Public Policy Praxis: A Case Approach for ­Understanding ­Policy and Analysis [4 ed.] 2019045070, 2019045071, 9780367180324, 9780367180348, 9780367444495

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Endosements
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Boxes
List of Cases
Preface to the Fourth Edition
Acknowledgments
Part I: Overview
Chapter 1. Public Policy, Power, the People, Pluralism, and You
Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville
Introduction
Introducing Narrative Analysis
Value Conflict
A Political System
Public Policy and Linkage Mechanisms
Power, Policymaking, and Democracy
Effect of Power Structures on the Policy Analyst
Stakeholder Analysis
Mini-Case: This Isn’t a Hilton Hotel, Ma’am
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary Terms
Case Study: The “Gig Economy” Case: Uber (and Lyft) from Boise to Burlington
Notes
Part II: T heory and Practice: Rationality, Nonrationality, Politics, and the Policy Process
Chapter 2. The Rational Public Policy Method
Genesis of the Rational Model
The Rational Public Policy Method in Theory
The Rational Model in Practice
Rationality or Something Else?
Mini-Case: The Portersville Health Clinic
Model Evaluation
Heading to a Conclusion
Concluding Thoughts
Mini-Case: Democracy or Science? Climate Change and GMOs
Glossary Terms
Notes
Chapter 3. T he Positivist Toolbox
Introduction
In Defense of Rationality and Big Data: Evidence-Based Politics
Shaundra the Policy Analyst
Tool #1: Sampling and Mail Surveys
Tool #2: Extrapolation and Forecasting
Tool #3: Measures of Central Tendency
Tool #4: Discounting
Tool #5: Cost-Benefit Analysis
Analysis of the Use of CBA
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary Terms
Problems
Notes
Chapter 4. Critiques of the Rational Model
Examples of the Power of Nonrational Explanations
Critiques of the Rational Model
Concluding Thoughts
Case Study: Vaping Politics and Policy: Up in Smoke
References
Glossary Terms
Notes
Chapter 5. T he Nonrational (Political) Approach
Essence and Overview of the Policy Process
Problem Identification/Gaining Agenda Status
Policy Formulation, Adoption, and Funding
Policy Implementation
Policy Evaluation, Adjustment, Termination
Mini-Case: The Pocatello Prison Siting Story: A Case of Politics
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary Terms
Case Study: Opioids and the Political Model of Policy Analysis
Part III: Practice and Theory: Problem Definition, Pragmatism, Policy Analysis, Methodologies, and Democracy
Chapter 6. A Pragmatic Public Policy Analysis Method
The Rational Public Policy Analysis Method: History and Form
A Five-Step Method
Summary of the Five-Step Method
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary Terms
Case Study: Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats
Notes
Chapter 7. Problem Definition, Mixed Methodologies, and Praxis
Anti-Praxis: The Two Tracks of Policy Analysis
The Ambiguous and Subjective Nature of Events in the System
School Shootings and Problem Definition
What Is the “Truth” and How Are Policies Generated?
Stone and Company: The Symbolic Representation of Problem Definition
The Social Construction of Public Problems
Mixed-Methods Tools
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary Terms
Case Study: School Shootings and Focus Group Research: Narrative Analysis and
Problem Definition
Notes
Chapter 8. D oing Democracy: A New (Six) Step Model
Defining Democracy
Democracy as an Ambiguous Symbol
The Critique of Traditional Policy Analysis
Structuring Democracy
Communitarianism and Democracy
Democratizing Steps I through IV and Inserting a New Fifth Step into a Six-Step Model
Doing Democracy: Postpositivist Tools
Ethics as Democracy
A Tie that Binds
Mini-Case: Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary Terms
Case Study: Big-Mart: Cheap Goods at What Price? Stakeholders and Storytellers: Playing
Politics and the Policy Process
Notes
Part IV: Conclusion: Praxis/Practice
Chapter 9. Wrapping Up and Letting You Show Off
Do Facts Matter?
Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville (Revisited)
Concluding Thoughts
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Public Policy Praxis

Public administration and policy analysis education have long emphasized tidiness, stages, and rationality, but practitioners frequently must deal with a world where objectivity is buffeted by, repressed by, and sometimes defeated by value conflict. Politics and policy are “messy” and power explains much more about the policy process than does rationality. Public Policy Praxis, now in a thoroughly revised fourth edition, uniquely equips students to better grapple with ambiguity and complexity. By emphasizing mixed methodologies, the reader is encouraged, through the use of a wide variety of policy cases, to develop a workable and practical model of applied policy analysis. Students are given the opportunity to try out these globally applicable analytical models and tools in varied case settings (e.g., county, city, federal, international, plus urban and rural) while facing wide-ranging topics (starving farmers and the red panda in Nepal, e-cigarettes, GMOs, the gig economy, and opioid abuse) that capture the diversity and reality of public policy analysis and the intergovernmental and complex nature of politics. The fourth edition expands upon its thorough exploration of specific tools of policy analysis, such as stakeholder mapping, content analysis, group facilitation, narrative analysis, cost-benefit analysis, futuring, and survey analysis. Along with teaching “how to,” the authors discuss the limitations, the practical political problems, and the ethical problems associated with different techniques and methodologies. Many new cases have been added, along with clear instructions on how to do congressional research and a Google Trends analysis. An expanded online Teaching Appendix is included for adopters, offering original cases, answers to problems, alternative approaches to case use, teaching exercises, student assignments, pedagogical ideas, and supplemental material directly tied to concepts covered in the text. With an easily accessible and conversational writing style, Public Policy Praxis is an ideal textbook for undergraduate and graduate courses in public policy analysis, community planning, leadership, social welfare policy, educational policy, family policy, and special seminars. Randy S. Clemons is Professor of Political Science and the Associate Dean of the Ridge College of Intelligence Studies & Applied Sciences at Mercyhurst University, Erie, Pennsylvania, USA. Mark K. McBeth is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Idaho State University, USA.

“Analyzing policy is hard. But Clemons and McBeth—with their focus on the politics of policy through case studies—makes understanding why it is hard, easy. Their 4th edition, per usual, exceeds expectations and continues to be my go-to policy analysis text.” –Michael D. Jones, Oregon State University, USA “Clemons and McBeth’s Public Policy Praxis offers a refreshing approach for students to understand the politics of public policy and yet also learn and use practical tools for policy analysis. This book offers cases and exercises for students to experience the complexity of decision-making, allthe-while putting abstract concepts of public policy into practice.” –Elizabeth Shanahan, Montana State University, USA

Public Policy Praxis A Case Approach for ­Understanding ­Policy and Analysis fourth edition

Randy S. Clemons and Mark K. McBeth

Fourth edition published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Taylor & Francis The right of Randy S. Clemons and Mark K. McBeth to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Prentice Hall 2000 Third edition published by Routledge 2017 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Clemons, Randall S., author. | McBeth, Mark K., author. Title: Public policy praxis : a case approach for understanding policy   analysis / Randy S. Clemons and Mark K. McBeth. Description: Fourth edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. |   Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN   2019045070 (print) | LCCN 2019045071 (ebook) | ISBN   9780367180324 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367180348 (paperback) |   ISBN 9780367444495 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Policy sciences. | Policy sciences—Case studies. Classification: LCC H97 .C56 2021 (print) | LCC H97 (ebook) | DDC  320.6—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019045070 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019045071 ISBN: 978-0-367-18032-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-18034-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-44449-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman Swales & Willis, Exeter, Devon, UK Visit the eResources: www.routledge.com/9780367180348

Contents

List of Figures  viii List of Tables  ix List of Boxes  x List of Cases  xi Preface to the Fourth Edition  xii Acknowledgments xv

Part I Overview 1 Chapter 1  Public Policy, Power, the People, Pluralism, and You  1 Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville  1 Introduction 3 Introducing Narrative Analysis  9 Value Conflict  11 A Political System  18 Public Policy and Linkage Mechanisms  20 Power, Policymaking, and Democracy  25 Effect of Power Structures on the Policy Analyst  33 Stakeholder Analysis  34 Mini-Case: This Isn’t a Hilton Hotel, Ma’am  37 Concluding Thoughts  38 Glossary Terms  39 Case Study: The “Gig Economy” Case: Uber (and Lyft) from Boise to Burlington  39 Notes 48

Part II Theory and Practice: Rationality, Nonrationality, Politics, and the Policy Process  51 Chapter 2 The Rational Public Policy Method  51 Genesis of the Rational Model  51 The Rational Public Policy Method in Theory  52 The Rational Model in Practice  54 Rationality or Something Else?  56 Mini-Case: The Portersville Health Clinic  57 Model Evaluation  59 Heading to a Conclusion  60 Concluding Thoughts  63 Mini-Case: Democracy or Science? Climate Change and GMOs  64 v

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Glossary Terms  66 Notes 66

Chapter 3 The Positivist Toolbox  67 Introduction 68 In Defense of Rationality and Big Data: Evidence Based Politics  69 Shaundra the Policy Analyst  70 Tool #1: Sampling and Mail Surveys  71 Tool #2: Extrapolation and Forecasting  82 Tool #3: Measures of Central Tendency  85 Tool #4: Discounting  89 Tool #5: Cost-Benefit Analysis  92 Analysis of the Use of CBA  101 Concluding Thoughts  103 Glossary Terms  104 Problems 104 Notes 106

Chapter 4  Critiques of the Rational Model  107 Examples of the Power of Nonrational Explanations  107 Critiques of the Rational Model  109 Concluding Thoughts  131 Case Study: Vaping Politics and Policy: Up in Smoke  132 Glossary Terms  138 Notes 138

Chapter 5 The Nonrational (Political) Approach  139 Essence and Overview of the Policy Process  139 Problem Identification/Gaining Agenda Status  149 Policy Formulation, Adoption, and Funding  155 Policy Implementation  156 Policy Evaluation, Adjustment, Termination  157 Mini-Case: The Pocatello Prison Siting Story: A Case of Politics  157 Concluding Thoughts  162 Glossary Terms  162 Case Study: Opioids and the Political Model of Policy Analysis  162

Part III  Practice and Theory: Problem Definition, Pragmatism, Policy Analysis, Methodologies, and Democracy  171 Chapter 6  A Pragmatic Public Policy Analysis Method  171 The Rational Public Policy Analysis Method: History and Form  172 A Five-Step Method  174 Summary of the Five-Step Method  186 Concluding Thoughts  186

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Glossary Terms  187 Case Study: Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats  187 Notes 208

Chapter 7  Problem Definition, Mixed Methodologies, and Praxis  209 Anti-Praxis: The Two Tracks of Policy Analysis  210 The Ambiguous and Subjective Nature of Events in the System  215 School Shootings and Problem Definition  216 What Is the “Truth” and How Are Policies Generated?  229 Stone and Company: The Symbolic Representation of Problem Definition  231 The Social Construction of Public Problems  234 Mixed-Methods Tools  237 Concluding Thoughts  247 Glossary Terms  248 Case Study: School Shootings and Focus Group Research: Narrative Analysis and Problem Definition  248 Notes 255

Chapter 8 Doing Democracy: A New (Six) Step Model  257 Defining Democracy  257 Democracy as an Ambiguous Symbol  259 The Critique of Traditional Policy Analysis  260 Structuring Democracy  264 Communitarianism and Democracy  265 Democratizing Steps I through IV and Inserting a New Fifth Step into a Six-Step Model  269 Doing Democracy: Postpositivist Tools  271 Ethics as Democracy  282 A Tie that Binds  284 Mini-Case: Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal  285 Concluding Thoughts  288 Glossary Terms  289 Case Study: Big-Mart: Cheap Goods at What Price? Stakeholders and Storytellers: P ­ laying Politics and the Policy Process  289 Notes 296

Part IV  Conclusion: Praxis/Practice  297 Chapter 9  Wrapping Up and Letting You Show Off  297 Do Facts Matter?  298 Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville (Revisited)  300 Concluding Thoughts  302

Glossary 303 Bibliography 307 Index 320

Figures

1.1 Public Attention  14 1.2 A Simplified Political Systems Model  18 1.3 The Backward Loop Variation  20 1.4 Annual Lobbying by Uber Technologies  41 2.1 The Decisional Teeter-Totter: A Graphic Presentation of the Rational Model  55 2.2 Decisional Types  59 4.1 Same Facts, Two Different Tales  129 5.1 Kingdon’s Multiple Streams and a Policy Window of Opportunity  140 5.2 Agenda Setting  151 6.1 A Map of Yellowstone National Park  203

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Tables

1.1 1.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 6.1 6.2 7.1

The Role of Policy Analysts and Their Normative View of Power  34 Stakeholder Map  36 Sample Sizes for 95 Percent Confidence Interval  72 Boondocks Residents by Neighborhood  73 Surveys Mailed by Neighborhood  74 A Comparison of Sample Data with Census Data  75 Population Trends of Boondocks  83 Three Types of Data  86 Reported Crimes in Boondocks  87 Reported Crimes in Boondocks (Ordered)  87 Swimming Pool Benefits and Costs  90 Discount Factors for Selected Discount Rates (up to 20 Years)  90 The Do Nothing Alternative  96 The Repair Alternative  96 The New Site Alternative  97 The Existing Site Alternative  97 Summary of the Intellectual/Analytical Critique  118 Summary of the Cognitive Critique  122 Summary of the Political/Institutional Critique  125 Summary of the Ideological/Philosophical Critique  130 An Adapted Goeller Scorecard with Weighted Criteria  183 Breaking a Tie  183 An Example of Different Content Analysis Outcomes  240

ix

Boxes

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 8.3

x

Why Is So Much Government Necessary?  5 Needle Exchanges: A Continuing Saga of Stigma versus Science  16 Sugar Beets versus Candy: Fact and Fiction  22 Another Look at Orwell’s Animal Farm 30 The Use and Misuse of Internet Surveys  81 Oops: Extrapolation in Practice  85 Up to My Elbows and Beyond  98 Positivism, Postmodernism, Postpositivism, and Praxis  108 A Just World? Cognitive Bias from Job’s Day to Yours  110 Evaluating Risk (and Science): GMOs and Vaccines  114 Politics Even Makes Us Bad at Math (Motivated Reasoning)  119 Black Letter Law?  126 The Chocolate Cake in the Classroom Story  130 Making a Difference: Malala Yousafzai  145 Biography and Policy Analysis  146 Baseball, a Tragic Tale, Focusing Events, and Multiple Streams  153 Different Causes, Different Solutions  174 The Advice is Simple, the Reality Isn’t  177 Teenage Drug Use  184 Mixed Methods Needed for Success?  213 South Park and School Shootings  220 Policy Development for Public School Safety  235 Changing the Game  265 Monologic Communication  274 Voting: Rules Matter, But Do Results Tell Us Anything?  277

Cases

Chapter 1

Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville  1 Mini-Case: This Isn’t a Hilton Hotel, Ma’am  37 Case Study: The “Gig Economy”: Uber (and Lyft) from Boise to Burlington  39 Chapter 2 Mini-Case: The Portersville Health Clinic  57 Mini-Case: Democracy or Science? Climate Change and GMOs  64 Chapter 4 Case Study: Vaping Politics and Policy: Up in Smoke  132 Chapter 5 Mini-Case: The Pocatello Prison Siting Story: A Case of Politics  157 Case Study: Opioids and the Political Model of Policy Analysis  162 Chapter 6 Case Study: Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats  187 Chapter 7 Case Study: School Shootings and Focus Group Research: Narrative ­Analysis and Problem Definition  248 Chapter 8 Mini-Case: Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal  285 Case Study: Big-Mart: Cheap Goods at What Price? Stakeholders and ­Storytellers: Playing Politics and the Policy Process  289 Chapter 9 Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville (Revisited)  300

xi

Preface

to the

Fourth Edition

We are very pleased to introduce the fourth edition of Public Policy Praxis (PPP), and are grateful to all the professors who have adopted this book over its first two decades. Moreover, although this is a significant revision, we are confident that those professors who have been using the book will find the heart and essence unchanged. We believe that this edition will appeal to a broader cross-section of faculty and it is even less U.S.-centric than before. More importantly, we believe the fourth edition is improved for students studying public policy. Reviews of the first edition (PPP1) stressed that the real strength of the book came from ­relating cases to policy and analysis, and ours was the first mixed-methodology textbook in the field. Our philosophy of using both theory and mixed methods remained in the second and third editions as it does with this fourth edition. Adopters over the years have praised us almost equally for our practical tools and our very political approach to policy analysis, which led to students learning a mixed methodology and key tools drawn from both positivism and postpositivism. With this fourth edition we have worked to improve on achieving the key goals that drove the first three editions. We continue to believe the book must be: • • • • • •

practical as well as theoretical; useful as well as cutting edge; fun as well as thorough; focused on the great issues and big themes as well as on specific techniques; about the politics of the policy process as well as about how to do policy analysis; both readable and teachable.

Although we still target both future and current professional policy analysts, as we argued ­originally, anyone who wants to understand and affect public policy (e.g., elected officials, citizen activists, interest group leaders, public administrators) must be a policy analyst. The online Teaching Appendix, which offers original cases, alternative approaches to case use, and other helpful materials related to our text’s use in the classroom, allowed us to save cases that were cut or significantly changed from earlier editions. It is available to adopting faculty free. Public Policy Praxis provides students with the ability to grapple with ambiguity and ­complexity by offering six different analytical models of policy analysis: the rational model ­(Chapter 2), the quantitative model (Chapter 3), the political model (Chapter 5), the pragmatic model (Chapter 6), a postpositivist-inspired model (Chapter 7), and the democratic model (Chapter 8). By emphasizing mixed methodologies, students are encouraged, through the use of cases, to synthesize these different models into a workable and practical approach to applied policy analysis. In addition to these analytical models, we provide specific tools of policy analysis, such as stakeholder mapping, content analysis, group facilitation, narrative analysis, cost-benefit analysis, futuring, and survey analysis. New to this addition are clear instructions on how to do a Google Trends analysis and congressional research. We hope this edition of the book even better captures our fundamental view of policy analysis. We still believe that policy analysis requires a combination of knowledge and skills. Students need to learn about the politics of the policy process as well as how to do policy analysis. Along with teaching “how to,” we discuss the limitations, the practical political problems, and the ethical problems associated with different techniques and methodologies. Pedagogically, we rely heavily on a case approach. Tactically, we rely on mixed methodologies.

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Organization, Approach, and Changes in the Fourth Edition While there are changes to the book, we never waver from our focus on theory and practice. ­Chapter 1 introduces the centrality of power, value conflict, politics, and democracy. “Opioid Abuse and Waterville” throws students right into the world of policy analysis. Students are also introduced to democracy, the policy process, stakeholder mapping (using a case about the gig economy—Uber and Lyft in particular), a stakeholder mapping tool, political IOUs, the strategic use of words and numbers, and the role that the analyst’s values (e.g., about the role of government and democracy) play in policy analysis. Chapter 1 now includes an expanded introduction to political storytelling (narrative analysis) which remains a key component of the book. Chapter 2 retains the popular mini-case “The Portersville Health Clinic,” along with a discussion of Vietnam and “wicked problems” and when to use, and not use, the rational model. It also includes the timely case “Democracy or Science? Climate Change and GMOs,” which has the student analyst grapple with the tension between beliefs and science that often underpins our contemporary policy debates. Chapter 3 opens with a defense of the use of Big Data and evidence in policy decision ­making. Then, using a case integrated throughout the chapter which uses the example of an analyst working for local government, five tools of rational analysis are explored through their application, including sampling and surveys (including an examination of Internet surveys), extrapolation and forecasting, measures of central tendency, discounting, and cost-benefit analysis. We also discuss data-analytic skills including algorithms, and topics ranging from building a new community swimming pool to workplace safety. The chapter also reminds readers of the potential pitfalls, and sometimes intentional misuse, of these tools; their implications for democracy; and the fact that they cannot make normative and political questions go away. Chapter 4 retains its critique of the rational model. An e-cigarette case, “Vaping Politics and Policy: Up in Smoke,” helps highlight this chapter’s theoretical and practical critique of rationality and adds to the praxis element as students get to apply theories to specific policy problems. The chapter provides examples of the power of various nonrational explanations of policy and then details four critiques of rationality: an intellectual/analytical critique, a cognitive critique, a political/institutional critique, and an ideological/philosophical critique. As part of this, two new boxes focus on the Just World Hypothesis and how politics makes us bad at mathematics. Additional discussions include the fallacy of black letter law, and rationality and GMOs, vaccinations, terrorism, and gluten-free diets. In Chapter 5, two cases—the classic mini-case, “The Pocatello Prison Siting Story: A Case of Politics” and a new case on “Opioids and the Political Model of Policy Analysis” —highlight this chapter’s formal introduction to a nonrational (political) model to policy analysis. The chapter begins with a concise but thorough historical and contemporary discussion of developments in ­policy process theory, including the Multiple Streams Approach, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Punctuated Equilibrium, and Narrative Policy Framework. The chapter then proceeds through the policy cycle of problem identification and agenda setting (including discussion of the role of narratives and language in that process), policy formulation, adoption, and funding, and policy implementation. A new box on Malala Yousafzai helps highlight the role individuals play in affecting policy. In Chapter 6, readers learn more about problem definition, criteria establishment (to evaluate alternatives), generating policy alternatives, evaluating and selecting policies, and evaluation research. We have updated but also shortened the case study “Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats” and, responding to feedback from professors over the years, have included teaching resource ideas.

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Chapter 7 focuses on the power of language and problem definition. The tragedy of school shootings is updated with new analysis and literature, and a box that you can use to have students practice writing a policy statement. A discussion of Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil spill and causation theory also plays an important role in Chapter 7. Although all of the flaws and problems are explained, the reader learns how to conduct content analysis and narrative analysis, and how to facilitate focus groups, futuring sessions, and meetings designed to resolve conflict and build consensus. A new box uses the National Weather Service and tornado warnings as an example of why a mixed methodology may be necessary for successful policy development. Chapter 8 focuses on democracy as the key ethical issue in policy analysis and on civic engagement (or how to “do” democracy) with updated literature. Both cases, the mini-case “Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal”, and The Big-Mart case (previously in Chapter 1) tie together not only ideas from Chapter 8, but Chapters 1 to 7 as well. Finally, Chapter 9 takes readers back to the first chapter’s Waterville case; readers can demonstrate knowledge of policy analysis as a coherent whole and utilize all of the separate elements they have learned about. This short chapter presents virtually no new material, but we do now offer a sort of summing up of the book and our position relative to questions about the role of rationality and postmodernism in policy analysis. As throughout the book, and this time based on the entire book, readers are presented with the chance to apply what they have learned and to learn by doing; they are then asked to reflect on what they did. Most professors, especially those teaching a graduate course, pair our text with other books. However, the breadth of our approach makes it possible to build an entire course around our text if the cases are fully utilized. In particular, the bison case in Chapter 6 can serve as a major research project for student analyst teams. Recently, while Mark taught a graduate course using our text, Randy taught an undergraduate policy course using it. In both courses, we again were reminded that hands on learning, learning through application of the cases and boxes, is both popular with, and helpful to, students. Further, the Teaching Appendix is available online for faculty adopters of the textbook and Part I includes ten fully developed teaching exercises, including cases ranging from organ donation to a school fight, while covering topics ranging from narrative analysis to the way voting rules affect results, and immigration to siting an airport. It also includes the case “So You Want to be a Policy Analyst” (formally in Chapter 8) but with an added assignment for students attached. Additionally, Part II offers thirteen more teaching aids, such as links to other cases and articles, pedagogical ideas on how to use materials, and supplemental material (including a number of boxes) directly tied to concepts covered in the text. Topics covered here include cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives, GMOs, the politics of wolves, and child labor in cocoa fields, bureaucracy, and narrative analysis, as well as skills such as how to do coding for content analysis. It also includes an answer set to problems offered in Chapter 3. Learning is a loop, and over the years our students have taught us much; we hope that the circle widens. We can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected].

Acknowledgments

Mark McBeth wishes to make the following acknowledgments: Thank you to the many faculty colleagues and staff members (both in Political Science and elsewhere) at Idaho State University for their continued support throughout the decades. Special thanks to Dr. Donna Lybecker, Dr. Rick Foster, and Dr. Jim Aho for their mentorship and friendship throughout the years. Thanks also to the hundreds of undergraduate and graduate students at Idaho State University whose insights into, and interests in, the field of policy analysis have greatly challenged me and have been a tremendous source of inspiration for more than twenty-five years. There are so many students who have greatly influenced my life and teaching that I dare not list any in deference to length constraints and out of fear of leaving some deserving soul out in the cold. As always I thank my family and friends. Lastly, I thank Randy for introducing me to first Deborah Stone’s work and then more broadly to postpositivist policy analysis, for knowing when to let me experiment with ideas and for telling me when I went astray, and for his patience in editing my ramblings. Randy’s Giants now have three World Series rings (since PPP2 came out) and I find that fundamentally unfair, but nonetheless we continue to work well together. Randy Clemons wishes to make the following acknowledgments: In the first edition, I noted that, [t]he list of those to whom one owes intellectual debts is too long to list comprehensively, and trying to compose a list of just the most significant contributors would guarantee that many who deserve to be mentioned would not receive their due.

Since then I have come to appreciate that the list goes back farther, and is much wider, than I originally understood. Luckily, it continues to grow in breadth, even as many of the old sources continue to nourish me. I do want to thank my colleagues and friends at Mercyhurst, including Jennifer Verga who produced Figure 5.1 with her characteristic helpfulness and good humor, as well as Michael, Rolfe, and Carl, and the political science majors and minors – and treasured alumni) who often endured first drafts of our arguments, boxes, and cases in class. Particular thanks go to Elise M. Yablonsky, my undergraduate research assistant for two years who co-authored the Big-Mart case, and Juliet Hilburn, a former undergraduate research assistant and co-author of the Kathmandu case. Also, I must again note the family and friends whose well of support I have particularly drawn from (they know who they are). My two “children,” Jack and Katie, continue to be a source of great joy and pride now that they are adults. And I continue to owe much to Mark for his friendship, but mostly for his role in a process that was for a fourth time “intellectually reinvigorating and rewarding, never rancorous, and frequently filled with serious insights and laughter” and that cost him lots of fishing time. His students greatly benefit from his creativity, work ethic, and continued commitment to intellectual growth. As for my Giants, their championship six years ago was the first in my lifetime, so I feel no guilt about three World Series titles in five years, especially relative to Mark whose Angels denied me that feeling in 2002 when they beat my Giants in the World Series. This book is truly co-authored. No matter who originally wrote what, nothing is Mark’s and nothing is Randy’s, and we believe it is a better book because of that. Also, we both offer our thanks to our editor Laura Stearns Varley for believing in the book and for her professionalism. Thanks to editorial assistant Katie Horsfall for her prompt attention to our concerns. We offer our thanks to the reviewers of the fourth edition of the book. Finally, we thank production editor Emma Harder, project manager George Warburton, and copy editor Kay Hawkins.

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Finally, we wish to once again dedicate our book to our students (past, present, and future), who allow us to help them learn; to the best political scientist we will ever know, Dr. Richard H. (Rick) Foster; to our families and friends, who always support us; and to Laura and Lisa, who continue (amazingly, still) to both tolerate and inspire us. Randy S. Clemons Mark K. McBeth

Part I: Overview

Chapter 1

Public Policy, Power, the People, Pluralism, and You

Mini-Cases “Opioid Abuse and Waterville” “This Isn’t a Hilton Hotel, Ma’am” Case Study “The ‘Gig Economy’ Case: Uber (and Lyft) from Boise to Burlington” According to Proverbs 1:7–9, fear is the beginning of knowledge, fools despise wisdom and instruction, and you should listen and heed teaching for it will gain you honors and rewards. We tend to agree and would rather scare you than bore you. So, we begin this chapter and the book by throwing you right into the political firestorm of doing public policy analysis. Good luck!

Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville

T

his case is typical of cases administered, as part of the application process, during competitions for public management jobs and internships in the United States. Such cases are designed to evaluate how much prospective public managers know about public policy analysis. You would be given directions similar to the following: 1. Read the information carefully. 2. Respond to the one-page case study in any format you feel is appropriate. 3. All necessary information to analyze this situation is provided in the background section. 4. Your response should be no more than three pages long. 5. Please note that calculations and research are not necessary for your response.

Background The community of Waterville, Pennsylvania (population 7,654), once mostly known for its historic hotel where both George Washington and the French General Lafayette slept, has recently taken note of what many community residents term “a major drug problem.” (continued)

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Three deaths in the last year due to heroin overdoses, several arrests of individuals for selling fentanyl, the recent busts by the state police of two “meth houses” in the space of one month, and the arrests of a couple of well-known Waterville High School athletes, allegedly involved in the local opioid drug trade, have led to calls from community leaders to combat what they view as a serious drug problem. Waterville is a community with an annual per capita personal income of $32,000. This compares with a state average of $38,000. The story of local business closings has been a frequent one in recent years, and the one major industry in Waterville left town last summer when the corporate bosses in Houston, Texas, decided to relocate the plant to Mexico. This left slightly more than 400 people, who had been earning above-average wages, unemployed. It will also cost Waterville a significant portion of city and school tax monies. While state and national rates for births to unmarried teens have been steadily decreasing in the past decade, that is not true in Waterville. Their teen birth rate and their overall divorce rate are both far above average. There is also a great deal of racial tension in the town, where 25 percent of the population is Latino. This tension was exacerbated when one member of the city council proposed the creation of an ordinance to forbid landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants, for which he was verbally attacked as racist. Up to now, the significant conflict between city officials and leaders within the Latino community has centered on issues such as use of the city parks; zoning; dances; and police practices, hiring policies, and priorities. Several members of the city council are concerned that the drug problem is an “epidemic” and are calling for a “war on drugs” including harsher jail sentences for drug dealers and users. Contrary to this rhetoric, social service providers have provided data that the opioid drug problem, in particular, is “impacting the white middle class and that prescription drugs, not necessarily illicit drugs, are the chief culprit of the drug problem.” Mayor Joyce Allen told the local paper that without some type of action from the city government, this problem will destroy the community and drive out more businesses. A priest told his congregation that the very souls of the town and its children were on the line. But, a social worker commented on her popular Twitter account that, “We need to rethink how we approach drugs, drug users are not deviants, they have a medical problem that needs addressing.” A recent Philadelphia newspaper story recently found that Latinos were more likely to be incarcerated for drug use, whereas non-Latinos were more likely to be given treatment options including drug counseling. This report was widely criticized by some Waterville community leaders as both unfair and inaccurate. The city manager has asked you to conduct a public policy analysis to identify the potential problems, issues, and policy alternatives, and to prepare and present a recommendation to the city council. What do you do?

Unless you have conducted a public policy analysis in the past (and possibly even if you haven’t), you undoubtedly have several questions. You may be asking questions such as these: (1) How do I best present the information? (2) What do I include in the analysis and what do I leave out? (3) How do I separate my own feelings from what should, or should not, be done? (4) What is the role of government in an issue like this? (5) How do I write three pages on this subject based on only one page of information? Don’t panic or doubt yourself. This exercise is partially designed to demonstrate to you that your policy analysis skills leave something to be desired, thus encouraging you to continue reading this book. Throughout the book you will be learning and applying lessons, skills, and a public

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policy analysis methodology—all of which will help you tremendously with this task. Indeed, at the end of the book, you will be offered the opportunity to redo this case. In the meantime, give it your best shot and tackle it before reading on.

Introduction Thanks for completing the case. While your professor might have you work on this as a group task in class, for now you need to think about, and thus be prepared to discuss, the following questions: How would you describe the process you used to respond to your task? Did you try to be objective? Did you recognize your values coming into play? Do you believe that it is appropriate for an analyst’s personal values to affect policy recommendations? Who in Waterville would you be trying to please? Who do you work for? How should you approach your job? Should you use your expertise and be “scientific,” or should you use more democratic1 means that encourage citizen participation? Should you just accept the stories of major players, or is that a mistake because individuals view and describe issues based on their own interests? What types of decision-making tools should you use? Should you use numbers and, if so, how do you use them appropriately? The case and the discussion questions were successful in preparing you for the rest of this book if they made you think about issues that you normally do not think about. In fact, this simple case is very important for setting the stage for the rest of the book. And this book’s subject matter is helpful whether or not you ever hold a job formally doing policy analysis. As we will discuss more shortly, government policy determines the likelihood of the food you eat making you sick, graduates getting good jobs, workers getting injured or killed on the job, and how much of your paycheck you get to keep, as well as what that collected money is spent on. It also impacts the cost and availability of health care, troops being sent to fight overseas, the cleanliness of the water you drink, and your safety when walking downtown, flying, or in case of a pandemic or natural disaster. The simple fact is this: From the minute you get out of bed until the minute you go back to bed, public policy affects your life. If you want to have the chance to affect it back, you need to learn to think like a policy analyst who understands politics, power, and stories. If you don’t choose that route, like s­ econd-graders scrambling for the last chair when the music stops in a game of musical chairs, ­others are very willing to grab that chair, sit in it, and make decisions for you. Or as consumer activist Ralph Nader once famously put it, “If you do not turn on to politics, politics will turn on to you” (Nadar quoted in Rensenbrink, 2016). It is also important that we explain the “praxis” part of the book’s title, although you may already have turned to a dictionary, Wikipedia, or your professor for an explanation. Although there are more ideologically loaded definitions some may wish to impose on the term, quite simply, praxis means “theory-guided action,” which means that as practicing analysts we want you to think critically about your role as an analyst and apply what you learn. Praxis requires both action and reflection. Our use of the term praxis also reflects, as does the use of cases, our belief that we need both theory-guided practice and theory capable of guiding, and being guided by, practice. Consequently, our approach is both guided by and tailored to both scholars and practitioners. Our focus is both on “how to do” policy analysis and on how to ask questions—and pose answers for your consideration—about the nature and meaning of policy analysis itself. The unifying theme between those concerns, the way to get praxis, is to focus on “how it really works” in the so-called “real” world. Public administration and policy analysis education has long emphasized tidiness, stages, and rationality, and academia stresses falsification, objectivity, and neutrality; but practitioners frequently must deal with a world where objectivity is buffeted by, repressed by, and sometimes defeated by, value conflict. Too often public administration education has failed individuals who must deal with the hustle and bustle and complexity of policymaking. Politics and policy are

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“messy” and power explains much more about the policy process than does rationality. This text will equip you to better grapple with ambiguity and complexity. By emphasizing mixed methodologies, you will be encouraged, through the use of a wide variety of policy cases, to develop a workable and practical model of applied policy analysis. When the first edition of the book came out, the discipline was caught up in a debate between positivism and postpositivism, and our book was, in part, a response to that debate. We hoped that our book would provide a middle ground between the fascinating theory of postpositivism and the usefulness of positivism. Today the field has largely moved away from that debate and increasingly narratives and politics rightly stand alongside the rational approach, Big Data, and evidence. Although we understand and teach the importance of bringing rigor, a systematic approach, and the old tools of the trade to bear on policy analysis, we also critiqued the insightful critics of that dominant approach and demonstrated that their insights needed to be (and could be) made useful to the practitioner. Again, however, none of this means we reject rationality, rigor, or pragmatism. Indeed, our central critique of postpositivism and postmodernism was that its adherents had often failed to explain how to make it useful. Unfortunately, when we wrote PPP1, the dichotomy between the tidy world of positivism and the messiness of postpositivism meant that most scholars picked a silo and stayed there. But within a decade that has changed. Smith and Larimer (2013, pp. 118–119) argued that there was an “emerging middle ground” between the two camps. They suggested that rationalists realize that they must account for the “fractured and value-laden nature of the political arena” and that the underlying assumptions of individual rationality have come under increased attack as the social sciences better understand how individuals make decisions (p. 19). At the same time, Smith and Larimer conclude, the rationalist approach is important because it provides evidence and data in policy disputes and this evidence plays an important role in the policy process (p. 19). Public Policy Praxis sits nicely in this new policy world and perhaps our book helped the discipline land here. Torgerson (1986) discusses the “three faces” of policy analysis. The first face is a purely rationalist and positivist orientation to analysis where the analyst relies on expertise. The second face of policy analysis is purely political and the analyst views themselves as an advocate. As Torgerson (1986) points out, both of the first two faces are flawed. He argues (and we agree) that there is a third face of policy analysis, one where the analyst deals with rationality and expertise but part of that expertise is the understanding of political context. Smith and Larimer (2017) argue that the rationalist project does “a better job of identifying problems” (p. 222) as well as ascertaining the “impact of the alternative chosen” (p. 222), but they have “failed miserably in its efforts to separate facts from values” (p. 223). Postpositivism, on the other hand, does better at grasping the “messy, perspective-driven political realm of policy” (p. 223) and is more effective at accounting for stakeholders and dealing with the “worth of proposed solutions” (p. 223) as well as better understanding of policy implementation (Smith and Larimer, 2017). Our book operates in the third face of policy analysis and we work to synthesize rationalist and postpositivist approaches to analysis (we will better define these terms in coming chapters). We recognize, for example, that even the selection of rational tools, and this procedure rather than that one, are value-laden choices that can determine the outcomes and the winners or losers. The policy process centers on value conflict and choosing—including the choices relevant to democracy (e.g., what role should public sentiment play and who gets to sit around the table when determining criteria or selecting options?), so politics cannot be excluded. Though logic, facts, rational methods, etc. are important, public policy analysis is fundamentally not about technical questions. Thus, analysts need to learn to think politically and to understand that public problems are socially constructed. Thus, policy analysis is more than the technical manipulation of models, numbers, and statistics. Consequently, we provide alternative methods to supplement traditional methodology and, in the process, advocate a more democratic mixed-methodology approach to

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analysis. As noted earlier, praxis requires a marriage of theory and practice, and our text focuses on providing a grounding in theory and then has you apply it (practice). This grounding in politics also makes the book more interesting. Political science is one of the oldest intellectual disciplines known to humankind. Since humans first began to form associations and live in communities, they have had to answer fundamental political questions. Politics and policy are about power and resolving the tensions and value conflict inherent in deciding who makes the rules, how rules are made and enforced, and, therefore, who gets what share of the “goods” and who bears the costs (i.e., the “bads”). The controversies fed from these policy questions continue to be central to our system of living together. Public policy debates are not generally about facts, but rather are ultimately political conflicts about our values. For example, the origin of most environmental problems is human action and the resolution of those situations (for good or for ill) depends on human interaction. In other words, while the realities of physical science and technical know-how are crucial, environmental problems are ultimately political problems. Philosophy, ethics, economics, etc. are all important, but primarily as they affect the political process. Power and economic inequalities, political institutions, intergovernmental relations, policy processes, the dominant social paradigm, the power to persuade, and the particular players/stakeholders on the scene are really the factors that matter most. Thus, even if we could all agree on the reality of global climate change, its causes and forthcoming consequences, and appropriate technical solutions to that problem, it would not mean the problem would be addressed, let alone resolved. This reality is not just true for environmental politics, but for all policy arenas in the U.S. and everywhere else across the globe. We think this focus on politics through cases helps make your leaning be more intriguing, interesting, meaningful, useful, and sometimes even fun. Conflict is inevitable and intriguing. This is what we call politics. To understand some of this conflict and questions about the role of government, Box 1.1 asks the question: Why is so much government necessary?

Box 1.1  Why Is So Much Government Necessary?

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his is an important question not just for policy analysts, but one crucial in democracies and one every citizen ought to think about relative to the idea of giving consent to be governed and support to various policies. Of course, the answer is not an easy one and the proper role of government is at the heart of a great many political debates. Even seemingly non-controversial governmental actions can become controversial. In the western United States the Bureau of Land Management has banned the use of exploding targets for gun enthusiasts because of the fire risk on public lands (and it could spread from there to private land) from the target explosions. Yet, some oppose this ban either because they don’t believe that exploding targets can cause a fire or because they believe that the ban is infringing on the Second Amendment rights of individuals to shoot guns on public lands. Take another seemingly very reasonable policy example, banning texting while individuals are driving. Surely most people find this a “common sense” regulation, yet others contend that these bans are not effective and that they are merely another way for government to interfere in an individual’s life. Though our question dates back to at least Plato, “modern” political science thinking about why government is necessary more clearly is based on Thomas Hobbes’ The Leviathan. Hobbes, writing in 1651, asserted that life in a state of nature (without government) would be chaotic as individuals are driven by self-interest and that a social contract was needed between individuals and a sovereign government to avoid such chaos. The classic 1954 book (and movie versions) of Lord of the Flies by William Golding makes this argument quite well.

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Further though, typically, in both a political- and economic-based policy analysis of even capitalist societies, the answer is that government is necessary because of market failure. The private sector provides goods in the marketplace for individuals to buy. But some necessary goods do not provide a profit, and without the profit motive those goods will not be provided. The classic example is a fire department. If an entrepreneur wanted to make money, opening a fire department would not be a good idea. Fire departments have to be open 24 hours a day and the equipment and fire trucks are very expensive, and it’s not clear you can staff them with volunteers, especially if you are operating them for profit. Furthermore, putting out fire is a public good and individuals are entitled to a public good regardless of whether they pay for it. You can’t just let homes burn if they don’t pay their monthly bill. The problems associated with market failure demand that government provides public goods like fire protection, police protection, the construction of roads, and national defense—and these are all generally accepted as required government services. But there are controversies over what is and is not a public good. A public park is a public good, but community members might disagree over whether a community needs a public park. One community might view a recreational facility as a public good whereas another community believes the private sector should provide recreation. In recent decades, we have seen increasing privatization in areas such as prisons and garbage collection. In the U.S. education sector, a longstanding accepted (by both liberals and conservatives) public good that government (especially in a democracy) is expected to provide, is today seen by many people and policy proposals and actions as an area where the private sector should step in and take over. Of course, there are other reasons why government is necessary. One prime one is what can be called spillover costs, or externalities. Market transactions involve externalities (a side effect of the transaction). If a company produces fertilizer and sells the fertilizer to a farmer, that is a market transaction and the transaction will continue to occur as long as the buyer believes that they are getting a good product at a fair price. In 1776, Scotsman Adam Smith (the father of capitalism) believed that the public interest arose through such transactions, and the fertilizer company (in our case) would not only gain profit for the company but would also provide several jobs for others. Regulation of the factory is dependent on the mechanisms of the market. If the factory raises prices or manufactures a poor product, the market will correct itself (new companies will emerge producing a better product at a cheaper prices and consumers will switch allegiances). This is his famous invisible hand concept at work, suggesting government interference be kept to a minimum. Yet, what this example ignores is that there are externalities in transactions. The factory might produce a good product at a fair price and the farmer might be happy to buy the product, but the factory also produces pollution and the pollution impacts individuals not involved in the market transaction. The spillover cost is the dirty air people breathe and the health costs that can bring to society. Externalities lead to governmental regulation of pollution in the form of taxes (which discourage the pollution) or the actual forbidding of the externality (e.g., requiring the fertilizer factory to put scrubbers in its smokestacks). Governmental involvement in aspects such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, and workplace safety laws are all examples of government getting involved because of externalities. While these laws today are widely accepted, particularly in the western world, they were highly debated and resisted decades ago. However, there are still significant debates today over the role of government, for example about reducing carbon emissions, its role in health care, and in regulating new economic sectors such as the gig economy (think Uber, temp work, etc.) that we will discuss and explain more in the case that concludes this chapter. Of course, regulation by government is not always economic in nature. Government can intervene and regulate social matters. The legal system, for example, makes killing or harming others through assault a crime. On issues such as this, there is little controversy that should play a role. But government throughout history has also implemented laws restricting the rights of (continued)

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women or other minorities, or making it illegal for individuals of mixed races to marry or for individuals who are not heterosexual to marry within their gender. Today, there are controversies over individuals who are transgender and what government can and cannot mandate in regard to bathroom use and other issues. Abortion is another prominent example. Just what social matters government should or should not get involved with are a matter of continuing controversy and value conflict in the policy arena. The policy analyst, when asked to tackle a particular policy issue, should always ask first whether there is a governmental role in addressing a problem and if so, the justification of that role. As you tackle different issues in this book, you will find that much of the contention in the issues focuses on debates over the role of government (how much government involvement is proper) and when government is, and when it is not, necessary. Sources: Golding, William. (1954). Lord of the Flies: A Novel. New York: Perigee. Hobbes, Thomas, 1588–1679. (1968). Leviathan. Baltimore: Penguin Books. Smith, Adam, 1723–1790. (2000). The Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library.

Politics in the form of public policy impacts your health care and health (e.g., the quality of air you breathe, marijuana legalization, and keeping radioactive waste out of our water system), the state of the economy and the sort of job you might have (including rural development and job safety via rules about construction or poultry slaughter factory lines), public transportation (including options like Uber and Lyft), immigration, national security, and even who you can or can’t marry, dog-leash laws, and rules about restrooms (gender). The federal government alone is responsible for these things (and much more): health care for veterans; the National Weather Service’s information and warnings about hurricanes and tornados; Social Security benefits; protection for students’ civil rights and the FBI’s prosecution of drug dealers, murderers, and child rapists; our national park system, the millions invested by the government in research, and the billions given in terms of tax breaks that sparked the fracking revolution that made the United States energy independent; and the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in responding to natural disasters. Pragmatism demands that analysts learn to think politically and to understand that public problems are socially constructed. As such, in addition to analytical models and rational methods and tools from positivism, you will be introduced to tools of policy analysis from postpositivism as well. Readers will learn about cost-benefit analysis, narrative analysis, stakeholder mapping, survey analysis, content analysis, discounting, group facilitation, futuring, and forecasting and extrapolation, and more (e.g., the idea of political IOUs, the role that the analyst’s values play in policy analysis, and even how the brain deals with emotion and politics and how these interact with science). By emphasizing mixed methodologies, students are encouraged, through the use of cases, to synthesize these different models and tools into a workable and practical approach to applied policy analysis. Students are given the opportunity to try out these globally applicable analytical models and tools in varied case settings (e.g., county, city, federal, international, plus urban and rural) while facing wide-ranging topics (starving farmers and the red panda in Nepal, e-cigarettes, GMOs, expansion of human services, the gig economy, opioid abuse, building a health care clinic in a rural community, an inner-city drug program, economic development, and the bison controversy in Yellowstone National Park) that capture the diversity and reality of public policy analysis and the intergovernmental and complex nature of politics. While our cases are primarily set in the United States, we think that our cases play well for international audiences. For example, the lessons from a case about bison in a national park in the United States could easily be translated to a controversy about endangered elephants in Africa.

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The cases are important and interesting policy issues, but they are used primarily to demonstrate theory in action, the role of rationality, the centrality of politics, and to allow learning by doing. Students need to learn about the politics of the policy process as well as how to do policy analysis. Along with teaching “how to,” we discuss the limitations, the practical political problems, and the ethical problems associated with different techniques and methodologies; and rather than just learning technique, you will be introduced to the highly political context that policy analysis occurs in and learn how to maneuver in such an environment. We also help you consider questions, such as: Who does a public servant work for? What role should democracy play in determining policy? Although aimed somewhat at future and current professional policy analysts, we also wrote this book for anyone who wants to understand or affect public policy (e.g., elected officials, citizen activists, interest group leaders, public administrators). Success depends on your being a policy analyst. We believe that policy analysis requires a combination of knowledge and skills. The skills that will allow you to most influence policy (in the U.S. or in the global arena) in the 21st century include knowing how to raise your issue’s salience, and framing the story in such a way that others will accept your story over the opposition’s story. Therefore, you need to develop the skills that will let you become a successful policy entrepreneur—which means being able to do policy analysis— so that you can impact public policy. The knowledge and skills that you will learn will be helpful in a variety of careers in the public or nonprofit sectors. If you become involved in public service, you might not actually become a policy analyst, but you will conduct policy analysis in the role of an administrator or manager. Working as a policy analyst, administrator, or manager means making or helping to make decisions in the public’s interest and doing so within a democratic setting. Making these decisions is not something to be done on the fly in an ad hoc manner. Public decisions are made in a complex and contentious environment featuring political partisanship, competing interests, numerous stakeholders, ambiguity, chaos, limited and often inaccurate information, and distrust. Those who work in public service have to deal with sometimes cynical politicians, a significant portion of the public who distrust “government” (and therefore government employees), and with stakeholders who are often ready and willing to do almost anything to get their own way. This book prepares you to conduct analysis in such a complex environment. Public administrators and officials are entrusted with making decisions in the public’s interest, not in her/his interest or in service to her/his political preferences or partisan leanings. So, in this contentious environment where the outlines of effective and democratically acceptable policy are dim at best, how can s/he know what is in the public interest or how that interest can best be served? In this book we will confront these issues while simultaneously working to help you learn how to analyze, affect, and make public policy. Policy analysis is complex and requires a method, tools, and political knowledge. In fact, what we believe makes our book unique is that both of us believe political knowledge is an essential aspect of policy analysis. In fact, to do a good job, we argue that policy analysis requires a mixed methodology. As you go through the book, the meaning of the phrase “mixed methodology” will become increasingly clear. Policy analysis is also affected by the analyst’s values—especially his or her understanding of democracy and view of the appropriate role of government. Beginning policy analysis students often mistakenly believe that good analysis can be learned by memorizing steps, just like baking a cake: step one, you define the problem; step two, you choose criteria to evaluate solutions; and so forth. Although you will later learn a five-step decision model (in Chapter 6), we contend that good policy analysis is about critical thinking tied to an improved theoretical understanding of democracy; human rationality and nonrationality; politics, power, and the policy process; as well as how various tools are used (and misused). Returning then briefly to the term praxis, a central element of praxis is the ability to reflect on your engagement with reality. We will argue that central to praxis in the policy world is the analyst’s

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ability to understand and analyze stories. Much of our teaching and scholarship has revolved around what is commonly called narrative analysis. That is, trying to research and teach the power of ­stories and language. So, let’s get started again by turning to narrative analysis, because politics is at the heart of policy and administration, and policymaking is rooted in storytelling. Although getting and keeping a job as a policy analyst may depend on expertise and technical skills, policy analysis is predominantly not about “objective” material facts, but rather about battles among ideas, the strategic use of words and numbers, and about socially constructed categories of shared meaning (e.g., about what is deviant and criminal or normal and about who is undeserving or deserving). Increasingly, scholars recognize that public policymaking and public policy battles revolve around competing narratives or stories. A major focus of the book, and of this chapter, is an exploration of the role that policy narratives play in the formation, adoption, and implementation of public policy.

Introducing Narrative Analysis As you know, stories (also called narratives) have beginnings, middles, and endings. They have heroes and villains and innocent victims. Well-told stories engage us emotionally and intellectually, making us care about and identify with someone else’s experience. The tellers of the stories strategically frame their stories for us in ways that expand or limit who is affected. Like a painting, the story frames a picture for us, focusing our attention on certain things, placing other things in the background, and leaving still other things completely out of the picture. Some stories, like landscape paintings, move what previously had been thought of as background into the foreground, making it the subject of the story being told. [Exercise #1, “Teaching Story Analysis—­Immigration” is available in the faculty online Teaching Appendix.] The teller of the tale chooses the focus, the words, the characters, and the analogies, and they get to leave outside the frame of the narrative the parts of the story they don’t want you to focus on. For example, stories impose differentiated time frames onto the very undifferentiated passage of time. A narrative also presents a version of the story, usually as if it were the only possible story. Yet that is rarely if ever true. One can see this, and the potential power of your story carrying the day, in the following example. In the run-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in China, the New York Times carried an editorial by Nicholas Kristof (April 3, 2008) explaining that while the tension between the United States and China is partially based in concrete interest conflicts, it is rooted in “competing narratives” that provide very different lenses through which to view the story of Tibet. For the Chinese, he argued, Tibet fits nicely into the long and humiliating story of imperialism and interference; of foreigners trying to break up, weaken, and stop China from claiming its rightful place in the world. Yet, Americans categorized the story of Tibet as part of the long struggle against colonialism and an oppressive government denying basic human and political rights. The sort of pressure brought to bear on China, by the United States and by the rest of the world, as well as China’s response, depends largely on which narrative resonates best. Similarly, consider the issue of e-cigarettes/vaping (even the choice of those two terms is a story). Are e-cigarettes the product of villainous corporations trying to addict young people to activity that might lead to tobacco smoking as well as inflicting health harms from the vaping itself? Or is vaping a safe alternative to tobacco smoking and is a health device that helps individuals quit smoking? Each question leads to a different set of potential heroes, villains, and victims and ultimately to alternative policy solutions. Political storytellers, including the U.S. president or Great Britain’s prime minister or an ayatollah who is Iran’s supreme leader, as well as their critics, attempt to frame issues to direct your attention, to persuade you, to place blame, or to declare a problem as being simply the way that it is. They frame political issues in ways designed to help them achieve their goals. Far from being

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innocent, innocuous, or unbiased, stories are value-laden attempts to realize a political outcome. In fact, Philip Gourevitch, author of a classic story on the Rwandan Genocide, has keenly defined power as the ability to make others inhabit your story of reality. In a sense, stories are like theories. Consider the role of theory. Theories are supposed to accurately describe what you can observe, and they are supposed to explain. That is, they are supposed to help make sense of the world. Political science students, for example, are often taught theories about power and structure. In essence, students are given special lenses with which to view the world. These lenses often make visible things that they had not seen before. Noted sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959/1976) taught this with his concept of the “sociological imagination.” His point is that we cannot simply look at the world objectively, but rather that we see the world through the lenses we have been given. The theories and stories in our heads determine what questions we ask and where we look, ultimately affecting what we see. Another simple, but powerful example of this is exemplified by this famous cognitive psychology experiment that you can try for yourself. Read the following paragraph, and then before reading on, close the book and try to remember and explain what you just read: The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into different groups. Of course, one pile may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to a lack of facilities, that is the next step, otherwise you are pretty well set. It is important not to overdo things. That is, it is better to do too few things at once than too many … After the procedure is completed one arranges the materials into different groups again. Then they can be put into appropriate places. Eventually they will be used once more and the whole cycle will then have to be repeated. (Bransford and Johnson, 1972, p. 723)

Okay, how did you do? Did you understand it? Could you remember it and explain it to someone else? If like most people the answers to these questions are: not that good, not really, and no—don’t feel bad. This is simply about how the brain works. Now, read the note at the end of the chapter2 which tells you what the paragraph is about, then reread the paragraph and see if it makes more sense and is more memorable and explainable. Political stories then, are attempts by stakeholders when there are conflicting values and interests at stake, to frame the issues, to direct the public’s attention, to persuade, to convince people either to care or not, to place blame, or to declare a problem as being simply the way things are. (The term stakeholders simply refers to individuals or groups that have an interest in a policy issue. Later in the chapter you will be introduced to the process of stakeholder analysis.) We intentionally used the word frame earlier. The concept of framing is generally understood to mean that words (language) evoke frames (conceptual/perceptual and moral) that construct an interpretation by deliberately locating the issue within a larger system, thus diagnosing, signifying, simplifying, and identifying the situation in a way that can create a group, a collective identity (e.g., of victims facing unfair treatment by identified villains), call forth a response for action to right a wrong, and persuade you that you can be a hero by working on one side or the other. The power of frames is often explained by an example of language such as the use of the phrase “tax relief.” Once evoked it limits your ability to win the day. If you argue, for example, that tax relief does not create jobs, you are still operating in the realm of taxes being something that people need relief from (rather than at worst a necessary evil, or even a chance to do one’s patriotic and moral duty; see Lakoff, 2004). In political stories, it is almost guaranteed that the story being spun has a point, sometimes a very sharp point. Sun Tzu (1988) famously said that battles are won before they are fought, by choosing the terrain on which the battle occurs; that’s exactly what political stories are attempting to do. Public opinion in the United States about gun control depends on whether a proposal is “just

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about background checks” or if that same proposal is instead seen as being about a national registry and an attack on the Second Amendment. Policy analysts have to listen to these stories and attempt to understand them within the context of the policy issue being discussed. Recall that in the Waterville case several differing stories were being told about the situation and its causes. The power of stories is undeniable. Maybe this is because, as the great essayist James Baldwin explained, sometimes we are not that interested in facts because the invented story better describes and reinforces our fears and prejudices (Baldwin, 1984). The story of a war on terror as a simple war of good versus evil, with a demonized though vague enemy, conflates separate threats into interconnected and equally dangerous threats, and it exacerbates our fears—but is it a good policy foundation? Does it make sense as a strategy? A tenet of democracy is that everybody should be allowed to tell their stories and that several stories may be equally valid even though they come to widely disparate conclusions. But yet, not all stories are equally valid. Some storytellers use faulty logic and questionable evidence, and the critical-thinking analyst must be able to use his or her “crap detector” and sort out differences in stories between those that are simply emanating from value conflict and those that are intentionally manipulative and misleading. One reason that all of this matters is the centrality of conflict in the political realm: conflict over both ends and means, commonly fueled by differing values, especially once we move beyond the general to the specific. That is, while most people agree with general principles such as when the Declaration of Independence claims, “All men are created equal,” there has been a great deal of disagreement about its implications and applicability. Chapter Roadmap: In this chapter we examine the theory of “value conflict” as first elaborated by sociologists Fuller and Myers. We add to the original theory by exploring the concept of public attention and the role that narratives might play in that process. We then consider how value conflict relates to what political science tells us about political systems. Again, because a central tenet of our approach to policy analysis is that political knowledge matters: power, democracy, representative democracy, pluralism, and elitism are discussed, and insights are provided into how knowledge of power and an analyst’s normative view of power affects a public policy analysis. We explain how to conduct a stakeholder analysis and let you try it out in another mini-case, and then conclude with our first major case study. It allows you to apply most of what you learn in this chapter, and to learn by applying. The concluding case helps illustrate the process of policymaking and demonstrates how “value conflict” and views of “power structures” fit into the analysis. In completing the case, you—the student policy analyst—must confront, consider, and decide your role in democratic governance. Ultimately, how analysts analyze is tied directly to how they believe policy problems are created and to their view of the proper role and location of political power. A discussion of these two concepts follows.

Value Conflict What is a public problem? This is a question that every policy analyst must confront. Deciding what is or is not a problem is a highly subjective process. For example, a medium-sized community is experiencing population growth at a rate of 3.5 percent per year.3 A native of the community who has a stable job might define the growth as “urban sprawl.” To her, growth means increased traffic and pollution; it means that her favorite fishing hole will become congested and polluted, her taxes will increase to pay for new community infrastructure, and the culture of her community will change. This individual wants her local government to enact policies to stop or control this growth. These might include strict land-use zoning that would prohibit subdivision development and commercial development or increasing fees on utility hook-ups to discourage commercial, industrial, and residential in-migration.

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However, not everyone in the community will share this view of the situation. Another individual, perhaps a local real estate agent, will see the growth not as a problem, but rather as an opportunity. He sees the growth as contributing to more business for him, better education for his children, better health care, better shopping, and more cultural opportunities. He will not want the city government to discourage growth but instead to implement policies that will increase growth, including actively recruiting new businesses, lowering utility fees, and having a pro-growth zoning policy that will accommodate developers. What does a policy analyst do in such a situation—when some in the community subjectively view the “objective fact” of growth as a problem and others perceive progress? Does this community have a “problem,” and, if so, what policies should be implemented? Who decides if an objective fact is a problem and requires government policy? What if the community is evenly split between those who want growth and those who want to stop it? What policies, if any, should be recommended? The answers to these questions are not simple or clear and are determined by the analyst’s view of democracy, power, and government. As a rule, politicians and interest groups strategically portray issues in a dualistic manner. In this example, a Hobson’s choice would likely be offered by each of the competing sides. The progrowth proponents would argue that, “The community must either grow or die.”4 This statement is designed for concerned citizens who, of course, do not want their community to die and would therefore want to continue growth policies. Similarly, the anti-growth coalitions would posit that, “We must stop the growth or live in a cesspool of filth, crime, and drugs.” Again, this hyperbolic statement is aimed at the typical citizen who is unlikely to want to live in a community such as the one described by the anti-growth coalition as the consequence of further growth. The analyst, however, must recognize these predictions of dire consequences as political posturing. [The online Teaching Appendix has a box addressing the question of sincerity versus political posturing, titled Immigration: Do You Really Believe What You Are Saying?] It is important to realize that such stark, zero-sum, and dualistic choices do not often correspond closely with reality. Competing interests can often find compromises, shared values, and, most important, shared interests that can be used to create a win-win policy. Perhaps, after reading this book, you will decide that an appropriate role for an analyst in a democracy is to facilitate a consensus-building process—or at least a process that widely seeks input and that provides the opportunity for increased collective understanding of problems and policies with greater collective acceptance. In their classic study of social problems, Fuller and Myers (1941) identify such differing definitions of the “social facts” as illustrative of what they term value conflict. Value conflict theory centers on objective and subjective conditions. The objective condition is an empirical fact (e.g., the community is growing in population). The subjective condition is the perception of the objective condition by individuals or groups with different values or interests (i.e., one person sees the growth as bad; another sees the growth as good). When discussing value conflict, one can sometimes differentiate interests (tangible, direct, related to power, money, etc.) from values (beliefs, emotions, etc.), and it often seems that today issues are more value-based. A county clerk who won’t issue marriage licenses to people of the same sex because of his values is different than having a direct interest such as safety or power or wealth, even though the result (discrimination and refusal to do his job and follow the law) may be the same. But part of the problem is that our interests and values are often so inextricably tied up even we don’t recognize the difference and it would be hard or impossible to pull them apart. So, the clerk might have not only a faith-based objection, but his objection may be intimately tied in with his membership in a church from which he gets power and status as well as a sense of community and identity. Another person might not like GMOs because he or she really hates Monsanto and most corporations (values) but also he or she is concerned about his or her own health (interest).

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Fuller and Myers argue that social problems (public problems) go through a natural history of (I) awareness, (II) policy determination, and (III) “reform” (implementation of policy). Importantly, the values and interests of individuals and groups will conflict at each stage. While we use their classic sociological analysis, we also update their three stages with more contemporary advances in the public policy field leading to new names and content for the three stages. Stage I: Awareness, Public Attention, and Narrative

In the first stage, some individuals and groups will see the objective condition as threatening their values and interests. Another way of considering this concept is by asking the question, “what is a public problem?” Later, in Chapter 5, you will learn about agenda setting but for now consider some different ways that individuals might become aware of a problem and also begin to believe that the problem is something that is a “public” problem (a problem that the public and, by default, government can, and has to, do something about). We would think that a public problem would be easy to define. Statistics, policy analysis studies, and other indicators would lead to public support for government intervention. But it is not that simple. Consider obesity in the United States. The rate of obese individuals has dramatically increased between 1990 and 2017. Consider the following facts for 2015–16 from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): • 39.8 percent of adults in the United States (about 93.3 million adults) are obese. • Obesity is a leading cause of heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, and certain cancers. • The annual medical costs of obesity were $147 million (CDC, 2018).

Just with these statistics (and not even looking at the dramatic trends since the late 1980s), obesity would seem to be a problem. Yet, with the exception of some initiatives during the Presidencies of both George W. Bush (focusing mainly on educational efforts) and Barack (and Michelle) Obama (focusing mainly on exercise but also healthier school lunches), obesity is not an issue garnering much public attention. Part of this reason is that obesity as a narrative is considered an individual problem (Clemons, McBeth and Kusko, 2012b; McBeth et al., 2013). From a narrative standpoint, individuals are viewed as controlling what they eat or do not eat. We also tend to put unfair negative connotations on individual obesity, unfairly calling such individuals lazy or undisciplined and ignoring genetics and the social factors (social economic status, marketing…) that could contribute to individual obesity. Rather than being innocent victims of corporate marketing tactics and/or their own genetics, obese individuals are too often portrayed not as innocent victims but rather as deviant victims (victims who play a role in their own demise). Earlier editions of this book used the example of AIDS to show how in the 1980s, those who suffered from AIDS were viewed as essentially deviant victims whose own lifestyles and choices led to the dreaded disease.5 As a society, we also ignore the social consequences of the “individual” problem of obesity. We ignore the medical costs that get passed along to all, we ignore the lost days of employee productivity, we ignore that even the military is concerned about getting enough recruits who can pass the military’s physical exercise tests. How does society become aware of a problem if not driven by data and statistics and studies (all of which there are lots which back up the problem of obesity)? Narratives play a large role in this process. It is not as easy to just say that “good narratives” lead to public attention, but narratives certainly play a large role. Public attention gravitates toward “good” stories. In the United States, President Trump (elected in 2016) is a well-known business person and, as a result, knows how to use a good story to bring attention to an issue that he wants to “sell.” We posit that a “good story” around an issue is necessary (though not sufficient) to draw public attention. Furthermore, consistent with Fuller and Myers, the values of the story must conflict with a significant number of individuals for the issue to become a public problem.

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Take for example, the following potential problems facing the United States: obesity, immigration, health care, crime, and income inequality. By using the search tool Google Trends (as you will see in a later chapter this is now used as a valid measure of public attention), we can test the relative frequency of individual searches for each of these terms. Figure 1.1 is both messy and illustrative. Notice that “crime” is consistently searched for on Google. Notice that immigration is both fairly consistent with four dramatic spikes in attention over the five-year period studied. Attention to health care generally coincides with immigration but without the dramatic spikes in attention (health care has three to four minor spikes in 2017). Finally, both obesity and income inequality receive virtually no attention in terms of individuals doing Google searches (obesity has a slight advantage).

Figure 1.1  Public Attention “obesity”: (Unitd States)

“crime”: (Unitd States)

“income inequality”: (Unitd States)

“immigration”: (Unitd States)

“health care”: (Unitd States) 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 6/29/2014

6/29/2015

6/29/2016

6/29/2017

6/29/2018

AXIS TITLE

Note: each term was in quote marks to delimit the search to the exact term.

We want this chapter to be introductory, so this is not the place for detailed analysis, but crime in the United States has trended downward for the past twenty years (with occasional small, one year increases but a general trend of dramatic decline). Immigration, at this writing, is certainly an issue as refugees crowd at the United States-Mexico border, but illegal immigration in the United States had been in decline since 2007 prior to 2019 (Pew Research Center, 2019). Income inequality, health care (and access) and obesity (arguably all three are interrelated) might well be more problematic than crime or immigration. Part of the difference in attention is that elected officials and others can spin dramatic narratives about crime and immigration with clear villains, innocent victims, and heroes (most often the story teller). Narratives combined with “triggering events” (the old term) or “focusing events” (Birkland, 2016), a term that we will discuss in Chapter 5, draw public attention, and consistent with Fuller and Myers, the subjective condition or perception is more important than the objective condition (the facts). McBeth and Lybecker (2018), for example, demonstrate how President Trump used the story around the focusing event of the 2015 death of a young woman in San Francisco (just days after Trump announced his candidacy for president of the United States) to construct “sanctuary cities” as a public problem and as part of the immigration problem that his Administration has aggressively pursued as a problem. Sanctuary cities, a term rarely used before 2015, quickly gained focused attention and through the dramatic story of the women’s death (she was shot walking on the pier with her father) generalized the event as occurring because San Francisco allowed the woman’s alleged killer (he was later acquitted by a jury) who was an illegal immigrant to go free after he was detained. The narrative constructed a threat to a wide variety of individuals who identified with the victim. In previous editions of this book, we discussed AIDS and how the death of actor Rock Hudson and the death of young kids and celebrities who received blood transfusions transformed AIDS into an issue impacting only the least powerful

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and most stigmatized in a community to impacting and threatening the values of the most powerful.6 This is what narratives do. Of course, in the case of immigration, other groups can also use narratives to show that the facts do not align with the original narrative. These counter-narratives, in regard to immigration and sanctuary cities, might focus on how sanctuary cities do not have higher crime rates than non-sanctuary cities, and that in fact immigration and crime are inversely related (higher immigration rates in communities actually lead to less crime) according to research conducted by Daniel Hummel (2016). Crime itself is a compelling story and a story that connects crime’s victims to a large swath of the public is going to be popular and gain attention for the issue. Stage II: Policy Determination and Narratives

Once an issue has drawn public attention through a compelling and dramatic narrative, value-­ conflict and narrative still dominate the process of determining a policy solution. In the previous editions of the book we discussed HIV/AIDS, and the policies that were proposed by various key groups such as increased sex education in public schools; education about, and free distribution of, condoms among young people; and the distribution of free, sterilized needles to intravenous drug users. These policy suggestions caused great conflict because the behaviors they recognized conflicted strongly with views of acceptable behavior held by powerful groups in the country, such as the religious right. In addition, there was worry among other more organized and powerful health political action committees that funding for HIV/AIDS would diminish funding for other important health issues. In our more contemporary example, the suggested solutions to immigration include a wall along the United States and Mexico border, deporting undocumented immigrants, ending refugee programs, immigration reform such as allowing undocumented citizens to remain or allowing children of undocumented immigrants (now adults) to stay (the term Dreamer being a good example of the power of language—who wants to be against those who dream of the American Dream?). These policy proposals are supported by different narratives and the competition between these narratives will be driven, and probably determined, by value conflict and politics, and not necessarily by objective facts. Sometimes that can be a good thing; sometimes it leads to poor policy. Stage III: Policy Implementation and Narratives

Even after policies are adopted, value conflict continues in the implementation process, as well as affecting changes in awareness and continued battles over problem definition and what, if anything, to do about it. Fuller and Myers stress that value conflict is a never-ending process. One such conflict in the HIV/AIDS policy arena was over whether private drug companies should benefit from publicly subsidized research. Various HIV/AIDS drugs have shown success in alleviating the symptoms of the disease and slowing its progress. Drug manufacturers make billions of dollars from these and future drugs that will combat the disease; yet significant percentages of these drugs originated from federally funded research. It seems unfair to many that drug companies would profit so greatly when those companies did not invest their own money in the research. In addition, value conflict over educational policies and condom and needle distribution continues. Groups continue to organize politically at the national, state, and local levels to resist HIV/AIDS education, in the fear that such education will lead to sexual promiscuity among the young or an acceptance of the “gay lifestyle.” If these groups hold political power, they can ultimately undo many HIV/AIDS policies. Ironically, the success of policies can (and did) lead to reduced concern about the problem, undercutting support for such controversial policies. Narratives play an important role in all of this as groups that resist educational efforts portray gays and their allies as villains promoting a lifestyle. When it comes to immigration, some communities will continue to not enforce federal law (states or local government cannot be forced to enforce federal law) and the narratives portraying

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immigrants as either heroes, villains, or innocent victims continue to play out even after there is a policy being implemented. In the equally political realm of implementation, value conflict also plays out. For example, in the United States implementation is never uniform because (1) the U.S. political system is not unified, and policy is almost always fragmented and uneven; and (2) state and locally elected officials, administrators, and even low-level bureaucrats have considerable discretion in how policies are implemented. Accordingly, in some states and local communities, education has been used extensively, whereas in other communities it has rarely been used. In some areas, education is done well and implemented wholeheartedly; in other areas, education is poorly done and grudgingly and haltingly implemented. Box 1.2 on needle exchange programs also demonstrates how different states and different governors can decide to ignore or enforce laws, as well as shape policy. To provide a longer look at policy development (which is a long-run game) we left the original story (Box 1.2) as it appeared in the first edition, added an update for the second edition, and did so again for the third edition. Implementation, discretion, and fragmentation are crucial political issues that will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

Box 1.2 Needle Exchanges: A Continuing Saga of Stigma versus Science

W

hen the first edition of this text was published we noted that although common in many countries, states, and communities, government programs exchanging clean needles for used ones have consistently been deemed a valuable way to prevent the spread of HIV infection. New Jersey—a state with more than 9,000 orphans who lost their mothers to AIDS, 26,000 people with AIDS, the nation’s third-highest rate of intravenous HIV infection, and the nation’s highest rate of infection among women and children—not only refused to pay for needles, it used undercover police and arrests of those distributing clean needles to prevent AIDS activists from violating the state ban on distributing syringes. Their governor (1994–2001), Christine Todd Whitman (R), was adamantly opposed to needle giveaways, claiming they send the wrong message to children about drug use even though the U.S. Surgeon General, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and most public health experts supported such exchanges, citing studies that show they reduce the spread of HIV significantly and that providing syringes does not increase drug use or addiction. In the second edition we reported that on January 2, 2007, Governor Jon Corzine (D) signed into law legislation permitting six New Jersey cities to create needle exchange programs. The bill also allocated $10 million for drug treatment programs. As widely reported, in the battles leading up to the bill’s passage and signing, arguments included the fact that New Jersey ranked fifth in HIV prevalence, that it had the highest rate of new HIV infections among women, and that the rate of AIDS cases resulting from the sharing of contaminated needles in New Jersey was nearly double (44 as opposed to 24 percent) the national rate. All this was against an incredible amount of evidence from the United States and around the globe about the efficacy—and lack of negative consequences from—needle exchange programs. Yet, in some cities, millions of needles are exchanged each year. Proponents cite evidence about success in reducing HIV and hepatitis C infection rates (and in getting drug users information on risk and easing them into treatment), that there is no evidence of needle exchanges leading to increased drug use by users or in the communities at large, that there is no increase in crime rates in the areas where the exchanges happen, and that the safe disposal of contaminated needles is a general public good. Further, given that the cost of medical care for people who are infected with AIDS is so high, cities and counties (and other countries) believe it also saves taxpayer dollars. Opponents still argue, however, that it is a mistake to abet drug use, that it sends the wrong message to our children, that it undermines the war on drugs, that it can lead to increased crime, that it diverts resources from treatment programs, and that they personally cannot vote to give people a needle to shoot up.

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When we wrote the third edition we observed that issues such as needle exchanges continue to be politically charged, despite a consensus among health care experts, because of value conflict, electoral concerns, and conflicting narratives. Needle exchanges are about more than clean needles, offering chances for outreach in terms of help with addiction, counseling, health care education, and dangers such as heroin cut with fentanyl, which a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) report showed had killed almost 200 people in Pennsylvania over a 15-month period. By 2015 it was clear to virtually everyone that the U.S. was in the middle of a national epidemic of drug abuse from painkilling opioids and their illegal chemical cousin, heroin (four out of five heroin addicts say they started with prescription painkillers). A CDC report that year showed heroin overdose deaths increased almost fourfold between 2002 and 2013 and those addicted, while still primarily young, white men, were increasingly older, wealthier, had private insurance, and included everyone from grandma to the farmer growing your corn. Paralleling this rise was a rise in hepatitis C infections and increases in HIV infections. With heroin about four times cheaper than the prescription drugs they began with, heavy users found heroin available and affordable. Approximately two decades later, Lopez (2018a) writes, [n]eedle exchanges work to combat the spread of infectious diseases like hepatis C and HIV, cut down on the number of needles thrown out in public spaces, and connect more people to treatment— all without enabling more drug use. This is an exhaustive body of research, backed by independent academic researchers, the World Health Organization, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Lopez (2018b) also notes that needle exchanges accomplish such objectives as giving “much needed hope to underserved populations” and can be part of a solution to the opioid addiction problem. When Portugal became the first country to decriminalize, in 2001, all narcotic personal use, as well as investing in other initiatives, such as needle exchanges and methadone programs that— rather than being punitive in nature—focus on harm reduction, they set in motion an experiment of sorts. The early results have been very positive, e.g., new AIDS cases fell significantly among drug users from 538 in 2001, to 42 in 2014 (Martins, 2017). Despite all the science and evidence, resistance fueled by values, stigma, and “common sense” means that “much of the public and many policymakers still view addiction as an issue that demands a punitive response, and see those with addiction as part of the problem instead of people who need help”. As Lopez reports, the U.S. is far behind other countries when it comes to needle exchange programs. Additionally, the stigma has been the primary cause of closing needle exchanges in West Virginia, Indiana, and California (Lopez, 2018). Lopez concludes that all of this is happening during a growing opioid crisis. Finally, there are debates over syringe litter with an Orange County (California) court shutting down a program because of concerns over syringe litter, but as Lopez (2018) shows, the evidence of syringe litter and needle exchanges is mixed at best. Sources: David Kocieniewski, “New Jersey’s Hard Line on Needle Exchanges,” New York Times, February 2, 1999, A-20. Lopez, German. 2018b. “Needle Exchanges Help Combat the Opioid Crisis: But Officials Keep Shutting Them Down.” Vox, November 29. www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/11/29/18116700/orange-county-needle-exchangeopioid-epidemic (accessed June 30, 2019). For general background on the controversy in the legislative session, see David W. Chen, “No Compromise in Sight on Plan to Fight H.I.V.,” New York, June 4, 2006. Available online at http://nytimes.com/2006/06/04/nyregion/04needles. html (accessed December 6, 2019). Massimo Calabresi “The Price of Relief: Why America Can’t Kick Its Painkiller Problem,” Time Magazine, June 15, 2015, pp. 27–33; Daniel Raymond, “Get Heroin Out of the Headlines.” Available online at https://www.vox.com/scienceand-health/2018/11/29/18116700/orange-county-needle-exchange-opioid-epidemic June 2019; and Liz Szabo, “Heroin Use Surges, Addicting More Women and Middle-class.” Available online at www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/07/ heroin-use-spikes/29788031/ December 6, 2019; Catarina Fernandes Martins. 2017. “The Things They Carried: The Needle Exchanger.” Foreign Policy, January/February: 19.

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A Political System The process described in 1941 by Fuller and Myers is better understood in the context of a political systems model.7 The political systems model is composed of six separate but highly interrelated parts: system parameters, government, linkage mechanisms, political demands and political supports, public policy, and a feedback loop (see Figure 1.2). Like most models, ours is a simplified representation that tries to capture the key aspects, not all aspects.

Figure 1.2  A Simplified Political Systems Model Political Demands/Supports A Government

Public Policy

B Linkage Mechanisms Feedback Loop System Parameters

The term politics, as used in the field of political science, differs from how the typical citizen in most democratic countries uses the term. To most citizens, politics means “campaigning for office,” or it may have a more negative connotation whereby politics is “something that politicians use to get their way.” Sometimes it is equated with the sort of politics found in families and the workplace, as well as in the public arena, where favoritism defeats merit. Sometimes people use the word politics to describe the value conflict inherent in a political system. In political science, politics has a very definite meaning and one that is somewhat different from typical usage. Harold Lasswell (1958) supplied us with the classic definition when he described politics as being about “who gets what, when and how.” In a political system there are political demands. Individuals have different values (wants and desires), and only government can authoritatively allocate these wants or demands.8 There are also inputs into the system other than demands. Inputs can also take the form of supports for the government and its policies. These supports may be as simple as obeying the law, voting, telling a pollster you favor an existing policy, or checking off the box on your federal income tax return to provide money to presidential candidates who agree to abide by certain campaign spending limits. There is one more topic, crucial to the operation of the political system, and one step in you developing a more sophisticated understanding of the policy process, that needs a thorough explanation. That topic is linkage mechanisms, and it is discussed both below (briefly) and then after we discuss the idea of backward loops in political systems. Backward Loops in the Political System

Traditionally, we think of linkage mechanisms as linking the demands of citizens to the government’s policy agenda—that is, there is a one-way loop first linking citizens to the linkage mechanism and then a second loop that connects the linkage mechanism to the government. However, this unidirectional view is too limited. Linkage mechanisms (e.g., political parties, interest groups, the media, and elites) do not merely represent citizen interests; they actively and purposely shape citizen values and interests.

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Citizens can also use the media as an instrument to get political causes on the government’s agenda. For example, citizens upset by the failure of the government to respond to a particular issue may call in the media to expand the issue to a wider public, thus putting political pressure on the government to act. Here’s how this played out in one community we are familiar with. Local citizens were concerned about high school student drug use and were frustrated by a lack of action by the city government. Underage students were drinking and were smoking marijuana in a park across the street from the high school. When the city police refused to act, concerned citizens recorded it on their phones and gave the video to a local television station to broadcast (with faces blurred), which showed the high school students illegally drinking and smoking marijuana. The video outraged the community, and subsequently the mayor and police chief received hundreds of angry phone calls and letters and online posts demanding police clean up the problem. Prompted by the citizens’ response, the police began patrolling the park across the street from the high school. The use of the media in this manner is how we traditionally understand the workings of the political systems model. Citizens used the media to expand their views to a wider public, and this led to government policy. But the media, like any linkage mechanism, also shape citizen inputs and values without any prompting from citizens. In another city, a local television station has shown almost nightly coverage of “meth busts” or stories about “the heroin epidemic,” which in turn has led many citizens to conclude that both drugs are a major community problem deserving further government action. Without the media’s constant reports on methamphetamine and heroin most citizens would have no idea that a problem even exists. The media thus play a constituting role by deciding what to cover and what not to cover. The media are a powerful political force that can work either to maintain or to undo the status quo. Undoubtedly the television station that covers meth busts could also have nightly news coverage of spousal abuse, arrests for driving while intoxicated (DWI)/driving under the influence (DUI), or even “excessive binge drinking” by community leaders. Imagine that the media did decide to conduct a nightly investigative report on well-known community businesspersons and other elites who frequent drinking establishments and frequently drive home intoxicated. The television station could have undercover reporters in the bar counting the drinks consumed by these community influentials. Then a television crew could show the influential tipplers (with blurred faces and license plates) driving away. Nightly or even weekly television reports (Thursday night specials, like dollar import nights, would probably be one good scheduling clue) could bring to the attention of citizens the idea that perhaps DWI enforcement in the community is uneven and unfair. A study of the DWI lists might show that only working-class citizens and college students are charged with DWI. Imagine an informant reporting that a college professor stopped at a DWI roadblock was allowed to sit in his car and sober up before being officially tested and sent home—the same night that several international students were arrested at the same roadblock. Perhaps the media’s investigation would discover that the police have “profiles” of cars that are likely to have intoxicated drivers. These cars tend to be sportier, louder, or low-rider cars. Thus, the police single out certain vehicles and ignore more family-oriented automobiles, sport-utility vehicles, and newer four-wheel-drive pick-ups. Such a media investigation would likely prompt citizen demand for more equal and consistent DWI enforcement.9 The major point is that the linkage mechanisms exist independently of citizen demands, and, in acting, they shape citizen values and interests. We have seen how the media can “create” problems while ignoring other issues, e.g., increased reporting on shootings performed by or against law enforcement. Likewise, interest groups link citizen values to government, but interest groups also actively seek to shape citizens’ values. Interest groups (most often using the media) produce messages that support their political values. Environmental interest groups may produce television commercials and documentaries showing the negative impact of timber clear-cutting or post videos

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online showing the violence of government-sanctioned bison killing. Timber interest groups may produce commercials and documentaries showing the positive uses of the forest, describing forests as a renewable resource, and portraying themselves as stewards managing resources wisely. Ranching interest groups may produce messages showing that ranchers take care of the land, telling how hard ranchers work to bring quality beef to the American consumer, and claiming that government policy is hurting their traditional way of life. Political parties and elites also actively seek to shape and influence public opinion. Therefore, when looking at the political systems model, we must remember that there are also “backward loops” from the government to the linkage mechanisms to the citizens. Figure 1.3 compares the traditional and the backward loop models.

Figure 1.3  The Backward Loop Variation The Traditional Political Systems Model Government

Citizens (Inputs)

Policy

Linkage Mechanisms

The Backward Loop Model Citizens (Inputs)

Backward Loop Backward Loop

Government

Policy

Backward Loop

Linkage Mechanisms

Public Policy and Linkage Mechanisms Public policy is defined by Thomas Dye (1987, p. 3) as “what governments choose to do or not to do.” If government decides to cut taxes, then this is a public policy; if government decides not to cut taxes, then this too is a public policy. Government action, or inaction, is still a value choice. These choices, or, in other words, public policies, are determined by “political means.” As we discussed earlier, the means of politics include bargaining, compromise, reward, and coercion. Politics is the driving force of what American government does. It is the grease of the political system. How do citizens influence government? You can, of course, write your senator and tell him or her that you support or do not support free trade. Legislative staff members certainly do count up letters, emails, faxes, phone calls, and even the occasional telegram from supporters and opponents of prospective legislation. You can also set up a meeting with your congressional representative (or his or her staff) to discuss the pros and cons of free trade. In your letter, email, or personal meeting you could try to use political means to influence your senator. “Vote for free trade or I will not vote for you in the next election” (coercion). Perhaps you could say, “Vote for free trade and I will strongly support you for re-election in the next election” (a reward). If you are an average citizen, it is doubtful that the senator would take your advice too seriously. The senator may listen to you and even respect your views, but the average citizen, speaking as an isolated individual, does not sway the congressperson’s vote.

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Democracy does not mean that the average individual citizen has much influence. As a result, even in the United States individual citizens do not typically engage in the means of politics.10 Rather, they influence government by voting, by joining political parties, and by joining interest groups. It is these linkage mechanisms that link citizens with the government, and it is at this level that political means are used. For instance, let us return to our free trade example. Your individual view might not influence your senator, but if you joined an interest group and this group represented 100,000 individuals in your state, coercion and rewards might work. Thousands of emails merit more attention than one does. You could also join a political party that agrees with your position on free trade, and the political party could work to elect a senator who agrees with all of your views on trade. Elections are a method whereby individuals collectively influence government by voting for the candidates who most closely represent their points of view. The following is a list of linkage mechanisms generally important in all democracies and even in countries that don’t merit that label: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Interest groups: These lobby elected officials for specific policies using political means. Political parties: These bring together broad groups of citizens who nominate candidates that represent the views of the people who belong to the party. Public opinion: Elected officials often follow aggregated individual opinions in deciding policies. Voting/elections: People vote for candidates who represent their points of view. The media: Media play an important role in influencing public opinion and in setting the policy agenda.

There are other ways that individual citizens collectively influence government. Public opinion showing strong support or opposition for an issue can persuade an elected official to vote for the public’s choice. The media, of course, can play a significant role in shaping public opinion. Newspaper columnists, television commentators, bloggers, and radio talk-show hosts are consistently given credit or blame for influencing the public’s opinion. The media (including social media), just like interest groups and political parties, help set policy agendas. In contemporary America, the media seemingly play an increasingly large role in influencing government policy. In essence, those who use political means (trading, rewarding, bargaining, coercing) most effectively get their values and interests turned into public policy. These groups or individuals hold the power in government policymaking. One of the best examples of citizens organizing and then using the means of politics to collectively influence public policy is the powerful American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). AARP is widely and appropriately considered one of the most effective political players in United States domestic politics. Whether the issue is regulations relating to nursing homes, Medicare coverage and fees, or Social Security benefits, this group effectively works to protect its understanding of the interests of senior citizens. For example, in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration generated a proposal that would have reduced Social Security benefits for eligible recipients. AARP got its members to bombard members of Congress with messages of protest. At town hall meetings, in telephone calls and telegrams, and in letters, the politically mobilized AARP members made their displeasure known and promised that there would be political hell to pay if the proposed changes went through. With at least 50,000 members in every congressional district in the United States, incurring the wrath of AARP is not something to be done lightly. Similarly, 30 years later in 2010, and much to the disgruntlement of the Republican Party (or Grand Old Party—GOP) and some of their own members, AARP’s support of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) was also seen as important to its passage through Congress, and has continued to be an important impediment to its repeal in the decade since its passage. The linkage mechanisms certainly do not perfectly reflect what an ideal democracy might produce but, like a universal joint in an automobile, they connect demands and the system together

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in a way that transmits energy into movement. They are also protected by the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and press, the right “to peaceably assemble,” and “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The (mostly) fictional story in Box 1.3 provides you with a realistic example of the political system at work. This story, originally written in the 1990s and inspired by a history of protection for the sugar beet industry by the late Senator Frank Church (D-ID), was imitated by real life several years later when corporate sugar users (including the Hershey Food Corporation) tried to get Congress to eliminate the sugar price supports, but were defeated by lobbying from a coalition nearly identical to the one described in our story. See Keith Bradsher’s New York Times story (1995). As illustrated by our factual updates (woven into the story in italics), sugar politics continues in the 21st century.

Box 1.3  Sugar Beets versus Candy: Fact and Fiction

A

n example may give you a better understanding of how demands are authoritatively allocated and of how a political system works. In our story, the U.S. government is considering a new public policy alternative. The policy, if passed into law, would allow the importation of sugar from Caribbean countries (which is forbidden under an earlier bill passed long ago). Why is this policy being considered? The answer lies in the workings of the political system. Certain citizens and business interests desire an authoritative allocation. In our story, the interested party is the candy industry, whose value is to increase profits. One way for manufacturers to increase profits is to cut the price of their raw inputs. In this case, the most important raw good is sugar. So, in our story, members of the candy industry band together and form an interest group and a political action committee (PAC). The interest group then lobbies members of Congress (ideally those on the appropriate committees) to pass a law that would allow for the importation of sugar from the Caribbean. This importation would increase the supply of sugar, thus lowering the price and subsequently lowering the cost of production. The end result of this would be increased profits. Which members of Congress are going to be interested in the demands of the candy industry? Well, those members who come from districts and states that are home to candy companies are going to listen to their demands with a relatively sympathetic ear. Perhaps the representative from the 17th District in Pennsylvania would be interested in helping the candy industry: Hershey, Pennsylvania (home of a main street called Chocolate Avenue and lampposts topped with ceramic Hershey’s Kisses), is in their district, and the candy company is a very large employer. Then some more bittersweet news emerged in the fall of 2012, when Hershey executives trumpeted a $300 million investment in construction and mechanical infrastructure in their hometown. That created jobs, and spoke to a long-time commitment to their Pennsylvania operations, but the new plant is heavily automated, which meant that a great many employees could kiss their jobs goodbye. The candy industry’s interest group will use the means of politics to entice members of Congress to introduce a bill that would allow for sugar importation. One means of politics would be to promise a “reward.” For example, the industry could promise that if the law is passed, the candy industry would strongly support the re-election bid of that member. The flip side of reward is “punishment,” which means that if the representative does not actively support such legislation, then the interest group will work to have the member defeated in the next election. The actions of the candy lobby are only part of the story. Having asserted that politics is about value conflict, we recognize that other individuals and groups would not favor passage of a Caribbean sugar import bill. Idaho sugar beet farmers might logically be against this policy change, seeing it as a threat to their economic viability, perhaps even as a threat to their way of life. Idaho sugar beet farmers would also use a linkage mechanism (the Idaho Sugar Beet Association)

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to fight the legalization of the importation of Caribbean sugar. Sugar beet lobbyists would use political means to persuade congresspersons who represent areas where sugar beets are grown. Lobbyists might also appeal to the public by portraying sugar beet farmers as potential victims of an international cartel. They might try to frame the issue as one of protecting either family farms or “greedy, cavity-causing corporations.” Actually, an organization called the American Sugar Alliance—self-described as representing American beet and cane farmers, processors, refiners, suppliers, and workers—has been hard at work since 2007 to protect the established program (called the no-cost sugar program) from being cut. An issue brief they produced (“An Examination of Wholesale Sugar Prices in America”) argued that after several hurricanes, most famously Katrina, food manufacturers who had to import sugar found out how difficult life would be without U.S. sugar producers (who operate in 19 states and reportedly create 146,000 jobs). They reported that imported sugar was inedible and had metal shavings, burlap pieces, rodent feces, and so forth in it. This same issue brief made sure to make clear that the cost of American sugar has had nothing to do with the rising price of cola products and candy (or the loss of American jobs and the opening of factories in Mexico by Brach’s Confections Inc. and Hershey’s). Their arguments on this, and similar ones, are quite well done and apparently persuasive (www.sugaralliance.org). But, back to our hypothetical case. Interestingly, if you look carefully at this example, you can see that in reality this issue will significantly impact only a very small group of citizens. How many cities or states have a strong candy industry? How many states grow significant amounts of sugar beets? Remember that for a bill to pass Congress it must receive a majority vote in both houses of our legislative body. Yet, most members of Congress would seem to be indifferent toward this bill. To understand the fate of this proposed bill, we must turn again to politics, which occurs at all levels of the political system. So far we have only focused on the fact that interest groups, operating at the linkage mechanism level, would be busily utilizing various means to try to influence members of Congress. If congressional members decide to act, they too must engage in the means of politics. They must reward, coerce, bargain, trade, and compromise. In this story, let’s assume that the members of the House of Representatives from districts in the eight key sugar beet-producing states (Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming) want to put together a coalition with enough votes to defeat the sugar importation bill. How can they achieve their goal when the majority of members are indifferent to, and some are in favor of, this new legislation? A first step would be to identify other allies. Although traditionally competitors,1 representatives from districts in the sugar cane-growing states (Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Texas) would also have constituencies hurt by this legislation. Legislators from the Midwest (e.g., Kansas) might also be opposed because the profitable corporate production of corn sweeteners (e.g., by Archer Daniels Midland Company) could also be endangered. Still, this coalition will not produce the necessary majority—and remember that the corporate sugar users (Hershey’s, Wrigley’s, Brach’s, Pepsi, and Coca-Cola) will be lobbying to try to gain a majority as well. The best political means would likely be a trade. Assuming some sympathy from members from other agricultural districts, the sugar beet states’ representatives could approach members of Congress from urban areas (without powerful candy interests) and offer a trade along the lines of “You vote against the sugar bill and we will support you on that urban renewal bill that you want passed.” Political scientists term this vote trading “logrolling.”2 In the end, whether the sugar importation bill passes or not is determined largely by which side plays the best politics, not by whether or not this is “best for our country,” “a sound policy,” or some other supposedly objective standard. Often there are solutions generated from the political process (continued)

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that benefit both sides. Politics often involves compromise. To conclude our story and reflect this last observation, let’s imagine a roaring domestic economy, fierce international competition, and a windfall of tax revenues generating a budget surplus. One option, given all these other pieces of the puzzle, would be to disallow these new imports, but provide tax breaks for the candy industry that will lower their costs and increase their profits. Four non-fiction articles (two from the Washington Post, February 12, 2014 and April 10, 2015, and two from the New York Times, January 9 and March 14, 2019) help our fictional sugar story continue to provide examples of how political the policy process is. The first article covered a lobbying war going on between the producers of corn syrup and sugar to highlight what it accurately described as increasing use of alternative lobbying tactics called “soft- lobbying.” According to Hamburger (2014), soft-lobbying is a way for friendly nonprofits and academic experts to “provide expert testimony, shape news media coverage and change public opinion in ways that ultimately affect decisions.” For example, it details sugar companies funding a group called Citizens for Health that campaigned for a reduction in the use of sugar’s top competitor, high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). Meanwhile the corn syrup refiners were funding a health doctor, a researcher/cardiologist trained at Harvard, and a nonprofit group called the Center for Consumer Freedom. The lobbying war’s initial big battle, surely intensified by growing health concerns about obesity and sugar’s health impact, was kicked off by a request to the Food and Drug Administration in 2010 by the corn refiners to allow HFCS to be renamed “corn sugar”— which was perceived by the Sugar Association as trying to “steal sugar’s identity and goodwill” (Hamburger, 2014). The second article, an opinion piece by Dana Milbank (2015), catalogs the efforts of the Sugar Association to alter proposed 2015 dietary guidelines (by the Agricultural Department) that would have included the recommendation that added sugars total no more than 10 percent of individual diets, along with its summary of the levels of evidence showing sugar’s strong ties to obesity, Type 2 diabetes, hypertension, stroke, and heart disease. Echoing their 1970s denial that sugar impacted cavities, the Sugar Association argued that there is “no proof of cause and effect or preponderance of scientific evidence” linking added sugar to serious disease (though, as the article points out, a recent study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that those who only get 10 percent or less of their calories from added sugar were only half as likely to die from heart disease as those who get 25 percent or more from added sugar). The sugar producers say the problem is HFCS, and among their arguments to the public via the media was the statement that sugar had been “used safely by our grandmothers and their grandmothers for centuries” (quoted in Milbank, 2015). The third article, by Andrew Jacobs (2019a), reviews how Big Tobacco executives, after acquiring sugary drinks such as Kool-Aid and Capri Sun, used their tobacco-marketing expertise (e.g., coloring, advertisements, and artificial flavors) to increase sales to children. The corporations used “child-tested flavors, cartoon characters, branded toys and millions of dollars in advertising” to help build child loyalty to sugar-laden products. As the article points out, this all occurred at a time of significant public health concern over childhood obesity in the U.S. Finally, another article by Jacobs, with contributions attributed to Claire Fu and Zoe Mou for research from Beijing (Jacobs, 2019b), makes clear that this is not just an issue in the United States, but also in China and elsewhere. Consider the following quote from the article: In just a few decades, China has gone from a nation plagued by food shortages to one buffeted by soaring obesity and chronic diseases tied to poor diet … In Chinese cities, nearly a fifth of all children are obese, according to government surveys. (Jacobs, 2019b)

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The article goes on to discuss how Coca-Cola and other Western corporations have played a significant role in influencing Chinese scientific findings and public policy toward obesity and pushing their agenda through a group called the International Life Sciences Institute (ISIL). ISIL (based in the U.S.) has promoted sugar in countries such as Mexico, India, South Africa, and Brazil. ISIL’s work is largely viewed as an attempt for the sugar lobby to expand internationally at a time when U.S. sugar consumption is down. Jacobs (2019b) also cites a Professor McKee who wrote, These groups, he said, support and publicize scientific studies whose results sometimes muddy the waters on contentious issues like smoking or alcohol and soda consumption …They often cherry pick data in ways that mislead while portraying these issues as so terribly complex that nothing can be done.

Sounds familiar to us! And, it’s no wonder people talk about Big Sugar. Sources: Hamburger, Tom. 2014. “‘Soft Lobbying’ War between Sugar, Corn Syrup Shows New Tactics in Washington Influence.” Washington Post, February 12. Available online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/softlobbying-war-between-sugar-corn-syrup-shows-new-tactics-in-washington-influence/2014/02/12/8123da00-90dd11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html (accessed October 15, 2015). Milbank, Dana. 2015. “The Sugar Lobby’s Sour Tactics.” Washington Post, April 10. Available online at https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sugar-lobbys-sour-tactics/2015/04/10/9fb5b78a-dfa7-11e4-a1b8-2ed88bc190d2_ story.html (accessed January 3, 2020). Jacobs, Andrew. 2019a. “How Big Tobacco Hooked Children on Sugary Drinks.” New York Times, March 14. Available online at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/health/big-tobacco-kool-aid-sugar-obesity.html (accessed December 6, 2019). Jacobs, Andrew. 2019b. “Research Details How Junk Food Companies Influence China’s Nutrition Policy.” New York Times, January 9. Available online at www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/health/obesity-china-coke.html?emc=edit_ th_190110&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=9073540110 (accessed December 6, 2019).

Notes 1 It is both a cliché and a truism that politics creates strange bedfellows. 2 Remember that this story is a simplified version of reality designed to clearly convey some key concepts, not the full richness of politics nor all possible factors or outcomes.

Power, Policymaking, and Democracy Power is often defined as the “ability to influence others more than they influence you.” The citizen, the interest group, or the party that has its political demands or values turned into public policy has power. Such groups influence government through the development of policies that reflect their values rather than allowing others to influence public policy in ways that they do not want it to be influenced. Policy analysts must understand how power structures really work: Who has the power over government (an empirical/descriptive question), and should possess a clear value about how they believe they should work in a democracy?; Who should have the power over government? (a normative/prescriptive question)—or in other words, as an analyst, who do you work for? If the citizens influence government more than elites, interest groups, or the media, then we term this government a democracy (literally, rule by the people). If interest groups control government, we call this a pluralist democracy (rule by interest groups). Finally, if elites have the power over what government does and does not do, the government is either an elite democracy, a bit of a contradiction in terms, where elites rule in the interests of the people, or it is an oligarchy, where the few rule for the benefit of themselves.

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Before exploring power in a democracy, we briefly look at the characteristics of an ideal democracy, thus providing us a measuring rod that can be used to evaluate whether a government is a genuine democracy or not. There are three key elements of an ideal democracy.11 Preference Expression

Equality in voting and effective participation are the two key elements of preference expression. The voting booth is where the clearest expression of preference happens. The essence of the idea of equality in voting is often captured in the simple phrase, “one person, one vote.” Each person would have an equal say in public policy formation. The right to vote is called suffrage. If everyone has the right to vote, that is called universal suffrage, even if many choose not to regularly exercise this right. Apathy does not speak well for democracy, but many citizens even in democracies question whether voting really makes any difference. Yet, for example, in the United States, despite election rules that favor the two-party system, gerrymandering, the electoral college, the Citizen’s United v. FEC 2010 impact, the fact that the U.S. was founded as a republic, not a pure or ideal democracy, and certainly the playing field is not level (e.g., between corporations and yourself), your authors still believe elections matter. For example, it can be argued that while anyone who had been able to attain the presidency would have gone to war in Afghanistan after 9/11, very few of those who could have attained the office, if any, would have then taken the U.S. (for good or for ill) to war in Iraq. At the federal, state, and local levels, elections for president, senators and representatives, governors, state legislators, mayors, county executives and council members, and even for school board members, affect policy that impacts our lives. The Trump Administration made changes in domestic and foreign policy that a Clinton (Hillary) Administration would not have. In Great Britain, the votes for Brexit and the party that supported it to be the majority party in Parliament, similarly had great impact. The second element of preference expression is effective participation. Access to the voting booth is not enough. Space for other forms of expression, such as petitioning the legislative branch, interest group activities, and public demonstrations must also be provided and utilized. Broad and representative participation is required. But, how many citizens attend public hearings? How many women hold national offices, at the state or province level, and at the local level? How many minorities, and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, and intersex (LGBTQI) community are in these elected bodies? How many women and minorities hold ­positions of influence in bureaucracies? From what socioeconomic classes do elected officials generally come? The answers to these questions tell us something about the nature of democracy. The short answer is that across the globe elites are not typical of the masses. Despite significant advances, for example, in the U.S. Congress in the 2018 midterm elections, United States political institutions are still dominated by older, white males, primarily from the upper-­middle to upper classes. These types of individuals are also the most likely to participate in the political process. A high percentage of elected officials at the federal level are attorneys, many of whom attended prestigious universities. Store clerks, baristas, and machinists are seldom our elected officials. Does this matter? Some would say that men can make policies for the benefit of women, or that people from the upper socioeconomic classes can make policies that benefit all of us, not just the upper classes. Whether this is true, false, or only part true is a source of considerable debate. While this is not the place for a detailed discussion, thinking through your views on this issue, understanding your view of democracy and public policy, is very important.

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Unimpaired Opportunity to Develop Political Preferences

The goal for those who want to improve democracy, in any country, is “enlightened understanding” and that depends on the following: • • • •

a formal education process; unimpeded access to alternative sources of information; a media system and an electoral system that both present clear alternatives; the opportunity to engage in real debates about the issues.

Democracy has often been said to be a marketplace of ideas. A genuine democracy rests on an informed public willing to debate ideas and search for truth. This is why new communication technology, most recently the internet, has often been forecast to dramatically expand both information and democracy by leveling the playing field—though history largely tells a more complicated story that still features political and economic power. Unfortunately, political discussions are mostly divided into camps of “us” versus “them.” The media contribute to this with television shows on which conservatives and liberals battle it out without seeking common ground. In addition, tabloid journalism now influences even mainstream sources. In the United States even our elected leaders are practicing such mean-spirited, scorchedearth politics that getting together to get things done has become more difficult. Combined with the negative advertising so prevalent today, many citizens tune out either from boredom or disgust, and the others are encouraged to see the opposition as evil, venal, and corrupt. Political polarization in the United States continues to grow. According to Pew Research (Jones, 2019), Republican and Democratic citizens have highly different priorities when it comes to the nation’s priorities and this polarization has increased since 1999. For example, recent research demonstrates a growing preference of parents to have their children marry a person who belongs to the same political party as the parents do (Vavareck, 2017). Peter Wehner, an advisor to Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, warns against this. He asserts that “we need to emphasize greater epistemological modesty on our side and greater appreciation for the perspectives of the other side” (Wehner, 2017, paragraph 18). Democracy relies on consensus and compromise, as well as on free speech and freedom of the press. Inclusion of all who want to participate, knowledge of how to effectively participate, and broad participation are also necessary. Together, all of this implies that each of us must put in our two cents’ worth and somehow blend the cacophony of our individual voices and values into a chorus singing out a clear vision—if we are to be a genuine democracy. Citizen knowledge of politics is also low. In the United States, confusion about how a bill becomes a law, the two houses of Congress, state legislatures, and other basics are well documented.12 Ignorance, even about a person’s own senators and representatives, is rampant. One reason may be the point that the media are often more interested in sensationalism than in informing citizens. It is perhaps worth keeping in mind that the media are businesses whose bottom line is profit, not public service, and today many sources are clearly very partisan and not interested in communicating across lines, but only in preaching to the choir of the like-minded that comprise their audience. Expressed Preferences Must Affect Governmental Conduct

Simply put, citizens would control the policy agenda in an ideal democracy. Citizens would have the final say over what issues government deems important and ultimately over what government does or does not do. An important question you should ask as a student, an analyst, and a citizen is:

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Who really controls policy agendas? Is it elites, PACs and special-interest groups, the media, or are citizens driving the policy bus? The answer to this question is complex. Interest groups claim to represent citizen interests and therefore their influence on government would seem to simulate rule by the people. Interest group leaders, however, are often accused of separating from the interests of their groups. Rule by interest group leaders is not democratic rule. Similarly, we know that elites often have unequal access to government. Money does not necessarily directly buy favorable public policy outcomes. But money almost always does buy access. People with access, in turn, are more likely to have their views heard by government and ultimately have their views turned into public policy. An “ideal” democracy generally means a direct democracy, in which the people get together to make laws. In the United States, with more than 330 million people, a direct democracy is, of course, impractical. Even with improvements in technology, direct voting on policy, let alone a debate on policy merits, is impractical, if not impossible, and a direct democracy is also problematic due to the aforementioned problems of apathy and ignorance. Genuine democracy also means that if elected officials’ preferences and policies are different from those of the citizenry, the officials must be at risk of losing their positions. Joseph Schumpeter (1950) once defined democracy in terms of a competitive struggle for people’s votes, which is why a one-party system cannot be democratic. Representative Democracy

In fact, the U.S. government was created to be a representative democracy in which elites could dampen the dangers presumed to flow from direct democracy. In a representative democracy, people choose agents who act on their behalf (and sometimes these agents choose other agents who act on the people’s behalf—e.g., Supreme Court justices, who are even more protected from the buffeting winds of democracy and elections). Citizens choose these agents through elections. Thus, power is seen as remaining with citizens because everyone (theoretically) has an equal voice in the selection of leaders (one person, one vote) and elections make leaders accountable to public preferences. There are, however, several problems with representative democracy. First, for representative democracy to work, elected officials must act in accordance with the preferences of the citizens. This is not an easy task, since it assumes that citizens have clear policy preferences. We know from survey data that citizens often hold contradictory positions on major policy issues. The American public may want improved education but may resist increased taxation necessary to pay for improving that education. The public may desire clean rivers but staunchly oppose the environmental regulation necessary to achieve this goal. A related issue is that contemporary politics is dominated by divisive wedge issues, symbols, and sound bites, and not by serious discussions of policy options. Citizens elect candidates based on the emotional impressions that they have of the individual, a single-issue, or party loyalty (sometimes based on ethnicity or religion), not necessarily on some well-thought-out decision about policy preferences. A second problem is simply whether or not elected officials should follow the demands of the people in the first place. In the U.S., historically, polls have consistently demonstrated that the public is less supportive of civil liberties (e.g., freedom of speech—even for unpopular ideas; protection against unreasonable search and seizure; the suffrage rights of unpopular minority groups) than are elected officials. Many times, elected officials may be better informed than the public and may indeed make better decisions. This view of representative democracy asserts that elected officials are still held accountable through elections. A third problem with representative democracy is that for this type of democracy to work, the system must produce highly qualified candidates. As discussed earlier, attorneys and other

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professionals are vastly overrepresented in the U.S. government. Working-class citizens are virtually eliminated from running for federal office. The incredible cost of running a credible campaign today has also deterred many candidates and given an advantage to the Trumps, Michael Bloombergs, Mitt Romneys, and John Kerrys in the United States. Similar problems have the same effect in other democracies, plus fears about physical violence and government persecution in countries with less established rules of law. Interest Group Democracy (Pluralism)

Two major questions confronted early political scientists studying power in American government: One, if neither direct democracy nor representative democracy adequately describes the American political system, then how are matters resolved? Two, who holds the power in American society? These questions continue to be relevant today, and their relevance goes far beyond the U.S. Beginning in the 1950s, a group of American political scientists decided that representative democracy did not adequately describe or explain the American political system. Political scientist Robert Dahl (1961) introduced the concept of pluralism. The root word of pluralism is plural (many). Pluralists believe that American democracy (rule by the people) is achieved through rule by many competing interest groups. Interest groups, as their name denotes, represent private interests. Interest groups act as an intermediary between the citizen and the government, but the citizen ultimately rules. Pluralism holds that democracy is alive and well, with interest groups representing citizen preferences. Further, pluralism believes that power in American society is widely scattered and that power comes through resources. Every interest group (and hence every citizen) has access to these political resources. Anyone can join, or even organize, an interest group. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the right of association is protected by the First Amendment. Unlike those who believe elites run the government, pluralism believes that money is only one type of political resource and that other political skills can overcome money. The following list elaborates on pluralism’s view of power: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Power is widely scattered (this is the essential point). Power comes through resources. Although groups have varying amounts, all groups have at least some resources. Resources are not limited to money. Other resources include things like access, sheer numbers, wide geographic distribution, a cause, effective leadership, and a reputation for winning. Potential power exceeds actual power. No one is all-powerful (groups instead are only powerful in one functional area).

In addition, the characteristics of pluralism include the below: 1. 2. 3. 4.

American government is influenced by a multiplicity of competing small groups. The system is open (groups can enter and leave the system as they see fit). Group strength is derived from the masses (all citizens have an interest group representing their interests). Politics is based on compromise.

Pluralism, as we stated, argues that American government is influenced by a multitude of competing and diverse groups. Some theorists who argue for pluralism, however, believe the U.S. has what is called biased pluralism—which reflects the very uneven power that wealth plays in the making of policy. The principles of pluralism are among the concepts the case studies in this text will help to illustrate and make more concrete by studying them in real political settings. It is the most common

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description of the U.S. political system subscribed to by political scientists and taught in American government textbooks. In the end, you may decide that elitism, the theory we will explain next and which takes biased pluralism a step further, is a better description of how policy is produced—or you may think they both identify important pieces of the policy puzzle—but either way you need to understand pluralism, the dominant model of American politics. We suggest you make sure you do before continuing. Elitism

Many political scientists believe that pluralism does not adequately describe the American political system. Elite theory also has a long history in the social sciences.13 As we shall see, however, elite theorists are severely divided on what the concept suggests about democracy and government. The most fundamental expression of elite theory is the idea that in any large organization (including governments) there will always be a small ruling minority (the elite) and a very significant majority (the masses) largely without power. Not surprisingly, then, elite theory’s critique of pluralism is based on the iron law of oligarchy (Michels, 1949), which attacks the theory of interest group representation directly. The iron law of oligarchy asserts that two classes will always appear: the few with power and the many without. Even if the elites are chosen from the masses, their interests, resource base, and functional values diverge from the majority. Box 1.4 explores how an elite theorist might analyze a classic political novel.

Box 1.4  Another Look at Orwell’s Animal Farm

G

eorge Orwell (also the author of 1984) wrote this classic story during World War II. Boxer, Benjamin, Old Major, Napoleon, the guard dogs, the birds, and all the other animals who establish “Animal Farm” are obviously symbols. Trade with the outside world, the easily changed rules painted on the barn wall, Farmer Jones, and the windmill are also symbols. While it is generally agreed that the best analogy to what happened at Animal Farm was the former Soviet Union, Orwell’s point can be seen in a much broader context. Is there an iron law of oligarchy for all societies, all organizations, and all revolutions? Are revolutions ultimately just a change in personnel? Once in power, elites inevitably increase the amount of information they control; their expertise increases; and as typical “humans,” they are subject to human temptations (i.e., power corrupts—that’s why “checks and balances” are more important than efficiency when designing a government). We witness the use of oratory, propaganda, and fear by an educated and articulate elite to control the inattentive, trusting, and hard-working masses. A moment of crisis becomes a chance to manipulate. Like Benjamin (the jackass), Orwell suggests we often see the glue truck coming too late. But what if Boxer, the representative of the working class, had been more politically astute? What if Benjamin had not been a jackass? What if Old Major—and his commitment to equality— had not died when he did? Are all elites really pigs? And, could Jones have avoided the whole revolution by allowing limited social mobility, perhaps co-opting the pigs, or even by simply being fairer and more efficient? Maybe Orwell’s classic tale still speaks to us today, even in the good old U.S. of A., where swamps are difficult to drain, not to mention many other countries where moments such as a hopeful Arab spring often turn into a bitter Arab winter. Source: George Orwell, Animal Farm (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990/1946).

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Elite theory does not necessarily dispute pluralism’s emphasis on the role of interest groups in the political system. Elite theorists, however, dispute the notion that interest groups represent the views of the public. Instead, elite theorists contend that pluralism is really “rule by interest group leaders.” Interest group leaders are likely of a high socioeconomic status, and their decisions will ultimately benefit themselves rather than the group they represent. Plus, many citizens are not represented by interest groups, and those from the lower socioeconomic strata are less likely to belong to interest groups. Elitism argues that interest group leaders are elites. Elites are derived from the same social class (the upper class), go to the same type of universities, serve on the same boards, and have similar interests. Whether on the left (e.g., teachers’ unions) or the right (e.g., the National Rifle Association), the idea is that often the organization’s leaders makes choices that differ from the opinions of their members. Therefore, elitism sees more cooperation and less competition than does pluralism. Citizens are apathetic, ill-informed, disorganized, and allow interest group leaders and elected officials (who according to elite theorists are controlled by elites) to develop policy.14 Elite theorists suggest that the reason citizens are apathetic is because elites socialize citizens into complacency by delivering a steady diet of television, social media, and by providing the illusion that “consumerism” is a sign of personal wealth and happiness. Or perhaps apathy stems from what has been termed “rational ignorance.” Because involvement takes time and energy and can have monetary costs, and because the chances of making a difference seem so small, it is rational to focus on feeding your family, on school, on the church, on sports, and such—rather than on politics.15 Elite theorists believe that money is power. Political skill cannot overcome the power that money delivers. Money may not buy votes or policies, but money buys access, and access in turn often leads to policies favorable to those who have access. The Democrats promised reform in 2006 when they took over both houses of Congress, and when the Republicans took over both houses after the 2014 midterms, they and their Tea Party supporters also talked about reform, as did candidate Trump in the presidential election of 2016 and the Democrats in the 2018 midterm election. As this book goes to print, significant reform still seems elusive, although topics such as earmarks, pork, oversight, and ethics remain perpetually on the agenda. Elite theorists believe that the public may be involved in some small decisions and interest groups may be involved in slightly larger decisions, but that large and important decisions are made by the few. According to these political scientists, policy decisions are analogous to a tree. There are twig decisions, branch decisions, and trunk decisions.16 Twigs are part of the tree but are not a very important part. Twig decisions are made by citizens and grassroots interest group efforts. Twig decisions are minor decisions that, while not unimportant, change little (e.g., noise ordinances, levies on building a new school, and local recycling programs). Branches are a more important part of a tree but are not the most important part—one example might be changing the state formula for education funding. Branch decisions are important but do not explain the entire political process. Interest groups, elected officials, and occasionally citizens make branch decisions. The most important part of a tree is the trunk, which supports the whole tree. Without a trunk, you do not have a tree. Trunk decisions, according to elite theorists, are made by elites. Note that while agenda setting is very important, the ability to control what is not on the agenda (to make nondecisions) is even more important. In recent years there has been a resurgence of scholarship that questions the relevance of public opinion in decision making and leans toward elite domination (e.g., Gilens and Page, 2014; Grossman, 2014). Grossman’s work finds that it is coalition building and compromises between political elites (and not the public) that drive public policy outcomes. In Grossman’s work, fundamental touchstones of democracy like elections, public opinion, and media coverage do not fully drive public outcomes. Gilens and Page (2014) found in their analysis of public-opinion data that it is the top 10 percent of the wealthiest Americans who get their policy preferences turned into

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policy. Such findings, of course, mean that the elite theory of political power remains very much alive in contemporary political science. And though multiple studies challenged Gilens and Page in terms of both analysis and findings (Matthews, 2016), it is undeniable that economic inequality in the United States continues and the relationship between economic and political inequality remains of great concern (Cole, 2018), and the extent of economic inequality is an issue that causes conflict from China to Columbia, from England to Egypt, from Mexico to Morocco, and everywhere in between. Elite Democracy: The Irony of Democracy

Going back to the time of Socrates, elite theorists have been divided on whether elitism is good or bad for democracy. Plato writes of elites as guardians of democracy, whereas Thrasymachus, a friend of Socrates, exclaims (Plato, 1945, p. 18): In every case the laws are made by the ruling party in their own interest … By making these laws they define as right for their subjects whatever is for their own interest, and they call anyone who breaks them a wrongdoer and punish him accordingly.

More recently, a generation of introductory political science students has been exposed to this major debate. For example, 17 editions of the book Irony of Democracy by Thomas R. Dye and Harmon Zeigler (and now Louis Schubert) have contended that elitism in the United States has been good for democracy, whereas Michael Parenti (1994) argues along the line most notably established by C. Wright Mills that elitism is exploitative of the masses. In the United States the debate also surfaced in the popular press with the publication of William Henry’s In Defense of Elitism (1994)—a book that argued that the United States has suffered from too much democracy and not enough elite decision making. The counter argument—that democracy is not threatened by the masses but by today’s elites—was made by Christopher Lasch in his national bestseller The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (1995).17 Echoing Parenti somewhat, even the left’s Michael Moore made a bipartisan attack on elites in his book Stupid White Men (2004). Fueled by the major economic recession, lost retirements, too big to fail, etcetera, that started under President George W. Bush, this also led to the rise of both the Occupy Movement and the Tea Party, on the left and right (respectively). The word elite seems to have become not a honorific title of excellence, but an albatross to hang around a neck. Dye and Zeigler (2006) believe that, throughout American history, elites have always been more democratic than the masses. They array a wealth of polling data to support their claim. The masses are seen as too passionate, too emotional, too swayed by clever sound bites, and not strongly committed to basic democratic principles. Elites are more tolerant on issues such as freedom of speech, homosexual rights, and religious tolerance. The irony is, therefore, that for our democratic rights to survive, the elites must continue to govern and govern wisely. In short, Dye and Zeigler take a paternalistic approach to American government. Elites, who understand issues better than ordinary citizens, control government but generally have done so for the benefit of all.18 The contrary view offered by Michael Parenti in Democracy for the Few (1995), is that elites rule for the benefit of elites (which is an oligarchy). He puts it quite plainly in his 1994 text, Land of Idols, on the first page of chapter 1: “Government in the hands of the privileged and powerful will advance the interests of the privileged and powerful” (p. 3). Parenti and others follow a Marxist interpretation of American government. Karl Marx believed that interests are driven by economic concerns and that history is a struggle of class interests (people with different economic interests). The capitalists (who own the means of production) create laws and institutions that benefit their class at the expense of the proletariat (the working class). American democracy, according to Marxist elite theorists, is a fraud.

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Dye and Zeigler make a similar, but slightly less harsh, appraisal. Elections are seen as a ritual perpetuating the myth of control by the people; yet voters are merely picking personnel, not policy. Like most elite theorists, they do admit the masses influence elites and that elections create some accountability. According to Dye and Zeigler, for elections to mean what pluralists say they do (that they allow voters to determine policy), all four of the following conditions would have to be met (i.e., they are all necessary but only sufficient as a complete package): 1. 2. 3.

4.

Competing parties and candidates would have to offer clear policy alternatives rather than obscuring and obfuscating as they seek votes. Voters would have to be concerned with policy questions (well-informed and voting on the basis of policy concerns not personality or image). Election results would have to be interpretable in a way that would clarify majority preferences on these questions (but what if a person prefers and votes for Candidate X although disagreeing with his or her position on the death penalty?). Even if we pretend that the first three conditions are regularly met in the United States, unless elected officials are bound by their campaign positions (which might not be a good idea), the pledges of our politicians are not necessarily the policies we receive (Schubert, Dye and Zeigler, 2016, pp. 155–156).

The following list lays out the rudimentary principles of elite theory. It is important to remember that, fundamentally, elite theory and pluralism are competing, but not totally dissimilar, descriptions of how we “do” politics. You can accept either as a description without endorsing it as a prescription: 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

American government, like all large organizations, is dominated by elites (the few), not the masses (the many). Financial and social class background and control of large institutions are the most important political resources. While skilled and knowledgeable nonelites can rise to power, the norm is elites from society’s upper strata. Elites are more democratic than the masses (Dye and Zeigler). Elites primarily benefit themselves, not citizens (Mills/Parenti). Democracy and pluralism are, to a degree, a sham. While masses have some influence, elections are primarily ritualistic. Some, whom Dye and Zeigler call counter-elites, are seemingly elites, but are not as committed as elites to democracy and use scapegoating, intolerance, political division and diversion, etc. to (à la Animal Farm) gain power by claiming to be empowering the people.

Effect of Power Structures on the Policy Analyst Power structures create limits that directly affect the work of the policy analyst. Further, the analyst’s view of how government really operates (a descriptive view) and how government should operate (a normative view) is key to conducting a policy analysis. You know from our discussion of value conflict that different groups and individuals will have different perceptions of what are and are not policy problems and what are acceptable solutions to these problems. The analyst’s view of power determines the depth and breadth of stakeholders in any given policy area. This, in turn, determines what evaluative criteria are used and not used, what policies are suggested and not suggested, and ultimately what policies are chosen and how they are implemented. An analyst may believe that the system is controlled by elites but should be controlled by citizens. The analyst might make the decision to attempt to gather citizen views but ultimately give in to the political reality that they perceive, namely, that elites make policy choices. If an analyst

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Table 1.1 The Role of Policy Analysts and Their Normative View of Power Analyst’s View of Power

Stakeholder Decision

Outcome/Problem

Ideal democracy

The analyst includes all citizens as This is excellent for democracy in stakeholders. theory but unworkable in practice.

Representative democracy The analyst includes stakeholders who are politically important to the elected bodies that the analyst serves.

This is how democracy is supposed to work, but there are big problems with representative democracy.

Pluralism

The analyst includes all interest groups in a policy issue area.

Democracy may occur if indeed all citizens are represented by an interest group. The problem is that interest group formation is not equal. Some groups are much more powerful than other groups.

Elitism

The analyst only includes influential individuals as stakeholders.

The irony of democracy argues that this would be good for democracy. Critical elite theory argues that the interests of elites and the masses are not the same.

believes in the irony of democracy, the analyst would be convinced that the stakeholders should be elites because their policy ideas will ultimately benefit the masses. Conversely, an analyst might believe that the system is controlled by interest groups (pluralism) and therefore stakeholders would include only major interest groups involved in the policy area. While the analyst may want to include citizens, she would believe that their interests are represented by interest groups. Also, while she may worry that some interests are not represented by groups, she is comforted that because the system is open, new interest groups can easily form for non-represented interests. Another analyst may decide that he represents elected officials and they in turn represent citizens (representative democracy). This analyst would typically listen to the views of elected officials when making policy analysis choices. Finally, an analyst might decide that the system is controlled by elites and interest groups, but that citizens should really rule. This analyst may go out of her way to include citizens outside the major power structures in the political process. She may suggest policies that favor these citizens over more powerful elites and interest groups. This analyst may risk political repercussions and may have her job threatened or even eliminated by the influence of elites and interest groups. Table 1.1 demonstrates the choices facing the policy analyst and the implications of those choices. The center column focuses on stakeholders. In an informal way, we have already discussed the issue of stakeholder analysis. Not only is this a critical factor for policy analysts, but it is especially crucial for the view of policy analysis that this text endorses, and it is essential as you engage the case studies to follow. Thus, it is now time for a fairly thorough and formal discussion of stakeholders.

Stakeholder Analysis Stakeholder analysis, or mapping, is in one sense recognition that the policy process is political. It is recognition that there are actors whose cooperation, or at least willingness not to obstruct, is necessary for policy success. It is recognition that differences in values, roles, perceptions, and

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interests are probable. Consider for a moment the idea known as the stand/sit principle (sometimes called Miles’s Law). The essence of the stand/sit principle is the old cliché, “where you stand (on an issue) depends on where you sit.” The key idea is empathy. It is important to try to see things from others’ vantage points—not just to be nice, but to strategize. It is also recognition of power differences. The reality is that there are key players, political heavy hitters, and a need to put together coalitions and to gain the cooperation of other key organizations and agencies. One of your authors grew up in several very small towns. One of the things he learned is the idea of the Rule of Five (or four or six). The point is that in a small town, and in any policy arena, there is a small group of people with the power to kill or sustain almost any project. Sometimes their veto power is formal; other times it is not. Without their support, you are usually wasting your time. With their support, you are golden. In its simplest terms, performing a stakeholder analysis is a process used to inventory, rank, and assess the positions of the individuals, groups, and organizations (internal and external to your “organization”) affected by or interested in the organization, issue, program, or policy being considered. It is the act of determining the “who,” detailing what they value and want and how salient this issue is to them, evaluating the resources they can bring to bear effectively on both the adoption and implementation of policy, and strategizing about how to get them on board. Table 1.2 is a stakeholder map that captures the essential steps of the stakeholder analysis process. The most crucial aspect of performing a stakeholder analysis centers on correctly identifying who the stakeholders are, so before moving on, here are a few hints. (1) Very often the most important stakeholder will be the political executive (e.g., president, governor, mayor, county executive, etc.). (2) If you look around carefully, the key power brokers from the community, the essential representatives of the various populations and groups affected (e.g., union leaders), the key program managers and agency heads, and the most important elected officials (e.g., perhaps the head of a legislative committee who will have to authorize funding) are often rather obvious. (3) There are questions that can help you identify the stakeholders most likely to be consequential. Questions to ask include the following: • Are there actors whose support in implementation is vital? • Which actors control the resources (funding, personnel, legal authority, clients, etc.) that are indispensable? • Who has traditionally been consulted or given the right to influence or control this matter? • Do any of the actors have superior competence or reputations as eminent authorities in this area? • Are there any leaders of concerned groups of significant size or groups with intense interest in this issue? • Is there a leader whose support would be enough to grant legitimacy or at least compel serious consideration?

Bryson, Cunningham and Lokkesmoe (2002) provide a more visual approach to stakeholder analysis. They suggest a “power versus interest” grid with a horizontal axis of power and influence and a vertical axis of interest. Thus, they suggest that stakeholders fall into one of four categories: (1) a player (high interest, high influence), (2) a subject (high interest, low influence), (3) a context setter (low interest, high influence), and (4) a member of the crowd (low interest, low influence). Bryson et al. then use this initial grid to build a “stakeholder influence diagram,” where simple lines are drawn to show who each stakeholder influences and, in turn, who influences them. The information provided is very similar to our stakeholder map except that their technique is more visual. We often encourage our students to use both our mapping technique and the Bryson and colleagues’ visual approach. (You can find the grid online, search “Bryson stakeholder grid” using your favorite search engine.) As you can imagine, doing a thorough stakeholder analysis can take quite a bit of time and effort. Consequently, a formal mapping should be reserved for important issues and projects.

Cooperation (+) Or Opposition (−)

Values and Objectives Shaping Their Attitudes Salience of This Issue: High/ toward This Med./Low Matter

Stakeholders’ Attitude

Adoption Power Yes (Y) No (N)

Implementation Power Yes (Y) No (N) Who They Influence

Stakeholders’ Power

Who Influences Them

Note: Trying to rank stakeholders exactly is probably not worth the trouble, and the key players are probably self-evident after completing the map; however, it may be useful to use an asterisk to note those most essential to success (Rule of Five).

Internal and/or External

Stakeholders

Table 1.2 Stakeholder Map

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However, the analyst is always choosing, always determining who the “real” stakeholders are, deciding who to include in the process and who to exclude, and analyzing the political situation. For example, who can influence a key stakeholder whose support you deem critical? These are among the important and appropriate questions to ask. Merely being able to identify stakeholders, or even consciously expanding your definition of stakeholders to be more inclusive, are only the first steps. In any large organization, community, state, province, territory, or country, if you wish to shape policy, or even just understand it, you must move beyond stakeholder identification. A mistake that beginning analysts often make is concentrating too much on the technical aspects of conducting a stakeholder analysis (completing our map or Bryson’s grid) and not understanding how and why a stakeholder analysis would be used. Stakeholder analysis is an essential skill in today’s third face of policy analysis that recognizes the centrality of different opinions and the dynamic politics surrounding policy issues. Think about how to use the analysis. Orr, Colvin, and King (2006), for example, detail how such an analysis is used in river management efforts in England and Wales. They discuss the importance of engaging stakeholders early in the process, providing “clear information,” being transparent in what is being done, listening, and “providing opportunities for involvement” and input (Orr et al., 2006, p. 334). Then stakeholders help define problems and brainstorm solutions (Paula, Colvin and King, 2006). Hampton (2009) uses stakeholder analysis along with narrative policy analysis to help develop a “metanarrative” of a policy problem that is reflective of all stakeholders. It certainly could have helped you with the Waterville case. Realize though that critics will complain that such public involvement is too time consuming and inefficient and that getting stakeholders involved is no easy task. We agree that stakeholder analysis is not easy, but we argue that it is often essential for successful policy analysis and can be done in a way that furthers democracy (we develop these ideas in more detail in Chapter 8). We think stakeholder analysis is important enough to offer you another mini-case before ­wrapping the chapter up and having you move on to the large case that concludes the chapter.

Mini-Case: This Isn’t a Hilton Hotel, Ma’am

T

he new policy emerged from a perfect storm created by a number of local events, capped off by the imprisonment of a high-profile entertainment elite sent to jail for drunk driving (while on probation for drunk driving). The other major events included a prisoner escaping; a prison stabbing; a prisoner dying of a drug overdose from illegal drugs smuggled into the prison; an Associated Press article in the local paper about HIV/AIDS infections originating in prisons and resulting from jailhouse tattoos, sharing of heroin needles, and illicit and sometimes unwanted sex (rape), which was accompanied by an editorial by the paper’s editor wondering if “this too was a problem at the County Jail.” Your boss, the warden, announced the policy at the same press conference (yesterday) where he testily told a female news reporter who questioned both the safety of inmates in your care, and the appropriateness of the policy, “This isn’t a Hilton Hotel, ma’am—or Paris”—without even realizing his juxtaposition of the city and place (and the case at hand) reminded people of the 2007 media frenzy over a nationally high-profile case. The warden claimed the policy is set to go into place in 30 days, and it could (theoretically), even though this is the first you’ve heard of it. The policy? A strip search, including a full orifice check, for everyone coming into or out of the prison. (continued)

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As the assistant warden, you immediately recognized that once again, the warden made a snap decision without consulting you or any other important political powers (including elected officials), and without even thinking through an informal stakeholder analysis. Sure enough, this morning you were asked to complete a formal stakeholder mapping of the actors whose cooperation, acquiescence, or opposition will determine the policy proposal’s success. Now you have to inventory, rank, and assess the key players, the political heavy hitters, and the interested and affected. Who are they? If they are a group, who leads them? Is this individual’s support, or this group’s support, vital? What resources necessary to adoption or implementation do they control? What do they value and want? How important (salient) is this issue to them? What political resources might they apply to get their way? Do they affect (and how strongly) adoption and/or implementation of policy? Have they traditionally had control or strong influence over such a decision? Can opponents be brought around? Would it be worth the cost? Who influences them, and whom do they influence? Once again, glad you kept your favorite college textbook, you decide to use the stakeholder map from Chapter 1 of PPP (Public Policy Praxis). Luckily, you’ve assembled this entire group of policy analysts to help you brainstorm this. (It’s a good thing too, because your brilliant boss gave you less than half an hour to complete your task so that he can look it over before his meeting with the county executive.) Your job is not to defend or attack the proposal, not even to take a position on its likelihood of becoming policy. Instead, it is to set forth the political lay of the land for the warden. So, first you are going to list (without ranking) as many stakeholders as possible, including both internal and external stakeholders. Then you are going to decide if they will oppose this policy (−), support it (+), or be neutral (0). Given the time crunch, you are not going to worry too much about detailing the objectives/worldviews/priorities that shape their attitudes toward this matter—but some of them are obvious, so you will list those for your boss’s sake. Salience you will score as high (H), medium (M), or low (L). You will, of course, use Y or N (yes or no) to denote if they have adoption and/or implementation power. Finally, you will try to very briefly list who they influence, and who influences them, when relevant and recognizable without research. Good luck, and here’s one final set of hints. First, review the discussion on stakeholder analysis. Second, the most important task in stakeholder analysis is figuring out the “who”— everything else depends upon that. Therefore, as you work on this, consider if there are individuals or groups in the following categories: clients and those in the system who work with them before and after jail, employees, politicians, political/legal bodies, advisory groups, unions, interest/ advocacy groups, volunteer organizations, peer institutions, businesses, media, or the general public? Then, try to move beyond identification to thinking about their power and interests.

Concluding Thoughts Analysts must make a philosophical choice of who their stakeholders are and ultimately who their clients are. The choice is not necessarily one of being an elitist and defining your stakeholders narrowly or being more democratic and defining them broadly. The preferred choice may well be what Danziger (1995, p. 445) suggests: Once they have recognized the political power wielded by technological analysis, policy analysts must acknowledge their responsibility to communicate directly to the public—most likely through the popular press—to ensure that interested citizens have the intellectual ammunition to defend themselves in the midst of policy battles that affect them. This requirement means that students need

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C hapter 1  •  P olicy , P ower , P eople , P luralism , Y ou  to learn the rhetorical skills that will enable them to translate for the lay public the results of, for example, their complex regression analyses. Equally important, they must accept the task of educating citizens to question those quantitative results, perhaps by ensuring that the relevant counter-data are made available for public consumption as well.

This view expressed by Danziger sees the analyst as a potential neutral party in that he or she can reveal the hidden assumptions, ideologies, and values in data collection, problem definition, criteria establishment, and consequently in policies considered and not considered. In this view, then, being neutral does not mean being uninvolved. We will state explicitly what Danziger states implicitly: policy experts (including front-line public servants) have knowledge and expertise that they are morally bound to share. Education has often been termed a privilege, and privileges create responsibilities. Indeed, if you are not committed to making a difference, you should reconsider your choice to be a public administrator, social worker, policy analyst, probation officer, or the like. Within this framework, then, the most important goal for the analyst is to gather input from as many stakeholders as possible, given limited time frames. Realize that policy decisions will frequently favor some groups and individuals over others and that policymaking is always based, consciously or not, on some theory of power and government. The analyst should provide his or her policy decisions to elected officials honestly and perhaps should use persuasion to convince the elected officials to adopt policies that favor a wide cross-section of the society. Ultimately, policy adoption is the job of the elected official, but the policy analyst can play a crucial role in framing the debate. The case study that concludes this chapter—“The ‘Gig Economy’ Case: Uber (and Lyft) from Boise to Burlington” will draw you into the world of the policy analyst, forcing you to review, and employ, the major concepts covered in the chapter and encourages you to honestly consider the philosophical base from which you operate.

Glossary Terms dominant social paradigm (p. 5) focusing event (triggering event) (p. 14)

Hobson’s choice (p. 12) interest groups (p. 21) normative (p. 25)

paternalistic (p. 32) public goods (p. 6) win-win policy (p. 12)

The “Gig Economy” Case: Uber (and Lyft) from Boise to Burlington: Does Regulating Uber Protect Entrenched Businesses or Citizens? Policy Analysis in a Transformative Economy The Case The ride sharing firm Uber is a popular new business (an app and website) and acts as a conduit connecting individual drivers who are willing to share a ride with individuals needing transportation. Currently, operating in 60 countries, the business had an estimated worth of U.S.$50 billion in 2015 (MacMillan and Demos, 2015). Lyft, only founded in 2012 by Logan Green and John Zimmer, operates out of San Francisco, is valued at U.S.$15 billion, and largely operates on the same model as their Uber competition. (continued)

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Uber has roughly 110 million customers globally. They provide services in 65 countries and they have provided more than 10 billion trips annually (Iqbal, 2019). A Pew Research Center survey conducted in the fall of 2018 reported that, in contrast with a late 2015 survey where only 15 percent of the U.S. adult population said they had used a ride-hailing service, 36 percent of U.S. adults had done so, and for 18–29 year olds, slightly over half had done so. People living in urban or suburban areas are twice as likely as those living in rural areas to have done so. Their role paralleling taxi service is seen in the fact that only 2 percent said they use such a service daily, and only 4 percent reported doing so weekly (Jiang, 2019). Uber is part of what is known as the “gig economy,” a rapidly growing part of the U.S. economy. Other examples are Lyft (detailed above) HomeAway and Airbnb, and activities encompassed by the so-called sharing economy. The term gig, borrowed from the music scene where artists/bands landed temporary gigs for performances, is often described as a free-market system where people work as independent contractors more so than employees, often in temporary job positions. The companies involved save money on the costs of training, benefits/taxes and office space, while maintaining greater flexibility to change directions without worrying about their work force. Workers may be allowed to focus on job tasks they are more interested in, gain greater work–life flexibility and balance, especially when adding such a job on as a part-time job. They also lose certain benefits, including, generally, the right to file for unemployment and many of the other benefits that made traditional employment more popular than piece-work pay. In some cases, the difference between what makes sense (e.g., in terms of regulating a hotel and someone renting out their basement) seems obvious, in other cases, the differences are less obvious, as is the case with ride-sharing companies and taxis. Grounded in the use of analytics, Uber has revolutionized transportation for individuals (without their own transportation). Using what is termed “ride-sharing,” Uber is replacing the traditional taxi cab business in major urban areas such as New York City (Hu, 2017) and has provided new alternatives to public transportation. The process for a customer using Uber works something like this: 1. An individual starts with an email address and phone number. They can use a browser (https://m.uber.com/looking) or the Uber app which they have downloaded on their cell phone. 2. Using the website or app, the user enters their destination in the “where to” box. The user then can confirm a pick up location and can confirm that they have been matched to a nearby driver. 3. As your driver drives toward your pick up location, you can track their arrival. Uber provides you the driver’s name, car model, and license plate number of the car. 4. As the car arrives, Uber recommends that you check the information provided (driver’s name, car model, and license plate number) before you get into the car. Uber recommends that you ask your driver to confirm their name before you get into the car or at least before the car departs. 5. The driver then drives you to your destination. You then pay the driver in cash, use a credit card, or use the Uber cash balance. 6. You then have the opportunity to rate how well your trip went, make comments about your driver, and add a tip in the app. The rating of the driver is important in that it allows future passengers to evaluate whether they want to accept a ride with the driver.

How Uber Plays Politics Uber has been very successful not only at using new technology to build their business, but they have also used their technology to resist governmental regulation. In Virginia, for example, after a state official had declared that Uber was illegally conducting business within the state, Uber directed Uber users to email and phone the state official. Combined with an

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effective lobbying effort of the state government, Virginia eventually backed down (Helderman, 2014). Led by its chief lobbyist David Plouffe (Barack Obama’s political and campaign adviser), Uber has become a significant political force and its lobbying activities as measured in money have steadily increased since the creation of the business (see Figure 1.4). In 2018, Uber’s contributions to political candidates were highlighted by their largest contributions going to two well-known candidates, $10,180 to Republican Anthony Gonzalez (the former NFL player and now a U.S. Congressperson from Ohio) and $10,140 to Democrat Beto O’Rourke (the former U.S. House member who lost a race against Senator Ted Cruz in Texas) (Opensecrets.org, 2018).

Figure 1.4  Annual Lobbying by Uber Technologies

Uber Lobbying Totals $2,500,000

$2,000,000

$1,500,000

$1,000,000

$500,000

$0 2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Uber’s lobbying efforts are highlighted in an article in the Washington Post; consider this: Uber’s approach is brash and, so far, highly effective: It launches in local markets regardless of existing laws or regulations. It aims to build a large customer base as quickly as possible. When challenged, Uber rallies its users to pressure government officials, while unleashing its well-connected lobbyists to influence lawmakers. The company—which says its goal is to work with officials to change old laws that its executives argue don’t apply to a phone-app-based service—has carried out this approach repeatedly in cities and states across the country over the past year. It has upended long-­ entrenched taxi regulations while building itself into a technology giant valued at more than $40 billion. (Washington Post owner Jeffrey P. Bezos is an Uber investor.) (Helderman, 2014, paragraphs 10–11)

Criticisms of Uber and Efforts to Regulate Uber Some city governments and state government want to regulate the business with such measures as driver background checks, mandatory insurance, minimum wage laws, and annual inspections. In particular, cab drivers, both in the United States and Europe, have (continued)

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been unhappy with Uber’s movement into their markets and have complained that the unregulated Uber is unfairly driving them out of business (Fleisher, 2014) and are engaging in predatory pricing practices that while it leads Uber to lose money also drives out taxi and limo competition (Solomon, 2016). A rare political loss occurred in August 2018 when the “New York City Council voted on Wednesday in favor of a cap on the number of for-hire delivery and transportation vehicles on the city’s streets, striking a stunning blow to tech companies like Uber and Lyft” (Wodinsky, 2018). Others contend that Uber drivers are not making a livable wage and are not being paid at the minimum wage rate (McHugh, 2018). Furthermore, there are complaints that Uber has harmed public transportation in cities and thus has increased pollution and road congestion (Bliss, 2017; Schmitt, 2017). There have been well-publicized examples in the media of Uber drivers committing crimes. For example, a 2018 report by CNN claimed that there had been 103 Uber drivers accused of sexual assault or abuse (O’Brien et al., 2018).

Defenders of Uber Defenders of Uber contend that state and local governments in the United States are simply looking out for entrenched business interest and not the public interest. Gillespie (2014, paragraph 3) writes that while local governments claim that they are protecting public safety: In reality, regulators are often (always?) “captured” by the very business interests they are supposed to supervise and end up doing the bidding of existing business interests even when that screws customers or potentially innovative ways to deliver services.

Reynolds (2014, paragraph 8) writes similarly of regulatory efforts aimed at Uber: The truth is that although occupational regulation is usually presented as a protection for consumers, it’s usually demanded by the regulated industries themselves, and not by consumers at all. That’s not surprising, because it’s usually the regulated industries and the well-off people controlling them who benefit.

A similar concern is raised over California’s 2018 state court decision that limits business use of contract workers (Greenhut, 2018). The article contends that because of excessive regulation of business in California, it is harming employees. Quoting the article: Most of the nearly 2 million Californians who are independent contractors prefer to make their own schedules rather than show up 9–5 at the office. Ask your Uber driver, realtor or barber. The Department of Labor found that 79 percent of contractors prefer these working arrangements with fewer than 9 percent preferring traditional employment. (Greenhut, 2018, paragraph 8)

The article goes on to say that regulation worked in the 1800s but not in the burgeoning new economy.

Why Uber is a Good Public Policy Analysis Case Uber provides an interesting example of a new business model and a good case to explore the role of government and governmental policy in regulating business in the new world of the new technologically driven economy. Working through this case provides good experience and raises important questions for beginning policy analysts to tackle.

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Uber and Boise, Idaho Boise (2018 population of 205,671) is the state capital of Idaho and resides within a growing Boise City–Nampa, Idaho Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) with a population of 709,845. Boise is well known for its blue-turf college football team (the Boise State University Broncos) and its dedication to being the most livable city in the United States. With a bustling economy consisting of major corporate and government entities, Boise eventually became a market for Uber (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). Unlike more traditional businesses, Uber does not enter a market by applying for a ­business license and then starting their business in a city within an existing regulatory framework. Instead, in Boise as in other markets, they used social media to start an advertising campaign for drivers in September, 2014 and they started offering their ride-sharing services in October, 2014. In December, 2014, the City of Boise asked Uber to cease operations while the city government worked on a regulatory framework (Terhune, 2015). These regulatory issues included, according to the USA Today, “background checks for drivers, annual inspections by the city, requiring driver’s carry insurance, making drivers adhere to airport shuttle regulations, requiring drivers get physical and commercial licenses, and requiring Uber to get a business license” (Terhune, 2015). In February, 2015, the Boise City Council was working on a short-term (three-month) regulatory agreement with Uber when the company announced that it was ending its operations in Boise (Berg, 2015) after the council voted 4–2 against a temporary agreement. Council President Maryanne Jordan was quoted in the Idaho Statesman as being highly critical of Uber’s business model. With an Uber representative in attendance at the council meeting, the Idaho Statesman reported that Jordan took exception to Uber not following an informal agreement to not conduct business until Uber and the Boise City Council could agree upon regulations (Berg, 2015). Jordan is quoted: The business model is “We’re going to come in and do whatever we want, and it just doesn’t matter how you function in your community.” And I’m really uncomfortable with that precedent. If somebody went in and put up a building and said, “The heck with you. I don’t have to have inspections done. I don’t really care what the rules are. I’m doing it anyway,” we’d be dealing with that issue. (Berg, 2015, paragraph 6)

Jordan than added. “The choice to come in and operate illegally was not the choice of the city, and I can’t vote for this agreement” (Berg, 2015). Roughly, ten days later, Uber announced that it was withdrawing its business services from the city. Uber general manager Bryce Bennett was quoted in the USA Today in a letter to the Boise’s mayor and city council: The City is pursuing a workable and outdated regulatory framework that would make it impossible for Uber to operate in Boise. Rather than crafting rules that recognize that ridesharing is unique, as over 20 jurisdictions across the United States have done, the city is trying to fit a square peg in a round hole, with no end date for approval in sight. (Terhune, 2015, paragraph 3)

Despite Uber’s announcement, the Boise City Council continued to work on a regulatory framework into March. However, at the same time, an Uber lobbyist had “introduced” legislation in the Idaho Legislature that would create a more streamlined regulatory framework within Idaho and would forbid Idaho cities from regulating Uber (and similar companies). The bill passed the Idaho House 56–12. (continued)

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Russell (2015) sums up the bill this way: The bill, proposed by a lobbyist for Uber, which has been battling with the city of Boise over regulations, creates a new section of state law regulating “transportation network company” services, requiring that the cars can’t be hailed on the street and can only be arranged for online; companies shall have “zero tolerance” for drug or alcohol use by drivers; companies must do their own background checks on drivers; and they must comply with insurance laws. “No municipality or other local entity may impose a tax on, or require a license for, a TNC, a TNC driver, or a vehicle used by a TNC driver,” the bill says. It also includes an emergency clause, making it effective immediately upon passage.

The Idaho Senate then passed the bill (Russell, 2015) and Governor Otter allowed it to take effect without his signature. In his letter explaining his decision, Governor Otter wrote: I have worked hard to ensure that my years in public service reflect my political principles. Two of those principles are an emphasis on local control and a bias for free-market solutions. In House Bill 262, those two principles conflict, and I am left with the difficult choice of choosing one over the other. Instead, I am choosing and encouraging watchful caution. (Otter, 2015, paragraph 2)

Since this state law went into effect, Uber has operated in Boise. In April, 2016, the Idaho Statesman ran a story about how Uber had lowered its per mile fare from $1.75 to $1.00 and how that had negatively impacted drivers, with one driver claiming that he makes roughly five dollars an hour after taking into account wear and tear on his car and other expenses (Kyle, 2016). The same article provides information from Uber and a driver that Uber referred the newspaper to that the lower fares meant more riders for Uber drivers (Kyle, 2016). In October, 2018, the Idaho Statesman ran a story about Uber (and rival firm, Lyft) drivers in Boise (Maier, 2018). The article provided a federal report that most “gig” workers do it as a hobby or to supplement income, with 16 percent of gig workers using the job as their main income (Maier. 2018). The same article provided data from an economic modeling study that found, “The number of those individuals working in ‘taxi services’ in the Boise area increased nearly 586 percent from 2010 to 2017” whereas the full-time taxi service workers had declined (Maier, 2018, paragraph 8). The same article provides testimonies from Uber and Lyft drivers with some saying that it would be impossible to support oneself as a full-time Uber (and Lyft) driver in Boise whereas others told more positive stories about driving for fun and as a way to supplement income for groups such as stay at home parents, retirees, or those with health issues that forbade full-time work. Also, in October, 2018, an article in the Idaho Statesman revealed that Uber (and Lyft) drivers were allowed to park in the Boise airport’s waiting lane although that lane is reserved for private cars (commercial taxi services pay for their own parking areas) and the article makes the point that the Boise Airport (run by the City of Boise) cannot do anything about Uber drivers parking in the lane due to Idaho law (Berg, 2018).

Burlington, Vermont and Lyft/Uber versus Taxis Burlington (2015 population of 42,452), the most populous city in Vermont, and hosting Vermont’s largest airport and hospital, is located in the northwestern part of the state. Bordering Lake Champlain, home to the University of Vermont and the beautiful public square on Church Street, it is correctly known as a very progressive place (based on things such as becoming—in 2015—the first city in the U.S. to operate entirely on renewable energy,

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its many parks and greenway, being the home of Ben & Jerry’s, preservation of its old New England buildings, history, and local business, and its former mayor and now U.S. Senator, Bernie Sanders). The state capital city, Montpelier, has a population under 10,000, although it is estimated the population more than doubles during the day due to many jobs in the city filled by those who live outside the city limits (Wikipedia, 2019). On July 1, 2018 a new state law targeting the gig economy went into effect in Vermont, that supersedes (overrides) all local ordinances. Targeting both ride-sharing regulation and short-term rental services, Vermont joined almost every other state in now having state-wide regulation of Uber and Lyft. One notable exception is Louisiana where the state senate president (a Republican) in August 2018 managed to kill a bill with broad bipartisan support (it passed their GOP controlled House 97–1 and had the support of the Democratic governor) (Weiss-Tisman, 2018). Critics claimed he did so at the behest of a politically powerful player friend of his who sells insurance to taxicab companies—the political powerbroker says it is simply about public safety (Allen, 2018). Though, as is often the case across the United States and across industries, Uber and Lyft have both often pursued state or federal regulation so as to reduce the time and dollar costs of differing regulations and approval processes in each locale, in Vermont where both Uber and Lyft were widely established already, Uber fought the bill, even though its requirements seem quite minimal (primarily, requiring background checks on drivers be performed by the companies and that companies carry insurance for its drivers, including something called “Med Pay” in Vermont. The sponsor of the bill, Burlington’s state representative, Jean O’Sullivan, noted this opposition, and during hearings on the bill an Uber lobbyist suggested it could cause the company to decide not to operate in Vermont. Med Pay calls for paying out $5,000 immediately after an accident “regardless of who’s at fault.” Representative O’Sullivan believes the legislature has a responsibility to figure out how to protect gig economy workers. After passage, Uber said it would comply and a Lyft spokesperson said they were thrilled with the law (Weiss-Tisman, 2018). In a personal interview with one of the authors in late December 2018 an independent taxi operator argued that it was inherently unfair that taxis were still heavily regulated, while their competition used lobbyists (including one of the two companies whom he claimed had hired as a manager a relative of someone sitting on a commission that regulates taxis) to operate with very little oversight. While the exact nature of his claims could not be verified, the complaint is a common sort of sentiment across the country by taxi companies who, correct or not, it must be noted, previously had a sort of monopoly on the business, and government regulated how many drivers and vehicles were allowed. It is also true that Uber initially did not provide insurance, and when they did provide it kept the total coverage for those injured or killed quite minimal (Weiss-Tisman, 2018). Lyft’s record on this is better, but—of course—they are still a big business trying to make as large a profit as possible.

Questions to Consider 1. Does government have an interest in regulating ride-hailing companies like Uber and Lyft? If yes, what are they? If no, why not? 2. What about protecting workers in the gig economy generally—is that a responsibility of the government? If not, what sort of problems might occur and why did government start regulating things such as working hours and working conditions in the first place?

(continued)

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P art 1  •  O verview 3. Based on the case information provided, what role did it seem democracy played in the decision in Idaho to pass a state-wide bill? Was democracy at play in Boise? What questions or information would you want in answering these questions? Should cities such as Burlington be able to regulate a company like Lyft more than the state would? 4. The first chapter introduces narratives, value conflict, backward loops, and models of democracy (among other concepts). Now that you have read this case, complete the following tasks: a. What are the conflicting (for simplicity sake, two) policy narratives about Uber? (Who are the heroes, villains, and victims in each narrative, who are the storytellers, and what is the moral of the stories?) b. How does such a narrative analysis help a policy analyst understand an issue such as governmental regulation of Uber or the broader gig economy? Be sure to cite the chapter where appropriate. c. What are backward loops and how do they play out in the gig economy case? Provide a couple of examples. What role do such backward loops play in public opinion about Uber or Lyft? Do you believe that individuals make up their own mind about issues like this or rely upon or get persuaded by their favorite linkage mechanism? Perhaps they reject the narratives of certain linkage mechanisms based on experience; for example, “I used the Lyft app on my vacation and it was simple, easy, and cheaper than a cab” … does that anecdotal type of evidence impact my views more than it should? Why is it helpful for a policy analyst to understand backward loops? Be sure to cite the chapter where appropriate.

Your professor might also use the case to have you “do” policy analysis. Here are some of the tasks they might assign in addition to the questions above: 1. Choose either the Idaho or Vermont case and complete a stakeholder analysis (in either case the governor of the respective state has asked you conduct this analysis). Identify the many interests in this case. 2. How will you use the stakeholder analysis? Be specific. 3. Reflect on your stakeholder analysis: a. Which view of power and democracy shaped your stakeholder analysis? For example, what groups did you include or exclude? b. What different narratives are being told by the stakeholders? c. How do narratives help you understand competing interests and how can they be used in a stakeholder analysis?

In the Online Teaching Appendix, we also provide instructors with how the case can be used with Chapters 2 and 3.

References Allen, Rebekah. 2018. “Louisiana Senate President Sank Ride-Sharing Bill. His Close Pal Sells Insurance to Cabs.” The Advocate Aug. 23. www.propublica.org/article/louisiana-senatepresident-john-alario-sank-ride-sharing-bill (accessed July 2, 2019). Berg, Sven, 2018. “Lyft and Uber Drivers Clog the Boise Airport’s Waiting Lane, and It’s Perfectly Legal.” Idaho Statesman. October 8. http://idahostatesman.com/news/local/community/boise/ article219577415.html (accessed December 30, 2018). Berg, Sven. 2015. “Tension Marks Boise’s Uber Hearing.” Idaho Statesman. February 11. http:// idahostatesman.com/news/local/community/our-community-blog/article40841679.html (accessed December 29, 2018).

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C hapter 1  •  P olicy , P ower , P eople , P luralism , Y ou  Bliss, Laura. 2017. “The Ride-Hailing Effect: More Cars, More Trips, More Miles.” Citylab. October 12. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/04/more-americans-are-using-ridehailing-apps/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=095220312f-EMAIL_ CAMPAIGN_2019_01_03_07_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70095220312f-399539009 (accessed June 30, 2019) . Bliss, Laura. 2017. “The Ride-Hailing Effect: More Cars, More Trips, More Miles.” Citylab. October 12. https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/10/the-ride-hailing-effect-morecars-more-trips-more-miles/542592 (accessed December 29, 2018). Fleisher, Lisa. 2014. “Thousands of European Cab Drivers Protest Uber, Taxi Apps.” Wall Street Journal. www.wsj.com/articles/londons-black-cab-drivers-protest-against-taxi-apps1402499319 (accessed December 29, 2018). Gillespie, Nick. 2014. “Local Governments are Going after Ride Services like Uber & Lyft to Help Politically Connected Businesses, Not Customers. Any Questions?” Reason: Free Minds and Free Markets. June 10. https://reason.com/blog/2014/06/10/local-governments-are-going-afterride-s (accessed December 29, 2018). Greenhut, Steven. 2018. “California Work Rules Sabotage the Gig Economy.” Reason: Free Minds and Free Markets. December 28. https://reason.com/archives/2018/12/28/californias-workrules-sabotage-the-gig (accessed December 30, 2018). Helderman, Rosalind S. 2014. “Uber Pressures Regulators by Mobilizing Riders and Hiring Vast Lobbying Network.” Washington Post. December 13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ uber-pressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-riders-and-hiring-vast-lobbying-network/2014/12/13/ 3f4395c6-7f2a-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html (accessed December 29, 2018). Hu, Winnie. 2017. “Uber, Surging in Manhattan, Tops Taxis in New York City.” New York Times. October 12. www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/nyregion/uber-taxis-new-york-city.html?module=inline (accessed December 29, 2018). Iqbal, Mansoor. 2019, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics (Updated: May 10). www.businessofapps. com/data/uber-statistics/ (last accessed July 1, 2019). Jiang, JingJing. 2019. “More Americans are Using Ride-hailing Apps.” Pew Research Center. January 4. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/04/more-americans-are-using-ridehailing-apps/(accessed July 2, 2019). Kyle, Zach. 2016. “Boise Uber Drivers Struggle with Lower Fares.” April 22. “https://www. idahostatesman.com/news/business/article73336687.html” (accessed December 30, 2018). MacMillan, Douglas, and Telss Demos. 2015. “Uber Valued at More than $50 Billion.” Wall Street Journal. July 31. www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-1438367457 (accessed December 30, 2018). Maier, Alison. 2018. “Valley Residents Embrace Gig Economy, either to Make Ends Meet or Make Sure They Overlap.” Idaho Statesman. October 16. www.idahostatesman.com/news/business/ business-insider/article219624475.html (accessed December 30, 2018). McHugh, Molly. 2018. “Can Full-Time Uber and Lyft Drivers Make a Livable Wage?” The Ringer. www.theringer.com/tech/2018/10/17/17989196/uber-lyft-minimum-wage-ridesharingeconomy (accessed December 29, 2018). O’Brien, Sarah Ashley. 2018. “CNN Investigation: 103 Uber Drivers Accused of Sexual Assault or Abuse.” CNN. April 30. https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/30/technology/uber-driver-sexualassault/index.html (accessed December 29, 2018). OpenSecrets.org. 2018. Uber Technology: Profile for 2018 Election Cycle. www.opensecrets.org/ orgs/summary.php?id=D000067336 (accessed December 29, 2018). Otter, C.L. “Butch”. 2015. Letter to Idaho Speaker of the House. April 6. http://media.spokesman. com/documents/2015/04/govletter-uberbill.pdf (accessed December 30, 2018). Reynolds, Glenn Harland. 2014. “Regulators Wreck Uber Innovation: Column.” USA Today, June 9. www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/06/09/uber-lyft-taxi-transportation-regulatorscolumn/10198131/(accessed December 29, 2018).

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P art 1  •  O verview Russell, Betsy Z. 2015. “Otter Lets Uber Bill Become Law without His Signature.” The SpokesmanReview. April 6. www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2015/apr/06/otter-lets-uber-bill-becomelaw-without-his-signature/(accessed December 30, 2018). Schmitt, Angie. 2017. “Uber and Lyft are Cannibalizing Transit in Major American Cities.” StreetsblogUSA. October 13. https://usa.streetsblog.org/2017/10/13/uber-and-lyftare-cannibalizing-transit-in-major-american-cities/(accessed December 29, 2018). Solomon, Brian. 2016. “Uber Sued for Predatory Pricing by San Francisco Taxi Company.” Forbes. November 12. www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/11/02/uber-sued-flywheel-predatorypricing-by-san-francisco-taxi-antitrust/#16edfcd74fca (accessed December 29, 2018). Terhune, Katie. 2015. “Uber Stops Operating in Boise, Dismisses City’s Proposal.” USA Today. February 26. www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/02/26/uber-stops-operating-boise-idaho/ 24079193/(accessed December 30, 2018). U.S. Census Bureau. www.census.gov/quickfacts/boisecitycityidaho (last accessed June 30, 2019). Weiss-Tisman, Howard. 2018. “New Vermont Rules Regulate ‘Gig Economy’ Companies, Including Airbnb And Uber.” Vermont Public Radio, September 4, 2018. http://digital.vpr.net/post/ new-vermont-rules-regulate-gig-economy-companies-including-airbnb-and-uber#stream/0 (accessed July 2, 2019). Wikipedia. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burlington,_Vermont (accessed June 30, 2019). Wodinsky, Shoshana. 2018. “In Major Defeat for Uber and Lyft, New York City Votes to Limit Ridehailing Cars.” The Verge, August 8, 2018.

Overview Reading For more information and a good overview of the regulatory fights over Uber, see Quinton, Sophie. 2015. “How Should Uber be Regulated?” Pew. November 24. www.pewtrusts.org/ en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/11/24/how-should-uber-be-regulated, (accessed December 6, 2019).

Notes 1 Political scientists always make a distinction between big D “Democratic” and small d “democratic.” The former is used to denote the Democratic Party. The latter is used to denote democracy in general without any reference to partisanship. 2 The paragraph is a description of doing laundry. 3 Although 3.5 percent might sound insignificant, the Rule of Seventy tells us that this rate of growth would double the population in 20 years. To calculate the time for doubling, simply divide the rate of growth into 70. 4 Inspired by the metaphor of living organisms, the German apologist General Karl Haushofer used Rudolf Kjellen’s idea on “living space,” or Lebensraum, to justify Nazi imperialism, arguing that Germany had to either expand or die. It did both. 5 For an excellent case study of the politics of AIDS problem definition, see Shilts (1987). 6 David Schuman’s concise discussion (1991, pp. 78–83) of the unfolding AIDS epidemic and of Surgeon General Koop’s role in this story was also a helpful source for our portrayal of this issue. 7 Like all discussions of political systems, we owe a debt to David Easton (1965). Our model is an adaptation of his systems model. 8 Another pertinent and equally famous definition of politics was penned when David Easton (1965) defined politics as the “authoritative allocation of values.” 9 In other than a major media market, the elite drinking binge story would most likely never be covered (despite the real bias of the media toward sensationalism, scandal, and hype). Because media management is typically part of the community’s elite network, and the media rarely devours its own, don’t hold your breath waiting for this story. 10 Throughout the text, the term citizen will be used to refer to nonelite individuals as differentiated from interest group leaders and other elites. While we clearly recognize that such elites are citizens, we prefer to use the term to denote the common person. 11 This discussion leans heavily on one of the most noted theorists of democracy, Robert Dahl, and, in particular, on his text Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance (1972, p. 39) and Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (1983, p. 6).

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12 A widely cited poll conducted for the Washington Post (October 12, 1995) showed 59 percent of the public able to name all three of the Three Stooges but only 17 percent able to correctly identify three of the nine Supreme Court justices (Biskupic, 1995). 13 An early elaboration of elitism is Gaetano Mosca (1939). 14 Please note that pluralism would view apathy as a good sign of democracy. Citizens are satisfied with the system and do not want changes. Ironically, as you will see shortly, some elite theorists also believe apathy is good, but for a very different reason. 15 Critics sometimes point out that we are rarely taught about organizing and policy victories by the weak. See Si Kahn’s classic text on organizing (1991) and Howard Zinn’s A People’s History (1980). 16 The tree metaphor is a useful teaching method found in Reynolds and Vogler (1991). The tree metaphor will also surface later in our discussion of decision trees and is used in a somewhat different manner in Charles E. Lindblom’s classic works on policy formulation (including “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’” (1959a); and in A Strategy of Decision (1970), coauthored by David Braybrooke). 17 We note that the discussion that follows draws heavily on introductory American government textbooks. We purposely chose these works because they provide an appropriately general overview to the debate about elite interpretation that is desirable for applied policy analysis. 18 However, Dye and Zeigler do worry that, increasingly, American elites have been making policy more often for their own short-term benefit.

Part II: Theory and Practice Rationality, Nonrationality, Politics, and The Policy Process

Chapter 2

The Rational Public Policy Method

Mini-Cases “The Portersville Health Clinic” “Democracy or Science? Climate Change and GMOs” Chapter Roadmap: To understand and evaluate the rational model of policy analysis, you need to understand its genesis, history, and evolution, including the critical reaction it spurred. After providing you with that base we explain the rational model and present one example (Vietnam) where it is traditionally blamed, perhaps erroneously, for producing poor policy. Next we offer a case that demonstrates how the rational model can help policy analysis, and we discuss its relevance in practice. We then provide you with the tools necessary to evaluate this and other models before reviewing the status of the rational model, sharing some concluding thoughts about all of these important topics and how they relate to material coming in future chapters, and then finally closing the chapter by letting you grapple with a second case that not only relates to two pressing global issues, and material covered up to this point, but also foreshadows an important issue central to the last half of the book—democracy.

Genesis of the Rational Model The debates over the U.S. Constitution revolved around notions of decentralization versus centralization and participation versus hierarchy. Alexander Hamilton, who favored a strong executive and decision making by experts, argued that democratic decision making could not be made by emotional citizens. Instead, Hamilton envisioned a democracy in which an enlightened few made policy in the best interests of the masses. Others such as Thomas Jefferson, although he was not in Philadelphia for the Convention, expressed the belief that democracy must be about decentralization and empowerment of the ­people. In theory, the Constitution created a republican (representative) system of checks and ­balances and separation of powers that would allow for calm deliberation. In practice, however, the initial reality was that Jefferson’s view predominated more than Hamilton’s. For at least the first 100 years, the United States was a country with a relatively small federal government.1 The political philosophy of the country was primarily one of laissez-faire economics, combined with an understanding that the primary role of the federal government was to protect property, control interstate commerce, and to both control and protect U.S. interests in the realm of

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international trade. The general agreement was that ultimately the states had the responsibility and authority to maintain the safety, health, welfare, and morals of the people under the Constitution. Unfortunately, or perhaps inevitably, Jefferson’s view of a decentralized government educating citizens in the principles of civic virtue was not realized either. Instead, even ignoring the issue of slavery, state and local governments were plagued by patronage, corruption, and generally sloppy decision-making practices. Many of these problems got worse during the Civil War. At the federal level, government had been transformed by the mid-1800s from what Mosher (1982) termed a Government by Gentlemen to a system of patronage and frequent corruption. At the same time, after the Civil War, American society changed fundamentally from an insular agrarian country to an international and urbanized country. For the first time in its history, the country had to deal on a large scale with problems like crime, poverty, pollution, monopolization of industry, economic trade issues, and the growth of technology. These new problems generated the need for complex policy and competent civil servants. The assassination of President Garfield in July 1881 at Union Station in Washington DC, by a disgruntled job seeker named Charles Julius Guiteau, helped spur Congress into creating a merit-based civil service by passing the Pendleton Act in 1883. This represented the first attempt to rationalize the bureaucracy and hence to rationalize government decision making. In accordance with Max Weber’s dictum of the ideal bureaucracy, the federal bureaucracy was staffed (ideally) by neutral experts who would make decisions not under the influence of the irrationalities of politics, but rather through rational, competent, businesslike, and scientific methods of analysis.2 Political scientist Woodrow Wilson, long before he became president, published The Study of Administration (1887), making a complex argument that politics and administration should be ­separated, largely to protect the administrative sphere from partisanship, exploitation, and corruption. The separation of politics and administration is known as the politics/administration ­dichotomy. Others followed Wilson’s path. Goodnow (1900), more focused on this issue than ­Wilson, attempted to make clear the distinction between politics (legislation that follows the public will) and administration (the execution of that legislation by experts). Gulick (1937) argued that, over time, the decisions of government would become so complex that only expert bureaucracies could make informed and sound public policies.

The Rational Public Policy Method in Theory The theories of scientific management—an idea most closely associated with the work of F ­ rederick Winslow Taylor (1911)—also influenced the interpretation of what the relationship should be between politics and administration. Taylor, who pioneered time and motion studies, suggested that there was one best way to organize and accomplish tasks. The scientific practice of administration seemed clearly at odds with, and superior to, the idea of politics.3 In 1945 Herbert Simon introduced his classic work Administrative Behavior, which sought to overthrow what he termed the proverbs of classic public administration theory found in the work of Gulick, Goodnow, and Wilson. Simon wrote that ultimately public administration is about decision making and that decision making involves some variant of three steps: scanning the environment, developing alternatives, and choosing alternatives. Despite his emphasis on science instead of proverbs, his ideas actually reinforced the politics/ administration dichotomy. Denhardt (2008, p. 71) writes, “Actually, Simon’s conclusions were far less a departure from the mainstream of work in the field than his harsh language implied.” Simon replaced the politics/administration dichotomy with the fact/value dichotomy and focused the study of public administration away from ends and onto means. Denhardt concludes that Simon’s major contribution was his emphasis on logical positivism, which separates facts and values, and his implicit endorsement of “generic” administration, which, according to Denhardt, led to a situation in which “more and more concern would be focused on means rather than ends, on administrative

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techniques rather than political principles.” In short, Simon argued that decision making, as well as decision administration, can follow the scientific method. The rational model of decision making led to a host of rational models that all aimed at eliminating sloppy, uninformed, and “off the top of your head” decision making. Simon believed that we could and should separate “facts” from “values.” Furthermore, he believed that decisions could be made scientifically, using, among other things, computer modeling and mathematical models.4 The social sciences have long envied the more prestigious hard sciences—data-based, cloaked in the power of numbers, and supposedly objective and free from the pollution of politics and culture. It is clear that the rational model was an attempt to move human decision making away from the emotional and sometimes corrupt world of politics to what was perceived as the calculated, dispassionate, impartial, and honest world of science. In general, this school of thought is called logical positivism, or, simply, positivism. Logical positivism is a scientific system that recognizes only nonmetaphysical and observable phenomena. The impact of this philosophy in many areas, including public policy analysis, has been extensive. It suggests training analysts to be value-neutral, to objectively observe facts, and to let these empirical realities tell their own stories. Positivism has dominated policy analysis. Within this still dominant worldview, the job of the analyst is to specify procedures to gather facts about the world as it is, to present those facts without error or prejudice, to f­ormulate rational policy alternatives, and then to allow the politicians to make purposeful policy that will help solve the policy problem. An ice-cold, impartial review and evaluation of the policy should follow. All of this fits nicely with Gulick’s call for informed and sound policy decisions by an expert bureaucracy. A Critical Reaction

There were many, most notably Robert Dahl, who were severely critical of the separation of facts from values (Denhardt, 2008, pp. 72–73). This debate is not new; it dates back at least to the time of ancient Greece, when Plato suggested rule by philosopher kings who would make rational decisions. This argument disgusted the sophists. The sophists believed that facts are simply what we are persuaded of (Danziger, 1995). In the modern era, some critics argue that the rational model is impossible to achieve. On the other side of the coin, some critics argue against the use of the rational model on the grounds that, when utilized, it produces poor policy.5 (We will address the critiques of the rational model much more thoroughly in Chapter 4.) A commonly cited, but not necessarily correct, example of the rational model producing poor policy can be found in the history of U.S. involvement in the conflict we call the Vietnam War. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson ­during the Vietnam War. Vietnam was, in fact, often called McNamara’s war. Prior to his arrival at the Pentagon, McNamara had been the president of Ford Motor Company. He and his whiz-kid staff tried to bring with them an approach widely known as systems analysis. This management approach to organization and budgeting was based on statistics, defining clear objectives, examining longterm cost and benefit ratios, and systematically monitoring and evaluating progress.6 McNamara and the Pentagon were routinely attacked for an overreliance on quantification— including the infamous use of body counts to prove that our side was winning. Jerome Agel (1972, p. 76), in an essay indirectly aimed at systems analysis, once took a slap at the legendary Public Broadcasting System show Sesame Street, arguing that “kids are razzle-dazzled with four following three—which is exactly what the guys who gave us Vietnam and pollution know.” The general critique was that while carefully counting the trees, the managers of our war effort completely missed the forest. It is not too much to claim that the close association of the rational model with the carrying out and defense of U.S. policy in Vietnam was enough to largely discredit this model in the minds of a great many people.

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For example, in their history of U.S. foreign policy from 1939 to the mid-1990s, America Ascendant, Thomas G. Paterson and J. Garry Clifford (1995, p. 151) state: “Management” became one of the catchwords of the time. They had an inordinate faith in data. When a White House assistant attempted to persuade Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the “whiz kid” from Ford Motor, that the Vietnam venture would fail, McNamara shot back: “Where is your data? Give me something I can put in the computer. Don’t give me your poetry.” Danger lurked in a heavy reliance on quantified information.

Stanley Karnow (1991), author of the premier text on the Vietnam War, writes the following: McNamara … looked at the figures and concluded optimistically after only forty-eight hours in the country that “every quantitative measurement … shows that we are winning the war.” No conflict in history was studied in such detail as it was being waged … But the statistics somehow failed to convey an accurate picture of the problem, much less offer solutions. For the missing element in the “quantitative measurement” that guided McNamara and other U.S. policymakers was the qualitative dimension that could not easily be recorded. (p. 271) Approaching the Vietnam challenge like industrial managers … Washington strategists reckoned that larger investments of men, money and material would logically yield larger results. (p. 284)

And Loren Baritz (1998), author of Backfire (arguing that American exceptionalism and culture, our technology and our bureaucracy, led inexorably to the disaster of Vietnam), almost got it right when discussing the noise, and political and bureaucratic problems that affected the analysts and blocked rational analysis. But, in the end, he, too, resorts to the familiar critique, citing a critic who characterized systems analysis as a model that “discourages the study of one’s opponents, his language, politics, culture, tactics, and leadership.” He sums this up with the observation that “By now, this is a familiar point. Systems analysis reinforced the traditional American assumption that the enemy, or anyone else, is just like us” (p. 248). Yet we believe that even a shallow reading of McNamara’s (1996) own riveting and moving history of the Vietnam War, In Retrospect, makes clear that the problem could not have been the following of the rational model, because it was not used.7 To help you decide whether it was used or not, we will briefly delineate the rational model. We will then briefly examine whether or not Vietnam was a case of rational decision making or not.

The Rational Model in Practice The rational model suggests the determination, clarification, weighting, and specification of goals/objectives/values (in other words, of the ends). Next, all plausible, available alternative means should be listed and their likelihood of achieving the ends carefully scrutinized. All relevant c­ onsequences and reactions (including side-effects, spillovers, and externalities) would be ­forecast. Then ­methods  are to be ranked, and the most appropriate method and implementing agent(s) ­chosen, to achieve the most desirable outcome. Decisions should then be made about how to measure success, gather feedback, and evaluate the policy. Review would happen as the policy environment is scanned, changes noted, and adjustments (or even policy termination) occur. All of this is to happen with analysts operating with stony neutrality, robotic efficiency, and no politics to taint the expert’s choices. In essence, the rational model is about the following: • gathering sufficient data and expert analysis; • understanding the problem (including its seriousness, scope, and sociopolitical history);

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• discerning and operationalizing goals with clarity and precision so as to make them achievable and prioritized; • intense and thorough thinking so that the ends drive the selection of the means; • reasoned choice based on calculation, comparison, and cost-benefit ratios8 so as to maximize the probability of the effective and efficient attainment of the determined objectives.

In addition, the rational model assumes that more information is always better, and that providing decision makers with more choices is a good thing. Somewhat contradictorily, it also assumes that the cognitive limits of our brains are a bad thing, while denying this plays a significant role, and ignores issues such as information overload. The rational model has appeal, including providing a methodology that seems to make sense and that has pragmatic value. The best example of that method is a simple five-step model. In Chapter 6 we will teach it to you in detail and flesh out its complexity, and provide you opportunities to practice its use, but as you move forward we thought it important to introduce it now, in this chapter on the rational model. The five-step model sets forth this plan: first, define the problem and determine its causes; second, establish criteria to evaluate alternatives; third, generate policy alternatives; fourth, evaluate and select policies; and fifth, evaluate the adopted policy. Figure 2.1 shows a policy decision that hinges on rational analysis. Presumably, an objective expert would have studied the problem and gathered facts to analyze. Goals would have been carefully thought through, articulated, and operationalized so that the costs and benefits of the alternative means evaluated are relevant to the desired ends.9 In this example, only two alternative policies are being weighed, but in the rational model all possible alternatives are considered. If all of this happens accordingly, theoretically the decisional teeter-totter will tilt toward the policy most likely to produce the optimal outcome. Of course, later policy evaluation will review how the policy is working and begin the process all over again.

Figure 2.1  The Decisional Teeter-Totter: A Graphic Presentation of the Rational Model Policy #1 Costs/Benefits

Policy #2 Costs/Benefits

Rational Evaluation

The following excerpts offer three substantive verbatim quotes from Robert McNamara’s book that perfectly capture the essence of his tale. (If you doubt this, see also pages xxi, 37, 39, 55, 63, 122, 152, 162, 175, 182, 191, 223, 235, 261, 264, 300, 316, and 332 for more great examples of a story that repeats itself so much it is almost a quagmire.) His ultimate insider account strongly contests the idea that the problem was the use of the rational model. Consider these three key quotes: 1.

Moreover, Johnson was left with a national security team that, although it remained intact, was deeply split over Vietnam. Its senior members had failed to face up to the basic questions that had confronted first Eisenhower and then Kennedy: Would the loss of South Vietnam pose a threat to U.S. security serious enough to warrant extreme action to prevent it? If so, what kind of action should we take? Should it include the introduction of U.S. air and ground forces? Launching attacks against North Vietnam? Risking war with China? What would be the ultimate cost of such a program in economic, military, political, and human terms? Could it succeed? If the chances were low and the costs were high, were there other courses—such as neutralization or withdrawal—that deserved careful study and debate? (p. 101)

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I have quoted extensively from my memo for two reasons: to show how limited and shallow our analysis and discussion of the alternatives to our existing policy in Vietnam—i.e., neutralization or withdrawal—had been; … we never carefully debated what U.S. force would ultimately be required, what our chances of success would be, or what the political, military, financial, and human costs would be if we provided it. Indeed, these basic questions went unexamined. (p. 107) The risk of Chinese escalation and the possibility that air attacks would neither break the will nor decisively reduce the ability of the North to continue supporting the insurgency in the South were recognized. But, because no better alternative appeared to exist, the majority of the group meeting in Saigon favored such attacks! This was the sort of desperate energy that would drive much of our Vietnam policy in the years ahead. Data and analysis showed that air attacks would not work. (p. 114)10

Rationality or Something Else? We repeat our questions. Was the U.S. pursuit of the Vietnam War hurt by, or would it perhaps have been helped by, more rationality? Is it accurate to characterize decision making at the highest levels of government during the Vietnam War as following the rational model, or is it more accurate to claim that it was not used? The story of decision making told by Robert McNamara reminds us not of the rational model, but of the model of decision making best described in Richard Neustadt and Ernest May’s 1986 book, Thinking in Time. Neustadt and May argue that policymaking is predominantly marked by the following characteristics, which are antithetical to the rational model: • • • • • •

actors plunging toward action; decision making heavily based upon “fuzzy analogies”; the issue’s past given inadequate attention; key presumptions not re-examined, or (sometimes) even examined; people and organizations seen through the lenses of “stereotyped suppositions”; “little or no effort” made to consider choices in the light of a “historical sequence” (pp. 31–33).

This sort of decision making—what one might call the all-too-human model, not the rational model—is what was exemplified by McNamara’s history lesson. The common critique is flawed. There is plenty to fault with the decision-making process during the Vietnam era, but upon ­examination we do not believe it can credibly be used to discredit the results derived from using the rational model. It was more that the rational model obscured what was really going on and gave it cover. What was going on was the ideology of the containment doctrine, tied to the domino theory, essentially eliminating the option of making the rational choice. On the other hand, the decisions surrounding the Iraq War have been effectively attacked as flawed due to a perceived lack of rationality. The president, and his “neocon” advisors, were attacked for abandoning realism in favor of a Wilsonian foreign policy; for ignoring intelligence that did not fit their worldview; for being unreasoning, unbending, and irrational. Could rational decision making have prevented, or improved the results from, the war in Iraq? Obviously even these questions, let alone the answers, are subjective and value-driven. In 2007 we learned that analyses predicted an insurgency and a long and bloody occupation that could fuel terrorism. Yet, the Bush administration (publicly at least) argued in 2003 that American involvement would be only a matter of months. As the examples of Vietnam and Iraq suggest, policy advice should not be tainted by political ideology. One of the major elements of the rational model is neutrality. While we do not necessarily believe that somebody can be totally neutral, we do believe that it is important that as an analyst you try to distance yourself from issues, and realize your own biases. Do not look at data and ­cherry-pick facts that meet your policy preferences. Oftentimes, your job will actually require you to try to keep your opinions and preferences out of your reports.

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But the core questions raised by the critics remain: Can rational decision making occur, and if it can, would it help? Does the rational model offer any help in deciding public problems? The mini-case that follows is a good example of the usefulness of the rational model. The million-dollar building first proposed by the architect could easily have destroyed the community’s chances of getting a health care clinic. In retrospect, it is easy to see that the $1,000,000 (U.S.) building was not going to work in such a small and poor community. But community leaders were excited about the elaborate design and the prospect of having such a facility in their community. Without rational analysis, the attempt to sell this structure to their citizens and other governing partners would have failed miserably, and if the building had somehow received funding and been built, it would have been underutilized—a white elephant sitting mostly unused and using up valuable government funds. The surveys, focus groups, and outside expert helped the community leaders focus on the problem and on a politically acceptable solution. Evaluation criteria were discovered, solutions generated, pros and cons discussed—and eventually a successful decision was generated.

Mini-Case: The Portersville Health Clinic

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he fictional community of Portersville is located in a rural area and has a population of 1,500. The nearest community (population 13,500) is located 60 miles (100 kilometers) away. Portersville had a small health care clinic that was located in a decaying old general store on the community’s only paved street. In the fall of 2015, the city’s building inspector closed the clinic after several bricks fell off the building’s façade and onto the sidewalk. In addition, the building’s roof was in disrepair and near collapse. The health care clinic provided primary care to the citizens of Portersville, and without it citizens would have to travel 60 miles for basic immunizations, ankle sprains, flu symptoms, tests for more serious diseases, and so forth. The community leaders decided to pursue the building of a new health care clinic. The decision-making process illustrated the usefulness of the rational model. The community had received a development grant for $16,000 (U.S.) to hire an architect to design a building for the clinic. The architect, unaware of rural realities and monetary limitations, designed a spacious 4,100-square-foot building complete with the latest medical technology and a helicopter pad. The design certainly stirred interest among the community’s health care specialists and among some citizens. A few citizens got their hopes up, others laughed at the idea as ridiculous. The problem was that the architectural design was made without any analysis. Word of a multimillion-dollar design quickly spread throughout the community and region. The “word around town” was that their leaders were trying to get the community to support a huge clinic that neither the region’s tax base nor patient base could support; and almost no one believed the national government was going to pay for most of the costs. The community leaders feared the project was doomed. An outside planner from the nearest university then entered the picture and took the community through a rational planning process. First, a survey was distributed to all residents, asking if they would support a new clinic, and, if so, under what circumstances. Second, focus groups were conducted at a special town meeting held one month after the survey. From these two events, a problem was neatly defined. Portersville citizens overwhelmingly wanted a primary (basic) health care clinic but only one that their small community could support without any real increase in taxes. From (continued)

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the survey and focus groups, it was determined that the major evaluation criterion was simply cost and effectiveness (would the clinic meet the basic needs of the citizens?). From this information, the community leaders brainstormed several alternative structures. Using local building contractors, cost estimates were conducted and the pros and cons of each design discussed. A medical planning expert was brought in and took the community through a “health care utilization” planning process. This process used the community’s age profile from census data to show demand for basic medical services. This formula predicts the annual number of primary care patients based on a community’s demographic profile of age and gender. The formula was based on an empirical analysis of primary health utilization by age groups. For Portersville, the predicted number of primary care patients per year was 3,339. Using this number, the health care planner then was able to use another formula to subdivide the categories of likely utilization. For example, a certain percentage of the primary care visits would be for vaccinations, a certain percentage for maternity checkups, a certain percentage for broken bones, and so on. The data calculated were then multiplied by the fees charged for each type of medical procedure, producing an estimated annual revenue flow for the proposed clinic. With this revenue data in hand, and knowing what the community could afford to subsidize in the form of taxes, the planner decided that a much less expensive and elaborate structure should be built. It was clear that the proposed 4,100-square-foot, $1,000,000 (U.S.) structure (before furnishing it with equipment, beds, desks, etc.) was well beyond the needs and resources of Portersville. This rational and empirical analysis helped the community understand both what Portersville would support financially and the correlated likely demand for services. The leadership group then engaged in some brainstorming and quickly determined that a simple 2,500-square-foot customized house could easily serve the community’s health care needs. So, the two options now on the table were as follows: Option #1: A 4,100-square-foot building at a cost of over $1,000,000 (U.S.). Option #2: A customized house converted into a health clinic at around $100,000 (U.S.) in costs.

Health care experts and community physicians all agreed that the customized house would make an effective health clinic. The costs were easily absorbed by the community and by the region’s existing tax base.

The decision made in the Portersville case resulted in a policy in which problem definition was agreed upon and the policy change was small (the community already had a small clinic). The decision rested in quadrant 1 of the 2 × 2 matrix represented in Figure 2.2 (adapted from Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970, p. 78). Some scholars suggest that it is only on the rare and relatively less important issues like the Portersville Health Clinic, and unlike Vietnam, that the rational model makes sense. (Deciding what to do in Vietnam, especially with all the value conflict over problem definition, places it squarely in quadrant 4.) For example, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970, pp. 78–79), referring to a rational model of policymaking as synoptic methods, write that “Synoptic methods … are limited to … those happy if limited circumstances in which decisions effect sufficiently small change to make synoptic understanding possible.” They also quote Herbert Simon stating: “Rational choice will be feasible to the extent that the limited set of factors upon which decision is based ­corresponds, in nature, to a closed system of variables” (p. 39).

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Figure 2.2  Decisional Types PROBLEM DEFINITION (Agreement) 1

2 Health Clinic Case LARGE CHANGE

SMALL CHANGE

3

4 PROBLEM DEFINITION (No Agreement)

In sum, the charge has been levied that the rational model is of little relevance or value to the policy analyst. Is this true? Others defend it as possible, as an ideal to work toward, as well as a method to follow that can at least mitigate bias, prejudice, ideology, and politics. Is that true? All of which begs the question: How does one evaluate models? An explanation of model evaluation follows.

Model Evaluation The rational model, like almost all models, can best be judged by three criteria. The first criterion is the ability to accurately describe. The fancy word scholars use for this is verisimilitude. Verisimilitude translates to the two familiar words it sounds like—very similar. In other words, models are usually expected to describe accurately. A model of a B-52 bomber should look enough like the real thing that you can identify it or at least distinguish it from the model of the space shuttle (even assuming you know no more about airplanes than the authors of this text). The second criterion is what has been called the ah-hah factor. That is, models should explain the world to us; they should help us make sense of what it is they purport to represent. The idea that geography influences politics is sometimes called geopolitics. In essence, it is a model that claims to help explain why countries behave as they do. If we judge geopolitics by the first two criteria, then its description of how countries behave should match up with the behavior of countries that we have observed historically and in the present; that explanation of why they behave this way or that way should help us understand that behavior—perhaps even prompting us to say, “Ah-hah, now I get it.” The third criterion is the most difficult one. This criterion states that if models are sound, they ought to be able to predict. The model must, like a crystal ball, predict the future as well as the past: 20/20 hindsight is not enough. Imagine a model formed by observing someone tossing a dime 50 times, with the dime landing face down each time (in other words producing the result we call tails). The observer suggests that the protruding head image of President Eisenhower creates wind currents that steer the coin so that his face ends up pointed downward, thus producing the constant result of landing with likable Ike upside down. If this was the first time you had watched such coin tossing involving a dime, it would, in fact, seem to be a model that accurately described this. Certainly the results you witnessed would not contradict the observer’s theory. Moreover, it might seem a reasonable explanation for such an unexpected

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result. Thus, you might nod your head up and down, saying something profound like “uh-huh” or “yep.” However, if you continue to flip the dime, the odds are that within a very short time you would have significant evidence that this particular model—while great at “predicting” the past—was not such a hot prognosticator of the future. Moreover, at this point, the verisimilitude of the model would start to fade, and you would recognize that, as an explanation, it was not very satisfactory.

Heading to a Conclusion You don’t have to be a political junkie to have heard of Nate Silver, FiveThirtyEight, and the quants who seem to be amazingly good at predicting elections. Silver, who created “538” as a blog, initially came to fame with his sports prognostication based mainly in forecasting baseball using a system called PECOTA. And, you don’t have to be a big baseball fan to have heard of Billy Beane, Moneyball, and sabermetrics—but if you are a fan, you know that Big Data has definitely changed the game. Speaking of Big Data, it is changing academic offerings, Wall Street, national security, and pretty much everything else under the sun. Within political science the precursor and still dominant version of this is known by the moniker of rational choice—a very quantitative application of the economic model of humankind (and game theory) to policy, including foreign policy, which assumes that actors always try to maximize their interests, and that policy decisions and behavior are largely predictable. A name you maybe don’t know but should is Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. A well-known academic, he has been compared to both Nostradamus and Isaac Asimov’s sci-fi character Hari Seldon from the Foundation series, who uses mathematics to (probabilistically) predict the future. A regular advisor to the CIA and Fortune 500 chief executive officers, he has a long history of surprisingly accurate and specific prognostications based on computer modeling using rational choice. Indeed, in political science, especially at the graduate level, we teach and practice rational choice theory, probability, game theory, risk management, sophisticated frequency, and (increasingly) probabilistic statistics. We teach them as attempts to understand and predict human, organizational, and state behavior. However, we do so in the shadow of pervasive evidence about unexpected outcomes, unanticipated consequences, and uncertainty, the role of luck, the vicissitudes of life’s chances, and seemingly random acts of violence, as well as questions of agency and rationality. Briefly consider this quote from Markus Zusak’s novel The Book Thief. The narrator (who is the character “Death”) is describing the Allied bombing of a small town on the outskirts of Munich, Germany. Bombs are cascading down, the sirens too little, too late. Here’s the quote that caught our attention: Within minutes, mounds of concrete and earth were stacked and piled. The streets were ruptured veins. Blood streamed till it was dried on the road, and the bodies were stuck there, like driftwood after the flood. They were glued down, every last one of them. A packet of souls. Was it fate? Misfortune? Is that what glued them down like that? Of course not. Let’s not be stupid. It probably had more to do with the hurled bombs, thrown down by humans hiding in the clouds.11

Certainly, sometimes, it seems we wish to assign blame not to the agents who act, but to Fortune; not to policy, but to chance—but if you’re the one not glued down—or the one who is—isn’t that often just good or bad luck? Although the rational choice model dominates, especially at the graduate level, if you travel down the collective political science path long enough, you will be exposed to the philosophizing

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of Aristotle, Plato, Thucydides, and Machiavelli, all of whom talk about capricious fortune and the power of luck, and offer their thoughts about the ability to use prognosis, wisdom, education, experience, foresight, decisiveness, adaptability, and ruthlessness to mitigate the effects of, if not defeat, that grand dame, Fortuna (The Prince, ch. 15). And that’s a good thing, but not the end of the story. Initially, when students are taught public policy, it often seems as if they are required to pick one side or the other (thereby transforming a complex continuum into a dualistic conception that is probably not that helpful and that obscures the way in which talented advocates from both sides necessarily rely on elements from the other) and instinctively they seem drawn toward an approach to the issue endorsing rational choice versus the more traditional approach (even if they don’t like the math aspect). But where would the likes of a Bruce Bueno de Mesquita be without the work of realists like Morgenthau, or the writings of experts on organizations, leadership, economics, business, sociology, regions, and culture? In part this is often structured as a debate about whether political science is an art or science. The legendary Dwight Waldo, in 1955, writing about “The Study of Public Administration,” discussed public administration as being both a science (the discipline), and an art (in the field). To oversimplify, he thought the systematic study of public administration could be deservedly called a science, but that the practice of public administration, involving judgment, leadership, and creativity, is much more an art. So, it would be tempting now—to us—and perhaps a relief for you, if we would simply close by saying that Waldo’s approach explains it all. In other words, the study of American foreign policy is more science, the practice more art, and we just need to be careful to clarify what we are talking about. But your fate is not to be so lucky and, more importantly, this is a problematic situation. We believe that such a divide leaves both the discipline and the practice weaker. This divide also harks back not only to the Perestroika debate of the 1980s, but to the debate within political science often associated with David Easton’s 1969 American Political Science ­Association (APSA) Presidential Address, when he spoke of a Credo of Relevance. Although ­arguably both camps can find something they like in his credo, the more general charge—the n­ ecessity to do work that could be applied to real-world problems of importance—is still a fundamental issue. In 1999, the prominent realist Stephen Walt ignited a bit of controversy (not his last or largest, we might add) when he argued in an article titled “Rigor or Rigor Mortis” that separating the discipline of, from the practice of, security studies amounted to pouring fuel on the fire known as the “‘cult of irrelevance’ that pervades much of contemporary social science.” Although advocating for mixed methodologies that include rational choice theory—and cautioning against polarization— this is admittedly an attack that was designed primarily to protect, or revive, security studies from the trap of being so formal, so precise, and so logically consistent that by necessity it also becomes largely irrelevant, lacking in insight or importance, and ultimately fails to contribute to decisions about significant real-world foreign policy issues. He also discussed how to evaluate theory in a way that suggested rational choice theory was more about method than content, and that it often operates only in an unreal ceteris paribus world of rational, individual maximalists. Walt’s argument rested on the assumption (pp. 8, 12) that the central aim of social science is to develop useful knowledge relevant to understanding important social problems and human social behavior in order to impact foreign policymakers’ assessment of the environment, goal-setting, the delineation of policy options, and both security policy decisions and implementation. Though Walt’s article was perhaps one of the more reasoned and balanced examples of this debate, and other prominent figures such as Joseph Nye have echoed his concern while raising the issue of the lack of interchange between scholars and practitioners, and placing most of the blame on political scientists whose rational choice approach tells us more and more about less and less; the criticized quickly turned into fierce critics and lambasted his critique. Like Walt, though, a January 11, 2007 International Herald Tribune (NY Times online) headline read “U.S. Foreign

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Policy Hurt by Skills Shortage” and went on to keenly identify two of the key trends underlying the problem: too much emphasis in the social sciences on statistical analysis, and the preeminence of rational choice theory. More recently Michael Desch, in Perspectives on Politics (2015), argued that political science, and especially the subfield of national security, has a decreasing policy relevance due to the professionalization of political science because the discipline tends to privilege method over substance, privileging certain techniques over broader relevance. It is also somewhat tempting to try to locate this debate relative to what was once commonly called the “Third Debate” in International Relations theory—namely the arguments relative to positivism versus postpositivism. However, if there is another lesson we can definitely learn from the public administration/public policy arena in the international relations silo, it is that it is time to move beyond that debate, where there has been so much philosophizing and oversimplification, to an acknowledgment of the value of mixed methodologies and the strengths and weaknesses of, and the importance of relevance to, both camps. George Berkley’s (and now with his coauthor John Rouse) classic text The Craft of Public Administration, in its tenth edition (2008), provides excellent context for what we argue. The focus here is on the job of the public administrator, but they use the word “craft” because they believe that the job involves scientific data, laws, and theories—but lacks rigor and repeatability, and that, like art, public administration involves imagination, artistry, creativity, personality, and mixed methods—but the goal (attempting to solve dilemmas of consequence to citizens), the end products, and the criteria for evaluating success, are fundamentally different. In the end, Berkley argues that the practice of public administration is best described as a craft. While the idea of a craft may be somewhat self-explanatory, listen to this key sentence from their text (p. 7): “While science uses unvarying methods to achieve predicted results, and art uses diverse methods to achieve diverse, unpredictable results, a craft uses diverse methods to attain a desired result.” In short, we believe Berkley’s formula offers us insight. Systematic research, efforts to consider grand theory, efforts at verification, quantification where possible, and sound methodology all matter—but so does narrative analysis, recognition of value conflict and nonrationality, disciplinary integration, ethical evaluation, and real-world relevance. In sum, then, foreign policy and security policymaking, divorced from the discipline by the discipline’s divorce from politics in favor of sophisticated mathematical modeling utilizing language that is not understandable, presented in journals, not read, etc. would be (is?) poorer policy; and the discipline will likewise suffer from the removal of politics and relevance. Fortune plays a role, but so must rigor and prognosis; and for the well-being of both policy in the field and as a field of study in the classroom, it’s best if we perceive it as, and practice it as, a craft. In the end, we are arguing here for the same thing we argue for in terms of public policy analysis—for praxis. We need both theory-guided practice and theory capable of guiding, and being guided by, practice. However, we also can’t just throw up our hands and declare it all idiosyncratic and beyond calculation or prognosis—Bruce Buena de Mesquita’s work clearly seems to show that. Neither, however, can we eliminate the role of chance, confounding variables, and unanticipated consequences. We have to consider both, have people working in and trained in both, to be relevant. The debate in public policy between positivism and postpositivism is over. A combination of the two, using mixed methodologies from each, has won out. The art/science dichotomy should also be rejected and moved beyond. Let’s let Nate Silver, the ultimate quant, have the next to last word via this long quote, cut and pasted from pages throughout his great book, The Signal and the Noise (2012, pp. 5, 9, 14, emphasis in the original): The story the data tells us is often the one we’d like to hear, and we usually make sure that it has a happy ending … The numbers have no way of speaking for themselves. We speak for them. We imbue them with meaning … Data-driven predictions can succeed—and they can fail. It is when we deny our role in the process that the odds of failure rise … We can never make perfectly objective predictions. They will always be tainted by our subjective point of view.

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Finally, even though Nate Silver calls U.S. national-level elections (although his aggregations on the 2016 U.S. presidential election were closer than other sources, they still predicted the strong probability of a Clinton victory), and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has predicted issues ranging from acts of terrorism to the development of Iran as a nuclear power, we still have to discuss something really important—baseball. Baseball is increasingly managed with Big Data (we will discuss Big Data in Chapter 3) and this has meant removing power from the manager (normally a former big league player) and centralizing power on everything from line-up construction to in-game decisions to a general manager (normally not a former player). General managers rely on statisticians to try to construct big league teams and even make decisions over such issues as whether to bunt, remove the starting pitcher from the game, and other decisions traditionally reserved to the manager. Mike Scioscia, the legendary Los Angeles Angels manager, is no longer managing the Angels after 19 years partially because of the view from Angels management that he did not adapt to the new baseball analytics, neither would he necessarily cede power to the general manager on in-game decisions. Scioscia has argued that while statistics are important, they only tell part of the story of baseball’s complexity. Baseball is about probabilities, but baseball is also about motivating humans, loyalty, and quite a bit of luck. Effective teams and managers are those that are able to balance the cold precision of numbers with the reality that baseball is a game played by human beings and not numbers. Brian Sabean (general manager of the San Francisco Giants) and manager Bruce Bochy (who retired after the 2019 season) represent the very best of that combination. Sabean is praised for his innovative use of sabermetrics, while Bochy is praised for his ability to get the most out of his players and for brilliant impromptu tactical moves during games. The Giants won three World Series in the past decade (2010, 2012, and 2014), although they never seemed to be the best team on paper or picked to win. Like a good manager, a good analyst, whether in foreign policy or domestic policy, has both the ability to deal in Big Data and probability, and to understand humans, context, and the ability to realize that data will not answer everything.

Concluding Thoughts The problem with the rational model is not just that it cannot consistently predict the future, nor that it often fails to describe in a way that matches our observations, nor that it often seems unable to produce the desired ah-hah. Part of the problem is that there are many other (nonrational) models that seem to describe, explain, and predict policy and the policy process as well as or better than the rational model, especially when we are operating outside of quadrant 1. But, this is not to suggest analysts should throw the proverbial baby out with the dirty bathwater. Chapter 3 is in some ways an appendix to the chapter you’re finishing. We call Chapter 3 “The Positivist Toolbox.” Everyone who opens the toolbox will have access to five key positivist tools of analysis: sampling and mail surveys, extrapolation and forecasting, measures of central tendency, discounting, and cost-benefit analysis. The positivist tools are powerful. As befits power tools, these each come with basic operating instructions as well as warnings about misuse. Then, in Chapter 4 we offer a brief introduction to nonrational models and critique the rational model more extensively. Before reading on, however, make sure you understand the rational model, because, whatever else one says about the rational model, it can and does play a significant role in policy analysis—and people really, really want to believe in it. Remember to use the criteria for model evaluation as you learn more about the rational approach by studying alternatives to, and critiques of, this important approach. Finally, science and rationality are not the same thing, but the concluding mini-case raises questions about the role that you believe rationality and science can and should play, and what the role of democracy should be, in the policy process.

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Mini-Case: Democracy or Science? Climate Change and GMOs

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hris Calhoun recently finished a PhD in policy analysis from one of the top programs in the country. Chris’s dissertation dealt with scientific consensus and climate change and the necessity to follow that consensus in pursuing policy options. Chris conducted a study which showed that involving citizens in climate change would only lead to poor policy because most citizens did not accurately understand climate change science. While a student, Chris did not shy away from political activism, and the research for the dissertation led Chris to be a strident proponent of climate change policy and a staunch and sometimes harsh critic of climate change deniers. One of Chris’s biggest opponents was Alessandra Mendes. Alessandra, originally from Tegucigalpa, Honduras, was a business major (MBA) at the same university where Chris finished his PhD. She was the student leader of a group called Truth in Science, and this group was a consistent critic of climate change policy. Alessandra’s group believed that science had to be questioned and that climate change policy should be determined by popular opinion and not just science. Her other passion, besides soccer, was a deep and genuine concern with poverty, hunger, and economic development strategies for places like her home country. Alessandra and Chris famously engaged in a week-long battle on a Facebook page in 2015. In heated exchanges, the two fought over the meaning of various scientific findings about climate change and about policies aimed at alleviating climate change impacts and dramatically reducing the human causes of climate change. Alessandra and Chris were not friends and their exchanges sometimes bordered on emotional diatribes from both sides. The debate ended when Alessandra accused Chris of being “a tool,” an “anti-democratic technocrat,” and asked if he would stop short of being a “science-Nazi.” Angry, Chris fired back at her with a shot he knew would hurt, saying that the greatest victims of climate change will be the poorest countries and people on earth due to its impact on food production, weak infrastructure, and weather events and he couldn’t understand her heartlessness on behalf of big oil. Some of Chris’s PhD student colleagues believed that Chris had gone too far both with his reply and his entrance into activism to a point where his own science findings about climate change might be questioned. After graduation, Chris remained in the largely agricultural state where he received his PhD, did some adjunct teaching, and in June 2018 took a lucrative position with a nonprofit group, NO GMOs (a group fighting GMO foods and supporting the labeling of these foods). Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives refused to pass a law that would have made companies that use GMO seed label such foods as GMOs. Additionally, the U.S. Congress has tried to pass laws that would ban states from passing such labeling laws. Chris is hired as a policy analyst and is given a first assignment of developing a democratic process to gather support and build momentum for allowing labeling of GMO foods. Chris is excited about this and fondly remembers courses in policy analysis that dealt with democracy. While a strong proponent of science (in his dissertation research and as an activist), Chris also supports the use of democracy as a way to overcome entrenched corporate interests and corporate control of information (as well as what Chris sees as corporate control of elected officials). Chris spent a month developing a plan. Chris and NO GMOs decide to release the details of the plan on the nonprofit’s Facebook page. The plan is released on Facebook and Chris explains the plan to the group’s Facebook audience. To his surprise and dismay the first comment on the Facebook post is from

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Alessandra Mendes. Now a policy analyst for a major biochemical firm, she is highly critical about Chris calling for the use of democracy over science. Alessandra writes: Chris Calhoun has made a career out of arguing that science should be the driving force of policymaking. He is a strong advocate of climate change science and consistently argues that climate change science is in near unanimous consensus in support of human caused climate change. I challenged Chris on this while we were both graduate students. I questioned the interests of the scientists that did the studies and also questioned whether policy should just follow science, arguing for democracy and suggesting it would be more beneficial to have a public debate on climate change. Chris responded that there was no need to debate, the science was settled. Now, Chris is working for a non-profit that wants to label GMO foods. Well, I work for a corporation that produces GMO seeds. I can tell you that the science is clear. There is a consensus around the fact that GMO foods are safe for human consumption. In addition, the seeds used to produce these foods allow developing countries to grow foods to feed their people (which Chris said he cared about). GMO foods are safe and GMO foods help people. Equally important, GMO-raised foods help in the fight to stop climate change. GMO raised foods lead to less use of fuels because farmers don’t have to spray crops. In addition, because of less plowing, the soil quality is improved and less carbon is released into the air. Finally, GMO foods allow farmers to use less fertilizers and this leads to less nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions. So, does Chris Calhoun just follow science when that science equates with Chris’s own values? Does Chris really support fighting climate change when GMO foods are a key technology in that fight? Is this just another case of science for hire?

Chris is outraged that Alessandra is raising these arguments.

Questions to Consider 1. What does this case say about the advantages, and limitations, of a purely rational approach to policymaking? Does money or political influence matter more than rationality? 2. Do you think that democracy should be used in this case by the nonprofit? If so, what plan do you suggest? 3. If you were Chris, what would you do? Do you respond to Alessandra? Why or why not? Does the place of the debate, on social media, impact your answer? Why? 4. Is Chris being inconsistent in terms of the views of science and democracy? 5. Is Alessandra being inconsistent in her criticisms of Chris? 6. What is your view on the role of science and democracy in analyzing (and making) public policy? Are they mutually exclusive or compatible or …? 7. Does it matter, and does it tell us anything, that Europe and the United States have different policies on GMOs?

Further Reading Material that might be useful in the case responses: Ahl, Johnathan. 2019. “People Strongly against GMOs Had Shakier Understanding of Food Science, Study Finds.” National Public Radio, January 26. www.npr.org/sections/ thesalt/2019/01/26/687852367/people-strongly-against-gmos-had-shakier-understandingof-food-science-study-fin (accessed June 30, 2019). EuropaBio. 2018. Press Release, “GMOinfo.EU Brings You Factual Information on GMOs in Your Language.” EuropaBio. March 8. www.europabio.org/agricultural-biotech/publications/ gmoinfoeu-brings-you-factual-information-gmos-your-language (accessed June 30, 2019). Engber, Daniel. 2016. “Label Thumpers: The GMO Movement Is about Faith, Not Facts.” Slate. Com., March 27. www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2016/03/the_gmo_ labeling_movement_is_about_faith_not_facts.html (accessed June 30, 2019).

(continued)

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Holly, Robert. 2015. GMOs, Monsanto and the Fight against Climate Change. Investigate Midwest, July 9. http://investigatemidwest.org/2015/07/09/gmos-monsanto-and-the-fightagainst-climate-change-2/ (accessed June 30, 2019). Lipton, Eric. 2015. “Food Industry Enlisted Academics in GMO Lobbying War, Emails Say.” New York Times, September 5. www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/us/foodindustry-enlistedacademics-in-gmo-lobbying-war-emails-show.html?emc=eta1 (accessed June 30, 2019). Trotter, Greg. 2016. “GMO Labeling Debate Puts Food Industry on Defensive.” Chicago Tribune, March 12. www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-gmo-food-labeling-0313-biz-20160311story.html (accessed June 30, 2019). Weise, Elizabeth. 2016. “Academies of Science Finds GMOs Not Harmful to Human Health.” USA Today, May 17. www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/05/17/gmos-safe-academies-ofscience-report-genetically-modified-food/84458872/ (accessed June 30, 2019).

Glossary Terms Externalities (p. 54)

Laissez-faire (p. 51)

Government by Gentlemen (p. 52)

Operationalizing (p. 55)

Notes 1 The Constitution was ratified in 1789. Fifty-two years later, in 1841, the total number of civilians working for the federal government was barely over 18,000. Fifty years later, in 1891, the total was still less than 160,000—but four years earlier (1887), Congress had created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first regulatory agency. By 1990, the total number of civilian federal employees had peaked at more than 3.5 million. Today there are only about 2.75 million. Of course, it is also true that only about one-eighth of all government employees work for the federal government. By far the largest percentage of employees work at the local level, which rose from about 4 million in the 1950s to approximately 14 million today. The number of state employees in that time period roughly doubled. As a percentage of the civilian workforce, the federal government’s percentage is lower today than it has been since World War II. http://www.census.gov/gov/apes/. 2 It is generally acknowledged that Max Weber, a German sociologist, developed the classic exposition of bureaucracies. Weber referred to his model as “ideal” but was not implying that it was ideal in the sense of being perfect. Rather, he was merely laying forth the hypothetically pure, or archetypal, form. Clemons thoroughly explains bureaucracy as a principle of organization, considers the power of bureaucracies, and discusses the relevance of bureaucracy to democracy in an essay in Freeman (1997, pp. 175–190). 3 Scientific management, or Taylorism as it is sometimes called, is a theory of management closely akin to the idea of the assembly line. The task of management was to determine the most efficient step-by-step approach to task completion. The worker’s task was then to implement that method. Scientific management was a major influence on public organizational and management theory especially as public administration sought to emulate the business approach, in which Taylor’s views on efficiency, management, and subordinates were a guiding precept. For fascinating reading on Taylor see Robert Kanigel’s The One Best Way (1997). 4 In Chapter 4, we will discuss Professor Simon’s satisficing concept, which recognized very real limits to just how scientifically we make decisions. 5 Note that the idea of separating facts from values is still an often-cited goal of analysts, researchers, and decision makers prior to decision making and is often offered as justification for the decision after the fact with statements such as “The numbers speak for themselves.” 6 The management technique known as “systems analysis” is not to be confused with the idea of political systems introduced in Chapter 1. 7 We can, however, criticize the attempt to use it, the resources devoted to trying to use it, the tactical policy consequences of the attempt, and its power as an argument justifying a policy that was arguably not rational. 8 Chapter 3, “The Positivist Toolbox,” has a thorough discussion of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 9 Once again, see Chapter 3 for a discussion of cost-benefit analyses. 10 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. 1996. New York: Vintage Books. An interested reader might also want to watch the documentary, Fog of War, which features an extensive interview with Robert McNamara. 11 Markus Zusak, The Book Thief. 2006. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 12–13.

Chapter 3

The Positivist Toolbox

Integrated Case “Shaundra the Policy Analyst” This chapter includes what we call “positivist tools” of analysis, and we present them to you in the form of a toolbox. Think about the metaphor of a toolbox for a minute. Suppose that you were repairing a fence in your backyard. We decide that you need some tools to help you build the fence, and we want to teach you how to use the tools necessary to build a fence. We are skilled but practical carpenters who don’t lift weights, so our toolbox only has tools in it that we use a lot. We have removed tools that we rarely, if ever, use. To build a fence, you only need a few tools (a hammer, a drill, a tape measure, a level, a power saw, and a handsaw). When we show up at your door, we don’t have to teach you how to use all of the tools in the toolbox. Instead, you need only learn how to use those tools necessary to build a fence. But in the future, when you decide to build a new deck in your backyard, you will know that you have a toolbox nearby with all the major tools necessary to build the deck. This metaphor explains how we see this chapter. It is not a chapter that is easily read from page to page. However, as we explain later, we believe that we would be failing the reader if we did not include these basic positivist tools of analysis. Remember that we advocate a mixed-methods approach. But just like building a fence, you do not always have to use all the tools in the toolbox. Perhaps you will get to work with all of them now. Or, instead, your professor will determine which tools in the box are most important for the goals of the class, and only cover them. While you may skip the discussion of some tools, you may also come back to them later as you begin or continue your careers as policy analysts. For each tool, our goal was to provide a clear, albeit basic, understanding of how and when to use it, and of the limitations of that tool. Both of us have our favorite textbooks from our college days, and we often go back to them for specific information. We hope that this chapter, indeed the whole book, can play that role for you as you actually do policy analysis and that you will refer to it often. Finally, some of these tools might even be described more as research methods tools than as traditional policy analysis tools. However, it is our belief that they are all necessary tools that a practicing analyst must use. When we were students, we were frustrated when textbooks only made casual references to certain methods and then informed the reader: “This topic is beyond the scope of the course.” While some students, especially graduate students, will likely have covered many of these topics, the reality is that in many smaller undergraduate and graduate programs, students will not have the opportunity to take a research methods course that is geared solely toward practicing policy analysts—that is, in most programs, students will take a general research methods course but not one that deals specifically with applied methods in policy analysis. We want to avoid the narrow

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drawing of lines between fields, and, as always, we are guided by pragmatism. Although these tools are positivist tools, they are particularly important in securing community input. Because our book suggests the need to reinvigorate democracy in policy analysis, we believe that these tools of input and analysis are particularly essential for the practicing analyst. So there you have it—our explanation of the toolbox. Go ahead and dig in, but remember the key trick for many jobs is to possess and select the right tools. Good luck with that fence.

Introduction Chapter Roadmap: In this chapter we examine five key tools of analysis: (1) sampling and mail surveys, (2) extrapolation and forecasting, (3) measures of central tendency, (4) discounting, and (5) cost-benefit analysis (CBA); and we also briefly discuss data-analytic skills. Our selections are by no means exhaustive. There are literally hundreds of tools in the positivist approach. Many positivist tools, while of theoretical and analytical importance, are rarely used by most practicing analysts. Most analysts are going to work in local governments, in nonprofit organizations, and in state agencies. The first lesson, for the beginning analyst, is that timelines are always too short, resources too limited, and political priorities almost always outweigh attempts at “scientific” analysis. In fact, many decisions are still made without much, or any, analysis. As practicing analysts ourselves, we have rarely, if ever, used the indifference curves and computer modeling that we struggled to learn as graduate students. Instead, we have found that there are something like five basic positivist techniques that we have used in practice in addition to the skills, models, and postpositivist techniques taught in the upcoming chapters of this book. In addition, our experiences, and the experiences of our students and alumni, tend to reinforce that these are five of the tools most likely to be used in the average careers of policy analysts (although some of you may end up working in a major federal, state, local, or nonprofit agency, and you will require extensive experience in more sophisticated statistical tools). Our goal here is to provide you with the basics. In addition, these tools provide a fuller flavor than we have so far provided of the positivist approach to policy analysis. However, this chapter is not meant as a blind endorsement of these techniques. Operator manuals for power tools offer cautions and warnings as well as instructions. Similarly, we not only offer instructions but also critique these tools, showing the often immensely subjective underlying assumptions of these “rational” and “scientific” tools of analysis. Most importantly, after mastering the basics, we want you to consider the implications of these tools for democracy. A potential problem with several of these tools is that they promote an appearance of objectivity and neutrality on issues that are instead value-laden and political. Furthermore, tools such as cost-benefit analysis often automatically assume that costs, benefits, and other quantitative factors are (and should be) the major criteria for decision making. They tend to encourage the efficiency fallacy (at the expense of effectiveness) and to discourage democracy by squelching debate. If analysts decide based on pluses and minuses—rather than asking whether it is appropriate to do this or not, rather than asking who estimated the costs and benefits, and rather than asking if benefits must always outweigh costs—that too reflects a value. Remember, at the heart of policymaking are normative questions. For example: • Should public policy encourage small businesses or larger corporations? • Should the World Bank only support sustainable development policies? • Would your government’s increased spending on health care or on a ballistic missile defense system do more to enhance the security of its citizens? • Should the government build a park, a health clinic, or a swimming pool, even if the costs exceed the benefits?

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These are value questions that need to be answered through democratic participation. Yet they are questions that policy analysts (which, remember, includes everyone competing in the ­political arena—including elected officials) too often try to answer by themselves, using rational techniques that displace democratic decision making with a form of technocracy. In short, the five (quantitative) tools presented are ones that practicing analysts will use, but these tools should only be used with a deep understanding of their limitations and of the potential for abuse they present. In fact, we also chose these five tools not only due to their frequency of use but also due to their frequent misuse. The old saying “numbers don’t lie” is actually a lie that is about equally dangerous and humorous in the world of policy and politics. Too often, astute observers of ­policy making will notice: (1) policy recommendations backed up by public opinion from a poorly worded and poorly designed survey; (2) policy recommendations backed up by public opinion from a survey with a nonrandom, or otherwise flawed, sample; (3) policymakers reporting the mean as a measure of central tendency when they should be reporting the median; (4) policymakers who do not discount costs or benefits when making arguments for or against a policy; and (5) the persistent misuse of cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is both one of the most powerful (persuasive) and important tools (providing valuable insight) and one of the most misunderstood and misused (sometimes abused) tools. But remember, we advocate the need for mixed methodologies, we do not dismiss there being a role for rationality, we recognize the need for evaluation, and we applaud the idea behind ­evidence-based politics. Therefore, we are going to briefly discuss the rise of Big Data.

In Defense of Rationality and Big Data: Evidence-Based Politics Students who wish to be policy analysts would be wise to combine their political knowledge, skills, and understanding with data-analytic skills. There is a growing demand for students able to take advantage of the rapidly expanding data pools and analytic tools. Simply put, there is a growing demand for analysts who can do text mining, who have the ability to analyze massive amounts of data, and visualize and recognize patterns, who know how to use Linux, program in Python, and have other basic computing fundamentals skills, and then know how to apply these skills to social policies, government programs, and the worlds of both nonprofits and the business sector. Shortly after the 2014 midterm elections for the U.S. Congress, Democratic Senator Patty Murray (WA) and former Republican Vice-Presidential candidate and Representative Paul Ryan (WI) co-sponsored a bill to create a study commission tasked with determining how to evaluate the effectiveness of federal programs and tax breaks/expenditures through the use of Big Data. The Obama Administration had been using metrics to evaluate approximately 700 federal programs. Think tanks and scholars have been producing reports, papers, articles, and books on the topic. Social data analytics is a particularly popular and powerful supplement to the positivist toolkit. And, whether we are evaluating the levels of poverty or inequality in India, Liberia, or Mississippi; trying to compare our risks from terrorism or gun violence; weighing the efficacy of foreign aid programs or domestic anti-poverty programs such as Head Start, Moving to Opportunity, or food stamps; trying to stem the scourge of human trafficking; or measuring the effect of childhood safety regulations by examining per capita child death rates and injuries; metrics matter. Knowing how to find, gather, harness, and analyze large volumes of data is increasingly crucial in evidence-based medicine and evidence-based politics. Both liberals and conservatives should be able to agree that making governmental programs more effective, understanding their impact and effectiveness, and designing new policies in a smart way are good things. Of course, liberals and conservatives will still disagree on the appropriate role of government on everything from the causes of climate change and inequality to dealing with gun violence and the costs and

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consequences of capitalism vis-à-vis its benefits. And, both sides will use data as weapons in their partisan and ideological battles, but making smart social policy and spending tax dollars wisely are important. So, while we are convinced of the centrality of politics, the inevitability of value conflict, and the need to both argue for the crucial importance of, and teach the how to of, democracy and qualitative tools, we are not monists, pure postmodernists, or Luddites. Rather, we recognize the need for methods emerging out of rational, scientific ideals. Therefore, we want you to look for multi-causal explanations, to utilize experimental design best practices when possible (random assignment and control), to be aware of the differences between facts and theories and opinions, and to be able to think rationally and critically (while being cognizant of your values and biases), and to have data-analytic skills. We caution you to continue to engage your “crap detector” as you wade through quantitative analysis and remember that humans always have a hand in Big Data (it does not appear by itself) and be wary of the fact that numbers often seem to have a concreteness that belies their subjectivity, that gives them almost magical power to persuade. Cathy O’Neil’s (2016) book, Weapons of Math Destruction provides an accessible critique of how algorithms are too often used in ways that produce inequality and threaten democracy. Contrasting decisions made by algorithms on everything from evaluating teachers to parole sentencing to baseball (remember our Moneyball discussion in Chapter 2), O’Neil discusses how too often in non-baseball issues, variables are used that only estimate some concept (these are called proxies). Furthermore, these models have significant blind spots (for example, evaluating teachers on test scores while ignoring other measures such as teacher engagement with students, how well the teacher teaches skills, or helps students in other ways). These models rely on human decisions to include and exclude certain variables and data and too often, she contends, they are influenced by goals and ideology. O’Neil (2016, p. 7) writes critically of accepting models and algorithms as truth and states of these models, “They define reality and use it to justify their results. This type of model is self-perpetuating, highly destructive and very common.” We like her critique, algorithms are now the rage in public policy schools. At the same time, we have been making her critique for the past 20 years in our editions of this book. Do not be mesmerized by the numbers of a cost-benefit analysis, or an extrapolation technique, or data from a survey. Remember that humans produced all of this data and that humans, even if their numbers are not flawed, are value-laden creatures driven by goals, political ideologies, values, and beliefs. We do argue that policy analysts who use Big Data need to understand context, have political knowledge, and be able to really understand the data in a way that is meaningful. Too often, Big Data analysts lack the “local knowledge” or the on-the-ground sense of a good analyst, and their interpretations of data can be meaningless. Facts do matter, and data can reveal crucial insights— even if precise forecasts with double decimal point values are prima facie silly and rationality neither equals wisdom nor can solve value conflict.

Shaundra the Policy Analyst To assist our understanding of the positivist method, we are going to examine the application of each of the five tools through a single case integrated throughout the entire chapter. One major problem with teaching and learning positivist methods is that often the techniques of analysis seem remote, theoretical, and detached from application. This case, involving the fictional community of Boondocks (population 50,500) and a policy analyst named Shaundra, helps place the use of the tools in practical situations and gives you a chance to see how they would be applied (and apply them!). Boondocks is a small metropolis that has grown substantially in recent years. Ten years ago there was concern that the city was going to become a modern-day “ghost town” because a variety

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of external forces led to the closing of several major businesses and industries. Today, though, Boondocks is a thriving community faced with new problems. Growth has created much opposition to economic development policies that were ­implemented 10 years ago. Many citizens believe that the community’s quality of life is suffering because increased growth has led to subdivision development, increased traffic, and noise pollution. Others are more concerned that the growth is leading to increased tax rates because a larger population creates demand for new schools, hospitals, sewer lines, water lines, and recreation facilities. An interest group, Citizens Against Growth (CAG), has formed, and they have been highly visible in their opposition to policies that will further economic development. CAG is currently opposing the proposed building of a new community swimming pool. The community only has one public pool, and it was built in 1955. The city of Boondocks has proposed a new pool be built either in the old pool location (which is in a low-income section of the town) or in a newer location that is more accessible to most of the city’s newer population bases. CAG has called for simply repairing the pool or doing nothing. They suggest instead that swimming opportunities could be provided by the private sector (e.g., ­private gyms, recreation firms) or nonprofit organizations such as the YMCA or YWCA. Shaundra is an analyst for the city of Boondocks. She has just received her Master’s of public administration (MPA) degree from Boondocks University. Luckily, like you, she had some great professors and learned her craft well. In this embedded case study, you will see how Shaundra uses various techniques to inform policymakers and assist in decision making. In addition, as promised, you will see the subjective and even arbitrary nature of some of the techniques.

Tool #1: Sampling and Mail Surveys A useful tool for gathering citizen input on an issue is to design and mail a survey. Sampling and mail survey research requires years of practical experience before one can truly be proficient in its application. But a grounding in the basics of the process is useful knowledge for any policy analyst. In this section, we examine how to determine sample size, techniques of random sampling, sample bias and weighting, the technicalities of survey design, and the politics of surveys. Remember, we will move our discussion along by using the Boondocks case to illustrate the major principles of the five tools. Sample Size

The determination of sample size is dependent on such things as confidence levels, margin of error, and the size of the population you are sampling from. Our purpose is not to go into a detailed explanation of sampling theory but rather to provide some general rules of thumb. Generally, for policy analysis purposes, a confidence interval of 95 percent with a margin of error of ±5 percent is acceptable. This would mean, for example, that if, after completing the mail survey, you find that 65 percent of citizens support the building of a new pool in a new location, you are 95 percent confident that if you surveyed the entire population, numbers would fall between 60 and 70 percent of support. Sometimes, when there is enough money, analysts will attempt to reach a ±3 percent margin of error. In Table 3.1, notice the much larger sample requirements for smaller margin of errors. Remember that the numbers reported in Table 3.1 are not the number of surveys that you will mail. Instead, these are the number of responses that are needed to achieve the desired level of precision. So analysts must play a guessing game with their response rate. Return rates for public policy issues vary widely, depending on such disparate factors as size of the population, political culture, level of controversy surrounding the survey project, time of year, length of survey, and clarity of survey. In smaller communities, it is not uncommon to reach return rates of more than 50 percent in a first mailing. In larger communities, return rates average around 25 percent or less for

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Table 3.1  Sample Sizes for 95 Percent Confidence Interval Population

±5 Percent Sample Size

±3 Percent Sample Size

±1 Percent Sample Size

500

222

250

250

1,000

286

500

500

2,000

333

714

1,000

3,000

353

811

1,500

4,000

364

870

2,000

5,000

370

909

2,500

6,000

375

938

3,000

7,000

378

959

3,500

8,000

381

976

4,000

9,000

383

989

4,500

10,000

385

1,000

5,000

15,000

390

1,034

6,000

20,000

392

1,053

6,667

50,000

397

1,087

8,333

100,000+

400

1,111

10,000

Note: These numbers were calculated using a statistical software package.

one-time mailings, and a rate this low may not guarantee the reliability desired. Only experience can provide the analyst with a feel for what type of return rate to expect. Generally, it is always best to over-sample. In the case of Shaundra (assuming she uses the ±5 percent margin of error), she needs about 397 surveys to hit the desired precision levels. With Boondock’s population barely over 50,000, she can probably design a short (one-page) survey and expect a return rate of around 25 percent. Therefore, she needs to mail 1,600 surveys and can expect roughly 400 to return (1,600 × 25 percent = 400). To be safe, Shaundra should mail closer to 2,000 surveys. Of course, the number of surveys that can be mailed depends on practical factors like time and money available. Techniques of Random Sampling

It is very important that analysts conduct random sampling. The term random simply means that everyone in the chosen population (that the sample will be generalized to) has an equal chance of being selected as a respondent. There are a host of practical problems that limit the randomness of samples generated, but your goal should always be to produce a sample that is random and that can be replicated by other researchers or citizens. Many communities conduct surveys of citizens on controversial issues. Often these surveys are done in such a manner that many citizens doubt their authenticity (based on experience, they should). One community we know conducted a survey concerning citizen support for curbside recycling. Many citizens were confused about how the sample was drawn, and many cynically contended that “the city council just passed out surveys to their buddies who supported the recycling.” Unfortunately, on the other hand, most citizens do not understand random sampling, and in this example nothing was done by the community to educate citizens on how the sampling was completed. Sometimes those conducting and utilizing the sampling are in need of education too. We have seen campus newspaper editors who really believed that if the paper sent out an email survey question (poorly constructed) to 4,000 students, and 150

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of them took the time to respond to it because they were really opposed to the policy change being considered, the responses generated could tell you something about the majority opinion on campus. The information above and below should help you understand why it does not. There are three major random sampling techniques (for more detailed discussions, see Babbie, 2012; Folz, 1996). These techniques should be used by analysts, and analysts should be prepared to explain their use and limitations to citizens. Remember, policy analysts must always be educators as well as experts. The chosen sampling strategy must be “transparent” and any limitations to the sample drawn must be honestly noted. The three techniques are systematic random sampling, stratified random sampling, and multistage cluster sampling. 1. Systematic Random Sampling  Here, the researcher is given a comprehensive list of names and draws a sample from the list. For example, our policy analyst Shaundra wants to randomly select 2,000 names from a list of driver’s licenses issued in Boondocks. There are 35,000 names (individuals 16 years and older) on the list. To randomly sample 2,000 names, Shaundra should randomly start somewhere in the list and then select every 18th name (35,000/2,000 = 17.5). Systematic random sampling is the most used sampling strategy among policy analysts. Note, however, that there is a problem in the sampling list. The sample is really a random sample of adults who have a driver’s license issued within the city. Excluded are elderly people who no longer drive and youth who have chosen not to learn to drive; citizens new to Boondocks, who had their driver’s licenses issued elsewhere; anyone else who, for one reason or another (e.g., cost), does not have a driver’s license with a Boondocks address. In practice, you will never find the perfect, allinclusive sampling list from which to draw your names. Again, these limitations should always be acknowledged by the analyst. 2. Stratified Random Sampling  Sometimes it is advisable to stratify your sample. Stratified sampling increases sampling representativeness among subgroups of the population, including age, ethnicity, gender, religion, and urban versus rural. For example, suppose that it is very important that the sample collected by Shaundra has proportional representation from the five major neighborhoods of Boondocks. While a well-prepared systematic random sample would probably produce results that are fairly proportionate, stratified sampling allows the researcher to be more precise. Shaundra would have to find a list that could easily divide residents into the five neighborhoods. In the United States, for example, most likely there is a list of citizens by census tracts. Shaundra collects the names broken out by neighborhood, as illustrated in Table 3.2. Remember that Shaundra still wants to mail 2,000 surveys (she is over-mailing to be safe). In her attempt to increase the precision of proportional returns, Shaundra will mail the 2,000 surveys proportional to their percentage of the population (see Table 3.3). Neighborhood A will receive

Table 3.2  Boondocks Residents by Neighborhood Neighborhood

Number of Residents

Percentage

A

10,000

28.6

B

5,000

14.3

C

5,000

14.3

D

7,500

21.4

E

7,500

21.4

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572 surveys (28.6 percent of those mailed), neighborhood B will receive 286 surveys (14.3 percent mailed), and so on. Shaundra will use systematic random sampling to sample within each neighborhood. Shaundra’s sampling choices as illustrated in Table 3.3 constitute a proportionate stratified sample (PSS). However, in some situations, stratified sampling can be used to create disproportionate stratified samples (DSS). For example, neighborhood A is a low-income neighborhood, and Shaundra knows through experience that the return rate for this neighborhood is likely to be roughly one-half of what can be expected from the other four neighborhoods. So, if Shaundra is expecting a 25 percent return rate from the rest of the neighborhoods, she can expect only a 12.5 percent return rate from neighborhood A. She may then want to double the number of surveys mailed to neighborhood A. She would mail 1,144 surveys instead of 572. While this would be preferable, in practice the increased costs of mailing the extra 572 surveys would probably mean that this would not be done. Lack of money is almost always a hindrance to policy analysts trying to “scientifically” create appropriate sample sizes. (In this instance the extra cost would also allow a more democratic survey sample.) 3. Multistage Cluster Sampling  This approach is more useful for hand-delivered surveys or for interviews than it is for mail research. It can also be used to generate samples for focus groups. In this approach, the researcher randomly samples at multiple stages. For example, Shaundra has been charged with conducting citizen interviews as a follow-up to the mail survey. She decides to use a multistage cluster sampling technique, and proceeds as follows: (a) Shaundra would have to divide the city into segments. It would probably be most useful to use the five voting precincts or neighborhoods as the first stage. (b) Shaundra can randomly choose four of the five neighborhoods. (c) Having randomly chosen four neighborhoods, she would randomly choose blocks in each of the neighborhoods. For example, if each neighborhood had 100 blocks, Shaundra could choose to randomly select 25 blocks from each of the four randomly selected neighborhoods. (d) From these 100 blocks, Shaundra then could randomly select two houses per block. (e) With her list of 200 houses, she could then arrange an interview with one of the home occupants. To avoid gender bias issues, Shaundra could randomly select the person who had most recently celebrated their birthday.

She would then have a random sample of 200 Boondocks citizens. The biggest problem with multistage cluster sampling is determining how many units to choose at each stage or in each cluster. For instance, why not randomly sample all five neighborhoods? Why not randomly sample 50 blocks instead of 25 blocks? And so on. The answer is that the number of

Table 3.3  Surveys Mailed by Neighborhood Neighborhood A

Formula .286 × 2,000

Number of Surveys Mailed =

572

B

.143 × 2,000

=

286

C

.143 × 2,000

=

286

D

.214 × 2,000

=

428

E

.214 × 2,000

=

428

Total

2,000 surveys

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units sampled at each stage and in each cluster is determined by time and resources. You should always try to sample the maximum number at each stage congruent with your agency’s resources. The way that Shaundra chose to sample produced 200 citizens to interview. Interviewing 200 citizens is a huge task and will take a lot of resources and time. Many smaller governmental agencies are understaffed, and trying to get the resources to interview this many citizens is quite difficult. Sample Bias and Weighting

Even if the analyst hits the targeted sample size, this does not mean that she necessarily has a sample that is representative of the population. Perhaps only those citizens who were very in favor of, or very opposed to, the swimming pool project returned the survey. Or perhaps retired persons disproportionately returned the survey. How does the analyst deal with the potential for sample bias? For example, perhaps the director of the local senior citizen center put out a flyer erroneously claiming the new pool would result in significant increases in property taxes and would therefore be unfair to people on fixed incomes. First, the analyst asks demographic questions of respondents on the survey. Typical demographic questions to ask include age, gender, education, and household income. Of course, any survey must have methodological procedures in place that guarantee the anonymity of the respondents.1 These results from the demographic section are then compared with census data for the community, county, state, province, etc. under study. In Table 3.4, Shaundra has prepared a table that compares sample demographic responses with census data. At this point, the analyst examines the data and decides if there are problems with nonrepresentativeness in the sample. Clearly, there is no problem with gender, income, and education. ­However, the sample is skewed in the distribution of respondents by age. Age is a particular ­problem, with 72 percent of the population being 49 years or younger in the census data compared with only 46 percent in the sample data. This is a typical problem in community surveys. As a rule, younger persons are less likely to complete surveys, even if the topic (in this case, swimming pools) is of interest and importance to them. What does Shaundra do in this case? Does she throw out the sample and start over? Of course, the city council and mayor would not be very pleased with the wasted money and time if she did.

Table 3.4  A Comparison of Sample Data with Census Data Boondocks Census Data

Boondocks Sample

Age

Age

18–24 (8%)

18–24 (2%)

25–49 (64%)

25–49 (44%)

50–69 (22%)

50–69 (55%)

70–85 (5%)

70–85 (0%)

Self-Identification: Gender

Self-Identification: Gender

Male (53%)

Male (51%)

Female (46%)

Female (48%)

Other (1%)

Other (1%)

Household Income

Household Income

Mean = $35,000

Mean = $36,000

Education

Education

12.8 years of education

13.1 years of education

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Instead, there are a variety of steps that the careful policy analyst must undertake. First, Shaundra needs to examine whether there is a determining factor regarding citizen’s attitudes toward the pool. Using statistical computer software, she could run a simple chi-square test (consult a statistics book for an explanation of chi-square analysis) and determine if age and support for swimming pool options are related. If they are not, then age is not an important predictor of attitudes and Shaundra does not have to worry about sample bias in this case. If, however, age and swimming pool attitudes are related, she must undertake corrective steps. This is done by weighting cases and giving younger respondents’ answers more weight. In the population, 25,200 out of 35,000 adult citizens are in the 18–49 age range (72 percent). This compares with only 184 persons out of 400 (46 percent) in that same age range in the sample. The analyst can then take the 72 percent (of the population) and divide it by the 46 percent (of the sample) to come up with a weighting factor of 1.56 (72 percent/46 percent). The answers of the individuals in the 18–49 age range in the sample are multiplied by 1.56. Check the math yourself. If you take the 1.56 and multiply it by 184, you will receive an answer of 287 persons. Now, the sample is counting 287 persons in this age range out of 400 in the sample (roughly 72 percent) and is, therefore, proportionate. As an example, suppose that 25 persons in the 18–49 age range supported the building of the swimming pool in a new location. When we report frequencies (the number of cases with each of the possible values on a single variable), we would take that number and multiply it by 1.56 (25 × 1.56) and get the number 39. The opinions of younger adults are now proportionately represented in the sample. The analyst should, in her formal report and in presentations, inform her audience that certain cases are weighted. The Technicalities of Surveys

There are a host of good books and methodology chapters on survey design (e.g., Babbie, 2012; Folz, 1996). The design of a survey is a complex issue that involves a certain level of theoretical understanding of research methodology. We cannot go into an in-depth discussion here. Instead, we provide five general tips that are a key for the analyst seeking to design a good survey. Tip #1: Write Simple and Clear Questions and Statements  Do your survey questions really ask the questions you want to ask? A problem with self-administered mail surveys is that the respondent does not have an opportunity to ask the survey designer for clarification about questions. Instead, the respondent must interpret the questions themselves. Awkward wording, the use of negatives, and including multiple information in one question are all sources of survey error. Examine the following statements and questions:2 1. 2. 3.

Do you agree or disagree that the United States should not intervene in the affairs of other countries unless national interests are directly at stake? Do you agree or disagree that local taxes are too high and that the city summer recreation program should be discontinued? What is your income?

The question in statement 1 is difficult to understand because it is negative. If the respondent agrees with the statement they are agreeing that the United States should not intervene. Thus, they are giving a positive affirmation to a negative statement. A typical respondent would be very confused as to exactly what the survey statement was stating. The statement should be rewritten as follows: • Agree or disagree: The United States should intervene in the affairs of other countries only when its national interests are at stake.

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Conversely, if using a Likert scale (with choices of answers such as strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree), the statement could be written as follows: • I believe that the United States should intervene in the affairs of other countries only when its national interests are at stake.

The question in statement 2 is “double-barreled.” A respondent may agree that taxes are too high but disagree that the summer recreation program be discontinued. The survey writer assumes that higher taxes and the summer recreation program are somehow unavoidably linked. But this is not necessarily true, or even likely. Higher taxes could be the result of too much money being spent on golf courses, city council member salaries, an overly generous travel budget for the mayor, or a host of other problems. Sometimes these double-barreled statements are just survey writer errors, and, at other times, they are deliberately misleading and politically inspired. The statement should be rewritten into two separate parts as follows: • Agree or disagree: The summer recreation program should be discontinued. (If you agree with the statement, please tell us the reason it should be discontinued.)

Once again, it could also be written with a Likert scale that would provide a clearer sense of how strongly the respondents agree or disagree and that provides the opportunity to be neutral. At first blush, question 3 might seem okay. It asks a simple question, but it could have a multitude of answers depending on how the person reading it interprets the question. A respondent could answer it as gross individual weekly income, gross individual monthly income, net individual weekly income, net individual monthly income, gross individual annual income, net individual annual income, gross household monthly income, gross household weekly income, and so on. This is a common mistake made by survey-question writers. Such questions also often irritate the people taking the survey who recognize that they don’t know what the survey is really asking, and so they may choose not to complete the survey or, worse, not to take it seriously. The question writer did not carefully consider the answer that he or she desired. The question should be rewritten as follows: • What is your annual (gross) household income?

or • What is your net (after taxes) annual household income?

Tip #2: Avoid Bias and Vagueness in Wording  Either intentionally or unintentionally, many survey questions are biased. Take the following example: “Do you agree or disagree that the disastrous policies of President __________ helped create our current foreign policy problems?” The term disastrous policies leads the respondent. What rational respondent would disagree that “disastrous policies” helped create our current foreign policy problems? In addition, the phrase, current foreign policy problems is both vague and leading. It assumes that the problems are a given and implies that the respondent should know about them. A better question would be: “Do you agree or disagree that President _______ did a good job in handling foreign policy?” In addition, another form of biased wording is found in what survey writers term “motherhood and apple pie questions.” These are questions that almost exclusively elicit socially desirable responses. For example, “Agree or disagree: Water pollution is bad.” or “Agree or disagree: Education is important for our children.” These questions are vague and symbolic. Elected officials often like to keep democratic “discourse” at this vague level. Few respondents will disagree about the ill

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effects of water pollution or disagree about the importance of education. Writing survey questions in this manner is useless unless the questions are used to support an elected official’s personal agenda. Instead, the conflict in answering these questions occurs when the survey writer crafts a question in a more specific manner. For instance, “Agree or disagree: This community should stop all commercial uses of the river in order to stop water pollution” or “Agree or disagree: We must incorporate a private voucher system to improve public education.” These latter questions will provoke considerable conflict and disagreement and will provide far greater insight into the political conflict surrounding the issues. Tip #3: Do Not Ask Questions that Will Produce Uninformed Responses  A problem with surveys is that they often ask questions that respondents have little if any information about. For example, asking common citizens to answer questions about “transuranic waste transportation” is not very helpful for the policy analyst. The respondents most likely do not know what “transuranic” is in the first place.3 Furthermore, they are even less likely to know much about policy issues and very rarely will know the details of specific legislative proposals. One city analyst we knew sent out a survey concerning the city sewer system. The survey included the following question: “Is the city sewer system big enough to handle more population growth?” Nearly all respondents answered the question, but it is highly doubtful whether any of the respondents had enough information to make an informed response. The purpose of the survey was to determine whether citizens are prepared to handle increased sewer fees in order to expand existing sewer facilities. Instead of asking questions that require such specific and technical knowledge, the survey writer could have written a more general question such as: “Would you support the city expanding its sewer system to accommodate increased population growth, even if it meant a $1 per month increase in sewer fees for all households?” Tip #4: Think of the Statistics that You Want to Produce with Your Questions  A common problem for novice survey-question writers is that they ask questions that do not produce the data that they need to run the statistics they want to produce. Later in this chapter we will discuss different levels of measurement (see Table 3.6). Importantly, certain statistics are calculated for certain levels of measurement. When questions are designed, survey writers must carefully consider what type of data their questions will produce. For example, a beginning analyst was once given the task of creating a survey. The analyst’s supervisor wanted to use regression analysis to analyze several questions. Unfortunately, the analyst wrote questions that generated only nominal level data measurements and therefore only chi-square statistics could be produced. Tip #5: Design the Survey with Consideration of Coding and Reporting of Results  Closely related to Tip #4 is the problem of how to code and report data. Coding is simply how numbers are transferred from the survey questionnaire to a data processing program. Often, question writers craft questions that produce almost meaningless information or information that is very difficult to analyze and report. Consider the following question: Please indicate the reasons that you shop in Boondocks. Check all that apply: convenience ____ quantity of goods ____ quality of goods ____

price ____ service ____ location ____

Most respondents will check all six reasons. What does this mean and how does the analyst code such data and report it? The answer is that the analyst would have to create a variable for each

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r­ eason and then “place code” each as 0 = yes (it was checked) and 1 = no (it was not checked). But in the final report, little useful information will be provided. A better question would be as follows: Below are several different reasons citizens may shop in Boondocks. Please rank the reasons, using a 1 for the most important, a 2 for the second most important, and so on. Rank all items.

This question forces the respondents to critically examine their own preferences and provide a ranking. The analyst can provide much stronger information with this question. The Politics of Survey Construction

In addition to possessing a technical understanding of survey design, the analyst requires an understanding and appreciation of survey design and administration in a political environment. First, remember that many citizens literally “hate” surveys. To some citizens, mail surveys (or email surveys) are just another form of junk mail that are quickly tossed in the garbage (deleted). Other citizens will return the surveys and chastise the survey sponsors for “wasting tax dollars by mailing this useless piece of crap.” Others will use the survey to vent their anger about a wide variety of issues not directly related to the survey itself. Therefore, our advice is be prepared to take heat and have a thick political skin. Second, do not overuse surveys. Many analysts and elected officials use surveys as a surrogate for democratic participation. Somehow there is the belief that by sending out 1,000 surveys, receiving 200 back, and writing a 50-page report from the 200 surveys, the analyst and elected officials have broadly achieved community input. Further, many communities conduct survey after survey and write report after report. Unfortunately, the reports are quickly forgotten and normally filed away without being used for any tangible purpose. Consider only using surveys when the desired information cannot be secured in other ways, and will actually be used. In the Boondocks case, a survey on citizen views toward the swimming pools seems appropriate. It provides a concrete set of choices, the survey design could be short, and they are going to make a choice. However, if Boondocks’s residents have been bombarded in recent years by a variety of other community surveys, some of which may have been poorly designed and written, the survey is more likely to irritate citizens than to provide a vehicle for democracy. Third, analysts must carefully seek input from many stakeholders in the design of the survey. Surveys are often political tools rather than tools of democracy. The wording of a question can dramatically affect the results. Examine the following statements. In each, the respondent is to tell the researcher whether they agree or disagree with the statement. 1. 2. 3.

“The City of Boondocks should not waste taxpayer dollars on building a new pool in a new location.” “I don’t have much information about the new pool and need more information before I can decide how I feel about constructing a new one.” “A new pool will make a positive contribution to our community and will bring in tourist dollars; therefore I support the construction of a new pool in the new site.”

The first statement is obviously biased against building a new pool. It presumes that building a new pool is equated with wasting taxpayer dollars. Respondents would most likely agree with this statement because few citizens would want to “waste taxpayer dollars.” Perhaps the first statement was written by the local businesses that are located near the existing pool. Their goal was to write a question that makes it look like citizens do not want the new pool in a new location. They may support the building of a new pool but only in the existing location.

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The second statement is a common ploy by opponents of projects. Citizens typically do not have a lot of knowledge about the intricacies of policies. Instead, citizens tend to make general decisions and value judgments. They either support something or they do not. Approximately 75 to 85 percent of the respondents would agree with this statement. Opponents would then use these numbers to argue that the vast majority of the citizens are uninformed and the city council and mayor cannot proceed on the issue. The problem is that at least this percentage of citizens tend to be uninformed on all issues, but the city council and mayor still must make decisions and pass ordinances. This second statement may be used as a delay tactic and to increase citizen distrust of city government. Most likely opponents would use these numbers in a newspaper editorial and state something like: The city council and mayor are about ready to vote on an issue that 75 percent of the population knows little about. Where is democracy? Why don’t they try to inform citizens about the true costs and benefits? Are the elected officials afraid to show the citizens the truth?4

The third statement is leading and again biased, but this time in favor of the pool construction. It is also double- or even triple-barreled in that it contains two or three separate pieces of information. For example, it is possible that respondents may agree that the pool will make a positive contribution to the community, but they may not believe that it will bring in tourist dollars and they may not support the pool because they see it as unfair competition with private recreation facilities. Conversely, another respondent may agree that the pool will make a positive contribution and bring in tourist dollars, but the respondent may still not support the new pool because they think the government should only provide “necessary” services. It is very important that the analyst attempts to create questions that are neutral and fair to all parties. The analyst should create a committee of stakeholders who all individually have veto power over questions. Shaundra would want to include the stakeholders from the CAG, citizens from the old pool neighborhood, businesses who would be affected by any pool decision, swimming groups, and any other identified stakeholders. In creating a survey-design committee, the analyst must fully realize that the stakeholders will try to craft questions that favor their interests and that survey design by committee is a long and frustrating process. One of the authors of this book once spent a month working with a state-wide coalition of tax experts to design a state-wide survey that was to measure citizen attitudes toward state taxation. Input was sought from academics, elected officials, elected officials’ staff, administrative experts, anti-taxation groups, and other citizen groups. The survey went through about 60 changes in the course of the month, as stakeholders fought over question construction. Importantly, taxation is an issue that promotes a high level of controversy. There is little agreement over what taxes are most equitable, and suggested changes could have major impacts on individual citizens. For some people, the benefits may appear not only diffused but absent, and the costs concentrated on their pocketbook. In this situation the governor of the state even wrote several questions for the survey and vetoed several others he did not want included. The result was a long survey that, despite the cross-sectional input, still created political controversy in the state. It would have been easier for a single analyst to design the survey, and, in fact, a more effective survey might have been designed this way. However, the analyst, in undertaking the survey by himself, also would have taken a lot of “political heat.” Instead, with the wide range of stakeholders, the analyst was able to state that a wide range of input was sought and that all stakeholders had signed off on the final product. This at least gave the survey some legitimacy and deterred some political attacks from interest groups and others. The lesson from all of this is that survey construction is a political process. It is very difficult to objectively and neutrally measure people’s attitudes. On a more positive note, the other author helped redesign a survey of foster parents, their caseworkers, and the nondirect staff (mostly management) who work with them. A broadly

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representative committee designed the survey. Unlike the tax survey, this project saw stakeholders with much agreement over basic problems and an honest concern for designing a useful survey. They accepted most of the suggestions from their hired analyst, but appropriately kept control of the final form. There were a few questions that were technically flawed, but it was their survey. More importantly, their goal was not to elicit certain responses that they could use to justify changes they wanted to make, but to honestly discover the values/beliefs and current practices, and then later to continue the inclusive dialogue. Today, analysts are turning toward the internet and new technology in survey administration and as forms of citizen input. Box 3.1 examines the use and misuse of such an approach.

Box 3.1  The Use and Misuse of Internet Surveys

I

nternet or email surveys have become increasingly popular and are used by many public administrators as a method of gathering citizen input. Online surveys are cheap to administer (you do not have to pay postage or hire telephone interviewers, and data are tabulated with technology) and offer designed/administration advantages for survey construction. In addition, there is some evidence that online surveys have higher response rates when compared with mail or telephone surveys, and it is estimated that nearly 90 percent of U.S. adults now use the internet. Yet, there are many problems. There are 10–11 percent who don’t have access, some people are unwilling to complete online surveys, there are biases in population subgroups (e.g., people who are 65 or older), and differences among those who are willing to complete online surveys in terms of income, political knowledge, partisanship, religious affiliation, geography, and urban/rural distribution. One method to conduct an online survey is to simply post an opinion poll (or something similar) on an internet site. Many city governments now do such a thing when they want public input on an issue. The problems here are quite numerous. First, this method does not generate a random sample. That is, those who respond to the survey are those most likely to visit the city government’s website and are not representative of any population. Second, related to the first problem is the fact that citizens from outside the area can participate. In other words, someone living in Pocatello, Idaho, could cast their opinion on an issue facing the residents of Erie, Pennsylvania. Third, some online surveys have methods to keep people from responding more than once (through the use of internet cookies), but other surveys do not have such restrictions. Much like the television show The Voice, where people can vote a dozen times for their favorite singer, citizens could complete dozens of surveys. And even when internet cookies are used, resourceful citizens can find ways to complete multiple surveys through using different computers and the like. A second method draws a random sample from email lists and then sends a survey to the selected emails (one of your authors received about 10 of these during a recent spring semester). While this is an improved method, it still has significant shortcomings. First, it is difficult to find email lists. Second, even if you find an email list, you have significant problems with representation. In short, not everyone has an email address. Finally, email surveys are being overused, and they are quickly becoming the equivalent of junk email (or spam). A third method uses established internet survey services. Mechanical Turk (henceforth MTurk) and Survey Monkey are two examples of the use of the internet gaining prominence as a legitimate survey source for research. While it is a self-selected convenience sample, where participants have the ability to opt in or out, analyses of those taking part have found them to be more representative of the national population than other internet samples (Berinsky et al. 2012; Buhmeister et al. 2011) or the prototypical university sample of freshmen and sophomores taking an introductory course. Further evidence shows that studies originally using MTurk have been able to replicate

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those findings after expanding to more representative samples (Goodman et al., 2013). In the case of MTurk, its population normally skews liberal and Democratic, so adjustments may be needed, and it creates certain limitations in terms of interpreting the data and generalizability. Costs are not negligible, but are actually rather reasonable. While technology is an important tool in gathering citizen input, the analyst should consider these problems and how to address them before engaging in an internet or email survey. Sources: Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. “Using Mechanical Turk as a Subject Recruitment Tool for Experimental Research.” Political Analysis, 20(3): 351–368. Buhmeister, Michael D., Tracy Kwang, and Samuel D. Gosling. 2011. “Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1): 3–5. Goodman, Joseph K., Cynthia E. Kryder, and Amar Cheema. 2013. “Data Collection in a Flat World: Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(3): 213–224. O’Sullivan, Elizabethann, Gary R. Rassel, and Maureen Berner. 2003. Research Methods for Public Administrators, 4th ed. New York: Longman. Scott, Keeter, and Kyley, Mcgeeney. 2015. “Coverage Error in Internet Surveys.” September 22. https://www. pewresearch.org/methods/2015/09/22/coverage-error-in-internet-surveys/ (accessed December 6, 2019).

Tool #2: Extrapolation and Forecasting Extrapolation is a method of predicting the value of something in the future. The underlying assumption of extrapolation is that what happened in the past will repeat itself in the future. Although today policy analysts use much more sophisticated models, extrapolation is calculated mathematically by using Formula 3-1. Formula 3-1: Extrapolation Pf = P0 + AGI ( n ) where:  Pf = the estimated population (or any other value that needs to be estimated) in the future  P0 = a chosen base year AGI = the average growth increment between time periods   n = selected time periods

The best way to understand extrapolation is by seeing its application in a case example. Extrapolation can be used for a variety of policy issues. Here, we examine its use in estimating the future population of Boondocks. Population Extrapolation Problem: The City of Boondocks

One outcome of the swimming pool debate is a desire on the part of the decision makers for more information. Shaundra has been asked to present a report to the Boondocks City Council on the city’s long-term development. In particular, she needs to provide the council with population estimates for the next 20 years. She decides to use extrapolation techniques. She first collects census data going back to 1970. The data are presented in Table 3.5. Shaundra needs to forecast population numbers in 2030 and 2040. She needs to use Formula 3-1 to project population for a future period: 1970 serves as time period zero (P0), 1980 = P1; 1990 = P2; 2000 = P3; 2010 = P4; 2020 = P5. Using Formula 3-1, the population forecast for 2030 would be as follows: P2010 = P0 + AGI ( n )

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Table 3.5  Population Trends of Boondocks Year

Population

1970

25,000

1980

40,000

1990

42,000

2000

42,000

2010

50,500

2020

55,200

where:  P0 = the base year (1970) AGI = the average growth increment between decades (15,000 + 2,000 + 0 + 8,500 + 4,700/5 decades = 6,040)   n = the number of decades since 1970 (in our case 6, then 7 for calculation of 2040).

Thus we are left with the following: P2030 = 25,000 + ( 6,040 × 6 ) P2030 = 25,000 + 36,240 P2030 = 61,240

To estimate the population for the year 2040, Shaundra would simply do the following: P2040 = 25,000 + ( 6,040 × 7 ) P2040 = 25,000 + 42,280 P2040 = 67,280

Of course, there are problems with the extrapolation technique. Most notably, it again assumes that the future will resemble the past. In addition, analysts must choose how far they want to go back in time in order to choose their base year. In the Boondocks example, the large growth rate between 1970 and 1980 was the result of Boondocks annexing another community. Therefore, the 15,000 increase in population was not created “naturally” in population ecology terms. Population ecology asserts that human populations can change in three ways: through (1) human births, (2) human deaths, and (3) human migration. Population ecology ignores the fact that population, like all social numbers, is socially constructed. Population can increase “artificially” through annexation. In addition, the U.S. Census is an imperfect method of determining a community’s population. Census numbers are really more an “educated estimate” of a population, and Census data are one of the most politically contentious issues because they have a huge impact on legislative power distribution and the amount of funding states and communities receive. For example, a western U.S. community “found” 400 homes that were missing from the U.S. Census Bureau’s address catalog. The community development and research department, using a public administration intern from the local university, undertook a comparison of the Census master file with an engineering department list of addresses it had granted approval for building over a five-year period. The intern found that in that time 400 new homes had failed to make the U.S. Census master list. This means that the community’s population would automatically be between 1,200 and 1,500 larger than what it would have been without finding the additional homes. The community development director was pleased because population

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drives funding formulas. Later, this same community development research department used a similar review and found enough homes to push the community’s population over 50,000, allowing the city to be entitled to more than $600,000 in annual community development block grants earmarked only for communities with populations over 50,000. Through an aggressive comparison of the U.S. Census list with the city’s lists, the community development department has literally brought millions in federal monies into the community. In our example, because of the annexation between 1970 and 1980, Shaundra may believe it would be better to use 1980 as the base year. In doing so, her numbers change quite dramatically: New Base Year (1980): Year Population 1980 40,000 1990 43,000 2000 42,000 2010 50,500 2020 55,200 New Calculations for 2030: P2030 = 40,000 + ( 3,800 × 5) P2030 = 40,000 + 19,000 P2030 = 59,000 New Calculations for 2040: P2040 = 40,000 + ( 3,800 × 6 ) P2040 = 40,000 + 22,800 P2040 = 62,800

Notice the differences, particularly in predicting the year 2040. If the city council wanted to promote Boondocks as a growing and prosperous city, or wanted to demonstrate the need for a new pool, they would most likely prefer Shaundra’s first estimation of a Boondocks population of 67,280 in 2040. Conversely, if the city council wanted to demonstrate the idea that growth was going to be steady but not huge, or wanted to downplay the need for a new pool, they would most likely choose Shaundra’s second estimate of a population of 62,800 in 2040. In either case, many or perhaps most citizens would be dazzled by the impressive number calculations and the appearance of technical precision that they provide. Most citizens do not have an appreciation of how extrapolation numbers are calculated, and therefore they are very unlikely to understand the problem created by the 1970 base year and instead accept the numbers as unquestionable scientific calculations. “You can’t argue with the numbers,” someone might even state. Good analysts get around this problem by supplying several different estimates, using several different base years, and explaining problems like those created by annexation. In addition, the analyst must explain that extrapolation does not account for changes in culture, changes outside of the area, changes in the economy, or other changes that might dramatically affect population growth (although sophisticated regression models try to account for these). The future rarely looks like the past. As always, honesty is the best policy. Unfortunately, in politics, “strategic representation” and “meaning capture” often are more salient than honesty. Analysts should resist the manipulative impulses of elected officials, interest groups, elites, and themselves, and present data to citizens that are open to scrutiny and understanding. Box 3.2 provides an example of some of the problems and pitfalls of extrapolation.

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Box 3.2  Oops: Extrapolation in Practice

O

ften population forecasts are quickly filed away and forgotten. When we do find forecasts that were made 30 to 35 years ago, we most often see wildly inaccurate predictions. Consider the two following real-life communities.

Community A In 1975, this community was booming; an enormous mining equipment company had, earlier in the decade, decided to locate in the city. The population in the community grew from roughly 40,000 in 1970 to nearly 45,000 by 1975. This trend was expected to continue for several years and, in fact, was expected to escalate. There is a rule in economic development circles that every 1,000 new manufacturing jobs create around 1,500 service and retail sector jobs. That is, the manufacturing jobs bring new money into the community, and this money is spent on groceries, clothes, homes, and recreation. This creates a larger service sector as grocery stores, restaurants, clothing stores, and other service sector employees fill the increased market. The forecasters, using techniques far more complicated than the one we just taught you, estimated that the population of community A would be 100,000 by the year 2000. City elected officials quickly implemented anti-growth measures, such as large sewer hook-up fees, in the hope of slowing the growth. But the forecasters could not foresee the changes in the mining market that would occur in the late 1970s. Neither could they see that major government deregulation would gut the community of much of its transportation industry. The population of community A in the year 2020 is just over 55,000 (it has increased, but is 45,000 below the predicted year 2000 number of 100,000 citizens).

Community B In 1975, community B was a stable community dominated economically by government. Its population in 1975 was around 60,000. Forecasters believed that without a major growth industry in the private sector, this community would grow steadily to near 70,000 by the year 2000. Forecasters could not foresee that a booming personal computer industry would locate three major manufacturers in community B, and that outmigration from urban areas would pull thousands to community B’s beautiful river valley. The population of community B in the year 2000 was more than 130,000 instead of 70,000. In 2020, it was well over 230,000 and is still growing rapidly within a metropolitan area nearing 750,000.

Tool #3: Measures of Central Tendency There are three measures of central tendency: means, modes, and medians. A mean is simply the arithmetic average of a distribution of numbers and is calculated by adding the values of the numbers in a distribution and then dividing by the number of cases in the distribution.5 Means are used when data collected are an “interval ratio,” meaning that the data have a true zero point (age in years, weight, number of fires in a city in a given year—see Table 3.6). With interval ratio data, the researcher can measure the precise distance between cases. For example, if one person is 60 years old and another person is 30 years old, we can say that the former is twice as old as the latter. Of course, the meaning of the phrase “twice as old” only accurately refers to chronological age and carries with it individual and social biases and beliefs.

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Table 3.6  Three Types of Data Type

Description

Examples of Questions

Nominal

Data that can be considered only mutually exclusive or exhaustive.

1. Are you over six-foot tall? Yes or No 2. Did you vote in the last general election? Yes or No

Ordinal

Data that are ranked.

3. P  lease indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement: “President is doing a good job handling the threat of terrorism.” A- Strongly agree B- Agree C- Neutral D- Disagree E- Strongly disagree 4. P  lease rank your favorite type of ice cream. (1 = favorite, 2 = 2nd favorite, 3 = least favorite) Chocolate Vanilla Strawberry

Interval ratio

Data that have a meaningful zero point.

How many times a year do you call the city police department? times a year How many years have you lived in Boondocks? years

Modes are simply the value of a frequency distribution that occurs the most. Modes are the exclusive choice for a central tendency measure for nominal data. Nominal data are data that have only the characteristic of being exhaustive and mutually exclusive (see Table 3.6). Examples of nominal data include height and yes and no answers to questions such as, “do you have a driver’s license?” Modes can also be used with ordinal data (data that have a rank; see Table 3.6) and interval ratio data. Medians are the middle point of a distribution of numbers. If there is an even number of values, the median is the mean of the two middle numbers. Medians are calculated with ordinal or interval ratio data. Boondocks and Central Tendency

Perhaps using our analyst Shaundra and the city of Boondocks as an example, we can clearly demonstrate the ease of use and usefulness of the three measures of central tendency. In addition, you will find that, as with all numbers, even simple measures of central tendency can be used incorrectly and can be used to mislead or politically manipulate. Consider the following example from Boondocks. Shaundra has been asked to provide data on the average number of crimes reported in Boondocks for the past 10 years. (Even in Boondocks there is more going on than just a debate about a swimming pool.) The number of crimes committed produces data that are interval ratio, so Shaundra can use any or all three of the

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measures of central tendency. She collects the following data from the Boondocks Police Department, as reported in Table 3.7. Calculating the mean, Shaundra comes up with the following: Sum of crimes reported over the past 10 years = 5,105 Number of years = 10 Mean = Sum of crimes/number of years Mean = 5,105/10 Mean = 510.50 crimes per year

Shaundra then uses the same data to calculate the median. Here she must reorder the data into a ranked distribution (from lowest to highest), as shown in Table 3.8. We then count down five from the top and five up from the bottom to find the midpoint of the distribution between 550 (in 2014) and 560 (in 2017). To find the midpoint, we must add 550 and 560 and divide by 2. Thus we find a median of 555. Finally, Shaundra calculates the mode, which in this case is 600 (occurring three times, in 2013, 2016, and 2018).

Table 3.7  Reported Crimes in Boondocks Year

Reported Crimes

2009

330

2010

380

2011

385

2012

450

2013

600

2014

550

2015

650

2016

600

2017

560

2018

600

Table 3.8  Reported Crimes in Boondocks (Ordered) Year

Reported Crimes

2009

330

2010

380

2011

385

2012

450

2014

550

2017

560

2013

600

2016

600

2018

600

2015

650

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Thus, Shaundra is left with three differing measures of central tendency. The calculated mean provides the lowest average crimes reported (510.5 per year). The median provides average crimes reported at 555 per year. The mode provides the highest measure of central tendency, with an average of 600 crimes reported each year. So which measure of central tendency should Shaundra report to decision makers?6 It should be noted that calculated means are often unreliable because they are the most vulnerable to the distorting effects of outliers. In this case, however, there does not seem to be an outlier effect because there is a fairly consistent pattern of increases in reported crime over the past 10 years. When there is an outlier problem, the median becomes the statistic of choice because it is less influenced by outliers. In this case, Shaundra would do best in reporting all three numbers and explaining the differences among the three. Unfortunately, in politics, numbers are often used for political gain. For example, perhaps the mayor wants to paint a picture of Boondocks as a relatively low-crime area. In this case, Shaundra might be pressured to report the mean number. Alternatively, perhaps the Boondocks chief of police is arguing to the Boondocks City Council that his department needs more funding because of high crimes reports. The mode of 600 might best fit his political purposes. There are more problems with the calculation of measures of central tendency. Shaundra could, for example, decide to report the average crimes committed based only on the past five years and produce higher averages. For the past five years, the mean is 592, the median is 600, and the mode is 600. These higher numbers might help the chief of police secure larger budget allocations, but they might also deter Boondocks in its economic development efforts, because companies may not want to relocate to a community with a high crime rate. There is also a larger problem. The data represent only “crimes reported.” So the data are not really a measure of crime in the city but rather just a measure of reported crime. In addition, as an analyst, Shaundra would have to be very careful that reporting procedures have been the same in all 10 years. Perhaps the community’s aggressive Neighborhood Watch program, which encourages citizens to report “suspicious behavior,” is solely responsible for the increases in reported crimes starting in 2013. Ironically, good police work can also increase the crime rate, as successful clearance rates by police tend to lead to higher reporting of crime because citizens have an enhanced sense that reporting the crime will make a difference. In other words, citizens may merely be more likely now to report crime compared with earlier years. Perhaps there is no increased crime problem in Boondocks. Instead, changes in police procedures and citizen programs have just increased the number of reported crimes. Moreover, what about comparing the number of crimes with the overall population? Perhaps crime has fallen per capita (i.e., due to the increase in the population, the rate of crime could be lower per person, even if there are more crimes being committed overall). Moreover, our report did not distinguish between more serious crimes and lesser offenses. Maybe murder, rape, armed robbery, and assault are way down but petty theft and forgery are way up. It is also possible that this is due to a significant increase in the percentage of citizens who are males between the ages of 13 and 19 (because they commit an unusually high percentage of crime). Further, what is a crime? The phrase marital rape used to be an oxymoron—not a crime. Maybe changes in attitudes among police, the courts, and society have made it easier for victims of rape to report crimes without worrying about being mistreated again by the system. In addition, the analyst would have to make sure that the police department did not alter its reporting procedures in other ways. For example, perhaps from 2009 to 2012, reports of juvenile activity were not reported because police believed the activity was merely the result of harmless juvenile hijinks. But possibly concern over teenage gang activity led the police department to change its reporting procedures in 2013, which could help explain increases in crime. Always remember, social data are socially constructed.

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Tool #4: Discounting Discounting is a method for estimating the present value of costs and benefits in the future. For example, your best friend owes you $10.00. If she pays you today, you will receive $10.00. But if she pays you one year from now, the $10.00 that you receive then will not really be worth $10.00 because you will have lost the interest that you would have earned on the money as well as a slight loss due to inflation. At a 5 percent interest rate, $10.00 earns 50 cents over a one-year period. Thus, if your friend pays you back in one year, she is really only giving back $9.50 ($10.00 minus the 50 cents in interest that you lost). In short, future costs and benefits have less value than present ones. This is crucial because many policies have costs and benefits that are not immediately realized, but rather have costs and benefits that flow forward into time. Boondocks and Discounting

In discounting, an analyst chooses an interest rate that estimates what a government or citizen could earn on an investment over the period of time in question. While there is a discount rate set by the Federal Reserve, these rates change over time. Thus, there is subjectivity in the choice of an interest rate number. It is difficult to estimate discount rates three, four, or five years in the future. Remember that Boondocks wants to construct a new swimming pool and that it would cost $1 million. The work will not be completed for a year; thus costs would not be incurred for one year. In the meantime, Boondocks can earn one year of interest, so the costs decrease. Shaundra would have to determine the present value of the $1 million expenditure that will be spent next year. Formula 3-2 provides the method for calculating present value. Formula 3-2 n PV = S n / (1 + r ) where: Sn = a sum of money spent or received in the future r  = the discount rate n = the number of years until the money is received

In our example, we plug the $1,000,000 into Formula 3-2 and assume an 8 percent discount rate: PV = 1,000,000 / (1 + .08 )

1

PV = $925,925

Suppose that because this money was not currently in the budget, a wealthy, civic-minded donor agreed to pay for construction if the city would pay him back the million dollars (without interest) in two, three, four, or even five years. Note how each year the cost of the million-dollar pool would drop dramatically. If the money did not have to be paid back for five years, the present value would be around $680,600 (assuming an 8 percent rate). Discounting and present value are useful in determining two measures of efficiency: net present value and cost-benefit ratio. Later, we will provide you help in understanding how benefits and costs are determined in public projects. But for now, just realize that benefits and costs are not all realized in the same year. Instead, costs tend to occur up front on a project and benefits are spread out over several years. Consider the swimming pool example given earlier. After one year, the costs are $1,000,000, with only minimal annual maintenance and operation costs thereafter. Benefits do not begin to accrue for one year but will then continue in a steady fashion for several years. Shaundra developed her cost and benefit numbers using narrow definitions of both costs and benefits. Costs were meant to include only the actual costs of building the pool. These costs include mainly

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construction costs. The benefits were also defined narrowly, as revenues that would be generated by the pool. Take a five-year period and consider the net present value (NPV) and benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the swimming pool project as presented in Table 3.9. Year 1’s benefits will be slightly lower because the pool will be operational for less than a full swimming season. Net present value is calculated by subtracting the discounted benefits from the discounted costs. You could use Formula 3-4 to calculate the present value for each year’s cost and benefit. However, to make things easier we have included the discount factor for 20 years in Table 3.10. The calculation of the discount factor allows you to calculate present value. Formula 3-3 demonstrates how the numbers in Table 3.10 are calculated.

Table 3.9  Swimming Pool Benefits and Costs Year 0

1

2

3

4

5 $15,000

Benefits

0

$10,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

Costs

0

$1,003,400

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

1

.9346

.8734

.8163

.7629

.7130

Discount rate Discount factor

$5,000

Table 3.10  Discount Factors for Selected Discount Rates (up to 20 Years) Discount Rate Year

5 percent

6 percent

7 percent

8 percent

1

.9524

.9434

.9346

.9259

2

.9070

.8900

.8734

.8573

3

.8638

.8396

.8163

.7938

4

.8227

.7921

.7629

.7350

5

.7835

.7473

.7130

.6806

6

.7462

.7050

.6663

.6302

7

.7107

.6551

.6227

.5835

8

.6768

.6274

.5820

.5403

9

.6446

.5919

.5439

.5002

10

.6139

.5584

.5083

.4632

11

.5847

.5268

.4751

.4289

12

.5568

.4970

.4440

.3971

13

.5303

.4688

.4150

.3677

14

.5051

.4423

.3878

.3405

15

.4810

.4173

.3624

.3152

16

.4581

.3936

.3387

.2919

17

.4363

.3714

.3166

.2703

18

.4155

.3503

.2959

.2502

19

.3957

.3305

.2765

.2317

20

.3769

.3118

.2584

.2145

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Formula 3-3 n Discount factor ( DF ) = 1 / (1 + r ) where: r = the discount rate n = the number of years

Thus with a discount rate of 7 percent and at Year 2, the discount factor (DF) is: DF = 1 / (1 + .07 )

2

DF = 0.8734

In each year, we can take the benefits and the costs and separately multiply them by the discount factor (Table 3.10) to get a present value. Please note that you could use the discounting formula that we discussed earlier and calculate the same answers (try it for yourself). However, Table 3.10 provides you a sample of calculated discount factor numbers. Net present value is now calculated merely by taking the discount factor and multiplying it by the annual dollar benefit or cost. Here we have taken the numbers from Table 3.9 and calculated discounted costs and benefits: Discounted benefits ( DB ) = $0 (1) + $10,000 (.9346 ) + $15,000 (.8734 ) + $15,000 (.8163) + $15,000 (.7629 ) + $15,000 (.7130 ) = $56,830 Discounted costs ( DC ) = $0 (1) + $1,003,400 (.9346 ) + $5,000 (.8734 ) + $5,000 (.8163) + $5,000 (.7629 ) + $5,000 (.7130 ) = $953,605

Thus, the NPV for the project is: DB – DC or $56,830 – $953,605 NPV = –$896,775

The NPV of the swimming pool project is a negative $896,775. Using the number calculated, you can now determine the benefit-cost ratio. It is a quick and easy calculation and is represented by Formula 3-4. Formula 3-4 BCR = DB / DC

In our example the BCR would be: $56,830 / $953,605 = .0595

The BCR is .0595. Based on these data, the swimming pool project is not an efficient project. If a government wants an efficient use of citizen’s money, then the BCR should be at least 1.00, or preferably over 1.00. Of course, this begs the question of whether public goods such as swimming pools can be evaluated in terms of their economic efficiency. Public goods, by definition, exist because of market failure, and the benefits that they provide are difficult to measure: nonetheless, there are benefits. Historically, public education was a classic example provided of a public good wherein the benefits, though difficult to measure, outweighed the costs. Swimming pools provide many benefits that are not necessarily tangible or easily quantifiable. Swimming pools provide opportunities for children to play instead of getting into various forms of mischief. Swim lessons taught there can help protect citizens from drowning in nearby lakes, rivers, creeks, and private pools. Swimming pools help provide a sense of community as children

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and parents gather in a common place and enjoy recreational activities. Swimming pools might also create external benefits. Swimming pools attract individuals into a central place, and local businesses may benefit from swimming pools by selling sunscreen, soft drinks, hot dogs, and candy to children and adults. Pools are also an asset that might help attract new businesses concerned with what they can offer employees in terms of quality of life. Then again, there might be external costs associated with the swimming pool. The pool may take business away from a local health spa that has a pool. Perhaps the community is building the new pool in a new location. Moving the pool from an old neighborhood to a more suburban neighborhood might place tremendous costs on the old neighborhood because this decision would deny poor children yet another opportunity. To a large degree, those decisions belong to the public and to elected officials. The larger question for an analyst like Shaundra is how to calculate “costs” and “benefits” on public projects in order to inform your and others’ decisions. There is a methodology that attempts to account for external costs and intangible costs as well as internal and tangible ones. This method is known as cost-benefit analysis, and it is our final tool.

Tool #5: Cost-Benefit Analysis Cost-benefit analysis (sometimes called benefit-cost analysis) is a central feature of the traditional school of policy analysis. According to Munger (2000, p. 352), “Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the most commonly used form of decision analysis.” As the name implies, CBA is simply a comparison of costs to benefits, and, ideally, benefits should exceed costs. Today, even in the nonprofit world and academe, it is often popular to talk about this in terms of ROI (Return on Investment). Two of the pioneers of the positivist approach to policy analysis, Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978, p. 134), add: Benefit-cost analysis is the principal analytical framework used to evaluate public expenditure decisions. This approach requires systematic enumeration of all benefits and all costs tangible and intangible, whether readily quantifiable or difficult to measure, that will accrue to all members of society if a particular project is adopted.

Even Deborah Stone (2002, p. 235) writes of CBA: You have probably used this method in your own decisions, if not in a formal quantitative way, at least by listing the “pluses” and “minuses” of an action you were considering. The only difference between your list of pluses and minuses and the formal cost-benefit analysis done by policy analysts is that the analysts have added numbers to theirs.

While Chapters 4 and 5 will elaborate on this topic, after reading Chapters 1 and 2 you can probably already foresee some of the problems with this approach. According to Dunn (2004, p. 237) there are three major problems with CBA. First, efficiency may override equity as a value. Dunn recognizes that public goods are not supposed to be efficient and that CBA ignores ethical or moral dimensions. Second, there is much subjectivity in assigning “shadow prices” to goods that do not have market prices. Dunn concludes here that “These subjective judgments may simply be arbitrary expressions of the values of the analysts.” Third, Dunn argues that “monetary value is an inadequate measure of responsiveness, since the actual value of income varies from person to person.” This latter point means that income is relative to individuals and that a $100 cost to one person may be a great burden, whereas to another, wealthier person, it is not a burden at all. Costs and benefits in CBA are defined broadly. We feel that four of these costs and benefits (defined by Dunn, 2004, pp. 237–238) are essential to understand: (1) “inside” costs and benefits, (2) “outside” costs and benefits, (3) “tangible” costs and benefits, and (4) “intangible” costs

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and benefits. An inside cost or benefit is linked directly to the government undertaking the public project. In the Boondocks swimming pool example, the inside cost is simply the cost to the local government that must finance the swimming pool construction. An outside cost or benefit (referred to as externalities) occurs outside of a direct transaction. For example, the local sandwich shop that benefits from the building of the swimming pool receives an external benefit. Externalities are typically viewed more negatively in the form of external costs. The increased traffic around the swimming pool is a cost for people in that neighborhood. Tangible costs and benefits are easy to determine. An intangible cost or benefit is not directly measurable and is much more difficult to identify and difficult especially to quantify. A tangible cost or benefit is something that we can put a real dollar amount on. The costs of concrete and other materials in the building of the swimming pool are tangible costs. Examples of intangible costs would include increases in crime from the increased traffic in the neighborhood with the swimming pool. An intangible benefit from the pool might be an increase in community spirit. Intangible costs also include opportunity costs, defined as the next best alternative foregone. For example, if you decide to spend $1,000,000 on a swimming pool, then perhaps roads will not be repaired, baseball programs not expanded, or fire protection not enhanced. Typically, in public projects, tangible costs are easy to identify and quantify, whereas intangible costs are much more difficult. There is one final difficulty to CBA. Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978, p. 134) argue that whereas profit and loss statements are ex ante, or after the fact, CBA tries to determine the costs and benefits of a project before it is undertaken. Thus, CBA involves prediction and not simply the accounting of costs and benefits already accrued. There is a methodology for CBA, and the approach attempts to account for all the various costs that we have just discussed. Dunn (2004, pp. 240–246) specifies the tasks of CBA. In essence, he recommends a nine step variation of the rational model: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

specification of objectives; identification of alternatives; collection, analysis, and interpretation of information; specification of target groups; identification of types of costs and benefits; discounting of costs and benefits; estimation of risk and uncertainty; specification of criteria for recommendation; recommendation.

Boondocks, CBA, and Swimming Pools

We now return to our example of the Boondocks swimming pool and you can see if your newly found knowledge of CBA changes the costs and benefits of the project. Let’s see how Shaundra analyzed the project in a simple manner using each of the nine steps of CBA. Step 1: Specification of Objectives  The city’s recreation department had created the following objectives: (a) to provide water recreation for 5,000 citizen visits per year and (b) to achieve 90 percent or better evaluation ratings on quality of service provided to citizen customers. Step 2: Identification of Alternatives  Shaundra identified four alternatives: (a) do nothing (which would lead to no public-owned swimming facility in the community); (b) repair the existing pool, which is not accessible to disabled citizens, which will cost more to maintain than a new pool, and which has several health code problems (without repair it must be closed immediately);

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(c) build a new pool at the current location at an initial cost of $1,000,000; or (d) build a new pool at a new site at an initial cost of $1,000,000 (the costs are the same here as they are at the old site because the city already owns the new site land). Step 3: Collection, Analysis, and Interpretation of Information  Shaundra is trying to be both fair and thorough in completing the following chart of swimming pool benefits and costs. (Note that both benefits and costs are more inclusive than those listed earlier in Table 3.9).

Alternative

Costs

Benefits

Do nothing

– money from swimming pool can – loss of public-sponsored swimming (difficult to quantify costs; maybe $50,000 be reallocated to other programs or returned to taxpayers ($1,000,000) in increased crime) – loss of swimming to lower-income families ($50,000)

– private swim clubs can provide the services (save $25,000 on operations and maintenance costs); city would not – loss of regional swim meets ($100,000 in gasoline, motel, restaurants, retail purchases) contract with private firms – loss of business in swim area (approximately $50,000 of lost revenue to local businesses over a four-month summer period) Repair

– bids for repair range from $1.25 million to $1.5 million – opportunity cost for private swim clubs (loss of $25,000 from expanded public swimming services) – annual operation and maintenance costs ($7,000)

– retain swimming and retain swim meets and sales to local businesses ($100,000) – potential for lower delinquency ($50,000) – $15,000 in user fees

Build a new pool in a new area

– $1,000,000 for an outdoor pool – $5,000 annually in operation and maintenance costs – existing site is too small for new pool because parking is inadequate; new pool would have larger parking area and could accommodate larger swim meets and more customers; however, the moving of the pool would mean that local businesses in the area would lose money (loss estimated at $50,000) – opportunity cost for private swim clubs (loss of $25,000 from expanded swimming services)

– new pool would keep children off the street and would reduce delinquency (estimated at $100,000 in reduced property crime) – service clubs could use pool for swimming lessons and other activities; would help these clubs provide more services to members and clubs would be more satisfied with city services (estimated benefit of $50,000) – a user fee of $3 would be charged, which would raise $15,000 annually – new pool at new location could lead to more swim club meets, which would attract more outside customers and bring money into the local economy (estimated at $250,000 annually)

Build a new pool in the existing site

–5  ,000 customers at $3 per customer for – $1,000,000 in construction costs $15,000 – $5,000 annually in operation and –w  ould retain local business profits of maintenance costs – opportunity cost: would lose an additional $50,000. $50,000 annually to local economy that – reduced delinquency ($100,000) would occur with a new pool at a new site (because of increased swim meets)

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Step 4: Specification of Target Groups  Stakeholders • • • • • • • •

swimmers; swimming clubs; service clubs; private recreation clubs; local businesses such as restaurants, fast-food establishments, candy stores; police; citizens; child care providers.

Step 5: Identification of Types of Costs and Benefits (To Stakeholders)  As you know, stakeholder mapping is too time-consuming and involved to use frequently. Shaundra does a quick and dirty, but accurate analysis: • • • • •

swimmers: direct benefit—intangible (difficult to measure); swimming clubs: direct benefit—intangible; service clubs: direct benefit—intangible; private recreation clubs: indirect, tangible costs (measurable)—lost business; local businesses (in old location): indirect and tangible costs if pool is relocated; direct and tangible benefits if pool is retained in current location; • local businesses (in new location): indirect and tangible benefits if pool is relocated; direct and tangible costs if pool is retained in current location; • police: new pool may lower delinquency and help police.

Step 6: Discounting of Costs and Benefits  In Tables 3.11 through 3.14, which follow the chart below, Shaundra calculates NPV and the BCR, using the principles of Tool #4: Discounting. Step 7: Estimation of Risk and Uncertainty  There are a variety of methods that can be used in this step. The analyst attempts to give the decision makers some sense of the probabilities of various outcomes. In addition, the analyst can provide data on how price changes of certain key elements of a public project could increase or decrease. The potential consequences of each decision are summarized in Tables 3.11 through 3.14.

Alternative

Total Costs

Total Benefits

Do nothing

– $250,000 (annually)

– $1,000,000 (one-time benefit) – $25,000 (annual benefit)

Repair existing pool

– $1,025,000 (low bid and opportunity costs; one-time cost) – $25,000 annual cost for loss of potential swim meets – $7,000 operation and maintenance costs

– $165,000 (annual benefit)

Build new pool in a new site

– $1,000,000 (one-time costs) – $80,000 (annually)

– $365,000 (annual benefit)

Build new pool in existing site

– $1,000,000 (one-time costs) – $55,000 (annual costs).

– $165,000 (annual benefit)

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Table 3.11  The Do Nothing Alternative Alternative: Do nothing (discounted over 5 years at 7 percent discount rate) Year 0

1

Costs

0

$250,000

2

3

4

5

$250,000

$250,000

$250,000

$250,000

Benefits

0

$1,000,000

0

0

0

0

Discount rate

–

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

Discount factor

1

.9346

.8734

.8163

.7629

.7130

Discounted benefits = $1, 000, 000 (.9346 ) = $934, 600

Discounted costs = $250, 000 (.9346) + $250, 000 (.8734) + $250, 000 (.8163) + $250, 000 (.7629) + $250, 000 (.7130) = $1, 025, 050 NPV = $934, 600 – $1, 025, 050 = −$90, 450 BCR = $934, 600 / $1, 025, 050 = 0.91

Table 3.12  The Repair Alternative Alternative: Repair Year 0

1

2

3

4

5

Costs

0

$1,057,000

$32,000

$32,000

$32,000

$32,000

$165,000

Benefits

0

$165,000

$165,000

$165,000

$165,000

Discount rate

–

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

Discount factor

1

.9346

.8734

.8163

.7629

.7130

Discounted benefits = $165, 000 (.9346) + $165, 000 (.8734) + $165, 000 (.8163) + $165, 000 (.7629) + $165, 000 (.7130) = $676, 534 Discounted costs = $1, 057, 000 (.9346) + $32, 000 (.8734) + $32, 000 (.8163) + $32, 000 (.7629) + $32, 000 (.7130 ) = $1, 066, 356 NPV = $676, 534 – $1, 066, 356 = −$389,822 BCR = $676, 534 / $1, 066, 356 = 0.63

Consequence #1: Do Nothing. Leads to no public swimming, which will lead to a political liability because parents will be unhappy that their children no longer have a major summer recreation activity to keep them occupied. Could lead to increases in juvenile delinquency and loss of sense of community. Costs of private swimming may be prohibitive to some families. In addition, there well might be loss of regional swim meets and loss of business to local businesses in summer months. Consequence #2: Repair. This will keep the public swimming in the community and will satisfy parents. However, there is no extra advantage in that there is only a 10 percent chance (estimated) of the newly repaired pool attracting additional regional swim meets. The repair will please the local businesses around the pool because they will retain existing summer business, even though there are other factors that could affect summer business, like bad weather. Consequence #3: Repair. The repaired pool will not be big enough to accommodate increased citizen demand as the population of Boondocks increases. In addition, the repaired pool is highly unlikely to attract additional regional swim meets. The pool is located in a section of town with limited parking and limited activities. The current trend is that Boondocks is hosting fewer and fewer swim meets each year. Even with repairs, it is unlikely that the trend will be reversed. This will lead to

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Table 3.13  The New Site Alternative Alternative: Build at new site Year 0

1

2

3

4

5

Costs

0

$1,080,000

$80,000

$80,000

$80,000

$80,000

Benefits

0

$365,000

$365,000

$365,000

$365,000

$365,000

Discount rate

–

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

Discount factor

1

.9346

.8734

.8163

.7629

.7130

Discounted benefits = $365, 000 (.9346) + $365, 000 (.8734) + $365, 000 (.8163) + $365, 000 (.7629) + $365, 000 (.7130) = $1,496,572

Discounted costs = $1, 080, 000 (.9346 ) + $80, 000 (.8734 ) + $80, 000 (.8163) + $80, 000 (.7629 ) + $80, 000 (.7130 ) = $1,262,616 NPV = $1, 496, 572 – $1, 262, 616 = $233, 956 BCR = $1, 496, 572 / $1, 262, 616 = 1.19

Table 3.14  The Existing Site Alternative Alternative: build new pool at existing site Year 0

1

Costs

0

$1,000,000

Benefits

0

$165,000

2

3

4

5

$55,000

$55,000

$55,000

$55,000

$165,000

$165,000

$165,000

$165,000

Discount rate

–

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

7 percent

Discount factor

1

.9346

.8734

.8163

.7629

.7130

Discounted benefits = $165, 000 (.9346 ) + $165, 000 (.8734 ) + $165, 000 (.8163) + $165, 000 (.7629 ) + $165, 000 (.7130 ) + $165, 000 Discounted costs = $1, 000, 000 (.9346) + $55, 000 (.8734) + $55, 000 (.8163) + $55, 000 (.7629) + $55, 000 (.7130) = $1,108,207 NPV = $676, 527 – $1,108, 207 = −$431, 680 BCR = $676, 52 7 / $1,108, 207 = 0.61

political unhappiness from the Boondocks Tourism and Visitor Center and the motel industry and among other businesses that benefit from regional swim meets. Consequence #4: Build at Old Site. A new pool (at the old site) is preferable to the alternative of repairing the old pool. The city would continue to provide public swimming, and the pool would remain an economic asset to the older section of town. However, public growth in the community is happening in areas of the town that are miles away from the existing pool site. Many of these new neighborhoods complain that the existing pool is located in a dangerous neighborhood and is inconvenient. The new pool at the existing site is unlikely to attract more regional swim meets because of its location. Consequence #5: Build at New Site. Building a new pool at the new location would allow Boondocks to continue the provision of public swimming. The new pool at a new location would likely attract increased numbers of regional swim meets. This would lead to increases in dollars spent by outsiders in the community as a whole. Businesses located near the existing pool site would lose some summer business. The location of the pool is more convenient for citizens in the growing population centers of the city.

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Step 8: Specification of Criteria for Recommendation  Based on Steps 1–7, Shaundra writes: From my analysis it is clear that we must be concerned with the overall impact of the swimming pool decision. This is a community project, and the community as a whole must benefit. Therefore, I recommend that the major criterion is net present value (NPV). Looking at the tables earlier, NPV is discounted benefits minus discounted costs which then leads to a Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR). We must carefully promote a policy that will increase benefits to the city as a whole rather than to select groups of individuals.

In short, Shaundra has to decide on the major criteria or criterion for making a decision. There are several criteria to be used. But it is clear from the analysis so far that decision makers in this case have already decided that net efficiency improvement is the major one. That is, the proposal of building a new pool at a new site is the only proposal that had a BCR of more than 1. The key criterion appears to be the possibility of attracting additional regional swim meets to the community. Moving the pool will create losers (the old neighborhood and neighborhood businesses) and winners (the new neighborhood and neighborhood businesses). But the analyst seems content that the overall increased benefit to the community will outweigh the loss to the old neighborhood. Step 9: Recommendation  Shaundra writes the following to the city council: Based on the CBA analysis, the best decision is to build a new pool in a new site. No other alternative meets the CBA criteria of net efficiency improvement. The “Do Nothing Alternative” produced a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 0.91, the “Repair Alternative” produced a BCR of 0.63, and the “Existing Site Alternative” produced a BCR of 0.61; whereas, the “New Site Alternative” produced a benefit-cost ratio of 1.19. Further, this choice is likely to yield more annual revenue than the repair alternative. Based on my analysis, the project that will maximize benefits and minimize costs is, once again, to build a new pool at the new site location.

Note that Shaundra avoided all other criteria in her written recommendation, and focused on the criterion the decision makers wanted fleshed out. Box 3.3 provides a real-life example of the reallife consequences of the sometimes more ideological use of CBA.

Box 3.3  Up to My Elbows and Beyond Q: How many professors does it take to change a light bulb? A: None, they have to get help.

T

his isn’t always true; your professor may actually possess skills and job experiences that amaze you. One of this text’s authors actually has a fork-lift driver’s license that dates back to years of working in a mill, cleaning various grass seeds (mostly Kentucky bluegrass, ryegrass, and various fescues). One of the machines he ran, known as a debearder, had long metal teeth that spun at a fast rate, beating the beard (a sort of hairy growth) off recently harvested seed. Sometimes a part off a combine, a hammer, a shovel, a pair of jeans, or some other inexplicable item would show up in the bulk seed and jam the debearder. Other times the seed would just bridge due to the crud picked up and the cottony beard. At this point, the solution was to turn off the debearder, open up the doors on the cylinder, reach up into it, and remove the object (not as easy as it sounds). One problem for whoever took on this task was that every time you put your arm into this machine, you were worried about a fellow worker accidentally turning on the machine.

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The offset steel teeth were each about eight inches long, two inches wide, and one inch thick, and the clearance rate between them and the walls was virtually paper-thin. They spun at hundreds of revolutions per minute. Sometimes you were up to your elbows and beyond to reach the plug. Usually, to be careful, your author would not only turn it off, he would go to the power room and turn it off there as well. Once, with a different machine, he had to climb into and stand in it with his feet in an auger that would have smashed his feet off his ankles; before climbing into the machine, he even took the fuses out of the fuse box and hid them. In 1979 the government had a rule ready to go into place to protect workers from this problem. It was known as the lockout/tagout rule. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) denied a petition to require lockout devices on electrical switches for machines such as this, but moved forward with the process to establish such a regulation (i.e., advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, an invitation for comments, and hearings). This regulation would be simple to implement. Switches today often have lockout capability. This is as simple as a guard with a hole on the on-off switch that allows one to place a padlock through it. With the padlock on, you cannot move the guard and turn on the machine. Every decade (including the 1980s), a thousand or more workers have died in horrible accidents due to this problem, and many more have been injured, often very seriously. Even though progress has been made, in 2013 OSHA counted 4,585 workers killed on the job. So, what happened to the government’s proposed rule? In 1989, after President Reagan left office, the rule—with a few key exceptions in terms of application—was finally established. Why did this policy languish during the eight years of the Reagan administration? The tragic mystery begins during Reagan’s original campaign for office and his promise to get government off the backs of the people and business. Shortly after his election, President Reagan issued an executive order (No. 12291) that revised, complicated, slowed, and discouraged rulemaking by government agencies. Executive Order No. 12291 placed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) squarely in the middle of all regulatory decisions. It called for a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for all major rules, regulations, and standards, and for the OMB to review the RIA and determine if the rule’s potential benefits to society outweighed its potential costs to society. It required “to the extent permitted by law” all executive agencies not to issue regulations unless the benefits exceed the costs. (This phrase is important, because Congress did, for example, technically forbid the use of cost-benefit analysis when OSHA was considering safety standards.) Further, if alternative approaches exist, the one that leads to the least net cost to society must be chosen (and the condition of both the regulated industries and the national economy had to be considered as well). It also froze virtually all rules that had worked their way through the system under the Carter administration but that had not yet been put into place. It was now the OMB’s call to delay or veto proposed regulations. In January 1985, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12498, which supplemented No. 12291 and further expanded the role of the OMB. President Reagan’s rhetoric and his election, his appointments, and his executive orders all created an ambiance and a process that discouraged rulemaking and encouraged cost-benefit analysis. When you were up to your elbows (or beyond) in the debearder, such a rational approach was of little comfort. To the families of those killed and to all those seriously hurt, it might even seem that slowing and stopping government regulation was not an unmitigated good. By the way, despite the rule (29 CFR 1920.147), workers are still being killed and maimed. In Robert Reich’s memoir (1998, p. 161) of his service as secretary of labor during President Clinton’s first term, he tells of four workers who worked for Bridgestone who suffered these types of accidents within less than a year (three at their Oklahoma City tire plant, the other (continued)

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in Morrison, Tennessee). One “died when his head was crushed in an assembly machine that was supposed to have been shut off before he tried to reset it.” Another had his arm “severely mangled and broken” trying “to unjam another machine that was also supposed to have been shut off.” The third (April 1994) “was bashed in the head and badly burned.” In Tennessee, coworkers rescued a worker whose head was “caught in an assembly machine … but not before his face was badly mangled.” Reich points out that OSHA has tried to “coax” Bridgestone into preventing lockout accidents by installing locking mechanisms on all their machines. He reports that the cost is approximately “six dollars per machine to buy and install,” but that Bridgestone would not budge. In the financial year 2014, the lockout/tagout rule was the sixth most frequently violated OSHA standard. In a tragic example in 2012, 42-year-old Jose Melana, a Bumble Bee Foods employee in San Diego, California, was burned alive while cleaning an industrial-sized oven. He was trapped by other unknowing employees who were unloading six tons of tuna into the oven. This incident resulted in the largest fine ever to result from the violation of a lockout/tagout standard. The company was charged $6 million in fines. Two coworkers were charged, one of the two pleading guilty for failing to follow the lockout/tagout rules. Melena’s family has received $1.5 million in compensation, and the company will plead guilty to a misdemeanor for its failure to maintain an employee safety program. Another example from the first quarter of 2015 reminded us of the debearder situation: An employee lost all the toes on his left foot when an auger was turned on in the grain bin he was cleaning in Waterville, Kansas. The Beattie Farmers Union Cooperative Association was fined $65,900 for failure to place locking devices on augers. One willful, one repeated and three serious safety and health violations were found. Inspectors also noted that drive pulleys on the bucket elevator legs and augers lacked adequate safety mechanisms to prevent workers from coming into contact with operating machinery parts. Beattie previously was cited for this violation in 2010.

Nonetheless, the lockout rule (now known as the lockout/tagout standard), has made a tremendous difference. An OSHA review of its effectiveness, completed prior to the second edition of this book, demonstrated that it covered more than 3 million workers and that, despite significant problems with business compliance, in the steel and auto manufacturing industries the number of deaths due to machinery being turned on unexpectedly had declined dramatically. The United Auto Workers (UAW) reported that, from 1989 to 1997, fatalities related to lockout issues had declined 20 percent per year despite an increase in the proportion of workers exposed to such hazards. The United Steelworkers of America reported that from 1990 to 1997, the 10 steel-producing companies in their database experienced a 55 percent decline in lockout-related deaths. Similarly, another study from Maine involving the wood product industry reported that businesses without a lockout/ tagout policy had three times as many injuries as those establishments with one. In July 2014, lockout regulation was expanded to include the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution industry, preventing an additional 118.5 serious injuries annually. Overall, OSHA’s efforts have helped to reduce workplace fatality rates by more than 66 percent and occupational injury and illness rates by 67 percent since 1970. Yet, the number of workers killed in 2014 by being caught in operating equipment or machinery equaled 104 (2 percent of the total number of workers killed in all incidents). This is down from 105 in 2013. In 2018, OSHA claims that lockout/tagout policy compliance is preventing 50,000 injuries and 120 fatalities annually, but in FY 2018 they also report it as 5th on the top ten list of violations most frequently cited by OSHA. And work is still a dangerous thing for people in many fields. According to OSHA, “5,147 workers died on the job in 2017 (3.5 per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers)— on average, more than 99 a week or more than 14 deaths every day.”

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Sources: Executive Order 12,291, 46 CFR 13,193, 1981; Executive Order 12,498, 50 CFR 11,036, 1986. Cann, Steven 1995. Administrative Law. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Reich, Robert B. 1998. Locked in the Cabinet. New York: Vintage Books. https://www.ehstoday.com www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html www.escservices.com/2014/06/10/lockout-tagout-regulation-update-final-rule-2014/ www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t01.htm www.escservices.com/2015/08/14/largest-fine-issued-for-safety-violation-in-california-failure-to-follow-loto/ http://ehstoday.com/safety/2015-osha-violations

Analysis of the Use of CBA Our view of the use of CBA is quite simple. First, CBA is a major tool used in the field of practice. Therefore, practicing analysts have to understand its application. Second, practicing analysts have to be able to recognize the subjectivity and outright “voodoo” potential of CBA. Analysts should be prepared to give several estimates of costs and benefits and be quite forthright in telling decision makers and the public that there are many policy outcomes that cannot be quantified. Third, we view CBA as an analytical tool. It is only a technique to encourage a serious discussion of the various costs and benefits of a proposed project and how the costs and benefits affect various stakeholders. It is not a magical tool that will produce a definitive truth. However, this use of stakeholder analysis within the context of CBA can be viewed as democratic, because CBA’s differentiation of costs into tangible/intangible and direct/indirect is a good method to force decision makers to think about the large-scale impact of a project on various groups. While it is easy to criticize positivist-oriented textbooks and their advocating of CBA, it is fair to point out that even most positivist policy analysis scholars recognize the limitations of CBA. Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978, p. 134) argue that this technique (what they call benefit-cost analysis) works best on specific and concrete projects, like choosing between pollution control systems or “deciding whether road repairs in a community should be made with a new, more weather resistant asphalt.” They admit that for wider-ranging programs, it is more useful as a “paradigm” (p. 135) and as a way for decision makers to use CBA to think about larger programs and for these decision makers to “pay attention to the tradeoffs that are important” (p. 135). Unfortunately, the carefully thought-out application of CBA advocated by such traditional policy analysts as Dunn and Stokey and Zeckhauser often gets lost in the very hectic and political world of practice. While saying that they are positive toward benefit-cost analysis, Stokey and Zeckhauser write of the technique’s problems in their classic text (1978, p. 135): But it would be unfair to praise the merits of project evaluation techniques without identifying their liabilities as well. Benefit-cost analysis is especially vulnerable to misapplication through carelessness, naiveté, or outright deception. The techniques are potentially dangerous to the extent that they convey an aura of precision and objectivity.

We are further troubled by the potential problem of the analyst becoming the single point of the decision. As stated earlier, CBA does have some potentially democratic aspects7 (e.g., the inclusion of the costs and benefits accruing to various stakeholders). However, as Stone (2002, pp. 241–242) writes in this regard, positivist policy analysis tends to be undemocratic in its execution because: In the polis, authority on issues of significance is usually dispersed, shared, negotiated, and constantly contested. Most policy issues involve questions of who has the power to decide. The rational decision model assumes this problem has been resolved or does not exist. The adherents of rational decision models are hardly troubled by the omission, however. Quite the contrary, they tout as one of the virtues of these methods that “true” interests are revealed without the distortions of politics.

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What often happens with the use of CBA is that an analyst collects data, makes calculations, and presents a recommendation to an elected official. CBA becomes the ritual that reinforces the myth of government by expertise rather than politics. The CBA process involves the gathering of extensive data, stakeholder analysis, and risk calculation. The output of the process is impressive and a subjective, value-laden, political question is turned into a rational one. But as a result, democracy no longer consists of bargaining, trading, negotiating, power, interests, information, knowledge, and trust. Rather with CBA, “democracy” is often wrongly represented by a CBA report. In place of the complicated and value-laden nature of democracy, we find seemingly complicated numerical calculations of net present value, benefit to cost ratios, and internal rates of return. Once the CBA report is turned over to elected officials, the final decision becomes a fait accompli (a thing that has been done). Despite the subjectivity of the number calculations, decision makers accept the mathematics because it provides them cover, projects a sense of objectivity, and perhaps even protects them psychologically. CBA may free them, psychologically, from worrying about the potential arbitrariness of their decisions, as well as freeing them from any selective harm stemming from the decision. Politics is a dirty word in American culture. Even elected officials have difficulty accepting the fact that much of what they do in public life is political and that their decisions are tied to their and their supporters’ interests. Policy analysts have an even more difficult time accepting the inevitability of politics. They have been trained, after all, to believe that it is possible to be scientific and value-neutral technicians. They have been trained to believe that ambiguity and subjectivity must be avoided. CBA, used poorly, provides elected officials cover for their political interests, and it provides policy analysis an appearance of certainty, or at least probability, in a political world that offers neither. Our critique of the use of CBA, then, is really a larger critique of the rational model. Or, perhaps more accurately, it is a critique of the misuse of rational techniques. CBA, and the rational model it is a central part of, are helpful in forcing decision makers to gather information and carefully examine the effects of potential policies. But, ultimately, all the data, all the statistics, all the number crunching denies, obscures, and demeans the politics, the bargaining, the compromises, and the shared values that encompass democracy. It is a problem that stems from the progressive era in American history when well-meaning citizens, scholars, and elected officials tried to take the “politics out of politics.” Public administration was in the forefront of the effort to rationalize and professionalize American government. Public policy analysis and the larger field of public administration are dedicated to rationalizing and professionalizing policymaking. Because of politics, policymaking is messy, full of conflicting demands and subjective interpretations. CBA, as part of the rational policy analysis tradition, makes policy development look efficient, rational, tidy, and decisive. It does so by making the analyst the central focus of the decision. It is the analyst who, despite all the possible input gathering, gets to decide final costs and benefits. It is the analyst who decides that one set of criteria is more important than another. It is the analyst who decides that one set of stakeholders is more important than another set. Again, CBA and the larger rational model in which it exists seemingly take the “politics out of politics.” Stone (2002, p. 242) writes, “The advocates of rational decision models come close to promising that politics will eventually become unnecessary.” But CBA cannot take the politics out of politics. Politics is not removed but hidden. We pretend it is not there, demean it, and try to hide it. As a consequence, politics is not vanquished but transformed into an unhealthier version of itself. Instead, CBA shifts politics from a multitude of groups and individuals to a single decision maker. What is the answer then? If a practicing analyst needs to use CBA, then how should it be used? We recommend the following: 1.

When conducting a CBA, try to gather as much original data as possible. That is, do not make subjective interpretations of how various stakeholders view the costs and benefits of a project. Instead, talk to the stakeholders; conduct focus groups and surveys. Allow the stakeholders to see your

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3.

4.

5.

6.

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conclusions well before the final report is submitted. Talk to them openly about your conclusions and their views. Do not try to hide the subjectivity of “shadow pricing” (your attempt to quantify intangible and indirect costs and benefits). It is impossible to quantify most of what government does. How do we really put a dollar amount on clean air, clean water, safe streets, worker safety, and city recreation programs? Advocates of CBA contend that these examples do have “implied prices” and that we can determine costs. But to tie cost or price numbers to an example like public education is to destroy the very definition of a public good. Public choice theory that assumes that we can attach costs and benefits to everything eventually destroys the role of government. Government exists because, in the long run, we all benefit from providing public schools, public bus systems, and recreation programs. The benefits, however, cannot be tied directly back to individuals. Thus, when you are asked to create a shadow price for the benefits of recreation, fully admit that the numbers you provide are simply estimates, and perhaps provide a wide variety of different scenarios using different ranges of numbers. Tell your audience that the shadow price is often just a political argument for or against a certain project. Demonstrate in your CBA how various shadow prices can change the final outcome. Do not be afraid to show your audience the subjective and value-laden aspect of such benefit and cost determination. After all, politics and policymaking are subjective and value-laden. However, take this advice with the full warning that your bosses (elected officials and fellow analysts) may not like you exposing the often quasi-scientific number crunching of the profession. Elected officials might well believe that you are destroying attempts at providing citizens with data that will make them comfortable with governmental choices. Fellow analysts might well think that you are hurting the profession by “lifting the curtain” that has veiled the subjectivity of the profession for years. Our advice here is to be politically subtle and incorporate this suggestion incrementally. Gain the trust of your elected officials and fellow analysts. Quietly point out the subjectivity of your number calculations, and subtly move policy analysis in your department or agency toward a more democratic approach. Wherever possible, conduct the CBA as part of a diverse team. This will help bring in additional viewpoints and lessen the problem of a single decision maker. In a similar vein, allow stakeholders and others to bargain for various definitions of costs and benefits, seek diversity for the CBA team, and be inclusive when considering stakeholders. Stress to decision makers the real value of CBA. Tell them that the numbers can be almost meaningless and that its only value is in rationally looking at how various groups are potentially affected by various policy options and in deriving very rough estimates of benefit-cost ratios. The CBA should never be used as a sole criterion for a final decision. Instead, it should be only one tool used among many. CBAs are essentially just a form of political argument for or against a certain policy proposal. A cost-benefit analysis should be simple. Numerical calculations and subjective determinations should be readily understood by elected officials, interest groups, and citizens. Note that, throughout the toolbox, we have not asked you to perform more than a very basic level of high school math. Alternative calculations and interpretations should be stressed.

Unfortunately, these suggestions make CBA less efficient and the final decision less predictable. Politics, human nature, and the positivist orientation make this difficult to obtain. Bureaucratic government demands efficiency, neutrality, and predictability. A more democratic CBA process would undermine many of these values because it would be less efficient, it would reveal subjectivity, and it would provide a final solution that would not be definitive. But, at least, it would be an effort at honesty.

Concluding Thoughts Throughout this book we argue that pragmatism demands policy analysis be political (and that in the field it is largely political). Public policy analysis based on our approach is much more than the technical manipulation of models, numbers, and statistics. With that said, however, these five key positivist tools are ones that any practicing analyst should understand and be able to apply (fully cognizant of their limitations and the way in which—intentionally or not—they have often been

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used to limit democracy). If you have a mixed-methods toolbox, with both positivist tools and the postpositivist-inspired tools you will learn about in later chapters, you are better prepared to build that fence than those who sit solely on one side or the other. The chapter closes with six problems based on the chapter’s tools. (The answers to the Chapter 3 problems are in Part II (#1) of the faculty online Teaching Appendix.)

Glossary Terms chi-square test (p. 76)

outliers (p.88)

confidence level (p. 71)

Problems Sampling 1.

Test your ability to conduct a random sample by completing the following assignment: You want to mail surveys to only those 18 or older (this is your population).

County

Population (≥18 Years)

Percentage

Payment

16,434

3.3

Jim

11,844

2.4

Boze

3,509

0.7

Gibbons

90,076

18.2

San Bueno

205,775

41.7

Moreland

8,392

1.7

Nomore

21,205

4.3

Kemmis

727

0.2

Goodland

11,633

2.4

Arid Falls

53,580

10.8

Seinfeld

15,138

3.1

Richland

13,552

2.7

Abe

3,308

0.7

Minico

19,361

3.9

Kamina

19,532

3.9

Total

494,066

100%

Using these counties, prepare sampling strategies to send mail surveys. Your sample size should have a confidence interval of 95 percent with an accuracy of ±3 percent. Remember: Sample size is not the amount of surveys you mail. Based on research, expect a 40 percent return rate for this survey. After completing these questions, make a recommendation on what sampling method to use. a. Prepare a strategy to prepare a systematic random sample. What is the process, and how many surveys do you mail?

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b. Prepare a strategy to create a proportionate stratified sample (stratify rural versus urban: Arid Fall, San Bueno, and Gibbons are all urban; the rest are rural). What is the process, and how many surveys do you mail to each stratum? c. Prepare a disproportionate stratified sample. You know from literature and experience that we can expect a 33 percent response rate in rural areas compared with a 50 percent in urban areas. What is the process, and how many surveys do you mail to each stratum?

Extrapolation 2.

The following data have been collected by the city of Hamptonville.

Year

Population

1970

56,800

1980

61,000

1990

65,000

2000

67,000

2010

69,500

2020

72,350

a. Project the population in 2030 and 2040, using extrapolation techniques. b. Discuss the benefits and limitations of extrapolation in this case.

Survey Design 3.

Design a survey for the Boondocks swimming pool policy project. Try to keep it simple, short, technically correct, and politically sensitive. Ask citizens their views of the swimming pool controversy.

Measures of Central Tendency 4.

An analyst has collected the following data on the number of complaints about garbage collection made over the past 10 years. Calculate a mean, median, and mode. Which measure of central tendency are you most likely to use, and why?

Year

Number of Complaints

2011

34

2012

42

2013

24

2014

43

2015

20

2016

45

2017

28

2018

42

2019

38

2020

40

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Discounting 5.

The mayor has asked you (an analyst working for the community development department) to explain the concept of discounting to the city council. How would you explain it?

Cost-Benefit Analysis 6.

You work as a policy analyst for the city of Acequia. The mayor has asked you to write a one-page memo to her about the use and misuse of cost-benefit analysis. Write that one-page memo.

Notes 1 Any government or nonprofit agency that receives federal money must create an Institutional Research Board (IRB) that reviews all research that involves human subjects. Any agency that receives federal monies and does not have such a board, risks severe consequences, most notably the loss of federal funds. IRBs typically have specific procedures for mail surveys that must be followed to ensure anonymity. 2 In survey construction, statements are usually used to measure a respondent’s level of agreement or disagreement. Statements are usually used with some type of Likert scale. Likert scales ask respondents to place their views on a continuum. For example, do they strongly agree, agree somewhat, (are they) unsure, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree. A question, on the other hand, typically looks for a yes or no answer or some other multiple choice-type answer. 3 Transuranic refers to “low-level” radioactive waste. Typically, this waste is the by-product of work done at nuclear facilities. It could include contaminated gloves, clothing, and other disposable items. 4 This very tactic was used by opponents of planned tax increment financing (TIF) in an intermountain western community. The tactic worked to a degree because some elected officials tempered their support of a plan that would have funded several inner-city infrastructure projects and recreation facilities. 5 One example would be calculating the mean or average height of a men’s basketball team. Consider a team of 10 players. The two centers are both seven footers (7′0″, 7′0″). The three power forwards are 6′11″, 6′10″, and 6′10″. The two “small” forwards are both 6′8″. The two shooting guards are both 6′6″. Their great point guard, Michael Thomas, moved to Australia, so they are stuck with Professor Clemons (6′1”). To figure the team’s mean height, we convert it to inches (lowest common denominator). So: 84 + 84 + 83 + 82 + 82 + 80 + 80 + 78 + 78 + 73 = 804 inches; 804 inches divided by 10 (the number of players) = 80.4 inches per person; 80.4 inches = 6′7.5″. Of course, old “Doc” still would be 6′1″ and still not be able to dunk. 6 It is generally more useful to look at the crime rate trends rather than calculating averages. 7 Of course, this would depend on how democracy is defined. CBA is democratic only under a limited, “technocratic view of democracy.” CBA is most certainly not democratic in a participatory sense.

Chapter 4

Critiques

of the

Rational Model

Case Study “Vaping Politics and Policy: Up in Smoke” It might be comforting to imagine a world in which public policy was the result of pure rationality, although for some that thought might also be quite frightening. Further, for policy analysts and public servants, trying to utilize the strengths of a rational process might be a really good idea. In Chapter 6, we will come back to exactly this issue. Certainly most of us try to make our decisions rationally. Yet, the rational-comprehensive model of decision making is flawed in theory and in practice. Although the dominant model in terms of prestige, publishing, and the classroom, the rational model is subject to withering attacks both as a description and as an explanation of the policy process and the resulting policies. Worse, it sets up both unattainable and politically naive guidelines for the public analyst or public manager. In the end, this wonderful-sounding approach is simply not fully satisfying to the scholar, the practitioner, or democracy advocates. Chapter Roadmap: We begin with three models and an axiom from political science that will serve as brief introductory examples of the explanatory power of nonrationality. Following that introduction, the rather extensive arguments that have been marshaled against the rational model will be provided. In general, these arguments fall into four broad categories: intellectual/analytical, cognitive, political/institutional, and ideological/philosophical.

Examples of the Power of Nonrational Explanations Do you remember our discussion of pluralism? If you do, then the idea of group theory should sound familiar. Group theory is a model that argues that public policy is the result not of rationality but of the competition between groups that struggle with each other to shape public policy. The size and composition of the “members” of the group, the group’s monetary wealth and access to policymakers, and its organizational health are all factors that influence the strength of these groups. For example, in the United States (historically speaking), groups that were better organized and voted in higher numbers (e.g., senior citizens) tended to get better policy results than groups that were poorly organized and failed to vote in significant proportions (e.g., college students). Thus, Social Security and Medicare have made huge differences in poverty among senior citizens, while the period since the late 1990s has seen student debt explode and get mostly symbolic or very minor policy attention. Other models focus on how decisions are made. One of the most common suggests that incrementalism is more common than rationality. Incrementalism, a model first given a thorough defense in 1959 by Charles E. Lindblom’s aptly entitled “The Science of Muddling Through,” points out 107

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that rarely, if ever, are decisions made as if starting from scratch. Rather, decisions are made from the starting base of the current situation and small changes are much more likely results than dramatic or revolutionary changes. An agency with a budget of $1,000,000 is more likely to end up with a budget of $1,100,000 or of $950,000 than a budget of $0 or of $10,000,000. This model suggests a conservative bent to decision making that favors the status quo over dramatic, significant, and radical change—no matter which is more rational. Another model that challenges the idea of rationality is known as elite theory. As explained in Chapter 1, elite theory suggests, at its most basic level, that the few with power in any society or organization (the elites) make decisions. Those decisions may not be rational—for example, they could make decisions that few would call rational or that favor their narrow interests in the short run rather than what is best for the long run (for themselves or for the many). An axiom of political science—it cannot be called a model—is that attempts to produce a certain policy result will often produce unintended results. Unexpected consequences, even completely opposite to the hoped-for result, are not uncommon. Whether due to our limited wisdom, or the free and often stubborn and contradictory will of human beings, producing the policy results we desire is not as easy as the rational model suggests. A favorite example is the attempt to improve the television viewing diet of youth in the United States through the use of ratings that warn parents about sexual or violent material. One reported consequence of this attempt to reduce the amount of “adult” content viewed by youth was an increase in the amount of “adult” content they viewed, as young children and teenagers could now more efficiently find the shows society sought to secure from them. No doubt the appeal of these television programs was increased by the very fact that they were labeled forbidden fruit! In international relations the period since the mid-2000s has seen a major debate (often personalized in the prominent contesting works and words of Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly) about the benefits of foreign aid—with many famous anecdotes about well-meaning efforts to help actually making it worse and examples from many developing countries where the statistics suggest it not only wasn’t helping, but was damaging local markets, hindering economic development, or empowering corrupt governments. However, evidence of just the opposite of that, both anecdotal and statistically significant systems-wide evidence, also exists. Even though we believe the weight of the evidence suggests a great many circumstances where aid has helped, is morally necessary especially in the short run, and can be done well if done better (e.g., being culturally sensitive, working with civil society, and empowering locals at the lowest level possible), the point is that sometimes trying to help makes things worse (see Gershman, 2010 for a summary). It may be unnecessary, but it seems appropriate nonetheless, to clarify and reiterate the fact that the opposite of the rational model is not necessarily irrationality. Thus, we use the word nonrational quite intentionally. Additionally, we wish to foreshadow several important future topics by defining the term positivism (a task we began in the second chapter) and then defining two related, but importantly different, critical reactions to positivism—postpositivism and postmodernism. These difficult concepts are explained in Box 4.1 and revisited in Chapter 7.

Box 4.1  Positivism, Postmodernism, Postpositivism, and Praxis Positivism is a body of thought that recognizes only nonmetaphysical facts and observable phenomena. In the social sciences, this is illustrated in the work of social researchers who believe there is an objective reality outside of our own experience. Researchers, according to positivism, can come to objective conclusions that are “outside” of their own minds; conclusions that are fair and neutral. That is, only empirical phenomena explored with social scientific methods can yield knowledge. This typically means that social scientists should follow a natural science approach to research,

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including deductive theory construction and hypothesis building and testing through the use of statistical techniques. The rational comprehensive model reflects a positivist orientation. Postmodernism is a body of thought that emerged in the late 1960s, primarily in France. The postmodern movement denies universalism and the metanarratives (grand stories) that shape our self-meaning. Truth and meaning are found only in particular communities of belief or desire. On most issues every individual, operating outside of a metanarrative, has his or her own beliefs, interpretations, and desires. Interpretation is the product of a worldview constructed through conversation, and thus beliefs, interpretations, and desires are shared by small discursive communities. According to postmodernism, language plays an important role in metanarratives and thus in constructing our realities. Through the deconstruction of language, we can find contradictions and assumptions. However, in its pure form—which we reject for a number of reasons—postmodernism denies the reconstruction of grand narratives and instead believes that human freedom is found only in individual particularism. In a very real sense, postmodernism is a peculiar form of postpositivism. Postpositivism is a body of thought that began to counter positivism in the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s. There are several strands of postpositivism, including critical theory, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology. The overarching criticism that postpositivism makes of positivism is the latter’s reification of the social world as an objective process—that is, the way positivism treats what is really abstract, subjective, and intangible as concrete, objective, and tangible. Postpositivism tends to use qualitative research methodologies that include focus groups, field research, and content analysis. Postpositivism still retains some belief in generalization. That is, social scientists can come to general conclusions about how individuals create their world.

These different approaches are the reason why the word praxis is the third word in the book’s title. In one sense, praxis represents synthesis. The dialectical idea of synthesis is the idea that thesis begets antithesis which begets, hopefully or inevitably, a higher truth—a synthesis. In the field of policy analysis, when we first wrote the book especially, we began with a dominant method (positivism), and sought praxis for the insightful but (then) too often irrelevant critiques of positivism from postmodern and postpositivist scholarship. In a very real sense we wrote this book seeking synthesis between theory and pragmatism, believing that theory must inform practice and practice must inform theory. Public policy praxis (and Public Policy Praxis) requires analysts to recognize the connections between theory and practice.

Critiques of the Rational Model I. Intellectual/Analytical

The core critiques offered under the intellectual/analytical umbrella all relate to the idea that there are significant barriers, many of which are beyond overcoming, that make obtaining the rational-comprehensive ideal unrealistic. These obstacles have to do with the limited intellectual resources that individuals can bring to bear on analysis and with the analytical problems that stem from both the nature of the problems and the nature of the task. The intellectual limits and analytical problems are separate but interrelated, and they exacerbate each other. The Human Problem  The intellectual limits can be characterized as the human problem. In short, humans are not omnipotent, totally rational, or blessed with unlimited intellectual capabilities. Rather, there are inherent limits on our ability to comprehend, calculate, evaluate, and forecast. Moreover, we now know with a steadily increasing certainty that people, not just individuals, are born with certain predilections. Nurture and nature are generally seen as roughly coequal partners in shaping our beliefs and values, and even if we are predisposed to be liberal or conservative

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(a topic we will return to shortly), that does not mean our destiny is determined. But, if an analyst is predisposed to oppose change, or to be more oriented toward ensuring individuals are treated fairly than worrying about preserving order and stability and tradition, then this aspect of being human also represents a challenge to our intellectual ability to be rational. Humans narrow, simplify, analogize, and separate problems into specialized, solvable chunks— losing valuable information and ignoring interrelatedness. We utilize models, metaphors, analogies, taxonomies, hierarchies, and categories to impose structure on the world, to provide a frame of reference, and to reduce the number of considerations and alternatives we face. Yet, situations are different, the creation of categories is a very subjective process, and we often reify—forgetting that just because we have given something a name or placed it in a certain group does not make the abstract real. Furthermore, we rationalize away evidence and have a difficult time cutting our losses and accepting sunk costs. Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (1996) makes clear, for example, that the idea “that intelligence can be meaningfully abstracted as a single number capable of ranking all people on a linear scale of intrinsic and unalterable mental worth” (p. 20) is fallacious, dangerous, and an all too common mistake.1 Further, humans frequently flee from the freedom of too many choices. Too many choices can overwhelm and paralyze us. We turn to routines and succumb to habits. We reduce that bothersome psychological discomfort called cognitive dissonance by rejecting facts that do not fit our preconceived worldview. The Mismeasure of Man is rich with examples of contorted logic, number finagling, and biased decisions about including and/or excluding evidence rather than changing our presupposed views. For example, Frenchman Paul Broca, who believed that brain size correlated with intelligence, made all sorts of adjustments to explain away evidence that Germans had bigger brains than did the French (including the very real factor of brain size relating strongly to body size). Yet when “mismeasuring” women, he felt no need to correct for such factors (not even for body size), stating that because we know that women are, on average, not as intelligent as men, we can then conclude that part of the brain size difference is due to body size and part to “her intellectual inferiority” (Gould, 1996, pp. 121–137). Interestingly, while Gould discusses some fraud by researchers, mostly he discovered inadvertent and unconscious bias. We surrender to wishful thinking and hubris and reject results too catastrophic to swallow as improbable. We stay the course due not to rationality, but to sunk costs and the self-deception that historian Barbara Tuchman called “wooden-headedness.” Wooden-headedness “consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contrary signs. It is acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts” (1984, p. 7). Box 4.2 looks at cognitive bias.

Box 4.2  A Just World? Cognitive Bias from Job’s Day to Yours

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t is well-documented and widely accepted, that humans are meaning-making machines. That is, we find meaningless horrifyingly, abhorrently frightening; we therefore impose meaning on the information our senses take in. In the words of Jonathan Gottschall (2013) in his book The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human: The storytelling mind is allergic to uncertainty, randomness, and coincidence. It is addicted to meaning. If the storytelling mind cannot find meaningful patterns in the world it will try to impose them … The human mind is tuned to detect patterns, and it is biased toward false positives rather than false negatives. (p. 103)

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Conspiracy theorists connect real data points and imagined data points into a coherent, emotionally satisfying version of reality … showcasing classic problem structure and sharply defined good guys and villains. (p.111)

But, it goes beyond our needing to make sense of the world; we also need to feel okay about our world. One way that people do that is related to the idea known as the just-world hypothesis (or theory). This fallacy is a cognitive bias many people have that goodness is rewarded, and badness punished. It is a just world if people’s actions lead to not just logical, but fair outcomes. Evil, lazy, cheating people get punishments as just rewards while virtuous, noble, hard-working people receive rewards. For many people, the comforting ideas that people get their just deserts, that there is a God  imposing consequences, that cosmic justice, karma, reaping what you sow, and “everything happens for a reason” are true, is much more satisfying than the ideas of innocent people suffering, of arbitrary misfortune and misery, of viciousness and vice being rewarded, and capricious consequences potentially awaiting us regardless of what we do in our daily lives. The great biblical book of Job tells the story of a morally upright, even blameless, man named Job whom God allows Satan to torture and torment. This challenging story, one of the oldest in the world, ultimately rests on a seemingly disturbing truism best captured by a 1958 (and 1961 updated) play by Archibald MacLeish, a modern adaptation of Job titled J.B. MacLeish’s J.B. suggests that if God is good he is not God, or if God is God, he is not good. (Because a God can stop any and all bad things from happening, and a good God would, so either God isn’t God, or isn’t good.) After Job suffers unbearable pain, financial ruin, sees his children killed, his wife desert him, his friends say—well, you must have deserved it, because they too believe in a just world and can’t handle the idea of a God who is not just. Noted scholar and translator Stephen Mitchell has offered a different understanding than the one often taught in Sunday school about the lesson of Job being acceptance of human suffering as part, somehow, of a majestic but rational and all too-human God’s plan based on a mathematical formula of justice. And, it makes Job’s just-world hypothesis friends look pretty bad. Work on this phenomenon by social psychologist Melvin Lerner, found a wide-spread tendency by study participants who were exposed to stories of innocent people being victimized, to devalue and blame the victims somehow, so as to make the outcome better fit the situation and therefore easier to accept. If people are poor, it is easier to accept (without feeling the need to try to fix the situation) if we blame them, rather than an unfair political and economic system. If someone is wealthy or wins a random lottery, the study participants elevated them mentally, as it was easier to feel good about this outcome if they were deserving. Again, it also might make one feel both safer (“Bad things won’t happen to me, because I am doing what I am supposed to.”) and hopeful about your prospects (“Surely things will turn around and I will get rewarded because I am deserving and that’s how things work.”). And, surely there is some merit to the idea of personal responsibility. But blaming someone who is raped for having had a drink, someone beaten by those who should be protecting them for “asking for it,” someone who is robbed for being downtown at night, or someone who overdoses for being weak, is not just unfair and wrong, it is dangerous. A key danger is that this cognitive bias can lead to complacency and blind obedience, to indifference and apathy, to acceptance of unnecessary injustice and acquiescence of excessive inequality. Why try to change policy, alleviate poverty and inequality, try to lessen human suffering, in a just world? Belief in a just world seemingly ends up making a just world less likely. Sources: Gottschall, Jonathan. The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human, (New York: First Marine Books edition, 2013). Lerner, Melvin J. The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion, (New York: Plenum Press, 1980). Lerner, Melvin J. and Lerner, Sally C., editors, The Justice Motive in Social Behavior: Adapting to Times of Scarcity and Change, (New York: Plenum Press, 1981). MacLeish, Archibald. J.B. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, softcover edition). Mitchell, Stephen. The Book of Job. (New York: Harper Perennial, Reprint Edition, 1994).

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While we are taught in college to be critical thinkers and to seek out information and evidence before making a decision, studies show that in politics (at least), individuals seek out information that confirms their bias (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Confirmation bias occurs partially because we don’t like dealing with cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) which is the uncomfortable feeling we get when we have a conflict between evidence and our own behavior or beliefs. We actively avoid cognitive dissonance by seeking out information that confirms what we already believe. Confirmation bias also explains why we too often believe fake news, as we tend to believe negative information about political individuals or organizations whom we dislike. Yet, the idea that we can become aware of, and learn to correct, things like implicit racial bias is informing training at many police departments across the U.S., but no one thinks it is easy or foolproof, especially when people have to make split-second decisions. Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson (2007) detail how humans engage in self-justification where humans convince themselves that what they did was not only “the best thing they could have done” (p. 4) but convince themselves that what they did “was the best thing” (p. 4). Furthermore, while we think that we are rational, we are trapped by cognitive dissonance, pride, prejudice, and faulty memory. Similarly, Brafman and Brafman (2008) discuss Daniel Kahneman’s “loss aversion,” which in politics means when we dig a deep hole, we keep on digging because we don’t want to admit failure and as a result our losses only get worse (otherwise known as the trip of sunk costs). They also discuss the $20 auction experiment where students bid on a $20 bill in one dollar increments and where the runner up in the auction must pay their last bid. In their discussion, they state that students have paid up to $204 for a $20 bill where failure to accept one’s losses leads to the bidding escalating and the losses getting worse (Brafman and Brafman, 2008). Some believe that as humans we, like other animals, respond instinctively (not rationally) to perceived territorial threats. Clearly, as humans, there are rationality problems based on physical limitations. People react intuitively, emotionally, and irrationally. Our memories falter, we tire, our intelligence is not unbounded, and we are sometimes aggressive and sometimes docile, but never purely rational. Economics is based on the assumption that humans are rational and that they maximize their self-interest. However, this ignores that humans are more often driven by what they consider fairness. Take for example, the classic economics experiment (which rejects the economic assumption of maximization). In the game, first described by Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), one person is given $100 to divide with another person. The first person can divide the money as they want but the second person can accept the offer (and both players get the money as the first person allocated it) or reject the offer (and nobody receives any money). What happens in the game is that most people will reject offers that are not considered fair (normally people reject anything less than $30 and most people want a fair $50–$50 split). If humans were maximizers it would be irrational to not accept even an offer of $10 because the person would be $10 better off than they would be by declining the offer. Fairness, not maximization, also explains many policy disputes. The concept of fairness even applies to capuchin monkeys who quit participating in cooperating in a task and reject cucumbers as a reward when the capuchin monkey next to them is offered a grape for completing the same task (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003). It also relates well to the concept of nationalism and how feelings of fairness, for example in trying to resolve disputes in the Middle East, are about more than money or rationality. The discipline of economics, long considered the bastion of the rational comprehensive model of the individual, has taken note of the newer science on human behavior. Richard Thaler won the Nobel Prize in 2017 for his work in the development of behavioral economics (along with individuals like Daniel Kahneman and Amos Taversky), which recognizes the role of emotion and nonrationality in human behavior. Economics is even embracing narrative with Shiller (2017) exploring

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how humans are attracted to narratives and how this understanding helps economists better understand how humans react to economic crisis. One of the most famous and powerful critiques of the rational-comprehensive model came from Herbert Simon, whom we discussed in Chapter 2. Simon stated that this view of humans attributed to them “a preposterously omniscient rationality” with “little discernible relation to the actual or possible behavior of flesh-and-blood human beings” (Simon, 1945/1976, p. xxvii). In other words, although he sought to rationalize decision making, Simon argued that we practice bounded rationality. That is, we do not consider every possible alternative and all attendant consequences, but rather latch on to the first satisfactory solution we come to. He calls this satisficing. Humans “satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize” (p. xxviii, emphasis in the original). He notes that “our perceptions capture only a drastically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world” (p. xxix) and that we ignore “the interrelatedness of all things (so stupefying to thought and action)” and instead rely on “relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands upon” our intellectual capacity (p. xxx). Analytical Problems  As you can probably recognize, the analytical problem of complexity contributes to the human factor problem. Complexity, problems with prediction, problems that relate to the precious commodity of time, and problems that relate to data, represent the key analytical problems. Today, complexity is widely recognized as a central problem of analysis. Hans Morgenthau, the premier realist scholar who explained how to understand foreign policy, argued that “The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget” is complexity (1993, p. 22). Problem situations are interdependent and changing rapidly. The problems tackled are often vaguely defined, immense, and extremely difficult problems, like poverty, racism, global warming, or teenage pregnancy. Explaining why they believe that the incremental approach, not the rational approach, dominates in the real world, Braybrooke and Lindblom help characterize complexity. They note that we face “a cluster of interlocked problems with interdependent solutions” (1970, p. 54) and point out that the problems are often not clear: instead, there is just a sense that “something needs to be done” (p. 57). Lofty, vacuous, conflicting, and nondelineated goals, often too broad to operationalize, can leave policy analysts and decision makers without a guiding star. (What is the public interest? How do we define literate? What is safe and affordable housing? How do we measure education?) The gist of the complexity argument is that the problems we face are so difficult, so undefined, so complicated, and so interrelated that they defy the utopian rational-comprehensive approach. Moreover, the specialization, simplification, and cognitive structures we apply to make the problems fit our intellectual scale can be liabilities as we try to solve complex problems. The great uncertainty that the chaotic world represents, the vast and tumultuous imaginable potential outcomes, occasionally carrying life-and-death consequences, the unknowable factors, and the imperfect anticipation of unintended consequences are all part and parcel of the analytical limitations on prediction and rationality. Rationality would require that future results be foreseen (i.e., be known accurately). Yet, clearly that is not possible no matter how deeply we peer into our crystal balls. Indeed, humans often spend inordinate amounts of time and money gathering “facts” in the deluded belief that the decision will make itself if we only can accumulate enough facts, when, in fact, the limits on what is gatherable and comprehensible are severe, and the reality is that value questions will still need to be resolved. Recent scientific studies on cognition, popularized by books like Blink (Gladwell, 2007) and Gut Feelings (Gigerenzer, 2007), have suggested that simple rules of thumb, less information, and snap judgments based on gut instincts tend to work better than the rational model.

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Whether it is human nature or a reflection of our political culture, most people in the United States both recognize that there are problems in society and government and believe that optimal solutions to those problems must exist. But once we start seriously examining social problems such as poverty, drug use, crime, health care, illegal immigration, or terrorism, it almost immediately becomes evident that simple solutions do not exist for complex, multicausal problems. In fact, serious study may reveal that we do not even know exactly what the problem is. Did the war in Iraq help or hinder the war on terror? What causes terrorism? What would diminish it? How serious is international terrorism compared with other risks? Box 4.3 examines how difficult it can be to rationally evaluate risk.

Box 4.3  Evaluating Risk (and Science): GMOs and Vaccines

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he authors of this book have many friends who are on the liberal side of the political spectrum. They like to see themselves as more rational than conservatives and point to research that shows liberals are more open to acquiring new information than conservatives and to differing beliefs about evolution as proof that conservatives are “anti-science.” One of their primary pet peeves is that the science behind climate change is pretty airtight. According to these friends, the science clearly shows that climate change is a problem and is human-caused, frequently citing a very legitimate study that showed that 97 percent of scientists agreed with these two fundamental points (NASA, 2015). Science, they say, and not fear, narratives, beliefs, scare tactics, or political manipulations should guide public policy to combat climate change. However, many of these very same friends are worried about the health effects of genetically modified organisms. In particular, they worry about food that has been genetically modified. What’s the problem with that policy concern? Well, 88 percent of scientists think GMOs are safe to eat, though only 37 percent of the public agrees (Plumer, 2015). The difference is that in this case it is liberals who most distrust the science that says GMOs are unsafe and critics argue that anti-GMO science is often fraudulent (Saletan, 2015). One of the coauthors has a childhood friend who is convinced that vaccinations pose all types of risk to children, including the risk of developing autism. This friend believes this despite scientific study after scientific study showing that problems with vaccines are extremely, extremely rare (Christensen and Kounang, 2014). Furthermore, when this friend was a child, both he and one of the coauthors were vaccinated by going as a first grade class to a county building where a nurse vaccinated all the students. Deer (2011) shows how a 1998 study published in the journal Lancet, which linked the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine to autism, was fraudulent with the lead author of the 1998 article falsifying data. Study after study since has shown no such connection, but the anti-vaxxer movement still is strong. Today, there are measles outbreaks (a real health threat) and a variety of other ailments showing up because fewer parents are vaccinating their children. Ten percent of U.S. citizens think vaccines are unsafe, with younger people being the most concerned and older people (who remember polio and other such outbreaks) less likely to believe that vaccines are unsafe (Frizell, 2015). The other coauthor has a friend who is terrified about terrorism. The friend has quit flying (after 9/11), avoids large crowds (so will not attend sporting events or concerts), and routinely follows blogs and often shares reports that he has read about imminent terrorist attacks. He lives in fear despite the fact that a U.S. citizen is less likely to die in a terrorist attack than they are to be killed by lightning. Oh, and this friend, he smokes cigarettes, probably a pack a day. This despite the fact that one in five deaths is attributed to smoking (and many of these are premature deaths) and that one out of 14 smokers will develop lung cancer. Smoking is far more risky than terrorism and

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the friend does not quit smoking but he tries to live his life to avoid the very, very, very rare chance that he will die in a terrorist attack (and we hope he escapes both dangers and lives a nice, long life). In part, what we are talking about is the fact that people do not really behave very rationally when it comes to risk. Perhaps some of that comes down to the fact that most people don’t understand statistics, thinking probabilistically, or the difference between uncertainty (which cannot be measured) and risk. Perhaps some of the problem stems from the 24/7 news media needing constant breaking news and crisis to generate viewership. Perhaps manipulative storytellers are constructing stories that play into our desire for drama, simplicity, dualism, and a sense of being able to control our fate. And some problems, like a river on fire due to pollution, are easier to “see” and appreciate the dangers of than invisible fine particulate matter in the air we breathe which even in the United States kills many more magnitudes of people every year than terrorism does in a decade. By the way, women and men seem to differ on their perceptions about risk and what is acceptable, and even if we all agreed on the validity of a statistic (e.g., that the risk of being in an auto accident while driving drunk was 0.45 percent—or a bit less than half of one percent), some of your peers might say it is a risk worth taking, while you might say “No, it isn’t!” Who’s right? Another contemporary example of the problem with assessing risk is gluten. Gluten is a protein found in wheat. If a person has celiac disease, gluten should be avoided since the gluten can cause an immune reaction. About 1 percent of the population should avoid gluten because of celiac disease. However, 30 percent of the U.S. population believes that they should avoid or cut back on gluten. The science says that is not only unnecessary, but also harmful, because many grains are high in fiber and are good for the human diet (Rettner, 2013). Let’s return to the question of what explains all of this. Why do people not act rationally and listen to the science and play the odds? It is partially explained by beliefs and values. Conservatives who distrust climate science do so because they distrust government, institutions, politicians, and others. They also worry that policies that would curb climate change will hurt their quality of life, their livelihood, and their way of life. They are willing to live with human-caused climate change because they don’t see the risk to themselves, they don’t like those who tell them that there is a problem, and they think the solutions will do more harm to their lives than they will do good. The anti-GMO liberals dislike and distrust multinational corporations such as Monsanto and Dupont that have, in fact, spent millions fighting to deny the American people even the right to have labels letting them know if foods contain genetically modified ingredients. They also value the environment and natural things, and genetically modifying food violates those values. While this group generally trusts scientists (certainly in terms of climate change), and recognizes that GMOs can increase production, they distrust the science behind GMOs, partially because they believe that industry-paid-for science might well be behind the science results presented to the public. As you may have discovered researching GMOs while working on Chapter 2’s mini-case about democracy and science, late in 2018 the United States Department of Agriculture did release a final GMO-labeling rule. The problems with it are significant, and though neither side is happy about it, label proponents are the ones most upset with it (opponents wanted a no labeling rule at all). First, food manufacturers were given until 2022 to comply. Second, the requirement to label food was set at 5 percent of ingredients (much higher than they wanted—in Europe the level is 0.9 percent). Third, three options exist for labeling (besides a fourth option, having a clearly worded label). One is having a QR code on the label. Another is giving consumers a link to text message the manufacturer and ask for the information you want. The other option is using a newly made up symbol “BE” (which stands for bioengineered) to “inform” consumers about the food (Linnekin, 2018). But if the known science about GMOs can be trusted, given the low risk and benefits, does it even matter other than being a question about democracy? Our primary point is that individuals are not wholly rational. Values and beliefs matter. Of course, we all get frustrated when the “other side” ignores the science, but we require the ability to

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see how “our side” also ignores the science. A good policy analyst can point out this reality and use it to help others understand the importance of values and beliefs in policymaking. It is frustrating, but we are all human after all. Sources: Christensen, Jen, and Nadia Kounang. 2014. “Vaccinations are Safe: Seriously.” Time, July 1. Available online at www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/health/vaccines-for-kids-safe/ (accessed October 31, 2015). Deer, Brian. 2011. “How the Case Against the MMR Vaccine was Fixed.” British Medical Journal, 342, c5347. 342 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c5347. Frizell, Sam. 2015. “Nearly One in Ten Americans Think Vaccines are Unsafe.” Time, February 9. Available online at http://time.com/3701543/measles-vaccines-poll-anti-vaxxers/ (accessed October 31, 2015). Linnekin, Baylen. 2018. “The USDA’s Final Rule for GMO Labeling Stinks.” Reason.Com, December 29. https:// reason.com/2018/12/29/the-usdas-final-rule-for-gmo-labeling-st/ (accessed July 6, 2019). NASA. 2015. “Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming.” Available online at http://climate.nasa.gov/ scientific-consensus/ (accessed July 15, 2015). Rettner, Rachael. 2013. “Most People Shouldn’t Eat Gluten Free.” Live Science, March 11. Available online at www.livescience.com/36,863-gluten-free-diet-healthy.html (accessed October 31, 2015). Saletan, William. 2015. “Unhealthy Fixation: The War against Genetically Modified Organisms is Full of Fearmongering, Errors, and Fraud. Labeling Them Will Not Make You Safer.” Slate. Available online at www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/07/are_gmos_safe_yes_the_case_ against_them_is_full_of_fraud_lies_and_errors.html (accessed October 31, 2015).

Moreover, as we study these issues carefully, we may see them as more complex. That is, gaining a serious understanding does not necessarily make the problem seem clear, the solutions obvious, and—in fact—the answers you determine may appear politically implausible. For example, perhaps the solution would not be palpable to the powers that be or run counter to the dominant social paradigm. And, certainly, different people, people in different roles and organizations, will come to different problem definitions and solutions. Further, no one group or individual is likely to be able to derive a solution. The only possible solution may have to involve the participation and buy-in of diverse groups of people and interests, and it may take a very long time. This is symptomatic of what Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973) called wicked problems. Wicked problems do not have bumper-sticker solutions. They do not have a single, optimal solution. Once seriously examined, complex, dynamic, multicausal problems, such as drug use, crime, poverty, immigration, environmental political concerns, or terrorism, obviously do not have simple solutions. And the issues and possible policy improvements that will really make a difference only become clear when a diverse group of participants with differing values, interests, and points of view (and shoes—look under the table for variety) come together to deal with them (which can also change the definition of what the problem is); plus, this can result in those around the table being invested in the issue and solution which they now partially “own.” In short, wicked problems can only be addressed through a problem-solving approach that is democratic, that recognizes the social nature of the problem and process, and that believes everyone involved brings something to the table and has something to learn. This argument is one that we will turn to fully in Chapter 8. The next analytical problem is time. It is common for critics of the rational-comprehensive model to note that time is a very limited and expensive commodity, and this factor is made worse because decisions in the world of the practitioner are usually made in a reactive mode, not a proactive mode. There are also situational, political, and economic time pressures to make a decision. One major contributor to the time shortage relates to the “blooming, buzzing confusion” the policymaker faces—namely, the problem known as “crowding-out.” Crowding-out relates to the fact that analysis is costly not only in terms of money but, more importantly, in terms of time. Faced with an extremely full plate, the decision maker does not have

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the luxury of devoting all of his or her, or the organization’s, attention to a single problem for the amount of time necessary to conduct a genuinely comprehensive analysis. Robert L. Hutchings (1997), author of an impressive insider’s tale of how the first Bush administration handled the end of the Cold War, discusses the way certain decisions were given inadequate attention due to preoccupation with other matters. An example of why this happens is provided here, when he describes the week of the historic first visit to the White House by a Bulgarian president, and how it was “overshadowed by a cavalcade of other events”: It is worth digressing for a paragraph to enumerate the events of the week of Zhelev’s visit, as they illustrate the enormity of President Bush’s agenda during the period. After addressing the World Bank/IMF annual meeting and holding a signing ceremony for the transmittal to the Senate of the treaty on German unification, the president departed for New York, where he addressed the World Summit for Children (attended by more than seventy presidents and prime ministers, the largest summit meeting ever held). Later he spoke before thirty-five foreign ministers at a CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] ministerial (the first ever held on U.S. soil), addressed the UN General Assembly, and held no fewer than 27 separate bilateral meetings with foreign leaders in his suite at the Waldorf Astoria. He ended his New York stay to return to Washington for an historic (and, as it turned out, politically disastrous) “budget summit” in which he and congressional leaders agreed on “revenue enhancement” (read: tax increase) measures. Upon returning to Washington, he hosted a Rose Garden reception on October 2 to celebrate German unity and taped a televised message to the German people. Small wonder that Bulgaria got neglected in the shuffle. (p. 256)

A final time problem (there is not time to go into more) is known as the temporal problem. In short, this type of problem recognizes that policies that work well in the short term could cause major problems in the long term. A closely related aspect of this is that it is usually easier to forecast the short-run results than to prognosticate the long-run implications. The final analytical issue involves data. Data problems begin with the co-equal dangers of having too little information and having too much information. People who have to make decisions often feel as if they simply do not have all the information they need. Incomplete information is a frequent complaint. On the other hand, sorting through mountains of information requires time that is usually not available and the knowledge, familiarity, and wisdom to decide what is most relevant. For example, foreign policy analysts must not only have access to information but they must also understand the language and the culture of the country that they are analyzing. Failure to understand the culture of another country is a key failure of foreign policy. Geographical distance from data can make them difficult to evaluate; old data can be incredibly wrong; fudged or manipulated facts can mislead; information can be contrary to other knowledge one holds true; and the data can indicate contradictory trends. There is also the huge difficulty in gathering data and in reliable and valid measurement. Jeff Leen, Washington Post staff writer, once summarized how little we know about drug use in the United States. In one year a “statistical imputation” problem, according to the Government Accountability Office, resulted in a report that the “number of habitual cocaine users in the United States had jumped an astounding 29 percent.” He told of a report by “a 79 year-old female respondent whose avowed heroin usage in one survey resulted in a projection of 142,000 heroin users, 20 percent of the national total.” In other words, based upon a single response they (extrapolated) assumed that a certain percentage of all senior citizens would also be heroin users. Further, as Leen and others have made clear, there are initial problems in locating, questioning, getting responses from, and getting honest answers from hard-core drug users. As an example of the problems with data, consider that one of the leading indicators of drug use in the United States comes from the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program conducted by the

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Table 4.1  Summary of the Intellectual/Analytical Critique The Human Problem

There are limits to the human capacity to comprehend, calculate, evaluate, and forecast. We are not as rational as we would like to believe. We utilize models, metaphors, and other techniques to impose structure on the world, to provide a frame of reference, and to reduce considerations. We use stories to explain the world, but also exclude other stories.

The Analytical Problem

Problems are complex. Time is never unlimited. We tend to emphasize the short term at the expense of the long term. We have too much data; the data tell us little; we have too little data.

Justice Department. “The DUF program collects voluntary urine samples from 30,000 jail inmates in 23 cities across the country to test for cocaine and other drugs.” This information was used by the Senate Judiciary Committee, in 1990, when its then Chairman, Joe Biden (D-DE) extrapolated these results to the general public (Leen, 1998, pp. 32–33). The barriers, obstacles, and limits posed by human factors and analytical problems explain not only why rational analysis is so rarely, if ever, rational, but also why informal, intuitive, and fly-bythe-seat decision making, without extensive analysis or gathering of facts, is so common. Table 4.1 provides a brief summary of the intellectual and analytical critiques of the rational model. II. Cognitive

A wealth of interesting scholarship conducted since the late 1990s has resulted in a growing consensus about our values, including political values, being partially innate—or at least that humans are inclined toward certain values and activities (e.g., an affinity and talent for music, art, and fiction, recognition of and condemnation of cheating). In one sense homo sapiens is homo-genous. Ironically, at the same time scholars such as Joseph Henrich (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010) have documented the dangers of believing everyone else is just like us (cultural differences show up in moral reasoning about fairness and greed, in our perception of spatial realities, in how we categorize, and in how we interpret others’ motivations). While we could have easily discussed the evidence of research about cognition and politics under the earlier umbrella of the human problem, the wealth and importance of it demanded its own section as the cognitive critiques. The period since the late 1990s has been tough for opponents of evolution, for those who don’t want to believe that (even if we are unique) being human means we are biological animals influenced by that reality, and more recently for those who want to be believe that with just a little more education, maturity, and rationality their political opponent would see the world just as they do. Research on the brain, genetic research, including twin research studies in political psychology and political biology continue to weigh in on the side of a more complex story than the one most of us grew up with—even if you are reading this before your 21st birthday. Let’s start this story with some basic brain facts. First, our cognitive and emotional responses begin occurring subconsciously, and the part of the brain (the amygdala) in charge of things like fear of snakes, when to be on extra alert, whether to approach or avoid, is the fastest part of our brain, telling us what to do before we can actually think about it. And studies on people who have had their brains damaged show that people unable to feel emotions are also unable to make decisions, even though their intellectual abilities are not impaired. That is, though we like to think that we are capable of making purely rational decisions, emotions play a part in making decisions.

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Second, there is powerful evidence that humans have predispositions to think “tribally.” We tend to categorize and show an inclination toward in-group loyalty and out-group hostility. Third, we seem to be very good at detecting when people (cheaters) cannot be trusted to hold up their end of the bargain, and we want them punished for not holding up their end of the bargain—or at least we want to avoid future social exchanges with them. Fourth, once our brain is primed—especially with negative stimuli—that affects what we then concentrate on and how we think about information that is subsequently presented. Fifth, while there seem to be some things we are perhaps born to see as right or wrong (helping others and keeping our word or cheating and stealing), there is also evidence that we are born with a preparedness to acquire certain views. Sixth, while we’d like to think we are pretty rational, we tend to agree with people we like, we succumb to peer pressure and authority figures often, and we seek information that affirms more than informs. Box 4.4 shows how politics can even make those good at math, bad at math.

Box 4.4  Politics Even Makes Us Bad at Math (Motivated Reasoning)

T

he rational model assumes that more information will move individuals away from ideological or partisan conclusions to the truth. But that is absolutely not always the case. For example, psychologists study the concept of motivated reasoning, or how individuals pursue conclusions that meet their preconceived ideas and identity. Even math, the bastion of logic and rational thought, is not immune to motivated reasoning. Dan Kahan et al. (2017) ran an experiment where individuals are shown data about the effectiveness of a rash cream. The data is presented in a simple two by two table without percentages, and participants in the experiment are asked to determine whether or not the rash cream was effective. Not surprisingly, participants who are better at math are more likely to read the table correctly regardless of whether the data (which is presented in two diametrically opposed ways) is saying that the rash cream worked or it did not work. The researchers also control for political ideology and it has no impact on the interpretation of the rash cream data. But then the researchers take the exact same combination of data and apply it to the effectiveness of either allowing or banning concealed gun carry. Now, what happens is that even those with better math skills are more likely to reason to a conclusion that fits their preconceived notion and their political identity. Liberals who were good at math misread the data when the data said that banning concealed carry increased crime. Conservatives who were good at math misread the data when it said that banning concealed carry decreased crime. Politics can even make us bad at math.

Source: Kahan, Dan M., Peters, Ellen, Dawson, Erica C. and Slovic, Paul, 2017. “Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government.” Behavioural Public Policy, 1(1):54–86. For a popular discussion of this study, see www.vox.com/2014/4/6/5556462/brain-dead-how-politics-makes-usstupid (accessed August 15, 2019).

Our brain is a meaning-making machine that wants to be right rather than a seeker of the unvarnished truth, and generally we are only rational in situations where we have the time to think carefully, and when we are not highly motivated by our values relative to the topic (for discussions of all the above, see Gigerenzer, 2007; Westen, 2008). But, just when you think this suggests that humans are, if not as rational as we might wish, at least all the same in terms of human nature (but still allowing for a 50–50ish role for nurture), along comes a host of research under various names (genopolitics, Big Five Personality Model, political biology, Moral Foundations Theory) that suggests people around the world fall into large groups, especially and essentially along a liberal/conservative divide. A slew of scientific studies—ranging from brain studies to fruit flies, from twin studies to game theory, from comparing personality and political

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orientation to studies where you ask people questions after priming them with subconscious words or images or smells or topics and find significant differences in our attitudes as well as aptitudes—all point toward a significant role for what James Fowler calls “genopolitics” (Fowler and Dawes, 2013). Yes, we and others react initially, it is easy to show correlation, and some of these studies are interesting, but that does not prove causation. Prudent skepticism suggested other known causes such as culture, socialization, and education, which are well-established factors affecting political views (e.g., tolerance is highly related to education), were better possibilities than genetics and biology—and they largely left intact our sense of mental autonomy and control. But more and better and wide-ranging studies, from around the world, kept coming out. The work of people like Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian Nosek (2009) examining moral foundations, and the political biology studies done by John Hibbing, Kevin Smith, and John Alford, and a plethora of established scientists, professors, and clever graduate students have continued to find persuasive evidence leading us to accept the following conclusion well-summed up by Hibbing, Smith, and Alford in their excellent book Predisposed (2013): It turns out that liberals and conservatives have different tastes not just in politics, but in art, humor, food, life accouterments, and leisure pursuits; they differ in how they collect information, how they think, and how they view other people and events; they have different neural architecture and display distinct brain waves in certain circumstances; they have different personalities and psychological tendencies; they differ in what their autonomic nervous systems are attuned to; they are aroused by and pay attention to different stimuli; and they might even be different genetically. At least at the far end of the ideological spectrum, liberals and conservatives are emotionally, preferentially, psychologically, and biologically distinct. (p. 6) A growing body of evidence documents that political temperaments have biological substrates. We have focused mainly on the central and autonomic nervous systems, but other aspects of physiology also correlate with politics. For example, various studies have linked hormones like cortisol, testosterone, and serotonin to political attitudes and behaviour. (p. 169) Political temperament, in short, seems to be at least partially heritable. (p. 186) The fact that humans can, on occasion, use other parts of their brains to mitigate the inclinations emanating from, say, their amygdala does not alter the fact that some people will have a more responsive amygdala than others and that over the long run and with enough observations, behaviors on average are likely to be correspondingly different for one amydalic group to the other. (pp. 197–198)

They are careful to note, and we must emphasize, that these are predispositions not predestination, probabilistic tendencies not inevitabilities or universals; and that there is more variation within groups than between them—yet there are powerful arguments that genes do predispose one toward this likelihood or that in terms of multiple orientations—including political orientations. Evidence from cross-cultural global studies suggests that there are some universal bedrock dilemmas, such as the importance one places on equality and tolerance versus the value one places on authority and order, or openness to change versus comfort with tradition or attitudes about science and religion, that show up in every society, and people are inclined to end up in one camp or the other. Thinking and feeling are, as suggested above, physical processes and apparently they are tied to everything from our tastes in food, music, and fiction to our sensitivity to an individual’s rights, change, and disgust. One suggested difference we see repeatedly play out in both life and politics is how comfortable people are, or aren’t, with ambiguity. The literature talks about this in terms of being a hard or soft categorizer and it helps explain the confounding mystery of why some people swing from one

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extreme to another in their lifestyles and/or politics. And, of course, as you can see, they certainly don’t deny a role for culture, education, or the impact of family and society in our political views. What you cannot see from our summary, but what is clearly acknowledged by Hibbing, Smith, and Alford, is that there is also a large group of people in the middle. These people are not strongly predisposed toward the ends of the political ideological continuum. As are many people, they are also less interested in politics than those people toward the ends of the continuum, and probably less interested than most of the people reading this book. This is where we return to our base argument about policy and politics, and about the power of a good narrative. Not only will some narratives appeal more to conservatives or to liberals, often the contest is really about those in the middle and crafting a story that appeals to them. The authors of Predisposed quickly touch on this near the end of their book, but largely only to dismiss the power of narratives as explained by famed cognitive linguist George Lakoff (pp. 256–258). Their book is excellent, well-written, and generally a very fair, balanced, and nuanced presentation, appropriately cautious; but we believe its readers would benefit from also reading our text. For example, both Lakoff (2010) and Haidt (2012) suggest that conservatives and liberals are essentially working off different narratives as they evaluate policy proposals, and that therefore different narratives by policy proponents would have more or less appeal. We develop this argument further later in the book, but for now will simply propose that a middle-ground narrative may also be possible. Another crucial piece of this puzzle challenges those who argue that it is essentially all about “nature” and our predispositions. It also challenges those who focus on “nurture” and argue that we simply need to better educate people (so that they are critical thinkers who take the time to think through things carefully rather than just react, and that they have a decent level of scientific literacy) and then we simply need to present those educated people with “the facts.” The new argument here is what is often called cultural cognition. There is solid evidence (for example watch Dan Kahan’s 16-minute talk on this at www.youtube.com/watch?v=d5fBkivqa78) that on a number of issues people who lean toward fairness, egalitarianism, and communitarianism, and people who lean toward authority, hierarchy, and individualism, when presented with facts contrary to their position on that issue, are not only not persuaded, but become more hardline and rigid on their views—especially if they have greater levels of science literacy, more education, and better abilities to think critically. The explanation offered for this is that some issues (thankfully not most day-to-day issues) end up weighted down with political meaning, with cultural baggage, with value conflict, with group identity concerns. When that happens, we are persuaded by what those whom we normally agree with believe and what our political tribe thinks. Our self-selected political culture determines our openness to those facts. Rather than using logic and reason to evaluate risk and consequences and changing our minds, we use our minds to find flaws and faults with that evidence, and to find arguments to support the view we, and our group, have determined is best for society—thus making some beliefs “sticky.” So, it is not just that we reject information because we are hardwired to do so, or are poorly educated or informed, but because it contradicts our and our political peer group’s views. In sum, we are culturally predisposed to accept or reject some evidence (see also Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman, 2011). Even the power of narratives cannot overcome sticky beliefs. Clemons et al. (2019) in their experimental study of Islamophobia show a narrative written to make a Muslim individual part of a non-Muslim’s in-group (by telling a story of the Muslim’s individual life experiences, family, etc.) does not make those who hold stereotypically negative views of Muslims less fearful or negative toward Muslims. This study shows that even a shared identity articulated in a narrative does not move individuals off what are sticky beliefs. This study in conclusion, the cognitive/political critique offers more evidence that challenges the rational model. Given what we have learned about what it means to be human, the way our brains work, genopolitics, and cultural cognition, it is much easier to conclude that we are political

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animals than that we are rational animals. So, the challenge presented to the rational model may be the simple fact that we are not as rational as we think. Table 4.2 summarizes the cognitive critique.

Table 4.2  Summary of the Cognitive Critique The Cognitive Our cognitive and emotional responses begin occurring subconsciously in the fastProblem thinking part of the brain (the amygdala). There is powerful evidence that humans have predispositions to think “tribally” and to fall naturally into liberal or conservative political camps based not on rationality, but genetics. We seem to be very good at detecting when people (cheaters) cannot be trusted to hold up their end of the bargain, and we want them punished for not doing so—or at least we want to avoid future social exchanges with them. Once our brain is primed—especially with negative stimuli—that affects what we then concentrate on and how we think about information that is subsequently presented. While there seem to be some things we are perhaps born to see as right or wrong (helping others and keeping our word or cheating and stealing), there is also evidence that we are born with a preparedness to acquire certain views. Yet our cognitive abilities are limited not just by education, but on some issues by their cultural baggage and the views of our self-selected political tribe. While we’d like to think we are rational, we tend to agree with people we like.

III. Political/Institutional

The word politics implies that choices are being made in a conflictual environment involving players with varying levels of power, and often involving the government. The critiques of the rational model central to the political/institutional category can be subsumed under two subcategories: the nature of political systems, using the United States as an example, and the nature of organizations and their impact on decision making and policy analysis. Once again, these categories are interrelated and influence each other. The factors discussed as falling under the intellectual/analytical umbrella also interact with these factors, and indeed both are intertwined with the ideological/philosophical factors to be discussed subsequently. Political System  While there is no political system that could guarantee or deliver rationality, the political system that exists in the United States—for all its strengths—can be cited as proof of, and a contributor to, the nonrationality of the policy process and policy outcomes.2 The most commonly proclaimed essential characteristics of the polity known as the United States of America are political pluralism, federalism, fragmentation, legalism, checks and balances, incrementalism, and an element of democracy. These characteristics are also the key parameters of the political system. This is not the place for a discussion of these aspects, but rather for examining the impact these characteristics have on policy. Policymaking in the United States generally requires consensus-building to put majorities together. It is easier to stop policy development than to change or create it. Dramatic and radical change is rare. As Braybrooke and Lindblom explain, “Nonincremental alternatives usually do not lie within the range of choice possible in the society or body politic.” “[The] nonincremental [is] often politically irrelevant … we always begin somewhere, not ad nihilo” (1970, pp. 73, 89, 83). Clear mandates are extremely rare and for any given issue there are multiple stakeholders, with legitimate and conflicting claims (both individuals and groups), who can affect, and are affected by, policy decisions.

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As the earlier discussions of group and elite theory suggested, not all players, or policies, are created equal. Nondecisions are common. Nondecisions occur when issues are taken off, or never placed onto, the table. The policy process offers many opportunities for contestants to get into the game, and it should be thought of as a never-ending, ongoing process in which the outcomes of earlier battles are relevant to, but not determinant of, today’s policy outcomes. The result is a messy process where, as John Kingdon (1984/1995) suggests, policy tends to occur more than be made, and policies that can gain the necessary level of political support, not necessarily the most rational policies, are the ones that win out. Writing about the making of environmental policy, Dean Mann (1986) powerfully captured the relationship between policy and the political system of the United States that produces it. He described the pattern of policymaking as being marked by “a process of dramatic advances, incomplete movement in the ‘right’ direction, frequent and partial retrogression, sometimes illogical and contradictory combinations of policies, and often excessive cost.” He concluded this discussion with the observation that this “should come as no surprise to students of American politics” (p. 4). The political system is based on value conflict, politics, self-interest, the public interest, and coalition building; it is fragmented and tied to political culture, and, as a result, the making of policy is far from rational. While a perfect following of the rational model seems impossible, a famous example of a rather rational and comprehensive policy is the energy policy that President Jimmy Carter, a nuclear engineer and policy wonk, devised. However, his political strategy was not nearly as well developed as his policy plan. While Carter knew the details and substance of the issue, he did not understand the need for stroking egos, striking fear in opponents, or swapping political favors. The Carter White House failed to generate and garner the political support necessary for his policy. It failed to become law not because of its substance, but because of poor politics.3 In another political system, the head of government might have been able to simply impose his or her policy on his or her society. Surely many presidents and prime ministers have wished that, if just for a week, they had the power of a dictator or were head of a one-party system. Instead, the nature of the political system of the United States has produced an energy policy that much more closely fits the portrait painted of the making of environmental policy by Dean Mann. To the extent that the United States has an energy policy (and not having a public policy is a policy), it was created through bursts of partial progress and steps backward and features legislation and goals that contradict other legislation and goals. The Nature of Organizations  The ideas that we have bundled under the rubric of the nature of organizations offer little comfort to anyone wishing to believe in the rational model. As descriptions of large organizations, though, they ring true to astute observers and participants. Organizations and their leaders designate authority and divide work. They train employees and establish organizational objectives. They limit access to information and standardize and fragment the information sought and recorded through, for example, the use of standardized forms. They limit the amount of time, money, and personnel available to work on any given problem. They institute rigid routines and standard operating procedures (SOPs). As Alexander George (1980) and others have demonstrated, the way decision makers and organizations are organized to process information is also important. Permanent, professional policy shops and temporary ad hoc committees thrown together too quickly to address a crisis are quite likely to produce different advice. The effect of all this is to create agency cultures, behavioral patterns, and decisional premises that guide decision makers. So, while in one very real sense individuals decide, in another equally real sense organizations, or subunits within organizations, decide. A related idea is role theory, and the contention of Miles’s Law—discussed in Chapter 1—that one’s stance on any given issue is determined by one’s position (where you stand depends on where you sit). This may be stated too deterministically, but it is a crucial insight into decision making and

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the impact that the particular organization, or branch of an organization, involved in the decision can have. Units and subunits tend to view policies that are good for them and their particular clients as sacred cows, while issues that do not affect them may be ignored or marginalized. All things being equal, the top Air Force brass is undoubtedly less likely than the top Army brass to doubt the efficacy of aerial bombing. As McNamara detailed, this was indeed the case. There is no doubt that role tends to complicate things. Imagine a proposal to completely ban alcohol on a campus, including fraternity and sorority houses. Would the attitudes toward such a proposal likely be different, whether you drink or not, if you were one of the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

a student living in an expensive on-campus apartment; an officer in a fraternity; a faculty member; a vendor; an employee of campus security; a member of the administration; an admissions counselor; the university’s attorney.

The point is that “policy decisions are made not by abstract people, but by people in particular roles and settings, using particular procedures, and addressing particular audiences” (Stone, 1988, p. 20). One of the classic bureaucratic pathologies often cited as a natural outcome of large organizations is over-quantification. Over-quantification is an example of confusing the ends and the means.4 In a similar vein, the expansion, protection, and survival of the organization sometimes become the informal mission of the organization. Just as individuals within organizations occasionally make risky choices for purposes of self-interest, the parochial interests of the organization or subunit may dominate decision making. In fact, one reality of decision making in the policy realm is the rarity of decisions being made solely by an individual. Accordingly, it is significant that the values of the group can sway independent reason, that the capabilities of decision-making groups vary, and that groupthink (subordinates fearing to dissent, exclusion of dissenters, pressure to reach consensus and preserve congeniality and cohesion, being impervious to information discordant with the desired outcome) is an ever-present danger in small working groups (Janis, 1982). Thus, the nature of the political system (and the messy, multiple-entry, never-ending, incremental policy process it creates) and the nature of organizations and their impact on decision making and policy analysis (represented by ideas like role theory, parochial interests, and group-think) do not suggest the rational model as a good description of, or explanation of, the world it models. Yehezkel Dror (cited in Crew, 1992, pp. 73–74) characterizes organizational decision making as political, not rational, in the sense that it is marked by the following: • bargaining and coalition formulation, in which exchanges of favors, power calculations, personal relations, and similar variables are often the most important factors; • the absence of clear operational goals, the presence of little data, and a very limited search for alternatives; • the tendency to follow the line of least resistance, innovation and originality being rather scarce; • the concentration of resources on acute and pressing issues to the neglect of long-term considerations; • a tendency to minimize risks and to achieve defensibility.

Dror’s description will sound familiar to anyone who has had significant experience dealing with organizations. Table 4.3 is a brief summation of the critique of the rational model, focusing on the nature of the political system and the nature of organizations.

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Table 4.3  Summary of the Political/Institutional Critique The Nature of the Political System

Policy analysts operate in an American political system characterized by pluralism, federalism, fragmentation, checks and balances, incrementalism, and some degree of democracy. The political system encourages incremental instead of comprehensive policy change. Clear mandates rarely occur. Policy occurs rather than is made.

The Nature of Organizations

Decision makers are guided by SOPs that create distinctive organizational cultures, behavioral patterns, and decision premises. Different organizations have different interest in policy determination and this contributes to different problem definitions. Organizational self-interest and survival come into play.

IV. Ideological/Philosophical

Group theory rests on an accepted truism: groups compete to shape policy. Elite theory suggests elites might make policy different from the policy that the masses might produce. We begin this section by asking a related and simple question: Does it matter who decides policy? We contend that the ideological/philosophical critique of the rational model is powerful. We assume that your answer is “Yes, of course” (or perhaps, more colloquially, “Duh”). It would matter, if earlier you agreed with the description of a political system that helps set up policy battles due to its pluralistic nature and its failure to produce clear mandates. Or perhaps you accepted our contention that different institutions, different subunits, and different groups of humans could arrive at very different conclusions. It could be you think some individuals are more likely to be wooden-headed, or more intuitive, or better at sorting through volumes of data. The cognitive/political critique of the rational model might have reminded you of your conviction that liberals and conservatives are different animals (and humans not all that rational). Maybe you agreed with the idea that policy problems and facts are subjective and socially constructed, and that, as even Nate Silver agreed, they are not objective, not neutral, and not able to decide policy. Certainly, the critiques raised earlier do relate to the critiques found in this new category. However, your answer probably did not depend on reading the earlier sections. The final set of critiques argues vociferously that it obviously matters who decides because of the following: • • • •

We have different belief systems and different visions of the future. We value and assume different things. We make subjective interpretations and judgment calls. Policy decisions commonly create winners and losers.

In other words, fundamentally, policy analysis/policymaking is not about rationality, but about competing ideas, alternative views concerning morality and ethics, differing philosophies, and about who should get stuck with the bads or get rewarded with the goods. We will examine first the less visible ways that the “who?” affects the data we utilize, and then the more direct ways analysis and decision making are shaped by subjectivity. Data and Who? Experts and analysts are not exempt from biases, neither are they capable of being dispassionate; that is why it matters who is in the room when decisions are being

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made. Small-group theory also has made it clear that not all participants participate equally and not all participants’ contributions are weighed equally. On juries, for example, social status irrelevant to the task at hand can influence the course of deliberations (e.g., see Bales, 1950). Moreover, personality and personal relations play a large role. Deil Wright (1988), author of a seminal article on intergovernmental relations (IGR) cautioned: Strictly speaking … there are no relations among governments; there are only relations among officials who govern different units. The individual actions and attitudes of public officials are at the core of IGR. (p. 17)

In his discussions of the Bush administration’s failures during the breakup of Yugoslavia, Robert Hutchings (1997) points to the rejection a priori of military options due to the opposition of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and due to the fact that the recent success of the Persian Gulf War gave their opinions extra credibility (p. 308). As Deborah Stone (1988) elaborates: The rational ideal not only overstates the purity of information, it also exaggerates the rationality of people in using information… . We are as much influenced by the source of information—the person’s race, looks, social manners, reputation, and credentials, or whether the source is a person or some other medium—as by the content. (p. 256)

People are, consciously or not, driven by their belief systems, their ideology. Despite the rational model, we cannot, and arguably should not, leave our values behind. Our values, models, expectations, and mental constructs precede and shape our selection of the data we then process. Is the problem an economic problem, a legal problem, a political problem, or not a problem at all? Our answer, the names or categories we apply, will affect which questions we ask and what information we pay attention to. Box 4.5 provides further insight into the power of ideology by examining the belief in black letter law. This is the common belief most people have that the law is clear, direct, and free from dispute.

Box 4.5  Black Letter Law?

I

n Karl N. Llewellyn’s famous work on the legal system, The Bramble Bush (1951), he discussed the idea that whether or not a particular legal precedent applies is a subjective judgment that depends on taking a strict or loose view. The “loose” view takes the previous ruling as established law without taking into consideration the context and specific facts of the previous case. The “strict” view would argue that very little of the previous case applies in the here and now of these facts and this case. Llewellyn points out that some precedents are welcome, and others unwelcome, to the various judges and lawyers involved in the current case. Students reading Llewellyn are sometimes surprised to consider the idea that precedent (the legal principle of stare decisis) may be just another subjective tool. Those students are often even more disturbed by the writings of Jerome Frank. Jerome Frank was a judge, a lawyer, and, earlier, a teacher. Consider the following points he made in Law and the Modern Mind (1963): • As the word indicates, the judge in reaching a decision is making a judgment. Judges, despite all their professional training, make decisions just like ordinary human beings. • Just as we do, judges come to a conclusion and then work backward to find premises that will justify their conclusion. • Judges pick and choose which precedents to apply to legitimate their decisions. • The judgments of judges are shaped by their education, race, class, economic background, political background, and moral prejudices.

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• Past experiences with “women, or blond women, or men with beards, or Southerners, or Italians, or Englishmen, or plumbers, or ministers, or college graduates, or Democrats” can color our judgment. • Something as minor as a smell, a cough, a yawn, or a gesture can decide what the judge hears, remembers, and believes. • Studies show that given the same set of facts, different judges decide cases and consequences differently. • Judges decide based on hunches and are deceiving themselves if they think they can ever escape who they are.

As Kafka’s The Trial makes clear, the law is not always what it seems. Jerome Frank’s words make clear that judges are very human. Llewellyn makes clear that precedent is not something that removes subjectivity from the legal process. Jonathan Harr’s nonfiction novel (and the movie by the same name it inspired) A Civil Action portrayed a biased judge whose prejudices had a huge impact on the outcome of this heart-rending case, and the 2014 movie The Judge pivoted on a case where a judge mistakenly went easy on a guilty man because he reminded him of his own son, who he would want to get a second chance. In a terrible case showing why we needed #MeToo, in 2019 a New Jersey judge got rebuked by an appeals court for a very light sentence he handed down because the convicted rapist was a nice boy from a good family and an Eagle Scout who was drunk, and the judge said he draws distinctions between what he called “rape and sexual assault” and he was worried how a harsher verdict would ruin the boy’s life (Gajanan, 2019). And, of course, it’s not just judges. All of this applies to juries and witnesses. In fact, though evidence shows jurors are very impressed by eye-witnesses, it turns out to be a very unreliable thing. Why? Well, as you may have heard, individuals can have false memories. For example, 50 percent of people who are shown a doctored photograph of them as a child with one of their parents will falsely remember the event (Garry and Wade, 2005). But the same study found that a narrative of the event actually produced more false memories compared to the photograph. When it comes to politics and with new technology, it is quite easy to falsify photographs or falsify a narrative and spread either or both the photograph and narrative on social media. Similarly, when it comes to our political memory, we are most likely to believe photographs and narratives of those we disagree with. For example, a conservative is more likely than a liberal to remember seeing a photo of President Obama shaking hands with the president of Iran despite the fact the event never happened (Frenda et al., 2013). Even without manipulation and prejudice entering in, memory is simply not that reliable. Just another problem for “the law.” Black letter law? Nah. Sources: Frenda, S. J., Knowles, E. D., Saletan, W., & Loftus, E. F. 2013. “False Memories of Fabricated Political Events.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(2): 280–286. Garry, Maryanne., and Wade, Kimberley A. 2005. “Actually, A Picture is Worth Less Than 45 Words: Narratives Produce More False Memories than Photographs Do.” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12(2): 359–366. Gajanan, Mahita. 2019. “A Teen from a ‘Good Family’ Allegedly Bragged About Raping a 16 Year Old. Now a Judge is Under Fire for Leniency.” New York Times, July 3. https://time.com/5619918/judge-james-troiano-new-jerseyteen-rape-case/ (accessed July 6, 2019). Llewellyn, Karl. 1951. The Bramble Bush. New York: Oceana Press, and Jerome Frank. 1963. Law and the Modern Mind. New York: Anchor Books, both as edited in John J. Bonsignore et al. (eds.), Before the Law, 6th ed. 1998. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Kafka, Franz. 1998. The Trial. Translated by Breon Mitchell. New York: Schoko Books; and Jonathan Harr. 1995. A Civil Action. New York: Vintage Books. For a popular discussion of political fake memory, see www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/4/20/17109764/ deepfake-ai-false-memory-psychology-mandela-effect (accessed July 8, 2019).

Even the decision to measure something reflects certain beliefs. If, after the appearance of a campus newspaper article on “blow-off ” courses, the university or college you attend suddenly decides to measure how many “A” grades are ending up on the grade rosters its professors are turning in, it suggests that

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a problem does exist and that the number of As is common enough to count. Deciding only to count As also suggests that As are different enough from B+s to count them separately. It also suggests that the grade inflation “problem” is not at the bottom of the scale (perhaps it is even okay to give social promotions and what used to be known as a Gentlemen’s C). It may imply that there are questions about rigor in certain departments and that grades are an accurate reflection of rigor. It implies that the result of this count may tell us how to resolve the problem: reduce the number of As students receive.5 “Who?” also affects the data in a way perhaps best captured by the NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome. NIMBY reflects the reality that costs are not diffused equally across society, in a geographical sense. Toxic waste incinerators may seem a good idea, if they are located in somebody else’s neighborhood. The meaning of the data can even be determined by where the “who” live. The issue of discounting (adjusting the cost-benefit analysis of a program over time to reflect the changing value of constant dollars) is another illustration of the power of the “who” to affect data. As with decision trees, discounting plugs a subjective determination by the analyst into a formula and creates the appearance of an objective and mathematical fact. The cost-benefit determination is liable to be entirely different if a discount rate of 5 percent is used rather than a discount rate of 10 percent. (Chapter 3 provided a substantial explanation of discounting.) This relates to the last point we will make relating to “who”: namely, that different individuals shape, select, and omit the facts used to make decisions. The Urban Institute studied welfare reform and noted that differences in how the population leaving the welfare rolls is defined (e.g., length of time off welfare, the reason they left, if they have stayed off) and how outcomes like employment are specifically measured “have led to employment rate differences of as much as 20 percentage points for the same geographic areas” (Brauner and Loprest, 1999, p. 3). Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970) point out that “multiple conflicting values are championed by different participants” (p. 17). It is also worth noting that the way we dress up our statistics, the facts we place at the top of the page, and the adverbs and adjectives we use to qualify our findings are reflections of the ideology and interests of the analyst. To evaluate the preceding argument, consider a pledge to increase funding by 100 percent. Visualize graphing a 5 percent improvement in funding (from the base) over the last four years, a total of 20 percent. We drew the first graph using 10 percent increments that go from 0 to 100 percent and that cover the past three years and the next seven years—for a total of 10 years one year at a time. We labeled the graph “A Troubled Decade” and wrote the following story about the funding situation below the graph: At the current pace of funding increases, it will take 16 more years for funding to reach the target level, and by that time inflation will have significantly discounted the value of the funding.

Next, we used 10 percent increments that go from 90 to 130 percent to compare funding four years ago, two years ago, and now (it assumes the same funding increases and base). We labeled this graph “$$$Wow!” and wrote the following story about the funding situation below the graph: Significant progress has been made in achieving the goal of increasing funding. It has already increased 20 percent in less than five years.

Both graphs are shown in Figure 4.1. Remember that both presentations are based on the same set of facts. Do you agree that these packages of facts (graph, headline, and story) tell very different tales? This is another way the “who” handling the data can affect policy. And some policy champions are better at this high-stakes game than others. When you read visuals such as this, always look at the vertical scale (look at the numbers range and whether the scale starts at zero). Additionally, be wary of graphs that only provide partial data (cherry picking a few years out of longer series of data). The following website is a helpful resource, www.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/ misleading-graphs/. The use of stirring analogies and seemingly apt metaphors, the categorization of this as clearly not that, and the words we drape around our numbers are all designed to persuade, convince,

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Figure 4.1  Same Facts, Two Different Tales A Troubled Decade

$$$ WOW!

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and sometimes bamboozle others into seeing things our way, or as Stone (1988) puts it, “to see a situation as one thing rather than another” (p. 6). Those able to paint a powerful portrait have an advantage in the policy arena. Subjectivity’s Direct Impact  Even if the facts are presented in a very even-handed way, and even if the facts are consistent rather than contradictory, our differing philosophies and values intervene because the technical question is rarely the key question. Instead, we choose subjectively. We decide the following: • • • • • • • •

whether or not there is a problem; how significant the problem is; what the causes of the problem are; whether or not it is a public problem; whether or not the problem is amenable to a solution; what solutions will work and are appropriate; whether or not the benefits of the solution are worth the costs of the solution; whether or not the opportunity costs override the direct cost-benefit equation.

Our answers to these questions are based on our beliefs about the nature of human beings, our opinion on the proper role of government, our moral and ethical philosophies (and predispositions?), and our interests. Table 4.4 well-summarizes this last critique. Liberals and conservatives are both generally concerned with the public interest, equity, and efficiency. They disagree, not on the general goal, but on how to get there and the specifics of what it is and what to prioritize. In Deborah Stone’s classic text (2002) on public policy (see Box 4.6), she tells a story that drives home this point. The story is about equity and how to divide up a chocolate cake. Besides pointing out that the goal of equity might conflict with other goals (like efficiency), she demonstrates eight perspectives on what would be the equitable (fair) way to divide the cake (pp. 40–41). Although it may have lost some of its flavor when we summarized and reduced it down to six examples, her telling insights remain a rich explanation of how people who agree on the goal of equity can still mightily disagree on the definition and path to achievement of that goal. And there are other equally reasonable ways to decide what was fair (all of which also have potential counterarguments). For example, we could distribute it based on merit to students depending on their grades. Or perhaps

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distribute them based upon seniority in terms of completing your degrees. Plus we could level the playing field and recognize that for some reason more women still bake than men so we should give them to the males. And the professor might like to use his or her authority and (out of concern for the department) distribute them to students based on trying to persuade them to declare a major or minor or concentration. But as a believer in democracy maybe instead they will let you vote on how to split the cake up. Or we could discuss the situation and make an informed decision (e.g., perhaps half only want one brownie, so the rest of you can have two—and some may be allergic, don’t like brownies, don’t like eating at this time of day, don’t like brownies without milk, or are willing to bargain and trade you their brownie for a promise of help studying for the midterm exam).

Table 4.4  Summary of the Ideological/Philosophical Critique Data and Who?

Experts and analysts (even judges!) are not exempt from biases, neither are they capable of being dispassionate. NIMBY (not in my back yard) reflects the reality that costs are not diffused equally across society, not even in a geographical sense. Different individuals shape, select, and omit the facts used to make decisions. The way we dress up our statistics, the facts we place at the top of the page, and the adverbs and adjectives we use to qualify our findings are reflections of the ideology and interests of the analyst.

Subjectivity’s Direct Impact

Even if the facts are presented in a very even-handed way, our differing philosophies and values intervene because the technical question is rarely the key question. Rationality can play a role, and you can try to be as objective as possible, but value questions are decided by your values. Subjectivity influences the data we gather, its presentation, the questions we ask, and the answers we arrive at.

Box 4.6  The Chocolate Cake in the Classroom Story 1. We could provide equal slices for all students attending. (It seems egalitarian, but is that fair for those who did not know cake would be served?) 2. We could distribute the cake based on group membership instead, giving half the cake to the female students and half to the male students. (But males are only one-third of the students, so they will each get more.) 3. We could equalize their overall meals by giving more to those who did not have a chance to eat lunch. (Now the issue is not just how to divide cake, but trying to distribute equity more broadly by increasing the boundary to include external factors.) 4. We could give everyone a fork, line students up in the back of the room, and let them “go for it.” (Resulting in unequal distribution but providing equal starting resources—sort of.) 5. We could cut the cake into eight large pieces and have a lottery to see which students get lucky. (Resulting in unequal distribution, but providing everyone with an equal statistical chance.) 6. We could hold an election (one person–one vote) and give the cake to the winning candidate. (Resulting in very unequal distribution, but everyone had an equal vote.) Source: Adapted from Stone (2002, pp. 40–41).

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Subjectivity influences the data we gather, their presentation, the questions we ask, and the answers we arrive at. Gary Orren notes that we are moved to action, and sustained by “a collection of deep commitments and feelings” (cited in Reich, 1988, p. 27). Choosing is about values, not rationality. That is the foremost reason why it matters who decides policy. The following is a brief summary of the ideological and philosophical critiques of the rational model: • Experts and analysts are not exempt from biases. • Our values, models, expectations, and constructs precede and shape our selection of the data we then process. • There is subjectivity in what we decide to measure or decide not to measure. • We shape, select, and omit facts.

[Exercise #3, “Dutch Donor Delusion Deepens Divide and Delineates Decision Difficulty Dilemma” is available in the faculty online Teaching Appendix Part I.] This concludes the chapter’s final section (prior to the case study), detailing and organizing the extensive and interrelated critiques of the rational-comprehensive model. Underneath the broad category of intellectual/analytical, we discussed the intellectual limits posed by the human factor, as well as the analytical problems stemming from complexity and the problems with prediction, time shortages, and data. The closely related category we called the cognitive problem discussed the role of emotion, cultural baggage, arguments about genetic predispositions to think tribally and to accept certain views that make us less rational and more likely to agree with people that we like. In organizing the arguments in the political/institutional category, we utilized two ­subcategories—the nature of the political system and the nature of organizations and their impact on decision making and policy—to present the critiques that question the model’s descriptive and explanatory power. In this fourth category, ideological/philosophical, the arguments focused on how the “who” affects data and the more obvious ways that subjectivity, not rationality, drives policy. [“Policy Analysis, Ethic, and Role” is available in Part II (#6) of the faculty online Teaching Appendix.]

Concluding Thoughts The last three chapters have been a thorough introduction to the rational approach. This introduction included its genesis, a delineation of the rational model, key positivist tools, the extensive critiques of the rational model, examples of the power of nonrational explanations, and its use in the case of the Porterville health clinic (and nonuse in the making of U.S. policy for the Vietnam debacle and decision to go to war in Iraq). You have also been supplied with criteria necessary for the evaluation of models. Make sure you do not leave the criteria for model evaluation behind as you progress through the book. What do you think? Has all of this induced you to change your opinion of the rational approach? If you have—who knows?—perhaps you will change your mind again before we conclude. Finally, the following case lets you practice some of the things you have been learning about and explore the nonrational, political nature of policy analysis. To reiterate, in the policy process we come upon questions that involve making choices where rationality and objectivity simply cannot determine the answer. Answering these questions is about ideology and philosophy, not about rationality and objectivity. For example, if given a choice between two policies—one where the result is somewhat satisfying with low risk and one where the result would be significantly better but entails high risk—which one is the rational choice? The answer picked depends on whether or not the decision maker’s philosophy is to be a risk-taker or a risk-minimizer. In a situation in which you must decide who wins and who loses, where the costs or benefits are not distributed equally, or where efficiency is incompatible with equity, social justice, or due process, is it possible to come to an objective decision? No. These are questions about

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your beliefs. Rationality can play a role, and you can try to be as objective as possible, but value questions are decided by your values. Try to use rationality to answer the following two questions: (1) Is quantity better than quality? (One colleague of ours feels that way about food; others certainly disagree.) (2) How responsive to organized interests, or to the majority opinion, should government be? Rationality is of little help in determining such answers.

Case Study: Vaping Politics and Policy: Up in Smoke What Are E-Cigarettes? According to Trtchounian, Williams, and Talbot (2010, p. 905), an e-cigarette is a “cartridge containing nicotine and propylene glycol, an atomizer, and a battery.” The e-cigarette user clicks a button and that button releases a “puff of vaporized nicotine” (Yamin, Bitton, and Bates 2010, p. 607). This, of course, is the technical description of an e-cigarette. Generally, they are made to resemble the shape, size, and look of cigarettes, including a red LED light on the end that glows when the smoker inhales. The smoker inhales a warm water-vapor mist, almost always laced with nicotine and flavoring (including flavors such as pina colada, bubblegum, grape, or watermelon deemed more attractive to children) and then exhales, thus providing the same ritual as smoking regular cigarettes.

What Do E-Cigarettes Mean in Terms of Public Problems and Policy? But in public policy terms, what are e-cigarettes? Are they a device that helps individuals stop smoking tobacco (better than the alternatives such as nicotine gum or a patch) and allows individuals to have their nicotine fix without the potential devastating consequences of all the other carcinogens in the more toxic tobacco cigarettes? Are they a device that is clean and does not harm bystanders with secondhand smoke (vapor)? Or are they a device that potentially has negative health consequences to both the user and bystanders? Are e-cigarettes just the latest ploy by tobacco companies to try and addict smokers (particularly teenagers) to nicotine? These sorts of questions about the meaning of an issue, in this case e-cigarettes, are what leads to conflict, and policy analysis seeks to explore these different meanings. With these widely varying views of e-cigarettes come widely varying policy prescriptions. Should e-cigarettes be regulated by government? How do e-cigarettes play into existing regulation of tobacco cigarettes (for example, can an e-cigarette user smoke in a nonsmoking area)? What does science tell us about this issue? Would a sin tax on them discourage their use? Are the corporations behind e-cigs targeting children? Should that at least be regulated? What are governments to do? What is the proper role of government in a situation such as this? Would the market take care of the situation without any nudges for consumers or rules for businesses? (By the way, you can rest assured that those corporations involved, including the tobacco giant Reynolds, have been busy lobbying to prevent regulations, what they see as punitive taxation, etc.) These and other questions are the questions of public policy analysis. These are the types of questions that we address and the types of questions that you as a future policy analyst will address. This case represents one way that the issue is impacting public institutions and public policies and will give you the chance to practice policy analysis.

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State University State University is a relatively large, comprehensive university serving nearly 13,000 students. Located in a rural region, State University sits in the town of Concordia, population 65,000 (counting the students). While the larger area is primarily politically conservative, with a strong libertarian streak, the community of Concordia is historically more liberal in its politics.

The Tobacco Ban Controversy at State U Five years ago, there was a significant-issue battle on campus when student activists started a petition to ban smoking on campus. The students were members of the group, “Students in Action” (or SIA), which is a nondenominational group associated with the Christian religion. SIA encourages its members to become politically active in their communities and to “seek to pursue policy goals consistent with a Christian lifestyle.” The student group had met for nearly a year, choosing which policy issue to work on and pursue. They eventually chose to try and end smoking on campus. According to group spokesperson Lucinda Linares (interviewed in 2010 by the school newspaper): Students in Action believes that smoking is something that a lot of students, faculty, and staff will agree should be banned on campus. Smokers hurt others with secondhand smoke and smoking itself is a major cause of disease and sickness. They harm themselves and they cost taxpayers money. It is also a fire risk, a major cause of littering on campus, and even when they smoke outside, innocent people are forced to walk through a smelly and harmful gauntlet of secondhand smoke to get into the buildings. We are not trying to ban smoking because it is immoral; we want to ban smoking because it is not healthy. Though we care about the smokers, our focus is on the harm they are inflicting on others. However, it is true that part of our charter encourages healthy living among young people and that includes both physical and moral health.

Over 1,000 students signed the petition and the issue was brought before the State University Student Senate. At this point, the issue became somewhat heated and it became obvious it was a controversial proposal with strong feelings on both sides. Jorge Alvarez, a student senator (and smoker) gave a fiery and articulate speech before the Student Senate accusing Students in Action of “moralizing and trying to impose your way of life and thinking on other people.” He stated that “many of us live in Concordia because of the freedom that rural living entails, we don’t want a ‘Nanny state,’ and we don’t want a smoking ban. SIA’s matriarchal moralizing is antithetical to what universities are supposed to be about.” This speech was placed on YouTube and received over 10,000 comments in its first week on the website. The campus suddenly became divided between those who supported, and those who opposed, the smoking ban. Several art professors claimed that “smoking is a way of life among bohemian artists and we feel singled out by this proposed action.” In fact, some art professors and poetry professors built an unlikely coalition with faculty from the business school and a faction of the engineering professors and created their own group, “Smokers United for Freedom.” The issue divided friends and divided conservatives and liberals alike. Some liberal faculty and staff opposed the smoking ban because they thought it was inspired by the fundamentalist religious concerns of the SIA students and these professors did not like what they saw as a group imposing their moral views on the larger campus community. A seemingly clear majority of liberal faculty and staff, however, were more supportive. One faculty member, Julia Johansen (sociology) ended up with her own popular YouTube video (continued)

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after she made a speech to the State University Faculty Senate stating, “Tobacco companies are the ultimate exploiters of young people. They market their goods to consumers and they lie and they sell death. As educators, we should be fighting to stop these corporate evil-doers.” Another liberal professor posted his sentiments on the State University Facebook page, “Banning smoking for the good health and safety of students is what progressive universities do in the 21st century. We sell condoms at the bookstore and in bathrooms and we should ban smoking.” Conservative professors and staff were likewise divided. Some conservative members saw the ban as too draconian and opposed to individual rights and responsibility. Yet, others believed that there were important health reasons to ban smoking and that the ban might also discourage drug and alcohol use and abuse (with smoking being viewed by them as a gateway drug to these other problems and as a covert delivery system). Eventually, a vote among students was held, with 65 percent supporting the ban and 35 percent opposing. The Student Senate then voted 9–6 for the ban and made a recommendation to the Faculty Senate and Staff Council. Both of these bodies eventually voted for the ban by 2 to 1 margins. The university president then agreed and charged his legal team with writing a regulation to enact the ban. That regulation was adopted on August 15, 2010. The ban was voluntary for the academic year 2010–11 in that smokers were not cited for smoking on campus. In 2011–12 they were cited but not fined or otherwise penalized. Though fines and housing preference penalties were supposed to be in place after that, no one was actually fined until 2014– 15, when something changed and they started handing out citations for smokers. That is, the campus police and residence hall staff began implementing (irregularly) the regulation. There are still individuals who smoke on campus and there have been controversies over what is university property and what is not, but the ban has generally reduced smoking on campus while creating only some controversy and no organized opposition arose trying to overturn the ban. It seemed there had been more smoke than fire.

E-Cigarettes Enter the Fold In August 2015, at the five-year anniversary of the smoking ban, Students in Action, fresh from not only that victory, but a “public education campaign” against binge drinking and a failed effort to get the university to stop providing contraceptives to unmarried students, decided to start their next campaign. The new SIA campaign was to add e-cigarettes to the list of smoking items currently banned on campus. The rule passed in 2010 had banned tobacco cigarettes, cigars, tobacco pipes, and chewing tobacco from campus. Students for Action was proposing that e-cigarettes be added to that list. The controversy began immediately, was heated, and any agreement about the smoking ban that had formed was, well, vaporized. The new leader for SIA, Tom Goodwin, began the debate by providing data from a study that e-cigarettes emit toxins that are harmful to those exposed to them. Goodwin proclaimed that “e-cigarettes are not safe and instead they are simply cigarettes without tobacco and … there is a public interest in regulating e-cigarettes by banning their use on campus along with tobacco products.” Goodwin’s post on the State University Facebook page led to a string of comments that fueled the political controversy over the issue. Below are a few of the comments: Belinda: E-cigarettes are like tattoos, they are gross, get rid of them. Hector: E-cigarettes have helped me quit smoking tobacco, what’s next State U and SIA are going to ban air and water? Jorge: Belinda, what is wrong with tattoos, what year do you live in?

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Jasmine: E-cigarettes are just ways for the big tobacco companies to get young people hooked on nicotine. Corporate America loves ‘em. Duane: It is my choice if I want to smoke an e-cigarette on campus. There is no evidence that it hurts anyone else, it is vapor, get it, vapor, it is like water? Yes, Hector, they are banning water. Lucinda: I can see where you can ban them in class they would be distracting but outside on the parkway, really? This is like banning water. Can you say, “nanny state”? Orwell: The original ban was for tobacco, e-cigarettes are not tobacco. Why does SIA want to ban everything, it sounds like tattoos are next? These goody two-shoes are moral fascists (who also were opposed to marriage equality). Stuart: Jasmine, e-cigarettes are not corporate, they are sold by small companies and small businesses. The vaping lounges are owned by local people. Why do you see corporations in everything? Are you anti-capitalism? Jasmine: I am “anti” letting corporations use their money to buy legislators so we cannot protect children from ads and flavors targeting them and addicting millions more smokers. Do you know how many people are getting hooked on nicotine now due to these e-cigs? The e must stand for entry-level … Duane: Jasmine, I don’t know where you got your facts, but I’ve seen evidence it helps people who want to smoke quit. Plus, my girlfriend and family love the fact that after I vape my hands, clothes, and breath don’t smell. And if she likes me more vaping that matters to me more than a bunch of out-of-state liberals and holier than thou Evangelicals trying to limit my rights! She rocks!

Within the first month SIA was once again able to gather 1,000 signatures, enough to have the potential ban considered by the Student Senate. As school started, an unscientific poll taken by the student newspaper showed that 61 percent of students supported the ban (but the poll was neither random, nor did it have that many respondents). By September, an organized group who chose to call themselves, “Freedom from Tobacco” (FFT) came to the forefront in opposition to the ban. Started by political science faculty member Macir Montague, the group used social media to mobilize opposition to the ban. The group was so successful that by early October when a scientific poll was taken by a sociology methods class (not affiliated with Montague), only 40 percent of students, 50 percent of faculty, and 45 percent of staff supported adding e-cigarettes to the tobacco ban. Much of the narrative from the FFT group revolved around the liberating effects of e-cigarettes on individuals trying to quit smoking. The group effectively used a student named Mario Lennon as an example of somebody who had benefited from e-cigarettes. Lennon is a 21-year-old accounting major who smoked two packs of cigarettes a day. According to the social media campaign sponsored by Freedom from Tobacco, Lennon had tried several other methods to quit smoking. Lennon finally tried e-cigarettes and since starting them he has not smoked a tobacco cigarette. Since Lennon has two small children, he thanked e-cigarettes for saving his life, saying he wanted to be around to meet his grandchildren someday, and asked why anybody would want to ban such a useful medical device? As of today, the SIA group is starting their own social media campaign focused on the negative consequences of e-cigarettes on the user and bystander—and on the argument they are a gateway to the more lethal regular cigarettes. An interview with university faculty member Philipe Belfiore cogently summed up the current debate as follows: There is a lot of identity politics going on here. The anticorporate groups try and make e-cigarettes look corporate. The e-cigarette users try and make the e-cigarettes look like health devices. Those that don’t like tattoos link e-cigarette use to tattoos. All the while the science is contested and the campus does not know how to move forward on this.

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Public health faculty member Morgan Muir has provided the State University administration with an initial review of the scientific literature on vaping. Her review is summarized here: Callahan-Lyon’s (2014) review article: There are limited studies on the health impacts of e-cigarettes. While they might contain less toxicants than tobacco cigarettes, overall studies are inconclusive. There is some evidence that e-cigarettes might help individuals stop smoking but again this is inconclusive. Hajek et al.’s (2019) randomized trial of 886 participants: Conclusion is that “e-cigarettes are more effective for smoking-cessation than nicotine-replacement therapy, when both products were accompanied by behavioral support.” Lee et al. (2018): They exposed mice to e-cigarette vape and conclude, “It is therefore possible that E-cigarette smoke may contribute to lung and bladder cancer, as well as heart disease, in humans.” Czugala et al. (2014) found second vaper impacts: “Using an e-cigarette in indoor environments may involuntarily expose nonusers to nicotine but not to toxic tobacco-specific combustion products.”

This is where you come into the case. You have just been hired by State University as a policy advisor to the new State University President Elizabeth Conger. She wasn’t president when the original ban was enacted, is nervous about controversy on campus, and is very concerned about anything that might harm enrollment due to the new state funding formula. In the third year of her term, she worries equally about faculty and student support, and the much more conservative Board (whose members actually have the power to fire her or renew her contract next year). Also, though she has tried to stop, she is actually a smoker herself—but she supports the ban already in place and is one reason the campus authorities finally started enforcing the ban. When a complaint about its nonenforcement reached her desk, she told her cabinet that she believes it is dangerous to ignore policy and selectively implement whatever you want—especially when there is a strong majority in favor of the policy. You were hired to deal mainly with statewide policy issues involving the university. But Conger has asked you to provide her with an initial policy analysis of the situation. Specifically, she asks you to: 1.

2.

Provide her with a problem definition. (What is the problem that is trying to be fixed here and why is this so contentious?). (a) As part of this, focus on the different images of the issue (frame the issue from the perspective of different coalitions in the case) and then try and reframe as a policy analyst working for the university. (b) What does the current science say about the issue? Make a recommendation on how State University should proceed.

With your studies in hand and your assignment given you are about ready to start your analysis, remembering a flurry of media stories (see Kaplan, 2019 and Kaplan and Richtel, 2019) and scientific reports in the waning days of summer of 2019, that might have fundamentally altered the landscape for understanding vaping. Even JUUL’s CEO (the company that has most popularized vaping with products attractive to young people) Kevin Burns, warned that individuals should not vape unless they are trying to quit cigarettes and admitted that the long-term health consequences of vaping are not known (Peterson, 2019). Partially prompting Burns’ statement were reports in 25 states of a series of pulmonary illnesses connected to vaping (with some using e-cigs containing cannabinoid products such as THC or CBD). The Center for Disease Control issued six recommendations to the public, some of which included: 1. 2.

If you are concerned about these specific health risks, consider refraining from using e-cigarette products. Regardless of the ongoing investigation, anyone who uses e-cigarette products should not buy these products off the street (e.g., e-cigarette products with THC, other cannabinoids)

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and should not modify e-cigarette products or add any substances to these products that are not intended by the manufacturer. Regardless of the ongoing investigation, e-cigarette products should not be used by youth, young adults, pregnant women, as well as adults who do not currently use tobacco products … Adult smokers who are attempting to quit should use evidence-based treatments, including counseling and FDA-approved medications …

With this information, you wonder if the uncertainty in scientific information that Newman et al. (2019) discusses was over and that any disagreement about regulating vaping would also be over. Rationality Critiques How might the first two critiques of rationality (Human/Analytical and Cognitive/Political) help analysts and elected officials understand the vaping policy issue and disputes such as this in general? Specifically, how does the concept of cultural cognition help us understand the value-laden nature of policy conflict in the e-cigarettes case? (Where possible, be specific and apply the theories to the case. Show the arguments of both sides and point out the value and belief-driven nature of the arguments where possible.) Is policy conflict totally value-driven? Or do material interests also play into the conflict? If so, what is the balance of interests to material conflict? How does such an analysis help policy analysts dealing with controversial issues?

Other questions for you to consider (some of these involve ideas covered elsewhere in the book) are shown below. Coalition Formation  What coalitions have formed or are forming around this issue? How are different coalitions using narratives to construct the issue? Do narratives matter in this case? Can you suggest an effective narrative? Why do you think that narrative would work? Agenda Setting  Where is this issue on the systemic, institutional, and action agendas? What is needed (if anything) for the original proponents (SIA) to be successful? Public Problems  Are e-cigarettes a public problem? Narratives and Facts  Conduct some research on the various narratives circulating both for and against e-cigarettes. Is even the choice of referring to the issue as vaping or e-cigarettes part of the battle? Also conduct additional research on various studies on the health impacts and benefits of e-cigarettes. What conclusions do you draw when comparing narratives to facts? Read the article by Joshua Newman referenced below in answering this question. Policy Implementation  How do e-cigarettes change or complicate existing antismoking regulations or laws?

References Callahan-Lyon Priscilla, 2014. “Electronic Cigarettes: Human Health Effects.” Tobacco Control, 23:ii36-ii40. Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2019. “Severe Pulmonary Disease Associated with Using E-Cigarette Products.” August 30. https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/han00421.asp (accessed September 1, 2019).

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Czogala, Jan.,Maciej L. Goniewicz, Bartlomiej Fidelus, Wioleta Zielinska-Danch, Mark J. Travers, and Andrzej Sobczak, A. (2014). “Secondhand Exposure to Vapors from Electronic Cigarettes.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research: Official Journal of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco, 16(6), 655–662. doi:10.1093/ntr/ntt203. Hajek, Peter, Anna Phillips-Waller, Dunja Przulj, Francesca Pesola, Katie Myers Smith, Natalie Bisal, Jinshuo Li et al. 2019. “A Randomized Trial of E-cigarettes versus Nicotine-Replacement Therapy.” New England Journal of Medicine, 380 (7): 629–637. Kaplan, Sheila. 2019. “Don’t Use Street or Bootleg Vaping Products, CDC Warns.” New York Times, September 1. www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/health/vaping-e-cigarettes-marijuana-cdc. html?module=inline. Kaplan, Sheila and Matt Richtel. 2019. “The Mysterious Vaping Illness, That’s ‘Becoming an Epidenic.’” NewYorkTimes,August. 31 www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/health/vaping-marijuanaecigarettes-sickness.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190901?campaign_id=2& instance_id=11968&segment_id=16647&user_id=ad43fcd06aaae407fed56e910481 b48d®i_id=9073540901 (accessed September 1, 2019). Lee, Hyun-Wook, Sung-Hyun Park, Mao-wen Weng, Hsiang-Tsui Wang, William C. Huang, Herbert Lepor, Xue-Ru Wu, Lung-Chi Chen, and Moon-shong Tang. 2018. “E-Cigarette Smoke Damages DNA and Reduces Repair Activity in Mouse Lung, Heart, and Bladder as Well as in Human Lung and Bladder Cells.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115 (7): E1560-E1569. Peterson, Hayley. 2019. “‘Don’t Vape. Don’t Use Juul’: Juul CEO Issues Stark Warning to Nonsmokers as He Admits Long-term Effects of Vaping are Unknown.” Business Insider, August 29 www.businessinsider.com/juul-ceo-dont-vape-long-term-effects-unknown-2019-8 (accessed September 1, 2019). Newman, Joshua. 2019. “The Role of Uncertainty in Regulating E-Cigarettes: The Emergence of a Regulatory Regime, 2005–15.” Politics & Policy, 47(2): 407–429. Trtchounian, A., M. Williams, and P. Talbot. 2010. “Conventional and Electronic Cigarettes (E-cigarettes) Have Different Smoking Characteristics.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 12(9):905–912 (Abstract available online at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20644205). Yamin, Cyrus K., Asaf Bitton, and David W. Bates. 2010. “E-Cigarettes: A Rapidly Growing Internet Phenomenon.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 153(9): 607–609.

Glossary Terms black letter law (p. 127)

equity (p. 131)

phenomenology (p. 109)

critical theory (p. 109)

hubris (p. 110)

symbolic interactionism (p. 109)

deductive theory

metanarratives (p. 109)

construction (p. 109)

Notes 1 Gould’s book is also an excellent refutation of the book The Bell Curve. 2 This discussion builds on, and makes more specific to the United States, the earlier explanation of political systems in Chapter 1. 3 This paragraph draws upon Charles O. Jones’s policy classic, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy, 3rd ed. (1984), pp. 107–108. 4 Body counts during the Vietnam War, an off-shoot of McNamara’s systems analysis, are often cited as an example of both over-quantification and confusing ends and means (it was not measuring strategic success, only tactical success). 5 Stone’s (2002) chapter on numbers, pp. 163–187, provided the general basis for this example.

Chapter 5

The Nonrational (Political) Approach

Mini-Case “The Pocatello Prison Siting Story: A Case of Politics” Case Study “Opioids and The Political Model of Policy Analysis” Chapter Roadmap: This chapter begins by presenting our view of the essence of the policy process and an overview of that process. An important but brief detour on the related topic of the role of individuals in analysis follows, after which you will be walked through the process via a discussion of its component parts. Following that is a story about building a prison, which highlights the political aspect of the policy process. We will then conclude this short but crucial look at the policy process and ask you to evaluate the nonrational model. What you have learned in the first four chapters, combined with what you will be furnished with in this chapter, provides the background necessary for you to successfully complete a case focusing on the tragedy of the opioid epidemic. Within the case we also teach you two simple public policy research skills: how to do a Google Trends search, and how to research congressional action on a policy issue.

Essence and Overview of the Policy Process The models, axiom, and extensive critiques in Chapter 4 all pointed toward the recognition that the policy process is not, at its heart, rational. What then is the essence of the public policy process? We suggest that the answer to this question is that the public policy process is essentially a political process. It is a contest where power from many different sources (stories, money, institutions, leadership, etc.) is the key currency. It is worth reiterating Harold Lasswell’s statement that politics is about “who gets what, when, and how” (1958). The public policy process is a political process concerned with addressing these same questions. Politics and the public policy process are intricately linked. Not surprisingly, the words politics and policy both have their origin in the Greek word politeia, a derivative of polis (Ayto, 1990, p. 402). In Deborah Stone’s conclusion, she states, “Policy analysis is political argument, and vice versa” (1988, p. 306). Another important and useful characterization of the fluid and political policy process comes from John Kingdon. In what is now known in the public policy process theory literature as “Multiple Streams” theory or the Multiple Streams Framework (Zahariadis, 2014), Kingdon, 1984/1995) suggests three separate streams that affect each other nonetheless, flowing steadily through society. These “loosely coupled” streams—the problem, policies, and politics streams—occasionally,

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Figure 5.1  Kingdon’s Multiple Streams and a Policy Window of Opportunity Problem Stream

Politics Stream

Policy Stream

Window of Opportunity

almost serendipitously, and sometimes with help from skillful work by policy advocates, converge; in the rush of the confluence, a window of opportunity opens for significant policy development (see Figure 5.1). When they are not in sync, they serve as a constraint rather than an impetus for policy development. In the problem stream, potential catalysts for the perception that problems exist include policy evaluation reports; budget renewals; comparative data; disasters, crises, and other focusing (or trigger) events; and changed expectations. A report that shows an increased number of children living in poverty, high unemployment, suicide bombings or massive protests, data revealing that the United States does not rank in the top 30 countries in terms of doing well relative to infant mortality or in the top 25 countries relative to life expectancy rates, a botched government response to natural disasters, genocide or ethnic cleansing, budget surpluses or deficits, a majority of citizens coming to believe that the government needs to do something about climate change, increased refugee flows across borders, or growing awareness of marriage inequality’s negative impact are concrete examples of these potential catalysts. Proposals by academicians, elected officials and staffers, think tanks, policy entrepreneurs, and other policy analysts and actors generate the policy proposal stream. These policy proposals float or sink in a burbling pot of policy primeval soup on the basis of their technical feasibility, their cost, the dominant social paradigm, and the amount and strength of political opposition or support they set in motion. Some alternatives survive the tides and eddies and are floating about as possibilities to consider; others disappear below the surface, perhaps to wash up on the shores at a later date. The politics stream considers the willingness of a political system’s policy institutions to place an issue on the formal agenda. The forces that alter the direction of this stream are perceived changes in opportunities and political mandates. These perceptions are modified as a consequence of election results, perceived changes in the political ambiance, interest group activity, and public opinion polls. In short, the political factors Kingdon considers are “electoral, partisan, and pressure group factors” (Kingdon, 1984/1995, pp. 150–153). One quick way to grasp his model is to apply it. Think back to the mini-case in Chapter 1 about the warden’s proposed policy change at the prison triggered by the escape, violence, and other problems at the prison. Instead, an astute warden might have been on the lookout for the three streams converging. Certainly, there were other policy proposals in the stream, such as more cameras, better lighting, more individual cells, and more and better-paid guards that the warden could have been prepared to advocate for (and ideally had been advocating for prior

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to this). Then, when the problems hit the front page and become major concerns for the public (perhaps helped along by the warden behind the scenes), the actors in control of the politics stream might suddenly see the problem stream about to overflow the banks and flood into their world. At that point one could likely get one’s proposals on the agenda and get the powers that be to act and allocate the necessary resources. Smart, proactive, prepared administrators can turn problems into opportunities. Less politically attuned administrators can be overwhelmed by the circumstances. Luckily, despite the continued emphasis on positivist methods, public policy process theory over the past 25 years has largely taken a political (nonrational) approach to understanding policy formation. While some theories do subscribe to rationality, including highly influential work by Nobel Prize winner, the late Elinor Ostrom (e.g., 2007, 2011), some of the other most influential theories have dealt with the very political nature of public policy formation, adoption, and implementation. For example, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as outlined by Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1999) and most recently updated by Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014) presents policy beliefs as a core element of the framework. According to ACF, in a policy subsystem, competing coalitions form and are bound together by policy beliefs. These beliefs involve a wide range of questions, including the seriousness of a specific problem, the cause of a specific problem, the level of government that should deal with a specific problem, and the role of government versus the market (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1999, p. 122). These competing coalitions engage in political battle and the political battles are influenced by stable system parameters (aspects of the problem area, constitutional rules, sociocultural values) and more unstable external events (changes in governing coalitions, changes in public opinion, or changes in socioeconomic conditions). Both coalitions have various resources at their disposal and use various strategies in efforts to influence public policy. Policy change occurs when one coalition is able to wrest control from the other coalition (because of changes in external events or because of changes in resources, etc.). The ACF is widely considered the dominant public policy process model of the past 30 years, and while its founder (the late Paul Sabatier) was a stickler for positivist methods and falsification, at its core the ACF is a very political model of the public policy process and that fact might well help account for its explanatory power. Another public policy process theory (and one that originated around the same time as Kingdon’s Multiple Streams and the ACF) is that of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) “Punctuated Equilibrium” (PE). Like Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, PE tries to explain policy change over time. Using the metaphor of the evolutionary biological theory of punctuated equilibrium, the scholars assert that U.S. public policy (and other studies have extended this to other countries) is characterized by long periods of policy stability punctuated by rapid periods of dramatic policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In PE, policy subsystems play an important role in explaining both policy stability and change. In this regard, True, Jones and Baumgartner (2007) provide an excellent discussion of PE in the context of the differences between parallel and serial processing. Importantly, because governments are involved in so many different issue areas, government institutions cannot focus attention on all of these issues at the same time. Instead, specialization has to occur and these policy issues become dominated by policy subsystems (elected officials, interest groups, scientists, bureaucratic experts). Policy monopolies occur within these subsystems as one coalition has dominance over the policy issue, and as long as there is not large unhappiness with the public policies supported by the policy monopolies, change does not occur. In a very real sense, these policy subsystems are what political scientists have long called iron triangles (but are more complex with more actors), and they are at the heart of the pluralist argument we covered in Chapter 1. However, as problems start

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to arise, other policy subsystems and policy actors work to break down these policy monopolies and move the issue outside of the subsystem into new venues and generally into the larger view of government or society. This often occurs through what is termed venue shopping, where groups that are trying to break a policy monopoly strategically work to move policy issues from friendly venues to less friendly venues. A good example of this is found in the issue of tobacco (Worsham, 2006), where, through a series of strategic maneuvers, jurisdiction over tobacco policy was moved from friendly agricultural committees in the legislative branch to other more nonfriendly committees. This strategic opening of what was a closed policy system by groups worried about the health impacts of tobacco led to different parts of the government becoming involved in the monitoring and regulating of tobacco. A major part of this movement from serial processing to parallel processing occurs when groups change the policy image of an issue. With tobacco, for example, the policy image that underpinned its place within a policy monopoly was its image as a crop and a product that gave pleasure to its users and income to both agricultural producers and cigarette makers. Certainly, you can imagine that having the Food and Drug Administration focusing on cigarettes, rather than the Department of Agriculture focusing on tobacco as a crop, would change the political and regulatory context. The policy monopoly only started to break down as groups successfully changed tobacco’s image using scientific evidence about health effects on users and bystanders along with information about the addictive quality of nicotine. This change in image was what helped open up new venues and ultimately led to a weakening of the classic tobacco subsystem. PE theory, then, is sort of a more sophisticated and specialized version of pluralism which asserts that public policy is a tug of war between coalitions trying to maintain a positive policy image of an issue that finds favor in friendly venues and opposing coalitions who try to change the policy image to make it less favorable and try to break down the monopoly by using the new policy image to open new venues for the issue to be considered. Of course, the power implications of elite theory fit into this tug-of-war tale as well. A fourth and much more recent public policy process theory has also dealt with the centrality of politics. The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) owes great allegiance to both the ACF and PE. Like the ACF, the NPF uses traditional social science techniques and hypothesis testing to study the political nature of public policy. Yet the NPF uses these traditional social science techniques to measure a policy world that the framework argues is largely socially constructed. Indeed, as we have argued since the late 1990s, as suggested earlier in this book, and as we will elaborate on later in this chapter, public problems are socially constructed: We decide whether or not there is a problem, whether or not it is a public problem, and whether or not something can be done about it. The NPF is also premised on one of the same assumptions that inform this book, the idea of “narrative cognition” or the view that humans make sense of the world through narratives or stories. Policy narratives are one major strategy used by groups to attempt to impact public policy. The NPF consists of studies of public policy at the macro (community), meso (group), and micro (individual) levels. Most of the published empirical work has occurred in the NPF at the meso and micro-level. The model of the NPF begins with the ACF’s emphasis on competing coalitions. Groups then use policy narratives to argue for or against a public policy. A group’s policy narratives consist of both policy beliefs (which the NPF measures by examining their narratives) and narrative strategies (strategies aimed at shaping the scope of the policy conflict). According to the NPF’s model, these policy narratives then influence individual opinion about the policy issue at the micro-level. The NPF has been used to show how policy narratives are measures of intracoalitional behavior (Shanahan et al., 2013) and how policy narratives either expand

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(attempting to bring other groups and individuals into an issue) or contain policy issues, depending on whether a group perceives themselves as winning or losing on an issue (McBeth et al., 2007). The NPF, which also has significant connections to PE, provides a framework that can help explain how policy images are either sustained or change over time. Clemons, McBeth and Kusko (2012b), for example, in a micro-level study showed that individual conceptions or images of obesity are overwhelmingly dominated by a strict father narrative (based on Lakoff, 2010 work on parenting metaphors and public policy) and argued that policy change in regard to obesity was unlikely without change in the image of obesity as a personal problem not really in the proper purview of government. Likewise, at the meso-level, McBeth et al. (2013) demonstrated that the narratives in the media coverage of obesity did not signify that a large-scale punctuation in obesity policy was imminent. While the authors found that pro-regulation groups were telling their stories in newspaper articles, the narratives in these newspapers still attributed individual causes for obesity, provided individual solutions, and were unsuccessful in coupling obesity to larger social and political problems. Another very political theory of the policy process is Schneider and Ingram’s (1993, 2005) “Social Construction of Target Populations” theory. At the heart of their theory is the notion that society can either socially construct individuals or groups as deserving (and entitled to favorable policy) or undeserving (and not entitled to favorable policy but likely to be subject to governmental sanctions or penalties). Individuals and groups with high power plus a positive construction are termed “Advantaged” target populations, as they are viewed as deserving of favorable public policy. Similarly, “Contenders” have high political power but are negatively constructed and are viewed as unworthy of favorable public policy (think of big corporations as constructed by liberals or unions as constructed by conservatives). A third construction is that of “Dependents,” populations or groups who have little political power but are socially constructed in a positive sense and thus are viewed as deserving of favorable public policy. We think of those in this category as innocent victims. For example, refugees (particularly children) are viewed as innocent victims by liberals and thus, are deserving of favorable public policy. Finally, “Deviants” have low political power and are constructed in a negative manner. Some conservatives construct undocumented immigrants as deviants not, therefore, deserving of favorable public policies and instead they are viewed as appropriate targets for sanctioned punishment and penalties (see Schneider and Ingram, 2005, p. 17 for more examples). You can use the case of opioids (see our case in this chapter). There are those who argue that even though African-Americans are no more likely to abuse drugs than any other race, they are too often constructed as deviants, and not only are they denied positive public policy (like treatment options) but they are also the target of sanctions (prison sentences). This was certainly the case with the crack-cocaine issue in the 1980s and 1990s where African-Americans were sentenced to prison terms for small amounts of cocaine (compared to White-Americans who were in possession of larger amounts of cocaine that was not crack-cocaine. Today, in the United States, a significant number of prescription opioid users are white (and prescription drugs are not illegal), we are more likely to view the users as victims (Dependents) and worthy of favorable public policy like drug treatment. Heroin users today are also viewed more favorably (as Dependents or victims) and worthy of treatment (partially because powerful Contenders such as large pharmaceutical firms might have initially played a role in hooking them on prescription opioids). Also, it seems that most people in the U.S. today personally know someone who has died or has suffered significantly from the opioid epidemic, and that sort of knowledge powerfully changes people’s construction of a problem. The NPF, like the ACF, PE, Multiple Streams, and Social Construction, asserts at its core that public policy is a political struggle between groups with differing beliefs and goals. Its focus on the

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power of stories and language—a topic we will more fully develop shortly—is also a major focus that sets the NPF apart. Regardless of their differing foci and terminologies, all these theories offer insight and they offer support for the same conclusion: Politics is both a strong determining and explanatory force in public policy. In addition to introducing you to these theories about the nature of how the policy process plays out, the fundamental shape and essence of the policy process needs to be explained. The policy process is perhaps best understood by breaking it down into the component parts that occur within the political system, utilizing the policy cycle model. As formulated by Jones (1984), Dye (2008), Anderson (2006), and others, this model posits four to six distinct but interrelated phases. The phases are as follows: • • • •

problem identification/gaining agenda status; policy formulation and adoption (including funding); policy implementation; policy evaluation/adjustment/termination.

“This process is not a sequential, orderly set of stages. It is sometimes defined as being cyclical in nature yet even this definition misses its complexity” (Lewis, 1997, p. 1). Note its close parallel to the five-step model you were briefly introduced to previously, and will soon (Chapter 6) be more fully introduced to. Shortly we will discuss the component parts of the policy process model. As you read about each, note how politics is a constant element. To paraphrase Mao Zedong, politics is the water that the policy process swims in. Before we move on, though, we need to pause and take a look both backward and forward and discuss the role of individuals in policy analysis. Chapters 1 to 4 have discussed how the values of analysts, including their views of power, affect analysis. You read about the role of values in implementation and how Governor Whitman’s beliefs affected the opportunity to reduce the spread of AIDS in New Jersey. We pointed out the importance of the values of key stakeholders and also that the talents of those using political means could be the difference between whether or not something becomes policy. The role of competing narratives, subject problem definition, and values show that attitudes about topics such as climate change and GMOs are not just about science or rationality. On a related note, the idea that policymakers use fuzzy analogies and rely on their stereotyped suppositions rather than being totally rational was discussed. Yet we also saw the difference a single analyst using the rational method could make in the “Portersville” health clinic case and offered a defense of Big Data’s use. Chapter 3 dealt with (among other things) cost-benefit analysis and that despite its rational appearance, politics is everywhere in its application. Chapter 4’s discussion of predispositions and the role of values and beliefs in determining policy preferences and evaluating risk relative to topics ranging from vaping to GMOs and vaccination furthered that point. Moreover, Chapter 4 established the clear importance of the “who” making decisions. The fact that some decision makers flee from their cognitive dissonance and that some are more prone to be wooden-headed or intuitive seems equally clear. Additionally, we found that individuals select science that helps them fit within their cultural group. The effect of inadvertent and unconscious bias on research was obvious. And we saw that the presentation of information, as well as the operationalizing of what is to be measured and the interpretation of the results, is not something that can be ignored. It obviously matters who makes judgment calls—including judges in the legal process. The political skills and willingness to play politics also matters, as it famously did when President Jimmy Carter failed to sell the U.S. public on his very rational public policy proposals on energy because he thought presenting the facts alone was sufficient to show it was the right thing to do, and that salesmanship and deal-making were not necessary (and they were personally loathsome to him). In fact, the questions of what a public problem is, and of what means to use when we agree

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on the ends (as exemplified in the chocolate cake story), both point us back to the values, and even personalities, of decision makers. Box 5.1 provides the story of Malala Yousafzai as someone whose leadership skills has made a difference in the lives of many.

Box 5.1  Making a Difference: Malala Yousafzai

O

ne reason why a political approach to analysis is helpful, is that it recognizes the importance of individuals. Many people have heard the story about a day in the fall of 2012, when a masked gunman in Pakistan, following up on a Taliban threat, got on a school bus, and asked “Who is Malala?” before shooting Malala, a young Pashtun girl, in the head. Because of that shot, and because of her survival, courage, and continued efforts to both tell her story and make education a right for all girls around the globe, today many people could answer his question. We know the names of many people who have made a difference, because they made that difference on an international or national stage. A book featuring many of these people’s stories, including the voices of the likes of Desmond Tutu, Maya Angelou, Vaclav Havel, John Lewis, and Arundhati Roy, is Paul Loeb’s book, The Impossible Will Take A Little While (www.paulloeb.org/ take-awhile/). Other people have similar stories, but are only known in their communities, and often times they are not even well known there. One of the media spotlights on people making a difference is CNN’s Heroes awards, which is, as they say, about ordinary people whose extraordinary contributions are inspiring. But this box is going to briefly focus on Malala’s story. In 2014, Malala became the youngest person to have won a Nobel Peace Prize. She humbly, and partially correctly says that she tells her “story not because it is unique, but because it is the story of many girls.” The story of her desire to overcome the odds and get an education, and even— sadly—the violent attack on her for pursuing and speaking out for that basic human right, is indeed a common story. As Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn make clear in their moving book, Half the Sky, in much of the world there is so much misogynist oppression and abuse that terrorism could be defined as being born female. With the support of her father, who founded the school she attended in the Swat Valley, Malala’s only sin had been speaking out publicly (including blogging for the BBC) against the Taliban’s policy of denying education to girls, and her defying them by attending school. Malala gained notoriety and support and was nominated in 2011 for the International Children’s Peace Prize. But that also made her more of a target, and the Taliban’s threat was not an idle one. Her recovery and physical rehabilitation, in England, took months and required multiple surgeries. Her response to what happened to her was to create the Malala Fund to support the goal of letting every girl pursue the opportunities (such as 12 years of free education and no child marriage) to have the future they want. Just nine months after the attack, on her 16th birthday, she appeared at the United Nations and spoke out, saying that: [n]othing changed in my life except this: weakness, fear and hopelessness died. Strength, power and courage were born … The extremists were, and they are, afraid of books and pens. The power of education frightens them. They are afraid of women. Let us pick up our books and pens. They are our most powerful weapons.

She also wrote a bestselling book, I am Malala. Then, on her 18th birthday, she posted this comment on her fund’s website: The shocking truth is that world leaders have the money to fully fund primary AND secondary education around the world—but they are choosing to spend it on other things, like their military

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budgets. In fact, if the whole world stopped spending money on the military for just 8 days, we could have the $39 billion still needed to provide 12 years of free, quality education to every child on the planet.

In 2018 she also began studies (in philosophy, politics, and economics) at Oxford. One person, a young girl in rural Pakistan, took a stand. Without the power of money, missiles, or government, she became an example of the power of one. One person, in or out of government can make a difference, can influence policy. It happens every day across this blue-green orb we call Earth. We don’t know exactly what the future will bring to Malala, but it is obvious what she is bringing to the future. Sources: Kristof, Nicholas D. and WuDunn, Sheryl, 2009. Half the Sky: Turning Oppression Into Opportunity for Women Worldwide. New York: Vintage Books. Loeb, Paul Rogat. 2014. The Impossible Will Take a Little While. Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: Basic Books www.malala.org Malala Yousafzai Biography. 2014. https://www.biography.com/activist/malala-yousafzai (accessed July 10, 2019).

Many of the issues discussed so far in this chapter will reappear in this chapter and in the chapters to come. For example, in Chapter 6 the normative views of the analyst regarding power, democracy, who they work for, and what their job really is, are key concerns. We return to the issue of value conflict in terms of problem definition and criteria establishment. You will see your values playing out as you work on a case study involving, of all things, bison. For the sake of brevity, we will just say that Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will also revisit many related concerns. Before you read about the policy process model, we present “Biography and Policy Analysis” in Box 5.2. This short examination of the importance of individuals in the policy process, also introduces you to three different ways to approach international relations analysis—a global systems approach (at the macro-level), state-level analysis, otherwise known as the power approach (at the meso-level), and the decision-making approach (at the micro-level).

Box 5.2  Biography and Policy Analysis

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magine that the year is 1939. It is May, and despite the Munich Pact, Hitler has invaded Czechoslovakia. Germany and Russia have not yet signed their secret nonaggression pact that allowed Hitler to invade Poland in September without worrying about fighting a two-front war. You are the top national security policy advisor to the government of a definitely not quite great power located in the southern part of Central Europe. The prime minister wants you to forecast the storyline and outcome of the war that is rapidly evolving into World War II. Will your analysis be shaped by the excellent psychological profiles you have in your possession of both Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin? Will the fact that Neville Chamberlain is still prime minister of England, rather than Winston Churchill, affect your predictions? Will the fact that Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) is president rather than Herbert Hoover or Calvin Coolidge affect your analysis? We suspect that the answer is yes, yes, and yes. This is important. Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. A major part of decision making in the realm of international relations hinges on trying to predict how other countries will behave. Your country’s future, and the lives of your fellow citizens, may depend on your approach to predicting that behavior. Two very important lessons you can try to remember are that, first, international relations, as the legendary realist Hans Morgenthau (2006, p. 22) taught us, are complex. Here’s a

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quote: “The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible.” (That’s not a bad lesson for most politics.) The second lesson is that, as hinted at moments ago but in the opposite direction, virtually everything you’re learning from this text and your class, is as equally applicable in the foreign affairs arena as in domestic affairs. In the field of international relations, analysis is commonly done on three separate levels, which, in turn, lead to very different approaches and often very different findings. Your orientation, the questions you ask, and where you look all affect the answers you get. One level of analysis focuses on the nature of the international system (the environment countries operate in—factors external to countries), change, and patterns of interaction. Thus, you would focus on the following: 1. who the actors are (e.g. countries, the United Nations, NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the African Union, the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Red Cross, Islam, Zionism, the Taliban, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation); 2. change in the number of power poles. (How many key players are there? Is it a bipolar world with two superpowers? A tripolar or unipolar world? A multipolar world?); 3. patterns of distribution of power assets (military strength, industrial capacity, natural resources, population, food production, financial resources, technological capabilities, leadership roles in key international institutions, etc.); 4. behavioral patterns (e.g., arms races, rigid [or fluid] alliances, extensive cultural exchange, leadership summits).

In sum, system-level analysis suggests that countries’ policies and their relations will be shaped by the structure and rules of the international system. A historical example of this view dominating is that during the era of the Vietnam war, the Cold War was in full swing and it tended to produce an East-West and zero-sum focus that led the U.S. to make mistakes by not fully seeing Vietnam as a country and people, striving for independence. Another level of analysis focuses on the nature of the state and on power. The idea here is that states (i.e., countries—like Germany, China, Japan, Russia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States) are the key actors (it is state-centric) and that they are relatively autonomous. State-level analysis (like geopolitics) tends to view states as logical actors focused on power, resources, and the amoral pursuit of their own national interest—almost as if states themselves decided. A central idea is recognition that all countries have national interests that vary in intensity. Core interests are primarily seen as power and survival, and possibly the wellbeing of your citizenry. But countries also have secondary and peripheral interests. It is important to remember that other countries have interests, some that they may be willing to risk death and destruction for, even if that doesn’t seem rational or logical to others. One related key to state behavior that has been extensively written about is the nature of the government of the various countries. In other words, state behavior and relations are believed to be strongly dependent on whether the form of government is democracy, theocracy, right-wing dictatorship, or left-wing dictatorship. This is key if, as it has been suggested, democracies do not fight wars with other democracies, you cannot appease dictators, totalitarian states are fundamentally different than mere dictatorships, and so forth. Thus, state-level analysis concentrates on the size, power, and interests of countries and predicts they will pursue what they believe to be in the national interest. This approach is also often called the power approach, because a central assumption is that all states seek to preserve or increase their power so that they can pursue their own interests. If true, state behavior becomes largely predictable. But, is that true? Who decides what those interests are? (continued)

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The third level of analysis, and the one most relevant to our current discussion, focuses on decision making at the level of the individual. In short, it says that Germany and Japan, Nigeria and North Korea, Iran and Brazil do not decide: people decide. One given accepted is that perception is a central tenet to consider, and perceptions matter at least as much as reality. The decision-making approach can also focus on process. There are three basic approaches that can be subsumed under the rubric of an individual-level approach. We will very briefly touch on two, and then focus on the third. The first general approach should sound very familiar. It can be called the humans in organizations approach. Within this category, scholars and other analysts consider the impact of group behavior factors and roles, and the focus is on the process by which policy is made rather than personality per se. Consideration is given to concepts like SOPs (standard operating procedures), groupthink, bargaining, Miles’s Law (the stand-sit principle), and so forth. Four policy models that one might consider here include: the Rational Actor Model (so, it is all about costs versus benefits); the Bounded Rationality Model (Herbert Simon’s classic idea that we don’t maximize, we satisfice, due to the fact that it is our perception of the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world); the Bureaucratic Process Model (policy debates, like decisions of where to go eat dinner, are not necessarily determined by logic and facts, but by the abilities of the various actors/bargainers to persuade); the Incremental Policy Model (Charles Lindblom’s famous article, The Science of Muddling Through, reveals as much about most of National Security policy as it does about budgeting); The second general approach within the decision-making camp can be labeled the nature of humankind approach. Herein, two sub-approaches dominate—one focused on psychological factors and the other on biological factors—but neither looks at individuals as individuals. In other words, sociobiology suggests (arguably without enough concrete evidence) that humans are genetically predisposed to favor those who are more genetically similar to themselves and that territoriality is also a genetic factor predominant in humans. And this approach believes that human behavior can be predicted based on common psychological traits (e.g., frustrationaggression theory). The third approach, key for our current purpose, is an approach that focuses on humans as individuals. Stated simply, the idea is that because decision makers’ childhood experiences, the tactics used in their first adult success, their ideology, their ego and ambition, and even their habits, suspicions, and physical health will shape their choices, you must study the decision makers to predict accurately. For example, Lasswell (1958) wrote about how private motives (such as hatred of the father) are displaced onto public agendas. George (1980) (drawing upon Lasswell’s work on leadership, 1960) details Woodrow Wilson’s drive to power and style of leadership seemingly derived from his feelings of inadequacy relating to his father’s abusive behavior. James David Barber’s (1985) classic study of presidential character separated presidents according to a typology based on an active or passive approach to their job and the affect toward their job—either negative or positive. Recently, psychobiographies (sometimes psychobabble) of presidential candidates appear long before they are elected. But none of this is new. One of the oldest clichés about war is the very sound advice the United States failed to heed in Vietnam: You need to know your enemy. Moreover, in the world of practitioners, it has never become passé (the CIA certainly continues to do research on leaders of other countries), and after a new president is elected in the United States, countries around the world are trying to figure out how that change will impact them. It matters who leads Russia, who is the prime minister of India, and which strongman leader was overthrown by a military coup and no longer in charge.

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Despite being a very old insight, the importance of biography finds a role in the political world influenced by postpositivist analysis that it could not find under a strict positivist approach. Perhaps that is one of the key advantages of a mixed-methodology trained analyst. Sources: Barber, James David. 1985. Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. George, Alexander. 1968, “Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders,” Journal of Social Issues, 24(3), July. Lasswell, Harold. 1960. Psychopathology and Politics. New York: Viking. Morgenthau, Hans J. 2006. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton. 7th edition.

Problem Identification/Gaining Agenda Status Public policies result after there is a subjective determination that an issue is a public problem. Or, as Fuller and Myers put it (1941; see Chapter 1), the beginning stage is becoming aware of what is perceived as a problem. The work of Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Lester and Stewart, 1996, pp. 61–62) strives to explain why some issues never reach agenda status, while others succeed. Issues can succeed by meeting certain necessary criteria. If an issue has “reached crisis proportions and can no longer be ignored,” it will be addressed. If the issue has “achieved particularity, that is, it exemplifies and dramatizes a larger issue,” it will gain agenda status. Having “an emotive aspect, or receiving media attention because of a human interest angle” helps an issue gain attention. If the issue is seen as having a “wide impact,” then it will make it onto the agenda. If the issue raises fundamental “questions about power and legitimacy in society,” it will receive attention. Finally, if the issue is viewed as “fashionable,” it will work its way onto the agenda. If a problem is identified and defined in ways that enable it to meet the previously discussed criteria, it will succeed in getting the government to consider acting to respond to the problem. That is what agenda setting is. “Defining the problems of society, and suggesting alternative solutions, is the most important stage of the policymaking process” (Dye, 1984, p. 325). In order to define a problem and give evidence to a problem, thus meeting the [previously described] criteria, Deborah Stone, in Policy Paradox and Political Reason, presents the subjective nature of the different types of language she claims are used in framing the policy problem. The languages are not objective but are a means to present a version of reality as the framers wish to portray it. (Lewis, 1997, p. 1)

Framing refers herein, not to the founding fathers, or to a more narrow, technical definition of framing, but simply to players in the policy arena who tell their story in a way that frames the issue in a way that fits with their worldview and interests. For example, Stone (2002) points out that a strategic definition can provide the means to manipulate “the scope of a conflict” by determining who is, and is not, affected (p. 155). Further, she nicely sums up this issue by arguing that all problem definitions are ripe with politics and “political maneuvering” (p. 156). Is health care a right, or something people must earn? Who is responsible for the safety of people migrating from their home country due to war, famine, or persecution? Should it be called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf? Is Social Security a welfare program or money we put away and own? Is a new park entrance fee a tax or a user fee that will keep taxes down? Are you prochoice or pro-abortion? Anti-choice or pro-life? Was the U.S. military’s takeover in Iraq an illegal invasion, or a mission of justified self-defense? Was the increase in the number of troops in 2007 an “escalation” or a “surge”? Is the issue gun control or gun safety? The words we use to define and describe are indeed both political and powerful. As explained in Chapter 1, political stories have a point. Far from being innocent, accidental, innocuous,

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or unbiased, political combatants fight with and over words, and tell political stories that are ­value-laden and potentially powerful attempts to realize a particular outcome. As Laura Lewis explains: The languages used include symbols, numbers, causes, interests, and decisions. Language is used to convey the disparity between the abstract, multi-meaning social goals such as liberty, justice, equity, efficiency, and security, and the current situation … Added to the types of languages presented by Stone is the language of words. Words are used to tell powerful causal stories that elicit emotive responses and result in action. These causal stories portray a scenario of heroes and villains, good and evil. They provide a version of what is causing the problem and how it can be resolved. The reader should pay attention in the case studies to the many languages used and the intention of the languages. (Lewis, 1997, p. 1)

Additionally, words have emotional content and studies have found that language that combines morality and emotion is the most powerful (Brady et al. 2017) and were likely to go viral on social media. They call this power, a “moral contagion.” For example, the conservative tweet, “America needs to arm itself. Stand and fight for your Second Amendment” (p. 5) was highly retweeted by conservatives. Whereas liberals had high retweets with, “Thanks to greed, the republication leadership & the #NRA—no one is safe” (p. 5). In the first tweet, the words “fight” and “war” are emotional-moral language with the words “greed” and “safe” filling that role in the second tweet. The key point is that emotion plays an important role in the diffusion of moral ideas. One example of the power of words relates to the idea of ambiguity. Because government action requires coalitions and consensus, ambiguity can help pull a coalition together (Stone, 2002, pp. 157–162). Many political terms (e.g., nationalism, socialist, or liberty), like most political campaign policy positions (e.g., address climate change, support for a two-state solution, or educational reform) are so vague, ambiguous, and subject to interpretation as to be almost meaningless without more details. President Bill Clinton’s popular call in the 1990s to “end welfare as we know it” is a great example of an ambiguity that could mean almost anything people wanted it to mean. Some liberals interpreted it to mean the United States would finally make available the funds necessary to provide adequate child care, transportation, education and training, and continued help after getting a job—thereby helping people who do want to work. On the other hand, some conservatives interpreted it to mean that government would finally end the costly federal program of handouts which led to dependency and fraud without requiring able-bodied citizens to work, and failed to empower states and local jurisdictions to deal creatively with their problems. This ambiguous campaign slogan helped create the collective action necessary for what proved to be dramatic change. It became the rallying cry that led to the passage of the legislation that replaced AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) with TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and its work requirements, time limits, block grants to the states, and some increases in the support services available during and after the time period of cash assistance. Another example of the use of ambiguity was when in 2015 a candidate running for judge in Pennsylvania ran ads that cleverly argued that a vote for him would bring balance to the court—though those ads never explained what was out of balance, or what it was about him that would create balance. After voting for Brexit, the people of the UK discovered there were significant differences between the consequences promised and possible. The political use of language, the portrayal of heroes and villains, and the power of ambiguity are not new. Joseph J. Ellis (1996/1998), author of American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson, explains Jefferson’s well-documented appeal across the political spectrum by describing his genius as being able to “articulate irreconcilable human urges at a sufficiently abstract level to mask their mutual exclusiveness … The Jefferson magic works because we permit it to function at

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Figure 5.2  Agenda Setting Issue Definition

Initiator

Issue Creation Trigger Device

Symbol Utilization

Issue Dimension Mass Media Emphasis

Expansion to a Larger Public

Systemic Agenda

Patterns of Access

Institutional Agenda

Action or Allocation

Stage III

Stage I Stage II

a rarefied region where real-life choices do not have to be made” (p. 11). Ellis also points to Jefferson’s writings prior to the Declaration as having been important primarily for having provided “a story line that brought all American colonists together as innocent victims” (p. 47). Jefferson even wrote a personal history of the United States that cast the Federalists as traitors and corrupt conspirators, himself as innocent, and the revered Washington as being on his side (pp. 304–306). (Further coverage of story analysis is provided in the online Teaching Appendix, available to your professor.) Lewis (1997), evoking Deborah Stone again, wrote, “Stone views problem definition, and subsequently gaining agenda status, as a matter of strategic representation of situations since there are no objective descriptions of a situation” (p. 1). In her own words, Stone (1988) put it this way: “Problem definition is strategic because groups, individuals, and government agencies deliberately and consciously design portrayals so as to promote their favored course of action” (p. 106). In sum, people not only fight over ideas, they fight with them—and words are their primary weapon. The single best work on agenda setting continues to be the Cobb and Elder classic, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (1972). Figure 5.2 graphically walks you through the three-stage model that the following paragraphs briefly describe. Stage I witnesses a policy initiator (an individual or group), possibly interacting with a focusing event or trigger device (which can also have an effect independent of a policy initiator), to help “create” an issue. Rachel Carson, author of Silent Spring (1962), epitomizes the ability of a single individual to be an initiator. Her book, like a disaster at a mine, a plane crash, a picture of a dead immigrant child washing ashore in Europe or lying in shallow river water on the U.S.-Mexico border next to her also drowned father, or—too literally—a shooting at a school, is an example of a trigger device. She told such a powerful story, in such readable words and evocative images, that an issue was born. Issue creation is the outcome of Stage I. Stage II involves battles over issue definition and symbol utilization (both of which determine the perceived issue dimension or scope). School shootings by children often not even old enough to drive are frightening tragedies. But what exactly is the issue? Is the problem a permissive society? Is it simply bad individuals? Is it access to guns? Is it the lack of security at schools? Is it the absence of the Ten Commandments on the school walls? Is it the violence endemic to and often celebrated in music, movies, and television? (Chapter 7 will home-in exactly on this debate.) In the United States, debating a right to gay marriage proved less effective than debating a right to marriage equality, and opponents of allowing this right fought (and fight) to define the issue as one of religious freedom (for those opposed to marriage equality). The portrayed scope of the issue and the effectiveness of the competing campaigns to utilize symbols both affect the amount of emphasis the issue receives in the mass media and the emphasis of the coverage. Issue dimension, symbol utilization, and the mass media emphasis determine the expansion, or not, of the issue to a larger public. Civil rights hero and labor leader Cesar Chavez was successful in expanding the dimensions of how migrant workers in an isolated valley in California were being treated. Part of his success

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came from the choice of an eagle as the symbol for his organization and the boycott of grapes, and part from his hunger strike and nonviolent marches, which were not only powerful symbols (tying this effort to Gandhi and the larger civil rights issue) but also helped attract the mass media and encouraged sympathetic coverage. If successful, Stage II ends with the issue arriving on the systemic agenda. In other words, society at large views the issue as important. In the past researchers used newspaper mentions of an issue to measure the systemic agenda. However, today, researchers are increasingly using Google Trends to measure the systemic agenda (Ripberger, 2011). According to Birkland (2005, p. 101), a focusing event is a “sudden event that can generate attention to public problems or issues.” These focusing events often create new phrases that describe problems in a succinct manner. For example, a tragic series of shootings at schools in the late 1990s led to the popularization of the term “school shootings”—a term that had not been part of American cultural discourse suddenly became an important political topic. Such events and the role that they play in creating terms such as “school shootings” play a crucial role in agenda setting. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have served as one of the most influential and contested focusing events in American history. Interestingly, most post–9/11 policy solutions that were implemented already preexisted that date as policy proposals (Birkland, 2004). In other words, policy entrepreneurs coupled preexisting “solutions” to the terrorist attack, and the attacks themselves shaped the public mood in such a way that preexisting policy proposals such as the information gathering allowed by the PATRIOT Act had much support. Birkland (2004), for example, contends that out of all of the policies either discussed or enacted after 9/11, only the securing of jet airliner cockpit doors was a genuine policy innovation. Mazzar (2007) sets forth evidence that the policy plan to invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein preceded 9/11 by many years; it just lacked political support. That is, a neocon policy community led by Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and others had developed Iraqi liberation plans way back in the 1990s, and the 9/11 tragedy provided the change in the public mood, and a vulnerability to be persuaded, that would lead to political support for a military effort to remove Saddam Hussein. In 2019, one of your authors (along with a chemistry professor and a public health professor) was on a panel focused on the crisis of, and understanding and responding to, the drug-resistant bacteria problem. For the record, it is a major problem. If you are unaware of that, you might want to do a Google Search of the topic, or visit the Center for Disease Control (CDC) site, or the World Health Organization’s site. Though not a sudden, obvious, dramatic situation, there is overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus that this problem requires governmental policy action. Yet, little has been done so far in response at the global, national, state, or local levels of government. After the panel made clear the magnitude of the problem and danger, it was time to discuss what was necessary politically for that to happen, and how likely that was. What the audience heard is discussed next. First, it is essential that health professionals understand that success does not depend upon ­primarily scientific facts, but on defining antibiotic resistance as a crisis; one with legal, cost-­ effective, culturally acceptable solutions. Who tells the story matters, and perhaps a story of calculating, obfuscating villains (and their innocent victims) who need to be reined in and even penalized, will eventually win out. But, some issues do not easily lend themselves to effectual narrative construction of a crisis, and this is unfortunately a good example of that. The only chance, other than waiting for a horrific crisis to unfold and act as a focusing event, is to construct a compelling, coherent, concrete morality story, comprised of villains, innocent individual relatable victims, and heroes; a story that belies complexity, and assigns causality. Also, solutions must be present (there’s an old and telling adage that a problem without a solution is not a problem) and a role for government imaginable (acceptable and possible). One of the challenges is the strong individualistic culture in the United States, and the fact that health care has been framed

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in strong individual terms and people feel it is their right to demand antibiotics when ill. But, to change the status quo policy, a narrative that contained a villain, who was not the individual or their doctor, but—for example—Big Pharma and politicians in bed with them leading government to not do its duty, and portraying the public as the victims would be more effective. So, while there are many academic and scientific studies detailing the problem of antibiotic resistance in the United States and around the world (e.g., by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization), it may be difficult to find a single, unifying focusing event capable of catapulting the issue to wide scale acceptance on policy agendas. Recall that focusing events do not normally objectively occur in the political system. Instead, policy entrepreneurs “socially construct” such issues. Research (e.g., Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007) has shown that individuals connect with identifiable individual victims better than with statistical aggregations. So, while there are not just imaginable, but actual troubling consequences of inaction, it is somewhat difficult to think of a realistic, dramatic, acute, hypothetical focusing event that would demand an immediate change in antibiotic resistance policy. Unfortunately, the audience was told, so far the arguments being made (and all the rational, scientific facts) suggest the status quo seems more likely to win the day than dramatic policy change. Change is almost always an uphill battle and the dedicated scientists, policy analysts, and public health professionals working to make a difference do not have an easy task especially when they must counter foes holding significant interests, connections, and large war chests, and/or well-­ established policy narratives and a political culture suggesting this is not an area where government should interfere. As you have seen, Kingdon, (1984/1995) suggests that policy change can occur when a policy entrepreneur connects (or “couples”) a solution to a problem in the political system in the hope that this problem has shaped the public mood to a point that there is political acceptability for the solution’s implementation. Box 5.3 explores how a single baseball player’s tragic death was used by an interest group to advance their cause.

Box 5.3  Baseball, a Tragic Tale, Focusing Events, and Multiple Streams

A

t age 16, Nick Adenhart of Baltimore, Maryland, was one of the top high school pitchers in the United States and was expected to be a Major League Baseball first round draft choice after high school graduation. But in 2004, while pitching in his final high school game, he tore a ligament in his elbow. This injury greatly harmed Adenhart’s estimated value according to Major League scouts. As a result, he ended up being drafted, by the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, in the sixteenth round of the Major League draft of 2004. Being drafted in the sixteenth round, rather than the first, not only hurts one’s pocketbook (first round signing bonuses run in the millions, and by the tenth round are down to amounts such as $5,000), but it also makes the climb to “the show” less likely and more arduous. Nick Adenhart had surgery on his elbow and did not pitch again until 2005 when he was assigned to the Angels’ Rookie League Team, the Orem Owlz (Utah). Adenhart worked his way through the Angels system with stops in Arizona, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Rancho Cucomonga, California, Little Rock, Arkansas, and Salt Lake City, Utah. Like any minor-leaguer hoping to make the big time, Adenhart had to endure long bus rides, hotels, and living away from home. But Adenhart persevered and by 2007 he was the second ranked prospect in the Angels organization and the 34th top prospect in baseball. In April 2008, while pitching for Triple A, Salt Lake City, Adenhart was called up to the Angels to make a start against the Oakland As. Overall, he made three starts in 2008 before being sent back down to the minor leagues and to Salt Lake City.

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Performing strongly during spring training in 2009, Adenhart made the Angels opening day roster and was penciled in as the team’s number three starter. On April 8, 2009, Adenhart started for the Angels at home against the Oakland As. In six innings, he gave up seven hits, three walks, struck out five batters, and gave up zero runs. With his father in attendance, Nick Adenhart had clearly shown his tremendous potential. He was praised by Angels manager Mike Scioscia and was mobbed by local media. After the game, Nick and three friends went out to celebrate. In Fullerton, California, just miles from the stadium, the car with the four friends was driving through a green light at an intersection when a driver in a minivan ran a red light and broadsided their car. The driver, Adenhart (in the passenger seat), and a passenger in the back seat were all killed. The fourth passenger survived but suffered traumatic injuries. The driver of the minivan was legally drunk and fled the scene. They were also driving with a suspended license because of past DUI charges. The driver was eventually arrested, tried, and sentenced to 51 years in prison for second-degree murder. What, might you ask, does this tragic tale have to do with public policy? Well, the answer is that at the time of the accident Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) was already pursuing legislation in the California Assembly that would make those convicted of drunk driving blow into a tube (which tests for alcohol content) to start their cars. This ignition interlock device would be mandatory (though only for six months) for drunk drivers in four California counties. MADD officials made a statement after Adenhart’s death: “Our hearts go out to all of the families and friends impacted by the alleged drunk driving crash that killed Los Angeles Angels pitcher Nick Adenhart” and “Any drunk driving death means a life-long sentence of grief for families and loved ones” (Laura Dean-Mooney, National President of MADD quoted in prnewswire.com, 2009). MADD then began a campaign where they used the drama of Adenhart’s tragic death to build momentum for the proposed ignition interlock law. MADD consistently referred to the driver that killed Adenhart and his two friends as an example of somebody who should have had to pass the ignition lock test before being able to start the minivan on the trip that eventually ended the lives of three young people. Arguably helped by this tragic tale, the California State Assembly eventually passed their law which went into effect a year later. Critics argued that the death of Adenhart and his friends and the law that passed have no rational connection. Matt Welch is a libertarian and the editor of Reason magazine (and an Angels fan). Welch believed that MADD was using the death of Adenhart to pursue a law that in reality would have had little impact on preventing deaths on that night in April 2009. Welch wrote of the then suspected drunk driver: 1) He was driving despite not having had a valid driver’s license since at least 2007, possibly 2006, due either to a May 2006 DUI conviction or a subsequent parole violation. 2) He was almost certainly still on parole for some crime or another (his 2007 rap sheet alone includes a marijuana conviction plus drunk and disorderly conduct). 3) He was driving despite having “almost three times” the legal blood alcohol level of .08. How much booze is that? Probably somewhere around 10 drinks. 4) According to cops, Gallo was driving well in excess of the speed limit, doing 50–65 miles per hour in a 35 mph zone. 5) Oh yeah, he also blew through a red light. 6) After he smashed two cars, obviously hurting multiple innocents, he ran away. So that’s at least six laws Gallo knowingly and brazenly flouted. Which begs the question: Why on earth would we suspect that somehow the seventh law would be the charm? (Welch, 2009)

Welch’s point was that the drunk driver had already violated six laws and thus, why would MADD think that the driver would obey the interlock ignition law? Welch also points out that even with the ignition interlock, the driver could have borrowed a car or had a friend blow into the tube.

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Questions to Consider 1. How does this case illustrate Kingdon’s Multiple Streams in action? Identify each of the three streams and the policy entrepreneurs. 2. How does the power of narrative play into this use of Multiple Streams? 3. What do you think of Welch’s criticisms of MADD? Do you agree with his criticisms? 4. Can you think of other policies that have been enacted that might have been (arguably) inappropriately tied to a focusing event? 5. Do you think ignition interlocks are an effective way to stop drunk drivers? Would such a lock have prevented the deaths of Nick Adenhart and his friends on that fateful night in April, 2009? Sources: Baseball Reference.com. 2015. www.baseball-reference.com/players/a/adenhni01.shtml (accessed September 12, 2015). “Death of Angels Adenhart by Suspected Repeat Drunk Driver Shows the Need for Ignition Interlocks.” 2009. April 10. Available online at www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/death-of-angels-adenhart-by-suspected-repeat-drunkdriver-shows-the-need-for-ignition-interlocks-61791977.html (accessed September 12, 2015). Singer, Tom. 2009. “Angels’ Adenhart Killed in Accident.” Available online at http://rn.mlb.com/news/ article/4179446/(accessed September 12, 2015). Welch, Matt. 2009. “MADD about Nick Adenhart.” Available online at http://6-4-2.blogspot.com/2009/04/mattwelch-on-nick-adenhart-as-madd.html (accessed September 12, 2015) www.ocregister.com/articles/gallo-264771-stewart-alcohol.html

Stage III reflects the fact that different patterns of access exist. As discussed in Chapter 1, power is not diffused evenly, and not all issues move from the systemic agenda to the institutional agenda where government action (in the form of an action or allocation) occurs. Even if an issue makes it onto the systemic agenda (recall Stage II), the issue might or might not make it to the institutional agenda (where government may or may not act on the issue). Climate change is certainly on the systemic agenda but beginning with the election of President Trump, climate change is not regularly on the institutional agenda of the federal government (though it is on the institutional agenda of a great many state and local governments, as well as other governments around the globe). Both Rachel Carson and Cesar Chavez were able to gain powerful governmental supporters who had access to the institutional agenda. Of course, that allocation or action may be merely symbolic, it may be minor, or it could even be counterproductive and exacerbate the problem. Silent Spring and its author altered our thoughts on the environment and the laws of the land. One example was the banning of the use of the pesticide DDT, a consequence of which was the recovery of the nation’s eagle population. Chavez’s greatest government victory may have been keeping the government from interfering effectively on the side of the growers. Remember, when the government does not act, that is also a policy.

Policy Formulation, Adoption, and Funding Policy formulation, but not necessarily policy adoption or adequate funding, occurs if an issue achieves agenda status. As Kingdon makes clear: [i]t is not enough that there is a problem, even quite a pressing problem … The subject with an “available alternative” is the one that rises on the agenda, crowding out equally worthy subjects that do not have a viable, worked-out proposal attached … The availability of a viable alternative is not a sufficient condition for a high position on a decision agenda … But the chances for a problem to rise on the governmental agenda increase if a solution is attached to the problem. (Kingdon, 1984/1995, pp. 142–143)

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Policy formulation involves analyzing policy goals and means, and the creation or identification of explicit alternative action recommendations to resolve, or at least ameliorate, the public problem identified. Remember, Fuller and Myers (1941) called this Stage II—policy determination. Although: [p]olicy is designed to remedy the problem and possibly prevent its reoccurrence, policy rarely solves a problem. (That is not to say that policy does not result in positive change.) The problem is continually redefined, new ideas emerge, competing interests battle for control, and unintended consequences result from the policy implemented. These factors and others lead to the formulation of new policy; thus policymaking is a never ending process. (Lewis, 1997, p. 2)

Policy formulation, as suggested earlier, typically proceeds incrementally, offering changes at the margins by narrowing and limiting the analytical task. As Stone argued, strategically crafted argument is used to convince others that a certain course of action should be pursued. Not all options are considered viable or given serious consideration. Due to the values of society, the need for legitimization of policy for and from majority approval, and the goals of the policymakers, only certain programs or policies will be considered. As Lewis notes: The importance of adequate funding to carry out policy may be obvious and yet it cannot be overstated. At the county level, as at the state level, unfunded mandates have presented policymakers and decision makers with difficult dilemmas. (Lewis, 1997, p. 2)

The reality is that there are always many very legitimate project and proposals, and multiple interests competing for pots of money too small to go around. This makes the funding process a contest, and every winner creates losers.

Policy Implementation Policy implementation refers to organizational activities directed toward the carrying out of an adopted policy by administrative bureaucracies at the national, state, and local levels. Administrators must make decisions about the allocation of the organization’s financial and human resources to effect the policy. As Lewis (1997, p 2) points out once a policy is formed and legitimized through legislation to solve a problem, it does not “ensure that action will be taken in an attempt to remedy or prevent the problem.” Lewis, (1997, p. 2), for example, pointed out that “governors who do not favor the National Voter Registration Act (commonly called the motor voter act) used a variety of strategies to hinder its implementation” (Lewis, 1997, p. 2). As Piven and Cloward (1996, pp. 39–42) point out, implementation can be hindered by elected officials or public administrators not “instructing eligibility workers to offer to register clients or telling them to do so only if they have time” or “not supplying the agencies with voter registration forms.” More contemporary examples where implementation might not occur is in such controversial issues as sex education, needle exchanges (see Chapter 1), and the Affordable Care Act (Obama Care). As Fuller and Myers (1941) indicated, value conflict does not end after a policy is chosen. There is often great discrepancy between the intentions of a policy and how it is carried out. This is in part due to how the policy is interpreted, the views and expertise of the administrators, and, of key importance, the funding that is actually appropriated (Lewis, 1997, p. 2). The administrative skills of the organizational leaders involved are another key factor, as are the attitudes of the lower-level bureaucrats toward the new policy. Political battles through, for example, the use of the media, word wars, definitional struggles, and court cases continue through this aspect of the policy process. Increasingly, the political nature of implementation has become a known reality. Whatever the wisdom of the goal of separating politics and administration, the dichotomy is dead.

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Policy Evaluation, Adjustment, Termination As the costs and benefits, the winners and losers, and the unintended and unforeseen consequences become clear, policy creates new demands and supports. The policy process is not only nonlinear, it is continuous, and feedback is inevitable—with or without formal assessment. Especially if policy is implemented without strong legitimization, and even if it possesses it, one common reaction to policy is political backlash that calls for adjustment. Theoretically, policy evaluation takes place as a means to discover the outcomes of the policy. (Did the policy bring about the intended results?) Realistically, as Charles O. Jones states, “policy evaluation tends to be program justification” (1984, p. 35). Just as there are no objective descriptions of a situation, nor are there purely objective descriptions of how well the policy is implemented or how well it met its objectives. Ideally, program evaluation also leads to policy change leading to program improvement. Though not the norm, policy evaluation does at times lead to policy termination. (Lewis, 1997, pp. 2–3)

So far we have discussed the political essence of the policy process and examined it as a whole. We then examined its component parts and discovered four distinct but interrelated phases of that process: problem identification/gaining agenda status, policy formulation and adoption (including funding), policy implementation, and policy evaluation/adjustment/termination. The mini-case that follows will revisit the issues of pluralism, group theory, and elitism as it illustrates the political, rather than rational, aspect of policy formation.

Mini-Case: The Pocatello Prison Siting Story: A Case of Politics

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hat is the best method of deciding where to put a new state prison? Many individuals, desiring rational policy, would argue that a new prison site should be located wherever the study of cost-benefit ratios suggests is most favorable. Perhaps proximity to the major population center of the state would be a major criterion. Or perhaps that would increase the cost of the land too much. A community with an available workforce trained in corrections and law enforcement would tip the scales of rationality. It might even be beneficial to build onto an existing prison rather than build an entirely new prison to reduce duplication of costs. For example, if you expanded an existing prison, you would still need only one warden. However, the process of siting a prison is less a rational process than a political one. Siting is based on state and local politics, coalition building, political compromise, partisan concerns, and political skill. This is not necessarily to argue that the political path is worse, nor that rationality plays no role. This is the real-life story of the siting of a prison in Idaho. As you read on, notice how rarely rational analysis is the story and how often the story is about political power plays. Early one year, the state of Idaho announced it would build a new women’s prison. The State Board of Corrections then announced that it would receive bids from Idaho communities. In Chapter 1, we discussed the fact that in the face of value conflict, government “authoritatively allocates values”—in other words, government decides who gets the goods. To some individuals, a prison may not seem like something a community would want. (continued)

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But to communities reeling from a nearly decade-long recession that had plagued many communities throughout Idaho, a prison is a source of stable (recession-proof) jobs. A new prison pumps additional money into a community’s economy through construction and maintenance and the buying of supplies, as well as by providing jobs. The city of Pocatello, Bannock County, had been hit extremely hard by the state’s economic downturn. Pocatello had lost hundreds of railroad jobs due to deregulation; a major regional trucking firm relocated to Salt Lake City, Utah; a major mining equipment corporation left town after the downturn in the mining industry; and deregulation also led to the loss of a major airline service. The retail sector was hit hard, and major grocery chains and department stores closed shop and left town. Pocatello’s population dropped from 46,000 to 40,000 in less than a decade. The locals repeated the not-very-funny joke told in other such distressed communities: “Will the last person leaving Pocatello please turn out the lights?” It was eagerly decided to put in a bid for the prison. The principles of pluralism and the very political nature of policy formation, discussed earlier in the text, are clearly illustrated in this tale. Pro-development interest groups in Pocatello (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce, the Real Estate Association, the Banker’s Association) all strongly supported the city’s bid for the prison. These groups all publicly announced their support and worked behind the scenes by writing letters of support to the State Board of Corrections and using political means to gain the support of Bannock County’s state elected officials and of the governor of Idaho. Early in the process, interest group support was strong because the prison offered concentrated benefits (to the community’s financial, construction, and real estate sectors) and diffused costs. The interest groups wove stories that portrayed the benefits as diffused through a multiplier/ripple effect in the economy that would benefit the community’s economy as a whole. In light of this persuasion, along with clear benefits and vague costs, and given the past economic downturn in Pocatello, citizen opposition to the project was virtually nonexistent. The pro-prison interest group support was highly visible, advancing its position, calling radio talk shows, and writing letters to the newspaper. The group gained strong support, indeed sponsorship, from the city’s elected officials. It developed a specific plan to bring the prison to Pocatello. The issue quickly found status on the policy agenda of the Pocatello City Council. They searched for available sites for the proposed prison. With strong interest group support and little, if any, opposition, the city announced that the proposed site for the new prison would be in north Pocatello/Chubbuck. (Chubbuck is a small bedroom community adjacent to Pocatello.) Called the Philbin Road site, this area was, at the time, largely agricultural, and there was plenty of room to build a new correctional facility. The Philbin Road site had one significant flaw, however. The site, located in the north Pocatello valley, was in a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “nonattainment” zone. The EPA designates air quality as either meeting minimum air quality standards (an attainment zone) or as not meeting these standards. Opposition arose quickly from outside the community as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) immediately threatened a lawsuit against Idaho if the Philbin Road site was selected. The threatened lawsuit’s basis was an assertion that forcing prisoners to live in an area with significant amounts of air pollution would violate the prisoner’s rights to a healthy quality of life. The state of Idaho, fearing that a lawsuit could delay the siting of the prison for years and increase costs significantly, removed Pocatello from the list of potential locations. The state had, in fact, apparently decided that the state capital of Boise would receive the siting of the prison. Boise, home of the men’s correctional facility, seemed a natural choice,

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having a highly trained and available correctional workforce. Boise and then-Mayor Dirk Kempthorne (R) were both considered success stories. While Pocatello was suffering, Boise grew tremendously. An economic success, it became a major regional city. Following the announcement that Boise would be the new prison site, and consistent with pluralism’s notion of an open system, the ACLU exited the political system because its interest had been satisfied. However, the pro-growth interest groups in Pocatello began their political maneuvering. Under pressure from the pro-prison interest groups, the state legislative coalition from Pocatello traveled to Boise to meet with Governor Cecil Andrus and to cash in a political IOU. A political IOU is what we described in the first chapter as a political trade. Cashing in a political IOU occurs when a group of elected officials, interest groups, or elites demand (and subsequently receive) a political favor in return for past political favors or allegiances. Governor Andrus, a Democrat in a significantly Republican state, always relied heavily on Pocatello for votes and support. The Democratic majority in Pocatello had been instrumental in Andrus’s very narrow gubernatorial victory over the Republican challenger David Leroy. The state legislative delegation had faithfully supported Andrus and had helped deliver votes. In fact, the governor’s political debts went back to his two victories the previous decade. The legislative delegation reminded Andrus of Pocatello’s role in his political victories and prodded the governor to reconsider Pocatello as a prison site. At this point, Boise Mayor Dirk Kempthorne announced that because Pocatello had been hit so hard by economic downturn, he would support the new prison being built there rather than in Boise. The mayor’s announcement shocked casual observers of politics, but astute students of Idaho’s politics knew that Kempthorne was gearing up for a race for an open U.S. Senate seat and that his generosity at this time primed him for support from Pocatello. Meanwhile, Governor Andrus, understanding the political necessity of trading and rewarding, agreed to put political pressure on the Idaho State Board of Corrections to “reconsider” Pocatello. Within a week the Board announced that Pocatello was back in the running for the prison. Remember that politics occurs at multiple levels. In other words, the pro-prison interest groups in Pocatello used politics on the state legislators, who, in turn, used politics on the governor, who, we must assume, used politics on the Board of Corrections. The city of Pocatello, not only back in the ballgame, but the apparent political winner, announced that a new location for the prison had been chosen. Virtually all that had to be accomplished was the “simple” implementation of building the new prison in Pocatello. Yet, as we shall see, politics does not stop at the implementation stage. The new site, Cusick Creek, was on Pocatello’s west mountain bench. Consistent with the principles of pluralism, group theory, and the politics of policy formation, an established interest group entered the political system, and one new interest group formed to enter the fray. The established interest group was the local chapter of the Sierra Club. This environmental interest group was resisting the siting of the prison in the Cusick Creek area because the location was in a federally protected watershed that was supposed to be protected from development. The prison violated the group’s interests, namely, protecting the local environment from damaging development. The Sierra Club mobilized political opposition to the new location and most notably used its political ties to the local congressional representative, U.S. House of Representatives member Richard Stallings (D-ID). Stallings, no longer in Congress, had been somewhat supportive of Idaho environmentalists. Because the new prison site would require congressional action to delist it as a federal watershed, the Sierra Club’s connection to Stallings was a strong political resource. (continued)

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The new interest group that formed was also opposed to the new site. Calling themselves “Citizens to Save the West Bench,” this group of local residents feared that the new prison would harm their quality of life and lower their property values. Many of these residents expressed safety concerns and concerns over noise, traffic, and light coming from the prison. This group stressed to the local media that while the prison might benefit the community as a whole, the costs were being dumped unfairly on the citizens in the neighborhood surrounding the new site. Fearing that the opposition might result in Pocatello once again losing the project, elected officials and pro-prison interest groups engaged in the very political art of compromise. This is also consistent with the principles of pluralism. First, to remove opposition from the local chapter of the Sierra Club, the city government and prison-backers agreed to zone the rest of Cusick Creek as a “nondevelopment zone” and to improve hiking trails in the area. The Sierra Club was willing to accept some loss of land in exchange for the assurance of future protection for the rest of the area. The Sierra Club even helped the city receive access to House member Stallings, and the city requested and received permission from the federal government to use the land. Second, to stop the opposition from the Citizens to Save the West Bench, the city of Pocatello agreed to move the prison location some 500 to 1,000 yards farther up the mountain and away from the neighborhood. Officials also gave assurances to the residents that the new prison would not be an eyesore (no big spotlights, no barbed wire, no tower guards). The neighborhood group, satisfied with the compromise and realizing that they were out of political resources, removed their objections. The path was now clear for the prison to be built in Pocatello and indeed it was. The prison was built and over time its mission expanded. Its impact on the local economy was sizable and arguably played a role in the recovery of Pocatello’s economy.

The mini-case illustrates the principles of pluralism, group theory, and elitism, as well as the political process of policy formation. Is this a good or bad process for government? The answer depends on your political values. Many would argue that the siting was simply the result of powerful elites looking out for their own best political interests. Certainly the mayor and the Pocatello City Council received considerable praise and support from local interest groups who wanted the prison. Certainly the governor benefited by maintaining his popularity and support in Pocatello and Boise. Mayor Kempthorne benefited by gaining support which translated into a successful run for the U.S. Senate, after which he ran successfully for governor, which also led to his appointment by President Bush and confirmation by the U.S. Senate, to the role of Secretary of the Interior. Therefore, some could argue that only these elites benefited from the prison siting in Pocatello, and maybe the rational location for the prison would have been Boise. There are, though, other interpretations. Economically hard-hit Pocatello benefited by having new employment and new state money pumped into its economy. The university in Pocatello benefited from new programs in corrections. The local neighbors were able to retain the quiet nature of their neighborhood, and the Sierra Club traded some development for a promise of no future development on the city’s west mountain bench. The political nature of policy formation does not necessarily produce bad policy, but the process is certainly messy and often untenable to those who do not like the give and take of politics. In addition to the theories of the policy process just discussed, the wealth of new knowledge about human cognition, human rationality, emotions, and beliefs is starting to filter into the public

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policy literature. For example, Campbell and Kay (2014) show that the solutions offered help determine whether an individual thinks climate change is a problem. In other words, they found that much of the disbelief in climate change can be attributed to individuals not liking the solutions that go along with the problem. For example, if a free market solution is offered, individuals who are more conservative are more likely to agree that climate change is a problem compared to those conservatives that are offered a regulatory solution. This finding helps us understand how individuals define problems and shows the nonrational element to such problem definition (if climate change is a problem then it is a problem regardless of the solution). Likewise, Oxley, Vedlitz, and Wood (2014) found that the perceived credibility of the information source was related to whether an individual believes climate change is a problem, and the perceived credibility of the source is dependent on the perceiver’s political ideology. Conservatives were more likely to believe that climate change was a problem if then President George W. Bush was making such a claim. Similarly, liberals were more likely to trust scientists, and a scientist’s opinion positively impacted their rating of climate change as a problem (though, we know that liberals do not always follow science, as indicated in Box 4.3). Finally, in “Priming Assad” Clemons, Peterson and Palmer (2016) created an original experiment to examine U.S. citizen evaluations of the Syrian crisis and Bashar al-Assad. Their study demonstrated that a subtle manipulation darkening Assad’s skin tone led respondents to view him more negatively and increased their support for U.S. intervention to effect regime change. That is, respondents primed with an image of Assad with darker skin were more likely to support aggressive policies than those who saw him with lighter skin. In the face of low public support for action against the Assad dictatorship, the authors had hypothesized that Assad’s appearance might be playing a role in limiting the mobilization of public support for intervention. His Westernized image diverged from those of recent previous U.S. foreign policy villains—such as Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi—even though his actions and their consequences were easily comparable with, or worse than, past military dictators in the region. That is, because Assad—with his modern haircut, business suit, and light skin—represented a divergence from the images of those leaders recently cast as enemies to the United States, they suspected it limited his susceptibility to being portrayed as a villain in foreign policy narratives. It is difficult to define him as the “other” when he looks like “us.” Sadly, but not unexpectedly, the prime had the expected effect in line with the research literature on racial priming and colorism (e.g., Banks, 2009; Hochschild, 2006; Hunter, 1998; Maddox and Gray, 2002; Viglione, Hannon and Defina, 2011) and on the impact of priming on shaping public opinion on issues (Bargh, 1999; Druckman, 2004; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990). (It is a well-established fact that white men are sentenced to shorter prison terms than black men sentenced for similar crimes. Colorism is the well-established fact that more “stereotypically black” facial features and skin tone affect sentencing, including a correlation with those sentenced to death.) Respondents in their experiment all read the same faux but factual news story describing the danger Assad posed and the harm he had caused. The only change was the altering of his skin tone in his official photo, yet this subtle treatment was enough to prime individuals and alter opinion (Clemons, Peterson and Palmer, 2016). Substantively, the results were modest shifts in opinion, though statistically significant. The fact is that his appearance seemed to impact public opinion. Luckily, making people aware of their vulnerability to such primes and the biases of colorism can have the effect of making them less vulnerable (this is when the slow part of our brain has time, and the wherewithal, to overrule the fast part of our brain). In fact, merely learning about such susceptibility can mitigate the effect. We may not be rational, but we are capable of thinking critically and learning.

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Increasingly, public policy theory is recognizing the nonrational nature of public policymaking. A better understanding of how the brain actually works is leading scholars to better explanations of policy phenomena.

Concluding Thoughts It is our conclusion that the essence of the policy process is much more political than it is rational. Note that the claim is absolutely not that rationality and positivist methods have no role to play. This chapter introduced you to the policy process model and its components. When it is seen as a continuation of Chapter 4, debating the role of rational methods in the policy process, you have been thoroughly exposed to an alternative way to envision and explain how policy analysis and policymaking occurs. Before moving to the case study, pause again and consider the three criteria for evaluating models presented in Chapter 2. Relate them to both the rational and nonrational policy models. What do you think now? How does the policy process work? Can analysts normally ignore politics and succeed? The case below, focusing on the tragedy of opioid abuse and opioid overdose deaths, will allow you to apply many of the concepts and tools from not only this chapter, but some previous ones. We will also make sure you have two simple public policy research skills: how to do a Google Trends search, and how to research congressional action on a policy issue. [Exercise #9, “The Expansion of Human Services in Allegheny County, 1968–95” (Section I) is available in the online faculty Teaching Appendix. Section II of the case is available in Part II (#9).]

Glossary Terms groupthink (p.148)

policy primeval soup (p.140)

political IOU (p.159)

Case Study: “Opioids and The Political Model of Policy Analysis” The Problem According to the National Institute of Health (NIH), opioids include “the illegal drug heroin, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and pain relievers available legally by prescription, such as oxycodone (OxyContin®), hydrocodone (Vicodin®), codeine, morphine, and many others” (NIH, 2019a). Opioids abuse burst on the scene with alarming statistics beginning after the drug OxyContin® became available in the mid-1990s; this first wave of increasing opioid overdose deaths was followed by a second wave that began in 2010 fueled by a flood of heroin, and then a third wave hit in 2013 driven by synthetic opioids, particularly illicit fentanyl (CDC, 2018a). Opioid deaths are increasing and they are particularly high in states such as West Virginia (the state with the highest death rate of 49.6 overdose deaths per 100,000 person), Ohio, New Hampshire, and Maryland (NIH, 2019b). Drug overdoses (including non-opioid drugs) are now the leading cause of death in the United States for individuals less than 50

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years old (Kaplan, 2017). By 2017, just since 1999, over 700,000 people had died from drug overdoses, with over two-thirds of those involving an opioid, and the number of deaths in 2017 was six times the number in 1999. According to the CDC, on any given day, 130 people in the United States die, on average (CDC, 2018a). The number of deaths in the U.S. from an opioid overdose in 2017 totaled 47,600 (CDC 2018b).). Driven both by these dramatic statistics that have touched so many families, along with the deaths of musical superstars Prince and Tom Petty at the hands of prescription opioids, concerns over opioids are being debated in both the systemic and institutional agendas, as well as around the dinner table, in bars, and online. Not surprisingly, those addicted and dying, tend to be those in society who are the most vulnerable, those who have experienced trauma, and those most isolated from their communities and lacking in connection with others. Veterans, youth, people in struggling rural areas, homeless, and the urban poor— but the opioid crisis also has impacted the wealthy, suburbanites, and people of all ages, including rapper Mac Miller. Probably most people reading this case will, sadly, know someone struggling with this problem or who died from it. The role of government in this issue, like any issue, is currently being debated in both the systemic and institutional agendas and like any such issue, there are competing narratives of the extent of the problem and the causes of the problem. Purdue Pharma, the maker of OxyContin®, is in litigation with over 500 cities and counties (Schott, 2019). As you learned earlier, there are also arguments in the U.S. about allowing needle exchanges, and safe injection sites, as well as whether or not to address homelessness first, or only if users are willing to get help first (Khazan, 2017). Similar debates about the costs involved with saving overdose victims with the opioid antagonist naloxone are happening in communities across the country. Though our focus for this case study is the United States, where opioid prescription outpaced the rest of the economically developed countries (Lopez, 2019a), drug problems and politics are certainly international issues.

The Big Pharma and Prescription Narrative This narrative construction asserts that pharmaceutical companies are marketing opioids to doctors who, in turn, overprescribe opioids to patients. A 2019 study by Hadland et al. found that pharmaceutical companies spent almost $40 million to market opioids to nearly 68,000 doctors (between August 1, 2013 and December 31, 2015) and the study discovered that counties where opioid companies offered physicians such amenities as meals, trips, and consulting fees had higher rates of opioid prescription and higher rates of overdose deaths involving prescription opioids, contrasted with counties that had less aggressive marketing on behalf of opioid companies (Hadland et al. 2019). So, more marketing led to more prescribing led to more deaths. Democratic U.S senators have been particularly vocal in their desire to hold pharmaceutical companies accountable. New York Senator Kirsten Gillenbrand told NBC News that “What we have to do is take on the drug manufacturers, who purposefully made these drugs stronger [and] more addictive and now that we have the documents we know they did it because they wanted record sales” (Timm, 2019). A 2019 article in The Atlantic authored by Ray Fisman (a behavioral-economics professor at Boston University) and Michael Luca, a professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School), that also cites Beth Macy’s 2018 book on this topic (Dopesick: Dealers, Doctors, and the Drug Company that Addicted America) explains the marketing research that shows how powerful even very small gifts can be at inducing reciprocity (continued)

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driven behavior. It isn’t rational, and learning to guard against it can help, but study after study confirms its power. One study they mention involved Britain’s “Nudge Unit” and a request to investment bankers who were asked to donate one day’s salary (approximately $750) to charity. Some just got the request, others received a small portion of candy along with the request. The rate of giving among those who got the candy along with the request was approximately 11 percent, whereas those getting the request without the sweets only contributed at a rate of 4.4 percent. So, yes, you don’t have to fly them to Hawaii for a twoweek vacation; gifts of pens, gassing them up at a local service station, providing their office with an inexpensive meal, all served the drug companies’ purpose (Fisman and Luca, 2019) Big Pharma’s efforts, of course, were not limited to marketing ploys. They lobbied legislatures to loosen laws affecting access, and sponsored efforts to “educate” the public about the safety and benefits (exaggerated claims for both) of their product. Three of their top business executives, as well as Purdue Pharma itself, were fined hundreds of millions of dollars for their marketing misinformation campaigns (Lopez, 2019a). As well as litigating against pharmaceutical companies, holding physicians accountable or at least letting them know when a patient dies of an opioid prescription is one possible solution. Two researchers (Doctor and Lucas, 2019) reported the results of a study in San Diego where physicians who had prescribed opioids to patients and those patients later died of an opioid overdose were notified of the patient’s death. These physicians were then found to reduce their prescriptions of opioids.

The Counter Narrative: Misleading Statistics and Misplaced Blame Dr. Josh Bloom, a former pharmaceutical drug researcher, has led the charge in creating a narrative that counters the narrative asserting that pharmaceutical companies are to blame for the current problem and he even argues that the problem is not as bad as it may seem. Bloom is particularly concerned about the work of Dr. Andrew Kolodny who is the director of Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing (PROP). According to Bloom, PROP played a key role in the 2016 CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. Bloom calls these guidelines “disastrous” and the evidentiary basis of the guidelines was “found unsupportable by FDA scientists” (Bloom, 2017, paragraph 2). Bloom critiques Kolodny’s (2017) work and makes six criticisms. First, he argues that annual drug overdose deaths (60,000) reported by Kolodny include deaths for all types of drugs and not just opioids. Bloom argues instead that in the year under study there were 30,000 deaths associated with opioids (including heroin) and that the number of deaths from prescription opioids was about 17,000 (Bloom, 2017). Here Bloom argues that this number is about the half the number of people who die from accidental falls each year and he quips, “Are we having an accidental fall epidemic?” (Bloom, 2019, paragraph 6). He goes on further to say that most opioid deaths are in conjunction with other non-opioid drugs (he mentions alcohol and cocaine) and then he approximates that the number of annual deaths from just opioids is about 5,000. Bloom then compares this number to annual bicycle deaths and states that this is “ten-times lower the (sic) 60,000 that Kolodny implies” (Bloom, 2019, paragraph 6). Second, Bloom contends that Kolodny equates hydrocodone and oxycodone effects on the brain with that of heroin. Bloom contends that while the effects are the same, the potency of heroin is much greater and concludes, “The two drugs don’t even belong in the same sentence, even though they happen to belong to the same class of drugs” (Bloom, 2017, paragraph 7).

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Third, Bloom contends that there have been no long-term studies of opioid effectiveness over the long term (and that it is unfair to say that they are ineffective over the long term) and he also contends that addiction risk for prescription patients is low (less than 1 percent) (Bloom, 2017). Fourth, Bloom (2017) pushes back on the narrative that the marketing of pharmaceutical companies is to blame for the problem. He states, “This tactic is appallingly unoriginal. There is no better way to shore up a weak argument than to introduce an ‘enemy’” (Bloom, 2017, paragraph 9). He contends that what Purdue Pharma did in the late 1990s is now irrelevant and while holding some companies “partly responsible for starting today’s fentanyl OD epidemic,” it “has nothing whatsoever to do with keeping it going” (Bloom, 2017, paragraph 9). Fifth, Bloom (2017) contends that abuse resistant OxyContin did lead to a spike in heroin deaths beginning in 2019. Finally, Bloom contends that there has been a crackdown in the number of opioid prescriptions (contrasting this with Kolodny’s assertion that there has not been a crackdown). Moreover, even the authors of the county by county study note that it could be a case of reverse causation (they rewarded physicians who were prescribing more) and prescription drugs were not the sole cause of death, for example a major contributor was fentanyl (Lopez, 2017).

The Race and Opioid Narrative A third narrative that is important in this issue involves race. The prescription opioid problem has primarily impacted Caucasians (Alexander, et al. 2017) including middle-class Caucasians. In the past, when drug issues like crack cocaine impacted minority communities, the governmental solution involved lengthy drug sentences. Today, however, the opioid issue involves treating the problem as a medical problem with treatment options. Vox (Lopez, 2017b) presents a story on the racialization of the opioid problem. They began by detailing how Republican politicians (Christie, Fiorina, and Trump) all had personal stories dealing with friends or family members who had died from opioids or from alcohol and that these personal experiences had made them more sympathetic to treatment options over the criminalization of drug use. This is contrasted with how white politicians treated crack cocaine use during the “War on Drugs” promoted by President Reagan. Lopez (2017b, paragraph 11) quotes Ithaca, New York, Mayor Svante Myrick (who is African-American) who states of the crisis, “It’s very real” but then says that his black constituents typically say something like: Oh, when it was happening in my neighborhood it was “lock em up.” Now that it’s happening in the [largely white, wealthy] Heights, the answer is to use my tax dollars to fund treatment centers. Well, my son could have used a treatment center in 1989, and he didn’t get one.

Netherland and Hansen (2017) conduct a detailed analysis of the differences between the “War on Drugs” in the 1990s and the current opioid issue. They write: This less examined “White drug war” has carved out a less punitive, clinical realm for Whites where their drug use is decriminalized, treated primarily as a biomedical disease, and where their whiteness is preserved, leaving intact more punitive systems that govern the drug use of people of color.

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Alternative Narratives We are not claiming that these are the only three policy narratives out there about the opioid overdose epidemic, or how to address it. For example, arguments about a strong penaltybased policy, a renewed war on drugs, rather than coddling criminals, and encouraging bad behavior, or even lessening the logical consequences such as homelessness and the risk of disease that make addiction a terrible thing, are still supported by many.

The Assignment You have been hired as a policy analyst for the United States Department of Health and Human Services As with most policy issues, opioid addiction is a political issue, there is much discussion about the causes and thus the solution to opioid addiction and there is even disagreement about the extent and exact nature of the problem. Some argue that opioid addiction is the result of pharmaceutical companies who have developed prescription opioid pain killers and who promote their use through marketing to doctors. Doctors, from this view, are also to blame as they seemingly over-prescribe the drugs. Yet, another view contends that opioid addiction and deaths are not primarily the result of prescription drugs and that instead it is illicit opioid drug use that is causing a large number of deaths. Efforts to regulate and limit opioid use are also controversial. Some argue that such regulation only moves individuals from prescription opioid use to drugs like heroin. Still others are concerned that individuals with significant pain are being denied pain relief because of stricter regulations on opiate prescribing. All of this leads to a variety of competing narratives with competing causes of the problem and competing solutions. U.S. Health and Human Services is trying to develop an understanding of the issue. With your background in policy analysis and public administration, you have been hired as an analyst for the U.S. Health and Human Services, and you have been asked to explore the following: 1. Your supervisor wants to know if the U.S. public is interested in the issue of opioid addiction and how this interest compares to other issues. To answer this question, use Google Trends to study public attention to gun deaths, car accident deaths, HIV deaths, opioid deaths over the past five years in the United States. Copy and paste your Google Trends chart and write a short paragraph explaining your findings (be sure to use quote marks for each term). This is a measure of the systemic agenda and these issues (be sure to mention any limitations in the use of Google Trends as a measure of the systemic agenda). See directions for this at the end of the assignment. Please note you have discretion to change your search terms but if you do so, please explain in your assignment what you did and why. 2. Your supervisor wants to know if the U.S. Congress is interested in the issue of opioid addiction and how this interest compares to other issues. Go to https://www.congress.gov/advanced-search/legislation (starting with the 113th Congress) and record the amount of congressional attention to the opioid issue, guns, car accidents, HIV, and opioids (be sure to use quote marks to bracket your searches). Use Excel or a similar program to produce a graph of your findings. Specifically, a. How often have “opioids” been mentioned in bills starting with the 113th Congress and ending with the current 116th Congress?

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b. How often have bills with “opioids” gone to the floor of a chamber (compare with guns, car accidents, and HIV)? c. How often have bills that mention “opioids” become law (signed by the POTUS?) (compare with guns, car accidents, and HIV)? 3. Your supervisor is unsure of the political battle occurring over opioid addiction. She is a trained epidemiologist and public health expert but not a political scientist or public administrator. She wants your knowledge and expertise to explain to her what might be going on and she wants a recommendation on government policy toward opioid addiction. Thus, provide both an explanation of what might be going on as well as your initial recommendation on a solution. This is going to be your first task for your new supervisor and you will have a chance to revise and extend your views here, so this is considered a quick analysis and beginning point of talking to your supervisor about this issue. Use a theory from the political model of policy analysis to provide a recommendation on government policy toward opioid addiction. a. For example, do you think that focusing events and Multiple Streams drive interest in opioid addiction and policy? If so, is this good, bad, or indifferent, and how might this lead you to a recommendation? b. For example, do you think that the problem of opioid addiction is geared toward what society views as “advantaged groups” over “deviant groups?” If so, is this good, bad, or indifferent and how might this lead you to a recommendation? c. For example, do you think that narrative constructions of the issue matter and that the narrative of opioid addiction is correct or incorrect, and how might this lead you to a recommendation? You don’t have to use all theories in this chapter but use a theory. Your recommendation should show an understanding of the political model of policy analysis. Please use APA style. Remember, you don’t have to be the expert here, you just have to demonstrate that you can sit down with your supervisor and have a quality discussion about opioid addiction from the political model of policy of analysis. Good luck!

Directions for a Google Trends Search 1. Go to https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US. 2. In the search bar, write “opioid deaths” (be sure to use quote marks). 3. When you get your search results, specify last five years and the chart will recalculate. 4. Now click compare and insert “gun deaths” (a new chart will be produced). 5. Now click compare (leaving “gun deaths”) and insert “car accident deaths” (a new chart will be produced). 6. Now click compare (leaving your previous searches) and insert “HIV deaths” (a new chart will be produced). 7. Cut and paste the chart produced into your Word document and interpret its meaning.

Directions for Conducting a Congressional Search 1. Go to www.congress.gov/advanced-search/legislation. 2. Under “Congress” click 113, 114, 115, 116. 3. Under “Words and Phrases” (click “all fields”), search for “opioid.” 4. Leave all defaults in place. 5. Click on search. 6. On the left side of the screen, expand Congress to all, you will see the mentions of the term for each Congress that you selected (record these on an Excel sheet).

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7. Now, drop down the box Status of Legislation and click “Floor Consideration” (notice that your counts for each Congress are now reflecting how many bills mentioning “opioid” have made it to floor consideration. Record the numbers for each Congress in your Excel sheet. 8. Now UNCLICK “Floor Consideration” and CLICK “Became Law.” Scroll above and see how many bills that mentioned “opioid” became law. 9. Put your data into Excel. In the first column have “Congress.” In the second column have “Mentions in Bills.” In the third column have “Floor Consideration,” and in the fourth column have “Bills Passed.” 10. Now highlight all the data and columns, then click on “Insert” and then click on “Recommended Charts” and produce a clustered column chart. Title the chart and then cut and paste into your Word document. 11. Interest groups, professional organizations, think tanks, academic institutions are all potential players in any policy arena. To make sure you understand an issue, and the politics of it, these players are important sources of information, can and do influence others, and are even potential stakeholders. For example, on the opioid issue, what are the positions of the National Association of Social Workers, the Heritage Foundation, the American Medical Association, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, the CDC, and the WHO? 12. Also, one advantage of federalism, captured sometimes in the phrase “laboratories of democracy,” is that states (Vermont? Indiana?) and cities (Seattle? Atlanta?) often offer examples of programs that work—and ones that don’t. Can you find something helpful by spending a little time checking that? 13. Finally, if you want government to more fully and effectively address this issue, how would you go about it? In particular, what narrative would you recommend advancing?

Sources Bloom, Josh. 2017. “The Opioid Epidemic in Six Charts Designed to Deceive You.” American Council on Science and Health, October 12. www.acsh.org/news/2017/10/12/opioid-epidemic6-charts-designed-deceive-you-11935 (accessed July 11, 2019). Center for Disease Control (CDC). 2018a. “Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic.” December 19. www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (accessed July 11). Center for Disease Control (CDC). 2018b. “Opioid Overdose.” December. www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/ data/statedeaths.html (accessed July 11). Lucas, Jason and Jonathan. 2019. “To Reduce Opioid Prescriptions, Tell Doctors When Their Patients Overdose and Die.” USA Today, August 8. www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/08/09/ reduce-opioid-prescriptions-tell-doctors-when-patients-overdose-die-column/937299002/ (accessed July 11, 2019). Fisman, Ray, and Michael Luca. 2019. “Did Free Pens Cause the Opioid Crisis?” The Atlantic, January–February. www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/did-free-pens-cause-theopioid-crisis/576394/ (accessed July 11, 2019). Hadland, S.E., Aguirre A.R., Marshall B.D., Cerda M. 2019. “Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid Products with Mortality from Opioid-related Overdoses.” JAMA Netw Open, 2(1). doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.6007. Kaplan, Sheila. 2017. “CDC Reports a Record Number of Drug Overdoes Last Year.” New York Times, November 3. Khazan, Olga. 2017. “Why Can’t Addicts Just Quit.” The Atlantic, November 13. www.theatlantic. com/health/archive/2017/11/why-cant-addicts-just-quit/545552/ (accessed July 11, 2019). Kolodny, Andrew. 2017. “The Opioid Epidemic in Six Charts.” The Conversation, October 6. https:// theconversation.com/the-opioid-epidemic-in-6-charts-81601 (accessed July 11, 2019).

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Lopez, German. 2017a. “A New Study Shows America’s Drug Overdose Crisis Is by Far the Worst among Wealthy Countries. Vox, February 26. www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/2/26/18234863/ drug-overdose-death-america-international-study (accessed July 11, 2019). Lopez, German. 2017b. “When a Drug Epidemic’s Victims are White: How Racial Bias and Segregation Molded a Gentler Rhetorical Response to the Opioid Crisis.” Vox, April 4. www.vox.com/identities/2017/4/4/15098746/opioid-heroin-epidemic-race (last accessed July 11, 2019). National Institute of Health (NIH), National Institute on Drug Abuse: Addiction Science. 2019a. “Opioids.” www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids (accessed July 11, 2019). National Institute of Health (NIH), National Institute on Drug Abuse: Addiction Science. 2019b. May. www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state (accessed July 11, 2019). Netherland, Julie and Helena Hansen. 2017. “White Opioids: Pharmaceutical Race and the War on Drugs that Wasn’t.” BioSocieties, 12(2): 217–238. doi:10.1057/biosoc.2015.46. Schott, Paul. 2019. “Opioid Lawsuits Intensify as Hundreds of Cities and Counties Sue Sackler Family.” Governing. March 25. www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/tns-purduepharma-lawsuit-cities-counties-sackler.html (accessed July 11, 2019). Timm, Jane C. 2019. “Gillenbrand Pledges to Go after Drug Companies over Opioid Crisis.” NBC News, March 18. www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/gillibrand-pledges-go-after-drugcompanies-over-opioid-crisis-n984596

Video Resources for Faculty and Students Josh Bloom talk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6_opNp5XA8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17Zh9XiDGlk Opioid problems in West Virginia, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/community-overwhelmedopioids

Part III: Practice

Theory: Problem Definition, Pragmatism, Policy Analysis, Methodologies, and Democracy

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A Pragmatic Public Policy Analysis Method

Case Study “Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats” In Part III, which begins with this chapter, the discussion balance shifts from theory and practice to theory and practice, but argues for praxis. It also argues that there is a need for praxis regarding the rational model and its critiques. In a sense we are arguing for a fourth criterion for evaluating models.1 That fourth criterion is applicability in the field (practicality for practitioners). As we have already discussed and implied, public policymaking is not a simple technical process. Public policy analysts must not only possess quantitative and other technical skills but must also understand that politics is fundamentally a conflict over interests and values and that policies are ultimately resolved through political power. So, while you might want to be left alone to complete as rational a policy analysis as possible, and then simply implement that product, success means being politically astute from the beginning, understanding who to consult with, gaining the support of key stakeholders, managing the politics and forging coalitions. You know from earlier chapters, particularly Chapter 1, that analysts—either consciously or not—must answer several related normative questions in the process of doing their job. For example: 1. 2. 3.

Does the analyst serve the client (elected officials or others), interest groups, or the public? Who has and who should have the power in a democracy—interest groups, elites/experts, or ­citizens? (Refer back to Table 1.1.) Is the role of the analyst to provide a policy recommendation or to educate all stakeholders, including the public, on various options, and live with their choice?

Chapter Roadmap: In addition to the important task of elaborating on the five-step method you were introduced to earlier that you can use to “do” policy analysis, this chapter lends assistance to students willing to openly confront the tough normative questions. To prepare you, we begin with a discussion that elucidates a public policy methodology for analysts. Drawing heavily on the classic work of Patton and Sawicki (1986), our discussion both presents the process in a stepby-step m ­ anner and, strongly relying on the critiques of Danziger (1995) and Stone (2002, 2012), establishes further the absolute difficulty of conducting a truly rational analysis.

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The chapter closes with a case, “Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats,” which deals with wildlife, rural economies, development, and environmental policy. The case places you in the role of a public policy analyst and requires you to grapple with several important issues. This time you are asked to conduct your policy analysis using the five-step method. In the process you must reconcile conflict stemming from the fact that the case revolves around value conflict and power structures. In other words, the case is very realistic. Indeed, the case, as well as the conflict, is real. Let’s begin by explaining a bit more about that case. In the United States the rural West is becoming increasingly divided between two groups. One group is composed of those who want the West to remain tied to an economic, cultural, social, and political system based on extractive commodity industries such as logging, ranching, timber cutting, and agriculture. They view the environment as something to be used for economic survival and profit, and they often want the state, instead of the federal government, to make (or eliminate) the rules. The second group is composed largely of newcomers who want the rural West to diversify economically, culturally, socially, and politically. These newcomers view the environment as something to be protected for its own sake and also used for recreation. More often they see the national government as a more enlightened partner than state or local governments, which they see as being controlled by local economic elites. As an analyst, you will be asked to recommend policies that will both satisfy the economic survival needs of the local rural region and simultaneously protect or at least preserve a wild species (bison). But you will also have to deal with national constituencies while listening to local concerns. In doing what appears to be a technical case, you will have to wrestle with issues of power, democracy, and who (as policy analysts) you ultimately serve. The case forces you to decide whether your job is to build consensus or to choose the interests of one group over another. While the case is located in the United States, the lessons from the case could be applied to any wildlife and environmental policy issue internationally. In fact, though about bison and Yellowstone National Park, besides the broad lessons valuable to anyone trying to understand policy, the case’s specific lessons can be transferred to other issues and locales, including government officials in South Africa or Namibia trying to protect rhinoceroses from poachers. The task, just like real policy analysis, is not easy.

The Rational Public Policy Analysis Method: History and Form There has always been conflict between those who see government policymaking as consisting of the interaction of power and politics, and those who believe that policymaking should be a more rational process. Public administration arose as a discipline in the late 1800s as a response to the corruption and inefficiency of American government. As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars and ­practitioners such as Woodrow Wilson (1887) believed that government administration should be the same as business administration. Wilson’s belief was that while policymaking was all about conflict and power, the administration of that policy should be conducted in a rational-scientific manner. Remember that Wilson’s ideas are termed the politics/administration dichotomy. This is the notion, discussed in Chapter 2, that politics should be removed from the implementation and execution of public policy. This ­ideological construct was a very strong component of the “progressive movement” in American history. Progressives sought to remove the corrupting influences of politics from governmental decisions. According to this philosophy, administrative experts should not make policy, but rather should only use their expertise to implement policy made by elected officials. In the period from 1880 to 1940, U.S. society changed greatly from a primarily agricultural society to a more metropolitan society. As explained earlier in the text, with these changes came

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the rise of social problems: crime, poverty, pollution, delinquency, congestion, and others. Governments at all levels were called upon to find creative and innovative solutions (public policies) to these problems. As the problems of society became more complex, the solutions to them likewise became increasingly complex. Elected officials often did not have the expertise to make complex scientific evaluations and decisions about these problems. The policy initiatives most often came not from elected officials but from administrators. The politics/administration dichotomy was a false one, and scholars such as Paul Appleby (1949) suggested that policymaking and administration are not, and have never been, separate. In fact, with the increasingly complex nature of public problems, elected officials turned to administrative experts to help find policies that would solve public problems. Thus, the “public policy analyst” was born. The roots of public policy analysis come from private management techniques. Businesses attempt to develop policies strategically, based on sound information. Business analysis answers questions such as, “Is there a market for our product?” and “Where should we locate our new business?” Business policies are not normally haphazard. Instead, they are predominantly made on the basis of careful research and statistical analysis. Public policy analysis is premised on the same reasoning. Instead of allowing public policy to simply be the result of power and politics, public policy analysts, steeped in the rational method, attempt to rationally and scientifically determine the most appropriate public policies. (Chapters 7 and 8, and to a lesser degree this chapter, will provide direction, adding insights from postpositivism, to facilitate a mixed-methods approach to analysis.) The rational public policy analysis methodology is typically based on some variation of a multistep approach: defining a problem, generating alternatives, establishing evaluation criteria, selecting alternatives, and evaluating alternatives. Whatever the variations, some policy analysts believe that the rational approach will produce one “best scientific answer” to policy problems such as poverty, crime, and pollution. This is termed a positivist orientation. Examples of these highly rational and scientific models include contemporary texts such as David Weimer and Aidan Vining (2016) and Dunn (2017), and foundational texts such as Michael Munger (2000), Edith Stokey and Robert Zeckhauser (1978), and Quade (1975). To help policymakers choose optimal policies, these talented scholars teach and analysts learn to use, highly quantitative techniques such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), regression, indifference curves, decision trees, extrapolation, the Delphi ­technique, and other rational models.2 This strict approach, however, has received great criticism since the late 1980s from policy scholars such as Deborah Stone (2012) and Marie Danziger (1995). These scholars argue that rational policy analysis is impossible and instead has largely served the interests of elites. It is argued that the quantitative techniques—the strategic use of numbers, graphs, and scientific formulas—serve as cloaking devices that hide the power politics that determine the outcomes of the value and interest conflicts. Somewhat of a middle-ground approach, between positivism and the postpositivist and postmodern critiques, is offered in the now classic text by Patton and Sawicki (1986), whose policy analysis method is one of “quick analysis.” They reject the notion that policy analysts can find the “one best” solution. They agree with our conclusion that policymaking, and hence analysis, is political. Their approach uses the scientific-rational approach but does so to find policies that are politically acceptable and effective. They do not accept a purely positivist orientation that there is one reality, that scientific methods can find it, and that hence we can find the one best policy. Patton and Sawicki (1986, p. 35) elegantly state: Rarely will there be only one acceptable or appropriate alternative. Not only will different options appeal to various interested parties, but two or more alternatives may bring roughly similar results. None of the alternatives is likely to be perfect, as problems are rarely solved. More often their severity is reduced, the burden is more evenly distributed, or they are replaced by less severe problems.

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A Five-Step Method We believe that a five-step method is most commonly used by public policy analysts in practice. Ultimately, our method is (please read slowly) a postpositivist-inspired, political, nonrational approach to a rational methodology. As you saw, the form that a multistep policy analysis method suggests is a rational, logical, and linear approach. Yet policy analysis, as you learned in Chapters 1, 4, and 5, is much more fragmented, subjective, political, instinctual, and nonlinear than the policy cycle model, or any multistep policy analysis methodology, implies. Step I: Define the Problem and Determine Its Causes

The definition of a policy problem determines what, if any, policies are implemented. We have already established that problem definition is not easy. You know that it is value-driven and that nearly all policy problems have complex causes. Take, for example, the problem of drug abuse. Before a government can determine what policies to implement to try to alleviate drug abuse, a public policy analyst must search for the root cause(s) of the problem. Varying problem definitions lead to varying policies. Box 6.1 looks at varying explanations of drug abuse and demonstrates how each one leads toward different policies.

Box 6.1  Different Causes, Different Solutions Explanation #1 Drug abuse is the result of a breakdown of community institutions such as the family, the church, and the school. These institutions provide guidance to the individual in the form of community norms. The breakdown of these institutions leads to a lack of clear norms, and drug abuse is one result of this breakdown. Policy #1 Government must institute policies to rebuild these institutions. Examples of such policies could include: (1) government-mandated employee flex-time that would allow working parents to be at home with their children more often; (2) an expanded family leave act—building on the law that was promoted primarily by the Democratic Party, vetoed by President George H. W. Bush, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1993—allowing workers to take unpaid leave for family emergencies; (3) school uniforms to help restore school discipline and cut back on gang activity in the schools; and (d) teacher-led prayer in public schools as a method to restore religion in the lives of youngsters. (According to the Supreme Court this would be a violation of the First Amendment—policies suggested are often controversial or, in this case, unconstitutional. Note also that there would be a problem putting a coalition together, because the majority of supporters of the Family and Medical Leave Act would quite likely oppose mandated school prayer.) Explanation #2 Drug abuse, like all behavior, is the result of the individual conducting a cost-benefit analysis on his or her own actions. Drug users perceive that the benefits of drug use (pleasurable high, social activity with peers) outweigh the costs of the activity (sickness, health risks, the risk of getting caught). Likewise, drug sellers perceive that the benefit of selling drugs (profits) outweighs the risk of getting caught. Policy #2 From this perspective, government must increase the costs of using and selling drugs. This would include: (1) increased penalties like mandatory prison terms for any drug user and (2) the death penalty for any drug seller. In addition, government could pursue educational policies that inform citizens of the health risks of drug use. Celebrities could be hired to make public service advertisements that persuade citizens that drug use is not socially acceptable or fashionable. These latter activities could help decrease the perceived benefits and simultaneously increase the perceived costs of drug use. Yet these policies often have unintended consequences. As state officials in the United States have cracked down on doctors overprescribing morphine (increasing its costs by penalizing those who use it illegally), heroin use has increased.

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Explanation #3 Drug use is learned through interaction in groups. Individuals learn to become drug users from the people they socialize with. Teenage drug users learn how to use drugs and learn to interpret their effects as pleasurable from their peer group. Corporate executives learn how to use drugs and perceive their effects as pleasurable from other corporate executives who use drugs. Becker’s (1953) work on pot smokers found that marijuana smokers learned how to smoke marijuana and even learned that certain effects were “pleasurable” from other marijuana smokers. People who tried pot by themselves without a supporting peer group were far less likely to become pot smokers. In short, when individuals become isolated within one dominant peer group, they take on the behavior of that peer group. Policy #3 Government should implement policies that do not stigmatize users by defining them as part of one peer group. For example, a teenager is arrested for drug use. Policy #2 says that this teen should be punished (to increase costs) by putting him in a juvenile detention center. Policy perspective #3 says instead that the juvenile should not be placed in a detention center because this activity would lead the youngster to define himself as deviant. The youngster’s peer group would be other juvenile delinquents who probably also use drugs, and from this peer group the youngster would learn how to use more drugs. The juvenile would accept society’s definition that he is a delinquent, and this self-perception would lead to more unacceptable behavior. This policy perspective instead suggests that the court system needs to be more lenient and allow the juvenile to remain in school, where he has the opportunity to interact with other peer groups (band, sports, debate, church, etc.) and where he is less likely to define himself as deviant. Explanation #4 Drug abuse is defined more broadly to include prescription and over-the-counter (OTC) abuse. Capitalism promotes the making of profits and drug companies like to make profits. They make profits by promoting OTCs to consumers, and by pushing their prescription drugs to doctors so that the doctors will prescribe these medications to patients. As a result, the United States has an engrained drug culture. From mass advertising, we learn that if we have even a slight headache, we should seek one of the several remedies available at the local pharmacy. If these don’t work, we go to a physician who gladly dispenses medication for even minor ailments. Physicians receive all types of inducements from drug companies to prescribe their medications. As a result, doctors make money from office calls, pharmacies make money from drug sales, and drug manufacturers make a lot of money from this activity. Policy #4 Government could nationalize the drug industry. All drug companies could be owned by the state. This would remove the profit motive and help alleviate drug abuse (this would not be very politically popular in our capitalist system). Other less radical approaches would be to eliminate drug advertisements and instead have public service announcements that promote more holistic health practices such as diet, exercise, and meditation. Sources: Explanation #1 comes from structural-functionalism and systems theory in sociology. See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds. 1951. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 227. Some of these policies are found in the contemporary works of Amitai Etzioni, 1996. The Golden Rule. New York: Basic Books. Explanation #2 comes from the sociological theory known as “exchange theory.” See George C. Homans, 1974. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, rev. ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Explanation #3’s orientation is from the sociological theory “symbolic interactionism.” See Howard Becker, 1953. “Becoming a Marijuana User.” American Journal of Sociology, 59: 235–242; George Herbert Mead, 1934/1962. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behavioralist. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Explanation #4 follows a “critical” or “neo-Marxist” line of thought. See Herbert Marcuse, 1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

So, there you have it—four different descriptions of the problem and four different policy suggestions. Perhaps all four explanations are correct or perhaps all four are wrong. William Dunn (2004, p. 6) writes, “A major and often fatal error of policy analysis is a Type III error—solving the wrong problem.”3 And, of course, there are many other policies that could be generated from these explanations as well as other theoretical explanations. But clearly policy choices are derived from the definition of the problem.

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How does the analyst go about defining a problem? The following suggestions from Patton and Sawicki (1986, pp. 104–110) are helpful. First, the analyst should research the problem to determine its location, history, and time frame. For example, how long has drug abuse been a problem? What is its history? Is it a national, state, or local problem? Second, the analyst needs to develop a fact base and operationalize terms. For example, what is “drug abuse?” Is it just use of hard drugs or is it pot use, alcohol use, OTC drug use, or nicotine use? Third, the analyst must conduct a stakeholder analysis. As you recall, in simple terms, stakeholders are those individuals or groups who have an interest in the problem. Remember that, at a minimum, the analyst must also determine the values and interests of each stakeholder. With drug abuse, those who can affect, or would be affected by, the policy decision includes school officials, parents, churches, the courts, police officers, doctors, and many more individuals and groups who have direct interests in the problem. These stakeholder groups can provide insights into the problem and provide a great deal of information about what types of policies are acceptable or unacceptable. Fourth, the problem statement should lead to action. Complex theoretical statements often lead to good scientific explanations but do not lend themselves to government policy. Explanation #4 is one such problem statement, because it is doubtful that the U.S. government could ever nationalize drug companies. Problem definition is not an easy task and it is difficult to build consensus around a definition of a problem. Dunn (2004, pp. 75–76) points out that public problems are: (1) interdependent, (2) subjective, (3) artificial, and (4) dynamic. Interdependency means that problems do not stand in ­isolation. Drug abuse is linked to other problems (e.g., poverty and quality of life), and the causes of these problems are multifaceted and may not be directly linked to the problems that directly cause drug abuse. Subjectivity refers to the fact that policy problems are open to multiple interpretations. Artificiality refers to the fact that, as Dunn (2004, p. 76) states, “Problems have no existence apart from the individuals and groups who define them, which means that there are no ‘natural’ states of society which in and of themselves constitute policy problems.” Dynamic means that ­policy problems are constantly changing and do not stay solved. Step II: Establish Criteria to Evaluate Alternatives

In our first step, it was clear that some of our policy prescriptions would be unacceptable to some. In the United States, government control of drug companies is politically unacceptable; state-­ sponsored prayer in school is legally unacceptable; and mandatory prison terms for all drug users might be socially, as well as economically and administratively, unacceptable. What we have just demonstrated is that there are certain criteria that are used to evaluate all policies. The analyst must be careful to honestly list all criteria. Patton and Sawicki (1986, p. 14) point out that elected officials often want to use “naive criteria,” which ignores the fact that criteria and objectives are often in conflict. For example, mandatory prison sentences for drug users might meet the effectiveness criterion (it gets drug users off the streets) but would fail an economic feasibility criterion: hundreds of new prisons would have to be built, necessitating excessive tax increases or ignoring other public issues that citizens expect government action on. Patton and Sawicki (1986, pp. 156–167) argue that there are some universal criteria for nearly all policy areas: • technical feasibility, including effectiveness and adequacy; • economic feasibility (costs and benefits); • cost-effectiveness (several policies may work, but which one is the cheapest or provides the “most bang for the buck”?); • political viability (includes acceptability with stakeholders); • legality and ethics (is the policy legal and is it ethical?).

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Values affect the choice and ranking of the criteria, as well as the evaluation of how a policy fares against those criteria. Box 6.2 explores these issues further through a series of interesting policy examples.

Box 6.2  The Advice is Simple, the Reality Isn’t Technical Feasibility In the heart of the Cold War period, President John F. Kennedy committed the United States to putting a man on the moon before the Soviet Union did. Within a decade, all of the technical obstacles had been overcome, and Neil Armstrong took that “one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.” Today, supporters of the space program have other goals and dreams involving sending humans into space, but they can’t convince Congress to support them. Outside the context of the Cold War, would the United States have thought it was technically feasible to go to the moon, or would the obstacles have seemed too large? Similarly, today, there are those who argue it is technically not feasible to develop alternative energies that would replace carbon-based fossil fuels. However, other critics contend that such alternative energy development would be feasible if there were the political and social will to make it happen. Elected officials, of course, garner much political and monetary support from traditional energy companies and, despite dire warnings about the potential long-term impact of climate change, there is not enough political momentum to sustain the innovation needed to replace carbon-based fuels. Another related example from the Cold War shows both how this criterion of technical feasibility is flawed and how it can be met but will conflict with other criteria and objectives. This is the story of the atomic airplane. For a very long time the Air Force sought a larger piece of the nuclear pie (the Navy had nuclear-powered submarines and the army controlled our nuclear missiles). The debate about building a nuclear-powered airplane focused on the question of technical feasibility. It was determined that it was technically feasible—and there was lots of political support from the Air Force, defense contractors, scientists interested in getting research dollars, and Cold Warriors. However, after years and years and millions of dollars of taxpayer money, they still had not solved the dangers of a plane crash, and the best solution to shielding pilots from radiation that they could come up with was to use older pilots because they would not be having children and any cancer would take a long time to develop. The real point, though, is that, while technically feasible, it did not make sense. There was no real mission or need for an atomic airplane.

Economic Feasibility and Cost-Effectiveness We dealt with the issue of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) rather extensively in Chapter 3, and those lessons can offer some insight here. Management of the national forests, like Allegheny National Forest, is the prime duty of the U.S. Forest Service. Yet many critics of their “multipleuse philosophy” accuse the Forest Service of seeing trees as a source of cash rather than being appropriately concerned with preservation, old growth, biodiversity, and wildlife populations. In terms of dollars, the revenues earned on the sale of timber from our national forests certainly outweigh costs. This also means that a thriving deer population is a bad thing because deer damage and eat trees. The Forest Service has, in fact, consistently argued for lowering the size of the deer population in the Allegheny National Forest. The most cost-effective solution, the most bang for the buck (so to speak), might be allowing a massive hunt with no limits on types of weapons or on the number of deer one can kill, no restrictions regarding does versus bucks, and no protection for (continued)

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fawns. Sorry, Bambi, this may not be sport, but it is business. What does CBA really tell us about the competing values at stake? What about possible conflicting ethical, legal, or moral concerns? These are in many ways the most naive, yet most compelling, criteria. Monetary concerns are politically powerful. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness are holy grails in public administration. Can you imagine a politician claiming they were not fiscally conservative? (Yessiree, I’m all for waste and mismanagement.) Never forget though, that the numbers can be massaged, that not all costs and benefits can be foreseen, and that there are things we should do even if they are not economically feasible or the cheapest option available.

Political Viability It is obviously true that the authors of this text endorse the importance of political viability, but this is also a concept that can be used as a political weapon. If you declare something politically impossible, if an idea is proclaimed dead on arrival (DOA), or if someone is branded politically naive, then it may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Recognize, though, that the political viability of a policy depends mightily on how the entire debate is framed. It depends on how the problem is defined. It depends on how the solutions are packaged and by whom. It depends on whether or not someone is willing to lead an informed dialogue. It depends on advocates who shift the debate through forceful advocacy of ideas outside the middle of the spectrum. Consider the subjective differences in political viability derived from a strategic argument relative to two problems that face every major city. You might not be able to generate public support for “high-tech” training programs for inner city dropouts if you portray it as welfare, but if you sell it as important to our economic future not to waste potential talent and as cost-effective compared with a life of crime and long-term dependency, you might. At one time in the 1980s, concern for the homeless was a hot political issue. The late Mitch Snyder’s activism, and his (unsupported) claim that on any given evening there were 3 million homeless people, helped increase that support. Ironically, the problem is worse today than it was then. (Even good economic times can actually be harmful, by driving up the price of housing.) The demand for emergency shelters has risen consistently and dramatically since 1985. And so has federal funding for a range of services, though not enough to adequately address the problem. But public support for seriously addressing homelessness depends significantly on whether the cause of homelessness is seen as the fault of the homeless or not. Many people believe that it is their individual responsibility, not society’s. Indeed, President George H. W. Bush’s initiative on chronic homelessness was both inadequately funded and described the homeless in negative terms suggesting the problem was largely one of character defects. In the 1980s, one argument that helped increase support was the fact that many of the homeless were Vietnam veterans. This is a group the nation has long believed deserved to be taken care of—as the outrage in 2007 over conditions veterans of the war in Iraq were living with at Walter Reed clearly showed. On the other hand, welfare recipients have often been portrayed as undeserving (lazy, giving birth to too many children, and cheats—Ronald Reagan told stories on the campaign trail about welfare queens). Yet, even before reform, most people did not stay on the welfare rolls for more than two years, well over half were children, the average number of children for welfare mothers was less than the societal average, and most of them worked at least part-time. In other words, while it is political suicide to support spending public monies for people seen as undeserving, there is political support from the public for helping veterans, those who cannot help themselves, and those (like the working poor) who are trying to help themselves. And, increasingly, many communities, including Salt Lake City in the very red state of Utah, are learning that it can be more cost-effective to provide people

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with housing first in terms of solving their problems such as addiction, unemployment, and petty crime. (Google “Housing First” if interested in this topic, or for a humorous take on it, see http:// thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/lntv3q/the-homeless-homed.) The main point here is that political viability is a dynamic, not a static, concept. It is also tremendously vulnerable to the other criteria. Part of the political argument that was made against the Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly dubbed Star Wars—its idea was to protect us from nuclear missiles) was that ballistic missile defense was technically not feasible. Cost and benefit numbers are often used to portray something in a way that makes it politically viable or politically not viable. Ethical and legal factors can be used to make an otherwise politically unpopular proposal viable or vice versa. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 legally forced many corporations, schools, and government agencies to do things that (while arguably quite ethical) would not have had winning political support due to cost.

Legality and Ethics Of course, you should consider what is legal, and of course you should consider what is ethical, but neither one is always clear. As you learned in Chapter 4, black letter law does not exist, and precedent is often contradictory and may be used strictly or loosely. Also, what could be more subjective than ethics? We certainly have made the argument that value conflict is the rule, not the exception. Let’s briefly visit the issue of cloning and stem cell research. While public support for stem cell research is quite strong, many people are disturbed by the thought of cloning humans (we are “playing God”; this is eugenics—like what the Nazis and Himmler did; there is a high rate of failure—Dolly (the first cloned mammal, in 1996) was the only sheep out of 277 fertilized eggs to develop from embryo to a lamb; do clones have souls?; we should not tinker with natural selection, etc.). Yet many people who support this research see it as too important to be guided by the “yuck” factor. Their arguments (academic freedom; natural selection is violated constantly—going back to the domestication of plants and wolves, and continuing to genetically alter tomatoes and in vitro fertilization; trying to stop the shortage of organs for transplant and develop 100 percent matches to stop rejection; twins are clones; it can be used to preserve endangered species, etc.) are persuasive to many people. Ethics are vital to consider but are not an easily applied criterion. Moreover, we once again must consider the impact of the other criteria on legal and ethical considerations. For our last policy example, let’s touch on the reverse aspect of the Nazi’s repugnant breeding program, exterminating “undesirables.” The Holocaust is often used (too often and too carelessly) as a metaphor. This is because it is a clear example of evil. However, one of the embarrassing parts of history is how most of the world, the United States very much included, failed to intercede in, and even sometimes abetted, this tragedy. The U.S. turned away a ship in 1939 loaded with refugees. It consistently and increasingly turned down applications for visas. It failed to bomb the rail lines transporting people to slavery and slaughter. Why, when Hitler was cranking up his final solution to the Jews, was it so difficult to turn moral abhorrence into a public policy to stop, or at least mitigate, the extermination of 6 million people? The sad answer is that other criteria and conflicting values won out. When the U.S. finally introduced its first immigration laws (e.g., the National Origins Act of 1924) they were based on ethnic, regional, and religious prejudices. Nativism—fueled in part by anti-Semitism (which was fueled by the radio broadcasts of the Catholic priest, Father Coughlin), in part by worries that our Protestant and Anglo-Saxon heritage and values were at stake, and in part by Depression-driven concerns about jobs and wages and the cost of adding people to the public dole—meant there were many hurdles to overcome. They also worried about a fifth column of Nazi (continued)

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supporters and spies. Further, the U.S. did not divert its bombers, in part, anyway, because some believed the best solution was to win the war as efficiently as possible, so other targets were more important. Domestic political concerns (political viability, coalition building for other legislation, and electoral self-interest) were other factors. Crowding out and bureaucratic lethargy were also problems—there was a lot on the agenda. The United States’ own racism and segregation were problems that made speaking out difficult, too. In sum, the shame cannot be lessened by this list of other factors, but they do make it clear that, even in the face of unmitigated evil, it is not easy to translate ethics into policy.

Recognizing the role of values, the central importance of political viability, the need to develop policies with legitimacy, and the idea of democracy, it is important that the criteria used in policy analysis come from the selected stakeholders and that stakeholders represent a strong cross-­ section of affected parties. Dunn (2004, pp. 248–250) terms such a process value ­clarification. He writes: The need for value clarification in making policy recommendations is most evident when we consider competing criteria for recommendation (effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, responsiveness, equity, appropriateness) and the multiple forms of rationality from which these criteria are derived. Value clarification helps answer such questions as the following: What value premises underlie the choice of policy objectives? Are these value premises those of policy analysts, of policy makers, of particular social groups, or of society as a whole?

Beginning policy analysts often believe that evaluation criteria are subjectively created by analysts or policymakers themselves. More advanced analysts realize that the criteria come from stakeholders. As discussed in Chapter 1, the question of who the stakeholders are is directly tied to the analyst’s view of democracy and power. The next two chapters also focus on the crucial question of who participates. One issue is that different people see things differently. Another issue is that as an analyst you need to value the instincts, interests, and input of average citizens, not just experts and elites. In fact, let’s quickly return to the idea mentioned above of the “yuck” factor. Around the globe water shortages and the question of equitable access, especially in terms of clean, safe drinking water, are absolutely one of the most pressing issues. Reusing water, via treatment at a wastewater plant, is an obvious potential solution to the scarcity question. State-of-the-art treatment (tertiary treatment is the technical term) can be expensive, but can produce water cleaner than it was before it was used the first time. However, you are now drinking water that came from your neighbor’s toilet, and if the public refuses that as too yucky, then it isn’t really a solution. This exact situation played out in Australia, where a citizen group called CADS (Citizens Against Drinking Sewage) defeated a referendum in Toowoomba in Queensland, in 2006. Having watched this play out, officials in Perth, Australia, treat their wastewater but then inject it back into the aquifer and pull it out downstream a bit. This indirect system, along with rigorous testing and education, won people over (Phillips, 2015). The point is that solutions are not solutions if they aren’t acceptable. And not only do you need diversity around the table for that reason, but also to gain different perspectives. Today it is also recognized that diverse groups routinely formulate better policy decisions. A simple test is to look not around the table, but under it. You should see diversity in the running shoes, heels, sandals, wing tips, work boots, loafers, flip-flops, and all sorts of other choices on those feet (we like to call this the concept of democratic shoes). If you do not see a wide variety of shoes under the table, then the talking heads above the table are unlikely to represent adequate diversity and, therefore, democracy.

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Step III: Generate Policy Alternatives

Once the problem statement or statements have been developed and the evaluation criteria have been determined, how can policy alternatives be generated? According to Weimer and Vining (2016, pp. 209–262, 363–366) and Patton and Sawicki (1986, pp. 181–192) there are several options: 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

Best Practices Search. The analyst can search for effective policies that other communities or governments have implemented for the same problem. Of course, you are unlikely to find a perfect fit. Weimer and Vining (2016, p. 364) suggest “tinkering.” Tinkering involves breaking a policy into its fundamental components to develop alternatives and assembling a combination that fits your community’s circumstances. Use of Experts. Experts can be called upon to offer advice, particularly in highly technical or scientific policy areas. Experts cannot solve value conflict and their values should not carry extra weight. Client Orientation. What is it that your client wants? If your boss is the mayor, and the mayor wants a policy of increased police visibility in neighborhoods, perhaps even has pledged to increase police patrols on the east side of town, then your policy design should take that into consideration. While we are on the topic, if you do not consider the political power of your client, you may design a policy for the state that only the federal government can enact. Brainstorming. A group of analysts can simply throw out policy suggestions using their knowledge of the policy problem. Be creative, brave, and willing to have fun. Do not shoot ideas down. Successful brainstorming requires the acceptance of all ideas, regardless of how outlandish they might be. Ideas are often rejected because they fail one criterion. Successful brainstorming requires that all options initially be considered acceptable. While an option might fail one criterion, it might well be acceptable using other criteria. You can also send your ideas up as trial balloons to test their political viability, and this too may generate more ideas as others react to your proposal. Incremental Approach. The analyst can look at existing policies and decide to essentially “tweak” the system rather than making large-scale changes. Although a somewhat unappealing theory, incrementalism dominates in practice because it has real advantages, including a solid knowledge base, and political opposition is often lower than for dramatic change. Use of Primary Research. The analyst may conduct mail surveys and focus groups to gather information about acceptable policies. Generic Solutions. Generic solutions mean orienting the search for policies in terms of general policy approaches such as privatization, trying to stimulate private markets through deregulation, using taxes or subsidies to alter incentives, utilizing regulations or legislation to change the rules, or offering economic protection through subsidization. Do Nothing. The status quo is always a serious policy option. Analysts must consider whether doing nothing might be the preferred course of action. Other policy analysts thought it was a good idea, and it had the political legs to become policy.

Importantly, the analyst’s alternatives should flow from the problem definition. If the problem definition is poor, the policy is likely to be ineffective. Moreover, there are many “no-nos” to keep in mind. David Weimer and Aidan Vining (2016, pp 365–366) list many of the key ones: • Do not “expect to find a dominant or perfect policy alternative” (p. 365)—you have to operate in the real world, and this includes complexity and restraints. • Do not “contrast a preferred policy with a set of ‘dummy’ or ‘strawman’ alternatives” (p. 365)—while this sometimes works politically (it is a Hobson’s choice), this can anger people, jeopardize your credibility, and is not honest or transparent in terms of democracy. • Do not “have a ‘favorite’ alternative until you have evaluated all the alternatives in terms of all the goals” (p. 365)—this is a common mistake. • Do not offer “‘kitchen sink’ alternatives—that is, ‘do-everything’ alternatives” (p. 366)—if there is one consistent theme in public administration, it is that it is constrained administration (e.g., legal, monetary, ethical, personnel, and time constraints). • Do not offer alternatives inconsistent “with available resources, including jurisdictional and controllable variables” (p. 366)—time is too valuable; pragmatism matters.

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Step IV: Evaluate and Select Policies

Each alternative must be evaluated according to each evaluation criterion. This will include quantitative evaluation, often using extrapolation, regression, discounting, cost-benefit analysis, and discounting techniques. For example, evaluating the alternative in our drug abuse example of putting all drug users in prison would require several quantitative applications. First, the number of drug users in our geographic region of interest would have to be estimated based on court records, interviews with experts, and other sources. Second, based on this, a researcher would have to estimate how many arrests would occur in a given year (which is, of course, affected by the policies adopted to deal with drug abuse). Third, this number could be extrapolated over time to take into account anticipated population increases or decreases. Of course, population changes would also have to be estimated. Fourth, the numbers collected so far could help us determine how many new prisons would have to be built over the next 10–20 years. Finally, once we had the number of new prisons, we could estimate costs using discounting techniques. Chapter 3 discussed the sort of positivist techniques needed to perform these quantitative tasks—as well as the limits of those techniques. (There would be several other questions to ask. Our list is suggestive, not exhaustive. It also doesn’t directly raise the question of whether or not we should be reducing the prison population.) Several more qualitative evaluations would also have to be made, for example: How do you measure effectiveness, equity, political acceptability, and ethical considerations? Much of this knowledge is subjective but a strong knowledge of social science disciplines such as political science, sociology, social work, and economics can assist the analyst. The analyst may have to conduct quick surveys, focus groups, or interviews to determine the views of stakeholders on various policy alternatives. In the drug abuse example, how do the different groups evaluate the different policies? What are the most relevant criteria for each group? The analyst must also make some decisions about feasibility. Does the government have the resources to implement a certain policy? In a classic text, Quade (1975, pp. 191–198), writing in a similar line of argument, suggests that when “quantitative models are inadequate,” the analyst can use expert opinion, groups of experts, scenario writing, and Delphi techniques. After policies have been evaluated, they should be displayed and scored in some type of matrix. Typically, analysts weigh criteria based on their research of stakeholders. A Goeller ­Scorecard with weighted criteria is the easiest and most useful technique. A simple example is illustrated in Table 6.1. In Table 6.1, policy A and policy C are tied with 13 points each. Policy B can be eliminated for now. In Table 6.2, we score policy A against policy C, giving a maximum of 2 points and a minimum of 1 point for each criterion. Using this approach, policy C is the preferred policy. In reality, it is very difficult to accurately assign points and weights to policies and come up with “one best” policy. But the process is not totally subjective. The assigning of weights is again determined by research of stakeholders. In this example, some stakeholders (taxpayers) believe that cost is the most important criterion, while others (administrators) believe that administrative feasibility is the most important criterion. The analyst must often make a decision on how to score a tie between choices. For example, what if two policies were rated good under administrative feasibility? Do you give 3 points, or does each receive 2.5 points? In this case, the latter choice would be best because you have a total of 6 points to assign to each policy. You could give 2.5 to the top two choices and 1 to the third choice. There is subjectivity in the process, but you must be consistent in your decision making. It is doubtful that you will ever have clear, unanimous, and specific consensus over what are the most important criteria. The analyst must rank the importance of each of the stakeholders and in essence place weights on their rankings of criteria. As explained previously, an analyst’s rankings are ultimately tied to his or her view of power and government. Does the analyst weigh the desires

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Table 6.1 An Adapted Goeller Scorecard with Weighted Criteria Policies Criteria

A

B

C

Cost

$50,000

$60,000

$35,000

(weight = 3)

(2 × 3 = 6)

(1 × 3 = 3)

(3 × 3 = 9)

Political Feasibility

Good

Fair

Poor

(weight = 2)

(3 × 2 = 6)

(2 × 2 = 4)

(1 × 2 = 2)

Administrative Feasibility

Poor

Good

Fair

(weight = 1)

(1 × 1 = 1)

(3 × 1 = 3)

(2 × 1 = 2)

Totals

13

10

13

Notes The first score in parentheses is the ranking: 3 = best alternative; 2 = second best; 1 = worst. The second number in parentheses is the weighting: 3 = most important criterion; 2 = second most important criterion; 1 = least important criterion.

Table 6.2 Breaking a Tie Policy Criteria

A

C

Cost

$50,000

$35,000

(weight = 3)

(1 × 3 = 3)

(2 × 3 = 6)

Political Feasibility

Good

Poor

(weight = 2)

(2 × 2 = 4)

(1 × 2 = 2)

Administrative Feasibility

Poor

Fair

(weight = 1)

(1 × 1 = 1)

(2 × 1 = 2)

Totals

8

10

of one interest group higher than those of another interest group because one group is more powerful and influential than the other group, or does the analyst make a decision based on his or her perception that one interest group represents the public interest more than another group? Analysts must decide, because interests will conflict, whether they work primarily to serve the political interests of the elected officials to whom they answer, or to serve the public interest at large. These are all value decisions tied directly to the analyst’s philosophy of government and beliefs about the role of the policy analyst. Consistent with the works of Danziger (1995) and Stone (2012), the process is highly subjective and value-laden. However, the evaluation of policies can help eliminate potentially unsuccessful policies and can provide elected officials, interest groups, and citizens with sound information with which to make their choices. As Danziger (1995, p. 45) writes: Students of policy analysis should be taught that their professional goal is not necessarily the attainment of consensus about the nature of the truth in any given policy issue. Rather, they should be concerned that all relevant parties have access to sufficient data and a level of understanding that will enable them to be true players in the policy process.

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The goal of the analyst, therefore, might not be one of selecting the best policy using a Goeller Scorecard, but rather of presenting information, including how data, criteria, and criteria weightings were derived. In this case, the role of the analyst is one of educator and not just expert.4 Another valuable technique is to have stakeholders do the scoring themselves. This could range from a committee using Goeller Scorecards to a community meeting where people put stars on a chart next to all alternatives of which they approve. On a more pragmatic level, we can argue that decisions in government must be made, and while postpositivists may criticize the rational approach, they have really failed to provide better decision-making methods. Postpositivism and postmodernism can be criticized as being comparable to the “lovely lemon tree” of the old folk song. As a theory and critique they are attractive and smell sweet, but their fruit (its pragmatic value) has all too often been impossible to eat. The rational approach, utilized under, and informed by, the premise that all political decision making is value-laden, is a nice compromise because it provides direction to policymakers who must make decisions in a political environment.5 The role of the analyst is to help the decision makers see the inherent value-laden nature of the process, how varying stakeholders might disagree with certain policies and support others, how changing circumstances and environments can alter policy decisions (the dynamic process), and the importance of a democratic ethos (see Chapter 8). Step V: Evaluate Adopted Policy (Evaluation Research)

Once a policy has been adopted, it should be evaluated for effectiveness in meeting its goals. Evaluation research is an important aspect of policy analysis. Many critics of government over the years have complained that many government policies do not work; yet the policies continue year after year. Remember that the fourth component part of the policy process, discussed in Chapter 5, was policy evaluation, adjustment, and termination. Public policy analysts believe that policies should be continually evaluated in the context of changing social, political, cultural, and economic conditions. Several methods of evaluation research cited by Babbie (2004, pp. 343–354) include the following: (1) experiments (with control groups); (2) nonequivalent control group designs (with comparison groups); and (3) time series analysis. Box 6.3 explores each of these methods in terms of teenage drug abuse.

Box 6.3  Teenage Drug Use

E

ven if we exclude alcohol, in both urban and suburban schools teenage drug use is widely agreed to be a major problem. Marijuana, inhalants, ecstasy, heroin, blow, speed, and other drugs are serious problems in middle and high schools. Assume that your community had developed and implemented an anti-drug program aimed at teenagers. How could you evaluate its effectiveness?

The Experiment The experiment, or control group approach, is illustrated by testing the success of a teenage antidrug program in schools. Students are randomly selected and then randomly placed into the antidrug program (the test group) or a group that does not receive the program (the control group). You would administer surveys about drug use and attitudes toward drugs to both groups, before and after the program. You would then evaluate the survey data to see if the test group had a greater decrease in drug use and had an increase in negative attitudes toward drugs relative to the control group. The control group works well in controlled experimental circumstances, but politically it is difficult to administer and often unethical. In the previous example, assume that the anti-drug

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program worked extremely well. Students in the test group had lower rates of drug use and reported more negative views toward drugs in general when compared to the control group. Parents of students in the test group would be pleased, but parents of students in the control group would most likely wonder why their children did not have the opportunity to participate in the anti-drug program. The use of control groups in public policy research is politically and ethically suspect.

Nonequivalent Control Group Due to political and ethical problems associated with control groups, many evaluation researchers will use what is termed the nonequivalent control group. Instead of randomizing participants into a test or control group, you would look for a comparison group that approximates the test group (i.e., in the school anti-drug program, a drug program would be administered to all ninth-grade students in a junior high school and pre- and post-tests would be administered at the beginning and end of the school year). As an evaluation researcher, you would then select a similar junior high school in a similar community and give them the same pre-test at the beginning of the year, and the same post-test at the end of the year. You would then compare results between the two schools. Politically and ethically this approach works. All the students in the first school receive the anti-drug training. The second school does not receive the training but does receive information on whether the program works so that they can decide to implement or not in later years. The process is neither perfect, nor a true experiment. In these quasi-experiments, the “control” group is not randomly created, therefore it is nonequivalent. Despite best efforts to find a comparison group that closely matches the test group, in most cases other variables will enter into the picture, making the two groups different and the results less meaningful than if it had been a true experiment.

Time Series Time series analysis looks at data over a long period of time, ideally before and after a policy is implemented. For example, you could collect data on teenage drug arrests for the past 20 years before the implementation of a teenage anti-drug program. These data would typically show some trend. The trend might be that teenage drug arrests are increasing over time, decreasing over time, or are fluctuating from year to year. Data would then be collected each year after the implementation of the anti-drug program. After a period of time adjudged by you to be long enough to be meaningful, you would then analyze the results. If drug arrests were increasing in the years before the anti-drug program and they are now decreasing, you would probably infer that the anti-drug program was working. If the trend was already decreasing and is still decreasing, you could not attribute much effect to the program. Similarly, if drug arrests fluctuated before the program, and are still fluctuating, the program’s effectiveness is called into question. If drug arrests have increased since the implementation of the program, you would likely deem the program unsuccessful. However, the analyst is cautioned that use of time series data is often unreliable. We will discuss two of many possible problems with concerns that should sound familiar. First, social data are socially created. Over the years, the police department may have changed arrest policies or increased or decreased the number of police officers. This activity could artificially alter arrest numbers. What looks like a drastic decline in teenage arrests could simply be the result of the police department shifting its emphasis away from teenage drug users to what it considers more serious crimes. Second, time series analysis does not control for population changes and cultural changes. Typically, analysts use nonequivalent control groups to help control for these variables. But even when using this approach, many problems remain.

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The Politics of Evaluation Research  Analysts must realize that evaluation research is very difficult. Although some agencies will be helpful (feeling they have nothing to hide, wanting to know about problems, and trusting in the evaluation process), that is not the norm. Administrators who implement policies are often very defensive when it comes to evaluating their agency’s policies. They may go to great lengths to put up roadblocks to the evaluation process. Many agencies require that the evaluation researcher work through agency personnel when accessing data, files, or clients of the agency. Many evaluation researchers term the person assigned to “assist” the evaluator “the insider” and see this person as a hindrance to securing an honest evaluation. Agency administrators and personnel are also very defensive about negative evaluations of the policies they implement. This defensiveness is understandable because poor evaluations can lead to budget cutbacks, the ending of programs, or the rare but possible elimination of the agency itself. Analysts should be prepared to defend their methodology and be prepared for the possibility that their personal integrity will be attacked by agency personnel who work on policies that receive poor evaluations.6 Finally, it is often inherently difficult to conduct a fair evaluation. Individuals such as prisoners, drug users, juveniles, and HIV/AIDS patients are often the beneficiaries of policies and are legally protected subjects. Evaluation researchers do not easily gain access to these individuals and many times will be denied access to their records. For example, if a researcher is hired to evaluate a teenage drug intervention program, the researcher would most likely want to interview teenagers who have been through the program to measure its effectiveness. However, the researcher cannot legally find out the identity of the teenagers because they are protected subjects.7 As a result, the analyst would have to interview staff members who work on the project. While this may secure valuable information, ultimately the ones who know whether or not the program works are the teenage clients, and the researcher cannot talk to them.

Summary of the Five-Step Method Perhaps you now feel you have a methodology, an approach to policy analysis that makes sense and that has pragmatic value despite the important warnings and caveats we offered. Once again, this method is neatly summed up in the following list, and the case study that concludes the chapter will let you try it out. • • • • •

Step I: Define the problem and determine its causes. Step II: Establish criteria to evaluate alternatives. Step III: Generate policy alternatives. Step IV: Evaluate and select policies. Step V: Evaluate adopted policy (evaluation research).

Concluding Thoughts Most multistep models are presented as ideal rational models. Even our five-step method (despite our warnings about politics, language, value conflict, and subjectivity, and our concerns about broadly defining stakeholders, education, and democracy) comes across as very logical, coherent, linear, and scientific. In practice, public policy analysis is never quite like that. Time frames are short, goals vague, problems ill-defined, and information always imperfect. If a practicing policy analyst was asked whether she used the rational model or any of its formal variations, she would probably say no. But if you asked her if she tried to define the problem, identify stakeholders, calculate the perspectives of stakeholders, determine evaluation criteria, generate alternatives, evaluate and choose alternatives, and conduct a post-implementation evaluation—she most certainly would say yes to most, if not all, of this.

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Like the policy process, policy analysis in real life is not clean and logical; it does not necessarily flow from step 1 to step 2 to step 3, and so on. Much of what analysts do is instinctive. Scholars like Patton and Sawicki attempt to rationalize the process, and their model is heuristic, which is to say that it helps students of public policy analysis understand the process by providing a sense of coherency and order. Rational models, like the five-step method you just learned, may also help analysts who use them as a blueprint, by helping prevent them from overlooking an important step. Unavoidably though, how analysts implement this rather rational five-step method is tied directly to nonrational factors such as how they believe policy problems are created and their view of the proper role and location of political power. The policy case that follows will help further explicate the processes of policymaking and policy analysis and once again demonstrates how “value conflict” and views of “power structures” fit into analysis. (You may wish to first review the discussion of these two concepts in Chapter 1.) Unless you are interested in working as an analyst in environmental management, you may not understand why a case about bison is relevant, but experience demonstrates that working on this case helps students become much better analysts, regardless of the policy issue, the country, or locale, and even the era. As policy analysts, in the classroom or on the job, you need to recognize the subjective element involved. You must also consider how the role you play fits with the norm of democratic governance. We give it high praise in theory but, all too often, make it a low priority in practice. Good luck.

Glossary Terms Delphi technique (p. 173)

scenario writing (p. 182)

Case Study: Playing Politics: Bison, Brucellosis, Business, and Bureaucrats Introduction: History and Context A Political History of Bison in Yellowstone National Park While Yellowstone National Park has been at the center of several well-known political controversies (fire management, wolf reintroduction, snowmobile regulation, grizzly bear management), no other issue—not bear management, not fire management, not snowmobile regulation, and not even wolf reintroduction—has created the sustained national political controversy caused by the killing of Yellowstone bison by the Montana Department of Livestock working in conjunction with the National Park Service (NPS). As you will see, bison occupy an important and special place in the history of Yellowstone, and the Yellowstone bison specifically represent a key element in the history of the American environmental movement. The controversy over how to manage bison, however, falls into the same general controversy over natural versus human management of the park. The bison controversy also demonstrates the multitude of interests that the NPS must try to accommodate. The American bison, a symbol of the pre-cowboy American West, has long been caught in the middle of a political and cultural struggle that makes Western politics a seedbed of ideological warfare, and political conflict. The current killing of Yellowstone National Park (continued)

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bison is best understood not in the biological or scientific realm, but rather in the world of power politics, economics, cultural identity, and postmodern symbolism. The controversy (from a political science perspective) is only indirectly related to brucellosis, the bacterial disease that infects some Yellowstone bison and that the ranching community publicly worries will be transmitted from bison to cattle. The history of politics surrounding Yellowstone bison is a long one, dating back to the founding of the American West. The evidence is that bison long ago made the 2,200,000 acres of Yellowstone and the 19,000,000 acres of the Yellowstone ecosystem home (although a few contemporary critics of the National Park Service contend that bison are not native to the park: see Kay, 2007). Schullery, Brewster, and Mack (1997) cite a Yellowstone National Park study that found bison blood residue on a 9,000-year-old knife found in the park. Francis Haines (1995, p. 157) states that in 1600, there were so many bison in the Yellowstone River Valley that the animals were forced to migrate into Idaho’s upper Snake River plains. Aubrey Haines (1977, p. 81) found that in 1870 an explorer, A. Bart Henderson, reported seeing thousands of bison above Hellroaring Creek in northern Yellowstone (the area now known as the Buffalo Plateau). Therefore, the strong evidence is that bison lived in Yellowstone and its ecosystem long before 1872, when Congress established Yellowstone National Park as “a public park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people.” Unfortunately, thousands of bison had been killed in the years since John Coulter first “unofficially” discovered Yellowstone in 1807. The establishment of the park did not end the carnage. Yellowstone Park Superintendent Philletus Norris reported that thousands of deer, elk, moose, and bison had been poached, because the park’s enabling legislation did not specify that hunting or acts of vandalism were prohibited. In 1882, the Park Improvement Company (a park concessionaire) had contracts with professional hunters to kill elk, deer, and other wildlife (Bartlett, 1989, p. 137). The larger problem facing wildlife, bison in particular, was poaching. More than 7,000 elk, deer, bighorn, and bison were killed in 1875 alone. By the mid-1880s, the near extinction (nationwide) of the bison drove the price of a bison head up to between $300 and $500 (Bartlett, 1989, p. 316; A. Haines, 1977, p. 60) and made bison a prime target of poachers. The debate and eventual passage of the organic act creating Yellowstone assumed that the area could be managed at no cost to the federal government. However, major tourism trade did not arrive for several years, and the park existed for its first 14 years with a skeleton crew whose main job was to map the area and build a human infrastructure of roads and buildings. It took several brave U.S. military officials, the actions of some outrageous poachers, and the eastern U.S. media to bring wildlife protection to Yellowstone. Stories of bison poachers spread throughout the region and many became ingrained in Yellowstone folklore. Without a National Park Service, the only government institution large enough to protect Yellowstone’s resources was the U.S. Army. The Army arrived in 1886 and quickly tried to end bison poaching. Acting Park Superintendent Captain George S. Anderson, in 1891, apprehended E. E. Van Dyck of Cooke City, Montana, who was poaching in the northeast corner of the YNP. Later, in 1892, Anderson captured Charles Pendelton, Cooke City poacher and butcher. Anderson also spent considerable time patrolling the area west of the park near Henry’s Lake, Idaho, where several buffalo poachers were thought to base their operations (A. Haines, 1977, pp. 61–62). Anderson’s actions helped slow the poaching and perhaps saved the remaining bison. Increasingly, the national media became involved in promoting the protection of Yellowstone bison and wildlife in general. During the winter of 1893–1894, an Army scouting party went into the Pelican Valley to look for buffalo and found a sledge trail headed

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toward Cooke City (A. Haines, 1977, p. 62). An earlier trail had been associated with known bison poacher Ed Howell, so Captain Anderson sent out another party to look for poachers. On February 13, 1894, the party found Howell with six bison scalps. The soldiers escorted Howell back to Fort Yellowstone at Mammoth Hot Springs despite the fact that there was no law to hold Howell or any other poacher. On the way to the fort, the party encountered Emerson Hough, Frank J. Haynes, and T. E. “Billy” Hofer of the New York weekly magazine Forest and Stream. Hough, an early 19th-century environmentalist, clearly recognized the symbolic importance of the event, wrote a story on the spot, and telegraphed it east (pp. 63–64). According to Haines, George Bird Grinnell, Forest and Stream editor, took the article to some important friends in Congress who used the bill to push passage of the Lacey Act, which would ban the killing of animals in National Parks. The Lacey Act was signed by President Cleveland on May 7, 1894. The act prohibited “all hunting or the killing, wounding, or capture, at any time, of any wild animal or bird, except dangerous animals when it is necessary to prevent them from destroying human life or inflicting injury” (Lacey Act, U.S. Statutes at Large, 28:73). Importantly, for future Yellowstone history, the act excluded predators such as wolves, coyotes, and cougars from protection. While the act was clearly a method to protect all the wildlife in the park including elk, moose, mountain sheep, and deer, the act more than anything was the result of the near-extinction levels of the American bison. The bison thus played an essential role in the preservation not only of wildlife but of national parks themselves. Without the outcry that surrounded the possible extinction of bison from Yellowstone (because they were nearly extinct elsewhere on the continent), the Lacey Act probably would not have had the necessary political momentum to be passed and signed into law. With bison now protected in Yellowstone, several offers, some of which were sincere and others of which were money-making schemes, were made to help save and grow the herd in the park. Charles Jesse Jones, known in the history books as “Buffalo Jones,” offered to become Yellowstone buffalo keeper in 1895 but was denied (Bartlett, 1989, p. 333). During that same time period the Smithsonian Institute provided some money to build a buffalo enclosure in Yellowstone. That money built an enclosure on Alum Creek in the Hayden Valley. The enclosure used hay to bait bison inside, where soldiers would then close a gate behind them. Unfortunately, only a few bison drifted in around the enclosure and none of these were captured (A. Haines, 1977, p. 69). Other unsuccessful efforts were attempted. E. C. Waters was given permission to buy four bison from a private herd in Texas (two cows and two bulls) and place them on an island of Yellowstone Lake. There, the bison would become a prime tourist attraction for Waters’s Yellowstone Lake Boat Company. His “game show” attracted visitors between 1896 and 1907. After 1907, the park regained control of the small bison herd that had been built up on the island (A. Haines, 1977, p. 77). Dr. Frank Baker, superintendent of the National Zoological Park at Washington, informed the park that capturing adult, wild bison was normally unsuccessful as the wild bison typically resisted restraint and died (A. Haines, 1977, p. 71). Haines writes of Baker’s remarks: His statement provided the basis for future efforts to save the Yellowstone bison. No further attempt was made to entrap the Hayden Valley herd; instead, funds were sought to purchase a semi-domesticated buffalo suitable for establishing a captive herd—which could be augmented with calves from the wild herd in the spring. (pp. 71–72)

(continued)

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In 1901, with Captain John Pitcher as park superintendent, Congress appropriated half of a requested $30,000 for buying between 30 and 60 bison and establishing them in a corral. The $15,000 was authorized by Congress on July 1, 1902. Buffalo Jones, after establishing a domestic herd of bison in the Midwest, sought and was awarded the title of “game warden” for the park. An enclosure was built one mile south of Fort Yellowstone, and 15 bison cows and three bulls were respectively purchased from domestic herds in northwestern Montana and Texas (A. Haines, 1977, p. 72). By 1902, only 22 bison were found in Yellowstone’s once bison-rich area of Pelican Creek (Bartlett, 1989, p. 333). By 1904, 11 calves were born in the Mammoth corrals. In addition, the size of the domestic herd was enlarged with the purchase of 21 bison from Howard Eaton’s herd in North Dakota (p. 334). By 1905, Pitcher moved some of the Mammoth herd to a new corral (to be later named Buffalo Ranch) located in the Lamar Valley (p. 336). Meyer and Meagher (1994, p. 65) report the establishment of the Buffalo Ranch in Lamar in 1907. Bartlett (p. 336) reports that the domestic bison population grew from 74 bison in 1908 to 276 by 1916. Near this time, brucellosis first appeared in the Buffalo Ranch herd. According to Meyer and Meagher (p. 650), the most likely source of the brucellosis was infected domesticated milk cows kept at Buffalo Ranch. The first park rangers arrived in Yellowstone in 1915, during the same time that automobiles were first allowed inside Yellowstone. The National Park Service Act, which set in motion the establishment of the National Park Service, was signed in 1916. The role of the U.S. Army was then phased out, and the rangers and the Park Service took over the management of the bison herd. Some of their wildlife management techniques would have detrimental environmental consequences. The U.S. Army began killing predators from the time of their arrival in the park. Between 1908 and 1917, 23 mountain lions, 1,188 coyotes, and 18 wolves were killed (Phillips and Smith, 1996, p. 15), The NPS continued the extermination of predators such as coyotes, cougars, and wolves in the false belief that the killing of these animals would help preserve elk, bison, moose, and deer. Park Superintendent Horace Albright wrote in 1922, “It is evident that the work of controlling predators must be vigorously prosecuted by the most effective means available” (quoted in Phillips and Smith, 1996, p. 15). By the mid-1930s, the last wolf pack had disappeared from Yellowstone. During the 1930s, Yellowstone rangers actively managed the bison herd. A. Haines (1977, pp. 311–312) writes: In the off-season the rangers managed the elk and buffalo in the northern part of the Park. They cut hay in the meadow at Yancey’s (Pleasant Valley, near Tower Junction), on Slough Creek, and on the bottom lands along the Lamar Valley at the Buffalo Ranch, stacking from 500 to 800 tons for the park horse herd and for feeding elk and buffalo during the worst part of the winter. The hope was to prevent large loss of elk and buffalo by holding them in the Park during very hard winters. The ranching operations were handled by a chief buffalo keeper, who had an assistant, one or two herders and an irrigator, and the help of rangers for feeding and for such big operations as slaughtering excess animals, castrating, and inoculating calves.

Using such control techniques, the bison herd was maintained at between 425 to 650 bison from the late 1920s until 1967. In that time period, 9,000 bison were killed or transferred (State of Montana Department of Livestock, 1997). The National Park Service changed its bison management in the late 1960s in response to the influential Leopold Report that advocated natural regulation of wildlife. According to this philosophy, bison numbers

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would be reduced only through natural deaths caused by winters, disease, or old age. Under this new management philosophy, bison herd numbers increased significantly. In the fall of 1996, the bison population was estimated at between 3,400 and 4,000.

The Case: Bison and Brucellosis The 1996 season was a difficult one for Yellowstone Park officials. Problems began during the late 1995 winter season when government shutdowns (as a result of a budgetary squabble between President Clinton and the Republican Congress) forced the closure of the park and hurt local tourist economies. Initial discussions over snowmobile use during the winter also began at that time and this further outraged local tourism communities. In August 1996, Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Mike Finley approved what was termed the “Interim Bison Plan.” For years there had been conflict between local ranchers and the park over the question of whether Yellowstone bison infected with brucellosis could transmit the disease to domestic cattle. Elk in Yellowstone are also infected with brucellosis, a disease that causes female animals to prematurely abort calves. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal, Plant, and Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for classifying a state as a “brucellosis class-free state.” Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming are classified as “brucellosis-free” states. The classification is important because it allows a state’s ranchers to sell cattle across state lines. APHIS has in recent years threatened to withdraw Montana’s brucellosis-free status because of its proximity to Yellowstone’s bison (Keiter, 1997, p. 5). Interestingly, ranchers and policymakers are less concerned about elk spreading the disease to cattle. Some have offered the politically plausible explanation that this is because elk are hunted outside the YNP and thus have a strong political base of support. The Interim Bison Plan was developed after a lawsuit was filed by the State of Montana against the NPS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s APHIS. The plan called for bison that were prone to wander outside the park to be corralled and tested for brucellosis. The plan replaced the “zero-tolerance” policy that had guided the state of Montana for several years. Under this earlier policy, bison that wandered outside the park were shot. According to the Yellowstone Journal (Glover, 1996, p. C–7), more than 400 bison were killed in the winter of 1995–1996 near Gardiner and West Yellowstone, Montana. Under the zero-tolerance policy, bison killings were typical each winter, with kills ranging from 200 to 400. The Interim Bison Management Plan found the NPS operating a capture facility inside the park near Gardiner, Montana. Unlike the previous zero-tolerance policy in which bison were shot by state of Montana officials once they left the park, this new policy instead had NPS personnel corral bison that were headed for private land inside the park. The Montana Department of Livestock operated a capture facility at the park boundary near West Yellowstone. Both facilities would test all bison and send those who tested positive for brucellosis, and all pregnant females, to slaughterhouses. Bison normally stay inside the boundaries of Yellowstone National Park during the late spring, summer, and fall months, when grasses for grazing are long and green. During mild winters, the vast majority of bison continue to stay inside the park. In the northern part of the park near Gardiner, Montana, the winters tend to be relatively mild in a climate that is essentially high desert. In the Madison River Valley near West Yellowstone, Montana, wintering bison tend to stay in the Firehole River and Madison River areas. In October 1996, a lawsuit was filed against the NPS, APHIS, and the U.S. Forest Service by the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, the Jackson Hole Alliance for Responsible Planning, the American Buffalo Foundation, the Gallatin Wildlife Association, and a private (continued)

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citizen. The plaintiffs were represented by the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now known as the Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund). The suit charged that the NPS could not participate in the capture and slaughter of bison because it was a “fundamental betrayal” of the National Park Service mission (Mansfield, October 31, 1996, p. 1). The suit was filed against federal agencies and not the state of Montana because the plaintiffs argued that the activities would take place on federal lands and that the activities would violate the National Environmental Protection Act (p. 14). Meanwhile, bad weather in the winter of 1996–1997 in YNP arrived later than normal. October remained unseasonably warm. As is typical, the park remained opened to motorized vehicles until the first Sunday in November. The period between early November and mid-December is a closed season for the busy park. In mid-December, the park opens for snowmobiles and the season lasts until mid-March. Snows finally arrived in November, and by early December the park was a beautiful winter wonderland of deep and fluffy snow. The NPS began grooming trails into Yellowstone from the park’s west entrance near the community of West Yellowstone and throughout Yellowstone. Snowmobile trails follow roadways and run from West Yellowstone through the Madison River Valley, and then at Madison Junction the trail splits into two directions. One trail breaks north and east and heads to Norris Geyser basin and the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone. A second trail leaves from Madison Junction and heads through large bison herds down the Firehole River Valley to Old Faithful. The northern entrance of the park is open year-round because a major roadway travels from Gardiner, Montana, through Mammoth Hot Springs to the Lamar Valley and on to Cooke City, Montana. (See Case Appendix A, which features a map of Yellowstone National Park.) In January 1997, the Greater Yellowstone Interagency Brucellosis Committee (GYIBC) met in Bozeman, Montana, to discuss solutions to the bison problem. Apparently, according to the West Yellowstone News (Mansfield, January 16, 1997, p. 4), a feud had been going on for about 30 years about the risks of brucellosis to cattle. The GYIBC is made up of the state of Montana livestock and wildlife agencies, the federal Fish and Wildlife Service, the NPS, the U.S. Forest Service, and APHIS. The group began meeting in 1994. They had been charged with the task of beginning an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing various options for bison management, including continuation of slaughter, public hunting, and vaccinations. By mid-January 1997, 52 additional bison had been killed in West Yellowstone and 113 were shipped for slaughter in Gardiner. At this point, it appeared that the bison removals (or slaughter depending on one’s stance on the issue) would be “minimal.” However, winter returned to Yellowstone in January, as heavy snow and severely cold temperatures hit the region. The partial melting in December had created a thick block of ice on Yellowstone grazing areas. Franke (2005, p. 139) writes: “An accumulation of snow ranging from two to five feet was followed by a partial thaw, rain, and then extreme cold, freezing a thick crust of ice that was impenetrable by foraging bison.” As a result, bison began migrating by the thousands toward what they hoped would be better feeding areas in the lower elevations outside the park. By late January, the West Yellowstone News (Mansfield, January 23, 1997, p. 14) reported that more than 585 bison had been killed. An article in the paper quoted Paul Pritchard of the National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), an eyewitness to the slaughter: The scene at the northern border of the Park is tragic. Animals are goring one another as they are crammed into pens and trucks to be shipped to slaughter. Three calves had their horns broken off and were bleeding profusely. An adult female arrived at the slaughterhouse badly gored and with broken ribs. Meanwhile, more bison are stacking up near the pens so another 100 bison could be killed next week at the north entrance alone.

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Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Mike Finley wrote a letter to Montana Governor Marc Racicot expressing concern about “humane treatment” for the bison and about the “number of animals being killed.” Finley asked the governor to invoke “contingency plans” to retain the integrity of the herds. Environmental groups such as the Fund for Animals and Biodiversity Legal Foundation called for an EIS to investigate the effects of snowmobiling on the park wildlife and other features. Environmentalists had noted for years that heavy winter use of the park was detrimental. Many environmentalists contended the groomed snowmobile trails were providing easy access for bison to leave YNP. More than 700 bison had been killed by the end of January 1997. During this time period, USA Today ran an advertisement paid for by the “Fund for Animals” that stated in part, “Boycott Buffalo Butchery … The State of Montana has zero tolerance for buffalo so we need you to have zero tolerance for Montana.” The ad asked readers to contact Montana Governor Racicot and “tell him that you won’t spend a dime in a state that doesn’t give a damn about the one animal, of all animals, everyone should have a conscience about.” In response to the ad, Racicot blamed the bison incident on the federal government and accused the Fund for Animals of false advertising (Mansfield, January 23, 1997, pp. 1, 8). Many people were convinced that the bison, not the state coffers, deserved their support. In late January 1997, Yellowstone National Park officials temporarily suspended the killing of bison at the Gardiner facility because of the harsh winter. Instead, officials tried to haze animals away from the park boundaries. By early February, YNP officials resumed capture operations after hazing efforts failed. Montana officials continued to shoot bison near West Yellowstone during this period. In February, Governor Racicot, facing severe national criticism, invited federal officials to Helena to discuss contingency measures. Interest groups soon began proposing their own bison policies. In early February 1997, a combination of regional and national conservation groups outlined a bison management plan that included putting pressure on the NPS or the state of Montana to protect wildlife, eliminate the snow trails, allow bison to use national forest lands, and vaccinate cattle against brucellosis. In early March 1997, Montana’s congressional delegation and Governor Racicot met with Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman to discuss the bison problem. Montana Senator Conrad Burns made it clear to federal officials that he wanted the NPS to manage bison within the park (Mansfield, March 6, 1997, p. 3). The parties seemed to disagree on ownership of the bison problem but agreed to work together to create an Environmental Impact Statement by the end of July 1997. By early March 1997, 1,049 bison had been killed under the policies of the Interim Bison Plan. In an editorial printed in the West Yellowstone News (Racicot, 1997), Governor Racicot called the shooting of bison “a tragic reality.” He blamed YNP for not controlling the population of bison and stated that his job, as governor, was to protect the interests of Montana’s main economic asset—ranching. In late March 1997, a woman from Bozeman, Montana, threw bison entrails at Governor Racicot as he spoke on the bison issue at a public forum in Gardiner (Mansfield, March 27, 1997). An aerial count of the herd in early April 1997 found the bison’s numbers in the park to be 1,089 compared with the 3,400 to 4,000 estimated count in the fall of 1996. While more than 1,100 were killed by the actions of the state of Montana and the National Park Service, many other bison died of starvation as they were trapped by deep snow inside the park’s boundaries. (continued)

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The Late 1990s: Studies and Planning In May 1997, the National Academy of Sciences began a study (published as a book in 1998) that looked at the following issues: the number of bison infected with brucellosis in Greater Yellowstone and “the potential of developing a vaccination program”; the role of elk and other wildlife in brucellosis transmission; “the relationship, if any, between bison population dynamics and brucellosis”; the ability of blood testing to measure infection rates; the effectiveness and “safety of existing vaccines for target and nontarget species”; and other questions related to reducing the risk of transmission from wildlife to cattle (Cheville et al., 1998, p. 13). November 1997 also saw the release of the academy’s findings to the public. Some of the major findings were: • “Seronegative results do not necessarily establish the absence of infection, because some seronegative animals in chronically infected herds are carrying live B. abortus.” • “The risk of bison or elk transmitting brucellosis to cattle is small, but it is not zero.” • “If infection rates are not substantially reduced in elk, reinfection of bison is inevitable.” • Bison leave the YNP as a “result of an increasing population and harsh winter weather, and under current management practices,” the bison herd numbers will continue to increase. • “A long-term, controlled vaccination study must be conducted to assess the complete role of vaccination in brucellosis control” and eradication and any vaccination program for bison must be accompanied by a concomitant program for elk. (Cheville et al., 1998, pp. 1–9)

The fall of 1998 saw a flurry of activity with all the various management plans, comment periods, and land negotiations regarding the bison. The fall of 1998 also marked Phase I of the Church Universal and Triumphant (CUT) land purchase (Royal Teton Ranch) being approved by Congress. This agreement among CUT, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation was announced in 1997. The Church Universal and Triumphant has 7,850 acres adjacent or close to Yellowstone National Park’s northern rim in the Gardiner, Montana, area. The asking price for this land was $13 million. The Department of Interior saw this purchase as part of a policy creating “bison easements”—allowing bison more room to wander when they leave the park. Hundreds of bison had been killed in 1996–1997 on the acres owned by CUT. It was not until April 17, 2008, after many years of delay, that the National Park Service moved toward purchasing grazing rights from the ranch (which should allow some free-ranging bison outside the park’s north border). The year 1999 ended with the release of a study that concerned many environmental groups and bison advocates. These advocates had for years questioned whether brucellosis was really the reason that bison were being killed by the state of Montana. In 1999, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition reported, “Three years of tissue analysis at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory has revealed that four out of every five buffalo slaughtered outside Yellowstone National Park had no trace of brucellosis” (Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 1999; Hoyt, 1998). One problem is that the test for brucellosis produces many false positives. The tests revealed that 117 of 144 bison that had been killed were not infected by the bacterial disease. Such scientific findings only further intensified the political conflict and further minimized trust between the opposing sides. Finally, in 2000, the Interagency Bison Management Plan was signed by participating agencies. According to the IBMP website, the goal of the plan is to: • maintain a wild, free-ranging bison population; • reduce the risk of brucellosis transmission from bison to cattle;

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The plan includes the use of adaptive management and it has been adapted many times between 2000 and 2015.

The 21st Century and the Bison Controversy The original edition of this book left the bison case in 1999. The second edition left the controversy in 2008 and the third edition in 2015. Sadly, despite a report from one of our book adopters that his students (falsely) concluded that the issue had already been solved by about 2012, we still cannot report in December 2019 as we work on the fourth edition that the issue has been resolved and that bison, cattle, ranchers, and environmentalists are living in harmony in the American West. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Instead, the issue and controversy continue. On May 18, 2007, brucellosis was confirmed in a herd of cattle in Bridger, Montana. The incident in Montana meant that all three Greater Yellowstone states lost their brucellosisfree status. Wyoming lost its status in 2003 (but regained it in 2006) and Idaho lost its status (with little media fanfare) in 2005. However, in all three incidents it was elk and not bison that infected domestic cattle. Jim Magagna, vice president of the Wyoming Stock Growers Association, stated, “None of us see the light at the end of the tunnel as to how we can actually eliminate brucellosis in the Greater Yellowstone area because of the wildlife side of it” (Brown, 2007).

Overview The period of 2000–2019 saw many twists and turns in the bison controversy. Who would have imagined when the first edition of this book went to print that seven years later a new federal agency called Homeland Security, created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC, would be involved in monitoring bison outside Yellowstone National Park? Policy change theory suggests that policy entrepreneurs routinely take preexisting solutions such as monitoring, hazing, and killing bison and couple (or connect) them to new problems (e.g., terrorism). So, as students of public policy, we should not have been surprised that, according to the Associated Press, as of the winter of 2006, “more than $180,000 has been spent to send more than 800 Yellowstone National Park bison to slaughter this winter including about $42,000 for the services of the U.S. Homeland Security agents” (Associated Press, 2006). Environmentalists were quick to jump on the involvement of Homeland Security, and critique it as silly. Carl Pope of the Sierra Club wrote: But evidently there is an undisclosed and critical reason for the massacre: homeland security. Could the government have information that al Qaeda has targeted Yellowstone’s bison as a possible biological weapon? Since brucellosis is only very mildly contagious to humans, with about 100 cases a year, mainly in slaughterhouse workers, this might suggest that al Qaeda really has been robbed of more potent weapons and that we are, indeed, on the verge of winning the war on terrorism. (Pope, 2006)

Pope then closes with more sarcasm: “If Homeland Security must spare agents to escort these bison, then clearly the bison threat must be supercritical—since there aren’t enough agents to guard facilities such as chemical plants in crowded urban areas.” (continued)

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In 2007, the period saw the development of another locally based pro-bison interest group, the Horse Butte Neighbors of Buffalo (HOBNOB). This group of homeowners, who reside just outside Yellowstone’s west entrance, have become vocal critics of the hazing and killing of bison. In May 2007, Susan McClure (2007), a member of the group, sent a blistering letter to Montana’s newly elected Democratic Governor Schweitzer. McClure pointed out that there are no longer grazing allotments near Horse Butte and described what she sees as the absurd and inhumane treatment of bison: We, the residents of Horse Butte, have been watching this every day for the last two weeks and it continues. Bison, who have naturally migrated out of Yellowstone National Park to feed on grass and give birth to calfs [sic], are repeatedly being run and chased. This includes, obviously pregnant cows and newborn calves. Some construction workers watched in horror as two hours-old calves were repeatedly run into the barbed-wire fence by two hazers who were obviously enjoying watching the calves brawl as they were being poked by the barbs. So much for “hazing the bison humanely and safely.”

Thus, despite changes, the basic dynamics of the bison controversy remained stable over the period of 2000–2007, and again from 2007–2015. Policy became ingrained in administrative procedure and incrementalism. The number of bison killed each winter declined significantly during the early part of the time period (at least compared with 1996–1997), but the controversy reignited during the 2005–2006 winter season when a total of 1,016 bison were either shot or sent to slaughter by the Montana Department of Livestock and the National Park Service. In addition, over 1,000 bison were removed from the herd in January 2015 (National Parks Traveler, 2015). Then, in November 2015, the National Park Service announced that at least 1,000 bison would be lethally removed from Yellowstone in the winter of 2015–2016. The bison controversy remains a local, regional, and national media event (search “Yellowstone bison” and “brucellosis” on Google News to see examples). The Buffalo Field Campaign still engages in its fieldwork, the Montana Department of Livestock still hazes and kills bison, and the National Park Service still operates a capture facility. The science behind brucellosis and its relation to cattle transmission has improved but is still very much contested in the political arena. The update that follows focuses on the following: (1) the new bison management plan, (2) political change, (3) a new bison hunting season, and (4) scientific developments on the issue. Finally, we conclude this update by posing and trying to answer the following question: Has there been policy learning between opposing coalitions since the 2000s?

Management Plan The late fall of 2005 saw a discussion of changes to the Interagency Bison Management Plan first signed in 2000. The plan recommended an “adaptive” management approach that acknowledges uncertainty, carefully monitors outcomes, and adapts future course of actions based on such knowledge (Clarke et al., 2005). The plan created two management zones, one in the Western Boundary Area (near West Yellowstone, Montana) and one in the Northern Boundary Area (near Gardiner, Montana). In the Western zone, the plan allowed some tolerance for seronegative pregnant bison. The Northern Boundary saw the hazing of bison that crossed the park’s northern boundary and the development of a capture facility where bison are either held or sent to slaughter. The plan seeks a target population of 3,000 bison. When the bison population is above this number, bison are likely to be quarantined or sent to slaughter rather than hazed. In addition, the plan continues to search for an effective vaccine for bison.

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National Park Service biologist Rick Wallen (2006), articulating NPS actions in January 2006 that led to bison being sent to slaughter from the Stephens Creek capture facility, describes the management plan this way: When bison cross the North Boundary near Reese Creek, we respond according to brucellosis risk management procedures identified in our decision document for Implementing the IBMP (released in December of 2000). We haze bison back into the Park until such operations become unsafe and unfeasible. Then we are faced with the difficult decision of capturing bison that consistently become a risk for commingling with livestock on private lands adjacent to the north park boundary. Holding bison inside fenced areas of the park, feeding them hay and supplying water using troughs for 1/4 of the year is not the intended purpose of the Stephens Creek capture facility. Thus, during January the decision was made to consign captured bison to slaughter because of the high risk of commingling with cattle. In late January, we estimated that the population is greater than 3500 animals. This size population has rarely been observed during the past 100 years. The reproductive increment added to the population over the last four years, born each year between late April and early June, has been between 600 and 800 calves annually. We expect the number of calves this coming summer to represent approximately 15 to 20 percent of the 2006 summer population.

As public administrators, employees of the National Park Service are, as Kenneth Ashworth (2001) defines it, “caught between the dog and the fireplug.” In other words, the National Park Service is trying to please the interests of the state of Montana livestock community and simultaneously please environmentalists who wish to retain free-ranging and wild bison in the world’s first national park. Wallen (2006), for example, concludes: “Please be assured that the National Park Service will continue to cooperatively advance the long term conservation of a free ranging population of wild bison.” The NPS for many years before their participation in the 1996–1997 killings had been, according to members of the livestock coalition, “uncooperative” on bison management issues. But Franke (2005, p. 164) writes in this regard: However, becoming a team player meant that after years of representing the interests of wild bison, the Park Service no longer had a voice of its own on bison management, or at least not a voice it could use in public.

In other words, as Franke points out, the NPS is caught in the ambiguously difficult position of both sticking to its mantra of maintaining a wild and free roaming bison population in Yellowstone National Park and simultaneously participating in capturing, holding, and testing bison. In essence, the new plan is a classic ambiguous bureaucratic compromise. The NPS can argue that it is retaining bison populations at historic high levels (the population was above 3,000 at least until 2008, when it fell to 2,300, but had rebounded to around 4,000– 4,500 animals by 2015) and at the same time cooperating with local livestock concerns. To be fair to the NPS, in a biological sense, the plan does seem to protect a population of bison that is big enough to maintain its existence. At the same time, the Park Service’s insistence that it is maintaining “free ranging” and “wild” bison is almost as difficult for wildlife advocates to accept as is what they see as needless slaughter of magnificent and powerful animals. In 2014, the Interagency Bison Management Plan was again updated. The update included objectives that would allow bison some migration outside the park, manage bull bison in a manner that better reflects their lower risk of transmission of brucellosis to cattle, and continue some vaccination of bison, continue hazing, and use slaughter only when necessary. (continued)

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Political Change In November 2004, Brian Schweitzer, a Democrat, was elected governor of Montana, replacing Republican Judy Martz, who did not run for re-election. Schweitzer is a rancher from Whitefish, Montana, and a former Clinton appointee to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In the first days of his administration in early 2005, Schweitzer shook up the policy arena with a major action and two bold suggestions. First, the new governor canceled a planned bison hunt because of the negative publicity that the event was bringing to Montana. Second, he publicly suggested that Wyoming close its elk feedlots to help eradicate brucellosis from elk. This bit of news was welcomed by environmental groups but sent shock waves through Wyoming’s elected and ranching circles. The governor of Wyoming’s spokesperson stated, “While the governor appreciates the advice, he thinks that Governor Schweitzer should concentrate on Montana” (Royster, 2005). While the first two actions signaled a new political direction from Montana on the bison issue, a third issue tended to suggest that partisanship and bison management bear little correlation. Simultaneously with the feedlot suggestion, Schweitzer proposed quarantining all bison in YNP and killing all infected animals and sending healthy ones to Native American tribes or ranchers. Thus, YNP, under the governor’s plan, would have temporarily been without any bison. Bison would then be restored with the offspring of the adopted animals. Such a plan sent shock waves through environmental groups but found much support from ranching groups. Schweitzer reversed course in the spring of 2006 and instead endorsed a buffer zone concept around YNP that would eliminate cattle grazing near the park and would pay ranchers not to graze cattle. But Montana Stockgrowers Association President Bill McDonald called it a “dangerous precedent,” and said the governor’s proposal—like most in the controversy—seems dead in the water (Missoulian, 2006). Schweitzer left office in 2013 and was replaced by another Democrat (Steve Bullock). While there were calls by activist groups for citizens to contact Bullock to stop bison killings (Defenders of Wildlife, 2014), the new governor had been largely quiet about the issue initially. However, in 2015, the governor suggested that bison could be allowed outside YNP and into Montana in selected areas when the population of bison drops below 3,500 (Brown, 2015). Similarly, the election of John Tester to the U.S. Senate in 2006 and the new Democratic majority in the U.S. House and Senate provided new hope for bison advocates. On March 23, 2007, the House Committee on Natural Resources held a hearing entitled “Oversight: Yellowstone National Park Bison.” The transcript provided on Lexis-Nexis Congressional reveals that despite the passage of time, the basic storyline of the bison issue remains the same. Range scientists and the ranching community still believe that bison can transmit brucellosis to cattle and that testing and slaughter is the only method to reach the goal of eliminating brucellosis from Yellowstone bison. Bison advocates, conversely, contend that brucellosis transmission is highly unlikely in the wild and that Congress could “direct the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to develop a brucellosis-management zone whereby livestock producers within the zone will institute brucellosis proof management practices” and “Congress can direct the Gallatin National Forest to establish a wild bison recovery zone within which the needs of habitat for bison and other species are taken as primary consideration in all multiple use decisions” (Statement of Joshua Osher, Buffalo Field Campaign, 2007). No congressional action has been taken. In the summer of 2018, YNP Superintendent Dan Wenk was given the choice of reassignment or retirement (he chose retirement). Media reports contended that Wenk was pushed out by the Trump Administration’s Secretary of Interior Ryan Zinke (who left his

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position six months later due to numerous ethics violation investigations) and the main sticking point seemed Wenk’s policies toward bison. An Associated Press news story (Brown, 2018) quoted Wenk as stating, “I feel this is punitive action, but I don’t know for sure. They never really gave me a reason why.” The news story then states, “The only dispute he’s had with U.S. Interior Ryan Zinke, who oversees the park service, was whether the park has too many bison” (Brown, 2018); Zinke was a former Montana member of the U.S. House of Representative and a well-known advocate of ranching interests.

Hunting When the first edition of our book came out, a bison hunt was being considered as a possible policy solution and was even endorsed by some environmental groups. Montana finally held its first bison hunt in 15 years in the fall of 2005 (remember that Governor Schweitzer suspended the hunt in the spring of 2005). Forty bison were killed during this first hunt, and hunters had to take a required training course that taught everything from how to deal with the media and protestors, to making a clean kill, to the history of bison (Bohrer, 2006). The winter of 2005–2006 was a hard winter with cold temperatures and deep snow that drove many bison outside YNP. For the most part, the hunt occurred without much media or interest group criticism. In fact, the local newspaper, the West Yellowstone News, featured several photos of young and older hunters who had proudly bagged their first bison. The second bison hunt was during the winter of 2006–2007, which was much milder, and few bison strayed outside the park. This hunt led to much criticism by both bison advocates and media outlets. During the hunting season of 2007, only three bison were seen outside the park near West Yellowstone, and these were often on private property near Horse Butte. These three bison soon became part of the daily media circus of the controversy. A first bison was shot illegally less than 150 yards from private residences (the killing was videotaped by the Buffalo Field Campaign and later posted on YouTube). Ed Millspaugh, president of the Hebgen Lake Estates Homeowners, was quoted in the West Yellowstone News and described the incident this way: I watched him [the hunter] fire and saw the buffalo jump the fence … the hunter fired again and the animal fell. The hunter walked off and the buffalo rose to its feet two more times before it died two hours later. (Hoffman, 2007, p. A–1)

Eventually, the other two bison were also killed (legally). As of autumn 2019, bison are still hunted in Montana (Montana, Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 2015). The controversy over killing bison as they leave Yellowstone National Park continues, unabated. The Buffalo Field Campaign dedicated much effort to documenting bison hunters shooting bison and the group uploaded much of this captured footage to its YouTube site (Buffalo Field Campaign, 2015). Some of these videos show hunters shooting bison as they quietly stand in a field. Other bison do not run after the guns are fired; instead they often seem to try and come to the rescue of the bison that have been shot. Analysis of these videos and their role in policy making is found in McBeth et al. (2012). The impact of bison hunting on bison population control seems minimal.

Science The science in the bison controversy has been much disputed by advocacy groups. Yet there has been much research done on this issue since the late 1990s. Science, of course, ideally (continued)

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provides answers to questions and can assure both sides that government actions are not arbitrary but rather are based on the best scientific evidence. Since 1999, there have been three areas in which a large volume of research has taken place. We are going to review the major findings in each of these areas. Brucellosis Transmission Remember, the controversy involves whether bison can transmit brucellosis to cattle and how long the brucella bacteria can remain viable on grazing lands. Clarke et al. (2005, p. 30) cite a study and state, “Primary risk of disease transmission from bison to cattle is through oral ingestion of shed bacteria.” Clarke et al. (p. 30) then go on to conclude that female bison are the highest-risk category “from January through parturition season, which typically ends in early June.” Later they contend that “risk of transmission from bull bison, though logically small, cannot be entirely eliminated” (p. 31). Yet there have not been any documented cases of bison to cattle brucellosis transmission in wild settings. On the second question of how long the brucella bacteria can survive in the local environment, the Animal, Plant, Health, Inspection Service and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (MTFWP) conducted field experiments in 2001, 2002, and 2003 using fetuses that had been infected with brucellosis. In short, the findings revealed that infected fetuses placed on the ground in February had bacteria that remained viable for up to 78 days. Conversely, those placed on the ground in May had “no positive carcasses detected by 18 days post-set out” (Clarke et al., 2005, p. 16). The difference in length of bacterial viability is explained by light conditions. Vaccinations A great deal of research was conducted on the best way to administer the RB-51 vaccine to bison (a pneumatic rifle seems to work), where to shoot bison (the thigh and shoulder seem the best places), and the safety of the vaccine on bison health (it seems generally safe but more research is needed particularly on pregnant female bison). However, the effectiveness of RB-51 in reducing or eliminating brucellosis in bison remains inconclusive (Clarke et al., 2005, p. 27). Despite the continued emphasis on vaccinations of bison in the 2014 IBMP updates, the NPS does not believe that vaccinations are effective. The NPS writes in this regard: This rationale was supported in February 2013 by an independent panel of vaccination and wildlife experts whose consensus conclusions included the “best available data do not support that remote vaccination of bison with the currently available vaccines will be an effective tool for suppressing brucellosis in wild bison to a level that changes the IBMP management strategies.” (National Park Service, 2015)

Bison Migrations A significant question raised during the 1990s was “Do bison use groomed snow trails to leave Yellowstone National Park in the winter?” In a detailed and systematic study, Bjornlie and Garrott (2001) concluded that while bison use the groomed roads (when the topography provided them with no other alternative), they generally forged their own trails parallel to roads and along river bottoms. On the other hand, Franke (2005, p. 210) points out that the Fund for Animals disputed the findings of the study because the study was conducted during only two “relatively mild winters that followed the major bison population reduction in 1997.”

Has Policy Learning Occurred? According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 145), opposing advocacy coalitions can, over time, learn across coalitions. In other words, through improved science and knowledge,

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problems that were once intractable can become solvable. Our final question is whether or not this has happened in this controversy. The answer, of course, depends on who you talk to. After reading the 2005 and 2014 adaptations to the 2000 bison plan, one is struck by the neutral, scientific language that places the controversy within scientifically testable questions and seems to suggest that all sides (at least all agencies) can work together. However, when one looks at the messy policy and political world of what Deborah Stone terms “the polis,” the answer seems to be that there has been only limited learning across advocacy coalitions. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith contend that issues that are dominated by battles between opposing coalitions over policy beliefs are likely to remain intractable. In this case, Greater Yellowstone’s opposing coalitions battle over three dominant and conflicting policy beliefs: federalism, science, and the relationship between humans and nature (McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones, 2005)—and these beliefs explain much of the continued conflict. In terms of federalism, the bison issue represents a fundamental conflict between local and national control. Whose interests should win out? Should policy primarily reflect the interests of local Montana livestock growers or the national constituency of Yellowstone National Park? In terms of science, Montana livestock officials view science as a means to protect their cattle. In other words, as an example, bison vaccines are seen as a way of protecting cattle. Conversely, bison advocates promote the science of conservation biology, natural management, and bison’s role in the ecosystem as key elements, and these advocates contend that the use of solutions like bison vaccines violates natural management philosophy. Finally, and most importantly, the relationship between humans and nature as a policy belief explains much of the continued conflict. The livestock industry fundamentally views bison as livestock that should be herded, tested, and slaughtered. Conversely, the environmental coalition view bison as distinct symbols of wildness and their importance goes beyond monetary calculation. The controversy, like nearly all such policy disputes (or at least wicked problems), remains grounded in power, politics, values, and value conflict. While the biological sciences can tell us much about brucellosis transmission and bison migrations, they cannot answer normative questions such as, “How do bison fit into our society, and what value do we place on them?” (although the social sciences can provide some evidence to how society answers these questions). In an article written in 1999 (McBeth and Clemons, 1999, p. 174), we concluded: There seems to be an unwillingness in this policy issue to actively seek empirical data or to ignore such findings. There also seems to be dozens of compromise solutions … The larger and non-stated question raised by individuals and groups from the bison controversy is a normative one: “How do we want to live our lives?” The highly symbolic bison is just an entity for both sides to hang their respective values on.

We still stand by this conclusion. The bison controversy is about power, people, and lifestyles—not just brucellosis and cattle. In short, it remains a socially constructed, wicked problem.

Case Big Task Your professor may or may not assign this case for you to work on (alone or more likely in teams), but even if not assigned, we encourage you to think through these five subtasks, before moving on to the discussion questions. (continued)

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Task Scenario: The “Greater Yellowstone Interagency Brucellosis Committee” (GYIBC) has hired you to conduct a policy analysis of the situation today and come up with policy recommendations. You are to do the following five subtasks utilizing the fivestep model: Step I: Define the Problem and Determine Its Causes. (How will you define the problem when the interests and values of the interested parties are so disparate? Who are the major stakeholders here? What are the values and interests of each of the stakeholders? How do you decide which stakeholders to include or exclude? What are the “stories” of the major stakeholders? How does your view of power structures lead to a problem definition? Who is your client here?) ____________________________________________________________________________ Step II: Establish Criteria to Evaluate Alternatives. (What are your major evaluation criteria? How are your criteria tied to major stakeholders? If stakeholders have conflicting criteria, how will you reconcile this?) ____________________________________________________________________________ Step III: Generate Policy Alternatives. (What are some possible policy alternatives? How do you generate alternatives in this case? Do these alternatives eliminate the problem without favoring one group over another?) ____________________________________________________________________________ Step IV: Evaluate and Select Policy. (What policies do you recommend and why? A table showing the pros and cons of each considered policy would be helpful. What criteria did you use to weight criteria? Was your decision ultimately based on some view of power and democracy?) ____________________________________________________________________________ Step V: Evaluate Policies. (Detail a plan to evaluate each recommended policy. What problems do you anticipate in evaluating these policies?) ____________________________________________________________________________

Discussion Questions 1. Does Kingdon’s policy model shed any light on what might or should happen here? How would the Advocacy Coalition Framework or the Narrative Policy Framework study this issue? 2. The rational actor model (public choice theory) suggests people are rational actors weighing up costs and benefits and pursuing their own best interests. As a whole, does this case study support this view? Is this a case where the positivist tools from Chapter 3 could be profitably used? Would that make a difference? 3. In Chapter 5 we discussed implementation. It has often been stated that the way public policy decisions are made has a substantial impact on their legitimacy. How would that play out in this situation? 4. Democracy is a recurring theme throughout this text. Would an analyst with a strong commitment to public involvement in policy analysis make a difference? 5. We have also focused on the impact of individuals and argued that personality, personal relations, propensity to take risks, and the quality of leadership are important factors in the policy process. In your opinion, in this case, what has been and what should be the role of individuals? 6. On a related note, in Chapter 4 we quoted Gary Orren as saying that what motivates people to sustained action is a “collection of deep commitments and feelings.” How does his point relate to this case study? 7. To put it bluntly, we have insisted that the essence of policy analysis is political—that it is about power and objective facts viewed subjectively based upon value conflict and interests. One key we have also stressed is the role of what Deborah Stone called “strategically crafted argument.” Does this case study support our view of the essence of the policy process and the argument made by Stone?

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8. Did the five-step model help you understand the problem, and help you organize and structure your research and a potential response in a way that made the task more manageable, your analysis more thorough, and so forth? Or did this wicked problem reveal possible problems with, or the limitations of, the five-step model? 9. What role did democracy play in your approach? If you felt democracy played too small a role, you may be encouraged to know that Chapter 7, and especially Chapter 8, help integrate a more robust role for democracy into your skill set and into the policy analysis model. 10. Finally, if you worked on the case in teams, did working on the case together produce a different outcome than if you had worked on it alone? If so, what does that reveal?

Case Appendix A Case Figure 6.1  A Map of Yellowstone National Park Northeast Entrance

North Entrance 5mi.

Mammoth

18mi. 29mi.

Tower Falls 21mi. 19mi. Norris

Canyon

12mi.

West Entrance

14mi. 14mi.

16mi

Madison Lake Bridge Bay

16mi.

21mi.

17mi. Old Faithful

Fishing Bridge

27mi.

East Entrance

West Thumb Grant Village 22mi.

N South Entrance

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Case Appendix B Teaching Resources Over the years, we have received several requests for additional teaching materials for this controversial issue. Here we provide some books (including a novel), videos, and Internet sources that might provide invaluable for both faculty teaching this case and for students writing papers on the issue. The case references are also full of excellent reading material about this issue.

Videos, YouTube, and Online Sources ABC News Nightline. 2000. Buffalo Wars. Despite some serious mistakes like stating that Teddy Roosevelt founded Yellowstone and an opening scene of the Grand Tetons with a voice-over “reporting from Yellowstone National Park,” this 20-minute video provides an interesting overview of the controversy in 2000. You can visit the website at http://abcnews.go.com/2020. Arts and Entertainment Home Video. 1999. Investigative Reports: War on the Range. The video provides fairly balanced coverage of the issue, although it overplays the “Wild West” angle. Good coverage of Buffalo Field Campaign protesting at Horse Butte. You can shop for the video at www.aetv.com/. Buffalo Field Campaign videos. The Buffalo Field Campaign Has Their Own YouTube Channel. See www.youtube.com/channel/UCIRWaQWXjK1RXc6_hG-kZzQ. Ralph Maughan’s website and blog. Dr. Maughan’s website www.forwolves.org/ralph/ (which ends in 2006) provides an almost daily 8–to 9–year chronicle of the controversy. His new blog (http://wolves.wordpress.com) continues to be an invaluable source of information. Google: Search for “Yellowstone National Park bison” and “Montana Department of Livestock bison” to get a wide-ranging set of views and information on the issue. Also search “West Yellowstone News” to find a local paper with an excellent archive on the bison issue. National Geographic documentary, “Silencing the thunder” provides a short (26:34) but fairly comprehensive overview of the controversy in 2017. This includes interviews with various stakeholders. www.npr.org/2017/04/16/524242247/slaughter-of-yellowstonebison-at-the-center-of-culture-war (accessed July 16, 2019). National Geographic. 2016. “Wild Bison Return to Europe after a Century.” https://news. nationalgeographic.com/2016/03/160323-european-bison-reintroduced-netherlandsrewilding-science/?google_editors_picks=true (accessed July 17, 2019).

Books Franke, Mary Ann. 2005. To Save the Wild Bison: Life on the Edge in Yellowstone. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. This book presents a detailed historical angle on the controversy and is invaluable to understanding the issue. Christofferson, April. 2004. Buffalo Medicine: A Novel. New York: Tom Doherty and Associates. This novel follows a veterinarian who teams up with a Buffalo Field Campaign worker to uncover the political motives behind the controversy. Despite the book’s fictional status, it does provide good understanding of the cultural context of the dispute.

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Farrell, Justin. 2015. The Battle for Yellowstone: Morality and the Sacred Roots of Environmental Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. The book focuses on the social, cultural, and moral roots of conflicts in Yellowstone and reading the book would give good background to the bison conflict.

Case References Allison, Ashley. 2014. “A Death Sentence for Yellowstone’s Bison.” Daily Kos, March 14. www.dailykos.com/story/2014/03/14/1284751/-A-death-sentence-for-Yellowstones-bison# (acessed July 31, 2015). Anez, Bob. 1999. “Judge Upholds Management Plan for Park Bison.” Billings Gazette, March 26. https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/judge-upholds-montanas-free-roaming-bison-plan/article_408d2a67-d999-5aa0-a761-5068bd7c37f1.html. Ashworth, Kenneth. 2001. Caught between the Dog and the Fireplug or How to Survive Public Service. Washington, DC.: Georgetown Press. Associated Press. 2006. “More than $181,000 Spent on Yellowstone Bison Round Up.” Accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic. Bartlett, Richard A. 1989. Yellowstone: A Wilderness Beseiged. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press. Bjornlie, Dan D., and Robert A. Garrott. 2001. “Effects of Winter Road Grooming on Bison in Yellowstone National Park.” Journal of Wildlife Management 6(3):560–572. Bohrer, Becky. 2006. “State Agency Will Back Expanded Bison Hunt.” Associated Press, May 23. Accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic. Brown, Matthew. 2018. “Yellowstone Boss Says Trump Administration Forcing Him Out.” June 7. www.apnews.com/24808bac6ff445998da7254d5b299ced (accessed May 13, 2019). Brown, Matthew. 2015. “Changes Considered for Yellowstone Bison Slaughter.” Billings Gazette, May 29. http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/changesconsidered-for-yellowstone-bison-slaughter-program/article_8e6ec888-460d-5e37b3db-94fae0a483c7.html (accessed July 31, 2015). Brown, Matthew. 2007. “Brucellosis Confirmed in Montana Cattle Herd.” Bozeman Daily Chronicle. May 18. Buffalo Field Campaign. 2015. www.youtube.com/channel/UCIRWaQWXjK1RXc6_ hG-kZzQ Chase, Alston. 1986. Playing God in Yellowstone. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press. Cheville, Norman F., Dale R. McCullough, Lee R. Paulsen, Norman Grossblatt, Katherine Iverson, and Stephanie Parker. 1998. Brucellosis in the Greater Yellowstone Area. Washington, DC: National Research Council. Clarke, Ryan, Craig Jourdonnais, John Mundinger, Lisa Stoeffler, and Rick Wallen. 2005. A Status Review of Adaptive Management Elements, 2000 to 2005. Interagency Bison Management Plan. Cromley, Christina M. 2002. Chapter 4, “Bison Management in Greater Yellowstone,” in Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West. Edited by Ronald D. Brunner, Christine H. Colburn, Christina M. Cromley, Roberta A. Klein, and Elizabeth A. Olsen. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fischer, Hank. 1995. Wolf Wars. Helena, MT: Falcon Press. Franke, Mary Ann. 2005. To Save the Wild Bison: Life on the Edge in Yellowstone. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Hoffmann, Carol. 2007. “Two Bison Killed on Horse Butte.” West Yellowstone News, January 26, p. A-1.

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Idaho State Journal. 2007. “Bison Face Slaughter If They Leave Yellowstone.” May 2, p. C4. Interim Bison Management Plan. 2000. www.ibmp.info/index.php (accessed on July 31, 2015). Glover, John. 1996. “Interim Bison Management Plan Approved.” Yellowstone Journal (September/October): C-7. Greater Yellowstone Coalition. 1999. “No Trace of Brucellosis Found in 80 Percent of Yellowstone Buffalo Examined after Slaughter.” November 17. www. greateryellowstone.org/buffalo_brucellosis_lab_nr.html (accessed June 20, 1999). Haines, Aubrey 1977. The Yellowstone Story: A History of Our First National Park. Vol. 2. Yellowstone National Park and Wyoming: Yellowstone Library and Museum Association. Haines, Francis 1995. The Buffalo: The Story of American Bison and Their Hunters from Prehistoric Times to the Present. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Kay, Charles E. 2007. Statement before the Committee on House Natural Resources Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands, March 20. Keiter, Robert B. 1997. “Greater Yellowstone’s Bison: Unraveling of an Early American Wildlife Conservation Achievement.” Journal of Wildlife Management 61(1):1–11. Lacey Act. 1894. U.S. Statutes at Large 28:73. Mansfield, Gayle. 1996. “Local Man Joins Others in Lawsuit on Bison Plan.” West Yellowstone News, October 31, p. 1, 14. Mansfield, Gayle. 1997. “Officials Debate Future Bison Plan.” West Yellowstone News, January 16, p. 1. Mansfield, Gayle. 1997. “Number of Bison Killed Surpasses Record of ’88–89.” West Yellowstone News, January 23, p. 14. Mansfield, Gayle. 1997. “Officials Parley over Bison.” West Yellowstone News, March 6, p. 3. Mansfield, Gayle. 1997. “Bison Meeting Interrupted.” West Yellowstone News, March 27, p.1, 6. McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Molly Anderson, and Barbara Rose. 2012. “Policy Story or Gory Story?: Narrative Policy Framework, YouTube, and Indirect Lobbying in Greater Yellowstone.” Policy & Internet, Vol 4(3–4), pp. 159–183. McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, and Michael D. Jones. 2005. “The Science of Storytelling: Measuring Policy Beliefs in Greater Yellowstone.” Society and Natural Resources 18:413–429. McBeth, Mark K., and Randall S. Clemons. 1999. “Postmodern Policy Analysis in the Premodern West: Problem Definition in the Yellowstone Bison Case.” Administrative Theory & Praxis (2):161–175. McClure, Susan. 2007. “Letter to Governor Schweitzer, Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. West Yellowstone News. May 4. http://westyellowstonenews.com/articles/2007/05/04/ opinions/letter1.txt (accessed April 29, 2008). McKee, Jennifer. 1999. “Bison Battle: Wildlife Groups Offer to Pay Ranchers for Vaccinating Cattle against Disease.” Billings Gazette, May 4. www.billingsgazette. com/region. Meyer, M. E., and Mary Meagher. 1994. “On the Origin of Brucellosis in Yellowstone National Park: A Review.” Conservation Biology 3(8):645–653. Missoulian. 2006. “Business Is the Basis for Bison Solution.” July 2. www.missoulian.com/ articles/2006/07/03/opinion/opinion1.txt (accessed May 20, 2007).

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Montana, Fish, Wildlife, and Parks. 2015. “Bison Hunting Guide.” http://fwp.mt.gov/ hunting/planahunt/huntingGuides/bison/ (accessed July 31, 2015). National Park Service. 2015. “Remote Vaccination of Bison.” https://www.nps.gov/yell/ learn/management/bison-management-faqs.htm (accessed July 31, 2015). National Parks Traveler. 2015. Bison Removal in Yellowstone National Park Draws Protests.” www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2015/01/bison-removal-yellowstone-national-parkdraws-protests26162 (accessed July 31, 2015). National Wildlife Federation. 1999. “Bringing Buffalo Back: National Park Service Report Reveals Public Overwhelmingly Supports Ending Slaughter of American Buffalo.” March 15. www.nationalwildlife.org./buffalo/pcomment.html accessed July 31, 1999. New York Times. 2008. “The Sorry Myth of Brucellosis.” New York Times, April 18. www. nytimes.com/2008/04/18/opinion/18fri4.html?ref=opinion. Overlander. 2008. “With Dems Running Montana, Yellowstone Bison Die Off.” Daily Kos, April 18. http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/4/19/175948/269/218/499139 (accessed in June 2008) Osher, Joshua. 2007. Statement of Joshua Osher, Buffalo Field Campaign before the Committee on House Natural Resources Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands, March 20. Accessed via Lexis-Nexis Congressional. Pope, Carl. 2006. “Feeling Safer Now.” www.sierraclub.org/carlpope/2006/02/feelingsafer-now.asp (accessed May 19, 2007). Phillips, M. K., and D. W. Smith. 1996. The Wolves of Yellowstone. Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press. Racicot, M. 1997. “Governor’s Statement on Diseased Bison.” Montana Online, March 3. www.mt.gov./governor/press/bison.htm. Unavailable as of 2007. Royster, Whitney. 2005. “Bison Plan Draws Mixed Reviews.” Casper Star Tribune, January 19. Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins Smith. 1999. “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment.” In Theories of the Policy Process, Edited by Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 117–166. Smith, Douglas W., L. David Mech, Mary Meagher, Wendy E. Clark, Rosemary Jaffe, Michael K. Phillips, and John A. Mack. 2000. “Wolf–Bison Interactions in Yellowstone National Park.” Journal of Mammalogy 81(4):1128–1135. Tuttle, Greg. 2007. “Bison Advocate Charged with Felony.” Billingsgazette.com. May 11. www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2007/05/11/news/state/40-bison.txt (accessed May 19, 2007). Wallen, Rick. 2006. Correspondence Sent to Mark McBeth. February 2006. Letter is undated. Schullery, Paul, and Lee Whittlesey. 2003. Myth and History in the Creation of Yellowstone National Park. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Schullery, Paul, W. Brewster, and J. Mack. 1997. “Bison in Yellowstone: A Historical Overview.” pp. 326–336 in International Symposium on Bison Ecology and Management in North America. Edited by L. Irby and J. Knight. Bozeman: Montana State University. State of Montana Department of Livestock. 1997. Bison Fact Sheet. Whittlesey, Lee H. 1995. Death in Yellowstone: Accidents and Foolhardiness in the First National Park. Boulder, CO: Robert Rinehart. Yellowstone Bison Management Plan. 2015. http://parkplanning.nps.gov/projectHome. cfm?projectId=50877 (accessed July 31, 2015).

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Notes 1 2

The first three criteria were accurate description (verisimilitude), explanation (ah-hah), and prediction (crystal ball). When addressed, even morality and ethics are often taught as a simple utilitarian calculation, or as a Pareto optimality (whatever is best for the most, or some win and none lose) that can be objectively determined. 3 This is coming from a rational perspective that suggests there is a correct formulation of a problem, but this quote suggests that even the rational perspective realizes the difficult and ambiguous nature of policy analysis. 4 Chambers, Clemons and Foster (1990), writing about economic development, argued that the key step was community development, and therefore outside experts needed to play the role not of experts who can solve problems (which are about value conflict) but of educators who increase leadership capabilities and help cultivate a sense of ownership and efficacy. 5 As we will explore further in the next chapter, our approach is postpositivist, but it is inspired by and reliant upon postmodern insights, particularly into the power of language. We also recognize—as some other postpositivists do—that there is a role for positivist methods. We are not recommending that analysts abandon the rigor or methods of science but that it be done with eyes wide open and that other postpositivist approaches and value considerations be given equal or greater attention. 6 For an excellent discussion of the politics of evaluation research, see Earl Babbie (2004, pp. 355–362) and Carol H. Weiss, cited in Shafritz and Hyde (1992, pp. 397–405). 7 In some instances it may be possible to secure legal permission to learn their identity, but research with minors always poses additional hurdles.

Chapter 7

Problem Definition, Mixed Methodologies, and Praxis

Case Study “School Shootings and Focus Group Research: Narrative Analysis and Problem Definition” As the first edition of this book was nearing completion, Laurence Lynn published an article, “A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice” (1999), in which he argued that postpositivist criticisms of traditional policy analysis were “ideological rather than analytical” and “detached from the inconvenient realities of policy-making and management.”1 Lynn (p. 411) also presented traditional policy analysis as being “fueled by intuition, argument, and ethical prompting; clearly engaged with the world of political action; and often identified with interests and values otherwise unrepresented at the table.” And he concluded that postpositivists have much work to do before they could be considered relevant to the “practical challenges of democratic governance that arise in the many roles that working policy analysts perform” (p. 411). Our book, both then and now, agrees and disagrees with him. First, we agree that postpositivists can easily caricature positivism (just as positivists can easily caricature postpositivists). Second, we agree that postpositivism needed to become more practical so it could play a daily role in governance (yet note that it increasingly has done so). Third, we agree that practicing analysts understand subjectivity, values, and interests. But we disagree with the idea that the typical approach to the teaching of policy analysis adequately prepares future analysts for dealing with the subjectivity, values, and interests that are prevalent in, and thus necessary for, governing in action, let alone democracy. Our book was, and is, an attempt to build a practical (not ideological) foundation for policy analysis that, reflecting the best of the discipline then and now, pragmatically combines the best from both positivism and postpositivism. We believe that we have done just that. The result is praxis. The result is a mixed-methodology approach. Today, we note with some satisfaction that the field of policy analysis has moved in the direction that we first advocated back in 2000 and we are even more confident in the value of our approach. Plus, the more we know about human cognition, the more we understand why individual decision making is not as rational as the positivists assume. With all of the limits on rationality now evident, the field of policy analysis needs to understand values and beliefs, and postpositivism plays a significant and helpful role here. Smith and Larimer (2013, pp. 118–119) come to this very conclusion when they discuss an “emerging middle ground” in the field of policy analysis. Chapter Roadmap: In this chapter, we argue that problem definition is arguably the most crucial step in policy analysis and that the essential insights gained from the postpositivist model

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are the subjective and conflictual nature of problem definition, the key role of language and stories in that process, and the need for a mixed-methods approach. Along the way you will gain valuable insight by studying the issue of school shootings in the United States and by briefly revisiting the Yellowstone bison case. The other major topic of inquiry for this chapter concerns the pragmatic value of the insights from postpositivism. Does it provide willing analysts with guidance for doing policy analysis? Are there useful postpositivist analytical methods? Can narrative/story analysis of political rhetoric help both democracy and analysts? Relative to all of this, we explain three key analytical tools used in policy analysis not emphasized by positivism: focus group methodology, content analysis, and futuring. And finally we examine the question: What does all of this mean for positivism and the practicing analyst?

Anti-Praxis: The Two Tracks of Policy Analysis Society and government, at all levels and across the globe, have grown apace in terms of size and complexity, making public policy and our need to understand the process by which it is made, prima facie more relevant. Yet, even as the salience of policy analysis became clearly recognized, the parochial walls erected between scholars also grew. For example, scholars of national- and state-level policymaking use substantially different approaches and bodies of literature. These stout walls inhibit cross-fertilization. Instead, policy analysis theory building2 and the teaching of policy studies largely ran along two tracks that rarely intersected. One track was the positivist, rational, value-neutral, quantitative track that has dominated the field. In the 1990s, though, the field increasingly became interested in a second track of policy analysis. The second track was a postrationalist, postpositivist, and postmodern approach to analysis (Danziger, 1995; deLeon, 1997; Stone, 2012). This qualitative track focused on the social construction of reality and argued that subjectivity is inevitable. Its inroads, however, were much more substantial in terms of theory than in practice, although it has forever altered analysis both methodologically and philosophically. One consequence was a move toward making policy analysis more democratic. A key concern of postpositivist policy analysis involved increasing meaningful participation of citizens in the formation of problem definitions, the generation of policy alternatives, and the eventual determination of policy. Sometimes referred to as participatory policy analysis (PPA), it emphasizes a brand of deliberative or participatory democracy. PPA is highly critical of the proceduralism and legalism of contemporary American democracy and instead attempts to tap into the Tocqueville and Jeffersonian view of American democracy.3 If all of this talk about positivism and postpositivism, and of two tracks of policy analysis, is making your eyes glaze over and your mind wander, it is only partially your fault. We recognize that this seems like, and to some degree is, an “ivory tower,” or “inside baseball” debate. However, that does not make it unimportant. (Indeed, we go into it in greater detail, which may be of particular interest to graduate students, in “Inside Baseball: Postpositivism versus Positivism” which is in the Teaching Appendix, Part II.) As we discussed earlier in Chapter 2, generations of policy analysts have learned in the classroom that their work should be nonpolitical, technical, and scientific. The politics/administration dichotomy has seen declining influence but is still an important overarching theory of public policy analysis. Discussed previously, the dichotomy asserts that administrators merely execute laws and implement policies passed by elected officials. Miller and Fox (2006) describe this as the “loop model” of democracy. The loop model asserts that at the core of democracy are sovereign citizens with political preferences. Political parties then form that put together various packages to meet those preferences. Citizens vote for the parties and candidates that meet their preferences. Elected officials then pass laws and citizens vote to retain them in office or remove them. The key is that there is a direct

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connection in the loop model between the citizen and the elected official. The administrator does not stand between the citizen and the elected official. Instead, the role of the administrator is simply to technically execute policies passed by an elected body. The policy analyst’s role, under the loop model, becomes the positivist role of using rational, scientific, and neutral methods to define problems and evaluate policies. It has you working directly for elected officials. Miller and Fox (2006) argue, though, that the loop model has been severely undermined. In contemporary American politics, even at the local level, elected officials act more as “symbols,” raising campaign dollars, finding wedge issues, and producing interesting sound bites. Miller (2002, p. xi) argues that “the public discourse has taken a peculiar shape in the era of mass communication and mass marketing” and that “information has become a commodity much like fashion design.” As Miller argues, public policymaking becomes little more than an exercise in marketing. Thus, even decisions involving war, and therefore life and death, are marketed to citizens as “shock and awe,” “mission accomplished,” and vaguely defined matters of national security and existential threats. Much of the legislation passed by elected officials is symbolic, vague, ambiguous, and part of the constant campaign, thus leaving the bureaucracy to deal with all of the politics of both policy generation and implementation.4 Unfortunately, generations of public administration and policy analysis students have been trained to assume that their jobs are simply to be efficient and objective and that they should not and cannot deal with political issues. We recognize that there is a place for objectivity, that analysts (e.g., intelligence analysts producing products for decision makers) are often taught, and required in the workplace, to not make recommendations. But, as you now know, public policymaking is very political. Thus, policy analysts, trained in the politics/administration dichotomy school, may try to use “neutral” positivist methods on policy questions and issues that are still ripe with political conflict. Their number calculations appear scientific and truthful, but often the numbers intentionally or unintentionally hide the values that are inherent in policies. Although some facts are telling and some claims and stories are founded on more solid ground than others, in one sense there is no “objective truth” when the questions asked are political and normative ones. If the loop model and the politics/administration dichotomy are indeed dead, it would seem that new approaches and methods of teaching and practicing policy analysis are needed. These new methods must be democratic, must explicitly recognize the workings of politics, and must be based on the latest social science techniques. Danziger (1995, p. 435) argued in this vein that policy analysis must be made more democratic and sophisticated and that the graduate classroom is the beginning focus of this effort. Danziger (pp. 447–448) added that “students need to be encouraged to examine the inescapable narrative element in policy analysis” and taught that the weapons in policy wars are “hidden presumptions, underlying ideologies, emotional arguments, powerful metaphors and analogies, moving personal narratives, economic models, and the striking presentation of statistics.” In addition, like most of academia, the field of policy studies was not immune from the powerful influence of postmodernism. The positivist approach has received great criticism from scholars such as Deborah Stone (2002/2012)) and Marie Danziger (1995), and, in turn, they received much criticism from some positivists. These two scholars, while not necessarily true postmodernists, argue that rationalistic policy analysis is impossible and instead largely serves the interests of elites. These scholars use postmodern techniques such as story analysis to demonstrate that politics is subjective and that what rational techniques identify as the “truth” may in fact be the product of some deep, hidden ideology. Analysts socially construct facts, and these subjective interpretations are contested by stakeholders. Postpositivism suggested that the role of the analyst was not to find the truth, but rather to be suspicious and distrustful of all policy claims and ultimately to provide access and explanation of data to all parties, to empower the public to understand analyses, and to promote political issues into serious public discussions (Danziger, 1995). In short, this view of analysis sought and seeks to turn the expert policy analyst into the democratic facilitator.

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We conclude that a major contribution of the second track of policy analysis (whatever we call it—postpositivist, postrationalist, postmodern) was in regard to problem definition. This track clearly demonstrated the subjective, value-laden, and conflictual quality of problem definition. Remember, as explained in Chapter 6, the idea is that just as different answers derive from d­ ifferent questions suggested by different models,5 different policies are likely to stem from different p­ roblem definitions. This is fueled, in part, by the inescapable subjectivity of the various advocates, agents, institutions, and analysts. The postmodern focus is on the crucial role of language, rhetorical argument, and stories, in framing debate and changing the context in which policy is made by affecting public opinion, coalition building, and the perception of who is potentially affected. And postpositivist methods, with their emphasis on problem definition and democracy, did make inroads into the classroom. Certainly these approaches provided an excellent theoretical critique of traditional positivism. But positivism remains the dominant teaching method in the policy analysis classroom. Part of the problem is that much of the literature of postpositivism, especially prior to the development of the Narrative Policy Framework explained in Chapter 4, is solely theoretical in its scope. These works often provide excellent theoretical criticisms to positivism but provide little guidance for applied policy analysis because they often lack mention of specific and teachable skills. Danziger (1995, p. 445) writes of “postmodern policy analysis” in this regard: There is a sense, after all, in which the “postmodern” seems fuzzy and inefficient by comparison, without the lure of quasi-scientific models for reducing complex data, and the issues surrounding them to some degree of measurability. Then too, methods of teaching rationalist models almost inevitably are more clear cut. Concepts in economics and statistics can be demonstrated quite effectively through lectures, graphic displays, problem sets, and software, while the teaching and learning of elusive deconstructive insights, not to mention persuasive writing and speaking, do not lend themselves to any surefire classroom formula.

Much of the difficulty of applying postpositivist methods, according to deLeon (1997, pp. 85–86), is that, unlike conducting rationalist methods like cost-benefit analysis, there is no endpoint. In short, deLeon (p. 86) argues that with postpositivist methodologies, the wider spectrum of opinions and perspectives tends to complicate the analyst’s task of making a final decision. In addition, he adds, policy analysis becomes subjective, dynamic, and there are no clearly defined parameters. In the final analysis, deLeon (p. 86) writes, “One may ultimately achieve ‘clarity’ but many would ask at what cost and in what time frame?” We argue that postpositivism often leaves the student in a sea of doubt and subjectivity that, just like positivism, often fails to equip the student for the real world of policy practice. For example, while Lawlor (1996, p. 111) fretted over the outdated epistemological standards of policy analysis, he pessimistically concluded in his review of postpositivist works that: [p]ostpositivism and so called postmodernism in policy analysis is a swamp of ambiguity, relativism, and self doubt. The new argumentation framed as an integral part of the policy process and with an unapologetic normative agenda, creates more problems for the policy analysis business than it solves.

Consequently, professors of public policy analysis were usually stuck with a dilemma. Teach positivism that provides the students with tangible skills, but which is undemocratic and often not useful in the political morass of public policymaking, or teach postpositivism, which, while theoretically superior in both its epistemological and democratic orientation, provides little guidance for practitioners in the field. Positivist approaches do not help to end the conflict that occurs over problem definition in policymaking. Instead, positivism’s role in the decision-making process can stifle democracy. However, postpositivism seemed to just confuse the issue of problem definition. It was more democratic, but does democracy mean anarchy? What was needed was a fusion of the

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tangible analytical skills provided by positivism with the democratic aspirations and qualitative methods of postpositivism. What was needed was praxis. Our contention in 2001, and still today, is that the choice is not limited to choosing between the traditional positivist approach or utilizing the postpositivist techniques. Happily, in the social sciences, a practical mixed-methodological approach that combines both positivism and postpositivism has found much support since the late 1990s (e.g., see Creswell and Clark, 2006). Researchers who work from a mixed-methodology approach simply acknowledge the importance of both text and numerical data, of both striving for objectivity and taking steps to counter our subjectivity, and of the reality that stories are crucial, but that not all stories are equally supported by the observable facts. Also, they accept the need to strengthen and honor democracy. We argue that there was and is no need to build artificial walls between the warring academic camps of positivism and postpositivism and their “inside baseball” dispute. What was also needed was pragmatism. That is part of the reason we wrote this book. Our emphasis on the pragmatic led us to answer a call. The abstract of Marie Danziger’s article (1995, p. 435) stated her call “for the academic preparation of more democratic, more rhetorically sophisticated ‘postmodern’ policy analysis.” What Danziger sought was the translation of postmodern insights into analytical skills. She urges the writing of “new case studies focusing on the kind of inevitable professional conflicts” that practicing analysts face and the deconstruction of existing case studies, helping students “identify unheard voices, missing criteria or policy alternatives, hidden assumptions, contradictory findings, uncertain outcomes, and suspicious numbers.” The pedagogical (teaching) difficulty that Danziger sees is that “often the only means of learning such skills and values is the trial and error of concrete experience.” Our book, the only mixed-methodology text on the market when first published, relies heavily on cases in part to meet that challenge. Box 7.1 suggests that mixed-methods may also be important for policy success.

Box 7.1  Mixed Methods Needed for Success?

T

his chapter demonstrates the benefits of merging both positivism and postpositivism methodologies. The mixed-methods approach requires the analytical skills of positivism and the democratic quantitative and qualitative methods of postpositivism as you work with numerical data and stories, empirical facts and their interpretation. In part, the argument for a mixed-methods approach goes back to Chapter 4’s critiques of the rational model. (As an analyst, if your assumptions about how people behave are wrong, your policies will not work.) But the nonrational approach taught, taking politics, power, and people into consideration, does not mean facts don’t matter. Michael Lewis, author of The Fifth Risk, provides insight into how rational assumptions about individuals might lead to ineffective policy. Lewis does so by providing the case of the National Weather Service (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or NOAA). Scientists working for the NOAA, like all scientists, are trained to use data and build statistical models. But invariably, NOAA scientists are also involved in communicating their science to the public. The science-based information that the NOAA communicates is important as a core function of the NOAA is to save lives and livelihoods by issuing weather warnings to the public. But, what was happening was that the public was ignoring the NOAA warnings. As Lewis engagingly explains, in 2011’s tumultuous tornado season across Oklahoma (for example), despite accurate predictions and 20 minutes of warning time being provided, large numbers of people were still dying from, and being injured by, tornadoes. A specific example provided by Lewis was the El Reno, Oklahoma tornado in 2013, where warnings were issued 30 minutes before the tornado struck but people did not take shelter (even (continued)

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though the population was used to tornados and their destructive capability). Many just ignored the warnings and thousands tried to flee in their cars (not what was recommended and not advisable), leading to a traffic jam on the freeway with the F3 tornado barreling right toward them. Problems like what occurred in El Reno, occur all the time. In Lewis’ book, Kathy Sullivan, a leading scientific researcher for NOAA, noticed a disconnect between citizen behavior on the one hand, and science and government warnings on the other. Lewis explains that individuals are not responsive to statistics, don’t comprehend probability analysis, and do not understand abstract scientific terms. Having read Chapters 4, 5, 6, and now Chapter 7 of the book, it should not be a surprise to you that the complex models and mathematics of the positivist approach neither parallel, or work as planned, in the even more complex world of human behavior and policymaking. To figure out the disconnect and how to be more successful, interviews were conducted in towns that experience frequent tornado activity and thus the participants had experienced several tornado warnings. The findings revealed a major point: Instead of listening to the warnings and acting rationally, individuals believed that “it won’t ever happen to them.” Also it became clear that too many people believed the news networks and their weather forecasts were unreliable and could not be trusted. Participants in the focus groups believed that the news media tends to over-hype the severity of weather warnings. NOAA needed to collect different types of data, data not about weather, but data that would enable them to understand residents so that the National Weather Service and NOAA could better fulfill their mission of protecting the public. To do that, they needed different types of scientists, and in 2014 Congress passed a law allowing NOAA to hire social scientists who could study questions such as how people evaluated risk and how to best motivate them to respond more appropriately. Accordingly, they did surveys that asked qualitative questions (which as noted above, revealed that people assumed that the tornado discussed in tornado warnings would not hit them). People seemed to need to believe (perhaps as a way to feel secure) that the tornado would not hit them, and many saw false patterns that seemingly confirmed that. For example, some believed incorrectly that tornadoes would not cross creeks or even Indian burial grounds. Some argued neighboring towns were more likely to be hit. Others also used faulty logic plus their mirage patterns, and assumed that since they had not been hit in the past, they would also be missed again. The National Weather Service implemented a tool for communicating with local emergency managers, NWSChat. By modifying slightly what they communicated (e.g., tornado emergency instead of tornado warning, and a warning that a warning was most likely coming) to locals, including Lonnie Risenhoover, an emergency manager in Beckham County, whose communication in turn was trusted by residents more, the system worked. Elk City took a hit (over 200 homes destroyed as well as almost 40 businesses). But this time, the warnings were believed and acted on. The outcome of this collaboration reduced casualties dramatically (one fatality, eight people with bruises). This level of success would not have been possible without the integration of the two methodologies for analysis and policy making. Source: Lewis, Michael. The Fifth Risk. 2018, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Especially pages 198–215. Also, thanks to all of the Mercyhurst students, but especially Natalia Joseph and Sara Paltrowitz, in Randy’s Public Policy Analysis and Impact class (spring, 2019) for their help in developing this box as part of a class assignment.

We begin now, as we did then, our exploration of teachable and useful postpositivist knowledge and techniques by first examining the subjective nature of problem definition. First, you will explore competing stories in the issue of school shootings in the United States. Second, you will revisit the Yellowstone bison controversy and explore story-based problem definitions in that heated issue and see how such analysis can be combined with more traditional positivist ones.

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In other words, we demonstrate a mixed-methodological approach to problem definition. Finally, returning to the school shooting issue, you will be given the opportunity to read, critique, and content-analyze a focus group transcript and sort out the possibilities and limitations of such analysis.

The Ambiguous and Subjective Nature of Events in the System At the heart of the postmodern method is the belief that social events are socially interpreted and thus the meanings of these events are socially created. This is what is conveyed by the phrase “the social construction of problems.” This does not mean that there is no truth, just that we can only know the world through our subjective and socially conditioned interpretations. The rational approach to policy analysis asserts that certain events occur in the political system and that these events lead to policy implementation or change. These events are usually referred to as “triggering events” or “focusing events,” and every beginning policy analyst is taught that these events lead to calls for policy change and implementation of new policies. A famous but misunderstood example from American history was the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled job seeker named Charles Julius Guiteau.6 Public personnel textbooks nearly always mention that the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883 (the Pendleton Act) was a response to the shooting: Guiteau had been denied patronage by the Garfield administration. These textbooks assert that this event gave civil service reform (which was already being discussed in Congress) the necessary momentum to be passed and signed into law. For an extended (and fascinating) discussion and analysis of these historical events, see Millard (2012). It is interesting, however, that Guiteau’s actions were portrayed by the media and others at the time as the work of a “disgruntled job seeker.” In contrast to the simple media story, Guiteau had a long history of mental instability, including several bouts with syphilis. He expected patronage for simply publicly reading an old speech supporting Garfield that he had written originally for Horace Greeley. Guiteau was never asked by the Garfield campaign to deliver the speech. Guiteau was, in fact, unknown by the campaign. Certainly, no rational person would expect patronage in this situation. The media of the time did not tell the entire story of Guiteau’s action. Thus, another interpretation of Guiteau’s shooting of Garfield could have been that he was simply deranged and that it was an isolated action having no larger social and governmental implication. (Other than perhaps the need to improve medical practice as Garfield died from infection not the shooting itself.) This interpretation would have meant that the patronage system did not encourage the killing of a president and, if it had become the dominant story, reform movements would not have been able to use the assassination to mobilize support for civil service reform. Compared with the 1880s, contemporary events in American society are perhaps more likely to produce multiple interpretations. Modern society is fed by 24-hour television news channels, blogs, social media outlets, tabloids, news magazines, and TV and radio talk shows—providing citizens with a plethora of views, facts, half-truths, conspiracy theories, opinions, and advice about the latest happenings in American society. In short, although there is a danger from the concentration of so much media in the hands of five to six corporations, the diffusion of reporting and commenting power to the Internet, bloggers, Redditors, Twitter, YouTube, and cell phone video-cameras seems to be countering the centrifugal forces somewhat. The well-publicized school shootings of the late 1990s and first two decades of the 21st century generated much discussion among citizens and policymakers alike. What, if anything, these shootings represent, however, is a subject of debate in a highly fragmented and individualistic American society. There are many interpretations of the causes of, and appropriate lessons from, these shootings.

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School Shootings and Problem Definition The policy issue of school shootings has been on and off the systemic and institutional agendas of American politics for over a decade. Two time periods, in particular, have seen policy entrepreneurs use school shootings to promote policy solutions. The first time period was 1997–1999, ending with the tragedy of Columbine High School. The second time period starts in 2007 and runs through 2019 and includes murders at Northern Illinois University less than a year after the tragedy at Virginia Tech. This time period was dominated by the tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012, where 20 children and six adults were shot to death. Sadly, this section of our book will never be fully up to date. In between these time periods, media and government attention to school violence waxed and waned. In addition, a body of social science literature on school shootings has emerged providing much debate on both the media coverage and the causes of school killings. In the following sections, we examine school shootings, first during the late 1990s and then during the first two decades of the 21st century. Next, we look at two different studies of school violence. This, then, sets up an examination of the different policy stories that have been told during the two major periods of school shootings. The Late 1990s and School Shootings

After a disturbing 1997–1998 school year, the 1998–1999 school year had been relatively quiet. The year closed with a flurry of arrests, suspensions, bomb threats, canceled events, rumors, jitters, additions of law enforcement officers, increased security measures, establishments of tip-lines, redoubled efforts to identify troubled youths, and budget requests for physical security measures. What set this tidal wave of activity into motion was Littleton—a strongly Republican, wealthy, overwhelmingly white, bedroom community of Denver. On April 16, 1999, in Notus, Idaho, a high school sophomore fired shotgun blasts, but no one was injured. Four days later it was a very different story. On April 20 the media turned its cameras, and the nation its eyes, upon a Jefferson, Colorado, high school, where victims, some of them wounded, were fleeing the deadliest school shooting rampage of the 1990s. Two boys at Columbine High School opened fire and killed 13 people and then themselves. Reportedly laughing and taunting victims, one of their weapons was a Tech DC 9 (assault-style, semiautomatic weapon). Tens of thousands attended the funeral services, and millions of Americans watched on television. We mourned the heroic teacher and freshman who helped others flee, the junior who refused to deny her faith, the inspiring senior apparently a target because he was both an athlete and black, and 11 more lives tragically ended. Two decades later, Columbine remains one of those moments in time people who lived through it will never forget and, disturbingly, is still a fascination and inspiration for some who want to imitate it and create “another Columbine.” Sadly, this was not the end of the school year’s violence. In Conyers, Georgia, a 15-year-old boy was arrested after he shot six students. None died—as the shooter apparently wanted it; they were all shot below the waist. According to reports, unlike the ostracized Columbine High Trench Coat Mafia shooters, the suspect was a clean-cut, average student who attended church every week with his family; the night before the shooting, he had even attended a Catholic youth group meeting. Working backward, chronologically speaking, let’s review the year before: • On May 20, 1998, a 15-year-old in Springfield, Oregon, was suspended from school for carrying a gun to school. He went home, killed his parents, and then returned to school on the 21st and killed two students; another 20 were injured. • On May 19, 1998, in Fayetteville, Tennessee, a student was shot in the school parking lot by an 18-year-old male classmate.

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• On April 28, 1998, a 13-year-old boy was taken into custody following an after-school shooting at a Pomona, California, elementary school basketball court. Two teens were killed and a third was wounded. • On April 24, 1998, at Nick’s Place (a banquet hall outside of Edinboro, Pennsylvania), a General McLane High School science teacher and coach, father of three, was shot and killed at the eighthgrade graduation dance he had helped plan and volunteered to chaperone. Two male students were shot, another had a bullet pass through his shirt sleeve, and a female teacher was grazed by a bullet. The 14-year-old shooter, Andrew Wurst, had told people he was going to make the dance “memorable.” He reportedly played with Lego and had Raggedy Ann dolls, but called Hitler and Napoleon “heroes,” used marijuana and whiskey, loved the movie Spawn, and was nicknamed “Satan.” • On March 24, 1998, two young boys in Jonesboro, Arkansas, pulled a fire alarm in their elementary school, hid in the nearby woods, and opened fire on classmates, teachers, and school personnel. The two boys shot 22 rounds in four minutes. Five students were killed and 10 were wounded. • On December 1, 1997, in West Paducah, Kentucky, students were gathered in the morning for a prayer circle in a Heath High hallway when a 14-year-old student, who had warned his classmates that “something big was going to happen,” opened fire. Five students were wounded and three were killed. • On October 1, 1997, a 16-year-old in Pearl, Mississippi, killed his mother and then went to school and shot nine students, two fatally, including his ex-girlfriend.

So many shootings in such a short period of time combined to make the issue one that many people had opinions on, whether (or not) it all had much impact on policy. School Shootings in the 21st Century

On April 16, 2007, a 23-year-old student at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia, killed two of his classmates in a dorm and then stormed a classroom building and killed 30 more two hours later. This tragedy on the Virginia Tech campus was the deadliest act of gun violence in American history. From February 2, 1996, to July 15, 2015, there have been a total of 58 separate school incidents in the United States (for an up-to-date list, search Google, “A Time Line of Worldwide School and Mass Recent School Shootings”). As the writing for the third edition of this book was nearing an end, there were a flurry of school shootings in Georgia, Mississippi, California, and Georgia. Then, on October 1, 2015 nine people were killed and 10 injured after a school shooting at a community college in Oregon. The Oregon tragedy was then followed by four less deadly shootings between October 1 and November 1, 2015. Some shootings, like those at Virginia Tech and the shootings at an Amish schoolhouse in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, and the Sandy Hook shootings, received extensive news coverage. Others were seemingly ignored by the media. Additionally, school shootings do not just occur in the United States. There were 13 school shootings in countries outside the United States in the 1996 through summer 2015 time period. Finally, the latter time period saw the rise of a seemingly large number of mass shootings outside of schools. This included the 2011 shooting of Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and 17 others, where six people were killed, including a U.S. District Court judge. Another mass shooting was the killing of 12 persons in Aurora, Colorado (in 2012), at the premiere of a Batman movie, and most recently the killing of nine people at an African-American church in 2015. Internationally, these included the killing of 12 persons in Paris, France, when gunmen stormed the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical weekly magazine that had run a cartoon that satirized Islamic terrorists, and the horrific shooting of 69 people, mostly children, at a summer camp in Norway by a rightwing, anti-feminist, Islamophobic terrorist (who also killed eight people just prior to that with a bomb). While not school shootings, these killings certainly contributed to the larger debate over violence in the United States and internationally. Again, some school shootings, such as the one at Virginia Tech, the shootings at an Amish schoolhouse in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, the Sandy Hook shootings, and the October 1 Roseburg, Oregon, shootings at Umpqua Community College,

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received extensive news coverage, while others were largely ignored by the media. This pattern continues through 2019—some shootings simply garner more attention than others. There are some simple theories to explain the inconsistent news coverage. One theory is that the media are most interested in mass killings and killings that are out of the “ordinary.” The Virginia Tech tragedy was unique, not only in the scale of its violence, but in that it occurred at a university with a 23-year-old killer and not in a high school with a teenager as the gunman. The shooting in Nickel Mines was unique in that the shooter was a 32-year-old man and the victims Amish. A second theory is that school shootings coverage is sometimes “crowded out” by other events. For example, does anyone outside the local area remember coverage of the school shooting in Caro, Michigan, on November 12, 2001? The answer is likely no because the events of September 11, 2001, pushed school shootings off the media’s agenda. In fact, despite a regular stream of shootings, no such tragedies after September 11, 2001, received much national media attention until March 31, 2005, when a 16-year-old boy in Red Lake, Minnesota, killed two adults and then went to school and killed a teacher, a security guard, five students, and himself. The latter period has seen only two school shootings receive large-scale and sustained media coverage. The first of them was the tragic Sandy Hook shootings in 2012. The unique nature of this shooting involved the shooter who shot his mother, the very young age of the victims, and the fact that it was the second most deadly school shooting in U.S. history. Six years later large-scale media coverage came again in February, 2018 when, sadly, 17 students were killed and 17 injured by a shooter at Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. Student activism by survivors certainly helped move the issue into the policy stream vortex. (Though not school shootings, other large-scale shootings, like the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, the Las Vegas massacre at a country music concert, and the El Paso white supremacist-inspired terrorist attack, have also drawn significant media coverage of the same level as the Parkland, Sandy Hook, and Virginia Tech school shootings.) The Social Sciences and Media Coverage

Media coverage of school shootings is an interesting and contested topic for social science to explore. Many of the tragic school shootings covered by the national media in the United States have occurred in rural areas. One theory, however, is that school shootings are not necessarily more likely to occur in rural areas. Instead, the media are more likely to cover rural shootings because it seems to be a more unusual story. That is, American’s view of rural areas as peaceful and pastoral, and the sheer violence and incomprehensible nature of young males (and all shooters have been male) killing their classmates provides a “good story” that, quite frankly, helps the media’s bottom line of profit making. Menifield et al. (2001), in their empirical study of school shootings in the late 1990s, argue just this. Looking at newspaper coverage, they demonstrated that rural school shootings compared with urban ones were more likely to be on the front page; have more articles with more words and more colorful headlines, and spend more time trying to understand the motives of the killers, often (unintentionally or not) generating sympathy for them. Conversely, urban school shootings generated only minor newspaper coverage, and no sympathy was generated for the shooter. Finally, there is continuing debate about whether school violence as a whole is on the increase or decrease as well as the accuracy of school reporting of school shootings. Larger Social Science Studies of School Shootings

There are differences between rural and urban school shootings. One difference is that rural shootings tend to have more victims and seem to be more random in the selection of victims. Sociologist Katherine S. Newman and colleagues (2004) tackle the question of school violence in close-knit rural communities in Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings. Using

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extensive interviews and review of documents in two rural communities that had experienced school shootings, Newman et al. conclude that school shootings occur partially because of the fragmented structure of schools that leads to difficulty in sharing information (teachers do not want to stigmatize kids, counselors have norms of secrecy, division of labor makes it difficult to share information) and because of the strict social hierarchy in schools that leads eventual shooters to psychological harm as they try to achieve status. These explanations could seemingly be applied though to urban or rural settings. Yet, Newman et al. (2004) provide three interesting theories of why school shootings occur in rural schools: 1.

2.

3.

In rural communities, schools are “public stages.” That is, in urban areas there are many different places youths can act out their violent urges. But in rural areas, the school is the centerpiece of community life, and thus the school provides the most visible stage for a troubled youth to act out his violent needs. All of the communities that Newman et al. studied had limited geographical mobility. Thus, young people who already had failed in the social hierarchy and felt “different” and like an “outsider” believed, unlike individuals in high geographical mobility communities, that they had no opportunity to leave the community upon graduation. This hopelessness led to despair and eventually bias. Newman and colleagues contend that the strong social ties in these rural communities contributed to the shootings because the three shooters studied were all from families that had long been established within their communities. These social ties led school staff to give these students the benefit of the doubt (often ignoring troubling signs of pending violence) because they had known the family for years.

Leary et al. (2003) studied school shooters between 1995 and 2001 and found that all but two incidents involved shooters who had been involved in acute or chronic rejection (ostracism, romantic rejection, bullying) and in addition the shooters had psychological problems, fascination with guns or bombs, along with a fascination with death or the occult. Kimmel and Mahler (2003) reviewed school shootings between 1982 and 2001 and concluded that the shooters came from Republican states or counties, that the shooters were commonly bullied and teased, with homophobia being the topic of the teasing or bullying.7 As good social scientists, the authors of the above-cited studies all carefully construct their theories based on empirical evidence. They are also careful to not try to carelessly generalize their findings or arrive at grandiose single-factor explanations. However, in the political system, policy entrepreneurs are not bound by peer review or the principles of social science research. Instead, they quickly and confidently define the problem (normally by providing a single cause) of school shootings and instantaneously offer their solutions (which they have normally been shopping around for years). With this in mind, we provide an analysis of how school shootings have been strategically constructed by both citizens (who are informal policy entrepreneurs) and policy entrepreneurs in the form of elected officials, think-tank analysts, journalists, and interest group leaders. There is continuing debate about whether school shootings are increasing or decreasing. For example, Nicodemo and Petronio (2018) argue that school shootings in the 21st century are occurring at a lesser rate than they did in the 1990s. They cite studies from Fox and Friedel (2018) and argue that despite the media coverage claiming that school shootings are an epidemic: Mass school shootings are incredibly rare events. In research publishing later this year, Fox and doctoral student Emma Fridel found that on average, mass murders occur between 20 and 30 times per year, and about one of those incidents on average takes place at a school.

While comparing the number of deaths of young people as being less than pool drownings or bike accidents, Fox and Fridel do support some gun regulation and mental health counseling, but they oppose turning schools into “fortresses” (metal detectors, armed guards, etc.). Similarly, though not

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classic social scientists, National Public Radio (Kamenetz, Arnold and Cardinali, 2018) reporters investigated United States Education Department reports that in the 2015–2016 school year almost 240 schools had reported at least one school related shooting. However, when NPR contacted these 240 schools, they found that “more than two-thirds of these reported incidents never happened.” Assisted by Child Trends, a nonpartisan nonprofit research organization, NPR instead found a variety of misreporting and incorrect categorization among the 161 schools that responded to the study (there were 11 confirmed incidents and 59 schools did not respond to the request for confirming the shootings). Battles over data are almost always part of value conflict wars over policy. School Shootings: Stories and Popular Culture

It is no wonder that in the United States the nation’s attention has been drawn toward juvenile violence in public schools since the late 1990s. This largely unique to the U.S. issue, is surely worth our attention. But, for the record, according to the National School Safety Center, although statistically much safer at school than at home, between the school years 1992–1993 through 2009–2010 (when the data were last updated), there have been 348 school-related violent deaths as the result of shootings (www.schoolsafety.us). As we will show by setting forth the primary thematic stories that have been told, there have been both consistency and changes in how these shootings are discussed in the political system. Box 7.2 examines how popular culture (in this case, South Park, a pop icon since 1997) viewed the school shooting issue.

Box 7.2  South Park and School Shootings

Y

ou might have expected that an essay connecting the two topics of the title would be blaming the casual and excessive violence of South Park. (Poor Kenny who, episode after episode, was killed again and again by some @#$$#@$$@$.) But guess what? You would have been wrong. Often attacked as obscene, sacrilegious, foulmouthed, raunchy, and crude—South Park, the popular television show spawned (pun intended) a film version—Bigger, Longer, and Uncut—that hit the theaters in the summer of 1999 and expanded the show’s popularity. The plot was, perhaps shockingly to some, not only evident but very ambitious. A film reviewer (M. V. Moorhead) accurately noted that the plot involved “war, bigotry, censorship, nationalism, true-versus-false patriotism, and the cosmic fate of the earth, and it all hinges on that most American of ideals, freedom of expression.” Sure, the boys are incredibly foulmouthed; and guest characters Satan and Saddam Hussein are having an affair in Hell; and the Chef (then the voice of Isaac Hayes) is about the only intelligent, wise, and semi-concerned adult. The other adults tend to be oblivious, hypocritical, racist, and consumed with sex. Moreover, they all find horrific, deplorable violence OK as long as no one says any naughty words. And, yes, the songs (including “What Would Brian Boitano Do?”) tend to be lyrically inspired by studies of scatology (but were just a warm-up for what their The Book of Mormon musical play would deliver). However, this movie’s connection to the school shootings relates to the blame game. Moorhead gets it right again in his conclusion of the movie review: The point of it all, of course, is that the grown-ups of South Park—thus in microcosm, of the U.S.— are willing to plunge society into any degree of panic, fury, and bloodshed in the name of “protecting our children” from the sort of language and crude culture that makes grownups uncomfortable. Yet all of the adults except for Chef pretty much ignore the children during the whole affair. In the media-critic opportunism and blame-shifting to which the post-Columbine climate has given rise, this mockery is a breath of vulgar fresh air.

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In one song about who is to blame for the kids’ behavior, they alternately blame the government, society, images on television, and Canada. Late in the movie, Kyle suggests his mom overlooked the possibility of blaming him. Hmmm. Maybe they’re all to blame (well, except for Canada). Source: Moorhead, M. V. 1999. “Review of Bigger, Longer, and Uncut.” Showcase, July 22.

Gun Access  According to some groups and individuals, the shootings are primarily the result of easy access to guns combined with a culture that glorifies gun use. This has led to calls from this group for fines and prison terms for gun owners who fail to secure them. This story was particularly important in the late 1990s but was less prevalent (for reasons that we will discuss) in the 2005–2008 time period. The late 1990s saw the storyline develop in the following manner. Barry Krisberg, president of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in San Francisco offered Time magazine (Labi, 1998, p. 39) this quote: “The violence in the media and the easy availability of guns are what’s driving the slaughter of innocents.” In Newsweek, Geoffrey Cowley (1998, p. 25) commented that, among other possible causes, “It’s possible, of course, that young boys have always nurtured bizarre revenge fantasies but lacked the means to carry them out.” He then quotes Geoffrey Canada, president of the Rheedlen Centers for Children and Families. Talking about the possibility that teenage boys may have always concocted revenge fantasies, Canada argues that easy access to guns makes fantasies become real. He states, “It would be a pain, but it wouldn’t be mass murder.” The article goes on to cite a National Institute of Justice study that found that one-half of all guns are unlocked and 16 percent are both unlocked and loaded (Cowley, 1998, p. 25). A study published in June 1999, in the journal Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, found that in a national survey of more than 5,000 households, it was discovered that about 20 percent of households stored an unlocked, loaded gun in the home. More specifically, 11 percent of the homes with both guns and children under 18 admitted that they kept unlocked and loaded guns in the home. The study also mentions that in 1995, almost 36,000 people died from firearms in the United States, including more than 5,000 children and teens (cited in Uhlman, 1999). Further, contributing to this storyline, editorial writer Bob Herbert (1999) quoted the following statistics on murders by handguns, by country, in 1996: New Zealand = 2; Japan = 15; Great Britain = 30; Canada = 106; Germany = 213; United States = 9,390. An April 21, 1999, Gallup Poll showed that a majority (60 percent) of adults believe the availability of guns bears a great deal of the blame for school shootings (Erie Daily Times, April 24, 1999). Polls also show that students are concerned about both guns and troubled classmates. According to a Washington Post/ABC News poll in April 1999, 40 percent could think of a student at their school who could do something like the Littleton shootings, 20 percent knew students who had brought guns to school, 54 percent reported that it was very or somewhat easy for them to get a gun, and 42 percent thought schools should do more to prevent violence (Rosin and Deane, 1999). Supporters point to figures released by the U.S. Justice Department demonstrating the success of the federal law known as the Brady Bill. From its enactment in March 1994 through December 2010, they ran over 118 million background checks, resulting in blocked sales of approximately 2.1 million guns. In 2010 alone over 10 million applications were reviewed and about 153,000 were denied by either the FBI or state and local agencies. The number-one cause for denial was felony convictions or indictments. Others were “fugitives from justice,” or denied for reasons such as having been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, being under restraining orders to prevent their stalking an intimate partner or harming a child, ineligible due to a mental health commitment

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or adjudication, submission of false information on an application, outstanding warrants, or restrictions such as people illegally in the country, people who renounced their U.S. citizenship, dishonorably discharged military personnel, and juveniles (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013).8 In sum, the problem is defined as allowing youths today, in our culture, to have easy access to so many deadly weapons. Gun regulation was again an important story after the Virginia Tech tragedy, but the ­unwillingness of many politicians to link the shootings with gun regulation seemed to lessen its importance. The lack of a political battle also seemingly decreased media interest in this storyline. Two days after the tragedy in Blacksburg, the Detroit News wrote, “Is there anyone left, outside the single-minded gun enthusiasts of the National Rifle Association, who would not agree that the massacre in Virginia is a clear sign that America must curb the easy availability of firearms?” (Detroit News, 2007). The newspaper The Record (in Hackensack, New Jersey) wrote on April 20, 2007, that the “gunman in the Virginia Tech shootings purchased his ­weapons legally” but that the purchase would have been prohibited under the expired assault weapons ban, however “the Republican-controlled Congress allowed that ban to expire in 2004.” After asserting that the Republican Party is “owned—lock, stock, and barrel—by the gun lobby” the editorial takes on Democrats who according to the editorial operate on political reality and not principle. Indeed, Democratic leaders in Congress were reluctant to use the Virginia Tech shootings to call for increased gun control. While one might wish that the reason for this was merely good taste and an unwillingness to try to take advantage of this tremendous human tragedy, there was more to it than that. Part of the success of the Democratic Party in retaking both the House and Senate in 2006 was the recruitment and election of pro-gun candidates in places like the South and Mountain West. Politicians often act based on conventional wisdom, and the successful targeting of some Democrats by the National Rifle Association (NRA) in close races had been cited by some as one reason they lost control in the first place. With such narrow margins in both Houses of Congress, playing politics with this tragedy was not a gamble the Democratic leadership was willing to take. While there was some evidence the gun control lobby was better organized in 2015 and making strides toward new regulations (Goss, 2014), public support in the United States for gun regulation has generally decreased since the early 1990s (Gallup, 2015), and even after the Sandy Hook shootings led to overwhelming public support for certain moderate steps, Congress failed to enact bipartisan legislation. The narrative of too much gun access continues to be a popular political narrative into 2019. For example, after the Parkland shooting in Florida, a 12th grade student identified as Aaron said this: I am a proud supporter of the right to own a firearm. Notice I said firearm, not weapon. A weapon is something used in a harmful manner. Firearms don’t kill people, ignorant people do. To start with, yes, firearms need to be regulated. Fully automatics are not needed. Bump stocks really don’t matter because with a semi-automatic rifle, the rifle fires as fast as you pull the trigger (PBS News Hours, 2019).

Concealed Gun Advocacy  During the late 1990s, others believed that the shootings could be prevented if teachers and school administrators were allowed to carry concealed weapons. In a Wall Street Journal article posted on an Internet site (www2.ari.net/mcsm/arkansas.html), John R. Lott Jr., a professor at the University of Chicago School of Law (1998), discusses a study with a colleague in which: [w]e examined a whole range of different gun laws as well as other methods of deterrence, such as the death penalty. However, only one policy succeeded in reducing deaths and injuries from these school shootings—allowing law-abiding citizens to carry concealed handguns.

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This view suggests that responsible adults should carry concealed weapons and when mass shooting occurs, these adults can put an end to the violence by shooting the shooters. Lott’s policy recommendation therefore stated: Attempts to outlaw guns from schools, no matter how well meaning, have backfired. Instead of making schools safe for children, we have made them safe for those intent on harming our children. Current school policies fire teachers who even accidentally bring otherwise legal concealed handguns to school. We might consider reversing this policy and begin rewarding teachers who take on the responsibility to help protect children.

According to the New York Times’s Barry Meier (1999), on the day before the Columbine shootings, Professor Lott was in Colorado advising supporters of concealed weapons legislation that some legislators and lobbyists were trying to pass. The NRA and other groups had been pushing such legislation in state legislatures around the country. The late actor Charlton Heston, then the president of the NRA, said the day after the massacre in Littleton that even one armed guard at the school might have prevented the tragedy. (He didn’t know yet that there was an armed guard at the school.) More support for this view was cited in an April 23, 1999, New York Times article (p. A-16). Former professional wrestler, and then governor, Jesse Ventura (Reform Party) of Minnesota, also on the day after the shootings, said that Littleton demonstrated the need for more gun permits and/ or conceal-and-carry laws. Ventura ventured that “had there been someone who was armed, in this particular situation, in my opinion, it may have been stabilized.” And Bill Dietrick, an NRA member who lives in Colorado and had lobbied hard for the legislation to loosen concealed weapons permit restrictions, stated, “When you make places like schools off limits to the honest gun-­carrying people … you create a killing ground for those inclined to do so.” But perhaps no one has been as actively opposed to any and all restrictions on any and all weapons as Larry Pratt, the executive director of the Gun Owners of America organization. Pratt was forced out of his role in Pat Buchanan’s 1996 campaign for the Republican nomination for the presidency when his ties and associations with white supremacist groups, militia movement extremists, and militant anti-abortion fringe groups were revealed. The week of the shootings in Colorado, Pratt said, “We’re saddened that there were not teachers and principals who had access to a gun, who might have been able to stop the mayhem” (Bruni, 1999, p. A-14). Part of this argument was that because there are already an estimated 200 million guns owned privately, we should not restrict gun access to criminals and thus inadvertently endanger the public we are trying to protect. Those who promote such an argument had a strong voice after Virginia Tech. One blogger wrote about Virginia Tech, “Every last good guy in those classrooms obeyed the law to the letter. They didn’t have guns with which they could defend themselves or their classmates, and they died” (blog, http://nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_272,613,127.html). Meanwhile, the website www.gunowners.org and Executive Director Larry Pratt argued: Isn’t it interesting that Utah and Oregon are the only two states that allow faculty to carry guns on campus. And isn’t it interesting that you haven’t read about any school or university in Utah or ­Oregon. Why not? Because criminals don’t like having the victims shoot back at them.

Finally, the Amarillo Globe News (2007) linked its solution and the problem of school shootings to 9/11 by arguing, “The U.S. currently employs several thousand air marshals, men and women who fly the not-so-friendly skies with weapons concealed on their persons. Just six years ago, this concept would have seemed outrageous, dangerous and, of course, illegal.” In fact, after the Virginia Tech shootings a grassroots organization called Students for Concealed Carry on Campus was formed. According to their website (Concealedcampus.com), by the end of their second annual “Empty Holster” protest, buoyed by the Northern Illinois tragedy and increasing media attention, the number of members (approximately 90 percent students) was approaching 30,000.

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The argument to allow even licensed college students to possess and carry guns on campus is a difficult sell but one that a number of state legislatures are addressing. However, by summer 2015, seven states (Idaho, Utah, Kansas, Wisconsin, Oregon, Mississippi, and Colorado) allow concealed weapons on campus as long as the gun holder is licensed (Schwarz, 2014). Only two months after Idaho enacted its law, an Idaho State University chemistry professor made national headlines when he accidentally shot himself in the foot while teaching a chemistry lab (Schwarz, 2014). The gun was concealed in the professor’s pants pocket and the professor was a licensed concealed weapon holder. Narratives of concealed carry and arming teachers were frequently argued after the 2018 Parkland shooting. President Donald Trump tweeted: Armed Educators (and trusted people who work within a school) love our students and will protect them. Very smart people. Must be firearms adept & have annual training. Should get yearly bonus. Shootings will not happen again—a big & very inexpensive deterrent. Up to States. (quoted in Landers, 2018).

Media Violence  Another story is that the shootings are the result of popular culture’s glorification of violence, approval of ridicule, encouragement of getting even and demanding respect, and perpetuation of cynicism. Multiple individuals and groups advocate government regulation and control of the Internet, video games, television, and music. Stanton Samenow was quoted in Time magazine right after the Arkansas shootings. Samenow argued, “Television and the movies have never in my experience turned a responsible youngster into a criminal.” He added, however, “But a youngster who is already inclined toward antisocial behavior hears of a particular crime, and it feeds an already fertile mind” (cited in Labi, 1998, p. 38). Former Representative Henry Hyde (R–IL) in June 1999 fought for a House bill he introduced that would have curbed access to violent and explicitly sexual material in movies and video games. Hyde said his measure would “slow the flood of toxic waste into our kids’ minds.” Representative Jo Ann Emerson (R–MO) said on the House floor, “Anyone who thinks [school violence] has nothing to do with the media is an idiot” (Erie Daily Times, June 17, 1999). Wayne LaPierre, executive vice president of the NRA, said that the killings at Littleton could be blamed on Hollywood’s obsession with violence and the moral breakdown in society (Meier, 1999). Some scholars have supported the notion that there is a link between television violence and violence in society. Simmons, Stalsworth and Wentzel (1999) reviewed the literature on the subject and found that television violence is particularly influential on children who are in the process of constructing their own reality. They cite a study that claims that, before the age of 12, the average child has viewed more than 8,000 murders on television. Some critics of television do indeed distinguish between types of violence portrayed. A study of nearly 10,000 hours of television programming from late 1994 to mid-1999 discovered that factors such as whether or not the perpetrator of the violence is shown to be punished, whether or not the aftermath of pain and suffering of the victim is shown, whether it was provoked or random, and so forth do affect the impact of watching violent shows (Fari, 1998, p. 21). What are the consequences of rap songs about killing cops, video games like Grand Theft Auto or Doom (which also teaches shooting hand-eye coordination and shooting tactics), movie heroes who get even, and hours and hours of TV violence? According to critics, the result is people who are desensitized to violence, who are convinced it’s a “mean world” and that they are owed their due, and who see those who use violence as heroes and people of significance. A related argument is that it is parents’ fault for not doing their jobs and for abandoning the task of teaching values to their children to the media. The media were mentioned as a cause immediately after Virginia Tech, but the intensity seemed less than what was experienced in the late 1990s period. Immediately after Virginia Tech, the Grand Forks Herald (2007) asked, “The more we watch murder and violence on television, do we become

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callous to the real thing?” Despite this quote, the media and video games as causes lacked any serious entrepreneurial attempts to link the solution of regulation or censorship to school violence. Neither did this argument gain any traction after the Northern Illinois University shootings in Dekalb, Illinois. De Venanzi (2012) provides an excellent review of the academic work on popular culture and school shootings and suggests that popular culture can play a role in understanding school shootings with particular emphasis on the narcissistic nature of popular culture and the self-­referential nature of how popular culture portrays school shootings. While the study does not suggest that there is a direct link between popular culture and school shootings, it does suggest that popular culture plays a role in the complex multicausal reasons that help explain why school shootings occur. Still, the media and popular culture angle is a popular narrative. After the 2018 Parkland shootings, there were concerns that the shooter was addicted to a video game called Call of Duty. Consider this, “Teachers were concerned that he was spending too much time playing ‘inappropriate’ video games—as much as 15 hours a day, some neighbors told investigators. His mother struggled to limit his playing time, believing it was a source of his hostility at home” (O’Matz, 2019). Religious and Moral Values and Conspiracy  The violence is seen as an outgrowth of the government’s own liberal values, which, according to individuals telling this narrative, have “outlawed prayer in school,” “disallowed corporal punishment,” “taught students to sue their parents,” and “authorized the murder of babies.” The solution from this perspective is governmental and societal return to what these individuals believe are fundamental Christian values. Message board users in the late 1990s discussed everything from moral relativity to socialism, to sex education and how all of this so-called “liberal” agenda had created children without values and that these children are now killing other kids. A letter to the editor that appeared the day of the Littleton tragedy (therefore obviously written before it happened) promised to answer for readers this question: “What is the matter with our country?” The answer was obvious, he wrote, by looking at the front page of the paper a week before. It had shown a baseball player, during the national anthem, blowing a bubble with his gum (Erie Daily Times, April 20, 1999, p. 3B). Within a week, another letter to the editor appeared in the same paper (April 26, p. 3B). This author: (1) blamed abortion (while we protect bald eagles); (2) claimed we took Jesus out of Christmas, prayer from school, and God out of the country; (3) named evolution as the foundation of racism and communism; and (4) summed up the problem by saying the solution to what happened in Littleton was to “turn back to God.” Prominent politicians hitched their wagons to this explanation as well. Former U.S. Representative Tom DeLay (R–TX), one of the most powerful members in the House at the time of the debate on gun control and school shootings, produced a litany of causes other than guns. The late ­Texas-based, nationally syndicated columnist Molly Ivins (1999) sums his argument up well: “DeLay blames all of this—the theory of evolution, birth control, small family size, day care, abortion and moral relativism—for the shootings in Littleton. He does not blame guns. He does blame liberals” (p. 46). Absent fathers often get blamed too, as well as easy divorce and single moms, and even pro-euthanasia Jack Kevorkian, but religion is often the central focus. Representative Bob Barr (R-GA) captured the extreme end of this explanation with a statement he made during the debate of an amendment to a juvenile justice bill (which passed the House). This probably unconstitutional legislation allows states to post the Ten Commandments in schools. As seen on C-SPAN and widely reported, Barr said that the Columbine killings would not have happened if the Ten Commandments had been posted there. Also, the week of the massacre, Representative James Traficant (D-OH), since sent to prison, was also seen calling for lifting the ban on organized school prayer because (to paraphrase) “it is unlikely that people who prayed together would kill each other.” While it occurred less in 2005–2008 than it did in the late 1990s (probably because Democrats had been out of power for much of the first part of the century), some policy entrepreneurs did use

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the tragedy at Virginia Tech to rhetorically link these killings with what they see as the evils of liberalism. Conflating liberals with Democrats, one such individual (Tremoglie, 2007) states that the Virginia Tech shooter was full of the class warfare ideas of Democratic party leaders like Charlie Rangel and Ted Kennedy. Furthermore, the writer contends that liberal support of civil liberties led to the killer being let go in December 2005, even though a court order had stated that he was an imminent threat to himself and others. In more recent years, the linking of school shootings to a perceived decline in moral values continued. In 2013, North Dakota U.S. Congressman Kevin Cramer, in a commencement address where he was discussing general moral decline in the United States, stated, “Forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned abortion on demand. And we wonder why our culture sees school shootings so often” (Terkel, 2013). After the Parkland shooting in 2018, this narrative again found traction. Consider this from the Palmetto Family: In the wake of Parkland, local leaders are seeking to restore a sense of the transcendent. Legislators in Florida introduced a bill to put the national motto “In God We Trust” into classrooms and administrative buildings. Democratic state Rep. Kim Daniels said, “The real thing that needs to be addressed are issues of the heart … We cannot put God in a closet when the issues we face are bigger than us.” (Kao, 2018)

Liberals have their own argument that evokes the notion of values and cultural learning. Some have argued that statistically speaking, parents are much, much more likely a threat to kids than their classmates. The problem is that in the world, and in their homes, we teach them that violence is an acceptable way to deal with problems. As a government, if we don’t like what the leader of another country is doing, we bomb them. As a parent, if we don’t like what you are doing, we spank you. Many individuals contend that we have given conflicting messages to the young, “Don’t hit your brother or I’ll tan your hide.” Or, “If you don’t stop crying, I’ll give you something to cry about.” In addition, liberals tend to cite violence in sports, history books praising warriors, and the God of the Old Testament smiting Israel’s enemies cruelly. All of this, some in the liberal community contend, promotes the value of violence to children. In 2019, for example, in the longer aftermath of the Parkland shooting, it was linked to U.S. use of drones and the killing of innocent civilians. After talking about how students at Parkland were confronting the violence problem in the U.S., an article in Salon.com (Harpootlian, 2019) wrote this: Here’s the irony, though: while those teenagers continue to talk about the repeated killing of innocents in this country, their broader message could easily be applied to another type of violence that, in all these years, Americans have paid next to no attention to: the U.S. drone war. Unlike school shootings, drone strikes killing civilians in distant lands rarely make the news here, much less the headlines.

The point of the article was to make young people aware and less accepting of not only school violence but U.S. sanctioned violence against civilians of other countries. Isolated Events/Bad Kids/Helplessness  Reflecting Kyle’s (South Park) view, some see the shootings as isolated incidents of “bad kids” or “attention-seeking kids” who should be held individually responsible for their acts. Time magazine quotes a neighbor of the Arkansas schoolboys as saying, “These are cold-blooded, evil children, and I don’t care how bad that sounds” (Labi, 1998, p. 36). These citizens argue that individual responsibility is the key and the only public policy matter to consider is making sure that states put juvenile killers on trial as adults and that discipline in the school is returned. Gun access is not seen as the problem, nor the media, nor liberals and the separation of church and state, nor the lack of enough guns, rather, the problem is the bad seeds who misuse guns. The goal of society should not be to ban guns or censor media because these solutions

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would restrict the freedoms of all Americans, even those who are highly unlikely ever to commit an act of violence toward another human. After the Columbine killings, some message board users argued strongly that a lack of individual responsibility led to the killings and they argued for public hangings among other similar ideas that they viewed as solutions to the problem. Similarly in 2007, some argued that the Virginia Tech killing was the result of a lack of individual responsibility. But because nobody has an interest group or think tank for individual responsibility, mention of this was limited. Many contended that school violence was simply a fact of modern life, and policy responses (and successes) were sure to be limited, or that responses had to be limited to using better technology (like metal detectors) or providing better alert systems at colleges and universities. Today, alert systems are in place, classrooms increasingly can be locked, faculty and many students receive training in how to respond to a crisis, and more and more campuses have armed their police or (as noted) their students and faculty, because, well, bad stuff happens and that fact creates pressure to do something (whether or not it will help). Mental Health  Unlike the killings in the late 1990s, the incident at Virginia Tech brought discussion of mental health policy in the United States to the forefront—albeit briefly. Even President George W. Bush played a part in this story by arguing: What we do know is that this was a deeply troubled young man—and there were many warning signs. Our society continues to wrestle with the question of how to handle individuals whose mental health problems can make them a danger to themselves and to others. (Roanoke Times, 2007)

The Virginia Tech killer had undergone psychiatric evaluation in 2005. Yet it was not clear if the young man was a threat to others or just himself. Although we now know that there were other troubling signs, including alleged stalking, starting a dorm fire, and writing violent screenplays, and a judge had ruled he was “only” a threat to himself, Virginia did not forbid him from buying a gun. The fact that he did eventually go on a shooting spree led to discussion of how or whether the leaders of society can recognize such illness before it is too late. The Northwest Herald (2007) wrote in the days after the shootings: Virginia Tech had recognized (the killer’s) problems. One had him removed from her creative writing class in late 2005 because he scared the other students with his behavior and writing. Another student also relayed concerns to campus police about him. But they said rules about disclosing student information made it difficult to do more.

The Oakland Tribune (2007), after talking to several California college administrators, added, “The challenge, now heightened by Monday’s massacre at Virginia Tech, is building a system that can find them and help them before they harm themselves—or others.” The University of California, the Oakland Tribune continues, has a centralized system that facilitates intervention by a trained therapist, but “the problem is a shortage of funding.” Though the Northern Illinois shooter’s actions were attributed largely to the fact that he had stopped taking medication designed to deal with mental health issues, the overall story and this particular narrative both quickly dissipated. Better identification of those needing help and a better system to deny them access to guns continue to resurface seemingly every time a shooting happens, but neither has prompted a largescale political movement. After the 2018 Parkland shooting, the mental health narrative was again popular, For example, the conservative Heritage Foundation (Swearer, 2019) wrote that: [t]he majority of the gunmen in mass public shootings exhibit clear signs of mental illness prior to their attacks, and school shooters are rarely any different. Regrettably, almost none of these individuals were receiving mental health treatment when they committed their violent acts.

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Related to this is the push for so-called Red Flag warnings, which would let family members and law enforcement authorities petition the judicial system to order the temporary removal of guns and gun availability away from people who might present a danger to others (or to themselves). Bad Bureaucracy  Finally, a theme that emerged somewhat after Columbine, and strongly after the Virginia Tech murders, and that relates both to the gun access and mental health stories, has to do with the “real” problem being problems with bureaucracies. Amazingly, very shortly after the Virginia Tech tragedy, the media and some critics homed in on questions of exactly what the administrators in Blacksburg knew, when they knew it, what steps they took, and so forth. Moreover, there were questions raised about the campus and local police. As the story of this troubled young man emerged, the focus shifted to why someone who had been deemed mentally ill could buy a gun. On May 14, 2007, a report released by a Washington think tank (Third Way, 2007) shed some light on the issue (although the shooter’s case involved a technicality that resulted in his exemption from being barred by the state from gun purchases), and it provided ammunition to those working this story. Federal law still should have prevented his (legal) purchase. However, according to the report, 28 of the 50 states fail to provide mental health records to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), resulting in some 235,000 mental health records being reported, when (conservatively) the number should be more than 2.5 million based on Government Accounting Office records. They also reported that 25 percent of felony convictions have not been supplied to the database. And by the end of May 2007, the Pennsylvania Auditor General released a report based on a survey of public schools that showed surprisingly high percentages of school districts that completed the survey (69 percent) did not have visitation policies (42 percent); did not have a single entry point for visitors, students, teachers, and staff (56 percent); and had not provided training to all faculty and staff on how to handle a weapons situation (48 percent) (Erie Times- News, May 25, 2007, pp. B1–2). In the years since, though, great progress has been made and you can no longer just walk into schools in Pennsylvania. Libertarians were quick to jump on this narrative after the 2018 Parkland shooting. For example, Soave (2019) writes, “The story of the Parkland mass shooting is one of catastrophic incompetence at every level: the sheriff, school resource officers, school security guards, the FBI, and the school itself.” The “bad bureaucracy” story is not unique to school shootings. In fact, bureaucracies and bureaucrats are regularly constructed in a negative manner by elected officials and policy entrepreneurs. A study of the U.S. Congress by Thad E. Hall (2002) found that on the floor of the U.S. House, congresspersons were likely to call living public administrators by the term bureaucrats, whereas dead public administrators were termed public servants. While this unfortunate pattern seemed to change post 9/11, at least toward its first responders, one wonders if the negative attitude even permeates policy toward them. The well-known public policy advocacy and even congressional testimony of comedian and former Daily Show host, Jon Stewart on behalf of 9/11 first responders came vividly to the fore again in the summer of 2019 when he forcefully and tearfully testified to a congressional panel asking Congress to appropriate the money needed so the fund that pays out awards is sufficient to cover the claims of those civil servants. As part of his testimony Stewart described their inaction as: “Shameful. It is an embarrassment to the country and it is a stain on this institution…(The first responders) responded in five seconds. They did their jobs— with courage, grace, tenacity, humility. 18 years later, do yours!” [The Teaching Appendix includes a discussion titled “Bureaucratic Horror Stories? Public versus Private” that examines the fairness of such a narrative.]

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What Is the “Truth” and How Are Policies Generated? So, what is the truth? What lessons do these shootings have for the American political system? What should government do or not do? The answers to these questions are complex. Analysts and experts will collect data on juvenile shootings and produce hundreds of studies on why children kill. Gun control advocates will produce similar policy briefs on gun use in juvenile crime. Other studies will examine the linkages between popular culture and youth violence. The safety of children at school will be compared with the number of children killed by their parents at home. Advocacy groups will suggest the evidence compels changes in mental health policy, and a think tank has already studied the bureaucracy’s flaws. All of these scientific studies will most likely still produce conflicting interpretations of causes and therefore conflicting policy recommendations. While empirical studies are used by policymakers, eventually definition of what happened in Dekalb, Blacksburg, Red Lake, Jonesboro, Edinboro, Springfield, Newtown, Maryville, Roseburg, and other places occurs in the political system, and in a political way. Activists are mobilized, coalitions are formed, rhetoric exchanged, elections held, and propositions passed (or not passed) that ultimately produce a public policy. After the Virginia Tech shootings, policy entrepreneurs even tried to use them to advance their views on what they perceived as the immigration problem. As noted previously, after Sandy Hook and despite overwhelming support from the American public, Congress failed to pass legislation to improve background checks. Then, after the Parkland ­shooting some places saw some policy movement, but nothing significant happened at the national level. At the end of this chapter, a case dealing with the school shootings is presented. In this case you will be given a first-hand opportunity to actually conduct a postpositivist analysis. First, though, we must further examine the social/political construction of public problems and introduce you to some methodologies used in postpositivist/postmodern policy analysis. We do so by showing you how policy interests are ultimately social constructions of policy entrepreneurs and how policy causation is likewise a social construction. Along the way, we explain the centrality of policy narratives to this process. Types of Public Policies and Policy Interests

Stone (2002) uses James Q. Wilson (1973) to provide a 2 × 2 matrix that assists in the understanding of American public policy. Using a rational approach, Wilson argues that there are four types of public policies and that the type of policy is determined by whether benefits and costs are concentrated or diffused. In addition, the type of policy determines how politics is played. Wilson asserts that concentrated benefits lead to mobilization on the behalf of interest groups, elites, and other groups. Conversely, diffused benefits (because they are necessarily smaller) will not give rise to such concentrated political efforts. Similarly, concentrated costs will give rise to intense political opposition from elites and groups who would have to bear the concentrated costs. Diffuse costs will not bring much political opposition because the costs are small and mobilization less likely. The idea of concentrated and diffused benefits, and concentrated and diffused costs, though partially subjective and contested stories, could easily be represented by a simple 2 × 2 table using two axes to produce four quadrants (1 = diffused costs–diffused benefits; 2 = diffused costs–­concentrated benefits; 3 = concentrated costs–diffused benefits; and 4 = concentrated costs–­ concentrated benefits). First, there are policies with benefits that are diffused broadly among many citizens and groups and costs that are likewise diffused. These policies are termed incremental. They are marked by the fact that the benefits and costs are both diffused. Such policies do not normally create much positive or negative political mobilization. Many public goods have these characteristics. For example, the National

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Weather Service gives benefits to many dispersed groups and, arguably, to everyone. The Weather Service benefits farmers (keeping the costs of food down), sailors, tourists, wildland firefighters, and people in the way of coming tornados and other dangerous weather, and therefore affects just about every citizen. However, the benefits that we receive are not so great that any one group would mobilize to expand the service, although some would if the Weather Service was going to be terminated. Likewise, because costs are diffuse, no groups are going to mobilize to have the service’s budget cut. Second, there are policies in which benefits are concentrated and costs diffused. In the United States these policies are what we term pork barrel politics. The goal is to redistribute money from a large group (the American people) to a recognizable group that benefits directly. For example, federal irrigation projects in Washington State and federal urban renewal programs in Michigan are paid for by all Americans, not just by Washingtonians and Michiganites. Benefits, however, are concentrated in Washington and Michigan, respectively, and the level of benefits is still more concentrated for the agricultural sector in the Columbia River Basin region in central Washington State and in the city of Detroit. Costs are diffused to all Americans. Significant opposition to such policies is less likely because there is a concerted effort among those who will receive the benefits to sustain the policies. For example, if you were a New York State citizen and you discovered that $1.35 of your taxes were going to an irrigation project in Washington or an urban renewal project in Michigan, would you bother to take time to mobilize against the project? The answer is that almost certainly no one would expend energy, time, and financial resources to kill a project when the costs are so diffused. On the other hand, because the most significant benefits are concentrated, citizens, interest groups, and elected officials in the states, regions, and cities that will benefit are going to spend a great deal of time maneuvering for the policy. Money will be spent, favors granted, and political IOUs called in to bring the irrigation system to Washington and the urban renewal package to Michigan. The political contest is uneven because there is a strong coalition promoting the policy and literally nobody opposing it. Third, there are policies that are termed regulatory policies. In this quadrant, political opposition rules the day because the costs (as with any regulatory policy) are focused on a specific group. Any environmental regulation has specific industries that bear the brunt of regulatory costs. These groups often spend millions and millions of dollars fighting attempts to regulate. In contemporary American politics, the attempts to regulate the tobacco industry were thwarted for decades by well-organized and well-financed tobacco interest groups. In addition, interest groups, including the Motion Picture Association of America, fought Henry Hyde’s amendment (discussed earlier) that would have restricted the motion picture industry. At the same time, benefits in quadrant 3 are diffuse, so there is little incentive to mobilize support. It is difficult to individually determine how much, if at all, one directly benefits (or is harmed directly) by pollution or by reductions in teen smoking. The rise of environmental groups since the 1970s can be seen as an attempt to organize individuals who receive diffuse individual benefits—but large collective benefits—from clean air, clean water, and wildlife preservation. Finally, we have policies in which both benefits and costs are concentrated and political support and opposition are strong. This situation most often creates a policy stalemate because neither side is strong enough to win, or a situation occurs in which victories alternate from policy to policy. The current struggle over bison and brucellosis in Yellowstone National Park could be seen as such a policy. Because Yellowstone politics draws national attention and thus national environmental constituencies and interest group mobilization, bison advocacy groups have successfully countered the local and regional ranching industry that still dominates regional politics. Neither side is strong enough to dominate, and emotions and symbolism have kept compromise and win-win solutions off the policy agenda. [Air Regulation: Wilson versus Stone, available in the Teaching Appendix, further explores costs and benefits, and how they (and their level of diffusion and concentration) are often politically constructed.]

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Stone and Company: The Symbolic Representation of Problem Definition Now, having better explained how policies are created through political language and strategy, we can look specifically at how postmodern scholars view problem definition. (This is important—and not just inside baseball. If you understand this, you will understand story analysis and the policy process much better.) Stone (2002, pp. 155–156) argues that “Problem definition in the polis is always strategic, designed to call in reinforcements for one’s own side in a conflict” and that: [p]roblems are not given out there in the world waiting for the smart analyst to come along and define them correctly. They are created in the minds of citizens by other citizens, leaders, organizations, and other agencies, as an essential part of political maneuvering.

As we discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Stone (2002, p. 155) points out that a “strategic definition” can provide the means to manipulate the “scope of a conflict” by determining who is and is not affected. In addition, players often present a Hobson’s choice and strategically portray problems using four types of symbolic representation: narrative stories, synedoches, metaphors, and ambiguity. Stone (2012) also argues that in their efforts to define problems, analysts, politicians, interest groups, and others are essentially trying to identify causes of the problem. Recall that Fuller and Myers (1941) discussed the evolutionary and political nature of social problems. Discussions of the life cycle of social problems became common after that. Robert Ross and Graham L. Staines (1972), in a classic journal article entitled “The Politics of Analyzing Social Problems,” summarized that process succinctly: Private or interest group recognition of the social problem; political recognition of the problem as an appropriate issue for public discussion; public debate and social conflict about the causes of the problem: a set of political outcomes of this sequence. (p. 18)

In their cogent elaboration of the article by Ross and Staines and its discussion on the debating of causes and solutions, Neubeck and Neubeck (1997) write the following: This stage is extremely important for perceived causes have a definite relationship to the types of solutions that are considered. Ross and Staines distinguish between two different causal interpretations commonly brought to bear on social problems. On the one hand, a problem may be given a systemic attribution … On the other hand, a problem may be blamed on the people involved … This second causal interpretation is termed personal attribution … Different groups find either systemic or personal attributions in line with their perceived self-interest … As Ross and Staines put it: “Since causal diagnoses of social problems are reached by different people in different political situations, conflict between alternative patterns of attribution becomes inevitable.” (pp. 14–15; emphasis in original)

When causes are found, blame and responsibility can be pinpointed, assigned, and then solutions offered. Stone (2002, p. 189) writes: In politics, we look for causes not only to understand how the world works but to assign responsibility for problems. Once we think we know the cause of a problem, we use the knowledge to prevent people from causing the problem, to make them compensate other people for bearing the problem, and to punish them for having caused suffering.

Stone goes on to explain how causal definitions are, in the end, stories told carefully using symbols and numbers. Stone argues that there are four types of causal theories and she again uses a 2 × 2 matrix to explain these (see Stone, 2002, p. 191).

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Using consequences and actions as her two dimensions, Stone’s four types of causal theories are important for demonstrating that multiple interpretations of causes are likely and that causation is ultimately socially created rather than just existing in the political system and waiting for a positivist policy analyst to find it. The four types of causes are common in political debates. Accidental Causes

Accidental causes have unintended consequences and unguided actions. Examples include winter blizzards, earthquakes, and generally anything attributed to “mother nature.” Because they are outside of human control, accidental causes are often the representational story told by those accused of causing a problem. The causal attribution language used by politicians tells us much more about their political orientation than the event. For example, when not blaming the governor of Louisiana or the mayor of New Orleans, the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 were described by many defenders of the Bush administration as simply an act of nature and thus beyond control of human action. Similarly, Rick Perry, then Governor of Texas, argued that the BP explosion (Deep Water Horizon) that devastated the waters, sea creatures, birds, fishes, and economies of the Gulf of Mexico and killed 11 people might have been an “act of God” (Sherman, 2010). Perry was clearly trying to deflect attempts by environmental groups to use the incident to ban offshore drilling. In 2015, after the tragic killing of nine African-Americans at a South Carolina church, Perry was quoted as saying of the Obama administration’s attempt to link the killing to hate crime, “This is the MO of this administration anytime there is an accident like this” (Gillman, 2015). Perry’s advisors quickly tried to discount the remark and stated that he meant to say “incident” not accident. Regardless, Perry’s remarks on both the BP disaster and the South Carolina shootings reveal classic attempts to argue that “nobody” is really responsible for the events and that government policy is unnecessary. The politicization of weather has only increased since due partially to the partisan differences in support of human-caused climate change. Consider this discussion of hurricanes’ destruction by Linker (2018), “For a Republican, a hurricane is an act of God. Storms happen. They kill people … You can hope for luck or pray for divine protection. But in the end it’s out of your hands. There are no guarantees.” Inadvertent Causes

Inadvertent causes are essentially unintentional with unintended consequences caused by purposeful actions. Here, policies or other actions are implemented that have unforeseen side-effects. There were many such inadvertent causes theories argued during the Katrina disaster and its short-term aftermath. One such theory was that the disastrous aftermath was the inadvertent result of President Bush placing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the Department of Homeland Security and that a new emphasis on terrorism had made FEMA ineffective in performing its primary role in disaster relief. Still others contended that the tragic aftermath was primarily the result of President Bush’s disregard for expertise (in appointing an inexperienced Michael Brown to head FEMA). Critics of American social policy, on the left and the right, identified two diametrically different inadvertent causes. Liberals viewed Katrina’s aftermath as the result of the U.S. government’s failure to adequately deal with poverty and race. Some conservatives, and libertarians, argued that Katrina’s aftermath was the result of the unintended consequences of a welfare system that had created a class of highly dependent and impoverished citizens. Finally, environmental groups even questioned whether the hurricane was an act of nature or whether the hurricane was intensified by global warming (affecting ocean currents and temperature) and thus inadvertently the result of carbon dioxide emissions (thus an inadvertent outcome of the United States’ failure to pursue a meaningful global warming reduction policy due to the Bush administration’s opposition).

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The Deep Water Horizon disaster in 2010 also saw an abundance of inadvertent causes. For example, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department of Interior had both the function of collecting royalties from offshore drilling while simultaneously regulating offshore drilling. Thus, the MMS was collecting significant revenue for the U.S. government while at the same time regulating the very industry that they relied upon for the revenue (Hastedt, Lybecker and Shannon, 2014). The unintended consequence of this structural arrangement was that the MMS had a conflict of interest. They had incentives to keep good relationships with the oil and drilling industry because that very industry brought the MMS power and influence (by collecting significant amounts of revenue, this revenue was second only to taxes for the U.S. government). It was unintentional because the MMS did not intentionally produce the disaster. The inadvertent cause scenario still regularly plays out after hurricanes. For example, after Hurricane Maria in 2018, a study accused Puerto Rico officials of poor disaster planning leading to unnecessary deaths and injuries (Acevedo, 2018). Intentional Causes

Intentional causes are actions that are purposeful and with intended consequences. Successful conspiracies would fall into this category. Intentional causes are the strongest form of accusation made in politics with conspiracy theories being the most used form of intentional cause stories. With the Katrina example, the argument was that the failures of FEMA and other branches and levels of government to respond quickly were intentional acts of racism. That is, New Orleans’s African-­ American citizens were intentionally neglected because they were minorities, and those in power failed to have empathy for these individuals. Many residents in one section of New Orleans argued that the government blew up a levee in their part of the town to protect the white and wealthy areas. There were a host of intentional cause theories concerning the BP oil spill disaster. While some involved a government cover-up of a UFO attack, the most intentional causes claimed that the oil rig was blown up for political purposes. A blogger claimed that the Obama administration blew up the rig to create a crisis that would benefit Obama politically. Radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh similarly opined that environmental groups blew up the oil rig to build opposition to offshore drilling. Liberals had their own intentional causes, including the theory that Dick Cheney was involved in blowing up the rig to artificially decrease the supply and increase the cost of oil (Phillips, 2010). The president of the United States joined in the conspiracy theory narrative surrounding Hurricane Maria in 2018. As reported by Campbell (2018), President Trump wrote on Twitter: 3000 people did not die in the two hurricanes that hit Puerto Rico. When I left the Island, AFTER the storm had hit, they had anywhere from 6 to 18 deaths. As time went by it did not go up by much. Then, a long time later, they started to report really large numbers, like 3000. This was done by the Democrats in order to make me look as bad as possible when I was successfully raising Billions of Dollars to help rebuild Puerto Rico. If a person died for any reason, like old age, just add them onto the list. Bad politics. I love Puerto Rico!

But, the accepted consensus is that the larger numbers are, as Campbell reported, the reality. Mechanical Causes

Mechanical causes are found in technological and institutional systems. In many examples of mechanical causes, human control is at dispute. Many public administrators saw the aftermath of Katrina as the result of overly complex rules and overlapping responsibilities involving federalism, exacerbated by a lack of ability to communicate between different agencies. For example, there was a dispute over whether the state had to request FEMA to deliver aid or whether FEMA could

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take the initiative without a formal, written request. Some defenders of the Bush administration cite the lack of a formal request for FEMA assistance from the state of Louisiana as the cause of the delay in delivering large-scale aid to New Orleans and other areas of the state. (Of course, Katrina’s impact across the Gulf region was not limited to the state of Louisiana.) Stone (2002, p. 195) sees mechanical causes as stemming from institutional systems or “a web of large, long-standing organizations with ingrained patterns of behavior.” In this case, conflicting organizational mandates led to problems in determining direct causes and may prove a barrier to finding a solution. Mechanical causes are often used as a defense by those accused of causing a problem. In regard to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, pinpointing cause and responsibility is not easy. Government agencies, laws, regulations, and multinational corporations (MNCs) all played some role but it is unclear what was ultimately responsible. BP, for example, relied on other MNCs like Transocean (which owned and ran the drilling rig) and Halliburton (which performed critical work on the rig). As Hastedt, Lybecker, and Shannon (2014, p. 307) conclude: The impacts of the disaster have led many of those affected to question the social responsibility of the MNCs involved. BP, Transocean, and Halliburton have all agreed to pay restitution for their deficiencies, each corporation admitting that it played a role in the disaster. But simply paying fines and settling suits does not prove social responsibility.

After Hurricane Maria in 2018, there were arguments that the response failure was the result of a multitude of break downs in planning and coordination between several levels of government (Clement, Zezima and Guskin, 2019).

The Social Construction of Public Problems What we have explored so far in this chapter is different elements of how groups socially c­ onstruct public problems. We have examined how policy interests are constructed (mainly through narratives) to present problems in ways that benefit the group telling the story. We have looked at how groups strategically construct causes to benefit their own interests and to assign heroes, villains, and victims. What we have not done is to provide the big picture of how public problems are socially constructed. In fact, we can return to some of the public policy process theories discussed earlier in Chapter 4. The policy entrepreneurs that are central to Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory are the central actors that write the narrative scripts (remember the Narrative Policy Framework) that construct whether something is a public problem. Of course, it matters whether those narrative scripts are followed by a large number of individuals. These narrative script writers represent opposing coalitions (remember the Advocacy Coalition Framework) and they use policy narratives (remember the Narrative Policy Framework again) to construct not only policy images (Punctuated Equilibrium) but distinctive storylines (with beginnings, endings, heroes, villains, causation attributed, policy suggestions, etc.), and these storylines are picked up by citizens and other groups. The notion that there are script writers and that citizens do not exercise free agency in their views of public problems is shocking to some students. But listen to what somebody says about a political issue; listen to their story. Then, type that story into Google and see if you can find a script writer. Most often, what appears to be an independent thought by an individual is actually a narrative script written by a policy entrepreneur and the individual is merely reading that script. That is why we believe that understanding policy narratives is so important. As a policy analyst (and citizen) you need to understand how policy narratives are policy scripts and understand how groups use these scripts to construct a problem. At the same time, you need to understand that you too also repeat the scripts of others. It is this critical thinking that is essential to being a good policy analyst.

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McBeth et al. (2013) provide an example of the social construction of a public problem by policy entrepreneurs. They do so by examining newspaper coverage of obesity. They assert that to socially construct a problem (or crisis in this case), policy entrepreneurs in the obesity issue must accomplish four goals. First, policy effectually must attribute social causes (p. 143). Using Stone, they assert that policy entrepreneurs must use policy narratives to move obesity from the realm of an individual problem to a social one. Second, using Rochefort and Cobb (1993), the authors assert that policy entrepreneurs must also present societal solutions. In other words, groups that support obesity becoming a public problem (and not just an individual problem) must provide solutions that again assign blame to larger society and these solutions would include some regulation of foods, advertising, etc. Third, the policy narrative used by policy entrepreneurs must construct a story of market failure. Again, using Stone, the researchers suggest a “helpless and control” storyline (based on Stone’s plots) that moves obesity from individual choice to lack of choice (because individuals are either “brainwashed” by corporate food marketing or lack the money or time to make good food choices). Finally, policy entrepreneurs require a focusing event (based on Kingdon) or must engage in problem surfing (Boscarino, 2009). This simply means that policy narratives are more powerful when they are tied to a focusing event or a larger problem (for example, tying obesity to economics or national security). The researchers found mixed evidence concerning causation (with newspaper stories tipping toward individual causation), a fairly strong use of individual solutions in newspapers, very limited use of focusing events (what is a focusing event for obesity?), and problem surfing. The researchers did find that, overall, newspaper stories took a pro-regulatory stance. The researchers assert that changes in policy narratives are precursors to punctuation (remember Punctuated Equilibrium) and that obesity narratives had not changed enough (at least in 2011) to say that a policy change toward obesity was imminent. Before moving on and learning about three key tools not normally found in the positivist tool box, Box 7.3 gives you the opportunity to write a policy statement on another real policy issue, one that we have already discussed multiple times.

Box 7.3  Policy Development for Public School Safety

S

cenario: School shootings have been a policy topic in the United States since the 1990s. These tragic shootings have led to large-scale debates over: the causes of such shootings; the solutions (gun control, arming teachers, metal detectors, secure school campuses, armed guard, etc.); as well as leading to discussions of whether such shootings are actually in decline or on the rise. While everyone thinks they are tragedies, there have also been discussions about the magnitude of the school shootings problem (e.g., is it a crisis when students are safer at school than at home?). It is a contentious issue and one that will not easily be solved. But school districts have developed school safety policies; generally all take the problem seriously, whether sincerely or as part of a public relations or CYA incentive. Suburban School District (fictional) is located in a bedroom community of 80,000 persons, outside the very large state capital city, in the Southern United States. The community is traditionally conservative, but in recent years has grown more liberal as individuals migrate to escape the city and gain quicker access to outdoor recreation. Many of these individuals have been more on the liberal side. The state that Suburban School District resides in allows the concealed carrying of guns with a permit (for adults 21 and older). The school district has (continued)

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fortunately never had a school shooting, though there have been a few school “lockdowns” over the past 20 years due to social media threats of students claiming that they are going to bring guns or bombs to school. Current school district policy is not well consolidated and has such features as no weapons in a school or in a school zone (consistent with state and federal law), centralized access to schools (meaning that visitors to any school must check in with a central administrative office), school lockdowns when there is any threat of violence, and school resource officers in middle schools and high schools. At a recent school board meeting, a group of parents expressed concern over a wide range of issues involving school safety. Some parents wanted metal detectors and better security parameters, while other parents worried about creating a “fortress” environment that would harm student educational pursuits, and told stories of elementary children traumatized by live shooter drills. One segment of parents wanted teachers to be trained and allowed to carry weapons, while another group of parents expressed great concern over this possibility. The School Board has decided that it wants a formal policy in place in the next year that will “protect our children.” The Superintendent, Chris Kelly, has been directed by the School Board to draft a policy on school shootings for the district. Though you are newly graduated from a very highly respected public policy program at the University of Delaware, and just recently hired (as was the superintendent), she turned to you for this policy analysis. Whether an old hand or, as is the case, a newly minted analyst, the assignment you have been given is not exactly an easy assignment—but you want to make a strong impression and, more importantly, do the right thing. Your supervisor has asked you to draft a policy (no more than 1,500 words) where you: 1. Write an introduction that provides a succinct but correct background of the problem (for this ­assignment, this will include a review of the national background). 2. Write the policy statement. This includes the intended audience of the policy. Questions to consider for the policy statement include: a. What is the (new) policy statement (a clear and concise articulation of district policy (past and proposed) on school shootings)? b. Who is the primary audience? (Who needs to follow and implement the policy?) c. Are there any exceptions to the policy? d. What are the costs associated with its various aspects? 3. Explain your process for policy development. How will the draft policy be vetted for policy comment? Will you reach out to specific stakeholders? If so, who?

The superintendent wants you to review the following documents or stories, and—of course— you’ll likely want to do additional research on your own and that is fine, but don’t ignore the ones your boss suggested. www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/08/27/640323347/the-school-shootings-that-werent https://news.northeastern.edu/2018/02/26/schools-are-still-one-of-the-safest-places-forchildren-researcher-says/ www.npr.org/2018/03/15/593831564/the-disconnect-between-perceived-danger-in-u-sschools-and-reality www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/180419131025.htm www.bbc.com/news/business-46507514 Note: Please provide any other citations including use of any school district policy that you consult in this assignment. Use APA style.

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Mixed-Methods Tools The key to analysis bequeathed by postpositivism is that the methodology used must not rely solely on quantitative analysis and that the analyst must seek a political understanding of problems. The postpositivist-informed analyst, in determining problem definitions, looks for rhetoric, ideologies, symbols, and metaphors and tries to understand how these elements socially construct the definition of the problem, leading to action or inaction. As illustrated thus far in the chapter, analysis is ultimately going to deal with language and words. As a policy analyst you will have to come up with a practical method of systematically analyzing this language. While there are many techniques available to analyze language, we discuss three major mixed-methodological research techniques that utilize skills and insights from both the positivist and postpositivist tracks: focus groups, content analysis, and narrative analysis. At the end of the chapter the case asks you to apply these methodologies while utilizing the theoretical orientations explained in this chapter. Tool #1: Focus Group Methodology

Since the 1930s, focus groups have emerged as a popular form of qualitative research (Krueger and Casey, 2000). Focus groups (or discussion groups) allow a facilitator to ask questions of persons in a group. Focus groups are also in the mixed-methodology school in that they combine subjectivity found in individuals’ words and a scientific method of analyzing that subjectivity. Another advantage of focus groups is that the discussion within a focus group occurs within a social system and individuals can react to the statements of other group members. Morgan (1996, p. 2) defines focus groups as a “research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher.” Morgan (1996, 1997) identifies the unique qualities of focus groups not found in other forms of social research, such as surveys. First, the focus group provides a way to learn about the implied, unspoken, and incidental knowledge that informs people’s opinions. This is possible because focus groups, unlike surveys, do not generally lead participants, but rather collect unfiltered and openended responses and discussions. Second, focus groups similarly provide researchers with access to the opinions of the participants in their own words, rather than in the closed-ended expressions of a researcher. Traditional techniques, like survey research, use questions and, most importantly, response options to the questions that are predetermined by the researcher. Essentially, the researcher using traditional techniques is testing only concepts that she or he believes are important. The postpositivist view, of course, holds that there are many different interpretations of events, issues, and policies. Focus groups ask general questions and then allow the group discussion to flow into a variety of areas. Third, focus groups provide an approach to examining people’s intent and meanings in the phrases, words, and expressions that they use in social interaction. This symbolic analysis is essential to the postpositivist method. Unlike other forms of social research, particularly survey research, researchers can probe and follow up in ways impossible in the more traditional methods. Fourth, the focus group provides researchers with opportunities to study the individual as part of a larger group. This aspect is essential because individuals do not form opinions about public issues in isolation, but rather their opinions are formed in the context of group life. An important criticism leveled by postpositivists against the positivist school is that the latter uses an economic (market) view of the atomized individual. According to postpositivists, the individual cannot be the sole unit of analysis and instead the unit of analysis has to be the larger entity of the community or polis. Fifth, the focus group can be combined with surveys and interviews. Small discussion groups are invaluable when researchers wish to design survey instruments based on valid opinion categories.

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Drawing generally on the literature on focus groups (Krueger and Casey, 2000; Morgan, 1996, 1997), some general suggestions are listed here about setting up focus groups and facilitating focus groups: 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

Group size should be between 10 and 15 members. Focus group composition should be representative of the studied population. For example, a study of local elected officials may include a city council member, a mayor, a county commissioner, and an elected county sheriff. A group with all city council members would not be representative of local elected officials. The facilitator must be trained. A good facilitator redirects questions back to the group and does not contribute his or her own opinion in the group process. A trained facilitator does not allow one or a few participants to dominate the group. Other than the facilitator and perhaps an assistant, nobody other than focus group members should be allowed at the focus group sessions. Outside members are a distraction, and their inclusion will violate the rules of institutional review boards that govern research with human subjects. Each focus group should be tape-recorded and then transcribed by a trained transcriber.

Criticisms of focus groups include financial expenses for facilitators and participants’ incentives, the time involved in forming and facilitating groups, and the difficulty of generalizing results because sampling is less random and systematic than that used in survey research (Babbie, 2004, p. 303). The latter concern about generalization is the most significant criticism of focus groups. Phone and mail surveys allow large numbers of randomly sampled individuals to participate in research. With these surveys, sophisticated sampling techniques can be employed that provide results that are highly generalizable to the larger population. It is fairly easy to sample 5,000 citizens in a mail survey and, with follow-up mailings, expect at least 2,500 respondents. Focus groups are necessarily smaller and most often use sampling techniques that are far from random. For example, with an average focus group size of 10 participants, it would take 250 focus group meetings to produce the 2,500 number responding to a mail survey. This number of meetings would be time-consuming, expensive, and probably impossible over a large geographical area. Even if a researcher did conduct 250 focus groups, the generalizability of the sample is not guaranteed because random sampling is far more difficult with focus groups. Focus groups are often a more effective method to research disadvantaged groups such as the poor, minorities, or other special populations. These groups usually do not respond in great numbers to mail surveys. Focus groups are friendlier to these populations. However, these groups, unless aggressively recruited, are still unlikely to attend focus group sessions. Sadly, focus group discussions on important issues like health care, nuclear waste, and school violence most often include only community elites and exclude those whose voices should be heard under the philosophy of democratic research. To change this involves making the effort to do outreach, and providing things such as transportation, health care, and accessible and neutral sites. Tool #2: Content Analysis

Content analysis is an approach used by researchers to examine written documents or transcripts of recorded interviews, such as focus groups and other types of communication. Content analysis revolves around classifying or categorizing unfiltered information into a conceptual framework. Content analysis is a form of mixed methodology in that it is a practical way to analyze written words and language in a way that is systematic. Content analysis even provides a simple quantification of language and words. Johnson and Reynolds (2005, p. 222), for example, describe content analysis as deriving “numerical measures from a nonnumerical written record.”

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Babbie (2004, p. 319) and others differentiate between manifest and latent content. Manifest content is visible and clear. An example of coding manifest content would be to simply count the number of words describing the phenomenon that you are studying. For example, in a study of citizen trust of government, the researcher would count the number of times a citizen in a focus group transcript uses adjectives like trustworthy, believable, and confidence to describe their interactions with government. Conversely, the researcher would also count words like untrustworthy, unreliable, and corrupt used in a similar context. Manifest content is reliable because it is easy to count words. Latent content refers to the language’s underlying meaning. Latent content is more valid than manifest content but is also less reliable. One researcher’s interpretation of a sentence may differ greatly from another researcher’s interpretation. Babbie (2017) recommends using both manifest and latent methods and then comparing your findings. Ideally, the two methods will produce similar results. If not, the researchers need to rethink their coding strategies. The key to content analysis is creating and defining meaningful and useful categories. Both deductive and inductive methods should be used. When studying people’s trust of government, for example, the researcher may want to examine the level of trust. He may produce categories such as very trusting, trusting, neutral, untrusting, and very untrusting. The researcher would then read the focus group transcripts or open-ended survey comments and classify each statement into one of the five categories. Each category needs to be defined for coding. The “very trusting” category could include responses that use several words to describe strong trust (words like honest, responsible, faith) and just a general interpretation that the person strongly trusts government. The trusting category would have responses that used fewer adjectives of trust and seem subjectively trusting. All five categories would be defined and coded (see the following example). Question: Give me an example of why you trust or don’t trust local government. Answers and Coding 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

“I have for a long time believed that my local government is better than most businesses. I have had several discussions with the mayor and city council about problems and each time they have kept their word, told me the truth, and even when they can’t help me I believe that they strongly care about me and are honest. I have faith in them.” (Coded: very trusting) “I really have no views on this question. I really don’t think much about local government.” (Coded: neutral) “I think that there are some problems with our local government. I am not sure but I think that some of the city council members are looking out for their own interests. This might not be true, I don’t know.” (Coded: untrusting) “Local government is a joke. They say one thing and then do another. I quit going to public hearings because the council will do whatever they want anyway. This is a major problem for our town.” (Coded: very untrusting) “My few interactions have been mostly positive and I think I trust them. I might be wrong but I haven’t had any problems with the local government.” (Coded: trusting)

Realistically, an inductive approach would be used also. After coding all responses, the researcher may find that the five categories do not fit with the responses and that he or she needs more categories, fewer categories, or altogether different categories. A common approach is to use a pair of scissors and cut transcribed responses into strips of paper. Then sitting on the floor or at a large desk, the researcher lumps similar responses together. Only through the reading of all responses can the researcher get a feel for the types of responses and the commonalities of each. At this point, the researcher names the categories of responses. Importantly, in content analysis at least three researchers should classify responses independently of each other. For example, perhaps one researcher may have found that the five categories

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of trust were adequate and successfully classified responses into these predetermined categories. A second researcher also uses the five categories but comes up with slightly different results. A third researcher abandons the five categories and instead decides to use a new classification scheme based on whether the respondent had interaction with government and whether that interaction was positive, neutral, or negative (see Table 7.1). When this occurs, the first two researchers need to examine their coding sheets and compare how they classified each response. Then these two researchers must listen to the third researcher and decide if the new categories are more valid than the five categories produced through deductive research. A simple tool is to determine the inter-rater reliability by dividing the total number of coding agreements by the total number of agreements plus disagreements. When there are disagreements, the process provides no hard and fast rules. Instead, the process is very much one of negotiation, discussion, and common sense (this process, after all, is as subjective as the concept of public opinion).

Table 7.1 An Example of Different Content Analysis Outcomes Researcher

Very Trusting

Trusting

Neutral

Untrusting

Very Untrusting

A

9

13

29

22

17

B

9

17

25

28

11

No Interaction

InteractionNeutral

InteractionNegative

InteractionPositive

25

15

40

10

C

Content analysis is an effective method in conducting policy analysis. It should be reemphasized that content analysis is used not only for focus group transcripts but also for classifying open-ended survey responses and social artifacts such as newspaper articles, magazines, and public documents. Working with social artifacts greatly reduces the cost and increases accessibility. Tool #3: Narrative Analysis

Try to remember that narrative analysis is simply story analysis—and that you already understand stories. We first introduced you to this in Chapter 1, and now it is time to, as promised, help you develop a deeper understanding of narrative analysis. Additionally, recall that in Chapter 5 we introduced you to the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), which presents itself as a way to use traditional social science methods (with objectivity) to measure subjective responses. Indeed, through content analysis, NPF researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to measure how groups use characters, how they construct a causal story, and, at the micro-level, the NPF can measure the impact of a policy narrative on individual opinion. Jones and Radaelli (2015, p. 6) write in this regard: “The NPF makes a clear ontological choice: reality is socially constructed by and through narratives that provide both organization and meaning to public policy.” However, our focus is teaching story analysis, a necessary skill if you ever want to use the NPF, and—in our strong opinion—a key lens that can help you understand politics. A very small portion of this section will be review, but we also add considerably to the elements of what you already know about narrative analysis. Sometimes discussed as framing, narrative analysis, or story analysis (narrative and story analysis are the same thing, while framing is closely related), narrative analysis is a technique that focuses on the use of stories in politics to frame issues. The struggle to determine the rules, to determine the problem definition, the fight to claim the goods and avoid the “bads,” and the

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determination of whether or not policies are legitimate, all hinge on competing stories. As you will see, political stories have all of the common elements of stories, because political conflict is rarely an argument over technical detail. As Deborah Stone (2002, p. 138) argues: Definitions of policy problems usually have narrative structure; that is, they are stories with a beginning, a middle, and an end, involving some change or transformation. They have heroes and villains and innocent victims, and they pit the forces of evil against the forces of good.

And, the tellers of these stories frame the story for us in ways that expand or limit the story and its apparent relevance. Suppose a child asked you to tell them a story; suppose also that you have to make it up. Finally, suppose that everyone who is reading this book, as well as the two authors, also all create their own stories. Certainly no two stories would be exactly alike, yet consider the aspects that all would have in common. All stories, sometimes called narratives, have beginnings. Then something happens; then we reach “the end.” Stories typically have characters who are heroes and villains (the plot thickens). We are told who is to blame, who caused—or at least could have prevented—the problem. Like a painting, the story frames a picture for us, focusing our attention on certain things, placing other things in the background, and leaving other things completely out of the picture. Some stories, like landscape paintings, move what previously had been thought of as background, into the foreground and makes it the subject of the story being told. The teller of the tale gets to choose the focus, the words, the metaphors, the characters, and the analogies, and they get to leave outside the frame of the narrative, the parts of the story they don’t want you to focus on at all. Narratives explain things to us and give events meaning, in part by organizing the complexity and chaos of reality into story form. They are attempts to put bones on the elusive ghosts of reality. Stories may try to tell a story of complexity, but more often they try to simplify or ignore complexity. For example, stories impose differentiated time frames onto the undifferentiated passage of time. A narrative also presents a version of the story, usually as if it were the only possible story, from the perspective of the person who tells it. In a sense, stories are like theories. Political stories are attempts to frame issues, to direct your attention, to persuade you, to convince you either to care or not, to place blame, or to declare a problem as being simply the ways things are. To give you the lenses we believe are crucial to understanding politics, we are first going to briefly examine the basic elements of story analysis using a movie. Then, utilizing the issue of school shootings, we will use these same elements, and a few more, to show you how to analyze politics. Analyzing a Movie

Let’s use The Wizard of Oz as an example of a well-known movie that we can analyze. When we analyze a movie as a story we look for the following elements: The Plot  The plot is the fundamental story of the movie. It usually has an ordered structure (a beginning, middle, and end). As viewers we are swept into the plot; it moves us from one scene to the next. We try to guess what will happen next. In a classic “who done it” mystery, we try to guess who the killer is. Good movies often have plot twists, or in other words, just when we think we know the villain or the direction of the movie, something new is revealed that confuses things. We tend to remember movies that have good plots. The Wizard of Oz has a clear beginning (Dorothy lives on a farm in Kansas with her Uncle Henry and Aunt Em). We meet various individuals, including a mean woman who steals her little dog Toto. Then a tornado hits and Dorothy lands (on a Wicked Witch) in a mysterious land inhabited by Munchkins and at least two different types of witches (a good witch and a bad witch). The middle of the story is Dorothy’s

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journey to see the Wizard of Oz. Along the way we meet other interesting characters too. The end of her journey (but not the end of the movie) begins as Dorothy awakes in a field of poppies and sees the Wizard of Oz’s great palace. (The journey has a plot twist when we find that the Wizard of Oz is just a normal guy hiding behind a literal smokescreen.) The story ends with the Wizard taking off in a balloon and Dorothy heading back to Kansas (with new-found strength and a greater appreciation for home). Characters  As we saw, characters in a movie are essential to plot development. Any good story has archetypal characters: heroes, villains, and victims. Throughout The Wizard of Oz, we think that the hero might be the Great Wizard of Oz. But when we first meet him, we think he might really be a villain. At the end of the movie, we probably believe that Dorothy is the hero after she melts the Wicked Witch (one of the clear villains of the movie). The Scarecrow (representing honest farmers) is a victim: even though he continually comes up with clever solutions, he believes he is stupid because he was made without a brain. The Cowardly Lion was a victim because he thought he lacked the courage to do what needed to be done, even though he courageously fights for his new friends. The Tin Man (turned into a machine by industrialization) was a victim because he thought that because he had no heart he couldn’t love, even though he was so soft-hearted he kept crying and rusting. Images, Metaphors, Symbols  A good movie has great images and cinematography. The Wizard of Oz was considered a landmark movie of its time. The most striking image is that the beginning of the movie, set in Kansas, is filmed in black and white. Then when Dorothy goes to Oz, the movie and her new world is in color. Other striking images include the glass slippers, the melting wicked witch, the shrinking feet of the first wicked witch trapped under the house, the Great Wizard of Oz, the Emerald City, the horse of another color, and the Winged Monkeys that still cause an occasional nightmare for a 58-year-old math professor we know. Even if we only watched this movie a few times, we remember these images. Narrator/Author  The narrator is also an important part of a story. The Wizard of Oz is told through the eyes of Dorothy. We tend to trust Dorothy’s version of the story. We get swept up in her story. We might have some doubts about Dorothy’s story when she awakes in the poppy field and then sees the Great Palace. But for the most part, we really think that Dorothy is in Oz. But then we find out at the end that Dorothy was dreaming. She never left Kansas and the farm. And, once you find out that the author of this story was a very political man who was trying to write a populist fable and political satire about the dangers of the gold standard (the Yellow Brick Road), the advantages of silver (the slippers weren’t ruby in the book and Oz is the symbol for ounce), the good-hearted farmers, and the dangers of industrialization … well, it is hard to ever really see the movie the same way again. The Audience and the Moral of the Story  We should consider the audience for a movie or book. Who was the audience for The Wizard of Oz? Was it small kids? Maybe, but most children are really frightened by the Wicked Witch and the Winged Monkeys. Maybe The Wizard of Oz is for the adults who read to their children. Maybe it tries to kill two birds with one stone by using a children’s story to tell a story about power and politics. Analyzing Political Narratives

Hmmm, you may still be asking yourself how the analysis of a classic children’s movie relates to a book about democracy, politics, and public policy. Mark Twain, a legendary storyteller, said good stories must accomplish two things: (1) they must accomplish something, and (2) they must

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arrive somewhere. Rarely are stories told just to educate. Usually the person telling the story is trying to lead the audience to a certain conclusion and shape how they think. Indeed, Gregory Maguire’s recent retelling of the story in “Wicked: The Life and Times of the Wicked Witch of the West” reminds us that it is very possible to ask different questions, see different things and see things differently, and then ultimately to come to very different conclusions about how and why and what unfolds. We accept the premise that stories convey meaning. We are taught, even as young children, that fables, Biblical parables, and fairy tales are more than just stories. All of them have a moral, all have a meaning, all relate somehow to real life. Indeed, it seems that story telling is one of the primary ways we teach children about morals. The story of the “little engine that could” is surely about more than a train. The story of the “giving tree” is about much more than a tree. We recognize that readers can construct their own meanings and that stories can have more than one meaning. In fact, we encourage readers to not passively accept stories as accurate, as analogous or relevant, or the story’s moral as necessarily conveying a valuable lesson. We also recognize, though, that the storyteller usually has an intended lesson and his or her own agenda. Remember, in political stories, it is almost guaranteed that the story being spun has a point. What to Look for in Analyzing Political Stories

We believe that understanding narratives is crucial. It has helped us better understand both domestic and international politics, and it can help you become a questioning and critical thinking policy analyst and citizen. Our favorite narrative analyst is Deborah Stone, and we drew heavily on Stone’s ideas in developing our explanation of the key elements people need to understand. Because we believe that students learn best through examples, we will now use a contemporary policy issue also covered in the textbook to show you how story analysis can be used to understand how the different political players tried to persuade people with their stories. As you know, the late 1990s saw an alarming number of well-publicized school shootings, most notably the one at Columbine. Those shootings led to a large-scale debate over what they meant to the American political system, and what—if anything—the government should do about it. The tragedies, and the debate, continue unabated. Plot  Interest groups, media, elected officials, and other policy entrepreneurs constructed various plots about the shootings. Common plot lines included the story of decline, stymied progress, and conspiracy. Pro-gun control groups had a plot that went something like (1) guns have been historically glorified in American culture (the beginning), (2) gun advocates had successfully resisted sensible regulation of guns (the middle), and (3) the outcome were these tragic shootings (the end). Stone would call this political story one of inadvertent cause. Whether through carelessness or simply as a case of unforeseen side-effects, those committed to unlimited gun rights inadvertently caused the shootings. But there were many other stories in the political system. Some elected officials used the following story. The beginning—liberals had created a society where “anything goes.” In other words, prayer is not allowed in school, corporal punishment has been outlawed. The middle—kids are raised without any values. The end—these kids who don’t have values kill. Stone would call this a “story of decline” because it states that things were once good. According to the story, we had values, then the liberals messed things up; now things are bad, but we can go back to how things were if we change some policies. (The story of decline is a common theme in political narratives.) Today the stories are similar, especially for the pro-gun control side. The anti-gun control advocates’ stories now frequently focus less on morality and more on mental health and the lack of gun access for “good people.”

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Characters  In politics, stories are usually about causation. Often, we see examples of questionable claims of causation. (Post hoc ergo propter hoc—after this, therefore because of this.) Heroes are the potential fixers of a problem, while the villains are the cause of the problem or those who should be held responsible for failing to prevent or fix the problem. The victim is the innocent bystander who is hurt by the intentional or unintentional actions of the villain. Among gun control advocates, the hero is anyone who supports gun control. In addition, the gun control advocates might bring in characters to help define their hero. Popular allies, such as police officers who support gun control, would be used to help create the image of the gun control group as hero. They also have used former Republican President Ronald Reagan’s Press Secretary, Jim Brady, shot during the Reagan assassination attempt, as a sympathetic victim. Groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) can be used by them as high-profile villains. The major villain is then linked to other characters (perhaps military survivalists) who are used to help define the NRA as a true villain. The victims in this story are the innocent children and teachers who die in school shootings, and, in a larger sense, the victim is civilized democracy. The other story would contend that the villains are liberals such as former President Bill Clinton, who was portrayed as too socially liberal and linked to other “morally repugnant” characters like Hollywood film stars. President Obama was painted as a villain who wants to take guns away leaving people as “sitting ducks.” Conservative elected officials—like former U.S. Representative Tom DeLay (R–TX), who argued that the cause of the school shootings was taking God out of the classroom—were the heroes as were, and are, conservative interest groups working to clean up television, movies, and music, or to protect and expand gun rights (e.g., onto campuses, and into bars, restaurants, and churches). These groups would then be linked to characters like former President Ronald Reagan and “veterans” in order to legitimate their hero status. Images, Metaphors, Symbols, Numbers, Striking Statistics, Analogies, Euphemisms, Emotive Language, and Stereotypes  Just like a movie or book, a political narrative tries to paint pictures in our heads or engrain certain images. Certain items in a culture have symbolic value. When we see the U.S. flag, we think of patriotism. A bald eagle makes us think of freedom. Policy entrepreneurs manipulated images in the school shooting issue. We can all remember news reports showing scared kids, ambulances, guns, violent music videos, violent movies, and so forth. Images are used to try and influence us. The pro-gun control groups used the image of guns; used the striking statistics of the number of people killed in the United States by guns, compared with other countries; showed pictures of kids shooting guns, kids buying guns, and violent video games; and discussed our society’s general glorification of guns. Using emotive language (e.g., slaughtered children) to evoke our emotion, they suggested that corrupt politicians being influenced by campaign donations were “in bed” with the NRA. Accurately or not, they also started calling themselves a gun safety group. The NRA has argued that “gun safety” is just a euphemism for “gun control.” The opposing group criticized violent movies made by stereotypically depicted “liberal Hollywood elites” (in bed with anybody and everybody) and used the analogy of a “slippery slope” to warn that any gun regulation at all could lead to us becoming like Nazi Germany at worst, and at best to a situation in which only criminals would have guns. Their metaphor was that we would be “cutting off our nose to spite our face,” by enacting further limits. Literary Theme or Motif  Remember that normally the specific points (the story’s ending, the character’s flaws, the statistics cited, the metaphors and analogies used) are all aiming toward a unifying theme, or motif. We can identify commonly used motifs, and these motifs are not unlike the motifs used in other stories. For example, political stories often tell stories about family, heroic quests, powerful forces that need to be confronted and defeated, appearance that belies reality, culture clash, falls from innocence, Faustian bargains, and choice versus fate.

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Narrator/Author  Sometimes the author is also the narrator, but not always. So, who is the author? Is he or she part of an interest group (e.g., gun manufacturers) whose bias and self-interest might make the story suspect? Is the individual an authentic voice who truly represents that view? (We probably don’t want to let Sarah Brady [Jim’s wife] define the NRA position.) Who is the narrator? If not the author, why did the author pick that person? Is the narrator a trusted figure, as when the NRA secured the narrative abilities of actor Charlton Heston (who, famously, had played Moses)? An anonymous figure? A sympathetic (and Republican) figure such as Jim Brady arguing for gun limits? Is it common citizens? A woman? A veteran? Why did the storytellers choose this narrator? Audience  Who do these groups try to reach? Are they preaching to the choir to get the already converted to cough up more money? Are they trying to win over the fence sitters by presenting them with a Hobson’s choice? (Do you want freedom, or do you want to live in a world where the government takes away all your rights?) Are they appealing to specific groups within the population (e.g., suggesting that women need guns to protect themselves from young male thugs who are stronger than they are)? And, does the use of the word thug intentionally or unintentionally enter the element of race into the story? Evidence and Proof  A good policy analyst, indeed any responsible citizen, should always ask these sorts of questions, as well as asking a few more about evidence and proof. For example, did the storytellers rely on authority figures or false authority figures, who aren’t really authorities in this arena, to make their case? Did they use personal testimony from “privileged witnesses” as evidence? What about the trustworthiness of their sources? Are there reliable and verifiable recorded statistics, or are they derived from a biased source? Is their argument circular or a testable theory? Do the authors use observable claims you can check for yourself? Is it merely anecdotal evidence? Do they use loaded or emotive language to tug at your heart instead of your head? Does the story raise an issue that is a red herring and try to obscure the real issue? These questions about stories are all part of an effort to answer three big questions: 1. 2. 3.

What is the overall point or moral of the story they want to get across? Is this story persuasive? If their story is true, so what? In other words, is this an issue worth caring about, something you believe you can and should do something about? And, what if anything, would that be?

People live their lives through stories. It is quite possible that individuals tell stories without fully connecting their story to a larger social or political context. An individual might tell a story that he or she asserts is “nonpolitical” and would argue that they only desire “a fair and neutral resolution to the problem.” However, a trained analyst can deconstruct the narrative and find significant issues of power and interests. Consider the following stories told surrounding the seemingly nonpolitical decision of performance evaluation and salary allocation in a government agency. Assume, for example, that the agency has received an extra $30,000 and must decide how to allocate the money. Frank has a tenured position in the agency and has worked in the agency for 15 years. Frank states about the decision: “We should allocate the money fairly, base it on merit; politics and the buddy system should have nothing to do with the allocation decision.” Frank’s narrative is one of merit and fairness. He clearly wants to indicate that he does not like what he sees as the unfairness of politics. While we could take Frank’s narrative as the truth, the careful narrative analyst would search further and try to place his views within a larger context. First, we must learn how Frank defines “merit.”

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Perhaps we will find that he defines merit as years of service, number of clients served, and knowledge of procedures. Clearly, this definition of merit will benefit someone who has had a long career in the agency. Thus, built into Frank’s definition of merit is a bias toward length of service. His definition of merit has political interests in it. An even more careful analysis might find that the manager of the agency has traditionally allocated extra money based on factors that include service to clients, evaluations of peers, and attendance at voluntary training sessions. The manager (Chamique) states, “I always try to allocate money in a method that rewards performance in a variety of ways. I really try to reward those who have given quality service to our clients.” Maybe we can conclude that Frank has interests and that he sees himself as losing in the battle for these interests in the past. He may not realize that his definition of “merit” is tied to his interests and that other equally possible definitions of merit are possible. Instead, he sees the manager as using the buddy system. The analyst, of course, would also have to analyze Chamique’s story and determine whether her told narrative equates to her lived narrative. In simpler terms, do her actions match her words—does she walk the talk? We have oversimplified this example to make a point. Narratives are efforts by the storyteller to construct social reality. The analyst attempts to place narratives within a larger context and look for issues of power and interests. It is important for the analyst to try to be prudent and not “invent” interpretations. Remember there are always trade-offs in approaches and the problem with story analysis is that it invites subjectivity on the part of the analyst. Using narrative analysis as a methodology can be as subjective and undemocratic as the blind use of positivist methods, but it is also a crucial skill. It is your turn to try it. Exercise for Students: Now that you have read this essay, find a newspaper editorial, an interest group document (or video), or an elected official’s speech, and analyze it as a political story. Be sure to identify the characters; the intended audience; the use of symbols, metaphors, literary theme; use of evidence; and so forth. Importantly, you should view narrative analysis in relation to the two other tools that we have discussed in this chapter and everything you have learned in the earlier chapters about language, numbers, stories, and subjectivity. Indeed, the focus group method is a major technique to generate narratives, and content analysis is a method to analyze and report different narratives. But, in addition to focus groups, there are other ways to generate narratives. Sources of policy narratives include letters to the editor, public speeches, transcripts of public speeches, public policy statements of elected officials and agencies, qualitative mail surveys sent to citizens, Internet chat rooms, and other public documents. In short, in most policy analysis areas there are many sources available to create narratives. The brief discussion that follows next helps explain how you can use narrative analysis (including positivist methods, so a mixed-methods approach) to recast the problem definition in the Yellowstone bison controversy that you worked on in Chapter 6. In the last chapter, the Yellowstone bison and brucellosis controversy was used in conducting a pragmatic policy analysis utilizing a five-step method that combined the rational and political approaches. In this chapter, we added to your knowledge about problem definition using postmodern and mixed-methodology perspectives. With this new knowledge, we now revisit the bison case and use it to illustrate postmodern problem definition and how it can be used by policy analysis practitioners. While the case in Chapter 6 ends in 2019, the analysis that follows focuses on the crucial problem definition of the issue in the period 1996–1998, though, when appropriate, we have provided an update through 2019. The bison controversy provides many excellent examples of how stories, symbols, and metaphors are used in the policy process, how they are subjective, and how they are used to misrepresent or to shape the definition that will, in turn, shape policy. Like all practicing analysts, we were faced with the question of how to gather information. We

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chose a combination of three methods that we explain in the Teaching Appendix. After reviewing all the materials and using an inductive approach, five major categories emerged from our analysis. Each category or story told by various actors in this public drama portrayed the bison issue in a different way, either by emphasizing some aspects of the case at the expense of other aspects, by using captivating metaphors, by misrepresenting facts, by searching for causes, and ultimately by trying to spin a story that favors a problem definition that would lead to a policy favorable to their interests. A key advantage of the mixed-methods approach is it demonstrates that ambiguity and subjectivity are involved. Another benefit from the contributions of postpositivism is that the focus on concepts such as metaphors, symbols, and stories suggests that analysts need to think critically about language being carefully crafted by stakeholders to frame problem definition. If we accept the ideal of democracy, there are also positives associated with the postmodernist demand that we seek input broadly so that we can hear the voices usually unheard. Democracy also benefits when we make the various stories both available and assailable. Importantly, an analysis of the conflicts evident between the different narratives raises several questions. At least nine questions crucial in problem definition emerge from the analysis of the bison stories. We labeled these: “Hidden Agendas and Heroes,” “Winter Ghost Towns and a Hobson’s Choice,” “Two Goliaths and Little David (Montana),” “Blue Ribbons, a Mercy Harvest, and Anti-Recreationist Conspirators,” and “Wild Bison and Wild Bureaucrats.” While definitive answers may be an impossibility, and while all answers will be partially political, again we reiterate that not all stories, numbers, and claims are equally well supported by the available evidence. Nothing central to the postpositivist insights forbids the use of positivist methods (informed by the postmodernist critique). This is where mixed methodologies come into play. We may not be able to prove whether or not brucellosis transmission is possible, but we can gather the scientific evidence, try to objectively evaluate the sources, and pass the research findings along. Statistics are obviously vulnerable to manipulation, but we can count the cattle potentially affected, compare the economic contributions of tourism and ranching, and examine public opinion on the relative importance of each. And, while the question of scientifically evaluating carrying capacity hinges on the political question of what land to include in the carrying capacity equation, we can at least lay out the questions. In the spirit of postmodernism, the reader is the final arbiter of the value of the postpositivist contributions, but it (combined with mixed methods) seemed to inform problem definition in a way that made it more comprehensive, more democratic, and that accounts for the role of politics better than does the positivist method alone. [A detailed explanation of our methods and analysis and the five stories is available in the Teaching Appendix. This will be particularly helpful if the bison case is assigned as a major project.]

Concluding Thoughts Positivist methodology has its place. As Hagan (2006, pp. 1–5) effectively points out in his excellent Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology text (now in its tenth edition [2013]), social science research—like scientific research in general—has revealed that the obvious and what is considered “common sense” are often patently false. Making social policy based on, for example, myths about crime, welfare, education, or immigration is not unlike making ocean exploration plans based on the idea of a flat earth. It may seem obvious to you that church attendance and delinquency would be related (negatively), but Hirschi and Stark (1969) found it to be a very weak relationship (and promptly had their study attacked as inadequately done, false, and stupid by those whose values and common sense objected to their findings).

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If policy is made based not upon solid research but upon the obvious, taxpayer money will often be wasted, successful alternatives not chosen, and the problem left unattended or exacerbated. Arguing for a scientific methodology, Hagan (2006, p. 5) is persuasive: [v]erbal descriptions of phenomena are not much different than numerical measures of some entity; the latter simply force the analyst to be more precise and rigorous, while thinking through the concept under study in a more disciplined manner. Thus, common sense and the experience certainly serve an important function in sensitizing us to a subject; however, our separate experiences might better be viewed as limited case studies of a subject matter that may not be entirely generalizable to the universe of such subjects, or as observations that may be limited by time, place, and the subjective biases of the observer.

Almost everyone favors solid research, a rigorous and disciplined analysis, and striving to reduce bias and enhance objectivity. But your authors believe that is simply not enough. The words we have acquired and arranged, the stories we tell and believe, demand more. You are given the ­opportunity to test the usefulness of this chapter’s concepts yourself and to reflect critically about postmodern problem definition in the case that closes this chapter. The case study that concludes this chapter focuses us again on school shootings and problem definition, as well as focus group research and narrative analysis. Please note that this transcript is fictional, although it was based on an analysis of multiple sources revealing how individuals frame the issue during discussions. You need to read the following transcript and be prepared to answer questions about it and possibly complete some of the suggested tasks. Both of the authors find students such as yourselves enjoy being assigned roles and hearing it read out loud. (There are nine focus group participant roles, two facilitators, and any other students have the task of paying attention to the job being done by the facilitators’ roles as written and being prepared to critique/ praise the job they do.)

Glossary Terms epistemology (epistemological) (p. 212)         synedoches (p. 231)

Case Study: School Shootings and Focus Group Research: Narrative Analysis and Problem Definition The Case A focus group researcher was interested in finding out the views of parents of schoolchildren toward the recent school shootings. The focus group researcher arranged for 12 citizens who live in the Sand Hills School District to show up at 7:00 p.m. to discuss the shootings. Most of them (10 of the 12) were parents of children who do, or did go to school there. However, only nine participants actually arrived at the school cafeteria for the session. This doesn’t surprise the researcher, in fact, he would have invited only 8–10 people if he thought they would all show up to control the size of the group. Due to scheduling problems with one of the facilitators, the focus group lasted for only one hour though it had been planned for 90 minutes. After introductions, the discussion began and the following transcript has been produced.

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Focus Group Transcript 7:00 P.M. Facilitator (F1): Question: “What are your thoughts on the recent school shootings?” Participant #1 (P1): I believe that the media really glorifies these events and that basically we have these kids who are looking at trying to make a name for themselves by doing these horrible things. I couldn’t believe how much coverage the shooting in Parkland received. Participant #2 (P2): Yeah, I agree, maybe if the media just would stop reporting these things, maybe the killing would stop. Participant #3 (P3): But the media is really responsible in much larger ways, such as their glorification of violence to teens. I saw a show the other day on television where 15 people were killed in 45 minutes. You can’t tell me that this doesn’t lead to violence. Kids sit and watch this stuff for hours. Participant #4 (P4): Yeah, but that is the parents’ responsibility to make sure they monitor what their kids watch. I don’t let my kids watch anything without me knowing what it is. P2: Yeah, but do you watch your kids 24 hours a day? What happens when they go to someone else’s house or to school? And you’re kidding yourself if you think you are controlling what they are doing online. You can’t be a 24-hour-a-day watchdog. P4: Well, I know what my kids are doing all of the time. P2: Oh yeah, what are they doing now while you are here? 7:08 P.M. Facilitator (F2): I think we are getting off topic here. Let’s get back directly to the school shootings. Participant #5 (P5): I think the point about violence on television is okay but maybe what we are missing here is the central point. Guns! How do these kids kill? They kill with guns. Why does this society need so many guns? I really get frustrated with our cultural love of killing machines. Participant #6: I don’t like your tone. If more people actually had guns, they could use them to shoot these deranged killers. The problem is gun-free zones. Guns are about freedom. I have owned guns for years and I don’t kill people. Anyway, people kill people; guns don’t kill people. Why not ban rocks? They can be a weapon. P5: But guns sure do make it a lot easier. Can you imagine somebody throwing rocks at their fellow students and really killing them? Can you imagine Oswald throwing a rock and killing a president? Get real. Also, I know that less than 15 percent of mass shootings happen in so-called gun free zones, and there’s no evidence anyone picked their target on that basis. We have too many guns, not too few. P6: Yeah, but people will find a way. I tell you that the bigger problem is the justice system. People get away with murder nowadays. The Bill of Rights has become a hiding place for these thugs. What we need is a death sentence for one of these thugs. That will make others think about whether killing is really the cool thing to do. Participant #7 (P7): I agree that guns are not the problem. P6: Voting for gun control is a violation of the oath our elected officials take to uphold and protect the Constitution. In my heart, I believe that the rifle used to shoot those students and teachers in Newtown was no more responsible for that tragedy than the automobile involved in a drunk driving death. My prayers and heart go out to the families, but when a drunk kills somebody the law goes after the driver of the car; why do they go after the gun when somebody shoots somebody? P5: There are big differences: the car is not something that is designed to intentionally kill. The NRA and gun manufacturers should be responsible. P6: Remember, the NRA is the biggest advocate of teaching kids how to handle guns safely. F2 (to P5): What was your point again?

(continued)

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P5: The NRA says it would be terrible to limit guns, to not be able to buy them, to have to wait to buy them, to not be able to have quick access to a loaded gun, to not be able to use automatic weapons when hunting. That’s not terrible. Kids at a dance diving under the punch bowl for safety is terrible. A dead father of three, who was there because he was the most giving teacher in the school, is terrible. School kids in body bags is terrible. A Holocaust survivor losing his life saving his students is terrible. I’m tired of the NRA portraying anybody who favors any gun regulations—no matter how reasonable, how narrow, and how carefully cast—as an elitist, anti-American, soft-headed, constitutional traitor. I was following the Twitter hashtag after that shooting in the Orlando nightclub, called the Purse or something?, and that stuff and the slippery-slope argument got real old fast. This isn’t about gun control; it is about gun safety. P7: It’s The Pulse, a gay night club, not a school, and his guns weren’t the problem. P3: I think if gun owners let their guns fall into the hands of anyone else, they are both responsible for what happens and grossly negligent, and in Massachusetts they put that into law. You have to keep guns locked up. Also, I read that 40 percent of guns are sold without background checks. The Second Amendment was about keeping the states free from armed invasions. It is about a well-regulated militia. Two hundred years ago we had muskets, not automatic weapons. We also didn’t have video games, movies, and television glorifying violence or the Internet and talk radio preaching hate. Moreover, the Constitution allows the government to protect us. It is very American to protect the innocent from reckless individuals. If they go back to using muskets, then I will support the abolition of all gun control. Meanwhile, count me among the 90 percent of Americans who favored making background checks mandatory with no loopholes. 7:13 P.M. F2: OK, I think what we have in this first discussion is the question of causes. What exactly is the cause of the problem? We will get back to this, but first let’s try and determine if there is a problem in the first place. Are these school shootings something for us to be concerned about? (What do you two think?—points to participants #8 and #9) Participant #8 (P8): Well, yeah, kids killing kids is a big problem. Participant #9 (P9): Certainly, I worry about my kids going to school with all of this violence. P1: Yeah, but come on, these things are isolated incidents; it is the media who makes it a big deal. If a schoolhouse shooting happened 100 years ago halfway across the country, most of us would never hear about it. Today, the media is so nationalized that everything becomes national news. These 24-hour-a-day news channels and social media outlets need something to keep them going. What would people on Facebook or Twitter do if they could not talk about tragedy and crisis all the time? P6: A hundred years ago these kids would have been strung up. Today, we coddle them, bring in the counselors, and find excuses. Talk about how their parents are to blame, blah, blah, blah. P3: I guess we need as a society to actually find out how many killings and shootings happen each year and then decide if it is really a problem. P9: That is what the media does. The media just tells us what happens. Don’t blame the media. P8: I read in a magazine that there had been a school shooting killing every 12 days since the Parkland shooting or maybe it was a shooting every 12 days since then. P4: I heard that it was only eight shootings a year, not one a week. 7:18 P.M. F1: So is this a problem that society needs to be concerned about? I personally think that it is, but I want to hear from you. P7: No, there are just bad kids and bad people, always have been. Just because there are some bad people doesn’t mean that we should gut the Constitution. These are isolated events. We shouldn’t take several school shootings and then use these to find a large national problem That is poor reasoning. These shootings don’t affect me.

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C hapter 7  •  P roblem D efinition , M ethodologies , P raxis  7:20 P.M. F1 (to P7): So is the problem just natural or is it subject to human control? I guess that is the central question. P7: It is just natural, part of human nature. We cannot control the evil that lives inside of some of us or perhaps all of us. P4: You sound like Captain Kirk in the old Star Trek (brings laughs). P7: Yeah, but seriously, how come liberals get so worked up about a few dead school kids, but don’t care about hundreds of thousands of murders of unborn children? P5: This is not about religion or abortion and it’s not about taking away guns. It’s about limited and practical anti-crime measures that most Americans and most cops support. P7: Give me a @#@$#$#$ break. The term “practical anti-crime measures” is just some fancy liberal talk for “gun control” and your appeal to cops is funny since liberals always support criminals and now suddenly want them for allies to stop guns. F2: Let’s watch our personal attacks. P8: This is a child issue, not a gun issue. We are raising troubled kids. We abandon and alienate them. P5: So you don’t think that giving guns to desensitized, angry, tense, and immature teens is a mistake? I think it’s like giving gasoline and a lighter to a pyromaniac. We can’t just ignore these events. All events have a larger meaning. We have to take a hard look at how we raise our kids, what our priorities are, and what we want our children to grow up believing. P2: The school is a symbol for me. It is a place that characterizes community, learning, respect, friendship. It is an experience that we all share together. All of us in this room went to school. I think, anyway. So the shootings do affect all of us, whether we have kids or not, and whether they’re the victims or not. We can all relate to the horror that the kids must face when there is a shooting. We all have an interest in trying to stop the violence. P1: Yeah, there is a problem. If we don’t stop school violence, it will spread to other areas. This is like a disease that has to be nipped in the bud. We must contain the problem now. P2: I agree. 7:22 P.M. F2: It seems that there is some consensus that these shootings are a social problem. If so, what can government do about it? I guess this gets us back to the question of causes. P6: If the problem is things like values, can government really play a role? How can we expect passing a new law to solve a problem of the heart? Kids without hope or shame are the problem. It may be a cliché but people kill people. I’m more upset at liberal judges than gun manufacturers. P1: Absolutely, government can play a role. They don’t have to condone murder like they do with abortion, they don’t have to ban prayer in school, and they don’t have to glorify pot smoking like they do. P2 to P1: What does that mean? P1 to P2: What does what mean? P2: The government glorifying pot smoking. P1: I mean that many of our leaders today openly admit that they smoked pot in college. Do you think that is a good symbol for our children? Can you imagine our founding fathers smoking pot and sleeping around? All of this is part of a larger agenda. The government is trying to change our values into accepting the philosophy of anything goes. Barack Obama admitted to drug use as a young adult—what kind of role model is that? P2: I don’t think any of this matters. P1: I think it does.

(continued)

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P2: Okay, let’s talk about George W. Bush’s DUI and drinking problem when he was young, and Trump’s comments about women. You conservatives like to pick and choose your facts. P1: I’m not a conservative. F1: Let’s stop this and get back on track. 7:25 P.M. F2 (to P1): So do you believe that the problem is intentionally caused by a hidden government agenda? Please clarify what you mean here. P1: Do I think that this is intended? Well, I believe that since the 1960s that the generation that grew up smoking pot and dropping acid have waited for their time in power. Once in power, they started legitimizing all of the stuff that happened in the 1960s. P5: Wow, a conspiracy. Pretty soon we are going to be talking about the grassy knoll and the Kennedy assassination. Let’s call in one of the CSI teams. Way to get the attention off the NRA. P8: Whatever happened to individual responsibility in this country? A kid goes nuts and shoots some fellow students and suddenly it is somebody else’s fault. Give me a break! I say it is the families’ and the kids’ fault. 7:28 P.M. F2: Okay, I think we need to get back on subject here. What is the cause of these school shootings? P7: What we haven’t talked about is the economy today. Many years ago my parents only needed to work 40 hours a week. That is, my dad worked and my mom stayed at home and took care of the kids. Dad had all but the 40 hours to spend with us. Today, I work, my husband works, and it is not just 40 hours for each of us. I get home and there are phone calls to make, texts to respond to, emails to answer, etc. In addition, I am tired of single moms getting blamed. I remember reading about Columbine all those years ago and those two kids in Littleton both grew up in two-parent households and with stay-athome mothers. P1: That is what you feminists wanted. Maybe the intention of feminism was to give women freedom but the consequences have been family decay and violence. P7: I work out of economic necessity. We live from paycheck to paycheck. It doesn’t have a lot to do with feminism. P4: What does this have to do with school shootings? P7: This is where I think the shootings are important to understand. Maybe we need to look at who these kids are. Do their parents work all the time or does the stress of work lead to divorce? P8: Yeah, but what can the government do? P7: How about mandated governmental child care on the work site? How about raising the minimum wage to a living wage so we can make ends meet? P6: How about not raising my taxes to pay for all of these social programs? This issue only affects people who have children who go to school where there is violence. I feel bad for them but why should my tax dollars be used to help a few? I don’t buy all of this talk about larger interests and meanings being at play. It doesn’t affect me. P2: As American citizens, we all have an interest in this. Something must be done, the shootings are not just isolated events. They are events that are happening in our schools and are important to all of us. We are all paying the price of this violence. P5: I think the cause is really complex and that maybe all of us are somewhat right. It is like this huge complex system of values, laws, politics, culture, media, and it all interacts and in some ways are outside of our control. But easy access to guns and the glorification of guns is what I am concerned about. Government outlaws pot. Why not outlaw guns?

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C hapter 7  •  P roblem D efinition , M ethodologies , P raxis  Some guns might be okay but let’s get real here. I know it is true that in the states with more gun restrictions the death rate from guns goes down, not up (that includes suicides) and I think it worked well in Australia too. P1: Once you start banning some guns, all will be banned—and this is America, my friend. If you want to go down under, go ahead. P6: I do think that people should be more responsible with their guns. Keep them locked up and stuff. 7:40 P.M. F1: So if we were to give advice to government in terms of public policy, what would this advice be? (looks at P8). P8: I don’t know; government can’t really do much. F1 (to P8): But certainly, government must play some role. P8: Well, how about putting gun detectors in schools? That is practical and makes sense. That is why all of the shootings have happened in rural and suburban schools. The big city schools already have them. I really have a tough time with all of this social engineering. A kid kills two kids and suddenly we need governmental mandated child care, gun control, and economic reform. Pretty soon government will control our lives totally. I heard the other day that they want to collect DNA samples of all Americans. Once we allow government into our lives a little bit, we are on the road to total government control and domination. We have to draw the line somewhere and prevent government intervention in our lives. P6: We need to reform the juvenile justice system. If you are old enough to kill, you are old enough for capital punishment. Quit all the plea bargaining and make these kids responsible. It’s like when I was a kid and did wrong. My parents would whip my butt and pretty soon I figured out that it wasn’t worth being bad because the whippings really hurt. P4: This sounds good, but in reality I doubt whether a kid is going to be rational and say, “I am not going to kill because I don’t want to be put in prison or face the electric chair.” These kids are not rational in the first place. I have never bought the death penalty as a way to stop crime. Crimes of violence are not rational and the death penalty or any deterrence only works if the person committing the crime has rational ends or goals. P1: That is why government must teach values from an early age. When I was young and did bad, my dad spanked my butt. Nowadays, when a parent spanks a kid, the kid probably has a lawyer and sues the parent (laughs in the group). I know that you think this is funny but I read just the other day about a kid who was suing his parents for spanking him. What they now call “abuse,” my dad called “discipline.” I whip my kids good when they need it and they are good kids, not hoodlums. P2: I’m glad that you are not my dad. P1: Yeah, I wouldn’t put up with your lifestyle (brings moans from the group). 7:50 P.M. F2: Let’s get back to what we want the government to do in regard to the school shootings. P3: The government won’t do anything because we haven’t fixed the campaign finance laws. Was it coincidence that senators who have received thousands of NRA dollars oppose any reasonable gun regulation? At least, the government should play a stronger role in regulating what is on TV, the Net, and what music can be downloaded. Have you seen some of the video games that they put out? My gosh, people are biting each other’s heads off and there is violent murder. In my time, we played video games like Frogger, Asteroids, and Pac-Man. These were harmless and fun games. But things have changed today. Now Doom seems mild. I also think that we need mandatory ratings of shows and the outright banning of some acts like violent murder on any media outlet. As a society we can start to eliminate some of the sickness that may influence our children toward violence or violent thoughts. The violence that our kids are exposed to is harmful to our society. I know all about the First Amendment, but this is the 21st century and we need some value clarification.

(continued)

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7:52 P.M. F2: What do you mean by “value clarification?” P3: I mean that government does, and should, play a role in what is accepted and not accepted. Blowing someone’s head off with a gun on TV is not what I want my kids watching after dinner and before bed. The Constitution is not a “free pass” for violent people and perverts. It is just a set of values that says we basically support free speech; it says nothing about supporting violence, hatred, and so on. P9: I think the focus really has to be on schools and not on these larger issues. I think schools have to play a larger role in counseling students and identifying these problem kids earlier in the process. I know it is a family responsibility but families are breaking down, we live in a mass society now, and government, in this case the schools, have to take a stronger role. P4: Yeah, I remember hearing about a really successful program in Seattle called the Second Step program that taught little kids about taking turns, conflict resolution, and anger management. And, we all know that mental health funding is inadequate, right? P8: I don’t think that we are going to solve the problem tonight. But just talking about this has been helpful. I guess there are a lot of different views on the subject. I am surprised. But how can society possibly solve this problem when we all have such different views? Maybe the experts can sort things out. I don’t know. F2: Can expertise solve a policy problem like this, or is this a situation where our values conflict and the political process will have to decide? P3: I think each school district should be able to decide, but can’t experts help us know what we want to do? 8:00 P.M. F1: I guess our time is up; thank you all for participating.

Questions/Problems Note: The professor may choose to have you answer all of these questions or only some, depending on time limitations, but please read all of them and think about the issues raised. If you were frustrated by participants seemingly getting off topic, and the way that issues and popular culture references that seem unrelated and often inappropriate to the serious issue at hand recurred throughout the transcript, you are not alone. Yet this is expected, since policy entrepreneurs use the media and more salient issues—such as school shootings—to address their pet problems and attempt to couple their solutions to the issue at hand. Some of our students reading this case struggle with the relevance of these competing stories as they try to understand school shootings as a political and policy issue. Some students feel that the facilitator should be more aggressive and cut off participants when they stray off topic. Other students contend that this is indeed (sadly) how citizens talk about school shootings and that the focus group facilitator should spend more time exploring why individuals talk about the issue in this manner, where they get their information, and so forth. Then again, as other students note, the school board wants practical advice, not theoretical exploration. What do you think?

Conduct a Content Analysis of Problem Definitions What are the major categories of respondents’ views of the causes of school shootings? How are their views of causes related to policies? Are the respondents always consistent in their views? Do their facts check out? a. What type of method did you use to conduct your analysis (deductive, inductive, combination)?

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b. Did you look for manifest or latent content or both? c. In your opinion, how reliable and valid are your findings? d. How do your results compare with other classmates’ conclusions?

Critique the Facilitator Critique the performance of the facilitator in this discussion. (A discussion of facilitation skills is included later in Chapter 8.) a. Did the facilitator intervene at the right moments? Are there examples where the facilitator should have intervened but did not or where the facilitator intervened inappropriately? b. Are there examples of the facilitator using leading questions? c. Did the facilitator ever inappropriately interject his or her own opinion into the discussion? d. Were the questions asked appropriate? If not, what questions would you have asked and why?

Surveys and Focus Groups Having read this transcript, what do you believe are the strengths and weaknesses of focus group research as compared to what you know about mail survey research? If you were to design a survey based on the results of this focus group session, what questions would you ask, and what responses would you let them choose from?

Symbols and Metaphors Can you find examples of participants using symbols or metaphors in their responses? What about their use of causes and Stone’s discussion? Does the understanding of Stone’s symbolic representation help in understanding the responses?

What Next? From a practical perspective, what could a policy analyst do with this information? Is this approach more democratic than other types of policy analysis, or is it merely an exercise in postpositivism that takes us nowhere?

Notes 1 In November 2002, Randy Clemons participated in a round-table discussion with Larry Lynn and Michael Munger (organized by Francine Sanders Romero) at the Southern Political Science Association Conference in Savannah, Georgia. The discussion focused on different approaches to policy analysis, and it was a pleasant and instructive exchange of ideas. 2 In 1997, Kim Quaile Hill, Paul Sabatier, and Edella Schlager engaged in a scholarly exchange of ideas in the journal Policy Currents. Their focus was the development status of systematic and generalizable theory in the field of policy studies. Sabatier and Schlager both identified the advocacy coalition framework and the institutional rational choice model as the two most-developed theories. Hill initiated the debate with the call for greater attention to theory building, including the use of what he labeled “ambitious case study scholarship and use.” 3 This approach is discussed in Chapter 8, and we will provide some actual democratic tools of analysis and policymaking. 4 It is interesting to note that bureaucracy is a symbol that since the late 1990s has been the enemy of both liberals and conservatives. Bureaucracy-bashing is very much part of elected official rhetoric. Calls for government reform consistently focus on bureaucratic reform instead of electoral or campaign finance reform. Bureaucracy has become the symbol for all that is wrong with American government. Yet elected officials are the ones passing vague legislation and leaving the real work of government to experts in bureaucratic agencies. 5 Graham Allison, 1971 classic of decision making and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and its revision (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), are still perhaps the best examples of this phenomenon.

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Tragically, many “triggering events” in American history have been literal triggering events. De Venanzi (2012) and Bonanno and Levenson (2014) provide excellent reviews of the emerging academic literature on school shootings. Bonanno and Levenson (2014) provide ideas about research findings that can be used in school prevention efforts. 8 The manufacture and sale of 19 specific assault weapons were banned by the federal legislation signed into law in 1994. This gun control legislation got a momentum boost from another tragic triggering event at a school, when a 24-year-old drifter with an AK47 assault rifle opened fire on a Stockton, California, schoolyard, killing five children and wounding 30 more. However, this law was allowed to lapse in 2004.

Chapter 8

Doing Democracy: A New (Six) Step Model

Mini-Case “Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal” Case Study “Big-Mart: Cheap Goods at What Price?”

Defining Democracy Sesame Street teaches third-graders about democratic elections in the following manner: You have three dollars to spend. Some people want crayons, others juice. You vote what to buy. If the majority wants crayons, you get crayons, and vice versa. (Amitai Etzioni, 1996, p. 115)

In part due to the 1990s debate between positivism and postpositivism, the first two decades of the 21st century saw renewed calls in the academic literature for the use of democracy in policy analysis and public administration (e.g., Denhardt and Denhardt, 2002; Helling and Thomas, 2001; Mizrahi, Vigoda-Gadot and Cohen, 2009; Nabatchi, 2010; Smith, 2010; Walters, Aydelotte and Miller, 2000; Weeks, 2000; Yang and Pandey, 2011). All of this literature on democracy emphasizes a renewed call for engaging citizens, not just at the end of the policy process but from the beginning and throughout policy implementation and for seeking substantive outcomes in the use of democracy. Unfortunately, both our society (as illustrated in the quote by Etzioni) and the professions of policy analysis and public administration often view democracy within the overly simplistic context of voting and majority rule. This tendency has, arguably, played out dangerously even in American foreign policy. While most U.S. citizens support the idea of the spread of democracy, the government’s push for democracy in several places, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and across the African continent seemed to be ignorant of the reality that majoritarianism does not equal democracy. Democracy requires the balancing of both majority rule and minority rights—especially the political rights necessary to try to become a majority. Democracy cannot exist without a strong civil society, without a culture of tolerance and trust, or without the necessary checks and balances on both elites and the tyranny of the majority. Free and fair elections are one thing; democracy, though, requires more. Interestingly, despite our society’s tremendous respect for democracy and freedom, it is common to denigrate and underestimate the public. Pundits do it all the time in clever

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editorials. Jimmy Kimmel does it with his Lie Witness News interviews of people on the street. Newspapers generally aim stories at “the lowest common denominator.” In 2016 many baffled political observers made incredulous comments about the intelligence of supporters of Donald Trump or the naivety of those supporting socialist Senator Bernie Sanders. Is all of this fair and accurate? Or is it a self-fulfilling prophecy? Are people responding to the expectations of the elites and the lack of opportunities for meaningful participation? Consider the following two related stories that unfolded long before the rise of the Tea Party or the Occupy movement focused on the 99 percent. In our second edition, we discussed the work of Edward C. Weeks (2000) and his illustration of how the city of Eugene, Oregon, engaged in an extensive citizen participation effort that helped the city put together their budget. Instead of disengaged citizens, public administrators were enthused by citizen participation. According to Weeks (p. 365), “Workshop attendance exceeded expectations. The city had never had more than a couple of hundred citizens attend a public meeting. Over six hundred and eighty citizens attended the three-hour Eugene Decisions workshops.” Participatory budgeting actually originated in Brazil in 1989 and since then has spread throughout the world. It is now used in three major cities in Brazil and also by two cities in neighboring Argentina. Between our second and third editions, in the United States, participatory budgeting is found in such diverse communities as New York City and Vallejo, California, in Canadian cities like Montreal and Toronto, and in European cities such as Newcastle, UK, and Seville, Spain (Participatory Budgeting Project, 2015). Participatory budgeting demonstrates that citizens will and can pay attention to financial and economic decisions and that not only can they pay attention, but that they can be informed and successful participants in decisions involving finance and economics (see this documentary on participatory budgeting in New York City, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DHhm6W0sD7M). Some academics are also optimistic about the future of democracy. Russell Dalton (2016) argues that in the United States (and also throughout the world), young people are the most educated generation in history, and acting as “engaged citizens” they are reshaping political participation toward a more participatory direction. Perhaps the reason people know more about the Kardashian/ Jenner clan than they do about Ukraine, ISIS, Ghana, female genital mutilation, desertification, and Iran is the media’s choice of what to cover based on their view of citizens. Perhaps there really is such a thing as “democracy,” and perhaps efforts should be made both to inform and to listen to the public. There is evidence to suggest that at least some of the perceived citizen ignorance and apathy is, if not a false perception, a self-fulfilling prophecy.1 Chapter Roadmap: The final substantive chapter of the book examines democracy and the role of the citizen in policy analysis. It is not quite the concluding chapter, but it will serve to pull together several loose ends (and clear up areas where, with good intentions, we deviously misled you). This chapter represents the end of our introduction to postpositivist methods of analysis and together with the sort of positivist tools covered in Chapter 3, these two threads are designed to leave you prepared to utilize a mixed-methods approach. The chapter’s mini-case puts you in a position to draw on both. The chapter’s (and these tools’) primary focus, as suggested by the chapter title, is on the role of the public policy analyst as a custodian of democracy—not only in theory, but also in practice. In completing the cases in Chapters 1–7, you have already dealt with questions of democracy. In your role as a policy analyst, you have had to wrestle with questions of who should and should not be your stakeholders, how evaluation criteria should be determined, the reality and challenge of hidden and unavoidable value conflict, and the dangers and limits of the rational, positivist tools and approach, as well as determining who you (as an analyst) work for. The case that concludes the chapter raises issues related to what an analyst can expect to experience in practice that, again, will let you use lots of tools.

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Democracy as an Ambiguous Symbol Fortunately, if you feel frustrated by defining democracy in policy analysis, you are not alone. Democratic theorists have for years debated exactly what democracy means. Democracy is derived from demokratia, meaning rule by the people. “Rule by the people” may appear an unambiguous concept, but appearances are deceptive. The history of democracy is complex and marked by conflicting interpretations. According to the classic work by Held (1987, p. 2), definitional problems emerge with each element of the phrase: “rule,” “rule by,” and “the people.” Held’s questions about democracy (1987, p. 2) appear here: The People: • Who are to be considered the people? • What kind of participation is envisioned for them? • What conditions are assumed to be conducive to participation? Can the disincentives and incentives, or costs and benefits of participation be equal? Rule: • How broadly or narrowly is the scope of rule to be constructed? What is the appropriate field of democratic activity? • If “rule” is to cover “the political,” what is meant by this? Does it cover law and order? Relations between states? The economy? The domestic or private sphere? Rule by: • Must the rules of “the people” be obeyed? What is the place of obligation and dissent? • What mechanisms are created for those who are avowedly and actively “non-participants”? • Under what circumstances, if any, are democracies entitled to resort to coercion against some of their own people or against those outside the sphere of legitimate rule? What Counts as Rule by the People: • That all should govern, in the sense that all should be involved in legislating, in deciding on general policy, in applying laws and in governmental administration? • That all should be personally involved in crucial decision making; that is to say, in deciding general laws and matters of general policy? • That rulers should be accountable to the ruled: that they should, in other words, be obliged to justify their actions to the ruled and be removable by the ruled? • That rulers should be accountable to the representatives of the ruled? • That rulers should be chosen by the ruled? • That rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the ruled? • That rulers should act in the interests of the ruled?

Held’s questions are very important to us as policy analysts. His question “Who are the people?” relates to our question “Who are the stakeholders?” Besides those who can affect adoption and implementation, should those directly affected by policy have a say? And should only those directly affected by a policy have a voice in the policy process? In a policy issue involving local communities, a state, and a national park, should the stakeholders be limited to local interests or, for example, should American citizens living in Florida have as much to say (or at least some say) regarding Yellowstone wildlife policy as citizens living in communities that border Yellowstone National Park? Who all should have a say about the fate of the Amazon? Once we have dealt with this question, we as analysts must consider what level of participation is appropriate for the stakeholders. How do the people rule? Do we simply send surveys to citizens

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and hold open public meetings—and then say that we have included the “people” in our democratic process? Or do we actively seek citizens to sit on policy boards and make decisions? Should we seek input of citizens if they are uninformed and uneducated about issues? Why should analysts spend hundreds of hours studying an issue and then allow uninformed citizens to make final decisions? Of course, if we agree that the uneducated should not rule, we are left with other troubling problems. Does this mean that we should only listen to the “educated,” when, dealing with most policy issues, the educated are going to be special interest lobbyists? Further, this begs the question: “Why are so many citizens uneducated?” Could it be that it is in the interests of the “politically educated” and powerful to keep the uneducated in the dark? If so, should the analyst try to “educate” citizens? This sounds good, but how do analysts separate their own subjective biases from their educational function? Would analyst education really be analyst propaganda? Moreover, we are left with the troubling notion of majority rule versus minority rights. How do we listen to the views of the minority and still make good policy? If the people make policy, does this oblige all to obey?

The Critique of Traditional Policy Analysis Finally, we need to consider the descriptive question: How democratic is policymaking? Postmodernism is a worldview that makes the persuasive argument that elites manipulate the public through symbols, through their dominance of the media, through insistence on positivist techniques and “rational” dialogue, and through “selling short” both the competence and community-mindedness of average citizens.2 Starting in the late 1980s, scholars started questioning the use of rational models in policy analysis. One of the critiques of teaching methods of supposedly rational and neutral policy analysis is that the positivist model fails to facilitate democracy and, in fact, lends legitimacy and support to the status quo (which, it is argued, is controlled by elites and interest groups, rather than citizens). Danziger (1995), as we previously discussed, suggests that the role of the analyst is not to find the truth but to provide access to, and explanation of, data to all parties; to empower the public in regard to understanding analysis; and to promote serious public discussions of political issues. But the critique, of course, is not limited to postmodernism. Peter deLeon’s classic book, Democracy and the Policy Sciences (1997), focuses specifically on the issue of public participation and advocates a “minipopulist” procedure to increase citizen participation. He argues that policy analysts have relied too much on quantitative analysis and, in doing so, have become elite technicians separated from the lives of real people. deLeon believes that policy analysis must rediscover its roots found in the work of the late political scientist Harold Lasswell, who said the aims of policy analysis are “directed toward knowledge to improve the practice of democracy” (Lasswell, cited in deLeon, 1997, p. 7). Professor deLeon believes that a more participatory policy analysis framework is found in the postpositivist models of social science research, including phenomenology and critical theory. Similarly, Majone (1989, pp. 7–8) contended that policy analysis is essentially about language and how individuals are persuaded of the truth through political language. The voices of common citizens, he argued, must be heard in the political process. The implication of Majone’s still very relevant work is that policy analysts cannot just engage in purely objective and technical assessment of various policies. Instead, analysts must engage in a public discourse and produce policy arguments that are, finally, based on value judgments. The responsibility of the analyst is not just to the client, decision maker, or stakeholder, but rather to what Majone calls the “audience.” He wrote that audience: [a] term with a long tradition in rhetoric—is a better, more flexible, and more neutral characterization of the set of actual or potential recipients and users of analysis than more familiar terms

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like “client” or “decision maker.” It also reminds us that the main justification of advocacy and persuasion in democratic policymaking is their function in a continuous process of mutual learning through discourse. (Majone, 1989, p. 41)

Further evidence that the critique that policymaking is not very democratic is not unique to postmodernism is found in the words of one of the great scholars of decision making. At the 58th National Conference of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), July 28, 1997, four years before his death, Herbert Simon delivered a speech subsequently transformed into a guest editorial in the January/February 1998 Public Administration Review. Consider his words: Of course, it is not enough that a society work efficiently and productively. We also expect a society to distribute goods and services fairly, however vigorously we may debate and disagree about the criteria of fairness. In particular, we cannot expect fairness of distribution, measured by almost any criterion, unless all members of the society are represented in the distribution process. (Simon, 1998, p. ii)

Professor Simon even argued that “democratic society is only sustainable if power is dispersed.” Moreover, the ASPA Code of Ethics calls for those who work in the public sector to do the following: “Promote democratic participation: Inform the public and encourage active engagement in governance. Be open, transparent and responsive, and respect and assist all persons in their dealings with public organizations” (American Society for Public Administration, 2015). The democratic ethos that public servants are ethically bound to follow is simply not limited to majoritarianism. It includes openness, access to representativeness, and responsiveness. Recall that in Chapter 1 we made it clear that democracy is much more than merely having the right to vote and having the majority rule. Two of the elements we discussed as part of an ideal democracy were effective participation and citizen control of the policy agenda. We can now briefly revisit these ideas and take them forward a bit by quoting from Chambers, Clemons, and Foster (1990, pp. 29–30, 34): Effective participation means that throughout the decision making processes, including the stage of putting issues on the agenda, citizens in the community must have adequate and equal opportunity for expressing preferences as to the final outcome (Dahl, 6; Barber, 203–12). The further assumption is that participation will lead to public conflict and that democratic processes need to be utilized to resolve the conflict (Dahl, 10–11) … Barber sees this “strong democracy” as offering an alternative model to “thin democracy” of which majoritarianism democracy is an illustration. He argues that “Those who identify democracy with decision making through choices or voting c­ apture the urgency of action without which politics becomes an abstract process that touches neither power nor reality. Yet to limit democracy to a selection among preferences and to think of efficient ­decision-making as its sole measure is to ignore all but the thinnest features of democracy” (p. 198) … In the literature there is often a nod to a participatory process and occasionally there is evidence of a very real commitment to it. Yet the reality often is that the citizen feels left out of the decision making with the consequences that she or he becomes less articulate and makes fewer contributions to decisions shaping the collective destiny (Biddle and Biddle, 1965, 2–4) … This sense of no “control” promotes conflict, divides the community, and spawns bitterness.

King, Feltey, and Susel (1998) use focus groups to both demonstrate the limitations of traditional ­citizen participation and call for “authentic participation.” Among their critiques of traditional participation is the fact that it is too “conflictual,” it occurs after agendas are already set, and the administrator is viewed as the expert and the citizen as the client whose “buy in” the administrator is trying to secure. Conversely, they frame “authentic participation” as “collaborative,” occurring early in the process and based in discourse.

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As we explained in Chapter 7, postmodernism and postpositivism call for the reinvigoration of democracy and call on policy analysis to play a key role in that process. Danziger (1995, p. 445) writes: If public deliberation is to remain democratic in any meaningful sense of that word, then policy analysts must accept the rhetorical challenge shouldered by the ancient sophists: to promote the “truth” in public policy debates, all the contenders need to be well armed. If most professional analysts work behind closed doors in the service of political and economic elites, they will breed widespread public mistrust of their profession, of their technocratic paradigms, and of the powerful interests who sponsor them.

In addition, deLeon (1997, p. 124) concludes, “If participatory policy analysis is taken seriously by citizens, analysts, and policy-makers, it might well extend to a revitalization of social capital and to what many observers have called a flagging faith in democracy and its governance.” When updating the book for its fourth edition, we were struck by the lack of new scholarship dealing with democracy and policy analysis. While democracy is certainly still discussed as part of policy analysis, the field seems to lack the big normative and theoretical discussions that dominated the 1990s and early 2000s. Ingram, deLeon and Schneider (2016) point out that democracy has largely been ignored in today’s policy process theories calling it the “elephant in the corner.” One exception to that is Torgerson (2017) who explores democracy and the policy sciences and, in particular, the role of propaganda in stymying democracy. Togerson (p. 348) ultimately concludes that if there is a dominant principle in the policy sciences and democracy it is found in a 1927 quote from Thomas Dewey. Togerson quotes Dewey, “The essential need … is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion: That is the problem of the public.” This seems to suggest that the role of policy scholars is to study and promote methods that stimulate democratic debate, productive disagreement, as well as how to persuade. This has always been a central concern of this book and this chapter, in particular. Perhaps, the field has become too obsessed with becoming more like a science rather than pursuing better understanding and promotion of democracy. Today there is great concern about the role of language, propaganda, demagoguery and this time in history has even been called a post-fact world. Competing narratives and realities constructed by those narratives are at the forefront of U.S. politics. The Trump administration’s narrative denied scientific facts about climate change in favor of various narratives that argue climate change is either a hoax, a conspiracy, or that the science is inconclusive (e.g., Pierre-Louis 2017). The Trump administration’s Counselor to the President, Kellyanne Conway, talked of “alternative facts” revolving around the size of the inauguration crowd in 2017 (Blake, 2017a) and she has even been accused on multiple occasions (including when she was White House counsel) of inserting a fictional narrative of a “Bowling Green Massacre” into U.S. political discourse (Blake, 2017b). Additionally, instead of acceptance of media criticism as part of the job, President Trump’s dismissal of negative coverage of himself as “fake news” (e.g., Davis and Eileen 2018) increased distrust of the media. Often our students tell us they don’t evaluate media so much as simply consider it all equally guilty. There are fears that populist revolts on the right and the left are leaving democracy behind not just in the United States but internationally. Furthermore, a common thread in this chapter is that for democracy to work, we must listen to each other, understand different viewpoints, and be willing to admit that we are wrong. However, in Chapter 4, we learned about confirmation bias. Democracy today is impacted by social media and social media contributes to confirmation bias through what is known as “filter bubbles.” Social media uses algorithms to try and push content (and businesses) that you want to see. For example, if you listen to music on YouTube, you will notice that YouTube quickly determines what type of music you like and starts suggesting other songs similar to the one that you have already listened to.

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The same thing happens in politics. Other social media outlets do the same thing and algorithms lead liberals to never seeing conservative political articles and conservatives never seeing liberal political articles. Social media lets us see what we want to see. Then there is the concept of an echo-chamber where online discussions of political events are simply individuals with similar beliefs talking to each other (preaching to the converted). Additionally, conservatives share conservative social media content with other conservatives and liberals share liberal social media content with other liberals. As Van Bavel and Pereira (2018: 222) write: It is thus a modern paradox how our increased access to information has isolated us in ideological bubbles and occluded us from facts. As comedian Stephen Colbert has noted: “It used to be, everyone was entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts. But that’s not the case anymore. Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything.”

Political scientists like Robert Putnam and Amitai Etzioni have long argued that for democracy to work, we must have connections to each other and that interactions between people will produce a common fact base and not just perceptions. While social media provides the possibility of collaboration and sharing of viewpoints, the reality of how social media has impacted democracy seems at this writing to be more on the negative side. If ever we needed policy studies to reinvigorate democracy, this is it. There are contemporary studies concerned with democracy. The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), for example, often seeks to explore the role of narrative in democracy (see Clemons et al., 2019; McBeth and Lybecker, 2018 for example) and other policy frameworks such as Schneider and Ingram’s Social Construction framework with their emphasis on deserving and undeserving target populations seem ripe to become launching grounds for a revival of democracy and policy theory. Furthermore, while academics might be neglecting democracy, practitioners are not. There are still great examples of participatory budgeting and other forms of participatory policy analysis as illustrated in King’s book Government Is Us (2015). Finally, though not a policy scholar, political philosopher Michael Sandel (2012) has called for us to rethink the limits of a market and government, and in a series of lectures available on YouTube has explored the importance of returning to democratic debate and to finding the underlying moral and ethical questions that seemingly divide us but that instead should unite us in democratic debate. This chapter provides a classical approach to democracy and policy analysis. It does so partially because the field has been remiss in developing a more robust theory of democracy and policy analysis. Of course, it is one thing to call for civic-mindedness, careful listening, active promotion of community discourse, cultivation of inclusive citizen participation, empowerment and education of citizens, the breaking down of boundaries, and working toward justice without paternalism— and quite another thing to operationalize these goals. Postmodernism, as previously explained, has often been criticized for its lack of applicability, but praxis demands it. Zanetti and Carr (1999, p. 211) stated that “postmodernism can only tear down the world; it cannot build it back up. The political consequence is a Hobbesian version of society as a war of all against all.” They then quoted C. Fred Alford, who argued that postmodernists do not even write about: [p]olitics. Not one word about how resources might be distributed, disputes settled, legitimate claims to authority determined, and collective amenities, such as hospitals, schools, parks, and roads funded and organized. Not one word about power and authority. Not one word about leadership. In part this is because an abstract, metaphysical approach to political theory leaves no room for such details. (p. 133)

Although this surely overstated the situation, postmodernism has been vulnerable to criticism echoing the fourth criteria we introduced for model evaluation—practicality. It is one thing to reveal

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tyranny, another to topple it; one thing to point out that the emperor has no clothes, another to make the emperor a suit that fits. To some degree, this was one of the original goals of this text—to remedy the problem of applicability. Thus, Chapters 6 and 7, in particular, sought to find pragmatic value in postmodernism for policy analysis, just as throughout the book we have made it clear that for postpositivist analysts there is still a required place for a rigorous methodology and positivist techniques. As Lasswell (1966, p. 12) wrote in the mid-1960s, democracy will be both “blind and weak” if it lacks a scientific policy process. But, also, it will not be a democracy if the sort of critiques offered by postmodernism, postpositivism, and other critics of traditional public policy methods and process remain solely in the realm of theory. But how does one actually structure democracy? How can a policy analyst “do democracy?”

Structuring Democracy As the beginning of this chapter asserted, democracy and policy analysis were the hot topics at the end of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century in the field of public policy and public administration—and the issue may be even more crucial now, though seemingly less prominent in academe. Democracy, from this perspective, is not about voting and polling, but an ongoing, inclusive participation that leads to real outcomes. If participation is not genuine, empowered/facilitated, and potentially meaningful, then it merely provides a fig leaf for nondemocratic policy decisions and will end in increased cynicism (like the corporate suggestion box stationed squarely over a trash container). Rather, this perspective suggests that public discourse (i.e., real dialogue) is essential to the development of shared values and visions. It is a belief that civic engagement can end the political posturing, conflict, and name calling that characterize modern policy debate, thereby leading to win-win solutions and an end to the we/ they, us/them stories. Once again, these criticisms are not limited to postmodernists. There is an entire school of writing (with important distinctions developing about viewing people as customers or citizens) regarding government reinvention and reform that aims at increased citizen participation (e.g., Carnevale, 1995; Lawler, 1996; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Peters, 1996; Schachter, 1997).­­ ­Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2002) book, The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering (a response to the reinventing government and new public management literature), promotes citizen participation as a key element of a new public service philosophy. Differentiating themselves from both traditional public administration and the new public management school, Denhardt and Denhardt (p. 114) write of the role of citizens in policy implementation in this manner: “Citizens are not treated as potentially interfering with ‘correct’ implementation, nor are they used primarily as vehicles for cost reduction. Instead, citizen engagement is seen as an appropriate and necessary part of policy implementation in a democracy.” Moreover, practitioners began making efforts to implement these ideas as highlighted in the works of Weeks (2000) and Walters, Aydelotte and Miller (2000). Likewise, the ideals being operationalized are neither radical nor necessarily driven by postmodernism. The ideal sort of democracy postulated by postmodernism is really an older view of democracy and civic life—invoking a time when there was a set place and time where people deliberated together, face to face, voicing hopes and fears, and working together on common problems. The Greek city states (although limited to free men), the indigenous peoples of North America (whose models of democracy influenced the founding of our democracy), and the idealized small town hall in New England are the examples people desire to imitate. Box 8.1 provides numerous concrete stories of implementation efforts that are being hailed as evidence that this is not a utopian dream.

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Box 8.1  Changing the Game

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he Innovations in American Government Awards program, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, has, since the 1980s, recognized innovative and exemplary government programs. At least once a year there are stories in the newspapers praising, rather than bashing, bureaucracy. A common theme among winners has been responsiveness to citizen participation that goes beyond voting, builds partnerships with nonprofit organizations and the private sector, and treats the citizens and groups that are affected by that governmental agency as insightful customers. Impressive federal, state, and local programs are nominated every year, and very worthy winners are identified (www. innovations.harvard.edu/). Finalists for the 2015 Harvard award included the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ outreach after Sandy Hook to experts in deliberative democracy to help communities study, assess, and then act on improving mental health approaches; Eau Claire, Wisconsin’s model for civic engagement and public problem-solving, which has transformed that community; New York State’s effort to improve Medicaid while also reducing costs, which utilized an intensive stakeholder engagement process; Oregon’s “Kitchen Table” program, which created a permanent civic infrastructure that connects elected officials and the public through a myriad of methods, including civic crowdfunding, in-state microlending, and in-person events; and a New York City participatory budgeting process where thousands of people directly decided how to allocate public funding to improve their communities. Last, but certainly not least among our changing-the-game examples, is the large number of organizations and communities that are concerned with reinvigorating democracy. One of the more interesting structures being implemented is known as a study circle. The Study Circles Resource Center (SCRC), now called EveryDay Democracy, was created to advance deliberative democracy, and helps communities, through materials and other assistance, organize study circles. These are democratic, high-participation discussions, in small, diverse groups. (You can read success stories and access publications at www.everyday-democracy.org/.) In the fall of 2019, the website listed success stories such as inclusive civic change dialogue in the Duke-Durham region, Decatur, Georgia, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, and in Maryland, Montgomery County schools have been working to remove ethnic and educational barriers, and in Stratford, Connecticut they’ve been working toward racial equity in not only policing, but educational and leadership opportunities, and this approach has led to concrete results such as a kindergarten-readiness workbook for parents, tutoring programs, expansion of a soup kitchen’s operation, improving lighting around a city to address crime, arranging financing for a new supermarket in a city neighborhood, a cultural awareness festival, and increased community input into a new county land-use plan. Finally, the 2015 book, Government Is Us. 2.0 (King, 2015) provides numerous examples of public administrators reaching out and making substantive connections to citizens leading to effective outcomes in environmental regulation, sustainability, to dealing with racism and implementing social justice.

Source: Study Circles Resource Center. 1998. Focus on Study Circles. Pomfret, CT: Author. 9, no. 4 (fall). Available online at www.everyday-democracy.org/ (accessed July 26, 2019).

Communitarianism and Democracy Our first and more minor deviousness goes all the way back to Chapter 1. In that chapter, when we introduced you to stakeholder mapping, we intentionally downplayed those “affected by or interested in the policy or issue” and instead focused your attention on those “with power over its adoption or implementation.” Along the way, we hope we have made it clear that some stakeholders have

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different resources and capabilities when it comes to representing their values and interests. In this chapter we are asking not only that the downplayed stakeholders be brought more fully into the picture, but also that you be aware of the power differences and consider trying to bring this into better balance. The real challenge is not recognizing that different actors have different interests (by now that should be obvious); the challenge is to try to find common ground, common purpose, and common agreements. But, considering what you know about politics and value c­ onflict, is that possible? The publication of political scientist Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community in 2000 led to renewed interest in rebuilding American community. Putnam argues that American social capital (connections between individuals) has declined significantly over the past few decades. Most importantly, Putnam contends that a decline in “bridging social capital” (connections between individuals from different backgrounds) has the most serious ramifications for American democracy. Bridging social capital is a key element of the United States’ pluralistic social and political environment, and weak civil society and low social capital, a problem all around the globe. Bridging social capital leads to reciprocity. Reciprocity is defined by Putnam (p. 20) using Yogi Berra, who stated, “If you don’t go to somebody’s funeral, they won’t come to yours.” Reciprocity, Putnam argues, leads to trust and reduced political conflict and violence. Though the communitarian movement is not as popular today as it was 20 years ago, it still remains influential in policy analysis circles. The work of Putnam built on the communitarian movement that found its voice primarily in the well-publicized and sometimes controversial works of sociologist Amitai Etzioni. Etzioni has been a leading figure of this movement, with such books as the updated The Spirit of Community (2002) and The Common Good (2004). Communitarianism sees itself as a moderate and middle-ground alternative to what it terms “radical individualism” and “excessive moralism.” As Lasch (1995, p. 109) explains, Etzioni, who founded the prominent communitarian journal The Responsive Community, convincingly argues the following: There is more consensus than at first seems to be the case. The “values we share as a community” include a “commitment to democracy, the Bill of Rights, and mutual respect among the subgroups.” Americans believe in fair treatment for all and in the “desirability of treating others with love, respect, and dignity.” They believe in the virtues of tolerance and truth telling. They condemn discrimination and violence. It is the breadth and depth of this agreement … that makes it possible to envision a “reasonable intermediate position” … Unfortunately the inordinate influence wielded by special interest groups, the media’s vested stake in conflict, and the adversarial mode of justice embodied in our legal system promote conflict rather than consensus.

One major critique of the communitarian view is that it would lead to social pressure to conform to the majority’s values, including the various communities’ parochial and often intolerant morality. More telling are two other critiques. The first relates to what we might call the Fulcrum Principle (Archimedes already has his own “principle” regarding the displacement of water, so we won’t name this the Archimedes Principle, but his is the name most associated with fulcrums). The idea is that choices must be made, and it is not always (perhaps rarely) possible to choose in a way that balances the lever on the point on which it pivots. Values such as individual rights and the welfare of the community may not always, or completely, be conflicting or mutually exclusive, but they are not easily balanced either. Time is a good example. You can try to balance your time between studying for this class and having a social life, or between work and family, but in the end you must make a choice that is somewhat a zero-sum choice, at least in the short run. Another example can be found in the power of unions. Without strong unions, workers often find themselves

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taken advantage of, placed in dangerous working conditions, or unable to share in the profits they generate. With strong unions, though, we often see competitiveness hurt, the protection of the incompetent, and corruption. A final example is deciding on the size and number of groups you engage in the policy process. Small groups almost always favor active participation. Big groups are, by definition, more likely to be representative. Unless you have unlimited time, staff, and money, you cannot have both. One choice tips the scales one way; the other choice tips the scales the other way. So, we must choose. We must pick our poison. We must decide what to sacrifice. We must favor one side or the other. Politics is about deciding who wins and who loses. Any other view of politics is a utopian delusion. The second idea has two parts, both of which relate to an acceptance of the fact that the values Etzioni cites do unite us. First, although true, these values cannot determine policy, only process. This harks back to a definition of democracy that argues that what the public is interested in is the rules for (the process), not the substance of, policy. Second, certainly most of us agree with general principles like “freedom of speech” or “democracy,” but when we start deciding what is protected speech and what is not (flag burning? deepfake videos?), and what democracy really means (majority rule vs. minority rights?), we disagree—sometimes violently. Communitarians find modern democracy inadequate because of its emphasis on procedural democracy, individualism, and lack of concern for community. Etzioni’s The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (1996) includes an important chapter for policy analysts called “Sharing Core Values.” In this chapter, Etzioni argues that current democratic practices that emphasize rational, deliberative thought are insufficient. Deliberation is a belief in democracy that assumes that by using democratic procedures, such as public hearings, as a forge, emotion and popular outrage will be tempered into policies that are well reasoned. He quotes Jack Knight and James Johnson, who write, “We view deliberation as an idealized process consisting of fair procedures within which political actors engage in reasoned argument for the purpose of resolving political conflict” (p. 98). He then quotes Philip Selznick, who adds, “If deliberation is taken seriously as a guiding principle, it is bound to check populist impulses. Deliberation is an appeal to reason rather than will, including popular will” (p. 98). Etzioni, oddly agreeing with many of the principles of postmodern policy analysis, argues that deliberation is inadequate because information is insufficient, group values influence individuals, and public issues are primarily normative, not empirical, questions. He then chastises both the right and left for their use of inflammatory language, in what Stone would call “strategic representation.” Instead of procedural deliberation, Etzioni suggests a form of civic engagement that allows citizens to engage each other not as enemies using democratic procedures, but rather as citizens with responsibilities and obligations to each other. Etzioni (p. 104) also provides several useful-sounding rules for what he terms “moral dialogues”: 1. 2. 3. 4.

“Contesting parties should not ‘demonize’ one another; they should refrain from depicting the other side’s values as completely negative, as when they are characterized as ‘satanic.’” “Do not affront the deepest moral commitments of other groups.” “Use less of the language of rights and more of that of needs, wants, and interests.” “Leave some issues out of the debate.”

In Etzioni’s world of moral dialogues, the postmodern world of symbolism and strategic representation is (theoretically?) replaced by one of honest discussion.3 Another communitarian who provides interesting guidance for policy analysts is Daniel Kemmis, who has two influential books: This Sovereign Land: A New Vision for Governing the West (2001), and his classic 1990 text, Community and the Politics of Place. Kemmis uses his experiences as mayor of Missoula, Montana, to promote his own brand of civic engagement.

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In the book, Kemmis provides several examples of political controversies that were resolved simply by making people engage other people. He is highly critical of Madisonian democracy, with its emphasis on mechanistic checks and balances that keep citizens from factious politics. Instead, Kemmis (1990, p. 17) argues that the idea of Madisonian democracy was an approximation of Smith’s Invisible Hand, wherein individual interests are merged into the public interest. He argues that James Madison had abandoned the idea of citizens acting upon the public interest. Kemmis (1990, p. 17) writes of Madison: “It was their private interests which he wanted them to behold, to understand, and to pursue.” He then reviews the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, who believed that democratic government had to build a sense of mutual responsibility among citizens for each other through the development of civic virtue. Kemmis (1990, p. 21) writes: Jefferson was appalled by the thought of large numbers of people making their living by depending solely upon the choices of other people with whom they had no social or moral ties of any kind. Yet it was this very disconnectedness which lay at the heart of Adam Smith’s doctrine of the “invisible hand” of the market.

Mayor Kemmis then reconceptualizes democracy based on Jefferson’s idea of civic virtue and Friedrich Hegel’s view that American democracy would only be possible when the space of the country had been filled and the occupants of the land forced to deal with each other. According to Kemmis, Hegel had argued that the frontier in American history had always acted as an escape valve for the development of a real civic culture. With this notion and the frontier of the western United States filling up with human populations, Kemmis suggests a new democracy based on a commitment to place and each other. As a practitioner of policy and not just a theorist, Kemmis provides many examples of his theory of civic engagement. One example (1990, pp. 111–113) is of a community group trying to secure a community development block grant to build a laundromat that would help generate income for a solar-powered greenhouse that would provide work for disabled, elderly, and unemployed Missoula citizens. The city’s private laundromat owners were outraged that public monies were going to be used to subsidize competition. Mayor Kemmis arranged a meeting at which the laundromat owners could meet with the nonprofit greenhouse group. At the beginning of the meeting, he asked the laundromat owners to explain why they were mad and then allowed the director of the solar greenhouse project to talk. Kemmis notes that, at first, both sides wanted him to make a decision, but, after some coaxing, he encouraged them to talk with each other and offer compromise solutions. After some time, the greenhouse group leader decided that even though he had the votes on the city council to win, he could not go through with his revenue-generating idea. This revelation did not produce victory yells from the private laundromat owners. Instead, they were impressed by the long planning efforts of the group’s director and tried to encourage him and the mayor to find other sources of revenue for the group’s endeavors. The traditional approach to this problem would have been for both groups to go before the city council and have each testify to the council members and mayor. This body would then make a decision and someone would walk away angry. Voting produces winners and losers, but the engagement approach of Kemmis made both sides take responsibility for what should be done. We are not suggesting that you transform yourself into a facilitator of democracy because it is easier than playing the role of neutral expert—because it isn’t easier. And inclusion of those not normally included (check for those democratic shoes!) in the policymaking process is, of course, no panacea. In fact, expanded inclusion significantly complicates—and often slows—policy analysis. Still, including the normally excluded and being more inclusive in Steps I through IV is essential, especially when dealing with wicked problems.

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Democratizing Steps I through IV and Inserting a New Fifth Step into a Six-Step Model We’re sorry. We apologize for our deceit, but it was quite important. We introduced you to a fivestep methodology for policy analysis. Did you notice that the fifth step was about evaluation following the policy decision? Of course, in one sense, all policy analysis begins after a previous policy choice. History matters, nondecisions are decisions, and defining a problem as not being a public problem still creates a policy. Yet, in another sense, formal policy evaluation after adoption is as different from the first four steps as it is (sadly) infrequent. Either way, let’s now call it (the evaluation of the selected policy option) the new sixth step and recognize that evaluation research is quite different from the other five steps of the policy model. And it was the appropriate, and common, place to locate its discussion. The inverse of this is true as well. Before reading Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 up to this point, you were not primed to fully grasp and evaluate our proposed new fifth step. Before we explain our fifth step, let’s back up for a minute and review the first four steps: Step I: Define the problem and determine its causes. Step II: Establish criteria to evaluate alternatives. Step III: Generate policy alternatives. Step IV: Evaluate and select policy.

We now propose a new fifth step that fits before what is now Step VI (policy evaluation, adjustment, termination). Now that you are more familiar with not only the critiques of democracy but also the language of postmodernism, we must rephrase and reemphasize its role—and make it practical. The stories of the stakeholders, their narratives, are central to problem definition—as is your narrative and the determination of who is a stakeholder. This chapter has suggested that democracy demands an inclusive and democratic discourse. The stakeholders’ stories, and the values they encompass, will also drive debates about evaluation criteria, and influence the generation of policy alternatives. ­During the fourth step, you were encouraged to use positivist methods to study the stakeholders’ use of facts. Chapter 7 suggested that you would deconstruct the rhetoric and ideology and provide “facts” that were relatively more truthful than the facts presented by some stakeholders. But now what? The new fifth step argues that while making Steps I through IV (and Step VI) more democratic is essential, it is not enough to just invite to the table voices too frequently ignored, to treat the speakers and their narratives with respect, or to work with their stories, utilizing both the insights and techniques born from a mixed-methodological approach. No, our new fifth step suggests you have not done enough democracy yet. Informally, we call Step V “returning to the table”: formally, we call it civic engagement. Step V: Civic Engagement

Allow us to return to Etzioni and company for a minute. Can communitarianism play a role in the pragmatic work world of the public policy analyst? While communitarianism and postmodernism are drastically different in many ways, we have shown—as befits communitarianism, perhaps—that there is a surprising amount of common ground as well. Additionally, while positivism and postmodernism/communitarianism may seem diametrically opposed, in the world of pragmatic policy analysis, the two approaches can work well with each other. We offer, in essence, a hybrid step of analysis that blends communitarianism, postmodernism, positivism, and postpositivism. We suggest that praxis (theory-guided method) and a mixed-methods approach can improve both democracy and policy analysis. Let’s see how it would have worked in the bison case.

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In Chapter 7 we examined problem definition in policy analysis using mixed methodologies to examine various narratives in the Yellowstone bison case. That analysis closed with several questions arising from rhetoric and symbolism. In that chapter, we stated that “While definitive answers may be an impossibility, and while all answers will be partially political … not all stories, numbers, and claims are equally well supported by the available evidence.” We then suggested that positivist methods could be used to answer questions about brucellosis transmission, the number of cattle, economic impact, and public opinion. In short, perhaps some “facts” are more reliable than other “facts.” With this information collected, positivism would suggest that the analyst now makes a decision. After all, we have listened to the stakeholders, we have analyzed their views, and we have answered questions. Communitarianism, however, would suggest that we take this further. The principle of civic engagement and moral dialogues would encourage the analyst to take the newly collected data and facts to the very stakeholders whose narratives were analyzed in the first place. In short, civic engagement calls for you to “return to the table.” At this point, the analyst facilitates sessions with the stakeholders at which the new facts serve to deconstruct many of the ideological arguments of the stakeholders. The analyst can present the information and then allow the stakeholders to digest and recycle it. Of course, in reality, many of the findings of the analysts are going to be disputed by some stakeholders. For example, in the bison case, it is true that there have been no scientific studies documenting transmission of brucellosis from bison to cattle in the wild. However, some ranching groups will state that there have been no real attempts to study the issue and that they have evidence that transmission exists. The analyst may find that only 2,000 cattle graze in the public lands near Yellowstone, but the ranching community will say that if these cattle are infected, the economic impact will go far beyond the park, because sanctions would affect all of Montana. The analyst should follow Kemmis’ lead and not allow the stakeholders to engage each other as enemies but rather as citizens occupying a common place. Through discussion, perhaps common political interests will arise. Perhaps rhetoric will be replaced by honesty and the real political and cultural issues dividing the stakeholders will finally be addressed honestly. Environmentalists, ranchers, and the business community may find that they share a common political interest in the protection of Yellowstone’s lands. Ranchers need to make profits so that they can keep their ranches and not be persuaded by big dollars to sell their land to subdivision developers. Environmentalists need to protect key wildlife habitat and migration routes found mainly in the area’s riparian zones. Interestingly, many of these areas are on private lands owned by ranchers. If ranchers sell their lands to developers, key habitat and migration routes will be destroyed. Businesses rely on outside tourist dollars, and tourists come to Yellowstone to see wildlife and open spaces, not condominiums and trophy homes. Under this scenario, all three major stakeholders would have a common political interest. Out of the common interests, perhaps over time common values would emerge as the three groups worked cooperatively on projects that preserve ranching, wildlife, and open spaces. Controversies would still arise, but they would be less likely to spiral into all-out political wars, because the groups would have developed interpersonal relations and modes of communication that make villainization unnecessary and less acceptable. In sum, throughout the process of the first four steps, stakeholders’ narratives play a key role. They also raise questions and make facts amenable, at least in part, to positivist analysis. Recognizing the limits and subjectivity of the positivist approach, you as an analyst answer those questions and study the stakeholders’ use of facts. This involves weighing the evidence, ­conducting focus groups, using content-analyzing surveys, reading census data, searching out and evaluating scientific studies, analyzing trends, and so on. You prepare a narrative, but it is not “your” narrative, that breaks down and analyzes their rhetoric, clears up “factual” misunderstandings, and provides accessible and assailable facts that are relatively more truthful than facts presented by some stakeholders.

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Once you have your story ready, it is then time for civic engagement. Rather than hearing the stakeholders out and then playing Solomon the wise king, return to the stakeholders. Strive to make the presented information as accessible as possible and to reveal the methodological pitfalls, assumptions, and biases associated with your research. You seek to educate (and, yes, persuade) stakeholders and tell, shall we say, your analyst story—striving to keep your personal story in the background. If you have strong feelings on the issue, someone else should probably handle the task, or you should state your bias up front and ask the stakeholders to monitor your fairness. Civic engagement must engage. Rather than merely presenting the information, you engage the stakeholders again and facilitate another discussion wherein the participants may reconstruct their narratives. This time (it is hoped) the dialogue is based more on “concrete information” and less on emotional rhetoric, half-truths, misunderstandings, and claims unsupported by evidence. You do not attempt to remove values from the discussion. Values are certainly a valid matter for stakeholders to raise. This is not a purely rational/scientific dialogue. On the other hand, just because one endorses the idea that people socially construct reality does not mean moving away from rational dialogue. As Lasch (1995, pp. 188–189) put it, “pragmatism holds that the impossibility of certainty does not preclude the possibility of reasoned discourse—of assertions that command provisional assent even though they lack unimpeachable foundations and are therefore subject to revision.” The discourse must be facilitated by a trained facilitator (e.g., you), the goal must be consensus. You do not have to have expertise in the substance of policy, but you do need to have expertise in process, and understand that positivist methods cannot be your sole methodology. In fact, at this point in the political conflict, the process is key and it is more political than empirical. Your position means that you have to do the following: • • • • •

try to pull together differing narratives; help brainstorm; point out that there may be weaknesses and limits to their individual stories; draw them beyond their parochial picture to focus on the larger context; be perceived as a fair arbiter.

The rest of the chapter consists of advice, rules, and tools (and examples) on “doing” democracy. The approach you will be offered is crucial to the successful use of all six of the steps in our policy analysis model and, we would argue, to democracy and to improved public policy.

Doing Democracy: Postpositivist Tools Tool #1: Discourse Rules for Achieving “Some Talk”

A major problem for the postpositivist approach to policy analysis is that, as an approach, it may replace the elite tendencies of positivism with the equally unwanted reality of anarchy. Fox and Miller (1996) argue that, in essence, typical bureaucratic policymaking is exemplified by monologic discourse or what they term “few talk.” They see the postmodern world of talk shows, 24-hour news cycles, and Internet chat rooms as “many talk.” Fox and Miller (1996, p. 139) write of their view of many talk: The many-talk model is mostly random bits of phraseology and unconfirmable gossip, with no situation to channel discourse. There is no object of intentionality; no “what do we do next” question that would lend itself to policy deliberation and effective action, no situation providing contexts to the conversations. Participating in babble, however uncoerced, deflects the prospects of collective will formation and frustrates the circulation of coherent public opinion.

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Fox and Miller (1996) instead suggest that public policy must be made within the context of what they term “some talk.” Some talk can be seen as a middle ground between the elitist tendencies of traditional positivist policy analysis and the anarchic tendencies of real postmodern policy analysis. How can the policy analyst use postpositivist methods (which are more democratic) without falling prey to the chaotic and anarchic notions of many talk? Using the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the authors provide “rules of discourse.” These rules (p. 120) include the following: 1. 2. 3. 4.

sincerity of the speaker; situation-regarding intentionality; willing attention; substantive contribution.

An explanation of these rules (Fox and Miller, 1996) is provided next. “Legitimate discourse” is discourse that meets the rules discussed. The problem, of course, is that, at some point, there is the danger of returning the policy analyst to the position of an elite—who is to say: “What is and what is not legitimate discourse?” To counter this criticism, the authors use Hannah Arendt’s “agonistic tension.” To quote Fox and Miller (1996, p. 11): “In the discourse we can expect a struggle over meanings, we expect argumentation, claiming, and counterclaiming, not harmonious consensus, as the participants try to resolve what to do next. But discipline is needed in such discourse.” Sincerity  Fox and Miller (pp. 121–122) argue that there are three classes of insincere claims: (1) insincere claims that betray the trust of discourse participants; (2) lame excuses for having made an insincere claim; and (3) calculated, consciously devious claims. Situation-Regarding Intentionality  Fox and Miller (p. 123) write, “Speakers with a situationregarding intentionality will take into account the context of the problem, the lives of those affected, and the public interest.” Claims must be connected to a situation and this avoids “the danger of levitating into postmodern hyperreality” as the “concreteness of the problematic increases.” Willing Attention  Fox and Miller (p. 125) define this as “a spirit of vigorous, active, even passionate engagement” but at the same time “a caring for the substance, process, and results of deliberation at another level.” Participants must listen and understand others’ viewpoints, they must be informed, and they must question the honesty or “veracity of an unwilling colleague.” Substantive Contribution  Here the authors (p. 125) write: Warrant for discourse can also be obtained by virtue of one’s proximity to the situation, by offering a unique point of view, specific expertise, generalized knowledge, or pertinent life experience, or by being able to express the concerns of groups or classes of citizens that one (actively or passively) represents.

They argue for an inclusive view of discourse where “People learn to be competent discourse participants in a developmental process that occurs over time and with ample opportunities to practice.” How does the analyst turn Fox and Miller’s views, and the postpositivist critique about a lack of democracy, into concrete tools for analysis? One method would be found in the facilitation of public meetings by policy analysts. The participatory democracy approach to policy analysis asserts that analysts must allow stakeholders to generate policy criteria, generate solutions, and ultimately choose solutions. Unfortunately, this approach is very inefficient because such an approach would invite a wide-ranging scope of voices and opinions. However, the use of the discourse rules by the facilitator would help eliminate “useless discussions.”

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It has been asserted that a major problem with policy discourse is that most individuals are not held accountable for what they argue. Analysts send anonymous surveys to respondents, who can then take verbal shots at anyone they please because they are protected by anonymity. Internet chat rooms allow users to use screen names that protect their real identity. Call-in talk shows allow citizens to argue their facts without ever having to face up to the responsibility of what they say. A policy analyst facilitating a participatory session would want to carefully implement Fox and Miller’s rules. Maybe the following example will be helpful in moving Fox and Miller’s ideas from the theory book to the practice of policy analysis. After setting the discourse rules of Fox and Miller, the analyst (facilitator) proceeds as follows: Analyst (Facilitator): We are here today to discuss options for ending school violence. Participant #1: I think that the school shootings are a manifestation of a government conspiracy to eliminate guns. The government is training kids to kill in the hope of finding ways to ban guns. Analyst: Do you have any proof of this? Participant #1: I heard it on a talk show yesterday. Analyst: Did the talk show provide any proof? Participant #1: No. Analyst: Then we are not going to go in this direction. (Participant #1 violated the rules of “sincerity of the speaker,” “accuracy of what is claimed,” and “relevance of utterances to the context of the discussion.”) (15 minutes of authentic discourse occur.) Participant #2: There is no way that I would ever want any more regulation on my guns. It would be too time-consuming and expensive for me. Participant #3 (To Participant #2): But what about the school shootings? Doesn’t this justify some regulation for the good of society? Aren’t you willing to sacrifice a little for a common good? (Participant #3 is enforcing the rules of discourse #3—making the speaker confront “situation-regarding intentionality” and “substantive contribution.”) (30 more minutes of authentic discourse occur.)

The point is that the analyst is now a facilitator enforcing the four rules of discourse and moving away from the empty symbolism and emotional rhetoric of postmodern society. The analyst does so but fully recognizes that almost all “facts” in politics are subjective and that honest opinions will differ. The facilitator provides guidelines that attempt to keep discussions focused, honest, and relevant. In short, there is a difference between lying and subjective interpretation, and there is a difference between grand philosophizing and problem solving. The philosopher Eric Voegelin, writing on the issue of willingness to participate in a rational discussion, also contributes to the sort of understanding a facilitator needs. Voegelin’s essay (found in an anthology of Western thought edited by Hunold, 1961, pp. 269–284) takes us back to ­Plato’s Protagoras.4 In this dialogue, Socrates and Protagoras are debating the possibility of teaching virtue. As Voegelin accurately reports, Protagoras makes a “brilliant speech, embellished with the Prometheus fable, richly interwoven with common-sense wisdom, and even a witty reference to one of the theatrical successes of the season.” The speech, read orally, “takes between twenty and thirty minutes to deliver.” Socrates is not pleased with this prolixity, because he recognizes that Protagoras seeks to avoid rational discussion. He is violating the rules of debate to avoid the serious scrutiny of his ideas. Voegelin claims, insightfully, that “in our modern society … preventing rational discussion has been reduced to such a fine art that it would require a really comprehensive monograph to exhaust the subject.” However, he limits himself to cataloging a few of the major variations. Voegelin identifies five methods. The first method is a group of tricks that goes back to the sophists. They are “simple, but effective. Their fundamental principle is that they must exhaust the time … by means of verbosity, appeals to authorities and so on.” The second method, also a group of tricks dating back to the time of Plato, Voegelin calls “back-stair psychology.” The key here is to skirt around the issue, and he

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provides the example of attacking the opponent’s line of argument as being based on a faulty political ideology or on the opponent’s economic interests. Classification is the third method identified. Here, rather than addressing the opponent’s argument, one demolishes it by classifying them and their position. (Voegelin tells how he had been classified and dismissed at various times as a Catholic, a Protestant, an anti-Semitic, a typical Jew, a liberal, a conservative, and a fascist.) Voegelin’s fourth method involves a systematic dogmatism, namely, making the statement that values absolutely do not belong in rational discussions. One example he gives is brushing aside discussions of values as being unscientific. The fifth and final method he lists is connected to what Voegelin calls “the neo-positivist method of social sciences.” While value is not an appropriate topic for debate, the method is. Thus, the debate gets stuck arguing about the method used rather than the fundamental questions. Voegelin’s contribution is not only the recognition of more violations to watch for (although a great contribution), but also the recognition that rational discussion cannot occur if participants wish to stop it. Thus, issues we will soon broach—such as ground rules for meetings, help from participants in enforcing the rules, setting the tone, grounding, and selling the process—are all key matters. Box 8.2 provides an explanation of one of the problems of our current public discourse.

Box 8.2  Monologic Communication

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onologic communication is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. The term monologic is used to denote one-way communication. In other words, monologic refers to the dissemination of information. The receiver of the information has no means to confront the speaker on meaning. The speaker does not have to justify what is spoken. In contrast, communication refers to “evoking understanding between two or more people.” In a conversation, the speaker and receiver go back and forth, testing meaning and searching for common understanding. Much of what passes as our public conversation in contemporary times is really monologic information dissemination. Look at these examples taken from a week of political news from a local newspaper: • “Most of the kids who shoot other kids come from single-parent families.” (Letter to the editor.) • “Environmentalists are working with the United Nations to take over our public lands.” (From a story on road closings in a national forest.) • “The city is trying to take my property over. It is already a crime that I must pay taxes for a school that I don’t use but now they want my property also.” (From a story on a city’s plan to create an area of impact outside the city’s boundaries: the statement was made at a public hearing.)

In each of these instances, the speaker was not challenged. In the first example, the newspaper failed to include a parenthetical quote that revealed that nearly all the kids involved in the school shootings came from two-parent families. In the second comment, the journalist did not ask the speaker to provide specific evidence of the environmental and United Nations conspiracy. Contemporary journalism is more interested in sensationalism and a good quote than they are in fact finding. Outrageous quotes like the ones provided here often go unchallenged in newspaper, television, and radio outlets across the country. The third example, from a public hearing, likewise went unchallenged, not only in the newspaper but in the public hearing itself. City planners had tried to explain to this individual earlier that if an “area of impact” is created, the city can annex this person’s farm property only if he sells it to a subdivision developer. One person on the city council tried to explain this to the speaker, but he was barked down by the angry resident. In these examples, individuals were allowed to make statements of “fact,” when, in all three cases, their remarks were purely declarations of opinion, bias, stereotype, anger, or frustration.

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But these uninformed sources of information quickly feed the policy “dialogue” and most often contribute to conflict, incorrect problem definition, and hostility toward government rather than partial consensus and democratic problem solving. We have an increasingly partisan and ratingsdriven electronic media (the only point of all those unscientific opinion polls is to get viewers to watch—they communicate nothing of any meaning). Moreover, as Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein have argued in Froomkin (2012), the press today has essentially opted for the safe, comforting-to-advertisers, and ratings-driven conflictportraying narrative of all politicians being bad and both parties and their candidates lying, and then not doing serious, in-depth reporting, but simply some fact checking seemingly rooted in an obligation to show balance in fact checking both sides equally—though both sides are not necessarily equally to blame. As Ornstein (quoted in Froomkin, 2012) explains, that means the media aren’t doing their job: “Your job is to report the truth. And sometimes there are two sides to a story. Sometimes there are ten sides to a story. Sometimes there’s only one.” Unchecked since the demise of the Fairness Doctrine, and now primarily owned by a handful of corporations, the electronic media (and print media as well), are facing challenges from the Internet’s largely unfiltered (e.g., blogs) news world—but it seems to be making the problem worse, not better. Letters to the editor seem more likely to be chosen if they are more outrageous and less substantial. And even when not a monologue, people seem to be preaching to the choir and talking past each other—and that’s not dialogue. Source: Dan Froomkin. 2012. “How the Mainstream Press Bungled the Single Biggest Story of the 2012 Campaign.” Huffpost Media. Available online at www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-froomkin/republican-lies-2012-election_b_2258586. html.

Tool #2: Futuring

Background: In the 1990s, under the Clinton administration, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) adopted a new approach in their efforts to deal with homelessness. This approach, known as the Continuum of Care, sought to “encourage” communities to develop a coordinated and community-based process of identifying needs and building a system to respond to those needs. All projects seeking funding were forced to be part of a consolidated or associated approach. HUD’s nationally competitive grant process awarded points for several different factors. Scoring on a 100-point basis, only 40 points were based on needs per se. The process and strategy used to develop the proposals were worth 30 points (inclusivity and collaboration being key), and carefully tethering the proposed projects to the priority of needs established through the Continuum of Care process, as well as the extent to which those projects were consistent with that priority, could score you another 20 points. The final 10 points depended on leveraging your proposal with other dollars from private, state, and local government sources. Struggles over turf, agency competition rather than cooperation, glaring gaps instead of a seamless system, and failure to see the big picture were problems this approach sought to overcome. Evidence gathered by Mercyhurst University’s Institute for Child and Family Policy as part of assisting with a grant application suggested that on any given night there were approximately 400 homeless people sleeping in emergency shelters and transitional living facilities in Erie County, PA, and approximately 600 more requests (from individuals and families) that were not being served. Erie County, comprising the city of Erie (then the third largest in Pennsylvania) and 38 other municipalities, had failed to overcome its fragmented system, and a HUD application the previous year was not funded. Spurred by this failure, Erie County and the city government created a new process designed to meet HUD’s requirements.

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Beginning the next year, a series of meetings were held that included 52 service providers and advocacy groups. As a result, a broad-based permanent coordinating committee was established, a mission statement was drafted and approved, and a process was established to annually allow service providers to collaboratively respond to the needs of the homeless through a fair, open, and inclusive competition for inclusion into the community’s consolidated application to HUD. Along with surveys and other research being done, the permanent committee decided that it was important to have an open forum during which the concerns, ideas, and beliefs of homeless service providers, homeless advocates, and homeless and formerly homeless persons could be shared. At the direction of one of your authors, this was advertised as a futuring session. More than 100 professionals and homeless/formerly homeless were invited to participate. In May, the futuring session began at 9:00 a.m. at a neutral site, with an exercise that led to a discussion of dominance, cooperation, compromise, negotiation, and nonverbal communication relative to having a successful dialogue, overcoming obstacles, and succeeding through trust and having a common goal. The participants were then introduced to the idea that “futuring” is not just about facts, but it is also a social interaction process that recognizes that people have feelings, that values fairness and inclusivity, that honestly seeks (rather than provides) input, and that is sensitive to the issues we had just discussed as part of the exercise. A set of ground rules, drawn up by the facilitator, were then reviewed and accepted by the participants, who agreed to be the “enforcers” of any violations by anyone—including the facilitator. These rules were as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Personal attacks will not be tolerated. The integrity, motivations, and values of participants will not be questioned. The facilitator will not impose his personal views. Disagreements will be regarded as valuable discoveries. The session will not be used as a “gripe session”—the focus of the session will be on the future. It is the joint responsibility of the facilitator and all participants to make sure the ground rules are observed. It is the responsibility of the participants to come to a consensus as to what was said, even if unable to reach consensus on the issues. Under no circumstances will the meeting continue past noon.

Futuring was explained to the participants as the name of a simple process that could be described technically as: (1) having a community list input on cards that are collected; (2) using that input to identify and discuss issues and goals—and all input received will be kept; and (3) further using the discussion to combine this information into a broader and smaller set of issues and goals deemed critical by and for the community. It was explained that we would look for cross-themes, for ideas at odds, and try to narrow—without losing anything—the list of issues and goals. Participants were told (accurately) that the assumptions, philosophical premises, and aspirations behind futuring were as follows: • to provide adequate and equal opportunities to express preferences; • to create commitment to, and a sense of community ownership and control over, the goals, priorities, and processes of the community through participation; • to gather data, to strive for consensus, and to honestly seek direction from the community (i.e., it is not to be an opportunity to direct your choices).

The facilitator told participants that input from them was desired, required, and hopefully would be acquired. The role of the leader (one of your authors)—an outsider to the service provider community with no real stake in the outcome other than concern for the community and the individuals of

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the community—was explained as being not to educate but to facilitate and to help the participants successfully complete their roles. The participants’ role was explained as being the primary initiators in clarifying, prioritizing, planning, and then perhaps directing this community’s effort to better address this serious need (i.e., to be both leaders and listeners). The session then began by providing the participants with a list of eight high-priority needs identified by the community through the Gaps Analysis Survey, the Client Survey, a group forum held two years earlier, and the HUD grant needs criteria. The participants were asked to prioritize this list in a way that allowed it to be scored using three different voting systems (see Box 8.3.)

Box 8.3  Voting: Rules Matter, But Do Results Tell Us Anything?

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othing signifies democracy like the concept of voting. Democratic policy analysis allows stakeholders to vote on various options. Yet the outcome of a vote depends on what voting rule is used. Just ask Al Gore, who won the popular vote for president in 2000 by 500,000 votes but lost the Electoral College to George W. Bush. But often, as practitioners of policy analysis, we forget the importance of voting rules. Take the following example. Students in a policy analysis class were asked to vote for their favorite type of ice cream. Students were given the following choices (the top 10 ice cream flavors in terms of sales): 1. vanilla; 2. chocolate; 3. cookies ‘n cream; 4. mint chocolate chip; 5. chocolate chip cookie dough; 6. buttered pecan; 7. cookie dough; 8. strawberry; 9. moose tracks; 10. Neapolitan.

Students were then given three voting rules. First, students voted for all the flavors that they approved of (approval voting). Second, students chose their single favorite flavor (plurality voting). Third, students were given 50 points to distribute to as many flavors as they saw fit (point voting). With point voting, students could give all 50 points to one flavor or divide the points among as many flavors as possible. Here are the results: 1. Approval voting: The top choice was vanilla (approved by 12 out of 13 students), and then three flavors (cookie dough, moose tracks, and cookies ‘n cream, which were all approved by 10 of the 13 students). 2. Plurality voting: The top choice with three votes was cookies ‘n cream, followed by two votes for cookie dough, moose tracks, and strawberry. In all, eight flavors received at least one vote. 3. Point voting: Chocolate received 99 points to win first place. Cookies ‘n cream (96 points) came in second, and buttered pecan came in third with 95 points.

So what was the choice of the class? After delivering the results, much discussion ensued. First, students complained that the professor, not the students, came up with the 10 choices. One student complained that her favorite choice, “cherry garcia,” was not on the list, and another said he could only eat lactose-free ice cream. Second, the professor offered to bring vanilla for a class party (continued)

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because 12 out of 13 students approved of it, but the students all thought that vanilla was OK but not the best choice overall. The professor then offered to bring cookies ‘n cream (using the plurality outcome), but only 9 of 13 students approved it, so it was decided that vanilla was actually a better choice. Finally, the professor offered to bring chocolate ice cream using the point voting results, but the students noted that it only received one vote in the plurality voting and was approved by only 9 of 13 students. No consensus was reached, and the professor decided to not have ice cream at the class party. (Boo, professor!)

First, they ranked all eight priorities from most to least important. It was explained to them that this allowed for two separate scoring systems. The total points would be summed to identify importance using the “Borda Count” method, where the lowest point total is best. It would also be scored using the simple “plurality” system, where each “number one” vote represented their most important priority. Second, they identified all of the priorities they felt to be of “first-tier” importance through an asterisk in an example of “approval voting.” With approval voting, a vote is cast for all of the “options” approved of. The participants were told that the results from this part of the session would be presented to them at their next meeting. The participants were then asked to write down on one side of a note card one or two points that this community was doing well to address the problems of the homeless, and on another card to record one or two points that were negatives, or issues of concern, in terms of how the community was responding to the problems of the homeless. On a third card, the participants were asked to briefly identify what the Erie County Continuum of Care would look like in 5, 7, or 10 years if it was a success. The bulk of the rest of the session was used to have the participants discuss, explain, explicate, and, where appropriate, consolidate the positives and negatives identified. The facilitator, with the help of a skilled assistant, listed the results on a large flip chart. Twelve participants listed as positive the process and cooperation now being developed, four listed the inclusion of consumers, and eight mentioned the high level of commitment among providers that produced a willingness to forego turf battles. All of these comments were linked by a theme identified by the participants as “process.” Finally, before ending the session on time, participant responses to the question of envisioning success were read back to them. As throughout the session, participants could identify themselves as authors or choose not to. One advantage of using the cards is that it allows participants to remain anonymous. Of course there are trade-offs to this approach, but a study (Morrell, 1999, pp. 293–322) suggested that small groups, mirroring, and other techniques sometimes used during discussions can lower collective decision acceptance because the participants get tied too closely to their views. At a follow-up meeting, the results of their three votes were revealed and discussed. They were presented as well with the detailed results from the listing and discussion of the positives and negatives, and a summary (and the raw comments) from the envisioning success question. The facilitator once again provided the participants with the chance to discuss, clarify, and correct the information gathered from them. It was then explained that these results would be used to complement the other data in generating the local request for proposal (RFP), and indeed it was. Appropriately, it was then used to design a Goeller Scorecard used by a seven-member selection committee to grade proposals for the consolidated application to HUD. With the new process in place, money from HUD once again started flowing into the community.

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Tool #3: Conflict Resolution and Consensus Building Techniques

There are several techniques available for resolving conflicts among groups of individuals and for achieving consensus. The following technique is one that has been used extensively in rural development issues and should be of use to analysts promoting participatory democratic approaches. Phase I: Establish a Grounding and Ground Rules for the Issue  Grounding is an important activity with which to start any meeting. Participants arrive at meetings with some level of apprehension or uncertainty about what will occur. The process of grounding allows the apprehension of the participant to be recognized. To understand this conflict resolution approach, we must first understand the problems and limitations of traditional public hearing methods. Typically, public meetings are set up in a hierarchical style, with decision makers sitting at a podium or table that is typically higher than the rest of the audience. Speakers then walk up to a microphone and are given a set period of time to make their arguments. There is no interplay between the speaker and the rest of the audience, and the interplay between the speaker and the elected officials is limited. Typically, one of the elected officials, normally the mayor, will tell the speaker when time is up and might answer specific questions posed by the speaker. Speakers cannot engage elected officials in any discourse, and elected officials do not attempt to engage the speaker. In addition, there is no attempt to build consensus among the different speakers. The citizen and interest group speakers simply make their points and then the elected body votes on the issue at hand. This type of public meeting represents a very thin version of democracy. Participants who come to conflict resolution sessions are likely to expect this type of hearing. They will come to the meeting with a prepared 5- to 10-minute presentation that represents their agenda. Conflict resolution techniques get drastically away from traditional public hearing approaches. First, the facilitator arranges the room in a circle. All participants, including elected officials or any other influentials, sit in the circle. The circle approach is explained to the participants, emphasizing that there is no hierarchy in the circle and that everyone in the circle is considered equal. One of your authors once facilitated a conflict resolution session in a small town. The issue involved annexation. The session was held at the city council meeting room. The mayor of the community wanted to sit at his normal chair, which was placed on a platform some three feet higher than the rest of the room. As the meeting began, the mayor refused to sit in the circle of participants, instead, sitting mightily above the proceedings. After about 30 minutes, the facilitator had to stop the meeting and again ask the mayor to sit in the circle. His comments, directed down to the circle, were destroying any chance of finding consensus. The mayor again refused, and the facilitator called for an early break. The facilitator asked the help of some community elites who then negotiated with the mayor to sit in the circle. After about 15 minutes, he agreed to come down and sit with the participants, and the meeting became very constructive. The facilitator should not have even started the meeting with the mayor on his perch, because the sight of the mayor sitting above the circle violated a major ground rule of the session. In addition, it is important that the facilitator assign seats within the circle. Otherwise, allies will sit together and enemies will sit apart. The facilitator must also explain that the circle allows the participants to occupy the room with the sound of their voice and thus helps them establish verbal territory. Once a person’s voice is in a room, it becomes easier for them to speak, especially if others listen to them. The facilitator then sets the ground rules for the session. The exact ground rules depend on the nature of the conflict, structure of the meeting, participants, and time frame. The ground rules would be tailored from the four Fox and Miller discourse rules, Voegelin’s insights, and the following: • All participants will listen with respect. • There will be no personal attacks. • Each participant will be given ample time to present their views.

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At the beginning of the session, the facilitator may want the participants to introduce themselves to each other (with smaller groups, a team-building exercise may be useful). In addition, participants should be given the full opportunity to voice their apprehensions about the meeting and to “get anything off their chest.” Typically, participants will note that they “doubt much will be accomplished” or that they are “very tense about this whole situation.” The circle is an intense process. It forces individuals who might not like each other very much into an environment in which they must deal with each other as human beings rather than as the abstract enemy. It is very important that the facilitator enforce the ground rules from the beginning. Once a model of listening with respect has been established and enforced, respondents are likely to follow the lead of the facilitator in their behavior. Phase II: Establish a Two- to Four-Person Panel to Talk about the Issue  The facilitator should have prior knowledge of the composition of the participants in order to ensure that the panel is made up of individuals on both sides of the issue. The rest of the group is told to listen carefully and take notes. Phase III: Question Answering and Listening  These sessions typically revolve around controversy that was generated from either an already implemented policy or a suggested policy. With this in mind, the following two questions need to be asked: 1. 2.

What is your view of the situation? How do you feel about it?

Begin with an individual who represents the current policy (or proposed policy) discussing her view of the situation and how she feels about it. A person from the party advocating change would respond by answering the same two questions. This is repeated by the other panel members, in turn. Establishing the panel provides order to begin the discussion. The party who has an issue with either the status quo or the proposed change begins by describing it in both intellectual and emotional terms. The other party gets to provide their group’s view, and this brings balance. The panel members are expected to represent their group views, clearly define issues as they see them, and speak for only 3–5 minutes per panel member. Phase IV: Listeners Respond to the Panelists  The rest of the group then responds to what they heard from the panelists. Three questions are posed to the listeners: • What did you hear or learn from the panelists? • What is your view of the situation? • How do you feel about the situation?

The listening members are first asked to report what they heard. The facilitator or an assistant uses a flip chart to quickly summarize the listener’s points, thus beginning a record of the event. This response allows the panelists to hear how clearly they were listened to and how clearly they presented the issue. In stating their view of the situation and how they feel about it, the listeners add to the common information base. Phase V: Panelists Respond to the Listeners  In the reverse order in which they spoke, the panelists are given the opportunity to respond to the listener’s report. This allows the panelists to clear up any misunderstandings and add any additional clarifying data. Again, this information is written quickly on flip charts and added to the common knowledge base.

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Phase VI: Key Issues  Each participant is then provided with an index card and asked to write down the key issues they have heard so far. This information is recorded on the flip chart and posted on a wall or bulletin board, along with any earlier flip chart pages. The entire group must be comfortable with what has been written on the flip charts. Typically, the facilitator and assistant will try to summarize and combine information, producing a coherent discussion of the participants’ views. It is important no views be excluded. Phase VII: Declaration of Worst Outcomes  The facilitator then directs the participants toward the collective statement and asks them, “Based on this information, what are the outcomes that you do not want?” Responses of the participants are then recorded on a flip chart. This phase is important because most individuals organize to prevent something from happening, and this approach allows the participants to constructively lay their agendas out on the table. Phase VIII: Break  At this point, the session has probably taken at least 1.5 hours. Phase IX: Declaration of Best Outcomes  Upon reconvening, the facilitator asks the participants to return their attention to the collective statement of the group and asks them, “Based on this information, what is the best possible outcome that you want?” This question is rarely asked in policy debates, instead, energies are most likely focused on avoiding worst outcomes. This question attempts to move the participants toward positive energy. Once again, answers are recorded on a flip chart. Phase X: Develop a Collective Statement of the Worst and Best Outcomes  The collective statement puts all the views together in one group statement. This will take some time to put together and will be posted on a flip chart once again. Phase XI: Best Outcome Policies  The participants are then asked to brainstorm for policies, strategies, and actions that would result in the best outcomes being realized. All input is recorded and none is judged at this point. This allows the group to explore options or action items that might solve the issues. Phase XII: Solution or Solutions  The facilitator asks, based on phase XI, “What is the solution we seek that would make the best outcome happen?” The facilitator should discuss this question with the group and see if any common answer arises. The facilitator should never force an answer on the group or ask the group to force an answer. If no common solution arises, the facilitator moves to another step and waits until another day for consensus. Phase XIII: Closure  The facilitator asks the participants the following questions: • • • •

How do you feel about what we did? What did you learn that will help us? How do you feel about the progress made at this session? What must we do to continue to be successful?

The participants’ answers should help you design the next session. All three tools in this chapter rely heavily on good facilitation, and can be counter-productive if poorly facilitated. Here’s some important observations on good and bad facilitating: • A good facilitator is a good listener. A bad facilitator is more interested in listening to himself or herself.

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• A good facilitator “disappears in a room.” That is, a good facilitator simply sets up and enforces ground rules and moves the process in a certain direction. • A bad facilitator is the “show” and wants to be the center of attention or shows bias by praising some ideas as good and ignoring or critiquing other ideas. If not just brainstorming—that is, if there is to be any critiquing of suggestions—that should be the job of participants, not the facilitator. • A good facilitator is not afraid of receiving information that might be critical of the facilitator or the program. A bad facilitator carefully arranges questions and situations so criticism is avoided. • A bad facilitator is a manipulator of views. • A good facilitator asks questions. A bad facilitator answers questions. • A good facilitator is humble. A bad facilitator is arrogant.

As you begin your policy analysis career, be sure to watch the facilitation skills of others. Most likely, you will meet skilled individuals who can gather citizen input easily and gracefully. In fact, facilitation is most easily learned from watching others do it successfully. Both of your authors have had the opportunity to watch skilled and talented facilitators. Do not, however, discount watching bad facilitators, for in their incompetence you can often identify the exact components which make a good or bad facilitation style.

Ethics as Democracy Whatever its strengths or weaknesses, postmodernism originates from a political view that sets forth normative claims. These claims urge the adoption of an ethical code that seeks a fuller democracy. Obviously, if citizens are supposed to be sovereign, then the government is supposed to respond to their opinions (within certain limits, e.g., not violating people’s rights). Postmodernism in policy analysis worries about the lack of citizens’ stories in the policy process and how that deficit affects democracy. In essence, the key ethical charge of postmodernism to those working in the public arena is the promotion of a broad, participatory dialogue. A postmodernist-inspired analyst would listen for the narratives of, and advocate for, the weak, tear down walls that oppress and obscure, and work toward the sort of democracy in which the stories of everyday people are as valued as the stories of experts and other powerful players. But hold on: aren’t these ideas bizarre, extreme, and utopian? Is democracy really the key ethical issue for public policy analysis? Are these positions shared by other viewpoints or somehow unique to postmodernists? Consider five voices outside the postmodernist camp: H. George Frederickson, John Rawls, a report on citizenship, the writings (blog, articles, and books) of a noted philosophy professor, and a prominent political scientist’s plan to address the impact of income and wealth on policy by re-democratizing the United States. Voice One: The place was Syracuse University’s Minnowbrook conference site; the year was 1968; the world was in turmoil. Dwight Waldo, noted public administration scholar, was the editorin-chief of the leading journal in the field, Public Administration Review (PAR). Waldo believed that turmoil, perhaps even revolution, was also affecting public administration, so he invited a number of younger academics to what became known as the “Minnowbrook Conference.” H. George Frederickson’s paper, “Toward a New Public Administration,” was clearly one of the most significant papers to come out of the conference. The essence of this paper was that, to the old values of public administration (particularly efficiency), new public administration added the value of “social equity.” Social equity meant enhancing the political power and economic well-being of minorities for whom pluralistic government was a losing proposition because they lacked the resources to compete (money, votes, and presence in positions of power). This was a dramatic paradigm shift that called for maximalist ethics (one is obligated to use power for the good; it is too dangerous to disconnect one’s behavior from moral standards of right and wrong; ethics as beyond the law) to replace minimalist ethics (administering without sympathy

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or enthusiasm; it is unethical to use one’s position in service of personal values; ethics as whatever the law says). In short, public administrators, contrary to Max Weber’s ideal of neutral competence and the politics/administration dichotomy, should not be neutral, and public organizations should make sure their results distribute the “goods” to the have-nots. Frederickson (1971) also detailed how to make this happen, including making the organizational structure of the public organizations less hierarchical and less authoritative, teaching public sector workers to tolerate conflict and ambiguity, and breaking down boundaries between the organization and its clients. New Public Administration was significant because it had a powerful impact on practitioners. Voice Two: Postmodernism also calls for advocacy for the disadvantaged, for social equity, and for inclusion of the disadvantaged, in terms of both consideration and actual input, in the decision-making process. This leads us to Rawls. John Rawls (1971) is the most famous name in the area of distributive justice. His central focus was the idea of justice as fairness. When trying to make a moral choice, Rawls suggested that what was fair, was just. His key suggestion for achieving fair decisions was adopting a “veil of ignorance.” The idea of this veil is that you should make decisions as if you were the one on the end of those decisions. Remember Stone’s (2002) story of dividing up the cake? Rawls’s point is that if one group gets to cut the pieces (e.g., the nine males in the class), knowing that another group gets to decide how to distribute the pieces (e.g., the nine females), the males will divide the cake into 18 equal-sized pieces, not nine. They will do so, hoping that the women will distribute it “fairly.” Moreover, Rawls says that this is how we should always make decisions, as if we are on the receiving end of the decision and are looking out for our own best interests. His idea may not be that original (consider, for example, any of the great religions of the world). And, it may not be that simple to ignore our own interests. But his work remains a significant and helpful way of exploring, discussing, and calling to mind justice. In an introductory public administration class taught by one of your authors, the students read Jonathan Kozol’s (1995) powerful nonfiction story (Amazing Grace) of poverty in the South Bronx and the inspiring and, yes, amazing grace with which the impoverished people conduct their lives in the face of racism, indifference, violence, poverty, and bureaucratic failure. One common reaction of students is a sense that they would not like to be treated as these citizens were by the government and public workers. Our discussion turned to Rawls’s veil of ignorance, fairness, and a recognition by the students that, in contrast to the stereotypes of disadvantaged neighborhoods, the people Kozol introduced them to were not that different from themselves—and that many of them, against all odds, were leading heroic and inspiring lives. Indignation aimed toward failed and flawed policymaking ran strong, as did the idea that those in charge should follow Rawls’s decision-making advice and his definition of justice as fairness. Postmodernism differs not with the idea of fairness as justice, but argues for replacing the “veil of ignorance” with “knowledge revealed.” What that means is that rather than guessing what people would want, one could actually ask them. (Don’t you think it’s possible that people who have been through the welfare system might have valuable insight into how to reform it?) Voice Three: The National Commission on Civic Renewal (1997) released a report in the late 1990s that, like many other organizations and experts, criticized the state of citizenry in the United States. Their study’s conclusion about the state of democracy was revealed in the title: “A Nation of Spectators: How Civic Disengagement Weakens America and What We Can Do about It.” There emerged in the late 1990s a general consensus that the lack of civic participation reflected in but certainly not limited to voting was a serious problem. The various calls for greater citizen involvement share with postmodernism a belief that public discourse is central to democracy. Today, there is less consensus. Some worry, like Putnam (2000), about people bowling alone, about our educational system’s seeming failure to teach civics (http://nationsreportcard.gov/), low voter turnout,

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and the lack of a civil public discourse. Others point to positive signs like the rise of faith-based organizations, government efforts to involve citizens in grassroots planning and decision making, increased volunteerism, technology creating a new public commons though open-source sites (e.g., Wikipedia, blogs), and the use of the Internet in political campaigns. Both the optimists and the pessimists believe democracy is important. Voice Four: Philosophy professor Peter Levine’s blog for civic renewal and his book We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For: The Promise of Civic Renewal in America (2013) both suggest that we have two interrelated problems, failure of major institutions and citizen disengagement. He argues that improving civic education would strengthen civil society and institutions, and increase civic engagement, which would improve civic health. Voice Five: Finally, Theda Skocpol (2014) of Harvard University, creator of the progressive-­ leaning Scholars Strategy Network, has responded to the growing concerns about growing income inequality, and the sort of evidence (including multivariate analysis) for its consequence for democracy documented by Gilens and Page that provides support for the argument that not only do we have pluralism rather than the majority-opinion-driven democracy people think we do, but we do not even have pluralism, but instead an affluent, dominant biased pluralism and/or economic elite domination. The response Skocpol argued for is that U.S. citizens organize dues-paying citizen associations to provide campaign contributions and votes for elected officials and candidates who would meet not just with corporate lobbyists, but ordinary citizens and their citizen association representatives. Thus, the ideas of postmodernism are not bizarre or extreme. They may not be utopian, but there are also no easy answers, and few—if any—are suggested directly by postmodernists. The postmodern normative position is not totally unique, but the emphasis and the insights on language and stories are very valuable. Is democracy really the key ethical issue for policy analysis? Well, that is a subjective judgment call, but perhaps democracy is the key ethical issue for public policy analysis if the following apply: • if you assume that a fuller democracy is central to fairness and justice; • if you believe that everyone has stories to tell and that those normally excluded should have more say in the decisions that affect their lives; • if you believe that increased and enhanced participation is central to strengthening democracy.

A Tie that Binds We remain committed to practicing what we teach and our commitment to the political skills, qualitative research tools, and philosophical approach embedded in Chapters 7 and 8. They are all also interrelated. As an example of this, consider the following brief illustration. • At the request of the county government and a philanthropic organization, in the fall of 2007 one of your authors facilitated a health care summit for a county concerned with health care problems and disparities in the community (and the communities within the community). A broad spectrum of community members, activists, health care providers, church leaders, and others were in attendance. • After grounding the event (including explaining his role and the small “d” democratic philosophy behind the summit), he set forth the ground rules, and led them through a futuring exercise to identify what was working, what needs were not being met, and then asked for practical suggestions and for their definitions of what success would look like. • Their answers were collected on cards, the discussion was publicly tracked on a large flip chart, and minutes of the entire meeting were kept. • All of that information was then analyzed into themes/stories using what amounted to content analysis. This information was then returned to the county officials and agencies involved, to all of the participants, and to a broad-based community task force charged with studying the information gathered and turning it into a plan.

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Then, in 2015, once again showing the timeless value of these tools, he essentially repeated that process to help a county Department of Human Services Office of Mental Health/Intellectual Disabilities successfully work toward developing and implementing processes, procedures, and understandings; plus improved coordination and communication, so that they could better provide comprehensive and integrated services to the community. As made explicit by our creation of the new fifth step, ultimately the ideas from Chapters 7 and 8 are linked not only to each other, but—even more importantly—to the rest of the book (e.g., to the rational model explained in Chapter 2 and to the five positivist tools of Chapter 3). We believe that the analyst committed to democracy and capable of utilizing a full array of mixed methodologies is the one best prepared to operate successfully in the field. The mini-case that follows, “Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal,” gives you a chance to decide which tools to pull out of your mixed-methodology toolbox, in a context involving NGOs and IGOs (nongovernmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations) and a Good Samaritan policy analyst in a situation that evolved in Nepal centered around economics, poverty, hunger, and an endangered species.

Mini-case: Kathmandu: Red Pandas, Hunger, USAID, and Agriculture in Nepal Coauthored by Juliet J. Hilburn

Facts The red panda (Ailurus fulgens) is native to the eastern Himalayan mountains in Asia. They are small and elusive creatures, also often referred to as “firefoxes” due to their bushy orange, red, and brown fur. Not closely related to the panda bear, these bear-like mammals compare in size to the average house cat. They look more like a fox with a kitten’s face than a bear, and dwell primarily in trees. Their modern geographical range extends from western Nepal to northern Myanmar in Asia, and about half their habitat is in the Himalayan mountains—but fossils of red pandas show they used to live in North America, too (WWF, 2015). Primarily herbivores, they “feed mainly on leaves and bamboo, but occasionally snack on fruit, insects, bird eggs and small lizards, too” (“Where Do Red Pandas Live?”, 2015). When endangered, they normally try to flee, but if unable to climb up a tree or rock face, they have been known to stand on their hind legs to look larger. Futa, a red panda living in a zoo in Japan, became a popular attraction in part due to his ability to stand like that for up to 10 seconds at a time. Futa even appeared in a soft drink commercial on TV and reportedly served as the inspiration for Pabu, an animal character in a popular U.S. television series for children, The Legend of Korra (“Descriptions and Articles about the Red Panda (Ailurus fulgens)—Encyclopedia of Life”). Lately, the number of these shy and fascinating creatures has been declining due to loss of habitat (like the panda, their diet relies heavily on bamboo). Classified as vulnerable to extinction, their population is reported to be under 10,000 and shrinking. Some estimates go as low as 2,500 total red pandas. They face dangers such as nesting trees and bamboo disappearing due to overgrazing of livestock and the clearing of land for farming and mining. Though hunting them is illegal, they are in constant danger of being killed for their valuable fur or being maimed and killed in wild pig and deer traps (WWF, 2015). (continued)

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Additionally, there is a lack of effective cooperation on conservation efforts between all of the countries involved (China, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, India), and their efforts to save this fascinating animal vary widely. Over the last 20 years, the red panda population has declined by approximately half. This loss in population is not expected to abate and may possibly accelerate in upcoming years (“Ailurus fulgens (Lesser Panda, Red Cat-bear, Red Panda),” 2015). Nepal, a small country surrounded by and located between China and India, constitutes approximately 38 percent of the red panda’s living range, but the population there is reportedly only several hundred (WWF, 2011). Brian Williams, a Nepal Fulbright scholar and the creator of the Red Panda Network, has many ideas on why the red panda should be saved. Two key points he makes are as follows. First, red pandas are unique critters which have special habitat needs. There are no other species quite like it, and they have no living relatives that are closely tied genetically. Thus, if red pandas are allowed to die off, we would lose any valuable scientific information that could be gained by studying their genetic codes and ecological niches. Second, red pandas live in an area referred to as the “lungs” of South Asia, and their presence attests to the health of not only the forest, but also the 500 million people living there. South Asia’s three largest rivers (the Ganges, the Yangtze, and the Brahmaputra) originate in the mountains here. Collectively they provide water crucial to the people of China, India, Bhutan, the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, and Myanmar, as well as Nepal. If red pandas are found in an area, it is usually an indication of little pollution and a properly functioning ecosystem; if an area is not safe for them, chances are it is not safe for humans either (“Red Panda,” 2015). In essence, they are like canaries in a mine. As noted, much of the red panda’s habitat is in landlocked Nepal, a country where the monarchy has given up absolute control in favor of a federal democracy. The Nepalese population is approximately 31 million people (The World Factbook, n.d.). In Nepal, the rural population (about 75 percent of the total population) is typically destitute, malnourished, and illiterate. It is one of the poorest countries in the world with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of only $730 U.S. dollars (Rural Poverty Portal, n.d.). The United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report 2013 ranked Nepal 157th out of 187 countries in terms of its Human Development Index score, which was 0.463 compared to the United States’ score of 0.937. Life expectancy is 67 years of age, the literacy rate is 63 percent, and child labor afflicts nearly one-third of children (The World Factbook, n.d.). Agriculture is the main source of employment for over 70 percent of the population but generates less than 40 percent of the country’s GDP. Common crops produced include rice, corn, wheat, and sugarcane (The World Factbook, n.d.). The most severe problem facing Nepali citizens is food insecurity. Farmers have insufficient technology and struggle to produce enough food for themselves, let alone the country. Roughly 13 percent of Nepalis suffer undernourishment, with the worst physical ailments from it afflicting children under five (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2015). Adding to Nepal’s challenges, on April 25, 2015, a massive 7.8 magnitude earthquake, caused major destruction across the country. The death toll was over 9,000 people, and more than 22,000 people were injured. Experts estimate, “Nearly 800,000 homes have been destroyed or damaged, along with some 30,000 classrooms, rural roads, government offices, and heritage sites” (Elmer, 2015). Tragically, the effects of the earthquake on agriculture were equally disastrous. According to an April 30, 2015 report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, $8 million was needed to help the farmers recover lost equipment and get ready for the approaching rice cultivating season. Farmers lost crops, seed stock, and livestock, suffered damaged and destroyed irrigation and draining canals, plus roads and

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markets were also hit (FAO, 2015). After the earthquake, countries and organizations all over the world began donating significant amounts of relief aid. Humanitarian groups traveled to Nepal to provide medical treatment for the injured and assist in the rebuilding efforts. The United States committed $10 million in aid, the United Nations made available $15 million from its emergency relief fund, and Japan donated $8.4 million in grant money (“Nepal Earthquake Donations: Who’s Sending What,” 2015). Fourth Edition Update: Not surprisingly, proposals to address this dilemma, focusing both on the problem of red panda conservation and the Nepali economy, especially for the small land-holding farmers most affected by the earthquake, have arisen. One five-year action plan (2019–2023), even gained the support of the Red Panda Network (RPN). As you do your research as part of the fictional scenario below, you can find out more about this, as well as ongoing statistics and facts on this poor and disaster prone country’s people, economy, and—of course—its red panda population and habitat.

Fiction You are a policy analyst (who adheres to a mixed-methodology approach) and are on a service trip to Nepal. Amidst rebuilding houses and traveling the country, you meet up with a friend from graduate school who now holds a high-level position in the Nepali government. Your friend tells you that in order to boost its GDP and recover from the devastation caused initially by the 2015 earthquake, many government officials are pushing for a program of intense agricultural development that they believe will be funded by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the Langtang Valley, which is part of the Langtang National Park in northern Nepal. You have worked with USAID many times in the past and respect their record, but you also know that they do not always share your values when defining problems, creating processes, determining policy, and implementing policy. The prospective plan is for thousands of struggling farmers from the area around Kathmandu, the area most severely damaged by the earthquake, to each receive five hectares of land which they may clear and use for farming. They have proposed extending the agricultural areas further into the park, lifting the environmental protections on those areas in the interest of economic development. The World Wildlife Fund and Red Panda Network are fiercely opposed to this plan, as the Langtang National Park is home to 24.33 percent of Nepal’s red panda population, and the clearing of the bamboo in these areas by farmers would greatly decrease the available habitats for these endangered animals (WWF, 2011). Of course, though the red panda might seem both adorable and essential to an animal lover, the trapper sees income and many farmers would surely see them only as impediments. Your friend asks you to do a bit of pro bono policy analysis for the Nepalese government. You agree and determine that fundamentally you need to perform a sort of cost-benefit analysis on this key question: Will the economic advantages for the distressed, malnourished citizens of Nepal outweigh the negative ecological impacts on the red panda, an endangered animal beloved by people all around the world? Your mind races with other questions too: Are there other alternatives? What role can and should rationality play? Democracy? Who should decide this and how could I get their input? Who are the stakeholders? If they go ahead with this plan, how should the policy be explained (what’s the best narrative)? Is there any information you could not access that you want or need? No matter how this complex situation is resolved, the answers are not easily decided, as the policy impacts many different citizens and international groups with conflicting interests and values, hungry people, and an endearing endangered species. Good luck with that report! (continued)

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Further Reading Here are some resources which might be helpful to you in your research in addition to the sources used to write the case (below): World Wildlife Fund: www.wwf.org Red Panda Network: www.redpandanetwork.org USAID: www.usaid.gov Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: www.fao.org The World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html Sources: “Ailurus fulgens (Lesser Panda, Red Cat-bear, Red Panda).” 2015. Available online at www. iucnredlist.org/details/714/0 (accessed November 29, 2015). “Descriptions and Articles about the Red Panda (Ailurus fulgens)—Encyclopedia of Life.” n.d. Available online at http://eol.org/pages/327984/details (accessed November 29, 2015). Elmer. 2015. “Nepal 2015 Earthquake: ADB’s Response” [Text], June 18. Available online at www.adb.org/ countries/nepal/earthquake-adb-response (accessed November 29, 2015). FAO. 2015. “Nepal Earthquake’s Impact on Food Security and Agriculture Likely Very High,” April 30. Available online at www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/285171/icode/(accessed November 29, 2015). “Five-Year Red Panda Conservation Action Plan Developed.” 2019. The Himalayan Times, Himalayan News Service, January 20th. https://thehimalayantimes.com/Kathmandu/five-year-red-panda-conservationaction-plan-developed/(accessed July 29, 2019). “Nepal Earthquake Donations: Who’s Sending What.” 2015. CNN Money, April 27. Available online at http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/27/news/nepal-earthquake-donations/(accessed November 29, 2015). “Red Panda.” 2015. Available online at https://www.redpandanetwork.org (accessed November 29, 2015). RPN Supports Nepal’s First Red Panda Conservation Action Plan. 2018. Red Panda Network, October 23, 2018. Available online at www.redpandanetwork.org/rpn-supports-nepals-first-red-panda-conservation-actionplan (accessed July 29, 2019). Rural Poverty Portal. n.d. Available online at www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/nepal (accessed November 29, 2015). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2013. Human Development Report. Available online at http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report (accessed November 29, 2015). U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 2015. “Nepal: Agriculture and Food Security,” November 20. Available online at www.usaid.gov/nepal/agriculture-and-food-security (accessed November 29, 2015). “Where Do Red Pandas Live? And Other Red Panda Facts.” 2015. Available online at www.worldwildlife. org/stories/where-do-red-pandas-live-and-other-red-panda-facts (accessed November 29, 2015). WWF. 2011. “Red Panda Conservation Action Plan for Langtang National Park and Buffer Zone Nepal 2010–2014,” March 3. Available online at http://wwf.panda.org/?199550/Red-Panda-Conservation-Action-Planfor-Langtang-National-Park-and-Buffer-Zone-Nepal-2010-2014 (accessed November 29, 2015). WWF. 2015. “Species: Red Panda.” Available online at www.worldwildlife.org/species/red-panda (accessed November 29, 2015). World Factbook, The. n.d. Available online at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ np.html (accessed November 29, 2015).

Concluding Thoughts Remember that value conflict and politics are ubiquitous, and major issues cannot be solved in quick three-hour meetings. Instead, the process that we introduced provides you, a policy analyst, with a method of participatory policy analysis that, given time and the right amount of skill, might well provide some consensual solutions to major policy issues. Moreover, the process itself is important. You will also be doing democracy and increasing civic literacy. This is the new fifth step. The case that follows provides you with an opportunity to reconceptualize the entire policy analysis model and to revisit a concept that we introduced in Chapter 1 and discussed throughout the book. That concept is power. This case allows you to explore the connection between the theory and practice of democracy and policy analysis.

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Glossary Terms “green” card (p. 291)

propaganda (p. 294)

grounding (p. 279)

Smith’s Invisible Hand (p. 268)

Case Study: Big-Mart: Cheap Goods at What Price? Stakeholders and Storytellers: Playing Politics and the Policy Process Coauthored by Elise M. Yablonsky

The Case All communities hope for economic vitality, but many are being cautious about what types of growth they encourage. As a result, economic development policy is full of value conflict, and it raises questions about what the public interest is and whose interests are, and are not, being served by different policies. New economic development projects are increasingly examined by concerned members of communities who ask: What is the cost of growth? Many local citizens and small-business owners have protested the development of big-box chain stores in their communities. For these citizens, not all kinds of economic growth are desirable; neither are they convinced this type of development will improve the economic health of the community. The motivations behind objections range from fears of the loss of good jobs to perceived threats to the local community’s character. Battles have been fought to stop the development of big-box chain stores in many states across the country; some have succeeded and some have failed. Read and ponder the following reality-based fictional case study, and then consider the questions posed at the end of the case. Also, as you read, keep the following questions in mind: How does the chapter you just read help you understand what is going on? (For example, who are the stakeholders in this case?) What can we learn about public policy and public policy analysis from the battles described? Which of the arguments made by those involved best resonate with you? Why?

Background After a failed effort 10 years ago, Big-Mart is once again hoping to open a store in VanWood. VanWood Heights is not the same place it once was. It is in decline and has an aging, shrinking population. It has been hemorrhaging jobs, and, consequently, tax revenue is decreasing. The closing of an automobile plant five years ago led to significant unemployment, scarring many families. The abandoned factory complex has left an unsightly mark on the city’s landscape. Currently, VanWood Heights has strict land-use zoning laws that discourage big-box stores like Big-Mart. The zoning restrictions were imposed after the previous, failed attempt by Big-Mart to open a store in VanWood. Before building, Big-Mart needs a change in the zoning requirement for the site they would like to build on. To complicate matters further, the proposed site is a largely undeveloped, wooded area. It has served various community purposes, including fields that have long served as home to youth soccer and Little League baseball games, and as the site of the town picnic since the founding of the town in 1909. (continued)

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Seven years ago, Big-Mart attempted to sidestep the city council and work with the mayor, Maria Thomas, to change the zoning requirements and secure the store site. The story was leaked to the public and was met with such fierce opposition that it was dropped. Now, Big-Mart has altered its proposal, including the use of building materials and architecture that would attempt to match the historic flavor of VanWood Heights. It also plans to open a health clinic in the store that would offer affordable health care to those in VanWood without health insurance, or with minimal coverage. Despite VanWood’s recent decline, many citizens reject the new proposal from BigMart. These citizens feel that Big-Mart came far too close to being allowed to proceed the first time. Many residents of “the Heights” take pride in the quaint, almost small-town feel of their community and fear that a large chain store would threaten the already depressed local economy. The Lindser family led the opposition 10 years ago and has joined many small-business owners in the area to fight against the Big-Mart proposal. The Lindsers have owned and operated VanWood Treasures, a toyshop on Main Street, for four generations. Other prominent VanWood business owners joined the fight, including Mary Kay and Tom Davidson, owners of a small coffee shop and restaurant on Main Street; Zach Kovitz, owner and operator of a local hardware store; Joanne Harris, the president of the local VanWood Heights Bank (who is married into the Lindser family); and Christopher Flannan, owner of a small chain of local grocery stores. Of course, Big-Mart also had its supporters the first time, including a few power players and an undetermined, but not inconsequential, number of average citizens. When the bid was announced, the opposition immediately began working again. The BigMart opposition group, “The Coalition to Save VanWood Heights,” organized information nights for the citizens of VanWood and led protests on the streets. The Davidson, Flannan, and Lindser families organized, and continue to lead, the group, with funding help from other local business owners. They are infuriated by the town’s offer to dedicate property taxes on infrastructure around the development site for 20 years, a common development tool known as tax increment financing. The group is concerned that the development will have impacts beyond the development site area and that there will not be enough of a tax base outside the area to supported services needed because of growth caused by the development. The coalition also finds fault with the recently passed state law that allows national chains to shelter all or part of their income from state corporate income taxes. Moreover, the coalition has cited studies that found regions do not have any employment gain when big-box retailers, like Big-Mart, move into a region. Their primary source is an article by Stacey Mitchell that cites studies by Kenneth Stone, a professor of economics from Iowa State. These studies have shown that regions lose as many jobs as they gain with bigbox chains. Mitchell also writes that the new jobs are worse-paying jobs than the ones lost. Also, his work shows that the cities lose property sales tax revenue (net). According to these studies, big-box stores also hurt the local economy by decreasing the need for local goods and services (Mitchell, 2006). Johnson et al. (Johnson et al., 2009) also show that some bigbox stores depress property values in the areas that they locate. The coalition has branched out to work with members of other opposing groups, including the local labor union, the local growers’ association, and regional environmentalists, and a local bank. Labor unions have battled with Big-Mart across the nation in opposition to their anti-union stance. Local growers, feeling threatened by the sale of cheap organic food and groceries, have already started a petition for a resolution that would limit the sale of groceries in Big-Mart to protect local produce production. Environmentalists have joined the opposition, claiming that VanWood Heights is losing many of the green spaces that

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distinguish it. They also are critical of the proposal because of the increased traffic and pollution they claim it will bring to the city. To counter the negative publicity, Big-Mart began running local ads giving their side of the story. They have also conducted their own information nights to “set the record straight” in the community. Their literature claims that they represent the interests of average citizens who are politically inactive, namely, the working poor. Big-Mart says that its low prices and increased access to cheap health care helps poor families, and senior citizens on fixed incomes, to get by. At their meetings they read testimonials from working families across the nation who thank Big-Mart for allowing them to feed, clothe, and care for their families by offering reasonable prices. They also passed out copies of worker testimonials that attest to the positive work environment in Big-Mart and to their employment and advancement opportunities. Big-Mart has also made efforts to promote itself as a good neighbor to local businesses. They have offered grants and radio advertising in stores to help local businesses, especially those located in blighted areas. Big-Mart also played its “green” card, explaining that the energy efficiency of their stores has been increasing due to the growing use of LED lights and hybrid trucks. They have also made an effort to pressure their suppliers into reducing packaging waste. Heightening the controversy, there are rumors that Big-Mart has two other sites in mind. Additionally, there are concerns that Big-Mart, if they are allowed to build in VanWood Heights, might not be in the community for the long haul. Recently, Big-Mart has been shrinking its number of stores in response to competition from online retail giants. There are worries that Big-Mart will come to town, drive out the local businesses and then leave themselves a decade later. Big-Mart may be willing to build on the site that was once the automobile plant, thus redeveloping an unsightly brownfield in VanWood Heights and saving the wooded park. However, the site would require costly clean-up before it could be redeveloped. The automobile plant site has neither been confirmed nor denied by city or Big-Mart representatives. The other rumor is that Big-Mart, fearing that once again its bid will be rejected by VanWood Heights’ political leadership (or perhaps just seeking leverage), has also opened communication channels with the small city of Fremming. The Fremming site is 150 feet west of the VanWood Heights’ westernmost city limit. In an early poll, conducted before all the meetings began, the residents of VanWood Heights showed that they are fairly evenly split between Big-Mart opposition and support. The poll had a ±3% margin of error, and found 45% favored the new store, 42% were opposed, and 13% were unsure. The local Chamber of Commerce has been pushing the planning commission and city council to allow for the revision of the zoning ordinance and allow Big-Mart to begin construction. Big-Mart’s new bid comes at election time for the city council, but the issue has been largely unaddressed by council representatives (most of whom seem to fear making enemies no matter what they do). Meanwhile, Mayor Thomas has only said that she believes Big-Mart and VanWood Heights “can do business together profitably and work together to improve our great city.” Nonetheless, under pressure from the local media to set up a town meeting, the city council set aside time at the end of their regular Monday night session to allow the citizens to express their concerns. Larry McGee, the long-time council member who is thought to be the least sympathetic to Big-Mart and the most likely to run for mayor two years from now, served as moderator. Speaking slowly, he pronounced the discussion of the Big-Mart issue to be crucial, and he asked everyone to be civil and to keep their comments brief. (continued)

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The Meeting Mike Zander, a local farmer, was the first person McGee called on. He said: Big-Mart would be a drag on our local economy, especially our local farming initiatives. Big-Mart provides its produce at extraordinarily low prices, but we have to ask ourselves—at what cost? When you support local farmers’ markets, you support your community, your neighbor, your friend. When you support local farmers and local grocers, those dollars are returned to you in the form of not only taxes, but also returned investment in the community. When you buy a bushel of tomatoes from Big-Mart, you support a faceless conglomerate and foreign farmers who don’t have to play by our tax, environmental, and labor rules.

Councilman McGee nodded his head in agreement and then called on the next speaker. Katie Schnitz, a teacher at the local school and single mother of two, argued: I support a Big-Mart coming to town. Even though I work full-time teaching your children, some days I can barely afford to buy food for my family, let alone healthy, nutritious food. With the low prices Big-Mart provides, I can afford to buy my children school supplies, give them fresh fruits and vegetables, and even afford to give them health care. I know some people say shopping or supporting Big-Mart is immoral … but I can’t afford to be moral. It’s all well and good that you politicians and businessmen don’t need the low prices of Big-Mart and you surely get along fine without them … Well, I can’t. Many people in this town have fallen on hard times lately. Big-Mart would be the answer to their prayers. After attending a Big-Mart information night, I believe that many, probably most, of the arguments against them are unfounded.

The councilman next called on Leah Lindser, owner of VanWood Treasures and a leader of the Coalition to Save VanWood Heights: My toy store has been operated by my family for generations, and was one of the first businesses in VanWood Heights. VanWood Treasures, and the other shops, boutiques, and restaurants that make Main Street what it is, would be crippled by the presence of a Big-Mart. More people would make the one-stop-shopping trip to Big-Mart than would support local Main Street businesses, like Zach Kovitz’s hardware store. As Mike said, we are your neighbors, we care about the neighborhood, and we reinvest in the community. Big-Mart will only suck the resources out of VanWood and pay low wages with few benefits. We cannot compete with Big-Mart and still offer living wages to our employees and high-quality products. We surely need a way to revitalize our town, but Big-Mart is not the solution. The tax incentives being offered to Big-Mart would rob the community of the tax dollars needed to maintain our city, and it would disadvantage local merchants.

McGee then recognized another critic, the president of the local chapter of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Andrew Amers: Big-Mart’s consistent anti-union stance should raise serious questions in our community. Our unions have had a successful history in VanWood. We have worked hard to ensure better working conditions, better wages, and a better life for the workers of this community. Without union representation, Big-Mart employees will have no one to fight for their rights as employees to a living wage, to benefits, and to fair and safe employer practices. These guys will hire illegal immigrants, lock them in the store at night, and cheat employees out of overtime. They discriminate against those who are not willing to work around the clock in their 24-hour stores. Although they didn’t fire them like Circuit City did, there are wage-caps on their employees in an effort to reduce long-term employment. And, they have a record of discrimination against both women and minorities in terms of promotions and pay. This is not the type of corporate neighbor that we want in VanWood. Big-Mart has been fined for violations of

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labor laws, including forcing workers to work during rest breaks and off the clock. They are a symbol of what has gone wrong with the relationship between people and business.

Councilman McGee, smiling, looked up and saw Suzanne Sturgan, vice president of the local Chamber of Commerce ready to talk. She didn’t wait for him to call on her: These Big-Mart battles have gotten out of control. Big-Mart has somehow become the symbol of an evil empire for the left. Local communities are asked to not support them as a stand against corporate exploitation, environmental degradation, and poverty. This is not an epic battle. This is about VanWood Heights—and we are in trouble. Big-Mart would give us the boost we need. Big-Mart has made amazing strides in the last decade to improve their labor and environmental track record. As a representative of the local Chamber of Commerce, I urge you to support Big-Mart’s proposal and to reject more unnecessary regulation of business. I would also like to introduce John Elko to speak to you all. It is my hope that he can ease the fears that some of you may have about this development.

Big-Mart representative John Elko spoke next, calmly but assuredly: I know that many of you have heard very negative things about Big-Mart. I want to assure you that none of those things are true. We at Big-Mart are proud of the positive impact we have had in communities since our first small stores were founded 40 years ago. We now have stores across the globe, providing people with high-quality goods at a low price. At Big-Mart we provide job opportunities and assist working families with their day-to-day lives, saving them up to $2,500 per year. We also generate tax revenue and support thousands of local and national charities. The jobs we offer are well paid and offer opportunities for advancement. When we open our stores, there is such a large demand for our jobs that we are forced to literally turn thousands away. Tell me those citizens didn’t want us as part of their community. You all know the same thing would happen here. We also provide health care to our associates, both permanent and part-time, for as little as $15 per month in some areas. And, our prescription drug prices forced our competitors to lower their prices to stay competitive, and ultimately that saves you money.

He continued: We are also trying to be globally and environmentally responsible. We have increased the amount of fair trade and organic products we buy. Some of our stores are experimenting with alternate forms of energy, including solar and wind power. We have decreased our energy use by 30 percent in the last three years alone, and are reducing our—and our suppliers’—waste.

“I also need to take this opportunity to respond to the recurrent criticisms about our lack of labor unions for our employees,” said Elko. We are a community at Big-Mart, and a labor union would be redundant. There are open lines of communication at all levels, and we do not need a divisive, third-party representative. Our managers are expected to take employee concerns very seriously. We, and our employees, believe that a labor union is unnecessary, due to our fair employee practices and collaborative efforts.

“Further,” he concluded: If you believe in democracy, like I do, the numbers speak for themselves. Many polls have shown that most Americans—if not most elites—like Big-Mart, plain and simple. And, they vote for us when they choose to spend their money in our stores too.

When Elko finished, McGee quickly called on Alex Stanley, the president of the Coalition to Save VanWood Heights, who spoke with passion in his rebuttal: (continued)

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I was hoping for the opportunity to speak after the Big-Mart supporter and debunk his myths. I know our community has fallen on hard times, but Big-Mart is not the answer. We need to reinvest in our community, not invite a multinational corporation in to benefit from inadequately compensated labor, and to remove profits generated by our local residents, while doing nothing to support its employees or the community. While there are some big-box stores, like Big-Co, that treat their employees well, Big-Mart is not one of them. Big-Mart pays its most common employees, its sales associates and cashiers, so little that their families are living on incomes below the poverty level, making us, the taxpayers, support them while it rakes in huge profits. And, while providing these low-paying jobs, it destroys other aspects of the local economy by luring customers away from local stores. Also, Big-Mart will not contribute to the local tax base due to the shameless tax incentives it is being offered. Ms. Sturgan claims to be against further government intervention with business, but what about the government incentives being offered to Big-Mart in attempts to lure them here? Apparently, our Chamber of Commerce believes that government should only intervene when it is on the side of multinational corporations, but not for local interests. The studies that show positive impacts from Big-Mart have been consistently funded by money from the company. Big-Mart, despite its propaganda, will not be an asset to VanWood Heights. As residents with pride in our beautiful, tight-knit community, we must work together to become one of the inspiring stories of communities that have successfully stopped Big-Marts from coming to their towns. We ask the city council to recommend that the ordinance not be changed, so that Big-Mart will be unable to build. And, as citizens, we should use the ballot box, and our political contributions, to hold accountable any politician who sells us out.

Rana Sadiqah, member of the regional environmental group followed Mr. Stanley: Thank you Councilman McGee and the rest of the council for this opportunity to address these key issues. The last speaker, Mr. Stanley, is absolutely right. I have been so impressed with the natural beauty of VanWood and with your fight to save it. You would not want to sacrifice your town for Big-Mart. They will only bring increased, 24-hour traffic and will cost you your beautiful park. I know that company executives have been making minor, but very public commitments to the environment, but this does not erase a corporate lifetime of polluting waterways, gobbling up green space and wetlands, and supporting environmentally unsound practices. Please, protect your sacred land and do not allow Big-Mart to build.

“We only have time for one more speaker,” McGee said. Then he called on a citizen he didn’t know, Frank Sherrle, a former employee of Hord Automotive: Ms. Sadiqah, you are not a member of this community and do not know the hard times that we have faced. I agree with the teacher who spoke up earlier. Many members of this community are unemployed and are struggling to get by. I represent many of those who could not be here tonight because they have to work double shifts to earn enough money to support their families. We don’t have a coalition, but our voices should matter. Not only will a Big-Mart offer cheap prices, it will provide jobs to those of us who have not been able to get back on our feet since the plant closed. Families like the Lindsers and the Davidsons see Big-Mart as a threat, but the majority of the residents of VanWood welcome it with open arms.

“Plus,” Sherrle said: I would also like to speak as a representative for the growing number of senior citizens in VanWood. Many of us have to make a daily choice between food and medicine. Big-Mart offers prescription drugs for as little $4 per month, and now they are going to be offering insurance to their customers and maybe even low-cost checking accounts. Also, there is talk

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After the testimony of Mr. Sherrle, Councilman McGee brought the town meeting to a close. In the end, the city council and the zoning commission must decide whether or not to take the steps necessary to approve the Big-Mart proposal.

Conclusion Which voices do you think they will listen to? Why? How do you think this case would play out? In many ways, this case is symbolic of key contemporary social problems, including corporate responsibility, health care, the environment, and the rising income gap between the rich and the poor. In other ways, this is a particular, small-scale, local issue dealing with local problems and factors unique to this situation. The two sides give opposing “facts” and make conflicting truth claims. As a policy analyst, you will be forced to confront similar issues. It may be your job to attempt to develop policy solutions and a policy process. Nobody said it would be easy, did they?

Questions to Consider Here is your chance to put your knowledge of policy analysis to work. You are working as an analyst for VanWood Heights. Provide responses to the following and direct your analysis to the mayor and city council: 1. Complete a stakeholder analysis, and identify the many interests in this case. As you work on this, note that competing interest groups and individuals frequently present alternatives in strategically convenient and often dualistic terms. How does each group define the problem? What stories are they telling? Are they offering a Hobson’s choice? How do their stories reflect their values, interests, and power? 2. Survey and Sampling: Develop a short (one-page) survey (review the discussion of surveys in Chapter 3) and develop a proportionate stratified random sample of 400 households that the survey will be distributed to (see sampling discussion in Chapter 3). Use the information at the end of the assignment to draw the sample. Be sure to specify how many households will be interviewed (by interns) in each neighborhood. Then discuss how the number of households in each neighborhood should be selected to ensure random selection. 3. Tool of Democracy: Then using a tool of democracy in PPP4, Chapter 8 (see pages 271–281), briefly explain how you might use the results of your stakeholder analysis and survey to reach some consensus on this issue. Provide some detail on how you will use the tool and how you hope it might work. Your analysis to the mayor and city council ends here. 4. Self-Reflection: Reflect upon how well you think the process (survey and democratic tool) will work as well as the strengths and limitations of the process. Do you think that such processes make better policy, make citizens feel better about decisions, neither, both, or something else? Draw upon course readings in your response.

Additional information for drawing a sample: VanWood Heights Population (Households) By Neighborhood Neighborhood # Households Fall 600 Madison 710 Bechler 460 Total Households 1770

(continued)

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Further Reading If you are interested in how box stores impact property values, please see “The NWIMBY Effect (No Walmart in My Backyard): Big Box Stores and Residential Property Values” by Daniel K.N. Johnson, Kristina M. Lybecker, Nicole Gurley, Alex Stiller-Schulman, and Stephen Fisher (2009). Social Science Research Network. (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1492195. Although a fictional case and big-box chain, here are some valuable sites about Walmart, including their own narratives: www.walmartfoundation.org www.walmartfacts.com www.wakeupwalmart.com www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/

Notes 1 For example, in the fall of 1991 the Philadelphia Inquirer ran a nine-part series of articles on economics. The focus included corporate debt, the savings and loan bailout, the bankruptcy code, and all sorts of other stuff people supposedly cannot fathom and do not care about. Yet crowds gathered in the lobby of the newspaper’s building for reprints—so many people, in fact, that security guards were called in to control the crowd. In the first eight months, the number of reprints exceeded 400,000. 2 Ironically, citizens are portrayed in the positivist rational choice model, and Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) as being self-interested, and predominantly (if not perfectly) rational. The irony arises from the fact that it is also common among elites, elite theorists, and advocates of positivism to describe the average citizen as irrational, easily swayed by emotions, ill-informed, apathetic, and not committed to democracy. The Advocacy Coalition Framework, while not necessarily a nonrational framework, does recognize, at its core, the power of beliefs in holding coalitions together. 3 Again, many contend that communitarianism tries in vain to take the “politics out of politics.” Some would even argue that the political world portrayed by Deborah Stone (2002) is the natural and inevitable outgrowth of hedonistic humans who want to win in the political arena. 4 We are indebted to Dr. Michael Federici for introducing us to Voegelin’s philosophy and sharing his expertise on its interpretation.

Part IV: Conclusion: Praxis/Practice

Chapter 9

Wrapping Up

and

Letting You Show Off

Mini-Case “Opioid Abuse and Waterville (Revisited)” OK, so you are probably tired by now, so we will keep this last chapter very brief. This book began by throwing you into the political firestorm of doing public policy analysis with the mini-case, “Opioid Abuse and Waterville.” When you were done you were asked the following questions: • How would you describe the process you used to respond to your task? • Did you try to be objective? Did you recognize your values coming into play? Do you believe that it is appropriate for an analyst’s personal values to affect policy recommendations? • Who in Waterville would you be trying to please? Who do you work for? • How should you approach your job? Should you use your expertise and be “scientific,” or should you use more democratic means that encourage citizen participation? • Should you just accept the stories of major players, or is that a mistake because individuals view and describe issues based on their own interests? • What type of decision-making tools should you use? Should you use numbers and, if so, how do you use them appropriately?

The Waterville case and the discussion questions sought to make you think about issues you might not normally have thought about. As noted in Chapter 1, the case is typical of cases administered during competitions for public management jobs and internships, which are designed to evaluate how much prospective public managers know about public policy analysis. After you completed the case, we explained our belief that public policy analysis is complex and requires a method, tools, and political knowledge. We also claimed that it is affected by the analyst’s values—especially her or his understanding of democracy and view of the appropriate role of government. We then told you that throughout this book you would be learning and applying lessons, skills, and a public policy analysis (mixed) methodology, all of which would help you tremendously with this task. It’s no wonder you might be tired. After all, we have challenged your mind by providing you with a theoretical understanding of policy analysis. You understand how public problems are socially constructed and that value conflict is omnipresent. You also understand the uses and limitations of the rational model. You can critique rationality from a human, political/institutional, and cognitive perspective. You understand the centrality of narrative in human cognition. You have a basis to evaluate theoretical models and know the strengths, limitations, and uses of multiple models and methods. You have spent time in Nepal and Yellowstone National Park, and considered 297

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questions of regulation relative to the gig economy (Uber and Lyft in particular). You considered the limits and advantages of a rational approach. You have evaluated the use of science and stories relative to topics ranging from vaping to GMOs and vaccines, and debated the causes (and cures?) of school shootings and the opioid crisis. You were introduced to the positivist toolbox, and given warnings about their use and misuse. You have knowledge and skills, including ones not found in that toolbox. These skills—stakeholder mapping, narrative analysis, content analysis, focus group facilitation, and futuring (among others)—are useful for any future policy analyst. [“A Delicious Dilemma, A Tragedy, and You” an international politics policy case is available in Part II (#8) of the faculty online Teaching Appendix.] Over the years, there are big questions that our students have had about our approach to policy analysis. Are we postmodernists? Are we closet rationalists? We conclude our substantive part of the book by addressing these questions.

Do Facts Matter? The book demonstrates that individuals are often nonrational and that policy disputes are value-laden. Individuals suffer from cognitive dissonance, fall victim to the idea of a just world, seek out evidence that confirms their bias and values while fact checking the narratives of those offering policy views different from their own, etc. As a result, individuals are often persuaded more by narratives, for example a story about an individual, than by facts, aggregate statistics, and logic. As a result, some students wonder: Do facts even matter in public policy debates? Postmodernists often argue that narratives are really reflective of individual life experiences, culture, etc., yet some narratives seem to be manufactured by elites and marketed to individuals. If they are the latter, why would we want to pay attention to them or accept them in public policy analysis? On the plus side, postmodernism seeks to give voices to those who had been left out of policy controversies, a democratic leaning easy to support. But postmodernism also seems to accept moral relativity, and the idea that all stories are equally valid—neither are positions your authors accept. Meanwhile, contrary to postpositivists, positivists believe in an objective truth down-­playing the role of perception and social construction, and suggest rationality can be the basis for policy analysis and policy making. Is there is an objective truth when dealing with policy issues? Is everything subjective? One goal of college is to teach students to seek evidence and make decisions based on evidence. Given that we are taught that educated people should be rational, why might some people suggest policy analysis not only can’t be based on rational methods, but perhaps shouldn’t be? Is rejecting the rational model anti-intellectual, or does it make sense that we don’t want algorithms and experts making policy decisions for us? Don’t values and emotions and democracy matter? Unfortunately, for strict proponents of rationality, studies in the social sciences call into question the rationality of individuals, as advances in cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and biology help us understand that humans are at least partially emotional creatures, just as prone to accepting a good story as they are to accepting fact. Some students have read this book and concluded that it argues that rationality is important. Other students read the book and conclude that rationality is not important. Is one group correct and the other incorrect? Which students are more correct? Is there a middle ground or third position? This text argues that you need to use evidence and be able to analyze and critique narratives. We want you to be critical thinkers, but that includes not accepting the positivist view of rationality (which seems counterintuitive); yet we also don’t endorse relativism or believe that everything is subjective—and we do advocate for the role of democracy, even while recognizing the importance of power.

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As analysts, facts do matter. Developing a process that allows conflicting stakeholders to share a common fact base is important. The point, however, is that facts must be developed through a process that includes inputs by others in order to avoid the sole rational actor problem. It is not that we don’t agree that facts are important, but that we have too often seen “rational analysis” be used to hide ideological assumptions, shut off discussion, and enable power plays. This is one area where one can applaud the importance of postmodernism (another is its focus on language and stories). At the same time, we don’t like the relativist assumptions of postmodernism. When we see narratives, the first thing that we often do is to find facts that counter or even correct the narrative. We accept facts but also realize that values matter. It is easy to conclude that we should use rationality in policy analysis. Of course, we should base policy decisions on facts and evidence. We also think that the use of science is essential in policy analysis. Climate change is real and it is caused by human activity. Immunizations don’t lead to autism. GMOs do not cause health problems. Another example you are familiar with from earlier in the text is needle exchanges. Opponents find them morally wrong and don’t like the idea of paying for it (through tax dollars). They believe the exchanges enable, if not encourage, drug use, and are therefore exacerbating the opioid crisis. The concern is a belief that safer drug use reduces the incentives to quit. They believe it leads to greater needle litter problems in public spaces, creating a health hazard. Consequently, for example, in 2019, a number of counties and cities in Washington state started fighting against (e.g., defunding) needle exchange programs (which exist in over 35 states and has the blessing of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention). And, Washington state was the home of the first needle exchange program in the country in 1988. And, the science and facts are on the side of the proponents and public health officers who favor needle exchanges. The evidence does not support the claims of opponents but does demonstrate many proven benefits (Greenstone, 2019). Analysts should accept scientific consensus. At the same time, as an analyst, you should realize that values and value conflict matter. Rejection of climate change is likely based on fear of the consequences of climate change regulation and how it might change the economy, and on ideology and partisanship. Fear of immunizations might well be the result of fear of modern medicine and the influence of big money and big pharma on science and medicine. Fear of GMOs could stem from the fear that a few powerful corporations might control the world’s food supply. If we want to use just evidence to make policy decisions, we could build artificial intelligence (AI) and let AI make all the “right” decisions for us. But none of us, regardless of our political views, would likely want AI making decisions for us. Humans are emotional creatures. We do things such as believe things that are untrue, we seek out information that confirms our bias, we ignore evidence that opposes our political ideology. Humans are not robots. Humans frustrate the heck out of us. But humans feel, fear, love, hate, and all of that makes us human. It is within human (and humane) processes where good decisions can be made and it is where most of us probably want decisions that impact our lives to be made. The fourth edition of our text is coming out at a time where populist authoritarianism is on the rise around the globe, and where hacking and fake news and social media filter bubbles can make it more difficult to know what’s real and what’s not. We do sometimes seemingly live in a post-fact world and that is not good. But the answer is not to double down on positivism and rationality. The answer is also not for more rationality at the cost of democracy, but instead for more discussion, more understanding, more processes to build common facts and common solutions. This is the middle ground we staked out in 2001 with the first edition; the mixed methods tools you now have in your tool box (along with a good crap detector) is what we have advocated all along. As an analyst, you will have the opportunity to make a difference in ensuring that democracy is still an important part of policy analysis when the fifth edition of PPP goes to press in coming years.

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We would like to conclude now and send you on your way. That is, have you go out into the world and practice policy analysis as taught in this book. But first, we have a promise to keep. We promised (or threatened, depending on your subjective perspective) that at the end of the book you would be offered the opportunity to redo the Waterville case. Well, we certainly hope you feel better prepared now to tackle this case. It is time to deliver on our promise, time for you to show off how much you have learned, and then time for us to offer seven final discussion questions and a very, very brief conclusion.

Mini-Case: Opioid Abuse and Waterville (Revisited)

T

his case is typical of cases administered, as part of the application process, during competitions for public management jobs and internships in the United States. Such cases are designed to evaluate how much prospective public managers know about public policy analysis. You would be given directions similar to the following: 1. Read the information carefully. 2. Respond to the one-page case study in any format you feel is appropriate. 3. All necessary information to analyze this situation is provided in the background section. 4. Your response should be no more than three pages long. 5. Please note that calculations and research are not necessary for your response.

Background The community of Waterville, Pennsylvania (population 7,654), once mostly known for its historic hotel where both George Washington and the French General Lafayette slept, has recently taken note of what many community residents term “a major drug problem.” Three deaths in the last year due to heroin overdoses, several arrests of individuals for selling fentanyl, the recent busts by the state police of two “meth houses” in the space of one month, and the arrests of a couple of well-known Waterville High School athletes, allegedly involved in the local opioid drug trade, have led to calls from community leaders to combat what they view as a serious drug problem. Waterville is a community with an annual per capita personal income of $32,000. This compares with a state average of $38,000. The story of local business closings has been a frequent one in recent years, and the one major industry in Waterville left town last summer when the corporate bosses in Houston, Texas, decided to relocate the plant to Mexico. This left slightly more than 400 people, who had been earning above-average wages, unemployed. It will also cost Waterville a significant portion of city and school tax monies. While state and national rates for births to unmarried teens have been steadily decreasing in the past decade, that is not true in Waterville. Their teen birth rate and their overall divorce rate are both far above average. There is also a great deal of racial tension in the town, where 25 percent of the population is Latino. This tension was exacerbated when one member of the city council proposed the creation of an ordinance to forbid landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants, for which he was verbally attacked as racist. Up to now, the significant conflict between city officials and leaders within the Latino community has centered on issues such as use of the city parks; zoning; dances; police practices; hiring policies, and priorities.

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Several members of the city council are concerned that the drug problem is an “epidemic” and are calling for a “war on drugs” including harsher jail sentences for drug dealers and users. Contrary to this rhetoric, social service providers have provided data that the opioid drug problem, in particular, is “impacting the white middle class and that prescription drugs, not necessarily illicit drugs, are the chief culprit of the drug problem.” Mayor Joyce Allen told the local paper that without some type of action from the city government, this problem will destroy the community and drive out more businesses. A priest told his congregation that the very souls of the town and its children were on the line. But, a social worker commented on her popular Twitter account that, “We need to rethink how we approach drugs, drug users are not deviants, they have a medical problem that needs addressing.” A recent Philadelphia newspaper story recently found that Latinos were more likely to be incarcerated for drug use, whereas non-Latinos were more likely to be given treatment options including drug counseling. This report was widely criticized by some Waterville community leaders as both unfair and inaccurate. The city manager has asked you to conduct a public policy analysis to identify the potential problems, issues, and policy alternatives, and to prepare and present a recommendation to the city council. What do you do?

Discussion Questions 1. We cite literature and argue elsewhere that we are all “embedded practitioners” (i.e., we are biased by our professional community, our life experiences, etc.). Based on your efforts with the cases in this book, think about the biases or prejudices you brought to your role as analyst (in general). Did these biases affect how you interpreted cases—especially the Waterville Drug Abuse case—and your proposed process and solutions? 2. Although it would hurt if someone hit you on the head with a bowling pin (reality exists), we accept the claim that public problems are socially constructed (their existence as “public” problems depends on human values and interpretation). Using the cases in this book as your examples, reflect on this claim—and then respond to it specifically in reference to the Waterville case. 3. The sophists of ancient Greece argued that, ultimately, the “truth is what we are persuaded of.” This conclusion, of course, is unsettling because we want public policy to be based on hard scientific facts—not just rhetorical persuasion. Some of the evidence presented in this edition (cultural cognition, predispositions) provides some backing to the sophists’ ancient claim. We have argued that not all facts are equal and that the analyst, while listening to all stories, must carefully sift through the evidence in the hope of developing a fact base that will be supported by stakeholders. Based on your experiences in completing the cases in this book, do you believe that there is a “truth” in policymaking? What was the hard scientific truth in this Waterville case? How do you deal with the subjectivity of public problems while trying to avoid the relativity trap of stating that all stories are equally true? 4. A central question that any public policy analysis student must answer is: What is the role of the policy analyst in a democracy? The answer to this, of course, depends on how one defines democracy. Based on your values, and the readings and case assignments, what do you think is the role of the expert analyst in democratic government? How did this belief affect your handling of the Waterville case? 5. It may have been surprising to you that as political science, public administration, and policy students, we had to spend time making decisions about technical and scientific issues outside our area of expertise. We talked about such topics as drug abuse, the economic development controversy of locating a big-box store, siting a prison, brucellosis transmission, Uber, opioids, juvenile violence, vaping, GMOs, and swimming pool construction. It

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is not unusual for policy analysts to have to attempt to understand information and interpret data outside of their area of expertise. How much of a problem is this? Can you think of ways to minimize problems with this? What technical or scientific issues might have arisen in the Waterville case? 6. Were the policy analyses you completed while responding to the book’s assignments rational-scientific documents, subjective narratives of political persuasion, or a combination of both? Did you use mixed methodologies? In other words, did you find that the rational, political, and democratic tools in your toolbox were useful? Explain how that is relevant to the Waterville case. 7. We have talked about the connections between theory and practice (Part II) and between practice and theory (Part III). This part of the book draws you back to our point that what is needed is synthesis/praxis—not only between theory and pragmatism but also between competing theories that each offer us part of the puzzle. In what way did your answer to the Waterville case reflect on the idea of praxis?

Concluding Thoughts As many policy scholars assert, public policy analysis needs to be more democratic, but it happens in bureaucracies that value rationality, neutrality, and efficiency. While rationality has a place and appeal, the evidence from study after study (e.g., social science studies, cognitive neuroscience studies, political biology) shows individuals are rather emotional, work to protect their views, are more biased than rational, and quite likely to reject facts in the face of a good story that fits their world view. Public policy analysts need to understand the relevance of theory, but in the end, analysts need practical advice more than they need insightful critiques and clever rhetoric. Policy analysis requires knowledge (particularly about politics), skills (both positivist and postpositivist), and a methodology. Public policy analysis requires synthesis and praxis. It requires mixed methods. Rather than positing rational decision making and makers, policy analysis texts and policy analysts need to recognize limitations, subjectivity, ambiguity, and public interests. Rather than playing the role of the expert, analysts need to be educators and facilitators. Rather than trying to take the politics out of policy and letting power hide in fancy words and carefully scripted numbers, let’s bring politics out into the open. Aldo Leopold’s writings make the point that you cannot both love wildlife and hate predators, because both are part of the harmony of nature. Similarly, politics is part of the nature of both humans and, therefore, policymaking. Public policy analysis requires synthesis and praxis, and mixed methods (and sunshine). We wrote this book for you, the student analyst. Ultimately, it is your values and beliefs that matter. It matters that you believe in democracy, in yourself, and in the possibility of making a difference. Public policy analysis requires synthesis and praxis, mixed methods, and you.

Glossary

Black letter law  (Chapter 4) An unsophisticated view that the law is concrete, unambiguous, and easy to interpret and apply. The law reads literally and is as clear as the black letters on the white page. Therefore it is easy for judges to render decisions. Our discussion in Chapter 4 suggests otherwise. Chi-square test  (Chapter 3) A statistical test that allows researchers to determine within probability levels whether two variables are associated. Chi-square tests are typically used on data that are nominal (having only the qualities of being mutually exclusive and exhaustive). Confidence level  (Chapter 3) The estimated probability that a population parameter lies within a confidence interval (e.g., a poll finds that “65 percent of respondents support candidate A within a confidence interval of +/−5 percent”). The confidence level explains how confident we are that the real population number falls within the established confidence interval of 60 percent to 70 percent. If the confidence level is 95 percent, then we can conclude in the above example that there is a 95 percent chance that the real population figures fall within the 60 percent to 70 percent interval.

Critical theory (symbolic interactionism, phenomenology)  (Chapter 4) Critical theory is a school of sociological thought that attempts to reorient Marxist theory toward a more s­ubjectivist orientation and includes a cultural critique of society rather than the traditional Marxist emphasis on economics. Critical theory is part of a postpositivist movement that pushed the social sciences toward a constructivist approach (the belief that social artifacts are socially created). Similar constructivist approaches include symbolic interactionism (the belief that there is not an objective reality, but rather a reality created through human intervention and interpretation) and phenomenology (how actors define situations and then act upon the definitions). The key is that all of these approaches believe that humans actively construct their own worlds. Deductive theory construction  (Chapter 4) A philosophical view of the sciences and social sciences that asserts that research methodology should proceed from theory construction, hypothesis development, operationalization, measurement, and testing. In the social sciences, the positivist approach has 303

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mainly argued that researchers should follow this deductive method. The opposite approach utilizes induction, which begins with observation followed by the development of hypotheses and theories. Delphi techniques  (Chapter 6) A research technique by which individuals are first asked to address a research topic anonymously (e.g., by using a mail survey). The results are then tabulated and the participants are asked to comment on the survey results (e.g., in a focus group). The anonymity is important, for the focus group participants do not know whose comments and conclusions they are commenting on. Delphi techniques are often used in organizations attempting to restructure operations. A survey is mailed to all employees (including managerial folks) and survey comments and conclusions are reported. In focus groups, employees are allowed to comment on survey responses without knowing whether a specific comment came from a fellow employee or manager. Dominant social paradigm  (Chapter 1) A paradigm is an accepted way of doing things. This includes societal values, culture, and ideology that dictate what is acceptable or unacceptable within a society. Epistemology (epistemological)  (Chapter 7) The theory or source of knowledge. In social science terms, how do we know what we know? Equity  (Chapter 4) An important criterion for policymaking. It means fairness in terms of general principles of justice. Equity is not a synonym for fair treatment. Due to varying circumstances, opportunities, advantages, etc., fairness may mean treating people or groups differently. Externalities  (Chapter 2) An externality is the effect from a market transaction on individuals outside the actual transaction. Externalities can be either positive or negative. An example of a positive externality could be the increased sales and profits secured by a local sandwich shop when a bank decides to relocate and build nearby. A negative externality is the increased traffic in the neighborhood

where the bank decided to locate. Thus one group’s positive externality is another group’s negative externality. These are often referred to as spillovers or side-effects. Focusing Event (triggering event)  ­ (Chapter 1) An event in the political system that focuses attention on an issue that may or may not require governmental action. In Chapter 7, you learned that these triggering events are often very ambiguous. Government by Gentlemen  (Chapter 2) A system of federal hiring practices that predominated from 1787 to the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. This system was defined by President Washington when he asserted that “fitness of character” should be the major criterion for selecting civil servants. Fitness of character was defined by such things as family background, education, occupation, and personal reputation. “Green” card  (Chapter 8, case) This has nothing to do with immigration. Instead, it is simply a term used to describe a corporation (or others) doing something to show off their environmental credentials. A similar term, “greenwash,” is a play off the term whitewash, meaning, in such a case, covering up the ugly, unvarnished truth with some “green” paint. Grounding  (Chapter 8) The creation of a productive culture of shared fundamental assumptions about the group process. (See the discussion of Tool #2, Futuring.) Groupthink  (Chapter 5) This term was coined by Irving Janis (1982) to describe limitations in rational decision making among groups of individuals. The lesson of groupthink is that group decisions are often not ideal or even rational since a variety of social, ­political, and psychological factors combine to distort group decision-making processes. Hobson’s choice  (Chapter 1) This is a strategy of argument where two alternatives are presented. Both alternatives are defined by the speaker but only one alternative is seen as ­preferred. The preferred alternative is always the alternative of the speaker. Thus, the “choice” is really a nonchoice. For example,

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“What we have here are two choices: First, we can continue economic development strategies and see our community prosper, or second, we can discontinue these efforts and turn our community into a modern-day ghost town.” Hubris  (Chapter 4) A term meaning arrogant pride or presumption. It can be a severe limitation on rational decision making, as ­individuals refuse to examine other possible problem definitions or solutions. Interest groups  (Chapter 1) These are groups that share a common interest, whether it is a single interest like gun control, abortion, or whales, or a broader concern like the interests of teachers, or the spectrum of issues a group like Common Cause champions; an organized group that attempts to affect public policy. Laissez-faire  (Chapter 2) A view of capitalism and government that asserts that the government should take a “hands-off ” policy toward regulation of the economy. Government’s only role is the protection of property. Metanarratives  (Chapter 4) The grand stories. Postmodern philosophers often criticize metanarratives since within them are all the ideologies and assumptions of those who have the power to write them. Postmodern scholars reject metanarratives. Normative  (Chapter 1) Used in the context of the social sciences, it typically refers to values underlying policy choices (e.g., whether an individual sees population growth as positive or negative depends on that person’s norms or values). In addition, a normative theory is one where a social scientist prescribes how a social system should be, as opposed to when they attempt to describe how it is actually (descriptive theory). For example, a social scientist may use elitism or pluralism to describe the American political system. But this same social scientist may propose a more participatory system as her normative theory. Interestingly enough, descriptive theories and normative theories are often confused. A social scientist describing how the political

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system is dominated by narrow special interests may be criticized by another social scientist because the latter believes the former is using the theory in a normative rather than a descriptive sense. Operationalizing  (Chapter 2) Moving from a theoretical level to a more concrete level. For example, public administration has recently been introduced to some postmodern theoretical influences. From this theory building, the field will try to come to concrete tools of post-modernism public administration. The term can be seen as moving from a theoretical level to a practical level where the concept can be measured. Outliers  (Chapter 3) Numbers that fall outside of a normal distribution of numbers. There are many different methods to determine whether a number is an outlier. To determine outliers you can calculate inter-quartile ranges for ordinal data or you can calculate standard deviation for interval-ratio data. Paternalistic  (Chapter 1) In political terms this refers to limiting freedom and responsibility through well-meant governmental regulation and policy. In the Superpatriot theory of consent, citizens obey government because they believe that government is a well-­ meaning parent whose actions are always in the best interests of the citizens. Paternalism hinges on the idea that citizens, like children, often do not understand what their best interests really are. Policy primeval soup  (Chapter 5) The word primeval means ancient or primitive. The phrase is used here to describe policymaking as chaotic, messy, and difficult to explain. The metaphor was borrowed by Kingdon from the biological explanation of molecules floating around before life began and suggests that as ideas bump into each other, as they stew over time, and as new ideas enter into the cauldron, new combinations of ideas form (come to life). Political IOU  (Chapter 5) This is a term that describes the situation in which one political actor owes another political actor a favor or a quid pro quo. The debt is simply implied

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and assumed. However, failure to live up to political IOUs can have negative political consequences. Propaganda  (Chapter 8, case) A typical ­dictionary definition is “an organized program of publicity.” In sum, propaganda is the systematic selling of an idea, ideology, or issue position. In policy and politics it usually has a negative connation of information that is “untruthful” or “misleading.” Often, in policy, one person’s facts are another person’s propaganda. Public goods  (Chapter 3) These are goods that have the features of both joint use and nonexclusion. They are goods provided by government. This means simply that with public goods, my use of the city park (a public good) does not limit your use of the same park. Similarly, even if you don’t pay taxes, you still cannot be excluded from using the park. Compare this to private goods (provided by businesses). With a private good, my purchase of a 1978 Mercury Bobcat means that you cannot purchase that same car. In addition, if I don’t pay for the car, there are methods to exclude me from using it. In recent years, moves to privatize government and the incorporation of user fees have often changed the definition of goods provided by government. Scenario writing  (Chapter 6) A traditional policy analysis technique by which the analyst provides several qualitative outcomes to a range of alternatives. The scenarios usually encompass a range of possibilities from optimistic to mid-range to pessimistic. They allow the analyst to look at solutions in a variety of ways and to forecast possible political problems.

Smith’s Invisible Hand  (Chapter 8) A view of laissez-faire capitalism credited to Adam Smith. It holds that the unregulated workings of the marketplace will produce public interests. For example, a capitalist wants to make money by selling hamburgers. His selling of burgers creates jobs for construction workers who build the burger buildings, jobs for those who work in the burger joints, and markets for farmers and ranchers who sell their products to the burger capitalist. All of this helps other individuals. Thus, out of one person’s desire to make money by selling hamburgers, a public interest is provided. This view, of course, neglects many problems of unregulated capitalism (child labor, unsafe working conditions, and monopoly). Synedoches  (Chapter 7) The simple definition is using a part to represent the whole. It is a figure of speech. An example would be a “bureaucratic horror story” where one account of bad service from a public bureaucracy is turned into calls for policy reforms. Win–win policy  (Chapter 1) A policy by which all sides can claim equal victory. Where, for example, the contesting parties both exceed their expectations—where we grow the pie. This is opposed to a traditional “zero-sum” view of policy by which one side’s gains are another side’s losses—your piece of pie can only be larger if mine is made smaller. There is great controversy about whether public policymaking is necessarily more zero-sum than it is win–win (i.e., should the goal of the policy analyst be to promote win–win solutions or, in reality, does policymaking necessarily create winners and losers?).

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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold type refer to figures; page numbers in italic type refer to tables. ABC News 221 access, patterns of 155 accidental causes 232 Adenhart, Nick 153–155 administration/politics dichotomy 52, 172, 210, 211, 283 Administrative Behavior 52 adult content 108 Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 141, 142 AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) 150 Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) 21, 156 Agel, Jerome 53 agenda setting 149–155, 151 agonistic tension 272 ah-hah factor 59 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 150 AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) 13, 14–17, 37, 186 Airbnb 40 Albright, Horace 190 Alford, C. Fred 263 Alford, John 120, 121 Allegheny National Forest (ANF) 177 Amarillo Globe News 223 ambiguity 150 America Ascendant 54 American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) 21 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 158–159 American Political Science Association (APSA) 61 American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) 261 American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson 150–151 American Sugar Alliance 23 Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) 179 analytical problems 113–118, 118 Anderson, George S. 188–189 Anderson, J. 144 Andrus, Cecil 159 Animal, Plant, and Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 191–192, 198, 200 Animal Farm 30 anti-growth coalitions 12 anti-science 114 anti-Semitism 179

320

apathy, of citizens 26, 28, 31 Appleby, Paul 173 approval voting 277–278 Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 221 Arendt, Hannah 272 Aronson, Elliot 112 Ashworth, Kenneth 197 Assad, Bashar al- 161 Associated Press (AP) 195, 199 Atlantic, The 163 audience 242, 245, 260–261 authentic participation 261 awareness 13–15 Babbie, E. 184, 239 Backfire 54 back-stair psychology 273 backward loops 18–20, 20 bad bureaucracy 228 bad facilitation 282 bad kids 226–227 Baker, Frank 189 Baldwin, James 11 Barber, James David 148 Baritz, Loren 54 Barr, Bob 225 Bartlett, Richard A. 190 baseball 60, 63, 153–155 Baumgartner, F. 141 Beattie Farmers Union Cooperative Association 100 Becker, Howard 175 belief systems 125–131 Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) 98 benefits 21, 68–69, 90, 229–230; see also cost-benefit analysis (CBA) Bennett, Bryce 43 Berkley, George 62 biased pluralism 29 biased thinking 110–112, 262–263 Biden, Joe 118 Big Data 60, 63, 69–70 big-box chain stores 289, 290 Big-Mart case study 289–295

I ndex  Bill of Rights (1789) 266 biography 146–149 Birkland, T.A. 152 bison and brucellosis case study 187–203, 270 Bjornlie, Dan D. 200 black letter law 126–127 Blink 113 Bloom, Josh 164–165 blow-off courses 127 Bochy, Bruce 63 Boise, Idaho 43–44, 158–159 Book of Job 111 Book Thief, The 60 Boondocks (fictional) 70–75, 73, 78–80, 82–100, 83; central tendency 86–88; and discounting 89–92, 90; population extrapolation problem 82–84; reported crimes 87 Bowling Alone 266 Bradsher, Keith 22 Brady, Jim 244, 245 Brady Bill (1994) 221 Brafman, Ori 112 Brafman, Ron 112 brainstorming 181 Bramble Bush, The 126 Bransford, J.D. 10 Braybrooke, D. 58, 113, 122, 128 Brexit 26 Bridgestone Tire 99–100 British Petroleum (BP) oil spill disaster see Deepwater Horizon disaster Broca, Paul 110 brucellosis see bison and brucellosis case study Bryson, John M. 35 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 60 Buffalo Field Campaign 196, 199 Bumble Bee Foods 100 Bureau of Land Management 5 Burlington, Vermont 44–45 Burns, Kevin 136 Bush, George H.W. 117, 126, 174, 178 Bush, George W. 13, 32, 160, 227, 232 business analysis 173 Calhoun, Chris 64–65 Callahan-Lyon, Priscilla 136 Campbell, T.H. 161, 233 Canada, Geoffrey 221 candy industry 22–25 Carr, A. 263 Carson, Rachel 151, 155 Carter, Jimmy 99, 123 case studies: Big-Mart 289–295; bison and brucellosis 187–203, 270; gig economy 39–46; school shootings and focus group research 248–255; vaping politics and policy 132–137 causes, of problems 231–234, 244

321 census data 75, 75, 83–84 Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF) 24 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 13, 16, 136–137, 163 central tendency 85–88 Chambers, R. 261 Charlie Hebdo 217 Chavez, Cesar 151–152, 155 cheap goods case study 289–295 Cheney, Dick 233 China 9 chi-square test 76, 78 Church, Frank 22 Church Universal and Triumphant (CUT) 194 citizen participation 260–261, 264–265 Citizens Against Drinking Sewage (CADS) 180 Citizens Against Growth (CAG) 71 Citizens for Health 24 Citizens to Save the West Bench 160 Citizens United vs FEC (2010) 26 civic engagement 269–271 Civil Action, A 127 Civil War (USA, 1861-1865) 52 Clarke, Ryan 200 classification 274 Clemons, Randy 143, 161, 261 Cleveland, Grover 189 client orientation 181 Client Survey 277 Clifford, J. Garry 54 climate change 64–65, 114, 115, 155, 262, 299 Clinton, Hillary 26 Clinton, William (Bill) 150, 174, 244 CNN’s Heroes awards 145 Cobb, R.W. 151, 235 Coca-Cola 25 cognitive bias 110–111; see also motivated reasoning cognitive critiques 118–122, 122 cognitive dissonance 110, 112 Cold War (1947-1991) 117, 177 colorism 161 Columbine High School shootings (1999) 216, 223, 225, 227 Colvin, John 37 Common Good, The 266 communitarianism 265–268, 269 communities, rural 172, 218–219 Community and the Politics of Place 267 community-based program 275 competing narratives 9, 144, 262 complexity problems 113–116 concealed gun advocacy 222–224 confirmation bias 112 conflict: resolution 279–282; of values 11–17, 58, 128, 156, 172, 179–180, 187 Congress 21, 23, 26, 166, 167–168, 228 consensus building 279–282

322 conservatism 114, 119, 120, 121, 143, 150, 161 Consolidated Application 276 conspiracy 225–226, 233 Constitution (USA, 1787) 51–52; First Amendment (1791) 22, 29, 174; Second Amendment (1971) 5, 11, 150 consumerism 31 containment doctrine 56 content: adult 108; latent and manifest 239 content analysis 238–240, 240, 254–255 Continuum of Care 275 Conway, Kellyanne 262 Corzine, Jon 16 cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 92–93, 173, 177–178; analysis of CBA use 101–103; Boondocks example 93–98, 94, 96, 97; real-life examples 98–100 cost-effectiveness 177–178 Cowley, Geoffrey 221 Craft of Public Administration, The 62 Cramer, Kevin 226 Credo of Relevance 61 crime 14, 15, 16; in Boondocks 86–88, 87; see also drug use; school shootings criteria, universal 176 critical theory 109, 260 critiques of rational approach 107–137; cognitive 118–122, 122; and democracy 260–264; ideological/ philosophical 125–131, 130; intellectual/analytical 109–118, 118; nonrational public policy explanations 107–109; political/institutional 122–125, 125; vaping policy case study 132–137 crowding-out 116–117, 180 Cunningham, Gary L. 35 Czogala, Jan 136 Dahl, Robert 29, 53 Dalton, Russell 258 Daniels, Kim 226 Danziger, Marie 38–39, 171, 173, 183, 211, 212, 213, 260, 262 data: analytic skills 69–70; problems 117–118; types 86; and who? 125–129, 130 De Venanzi, A. 225 decentralization 51 Decisional Teeter-Totter 55 decisional types 58–59, 59 decision-making 123–124, 125, 148, 184, 261, 283 Declaration of Independence (USA, 1776) 11 Deepwater Horizon disaster (2010) 232, 233, 234 DeLay, Tom 225, 244 deLeon, Peter 212, 260, 262 deliberation 267 deliberative democracy 265 Delphi techniques 182 democracy 11, 12, 21, 51–52, 68, 102, 212, 247; BigMart case study 289–295; climate change and GMOs mini-case 64–65; and communitarianism 265–268; and critiques of traditional policy analysis 260–264;

I ndex definitions of 257–260; deliberative 210, 265; doing 257–295; ethics as 282–284; ideal democracy 26–28; Kathmandu mini-case 285–288; postpositivist tools 271–282; power and policymaking 25–34, 34; six-step model 269–271; structure of 264–265 Democracy and the Policy Sciences 260 Democracy for the Few 32 Democratic Party 31, 222, 226 Denhardt, Janet Vinzant 264 Denhardt, Robert B. 52–53, 264 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 275, 276 Desch, Michael 62 Detroit News 222 Dewey, Thomas 262 Dietrick, Bill 223 discounting 89–92, 96, 97, 128 discourse rules 271–275 Dominant Social Paradigm 5 domino theory 56 driving while intoxicated (DWI) 19 Dror, Yehezkel 124 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 17 drug use: abuse 1–2, 17, 117–118, 143, 162–163, 174–176; cocaine 117–118, 143; heroin 2, 17, 19, 143; needle exchange program (NEP) 16–17; opioids 1–2, 143, 162–168; quantitative evaluation 182; underage 19, 184–185; Waterville case study 1–2 Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) 117–118 drunk driving 19, 37, 154 Dunn, William 92, 93, 101, 173, 175, 176, 180 DWI (driving while intoxicated) 19 Dye, Thomas 20, 32, 33, 144, 149 Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund 192 Easterley, William 108 Easton, David 61 e-cigarettes 9, 132–137 economic feasibility 177–178 economics 6, 32, 71, 112–113, 172, 237, 289 effective participation 26, 260–261 Elder, C.D. 151 elections 21, 28, 33 elitism 20, 160, 260; and positivism 271–272; power and policymaking 25, 28, 30–34, 34; theory 108, 125, 142 Ellis, Joseph J. 150–151 Emerson, Jo Ann 224 entrepreneurs 140, 152, 153, 195, 216, 219, 229, 235 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 192, 193 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 158 environmentalism 5, 155, 230, 232, 270, 290; bison and brucellosis case study 187–203; policy 123, 172 equity 129, 282, 283 essence, of policy process 139–149 ethics 179–180, 261, 282–284 Etzioni, Amitai 257, 263, 266, 267

323

I ndex  evaluation criteria 182–184 evaluation research 184–186 EveryDay Democracy 265 evidence-based politics 69–70 externalities 6 extrapolation 82–85 facilitation 281–282 facts, importance of 298–299 fairness 112, 245, 261, 283 Fairness Doctrine (1949-1987) 275 Family and Medical Leave Act (1993) 174 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 232, 233–234 Feltey, K.M. 261 Fifth Risk, The 213 Finley, Mike 191, 193 firearms see guns First Amendment (1791) 22, 29, 174 Fisman, Ray 163–164 five-step method: define problem and determine causes 174–176; establish criteria to evaluate alternatives 176–180; evaluate adopted policy 184–186; evaluate and select policies 182–184; generate policy alternatives 181; see also six-step method FiveThirtyEight 60 focus group methodology 237–238, 261; school shootings case study 248–255 focusing events 14, 152, 152–155, 235 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 286 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 24 Ford Motor Company 53 forecasting 82–85 foreign aid 108 foreign policy 54, 61, 62, 117, 146–149, 161 Forest and Stream 189 Forest Service (USFS) 177, 191, 192, 194 Foster, Richard xv–xvi, 261 Fowler, James 120 Fox, C.J. 210–211, 271–273 Fox, J.A. 219 framing 10–11, 149–150, 241 Frank, Jerome 126–127 Franke, Mary Ann 197, 200 Frederickson, H. George 282–283 free trade 20–21 freedom of press 22, 27 freedom of speech 22, 27, 220 Fridel, E. 219 Fu, Claire 24 Fulcrum Principle 266 Fuller, R.C. 11, 12–13, 14, 18, 149, 156, 231 funding 82, 128, 129, 155–156 futuring 275–278 Gallup 221 GAPS Analysis Survey 277 Garfield, James A. 52, 215

Garrott, Robert A. 200 gay lifestyle 15 gay marriage 251 generic solutions 181 genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 64–65, 114, 115 genopolitics 120 George, Alexander 123, 148 gig economy case study 39–46 Gilens, M. 31–32 Gillenbrand, Kirsten 163 Gillespie, Nick 42 GMO foods 64–65, 114, 115 Goeller Scorecards 182–184, 183 Golding, William 5 Gonzalez, Anthony 41 Goodnow, F. 52 Google Trends 167 Gottschall, Jonathan 110–111 Gould, Stephen Jay 110 Gourevitch, Philip 10 government: action 20–21, 22–25; federal 51–52, 172; role of 5–7 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 117 Government by Gentlemen 52 Government is Us 263, 265 Graham, Jesse 120 Grand Forks Herald 224–225 Great Britain 26 Greater Yellowstone Coalition (GYC) 191, 194 Greater Yellowstone Interagency Brucellosis Committee (GYIBC) 192, 202 Green, Logan 39 green card 291 Grossman, Matt 31 group theory 107, 125, 126 groupthink 124, 148 Guiteau, Charles Julius 52, 215 Gulf War (1990-1991) 126 Gulick, L. 52 Gun Owners of America 223 Gunn, L. 149 guns 221–224, 243, 244; access to 221–222; concealed gun advocacy 222–224; control 5, 10–11, 244; see also school shootings Gut Feelings 113 Güth, Werner 112 Habermas, J. 272 Hadland, S.E. 163 Hagan, F.E. 247 Haidt, Jonathan 120, 121 Haines, Aubrey 189, 190 Hajek, Peter 136 Half the Sky 145 Hamburger, Tom 24 Hamilton, Alexander 51 Hampton, Greg 37 Hansen, Helena 165

324 Harr, Jonathan 127 Hastedt, G. 234 health, mental 227–228 health care 6, 7, 14, 14, 24, 152–153; needle exchange program (NEP) 15–17; Portersville Health Clinic mini-case 57–59; vaping policy case study 132–137 Hegel, G.W.F 268 Held, D. 259 Henrich, Joseph 118 Henry, William 32 Herbert, Bob 221 Heritage Foundation 227 heroin 2, 17, 19, 143 Hershey Food Corporation 22 Heston, Charlton 223 Hibbing, John 120, 121 Hirschi, T. 247 Hobbes, Thomas 5 Hobson’s choice 12, 231, 245 Hogwood, B. 149 HomeAway 40 Homeland Security 195 homelessness 178–179 Horse Butte Neighbors of Buffalo (HOBNOB) 196 Hudson, Rock 14 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 15–17, 186 human problem 109–113, 118 Hummel, Daniel 15 hunting 189, 199 Hurricane Katrina (2005) 232, 233–234 Hurricane Maria (2017) 233, 234 Hutchings, Robert L. 117, 126 Hyde, Henry 224, 230 Idaho Statesman 43, 44 ideal democracy 26–28, 34 ideological/philosophical critiques 125–131, 130 immigration 14–16, 14, 179 Impossible Will Take A Little While, The 145 In Defence of Elitism 32 In Retrospect 54 inadvertent causes 232–233 income inequality 14 incrementalism 107–108, 113, 181, 229–230 individual citizens, role of 20–21 Ingram, Helen 143, 262, 263 Innovations in American Government Awards 265 inside baseball 210, 213 intellectual/analytical critiques: analytical problems 113–118, 118; human problem 109–113, 118 intentional causes 233 interactionism, symbolic 109 Interagency Bison Management Plan (IBMP) 194–195, 196, 197 interest groups 19–20, 21, 22, 28, 34, 183, 230; against drunk driving 154; elite theory 31; pluralism 29–30; pro-prison 158–160

I ndex International Herald Tribune 61–62 International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) 25 international relations 146–149 Internet surveys 81–82 Iraq War (2003-2011) 26, 56, 152 iron law of oligarchy 30 Irony of Democracy, The 32 issue creation 151 issue definition 151 issue dimension 151 Ivins, Molly 225 Jacobs, Andrew 24 Jefferson, Thomas 51–52, 150–151, 268 Jenkins Smith, H.C. 141, 200–201 Johnson, Daniel K.N. 290 Johnson, James 267 Johnson, J.B. 238 Johnson, M.K. 10 Jones, B. 141 Jones, Charles O. 144, 157 Jones, Michael D. 201, 240 Jordan, Maryanne 43 Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 24 Judge, The (2014) 127 just-world hypothesis 111 Kafka, Franz 127 Kahan, Dan 119 Karnow, Stanley 54 Kathmandu and red pandas mini-case 285–287 Kay, A.C. 161 Kemmis, Daniel 267–268 Kempthorne, Dirk 159, 160 Kennedy, John F. 53, 177 Kimmel, M.S. 219 King, C.S. 261 King, David 37 Kingdon, John 123, 139–140, 153 Knight, Jack 267 Kolodny, Andrew 164 Kozol, Jonathan 283 Krisberg, Barry 221 Kristof, Nicholas 9, 145 Kusko, E. 143 Lacey Act (1894) 189 laissez-faire economics 51 Lakoff, George 121 Lancet 114 Land of Idols 32 language, political use of 150; see also narratives LaPierre, Wayne 224 Larimer, C.W. 4, 209 Lasch, Christopher 32, 266, 271 Lasswell, Harold 139, 148, 260, 264 latent content 239 law, black letter 126–127

I ndex  Law and the Modern Mind 126–127 law enforcement 19, 228 law system 126–127, 179–180 Lawlor, E.F. 212 Leary, M.R. 219 Lee, Hyun-Wook 136 Leen, Jeff 117 legality see law system legitimate discourse 272 Leopold Report (1963) 190 Lerner, Melvin 111 Leviathan, The 5 Levine, Peter 284 Lewis, Laura 149, 150, 151, 156 Lewis, Michael 213–214 Likert scale 77 Limbaugh, Rush 233 Lindblom, Charles E. 58, 107–108, 113, 122, 128 linkage mechanisms: and political systems 18–20; and public policy 20–25 Linker, Damon 232 Llewellyn, Karl N. 126 Loeb, Paul 145 logical positivism 52–53 Lokkesmoe, Karen J. 35 loop model 210–211 Lopez, German 17 Lord of the Flies 5 Lott Jr., John R. 222–223 Luca, Michael 163–164 Lybecker, Donna xv, 14, 233–234, 263 Lybecker, Kristina 296 Lyft case study 39–46 Lynn, Laurence 209 Macy, Beth 163 Madison, James 268 Madisonian democracy 268 Magagna, Jim 195 Mahler, M. 219 mail surveys 74; politics of survey construction 79–81; sample bias and weighting 75–76; sample sizes 71–72; technicalities of surveys 76–79; techniques of random sampling 72–75 Majone, G. 260–261 Mann, Dean 123 Mann, Thomas 275 Marx, Karl 32 May, Ernest 56 McBeth, Mark 14, 143, 199, 235 McClure, Susan 196 McDonald, Bill 198 McNamara, Robert S. 53–54, 55–56 mechanical causes 233–234 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 81–82 media 115, 151–152, 275; criticism of 262, 275; as linkage mechanism 19, 21; and obesity 143; political

325 polarization 27; and school shootings 215, 218, 219, 224–225, 228; social media 262–263 Meier, Barry 223 Melena, Jose 100 Mendes, Alessandra 64, 65 Menifield, C.E. 218 mental health 227–228 metanarratives 109 metaphors 110, 242, 244, 247 Milbank, Dana 24 Miles’ Law 35, 123–124 Miller, H.T. 210–211, 271–273 Mills, Charles Wright 10, 32 Millspaugh, Ed 199 Minerals Management Service (MMS) 233 mini-cases: climate change and GMOs 64–65; Kathmandu and red pandas 285–287; opioid abuse 1–2, 297, 300–302; Pocatello prison siting 157–160; Portersville Health Clinic 57–58; prison strip search 37–38 mining market 85 minority rights 257, 260 Mismeasure of Man, The 110 Mitchell, Stacey 290 Mitchell, Stephen 111 mixed-methodology 209–210, 213–215, 269–271; school shootings and focus groups case study 248–255; tools for 237–247 mobilization 161, 229–230 model evaluation 59–60, 263 monologic communication 274–275 Monsanto 12, 115 Montana Department of Livestock (MDOL) 187, 190, 191, 196 Moore, Michael 32 Moorhead, M.V. 220 moral values 225–226 morality 125, 150, 266 Morgan, D.L. 237 Morgenthau, Hans 113, 146–147 Mosher, F.C. 52 Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) 154 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 230 motivated reasoning 119 Mou, Zoe 24 Multiple Streams Framework 139–141, 140, 153–155 multistage cluster sampling 74–75 Munger, Michael 92, 173 Murray, Patty 69 Myers, R.R. 11, 12–13, 14, 18, 149, 156, 231 Myrick, Svante 165 Nader, Ralph 3 naive criteria 176 Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) 142–144, 212, 240, 263 narratives 142–143, 152–153; competing 9, 144, 262; narrative analysis 9–11, 240–247; on opioid deaths

326 163–166; policy determination and implementation 15–17; problem awareness 13–15; problem definition 149–150, 234, 235; school shootings and focus groups case study 248–255; sticky beliefs 121 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 194 National Commission on Civic Renewal 283 National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA, 1970) 192 National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) 228 National Institute of Health (NIH) 162 National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 221 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 213–214 National Park Service 187, 190, 191–192, 196, 197, 200 National Park Service Act (1916) 190 National Public Radio 220 National Rifle Association (NRA) 222, 223, 244 National School Safety Center 220 National Voter Registration Act (1993) 156 National Weather Service 213, 214, 229–230 nativism 179 needle exchange program (NEP) 16–17 Nepal 286–287 net present value (NPV) 89–90, 91, 98, 102 Netherland, Julie 165 Neubeck, Kenneth J. 231 Neubeck, Mary Alice 231 Neustadt, Richard 56 neutrality 56, 68 New Golden Rule, The 267 New Public Service, The 264 New York Times 9, 22, 24, 223 Newman, Joshua 137 Newman, Katherine S. 218–219 Newsweek 221 Nickel Mines school shooting (2006) 217–218 Nicodemo, Allie 219 NO GMOs 64 nominal data 78, 86, 86 nonattainment zone 158 nondevelopment zone 160 nonequivalent control groups 185 nonrational (political) approach 139–168; essence of policy process 139–149; opioids and political model case study 162–168; Pocatello prison siting mini-case 157–160; policy evaluation 157; policy formulation 155–156; policy implementation 156; problem identification/gaining agenda status 149–155, 151 nonrational public policy explanations 107–109 Northern Illinois University shooting (2008) 216, 225, 227 Northwest Herald 227 Nosek, Brian 120 not in my back yard (NIMBY) 128, 130 Nye, Joseph 61 Oakland Tribune 227 Obama, Barack 13, 233, 244

I ndex obesity 13, 14, 14, 143, 235 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 99–100 Occupy Movement 32 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 99 oligarchies 32 O’Neil, Cathy 70 opioids 1–2, 143; case study 162–168; mini-case 1–2, 297, 300–302 ordinal data 86, 86 Oregon’s Kitchen Table program 265 organizations, nature of 123–124, 125 Ornstein, Norman 275 O’Rourke, Beto 41 Orr, Paula 37 Orren, Gary 130 Orwell, George 30 Ostrom, Elinor 141 O’Sullivan, Jean 45 Otter, C.L (Butch) 44 outliers 88 over-quanitification 124 over-the-counter (OTC) drugs 175 Oxley, D. 161 Page, B. 31–32 Palmer, Carl 161 Palmetto family 226 Parenti, Michael 32 Parkland shooting (2018) 222, 226, 228 Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building 151 participatory budgeting 258, 265 participatory democracy 210, 272, 279 participatory policy analysis (PPA) see postpositivism Paterson, Thomas G. 54 Patton, C.V. 171, 173, 176, 181 Pendleton Act (Civil Service Act, 1883) 52, 215 Pentagon 53 Pereira, A. 263 Perry, Rick 232 Perspectives on Politics 62 Peterson, Rolfe 161 Petronio, Lia 219 Pew Research 27 pharmaceutical companies 163–165, 175 phenomenology 109, 260 Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing (PROP) 164 Piven, F.F. 156 Plato 5, 32, 53, 273 Player Empirical Comparison and Optimization Test Algorithm (PECOTA) 60 Plouffe, David 41 pluralism 29–30, 33, 34, 34, 142; Pocatello prison siting mini-case 157–160; see also group theory Pocatello prison siting mini-case 157–160

327

I ndex  policy: alternatives 181; determination 15, 156; entrepreneurs 140, 152, 153, 195, 216, 219, 229, 235; evaluation 140, 157, 269; foreign policy 54, 61, 62, 117, 140, 146–149; formulation 155–156; implementation 15–17, 156, 215, 264; monopolies 141–142; narratives 142–143, 163–166, 234–235, 246; stalemates 230; subsystems 141–142; termination 54, 157; see also political systems Policy Paradox and Political Reason 149 political action committees (PAC) 22 political polarization 27 political science 5, 10, 18, 23, 30, 60–62, 108; see also social sciences political systems 16, 122–123, 125, 215, 219, 229; in action 22–25; American 29–30; models 18–20, 18, 20, 144 political viability 178–179 political/institutional critiques 122–125 politics: Big-Mart case study 289–295; bison and brucellosis case study 187–203; change 198–199; of cost-benefit analysis 101–103; demands 18, 25; of evaluation research 186; evidence-based 69–70; means 20–22, 23; parties 20–21; playing 222; pork barrel 230; science 4–5, 10, 18, 23, 30, 60–62, 108 politics/administration dichotomy 52, 172, 210, 211, 283 Pope, Carl 195 popular culture 220–228 population forecasts 82–85 pork barrel politics 230 positivism 4, 53, 108–109, 173, 209, 212–213; see also critiques of rational approach; mixed methodologies; positivist toolbox positivist toolbox 67–106; cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 92–103; discounting 89–92; evidence-based politics 69–70; extrapolation and forecasting 82–85; measures of central tendency 85–88; sampling and mail surveys 71–82 postmodernism 109, 184, 211, 212, 213, 215, 231, 260, 263–264, 282, 284, 298; see also mixed methodologies postpositivism 4, 62, 109, 184, 209–213, 237, 247, 260; conflict resolution and consensus building 279–282; discourse rules for achieving “some talk” 271–275; futuring 275–278; see also mixed methodologies power structures 25, 29, 31, 33–34 pragmatic public policy analysis method 174–203; bison and brucellosis case study 187–203; define problem and determine causes 174–176; establish criteria to evaluate alternatives 176–180; evaluate adopted policy 184–186; evaluate and select policies 182–184; generate policy alternatives 181; history and form 172–173 pragmatism 103, 109, 213, 271 Pratt, Larry 223 praxis, definition of 3, 9–10, 109 Predisposed 120, 121 preference expression 26–28

prison strip search mini-case 37–38 Pritchard, Paul 192 problem definition 15, 39, 58, 59, 174–176, 209–255; identification 149–155; mixed-method tools 237–247; and postpositivism 212; and school shootings 216–228; school shootings and focus groups case study 248–255; social construction 234–237; subjective nature of events 215; symbolic representation of 231–234 problem identification 149–155 problem stream 140, 141 proceduralism 210 proletariat 32 propaganda 30, 262 proportionate stratified sample (PPS) 74 Protagoras 273 proverbs 52 public administration 3, 52, 61–62, 102, 172, 181, 257, 282–283 Public Administration Review 261, 282 public education 91, 103, 134 public goods 91, 92, 229 public opinion 20, 21, 31, 69 public policy types 229–230 public problems: definition and awareness of 11–15, 14; policy determination and implementation 15–16; see also problem definition public servants 228, 261 Punctuated Equilibrium (PE) 141–142 Purdue Pharma 163, 164, 165 Putnam, Robert 263, 266 Quade, E. 173, 182 qualitative evaluation 182 quantitative evaluation 182 race 165 Racicot, Marc 193 Radaelli, C.M. 240 Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings 218 ranching 20, 188, 193, 198, 230, 270 random sampling 72–75; see also sampling rational decision making 54, 56, 101 rational public policy method 51–65; genesis of 51–52; graphic presentation of 55; model evaluation 59–60; in practice 54–56; rationality or something else? 56–59; in theory 52–54; see also critiques of rational approach; positivism Rawls, John 283 Reagan, Ronald 99, 165, 178 Record, The 222 Red Panda Network (RPN) 287 regulation 6–7; and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 99–100; environmental 28, 229; gig economy 41–43, 45; guns 219, 222, 243; smoking 134 Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) 99 regulatory policies 230 Reich, Robert 99–100

328 religion 225–226 representative democracy 28–29, 34 Republican Party 21, 27, 31, 165, 222, 232 Request for Proposal (RFP) 278 Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology 247 Responsive Community, The 266 Return on Investment (ROI) 92 Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, The 32 Reynolds, Glenn Harland 42 Reynolds, H.T. 238 Rigor or Rigor Mortis 61 risk evaluation 114–116 Rittel, Horst 116 Rochefort, D.A. 235 ROI (Return on Investment) 92 role theory 123–124 Ross, Robert 231 Rouse, John 62 Rule of Five 35 rules of discourse 271–275 rural communities 172, 218–219 Russell, Betsy Z. 44 Ryan, Paul 69 Sabatier, Paul A. 141, 200–201 Sabean, Brian 63 sabermetrics 60, 63 Sachs, Jeffrey 108 Salon.com 226 Samenow, Stanton 224 sampling: Boondocks samples 73, 74, 75; focus groups 238; Internet surveys 81–82; politics of survey construction 79–81; sample bias and weighting 75–76; sample sizes 71–72, 72; technicalities of surveys 76–79; techniques of random sampling 72–75 sanctuary cities 14–15 Sandel, Michael 263 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting (2012) 216, 218, 222, 265 satisficing 113 Sawicki, D.S. 171, 173, 176, 181 scenario writing 182 Schmittberger, Walt 112 Schneider, Anne 143, 262 Scholars Strategy Network (SSN) 284 school shootings: bad bureaucracy 228; bad kids 226–227; Columbine High School (1999) 216, 223, 225, 227; concealed gun advocacy 222–224; focus groups case study 248–255; gun access 221–222; media violence 224–225; mental health 227–228; narrative analysis 243–245; Parkland (2018) 222, 226, 228; policy statement exercise 235–236; and problem definition 151, 152, 216–228; recent history of 216–218; religious and moral values 225–226; Sandy Hook Elementary School (2012) 216, 218, 222, 265;

I ndex social sciences and media coverage 218–220; stories and popular culture 220–228; Umpqua Community College (2015) 217–218; Virginia Tech (2007) 217, 218, 222, 223, 226, 227 Schubert, Louis 32 Schumpeter, Joseph 28 Schwarze, Bernd 112 Schweitzer, Brian 198 science: bison and brucellosis case study 119–201; climate change and GMOs 64–65, 114–116, 299; needle exchange program (NEP) 16–17, 299; vaccines 114–116, 299; see also political science; social sciences Science of Muddling Through, The 107 scientific management theories 52 Scioscia, Mike 63 Second Amendment (1971) 5, 11, 150 Selznick, Philip 267 September 9/11 attacks 26, 152, 223, 228 Shanahan, Elizabeth 142, 291 Shannon, V. 234 Shiller, R.J. 112–113 shootings see school shootings Sierra Club 159, 160, 192 Signal and the Noise, The 62 Silent Spring 151, 155 Silver, Nate 60, 125 Simmons, B. 224 Simon, Herbert 52–53, 58, 113, 261 sincerity 272 situation-regarding intentionality 272 six-step method 269–271; see also five-step method Skocpol, Theda 284 Smith, Adam 6, 268 Smith, K.B. 4, 120, 121, 209 Smith’s Invisible Hand 6, 268 Smokers United for Freedom 133 smoking ban 133–134 Snyder, Mitch 178 Soave, Robby 228 Social Construction of Target Populations 143, 263 social media 262–263 social sciences 4, 53, 61, 62, 108, 109; neo-positivist method 274; and school shootings 218–220; see also political science Social Security 21, 107 Socrates 32 soft-lobbying 24 some talk 271–275 Sophists 53, 262, 273 South Park (1997-) 220–221 Spirit of Community, The 266 Staines, Graham L. 231 stakeholders 10, 79, 182, 259, 265–266; analysis 34–38, 36, 176; civic engagement 269–271; cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 102–103; and power structures 33–34, 34, 38–39; stakeholder map 36; survey construction 80–81; value clarification 180

I ndex  Stallings, Richard 159 Stalsworth, K. 224 standard operating procedures (SOP) 123, 148 Stark, R. 247 state-level analysis 147 statistical imputation 117 stem cell research 179 Stewart, Jon 228 sticky beliefs 121 Stokey, Edith 92, 93, 101, 173 Stone, Deborah 126, 129, 139, 156, 171, 173, 183, 201, 211, 229; cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 92, 101, 102; problem definition 149, 151, 231–232, 235, 241 Stone, Kenneth 290 Stoneman Douglas High School shooting (2018) see Parkland shooting (2018) stories see narratives Storytelling Animal, The 110–111 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, Star Wars) 179 strategic definition 149, 231 strategic representation 84, 151, 267 strategically crafted arguments 156, 202 stratified random sampling 73–74 Students for Concealed Carry on Campus 223 Students in Action (SIA) 133, 134 Study Circles Resource Center (SCRC) 265 Study of Administration, The 52 Study of Public Administration, The 61 Stupid White Men 32 subjectivity 127, 176, 182, 212, 213, 237, 246; costbenefit analysis (CBA) 92, 101, 102, 103; direct impact 129–131, 130 substantive contribution 272 suffrage 26 sugar beet industry 22–25 sugar politics 22–25 Sullivan, Kathy 214 Summer Olympics (China, 2008) 9 Sun Tzu 10 Survey Monkey 81 surveys see Internet surveys; mail surveys Susel, B.O. 261 symbolic interactionism 109 symbolic representation 231–234 symbols 151–152, 211, 242, 244 synedoches 231 synthesis 109 Syrian crisis 161 systematic dogmatism 274 systematic random sampling 73 systemic agenda 151, 152, 155 system-level analysis 147 systems analysis 53–54 Talbot, P. 132 TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) 150 tangible benefits 95

329 tangible costs 95 Tavris, Carol 112 taxation 80 Taylor, Frederick Winslow 52 Tea Party Movement 31, 32, 258 technical feasibility 177 technocracy 69 teenage drug use 175, 184–185 television violence 220–221, 224–225 temporal problem 117 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 150 terrorism 56, 63, 114–115, 195; September 9/11 attacks 26, 152, 223, 228 Thaler, Richard 112 Thinking in Time 56 Third Debate 62 This Sovereign Land 267 Thrasymachus 32 Tibet 9 Time 221, 224, 226 time problems 116–117 time series analysis 185 tinkering 181 tobacco 9, 24, 142, 230; vaping policy case study 132–137 Torgerson, Douglas 4, 262 Toward a New Public Administration 282 Traficant, James 225 Transocean 234 Trial, The 127 trigger device 151 triggering events see focusing events Trtchounian, A. 132 True, J. 141 Trump, Donald J. 13, 14, 26, 31, 224, 233, 262 trust 239–240 truth 109, 211, 229–230, 301 Truth in Science 64 Tuchman, Barbara 110 Twain, Mark 242 twig decisions 31 types, of public policy 229–230 Uber case study 39–46, 41 Umpqua Community College shooting (2015) 217–218 United Auto Workers (UAW) 100 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 286 United Nations (UN) 145, 274, 286–287 United States of America (USA): Agency for International Development (USAID) 287; Air Force (USAF) 124, 177; Army (USA) 177, 188–189, 190; Bill of Rights (1789) 266; Census Bureau 83; Civil War (1861-1865) 52; Congress 21, 23, 26, 166, 167–168, 228; Constitution (1787) 5, 11, 22, 29, 51–52, 150, 174; Declaration of Independence (1776) 11; Department of Agriculture (USDA) 115, 142, 198; Department of Defense (DOD) 126; Department of

330 Health and Human Services (HHS) 265; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 232; Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 275, 276; Department of Interior (DOI) 194, 233; Department of Justice (DOJ) 118, 221; Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 158; First Amendment (1791) 22, 29, 175; Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 192; Forest Service (USFS) 177, 191, 192, 194; Government 29–30, 32, 51–52, 102, 172; House Committee on Natural Resources 198; House of Representatives 23, 64; Pentagon 53; political system 122–123; rural communities 172, 218–219; Second Amendment (1971) 5, 11, 150; Senate 160, 198; Senate Judiciary Committee 118; Supreme Court 174, 226 United Steelworkers of America (USW) 100 universal criteria 176 Urban Institute 128 urban renewal 230 urban sprawl 11 USA Today 43, 193 vaccination 114, 194, 200, 201 values 115–116, 118, 126, 129, 131, 144, 209, 271; clarification of 180, 253–254; conflict of 11–17, 58, 128, 156, 172, 179–180, 187; moral 225–226 Van Bavel, Jay J. 263 VanWood Heights (fictional) 289–295 vaping see e-cigarettes Vedlitz, A. 161 veil of ignorance 283 Ventura, Jesse 223 Vietnam War (1955-1975) 53–54, 55–56, 147 Vining, Aidan 173, 181 violence: gun 69, 217; media 220–221, 224–225, 244; school 216–220, 226, 227 Virginia Tech shooting (2007) 217, 218, 222, 223, 226, 227 Vogelin, Eric 273–274 voting 21, 28, 33, 210–211; and pluralism 107; preference expression 26; rules 277–278; vote trading 23 Vox 165 Waldo, Dwight 61 Wall Street Journal 222 Wallen, Rick 197 Walt, Stephen 61 Washington Post 24, 41, 117, 221 water shortages 180 Waters, E.C. 189

I ndex Waterville, Pennsylvania 1–2, 11 We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For 284 Weapons of Math Destruction 70 Webber, Melvin 116 Weber, Max 52 Weeks, Edward C. 258 Wehner, Peter 27 weighted criteria 182, 183 Weimer, David 173, 181 Welch, Matt 154 Wenk, Dan 198–199 Wentzel, H. 224 West Yellowstone News 193, 199 Whitman, Christine Todd 16, 144 wicked problems 116, 201 wildlife 172, 177, 188–195, 259, 270 Williams, Brian 285 Williams, M. 132 willing attention 272 Wilson, James Q. 229 Wilson, Woodrow 52, 172 win-win policy 12 Wizard of Oz, The 241–242 Wood, D. 161 wooden-headedness 110 World Health Organization (WHO) 17 World War II (1939-1945) 30, 146 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 287 Wright, Deil 126 WuDunn, Sheryl 145 Yellowstone National Park (YNP) 230, 259, 270; bison and brucellosis case overview 191–195; bison controversy in 21st Century 195–201; case task 201–203; civic engagement 270; Greater Yellowstone Coalition (GYC) 191, 194; Greater Yellowstone Interagency Brucellosis Committee (GYIBC) 192, 202; history of bison 187–191; map of 203; and policy stalemate 230 Yousafzai, Malala 145–146 yuck factor 179, 180 Zanetti, L. 263 Zeckhauser, Robert 92, 93, 101, 173 Zeigler, Harmon 32, 33 zero-tolerance policy 191 Zimmer, John 39 Zinke, Ryan 198–199 Zusak, Markus 60