Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany - The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day 9780262620192

Table of contents :
000......Page 0
001......Page 2
002......Page 3
003......Page 4
004......Page 5
005......Page 6
006......Page 7
007......Page 8
008......Page 9
009......Page 10
010......Page 11
011......Page 12
012......Page 13
013......Page 14
014......Page 15
015......Page 16
016......Page 17
017......Page 18
018......Page 19
019......Page 20
020......Page 21
021......Page 22
022......Page 23
023......Page 24
024......Page 25
025......Page 26
026......Page 27
027......Page 28
028......Page 29
029......Page 30
030......Page 31
031......Page 32
032......Page 33
033......Page 34
034......Page 35
035......Page 36
036......Page 37
037......Page 38
038......Page 39
039......Page 40
040......Page 41
041......Page 42
042......Page 43
043......Page 44
044......Page 45
045......Page 46
046......Page 47
047......Page 48
048......Page 49
049......Page 50
050......Page 51
051......Page 52
052......Page 53
053......Page 54
054......Page 55
055......Page 56
056......Page 57
057......Page 58
058......Page 59
059......Page 60
060......Page 61
061......Page 62
062......Page 63
063......Page 64
064......Page 65
065......Page 66
066......Page 67
067......Page 68
068......Page 69
069......Page 70
070......Page 71
071......Page 72
072......Page 73
073......Page 74
074......Page 75
075......Page 76
076......Page 77
077......Page 78
078......Page 79
079......Page 80
080......Page 81
081......Page 82
082......Page 83
083......Page 84
084......Page 85
085......Page 86
086......Page 87
087......Page 88
088......Page 89
089......Page 90
090......Page 91
091......Page 92
092......Page 93
093......Page 94
094......Page 95
095......Page 96
096......Page 97
097......Page 98
098......Page 99
099......Page 100
100......Page 101
101......Page 102
102......Page 103
103......Page 104
104......Page 105
105......Page 106
106......Page 107
107......Page 108
108......Page 109
109......Page 110
110......Page 111
111......Page 112
112......Page 113
113......Page 114
114......Page 115
115......Page 116
116......Page 117
117......Page 118
118......Page 119
119......Page 120
120......Page 121
121......Page 122
122......Page 123
123......Page 124
124......Page 125
125......Page 126
126......Page 127
127......Page 128
128......Page 129
129......Page 130
130......Page 131
131......Page 132
132......Page 133
133......Page 134
134......Page 135
135......Page 136
136......Page 137
137......Page 138
138......Page 139
139......Page 140
140......Page 141
141......Page 142
142......Page 143
143......Page 144
144......Page 145
145......Page 146
146......Page 147
147......Page 148
148......Page 149
149......Page 150
150......Page 151
151......Page 152
152......Page 153
153......Page 154
154......Page 155
155......Page 156
156......Page 157
157......Page 158
158......Page 159
159......Page 160
160......Page 161
161......Page 162
162......Page 163
163......Page 164
164......Page 165
165......Page 166
166......Page 167
167......Page 168
168......Page 169
169......Page 170
170......Page 171
171......Page 172
172......Page 173
173......Page 174
174......Page 175
175......Page 176
176......Page 177
177......Page 178
178......Page 179
179......Page 180
180......Page 181
181......Page 182
182......Page 183
183......Page 184
184......Page 185
185......Page 186
186......Page 187
187......Page 188
188......Page 189
189......Page 190
190......Page 191
191......Page 192
192......Page 193
193......Page 194
194......Page 195
195......Page 196
196......Page 197
197......Page 198
198......Page 199
199......Page 200
200......Page 201
201......Page 202
202......Page 203
203......Page 204
204......Page 205
205......Page 206
206......Page 207
207......Page 208
208......Page 209
209......Page 210
210......Page 211
211......Page 212
212......Page 213
213......Page 214
214......Page 215
215......Page 216
216......Page 217
217......Page 218
218......Page 219
219......Page 220
220......Page 221
221......Page 222
222......Page 223
223......Page 224
224......Page 225
225......Page 226
226......Page 227
227......Page 228
228......Page 229
229......Page 230
230......Page 231
231......Page 232
232......Page 233
233......Page 234
234......Page 235
235......Page 236
236......Page 237
237......Page 238
238......Page 239
239......Page 240
240......Page 241
241......Page 242
242......Page 243
243......Page 244
244......Page 245
245......Page 246
246......Page 247
247......Page 248
248......Page 249
249......Page 250
250......Page 251
251......Page 252
252......Page 253
253......Page 254
254......Page 255
255......Page 256
256......Page 257
257......Page 258
258......Page 259
259......Page 260
260......Page 261
261......Page 262
262......Page 263
263......Page 264
264......Page 265
265......Page 266
266......Page 267
267......Page 268
268......Page 269
269......Page 270
270......Page 271
271......Page 272
272......Page 273
273......Page 274
274......Page 275
275......Page 276
276......Page 277
277......Page 278
278......Page 279
279......Page 280
280......Page 281
281......Page 282
282......Page 283
283......Page 284
284......Page 285
285......Page 286
286......Page 287
287......Page 288
288......Page 289
289......Page 290
290......Page 291
291......Page 292
292......Page 293
293......Page 294
294......Page 295
295......Page 296
296......Page 297
297......Page 298
298......Page 299
299......Page 300
300......Page 301
301......Page 302
302......Page 303
303......Page 304
304......Page 305
305......Page 306
306......Page 307
307......Page 308
308......Page 309
309......Page 310
310......Page 311
311......Page 312
312......Page 313
313......Page 314
314......Page 315
315......Page 316
316......Page 317
317......Page 318
318......Page 319
319......Page 320
320......Page 321
321......Page 322
322......Page 323
323......Page 324
324......Page 325
325......Page 326
326......Page 327
327......Page 328
328......Page 329
329......Page 330
330......Page 331
331......Page 332
332......Page 333
333......Page 334
334......Page 335
335......Page 336
336......Page 337
337......Page 338
338......Page 339
339......Page 340
340......Page 341
341......Page 342
342......Page 343
343......Page 344
344......Page 345
345......Page 346
346......Page 347
347......Page 348
348......Page 349
349......Page 350
350......Page 351
351......Page 352
352......Page 353
353......Page 354
354......Page 355
355......Page 356
356......Page 357
357......Page 358
358......Page 359
359......Page 360
360......Page 361
361......Page 362
362......Page 363
363......Page 364
364......Page 365
365......Page 366
366......Page 367
367......Page 368
368......Page 369
369......Page 370
370......Page 371
371......Page 372
372......Page 373
373......Page 374
374......Page 375
375......Page 376
376......Page 377
377......Page 378
378......Page 379
379......Page 380
380......Page 381
381......Page 382
382......Page 383
383......Page 384
384......Page 385
385......Page 386
386......Page 387
387......Page 388
388......Page 389
389......Page 390
390......Page 391
391......Page 392
392......Page 393
393......Page 394
394......Page 395
395......Page 396
396......Page 397
397......Page 398
398......Page 399
399......Page 400
400......Page 401
401......Page 402
402......Page 403
403......Page 404
404......Page 405
405......Page 406
406......Page 407
407......Page 408
408......Page 409
409......Page 410
410......Page 411
411......Page 412
412......Page 413
413......Page 414
414......Page 415
415......Page 416
416......Page 417
417......Page 418
418......Page 419
419......Page 420
420......Page 421
421......Page 422
422......Page 423
423......Page 424
424......Page 425
425......Page 426
426......Page 427
427......Page 428
428......Page 429
429......Page 430
430......Page 431
431......Page 432
432......Page 433
433......Page 434
434......Page 435
435......Page 436
436......Page 437
437......Page 438
438......Page 439
439......Page 440
440......Page 441
441......Page 442
442......Page 443
443......Page 444
444......Page 445
445......Page 446
446......Page 447
447......Page 448
448......Page 449
449......Page 450
450......Page 451
451......Page 452
452......Page 453
453......Page 454
454......Page 455
455......Page 456
456......Page 457
457......Page 458
458......Page 459
459......Page 460
460......Page 461
461......Page 462
462......Page 463
463......Page 464
464......Page 465
465......Page 466
466......Page 467
467......Page 468
468......Page 469
469......Page 470
470......Page 471
471......Page 472
472......Page 473
473......Page 474
474......Page 475
475......Page 476
476......Page 477
477......Page 478
478......Page 479
479......Page 480
480......Page 481
481......Page 482
482......Page 483
483......Page 484
484......Page 485
485......Page 486
486......Page 487
487......Page 488
488......Page 489
489......Page 490
490......Page 491
491......Page 492
492......Page 493
493......Page 494
494......Page 495
495......Page 496
496......Page 497
497......Page 498
498......Page 499
499......Page 500
500......Page 501

Citation preview

То ТНЕ MEMORY OF МУ FATHt:R LOUIS LERNER

whose account о/ Tsarist pogтoms Ьесаmе ту fiтsl lesso,a in psychological war/are

CONTENTS СНАРТЕR.

l'AC!:

Fore,vord Ьу General Robert А. McClure 1. POLICY AND PROPЛCANDЛ IN WORLD \·VAR 11 •

1. Policy and the Propaganda Process . . 2. Psychologica.l \Var[are in Total \Var . 3. The Case of Syke,var, \Vorld \Var 11 . .

11. MAIUNC SYKEWAR POLICV ,

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. б.

,

•

•

Policy Complications of Coalition \Varfaгe . Function of \,Var Aims . . ProЫems of Unconditional Surrender . The Strategy of Trutlt . . The Syke,var Policies . . . . Policy Position of P\VD/SHAEF

IJI. 0RCANIZATION •·oR SYXE\VAR. • 1. The Syke,var 1'Hssion 2. Multiple Syke,var Agencies . �- Place of P\VD/SHAEF . . 4. lntemal Organization of Syke,var 5. Significance of Syke,var Organization .

xv 1

2 б 13

13 16 18 26 32 35 42 43 47 52 54 57

I\f. SYКE\VAR PERSONNEL AND PERSONALITIF.S . 1. Persistent Pcrsonnel ProЫems . . 2. Composition of P\VD/SHAEF . 3. Three Syke\varriors: \Vhat Makes а Propagandist? . . . 4. Summary: Talents and Skills .

67 67 72

V. Rou OF SYKE\VAR INTELLIGENCE (P\·VI) 1. Тhе Special ProЫem: Attitudes and Action . 2. The Dual Function: "Pure" and "Output" Intelligence . 3. P\·VI Sources. 4. P\VI Methods 5. P\VI Rcports vii

94 95

78 88

98 103 109 117

-

viii

CONТENТS

СНАРТЕR

VI. TARGEТ GERMANY: ТнЕ Svю:,vлR PUBLICS t. The Special ProЫem о[ Nali Gennany 2. Composition of the Audience . 3. The Wehпnacht as Target. 4. The Homc Front as Targct . 5. "Special PuЫics" in Geпnany

VII. Svк.E\VAR ТнЕмЕS . 1. The Making of Tl1emes. . 2. Themes and Situations . . 3. Distribшion of Themes: Sample Counts . VIII. SYKE\VAR TECHNIQUES . 1. Long-Teпn and Short-Term Techniques . 2. Basic Techniques: Factual ism and Indirection. 3. Technical Dcvices. 1- Analysis of R epresentative Texts . IX. SYКEWAJt. MEDIA 1. Media of tl1e Broadcast '\Vord . 2. Media of tl1e Printed \Vord . 3. Sykc,var Mcdia Innovations 4. Coordination of Mcdia .

РАСЕ

131 131 135 143 147 149

164 164 171 183 1 94 194 200 203 211 223 223

2g1

240 246 255

Х. SPECIAL 01'ERATIONS . 1. \Vords and Dccds: Tl1oory of "Special Operations" 2. Special Operations: Specimen Campai gns. �- U°)\·crt Opcrations: "Gray" and "Вlack" . 1· EIТcctivcness of Covcrt Operations . 5. Sicge or tl1e City .

255 258

X I. EПECГIVENESS 01' SYКEWAR. , 1. Liшitations of tl1e Evidence . 2. Types of Syke,var Evidence . 3. Syke,var Effecti,•eness: Some Expert Opinions . 4. To,vard а Pol icy Conception of Propaganda. .

285 286 289 301 313

262

268 271

SUPPl,.F.MF.NTARY EsSAv, ВУ R1CHARD н. s. pean audicnce, and wc cnnnot a.tJord 1О let the Driti.sh ,·i�int go 1,у def.ult." Br"dcмting Polie,, р. 17. 1�. ln additIOn, the МО (MDr.. le{)p(;rfl.1ions) Ьnnch of OSS wu d\:irged wii.h cc:rta.iл propapлd.. fuщ::tiмs, p�r[in1]arty in "Ыаd" ou1pu1. This pb:ue is discu*'td more, h4d ш Ano�,i more:· (Ita1ia mine.) Experime11t in Gumon1, р, J, 16. Е. М. Zach:arias. Secrf!t Miuion, (Ncw Yoтll., 1�6), р. � Тht: fo� soing :accaunt of SJktwar, and particularly P\VI, pcrsonnc:I, may Ьt: O)l'l'I• parcd with UOnз.rd \У. DсюЬ'1 "The UtШzation of Soci:al .S.::E�tbu in thc Оwшм Brand\ of th� O\VI," Amnic.Jn PtJtitic4l Stiu1и Rn.ritw (19,t7), VQI. ,tt, р. '1i9· Ste аlю the La1rer'1 dtю.i�iьn of "Тht: Propa�ndi.м" iп his �Ыi< Opi11ion and Pr0Jмgt1nd4 (New YorJr,. l!Н8), 01�ptcr 11, Sec:, f,n:ally. tЬе гeport prcp.�:r�I Ьу the OSS A�.ut Staff, Амштепl of Men: Sil��lion Q/ Personnel for tlte OSS (New York, 1948},

l\j 11"

s par 60

Chapleт 5

ROLE OF SYKEWAR INTELLIGENCE (PWI) IF k..'IIO,,·u:uct of his targct is а pri1n:нy rcчuirr:1щ�щ for Lhe

propagandist, tl1en propaganda intel1igc:nce is onc of l1is mщ,t

impoгtarн tools. Es pa:ially is thi.$ true llistorian or the Sykc,"ar opcratio11 at т,�·elft.J1 Anny Gтoup hu writtc11: \Vhen tЬе fint Р\·\11 tca.nu ,,,.crc given thc�ir assigшnenu . in Мау 1944 ... it i.s 1:1Ге 10 s;ay that pr:ittically notblng v.·:u 1:.1101,т аООш 11,е J)rucet.� or ga1l1cring intclligco« Jor сошЬ:н r,-v Opeг�1iorl!. Tl,crc 11.id Ьее11 а l1i.ш,11 оГ iщеlНgе,ю: .tct.iv­ ity iп tl1e North Лfrica/1 ;rпd ltaHaп \V but а, i.&tielris�t,• e&. Srcond, the di,·ergence of . rcqtiirc:П)cnts fm'. t"fie 't\l."O l:.inds of intelli�nc:e "'3.$ orten so �·i!1.e�tь:i-� O"t section could ha.rd]y satisfy Ьoth compJctcly.:rt ·/: �·otliput"' inteUigenc:e required stories and phrases whose accur:icy mattered littlc, а.� c:ompared with their verisimilitude. Оп the otheт Ьалd. '"purc" intc11igencc wa.1 cxclш:ivcly con­ cemed '"it.11 accuracy. lts шain business "'a.!i to eliminate t.he obscura.11tist and atypical stor-ie1. , to "�е tl1rough" the draшatic: and colorful aspecu to wh.at ,,·;ц ar,:curate and r�гcsc11tзt.ivc. Since Ьoth of these functions were performcd Ьу the same Р\\11 pcrюnnel, i11 the field and at headquaгten, the effecu often Ьordcrcd on м:hiiophrc:niз Qf t.he analytical faculty. Thc cas.c w.u woNe than the riglн ha.nd not knowing what the le-ft. hand w;ц doing; mоге ofte11, t.he riglн hand was а"'·а� tl1at tl1e left hand might Ьс: doing юmething haпnful, but had to let it continue doing so.2j One illustratioo "'Ш se:n•e. Tl1e Cerman det.-:ision ш raise а Jlollts.rlurn1 (ptoplt's t�istanct:) wa.s а g61dtn oppot г 11fiity for Sykewar's output pc:тюnncl. Тlн: prospect of an arтny of aged, iofim1, and crippled being rushed to tl1e derense or the Fatl,er­ la.nd on c:rutc:hes and stretchen r-aiиd limitless pos.siЫliti� fur jokes aЬout "кraping the Ьоноm of tl1e Ьаггеl," for indi gn ant atU;cks on the N.azi lcadership re.sponsiЫe for such inJшma.nity to its own people, for itern admonitioru 10 iun-e1,der (lu,ic-kly Jeit the whole Сс:гп1аn JК(.)ple bt made Н> �гiih. Dozens о( storics illu.strating wch themes '"'ere received Ь)' P\,VJ during t11e days following tl1e crea.. tion of the Volks.sturm. Ho,�·cvcr, the fir$t "pure" intelligence reporu of thther Sla"ic FW'i), h,1d tx:en mi:ктably in.tdequatc." Addcd to thci.t physical debllitation was а high dcgrec о( neuroticism, expus�d in such forms 3$ e-x.зggcrated worric.s aЬottt their statщ ir, tt1cir l1omt countr·ics and (partly а res1,1lt of long subjc-c;,tion to rhc incess:шt propaganda of Nai.i superiority) unrea.soniпg fear о( tJ1e Cer­ mans..." Gi"·cn а.11 1Ьс$С: factors, Syk.ewar chosc "'hat sccmcd to Ьс thc only (e-.asiЫe linc. \Vith the decision to "oontain and oontrol" the F\\l'J, however, it sl1ould � notcd tl1at Sfke�·aг ,поtе off thtir рстiЫс contribution to thc n1ain Sykc1'·aг mi5sion-to undermine the encmy's wШ 10 raist. (t) Co,u:-enlra/iьri Campi-These Nazi ins1itutioш were com­ monly known as ··кz," an abbrC'\1iaton of thc German "Konzc:n• 1ratioшlager.'' �J No accura,e count о( their iшnates haJ Ьсео,

SYКF.\VAR or ever will Ье, m.з.de. Tl1e Na:i.is 1..ept Lheir crm1atoria running оп а fu11-timc Ьa$iS, b11ricd the a$.lн:s, ;щd in most t.1$C$ were agile enougl1 10 destroy tl1eir lis1s of the dt!:a.d before the АШ� arтived.:.8 Tl1e Kz in1na1es оЕ rnai11 iщ_erc.st to Syl..ewar ,,,ere t11e political prisoncrs. \Vhatc,•cr tbcir diffcrc-nccs, \\ hich in many ca.mps ,,•cre ex,rcme1y serious., t11ey ,,·е1·е aJI anti-Naz.i and, in tl1is sen.se at Jea.st, pro-Allied. Ву te111pe:raп·1ent, tl1ey were а group h11ngry for new1 зnd idcas, in whosc livc1 radio злd ncw1papcrs l1ad al\'13)'S pla)·cd an iшportant рап, Ош� of tf1e most draшatic stories of t10t\' an a.nti-Nazi сеН was organiicd "'ithin а Kz illщtntc:s this hunger for ou1$.ide com­ munication, partic11larly among 1l1c political priю11ers. Tl,.is ь«а.n,е part of t11eir (aпt.asy world. Л (ormer Uшu1e nf Lager Iюrgermoor rc:collccu 110,v t}1e Comm11nist-lcd group initiatcd it.!I control o,•cr а.11 an1i,Nazi forccs in the ca.mp Ьу simulating ал ьuuide n.dio broadc:ast, after "taps'" one nigl1L Their spokes­ шзn, mtJfflir1g his Y()ii;c= iн l1i.s Ьlanl..c:1, coщmcnccd ,,.·itlt th c: a.nnounc:.emcпt: "Acht1mg.' Acl1lung! Нier ist der rote Sender. . . . Ge110.ue11, vo,1 h�1ae Nachl аЬ wird der тоtе Sender regel­ miissig .ш Euch Jfrecl1en." This dc:vir.c ;i.rouscd 11.1ch intcra, aшong tl1e 01.her pri:юne1'S tbat tl1e Comшunist "coup" ,vas ac-­ c::epttd witl1out challe11ge and U1e rote Se1\der" Ьес:::а111е thc main cl1a.nnc:I Ьу \\0hii;h th c: Communi .51. .. lc;1dcпhip .. iШ· nounced 1hcir ncws апd instructiorn t0 their (ollowen.�11 Sornc indicзtioo of tl1c rote pl.iyed Ьу syke�·ar in fiШ11g tbls 11eed is gi,,en i11 tl1e followirtg pas5Зgc Ьу От. Eugcn Kogon, .1 vet�n of se\·eral Kt c::amps. His Ьооk. Dет SS-SJaat i 1 t.he: Ьcst .soc:ial a11alysi.s of the Nazi concwttation-camp 51stcm ,vhich bas )'Ct been puЫisl1ed: 1

11

Knowlcdge of foreign radio repons sptead а li11.le furthcr in 1hc соuт of tiшe. Not 10 f.aH eitlter into u!!t:lcss depreuioru or rutile Шusioru \\·:u of t!1e grc:atat imporunce. One had to get new&. therc.fore, зЬоut thc situзtion in Gc:rmany and in the "·orld. The k.зlcidoкopic inFormмion bro,1ght iщо the tu·s Ьу ncwromcn from all 11car-by nations w:u collec1ed, щilii.ed, .зnd р:щеd оп со tl1e men «н1cemed Ьу tfie leading politkal forces (ю that юme1i1)lCS а truer picture w.u gained Lhan most Genn.111.s 01) tЬе ouuide could get). Thc=sc were elfectively ,up, plemented Ьу Ji,tening in to forcign broadcasu. The organit.t· tio11 of tbls illcgal nc"'"S strvicc was of C'OUl'ie e-x. tremely diffic::ult and dangerous. Central placcs of tblat lund i1, most caпtps �·crc

ТАЯ.СЕТ CERMANY: ТНЕ $YК.EWAJt PUBLICS

1,!.�

the constтuction offices a.nd the el�u-ician.,• "·orbl1ops. The priюnen uk.ing ovcr the �k. of ltltening in �liaЫy and r�,u . luly wcre in constant roduced 3! AppcndLx n 10 the History: P!JID. t�. Cf. "Condition• 111 \Vcstern Germзn1" (1 )anuaIJ' 194!i), 1. P\VI ronюlidatcd rc1юr1 Ьу MichaC'I Ballour оп ev:acuatioп wnl of thc Rhinc. ц. JYec.tl7 Jntcllige"u Summary Jor PJYcholo,gical Wa,far, (Mardl· April 19,15,). S« :.lю P\VI rrport Ьу Dlпic:I I.пncr, "Notn Оп I Тrip Through Oro.ipkd С�n:шу" (18 April 1941.). 15. Т. О. Bad1crof1, C12/lirtg &rz №tio,u (ВВС 19-111). 115. ThU wr, ·ey. 1long witJ1 oLhcr• ol conti. :knЫc lntttCЫ (or rompaf'i• .011 of the campaigщ iл Iuly and Frarкc. iJ �pot'tcd in Н. L.Anib:achcr. "Attltudes oI Gcrman PO\V's." roe. cit., р. 15. 1Ъе P\VJ Jun'C")'l, "''hich c:irтicd the in,·estigatioп thJ()IJ3h thc "''hole c:ampaign. show а ,imiJ.ar :u,o.. .;-i;111ion �twtt11 the w-iLhholding of b:ad nc,,,•1 Ьу Cttou.n юurct"S and in. c.тc,:a!ling c.-...1fideпcc Jn АШеd SOIJl'C:C'!. Thc loglc of thiJ rebtiont.hip hu Ьet'n st:11cd Ьу Hans Spci� l'>," a.1utiill1 the imporuna or inform.ati�� propapnda within W г.anks о{ •lw: e:ncmy Ь gт•шсr Yl"hnt an inwn"mi mt Lnllh has Ьееп .,.ithbeld Ьу hl! «-МQf\ or d!�iortnl Ь}· his dшltful ptop.1pnW. or •·bm hC' h.111 Lried •о di,·cn ;111cm1ion from it 6r 1't·hcn it• te11tit.1.tIOn r«iuin::s wmpariюtu of i,nmt'ldi:н� Yl'ith rt:tDOte fкu. lt w11 ln Amttlan idn [111 ,,•ot1d '\\'а г IJ to diS(riЬu1e Lhe urм ll""tpa.pn' la 1Ьс trnl(hб ot ЬоtЬ the: Amttic:an. and Gt:rm11n 10ldle1L l11 dcmonJiilwi1 clJ«i .,,.J ЬcBf'\·cd to ltc 1impLy ln iц ш1cinform:нion. ll'11ri" QurTime,p. ,,,. •;. Dr. Spcirт (:laiпu that ''One or thC! , •• Шoncomin� of Лmerioл prOp;agtnd:i. di1.r]ng tJ 1c lai.t 1't'ar waJ th� l:.ck ol polit.C:::t.l ptaмiпg t.м:yond t,he JIC!"''S of I.J)C! "'·cc:k.." Spe1.king p11rtiruta.rl1 о{ the d\lШ 1.n .a.gn1< :it1 in \V;u,!1ingю11, he 1101с, UIC! fol(o,- •ing consc-qucncc о[ propagan1U. CQщ:ti:vcd

SY&.EWAR. Tll:[,M.E;S

193

only u а ncws ктvi«: 'The mоы impomnt news during thc- w�r w;i,1 'produced· in battle and Ьу thC' шt�mC'n от thc-ir glюы ,-·rita,. Thc prop�a.ndisu had ,·irtually оо in.Bum« on l.hesc: productions; tЬеу f11щ­ tioned as whol«зk and retail agC'nls in Юс ПC'WJ bu,inatcd 1tric:tly a«ordla,: to thf! Ge1:it!\'I Co11,·c:11tlo11 an4 tbc rulc1 ol •·•r 111d wШ Ьс relurned 10 1heir hoi:ne, ,1 ttle е114 ot l:lo.slllJtle..,

'

HLIIERТES OBERKOIIIIA.DO (Sa,......e H....iq,..,te.., АШ.d Espod/U....,, f.,..)

An die Arbeiter und YerwaИun gsbeamten in

ИAMBURGI Die Alliienen bedrohen je11.t Eure StadL Die deut­ Sng poinu .1.n,I road ЫОСU of t'nany re_., g-1:arЩ, :and the 1,;1p!tu1atiori or ma11y towм without а bl'lot tкing firc:d Ьу their g.irтiюns." 1-J,'11011: РЬ Р111, р. 181. ,,_ Le:н-:r to 1Ьis writl!r f11;11n, Cuy dtlla-CIOppa, P\\'D spccialiм оо . depmitecl in The Hoovtr Libnr,. quiet s«tor in the ntiddle of tlte nigJtt. Tliis рlапс: -\}'thological cffcct.s t1pon moпle of sнclt techniqucs шсd in isolation prob.iЫy were not ,•ery profou11d, altl1oщ�fi 1lte "uns.eн]c111cm" о( nen•es, partjcularly amo11g green troops, r11ust l1avt" l1elpcd to dull tl1e ctlgt о[ crнhщiasm for ,�·ar. Sш;l1 co1nba1 t.accic-.s wcre ,\·cll ш1dcпtood Ьу Ьoth sidcs in \\lorld \'\!;ir II. 8 Lt"s.s ,vidc}y unde1·stood among Allicd COl}lbat leadcrs ,.,.as tl1e increased degт'Y'lter, the$C tlai1n.s ат� l1igl1ly du!J:ioш. F.xpтe.ssions о( а wl1olly differe11t eva.lнзtio11 of coveтt opera­ tions, including tlюse о( tltc superior ''Soldaten.sender Calais," ha\'e Ь«n ,,·riнcn Ьу form�r Syk.e,...arrio1·s ,,,Jю arc qualif1cd to ПJakc s�1ch evali1;ition.s. Thc fiг$t or tl1c rollowi11g p.15sagcs was ,пittcn Ьу the formeт deput)· chicf of P\\fD in сlытgс c: ,f me. Gttte invir.ation s'ac.€ompagne d'une promesst: solennelJe; оп Jeur prome1 det templcs.... On suppo!!ait que les dicux пс pou­ Vi1.ie11t pat tf.sister ¼ 11ne 1elle prierc . » Machia\·elli, in tl1e Renaissa.nce era о{ ltalian city-states, n:.шr.tlly was fascinatcd Ьу tbc probkms of lxsi cgcd cities and came to tlie conclшion that tl1e R.oman metJ10d о( ps.ychologica] warfэrc \\'aS ргоЬаЫу шоте eff«ti\·� than that u� against them Ьу thcir cncmic:s, viz.: It is а.11 eтror 10 ta'kc a(tv.intage or the intemal diжnsion.s о( а clty, and 10 atteшpt to take poмe5iion о( it whilst in th.at cond1tion. The disscnstons Ьct\'t·�n t11c p0rt.1.rюe of propagaщl:1, th:щ to 11\е actua.l rcspo11Ji,1eness or tbe n1i�raЫe Gcrmans to '-''hom thc:y \\' tt'C addreмnJ,r. А .similar ,•it,\' ¾'as 6pres.1M Ьу t11e Morale Division or the Stratcgic Rombing Survq·, "\\"l1ich indigtcd юmс possiЫe con­ seq11c11ccs of profo�шd import: Ccrmar1 offidal.s at or nea.r thc Ministeri:1\ lcvel were t\ition 1nay Ьс ask.cd, in t.he [асс of this una.ni­ mous convictio11 among thc e-x.pcru, did high Amcrican lcad· ership in \Vorld \Var 11 di:splay sucl1 strik.ing indifference 10 syke\lo·ar? Eviderкe wa.s adducIO earliet iн 1}1е .study to show that R005-C\'Clt зnd H11l1 kn(:w littl c:, and c;1rcd lс:м, аЬощ 1hc weapon Syke,varriors considcrcd ю important. \Va.llatt Ca:rroll conc.ludcd, from his diю.1s.sion of .sykcwar with 1hc Prcsidc-nt, that "R°"""vclt djd not und...,tand thc ,yщmatic 11,е of propa. gand .t in tot.11 \Y"ar." и This aucnion may }к accuratc, and yet Ьё i1'Ladequatc to а · p1ain the minirniting or syke"'·ar Ьу tl1e АШеd leadeт .ship. Carтoll himselI obviousty con!iders Roosevelt an intelligent and tc:JPOns.iЫe le:ader wl\O was interestcd in evur (1alian divi$ion.s, to split thc Gen11an Anny in half. At б o"clock on t.hc: nc:xt morning, lhc: discml>.i:rkations on chc bc.1chc-s would l>c::l s-Spe11de"-f'ropa&i11tla for tl1e Propaganda Ministcr. Conci=ntration camps: ..Thi= \\'chrmacht did not know." Tr:щJCriptioщ. or $hOrthзnd notcs 1зkcn at Hitlcr·s ._.q. The mtдtled Рrс:м or N:ц.i Gerrщiny. "А it\onir11t as rа.�огаЬ1е as 11,а, in 19!9 wcx1ld l\e\·t-r re(\lr." Hitlcr t")(plai1u the tiщi11g о{ Gttn,a,1y's "'ar. Forctd шarchcs of Allied offictr P\V's. Vit""Yi·1 011 Vla.uov and С«mзпу·s torcigтi lcgions.. Hitlcr·s br.1i11.,,•avc how to raisc Ru»iaп к,in: i11 E11glзnd. Hitler's $42.tlling criticism or :Ьis foreig11 Di\·isioos. 19,15-Hi1Jer'1 гeactioo to 1l1e Dtн:e'• lall. ,ъе d«li11c of thc Luftwaffe. Rumors Ьу "Volkscшpl:ingcr." Gest.a:po �nd SP investigations of rерощ br�dcast Ьу "Seлder Atlaщik." "КШ tЬс Schwcinbund." Nati propagand.i for Ccrшarn. Covcrnmcnt and l'ar-ty offic,t':\ ii,r110п:d C«bЬcls/1...ammers :1ppcal (О hclp зir пid vict.iшs.. HiшnUcr comptai1t1 aЬout ge-tting Allied radio 11c¼'II instead о( music. Na.zis debated. whetltt.r to hang Bishop о{ Mi.insta for "Treai;:hcrous utt�rзn«s,"

"'' �

SY:K.EWAR. l>o(tj,rt�I Shorl Title N1m1C,.,,, 458 LUtc:11iпg to foгtigн broadcaщ iп \\ 'artimc-a. m:ijor proЫcrn iп N:u;i-�m1a.ny. -t!i9 Pro1-..iganda: Fri,k зпd СосЫкls did llOt � е)'е to еуе o n issues o f policy and a1нhority. 1бо ConГl!ic.ation of radio seu [rom Je\ol-s kept dи-k. Himm.ltt racro Gocbhels, and flitJer- approved. Lammen o\it or ra\ ·or with Hitlcr and Bormann, 460 -46:t Jap.1,1, i1, 19, 11 planпed 1() анасt. Rш,siэ. 46.5 GoebЬelJ/Ribbentrop ri"atry for control of Na.ti Propapnda Agt.nc;ie5 in lorrign countries. "Opaзtion Grt.>t!n" (Cztth�Jo..,a_kia): Gcrmany's plзn for­ aggr�ion. Pte-Hit1er Go,·crnmeщ rнnch for Nazi Militз.ry Org.i niza.­ tioщ. Nazi nt.з.ck Li.su of JewUh con1p0�n a11d orche,.1n1ort. 19$4 corn.-srю1,dt1н:e �iweeн Cardinal F:шlhaЬcr, Aтch­ 470 bishop or Miinic.h, and Adotr \\ 1agncr, G:iuJeitrr ol Munich. MemЬcrship in the NSDAP as t11e dttisi..,e fattor in the ap­ 47 5 poinrmtnt of blgl1 gtJV"erome,н officiaJs. Tl•e Ь..cckground of Hitler's "En:1Ыing Act." ",Ысh sus-pended. the \\1cimзr Constitution. Dr. Schacht dismiмcd a.s Prcideпt of Rekh.sЬank.. Coc:ring's list of №7.i 1,ar1y зddres�. "Reith Cl1шnЬtr о( Ct111.ure•· Ьla(k.Jiщ о! h:alf-Je"''' and per· .юns in:i.N"ied to Je"-'tN:u.i l9'JO Ыucprint о( thc ccoпomic n� order in post�·ar EuroJК. Comprehcrui\·t: directi\ 'e ror polic:e ue:нment or Вerlin Jews . Nazi's "Coloпial" policjes in occupi«I tastcr-n Tl!ТТitori es (19.р): Stan •ation and «onoшic .slз,·cry. №zi propзgзndз lilm against AIJit-d tюntblng (()r showing iп nt:t1tral cou11trits '1Ctotd Ьу GoebЬel$. 495 List or aJI Gеnщщ re-iщ,1re fiJ1ns produccd from 19!9-19,и. 495 App1ic:t.1ions to CocbЬels (or pc.rmis..1ion to scc films pro­ hibltcd in Nazi G1: rma11y. Rt:ich Propщ;anda Ministry Ыac-klists о( aulfюn a,1d joar­ na1ists (pre-w.i.r). лr1er tlн: ral\ or Fraocc-Hitle:r', opinion on potitic:al and 4!17 miНtary possiblliti� in Europ c.

rGoog

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES

S.FILE Shorl Tille

D«'Wl'Ш'III NиWJЬп

10 12 1! 14 15

16 17 18

19 20 i-1 �:r: •, 1:4 15 116 i? 18 19 s.o

31

.$1 35

5·1

Order conce.n1i1,g proh1ЫUon or IUter1int to rorelgn broad, casts. Activities о( stoгmtroop(:n оп Сспnап "lrint'rt Fro1н." Exmcts from soldjc:-в' lcttcn. Schcmc of Cerm:11n military c::enюl"$blp. Gиman home mor..le. Gennan w:irning agaiщt Alli� Je,;.Otu. �m1an 1old.icn d�Ьс- AJli..rd. fi.rc powc:r. D;a.ngcr of typhus, ctc.., through iпsufficicnt dr..ining ly&teш. 1,..зсk. of cquipmcnt and unHo,rnu. Re arrat о{ ОЬеm SUoda. Duplicatior1. Alu.r (or thc FUhr� in c,·cry dugout or И"Ction. Cбman lcaAct: Mistrc::i.tmc11t of Priю11cn Ьу the British. Ordcr demandi11g 0011.s("rvation of civilian monlc i_n fnnce. Comm�шder ChcrЬo1.1rg compla.ins а1ющ i1uнl[icient equtpшcnt. Evidtncc о( putisan activities. in Fr.шcc, .Ex.tncu from soldicl'$' diaric:s;. Order re leadeцhip and mon]� and ooшнering enemy prop-

aganda.

Order re "corner !ог tl1e FUЬ:rer i11 troop qua.rters." \Vt.hлnacht pampttlc:-t tt:lling soldien "wl1y tltey have 10 fight." Сспп:щ soldicn on bun'kc:n. Deacc rorciog Frcncl1 civili:11n popt1l:нion to repa.ir commt1niatio1u. Order re food Gernш.n uniu are allo"'·td to 1юу in Francc. Sccuring of cl.i.мificd шзtc:ri:11 i11 th,c: c:,•ent о( с:11СШ)' ан.асk.. {;(rn\211 unit with по teleph 0 . 11c: comniuni�tion o"''ing to lack or "-'ire. DtunJt.en Gt-tn,a.11 soldiers (le.ttroy Frent'l1 r�1rnit1.1re, e-tc. Patttm о{ №zi ideological traini11g i11 tlie Ar1ny. Ordc:r rcv�li11g mctbod or sprcading Jcзll( Shortagn rcv�1cd in various 61n, ""\\1hat зrс wr tighti11g fог?" Вооk in pгcpaг.ation. lntentional optimi$.m Ьу ."-uloc.\:. Decline or dilcipline fп S S . PerюnaI Ьclonging:5 о ( \:ШN solsycl1ological \Varlarc it is .i. funda,nental principle not to antagonizc thc audicnc.e. Dircct dcnunciation or dircct ofJcncc ag:ainst kno¼'n susccptibliities will therelorc � a\·oided in all Piychological \V:irfare againsl the епеmу armed fora:s-. Оп 1hc othcr hand, 1101hiпg: "'ili Ъе do11c to enrou.rage or co11done the co11ctpt о[ G,r.r111.a.n тnilitarism a.nd thc attiшdcs of mind Ьehind it, Ьoth of v,·hich "-'С ап- plcdgcd to dcstroy. 5. Piycho!ogic:a.J ,v , arfarc is not .а magic suЬ:stiшtc for physical Ь::шlе, but an at1xili:11ry· to it. . Ву att.1,c.lti11g thc fighting morate of the e11einy, it aimt ,1.1: (.-) redщ;:i:1,g t11e cost ol й�е ph ysic.11 battle, a1\d (Ь) rtndering 1.!1е cnemy taiier to l.lil.шllt afttr s11rr�nder •

*·

..,

.,

" ;J

SYKEWA.Jt.

б. 'fhc сопdщ:t of Psycho1ogka1 \\ranare thcrc!orc {omu pan of thc condua of mШt.1,ry opcг.i.,ioos, and шu.s.t Ьt ro-ordi11a(IO wil.Ь that о{ o,hcr arnu о{ war. lt U thc task. о[ Ps)·cho1ogical \Varfart to auist tbc Supreme Commandcr in fulfiШng his miuion agairut thc rncmy '\'\'ith thc mosr «0110111tcal use of trooP5 and �uipшenL 7. The u.sc of Psy(;hologi�I \Var[a.re i11 01il.itary ope:r2.1ioщ: ШU$t however Ьс stricti)' ,t,uЬordioated 10 the long·terr,1 policy or ou.r Go\•erninentt. in the $C'1iie that nothing 11\ust Ьt done with thc obj�t of undetmining fightiлg mогз.lе duriлg ope:rations ,�·Ысh "'ould prcjudicc Со\•с.rшщ·пt policy to Gcrmany aftcr thc war. То th.is cnd, this St3nding Directive for Psydiologica.l \\7a.rfare during operatiOn.$ i5 preceded Ьу а summary о{ standi11g high•policy direc­ ti\'eJ, 8. Тhск high-policy directivcs dehnc not thc stпtCg)' of thc campaign which Ps)·chologic�l \Varfa� will ronduct зgainst Ccr­ m:ш f1ghting mor:ile, but thc limits "''it.hi11 which it must, !or pofiq rc:uons, Ье conf'incd, SТANJ;JINC НICH-fOJ..ICY DLRECТIVES 9. No spccific promis.:s \o!'lll Ьс mзdc- co11oerning thc tn:atmen1 о! Gcrm,:iiny :.ftcr t.he "'':.r, othcr 1tian those expreмly 1щdс Ьу �\'trnro.tnt ip6kttn\�n. lo J):lftitultr thtrt мшt Ьt м, !�tion that tht ЛtJa.11r.ic Cha.rtcr аррНе1 to Gc-лnany Ьу right. 10. On по account must thcre Ьс any iuggcsti:on or impli'-1tion:­ (a) that "'с m::ognizc any claiin о{ t.hc Cc-:nnan Агmу to Ьс aЬ­ sol\'cd from its full sharc of raponsibllity for Сслnап aggтcs­ Non оп thc groun,Js th•н its part i.s mcrc]y pro!�ional зnd nonpolitical and th,at it docs 110 more th:щ оЬеу ordcn;

(Ь) that wc rccog11izt thc possibllity о( diYorcing tJ1c ""fighting

war·· lrom ilic atrocitics \\'hich thc Cc-rman юldicr h:u com­ mi11cd or condoned, c:.g.• thc taking зnd shooting of host2g'C.5 :шd tlJc murdcr of priюners: (с) th.at "''с: would Ьс prcparcd to aHow Gcnnan mi1itarisш to sur­ vi\·e in :1.ny rorm. 11. Т!1с follo"''i1�g are thc poinu оп whid\ щ1r Go,•ernme.o� l)avt cominitted t.httl'lкlve:s; (а) Dcmilitarization о( �nnany. (Ь) Pu11Lt.h1ne11t о( war crimin:ils.. (с) Li�ntio11 о{ tt:rritories ovcrru11 Ьу NШ Сетшаnу, ir1cluding Aшtria. (4) Occupa1ion of Сеrщапу. (е) Destruc-tion or Nui1m and Cerman MЩtarism.

,oog

ТНЕ SYKEWAR POLICI.ES (t) Ptt�ntion of such �onomic dist� in Сt'пnапу as wШ Ьt=: dctrimcnt:i.l to 1hc rn[ ol 1hc world. (g) Ul1imate �toration ol Germany 10 а place "in the world bmily о( demattatic niltiona," Thc lt.cy quotation, on thc,e роi1щ .irc given in AnneJ[c 1. Note th;ц (d), {f) ar,d (g) are 01\ly genet:al rom1\litrnenu, and тау not Ье el.i.ЬontM in 1'ycho1ogir.1.I \\li1.rfart" unltss and unt.il ap«ific G,m•. erntnc:nt atatemcnt.s а� Гorthcoming on thcs.c: point.s. APPRECLATJON OF STRENCTH AND WEЛKNESS OF C.ERMAN FICНТINC MORALE \VITH SPF.C!A!, REFER· ENCE ТО PSYCHOLOC!CAL \VARFARE Notr: Exccpt v.·here spe-cifica11y 5ш�. the following genenliu­ tions :ippl)· to thc Cttmany Army, not to the Air Foroe: or Nary. 1 t. Stro,,g Points (t) Th� Ha blt of Discipline, Тhе hablt of uncritic:al oЬcdi­

cncc to authority, гзthcr th:щ any nнhlc:ss cnforccmi:nt or di:w:iplinc rron1 аЬо '\'С, rcm.ains thc �trongc,t ractor in Cerm�ш morale t(Кlay. This r,юor may 1101 decrease shэ.rply 11ntil the Cenn;ш Лrшу м а v.·hole is broken оп 1.he b:шlcfield, since t.hc re1rc:lt! :шd de(ensive b:шles to whicl:I the \Vchrm:н:ht i, now rommi11ed :шtoooa1i­ caHy pface grtater relia.nce on ЬiяЬеr aLн.J1ori1y than offcnsive campaigns of the 1940 type.

(11) Comradtsltip, The idea1 of comr:adeship ha.s Ьееn keenly culti\·attd in t.he Cer,nan Amay, partitu1arly 5in« 19��· The Ce:nna11 NCO fornu а tr.an,itional sta� Ьс�·ссn юldjc.r st:;itw and oflic-c.r statш, а fact which J.tl'engthc:ns this кпsс: or comrзde\hip. Jt h::1s further­ more Ьссп irпmemcly decpc:ned Ь)' the R11ssia.n cam­ palgn. (111) Proftssionлt Pridt. Thc :;ivcra� Gcnnan·s convlct.ion tha1 1he lн-st liГe is the soldier's life, p1w the &Ocial fact that 1J1e bighest caШng in Ceпn.tny i1 the .юld.itt's ca.11ing. constitutcз а gre:at .юuке of нrength. Addcd to t.his thc. Gc.nn:ш soldic:r. and often thc non­ Gcrm.:щ soldicr scn•ing i.n th e: \\rehrmзcht, is con­ vinced:(а) that he is privil�d to Ье к-rving in the fine,t апnу in thc. world, pennc.atcd "·ith а code: of юJ­ dicrly honor wblch rulcs him and his officers al.i!r.e;

SYX!:WAR

(Ь) that the Weh.nnacht is thc= emЬodimcnt of thc high­ at physie2I :ind spiritual attainments of Gc:rman culture; (с) that tl1e \\'ehnnat:ht is thttefoтe the nonpolitical gua.nli:in of Lhc future of thc Gttnun п.се; (d) that, a..s а бghting mac.hine, Cerm.an ··quality" ean probafJly s.ucceed io UU'Owing back. Ьoth Anglo­ Amcrican and Russi..t1) "qu.a.,нity," (IV) ltfalnitJl t,11e.re.,1.s. The Germ.i.n Лтmу reprt5ents, (or the rtas.ons s.tattd in subparagr. (111) аЬо\•е, an honored carffr ,...·ith con.sideraЫe materi.il �nefits. (Рау allow­ a.na=s and cspccially food :tN: good comparcd with civil­ ian щi:ndard.$ iн Cermany.) Тhо\1$ащЬ of officen (especially tlн>Se о( junior and fit'ld �nk) and te,u о( thousands о( NCO's (pэ.rticularly in s:pecl,1list tr.idn) h.a\-"t' signed оп not simply fQr the duration, but for pcriods vз.rying fron1 j·14 yea.rs, or longc,r, and arc light• ing not only to pn:servc the German Army as а war m.achine, but as а n1eans о( li"·elihood. (V) The BolsheviA Bogty. The guilty rea.r or Russian ven� ance, Jjnked "'·it.lt tl1e Teuton dislik.e of U\e Slav and gt11tг.r.l fcar of Bo])hc,·i:.m, h.u ronYinct'd Lhc a.Ycг.r.gc �rшan soldicr th.1.t "anything is Ьевсr tha.n defea.t in the Еа.н,·· Gern,a.11 pro 1:t.1ganda ha.s deliЬttatel)' enlugtd a.ud intt-nsi.fi� tbls !ear, in the (ollo"'·ing ways:(•) lt ha, la.rgely suaeeded in ixnu1ding the юlditt chat the Angfo-Amerian1 art ю dominated Ьу tht: Вolsht".·ik Colos.sus that they would Ьr: powc:rl� to sa,·e Cerm�y. (Ь) It 1 w fШed the g:ip aeated Ьу the -iЬsenc:e о! spe­ cific Unitcd N:нion.s polic:y to Getmany with atroc:• ity stories о( (orct'd ЬЬоr in Ruиi;;a, c:utntion. depoгtation, etc. (VI) The Rew(lrdJ о/ Victory in the Wesl. l.t-am.ing (rom Мг. Churchi!I in 19 ,10, 1.he High Command ha.1 tit-li�te:17 cзpit.ilizcd the tl1rc:1t о( inva1ion Crom thc \Vct. lt has:(a) =1.rgued tfш, if th� Aoglo-An,eгicaп thrtat can Ьt frustratcd or confined, the Germar, An1Ues ал Ьt­ '"''itchcd to t.he WL ТЫ, argument hз.,. Ь«n w.td to justify the retrtata iл the .East, а

,0090

ТН& S\'KE\o/A.R POLIC1ES (Ь) 3rgued tha1 3 dc:(c-mivc- ,-•ictoгy iп thc- \Vest ,,,.,ш fonn thc- basis for thc spccdy conclщion or а ··com· proшise рсасс:"' cithcr "'ith thc \\7e$t от with thc .E.ut, wblcl1 wot11d in ract Ье а Gen11a.n victory. (с) aploit«I thc Ьontblng о( Gerrnany to pe.nuade tl1c юldier th3! his only hopc- of rq;a.ining wh3t hC' has lost Jies iп 2 Gen)1an vi(tOI') ' in thc \\ 1est. (d) succeeded i11 0011vincing t.he Genna.n юldier that for these re;1so1is one 1.ut 1reme11dous e&:ort mщt and сап 1х madC'. (VII) Summary (а) Tak.en Ьу and l:r.rgc, it mшt Ье ::tcccpted that thc­ �rrщn Н i.gh Command has n:ndcred Цн: Army largtiy iт,ошн: to tl1e 113ganda," ,шd dots поt offe11d thar sense of "soldicrly hQпor:· Unconsciously 1tШ, but ac­ tively, tbe Cerшan юldicr cn,·cs ror an схсuк to stop the 11�!� slaщ;bter whic·h lcaves his honor as а Gcnnan soldic:r umcathed, and pнts the Ыаmе on somconc or юmcthing ouuide the \Vehnnaclн. Не nсСЩ, in bricJ: (1) f:icts, "'•hich s�m to bim to Ье objectivc, showi11g; Фзt, (l(Spitc the цшr:igc of the \Vehrmacht, Ю111001'е at homc bas lои che war for Genoaпy; (11) а picн1rt or the futute wh.ich portrays de:ath ;шd de.struction {or "tlte Ьeu-aytrS ol Cc::rmany" апd и1гvival for thc �пш1п реор)е. Evidencc for the зЬо\'С- :щ:il)1,is is proYidcd Ьу 1he gto"'ing succm of: (а) frte Gennan Committec broadc::tш froш Moscow, l1.raded Ьу �nenl Sey· dliu. and (Ь) Radio CaJ.ais. Вoth th� tnnsшissioru sccm tQ assumc- an :inalysis of Gcnnan fighting monfc .simil:ir 10 thзt аЬо,•с.

(d) Douhts abaut the Lu/tumfle. Moтcover, Ше Air JVar

brings witJ, it а c:ause or friction Ьetween tl.\e Air Fortt: and tl1e Ann)', Gc-nnan юJditn .а� �n­ ning to ulk. lik.c rnany Briblh юldicn in 1940. This friciion, and thc тcщl1ing Ыаn1е оп '"the ;:authori­ tiC$" is а re.-J ir minor chink in Germ:1n fig:h1ing morale. АН thtst f.icton are important, i11 that the:y pтo­ vidc the юldieт "•ith scзpcgo:нs for his dcclinc in fortunc, and "'htn 1h.ing, go "Wrong the Gcrm:in'1 щнurа .1 reaction is: "l have �n Ьe:tra)· ed." (Н) /tlanpourer, Тhis is pcтhaps thc main oper-ationaf \\'оrту о{ thc Ccmun soldicr. Нс is disturЬcd Ьу thc cnor­ "'hich he kno"·s the mous loыcs in шсn and mнerial : Ьал1еs in Rшsia t1a\·t cost tlle: \Vtbnnacht. Тhis un­ easineu is heightcn«=d Ьу thc: AJtied pmpagandз ba.rт.agc on th.is thcrш:, con1.rastcd "''ith thc silcncc of hi.s own aul.horitic:s, а silcnce all the шоrе signiЛcant when it

,t Jь r. 1

SYKr:\VAR репiш e\'en under thc:: ncw OK\V poliq of ,imulating c:oшplete frankлeu on opent:.ion:il matttn. Thi1 gtnenl manpowe.r worтy brea.b down inю other specific оо�: (а) The WОП')' that, Ьссаwе of manpo\\·er trouЫn, tЬt r.шks о( the \Vehnn:icht are Ьcing incn:uing1y fi.11td with forcignen of ю1)tС l"'enty n.ation::lliues, and that thc quality of the a.rmy is Llterefore i n d.a1:1cger о( "pollшion." (Ь) The \\'01'1')' that, wit.h almost n>try one о( its бе1d d.i,•Uio11f committed a)ready to actuat or pote.ntUI baнle-fitld.s, the German Army has no cffcctive cen· t.r:il raerve to 1us.tain it. Вoth (it) .i.1)d (Ь) аtю,·е арр!у \\·ith ·particular forcc to the u.rget of this paper-tbe Cernu:n forccs i n the \Vat. These troops l1эvt ir1 thefr own forщ:нioo,. l:;irge numЬus of foreign en; a..nd m0&t of tl1ese di,·isiotU have h:,d proof, Ьу their own expcrien« о{ Ьc-ing 5\\'itdiW frorn \\'est to F.ut �шd back, that по uncommiш:d ct:n­ tral resen •e exisu. The �:н volumc: ol Cc:rman countcc· propa�randa 011 this point is funber evidc::nce ol its importancc. (III) А War Со11е JJ1ro11g. ln buildiлg up thc picture of the c:hi..,aJro ш \Vc:hrmacht in deadl'y Ь;щJе against Воl· $hcvisш, the High Comшand inevitaЫy r.aise1 in the Gcrшan ю1(1icr', mind thc qucstion why Gennany i.� Гtghting 'Srit;ajn a11d Amcric:a, cspccially 1ince Hitle:r de1 '101111