Proverbs Volume II: Proverbs 10-15: Volume 0 (Historical Commentary on the Old Testament) [1 ed.] 9042948388, 9789042948389

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION

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HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

PROVERBS VOLUME II Proverbs 10-15 by James Alfred Loader

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT *** PROVERBS VOLUME II PROVERBS 10-15

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

Editorial team: Carly Crouch (Nijmegen, The Netherlands) Bénédicte Lemmelijn (Leuven, Belgium) Gert T.M. Prinsloo (Pretoria, South Africa) Klaas Spronk (Amsterdam, The Netherlands) Wilfred G.E. Watson (Newcastle, UK)

PROVERBS VOLUME II PROVERBS 10-15

by James Alfred Loader

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – WALPOLE, MA 2022

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Cover design by Dick Prins. ISBN 978-90-429-4838-9 eISBN 978-90-429-4839-6 D/2022/0602/84 © 2022 — Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

CONTENTS

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VII

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IX

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

XV

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §1. Using the Commentary: Practical Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §2. The Structure of the Book and the Question of Proverb Groups. 2.1 The Main Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Single Sayings or Proverb Groups?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 The Sentence Literature as Independent Sayings . . . 2.2.2 Proverb Groups in the Sentence Literature . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 A Two-sided Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §3. Line, Parallelism and Rhythm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Line (= Stich) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Parallelism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Rhythm and Metre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §4. The Date and Social Setting of the Book and its Diversified Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §5. The Order of the Masoretic Text and the Versions . . . . . . . . . . . §6. The Relevance of Proverbs: Theological and Ethical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §7. Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §7.1 Virtue between Command and Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2 Proverbs as a Handbook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.3 Education in Different Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §7.2 Learning in the Indicative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 The Imperative, the Indicative, and Life-setting . . . 7.2.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §7.3 Metaphorical and Literal Readings of Aphorisms in Proverbs 7.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Evidence from the Textual Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 4 5 6 7 13 21 24 24 26 29 31 35 35 39 40 40 41 44 56 57 57 58 64 65 65 66 74

VI

Contents COMMENTARY

THE SECOND PART OF THE BOOK OF PROVERBS PROVERBS 10:1–22:16* ESSENTIALS AND PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

CHAPTER 10

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Translation and Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85 85

CHAPTER 11

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Translation and Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

206 210

CHAPTER 12

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Translation and Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

315 320

CHAPTER 13

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Translation and Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

410 413

CHAPTER 14

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Translation and Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

490 494

CHAPTER 15

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Translation and Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

584 588

INDEX OF AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

663

INDEX OF RABBINIC AND PATRISTIC SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

671

* This volume of the commentary covers half of the Second Part of the Book of Proverbs (10:1–15:33). The other half will open the next volume of the Proverbs commentary in HCOT, beginning at 16:1.

PREFACE

In the preface to Proverbs 1-9, which is the first volume of this commentary on the biblical book also known by its Hebrew title of Mishle, I made a number of remarks that also hold good for the second volume under the title of Proverbs 10-15. Among those are the questions regarding the justification for another commentary on the Book of Proverbs, a matter that does not need to be discussed in a second volume of the same commentary. An issue that does bear pointing out in the preface of a second volume, is the demands made on the author of a commentary in which the short sayings beginning at Chapter 10 are concerned. The short sayings need to be treated along the same lines that govern all the volumes in the series Historical Commentary on the Old Testament. • The Hebrew text is first translated, followed by short observations under the following headings: • “Essentials and Perspectives” that are intended to offer readers a general orientation to the pericopes to be commented on. • In the design of the series that is followed by an “Introduction to the Exegesis,” which was identified as “Exposition I” in the first Proverbs volume. • Last follows the detailed exegesis, previously under the title “Exposition II,” which contains the mainstay of the commentary. • The first two of these are also provided with a short literature list relevant for that specific section. I have followed this pattern as closely as possible in the first volume of the commentary, which could be done because it was concerned with the extended texts making up the poems found in Chapters 1-9. But in the present volume such a strict organisation is not possible. Here we have to do with single sayings, each requiring its own interpretation in terms of form and content, that is, cum grano salis, like miniature chapters in their own right.1 It stands to reason that each cannot be treated as though it were a full chapter, each containing the paragraph headings suited for extended texts. But I have tried to attend to the issues required by the series Historical Commentary on the Old Testament, and to do so in a way suitable for the treatment of short sayings. 1

This remains true despite the fact that some have been edited together to form what has come to be called “clusters.” My view on interpreting short proverbs in their own right while allowing for the existence of groupings and pairs is set out in the Introduction and will be obvious throughout the commentary.

VIII

Preface

This volume has been a long time in coming, somewhat like the first one – and to a not inconsiderable degree for similar reasons. I sincerely hope the third volume will not follow the same pattern. That simply won’t do, even if I no longer have the luxury of assistants whom I would have liked to thank again, such as Frau Katja Bachl, Frau Helene Lechner, Frau Esther Scheuchl, Herr Björn Bergh, Frau Nayomi Lara Keller or Herr Ferenc Susmaier. At the end of this stage, I nevertheless express words of gratitude. First, to the editor of the series Historical Commentary on the Old Testament, who yet again showed the patience and understanding I thanked him for in the preface to the first volume – and to whom I owe the same appreciation, but to a heightened degree. To Dr Margot von Beck, who did the page editing and always showed concern for my personal wellbeing. To my family, especially my wife, who supported me during the continued difficult time of writing not only this volume, but also her own book. Special thanks to our little dog, who lay on my feet under the desk when there was nobody else at home. That provided the warmth indispensible for work in the Alpine cold. Finally, it seems that Qohelet was wrong – producing books does come to an end, at least for individuals. In my case, whether I get to the end of Volume III or whether I don’t. I would like to dedicate this volume to Professor Jurie le Roux, in gratitude for having learnt much more from him than he will ever realise. Vienna, as autumn encroaches on the last rose of summer, 2021

ABBREVIATIONS

AB AEL AJBI AJSL AnBib ANE ANEM ANET

ANF AnOr AOTC ArTh ArOr AS ATD AThANT AuS BASOR BBRS BDB BEThL BHQ BHS BHTh BIFAO Bib et Or Bibl BINS BK BOT BS BSOAS BTh BThZ BWANT BZAW

The Anchor Bible Lichtheim, M., Ancient Egyptian Literature I-III, Berkeley 1973-1980 Annual of the Japanese Biblical Institute American Journal for the Study of Religion Analecta Biblica ancient Near East Ancient Near East Monographs Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, ed. J.B. Pritchard, Princeton 1955; Supplements: The Ancient Near East. Supplementary Texts and Pictures Relating to the Old Testament, Consisting of Supplementary Materials for The Ancient Near East in Pictures and Ancient Near Eastern Texts, ed. J.B. Pritchard, Princeton 1969 (page numbering continuous) The Ante-Nicene Fathers Analecta Orientalia Abingdon Old Testament Commentaries Arbeiten zur Theologie Archiv Orientálni Acta Sumerologica Das Alte Testament Deutsch Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina I-VII, by G. Dalman, Hildesheim 1964 [Gütersloh 1928ff.] Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research Bulletin for Biblical Research Supplements Brown, F., Driver, S.R. & Briggs, C.A., Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. With an Appendix Containing the Biblical Aramaic, Oxford 1966 Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium Biblia Hebraica Quinta, Part 17, ed. J. de Waard, Stuttgart 2008 Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, Part 12, ed. J. Fichtner, Stuttgart 1974 Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale Biblica et Orientalia Biblica Biblical Interpretation Series Biblischer Kommentar De Boeken van het Oude Testament Biblische Studien Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies Biblical Theology Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft

X CBM CBOT CBET CBQ CBQMS CL CM COS CTA EE EHLL EJ ETL EvTh FAT FB FCB FThSt FZPhTh GKC GTJ HALOT HAT HAW HSAT HCOT HdO HS HSAT HSM HTS HUCA IBHS IBT Inst Int ICC IEJ JAAR

Abbreviations Chester Beatty Monographs Coniectanea Biblica, Old Testament Series Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology Catholic Biblical Quarterly Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series Cognitive Linguistics Cuneiform monographs The Context of Scripture I-IV, ed. W.W. Hallo & K.L. Younger, Leiden 2002-2016 Corpus des tablettes cunéiformes alphabétiques découvertes à Ras Shamra-Ugarit, en 1929 à 1939, ed. A. Herdner, Paris 1963 M.V. Fox (ed.), Proverbs. An Eclectic Edition with Introduction and Textual Commentary (The Hebrew Bible: A Critical Edition No. 1), Atlanta 2015 Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics I-IV, Leiden & Boston 2013 Encyclopaedia Judaica I-XXII, 2nd Edition, New York, London 2007 Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses Evangelische Theologie Forschungen zum Alten Testament Forschung zur Bibel The Feminist Companion to the Bible Freiburger Theologische Studien Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar as edited and enlarged by the late E. Kautzsch, 2nd English Edition by A.E. Cowley, Oxford 1910-1966 Grace Theological Journal The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament by L. Köhler & W. Baumgartner, Leiden 2002 (unabridged two-volume version of the five-volume Third Edition of KBL) Handbuch zum Alten Testament Hebräisches und aramäisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament by E. König, Leipzig Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments, ed. E. Kautzsch et al., 18941923 Historical Commentary on the Old Testament Handbuch der Orientalistik / Handbook of Oriental Studies Hebrew Studies Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments Harvard Semitic Monographs HTS Theological Studies Hebrew Union College Annual An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, by B.K. Waltke & M.P. O’Connor, Winona Lake 1990 Interpreting Biblical Texts Institutio Christianae religionis by John Calvin, Genève 1559 Interpretation. A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching The International Critical Commentary Israel Exploration Journal Journal of the American Academy of Religion

Abbreviations JAOS JBL JETS JHNES JNSL JPSV JQR JR JSem JSOT JSOTSup JSQ JSS JTS KAHAL KAI KBL KCAT KeHAT KHCAT KTU LAI Leš LTh LUÅ MPG MPL NAB NCBC NEB NIB NIDB NICOT NIV NKJ NPNF NRSV NTS NZSTh OBO OEBE OLP

XI

Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of Biblical Literature Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society Johns Hopkins Near Eastern Studies Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages Jewish Publication Society Version Jewish Quarterly Review The Journal of Religion Journal for Semitics Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series Jewish Studies Quarterly Journal of Semitic Studies Journal of Theological Studies Konzise und aktualisierte Ausgabe des Hebräischen und Aramäischen Lexikons zum Alten Testament, ed. W. Dietrich & S. Arnet, Leiden & Boston 2013 Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften, ed. H. Donner et al, Wiesbaden 1962-1969 Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros, by L. Köhler & W. Baumgartner, Leiden 1958 Kurzgefaßter Commentar zum Alten Testament Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament Die keilalphabetischen Texte aus Ugarit, ed. M. Dietrich et al., Neukirchen-Vluyn 1976 Library of Ancient Israel Lešonēnu Literature and Theology Lunds Universitets Årsskrift Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1844-1864 Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1857-1866 The New American Bible The New Century Bible Commentary Die Neue Echter Bibel The New Interpreter’s Bible The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible The New International Commentary on the Old Testament New International Version New King James Version The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers New Revised Standard Version New Testament Studies Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Ethics, ed. R.L. Brawley, Oxford & New York 2014 Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica

XII OLZ OTE OTL OTP OTS OTWSA PNWCJS POT PSAT PTh RB RDLW REB RES RGG4 RTB SANT SAT SBLDS SBS SBEC SBT SEL Sem Str-B SJSJ SNT SPSM SUNT SuR SVT TANZ THAT THOTC ThW ThWAT ThWNT TThZ TynB UCOIP UET UF UTB

Abbreviations Orientalistische Literaturzeitung Old Testament Essays Old Testament Library Old Testament Pseudepigrapha I-II, Garden City 1985 Oudtestamentische Studiën Journal of Die Ou-Testamentiese Werkgemeenskap in Suid-Afrika Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies De Prediking van het Oude Testament Poetologische Studien zum Alten Testament Pastoraltheologie Revue Biblique Reallexikon der Deutschen Literaturwissenschaft, ed. K. Weimar et al., Berlin 1997-2007 Revised English Bible Revue des Études Sémitiques Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 4. Auflage, ed. H.D. Betz et al., Tübingen 1997-2007 Religionsgeschichtliches Textbuch zum Alten Testament, ed. E. Beyerlin, Berlin 1978 Studien zu Alten und Neuen Testament Die Schriften des Alten Testaments The Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series Stuttgarter Bibelstudien Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity Studies in Biblical Theology Studi Epigrafici e Linguistici Semitics Strack, H.L. & Billerbeck, P., Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch I-VI, München [1926-1961] 1965 Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism Supplements to Novum Testamentum Studia Pohl, Series Major Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments Spätmittelalter und Reformation Supplements to Vetus Testamentum Texte und Arbeiten zum Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament, ed. E. Jenni & C. Westermann, München & Zürich 1971-1984 The Two Horizons Old Testament Commentary Theologische Wissenschaft Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament, ed. J. Botterweck, H. Ringgren & H.-J. Fabry, Stuttgart e.a. 1973-1995 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. G. Kittel & G. Friedrich, Stuttgart 1933-1969 Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift Tyndale Bulletin The University of Chicago Oriental Institute Publications Ur Excavations: Texts Ugarit-Forschungen Uni Taschenbücher

Abbreviations VeE VT VTS VWGTh WAS WBC WCG WdF WiBiLex WJTh WMANT WUNT WZKM YJS ZÄS ZAW ZDMG ZRG ZThK

XIII Verbum et Ecclesia Vetus Testamentum Supplements to Vetus Testamentum Veröffentlichungen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie Wiener alttestamentliche Studien Word Biblical Commentary Wisdom fragments from the Cairo Geniza Wege der Forschung Das wissenschaftliche Bibellexikon im Internet Wiener Jahrbuch für Theologie Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes Yale Judaica Series Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche

RABBINIC ACRONYMS Bahya Gerondi Hame’iri Mezudat David Malbim Nahmias Radaq Ralbag Ramaq Rambam Rashi Riyqam Saadia Vilna Gaon

Bahya ben Asher ibn Halawa (1255-1340) Yonah Gerondi (1180-1263) Menachem b. Shelomo Hame’iri (c. 1249-1316) Commentary by David Altschuler (18th century) Meir Loeb b. Yechiel Michael (= Meir Löw, 1809-1879) Yosef ben Yosef Nahmias (14th century) David Kimhi (c. 1160-1235) Levi b. Gershom (= Gersonides, 1288-1344) Moshe Kimhi (= Remak, c. 1190) Moshe ben Maimon (= Maimonides, c. 1135-1204) Shelomo b. Isaak (1040-1105) Yosef Kimhi (c. 1105-1170) Saadia ben Joseph Gaon (882-942) Eliyahu b. Shelomo Zalman (= Gra, 1720-1797)

NOTE ON RABBINIC AND PRE-CRITICAL CHRISTIAN SOURCES For the traditional rabbinic commentaries referred to in the text by the authors’s name, I have mainly made use of the annotated ‫ מקראות גדולות‬edition of ‫ משלי‬by A.J. Rosenberg ([1988] 2001), which also reflects consultation of the Rashi editions of Salonica (1515), Vilna (1839), and Warsaw (1862-1866). For the ‫ משלי‬Commentary of Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, I have used the Oxford edition by S.R. Driver (1880), and for the ‫ פירוש על ספר משלי‬by Yosef Nahmias, the Berlin edition by M.L. Bamberger and S. Poznanski (1911). I have often consulted the compendium of rabbinic comments

XIV

Abbreviations

on the Hebrew text of Proverbs, translated with notes by E. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009) and E. Ginsburg & Y. Weinberger (2007). For the early Christian use of the Book of Proverbs, I used MPG and MPL (respectively Greek and Latin), with regular references to the more accessible series ANF and NPNF (English translation). Additionally, I am indebted to the essays in R.E. Murphy’s collection of studies on medieval exegesis of wisdom literature by Beryl Smalley (1986 [actually 1987]). For the Proverbs commentary by John Chrysostom, I have also consulted the translated edition with helpful notes by R.C. Hill (2006). Finally, J.M. Gohl’s fine work on the Proverbs Scholia by Evagrius of Pontus (Gohl 2017), which only became available after the publication of Vol. I of this commentary, was valuable to access the views of the monk of the Nitrian desert. In the form of scholia, that is, not a running commentary but interpretative notes on proverbs in their own right, it leaves many proverbs untreated, which also suited the work of Melanchthon more than a millennium later. Gohl provides each scholion number, followed by the Septuagint text, then Evagrius’s scholia in Greek and then Gohl’s own translation of the latter. In the absence of Proverbs commentaries by either Luther or Calvin, the sustained attention to the Book of Proverbs by Philipp Melanchthon, a close associate of Luther, is all the more prominent. Of the four editions of his explication of the book (1524, 1529, 1531 and 1550 – all revised repeatedly), I used the 1550 version. As the main source for references to Calvin’s use of the Book of Proverbs, I used his opus magnum, the Institutio Christianae Religionis (Institutes of the Christian Religion). See the List of Abbreviations and the Bibliography for further particulars, where applicable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albright, W.F. Alonso-Schökel, L. Alster, B.

Alter, R. ––– Ansberry, C.B. Anthonioz, S.

Arzt, M. Attridge, H.W.

Avishur, Y. Baron, S.W. Barrett, C.K. Barr, J. Barucq, A. Bauks, M. Beckman, J.C. Becker, J. Behnke, P. Ben Zvi, E.

[1955] 1969. “Some Canaanite-Phoenician Sources of Hebrew Wisdom,” SVT 3, 1-15. 1982. “‫ ישר‬jāšar III,” ThWAT III, 161-169. 1996. “Literary Aspects of Sumerian and Akkadian Proverbs,” in M.E. Vogelzang, & H.L.J. Vanstiphout, (eds), Mesopotamian Poetic Language: Sumerian and Akkadian (CM 6), 1-21. Groningen, 1-21. [1985] 2011. The Art of Biblical Poetry, New York. 2010. The Wisdom Books. Job, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. A Translation with Commentary, New York & London. 2011. Be Wise, my Son, and make my Heart Glad: An Exploration of the Courtly Nature of the Book of Proverbs (BZAW 422). 2014. “Water(s) of Abundance in the Ancient Near East and in Hebrew Bible Texts: A Sign of Kinship,” in E. Ben Zvi, & C. Levin, (eds), Thinking of water in the early Second Temple period (BZAW 461), Berlin, 4168. 1953. “The Teacher in Talmud and Midrash,” in M. Davis (ed.), Mordecai M. Kaplan. Jubilee Volume on the Occasion ofhis Seventieth Birthday, New York, 35-47. 2006. “The Cubist Principle in Johannine Imagery: John and the Reading of Images in Contemporary Platonism,” in J. Frey, J.G. van der Watt, & R. Zimmermann, (eds), Imagery in the Gospel of John. Terms Forms, Themes, and Theology of Johannine Figurative Language (WUNT 200), Tübingen, 47-60. 1971-1972. “Pairs of Synonymous Words in the Construct State (and in Appositional Hendiadys)”, Sem 2, 17-81. 1972. Ancient and Medieval Jewish History, New Brunswick. [1955] 1967. The Gospel according to John. An introduction with commentary and notes on the Greek Text, London. 1962. Biblical Words for Time (SBT), London. 1975. “Ba’areṣ–Molis: Prov. XI.31, I. Pet. IV.18,” JSS 20, 149-164. 1964, Le Livre des Proverbes, Paris. 2015. “Erkenntnis und Leben in Gen 2-3. Zum Wandel eines ursprünglich weisheitlich geprägten Lebensbegriffs,” ZAW 127, 20-42. 2013. “Concessive Clause: Biblical Hebrew,” EHLL I, 537-540. 1965. Gottesfurcht im Alten Testament (AnBib 25), Rome. 1896. “Spr. 10,1. 25,1,” ZAW 16, 122. 2014. “Thinking of Water in Late Persian/Early Hellenistic Judah: An Exploration,” in E. Ben Zvi & C. Levin,

XVI

Berger, K. ––– ––– Berlin, A. Bertheau, E. Bickell, G. ––– Black, J.A., Cunningham, G., et al. (eds) Bonhoeffer, D. Borowski, O. Boström, G. Boström, L. Brenner, A. Bretzke, J.T. Brewer, D.

Brewer, D.J. & Teeter, E. Broshi, M. & Finkelstein, I. Brown, W.P. ––– –––

Bibliography (eds), Thinking of Water in the Early Second Temple Period (BZAW 461), Berlin, 1128. 1989. Die Weisheitsschrift aus der Kairoer Geniza. [Erstedition, Kommentar und Übersetzung] (TANZ 1), Tübingen. 1990. “Die Bedeutung der wiederentdeckten Weisheitsschrift aus der Kairoer Geniza für das Neue Testament,” NTS 36, 415-430. 1991. “Die Bedeutung der wiederentdeckten Weisheitsschrift aus der Kairoer Geniza für das Alte Testament,” ZAW 103, 113-121. [1985] 2008. The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism (Revised and Expanded Edition), Grand Rapids & Cambridge. [1847] 1883. Die Sprüche Salomo’s (KeHAT), Leipzig. [The second edition of 1883 revised by E. Nowack frequently differs from the first by Bertheau]. 1880. “Die hebräische Metrik,” ZDMG 34, 557-638. 1891. “Kritische Bearbeitung der Proverbien,” WZKM 5, 79-102; 191-214. 1998-2006. The Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature (http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk), Oxford. [1949] 1966. Ethics (ed. E. Bethge, transl. N. Horton Smith), London. 1998. Every Living Thing. Daily Use of Animals in Ancient Israel, London & Walnut Creek CA. 1928. Paronomasi i den äldre hebreiska maschalliteraturen med särskild hänsyn till Proverbia (LUÅ NF I 23/8), Lund. 1990. The God of the Sages. A Portrayal of God in the Book of Proverbs (CBOT 29), Stockholm. 1993. “Proverbs 1-9: An F Voice?,” in A. Brenner & F. van Dijk-Hemmes, (eds), On Gendering Texts, Leiden, 113-130. 2003. Consecrated Phrases. A Latin Theological Dictionary. Latin Expressions Commonly Found in Theological Writings, Collegeville, MN. 2002. “Hunting, Animal Husbandry and Diet in Ancient Egypt,” in in B.J. Collins (ed.) A History of the Animal World in the Ancient Near East (HdO 64), Leiden, Boston & Köln, 427-456. 2002. Egypt and the Egyptians, Cambrigde and Chicago. 1992. “The Population of Palestine in Iron Age II,” BASOR 287, 47-60. 1996. Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature of The Old Testament, Grand Rapids. 2014. Wisdom’s Wonder. Character, Creation and Crisis in the Bible’s Wisdom Literature, Grand Rapids & Cambridge. 1990. “The Social Significance of Solomon as a Patron of Wisdom,” in J.G. Gammie, & L.G. Perdue (eds), The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East, Winona Lake, 117-132.

Bibliography Brueggemann, W.A. Bryce, G.E. Bühlmann, W. Burkert, W. Carasik, M. Carr, D.M. Carrigan, H.L. Chaney, M.L.

Ceresco, A.R. Clements, R.E. Clifford, R.J. ––– Coleman, S.M. Collins, B.J.

––– (ed.) ––– ––– Collins, T. Conybeare, F.C., Rendel Harris, J., & Smith Lewis, A.

XVII 1992. “Bodied Faith and the Body Politic,” in id. and P.D. Miller (ed.), Old Testament Theology. Essays on Structure, Theme, and Text, Minneapolis, 67-94. 1972. “Another Wisdom-‘Book’ in Proverbs,” JBL 91, 145-157. 1976. Vom rechten Reden und Schweigen: Studien zu Proverbien 10-31 (OBO 12), Freiburg. 1991. “Oriental Symposia: Contrasts and Parallels,” in W.J. Slater (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context, Ann Arbor, 7-24. 2000. “The Limits of Omniscience,” JBL 119, 221-232. 2011. The Formation of the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction, New York. 2010. Ascent of Mount Carmel – John of the Cross, Brewster, MA. 2014. “The Political Economy of Peasant Poverty. What the Eighth-Century Prophets Presumed but Did Not State,” in R.A. Simkins & T.M. Kelly, (eds), The Bible, the Economy and the Poor (RLSS 10), Omaha, 34-60. 1978. “The function of Chiasmus in Hebrew Poetry, CBQ 40, 1-10. 1996. “The Concept of Abomination in Proverbs,” in M.V. Fox et al. (eds), Texts, Temples and Traditions: A Tribute to Menahem Haran, Winona Lake, 211-225. 1998. The Wisdom Literature (IBT), Nashville. 1999. Proverbs. A Commentary (OTL), Louisville, London & Leiden. 2016. The Biblical Hebrew Transitivity Alternation in Cognitive Linguistic Perspective (dissertation CUA), Washington. 2002. “Animals in Hittite Literature,” in B.J. Collins (ed.), A History of the Animal World in the Ancient Near East (HdO 64), Leiden, Boston & Köln, 237250. 2002. A History of the Animal World in the Ancient Near East (HdO 64), Leiden, Boston & Köln. 1991. Review of Berger (1989), JBL 110, 148-150. 1992. Review of Rüger (1991), JBL 111, 705-707. 1978. Line-Forms in Hebrew Poetry, SPSM 7, Rome.

1913. The story of Aḥiḳar from the Aramaic, Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, Ethiopic, Old Turkish, Greek and Slavonic Versions, Cambridge. Cook, J. 1993. “The Dating of Septuagint Proverbs,” ETL 69, 383-399. ––– 1997. The Septuagint of Proverbs. Jewish or Hellenistic Proverbs? Concerning a Hellenistic Colouring of LXX Proverbs (SVT 69), Leiden. Cotterell, P. & Turner, M. 1989. Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation. London.

XVIII Cowley, A. Craigie, P.C. Crenshaw, J.L. ––– ––– ––– Crown, A.D. Crüsemann, F. Dahood, M. ––– ––– Dalman, G. Delekat, L. Delitzsch, Franz ––– Delkurt, H. Dell, K.J. De Meulenaere, H. De Rossi, J.B. De Sales, F. D’Hamonville, D.-M. Dobbs-Allsopp, F.W. Döderlein, J.C. Dollimore, J. Donner, H.

Driver, G.R. ––– ––– –––

Bibliography [1923] 1967. Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C., Oxford. 1979. “Biblical Wisdom in the Modern World, I. Proverbs,” Crux 15, 7-9. [1981] 1986. Old Testament Wisdom – an Introduction, Atlanta. 1985. “Education in Ancient Israel,” JBL 104, 601-615. 1995. Urgent Advice and Probing Questions. Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom, Macon, GA. 1998. Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening Silence, New York. 1974. “Messengers and Scribes: The ‫ ספר‬and ‫ מלאך‬in the Old Testament,” VT 24, 366-370. 1996. The Torah. Theology and Social History of Old Testament Law, Minneapolis. 1960. “Immortality in Proverbs 12,28,” Bibl 41, 176-181. 1963. Proverbs and Northwest Semitic Philology, Rome. 1982. “The Hapax ḥārak in Proverbs 12,27,” Bibl 63, 6062. [1928–1941] 1964. Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina, I–VII, Hildesheim. 1972. “Zum ugaritischenVerbum,” UF 4, 11-26. 1874. Biblical Commentary on the Proverbs of Solomon I, II (transl. M.G. Easton), Edinburgh. 1885. Commentary on the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes (transl. M.G. Easton), Edinburgh. 1993. Ethische Einsichten in der alttestamentlichen Spruchweisheit, Neukirchen-Vluyn. 2006. The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, Cambridge. 1986. “Une famille sacerdotale thébaine,” BIFAO 86, 135142. 1798. Scholia Critica in Veteris Testamenti Libros, Parma. [1616/1884] 1997. Treatise on the Love of God. London. 2000. La Bible d’Alexandrie: Les Proverbes. Paris. 2015. On Biblical Poetry, Oxford. 1786. Sprüche Salomos [neu übersetzt mit kurzen erläuternden Anmerkungen, 3. verb. Ausg.], Nürnberg. 1998. Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, New York. 1994. “Der Spruch über Issachar (Gen. 49,14-15) als Quelle zur Frühgeschichte Israels,” in ibid., Aufsätze zum Alten Testament aus vier Jahrzehnten (BZAW 224), Berlin, 180188. 1932. “Problems in Proverbs,” ZAW 50, 141-148. 1934. “Hebrew Notes,” ZAW 52, 51-56. 1940. “Hebrew Notes on Prophets and Proverbs,” JTS 41, 162-175. 1951. “Problems in the Hebrew Text of Proverbs,” Bib 32, 173-197.

Bibliography ––– ––– Driver, S.R. (ed.) Driver, S.R Ehrlich, A.B. Ellingsen, M. Emerton, J.A. Ewald, H. Fensham, F.C. Fiddes, P.S. Fitzgerald, J.T.

Foster, B.R. Fox, M.V. ––– ––– ––– –––

––– ––– Fox, M.V. et al. (eds) ––– et al. Frankenberg, W.

XIX 1954. “Problems and Solutions,” VT 4, 223-245. 1967. “Review of A.L. Oppenheim et al., The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago Vol. IIB,” JSS 12, 105-109. 1880. A Commentary on Proverbs attributed to Abraham Ibn Ezra, Oxford. 1913. Introduction to the Old Testament, Edinburgh. [1913] 1968. Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel, VI, Hildesheim, 1983. ‘Luther as narrative exegete,’ JR 63(4), 394–431. https://doi.org/10.1086/487063 1964. “A Note on Proverbs xii.26,” ZAW 76, 191-193. 1837. Die poetischen Bücher des Alten Bundes. Vierter Theil. Sprüche Salomo’s. Kohelet. Zusätze zu den frühern Theilen und Schluss, Göttingen. 1962. “Widow, Orphan and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern Legal and Wisdom Literature,” JNES 21, 129-139. 2013. Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew Wisdom and Christian Doctrine in Late-Modern Context, Oxford 2008. “Proverbs 3:11-12, Hebrews 12:5-6, and the Tradition of Corporal Punishment,” in P. Gray & G.R. O’Day, (eds), Scripture and Traditions: Essays on Early Judaism and Christianity in Honor of Carl R. Holladay (NTS 129), Leiden & Boston, 291-318. 2002. “Animals in Mesopotamian Literature,” in B.J. Collins (ed.), A History of the Animal World in the Ancient Near East (HdO 64), Leiden, Boston & Köln, 271-288. 1994. “The Pedagogy of Proverbs,” JBL 113, 233-243. 1996. “The social location of the Book of Proverbs,” in M.V. Fox et al. (eds), Texts, temples, and traditions: A tribute to Menahem Haran, Winona Lake, 227-239. 1997. “Who Can Learn? A Dispute in Ancient Pedagogy,” in M.L. Barré (ed.), Wisdom, You Are My Sister. Festschrift for R.E. Murphy (CBQMS 29), Washington D.C., 62-77. 2000. Proverbs 1-9. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 18A), New York. 2003. Review of K.M. Heim, Like Grapes of Gold set in Silver: An Interpretation of Proverbial Clusters in Proverbs 10:1–22:16 (BZAW 272), Berlin 2001, HS 44, 267272. 2009. Proverbs 10-31. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 18B), New Haven. 2015. Proverbs. An Eclectic Edition with Introduction and Textual Commentary (The Hebrew Bible: A Critical Edition No. 1), Atlanta. 1996. Texts, temples, and traditions: A tribute to Menahem Haran, Winona Lake. 2004. “Essays on the Art of the Aphorism,” JSOT 29, 131242. 1898. Die Sprüche (HAT), Göttingen.

XX Freuling, G. ––– Fuhs, H.F. ––– Garr, W.R. Geiger, A. Gemser, B. ––– Gerstenberger, E. ––– Gese, H. Gianto, A. Ginsberg, H.L. ––– Ginsburg, E. ––– & Weinberger, Y. Glueck, N. Goering, G.S. Gohl, J.M. Golka, F.W. –––

––– ––– Goossens, L.

Gordon, R.

Bibliography 2004. “Wer eine Grube gräbt ...,” Der Tun-ErgehenZusammenhang und sein Wandel in der alttestamentlichen Weisheitsliteratur (WMANT 102), Neukirchen-Vluyn. 2008. „Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang,” WiBiLex, permanent link: https://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/stichwort/36298/ 2001a. Das Buch der Sprichwörter (FB 95), Würzburg. 2001b. Sprichwörter (NEB), Würzburg. 2004. “Hēn,” RB 111, 321-344. [1857] 1928. Urschrift und Übersetzung der Bibel, Breslau & Frankfurt am Main. 1953. “The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law” (SVT 1), Leiden, 50-66. [1937] 1963. Sprüche Salomos 2. Aufl. (HAT 16), Tübingen. 1965. Wesen und Herkunft des “apodiktischen Rechts” (WMANT 20), Neukirchen. 1984. “‫ תעב‬tcb pi. verabscheuen,” THAT II, 1051-1055. 1958. Lehre und Wirklichkeit in der alten Weisheit. Studien zu den Sprüchen Salomos und zu dem Buche Hiob, Tübingen. 1995. “A New Edition of Aramaic Texts from Egypt,” Bibl 76/1, 85-92. 1945a. “The North-Canaanite Myth of Anath and Aqhat,” I, BASOR 97, 3-10. 1945b. “The North-Canaanite Myth of Anath and Aqhat,” I, BASOR 98, 15-23. [1998] 2009. Mishlei Volume I. Chapters 1-15, New York. 2007. Mishlei Volume II. Chapters 16-31, New York. [1927] 1961. Das Wort ḥæsæd im alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauche, als menschliche und göttliche gemeinschaftsgemäße Verhaltungsweise, Gießen. 2009. Wisdom’s Root Revealed. Ben Sira and the Election of Israel (SJSJ 139), Leiden & Boston. 2017. Evagrius of Pontus, Scholia on Proverbs. Translation and Notes. 1986. “Die israelitische Weisheitsschule oder ‘des Kaisers neue Kleider’,” VT 33, 257-270. 1989a. “Die Flecken des Leoparden: Biblische und afrikanische Weisheit im Sprichwort,” in R. Albertz, F.W. Golka, & J. Kegler, (eds), Schöpfung und Befreiung: Für Claus Westermann zum 80. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 149-165. 1989b. “Die Königs- und Hofsprüche der israelitischen Weisheit,” VT 36, 13-31. 1993. The Leopard’s Spots: Biblical and African Wisdom in Proverbs, Edinburgh. 1995. “Metaphtonymy: The interaction of metaphor and metonymy in figurative expressions for linguistic action,” in L. Goossens et al. (eds), By Word of Mouth: Metaphor, Metonymy and Linguistic Action in a Cognitive Perspective. Amsterdam & Philadelphia, 159-174 (original publication in CL 1/3 [1990], 323-340). 1975. “Motivation in Proverbs,” BTh 25, 49-56.

Bibliography Gossberg, D. Graetz, H.

Green, D.A. Greenfield, J.C. ––– ––– Greenstein, E.L. Gregory, B.C. Grintz, J.M.

Hartenstein, F. & Janowski, B. Hatton, P.T.H. Hausmann, J. Healey, J.F. Heaton, E.W. Heiligenthal, R.

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XXI 1994. “Two Kinds of Sexual Relationships in the Hebrew Bible,” Hebrew Studies 35, 7-25. 1892. Emendationes in plerosque Sacrae Scripturae Veteris Testamenti libros, secundum veterum versiones nec non auxiliis criticis caeteris adhibitis, Breslau (ed. W. Bacher New York). 2011. The Aroma of Righteousness. Scent and Seduction in Rabbinic Life and Literature, University Park, PA. 1959. “Lexicographical Notes II (The Root ‫)שׂמח‬,” HUCA 30, 141-151 1971. “The Background and Parallel to a Proverb of Ahiqar,” in A. Caquot & M. Philonenko (eds), Hommages à André Dupont-Sommer, Paris, 49-60. 1985/86. “The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Prov. 9:1). A Mistranslation”, JQR 76, 13-20. 1982. “How does Parallelism Mean?”, in S.A. Geller (ed.), A Sense of Text: The Art of Language in the Study of Biblical Literature, Winona Lake, 41-79 (actually published in 1983). 2014. “Social and Theological Aspects of Hunger in Sirach,” in S.E. McGinn et al. (eds), By Bread Alone: The Bible through the Eyes of the Hungry, Minneapolis, 89-110. 1968. “‫ בירורים בשאלת היחס שבין שלושת‬:‫משלי שלמה‬ ‫הקבצים בס׳ משלי המיוחסים לשלמה‬,” Leš 33, 243-269. “The Proverbs of Solomon: Clarifications on the Question of the Relation between the Three Collections in the Book of Proverbs Attributed to Solomon”, transl. by D.C. Snell as (with retention of the original page numbers), in D.C. Snell, TwiceTold Proverbs and the Composition of the Book of Proverbs, Winona Lake, 87-114. 2012. Psalmen (BK XV/1), Neukirchen-Vluyn. 2008. Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs. The Deep Waters of Counsel, Aldershot. 1995. Studien zum Menschenbild der älteren Weisheit (FAT 7), Tübingen. 1991. The Targum of Proverbs (The Aramaic Bible 15), Collegeville. 1994. The School Tradition of the Old Testament. The Bampton Lectures for 1994, Oxford & New York. 1992. “Die Weisheitsschrift aus der Kairoer Geniza und der Judasbrief: Ein Vergleich zwischen einer umstrittenen jüdischen und einer judenchristlichen Schrift,” ZRG 44, 356-361. 2001. Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver: An Interpretation of Proverbial Clusters in Proverbs 10:1–22:16 (BZAW 272), Berlin. 2008. “A Closer Look at the Pig in Proverbs xi 22,” VT 58, 13-27. 2013. Poetic Imagination in Proverbs. Variant Repetitions and the Nature of Poetry (BBRS), Winona Lake.

XXII Held, M.

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Jansen-Winkeln, K. ––– Jastrow, M.

Bibliography 1962. “The yqtl-qtl (qtl-yqtl) Sequence of Identical Verbs in Biblical Hebrew and Ugaritic,” in M. Ben-Horin, B.D. Weinryb, & S. Zeitlin, (eds), Studies and Essays in Honor of Abraham A. Neuman, Leiden, 281-290. 1965. “The Action-Result (Factitive-Passive) Sequence of Identical Verbs in Biblical Hebrew and Ugaritic,” JBL 84, 272-282. 1968. Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit (WMANT 28), Neukirchen-Vluyn. 1988. “Proverbial Pairs: Compositional Units in Proverbs 1029,” JBL 107, 207-224. 1990. “Proverbial Strings: Cohesion in Proverbs 10,” GTJ 11, 171-185. 1992. “Motivation and Antithetic Parallelism in Proverbs 10-15, JETS 35, 433-444. 2006. St. John Chrysostom, Commentaries on the Sages II. Commentary on Proverbs. Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Brookline, MA. 1858. Die Sprüche Salomo’s, Zürich. 1991. ṣedeq and ṣedaqah in the Hebrew Bible, New York. 2007. Anthologie der demotischen Literatur (Einführungen und Quellentexte zur Äggyptologie 4), Berlin & Münster. 1966. “The Recovery of Poetic Passages of Jeremiah,” JBL 85, 401-435. 2005. “The Fountain of Living Water and the Deceitful Brook. “The Pool of Water Metaphors in the Book of Jeremiah,” in P. van Hecke (ed.), Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible, Leuven, 99-118. 2007. “Hebrew Prosody,” in EJ 16, 595-623. 2005. “Das Phänomen Angst. Eine Studie zur theologischen Anthropologie,” NZSTh 47, 35-57. 1984. “The Metaphor in Prov 11,20,” Bibl 65, 97-100. 1972. “The qal va-ḥomer Argument in the Old Testament,” BSOAS 35, 221-227. [1994] 1999. “Die Tat kehrt zum Täter zurück. Offene Fragen im Umkreis des ‘Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhangs’, in id., Die rettende Gerechtigkeit. Beiträge zur Theologie des Alten Testaments 2, 167-191. Neukirchen-Vluyn (first published ZThK 91 (1994), 245-271). 1999. Sentenzen und Maximen in den Privatinschriften der ägyptischen Spätzeit (Achet-Schriften zur Ägyptologie, Philologische Reihe 1), Berlin. 2001. Biographische und religiöse Inschriften der Spätzeit aus dem Ägyptischen Museum Kairo Teil 1. Übersetzungen und Kommentare, Wiesbaden. [1903] 1950. A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature I-II, New York.

Bibliography Jenni, E. ––– Jepsen, A. Kaiser, O. Kautzsch, E. Kayatz, C. ––– Kellenberger, E. Keller, C.A. & Wehmeyer, G. Klopfenstein, M.A. ––– ––– Klopper, F. Koch, K.

Kramer, S.N. Krause, M. Krispenz, J. ––– Kruger, P.A. Krüger, Th.

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XXIII 1971. “‫’ אהב‬hb lieben,” THAT I, 60-73. 1992. Die Hebräischen Präpositionen Band 1: Die Präposition Beth. Stuttgart. 1965. “‫ צדק‬und ‫ צדקה‬im Alten Testament,” in H. Graf Reventlow, (ed.), Gottes Wort und Gottes Land. Festschrift für Hans-Wilhelm Hertzberg, Göttingen, 78-89. 1993. Der Gott des Alten Testaments. Theologie des Alten Testaments Teil 1: Grundlegung (UTB 1747), Göttingen. 1894. See Steuernagel. 1966. Studien zu Proverbien 1-9. Eine form- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchung unter Einbeziehung ägyptischen Vergleichsmaterials (WMANT 22), Neukirchen-Vluyn. 1969. Einführung in die alttestamentliche Weisheit (BS 55), Neukirchen-Vluyn. 1982. ḥäsäd wä’ämät als Ausdruck einer Glaubenserfahrung (AThANT 69), Zürich. 1971. “‫ ברך‬brk pi. segnen,” THAT I, 353-376. 1964. Die Lüge nach dem Alten Testament: Ihre Begriffe, ihre Bedeutung und ihre Beurteilung, Zürich. 1971. “‫ בגד‬bgd treulos handeln,” THAT I, 261-264. 1991. “Kohelet und die Freude am Dasein,” TThZ 47, 97107. 2002. Oë in die wildernis. Die religieuse funksie van fonteine en putte in die Hebreeuse Bybel. ’n Godsdienshistoriese studie, Diss. Unisa, Pretoria. [1955] 1972. “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?,” in K. Koch (ed.), Um das Prinzip der Vergeltung in Religion und Recht des Alten Testaments (WdF 125), Darmstadt, 130-180. 1949. “Schooldays: A Sumerian Composition Relating to the Education of a Scribe,” JAOS 69, 199-215. See Müller, H.-P. & Krause, M. 1989. Spruchkompositionen im Buch Proverbia, Frankfurt am Main. 2004. “Wie viele Bäume braucht das Paradies? Erwägungen zu Gen ii 4b—iii 24,” VT 54, 301-318. 1987. “Promiscuity or Marriage Fidelity? A Note on Prov 5:15-18,” JNSL 13, 61-68. 1995. “Komposition und Diskussion in Proverbia 10,” ZThK 92, 413-433. 1997. Kritische Weisheit. Studien zur weisheitlichen Traditionskritik im Alten Testament, Zürich. 2000. Kohelet (Prediger) (BK), Neukirchen-Vluyn. 2009. Das menschliche Herz und die Weisung Gottes. Studien zur alttestamentlichen Anthropologie und Ethik (AThANT), Zürich. 2019. “On the Sense of Balance in the Hebrew Bible,” in A. Schellenberg & Th. Krüger, (eds), Sounding Sensory Profiles in the Ancient Near East, Atlanta, 87-97.

XXIV Kselman, J.S. ––– Kugel, J.L. Kuhn, G. Kuropka, N. Labuschagne, C.J.

Lam, J. Lambert, W.G. Landy, F. Lang, B. ––– Lange, A. Lemaire, A. ––– Leuenberger, M. Levy, J. Lichtheim, M. Lillas, R. Lindenberger, J.M. Loader, J.A. ––– ––– ––– –––

Bibliography 1977. “Semantic-Sonant Chiasmus in Biblical Poetry,” Bibl 58, 219-223. 2002. “Ambiguity and Wordplay in Proverbs XI,” VT 52, 545-547. [1981] 1998. The Idea of Biblical Poetry. Parallelism and its History, Baltimore & London. 1931. Beiträge zur Erklärung des salomonischen Spruchbuches (BWANT 57 = Third Series No. 16), Stuttgart. 2002. Philipp Melanchthon: Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft. Ein Gelehrter im Dienst der Kirche (1526-1532) (SuR NR 21), Tübingen. 1966. “The emphasising particle gam and its connotations,” in W.C. van Unnik, & A.S. van der Woude, (eds), Studia Biblica et Semitica Theodoro Christiano Vriezen Dedicata, Wageningen, 193-203. 2016. Patterns of Sin in the Hebrew Bible. Metaphor, Culture, and the Making of a Religious Concept, New York. [1960] 1975. Babylonian Wisdom Literature, Oxford. 1984. “Poetics and Parallelism. Some Comments on James Kugel’s The Idea of Biblical Poetry,” JSOT 28, 61-87. 1972. Die weisheitliche Lehrrede. Eine Untersuchung von Sprüche 1-7 (SBS 54), Stuttgart. 1986. Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs, New York. 1998. “Kohelet-Rezeption und die Weisheitstexte aus Qumran,” in A. Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (BEThL 136), Leuven, 114-160. 1981. Les Écoles et la formation de la Bible dans l’ancien Israel, Fribourg. 1984. “Sagesse et écoles,” VT 34, 270-281. 2008. Segen und Segenstheologien im alten Israel. Untersuchungen zu ihren religions- und theologiegeschichtlichen Konstellationen und Transformationen (AThANT 90), Zürich. [1924] 1963, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim I-IV, Berlin, Wien & Darmstadt. 1973-1980. Ancient Egyptian Literature Volume I-III, London & Berkeley [I 1973, II 1976, III 1980; I-III in new edition 2006]. 2012. Hendiadys in the Hebrew Bible. An Investigation of the Applications of the Term, Diss., University of Götheborg. 1983. The Aramaic Proverbs of Ahiqar (JHNES), Baltimore. 1971. Die stam qrb as religieuse term in die Ou Testament en die daarvan afhanklike Semitiese literatuur. Diss., University of Pretoria. 1979. Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet, (BZAW 152), Berlin. 1990. A Tale of Two Cities. Sodom and Gomorrah in the Old Testament, early Jewish and early Christian Traditions (CBET I), Kampen. 1996. “Learning in the Indicative,” JSem 8/1, 21-33. 1999. “Wisdom by (the) People for (the) People,” ZAW 111, 211-233.

Bibliography ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– Lohfink, N. Longman, T. Lowth, R.

Lucas, E.C. Luchsinger, J. Lunn, N.P. Lust, L. Luther, M. Lyu, S.M. Maekawa, K. Maier, C.

Marcus, R.

XXV 2001a. “Zum Preis der Rechtfertigung Gottes im Alten Testament,” BThZ 18/1, 3-23. 2001b. Begegnung mit Gott. Gesammelte Studien im Bereich des Alten Testaments (WAS 3), Frankfurt, Berlin, Oxford & Wien. 2002. “Lebensgestaltung als weisheitliche Lebensverantwortung,” OTE 15/3, 715-738; = in E. Herms, (ed.) 2004, Leben: Verständnis. Wissenschaft. Technik, Gütersloh. 2011. “Schön/Schönheit,” in M. Bauks, K. Koenen, & S. Alkier, (eds), Das wissenschaftliche Bibellexikon im Internet, http://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/. 2012a. “Prosthetic Memory in the Old Testament,” OTE 25/3, 583-597. 2012b. “Schönheit zwischen Segen und Errettung,” ZAW 124, 163-179. 2012c. “The Problem of Money in the Hand of a Fool,” HTS 68/1, 1a-9b; electronic: a1266. 2013. “The Bipolarity of Sapiential Theology,” OTE 26/2, 365-383. 2014a. “Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” OEBE I, 296304. 2017. “Die gestaltes van Philipp Melanchthon se Spreukekommentaar,” HTS 73/4, 57-65; electronic: a4642. https:// doi.org/10.4102/hts.v73i4.4642 1990. “Qoheleth 5,17-19 – Revelation by joy,” CBQ 52, 625-635. 2006. Proverbs, Grand Rapids. [1787] 1835. Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews, London et al. Original lectures began 1741, published in Latin as De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum 1753, transl. by G. Gregory and published in English 1787, 3rd edition 1835. 2015. Proverbs (THOTC), Grand Rapids. 2010. Poetik der alttestamentlichen Spruchweisheit (PSAT 3), Stuttgart. 2006. Word-Order Variation in Biblical Poetry. Differentiating Pragmatics and Poetics. Eugene, OR. 1990. “J.F. Schleusner and the Lexicon of the Septuagint,” ZAW 120, 256-262. [1530] 1909. “Ein Sendbrief D.M. Luthers: Von Dolmetzschen und Fürbitt der heiligenn,” in Weimarer Ausgabe 30/2, 632-646. 2012. Righteousness in the Book of Proverbs (FAT II.55), Tübingen. 1997. “The Agricultural Texts of UR III Lagash of the British museum (XI),” AS 19, 113-145. 2012. “Proverbs: How Feminine Wisdom Comes into Being,” in L. Schottroff & M.-Th. Wacker, (eds), Feminist Biblical Interpretation. A Compendium of Critical Commentary on the Books of the Bible and Related Literature, Grand Rapids & Cambridge, UK, 255-272. 1943. “The Tree of Life in Proverbs,” JBL 62/2, 117-120.

XXVI Margolis, M.L. McCreesh, T.P. McKane, W. McNutt, P.M. Meier, S.A. Meinhold, A. ––– Melanchthon, P. Mettinger, T.N.D. Michaelis, W. Mieder, W. ––– ––– & A. Dundas (eds.) Millar, S.R. –––

Miller, C.L.

Mondin, B. (ed.) Moriarty, F.L. Moss, A. Mouser, W.E.

Murphy, R.E.

Bibliography 1911. “The Place of the Word-Accent in Hebrew,” JBL 30, 29-43. 1991. Biblical Sound and Sense. Poetic Sound Patterns in Proverbs 10-29 (JSOTSupp 128), Sheffield. [1970] 1977. Proverbs. A New Approach (2nd ed.) (OTL), London. 1999. Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel (LAI), London. 1988. The Messenger in the Ancient Semitic World (HSM), Atlanta. 1991a. Die Sprüche. Teil 1: Sprüche Kapitel 1-15 (Zürcher Bibelkommentare), Zürich. 1991b. Die Sprüche. Teil 2: Sprüche Kapitel 16-31 (Zürcher Bibelkommentare), Zürich. 1550. Explicatio proverbiorum Salomonis in Schola Witembergensi recens dictata a Philippo Melanthone, Frankfurt. 1972. “The Nominal Pattern qetulla in Biblical Hebrew,” JSS 16, 2-14. 1954. “ὁδὸς κ.τ.λ.” ThWNT V, 42-118. 1993. Proverbs are never out of Season, New York. 2004. Proverbs. A Handbook. Westport. 1981. The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb, New York. 2018. “When a Straight Road Becomes a Garden Path: The ‘False Lead’ as a Pedagogical Strategy in the Book of Proverbs,” JSOT 43, 67-82). 2020. Genre and Openness in Proverbs 10:1–22:16 (Ancient Israel and its Literature 39), Atlanta. (Note: This important study only became available when Volume II of this commentary had already been completed. Therefore I could only make use of it on a limited scale.) 2005. “Ellipsis Involving Negation in Biblical Poetry,” in R.L. Troxel et al. (ed.), Seeking out the Wisdom of the Ancients. Essays Offered to Honor Michael V. Fox on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, Winona Lake, 37-52. 2005. S. Tommaso d’Aquino, Commento al Corpus Paulinum (Expositio et lectura super epistolas Pauli Apostoli) Vol 1. Lettera ai Romani, Bologna. 1974. “Word as Power in the Ancient Near East,” in H.N. Bream et al. (eds), Old Testament Studies in Honor of Jacob M. Myers, Philadelphia, 345-362. 2015. Proverbs (Readings), Sheffield. 1995. “Filling in the Blank. Asymmetrical Antithetic Parallelisms,” in R.B. Zuck (ed.), Learning from the Sages: Selected Studies on the Book of Proverbs, Grand Rapids, 137-150 (first published in W.E. Mouser, Walking in Wisdom. Studying the Proverbs of Solomon, Downer’s Grove 1983). 1998. Proverbs (WBC 22), Nashville.

Bibliography Nänny, M. Nel, P.J. Niccacci, A. Niemeier, S.

Nissinen, M.

O’Connor, M.P. Oesterley, W.O.E. Ogden, G.S. Otto, E. Otto, R. Pardee, D. Park, Sung Jin Paterson, J. Pedersen, J. Perdue, L.G. ––– ––– Perry, T.H. Petersen, S. Pilch, J.J. Pinkuss, H.

Plath, S. Plöger, O. Preuss, H.D. –––

XXVII 1988. “Chiasmus in Literature: Ornament or Function?,” Word & Image 4, 51-59. 1982. The structure and ethos of the Wisdom Admonitions in Proverbs (BZAW 158), Berlin. 1990. The Syntax of the Verb in Classical Hebrew Prose, transl. W.G.E. Watson (JSOT Suppl. 86), Sheffield. 2003. “Straight from the Heart – Metonymic and Metaphorical Explorations,” in A. Barcelona, (ed.), Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads. A Cognitive Perspective, Berlin, 195-213. 2014. “Sacred Springs and Liminal Rivers: Water and Prophecy in the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean,” in E. Ben Zvi & C. Levin, (eds), Thinking of Water in the Early Second Temple Period (BZAW 461), Berlin 2948. 1980. Hebrew Verse Structure, Winona Lake. 1929. The Book of Proverbs. With Introduction and Notes (Westminster Commentaries), London. 1984. “Qoheleth xi 7-xii 8: Qoheleth’s summons to enjoyment and reflection,” VT 34, 27-38. 1994. Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments (ThW 3,2), Stuttgart. 1924. Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen, Stuttgart. 1988. Ugaritic and Hebrew Poetic Parallelism: A Trial Cut (cnt and Proverbs 2) (SVT 39), Leiden. 2017. Typology in Biblical Hebrew Meter. A Generative Metrical Approach, Lewiston, NY. 1961. The Wisdom of Israel, London. [1926-1940] 1959. Israel. Its Life and Culture I-II, III-IV, London & Copenhagen. 1977. Wisdom and Cult, Missoula. 1994. Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature. Nashville. 2000. Proverbs (Int), Louisville. 1993. Wisdom Literature and the Structure of Proverbs. University Park, PA. 2008. Brot, Licht und Weinstock. Intertextuelle Analysen johanneischer Ich-bin-Worte (SNT 127), Leiden & Boston. 2016. The Cultural Life Setting of the Proverbs, Minneapolis. 1894. “Die syrische Übersetzung der Proverbien: textkritisch und in ihrem Verhältnisse zu dem masoretischen Text, den LXX und dem Targum untersucht,” ZAW 14, 65-141, 161-222. 1963. Furcht Gottes (ArTh II.2), Stuttgart. 1984. Sprüche Salomos (Proverbia) (BK 17), NeukirchenVluyn. 1970. “Erwägungen zum theologischen Ort alttestamentlicher Weisheitsliteratur,” EvTh 30, 393-417. 1974. “Alttestamentliche Weisheit in christlicher Theologie?” ETL 23, 165-181.

XXVIII ––– ––– Price, J.D. Radden, G.

Reider, J. Reiterer, F.V. Rendsburg, G.A.

Richardson, H.N. Richter, W. Ricœur, P. Riede, P.

Ringgren, H. Römheld, D. Rosenberg, A.J. Rudnig-Zelt, S.

Rüger, H.P. Rylaarsdam, J.C. Sæbø, M. –––

––– Saggs, H.W.F.

Bibliography 1987. Einführung in die alttestamentliche Weisheitsliteratur (UTB 383), Stuttgart. 1991. Theologie des Alten Testaments I. JHWHs erwählendes und verpflichtendes Handeln, Stuttgart. 1990. The Syntax of Masoretic Accents in the Hebrew Bible (SBEC 27), Lewiston. 2004. “The Metonymic Folk Model of Language,” in B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & A. Kwiatkowska, (eds), Imagery in Language: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Ronald W. Langacker, Frankfurt am Main, 543-565. 1952. “Etymological Studies in Biblical Hebrew,” VT 2, 113-130. 1989. “‫ פוח‬pwḥ”, ThWAT VI, 538-543. 2015. “Literary and Linguistic Matters in the Book of Proverbs,” in J. Jarick, (ed.), Perspectives on Israelite Wisdom. Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, Oxford, London et al., 111-147. 1955. “Some Notes on ‫ ִליץ‬and its Derivatives,” VT 5, 163179 + 434-436. 1966. Recht und Ethos. Versuch einer Ortung des weisheitlichen Mahnspruches (SANT 15), München. 1976. Interpretation Theory. Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Fort Worth TX. 2002. “‘Doch frage die Tiere, sie werden dich lehren,’ Tiere als Vorbilder und ‘Lehrer’ des Menschen im alten Testament,” in id., Im Spiegel der Tiere. Studien zum Verhältnis von Mensch und Tier im alten Israel (OBO 187), Freiburg & Göttingen, 1-28. 1966. Sprüche (ATD 16.1), Göttingen. 1989. Wege der Weisheit. Die Lehren Amenemopes und Proverbien 22,17 – 24,22 (BZAW 184), Berlin & New York. [1988] 2001. Mishle – Proverbs. A New English Translation. Translation of Text, Rashi and other Commentaries (Mikraoth Gedoloth), New York. 2017. Glaube im Alten Testament: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Von Jes 7, 1-17; Dtn 1-3; Num 13-14 und Gen 22,1-19 (BZAW 452), Berlin. 1991. Die Weisheitsschrift aus der Kairoer Geniza: Text, Übersetzung und philologischer Kommentar (WUNT 53), Tübingen. 1964. The Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Solomon. Richmond, VA. 1971a. “‫ יסר‬jsr züchtigen,” THAT I, 738-742. 1971b. “‫ יעל‬jcl hi. nützen,” THAT I, 746-748. 1986. “From Collection to Book: A New Approach to the History of Tradition and Redaction of the Book of Proverbs,” PNWCJS Div. A, 99-106. 2012. Sprüche (ATD 16.1), Göttingen. 1966. The Greatness that was Babylon. A survey of the ancient civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, London.

Bibliography

XXIX

Sandoval, T.J.

2006. The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs (BINS 77), Leiden & Boston. 1984. “‫ תעה‬tch umherirren,” THAT II, 1055-1057. 1904. “Geniza Fragments,” JQR 16, 425-442. 1993. “Qohelet’s positive advice,” OTE 6/2, 248-271. 1999. Das weise Wort und seine Wirkung. Eine Untersuchung zur Komposition und Redaktion von Proverbia 10,1 – 22,16 (WMANT 83), Neukirchen-Vluyn. [1820-1821] 1822. Novus thesaurus philologico criticus, sive lexicon in LXX et reliquos interpretes graecos ac scriptores apocryphos veteris testamenti, five vols., originally Leipzig, reprinted Glasgow. 2012. Hermeneutik der Tora. Studien zur Traditionsgeschichte von Prov 2 und zur Komposition von Prov 1-9 (BZAW 432), Berlin & Boston. 2013. “When Wisdom Is Not Enough! The Discourse on Wisdom and Torah and the Composition of the Book of Proverbs,” in B.U. Schipper & D.A. Teeter, (eds), Wisdom and Torah. The Reception of ‘Torah’ in the Wisdom Literature of the Second Temple Period (SJSJ 163), Leiden, 55-80.

Sawyer, J.F.A. Schechter, S Scheffler, E.H. Scherer, A. Schleusner, J.F.

Schipper, B.U. –––

Schipper, B.U. & Teeter, D.A. (eds). Schmid, H.H. ––– ––– Schultens, A. Schwab, Z. Schwarz, A. SchwienhorstSchönberger, L. Scoralick, R. Scott, R.B.Y. ––– Seitel, P.

2013. Wisdom and Torah. The Reception of ‘Torah’ in the Wisdom Literature of the Second Temple Period (SJSJ 163), Leiden. 1966. Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit: Eine Untersuchung zur altorientalischen und israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur (BZAW 101), Berlin. 1968. Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung. Hintergrund und Geschichte des alttestamentlichen Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes (BHTh), Tübingen. 2018. Sprüche (Proverbia). Teilband 1: Proverbien 1,1– 15,33 (BKAT XVII/1), Göttingen. 1748. Proverbia Salomonis Versionem Integram ad Hebraeum Fontem expressit atque Commentarium adjecit, Leiden. 2013. “Is Fear of the LORD the Source of Wisdom or Vice Versa?” VT 63, 652-662. [2003] 2007. “Sprechakt,” RDLW III, 484-486. 2008. “Das Buch der Sprichwörter” in E. Zenger et al., (eds), Einleitung in das Alte Testament, Stuttgart. 1995. Einzelspruch und Sammlung: Komposition im Buch der Sprichwörter Kapitel 10-15 (BZAW 232), Berlin & New York. [1965] 1981. Proverbs. Ecclesiastes. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 18), Garden City. 1972. “Wise and Foolish, Righteous and Wicked,” SVT 23, 146-165. [1969] 1981. “Proverbs: A Social Use of Metaphor,” in W. Mieder & A. Dundas (eds.), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb, New York, 143-161.

XXX Sekine, S. Shupak, N. ––– Silver, M. Ska, J.-L.

Skehan, P.W. ––– Skladny, U. Smalley, B. Snell, D.C. ––– Stähli, H.-P. ––– Steinmann, A.E. Stendebach, F.-J. Steuernagel, D. Stewart, A.W. Story, C.I.K. Streete, G.C. Strack, H.L. Stuart, D.K. Stupperich, R. Tan, Nam Hoon N. Tauberschmidt, G. Taylor, A.

Bibliography 2002. “Proverbs as a catalogue of virtues: A comparison with Nicomachean ethics,” AJBI 28, 55-86. 1984/85. “‫מטבעות לשון ורישומים בחכמה המקראית‬,” Tarbiz 54, 475-484 (“Egyptian Terms and Features in Biblical Hebrew”). 1993. Where can Wisdom be found? The Sage’s Language in the Bible and in Ancient Egyptian Literature, Göttingen. 1983. Prophets and Markets. The Political Economy of Ancient Israel, The Hague, Boston & London. 2008. “Genesis 2–3: Some Fundamental Questions,” in K. Schmid, & C. Riedweg, (eds), Beyond Eden: The Biblical Story of Paradise (Genesis 2–3) and Its Reception History, Tübingen, 1-27. 1947. “The seven Columns of Wisdom’s House in Proverbs 1-9,” CBQ 9, 190-198 (= Skehan 1971, 9-14). 1948. “A Single Editor for the whole Book of Proverbs,” CBQ 10, 115-130 (= Skehan 1971, 15-26). 1962. Die ältesten Spruchsammlungen in Israel, Göttingen. [1949] 1986. Medieval Exegesis of Wisdom Literature, Atlanta (essays from 1949 and 1950, appeared January 1987). 1983. “ ‘Taking Souls’ in Proverbs XI 30,” VT 83, 362-365. 1993. Twice-Told Proverbs and the Composition of the Book of Proverbs, Winona Lake. 1971. “‫ יעץ‬jcs raten,” THAT I, 748-753. 1984. “‫ פחד‬pḥd beben,” THAT II, 411-413. 2002. Review of K.M. Heim, Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver: An Interpretation of Proverbial Clusters in Proverbs 10:1-22:16, Berlin 2001, JBL 121/3, 546-549. 1995. “‫ ָשׁלוֹם‬šālôm,” ThWAT VIII, 12-46. [1910] 1923. Die Sprüche (HSAT 2), Tübingen. 2016. Poetic Ethics in Proverbs. Wisdom Literature and the Shaping of the Moral Self, New York. 1945. “The Book of Proverbs and Northwest Semitic Literature,” JBL 64, 319-337. 1999. The Strange Woman: Power and Sex in the Bible, Louisville. 1888. Die Sprüche Salomos (KCAT 6,2), München. 1976. Studies in Early Hebrew Meter, Missoula. 1975. “Melanchthons Proverbien-Kommentare,” in A. Buck & O. Herding (eds), Der Kommentar in der Renaissance, Boppard, 21-34. 2008. The Foreignness of the Foreign Woman in Proverbs 19. A Study of the Origin and Development of a Biblical Motif (BZAW 381), Berlin & New York. 2004. Secondary Parallelism: A Study of Translation Technique in LXX Proverbs, Atlanta. [1962] 1981. “The Wisdom of Many and the Wit of One,” in W. Mieder & A. Dundas (eds.), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb, New York.

Bibliography Teeter, E. ––– Terrien, S. ––– Thomas, D.W. ––– ––– ––– ––– Thompson, J.M. Tomoda, A. et al. Toperoff, S.P. Tournay, R. ––– Tov, E.

Toy, C.H. Trible, P. Tsumura, D.T. Tuinstra, E.W. Umbreit, F.W.C.

XXXI 2002a. “Animals in Egyptian Literature,” in B.J. Collins, (ed.), A History of the Animal World in the Ancient Near East (HdO 64), Leiden, Boston & Köln, 251-270. 2002b. “Animals in Egyptian Religion,” in B.J. Collins, (ed.), A History of the Animal World in the Ancient Near East (HdO 64), Leiden, Boston & Köln, 335-360. 1962. “Amos and Wisdom,” in B.W. Anderson & W. Harrelson, (eds), Israel’s Prophetic Heritage. Essays in Honor of James Muilenburg, New York & London, 108-115. 1985. Till the Heart Sings. A Biblical Theology of Manhood and Womanhood, Philadelphia. 1934. “The Root ydc in Hebrew,” JTS 35, 236-238. 1963. “Blycl in the Old Testament”, in J.N. Birdsall, & R.W. Thomson, (eds), Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of R.P. Casey, Freiburg, 11-19. 1964. “Additional Notes on the Root ydc in Hebrew,” JTS 15, 54-57. 1965. “Notes on Some Passages in the Book of Proverbs,” VT 15, 271-279. 1969. “Textual and Philological Notes on Some Passages in the Book of Proverbs,” SVT 3 (2nd ed.), 280-292. 1974. The Form and Function of Proverbs in Ancient Israel, Paris. 2009. “Reduced Prefrontal Cortical Gray Matter Volume in Young Adults Exposed to Harsh Corporal Punishment,” (NeuroImage 47 Suppl 2), T66-T71. 1985. “The Ant in the Bible and Midrash,” Dor le Dor 12, 179-185. 1962. “Relectures biblique concernant la vie future et l’angélologie,” RB 69, 481-505. 1973. Review of G. von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, RB 80, 129-131. [1990] 1999. “Recensional Differences between the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint of Proverbs,” in E. Tov, The Greek and Hebrew Bible. Collected Essays by Emanuel Tov, Leiden, 419-432. [= H.W. Attridge, J.J. Collins, & T.H. Tobin, (eds), Of Scribes and Scrolls. Studies on the Hebrew Bible, Intertestamental Judaism and Christian Origins presented to John Strugnell on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, Lanham, 43-56, 1990.] [1899] 1914. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs (ICC), Edinburgh. 1975. “Wisdom Builds a Poem: the Architecture of Proverbs 1:20-33,” JBL 94, 509-518. 2005. Creation and Destruction. A Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theory in the Old Testament, Winona Lake. 1996. Spreuken I (POT), Baarn. 1826. Philologisch-kritischer und philosophischer Commentar über die Sprüche Salomo’s, Heidelberg.

XXXII Vance, D.R.,

Bibliography 2001. The Question of Meter in Hebrew Poetry, Lewiston, NY.

Van der Merwe, C.H.J. et al. 1999. A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar. Sheffield. Van der Watt, J.G. 2000. Family of the King. Dynamics of Metaphor in the Gospel according to John (BINS 47), Leiden, Boston & Köln. ––– 2006. “Ethics Alive in Imagery,” in J. Frey, J.G. van der Watt, & R. Zimmermann, (eds), Imagery in the Gospel of John. Terms Forms, Themes, and Theology of Johannine Figurative Language (WUNT 200), Tübingen, 421-448. Van Leeuwen, R.C. 1988. Context and Meaning in Proverbs 25-27 (SBLDS 96), Atlanta. ––– 1992. “Wealth and Poverty: System and Contradiction in Proverbs,” HS 33, 25-36. ––– 1997. The Book of Proverbs (NIB V), Nashville. Vayntrub, J. 2016. “The Book of Proverbs and the Idea of Ancient Israelite Education,” ZAW 128, 96-114. Visotzky, B.L. 1992. The Midrash on Proverbs (YJS 27), London & New Haven. Volz, P. 1911. Weisheit (Das Buch Hiob, Sprüche und Jesus Sirach, Prediger), (SAT III/2), Göttingen. Von Rad, G. 1953. “Josephsgeschichte und ältere Chokma,” SVT 1, 120-127. ––– 1970. Weisheit in Israel, Neukirchen-Vluyn. English transl. by J.D. Martin, Wisdom in Israel, London 1972. Wagenknecht, C. [2003] 2007. “Wortspiel,” RDLW III, 864-867. Waltke, B.K. 2004. The Book of Proverbs. Chapters 1-15 (NICOT), Grand Rapids. ––– 2005. The Book of Proverbs. Chapters 15-31 (NICOT), Grand Rapids. Washington, H.C. 1994a. Wealth and Poverty in the Instruction of Amenemope and the Hebrew Proverbs (SBLDS 142), Atlanta. ––– 1994b. “The Strange Woman of Proverbs 1-9 and PostExilic Judean Society,” in T.C. Eskenazi & K.H. Richards, (eds), Second Temple Studies 2, Sheffield, 217-242. Watson, W.G.E. [1984] 2007. Classical Hebrew Poetry. A Guide to its Techniques (JSOTSup 26), Sheffield, London & New York. ––– 1994. Traditional Techniques in Classical Hebrew Verse (JSOTSup 170), Sheffield. ––– 2017-2019. “The Etymology of Ugaritic ypḥ and Hebrew yāpîaḥ, ‘Witness’,” SEL 34-36, 83-92. Watters, W.R. 1976. Formula Criticism and the Poetry of the Old Testament, Berlin. Weeks, S. [1994] 2007. Early Israelite Wisdom, Oxford. ––– 2007. Instruction and Imagery in Proverbs 1-9, Oxford. ––– 2010. An Introduction to the Study of Wisdom Literature, London & New York. Weigl, M. 2010. Die Achikar-Srüche aus Elephantine und die alttestamentliche Weisheitsliteratur (BZAW 399), Berlin.

Bibliography Weiner, I.B. Weitzman, M.P Westermann, C.

––– ––– ––– ––– ––– Whybray, R.N. ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– Wildeboer, G. Williams, J.G. Winton Thomas, D. Yoder, C.R. ––– Zehnder, M.P.

Zimmerli, W. Zunz, G.

XXXIII 2008. Principles of Rorschach Interpretation, Mahwah, NJ & London. 1999. The Syriac Version of the Old Testament, Cambridge. 1971. “Weisheit im Sprichwort,” in K.-H. Bernhardt, (ed.), Schalom: Studien zu Glaube und Geschichte Israels Alfred Jepsen zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht von Freunden, Schülern und Kollegen, Stuttgart, 73-85. 1984. “‫ נֶ ֶפש‬npš Seele,” THAT II, 71-96. 1985. Theologie des Alten Testaments in Grundzügen, 2. Aufl. (ATD Ergänzungsreihe 6), Göttingen. 1990a. Wurzeln der Weisheit: Die ältesten Sprüche Israels und anderer Völker, Göttingen. 1990b. “Weisheit und Praktische Theologie,” PTh 79, 515524. 1991. Forschungsgeschichte zur Weisheitsliteratur 1950-1990, Stuttgart. 1974. The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament (BZAW 135), Berlin & New York. 1979. “Yahweh-sayings and their Contexts in Proverbs, 10,1 – 22,16,” in M. Gilbert, (ed.), La Sagesse de l’Ancien Testament, Leuven, 153-165. 1982. “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 23, 87-98. 1990. Wealth and poverty in the Book of Proverbs (JSOTSupp 99), Sheffield. 1994. The Composition of the Book of Proverbs (JSOTSup 168), Sheffield. [1972] 1994. Proverbs (NCBC), Grand Rapids. 1897. Die Sprüche (KHCAT XV), Leipzig & Tübingen. 1980. “The Power of Form. A Study of Biblical Proverbs,” Semeia 17, 35-58. see Thomas, D.W. 2001. Wisdom as a Woman of Substance: A Socio-Economic Reading of Proverbs 1-9 and 31:10-31 (BZAW 304), Berlin & New York. 2009. Proverbs (AOTC), Nashville. 1999. Wegmetaphorik im Alten Testament: eine semantische Untersuchung der alttestamentlichen und altorientalischen Weg-Lexeme mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer metaphorischen Verwendung (BZAW 268), Berlin & New York. 1933. “Zur Struktur der alttestamentlichen Weisheit,” ZAW 51, 177-204 (English: “Concerning the Structure of Old Testament Wisdom,” Crenshaw 1976, 175-207). 1956. “Der Antinoepapyrus der Proverbia und das Prophetologion,” ZAW 68, 124-184.

INTRODUCTION

1. USING THE COMMENTARY: PRACTICAL NOTES 1.1 In keeping with the plan of the series, the commentary is designed as follows: The introduction contains discussion of the usual issues of the book’s structure, the date of the sections and the redaction, the provenance of the poems and sayings, the theological relevance of the book, the text and versions; a collection of essays (which has become conventional in recent commentaries on Proverbs, cf. Murphy, Fox, Waltke and earlier antecedents). They have been shortened for the purpose of inclusion in the volume, but nevertheless retain a certain independence as texts in their own right. As such they could perhaps inculcate a feeling for independent units later incorporated into a larger whole, such as we have in the Book of Proverbs itself. Organically they belong to the whole, but nevertheless show literary signs of erstwhile autonomous existence (in this case they hail from a single author!). The commentary proper keeps to the outline of the series as far as possible, even though allowance has to be made for the special requirements of a collection of individual sayings. A translation of the Hebrew text in stichs and hemistichs is given, however not in the same form as in Vol. I (see below). Indentation is used to indicate the hemistichs. A paragraph on “Essentials and Perspectives” on Chaps. 10-22 is given at the beginning of the commentary on Chap. 10. Since for the most part we shall not be dealing with longer poems, the sections of Vol. II are not as easily cut out for exposition as they are where poems such as those of Chaps. 1–9 are concerned. Because the task of commenting upon single proverbs, sometimes on juxtaposed ones and occasionally clusters of sayings is not commensurate with rigid application of the series schema used in Vol. I, “Essentials and Perspectives” cannot regularly follow every translation. Nevertheless, I have tried to indicate principal issues in broad strokes and have given a short bibliography of pertinent literature to the relevant part of the anthology (excluding commentaries) where it seemed possible and helpful, which I also plan to do in Vol. III at regular interludes. As in Vol. I, this information is not intended as a

2

Introduction popularised summary of the detailed exegesis and the literature list does not suggest completeness or that such literature pertains exclusively to that section. It neither precludes nor presupposes being specifically engaged with in the discussions and footnotes that follow. Under the heading “Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter Z” I discuss general issues of structure and literary criticism, organised under the captions “Themes and Motifs,” “Chapter Organisation,” and “Social Background”. Here too the organisation and presentation are dictated by the demands of the character of proverbs in Chaps. 10–29. The main commentary on each chapter is entitled “Translation and Exegesis of Chapter …” and gives a detailed exegesis of each proverb. Sometimes subdivisions are indicated in the exegesis, mostly to accommodate longer units (most of which are discussed in Vol. III) or where groups of proverbs are clearly linked (some treated here but most in Vol. III, such as the four groups of associated proverbs in Chap. 26). For the occasional excursus a smaller type is used. This is also used throughout the commentary for collateral technical discussion or supporting argument. Small type is however not intended to distinguish between “general” and “scholarly” comment and the academic status claimed for both is the same. The arrangement of Vol. II of the commentary cannot simply emulate that of Vol. I on Proverbs 1–9. Whereas the meticulous poems in the first part of the book require being read, translated and interpreted as longer units, that is not the case in Chaps. 10–29. In these chapters aspects of form as well as content often relate both to proverbs as single sayings in their own right and to redactional relations between them or some of them in a given passage. Since these factors pertain to both exegesis and translation, it is as convenient as it is opportune to keep the translation of the sayings and their exegesis in close proximity. Standard procedure in Vol. II of the commentary will therefore be to offer translations of the individual sayings, while an extended translation is given in the case of poems such as those in Chaps. 30–31 or where redactional features of the text call for it. For these reasons I shall discuss the broader issues under the standard series rubric “Introduction to the Exegesis …” (as usual in Vol. I), while the more detailed discussion and the translation1 are reserved for the extended commentary on the proverbs themselves in “Translation and Exegesis …”. Since the series Historical Commentary on the Old Testament aims to pay attention to the reception of the text, this is done regularly in the body of the commentary. However, in terms of genre the book is a

1 Sometimes it is sensible to translate and focus on a group of proverbs together, but mostly on single proverbs at a time.

Introduction

3

commentary on the Hebrew text and not a monograph on the history of the biblical book’s reception. Therefore the reception history does not become an end in itself and remains subservient to the overall goal of the commentary. In the case of Proverbs this becomes a rather special charge. On the one hand, the book as such has not had the influence in the theological thought of either Judaism or Christianity as that enjoyed by, say, the Pentateuch, the Psalms or Isaiah. Therefore the reception of the book is mostly reflected in references to rabbinic and early Christian literature. 1.2 I use the following terminology for the poetic units of the text: This term refers to the primary units according to the Masoretic division of pesūqīm, each marked by a sōph pāsûq and numbered in printed editions of the Bible. Although the word itself is a poetic term by origin (“verse” as opposed to “prose”), it has conventionally come to indicate a numbered unit of text in the Bible, whether poetry or not. Stich: Derived from the Greek stichos, the term refers to a poetic line. As a rule, it corresponds to the lines as printed in critical editions of Proverbs in the Hebrew Bible, such as BHS and BHQ. Hemistich: Derived from Greek hemi + stichos, half or part of a stich (cf. Latin semi), the term refers to the individual units making up a bistich or a tristich.2 Couplet: Two closely associated stichs (two full lines, not to be confused with a bistich of one line). Tercet: Three closely associated stichs (three full lines, in turn not to be confused with a tristich). Quatrain: Four closely associated stichs.3 Verse:

2 A hemistich is sometimes also called a “verset” or constituent part of a verse (so Alter [1985] 2011, 19 and passim) and Waltke (2004, 41 and passim), which tallies with my view of a hemistich as part of a line. Greenstein sometimes seems to employ – at least partly – the terminology I use (cf. 1983, 45f.). 3 In commentaries where a hemistich/verset is called a “line”, a combination of two of them is called a “couplet,” a combination of three hemistichs is dubbed a “tristich” and a combination of four a “quatrain.” Although this terminology is understandable (especially for the aphorisms from 10:1 onwards), it requires a line as the fundamental unit of poetry to consist of a single rhythmic unit and always to be a monostich. But that does little justice to the effect of close rhythmic combinations (cf. Par. 3 below) within lines, e.g. units arranged as 3+2, 2+3 (or Fünfer [Fivers]) rather than merely a string of four monostichs consisting of respectively 3, 2, 2 and 3 stressed units. Moreover, monostichs are relatively rare and where they do occur, they have a specific function (such as an introductory formula for the direct speech, e.g. 4:4a).

4

Introduction

1.3 The character of a commentary is not the same as that of a monograph. Since a commentary has to deal with the broad spectrum of issues presented by the text, many specialised topics can only be treated summarily and/or by way of further reference. I have tried to (partly) make up for this by including some essays on relevant topics that seem to warrant more attention. However, this too remains within the constraints imposed by a commentary and the series guidelines it has to adhere to. The reference system makes use of the freedom awarded contributors to the series. I have used this freedom – occasionally perhaps at the cost of strict consistency – in the service of the economy of space. However, in the footnotes some authors’ works are occasionally mentioned by name, rather than by their dates only, if that has a purpose (e.g. Melanchthon; Von Hoffmann). The line between a historically interesting work and a research publication to be treated in terms of present-day conventions is not always easy (e.g. Schultens; Ewald). Mostly only surnames of authors are used, but sometimes also initials when called for by the type of reference or the necessity to clearly identify authors (such as Boström). Commentaries on the Book of Proverbs are not cited with full particulars and/or date, since such references are readily identifiable as the cited commentary in loco. Standard reference works are cited in the conventionally accepted way and can be identified in the table of abbreviations. Full particulars of all publications are given in the bibliography.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND PROVERB GROUPS4

THE

QUESTION

OF

There is wide agreement among commentators about the overall structure of the book. Differences of opinion do not so much concern the existence of the main collections5 in the anthology as the question of the organisation of the materials within them. Disagreement on this topic is as wide ranging as the consensus about the overall structure and has become a principal feature of recent Proverbs research. Do the main collections or divisions contain subdivisions and, if so, how is this to be understood? For the initial and closing chapters the answer is fairly straightforward, since Chaps. 1–9 and 30–31 consist of longer poetic units and not of individual sayings. But for Chaps. 10–29, the fact that they are made up of individual sayings poses other questions. Are the proverbs just isolated sayings or do groups of related proverbs exist 4 5

Cf. the notes above in Par. 1.1 and Vol. I, Introduction Par. 3. They are called “divisions” in the commentary and are identified with Roman numerals.

Introduction

5

in these chapters? If they do, how are such groups to be identified, how extensive are they and how are the relationships between the proverbs that constitute them to be interpreted? Moreover, are there perhaps links between proverbs across different subdivisions or even connections cutting across the whole book? If there are, do such groups or units constitute interconnected building blocks of the anthology as a whole? Several scholars argue in this line, but others deny the existence of such grand redactional schemes (see the overview below). 2.1 The Main Divisions As for the less controversial issue of the main divisions of the book, there are also differences of opinion between scholars, but these are not pivotal. Usually seven main divisions are identified, but some find eight6 or nine7 in the final form of the Hebrew book. This in turn relates to the diachronic dimension of the redactional process. But if we start from the synchronic perspective (without denying preceding stages of growth), the superscriptions8 as these appear in the final redaction of Proverbs provide indications of the composition created by the redactor who put together the whole anthology. The following architecture emerges: I II III IV V

1:1–9:18 10:1–22:16 22:17–24:22 24:23–34 25:1–29:27

VI 30:1-33 VII 31:1-31

The proverbs of Solomon son of David, king of Israel The Proverbs of Solomon Proverbs of sages9 The following too stem from the sages The following are proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah, edited The words of Agur, son of Yakeh The words of Lemuel, king of Massa, which his mother taught him

The sections 30:15-33 and 31:10-31, which are clearly identifiable, as recognised by most commentators, lack captions and in the concept of the redactor are therefore part of the Agur and Lemuel passages. Division I stands apart from the rest by virtue of its genre, notably longer poems in the form of lessons and wisdom poems. The remainder is organised in two substantial collections of “Solomon’s proverbs” (10:1–22:16 and 25:1–29:27), each of them in turn followed by two shorter collections attributed to other wise people (22:17–24:22; 24:23-34; 30:1-33; 31:1-31).10 The overall formation is thus: 6

Yoder (2009, xxiii). Whybray ([1972] 1994, 19-20). 8 Cf. Scoralick (1995, 13). 9 The caption has been integrated with the admonition of the first stich; in the Septuagint the word order maintains the caption as the first two words of the verse. 10 Similarly Plöger (1984, xiv). 7

6

Introduction

I

1:1–9:18

Introductory collection of poems

II

10:1–22:16 III 22:17–24:22 IV 24:23-34

First main collection of sayings Appendix i Appendix ii

V

25:1–29:27 VI 30:1-33 VII 31:1-31

Second main collection of sayings Appendix i Appendix ii

The brackets in the sketch above indicate a certain symmetry in the arrangement of the main divisions of the book of Proverbs. This expresses two basic observations concerning the material beginning at 10:1, as well as a conclusion about the introductory function of Chaps. 1–9 produced by the exegesis of these poems: • The first is the quantitative observation that Divisions II and V, marked as they are by the captions in 10:1 and 25:1, are lengthy whereas III, IV, VI and VII are fairly brief in comparison. • The second is the formal observation of their arrangement: one long collection is followed by two shorter collections twice over. • Thirdly, the argument developed in Vol. I of this commentary, that not only the introduction proper (1:1-7) but the whole of Division I lays the groundwork for the sayings that follow from 10:1 onwards,11 is represented above by the bracket linking the two main collections plus their appendices with Chaps. 1–9. It can therefore be said that the overall structure of the anthology is well devised. But this by itself does not entitle us to assume that a sophisticated grand compositional scheme must reach into the details of the proverb collections or be the bearer of hidden “real meanings.” Such claims would need careful substantiating argument and testing. 2.2 Single Sayings or Proverb Groups? Nevertheless, the proverbs from Chaps. 10 through 29 do exist in a literary environment. They have been edited (and partially pre-edited) into collections or sections. By having been written down next to each other, the proverbs are associated with each other on a literary level. By the same token, also the collections or sections themselves exist in literary association with each other, namely the affiliation constituted among the parts of an edited book. Therefore both the individual sayings and the sections have a “literary context.” 11 See Vol. I, 52-53, 377 and passim; for early opinions of the introductory character of Chaps. 1–9, cf. Delitzsch (1874, 207), who finds them a “disproportionately long” introduction in relation to the rest of the book, and Bertheau ([1847] 1883, XXXIX).

Introduction

7

This raises what I have already pointed out as one of the prominent features of recent scholarly discourse on the Book of Proverbs, namely the issue of the compositional character of these chapters within the book. The debate covers the whole chromatic scale. • On the one side are those commentators who deny the existence of units composed of proverb groups or who de facto ignore the matter altogether.12 • At the other end of the scale are those who identify, not merely clusters of sayings, but intricate compositions in the arrangement of the proverbs. • Between these outer poles, several commentators assert the existence of clusters or groups of proverbs in the book but differ among themselves as to where and how often such units are to be found, as well as about the size and degree of intricacy in the design of poetic units. • A fourth assessment takes the view that, where sayings do occur in clusters or groups of comparable type, they have to be interpreted on both levels, that is, as individual sayings and also as part of the particular literary edifice into which they have been built. In this commentary I shall be working in this vein where appropriate (see below). 2.2.1 The Sentence Literature as Independent Sayings Beginning at the former end of the spectrum, the view that the sentence literature mainly consists of strings of independent proverbs is taken by several commentators. Ernst Bertheau13 states that the proverbs from 10:1 onwards “stand loosely alongside each other.” He is prepared to accept that sayings can occur in pairs marked by catchwords and he lists examples of this, but it does not influence his exegesis of the individual sayings. Likewise, Franz Delitzsch14 accepts Bertheau’s view that the sayings stand alongside each other according to “certain characteristics,” but at the same time Delitzsch requires scholarly exposition to “renounce reproduced combinations of thought” in the adages. Whatever similarities or common ideas there may be between proverbs, are in his opinion only external and have no influence on the exegesis of the sayings, for “[t]here is no comprehensive plan, ... the progressive unfolding follows no systematic scheme, but continuously wells forth.” According to Delitzsch each proverb is thus to be read and understood on its own terms alone. Also 12 For convenient surveys of the relevant literature, cf. Fox (2009, 477-483); Heim (2001, 5-66); Waltke (2004, 14-28); also the earlier overviews by Krispenz (1989, 9-15); Scoralick (1995, 13-52, in regard to 10:1–22:16). Also see the references in Weeks ([1994] 2007, 2040), where he presents his own argument rather than just a survey. 13 Bertheau ([1847] 1883, XII-XIII); the first edition of this work was published in 1847 and influenced Delitzsch (see below). 14 Delitzsch (1874, 208).

8

Introduction

Gerrit Wildeboer15 accepts Bertheau’s recognition of catchwords but no order whatsoever in the way the sentences have been brought together. That means that the sharing of catchwords has no contribution to make to the meaning of the proverbs and can at best be of mnemotechnical value (which, it may be remarked, suggests the question why this would be necessary in a written text, since writing is itself an aid to memory). Wildeboer’s contemporary in the English speaking world, Crawford Toy,16 is keenly aware of repetitions in and between the bigger divisions of the book, but regards the fact of repetition as proof that such divisions as 10:1–22:16 and 22:17–24:22 were originally independent collections the authors of which were unknown to each other.17 The most consistent approach to the proverbs as individual sayings in their own right, is the early work by Paul Volz.18 He takes each aphorism completely by itself, lists them in his own order according to the thematic matter he identifies in them (e.g. truth, honesty, friendliness, peacefulness, reconcilement etc.) and treats them without recourse to their Sitz im Text (location in the text). However, he does treat them in comparison with the same themes as these occur in the Wisdom of Ben Sira. Clearly, the literary dimension of the Book of Proverbs is so unimportant to Volz that he can even draw together materials from two books under the banner of “the sayings of wise men” in order to focus on the thematic aspect of individual proverbs (principally for Proverbs, but often also for Ben Sira).19 W.O.E. Oesterley thinks that the proverbs were “massed together in a somewhat haphazard fashion without any attempt at subject-grouping.”20 Referring to 15:28–16:9, he concedes that “[a]ttemps at co-ordination of subjectmatter are to be discerned here and there; but generally speaking the proverbs are thrown together in a very haphazard fashion in this collection.” He thinks that basically the same applies to the parts (or “some parts”) of the book as a whole.21 In a famous monograph dating from 1970, Gerhard von Rad studies Israel’s wisdom in general and naturally pays extended attention to the Book of Proverbs. As could be expected in a monograph of this kind, he structures the study on the basis of concepts such as “knowledge,” “the fear of God,” “order” 15

Wildeboer (1897, XI). Toy ([1899] 1914, vii-viii). 17 Cf., by contrast, the pioneer work on repetitions in Proverbs by Jehoshua Grintz (1968) and the major study of the phenomenon by Daniel Snell (1993), both of whom consider repetitions as indicators of composition; see below. 18 Volz (1911, 157-229). 19 There is a similar tendency in the commentary of Moss and to a certain extent also of Clifford (see below). 20 Oesterley (1929, 73); later he calls it “very haphazard” (1929, 125). 21 Oesterley (1929, 77). 16

Introduction

9

and themes he regards as the “individual subjects of instruction” (“einzelne Lehrgegenstände”), such as cause and effect, time, creation etc. Although this is not a commentary, he does discuss the single proverb as a literary work of art22 as well as other sapiential forms,23 but in his work too the literary context has no effect on the reading and understanding of the sayings. This is unambiguously said in a statement like the following: We find particularly aggravating the lack of any order determined by subjectmatter, of any arrangements in the collection of sentences and teachings. Only rarely does the reader come upon a group of proverbs in which related material has come together. For the understanding of the sentences as a whole, these small ordered arrangements are of no significance, for they appear too sporadically.

This places him unequivocally in the group of scholars denying any impact of the editorial context in which the proverbs find themselves in the book. In the same year, another highly influential denial of contextual units in the sentence literature of Proverbs was put forward in the commentary by William McKane.24 He says unambiguously “that there is, for the most part, no context in the sentence literature and that the individual wisdom sentence is a complete entity.” His declaration is so categorical that it assumes that being an entity in its own right excludes being part of a context. It also assumes that the concatenation of such written “entities” is not or cannot provide a context. But the assumption is not expressed or substantiated, nor are possible objections eliminated. For instance, no argument is offered as to why a written string of stichs cannot be a context,25 particularly when they are interconnected by the shared literary form of poetry, the binary structure of verses, and common stylistic features such as especially parallelism. Moreover, even if the addition of the words “for the most part” could be said to qualify McKane’s position formally, it has no effect on his treatment of the sentence literature. Therefore his admission that there were some “editorial principles” at work remains ineffectual, since he immediately qualifies it by alleging that said principles have such a “secondary character” that “they do not contradict the statement that there is, for the most part, no context in the sentence literature.”26 He classifies the sayings into groups of his own and tags them 22

Von Rad (1970, 41-53; English translation: 1972, 25-34). Von Rad (1970, 53-73; 1972, 34-50). Cf. R.B.Y. Scott (1965, 130-131), whose position is similar. 24 McKane ([1970] 1977, 10-14). For a detailed critique, cf. Heim (2001, 9-12). 25 Cf., as illustration the fact that an exponent of a group approach (for want of a better term) such as Scoralick (1995, 13) has no problem to grant that the individual sayings in 10:1–22:16 are “independent” (selbständig). The very title of her book, Einzelspruch und Sammlung (“Individual Saying and Collection”) shows that her thesis posits the compatibility of the concepts of independent sayings and the context of a larger literary unit. 26 In light of this argument it should be clear that Hildebrandt (1988, 207) and Whybray (1990, 156-157) are right in calling McKane’s position “atomistic,” but Hildebrandt is certainly 23

10

Introduction

according to their content (Class A: old sayings concerned with the education of the individual; Class B: sayings concerned with the community rather than the individual and mostly of a negative character; Class C: sayings that express a Yahwistic moralism).27 McKane then organises hundreds of pages of commentary according to his own groupings and thus treats the sayings without regard to their location in chapters (somewhat – mutatis mutandis – like Volz). The interest in single proverbs motivated by form-critical interest in the paremiology of oral traditions as espoused by Claus Westermann and Friedemann Golka,28 is discussed in the first essay (“On the Social Setting of Wisdom”) in Vol. I of this commentary.29 J.M. Thompson30 provided the term used by Ted Hildebrandt31 to label this kind of typifying the relationship of the sayings. According to Thompson, “they [that is, the proverbs] are jumbled together willy-nilly into collections,” which caused Hildebrandt to lump together some of the commentators mentioned above and others32 as “willy-nilly advocates.” That is perhaps a somewhat unwieldy label because several of these commentators, unlike Thompson, would not accept the description of the proverbs as a pack of shuffled cards, and maintain instead that whatever connections can be found are technical, such as catchwords and occasional similarities in content matter not significant for interpreting them.

not justified in lumping Whybray himself in this group, appealing as he does to a remark by Whybray (1974, 67) where the latter incidentally compares Job with Ecclesiastes both of which contain “many short proverbs similar to those found in the Book of Proverbs.” Scoralick (1995, 132) is perhaps not quite cogent in claiming that this is a “misunderstanding.” If there is a misunderstanding, it is rather to be sought in the endeavour to explain away McKane’s own characterisation of the sentence literature. He himself continually refers to the “random way in which wisdom sentences follow upon one another in any chapter,” and speaks of “the atomistic character of sentence literature” as well as his own method ([1970] 1977, 10; 413). 27 McKane ([1970] 1977, 413ff.). The treatment of Chap. 10 offers a good illustration ([1970] 1977, 420-427), where, for instance, v. 3 is discussed just before v. 30, and v. 32 – which is the last verse in the chapter – several pages earlier. He even needs a system of cross-references in his translation ([1970] 1977, 225-258) to enable readers to find the pages where specific verses are commented upon. This idea was not new when McKane wrote his commentary. It had already been used by Volz (1911, VI-IX), but McKane does not cite him, neither for the reference system nor for the method of using his own classification as an organising principle, nor even for the persistent fragmentation of the text. 28 Westermann (1971; 1991; cf. also 1990b, 515-516); Golka (1986; 1989a; 1989b; 1993). 29 See Vol. I, 15-19; cf. also Loader (1999, 211-233) for a fuller discussion. 30 Thompson (1974, 15). 31 Hildebrandt (1988, 207). 32 E.g. J. Paterson (1961, 63); R. Gordon (1975, 49); P.C. Craigie (1979, 7); J.L. Crenshaw ([1981] 1986, 73); B. Lang (1986, 3); J.C. Rylaarsdam (1964, 48); also a number of introductions to the Old Testament (Hildebrandt 1988, 208); cf. further H.D. Preuss (1987, 3233).

Introduction

11

The same tendency is also found in several commentaries on the Book of Proverbs, such as those by R.B.Y. Scott, Richard Clifford and Tremper Longman. According to Scott, Prov 10:1–22:16 is “amorphous,” even if sometimes there is “a semblance of order in the occurrence of small groups of sayings on one subject.”33 Despite such a semblance, for him the “miscellaneous subject matter and the discontinuity of their arrangement” speak against reading them together.34 Clifford acknowledges “that many of the sayings have been arranged by catchword and theme” and that “there are many arresting associations of verses worthy of a commentator’s attention.” 35 But then he continues: “At the same time, one must remember that aphorisms are by definition concise and self-contained. Each must be allowed to have its own say.” I would agree with both statements, but in practice the second cancels the first in Clifford’s commentary, where he ignores any meaningful impact of the “arresting associations” in the actual exegesis and, in fact, disposes of the problem in a couple of lines. Longman36 likewise accepts that “proverbs of similar topic are occasionally grouped together.” But to him this is of no consequence for their interpretation. He declares that, despite some occasional thematic grouping, there is nevertheless no “systematic structure to Proverbs.” An aspect of the proverbs as individual sayings is their classification into different sub-genres. Some are descriptive sayings and some are injunctions in the imperative or jussive.37 That does not mean, however, that only the injunctions or directives can be regarded as didactic material. On the contrary, most didactic material is contained in statements meant to learn and take to heart. But further classifying proverbs into different classes according to their thematic content, becomes at once more sophisticated and more difficult. The “new approach” introduced by McKane entailed a distinction between three categories in the sentence literature from Chap. 10 onwards. His “Class A” is made up of proverbs concerned with the individual for a successful life and placed in what McKane called the “old wisdom.” His “Class B” are the 33 Scott (1965, 17). In a later article he confirms this view and calls the collection “variegated materials without contextual connections” (Scott 1972, 147); cf. Heim (2001, 7). 34 Scott (1965, 130-131). He does, however, include a list of proverbs from the division grouped according to his view of their thematic content, somewhat like Volz (1911) and Moss (2015), but, in contrast to them, Scott leaves his commentary in the traditional order for ease of reference. 35 Clifford (1999, 108). 36 Longman (2006, 41), in the context of an argument in defence of a random arrangement (2006, 38-42). 37 See below, Essay 1, Virtue between Command and Advice for a discussion and illustrations.

12

Introduction

proverbs concerned with the community and mostly have a negative character as they point out the harm that could be done to the community. “Class C” are those expressing pious moralism and containing “God-language.”38 McKane’s proposal is based on the hypothesis that an original secular wisdom was later re-interpreted in theological terms, a now largely discarded idea.39 These classes are not groups or clusters – about which McKane repeatedly declares his scepticism – and are strewn throughout the collections of sayings. Bernd Schipper – who pays extensive attention to proverb groupings – also distinguishes his own proposal from of McKane’s “classes,” but nevertheless offers a submission of very similar categories.40 He calls them “levels of sapiential thinking,” which however does not mean that all proverbs are to be understood by means of a three-tier system of levels, but that an individual proverb belongs to one of the three categories, therefore basically in the same terms as McKane. Some proverbs are manifestations of a “general saying of common sense” (“allgemeine[r] Sinnspruch”). Proverbs in a second category translate such practicalities in terms of sapiential concepts and use wisdom terminology for the purpose. The third category is made up of proverbs with a religious dimension, which is often (but not always) noticeable by their God-language. Although Schipper is not dependent on the thesis of development in the same way as McKane, there are similarities in the concept itself. His categories are illuminating in terms of the lucidity they offer regarding the variety of ancient perspectives on reality. But exegetically such categories do not seem to yield many value-added results. The categories useful :: harmful, sapiential :: foolish and righteous :: wicked alike pit “plus” against “minus” and as such must have meant very much the same to the ancients who did not divide reality into holy or religiously relevant and secular or religiously irrelevant. That is why the same everyday phenomena addressed in such proverbs could also become sapientially and religiously relevant. It is therefore also understandable that they were maintained alongside each other and not all edited into becoming “theological.” Moreover, as far as their literary form is concerned, they cannot be so markedly different in light of the hermeneutical foundation that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of all knowledge (1:7; 9:10). Nevertheless, as pointed out above, Schipper is often also prepared to consider groupings of proverbs by means of catchwords, structural features and other techniques, so that he can by no means be regarded as a stringing-together commentator.

38

McKane ([1970] 1977, 11. Cf. Scoralick (1995, 35-37). 40 Schipper (2018, 600-602). This is also interesting when one considers that McKane finds the idea of proverb groups irrelevant, while groups are important to Schipper. 39

Introduction

13

2.2.2 Proverb Groups in the Sentence Literature Concerning the question of connections between sayings, recent Proverbs research has on the other hand produced many studies that argue for the opposite take. The authors who emphasise connections between proverbs have a forerunner in Philipp Melanchthon, who noticed in the early years of the Reformation (some time before 1529) that the placing of specific proverbs adjacent to certain others cannot be explained satisfactorily by coincidence. He had a special interest in the Book of Proverbs and often devoted exegetical lectures to the book, the notes of which were preserved and often revised.41 In one of these, published in 1529, Melanchthon stated,42 Posteriores duo versiculi interpretantur superiores. Saepe enim Salomon tradita sententia paulo obscuriore subicit aliquanto minus obscuram, qua superiorem velut interpretetur. (The latter of two lines interprets the former one. For, to a saying handed down somewhat too obscurely, Solomon often attaches one appreciably less obscure, after the like of which the one standing first can be interpreted.)

For Melanchthon, the author (Solomon) applied compositional methods for organising the literary form of the anthology. This entailed adding “less obscure” proverbs to “obscure” ones, so that the difficult proverbs can be elucidated by the easier ones that follow. Melanchthon makes his statement as an observation on the purely literary level, but it resonates well with what became increasingly significant in the interpretative tradition of the Reformation, viz. the motto, Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres (Holy Scripture is its own interpreter).43 On this side of the scale commentators have often made the same basic observation as Scott, Clifford and Longman, namely that groups, clusters or sections consisting of proverbs do occur, but in their case the emphasis differs markedly. It falls on the coherence, attachment and unity of the sayings and not on their isolation, detachment or fragmentation. In a sense, this state of affairs is reflected by the work of Gustav Boström,44 who studied what he called “paronomasia” in the proverbs. In his usage the term refers to all kinds of sound play, including alliteration, assonance and rhyme.45 Although 41

See Stupperich (1975, 21-34). Melanchthon (1529, 345); this refers to the notes for his second semester of lectures on Proverbs, held in 1527-1528 and published in 1529 (Kuropka [2002, 106]); it should not be confused with his commentary on Proverbs of 1550, which is cited in this volume. 43 Nevertheless, the axiom is older than the Reformation and was already used by Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274); see Bretzke (2003, 127). 44 Boström (1928, passim) – in Swedish; only with difficulty accessible to me and therefore mostly cited indirectly. 45 Normally the term “paronomasia” is not used to include external similarities such as rhyme, but to indicate the play of sounds with relevance for meaning, that is, a word play that can be effected by the use of homonyms and the like; cf. Wagenknecht ([2003] 2007, 864-867). 42

14

Introduction

this study has been widely cited, its central interest is not the arrangement of proverbs in groups, but rather the power that sound has to express a particular way of thinking. Nevertheless, the idea of links by sound between proverbs became a criterion for the identification of compositional units and contexts. In a slim doctoral dissertation of 95 pages, Udo Skladny provided another incentive for the study of coherent groups.46 His analysis of the proverbs beginning at 10:1 claims that both stylistic and thematic similarities can be found within specific divisions of the book. In Prov 10–15 (his “Collection A”) he finds mostly antithetic parallelism expressing an ethical wisdom about the “righteous” and the “wicked,” in which a nexus of character and consequence rather than of deed and consequence is expressed.47 In 16:1–22:16 (his “Collection B”) the parallelisms according to Skladny are mostly synonymous and “synthetic,” the wisdom is less ethical, more concerned with society, intended for officials, while the deed-consequence nexus as well as practical concerns are more prominent.48 Skladny’s “Collection C” (25-27) contains more admonitions and comparisons and smaller thematic clusters mainly for simple folk.49 In “Collection D” (28-29) he finds similarities to A, since the nexus of character or general attitude and consequence, interest in the types “righteous” and “wicked” as well as antithetical parallelisms become prominent again. Skladny thus articulated the case against a “willy-nilly” lumping together of sayings. Although the details are not always convincing,50 Skladny has the distinction of producing a doctoral dissertation that has become a classic point of reference in sapiential studies (even though he never developed his research further). Picking up Boström’s study, Hans-Jürgen Hermisson develops the idea of links via paronomasia further. According to him, it is surprising that Boström could notice a connection between paronomasia and thought patterns within the individual sayings themselves, but not between them.51 He limits his investigation to Prov 10–15 and, in addition to paronomasia, applies criteria such as catchwords and thematic associations to conclude that a number of relatively short groupings of sayings do exist in these chapters. He emphasises that this is not a systematic ordering, but it does “demonstrate in principle that elements of order within the proverb collections outweigh the often-assumed 46 Skladny (1961); the dissertation actually dates from 1959, but was only published several years later. 47 Skladny (1961, 21-24). 48 Skladny (1961, 40-46). 49 Skladny (1961, 55-57). 50 For instance, when sayings in B may contain the same ethical impact as in A (cf. individual proverbs such as 16:8 and 10:2, or groupings like 16:10-15 and 14:27-28). 51 Hermisson (1968, 171-172).

Introduction

15

muddled confusion.”52 His overall conclusion is that the single proverb is first to be interpreted in its own right and then to be checked for possible contributions to its meaning by other related proverbs.53 An innovative proposal, made in the forties and maintained into the seventies by Patrick Skehan, has not found a following but still maintains a presence in scholarly literature.54 Skehan’s thesis is that the entire Book of Proverbs was put together by a single editor. He thinks the whole book is designed in columns on the architectural model of a house, which recalls the House of Wisdom in Prov 9:1, where the reference to the seven pillars is interpreted literally by Skehan.55 Major objections to the thesis are that Skehan has to rearrange several parts of the text to retain his columns, that the gematria which purportedly supports the thesis is unconvincing,56 that lines of varying length are assumed to fit into the same length of space available for symmetrical columns, and that artistic arrangements of books in columns of this kind are only known from much later times.57 One of the prominent sapiential scholars of the 1970s through 1990s, Norman Whybray, advanced an interesting variation of the idea of purposeful composition. According to him,58 the Yahweh sayings in 10:1–22:16 were deliberately positioned where they now are in order to provide a theological context for the less theologically sounding sayings. That enables the reader to interpret the less theological proverbs in the light of the strategically placed theological ones. Since it had become untenable to uphold the older view that an early “secular” phase was “theologised” in a later phase of sapiential development, Whybray’s thesis in effect proposed to account for the perceived secular-religious polarity and simultaneously to answer the question whether purposefully edited contexts can be discerned from Chap. 10 onwards.59 The other main collection of the book (my Division V) has also been examined for poetic units. Using rhetorical criticism and structuralist methods, Raymond van Leeuwen argues for the presence of proverbial poems in 52

Hermisson (1968, 179). Hermisson (1968, 182); see the commentary on 10:15. 54 Skehan (1948, revised: 1971, 15-26; 1967, revised: 1971, 27-45). 55 Skehan (1947, 190-198); support for his interpretation of the pillars referred to in 9:1 as columns of the book came from Tournay (1973, 130), but the idea was already adumbrated in the 19th century by Ferdinand Hitzig; cf. the discussion in Vol. I, 383. 56 For instance, it needs a textual emendation from ‫ חזקיה‬to ‫( יחזקיה‬25:1) in order to make the gematria of the name match the number of verses in 25-29. 57 See further Waltke (2004, 9-10) and Fox (2009, 481-482). 58 Whybray (1979, 153-165); this is a view the essence of which he held, albeit with modifications, until his commentary, which was published in 1994 (cf. Whybray 1994, 152). 59 Other scholars reached comparable results, namely Scott (1972, 146-165) and Sæbø (1986, 99-106); cf. Scoralick (1995, 132) and Waltke (2004, 18). 53

16

Introduction

Prov 25 and 26.60 In 25:2-27 he finds a “proverb poem” on the theme of social position and social conflict contained within a clear inclusio in verses 2 and 27.61 While 26:1-12 is a collection of sayings about the fool, the inner associations in the passage enrich the meaning to become a “treatise” on real wisdom. Again, in his opinion, 26:13-16 is a small group of sayings about the sluggard, but 26:17-28 and 27:23-27 are unified poems. Van Leeuwen does grant that 27:1-22 is a “loose collection,” but concludes that this confirms the “high degree of literary unity” in the other examined parts.62 A further contribution came from Ted Hildebrandt who applied linguistic and stylistic criteria63 to identify 62 pairs of proverbs in Prov 10–29.64 These pairs are groups proving the compositional character as opposed to “willynilly” lumping of sayings into collections. “Hence, the ‘proverbial pair’ is proposed to be a literary form which evinces the literary and editorial craftsmanship of the proverbial collectors (Prov 25:1).”65 He discusses five examples, but gives a full list of the pairs as well as the other “bonded units.”66 He also considers whether such pairs are part of larger clusters with the verses preceding and adjoining them and claims that to be the case in several instances. Finding the proverbial pair to be “one molecular element at the collectional level” in the transition “from the atomistic, proverbial sentence to the proverbial collection,”67 he pleads for the examination of Proverbs from the collectional as well as from the sentential perspectives. The cue offered by Hermisson in the German-speaking world was developed in the work of Jutta Krispenz on what I have called Divisions I and V.68 She applies the criteria of repetitive sound play, paronomasia and catchwords to reach groupings with relevance for meaning, finding a number of them in all chapters except Chaps. 14, 17, 19 and 29. Her result and way of obtaining it are criticised mildly by Waltke and severely by Scoralick (see below). Even if the present commentary may come to different results and conclusions, Krispenz should be commended for recognising that, if proverb groups are to be taken seriously as compositional entities, they should have more than superficial connections and must be units in terms of meaning. 60

Van Leeuwen (1988); the dissertation was completed in 1984 and published in 1988. For this chapter, Van Leeuwen builds on observations first made by G.E. Bryce (1972, 145-157), who used a structuralist approach to claim that 25:2-27 is a literary unit. 62 Van Leeuwen (1988, 125). 63 Hildebrandt calls these the “levels” of his methodology, namely “phonetic, syntactic, semantic, rhetorical, pragmatic, and thematic” (1988, 209). 64 Not only in 10:1–22:16, as Waltke (2004, 18) says. 65 Hildebrandt (1988, 208); cf. the remarks above on J.M. Thompson. 66 Hildebrandt (1988, 208-218). 67 Hildebrandt (1988, 224). 68 Krispenz (1989); the dissertation was completed in 1988, twenty years after the publication of Hermisson’s seminal study, but published in 1989. 61

Introduction

17

Although she acknowledges the importance of Hermisson’s work, Ruth Scoralick finds his results too vague. According to her, Hermisson made no real progress since the work of the 19th century commentators, in view of the fact that some of them also conceded formal elements shared by sayings, while on his part Hermisson insists that the groupings are not systematic.69 Her rather sweeping verdict assumes that only research coming up with a consistently systematic “explanation” (“Deutung”) for the relations between proverbs is progress. Not surprisingly, Scoralick is criticised for this by Scherer,70 who assesses Hermisson’s work to be “a concentrated effort to demonstrate the relations between the individual sayings in Prov 10-15.” Hermisson in fact provided a vantage point from which she could work in her own examination of Prov 10-15. She uses paronomasia, catchwords, and theological reinterpretations to isolate five text segments (10:1–11:7; 11:8–12:13; 12:14– 13:13; 13:14–14:27; 14:28–15:32). However, “the meaning or theme of the sayings is not always favorable to the division on the basis of literary features.”71 Neither can her handling of repetitions and variant proverbs “be used as structuring devices because there are no repetitions within the delimited text material.”72 Although Waltke is therefore right that “she made no attempt to show the unity of the material within this broad framework,”73 Scoralick has nevertheless contributed substantially to the growing realisation that the compositional aspect of the Book of Proverbs cannot be ignored. Another among the number of doctoral dissertations that significantly impacted the study of Proverbs is that by Knut Martin Heim.74 He proposes the theory that the way proverbs are read varies according to the readers’ awareness of editorial organisation. Those who read without such awareness can read the proverbs atomistically and apply them in many ways. Those who notice redactional activity can recognise that proverbs are grouped by the editor (of Prov 10:1–22:16) so as to create contexts conducive to understanding the individual sayings with an enriched meaning. Using linguistic and stylistic criteria such as syntax and especially the repetition of, among others, sounds and roots, he divides 10:1–22:16 into four groups and several smaller 69

Scoralick (1995, 120). Scherer (1999, 20). Scoralick is not averse to harsh judgmental terminology, e.g. authors who “drown” in their own data or offer “fanciful” explanations (1999, 126); contrast the irenic way in which Waltke (2004, 18) reacts to the same issues and scholars. 71 Murphy (1998, 64; italics in the original). 72 Heim (2001, 58; my italics). He provides a thorough critique of Scoralick, including her original use of repetitions (Scoralick [1995, 156-159]) with applications in the analyses of Part B of her book [1995, 160ff.]). She could not consult Snell’s detailed study of repetitions, published shortly after the completion of her own dissertation (Snell 1993), but that of Grintz (1968, 243-269) was available long before that. 73 Waltke (2004, 20); cf. in detail Heim (2001, 51-59). 74 Heim (2001; the original dates from 1996). 70

18

Introduction

clusters within each.75 The clusters should not be seen as dividing markers between carefully structured poetic passages, but as groups of individual sayings linked to each other like individual grapes are linked by twiglets into a bunch. They can indeed be read individually and in any sequence, but they should be read together. “This reading-together allows for inferences and cross-references which lead to a cross-fertilization and inter-animation of meaning through the creative combination of the common truths and the emotive language of all members of the group.”76 This is the attractive aspect of Heim’s impressive work, and also the aspect questioned by Fox, who uses the metaphor of jewels instead of grapes in his rhetorical question, “[i]s it really such a loss if they are not all laid out in pretty, symmetric designs or divided into neat little piles?”77 A possible answer could be that a lack of symmetric designs and neatly organised units would not matter much but that does not mean that, in those places where similar kinds of diamonds, rubies, sapphires or emeralds do indeed associate (even if the “piles” are not so “neat”), the reader may see this as “creative combinations” made by the editor either intentionally or unintentionally. However, Heim does seem to work with the supposition that the only real literary context of the proverbs is that found in carefully structured clusters.78 As I will argue below – and the commentary itself will illustrate – the flow of sayings is not so smooth as supposed by the assumption that exquisitely built-up clusters are a prerequisite for reading the proverbs “in context.” Building on the work of Hermisson, Krispenz and Scoralick, the doctoral work of Andreas Scherer took the topic another step forward in his study of 10:1–22:16. Besides paronomasia and catchwords, he also works with word fields and attempts to define proverb groups. As opposed to Scoralick, he argues that the interrelationship between proverbs entails more than structural patterns and also includes meaningful thematic connections. He finds thirteen units in 10:1–22:16, the longer ones of which often have didactic as well as religious categories at their beginnings.79 According to Scherer, these provide mottos to set interpretative frames. His thesis is that the manifold perspectives among the proverbs are thus associated in such a way as to show the reciprocity of education and religious faith. In the framework of her investigation of the social context in Prov 10:1– 22:16, Katharine Dell also pays attention to groupings among the sayings. 75 Heim (2001, 111ff.; [Prov 10:1–13:25]; 171ff. [Prov 14-16]; 225ff. [Prov 17:1–20:4]; 271ff. [Prov 20:5–22:16]). 76 Heim (2001, 107). 77 Fox (2009, 481); cf. also the criticism in the similar style of rhetorical questions used in the review of Heim’s book by Steinmann (2002, 548-549). On the other hand, Lucas (2015, 15-21) provides a guarded defence of Heim’s cluster principle. 78 Cf. Steinmann (2002, 548-549). 79 Scherer (1999, 334-337).

Introduction

19

While in her opinion “clusters of material ... on thematic criteria” are important, she thinks (contrary to Heim) that unity is not the identifying feature of these chapters, but quite the opposite, notably “fragmentation which reveals oral clusters.”80 In her judgement this may be due to the usefulness of oral thematic clusters in a society that had to memorise much, which, again, may suggest that Heim’s cluster theory (see above) points to an “interim stage” between the oral clusters and their being committed to writing. In any event, her conclusion is important, namely (a) that there are clusters or thematic groups and (b) that the overall identifying feature is fragmentation which reveals clusters. It entails that the presence of groupings does not exclude the presence of diversity, even to the point of fragmentation. A Hebrew article by Jehoshua Grintz only started exerting a wider influence once it was republished in English.81 This was mediated by Daniel Snell in a thorough study of proverb repetitions and variations.82 These studies are not strictly about units and clusters, but do have a bearing on the question of redactional activity in the ordering of the proverbs. Snell, building on the work of Grintz, uses the phenomenon of repeated phrases and sayings in the book as the criterion for the assemblage of the book. His conclusions confirm some of Grintz’s about the connections between the overarching divisions in the book83 and deny or partially deny others. The result is, as Snell himself concludes, an “uncertainty,” but his meticulous analyses prove to be very helpful for detailed investigation, even if he does neglect other criteria, such as theme and style. The view that there are meaningful compositional units in the book had already been put into practice in commentaries before the spate of studies published in the nineties. The most prominent and consistent of these is the two-volume commentary by Arndt Meinhold (1991).84 He consistently identifies units of sayings that in his view cohere by virtue of their theme. Only in very few cases does he recognise single verses (10:22; 14:4; 16:16; two “framing proverbs” in 22:15 and 16 and two “structuring proverbs” in 28:1 and 29:27). This position and its application can best be reacted to at appropriate places in the commentary proper.

80

Dell (2006, 63-64). Grintz (1968, 243-269); English translation by D.C. Snell (1993, 87-114). 82 Snell (1993). 83 These are the connections or lack of connections between Prov 1-9 and 10:1–22:16; between 1-9 and 22:17–23:11 as well as 23:12–24:22; between 1-9 and 25-27; between 10:1– 22:16 and 22:17–24:34; between 25-29 and 22:17–24:34. 84 Cf. also the commentary by Plöger (1984), in which he reads the individual proverbs in their own right, but finds some proverb groupings as well, mostly pairs (e.g. 10:2-3, 24-25, 31-32; 11:10-11; 21:31-32) and relatively short units (e.g. 11:3-6, 12-14; 12:13-23; 16:21-24; 18:6-8). 81

20

Introduction

A rigorously consistent exponent of the composition thesis is Hans Fuhs, who set out his ideas in two commentaries in 2001.85 His main thesis bears directly on the composition issue. Since the book as a whole is a unity, it has been carefully composed. There are a few signs of some redaction, but the book as such was composed by one author on the basis of a unified concept (“geschlossene Konzeption”), which is the ordering of society on the basis of a synthesis of faith and wisdom. Therefore Fuhs also finds the individual sayings carefully ordered. He is sensitive to literary features, figures of style and the like, but these are not so much criteria for his idea of one unified composition – the assumption from which he works is his real criterion – as illustrations of that conceptual unity. Christopher Ansberry also proceeds from the assumption that underlies Fuhs’s work, but his original study of the book’s literary unity moves in quite another direction. He does not develop the debate on clusters or groupings as opposed to single aphorisms, but is interested in “the nature and function of the individual compositions within their final, editorial Gestalt.”86 Rather than arguing for compositional or redactional clusters, he assumes “the traditional divisions of the material” and attempts to show that indications scattered through them testify to the book’s “courtly” function of educating privileged boys in the “Deuteronomic paradigm of leadership.”87 He distinguishes between “elementary” (Prov 10:1–15:33), “intermediate” (Prov 16:1– 22:16) and “vocational” wisdom (Prov 22:17–24:34), all of which is “rudimentary” vis-à-vis “advanced” (Prov 28-29) and “applied” wisdom (Prov 3031). The assumption from which he works takes the literary context seriously, which in itself is meaningful. But it labours under another assumption, viz. that higher class education means “courtly” education, which is a highly suggestive historical assumption. This becomes especially problematic in the light of the post-exilic dates for various phases of the redaction. However interesting the final Gestalt of the book may be – which it certainly is, for instance in theological perspective – the argument does not contribute to the cluster/sentence debate, neither does it intend to. The work of Bernd Schipper has been discussed above (Par. 2.2.1) in relation to the work of McKane on classes or categories of proverbs. However, he should be mentioned in 2.2.2 again since his major commentary does not only primarily discuss the proverbs one by one, but also pays extensive attention to groups and pairs of proverbs. Some commentators argue strongly for the literary unity of the book, including the sayings, but then interpret them thematically. For all their other 85 Fuhs (2001a, 2001b). The one is a substantial work and the other a shorter version within the constraints of the series “Die Neue Echter Bibel.” 86 Ansberry (2011, 9); italics in the original. 87 Ansberry (2011, 188).

Introduction

21

differences, there is a curious similarity between Volz’s work (cf. above) and the more recent commentary by Alan Moss. Moss begins from the exact opposite vantage point by giving most attention “to the context of the passages within the book sections, and within the whole unfolding educational context.”88 Nevertheless, he often ends up commenting on a theme distilled from several chapters, which requires him to cover the same chapters several times over to comment on different themes as they crop up in other verses from such chapters. For instance, Chaps. 10–22 are discussed as far as they contain the idea of speech,89 then the same chapters are worked through in another round of comments on poverty and prosperity,90 and once more – though shorter – on the theme of joy and sadness.91 Although it is important to Moss that the book be seen as a symmetrical literary arrangement, his net result of themes and their interpretation seems to be neither necessarily nor essentially determined by the emphasis on literary unity and composition.92 If one assumes the existence of closely knit patterns, one has to pay heed to the warning by Fox93 that, in terms of the Rorschach principle, one will necessarily succeed in seeing them or “define them into existence.” 2.2.3 A Two-sided Coin This commentary will apply what may be called a both-ways-approach. That does not mean a simple additive approach according to which one avoids a decision as one proceeds. On the contrary, it reckons with my understanding of a fundamental principle governing the series Historical Commentary on the Old Testament. Both the literary and the historical aspects of analysing the Hebrew text before us94 are taken into account. For the Book of Proverbs it involves an application of the literary relevance of a historical approach, namely that the original dimension of individual proverbs standing on their 88

Moss (2015, 2). Moss (2015, 79-87). 90 Moss (2015, 87-93). 91 Moss (2015, 93-95). 92 Cf. the commentary by Richard Clifford to which I have already referred above. He acknowledges the existence of literary groupings of proverbs, but in practice ignores them in his exegesis of the individual sayings (e.g. 11:3-6). However, he does not group the sayings of 10:1–22:16 into thematic clusters of his own for the purpose of interpreting their contents, as Volz and Moss do. Clifford suspects that “[t]he structure may well be a system of ‘builder’s marks’ devised by editors rather than a system meant to communicate to readers” (Clifford [1999, 111]). What they would mark, for what purpose, and with what significance, are not clear. 93 Fox (2009, 481). On the Rorschach principle, cf. below, the Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 12. 94 “Historical” is therefore not understood as only pertaining to extra-textual historical events referred to in the text or as background material, but primarily to the historical growth of the text, specifically the diachronic dimension of its redaction. 89

22

Introduction

own feet95 be considered as well as the later dimension of proverbs that subsequently were brought together – whether in clusters or all manner of associative thinking, such as thought-provoking contrasts (e.g. 26:4-5), correctives (e.g. 14:12 after 14:11) or even as a whole book. On both levels the proverb is to be interpreted synchronically,96 that is, as it stands at a particular point in the history of its use. The diachronic dimension, that is, how the one stands in relation to the other, whether/how the earlier was modified by subsequent development and whether/how the different stages amplify each other’s meaning, can only be appreciated when the literary character of all identifiable stages in the growth of the text have been taken seriously. In any event, the interpretation should be open to all possibilities; it should neither be assumed that proverb contexts are closely knit and thus necessarily influence the single proverbs involved, nor should such possibilities be excluded in principle. Where relationships are found to be arguably present, they should be considered seriously. But I would suggest that the primary interest should be the individual proverb, due to its “self-containedness” and aphoristic character as “a flash of comprehension,” meaning that “no total system is reached.”97 At the very least, the survey given above shows a tendency among scholars (even scholars sceptical of sophisticated designs) to associate certain proverbs with others by means of similarity in thematic material, but also by means of formal criteria such as word patterns, sound patterns or catchwords. The moot point is the weight to be accorded to such associations, in other words, whether such arrangements are significant for “bringing out the proper meaning” (to use Weeks’s expression). We have seen above that Weeks does not in principle deny the semantic significance of structural proximity,98 but he does assert that the redactor was “more interested” in the outward association of proverbs than in showing any “proper meaning” by means of the formal alignment and organisation of proverbs. Without claiming the ability to read the redactor’s mind, this seems a reasonable pronouncement to me. On the level of redactional intention (actually our reconstruction of it), it means that the redactor did not exclude the meaning(s) of the individual proverbs in 95

That this is the point to begin, stands to reason in light of the aphoristic character of most proverbs from Chap. 10 onwards. In its compressed form of expression, the individual proverb indeed presents itself as “a moment of insight, a flash of comprehension of some universal insight,” as Millar (2020, 37) puts it. Therefore it is logical to make this little selfcontained unit a point of departure. 96 The term “synchronic” should not be taken as the equivalent of “a-chronic.” The former refers to a text as it stands at a given point in time, the latter to work regardless of the dimension of time, and “diachronic” to the dimension of development over time. 97 This sentence says basically the same as the formulation in my original manuscript, but just before going to the press has now been imbued with words and phrases for which I have Dr. Suzanne Millar (2020, 36, 193) to thank. 98 Weeks ([1994] 2007, 39).

Introduction

23

favour of the “real” meaning carried by the positioning of the sayings. Neither did the redactor, in my opinion, privilege the former to the detriment of the latter. So, Hermisson was right: first the single proverb, then a check to see whether other proverbs contribute an additional dimension.99 It also means that the role of the reader is to be respected; the reader has to accept responsibility for taking both levels into account and substantiating each reading in its own right. With a few exceptions, the grouping of the sayings from Chap. 10 onwards is not as closely woven as the thoroughly structured poems in Chaps. 1–9. Often they can indeed be read on the level of the individual proverb as well as on the level of their context among the surrounding proverbs.100 It may be helpful to think in terms of “associative links” between proverbs, as suggested by Weeks and Fox.101 There may be chains of associations from verse to verse without the same theme running through all of them. But there may also be “more than simple association at work,” as Weeks concedes, citing 25:4-5 as an example. Likewise, Fox also accepts such thematic series, e.g. 26:1.3-12, which also contain a non-thematic associative element in v. 2. Although he agrees that such associations are not devised to bring out socalled “real” or “deeper” meanings, he rightly cautions that, “when thematic clusters do occur, they are relevant to interpretation.” That “associative thinking” can certainly also entail thematic associations, even on a relatively extended scale, seems to be supported by the sapiential tradition of onomastica. Onomastic texts from the wisdom traditions of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Israel are defined as the stringing together of lists of phenomena that belong together inherently, i.e., thematically. For instance, aquatic phenomena, human types or human characteristics etc. are strung together in associative groups indicating that there is an order in the bewildering world. These texts cannot be regarded as poetic compositions in the usual sense, but nevertheless show that the sapiential tradition knew and often drew on configurations of unit-strings relating thematically to each other. In the Old Testament this principle is often poeticised in compositions such as Job 9:510; 26:5-14; 36:27–37:13; 37:14-24; 38–39; Qoh 3:2-8; Ps 8 and others.102 Of course, this does not mean that one can simply appeal to such sequences to declare the aphoristic strings from 10:1 onwards to be careful compositions, but it does suggest that the sapiential tradition is no stranger to written texts consisting of strings of additive but sensible sequences/units. 99

See the paragraph above on Hermisson. See “Essentials and Perspectives” on Prov 10:1–22:16. For an illustration, see the note on “Variant Repetitions” in the commentary on Prov 12:15-16. 101 Weeks ([1994] 2007, 37-39); his examples are 12:12-14; 14:35–15:2; 15:31-33. Fox (2009, 479-480) illustrates with 19:11-14. 102 Cf. Loader (2001b, 5-8; 103-110), where extensive literature is cited. 100

24

Introduction

To illustrate my point, a concrete comparison may be drawn cum grano salis with the editorial effect of a collection of essays on, say, the aphorism in the Journal for the Study of the Old Testament. The editor says of this collection, “[t]he strength of this group of essays lies less in cohesiveness than in diversity.” These essays are not a random mixture of unrelated articles, but an edited group. This is manifested not only by the fact that the editor identifies them as a “group” and thus implies a certain commonality among them, but they also share a central interest, which is expressed in the title of the collection, “Essays on the Art of the Aphorism.” Nevertheless, the editor also identifies and emphasises a diversity among the individual articles despite the common condition towards which they gravitate. Each essay in its own right should alert the reader to the “several ways” in which the art of the aphorism can manifest itself and in which the aphorisms themselves can be read and understood (granting that essays on aphorisms are not aphorisms). The editorial formulation, “less in cohesiveness than in diversity”103 is well chosen, for it says exactly that; there is indeed a cohesiveness in the collection, but the diversity is more salient. That sums up and illustrates my view of the overall issue of proverbs on the level of both the individual sayings and on the level of the literary context into which they have been edited – a clear interrelatedness but also an equally clear multifariousness. The issue of redactional groupings and the relation of the individual proverbs to them are in turn interrelated with the date and the provenance of the materials (cf. above on the work of Katharine Dell), as we will see below in Par. 4.

3. LINE, PARALLELISM AND RHYTHM The three terms in the heading above represent distinct, but closely interrelated concepts. Being poetry, the Hebrew proverbs can neither be adequately experienced nor understood without taking all three of them seriously. That can already be appreciated when one tries to define them, and finds that they are so closely intertwined that a description of one can hardly be given without recourse to the other. 3.1 Line (= Stich) Since the 18th century the attempt to describe Hebrew verse lines in semantic terms was highly influential in biblical scholarship. The endeavour was built on the treatment of lines as units made up of sub-units with “synonymous,” 103

Fox et al. (2004, 132), my italics.

Introduction

25

“antithetical” or “synthetic” meanings.104 While this approach basically entails that the parallel usage of meanings determines what lines are, other approaches were based on the counting of syllables105 or the analysis of grammar, more specifically syntax,106 to achieve the same purpose. But these approaches have been critiqued both for inconsistencies and with reference to our lack of knowledge about the character of vowels and syllables in the pre-Masoretic period, when the poetry in question originated.107 A line or verse – not in the sense of a numbered segment of a biblical chapter, but verse “properly so called” (Lowth) – is a poetic unit defined by rhythm, syntax and parallelism.108 This view of the unit of biblical poetry has been succinctly described and substantiated by the Hebrew prosodist Benjamin Hrushovski.109 Avoiding one-sided attention to semantics or syntax and efforts to align Hebrew poetry to what had become a canon of classicist patterns derived from Greek and Latin poetry, he proceeds from “the intimate, almost inseparable relationship between the semantic, syntactic, and accentual aspects of its rhythmic patterns of language.” In this fundamental orientation Hrushovski is followed by Alter,110 which is what I also accept because of its incorporation of emphasis/stress as the “major rhythmic element”111 with meaning and syntax. On this basis, a line is a “semantic-syntactic-accentual” unit by means of which a poem is built up.112 It consists mostly of two sub-units (sometimes more), which can be determined by the synergy of their syntactic and rhythmic organisation as well as their meaning. I use the term “stich” for a line and “hemistich” for a half-line or verset,113 since this terminology is well known and does not seem to me to labour under negative effects only because they were derived from classical Greek nomenclature. The acrostic principle, where each line (not every other line) begins with the next letter of the alphabet, shows that this was also how a line/stich was regarded in Proverbs, where 104 More or less “equivalent,” “contrasting,” and “rounding off” respectively. The pioneer is Robert Lowth ([1787] 1835), whose classic lectures De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum was given at Oxford from 1741-1753. 105 E.g. G. Bickell (1880, 557-563); D.K. Stuart (1976, passim), 106 E.g. Collins (1978, passim); O’Connor (1980, passim). 107 Cf. the general critique by Alter ([1985] 2011, 1-3); also Watson ([1984] 2007, 107-108) on specific aspects, and the extended discussion by Dobbs-Allsop (2015, 123-129). 108 See above, Introduction, pp. 2-3. 109 Hrushovski (= Harshav) (2007, 598b). 110 Alter ([1985] 2011, 7). 111 Hrushovski (2007, 599a). 112 Cf. Dobbs-Allsopp (2015, 123), who makes “Line” a subsection of his chapter on “The Free Rhythms of Hebrew Poetry.” 113 In this respect, the terminology used in Vol. I of the commentary remains the same; cf. above, Par. 1; for a summary of alternatives, cf. Watson (1994, 331-335); for an illustration, cf. Greenstein (1982, 41-79).

26

Introduction

it occurs in the twenty-two lines of 31:10-31.114 The same alignment is found in Qumran, from where we also have evidence of the equal positioning of two parallel rhythmic units to a line.115 A stich may coincide with a Bible verse or pāsûq (and often does in Proverbs), but that is not necessarily the case. It usually consists of two units defined by rhythm, syntax and parallelism (a bistich116) and occasionally of three such units (a tristich). Accordingly, the terms “bistich” and “tristich” refer to a stich containing two or three such units and not to a combination of two or three stichs respectively. 3.2 Parallelism It is a well-worn point that parallelism is “basic to” Hebrew poetry, which is true. But it becomes misleading if the claim is intended to assert that parallelism is understood only in semantic terms, in other words, that its units must either be “synonymous” or “antithetic” or “synthetic” in meaning. Lines or stichs will then have to consist of a second half that repeats the meaning of the first, contrasts with it, or rounds its meaning off. This has been opposed from several angles, and with good reason. The major contribution of James Kugel in this regard is his demonstration that the second hemistich of a “synonymous” parallelism does not merely repeat or balance the first, but goes beyond it and has an amplifying effect (often quoted, “A is so, and what’s more, B”).117 In dialogue with Kugel, several scholars have developed this idea, even if in other respects they are severely critical of him. Robert Alter118 accepts the principle of the second member of a parallelism “going beyond” the first, but, under the influence of Hrushovski, regards it as a movement of meaning that intensifies, specifies or focuses, and is to be understood as a manifestation of the free rhythm of biblical versification. In her book on the dynamics of parallelism from a linguistic perspective, Adele Berlin pays careful attention 114 Van Leeuwen (1997, 42), finds the alphabetic principle in the twenty-two lines of Chap. 2, although in this case only the number of the lines agree with the number of the letters in the alphabet (cf. also Pardee 1988). 115 4QProvb, containing lines from Prov 13, 14 and 15. This fact shows that the form of proverb lines represented by critical editions of the Bible was known in pre-Christian times and represents an ancient conception of what a poetic line or stich is. Therefore this way of writing Hebrew verse is called “stichometric,” that is, the parallel rhythmic units are written on one line and together make up a stich. 116 Whereas in this commentary “bistich” refers to a stich consisting of two half-stichs, some commentators use the related term “distich,” but understand it as a combination of two lines (so Oesterley e.g. 1929, xi; cf. Toy [1899] 1914, ix). 117 Kugel ([1981] 1998, passim); cf. the critical discussion in Watson (1994, 44-51) and Alter ([1985] 2011, 2-8). 118 Alter ([1985] 2011, 19).

Introduction

27

to the way in which parts of parallelisms set up relationships of equivalence and opposition. Her illustrations of disambiguation of a hemistich by a hemistich following it119 seems fruitful to me and is applied in this commentary in both directions (A to B and vice versa), particularly concerning gaps or ellipses and the impact of seemingly lacking information.120 Hrushovski121 regards parallelism as the “foremost principle dominating biblical poetry.” The units can be “parallel to each other in one or several aspects,” complete or partial, entailing a whole hemistich or individual words in it, in the same or reversed order. It can involve semantic, syntactic, prosodic, morphological or sound elements. It may indeed contain synonymous and antithetic elements, but also be hierarchic. The point is that “no single element – meaning, syntax or stress – may be considered as completely dominant or as purely concomitant,” and that these may change from verse to verse. This interplay of principles is what Hrushovski calls a “free rhythm,”122 showing that parallelism takes part in rhythm as much as stress does. This brings us to the last aspect involved in the prosodic synergism under discussion, namely the issue of rhythm. But first, for the sake of convenience, I add here a short sketch of a specific form of parallelism prominent in the Book of Proverbs and already treated in Vol. I of the commentary, notably chiasmus.123 Although it is also found in prose texts, the figure of chiasmus occurs frequently in poetry, not least in the Book of Proverbs, and will often be pointed out in the commentary. It is a literary trope in which the parallelism is fundamentally characterised by the inverted repetition of its elements (A-B, B-A). The basic pattern can appear in many forms. It can occur in one stich or in a couplet, but it can also span or frame an extended text (as in the case of 1:11, 18: ‫ דם‬- ‫ ארב‬followed by ‫ ארב‬- ‫ ;דם‬cf. also 1:24-31). It can even be carried by whole strophes (e.g. 1:22-33) and contain another extended 119

Berlin ([1985] 2008, 97-99). Fox (Fox et al. 2004, 165-177) provides a thorough consideration of the topic, showing the various ways in which missing information may be provided (premises, conclusions or both may be gapped). He likens the phenomenon to a kind of Aristotelic enthymeme (a syllogism in which elements are unexpressed) and comes to a conclusion fundamentally consonant to that proposed by Berlin, viz. that the proverbs containing this phenomenon in the aphorisms do “not only transmit packets of truths, they also train the reader in a mode of thinking: identifying behaviors and associating them with their consequences. In other words, they train the reader to think like a sage.” These contributions are developed critically in a major recent study by Millar (2020, passim). On the other hand, Greenstein (1982, 44) views parallelism through a geometrical lens as a repetition of syntactic patterns. 121 Hrushovski (2007, 598b-599a). 122 Another aspect of free rhythm follows below in Par. 3.3. 123 See Vol. I, 76-77. 120

28

Introduction

chiasmus within it (e.g. 1:24-31 within 1:22-33). A chiasmus can be formed by repeating words in inverted order (sometimes called antimetabole, pure or mirror chiasmus), but it can also be semantic (where not the exact words, but their meanings are inverted, e.g. substantiation-threat, threat-substantiation, as in 1:24-31), syntactical (e.g. object-verb, verb-object, as in 1:13; the other way round in 1:29), or stylistic (e.g. couplet-quatrain, quatrain-couplet, as in 1:22-33). Moreover, a chiastic pattern often includes one or more additional element(s) to the four basic units (A-B-C, C-B-A, e.g. in 3:10; cf. also 8:21). Conversely, a pattern consisting of only three elements is sometimes also called chiastic when one is repeated so that it encircles the other (A-B-A, e.g. the repeated parental anguish arranged around the foolish son in 17:25). A chiastic pattern can have several effects. Max Nänny124 lists the various functions as reversal, balance, centring, framing and circling. By virtue of being a pattern, the chiasmus naturally has an integrating or cohesive effect and binds together its elements or the text it frames (as in 1:11, 18 referred to above). The formal phenomenon of inversion directs attention to balance in the content, either synonymous or antithetical, e.g. respectively 2:20 and 3:33. The very character of such a crossover makes it especially suited to underline a contrast or tension in the content (e.g. 10:11). When there are more than the four basic elements, a centring effect can be achieved (e.g. 3:10, where the repetitive inversion of verb-container-product directs the focus to the centre, which is the wealth that can be enjoyed). Where a nonrepeated element is placed in the middle of a chiasmus (sometimes called a pivot pattern, as in A-B, C, B-A) the effect is encircling (e.g. the encircling of the name “Yahweh” by the syntactical chiasmus of object-verb, verb-object in 15:25). When the non-repeated constituent is not centred (for instance A, B-C, C-B) the effect is emphasis by isolation (e.g. 3:20, where “his knowledge” falls outside the chiasmus). Both the latter patterns and their variants (such as A, B-C; A, C-B in 2:2) are sometimes also called “partial” chiasms, although they do contain a full chiasmus apart from the extra component. In sum: The fundamental literary function of a chiasmus is to draw attention through conspicuous integration, by means of which it may serve an elevated style, impress and aid memory. Whether giving formal expression to contrast and opposition or underscoring symmetry and balance, chiastic patterns accentuate the content and therefore enhance its meaning.125

124

Nänny (1988, 51-59). For an exhaustive treatment of the trope, see the treatment by Watson ([1984] 2007, 201-208; also 1994, 313-391, especially 328-389). 125

Introduction

29

3.3 Rhythm and Metre In scholarly literature the terms “metre” and “rhythm” (and their derivatives) are sometimes used to mean the same. In Vol. I of this commentary I have also used “metre” in the sense of “rhythm” described below.126 But, since opinion seems to be gravitating towards distinctive uses of the two,127 I have decided to change that and use the term “rhythm” instead. Rhythm is the overarching term and applies to speech generally, including all poetry.128 It actually applies to all sounds when they are repetitive and occur in a pattern, such as in music, even if the pattern is not strict. However, metre applies to poetry only and the term is used for specific fixed, repetitive patterns of syllables in poetic texts. Different languages and even poetic epochs of the same language differ in their metric systems (for instance, classical as opposed to Medieval Latin poetry).129 Hebrew poetry also works with stresses, but does not require fixed patterns according to which the number of stressed and unstressed syllables in a stich is determined.130 Whereas the Masoretes counted everything countable in order to safeguard the transmission of the text, the ancient poets whose verse they transmitted did not count syllables. The number of stresses in a hemistich was not fixed. Usually one stress is separated from another by one, two or three unstressed syllables. Or, as Hrushovski131 puts it, “each stress dominates a group of 2, 3 or 4 syllables.” Example: A hemistich with three stressed syllables (marked ▪) could contain unstressed syllables (marked ˇ) as follows:

126 The same is often found in the works on Hebrew poetry by Watson (e.g. 1994, 87-88, 91-93, 98ff. and passim; [1984] 2007, especially 91-92 for ancient Semitic metre generally; also 330f. and passim). 127 This is amply documented in the literature referenced here, but has earlier origins, as exemplified in the 19th century slogan in German literary criticism, “Metre is nothing, rhythm is everything.” The two perspectives of metre and rhythm become observable even during antiquity in the formation of opposing traditions of the “metricists” (μετρικοί, those who favoured a structural view of syllables) and the “rhythmicists” (the ῥυθμικοί, those who favoured the temporal element of rhythm); cf. RLDLW II, 593. By contrast, no distinctive use applies to the terms “hemistich” and “verset,” so that a change in terminology regarding stichs and their parts is unnecessary (see above, Par. 3.1). 128 Cf. Dobbs-Allsopp (2015, 103): “Meter here is a specialized (or marked) component of the larger (unmarked) phenomenon named rhythm.” 129 In classical Greek and Latin poetry syllables are counted according to their arrangement of long and short, whereas in English poetry they are counted according to the arrangement of their stresses. 130 Accentual syllabic metre only appears in Hebrew poetry at the end of the 19th century (Hrushovski [2007, 617a]). In this respect scholars who understand “metre” purely in quantitative terms are justified in the claim that there is no metre in classical Hebrew poetry (e.g. Kugel [1981] 1998, 301; O’Connor [1980, 138] and Dobbs-Allsopp [2015, 99-102]). 131 Hrushovski (2007, 599b).

30

Introduction

10:6a berākōt

lerō’š ṣaddîq

ˇ ˇ ▪ ˇ ▪ ˇ stress unit 1 s.u. 2

▪ s.u. 3

(Blessings come upon the head of a righteous man) stress units: 3 stressed syllables separated by 2, 1 and 1 unstressed syllables

The unstressed syllables in a hemistich with four stresses could relate to the stressed ones in the following way: 10:6b ufî rešācîm yekassê ḥāmās (but the mouth of the wicked covers up violence) 10:6b ˇ ▪ ˇ ˇ ▪ ˇ ˇ ▪ ˇ ▪ stress units: 4 stressed syllables separated by 1, 2, 2 s.u. 1

s.u. 2

s.u. 3

s.u.4

and 1 unstressed syllables

The number of unstressed syllables between stresses is as unfixed as the number of stresses to a hemistich or the grouping of stresses within a whole stich. Therefore it is justified to call all of this a “free rhythm.” But that does not mean that there is no system to it. Freedom is not the antithesis of system.132 There are certain typical stress patterns, such as 3 stresses in the first plus 3 in the second hemistich, indicated as 3+3; moreover 3+4 or 4+3, 3+2 or 2+3, 4+4, 2+2+2 (in stichs with more than two hemistichs) and a number of others, in all of which the occurrence of stresses in two immediately adjacent syllables is avoided. These patterns, although filled by many different arrangements of their syllables, are very strong. Therefore, together with the semantic and syntactic aspects discussed above, they support parallelism. In fact, “[t]he rhythm of major stresses is so strong that sometimes it may be the only supporter of the parallelism of two versets, without any actual repetition of meaning or syntax.”133 To be sure, the term “metre” can indeed be understood to indicate the poetic stress patterns irrespective of the number of unstressed syllables in relation to stressed ones, so that the issue becomes only a matter of terminology.134 But, in line with the trend that has established itself in theoretical studies,135 I have decided to replace the terms “metre” and “metric” used in Vol. I with the more encompassing terms “rhythm” and “rhythmic.” As Hrushovski shows, rhythm is a constitutive aspect of the Hebrew verse line and intertwined with the semantic and syntactic dimensions. Therefore it is a pity that this aspect is neglected in many commentaries on Proverbs (the dated but 132 Cf. also Collins (1978, 7), although he goes in another direction. Dobbs-Allsopp (2015, 120-177) offers a thorough discussion of “the free rhythms of biblical poetry,” far more than can occupy us here, but includes sections on stress, line, syntax, parallelism and meaning – all of them important for our overview. Cf. also Vance (2001, 519) on rhythm both in poetry and prose. This “rhythm” seems to be what Park (2017, 431-433) calls “loose meter.” 133 Hrushovski (2007, 599b). This does not make rhythm more important than meaning or syntax. The key word is “sometimes” – in certain cases any one aspect may be more prominent than others. 134 See the references above to Vol. I and to Watson, who refers to earlier work on the topic. 135 For instance, the work of Hrushovski and, under his influence, Alter ([1985] 2011, 5-8) and Dobbs-Allsopp (2015, 99-101).

Introduction

31

still very useful commentaries by Toy and Gemser are notable exceptions). I will therefore regularly present my take on the rhythmic structure of a line (or, in my terminology, a stich).

4. THE DATE AND SOCIAL SETTING OF THE BOOK AND ITS DIVERSIFIED MATERIALS General matters of dating the sections and the redaction, and the social setting have been discussed in the Introduction to Vol. I, respectively Par. 4 and Par. 5 as well as in Essay 1 (9-10; 15-19). But the dating of the aphorisms themselves as they occur in Chaps. 10-29 and the earliest redactional activity involving them should be considered as an issue in its own right. The socalled royal proverbs would be the natural starting point because they suggest a context in which the monarchy was still intact. The sayings referring to the king, court etiquette and the actual dangers of being at court suppose the time of Israel’s monarchy (before 586 BCE). They offer advice to the king or future king himself (e.g. 28:16; 20:26, 28; 29:4, 12, 14). According to Weeks,136 such sayings do not necessarily prove such a date for those proverbs. It is imaginable that the king could be a foreign monarch whose subjects the Israelites became. But several things make that unlikely. The mention of the “king’s men” who collected and edited proverbs (25:1) refers to an actual editorial project of the Jerusalem court or at least to an awareness of such sapiential activities before the monarchy came to an end. Moreover, some sayings betray a lively self-esteem of royal counsellors (e.g. 11:14; 15:22; 20:18; 24:6), which only makes sense if there really were active wise men who served the court by teaching and advising Israel’s wisdom, which would hardly be understandable in the context of a foreign court. For these reasons it is more likely that such proverbs hail from monarchic Israel.137 Fox extends the argument in two respects. First, he shows138 that, if the royal proverbs are to be dated in pre-exilic times, the same must apply to the other sayings in Chaps. 10-29 (without denying that exceptions occur). Since the many references to the king are scattered throughout these chapters, and since they occur in sayings that differ neither linguistically nor stylistically from non-royal sayings, the latter must date from the same time, probably the 7th century, perhaps starting even earlier. Second, he demonstrates139 136

Weeks ([1994] 2007, 52-53). Similarly Scoralick (1995, 1). She thinks that “something can be said” for the probability that not only Chaps. 25-29, but also 10:1–22:16 contain pre-exilic material; cf. SchwienhorstSchönberger (2008, 376). 138 Fox (2009, 503). 139 Fox (2009, 504-506). 137

32

Introduction

that the convergence of linguistic evidence supports a pre-exilic dating. Building on extensive linguistic scholarship, he shows that several features of classical (= pre-exilic) biblical Hebrew are found in the proverbs, but none of late biblical Hebrew. The pre-exilic features are: Preference for the verbal suffix over the nota accusativi with suffix. The asseverative use ‫אְך‬. ַ Use of the infinitive absolute as an imperative. Use of the infinitive absolute as a gerund. The order of the pair ‫ ֶכּ ֶסף וְ זָ ָהב‬as opposed to late Hebrew ‫זָ ָהב וְ ֶכ ֶסף‬.

It is improbable that stand-alone sayings containing such features from preexilic times would have survived the catastrophic events of the exile in their isolated state as so many individual proverbs. Therefore the earliest work involving their collection and redaction must have begun before the end of the monarchy. There is such a diversity of material and contexts in the book that it would be unnatural to assume that all of them originated in the same social setting. One could affirm in general what Katharine Dell140 says of 10:1–22:16. Reacting to the cluster theory put forward by Knut Martin Heim (2001 passim), she concludes from her examination of these chapters that not unity, but fragmentation is their identifying feature.141 Linking her “structural” observation of fragmentation with the question of social context, she affirms a whole variety of social settings for the materials in Proverbs, such as a “family/folk/ tribal context” for much of 10:1–22:16, an educational context in a home or a more formal school setting for Chaps. 1-9; 22:17–24:22; 30:1-14; 31,142 and a court setting for 31:1-9 as well as 24:23-34; 25-29; 30:15-33 and some sayings in 10:1–22:16.143 Sayings that presuppose a refined urban life (e.g. 10:4; 17:3; 20:15; 22:21; 25:11f.) or a rich landowner’s situation (e.g. 11:26) cannot be imagined in a simple folk setting. The proverbs of simple clan wisdom were collected, edited and supplemented just as sophisticated proverbs were. There is no reason why “the king’s men” could not have participated in this process, as claimed in 25:1.144 But the contents of the individual sayings show 140

Dell (2006, 63-64). To be sure, this fragmentation does not preclude the identification of proverb groups, but it “reveals oral clusters” (Dell [2006, 64]). Whether those clusters are to be described as “oral” only is a moot point, since doing so assumes (a) a necessary oral stage in the development of proverbs and (b) that clustering in the editing stage did not or probably did not take place. 142 Dell (2006, 88). 143 Dell (2006, 89). 144 It is argued by Rendsburg (2015, 112-113, 131-133), that Hezekiah’s men imported “northern proverbial material into Judah,” which in his view even warrants dating “a sizeable chunk of material ... no later than the eighth century BCE.” Cf. also Carr (2011, 403-431), who argues that “the kind of material seen in Proverbs tended to be used earliest in ancient educational processes” (2011, 409). 141

Introduction

33

that simple and sophisticated, rural and urban, learned and court-associated carriers of the sapiential tradition all weigh in. Therefore the burden of proof is on those who wish to deny the contribution of any one of these locations. Taking the foregoing (and the discussion in the Introduction to Vol. I)145 a step further, we also have to consider the setting of the later stages of the book’s formation. We can consider this in the light of a dimension of recent research relevant to the redaction of the book as a whole. This concerns the phenomenon of diversity and unity, fragmentation and cohesiveness, or what we may call centrifugal and centripetal forces that pervade readers’ encounter with the Book of Proverbs. I will sketch the issue on the following levels: • The composition is marked by the tension of fragmentation and unity First, let us recall the general observation of unity and diversity on the literary level that we have already encountered at various points above. We have seen that there is a clear structure of the Book of Proverbs as a whole, both in Chaps. 1-9 and 10-31, as well as their relationship. But we have also seen that, from Chap. 10 onwards, there is also a great diversity that makes it difficult to demonstrate sophisticated poetic compositions over extended stretches of text. If fragmentation is the identifying characteristic (Dell [2006]) of the sayings that were nonetheless edited together, there is an ambivalence of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. • Indications of differing intellectual strands in the Second Temple community Recent research on theological developments in the Second Temple period has opened a discussion on a tradition-historical level about different intellectual strands involving wisdom, Torah and revelation. These modalities bear on the character of the Book of Proverbs and its interpretation. Schipper argues for the redaction of the book as a witness to the panning out of a theological discourse in learned Jewish circles (“litterati”) in the Second Temple environment, which is therefore a further social context relevant for understanding the book. Rooted as they were in the intellectual context of sapiential and priestly circles, these strands were concerned with the possibility of human knowledge in a discourse that developed a “Torah hermeneutic.” One line of thinking in this connection was committed to a sapiential orientation concerning the relation between wisdom and Torah and accordingly emphasised wisdom almost to the point of apotheosis (for instance, Prov 8). Another school of thought countered that with a stance that set store solely by divine revelation as opposed to human knowledge (for instance, Prov 30). And yet another faction approached wisdom from 145

See Vol. I, 9-10.

34

Introduction

a Torah perspective (Prov 2).146 These differing strands are mirrored in the book itself. Therefore they also interrelate and are consequently theologically relevant (see below, Par. 5). Again we observe diversity within one literary product,147 which is to be expected of a process of rethinking, rewriting and editing. • “Heart” as the central sapiential notion for a diversified concept of humanity It seems to me that this encompassing perspective is confirmed and illustrated on the conceptual level by a specific study of a concept that is central to Old Testament anthropology and vital for the sapiential tradition, notably the concept of the human “heart.” Discussing the significance of the concept of the human heart for Old Testament anthropology, Krüger148 has shown that it is not only the semantic polyvalence (“Bedeutungsbreite”) of the Hebrew word for “heart,” ‫ לב‬/ ‫לבב‬, but the highly differentiated use made of it in different contexts that demonstrates its relevance for Old Testament anthropology. The word denotes a human being’s inner torso, inner being or inner life,149 it can steer the whole personality as the emotional, intellectual and moral control organ – in the sapiential literature as elsewhere150 – and can be hardened against the will of God. While according to some texts it can receive wisdom from God himself (cf. Ex 28:3; 31:6), other texts are sceptical of the heart’s capability to respond to God’s instruction (e.g. Deut 29:3; 30:6; 31:21). Its capacity is limited and it is corruptible (e.g. Qoh 3:11; 7:7). This shows that Israel did not develop one unified concept of humanity (“Menschenbild”) but highly diversified, even contradictory concepts. However, for that very reason, precisely because of its multifariousness, the concept of the heart could become a central anthropological entity in wisdom circles as elsewhere. The amplitude of this concept (cf. Prov 4:23) shows that interpreting wisdom literature as the intellectual pursuit of humans is bound to come to terms with the interrelation of cohesiveness and diversity. 146 See the central chapter of Schipper’s monograph, (2012, 221-279), and the summary in German and English (2012, 281-299). Cf. also a later and shorter study by Schipper (2013, 55-80), in which he argues that the post-exilic theological debate on wisdom and Torah developed into two diverse conceptions of revelation, viz. on one hand the teaching from generation to generation, and on the other that Torah had to be put into the human heart by God himself. Note: The important monograph became available as Vol. I of my commentary was already in editing. In hindsight it is clear that, allowing for the late stage, even limited recourse to it could have appreciably benefited my treatment, particularly of Chap. 2. 147 This diversity is not the same as the “openness” of proverbs to different readings, to which Millar has devoted a thorough study (2020), but it is akin to the principle on the level of the redacted book. 148 Krüger (2009, 91-106); the whole volume and the essay following this one also bear titles referring to the human heart. 149 Krüger (2009, 95). 150 Krüger (2009, 97-99).

Introduction

35

• ‫ חכמה‬is part of universal wisdom and ‫ תורה‬is Israel’s particular aspect of it. There is also a macro dimension to the principle. In his study of Ben Sira,151 Goering strongly argues that the association of wisdom and Torah in that book is not, as is often claimed, an identification of the two,152 but fundamentally “an attempt to relate the universal and the particular.”153 According to him, Ben Sira neither equates wisdom and Torah in the sense of a “nationalization of Wisdom” nor in the sense of a “universalization of Torah.” Rather, it is founded on the notion of election. Israel has been chosen by God to receive a special wisdom, which is carried by Torah, while the latter in turn “partakes in the general wisdom bestowed upon all human beings.”154 Israel’s wisdom thus is part of universal wisdom, but Israel’s Torah is her own special gift of God and therefore a particular aspect of wisdom. This is perhaps the farthest point to which the interplay of diversity and unity was brought in the sapiential tradition.

5. THE ORDER OF THE MASORETIC TEXT AND THE VERSIONS On the Hebrew text of Proverbs and the versions, see Vol. I, 10–12. The Septuagint shows a particularly drastic variation of the material contained in 24:23–31:9 of the Masoretic Text. As in Vol. I, the table comparing the sequence of divisions in the two text forms is given here for convenience. The sequence of divisions according to the Masoretic Text is given on the left and the arrangement of the Septuagint on the right: IV V VIa VIb VIIa VIIb

24:23-34 25:1–29:27 30:1-14 30:15-33 31:1-9 31:10-31

(Proverbs of the wise) Greek VIa (30:1-14) (Hiskianic collection of Solomon) Greek IV (24:23-34) (Agur) Greek VIb (30:15-33 (Agur II) Greek VIIa (31:1-9) (Lemuel’s mother) Greek V (25:1–29:27) (The virtuous wife) Greek VIIb (31:10-31)

6. THE RELEVANCE OF PROVERBS: THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS The mere fact of the influence of the Book of Proverbs on Ben Sira and the Wisdom of Solomon as well as its poignant use in the Christological disputes 151 Goering (2009). For a wide-ranging discussion of wisdom and Torah, see the variegated contributions to Schipper and Teeter (2013). 152 Goering (2009, 78). 153 Goering (2009, 237). 154 Goering (2009, 238).

36

Introduction

of patristic times155 show a strong consciousness of its relevance at different times and in diverse contexts. As in Vol. I, the exegesis in Vol. II will endeavour to show that the themes contained in proverbs are indeed theologically relevant and were perceived to be so for centuries. This is denied by Horst Dietrich Preuss,156 for whom the book contains a secular substratum that was only gradually overlaid with a theological dimension and is not usable in biblical theology. Over against this position, recent research (see Par. 3 above) has opened a new dimension, which has highlighted the theological importance of wisdom in the Second Temple period. To be sure, this has been achieved exactly by what Preuss regarded as a negative process of theological editing, rewriting and interpretation of wisdom.157 If wisdom was so marginal and theologically negligible, it would have drained out of the tradition. But the contrary happened; it provoked a discourse the traces and results of which can be seen in sapiential books like Proverbs and Ben Sira. The theological importance of the wisdom tradition is already visible in the phenomenon of tension between its “deficient revelation”158 and the divine Torah given to Israel as the Word of God. This became so topical in post-exilic learned circles that the relation between revealed Torah on the one hand and intellectual wisdom of humans on the other had to be taken seriously. The need to resolve the tension resulted in a theological discourse to settle the issue. As shown by Goering (with focus on the Book of Ben Sira) and Schipper (with focus on the Book of Proverbs), a nuanced resolution emerged in which Israel’s wisdom was to be understood in the light of the Torah. Beginning from the programmatic chapter in Prov 2, Schipper argues that the discourse about wisdom and Torah was fundamentally related to the question of human knowledge as a human intellectual enterprise. On the one hand, there were those who had fullest confidence in wisdom’s adequacy (cf. Prov 8) and on the other hand, there were those who saw mere human knowledge as deficient (cf. 30:1-4).159 But between the two, Prov 2 takes the position that the human heart is able to know and fulfil God’s will.160 Wisdom can thus be read from the perspective of Torah. The vibrancy of this intellectual environment shows how theologically relevant wisdom was in the period when the Old Testament was taking shape. 155 See the Excursus on reception history at the end of the commentary on Chap. 8 (Vol. I, 367-375). 156 Preuss (1974, 165-181; 1991, 209-220). 157 See above on the work of Schipper (2012, 2013) and others, e.g. Goering (2009) and Krüger as well as further contributors to the Schipper and Teeter volume (2013). 158 Cf. Vol. I, 28-39. 159 See the explicit formulation by Schipper (2012, 264): “In the end the Torah gets the upper hand.” 160 Schipper (2012, 259).

Introduction

37

However, since historical exegesis requires attention to all the strata represented in the book, there cannot be only one valid reading for our exegesis. If the book can and should be interpreted on the level of individual sayings as well as on that of redactional units, then it should also be interpreted with recourse to the differing conceptual strands it contains, including the “hermeneutic of Torah,” to appropriate the title of Schipper’s book. The theological relevance of the book entails not only the themes it evinces, but also its character, what it says, and what it is or is not. The following topics endeavour to summarise what seems to me major aspects of the theological relevance: • The Book of Proverbs is indeed “concerned with a fundamental option in life rather than with specific wise actions,”161 but it is also concerned with down to earth practical deeds. However, since “wisdom is both a human achievement and a divine gift” (Clifford),162 it is a perspective in which the world of everyday activities constitutes the terrain where the Fear of the Lord is lived out. That alone makes the book highly relevant for theology, especially a theology that has to come to terms with the Epistle of James (cf. particularly Jas 2:14-26).163 • This is also expressed in terms of “knowing God” (e.g. 3:6). One is to know God in all one’s ways and must therefore constantly seek that knowledge. Therefore we can concur with Fox that a manifestation of “the fusing of knowledge, piety and action into one principle” stands “at the core of the message of Prov 1-9”164 and, I would add, of the edited book. Accordingly, far from being mere knowledge about him, knowing God entails trust (3:5) and must be expressed in concrete behaviour. • By the same token, the sages accept that their precepts can be carried out and lead to success. This has a significant implication for theological anthropology – humans have potential, which should be acknowledged, respected and cultivated positively. • Any theological interpretation of the deed-consequence nexus165 underlying so many proverbs should take the optimistic mindset of Proverbs into account. The nexus of deed and consequence constitutes the foundation for plain good advice, as all accept who teach children how and why they 161

Clifford (1999, 32-33). Yoder (2009, 34) puts it in very similar terms: “… the attainment of wisdom is a convergence of human effort and divine gift” (see above on the Second Temple debate). 163 Cf. Hausmann (1995, 265-276); for the relationship of the aspects of ethics and faith in ‫יראת יהוה‬, see Hausmann (1995, 267); also Plath (1963, 63, 68) and Becker (1965, 226f.), both of whom Hausmann cites. 164 Fox (2000, 149; cf. 154-155). 165 The term means the idea that wise/good deeds have favourable/good results and unwise/ wicked deeds have unfavourable/bad results. See the next note. 162

38

Introduction

should obey traffic rules. It represents a dimension that should not be overlooked in polemics against any “theology of reward.” • At the same time the deed-consequence nexus is also an expression of the deep-seated consciousness of an order built into creation. Whether in proverbs with explicit reference to God as the agent of such consequences or in those suggesting that a deed carries the seed of its own consequence within itself,166 it remains an attempt to formulate the conclusion to which innumerable empirical observations in nature, the human condition and society have brought the sages. They made their observations in the world. Since this is God’s creation (8:22; 14:31), the order is his order.167 • From this follows a theological caveat. The sages were not so arrogant as to imagine that they have the world formula. They should not be equated to Job’s friends in facile generalisations as if they assumed that they knew all the answers. On the contrary, they were quite aware that the ways in which the order manifested itself were full of enigmas.168 It should be pointed out that the mere fact of such an insight has profound theological implications: Neither God’s ways nor he himself can be encapsulated in theories or manipulated in practical plans, however wise these may be. But despite their limitations we still need such theories and advice to guide us – as far as we can see. • Understood on this basis, the proverbs do give good practical advice on which hope for success can be built, but they are more than that. They are deeply ethical because they aim at practically living the Fear of the Lord (1:7; 9:10). Respect for one’s fellow humans (17:13; 20:22 etc.) goes hand in glove with self-respect (11:15; 22:26-27), which together can be seen as a way to “love thy neighbour as thyself.” 166

The latter became a veritable vogue after the influential treatise on the border between a paper and a monograph by Koch ([1955] 1972), in which he introduced the idea of a “schicksalwirkende Tatsphäre,” i.e., a sphere in which a deed is thought to generate its own consequences. The thesis was later amended by others, such as Janowski ([1994] 1999, 245-271, here specifically 255-256), and in a widely received dissertation by Freuling (2004). Influenced by developments in Egyptology, they stress the phenomenon of social processes by means of which social equilibrium is redressed according to Proverbs and other literature. According to these interpreters, that is also the way in which God works, so that he is indeed involved in the process, albeit not in the form of retribution or retaliation. By focusing on linguistic and stylistic phenomena in Proverbs as well as on the book’s pedagogical purpose, Freuling (e.g. 2008, 6-7) is especially helpful for understanding the contradictory statements in the book (cf. the previous and following bullet points remarking on respectively teaching traffic rules and enigmas). 167 The study of L. Boström on “the portrayal of God in the Book of Proverbs” also relates these issues rather closely: The non-mechanical interpretation of the deed-consequence nexus, the significance of creation theology in the book, the presence of a religious dimension whether there is explicit reference to God or not, and the significance of sapiential observation (Boström 1990, passim; for the last of these, the relation of empirical observation and theological conviction, see Essay 3 in Vol. I, 28-39 and Essay 2 below). 168 This is addressed in Vol. I, Essay 4.

Introduction

39

• The oft repeated claim that wisdom in Israel, at least as expressed in the Book of Proverbs, does not work with revelation, should be questioned or at least qualified from the angle of natural theology. In Proverbs the idea of revelation may at most be deficient in the sense that it lacks the conventional modes of expression found in other biblical traditions and their genres. But when expressions of wisdom as an apprehension of God are compared to non-sapiential ways of articulating “revelatory” experiences, it appears that the differences are variations of degree or style, not dissimilarity in essence. If assertions held to be revealed by God are also held to be true in terms of common human insight, then their truth depends on a natural condition, whether rational or intuitive or both, and not on their being spoken from above. This would be my appropriation of the theological significance of the different options put forward in the discourse of Second Temple times referred to above. Doing so would erode the stark distinction often made between revealed religion as exemplified by the prophets or the great traditions of Israel’s history, and the religious dimension of wisdom.169 The revelatory deficiency of sapiential literature can be interpreted as a salutary contribution to the rehabilitation of natural theology.170 • Related to the issue just mentioned, is another of equal theological import. Often flagged as the absence of the prophetic proclamation, “Thus says the Lord!”, the putative dearth of the Book of Proverbs is in fact an asset. Israel’s sapiential thought transcends herself, integrating Israel into the world and grafting the world onto Israel. Its canvass is creation, the world and humanity universally. Seen from this perspective, the Book of Proverbs is at least the equal of Deutero-Isaiah in directing the reader’s eye beyond the salvation history of one nation.

7. ESSAYS As promised in the first volume of this commentary,171 I add some further essays to this volume. The three essays constituting the last part of the introduction mainly address issues pertinent to the sayings from Prov 10 onwards. Although the essays relate to each other, they are based on articles published in their own right and in different journals.172 But they are also intended to 169 This is also the gist of the view taken by Terrien (cf. 1962, 115) and Weeks (2010, 136 and passim). 170 Cf. the essay on “The Significant Deficiency of Revelation in Wisdom,” Vol. I, 28-39, for a fuller treatment of the issue. 171 See the Introduction to Vol. I, 15. 172 The articles have been shortened (but not fundamentally overhauled) for the purposes of this commentary and are used so with permission. I thank the editors of the respective journals

40

Introduction

express my understanding of specific issues relevant to the reading of proverbs/ Proverbs and therefore to wisdom’s meaning. These issues are addressed in the essays and referenced at appropriate places in the exegesis offered in the commentary proper. 7.1 Virtue between Command and Advice 7.1.1 Introduction It can be considered a matter of consensus that the Book of Proverbs is the Old Testament book of human conduct par excellence. Since this concerns right and wrong behaviour, it may also be said that the book is organised around the theme of virtue. All virtues, such as obedience, diligence, selfcontrol, loyalty or faithfulness are categorised under “wisdom” and all wrongs, such as disobedience, laziness, impetuosity, untrustworthiness or dishonesty are assigned to the category of “folly”. But this is not such a simple matter. Although it cannot be denied that the actual sapiential acts are manifestations of “virtue” in the conventional sense, and foolish acts are manifestations of their opposites, the character of this concept of virtue seems to be unclear or even out of focus. Therefore a debate started by Walter Zimmerli as long ago as 1933 “on the structure of Old Testament wisdom” still offers material for fruitful discussion. According to Zimmerli173 wisdom’s advocacy of virtue is no categorical command or order (‫)מצוה‬, but rationally considered advice or counsel (‫)עצה‬. But the unclarity is apparent in the very fact that the sapiential directives are explicitly called both “commands” and “advice”,174 so that the virtues are sometimes commanded and sometimes recommended. Consequently, virtue in the book acquires an ambivalence the two sides of which correspond to authority and reliability. These can overlap, but are not identical. That which has authority cannot always be relied upon – as can be seen for instance in the words about mighty kings in Proverbs 16:14 and 19:12 or Ecclesiastes 10:20. And who is dependable is not always recognised as such – as the wise man spoken of in Ecclesiastes 9:16 had to experience. But this is not what one would expect in a book the motto of which is: The Fear of Yahweh is the beginning of knowledge (Prov 1:7).

for permission to use them in this way. They were originally published as follows: “Virtue between Command and Advice,” OTE 17/3 (2004), 416-434; “Learning in the Indicative,” JSem 8 (1996), 21-33; “Metaphorical and Literal Readings of Aphorisms in Proverbs”, HTS 62 (2006), 1177-1199. 173 Zimmerli (1933, 177-204). 174 E.g. Prov 6:20, 23; 10:8; 13:13; 19:16 (command); Prov 1:25; 8:14; 16:30; 19:29; 20:5; 21:30 (advice).

Introduction

41

The motto presupposes faith in God as the highest authority of wisdom. That means that the virtues to be practised are manifestations of faith and together constitute a kind of index for an authoritative religious ethics of Israelite wisdom.175 I do not wish to dispute this, but it does need qualification. For some this does not seem to particularly call for explanation. Although there are many injunctions without explicit substantiation, it is sometimes thought that those that are substantiated are to be taken as appeals to reason for the acceptance of their authority. But this sits uneasily with any claim that knowledge of wisdom is not a matter of facts, but rather of an authoritatively revealed ‘ethos’. This is sometimes asserted by making the Fear of God a kind of link between reason and revelation.176 It is, however, questionable whether one can use this motif as a vehicle to facilitate the fusion of reason and revelation so directly. Otto (1994, 162) does not go so far and the characterisation of sapiential ethics in the title of his chapter on the topic, ‘Ethos and the Creational Order’, is quite appropriate. Even so, the question remains whether the matter can really be pictured as cut and dried as this. On both counts wisdom and knowledge are identified with each other and claimed to be ‘revelation’, the object of which is thought to be the creational order in both the admonitions and the ‘younger wisdom’. The sages are supposed to have understood the Order only because they had received revealed knowledge from above, which of course would preclude all forms of natural theology. In reply it is to be queried whether this does justice to the individual proverbs and to the book as a collection. In the preamble to the book its complete sapiential programme is subsumed under the principle of the Fear of God. The question is whether this really means that the final redaction, that is, ‘younger wisdom’, saw the sapiential enterprise as a matter of revelation. 7.1.2 Proverbs as a Handbook In the preamble of Proverbs an index of presuppositions for the learning of virtues is given (Prov 1:1-7).177 1 The proverbs of Solomon son of David, king of Israel. 2 For getting to know wisdom and discipline, for understanding the words of insight, 3 for gaining instruction in wise conduct, righteousness, justice and honesty, 4 for giving the simple shrewdness, knowledge and circumspection to the young. 175 The sapiential prescriptions for correct living are often described in this way, cf. Otto (1994, 117-174). 176 For example, P.J. Nel (1982, 91): “The created order is comprehensible within the frame of the yir’at Jahweh. ... This ethos is in fact revealed knowledge of righteous human conduct, and has an authority in itself apart from man’s response to it.” 177 Cf. the extended discussion in Vol. I, 51-63.

42

Introduction 5 A wise man should listen to expand learning and a discerning man to acquire skills, 6 in order to explain a proverb and a figure, the words of the wise and their riddles. 7 The Fear of Yahweh is the beginning of knowledge; fools despise wisdom and instruction.

The passage may be paraphrased as follows: A (i) Solomon’s Proverbs. (ii) To acquire all aspects of wisdom. B The book offers didactic expansion of wisdom to the wise. C The Fear of Yahweh is the principle of wisdom. “A” contains the title (v. 1) and an expansion, qualifying the title itself and therefore specifying the contents of the book in the manner of what we would call a subtitle (vv. 2-4); “B” is a summarising injunction that adds precision even to the subtitle (vv. 5-6); accordingly, “C” is the motto of the book (v. 7). The thrust of the passage is to preface the following poems as well as the adages by typifying them as educational literature for the benefit of both the inexperienced youth to be taught and the more mature who are to teach them. This wisdom is based on the religious foundation of the fear of Yahweh. According to v. 4 the real recipients of the sapiential enterprise are ‫פתאים‬,178 the naïve “simple” who can be influenced. Certain qualities are “given” (‫)לתת‬ to them, which not only means that they are the beneficiaries of the training, but also implies a source that imparts the sapiential qualities to the receivers. Again, this may be read in two ways; both the people who teach and the book itself may be taken as the source. In the present context the latter would be the most natural. This book is for imparting sapiential qualities. Even so, however, the association of discipline and training with the enterprise (‫מוסר‬ occurs in both preceding verses) points to the presupposition that the Book of Proverbs is to be used by teachers for the conveying of the qualities and qualifications in question. This proves nothing in the notoriously difficult debate on educational structures in Israel,179 but it does suggest that, by the time of the final redaction of the book – when the title and preamble (vv. 1-7) were put in their present position – there could have been people who needed a book like this for the instruction of the youth. It may thus be said that the book is a collection of materials for use in teaching. 178 Cf. the spelling without aleph in vv. 22, 32 and GKC 93x on the orthography of the plural noun. 179 Cf. Lemaire (1981; 1984, 270-281) for a positive answer to the question, Weeks ([1994] 2007, 132-156) for a negative answer, Crenshaw (1985:601-615; 1998:85-113) whose positive answer is qualified.

Introduction

43

That the book is intended as a handbook for teachers, can be seen in verse 5. Notwithstanding the fact that the ‫ חכם‬already has understanding (‫ )נבון‬the book is still intended for him. Since this verse breaks the series of infinitives in the passage, it is often thought to be a later addition. Whether this is so or not, it still makes sense in its present position. The jussive ‫ישמע‬ has not been clumsily inserted between infinitives, but is necessary to mark a new beginning. In this way the actual reader is now addressed, which is in no way impeded by the third person in a jussive construction.180 So this verse is not a part of the subtitle, but a kind of miniature foreword. The sages are to extend the insight they already have. Therefore the learning mentioned here (‫ )לקח‬is received from predecessors and passed on to the next generation.181 The next word also points in this direction: ‫ תחבלות‬is a rare word meaning “skills” and indicates the use to which the received sapiential tradition can be put in teaching the young – which can be acquired over and above existing wisdom.182 Of what this sapiential “plus” consists, is now added. The infinitive construct ‫ להבין‬is the Hiphil infinitive construct of the verb ‫בין‬. Similar to the Qal forms of this verb, the Hiphil may mean “understand” (as in v. 2), but often occurs in the meaning “bring to understanding,” “to impart understanding,” “clarify.” The personal object is in the accusativus rei.183 It would make no sense to expect a sage to “listen” so as to acquire the competence to understand a proverb, since he already has this ability. But when he “listens” in the sense of attentive use of this book, he will enhance his didactic ability to pass on the contents of wisdom. So, the teacher as an experienced sage whose character has already been formed by the ‫ לקח‬imparted to him in his day, now does the same with the next generation, so that they can also benefit by the “plus” of insight. That is, their characters are formed and developed.184 If this argument is right, it has been shown that the whole of the Book of Proverbs is intended as teaching, or, better, as help for teachers. Now this 180

Cf. GKC 109a & f. The root of this noun, ‫( לקח‬take, receive) suggests tradition, in other words: knowledge that is passed on from generation to generation. Cf. Prov 4:1-4, where it is clearly explained and associated with ‫מוסר‬, ‫ דעת‬and ‫( תורה‬teaching). The word is usually linked to speaking (cf. Prov 7:21; 16:21, 23; Deut 32:2; Job 29:23f.), which supports the interpretation of ‫לקח‬ as the passing on of knowledge (as well as the causative understanding of ‫ להבין‬in 1:6). 182 Cf. Prov 11:4; 12:5; 20:18; 24:6; Job 37:12. 183 Isa 28:9, 19; Job 6:4; so in some major German versions of Isa 28:19; Luther (“Offenbarung deuten”), Elberfeld (“die Botschaft verständlich machen”) and the Einheitsübersetzung (“das Gehörte erklären”). It can also be formulated with ‫( ל‬e.g. Job 6:24) or in the accusativus personae (e.g. in Isa 28:9; 40:14; Neh 8:8), but does not necessarily have to be expressed (e.g. Isa 28:19), and the explained matter can be expressed by ‫( ב‬e.g. Neh 8:7). 184 The forming of character is extensively treated by Brown (2014, 5ff. and passim; also the earlier version, 1996, 21 and passim) and Stewart (2016, 11-28 and passim). 181

44

Introduction

teaching is found in the form of poems in chapters 1-9,185 and from chapter 10 onwards in the form of aphorisms. The shorter proverbs are of different genres and therefore do not teach in the same style. But this is denied by Westermann,186 according to whom the teaching is only given in those proverbs formulated in the imperative and not in the descriptive sayings in the indicative. That implies that virtue can only be taught prescriptively – which is highly questionable. 7.1.3 Education in Different Keys Authoritative teaching is offered in descriptive as well as prescriptive form. The following proverbs demonstrate that the teaching of virtue is not only done in admonitory style, but also in descriptive sentences. • Descriptive sayings We begin with some sayings that obviously belong to Westermann’s category of wisdom sentences (“Wahrsprüche”).187 As snow in summer and rain at harvest time, so honour does not suit a fool. (26:1)

What a topical dimension this proverb acquires in light of today’s climate crisis and its deniers! The meteorological order would be disturbed if winter weather were to set in during other seasons. That this would be absurd, is exemplified by the fact that the second hemistich expresses the nonsense in a comparison – which confirms the harmony of the normal pattern. The teaching is obviously that, since disharmony in human life is as negative as disharmony in nature, social dissonance is to be avoided. Humans are thus able to disturb social order or to harmonise with it. A bad tooth or an unsteady foot, such is trust in a faithless person in time of trouble. (25:19)

The faithless person is akin to the untrustworthy one also compared to weather phenomena in verse 14. A general truth about human characteristics is explained by means of comparison with physical phenomena, here failing parts of the body (empty clouds and wind in v. 14). As flawed teeth and feet can never be trusted, so untrustworthiness is part of the nature of undependable people. Such a statement is certainly descriptive, but at the same time 185 These are called “didactic speeches” (Lehrreden) by Lang (1972), “instruction” (McKane [1970] 1977 and Fuhs 2001a) or “lectures” (Fox 2000). 186 Westermann (1971, 73-85). 187 For the following, cf. Loader (2002, 715-738), where some of these proverbs are treated in the context of an argument about a responsible life in sapiential perspective.

Introduction

45

it is an evaluation, and communicating an evaluation in a descriptive proverb entails teaching the recipient. A roaring lion and a rushing bear: a wicked ruler over a poor people. (28:15)

The strength and the dangerousness of specific species here epitomise the power and the dangerousness of respectively a just and a wicked king. Only the lacking virtue of a power-drunk ruler is expressed, but this does not preclude the argumentative function of the speech act at all. The argument has both a negative and a necessarily implied positive side, and functions as a warning to those who serve such a ruler. That in turn is quite akin to “counsel” formulated in the imperative (“You should be careful in the presence of someone like that ...”), but is not necessarily an injunction to ethically responsible behaviour. Nevertheless the use of animal metaphors can also function as criticism of the misuse of power by the strong, since the latter is identified as a ‫רשע‬. Iron sharpens iron, and one person the other. Whoever tends a fig tree eats its fruit, and anyone who takes care of a master is honoured. (27:17f.)

Even if the tertium comparationis of these two proverbs is to be seen in “correct interpersonal relations,”188 they still draw from the laws of natural phenomena for the purpose: metallurgical characteristics (v. 17) and the agriculturally indispensable knowledge of the seasonal care of trees (v. 18). Not only a well meant “brotherly correction,”189 but the reciprocal sharpening of capabilities and the forming of character between equals are imprinted in the socio-psychological order of human society, just as the characteristics of iron are laid down in the domain of metals. The metaphor of verse 18 does not depend on the closeness in meaning of its elements, but on their formal alignment – the fig tree corresponds to the master, the farmer to the servant, tending corresponds to caring and eating the fruits to being honoured. As the farmer has to apply his dendrological knowledge to care for the fig tree according to its needs in different seasons, so the servant should attend (‫)שׁ ֵֹמר‬190 to the different needs of his master at different times in order to have success. So behaviour suitable for the needs of a farmer and a servant is recommended as virtuous. Instead of using the imperative, the results of such actions are presented as attractive. The argumentative function of the proverb conveys 188

Fuhs (2001a). So Fuhs, who overlooks the reciprocity of the metaphor: both knives are sharpened by the friction. 190 The verb ‫ שׁ ֵֹמר‬is also used agriculturally, both for the care of plants (Gen 2:15) and for the care of animals (Gen 30:31; 1 Sam 17:20 etc.). 189

46

Introduction

practical acceptance of virtue in specific contexts and does so in a didactically nimbler way than using a bland imperative – exactly as envisaged by the introduction to the book (Prov 1:5). Pressure on milk produces curds, and pressure on the nose produces blood, and pressure on anger produces strife. (30:33)

Elementary knowledge of the biochemical, physiological and psychological order is here applied in a string of statements, the paronomasia191 of which assumes that the contents of the first two statements are well known, thereby focusing on the last. The categorical statements show that they concern established laws192 and the unproblematic association of the various fields exemplify the fact that wisdom does not separate nature and culture. Reality is an undivided whole. The pupil is expected to draw a valid conclusion from the factual state of things. Although the description of this state is not itself “virtue”, the conclusion to which the pupil should come, is. Here we have a clear illustration of how virtue is arrived at inductively from empirical observation of reality and not deductively by inference from a grand principle such as revelation. The simple declaration of the way things are enables the teaching that strife can be avoided by reassurance rather than pressure on an angry person. This kind of descriptive dealing with empirical reality is found all over the Book of Proverbs. The indicative is also used elsewhere in the short sayings in connection with the motif of appeasement and its negative opposite: A soft answer turns away wrath, but a harsh word stirs up anger. (15:1)193

In addition to this antithetical parallelism we may also note a “synonymous” parallelism containing a variant of the motif: With patience a ruler can be persuaded, and a soft tongue can break bones. (25:15)

But this principle concerns the king as much as it does his subjects. He too has to submit to the order, as the courtiers at the palace in Jerusalem realised very well as early as the time of Rehoboam. The narrative of the young king’s fateful failure to accept their advice to this effect (1 Kgs 12) is actually a manifestation of this aspect of the descriptive teaching we have found in the 191 An attractive play on words in the list: ‫ ֶח ְמ ָאה‬/ ‫( ֵח ָמה‬curds), and ‫( ֶח ְמ ָאה‬anger), cf. Job 29:6; ‫( ַאף‬nose) and ‫ ַאף‬/‫אפים‬, ַ (anger); Whybray (1994, 421) and Plöger (1984, 368) only see the second element. 192 On justice as concept of order in Israel and in the ancient Near East, cf. Schmid (1968, passim). 193 Cf. Prov 14:29; 15:18; 29:8, 11.

Introduction

47

proverbs mentioned above. A comparison of this story with the sapiential sentences reveals the teaching quality of descriptive presentation. When his subjects request relief of the burden loaded upon them by his father he consults the senior advisors at the court: 6 Then King Rehoboam took counsel with the older men who had attended his father Solomon while he was still alive, and said, How do you advise me to answer this people? 7 And they said to him, If you will be a servant to this people today and serve them and answer them kindly and speak good words to them, then they will be your servants for life. (1 Kgs 12:6-7)

If ever there was counsel in the classic sense, this is it. The senior courtiers use neither imperative nor jussive, but describe in a conditional clause what is to be expected when the king really were to do what they require in their fourfold protasis. Their argument is based on behaviour that can be expected in terms of human nature in a situation where a people needs a king, but is unwilling to accept oppression. But Rehoboam follows the advice of his younger courtiers, who twice use the direct command mood in the second person jussive, even with a proverb added for good measure, in their insistence on a harsh answer: Thus you should say to this people … thus you should say to them, My little thing is thicker than my father’s loins. (1 Kgs 12:10)

That means, I reject your request and will be even harsher than my father was. The result is completely in agreement with the proverbs cited above: anger, rebellion and a permanent rift in the kingdom: When all Israel saw that the king would not listen to them, the people answered the king, What share do we have in David? We have no inheritance in the son of Jesse. To your tents, O Israel! Look now to your own house, O David. So Israel went away to their tents. But Rehoboam reigned over the Israelites who were living in the towns of Judah. When King Rehoboam sent Adoram, who was taskmaster over the forced labour, all Israel stoned him to death. King Rehoboam then hastily mounted his chariot to flee to Jerusalem. So Israel has been in rebellion against the house of David to this day. (1 Kgs 12:16-19)

The function of the reference to the natural order of things – here the typical nature of a population – is to suggest to the king that social consideration naturally brings about success, in order to persuade him to take a virtuous decision. These texts show that knowledge of the order of phenomena is a precondition for virtuous behaviour. This order prevails in all spheres of nature and the mind as well as where humans have to come to terms with both, that is, in agriculture, industry, politics, society and culture. Who attunes, can expect success; who does not, must expect a negative result. The senior advisers at

48

Introduction

Rehoboam’s court realised the demands of the socio-psychological order within society, but the younger ones utterly misunderstood the issue. Thus the concept of the cosmic order was thoroughly Israelite. It was also understood as such by the Septuagint, as can be seen in its rendering of Proverbs 25:26, which says the following in the Masoretic text:194 Like a muddied spring or a polluted fountain is the righteous (‫)צדיק‬, who gives way before the wicked (‫)רשע‬.

This is translated as follows by the Septuagint: ὥσπερ εἴ τις πηγὴν φράσσοι καὶ ὕδατος ἔξοδον λυμαίνοιτο, οὕτως ἄκοσμον δίκαιον πεπτωκέναι ἐνώπιον ἀσεβοῦς. (As one who stops a well or corrupts a spring of water, so it is disorderly for a righteous man to fall before an ungodly man.)

The translator considers an act of ‫( ֶר ַשׁע‬as opposed to ‫)צ ָד ָקה‬ ְ as “acosmic” or “disorderly,” that is, disruptive of the order, like the corruption of natural water flow. In the light of my argument above this – although fully compatible with the Hellenistic Jewish mind – should not be taken as influence imported from Hellenism, but as an appropriate rendering of the basic principle underlying Israelite and Ancient Near Eastern wisdom itself.195 If humans are to achieve success, they have to be acquainted with the cosmic order and act in conformity with it, which means having to shape life in terms of this pattern. It may be objected that human behaviour can hardly be called virtuous in terms of an ethic of responsibility if such behaviour is only a mechanical attunement to the cosmic order, since this cannot be an answer to a divine “thou shalt,” that is, to a commandment of the divinely revealed will. But this is only one side of the matter. The other is that people recognise the order in nature, but then in nature as creation, so that there is no question of a mechanical process without regard for the divine Creator. But, by the same token, there is also no question of any divine revelation, neither in the form of a word of God, nor of an audition or a vision by a sage. Unless one defines “revelation” in such a way that not only words and visionary experiences, but also observations of empirical reality become a vehicle of revelation (the Rorschach principle), in which case the debate is rendered superfluous. The concept of virtue entertained by this view therefore lies between recommendation of the cosmic order and the demand to obey the divine will. 194

Cf. Loader (2002, 724-725), where the verse is used in the context of another argument. As far as I can see, Cook does not refer to this verse in his work on Proverbs in the Greek Bible (the reference “25:25-27, 308” in the index by Cook [1997, 386] is obviously an error). Still, my interpretation above agrees with the result reached by Cook via an investigation of various representative sections of the Book of Proverbs, notably that the translator(s?) used Greek motifs in order to explicate concepts already in the Hebrew text for a Greek reading public (Cook 1997, 318-319). 195

Introduction

49

So the Septuagint represents a late Jewish perspective that is fully in accord with the consciousness of order exemplified by the earlier proverbs. Therefore the divide between pre-exilic “inductive” ethics and post-exilic “deductive” ethics cannot be so sweeping as presented by Otto.196 Since the Septuagint is later than all other phases of Proverbs in the Hebrew tradition, it is hardly credible to deny the rest of the so-called “later” wisdom the same inductive approach. But nothing requires that. The examples given above show that the Septuagint is not alone in this at all and has not imposed a foreign idea from Hellenistic thought on the earlier Hebrew wisdom tradition, neither in its aphoristic form (as we have seen), nor in the supposedly later form of wisdom poems (as will be shown shortly). Accordingly, virtue is not merely something assigned to young people by command, but it is also mediated by the recognition of order as this is observed in the world and pointed out by their teachers. The following examples intend to demonstrate that the same thought pattern is found also in the later wisdom texts. The argument just developed also applies where wisdom is explicitly seen as a gift of God, as in Proverbs 2:1-6: 1 My son, if you accept my words and treasure my commandments, 2 so that you let your ear attend to wisdom, and incline your heart to understanding, 3 if you really cry out for insight and raise your voice for understanding, 4 if you seek it like silver and search for it as for hidden treasures – 5 then you will understand the fear of Yahweh and find the knowledge of God. 6 For Yahweh gives wisdom and from his mouth come knowledge and understanding.

The extended conditional construction expresses what will take place under specific conditions. These conditions stand in a definite relationship to the consequences. Verse 6 does not have to mean that wisdom is “knowledge revealed by God,”197 at any rate not in the sense that the contents of the knowledge are revealed by Yahweh. Young people must first know and demonstrate virtues as obedience (v. 1), attentiveness (v. 2), enthusiasm (v. 3) and diligence (v. 4), and will only then (‫ )אז‬understand (‫ )בין‬and find the knowledge of God (v. 5). What is given, is not the contents of virtue – for that is already there – but the capability of understanding. This can also simply be called “wisdom” (wisdom and knowledge are here used parallel to ‫[ תבונה‬insight]). But in practice it must still be translated into action. So also in the younger wisdom the sapiential virtues precede not the Fear of God itself (for that is already there), but understanding it, that is, insight in the knowledge. Therefore it cannot be maintained that the later wisdom stages take the Fear of God as their point of departure, whereas the earlier stages 196 197

Otto (1994, 152-174). So Otto (1994, 162).

50

Introduction

start from empirical reality.198 That the Fear of God is the “beginning” (‫)ראשית‬ of wisdom, does not mean to say that God reveals its contents, but rather what the condition is for the acquisition of wisdom: Acceptance of authority that is not only vested in parents and teachers, but in the final analysis has its source in God. This is pinpointed unambiguously near the end of Chapter 9, thereby framing the first part of the anthology (Prov 9:7-12; cf. 1:7): 7 8 9 10 11 12

Whoever corrects a scoffer is abused and whoever rebukes the wicked is blemished. Do not rebuke a scoffer, so that he does not hate you; rebuke the wise, and he will love you. Give to the wise, and he will become wiser still; teach the righteous and he will enhance learning. The Fear of Yahweh is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is insight. For by me your days will become many and the years of your life will be multiplied. If you are wise, you are wise for yourself; if you scoff, you alone will bear it.

The scoffer (‫)לץ‬, as example of arrogance, will not submit to wisdom and therefore cannot accept its teaching. He does not fulfil the condition and consequently cannot attain wisdom. This is documented just as clearly in the short sayings, for example Proverbs 16:18:199 Pride goes before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.

There is as little difference between the haughty person of this proverb and that of Chapter 9 as in the thought structure of the two texts. The positive counterpart is even paralleled with the Fear of God in Proverbs 15:33: The fear of Yahweh is the discipline of wisdom, and humility goes before honour.

This confirms the interpretation of the Fear of God as discipline (‫ )מוסר‬that leads to wisdom. So the thought structure of the earlier and the later wisdom stages is the same also in this respect. From all of this we must conclude that the motif of the Fear of God and the idea of God as the source of wisdom do not require the concept of revelation – neither in the short sayings nor in the poems. Therefore we have no need to find reasons for denying later wisdom the ability to start from empirical reality. 198 On this submission it would be inexplicable that the Fear of God is associated with human action as much in the ostensibly early “empirical” aphorisms (cf. Prov 14:26, 27; 15:33) as in the wisdom poems (cf. also Prov 8:13) – unless one appeals to the petitio principii that such sentences must be late for this reason. The claim by Sekine (2002, 79) that such proverbs are not interested in “the good or evil of people’s outward behaviour, but with whether they have a faith that rests in God,” cannot be upheld. 199 Cf. also Prov 18:12; 21:4; 29:23.

Introduction

51

Evidence of the importance of empirical observation is also found elsewhere in post-exilic wisdom. The Book of Qohelet is a veritable goldmine in this respect. In the opening passage it says (Qoh 1:3-11): 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

What do people gain from all the toil at which they toil under the sun? One generation goes and another comes, but the earth remains forever. The sun rises and the sun goes down, and hurries to the place where it rises. The wind blows to the south, and goes around to the north and back again, and to the place where it began it returns again. All streams run to the sea, but the sea does not fill up; to the place where the streams flow, there they continue to flow. All words are so wearisome, more than one can express; the eye is not satisfied with seeing, or the ear filled with hearing. What has been will be again and what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. Is there a thing of which it is said, “See, this is new”? It has already been, in the ages before us. The people of long ago are not remembered, nor those yet to come, neither will there be any remembrance by those who come after them.

Qohelet substantiates his negative conclusion – which is heavily emphasised by its position as a rhetorical question at the very beginning – by an observation encompassing phenomena from what we would call nature and culture. The cycle of nature always remains the same, and so does human nature. The “ethos” of wisdom sentences standing alone as well as of those built into larger poems, thus consists of teaching on the basis of experience or observation. That these sentences (“Wahrsprüche”) have a religious character, is obvious on the redactional level and, in respect of the individual units, can be inferred from the references to God as well as to the Fear of God that occur in many places. But that the “ethos” is revealed cannot be shown – neither in any normal theological sense nor in religio-historical terms. • Admonitions as injunctions It would be surprising indeed if the sapiential admonitions, having not only been handed down as they were with, alongside and between the sentential sayings, but also representing as they do the same “ethos” as the sentences, were to contain a contradictory religious orientation. The following considerations, however, show that this is not the case. Admonitory injunctions in both aphoristic form and in the poems are often substantiated, but the substantiations never necessitate the inference that their contents originate in a revelation. As a first instance among many200 we may examine the double injunction from a wisdom poem already considered above (Prov 9:9): Give to the wise, and he will become wiser still; teach the righteous and he will enhance learning. 200

Nel (1982, 18ff.) offers relevant texts classified according to syntactical types.

52

Introduction

Since the motif of teaching itself is their topic, both injunctions with imperative are interesting. Who is already wise should be instructed further in order to increase his wisdom (cf. Prov 1:5).201 Here no technical substantiation (for instance with ‫ )כי‬is given, but a final construction is used in both cases. Therefore the aim of the admonition is to enhance competence in teaching (‫ ֶל ַקח‬is both what is received by the teacher and what is given to the pupil). In as far as the aim also conveys the reason for admonishing, it can of course also be called a motive or incentive for the injunction. Although one can hardly speak of a final construction and a “factual statement” in the same breath,202 the use of this construction does betray the sage’s assumption: the wise grow with continuing education. This is again seen as a generally valid reality and therefore is founded in the observation of empirical reality: this is how it always is.203 Since this is a general truth, the teaching on teaching of the already wise makes sense. A very simple case is the advice to discipline one’s son: Discipline your son, for so there is hope, but do not set your heart to kill him. (Prov 19:18)

Hope for the son implies that discipline is profitable for him, which in turn (whether seen as purpose or as result), makes up the basis for paternal punishment. As also those parents who have never had anything to do with revelation know all too well, the hard experience of social reality is the only source of this insight. This admonition is also relevant to our topic on another count, namely in that it implies the strictness of the teaching milieu. This often recurring motif204 only makes sense if corporal punishment actually was so harsh that killing of children was not only thinkable, but indeed had to be warned against. Such a severely strict teaching practice for our purposes renders the question superfluous whether the vetitive (‫אל‬+ jussive) is a milder and the prohibitive (‫ לא‬+ imperfect) a sterner form of the admonition, respectively discouragement and prohibition. More cases of the vetitive are cited below, but logically we do not need the grammatical distinction in order to demonstrate that some admonitions are advice or encouragement and others categorical negative commands. Consequently we have no need to pursue the matter further.205 Advice for or against any action or attitude is given with the 201 Lifelong learning is also a topic in Ben Sira (e.g. Sir 6:18-37); cf. Crenshaw (1998, 178-179). 202 So Nel (1982, 20). 203 Further illustrations from the poems: Prov 8:32, 33f. 204 Cf. Prov 13:24; 22:15; 23:13f.; 29:15, 17; Sir 30:1; Achikar No. 4; cf. Crenshaw (1998, 147-149 [on the motif in Egyptian texts]; 203, 281). 205 Cf. the fact that both vetitive and prohibitive can occur in synonymous parallelism, e.g. Prov 22:24 (Nel 1982, 21), and that a vetitive can negate the imperative in the same kind of parallelism (e.g. Qoh 11:6).

Introduction

53

authority implied by this stringency and the recurring motif of “discipline.” The distinction between advice and command on which we are focusing is not a matter of strictness or even authority, but has its base in the question whether we have to do with a divinely revealed demand or not. In the light of what we have found so far this question has to be answered negatively. In Proverbs 25:8-10 two admonitions occur alongside each other: 8 9 10

Do not hastily go to court; for what will you do in the end, when your neighbour puts you to shame? Argue your case with your neighbour, but do not disclose another’s secret, or someone who hears it may talk ill of you, and your slander comes back at you.

Both warnings mention completely understandable consequences to be expected when one is not careful enough in legal proceedings. Judicial practice shows that overhasty litigation easily causes the disgrace of the litigant. Verses 9-10 contain a clear illustration of the nexus of deed and consequence. Defamation comes back at the one who sends it into the world. That is simply how empirical reality is and it is only wise to keep such an obvious nexus in mind.206 On the one hand the motif of relentlessness contained in it confirms that advice is not a mere matter of arbitrariness. It comes with the full authority of the father or the teacher and, as all sapiential sayings, is based on the foundation of what they have observed in the cosmic order ascribed to the Creator. Its authority has nothing to do with its being revealed or not.207 This applies even in those cases where Yahweh is explicitly mentioned. So it says in Proverbs 24:21f.: 21 22

My son, fear Yahweh and the king, and do not associate with insurgents; for suddenly disaster can come from them, and who knows what ruin both can bring?

The Fear of God is mentioned together with the imperative, so that the proverb is not only clearly an admonition, but also has a distinct religious quality. It may be right that the Fear of God and of the king here exemplifies the conviction that Yahweh is the primary and the king the secondary “author” of the world order. But that would contribute nothing to the idea of an ethos appearing in the admonitions (especially in their substantiating parts) that should be regarded as “revealed knowledge of righteous human conduct.”208 206

Cf. also Prov 23:1-3, 10f.; 25:6f. Cf. Fox (2000, 108), who seems to think in similar terms. 208 Nel (1982, 30), discussing the structure of the admonitions in Proverbs; and Nel (1982, 91) in the context of an argument on the authority of the admonitions. 207

54

Introduction

The nexus between deed (here the negative side of the antithetical parallelism, v. 21b) and consequence (here the sudden coming of disaster, v. 22) is not upheld by an appeal to a divine announcement but is offered, as in the other substantiated admonitions, as succinct presentation of a general truth. For the sage the consequence is an empirically observable fact (whether the observation can always be squared with real experience – cf. the theodicy – is another matter altogether).209 Similarly, Qohelet’s admonition to obey the king because of the Godoath does not introduce revelation as the source for the contents of virtue. Qoh 8:2-5: 2 3

4 5

Keep the king’s command because of the God-oath, Do not become perturbed, go from his presence, and do not keep standing in a difficult situation, for he does whatever he pleases. For the word of the king is powerful, and who can say to him, “What are you doing?” Whoever obeys a command will meet no harm, and the wise heart knows the time and judgement.

Whatever the most probable interpretation of the difficult statement about the God-oath,210 the substantiation for the admonition lies in the observation of the fact that the king can do as he pleases. In this passage, where the motifs of obedience, king, God and revolt are again associated, the advice to refrain from insurgence is based on the fact of royal power. That is pure observation founded on the ability to take empirical reality into consideration. Qohelet, like the sages whose advice is found in the Book of Proverbs, offers his in the genre of the admonition. Qoh 11:6: In the morning sow your seed, and at evening do not let your hand be idle, for you do not know which will prosper, this or that, or whether both alike will be good.

The first stich is a synonymous parallelism in which an admonition in the imperative (‫ )זרע‬is balanced by another in the vetitive form (‫)אל־תנח‬. Qohelet, quite in line with popular wisdom, refers to plainly visible agricultural practice. 209 Similarly Prov 22:22-23, where the fact that Yahweh is on the side of the poor in no way supposes any command by him and can equally well be a religious interpretation of the observed consequence. Cf. further Prov 23:17-18: In an aphoristic admonition the Fear of God is called for, which is supported by a generally valid consequence. 210 A survey is given by Krüger (2000, 277-288).

Introduction

55

What is different in his case is not a vantage point in the observation of nature, but the protestation of the fundamental ignorance of humans: “for you do not know ....” Certainly there is a natural order – seeds germinate and crops are harvested – but the inner essence of this order is inaccessible to humans. For safety’s sake it is therefore better to work at different times. • An isolated prayer A third sapiential mode, after description and prescription, occurs only once in the Book of Proverbs. In the relatively young passage of Proverbs 30:7-9 a solitary prayer is found: 7 8 9

Two things I ask of you; do not deny them to me before I die: Remove far from me falsehood and lying; give me neither poverty nor riches; let me have the food that I need, so that I do not, if I am satiated, deny you, and say, “Who is Yahweh?” so that I do not, if I am poor, steal and profane the name of my God.

Of course the prayer underscores the deep religiosity of the contents. The request comprises the aspect of honesty on the one hand and that of frugality on the other. The former is a typical sapiential virtue;211 the latter is known in wisdom literature as respect for moderation212 and exemplifies the insight gleaned from the observation of nature by many “primitive” cultures, notably that moderation is positive because it harmonises with the natural order.213 The wisdom of the right measure is good because it cultivates the right faith (v. 9). Again the sequence is conspicuous: The sage does not hear from God that frugality is pious, but prays that God may keep his life within the confines of this virtue already known to him. He wishes to shape his life in this way and no other so that he can answer to God for this life. It is particularly clear in this passage that the Yahwistic piety of a praying sage and the rational structure of his knowledge of the world order are necessarily predicated upon one another, but then in the sequence: Knowledge of natural order

211



Prayer

Cf. Prov 4:24; 10:32; 13:5; 11:3. Cf. Prov 25:16; Qoh 5:11; 6:2. 213 Reference to the San of the Kalahari and the indigenous people of North America may suffice for our purpose. 212

56

Introduction

and not the other way round.214 Qohelet’s commendation of wisdom and his “positive advice”215 offered despite his fundamental pessimistic mood, are closely related to what we find in the Book of Proverbs. They are the consequence of a development the roots of which are encoded in ancient Near Eastern wisdom itself: the observation of empirical reality, which is then related to God. 7.1.4 Conclusion Returning to the preamble of the Book of Proverbs, we may recall that the contents of the whole book are summarised there as teaching – sayings, admonitions and poems, observations of the empirical world and reflection on the Fear of God as faith. To assume that the redactor understood none of this, is simply unreasonable. On the other hand, a development within the sapiential tradition and the recognition of earlier and later topoi, motifs and forms are as plausible as ever. But that does not require an essential difference between an empirical orientation for the earlier phase and an orientation in terms of revelation faith for the later phase. Such a bifurcation is not only logically unnecessary, but also refuted by what we have seen in the actual texts from both groups. Even if “older” and “younger” wisdom is found in the Book of Proverbs, such sayings were incorporated into one book by a redactor who obviously had no problem with combining the two. That is not surprising, since the synthetic world view of Israel’s wisdom tradition did not allow for the division of reality into compartments. Neither did it, therefore, differentiate between human perception of empirical reality on the one hand and faith in a God sustaining this reality on the other. Therefore it could develop a canon of virtues that was not determined by the either-or of command as a matter of revelation and advice as a matter of reason. Neither should this surprise us on the second count: As we have seen, aphoristic wisdom and the sapiential poems are compatible both logically and thematically. However different their focal points and their literary manifestations may be, both set out to shape a virtuous life 214 I have argued in another context (Loader 2002, 715-738) that wisdom here reaches its limit because respect for the “right measure” ipso facto undermines the deed-consequence nexus (the more wisdom, the more blessing, therefore wealth). 215 Cf., among others, Qoh 8:1 and 3:22; 8:15. The positive element in Qohelet’s reflections is repeatedly underscored in recent research; cf. Whybray (1982, 87-98); Ogden (1984, 27-38); Lohfink (1990, 625ff.); Klopfenstein (1991, 98ff.); Scheffler (1993, 248ff.). I remain unconvinced by endeavours to make Qohelet have a “positive message”, precisely because both his undeniable commendation of wisdom, sapiential labour and enjoyment and his equally clear observation of “chasing the wind” in life, founded as they are on a firm faith in God, as such radicalise the presuppositions inherent in traditional wisdom itself (thinking in terms of order, the resulting dilemma, faith in God).

Introduction

57

and both do that by observing the order of the world and taking it seriously. Despite the absence of revelations by a divine subject, both forms order life before the object of the ‫יראת יהוה‬. Whether in indicative, jussive or imperative garb, all sapiential forms are forms of teaching, offering as they do human instruction, the authority of which lies in the truth of its plain compatibility with the natural order. For the same reason this authority must also be divine. The utterances of this instruction can therefore also claim the force of a command, because the Creator is the underwriter of the order. So, instead of the either-or of empirical reality and revelation for respectively the “early” and the “late” phases in the development of wisdom, the same inductive logic is to be postulated for both, notwithstanding their differences of degree. Not the deductive sequence: I believe in Yahweh, therefore x is true (although I was not told that Yahweh had revealed it).216

But the inductive one: I see that x is true, therefore it must rest in Yahweh (for I believe in him).

This logic can be inverted only if one is called Eliphaz, Bildad or Shophar. But the Book of Proverbs itself does not require it. If the will of God can be gauged from natural reality, then revelation and observation coincide. That opens the possibility to interpret religion in terms of the aesthetic judgement. And, if virtue means to do what is right on the grounds of the creational order, then the right deed is a beautiful deed. 7.2 Learning in the Indicative 7.2.1 Introduction “… [w]e”, says P.J. Nel in an important study on Proverbs, “are inclined to differ with Westermann who exaggerates the difference between wisdom saying and admonition”.217 What he is driving at is that there is a “coherence in content of the admonition and the wisdom saying.” This should not, I think, be interpreted as a statement that the admonition as genre and the wisdom saying as genre mean the same thing, but probably that room should be left for “the coherence of admonition and motivation.” This would seem to boil down to the claim that, despite the formal difference between wisdom sayings and admonitions, there is some common ground between them which 216 In Proverbs it is only said that Yahweh gives the wisdom/ability to recognise/understand virtue, in other words: that Yahweh bestows inductive logic. 217 Nel (1982, 75).

58

Introduction

is not accounted for in Westermann’s exaggeration of the difference between the two.218 If I understand Nel correctly, I agree. So, I propose to take a look at Westermann’s treatment of the two genres in his study on wisdom in the sapiential saying (Westermann 1971), which has long been overlooked, but is now being brought to prominence (cf. Westermann’s own comment to this effect, 1991:28). 7.2.2. The Imperative, the Indicative, and Life-setting In his study, Westermann develops the thesis that wisdom sayings found in collections are no longer “real” wisdom sayings. They have been divorced from their original life-setting or Sitz im Leben,219 and are developments from the stage of the simple saying (“einfaches Sprichwort”) to the level of sophisticated proverb (“Kunstspruch”). Since, therefore, these proverbs represent the later development (“Nachgeschichte”) of an earlier stage in Israel’s sapiential history, they need to be related to a suitable backdrop in which the saying had its real and socially relevant meaning (“in dem das Sprichwort seine eigentliche und für die Gesellschaft zentrale Bedeutung hatte”).220 Such an earlier stage is not found in the Old Testament, but it can still be observed in the wisdom sayings of “primitive” peoples. Therefore these sayings from all over the world (in his own case only from a section of Africa) should be examined to provide the missing foundation. The cornerstone built into this thesis is that sayings in the imperative (Westermann does not include the vetitive) have a totally different life setting from that of the sayings in the indicative.221 • Imperative and direct speech Westermann takes his cue from an old book by Jakob Spieth,222 who collected 128 sayings of the Ho, an Ewe tribe. He attaches significance to the fact that only one of these has an imperative form, but immediately adds: “Es gibt hier auch Werte, die den Imperativ-Sprüchen des Alten Testaments entsprechen – aber sie kommen nur in direkter Anrede vor, und zwar bei der Ermahnung eines Kindes oder Heranwachsenden. Z.B. bei Spieth S. 634.” For instance: 218 For the sake of not unduly complicating the matter, I leave aside Nel’s statement to the effect that this “coherence in content” does not “abolish” the “intentional differences” between the two genres. 219 Westermann (1971, 73-74). 220 Westermann (1971, 75). 221 I shall respectively be referring to the genre of the admonition (Mahnspruch) for the former, and to the genre of the (wisdom) saying (Aussagespruch) for the latter. For this purpose the constructions of ‫ לא‬plus imperfect for the prohibitive and ‫ אל‬plus jussive for the vetitive will be included in the admonition category. 222 Westermann (1971, 75); the work referred to, Die Ewe-Stämme, dates from 1906 and has not been accessible to me.

Introduction

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Sieh doch deine Altersgenossen an, wie sie fleißig und gehorsam sind, wie sie niemandes Eigentum nehmen, sondern arbeiten, daß sie für sich selbst etwas erwerben! Wir bitten dich deswegen: Sei doch auch du nicht träge, sondern arbeite fleißig! Dann wird dir alles gelingen, damit du deinen Altersgenossen gleich werdest, alles tuest und so den Leuten gefällst!

The pupil should observe the diligence and honesty of his peers and emulate them, so that he will be successful and respected. Westermann continues to claim that the imperative and indicative sayings have, at any rate in this example, different life-settings.223 This is quite difficult to see. But, in the light of the far-reaching claims that follow, it merits closer attention. First, the concession that also in this collection there are imperative pronouncements, undermines the categorical distinction that Westermann wishes to make between imperative and indicative proverbs. Second, the attempt to minimise his weakening of his own argument, by appealing to the supposed occurrence of the imperatives exclusively in direct speech, is unsuccessful. It is not clear how the imperative can be used in any other way than in direct speech, which in itself cancels any meaning that could have been attached to the statement. Moreover, the very example that Westermann puts forward contains two imperatives, one following upon an introductory formula and one not so presented. If Westermann means by “direkte Anrede” (direct address) an imperative preceded by an introductory formula (such as “So we ask you ...”; cf. line 5 of his quote), the reference does not mean much, since the first line of his quote contains an imperative (“Observe your peer group”) without any such formula. Even if this were not the case, it would still remain unclear what difference the presentation of imperatives in introduced direct speech would make to the argument. • Sitz im Leben: equal and unequal situations The pièce de résistance of Westermann’s proposition is that the admonition and the wisdom saying hail from different life-settings. He plainly declares that proverbs in the imperative and those in the indicative have different life contexts and that the injunction belongs to education, “as opposed to which” the real adage is an (indicative) saying:224 223

Westermann (1971, 76). Westermann (1971, 76): “Es ist deutlich, daß die Einmahnung ihren ursprünglichen Sitz im Leben in der Erziehung hat. Imperativ- und Indikativspruch haben ... einen verschiedenen Sitz im Leben. Die Mahnung zu einem richtigen Handeln gehört in die Erziehung, sie ist an Kinder oder Aufwachsende gerichtet. Das eigentliche Sprichwort dagegen ist Aussagespruch.” 224

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The moot point is not whether admonitions are to be located in education, but whether it is true that the indicative wisdom sayings are not to be understood as part of this aspect of ancient Israelite (and so-called “primitive”) society. There seem to be several loose ends in Westermann’s handling of the matter. He obviously regards a rigid distinction between the two genres as support for his fundamental thesis that the collections of proverbs should be studied against the backdrop of “primitive” sayings to compensate for the irretrievable loss of the original setting of the biblical proverbs. I do not see why this is necessary. Westermann could have developed his argument225 without saddling this horse. The only incentive I can see for arguing along these lines is the desire to safeguard the simple sayings from being incorporated into the category of instruction (“Lehre”). The latter is “education” and, if one can keep the former from being understood as education as well, they will also be kept from the danger of being regarded as part of a sophisticated didactic system and from association with schools,226 while it would not be such a loss to have to cede only the admonitions to the category of “Lehre.”227 Next, Westermann’s exposition is less than lucid when he comes to explain the intention of indicative sayings in relation to admonitions. Denying that all indicative sayings have the function of merely establishing facts (“die Funktion bloßer Feststellung”), he continues (Westermann 1971:76): Quite a number of these sayings have a clear demanding or even admonishing character; but it is essential that this demand or admonition is to be inferred, deduced, from the indicative … The declarative saying says how it is. ([E]ine ganze Reihe dieser Sprüche hat einen ausgesprochen auffordernden oder auch mahnenden Charakter; aber es ist wesentlich, daß diese Aufforderung oder Mahnung aus dem Indikativ zu entnehmen, zu folgern ist ... Der Aussagespruch sagt, wie es ist.)

It makes very little sense to concede the admonitory character of indicative statements and, in the same breath, to reiterate their simple descriptive character. These two statements are not reconciled by calling it seminal that the 225 I do not find much convincing in the attempts of Westermann’s pupil, F.W. Golka, to show that our understanding of the biblical proverbs is enhanced by such comparisons with African wisdom sayings (cf. Golka 1986, 1989a, 1993.) See Loader (1999, 211-233) for a detailed discussion of the matter. 226 For Westermann’s opposition to this association and his championing of the “folk school” (which associates the origin of proverbial sayings with “ordinary folk”), cf. Fox (1996, 232-234). 227 Zimmerli ([1933] 1976, 180) and Von Rad (1970, 48) point out the relative scarcity of direct admonitions in relation to the total number of verses in the Book of Proverbs. Compare this, however, with the hefty list of 103 admonitions, arranged according to form, provided by Nel (1982, 65-67).

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admonition is to be inferred from the indicative.228 This is exactly what anyone wishing to demonstrate the affinity of imperative and indicative sayings would claim. If anything, the inconsistency in Westermann’s argument reveals uneasiness about the relationship between admonitions and indicative wisdom sayings. His examples from the Ewe collection illustrate this: The dwarf antelope does not put on the elephant’s foot.

and: The strife of the sheep is no concern of the goats.

Both are obviously statements, but imply what should be respected and done. In the natural order of things the dwarf antelope does not walk with huge elephant feet. The opposite would be unnatural, therefore undesirable, and should therefore be avoided. In other words, the small, lowly or less powerful should know their station and not aspire to things that are too big for them. The strife among sheep, for instance the competition among rams in the mating season, has no impact on the quite different species of goats. The implied admonition is to keep out of conflicts that do not concern one. Both examples have equivalents in biblical wisdom. The biblical admonition not to be assuming in the king’s presence or to take a place among the great (Prov 25:6) and the statement that a skilful man may stand before kings (Prov 22:29) have the same function. The admonition advises humility in high society and implies that only certain people have the right to certain styles of conduct in that society. The indicative states that only certain people have a certain status, and implies that skill should be striven for. Another example: The statement that it is foolish to meddle in others’ quarrels (Prov 26:17) can be compared to the Ewe saying on sheep and goats. It has the didactic implication that one should not concern oneself with conflicts among others. The vague dividing line between the admonitions and the indicative sayings was underscored by Zimmerli as early as 1933.229 Not only are several transformations of admonitions into “ordinary sayings” and vice versa 228 The same is done by Gerstenberger (1965, 119-120), although he is more sensitive than Westermann to the flimsy distinction between the direct admonitions and the wisdom sayings with admonitory implication (Gerstenberger calls it a “feiner Unterschied”). Gerstenberger is certainly right that the difference is not eradicated by the fact that such indicative sayings require the hearer to infer the implied admonition, but neither is the similarity in thrust eradicated by the difference in grammatical form. Compare this with Bauer-Kayatz (1969, 13-14), according to whom both the admonitions and the indicative sayings belong to “clan wisdom”. Von Rad’s idea (1970, 48) that the wisdom sayings contain an element that points beyond themselves (“etwas über sich Hinausweisendes”), which makes possible all kinds of associations, can be taken to support the affinity of the two forms despite their grammatical difference. 229 Zimmerli ([1933] 1976, 181).

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possible (cf. his illustrations by means of Prov 16:3, 19:20 on the one hand, and 10:2a, 23:4-5 on the other), but also the “two forms are often found joined together in Proverbs into a verbal unity” (e.g. 23:20-21, 26-27; 24:15-16, 19-20). Hermisson230 also pays attention to forms on the border of the indicative saying and the admonition. He is taken to task by Nel231 for furthering the cause of those who would advocate a genetic development from wisdom saying to admonition, but this is not what Hermisson in fact has done. He has only demonstrated the grey area between the two forms as witnessed to by what he calls “Übergangsformen.” These are wisdom sayings in which the imperative is used, but which cannot be understood as direct admonitions to do as one has been told. For example, Proverbs 22:10a: Drive out the insolent and strife goes away.

In the syntax of the Hebrew imperative it is well known that either two imperatives or an imperative and a jussive232 may be related in this way, so that “the first imperative contains, as a rule, a condition, while the second [imperative or jussive] declares the consequence which the fulfilment of the condition will involve.”233 This is what can be seen here (cf. also Isa 8:10; 55:2). It is not an injunction that one should act in a certain way towards insolent people, but a statement showing what happens in the presence or absence of such people. Proverbs 20:16 (and its parallel in 27:13) may also be compared: Take away his garment, for he has pledged for a stranger, and hold him as a pledge for strangers.

This is a strong form of condemning the practice of surety, not an admonition as to what the wise person should do to those who have pledged. The focus is on demonstrating the folly of an unhealthy financial practice, not on the duty of punishing others. Westermann234 concedes that a saying in the indicative can imply an admonition, but the examples provided show that an admonition in the imperative can also, conversely, imply a statement. Therefore the formal side of his argument for the strict distinction and indeed separation of the two forms is very weak. The logical aspect of his argument is just as unconvincing. Westermann, as we have seen, declares that the admonitory saying has its life-setting in 230 231 232 233 234

Hermisson (1968, 160-162). Nel (1982, 74-75). GKC 110f and 110g. GKC 110f. Westermann (1971, 76).

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“education” (“Erziehung”). This is a broad category and does not yet address the controversy of the “school school” versus the “folk school.”235 However, when he has to define the life-setting of the indicative wisdom saying, he is even less clear (1971, 76): Das eigentliche Sprichwort dagegen ist Aussagespruch. (The real adage, on the other hand [sc. as opposed to the admonition which is placed in “education”] is a factual statement).

This is not a proclamation, as required by the context of Westermann’s argument, on the supposedly differing Sitz im Leben of the simple proverb, but one on its literary form. So he still does not say where the saying is to be located, but the implication is “not in education.” It is important to Westermann that the implied social status of those involved in the speaking and hearing of the two genres should be considered. In fact, this is the most important, if not the only, argument for their functional difference. The admonition implies, he thinks, unequal social positions, while the wisdom saying implies equality in the status of the speaker and the addressed. An admonition implies a position of authority for the speaker, therefore it points to a teacher-pupil relationship; therefore the life-setting is “education.” An indicative saying implies two parties “auf gleicher Ebene stehend”;236 therefore it does not point to a life-setting in education; where it should point to, if not to education, is left unclear. However, much – indeed most – education is formulated in the indicative. If wisdom sayings imply anything, it is that they contain worthwhile knowledge which necessarily entails that the speaker has knowledge that the hearer does not have. This is the nearest one could get to a teacher-pupil relationship, whether the former is a father, an experienced clan elder, or a teacher in a formal schooling institution, and whether the hearer is a child, an adolescent, an adult member of the speaker’s clan, or even a superior. Moreover, if the instructions of, for instance, Proverbs 1–9 may employ indicative statements as well as admonitions in the imperative, why can this not be the case in the shorter sayings from chapter 10 onwards? McKane237 235 Compare this with Nel 1982, 79-82, who thinks the life-setting of the admonition to be the same as that of the wisdom saying, notably “the Israelite city,” which he regards as comprehensive enough to accommodate a whole series of ethoi, including the family ethos and the school ethos. Although Nel is thoroughly part of the “school school” (cf. his indebtedness to Gese – Nel [1982, v]), his social placing of the admonition genre is so broad as to keep the folk-school controversy unresolved. This does not contribute to his endeavour to evaluate the “two main solutions” of the problem, viz. those of Gerstenberger (1965, 121) and Richter (1966, 117), who respectively opt for the family and the school as the life-setting of the admonitions. 236 That is, standing or finding themselves on the same level (Westermann 1971, 77). 237 McKane ([1970] 1977, 7).

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forcefully makes this point with reference to Proverbs 7:6-23 (cf. 24:30-34), where we find: greater imaginative and descriptive scope than the didactic employment of imperatives and motive clauses in order to inculcate authoritative instruction. There is rather a reliance on descriptive power in order to win acquiescence for the point which is being made.

Westermann238 himself refers to Proverbs 1–9 in this connection and concedes that we here find the father or teacher teaching a son or pupil. He then adds that his examples of Ewe wisdom have shown that one cannot take both indicative and imperative proverbs as instruction.239 Non sequitur. 7.2.3 Conclusion Westermann’s taking a position so fraught with difficulties is probably related to his basic orientation towards “form” rather than “content.” The argument we have been considering seems to anticipate the thoughts on this issue expressed in Westermann’s later works on wisdom.240 In these it is quite clear how preoccupied he is with a strong distinction between studying wisdom from the perspective of “Redeformen” (forms) and studying it with the focus on “gedankliche Inhalte” (ideas). It becomes a yardstick for categorising contemporary “schools.” For him the “Redeformen” school coincides with the “folk” school as opposed to the “gedankliche Inhalte” school, which coincides with the “school/court” school. His own allegiance to the former leads to his strict separation between the wisdom poems (“Schulweisheit” or “Lehrweisheit”) and the aphorisms (“Volksweisheit” or “Spruchweisheit”). The former is pure education in a formal situation, and the latter not. When it comes to aphoristic wisdom, the form-content dichotomy, specifically the separation of form and content at the expense of the content, in turn causes an exaggerated distinction between imperative and indicative proverbs – two forms that are equally part of aphoristic wisdom.241 Finally, different life-settings for different forms have to be sought, which leads to the discrepancies and obscurities242 that I have pointed out. This conclusion cautions against the dichotomy of form and content. 238

Westermann (1971, 77). This is said as criticism of Gese (1958, 5-6), who does contend that the two forms together are constitutive of the instruction genre. 240 Westermann (1990a; 1991). 241 See the essay on the concept of order, Vol. I, 19-28. 242 These include the following: the instructions of the poems differ fundamentally from the aphorisms, but the aphoristic admonitions are also instructions; the poems have a lifesetting in education, but the fundamentally different admonitions should also be located in the educational setting; no attention is given to the use of the indicative in an educational setting; admission of the admonitory character of indicative sayings while arguing for their descriptive character; conclusions are drawn without attention being paid to syntactical possibilities. 239

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7.3 Metaphorical and Literal Readings of Aphorisms in Proverbs 7.3.1 Introduction In his monograph on wealth and poverty in the Book of Proverbs, Timothy Sandoval proposes a bold thesis on the basis of an investigation of what he calls “the discourse of wealth and poverty in the Book of Proverbs.” Focusing on “metaphor” and “discourse” and depending considerably on Paul Ricoeur, he argues that the book’s discourse on wealth and poverty is “more coherent than is usually thought and plays an integral role in the book’s construction of a moral vision for its reader or hearer.” This is extremely interesting, since it prompts several further questions: • whether the perceived coherence, being part of the whole book’s strategy in constructing a unitary moral vision, can also be observed within other discourses found in the book or in its presentation of other topics, such as trustworthiness, industriousness, the royal court and so on; • whether these discourses are coherent within and among themselves; • whether the roles played by such different aspects contribute by virtue of their unity to the moral vision; • if so, what is special about the discourse of wealth and poverty, and if not, is a general coherence of argumentative material not to be expected in a book of which it can be claimed that it has one “moral vision”? For the moment, I shall not pursue these questions in any depth, since they provide a backdrop to what specifically is relevant for the purposes of this essay, notably another idea exploited by Sandoval for the development of his argument. He continues in the review of his procedure:243 The key to recognising the coherence of Proverbs’ discourse of wealth and poverty is an appreciation of the text’s figurative interpretive possibilities. The book’s prologue, which articulates the primary virtues and goals of Proverbs, itself invites the wise and discerning reader at the outset of the instruction to consider the book’s tropes and figures. With various individual meshalim, other internal cues, such as the difficulties or absurdities posed by a literal interpretation, likewise point to the text’s figurative qualities.

The survey is consistently developed in the book and the importance of the prologue as hermeneutical “cue” is not co-incidentally stressed. In a detailed discussion of Proverbs 1:2-7 Sandoval244 develops the idea that the “tropes and figures” of verse 6 are intended to suggest that readers should be sensitised to find “figurative” meanings all over the book. If this is true, it would have to hold good for the Book of Proverbs as such and not only for the discourse of wealth and poverty. 243 244

Sandoval (2006, 205). Sandoval (2006, 45-57).

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I do not dispute the idea that the prologue provides a hermeneutical indication of how the book as a redactional composition is to be read. But using this insight for all practical purposes as an argument to slant the reader towards a figurative reading of the book as such, or at least a “more figurative” reading than would otherwise have been the case, perhaps overestimates its possibilities. An alternative interpretation can be found in Vol. I of this commentary.245 For the present purpose we may begin with some illustrations of difficulties when trying to read “overly figuratively” as an alternative to what Sandoval calls “overly literalistic” readings. As a corollary, some illustrations follow of many instances where literal readings are not only possible, but also necessary. Together, these considerations will show that such an overriding “metaphorical” or “symbolical” hermeneutical perspective is not strong. 7.3.2 Evidence from the Textual Material The outcome of my reading of the “prologue” to the Book of Proverbs is that “figures” or “tropes” may well be meant in verse 5, but that the “cue” given is not about general figurative meanings encoded in the book. Rather, it is that teachers are to understand that the book is intended for them in order to enhance their adroitness in explaining figures and tropes and comparable difficult matters in need of clarification. Therefore a heavy emphasis is on this verse as a pointer to read the whole book with a sensitivity to figurative aphorisms and motifs is exaggerated. • The endeavour to read aphorisms as if they “generally function figuratively” The strength of the idea that the prologue gives hermeneutical indications is that it highlights the fact that the aphorisms from Chapter 10 onwards are in their present form determined by literary relationships no less than the poems in chapters 1–9. This may of course indicate or invite several possibilities for understanding the proverbs, including metaphorical readings. The weakness is however that the idea cannot be generalised to such an extent that metaphorical readings are privileged. A further sweeping claim in support of this tendency should also be handled with care. Sandoval formulates it as follows:246 … folk sayings are regularly intended and understood metaphorically. There exists a commonplace recognition that even though a proverbial utterance may make perfect sense when taken literally, it should not be so understood because proverbs by their “nature” (i.e., their regular usage) are concerned to 245 The detailed discussion of the prologue as offered in the original publication of this essay, is therefore omitted here. See Vol. I, 49-63. 246 Sandoval (2006, 11); cf. also p. 118 and passim.

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say something metaphorically about human beings, the world, or the ways and concerns of human beings in the world. More specifically, they are used to say something about the world and human beings in relation to quite particular contexts of human life.

He seeks support from the views of Archer Taylor and Wolfgang Mieder for the claim that “folk sayings are regularly intended and understood metaphorically” and from Peter Seitel that social context shows “how proverbs function metaphorically.”247 Without entering into the matter of social context and its many ramifications, we should keep in mind that many aphorisms in the Book of Proverbs are not folk sayings and that all of them now are part of a literary context, both in the poems, where short sayings are often incorporated, and in the collections of short proverbs beginning at Chapter 10. It seems precarious to make, on one hand, a basic point of the literary context or “Gestalt” of the Book of Proverbs in the light of the prologue as a hermeneutical cue for a metaphorical understanding, and on the other hand to make the same point regarding (or at least including) the social context whence the proverbs came before they were edited into a literary anthology – in order to serve the same purpose. If such general statements on the character of the prologue and of aphoristic proverbs as they are generally intended and understood, are true, then the whole Book of Proverbs, not only a specific discourse within it, is to be understood metaphorically. Then the claim has to be that the book as such is primarily, if not exclusively, metaphorical. But, although that is what the logic of the argument seems to require, Sandoval states that he does not exclude non-metaphorical understandings and only calls for more sensitivity for the metaphorical meaning of some proverbs.248 This seems to counter the force of the argument by curbing its consequences. It is presented as a balanced approach, but the evidence seems to present an argument for only one side of it. We may now consider some representative proverbs in the light of the “generally” metaphoric quality aphorisms are said to have by virtue of their supposed kinship with folk sayings. There are many aphorisms where a metaphorical understanding is possible but unnecessary and others where such an interpretation is not possible. In Proverbs 5:15 we have an aphorism in the context of a longer text: Drink water from your own cistern, running water from your own well. 247 Sandoval (2006, 12); cf. respectively Mieder (1993, 9), Taylor ([1962] 1981, 6), and Seitel ([1969] 1981, 126-128). 248 E.g. Sandoval (2006, 67, 128); only an “overly literalistic” (p. 130) or “overly literal” (p. 141) reading is to be avoided, implying that he is defending a reading where a measure of the rejected literalism, but not too much of it, is acceptable.

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This is a proverb from the injunction genre. It can stand by itself and be meaningful in its own right. As it stands in the context of verses 15-20, it is clearly part of an admonition on sexual satisfaction within marriage. The thrust is that sexual satisfaction is to be sought with one’s own wife, not with other women (v. 20), and that one’s wife is not for sharing (v. 17). There are notorious difficulties in the passage, such as the question whether verse 16 refers to a reward or has to be taken as an admonition or a threat,249 but the salient point for our purpose is the fact that we here clearly have a metaphor in the text and can only read it as a metaphor because the literary context makes another reading impossible. From verse 15 to verse 18 a string of water metaphors250 are used and then explicitly placed in a parallelism with “wife” (v. 18): Blessed be your fountain, and rejoice in the wife of your youth.

So we have no choice; the passage’s concepts from the sphere of water (drink, water, cistern, well, springs, streams, fountain) are pinpointed by the context, which then moves on to another group of metaphors from the world of animals, again explicitly identifying the hind and the doe with the youthful wife as opposed to other women (vv. 19-20; cf. Cant 2:7, 3:5). But verse 15 is a typical proverb that, despite now being part of a literary unit, can just as well stand by itself in an aphoristic collection. It is therefore a saying that, in Sandoval’s appropriation of Mieder cited above, is typical of those folk sayings that should be understood metaphorically because by their very nature they “say something metaphorically about human beings, the world, or the ways and concerns of human beings in the world.” Let us consider this with the help of the example before us. Verse 15 can very well be understood literally and still say things about the concerns of people in the world. For instance, in a dry land it is unwise to become dependent on others for water supplies. Therefore the wise man should see to it that he has his own water resources. The saying would be an injunction to economic independence and would focus on the interests of the individual spoken to. Second, if the addressee does have his own resources, he should not avail himself of those owned by other people. That would be an admonition in the spirit of Nathan’s parable, an idea taken for granted by David, since he was angered by the narrative of a man who had enough of the same resource and still took from another’s (2 Sam 12:1-6), and it would focus on the interests of society. In Proverbs 9:17 water imagery is clearly again used in the service of a sexual ethic. 249 250

Fox; cf. Murphy, Waltke, Kruger (1987, 68). Cf. Klopper (2002, 184-187).

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Stolen water is sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant.

From the context we know that the pithy saying is spoken by Dame Folly in order to lure unwise men to her. This in itself is metaphorical, since the imagery of public soliciting by a woman in the city is clear. It stands for folly luring simple men. As such it could be understood metaphorically for illicit sex,251 but it could also be understood quite literally. The proverb by itself could be interpreted as an expression of the same logic used in Prov 20:17: Bread gained by deceit is sweet, but afterward the mouth is full of gravel.

The second aphorism uses the so-called “synthetic” device to represent the consequences of theft by means of a clear metaphor for experiencing the unpleasant consequences of deceitful gain. The gravel in the mouth is a pointer that the eating of bread in the first hemistich is also a metaphor. But even so, the eating of bread can be a literal reference to food gained by deceitful means, for which the consequence can be most aptly indicated by a metaphor from the field of the literal eating. The first proverb, however, does not develop the consequences of the pleasure of illicit gain. In the context the suggestiveness of Dame Folly is clear, and clearer still in the context of a collection of poems including Prov 2:16-19 on illicit sexual behaviour and the water imagery of Prov 5. But if we consider the proverb by itself,252 it can very well be understood literally. Drinking and eating what one has unlawfully gained, obviously has a fascination, since it lures people so generally that it can be said to always provide the additional thrill of adventure.253 The repetitive expression of the principle in the parallelism leaves no room for pointing out the consequence as in Prov 20:17. Therefore there is a gap in the text, which has to be filled up by the hearer.254 But nothing absurd results, and the proverb can be as suggestive as any when taken literally. As a last example of this kind, we may consider Proverbs 24:17-18: Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, and do not let your heart be glad when he stumbles, So that Yahweh does not see it and it be wrong in his eyes, and turn away his anger from him. 251

Cf. Waltke (2004, 40, 445-446 and [on 29:17] 2005, 145-146). Suggested but not pursued by Murphy. 253 Similarly Fox. 254 The same logic is found in the Arabic proverb, “Anything forbidden is sweet” (cf. Winton Thomas 1965, 271-279). The invitation to think further in line with the suggestive text also occurs at the endings of the Book of Jonah and the Gospel of Mark, where the anti-climax likewise calls for participation by the reader; cf. also the many gaps in the Book of Esther, likewise invitations to contribute to the meaning. 252

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Here the aspect of interest for us is whether we have a metaphor in the way that God’s observation of human conduct is described. A human being rejoices over the ill fortune of an opponent, God sees it and as a result takes the side of the underdog. The anthropomorphic speech may indeed be a metaphor, that is, the proverb speaks of God as if he were human. This obviously has to do with the idea that God has physical features as humans do, in this case eyes to look out of. But the proverb could also be understood literally. That would depend on the concept of God lying behind the proverb. Is the God spoken of here pictured naively, which happened all over the ancient Near East, as a personal being who walks around, observes things and makes decisions on that basis? If so, then the anthropomorphism is not meant metaphorically, but literally in terms of the anthropomorphic concept of God. If the God concept lying behind the proverb is however not that God somehow has human features (cf. Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29; 1 Kgs 8:27), then the anthropomorphism does represent a metaphorical way of speaking about him. Then it intends to say something that has to be said but can only be said metaphorically for lack of ways in which to conceptualise the inconceivable. So the question of metaphorical features in the text can also depend on issues of ancient Israelite religious history. In none of these cases is there any sign of an absurdity occurring as a result of a literal understanding of aphorisms when they are read in their own right. The absurd result Sandoval, following Ricœur,255 ascribes to efforts at understanding such proverbs literally, is to be expected if both the literary shape introduced by the prologue keynote and the nature of aphorisms point in that direction. But it does not happen. If absurdity or self-destructing contradiction is a sign that a metaphor is present, we do not have metaphors here. If such aphorisms are a “difficulty” since they lack absurd literal potential,256 it begs the question why at all bother to get it to be a metaphor? Why at all stick to such a criterion? • Aphorisms that cannot be understood as metaphors My argument thus far suggests that there are levels of the text clearly indicating where metaphors are present in aphorisms, and other levels that allow literal readings. This may happen within the aphorisms themselves and sometimes on the level of the aphorisms in their context. But there are often cases where texts can not be read metaphorically unless the readers in their own right apply the proverb to a new situation and thereby create a metaphor.

255 256

Ricœur (1976, 50); Sandoval (2006, 7, 10). Sandoval (2006, 10).

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As a first series of examples we can consider the aphorisms on scales and fair trade.257 Deceitful scales are an abomination to Yahweh, but a full weight has his favour. (Prov 11:1) A just balance and scale are Yahweh’s; all the stones in the bag are his work. (Prov 16:11) A stone and a stone, an ephah and an ephah – both of them an abomination to Yahweh! (Prov 20:10) An abomination to Yahweh are a stone and a stone, and false scales are not good. (Prov 20:23)

The two epexegetical genitives ‫ מאזני מרמה‬and ‫ מאזני משפט‬in three of these proverbs exemplify the opposites in the measurement scales used by merchants. They can also be understood as objective genitives; scales that bring about fraud and scales that cause justice to be done. The stones are the weights used on the scales. The repetition “stone and stone”, “ephah and ephah” (Prov 20:10 and 23) imply two opposite kinds of measuring tools; too light for selling and too heavy for buying.258 The heavily moral word ‫ תועבה‬is used to condemn such business practices in the strongest possible terms.259 The whole issue is distinctly religious and as such concerns a moral value, but this has nothing to do with non-literal understanding. The meaning is plainly and straightforwardly literal. The scales and the weights and the measuring units do not represent “higher” as opposed to “lesser” values (so often distinguished by Sandoval).260 The literal meaning is a moral meaning. Of course the reader can apply these proverbs to other spheres of life, such as nondiscrimination in politics, treating children equally, fair criteria for evaluation of examination papers, equal treatment for all language groups, consistent refereeing in sports and so on. But that does not declare the proverb to be a metaphor in its intentional historical or literary context. It does show the polyvalence of the proverbs and the extent to which the reception of literal 257 Sandoval obviously has to treat them, since they are so important for his focus on economic motifs, although they sit uncomfortably with his thesis (cf. Sandoval 2006, 143145). 258 Cf. Murphy (1998, 151). The same kind of repetitive idiom is found in our parlance: There are friends and “friends”, meaning, “Some friends are good and others are bad.” 259 Cf. Deut 25:3-16; for the principle, cf. further Lev 19:35-36; Ezek 45:10-12; Am 8:5; Mi 6:10-12. 260 Cf. Sandoval (2006, 92, 130 and passim) in several contexts. An appeal to the prologue (Prov 1:3) does not remove the principle of social justice from the literal sphere (Sandoval 2006, 145).

72

Introduction

meanings is influenced by the reader and highlights the creativity of the interpreting subject. A second group of examples is taken from the aphorisms on laziness. In two cases we have clear-cut metaphors, but the majority are quite literal. The way of the sluggard is like a hedge of thorns, but the path of the upright is a highway. (Prov 15:19)

In this antithetical saying, there is a metaphor and a simile. The way (both ‫ דרך‬and ‫ )ארח‬is the life course, including the conduct and the experience of humans. In terms of the metaphor the last hemistich is quite literal: a highway is a built-up ‫סללה‬, but for that reason it extends the metaphor. The metaphor says that, whereas a sluggard’s life is “thorny”, that is, cumbersome, the upright make easy progress. The proverb contains a metaphor, but the metaphor has nothing to do with laziness. That is to say that the aphorism has something to say about literal laziness, but does so by using the metaphor of the way. Moreover, an endeavour to understand the metaphor literally does not produce the kind of Ricœurian absurdity. It is quite thinkable that a lazy traveller takes a shortcut to avoid too long a walk along the road, and finds himself hindered by thorny bushes, while a wise man keeping to a longer but tested “beaten track” finds walking to the destiny easier. So, although we do have a metaphorical aspect in the aphorism, the criterion that its literal interpretation should “produce an immediate or unambiguous absurdity” is not met.261 Sandoval finds this a “problem”, but it is only a problem in terms of his interpretation of Ricœur that it should be. Go to the ant, you sluggard, consider its ways, and be wise. (Prov 6:6)

Part of the section 6:6-11 on laziness, this command is a complete sapiential injunction in its own right. The ant is an example of diligence (cf. Prov 30:25), but the saying does not become a metaphor for that reason. The sluggard is to literally study the ant and do as the ant does in order to provide food for the time of need.262 Like vinegar to the teeth and smoke to the eyes, so the sluggard to his senders. (Prov 10:26)

In this saying (Wahrspruch) we do have a figure, but not a metaphor. It is a direct comparison between the effects of sending a sluggard on an errand and the negative and painful experience of vinegar on the teeth and smoke 261 262

Sandoval (2006, 13). Cf. Toperoff (1985, 179-185).

Introduction

73

in the eyes. The point is quite literally to state that employment of a lazy person brings about negative consequences. It is left to the hearer to infer that such employment should be avoided.263 The lazy person says, “There is a lion on the road! There is a lion in the streets!” A door turns on its hinges and a sluggard on his bed. (Prov 26:13-14)

These two aphorisms obviously occur together because of the shared motif of laziness. Beginning with the second one, this is also clearly a complete metaphor in which the things compared are stated,264 but without ‫ כ‬and/or ‫כן‬. The metaphor exemplifies the fact that a sluggard gets nowhere. His movement is like the movement of a door on its hinges, it stays only where it stands. This brings an important element of humour into the aphorism, which, again, serves to ridicule sloth. The literal element is however again quite apparent. The sluggard only turns around in bed, unwilling to get up and work. The turning sluggard on his bed “is” a turning door on its hinges. The only reason why it is called a metaphor and not a simile is that the particle of comparison ‫ כ‬is absent. But a “complete” metaphor expressly measures the literal thing compared with the metaphorical figure. The former of the two aphorisms (Prov 26:13) has a parallel in Chapter 22: The sluggard says, “There is a lion outside! I shall be killed in the streets!” (Prov 22:13)

These are literal aphorisms, not metaphors. Whether there actually is a lion outside is irrelevant, because the extravagance of the reason for not going out and being active serves to ridicule the sluggard by unmasking the (real) absurdity of his excuses for doing nothing. It is humour again employed to evoke a negative response in the hearer. Therefore the literal understanding of the sluggard’s words is necessary for the point of the aphorism to be grasped: lazy people stop at nothing to do nothing. It is then suggestively left to the reader to supply the consequence that laziness is to be avoided. We can continue in this vein with many aphorisms on trustworthiness (e.g. Prov 11:3; 13:17; 26:6), human speech (e.g. Prov 15:1, 2, 4, 28; 25:15), the royal court (e.g. Prov 16:14; 19:12; 20:2), women (e.g. Prov 2:16; 5:3-4; 7:5) and so on. The question whether such aphorisms contain metaphors or not, is to be distinguished from the question whether they are to be understood 263 264

Cf. Loader (1996, 21-33). Cf. Waltke (2004, 39).

74

Introduction

metaphorically or not. Even on the submission that these aphorisms are “about virtue and vice”, the conclusion is not warranted that this makes them more metaphorical265 or that their “moral values” should be contrasted with “literal” things understood as “material” things or “lesser goods”.266 7.3.3 Conclusion My purpose in this essay was to show that a general claim for more willingness to interpret aphorisms of one discourse or group of discourses “more” metaphorically, can be substantiated neither on the basis of the overall literary context (the “hermeneutical cue” of the prologue) nor on the basis of indeterminate paremiological suppositions about aphorisms (that short proverbs have much in common with folk proverbs, most of which “naturally” require metaphorical understanding). Generalised statements in favour of a more metaphorical reading of Proverbs, made on the basis of the literary Gestalt of the anthology (whether this is called the redactional perspective or not) have to be generally applicable or not at all. And equally generalised perceptions on the “nature” of aphorisms have to be equally applicable overall if they are to have argumentative value. Moreover, this kind of argument runs the danger of applying a petitio principii; aphorisms naturally tend to say more than they seem to say, so they do that here as well. There certainly is a coherence to be seen in the Book of Proverbs, not only because a hermeneutical framework is provided by the prologue, but it can also be observed in the use of sapiential perspectives (such as the creational order, the deedconsequence nexus, and the religious dimension) and motifs (such as the concept of wisdom, discipline, and human possibilities). It can also be seen in the impressive literary employment of figures, including metaphors, and of other possibilities offered by poetry, as these occur throughout the book. But the topics covered are so variegated that we should not give in to the temptation to employ a specific strategy in order to satisfy a need to discover coherence in the book. Rather, exegesis should opt for interpretive acts with creative theological possibilities. For instance, as Wencislaus Link did in his criticism of the papal withholding of the biblical abundance from the people. He is quoted:267 The wise Solomon says in Proverbs 11: “The people curse him who withholds grain, but there is a blessing on the head of him who sells it.”

In this literal aphorism, people curse merchants for manipulating prices by withholding grain from the market. The monopolistic merchant becomes a 265 266 267

Cf. Sandoval (2006, 138). Cf. Sandoval (2006, 118 and passim). Luther ([1530] 1909, 632). The reference is to Prov 11:26.

Introduction

75

metaphor for the pope, his withholding grain metaphorically stands for the papal withholding the bread of life in the Bible from the hungry, the common people of Europe are kept in the power of the church as the Israelite populace are kept in the power of the merchant. Luther, on the other hand, would be the one who puts the food at the people’s disposal by translating the Bible into the tongue of the people, and is blessed for it. On a second level, Link himself puts Luther’s essay on Bible translation at public disposal, claiming that he just cannot withhold it, and can also hope for the sapiential blessing on his own head. Whether one agrees with this application or not, is not decided by the question whether the proverb can be shown to need a “more metaphorical” interpretation than usual. It is decided by one’s views on the Reformation and issues of the authority of the church. This is not a “right” interpretation reckoning with literary and paremiological reasons for reading metaphorically. But it is a legitimate metaphorical application of a literal proverb.

COMMENTARY PROVERBS 10:1–22:16 THE SECOND PART OF THE BOOK OF PROVERBS

ESSENTIALS AND PERSPECTIVES

Bibl. Dell 2006, 51-64; Hausmann 1995, 77-93, 331-344; Heim 1996 passim; Hildebrandt 1988; Krispenz 1989, 41-102; Murphy 1998, 260-264; Scoralick 1995 passim; Snell 1993 passim; Weeks 2007, 20-29.

The second main part of the Book of Proverbs consists of 10:1–22:16 and contains the first collection of short sayings or aphorisms.1 There is a farreaching consensus among interpreters that the collection ends at 22:16, since 22:17 introduces a new group of sayings that begins with a distinctive style and different characteristics.2 A trend can be observed in recent scholarship to emphasise groupings or clusters of proverbs, and these chapters provide an especially suitable mining field for developing it. Krispenz3 finds 30 groupings of proverbs within 10:1–22:16 (although these do not include all the verses). Scoralick4 limits her research to Chaps. 10-15 and identifies five sections in these chapters. Heim5 divides this collection into 57 units, each with an own meaning. On the other hand, Weeks6 argues that the divisions cannot be precisely demarcated with certainty. He accepts the existence of groupings, but is sceptical about the notion of an encompassing composition made up by meticulous editing. So are Dell,7 Yoder,8 Fox9 and others. Important though this issue is, it should not be over-exploited one way or the other. Authors critical of efforts to find closely-knit clusters often concede that certain groups of associated proverbs can be recognised at least in places,10 and as far as I can 1 The term “aphorism” is here used in the general sense of a short and independent, insightful and often provocative utterance, whether its statement is assertive or cast in the form of a (rhetorical) question (e.g. 14:22) or an exclamation (e.g. 15:23), and irrespective of whether it is prose or, as always in the Book of Proverbs, poetry; cf. RDLW I, 104-106; Williams (1980, 37-39). 2 Although, strictly speaking, 22:17 does not contain a superscription, it does allude to the clear caption at 24:23, which refers to “the wise men,” and uses the same word to identify whose words are to be taken to heart. 3 Krispenz (1989, 164-176). 4 Scoralick (1995, 161-237). 5 Heim (2001, 109-311). 6 Weeks (2007, 26). 7 Dell (2006, 61). 8 Yoder (2009, 118). 9 Fox (2009, 478-482; cf. 2003, 271-272). 10 Including, for instance, Dell, Fox, Weeks and even older commentators such as Toy and Gemser, but not Wildeboer, who only refers to Ewald’s clusters without comment. These are practically ignored in the commentary by McKane.

80

Essentials and Perspectives

see, no advocate of the clusters denies that the building blocks are the individual sayings themselves. The exegesis offered below will take a similar position. In nuce it has already been formulated almost half a century ago by Hermisson,11 according to whom the individual proverbs should first be interpreted in their own right, after which it should be investigated if and how the groupings within which they may find themselves contribute an enriching dimension to their meaning. Where groups of proverbs seem to be defined by more than just standing alongside each other, I will translate them together and try to substantiate patterns. Since some in my opinion are looser than others, this is a matter of degree rather than principle. Often such relationships can only be seen with great difficulty and often not at all, at any rate, not by me. In those cases, I will translate and discuss the proverbs individually. In the light of these considerations,12 it is thus best, in my view, to keep the organisation of the commentary close to the organisation of the biblical book in chapters.13 Division II of the Book of Proverbs is itself made up of two sub-collections (10:1–15:33 and 16:1–22:16). Most commentators are agreed that the division lies between 15:33 and 16:1,14 although other lines have also been drawn15 on both thematic and formal grounds, such as catchwords, figures of style and repetitions. A prominent instance of the latter type is the proposal by Snell,16 according to whom the first subsection consists of 10:1–14:25, a second follows from 14:26–16:15, and a third from 16:16–22:16.17 There are however no sharp boundaries between such groupings of sayings, as will be seen in the exegesis. Especially the effort to draw the lines with the help of thematic criteria should not be rigidly applied, since the topics and motifs 11 Hermisson (1968, 171; 179) focuses on 10:1–15:33 only (so also Scoralick, although she does refer to this as a sub-division within the whole of 10:1–22:16; cf. Scoralick [1995, 1318]). 12 Cf. the Introduction, Par. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 . 13 This is done by many commentators, from Delitzsch, via Wildeboer to Murphy, Clifford, Tuinstra, Fox and others. Cf. Sæbø (2012, 160), who opts for this form of organisation as an aid to orientation, even if the chapters as we know them are late and even if they remain “secondtier” (“zweitrangig”) in relation to the “inner character of the texts.” However, there are some indications that what we call the chapters have ancient roots (cf. Waltke [2004, 544-545]): not only thematic shifts (which are always difficult to adduce as substantiation, except in the clearest of cases), there seem to be indications that the last and/or the first verses of chapters mark a caesura (cf. 11:31 and 12:1, 12:28 and 13:1, 17:1 as well as 19:1, where changes in the type of parallelisms seem to indicate new junctures). 14 Therefore the divide between Vol. II and Vol. III of this commentary will also be introduced at this caesura. 15 E.g. at 15:20, on the grounds that this verse forms an inclusio with 10:1, or at 15:29, as Waltke does, grouping 15:20-29 together as a section. 16 Snell (1993, 6). 17 Cf. Whybray (1979, 158 as opposed to 1994, 237f.); Scoralick (1995, 58-62) and Fuhs (2001a, 249-250); Krispenz (1989, 80) considers the possibility of a beginning at 15:33 but decides against it.

Essentials and Perspectives

81

can sometimes occur in clusters, but they can equally occur across sections.18 Moreover, the meaning of many proverbs cannot be pinpointed so clearly, either because of generic meanings or because of ambivalence. Therefore various possibilities for reading them generate the potential to associate them in several directions. The same goes for the criteria of form. Sayings and admonitions do not occur in watertight groupings and their form can therefore not be taken as a yardstick to isolate them into sections and subsections. Nevertheless, within 10:1–15:33 (and thereafter) it is possible to discern groupings of comparable or related proverbs, both in content and in form. Without taking theme as a stringent criterion, we can indeed observe rough clusters of proverbs on several levels. But the very fact that some proverbs can be interpreted in more than one way and therefore can “look” in several directions, means that the collections or sections into which they have been edited can themselves be read in several ways and are therefore only loosely grouped (similarly already Delitzsch). If the redactional context influences the meaning of individual sayings, then the richness of the aphorisms conversely also adds value to the contextual clusters. Corresponding to what McKane calls “proverb classes” are Schipper’s “levels of sapiential thought,” with which the whole division teems. Some proverbs are manifestations of a “general saying of common sense” (“allgemeine[r] Sinnspruch”). Proverbs in a second category translate such practicalities in terms of sapiential concepts and use wisdom terminology for the purpose. The third category is made up of proverbs with a religious dimension, which is often (but not always) noticeable by their God-language.19 They occur throughout the two halves of Division II.

18 For examples, cf. Clifford (1999, 157), who recognises “a string of sayings on divine governance” in 15:33–16:9, without claiming that this has a bearing on the boundaries of the subsections, while Scherer (1999, 190) sees a smaller unit in 15:33–16:15. 19 In Schipper’s presentation, the spread of these three “levels” plays a prominent role (Schipper [2018, 598-605]); see the Introduction to Vol. II, par. 2.2.1 (ending).

INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 10

Bibl. Boström 1928, 120-127; Freuling 2004, 45-57; Hatton 2008, 84-98; Heim 2001, 111-134; Hildebrandt 1990, 171-185; Krispenz 1989, 41-48; Krüger 1995, 413-433; Lucas 2015, 16-18; Millar 2020, 121-125, 135-139; Scherer 1999, 48-72; Scoralick 1995, 161-181.

Themes and motifs Chapter 10 contains a broad spectrum of topics: the typical opposites found in wisdom literature, such as wisdom :: folly (e.g. vv. 1, 8, 13-14), diligent :: lazy (e.g. v. 4), righteous :: wicked (e.g. vv. 7, 24-25, 30) etc. Other sapiential themes also occur, such as speech and the effects of words (e.g. vv. 6, 10b, 11, 13, 19-21, 31-32), hate and love (v. 12), the nexus of deed and consequence (e.g. vv. 3, 24) and topics such as possessions and the handling of assets (e.g. vv. 2, 15-16). This by itself is reason enough to see the chapter as a kind of overture to what will come in the next chapters (similarly Sæbø). Two further aspects of the thematic content confirm that the opening chapter of Division II of the Book of Proverbs introduces what is to be expected in 10:1–22:16 or at least the first part (10:1–15:33). The first aspect has just been intimated above under Essentials and Perspectives, viz. the use of proverbs representative of the main proverb types found in the rest of the book. The second is an insight put forward by Krüger,1 viz. that the grouping of proverbs in this chapter has the effect of indicating a hermeneutical key for understanding what is on offer further on. He points out the high degree of ambivalence of the proverbs in Chap. 10, in his opinion due to the effects of parallelism. This is undoubtedly the case, as we will often be able to observe both in this and in the following chapters. But also the redactional placing of proverbs to form clusters in Chap. 10 contributes to the possibility to recognise ambivalence, or even multivalence in meaning (see below). The proverbs are associated with each other more sedulously than usual and thus open up expanded perspectives for considering a proverb on its own as well as in relation to others.2 The themes and motifs in this chapter thus carry the amplified function of suggesting that the short proverbs in the rest of the book are 1

Krüger (1995, 413-433). It thus seems no coincidence that I find myself identifying more groups or clusters in this chapter than in the later ones. 2

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 10

83

indeed intended for use by those who wish to expand their knowledge, as the Prologue to the book says.3 Chapter organisation As opposed to fundamental scepticism about the existence of proverb groups from Chap. 10 onward (of which McKane has probably been the most consistent exponent in the last decades), several possibilities have been proposed to account for clusters of meaningful units in the chapter. According to the proposal by Krüger just referred to, the sayings in Chap. 10 can be grouped to form clusters in vv. 1-5; 6-11; 12-18; 19-21; 22-27; 28-32. This is achieved by means of several criteria, like catchwords, stylistic patterns and figures, but also thematically. Other associations are also possible, which do not necessarily have to contradict these clusters or have to depend on the arguments proposed for them by Krüger. For instance, Schipper finds clusters in vv. 1-5; 6-11; 12-21; 22; 23-30; 31-32. What he combines as vv. 12-21 can however itself be divided into a group on the folly and wisdom (vv. 12-18) and one on the effects of words (vv. 19-21). Both Krüger and Schipper partially coincide with Meinhold’s earlier division – Krüger in vv. 1-21, and Schipper in vv. 22-32, while Tuinstra completely agrees with Meinhold. Waltke goes his own way: vv. 2-5; 6-14; 15-16; 17; 18-21; 22-26; 27-28; 2930; 31-32 (and then includes the whole of Chap. 11, while Scoralick4 finds a caesura at the end of 11:7). Scherer5 combines Krüger’s second, third and fourth units, which coincide with Schipper’s second and third units, into one (vv. 6-21), while seeing the ending like Schipper, but for one verse: vv. 1-5; 6-21; 22f.; 24-30; 31-32. Again, the couplets found by Clifford in vv. 2-3 and 4-5 (differing from Schipper) can be part of a cluster in vv. 1b-5, while vv. 31-32 can be a proverbial pair (differing from Krüger) ending the chapter.6 Moreover, Clifford detects “[s]ome structural unity” in the sayings now standing in Chap. 10. Fourteen sayings mention organs of perception, expression or activity, and fourteen antithetic parallelisms contrast the righteous and the wicked. He also finds a series of “bicola” (“couplets” in my terminology) from v. 2 to v. 21, which is however not shared by many commentators. In as far as such issues impact on the exegesis, they are a matter for the detailed exposition itself. A meaningful contribution of the groupings by Krüger is the insight that the proverbs now standing in Chap. 10 attain a fundamental ambivalence. We shall find that an openness to various possibilities for understanding individual proverbs arise not only from their parallelistic character, but also from their having been edited into a literary context. If there is one genre in which this openness to various meanings does 3

See Vol. I, 60-62 on 1:5f. Scoralick (1995, 180-181). 5 Scherer (1999, 50-64, summary on p. 64). 6 Cf. Heim (2001, 132ff.) and both options defended by Whybray (1994, 96 and in his commentary). 4

84

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 10

not amount to the reluctance of the reader to choose but rather to the insight of the reader to be able to choose from several options – then it is the sapiential anthology of short sayings. Krüger refers to an issue with theological relevance. He argues that the chapter attains a mien of ambiguity through the “theological” framing of the three proverb groups in the middle of the chapter (vv. 6-21), by three further groupings (vv. 1-5 at the one and vv. 22-27 plus 28-32 at the other end).7 Since human and divine action both have to do with the maintenance of a just order in life and the world, the question becomes pressing: Does the involvement of God compensate for the failure of humans to uphold the order in terms of the nexus of deed/attitude and consequence? Or is the divine justice rather realised in precisely these human endeavours? According to him, these two ways of understanding the text (“Verstehensmöglichkeiten”) do not mutually exclude each other. This evaluation shows the programmatic character of Chap. 10, with which I agree,8 which will be seen in the expositions that follow.

Social background Sometimes the social context of those addressed in the chapter is seen as that of a society marked by affluence as well as poverty. Vv. 1-5, 15 and 22 contain the theme of wealth, but that is less than a quarter of the chapter. Quantitative calculations are of course not sufficient to decide such matters, and an element of speculation remains if we wish to determine the context intended by the collector of these proverbs. Also the presence words at home in the sphere of finance (like ‫[ כסף‬silver] in v. 20, where it is metaphorically used) provide tenuous grounds. Moreover, the argument that v. 20 connects poverty with piety9 (“Armenfrömmigkeit,” so Schipper) seems questionable to me, since it depends on the interpretation of that verse as championing “spiritual” wealth (see the exegesis of that verse). The proverbs in Chap. 10 can certainly be well understood in an affluent society, but both the ambivalence of proverbs and the broadness of the thematic spectrum (speech, love, hate, discipline etc.) resonate with the programmatic character discussed in the previous paragraph. As an overture to the following chapters, Prov 10 gives a sampling of topics and perspectives that are to be expected further on, such as everyday observations (e.g. v. 12), sapiential teaching (e.g. v. 14), and theologically conceived statements (e.g. v. 32). Of course these cannot be exhaustive, but they can introduce suggestions that orientate the reader and whet the appetite. Therefore attempts at sketching a social background for the chapter remain vague and general.

7

Krüger (1995, 331). For a substantiation and illustration involving the whole of the book, see Essay 4 on “‘Retribution’ and the Limits of Wisdom,” Vol. I, 39-46. 9 Commenting on Chap. 10, Pilch (2016, 35) does not even mention this possibility or the verse itself, although he does recognise the motif of wealth in the chapter (2016, 34; cf. his reference to 216-218). 8

TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 10

Proverbs 10:1-5 1

2 3 4 5

The proverbs of Solomon.10 A wise son delights a father, but a foolish son is his mother’s grief.11 Treasures of wickedness are of no avail, but righteousness saves from death. Yahweh does not let the appetite of the righteous hunger, but the desire of the wicked he rebuffs. He becomes poor who works with a slack hand, but the hand of the diligent makes rich. He who gathers in summer is a prudent son, but he who slumbers during harvest acts disgracefully.

Bibl. on 1:1-5: Dell 2006, 61; Heim 2001, 111-113; Krispenz 1989, 41-45; Krüger 1995, 417-422; Pilch 2016, 33-34; Scoralick 1995, 169-175; Scherer 1999, 52-53, 64-71.

The opening verses of Prov 10 afford us the opportunity to engage right away with the issue of proverb groups discussed at length in the Introduction, Par. 2. Many commentators agree that the first verses together can be taken as such a group. Krispenz finds a clear train of thought in vv. 1-712 and Sæbø groups vv. 1-8 together. But many others draw the line at the end of v. 5, as Krüger does with detailed arguments.13 Meinhold noticed that vv. 1b-5 are spanned by a doubly chiastic pattern in the word order (see the sketch below). Moreover, he also notes that in each verse the first hemistich is positive when the last hemistich of the previous verse is positive and negative when the previous verse ends negatively.14 Thus: 10 The superscription is missing in the Septuagint, Peshitta and in some manuscripts of the Vulgate, which de facto links the chapters beginning here even closer to the Solomonic caption of the whole book in 1:1. 11 In the pointing of both the Codex Aleppo and the Codex Leningradensis a maqqeph is found before ‫אב‬, which makes the first hemistich into a unit of three beats, while the second hemistich clearly consists of four (thus 3+4). The same happens in the identical 15:20a, while the slightly different 15:20b also has four beats. 12 Krispenz (1989, 44). 13 Krüger (1995, 417-422); cf. Whybray, Murphy, Tuinstra, Lucas, and Scherer (1999, 5253). 14 Waltke, apparently independently, also points out these phenomena, speaking of them as framing and stitching the cluster together; similarly Lucas. The sketch provided by Krispenz

86

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

1b

positive – negative15

2

negative – positive

3

positive – negative

4

negative – positive

5

positive – negative

First hemistich

Second hemistich

type of ‫ בן‬+ two words;

type of ‫ בן‬+ two words

two words + type of ‫;בן‬

two words + type of ‫בן‬

Such indications of cohesion (formal ties) do not prove a closely knit poetic composition with coherence (logical flow). Krüger finds a concentric pattern (ABCBA) in the verses, in which the motifs of wisdom (vv. 1; 5) and wealth (vv. 2; 4) span the motif of righteousness in v. 3.16 These motifs undoubtedly occur in the verses mentioned, but so do the equally prominent motifs of righteousness/wickedness (vv. 2-3) and diligence/laziness (vv. 4-5) in positions not consistent with the concentric pattern. Nevertheless, there is a degree of thematic homogeneity, since the sayings can be understood to be about wisdom and success (including their respective opposites). However, this is very broad and bound to occur in a collection of sapiential sayings. There is no development of an argument or interdependence of parts necessary for understanding the whole. But the cohesion does show that these sayings were edited together. This by itself is significant enough to have consequences for the interpretation of the contents. For instance, while wise and foolish persons such as those mentioned in v. 1b cannot per se be equated with diligent and lazy people such as those mentioned in vv. 4-5, the context of the cluster does show that the former anthropological types respectively do include the latter types. Likewise, the results of wickedness and righteousness (v. 2) have to be attributed to the intervention of God when read in the context of v. 3. In his review of Heim’s work on clusters, Fox agrees with Heim that such are the effects of reading the sayings in the light of each (1989, 164) suggests that she notices the ‫בן‬-‫בן‬-frame together with a parallel of alliteration and assonance between ‫ כסיל‬and ‫ משכיל‬in vv. 1b and 5 (although her cluster ends at v. 7). Scoralick (1995, 171) points out that the occurrence of 2× ‫ בן‬in two hemistichs only occurs in these two verses in the Book of Proverbs. 15 “Positive” and “negative” here refer to statements with favourable and unfavourable content, not to the absence or presence of a negative particle like ‫לא‬. Heim (2013, 216), who also notices the positive-negative pattern, misses a minus symbol (-) for v. 1. 16 Van Leeuwen also sketches an ABCBA pattern and notices another set of chiastic figures within all of vv. 1-8, but his pattern is based on other key words (or concepts) and the extension of the cluster to the end of v. 8. The various concentric and cross-patterns discerned by interpreters illustrate again the possibilities generated by a collection of individual proverbs such as this, and the role of the reader.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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other, and he finds Heim’s grouping of vv. 1-5 one of his “persuasive” clusters. Nevertheless, the inner connections of vv. 1-5 pointed out by Heim and others before him,17 play no role in Fox’s own commentary on these verses, where he counts v. 6 as part of the cluster.18 Scoralick, who affords a primary significance to superscriptions for identifying the main divisions of the book,19 demarcates her first section as 10:1– 11:7, in support of which she adduces repetitions and back references between 10:2-3 and 11:4-7. But there are other repetitions within this longer unit, such as 11:2b/13:10b, 11:6a/12:6b. I would therefore prefer to work with the smaller cluster of the first five verses, to which Scoralick assigns a special shape (“Gestalt”) as a group (“Gruppe”) within her first section.20 10:1a The caption The correlation between the terse superscription in this verse and the longer one in 1:1 is obvious. Delitzsch sees an intentional link between the two, which tallies with his view of Chaps. 1–9 as an extended introduction to the short sayings that follow from this point on (cf. also the argument I have developed in Vol. I, 7 and 377). In 1896 the German pastor P. Behnke21 published a brief note in which he pointed out that the numerical value of the letters in Solomon’s name amounts to 375, which equals the number of verses in 10:1–22:16: ‫ש‬ ‫ל‬ ‫מ‬ ‫ה‬

= 300 = 30 = 40 = 5

This cannot be coincidence and demonstrates the editorial association of the “Solomon” collection with the preceding collection of poems. It claims the same Solomonic authorship for the proverbs now following. On the meaning of this assertion, that the proverbs “are of the sapiential nature traditionally exemplified by the great wise king”, cf. the commentary on 1:1. The Septuagint, Peshitta and some Vulgate manuscripts omit the caption. This, as well as the omission of other superscriptions (with the notable exception of 25:1), strengthens the authorship claim even more, since it emphasises that the longer Solomonic title in 1:1 should be understood to apply to the whole book (similarly Plöger, Fox). 17 18 19 20 21

Heim (2001, 112-113); Krüger (1995, 417-422), also Meinhold and, more recently, Waltke. Fox (2003, 270-271; 2009, 510-515). Scoralick (1995, 13). Scoralick (1995, 169-176). Behnke (1896, 122).

88

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

10:1b-5 Wisdom and success 10:1b A wise son delights a father, but a foolish son is his mother’s grief. The opening proverb has a near-parallel in 15:20. It is cast in general terms, which however does not mean that it is vague or fuzzy. The saying is quite clear, but leaves room for being applied to different situations. Any thinkable manifestation of wisdom that may be mentioned in the sayings that follow is covered by the first half of the verse and any form of folly is judged by the second half. The whole proverb collection thus receives an anticipatory label, namely that all expressions of wisdom and folly are respectively positive or negative, and that they impact on the family. In Lowth’s classic terms,22 the parallelism between the two hemistichs would be called “antithetic” because the wise son is the antithesis of the foolish son23 and delight is the opposite of grief. The implication is that the deeds of a wise son contrast with the deeds of the foolish son and that the effect achieved by the one is therefore the converse of the other. The wise and the foolish represent the major opposition in the sapiential anthropology. A good illustration of the two opposites in this proverb can be seen in sayings of Ptahhotep, in which a father is addressed in respect of two contrasting sons. Their respective effects on their father is extensively worked out.24 The one is “correct,” inclines to his father’s ways and listens to the fatherly instructions, which makes him a parallel of the wise son in v. 1a. The other goes “astray,” transgresses and does not heed his father’s instructions, making him a parallel to the foolish son of v. 1b. Although the mother is not mentioned, the extent of the delight and the grief the two sons cause is graphically portrayed in Ptahhotep’s saying: The wise son is to be entrusted with important matters, since he has been engendered by the father’s ka. On the other hand, the son with no filial piety can be cast away and even be enslaved, since he should not be acknowledged as a son at all. The poles of parental joy and grief can perhaps not be expressed more strongly than that.

But there is more to the contrast than meets the eye. First, the two statements complement each other in such a way that they argue the same point, like the 22 Lowth ([1753] 1835, 210: “The Antithetic parallelism is ... when a thing is illustrated by its contrary being opposed to it.” In v. 1b the antithetic or contrasting parallelism is fully coordinate, even if ‫תוגה‬, “sorrow,” as a noun is the opposing parallel to the verb ‫ שמח‬Piel, “make glad,” and the suffix with ‫אמו‬, “his mother” is gapped in the parallel noun ‫ אב‬without suffix (cf. below). For the only other occurrence of the noun ‫תוגה‬, cf. 17:21, where it is used in the absolute state and the one experiencing the emotion because of having a foolish son, is the father. 23 Waltke takes the second word in ‫ בן כסיל‬as a noun in apposition to the first. Whether taken as a noun in apposition (BDB) or as an adjective (KBL, KAHAL) is somewhat of an academic question, since in both cases the second word qualifies the first. 24 ANET, 413a.

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obverse and the reverse of a coin, the opposite sides of which jointly have the same value. Saying that a foolish son has a negative effect means essentially the same as saying that a wise son achieves a positive effect, because both together commend wisdom at the expense of foolishness. Although it is not untrue that the statements are “antithetic,” the difficulty with the established Lowthian terminology is illustrated by the fact that at a deeper level the two hemistichs are “synonymous.”25 Next, the second hemistich provides information that the first does not have and the first contains information missing in the second. Although neither statement is what we would usually call “ambiguous,” they are gapped in that each hemistich fills a gap (provides what is missing) in the other, so that either can be reread in the light of the respective other and have its information amplified.26 At first sight we just encounter a delighted father with a wise son and a sorrowful mother with a foolish son. But in light of the parallelism the question is forced as to the father’s emotions in the quite thinkable event that his son is not wise and the mother’s feelings when her son is wise. Therefore the parallelism alerts the reader of the proverb to a type of enthymeme (where one element is present but unexpressed):27 fathers delight in wise sons – expressed [mothers also] delight in wise sons – unexpressed mothers grieve over foolish sons – expressed [fathers also] grieve over foolish sons – unexpressed

The fact that the first saying in the collection, a value judgement, is cast in family terms reminds the reader that both the father and the mother are mentioned in the very first admonition of the whole Book of Proverbs (1:8).28 25 Therefore it is understandable that Hill (2006, 221) criticises Chrysostom’s comment on this verse for “seeing contrast where none is intended.” Nevertheless, it is too harsh, since the proverb does contain an element of contrast in both the Hebrew and the Greek text (see below). 26 In her section on “disambiguation and ambiguity” in biblical parallelism, Berlin ([1985] 2008, 96-99) says, “A parallel line ... insures the delivery of the information in the first line and, even in the context of that first line, it encourages a second view of things, an alternate interpretation.” 27 This is clearly visible in miniature in the same verse, where the suffix in ‫אמו‬, “his mother” (verset b) is absent in the parallel noun ‫אב‬, “father” (verset a). Due to the parallelism disambiguation takes place: not just an undetermined father, but the father of the wise son is meant because the third person masculine singular can be supplied from the second suffix referring to the foolish son. 28 Clifford calls the affinity of 10:1b to 1:8 “programmatic” because it highlights the teaching responsibility of fathers and mothers. But he also correctly refers to the fact the “[t]he saying points forward thematically within this collection, for it is the first of many sentences on domestic happiness (or unhappiness) in family relationships – between parents and son (15:20; 17:21, 25; 19:13, 26; 23:22-26) or husband and wife (12:4; 14:1; 18:22; 19:14; 21:9, 19).” Tuinstra, who also refers to 1:8, substantiates the programmatic character of vv. 2-5 with the presence of the main contrasting figures in the proverbs (wise/fool, righteous/wicked, industrious/ lazy) as well as the motif of education.

90

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

This suggests that education is primarily a family matter, although Fox rightly points out that many of the proverbs were not originally composed for that purpose. Formally, the two hemistichs are two complete sentences, the first a verbal and the second a nominal sentence. They are straightforward statements. But their pragmatic function is to encourage wise conduct and to discourage foolish conduct. Therefore they teach. On teaching in the indicative as opposed to the imperative,29 see the Introduction above, Essay 2. The rhetoric v. 1b assumes that sons are eager to please their parents, for it presents pleased parents as an attractive result for which a son would want to strive, and unhappy parents as a result he would wish to avoid. It looks in two directions: at parents to teach wisdom and at sons to learn it. Hausmann points out that the focus of interest is not primarily the feelings of the parents, since their feelings are used here as a means to an end, viz. to motivate30 the son to wise behaviour or to keep him from foolish behaviour. On the other hand, if parental feelings are to motivate parents to teach, their emotions must be regarded as a powerful incentive. Importantly, Hausmann states that what is praised or criticised in the son allows the inference about what is essential to the anthropological ideal of Israelite parents.31 Since this vital quality is wisdom, it is indispensable for the cultivation of the human character in the sapiential tradition of Israel. Several rabbinic explanations are given for the association of the wise son and joy with the father in the first hemistich, while foolish son and grief are associated with the mother in the second. As its first interpretation, the Midrash Mishlei (9th century) declares that the wise son refers to Israel and the father to God, since Deut 14:1 refers to Israel as the Lord’s children. This ignores the foolish son and the mother, but another possibility is mentioned, namely that the wise son is Solomon who “caused God to rejoice,” while the foolish son is “the wicked Haman, who listened to his wife” (Est 5:14). The wife seems to take the place of the grieving mother. In any event, the Midrash historicises the verse. But usually the rabbinic interpretations are more interested in the socio-educational aspect and thus remain closer in principle to the intentio textus. Saadia Gaon (10th century) does not deny that both parents share responsibility for raising the son, but declares that the father has better contacts outside the household where he can hear the praise of others for his son. But sorrow is a more intimate matter, which would therefore first come to the attention of the mother in the home environment (similarly John Chrysostom, 4th century, see below). Rashi (11th century) considers it possible that the father could refer to God, but also that the reference could be to the biological father who has joy when 29

For a contrary view, see Westermann (1971, 73-85, particularly 76). Stewart (2016, 110) regards this proverb as an expression of the idea of honour, which – alongside “wealth,” “protection,” and “life” – is one of the paradigms used by the sages to motivate pupils. The son indeed finds honour in pleasing his parents, but also the honour of the parents themselves is at least implicitly involved (cf. 29:15b, where the opposite of a wise son brings the opposite of honour on his mother [‫ בוש‬Hiphil]). 31 Hausmann (1995, 106-107). 30

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91

his son sits among the wise, whereas the mother is the one who would see a foolish son’s behaviour at home. According to Hame’iri (13th century), a father does not notice foolish behaviour on the part of his son because the son respects his father’s authority.32 But when the father dies the mother cannot impose the same authority, resulting in errant behaviour of the son and grief for the widowed mother (similarly Ralbag, 13th century). Somewhat like Rashi, the Vilna Gaon (18th century) says that a father studying Torah with his son (which amounts to the acquisition of wisdom) can rejoice when he hears his son. But a mother, who is not present in the study room, can only hear the foolishness of a son who does not go to study Torah. For Malbim (early 19th century) the father is the one who teaches and disciplines the son, which results in the gratifying practising of wisdom, whereas the mother is the parent who is too lenient on the son, which results in the latter’s waywardness.33 Chrysostom thinks mothers are more given to latitude in the rearing of children. Hence they have to contend with all the grief that results from such an attitude, while fathers are unmoved in the upbringing process and are therefore complimented with their sons. He even admonishes mothers not to allow their love for a child to become an impropriety, but rather to develop in their children the fear due to their father.

These interpretations are possible when the statements of the parallelism are read as an antithesis only, but when they are reread so as to allow their reciprocity to mutually influence each other, the father and mother assume the same equality they have in 1:8. Delkurt34 provides collateral arguments for understanding the emotions to be equally divided between both parents. According to him, this can have nothing to do with the thematic material in the verse, since other proverbs show that fathers are frequently as annoyed or harmed by a son’s foolish behaviour as mothers are (e.g. 17:21,35 25; 19:13; similarly 19:26; 20:20; 28:7, 24; 30:17). Likewise, a mother can celebrate a judicious son as much as a father can (23:25, where, one might add, the asymmetrical parallelism gives the mother’s delight threefold the literary prominence it affords the father’s). Therefore, according to Delkurt, the formulation as we have it in the present verse is rather due to formal considerations, since the positive aspect is mostly mentioned before the negative aspect in antitheses and the father is almost always adduced first when both parents are mentioned together – which is to be expected in a patriarchal society and should not be overinterpreted (cf. Ex 20:12; 21:15, 17; Lev 20:9; Deut 27:16 and others; the only exception is Lev 19:3). 32 The contrary example of Eli comes to mind. He was aware of his sons’ misconduct but did nothing about it and was punished (1 Sam 2:22-36). King David as a weak father to unwise sons is also an established motif in the Succession Narrative (e.g. 2 Sam 13:21; 1 Kgs 1:6). 33 On the pampering rearing of young boys by mothers and the contrasting harshness of learning to become a man without ever “having had a male role model or male attention,” see Pilch (2016, 182-183). 34 Delkurt (1993, 29-30). 35 Other than in 10:1, this is the only case where ‫ תוגה‬denotes grief over a child. Here it is used in the absolute state. The noun occurs once more in Proverbs (14:13) and once in the Psalms (119:28).

92

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

10:2 Treasures of wickedness are of no avail, but righteousness saves from death. This proverb has an echo in 11:4 (cf. 11:19; 12:28). The second fundamental pair in sapiential anthropology (after the classic opposition between the wise and the fool, v. 1b), is now introduced. The nouns ‫ צדקה‬and ‫ רשע‬represent the opposing types of the righteous (‫ )צדיק‬and the wicked (‫ )רשע‬and essentially overlap with those called a “wise man” (‫ )חכם‬and a “fool” (‫)כסיל‬.36 Apart from a chiasmus of root forms with v. 3 (see below), there is also a syntactic chiasmus in both proverbs: the order of the first hemistich (predicate-subject) is inverted in the second (subject-predicate). Because of the maqqeph in the first hemistich the rhythmic pattern has three beats in both hemistichs (3+3). In the expression ‫אוצרות רשע‬, “treasures of wickedness,” the second word is an instrumental genitive, which (as the nomen rectum) denotes the means for acquiring the wealth (the first word or nomen regens in the construct state). The alternative, a qualitative genitive (“treasures consisting of wickedness”) is theoretically possible, but the idea of wickedness itself as a treasure is awkward and does not suit the parallelism with the second hemistich. The meaning is thus that wealth acquired by wicked means will not help the owner. In both biblical areas where ‫ יעל‬Hiphil (help) occurs, namely in wisdom literature and where prophets speak, it is almost always used with a negative particle.37 The statement assumes that wicked people can be rich. The apparent contradiction of the deed-consequence nexus38 is limited by the negative qualification that such wealth will have no value for them. What good is wealth if it doesn’t help (cf. 21:6)? It is not said what the predicament is in which a rich person might imagine to be helped out by his wealth. We have to read further to understand it. Again the second hemistich is an antithesis, but again the parallelism helps us to fill the gap left in the first hemistich. “Righteousness saves from death” contrasts with the wealth that is of no avail. That provides the answer to the question left open by the first hemistich: the implied predicament is a danger or catastrophe of life-threatening proportions. In such a situation wealth will not be able to buy off death (cf. Ps 49:7). It sounds similar to the well-known 36 The third pair – the diligent and the lazy – follows in vv. 4-5: Cf. Hausmann’s extensive discussion of the three pairs (1995, 9-36; 37-66; 66-77); also Essay 3 in Vol. I, 33-34, where the anthropological types of Chap. 10 are referenced. 37 Sæbø (1971b, 746-748), who identifies one exception in Isa 48:17, where Yahweh teaches what “helps” Israel. 38 On the problem of the contradiction, see Essay 4 on “ ‘Retribution’ and the Limits of Wisdom” (Vol. I, pp. 39-46). Cf. further Sir 3:30.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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popular expression that “the death cloak has no pockets,” but the saying does not mean money cannot be taken into the afterlife. V. 2a is about money amassed by wickedness, which presupposes a punishable disposition. When the reckoning expected by the sages arrives, dirty money cannot become even dirtier by the wicked’s bribing himself out of the punishment he deserves. Rashi cites Jeroboam as an example of this exposition (cf. Hos 12:9). The value of wealth is therefore not absolute. Although it does have positive worth (cf. v. 4b),39 this is cancelled if it is based on injustice. Moreover, the parallelism does not suggest that righteousness brings everlasting life, since it is not said that the righteous never die. If v. 2b does not claim immortality, it also does not claim the variant idea that everlasting life will follow after death. Like 11:4, the verse as a whole thus states that money will not buy one’s way out of deserved punishment, but, as a sapiential virtue, righteousness avoids getting into the fix in the first place.40 Wildeboer points to the possibility (improbable, but possible) that ‫צדקה‬ may here mean “charity” or “almsgiving.” But it did acquire this meaning and became common in later Jewish usage. Righteousness par excellence is to give alms. When used with the verb ‫נתן‬, this meaning is quite clear: ‫ ;נתן צדקה‬cf. Aboth 5:13 and the plural ‫( הצדקות‬deeds of almsgiving) in Aboth 6:5-6.41 The Septuagint renders ‫ צדקה‬in v. 2b by δικαιοσύνη, which is expressed by ἐλεημοσύνη (charity) in the near identical statement of Tob 4:10 and 12:9: ἐλεημοσύνη [γὰρ] ἐκ θανάτου ῥύεται, Vulgate: eleemosyna a morte liberat (charity liberates from death). Also to be compared is Matt 6:1-2, where δικαιοσύνη and ἐλεημοσύνη are used parallel, both times in an admonition about giving alms in an acceptable way. In addition to the references to rabbinic ideas given in the exegesis above, the following also shows how the proverb was received. According to Yonah Gerondi (Spain, 13th century), the illegal amassing of money contrasts with charity, which is the legally required giving of money. The latter brings credit and can save a life (Mezudat David on Prov 10; similarly Ralbag, see on v. 4). The same perspective is also found in the Babylonian Talmud. Ketubim 66b states that the way to preserve money is by giving it to charity, since the power of money lies in knowing how to spend it wisely. The idea of saving righteousness/charity is expressed negatively in the Cairo Geniza 39 Cf. Krüger (1995, 420), who remarks that the perspectives on wealth in vv. 2 and 4 are integrated by virtue of the context and therefore mutually interpret and correct each other. 40 Cf. the Targum: righteousness can spare one a ‫( מותא בישא‬bad death), which means the righteous will have a natural, peaceful death (cf. Lucas). The Talmud goes further still. As Meinhold and Waltke point out, it is expressly said in the Talmud (Shabbat 156b) that righteousness in the sense of good deeds “saves from death, not only from an unnatural death, but from death itself” (cf. also Baba Batra 10a and Rosh Hashana 16b). Although this is a general statement, it is clear that the rabbis could and did also understand the concept of v. 2 as salvation unto a life after death. 41 Cf. further Sir 3:30 (Hebrew ‫צדקה‬, Greek ἐλεημοσύνη). Extensive discussion and examples in Str-B IV/1, 536-558.

94

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

Wisdom Text, where it is said: “Even wisdom is a snare on a man’s path if it lacks righteousness.”42 John Chrysostom (4th century) notices the problem of the first hemistich in the face of the harsh experience that many people escape death because of their money, but irons out the difficulty by declaring the life of sin that they lead to be even worse than death, whereas hope of salvation lies in righteousness. His contemporary Evagrius Ponticus solves the problem with the help of Matt 6:19, stating that the wealth illegally acquired is earthly and thus destined to perish due to moths and rust, burglary and theft (ὅπου σὴς καὶ βρῶσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου κλέπται διορύσσουσιν καὶ κλέπτουσιν).43

10:3 Yahweh does not let the appetite of the righteous hunger, but the desire of the wicked he rebuffs. Despite the negative particle ‫לא‬, the content of the first hemistich has a positive thrust, since it says that an undesirable or negative situation will be avoided. Likewise, the second hemistich contains an affirmative statement, the purport of which is negative. Thus we again have an antithetical parallelism with the two sides of the coin upholding the same sapiential value. Apart from v. 19, this is the only proverb in Chap. 10 with five words in the first hemistich. But again two of them are joined by a maqqeph, so that the five words make up four beats and the proverb becomes a typical Siebener of 4+3 (cf. Toy). The first verset says that Yahweh will not allow the righteous to go hungry and the second states that he44 will prevent the wicked to be satisfied. The verb ‫ רעב‬Hiphil (cause to be hungry, let one go hungry) suits the meaning “appetite” of the noun ‫ נפש‬well (so also Whybray, Westermann;45 cf. 13:19; 16:26). The parallel in the second hemistich causes some textual difficulty. In the Septuagint, ‫( ַהוׇּ ה‬desire, greed) is translated by ζωή (life). This may be taken as evidence that the Septuagint used a Hebrew Vorlage in which the construct state of ‫( ַחיׇּ ה‬life) stood. That is the view of Fox, who emends the text accordingly but translates “desire” anyway. However, in his eclectic edition of the Proverbs text he does leave open the possibility to retain the Masoretic Text with the meaning “desire” for ‫הוׇּ ה‬. ַ 46 This option seems preferable, since the Greek could have read the Hebrew ‫ והות‬as ‫וחית‬ (‫ ח→ה‬and ‫ )י→ו‬rather than vice versa. This is the more probable of the two possibilities because an uncommon word (‫ )הוה‬would rather have been read as a common 42 Cf. ix, 7 (line count according to Schechter [1904, 437]): ‫כי חכמה נבראת בשביל אדם‬ ‫ ;והיא בלי צדקה‬see below on v. 14. 43 Cf. Gohl (2017, 41). 44 ‫ יהוה‬in v. 3a is the antecedent of the third person masculine singular in ‫ יהדף‬in v. 3b. 45 Westermann (1984, 75). 46 Fox (2015, 173); I cite this edition as EE, in the same way as other editions of the Hebrew Bible, such as BHS and BHQ.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

95

word (‫ )חיה‬than the other way round (cf. 11:6). The meaning “desire” for ‫ הוה‬also seems probable in Mic 7:3 and, according to Delitzsch, Ps 52:9 (so HALOT and KBL47). Most commentators go in the same direction.48

As Murphy states,49 this expresses the usual Israelite understanding of the justice of God. On the level of the single proverb, the verse expresses the same conviction as 13:25 and Ps 37:25: God sees to it that the just have enough to eat and punishes the wicked50 with hunger. Of course, that causes the problem that the “usual” view of justice often does not agree with what is actually experienced, which is precisely the problem of such poems as Pss 37; 49; 73 or the Books of Job and Qohelet.51 The sages knew this, since they often say or imply that the wicked can be prosperous and rich, which is what v. 2a has just done (cf. Ps 37:6, 35; 73:3; Job 12:6; 21:6-18).52 On the level of the proverb cluster, vv. 2 and 3 influence each other reciprocally. This has several consequences for the exegesis of the present cluster, but also illustrates the literary and theological relevance of mutual influence for the collected proverbs generally. • V. 3 gives a theological dimension to the group of proverbs in its vicinity. The mention of Yahweh by name alerts the reader of the collected proverbs to understand the positive and negative results in the surrounding proverbs to come from God no less than those in the Yahweh proverb itself. In this case, the expanded effect is highlighted by a number of conspicuous stylistic features. With reference to the verses at the beginning of Chap. 10, Fox53 points out – rightly, in my opinion – that the presence of such explicitly religious proverbs “affect[s] the perception of sayings close by, but they also influence the reading of the collections and the book as a whole.”

47

But cf. KAHAL (glossed by “Willkür”) and BDB (glossed by “arbitrary choice”). E.g. Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, McKane, Plöger, Meinhold, Murphy, Clifford, Sæbø and others. Schultens relates ‫ הוה‬to an Arabic root hwy in which he sees the concept of vasta cupiditas (vast desire), vastus being understood as insatiabilis (insatiable); cf. Arabic hawāya (passion, desire). This brings it quite close to Waltke’s idea that the uncontrolled craving of the wicked is “finally” thrust aside, i.e., from that point on they will never be satisfied. 49 Cf. also Perdue, following Boström (1990, 90-140), who finds justice through retribution a dominant theme in Chap. 10, the means for divine maintenance of the world including the social order and, to be sure, “at the heart of this theology.” 50 Some Hebrew witnesses of the 16th and 17th centuries have ‫( בוגים‬treacherous people) instead of ‫( רשעים‬wicked people), which is probably due to the latter word’s use together with ‫ הוה‬in 11:6. Oesterley surmises that it was an explanatory gloss supplanting the original word in these manuscripts. Both variants pair a singular word (‫ )צדיק‬with a plural one (‫רשעים‬, ‫)בוגים‬. This often happens for lexical reasons or to create a morphologic parallelism (Berlin [1985] 2008, 45; cf. 44-50 for a detailed discussion and examples). 51 Cf., for instance, Job 29-31; Qoh 9:1-6. 52 Cf. what Gregory (2014, 102) says particularly of Ben Sira but also of Proverbs, notably that “wealth is not necessarily a sign of God’s blessing; rather, it is a good thing only if it has been acquired righteously. Strikingly, Ben Sira does not blame the poor/hungry for their own condition.” 53 Fox (2009, 483). 48

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• This does not prove that the secular proverbs are older while the proverbs containing “God-language” (McKane) were added later or that an older secular wisdom was later reinterpreted to make it Yahwistic.54 There is no reason to suppose that the original phase of a deeply religious culture must first have been irreligious or secular.55 Individual Yahweh proverbs could also have existed before they were collected. The theological influence cuts both ways: On one hand the religious dimension of the collected sayings is exemplified by the presence of Yahweh proverbs. But since, on the other hand, there is no denying that the book is full of secular sounding proverbs, their collected status together with the Yahweh proverbs, shows that even the most down-to-earth topics fall within the ambit of the Fear of the Lord. • At the same time, the fact that the usual nexus of deed and consequence is questioned by implication (v. 2a) and the further fact that both v. 2 and v. 3 address the issue, show that the edited proverbs contribute a qualification to the absolute statements among them. In this sense Murphy’s comment that “[n]o proverb says it all” is correct. It may be that categorical, sweeping statements of individually spoken proverbs were often understood to indicate a general “default” principle without intending to exclude exceptions. But often they were not understood in that way. Hence the intense wrestling with the issue of justice and suffering in the Books of Job and Qohelet and the psalms referred to above. Therefore the edited proverbs also contribute to a nuanced reading. If it can be said of wicked people who are wealthy that their assets would not help them in the end (v. 2a), then v. 3b becomes a similar statement even if some wicked people do have their appetites satisfied (cf. 30:22; Qoh 5:11; Ps 73:7).

The contextual effects are highlighted by the stylistic features in these proverbs. Vv. 2 and 3 contain a chiastic arrangement of the roots ‫ צדק‬and ‫רשע‬: ‫צדקה‬

‫רשע‬

‫רשעים‬

‫צדיק‬

Add to this the chiastic statements [positive – negative; negative – positive] in the four hemistichs (the feature continues to the end of v. 5), as well as the double chiasmus pointed out between vv. 1b and 5 by Meinhold (see above), and the effect of the cohesion becomes even more apparent. Fox’s caricature of the implausibility that editors would move around little bits of papyrus with proverbs on them until they fit into tidy groupings56 may be right (the idea is far-fetched indeed). But whatever technique the editor of this chapter used, 54 A view often espoused, especially in older literature, but qualified by Schmid (1966, 144145) as the theological explication of earlier wisdom in which the religious foundation was only implied. It is a major thesis of McKane’s commentary (cf. [1970] 1977, 10-22); cf. also Whybray [1979, 165]; Westermann (1990a, 10-13), who assumes that the short sayings were oral, and then assumes that oral sayings must be older than written ones. Cf. the critique of Heim (2001, 316); Dell (2006, 105-124); Weeks ([1994] 2007, 57-73). 55 So also Dell (2006, 123); cf. Weeks (2007, 73). 56 Fox (2009, 481).

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this is what he committed to writing, this is what it looks like, and this is its effect.57 Moss also finds a sound play in vv. 2-3 (‫)לא יועילו – לא ירעיב‬,58 but only the negative particle and the preformative yod have signs of alliteration or assonance. Rashi finds the proverb a divine assurance to the righteous that they will not become hungry as a result of giving alms to the needy, which is possible when the righteousness of the ‫ צדיק‬is understood as “charity” (see above on v. 2). The exposition in the Mezudat David, that the sin of the wicked (‫ )הות רשעים‬itself brings punishment over them, is only indirectly correct, for the subject of the masculine verb ‫ יהדף‬can only be ‫יהוה‬, since ‫ הוה‬is feminine. The cause of the misfortune is sin, but it is God who brings about the punishment. Similarly to his handling of the previous verse, Chrysostom notices the difficulty that the righteous in fact have to contend with poverty, but then declares the problem away by an unsubstantiated claim, viz. that the wicked, “even if enjoying prosperity, will have nothing further to enjoy.” Obviously he takes for granted that the perspective of an Old Testament book must coincide with his Christian perspective.59 The same goes for Evagrius Ponticus (346-399), however different his perspective as a follower of Origen (185-254) may have been. He invokes 1 Cor 15:24, 28 to argue that the wicked will in the end no longer be wicked, but participate in the realisation of Paul’s statement that “God will be all in all.” Melanchthon uses the reference to Yahweh in the first verset to construct a doublesided theologoumenon. His translation into Latin deviates from the Vulgate. Where the latter has, Non adfliget Dominus fame animam iusti (The Lord does not afflict the soul of the righteous with hunger) Melanchthon translates, Non sinet esurire Dominus animam iusti (The Lord does not allow the soul of the just to hunger) His milder rendering of the causative Hiphil (‫ )ירעיב‬avoids the implication – even in a negative statement – that God’s will can be the direct cause of hunger and rather opts for the idea of voluntas permittens (God’s permitting will). For Melanchthon, the statement pertains to the biblical promises about physical things, specifically, Ut doceant nos de providentia et refutent Epicureas et alias opiniones, quae fingunt Deo non esse curae homines, aut certè haec corporalia non esse curae Deo ... (To teach us about providence and refute the opinions of the Epicureans and others, who purport that for God humans are not objects of care, or certainly that such corporeal things are not objects of care for God ...)

57 On the integrative and emphasising effects of chiasmus, cf. Vol. I, 76-77; Nänny (1988, 51-59); Watson (1994, 328-389). 58 Moss (2015, 68). 59 Cf. Hill (2006, 108, 221).

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On the other hand, he says, Ideo expressum dictum est: Non in solo pane vivit homo, sed in omni verbo quod procedit ex ore Dei. (So it is expressly said: Not by bread alone shall humans live, but by every word that goes forth from the mouth of God.) Melanchthon thus takes the opportunity to use the literal sense of the proverb as substantiation for his theology of divine providence, sc. that it includes provision for the physical needs of humans. At the same time he qualifies it by referring to the spiritual need of humans for the Word of God. He does so by linking the proverb to other biblical texts, in this case by quoting Deut 8:3 (he also freely quotes Pss 72:12 and 50:15). Continuing at length in this vein, Melanchthon obviously regards the contrasting second verset as the other side of the same truth and therefore not in need of further exposition.

10:4 He becomes poor who works with a slack hand, but the hand of the diligent makes rich. Linked to the negative idea with which v. 3 ends, the proverb begins with a negative or undesirable circumstance. For the fourth time in succession we have a maqqeph-combination in the first hemistich, so that the rhythmic pattern is 3+3 (4+3 according to Gemser, but that requires the maqqeph to be ignored). The verse presents some difficulty about how the consonants are to be read. In the Masoretic text ‫ ע ֶֺשׂה‬is vocalised as the masculine singular participle Qal of ‫עשה‬. The pointing requires it to be understood as the subject of another masculine60 singular Qal (‫ראשׁ‬,‫ ׇ‬either the participle or the third person perfect of ‫רוש‬, written with aleph, cf. ‫ קאם‬from ‫ קום‬in Hos 10:14), which would then be the predicate. Thus: “who makes a slack hand is/becomes61 poor,” asserts that he works with62 a feeble hand. That would contrast well with the second hemistich, where the hand of the diligent is said to make rich. In the context of the second half, the first half would mean that what causes poverty is to work with a sluggish hand. So the indistinctness in the first verset (what is a slack hand? what is the ‫)?ראשׁ‬ ָ is compensated for by the 60 ‫( ַכ ף‬palm, hand) is feminine and therefore cannot be the subject (overlooked by Oesterley, who thinks “slackness of hands maketh poor” a possible translation, although the sense would be the same). 61 Both “is” and “becomes” are grammatically possible, since the intransitive ‫ רוש‬can connote a state or the transition into a state (ingressive), whether the participle or the perfect is read. Bertheau (1847, not 1883) opts for the former, but Delitzsch points out that the context is about the source of the poverty and thus requires an ingressive meaning. 62 ‫ כף‬is the “non-cognate internal accusative” (IBHS 10.2.1g) denoting the means by which the action is performed, and ‫ רמיה‬is the qualifier necessary in this construction (GKC 117s).

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second.63 Hence the translation above, “[h]e becomes poor who works with a slack hand.” The pupil must think for himself. ‫ רמיה‬can either mean “laziness” or “deceit,” both of them moral categories. Fox opts for the latter,64 but concedes that “the notion of slackness is activated by the parallelism in 10:4; 12:24; and 19:15” (cf. 12:27; 15:19). The word is also understood as “deceit” by several traditional Jewish interpreters, who often elaborate it further. For instance, Rashi understands ‫ כף־רמיה‬as a deceitful scale used by a merchant to hoodwink clients.65 Parallelismi causa, this forces the interpretation of the second verset to refer to honest people.66 Similarly, Ramaq, Ralbag and Nahmias. For ‫ חרוצים‬as “diligent,” cf. 12:24, 27; 13:4; 21:5. Malbim interprets the ‫( כף‬palm) of v. 4a to mean that some people only use part of their hand to work, which metaphorically means insufficient labour input, and are therefore reduced to deceit. By contrast, the industrious work with their whole hand (‫)יד‬, i.e. with their full capacity, and therefore become wealthy. Quite another perspective is opened by the Vilna Gaon, who sees a metaphorical contrast between the two hemistichs: The superficial study of Torah (the slack hand), which leads to poverty in the sense of forgetting even what has been learnt, as opposed to thorough Torah study (the diligent), which leads to rich knowledge. In a homily,67 John Chrysostom argues for the neutralisation of the positive evaluation of wealth in the proverb. He counters it with the blessing of the poor by Jesus (Matt 5:3). Having done the same with Qoh 9:16 versus Prov 30:8, he concludes that this evaluation of wealth was common under the old covenant, which has now been changed under the new covenant, so that the value of wealth and the curse of poverty are inverted. But in his commentary he again strives to dispel any conflict between the text and his Christian convictions. Sometimes poverty does not humble people, for instance, Peter (Acts 3:6), Paul (Acts 20:34) and the prophets of old. For him, the text only discourages laziness, while being humble in the sense of not thinking oneself important, is good. For this purpose, the addition in the Codex Patmiacus (see below) stresses that whatever wealth one may have comes from God and not from one’s own efforts.

In light of these considerations, it is unnecessary to emend the participle to the feminine form (‫ )ע ָֺשׂה‬or to emend the first word to ‫( ֵראשׁ‬poverty; cf. the Septuagint πενία [poverty]).68 The Vulgate reaches the same result along a 63 Clifford also rereads the first verset in this sense. He credits Choon-Leong Seow for an oral communication to this effect, but Berlin (2008, 96-99, first published 1985) discusses the phenomenon fully. 64 In his eclectic edition of the Proverbs text, however, Fox (2015, 174) comments that the Vulgate “rightly understands ‫ רמיה‬as ‘slothful.’” 65 Already Delitzsch pointed out that the meaning of “scale” for ‫ כף‬is late Mishnaic and is not found in the Old Testament. 66 Although Fox opts for the meaning “diligent” for ‫חרוצים‬, he also mentions Riyqam and Hame’iri, who advocate “honest,” which is thought to be based on the parallelism with ‫רמיה‬, if the latter is understood as “deceit” in this verse and in 12:24, 27. 67 Hom XVIII in Hebr 10:8-13 (NPNF I/14, 452). 68 So also the Peshitta, Targum and Vulgate. Fox emends both words, but most other commentators do not. Toy does not emend the text, but curiously finds “not much choice” between the two vocalising possibilities of ‫ ראש‬translating as though the participle is ‫ע ָֺשׂה‬, without comment on the gender of ‫כף‬.

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different route.69 But it is possible that the whole verse can indeed be read so that it contains an ambivalent (as opposed to an ambiguous) meaning. Berlin has shown that parallelism can, in addition to disambiguation, also cause ambiguity. In this case I would prefer to speak of ambivalence in order to avoid the impression of clumsy formulation. This verse is perhaps a good example of such an expanding of legitimate possibilities to read a proverb. Perhaps we have both effects of parallelism here. The diligent hand (= work) in v. 4b clarifies the sloppy hand (= inactivity) in v. 4a (“disambiguation”); therefore one has to understand the first verset as, “who works with a sloppy hand becomes poor.” But if wealth is created by hard work (v. 4b),70 then the sluggard who has become poor will still have to “make a drooping hand” (‫ )עשה כף־רמיה‬by being forced to hang out a begging hand (ambivalence). The hand that does not work becomes a hand that has to beg. Considering the various ways the proverb is presented to him, the pupil can imagine the begging hand as a result of the slack hand of the lazy person and is motivated71 to choose the virtue of diligence. The overall sense of the proverb is clear and echoed in various other sayings, e.g. 12:11; 13:4; 14:23a; 28:19. The same thought is expressed in an Akkadian proverb as early as the second millennium BCE: “As long as a man does not exert himself, he will gain nothing,”72 and even in the New Testament (2 Thess 3:10). The Septuagint adds a full proverb after v. 4:73 υἱὸς πεπαιδευμένος σοφὸς ἔσται, τῷ δὲ ἄφρονι διακόνῳ χρήσεται. 69 Egestatem operata est manus remissa (A neglectful hand has made poverty); here ‫ כף־רמיה‬is taken as the subject and the participle is read as ‫ ע ָֺשׂה‬to suit the feminine subject. Although the Hebrew syntax is read differently, the sense yielded is the same: laziness results in poverty (cf. BHQ, p. 39*). 70 This shows that the value of wealth is not absolute. It has to be created by honest work, which again amplifies the insight of v. 2a that wealth acquired by wicked means does not “help,” i.e., is worthless. 71 Cf. Stewart (2016, 107f. and 191f.) on imagination and motivation by wealth; also the earlier work by Sandoval (2006, 57-61, 71-113), where the motivational aspect of wealth is emphasised. Stewart’s proposal that “the form of Proverbs functions to educate the student’s imagination” is well illustrated in the way parallelism functions. If the shame of having to beg is also heard in the proverb, the negative cultural impact of imagining dishonour (cf. v. 5; Pilch [2016, 33]) would strengthen the motivation. Therefore the sweeping remarks by Pilch (2016, 216-217), who claims that “[b]eing rich was synonymous with being greedy” (Prov 15:27; 22:2), cannot be upheld, certainly not for the Book of Proverbs (to be sure, neither of his citations says anything of the sort). 72 ANET, 425. 73 Toy regards the addition as the first part of v. 5. Before this addition, the Codex Patmiacus 161 of Chrysostom’s commentary also adds, “yet riches are from the Lord” (Hill [2006, 109, 221]).

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(An educated son will be wise and will treat the ignorant as a servant.) The second verset of the addition carries the same idea as the second verset of 11:29. In the Septuagint: δουλεύσει δὲ ἄφρων φρονίμῳ. (the ignorant will serve the knowledgeable.) The addition as a whole polarises the wise and the fool (cf. v. 1b), which is what happens in v. 5, where the Septuagint offers a thorough reinterpretation of the Hebrew text (see below). In this sense it has a bridging function to v. 5 and de facto cohesion with v. 1b, which in turn contributes to a measure of cohesion in the cluster.74

10:5 He who gathers in summer is a prudent son, he who slumbers during harvest acts disgracefully. The positive statement of the first verset continues the positive one with which the previous proverb ends, both of them expressing the motif of diligence. Followed by a statement on sloth in v. 5b, it brings to an end the crossstitching of positive and negative stichs that began with v. 1b. The rhythmic organisation consists of 4+4 beats (so Gemser). Waltke notices that the parallelism of the two versets not only contains word-for-word opposition and equivalence, but also repetitive sounds75 (consonants as well as vowels): ’gr baqqayiṣ nrdm  baqqāsir

bēn bēn

maśkīl mēbīš

The combination of these unquestionably reinforces the antitheses and highlights the proverb on both the semantic and the phonetic levels.

Summer (‫ )קיץ‬is the time of the harvest (‫)קציר‬, and the two terms are often used together (cf. 6:8; 26:1; Isa 16:9; Jer 8:20). He who brings in the harvest has to work long and hard (the participle Qal of ‫ אגר‬76 indicates a durative action). He is a prudent son, since he knows that the season’s opportunities cannot be postponed. He has insight in the wisdom of carpe diem, seizing 74 For the reasons mentioned in the opening remarks of “Exposition II” above, I have preferred a cluster in vv. 1-5 rather than others. The observations on the Septuagint of v. 4 suggest a similar grouping. But cf. Sæbø (1986, 99-106), who prefers a unit of vv. 1-8 with its centre in v. 4, and Krispenz (1989, 41-46), who sees v. 4 as the centre of a unit spanning vv. 1-9. 75 Similarly, Luchsinger (2010, 184) finds the “phonological level” of the proverb highly effective. 76 The verb also occurs in 6:8, and, according to Rendsburg (2015, 138), 11× in Mishnaic Hebrew.

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opportunities when they are there (cf. 20:4; 24:30-34; Qoh 3:12-13, 22; 8:15; 9:7-10; 12:1). ‫ משׂכיל‬is the Hiphil participle masculine singular of ‫( שׂכל‬have insight), indicating in the context that the son acts with insight and is therefore wise (cf. 10:19; 14:35; 15:24; 17:2). Who sleeps during harvest time, does not act at all.77 ‫ רדם‬Niphal is not just a nap or rest, but a deep sleep.78 This behaviour causes dishonour. ‫ מביש‬is the Hiphil participle masculine singular of ‫( בוש‬be ashamed), indicating that the son causes shame (cf. 12:4; 14:35; 17:2; 19:26; Ps 14:6). Mention of a ‫( בן‬son) implies parents. The presence of the word in both versets shows that the two types of people are thought of in terms of what they cause their parents to experience rather than in terms of the effects of their behaviour on themselves.79 Fox’s observation that the participle ‫ מביש‬always refers to a subordinate person in relation to another (in addition to the references just given, cf. also 29:15) confirms this. The consequences of good and bad behaviour for the doers themselves are concentrated in vv. 2-4 and the consequences for their parents in vv. 1b and 5. This creates a frame and makes the group of proverbs a credible cluster. Though still not a poem, the cohesion enhances the reading of the units in light of all of them.80 In addition to the possibilities created by gapped proverbs and their parallelism (see above), we can now understand the promise of v. 3a (Yahweh will not let the righteous hunger) in the light of v. 5a: the promise does not exclude hard work to earn the daily bread. Likewise the other statements in the group: sloth is not compatible with righteousness, the lazy are reckoned among the wicked. The rendering of the Septuagint amounts to a paraphrase of the Hebrew v. 5:81 διεσώθη ἀπὸ καύματος υἱὸς νοήμων, ἀνεμόφθορος δὲ γίνεται ἐν ἀμήτῳ υἱὸς παράνομος. (A wise son is saved from heat, but a lawless son is windblown at harvest time.) 77

Cf. the commentary on 6:7-8 (Vol. I, 262-263). Cf. Judg 4:21 and the cognate noun ‫ תרדמה‬in 19:15 (stupefied sleep) and Gen 2:22: (numbing sleep). Luchsinger (2010, 184) calls the contrast of an active participle in v. 5a and a passive participle in v. 5b a “morphological contrast” and an instance of what Berlin (2008, 32-53) calls a “morphological parallelism.” Her list of parallelisms with contrasting conjugations contains several with Qal/Niphal, but not Prov 10:5. However, she also thinks that the contrast in conjugation has the effect of emphasising the contrast in ideas between the two hemistichs (Berlin [2008, 40]); cf. Held (1965, 272-282), although his essay is about the factitive-passive sequence of identical verbs. Luchsinger argues that the morphological contrast in this verse stresses the motif of activity in the first and lethargy in the last hemistich. 79 Cf. Pilch (2016, 33, 34) and above on v. 4 for the cultural impact of shame. 80 Plöger calls the effect of the correspondence between vv. 1 and 5a rounding off of all the verses between them (“eine Abrundung der Zwischenverse”). 81 Toy takes the “educated son” as a paraphrase of “the one who harvests in summer,” and his “third clause” (i.e., the first line of the conventional v. 5) as an uncertain doublet of the same (cf. the note above on the Greek rendering of v. 4). 78

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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The wise son in the Greek text represents the one who (wisely) gathers in the harvest and the lawless son corresponds to the sluggard of the Hebrew text. Likewise, the heat (καύματος) glosses the Hebrew ‫( קיץ‬summer). The Septuagint thus makes the concrete Hebrew saying more generic. It can now be applied to regions where the harvest time is not summer.82 Melanchthon interprets the saying even more generically than the Septuagint. To him agricultural tasks appropriate to specific seasons can be applied to any occupation (in suo officio), where one should prudently observe the appropriate order (ordinem actionum), which is often constituted by economic rules (præcepta œconomica). Earlier, in a late medieval exposition attributed to John of Varzy (†1278),83 the author is interested in the type of person depicted in the second hemistich. He applies the negative verdict to the ribaldi, scoundrels who were originally mercenaries, but later became parasitic drones. The “son” spoken of in the second hemistich is a filius confusionis (a son of confusion). This is to be interpreted literally (ad litteram): tales sunt ribaldi otiosi, qui nichil faciunt, nisi dormire ad solem et ideo confusi sunt et despecti (such are the awful mercenaries who do nothing but sleep at sunlight and therefore are confused and despicable).

10:6-11 Speaking and related effects 6

Blessings come upon the head of a righteous man, but the mouth of the wicked covers up violence. 7 The memory of a righteous man is for blessing, but the name of the wicked putrefies. 8 The wise of heart accepts precepts, but the foolish of lips comes to ruin. 9 He who walks in honesty walks securely, but he who makes his ways crooked will be found out. 10 He who winks the eye causes grief, and the foolish of lips comes to ruin. 11 The mouth of a righteous man is a fountain of life, but the mouth of the wicked covers up violence. Bibl. Dell 2006, 61; Heim 2001, 113-116 and 2013, 217-220; Krispenz 1989, 45-46; Krüger 1995, 422-424; Pilch 2016, 34; Scherer 1999, 55-57, 64-71; Scoralick 1995, 176-178; Stewart 2016, 116-120.

While Plöger finds no thematic coherence in these verses, many others do. Exponents of the latter view are Meinhold, Krüger and Lucas. According to 82 In Israel the harvest was brought in during summer. According to Wildeboer, 2 Kgs 4:1819 suggests that in Israel the harvesters were still in the fields in late summer. Dalman specifies that crops such as sorghum (which he calls “Kafferkorn”) were harvested during that time, but wheat was harvested during June and July (AuS III, 1-6). Chrysostom even uses the generalisation of the Greek to spiritualise the idea and interprets “windblown” as “inwardly ruined.” 83 Super Proverbiis; cf. Smalley (1986, 94-95).

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the former, all verses from v. 6 to v. 11 mention or – in the case of v. 9 – suggest parts of the human body, with the exception of v. 7 (similarly Whybray). However, one could object that the suggested presence of “foot” by virtue of the use of the verb ‫( הלך‬walk) in v. 9 is somewhat forced. Moreover, the one exception that Meinhold allows within the cluster (v. 7) is not an exception if another set of motifs is brought into play. All the verses in question with the possible exception of v. 9 contain the motif of human speech.84 A legitimate reply to this observation could be that the speech motif is also present later in the chapter (cf. vv. 13f., 18f., 20f., 31f.) and that it therefore cannot be used to substantiate a cluster limited to vv. 6-11. But apart from the thematic flow (coherence) there is also evidence of formal connections (cohesion) pointed out by several commentators.85 Krüger finds a concentric pattern in the verses similar to the ABCBA pattern he discerns in vv. 1-5:86 6 7

A 8 9

10 11

B C B A

This reflects the motifs of mouth-lips (A-B in vv. 6, 8) and lips-mouth (B-A in vv. 10, 11). It places the motif of behaviour in the centre and expresses the connection of word and deed. Meinhold, who also recognises this as the “Zusammenhang von Wort und Tat,” additionally points out further elements of formal cohesion, several of which are mentioned by other commentators as well (e.g. Waltke). The identical second hemistichs of vv. 6 and 11 form an inclusio and bind the verses together as a cluster. Furthermore, the identical last hemistichs of vv. 8 and 10 reinforce the cohesion,87 as well as the fact that three consecutive stichs in vv. 8, 9 and 10 end with a verb in the Niphal perfect masculine singular, which causes a threefold assonance on the sounds i, ā and ē.

84 Waltke suggests that the speech motif is implicitly present also in v. 9, since “the ciqqēš (crooked) are linked to perverse speech (see 4:24; 6:12).” Therefore those who “make crooked” their ways can be thought of as people who use “devious words.” Whether the proverb itself allows that may be questioned by some, but in the literary context of the surrounding proverbs it is a possible understanding. 85 Cf. Scherer (1999, 55-57), who also distinguishes between the formal and thematic aspects of the adherence of proverbs in groups. In his opinion these two aspects do not necessarily have to cover the same stretch of text. In this case the formal unit covers vv. 6-11, while the thematic unit extends to v. 21 (cf. Hermisson [1968, 174], who also ends a thematic unit at v. 21, but sees differing associations in vv. 6-9 and 10-21). 86 Krüger (1995, 423). 87 On repeated half-verses, see Snell (1993, 20-21).

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In my opinion, these considerations do indeed show cohesion and coherence as argued by the cited scholars. But the unity is not stringent. For instance, the concentric pattern is not symmetrical, as one would have expected in a carefully composed piece of poetry. A whole proverb (v. 7) has to be left out of the equation because it does not fit in the chiastic ABCBA symmetry. However, the non-participating proverb does link with v. 6 on other grounds, such as word repetitions (blessing, righteous, wicked).88 For these reasons it can be said that the verses in question are a cluster, i.e., they have been brought together intentionally, but the stuff of which the cluster is made does not warrant looking upon it as a carefully composed poem.89 The passage 10:6-11 therefore still corresponds to Dell’s basic conclusion that the material up to 22:16 is not so much identified by unity of composition as by “fragmentation which reveals unity.”90 Nevertheless, the considered way in which the cluster has been edited generates new possibilities for reading it. 10:6 Blessings come upon the head of a righteous man, but the mouth of the wicked covers up violence. As the verse stands, it has a rhythmic pattern of 3+4. Gemser considers the possibility to count three beats in the second hemistich, but not in the identical v. 11b, where that is less likely.91 Therefore a unit of three beats in v. 6b is also unlikely. It is often thought that v. 6b is not fitting as a parallel hemistich to v. 6a. To improve the putative imbalance, emendations have been proposed. For one, to vocalise the active verb (‫יְ ַכ ֶסּה‬, third person masculine singular Piel imperfect) as a passive (‫ י ִָכּסֶה‬third person masculine singular Niphal imperfect). This proposal92 is unnecessary because an active verb 88 Heim (2001, 113-114) notices that v. 7 has to be accommodated and finds the pattern ABCDCA in the six verses. He calls this a chiasmus (based on the repetition of v. 6b in v. 11b and of v. 8b in v. 10b), “with v. 9 (= D) at its centre.” But even if v. 7 is given a tag (“B”), it still does not fit a chiastic pattern around v. 9 because the cluster is a hexacolon of six lines without a centre. One could compare Ps 12:4-5, a chiastic heptacolon ABCDCBA with an uneven number of lines around a centre and element B in its place (see Watson [1994, 347]). Vv. 6-11 could at most be called a “skewed chiasmus” in which a compromise is struck “between the chiastic pattern and sequentiality,” as explained by Holladay (1966, 432-433), cf. Watson (1994, 348). 89 For other commentators who demarcate the groups/clusters differently, see the references above. 90 Dell (2006, 63-64). 91 In v. 11 it would be hard to explain why ‫( פי‬mouth) should be counted as a beat in the first half but not in the second, where it is also combined with a conjunction (waw). 92 Made by Hitzig in 1858, arguing that the Piel is acoustically ambiguous (“zweideutig”), since it sounds like the Niphal. However, the two forms may sound somewhat similar, but are not ambiguous; the doubling of consonants occurs in different places, the length of the a-vowel

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makes good sense when ‫( פי רשעים‬the mouth of the wicked) is taken as the subject. Neither is anything improved by emending ‫( ופי רשעים‬but the mouth of the wicked) to ‫( ופני רשעים‬but the face of the wicked).93 The first hemistich may be read in two ways: (a) The righteous receive concrete blessings (such as a long life, wealth or copious offspring, cf. Gen 49:26; Deut 33:13-16) as a reward for being righteous. (b) Alternatively, it may mean that blessings are invoked by other people who wish the righteous well (for instance, in gratitude for or in praise of his practising of righteousness). The latter entails the act of speaking, which is a suitable parallel for the “mouth” referred to in the second half. However, spoken blessings do not exclude the idea of concrete blessings, for that is what a verbal invocation wishes for. V. 6b can also be read in several ways: (a) Violence (‫ )חמס‬is the subject; it covers the mouth of the wicked either in the sense that their mouth is labelled by violence, i.e. their mouth is conspicuous for the violent things they say, or in the sense that violence overwhelms the mouth of the wicked and flies in the face of the wicked, so to speak (Targum, Peshitta, Rashi, Schultens, Delitzsch, Waltke94 and others95). (b) Essentially the same effect is achieved by the proposal that ‫ כסה‬be taken to mean “fill” (so Gemser, Whybray, Clifford, and apparently Lucas; cf. Isa 11:9; Hab 2:14; 3:3), so that the wicked has a “mouthful” of violence and is thus always ready to utter violent words.96 is different, and the pronunciation of the kaph without dagesh was different from kaph with dagesh at the time of editing. 93 So BHS but not BHQ or EE. 94 According to Waltke, vv. 6-9 are about the effects of speech on oneself and vv.11-14 about its effect on others. Cf., however, the identical verset in both verse groups (vv. 6b and 11b), where he has to assign the different meanings “overwhelm” and “cover up” to the same verb (‫ כסה‬Piel) and to invert the subject and object in v. 11 in order to maintain the pattern. Putting “violence over the surface of the wicked” seems a difficult way to get to “overwhelm the wicked.” As early as the middle of the 19th century, Hitzig also saw a problem in the use of ‫ כסה‬Piel in both verses, which he found “ambiguous” in light of the respective subjects and objects. His proposal is to maintain the grammatical subjects and objects of both verses as well as the consonants by simply reading Niphal (‫ )יִ ָכּ ֶסה‬instead of Piel in v. 6b, so that the grammatical subject can become the logical object (“the mouth of the wicked is covered by violence” [he translates “mit Leid”, i.e. “with suffering”]). 95 E.g. Heim (2001, 114 and 2013, 219) – but cf. his change of mind regarding v. 11b (2013, 218-219). 96 However, when one considers the texts adduced in support, this seems to be only a matter of a different translational equivalent, since water “covering” the sea floor naturally means that

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(c) A further possibility is that the mouth is the subject with ‫ כסה‬Piel meaning “to conceal” (cf. Gen 18:17; 37:26; Ps 32:5), so that wicked people cover up violence by concealing it with words (cf. 10:18; 26:26; Fuhs, Yoder, Fox, Sæbø, Moss and others).97 Since the verb ‫ כסה‬is not used elsewhere for indicating punishment or destruction, the last possibility is the best. Because the typical antitypes (‫ צדיק‬and ‫ )רשע‬are then the receivers and the perpetrators of the respective actions, the parallelism between the two hemistichs on the surface seems to be slack. But, as Berlin has shown, stringency is not necessary in parallelism.98 The parallelism would then lie in the contrast between benevolent and malevolent words and the attendant consequences for antipodal types of people. Read in the light of each other, the two sentences of the proverb imply several things. On one hand the second hemistich provides the implied information that the righteous of the first hemistich do not cover up harmful intentions with deceptive words and therefore that honest talk is part of ‫ צדקה‬and deserving of blessing. On the other hand the first hemistich implies that those who use covering-up words will not be blessed. When the effect of parallelism is taken into account, the proclivity of poetry to suggest more than what is apparent on the surface can be noticed. In this proverb the parallelism expresses an underlying symmetry that is not so apparent at first sight (square brackets indicate what is implied by the parallelism): V. 6a benevolent speaking righteous righteous receive blessings [righteous do not speak to cover up]

:: :: → ←

V. 6b malevolent speaking wicked [wicked do not receive blessings] wicked speak to cover up

Essentially the two halves of the proverb express the same truth, once from the perspective of the righteous and once from that of the wicked. Indeed: “The parallelism forges oneness out of twoness.”99 In any event the proverb the sea is filled with water (Isa 11:9; Hab 2:14). Moreover, God’s glory covering the heavens (Hab 3:3) is an appropriate metaphor for the experience of an epiphany while looking at the sky from a human perspective. Clifford refers to Isa 60:2; Ezk 30:18; Hab 2:17; Jer 3:25 in support of his translation with “fill” (none of which is decisive), but, conceding that the former (“cover”) is “the more natural reading of the Hebrew,” he thinks that the verb choice is intentionally ambiguous. 97 A similar interpretation is given by Ramaq. He uses the synonym ‫( סתר‬Piel or Hiphil: cover, hide) to gloss ‫כסה‬. He does not say that the wicked mask violent intentions with misleading kind words, but that the wicked hide violent words until an opportune time presents itself, although the latter does not exclude the former. 98 Cf. Berlin ([1985] 2008, 15-16). 99 The felicitous expression is by Berlin (2008, 16).

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shows that blessing is the result of righteousness, which is manifested in concrete behaviour, such as honesty vis-à-vis covering up violence and lawlessness. The Septuagint theologises the first verset by expressly saying that the blessing for the righteous comes from God. It balances this by taking “the mouth of the wicked” as the object in the second verset: εὐλογία κυρίου ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν δικαίου, στόμα δὲ ἀσεβῶν καλύψει πένθος ἄωρον. (The blessing of the Lord is on the head of the righteous, but untimely grief will cover the mouth of the wicked.)

This creates a typical contrast in terms of reward and punishment brought about by God himself. The expression “blessing of the Lord” also occurs in 10:22, both in the Masoretic Text and in the Septuagint. Jewish interpretation offers several examples of reading the two versets in the Hebrew proverb as they impact on each other. According to Nahmias (14th century) the first half states that the righteous are blessed by people, which happens while the recipients of the benedictions are alive. Under the impact of this reading the second half of the verse has to mean that the wicked are subjected to the opposite kind of wish, which is a curse. The content of the curse reiterates what had already been said by Rashi some three centuries earlier, namely that the violence they commit (not just the violent words they speak) cover their mouth so that they lack breath and die. Some 18th century commentators also interpret the second verset to say that the wicked are punished by the very sin they commit. The Mezudat David (David Altschuler, 18th century) takes up the line of Rashi, notably that the covering of the wicked’s mouth is the rebound of their own deeds of violence upon themselves in order to choke them. In turn, the Vilna Gaon (Eliyahu Zalman, 18th century) takes the line of Nahmias by explaining ‫ חמס‬as violent talk specifically: the wicked speak violently of others, i.e. curse them, which then turns on themselves. In this case too, the impact of the benevolent speaking mentioned in the first hemistich causes ‫ חמס‬to be understood as violent, cursing speech, which is then punished. Thus the alignment of the two versets becomes theologically important, since the Vilna Gaon infers that the righteous do not only receive blessings for unspecified righteousness, but are blessed because they themselves utter blessings on others and therefore are rewarded in kind by the hand of God. But there is a difference: The mouth of the wicked is mentioned, but not the mouth of the righteous, which allows the inference that God blesses the righteous for merely thinking about blessing others, but he only punishes the wicked when the idea of cursing someone actually leads to an oral assault. This implies the mercy of God, who is eager to bless for the mere thought of doing good, but who defers punishment until an evil intention is actually practised. Chrysostom summarily says that the blessings “on the head” of the righteous means that “what is of capital importence for him is preserved and crowned,” and relates it directly to the next verse. John Calvin only quotes the proverb incidentally to undergird his point that “everlasting mercies” are for the righteous and “an eternal destruction that does not end” awaits the wicked.100 100

Inst II/10, 18.

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10:7 The memory of a righteous man is for blessing, but the name of the wicked will rot. The verse has a simple rhythmic organisation of 3+3. Several features align it to the preceding proverb: first, of course, its antithetic arrangement; also the presence of the words ‫( צדיק‬both times singular), ‫( רשעים‬both times plural) and ‫( ברכה‬once plural and once singular); the same syntactic structure in both proverbs (a nominal sentence in the first hemistich and a verbal sentence in the second). The memory of a person and the mention of his or her name are sides of the same coin.101 When someone’s name is “mentioned in Israel” (Ruth 4:14) the memory of that person is kept alive (Ruth 4:5, 10). When the dead are forgotten, such perpetuation does not happen and, along with memories of them, they are excluded from what good can be enjoyed in life (Qoh 9:5-6), which is regarded as a punishment (Isa 26:14; Ps 34:17).102 However, when the name is mentioned, it does not necessarily mean a good memory, since the name can also be used as the substance of a curse (Jer 29:22). The biblical authors themselves made ample use of this possibility, as can be seen for example in the frequent use of King Jeroboam’s name in malam partem, showing that his name was remembered unfavourably long after his death (e.g. 1 Kgs 15:30, 34; 16:3, 19, 26, 31; 22:53; 2 Kgs 3:3; 10:29, 31; 13:2 etc.).103 The opposite is to be remembered in bonam partem and can be used as part of a new blessing prompted by the blessing received by the one being remembered (e.g. Gen. 48:20). Not only men (e.g. Gen 28:3f.; 48:16104), but also women (e.g. Ruth 4:11) of the past are held in blessed memory, and sometimes the names of men and women together are used for the same blessing (Ruth 4:12). In the proverb of v. 7 the words are used along these lines. The remembrance of the righteous is “for blessing,” i.e. to be used in benedictions like This is particularly clear in Ex 3:15, where ‫ שם‬and ‫ זכר‬are used as synonyms (cf. Ex 15:3); also in Hos 12:6, where ‫ זכר‬is used in an expression usually containing ‫ ;שם‬cf. THAT I, 508 for zkr not only meaning “memory,” but also “name” in Hebrew and in several other Semitic languages; cf. Ps 111:4. 102 Meinhold cites the teaching of Merikare (line 36, “Make your memorial permanent by being beloved” [AEL I, 99; ANET, 415; COS I, 62]). Fox mentions the Egyptian tomb autobiography of Men[t]uhotep, where it is said, “A man’s goodness is his memorial, while an evil person is forgotten,” the positive side of which echoes Merikare, as well as Ptahhotep (AEL I, 72, “Kindness is a man’s memorial” and AEL I, 73, “A good character will be for a memorial,” cf. AEL I, 107). However, being forgotten in this sense is not the same as having a rotten name (see below). 103 Cf. also Deut 28:37; Jer 24:9; 25:9; 29:22. 104 Cf. also Gen 12:2; 26:4f. 101

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that of Isaac, Jacob or the women of Bethlehem.105 Because of the prosperity enjoyed by the archetypes of blessing they become paradigms for later pronouncements of blessings. So the righteous spoken of in the first hemistich is assumed to receive a concrete ‫ ברכה‬and consequently becomes the standard or even identification of the ‫ ברכה‬people wish for others.106 In the same way, the wicked are not remembered for anything good. Their name/memory rots. The verb ‫ רקב‬Qal means “rot,” “putrefy,” and does not necessarily indicate being forgotten after death, as is often assumed (e.g. Meinhold).107 Having a rotten name means to have a rotten reputation even while that person is still living, without however excluding the offensive reputation continuing after death. Being remembered in this unfavourable sense means that the name is not forgotten, but rather used in curses. Conversely, being held in blessed memory for having been righteous (and therefore having been blessed oneself) includes to be respected in the benedictions of others. In addition to the examples adduced above, this usage also lives on in the later Jewish practice of referring to a deceased with the words, ‫זכרונה לברכה‬/‫( זכרונו‬his/her memory be blessed), and especially with the exact citation of the first hemistich as a honorific for exceptionally respected people (abbreviated ‫)זצ״ל‬. So the proverb can be used to say that (a) righteous and wicked people are remembered positively and negatively in this life. It can also say that (b) they are thus remembered after their death, but the use of the powerfully connoted verb ‫( רקב‬decompose) can equally well suggest that (c) the wicked disappear as completely as Qohelet claims (see above). This polyvalence makes it possible to use the proverb in various situations and for various purposes. It retains its force even if wicked people – despite Qohelet’s claims to the contrary – are remembered long after their death. This is illustrated by the experience of Israel in the examples above. The adage can also apply if the oft quoted claim by Shakespeare’s Mark Anthony108 is true, or be quoted by readers who recall the feculence of names such as Stalin, Hitler or Pol Pot. When invoked in concrete circumstances, the proverb’s potential can be realised accordingly.109 105 If Pedersen ([1926] 1959, 198-199) is right with his sweeping claim that “[w]isdom is the same as blessing,” and that a blessed man (‫ )ברוך‬is not “one on whom a blessing has been pronounced,” this proverb would be unintelligible. For the noun ‫ברכה‬, cf. THAT I, 365-367 and below on 11:11. 106 For references to parallels in Egyptian literature, cf. Meinhold and Fox. 107 Therefore the proposal in BHS to read ‫( יוקב‬will be cursed), from ‫ קבב‬or ‫( נקב‬cf. KAHAL, s.v.) is unnecessary; the alignment with the first hemistich is already given by the fact that both versets are applicable to the time before as well as after death. 108 Julius Caesar III/2: “The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones.” 109 Cf. the fundamental assertion of the monograph on “openness” in proverbs by Millar (2020, passim).

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Melanchthon anticipates that the proverb could prompt the question why the wicked are in fact often remembered110 and from the outset counters the difficulty by retreating forward: Generalia dicta sunt & consolationes contra scandalum fælicitatis impiorum, qui aliquantisper florent, sed tandem iustis bene erit, & malis male. (The generalisations are statements and consolations levelled against the obstacle of the happiness of impious people who flourish for a while, but eventually good will happen to the just and evil to the evil.) Melanchthon generalises the proverb so that the statement about the wicked being forgotten can represent the fundamental theodicy question (cf. Pss 37; 49; 73 and the Book of Job). His answer is a solution in the mode of Ps 37:2, 10, 35f., that the dissonance in the standard deed-consequence mechanism is only temporary and in the end “normal” retribution will prevail. The Septuagint understands the whole proverb to refer to what happens to the righteous and the impious after death. In the first hemistich it translates ‫( לברכה‬for blessing) by μετ᾽ ἐγκωμίων (with praises), which refers to the encomium or eulogy given at a funeral. In the second hemistich it renders the Hebrew ‫( ירקב‬will rot) by σβέννυται (will be extinguished). The Peshitta translates similarly, using the same root (see the footnote for full reference) as the Hebrew verb in 13:9 (‫)דעך‬. The image of the lamp/light of life being extinguished is thus employed by both the Greek and the Syriac to draw attention to the disappearance of the wicked after death,111 which tightens the antithetical parallelism, especially clear in the Septuagint’s reference to the funerary encomium. The rabbinic tradition tends to interpret the proverb as a saying about what happens after death. Ramaq’s focus on the second hemistich, where he compares the rotting of the wicked to a rotten tree that produces nothing, can include that the wicked produce nothing fruitful in this life. But the thrust still is that nothing remains to be shown, with the implication that nothing remains “after death,” particularly in light of the contrast with the clear reference in v. 6 to retribution in the present life. Rashi substantiates the forgetting of the wicked with the argument that the foulness of a wicked person’s name prevents people from even mentioning it. This can include the time when the wicked are still alive, since Rashi also says that someone who mentions a righteous man blesses him.112 But in its own right it can also mean that the act of mentioning somebody (sc. after death) keeps the memory of the deceased alive and is therefore a blessing. The idea of blessing after death is developed by 110 By contrast, Chrysostom does not do this, probably because he has paid much attention to such discrepancies with real life in his comments on the previous verses (and has laboured under the effort). 111 The Masoretic Text and the Peshitta use the same verb in 13:9; 20:20; 24:20 (‫ דעך‬and ßïx) and the Septuagint in 13:9; 24:20 (σβέννυμι). In all of these cases the metaphor of the lamp of life is used. 112 This probably means one should bless when mentioning. Cf. the requirement in Ber Rab 49:1, that one should bless a righteous person and curse a wicked person upon mentioning them. The whole idea of the combinations mentioning-blessing and mentioning-cursing is developed at length in the Babylonian Talmud (Yom 38b) with reference to the stories of Abraham (Gen 18) and Lot (Gen 13).

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the Vilna Gaon in contrast to the punishment of the wicked. According to him, ‫זכר‬ implies that the blessing comes after death, but the punishment of the wicked already begins in this life, because ‫ שם‬means the name that one bears in this life. Hame’iri seems to think of the ‫ זכר‬as a continuum from this life into the next, and so does Malbim. The latter sees the rotting name of the wicked as a total destruction of their very souls after death.

10:8 The wise of heart accepts precepts, but the foolish of lips comes to ruin. According to Toy, the parallelism consists of 3 beats in each hemistich, while Gemser regards 3+3 possible but finds 4+3 more probable. Seven beats would require the maqqeph to be ignored and result in two adjacent stressed syllables (‫ חכם‬and ‫)לב‬, which is rather unlikely.113 The antithetic parallelism in the two versets once again illustrates the complementing impact of their mutual influence. The expressions ‫ חכם־לב‬and ‫ אויל שפתים‬in the respective hemistichs are explicative genitives, in which the first word (in the construct state) is qualified by the second word (the genitive).114 Since the heart is the centre of human vital functions (cf. 4:23),115 it marks the vital integrating aspect of the personality. Therefore the wise of heart does not just have a measure of wisdom, but is essentially wise, the truly wise person. His counterpart is the foolish person (‫)אויל‬, whose foolishness is specified by the genitive (“the fool of lips”): it manifests itself in his lips, i.e., in his speaking.116 By speaking foolishly he contrasts diametrically with the wise person who is prepared to accept precepts. That means that the latter is prepared to listen to the counsel 113

See Hrushovski (2007, 599). This type of genitive (genitivus explicationis) is also called a genitivus epexegeticus and encompasses several subtypes. In this verse both genitives are genitives of specification, where the second word provides a specification of the first word (genitive of species); cf. GKC 128m, also IBHS 9.5.3g. 115 For the heart as the centre of the inner human being and for references to ancient Near Eastern parallels, see Vol. I, 226-227, and especially the detailed analysis and references by Hausmann (1995, 178-186). Referring to the heart as well as the other organs mentioned in the context, Krüger (1995, 423) also argues for the presence of the “inner” and “outer” sides of the human disposition (“Haltung”). According to him (Krüger [2009, 91-106]), the centrality of the heart goes hand in glove with the differentiated way in which the heart, its possibilities and its limits are presented in the Old Testament. The image of the heart as centre of the “inner human” (2009, 97) was possible precisely for the reason that it could be perceived in such varied ways (especially 2009, 106). In my opinion that is particularly true of sapiential literature, e.g. 4:23, where the plural manifestations of the many aspects of life proceed from the heart (cf. Vol. I, 227). 116 That the genitive is explicative was understood by the Greek translator, since the Septuagint renders the “fool of lips” by ἄστεγος χείλεσιν (unguarded in lips) and thus specifies the foolishness. 114

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given to him by those in authority, which the foolish one is not prepared to do. The two hemistichs complement each other, but that is no sign that they are not parallel (cf. Fox). On the contrary, they complement each other by virtue of their contrasting parallelism. The elements of the two versets are counterpoised as follows: V. 8a wise heart / inward seat of wisdom listens accepts precepts / authority [does not come to ruin]

:: :: :: → ←

V. 8b fool lips / outward manifestation of foolishness prattles [does not accept precepts / authority] comes to ruin

The complementing effect of the first hemistich on the second is the implication that the foolish person does not accept precepts (similarly Plöger), which is in accord with 1:7.117 That means that he is not prepared to listen and only blurts out his own folly (cf. 10:14; 17:28; in both cases ‫ אויל‬is also used). The analysis of v. 8a and b by Knut Heim118 is very similar to mine, even as far as the columns given above are concerned. A difference is, however, that I do accept that “heart” and “lips” are parallel, whereas Heim thinks they are “not really parallel as such” and that we should rather say that “an association can be made” between them. In my view, the nature of the association does allow us to regard them as parallels. Not only are both the heart and the lips body parts, but the heart indicates true, essential wisdom, whereas in this proverb the lips are the vehicle of its diametrical opposite, foolishness. Moreover, in terms of the “Three-Zone Personality” of circumMediterranean culture,119 the heart-eye body zone (purposeful thinking) is linked to sensible activity (the hands-feet body zone) in the wise, but with self-expressive speech (the ears-mouth body zone) in the foolish, who is here called exactly that, viz. “foolish of lips,” that is, expressing his inner self as a fool by prattling. Another difference is that Heim identifies the ideas of accepting commands and being ruined as a “set”, i.e. a pair, while the two motifs are not related at all. I would argue that the asymmetry in the antithesis120 does not consist of an unrelated pair of accepting precepts and being ruined, but by a gap over against each concept:

117 In the programmatic motto for the whole book it is explicitly said that he does not accept authority (‫ )מוסר‬and the same word is used there to indicate the fool (‫)אויל‬. He thinks himself wise and is therefore incorrigible (26:12). 118 Heim (2013, 224-226). I had already written the exposition offered above when Heim’s imposing tome on poetic imagination in Proverbs reached me, but if credit is due, it is his. I have found this elsewhere as well, viz. that independently attained views of mine pertaining to the reading of parallelisms in versets and stichs in the light of each other, were confirmed or partly confirmed by his work. The same goes for the analysis of Millar, in this case even as far as the presentation in square brackets is concerned (2020, 202, 122). 119 Cf. Pilch (2016, 34). 120 A concept Heim derives from Mouser (1995, 137-150), whose work was unknown to me but whose noticing “asymmetrical antithetical parallelisms” obviously deserves our recognition.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10 accepting precepts [–]

[–] being ruined

It is this blank that the reader has to fill by reading imaginatively. The reader must, so to speak, supply content in the suggestive gaps121 and thereby make the antithetical parallelism complete. Noticing that the fool does not (antithesis) accept precepts prompts the next step, namely realising that an antithetical result must also be supplied in the blank space122 opposite the fool’s ruin (“being delivered,” in Heim’s terminology). This is exactly what Heim does in his second analysis, which to me seems an unnecessary step if one notices that all of this rests on another subtle opposition in the proverb. The wisdom of accepting precepts spoken by a father or teacher must include the act of listening, while the explicative genitive “fool of lips” states that the folly intended is foolish speaking. The antithesis is therefore wise listening as opposed to foolish chatter. In the final analysis, however, these are but differing ways of reaching the same end and I concur with Heim that the proverb does not merely state the obvious, but calls for “creative thinking.”

The fool evinces the motif of speaking, which is a fundamental sapiential idea and quite prominent in Chap. 10 (cf. vv. 11; 13-14; 19-21; 30-31). So the contrast is not between speaking wisely and speaking foolishly, but between listening to wisdom and blabbering folly.123 At the same time, the parallelism has a retroactive effect. In the light of the information that the prattling fool comes to ruin,124 the reader must infer that that is not the fate of one who can listen, another fundamental sapiential motif (cf. the oft repeated injunction to listen, both in the poems [1:8; 4:10; 5:7; 7:24; 8:32, 34] and in the shorter sayings [13:1, 8; 19:20; 23:19, 22; 25:10]). Together with v. 10, this proverb is listed under what Snell125 calls “[h]alfverses repeated with spelling variations” (here the respective second hemistichs contain no such variations). We will attend to the repetition in the exegesis of v. 10, but as far as v. 8 is concerned, we could ascertain that the parallelism has nothing to do with the fact that the last verset is repeated 121 Cf. the title devised by Schwab (2003, 170-181) for his consideration of Wolfgang Iser’s impact on biblical studies: “Mind the Gap.” 122 It seems to me that this also does justice to the idea expressed by the main title of Mouser’s (1995) argument: “Filling in the Blank.” This is what Millar (2020, 9) undertakes to explore in her study of openness in proverbs. 123 Toy considers the possibility of “an elaborate implicit antithesis,” but then rejects it as not “clearly set forth”. However, newer insights in the poetics of parallelism offer new avenues (cf., for instance, on v. 4 above). When one considers the phenomena of what Berlin (2008, 96-99) calls “disambiguation and ambiguity,” constituting what she regards as “one of the main functions of parallelism,” it no longer seems so obvious that 10:8b is “an error of scribe.” 124 Cf. the same verb also in Hos 4:14. Fox has doubts about the meaning of the verb ‫לבט‬, but does accept that “be destroyed,” “go astray” or “be cast aside” are all possible. Cf. Delitzsch for a summary of relevant data from the ancient versions and etymology. The Septuagint (ὑποσκελισθήσεται [will stumble]) seems to support an understanding in terms of the Arabic cognate ‫ لبط‬labaṭa (throw down), which would in any case be a metaphor for coming to a fall or to ruin. 125 Snell (1993, 20; 42).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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two verses further on. It rather has to do with suggestive blanks left in the poetry to invite creative, participant reading. Therefore I agree with Heim that efforts to “rectify” the text by following the Septuagint126 (Murphy, Clifford and others) make a rather unimaginative truism out of the proverb. The “wise of heart” is sometimes historicised in the Jewish tradition. Rashi takes it as a reference to Moses, who was prepared to accept the command that Joseph’s bones were to accompany Israel from Egypt (cf. Ex 13:19; Gen 50:25). In Genesis Rabbah (52:3), however, it is applied to Abraham as an explanation for his move from Mamre near Hebron to Gerar after the destruction of Sodom (Gen 13:18; 20:1). His action is supposed to illustrate his acceptance of the commandment to practise hospitality as he had done before the destruction (Gen 18:1-8). In the Jewish reception of Proverbs the sapiential literature is not divorced from Israel’s historical traditions.127 Malbim says the fool (‫ )אויל‬is a doubter (‫[ אולי‬perchance] as expression of doubt) and ‫ לבט‬Niphal means “to become worn out.” He interprets the identical v. 10b differently (see the exegesis of v. 10). Melanchthon merely translates the first verset (Sapiens corde admittit admonitionem), but takes the second as its interpretation (id est [that is]): foolish lips mean that fools continuously128 give wrong counsel (perhaps as antithesis to v. 8a). Since such perversion of truth eventually is discovered, the fools “become caught up in punishments” (haerebunt in poenis).129

10:9 He who walks in honesty walks securely, but he who makes his ways crooked will be found out. The contrast in the parallelism is between upright honesty and crooked deviousness. Rhythmically, the proverb is a classic Siebener with four stressed syllables in the first hemistich and three in the second. There is a textual issue directly pertinent to the stylistics of the verse. BHS (as opposed to BHQ) 126 The Septuagint has, ὁ δὲ ἄστεγος χείλεσιν σκολιάζων ὑποσκελισθήσεται (he who is unguarded of lips is perverse and will stumble). 127 In the Midrash Mishle the association of wisdom literature with the historical tradition is very frequent and often involves all the books of the Pentateuch, Joshua, the Books of Samuel and Kings, as well as all the Major Prophets and all but two of the Minor Prophets; cf. Visotsky (1992, passim). Cf., to mention only a few further examples, the patriarchal stories (e.g. Midrash Mishle on Prov 8:4; Ber Rab 75:2 on Prov 25:26, and Jacob and Esau in Gen 33), the wilderness narratives (e.g. Nahmias on Prov 13:17 and Moses in Num 12:7; Rashi on Prov 13:17 and the Balaam story in Num 22:35), the history of David (e.g. Rashi on Prov 13:13 and David before Achish in 1 Sam 21:14 and on Prov 13:16 and 1 Kgs 1:2); the Talmud even takes the whole of Israel’s history as a manifestation of the quarrelsome wife in Prov 21:9 and 25:24 (R Hash 31a, also taken up by Rashi). Cf. Ginsburg (1998, passim), Ginsburg & Weinberger (2007, passim); Rosenberg (2001, passim). 128 Also Chrysostom emphasises that being “unguarded of lips” (ἄστεγος χείλεσιν) displays foolishness and suggests a continuous disposition, repeatedly saying so in a very short exposition of the verse. 129 Cf. also below on v. 10.

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takes up an old proposal by declaring that ‫( יִ וׇּ ֵד ַע‬will be found out) should be read ‫( יֵ רו ַֹע‬will suffer). Toy asserts that the text as it stands is possible, but thinks that “the parallelism calls for the mention of punishment.” Therefore he reads ‫יֵ ר ַֹע‬, namely the third person masculine singular imperfect Niphal of ‫רעע‬, which also occurs in 11:15 and 13:20 (he omits the waw, probably inadvertently, since there would be no reason to discard the waw in ‫)יִ וׇּ ֵד ַע‬.130 Waltke objects to this emendation on the grounds that it would destroy the assonance between this proverb and the identical endings of the previous and the following verses.131 On the level of the edited proverbs, that certainly is the case, but on the level of the proverb in its own right it does not decide anything. However, within the proverb itself there is also good reason to retain the Masoretic Text. The one who makes his ways crooked,132 is the person who follows all kinds of devious ways. In the second hemistich the explicit metaphor of the way133 is used in parallelism with the first hemistich, where the noun is not used, but the metaphor is suggested by the verb ‫הלך‬. The use of the plural ‫( דרכיו‬his ways) for the object is significant. The plural noun with singular suffix (and the singular verb ‫ )יִ וׇּ ֵד ַע‬emphasises the many deviations of the scoundrel (cf. Qoh 7:29). Waltke comments that this is “to denote his many deviations from the standards of Proverbs,” and thus considers the significance of the plural to lie on the level of denotation (the metaphor points beyond itself to many actual breaches of the standards prescribed for life). Without denying this, we should also recognise the significance of the plural residing within the metaphor itself. The idea of a person who “makes numerous crooked ways” creates the image of the vacillation with which swivelling scoundrels mislead people (similarly Vilna Gaon). They deceive fellow humans and deviate along side-tracks and alleys so as not to be found out.134 Precisely that is what the second verset refutes. Their erratic tricks will fail to help them get away because they will “become known,” i.e., they will be found out. In traditional Jewish interpretation the problematic last word (‫ )יִ וׇּ ֵד ַע‬is usually understood similar to my proposal above, viz. that the man of crooked ways will be “found out.” The Vilna Gaon, for instance, attributes the eventual revealing of the scoundrel to God himself: The crooked deceive by hiding their intentions, but God Toy claims to be following Graetz, who does retain the waw in ‫( ירוע‬Graetz [1892, 66]). The last word of all three verses has the vowel pattern i-ā-ē, but in v. 9 there is also a patah furtivum, which slightly weakens the assonance of vowels. 132 The verb ‫ עקש‬in the Piel only occurs here in Proverbs; but cf. another verb in Qoh 7:13 (‫ עות‬in the Piel) and Qoh 1:15 (‫ עות‬Pual). 133 The metaphor is also common in the poems of Proverbs; it is discussed in Vol. I, 66-67 (cf. 1:15; 2:8, 9, 13, 23; 3:17, 23; 4:10-19, 26-27; 7:25). 134 Clifford seems to mean something similar with his pithy note, “twisted, that is, hard to track.” 130 131

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

117

will cause it to be revealed. Ramaq states that the crookedness of the scoundrel will be exposed when evil happens to him. He also mentions another interpretation, viz. the possibility that such a person will be “broken” (‫)ישבר‬. This is probably inspired by Rashi’s ingenious argument that the crooked man will be broken (‫)ישבר‬, which he advances on the grounds that ‫ יִ וׇּ ֵד ַע‬can also be read ‫י ַֹד ע‬, as in Judg 8:16, where it is said that Gideon punished the elders of Succoth with thorn shrubs for their disloyal attitude (‫וידע בהם את אנשי סכות‬, probably an error for ‫ וידש‬cf. Judg 8:7, “and he threshed”). The same interpretation is also found in Pseudo-Ibn Ezra.135 Melanchthon only comments on the first hemistich. He shares the rabbinic understanding of ‫ תֹּם‬as “innocent,” signifying people of integrity and incorruptibility (integri & incorrupti),136 but theologises it in terms typical of the Reformation: Id est, habentes fidem sine corruptelis et bonam conscientiam iuxta Evangelium (That is, having a faith without flaw and a good conscience according to the Gospel) According to him, the proverb promises people with such faith that they will “walk securely” (ambulant secure), the exposition of which is that they “have a tranquil conscience” (conscientiam tranquillam habent). Again Melanchthon theologises his exegesis: “Consequently, they are also sustained by the hope of divine help” (Deinde & spe auxilii divini sustenantur). He thus avoids any deed-consequence possibility, which would endanger the principle of sola fide (by faith alone) so important to the Reformation: The security of a clear conscience and therefore hope of divine help are for those who have faith rather than practice good deeds.

Several scholars remark on the alliteration in the first verset, but differ among themselves in their observations. Meinhold only notices the repeated sounds ‫ל‬, ‫ כ‬and ‫ ב‬but misses the dentals ‫ ת‬and ‫ ;ט‬Clifford conversely notices the dentals but misses the ‫( ב‬although he does point out the additional assonance of the vowels ō and ē); Luchsinger137 mentions v. 9a in his list of alliterative half-verses that are linked to another half-verse where this is not the case;138 Waltke prints the Hebrew words as a case of striking alliteration; so does Murphy, who repeats the Hebrew consonants, whereas Fuhs, who is normally sensitive to stylistic patterns in Proverbs, does not mention it at all. We here find the sounds ‫ל‬, ‫כ‬, ‫ב‬, and ‫ת‬/‫ ט‬twice, and in that order. If we assume the spirantisation of kaph, its sound would also be present in the last consonant of the verset (‫)ח‬. Add to this the repetition of ō and ē as well as that of the segol, the hemistich is striking indeed: hōlēkh battōm yēlekh beṭaḥ

This constitutes, in Luchsinger’s terminology, a kind of inner rhyme and creates an ordered, firmly measured effect. Especially in the rhythmic pattern 135

Driver (1880, 12). Chrysostom seems to understand the Greek rendering of ‫תֹּם‬, ἁπλῶς (simply, sincerely), in the same way, since he explains it as the opposite of villainy. 137 Luchsinger (2010, 328). 138 These are 10:9a; 11:2a; 16:4b; 16:17b and are supposed to aid memory. 136

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of four stressed beats, it goes very well with the content of the sentence:139 the unblemished, straightforward conduct of the upright person who goes his way confidently and safely (cf. 3:23, where the wise person is expected not even to stumble over an obstacle on the way). The contrast of the integrating sound effects in the first verset with their absence in the second enables the reader/hearer not only a cognitive understanding of the proverb, but also an emotive experience of the opposites. In other words, the notions “security for the upright” and “unmasking for the devious,” clearly intelligible as they are, are further enhanced by the aesthetic experience of firm security of the upright as opposed to evasive moral meandering of the crook. 10:10 He who winks the eye causes grief, and the foolish of lips comes to ruin. This is the only saying in the cluster of vv. 6-11 where – at first sight – the parallelism is not antithetical. In each statement a negative activity springing from a part of the body is mentioned. The rhythmic organisation is the same as the previous proverb (4+3). Commentators have long been troubled by what appears to be the lack of antithetical parallelism in the Masoretic Text of this proverb. Many accept the contrast established by the Septuagint (Wildeboer, Oesterley, Gemser, Ringgren, Lucas et al.; see below). Others consider it sympathetically (Plöger, Van Leeuwen, Tuinstra). However, Meinhold, Waltke and Heim140 point out that the causing of grief (‫ )יתן עצבת‬spoken of in the first hemistich can include that the grief the perpetrator causes others has a backlash for himself.141 The idea of a perpetrator himself experiencing what he had planned to bring over others is well established in the sapiential literature and beyond it (see 12:14; 26:27; 28:10; 29:5-6; Qoh 10:8; cf. Ps 7:16). The first hemistich can be read both ways (which is denied by Schipper). If it is read as a reference to a backlash returning to affect the perpetrator, the parallelism is not asymmetric, because both versets would contain a reference to the “punishment” of the perpetrator. If, on the other hand, it is not taken to indicate such a backlash, the force of the parallelism suggests that the undesirable effect of verbal negative communication in v. 10b would also apply to the nonverbal 139 Cf. Yoder (2009, 123), who also points out the effect of “the gentle rhythm and repetition of sounds” in v. 9a, and of the “[j]uxtaposition of ... physical activity and moral language” – correctly, in my opinion. 140 Heim (2013, 226-227). 141 For the same ambivalence, cf. also 17:20b: the one who is deviant of tongue “will fall into evil,” which can either mean that he will commit evil or experience evil (cf. Freuling [2004, 99f.]).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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negative communication in v. 10a (similarly Schipper, who opts for this possibility and upholds the antithetical parallelism). In effect, both readings would amount to the same result (with the second hemistich intensifying the first with the explicit use of the Niphal to express self-ruin). The Masoretic Text can thus make sense on both counts. The Septuagint has a different reading altogether. ὁ ἐννεύων ὀφθαλμοῖς μετὰ δόλου συνάγει ἀνδράσι λύπας, ὁ δὲ ἐλέγχων μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ. (He who winks with the eyes deceitfully, causes a man sorrows; but he who reproves openly, makes peace.) The Septuagint is clear that the winking of eyes is more harmful to another party (ἀνδράσι) than to the perpetrator. The second hemistich builds a neat antithesis to the first: open reproof contrasts with crafty signs, and making peace contrasts with causing sorrow. In accordance with this contrast, Fox142 adopts the Hebrew retroversion proposed by Ehrlich: ‫( תוכחת מגלה שלום‬an open reproof makes peace) and appeals to its similarity with the Hebrew of 27:5. But the Septuagint itself differs in these two verses. Whereas in 10:10b the verb ἐλέγχω (reprove, correct) is used with a noun (παρρησία [open confidence]), in 27:5 a plural noun (ἔλεγχοι [corrections]) is used with a perfect participle (ἀποκεκαλυμμένοι [revealed, opened]). This poses the question why the Septuagint does not use the same translation for what is reconstructed as the same Hebrew text. In any event, Clement of Alexandria finds the Septuagint version of v. 10b useful to substantiate his rather stern prescriptions,143 and again as an apology for his own plain talk in expressing truth as opposed to typical “artful” Greek.144

The winking of the eye has long caused creative proposals. In the 18th century Schultens found the expression unfathomably obscure, without wit or anything enlightening, and Döderlein thought it an ambiguous aspect of an ambiguous verse. According to him it could mean the anxious glancing of an uncertain person as well as the threatening frown of an intimidating person. Wildeboer simply refers to 6:13, where he refers to 10:10. Gemser claims that the verb ‫ קרץ‬here means “close the eyes“ in the sense of “ignore” or “overlook” and appeals to his own reconstruction of the second verset in support. Although conceivable, that bases an assumption on a conjecture and does not validate the claim. On the contrary, evidence both from Israel and Egypt suggests that winking the eye is an evil act. Ben Sira says so explicitly (Sir 27:22, “Who winks the eyes plans evil”) and in the collection of mortuary texts making up the Egyptian Book of the Dead a deceased names a whole number of sins 142 In EE, but not in his commentary, where he leaves the text unaltered – rightly, in my opinion. Cf. other reconstructions by Gemser (‫על פנים ומוכיח ישלים‬, which evidently should be ‫)ומוכיח על פנים ישלים‬, and Clifford (‫)ומוכיח יעשה שלום‬. 143 Paid III, 12 (ANF II, 292). 144 Strom II, 1 (ANF II, 347).

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and denies having committed them while he was alive, among them having winked.145 There is therefore no reason to interpret the verb differently from 6:13 (see the commentary on that verse and the references given there). He who furtively makes signs with the eye146 causes others grief (and can expect it to rebound to his own detriment), and he who plainly speaks foolishness causes himself ruin. So the parallelism is equivalent in as far as two negative actions have negative consequences, but there is an element of contrast present in as far as secretive147 communication and openly trumpeted communication make up the opposites covert :: overt. The repetition of v. 8b in v. 10b is often seen as the result of a half-verse that became corrupted or went missing after the Septuagint had come into existence. The corruption is thought to have taken place in v. 10 and to have been remedied by borrowing the last half of v. 8 “for sense” (so Clifford). Even Waltke thinks that the Masoretic Text “suspiciously reads the same as v. 8b” and considers it possible that the text has “suffered by dittography from v. 8b.” Nevertheless, he retains the text despite his suspicions and regards it as a Janus verse in vv. 6-14.148 Whether one agrees with his demarcation of units or not, Waltke’s principle is sound. It may well be that the form of the Masoretic Text was attained because of difficulties in its transmission and it may be that other readings, such as the Septuagint (and, in its wake, the Peshitta) do preserve evidence of an older form. But the Masoretic Text (followed by the Targum, except for the last word) has not been patched together mindlessly. The editor who wrote what we now have in vv. 8-10, created not only a repetition, but also a threefold assonance in the vowel pattern of the three final verbs. What is more, this form of the text is also meaningful, as Fox accepts in his commentary. Therefore I would neither want to venture an improvement of the text nor overinterpret it as a structural marker with implications for a larger poetic unit. Taken as a proverb by itself, it warns against the mischief of both secretive sign language and open loquaciousness. 145

Book of the Dead, Spell 125 (ANET, 35; COS II, 61). The verb can either be construed with ‫ ב‬of the means or agency as in 6:13 (IHBS 23.2.2f), or with the accusative as here and in Ps 35:19 (cf. also Prov 16:30, where another verb [‫ ]עצה‬is used). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra explains the verse by simply stating that ‫ קרץ‬here means ‫קרץ ב‬, indicating that he understood the verse not to refer to turning a blind eye (Gemser), but to using the eye maliciously. 147 Heim (2013, 226-227) states that such behaviour could either entail deception or mockery (basically the same as Delitzsch, who speaks of “injury” or “derision” to the other party). Indeed it could. Since both are to the detriment of the interlocutor, the important thing would be to notice the generic element common to both, viz. surreptitious interaction behind somebody’s back; cf. also Heim (2001, 115-116). 148 Waltke’s case for the hinge function of v. 10 rests on the assumed unity of vv. 6-14. But that forces him to assign different meanings (“overwhelm” and “cover up”) to the verb ‫כסה‬ Piel in the identical sentences of v. 6b and v. 11b respectively, which seems purpose-serving (cf. above on v. 6b). 146

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

121

According to Rashi, the winking of the eye is not evil in itself, but it is intended to entice others to do evil. Malbim proposes a completely different interpretation. The winking of the eye is, in his opinion, to throw repeated glances, such as done by someone who follows the path of Torah, but continually doubts it and looks toward the wrong path. This causes grief, not so much to others as to himself, as the ‫עצבת‬ spoken of in the verse is the disquiet of incertitude in his own heart. Malbim aligns his understanding of the second verset with this interpretation, explaining foolish lips as the uttering of doubts about the right path. Hame’iri, on the other hand, thinks that the grief caused by the winking eye is caused to other people by one who surreptitiously plans to harm unwitting victims. He too aligns the two statements in the verse by stating that the second verset, though consisting of wording identical to v. 8b, has a different meaning. To him, the passive ‫ ילבט‬here means “will be thought corrupt,” since the fool’s reputation will become known (cf. above on v. 8b). Yet another explanation of the grief is given by the Mezudat David, which states that the winking person experiences grief until such time as his reticence finds the opportunity to be transformed into an actual harmful deed. Both Chrysostom and Melanchthon take v. 10a quite literally. Chrysostom explains the winking of the eye as the opposite of open honesty. For Melanchthon, those who wink with the eye are hypocrites who feign facial expressions by simulating flattering cheer (blanditias) or sadness (tristitiam) as the occasion requires. In his opinion, the statement expresses the sense of the Latin saying, fronti nulla fides (no reliance on appearances). But then Melanchthon ignores the second verset, probably because he discussed it a few lines earlier in his comment on v. 8, which he understands as literally as v. 10.

10:11 The mouth of a righteous man is a fountain of life, but the mouth of the wicked covers up violence. In the first verset each of the four Hebrew words carries one accent, and the second verset has the same number of accents as its identical counterpart in v. 6, so that this proverb is the only one in the cluster with a 4+4 pattern. The stich as a whole shows a chiastic organisation, since the second sentence inverts the order of predicate and subject. The first verset is a nominal sentence with the predicate (two words) in the first and the subject (two words) in the last position, while the second verset is a verbal sentence beginning with the subject (two words) and ending with the predicate (two words):149 ‫פי צדיק‬

149

[S]

‫[ מקור חיים‬P]

‫[ יכסה חמס‬P]

‫[ ופי רשעים‬S]

In v. 6a, a nominal sentence also precedes a verbal sentence in the second hemistich.

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The syntactic chiasmus is reinforced by the presence of ‫ פי‬in both subject phrases and by the antithesis between the righteous and the wicked.150 The chiasmus in v. 11 is overlooked by Heim when he reverses his earlier argument, which asserted the likelihood “that the syntax of a whole colon repeated in close proximity should be construed in the same way.”151 On the position of the proverb in the context, see above on v. 6b and v. 10 (in the latter case, in connection with the relationship of that verse to vv. 11ff.). The second hemistich is identical to v. 6b (see above on v. 6 and further below). The first hemistich consists of a metaphtonymic construction, that is, a combination of metonymy and metaphor in which the latter elaborates the former. According to Günter Radden,152 this is a recurrent phenomenon in many languages and is often encountered where the motif of speaking is concerned. He shows that the metonymies for speaking “rely on a small set of speech organs only ... [that] tend to be elaborated by metaphor, for which Goossens (1995) has coined the term metaphtonemy.” If the mouth of the righteous is a fountain of life, then the mouth stands for speaking (metonymy) and simultaneously is a fountain (metaphor).153 That means that the righteous speaks things that bring life. The source of water is a source of a life-giving commodity, therefore a necessity. In the same way the words spoken by the righteous are conducive to and therefore necessary for life. The same idea is found elsewhere in Proverbs, e.g. in 13:14 where ‫ מקור חיים‬is applied to the teaching of the wise, which is equivalent to the words of the righteous.154 As Clifford points out, the expression “fountain of life” can also be applied to other concepts, such as the Fear of Yahweh (14:27) and understanding (16:22); the fountain of life can be Yahweh himself (Jer 2:13; 17:13155) or be found “with” 150 In vv. 6 and 7, the righteous is singular (‫ )צדיק‬and the wicked are plural (‫)רשעים‬, as in this proverb. 151 Heim (2013, 218-219, cf. 2001, 114). 152 Radden (2004, 543-565); the quote is from the opening page. 153 Cf. Luchsinger (2010, 288-289); he says that “mouth” stands for “person,” but the person is explicitly identified by its own noun (‫ ;)צדיק‬cf. also 13:14, where the fountain of life is not the wise person (‫)ח ָכם‬, ָ but his teaching (‫)תּוֹר ה‬. ָ That the words of a man’s mouth – not his person – are a “fountain of wisdom,” is expressly said in 18:4. For the terminology (also in connection with speaking actions), see Goossens (1995, 159 [originally 1990, 323]). 154 On the basis of the fact that “the concepts of wisdom and righteousness evoked each other in the discourse of the community,” Ben Zvi (2014, 19) cites 13:14 as an illustration of thinking of wisdom and closely related concepts in terms of water. For this reason he finds it “not surprising” that an expression such as 10:11a existed “in the repertoire of the community.” 155 In the Jeremiah texts the word ‫ מים‬is added: ‫( מקור מים חיים‬the fountain of living water). See Holt (2005, 99ff.). Cf. also John 4:10; 7:37-38 (Jesus as the source and the faithful as

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

123

him (Ps 36:10).156 The explicative genitive “fountain of life” must mean that the fountain (nomen regens) makes life (nomen rectum) possible. Where the expression ‫ מקור מים חיים‬is used (as in the Jeremiah texts referred to) the middle word is in the absolute state and cannot therefore entail a second genitive to render “water of life,” but must mean living = running water as in texts from the Old and the New Testament just referred to. Excursus on water imagery Running water to be found in springs or streams was especially important in the Ancient Near East,157 which is to be expected in a relatively dry region. Therefore human settlements were often built in the vicinity of fountains, as is evident from numerous place-names prefixed by ‫( עֵין‬Fountain of ...), such as En-Dor, En-Gedi etc.158 This testifies how indispensable springs were for human life and society. That is how indispensable wise words of righteousness are for human society and for life itself. Several essays in a volume on thinking of water in the Ancient Near East159 are relevant to the imagery found in this proverb as well as the other texts cited above. Ehud Ben Zvi160 finds 11:25b (he who waters is really one who teaches) a case that “clearly evokes an image of ‘watering’ ... while at the same time conveying a sense of teaching.” This is also the case in 13:14. In an essay about the significance of water for prophecy Martti Nissinen161 points to the global occurrence of water as a metaphor for life, but also pays attention to sapiential texts. He thinks that the presentation of Yahweh as the “fountain of living water” in Jer 2:13 and 17:13 sounds like “an apotheosis of the ‘fountain of life’ found in Proverbs and Psalms,” including Prov 10:11. The contribution of Stéphanie Antonioz162 to this volume is most illuminating. She surveys the motif of “waters of abundance” in texts from Sumer and Akkad to the Amorite Middle Euphrates and Assyria. Coming to the Old Testament, she shows that the motif of gushing water in Mesopotamia was the primary image of life. Citing not only the pertinent Mesopotamian myths, but also royal inscriptions (Hammurabi [p. 57], Yahdun-Lim of Mari [pp. 59-60], Aššur-ballit [pp. 60-61], Adad-nêrârî [p. 61] and Aššurnaṣirpal II [pp. 61-62]), she shows how this life is mediated to the people by water “flowing continually through the king who is responsible before the gods for that gift.” For Israel, banishment from the watered Garden of Eden meant that the only mediating agency of God’s gift had become the Torah (cf. Deut 11:10-17) instead of a human king as in Mesopotamia. She confirms her analysis by incorporating the prophets Deutero-Isaiah (cf. Isa 41:18; 51:3-4 [pp. 66-71]), Ezekiel (cf. Ezk 47 [p. 73]) and Zechariah (cf. Ze 14:8-9 secondary source of living water). In Ezk 47:1-12, Joel 4:18b [3:18b] and Zech 14:8 the temple and Jerusalem are pictured as the sources of living water. 156 Cf. also the commentary on 20:5. 157 Cf. Antonioz (2014, 62) for an example in an inscription from the Aššurnaṣirpal II palace. 158 Cf. NIDB 2, 488-499. 159 Ben Zvi (2014, passim). 160 Ben Zvi (2014, 20); cf. the commentary on 11:25. 161 Nissinen (2014, 30). 162 Antonioz (2014, 41-68).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

[pp. 73-74]). All of this establishes convincingly that the flowing waters mediating life through the king in Mesopotamia travelled west and became a motif no longer tied to the king, but to Yahweh and his Torah. Although, unlike Ben Zvi and Nissinen, she does not incorporate wisdom texts in her investigation, I would suggest that her results from the Near Eastern background are highly germane to the fountain imagery in Proverbs. My proposal is that it is now plausible that the prophetic texts are not so much an apotheosis of the Proverbs texts, but rather that the latter are the sapiential manifestation of the same pattern that she has uncovered in the ancient Near East, Pentateuch and Prophets. Mediating wise words and righteousness is the sapiential manifestation of expressing the necessary obedience to Torah, so that Yahweh will provide the life-giving water (Deut 11:10ff.). Not the wise man personally, but the words of his mouth are the living fountain mediating life.

As in v. 6, we again encounter a parallelism in which the two versets impact on each other (see further the commentary on v. 6): V. 11a righteous speaking brings life [does not hide violence]

:: → ←

V. 11b wicked speaking [does not bring life] hides violence

The proverb thus contains a thorough contrast that can stand on its own feet, but also provides a nuanced variation of v. 6. Therefore the Masoretic Text needs no emendation, even if versions like the Septuagint and the Peshitta also make good sense. The power of speech in general and specifically the fountain metaphor in this verse are commented upon in Jewish literature and is found in Christianity as early as the New Testament. The power of speech is famously emphasised in James 3:1-12. The metaphor of the tongue is the primary one, but – apart from comparisons with ships and horses – it is also combined with the motif of a gushing fountain (3:11) which is rhetorically said never to produce both fresh and brackish water. In the same way human speech should only produce fresh, living water. The motif and the image are similar to that of the proverb, but there is no direct indication of dependence. Oesterley calls the figure of the fountain “a favourite one among the Jews.” Citing Pirqe Aboth, he shows that the identification of the wise words and Torah in the motif of water is also found in the rabbinic tradition. In Pirqe Aboth 2:10 and 6:1 people intent on studying the Torah and devoted to it are called a spring that does not stop flowing. The same motif is expressed by Hame’iri, Ibn Ezra and the Dacat Miqra. In all of these cases there is a shift from the word to the person. The quality of a lifegiving fountain is transferred from the act of speaking (= mouth) to the person doing the speaking. In contradistinction, the Vilna Gaon identifies the words by which the righteous teach others with the source of life. Rashi in turn interprets the negative aspect of the last verset in the light of the positive antithesis in the first. He takes the violence as the subject of v. 11b, meaning that it “covers the mouth of the wicked” in the sense of marking their mouth, i.e. speaking so that their words are camouflaged as sweet water, but in fact are poisonous. But if violent/bitter words are camouflaged as sweet, they do not cover, but are covered.

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10:12-18 Folly and Wisdom in the light of hatred and love 12 Hatred stirs up quarrels, but love forms a cover over all transgressions. 13 On the lips of a discerning man wisdom is found, but a rod is for the back of one who lacks sense. 14 The wise store knowledge, but the mouth of the fool is imminent ruin. 15 The wealth of a rich man is his fortified city, the ruin of paupers is their poverty. 16 The wage of the righteous leads to life, the produce of the wicked leads to sin. 17 A path to life is he who accepts instruction, but who discards reproof leads astray. 18 Who conceals hatred has lips of deceit, and who spreads calumny, he is a fool. Bibl.: Heim 2001, 119-124 and 2013, 228-235; Krispenz 1989, 46-48; Krüger 1995, 424-427; Pilch 2016, 34-35; Scherer 1999, 57-58, 64-71; Scoralick 1995, 178-179.

The caption above is an endeavour to sum up the group of proverbs framed by the motif of hatred and the verb ‫ כסה‬in vv. 12 and 18. But although the group can be referred to as a cluster, it is not closely knit. There are catchwords that reveal a certain pattern (cf. below on Krüger’s observations), but also connections to other proverbs in the chapter,163 even between v. 12 and the immediately preceding v. 11 (the verb ‫ כסה‬Piel); also thematic groupings partly within these verses, such as vv. 11-14, regarded by Van Leeuwen as the first “cluster of verses on good and bad speech” and vv. 18-21, his second cluster on speech. No wonder then that many differing demarcations of the group have been proposed,164 while several scholars deny or bypass the issue altogether. Although arguments can be put forward for several such groupings, vv. 12-18 do seem to be marked by an inclusio through the use of the noun ‫ שנאה‬and the verb ‫ כסה‬Piel in inverted order. Moreover, vv. 14 and 15 are linked by the catchword ‫( מחתה‬ruin), vv. 16 and 17 by ‫( לחיים‬to life), while v. 13 shares the thematic element of speaking with v. 14, and v. 15 shares the motif of wealth/produce (‫הון‬, ‫ עשיר‬/ ‫פעלה‬, ‫ )תבואה‬with v. 16. Krüger notes the catchword connections between vv. 12 and 18, 163

Meinhold; Heim (2001, 120). For instance, Krispenz (1989, 46-48) and Scherer (1999, 57-58): vv. 13-17; Scoralick (1995, 178-179) and Fuhs: vv. 13-21; Krüger (1995, 424-425), Heim (2001, 119-120), Meinhold and Tuinstra: vv. 12-18; Sæbø: vv. 8-17 as a “motley section” (“bunt zusammengesetzte[r] Abschnitt”); Whybray: a more or less undefined group between vv. 6-11 and 18-21; Lucas: vv. 6-11 and 13-17 with v. 12 in the middle although linked to v. 11. 164

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between vv. 13 and 14, as well as between vv. 16 and 17 and presents these verses as a concentric pattern around v. 15, which he then takes as a balancing corrective to the negative view of wealth in vv. 2-3. But, if catchwords are to be the basis of the structure, the repetition of ‫ מחתה‬in vv. 14 and 15 would rather integrate v. 15 in a looser chain:165 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

The catchwords can be regarded as clues to cohesion (signals of formal association), but they neither define necessary logical constructs (coherence) nor draw watertight boundaries between poetic units. 10:12 Hatred stirs up quarrels, but love forms a cover over all transgressions. The rhythmic pattern is 3+4.166 Tuinstra finds a chiasmus in the fact that the proverb begins with “hatred” and ends with “love,” probably intending to say that the syntactic structure of its two sentences is inverted (similarly Meinhold), which could be sketched as follows: subject – verb – object

object – verb – subject

The verb ‫ כסה‬Piel (cover) is the penultimate word both in v. 11 and in v. 12, but that does not prove that the previous cluster has to reach further than v. 11. The meaning of the verb differs in any case. In v. 11 it means “cover up” in malam partem, while here it means “cover over” in bonam partem in the sense of overlooking or forgiving transgressions (cf. 12:16; 17:9 and the use of the concept in Jas 5:20 and 1 Pet 4:8 [καλύπτειν]; also the similar 165

Cf. also the critique of Heim’s argument for a coherent section by Fox (2003, 271). Gemser considers three beats in the second hemistich as an alternative possibility, which is not what the Masoretes intended, since otherwise a maqqeph would be necessary both before and after ‫כל‬. 166

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idea in 19:11 and 1 Cor 13:7 [στέγειν]). Fox calls the use of ‫ כסה‬in vv. 11 and 12 a paradox, viz. that covering up one’s own misdeeds is wrong and covering up one’s anger about some else’s misdeeds is good.167 But the other comparable uses of the verb point to the notion of making the misdeeds of the adversary invisible (overlooking, thus forgiving them),168 rather than suppressing one’s own anger (therefore at best tolerating the misdeeds). The parallelism of the two hemistichs read in the light of each other once again enrich the meaning. The hateful act of v. 12a would include the opposite of making the misdeeds of an adversary invisible (v. 12b), in other words, the malevolent disclosure of the latter’s mistakes. And the strife referred to in v. 12a could be expected to result from the divulgence of damaging information about other people (v. 12b). Thus, two elements are explicit in each verset and one of them is respectively projected backwards and forwards by the force of the parallelism, thereby providing its own opposite (in square brackets below) in the respective antithetical verset: V. 12a hate [disclosure] strife

:: ← →

V. 12b love covering over [avoiding strife]

Both in their respective verb and noun forms, the opposites hatred (root ‫)שנא‬ and love (root ‫ )אהב‬are constantly associated with each other in the Old Testament,169 which is also the case here. As distinct from the love between a man and a woman, parents and children or between friends, the love spoken of here is the general positive inclination towards fellow humans,170 which is already clear from the contrast with hate and the consequences of both emotions. The two nouns may represent personified concepts (so Waltke); then the meaning would be that the emotions themselves are the sources from which respectively quarrels and forgiveness spring. The nouns may also be metonyms (so Ramaq, cf. Fox), in which case the meaning would be that the hateful and loving persons for whom the abstractions stand, are the ones 167 I doubt whether the reference to Achiqar (Col. 6, l. 100) provides support for Fox’s claim that ‫ כסה‬is used similarly to his understanding of the Proverbs verse. At best, the text is unclear and probably to be read ‫( אל תכבה מלת מלך‬Do not quench the word of a king), with the verb ‫ כבה‬Pael; cf. Lindenberger (1983, 79, 344); likewise Clifford (1998, 39); for the similar concept expressed by ‫ כפר‬Piel (cover over, forgive) and derivatives, cf. Deut 21:8; Ex 25:17-22; Loader (2014a, 297-298). 168 Chrysostom takes the motif of covering to refer to the covering of the moral nakedness of those who have sinned, which spares them shame. 169 See Jenni (1971, 63). 170 Jenni (1971, 67-68) describes it as the love of humans for humans that is commanded in the Torah several times (e.g. Lev 19:34; Deut 6:5), i.e. the “love of one’s neighbour.” For him, this is “theologically relevant” love.

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who cause clashes and pardon respectively. Although the proverb is a statement in the indicative, its illocutionary force is teaching the negative effects of hatred and the positive effects of love (so already Chrysostom). Teaching is not only imparted in admonitions, but also and especially in statements.171 This verse is no exception and thus advises to refrain from hatred in order to avoid conflicts, and to act with love in order to achieve the harmony resulting from forgiveness. Both the personified reading of the proverb (the emotion of hate is dangerous, but the emotion of love is beneficial) and the metonymic reading (the hateful person runs into trouble, but the loving one brings about harmony) fundamentally express the same advice and therefore boil down to the same result. Waltke finds it a matter of tension that there are texts according to which it is thought to be a friendly or positive act to reprimand an offender rather than overlook the offence (cf. 15:31-32; cf. Qoh 7:5;172 Ps 141:5). But these cases refer to correction in the course of sapiential discipline, which is a basic tenet of wisdom (cf. 1:2, 7; 13:24; 22:15 etc.),173 whereas the present proverb is about avoiding malevolent exposure, not about avoiding correction. Both can coexist without contradicting or opposing each other. Rabbinic interpretation of the proverb varies. On the one hand there is the straightforward understanding of two contrasting situations that give rise to contrasting reactions. Ralbag notably interprets the first verset to mean that hatred can cause even minor differences to flare up into major conflicts, while according to him the second verset states that love enables the one who feels it to avoid conflict even in the face of injury as well as insult (in the same vein also Malbim in the 19th century). This reading of hatred and love also occurs in the Mezudat David, in its explanation of the former as pre-existing enmity that aggravates annoyance even over a small matter (‫)דבר קל‬, whereas the latter avoids anger even over a serious issue (‫)דבר קשה‬. Rashi theologises and historicises the covering of transgressions. According to him the proverb refers to Israel and God. God covers their sins in the sense that he seemingly forgets them, but when the sins become more, he uncovers the past ones to be remembered with the later ones (which, along the lines of Lev Rab 7,1, Rashi sees illustrated in Ezk 20:7 [cf. vv. 6-11, where Israel is scolded for the sins of earlier generations]). But Rashi also sees the prospect of forgiveness in the second verset’s idea of covering: even the serious sins of Israel will be covered, that is, not temporarily or seemingly forgotten, but forgiven if they repent. The Vilna Gaon also connects the idea of love in v. 12 with that of repentance. In accordance with the Talmudic concept of repentance derived from love for God (Yoma 86b), the proverb can be understood to say that people who repent out of love (‫)תשובה מאהבה‬ will receive total forgiveness of sins. Nahmias, again in the line of Rashi, extends the meaning of v. 12b to speak not only of the covering of transgressions between humans, but also those committed by Israel against God.

171 172 173

See the Introduction to this volume, Essay 2 on “Learning in the Indicative.” Waltke refers to Prov 7:6, which cannot be correct; perhaps Qoh 7:5 is intended. Cf. the commentary on 1:2 in Vol. I.

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Thomas Aquinas quotes from v. 12b174 in support of the Roman Catholic doctrine of fides formata, according to which the faith that brings salvation is “a faith formed by charity” (fides per charitatem formata): Haec est idem fides de qua dicitur Act 15:9: “Fide purificans corda eorum,” quae quidem purificatio non fit sine charitate. Prov 10:12: “Universa delicta operit charitas.” (This is the same faith of which it is said in Acts 15:9: “having purified their hearts through faith,” which purification does not happen without charity. Prov 10:12: “Charity covers all transgressions.”) Delitzsch refers to the rejection of this doctrine in the Apology to the Augsburg Confession, adding: “and, indeed, the multitudo peccatorum is not meant of the sins of him who cherishes love, but of the sins of the neighbour.” That is indeed the case in the proverb, which cannot be used in the dogmatic debate.175 Melanchthon has a long exposition176 of the verse, interspersed with illustrations from history. He begins with the statement: Praeceptum est de ἐπιεικεία et candore. Ut, Iusticia est virtus inter duo vitia, inter remissionem & crudelitatem, ita species iusticiae est aequitas quae mitigat severam iusticiam ... (The proverb is about uprightness and kindliness. So, Justice is a virtue between two vices, between indulgence & cruelty, this kind of justice is equanimity that mitigates severe justice ...) Translating the Hebrew ‫ אהבה‬with dilectio rather than following the Vulgate’s use of caritas, he makes a case for “justice with mercy,” in which the second verset plays the major role, while the first serves as a foil to show the negative effects of harsh justice. The covering over of transgressions is explicitly explained as forgiveness of sins and theologised by being given a horizontal as well as a vertical dimension: Remittite & remittetur vobis.177 Vult enim Deus hanc condonationem fieri, ut cogitemus nos quoque indigere divina et humana remissione. (Forgive and it will be forgiven you. For God wills that this generosity happens, so that we realise that we are also in need of divine and human remission.) 174 Thomas (Comments on the Epistle to the Romans, Lesson 3 on Rom 3:21-26, § 302) further quotes Jas 2:26; Gal 5:6; Eph 3:17; 1 John 4:16 and Acts 15:9, ending with Prov 10:12 as his final proof-text; see Mondin (2005, 262). In the edition of 1570 (Opera, Tomus XVI, iii, Fol. 12b) the spelling charitas is used, but sometimes (e.g. in the Venice edition, Tomus V of 1775) it is Latinised to caritas. 175 However, it must also be said that the inapplicability of Prov 10:12b in the dogmatic discussion has no impact on the force of the argument from Jas 2:26 that Thomas quotes with the other texts given above: Fides sine operibus mortua est (Faith without works is dead). 176 Contrast Calvin, who refers only in passing to the second half of the proverb (with the first half of Prov 16:6) to oppose the scholastic view of repentance and punishment (Inst III/4, 31). In III/4, 36 he quotes the whole of 10:12 to argue that the covering of sins by (deeds of) love is only valid between humans and not between humans and God – which illustrates the Reformation doctrine of saving by faith alone and not by good works. 177 Large print (1550 edition). It probably refers to Matt 6:14-15; Mk 11:25-26; Jas 2:13; Col 3:13-14.

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10:13 On the lips of a discerning man wisdom is found, but a rod is for the back of one who lacks sense. The line of seven beats is arranged as 4+3.178 Although the Hebrew of both versets is grammatically clear, it can be understood in various ways. The second verset may be read as a nominal sentence (as translated above, cf. Gemser, Ringgren, Scott, McKane and others), but ‫ ושבט‬may also depend on the verb ‫ מצא‬Niphal in the first verset: “On the lips of a discerning man is found wisdom, and also a rod for the back of one who lacks sense.”179 The latter understanding was proposed by Hitzig and again by Fox, but Delitzsch rejects it as “inadmissible” despite acknowledging that words spoken by the mouth can be called a rod, as shown by Isa 11:4. His only reason for the rejection is subjective, viz. that he finds the idea of both wisdom and a rod on the lips of the wise “a figure in bad taste.” This is supported by Meinhold, who also thinks wise words cannot simultaneously be seen as chastisement, at least not without sacrificing good taste. But it is unclear how any rebuke spoken by a ‫ חכם‬can be anything but wisdom. There are simply so many examples of wisdom as chastising words that it is hard to see how Delitzsch could have arrived at his understanding along an exegetical route.180 We will return to the ambivalence of the two hemistichs in a moment. The Septuagint (followed by the Peshitta) makes one sentence out of the whole proverb: ὃς ἐκ χειλέων προφέρει σοφίαν, ῥάβδῳ τύπτει ἄνδρα ἀκάρδιον (Who produces wisdom from the lips strikes a man lacking sense with a rod)

The Septuagint reads the feminine imperfect Niphal ‫ תמצא‬as a masculine participle Hiphil of ‫( יצא‬go out) and ignores ‫( נבון‬the discerning man). It reduces the ambivalent Hebrew proverb to a saying with only one possible meaning, namely that the wisdom spoken by the wise is a chastising rod for the mindless (according to Chrysostom a wise word even delivers “a worse blow than if you had a rod”). However, despite its different syntactic 178 Gemser considers four beats in the second hemistich as an alternative, making up a 4+4 line. That differs from the Masoretic reading as evidenced by the maqqeph linking ‫ חסר‬and ‫ לב‬into a unit of one beat. A 4+4 scanning assumes a pre-Masoretic pattern with two adjacent stressed syllables, which is unlikely, although not impossible. On either submission, one cannot speak of a “length imbalance in 10:13” in metrical terms; cf. Heim (2013, 17). 179 For a feminine singular verb with a feminine and a masculine singular subject: GKC 146g; cf. IBHS 4.4.1.11 (masculine singular verb with a masculine and feminine subject). 180 Cf. 19:25, where caning and spoken rebuke are in parallelism and have the same subject; Qoh 7:5; also other references to biblical and extra-biblical texts given below.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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basis, one of the possible readings of the un-emended Hebrew proverb does indeed contain the idea that the rod of the lips can chastise unmindful people. (a) The first possible reading: If ‫ ושבט‬depends on ‫ מצא‬it would entail that wisdom is found on the lips of the discerning man, as are reproachful words for chiding the mindless. Accordingly, the rod is an expression of wisdom. The kind of wisdom is simultaneously expressed by both metaphor and metonymy: the rod is the lips (metaphor) and the lips stand for the speaker of harsh words (metonymy),181 which is an established motif in sapiential literature (see below). Rereading the first verset in light of the second produces an additional dimension:182 V. 13a the wise/discerning one speaks wisdom [does not need rebuke]

:: → ←

V. 13b the mindless/unmindful one [speaks no wisdom] is rebuked

A rod is not the antithetical parallel of wisdom, but the mindless person is the antithesis of the discerning one and the metaphorical rod is the antithesis of what the wise man can expect. The two hemistichs each provide an implied element to the respective other, so that the proverb is indeed antithetical – not as opposed to being complementary (Fox) but because of it. Therefore the proverb means: • The speech of the discerning expresses wisdom. • But sometimes their harsh words give those who need it a tongue-lashing. • Implication: scolding can improve some callow and inexperienced boys. (b) The second possible reading: When the proverb is read as a verbal sentence followed by a nominal sentence, the focus shifts. ‫ נבון‬means a discerning person, but can also indicate a teacher.183 In this case the rod is not a metaphor for a rebuke, but the lips remain a metonymy for speaking. Accordingly, the contrast is between oral teaching and physical caning meted out by the teacher. V. 13a the wise/discerning one speaks wisdom [does not experience beating] 181

:: → ←

V. 13b the mindless/foolish one [speaks no wisdom] is beaten

Therefore this is another instance of metaphtonymy; see above on v. 11. This is another case in which deference to both Knut Heim and myself requires that I point out the completely independent similarity of my interpretation and his. See Heim (2013, 232, cf. also 17). 183 Cf. Vol. I, the commentary on 1:3, where the teacher is called both a ‫ חכם‬and a ‫נבון‬. 182

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

On this reading, the proverb means: • The discerning sage gives wise oral teaching. • But when one has to do with some pupils who lack sense, it is clear that physical chastisement must be applied (19:29; 26:3).184 • Implication: some people are incorrigible fools who don’t benefit by rebukes.185 Contrary to the confident opinion of Oesterley, who declares that the two parts of the proverb “certainly do not belong together,” and finds it “an example of the somewhat haphazard way in which some parts of the book have been put together,” both readings are possible. Recognising them does not mean avoiding a choice, but noticing the powerful polyvalence often contained in the complementary parallelism of concentrated short proverbs. A note on corporal punishment in the ancient Near East The harshness of sapiential education included physical caning. This is not only attested in the Book of Proverbs (10:13; 13:24; 17:10; 19:25, 29; 20:30; 22:15; 23:13f.; 26:3; 27:22; 29:15; cf. Ps 141:5), but is also found all over the ancient Near East.186 Several Egyptian texts refer to the necessity of corporal punishment. For instance, in the Papyrus Anastasi III,3,13 (cf. V,8,5) it is said, “do not spend a day of idleness, or you will be beaten – a boy’s ear is on his back, he listens to his beater.” The Papyrus Insinger IX, 6ff. even claims that “Toth has placed the stick on earth in order to teach the fool by it ... A son does not die from being punished by his father.”187 And the Instruction of Anii 9,17-10,7 compares the disciplining of a son to that of domestic animals (see further biblical and rabbinic references below). 184 The second versets of both these proverbs are similar to 10:13b, and Heim (2013, 234) may be right that 26:3b was borrowed by the other two from its frank tripartite context in order to form new sayings. Snell (1993, 47) notices the relationship between 26:3 and 19:29, but does not include 10:13b. 185 This opinion is clearly visible in 19:25: If an incorrigible scoffer (‫ )לץ‬is smitten, other as yet untrained but nevertheless corrigible learners (‫ )פתי‬benefit. See Fox (1997, 67 and cf. Plöger). Fitzgerald (2008, 305) remarks that a similar point is made by the Septuagint rendering of 22:3. But an alternative opinion is also recorded. Some sages thought that physical beatings could indeed help to get even tenacious folly (‫ )אולת‬out of a boy’s heart (22:15) and that bloody punishment can cleanse no less than evil itself (‫ )רע‬from the innermost being (20:30). (Modern researchers argue against the type of corporal punishment manifested in the ancient Near East – not only on psychological grounds, but even on neurological grounds. Cf. Tomoda et al. [2009, T66-T71], whose results show that harsh corporal punishment suffered by children, caused significant GMV [grey matter volume] reductions in the cortex when they become young adults and thus can have detrimental effects on trajectories of brain development, which again may increase the risk of further exposure to harsh corporal punishment.) 186 For a convenient survey, see Fitzgerald (2008, 291-318, particularly the second section [293-300] on the ancient Near East, and the third [300-306] on ancient Israel and early Judaism). 187 Shupak (1993, 49-51); cf. Crenshaw (1998, 165) and the helpful collection of further references in Fitzgerald (2008, 297); all of this is indebted to Lichtheim (AEL I-III, passim).

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Some Mesopotamian examples show that caning could be brutal. In a Sumerian text from the second millennium BCE188 it is described how a pupil fears being late for school the next day, which will bring him caning. Despite all precautions, that day he was in fact caned nine times (!) by the teacher and other staff as punishment for his writing, speaking, and trivialities such as leaving the room when the teacher was out. In another tablet of the same text189 the pupil is even threatened with a cudgel, being chained and held in detention for two months. Another famous example is found in the Wisdom of Achiqar,190 who is presented as a sage in the Assyrian royal court. In the Aramaic version191 corporal punishment is explicitly advised. The Armenian version expands by advising the pupil not to spare his own son the rod, since it is “to children as the dung in the garden,” and the “tether on the foot of the ass”192 – that is, unpleasant, but wholesome. That this could be quite severe in Israel as well, seems to be suggested by the warning not to go too far and kill the boy being beaten (19:18).193 Ben Sira (2nd century BCE) shows that this view of wholesome punishment was also entertained in much later Jewish circles. For instance Sir 30:1:194 ῾Ο ἀγαπῶν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐνδελεχήσει μάστιγας αὐτῷ, ἵνα εὐφρανθῇ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτων αὐτοῦ (Who loves his son will continue giving him lashings, so as to have joy of him in the end) In the New Testament the idea of punishment is quoted from Prov 3:11-12 and interpreted as loving chastisement by God, and his love for the object of the punishment is taken to be clear.195 Augustine of Hippo (354-430) refers to the beatings he received from his loving parents. He prayed to God that he might not be beaten in school, but when God “did not hear” him, his own parents laughed at his stripes.196 However, verbal rebuke as a form of chastisement is also widespread (cf. 1:23, 25;197 13:1, 18; 15:10, 12, 31f.; Qoh 7:5), and is sometimes mentioned together with the motif of physical punishment (e.g. 17:10; 19:25 and perhaps Ps 141:5).

188

Kramer (1949, 199-215). The title of Kramer’s article (“Schooldays: A Sumerian Composition Relating to the Education of a Scribe”) has given rise to dubbing the many tablets and fragments of the popular Sumerian text from the Late Babylonian period as “Schooldays.” Cf. also Fitzgerald (2008, 293-294) and Saggs (1966, 118). 189 Saggs (1966, 437). 190 The text is primarily known in its Aramaic form, but Syriac and Armenian versions have also survived; their recensions preserve readings that differ from the Aramaic. 191 Col. 6, l. 81-82; see Lindenberger (1985, 498); cf. ANET, 428. 192 Lindenberger (1983, 49); cf. Crenshaw (1998, 166-167) and Fitzgerald (2008, 295296). Similarly also the Syriac version. 193 Even if one affirms Jacqueline Vayntrub’s argument that the presence or lack of framing devices in the Book of Proverbs does not warrant deductions about educational practices in ancient Israel (2016, 96-114), one can notice distinct aspects of educational practices such as rebuking and caning (she allows that “the biblical text does express positions on values espoused by this tradition” [2016, 114]). 194 Cf. Crenshaw (1998, 179). 195 See Fitzgerald (2008), where the Hebrews text (Heb 12:5-6) is central. 196 Conf I, 9, 14 (NPNF I/1, 50); cf. also I, 9, 15. 197 Cf. the commentary on these verses in Vol. I, 94-96.

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Rashi reads v. 13b back into v. 13a. Wise words become scolding as opposed to beating. He uses the scolding of David by Nathan as an example (2 Sam 12:13). But he also takes the second verset as a case of physical punishment, an example of what happens to those who do not listen until they are smitten. The example is Pharaoh, who would not listen until he was severely punished, although not with a rod, but nevertheless in a very physical sense (Ex 7-11). The Mezudat David opts for the interpretation of 10:13 in terms of the rod as a metaphor for a rebuke. Malbim sees physical beating as the need of him who cannot reason for himself and is thus comparable to an animal (cf. Ps 32:9; Jas 3:3). Similarly also Gerondi.

10:14 The wise store knowledge, but the mouth of the fool is impending ruin. The rhythmic pattern is not so straightforward in this proverb. Gemser’s scanning of the stich as a Siebener (three beats followed by four) must ignore the maqqeph in the first verset but not in the second. Although that is thinkable, it would result in two adjacent stressed syllables in ‫יצפנו דעת‬. The Masoretes avoided this by the maqqephs and thus provide a 2+3 metre, which seems preferable198 (cf. other proverbs, such as vv. 2, 7, 8, 11, that also deviate from the seven-beat pattern in the vicinity).199 In this proverb, as in the preceding verse, the second verset can be read as a nominal sentence with Delitzsch, Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, McKane, Meinhold, Clifford, Sæbø, Alter and others (see the translation above). Other commentators regard the verb of the first statement to be implied in the second (so Plöger, Murphy, Fox): “The wise store up knowledge, but the mouth of the fool [stores up] impending ruin.” But storing up implies stockpiling for use at a later stage and does not sit well with ruin that is presented as imminent or ‫( קרבה‬near) and therefore cannot be described as stored away for later.200 Wildeboer, Toy and Fuhs take ‫ צפן‬in the meaning of “conceal,” which is possible (cf. the Septuagint’s rendering by κρύψουσιν; 13:22; Cant 7:14). It would yield the sense that the wise are reticent and only speak at an appropriate time (cf. v. 19; 12:23; 17:27), whereas fools201 prattle all the time 198

See Hrushovski (2007, 599). The Codex Leningradensis has no rebiac with ‫אויל‬, but the Codex Aleppo does; cf. 7:25, where Leningradensis lacks the rebiac, while other manuscripts do have it (BHS). In the Books of Proverbs, Psalms and Job the rebiac mugraš (′ followed by ♦) is a dividing accent, which would fit neither verse. 200 The subject of the storing (‫ )חכמים‬is plural in the first verset, but the subject of the verb assumed to be implied in the second verset (‫ )פי‬is singular. This is not an insurmountable problem, but does add improbability to the logical objection just mentioned. 201 The Septuagint specifies the type of fool by translating with προπετής (reckless person), which goes well with the motif of thoughtless talking. Chrysostom ignores the whole second hemistich and takes the first to mean that the wise keep their good sense to themselves but 199

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(cf. 13:16b; 15:2b; also 11:13). The proverb would then express the astuteness of a word in season (15:23; 25:11).202 But ‫ צפן‬can also mean “store up” (see the comments on 2:1 in Vol. I of the Commentary). Contrary to Toy’s opinion, this would not destroy the antithesis with the second verset, since the wise store up knowledge only for using it when the right moment comes. Whybray is thus correct that both possibilities make excellent parallels with the second verset. They essentially lead to the same result. The contrast in the parallelism again contains a gap required to be filled by the reader/hearer:203 V. 14a the wise store up knowledge [attain the opposite of ruin]

:: → ←

V. 14b the fool’s mouth [prattles nonsense] quickly experiences ruin

The mouth is a metonymy for speaking and the contrast with the idea of storing up gives rise to the motif of indiscriminate strewing around, while knowledge in the first verset enables the corresponding gap in the second to be filled with the opposite idea, namely nonsense. In turn, the second verset’s idea of sudden ruin enables the reader to recognise and fill the gap in the first to the effect that the knowledge of the wise brings the opposite of ruin (similarly Fox). Appreciation for reticence in speaking and the motif of dangerous chattering are also found in Egyptian wisdom. For instance, in the Instruction for Kagemni: The tent is open to the silent, the quiet is well received. Do not chatter! ... Let your name go forth when your mouth is silent.204 Or in the Instruction of Ptahhotep: The trusted man who does not vent his belly’s speech, he himself will become a leader.205 Concentrate on excellence, your silence is better than chatter. share their wisdom, which is difficult to understand in the absence of any further comment by him (cf. Hill [2006, 222]). 202 The Septuagint translates ‫ דעת‬by αἴσθησις, which can refer to both sensual experience and moral insight, the latter of which suits the contrast with foolish behaviour best; cf. Cook (1997, 53). 203 Cf. Millar (2020, 122), whose analysis is similar but was unknown to me when I wrote mine. 204 AEL I, 59, 60f. 205 AEL I, 67.

136

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10 Speak when you know you have a solution, it is the skilled who should speak in the council.206

Delitzsch, McKane, Meinhold and Fuhs think the blabbering fool brings the ruin referred to here upon himself as well as on others,207 while Fox appeals to v. 8b, 13:3 and 18:7, where foolish speech is said to harm the speaker,208 to claim that the same must be the case here. If wise people speak at the right time, they still speak to others, which makes it likely, though not strictly necessary, that the implied advantage (v. 14a) accrues to all involved – themselves as well as pupils or others benefiting from the wise words. Then the contrasting ruin would probably also be understood to apply to the fool himself as well as his relatives and all who are affected by his stupidity. But the deed-consequence nexus and the parallels cited by Fox do suggest that the primary recipients of the respective consequences are the sages and the fools themselves. Editing the Cairo Geniza Wisdom Text he called a “Gnomic fragment,” Solomon Schechter noticed that the three words comprising the first half of Prov 10:14 were also the first three words in line 11 of the fragment page he numbered “ix”.209 However he did not notice that the last three words of Prov 1:22 were also the last three words of the same line:210 ‫וכסילים ישנאו דעת‬ (Wise people store knowledge

‫חכמים יצפנו דעת‬

but fools hate knowledge)

This does not only testify to the plain fact that the Book of Proverbs had a reception in a sapiential-style text that shows strong influence of, among others, Job and especially Qohelet,211 but also to the way in which new proverbs could be created by repeating parts of known ones in new combinations.212 It is a double example and illustrates the creation of a balanced antithetical parallelism by means of borrowing half-verses from two proverbs neither of which contains the same kind of symmetry, viz. Prov 10:14 and 1:22. If one accepts Berger’s early dating (c. 100 CE),213 206 AEL I, 70. For further examples from Israel and the ancient Near East, cf. Shupak (1993, 158-167; 173-175; 178); also Crenshaw (1995, 316-317). 207 Alter regards it as a possibility that others are also affected by the ruin. 208 So also Ramaq (‫לו‬, referring to the fool); cf. below. 209 In his first edition of the fragment now in the Jewish Theological Library in New York, Schechter (1904, 437; cf. 425). 210 See Rüger (1991, 64-65), followed by Tuinstra. 211 Berger (1991, 114-116), cf. Lange (1998, 123). The re-editions by Berger (1989) and Rüger (1991) contain the controversy about the dating of the fragment around the end of the 1st century CE (Berger [1989, 77]) or between 600 and 1200 CE (Rüger [1991, 15]). 212 Cf. Snell (1993, 20-21), and the 96 “sets” of repetitions analysed by Heim (2013, 3-9 and passim). 213 Berger (1989, 56); cf. his later bolstering of the argument from parallels in word fields between the fragment and 2 Clem, Hermas, the New Testament, and further connections with Philo, 1QS and 4Q 185 (1990, 427). Cf. the cautious support by Heiligenthal (1992, 361) for the early dating.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

137

it would be interesting enough as an illustration of proverb-making at a time when the New Testament was being formed. But if Rüger’s dating (600-1200 CE)214 is right, it would mean that – over and above the reception of specific proverbial sayings and ideas – also the method by which new Hebrew proverbs could be produced from an existing source for use in new contexts was applied right down to medieval times. Jewish reception of the proverb sometimes takes the verb ‫ צפן‬as “hide,” also referring to reticence of the wise to speak, and interprets it as a measure to conserve wisdom. So the Mezudat David thinks that the knowledge is not divulged to those for whom it may become an impediment. For Ralbag, it means that the knowledge is withheld from many who may even benefit from it, for fear that they may not understand it. Hame’iri links the two hemistichs in that he claims that fools cause ruin when the wise do not divulge their knowledge on time, that is, when they hold it back too long. But Rashi and Ramaq understand ‫ צפן‬as “store,” and interpret the first verset to mean that the wise keep their knowledge in their heart so that they do not forget it. According to Ramaq it is a “bad word” (‫ )דבר רע‬in the mouth of the fool that becomes an imminent threat to himself (‫)לו‬.

10:15 The wealth of a rich man is his fortified city, the ruin of paupers is their poverty. It is often remarked by commentators that this proverb deviates from the proverbs in the vicinity in that it is not about the righteous and the wicked (or the wise and the foolish), but about a socio-economic phenomenon. Likewise, it is pointed out that the reason for its placing is probably the use of the noun ‫( מחתה‬ruin), which also occurs in the previous verse (e.g. Plöger, Fox and others). Meinhold thinks that the perspective of profit and loss in this verse is also present in vv. 13-14, which to me seems somewhat tenuous (see the exposition of these verses above). On the other hand, Hatton shows that this verse introduces a “discordant note.” Together with v. 16 it lacks the conjunction that introduces every b-verset in the chapter except in these two verses and in vv. 5 and 20. 214 Rüger (1991, 15). He rejects Berger’s linguistic arguments as well as putative references in the fragment to the destruction of the Jerusalem temple, and points out similarities between the fragment and later rabbinic literature, to arrive at the conclusion that the wisdom text is a manifestation of medieval Jewish Neoplatonism (Rüger [1991, 17]). Cf. also the support by Lange (1998, 123) for the late dating. The issue is complicated (cf. Collins [1991, 148-150; 1992, 705-707], who was at first convinced that “Berger makes a very strong case for a date about 100 CE” [1991, 149] and shortly afterwards that Rüger had “demolished Berger’s arguments for an early date” [1992, 706]). But the arguments for the late date are probably stronger. This is especially the case in the light of Berger’s tenuous identification of references to the destruction of the temple, and because of the fact that it has not been shown that the Platonic features of the fragment were known and used in Hebrew-speaking antiquity before the advent of Islam (Collins).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

The accents in the verse are clear, consisting of one beat per word. Although the pattern of 4+3 beats has the effect of a longer sounding opening verset, the two halves are equally long in terms of syllables, namely seven each. They are also symmetrically balanced by means of two nominal sentences organised in a syntactic chiasmus: predicate ‫קרית עזו‬

subject ‫הון עשיר‬

subject ‫רישם‬

predicate ‫מחתת דלים‬

The antithesis is near-perfect in terms of its word-for-word215 semantic oppositions: wealth / poverty, rich person / pauper, strong city / ruin.216 The contrast is not only enhanced by the turnaround effect suggested by the syntactic x-pattern, but also by the close verbal opposites in identical sentence types. Moreover, the proverb contains another chiasmus, viz. the extended ABC // C′BA′ mentioned by Clifford (although he mistakenly calls the rich person [‫ ]עשיר‬a wise person [‫)]חכם‬: C ‫קרית עזו‬

B ‫עשיר‬

A ‫הון‬

A′ ‫רישם‬

B ‫דלים‬

C′ ‫מחתת‬

In such a carefully constructed balance, the wealthy minority and the poor majority may perhaps be reflected by heightened contrast of the singular and the plural (Yoder), but the point should not be laboured.217 The proverb is a statement of a phenomenon by which the sage describes his observation of economic forces at work and not about social injustice of the elite towards the poor.

215 A subtle difference in the two genitive constructions is however that the nomen rectum is singular in the first hemistich and plural in the second (‫[ עשיר‬rich man] and ‫[ דלים‬paupers]). 216 Wildeboer mentions only the first and the last of these pairs. 217 It may reflect something of the socio-economic reality in ancient Israel (cf. Baron [1972, 61]), but in the light of Silver’s estimate that about 30% of the northern Israelite population belonged to the wealthy class (similar calculations for Judah), one should perhaps heed his warning (Silver [1984, 115-118]) not to overstate the case; cf. Broshi & Finkelstein (1992, 54) for a summary breakdown of the population of the entire Palestine during Iron Age II.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

139

Much energy has gone into comments about what is seen as the indifferent or even callous quality of the proverb.218 It is certainly a statement of fact (cf. Qoh 7:12) and not an emotional call to compassion and justice as we know from the prophets (cf. classic examples such as Amos, Micah or Jeremiah).219 Though not a moral judgment, it assumes that wealth is something positive and poverty negative.220 But it is not callous – neither as a sapiential statement in its own right nor in its literary context. As several other proverbs show, the sages too had compassion for the poor and even formulated it in religious terms (e.g. 14:21, 31; 19:17; 22:22f.; 23:10f.; 29:13 etc.). But such compassion could not be practised effectively without taking note of the de facto social situation by observing it or being informed about it. If poverty were not the downfall of humans, it would not be necessary to point out the plight of those who have to live with ‫מחתה‬. And if the rich were not powerful by virtue of their wealth, it would not be necessary to teach young men this fact (as here and in 18:11,221 23). The sapiential sayings about the dangers posed by the wealthy (e.g. 23:4-5; 28:11, 22; cf. Qoh 5:7) and how to cope in the company of the powerful (e.g. 23:1-2) make sense only on the basis of the fundamental insight expressed in v. 15. Likewise, only when young men realise the precariousness of poverty (cf. 14:20; 15:15 etc.), does it make sense to admonish them to be considerate to the poor (e.g. 3:27-28; 28:8), and, of course, to avoid it by diligence (cf. 6:6-11). The ambivalence of wealth and, under certain circumstances, even the relative 218 E.g., Plöger (wealth is deserved, poverty self-inflicted); McKane (not open to another interpretation than the literal fact); Meinhold (a description of a favourable and an unfavourable condition); Murphy (no moral lesson); Van Leeuwen (no moral or spiritual judgments); Fox (a simple statement of fact); Moss (merely shows society’s inequalities). On the other hand, Hitzig and Wildeboer see the two versets as referring to self-confidence and timidity; Delitzsch accepts this possibility, but derives an obligation to mercy from the proverb as well; Clifford thinks the plight of the poor is here recorded “in a compassionate manner”; Toy thinks it possible though improbable that the moral dangers of poverty are also intended; Whybray (1990, 22) and Waltke read the verse in the light of other evidence of hostility towards the rich (cf. also Pilch [2016, 217-218], who sees both categories entirely in social and moral terms). Already the Septuagint moralised the harshness away by rendering ‫ דלים‬with ἀσεβῶν (of the wicked) instead of ἀσθενῶν (of the weak), which is found in a few Greek witnesses and in the translation of ‫ דל‬in 21:13 (cf. Hatton [2008, 93], who states that the translator “imports a morality not present in the Hebrew;” EE; for an extended discussion, Zunz [1956, 161]). 219 For instance, Am 5:12-13; 6:1-6; Mic 3:1-4; Jer 22:16-17 etc. 220 Pilch (2016, 216-218) claims that the ancient Middle Eastern / North African attitude was “that every rich person was either unjust or the heir of an unjust person.” It is hard to see how such a generalisation can be upheld – at least not in this sweeping form. It squares neither with such clear pronouncements as 10:22, that wealth is a blessing from Yahweh (see below), nor with the deed-consequence nexus, and certainly not with the presentation of the wealth of, for instance, Abraham (Gen 24:9; 35), Solomon (1 Kgs 3:13; 4:21-24), or the early and later Job (Job 1:1-3, 21; 42:10). The same goes for similar statements by Pilch in his discussion of rich and poor, for instance, that “rich” is better translated as “greedy.” 221 On the relationship between 10:15 and 18:11, see the commentary on that verse; Berlin (2008, 94-96); Heim (2013, 237).

140

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

preference for poverty over wealth (e.g. 15:16-17; 19:1; 28:6, 11; cf. Qoh 4:13-14) make clear that the wisdom tradition in Israel was fully aware of the different sides of the wealth-poverty theme and of several perspectives for approaching the topic. Agreeing with Washington,222 Fox states that ethically neutral or problematic proverbs such as the present one, may be qualified by other sayings in the context. Indeed, when a proverb with ethically normative quality is placed adjacent to or in the proximity of a “questionable” saying – or, to be sure, anywhere in the collection – it functions as a corrective, but even so is also questioned by the shocking proverb. This does not bring out any assumptive “real meaning” of the problematic proverb so that it becomes unproblematic, but it provides a context from which different perspectives on the issue at stake are offered. Such a “disturbing ripple” (as it is called by Hatton223) amidst proverbs attuned to the default setting is perhaps an effective way of highlighting inner tensions in wisdom and dealing with them. Then the collection in question or the whole Book of Proverbs or the entire sapiential context provides the framework for interpreting these “difficult” sayings. But “smoothly flowing” context is in turn challenged and questioned by the nonconformist proverbs. Thus the collected proverbs become an ongoing discourse of perspectives. The discourse is never finalised and polished off, but it confronts the reader with an invitation to think along and take part in the debate. In the case of v. 15, this will become apparent presently, when we consider v. 16 and its placement immediately after a morally neutral but tough-sounding statement. These two verses are chosen by Hermisson224 as a prime illustration of the conclusion to which his seminal early investigation led him: whereas v. 15 simply states how things in fact are in this world, v. 16 adds a closer qualification (“Präzisierung”), which contributes to an understanding. This demonstrates Hermisson’s overall position, notably that every single proverb (“Einzelspruch”) is first to be interpreted in its own right and then to be checked for possible contributions to or by other relevant proverbs (“zugeordnet[e] Sprüche”). The traditional rabbinic expositions of the verse usually solve the tension of the difficulty in the proverb by taking ‫ הון‬metaphorically as Torah and accordingly interpreting wealth as the wealth of knowledge of the Torah. So Rashi and the Mezudat David, the former ascribing ruin to those who do not learn Torah and are therefore poor in Torah, while the latter sees the contrasting negative side in ignorance of the riches contained in the Torah. But Ramaq is an exponent of the “straightforward” interpretation, adding however that, even if wealth can protect the rich against many vicissitudes in life, there are some against which it is of no avail. Yonah Gerondi 222 223 224

Washington (1994a, 196-202). Hatton (2008, 93). Hermisson (1968, 182); see the Introduction, Par. 2.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

141

(1180-1263), also upholds the plain literal meaning, but adds the critical note that both the rich who trust in their wealth and the poor who fear225 because of their poverty are wrong, since the will of God prevails in any case. This relates to Gerondi’s exposition that security only comes from good deeds and not from wealth. Melanchthon comments concisely on the proverb. He caps it with the heading, De insolentia divitum (On the insolence of the rich), then gives his own translation of the first verset, Substantia divitum est urbs munita.226 Iustis prosunt partae facultates ad vitae necessaria. Id est, iusti bene utuntur facultatibus, Mali abutuntur. (The means of the rich is a fortified city. The possibilities of property are useful to the righteous for the necessities of life. That is, the righteous make good use of the possibilities, the wicked abuse them.) Melanchthon avoids the difficulty in the verse by (a) ignoring the second hemistich and then (b) moralising the first one. He takes for granted that the rich will be the righteous, thereby assuming the deed-consequence nexus (which he, as a theologian of the Reformation, is usually not fond of doing). This leads to the opposition of the righteous and the wicked, which elsewhere may correlate with the wise and the foolish but is not expressed in this proverb. According to him the benefits enjoyed by the rich are to be put down to their making proper use of their possibilities, which would imply their wisdom. Thus they can be called the righteous, who are wise in the Book of Proverbs. The inverse is then naturally that those who do not make good use of their possibilities, squander (abuti) what they have and therefore must themselves be responsible for their (in light of the ignored second half-verse, implied) poverty.227 The last logical step is that they must thus be the morally wicked people. So the opposition righteous :: wicked is inductively developed from the opposition rich :: poor in the text.

10:16 The wage of the righteous leads to life, the produce of the wicked leads to sin. The so-called “corrective” to v. 15 is immediately added, thereby making a proverb pair of the two verses. However, the pairing does not so much correct anything as provide another insight or prism through which the previous proverb can be seen (in Hatton’s terms a majority-view counter to v. 15). The rhythm in v. 16 is evenly proportioned with simply one beat for each of the three words in the two hemistichs (thus 3+3). Also the syntax of the two sentences is as symmetrical as it comes, but on the surface the content ‫ מחתה‬taken in the (possible) meaning of “fear.” The Vulgate has, Substantia divitis urbs fortitudinis eius (The means of the rich man is his city of strength), translating the Hebrew third person masculine suffix, which Melanchthon does not. 227 Melanchthon could have appealed to 21:17, 22, but does not. 225 226

142

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

is not symmetrical (see below). As in v. 15, there is no waw or other conjunction to join the sentences in the two versets. However, their association is not only evident in the antithetical parallelism, but also strengthened by assonance and alliteration (pecullat – tebu’at and leḥayyîm – leḥaṭṭā’t) as well as by a symmetry of syllables (3/2/3 in both versets) with the emphasis on the same place in each word. The noun ‫ פעלה‬can mean “work,” but also the reward or pay received for such work (Delitzsch; cf. Lev 19:13),228 whereas ‫ תבואה‬means the proceeds produced by a land (cf. Lev 25:7, 12, 22; Deut 14:28; 26:12) or profit yielded by an investment (even metonymically, cf. 3:14; 8:19; Qoh 5:9). The proverb thus contrasts the fair wage earned by work (cf. Lev 19:13; Deut 24:14f.) with the income generated by existing wealth (cf. 6:1-6), or by the labour of others (cf. Ruth 2:3ff.) or acquired by dishonest means (cf. 16:8). The fact that the “produce” spoken of here is that of the wicked, whereas the “wage” is due to the hard-working righteous, fits the semantics of the two nouns very well and suggests that the produce of the wicked is indeed shady. The use of the preposition ‫ ל‬also suits this interpretation well. Waltke takes it in both versets as the emphatic particle, which is possible, but does not seem the best option in view of the gapped parallelism. The gap is interpreted by Fox in the same way as McKane. It is yet another manifestation of the invitation to the reader or hearer to engage creatively with the proverb. V. 16a the wage of the ‫צדיק‬ [leads to the opposite of sin] leads to life

:: ← →

V. 16b the produce of the ‫רשע‬ leads to sin [leads to the opposite of life]

The idea of the righteous man’s wages leading to life “does not seem apt” to Waltke, which is understandable since at first sight one would expect the wages to be life (cf. Rom 6:23). The same idea probably motivates BHS to propose the conjecture that ‫( מחתה‬ruin) should be read in the second halfverse as in vv. 14, 15 and 29. But the gaps left in both versets show the reading possibilities. Reread in the light of the second verset, the first is amplified by the implied intermediate step: the earnings of the righteous (rewards and blessings) [bring about a career of not sinning] which in turn leads to the final reward of life

228 See HALOT; KAHAL; IBHS 5.5b.The word should therefore be classified under the subgroup of qetullâ-pattern nouns that denote the result or product of an act (cf. Mettinger [1972, 2-14]).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

143

And, reread in the light of the first verset, the second is enriched in the same way by an implied final end to a career of sin: what the wicked produce (unjust gain etc.) develops into a career of sin229 [which in turn results in death]

The sin of the wicked mentioned in the second half shows the gap left in the first half [ ], and the reader is required to supply it appropriately. Likewise, the antithetic parallelism requires that the life of the righteous spoken of in the first half be counterbalanced by filling in the death of the wicked unexpressed in the second half [ ]. In both cases ‫ ל‬should be understood as the preposition and not as the emphatic particle, since it makes good sense to indicate the logical movement: non-sinning career → life (the achievements of righteousness eventually reach their apex) and sinful career → death (the outcomes of wickedness degenerate to their final conclusion)

Fuhs notices an additional and important dimension to the force of parallelism in the proverb. He states that v. 16a provides a contextual interpretation of v. 15a, but that v. 16b cannot be said to be a direct interpretation of v. 15b. That means that the two adjacent proverbs in their edited position do not allow relating the sin (v. 16b) to the poor (v. 15b). Read at the literal surface level this is quite right. But also on the deep level of the parallelism with its gapped signals of implication, it becomes clear that the expected misfortune of the wicked cannot be identified with the misfortune of poor people generally.230 What it does show as a proverb pair, is that there is another dimension to the strong position enjoyed by the privileged. It should namely not just serve as a fortress for acting tough, but be understood as the wages of righteousness. The dimension of ‫ צדקה‬not only mitigates the harsh sound of the factual statement in the previous proverb, but indicates two aspects 229 On ‫ חטאת‬Waltke remarks that “sin entails a whole realm of conflict” with God, which is enduring and not just “a single, merely physical event.” But Millar (2020, 125) helpfully adds a dimension not developed by me, viz. that ‫“ חטאת‬suggests that the world order does not always click along mechanically.” 230 Heim (2013, 237-238) does relate the two final half-verses to each other, but suggests that the poverty mentioned in v. 15b is the result of the sin referred to in v. 16b. According to him, the wealth of v. 15a must therefore be the “well-earned reward for righteous living” spoken of in v. 16a. As his complicated sketch suggests, this requires some intricate exegetical manoeuvring. It results not so much in “economic ethics” as in harmonisation of the two verses. In my view, the factually descriptive reading of v. 15 as an amoral proverb is influenced by the morally motivated view of wealth “as it should be” (v. 16). That recasts the two sayings as an ethical pair. Ethical action is required of the wealthy.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

of what Heim calls “economic ethics.”231 First, that wealth should come from honest work, which is an aspect of a righteous life. Second, it also shows that the wealthy should use their strength not merely to acquire further riches, but apply it in the service of righteousness, which is the way to (‫ )ל‬life. This is not realised by the proposal in BHS (ignored in BHQ) to read ‫ מחתה‬in v. 16b, which would suggest that the poor of v. 15 are evil. Several traditional rabbinic expositions relate the motifs in v. 16 to those in v. 15. According to the Spanish commentator Joseph Ibn Nahmias (14th century), righteousness and wickedness and not wealth or poverty are what really determines a person’s happiness. He thus substitutes moral for economic categories to decide what ultimately constitutes well-being or trouble. Gerondi interprets the achievements (that is, the ‫ פעלה‬as well as the ‫ )תבואה‬of those mentioned in v. 16 in terms of righteousness and wickedness, but he does not simply downplay the material side of things. The money of the righteous is earned “for life” as the Torah understands life, which involves earning a livelihood honestly in order to avoid sinful methods towards that end. It can therefore be said that they make money so as to be able to serve God.232 On the other hand, the wicked accumulate gains to strengthen their wickedness at the expense of others. Therefore it is “for sin” (‫)לחטאת‬, which provides a critical interpretation of the financial strength referred to in v. 15a. Gerondi contrasts honest labour by the righteous in support of their families with the wicked’s use of their income for their own sinful aspirations. In such cases the income is regarded as an instrument, an intermediate step between obtaining it and using it for either good or evil. The Mezudat David (18th century) also seems to think of the results as processes taking place over time. Thus, the upright actions of the righteous leads to an increase of life, whereas wicked actions shortens life. Since “life” is explicitly mentioned in v. 16a, but “death” is not mentioned in v. 16b, this is a clear case where a gap is sensed in the second verset and filled under the impact of the first. In a letter dating from 396 CE to Christians in the northern Italian city of Vercellae, the Milanese bishop Ambrose233 develops the argumentative thrust ascribed to Yonah Gerondi (cf. above) when he warns against seeking riches, but immediately qualifies his exhortation. “However, riches themselves are not to be blamed ... there is room for virtue even in these material riches.” Although Ambrose quotes Prov 10:15 (and 13:8, but not 10:16), he does so referring to kindness being shown to the poor and the redemption unto life the giver’s soul receives for such kindness. These are very similar to the motifs occurring in v. 16a and unquestionably to those in the interpretations of Nahmias and Gerondi. Ambrose further refers to “one who does not know how to direct his property” and who therefore goes under, which evokes the ideas in v. 16b. If this is right, Ambrose too interprets v. 15 in the light of the proverb following it and applies his reading of both to a pastoral situation in 231 Cf. also Krüger (1995, 462), who finds the economic perspective integrated into the ethical rather than supplanted by it (as opposed to vv. 2-3). According to him, the relationship of ethical and economic is found on the level of the single proverb (v. 16), whereas that only happens on the editorial level in the opening verses. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the “purely economic” perspective of v. 15 to be “modified” by v. 16, although not in such clear religious terms as in v. 3. 232 Ambrose of Milan (4th century) seems to entertain a similar position, see below. 233 Epist LXIII, 92 (NPNF II/10, 470).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

145

the church. Chrysostom (also 4th century) likewise takes vv. 15 and 16 together, but does so in a rather forced way. To him, the poverty spoken of in v. 15 is offset by a recommendation of work (“the deeds of the righteous”) in v. 16.

10:17 A path to life is he who accepts instruction, but he who discards reproof leads astray. The proverb has a straightforward rhythmic pattern of 4+3 in seven words. It consists of a nominal sentence followed by a verbal one (with the Hiphil participle ‫ מתעה‬as the predicate).234 Its syntax shows a chiastic organisation: predicate ‫ארח לחיים‬ subject ‫ועוזב תוכחת‬

subject ‫שומר מוסר‬ predicate ‫מתעה‬

The antithetical parallelism contains two contrasts: he who accepts discipline :: he who discards it, and leading to life :: leading astray. The catchword ‫ לחיים‬links the proverb to the previous verse (cf. the chain pattern sketched above). Although the motif of discipline differs from the motif of material goods found in the previous two proverbs, there is a strong thematic link with v. 16 in the references to that which respectively leads to life and its opposite. The preposition ‫( ל‬unlike in 5:6, where it is not part of the expression) is of importance, since it emphasises the direction in which the path leads. This brings us directly to a moot point relating to the vocalisation of the first word in the verse. Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (BHS) (again not followed by BHQ) regards it probable that the vowels should be read ‫ א ֵֹר ַח‬and not, as the Masoretes decided, ‫א ַֹרח‬. This is an old proposal defended by Ewald.235 It reads the Qal active participle masculine singular of the verb ‫( ארח‬step, walk); thus, “He who accepts instruction, walks to life.” But that would not accord well with the last word, which is clearly a Hiphil participle of ‫( תעה‬Qal: wander about, err; Hiphil: cause to err). Several commentators cite Gemser when declaring this to be a so-called “internal Hiphil,”236 but that is often influenced by 234 Even so, McCreesh (1991, 33) regards the second hemistich as a “simple nominal sentence[].” 235 Ewald (1837, 32 [German]; cf. 407 [Latin]). 236 Also called “inwardly transitive,” an “intransitive Hiphil” or a “one-place Hiphil,” cf. IBHS, 27.2f; GKC 53d. It should be noted that Gemser does mention this possibility, but does not make a specific choice in favour of such a Hiphil. He only states that the first word of the verse should preferably be read ‫ א ֵֹר ַח‬if ‫ מתעה‬is taken as intransitive.

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Jer 42:20, which is doubtful evidence for an intransitive use of the participle (Meinhold). In any case, that would destroy the antithetical relationship of the two versets or require a different vocalisation of the first word. Alternatively, it would compel a forced construal of the first verset as a verbal sentence: “The path of life guards instruction,” (cf. the Targum, Peshitta and Vulgate; so Waltke), or the other way round, as in the Septuagint, where παιδεία (education) is made the subject. A further construal is to treat the participle ‫שומר‬ as if it were an infinitive: “to guard instruction” is thought to be the path to life (so the Mezudat David). The argument that the last verset contains an intransitive Hiphil, itself an emergency measure, requires another contingency procedure, viz. that the nominal sentence in the first verset be understood as a claim that a person who accepts instruction goes on the path to life.237 Even so the concept would not change, since being a path for others to follow implies leading them and therefore going on that path.238 But such an interpretation of the nominal sentence would require the phrase to begin with the preposition ‫ ב‬preceding ‫ארח‬. Moreover, for the very reason that the concept would not change, it is unnecessary to replace the natural understanding of the nominal clause “x is a path” with an artificial elucidation. The two half-verses, when read in each other’s light, that is, in the light of the parallelism, present the following picture: V. 17a who accepts instruction is a path to life [for others to follow] i.e., leads to life

:: ← →

V. 17b who discards reproof leads astray, namely: others (elided object) [leads them to the opposite of life]

Looking first at the transitive Hiphil ‫מתעה‬, the participle indicates a general truth. To lead astray needs an object, which must therefore be the elided “others” (similarly Waltke).239 The question naturally follows, lead astray from what? Under the impact of the path to life in v. 17a the meaning must be that 237 E.g. Ewald, Delitzsch, Toy, Sawyer (THAT II, 1055), Murphy, Fuhs, Marsh; Hausmann (1995, 310-311) prefer the intransitive reading of the second half-verse, but allow for the alternative possibility. For the rendering adopted in my translation and interpretation, cf. Wildeboer, who concedes the feasibility of Ewald’s vocalising but does not opt for it, McKane, Meinhold, Scherer (1999, 49), Waltke, Fox, Clifford, Yoder, Sæbø. For commentators who do not choose between the options, cf. Oesterley, Gemser, Whybray and Van Leeuwen. Plöger’s position is different still, see below. Millar (2020, 135-137) sees an interesting openness in the proverb. The ‫ שומר מוסר‬may personally lead on the path to life, while the ‫ עוזב תוכחת‬causes others to stray, or the first man may himself be the path to life; in both cases the proverb focuses not on the heeder and the rejecter, but “on their actions toward others.” 238 This seems to be what Plöger means when he does not accept the intransitive understanding of ‫מתעה‬, but nevertheless chooses what he regards as the implied verb “gehen” (to go) for his translation of the nominal sentence in v. 17a. 239 Cf. IBHS, 27.2e; example: Mic 2:6 – [ ] ‫( לא יטיפו‬they will not let drop [words]).

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he who discards reproof leads others astray from the path to life,240 in other words, to its opposite, death. As for the first verset, being a path to life implies being a way for others to follow and therefore an example leading them there. So, the wise person who accepts sapiential discipline is a trailblazer on the way to life and therefore can be followed (cf. on 12:1 for accepting and imparting discipline). Combining as it does metonymy and metaphor, the stylistic figure used here is a form of metaphtonemy (cf. above on 10:11). • The path stands for leading people to life (metonymy) and simultaneously • it is a person who imparts the received sapiential teaching (metaphor) ‫ מוסר‬241 can only be had in a relationship, notably between a teacher/trainer and a pupil/trainee, which implies that the person spoken of here first has to receive the instruction from an authority and in turn becomes an authoritative leader for others.242 The whole concept of passing on sapiential values along a traditional chain of receiving and giving is thus carried by the first verset.243 The fundamental assumption of the positive first verset (and, in its adverse form, the second verset) is that humans become paradigms for others to follow.244 The thrust of Melanchthon’s exposition speaks to the wholesome effects of teaching. He realised the fundamental importance of the concept of discipline (‫ מוסר‬and ‫)תוכחת‬ in education, which dominates his exposition of this proverb. As opposed to arrogance, “docility is a necessary virtue.” He adds, “To err is human, to persevere in error is diabolical.” For Melanchthon, the first verset implies the human imperfection of making mistakes, but, for him, it is rounded off by the motif of accepting educational discipline (which leads to life). The second verset is about ignoring corrective teaching, which earns the incorrigible the qualification of “diabolical” (Melanchthon’s gloss

240 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra does not merely relate the two versets, but combines them in such a way that there is only one subject, viz. the casus pendens and its pronoun: ‫ועוזב תוכחת מאיש‬ ‫‘“( מתעה היא ארח חיים‬And he who discards reproof from the one who leads astray’ – that refers to the path of life”). Cf. 2:9 for the one path, and 2:15, 18 for the other. 241 In the Septuagint the education (παιδεία) is the subject guarding the object, “right ways of life.” 242 See the discussion of these fundamental aspects of the seminal term ‫ מוסר‬in the commentary on 1:2. 243 Traditional teaching is embodied in the concept of learning; cf. the commentary on in 1:5 about the learning received by one generation and passed on to the next. It is often associated with ‫מוסר‬. This is expressed in so many words by the opening verses of Chap. 4. Introduced by ‫( מוסר‬4:1, with parallel ‫ )דעת בינה‬and ‫( ֶל ַקח‬4:2, paralleled by ‫)תורה‬, the sons (third generation) are addressed (4:1-4a) by the father (second generation), who passes on to them the very words with which he himself was taught by their grandfather (4:4b-9). 244 The idea of following a teacher is, in turn, a basic metaphor for the disciple-teacher relationship (“Schülerverhältnis,” Str-B I, 187-188). Cf. Erub 30a; Keth 66b; 72b; Aboth R. Nathan 4, et al.; Matt 4:19f., 21f. par.; 8:19 par., 22; Luke 9:23; John 1:41, 44.

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for straying from life). Although his exposition does justice to the basic statement of the proverb about the cornerstone of education, it does not dwell on the means of its transmission, which in my opinion is an important element both as far as the historical and the thematic aspects of pupils following the model of the master are concerned.245 Although the idea of examples and role models, leaders and followers is common in all cultures, I could find no cases in ancient Near Eastern literature where the path/ road metaphor is applied to the role of the teacher/leader.246 This also goes for traditional Jewish literature, where rabbis teach, have followers and speak about the way to be chosen or to be avoided, and for the whole corpus of law seen as a way for life to be lived (cf. ‫ הלכה‬from ‫[ הלך‬go] as the embodiment of the totality of directions for a religious way of life). However, as far as I can see, there is one exception, notably in the New Testament. In John 14:6 the famous words of Jesus identify him as “the way.” ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ζωή· οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰ μὴ δι’ ἐμοῦ I am the way and the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father except through/ by me Jesus is the way by which people come to God; “that is, the way which he himself is now about to take is the road which his followers must also tread.”247 Since that is how he achieves life for them to share (cf. John 1:4; 3:15; 4:14; 11:25), he is also the life. And because God is the source of truth imparted to the world by his Son (cf. John 1:14), Jesus is also the truth. This truth imparted to his disciples seems very akin to the ‫ ֶל ַקח‬imparted by the sages to be accepted and followed by their disciples. The influence of materials from the Book of Proverbs on the Fourth Gospel is particularly visible in Prov 8.248 Amplified by Van der Watt’s argument for John’s awareness of Jewish education, including fathers teaching sons,249 it is very tempting to contemplate a connection between Prov 10:17 and John 14:6. The path/way metaphor 245

Cf. Brown (2014, 46-48). Cf. the massive work on the way/path metaphor and its applications in the Old Testament (and other Semitic languages) by Zehnder (1999 passim). 247 As early as 1955 C.K. Barrett ([1955] 1967, 382) identified Jesus as the way with Jesus leading along the way of death and resurrection. The conclusion reached by Petersen (2008, 138) points in the same direction, although apparently independent of Barrett. Her argument concerning John 14:6 is based – rightly, in my opinion – on the fact that the farewell speeches of Jesus provide a context for the metaphor to imply that the disciples are to follow on the way led by Jesus. That is what disciples of sages and rabbis do. Thus Barrett’s statement is justified that, in John 14:6, “truth” and “life” are “explanatory” of the way. The claim therefore is nothing more and nothing less than that Jesus is the true ‫ארח לחיים‬. Attridge (2006, 49) argues that Jesus as the way connotes the same as the equally well-known metaphor of Jesus as the gateway (John 10:7), which can be denied neither in respect of logic nor in the light of their actual conflation in Matt 7:13-14 as well as in several sources referenced below (Str-B I, 460ff.). 248 See the Excursion on the Reception of Proverbs 8 in Vol. I, especially p. 371. 249 Van der Watt (2006, 426f.). He later refined his thesis by the further distinction between instruction in the family context and instruction by rabbis, the latter of which applies to Jesus as rabbi and his disciples (communication by mail). For a full consideration of the theoretical 246

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

149

iself is so widespread that it is almost impossible for John not to have known it from a variety of Jewish sources.250 But that Jesus is the way just as the subject of the nominal sentence in Prov 10:17 is,251 that he is a rabbi (Matt 8:19; John 1:50 etc.), has disciples, teaches them and expects them to follow the path he indicates (Matt 10:36; 16:24; Luke 9:23) – all of this comes together in a pattern typical of ancient sapiential teachers as well as later rabbis.252

10:18 Who conceals hatred has lips of deceit, and who spreads calumny, he is a fool. The last proverb of the cluster comprising vv. 12-18 is conspicuous within the group because, in the opinion of many commentators, it does not seem to contain an antithetical parallelism.253 But it is formally connected backwards by means of the catchwords ‫ כסה‬Piel (conceal) and ‫( שנאה‬hatred) that span the distance to v. 12 in chiastic order. Thematically, some regard v. 12 as the beginning of a new cluster around the motif of speech, which however also occurs in vv. 6, 10 and 11 of the previous cluster as well as in vv. 19-21. Although it is true that vv. 15 and 16 contain the thematic elements of profit and property, the idea of speech is also present in vv. 13-14 and implicitly in v. 17. Therefore the chiastic framing of vv. 12-18 makes sense, especially since the motif of speech is common to all three proverb-groups in question (vv. 5-11, 12-18 and 19-21). V. 18 can even be seen as a kind of Janus verse, looking backward and forward at the same time (causing Lucas to include it with vv. 19-21). The rhythmic arrangement is once again a Siebener as in the previous verse, but this time with three beats in the first and four in the second half-verse (4+4 would require the maqqeph to be ignored and two adjacent stressed syllables to be tolerated). The syntax of the verse is problematic and so is the parallelism, depending on how the syntax is understood. The following are possibilities: (a) Two nominal sentences, with “who conceals hatred” (‫ )מכסה שנאה‬as the subject and “lips of deceit” (‫ )שפתי־שקר‬the predicate in the first verset issues involved, cf. also his major work on metaphor in the Fourth Gospel (Van der Watt 2000, 1ff. and, on key passages from this gospel, 25ff.). 250 Cf. Deut 11:26; 30:15; Jer 21:8; Prov 28:6, 18; Sir 2:12; Slav Hen 30:15; 4 Esr 7:3; Pirqe Aboth 2:9; Mek Ex 14:28; Sifre Deut 53 and many more; see Str-B I, 460-463. 251 Accordingly, there seems to be reason to doubt the categorical claim made by Wilhelm Michaelis in 1954 (ThWNT V, 85), that there is no parallel in the Old Testament for the use of ὁδὸς in John 14:6, and therefore to question his equally forthright conclusion (ThWNT V, 88) that the use of ὁδὸς in the Fourth Gospel has no antecedent or parallel anywhere else. 252 By teaching them wisdom, the rabbi brings his pupils “into the world to come” (Baba Metzia 2:11). Cf. further Mek Ex 31:12; Yoma 85a et al.; Str-B I, 188. 253 See below for another view.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

and “who spreads calumny” (‫ )מוצא דבה‬the subject in the second. So Murphy and others. (b) Two nominal sentences with “lips of deceit”(‫ )שפתי־שקר‬the subject and “cover up hatred” (‫ )מכסה שנאה‬the predicate in the first verset (the second verset similar to [a]). So Fox. (c) The whole verse, read as one sentence with enjambment: “Who conceals hatred with lips of deceit and who spreads calumny, he is a fool.” So Waltke. (d) Two nominal sentences as in (a), but read as two independent monostichs and therefore not in antithetical parallelism with each other, but rather amplifying one another, each as “a thoroughly bad thing.” So Oesterley. Options (a) and (d) are syntactically the same and differ only as far as their combination or division of the units into poetic stichs is concerned. A problem with option (b) is that the verb is a masculine singular participle (‫)מכסה‬ and the subject (‫ )שפתי־שקר‬is feminine plural. Rather than seeking a solution in the fact that the plural is a synecdoche and therefore may govern a singular verb,254 the natural word order would be predicate-subject, not subjectpredicate (Murphy), which avoids the problem in the first place. Option (c) opts for a very extended casus pendens, with the subject and predicate only in the last two words. Waltke is correct that an accusative of manner (in his opinion, ‫ )שפתי־שקר‬is “unexceptional,” but the use of the preposition ‫ ב‬would be expected in this case. However that may be, in my view this analysis does not offer a better parallelism, since on Waltke’s submission there are not two “inferior types,” and a single statement is made about one type, which can only with difficulty be construed as parallel to itself. That leaves us with option (a), which indeed offers a good parallelism. The question is whether this is an antithetical or a so-called synonymous (equivalent) parallelism. Oesterley sees an antithesis between concealment (of hatred) and outspokenness (of a slander), but opts for two independent stichs in the verse (option [d] above). Deviating from most commentators, Weeks255 also thinks that the parallelism is indeed antithetical and paraphrases, “One who conceals hatred may be a liar, but one who utters slander is (far worse!) a fool.” However, he does not identify the antithetical elements themselves, nor does he explain how they are to be seen as contrasts. His rendering of the verse rather exemplifies what Berlin calls “disambiguation,” or a “clarification, redefinition, unfolding of development.”256 That is, the repetition in the 254 In his commentary Fox takes the synecdoche to stand for a singular (“man”), but in EE for a plural (“people”). 255 Weeks ([1994] 2007, 25 n. 7). 256 Berlin ([1985] 2008, 98-99).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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second verset (equivalent parallelism) is actually a further specification of the first verset. I would submit that this is indeed what we have here, yet with due appreciation for Oesterley’s detection of the contrasting element. The second verset repeats a negative motif from the first verset in a specified form and the judgement at the end is a sapiential comment on the deceitfulness of the first verset. The equivalent elements are hatred (‫ )שנאה‬and slander (‫)דבה‬, and the antithetical elements are covering up (‫ )מכסה‬and spreading (‫)מוצא‬. Thus we have a proverb in which the first verset is amplified by the last (as Weeks himself seems to suggest: “worse!”). I find it difficult to see why being a fool is far worse than being deceitful,257 but I do see how both hidden and publicised malice can be clarified in terms of sapiential thought by explicitly subsuming it under foolishness. That would be the “synonymous” aspect of the parallelism, or, in Berlin’s terms (actually Kugel’s), the “what-ismore” element. The antithetical element is the contrast between concealing and spreading. • Who conceals hatred, obscures it so that others do not notice and can be harmed with devious talk (cf. Jer 9:7b for a close thematic correspondence). • Who spreads slander, does the opposite by proclaiming the untruth to all and sundry and thus also harms the victim (cf. the similar situation in Jer 9:7a). Both concern speaking and both types are untruthful (deceive others). Therefore the first verset cannot be construed to mean that it is better to display hatred than to hide it.258 The two versets, when read in light of each other, underscore that both concern manifestations of dishonesty, whether played out as insincere guile or by spreading untruthful slander. Two totally contrasting styles, but both are castigated, first as deceitful and then as foolish. The “unfolding of development” concerns the principle of dishonesty in hatred of others and the antithesis concerns the manner of its appearance. For these reasons it becomes unnecessary to divide the verse into two proverbs of one monostich each, as Oesterley proposes. 257 In the rabbinic tradition, exactly the opposite is sometimes said in expositions of the proverb. For instance, Ralbag (Provence, first half of the 14th century) states that the dishonest are more dangerous than the fools. Nahmias (Spain, second half of the 14th century) thinks only one type of person is meant in both versets, namely that kind of person who is so thoroughly wicked that he is worse than a fool. Nahmias thus implies that some fools are not necessarily that bad. 258 Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 185) points out that this interpretation is found in the midrashic exposition of Gen 37:4, where it is deemed a virtue of Joseph’s brothers that they vented rather than concealed their hatred of their brother by speaking kindly to him (‫)ולא יכלו דברו לשלם‬. On the other hand, cf. Visotzky (1992, 110) on the Midrash Prov 26:24, for an interpretation of Esau’s behaviour towards Jacob (Gen 33:4), which amounts to the opposite of what Joseph’s brothers did.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

The complexity of syntax and parallelism and therefore of the overall sense of the proverb have also left their mark on the ancient versions. This is particularly the case in the Septuagint, which turns the verse around so that it becomes a simple antithetic saying: καλύπτουσιν ἔχθραν χείλη δίκαια, οἱ δὲ ἐκφέροντες λοιδορίας ἀφρονέστατοί εἰσιν (Righteous lips conceal hatred, but those who carry out insults are complete fools) The lips become the subject and the verb is therefore plural (so also the Peshitta and Vulgate), but the Septuagint makes still another change by turning the deceitful lips (‫ )שפתי־שקר‬of the Masoretic text into “righteous lips” (χείλη δίκαια). “Cover up” therefore becomes “hide” in bonam partem (cf. on v. 12 above),259 and hatred is thus contained. That sidesteps the difficult combination of disambiguation and antithesis in the Hebrew proverb by making a straightforward antithetical saying out of it.260 Several traditional rabbinic expositions have already been referred to in the notes above (cf. on Ralbag and Nahmias about human types that are worse than fools). Rashi focuses on the insincerity referred to in the first hemistich, notably false speaking and inner hatred, which to him describes the typical behaviour of the flatterer. On the other hand, the Mezudat David declares that the slanderer of the second hemistich is a fool because he does not realise that other people will talk behind his back about his own talking slanderously behind the back of his fellow. The latter view is also found in the Talmud (Kiddushin 70b).261 Gerondi relates the proverb to Lev 19:17, where it is forbidden to hate one’s neighbour in one’s heart (cf. 10:18a), and where it is commanded that a neighbour in need of reproof should be rebuked. The proverb is used to put the Leviticus injunction into perspective. In the light of our proverb, to “freely rebuke” such a person, as the Torah requires, does not mean to do so publicly (cf. 10:18b), which will only cause embarrassment.262 Without referring to the rabbinic material or to other biblical texts, Melanchthon moves in the same direction. He takes the proverb as a statement about the incorrect way to rebuke those who need admonition and thereby doing them the injustice of public reproach.

259 This is misunderstood by Oesterley, who finds the Septuagint’s rendering not merely unjustifiable (which it is), but “nonsense, for hypocrisy is not the rôle of righteous lips” (which is not applicable, because the Greek text does not speak of hypocrisy, but of covering over in bonam partem). 260 The evasion of the difficulty by the Septuagint does not seem to have made things easier for Chrysostom. He interprets concealing hatred as avoiding refusal, apparently by silence, whereas the opposite (uttering threats) is foolish. He undergirds this interpretation by reading the proverb not as a Janus, but only in conjunction with v. 19 (loquacity brings transgression and restrained speech is sensible). 261 So Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 185). 262 I would comment that this shows insight in the reverse side of not hating a neighbour in one’s heart, viz. love for one’s neighbour (Lev 19:18), which is what it means to spare him embarrassment even when he needs reproof.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

153

10:19-21 On the effect of words 19 Where there is a multitude of words, transgression will have no end, but who restrains his lips is prudent. 20 The tongue of a righteous man is choice silver, the heart of the wicked is worth as much as a trifle. 21 The lips of a righteous man shepherd many, but fools die through lack of sense. Bibl.: Hausmann 1995, 17, 187, 204; Heim 2001, 124-126; Krispenz 1989, 58-62 (a completely different take); 164; Krüger 1995, 427-428; Scherer 1999, 58-60, 64-71; Scoralick 1995, 68.

These three proverbs are evidently connected by their shared theme of speech, which is however also found in the previous two clusters (vv. 5-11 and 12-18; see above on the possible Janus function of v. 18). But Krüger, conceding the broader spread of the theme as well as its expression by specific lexemes, also points out the special distribution of catchwords in vv. 19-21.263 Thus, the words for “many” (‫רֹב‬, ‫ ַ)ר ִבּים‬and “lips” (‫ )שפתים‬connect the first and the last of these verses.264 I am not inclined to see a concentric pattern in the group, since the other catchwords (‫ צדיק‬and ‫ )לב‬occur only in vv. 20 and 21, while thematic considerations and not only catchwords should equally be considered. Therefore the pattern is: 19 20 21

rather than: 19 20 21

The proverbs are stitched one onto the other by means of the theme of the positive and negative effects of speaking. The thematic coherence is clear, but the cohesion of formal ties is asymmetrical, since the range of catchwords representing it (called the “Ausdruckseite” by Krüger) is unevenly spread.

263

Krüger (1995, 427). To which it may be added that this happens in chiastic order: many–lips; lips–many (cf. the chiastic order of ‫ שנאה‬and ‫ כסה‬in vv. 12 and 18). 264

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

10:19 Where there is a multitude of words, transgression will have no end, but who restrains his lips is prudent. The clearly antithetical proverb has 4+3 beats in the two versets (maqqeph in the first). In v. 19a there is alliteration of the consonants ‫ ב‬and ‫ר‬, and alliteration of ‫ שׂ‬in every word of v. 19b.265 The speech theme is discussed from the perspective of the relation between the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of talking or, more precisely, the effects involved. Talking is not forbidden and silence is not prescribed, but restraint is advised.266 Therefore, to talk a lot causes transgressions, while restraining one’s lips (metonymy for the act of speaking) is regarded as wise. Although the thrust of the first hemistich is clear, several details need further clarification. First, the verb ‫ חדל‬Qal can mean several things. It is often taken to mean “be absent,”267 but Waltke objects that support for this meaning found in Job 19:14 is itself dubious. When the subject is a person, the verb means “leave” (e.g. Jer 40:4; Ezk 3:27; Am 7:5 et al.). When, as here, the subject is not a person, it means “come to an end” or “cease” (e.g. Ex 9:29, 33f.; Isa 24:8 et al.).268 It is used in the figure of style of litotes, the negative as an emphatic affirmation of the opposite positive (wrongdoing will certainly occur). Moreover, the idea of never ceasing transgressions is in turn ambivalent. • On the submission that wrongdoing increases with the quantity of talking, it is only logical that the more one talks, the more opportunity one has to err, for which evidence is supplied by the statement in Qoh 6:11 that that actually happens (“Where there are many words, one increases vanity, so what is the use?”). As suggested by Gerondi in the 13th century, the verset may imply the reason for its own claim. If one talks so much, transgression is not only more likely but actually unavoidable because there is no opportunity to think through what one says (similarly Meinhold, Waltke; cf. Sir 20:7). Transgressions keep coming while the words keep coming.

265 McCreesh does not mention these in his standard work on sound patterns in Prov 10-29, although they fit his definition of the phenomenon, which he calls “consonance,” cf. McCreesh (1991, 26). 266 On this topic, cf. 10:14; 12:23; 17:27; Hausmann (1995, 17). 267 E.g. BDB, Wildeboer, Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, Murphy, Fox (so in his commentary, but in EE he opts for “cease”). 268 So HALOT, KAHAL, Waltke; cf. also Volz, McKane, Meinhold, Plöger, Hausmann (1995, 204), Alter, Clifford, Sæbø; Whybray mentions the meaning but does not choose (neither does Yoder).

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• By the same token, once words are uttered, they live their own life and go on doing harm long after having been spoken (Meinhold). The transgressions live on in their effects even after the loquacious speaker has finally shut up. Bühlmann269 takes another line by making the error the vantage point for his interpretation. Once an error has been made, not even a multitude of words can erase it. But Plöger and Fuhs are to be agreed with that this does not suit the sapiential topos of the correct use of speech (cf. the positive evaluation of speech in v. 20a and proverbs like 15:23; 25:11). Neither is it compatible with the link between speech itself (lips and mouth) and ruin in 10:8b, 14b and 13:3, or likely in light of the explicit statement by Qohelet that vanity increases with the increase in the words themselves (Qoh 6:11 quoted above). In the first verset, the Septuagint substitutes the second person singular for the third person masculine singular of the Hebrew verb: οὐκ ἐκφεύξῃ ἁμαρτίαν (you will not escape sin). This amounts to a paraphrase and may reflect the translator’s understanding of ‫ יחדל‬as “be absent”270 and an interpretation holding either that the prattler must inevitably run into transgression or that he will not escape once he has landed in trouble (cf. Bertheau as well as Bühlmann). Waltke explains the use of ἐκφεύγειν by assuming that the Septuagint read ‫ נצל‬for ‫( חדל‬which could also be the case with the Peshitta).

The transgression (‫ )פשע‬emanating from loquaciousness is a personal offence caused to others, as usually in the Book of Proverbs (cf. v. 12; 12:13; 17:9, 19; 19:11; 29:16, 22).271 The second hemistich is not aimed against speaking, but against excessive speaking. Restraining one’s words would accordingly mean to say the right thing in the right way at the right time. McKane says: “The wise man will keep silence unless272 he is assured that the time is ripe for him to speak, that he can do it effectively and that his words have been 269 Bühlmann (1976, 176-178) takes his cue from one possibility mentioned by Bertheau (1847), who however does so on the basis of the supposition that ‫ חדל‬means “disappear,” which is rejected in the second edition of Bertheau’s commentary tended by Nowack (1883). Plöger has appreciation for Bühlmann’s take, but does not accept it as Whybray thinks. 270 That is evidently how the Vulgate understood the Hebrew. The Latin has, in multiloquio peccatum non deerit (in much speaking sin will not be absent). This is a fairly literal rendering of the Masoretic Text, assuming as it does that ‫ חדל‬indicates absence, and it may have influenced the traditional rendering of the verse (see above). It preserves the thrust of the Septuagint’s interpretation but simultaneously seems to be an endeavour to correct the paraphrasing second person singular of the Greek back to the third person singular of the Hebrew. 271 So Whybray, Fox. The root can however also refer to specific crimes (e.g. Ex 22:8; Am 1:3, 6, 9, 11, 13) or general crimes against God and humans (28:13, 21), often parallel to a word for “sin”, such as ‫ עון‬and ‫( חטאת‬e.g. Lev 16:21; Num 14:18; Ps 32:5). 272 My emphasis.

156

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10 carefully weighed. ... This conviction that it is part of wisdom to keep speech on a tight rein finds expression in v. 19.”

That McKane is right, is apparent from the reciprocal influence of the contrasting parallelism between the hemistichs. V. 19a much speaking causes wrongdoing [is the opposite of wisdom]

:: → ←

V. 19b restrained speaking [avoids wrongdoing] is prudent expression of wisdom

In the light of v. 19a, the prudence spoken of in v. 19b must mean that such a manifestation of wisdom actually avoids wrongdoing. Likewise, in the light of v. 19b, the prattling referred to in v. 19a is an expression of wisdom’s opposite, folly. McKane does not give examples, but the negative view of excessive talking and the concomitant positive view of restraint together make up an established sapiential topos over millennia. This includes biblical273 and ancient Near Eastern wisdom generally, as well as a substantial afterlife in the Jewish and Christian traditions. Some examples: An illustration from Egyptian wisdom literature is the Instruction of Ptahhotep, which addresses the topic several times, for instance:274 The trusted man who does not vent his belly’s speech, he will himself become a leader. ... Concentrate on excellence; your silence is better than chatter. Speak when you know you have a solution, it is the skilled who should speak in council. Speaking is harder than all other work, he who understands it makes it serve. If you are mighty, gain respect through knowledge and through gentleness of speech. A thousand years later, in the Babylonian Counsels of Wisdom (probably after the First Dynasty)275 there are two sections devoted to the topos (ll. 26-30 and 127134):276 Let your mouth be controlled and your speech guarded: Therein is a man’s wealth – let your lips be very precious. 273 E.g. 5:2; 12:23; 13:3; 15:28; 17:27f.; 15:2; Qoh 5:1f., 11; 10:14; Job 34:35; 35:16; cf. Bühlmann (1976, passim) and Hausmann (1995, 17). 274 See AEL I, 67, 72; ANET 412-414. The precepts date from the time of the fifth (so J.A. Wilson in ANET, 412) or the sixth dynasty (so Lichtheim in AEL I, 62), in any case from the second half of the third millennium BCE. 275 Lambert ([1960] 1975, 97), dates it to the Cassite period, i.e. 1500-1200 BCE. 276 Lambert ([1960] 1975, 100-101 and 104-105); cf. ANET, 426-427.

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Let insolence and blasphemy be your abomination; Speak nothing profane nor any untrue report. A talebearer is accursed. ... Do not utter libel, speak what is of good report. Do not say evil things, speak well of people. One who utters libel and speaks evil, Men will waylay him with his debit account to Šamaš. Beware of careless talk, guard your lips; Do not utter solemn oaths while alone, For what you say in a moment will follow you afterwards. But exert yourself to restrain your speech. After yet another thousand years, Ben Sira has sayings on both the negative and the positive sides of the topic. For instance, Sir 20:8: ὁ πλεονάζων λόγῳ βδελυχθήσεται, καὶ ὁ ἐνεξουσιαζόμενος μισηθήσεται. (Who talks too much will be disliked, and who usurps authority will be hated) Speaking of a patient person, he says in Sir 1:24, ἕως καιροῦ κρύψει τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ, καὶ χείλη πολλῶν ἐκδιηγήσεται σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ (Until the right time he holds back his words, and the lips of many testify to his good sense) Still later, Pirqe Aboth 1:17 is probably based on this proverb (so Toy):277 All my days I have grown up among wise men and have found nothing better than silence ... and whoever produces many words causes sin (‫)חטא‬. Cf. also Pirqe Aboth 3:17:278 Silence (‫ )שחיקה‬is a fence around wisdom (Rabbi Akiba). The fence makes it unlikely or even impossible to transgress the Torah. The topos is so widely spread in Jewish literature that the Mezudat David links this fact itself to v. 19. It explains the proverb on the basis of Jewish regulations and, vice versa, the latter on the basis of the proverb. Looking back from its own historical perspective, it judges the multitude of Jewish prohibitions about speaking to confirm the proverb’s view, notably that sooner or later excessive words are bound to transgress at least one of them. Therefore it is not surprising that Gerondi’s opinion concerning the lack of adequately thinking through what one says (cf. above) is shared by the Mezudat David. Rambam (= Maimonides, 12th century) divides all speech into 277 Pirqe Aboth belongs to the didactic (‫ )מוגר‬literature of the rabbis and dates from the Mishnaic period (second century CE). 278 On restraining speech, cf. also Pirqe Aboth 1:5, 11, 15; 2:5.

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four categories: forbidden, permissible, optional, and virtuous. In the 19th century Malbim took the most careful position by stating that even the category of optional speech can lead to sin, for which reason it is wise to utter no words at all other than wisdom alone.279 For a comparable sweeping assessment of human speech, cf. Jas 3:1-12. At the conclusion of his “Fifteen Books on the Trinity,” Augustine of Hippo (354430)280 makes an interesting use of the proverb to justify his own voluminous speaking in the book, perhaps also as an apology for continuous preaching generally. Saying that he is quite aware of the proverb’s warning that much speaking will lead to sin, he argues with a counter-quotation from 2 Tim 4:2 (“Preach the word, timely or untimely”). He puts a rhetorical question to God, whether only one who has been silent about God’s word in defiance of the New Testament injunction is in line with the proverb. Implying that the answer must obviously be negative, his way out is even more interesting: even if one has been speaking continuously in sermons, it still is not much, but equals only what was necessary for people to hear. So preaching a lot is excepted from speaking a lot and thus exempted from falling into sin.281 Even without the last step of his argument, the use of a text obviously at variance with another demonstrates the same mentality found so often in the Book of Proverbs (cf., for instance, below on v. 22). In quite another vein, this proverb is used in Benedict’s Rule (6th century CE) to substantiate the monastic regulation of silence and rare speech: ... if on account of taciturnity one should sometimes refrain even from good speech, all the more, on account of the punishment for sin, one should avoid evil words. Hence, for good and holy edifying conversation, on the grounds of the gravity of taciturnity, licence to speak should seldom be given even to perfect disciples. For it is written, “In much speaking you will not escape282 sin,” and elsewhere, “Death and life are in the power of the tongue.”283

279

Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 186). De Trin XV, 28, 51 (NPNF I, 3, 228); cf. also Retr. Prolog 2 (MPL XXXII, 583), where he cites the proverb (with Matt 12:36, Jas 1:19; 3:1-2) to express how terrified he was (terret me plurimum!) that he had said too many unnecessary words (cf. the next note). 281 Which sounds attractive for a voluminous commentary. Cf. Chrysostom (c. 347-407) (Instr Cat II, 4 [NPNF I, 9, 168-169]), who applies the first half of the proverb in a comparable but nevertheless different way: “If you have anything useful to say, open your lips, but if there is nothing necessary for you to say, be silent, because that is better.” Likewise, Jerome finds in this proverb a counterbalance to his admiration for eloquence, which therefore is not a one-sidedly positive quality (Adv Pel III, 1 [NPNF II, 6, 472]). On an altogether different note is the appeal made to the proverb by Clemens Alexandrinus (Paed II, 6 [ANF II, 251]), who quotes it together with Sir 20:5, 8 to support the conviction that frivolous speech is as bad as “shameful speaking,” viz. talking about wickedness which leads to wicked deeds (much like the rabbinic principle of a fence around the Torah). Cf. also the “head,” or short precept to refrain from much speaking, with which Cyprian alludes to this proverb (Adv Iud III, 103 [ANF V, 530]). 282 The Latin text here is not that of the Vulgate, but the verb used is effugere (escape, in the second person, corresponding to the Septuagint ἐκφεύξῃ), whereas the Vulgate uses deesse (be absent, third person, see above). 283 Regula Benedicti, De taciturnitate 6, 2-5. The second quotation is from Prov 18:21. 280

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

159

10:20 The tongue of a righteous man is choice silver, the heart of the wicked is worth as much as a trifle. The proverb is another Siebener (4+3), this time in seven words (where v. 19 has eight words). It consists of two nominal sentences284 but lacks the conjunctive waw between them. However, they do form a syntactic chiasmus, in which the human types and corresponding body parts form the inner circle and the metaphors expressing their value make up the outer circle: subject ‫לשון צדיק‬ predicate / metaphor ‫כמעט‬

predicate / metaphor ‫כסף נבחר‬ subject ‫לב רשעים‬

A chiasmus naturally manifests cohesion,285 but cohesion is also strengthened by means of sound play, in this case by the initial kaph in the first and the last words (so Waltke, who calls it “coherence”) as well as by the alliteration of initial lamed in the first words of the inner circle (‫ לשון‬and ‫)לב‬. The contrasting elements of the antithetical parallelism are the righteous :: wicked and the value of choice silver :: the practically valueless. Silver, as “the most precious metal in ancient Israel” (Perdue, but cf. I Kgs 10:21), was so important as monetary metal that the word came to mean “money” per se. Especially when it can be described as “choice,” i.e., the best obtainable, which must mean purified silver. Therefore it is quite understandable that the Septuagint could translate πεπυρωμένος (purified by fire), so that nothing is gained by reading the Niphal participle of ‫בחן‬, as proposed by BHS (not BHQ). Both ‫ בחן‬and ‫ בחר‬can carry the meaning “tested,” that is, in the purification process.286 The same expression occurs in 8:19 (Oesterley) but is there translated differently by the Septuagint as well as the Peshitta and the Targum. Bühlmann287 thinks that the idea of purified silver has aesthetic significance, which is probable if we compare 3:14f. (cf. 2:4). At any rate, it 284

Cf. Luchsinger (2010, 199). On the cohesive effect of chiasmus, see the “Note on chiasmus” in Vol. I, 76-77. Cf. also Ceresco (1978, 1, 2ff.), who speaks of “the structuring function” of chiasmus, but regards this function much looser than, for instance, Watson (1994, 328ff.) and asserts that the figure gives insight not only in the structure, but also in the meaning of Hebrew poetic passages. 286 So Wildberger even proposes that the two roots are etymologically related (THAT I, 275276). The same meaning for both roots is also attested by HALOT and KAHAL; so also Gemser, Plöger and others. For “choice silver” (“auserlesenes [erwähltes] Silber,” see the references by Bühlmann (1976, 39) to Jer 8:3; Prov 8:10, 19; 16:16; 21:3; 22:1). 287 Bühlmann (1976, 41). 285

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is clear that a form of human speech is here presented as something extremely precious,288 which is enhanced by the pun discovered by Van Leeuwen: an ingot of smelted and therefore purified metal is also called a “tongue” (‫;לשון‬ see Josh 7:21, 24). The human words that can be evaluated so highly are those spoken by the righteous (‫)צדיק‬. That identifies the righteous with the wise and expresses the religious dimension of the proverb. The heart as metonymy for thinking is the antithesis of the tongue as metonymy for speaking (cf. the parallelism of tongue and heart in 16:1; 17:20). Several commentators refer to the heart as the origin of the thoughts that are spoken by the tongue (somewhat like concepts transformed into words) to substantiate the parallelism between heart and tongue.289 If the source is wicked, so will the words be (cf. 16:23; 23:33). That is undoubtedly correct and can further be underpinned by the reciprocity at work in the parallelism (see below). The human category of the ‫( רשעים‬wicked) mentioned in the second hemistich is the counter-pole of the ‫( צדיק‬righteous) in the first hemistich. This represents a religious dimension in the proverb. In her extended discussion of the two human types,290 Hausmann is sceptical about Schmid’s view that whoever is called ‫ צדיק‬in the sapiential sense is also ‫ צדיק‬before Yahweh.291 But she is not dogmatic about it and does find evidence in Prov 10ff. that there is a relation between the righteous and God (the Fear of the Lord, 10:27, and finding refuge in the name of the Lord, 18:10). Therefore she also considers with Delitzsch, and particularly Plöger and Meinhold292 whether a convergence (“Annäherungsmöglichkeit”) between sapiential and the religious thinking and language is possible in this regard. She does not deny this, but finds that the Torah spoken of in the sayings and the Law of God cannot be identified with one another.293 That is certainly so for the wisdom prior to Ben Sira, but in my estimation is not a ground for denying the religious dimension in such proverbs as those just quoted (cf. 28:5 and the religious dimension of the nearby 28:9). Moreover, the self-evident religious assumptions of the sages based in creation also speak for it. 294 Therefore I would concur that the religious dimension is at least fundamentally present where the righteous and the wicked are discussed.

The thoughts and therefore the words of the wicked are judged to be worth little (literally “as a little/trifle” [‫)]כמעט‬. The parallelism suggests not only a 288

So Hausmann (1995, 187, 204) on this verse and v. 19; cf. also Luchsinger (2010, 277). Clifford, Meinhold, Whybray, Fox, Waltke, Yoder, Tuinstra; cf. Sir 21:26. But Hausmann (1995, 63) correctly warns that, although conclusions may be drawn about the respective attitudes of the righteous and the wicked, the picture presented in Proverbs concerns the behaviour more than the attitudes of the anthropological types. Cf. also Krüger’s nuanced presentation (2009, 91-106), and the comment above on v. 8. 290 Hausmann (1995, 37-66). 291 Schmid (1966, 161); Hausmann (1995, 65). 292 In their commentaries on 28:5. 293 Hausmann (1995, 62), referring to Prov 28:4-5 in the context of her discussion of ‫צדיק‬ and ‫רשע‬. 294 See the Introduction, Par. 7; also Vol. I, 12-14. 289

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correspondence between “tongue” and “heart,” but also an antithesis between the value of purified silver and ‫מעט‬. What is clear, is that this connotes the worthlessness of thoughts expressed by the wicked. The expression need not be an aposiopesis (with a missing element) as Plöger and Tuinstra think. The missing element would have to be silver (meaning more or less, “worth a little silver”), which would weaken the contrast (choice silver :: a little silver). Used in the absolute sense, ‫ מעט‬means “little of anything,” i.e. absolutely worthless. Wherein does the value of the silver words lie? Stewart295 incidentally notes that it is “a motivational symbol.” Silver is used to describe righteous speech, as she says, and not as a result obtainable by listening to or even delivering righteous speech. In light of the connections with and placement before to the following proverb, the value of the silver words is not that they enrich people, but that they guide them. In terms of v. 21, they “shepherd” many people. Here the Targum and the Peshitta have interesting variants that may well point to a concrete meaning and to the possibility that the Targum for once has preserved the original reading.296 The Targum says, ‫ולבא דרשיעי מחתא‬ (and the heart of the wicked is ‫)מחתא‬ In the Eclectic Edition of Proverbs (EE) an appropriate meaning for ‫( מחתא‬usually vocalised ‫)מ ֲח ָתא‬ ַ is not given, but it mentions Healey’s translation, “deficiency.”297 However, Jastrow298 mentions this meaning as well as ‫ ַמ ֲח ָתא‬II (ash pan), and Levy299 has ‫( ְמ ָח ָתא‬rather than ‫)מ ֲח ָתא‬ ַ in the meaning “metal slack.” Read with Healy, it would indeed be a “reasonable translation” of the Masoretic Text’s ‫( כמעט‬a little nothingness).300 But read with Levy, the parallelism would be concretised in the Aramaic version, since it would contrast valuable silver with the valueless slack left over from the smelting process.301 The Peshitta may originally have had this word (ÀĀÑã), which was later corrupted to Àüã (bitterness).302

The force of the parallelism enables us to recognise the presence of the motif of speech in the second verset (where it is not mentioned) and the presence of the heart as the origin of good speech in the first (where it too is not mentioned): 295

Stewart (2016, 118). So BHQ (note 39*). 297 Healey (1991, i.l). 298 Jastrow ([1903] 1950 II, s.v.). 299 Levy ([1924] 1963 III, s.v.). 300 Bühlmann (1976, 41): “etwas Minderwertiges” (not just something of less value, but of poor quality). 301 ‫ ַמ ֲח ָתא‬II instead of ‫ ְמ ָח ָתא‬would also maintain the image: the words of the righteous are valuable silver, and the heart (receptacle containing the thoughts) of the wicked would be as worthless as the receptacle with the leftover ashes of the smelting fire. 302 Cf. EE and the references given there. 296

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

V. 20a righteous speaking mentioned [heart is source of] valuable speaking

:: → ←

V. 20b wicked heart [is source of worthless speaking] heart mentioned

Rabbinic understanding of the proverb has much in common with what we encounter in their interpretation of the earlier proverbs on speech. Gerondi takes the refined words of silver to refer to the sincere rebuke offered by a wise person and understands ‫ כמעט‬to be the “little” or short time spent on attending to it by the wicked (this interpretation assumes an aposiopesis, viz. a hidden word for “time”). In the same strain Rashi and later the Vilna Gaon interpret the first verset as a reference to the admonition of those who deserve it. The latter uses the mention of the heart in the second verset to undergird his opinion that an upright overseer remains blameless if his reproof has no success, since the fault lies in the heart, the innermost being of the wicked. Perhaps the most interesting interpretation of ‫ מעט‬is offered by the Mezudat David, which states that the heart of the wicked is not merely of little worth, but in fact is small. Since it is the seat of the mind, the small-minded wicked can understand only a little and therefore does not profit by teaching. Cyprian of Carthage (c. 200-258 CE)303 chose this proverb as both the expression of and the substantiation for number 103 from 120 “heads,” i.e. summaries necessary for teaching simple people the essentials of a Christian life. However, in an encyclical to the bishops of North Africa, dating from 356 CE, Athanasius of Alexandria had no objection to use the Septuagint version of the second hemistich to express his conviction that his pro-Arian Meletian adversaries would fail in their opposition to him and his orthodox followers.304 Since he expects the Emperor to put a stop to the activities of his adversaries, his quotation of v. 20b probably means, “the heart of the wicked will come to an end.” This is not so much an exegesis of the verse as a rhetorical use of it based on the assumption that his opponents are wicked, which equals impious heretics preparing the way of the Antichrist.

10:21 The lips of a righteous man shepherd many, but fools die through lack of sense. This is the third consecutive proverb of 4+3 rhythmic units, indicated as such by the Masoretic maqqeph in the middle of the second hemistich. Whereas we have a verbal plus a nominal sentence in v. 19 and two nominal sentences in v. 20, this verse consists of two full verbal sentences. As in the previous verse, the singular form of ‫( צדיק‬righteous) is contrasted with a counter-pole in the plural (‫ רשעים‬in v. 20, ‫ אוילים‬here). This is not unimportant, since it confirms the identical contrast of the type of the righteous man pitted against all wicked people and all fools, as well as the 303

Test III, 103 (ANF V, 554). Ad Episc Aeg II, 23 (NPNF II, 4, 235). The Septuagint has, καρδία δὲ ἀσεβοῦς ἐκλείψει (but the heart of the wicked will fail). ἐκλείπω can mean “fail,” “come to an end,” but also “be inferior,” which would approach the Hebrew ‫ כמעט‬in the verse. 304

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163

association of the wicked and the foolish.305 There is also a link to v. 19. Not only speech itself, but also a specific aspect of it, namely that it can have opposing effects, associates vv. 19 and 21. The detrimental effect of too many words (v. 19a) is counterbalanced by the fact that some words do have a positive, nourishing effect (v. 21a). Perhaps the qualification of the righteous person’s words as “choice” silver (v. 20a) contributes to the total picture, since the middle verse suggests that good speech consists of only a few selected words: bad: many words: good words are the select few good: righteous words

The verb ‫ רעה‬Qal can be intransitive as well as transitive. In the former sense it means “to be a shepherd,” or “to graze;” in the latter it means “to pasture (a flock),” which includes several typical components: to lead the flock, protect them, feed and water them.306 The object ‫ רבים‬shows that the verb here is transitive. It can also be used metaphorically in the meaning “to rule” and as such is part of the ancient Near Eastern kingship ideology.307 Brown is right in claiming that the food metaphor is deployed here,308 but the suggestiveness of the shepherd motif encompasses other important nuances as well, viz. leading (invoked by the Mezudat David, see below) and protecting. The shepherd metaphor309 does stimulate “a hunger for edifying speech” (Brown), but it also inculcates the willingness to follow – which is what a pupil does (cf. on v. 17a) – and it promises protection. The fools, by contrast, die because they lack sense. In the context of the first hemistich, it means that they do not follow wise guidance, therefore they stray (cf. on v. 17b) and forego the shepherd’s protection and the green pastures necessary for their nourishment. They can die of a lack of sustenance and/or due to danger overcoming them on strange, unprotected tracks (cf. 4:19). In the second hemistich it is formulated plainly: the fools will die due to a lack of heart = mind = sense (‫)חסר־לב‬.310 The framework may be summarised in the following sketch: 305

See below on the fools lacking sense. For these activities, cf. i.a.: Ezk 34:13; Ps 23:2f. (lead); Ezk 34:12, 15; 1 Sam 17:34f. (protect); Ezk 34:13; Ps 23:2f. (feed); Gen 22:2; Ex 2:16; Ezk 34:19; Ps 23:2 (water). 307 Cf. 2 Sam 5:2; 7:7f.; Mic 5:1-3; see also NIDB V, 228-229; RGG4 III, 1347-1349. 308 Brown (2014, 59-60); Stewart (2016, 118) calls it “the motive of satiety.” 309 Cf. Luchsinger (2010, 287). 310 Heim (2013, 203) presents the opinions of Fox (2000, 39-40) and Waltke (2004, 115) as stark opposites, while his own is neither, since he finds “the truth, as so often, at [sic] both extremes.” But Fox accepts that ‫ חסר־לב‬sometimes does involve immorality (cf. 6:32) and Waltke does not deny the possibility of improvement for such people or that the phrase approaches the meaning of ‫( פתי‬simple-minded). In Prov 10:21 we find the fool (not the mindless) as antithesis of the righteous. Therefore they are the same as the wicked (‫ )רשעים‬in the 306

164 V. 21a righteous speak nourishment to many shepherd’s care [avoids death]

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10 :: → ←

V. 21b fools with no heart/sense don’t understand [wholesome speaking] die

Although the first hemistich does not mention death, the second provides information to indicate that the image of the shepherd’s care includes the opposite of the explicit death motif in v. 21b. Likewise, there is no mention of speaking in the second hemistich, but the parallelism indicates that the death of the fools is due to not understanding (“having a heart for”) the nourishing words with which the righteous teach them. While the addressees of the words are mentioned in both hemistichs, those who offer it (“the righteous”) are prominent in the first and implied in the second, since they are the ones not listened to. The ‫( רבים‬many) who benefit from their words must accordingly themselves be wise (non-‫ )אוילים‬as well as righteous. It is therefore no wonder that some rabbinic authorities include the providers of the pastoral sustenance among the beneficiaries of their own wise words. There are some text-critical issues to be clarified in the verse. As often remarked by commentators, the Septuagint reads ἐπίσταται ὑψηλά (understand lofty things) in the first hemistich and obviously read the Hebrew as ‫( ידעו‬know). Accordingly, it had to make the quantitative “many” into a qualitative concept of exaltedness. This seems to be strengthened by the Vulgate, which has erudiunt plurimos (teach many people), and must have accordingly read a Hebrew verb with dalet in the Hiphil (bring to know = teach),311 thereby not needing to come up with a creative interpretation of the Hebrew ‫רבים‬. In the second hemistich, the vowels of ‫ר־לב‬ ֵ ‫ ַבּ ֲח ַס‬seem like those of the participle Qal status constructus of ‫( חסר‬one who lacks),312 which would not make sense with the preposition ‫ב‬. Therefore it is to be taken as an alternative vocalisation for the construct state of ‫( ח ֶֹסר‬Fox) or ‫( ֶח ֶסר‬BHS).313 The Septuagint reads ἐν ἐνδείᾳ (in lack), which needs some explanation, since it does not say what the fools lack. An attractive explanation is offered in EE by pointing out that there is an extra mention of the heart at the end of the Greek v. 22, while the Hebrew has none. Therefore it seems natural to assume that the scribe accidentally read the Hebrew ‫ לב‬as part of the next line instead of v. 21. Rashi interprets the pastoral speaking of the righteous as literal sustenance for many people. The merit of the righteous has such effect on God that he sends agricultural blessings to earth, which enables many people to provide the needed nourishment and survive. By contrast, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra takes the speaking as spiritual nourishment, previous verse (there too as antithesis of the righteous) and therefore morally wrong. When they die, it is because of a lack of heart/mind, but that does not mean that all who lack heart will permanently remain so. 311 So Winton Thomas (1964, 54-57), Tuinstra, EE and others. 312 Cf. v. 13 for the same form, however as the participle of the verb ‫ חסר‬Qal. 313 BHQ and Waltke consider both ‫ ח ֶֹסר‬and ‫ ֶח ֶסר‬to be possible as the absolute state; both actually occur in the Old Testament (cf. Deut 28:48, 57 and Prov 28:22; Job 30:3 respectively [KAHAL]).

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which helps those who accept it while the fools who reject it perish because they do not have the necessary understanding. The Mezudat David moves in the same direction, suggesting that the righteous lead many people on the right path as a shepherd does (see above and on v. 17). Those who follow consequently benefit, while the fools forego any such advantage and die as a result of a lack of understanding (similarly Hame’iri). Meinhold cites Rambam’s general observation that fools are ignorant and therefore cannot even counsel themselves, for which reason the community should not take them seriously. Ralbag argues likewise and includes the leader among the beneficiaries, since both flock and shepherd prosper if pasturing is done well. The image of Jesus as the Good Shepherd in the Johannine literature clearly shares these concepts. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus is the gate of the fold but also the shepherd who leads his flock, grazes them, saves and protects them (John 10:3-6, 11, 16). Cf. also the remarks on v. 17 about Jesus as the path/way and teacher, as well as the references above to the confluence of the path/leading and pasturing/feeding motifs. That would also converge with the importance given in rabbinic tradition to the idea of pasturing as leading (v. 17) and teaching/leading (v. 21).314

10:22-27 Fortune, fear and expectations 22 Yahweh’s blessing, that is what makes rich, and toil does not add a thing alongside it. 23 Committing a disgrace is like a delight to a fool, so is wisdom to a man with understanding. 24 What the wicked man is afraid of, that will come over him, but what righteous people desire will be granted. 25 When the storm has passed, the wicked is no more, but the righteous is a lasting foundation. 26 As vinegar to the teeth and as smoke to the eyes, so is the sluggard to those who send him. 27 The fear of Yahweh adds days, but the years of the wicked are cut short. Bibl. Hausmann 1995, 257-258; Heim 2001, 128-131; 2013, 250; Krüger 1995, 428-430; Scherer 1999, 60-61; Scoralick 1995, 179-180.

Scoralick finds a unit in vv. 22-27, framed by two Yahweh sayings, however also containing an unusual feature. Both begin with the positive side of a contrast, while all four the others begin negatively, which, according to her, is unusual. Waltke takes vv. 22-26 together, but regards these verses as a subgroup alongside vv. 27-30 to make up a unit with a symmetrical form: Yahweh saying (v. 22), joy (vv. 23-24), lasting security (v. 25); followed 314 Cf. the references in the commentary on v. 17 to the concept of Jesus as teacher, and the cited contribution by Van der Watt to the imagery relevant for us.

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by another Yahweh saying (v. 27), joy (vv. 28-29), lasting security (v. 30).315 However, there is no place for v. 26 in this schema. Its ‫כ‬-comparison is too similar to the one in v. 23 to justify taking the former as part of the pattern and not the latter. For this reason Scoralick’s demarcation seems preferable. It can be substantiated by genre features, syntactic constructions, parallelism type and by the spread of catchwords, all of which is too much to ignore or to put down to coincidence. The pattern reveals a concentric symmetry.316 It can be sketched as follows: 22 ‫ יהוה‬saying; ‫יסף‬ 23 ‫כ‬-comparison; “synthetic” parallelism 24 ‫צדיק – רשע‬ 25 ‫צדיק – רשע‬ 26 ‫כ‬-comparison; “synthetic” parallelism 27 ‫ יהוה‬saying; ‫יסף‬

Framed as they are by two Yahweh sayings (one of which carries the key concept of the book’s motto [1:7; cf. 9:10]), the two ‫צדיק‬/‫רשע‬-proverbs in the centre can hardly be denied a religious dimension, whatever one might judge their meaning as independent proverbs to be. 10:22 Yahweh’s blessing, that is what makes rich, and toil does not add a thing alongside it. The proverb continues the seven-beat pattern dominating those in the vicinity (cf. vv. 15; 17ff.). Consisting of two verbal sentences, the saying is a syntactic chiasmus: predicate: ‫תעשיר‬

subject: ‫ברכת יהוה‬

subject: ‫עצב‬

predicate: ‫לא־יוסף‬

It is not a normal antithetical proverb,317 although there is an element of contrast in the fact that the first hemistich says what is the source of wealth and the second says what is not. Since the subjects are different in the two sentences, the negative hemistich confirms the positive one by providing 315 Heim (2013, 250; cf. 2001, 126-132) similarly finds a cluster containing subgroups in almost the same verses. According to him, they are vv. 22-25 and vv. 27-30, while v. 26 stands between them. 316 Krüger (1995, 428) prints the lines in a way that suggests an ABCCBA structure, but does not provide a substantiating discussion. 317 Fuhs gives it the traditional label, “synthetic parallelism.” See below on v. 23 for Hrushovski’s consideration of rhythmic stresses as support for parallelism.

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another vantage point from which wealth can be considered. By doing so, the b-sentence adds a dimension to the a-sentence and thereby enriches it, so that together they make the same fundamental statement.318 Most commentators stress that the saying does not affirm inertia, which would be contrary to the diligence inculcated in v. 4 (Murphy) and many other proverbs, including those that deride sloth (e.g. 12:24; 13:4; 15:19; 19:24; 20:4, 13; 21:5, 25; 22:13; 24:30-34; 26:13-16 etc.). That is so, but the proverb can be read in several ways that need to be weighed up against each other. The following are possibilities: (a) The first possibility: The subject of the first hemistich is “blessing” and the subject of the second hemistich is the third person masculine singular of which Yahweh is the antecedent.319 Then “toil” must be the object in the second sentence: The blessing of Yahweh makes rich and he (Yahweh) does not add toil to the wealth with which he has blessed a person. So Chrysostom (on the basis of the Greek text), Toy, McKane, Waltke, and a number of English versions.320 The basis for this interpretation occurs in the Septuagint: καὶ οὐ μὴ προστεθῇ αὐτῇ λύπη ἐν καρδίᾳ (and misery is not added to it in the heart);321 so also the Peshitta: Íäï À{Íæ ¿ćà ¿Â¾Ý{ (and pain will not be with it); the Vulgate: nec sociabit ei adflictio (and affliction will not associate with it). It may be objected that the feminine subject in the first hemistich would be paralleled by a masculine third person singular in the verb of the second. Its antecedent would have to be the nomen rectum of the genitive construction, which would create an extra object (“toil”) in the second hemistich and undo the chiastic parallelism. Moreover, the notion itself would run counter to a well-established theme in sapiential literature. The pious Job was wealthy (Job 1:1-3) and nevertheless experienced the addition of many hardships (Job 1:13-19), to which he reacted by ascribing both the blessing and the affliction to Yahweh (Job 1:21). Qohelet knew that both sides of the issue are possible. God may give wealth together with the ability to enjoy it (Qoh 5:18), but he could also withhold the ability to enjoy it. For instance, a rich person may experience the same fate as Job (Qoh 5:14, cf. Job 1:21) and find that nothing but toil and worry follows (Qoh 5:10, 11, 12f.; cf. 6:1f.). 318 Somewhat like Marcel Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel in the New York Museum of Modern Art. Mounted on a stool, the wheel is neither a repetition of the stool nor an antithesis of it, but together they draw attention to the same basic aspects of viewing modern art. 319 Alter also takes the third person masculine singular as the subject, however not with Yahweh, but the impersonal third person as subject and ‫ עצב‬as object (“and one increases no pain through it”), thus combining features of the first as well as the second options discussed under these two options. 320 For instance, NRSV, NEB, REB, NIV; cf. Bertheau, who criticises a number of early exegetes for choosing this option. 321 On the reason for the addition of καρδία, see the text-critical note on v. 21.

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(b) Secondly, the interpretation that does best justice to the text. “Toil” is indeed the subject in the second hemistich, but the third person feminine singular suffix with ‫ )עמה( עם‬can only refer to the blessing (‫ )ברכה‬in the first hemistich, which is feminine (Clifford). Therefore the toil (‫)עצב‬ is to be understood as an entity “alongside it,” namely alongside the blessing. Several commentators translate this way (cf. Bertheau, Delitzsch and Meinhold [“neben ihm”]). In my opinion, this is the correct option, since the preposition ‫ עם‬is used and not ‫על‬.322 But the moot point is how the toil acting alongside / at the side of / apace with the blessing is to be interpreted. Fox says that ‫ עם‬does not elsewhere mean “to” and therefore does not allow the translation “add to it.” According to him, humans have to work and then “God carries their efforts to fruition.” Fox translates ‫ עצב‬by “striving” and explains it as “overwork,” claiming it is called “hastening” (21:5, cf. 19:2 and 28:20). What he calls the “divine-human collaboration” in fact means God blesses pertinent work with wealth, but not too much work, which makes “overwork” useless and impious. This seems tendentious, notably in order to get “toil” and “hastening” to mean “striving” which can be interpreted as “overwork.” But the verb for “hasten” (‫ )אוץ‬in 21:5 is contrasted with planning, not with work, and the contrast is between careful planning and impatient overhastiness, not between work and overwork. In 28:20 the same verb refers to any scheme to get rich quickly (cf. 1:10-14) and not specifically to overwork. Additionally, the verb is qualified by ‫( להעשיר‬to gain riches), which shows that ‫ אוץ‬itself has nothing to do with striving overwork. According to Meinhold, Fox and others,323 the proverb advocates a synergism of God and humans. But if the preposition ‫ עם‬means “with,” and if the antecedent of its suffix is the blessing, then the second hemistich says that human toil, considered as a phenomenon alongside or together with (‫ )עם‬blessing, adds nothing; to what, is not expressed, but clearly implied. If human toil adds nothing as an alternative source of wealth, it adds no extra wealth to the wealth already granted by God’s blessing. An outline may sum it up:

322 It seems to me that Fox also tends in this direction, although he does not cite Meinhold. The difference between his translations “thereto” (accepted) and “to it” (rejected) for ‫ עמה‬is at best very marginal. The rendering, “striving adds nothing more thereto” does not clarify the subtlety that toil is denied to be a source of wealth “with it” = alongside divine blessing as such a source. It rather suggests that striving does not add value to that which blessing gives, while Fox seems to mean that striving itself is not an additional source like blessing is. The logical thrust is the same both ways, but the preposition ‫ עם‬instead of ‫ על‬makes the nuance necessary. It may be noted that Delitzsch also translates “neben ihm,” but that the English translation by Easton incorrectly renders it “thereto,” as does Fox. 323 Cf. also earlier scholars as Skladny (1962, 27, 75) and Schmid (1966, 148); also Vol. I, 41.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

10:22a 10:22b

source divine blessing human toil

→ →

169 outcome wealth : wealth :

statement made affirmed denied

This maintains that only divine blessing makes rich and that human toil does not. As such it says the opposite of 10:4; 13:4 (Van Leeuwen).324 Of course humans are to work as these proverbs on diligence and laziness325 and the frequently cited Ps 127 maintain, of course God can bless (Job 1:10) and confirm (Ps 90:17) the work of human hands. But that does not mean that God needs the work of humans with which he can co-operate so as to be able to bless them.326 In wisdom literature and elsewhere wealth can even be ascribed neither to God’s blessing nor to the virtue of diligence (cf. 1:13; 19:14; 28:6), which contradicts both v. 4 and v. 22 and evokes the so-called theodicy problem (cf. Pss 37, 49, 73).327 On the literary level, this problem is conjured up by the very tension between vv. 22 and 4, which is an expression of the way in which the sages sought to come to terms with the fundamental tension in their experience of the world. The earlier saying so clearly declares that human labour makes one rich and v. 22 so clearly denies it that the contradiction cannot be overlooked or explained away (Krüger, cf. Van Leeuwen). Maintaining both poles creates a sphere in which they hold each other in check and each shows where the respective limit328 of the other is. The tension brought about by the “characteristic exaggeration of many proverbs,” as Murphy calls the categorical statements of such verses,329 brings 324

The same goes for those proverbs where failure is exposed as the consequence of sloth (cf. 6:10f.; 19:15; 20:4) and for those where work is praised as the source of wealth; cf. especially 14:23a, where it is expressly said that “there is profit in all toil” (‫)בכל עצב יהיה מותר‬. On every count the assertions by Pilch (2016, 217-218), who contends that “[p]rofit-making and the acquisition of wealth were automatically assumed to be the result of extortion or fraud” and “[t]he notion of an honest rich man in antiquity was an oxymoron,” are evidently invalid for the Book of Proverbs (in the commentary section of his book, Pilch skips Prov 10:22). It seems to me that the sociological thesis of “limited good” is read into his examples rather than examining whether or not it can be adduced as evidence for the thesis. Cf. the notes above on v. 4. 325 Whybray calls the proverb a “correction,” and a “theological reinterpretation” of v. 4b. Cf. Sandoval (2006, 134-141) on the value of diligence in what he calls “the wisdom’s virtues discourse,” namely that the hearer of the sayings “is being rhetorically prodded into a life of industrious activities.” Since a saying such as 10:22 would rather undermine that kind of didactic rhetoric, it is not usable in such a discourse and unsurprisingly, therefore, not discussed by Sandoval. 326 Similarly Krüger (1995, 429) in criticism of Meinhold. This is highlighted by the casus pendens with ‫ היא‬in the first hemistich: “The blessing of Yahweh – that (and nothing else) is what makes rich;” so also Wildeboer, Hausmann (1995, 258) and Fuhs. A pertinent example of “anything else” is the fact that not even the most strenuous toil makes rich. 327 On this issue, cf. Loader (2001a, 3-23). 328 Similarly Hausmann (1995, 258), Yoder; Tuinstra, following Delitzsch, calls v. 22 the first part and v. 4 the second part of the motto, Ora et labora. 329 Cf. the classic example of contradictory proverbs in 26:4-5.

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about a balance in the social and certainly the literary context within which they function, so that neither is watered down and both testify to the limits of human wisdom. Work is rewarded with wealth – that is an expression of the deed-consequence nexus, the default position of the sages. But that is not the whole story. The sages were just as aware that reality is too complex to confine to one formula. Precisely because the “normal” situation is unthinkable without God, the Creator of the order, it cannot be encapsulated in one saying. Therefore neither of the opposing poles contains the full reality.330 I think this should be recognised as a major aspect of Brown’s felicitous idea of “wisdom’s wonder.”331 Several rabbinic authorities attempt to merge divine and human activity in their explanation of the proverb, while others spiritualise it. The first of these options is represented by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, who says the meaning is: “The blessing that comes to one from God because of one’s destiny (‫)על פי מזלו‬ or because of one’s good works (‫)על פי מעשיו הטבים‬, that is (‫ )היא‬what makes a man rich.” Hame’iri declares the blessing of God to be “the strength to produce wealth” (‫)כח לעשות חיל‬, i.e., so that humans can work with what God has done first. Nahmias relates blessing to the character of a righteous person, whose blessing is so great that even owning little is of no consequence to him. Hence the non-material blessing is real wealth. A century earlier, Gerondi had also used the destiny motif, but he did so precisely to reject synergism between God and humans. Those destined to receive wealth, will not ruminate or agonise about it, while those whose destiny is poverty, will not be able to work themselves out of it in any case. However, if one is righteous, one will accept either allotment and not care about it. The second line of interpretation is put forward by the Vilna Gaon, for whom blessing refers to the wealth acquired by learning Torah. The ending of the proverb accordingly means that those blessed by the wealth of Torah do not experience any toil to learn it. This is reminiscent of the view of the Sabbath advanced in the Midrash Rabbah,332 where Prov 10:22 is applied to God’s blessing of the Sabbath in Gen 2:3. To experience the Sabbath is to experience wealth, since the Sabbath was blessed by more food from heaven (manna) than weekdays, while the last part of the proverb is applied to the absence of sorrow (‫)עצב‬, which may not be expressed on the Sabbath.333 The expository note on this verse in the fragmentary catena-like commentary on Proverbs by Origen (185-254 CE)334 comes quite close to the position that the Vilna Gaon would later take. He begins with the feminine pronoun and verb (‫)היא תעשיר‬, which he translates literally (Αὔτη πλουτίζει). The argument is: If the blessing of the Lord makes rich, then “those who walk in the Law of the Lord” (οἱ δὲ πορευόμενοι εν νόμῳ Κυρίου) are rich, since they are the ones who are blessed. Staying in the Law thus “plainly” (ἄρα) means spiritual wealth.

330

Millar (2020, 215) calls it “a fragmentary view of reality.” Brown (2014, passim). For a discussion of the issue, see Essay 4 in Vol. I, 39-46. 332 See Ber Rab 11,1-2. 333 The Midrash thus refers to material blessing as well as inner tranquillity, which is also what Ginsburg (1998, 188) himself accepts. 334 MPG 13, 31-32. 331

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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Melanchthon comments on the first hemistich at length. According to him, the giving of material wealth is ascribed to God for four reasons, viz. to teach us about the providence of God, to teach people to call on God in faith and hope, that faith in the spiritual things should have precedence also in prayers for worldly things, and finally, that the church may serve God in this life without suffering from desperation. These are therefore the reasons that even great human work cannot be of any further help (second hemistich). He does not offer an exegetical exposition of the first half, but provides his systematic convictions about providence as grounds for Scripture saying such a thing, and afterwards reads the second half as confirmation of these convictions. In that sense, he may be said to read the first hemistich under the impact of the second, but in fact he reads both under the impact of what he believes to be the general biblical teaching on the subject. This can be understood against the backdrop of Reformation theology claiming that Scripture is its own interpreter (Scriptura sui ipsius interpres).

10:23 Committing a disgrace is like a delight to a fool, so is wisdom to a man with understanding. The syntax of the 4+3 proverb can be mapped in different ways. In any case it is, like the previous verse, an example of how difficult it can be to classify such a saying as “synthetic,” “antithetic” or “synonymous.” The verse can be read as two sentences with a comparative construction in the first one only. Or it can be read as one sentence consisting of a comparative construction in which both the protasis and the apodosis depend on the particle ‫כ‬.335 Thirdly, it can be read as two independent sentences. Thus: • Taken as two sentences, the ‫כ‬-clause comprises the verb phrase of verset a. ‫וחכמה לאיש תבונה‬ Pred

Subj

‫עשות זמה‬

‫כ שחוק לכסיל‬

Subj Pred

Committing a disgrace is like (‫ )כ‬a laughing matter to a fool / so is wisdom to a man of understanding • Taken as one sentence, the ‫כ‬-construction determines versets a and b. ‫ו חכמה לאיש תבונה‬

‫עשות זמה‬

‫כ שחוק לכסיל‬

As (‫ )כ‬committing a disgrace is a laughing matter to a fool, so wisdom is to a man of understanding 335 As evident in its translation ἐν γέλωτι (in laughter), the Septuagint read ‫בשחוק‬, which is also attested in some Hebrew manuscripts of Kennicott and De Rossi. As pointed out in BHQ, this can only be an error, since it is directly followed by the preposition ‫ל‬.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

• The third possibility is to accept with the Targum and the Peshitta that we have two sentences in the verse, but that the second does not carry an elliptic ‫שחוק‬. Then the Hebrew could be rendered: It is like a joke for a fool to commit a disgrace, / but wisdom belongs to an understanding man.336

The latter option has been proposed by Plöger, who recognises a contrast in the two verse halves. It is grammatically possible, but it would weaken the parallelism, since possessing something is not a suitable antithesis to joking at something else. There is indeed a clear contrast between “fool” and “man of understanding,” but also between disgraceful villainy as a matter of pleasure to the one type and wisdom giving pleasure337 to the other type. Moreover, even on Plöger’s submission the force of parallelism would compel the reader to consider the reciprocal influence of the two hemistichs in each other’s light and end up linking their contents stylistically if not syntactically. As far as that is concerned, it is justified to call the proverb “antithetical,” as suggested by commentators who begin their translation of the second hemistich with “but” (Murphy, Fox, Waltke; also Toy338). Nevertheless, the stich as a whole, whether read as one or two sentences, is also a “synthesis” of both hemistichs, since the first is brought to completion in the second. Stylistically the unity of the proverb is also indicated by the chiastic organisation of predicate–subject :: subject–predicate. Additionally, it is helpful to consider Hrushovski’s remark about the supporting strength of the major stresses in parallelism. He says, “The rhythm of major stresses is so strong that sometimes it may be the only supporter of the parallelism of two versets, without any actual repetition of meaning or syntax.”339 In the present case there are indications of parallel contrast and syntactical connection, so that the admittedly subjective effect of a strong sapiential Siebener could add an additional consideration, but the integrating effect of the stress pattern seems even stronger in the previous verse (see above). I therefore prefer the second option noted above, which understands the proverb as a simile (overtly expressed comparison). The fool makes a frivolous game of committing villainous acts. Both ‫שחק‬ and ‫ זמה‬have generic and more specific meanings. ‫ זמה‬can mean an intention (21:27; 24:9 – in both cases with an unfavourable value) and can even be 336 Targum: “When a fool laughs, he contrives business, but wisdom is for the man of understanding.” Peshitta: “When a fool laughs, he does evil, but wisdom provides a man his understanding.” 337 The infinitive ‫ שחוק‬is present elliptically in the second hemistich (Van Leeuwen), “gapped” (Waltke); commentators who do not expressly refer to it, mostly accept the ellipsis implicitly. 338 However, Toy helps the antithesis along by reading ‫( תעבה‬abomination) instead of ‫ ;חכמה‬cf. BHS and Waltke’s objection on text-critical grounds. 339 Hrushovski (2007, 599).

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associated with murder (Hos 6:9). But it often has a more specific sexual connotation and means lewdness or lechery, especially with the verb ‫( עשה‬so Fox, cf. Judg 20:6; Ezk 16:43). The verb ‫ שחק‬is a derivative of ‫ צחק‬340 and in the Qal can mean “laugh,” “joke,” “play” or “amuse” (Judg 16:25 [twice, with both ‫ ש‬and ‫)]צ‬, and, as here, the infinitive is used as a noun meaning “laughter,” “amusement” or “a laughing stock” (14:13; Qoh 2:2; 7:3, 6). The root is also used with sexual overtones (Gen 26:8), which would go well with ‫ זמה‬and the erotic allusions in sapiential literature (cf. 4:6, 8; 8:17, 21;). Then the fool has frivolous amusement from flirting with disgraceful deeds, sexual and otherwise.341 By contrast, the man of understanding, that is, the sensible man, “has” wisdom,342 but not merely in the vapid sense of being occupied with it (Plöger). The elliptic presence of ‫ שחוק‬in the second hemistich is explicable both in linguistic and in poetic terms. First, under the impact of the parallelism, the sensible man experiences joy in wisdom. Second, the contrast of the parallelism means that this is a serious delight, which is to be expected if Wisdom herself can bring God, humans and herself delight (8:30f.).343 It is an experience similar to the psalmist’s joy in the Torah (Ps 119:14, 24, 35, 47f., 143, 162 and passim) and the Jewish concept of experiencing joy in the study of Torah, ‫שמחת תורה‬. What gives people joy says much about their character (so Clifford and Van Leeuwen344). While there are various views among the rabbis about the meaning of ‫זמה‬, most agree on the general meaning of ‫שחוק‬. Rashi and Ramaq as well as the Mezudat David and the Vilna Gaon interpret the laughing matter to indicate that it comes easy for the fool to commit disgraceful deeds, whereas it is easy for a sensible person to be wise. This is explained by Malbim to be the result of habits. Since fools habitually commit villainy, they become so accustomed to it that it comes upon them easily and quickly. 340

The Semitic root is *ḍḥq (Akkadian ṣiāḫu); see KAHAL, HALOT et al. s.v. Leaving v. 23b uncommented, Chrysostom finds the laugh of the first hemistich “a stupidity,” which doubles the trouble to be expected from the “risky business” of sin. 342 Origen (MPG 13, 31-32) interprets the second hemistich differently. He sees no ellipsis and regards “wisdom” as the subject and “understanding” as the object of an independent sentence: “But wisdom gives birth to understanding in a man, which is practical virtue” (Ἡ δὲ σοφία ἀνδρὶ τίκτει φρόνησιν· πρακτικὴν ἀρετήν). 343 See the commentary on 8:30bc-31 in Vol. I, 360-361. 344 Cf. 2:14; 15:21; 26:19; Van Leeuwen finds this principle a “basic theme” relating to individuals, groups and societies in Prov 1-9 and also in Augustine’s City of God, but gives no examples. To him, the “sport” of persons and cultures reveals their characters in the same way as “primary love.” I would agree in as far as the metaphor of love for Wisdom or Folly in Prov 1-9 determines the character of the respective pupils. It could also be said of the basic attuning of the human will towards God and love by the members of the “city of God,” or “the combination of human wills” towards themselves and power by the members of the “earthly city” who follow the way of Cain (Civ Dei XV,7 [NPNF II, 2, 288-289; XIX,17 [NPNF II, 2, 412]). However, as far as I can see, Augustine does not substantiate these ideas with the Book of Proverbs, except perhaps very indirectly by using Prov 18:12 to claim that Adam’s sin was preceded by a wicked desire, viz. pride (Civ Dei XIV,13 [NPNF I, 2, 274]). 341

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By the same token, sensible people are so often occupied by wisdom that it too moulds their character to the extent that it becomes a natural and straightforward way of life. As for the vice called ‫זמה‬, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra refers to Lev 18:17, where the word is used to name illicit sexual relations, which to him is what is meant here (see the discussion above and the reference to Fox).345 The same view is developed by the Vilna Gaon, since moral depravity makes it easy to degenerate from light-hearted banter to debauchery.

10:24 What the wicked man is afraid of, that will come over him, but what righteous people desire will be granted. The proverb is a straightforward antithetic parallelism, again organised as four beats in four words plus three beats in three words. There is a text-critical issue concerning the last word. ‫ יתן‬may be read ‫ יִ ֵתּן‬as it stands in the Masoretic Text,346 or ‫יֻתּן‬ ַ as proposed by Hitzig.347 Some do not wish to choose (e.g. Whybray), or are hesitant (e.g. McKane and Tuinstra). The Aramaic and Syriac versions have passive forms, but that does not necessarily testify to a passive verb form, since the Qal imperfect active can be understood as indefinite,348 which equals the passive usage, or as impersonal, which can be rendered “there will be” (like the German “es wird geben,” so Wildeboer).349 A passive translation in the Targum, Peshitta and Vulgate350 can be the result of reading the indefinite Qal or the quttal-form of a Qal passive not recognised by the Masoretes (so Clifford). In any event, changing the pointing would make little difference to the meaning. Taken as a passive, the implied referent would be understood as Yahweh, who is mentioned in v. 22. If understood as an indefinite or impersonal construction, the implication would also be that God is the source of the fulfilment of the desire (cf. the same implied reference to God in 13:21b). A passive translation can therefore be used to render the indefinite third person masculine singular without having to change the vowels. The dread of the wicked (‫ )מגורת רשע‬is a subjective genitive, that is, it refers to the dread felt by the wicked. The whole genitive construction is in turn the subject of the verb ‫( תבואנו‬come, come upon) and the pronominal 345 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra seems to take ‫ שחוק‬as a joke in the sense of a trifle, which would come near to the easiness spoken of by the other commentators. 346 So Schultens, Delitzsch, Wildeboer, Waltke, Fox, Alter, Sæbø, cf. BHQ. 347 So Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, Ringgren, Scott, Plöger, Meinhold, Murphy, Clifford, cf. BHS. 348 So Waltke; see GKC 144d; IBHS 4.4.2; cf. Job 37:10. 349 See GKC 144b; IBHS 22.7. 350 Targum: ‫ ;תתיהב‬Peshitta: uÍÙĀã; Vulgate: dabitur; Septuagint: δεκτή (is acceptable) – see below.

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suffix third person masculine singular refers to the wicked, who now becomes the object. The two parts of the sentence are clearly marked by another casus pendens with ‫( היא‬cf. v. 22), which gives emphasis: that which the wicked is afraid of – exactly that will come over him. So: The casus pendens subject: the wicked

→ object: the dread [experienced by him]

The whole verset subject: [concrete manifestation of] the dread → object: the wicked referent of the suffix

A moot point is what this dread entails. Is it an inner fear or pang of conscience (Waltke) or fear “in an objective sense” (Clifford)? In other words, does it refer to the emotion itself or to an external phenomenon that installs the fear in the wicked? Since there is ample evidence in the immediate context (v. 23) and elsewhere (1:10-14; 4:16-17, so Meinhold) that the wicked often go about their villainy without being troubled by anxiety or pangs of conscience, the meaning must be that neither their conscience nor any brooding over punishment (McKane), but the punishment itself will come over them. That is, the actual occurrence of what they would regard as a catastrophe if it were to happen, will take place at their cost (the imperfect refers to the future [Vilna Gaon]).351 That was the experience of Job, who found that the thing he feared, not the fear he had already felt anyway, actually came over him (Job 3:25). By contrast, that which righteous people desire, will be granted them. The close antithetical parallelism is perhaps the clearest sign that the first hemistich should not be interpreted to refer to the inner emotion of fear, since in the second hemistich the reward of the righteous cannot be that they may continue to desire. That would imply an unfulfilled wish, which is the opposite of what the proverb says.352 So the symmetry of the two antithetic sides does indeed suggest that retribution will take place “in accord with poetic justice” (Clifford).

351 Fox refers to 1:27a; in 1:26-27 the terror and the calamity are telescoped in a chiastic pattern of calamity (‫)אד‬, panic (‫ ;)פחד‬panic (‫)פחד‬, calamity (‫ ;)אד‬cf. 1:26-27; Vol. I, 97 and below on v. 25. This is also combined with the motif of a storm as metaphor of the actual calamity, which too follows directly in 10:25, where the noun ‫ סופה‬is used again. In both cases the due symmetry of the deed-consequence nexus is alluded to. A clear confirmation is provided by Isa 66:4: ‫( ומגורתם אביא להם‬and what they are afraid of, I will bring over them), where the suffix in ‫ מגורתם‬must entail that they already have fear, the contents of which will be brought over them by God at some point in the future. 352 In the description of the Martyrdom of Ignatius (2nd century), v. 24b is quoted to illustrate the fulfilment of the wish for martyrdom on biblical grounds. Ignatius had expressed the desire to die a martyr’s death, which was fulfilled “according to that which is written” when he was thrown to wild animals (Mart Ign VI, ANF I, 131).

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The Codex Alexandrinus of the Septuagint adds expansions to both hemistichs,353 so that two complete stichs of two versets each result. ἐν ἀπωλείᾳ ἀσεβὴς περιφέρεται δουλεύσει δὲ ἄφρων φρονίμῳ ἐπιθυμία δὲ δικαίου δεκτή καρδία δὲ ἀσεβοῦς ἐκλείψει (In destruction the wicked rambles about and the fool will serve the prudent. The desire of the righteous is acceptable, but the heart of the wicked will fail.) The first of the newly formed stichs illustrates the difficulty of endeavours to maintain watertight distinctions between the types of parallelism. The first line of v. 24 in the Alexandrine version is now a so-called “synthetic” parallelism in as far as the second hemistich completes the first. But there is also a “synonymous” element in that the misfortune of the wicked/fool is repeated. Likewise, there is an “antithetic” element in that the contrast between the fortunes of the wicked/fool and the wise/ prudent is expressed. The second new stich is a straightforward antithetical saying. Moreover, it also shows the dynamism of a proverbial text (so EE), even in the transmission process within the Greek tradition. Sayings can be modified, combined and made into new ones. The Peshitta also deviates strongly from the Masoretic Text: ÇðÙĀã ¿Ù˾ćà ¿ćàÎï uÍُ ¿úÙxÏà ÁüÃé{ (The sinner is dragged to destruction, but hope is given to the righteous.) The Peshitta is dependent on the Septuagint in the first half, and in the second it either read the Hebrew as ‫ יֻ ַתּן‬or understood it as an indefinite Qal (like the Targum and the Vulgate, see above). But the motif of hope is an original contribution. Weitzman354 has pointed out that the Peshitta of Proverbs often introduces this idea where it is not expressed in the Hebrew. In the context it has the capacity to ameliorate the problem that the wicked sometimes have pleasure in their villainy (v. 23a) and that the blessing of Yahweh (v. 22a) is not always apparent in everyday reality. The idea of hope would at least offer material to reflect on the discrepancies.

According to Waltke, “[t]his verse nuances v. 23.” In the previous proverb it was said that the wicked have fun doing wicked things, but the antithesis in that verse makes no mention of due rewards for the righteous/wise. Therefore both sides of the equation are addressed in v. 24. The wicked may have pleasure while practising evil, but the punishment will come (v. 24a). Conversely, the man of insight will be fully rewarded for his wisdom when 353 The first, expanding v. 24a, repeats 11:29b; the second, which comes after v. 24b, repeats 10:20b. 354 Weitzman (1999, 224); see 2:7; 8:21; 11:3; 13:12 (in the latter case the idea of hope is present in the Hebrew, but interpreted and expanded in the Peshitta); cf. also EE.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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his every desire is fulfilled (v. 24b). In my opinion, this is correct, although it should be pointed out that the connections between vv. 24 and 25 are even stronger in this regard,355 so that the poetic justice becomes even clearer when we consider the question with v. 25 in mind as well (see below, especially on v. 25b and ‫)עולם‬. Meinhold cites Rashi’s interpretation of the proverb by means of the story of the Tower of Babel. The locals wanted to build a tower right up to heaven because they feared that they would be scattered all over the earth (Gen 11:4). Exactly that happened to them (Gen 11:9). Since they were filled with hubris because they wanted to “make a name” for themselves, the precise thing that they feared came over them. God did not now instil in them a fear that they would have had if they had reckoned with the deed-consequence connection (which they evidently did not), but the content of their fear is what came to pass. Since the same can be assumed in v. 24 (cf. also the storm in v. 25a, which the wicked certainly did not contemplate while doing evil anyway), Rashi’s example does not need to be assuaged as Meinhold suggests. The Vilna Gaon is of the opinion that the wicked fear the effects of their own sins. That would mean that they at least know that there is a connection between evil deeds and punishment, which in turn suggests that they concede that they are in the wrong. He further develops the proverb’s thought by emphasising the future tense (see above) and transferring the reward to the coming world – which takes care of the theodicy problem. In the same strain, the Vilna Gaon infers from the proverb that the reward will be unlimited because it is given by the infinite God himself and therefore exceeds that which the deeds themselves can achieve. Malbim balances the two sides of the antithesis in interpreting the first half to mean that the wicked can devise no plan to escape their punishment, while the righteous will have to do nothing to receive their reward apart from thinking about it. However, this still presupposes the good deeds that they have to do in order to be righteous at all. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra thinks the desire of the righteous is to destroy the wicked (‫)להשמיד הרשעים‬, which is what God will grant them. The use of the proverb by the Spanish mystic, St. John of the Cross (1542-1591), goes in the opposite direction, but does contain a degree of similarity to the Vilna Gaon, whom he predated by two centuries. In his expository notes to the “Ascent of Mount Carmel,”356 he addresses the problem of divine promises that are not seen to be fulfilled. Like the Vilna Gaon, he explains the discrepancy as only apparent, but does it in his own way. He uses texts from Holy Scripture to argue that such promises are in fact kept, although not as humans would expect, since they are deferred to the hereafter. As proof, he uses Prov 10:24b in conjunction with Ps 9:17a. The proverb says, desiderium suum iustis dabitur (to the just his desire will be granted), and the psalm says, desiderium pauperum exaudivit Dominus (the Lord has granted the poor their desire). If, then, the righteous find at the end of their life that the promise of the proverb has remained unfulfilled, then the future tense of the promise and the past tense of the psalm together show that it has now been “fulfilled perfectly in the next life” (which has begun for the faithful [= poor]357 in question). 355

The same goes for the links between vv. 23 and 26 (see the sketch above ). Asc Carm II,19, 13 (see Carrigan 2010, 86). 357 As a monk, John would probably have understood the piety of poverty, but here the reference suits the fact that all who die without the fulfilment of promises made to them can be seen as “poor.” 356

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

10:25 When the storm has passed, the wicked is no more, but the righteous is a lasting foundation. Yet another 4+3 proverb follows. It consists of two antithetic nominal sentences. According to Meinhold, the saying forms a pair with v. 24, which is understood in a similar way by others (e.g. Plöger, Whybray, Van Leeuwen, Waltke and Schipper358). In their present position they are not only linked by the catchwords ‫ צדיק – רשע‬in that order, but also by the theme, which is the “fulfilment” of what the reader of v. 24 can expect (Plöger) or by the fact that they describe “more explicitly” the dread and the desire of the previous verse (Whybray). Thus the two stichs influence each other, but also the hemistichs of v. 25 have a prospective and retrospective effect within the proverb. The syntax and theme as well as the motifs used help the reader to understand the two hemistichs in terms of each other. A further literary argument for the coherence of the two proverbs is that several of their motifs are also associated with each other in a passage from Lady Wisdom’s address to fools (1:26-27), where the same ideas as in 10:24-25 occur.359 As Waltke observes, the temporal clause with ‫ כ‬in the first hemistich has no counterpart in the second hemistich, which means that it modifies both hemistichs (similarly Sæbø). Therefore the storm engulfs all, the wicked as well as the righteous. The storm in itself is a neutral natural phenomenon and not a punishment. However, the wicked attitude/deeds of some people make them susceptible to its destructive power and the righteousness of others make them immune to the same power,360 so that it becomes a punishment for some but not for others. In this way the incomplete metaphor of the storm motif is carried over to the second hemistich, and, by the same token, the architectural motif is carried back to the first hemistich: 358 Toy does not explicitly say so, but his grouping the lines as what I would call a couplet and their layout in his commentary point in the same direction. 359 The motifs are fear, catastrophe and storm (‫ סופה‬as well as ‫)שואה‬, and the point remains valid irrespective of the decision about an objective or a subjective genitive in 1:27 (cf. Vol. I, 97-98). Fox thinks that the threat of Lady Wisdom (1:16-27) was “probably” derived from 10:24-25. Cf. the note above on the comparison of v. 24 with 1:26-27. 360 All over the ancient Near East, the storm is a metaphor for several kinds of catastrophe, e.g. 1:27 (so Schipper); cf. Isa 28:18 (Fuhs). It is a strong metaphor for military destruction in the Lamentation over the Destruction of Ur (ANET, 455-463) and appears in several Mesopotamian royal annals such as Esarhaddon (Syrian Campaign II, ANET, 291), Sennacherib (v, 58-60, 57-77; vi, 3-5; Luckenbill [1924, 41, 44f.]) and Assurbanipal (ANET, 297, 300); probably also in Ugaritic literature such as the Krt Epic (KTU 1.14, II, 39-40; IV, 17-18 [kmyr, “like a dust-storm” or km yr “like a rain-storm”?]; ANET, 143f.); cf. Tsumura (2005, 184-185); vice versa, for military action as metaphor for storms in the Gilgamesh Epic, see Tsumura (2005, 187); Schipper cites Amenemope 3,15 as an example of the metaphorical use of the motif (“a storm of words”).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10 V. 25a when the storm has passed wicked [+ his house foundation] is gone

→ ←

179 V. 25b [when the storm has passed] righteous proves to be a lasting house foundation

The image of a storm sweeping away the wicked man together with his house occurs also in Job 27:13-23. Several of the words in this passage are also the same as in Prov 10:25 (the ‫[ רשע‬v. 13] is swept away by a ‫[ סופה‬v. 20] so that he “is no more” [v. 19, ‫]איננו‬, while the ‫[ צדיק‬v. 17] is favoured). In the Job passage the architectural motif is represented by the more common ‫( בית‬Job 27:18) and by the noun for a flimsy hut (‫ )סכה‬built by a mere insect (‫ עש‬361), which contrasts strongly with the sturdy foundation (‫ )יסוד‬in the proverb, while the speed with which the wicked disappear into non-existence (vv.19-20) is just as clear in Job’s words as in the proverb.362 All of this does not entitle us to speculate about literary dependence one way or the other, but it does show that the complex of motifs and words making up the theme was well known. The righteous man “is” a sturdy foundation, which, by virtue of the reciprocal influence of the parallel versets, means that the wicked is thought of in architectural terms as well, namely as a flimsy structure such as that mentioned in Job 27:18. If the one “is” a flimsy and the other a sturdy building,363 then it could also suggest what these two types mean to others “in their house” or social sphere of responsibility (similarly Meinhold and Tuinstra). The wicked draws others into disaster with him and the righteous is a pillar of strength for those around him. The foundation is qualified by a genitivus qualitatis ‫( עולם‬durableness, permanence, perpetuity). I doubt whether this entitles us to see an eschatological dimension in the proverb – which is not said explicitly by Waltke, although he does suggest it by stating, with reference to Matt 7:24-27, that the scenario of the proverb “anticipates the eschatological age to come” (most commentators make the gospel reference). Delitzsch also associates the proverb with “the close of the Sermon on the Mount” and thinks that the proverb here “finds the final confirmation of its truth,” although he admits that that is not as the poet understood it from his “narrow” perspective. Krüger364 offers another proposal. His argument is that, since ‫ עולם‬means “auf längere Sicht” (for an indefinite time),365 it enables 361 The word is used as an image of infirmity or fragility, cf. Ps 39:12; Job 4:19 (BDB, KAHAL; KBL mentions the possibility of the meaning “bird’s nest” in Job 27:18 et al.). 362 In a rhetorical question Job (21:18) had denied that the wicked are swept away by winds and storms. 363 Delitzsch takes “foundation” as a synecdoche for “house,” rightly, in my opinion, the sense of the synecdoche being that it highlights the attribute of sturdiness, which is the tertium comparationis here. 364 Krüger (1995, 430). 365 Similarly Fox (“indefinite future,” “lifetime,” “the entirety of the period relevant to context”); Barr (1962, 69) sums it up by stating that the meaning of ‫ עולם‬entails “a kind of

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the reader of the edited proverbs to find an answer to the problem arising from the experience of a deficient deed-consequence nexus (Krüger refers to vv. 2 and 16). The lack of reward or punishment due in terms of this system can then be seen as an interim, i.e. passing, disruption of the just order that will be fixed durably for the righteous and entails annihilation for the wicked. Delitzsch arrives at a similar conclusion, however not on the basis of the text but with the help of the Sermon on the Mount. Even on that submission – which may be as consolatory as Krüger’s proposal – the basic question of why injustice is often allowed to happen, still remains a mystery. With reference to the Babylonian Talmud (Yoma 38b) Meinhold points out that v. 25b is invoked in rabbinic Judaism as substantiation that the world can be preserved on account of one righteous person.366 This is a widely held opinion and is quite understandable, since ‫ עולם‬can also mean “world” and the whole hemistich can therefore also be translated, “the righteous is the foundation of the world” (so already the Targum [‫בעלמא‬, in the world]). But even if ‫ עולם‬is understood as “everlasting,” the sentence can still be interpreted this way: if “he” is a permanent foundation, then it must be for something to be founded upon. In both cases the singular ‫צדיק‬ is taken as theologically very significant. Thus the Vilna Gaon’s argument is that the righteous holds up others through personal merit, even after death. The Midrash Rabbah relates the proverb to the story of the Flood (Ber Rab 30:1): the first hemistich refers to the people of the Flood, who were swept away by (what could also be called) a storm and perished, while the righteous Noah became the foundation of the world through whom humankind was saved from extinction. Rashi and Hame’iri emphasise the suddenness of the destruction of the wicked, which is a typical way for punishment to arrive. The Apostolic Father Ignatius (c. 35-107 C.E.) uses the obvious scribal error in the Septuagint of 10:25 to the advantage of his own argument.367 In the second hemistich, the Hebrew word ‫( יסוד‬foundation) was read ‫( יסור‬turn away = ἐκκλίνας), producing: “The righteous man, turning away, is saved forever.” Ignatius quotes this verset first and combines it with the second half of 11:3 in the Greek version (“but the destruction of the wicked is sudden and a matter of joy”). Warning against range between ‘remotest time’ and ‘perpetuity’,” and stresses in his typical way the importance of context in every case for determining the relevant point in the range. Cf. THAT II, 230, where Jenni shows that “unlimited duration” is the only possible meaning when ‫ עולם‬is used as the genitive in a status constructus combination, which is the case in this proverb (“a foundation of durability”). The motif of durability as characteristic of the righteous occurs often in the book; cf. v. 7 and v. 30; 12:3, 7; 14:11. So Hausmann (1995, 47f.), who, however, translates v. 25b as, “aber der Rechtschaffene – er hat einen ewigen Grund” (but the righteous – he has an everlasting grounding). She also cites several comparable proverbs (such as 11:6, 18 and others) that use other terminology to convey continuance for good people. 366 This well-known principle is taken to its extreme by Rambam (Hilkot Teshuvah 3, 4). He requires people to consider the whole world half good and half guilty, so that only one extra transgression could tilt the world to disaster, while the fulfilment of one extra mitzvah could tilt it towards being saved. Using the metaphor for sturdiness, he supports his point by quoting v. 25b to say that “the righteous man is the foundation of the world.” This also implies that one sinner could be a slumping foundation, but it would be consistent with the thrust of v. 25a. 367 Epist Eph VII (ANF I, 52).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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teachers who spread an unworthy doctrine “to their own destruction,” he uses his new antithetical proverb to undergird the two sides of his message. First, that believers should turn away from the impious as one would avoid wild animals, and be saved forever. Second, that the false teachers will suddenly perish. Here too, as above on v. 24, we can observe how different proverbs can be taken apart and reconstructed in new ways to form new ones for application in new situations – not only in the inner-Septuagint tradition, but also in the early Christian literary use of the tradition.

10:26 As vinegar to the teeth and as smoke to the eyes so is the sluggard to those who send him. According to Clifford, this is the only verse in the chapter that is built with three units (he calls it a “tricolon,” which corresponds to a tristich in my terminology).368 However, that would require a rather unusual rhythmic organisation of 2+2+3. Gemser may have considered this option and then decided that it is less probable. He marks it as 4 (2+2)+3, by which he, however, more probably intends to point out the symmetrical makeup in the metre and syntax of the first hemistich (which also marks the double simile, see below), and thus reads the line as a conventional Siebener. This is supported by McCreesh’s observation of the sound patterns in the proverb.369 He says: In this proverbial simile the two images are indicated by the same sequence and these in turn are echoed by the same sounds in the second colon370 ... In the first colon the two images of vinegar and smoke share a sequence of the same sounds ... The dual endings on the second word of each simile help both to distinguish each half of that colon and also to link them together. Thus, the sound patterns follow the syntax of the colon and serve to emphasize or mark it. Each simile, in other words, echoes or repeats the major sounds of the other and in almost the same sequence.

According to McCreesh, this “tags” the second hemistich, which itself echoes other sounds in the first hemistich. I would summarise the relevant consonants and vowels as follows: v. 26a k ṣ l š nayim371 k š n l nayim

v. 26b k n ṣ l

368 Albright ([1955] 1969, 5) also speaks of a “tricolon.” That is the case in the longer stichs of the Ugaritic examples cited below, but not in the proverb of 10:26. However, the stylistic structure of a double simile nevertheless remains the same. See Vol. I, 3 for a summary of the terminology. 369 McCreesh (1991, 76-77). 370 The word “colon” is the equivalent of “hemistich” (and sometimes “verset”) in my terminology. 371 The vocalisation making it a dual instead of the expected plural (teeth), is obviously intended by the Masoretes and, in light of the other sound matches, probably reflects the original intention as well.

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In inverted order the sequences l+š and cāš in v. 26a form alliteration as well as assonance with respectively l+š and cāṣ in v. 26b.

The proverb is a single sentence consisting of a double comparison.372 The structure of the twofold comparison also occurs in Ugaritic epics.373 For instance, in the Baal Epic and the Krt Epic:374 As the heart of a cow for her calf, as the heart of an ewe for her lamb, so is the heart of Anat for Baal. and As the heifer lows for her calf, as soldier boys call for their mothers, so the people of Udm moan.

There is one tertium comparationis shared by vinegar and smoke which is also found in the conduct of the sluggard.375 That is the unpleasant effect they have on humans. Sour vinegar376 is painful on teeth cavities (of which most ancients must have been acutely aware) and smoke irritates the eyes (of which most people who have had to cook on an open fire will be aware). The smoke adds no new logical element to the vinegar, and the use of the double comparison is therefore rightly ascribed to its emphasising effect by Waltke (Story had already called it “a sort of climactic effect”). Perhaps the emphasis can be understood in the light of the person who is being compared to the physical irritations. He is called “the sluggard” (‫ העצל‬with the definite article) and is therefore not any accidental loafer, but a specific type of person.377 This can be seen in the fact that, as Plöger says, the proverb is less about the useless sluggard than about the damaging impact he has (cf. Lucas). As a sluggard he does not even have enough diligence 372 The use of the conjunction ‫ כ‬shapes the comparison stylistically as a simile; cf. above on v. 23, which is also a ‫כ‬-comparison and a “synthetic” parallelism, and the notes at the beginning of the cluster on the formal relationship between vv. 23 and 26. 373 See Watson (2001, 258-259), who calls it a “cumulative simile.” McKane cites Albright (1969, 5) to this effect, but the point was first made by C.I.K. Story (1945, 319-337; 322 for the Baal quotation). 374 KTU 6, II, 6-7, recurring at 28-30 (Baal); KTU 1.14, I, 5-7 (Krt); cf. also McKane. 375 Luchsinger (2010, 235) claims that the comparison in the proverb differs from metaphor by virtue of its limitation to a single point of comparison, but that is also true of a metaphor (e.g., if God “is” a rock, the tertium comparationis is reliability, not lifelessness, hardness or insensibility). The difference rather lies in the overtness or covertness of the saying, that is, in the presence or absence of the conjunction ‫ כ‬and therefore in the explicitness (in a simile) or implicitness (in a metaphor) of the comparison. 376 Sometimes diluted vinegar was taken as refreshment (e.g. Ruth 2:14), but when it has become acetous (cf. 25:20), it is disgusting (Ps 69:22b). For its association with wine, cf. Num 6:3. 377 For an extensive discussion of the sluggard as opposed to the diligent antipode, see Hausmann (1995, 66-77; 71-72 on 10:26).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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to take care of his own business – how much less would he look after the interests of another person? He has the social (and conceivably the financial and even political) effect on his employer that vinegar and smoke have physically on humans. A messenger was not merely an errand boy, but a key person with important responsibilities (cf. Gen 24 for a vivid description of the goods entrusted to such a messenger, the importance of the business he had to conduct in the interests of his employer, and the negotiating powers delegated to him by the latter).378 Therefore it is not surprising that proverbs see a stark antithesis between dependable and undependable messengers (cf. 13:17, and 25:13 as opposed to 26:6; cf. 22:21, which belongs to what is called the Amenemope collection and as such shows Egyptian sapiential influence). Several commentators cite another Egyptian text illuminating 10:26, from the Instruction of Ptahhotep, Chap. 8, lines 150ff. (e.g. Meinhold, Waltke):379 If you are a man of trust, sent by one great man to another, adhere to the nature of him who sent you, Do not suppress anything that was told you, ... Keep to the truth, don’t exceed it, but an outburst should not be repeated.

And in the Egyptian Satire of the Trades, a son is instructed by his father in the following terms: 380 When an official sends you with a message, tell it as he told it, don’t omit, don’t add to it.

The simile of v. 26 is intended to address a general principle that is always true, as can be seen in the use of the participle as well as the plural form to which the third person masculine singular suffix is attached, ‫( שלחיו‬all those who send him). However, although the Septuagint remains faithful to the general flow of the saying, it strongly modified the text for this purpose: ὥσπερ ὄμφαξ ὀδοῦσι βλαβερὸν καὶ καπνὸς ὄμμασιν, οὕτως παρανομία τοῖς χρωμένοις αὐτήν 378 See Crown (1974, 366-370), who refers among others to Uriah as an “irregular messenger” (2 Sam 11), 2 Kgs 6:32 and Ezk 23:40 as illustrations of messengers’ importance, and 2 Kgs 18:18, 37 to illustrate their official status. He suggests that the use of the title ‫ ס ֵֺפר‬in this regard may relate to the title mâr-šipri of the Tell El-Amarna letters (368). Meier (1988) provides an exhaustive discussion of the messenger in the ancient Semitic world. 379 AEL I, 65 (not 165 as cited by Waltke). 380 AEL I, 190.

184

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10 (As an unripe grape is harmful to teeth and smoke to eyes, so is lawlessness to them who practice it.)

This is not merely a matter of establishing the “correct” text. At least three aspects are noteworthy. First, the Septuagint gives a specific content to the negative human characteristic by ascribing the unfavourable effects to lawlessness.381 Second, it explicitly says that vinegar and smoke have “hurtful” effects (βλαβερὸν), where the Hebrew proverb assumes that the reader knows that or can work it out. Third, it creates a straightforward reprisal for the lawless person himself instead of a relatively innocent sender or employer.382 Although it has preserved the double simile in one stich, the Septuagint has thus creatively reshaped the content of the text by bringing in the idea of the law, or disobedience to it, by aiding its readers to understand that the irritation caused by vinegar and smoke is intended, and by making the deedconsequence nexus explicit (so Chrysostom). The rabbis often paraphrase the proverb (e.g. Mezudat David) or leave it uncommented (e.g. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra). However, Yonah Gerondi explains it as a metaphor for being lax in the task with which God has sent the messenger into the world. He does not seem to be bothered by the consequence that, in terms of the image, God and not the messenger would then have to be the one who is irritated by having to contend with vinegar on his teeth and smoke in his eyes. The Vilna Gaon does, on the other hand, expand by declaring the damage done by a sluggard’s failure in his task to be no less than a double loss. It does not seem to be inspired by the double comparison in the first part of the simile, since he ascribes two irritations to vinegar (spoiling the appetite and irritating the teeth so that one cannot eat anyway) as well as two irritations to smoke (not producing light through the use of damp wood and so much smoke that the eyes cannot see anyway). Likewise, the sender’s loss is also double: his task is not carried out and he has to suffer agitation additionally. Interpreting Ps 49, Augustine383 uses the Greek version of the proverb to underpin his use of the parable of the rich fool (Luke 12). Who has eaten a sour grape (“unrighteousness”) will not be able to eat bread (which to him is Christ) as one who “hungers after righteousness” (Matt 5:6). Melanchthon finds the simile (figura) in the verse an indication that it is a common folk adage, citing examples from classic literature to show that messengers’ 381 Apart from lawlessness, EE (on 10:5) mentions several further cases in which the Septuagint substitutes other flaws, such as cowardice, unjust gestures, slander or impiety, for the laziness mentioned by the Hebrew text, e.g. 10:5; 19:15, 24; 20:13; 21:26. “Lawlessness” presupposes the Law, Torah, which is closely associated with wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira (cf. Deut 4:5-8 and Sir 24:23-34). According to Goering (2009, 237-238 and passim) the association is based on the notion of election; see the Introduction, Paragraph 3. For a wide-ranging discussion of wisdom and Torah, see Schipper and Teeter (2013), particularly the contribution by Schipper (2013, 55-80), in which he argues that the post-exilic theological debate on wisdom and Torah developed into two diverse conceptions of revelation, viz. on the one hand the teaching from generation to generation, and on the other the Torah that had to be put into the human heart by God himself. 382 The Peshitta contains the same three elements, evidently influenced by the Greek. 383 In Ps xlix II, 7 (NPNF I,8, 176).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

185

speed is appreciated and tardiness disliked. He also remarks that this can be accommodated to those many proverbs where diligence is praised and laziness criticised. To him many proverbs are only community maxims pertaining to the rule of just punishment for delinquency. He thus appreciates the judicial and cultural value of proverbs that do not provide theological material (although he leaves many of them undiscussed in his commentary).

10:27 The fear of Yahweh adds days, but the years of the wicked are cut short. Another 4+3 saying consists of two complete verbal sentences. Again, the proverb is classified as antithetical. Indeed, the concepts in both hemistichs are opposites: ‫יראת יהוה‬ ‫ יסף‬Hiphil

– –

fear of the Lord add / make more

:: ::

being a wicked person be / become short384

– ‫רשע‬ – ‫ קצר‬II Qal

Although “days” in the first half and “years” in the second are not synonymous words, they both have the same referent, viz. “lifespan.” The antithesis in lifespan thus matches the antithesis in moral type. The antithetical halfverses affirm the same conviction, namely the validity of the deed-consequence nexus, and thus fundamentally say the same thing. This is also what Eliphaz maintains in his description of the fate of the wicked, since the wicked perish when their lifespan “is not yet full” (Job 15:32; also 22:16; cf. Ps 55:24; Qoh 7:17). On the other hand, King Hezekiah experienced an addition to what seemed to be the end of his lifespan (2 Kgs 20:6).385 The same concept occurs in the Decalogue (Ex 20:12),386 where the “internally transitive” Hiphil387 of ‫ ארך‬is used to express the lengthened life that may be expected by those who honour their parents. The proverb’s categorical affirmation that the fear of the Lord, the foundation of wisdom (1:7; 9:10), is the cause a long life and that the opposite is the case with the wicked, expresses what Kaiser calls the “conviction that righteousness and life are correlated thanks to God’s providence, which is the self-evident assumption of all the wisdom books.”388 This makes it inevitable 384 Clifford calls the use of the verb a “divine passive,” but the form is third person feminine plural imperfect of an intransitive Qal (they are of a shortened number). Waltke notes that all other uses of the verb in this form refer to spatial shortness (cf. Num 11:23; Isa 28:20; 50:2; 59:1). Even so, the implication is that the “divine activity” spoken of by Clifford is at work here as well. 385 Cf. Isa 38:5; Pss 21:5; 61:7 – where God is the subject as in 2 Kgs 20:6 (Tuinstra). 386 Cf. also Deut 5:16; 6:2; 25:6, as well as Prov 28:2. 387 See GKC 53d. 388 Kaiser, (1993, 263).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

that commentators often find themselves obliged to respond to the theological difficulty involved in the proverb (for instance, Delitzsch). Van Leeuwen writes: As usual with proverbs, this saying needs to be qualified, for the life of the righteous is sometimes cut short (Ps 102:24-25). Compare Isa 57:1, which offers one explanation for this phenomenon, and Ps 44:22 [Hebr. 23] and Wis 4:7-20, which offer others. The problem’s ultimate resolution requires a developed view of life after death.

Whether the righteous die early to escape evil (Isa 57:1-2; Sap Sal 7:11, 14) or die as martyrs (Ps 44:22) or whether repair will be made in eternity (Delitzsch) – that still is not a resolution of the problem. It does not answer the question why the righteous sometimes die early or suffer otherwise and sometimes are indeed blessed according to the theory, or why the wicked are sometimes punished as expected, but sometimes not. Even on the submission that things will be rearranged after death (and on the assumption that the sages reckoned with an afterlife), the inconsistencies in the application of the principle underlying the proverb still remain. If the rewards of some righteous people are granted all their life as well as after death while others have to suffer and wait, then some righteous are more equal than others (and mutatis mutandis the wicked). The answer is that there is no resolution. The sages knew that and maintained the “normal” conviction as described by Kaiser. But, as the sceptical reverse to an obverse of “imposing faith” (Von Rad),389 they also maintained the insight that its workings often remain unfathomable (cf. 14:8 vis-à-vis 20:24). See Essay 4, Vol. I, 39-46, where the topic is treated with examples. Krüger390 fleshes out the formal connections between vv. 22 and 27 (both are Yahweh sayings, both contain the catchword ‫ ;יסף‬see the notes before v. 22). He points out that both verses show complementary sides of a blessed life. True wealth does not only consist of material riches (v. 22), but also of a long, fulfilled life (v. 27; cf. 3:2, 16; 9:11).391 Moreover, according to Krüger, these verses pick up the religious or theological dimension that was absent (“ausgeblendet”) in vv. 6-21 of the chapter. That closes this cluster. But the ending is not stringent. There are also links between vv. 27 and 28, which are described by Waltke (see below on v. 28) and produce a type of “hinge effect” between the preceding proverbs and those that follow.392 389

Von Rad (1953, 123-125). Krüger (1995, 428). 391 However, this is contradicted by Sap Sal 7:8. 392 Therefore it is understandable that many commentators link v. 27 to v. 28 and beyond (e.g. Hitzig, Toy, Gemser, Plöger, Meinhold, Murphy, Van Leeuwen and others). 390

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

187

In the Talmud (Yoma 9a) the proverb is applied to a calculation of the lifespans of the high priests who served in the First and Second Temples. In the 410 years of the First Temple there were 18 high priests, and in the 420 years of the Second Temple there were 300 high priests. Allowing for a few righteous figures among the latter, it meant that the second group did not last one year each, while the first group lived long. The years of the later high priests were shortened due to their corruption, while the earlier high priests had their days prolonged due to their righteousness. This application does create its problems concerning some high priests in both groups, which has elicited later rabbinic explanations.393 Ralbag interprets the addition or subtraction of time on the basis of a predetermined time set for every person. God may change that point in time either forwards or backwards according to the merit of the person.394 Gerondi extends the wicked’s shortening of years in this world to also entail a shortening in the next, which does not only leave the question what happens after that, but also what happens after death but before and at the second shortening. The medieval Kabbalist Bahya ben Asher takes the proverb to refer to a mystery. People who agonise about sin, do not worry themselves to death as one would expect, but have their life prolonged. People who attend to their physical needs actually shorten their life. There is such a thing as an allotted lifespan, but nevertheless it can be changed according to the merits or demerits of a person. This is not a mere phenomenon of nature (‫)ט ַבע‬, ֶ but based on the will of God in every detail and is a hidden truth. Chrysostom’s comment consists of a single rhetorical question to underline that not divine determination, but the right or wrong deeds of humans cause a long or short life. Hill395 points out that he thus uses the proverb to promote the typical insistence of Antiochene theology on human free will and responsibility. By contrast, Athanasius of Alexandria,396 who stood in the rival Alexandrinian tradition, uses the same proverb for the opposite purpose, viz. divinely appointed times for every human. He defends his flight against accusations of cowardice by his Arianising opponents and in the course of the argument he paraphrases the second hemistich of v. 27, “The souls of the unrighteous are taken away untimely.” In the context he refers to King Hezekiah’s added days (2 Kgs 20:6) and quotes a number of other relevant texts from the Septuagint more or less freely (Ex 23:26; Ps 102:24; Job 5:26; Qoh 3:2; 7:6). He seems to suggest that the time of his end as defender of orthodoxy has not yet come. The interesting aspect is that he does this by appropriating a notion very much like the Jewish views referred to above. Oriented towards Qoh 3:1, the paragraph heading is, “An hour and a time for all people” and the argument is that Christ as the Word and therefore the Creator, has appointed a time for every living being according to the will of the Father. However, the shortening or lengthening of that time is not conceived of as additions or subtractions from what was originally allotted, but is included in the allotment itself.

393

See Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 193). This is also the assumption of a story about a pious rabbi in the Midrash Rabbah (Deb Rab 9,1). 395 Hill (2006, 222). 396 Apol de Fuga 14 (NPNF II, 4, 260). 394

188

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

10:28-32 A group of sayings about the righteous and the wicked 28 The expectation of the righteous is joy, but the hope of the wicked will perish. 29 The way of Yahweh is a fortress for the blameless, but ruin for those who do iniquity. 30 The righteous man will never be moved, but the wicked will not dwell in the land. 31 The mouth of the righteous man yields wisdom, but the crooked tongue will be cut off. 32 The lips of the righteous man are concerned with what is favourable, but the mouth of the wicked [is concerned with] perverse things. Bibl. Hausmann 1995, 62, 188-189, 236-238; Heim 2001, 131-134; 2013, 240251; Krüger 1995, 430-431; Scherer 1999, 62-63, 64-71; Scoralick 1995, 180181.

Krüger397 argues that this group of proverbs is not as closely framed and structured as the previous clusters in the chapter. But Scoralick, in her defence of a cluster reaching from 10:28 to 11:7 rather than from 10:28 to 10:32, asserts a chiastic pattern of “central catchwords” in the two verses.398 ‫תוחלת – תקוה – אבד‬ ‫אבד       – תקוה – תוחלת – אבד‬

While emphasising the inversion of ‫ תוחלת‬and ‫ תקוה‬but also including ‫אבד‬ in her pattern, the chiastic principle is undermined by the asymmetry of too many instances of the latter root.399 Moreover, Scoralick concedes that there are further connections between 11:7 and the verses following it.400 Both of these considerations, in my view, significantly weaken the demarcation of an ending at 11:7 instead of 10:32. Over and above what has been advanced earlier about the beginning of this section in relation to the ending of the previous one (10:22-27), it may also be pointed out that the terms ‫ צדיק‬and ‫ רשע‬appear in all five proverbs in vv. 28-32, except v. 29 (where equivalent terms are used) and v. 31b (where ‫ רשע‬is implied by means of a significant gap). The thematic closeness of vv. 31 and 32 causes Heim401 and 397 398 399

Krüger (1995, 430). Scoralick (1995, 180); likewise Fuhs. See also Scoralick (1995, 166), where she has the same schematic presentation as on

p. 180. 400 Scoralick (1995, 164-165). She accepts the links pointed out by Hermisson (1968, 175), but criticises him for remaining vague in terms of content – to which her own demarcation argument is perhaps also not totally immune. 401 Heim (2001, 133); cf. also Meinhold, Plöger, McKane and Hermisson (1968, 175). Heim (2013, 254) finds only a “weak link” between 10:32 and 11:1.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

189

Fox to see them tightly bound, which also speaks for the caesura to be drawn after v. 32. But, as between the ending of the previous cluster and the beginning of this one, the line between 10:32 and 11:1 is not rigid. The group as a whole is loosely held together by the opposition of the righteous and the wicked. 10:28 The expectation of the righteous is joy, but the hope of the wicked will perish. The relatively simple but by no means insignificant proverb consists of one nominal and one verbal sentence with three rhythmic beats each. The parallelism is a direct antithetical correspondence: V. 28a:

subject (construct state)

–

synonyms 402 V. 28b:

genitive

–

opposites

subject (construct state)

–

genitive

predicate (noun) inexact contrast

–

predicate (verb)

Driver sees a problem in the asymmetry of the respective last words of the two hemistichs and emends the noun ‫ שמחה‬to the verb ‫( ָצ ְמ ָחה‬sprouted).403 But that is the Qal perfect, which would not go well as the parallel of the imperfect ‫( תּא ֵֺבד‬will perish). Not only is a noun and a verb in antithetical parallelism no problem, but in this case it is also significant (and the noun is the predicate in a nominal sentence). The significance lies in the inexact contrast, not only of noun and verb but especially in the meaning. The nominal predicate “is joy”404 is counterbalanced by “will perish,” which creates more than one polyvalent interpretive possibility. V. 28a expectation of the righteous is joy [will not perish]

:: → ←

V. 28b hope of the wicked [joy hoped for by the wicked] will perish

402 See THAT II, 625 for a discussion on the two synonyms; they are used as a pair (“Begriffspaar”), as a few verses on in 11:7; cf. Isa 51:5; Mi 5:6; Job 30:26; Lam 3:25f. ‫( תוחלת‬e.g. 11:7; 13:12) does not occur as often as ‫תקוה‬, but always expresses a “joyful, not anxious, expectation” (Delitzsch in criticism of Hitzig). 403 Driver (1951, 179); his proposal is referred to in BHS without mentioning his name. Fox mentions that Tur-Sinai (1947, 35) made a similar suggestion (‫ שמחה‬third person female singular Qal perfect or feminine singular participle Qal of ‫ *שמח‬with a conjectured meaning “rise”). 404 The Septuagint makes joy the subject of a verb (ἐγχρονίζει): “Joy lingers for the righteous.”

190

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

The second hemistich read in the light of the first suggests that what the wicked fruitlessly hope to achieve is the same as that which the righteous certainly will attain. And, if the first hemistich is reread in view of what the second has brought to light, the reader is given reason to consider that the joy of the righteous is not perishable. Waltke makes a similar point when he finds that the “imprecise parallelism” suggests that the ideas of joy and perishing are implicit in the respective alternative hemistichs. Heim405 calls Waltke’s suggestion “somewhat mechanical,” but this does Waltke no justice. There is abundant evidence of this kind of effect in parallelism.406 If the reciprocity of the mutual impact is a mechanism of parallelism, then it can itself be called “mechanical” in bonam partem, which is no ground for criticism of Waltke. But there is a further element of polysemy in the proverb. (a) If the expectation of the righteous “is” joy, it may mean that they now expect joy to come their way, which would make most sense if the joy is understood as a metonymy of result (Waltke) for the positive things that are to come in future. On the opposite side, the wicked now hope for an undefined positive experience in future,407 which will come to nought. Both sides would then add up to a natural manifestation of the deedconsequence nexus. (b) But the meaning may also be that the positive expectation entertained by the righteous is a source of joy already now while they are waiting and anticipating an unspecified reward for their righteousness.408 Although, on this understanding, it is not said what precisely they expect, the joy already felt in advance shows it to be something positive. Then the second half-verse would mean that, on the other hand, the wicked already lose hope now and have to lead a hopeless life. 405

Heim (2013, 242). See the exegesis above of sayings in Chap. 10; we have had occasion several times to note and apply this fundamental insight emphasised by Berlin (cf. above on v. 1b and Berlin [2008, 96-99]). 407 Brueggemann (1992, 90) says that the future of the righteous is “very different from the future sought by the wicked” (my emphasis). The word “sought” is perhaps not the best choice, since the wicked also want happiness, which is not different from what the righteous want. So Toy: “the aim of all men, good and bad, is happiness ... the good will, the bad will not, gain what they wish.” A vivid picture of the gains the wicked hope for is given in 1:13-14. 408 Millar (2020, 51-52) only points out the ambiguity resulting from the juxtaposition of a noun phrase and a noun in v. 28a, but it seems to me that the openness of the proverb resides precisely in this fact; the righteous hoping for joy, the joy of being hopeful and the joy of the result are all legitimate possibilities and not merely unclarities. Cf. Huxel (2005, 5657), who illustrates the anticipating effect of hope with Job’s famous expectation of what is to come (Job 19:25-27). Sæbø seems to suggest something similar (“Das Harren der Gerechten ist Freude”), which, according to his only remark in the commentary, means “It is joy for the righteous to wait.” Fuhs defends this possibility and ascribes calmness and strength to the righteous because they trust in God rather than themselves. See below on Gerondi who suggests the same. 406

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

191

The polyvalence does not compel the reader to choose between the possibilities. The many-sidedness of terse poetic formulation is an asset, not a liability. Discussing the theological significance of hope in the Old Testament, Brueggemann acknowledges that “hope is not on the horizon of the book of Proverbs.” 409 Nevertheless, he identifies four proverbs “that suggest that even the wisdom teachers had on their horizon a future that God would give.” One of these is our present proverb.410 Referring to 11:23, Brueggemann states: “Even the prosperous righteous anticipate a more blessed, joyous state of well-being yet to be given.” This would be true also of 10:28, read according to either possibility mentioned above. The second option (b) would fit Brueggemann’s point no less than (a), since, if hope for the future is so strong that it even has anticipatory effect in the present, it is indeed a powerful concept. Despite accepting the idea “that hope is not on the horizon of the book of Proverbs,” Brueggemann makes the far-reaching statement “that hope and expectation are the impetus for the teaching of the sages.”411 He does not develop the idea, but in the context of his presentation the statement is significant. He understands hope – rightly, in my estimation – as the affirmation that “there is an ‘afterward,’ a time of well-being for the wise, righteous, responsible, and obedient, a time to be distinguished from the present time, a time that will be better than the present.” However, I would add a caveat, viz. that this is not to be understood as some eschatological era. This seems to be Brueggemann’s view also, since he adds: “That better time, however, depends on finding wisdom.” The “afterward” thus is not an era in history, but a future reward relative to the individual’s acquisition and practice of wisdom. Sapiential hope relates to what comes after the practice of wisdom. Brueggemann even sees this kind of hope as the “impetus for the teaching of the sages.” Although he touches upon the important concept of impetus, he does not explicitly address the question of motivation in the Book of Proverbs. But it does seem to me that the terms of his treatment of hope are related to motivation. Stewart has extensively analysed the model of motivation and its paradigms as well as other models in Proverbs.412 Her study shows how pupils are motivated by incentives – wealth, for instance – to find the wisdom that would lead to the desired or hoped-for result. Brueggemann focuses on the teacher, who knows that pupils hope to achieve what they 409 Brueggemann (1992, 89-90). In light of his statement shortly afterwards (that hope is on the sapiential horizon) and the number of texts that attest to that fact, this is clearly intended to say that the motif of hope is not often explicitly formulated in the Book of Proverbs. 410 The others are 11:23; 23:18; 24:14. One could add a fifth, 11:7, which illustrates the principle despite containing two negative hemistichs. 411 Brueggemann (1992, 90). 412 Stewart (2016, 102-129).

192

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

not yet have. When the sage designs his teaching, he uses the ‫תוחלת‬/‫ תקוה‬of the pupils as an impulse to motivate them in the pursuit of wisdom. Rashi makes certain that the agent of the fulfilment or frustration of the hopes entertained by the righteous and the wicked is understood to be God. Gerondi implies that the righteous feel joy even before their hope is realised, since they delight in putting their trust in God rather than in themselves. Like Gerondi, the Vilna Gaon emphasises the temporal element. The righteous must often wait a long time for their hope to be fulfilled, which is not a problem because the compensation will be in the world to come. On the other hand, the wicked expect to get what they desire quickly, which may even happen, but in the end that will perish. This seems to imply that, in the latter case, the hope is understood to be not only what they wish for but also what they may already attain in the this world: all of it will perish. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)413 quotes the proverb in an awesomely creative meditation “On the Future Benefits from God.” As for the first hemistich: The hope of every deceased “holy soul” is fulfilled by being escorted to a place of peace at the bosom of Abraham. Their joy cannot be described by any pen, but at least part of their hope continues in their rest. For they wait in happy expectation for the total number of their “brothers” to be reached, when the resurrection will take place and the untold joy will be experienced. As for the second hemistich: Although we are not told what the wicked hoped for, we do hear exactly what it means when their hope perishes. They receive a terrible fate – accursed spirits tear them (presumably the souls) from their bodies, they are hurled into the pit, burned by fire, ripped apart by birds and suffocate due to unending stench. All of these rather brueghelesque ideas are carried by a literal quotation of the proverb. Half a millennium later, the humanist reformer Melanchthon simply left all the proverbs in vv. 27-32 uncommented in the final version of his commentary.414

10:29 The way of Yahweh is a fortress for the blameless, but ruin for those who do iniquity. The proverb consists of two nominal sentences of respectively four and three beats. It is difficult to follow Tuinstra in finding a chiastic tricolon415 in the verse. Citing Watson,416 he states that the first two words (‫)מעוז לתם‬ and the last three (‫ )ומחתה לפעלי און‬are in a parallelism separated by the two words in the middle (‫)דרך יהוה‬, which would require an unusual pattern of 2+2+3 beats,417 and divide one sentence in two cola. 413

Meditatio XVII (§87) (London ed. 1872, 230). He did, however, provide short notes on vv. 30-32 in the 1529 version (Nova Scholia in Proverbia Salomonis), in which he interpreted the righteousness spoken of here as faith (fides). 415 On the terminology and the rhythmic pattern, see above on v. 26. 416 Watson (1994, 340 and 2007, 181) defines a “chiastic tricolon” as two cola separated by an isolated line” (that is, an ABA pattern). It is perhaps confusing to apply the term “chiastic” to a pattern of three units, since a chiasmus with three points is difficult to picture. However that may be, Watson (1994, 148-149) includes this verse under “the catch-all term ‘nominal’ ” among “half-line parallelisms.” 417 Cf. on v. 26 for the same problem if that verse is read as a tricolon. 414

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The subject of the first sentence is gapped and therefore implicit in the second. But what this subject is, is controversial. As the Masoretic Text stands, it must be “the way of Yahweh,” but with an emendation of vowels it can also be “Yahweh.” Thus, the translation may either be, “the way of Yahweh is a fortress for the blameless” or “Yahweh is a fortress for the blameless of way.” The former option is chosen by most commentators (cf. Oesterley,418 Meinhold, Waltke, Fox, Sæbø, Alter et al.), the latter option by Toy, McKane and Plöger (also the apparatus in BHS). Yoder finds both options possible, but tends to take the divine name alone as the subject.419 In defence of his choice, McKane appeals to 11:20 and 13:6, where ‫ תם‬and ‫ תמים‬occur in the construct state with ‫דרך‬. Toy and Plöger refer to the idea of a stronghold used as an image for Yahweh himself, which occurs in several psalms (cf. Pss 27:1; 37:39; 46:2; also Joel 4:16), which Plöger underscores by pointing out that ‫ פעלי און‬is also typical of the Psalms.420 The subject can in my opinion only be “the way of Yahweh” and not just “Yahweh.” As already pointed out by Delitzsch, the alternative option is prevented by the delay of the subject to the end of the sentence. If “Yahweh” were the subject, the syntactic order would have been ‫מעוז יהוה לתם דרך‬. By pointing the preposition ‫ ל‬with the article, the Masoretes indicated that the whole genitive phrase is to be taken as the subject, for that shows that ‫ תֺּם‬is in the status absolutus.421 As for the meaning of “the way of Yahweh,” it can either be understood as the way Yahweh wants people to live (cf. Gen 18:19; Deut 28:9; Ps 18:22), or the way Yahweh himself acts (8:22, cf. Van Leeuwen’s reference to the analogous way of wisdom in 3:17; 4:11; 8:20). The context here demands the former, which would correspond to the obedience demanded in Deut 8:6; 418

Oesterley translates “the way of Yahweh” as the subject, but then curiously first comments that the option with Yahweh himself as subject is equally good, then again that the latter option is actually better in line with Old Testament thought, and finally that Yahweh only is the subject of the second hemistich. 419 She says, “This translation resonates with the claim that God is a ‘stronghold,’” as elsewhere in the Old Testament (so also Toy and Plöger), and refers to the similar phrase “upright of way” (cf. McKane). 420 Cf. Pss 5:6; 6:9; 14:4; 28:3; 36:13; 94:4, 16 etc.; also Prov 21:15 and, with the perfect of ‫פעל‬, 30:20. 421 Therefore the proposal in BHS, to not only emend the holem of ‫ תֺּם‬to patah so as to make the abstract “innocence” into the concrete “innocent person,” but also to eliminate the article (‫ ַלתֺּם‬to ‫)ל ַתם‬ ְ in order to get the desired status constructus, should be rejected. Another reason is that ‫ ַתם‬does not elsewhere occur with the preposition (Delitzsch). Sæbø retains ‫תֺּם‬, but keeps the abstract concept “Lauterkeit” (integrity). Toy also changes the vowel, but vocalises with qamets instead of with patah, while the short a would be necessary for a status constructus. All of this is unnecessary, since ‫ תֺּם‬is explicable as abstractum pro concreto (thus not “a stronghold to perfection,” according to Toy’s gloss of the Masoretic Text), which has long been been shown to be the case by Radaq and Delitzsch, followed by others (cf. Scherer [1999, 71], Fox and Tuinstra). The Peshitta, Targum and Vulgate all support this reading.

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11:22; 26:17. The same idea occurs frequently in Ps 119, e.g. v. 14 (the way of God’s instructions), v. 27 (the way of his precepts), v. 30 (the way of truth, parallel to his decrees), v. 32 (the way of his commandments), v. 33 (the way of his statutes), v. 35 (‫נתיב‬, the path of his commandments) etc.422 If the divine precepts/demands can be called a “way,” then the contrast of the two hemistichs makes good sense as well: Since this way is God’s Torah, it can naturally offer the protection that the Torah offers to those who keep it (the blameless) and carry the ruin of punishment for those who do not (the doers of iniquity). It is unnecessary to think of the road leading to ruin for those who deserve it, but the metaphor resonates with the logic of the concept. Luchsinger423 finds this idea shocking and regards it in line with 16:4, but the proverb is not deterministic. If God’s way is his teaching, of course it would not only lead to safety, but also to disaster – notably for the doers of iniquity who disobey his commands, not for hapless people predestined to undergo ruin they can do nothing about. Understood in these terms, a stronghold is not such a strange predicate for a way as Toy thinks (Waltke). For, if the way of Yahweh is the set of his instructions, it can be a protection (‫)מעוז‬ in the same manner that the set of words teaching wisdom and insight offers safety and protection (‫ שמר‬and in ‫נצר‬, 4:4-7).424 Thus the antithetic parallelism becomes a straightforward instance of the correlation between deed and consequence (cf. Meinhold).425 Among the Greek witnesses, the Codex Alexandrinus and the Codex Vaticanus read: ὀχύρωμα ὁσίου φόβος κυρίου, συντριβὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐργαζομένοις κακά (The Fear of the Lord is a pious person’s stronghold, but destruction to those who do bad things) Here the well-known phrase “Fear of the Lord,” avoids translating ‫דרך יהוה‬, which is unusual. At the same time it connects v. 29 with v. 27, since in the Greek both sayings now mention the Fear of the Lord (Tuinstra, cf. EE). The Aramaic versions of the Peshitta (¿Ùüãx ÍЍ{s), and the Targum (‫ )דאלהא אורחיה‬as well as the Vulgate (via Domini) all testify to ‫ דרך יהוה‬read as a genitive construction in the Hebrew Text.

When v. 29 is read in conjunction with v. 15, it can, according to Krüger,426 be seen as a “ ‘theological’ corrective” to any unreflected evaluation of wealth (similar to the mutual balance between vv. 4 and 22). In the earlier verse the 422 Cf. Ps 119:101, where the “evil path” is the antithesis of keeping God’s word. In the cited texts from Ps 119, the ‫ דרך‬is singular, as in our proverb, so that we do not have to agree with Murphy for whom it is a difficulty that the plural is not used. 423 Luchsinger (2010, 193). 424 Notwithstanding the erotic metaphor used in Chap. 4, the ‫דברים‬/‫ מצות‬of 4:4 teach wisdom/insight (4:5) and provide safety/shelter (4:6). 425 See below on v. 30 for a figure relating to both v. 29 and v. 30. 426 Krüger (1995, 431).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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stronghold of the rich is not the teaching of Yahweh but their wealth, whereas the ruin of the poor does not reside in their evil deeds, but in their poverty. Delitzsch claims that “almost all the Jewish interpreters, from Rashi to Malbim, find here expressed the operation of the divine revelation set over against the conduct of men, – essentially the same as when the Tora or the Chokma present to men for their choice life and death.” Therefore an element of Torah originating with Yahweh as well as an element of human conduct in accordance with it is present in the proverb (which is essentially what was proposed in the exegesis above, viz. God’s Torah for shaping human behaviour). In this sense Delitzsch and others, such as Van Leeuwen and Waltke, are justified in speaking of revelation in the proverb itself,427 and certainly in respect of its Jewish reception. Rashi explicitly speaks of the retribution brought by this “way.” At the other end of the historical spectrum mentioned by Delitzsch, Malbim also clearly ascribes the disaster of the wicked to God’s punishment. Malbim relates the saying to the Torah in a reference to Deut 32:4 (God’s ways are just), but emphasises another aspect of Torah as well, namely the kindness and mercy of God’s way with which he guides the world. In the Mezudat David there are comments in legal terms that point in the same direction, since the way of the Lord will defend the innocent in the heavenly court and prosecute the wicked, expressing as it does the judicial aspect of the Law. The Vilna Gaon works in a similar way, but cites Hos 14:10 to show that the “straight ways” of the Lord will be to the advantage of the righteous and the disadvantage of the wicked. Ralbag’s interpretation also seems directly applicable to the Torah: following God’s way and keeping to it means that that way will give strength to them (and the opposite to the wicked). This shows that he understood “the way” as something that people can keep to, as well as something that can “give” strength. Of a different order but mentioned by Delitzsch in an extension of the sentence quoted above, is the statement in 2 Cor 2:14-16 (Delitzsch incorrectly cites only v. 15). Paul gives thanks that the early Christians spread the knowledge of Christ, which is an aroma for those who are being saved and those who are perishing, respectively of death and life.428 There is no reference whatsoever to the proverb, but the logical structure is identical: The knowledge spread (= the gospel) is parallel to the Torah; the redeemed and the perishing are parallel to the innocent receiving refuge and the wicked coming to ruin; the two groups relate either positively or negatively to the gospel as those in the proverb relate to the way/Torah. I could find no quotation, reference or allusion to this proverb in patristic literature, not even in the Proverbs commentary by Chrysostom, which jumps from v. 28 to v. 30 and leaves v. 29 unquoted and uncommented.

10:30 The righteous man will never be moved, but the wicked will not dwell in the land. Although rhythmic patterns are important to Gemser, he omits the topic as far as this proverb is concerned. However, a traditional arrangement of 3+3 427 On the concept of revelation, see the essay, “The Significant Deficiency of Revelation in Wisdom,” Vol. I, 28-39. 428 Here the word order is chiastic: save (A) – perish (B); death (B) – life (A).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

is probable despite the fact that each hemistich has four words. The Masoretes combined the ultimate and penultimate word of each half by means of a maqqeph, thereby in both cases avoiding adjacent stressed syllables and indicating a Doppeldreier as in vv. 28 and 31. Two verbal sentences, each containing a negating particle, produce a simple antithetic parallelism in two hemistichs, although each does contain an element that has no counterpart in the respective other half-verse.429 As Clifford remarks, the verse contains two contrasts: on one hand the righteous :: wicked, and on the other stability :: instability (not being moved :: not living in the land). Stability is expressed by the negated verb ‫ מוט‬which in the Qal means “totter” and in the Niphal “be moved, shaken, overthrown.” It is usually accompanied by a negative particle, mostly with ‫בל‬, as here.430 This expresses a motif also found in v. 25. As most commentators point out, the two verses are thematically similar. Although different words are used, the similarity is close. V. 25a the wicked will not be [standing fast]

V. 25b the righteous will be a steadfast foundation (+ ‫)עולם‬

V. 30a the righteous will not be moved (+ ‫)עולם‬

V. 30b the wicked will not remain settled

As can be seen in the figure above, the first hemistich of each proverb says the same as the last one in the respective other proverb. I do not use the term “chiastic” because the proverbs are not placed in a compositional chiasmus. But they are clearly a “twice told” proverb and are noted by Snell,431 but not by Heim. Since v. 30 stands immediately after v. 29, it can obviously be read as a specification of the stronghold for the righteous and the ruin for the wicked mentioned in the previous line.432 The stronghold becomes a guarantee for unshakable security, while the ruin suffered by the doers of iniquity means losing the land. ‫ ארץ‬can mean the land or the earth. In the former case, the 429 In the first sentence, it is the temporal qualification ‫( לעולם‬forever, never [when used with a negated verb]), in the second it is the object ‫ארץ‬, used with the transitive verb ‫שכן‬. 430 All instances of ‫ מוט‬are found in poetic texts, 13 times with ‫ בל‬and 6 times with ‫לא‬ (BDB, cf. HALOT, KAHAL), frequently in the Psalms (cf. Pss 10:6; 13:5; 15:5; 16:8; 21:8; 30:7; 62:3, 6; 112:6 etc.). For its use with ‫צדיק‬, cf. 12:3 and 25:26 (Snell [1993, 134]). 431 Snell (1993, 137). 432 Apart from the thematic similarity (in my view, a development by particularising), Waltke finds several kinds of links between vv. 29 and 30. There are phonetic links (initial l in the second word of every verset) as well as syntactic links (singular [‫תם‬, ‫ ]צדיק‬in the first, and plural [‫פעלי און‬, ‫ ]רשעים‬in the second versets). For thematic similarities, cf. 2:21-22.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

197

second hemistich would say that the wicked will lose his land, that is, his heritage in the land of Israel, (so Toy, Gemser, McKane, Ringgren, Plöger, Meinhold, Whybray, Scherer,433 Sæbø and others). In the latter case it would mean that he will not inhabit the earth at all,434 that is, lose his life (so Fox, Waltke, Alter, Tuinstra). In favour of the former it could be said that no secure existence was possible without the social and economic support provided by the land,435 which would endanger the life of the wicked in any case. But that does not mean the reference must be to the exile, which would be improbable in the light of the first hemistich. Only wicked individuals are said to lose their land, not the whole Israel, which would mean exile as the collective loss of their country by all, including those individuals who could be described as righteous. In this context, ‫ עולם‬should not be interpreted as evidence for the eternal future of “the salvation and the perdition of the righteous and the wicked” (Waltke). For these reasons, there is a parallelism within both proverbs themselves as well as a parallelism between the two proverbs due to their having been edited into their present positions. V. 29a the way of Yahweh is a fortress for the blameless V. 30a The righteous man will never be moved [from the land]

→

←

V. 29b [the way of Yahweh] is ruin for those who do iniquity V. 30b the wicked will not dwell in the land

By virtue of the parallelism, the mentioning of the land in v. 30b enables the reader to understand the immovability spoken of in v. 30a as the retention of the life-sustaining land, which in turn enables one to reread v. 29a in this light and to realise what the practical consequence is of the fortress provided by the Torah or precepts for the way of Yahweh. Likewise, the parallelism within v. 29 shows that the same Torah – or, rather, disobedience to it – will cause the punishment of ruin, which in real terms means the loss of the sustenance provided by the land. Each proverb can thus be understood as meaningful in its own right without recourse to the other, but once the literary context is considered, a value-added dimension is generated thanks to the efficacy of parallelism and context. 433

Scherer (1999, 49). For the motif used in a positive sense, cf. Matt 5:5 (αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσιν τὴν γῆν [they will inherit the earth]). Krüger (2019, 93f.) also considers “stagger,” stumbling and falling off balance for the verb ‫מוט‬. 435 See Pilch (2016, 184-185). Whybray, who also notes the general similarity between vv. 29 and 30, refers to the significance the concrete existence in the land had for the ancient Israelites. Without explicitly mentioning the exile, he nevertheless excludes any allusion to it by observing that the reference here is not to the whole nation, but to individuals. 434

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

Rashi interprets ‫ לעולם בל־ימוט‬not as “he will never be overthrown,” but as “he will not be overthrown forever.” He says, “When he does collapse, his collapse (‫)מוטתו‬ is not an everlasting (‫ )עולם‬collapse, but he will fall (‫ )יפול‬and stand up (‫ )וקם‬again.” The Mezudat David presents the same interpretation in somewhat different words. The introduction of a temporary qualification allows an alignment of the proverb with the practical experience that the righteous sometimes do come to grief, and so squares this experience with the deed-consequence nexus. Ramaq solves the problem along another route. “The righteous will never collapse when he walks among dangers, or alternatively, when he does collapse, he leaves his offspring [to keep possession of the land]” while the memory as well as the offspring of the wicked (‫)זכרם וזרעם‬ perish. Both the fragmentary notes on Proverbs by Origen and the commentary by Melanchthon leave this verse uncommented and only start again with proverbs from Chap. 11.

10:31-32 31 The mouth of the righteous man yields wisdom, but the crooked tongue will be cut off. 32 The lips of the righteous man are concerned with what is favourable, but the mouth of the wicked [is concerned with] perverse things. Although the Bomberg Rabbinic Bible lets Chap. 11 begin with 10:32, many commentators group the two proverbs436 in vv. 31-32 (4+3,437 4+3) together and provide convincing arguments for doing so. Usually the grounds are the thematic coherence and the reintroduction of the speech motif.438 Whybray goes a step further in stating that v. 32 clarifies v. 31 (similarly Tuinstra). Some commentators also find a formal cohesion between the two proverbs. For instance, Toy considers it possible that all four the hemistichs make up a chiasmus, the fourth answering to the first and the third to the second, while Boström, Gemser, Meinhold and Fuhs positively declare this to be the case.439 That would produce: 436 Both have a 4+3 rhythmic arrangement. In v. 31 Gemser thinks that both 3+3 and 4+3 are possible. But the former incorporates the maqqeph with the first word, although it does not concern the avoidance of two adjacent stressed syllables in this verse. Toy regards a ternarybinary (his terminology) pattern possible for v. 32, but gives no substantiation. 437 The maqqeph after ‫ פי‬is not necessary, since the stresses do not fall on adjacent syllables. 438 E.g. Hermisson (1968, 175), Plöger, Murphy, Clifford, Hausmann (1995, 188-189), Van Leeuwen, Fox, Waltke and Yoder. Scherer (1999, 63) points out that the idea of speaking is absent in vv. 24-30 but prominent in vv. 6-21, so that the couplet (my terminology) makes a fitting conclusion to the chapter, whereas Hildebrandt (1990, 184) also takes the two stichs together, but sees them as the beginning of a new “string” continued in 11:1 (as opposed to Scoralick [1995, 180], who incorporates 11:1-7 with the last verses of Chap. 10, but sees the caesura in 10:28). 439 Boström (1928, 127). Tuinstra even finds two chiasmi in the couplet, apparently mouthtongue / lips-mouth (like Meinhold) and righteous-crooked / righteous-evil (?). But neither is a chiasmus. If I correctly reconstruct his intention, which is compounded by a garbled

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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V. 31a mouth (good)

v. 31b tongue (bad)

V. 32a lips (good)

v. 32b mouth (bad)

But this does not seem convincing to me. The concepts used in the two stichs do not relate crosswise, but are in direct equivalent parallelism (not antithetical as the hemistichs within the stichs themselves are): good speech, bad speech / good speech, bad speech. If the lexemes themselves are to be matched, as Meinhold and others do, and not the single concept (speech) they all express, then ‫ לשון‬and [‫ שפתי]ם‬are not the same, even if both represent the motif of speech and even if all the organs mentioned constitute the stylistic feature of synecdoche to represent the whole person speaking. ‫לשון‬ and [‫ שפתי]ם‬do not correspond more closely to each other than either corresponds to ‫ה‬/‫פי‬. Following Hitzig, both Delitzsch and Toy mention a possible realignment of hemistichs to be thinkable in the form of vv. 31a+32b and 32a+31b, which partly overlaps with the purported chiasmus, but neither commits to accept Hitzig’s idea, and rightly so, for the parallelism in the Masoretic Text is strong and not in need of being “improved.” But Heim440 offers an argument confirming the essence of Meinhold’s main point that the thematic unit of good and bad speech, cemented as it is by the catchwords ‫ צדיק‬and ‫ תהפכות‬respectively in the a- and b-hemistichs, indeed forms a proverbial pair. He argues that the “subject of speech” is introduced here for the first time since vv. 6-21 with only a few verses in between (which had already been pointed out by Scherer, see note above), so that the reader can associate the passages on speech with each other. Conceding that the words ‫ צדיק‬and ‫ רצון‬are respectively also found in the preceding and the following verses (10:30; 11:1), he appeals to the different context so as to keep vv. 31-32 together. Although I agree with this, I would also agree with Whybray,441 to whom Heim refers in this regard, viz. that vv. 1-30 “constitute a large loosely connected group with an introduction in vv. 1-5 ...” and a conclusion in vv. 31-32 and not in v. 30. Text-critically, the verb ‫( ידעון‬they know) in v. 32 is often deemed to be unsuitable for the subject [‫( שפתי]ם‬lips). Therefore Hitzig proposed ‫יבעון‬ (Hiphil imperfect of ‫[ נבע‬let flow] with nun paragogicum), which is accepted by Toy, Gemser, BHS, EE and others but not by BHQ. However, McKane identification of hemistichs (v. 31b twice, v. 32b missing), the arguments given in the following lines apply to him as well. 440 Heim (2001, 133). 441 Whybray (1994, 96); in my opinion, though, the large group includes smaller groupings (see above).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

has shown that ‫ ידע‬can mean “be concerned with,” “be interested in” or “pay attention to” (cf. Gen 39:6, Job 9:21 and Prov 27:3), which makes good sense.442 Therefore the argument for emendation is not strengthened by an appeal to the Septuagint, which has ἀποστάζει (let drop), since this Greek verb is not used elsewhere for ‫ נבע‬443 and in some Greek manuscripts it is here translated by ἐπιστάτει, which represents the Hebrew verb ‫ ידע‬and may be a corrective back to the Masoretic Text (so Waltke) rather than an etymologising translation of ‫( נבע‬EE).444 Without substantiation or any other comment, Wildeboer declares that “v. 32b is a nominal sentence.” But that produces an ungainly result: “the mouth of the wicked is perverse things.” Not only would the plural in the predicate clash with the singular of the subject, but the formulation would at best be wooden, while the sense in which a mouth can “be” such things would remain unclear. Moreover, a key aspect of the parallelism would be overlooked. However the verb ‫( נוב‬v. 31) is interpreted and whatever the textcritical decision on ‫ ידע‬in v. 32 may be, when the hemistichs are read in each other’s light, aspects of information in v. 31 and the elliptic presence445 of the verb of v. 32a in v. 32b are profiled. This may be summarised as follows: V. 31a mouth of the righteous yields/speaks wisdom [experiences opposite of punishment]

V. 31b :: crooked tongue → [yields/speaks opposite of wisdom] ← punished by cutting off

V. 32a lips of the righteous are concerned with what is favourable [experience favour]

V. 32b :: mouth of the wicked [is concerned with] perverse things → [punished by cutting off]

What the results are that accrue from the wise speech by the righteous is not said (v. 31a) but the punishment for the crooked tongue is graphically mentioned, while it is not said what the crooked tongue actually produces that warrants such a punishment (v. 31b).446 In v. 32 the gap is easily filled, since 442 Cf. also Plöger and Bühlmann (1976, 289-290) who understand the verb in a similar way (“beachten” or “sich kümmern um”). 443 Cf. 15:2, 28, where the Hebrew verb occurs in similar expressions, but in these cases the Septuagint translates it with yet other Greek verbs, notably ἀναγγελεῖ (15:2) and ἀποκρίνεται (15:28). Moreover, ἀποστάζει is also the translation of ‫ ינוב‬in 10:31. 444 For proposals that have been rejected by McKane, Waltke, Sæbø and others, and dealt with ipso facto by the considerations above, cf. Dahood (1963, 20-21) and Winton Thomas (1969, 284-285). 445 This verse is a textbook illustration of what Alter ([1985] 2011, 25) calls “‘hidden’ repetition,” which mostly occurs through elliptic governing of the second hemistich by a verb in the first. 446 Interestingly, Hill (2006, 222) points out that for the first time in his commentary, Chrysostom seems to show interest in the stylistic feature of parallelism, speaking as he does of a “twofold advice” that “holds a balance” in the proverb.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

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the verb is implied in the second hemistich.447 Its elliptic presence in v. 32b is known in the light of its presence in v. 31a, which is prominent not only by virtue of the unusual meaning for which it is employed, but also by the special nun paragogicum in ‫ ידעון‬which marks its prominence. Therefore it is not said what the crooked mouth is, as Wildeboer claims, but what it does, which in turn contrasts with what the righteous speaker of the first hemistich does. In the first proverb, the information provided by v. 31b (that the crooked tongue is punished) makes a rereading of v. 31a possible that enables the reader to understand that the speaking righteous are not punished, which is favourable and may suggest a positive reward. On the other hand, the information provided by v. 31a (that the speaking of the righteous yields wisdom) enables the reader to understand the reason why the tongue of the crooked speaker will be cut off, notably that his words produce the opposite of wisdom, which is folly. We have often found this kind of mutual enrichment in the parallelisms of this chapter, which Berlin448 calls “one of the main semantic functions of parallelism.” In v. 31 Toy had already adumbrated this as early as 1899, however without working it out. He says, [a]s the text stands, the antithesis is implicit. Instead of saying that the tongue of the wicked utters folly or falsehood (as in v. 32), the verse, looking forward to consequences, declares that it shall be cut off; the proverb in full form would be: the righteous speaks wisdom, obeys God, and lives – the wicked speaks folly, disobeys, and dies. It is a repetition of the familiar idea of precise compensation in this life ...

Waltke calls this parallelism “imprecise,” but works out mutual contributions of the a- and b-versets in v. 31 (indicated by the arrows in the figure above). For this very reason I would rather choose another description than “imprecise,” because a lot of calibration goes into the creation of such a finely balanced parallelism that says as much by leaving unexpressed as by expressing. Turning to issues of detail in the couplet, the first is the verb ‫ נוב‬in v. 31. The root is used for referring to what plants produce (cf. the verb in Ps 62:11; 92:15;449 Ze 9:17); the derivative nouns ‫( ניב‬Isa 57:19 Qere;450 Mal 1:12) and ‫( תנובה‬Deut 32:13; Judg 9:11; Ezk 36:30).451 In the Qal it can be used intransitively, meaning “to flourish,” but followed by an accusative it can 447 Here the “syntactic gapping” (ellipsis of the verb in one of the hemistichs) spoken of by Fox (2009, 404) combines with semantic gapping or the gapping of ideas. Syntactic gapping occurs in v. 32 and the gapping of ideas occurs both within v. 31 and between the two stichs of vv. 31-32. 448 Berlin (2008, 97-98). 449 In this psalm the image of a fruit-bearing tree is particularly clear in its application to the ‫ צדיק‬or righteous person (v. 13) who is planted (v. 14) and bears fruit even in ripe old age (v. 15). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra refers to Ps 92:15 in support of his interpretation that ‫ ינוב חכמה‬in the proverb means “he will multiply wisdom” (‫)חכמה ירבה‬. 450 Rashi refers to this reading in Isa 57:19 and appeals to the Qere “fruit of the lips” to substantiate that the proverb refers to producing fruit. 451 Ramaq, in turn, refers to the noun ‫ תנובה‬in order to arrive at the same interpretation.

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also be transitive. Bühlmann and Heim452 prefer the intransitive use in this verse and take ‫ חכמה‬as an instrumental accusative (“the mouth of the righteous thrives by wisdom”), but most accept the transitive use with “wisdom” as the direct object. As Plöger observes, the basic thrust of the proverb is not determined by the question whether the mouth produces wisdom or is characterised by wisdom (in both cases the righteous speaker escapes the shattering punishment undergone by the crooked speaker). But the transitive is preferable for two reasons. First, because of the parallelism between the contrast of speaking organs and what they produce (the mouth of the righteous produces wisdom as opposed to the tongue of crookedness that can only yield crooked things, cf. the figure above). Second, the plant imagery for speaking is well established in the Old Testament (e.g. 12:14; 13:2; 18:20; Isa 57:19; cf. Ps 92:13-15 [Clifford]). Moreover, also the idea of cutting out that which produces nothing good (v. 31b) fits the plant/fruit image excellently (cf. Matt 3:10; 7:19; Luke 13:7). Trees that do not produce good fruit are cut off, and if the tongue is the metonymic counterpart of the wisdom producing speech of the righteous, the same goes for it. V. 31ab provides an interesting case of metonymy, metaphor as well as metaphtonymy, again in connection with the motif of speaking.453 In the first hemistich, the mouth stands for speaking (metonymy). But simultaneously it is a fruit producing tree (metaphor), so we can apply Goossens’s term “metaphtonymy” to the interaction of metonymy and metaphor as we could in 10:11. Furthermore, the a-hemistichs of vv. 11 and 31 say the same thing with different but closely related metaphors, namely a fountain of life and a tree producing food for life: righteous people speak things that bring life. In the second hemistich, the tongue stands for speaking (metonymy), but the disambiguating parallelism simultaneously makes it a bad tree (metaphor). Bad people speak things that are not conducive to life. V. 32a has been examined in the text-critical discussion above (‫ ידע‬meaning to “be concerned with” or “pay attention to”). But the object ‫( רצון‬favour) poses the question how that should be interpreted. It always indicates the goodwill shown by an authority to an inferior (Clifford).454 Then the first hemistich can mean that the righteous man is occupied with goodwill towards subordinates (Fox, who, however, emends the text and translates ‫ יביעון‬with “express”). Although that is possible, it would imply that only people in socially superior positions can be righteous, which is not what the advice to 452

Bühlmann (1976, 303-306); Heim (2001, 132-133). Cf. above on 10:11 and the references given there to Radden, Goossens and Luchsinger; for v. 31 specifically, see Luchsinger (2010, 239-240, 286-290). 454 Ten times by God and four times by the king. Clifford refers to 11:1 and 16:13, the latter of which specifically clarifies that the text of v. 31a is not problematic. If “righteous lips have the favour of kings,” then “the lips of the righteous” can “know” it, that is, pay attention to what brings that favour. 453

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young people in Proverbs assumes. It can also mean that the righteous man “speaks with the express intention of winning the approval of others” (McKane). These “others” can be God or authoritative humans (similarly Murphy, cf. Clifford). Waltke interprets the idea as speech finding favour with God and possibly also with people (although he thinks ‫ רצון‬is a metonymy for favour-finding speech, which is unlikely, since [‫[ שפתי]ם‬lips] is already the metonymy for that speech). As pointed out above, the two stichs stand in direct equivalent parallelism with each other: a-hemistichs: status constructus (speaking) + genitive + verb + object b-hemistichs: status constructus (speaking) + genitive + verb / predicate with implied verb

As Whybray claims, although he gives no particulars, the overarching parallelism of the two lines has a clarifying effect. The wisdom said to be produced by the words of the righteous (v. 31a) are specified to be words that please and therefore are favoured. The righteous may consciously work towards that favour (McKane) or just find favour. Wisdom is therefore specified as something that leads to favour and acceptance. It is not said who bestows the favour, but in light of the fact that ‫ רצון‬is always received from a superior party, the parallelism must mean that wisdom is pleasing to authoritative people such as kings and to God. Likewise, the parallelism between the mouth of the ‫( רשעים‬wicked people) in v. 32b and the tongue of crookedness (v. 31b) confirms the interpretation that the crooked tongue stands for people who speak crooked things and therefore that those who are punished are wicked people. The cutting off of the tongue is a harsh but appropriate image for use in the context of speaking. It may, because of synecdoche, suggest that people are “cut off” from the community and the land (so Yoder, cf. 2:22, where the wicked [‫ ]רשעים‬are also said to be “cut off” [‫ כרת‬Niphal] from the land, and the immediately preceding v. 30, where the wicked undergo the same fate, although expressed negatively). Nevertheless, despite the metonymy and metaphtonemy in these verses, the cutting of the tongue also refers to a harsh reality. As shown by Greenfield,455 there is a parallel to these verses in the 5th century Aramaic version of the Wisdom of Achiqar, presented as an Assyrian sage from the 7th century, which backs up the idea of literal punishment of insincere or dishonest people by ripping out the tongue. It says,456 [‫יאפך אל פם אפכא וינסח לשנ]ה‬ Literally: El will distort the mouth of the distorter and tear out [hi]s tongue. That is: El will maim the mouth of the one who goes back on his word and tear out his tongue. 455 456

Greenfield (1971, 49-60). Achiqar Col. 10, l. 156 (ANET, 429).

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The Aramaic verb ‫ אפך‬can mean “turn upside down,” “destroy,” “turn back” or “repay.” It is here used in the imperfect as well as the participle, which carries a pun: El will literally pluck out the tongue of someone who turns back on his word, thereby meting out retribution in the style of the ius talionis (an eye for an eye and a tongue for a tongue, see below on Hammurapi). The “one who distorts” (participle of ‫ )אפך‬is not merely one who speaks wrongly, but one who persistently “turns back” on his word, that is, does not keep his word. He gets his mouth distorted (‫)אפך‬, which is explained as “take out” (‫ )נסח‬the tongue. Where Greenfield relates this to the ancient Near Eastern practice of tearing out the tongue of people who go back on their word, Yoder refers to Assyrian evidence of doing that to rebels, to which blasphemers could be added:457 I tore out the tongues of people whose malign mouths had spoken desecration against Ashur my god and had conspired against me ...

In the Hammurapi Code (18th century) the same punishment is prescribed for an adopted son of certain officials, if he were to use words denying the parenthood of his foster parents.458 Therefore the practice can be regarded as a very old punishment that was maintained for centuries. Rashi and Ramaq share the interpretation of v. 31a as a reference to a fruit-bearing tree. Their arguments have already been referred to in the notes above. Bahya gives an extended interpretation based on Ps 1:3 (where he who is not wicked, i.e. who is righteous, is likened to a tree planted by water, that gives its fruit on time and the leaves of which do not wither). To him, the giving of fruit mentioned in the proverb must therefore also have a relation to leaves, which the rabbi interprets as two types of righteous speech. The leaves represent the worldly speech of the righteous and the fruit their words about Torah. The latter are the most important, but their worldly speech is also meaningful (cf. Sukkah 21b),459 since it protects their religious speech like leaves protect the fruit on the tree. Moreover, since it is natural for a fruit tree to produce fruit, it also comes natural to the accustomed righteous person to speak wisdom. Hame’iri and the Mezudat David pay attention to the crooked tongue of v. 31b. The former takes it to refer to treachery (crookedness) which will come to naught, while the latter also thinks of treachery, but in the sense of distorting the words of Torah into heresy, which of course will also be frustrated. Rashi interprets the ‫ רצון‬with which the righteous are concerned to mean that the righteous know how to please God in the sense of placating him460 (by prayer, intercession and doing what is right), but also how to please people – both of which can be defended on the basis of the text. Gerondi adds a rider to v. 31 with the help of v. 32. Although the “tongue of crookedness” is cut out, there are cases where “bending” 457

Annals of Ashurbanipal (Rassam Cylinder), IV, 65f. (ANET, 288). Codex Hammurapi 192 (ANET, 175). 459 It was said in the name of Rab, “Whence do we know that even worldly speech of sages needs study? From Scripture, where it is says, ‘And whose leaf does not wither’ [Ps 1:3].” 460 See Taanit 19a for an example of the effect of the prayers of Honi, the “member of God’s household” (Ginsburg [1998] 2009, 194). 458

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 10

205

the truth somewhat is in order, namely when what is good and peaceful (‫ )רצון‬for people can be achieved by it.461 This at least illustrates how parallel proverbs can be used creatively to create new possibilities of application. Clement of Alexandria (3rd century)462 uses v. 31 to support his argument that doing good is better than speaking well. He quotes the verse as, “The mouth of the righteous will distil wisdom” (cf. the Septuagint, ἀποστάζει σοφίαν [let drop wisdom]) and reads it together with a paraphrase of Prov 14:6 to the effect that wisdom is not found among the wicked. This is framed by quotations of Sir 19:22 to claim that the invention of oratory is negative, and 2 Tim 2:14 to show that words should not be deemed important. In this context he turns v. 31a into the opposite of what the Hebrew text says: not the production of many fruits/words, but the production of few, purified words is what counts. Later he quotes the whole verse in a passage on virtues and vices, but inverts the two biblical hemistichs in order to emphasise the positive “drops” of wisdom over against the deceitful heresies (with a reference to the “deceitful scales” of 11:1).463

461 This interpretation tallies with an opinion expressed in the Talmud (Yebamoth 65b, where the reference is to Gen 50:16-17, according to which Joseph’s brothers stretch what could have been their father’s wish in order to keep peace with Joseph). 462 Strom I, 10 (ANF II, 310-311). 463 Strom II, 18 (ANF II, 365).

INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 11

Bibl. Ansberry 2011, 80-95; Boström 1928, 127-133; Freuling 2004, 63-76; Hatton 2008, 98-109; Heim 2001, 135-144; Hermisson 1968, 175-176; Irwin 1984, 97100; Krispenz 1989, 49-57; Kselman 2002, 545-548; Lucas 2015, 18-19; Pilch 2016, 37-41; Sandoval 2006, 156-164; Scherer 1999, 72-94; Scoralick 1995, 182-197.

Themes and motifs The proverbs collected in Chap. 11 are again mostly antithetic.1 Often these concern the typical theme of the antithesis of the righteous and the wicked (‫ צדיק‬and ‫)רשע‬.2 The nexus of deed and consequence occurs repeatedly. However, among such sayings there are several verses that show that this is not merely a matter of eudemonistic obsession with what brings the highest profit for oneself. For example, the chapter begins with a saying about fair trading as a matter of divine will (v. 1). It continues with a saying about modesty as opposed to arrogance (v. 2). Accordingly, the motif of wealth combines with the theme of social responsibility to give the chapter a decided ethical dimension. There is even a whole group of proverbs touching upon the social impact of sapiential behaviour (vv. 8-11). The presence of such sayings among the others relativises the deed-consequence linking and allows the conclusion that it cannot simply be accounted for as fixation on selfinterest. Chapter organisation Despite such thematic associations, the fact that proverbs of one kind occur along with others of a comparable kind still does not prove that we have exquisitely composed poetic units in the chapter. It can only be determined whether such is the case on evidence founded on a broader basis. Several scholars have identified either clusters of sayings or delicately rounded off proverb units. Since the proverbs are poetry, such tracts would amount to poetic units – although commentators generally do not refer to them as “poems” in the sense of those found in Chaps. 1-9. Even a cursory survey of recent research results reveals that there is no consensus as to where these units are, what they look like, how many they are or what their extent is. 1 Except vv. 7, 16, 22, 25, 30-31 – so Murphy, who however omits v. 22 from the list, and Sæbø, who includes v. 10 among these. 2 E.g. vv. 8, 10, 18, 23; also vv. 2, 16, 25, 29, where other labels for human types occur.

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One of the early pointers in the direction of the identification of “groups,” as he calls them, is provided by Toy. Even though he is an exponent of the “independent proverb school,” he cannot avoid making the simple if unsubstantiated statement that vv. 1011, 19-21 and 24-26 form such groups. The more recent work of Sæbø offers a further example. Critical of the compositional units proposed by Scoralick (see below), he treats the sayings in the chapter on their own merits, but still does identify loose groups (e.g. vv. 3-11; 18-21; 30-31) as well as proverb pairs such as vv. 16-17, 2526, some of which even cross over the group limits that he identifies, notably vv. 1819 and 23-24. Recent scholars3 have offered extended arguments for the grouping of verses. Hermisson identifies vv. 2-14 as a thematic unit that also shows an “associative ‘progression of thought.’”4 Within this unit he finds the principle of “dovetailing”5 involving initial ‫ צ‬in vv. 5-6+8 and initial ‫ ב‬vv. 7+9-12. According to him, vv. 1721 is a unit bound together by the idea of reward and retribution, and vv. 23-31 are general sayings exemplified by more specific illustrations. Krispenz discerns two groups among the proverbs in the chapter. In vv. 3-6 she identifies a group constituting a reflexion of the experience of the righteous and the wicked on the basis of the deed-consequence nexus. This in itself is quite vague, and her description of the relationships between the verses likewise (no direct relationship between vv. 3 and 4 or between v. 4 and v. 5, but v. 5 specifies v. 3, and v. 6 in her opinion elucidates v. 4). Following Hermisson, she takes vv. 17-21 as a close thematic unit, but sees a difficulty with v. 20 in this context (see note above). Scoralick reckons vv. 1-7 to the last section of Chap. 10 and then identifies two further units in vv. 8-17 and 11:18–12:3. According to her,6 10:1–11:7 is characterised by themes from the “inner life” of humans, while interest in the “outer world” (terms relating to nature and farming) appears in 11:18–12:3. However, the potential impact of this observation is enervated by her admission that the “inner life” themes also occur in the latter unit. Moreover, she concedes that a “nature image” also occurs in the former unit (10:3), but she overlooks the presence of both “farming” and “nature” motifs in Chap. 10 (vv. 5 and 25). In the same vein, Sæbø points out that the existence of multiple thematic and formal similarities between Chaps. 10 and 11 dilutes her argument7 for beginning a new proverb group at 11:7. Heim finds groups in vv. 2-14, 15-21, 22-31. According to him, the introductory proverb on fair trading (v. 1), which is then “applied in human affairs generally,” first in vv. 2-8 (greed, which however is very indirect), then in vv. 9-14 (the deception alluded to “exemplified in the area of speech,” which again is rather circuitous).8 Vv. 15-21 lacks the motif of speech and introduces that of dishonesty.9 In his view, vv. 23-31 are introduced by an isolated v. 22, and contain two subgroups (vv. 2327 and 28-30, so Meinhold), framed by vv. 23 and 31 as the only verses containing the key concepts in the same order.10 Heim presents a detailed analysis, but 3

See above, Introduction, Par. 2.2.2. Hermisson (1968, 175). 5 The term is Heim’s (2001, 136); in this “alphabetical order,” Hermisson is followed by Plöger (similarly Meinhold and Scherer [1999, 76]). 6 Scoralick (1995, 196-197). 7 For instance, on the basis of similarities between 10:2 and 11:4 or between 10:28 and 11:7. 8 Heim (2001, 138). 9 Heim (2001, 139). 10 Heim (2001, 143-144). 4

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even so the bottom line is thematic, which is applied broadly. Lucas only differs from Heim in minor respects. The divisions marked out by Waltke show some similarity to those by Scherer (see below), although their arguments are not the same. The differences mostly concern the borderline between groups (e.g. at vv. 9/10, 15/16, 23/24 or 26/27). Waltke discerns thematic foci for the sections: vv. 1-8 (honesty through righteousness), 1015 (words in the community, with v. 9 as a Janus verse connecting both ways), 16-22 (benevolence and community), 23-27 (desires), 28-31 (gain and loss).11 If these divisions are accepted, one must also concede a certain vagueness of motifs in their relation to the given theme (e.g., how the pig or the woman of v. 22 can relate to benevolence). But then again, that is perhaps to be expected and not unnatural in a collection of proverbs, however carefully the pre-existing material may have been grouped and edited. The analysis done by Scherer12 similarly operates with thematic criteria, but he also works extensively with catchwords, word fields and formal symmetry to mark the sections he identifies in the chapter. The formal argument that an “introduction” (vv. 1-2) and a “conclusion” (v. 31) mark the chapter as a whole, as well as the catchword ‫ רצון‬in 10:32 and 11:1 show that Chaps. 10 and 11 are not unrelated, but underwent similar redactional procedures. Importantly, however, as far as the thematic criterion is concerned, Scherer finds that it uncovers “thematic modulations,” that is, changes and variations in the use of ideas. He consequently reaches the conclusion that we here encounter a certain togetherness and integration (“Beieinander und Ineinander”) of thematic unity and multiplicity. According to him, this constitutes a polyphony in both chapters, which, in my opinion, does justice to the twosided aspect of proverbs simultaneously standing on their own feet and doing so in the literary context given to them.

On the one hand, the lack of consensus among interpreters does not necessarily mean that they are all wrong (as the history of science shows, it does happen that a minority of one can be right). But nevertheless the general picture should sound a warning to be cautious, for arguments advanced in favour of certain positions may be possible, while other considerations may point in equally possible alternative directions without constituting proof of “correctness.”13 Introducing the form of the chapter, Murphy says,

11

Cf. the similarities of Tuinstra’s groupings: vv. 1-8, 9-14 (15), (16) 17-21 (22), 23-31. Scherer (1999, 72-94, summary 88-89). 13 Commentators themselves may even point out differing possibilities within their own analyses. Scherer (1999, 83-84) for instance regards vv. 17-23 as such a unit, but concedes that v. 22 cannot be smoothly fitted into it. He also concedes that vv. 16 and 17 are connected at the level of paronomasia (‫ אשת־חן‬and ‫)איש חסד‬, while insisting that a new unit nevertheless begins with v. 17 because of its ethical connection with the verses that follow. Similarly, Krispenz (1989, 55) considers vv. 17-21 as a close unit, but at the same time that v. 20 can be seen as connected too loosely with the surrounding verses to fit. Whybray, further, changed his mind from three smaller units in vv. 4-6, 10-11 and 12-14 (commentary of [1972] 1994, 177, 179-181, incorrectly simplified as vv. 4-6 and 9-14 by Heim [2001, 136]) to a single unit in vv. 3-14, followed by isolated sayings in vv. 15f. (1994, 96-97) – both (re)published in the same year. 12

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 11

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... there is no clear principle of organization. But there are signs that sayings have been grouped together. ... All these features indicate, however slightly, a broad sense of unity between groups of sayings that seem to us quite disparate. However, the arguments are fragile and not all will agree ...

In principle, there is room for different readings of the text, which can, like the score of a sonata, legitimately be played out in different ways – quite apart from the practical fact that exhausting the detailed issues involved is the task of monographs rather than commentaries. Social background The social background to several of the prominent proverbs can be observed in the theme of social justice. Not only commercial life as such is represented, but also the fact that it was necessary to condemn unfair commercial profits (v. 1). This shows a society in which profiteering (v. 16b) and commercial tricks (v. 26) were rife. Such practises imply a society that depends on the sale of agricultural products (v. 26). Therefore an urban context is presupposed for the sale of food produced by landed gentry to the non-landed populace of the towns. In fact, towns and cities are explicitly mentioned in vv. 10f. (‫ קריה‬and ‫)קרת‬. In this context, the sapiential insistence on fairness and magnanimity towards others makes sense (v. 24).14

14

Cf. Sandoval (2006, 145-148).

TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 11

Proverbs 11:1-8 Fair trade and general righteousness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Deceitful scales are an abomination to Yahweh, but a full weight has his favour. Once arrogance has come, disgrace too has come, but with modest people is wisdom. The innocence of the upright leads them, but the crookedness of the treacherous destroys them. Wealth is of no avail on the day of wrath, but righteousness saves from death. The righteousness of the innocent makes his way straight, but through his wickedness the wicked falls. The righteousness of the upright rescues them, but through [their] desire the treacherous are ensnared. At the death of a human being hope perishes, but expectation built on human strength has perished already. A righteous person is rescued from adversity, and then a wicked one comes in his place.

Bibl. Dell 2006, 61; Hausmann 1995, 48-51, 56, 58; 281, 313; Heim 2001, 134-136; Heim 2013, 240-246, 252-262; Hermisson 1968, 175; Krispenz 1989, 49-57; Millar 2020, 137-139; Pilch 2016, 37-39; Scoralick 76, 157, 162-169; Scherer 1999, 75-79.

The opening verses already show what Scherer says of the whole chapter, namely that the dividing lines between sections or groups are difficult to draw with clarity. That also means that the structural build-up of such groups is also elusive, because their boundaries are elusive. What several commentators have noticed is that there is at least a loose connection or association between Chaps. 10 and 11, which is marked by the prominent catchword ‫( רצון‬favour) in 10:32 and 11:1.15 Moreover, 11:1-2 can be regarded as a kind of introduction to the chapter as a whole, since it states a practical principle (fair trading, v. 1) and a basic principle (hubris and humility, v. 216). There is also a striking 15 Cf. Steinmann (2002, 549), who thinks that “Heim has purposely to downplay certain links to produce his groupings of proverbs,” and finds this case an illustration. Although it may be said that Heim’s groupings are not always as convincing, it must be said that he nevertheless acknowledges this link, albeit, in his opinion, a weak one (Heim [2013, 254]). 16 See the commentary on 1:2, Vol. I, 56-57; the principle also occurs at 15:33; 16:5, 18; 18:12; 29:23.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

211

alliteration and assonance of the vowel ô and the consonant n in ‫רצונו‬, ‫זדון‬ and ‫ קלון‬in the two verses, which Waltke identifies as a phonetic link. The proverbs in vv. 3-8 show a concentric placing. The signs marking this are discernible, but do not testify to a poetically closely knit unit. 3 4 5 6 7 8

Ethical contrast: ‫ ישרים‬:: ‫בוגדים‬ ‫( הון‬financial strength) ‫( צדקת תמים‬rhyme, assonance); waw + ‫ ב‬open v. b ‫( צדקת ישרים‬rhyme, assonance); waw + ‫ ב‬open v. b ‫( און‬strength) Ethical contrast: ‫ צדיק‬:: ‫רשע‬

This sketch confirms the presentation given by Scherer,17 or at least points in the same direction. However, it seems less certain that fine detail is so meticulously worked out as to suggest a delicate poetic composition. In my opinion, the markers rather testify to careful editing than to exquisite composition. Scherer finds a subtle chiasmus in the use of ‫ צדקה‬and ‫ מות‬in v. 4, and ‫מות‬ and ‫ רשע‬in v. 7, respectively at the end and the beginning of those verses. But there is a textual uncertainty in v. 7 (see below), while one of the chiastic poles contains the abstract noun of the positive concept and the other contains the personal noun of the negative concept. Moreover, the fact that vv. 4, 5 and 6 are clearly “three proverbs in praise of ‫( ”צדקה‬Delitzsch, cf. Fox on v. 6), cuts across the concentric pattern. Nevertheless, the concentric order of these six proverbs can be affirmed.18 11:1 Deceitful scales are an abomination to Yahweh, but a full weight has his favour. The proverb is a classic 4+3 saying consisting of two nominal sentences. Both hemistichs have one stress for each word. There are two genitives in the opening hemistich. The first is an explicative genitive, since the nomen rectum in ‫( מאזני מרמה‬scales of deceit) explicates what kind of scales are meant and can therefore be translated by an adjective. In ‫( תועבת יהוה‬abomination of Yahweh) the genitive is subjective because Yahweh is the subject of the loathing. Every element of the antithetic parallelism has a precise counterpart in the respective opposing hemistich.

17 Scherer (1999, 75-79); cf. also on v. 3 below for Melanchthon’s grouping of vv. 3-8 on thematic grounds. 18 The association of the use of the noun ‫ צדקה‬is stronger in vv. 5 and 6 than between these and its form in v. 4, since in v. 4 it is in the absolute state and in vv. 5 and 6 in the construct state, moreover with rhyme and assonance in the latter two verses.

212 V. 1a scales of deceit abomination to Yahweh

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11 V. 1b complete19 stone favourable third person masculine singular suffix

In this saying there is no gapping for the reader to fill. Referring to this verse (and to antithetic proverbs in general), Alter20 remarks that “the expressive force seems to come chiefly from the emphatic matching of complementary opposite terms rather than from the interverset patterns for the development of meaning.” He compares v. 1 with v. 20, where the complementary opposites “loathing of Yahweh” and “his pleasure” also occur, however with reference to general concepts of crooked intentions (“heart”) and blameless action (“way”), while the subjects and predicates in the two nominal sentences are also inverted. According to Alter, the metaphoric power exercised by the formulaic pair of loathing and pleasure enter into a mutual defining play: the pair indicates all that is twisted and crooked as opposed to all that is blameless and whole. This is a clear ethical judgement. If the contrast in v. 1 is considered in the light of the semantic play in v. 20, the reader can infer that dependable as opposed to deceitful weights in commercial practice are a manifestation of a general God-willed ethical principle. Another “twice-told” proverb noted by Snell21 and discussed in depth by Heim22 is 20:23. As in 11:20, the predicate ‫ תעבת יהוה‬stands first, but the subject is ‫( אבן ואבן‬a stone and a stone, heavier and lighter stones purporting to be the same weight), and in the second hemistich the deceitful scales are said to be ‫( לא־טוב‬not good) instead of favourable. Heim thinks that the frequent statements about fair trade practice and divine judgement are evidence of the importance of the theme to the final editor(s) of the book. He criticises Murphy for surmising that unfair trade practice must have been common in Israel if it is chided so often. I do not dispute the importance of the topic to the final editor, but it was important to others as well (cf. Lev 19:35; Deut 25:13-16; Hos 12:8; Am 8:5-6; Mic 6:11). Neither do I dispute that proverbs could be created by modelling them on other proverbs, but the claim that this must have been done by the final editor, seems to me purpose-driven. In this case, according to Heim, it was done to increase the number of fair trade proverbs artificially, so as to “drive home to readers the importance that 19 The Peshitta translates the Hebrew ‫( שלמה‬complete, full) with À‹ (correct, just, orthodox), perhaps influenced by the Septuagint’s rendering with δίκαιον (just); both highlight the moral aspect, which, as EE points out, is already inherently present in the Hebrew text. 20 Alter ([1985] 2011, 210-211). 21 Snell (1993, 38). He groups the sayings in his category 1.2, viz. whole verses with two dissimilar words. Their counting is problematic, since this comparison shows up four dissimilar words. 22 Heim (2013, 252-254).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

213

this theme had in the eyes of those who forged the book of Proverbs into its final shape.” The case has however not been proven. In any event, I count only five proverbs that come into play for the purpose of this argument (11:1, 20; 16:11; 20:10, 23). According to Pilch,23 this proverb is among those in the book suggesting “that human beings are incapable of creating consistently accurate weights” and that only God can determine these (cf. 16:11). There was a royal standard for weights, as can be inferred from 2 Sam 14:26. If this was not adhered to, it was dishonest, since if a too light weight is used for selling a product it would mean customers are given less than they believe to be getting, and a too heavy weight for measuring the payment would mean that customers in reality pay more than they think. This fraudulent practice is being forbidden. It is justified to use the term “forbidden,” not only with reference to the commands in the Pentateuch, but also to a statement such as 11:1. The use of the expression ‫תועבת יהוה‬, whether it has cultic overtones or not, plainly shows divine disapproval of commercial fraud and the contrast makes clear what he expects from merchants. Whether the form of a sapiential statement in the indicative (“Wahrspruch”) is used or whether it comes as a sapiential injunction in the imperative or jussive, it is a didactic speech act that expects to be acted upon.24 The fact that this is a Yahweh-saying, as well as its parallels in the Pentateuch and in other ancient Near Eastern sources show that the economic sphere of life in the ancient world indeed is not a “free-standing social institution” (Pilch), but deeply imbedded in religious consciousness. Apart from the Pentateuch and the prophets cited above, we may also compare texts from Egypt and Mesopotamia. In the Wisdom of Amenemope several comparable passages are found: Do not move the scales or alter the weights, Nor diminish the fractions of the measure; Do not desire a measure of the fields, Nor neglect those of the treasury. The Ape sits by the balance, his heart is in the plummet; Where is a god as great as Thoth, Who invented these things and made them? Do not make for yourself deficient weights, They are rich in grief through the might of god. 23

Pilch (2016, 37-38). The topic of instruction contained in descriptive statements and not only in admonitions is discussed in the Introduction, Essay 2, and touched upon in Essay 1. In his section on “The Illocution of the Sapiential Saying,” Luchsinger (2010, 301-315, esp. 310-311) uses 11:1 as an example of how a contrastive saying confronts the learner with alternatives. The illocutory aspect requires the learner to compare a positive and a negative statement, the assertive function of which is to impart an injunction: “be honest in business, don’t be dishonest.” Luchsinger calls it an appeal to the hearer’s ability to practise “voluntary control.” 24

214

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11 If you see someone who cheats, Keep your distance from him.25 ... Beware of disguising the measure, So as to falsify its fractions; Do not force it to overflow, Nor let its belly be empty. Measure according to its true size, Your hand clearing exactly. Do not make a bushel of twice its size, For then you are headed for the abyss. The bushel is the Eye of Re, It abhors him who trims; A measurer who indulges in cheating, His Eye seals (the verdict) against him.26

In Mesopotamia the motif of commercial weights spans more than a millennium, as can be seen in the Hammurapi Code (18th century) on the one hand and the Shamash Hymn (in the library of Ashurbanipal, 7th century) on the other: If a merchant lent grain or money at interest and when he lent (it) at interest he paid out the money by the small weight and the grain by the small measure, but when he got (it) back he got the money by the [large] weight (and) the grain by the large measure [that merchant shall forfeit] whatever he lent.27

and He who handles the scales in falsehood, He who deliberately changes the stone weights (and) lowers [their weight], Will make himself lie for the profit and then lose [his bag of weights]. He who handles the scales in truth, much ...28

In all of these cases the same motif with the same commercial intent occurs together with the religious dimension (also in the Shamash Hymn, where several lines are broken at the end of the quotation, but it is then said that whoever handles the measure fairly is pleasing to the deity). The Mishnah (Baba Batra 5,10) takes the question of measures and scales so seriously that prescriptions are even given for the cleaning of these implements by ordinary householders (once a year). Shopkeepers must clean out measures twice a week, polish the weights once a week, and clean out the scales after every weighing (so Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel). Although neither v. 1 nor the other relevant proverbs or the Torah are quoted directly,29 they are assumed by the argument. Rabbenu Yonah 25 26 27 28 29

Amenemope XVII, 17 – XVIII, 7 (AEL II, 156-157; COS I, 119); cf. ANET, 423. Amenemope XVIII, 15 – XIX, 4 (AEL II, 157; COS I, 119-120). Codex Hammurapi 94-95 (ANET, 169; COS II, 342). Shamash II, 51-53; cf., after the hiatus, III, 7 (ANET, 388). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra skips the proverb and begins his commentary of Prov 11 at v. 2.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

215

Gerondi (13th century), on the other hand, directly connects 11:1 with 10:32. Interpreting the loathing of deceitful scales to mean that they are wrong even if not used, revealing as they do dishonest intentions, he applies the principle to the “mouth of the wicked” mentioned in 10:32b. In the light of 11:1, the previous verse must mean that the very intention to speak hurtful things is condemned, even if harm has not yet been done.30 The ‫ספר החימוך‬, a medieval exposition of the 613 commandments of the Torah (13th century) says that false weights and measures deserve stricter divine punishment than most, because the dishonest user does not even know how many people he deceived and cannot make restitution.31 According to the Vilna Gaon, the proverb applies to spiritual entities as well. One may not measure leniently in one’s own interest and severely in another’s (cf. Matt 7:2; Mark 4:24). Malbim’s view of the contrast between the honesty and dishonesty spoken of here is that there is no neutral ground between them. To avoid what God loathes is a positive action. Clemens Alexandrinus (2nd century)32 quotes the proverb quite creatively in an argument about the origin of Greek ethics, notably the “mosaic Law,” which to him includes Proverbs. Quoting the full proverb, he proceeds: “On this basis Pythagoras exhorts ‘not to step over the balance,’ whereas professing heresies is called ‘deceitful righteousness’.” So it is from Prov 11:1 that Pythagoras drew his insight of the unacceptability to deviate from the norm (which amounts to “heresy”). The argument on the duties of the clergy developed by Ambrosius (4th century) is much more straightforward.33 It is based on several texts from the Old Testament, including Prov 11:1 (and 20:10) and infers from them that the clergy should not only be free from major iniquities, but also from unfair actions that seem common. He concludes a minori ad maiorem that, if unfair practises in the market place are subject to punishment, how much more would that not be the case if found in the ranks of the clergy, who are supposed to be occupied with the “performance of the duties of virtue.” Melanchthon picks up his commentary at this point after skipping six verses. He relates 11:1a to the Decalogue: Praeceptum est de particulari iustitia, et de veritate in contractibus. Pertinet autem ad praeceptum Decalogi: Non furtum facies. Et comminatio saepe repetita, hic quoque; repeti intelligatur. Atrocia delicta puniuntur et in hac vita atrocibus poenis. (The precept is about a particular justice, and about truthfulness in commerce. So it pertains to the precept of the Decalogue: You shall not steal. A threat is also often repeated, this one too; by being repeated it is understood; severe crimes are punished even in this life, by severe punishments.) His comment seems to refer to v. 1a and to the rest of the chapter generally. Applying the Reformation principle of using Scripture to explain Scripture, he first relates the commercial deceit spoken of in the proverb to the Eighth Commandment in Ex 20:15 (“You shall not steal”) and then to the general principle that punishment 30 Likewise, Nahmias (14th century). Cf. Baba Batra 89b, where a non-standard measure is forbidden in any household, even if used for other purposes than measuring. 31 Cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 196) for accompanying information on 19th century applications of the motif by the Polish Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan. 32 Strom II, 18 (ANF II, 365). 33 De Off Min III, 9 (NPNF II,10, 78); cf. De Vid XIII (NPNF II,10, 405), where Prov 11:1 and 20:10 are also quoted.

216

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

should match the crime in question. Since punishments and rewards are not mentioned in v. 1, this is most naturally understood in light of the other proverbs where that is often the case (cf. v. 21). It therefore seems that Melanchthon indeed regarded the verse as a kind of introduction to the whole chapter.

11:2 Once arrogance has come, disgrace too has come, but with modest people is wisdom. The maqqeph after the first word of each hemistich seems to invite a reading of 3+2 stresses in the verse, but this is not necessary, since no emphasised syllables stand immediately alongside each other. Therefore we may accept Gemser’s scan of 4+3, which gives the first hemistich a “hammering rhythm” and therefore a memorable impact (Fuhs). The a-hemistich consists of two verbal sentences, both with the same verb, first in the perfect Qal and then the imperfect with the consecutive waw.34 This suggests a contiguous association between the events expressed by both. Waltke calls the clauses “inseparable,” which amounts to a cause-and-effect relationship: when one comes, the other is bound to come as well. The strong effect of the unmistakable assonance and alliteration of the two nouns making up the subjects of the repeated verb ‫בוא‬, viz. ‫ זדון‬and ‫קלון‬,35 strengthens the bond. The second hemistich is a nominal clause and, as Waltke states, the verb ‫ בוא‬is not syntactically gapped, but that does not preclude that unexpressed ideas in the hemistichs can be inferred in light of the respective other hemistichs (see below). The use of the verb ‫ בוא‬suggests the metaphorical presentation of arrogance and disgrace as people who go places together36 (Meinhold: inseparable twins; Waltke: invited and uninvited guests). The perfect followed by the consecutive imperfect aligns the two concepts closely (so Bertheau, Delitzsch). The one goes hand in glove with the other. One may perhaps call the first hemistich 34 Cf. 6:10-11 and the almost identical 24:33-34, where the perfect of ‫ בוא‬with the consecutive waw occurs. In these two cases it follows a series of nouns for laziness and expresses what the certain consequence of sloth is. In 18:3 the infinitive construct of ‫ בוא‬is used with the preposition ‫ב‬, denoting temporal proximity (IBHS 36.2.2b; GKC 114d), and followed by the same verb in the perfect (“When the wicked comes, contempt also comes”). 35 Hermisson (1968, 175) is undoubtedly right that these words present no case for any link backwards to 10:32, since their sound cannot be construed as paronomasia, cf. Boström (1928, 127). 36 Therefore not a metonymy where “arrogance” stands for “arrogant man,” which is regarded as probable by some commentators. Metonymy would require “disgrace” to stand for “man of disgrace,” which is awkward, for an arrogant man followed by a disgraced man makes little sense, whereas the attitude of arrogance is indeed followed by the experience of disgrace. Cf. the metaphorical use of the verb ‫ בוא‬in 6:11, where poverty “comes” as an unwelcome, dangerous person. In 11:2 the one arrives with the other to keep the wicked person company.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

217

a “mini-narrative” (Clifford) or a “narrative vignette” (Fox) as described by Alter, but not the whole proverb.37 By “narrative vignette” Alter means the presentation of a minimal plot in one proverb by which the reader is prompted to imagine little scenes following each other so that the second verset intensifies the first verset. This usually happens in verses based on equivalence, but sometimes also in “a pair of antithetical versets, where the moral calculus of reward for the good and retribution for the wicked is turned into a seesaw of miniature narrative.”38 But in v. 2 the metaphorical “going together” of two concepts is packed into a single verset and we can hardly imagine a scene in which one concept dominates the first verset, followed by a scene in the second verset where the other seesaws the situation. I would thus rather agree with Heim’s assessment that “[t]he proverb is not ‘telling a story’ ... but rather, the combination of verb forms introduces a sequential aspect,”39 sc. in half of the proverb. The adjective *‫( נצוע‬modest) occurs only here in the Old Testament.40 The adjective can, as here, be used nominally, that is, it can indicate a modest person, but is not an abstract noun “modesty.” This attitude resonates with the basic sapiential requirement of humility as opposed to hubris, which is a sine qua non for the acquisition of wisdom,41 and therefore presents an antithetic parallel to the arrogance spoken of in the first hemistich (arrogant attitude :: modest person). The constituent elements of the parallelism are again arranged so as to enable the reader to infer the opposite of one idea per hemistich in the corresponding other hemistich. Thus: V. 2a arrogance disgrace accompanies it [arrogance a mark of fools]

:: → ←

V. 2b modest people [honour accompanies them42] associate with wisdom

37 The term “narrative vignette” is used and explained by Alter ([1985] 2011, 212f. and 215f.). 38 One of Alter’s examples is Prov 21:13: “Who stops up his ear to the cry of the poor, / he, too, will call unanswered.” Here two distinct little scenes can be imagined by the readers, where the last one pictures what happens (imperfect) when the first one has happened (participle). 39 Heim (2013, 255). Bertheau calls the consequence “immediate” and Delitzsch “almost simultaneous.” 40 In the Hebrew Ben Sira the word also occurs (e.g. 34:22 [corresponding to the Septuagint 31:22]; 42:8); according to Yoder, the use in Ben Sira suggests “levelheadedness;” Lucas: modesty intended “in the sense of proper self-assessment.” 41 See the introductory notes to the passage, and Vol. I, 56-57. Several commentators interpret in this vein; the modest man does not overestimate himself, avoids antagonisms and is therefore wise (Toy); “intellectual reticence” as an important ingredient of wisdom (McKane); prudence as modest self-restraint (Whybray); “wisdom that emerges from humility” (Perdue). 42 Similarly Meinhold, who compares 15:33, and Clifford.

218

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

The proverb prompts the reader to fill out what is not expressed: the arrogant are fools and the modest receive honour. No wonder, then, that the arrogant fools are disgraced and the modest wise are honoured, since all of this complies with basic statements of the principle involved, as in 15:33; 16:5, 18; 18:12; 29:23. The first hemistich suggests that the disgrace (and therefore, by implication, also the honour) is a social affair, but what it entails is not said.43 Therefore it remains general enough to be universally applicable (cf. 3:34 for one side of the equation). Several rabbinic commentators interpret the arrogance (‫ )זדון‬of v. 2a as wilful sin. To sin deliberately and knowingly, is to challenge God, which is extreme haughtiness. The Mezudat David adds that such a form of arrogance brings its own shame with itself, since it embarrasses also the people around such a person. The link between arrogance/modesty and folly/wisdom is clearly underlined in Jewish exegesis. The Vilna Gaon, for instance, identifies the modest as those who quietly listen to their teachers and thereby acquire wisdom, whereas the arrogant are those who deliberately seek controversy for argument’s sake (similarly Malbim). Therefore humans have two eyes to read the written Torah and two ears to listen to the oral Torah, but only one mouth to give opinions. The link between vv. 1 and 2 is highlighted by the Midrash Tanchuma (4th century). A generation who deliberately uses false weights (v. 1) will be punished and shamed (v. 2) by being attacked. This is inferred from the fact that the prohibition of false weights in the Torah is immediately followed by the mentioning of Israel’s humiliation at the hands of the Amalekites (Deut 25:13-16, followed by Deut 25:17-18), just as the criticism of false scales in Proverbs is followed by the mentioning of disgrace for the arrogant. Although not with a direct citation of the proverb, the idea of the combination of humility and learning is also expressed in the Talmud. Rab Hanina bar Ida is quoted as saying that the Torah is likened to water because water flows from a high place to a lower place, which teaches us that “the words of Torah only endure with a person who has a modest mind” (Taanit 7a). Several patristic authors quote from the Book of Proverbs in connection with hubris, arrogance, pride and their opposites (see the commentary on the relevant proverbs cited above), but Chrysostom directly identifies the arrogance spoken of in v. 2 with insults. Taking ὕβρις as “insult,” he notices the grammatical ambiguousness (insults may bring disgrace to the one who is insulted or to the one who metes it out) and, referring to the parallelism, declares the subject of the insulting to be the one who is disgraced. Melanchthon pays attention to the verse in a somewhat circuitous way. According to him, when people are occupied with ordinary things, over time they often gradually become careless where the fear of the Lord is concerned. As Ex 32:6 shows, they then become lax in their observance of his will. This deteriorates, as can be seen in the fact that Israel first sat down to feast, then stood up to play, and finally became overbearing by turning to the golden calf instead of truly knowing God. 43 Waltke mentions several examples of concrete social consequences of hubris, e.g. Gen 11:5-8; Num 12:2, 10; 2 Chron 26:16-21; for the New Testament, cf. also Matt 23:12; Luke 14:11; 18:14; Acts 12:22-23. Plöger compares the story in Dan 5, where the arrogant king (Dan 5:1-4) is found to be too “light” (Dan 5:27; ‫קלל‬, the same root as ‫ )קלון‬and humiliated.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

219

This is hubris, since real wisdom consists of truly knowing God (recte agnoscere Deum, cf. 9:10), and therefore wisdom must be manifested in the humility spoken of in v. 2b.

11:3 The innocence of the upright leads them, but the crookedness of the treacherous destroys them. The antithetic proverb is closely symmetrical, three words with three stresses in each hemistich, with even the forms and meanings in a 1:1 alignment: V. 3a V. 3b positive characteristic in status constructus :: negative characteristic in status constructus positive noun in the masculine plural :: negative noun in the masculine plural positive verb imperfect with suff. 3 m. pl. :: negative verb imperfect with suff. 3 m. pl.

There is however a textual issue. The last word of the verse is an impossible form as it stands in the Ketib (‫ )וְ ָשׁ ֵדּם‬and should be read ‫ י ְָשׁ ֵדּם‬44 with the Qere (supported by a Hebrew fragment from the Cairo Geniza, the Greek Codex Alexandrinus, Origen and the Vulgate). Still, the Septuagint rendering deviates from the Masoretic Text, a fact ascribed by some commentators to possible ignorance about the meaning of the rare word ‫ס ֶלף‬: ֶ ἀποθανὼν δίκαιος ἔλιπεν μετάμελον, πρόχειρος δὲ γίνεται καὶ ἐπίχαρτος ἀσεβῶν ἀπώλεια (When the righteous dies he leaves regret, but the destruction of the wicked happens quickly and causes joy)

Both the Targum and the Peshitta show signs of confusion as well,45 but neither is of text-critical help other than confirming uncertainty about especially the second half of the verse. If we however accept the Qere, we have a close parallelism that makes sense. Waltke sees a proverb pair in vv. 3-4. There is indeed a chiastic order of positive and negative statements in the four hemistichs (v. 3a positive, v. 3b negative; v. 4a negative, v. 4b positive). Read in that way, it is possible to understand v. 4a as a specification of v. 3b (wealth from treachery is of no 44 Third person masculine singular imperfect Qal of ‫ שדד‬with the third person masculine plural suffix; the suffix causes the qamets hatuph (see GKC 67n). Cf. BHQ, which adduces not only textual witnesses, but also the parallelism in the verse, and notes the apparent Greek rendition of the rare word ‫( ֶס ֶלף‬crookedness) by ἀπώλεια (destruction). 45 The Targum gives a literal translation of the first hemistich, but paraphrases the second, showing that it too did not know what to do with the Hebrew: ‫( ונטלטלון בזוזי ונדכנון‬but robbers are taken away and brushed aside). In both hemistichs the Peshitta is even further away from the Hebrew as well as the Greek text: ôÐĀé ¿ćàÎïx ÀÎã{ ¿çÂĀæ À‹x ÁüÃé (The hope of the righteous is built up, but the pride of the wicked is destroyed).

220

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

help) and to see v. 4b as an intensification of v. 3a (the just are guided away from death). But the two proverbs can also be read each in its own right. The innocence of the upright is the agent of their well-being. The abstract noun ‫( תמה‬completeness, blamelessness, innocence) is used as a metonymy. It is not an abstract quality for the person possessing the quality as Clifford claims,46 but an abstract standing for the concrete acts by which innocence is manifested (abstractum pro concreto). The verb ‫( נחה‬lead, guide), here in the third person feminine singular Hiphil imperfect with the suffix of the third person masculine plural, is often used for the care given by a shepherd to his flock47 and here suggests precisely that.48 This would fit Waltke’s connection of the hemistich to v. 4b, where the just are said to be saved from death. But the connection is not necessary to understand v. 3, since the notion of the shepherd leading his flock in itself connotes positive care and includes an established motif of saving the sheep from death (cf. 1 Sam 17:34f.; Ezk 34:1ff.; John 10:4, 11-15). The second hemistich contains the rare noun ‫( ֶס ֶלף‬crookedness), which occurs only here and in 15:4.49 This is an appropriate description of the twisted tricks of people who deceive others (as opposed to honest and morally correct behaviour, which is often described as “straight”50). It is the same crookedness that brings about their destruction, as 28:10 illustrates graphically. Both halves of the proverb express the deed-consequence nexus. The negative side is well-known from the oft-quoted sayings of 26:27 and Qoh 10:8 (cf. Ps 7:16).51 The nexus does not imply that there is no place for the involvement of God in the positive or negative outcomes, since he is the one who upholds the order of the world as its creator.52 46 That is impossible in view of the construct state of the noun with following genitive; “the innocent people of the upright people” would make no sense, but “the innocent behaviour/acts of the upright” is perfectly intelligible. The cognate noun ‫( תמים‬innocent person) is not used in v. 3, but it does occur two verses further. Scherer (1999, 78) notices this and sees it as part of a network of catchwords in which i.a. a connection between vv. 3 and 5 is involved. 47 So Wildeboer, Oesterley, Gemser, Tuinstra; cf. Pss 23; 31:4; 61:3; 73:24; 78:14, 78:53, 72; 107:30 et al.; cf. THAT II, 53-55. The verb may also be used for sapiential instruction (so Meinhold, Fuhs, Yoder and others; cf. 6:22), which is not incompatible with the shepherd imagery (see the commentary on 6:22, Vol. I, 276). 48 An example of metaphtonemy: the innocence stands for innocent acts (metonymy) and at the same time is the shepherd. See above on 10:11 and the references there to Goossens and Radden. 49 The verb ‫( סלף‬Piel subvert, pervert) suggests distortion and twisting (Fox); in the Old Testament it occurs more often than the cognate noun (e.g. Ex 23:8; Deut 16:19; Job 12:19; for Proverbs, see 13:6; 19:3; 21:12; 22:12). 50 The root ‫ישר‬, as verb and as adjective, occurs often both as “straight” in the literal sense or as “right,” “straightforward;” for the latter, cf. 2 Kgs 10:15; Prov 20:11; 21:8; see THAT I, 790-794. See below on rabbinic interpretation of the issue. 51 The Qohelet text however mentions the digging and falling as a possibility, not as a necessity (cf. GKC 107r). 52 See Vol. I, 39-46 (Essay 4 on “retribution”), and 19-28 (Essay 2 on the concept of order).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

221

Sometimes, the rabbis are content to paraphrase the proverb (e.g. Rashi, Hame’iri), but sometimes this goes together with perceptive remarks on the logic of the contrasting statements in the verse. Yonah Gerondi expands on the innocence (‫ )תמה‬and obviously does so in light of the crookedness (‫)סלף‬. He explains ‫תום‬, a cognate of ‫תמה‬, in terms of ‫( יושר‬cf. the note above on “straight”). According to him, it means that the innocent or blameless one is perfect. Since in the case of humans this is a moral judgement, such a perfect person must be regarded as a ‫ישר‬, a just person who lives straightforwardly. In this context he links people’s character with their goal. Walking straight ahead implies perceiving a clear aim. Therefore it is this blameless straightforwardness which leads them toward the positive end goal, not as elaborately but comparably. The Mezudat David ascribes the positive result of the innocent and the negative result of the crooked to themselves. Their own deeds bring about the results, which in the case of the crooked is the loss of their souls. Likewise, Nahmias sees an inner necessity in the treacherous nature of the ‫ בוגדים‬that leads them toward their own destruction. However, he adds that this destruction is not only a matter of chance, but is in fact divine retribution. So, here too there is no sense of any tension between the deed-consequence nexus and divine retribution. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra relates ‫ ֶס ֶלף‬to the use of the verb ‫ סלף‬Piel in Ex 23:8 (a bribe “makes the affairs/words of the righteous crooked”). He seems to mean that a treacherous person who corrupts a righteous person will be destroyed.53 In his Epistle to the Ephesians, Ignatius54 alludes to the second hemistich of the proverb while warning about false teachers. He criticises wicked people who use the name of Christ treacherously (cf. ‫ )סלף בוגדים‬and thereby spread a false gospel. This will lead to their own destruction, which will come suddenly (perhaps an oblique reference to 10:25a). Chrysostom comments on the proverb as it appears in the Septuagint (“When the righteous dies he leaves regret, / but the destruction of the wicked happens quickly and causes joy”). He calls the proverb “a correction” of Qoh 9:2 on the identical fate of the righteous and the wicked.55 While Qohelet is right that the death of the righteous and the wicked is the same, the difference sets in after death. Chrysostom achieves this by reading the Greek v. 3 in the light of 10:7 (“The memory of a righteous man is for blessing, / but the name of the wicked will rot”) and by a strained interpretation from two perspectives, viz. the regret or joy of people at the death of the righteous and the wicked respectively, and joy in the face of death and regret for the coming of death, which “suggests resurrection” to either a joyous or a dreadful afterlife. Melanchthon takes vv. 3-8 as a unit on “the fundamental doctrine of providence,” which is: “To the just good is done, to the wicked evil is done.”56 He addresses the strength of the simple contrast in v. 3 as a problem to be analysed in the church. The question for the interpreter is: if such a clear condemnation is made in the 53 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra adds an explanation of the difficult last word by using the alternative form with plene spelling and an independent pronoun instead of the suffix (‫)ישוד אותם‬. 54 Epist Eph VII (ANF I, 52). 55 Cf. the way Chrysostom neutralises Qoh 9:16 with Prov 30:8 (see on 10:4 above). 56 Interestingly, Waltke makes the following statement about vv. 3-8 (also taken as a unit by him): “Verses 3-8 develop the theme of security through righteousness alone and the certainty that death is God’s final ‘no’ to the wicked.” He does not refer to Melanchthon and seems to have reached a similar interpretation of the general theological thrust of the same proverb group quite independently from Melanchthon.

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verse, how can it be squared with the fact that there are so many awful sins left in the church (his examples are Aaron and David)? His answer relates to the Lutheran opposition between law and gospel: in terms of the law all are condemned to destruction, but in terms of the gospel some of those (aliqui) are justified so that they escape condemnation.

11:4 Wealth is of no avail on the day of wrath, but righteousness saves from death. The proverb is a typical Siebener, here 4+3, with the negative particle a part of the first stress unit. The verse is missing in the Septuagint.57 It is a simple antithetic parallelism consisting of two verbal sentences the syntax of which is arranged in a chiastic pattern: [‫]ביום עברה‬ Prepositional phrase

[‫]ממות‬ Prepositional phrase

‫הון‬

‫לא יועיל‬

Subject

Predicate

‫תציל‬

‫וצדקה‬

Predicate

Subject

The proverb echoes 10:258 (see above on that verse) and even has the same chiastic basis. But in that verse the a-hemistich lacks a prepositional phrase, which is compensated by a longer noun phrase making up the subject, while in 11:4 the prepositional phrase “on the day of wrath”59 supplies an important element. First, it falls back on the prophetic tradition where “the Day of the Lord” is often a day on which the judgement and punishment of Yahweh are expected (cf. Isa 13:9, 13; Ezk 7:19) and when wealth will be of no avail to save (Zeph 1:14-18). Since the antithetic parallel is the saving power of righteousness, the wealth is implied to be obtained by wickedness (Whybray) and therefore has the same quality as the riches spoken of in 10:2 (denied by Tuinstra; Yoder thinks the wealth is “somehow suspect”). Second, the wrath spoken of in the first hemistich is not just any punishment,60 but shown by 57 The remarks by Delitzsch on the “LXX” form of the proverb seem to relate to Theodotion, whose translation is supplied in some Septuagint manuscripts (see EE); cf. Delitzsch’s comparison of the rendering of ‫ ביום עברה‬by ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπαγωγῆς in the supplied verse with Theodotion’s use of ἐπαγωγή (fate) to translate Hebrew ‫( אד‬calamity) in 27:10. 58 The pair belongs to Snell’s Group 1.3 (“whole verses repeated with three dissimilar words” as he identifies them); see Snell (1993, 39). 59 Tuinstra lists similar phrases in the Book of Proverbs: “the day of revenge” (‫יום נקם‬, 6:34), “the day of evil” (‫יום רעה‬, 16:4), “the day of adversity” (‫יום צרה‬, 24:10; 25:19), “day of calamity” (‫יום אד‬, 27:10). 60 Some commentators do not regard the force of the parallelism to be this strong and think any disaster may be meant (Murphy), or even repeated punishments (“Straftaten,” Plöger). Others agree that the “day of wrath” means a “life-threatening disaster” (Clifford, similarly McKane) and still others regard both as possible (Waltke).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

223

the second hemistich to be the punishment of death (so Sæbø, Fuhs, Lucas; cf. Oesterley, who regards this as more probable than a general calamity as in Job 21:30). Thus we again have an example of an opening hemistich being disambiguated by a rereading in the light of the second hemistich:61 V. 4a wealth of no avail [generated by wickedness] on the day of wrath [wrath brings death]

V. 4b righteousness saves from death

This does not mean that the proverb refers to an eschatological day of judgement in prophetic style (which is not excluded by Van Leeuwen and regarded as a possibility by Waltke). As distinct from the prophetic usage of the concept, the proverbs are rather concerned with the behaviour of the individual and its consequences (Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, Meinhold, Tuinstra). The context of vv. 1-8 suggests what the focus on the individual person entails. As argued in the remarks on links within vv. 1-8 above, these verses are a group of sayings on honesty and righteousness (cf. Delitzsch, Waltke and others). Therefore we can agree with Heim that the reference to “the day of wrath” here “establishes a strong link to the nearby, salient Yahweh-saying in Prov 11:1.”62 The practical principle of fair trade (v. 1), the basic principle of modesty (v. 2) and the ideas of uprightness and righteousness in vv. 3, 5-8 concern ethical attitudes and actions of individuals in everyday life. None of this reveals a “hidden” or “deeper” meaning in addition to what the proverbs themselves say, but it does provide evidence of editorial concern by virtue of which the sayings reinforce each other. What the proverb says in its own right can best be described in terms of its performative function.63 The proverb asserts the limits of wealth and the power of justice, which means it has an assertive illocution (function).64 Since the assertion commits to the realisation of specific results, thereby seeking to convince the reader/hearer, its function also has a commissive (promising)65 and a persuasive (argumentative or urging)66 side. A single-stich proverb has 61 The same effect is created by the parallelism in 10:2, although the wrath spoken of in 11:4 adds a dimension of suggested divine wrath not mentioned in 10:2. Nevertheless, the effect is the same in both cases, because the parallelism makes it clear that the issue is a matter of life and death. 62 Heim (2013, 217). 63 In pragmatics and critical application of the speech act theory, the use of terminology – such as locution, illocution, perlocution etc. – is not always consistent (cf. RDLW III, 484486), hence the additions in parentheses provided here. 64 Cf. Luchsinger (2010, 301). 65 According to Luchsinger (2010, 315), the commissive illocution can often be seen where results of the deed-consequence nexus are presented. 66 Luchsinger (2010, 313).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

several facets like the facets of a cut gem and its simplicity should therefore not be underestimated. This one provides instruction by: (a) (b) (c) (d)

asserting a conviction of the sage, arguing for insight in the limits of wealth, promising reward for the practice of righteousness, and urging its point with an ominous prophetic concept.

The Talmud contains a striking instance of a “twice-told proverb,” namely of Prov 11:4 and 10:2 (in that order). The double quote is attributed to R. Johanan (Baba Batra 10a). He says that the reference to ‫( עברה‬wrath) in 11:4a shows that the saving from death in 11:4b must mean that righteousness saves one from the punishment of Gehinnom, whereas the identical 10:2b means that righteousness can also save one from an unnatural death in this world. In both cases the continuing discussion (Baba Batra 10b) reveals that ‫ צדקה‬is here understood in the later technical sense of “charity.”67 PseudoIbn Ezra also distinguishes between two kinds of death, viz. that experienced by the wicked and an untimely death, and thinks that both may be meant here. In the opinion of Yonah Gerondi, dishonestly obtained wealth cannot save its owner from misfortune, but when God’s wrath is inflamed not even honestly obtained wealth can save one from him. Only ‫ צדקה‬as the giving of charitable alms can earn enough merit to achieve that. That means that money can indeed save one both in this world and even in the world to come, but only when it is given away in an act of beneficence.68 A positive rider about the saving power of money is also added by Malbim. In peacetime assets do have value, but not in times of God’s wrath, when God punishes by war or pestilence. Chrysostom does not discuss this verse (neither does he discuss the following two), but he does comment on 10:2 (see above). The Constitutions of the Apostles69 (4th century) quotes the verse and applies it in a literal sense to those who have money but neither use it themselves nor give it to the needy. This is interpreted as placing one’s faith in the god of money rather than in the true God, which would accord with the basic idea of Jas 2:14-26.

11:5-6 5

The righteousness of the innocent makes his way straight, but through his wickedness the wicked falls. The righteousness of the upright rescues them, but through [their] desire the treacherous are ensnared.

6

These two proverbs (4+3, 3+3) are often taken as a proverb pair,70 and with good reason. Apart from the obvious thematic closeness of the two verses, there are also formal affinities. 67

Cf. the notes and references in the commentary on 10:2. See Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 198). 69 Const Apost IV, iv (ANF VII, 433-434). 70 E.g. Meinhold, Van Leeuwen, Murphy, Fuhs, Waltke, Tuinstra, Heim (2013, 262). Yoder even refers in the singular to the two verses as one proverb. Cf. further Scherer (1999, 76), 68

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

225

The respective a-hemistichs as well as the respective b-hemistichs are similarly built up: V. 5a st. cs. of ‫ צדקה‬with sg. adj. as noun; V. 6a st. cs. of ‫ צדקה‬with pl. adj. as noun;

3rd f. sg. impf. verb; object with 3rd m. sg. suff. 3rd f. sg. impf. verb; object is 3rd m. pl. suff.

V. 5b waw + ‫ ;ב‬noun (cause of downfall) + genitive in suff.; verb impf.; subject V. 6b waw + ‫ ;ב‬noun (cause of downfall) + genitive noun; verb impf.; subject in verb Moreover, the first words of all four stichs present cases of anaphora and sound play with consonants (alliteration) and vowels (assonance): ‫ צדקת תמים‬/ ‫ – צדקת ישרים‬ṣidqat tāmîm / ṣidqat y ešārîm ‫ וברשעתו‬/ ‫ – ובהות בגדים‬uberiš cātō / ubehawwat bō[gedîm] also ‫ תישר‬/ ‫ – ישרים‬t eyaššēr / yešārîm There is a textual problem with ‫ ובהות‬in v. 6b. Irrespective of the different semantic possibilities of the noun ‫הוה‬,71 the issue is that there are several witnesses to the presence of a masculine plural suffix, which is however lacking in the Masoretic Text. The Septuagint has τῇ δὲ ἀπωλείᾳ αὐτῶν (and in their destruction), the Peshitta has …{ÍàÎð (in their iniquity), and the Targum has ‫( בשלומיהון‬in their retributions). As noted in EE, the different translations of the versions show that each tries independently to come to grips with the difficult word ‫הוה‬, but they also testify to a Hebrew text with a pronominal suffix of the third person masculine plural. If accepted, it would suggest that we should read ‫( ובהותם‬and through their desire) and explain it as a “near haplography” of similar looking ‫ ם‬and ‫( ב‬EE, but not mentioned in BHS). This in turn makes ‫( בגדים‬treacherous people) the grammatical subject of the passive verb ‫( ילכדו‬they are ensnared) rather than the genitive of the preceding noun in the feminine construct state (‫)ובהות‬. Thus: “[B]ut through their desire the treacherous are ensnared” rather than “but through the desire of the treacherous they are ensnared.” Toy prefers the emendation with the suffix, arguing that otherwise the subject of the verb has to be inferred by the reader. Fox also emends in this way and makes the similar point that the only available antecedent for ‫ ילכדו‬is the ‫ ישרים‬of the first hemistich, which would produce an unintelligible statement. This would be a more natural way to understand the Hebrew text, although it is possible to infer the subject of the passive verb from the genitive preceding it (so Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, Hitzig and Delitzsch72) instead of the ‫ ישרים‬of the first hemistich, which would be impossible. But in the latter case the weight of the versions’ evidence for a suffixed mem would have to be ignored, which would be difficult to defend, especially in the light of their who does not explicitly call vv. 5-6 a “pair,” but in the context of the pattern he detects surrounding them, he finds the verses “aligned to one another exceptionally closely.” Similarly Krispenz (1989, 50), who also regards vv. 5 and 6 closely connected despite links to other verses in the cluster she finds in vv. 3-6. 71 Capriciousness (e.g. Mic 7:3 [so KAHAL]); desire (Mic 7:3 [so HALOT, KBL], Ps 52:9 [so Delitzsch]), Prov 10:3 [see the commentary on that verse above]); deceit (Prov 17:4); word (cf. Ugaritic hwt, Akkadian awātu); disaster (Prov 19:13, Job 6:2; 30:13 [so Yoder]). 72 Hitzig (1858) first referred to Gen 9:6 and Ps 32:6 and was later followed by Delitzsch (1874) with a reference only to Gen 9:6, but not to Hitzig.

226

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

independence.73 McKane and BHS propose the plural, which would not require changing the consonants and enables the form to be read in the absolute state (“but by desires the treacherous are caught”). Tuinstra opts for leaving the text unaltered, but his appeal to 11:9 as a comparable construction has the drawback that ‫דעת‬ (knowledge) in that verse does not have to be in the status constructus and should be read as a status absolutus. One can claim with Dahood74 that the word here appears as a Phoenician form, where the absolute state of the feminine singular does have a ‫ת‬, but even so v. 9 does not provide support, since the Hebrew segolate ‫ דעת‬must have a ‫ ת‬on both counts. BHQ contemplates “a base ‫ ”תוֹם‬for the form, but only on the tenuous indirect grounds that, in 10:9 and 28:10 the Targum renders ‫ תם‬/ ‫תמם‬ by the root ‫שלם‬, which it also uses here. Plöger proposes to interpret the Niphal verb as a reflexive, which would imply that the subject is the treacherous (“but in the greed of the treacherous they catch [themselves]”). But this again does not account for the versions. Waltke regards it possible that the Septuagint’s Vorlage could have had the mem of the suffix, but thinks it more probable that, conversely, the pronoun was added by the Septuagint to facilitate its translation of ‫ הוה‬as ἀπωλεία (destruction). Most of these proposals have their strengths, but in my opinion they are overridden by the argument that so many versions independently suggest the loss of a suffix. Moreover, the similarity of ‫ ם‬and ‫ ב‬is a good explanation for an oversight by a Hebrew copyist. This is further amplified by Fox’s argument that the disjunctive accent (rebiac mugrāš) is placed on [‫ ובהות]ם‬to separate it from the next word so that it cannot be read as part of a genitive construction. But Delitzsch also noticed the importance of the accent and interpreted it differently, viz. as an indication that ‫ בהות‬is “the principal form.”75 Still, the combined weight of the haplography, the versions and their independence speaks for a textual emendation of ‫ ובהות‬to ‫ובהותם‬ (but through their desire). After so much attention to the text-critical aspect of the text, it may be deemed a little irony that neither maintaining the Masoretic Text nor repointing or emending it makes a real difference to the thrust of the proverb’s assertion. Therefore it is understandable that several commentators simply slip the pronoun “their” into the translation, either in brackets or not, or avoid emending the text, but interpret the verse in the same strain anyway. Nevertheless, the exegete’s responsibility to take textual criticism seriously is not absolved by this circumstance. On the contrary, it illustrates that claims about the sense of a text cannot be made responsibly if such issues are glossed over.

It is clear from the outset that the two verses are not only narrowly bound together, but are also associated with the others in vv. 1-8. The “contrasting fates of the righteous and the unrighteous” (Fox) are specified in terms of death and destruction on the one hand and being saved on the other (Lucas). That this happens in vv. 5 and 6 is clear from the genitive constructions with which both verses open. ‫ צדקת תמים‬and ‫ צדקת ישרים‬show that righteousness 73 This is augmented further still by the Vulgate, which does not merely latinise the Greek but translates independently, in insidiis suis (in their pitfalls). 74 Dahood (1963, 21). 75 As far as I can see, Ewald (1837) was the first to suggest that, although the Masoretic accentuation “appears” to separate the words ‫ בגדים‬and ‫ובהות‬, they should be taken as a genitive construction. Delitzsch does not refer to him, but is perhaps providing a rationale for Ewald’s statement.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

227

is central to the moral make-up of both the “innocent” and the “upright.” The fact that ‫ תמים‬is singular and ‫ ישרים‬is plural has stylistic effect but is of no consequence to the meaning, since in the singular the type of person is referenced and in the plural the individuals who make up the category in question. As the text stands, the singular form of the one and the plural of the other bring about a rhyming effect. This could have been deliberately created in the composition of a two-stich proverb (a couplet in my terminology). On the other hand, an existing similarity in sound could have contributed to independent proverbs being edited together. In view of the thorough equivalence of the two lines in other respects as well (see above), it is more likely that the two stichs were conceived as a single proverb (so implicitly Yoder). The ‫ צדקה‬spoken of here is obviously not just a static quality. What makes one’s path straight and consequently saves people is actively performing righteousness, i.e. behaviour in accordance with the normative order.76 The metaphor of the path or way is often used for human behaviour (although for other purposes as well).77 According to v. 5 the path of life is made straight for the righteous person, which in the light of the second hemistich means that it is made level rather than without curves (so Ramaq). By contrast, the wicked person falls on the way. The preposition ‫ ב‬can mean that he falls “into” his wickedness (‫)ברשעתו‬, but it can also indicate the cause of his coming to a fall (“through” his wickedness).78). In the first case the metaphor would be that he stumbles into a pitfall (i.e. wickedness) along the way, and in the second it would imply that his own wickedness causes him to encounter obstacles (cf. 4:19; 5:22; 15:19; 22:5). The latter is to be preferred, since (a) he already is a ‫ רשע‬when he starts walking and therefore cannot only encounter wickedness along the way – unless he falls into even more wickedness – and (b) a cause for the adversity is required by the force of the antithetic parallelism that emphasises a cause for good going.79 Yoder finds a pun in the use of the rare word ‫( הוה‬v. 6b). Recalling the meanings “desire” and “disaster” for this noun she suggests that the 76 This supports the view of Jepsen (1965, 78-89), as opposed to that of Ho (1991) who finds ‫ צדקה‬a “state of being.” See H.H. Schmid (1968, 166ff.) and cf. on 1:3 in Vol. I. 77 See the note on the “ground metaphor” of the way, Vol. I, 66-67. Different lexemes are used for this purpose in the Book of Proverbs, e.g. ‫דרך‬: 4:19; 5:8; 8:2; 9:15; 10:29; 11:20; 12:15; 13:6; 14:12; 15:9, 19; 16:2, 9, 25; 21:2, 8; 29:27; 30:19; 30:20 (Zehnder [1999, 294-385]); ‫ארח‬: 5:6; 8:20; 10:17; 15:10, 24 (Zehnder [1999, 385-401]); ‫נתיבה‬: 3:17; 8:20; 12:28 (Zehnder [1999, 420-425]). 78 So Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, who explains ‫ ב‬as ‫( בעבור‬because of): ‫[ שיעשו ילכדו‬sic, plene] ‫( ובעבור הות בוגדים‬but because of the desire of the treacherous that they practise, they are entangled). However, Rashi takes the alternative view of ‫ב‬: ‫( ובוגדים בהוות ילכדו‬and the treacherous will be caught in destruction). 79 In both vv. 5a and 6a the subject ‫ צדקה‬is syntactically emphasised by preceding the verb.

228

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

treacherous are entangled by (‫ )ב‬their desire, which would then involve being entangled in (‫ )ב‬a disaster.80 This calls to mind the two possibilities of the corresponding prepositional phrase in v. 5b, but ‫ רשעה‬cannot mean “ruin” or a comparable punishment for being wicked. Who wishes to uphold the ambiguity will have to conclude that the wicked lapse into even more wickedness (Vilna Gaon, see below). In my opinion the ambiguity lies in the use of the preposition ‫ב‬. By virtue of the meanings “by/through” and “in/into” readers may be prompted (and were, as we have seen) to consider the possibilities offered by the proverb for them to understand and apply it: • The wicked fall due to their own wickedness and thus have only themselves to blame.81 • The wicked fall into a downward spiral of wickedness begetting wickedness. • Desire or greed82 is what causes the treacherous to be trapped. • By the same token, the treacherous are caught by a disaster. • Perhaps their treacherous talk unleashed it all. The reader/hearer is invited to consider different options. The same principle goes for the two a-hemistichs and for the two complete lines. Reading them in each other’s light reveals a development from v. 5 to v. 6. In v. 5a righteousness levels the way of those who practise it. In v. 6a this idea is enhanced. Once travelling on the straight way, those who practise righteousness experience more than easy progress, they are saved. It is not said what they are saved from, but Waltke thinks the contrasting parallel (‫ )ילכדו‬suggests the snares of death and therefore that this is what they are saved from. This seems probable in the light of the one-liner in v. 4 immediately preceding the twoliner (cf. also the identical 10:2b), but the text also allows rescue from other forms of adversity and harm along the way. This also impacts the respective b-hemistichs. The general “fall” (‫ )נפל‬of the wicked in v. 5b is similarly enhanced by a specification in the parallel v. 6b: those who lack righteousness are caught in the snares of various adversities, including death. Schematically it can be presented as follows:

80 Similarly Millar (2020, 137-138). Quite another pun involving ‫ הוה‬is suggested by Kselman (2002, 545f.), viz. the meanings “desire” and “word,” so that two reasons for the entrapment are suggested. Thus the treacherous are caught because of both their desire and their words. 81 This may in turn represent what Lam (2016, 16-86) calls “the burden of sin,” meaning that sin is metaphorically conceived of as something that weighs down the bearer; in the case of 11:5 this burden would be what causes the wicked to fall. Lam (2016, 67) does point out though, that no term for weight or heaviness occurs here. 82 Pilch prefers the translation “greed,” which he as a social scientist finds “much more suitable to the world of ancient commerce.” I would add: if anything, even more so to the world of present-day commerce.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11 V. 5 righteousness levels path of the innocent practising righteousness

V. 6 righteousness saves life of the upright practising righteousness

by wickedness / in further wickedness the wicked falls [adversity including death]

by desire / in disaster the treacherous are entangled [in adversity including death]

229

If the parallelism enhances “easy going” to “being saved,” then “being entangled” and “coming to a fall” mean not being saved, which can include even death. So the proverb is not only two contrasts together making up an equivalent parallelism on the level of a couplet, but a dynamic element is introduced by the progress noticeable once the second line sheds its light on the first. The Mezudat David interprets both vv. 5b and 6b to state that the wicked will fall into or be trapped by their own wickedness, meaning that they will experience the same evil they have designed for other people (cf. 26:27; 28:10; Qoh 10:8; Ps 7:16) – similarly, already Rashi. The Vilna Gaon however thinks the falling of the wicked does not only result from erring in Torah, but primarily from earlier evil deeds, which subscribes to the view that evil generates even more evil (cf. above). Further references to rabbinic interpretations have been made at the relevant places in the comments above. Clemens Alexandrinus uses v. 5a in a completely different way,83 notably to support his view that a sinner, once reborn, may not sin again. He quotes the first part of the verse (together with a reference to 13:6). To him, the proverbial righteousness that makes a straight path means the state of remaining blameless once one has received forgiveness, since asking for forgiveness frequently shows a semblance of repentance, but not repentance itself. After repenting, one is saved through merciful forgiveness and not by one’s own righteousness (Clemens does not quote v. 6!), but the saved have to preserve their status salutis by their own righteousness, “as obedience is in our power.”

11:7 At the death of a human being hope perishes, but expectation built on human strength has perished already. The five words of v. 7a require five stresses, but a proverb of 5+2 would be burdened with a far too lengthy opening verset. Although it is unwise to emend a text on metrical grounds only, there are several reasons why an emendation is necessary in this case. Several ancient versions and some Hebrew manuscripts show an uncertainty about the state of the text, trying as they do to make sense of a seemingly unintelligible proverb. Related to 83

Strom II, 18 (ANF II, 361).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

this is the use of ‫ רשע‬as an adjective with ‫אדם‬, which is pleonastic as the text now stands.84 In the present form of the Masoretic Text, it is difficult to make sense of: At the death of a wicked person hope perishes, and the expectancy of potency has died. That cannot be construed as an antithetic parallelism, which is precisely what the Septuagint turns it into: τελευτήσαντος ἀνδρὸς δικαίου οὐκ ὄλλυται ἐλπίς, τὸ δὲ καύχημα τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὄλλυται. (When a righteous man dies, hope does not come to an end, but the boasting of wicked people comes to an end) An attractive explanation for how this could have happened is offered in EE. In the last hemistich the Septuagint associates ‫( אונים‬strength) with ‫( ָאוֶ ן‬wickedness),85 cf. Ps 94[93]:23, and reads ‫( ותוחלת‬expectancy) as ‫( ותהלה‬praise, glory), which it glosses with καύχημα. That provides a contrasting parallelism and suggests that the righteous have hope for a life after death (cf. also 10:28 and 14:32 [EE]).86 As for the first hemistich, BHQ mentions the possibility that an earlier version of the Hebrew text did not have ‫( רשע‬so Ehrlich, Scott, Plöger, Clifford, Waltke). This is indeed the case in two Hebrew manuscripts, although these are of a late date. Other commentators (Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, Ringgren)87 think that ‫ אדם‬is the redundant word, and yet others retain the Hebrew text (Delitzsch, Scoralick,88 Yoder) or do not choose (Lucas). In my opinion, we should accept the verdict of Waltke, that ‫ רשע‬should be omitted “because the internal evidence favors its omission.” This will now be discussed further.

McCreesh89 has shown that sound patterns play an important role in the proverb. In both hemistichs there is an obvious consonance of the sounds b, t and d as well as the assonance of the o vowel. The only word that does not participate in the sound play is ‫ רשע‬in the first hemistich. Therefore ‫רשע‬ was probably not part of the original text and was later inserted editorially for reasons of piety,90 which “fits neatly into the theme of the proverb with 84 The two words do occur together in Job 20:29; 27:13 (Yoder), which however does not mean that this has to be the case in 11:7 as well. 85 So does Hitzig, taking it as a plural of abstraction, although ‫ ָאוֶ ן‬does not occur in the plural (McCreesh [1991, 139]). In the same strain, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra infers the meaning of the difficult ‫ אונים‬from the easier ‫אוֶ ן‬. ָ Citing a suggestion in BHS, Plöger considers it possible that the word could have been read as ‫ אוילים‬and indeed translates accordingly (“Bosheiten”); cf. also Wildeboer. 86 Cf. Oesterley; see above on the Jewish and Christian reception of 10:28, and below on 14:32. 87 Not Plöger as claimed by Whybray. 88 Scoralick (1995, 164-168). 89 McCreesh (1991, 138-140). 90 Fox finds it unlikely that the evidently orthodox editor of this collection would have included a “skeptical” proverb, but the editor’s “orthodox piety” can just as well be the reason for inserting ‫רשע‬, perhaps under the influence of 10:28b, where ‫ רשע‬is used in a “pious” expression of the same idea.

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‫ רשע‬omitted” (McCreesh). In this verse ‫( אונים‬strength, wealth, virility) has either the generic sense (Waltke) or means financial strength (McKane, Murphy, Clifford,91 but not the strength of progeny (so Rashi, Malbim), since progeny is begotten from virile potency, but the children of the deceased “are not themselves the robur virile” (Delitzsch). Therefore wealth is to be understood as the source of expectation. The third person feminine singular perfect of ‫ אבד‬at the end of the verse, can be interpreted as a gnomic perfect, i.e. a proverbial perfective,92 set against the habitual imperfect of the same verb in the first hemistich.93 The imperfect would thus be “used to denote habitual activity with no specific tense value” and go with the gnomic perfect conceiving of “a universal state or event as a single event.”94 Read in this way, the proverb would be a parallelism of equivalence (“synonymous”): When a person dies, the object of his hope perishes (so Fox) and the trust placed in wealth95 perishes. The second hemistich would then also be governed by the temporal phrase [...] ‫ במות אדם‬at the beginning of the verse (so Hitzig) and provide a specification of the first hemistich, namely that no wealth can offer hope when humans are confronted with death. But the perfect following the imperfect of the same verb can also be read another way. As in Ugaritic,96 the perfect can describe an event or state prior to another event, as a pluperfect, future perfect or a general truth.97 Then the proverb would contain an element of contrast: When a person dies, the object of his hope naturally dies as well, but any trust in wealth will by then already have perished anyway. That is, one may entertain all sorts of hope until the moment of death, but even before then it should be clear that wealth cannot be trusted. This is more pointed than the alternative, since the second hemistich does not just sharpen the first, but states a principle that trust in human strength/wealth is gone with the wind irrespective of the moment of death. The proverb thus starts from the same premise as Qoh 9:4-5 (as long as one belongs to the living – and only so long – there is hope [‫)]בטחון‬, but avoids the bitter irony of Qohelet (“for the living know that they must die”) in favour of a conviction that leaves room for pious trust in God rather than in things material or human (cf. 14:26; 29:25b; Pss 40:4; 42:6; 118:8-9; 146:35; Isa 40:3198). 91

Clifford points to “the economic context established by v. 1 and elaborated in vv. 3-6.” See IBHS, 30.5.1c; cf. GKC 106k. 93 So IBHS 31.1.1e, no. 5 and 6; cf. GKC 107g. 94 IBHS 31.e 95 Or other aspects of human strength, if the generic meaning of ‫ אונים‬is understood. 96 Cf. Held (1962, 281-290), Delekat (1972, 11-26) and Watson (1994, 242). 97 See GKC 106f, m-o. 98 Cf. Lam 3:18-21, where the sinner’s hope (‫ )תוחלת‬has also perished (‫)אבד‬, but he is still alive and resolves to put his hope in Yahweh. 92

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Therefore the proverb was never in need of having its “orthodoxy” salvaged by the insertion of ‫( רשע‬Masoretic Text) or being rewritten to give the righteous a hope despite death (Septuagint). Nevertheless, it has been interpreted so in both lines of transmission. With the insertion of ‫רשע‬, the Hebrew text accommodates the proverb to the context about righteousness and wickedness. It now states that the wicked lose all hope at the moment of death, and implies that the righteous retain hope. In this edited form, the Masoretic Text adumbrates belief in life after death,99 as does the Septuagint in this verse as well as in 10:28 and 14:32 (Fox in EE). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra interprets the lost hope of the wicked person to mean that his hope for the world to come dies, whereas Rashi relates the hope of the wicked to that of the implied righteous person and interprets them in their mutual correlation. While the wicked may have influence during their lifetime, it has no effect after their death and trust put in them proves to have been futile.100 But the righteous build up merit during their lifetime, which becomes a source of hope for the benefit of their children. The Mezudat David sees the perishing of hope at death as an implication that there still is hope for the wicked to repent while they are alive, but afterwards all is lost for them. The negative side of this understanding makes up the gist of the exposition by the Vilna Gaon. According to him, the hope of the wicked dies in the sense that their children will not benefit from the evil perpetrated by their parents. R. Bahya explains the presence of ‫ אדם‬together with ‫ רשע‬by means of etymology. Since ‫ אדם‬has a cognate in the noun ‫( אדמה‬earth) and the first Adam was made of earth, the proverb refers to the “earthly” attitudes and desires entertained by the wicked. As opposed to spiritual concerns, these all die with such people and therefore constitute no hope. John Chrysostom comments on the Greek version of the text. Since the Septuagint already carries built-in references to the righteous and the wicked as well as a suggestion of life beyond death, both ideas make up the mainstay of his exposition. The idea of hope not perishing refers the reader to the motif of the resurrection, but also to the future before death and even to the descendants of the righteous who – akin to rabbinic interpretation – benefit from the deceased’s righteousness.101 Chrysostom also accepts that the righteous may maintain a good reputation after their death. Although he does not say whether this reputation is enjoyed in heaven by the deceased or on earth by those who knew them, the latter is probable in the context of Chrysostom’s explicit mentioning of the descendants. 99

Similarly McCreesh (1991, 140). Meinhold: Hitler and his followers offer a good illustration of this interpretation. 101 “By this stage,” Hill (2006, 222) remarks, “Chrysostom cannot avoid the question of the difference in eschatology” between what he calls “Old and New Testament beliefs.” He seems to fault Chrysostom for not formally acknowledging the difference between the hope for the future before death and the hope for life beyond death. But it is not certain – not even likely – that either dimension is lacking in the Greek version of this proverb and others, such as 10:28 and 14:32 (so McCreesh [1991, 140], similarly Fox in EE). The Greek phrase, “hope does not come to an end” can be understood to mean hope for the world to come, but also hope for the descendants of the righteous or a good reputation by which the deceased are remembered on earth. All of these possibilities are present in rabbinic interpretation of the Hebrew text and are expressly entertained by Chrysostom on the basis of the Septuagint, so that he cannot be faulted for his exegesis. 100

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11:8 A righteous person is rescued from adversity, and then a wicked one comes in his place. The proverb is an exact Doppeldreier with three stresses on three words in both hemistichs. Each half-verse consists of a verbal sentence, but syntactically the two are related in such a way that the situation described in the second one succeeds the first one not only temporally but also logically.102 Where that happens, the association between the two units can often be rendered as a single sentence ending in a consequential clause with waw consecutive plus imperfect. This is the case in our present proverb. ‫צדיק מצרה נחלץ‬ perfect

‫תחתיו‬

‫ויבא רשע‬ waw imperfect

A righteous person is rescued from adversity and then = so that a wicked one comes in his place

Not only syntactically but also stylistically the two hemistichs are closely bound by means of a chiastic word order:103 subject [followed by prepositional phrase] verb

verb subject [followed by prepositional phrase]

All of this has consequences for the meaning of the proverb. If the second clause describes the result of the event mentioned in the first clause, the proverb cannot mean that the wicked suffers vicariously for the salvation of the righteous.104 Since the result cannot be the cause, the suffering of the wicked does not facilitate the rescue of the righteous, but the rescue of the righteous vacates a place in the sphere of adversity for the wicked. In 11:2a a similar construction occurs, but only in a part of the proverb. It is appropriate to call v. 8 rather than v. 2 “a narrative in a nutshell” (Van Leeuwen), because in 102 See IBHS 33.2.1a for the rule and examples: “Situations described with wayyqtl are mostly temporally or logically succeeding ... Wayyqtl signifies logical succession where a logical entailment from (a) preceding situation(s) ... is expressed.” Cf. Luchsinger (2010, 169), who correctly applies this to 11:8, and Hermisson (1968, 142-143), who provides an extended discussion of several similar patterns. 103 Cf. also the integrating effect of the alliteration with ‫ צ‬in the first hemistich (Clifford), which, together with the opening position of the subject (‫)צדיק‬, highlights the importance of the righteous. 104 Often traditional Jewish commentators (e.g. Ramaq, Mezudat David) as well as Christian expositors (e.g. Chrysostom) have interpreted the verse as vicarious suffering of the wicked for the righteous. Waltke rightly objects that it here is a question of “exchange” in the sense of retaliation, not substitution; similarly Fuhs. Tuinstra points out that vicarious suffering works the other way, i.e., the righteous suffer vicariously for the wicked (e.g. Isa 53 and repeatedly in the New Testament, cf. Rom 8:32; Gal 2:20).

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v. 8 a miniature plot can be identified in which the logical sequence matches a chronological succession, while in v. 2 the verb forms indicate simultaneity (Delitzsch).105 Plöger explains the “factual” character of the proverb as a postulate that testifies to the unswerving belief of the sages in the basic principle of order. Equally apt is the comment by Meinhold that this construction is the formulation of a generally applicable rule by presenting it as though it were an incident that has actually taken place.106 Since ancient times the saying has been interpreted as an instance of a wicked person falling into the pit that he has dug for somebody else (cf., for instance, 26:27; 28:10; Qoh 10:8; Ps 7:16).107 Meinhold points out that the text at least suggests that the wicked person is the one who plotted the adversity into which the righteous must have first fallen in order to be rescued from it. Although the wicked falls into the very adversity from which the righteous was saved, it is not said that the wicked had dug it. Nevertheless, the identical ‫ צרה‬makes Meinhold’s suggestion understandable, and we could answer Murphy’s question in this regard with Plöger’s help. Murphy questions whether, in view of the “obvious exceptions” to the symmetry of deed and consequence,108 the sages really set great store by it and asks whether to them it was not perhaps “more of a fond hope.” But these are not mutually exclusive alternatives, since a fond hope means setting store by that which is hoped for. If anything, the recurring mention of the symmetry confirms the conviction,109 so that Fuhs can call it a statement of faith (“Glaubenssatz”). Clifford is to be agreed with when he considers the verse a variant of the familiar theme of falling into one’s own pit. Therefore it is not surprising that several commentators (e.g. Meinhold, Van Leeuwen, Fox, Waltke) join traditional interpreters (see below) in referring to the illustration of the principle provided by Haman’s scheme against the Jews (Est 5:14; 7:10; 9:24f.) and the opponents of Daniel (Dan 6:23-25). Rashi connects the proverb to the previous verse, understood as a saying about the death of the wicked. He seems to mean that v. 8 presents the death of the wicked as an event that saves the righteous. In any event, this was understood along these lines in the 19th century by Samson Raphael Hirsch,110 for instance, when a righteous person 105

Cf. the commentary on 11:2. Similarly Tuinstra, who combines the formulation of Plöger and Meinhold. 107 E.g. Clifford, Moss; Whybray thinks that adding 21:18 to the list (so, for instance, Wildeboer) is perhaps reading too much into it, but the thrust of the second hemistich of that proverb is the same. 108 Toy is certainly right that the problem of the non-operation of the principle is not worked out here. But it is fair to say that the categorical reformulation of the conviction despite the difficulties experienced in actual reality offers a “solution” to the discrepancy of the suffering of the righteous, more or less along the lines of a number of psalms concerned with the issue (e.g. Pss 37; 49; 73; cf. Oesterley). 109 See Essay 8.2, “On the Concept of Order” in Vol. I, 19-28 of the commentary. 110 Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 199). 106

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rejects an attractive but evil offer and a wicked person accepts it. The Mezudat David also sees it this way, namely that divine judgement is not appeased unless someone else takes the place of the righteous person saved from punishment. Likewise Ramaq, who says that the wicked person is punished “for the sake of” the righteous (‫)בעבורו‬, so that the latter can benefit from atonement. The Vilna Gaon emphasises the illustrations of the proverb in the Book of Esther and in Daniel (see above). In his school the notion that Mordechai, Daniel and also the friends of Daniel (Dan 3) became stronger after their ordeal, is moreover linked to the use of the verb ‫חלץ‬, which in the Hiphil can also mean “strengthen” (cf. Isa 58).111 Chrysostom, who also cites Daniel as an illustration, evidently interprets the proverb as an instance of vicarious suffering. He says that the words ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ δὲ παραδίδοται ὁ ἀσεβής (in his place the wicked person is given up) mean that the wicked is given up, “not for his own sins but in the place of the righteous person, so that you may learn that it happened according to his righteousness.” However, it seems difficult to maintain this logic in a Christian context, where vicarious suffering of the righteous for the wicked plays an inverted role in Christ. Unless, perhaps, one understands Chrysostom in the same way as Melanchthon’s rather superficial handling of the proverb. Melanchthon comments only indirectly on v. 8 by subsuming it under the overarching message of the unit he sees in vv. 3-8, viz. under “the fundamental doctrine of providence.” This is: “To the just good is done, to the wicked evil is done,”112 which says basically the same as what I have just quoted from Chrysostom’s commentary.

Proverbs 11:9-13 On the ethical aspect of speaking and silence 9

With his mouth the deceiver destroys his neighbour, but by knowledge the righteous are rescued. When it is well with the righteous, the city rejoices, and at the perishing of the wicked there is jubilation. By the blessing of the upright a city is elevated, but by the mouth of the wicked it is overthrown. The senseless man despises his neighbour, but the man of understanding keeps quiet. Who goes around as a slanderer reveals a secret, but who is trustworthy in spirit conceals a matter.

10 11 12 13

Bibl. Hausmann 1995, 54f., 125, 194-196, 202, 204; Hermisson 1968, 48f., 73, 159f.; Heim 2001, 134-138; 2013, 262-267, 271-272; Krispenz 1989, 165; Millar 2020, 117-118, 149-155; Pilch 2016, 39-40; Scoralick 186-189; Scherer 1999, 79-83.

Commentators who – at least in some measure – reckon with the grouping of proverbs are divided as to how the sayings in Chap. 11 and therefore also in its middle part are to be demarcated. Among other factors, this of course 111 112

So Menachem Mendel Bendet, cited by Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 199). See above on v. 3.

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has to do with differing views about where the caesura at the end of the previous group should be seen (v. 8 or v. 9 or neither). Scoralick, for instance, works with a unit in vv. 8-17 as the opening section of a lengthy concentric structure reaching as far as 12:13.113 Mostly on grounds of catchwords and thematic similarities, Heim114 finds a relatively long cluster in vv. “1 + 2-14,”115 whereas Plöger, Meinhold and Waltke see a caesura at the end of v. 15. Sæbø in turn takes vv. 3-11 together but calls it a “very complex verse grouping” that he finds difficult to break down. In my opinion, Scherer provides a well-reasoned argument for recognising a smaller cluster in vv. 913.116 He argues for the coherence of these verses on the grounds of three “constitutive elements.” First, there is a tendency to ethical contrasting (such as the righteous and the upright versus the deceiver and the wicked, or the attitudes supporting the speaking or silence in vv. 12f.). This is absent from v. 14 and therefore marks a caesura. Second, the deed-consequence nexus is geared towards the consequences of good or bad deeds for the social environment of the doer (with emphasis on the use of words for “neighbour” and “city”).117 Finally, the concentration of the theme of speaking and silence (“mouth” and “slandering,” as well as the speech acts of expressing joy or contempt and the silence that contrasts with them). Moreover, there is an anaphoric effect in vv. 9-11, where every a-hemistich begins with the preposition ‫ ב‬and every b-hemistich begins with ‫וב‬.118 However, the cluster should not be seen as a too tightly construed unit, since there are links backward as well as forward. On the one hand the verb ‫ חלץ‬Niphal, appearing as it does both in v. 8 and in v. 9, creates the effect of a catchword, while the idea of the righteous/upright escaping adversity is also present in vv. 4-6, albeit with other verbs. On the other hand, a social element is also present in vv. 14-15, while the element of speech is at least suggested in v. 14 as well (both sides of which Scherer concedes). 11:9 With his mouth the deceiver destroys his neighbour, but by knowledge the righteous are rescued. The proverb has the common pattern of 4+3 stresses in as many words and consists of two verbal sentences. Since both make perfect sense, there is no 113

Scoralick (1995, 186-189, 196). Heim (2001, 134-137). 115 Cf. Hermisson (1968, 175) and Lucas, who also see the break at the end of v. 14. 116 Scherer (1999, 79-83 and 88 [summary of his view of the whole chapter]). 117 Scherer (1999, 82) also sees a chiastic pattern in the relevant catchwords: neighbour (v. 9), city (v. 10), city (v. 11), neighbour (v. 12). 118 This automatically brings about assonance and alliteration; cf. also the fact that v. 12 begins with the same consonant (‫)ב‬, although not with the preposition. 114

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need to read the first word as a status constructus (‫ פי‬instead of ‫ )פה‬in order to accommodate the Septuagint, where the plural genitive is used (ἐν στόματι ἀσεβῶν) and the Hebrew ‫( ישחית‬he destroys) was probably read as the noun ‫( שחת‬pit) and therefore translated as παγὶς (trap).119 In any event, the Greek says the same but creates a metaphor for the harm done by the mouth of one human to another. The ‫ ָחנֵ ף‬is a scoundrel whose dastardly behaviour can take on many forms. Here it is manifested in antisocial words,120 which means he deceives his neighbour. The duplicity with which he goes about his business is particularly clear in the use of the word ‫ר ַע‬,ֵ which is a neighbour in an extended community sense.121 The antisocial rogue is particularly devious because he does not shrink from ensnaring his own clan or townsfolk in his guileful talk, not even when that means destroying them. By contrast, the righteous have knowledge, i.e., they belong to the wise.122 The second hemistich is technically ambiguous. ‫ דעת‬can be in either the absolute or the construct state. If it is taken as absolute, the ‫ צדיקים‬are the grammatical subject of the passive verb ‫( יחלצו‬as translated above); if taken as construct, the word ‫ צדיקים‬becomes its genitive and the verb indefinite123 (“by knowledge of the righteous, people are rescued”). Since even so the indefinite subject implies the knowledgeable people alone or together with others, the sense remains the same on both counts. Because having knowledge means being wise, they can see through the double-talk of the deceitful and avoid being conned by such a person. Fox is right in pointing out that the second hemistich limits the scope of the first “by mitigating the danger implied.” But still the antithesis between 119 Cf. BHS, where these readings are mentioned (not BHQ, where only a possible metathesis of ‫ יצלחו‬for ‫ יחלצו‬is mentioned as an explanation for “on track,” cf. 28:13). The Septuagint has, ἐν στόματι ἀσεβῶν παγὶς πολίταις, / αἴσθησις δὲ δικαίων εὔοδος (A trap is in the mouth of the wicked people, / but the discernment of the righteous is on track). 120 So often in traditional rabbinic interpretation (see below); also Waltke; cf. THAT I, 599 (Knierim); cf. Isa 32:6; Jer 23:11, 15. 121 Pilch (2016, 201) describes the term as indication of “an extension of one’s kin group,” a social unit in terms of what Pilch calls the “in-group” as opposed to the “out-group.” Hausmann (1995, 54-55) also points out the social effect (“Gemeinschaftsbezogenheit”) of such actions, but adds that this does not occur as often as the negative effects for the perpetrator, which she puts down to the didactic nature of proverbial literature. 122 Cf. the warning by Hausmann (1995, 9-10), that the wise and the righteous (or the fool and the wicked) are not to be summarily identified, since the conceptual pairs have their own respective sense environments (“Sinnzusammenhänge”). Although this is indeed so as a rule, the present proverb shows that it too cannot be maintained in too watertight a fashion. The word ‫ דעת‬and not ‫ חכמה‬is used here, but the concept of wisdom still is present and the righteous is explicitly said to have the quality of sapiential knowledge. 123 Murphy refers to GKC 144f for such a use of the indefinite subject, which is technically correct. But in this reading the indefinite subject of the passive verb is “re-defined” by the genitive in the prepositional phrase preceding it – the impersonal subject must be understood to be those who have knowledge saving either themselves or others who benefit from their knowledge (cf. v. 11; 10:11; 12:6b, 18; Qoh 9:14-15); cf. also Hausmann (1995, 194-195).

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the two versets is not eliminated.124 The deceiver is still the very antithesis of the righteous while the damage control by the latter and the damage inflicted by the former clearly remain antithetic. The proverb implies that the sages were aware that harm can sometimes be effected by the wicked, but they also knew that in their knowledge the wise have an antidote to it. Therefore the proverb can indeed be called optimistic, but it is at the same time also realistic. The motif of the powerful word occurs often in the Bible, but also in other ancient Near Eastern literatures. The word spoken by a human being or by a god can be positive or destructive. Examples of the divine word’s positive power are well known from the biblical creation tradition (e.g. Gen 1; Ps 33:6), and its destructive force can for instance be seen in Job’s laments (Job 9:6; 26:11) and in hymns (Ps 148:8). Illustrations of both types are prominent in such Mesopotamian texts as the Enuma Elish epic on creation and the Lament over the Destruction of Ur. On the one hand, the steadfast power of the divine word is sealed in the ending of Creation Epic:125 Firm in his order, his command unalterable, The utterance of his mouth no god shall change.

On the other hand, the destruction of Ur is depicted as a storm “spoken” by Enlil:126 On that day the word – who knows its meaning? – attacked like a storm, The word of Enlil that winds to the right, knows to the left, Enlil who decrees the fates, this is what he did.

But the sapiential tradition is specifically interested in human words that can be positively life-giving or, as in the present proverb, destructive. The principle is summarily expressed in the succinct brevity of 19:21a: Death and life are in the power of the tongue.

There are many situations in which humans can have negative as well as positive influence on society. The victims or beneficiaries of speech can be the speakers themselves or others to whom or about whom they speak.127 In an Egyptian creation myth the power of speech in general is expressly related to the creation process, in the course of which life was transmitted 124 Clifford calls it “a subtle contrast” and finds the following elements: what is expressed :: what is not expressed; causes harm :: assures protection; others :: themselves. However, the text also allows for a genitive in the second hemistich, so that it remains possible that others are included in the rescue. 125 Moriarty (1974, 349); ANET, 72. Cf. also Ugaritic examples given by Moriarty (1971, 353-354). 126 Moriarty (1974, 348); ANET, 614. 127 For the Book of Proverbs, cf. 10:11; 12:6, 13, 18; 13:2f.; 18:7. The most thorough New Testament example of the power of human speech for better or for worse is the series of metonyms, metaphors and comparisons in the argument developed in Jas 3:1-12 (cf. Jer 9:3; Ps 64:3).

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via the heart (thought) and the tongue (speaking the thoughts), which effectively derives the power of human words from the divine realm. So it is said in the so-called Memphis Myth of Origin:128 Thus it happened that the heart and tongue gained control over (every other) member of the body.

Like the biblical tradition, the precepts from elsewhere in the ancient Near East also show that human speech (word, mouth, tongue) is a powerful social factor. They are not within the ambit of Moriarty’s investigation just cited, but are the most illuminating for comparison with biblical aphorisms on speaking. Illustrations from Egyptian, Babylonian and later Jewish literature as well as references were given earlier (see above, the commentary on 10:19). Most of the rabbinic interpreters agree that destruction by mouth spoken of in the proverb refers to flattery or glib talk to entice people to do evil so that they are destroyed by the wicked way they have been lured onto (Rashi, Gerondi, Nahmias, Vilna Gaon) or by slander afterwards (Hame’iri). Gerondi and Nahmias point to the contrast with the righteous person who can see through such deception and are therefore not caught. Rashi and the Vilna Gaon129 interpret the ‫ דעת‬of the righteous as their knowledge of Torah, for which Rashi can cite a specific Torah command, Deut 13:9, where it is forbidden to accede to those who would entice one to deviate from the way of the Lord. Commenting on the Septuagint’s rendering of the first hemistich (“A trap is in the mouth of the wicked people”) Chrysostom makes what Hill calls “a puzzling reference to ‘the ruler.’” 130 Chrysostom says, “The ruler wished to take account of the virtue not only of the individual but also of others. Therefore he bids the impious to be punished and the whole city destroyed.” What is clear is that he sees the deceiver of v. 9a as “the ruler” who destroyed people. It is possible that this refers to the punishment of the city of Antioch in 387 by Emperor Theodosius for their violation of the imperial effigies, as Hill131 mentions. In that case the emperor’s indiscriminate punishing guilty and innocent people is criticised with the help of the proverb, but the reference nevertheless remains puzzling. Melanchthon resumes his individual verse comments at this point and paraphrases the proverb as an admonition:132 Admonitio est, ut prudenter caveantur fucati amici. Et pertinent huc multa dicta: Tuta frequensque via est per amici fallere nomen, Tuta frequensque licet sit via, crimen habet. 128

Moriarty (1974, 351); ANET, 5. The Vilna Gaon reads the first two words as a noun qualified by a participle with adjectival function, i.e ‫ בפה חנף‬is “by a flattering mouth,” see Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 199). That does not influence the substance of his interpretation. 130 Hill (2006, 4). 131 Hill (2006, 222). 132 Cf. Introduction, Essay 2 on “Learning in the Indicative” for a discussion of the use of statements (“Wahrsprüche”) as a mode of instruction or teaching and admonishing in sapiential literature. 129

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11 Praecipue vero nocet simulatio, hoc est, sophistica in corruptelis doctrinae. Semper autem in sophismatibus, vera aliqua, splendida et plausibilis sententia proponitur ut aditus sit speciosus, et invitet auditores. (The admonition is that we should be prudently careful of feigned friends. Many sayings address this: It’s a common way to deceive [people] by using the name of “friend,” But although it may be common, it still is a crime.133 Imitation is especially quite harmful when it is sophist-like in the falsification of doctrine. For in sophisms a truthful, splendid and plausible saying is always put forward so that accepting it appears good and inviting to the listeners.)

Melanchthon thus applies the proverb’s negative verdict on destructive deception by insincere people to warn against those who use attractive words for their false theological doctrines.

11:10-11 10 When it is well with the righteous, the city rejoices, and at the perishing of the wicked there is jubilation. 11 By the blessing of the upright a city is elevated, but by the mouth of the wicked it is overthrown. Most commentators134 agree that these two sayings are a proverb pair. As Waltke remarks, this is not only due to the similar theme, but also to catchwords, synonyms and syntax. First, we may note the close rhythmic parallel between the two proverbs. Both have four stresses in the first hemistich and three in the second, both have four words in the first and three in the second hemistich,135 and both have ten syllables in the first and nine in the second hemistich. Schematically: Versets:

10a

10b

11a

11b

Stresses:

4

3

4

3

Words:

4 [5]

3 [5]

4 [5]

3 [5]

10

9

10

9

Syllables:

This goes hand in glove with the sound patterns of ‫ ב־‬and ‫ וב־‬to open the respective a- and b-versets (see above on the alliteration and assonance, including that of ‫צדיקים‬, ‫ ישרים‬and ‫)רשעים‬, and the repetition of words 133 A quotation from Ovid, Ars amatoria I, 585-586, in the typical classicist fashion of Melanchthon. 134 Including traditional rabbinic exegetes like Ramaq, Ralbag and Malbim. 135 That is, if the written words are counted as orthographic units; if each lexeme is counted independent of the written convention, the count remains symmetric, namely five words in each hemistich of both verses (indicated by square brackets in the table).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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(‫קריה‬/‫ קרת‬and ‫ )רשע‬as well as the use of synonyms (‫ צדיק‬and ‫)ישר‬. In addition to these phenomena, the syntax of the two stichs is closely parallel:136 ‫ ב־‬+ st. cs. (‫ )טוב‬+ gen. (‫)צדיקים‬

3rd pers. f. sg. impf. (‫ )תעלץ‬subj. (‫ וב־ )קריה‬+ inf. cs. + gen. (‫ )רשעים‬predicate

‫ ב־‬+ st. cs. (‫ )ברכת‬+ gen. (‫)ישרים‬

3rd pers. f. sg. impf. (‫)תרום‬

obj. (‫)קרת‬

‫ וב־‬+ st. cs. + gen. (‫ )רשעים‬predicate

Such formal characteristics137 do not only show that the two stichs form a pair, but they also underscore the thematic concurrence of the couplet. A cursory reading is enough to see that v. 11a provides the reason for what is stated in v. 10a, while v. 11b does the same with regard to v. 10b. In both cases the second hemistich provides information that adds value to the reader’s understanding of the first, so that the parallelism of the full stichs within the couplet is augmentative rather than synonymous. The use of ‫ ב‬with ‫ טוּב‬is temporal (when), showing that a city rejoices when things go well for the righteous. In Proverbs the noun ‫ טוּב‬occurs only here. It can mean material well-being (property, assets, e.g. Gen 24:10; Job 20:21) or well-being generally (cf. Job 21:16) and in some cases comes near the concept of blessing,138 which would suit the parallelism with v. 11a admirably. The whole city139 rejoices140 when the righteous receive what is due to them in terms of the nexus of deed and consequence. Conversely, there is shouting for joy when the wicked perish, which must mean that the whole populace delights in the demise of those who have to suffer what is justly due to them. In neither case is it said why collective joy is expressed, but traditional exegetes have offered several suggestions (see below). McKane comments: “Thy have lived to themselves and they must die to themselves ...,” but the verse neither approves nor disapproves of the jubilation. The proverb is descriptive.141 Neither joy over the success of the righteous nor celebration of the demise of the wicked is prescribed. In 24:17 136

Cf. Waltke, who however only describes the respective a-versets. Surprisingly, the philologically trained eye of Schultens observed none of this and found nothing of interest in the couplet, as he translates it into Latin and resumes his commentary at v. 12. 138 So THAT I, 662-663; cf. Pss 27:13; 65:5; especially 128:5. 139 The relatively rare noun ‫ קריה‬and the cognate ‫( קרת‬v. 11) occur more often in Proverbs than the common ‫( עיר‬Tuinstra: 7 times to 4). In this verse it is used as metonymy for the inhabitants of the city. Therefore Luchsinger (2010, 219-220) is right that ‫ קריה‬does “double duty” by being the implied subject of the action noun ‫רנה‬. But he is not right in questioning Alter’s ([1985] 2011, 211-212) hypothetical suggestion that “wailing” might be expected rather than “jubilation,” since Alter means that the surprise effect of joy instead of wailing demonstrates the “apt framing of familiar insight that the proverb means to achieve.” 140 The verb ‫ עלץ‬can indicate both the inner feeling of joy and its outward expression, the latter of which parallels ‫ רנה‬in v. 10b. Therefore the second meaning is to be preferred in this proverb. 141 This remains true even if Scherer (1999, 80-81) is right in detecting an element of “ethical contrasting” in both this verse and the next. The presence of ethical concepts (“Begriffspaare”) does not make the saying an injunction. 137

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

both hemistichs expressly prohibit joy over the fall of one’s enemy (cf. also 25:21f.),142 but Meinhold denies any tension between that proverb and v. 10. According to him, 24:17 is about a matter of personal animosity (in which case gloating is wrong), whereas v. 10 implies that the wicked coming to a fall is a figure of public leadership (for which reason, he thinks, gloating is not only acceptable, but even necessary). A note on celebrating misfortune That v. 10b involves community leaders does not necessarily have to be implied, but it might. In any event, Meinhold’s further thought is open to question, namely that society “must” (his word) rejoice over the fall of the powerful wicked or else be guilty of the same evil. His reference to the embarrassing swaths of Germans who silently cowered in 1945 rather than rejoice over the fall of the criminals (“Verbrecher”) may be an understandable historical sensitivity referring to Hitler and his evil helpers. Although indicative statements – including this proverb – can undoubtedly prompt learners to follow the right course (e.g. the immediately preceding v. 9 or v. 3), it is difficult to infer an imperative for Schadenfreude from the observation in v. 10b. If that were legitimate, what grounds would there be for judging the jubilation in the streets of London at the death of Margaret Thatcher, behaviour that was specifically defended on the sidewalks with the very three words used in this hemistich? Who decides which public figures may be classed as good or bad people? It seems to me that the proverb is not at all calling for revelling over misfortune, but is describing what Dickens conjured up in his scenes of the poor celebrating the death of a heartless Ebenezer Scrooge. That is de facto what happens in societies. Those who observe the fact pointed out to them by the sage, are indeed prompted by the indicative, but then they are prompted to learn from it for their own benefit,143 as Ebenezer did – and changed from a ‫ רשע‬to a ‫צדיק‬.

The formal parallels between vv. 10 and 11 discussed above accentuate the statement that, as they stand, v. 11 gives the reason or explanation for v. 10 (Fox, Lucas). The first hemistich of v. 10 suggests the question why a whole city144 would rejoice if the righteous within it experience prosperity. The first half of the following stich adds several additional particulars that provide the ingredients with which the reader can forge an answer. First, the righteous are upright people (so Sæbø) who are blessed for it. Second, the blessing (feminine singular) lifts up (third person feminine singular Qal imperfect 142 Yoder lists examples of both the acknowledgement and condemnation of Schadenfreude in the Bible. 143 It seems to me that Volz (1911, 148) has a similar, though not identical, interpretation. He says that the sage here states what the consequences of certain attitudes in life are and that the public opinion is a force to be reckoned with. According to him, this demonstrates the interest of human society in the moral order of a community. 144 At this point, Pilch reminds us that what is called a “city” was usually only a village with a small population. Since group dynamics are stronger in small than in large communities, the behaviour and achievements of individuals would impact on the rest of their “city.” On population levels and city life, cf., further, McNutt (1999, 152).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

243

of ‫ )רום‬a city. While the city is the subject in v. 10, it is the object in v. 11 and therefore is being done something to. That can only mean that the blessing of the upright extends to the rest of the city. Moreover, the sentence is grammatically ambivalent (similarly Van Leeuwen). It can mean that either the blessing received by the upright (genitivus objectivus) or the blessing bestowed by the upright (genitivus subjectivus)145 lifts up the city. On both counts the whole community benefits, either because of the social solidarity146 or because the upright bestow some of their own advantages on the community at large. Depending on the kind of blessing, this can be of a material nature or prestige or both. The possibility of two readings reinforces the sharing of the community in the blessing of some of its members (cf. Rom 12:15; 1 Cor 12:26). In the same way, the second hemistich of v. 10 suggests the question what the reason would be for rejoicing over the undoing of the wicked. The second half of v. 11 in turn provides an angle from which the reader could answer this. Because the wicked speak things that are destructive for the city and therefore tears down147 its possibilities to prosper, it would be natural that pleasure at the elimination of the threat is expressed by those affected. The concept of “blessing” (v. 11a) remains to be accounted for. Leuenberger describes ‫ ברכה‬as the force that brings about well-being, thereby securing or protecting life, and therefore “blessing” can also entail the imparting of that power.148 However, this is not only true of cases where the root ‫ברך‬ is used, but also where the underlying concept is used, even when expressed by other words. In the Old Testament, this is often associated with the motif of salvation or rescue,149 which makes the strict separation between “blessing” and “salvation” espoused by Westermann150 untenable. Therefore it is quite 145

The parallelism of the “mouth” of the wicked (v. 11b), favours, as Waltke notes, that the blessing (v. 11a) is something spoken by the upright. A town is thus damaged by the words of the wicked and benefits by the blessing bestowed by the upright. 146 Cf. Pilch (2016, 201); also McNutt (1999, 76, 78f.; further 198 on the collective welfare of a “local community structure” in the fifth century). Fuhs goes as far as to suggest that the blessing of the upright means there should not be just talk of justice, freedom and solidarity, but that this should be practised concretely in day-to-day life. In my opinion, the sage at most leaves such conclusions to be worked out by his pupils/readers for themselves on the basis of his de facto statement. 147 Cf. ‫ הרס‬in 14:1; 29:4; 2 Sam 11:25; Isa 14:17; Jer 1:10. Contrasting this verb with ‫ רום‬in the first hemistich, Luchsinger (2010, 263) finds a metaphor of physical orientation in the verse, present in the “bipolar concepts” of “above” and “below.” 148 Leuenberger (2008, 9-11). This view is derived from Keller (1971, 354f.) and ultimately from Pedersen ([1926] 1959, 182). 149 See Loader (2012b, 163-179, particularly 164-165); e.g. the stories of the threatened matriarch in Gen 13:10-20; 20:1-18; 26:1-16; the motif of blessing with nourishment in the Joseph story (cf. Gen 45: 7, 10f.); the story of Israel’s liberation from Egypt (e.g. Ex 1:20f.) and the journey through the desert (Ex 14:30; 17:1-7 etc.); the Book of Ruth; Pss 107:2-21; 109:21-28. 150 Westermann (1985, 88f.; also his earlier study 1968, passim, especially 32f.).

244

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

natural to understand v. 11b to mean that the city not only shares in the material or social benefits enjoyed by the upright, but at the same time is rescued from being torn apart by the wicked. That, again, fits in well with the antithetic parallelism151 between the first and the last halves of v. 11. Cf. above on 10:6f. for the spoken and concrete blessing; 10:22 and its counter-pole in 10:4 and 13:4 on the question whether humans cooperate in blessing (see also Van Leeuwen on this issue). In the Septuagint the proverb pair is condensed into one stich consisting of the first hemistich of v. 10 and the second hemistich of v. 11: 10a ἐν ἀγαθοῖς δικαίων κατώρθωσεν πόλις, 11b στόμασιν δὲ ἀσεβῶν κατεσκάφη. (10a By the good works of just people a city is made right, 11b but by the mouths of the impious it is broken down) In itself this already illustrates the close association of what the Hebrew text has as two stichs. De Waard152 ascribes the possibility of telescoping the two lines into one to the “strong parallelism between 10a and 11a.” If he is right in further inferring from 8:3; 9:3, 14 that the translator probably did not know the meaning of the word ‫קֶרֶת‬, the collapsing of the two lines would have been intentional so as to overcome this problem. However, an explanation is possible without recourse to such a supposition. The collapse of two lines into one probably came about by a jump of the translator’s eye from ‫ קריה‬at the end of v. 10a to ‫ קרת‬at the end of v. 11a (similar endings, homoioteleuton).153 The missing versets do occur in some Septuagint manuscripts (Codex Vaticanus and Codex Sinaiticus), possibly supplied from Theodotion (Toy).

Oesterley finds the content of vv. 10-11 “important from the point of view of the date of this collection.” According to him, “[w]hat is said about the city rejoicing at the prosperity of the righteous &c. could only apply to Israelite cities governed by themselves, i.e. to pre-exilic times.” He states this in opposition to Toy, who thinks that we find the city state of the Greek period in Palestine reflected in these verses. But Oesterley assumes that the righteous/ upright must be heathen rulers, which would make v. 11a an unthinkable utterance. Although the couplet would be quite understandable as a pre-exilic saying, there were also cities of the Hellenistic period in which – by Oesterley’s own admission – Jewish elders took part in the government. Thus nothing conclusive about the dating can be garnered from these verses. 151 Both v. 10 and v. 11 are antithetical, so that the question put by Scoralick (1995, 20) should be answered in the positive. The contrasting elements are good fortune :: demise, and blessing :: downfall. Even if v. 10b has “jubilation” as parallel of “rejoice” in v. 10a, the semantic parallel functions “within the antithesis” and is therefore “perfect,” as Alter ([1985] 2011, 211) puts it. 152 BHQ, 41*. 153 Similarly Fox in EE, although he uses different terminology; Whybray simply calls it “accidental.”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

245

In the Mezudat David the public joy (v. 10a) is interpreted by the inductive argument that the righteous people share what they enjoy with other people. Gerondi addresses the problem of a possible contradiction between v. 10b (joy over the undoing of another person) and Lev 19:17, where it is forbidden to hate one’s brother (‫)אח‬. His solution is that there is no contradiction, since the wicked (‫ )רשע‬cannot be regarded as the “brother” of the righteous, who, it is assumed, are the ones who shout for joy.154 The Vilna Gaon regards the link between the two halves of v. 10 to lie in their successive relationship. This is noteworthy because he expressly interprets it as a matter of a saving act being connected with a blessing act (see above the note on Westermann). To him, this is illustrated by the exodus story, where God first saves his people and bestows good on them (v. 10a) and afterwards punishes their enemies in the sea (v. 10b).155 Rashi has a creative interpretation of the verset by reading ‫קרת‬ (city) as ‫( תקרה‬ceiling). That is taken to say that, if kings are good, the ceiling of the temple is kept high (= not destroyed) and the city not destroyed. The Mezudot as well as the Vilna Gaon interpret the blessing of v. 11a to refer to the blessing of the righteous who are in power in the city. It must accordingly mean that the authorities lead the whole populace on the right way, which results in the benefit of the whole city and therefore “elevates” it. The Vilna Gaon interprets the “mouth” of the wicked (v. 11b) as the wicked decrees issued by them, implying that they are in power and lead the populace on the wrong way.156 Chrysostom does not presuppose that the beneficial good deeds of the righteous identify them as authorities of the city. According to him, nothing is an obstacle for a city if there are good and righteous people in it, which is a general statement referring to the inhabitants at large. He does stress that wisdom alone is not enough and that it should be accompanied by virtue (which for him is not the same as wisdom). His following remark betrays that he is commenting on a Greek text in which the two stichs have been restored rather than on the telescoped Septuagint text (see above on the Codex Vaticanus, Codex Sinaiticus and Theodotion). He says that the proverb author “goes further to say the same again.” That can only refer to vv. 10b and 11a, because Chrysostom adds that the populace benefits from evil (v. 10b) as well as from good behaviour (v. 11a). Like some of the rabbis, Melanchthon accepts that the people whose deeds influence the fortunes of a whole city are the authorities in power. He infers an injunction from the indicative statement: Gubernatio debet imitari voluntatem Dei, iustitiam tueri & punire sceleratos, ut Rom. 13 perspicue dicitur ... (Government must express the will of God, to uphold justice and punish offenders, as is expressly said in Rom 13 ...) 154 Cf. Sanh 39b, where v. 10b is quoted with reference to the shouting (‫ )רנה‬at the death of the evil King Ahab (cf. 1 Kgs 22:36). Here the Talmud has Jose b. Hanina declare that God himself does not rejoice over the misfortune of the wicked – who, like even the persecuting Egyptian army of Ex 14, still are his creation – but he does allow others to rejoice over the same. 155 Cf. Ex 14. He finds a similar example in the honouring of Mordecai (Est 6:10) and the subsequent punishment of the enemy, Haman (Est 7:10). 156 Here a text in the Talmud can be compared; cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 201). Kidd 40a says that the upright have good thoughts that lead to God uplifting the city. Not so with the wicked, since God reckons a good thought as a good deed, but not a bad thought, which has to become a bad deed before being punished.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

For Melanchthon, it is not only a description of a de facto state, not even a suggestive nudge towards preference for righteousness over wickedness, but he explicitly interprets in terms of Rom 13(:1-7) and thus appropriates the couplet to a Christian understanding of government by deducing a prescription from a description.

11:12-13 12 The senseless man despises his neighbour, but the man of understanding keeps quiet. 13 Who goes around as a slanderer reveals a secret, but who is trustworthy in spirit conceals a matter. As with the previous couplet, most commentators are of the opinion that these two verses belong together. The thematic similarity is easy to see, since spreading unfavourable rumours about others stands in contrast to maintaining silence or confidentiality (cf. Meinhold) about such things. V. 12 consists of two verbal sentences and has a rhythmic pattern of 3+3. Although Gemser prefers this scanning, he also considers 4+3 as possible, but that would require two adjacent stressed syllables in ‫חס`ר]־[ל`ב‬. Thus only the second maqqeph (not the first one in ‫ ]־[לרעהו‬157‫ )בז‬should be maintained, unless one accepts a stress pattern of 2+3 (which is possible, but improbable because five syllables for one stress seem too many). For v. 13, Gemser opts for a 4+4 pattern amounting to one stress per word. But that would also cause two adjacent syllables with stress, this time even twice over and in close proximity (‫ מגל`ה ]־[ סו`ד‬and ‫)ונאמ`ן]־[רו`ח‬. Therefore it is better to scan 3+3 and maintain one stress unit in both cases where the maqqeph indicates that this was what the Masoretes intended. As opposed to vv. 10-11, there is no clear sound pattern contributing to the binding of vv. 12-13.158 The verb ‫ בוז‬is a cognate of ‫בזה‬, where the former in the Qal means to show contempt (often, as here, found in the Book of Proverbs with the preposition ‫ל‬, cf. 6:30; 13:13; 14:21; 23:9; 30:17) or to have contempt (with the accusative, also in Proverbs, cf. 1:7; 23:22 and possibly as a conjecture in 27:7); where the latter root occurs in the Qal with ‫ ל‬or with the accusative, it means to have contempt (15:20; 19:16; cf. Pss 22:25; 51:19 and the participle in Qoh 9:16). The consonantal form of the verb in v. 12a could be perfect 157 See below on the parallelism as reason for reading ‫ ָבּז‬as participle with a full ā-vowel. It should also be noticed that all the verbs in v. 13 and, indeed, of the six verbs in the couplet all but the last one in v. 12 are participles. 158 Waltke says there is: “The alliteration of ḥārēs ‘tear down’ and ḥāraš ‘keep silent’ also binds the verses.” But this should perhaps be put down to a reading error; the first verb is the Niphal of the root hrs with h and not ḥ, and the sibilants s and š are not the same either, so that only the r is common to the two forms as they stand. In any case hrs occurs in v. 11, which is not part of the couplet under discussion and therefore not relevant for the unity of vv. 12-13.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

247

or participle, although the perfect would have been vocalised with a patah rather than a qamets (cf. Zech 4:10). Since the verb is paralleled by a habitual imperfect in the second hemistich, it should rather be taken as a participle with qamets, not with maqqeph and qamets hatuph as though it were an absolute infinitive (cf. Cant 8:7).159 The sentence of v. 12a is ambiguous. It can either be a nominal sentence (“who despises his neighbour is a senseless man”) or a verbal sentence (“a senseless man despises his neighbour”). The parallelism with v. 12b shows that the latter is to be preferred: the understanding person keeps quiet and the senseless person blurts out despise. It is about what the two types typically do (participle and habitual imperfect), and the emphasis is on their actions rather than on ways to recognise them. The contrast is highlighted by the chiastic ordering of the parallelism. verb type of person

type of person verb

Moreover, read in light of the first hemistich, the second acquires the implication that the sensible person may indeed feel contempt for someone else, since the difference between the two types is not whether or not they despise someone (who may indeed deserve it), but whether they show it or not. The theme is thus inconsiderate venting of such opinions as opposed to prudent silence about them, and not so much the right time to speak or “a word in season” (15:22). V. 13 confirms that the theme is talk and silence. It does so by specifying the two opposites with the addition of a variation of both, viz. going around spreading slanderous talk about confidential matters versus the wisdom of not betraying sensitive matters by speaking about them (‫ דבר‬can mean “thing” and “word”). ‫ רכיל‬can either refer to slander or to the person spreading it, which is especially clear with the participle of ‫ הלך‬and without preposition (“who goes around as a slanderer”).160 The ‫ סוד‬can be a confidential deliberation between humans (e.g. 15:22; Pss 64:3; 111:1) or in the divine council (e.g. Job 15:8; Jer 23:18, 20); it can also mean the result of such a deliberation, either between God and humans (e.g. 3:32; Ps 25:14) or between humans only (e.g. 11:13; 20:19; 25:9; Ps 83:4). In this verse the meaning is obviously a confidential situation involving humans. This can be summarised as follows: 159

See above on the argument from rhythm. So also in 20:19, cf. Jer 6:28. While Bühlmann (1976, 241) emphasises the element of speaking too much, Hausmann (1995, 204-205) points out the relationship of too much talk and the attendant heightening of the chance to reveal secrets (similarly, Scherer [1999, 81] and Plöger. 160

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

V. 12 the senseless man despises his neighbour

→ →

V. 13 he who goes around with slander reveals a secret

man of understanding keeps quiet

→ →

the trustworthy in spirit conceals a matter

Every element in the first stich is complemented by an element in the second, which provides concrete manifestations of the more general motifs in the first line. In this couplet the second member of the parallelism does provide new information that bears on the first, but not in the sense that it opens a new dimension in which the proverb can (also) be read. It rather provides a refining of the first set of elements by offering concrete instances of how the general principle manifests itself.161 Thus, the senseless man (v. 12a) typically goes about slandering others (v. 13a), which illustrates the fact that he despises his neighbour (v. 12a). That is proved by the way he betrays confidentiality or reveals what is detrimental to others (v. 13a). The opposite is true of the man with understanding (v. 12b), who can be trusted (v. 13b). He knows how to handle the virtue of silence (v. 12b), which manifests as the ability to be discreet in matters that can be painful or detrimental to others (v. 13b). This assumes that certain things should not be made public but does not exclude that other contexts may indeed require the prudent to speak (cf. the oft quoted antilogion of 26:4-5, which establishes the principle of preference for speaking or silence relative to differing circumstances). The two stichs of our couplet are fully antithetic within themselves, each b-hemistich containing as it does two contrasting elements to the respective contrasting building blocks in each a-hemistich: V. 12 V. 13

senseless man slanderous

:: ::

understanding man trustworthy

despises reveals

:: ::

keeps quiet conceals

However, as a couplet they are not antithetic but together say the same thing.162 Not in the sense that v. 13 repeats v. 12 in other words, but in the sense that together they make the same point, first on the general sapiential level (wisdom terminology as ‫ חסר־לב‬and ‫)תבונה‬, and then specified and illustrated on the ethical level (terminology as ‫ נאמן־רוח‬163). 161 Cf. also the comparison between 11:13a and 20:19a by Heim (2013, 263-267, esp. 265). He points out that in 11:13 the words ‫ הולך רכיל‬open the first hemistich and thus emphasise the generalisation drawn from this specific behaviour. But in 20:19 (one of Snell’s “twice told proverbs” [1993, 45]) the expression ends the first hemistich and therefore highlights the character of the person in question. 162 Waltke comments on the parallelism: “The pairing suggests that slander (v. 12a) is rooted in contempt (v. 13a), while prudent silence (v. 12b) is rooted in a faithful spirit (v. 13b).” This contains what is probably a lapsus calami, since slander (‫ )רכיל‬is mentioned in v. 13a and contempt (‫ )בוז‬in v. 12a. 163 For the association between the sapiential and the ethical, cf. Scherer (1999, 59, 81), who highlights it as an important insight.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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The motif of the silent person (v. 12) is a sapiential ideal in the Egyptian Teaching of Amenemope, where it is, along with the motif of honesty, part of the main theme on which the whole work concentrates. 164 It is found in the form of statements as well as injunctions, e.g.:165 Do not broadcast your words to others, nor join with one who bares his heart. (XXII,13-14) The ideal of the “truly silent one” already occurs in the prologue (2.7) and several times more: The truly silent, who keeps apart, he is like a tree grown in a meadow. (VI, 7-8) But all the silent in the temple, they say, “Re’s blessing is great!” Cling to the silent, then you find life. (VII, 7-9) The boat of the greedy is left [in] the mud, while the bark of the silent sails with the wind. (X, 10-11) The idea of not spreading rumours about (v. 13) occurs several times in the Words of Achiqar, where it takes the form of injunctions:166 Who has heard a word but does not reveal it, look, this is precious to Shamash. (Col. 6, l. 93) My son, do not chatter too much until you reveal every word that comes into your mind ... More than all watchfulness watch your mouth and harden your heart over what you hear, for a word is like a bird, and when he has sent it out, a man does not recapture it. (Col 7, l. 96-98) A good vessel covers a word in its heart and a broken one lets it out. (Col 7, l. 109) The traditional Jewish reception of the couplet shows a variety of perspectives. Commenting on ‫( חסר־לב‬v. 12a), Gerondi interprets the “lack of heart” as a deficit in good character (despising people) as well as in understanding. On the other hand, an understanding man does not respond to an insult because it would be beneath his dignity to do so. Rashi finds the kind of person mentioned in v. 12b exemplified in Saul who, when he was anointed as king and was insulted by wicked men, kept silent like a mute (1 Sam 10:27). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra only adds the phrase ‫כאשר יבוזו אתו‬ 164

Introduction to Amenemope, AEL II, 147; COS I, 115 (written by Lichtheim). See AEL II, 159, 151, 153; 1; COS I, 129. For the opposite, the man of many words, cf. XII, 1–XIII, 9 (AEL II, 153-154; COS I, 118; ANET, 422-424). 166 ANET, 428, 429. 165

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(when they insult him) to the verse, showing that he shares this opinion. Ramaq goes in the same direction by stating that a man of understanding rather suffers the insults than insult or even reply in return. But Hame’iri is quite pragmatic in commenting that the stupidity of insulting a neighbour resides in the fact that it may cause the receiver to become an enemy and to retaliate in kind when given the chance. Malbim extends the wisdom of silence to mean that the man of understanding does not stoop to answer insults even when he knows how to answer.167 In the 14th century, v. 13 was understood both literally and as a reference to the secrets of Torah. Ralbag thought that a person of faithful spirit (v. 13b) would conceal the secret of the Torah from those who are not worthy of it, whereas harm can be done if it is revealed (v. 13a) to an irresponsible person. But Nahmias (14th century) saw the verse as a warning not to take talebearers into one’s confidence and only to trust faithful people. The Mezudat David also sticks to the literal meaning about talebearers, but extends v. 13b to mean that a real faithful person keeps all things told to him secret regardless of whether they were told in confidence or not.168 The interesting aspect in Chrysostom’s commentary on these verses is not so much his insight in the content as the form he identifies. To be sure, he does recognise the element of self-injury in v. 12a (comparable to Hame’iri, see above) and he does interpret v. 13 as the public revealing of a personal secret, which agrees with the Greek text (βουλὰς ἐν συνεδρίῳ [counsels in the assembly]). But he notices the comparison of two opposites so that the reader may choose the one and avoid the other. Hill169 points out that Chrysostom rarely noticed the stylistic feature of parallelism and only began doing so at 10:31 in his commentary. It seems that he is by now opening up to the figure. Melanchthon seems to comment on v. 12b under the influence of v. 13b (which also testifies to their closeness). He says: ... prudens tegit probra. (... the prudent man covers defamatory things) Prudens (the prudent) is to be expected where the Hebrew refers to the man of understanding (‫ )תבונות‬in v. 12b, but the verb ‫( יחריש‬keeps quiet) is glossed by tegit probra (covers defamatory things), which is derived from v. 13b. Melanchthon thus telescopes the text in a kind of paraphrase, which he expounds theologically as an injunction prohibiting defamatory words and a directive to uphold the good reputation of others. It notably is the will of God to discriminate between good and bad reputations, i.e. of honest and dishonest people. He compares it with the famous words of Jesus, “do not judge, so that you are not judged” (Matt 7:1 par.). V. 13 is also seen as an injunction: Hoc dictum damnat perfidiam patefacientem arcana. (This saying condemns the treacherous spreading of secrets)

167 Cf. on Yonah Gerondi above; the idea is also mentioned in the Talmud (Shabbat 88b), although with reference to Judg 5:31, not Prov 11:13. 168 The same idea is found in the Talmud, Baba Batra 28b: “Your friend has a friend and the friend of your friend has a friend,” which points to the danger that speaking about someone behind that person’s back can still reach the ears of the one spoken about. 169 Hill (2006, 223).

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As an illuminatio, Melanchthon, ever the humanistic expert on both Latin and Greek classical literature, quotes Seneca as effortlessly as he quotes Jesus: Fides sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum est. (Faithfulness is the holiest good of the human heart)170

11:14 Where there is no planning a people will come to a fall, but there is safety in an abundance of counsellors. The proverb has two clauses with verbs, the first an imperfect and the second a participle. The rhythmic organisation is, as in both preceding verses, 3+3.171 Waltke takes vv. 14-15 together on the grounds that these two verses about prudent action maintain equilibrium with the previous two verses about prudent silence. Plöger finds a connection between v. 14a and vv. 12-13 in the fact that the corporate dimension of behaviour now comes into focus while the preceding verses were concerned with the individual dimension. Such affinities cannot be denied, but the thematic scope of v. 14 is broader than the motif of speech and contains political and military aspects that justify its consideration in its own right. That said, it remains helpful to notice the redactional contrast created between v. 14 and the verses surrounding it, that is, between the public level (v. 14) and the individual or personal level, not only backwards (vv. 12-13), but also forwards (v. 15172). The proverb has a chiastic organisation in which a prepositional phrase introduced by ‫ ב‬stands in the first and in the last position, with the predicate of both sentences in the two middle positions:173 A prepositional phrase (‫)באין תחבלות‬ B predicate (‫)ותשועה‬

B predicate (‫)יפל־עם‬ A prepositional phrase (‫)ברב יועץ‬

As Waltke points out, the A-parts set forth the conditions and the B-parts set forth the consequences. The inverted correspondence emphasises the antithetic parallelism of both the conditions and the consequences. Both hemistichs of the verse or one of them appear at several other places in the book. The whole proverb is duplicated in 15:22,174 the first hemistich 170

Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium LXXXVIII, 29. Gemser considers 4+4, but that would again result in two adjacent stressed syllables and necessitate eliminating the maqqeph and a full o-syllable instead of a qamets hatuph in ‫ל־עם‬ ָ ‫יִ ָפּ‬. 172 Cf. Plöger, who calls v. 15 a kind of afterthought (“Nachsatz”) to v. 14. 173 Cf. Heim (2013, 268), who refers to the arrangement of the “parts of speech” in both hemistichs. 174 Snell (1993, 40). 171

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in 29:18a, and the second hemistich in 24:6b.175 Fox appeals to the parallel in 24:6 to determine the specific meaning of ‫ נפל‬in this verse, suggesting that it has a military connotation and thus alludes to a military defeat,176 which would make the meaning “strategy” natural for ‫תחבלות‬. That is possible, but not necessary. In 11:14 a political dimension is just as natural. The word also occurs in 1:5, where the context of education in general shows that it means the skills necessary to navigate through life.177 As Meinhold points out, the use of ‫( עם‬people) rather than ‫( גוי‬nation) suggests the populace of a town rather than a state.178 If we are to invoke comparisons with other proverbs, the immediate context (vv. 10, 11) would invite at least considering this possibility (so Fuhs). Moreover, if we were to choose the military options for all three the mooted words (‫תחבלות‬, ‫עם‬, ‫)תשועה‬, it could still be said with Clifford that the verse “offers a metaphor from waging war applicable to daily life.” But the term ‫ תחבלות‬goes further still as “a metaphorical expression for political expertise – the ability to steer the ship of state through troubled waters – and it is indispensable to the survival of a community in a dangerous world” (McKane, similarly Whybray). The ancient versions interpret the Hebrew in similar vein, e.g. the Septuagint: οἷς μὴ ὑπάρχει κυβέρνησις, πίπτουσιν ὥσπερ φύλλα, σωτηρία δὲ ὑπάρχει ἐν πολλῇ βουλῇ. (Those who have no steering fall like leaves, but salvation is available with much counsel) The Greek word κυβέρνησις (steering, navigation) is semantically very like the Hebrew root ‫( חבל‬see on 1:5),179 while σωτηρία (salvation) can express both the act of saving and the state of having been saved. The same goes for ‫( תשועה‬deliverance, safety). The Greek βουλή (counsel) makes an abstract180 out of the Hebrew noun 175

For these three repetitions, see Heim (2013, 267-273, 273-278, 278-282), who also points out the similarities in vocabulary between 24:6 and 20:18b; in addition to a full discussion of the intricate cross relationships between all of these, he gives a helpful schematic overview on p. 268. See further the recording by Snell (1993, 43 [for 24:6b], 48 [for 20:18b], 49 [for 29:18a]). 176 He also points out that the subject (‫ )עם‬can specifically refer to the army (cf. Judg 20:10; 1 Sam 14:17; 2 Sam 10:10; 2 Kgs 13:7); so also Clifford and others, while Heim (2013, 267) appeals to the parallel in 24:6 in support of the meaning “victory” in a military sense for ‫תשועה‬. 177 So Wildeboer, Gemser, Whybray and others on 1:5; cf. Vol. I on that verse. The word occurs only in the Book of Proverbs (1:5; 11:14; 12:5; 20:18; 24:6) and in Job 37:12. Meinhold argues that the verse relates to leadership conditions for peacetime as much as for war. Ansberry (2011, 80-81) accepts the possibility of a general application but stresses the proverb’s relevance for the royal court. 178 Among the parallels mentioned, 15:22 is not military, and 29:18 uses ‫( חזון‬vision) instead of ‫( תחבלות‬skill, plans, strategy). For ‫ עם‬in this sense, cf. Gen 19:4; 1 Sam 9:13; Jer 29:16. 179 The Vulgate here has the noun gubernator (pilot, leader; hence governor), “Where there is no governor a people collapses.” Likewise, the Peshitta has a noun indicating the person performing the function rather than the function itself (cf. EE): ¿æüÂËã (leader, administrator), “A people that has no leader, comes to a fall.” 180 Possibly betraying “a lack of enthusiasm for royal administrators” (EE).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

253

(participle) ‫יועץ‬, although the Hebrew word does not have to mean a royal councillor and can also refer to one who gives private advice (12:20) or who serves a community in that way (Isa 1:26; 3:3; cf. Delitzsch). The singular represents the plural with ‫( ברב‬Waltke: the singular for the plural in enumeration181).

Taking the above into account, the proverb should not be interpreted as only a military saying, but rather as a statement on the principle of leadership by counsel from multiple perspectives and therefore applicable to multiple situations (Yoder). Not all commentators agreed with the principle, as attested by the rather less democratic comment in Hitzig’s commentary from the middle of the 19th century: “Viele Köche verderben den Brei” (equivalent to the English “[Too] many cooks spoil the broth”). Yonah Gerondi understands the proverb to apply to government in general, including defence against enemies. Therefore many counsellors and thorough counsel are necessary. Rashi finds a deeper meaning in the ‫ תחבלות‬taken as the understanding and concomitant repentance that the Jewish people needs in times of conflict. This does not deny the military aspect, but contends that an enemy can only be overcome by understanding the sins that caused the threat in the first place. The 18th century authorities interpret with straight peshat-type expositions. The Mezudat David requires sound military preparations for battle. The Vilna Gaon also pays attention to the military dimension, but focuses on the question why a word with a plural sense like ‫( רב‬many) goes with a singular noun like ‫( יועץ‬councillor). On the one hand, a single army commander cannot oversee all aspects, which calls for many officers to assist. On the other hand, many differing opinions could confuse the army, which calls for a single commander-in-chief to make the final but well-advised decision. This balanced view is obviously not the same as Hitzig’s somewhat cynical remark quoted above. Clemens Alexandrinus (c. 150-215)182 quotes the Greek v. 14a in support of his persuasion that reason is the governing principle for guiding the soul. He also uses other concepts from the proverb to strengthen his point. “Those who have no guidance fall like leaves,” but that is avoided where reason is the pilot guiding the ship of the soul. For him, not so much people who guide as the rational faculty of humans is what the proverb refers to. Chrysostom (c. 347-407) accounts for the Greek comparison of falling “like leaves” (Hebrew ‫ עם‬misread as the preposition ‫ כ‬with ‫עלה‬ [leaves], so EE). The absence of good steering makes it inevitable that leaves fall as if from a barren tree. He explicitly works with the idea of the pilot on a ship, since he mentions that the heavy swell of the ocean requires good helmsmanship. Therefore a community will sink/fall as inevitably as a ship without steering or leaves on a barren tree. To be saved, then, one needs not merely advice, but an abundance of it. The proverb is used by John Cassian (c. 360-435) as biblical substantiation for the value of discretion. Assuming that “guidance” means guidance to discretion, he quotes v. 14a according to the Septuagint to show that lack of (guidance to) discretion brings about a fall.183 181 IBHS 7.2.2b; GCK 123b (nomen unitatis). However, see below for the original explanation of a singular with “many” by the Vilna Gaon. 182 Strom II, 11 (ANF II, 359). 183 Confer II, 4 (NPNF II,11, 311). Cassian also quotes other verses from the Book of Proverbs (25:28 and 31:3 LXX), which he seems to have known rather well, even if he used them somewhat laboriously (here, for instance the Greek 31:3, which to him refers to the spiritual wine which is to be enjoyed with counsel).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

Philipp Melanchthon offers a thoroughly Protestant perspective. He translates the first hemistich, Absque magistratibus ruet populus. (Without magistrates a people falls)184 and comments: Prior pars damnat ἀναρχίαν. Altera pars prohibet Tyrannidem. Ibi est salus, ubi multa est consilia, id est, ubi non ad unius arbitrium & cupiditatem omnia fiunt, sed ubi valet autoritas fidelium hominum, qui judicare possunt. (The first part condemns anarchy. The other part prohibits Tyranny. Well-being is there where much counsel is, that is, where all does not happen according to the arbitrariness and pleasure of one person, but where the authority of faithful people who are able to judge, is strong) To him the indicative proverb equals an ethical command expressing God’s will (Deus vult ...). Without explicitly mentioning church order, his exegesis does accommodate typical Protestant principles of church polity, viz. no charismatic indifference towards the necessary order in the running of church affairs and no episcopal acceptance of the tyranny of “government by one alone or by a few.”

11:15 Who gives surety for a stranger will be badly harmed. but who hates pledging by handshake feels secure. In its Masoretic form, the proverb has a rhythmic organisation of 3+3, although Gemser’s scanning of 4+3 is also thinkable if one ignores the first maqqeph and retains the second one. The verse consists of a sentence in each hemistich, the second of which has two participles, one carrying the subject (‫שׂ ֹנֵ א‬, the hater) and the other the predicate (‫בּוֹט ַח‬, ֵ feels secure). The first hemistich contains several interesting aspects. The opening words (‫רוֹע‬ ַ ֵ‫ ַ)ר ע־י‬are often emended to read ‫רוֹע‬ ַ ֵ‫( ר ַֺע־י‬Toy, BHS, Plöger, Meinhold, McKane, Whybray and others), but Wildeboer retains the patah and, correctly, in my opinion, describes the form as “an adverbial adjective in the accusative,” with the same effect as the absolute infinitive. Waltke also retains the Masoretic vocalisation and calls the construction an “internal accusative” while treating the verb as active (Qal), with which Yoder seems to agree (although she does not mention Waltke).185 Several commentators point out the striking use of 184 Cf. the Vulgate: ubi non est gubernator populus corruet (Where there is no governor a people collapses). Melanchthon does not bother to translate the second hemistich. 185 Two further notes on v. 15a: First, the Qal would have been ‫( יֵ ַר ע‬cf. Gen 21:11f.; GKC 67p) and the form in the Masoretic text can only be Niphal (Wildeboer explains the Niphal morphology as an analogy of the Niphal of ayin-waw verbs). Second, referring in his commentary to his Hebrew Syntax (IBHS 10.2.1g), Waltke rejects the explanation of ‫ ַר ע‬as an equivalent of an absolute infinitive, but in the latter work he himself states that the internal accusative, which he accepts in this case, resembles an infinitive absolute and adverbial accusatives.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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alliteration in this hemistich (so, for instance, Meinhold, Murphy, Clifford, Yoder).186 While the similar stylistic feature of assonance may be found in the o and e sounds of v. 15b, it is not as strong as the combination of alliteration and assonance in the first hemistich, resulting in more emphasis on the negative warning than on its reassuring counterpart. The parallelism is organised in a syntactical chiasmus with the predicates at the outer sides enclosing the subjects: A predicate (‫)רע־ירוע‬

B subject (‫)כי־ערב זר‬

B subject (‫)שנא תקעים‬

A predicate (‫)בוטח‬

The predicates are each other’s opposites, as are the subjects, so that an antithetic parallelism ensues. Being harmed :: feeling secure, and being surety :: hating to vouch. But precisely for that reason both halves give the same advice, viz. not to stand surety. The theme is a favourite in the book, both in the short proverbs (see also 17:18; 20:16; 22:26-27; 27:13) and in the poems (6:1-5). In Chap. 6 it is difficult to say with certainty who is the creditor and who is the debtor,187 but in our present proverb this is not the case. Whereas in the poem advice is given to a young man who has already landed himself in the predicament, here only a description of that predicament is given in general terms. The hard fact is that someone who stands surety will be treated very badly. But, in pragmatic terms, the harsh picture functions as a warning to stay away from such practices. In the same way, the positive picture in the second hemistich functions to present the attractive side of abstaining from the hazardous undertaking. For only so can the young pupil feel safe.188 The two participles together suggest stability. They evoke a picture of enduring security as long as one stays away from vouching for a ‫זר‬, that is, a person one does not know. This may be an alien (Meinhold) but can also be an Israelite unfamiliar to the guarantor (Plöger). The proverb and its parallels suggest the question why such an uncompromising principle is so prominent without any mention of kindness to those who really need financial assistance, especially in light of the solidarity within a tribe or clan. Indeed, social concern and repudiation of carelessness occur 186 Yoder calls the sound play in v. 15a “assonance,” of which there indeed is an element present (a play on vowels in the double use of both the short a and the long ā). Meinhold finds the alliteration in the fourfold repetition of ‫ ר‬and the threefold repetition of ‫ ע‬and thinks it alludes to ‫( רע‬bad), while it should be remarked that ‫ ַר ע‬is not just alluded to, but explicitly present anyway. 187 In 6:1 the verb is used with the preposition ‫ל‬, which can be understood as giving surety “to” or “on behalf of;” in 11:15 the same verb is used with a simple accusative; see the commentary on 6:1-5 in Vol. I. 188 ‫בטח‬, as Fox points out, does not mean “to be safe,” but “to have trust,” “be confident.” It thus designates an inner disposition rather than an outward condition.

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often in wisdom literature (cf. 3:27-28; 11:24, 26; 14:21, 31; 17:17; 21:26; 27:10; Sir 29:1, 2, 20). While the very old Sumerian Instruction of Shuruppak (c. middle of the 3rd millennium BCE)189 contains the same caveat with the same substantiation as the warnings in Proverbs (cf. Tuinstra), the much younger Jewish wisdom of Ben Sira combines the warning with a more lenient view on surety in Sir 29:14-16. In the same spirit as the Targum of 11:15 (see below) Ben Sira even praises surety, but then immediately adds a passage on the dangers of the practice (Sir 29:17-20).190 Pilch (2016, 210) explains this as an example of the “ideal” contrasted with the “real” in the ancient Near East and also as a case of the phenomenon of “normative inconsistency,” which means that conflicting and even contradictory circumstances of a given case are carefully considered in the hope of aiding a decision that would have a positive result.191 Of course, all of this cannot be imagined without people speaking to each other, but it seems going too far to suggest with Meinhold that the verse adds a kind of appendix to the motif of speaking in the previous verses (cf. vv. 13f.).192 The verse has been handed down differently in the Greek textual tradition. The Septuagint has: πονηρὸς κακοποιεῖ, ὅταν συμμείξῃ δικαίῳ, μισεῖ δὲ ἦχον ἀσφαλείας. (An evil man does mischief whenever he meets a righteous man, and he hates news of safety) The Eclectic Edition of Proverbs provides a convincing explanation for the Greek, starting from the translator’s misunderstanding of ‫ רע‬as “evil man” (πονηρός). That necessitated an antonym in order to create a balanced antithetic parallelism, for which δίκαιος was chosen. In the second hemistich ἦχος (sound, report, news) understandably was related to ‫( תקע‬sound, blow) and the participle ‫ בוטח‬was associated with the noun ‫( ֶבּ ַטח‬safety). The Peshitta follows the Greek in the first hemistich, but in the second hemistich proceeds to give the reason for the evil man’s doing wrong: ÁüÃêà èÚÃêäà ¿çéy âÔã (because he hates those who wait in hope). The thinking behind this rendering seems to be similar to that which is expressly put into so many words by the Targum, where it is said, “The evil man does harm to the righteous man because he stands surety for a stranger” (‫)מטול דהוא ערב חלוני‬, but in the second hemistich the Targum comes closer to the Peshitta: “[A]nd he hates those who put their hope in God” (‫)וסני לאלין דסימין סברהון באלהא‬. For the Targum, those 189 Instruction of Shuruppak, l. 19: “You should not vouch for someone: that man will have a hold on you” (Black, Cunningham et al. 1998-2006). 190 See Vol. I, 257 for the text and a translation. 191 Volz (1911, 174-175) tends in this direction when he cites the proverb as evidence for the “natural fear” of young people to identify with those who suffer and hold, on the strength of Matt 25:31ff.; Prov 15:26; 19:22; 25:20, that Jewish and Christian ethicists encouraged them to overcome such fear. 192 Similarly Sæbø; but Scherer (1999, 83) points out that not words, but the shaking of hands is constitutive for establishing a transaction of surety (cf. 6:1; 17:18; 22:26).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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who put their hope in God are people who out of kindness stand surety even for strangers in need. Who harms such kind people must therefore be wicked, while those who take risks do so trusting God to help them if they suffer as a result of their kindness. In terms of the explanation offered by Pilch, the Hebrew text and the Targum reflect the opposite sides on the spectrum of “normative inconsistency.” In the classical rabbinic reception the verse is often understood quite literally, but there are also cases of metaphorical interpretation. Gerondi recognised the moral difficulty posed by a literal understanding for the requirement of kindness to the needy. He provides an example of the careful consideration of conflicting aspects of a situation in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution in a given situation (“normative inconsistency”). He points to the conflict that will arise if the strange debtor reneges, but also to the merit of a good person who vouches for a stranger and is willing to suffer the loss in case of default by the debtor. In essence, this should be regarded as an act of charity. However, Gerondi also warns not to fall for those who prey on the kindness of others. Rashi provides a metaphorical interpretation, viz. that the guarantor is actually one who has pledged himself to idolatry and those who give a handshake are people who bind themselves to seducers to sin. But other interpreters stick to a simple realistic reading about the foolishness of vouching for untrustworthy people (Ramaq) or even for friends, whether in writing or with a handshake (Mezudat David). In the Christian tradition, John Cassian193 quotes this proverb (as he does v. 14) in connection with the value of discretion. Arguing from the Septuagint text, he explains the company of an evil man with a righteous man as the devil who deceives by means of association with a good person. To him, the second hemistich means that the evil man hates the sound of the “watchman,” i.e., the warnings of the fathers. For Chrysostom the first hemistich means that the wicked do not profit by the company of the righteous and thereby show that they hate the “house” of safety where the righteous find themselves. But Melanchthon, with reference to his favourite classical author Cicero, returns to pointing out soberly the danger of false trust in the pecuniary world and the wisdom of not trusting universally and blindly.

11:16 A beautiful woman takes honour and tough men grab wealth. This short proverb (three stresses in the first hemistich and two in the second) provides a good example of the polyvalent power of a simple form.194 It can be read in several ways and can therefore mean several things when used in differing contexts. This could also have been a difficulty for the Septuagint with the proverb as a whole so that it made two lines out of it by adding a verset after the first Hebrew hemistich and another before the last (see below). 193

Confer I, 20 (NPNF II,11, 305-306). Mieder (2004, 132) calls the phenomenon “the poly-semanticity of proverbs as ‘einfache Formen’ (simple forms);” cf. also Berlin ([1985] 2008, 98-99). Yoder finds more than one understanding viable (notably, charm versus violence and a gender-based contrast between women and men), but builds it on the polyvalence of the conjunction ‫ ו‬as “and” or “but” (cf. below under [c] on Whybray’s remarks about the ‫)ו‬. 194

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

A further effect of the “poly-semanticity” is the lure to simplify the text in order to “improve” what is perceived as poor parallelism in the use of ‫עריצים‬ (strong, tough, violent men), by reading ‫( חרוצים‬diligent men) at the beginning of the second hemistich.195 The second word in the combination ‫( אשת־חן‬woman of grace) is a genitivus qualitatis, denoting the quality of grace by which a woman is defined. The genitive can specify both appearance and character that find favour and thus bear on the woman’s beauty (cf. Sir 9:8) or her graceful inner features (cf. the similar expression ‫ אשת־חיל‬in 12:4; 31:10; Ruth 3:11). The options for interpreting the Hebrew are best facilitated by presenting them in a paraphrastic translation: (a) A beautiful woman obtains esteem and tough men get hold of wealth (b) A beautiful woman gets herself celebration and violent men appropriate wealth (c) A gracious woman obtains honour and powerful men obtain wealth (d) A gracious woman obtains honour and diligent196 men obtain wealth

– It is simply a fact that female beauty is thought of highly and that male toughness pays – Pretty women use their beauty to garner glory and brutal men use violence to get rich – Women with inner decorum are esteemed and men with power become affluent – A woman with inner decorum is esteemed and hard-working men become well-off

Option (a) takes the verse as a statement of fact:197 In human society, beautiful women are applauded in adulatory terms,198 while no-nonsense forcefulness in men brings them profit. Fox has two objections to this reading, viz. that there would be no reason for limiting the first part to women, since types of behaviour, not types of people are being contrasted, and second that the woman would be put in a bad light by the implication that she is greedy for honour. But neither objection is convincing. Not a contrast, but a factual assertion is presented about typical effects of men and women in society. Second, being beautiful is not a type of behaviour, so that one first has to assume that 195 So Gemser, Ringgren, Fox (in his commentary but not in EE), BHS (but not BHQ), while Oesterley agrees that “it is quite clear that the text is out of order” and that the Septuagint “has retained, at any rate, an echo of the true text.” Delitzsch however thinks reading ‫חרוצים‬ rather disrupts the parallelism. 196 Reading ‫( חרוצים‬diligent men) instead of ‫( עריצים‬violent, powerful men). 197 Cf. 10:15; 18:11, where a similar, though not the same, statement is made (rich people are strong, not: strong people become rich). A factual statement is made without evaluation or moral judgement. Similarly Hausmann (1995, 152f.), who thinks that didactic information about a “functioning” woman was unimportant for the sages because their pupils did not need to come to terms with it. 198 In Prov 29:23 the verb ‫ תמך‬with the object ‫ כבוד‬is used in this way, viz. that the lowly of spirit “obtain honour.” They don’t grab or otherwise appropriate it, but simply receive it.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

259

the woman has to be thought of as using her beauty under all circumstances (cf. option (b) below) and then find that objectionable.199 Fox is right in saying that the verse does not contrast “types of woman,” but it also does not contrast types of human beings in general. The point of interest is neither human types nor specific acts of women and men, but what can be the result of certain characteristics in the case of both genders. On this reading, nothing is promised to vain women and violent men, but it is stated what has de facto effect in society both as far as women and men are concerned. Even those not particularly interested in Hollywood-cultivated images know very well the heroine must be beautiful and the hero must be macho, but the phenomenon itself is as old as the mountains. Option (b) also reads the verse as an observation of fact (so Van Leeuwen and Lucas). Although it is not necessary to read the first hemistich as implying that a woman uses her beauty, it is possible and valid to do so. The verb ‫ תמך‬can mean “grab,” “seize” (cf. Prov 3:18; 4:4; 29:23) and on this reading would mean that the pretty woman has a way of relying on her beauty to seize a bonus for herself.200 It would then not be an ad hoc act such as that of Ruth in her predicament, but a way of manipulating people for ulterior motives. In the same way, the men of the second hemistich would not only be resolute and business-like, but brutal and violent in their pursuit of wealth. This reading would be a crescendo of option (a) and, although it does suggest a harshness criticised and countered elsewhere in Proverbs,201 in this case it is neither censured nor condoned or recommended. Van Leeuwen thinks the proverb is “probably a shrewd observation” in the line of option (b), but the shrewdness he rightly detects in the verse rather suggests than excludes further possibilities. Option (c) depends on an alternative nuance in the meaning of the noun ‫חן‬. It can also mean “grace” and the genitive would accordingly qualify the woman as a woman with decorum and propriety (see above).202 Then the 199 It could not have been so objectionable for a woman to use her charm if one considers the advice given to Ruth by Naomi and the success it had when Boaz first had the shivers with her in his bed (‫ חרד‬Qal, Ruth 3:8) and then praised her, adding a splendid compliment and a promise to do what she wishes. The expression used by Boaz (‫אשת חיל‬, Ruth 3:3-4, 11; cf. Prov 12:4; 31:10) is very similar to the one used in this proverb (‫)אשת חן‬. Although a “woman of substance” is not synonymous with “a woman of grace,” features of their meanings do overlap. There is no doubt as to Ruth’s premeditated use of female appeal nor to her honour and esteem in the tradition of Israel. 200 Millar (2020, 153-155), stresses this option, which, she says, “cynically asserts that bad people get good things.” As one of several possibilities, this perfectly illustrates the “openness” on which her study focuses. 201 E.g. 21:13; 22:16; 28:27; cf. 31:8; 11:25; 19:17; 22:9; cf. also Tuinstra on its use with the parallel concepts of “enemy” in Job 6:23, “bad” in Job 15:20, “brutal” in Ps 86:14, and “evil” in Jer 15:21. 202 This reading represents the spirit of 31:30, although ‫ חן‬is there used as a synonym for ‫( יפי‬physical beauty) and the woman of grace is accordingly called an ‫אשת־חיל‬.

260

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

parallelism would make good sense if ‫ עריצים‬is understood in its milder shade of meaning, namely strong or powerful men (cf. Jer 20:11). In this case the woman’s demeanour is what brings her esteem in the eyes of society, while a strong man’s power is what brings him ‫כבוד‬, which can also mean “weight,” “importance.” Gracious women are respected (cf. 12:4; 19:14) and powerful men carry weight (cf. 10:15; 18:11). But, as a variant of this option, it can also be understood to contrast the gentle grace of the woman203 with the fearsome ruthlessness found in men.204 Even so, no evaluation is necessarily implied, but it can be understood that way.205 Waltke finds significance in the fact that the first subject is singular and the second plural: “The greater gain of a single woman over fierce men (pl.) signals the superiority of ‘grace’ to brute force.” The superiority of grace over brute force is certainly a possible motif, especially in light of its redactional placement directly alongside v. 17, where the preferability of kindness to cruelty is espoused. But the use of singular and plural is not necessary to bring this idea about and may be attributable to the female’s social role primarily within her own family whereas the male’s role is defined by the company of the seniors in the community (cf. 31:23, 27). The last option (d) understands the first hemistich in the same way, but attempts to construe what is perceived as a better parallelism by emending ‫( עריצים‬strong men) in the second hemistich to ‫( חרוצים‬diligent men). On this submission, a moral characteristic of the woman is paralleled by a moral characteristic of the man. Accordingly, no contrast between gentle female and harsh male qualities is intended, but a positive aspect of both genders would be mentioned. Several commentators mentioned above emend the text in this way, and the underlying interpretive difficulty may also lie at the root of the amplified text found at this point in the Septuagint. The Septuagint adds two hemistichs between the first and the last hemistichs of the Hebrew text, thereby creating two full stichs with a clear parallelism in both, viz. first about women and then about men: γυνὴ εὐχάριστος ἐγείρει ἀνδρὶ δόξαν, θρόνος δὲ ἀτιμίας γυνὴ μισοῦσα δίκαια. πλούτου ὀκνηροὶ ἐνδεεῖς γίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐρείδονται πλούτῳ 203

Cf. the positive evaluation of a good woman in 12:4, in 18:22 even in religious terms. Cf. Ezk 28:7; Ps 37:35. Waltke thinks ‫( עריצים‬the fierce) is “bound with” ‫( אכזרי‬the cruel) in v. 17, but Scherer (1999, 83) sees the link rather with v. 15 on the grounds of economic motifs (surety and wealth). Since both can be argued, I would say that this rather speaks for the looser compositional principle that I have put forward in the Introduction (see Introduction, Par 2). 205 Cf. Whybray, who finds that the ‫ ו‬can possibly be a waw aedequationis (GKC 161a), meaning “as energetic men acquire riches, so a charming woman gains honour,” and thus making the proverb into advice concerning the choice of a wife. 204

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

261

(A gracious woman brings about honour for a man, but a woman who hates righteousness is a throne of dishonour. Slothful men get to lack wealth, but the manly are undergirded by wealth) The woman is a source of honour or dishonour primarily for her husband (so Delitzsch, Meinhold, Hausmann;206 cf. 12:4; also 1 Cor 11:7). The “manly men” (ἀνδρεῖοι) may be taken to represent men who act as men should, which, in the light of the parallelism with the lazy men (ὀκνηροὶ) of the preceding hemistich, must mean that they are not lazy. However, that does not necessitate an emendation of the Hebrew text to a noun meaning “diligent men” (‫)חרוצים‬, precisely because the Greek word used is “manly” and could indicate that the translator had ‫ עריצים‬in the Hebrew text before him.207 Even in that case he still construed it to mean the opposite of indolence in men and therefore augmented the verse to correspond to the well-known sapiential criticism of laziness and commendation of diligence (cf. 10:4, 5; 12:24, 27; 21:5a).208 This interpretation is supported by the Peshitta, which follows the Septuagint in adding the two half-lines, but understands the Greek ἀνδρεῖοι to mean the same as the Hebrew ‫עריצים‬, since it says that “the powerful (¿çÚþï) uphold knowledge.”

The several reading options available have both an extending and a limiting effect. On one hand, the fact that more than one understanding is possible extends the application potential of the proverb. On the other hand, each of these possibilities limits the latent claim of the others to be “the” correct reading. The options border on each other in the same way that the opposing statements of an explicit antilogion as 26:4-5 do. In the latter case the options are clearly spelled out (answer a fool :: don’t answer a fool), so that both are true and either can be used with good effect as diverse circumstances require. One is annexed to another and thus extends it, while – by that very same token – limiting any claim to absoluteness it may have. But in a “poly-semantic” proverb such as 11:16 the border is rather a Schengen-type209 “soft” border than a clearly drawn and fenced one like 26:4-5. Nevertheless, it is quite real and the responsibility is squarely on the reader/hearer to recognise the different possibilities for application in different circumstances and to select the appropriate one. The proverb can be used to criticise or warn against a femme 206 Cf. Hausmann (1995, 149-153). Cf. Hatton (2008, 107-109) on the reaction of the translator; he also thinks that such reaction to v. 16 (called “Ripples around Proverbs 11:16”) continues beyond v. 22; see below the exegesis of vv. 24 and 26. 207 So also Millar (2020, 152). 208 Cf. Tov ([1990] 1999, 46), who thinks that the translator did not understand his Hebrew Vorlage and therefore added the two hemistichs. In my opinion this is a very reasonable explanation, whatever is made of the suggestion by Driver (1951, 180) to the effect that ‫ עריץ‬can have a meaning in bonam partem, for which he adduces Arabic ‫ عرض‬expressing a “vigorous activity” and refers to Ps 37:35. Contrary to Waltke’s opinion that in Hebrew the word only has a “bad meaning”, Jer 20:11 shows that it can indeed be used in a positive sense, since there God himself is likened to “a strong hero” (‫ )כגבור עריץ‬who helps the prophet. 209 Written before Brexit and Covid-19.

262

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

fatale (cf. 2:16-19; 5:3-5) and the ruthless wealthy (cf. 10:15; 18:11, 23), but equally well to describe social realities; it can be used to suggest the superior value of inner qualities, or to point out the advantages of using one’s capabilities (cf. 10:4; 13:4; 21:5; 24:33-34) – as in the case of a woman like the royal ancestor Ruth, although the proverbs were not primarily earmarked for female consumption. In this light, the role of the reader/hearer in bringing the proverb to life is just as important as that of the collector or editor. The pragmatics of its use make it signify, even to the extent that the simple assertion may assume the function of social criticism or an injunction. Despite the form of a statement in the indicative rather than a judgement or injunction, the proverb’s applicability in real life situations makes it useful for learning in the indicative.210 Rabbinic treatment of the proverb covers a wide spectrum of possibilities and seems to reflect some uncertainty of what to make of it. On the evidence of the editions of Rashi, Malbim and others, Rosenberg211 suspects that censorship played a role in the comments on the verse. Yonah Gerondi construes a clever link with Deut 1:29, where the root ‫ ערץ‬Qal is used meaning “to be intimidated,” so that the ‫ עריצים‬here becomes those who intimidate others. That is how they “support” their wealth. Negatively, it can thus be said that they do not understand that honour comes from humility and not intimidation, which is at least suggested by the “grace” of the woman in the first half of the proverb. In Rashi’s opinion, however, the woman spoken of here has a completely different reference. For him, she refers to Israel212 who “draws near” to God and the Torah (‫ תמך‬is taken as “reach out for” rather than as “take hold of”). In the 19th century, this type of interpretation was taken a step further by Malbim, who sees the gracious woman as a metaphor for the wise human soul. According to the Mezudat David, the woman is respected because of her virtues and she supports her honour by doing more good deeds, whereas the strong men support their wealth so as not to lose it, which seems to be related to what I have called option (d) above. The idea of support is explicitly explained in Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, according to whom ‫ תמך‬here means ‫( סמך‬support), but he only uses it to interpret the first hemistich. Strong men “draw near to wealth” so that they do not lose it. Chrysostom only comments on the woman who, according to the Septuagint, honours her husband, and does so by reminding his readers that virtue can also be practiced by women. He only mentions Deborah (Judg 4:5) and “the woman who taught Apollos” but does not even mention her name (according to Acts 18:26 it was Priscilla who, together with her husband Aquila, taught Apollos). As for the second half of the Septuagint verse, he interprets it as deploring neither wealth or poverty. Melanchthon is also quite breviloquent in his comment on the Hebrew proverb, citing as he does only the first hemistich. “A woman who is regarded with honour is gracious” (Mulier quae tuetur honorem gratiosa est) reminds him of a saying that good manners are a better commendation than outward form. Without quoting the words of the second hemistich, he claims to be reminded also that active business goes before wealth. His comments are almost as polyvalent as the text itself. 210 211 212

See the Introduction, Essay 2. Rosenberg ([1988] 2001, 64). According to Malbim, the woman is a metaphor for the wise soul.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

263

11:17 A man of kindness rewards himself, but a cruel person harms his own flesh. The verse is a simple antithetic proverb consisting of 4+3 beats in seven words. In a classifying clause the predicate normally precedes its subject213 (so Waltke, following Toy). The alternative (“He who rewards himself is a man of kindness”214 is theoretically possible, but the missing object (“others”) in the first hemistich makes that highly unlikely. The parallelism of the two hemistichs also supports the decision not to depart from the usual syntactic order, since the second hemistich would be difficult to understand if it said that “he who harms his own flesh is a cruel person.” Thus the antithesis is built up with a straightforward syntactic symmetry: ‫איש חסד‬

‫גמל נפשו‬

subject

predicate

‫אכזרי‬ subject

‫ועכר שארו‬ predicate

In each case a Qal participle followed by a noun with masculine singular suffix produces the integrative effect of assonance. The noun ‫( אכזרי‬cruel person, cf. 5:9; 12:10; 17:11) has a counterpart in the genitive construction ‫איש חסד‬ (man of kindness), which accordingly must be an attributive genitive indicating a quality by which the status constructus is typified.215 According to Clifford, “[w]e normally think of kindness and cruelty as primarily affecting others, but the saying calls attention to the effect they have upon the one who does them.” That is so, but in its ancient context the proverb is in full agreement with the usual view that a good deed leads to a good result and a bad deed to a bad result for the respective doers, whether as a result of the physical, social, psychological or moral order of things (Wildeboer, Murphy; Van Leeuwen calls the consequences of behaviour for those responsible “boomerang-like;” similarly Waltke). Therefore it can be called a short statement of the deed-consequence nexus. There are many examples in the Book of Proverbs (cf. among others 10:24; 25:16-17).216 This specific case may be compared to Matt 5:7, where the same Greek root (ἐλεήμονες, ἐλεηθήσονται) is used as in the Septuagint rendering of ‫ חסד‬in this proverb (ἐλεήμων [showing kindness]), and the balance of deed and consequence is clear. 213 214 215 216

See IBHS, 8.4.2. This option was already preferred by Ralbag in the early Renaissance. Cf. IBHS, 9.5.3b; GKC 128s. Cf. Par 8.4 in the Introduction to Vol. I, especially 44-46.

264

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

In this verse, the nouns ‫( נפש‬soul) and ‫( שאר‬flesh) are used as synonyms. The first can refer to the throat (cf. 27:7; Isa 5:14; Jer 4:10; Ps 63:6) and thus, unsurprisingly, to the breathing being (cf. Gen 2:7) or to living beings generally (cf. Gen. 1:20), but is also frequently used to express the very identity of the self (cf. Gen 27:4, 25; Lev 26:11, 30). The second noun (‫)שאר‬, particularly with the suffix, can mean the flesh or body (cf. Ex 21:10; Mi 3:2), but also a person’s self and, as Fox points out, a blood relative (cf. Lev 18:6; 25:49; English “flesh and blood”). If the latter is also present here, it would mean that the cruel person harms his own family (so Fox, who judges the use of the word to be an intentional double entendre). If that is the case, the parallelism would dilute the suggestion to become only very indirect, since the close parallel ‫ נפש‬in the first hemistich only signifies that the deed or attitude rebounds on the doer personally (similarly Waltke).217 Moreover, the nouns ‫ נפש‬and ‫ שאר‬are forceful precisely because they demonstrate the very close association between – and even the identity of – the subject of a deed and the receiver of its consequence. McKane and Tuinstra think that the proverb expresses the view that “what is good for the individual is good for the whole.” The principle is self-evident for the corporate personality in ancient Israel and not in need of being made the point of a proverb. The issue is not the dynamics of social integration and the effects of deeds on others, but the effects of good or bad deeds on the doers themselves (similarly Meinhold, Whybray, Murphy, Clifford).218 According to Van Leeuwen, “the ethical problem of self-love finds its proportion and resolution” in the proverb. The saying certainly does not propound self-love as the driving force for one’s actions – i.e., doing good to others and avoiding to harm others out of mere self-interest. That would fly in the face of the noun ‫( חסד‬solidarity, loving-kindness) and, would not be a suitable contrast to the contrary attitude of the ‫( אכזרי‬cruel person). Neither is self-interest repudiated,219 but in this proverb it is a supporting motif to 217 In this verse Rashi does interpret ‫ נפש‬as a “neighbour” (see below). Tuinstra compares Gen 12:5, but there ‫ נפש‬refers to living human beings acquired as slaves, not relatives; cf. Lev 22:11. A better, and decisive, parallel is found in 1 Sam 18:3, according to which Jonathan loved David as he did himself (‫ ;)נפשו‬cf. also 1 Sam 20:17; KAHAL, s.v. Although ‫( עכר‬harm) is also used in v. 29 and in 15:27 with reference to one’s own house (so Fox; also cf. 15:6), but in those cases explicit reference is made to the ‫בית‬, which is not the case here. 218 This is further highlighted by the observation made by Scherer (1999, 84) that in light of the arguments on all counts, Plöger’s idea that the proverb champions the correct relation between the judgement of an individual’s own possibilities and the goal striven for (“das rechte Verhältnis der Selbsteinschätzung eigener Fähigkeiten zu dem Ziel, das man anstrebt”) seems quite forced. 219 On the contrary, self-interest is implicitly accepted as normal. Self-love is even the criterion by which the love for one’s fellow human beings can be measured (Lev 19:18; cf.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

265

demonstrate the close symmetry of deed and consequence. On that level it may be perceived as a motivation or warning relative to good and bad deeds respectively. The rabbinic tradition shows much common ground in the interpretation of the proverb. Gerondi understands the two hemistichs as a foundation for moderation in matters of corporal requirements. A miserly life weakens one’s own flesh and therefore also one’s soul because proper service to God becomes impossible (the opposite of the ascetic ideal). Therefore one should be kind to oneself so as to be able to keep the commandment of kindness to others. Similarly, the Mezudat David pictures a stern Scrooge-like figure who lives as a miser in order to accumulate wealth and who therefore is cruel to others as well. Also Hame’iri, Ramaq and Nahmias tend in this direction. But Rashi prefers to see a reference to relatives in both hemistichs. ‫נפש‬ as well as ‫ שאר‬are taken as references to family. The use of Ex 22:24 on lending money to the poor “with you” (‫ )עמך‬is seen to imply immediate family and thus to support this interpretation (so Rashi as well as the Babylonian Talmud220). PseudoIbn Ezra combines the use of ‫ גמל‬with its use in Deut 17:23, where it refers to the ripening of edible almonds (‫)שקדים‬, and says that the verb means to do good deeds, probably giving food to the needy. On the other hand, the cruel man goes after the desire of the flesh (‫ שאר‬equals ‫בשר‬, which in turn is edible meat given to the people of Israel but called ‫ שאר‬in Ps 78:20). The kind person gives, his counterpart follows his own desire. In the Christian tradition the proverb does not seem to have attracted much attention, but where it has, it has been interpreted in completely contrasting ways. Still, there is some affinity with the rabbinic idea of almsgiving associated with the first hemistich. Chrysostom sees the proverb as an injunction to almsgiving and simultaneously as a good form of instruction. When a person does a good deed, it should be done as though one were the recipient of a good deed oneself and remain well disposed. On the other hand, he who performs no charity harms his flesh but not his soul. The mild punishment leads to the advice not to over-indulge, which is unhealthy! Leo I (†461, Pope from 440) quotes the first hemistich in support of his conviction that prayer for forgiveness is best supported by almsgiving and fasting.221 A millennium later, Melanchthon goes another way altogether. Although he does not refer to Rashi, he thinks along the lines of the latter’s view that the verse refers to family. For Melanchthon, the proverb is evidence that God imbued nature with the drive to first embrace one’s own house (family). Likewise, humans have the tendency instilled in them so that they can be reminded of the love of God “for the Son and for us” (erga filium & erga nos).222

Matt 19:19; 22:32); Jesus also uses the same principle as injunction to be good to others (Matt 7:12; Luke 6:31). Accordingly, it is not the driving force for kindness, but a yardstick by which kindness can be illustrated. 220 Baba Metzia 71a; Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 204). 221 Sermo XVI, 2 on the Fast of the Tenth Month (NPNF II,12, 124). 222 The pronominal first person plural nos leaves it unclear whether Melanchthon means “us humans” or “us faithful,” but, given his humanistic background, the former is probable.

266

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

A note on uncertainties about proverb groups in the second half of Prov 11 Several commentators regard 11:18-19 as a pair223 making up a quatrain224 (in my terminology, a couplet),225 while others reject the idea in principle.226 Whether these verses are part of a larger group, is mooted by Krispenz,227 who states that there is a “certain consensus” that a proverb group somehow exists “within vv. 16-22,” but simultaneously maintains that “the exact demarcation of such a group is controversial.” This formulation in itself betrays how precarious the “consensus” was even in the 1980s, when she wrote her book (cf. also Toy’s inconsistency just cited). The short survey below will indeed show a tendency among commentators to see some common ground between vv. 18-19 and the surrounding verses, but equally an uncertainty about how to draw the links and provide substantiation for it. The picture suggested by the table seems to confirm my suggestion that there are indications of grouping, but that so many mutually contrasting and conflicting arguments can be offered to justify differing expansions in their reach, and proportions within them that it is better to accept a general editorial propensity to bring together broadly related proverbs without an effort to construe large and intricately structured compositions. Only where formal cohesion and thematic coherence are strongly manifested, should such pairs, clusters or groups be identified. Such a case is present in 11:18-19. Heim228 Lucas

11:15-21 11:15-21, while vv. 18-21 expand on v. 17 specifically

Waltke

11:16-22, consisting of subgroups vv. 16-17, 18-19 and 20-21

Hermisson229 11:17-21 Krispenz230 11:17-21, but vv. 16 and 22 could possibly (“könnten”) form a further frame Meinhold 11:17-21, but vv. 16 and 22 constitute a frame Scherer231 11:17-23, but one can also link vv. 16-17; vv. 18-21 are specifically ethical Fox

11:18-19

223 E.g. Hildebrandt (1988, 207), Heim (2001, 142) and, with some hesitation, Meinhold (as part of a unit in vv. 17-21). 224 E.g. Fox (he usually applies this term to a unit consisting of two verses). 225 Counting the hemistichs/versets as “lines” provides the four units needed to constitute a quatrain. Counting the full verses as “lines,” we arrive at a combination of two lines, which in my opinion is correct (cf. Vol. I, 2-4). 226 E.g. Toy and Oesterley, both claiming that this would be contrary to the usage in this collection, which, as we have already seen, is incorrect and therefore constitutes a petitio principii. Nevertheless, this does not stop Toy from linking vv. 18 and 19 together. 227 Krispenz (1989, 53): “Über die Existenz einer Spruchgruppe innerhalb der Verse 16-22 besteht ... ein gewisser Konsens, wobei die genaue Abgrenzung der Gruppe strittig ist.“ 228 Heim (2001, 142; 2013, 286). 229 Hermisson (1968, 175). 230 Krispenz (1989, 55). 231 Scherer (1999, 83-84).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11 Toy Plöger Whybray Fuhs Ringgren Scoralick232

267

11:18-21, but a connection between vv. 18 and 19 is unjustified 11:18-21, but with a special connection between vv. 18 and 19 11:18-21 11:18-21, again as part of 11:18–12:3 (not to be confused with Scoralick) 11:18-21 plus 23 11:18–12:3, again as part of 11:8–12:13

Van Leeuwen 11:19-20, “perhaps” also with a link to v. 18

11:18-19 18 The wicked man generates a deceitful wage, but he who sows righteousness [generates] a true reward. 19 Indeed, righteousness leads to life, but he who pursues evil reaches his death. Gemser regards the rhythm of the two stichs respectively as 4+4 and 3+3 beats. His scanning in v. 19 is less problematic than in v. 18. Although there is a text-critical difficulty with ‫ כן‬which impacted the Masoretic reading with its maqqeph in v. 19 (see below), this does not have implications for the scanning, since no stresses on adjacent syllables come into play. If sense can be made of ‫כן‬, three beats in the first hemistich would be just as possible as in the second hemistich, and therefore no maqqeph leading to the less probable pattern of 2+3 would be necessary. But four beats in the four words of v. 18a do stumble over the problem of stress on immediately adjacent syllables in ‫פעלת שקר‬, which is why the Masoretes correctly combined them with a maqqeph to form one beat. Therefore v. 18 should be scanned as 3+4 and v. 19 as 3+3. The cohesion of the verses is apparent in the chiastic organisation in which all four hemistichs participate: V. 18

A ‫רשע‬

B ‫צדקה‬

V. 19

B ‫צדקה‬

A ‫רעה‬

Fox takes the first word of v. 19 (‫)כּן‬ ֵ as an “adverb of ratio,” meaning “so”233 (cf. 1:19; 6:29; 24:14; 26:19; 30:20), which to him means that v. 19 was written by the editor to elaborate on v. 18. It would establish the relationship with the preceding verse in the sense intended by Fox, but so does the option 232

Scoralick (1995, 192-196, within 182-197). Waltke opts for ‫ ֵכּ ן‬I, a noun (what is right, truth), used as a “confirming answer,” which can be glossed by “indeed;” as opposed to a “deictic adverb,” ‫ ֵכּ ן‬II (so, thus); cf. Josh 2:4 and modern Hebrew for “yes”; see also HALOT and KAHAL (with some reservation as to the text-critical option for reading ‫( בן‬son). 233

268

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

of Waltke, namely ‫ ֵכּ ן‬as a noun used as a confirming statement. In addition to the formal binding, the economic metaphors of v. 18 (wages, rewards, agriculture) are generalised in v. 19 (matters of life and death), so that both verses cohere well thematically. Furthermore, Scoralick234 has shown that both the formal and the thematic arguments can be confirmed negatively as well: Since the social theme stops at the end of v. 17, v. 18 makes a new beginning, and formal cohesion with what goes before is lacking. There are some text-critical issues in both verses. The Septuagint235 read the first word of v. 18b as a noun (‫זֶ ַר ע‬, σπέρμα [seed]) instead of a participle Qal (‫)ז ֵֹר ַע‬236 and the first word of v. 19a as ‫( בן‬υἱός [son]237). The reading with kaph however makes good sense, while “son of righteousness” would have to be interpreted as an unattested qualitative genitive meaning “a righteous man.” Moreover, the parallelism with the repeated preposition ‫ ל‬would then be weakened (see below). For the same reason we do not need to accept a reading that derives ‫ כן‬from the root ‫( כון‬be steadfast).238 R.B.Y. Scott reads a Hiphil participle ‫ מבין‬and translates “he who discerns what is right,” but offers no justification or evidence.

Clifford points out that, “on the first reading,” v. 18a is ambiguous. He has in mind that ‫ פעלה‬can mean both “work” and “wages.” Therefore either the work/acts or the wages earned can be deceitful. However, there is yet another aspect to the ambiguity, namely that the deceit can be at the cost of the wicked person’s victims, but it can also be to the detriment of the doer himself. When we reread the first hemistich in the light of the second, it becomes possible to disambiguate the verse in a special sense, viz. not determining which meaning is intended, but that both are intended, so that the verse is rather multi-levelled than merely ambiguous. The second hemistich shows that the deeds (sowing) have a positive effect for the doer, because his reward or “wage” (the harvest in terms of the agricultural metaphor239) is secure and trustworthy (‫)אמת‬. His righteous deeds (sowing) imply righteousness done to others but they bring himself a steady income as reward. Read in this light, the wicked person’s 234

Scoralick (1995, 192). So also the Peshitta and Targum. 236 Cf. v. 21b, where the noun occurs with the plural ‫צדיקים‬. 237 So also the Peshitta and minor Hebrew manuscript evidence; the reading is accepted by Alter. 238 So Yoder and Clifford (following Ehrlich) but earlier commentators like Gemser and Ringgren also maintain the Masoretic text on the basis of this derivation (Gemser postulates an active sense “strive,” cf. Job 31:15). Delitzsch, following Rashi, maintains the text but translates “genuine righteousness,” which is countered by Meinhold by suggesting that it weakens the idea of justice when it is qualified in this way, as if it could contain other characteristics apart from being genuine. 239 Several commentators compare Hos 10:12 as an illustration for the use of sowing and reaping as a metaphor for deeds and their later results; cf. Prov 22:8; Hos 8:7; 10:11ff.; Ps 126:6. The motif is also present in the New Testament, e.g. 2 Cor 9:6; Gal 6:7 and, more generally, the series of parables about sowing and reaping in Matt 13. 235

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

269

“work of deceit” must be the opposite of righteousness and have a detrimental effect on others (he deceives them with his devious work). But it must also designate what he himself receives as a result (he suffers self-deceit because, by virtue of the parallelism, the result must be the opposite of a dependable wage). The wordplay referred to by Yoder (‫[ שקר‬deceit] and ‫[ שכר‬wage]) is a nice soundplay,240 but a really clever pun is constituted by the two ways in which v. 18a can be understood. The parallelism activates both levels, deed and consequence. V. 18a the man who is wicked (to others) makes a work of deceit [negative result for himself]

:: → ←

V. 18b he who sows righteousness (for others) [makes] a trustworthy reward (for himself)241

In v. 19 it is again possible to achieve disambiguation by reading the first hemistich in the light of the second. The preposition ‫ ל‬occurs in both halves and indicates direction in v. 19b, but not necessarily in v. 19a. Righteousness is “for” life in the sense that it serves life. But after the verb of movement ‫( רדף‬chase, strive after) the preposition indicates direction. By virtue of the parallelism the same preposition in the first half would acquire an additional shade of meaning and suggest that righteousness reaches out to life, that is, it is on the way to reaching its goal, which is to achieve life (similarly, Waltke suggests the idea of chasing after as in a hunt). It thus evokes the metaphor of the way, walking and reaching the ultimate purpose, which goes well with the metaphor of sowing and reaping in the previous verse, both referring as they do to deeds and their consequences. If this interpretation is right, it also goes well with ‫ כן‬as an affirmation (yes, indeed), which in turn would underline that v. 19 does not only confirm v. 18, but also enhances it by expanding its concrete scope to the ultimate. Although not a direct parallel, there is a similar thought in the Egyptian Wisdom of Amenemope.242 What you have, let it suffice you. If riches come to you by theft, They will not stay the night with you. Comes day, they are not in your house, Their place is seen, but they’re not there ...

240 The details were set out by McCreesh (1991, 150-151), who demonstrated how the paronomasia with primarily sibilants, but also with qoph/kaph, resh and taw can be viewed. 241 Ordinary brackets indicate what is implied in the nouns; square brackets indicate what is supplied in v. b from v. a or in v. a from v. b. 242 Amenemope IX, 15-20; AEL II, 152; COS I, 118; cf. Yoder.

270

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

The Amenemope passage specifies the general “treacherous work,” as it is called in the Hebrew proverb, as stealing. It is made clear that no “steadfast reward” can come of it. In the same vein as the proverb’s idea of self-harm, the culprit himself finds next morning that he actually has fooled himself. Rashi explains v. 18 simply: the wicked earn themselves wages, but these are an illusion (‫ )שקר‬because they will only be passing, but the righteous receive a reward that will certainly (‫ )אמת‬come at the end. Certain manuscripts interpret ‫ ֶשׂ ֶכר‬as a fish fence, which is certain to catch many fish and thus provide a reliable and copious reward.243 As for the difficult first word of v. 19, Rashi interprets it as “right,” “true,” cf. Num 27:7, where women are said to have spoken “right” (‫)כן‬. The Targum, Radaq and others all explain ‫ ֶשׂ ֶכר‬with double segol as an equivalent of the more common ‫ ָשׂ ָכר‬with double qamets (reward). An interesting interpretation is found in the Midrash on Proverbs, Chap 11.244 Since the claim of v. 19 that evil pursuits lead to death cannot be understood literally (people do not deliberately pursue their own harm), it must mean that people who live without due attention to Torah cause harm to themselves relevant at the time of their death, which is then amplified to mean harm to their own souls. Chrysostom follows the Greek reading of v. 19 as a reference to a son (υἱὸς; Hebrew ‫)בן‬. Noble children (of both sexes, he adds!) are born to the pious as a reward for their piety.

11:20-21 20 An abomination to Yahweh are the crooked of heart, but acceptable to him are those who are upright in their way. 21 Certainly, a wicked person will not go unpunished, but he who counts among the righteous type will escape. The relation between these two proverbs is not dissimilar to that between the preceding pair. Where v. 19 shows the logical results of the antithetical human acts mentioned in v. 18 to be either life or death, v. 21 provides the logical outcomes of antithetical human dispositions named in v. 20, viz. either escaping or not going unpunished. On the formal level, however, the previous couplet was interrelated crosswise (see above), whereas the antitheses of the hemistichs in vv. 20 and 21 are integrated by means of a straight “synonymous” parallelism of full stichs: V. 20

A negative

::

B

positive

[antithetical]

⎫ ⎪

⎬ V. 21

243 244

A negative

::

B

Rosenberg ([1988] 2001, 64). Visotzky (1992, 60).

positive

[antithetical]

⎪

⎭

“synonymous”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

271

In v. 20 there are two nominal sentences, both of which place the predicate first and the subject second.245 V. 21 has two verbal sentences, both of which are in the Niphal stem, and here the syntactic order is chiastic (predicatesubject in the first hemistich and subject-predicate in the second). There is thus a structural symmetry as well as a coherence of content in the two verses, which already entitles us to regard them as a couplet. A close analysis also reveals a symmetry in the rhythm. V. 21a is one of the fourteen cases in the Hebrew Bible where a ‫ ר‬has a dagesh forte.246 In this case the unusual doubling has to do with the rhythmic organisation of the stich. When a monosyllable is preceded by a so-called milcel,247 then the doubling of the first consonant of the monosyllable is a dagesh forte conjunctivum,248 meaning that it links with the previous word to form one stress beat. This instance is unique because the monosyllable not only begins with a consonant that is not usually doubled, but also because the previous word itself is already connected to the negative particle ‫ לא‬by means of a maqqeph. Therefore we have three words making up one beat, preceded by one word repeated with preposition making up two stresses: ‫לא־ינקה רּע׳‬

‫ליד׳‬

‫יד׳‬

Following the Masoretic pointing, the rhythm therefore has the same pattern in both stichs, namely two times a Doppeldreier (3+3, 3+3) and not a Siebener twice over (4+3, 4+3) as claimed by Gemser, which would ignore what has just been argued.

V. 20. What Yahweh regards as an abomination (‫תועבת יהוה‬, again a subjective genitive as in v. 1) is a criterion for judging what is good and what is bad. The term can be used in a generic sense (cf. Ps 107:18), but often has a cultic reference (cf. Deut 7:25; 12:31; 17:1; Ezk 22:11) as well as an extended moral sense, as here (cf. v. 1; 3:32; 15:8; 21:27; Ps 5:9).249 Although a reference to God does not necessarily have to accompany the use of the ‫תועבה‬-idea, the fact that it can and in this verse explicitly does, underlines the religious dimension of the negative judgement of crookedness. Fox makes the important point that we here have evidence that the motivation for people to do good is not only the prospect of reward and avoidance of punishment, but also love of God and the desire to please him. In the second hemistich, 245 The syntactic order is the opposite of that in the two hemistichs of. v. 1, where ‫תועבת‬ ‫ יהוה‬and ‫ רצונו‬are also used. In the similar 12:22, the order in the second half is reversed to subject-predicate. 246 The others are: 20:22 with the same word, also 3:8; 14:10; 15:1, where other words are used; 1 Sam 1:6; 10:24; 17:25; 2 Kgs 6:32; Jer 39:12; Ezk 16:4 (twice); Hab 3:13; Cant 5:2. 247 A word with its natural emphasis on the penultimate syllable, as opposed to milrac, where the emphasis is on the final syllable. The observation by Margolis (1911, 42) – in criticism of GKC 29a – that “[i]n the case of a long vowel in the penultimate, the accentuation fluctuates between milrac and milcel,” only applies to verbal forms with waw consecutive. 248 See GKC 20a, 22s. 249 For a discussion of the word group formed by the root ‫תעב‬, cf. THAT II, 1051-1055.

272

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

the pronominal reference (third person masculine singular suffix) explicitly connects God to the positive side of the equation as well. God is the subject who feels the ‫( רצון‬favour), which can again have a generic sense (when something is found acceptable, cf. Ps 104:34), but also a cultic (cf. Ex 28:38; Lev 1:3; 19:15) or an ethical reference (cf. 16:7; Deut 33:11; Qoh 9:7 et al.).250 The other side of the coin pointed out by Fox would be that God does not only mete out mechanical retribution, but also feels affection for or pleased with those who are upright. These two hemistichs again mutually contribute to each other: V. 20a V. 20b crooked of heart (inner disposition) → [who acts upright must also have an upright heart] [a crooked heart also acts crooked] ← upright of way (outward deeds)

The implication of the negative statement about inward character (v. a) is that positive deeds (v. b) spring from a positive character; and the implication of the positive statement about a concrete way of life (v. b) is that a negative character (v. a) has a corollary in crooked practice. There is thus an alignment of inner attitude and outer manifestation in what we usually call the nexus of deed and consequence, to be sure, on both the human and the divine sides. Good and bad deeds are as much a matter of inner sensibility of humans as reward and punishment are a matter of God’s feeling.251 In this sense we can agree with Clifford’s judgement that the two halves of v. 20 constitute “a merism expressing the whole of human life,” and with Fuhs’s statement that, in the matter of divine judgement, the metaphor of the way connects human thought and action. V. 21: The Midrash Mishle and several other Jewish interpretations take the expression ‫( יד ליד‬hand to hand) as an indication of insincerity or mutually exclusive actions (see below). But a more natural and therefore convincing interpretation follows a number of exegetes since the 19th century who take the expression in the sense it is used in 16:5b, where it is clearly an asseverative,252 that is, a strong assurance. The wicked will certainly not go unpunished (cf. 250

THAT II, 812. This is how Augustine (De perf ius hom IX, 20) and others interpreted the proverb; see below. 252 So Bertheau, Hitzig, Ewald, Delitzsch, Toy, Gemser, Plöger, Meinhold, Waltke et al. The Midrash Mishle has Rabbi Joshua maintain the asseveration (“assuredly,” see Visotzky [1992, 61]). Meinhold explains this interpretation with the use of the hand in the sealing of a deal, cf. v. 15 and 6:1; so already Schultens, who thinks of a deal involving an inheritance post posteros, citing the Arabic use of the same word, ‫( ید‬hand), for the purpose. The expression also occurs in 16:5, where, as in v. 21, it is strongly denied that one who has a wrong attitude will escape punishment (‫)לא ינקה‬. In 16:5 the “haughty of heart” is called ‫( תועבת יהוה‬an abomination to Yahweh), like the “crooked of heart” in the first line of the couplet vv. 20-21. 251

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

273

Ex 21:19 and Num 5:19, 28, 31 for the use of ‫ נקה‬Niphal in a legal sense). ‫ רע‬must be a noun, not the often attested adjective.253 By virtue of the parallelism, the asseveration is also carried forward to the second hemistich: the evil man will certainly not be declared innocent (both the verb and ‫ רע‬are masculine singular, the evil principle would have been feminine, ‫)רעה‬. Several commentators point out that the strong form of the denial that punishment will stay away indicates a consciousness that reality often proves the opposite. Nevertheless, justice will somehow be upheld so that any discrepancy will be eliminated (cf. also v. 31). This is a conviction based on faith and not on the investigation of life’s realities. In Van Leeuwen’s words: “The phrase affirms the ultimate justice of God, not on the basis of empirical observation, but on the basis of God’s nature.” The subject of the second sentence in v. 21 is a matter of some difference of opinion. Sometimes the ‫ זרע צדיקים‬is interpreted as the descendants of the righteous who will escape danger on account of their merit (e.g. McKane, Murphy, Clifford, Whybray, Fox, Yoder). But others understand it as a genitive of species (so Delitzsch,254 Wildeboer, Toy, Oesterley, Meinhold, Scoralick,255 Fuhs, Waltke, Moss).256 The latter seems the better choice (a) in light of the use of the phrase in Isa 1:4; 65:23 (the principle also occurs in Pss 24:6; 112:2, where the noun ‫ דור‬is used in the same way), and (b) since the introduction of the progeny at this point is, although not impossible, nevertheless unmotivated (so Plöger). When the parallelism of the two stichs in the couplet is taken as seriously as the parallelism of the hemistichs within them, it becomes clear how the phenomenon enhances the power of the religious dimension in the pair. Since the first verse casts its light on the second, the issue of outward and inward in both the human and the divine ‫לב‬/mind cannot be factored out of what is said about escaping or not escaping punishment. Inner attitude and conviction, thinking and intention play just as constitutive a role as actions for determining to what ‫ זרע‬people belong, what “species” they are, or in which character type they should be classified – and that is what determines whether they go free or not. 253 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra underlines this by suggesting that the word “man” should be understood before “evil” (‫)איש רע‬. 254 Delitzsch calls it a “genitive of apposition.” 255 Scoralick (1995, 67). Referring to the Septuagint reading ὁ δὲ σπείρων δικαιοσύνην (who sows out righteousness), Heim (2001, 139) thinks of “sound business practices,” but the fact that the Septuagint here translates the Hebrew text of v. 18 is better explained by Plöger as uneasiness about the unmotivated introduction of ‫ זרע‬understood as “offspring” (see below). 256 The Septuagint escapes the issue by recourse to the Hebrew of v. 18: “he who sows righteousness will receive a faithful reward” (ὁ δὲ σπείρων δικαιοσύνην λήμψεται μισθὸν πιστόν; cf. BHQ, *41).

274

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

In the rabbinic tradition, Gerondi finds the idea of different character types present not only in v. 21, but already in v. 20. The crooked of heart is a person with a perverse character, while the ‫ תמים‬is one who is wholeheartedly good, thus of perfect character. Such perfection can be acquired by intellectual effort if one is not naturally so inclined. What we have found above to be the important correlation of internal attitude and external action is made quite explicit in the Mezudat David, where the crooked are those whose hearts are inconsistent with their deeds. This is obviously influenced by the parallelism in the biblical text, since a “crooked” heart implies that the exterior actions inconsistently purport to be righteous. A similar interpretation is found in the Midrash, where it is however based on the double use of ‫ יד‬as the first words of v. 21 and combined with the alternative reading of ‫ יד ליד‬as an asseveration. Who sins with one hand (‫ )יד‬and does good with the other, will assuredly not escape punishment.257 Rashi thinks ‫ יד ליד‬means that punishment will come from God’s hand to the sinners hand, presumably meaning direct punishment, whereas the Peshitta and the Targum258 think it refers to the punishment by God for the unfavourable stretching out of a human hand against one’s fellow. As for the “seed” of v. 21, Jewish tradition prefers the view that it means the offspring of the righteous, which is a well established idea, since children are thought to benefit from the credits earned by the good deeds of their fathers (so the Midrash, cf. Berachot 7a and LevRab 36:3; the Vilna Gaon even specifies that this is valid for four generations259). Chrysostom (347-407) takes v. 21 as an illustration of what it entails to be of “crooked ways” (the Septuagint has ὁδοί [ways, not heart]). Putting hand on hand according to him means bribery. He then shows appreciation for the parallelism – with which he is not often credited – by concluding that the “other person” (the pious) indicates the opposite of a briber. Important is also that Chrysostom makes one of his rare references to God in relation to the words of the Israelite sages. Shunning crooked ways is not only a matter known from experience, but from the will of God.260 Augustine (354-430) highlights the motif of blamelessness in the context of his anti-Pelagian Treatise on Human Perfection. He includes a free quotation of v. 20 among a series of biblical texts about the necessity to be blameless, which in his opinion amounts to the practice of righteousness and being holy as God is holy (Lev 11:44; 1 Pet 1:15).261 The contemporary ascetic Sulpitius Severus (c. 360-420)262 interprets the blamelessness from the perspective of the Christian ascetic ideal, namely in support of purity of Christian life, especially of virginity. He combines the motif of being perfect or “undefiled” with the idea that v. 20b contains the motif of God’s love for such people who have “holy hearts.” Melanchthon understands ‫ יד ליד‬as the wicked giving each other handshakes, thereby constituting a wicked business (opus perversum) by colluding among themselves (inter se conspirant). Although they set 257

Visotzky (1992, 61). The Peshitta has: züÃÐ âï zËÙs ÕýÎãx (who stretches out his hand against his fellow); and the Targum has almost the same: ‫( דמושיט אידא על חבריה‬who stretches out the hand against his fellow). 259 Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 208). 260 Chrysostom seems to have anticipated modern views in at least one respect: he regarded the ethics of Proverbs as a combination of primarily human experience and secondarily of divine revelation and therefore does not speak of the sages as “prophets” (cf. Hill [2006, 223]); see also below on 12:3. 261 De perfectione iustitiae hominis IX, 20 (NPNF I,5, 166). 262 De virginitate XI (NPNF II,11, 63). 258

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

275

themselves up against the truth by entering such deals, they will not go unpunished, whereas the progeny of the righteous will escape.

11:22 A golden ring in a pig’s snout – a beautiful woman who abandons sense. Hermisson’s view that this proverb stands by itself263 is echoed by several other commentators (e.g. Plöger, Scherer,264 Sæbø and others). What is straightforward in this intriguing proverb is at least its lack of an antithesis (cf. also v. 16) and its symmetrical rhythm: four words carrying one stress each in both halves (4+4). It consists of two hemistichs unconnected by a conjunction. On their own they can each be read as separate anacoluthon (incomplete dictum):265 A golden ring in a pig’s snout ... A beautiful woman but one who abandons sense ...

Yet, since they stand directly next to each other, the reader/hearer immediately perceives a parallelism between the two halves. This is further strengthened by the symmetrical rhythm and by a concentration of sound effects (mainly sibilants and bilabials and by a concentration of several a-sounds).266 Oesterley seems to have sensed both these aspects by stating that “there can be no question of a comparison” while nevertheless describing “something very incongruous” common to both and therefore maintaining that “they undoubtedly belong together.” This proximity makes them a simile, which can be conveyed through parallelism as much as by special particles as ‫ כ‬and ‫כן‬.267 As Berlin points out with other examples, the structure of the half-verses immediately identifies them as a simile, although there are no markings apart from the parallelism. The persuasive function of parallelism in short sapiential sayings is worked out by Luchsinger.268 With reference to Landy,269 he shows how the first half of the saying is set up as an interest-generator for the actual message to be driven home in the second half. It is the units as such – in this case two hemistichs – that are related to each other. That is, statement A as a whole is a semantic parallel to the whole of statement B. The principle could 263

Hermisson (1968, 175). This was however already emphasised by Hitzig. Scherer (1999, 84). 265 Theoretically, the first hemistich can also be read as a nominal sentence (a golden ring is in a pig’s snout), but in the context of the whole verse, where it is part of a stich, this is obviously not pertinent. 266 Cf. the detailed analysis by McCreesh (1991, 108-109). 267 Described and illustrated by Berlin (2008, 100-102). 268 Luchsinger (2010, 322-324), with examples such as 18:22; 20:1, 20 et al. 269 Landy (1984, 81): “A sets up a tension, and expectation, which B resolves.” 264

276

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

be illustrated cum grano salis by considering a simile like “as dead as a doornail,” which conveys lifelessness without concerning itself with the other characteristics of the nail, such as its metallic material, ability to hold door boards together, stabilising the entrance, or what distinguishes it from other nails. Likewise, the simile in the proverb does not need each separate element in the first hemistich to have an own counterpart in the second as though it were an allegory with its exposition. If we try to link each individual element in v. 11b with a corresponding element in v. 11a, it leaves (necessarily, it seems) several self-generated problems unsolved – and an end result that can also be reached without the effort. Nevertheless, some serious attempts in this direction have been made and need to be examined, particularly an ingenious article by Heim devoted to the proverb.270 He provides an overview of several contributions since the late 19th century and arrives at the conclusion that the “equation between the pig and the woman” is not what the proverb proclaims. I would be inclined to agree, although I would add: neither should any other pair of individual motifs be equated. However, Heim provides a detailed breakdown of the constituent elements in each hemistich and relates them one by one to a corresponding element in the alternative hemistich. According to him, the order of the words in the first hemistich correspond exactly to the order of the words in the second. The ring represents the woman; its being made of gold represents her beauty; its location in the pig’s snout represents her turning away; the pig represents “from discretion.” Heim’s comprehensive table271 may be summarised as follows: First hemistich

Second hemistich

ring

woman

golden

beautiful

snout

her turning

pig

from discretion

It is difficult to see how such precise correspondences can be upheld. “Turn” (the feminine participle of ‫ )סור‬has to represent “snout,” which in itself seems forced. The pig must parallel discretion, which would really run contrary to the simile because the unclean animal can least of all be that. Heim does seem somewhat uneasy about this, since he has the pig stand for “from discretion” (my italics). But this is artificial, because the participle of ‫ סור‬is in the construct state, so that ‫( טעם‬discretion) must be an objective genitive. The problem cannot be disguised by adding an English preposition “from”272 to “discretion” so that it looks as if the pig represents being away 270

Heim (2008, 13-27). Heim (2008, 24). 272 The preposition ‫מן‬, which often accompanies the verb ‫סור‬, is lacking here, so that the use of the verb in the Qal must have a direct object, in this case the genitivus objectivus ‫טעם‬ (intransitive verbs like ‫[ סור‬turn aside] may often be used transitively; for other examples, cf. Gen 34:2; Num 5:13,19; 2 Sam 2:22; 13:14; Ezk 23:8; see also the illustration given in the 271

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

277

from discretion (discretion[-]). This function has already been ascribed to the previous element (turning away = snout). The effort to isolate the elements in one hemistich so that each can be assigned a function specified by a partner element in the next hemistich does not work. It is therefore not surprising that Fox, who agrees with most of Heim’s exposition, dissents at this point. According to him, the whole genitive construction ‫ סרת טעם‬represents the snout and the pig stands for the husband. However, Fox sees it as follows: First hemistich

Second hemistich

ring

woman

golden

beautiful

location in snout

lack of discretion

pig

husband

But this too entails splitting a genitive construction (‫ )באף חזיר‬asunder in order to achieve a precise match: the first half (snout) is the woman’s expressed lack of discretion and the second half of the same construction (pig) is the husband’s unexpressed identification with the unclean animal. This seems forced by necessity and has to contend with several difficulties. First, ascribing two functions to only the pig appears contrived to me. It forces part of the pig (snout) to stand for the woman’s deficient character and simultaneously for the husband’s deficient judgement. Moreover, the problem cannot be camouflaged by referring to part of the pig as a “location” – if the pig is the husband, its nose cannot be something else. Next, even if the intention is to critically present the putative husband as a fool (for having such a wife), the metaphor would not merely be sarcastic, but so repulsive as to overreach its purpose. In any case, finally, a nose ring is women’s jewellery,273 not men’s. The image would be incomprehensible since it would assume that a man could wear a nose ring with dignity under different circumstances, which is not the case. Neither could it be claimed that the nose ring would then become a ring for controlling a difficult animal, because that would give the senseless woman a quite sensible function and, in any case, not nose rings but hooks274 were used for that purpose.

What is convincing in Heim’s and Fox’s view, is that the saying warns young men not to choose a wife only for her beauty.275 In the light of young boys as addressees of wisdom and the frequent warnings against disreputable and study of the transitivity alternation in biblical Hebrew by Coleman [2016, 286]). Hence my translation “discard” = abandon / go away from. 273 See Gen 24:22, 30, 47; Isa 3:21; Ezk 16:12; Hos 3:21; cf. NIDB 3, 304-305; EJ 16, 479; AuS V, 349. 274 So Toy; ‫ ַחח‬differs from ‫( נֶ זֶ ם‬Ex 35:22); Isa 37:29; 2 Kgs 19:28; ‫ח]וֹ[ח‬ ַ (thorn, hook) for animals (Ezk 19:4; Job 40:26) and captives (2 Chron 33:11//2 Kgs 19:28); also ‫( וָ ו‬hook), ‫ ִצנָּ ה‬and ‫( ִס ָירה‬respectively thorn-hook and barb, Am 4:2); cf. NIDB 2, 885; EJ 2, 173. 275 Heim (2001, 20ff.), for whom the woman is not denigrated by the saying, makes much of the many references to women in Proverbs, especially in terms of his application of the whole book as “interpretative context” for the proverb. Cf. 18:22; also Sir 7:26; 25:21-22; 26:13-15. See Hausmann (1995, 153) for a contrasting look at the book’s view of women, and Stewart (2016, 50-52) on the various possible readings enabled by the parataxis of the proverb.

278

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

irritating women (cf. 5:3-14, 20; 6:23-35; 7:1-27; 12:4; 14:1; 19:13; 21:19; 22:14; 25:24; 27:15f.; Sir 9:8-9) that should be undisputed. But this is clear whether one follows the line of Heim and Fox or not, as the latter acknowledges. However, that a wife can be called her husband’s garland or crown (12:4) should not be stretched to become a “ground metaphor.” A crown is not a nose ring, which, anyway, is not worn by a man. The metaphor should therefore not be diluted by extending it to such generic proportions that it becomes any adornment whatsoever and simultaneously be reduced in scope back to become a nose ring. The widely accepted human wisdom about the decisiveness of a woman’s inner quality is expressed all the stronger by the very negativity of the proverb (cf. Volz, Whybray, Clifford, Waltke, Heim, Fox, Sæbø). Volz shows from Ben Sira that female beauty in itself is appreciated among the sages (cf. Sir 26:1618; 36:27), but this is relativised by the insight that inner integrity overrides it (cf. Prov 31:10ff., particularly v. 30, and 1 Pet 3:3-4). By the same token, the warning of the proverb can also speak to women.276 The feminine participle Qal of ‫ סור‬suggests that the woman who turns away from sense can also choose not to discard it. In terms of the proverb’s norm, a woman should attend to her inner qualities no less than to her physical beauty. An ideal woman should have the sense, decorum and judgement that the ‫ טעם‬involves for which David praises Abigail (1 Sam 25:33, so Tuinstra). In summary, it can be said that Delitzsch was right to call the proverb’s parallelism neither antithetic nor synonymous but “emblematic.” That is, a figure is sketched in the first hemistich to feature as the eye-catching emblem of an idea, and in the second hemistich a clarifying saying is provided as a kind of subscription. The whole anacoluthic dictum of v. 22a conjures up an integrated image of a pig with a golden ring in its snout – however beautified277 the pig’s snout may be, it is besmirched by filth. Then the whole anacoluthon of v. 22b explains the image, providing the trigger for the sordid picture that the mind’s eye should see when a young man looks at or thinks of a beautiful but inane woman. The two hemistichs mutually support each other: the first half-verse is understood better in the light of the second, and the second receives its sharpness from the first.278 276 Stewart (2016; 50) recognises the resistance of the paratactic proverb to “conclusion,” meaning that it can be read in several ways. 277 Cf. Polonius on Hamlet’s letter to Ophelia (Hamlet, Act 2/2, 110-111): “That’s an ill phrase, a vile phrase, ‘beautified’ is a vile phrase.” 278 Cf. McCreesh (1991, 108) who, in his terminology, says, “The comparison is achieved by the simple alignment of both pictures, one in each colon, colon a being predicated of colon b” [sic]. For the idea of sharpness imparted by the second hemistich, see also Alter ([1985] 2011, 176).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

279

Traditional Jewish interpretation of the proverb had no problem with interpreting the swine with a golden ring as one image, but often applied it creatively. In the Midrash Mishle the straightforward interpretation is offered that a pig adorned with a golden ring in its snout will not be adorned by the ring, but the ring will be soiled by the pig’s rooting in filth. This is accompanied by a further symbolic interpretation, viz. that, if a student of Torah consorts with a dubious woman, he will devaluate Torah (‫מקלקל‬ ‫)תורתו‬. Several variants of this interpretation are found in other rabbinic expositions. According to Rashi, a person who abandons Torah (not just by consorting with a harlot) can be compared to a beautiful woman who has forsaken Torah. Possibly influenced by these views, the Mezudat David similarly finds that a woman’s external adornment is only effective where there is inner quality. So, someone who has been gifted with wisdom but misuses it to the detriment of others, does the same as a woman who uses her beauty for sin like a pig that spoils a golden ring.279 Pirqe Abot 6:2 provides an early application of the proverb’s image to Torah study. Who does not study Torah is looked upon as rebuked (‫)נזוף‬, after the initial letters of ‫ נזם זהב‬and the final letter of ‫באף‬. Clemens Alexandrinus (2nd century)280 takes an earring in the nose of a swine as an illustration of what beauty is to a woman without discretion. The ensuing logic is interesting – a person who thinks that gold makes a human beautiful, is inferior to gold and therefore not its master. Additionally, excessively luxurious women dishonour real beauty like a sow pollutes a golden ring. In a passage replete with citations from Proverbs, 11:22 is used in the Constitutions of the Apostles to castigate women who are snares to their husbands (with, among others, Qoh 7:26; Prov 12:4 according to the Septuagint).281 John Chrysostom also has a literal interpretation: a beautiful woman without taste soils her beauty like a pig will soil an ornament put on his snout. But he also adds an extra moral lesson, saying that a sensible woman can learn from a beautiful but foolish woman. In such a case she learns what real beauty is (i.e., not external prettiness). And, if a foolish woman is also rich, the not so rich wise woman learns not to desire what she lacks. Gregory of Nyssa quotes v. 11a together with Matt 7:6 (pearl trodden under swines’ feet) to illustrate that the “precious thing” called virginity becomes marred when discord in the soul undermines it.282 And John Cassian283 uses the proverb in an analogous way to the rabbis’ criticism of Torah students who do not forsake sin. For him, the whole verse applies to those who read the Holy Scriptures and even commit them to memory, but do not forsake “carnal sins.” Melanchthon is forthright: Sententia est, maius ornamentum sunt boni mores quam forma. The saying is that good morals are a better ornament than [external] form.

279 Similarly, Malbim; in line with the Talmud (Yoma 86a), where it is said that a student of Tanach and Mishnah who is dishonest and discourteous, brings denunciation on himself and those who have taught him. Cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 209). 280 Protrept XI (ANF II, 285). 281 Const Apost I, iii (ANF VII, 395). 282 De Virg XII (NPNF II,5, 363). 283 Confer XIV, 16 (NPNF II,11, 443).

280

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

A second note on uncertainties about proverb groups in the latter half of Prov 11 As we have seen in the first note above (preceding the exposition of v. 18) several proposals about groups of proverbs in the remaining verses have also been made. But here too they differ both as to the extent of the units and the reasons for their demarcation. The summary given in the table below outlines such arguments, to which the following may be added: According to Scoralick,284 11:27 is the centre of a concentric unit (11:8–12:3) in which themes of the earlier verses recur, but with more regard for the external world, particularly social behaviour and a certain equilibrium of “city” and “countryside.” Fuhs agrees with the overall demarcation proposed by Scoralick and also finds 11:27 the centre, but differs in his internal grouping within the concentric pattern as he sees it, although he too remarks on the prominent social motif. The picture suggested by the table again seems to confirm my suggestion that there are indications of grouping, but that so many arguments can be offered to justify differing proportions within them, that acceptance of a general editorial principle to bring together broadly related proverbs is more convincing than trying to find sophisticated poetic compositions that can be defined into existence according to the criteria selected. The following is intended only as a sketch containing broadly formulated ideas: Scoralick285 Fuhs

11:27 the centre of a concentric unit 11:8–12:3 11:27 the centre of a concentric unit 11:8–12:3

Heim286

11:22-31 clusters: 22-27 (righteous, wicked), 28-31 (partially plant images)

Meinhold Plöger Fox Waltke Lucas

11:23-27 + 28-30 + 31; cf. Ringgren, different beginning & inner structure 11:23-27 a subgroup within vv. 23-31, which is partly loosely connected 11:23-27 v. 23 expanded in 24, reinforced by vv.25-27; doubts about v. 24b 11:23-27 vv. 23 + 27a yoke the unit; ‫טוב‬-catchword + generalisation 11:23-27 thematic unit about generosity; ‫טוב‬-catchword

Hermisson287 Krispenz288 Tuinstra

11:23-31 vv. 23+24-26; 27 general, 24-26 links to 28; 30 links to v. 28 (tree) 11:23-31 no argument, only table, but does point out ‫ ברכה‬in vv. 25, 26 11:23-31 relation of deed and long-term consequence

Sæbø

11:24-29 on the ethical use of property, “possibly” with a link in v. 23

Toy Whybray Scherer Ringgren Van Leeuwen

11:24-26 vague argument, theme “liberality” :: “avarice” 11:24-26 criticises Plöger, but also uses the paradox-argument for vv. 24-26 11:24-26 thematic unit with “property” + “generosity” (1999, 85) 11:24-26 and 11:27-31 vague groups, substantiation actually a paraphrase 11:22-23 and 11:24-26 but the linking of v. 23 backwards is unclear

internal differences

284 Scoralick (1995, 196-197); cf. the general discussion beginning my exposition of Chap. 11. 285 Scoralick (1995, 196-197, within 182-197). 286 Heim (2001, 142). 287 Hermisson (1968, 175). 288 Krispenz (1989, 166).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

281

Waltke does show that vv. 23 and 27 frame the group (catchword ‫ ;)טוב‬the echoes both he, following Meinhold, and Fox mention between vv. 25//24a, 26//24b, can readily be seen. But there is also a concentric placement of these verses: V. 23 V. 24 V. 25 V. 26 V. 27

positive striving (‫ – )טוב‬negative striving giving out – holding back only “synonymous” parallelism in the series, links to vv. 24, 26 holding back – giving out positive striving (‫ – )טוב‬negative striving

Proverbs 11:23-27 Striving and paradoxical results 23 The desire of the righteous is only good, the hope of the wicked is wrath. 24 There is one who scatters and is increased more, and one who withholds from what is right only to his loss. 25 A person who blesses will be fattened, and one who refreshes will himself certainly be refreshed. 26 Who withholds grain, the people will curse him, but blessing is for the head of him who sells grain. 27 Who pursues what is good [actually] seeks favour, but who goes after evil – on him it will come. Bibl. Dell 2006, 60f.; Hatton 2008, 107-109; Hausmann 1995, 62, 221, 225, 228, 388f.; 232, 313; Heim 2001, 142-146; Hermisson 1968, 175; Krispenz 1989, 166; Pilch 2016, 41; Scherer 1999, 84-86; Scoralick 1995, 195-197; Stewart 2016, 135141.

Weighing up what was summarised in the note as well as in the table and sketch above, it has to be said that this is not a poem with closely-knit texture. There is a certain similitude in the association of the logically connected ideas of striving and its often paradoxical outcome. But what the verses have in common shows neither progression nor conceptual development. While certain patterns can indeed be seen, I find it difficult to recognise a sophisticated poetic composition in these verses (which does not, of course, imply a judgement on the poetic quality of the individual proverbs themselves). The concentric structure in vv. 23-27 is conspicuously noticeable, but each of the proverbs within the group can nevertheless also be read and understood by itself and without recourse to the others.289 Therefore the conclusion is that they are proverbs in their own right that have been nicely edited together, and their interpretation should consequently be considered both ways.

289

Similarly Dell (2006, 60-61).

282

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

11:23 The desire of the righteous is only goodness, the hope of the wicked is wrath. At first sight the saying seems relatively simple. There are two nominal sentences and a clear rhythm of 3+3 (so Toy, Gemser). The two hemistichs form an obvious antithetical parallelism, but in an interesting way. Every word in the first hemistich is parallel to every corresponding word in the second, but the first pair (‫תאוה‬, “desire” and ‫תקוה‬, “hope”) have a congruent relationship.290 ‫אך־טוב‬

‫צדיקים‬

‫תאות‬

::

::

//

‫עברה‬

‫רשעים‬

‫תקות‬

The contrast hinges on the affinity of two words expressing the anticipation of two antithetical prospects. Therefore the overarching sense of the parallelism is antithetical, but even so it needs the presence of non-antithetical words. As in the preceding proverb, there is no conjunction in the form of the usual waw or another particle (e.g. 10:26) and the two statements are only attached by their proximity.291 It is often said that the verse calls 11:7 to mind, and sometimes that it recalls 10:28 (e.g. Murphy and Yoder), while Waltke regards it as an intensification of 10:28. However, the comparison to 10:28, which is much more striking than the comparison to 11:7 not only in terms of content but also of form, is not treated as a “twice-told proverb” by Snell (1993) nor is it seen as such by Heim (2013). The comparison of these two proverbs also bears on the text-critical questions regarding v. 23, so that it makes sense to begin with a sketch of the similarities and differences of the two proverbs. These can be summed up in the following way: 10:28

11:23 ‫תוחלת צדיקים שמחה‬ ‫ותקות רשעים תאבד‬

‫תאות צדיקים אך־טוב‬ ‫תקות רשעים עברה‬

The expectation of the righteous is joy, The desire of the righteous is only goodness, but the hope of the wicked will perish. the hope of the wicked is wrath.

290 Toy even declares them identical, although he translates ‫ תקות‬by “expectation” in 11:23b and in 10:28b and ‫ תוחלת‬in 10: 28a as “hope.” They are not fully synonymous, but congruent, they relate to each other in a state of agreeing/corresponding. In the figure, // stands for congruence and :: for contrast. Cf. Waltke’s analysis and the argument developed below. 291 Cf. above on v. 22 and the references given there.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

283

Similarities: Both proverbs are about the ‫ צדיק‬and the ‫רשע‬. Both are antithetical. Both are about prospects for the future. Both anticipate a positive outcome for the righteous. Both anticipate a negative outcome for the wicked. Both consist of three words per hemistich.292 Both have a rhythmic pattern of 3+3. Differences: The place of ‫( תוחלת‬expectation) in 10:28 is taken by the keener word ‫תאוה‬ (desire) in 11:23.293 Where 11:23 has the sweeping phrase ‫( אך־טוב‬exclusively what is good), 10:28 has ‫( שמחה‬joy). In 10:28 there are one nominal and one verbal sentence, but 11:23 has two nominal sentences. The place of the verb ‫( אבד‬perish) in 10:28 is occupied by the noun ‫עברה‬ (wrath) in 11:23.294 Our present proverb begins with a polyvalent statement. The nominal sentence can mean that the desire of the righteous in itself is only good. As opposed to the evil person, who desires evil and continuously plans it,295 the righteous person wants only positive things to happen, which is a good desire to have. It can also be understood to mean that the righteous person wishes to actively practice only good (so Waltke; also Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, who provides the infinitive ‫ לעשות‬before ‫[ טוב‬and also before ‫)]עברה‬. Thirdly, it can mean that he desires a good outcome by wishing others what is good so that he thereby contributes to the benefit of society. Tuinstra thinks the wishes of the righteous will lead to a good end, which is possible but unlikely in light of the implied verb “to be” in the nominal sentence. Likewise, it Counting the maqqeph combination ‫ אך־טוב‬as one. This point and several of the following are noted by Waltke. 294 This diversity is the focal point of the text-critical issue referred to above. The Septuagint translates the word by ἀπολεῖται as though it were the third person feminine singular Qal perfect or the feminine singular Qal participle of ‫( עבר‬pass), or of the verb ‫( אבד‬perish), which could be attributable to the influence of 11:7, where ‫ אבד‬occurs both in the imperfect and in the perfect. However, the verb ‫ עבר‬is never translated by ἀπόλλυμι (BHQ, EE). ‫ אבד‬occurs in a medieval Hebrew manuscript, which may be under the influence of 10:28 and 11:7. Even if such influence is assumed, the various intensifications would still favour the retention of the Masoretic text. The same could be said about Driver’s proposal to read ‫ ָע ְב ָרה‬under Syriac influence as a verb meaning “to pass away” (Driver [1940, 174]). 295 So Lyu (2012, 65) and Stewart (2016, 138-140); both quote Fox (1994, 241), who stresses that the wicked not only practises evil, but also “delights” in it. Cf. 4:16; 6:14a; 21:10, 15; Ps 36:2-5; Mic 2:1-2; the same logic applies to the fool, cf. 15:21. 292 293

284

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

is possible that he desires a good reward for himself. All five are possible, but in this verse the addition of ‫( אך‬only, exclusively) makes the latter less probable because it does not make sense to have to exclude the possibility that a person sometimes knowingly desires what is bad for himself (although this can happen without his realising it [cf. on v. 17 above]). This does not mean that the “model of desire” does not always work as an “internal source of motivation,”296 for the righteous can also be motivated by the joy of the sapiential enterprise itself (cf. 10:3; 12:20; 15:23; Ps 119:14, 16, 24, 77 and passim) and a bad character can experience joy in its opposite (cf. 15:21). As it stands, the second hemistich says that the hope of the wicked “is” wrath. That obviously does not mean that a wicked person entertains a masochistic hope to receive wrath. It must accordingly be ironic rather than facetious, as Fox calls it, since facetiousness suggests frivolity and a lack of serious intent. The ironic alternative is very serious. If the best he can hope for is wrath, then a ‫ רשע‬is indeed hope-less, therefore his is “hope” in inverted commas. It would mean the same as 10:28b, but with the added sharpness of irony. It could be argued that the translator of the Septuagint read ‫אבדה‬,297 but it can equally well be – or even is more likely – that he simply missed the irony and was unsettled by the assumed problem that nobody would hope to be the object of wrath, whether divine or human. If we now consider the parallelism and compare it with what we have found above in 10:28, the retention of the Masoretic text will be supported. 11:23a desire of the righteous is to do good [will not experience wrath]

→ ←

11:23b “hope” of the wicked [who do not do good] will turn out to manifest as wrath

Far from necessitating a repaired text by providing a “better” parallel to the first hemistich, the noun at the end is very sensible and reveals a richer parallelism than what an emended text reading “perishes” or “passes away” would offer. In this proverb the first hemistich contributes to the second by revealing that the opposite of an ‫אך־טוב‬-seeker is a no-good who has only wrath to look forward to despite any hopes he may harbour in vain. This may be visited on him by his wronged fellow humans or by God. And the second hemistich retrospectively contributes to the first by suggesting that the righteous need not fear any wrath. 296 Stewart (2016, 137). She analyses the power of motivation wielded by desires of all kinds, and describes at length how this works to prompt both positive and negative deeds, as well as several typologies of desire (2016, 130-169). 297 Cf. above on the text-critical question.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

285

Although 10:28 has a simple verb at the end and no irony, it works with exactly the same parallelistic structure: 10:28a expectation of the righteous is joy [will not perish]

→ ←

10:28b hope of the wicked [joy hoped for remains unattained] will perish

The first hemistich contributes the suggestion to the second that the wicked fruitlessly hope to achieve the same as that which the righteous certainly will attain. The second hemistich contributes the idea to the first that the joy of the righteous’ expectation is permanent.298 So, the wrath in 11:23b is indeed more intense than the general idea of perishing spoken of by its counterpart in 10:28b. Likewise, the expectation for a positive outcome in the future (10:28a) is intensified by the strong desire for a sapiential lifestyle (11:23a), while the joy to look forward to (10:28a) is enhanced by the idea of being occupied exclusively by the good (11:23a). It seems to me that this conclusion supports Lyu’s thesis of righteousness as a virtue that is practiced.299 On the many-sidedness of terse poetic formulation, Brueggemann’s views on future expectation, and the impetus for teaching provided by hope in the Proverbs (including 11:23), see the commentary on 10:28 above and the reference given there. According to Yonah Gerondi, ‫ אך‬shows that a person is only righteous when that person has eliminated all desires except the desire to do good. That does not entail a negative verdict on wealth or power, but only on the desire to obtain such things (which amounts to the opposite of the motivational power of desire identified by Stewart in the Book of Proverbs itself, cf. above). Thus this opinion is compatible with the idea that such things as power and wealth can be used to do good without themselves being the objects of desire. The same view is espoused by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, Radaq and the Mezudat David, who accordingly interpret the second hemistich to mean that the wicked want to practise wrath. They hope to become the subjects of wrath, not its objects. On the other hand, Rashi gives a quite literal explanation: the wicked hope for wrath in the sense of the wrath suffered in Gehinnom. This seems to underline the ironic quality of the proverb – the wicked do not literally hope to end up in Gehinnom, but the detrimental hopes they have will cause them to experience the divine wrath of Gehinnom. The Vilna Gaon gives the same idea an explicit turn by explaining ‫ תקוה‬as a hope for immediate fulfilment, which will meet the wrath of God in that they do not attain what they wish for. Ginsburg300 comments on the prominent rabbinic attention to ‫ אך‬in the proverb, referring to Qohelet Rabbah 1:34 (on the many desires unfulfilled at death). He asserts that the adverb implicitly shows that the righteous exclude all but the most basic needs, 298

See the discussion above on 10:28. Lyu (2012, passim) illustrates this in terms of the concept of desire (2012, 62) and in terms of its ironic opposite of “misdirected virtue” (2012, 64). 300 Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 209). 299

286

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

whereas the wicked can never get enough. Thus their desires multiply and therefore also the unfulfilled ones. That necessarily causes anger in themselves and loss of quality of life. On the basis of the first hemistich, John Chrysostom makes the point that desire in itself is not evil, for the desire of the righteous to do good cannot be evil. He does not consider what light is shed on his interpretation by the Tenth Commandment on coveting/desiring (Ex 20:17)301 either as a difficulty or as support. One would have expected such reflection in light of Chrysostom’s conviction that the prohibition of desire for others’ property is part of inborn natural law,302 which he could have used to undergird his statement on the proverb. What is bad according to him, is the desire for evil. The hopes of the wicked, on the other hand, come to nothing (following the Septuagint reading ἀπολεῖται for ‫)עברה‬. Philipp Melanchthon (1550) simply leaves the verse without comment, as he also did with 10:28.303

11:24 There is one who scatters and is increased more, and one who withholds from what is right only to his loss. This proverb is not merely ambiguous but profoundly polyvalent, both in itself and in relation to its context. The rhythmic pattern is 4+3 (so Gemser) rather than ternary (as suggested by Toy), to which the fact that there is no maqqeph in the first half to unify two stresses also testifies. ‫ אך‬with maqqeph in the second hemistich also occurs in the previous verse and may thus be adduced as support for the opinion of Riyqam that the two proverbs are connected (cf. also Scherer304 and Waltke). The participles in both verse halves are carried by the single ‫( יש‬existence), which is normally rendered by “there is”. This suggests the actual existence of real situations as those described here but also that their occurrence is widespread and not limited to a specific case. Text-critically, the transmission of the Masoretic Text shows no uncertainty, but the ancient versions seem to have been puzzled by the possibility that the verse can be interpreted both as a manifestation of the deed-consequence nexus and as a contradiction of it. Several ways are found to circumvent what they perceive as a problem. The Septuagint relegates the saying to the sphere of agriculture,305 thereby making 301 In Ex 20:17 the Septuagint uses the same root for the verb (ἐπιθυμεῖν, Hebrew ‫)חמד‬ as for the noun in the proverb (ἐπιθυμία, Hebrew ‫)תאוה‬. 302 Ad Pop Ant Hom 12,9 (NPNF I,9, 421-422). To Chrysostom, God “implanted in nature” (φυσικὸν ἐγκατέθηκε) the laws of conscience found in several Decalogue commandments. Although he does not explicitly mention the last commandment, he does take the Sabbath commandment as an exception. 303 Cf. Loader (2017) on this peculiarity as a feature of Melanchthon’s whole Proverbs commentary. 304 Scherer (1999, 85). 305 The participles σπείροντες (those who sow) and συνάγοντες (those who gather), both times preceded by εἰσὶν for the actual (v. 24a) and elided (v. 24b) ‫יש‬.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

287

its impact straightforward: the more you sow your own grain (τὰ ἴδια σπείροντες) the more you will harvest, but if you only want to harvest there will be nothing (20:4; cf. 19:15). The Peshitta follows the Septuagint in the first half, but construes the second hemistich around the focal point of ownership: there is one who gathers what is not his (ÍáÙx ĀÙs{ ÿçÃã ¿ćàxx), but he finds that it is worth little.306 The Targum moralises v. 24b: “[H]e who holds back from justice” (‫)חשיל מן תריצותא‬, is the one who will in the end experience shortfall. So does the Vulgate by making the first half-line say that some people who divide up their property (presumably for charity) get richer, while those who appropriate the assets of others always find themselves in need.

But neither the moralism nor the disambiguation of such “solutions” is needed. The proverb can be read in various ways. It is not necessarily a saying about scattering seeds, that is, sowing, as it is interpreted by the Septuagint and others (cf. Van Leeuwen, Murphy). The verb ‫ פזר‬Piel can be used with several kinds of object, such as humans (Joel 4:2; Ps 89:11), bones (Ps 53:6) and frost (Ps 147:16), or it can be used without object in the sense of providing generously (Ps 112:9, parallel with ‫[ נתן‬give]). It is not usually applied to the agricultural process of the scattering of seeds, but the generic meaning can be understood in such a sense, particularly when read in the context of v. 26. In the second hemistich another interpretive problem is created by the phrase ‫( מישר‬from what is right).307 The phrase can be understood as the comparative ‫ מן‬with ‫( ישר‬more than what is right). It would then imply that one may withhold from giving to the needy what is necessary for one’s own interests but not more than that.308 But it may also mean “more than necessary,” that is, “more than the normal measure,” cf. Job 33:23 (so Oesterley, Ringgren, Plöger, Meinhold, Tuinstra). In this case the idea would be that even if one were to save exceedingly much, it could still come to loss or damage. The Hebrew proverb can thus be understood to mean: (a) Who scatters seeds or invests in business finds that the gain is more than the investment made, and who over-cautiously holds back necessary agricultural or business outlay, has a deficient result. (b) Who gives generously finds increased profit, and who withholds part of the right charity finds that it leads to his own deficiency (cf. 28:27). 306 Reaping where one has not sown seems to have been a not unknown phenomenon in the ancient Near East, cf. Matt 25:24, 26; Luke 19:21f.; John 4:38; Lev. 26:16; Job 31:8. In Matt 25:24 and Luke 19:22 the same verbs for “sow” and “gather” are used as in the Septuagint of Prov 11:24 (σπείρειν and συνάγειν), as well as synonyms θερίζειν (reap; also John 4:38) and διασκορπίζειν (scatter). 307 Fox understands ‫ מישר‬as “out of honesty.” Although the noun can indeed mean “honesty” (cf. 14:2; 1 Kgs 9:4), it is not clear why, in this proverb, honesty should be the motive for saving, especially when the first hemistich is about open-handedness (Clifford). 308 It seems to me that Waltke’s rejection of the comparative ‫“( מן‬more than”) in favour of its ablative use (“from”) still yields the same sense: one should not withhold from the right amount or volume required by the needy.

288

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

(c) Who scatters away assets may still end up with more than he had, and who even saves more than the normal may still end up with loss. Reading (a) would be an observation of what happens in economic reality, expressed in agricultural terms. That is the natural order of things and the outcome is to be expected in both cases of the parallelism. Thus understood, the proverb encourages well-judged economic boldness and discourages irresolute economic timidity. This would not be a real paradox and at most contain an element that looks like a paradox (scattering a little seed for a big harvest). Reading (b) would be an inculcation of generosity and be a straightforward antithetic instance of the deed-consequence nexus. Who is charitable is rewarded and who is not must pay with his own loss. Reading (c) would express the real paradox of sapiential limits: It sometimes does happen (‫)יש‬309 that, contrary to expectation, no loss results when things are just scattered about, while it also happens that saving ever so warily does not safeguard against loss. All three are possible – the first is a very old understanding of the proverb. As far as I can see, the last reading does not play a role, at least not a significant role,310 although several commentators speak of the proverb as a paradoxical saying (e.g. McKane, Murphy, Clifford, Van Leeuwen, Waltke, Fox and others), and Millar,311 discussing what she calls the “multiple usage” of the proverb, shows that this reading may utter an “outraged cry” at injustice or even a “cynical comment” on reality. Ultimately, reading (c) says the same as the famous Qoh 11:1 read, as it should be, together with the less famous following verse.312 Strewing out bread/assets over the water may seem risky,313 but it may still be found again (imperfect of possibility, GKC 107r). On the other hand, if one takes safety precautions by dividing the risk potential, as Jacob did at the Jabbok (Gen 32:7-8), even seven- or eightfold, one still cannot ensure the elimination of loss and one simply does not know 309

Cf. the striking similarity to the Egyptian formulation quoted below. McKane takes “scatter” to mean “put money to work,” which is supported by the interpretation of Qoh 11:1-2 that I suggest (see below), although he does not refer to the Qohelet passage. Likewise, he sees Prov 11:24b as a reference to the excessive hoarding of money. McKane nevertheless thinks that the first half of the proverb should more probably be taken as a stance for philanthropy. But see Yoder, who does refer to Qoh 11:1-2 and carefully distinguishes between a reading of the proverb as a saying about generosity and a paradox. She seems to intend her reference to Qoh 11:1-2 as support for the idea of generosity. Delitzsch does not refer to the Qohelet passage, although in his exposition of the latter (1885), he offers a similar exposition. 311 Millar (2020, 154). 312 Both verses are connected chiastically. Although vv. 1a and 2a contain imperatives and vv. 1b and 2b contain corresponding ‫כי‬-clauses, the thematic cross-correspondence is obvious: risk → success, no risk → calamity, while one would expect it the other way round. 313 ‫ שלח‬in the intensive Piel, not Qal; cf. the risks of maritime trade in Alexandria in the 4th century. 310

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

289

whether catastrophe may override all safety measures.314 Therefore one can agree with Fox that the proverb contains a lesson, viz. “as a warning against overconfidence in one’s own industry and acuity.” He adds examples of the same insight from Egypt, for instance from the Papyrus Insinger:315 There is one who lives on little so as to save, yet he becomes poor. There is one who does not know, yet the fate gives (him) wealth. It is not the wise man who saves who finds a surplus. Nor is it the one who spends who becomes poor.

And from the Instruction of Ankhsheshonq:316 There is one who saves and does not profit. All are in the hand of fate and of the god.

In the context of v. 26, the first two readings are understandable and valid. Taken by itself, the third reading expresses the limits of wisdom. The sages indeed applied what we call the nexus of deed and consequence as a basic rule of thumb, but they also knew that it cannot explain everything. It is a useful principle for education, but has its limits (cf. 10:22; 16:33; 19:21; 20:24; 21:1).317 For the theological import of this insight, see the Introductions to Vol. I and this Volume.318 Rabbinic interpretation generally tends toward option (b), for instance Rashi, Nahmias (14th century, Spain), the Mezudat David, the Vilna Gaon and Malbim, who take this option in a literal sense (cf. the same principle in the Babylonian Talmud, Kethuboth 67b). But often it is also understood as disseminating Torah rather than money, e.g. Ralbag, who noticed that a teacher increases in knowledge the more he teaches his pupils (cf., in the Talmud, Berachoth 63a, where the ideas of disseminating and holding back as applied to Torah are attributed to the famous Hillel [see also Makkoth 10a for a similar idea]). The downside of the same principle is expressed by the Midrash Mishle, notably that a teacher who denies the people around him his knowledge of Torah, will find that his own knowledge is lessened. Clemens Alexandrinus319 quotes the saying while making the case for sharing one’s earthly goods and becoming righteous in eternity. This citation is interesting because 314

Loader (1979, 67). Pap Insinger VII, 13-16 (AEL III, 191). 316 Instr Ankhsheshonq XXVI, 7-8; AEL III, 179. Lichtenberger (AEL III, 184) also calls this case (and a number of similar sayings) a “series of paradoxes” and compares them to similar paradoxes in the Papyrus Insinger, all of which date from the Hellenistic period. 317 See Loader (2013, 365-383) on the sapiential adherence to an orderly principle despite the knowledge of its inability to explain paradoxes, and the pedagogical value of maintaining the rule and its constraint (2013, 377-378). For the polyvalence of proverbs in general and the impossibility of according absolute value to categorical sayings, cf. von Rad (1970, 170) The didactic value of keeping the nexus as a rule is also emphasised by Freuling (2004, 107), who is followed by Fox. 318 Vol. I, 39-46; also the Introduction to Vol. II, § 2.3.7, and § 6 on the relevance of Proverbs. 319 Strom III, 6 (ANF II, 391). 315

290

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

Clemens explicitly links it to Ps 112:9, where the same Hebrew verb is used for “scattering”/“giving” as in the proverb (see above). In his Treatise on Alms, Cyprian320 shortly cites the proverb in a theologising critique of those who do not practise good works (sc. charity) and so choose preserving wealth rather than serving Christ. Chrysostom acknowledges that the Greek form of the proverb suggests the irregularity of the deed-consequence nexus and then provides a rationale for it. According to him, this happens to prevent that people practise virtue only for the ulterior motive to become rich, so that they rather do so as a matter of choice. Thereby he seeks to make it possible to live with discrepancies in the doctrine without having to give it up. Evagrius Ponticus reads the proverb’s Greek antithesis of sowing (σπείροντες) and gathering (συνάγοντες ) as a contrast between those who sow in the Spirit and those who gather in the flesh. The former reap life, the latter corruption (cf. Gal 6:8).321 Philipp Melanchthon gives the proverb a typical Protestant turn. He paraphrases the whole proverb with one phrase, danti dabitur (to the giver will be given), which also implies the negative aspect present in the second hemistich. But then he states that this is a doctrine about worldly goods that “confirms the faith” (fides confirmanda). In typical Reformation fashion Melanchthon thus precludes any interpretation involving the idea of retribution for good works. Humans do not receive good things as a reward for their deeds, but only by the grace of God on the basis of faith – and whatever is so received, is nothing more than a confirmation of the faith (sola fides).

11:25 A person who blesses will be fattened, and one who refreshes will himself certainly322 be refreshed. The verse has a rhythm of 3+3. Deviating from the trend in Prov 10-15, the parallelism is not antithetical.323 Toy calls it “synonymous,” so does Fuhs, although he qualifies by stating that the second half concretises the first. Rather, the parallelism in the two hemistichs is complementary in that the two verbal sentences share metaphors from the agricultural sphere (“fatten” and “give water”) and because the general “bless” of the first half is specified as “refresh” in the second. The genitive ‫“( נפש־ברכה‬person/soul of blessing”) is an objective genitive, indicating that the genitive (‫ )ברכה‬is the object conveyed by the logical subject (‫)נפש‬, so that the person in question dispenses blessing.324 Who bestows 320

Treatise VIII, 17 (ANF V, 481). Gohl (2017, 45). 322 On the emphasising particle ‫גם‬, see Labuschagne (1966, 193-203). 323 In Prov 11, there are four more exceptions, viz. vv. 7, 22, 29, 30, so Heim (2013, 281). It is however possible to interpret the Vulgate qui inebriat negatively, since inebriare means “to make drunk” and figuratively “to satiate with moisture.” In that case v. 25b would mean “he who intoxicates will himself be intoxicated;” this may be what Leo I († 461) means (cf. Reg Past XXV [NPNF II,12, 53]). 324 Wildeboer: “eine Seele, die Segen verbreitet;” Waltke does not deny this, but opts for calling it a genitive “of the mediated object to signify dispensing the divine blessing on others” (cf. IBHS 9.5.2d), thereby stressing the religious dimension of receiving and then dispensing the blessing of God, although Yahweh is not mentioned. 321

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

291

blessing to others, will be “made fat.” The metaphor of fat connotes well-being (cf. 13:4; 15:30; 28:25; Deut 31:20; Ps 23:5b325) and is a specification of the (general) blessing dispensed to other people. Scherer326 distinguishes between ‫ ברכה‬in this verse and ‫ ברכה‬in v. 26. According to him, the word in v. 25 carries only the notion of human magnanimity, whereas its parallelism with “curse” in v. 26 also contains an element of religious magic (see below on v. 26). The second hemistich presents a text-critical issue. The last word ‫ יורא‬is rendered differently by the ancient versions.327 In the Septuagint only the first two Greek words of the verse are close to the first two words of the Masoretic Text. The Syriac derived the verbs of the second hemistich from the Hebrew ‫( ארר‬curse)328 and the Targum from the root ‫ ירה‬II (to water, drench, soak). Toy proposes to “perhaps” emend to a Hophal of ‫רוה‬, but actually leaves the text unchanged and assumes an internal development of the vowels.329 Fox emends the last word to ‫ירוא = ירוה‬, root ‫( רוה‬be slaked), an end result more or less equivalent to that achieved by Meinhold, Tuinstra, Waltke and others by leaving the text unchanged and deriving the form from ‫ירה‬ II Hophal (Plöger, Meinhold, Tuinstra, also Schipper who prefers the vowel ū for the preformative) or internal Hiphil (Waltke). In my view the text should not be emended but interpreted along the lines proposed by Ben Zvi.

Discussing water metaphors relevant for his representation of wisdom and learning in terms of water (cf. 10:11; 13:14; 14:27) Ben Zvi330 points to “the double meaning of the root ‫‘ ירה‬water (as a verb)’/‘teach’” and quotes v. 25b as an example, “which clearly evokes an image of ‘watering’ or ‘raining’ while at the same time conveying a sense of teaching.” His interpretation of the proverb is thus that it “asks the community to conceptualize teaching as ‘water,’ and the teacher as both a recipient and distributor of ‘water,’ that is, wisdom.”331 325 It is interesting to note that the two hemistichs of Ps 23:5b contain the roots expressing the metaphors in a proposed emendation to Prov 11:25 (i.e., ‫ יורא‬emended to ‫ ירוה‬or explained with Toy’s vowel development [see below]): “You make my head fat [‫ דשנת‬Piel, anoint] with oil, my cup is overflowing [‫”]רויה‬. 326 Scherer (1999, 86). 327 Here the Septuagint has a different proverb (ψυχὴ εὐλογουμένη πᾶσα ἁπλῆ, ἀνὴρ δὲ θυμώδης οὐκ εὐσχήμων [Every blessed soul is sincere, but a hotheaded man is not gracious]). The Peshitta has a different second hemistich (ÕàĀæ u{ ¿ÔÚà{ [and who curses will be cursed too]); the Targum also differs in the second half (‫[ ומן דמ]א[לף אף הוא יליף‬and the one who teaches will himself learn]). 328 The proposals in BHS for both ‫ מרוה‬and ‫ יורא‬accept this line for a possible reconstruction of the text, while BHQ explains the first as a derivation from ‫ ארר‬and the second as an instance of metathesis. 329 He argues: the Hophal could have developed from ‫י ֶֹרה > יָ ֶרה > יָ ֶרו > יָ ְרוֶ ה‬. Then the spelling with ‫ א‬is to be regarded as a variant for the spelling with ‫( ה‬some, e.g. BHS and Hausmann [1995, 232] prefer to read with ‫ ה‬rather than with ‫)א‬. This seems inspired by Delitzsch’s metathesis proposal and Wildeboer (‫)י ֶֹר א > יָ וְ ֶרה > יָ ְר וֶ ה‬. 330 Ben Zvi (2014, 19-20). 331 For a somewhat more distant parallel, cf. Acts 3:6-8; cf. also the same principle and the motif of overflowing in Luke 6:38 (Oesterley).

292

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

We do not have to choose between the motifs of giving to drink and teaching, since the two roots ‫( ירה‬give to drink and teach) suit the metaphor of water as wisdom admirably. Again the polyvalence of a proverb is manifested in a terse saying. The Masoretic pointing as well as the motif in the other proverbs quoted above fit quite well. This provides a corollary for the idea of both receiving and dispensing blessing, as proposed by Waltke for the first hemistich. It also links with the targumic and rabbinic view that teaching Torah brings learning not only to the pupils, but also to the teacher himself332 (see the discussion of the Jewish interpretation of v. 24, referring to the use of the idea by Ralbag and the Talmud). He who gives to drink (the wisdom of Torah) himself has his thirst for learning quenched (see Riyqam). In this way the complementing statements of both half-verses confirm and strengthen each other. This saying is as clear an instance of the cliché danti dabitur (to the giver will be given) as, according to Philipp Melanchthon, the previous proverb is. That partly explains how Melanchthon could skip comment on v. 25 and only resume his commentary at v. 26. But earlier Christian commentators did pay attention to the proverb. In an exposition of Ps 67, Augustine333 quotes the first hemistich according to the Septuagint tradition (“Every blessed soul is sincere/simple”). He uses it to undergird his view that the pious ascribe blessing to God without clinging to earthly things (which seems to echo the Hebrew).334 The proverb turns up in several homilies by Chrysostom.335 In a homily on Acts 2:37, he quotes the Greek version of the proverb (together with Prov 10:9) to argue that simplicity understood as uprightness includes prudence. In the homily on Acts 13:16-17, he quotes the second Septuagint hemistich (ἀνὴρ δὲ θυμώδης οὐκ εὐσχήμων) to make a point against passion. Finally, in his homily on John 7:1-2 he mentions the same verset as one of the “soothing charms drawn from Holy Scripture” to use against the temptation to answer aggression with aggression, here interpreting θυμώδη as “wrathfulness.” In a similar vein, Chrysostom’s younger contemporary, John Cassian, used this formulation to support his censure of “the sin of anger.”336 Traditional Jewish interpretation is more straightforward. Rashi interprets the ‫( נפש־ברכה‬a person of blessing) as one who always blesses financially and is thus a generous person. The Mezudat David follows this lead and promises the financially generous a reward of wealth for themselves. The second hemistich is explained by Rashi as the provision of enough nourishment for the poor (Nahmias even more concretely: the hungry) and therefore being nourished oneself. On the Targum’s 332

Cf. the commentary on 1:5 (Vol. I). Exp Ps lxvii, 3 (NPNF I,8, 281). 334 Cf. also the Const Apost IV, xxxv, where the subject and predicate of v. 25a are interchanged: “every bountiful soul is blessed” (ANF VII, 413). In his commentary, Chrysostom explicitly denies this. According to him, the proverb does not say, “A simple soul is blessed,” but “a blessed soul is simple,” meaning he is blessed with being of single substance containing no wickedness. 335 Hom VII in Act Apost, 3 (NPNF I,11, 48); Hom XXIX in Act Apost (NPNF I,11, 186); Hom XLVIII in Ev Joh, 3 (NPNF I,14, 173). 336 Inst Cœn VIII,1 (NPNF II,11, 257). 333

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

293

interpretation (providing and receiving learning), see above on the text-critical dimension of the proverb. The Vilna Gaon gives a very literal exposition: Who constantly serves others’ happiness by blessing them, makes them eat well. As a reward, his food will be blessed with good digestion to go with wealth. Perhaps one may find insight in the mutual impact of the parallel hemistichs in a similar application of the idea made in the Talmud (Baba Batra 9b): irrigation of farmland (giving to drink, second hemistich) yields profit; similarly, the generous are blessed (first hemistich) and can continue the good work.

11:26 Who withholds grain, the people will curse him, but blessing is for the head of him who sells grain. The proverb is a straightforward antithetical saying rhythmically cast in a characteristic sapiential Siebener (4+3 stresses) and organised in a chiasmus of concepts: withholding grain (‫)מנע בר‬

::

curse (‫)יקבהו‬

blessing (‫)ברכה‬

::

selling grain (‫)משביר‬

The x-pattern is achieved by means of a casus pendens337 in the first hemistich, which enables the object to be placed in the first position (pendens, “suspended”) and then be taken up by the third person masculine singular pronominal suffix in the verb (‫)יקבהו‬. At the same time, the outer ends of this chiasmus correspond crosswise to synonyms in v. 24, so that vv. 24-26 are integrated into a tighter unit within vv. 23-27 (see the discussion above, before the exegesis of v. 23). This is filled by what Scherer calls a “thematische Verflochtenheit,” that is, intertwined concepts closely related to each other. In his description, “v. 24a is given a closer explanation by v. 25ab and v. 26b. Likewise, v. 26a presents a developing explanation of v. 24b.”338 Clifford points out another stylistic feature of the proverb, namely the alliterative sound play on the consonants b and r (‫בר‬, ‫ברכה‬, and ‫)משביר‬. He probably refers to the combination of those consonants in single words, since the r-sound also occurs in ‫ראש‬, (v. 26b) while the b-sound also occurs in ‫( יקבהו‬v. 26a). The sounds b and/or r occur in every word of v. 26b, and, 337 See GKC 143b; IBHS 4.7b. Even if Niccacci (1990, 148) may be technically correct with his linguistic statement that the casus pendens “does not really occupy the first position of the clause but is placed outside it ... and reference to it is usually made by an anaphoric or resumptive pronoun,” the stylistic use of the construction in the first position of the stich clearly serves the formation of a chiastic figure of style. 338 Scherer (1999, 85). These connections, or aspects of them, are also mentioned by several other commentators, such as Plöger, Meinhold, Van Leeuwen, Waltke, Lucas, Schipper and others.

294

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

with the total of four times for each of the two sounds in the proverb as a whole, contribute to an effect of coherence. Holding back grain obviously means hoarding it by not selling it, which is required by the antithetical Hiphil participle of ‫ )משביר( שבר‬in the second hemistich. This verb is probably a denominative of the noun II ‫( ֶש ֶבר‬grain);339 the Qal means “to buy” (cf. Gen 41:57; 42:2, 3, 5; 47:14) and the Hiphil “to offer for sale,” usually food (cf. Gen 42:6; Deut 2:28; Am 8:5f.). In our proverb the use of the word is absolute, but the parallelism with the first hemistich makes it clear that the merchandise is grain. The frequent use of the root in the Joseph story lends further plausibility to Fox’s statement on the grounds of Gen 42:6 that Joseph was a ‫משביר‬.340 The extent of Joseph’s activity also shows that a ‫ משביר‬was a large-scale businessman, both nationally (Gen 41:56) and internationally (Gen 41:57). On the other hand, one who holds back the supply manipulates the demand and drives the price up, which amounts to the opposite of the advice given in 3:27 (cf. Job 22:7). Therefore it is quite understandable that the nation (‫)לאום‬, viz. public opinion,341 would curse him, cf. ‫( כל־עם הארץ‬all the people of the land) who had to buy from Joseph (Gen 42:6). It is equally understandable that the (ordinary) people (‫ העם‬342) would collectively be thankful for the saving of their lives through Joseph’s agricultural policies (Gen 47:25). Although the relevant passages in the Joseph narrative do not provide replicas of the scenarios pictured in the proverb, they do illuminate them both. Scherer343 accepts Whybray’s view that the blessing in v. 25 relates to normal gratitude for human benevolence, but thinks that both the blessing and curse in v. 26 contain an element of religious magic, since curse and blessing are the instruments of the powerless. That is conceivable but not based on textual evidence. According to Van Leeuwen, the curse and the blessing are essentially prayers to God, which 339 Delitzsch derives II ‫ שבר‬from I ‫( שבר‬break), since grain is crushed, which is thinkable but not provable. The noun often occurs in the Joseph story (Gen 42:1, 2, 19, 26; 43:2; 44:2; 47:14), and so does the verb both in the Qal and the Hiphil conjugations (see references in the main text). 340 It must be added, though, that Joseph not only sold grain, but also hoarded it and sold it at enormous profits as the crisis grew worse (Gen 41:48f.; 47:13-26). Since Tuinstra refers to the latter text together with Am 8:4-8, he too seems to have noticed the element of speculation in Joseph’s policy. 341 Cf. 24:24 for the motif of collective curse on those who practice injustice. Schultens translates universa natio (the whole nation) and, with reference to Origen, suggests that the nuance is that of a conglutinatio (a pact among individuals), to react “all of one mind and with one voice” (una omnium mente ac voce). This strikes the balance between Fox, who says that ‫ לאום‬only refers to a nation as a whole, and Delitzsch, who says that this is the case in the prophets, but not here or in 24:24. 342 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra explains the lesser known ‫ לאום‬of the Masoretic Text by the better known noun ‫עם‬. 343 Scherer (1999, 86).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

295

is supported by more explicit contexts such as 2 Sam 16:10-11 (curse) and Ruth 2:20; 3:10 (blessing) and Deut 28 (both). In any case, the explicit involvement of Yahweh in the related topic of 11:1 shows that wisdom does not at all lack a religious basis for its socio-economic concern. Tuinstra and Schipper cite the Babylonian Shamash Hymn, where the curse of the people comes over grain sellers who practise injustice, although the speculative manipulation of supplies is not at issue in this case:344 The merchant who practises trickery as he holds the corn measure, Who weighs out corn by the minimum standard, but requires a large quantity in repayment, The curse of the people will overtake him before his time ... To Rashi, the Midrash Mishle, and Ralbag, the grain spoken of in the proverb stands for the Torah. The curse thus is on the head of him who holds back (= does not teach) Torah to those who need its nourishment and the blessing is for him who provides Torah. On the other hand, Ramaq, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra and the Mezudat David interpret the holding back and selling of grain literally. Ramaq promises merchants resisting the temptation of exploiting others in times of scarcity a reward in the World to Come. The Mezudat makes clear that waiting for a rise in prices before one sells is unacceptable, but it is also an exponent of the symbolic interpretation, viz. providing wisdom to those who need it. Cyprian (c. 300)345 cites the proverb as one of a series to show that desiring possessions is wrong. The Constitutions of the Apostles, referring to v. 26 before v. 25,346 ignores the first half and turns the second into a blessing for him who gives offerings to the priests and doing good to the poor. Athanasius347 does the opposite, citing the first half to show that a person who neglects and hides grace is cast out as an unthankful person. Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389)348 uses the proverb in a literal sense to illustrate how those who control goods in an inland city misuse the hardship of others for their own profit. Ambrose (339-397) has a whole section on profits and the selling of grain349 and at its very beginning appeals to the first hemistich as support for his claim that “getting an increase in price is not a sign of simplicity but of cunning.” Chrysostom too interprets literally and supports the legitimacy of people cursing others by an appeal to the fact that the Apostle Paul also used a curse (Gal 5:12). Several centuries before Rashi (1040-1105) and Ralbag (1288-1344), Leo I († 461)350 already used the proverb in a similar symbolic way, viz. to argue that those who refrain from preaching due to excessive modesty, hold back the spiritual nourishment that may save the lives of others. But Melanchthon, again, turns to the literal meaning as an injunction to the fair selling of grain to the needy in times of famine. 344 The Hymn to Šamaš, ll. 112-114; Lambert ([1960] 1975, 133); the lines are omitted in ANET. Schipper also refers to the presence of the motif in the Codex Hammurapi §§7075). 345 Adv Iud III, 61 (ANF V, 550). 346 Const Apost IV, xxxiv (ANF 7, 413). 347 Easter Letter III, 2 for AD 331 (NPNF II,4, 513); cf. below on 12:11-12. 348 Oratio XLIII (NPNF II,7, 407). 349 De Off Min III, vi (NPNF II,10, 73). 350 Reg Past XXV, Admonitio 26 (NPNF II,12, 53).

296

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

11:27 Who pursues what is good [actually] seeks favour, but who goes after evil – on him it will come. Like the previous verse, this one contains a straight antithetical parallelism consisting of 4+3 stresses in the respective hemistichs. Both halves begin with a participle Qal plus object, followed by an imperfect verb plus another object. participle Qal

object

verb imperfect

object

v. 27a

‫שחר‬

‫טוב‬

‫יבקש‬

‫רצון‬

v. 27b

‫דרש‬

‫רעה‬

[]‫תבוא‬

‫][נו‬

The positive principle in the first hemistich is expressed by two words: ‫טוב‬ (what is good in general) and ‫( רצון‬favour), the latter narrowing down the general principle contained in the former. By contrast, the negative principle in the second hemistich is expressed by one term only (‫)רעה‬, which is therefore used in both its meanings, namely the evil planned for others and the trouble to come upon the perpetrator as punishment for it (Van Leeuwen: “unhappily ambiguous;” similarly Murphy and Clifford). Thus ‫ רעה‬in the sense of “evil” is the object of the third verb for “seek” (‫)דרש‬, and in the sense of “trouble” it is the antecedent subject of the third person feminine singular in the imperfect Qal of the verb ‫בוא‬. Within the proverb, the verbs from the semantic field “seek” amplify each other. • ‫ שחר‬Piel suggests a purposeful pursuit of something specific (cf. 1:28; 7:15; 8:17; 13:24; also Pss 63:2; 78:34); it occurs in the Qal only here and has the same meaning as the Piel. The Qal-stem of verbs in the D-stem does occasionally occur.351 For this reason EE is to be agreed with that there is no text-critical problem with the form. Moreover, Waltke points out the stylistic effect of using the Qal participle in this proverb, viz. for the sake of assonance with the Qal participles opening vv. 26, 28 and 29. Even more obvious is the immediate effect of the o-e-assonance in the first words of both hemistichs of the same proverb (‫ שׁ ֵֹחר‬and ‫)ד ֵֹרש‬. • ‫ בקש‬Piel denotes looking for something concrete of which the seeker does not know the whereabouts, and when the object is abstract, it denotes striving with care.352 There is thus no need to follow Driver353 and Whybray 351 E.g. ‫ דּ ֵֹבר‬for ‫( ְמ ַד ֵבּר‬speak) and ‫ קוָ ֹו‬for *‫( ְמ ַקוָּ ו‬wait on); cf. BHQ. The Septuagint has τεκταινόμενος (who contrives), supposing ‫ ח ֵֹרשׁ‬for ‫שׁ ֵֹחר‬. Aquila has ὀρθρισμόϛ (early rising), presupposing ‫( ַשׁ ַחר‬dawn). 352 THAT I, 333-334. 353 Driver (1967, 108). For a further critique, see Heim (2001, 143), who finds the proposal unnecessary and speculative – correctly, in my opinion.

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when they derive the verb in this verse from Akkadian baqāšu (be large) and interpret it to be a homonym meaning “to magnify.” • ‫ דרש‬Qal is to search out, investigate something, mostly abstracts or ideas.354 It thus implies putting specific effort into the undertaking. From all of this it is clear that some people purposefully pursue what is good for other people, which is confirmed by the parallel with “evil” in the second hemistich (so Delitzsch, while Schipper finds that the connection between deed and consequence is only “supposed” [“vorausgesetzt”] in v. b). Without premeditation, such striving turns out to find favour – either the favour of humans who have benefitted or of God who approves, or both. In other words, who seeks good for others, finds in the end that the search was also good for the seeker. On the other hand, those who look for and plan evil for others, find that the object of their search becomes the subject of what befalls them. After the first hemistich, the parallelism conjures up the image of the seeker of evil finding what he seeks – a dangerous monster turning on the one who went after it. This is one of the clear expressions of the equilibrium of deeds and their consequences so typical of the wisdom literature (cf. 26:27; 28:10; also 10:24; Qoh 10:8; Ps 7:16; see the Introduction § 6). While the catchword ‫ טוב‬in vv. 23 and 27 marks the outer ring in the cluster of proverbs defined above (before v. 23), the content of v. 27 summarises vv. 24-26355 (not only v. 24a and vv. 25-26 [Fox]). V. 27a: who pursues what is good [actually] seeks favour – [23a, 24a, 25ab, 26b] V. 27b: but who goes after evil – on him it will come – [23b, 24b, 26a]

Despite the fact that ulterior motives are not part of “pursuing what is good,”356 favourable results are not denied or evaluated negatively. Stewart has shown that the prospect of favourable results form the substance of the pedagogical motivation in Proverbs. This is particularly so where what she calls the “model of desire” is invoked for persuading young people to accept the advice of those who teach them.357 However, this cannot simply be called 354

THAT I, 461. Respectively the outer ring of the concentric arrangement (vv. 23 and 27) and the inner ring around its centre (vv. 24 and 26 around v. 25). 356 This is emphasised by Waltke, who says that “the benevolent serve the needy out of the desires of the heart,” that “they are pious because they seek God’s favor,” and that “the proverb admonishes its audience to be like Jesus, who went about doing good and was rewarded by eternal life (cf. Matt 25:35, 36; Jas 1:27.)” The idea of Jesus being rewarded with eternal life for his good deeds in my opinion goes too far even with the New Testament references, which do not claim that and perhaps suggest a faulty formulation on the commentator’s part. 357 See Stewart (2016, 138-141) and her account of the fundamental “form of motivation” (2016, 114-125). It should be pointed out, though, that her several references to the essay by Gemser (1953, 50-66) on “the motive clause” reflects his use of the word “motive” in the sense of “substantiation” (probably under the influence of his Dutch mother tongue), not of 355

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

“eudemonism,” the pursuit of one’s own well-being as the highest good, as can often be found in earlier assessments of wisdom literature. It is an argumentative pedagogical device for prompting young people to act virtuously, which includes more than self-interest, such as the fear of the Lord (1:7; 9:10; 14:2; 16:6; 30:3),358 unrewarded justice (16:8),359 modesty of character (16:19), love (15:17) and respect (22:2; 29:13).360 According to Rashi, the first half-verse refers to desiring the good for others in the sense of leading them on the good path, even by means of reproof, which seeks reconciliation with God for them and thus their acceptance by God. The Midrash Mishle interprets “seek what is good” as “speak well;” when people speak well of others, the angels speak of his merit to God. The Vilna Gaon solves the question of the motivation for doing good by linking ‫ טוב‬with the commandments of God, which are “good.” Thus, one seeks God’s will (the good Torah) and not one’s own. Then God will fulfil one’s desires (cf. Aboth 2:4). The several possibilities of words from the semantic field of “seek” are exploited by Malbim. Since ‫ שחר‬is related to ‫שׁ ַחר‬, ַ which refers to the red of day coming at dawn as well as dusk, it means day in and day out one should seek the good. Constant effort is necessary to counter the natural instinct to do evil. But it can also imply willingness, i.e. the deliberate will to do good against the natural inclination to do evil. Evil comes easily (as the verb ‫ בוא‬shows), but continuous striving is necessary to do good. Since ‫ בקש‬can also refer to prayer (as in “seek the Lord”), this effort is a matter of prayer, which will result in God’s help to achieve the will to do good (cf. Shabbath 104a).361 The second half-verse is usually just paraphrased (Radaq, Mezudat David), as Melanchthon does with the whole proverb, while Chrysostom leaves it uncommented.

11:28 Who trusts in his wealth, he will fall, but the righteous will sprout like foliage. The verse is a Siebener with one stress per word (so also Gemser; how Toy arrives at 3+3 is unclear to me). It consists of two verbal sentences, the first of which is built up with a participial casus pendens and following pronominal subject. This is strikingly similar to the immediately preceding v. 27b, where a participial casus pendens with following pronominal object is found “incentive.” However, in Proverbs it is a matter of prompting young people rather than giving reasons for why an action is right. 358 This does not deny that the fear of the Lord can also be seen in connection with reward, but it does show that the value of the former does not reside in the latter. Cf. Hausmann (1995, 267), who stresses especially 14:2 as manifestation of the central role of “the ethical component.” 359 Cf. the criticism by Hausmann of Ringgren’s surmise that the sage of 16:8 probably nevertheless expects a following pecuniary reward, Hausmann (1995, 336). 360 Hausmann (1995, 92) rightly points out that these proverbs are so construed that they do not focus on what good may result for the pious (not even in 19:17), but on their relation with the unfortunate. 361 Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 212).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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(because in that case the negative result of evil is brought about by the evil entrapping its own perpetrator, while in v. 28a the subject of wrongdoing is also the subject of coming to a fall).362 The plural subject and verb in the second half-verse suggest that the consistent use of the singular in the first half-verse entails a distributive (“everyone who trusts in his wealth”). The parallelism is again of particular importance for the interpretation of the proverb. Waltke calls it an “imprecise” parallelism and Fox speaks of “imperfect” parallelism,363 both of which resemble what I prefer to indicate schematically: 11:28a who trusts in wealth [who is not righteous] falls [unlike a sprouting leaf]

→ ← ←

11: 28b [who does not trust in wealth] the righteous sprouts like a leaf

Rereading the first hemistich in light of the second, reveals a well construed antithetical parallelism in which the second half provides the information lacking in the first half,364 but also the other way round, for information from the first hemistich also fills the gap in the second. These vacancies (indicated by square brackets above) provide room for implication, which is not mere subjective guesswork, but can be derived from explicit elements in the text through the cohesive force of parallelism. Since the parallelism is antithetical, the antithesis of the character who trusts in his wealth must be a person who does not trust in his wealth; since the latter is called righteous, the former must be the opposite and thus non-righteous, that is, a ‫רשע‬.365 Since the righteous 362 Therefore Schipper can stress the connection between the two proverbs as a chiasmus of distinct actions: X striving for good :: Y seeking evil (v. 27); Y the fall of those who trust in wealth :: X the flourishing of the righteous (v. 28). A connection between these proverbs has also been noticed among rabbinic interpreters, cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 212; see below), but denied by Plöger, while the interrelationship of the verses in the proximity is differently construed by others, such as Fuhs and Waltke. Heim (2001, 146) also accepts a relation between vv. 27 and 28 but includes vv. 29-31 in the group. Still, each proverb is a perfectly sensible saying irrespective of such affinities; cf. above “A Second Note on Uncertainties about Proverb Groups in the Latter Half of Prov 11” (after the comment on v. 22). 363 To Fox such a proverb is “disjointed” (Fox et al. [2004, 165-177]). It does look disjointed, but often – as in 11:28 – is perfectly thought through, which is the thrust of Fox’s argument as well; cf. his criticism of Murphy’s comment on the phenomenon in 11:2 (p. 169): “It would be more accurate to say that line B does catch the antithesis, but only on the rebound.” This tallies with what I argue at various points in the commentary, not only where antitheses are found, but also in other forms of parallelism. The significance is that the “gapping” or “disjuncture” between parallels entails involving the reader in the process of supplying meaning (for instance, p. 168). 364 Similarly Plöger, although he seems to regard the gap in the first hemistich as a shortcoming. 365 Cf. Scoralick (1995, 242), who is quite emphatic about it and identifies those who trust in their own wealth with the wicked who are fully integrated in society and not mere peripheral criminals.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

prospers (= sprouts) and his opposite comes to a fall, the motif of falling is coloured by the image of sprouting. The image of foliage in the second hemistich thus suggests that the falling spoken of in the first half is better understood as a falling leaf rather than the falling of a house (Waltke) or a tree (Fox) or a stumbling person (Yoder, referring to 4:19; 22:14; 28:10). Waltke’s objection that the verb ‫( נפל‬fall) is not used with leaves as its subject is weak. First, it doesn’t need to be used like that, because here a verb for the opposite natural phenomenon (sprouting) is used to indicate humans experiencing the opposite of a fall. That suggests a negative image (not the verb ‫ נפל‬per se) for the first hemistich. Second, if humans can take a fall with this verb, then leaves as metaphors for those humans366 can also. What could they do otherwise to get to the ground? In the first elements of the parallelism the antithetical gaps and their filling are obvious. The righteous must be someone who does not trust in his wealth, and the one who trusts in his wealth cannot be righteous. If the reward of the righteous is postulated by a botanical comparison367 expressing the sprouting of life on a shrub or tree, then the requital of his counterpart will rather be thought of in related terms than in terms of a building construction. If leaves do not elsewhere happen to be said to fall (‫)נפל‬, it would be an argument from silence to state that it cannot be implied here. Although Waltke’s references to ‫( נבל‬wither) and ‫( נדף‬Niphal, be blown) are accurate,368 they do not exclude the image of a falling leaf in this proverb – especially in the light of Tuinstra’s point that things can indeed be said to fall (‫ )נפל‬from trees (fruit in Nah 3:12).369 For this reason the conjectural emendation of ‫( יפל‬he will fall) to ‫( יבל‬he will wither),370 which is not supported by the Versions, is unnecessary (so most later commentators, but not the Revised Standard Version). It would not make the parallelism better, but detract from it since it would be blandly predictable, whereas the more generic “fall” opens up possibilities and invites the reader to cooperate in determining what the proverb means. Van Leeuwen makes the gripping suggestion that the varying translations for the similar sounding “wither” (yibbol) and “fall” (yippol) perhaps may reflect a pun in the Hebrew text. In any event, the pun now exists de facto thanks to the readers who have drawn attention to it.

The proverb evidently contrasts two types of people and in particular what happens to them. The casus pendens in the first half foregrounds a specific type of counterpart to the generic ‫צדיק‬. The person who trusts in his wealth is a specific kind of ‫רשע‬. If the specific is shown in contradistinction to the generic of its opposite, the latter is necessarily viewed through the prism of 366 Here the leaves are a comparison (with ‫ )כ‬in the second hemistich, which suggests an implied metaphor (comparison without ‫ )כ‬is called for in the first hemistich. 367 This is not really a metaphor, as Luchsinger (2010, 190) claims, since the comparative particle ‫ כ‬is used; cf. v. 30, where the absence of ‫ כ‬makes a full metaphor of the botanical image for life. 368 Respectively Ps 1:3; Isa 1:30; 34:4; 64:5; Ezk 47:12 (for ‫ ;)נבל‬Lev 26:36; Job 13:25 (for ‫)נדף‬. 369 Cf. the combination of leaves and fruit in rabbinic exposition of the proverb (see below). 370 So Ewald, followed by Wildeboer and others; mentioned in BHS, but not in BHQ.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

301

the former. The logic of the opposition requires the reader to understand that the general category of righteous people do not trust in their own wealth. This gap in the second hemistich is thus filled by the information provided by the first hemistich.371 Moreover, the prominence of the motif of trust (‫ )בטח‬is indicated by the construction of the casus pendens. Keeping the person who builds his trust on wealth in the pending case and then linking him to the third person masculine singular verb by means of another pronoun of the same person (‫)הוא‬, the construction strongly emphasises the idea (cf. Waltke, who seems to make a similar suggestion in a parenthesis). Downfall can mean death (cf. 1:19), but does not necessarily have to. It can also take the form of becoming undone in the social (cf. 16:18f.) or other unspecified (cf. 11:5-6) spheres. Wealth can be a blessing (cf. 3:14f.; 8:18; 13:8; 14:24; 18:11), but is also ephemeral (cf. 10:2; 11:4; 23:4-5). Thus not wealth itself is viewed unfavourably, but placing one’s trust in it, since only God is to be the object of trust (so Schipper, who refers to 3:5; 16:20; 28:25; 29:25).372 The same idea is also found in Ben Sira: “Do not trust in your wealth” (Sir 6:2a). But it is very old, as shown by the maxims of the Egyptian vizier Ptahhotep (3rd millennium BCE): Do not put trust in your wealth Which came to you as a gift of god.373 The interpretation of Gerondi seems to understand the proverb in terms of the interrelationship of the two hemistichs. The sprouting of a leaf is carried back to the first hemistich and turned into its opposite. According to him, a leaf grows faster than fruit, which means that the righteous will quickly be saved from their difficulties. There is no mention of adversity in the second hemistich, but there is in the first (coming to a fall). So the idea of adversity is, in its turn, carried forward to the second stich, which enables Gerondi to interpret the fast growth of a leaf as the speedy rescue from the righteous’ adversity. Conversely, the idea of swiftness that Gerondi finds in ‫פרח‬, projected back to the first half and taken to mean that whoever places his trust in wealth will quickly lose that wealth. The Vilna Gaon thinks that the possibility of falling is implied in the second half, which is obviously suggested by ‫ נפל‬in the first half. But when a leaf falls in autumn, it sprouts out again in spring, meaning that the righteous will sprout out and thrive even if they too come to a fall. Since this implies that the righteous can also come to a fall, it can be applied to address the problem that the nexus of deed and consequence does not always work with mechanical precision. Rabbi Bahya ben Asher (Spain, 13th century) interprets the first hemistich 371 Cf. Ps 92:13-16, where botanical imagery and green sprouting also express that the righteous (‫צדיק‬, ‫פרח‬, also with ‫כ‬-comparison, v. 13,) put their trust in Yahweh as their steadfast rock (v. 16) and experience well-being (v. 15, ‫[ רעננים‬green]). 372 Hausmann (1995, 53) affirms that misplaced trust is rejected in v. 28, but denies (n. 125) that even an indirect injunction to put trust in Yahweh can be seen in this verse. The indicative statement certainly is not an injunction (“Aufforderung”), but, as the references given by Schipper show, the implication that trust is to be placed elsewhere can only mean Yahweh. 373 Ptahhotep, Maxim 30, lines 432-433 (AEL I, 71; ANET, 414 has a different translation: “do not be miserly with thy wealth”).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

in light of the preceding statements about those seeking to harm others.374 For him, they are also the people who trust their own wealth and come to a fall or, in terms of v. 27b, encounter what they wanted to do to others. For Ramaq this kind of ‫ נפל‬means falling into the hands of one’s pursuers. Chrysostom interprets the Septuagint version, where the second hemistich has no botanical imagery and reads: ὁ δὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος δικαίων, οὗτος ἀνατελεῖ (but he who supports righteous people, he will spring up) According to him, whoever trusts in wealth will die without reaping the fruits of his work, whereas the helper of the righteous will rise in wisdom. Melanchthon offers a one-sentence interpretation, containing an idea found in the thought of Rabbi Bahya: Confidens suis divitiis, sæpe alios iniuste opprimit. (Who trusts in his own riches, often unjustly oppresses others)

11:29 Who disturbs his house will acquire wind, and a fool becomes a slave to the wise of heart. The line consists of a nominal and a verbal sentence with three stress beats each (so also Toy). Gemser scans it as 4+4, but that would require the last two words of both hemistichs to have stresses in adjacent syllables instead of forming one stress each, as the maqqeph indicates in both cases. According to Oesterley the verse “seems” to contain two independent proverbs (which would amount to two monostichs), but he offers no supporting argument. The parallelism is called “synonymous” by Toy, but the second half, which can indeed be said to restate the general point of the first, also takes its thought further.375 Despite causing ancient translators to struggle with the interpretation of ‫( עוכר‬similarly Meinhold), the Masoretic Text is not suspect. Difficulty to understand the idea of harming a house is not the same as a text-critical problem. BHS is not justified in dubbing the whole verse text-critically “corrupt” (with which BHQ does not concur). The versions do testify to this difficulty, but nevertheless translate the Hebrew participle ‫ עוכר‬in the first sentence to suggest a person acting foolishly towards his household. That can be readily seen in the case of the Peshitta, which shows its uncertainty about the meaning of the participle in the first hemistich. It notably offers two translations of the same verset and thus makes a tristich (in my terminology, a stich with three units, and not a tercet, which is a group of three connected stichs) out of the verse:376 374

See the note above on the connections between the proverbs noticed by rabbis. Fuhs also calls the parallelism “synonymous.” Waltke, according to whom the second statement “escalates” the misfortune spoken of in the first, calls the parallelism “synthetic;” similarly, Van Leeuwen finds a “further descent” in the second half. 376 See EE, which argues, in my opinion plausibly, that the Syriac presentation of v. 29 shows traces of being influenced by both the Greek and the Hebrew texts. The Greek must have 375

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

303

? ? €zÎçÃà ŒÎÃþæ fÀĀð zĀÚ ¿çÂx (a i) fÀĀÑæ (Who builds his house with deceit will leave moaning to his children) ? f¿Ð{㠀zÎçÃà ÇáóæfzĀÚàŽ¾Ý ¿ćàx (a ii) (Who does not stay quietly in his house will bequeath wind to his children) f¿ćäÚÞÑà ÁËÃï À{Íæ ¿ćáÞé{ (b) œ (And the fool will be a slave to the wise) If one can harm (‫ )עכר‬his own body (cf. v. 17), he can also do so to his household (15:27, with the same two words),377 which would include his children, slaves and estate as a whole (Waltke: his “chattel property”). Van Leeuwen refers to 19:14 as evidence that a house is an inheritance, (and adds that it is to be built up with wisdom according to 24:3-4), which is pertinent to the interpretation of this proverb.

Fox moots the question who the troublemaker of the first hemistich is. The Septuagint seems to favour an interpretation that it is a son as a prospective heir, saying as it does, “he will inherit” (κληρονομήσει), not “he will bequeath.” The Peshitta is quite clear that it must be the father, since it speaks of a father leaving something to his children. In the Hebrew text, it can be the father of the household, but it could also be his son. • If it is the father, it would entail that somehow he does not do justice to his household, that is, his family, servants and property (so Meinhold, Plöger, Murphy, Waltke, Schipper and most older commentators such as Hitzig, Delitzsch, Wildeboer and Toy). The father then acquires wind, that is, nothing (cf. Qoh 1:14; Jer 5:13). In this case ‫ נחל‬has the meaning “to acquire” (e.g. Num 26:55; Josh 16:14), “to own” (e.g. Ex 34:9; Ps 82:8), or “to take possession of” (e.g. Ex 23:30; Isa 57:13). The father would then have created a mere puff of wind out of his earlier estate and find himself in a state of financial ruin.378 Alternatively, the Qal may also mean that the father, as a result of his inappropriate actions, can now only bequeath wind = nothing to his son, although the Hiphil would rather be expected in that case. In any event, these alternatives boil down to the same factual situation. • If, on the other hand, the troublemaker is a potential beneficiary of the estate, that is, a son, he would receive wind as his inheritance instead of a thriving household (cf. the ideal in 31:10-31). Then the verb ‫ נחל‬would prompted the interpretation of “house” as “children” (cf. the participle συμπεριφερόμενος [being adapted to, in tune with], which requires persons to be in accord with). The Hebrew ‫ינחל‬ was then possibly read as Hiphil (bequeath), but the Qal (inherit), can also be used for the former meaning (see the notes below on ‫)נחל‬. 377 Clifford mentions Achan (Josh 7:25) and Saul (1 Sam 14:29) as examples of a “troublemaker” (‫ )עכר‬of a collective entity. 378 This is expressed with the Qal of ‫( נחל‬which occurs four times in the Book of Proverbs, cf. THAT II, 55). The Hiphil of ‫( נחל‬cf. 8:21; 13:22; Jer 3:18; 12:14; Zech 8:12) would mean “to bequeath” or “to give as inheritance,” although the Qal can also be used for this meaning (Num 34:17f.; Josh 19:49); see KAHAL, s.v. ‫נחל‬, for details and further examples.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

mean “inherit” or “receive as inheritance.”379 Fox, following Riyqam, prefers this reading on the grounds that it gives a greater coherence to the two halves of the proverb. He does acknowledge that ‫( ביתו‬with the third person masculine singular suffix) suggests the father as owner of “the house,” while, on the other hand, the son rather than the father would expect an inheritance. Since the verb does not necessarily have to mean that specific reference is made to an inheritance being transferred to a son, both readings are possible, or relevant (as Fox calls them). On both counts the person causing the trouble has to bear the result of his own making. Nevertheless, what makes Riyqam’s reading attractive, is that the relation of the two hemistichs comes into focus. If the ‫ עוכר‬is one among the father’s sons who causes strife about the inheritance issue,380 he will inherit nothing (first hemistich). Moreover, he will be seen as a stupid fool (‫אויל‬, cf. on 1:7 in Vol. I) and be subjected to the management of the estate by someone who is “wise of heart” 381 (second hemistich). It is not expressly said that the latter is a slave who now becomes master of the foolish person, neither is it expressly said that the fool is the troublemaker, but this is suggested by the interrelationship of the two hemistichs – exactly as the social reversal between a slave (‫ )עבד‬and a problematic son (‫ )בן מביש‬in the context of the administration of an estate (‫ )נחלה‬is pictured in 17:2. 382 This would be a real disgrace, for slaves ruling over their social superiors would normally be frowned upon (cf. 19:10). If an intelligent slave is needed to handle the estate affairs, it implies both that the father is dead and that the all too familiar brotherly disturbances (root ‫ )עכר‬concerning an inheritance have set in (cf. Gen 27, which shows that this can begin even when the death of the father is still impending). The extraordinary situation may also be reflected in the syntax of the second hemistich, which has the subject (‫ )אויל‬in the opening position, thereby dividing the predicate phrase in two: ‫ לחכם־לב‬... ‫ועבד‬. That heightens the emphasis on “slave,” as though this is too unusual a picture to contemplate, “and a fool really becomes a slave to a wise person.” In this way the function of the proverb would be to paint a deterrent picture of the consequences of This is also expressed in the Qal of the verb. cf. KAHAL, s.v. ‫נחל‬. Pilch too seems to think in terms of a son who eyes an inheritance, since he speaks of the foolish behaviour as something that “can cost a troublemaker his or her inheritance.” However, neither here nor at 19:10 does Pilch comment on the exceptional circumstance of slaves ruling the affairs of their social superiors. Cf. Whybray, who finds the proverb an illustration of “the precarious situation of the social class from which these proverbs come.” 381 ‫חכם־לב‬. Cf. 10:8; 14:33; for the opposition of ‫ חכם‬to ‫( אויל‬as here), cf. 12:15; 17:28; to ‫כסיל‬, cf. 3:35 and to ‫סכל‬, cf. Qoh 2:19. 382 Tuinstra points out that a sapiential text from the Cairo Geniza (IX, 3f.) mentions that fools need to be ruled by wise people. Here however, the wise are not thought of as slaves or former slaves. 379 380

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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selfish troublemaking within families. It would aim to be a disincentive, warning against the “dangerous consequences” of the “pursuit for selfish or harmful gains.”383 Gerondi regards the troublemaker as a miser who begrudges the members of his household the means to be sensibly occupied. He will find that his means dry up so that he is left with wind = nothing. From the second hemistich Gerondi infers that the children of such a person would be inferior and even become slaves to the wise, because they were never taught the wealth of Torah. Rashi inverts the subject and the predicate of the first hemistich and interprets: ‫אדם עצל שינחל רוח תמיד ואינו יגע בתורה ולא במלאכה סוף עוכר את בני ביתו שאין‬ ‫להם מה לאכול‬ (A lazy man who always inherits wind and does not come to Torah or an occupation, will in the end trouble the children of his house, since there will not be something for them to eat) That means that a lazy man who – naturally – only achieves wind and never engages in work on Torah or respectable labour, will become a burden to his family because they will have nothing to eat due to his failure. This makes the proverb a very simple, almost banal, statement on the consequences of sloth. The Mezudat David interprets in a comparable way by also making the subject a lazy man, but then ingeniously interprets the wind (‫ )רוח‬to be discord. The wind he inherits as a consequence of his laziness is the discord of his undernourished family. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra soberly states that the troublemaker-slave is the fool as opposed to the wise of heart, which seems intended to prevent mistaking the unusual word order to mean “a slave will be a fool to the wise at heart.” Ramaq keeps to the natural Hebrew word order: he who troubles his family by his misconduct, will end up having nothing. Ralbag, in turn, takes the house metaphorically as a reference to the (lazy) man himself. He will thus harm his own person. For the innovative reading given by Riyqam, see above.384 The Patmos manuscript of the commentary by Chrysostom is defective at 11:29– 12:3. But Hill385 provides substitutes from the catena commentaries which suggest that the first half of the proverb advises a man to spend time in the interests of his family at home, while the second half suggests that slaves too can have sense and should seek it. Thomas Aquinas386 uses the proverb together with Ps 48:21 (Hebr 49:21) as a substantiating text for arguing that it is lawful to kill sinners. The argument is that a sinner has departed from the order of reason (cf. ‫ אויל‬in the second hemistich) and has fallen into the “slavish state of beasts” (cf. ‫ עבד‬with ‫ )אויל‬testified to by the psalm, and may therefore be killed like an animal. The proverb prompts an extended discussion from Melanchthon, who states (with reference to Homer and Vergil) that the proverb is aimed at ill-humoured (morosus), inconsiderate (praefractus) and polemically-minded (contentiosus) people. These are 383 Stewart (2016, 138), writing about a negative aspect of what she calls the “model of desire” in the Book of Proverbs. 384 From 11:29 to 12:19 there is no comment or explanation in the Midrash Mishle (cf. Visotzky [1992, 141]). 385 Hill (2006, 122, 223). 386 Thomas Aquinas, Sum Theol II, ii, 64, 2.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

intolerant individuals who cause the most terrible discord to erupt, often from insignificant beginnings. They disrupt “their house” and will find that they reap wind, namely incurable discord (discordias insanabiles) with private as well as public ramifications. This understanding of the motif of “wind” in the proverb is surprisingly similar to that found in the Mezudat David.

11:30 The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life, and the wise man enthrals souls. Van Leeuwen comments that “a fully satisfactory solution [to the problems of this proverb] remains to be found.” A perfect solution does seem elusive, but perhaps progress can be made in that direction. Beginning with the rhythmic pattern, the first hemistich may either have three or four stresses, depending on whether one agrees with the maqqeph connecting ‫ פרי‬and ‫צדיק‬. Since there is no compelling reason to emend ‫( ַצ ִדּיק‬righteous person) to ‫( ֶצ ֶדק‬righteousness), it is not necessary to connect the first two words into a single stress unit and the pattern is consequently 4+3.387 Two further text-critical remarks remain to be made. The first concerns the penultimate word, which appears with an erroneous ‫ שׂ‬in the Codex Leningradensis (‫)נפשׂות‬ but with the correct ‫ שׁ‬in the Codex Aleppo, the Cambridge Ms 1753 and many others. The ‫ שׂ‬is obviously a lapsus calami and is usually recognised as such. The second issue concerns the last word, which is sometimes read as ‫( חמס‬violence), e.g. BHS, Toy, Oesterley (with some reservation), Gemser, McKane, Murphy and others. But it is not necessary to first assume that an antithetic parallelism is needed and then that it has to be “restored” in this way (see below).

Like the previous verse, the proverb is a “synonymous” parallelism.388 But if the consecutive “synonymous” proverbs are taken together, they stand in an antithetic relation to each other and are therefore neither a pair in the sense of a “repeated” proverb nor unrelated to the preference for antitheses in Prov 10-15: v. 29 v. 30

A A

negative positive

// //

B B

negative positive

– –

downfall of the fool (Waltke) flourishing of the righteous (Waltke)

387 If the ‫צ ִדּ יק‬-‫ק‬ ַ ‫ ֶצ ֶד‬change is made, the first two words together would have one stress and the pattern would be 3+3. Gemser considers both possibilities but seems to prefer 4+3, yet he still emends the text under the influence of the Septuagint, which at this point has δικαιοσύνη, the Greek equivalent of ‫( ֶצ ֶדק‬righteousness). But Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the Peshitta, Targum and Vulgate support the Masoretic Text. The proverb contains a nominal and a verbal sentence, unless the participle ‫ֹלק ַח‬ ֵ is taken as the subject of a second nominal sentence instead of the predicate of the second hemistich (which is grammatically possible, but improbable in the context); see below on the proposal by Luchsinger. 388 According to Heim (2013, 281), the other non-antithetical proverbs in the chapter are vv. 7, 22 and 25; but see also v. 16.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

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This may well be the reason why they have been edited together. On the other hand, as the text now stands, v. 30 can even be seen together with v. 31 as a suitable ending to Chap. 11, analogous to 10:31-32. According to Schipper, both chapter endings represent a combination of two verses indicative of the conclusion of the chapters in question (“Merkverse”). Still, the opposition between the parallelisms of vv. 29-30 should not be overlooked. The first hemistich contains what I would call a progressive metaphor. “The fruit of the righteous person” is the beneficial effect of what that person does, as the metaphor “fruit” is also used today. But when it is said that this fruit “is a tree of life,” the metaphor of the fruit is extended so that the deeds of the righteous person become a tree giving life (objective genitive, the tree brings forth life and sustains life). The fruit not only feeds the one who eats it, but it also contains the seed from which another tree can grow389 and produce further life-giving nourishment. The work of the righteous person thus exponentially expands as a fruit nourishes once and then grows into a tree that repeatedly increases the same benefits.390 The progressive metaphor can be spoken of as a “tree metaphor,”391 but here the primary image is that of nourishing fruit. The second hemistich presents problems to many interpreters, ancient and modern. The main problem is how to understand the phrase ‫( לקח נפשות‬take souls/lives).392 Taking a ‫ נפש‬means to kill (cf. 1:19; 1 Sam 24:12; 1 Kgs 19:10, 14; Ps 31:14; Ezk 33:6), which often occasions reading the last word as ‫חמס‬ (violence) instead of ‫( חכם‬wise), to which I have referred above.393 In the article just cited Snell argues that the noun ‫ ֶל ַקח‬means “understanding” (cf. 1:5; 4:2; 7:21) and that the root may therefore mean something in this direction. He who understands souls/people would be associated with a sapiential teacher. This builds on an idea developed by Ramaq in the 12th century and accepted also by Schipper. Although the verb never means “teach,” the association can suggest taking hold of people’s minds, thus to enthral them (Fox: 389 So Clifford (“Such fruit grows into a tree of life ...”), but Delitzsch states: “This fruit is a tree of life” (my italics). 390 Waltke, who speaks of an “incomplete metaphor,” says that “fruit is organically pregnant in the seed,” which, I suppose, can be said cum grano salis, because when the seed germinates and becomes a tree, that tree’s fruit can be regarded as having been organically in the seed (cf. Heb 7:9f.). 391 So Schipper, who refers to v. 28; 3:18; 15:4. He cites Bauks (2015; 25f.) for the motif of the tree of life as an originally sapiential concept, as well as Ps 1:5 and Hartenstein & Janowski (2012, 38-40) for correspondences between Ps 1 and Prov 11:28-30 – in which Janowski pays attention to the tree imagery of the psalm. 392 Cf. the excursus by Heim (2001, 145-146); Irwin (1984, 97-100) thinks of an intended contradiction. 393 The vague translation in the Septuagint ψυχαὶ παρανόμων (the souls of outlaws) may suggest that the translator was adapting to what he knew about translations of ‫ חמס‬in the Septuagint (cf. the list by Snell [1983, 364, footnote 2]), but not necessarily that this word stood in his Hebrew Vorlage.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

“captivate souls”). Such a person is wise and certainly knows how to teach. If this is correct, the metaphorical first hemistich finds its precision here. He is not only a ‫צ ִדּיק‬, ַ but he provides the nourishment from the tree of life through his teaching. Although the parallelism does not consist of wordfor-word correspondences, it is quite discernible and all the ideas are there. 11:30a fruit of the righteous is a tree giving life

→ ↔ ↔ ↔

11:30b [beneficial influence] a wise man enthrals living souls

A similar – though not identical – thrust is suggested by Luchsinger394 in his survey of possible combinations of positive (+) and negative (-) constituents in subjects and predicates of two hemistichs. For v. 30a he proposes [fruit of the righteous +], [tree of life +] and for v. 30b he gives [win +], [souls +] and [wise +]. I would rather combine what he calls the winning of souls into one positive “plus” (win souls as the predicate, not the subject), followed by a second “plus” (the wise man as subject). Rabbinic understanding of the proverb mostly takes the fruit mentioned in the first hemistich as the deeds of the righteous.395 According to Rashi, the fruit of the righteous deeds becomes a tree from which in turn springs life “for the world” (or “for ever,” since his phrase ‫ לעולם‬can mean both). The Mezudat David states that the merit of the good deeds earned by the righteous is life growing on a tree. Thus the fruit is life. For Malbim the righteous of the first hemistich have to be distinguished from the wise mentioned in the second half. The righteous person spreads life for those who eat the fruit he produces, which is his deeds. The wise, on the other hand, have a different effect, for they attract people by their wise teaching. In fact, the second hemistich is usually taken to refer to teaching (cf. above on Ramaq). Rashi supports the interpretation of ‫ לקח‬as “acquiring” in the sense of luring through teaching. He supports this with a reference to Gen 12:5, where the slaves acquired by Abraham and Sarah396 in Haran are mentioned. The Targum Onqelos presents the same incident to mean that the acquired slaves were subjected to Torah. Similarly, the Midrash Rabbah397 refers to Noah whose offspring and righteousness are mentioned in Gen 6:9, where the offspring is interpreted as Noah’s righteous deeds. In a cursory commentary on texts from the Book of Proverbs, Hippolytus (c. 170236)398 summarily states that “the fruit of righteousness” (cf. the Septuagint rendering of the first half, ἐκ καρποῦ δικαιοσύνης) and the tree of life (Septuagint: δένδρον 394

Luchsinger (2010, 222, cf. 217-218). Later the idea of the deeds of the righteous was also combined with the motif of children as the fruit of their bodies. So Yaakov Kamenetsky (1891-1986), in whose opinion the fruit/ children of the righteous are raised according to the Torah, which then brings them eternal life (Ginsburg [1998] 2009, 213). 396 A reference to Gen 21:7 in the Midrash Tanchuma is also comparable. The plural referring to children raised by Sarah is taken to mean that she raised others’ children to become converts. 397 Ber Rab 30,2. 398 In Prov (ANF V, 173). 395

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

309

ζωῆς) is Christ. His life is “of himself” (αὐτοζωή) and produces fruits of knowledge like a tree. Then Hippolytus explicitly identifies this tree with the tree of life in the Paradise Narrative and thus with the remedy for exclusion from its fruit (Gen 3:22). Evagrius Ponticus (346-399)399 is quite unambiguous in his Scholia on Proverbs when explaining that, although this tree was also situated in the middle of Eden (Gen 2:9), it only became forbidden fruit after the advent of sin in the world (Gen 3:22, 24). According to him, its “seeds of righteousness” (τὰ σπέρματα τῆς δικαιοσυύνης) became more trees for nourishment unto life. His contemporary, Chrysostom (347407), also gives a highly theological exposition by interpreting the Greek second hemistich in terms of the problem of theodicy. The text says, ἀφαιροῦνται δὲ ἄωροι ψυχαὶ παρανόμων (the lives of the lawless will be taken away before their time) But this does not happen often in real life. The question therefore arises how the opposite (i.e., the early death of those who deserve a long life and a long life enjoyed by others) can be explained. Chrysostom answers that the intended lesson of the proverb is that one should practice virtue as a matter of choice, which implies: not because one has to do so for the sake of reaping the reward. Melanchthon closely relates the two halves of the proverb. The advice (consilia, v. 30b) of the righteous and their deeds (actiones, v. 30a) are as salutary as a lifegiving tree. He adds an argument from his own practical observation, namely that the righteous makes a wise governor who achieves concord and shows leniency, which in turn is borne out by one of Jesus’ beatitudes (Matt 5:5, “Blessed are the mild, for they shall inherit the earth”). Melanchthon thus relays the Hebrew proverb through his own contemporary experience, which he can then use as a filter to relate the proverb with a New Testament text, thereby making allegory or typology unnecessary.

11:31 If the righteous is repaid on this earth, then surely also the wicked and the sinner. The proverb is a Siebener (4+3, so Gemser) and consists of one verbal sentence in the form of a conditional construction. The style is the interesting aspect of this saying, since the condition of the protasis is implied to be fulfilled and is followed by the conjunctive phrase ‫( אף כי‬how much more). Therefore the parallelism is neither synonymous nor antithetic, but climactic (Meinhold, Waltke; called “progressive” by Toy). The particle ‫ הן‬is used to introduce the protasis (cf. Ex 4:1; 8:22; Jer 3:1; parallel to ‫ אם‬in Hag 2:12f.; 2 Chron 7:13). Garr400 has shown that statements where ‫ הן‬is used either in a conditional protasis or in other functions (cf. Job 21:27; Deut 31:27), even when an epistemic verb like ‫ ידע‬is absent (Deut 5:24[21]; Job 13:1; 19:7 et al.), “assert speaker knowledge.” It 399 400

Gohl (2017, 46). Garr (2004, 328).

310

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

therefore stands to reason that ‫ הן‬is often used to introduce “a logical premise that, from the speaker’s viewpoint, conditions a highly predictable, inevitable, or obvious consequence (see Gen 15:3).”401 Such a premise “can even lead to an inexorable a fortiori inference (‫)וחמר קל‬.” This is what we have in the present proverb, so that Garr can include the verse in his list of relevant cases and add, 402 ... the function of the ‫ הן‬utterance remains constant. It presents information which the speaker knows to be reliable and true. At the same time, it presents information which forms the basis for a subsequent inference, directive, or active response.

Accordingly, it introduces collective knowledge, which the speaker not only accepts as true but also assumes to be shared by the addressees. It is the minimum on which the sage can build the argumentative maximum of the apodosis in the next hemistich. Applied to v. 31, the a fortiori logic entails three possibilities. First: [The righteous] [is repaid on this earth] – therefore, a fortiori, the wicked and sinner as well.

In this case, ‫ בארץ‬is taken as an adverbial phrase that qualifies the verb ‫ישלם‬ (is repaid); so Toy, Oesterley, Meinhold, Plöger, Murphy, Clifford, Schipper, Sæbø et al. Even the righteous is subject to the consequences of justice on this earth.403 Therefore the wicked and sinner should expect due retribution on this earth no less than the righteous. A second possibility is proposed by Barr:404 [The righteous in the earth] [is repaid] – therefore, a fortiori, the wicked and sinner as well.

Here ‫ בארץ‬is taken as an adjectival phrase that qualifies ‫( צדיק‬the righteous). Then the prepositional phrase would only be a stylistic device (cf. also Whybray). But if the righteous-in-the-land (the righteous of this world) are 401

Garr (2004, 331). Garr (2004, 332). In the rabbinic tradition the a fortiori or a minori ad majorem reasoning (= gradatio a minori ad majus) is called the qal wa-ḥomer argument, cf. Jacobs (1972, 222, for a list of the explicit cases in the Old Testament, and 223-225 for many more implicit cases). 403 Waltke gives a whole list of examples: Num 20:12 and Deut 3:23-26; 1 Sam 2:27-36; 2 Sam 12:9-12; 1 Kgs 11:9-13 and others (Moses, Aaron, Eli, David, Solomon etc.). The Midrash Rabbah tells a story about Noah who was late to feed the lion and consequently injured by the animal, making him unfit to sacrifice. If he was thus punished in this life for such a small infringement, how much more was the wicked generation of the flood punished by their death (see Ber Rab 30, 6; cf. also 30, 8 for Noah’s righteousness and 65,18 for the principle). 404 Barr (1975, 149-164, esp. 161). 402

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

311

repaid, then the wicked and sinner would, by the same token, be in-the-landtypes as well (thus, the wicked people and sinners of this world). Barr’s reading has no necessary impact on the issue addressed by the third interpretation (before or after death): The righteous is repaid [in the earth] – therefore, a fortiori, The wicked and sinner [in eternal death]

Waltke finds the proverb an instance of retribution after death (so perhaps also Fuhs, although somewhat vaguely). But his claim “that the preceding proverbs leave no doubt that their [the sinners’] eternal death is in view” has not removed my doubt. Not even the immediately preceding tree of life (v. 30) makes a reference to eternal life necessary and therefore hardly supports any idea of punishment by eternal death in v. 31. Waltke states that the verb ‫ שלם‬is gapped in the second hemistich, but not the prepositional phrase “in the land.” In opposition to Barr, he takes ‫ בארץ‬as an adverbial phrase – in my view, correctly. But with such close nexus to the verb, it is difficult to see why the one but not the other is gapped. Moreover, the only contrasting elements in the climactic parallelism are the righteous on the one hand and the wicked/sinner on the other. The a fortiori logic advances that all the elements not explicitly contrasted (righteous, wicked + sinner) are intensified in the second hemistich. This is further highlighted by Tuinstra, who points out the central position of the verb in the verse. As one sentence with one verb, the syntax thus centres the main motif of the proverb, viz. retribution. The first alternative above therefore seems the best. But that still leaves some questions to be considered. First, does the a fortiori logic imply that punishment for the wicked is “more certain” than reward is for the righteous? This is correctly rejected by Van Leeuwen, for it would leave the reasoning a minori ad majorem unexplained. In order to be valid, the same kind of reckoning is required in both cases (that is why the reasoning is also technically called a gradatio, a grading). Therefore, the meaning must be that the righteous are repaid not only for the good things they do, but also for their imperfections (so Delitzsch; cf. Barr, although this does not require considering ‫ בארץ‬an adjectival phrase405). That puts the climactic argument into focus: if such retribution happens to the righteous, then surely it must go for the wicked and the sinners as well. But, second, this does not eliminate the well-known observation that retribution in this life often does not take place as expected. The sages were well aware of the problem. Since the proverb’s logic requires that the righteous 405 Cf. Job 4:17-19; 25:4-6; Qoh 7:20; cf. also Num 20:12; 2 Sam 12:10-12 (so Van Leeuwen). Also see above on Waltke’s list of righteous people punished on earth and the story of Noah and the lion in the Midrash Rabbah.

312

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

too are not sinless, this suggestion may alleviate the difficulty, but it does not remove it. The proverb rather takes a nuanced stance on simplistic formulations of the deed-consequence link (Van Leeuwen). Still, there does seem to be a polemic ring to the insistence that retribution takes place in this life. Fox is probably right that the proverb’s stance also guards against another attempt to solve the problem, notably that rectification of remaining injustices in this life may only be possible in the afterlife. Qohelet knew this “solution” but rejected it (Qoh 3:19-21; cf. 9:2-3), and did so despite his conviction that also the best among people cannot avoid doing wrong (Qoh 7:20). V. 31 thus shields on three fronts: against rejection of the idea of retribution altogether, against a facile restatement of the other extreme (cf. Ps 37:25), as well as against a postponement of the rectification to the afterlife. Toy paraphrases, “he who sins even a little, will be punished, and he who sins much will receive greater punishment.” This position itself is also a restatement of the retribution principle, albeit a somewhat subtler rendering. But that is not how the proverb was understood by the Septuagint: εἰ ὁ μὲν δίκαιος μόλις σῴζεται, ὁ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἁμαρτωλὸς ποῦ φανεῖται; (But if the righteous is barely saved, then where will406 the wicked and sinner appear?) The verb ‫ שלם‬is here understood as “give peace” (‫ )שלום‬and thus glossed as σῴζεται (he is saved). But μόλις (barely) eliminates the impossible a fortiori conclusion that the wicked are saved even more (so EE). The retribution coming upon the wicked is then expressed by making the second hemistich a rhetorical question – the sinner has no chance. Plöger suspects that the translator was offended by the idea that retribution only takes place on earth and therefore created a reference to being saved. That is why it was possible for the Septuagint rendering to be cited in 1 Pet 4:18.

Several commentators consider v. 31 a fitting end to the chapter (so Meinhold, Scherer,407 Heim,408 Waltke, Schipper409). Even if one does not subscribe to a theory of a sophisticated composition for the sayings, one can accept this view. For even so the sayings were not merely thrown together. The verse brings together the opposite types of ‫ צדיק‬and ‫ רשע‬once more (cf. also 10:32) and amplifies the religious character of the contrast by equating the wicked with the sinner (‫)חטא‬, so Meinhold. The idea is reinforced by comparison with 13:21f., where the same words occur, again together with ‫שלם‬. 406 The Greek verb φανεῖται is singular, so that the subject ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἁμαρτωλὸς is a hendiadys. This is followed by the Peshitta, where the verb is also singular: ÒÝĀþã (be found). 407 Scherer (1999, 88). 408 Heim (2001, 144-145) regards the verse as the ending of a whole cluster in vv. 22-31. 409 Schipper even combines the last two verses of both Chap. 10 and Chap. 11 to perform this function; see above on v. 30.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

313

Rashi neatly solves the problem of retribution on earth by interpreting the first hemistich as a requital of the righteous person’s sins already during his earthly life. According to him, the wicked person should therefore not feel confident if he himself prospers. He should rather realise that the requital of the righteous entails forgiveness, while the wicked will be “repaid either in his lifetime or after his death” (‫להשתלם לו‬ ‫)או בחייו או במותו‬. The contrast between “in his lifetime” and “after his death” shows that the wicked will anyway be punished, but also that forgiveness for the righteous is already granted while he is still on earth, so that he will not be punished after death. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra explicitly states that the first hemistich means that the righteous is repaid the wrong that he does on earth (‫)הרעות שיעשה בארץ‬. The Vilna Gaon echoes this view. Augustine refers to the proverb in conjunction with a quotation of 1 Pet 4:17f. in the tradition of the Septuagint. Commenting on Ps 94,410 he addresses the perennial problem of injustice to the righteous by the wicked and gives a paraphrasing answer that God does not spare even his faithful in order to teach them – which is one of the typical ways of dealing with the difficulty.411 Philipp Melanchthon calls this proverb an “admonition to be reckoned under the most important sayings of the book, which is quoted by Peter” (1 Pet 4:18). Perhaps under the influence of Augustine’s use of the proverb, he puts the issue in a rhetorical question quoted in Latin from 1 Pet 4:17: Quia tempus est, ut incipiat iudicium à domo Dei, si autem primum à nobis, quis finis est eorum, qui non credunt Euangelio Dei?412 (For it is time that judgement should begin at the house of God, if then first with us, what would the end be of those who do not believe the Gospel of God?) Thereby he Christianises the a fortiori logic of the proverb via 1 Pet 4:17-18 – which in turn quotes from the Septuagint – and, in typical Protestant fashion, Melanchthon relates it to the divine judgement on the basis of believing the gospel. He relates the whole “doctrine of Providence” (doctrina de Providentia) to the proverb. Providence (equated with God) holds consolation, so that Melanchthon can affirm that “there remains a judgement by which, without any doubt, the most certain punishment will be meted out to the impious.” Therefore he can uphold the idea of retribution for those who believe and for those who do not, without compromising his Protestant conviction of salvation by faith alone. With this belief, he can interpret the proverb clearly: Necesse est igitur post hanc uitam restare aliud iudicium. (It is therefore necessary that another judgement remains after this life) Therefore these rewards and punishments (præmia & pœnæ) are not momentary, but perpetual and durable (perpetuæ et durabiles). Melanchthon sticks to the traditional reference to a coming judgement, but does so by invoking the “doctrine of Providence,” which he writes with a capital letter and regards as essential to God’s 410

Exp Ps xciv, § 18 (NPNF I,8, 465). Suffering as teaching by chastisement occurs in both the Old and the New Testament; cf. for instance Ps 119:71, 75; Jer 31:18; Job 33:19-30; Heb 12:6-11. 412 This is Melanchthon’s own translation; the Vulgate has, quoniam tempus ut incipiat iudicium de domo Dei si autem primum a nobis qui finis eorum qui non credunt Dei evangelio. 411

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 11

character. An interesting aspect is that Melanchthon undergirds his lengthy exposition of the proverb with several examples from Old Testament narratives to illustrate how oppression and suffering in this life can be followed by judgement (Pharaoh, Saul, the exodus from Egypt, the deliverance from Babylon). This is an essential aspect of Melanchthon’s use of Scripture, in terms of which he incorporates all texts – even psalms and proverbs – into the overarching narrative line of the Bible.413

413 See Loader (2017, 5 [col. 12]). Melanchthon’s hermeneutical approach is aligned to that of Luther (or perhaps the other way round), since both of them stressed the narrative character of Scripture, including those texts that normally would not be labelled so (see Ellingsen 1983, 394).

INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 12

Bibl. Berger 1991, 118; Boström 1928, 133-139; Dahood 1960, 176-181; Dahood 1982, 60-62; Emerton 1964, 191-193; Freuling 2004, 109-110; Hausmann 1995, 12, 16f., 41, 66f., 173, 195f., 203, 206, 262, 314, 323; Heim 2001, 147-159; Hermisson 1968, 175-176; Krispenz 1989, 58-62; Pilch 2016, 41-46; Scherer 1999, 95-119; Scoralick 1995, 182-218; Tournay 1962, 489-505.

Themes and motifs Like the proverbs collected in the previous chapter, those in Prov 12 are again mostly antithetic.1 Often these concern the major theme of the opposition between the righteous and the wicked (‫ צדיק‬and ‫)רשע‬.2 Sometimes only one of the two types is mentioned but alternative hallmarks for human types are used instead (e.g. vv. 6, 10, 13). In several sayings the contrast is absent or only present in so far as positive and negative anthropological types are implied by other characterisations (e.g. vv. 14-20, 22-25). The nexus of deed and consequence occurs repeatedly.3 The chapter shows a continued interest in the themes that have already been introduced in the previous two chapters. In addition to the themes just mentioned, the motif of speech (e.g. vv. 13, 14, 16, 17-19, 22) is prominent in the chapter. A number of proverbs are thematically paired together (vv. 11f. as well as vv. 13f. and 15f.) and in two cases (vv. 1-3 and 17-19) there are groups of three, but these are not little poems.4 Although one does not have to agree with all his details, in my view Sæbø is correct when he points out that the predominance of proverbs “standing by themselves” (he uses quotation marks with the adjective “freistehend”) is higher in this chapter than in the previous ones. Chapter organisation In this chapter no less than in the previous two, several scholars have identified clusters of sayings or structured proverb units. Even a cursory survey of recent research results reveals that there is no consensus as to where these units are, how many there are or what their extent is. In this regard Murphy 1 Except vv. 9, 14 and the difficult v. 28 – so, for instance, Murphy (who however does not mention v. 28), Sæbø and Schipper (both of whom do include v. 28 among these). 2 E.g. vv. 5, 7, 21, 26; cf. also vv. 3, 28, where abstract nouns from the same roots are used. 3 Cf. the Introduction to Chap. 11 on the qualification of the nexus. 4 Within vv. 1-3, the terminology of the righteous/wicked is only explicit in v. 3; vv. 1719 on speech nevertheless borders on another proverb with that theme (v. 16).

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can judge this chapter in much the same way as he did the previous one. He finds Scoralick’s arguments5 for her division of two overarching units in 11:8–12:13 and 12:14–13:2 unconvincing “to determine structure,” but according to him, “they do indicate a careful assembling of the proverbs.” This coincides with the view I take. Perhaps Chap. 12 offers an even better illustration than the previous two of how the issue of clusters, groups and structures – or the lack of them – exemplify the “Rorschach phenomenon,”6 where different patterns can be detected and described equally feasibly by different observers. A short overview can illustrate the deficiency of consensus among scholars about both the extent of the clusters and the reasons offered by commentators for seeing what they see. Meinhold finds a structure of three times three verses (vv. 1-3; 5-7; 10-12) separated first by a single saying (v. 4) and then by a group of two (vv. 8-9). He finds a chiasmus in the first and last lines of each group (vv. 1 and 3; 5 and 7; 10 and 12) but does not clarify what constitutes such patterns. One may speak of a “chiastic evaluative pattern,” as Waltke does, but for him this chiasmus is found in two other verses, viz. vv. 2-3. However, the chiastic pattern “+ :: -, - :: +” (as Waltke calls it) does not integrate the beginning and end of the cluster because the same would apply for the relation of v. 2 to v. 3 as for the relation of v. 1 to v. 3. In the second of these groups, again, the words ‫ צדיקים‬and ‫ רשעים‬indeed appear in the order ‫רשעים – צדיקים‬, ‫ צדיקים – רשעים‬in vv. 5 and 7, but ‫רשעים‬ also occurs in the first hemistich of the verse in between (v. 6), directly parallel to the first half of v. 7. Moreover, Meinhold claims that these catchwords (“Stichwörter”) characterise the three units of three proverbs he discerns, but the pair is absent in vv. 1, 2, 8 and 9, while only one of the two occurs in vv. 6, 8 and 9. On the thematic level, Waltke finds an educational proverb in v. 1, an ethical proverb in v. 2 and a theological saying in v. 3. Apart from the unclarity about what makes v. 2 less theological or religious than v. 3 (Yahweh is mentioned in v. 2 and not in v. 3), these verses are often presented quite differently by others.7 Lucas follows the same grouping as Meinhold 5

Scoralick (1995, 182-216); Fuhs follows this demarcation. Also see the remarks on Scoralick in the Introduction to Chap. 11. 6 A test developed by Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922) in which folded inkblot patterns are recognised by different observers to represent very different images. The less clear the image stimulus is, the more likely observers describe it in their own terms; see Weiner (2008, 4-11) and cf. above, Introduction Par. 2.2.2 (ending) as well as Par. 2.2.3. 7 Heim: introduction in v. 1, support for it in v. 2, application of both in v. 3; Scherer (1999, 97-99): an introduction in vv. 1-2, but v. 2 aligned to v. 3 by means of ‫רשע‬, vv. 3-7 contain the oppositional pair of righteous people :: wicked people (however, not quite, since vv. 3a and 6b have to be excepted!); Hermisson (1968, 176): vv. 2-7 are grouped together, but one has to use word-fields rather than catchwords to substantiate why; while Meinhold sees v. 4 as a dividing mark between two units, Heim (2001, 148-149) declares it, on the contrary, to be a link between the surrounding clusters.

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and Heim, but for different reasons: not chiastic patterns (Meinhold) or the development of thought, viz. instruction → verdict → consequences (Heim),8 but “fundamental truths” constitute vv. 1-3. For the second putative group, Whybray finds a logical progression in vv. 5-7 (thoughts → expressions → consequences), while Heim calls it “plans – words – consequences” in a unit that links with vv. 1-3. However, Whybray does not make that link, preferring to suspect that v. 2 is an interpretation of the verse that follows it. As for Meinhold’s third unit (vv. 10-12), most commentators differ widely about what constitutes linked verses and why.9 The second half of the chapter is another inkblot containing many figures for several commentators. For Hermisson it consists of vv. 13-25 (on speech) minus v. 24, then v. 24+26-27 (partly on sloth), with an extra theological comment in v. 26 and a general conclusion in v. 28. Meinhold regards vv. 13-23 (mostly about speaking) as another cluster, but according to him it contains a subgroup within itself (vv. 17-19 as another threeliner, also involved in a complicated pattern of chiasms with the other verses up to v. 23), while a retro-linking group in vv. 24-28 concludes the chapter. Scherer10 concurs with vv. 13-23, for which he finds v. 21 the “theme verse,” however without clear substantiation. But the beginning and the end of this group are also controversial: Krispenz demarcates vv. 15-23 but finds no thematic unit in these proverbs, at least not in vv. 17-22. Nevertheless, she thinks that the theme of the whole section is right and wrong speech. However, the theme is not overtly apparent in all the verses, and where that is the case Krispenz opines that such unclear proverbs are drawn into the slipstream (“Sog”) of those that are clear and are thus perceived as such by the reader.11 Sæbø takes vv. 13-20 as a unit on correct speech (but finds five hemistichs that are irrelevant to this theme, followed by vv. 21-28, which he calls “a real motley”!). Schipper groups vv. 13-25 together, mostly on the theme of correct speaking, although they only contain general truths. According to him, they are followed in vv. 26-28 by a group of concluding proverbs that link back to earlier verses in the chapter as a whole (similar to Meinhold’s group of vv. 24-28).12 8

Heim (2001, 147). Hermisson (1968, 176) groups vv. 8-12 (honour and, somewhat vaguely, its opposite), then vv. 13-23+25; Waltke groups vv. 8-12 (deeds and property, similarly Lucas), vv. 13-14 (words and deeds, simultaneously a Janus looking backwards and forwards); Whybray, Heim and Schipper agree about grouping vv. 13-25, but differ in how v. 24 is to be treated/counted in this regard (Heim says that vv. 26-28 form a section that is “opened up” by v. 24). 10 Scherer (1999, 100). 11 Krispenz (1989, 60). 12 Not quite the same, but similar is the even more involved structure found by Sæbø, according to whom vv. 21-28 link up with vv. 1-4 to encircle the whole chapter, which in his opinion is again made up of two groups, viz. vv. 5-12 and 13-20. Thereby he cuts across the two main clusters identified by Waltke (vv. 1-14 and 15-28, see above). 9

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Tuinstra finds vv. 24-28 typical sapiential sayings on a wide spectrum of topics, however without discernible links backward to what he identifies as somewhat disparate groups in vv. 1-12 and 13-23. Finally, it is worth noting that Delitzsch even regards v. 28 as the proverb concluding a still bigger unit, namely 10:1–12:28 by virtue of what Delitzsch perceives as the sublimity and weight of this verse. Of course, this overview does not purport to present all details involved in the sketched opinions, nor can it subsume all proposals put forward. But it does give an indication that: (a) almost every reader presents a picture that differs from that of almost every other reader; (b) some groupings can be defended by formal or thematic arguments, even if one concedes that arguments for opposing units can likewise be produced; (c) considerable overlap between the presentations of various commentators exists, even when they offer differing arguments in support of their specific views or where such substantiations are unclear. That so many patterns are seen in the edited proverbs coincides with the observation mentioned above, namely that the number of differing patterns seen in the Rorschach inkblot test rises in proportion to the lack of unassailable markings in the images. In other words, the more combinations, groups, clusters and pairs are possible or thinkable, the more will be seen and described. Mostly the proposals summarised above are conceivable possibilities on the grounds provided in defence of them. By the same token, that means that it is not so easy to demonstrate “right” and “wrong,” although pros and cons can of course be discussed. Applying the Rorschach principle13 to these proverbs (and to others in Prov 10–29) entails that such formations be considered, but also that one does not begin from the presupposition that exquisite compositional patterns must necessarily be there. Whether or not the present positioning of the proverbs was purposely designed to form (some) clusters, commentators can show how they come to see such patterns in the collected proverbs. Whether a moth, the horns of an antelope or two damsels looking away from each other, this lies in the realm of the reader’s creative involvement with what the text – or, better, what happened to the text – allows. But that still does not absolve the reader from considering such associations for plausibility on the level of the redaction of the book, which was edited in historical contexts. Even less does it absolve the interpreter from the obligation to examine the individual proverbs in their own right as well. 13

Cf. Fox (2009, 481).

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 12

319

Social background Schipper identifies – as he does in chapters 11 and 13 – a privileged class whose interests are addressed in several of the proverbs. If vv. 5 and 24 provide evidence to go by, it is even possible that people with ruling authority or power are included among these. Perhaps that was indeed the case when these proverbs originated, but the present literary context at best allows no more than an impression.

TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 12

As I have done in the previous chapters, I will usually translate proverbs individually, unless it is practical and convenient to present and discuss several at a time, which does not necessarily imply that they constitute a poem. This is the case with the first three verses in the chapter. 12:1-3 1

He who loves discipline loves knowledge, but he who hates reproof is an ignoramus. The good person will obtain favour from Yahweh, but the scheming man he will condemn. A human being is not established by wickedness, but the root of the righteous will never be shaken.

2 3

As I have argued above, it is difficult to see in these proverbs a carefully construed introduction to a poetic unit consisting either of the first half of the chapter (vv. 1-14, Waltke) or the whole chapter (Heim, Lucas and others). But they are not thoughtlessly thrown together either. V. 1 does establish the conditions under which wisdom or foolishness characterises a person, v. 2 relates the moral order on which wisdom is founded to God as guarantor, and v. 3 presents a general formulation of the destiny both human categories can expect. Although there is no cohesion in the terminology describing the positive and the negative types and although there is no necessary logical development from the first to the third, it does make sense to open the chapter with a saying on the basic preconditions involved, a saying on God’s involvement, and one that represents the deed-consequence nexus. Having been thus juxtaposed, the three edited proverbs interact. Together they assume a function that they do not have individually, namely to become an editorial introduction to the chapter, which implies that there is indeed a caesura between the end of Chap. 11 and the beginning of Chap. 12.14 12:1 He who loves discipline loves knowledge, but he who hates reproof is an ignoramus. The proverb is an antithetical parallelism organised in a 4+3 rhythmic pattern, as Gemser scans it. Toy however considers the proverb a ternary stich, which 14

See below, after the exegesis of v. 3.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

321

would require taking ‫א ֵ ֽהב ָ ֑דּ ַעת‬ ֹ ֣ as a single stress unit. That would normally be understandable, but ‫א ֵ ֽהב‬ ֹ ֣ before the Qal infinitive of ‫ ידע‬has a relatively rare extra retarding accent15 indicating a pause between the two syllables in question. The proverb consists of two nominal sentences (substantival clauses, since all three participles behave like substantives). Both of them can be syntactically construed in different ways. In either case the first phrase can be the subject and the second the predicate: He who loves discipline loves knowledge, but he who hates reproof is an ignoramus.

Or it could be the other way round, which according to Delitzsch “lies nearest:” He loves discipline, who loves knowledge, but an ignoramus hates reproof.

Despite finding the subject in first position better in v. 1b, Delitzsch prefers the predicate in that position of v. 1a on the grounds that he sees no reason to invert the order of v. 1a to match the second (Whybray thinks just the opposite: predicate first in v. 1a, but not in v. 1b). Toy states that the first option (subject first) defines people by their attitude to instruction, that is, the disciplinary process offered by sapiential teaching. Accepting the disciplined system brings knowledge and rejecting it reveals one as a stupid boor. According to Toy, the second option defines people by their attitude to wisdom: sensitivity to wisdom brings acceptance of the educational system and contempt for wisdom causes one to reject being educated. In the end Toy proposes a combination of both, viz. the first option for the second hemistich and the second option for the first, but the general sense for all three remains the same. But another question also applies to both halves of the proverb. Who loves/ hates, the father/teacher or the son/pupil? Again, something can be said for both. Most commentators assume that the pupil is meant, but there are contexts attested to by other proverbs that make it viable that the father could be meant. Several proverbs, such as 13:2416 are only topical if there are fathers who indeed did not like disciplining their sons or at least neglected it.17 15

The Hebrew name of the accent (‫העמדה‬, “causing to stand still”) shows that a stop between the relevant syllables is necessary. It occurs at the unstressed syllable (usually to the left of the vowel, which is mainly a ṣērē) near the end of a word that is connected to the next word by a maqqeph or otherwise, with the latter word mostly stressed at its beginning, and often before a laryngeal consonant (see EJ 13, 637); all of these characteristics apply in this case. The ‫העמדה‬accent should not be confused with a silluq that occurs with the soph pasuq at the end of a verse. 16 Cf. also 22:15; 23:13f.; 29:15, 17; Sir 21:6; 30:1; Achikar No 4; cf. Crenshaw (1998: 147-149 [on the motif in Egyptian texts] and 203, 281); further the Introduction above, Essay 1 (Virtue between command and advice), § C.2. 17 On the other hand, 19:18, a warning not to strike a boy so excessively that he is killed, only makes sense if overly harsh punishment actually took place so that it also was necessary to curb punishment. See on 10:13 (Note on corporal punishment in the ancient Near East), and Fitzgerald (2008, 305).

322

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a son loving it to be thrashed, unless Murphy is right in claiming that the concepts of love and hate are here used “without the emotional impact” usually accorded them. Fox finds Murphy’s remark unclear and states that an appeal to emotion and intense feelings is, on the contrary, made throughout the book (e.g. embracing wisdom, loving her, and the like; cf. 3:13-18; 4:6; 7:3-4 etc.). But that is emotion or eros for wisdom, not for being flogged(!). Waltke in turn claims that the choice of the word “love” strikes “at the passions that motivate behavior.” But a father who spares the rod and thus hates his son (13:24) is indeed an ignoramus,18 for he disrespects the basic sapiential discipline that is necessary for bringing his son up to be a ‫( טוב‬v. 2) and a ‫( צדיק‬v. 3). That does not mean that a father who does chastise his son has pleasure in flogging the boy, but that he unemotionally19 chooses the right option (Murphy). It is true, the idea is attested that pupils may also rue the fact that they hated ‫ מוסר‬and despised ‫( תוכחת‬5:12f.).20 But that does not invalidate the argument, since this pictures a foolish son who ran into trouble later in life and only then rues the fact that he did not pay heed to discipline and reproof during his education, or – so to speak – that he did not pay attention to the wisdom of 12:1. The proverb can thus be read both ways. Notwithstanding the difference in focus, it retains the same general sense whether read from the perspective of the father/teacher or from that of the son/pupil. We could paraphrase the father’s perspective21 as: Who accepts he has to mete out discipline actually imparts knowledge, but who rejects reproving boys is himself an ignoramus.

18 Wildeboer: homo brutus; Schultens: brutus est (he is irrational). The Latin word is used of irrational animals by Pliny the Elder [e.g. Hist Nat IX, 86; XI, 183 and 226]); the Vulgate: insipiens est (he is insipid, stupid). The word ‫ בער‬occurs five times in the Old Testament; it is primarily associated with unthinking animals, Prov 30:2; Pss 49:11 (cf. v. 21); 73:22; further, cf. Ps 92:7. 19 Similarly Moss, who calls the love/hate word pair an illustration “that wisdom requires a decisive choice,” although he only pays attention to the recipient’s perspective. Hausmann (1995, 173) regards the pair as an indication of a close association between one’s own participation in the education process and its success, while ‫ אהב‬specifically shows the close relationship of discipline and knowledge (so Plöger, whom she cites). Thus she also suggests a non-emotional choice of lexemes in this proverb, as does Plöger and perhaps Whybray, whom she also cites. Of course, that does not deny that emotions have no place in Proverbs – on the contrary, desire is often used as a motivational model (cf. Stewart [2016, 138-144]). 20 Cf. 10:17, where the son is in the foreground, since there the verbs ‫( שמר‬keep to) and ‫עזב‬ (abandon) are used and not the love/hate opposition. But also in that proverb the receiver of the ‫מוסר‬/‫ תוכחת‬becomes one who imparts it. 21 Although 12:1 is not quoted, the idea of a father chastening a son out of love is applied to God in 3:12 and interpreted in the Talmud as suffering (‫יסורין‬, the same root as ‫מוסר‬ [Berachot 5a]).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

323

And the son’s perspective: Who accepts discipline actually accepts the source of his own knowledge, but who does not accept being reproved is an ignoramus.

Both readings express the sine qua non for acquiring wisdom, an element so essential that it features in the very opening of the book (1:2f.). The prominence of the motif of discipline in the keynote to the book corresponds to the two possible perspectives for reading 12:1, since it is directed at both naive learners (1:4) and established teachers (1:5).22 However, ‫ מוסר‬can also mean “correction” as a form of instruction even if the element of discipline is not absent altogether (cf. the commentary on 1:2). When read in this way, the father/teacher can still be the subject, although the son/pupil would make a more probable subject, since the idea of “loving” to receive instruction as opposed to hating it is more apposite than the idea of loving to rebuke people. In this case the use of the verb ‫ אהב‬would be less problematic because it would entail being pleased with correction as a form of help, and there would be no need to soften it to mean accepting something unpleasant.23 This is how the proverb has often been understood by Jewish interpreters. According to Yonah Gerondi (13th century), if one makes a mistake but then welcomes being corrected, one is intelligent and avoids being the captive of one’s lusts like an animal. The Mezudat David (18th century) seems to imply a similar notion. It claims that the love of discipline, which amounts to ethical teaching, provides knowledge that one previously did not have,24 while the Vilna Gaon construes ‫מוסר‬/‫ תוכחת‬to mean the discipline of suffering as a prerequisite for understanding Torah. In the next century, Malbim developed a view similar to that of Gerondi by making room for self-discipline in the concept. In his opinion, discipline is to keep one’s animal-like desires under control. In the catena note to 12:1 (Chrysostom’s running commentary lacks 12:1-3) the discipline is likened to a sick person’s will to be cured. Only one who has this will/ discipline can receive grace. Melanchthon has an extended exposition in which he goes to great lengths to associate the proverb with the pursuit of truth and justice. That enables him to explain the phrase ‫אהב מוסר‬, relate the entire proverb to the Law and finally to Christ. We have to accept the injunction, “Humiliate yourselves under the mighty hand of God” (Humiliamini sub potenti manu Dei, 1 Pet 5:6), which implies the will to accept discipline and eventually results in exaltation by God. An example is King David who understood that he had sinned, but actually willed obedience25 to God’s law (obedientiam vult), and only then was rehabilitated.26 Therefore strict 22

See Vol. I, 56-58 on 1:2f. and 59-62 on 1:4f. Cf. THAT I, 67. 24 Thereby it avoids having to deal with the semantics of ‫ אהב‬associated with caning. 25 This is the closest Melanchthon’s exposition comes to the relevant Hebrew phrase ‫אהב מוסר‬. 26 Cf. 2 Sam 12:13; 24:12-14; Ps 51:6. This again illustrates Melanchthon’s penchant for situating non-narrative parts of Scripture in an overarching narrative covering Old and New Testaments; see above on his handling of 11:31. 23

324

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

discipline is prescribed to parents, magistrates, teachers and others in the service of administering justice. For Paul says, Lex est paedagogus in Christum (the Law is a tutor unto Christ, Gal 3:24).

12:2 The good person will obtain favour from Yahweh, but the scheming man he will condemn. The two hemistichs consist of a verbal sentence each, organised in a clear 4+3 rhythmic pattern in seven words. The two hemistichs are firmly integrated in that the third person masculine singular subject (he) of the last verb (‫)ירשיע‬ has its antecedent (Yahweh) in the prepositional phrase of the first hemistich. The parallelism is antithetic but the two main contrasting concepts (the good person [‫טוב‬, subject] and the scheming man [‫איש מזמות‬, object]) occupy the same position at the beginning of their respective half-verses and are both followed by a verb in the Hiphil imperfect (‫ יפיק‬and ‫)ירשיע‬.27 The good person28 is one who fulfils the sapiential ideal. Following as it does immediately on v. 1b it suggests the opposite of the kind of person who is there called a brute ignoramus and thus confirms the general equality of wise and good. The syntax makes it possible that the subject of the verb in the second hemistich may be God or the good man. The latter is unlikely because it would dilute the antithesis of the parallelism. The contrasting human types have contrasting experiences, which would be distorted if the receiver of the first half becomes the doer in the second half.29 By virtue of the parallelism, the judicial use of the verb ‫ רשע‬Hiphil (declare guilty, condemn)30 has an effect on the first hemistich. Therefore, the idea of finding favour should be understood under its impact, just as being condemned 27

See below for other views of the grammar in the verse. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra explicitly points out that in this case the single word ‫( טוב‬good) is to be understood as ‫( איש טוב‬good man). Cf. further 2 Sam 18:27; 1 Kgs 2:32. 29 Fox mentions and rejects yet another possibility, namely that suggested by Saadia Gaon, to the effect that the ‫ איש מזמות‬be understood in a positive sense, thus denoting a man who can make shrewd or clever plans. ‫ מזמה‬often has a positive sense (e.g. 1:4; 2:11; 3:21; 5:2; 8:12; negative: 14:17; 24:8). Cf. the similar scale of possibilities in the semantics of ‫ערום‬ and the cognate noun ‫( ערמה‬Prov 1:4; 8:5, 12; 12:16, 23; 13:16 as opposed to Gen 3:1 and Job 5:12). Such a brainy man will prevail in his argumentation; cf. 1 Sam 14:47, where the verb ‫ ירשיע‬is however text-critically suspect, while the verb is anyway used in a military context and therefore cannot mean “condemn.” Likewise, the assumed objectless use of the verb in this proverb cannot mean that. 30 With reference to Ex 22:8, Oesterley calls it a “forensic” term; many commentators think in the same line, e.g. Toy, McKane, Waltke, Van Leeuwen, Yoder, Sæbø; Whybray agrees as to the “proper” meaning of the verb but thinks it “is here used in a general sense.” Cf. THAT II, 816-817, where it is shown that ‫רשע‬, which in Proverbs occurs 87× (more than in any other Old Testament book except Psalms), is often used in judicial contexts, e.g. 17:15; Ex 22:8; Deut 25:1; 1 Kgs 8:22; Isa 50:9; Ps 94:21 etc., so that it makes little sense to say that the root “itself” has no judicial meaning. 28

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

325

is to be understood under the impact of the divine favour spoken of in the first half. The involvement of Yahweh – explicit in the a-half – is thus implied in the b-half, while the act of a judicial declaration – explicit in the b-half – is carried back to be implied when the a-half is reread. V. 2a the good person will obtain favour └ [in judgement] from Yahweh

:: :: ← →

V. 2b the scheming man will be condemned └ in judgement [from Yahweh]

Following Heim,31 Schipper points out the similarity between v. 2a and 8:35,32 where reference is made to Yahweh in connection with the verb ‫ פוק‬and the noun ‫רצון‬. Although these correspondences are not necessary to demonstrate the presence of a theological element in the verse, the involvement of God in the judgement obviously gives it an important religious dimension. Why Waltke finds this proverb “ethical” and v. 3 “theological” is unclear to me. Delitzsch argues that ‫ טוב‬is also used of God (cf. Pss 73:1; 86:5) and therefore reflects the essence of what is really good, viz. the benevolent. With the help of psalms, one could perhaps argue that the theological dimension necessitates the ethical, but it seems to me that Delitzsch stretches his argument somewhat in order to have the text say that this essence is the “Scriptural truth” that God is love. Nevertheless, ‫ טוב‬is used in a generic sense to include the whole sapiential ideal, so that the overall thrust of Delitzsch’s comments cannot be faulted (the divinely rewarded good manifests in wisdom, which is a theological judgement). How the Septuagint came to its translation of the proverb can be explained to an extent, but it is unwieldy at best. Its first hemistich begins a comparison but leaves it uncompleted: κρείσσων ὁ εὑρὼν χάριν παρὰ κυρίῳ, ἀνὴρ δὲ παράνομος παρασιωπηθήσεται. (Better is the man who obtains favour with the Lord, but the lawless man will be passed in silence) This is probably prompted by the presence of ‫ מן‬.... ‫ טוב‬in the first sentence, which corresponds to the normal comparative construction with ‫טוב‬. But here the Hebrew ‫ מן‬is translated by the normal preposition παρά, so that neither hemistich answers the implied question, “better than what/who?” The translator probably regarded the Hiphil as a so-called “inner transitive” (which does occur with ‫רשע‬, cf. Ps 106:6, Job 34:12). It is plausibly explained in EE as “to be silenced in court,” in the sense of “to be convicted.” This is confirmed by the Peshitta, where ÄÚÐĀæ (uÎÐ: third 31 Heim (2013, 186-192) also includes 18:22, where ‫ טוב‬is used in association with ‫רצון‬, and ‫מיהוה‬. 32 Cf. Snell (1993, 39, 45) on all three these “twice-told” proverbs (8:35; 12:2; 18:22).

326

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

person masculine singular Etpecel imperfect: will be convicted) suggests the same understanding of the Hebrew text. But the Targum goes its own way with the second hemistich and translates: ‫( וגברא רשיעא רעיעא תרעיתיה‬and the bad man, his intrigue will be broken). Rashi interprets both hemistichs in terms of the principle that a single deed may tip the balance of good and evil to either side (elucidated in the Talmud, Kiddushin 40b). On one hand, a good person can thus bring much good to the world (‫)להביא טובה לעולם‬. On the other hand, evil schemers make other people culpable, which Rashi compares to Qoh 9:18 (one sinner can corrupt much good). Accordingly, he explains ‫רשע‬ Hiphil as “make (others) guilty” (so also the Mezudat David: ‫הוא ירשיע את כל העולם‬ [he makes the whole world guilty]). But Gerondi and Ramaq advocate the meaning attested in Biblical Hebrew and opt for “declare guilty” or “condemn.” I have already referred to Pseudo-Ibn Ezra above (on ‫ טוב‬and ‫)איש טוב‬. As for the second hemistich, he declares the lesser-known expression ‫ איש מזמות‬with the more explicit ‫איש מחשבות‬ ‫( רעות‬a man of evil plans). This person always condemns others33 but, adds Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, there are other interpreters who say he is the kind who himself is like those plans (‫)שהוא כמו זמות‬, perhaps suggested by the similarity of consonants in ‫איש מזמות‬. Hippolytus of Rome34 (c. 170-236) seems to cite the first hemistich indirectly, saying that a person who wishes for wisdom is more prudent than one who wishes to learn nothing and thus also prevents other people from becoming wise. If this is correct, it would suggest the rabbinic exposition that a person of negative character causes others to become guilty as well. In the absence of running commentary in Chrysostom’s Proverbs exposition the catena note merely paraphrases the first hemistich of the Septuagint.

12:3 A human being is not established by wickedness, but the root of the righteous will never be shaken. Two verbal clauses of four words and three stresses each make up the proverb. There is a chiastic pattern in the syntax: negated verb + subject, subject + negated verb. In both cases the negative particle is bound to the verb with a maqqeph, thus indicating one stress in each case. Since the subject of the first hemistich (‫ )אדם‬is ethically neutral, the prepositional phrase ‫( ברשע‬by wickedness) is needed to construe the antithesis with the ethically explicit ‫( צדיקים‬the righteous) in the second hemistich. That in turn leaves a vacancy for another word in the second clause (‫[ שרש‬root], the word that carries the metaphor and all the interpretative possibilities coming with it). The necessary plus in the first half and the loaded plus of the second half also stand in chiastic positions relative to each other (last and first in their respective hemistichs).

33 34

Or “makes others transgress” (again ‫ רשע‬Hiphil in the explanatory note). In Prov (ANF V, 174).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12 ‫אדם ברשע‬ ‫בל־ימוט‬

327 ‫לא־יכון‬ ‫ושרש צדיקים‬

The verb ‫ כון‬Niphal means to be established, firmly grounded, as said of the pillars of a building (Judg 16:26, 29), the world or a throne (Ps 93:1f.). It forms a very suitable counterpart to its complement in the second half. Not only are ‫ כון‬and ‫ מוט‬each other’s semantic opposites, but their contrast is also highlighted, first by their chiastic placing and second by their morphological as well as phonological properties. Both are Niphal imperfects and stand out by assonance of the sounds i and o. “The permanence of the just and the evanescence or rootlessness of the wicked” (Murphy) occur often in the Book of Proverbs. In addition to this proverb, Hausmann35 lists 12:7 as well as 10:7, 25, 30 and 14:11. According to her, in these sayings permanence and its opposite are assigned to the righteous and the wicked without argument, what is regarded as a matter of course is simply stated as a fact. She remarks that the mere presence of the motif of permanence necessitates the question whether this is meant as applicable to this life only or also reaches beyond death. Since she finds nothing in the mentioned proverbs to prove that this permanence is thought to continue beyond death, she concludes that we have to think in terms of this life “in the first place” (“zunächst”). But then she makes the astute observation that the temporal dimension remains outside the sphere of interest completely, and adds that understanding the text (i.e., in such a way) remains open – even if the use of ‫ עולם‬in 10:25, 30 should be understood as a long period rather than as continuing after death. But the permanence of the righteous after death may simply consist of their children (so Ramaq) or their being remembered after death.36 The root of the righteous opens up the future, as Clifford points out with reference to Isa 5:24; Mal 3:19; Job 8:17; 18:16. It can accordingly mean their reputation that will survive their death. But the text also allows the understanding that the permanence or evanescence is to be thought of in terms of life after death (Hausmann). Paying attention only to the second hemistich, Fox finds this an “insipid maxim.” According to him, the verb ‫( מוט‬Qal: totter, flounder; Niphal: be brought to flounder) is not appropriate for describing the destruction of a tree’s roots. But that is not what the proverb is describing. On the contrary, it is saying that the root is not brought to falter. The use of the verb ‫ מוט‬is quite understandable whether or not it is used in a frozen metaphor.

35 36

Hausmann (1995, 47-50). Cf. above on 11:7 and the adumbration of life after death; cf. Qoh 2:16.

328

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

(a) As an ordinary metaphor it can indeed be called dendrological.37 The subject is ‫( שרש‬the root, not the tree itself). The overall image is of a fallen tree the root of which is still intact and still has “hope” (Dalman).38. This image is well known in the Old Testament (e.g. Job 14:7-9; also Dan 4:11f., 20, 23 about a tree that can grow again and be stable if only its root remains unscathed). This is what the proverb says. Even the righteous can fall,39 but that will not be permanent, since the root of the righteous remains steadfast. A collateral argument could be added in support of this exegesis. The frequently occurring expression ‫בל־ימוט‬, used here, is also used in Job 41:15, where it denotes the immovable, i.e. indestructible body parts of a crocodile, probably the fixed scales. This shows that the verb does not have to be “predicated of something that can totter and fall,” as Fox requires.

(b) Second, a foot (‫ )רגל‬can totter (‫)מוט‬,40 although it has even less “vertical rise” than Fox requires of a root to be used with this verb. Interestingly, a foot can be said to have a root (‫)שרש‬, where “the roots of the feet” mean the soles of the feet (Job 13:27). If the feet can falter, so can their soles. That would be a good example of a conventionalised41 metaphor that begins as a metaphor, but becomes “frozen,” i.e. used without recourse to the imagery that gave rise to it. This option leads to essentially the same sense as (a), viz. that the righteous will remain steadfast, as opposed to those who practise wickedness, who will not enjoy the security of steadfastness. The only significant difference between (a) and (b) would be that the second option does not imply the important concession that even the righteous may stumble. Option (a) reveals an insightful dimension in the proverb. The righteous are not perfect in all respects, but when they do fall, they are anchored firmly and will therefore be able to flourish again. Since this insight is suggested four verses back (11:31), it is probably the best option. Van Leeuwen proposes to understand the established status of the righteous in terms of the throne of divine and human kingship (16:12; 25:4-5; Pss 89:14; 93:1-2; 37

Waltke: horticultural; Plöger: plant metaphor; Schipper: tree metaphor. In AuS IV, 181: if only the root remains and the tree “gives hope,” then it is not uprooted by those tending it (cf. Qoh 3:2; Matt 3:10; Luke 3:9). Cf. also Isa 54:10, according to which a ‫ ברית‬can also totter. 39 Similarly the Vilna Gaon, Malbim. Cf. above on 11:31 and the biblical and rabbinic examples cited there. 40 Cf. Pss 38:17; 66:9; 94:18; 121:3. 41 Whybray, following Watson, calls the metaphor in this proverb “conventionalised,” used as a cliché, which would render superfluous the trouble to relate the fate of people to that of trees. Cf. Watson ([1984] 2007, 264): conventionalised or “frozen” metaphors are those that neither belong to “ordinary language” like “lexicalised” metaphors, nor are “new coinage” (“creative” metaphors). 38

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

329

97:1-2). But ‫ כון‬is used for this steadfastness as well as for other things (Fox), and the established throne still does not explain the non-faltering root of the second hemistich. Gerondi explains the first half to mean that wickedness is futureless. He says that the prosperity of the wicked will not last, thus using the proverb to address the problem of the prospering wicked. According to him, the wealth of the wicked should be inherited by his children (which may be suggested by the “root” of the second half understood in the sense of “offspring,” as Ramaq explains the word). Several rabbinic commentators explain the wickedness of the first half as unjustly obtained wealth, which can provide no sturdy foundation (root ‫ – )כון‬so the Mezudat David and Malbim. The latter however also offers a rather strange explanation: the righteous are like a tree turned upside-down, i.e. with its roots planted in heaven, whence its strength comes, while the wicked are without roots and their material basis on earth is therefore only temporary. By contrast, a lapse by the righteous will be temporary because they have secure roots that will allow them to grow again (Vilna Gaon, Malbim). Chrysostom, commenting on the Septuagint,42 sees cause in the verse to point out that Solomon sometimes argues from God’s perspective and sometimes from that of human evidence. Hill finds this a sign that Chrysostom is gradually coming to realise that sapiential morality has a “double source.”43 A note on the grouping of 12:1-3 The relationship between a reading of each proverb in its own right and also in the light of the context within which they now stand can be well illustrated by these three proverbs. Their thrust may be paraphrased as follows: • Discipline is essential in the educational process (v. 1). • The sapiential enterprise is a religious matter, founded as it is on Yahweh’s warrant (v. 2). • Righteousness brings security as its reward, which is not the case for its opposite (v. 3). But each proverb says more when considered in the context of the other two than it does independently. By itself, v. 1 does not say that acceptance of discipline leads to God’s favour and v. 3 does not relate security (or the lack of it) to acceptance (or rejection) of discipline. Each has its own scope, but when they border on each other the three thematic foci throw new light on each other. That is not a “deeper meaning,” but an extension of meaning comparable with the way words influence each other semantically when they are used together.44 It may also be remarked incidentally that such phenomena could have been noticed by those who later introduced the numbered chapters as we have them and could have been regarded markers for borderlines between chapters.

42

Second half: “the roots of the righteous will not be removed” (ἐξαρθήσονται). Hill (2006, 223). 44 E.g. Gen 1:26, where the words for the image (‫ )צלם‬and likeness (‫ )דמות‬of God interact – humans have the figure (‫ )צלם‬of God, however they are not identical to him but only a representative copy (‫ )דמות‬of him. 43

330

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

12:4 The woman of substance is the crown of her husband, but one who brings shame is like a rot in his bones. The proverb may be scanned as either a 3+3 (Toy) or a 4+3 (Gemser) stich. The latter is preferable because the maqqeph between the first two words is not needed for rhythmic purposes and can equally well underline the importance of the single concept “woman of substance” (as in 31:10). There are two nominal sentences in the antithetical proverb. The stylistic organisation is again chiastic: (‫ )עטרת בעלה‬predicate (‫ )מבישה‬subject

(‫ )אשת־חיל‬subject (‫ )וכרקב בעצמותיו‬predicate

The opposing female types occupy the outer parts of the chiasmus so that the stylistic polarity matches the conceptual distance that separates their characters and conduct (see below). The inner pair in the parallelism is formed by the effects they have on their husbands. The woman of substance is described with a metaphor, viz. a crown or diadem, and her negative counterpart is described by a straight comparison (with ‫כ‬, thus not a metaphor).45 Waltke makes the apposite point that the former suggests outward visibility, while the latter suggests inward invisibility, both of which express the social impact of such women. But Meinhold, while making basically the same observation, adds that the effect of the rot “nevertheless mostly does not remain secret.” The genitive construction ‫( אשת־חיל‬woman of strength) is a genitivus qualitatis, where the genitive describes a quality of the preceding noun in the construct state. ‫( חיל‬strength) can be used to indicate physical (Qoh 10:10), sexual (31:3), military (Ex 14:4) or economic (Gen 34:29) strength, as well as quality of character (Ruth 3:11).46 The woman praised so highly in 31:1031 has such skills and wisdom that her strength integrates just about all that a man could wish for in a wife. Such a woman is a crown47 for her husband 45 The end effect remains similar, although the metaphor states that the first woman is an adornment for her husband, while the comparison states that the second woman works like a rot in the bones. The comparison “like” suggests that she erodes her husband in several respects. Here the comparison also needs the preposition ‫ ב‬to indicate the inconspicuous location of the rot, which the metaphor does not. 46 According to Terrien (1985, 89) and Hausmann (1995, 150-151) the woman of ‫ חיל‬is seen to possess “heroic quality,” since she is the very crown of “a hero of military valor” (‫)]גבור[ חיל‬. Whether on the grounds of the qualitative ‫ חיל‬or not, her portrait in 31:10-31 (cf. 31:17!) certainly is that of a heroine. 47 Several other things are also called crowns, as commentators often note: wealth (14:24), gray hair (16:31, cf. 20:29 where greyness is called the “splendour” of the elderly), and grandchildren (17:6).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

331

(cf. 4:9), which does not mean that she is a mere decorating frill (cf. the tiara of the bridegroom in Isa 61:10),48 but a mark of sustained dignity (cf. the parallel ‫ כבוד‬in Job 19:9 [Fox]). Although only a one-line saying, this proverb is as much an example as 31:10-31 of what Maier49 calls the “economically based” partnership of husband and wife as depicted in Prov 10-29. Maier points out that, in these chapters, “[t]here is not a single mention of love between the marriage partners.” The worth of the woman is not described in terms of her status as a person in her own right, but solely relative to her status as a married woman and then only in terms of the value she has for her husband (cf. 31:11, where it is clear that she contributes economically to such an extent that her husband profits and thus is strengthened by her). The woman therefore has relative value, which is typical – as Maier puts it – “of an agricultural tribal culture with households that are largely oriented toward raising their own food ... as it existed in Israel into the late monarchic period of the seventh century B.C.E.” This is fully consistent with the use of ‫( בעל‬lord, master) to denote the husband. It would be difficult not to recognise a similar mindset in Paul’s contention that a wife is her husband’s glory (1 Cor 11:7, cf. Van Leeuwen). The counterpart of such a worthy woman is the one who causes shame (‫מבישה‬, Hiphil feminine singular participle of ‫בוש‬50 [be ashamed]). Again, her worth, albeit a negative worth, is gauged in terms of her husband’s interests, for the pronominal suffix in “his bones” has ‫( בעלה‬her husband) as its antecedent51 and thus shows that “his” well-being is what counts. She causes her husband shame, just as a lazy, imprudent son causes shame to his parents (see above on 10:5, where the masculine form of the same participle is used), which Gemser, Ringgren and McKane judge to include a moral element. This works like caries of the bones that gradually deteriorates the skeleton52 until the whole life that needs their support, collapses (so Delitzsch). Following Brenner, Maier characterises the exclusive androcentric perspective as an “M-voice.” This is the male voice speaking from an angle that has no recourse to the self-understanding of women.53 Neither here nor 48 The Midrash Tanchuma does use the word ‫( תפארת‬adornment, beauty), which Toy explains as a citation from memory. The royal crown is called a ‫ נזר‬in Proverbs (27:24, so Schipper, although his verse reference is wrong) and the word used here can also denote another form of headdress, but in any event a symbol of honour (similarly Whybray, with reference to 14:24; 16:21; 17:6). Cf. also Clifford, Yoder and Lucas, although Whybray maintains that ‫ עטרה‬is “properly the symbol of royalty.” 49 Maier (2012, 259). 50 This is the only instance in the Book of Proverbs where the Hiphil participle of ‫ בוש‬is used in the feminine form (Delitzsch). 51 This is explicitly pointed out by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra. 52 For the idea of rotting away, cf. 14:30; Hos 5:12; Hab 3:16. 53 See Maier (2012, 260-261); Brenner (1993, 125-126).

332

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

anywhere else in the book does it refer to love between husband and wife or marital bliss of a woman.54 Pilch points out that the choice of a wife cannot have anything to do with inculcating good judgement for the purpose of choosing a wife by the husband, since marriages were arranged and neither the groom nor the bride had any option but to accept the choice made for them by their parents. Nevertheless, written as they are by men for men (Meinhold), the wisdom sayings often give young men guidance about women. If this cannot be of use in choosing a wife, it can still be helpful in living with and adjudging a wife, and to one day choose a good wife for the pupil’s own sons. On the one hand positive reference is often made to women (11:16; 12:4; 14:1a; 18:22; 19:14 plus 31:10-31 and in the poems, e.g. 5:15-19). On the other hand there are more negative references to the female gender, such as the pretty but emptyheaded woman (11:22), the quarrelsome wife (19:13; 21:9, 19; 25:24; 27:15f.), the foreign woman (22:14), the prostitute (23:27; 29:3), the adulteress (30:20), the rejected woman (30:23a), and the ambitious servant girl (30:23b)55 plus extensive passages in the poems (2:16-22; 5:1-23; 6:20-35; 7:1-27).56 Some rabbis ascribe virtues drawn from the closing poem in praise of the woman of substance to the woman mentioned in v. 12:4a. She is diligent (Mezudat David; cf. 31:13-15), can bring in wealth (Ramaq; cf. 31:14, 18), and she shows the virtue and wisdom to which the whole poem bears witness (Nahmias; she is a crown when she “brings in money with her wisdom” [‫]שתקנה ממון בחכמתה‬, cf. especially 31:14, 26). She even protects her husband (Vilna Gaon; cf. 31:17, 25). Ramaq also paraphrases the first half of the proverb by relating the honour of wearing a crown to a king and the honour brought to the husband by the good wife (cf. 31:23). Gerondi (13th century) uses the proverb as an opportunity to advise careful scrutiny before choosing a wife,57 since inner character is more important than wealth or beauty (cf. 31:30, also 11:22). Nahmias and Malbim relate the rot in the bones to the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib (Gen 2:23). Because of the woman’s origin in the man,58 she is a part of him and if a wife acts in a rotten way, it is as if part of her husband is also rotten. The rest of him will therefore rot as well. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra paraphrases the literal meaning of the biblical words, and offers two notes: first, he explains that the suffix in ‫ בעצמותיו‬refers to the husband, and second, that the shame caused by the ‫ מבישה‬does not so much bother her as it afflicts her husband, because her machinations bring contempt and disgrace on his head. Patristic use of the proverb usually reflects the need of biblical support for an established culture of prudery. In a section against female facial cosmetics, Clemens Alexandrinus59 simply quotes the first hemistich (in conjunction with 5:3-5 as its opposite) in support of his requirement that women must be modest in appearance, 54

Brenner (1995, 54-55); Maier (2012, 259). Tuinstra lists most of these texts (although in other combinations), but he erroneously documents the ambitious servant girl as 31:3, where the femme fatale in the royal court is actually mentioned. 56 See Vol. I, 136-140. 57 Lucas seems to agree with this in respect of the biblical text, but one should not forget the remark by Pilch that a bridegroom could not choose his own wife. 58 Nahmias: ‫( שהאישה עצם מעצמי הבעל‬because the woman is bone of the husband’s bones), which refers directly to Gen 2:23. 59 Paed III,11 (ANF II, 287). 55

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

333

gestures and speech. In the same vein, the Apostolic Constitutions60 quote the first half-verse (together with 31:10 and 14:1) to warn women about punishment if they by their appearance entice other men to lust after them, and somewhat further the proverb is combined with 11:22 and 21:9, 19 to argue that lascivious make-up tries to improve a woman’s face, which is the workmanship of God himself. Chrysostom’s exposition addresses the reader in the second person plural, assuming that his readers are men only, and claims that a husband will be adorned by a beautiful wife not only on account of her beauty, but also by bringing him to the same level of virtue as she has (!). The contrary is true of the many men who come to grief on account of their wives. Here Chrysostom cites the Septuagint, making the woman gradually undermine her husband like a worm in a tree.

12:5 The plans of the righteous are justice, the designs of the wicked are deceit. The proverb is a Doppeldreier with three stresses in both hemistichs. There is a nominal sentence in each half, both with exactly the same syntactic shape: Subject: construct state feminine plural + genitive masculine plural Predicate: noun functioning as adjective61

But the syntactic structure also creates the stylistic features of assonance in the vowels and alliteration in the consonants: 8 7 ‫ִמ ְשׁ ָפּט‬

6 5 4 ‫יקים‬ ִ ‫ַצ ִדּ‬

3 2 1 ‫ַמ ְח ְשׁבוֹת‬

– syllables

ā mi-

-īm 

-ōt -aḥ-

– sounds

‫ִמ ְר ָמה‬ 8 7

‫ְר ָשׁ ִעים‬ 6 54

‫ַתּ ְח ֻבּלוֹת‬ 32 1

– syllables

Moreover, each word has the same number of syllables as its counterpart in the respective other hemistich and every stress is found in the last syllable of every word with the identical number of unstressed syllables preceding it. The resulting effect is a very symmetrical one, consisting of a play on vowels, consonants, syllable count, stress and word order. This is not even disturbed by a waw connecting the two halves of the verse. The parallelism is therefore a precise antithetical figure: the last two words of each hemistich are 60

Const I, iii, (ANF VII, 394-395). For this use of a noun, see GKC 141c-d: the function of an adjective can be assumed by a predicate noun; when that happens, it usually is to add emphasis suggesting the identity of the subject and the predicate. Cf. 3:17 and its exposition in Vol. I, 173. 61

334

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

opposites of their counterparts and the first word of each is a synonym of its counterpart, which is necessary for the contrasting parallelism to be so precise. The plans of the two contrasting human types are clearly opposites, but this is not visible in the words themselves and is gathered from their respective predicates, viz. justice and deceit (and from their association with the righteous and the wicked). The planning necessary for the realisation of the intentions entertained by righteous and wicked people is described by two synonyms, ‫ מחשבות‬and ‫תחבלות‬. According to McKane, these words were “akin” in what he calls “the old wisdom,” but later acquired respectively an “ethically commendable” and a “pejorative” meaning. This distinction seems difficult to uphold. Several commentators have pointed out that both can be used in bonam as well as in malam partem.62 Toy rightly states that the two words themselves “are not ethically distinctive.” It is not the lexemes, but the context that determines whether the plans are good or bad. In this case the ‫מחשבות‬ are devised for justice and are therefore good plans, while the ‫ תחבלות‬are devised to deceive63 and are therefore bad plans (suggested in the translation above by the English word “design,” which itself can be used with a neutral, positive or negative connotation). Although the proverb is cast in the form of a statement, it communicates an insight. Its pragmatic function is thus to teach that whoever wishes to count among the righteous should make integrity the fabric of their planning.64 The Mezudat David interprets the noun-adjective ‫ משפט‬to mean “directed toward justice,”65 which is quite logical because a plan that “is” justice can only be a plan to practice justice, that is, to “do” it (‫)לעשות משפט‬. The text then expounds the content of doing justice, notably “to faithfully practice justice in order to deliver the oppressed from his oppressor” (‫)להציל העשוק מיד עושקו‬. The same applies to the second hemistich: deceit is a deceitful act (‫)לעשות מרמה‬.66 This understanding confirms the explanation of the construction as emphasis by suggesting the identity of subject and predicate.67 Here more than emphasis may be meant, for the identity of subject and predicate may also be understood as “planning is already doing,” although it seems more likely that the exposition offered is intended to explain the noun used in the function of an adjective. Gerondi sees the difference between the two types of planning in the fact that the planning of the righteous never proceeds from crookedness, 62 E.g. Toy, Meinhold, Tuinstra, Schipper and others. Cf., for ‫ מחשבות‬in a positive sense: 16:3; 21:5; in a negative sense: 6:18; 15:26; neutral: 15:22; 19:21. For ‫ תחבלות‬in a positive sense: 1:5; 11:14; 20:18; 24:6; and in a negative sense: 12:5. 63 ‫( מרמה‬deceit) occurs three times in the chapter (vv. 5, 17, 20). According to Schipper it therefore has the status of a thematic indicator (“Leitwort”). By this criterion it has to be one among several. 64 See Loader (1996, 21-33), and the Introduction above, Essay 2 (“Learning in the Indicative”). 65 So does Waltke, however without citing the Mezudat. 66 Similarly Pseudo-Ibn Ezra. 67 See above the note on GKC 141c-d.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

335

whereas the wicked do not do justice unless they can undermine it by a wicked plan, which is a matter of deceiving others by a facade of justice and undermining it by its opposite. Malbim’s interpretation distinguishes between the plans and the designs. The first (‫ )מחשבות‬are ideas spontaneously presenting themselves to a person who then considers them before acting. The second (‫ )תחבלות‬are intricate, premeditated schemes woven together from different threads like the many intertwining filaments that make up a rope, in support of which he claims a putative etymological relationship between ‫ תחבלות‬and ‫( ֶח ֶבל‬rope). Athanasius (298-373 CE)68 quotes the verse in its Greek form together with v. 6 simply to bolster his statement that the words of heretics are not to be trusted (in the controversy whether the Son received his being from the Father). John Cassian (360435 CE)69 cites the text as proof of the third source of human thoughts, namely, humans themselves (alongside God and the devil). John Chrysostom (347-407 CE) too cites vv. 5-6 from the Greek tradition and seems to think in terms of court procedure. Focusing on the first hemistich, he states that, since the thoughts of the righteous lead to fair judgements,70 righteous people need nobody to advocate their case as their own mouth will rescue them, because virtue of itself comes to their aid when they speak for themselves. Melanchthon only gives a paraphrastic translation of the verse and one comment: I[n]dustria impiorum fraus est. (The industry of the impious is fraud)

12:6 The words of the wicked are a bloody ambush, but the mouth of the upright will save them. The verse is a clear antithesis with a 3+3 rhythmic pattern. The maqqeph between ‫ ארב‬and ‫ דם‬is to be taken seriously for it avoids two neighbouring stressed syllables. ‫ ֱא ׇרב־‬is literally “a lying in wait” (with shortened o because of the loss of stress) and ‫ ׇדּם‬is the object of the waiting, viz. a blood-deed. Delitzsch remarks that the vocalisation of the guttural as ‫ ֱא‬would normally indicate the imperative whereas ‫ ֲא‬would normally be the infinitive, although in this verse the form can only be the infinitive. Lying in wait for blood thus means an ambush with violent intent (cf. 1:11). The third person masculine plural suffix to the last verb is ambiguous. The question is to whom it refers – to the upright themselves or to another concept? In the former case, the upright will save themselves. Judging that no other antecedent for the suffix is available, Fox opts for this possibility71 68

Contr Ar Or II, 30,59 (NPNF II,4, 426). Confer I, 19 (NPNF II,11, 304). 70 The Greek word by which ‫ משפט‬is translated in the Septuagint of the verse (the plural κρίματα) can mean lawsuits or verdicts. 71 Similarly Bühlmann (1976, 301f.), Murphy and Schipper. Fox cites 10:2b; 11:6b, 8b, 9b; 12:21. 69

336

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

and appeals to the often occurring concept of the righteous who evade danger to their own persons. But Delitzsch already pointed out that in the mashal style subjects and objects can frequently be inferred from such a connection to pronominal elements (cf. 14:26; 19:23). The other possibility is that the upright will save those who are in danger of being bled to death by the wicked,72 which is the option of earlier interpreters such as Ewald, Bertheau, Delitzsch and Wildeboer.73 Meinhold tends in this direction but finds an intended ambivalence in the proverb that makes it usable in several situations. All of this is best resolved by an analysis of the parallelism. V. 6a the words (speaking) of the wicked are a bloody ambush          └ for implied people

// :: :: ←

V. 6b the mouth (speaking) of the upright will save        └ them

In the first hemistich it is not explicitly said who the victims or intended victims of the violent words74 are. But if those words “lie in wait” (‫)ארב‬ for a blood deed, somebody must be on the receiving end. Thus there is an implied victim, whoever that may be (cf., for instance, 1:11). In light of the close correspondence of the parallel elements the unspecified but expressed object in the pronominal suffix (v. 6b) stands in the same parallelistic relationship to the unexpressed but necessarily implied victims of the ambush (v. 6a). For these reasons the reading is to be preferred that the upright save others.75 The ambiguity is thus resolved by rereading the first hemistich in light of the second. Although this argument can stand by itself, it is worth noting that both hemistichs in this proverb have the same syntactic structure as those in the previous one (v. 5): V. a subject––––––––––––––––––––predicate;

V. b subject––––––––––––––––––––predicate

status constructus + plural genitive

status constructus + plural genitive

72 The proposal in BHS (not in BHQ) to read ‫( ׇתּם‬blameless) instead of ‫( ׇדּם‬blood) may be an effort to create an explicit antecedent, but in the light of the argument below the emendation is unnecessary. 73 Wildeboer surmises that the author of 1:11-19 “probably” based his description on this proverb and Tuinstra regards it as possible. 74 For the idea of the violence perpetrated by words, cf. Sir 28:18 (Oesterley); cf. also Jas 3:8. 75 The idea that wise or kind behaviour saves others is not at all foreign to the Book of Proverbs; cf. 10:12; 11:30; 19:19; 23:14; 24:11; Waltke points out that, in the case of speaking, this holds true not only for direct verbal intervention as in a court case, but also for the teaching of the wise (cf. 2:12, where being saved is ascribed to accepting what he calls the “salvific words” of the teacher [2:1f.]).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

337

It is quite possible that this structure as well as its content provided the reason for the two proverbs in vv. 5 and 6 to be placed alongside each other. This logic is even continued in the next verse (v. 7), where the result of what the wicked do and what the righteous do is expressed. Thus: the planning in v. 5, the execution in v. 6, the result in v. 7.76 Once more, this does not make the three verses a tercet or a poetic unit, but it does illustrate the care with which single sayings have been edited together. Rabbinic exegesis interprets the suffix with the verb ‫ נצל‬as a reference to the victims of the wicked (the second possibility above). So Rashi explains that words can indeed “lie in ambush” in the sense that the wicked “give counsel for murder” (‫ )יועצים לרצות‬either to follow it up themselves or to plot it through false testimony. Malbim goes in the same direction by illustrating this with the classic example of the way Jezebel contrived the death of Naboth by means of false testimony (1 Kgs 21:8-13). The Vilna Gaon mentions the words of the wicked intended to bring death on an innocent victim, but adds that deceptive words can sometimes be spoken to undermine such wicked words and achieve the saving of innocent lives. As an example of both types he refers to the story of Ahitophel’s words intended to trap and kill the innocent King David, and Hushai’s deceptive words by means of which he thwarted Ahitophel’s advice and saved innocent lives (2 Sam 17:7-13). Ramaq sees only a general observation in the proverb, viz. of how the wicked conspire to harm the innocent. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra quotes the first hemistich, but adds a ‫ ל‬to ‫ ארב‬in order to show that it is an infinitive and can therefore be interpreted as words that confer how to lurk on others in order to shed blood. Athanasius77 cites the proverb according to the Septuagint together with v. 5 (and 15:28) to characterise the words of “Antichrists,” that is, heretics, who even hire people to advocate their heresy. Here the Septuagint has, λόγοι ἀσεβῶν δόλιοι (the counsels of the impious are deceitful), which avoids the problem of how words can “lie in wait for blood” and at the same time echoes the δόλους (deceits) of v. 5b. For Chrysostom, see above on v. 5, which he too cites together with v. 6.

12:7 Overthrow the wicked and they are no more, but the house of the righteous will stand. The proverb consists of two halves with three stresses each (so also Toy and Gemser). Remarkably, v. 7 has exactly the same number of syllables and the same pattern of stressed and unstressed syllables as v. 6: 16 15 14

13 12 11 10 9

‫ו׀פי | י| ש|רים | י |צי|לם‬ 16 15 14

13 12 11

8

5 4 3

2

1

‫דב׀רי | ר׀ש׀עים | א׀רב׀־דם‬

|

‫ו׀אי׀ נם‬

10 9

‫ו׀בית ׀צ׀די׀קים ׀ י׀ע׀מוד‬

7 6

|

8

7 6

5 4 3

–

v. 6

–

v. 7

2 1

| ‫ה׀פוך | ר׀ש׀עים‬

76 Sæbø makes a similar observation and calls it an “intensification” (Steigerung) from plans (v. 5) via words (v. 6) to results (v.7). See the commentary on v. 7 for the same view taken by rabbis. 77 Ad Episc Æg I, 9 (NPNF II,4, 227).

338

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

The grammatical character of the first hemistich depends on the interpretation of the infinitivus absolutus ‫הפוך‬. If it is taken as a passive of the finite verb, the hemistich contains two sentences (“the wicked are overthrown” + “and they are no more”). But if it is taken as a rhetorical imperative,78 it becomes the protasis of a conditional clause (“overthrow the wicked and lo, they are no more” = “if you overthrow the wicked, then they are no more”). The latter underlies the translation given above. Whether it is glossed with the equivalent of a rhetorical imperative (the Vulgate, Murphy, Clifford, Waltke, Fox and others) or translated as a passive (Schultens,79 also Toy, Plöger, Meinhold and others), the effect remains the same. The Septuagint deviates by interpreting the Hebrew “overturn” as “turn towards.” Cf. the translations of the Septuagint and the Vulgate: The Septuagint has: οὗ ἐὰν στραφῇ, ἀσεβὴς ἀφανίζεται (Wherever he turns to, the impious is caused to vanish) and the Vulgate: verte impios et non erunt (Overturn the impious and they will not be) The Greek οὗ ἐὰν στραφῇ is an understandable effort to come to terms with the Hebrew ‫הפך‬, but does not represent it. In the Latin text of the Vulgate the second sentence (non erunt) is presented as a consequence of the first with its imperative (verte impios) and thus does correspond to the Hebrew.

The contrasting elements in the two hemistichs are not only the subjects (the wicked and the righteous) but also the predicates (being no more and standing). In parallelism, the two hemistichs influence each other. “Being no more” affects “stand” and the “house of the righteous” suggests that the house of the wicked is affected as much as the individual person. The quasi-verb ‫( אין‬nonexistence, the opposite of ‫ )יש‬does not mean “disappear” in the sense of not being visible any longer, but indicates that something does not exist at all or ceases to exist (cf. 25:14; Ps 39:6; Isa 40:17). Its counterpart in the second 78 The infinitive absolute can be used in the place of a form of the finite verb in a number of functions. One of these is as an emphatic imperative, which may occur alone or in combination with other forms of a finite verb. In this proverb it is used alone. This is comparable to the use of the imperative in English for a similar purpose, for instance: “Leave this room now and you won’t be allowed back” = “If you leave this room now, you won’t be allowed back.” See IBHS 35.5.1a; the specific function in this proverb is that of oratio variata (IBHS 34.3d), as pointed out by Waltke, which enlivens an already emphatic statement in poetic style. Cf. GKC 113y-gg, in this case especially paragraph bb. 79 Schultens: Subvertentur improbi et nulli erunt (When the wicked are overthrown, none of them will be any more).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

339

hemistich (‫ )עמד‬therefore does not indicate standing upright as opposed to sitting, but to remain firmly established (so Rashi, who glosses it as ‫יתקיים‬, see below; cf. Qoh 1:4; Pss 33:11; 19:10). This is particularly clear in the comparable 10:25, where the contrast to the non-existence of the wicked is expressed by ‫( יסוד עולם‬a permanent foundation).80 The motif of a storm sweeping away the wicked man together with his house (cf. also Job 27:1323) is not explicit in 12:7, but, strengthened as it is by the parallelism, the basic idea is the same. Whether the (houses of the) wicked are overthrown by human agency or blown away by a natural force – if they’re gone, they’re gone permanently. No restitution or reparation is possible. The point thus made is that the wicked succumbs to disaster once and for all, whereas the righteous not only survives a particular disaster but remains established permanently. The choice of the root ‫ הפך‬evokes the total and permanent devastation of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 19; cf. Deut 29:22; Isa 13:19; Jer 49:18; Am 4:11; Job 34:24).81 The parallel to the contrast conjured up by Jesus (Matt 7:24-27) is remarkable, not only for the architectural image of a house82 and the devastating meteorological phenomena (10:25), but also because there the positive and negative poles are called “wise” and “foolish,” which coincides with sapiential thinking. Moreover, “house” is polyvalent; besides meaning a physical construction, it can also indicate a man’s family (e.g. Josh 7:14; 24:15; cf. Prov 24:27) and offspring (e.g. 1 Sam 20:16; 1 Kgs 12:26). Prov 12:7a is illustrated well indeed by the story of Achan’s fate and that of his family together with all he has (Josh 7). There is a close parallel to this proverb in some versions of the Sayings of Achiqar, viz. in the Syriac (Saying No. 21) and in the Ethiopic (Saying No. 9):83 Syriac: The wicked falls and does not rise, but the just is not moved, for God is with him. Ethiopic: My son, the wicked falls and does not rise again, but the good man falls and rises instantly and remains in his condition. Interpreting the infinitive absolute ‫ הפוך‬to indicate that the destruction takes place in an instant (‫)כמהפכת רגע‬, Rashi sees the overthrow of the wicked as equivalent to that of Sodom (‫כגון סדום‬, see above). He disambiguates the verb “stand” (‫ )עמד‬by 80 The similarities of 10:25 and 12:7 justify speaking of the two as a “twice-told proverb,” but they seem to interest neither Snell (1993) nor Heim (2013), while several commentators notice the resemblance of especially the first hemistich; cf. Oesterley, Whybray, Murphy, Clifford, Waltke, Schipper and others; Fox even calls 12:7 “equivalent to 10:25.” 81 Cf. Loader (1990, 56f.; 60-62; 65f.); cf. also Van Leeuwen; see below on Rashi’s comparison of the overthrow in the proverb with the destruction of Sodom. 82 Cf. 14:11, where a similar proverb also occurs and where “house” and “tent” correlate. 83 Cf. Conybeare et al. (1913, 105, 129).

340

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

the Hitpael of ‫ קום‬to say that the righteous will remain established, and so do Ralbag and the Mezudat David. The latter also links the end of the wicked’s existence with the obliteration of their memory. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra uses a prepositional change to produce a pun on two meanings of ‫ עולם‬and thereby a contrast between the memory of the wicked and that of the righteous: there will be no memory of the wicked “in the world” (‫)בעולם‬, but the memory of the righteous will remain “for ever” (‫)לעולם‬. Nahmias has a lengthy exposition with references to biblical books from the Pentateuch, Prophets and Writings as well as Midrash Tanchuma to show that the fall of the wicked and the enduring stance of the righteous are evidenced in all the parts of the Tanak, e.g. the Egyptians as opposed to Israel, the Sodomites as opposed to Abraham, the Babylonians as opposed to the exiled Israelites etc.84 Both Ramaq (12th century) and Yonah Gerondi (13th century) discover a progression in the three proverbs constituting vv. 5-7, moving from what people think (v. 5) to what they execute (v. 6) to the consequences (v. 7).85 Chrysostom’s exposition pays much more attention to the wicked than to the righteous. Whereas he also interprets the “houses” (plural οἶκοι) of the righteous to include their families, he expands on the hopelessness of efforts by the wicked to find refuge anywhere on earth. This is evidently due to the Septuagint’s subjunctive στραφῇ, meaning “turn towards.” Wherever he turns to, the wicked perishes (ἀφανίζεται).86 Athanasius87 uses the same understanding of the first Greek hemistich to give a figurative characterisation of those opposing Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria. According to Athanasius, the Arians wrongly claim that Dionysius supports them, and they subtly turn their false arguments in all directions but are destroyed in every case.

12:8 According to his prudence a man is praised, but who is crooked of heart will be for scorn. Gemser counts every word in the verse as a stress unit, but that requires adjacent stressed syllables in both hemistichs. Toy wavers between 3+3 and 2+3, but the first maqqeph is not required to indicate a rhythmic combination. Therefore the pattern 3+3 is the most natural. The proverb is a plain antithetic saying, built up with a simple symmetry of its two sentences.88 In both halves the criterion for measuring social standing is mentioned first, followed by the outcome of applying that criterion: 84 This is another example of how Jewish tradition could relate single proverbs to the overall biblical narrative, which is also one of the hallmarks of the way Philipp Melanchthon treated proverbs (although this particular proverb is skipped in his final edition); see above on v. 2 and 11:31. 85 Similarly modern commentators, such as Meinhold, Sæbø and Schipper; Murphy also sees a connection, however via catchwords. 86 In the passive, the verb ἀφανίζειν can mean either “perish” or “cause to disappear.” On either count Chrysostom’s exegesis would hold, viz. that the wicked will be shunned by any person or society towards which he would turn. 87 De Sent Dion 21 (NPNF II,4, 184). 88 Cf. v. 8b with 18:3 (Wildeboer) and v. 8a with 27:21b (Fox). Heim (2013, 411) does mention 12:8 in connection with 27:21, but only for the expression ‫לפי‬. He does not regard the two proverbs as a “variant set,” but only that 27:21b is a “reassembled version of 12:8a,”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12 v. a criterion: prudence v. b criterion: crookedness of heart

[‫]לפי־שכלו‬ [‫]נעוה־לב‬

341 outcome: praise outcome: scorn

[‫]יהלל־איש‬ [‫]יהיה לבוז‬

The proposal noted in BHS, to read ‫( ונעבה־לב‬fat of heart, thick-headed [?]) instead of ‫( ונעוה־לב‬crooked of heart) is rightly rejected (see McKane) or ignored (BHQ). It can appeal to the Septuagint’s translation νωθροκάρδιος (slow-minded, stupid), but the Niphal of ‫ עבה‬does not occur elsewhere in biblical Hebrew and anyway does not produce a better sense than ‫עוה‬ (Qal go wrong, Niphal be crooked).89 The proverb is about honour and shame, that is, about a man’s social standing in the community. One is praised according to (‫ )לפי‬prudence,90 which is a basic concept in wisdom literature and includes intelligence, discernment and the ability to make good practical decisions.91 This can indeed be understood to mean on the grounds of prudence, which would mean that praise is given where prudence is practiced. ‫ לפי‬can also indicate that the criterion is proportional, that is, the degree of the praise relates to the degree of prudence displayed by the person in question. The contrasting hemistich only mentions a categorical contempt for the crooked-hearted, but the power of the parallelism may also imply a similar gradation (as several rabbinic expositions hold, see below). The opposite of social acclamation is social derision, which is meted out to the crooked of heart (‫ עוה‬Qal go wrong, Niphal be bent, crooked).92 The heart is not only the seat of moral attitudes, but also of intellectual capacity and understanding and thus of the whole “inner human.”93 In the sapiential thinking of Proverbs, the ethical and the intellectual spheres cannot be separated. A person with a crooked heart has deviant judgement and is therefore errant and offending in his practical ways. Such a person meets with social contempt and ridicule (‫ )בוז‬from all who encounter him.94 and that “the raw material from 12:8 may have served as a convenient grab-bag for creating a contextually appropriate second half-line to accompany 27:21a ...” (Heim 2013, 612). 89 The proposed emendation goes back to Kuhn (1931, 25), whose only substantiation is that “crooked of heart” is not as “sharp” a contrast for “prudence” as “plump of heart.” For the counter-argument, see McKane; Whybray points out that ‫ עבה‬rather means “be fat” in all its occurrences (Deut 32:15; 1 Kgs 12:10; 1 Chron 10:10); it cannot therefore be assumed to have a subordinate sense of “stupid.” 90 Hebrew ‫ לפי‬is the construct state of ‫( פה‬mouth) with the preposition ‫ל‬, idiomatic expression for “according to” (cf. Ex 12:4; 16:16, 18; Hos 10:12; cf. also ‫כפי‬, Lev 25:52; Num 7:5, 7, 8 et al.). 91 For the use of the root and the semantic make-up, see the commentary on 1:3 in Vol. I, 58. 92 Thus the same image as the English adjective “crooked” and noun “crook” to describe an act or attitude of felony and the person guilty of it. 93 So Krüger (2009, 97); on the centrality and limitations of the heart, see Krüger (2009, 91-106); cf. Hausmann (1994, 178-186), as well as above on 10:8 and Vol. I, 226-227. 94 The translation above is partly inspired by the libretto of G.F. Händel’s The Messiah, Part Two, No. 27 (“All they that see him laugh him to scorn”), which in turn is based on the use of the same verb (‫ )בוז‬in Ps 22:7.

342

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

In his treatment of Proverbs in terms of its cultural life setting, Pilch states that honour in the ancient Mediterranean world “permeated every aspect of public life.” It “was the fundamental value. It was the core, the heart, the soul. ... Simply stated, honor is public reputation. ... It is one’s status or standing in the community together with the public recognition of it. Public recognition is all-important. ... The vocabulary of praise and blame can therefore function as a social sanction on moral behaviour.”95 Pilch also cites many cases in ancient literature, including Jewish-Hellenistic, where the same mindset can be seen.96

It is in this world that 12:8 belongs, expressing as it does the powerful dynamic of its cultural and social setting in one simple line. The honour and disdain spoken of here are not, in Pilch’s terms, simply “ascribed” due to one’s birth, but are “acquired,” due to skill,97 or – to use the appropriate terms of wisdom literature – due to the quality of prudence or the lack of it. However, there is a rider. According to Waltke, this aphorism “must be held in tension with counter aphorisms.” In my opinion, there are at least two kinds of sayings relevant in this respect. First, sometimes the opposite of what this proverb declares does happen. It may be that the wicked are praised (so 28:4 with the use of the same verb ‫ הלל‬as here). It is true that those who praise the wicked are themselves lawless, but it nevertheless does occur that the categorical statement of 12:8 is not seen to be correct under all circumstances. A similar situation is sketched by Qohelet, where the one with prudence puts it to good social use and is not praised or even thanked by the beneficiaries of his wisdom (Qoh 9:15). But even so it remains clear that such a situation is wrong and should not happen. The other kind of counter aphorism does not contradict this one by claiming praise for the wicked or lack of praise for the wise, but provides a different criterion. Only four verses back, it is stated in v. 4 that a man’s social status is determined, not by his prudence, but by his wife. However, the two criteria are not necessarily mutually exclusive. From the perspective of the collected proverbs, honour can thus come along more than one route. Rashi, Nahmias and the Mezudat David offer similar expositions. According to Rashi, the first hemistich means that a man will receive his reward (‫ )שכרו‬according to how much wisdom he practiced. He interprets the second hemistich to mean that a person who has moved (‫ )שהניע‬his heart entirely away from Torah will be scorned. For Nahmias, the focus of the proverb is not so much the simple principle of retribution, but rather the proportion of retribution for prudence and crookedness. The proverb apportions much praise for much prudence and, accordingly, less praise for 95

Pilch (2016, 190); the emphasis is original. E.g. Josephus (BJ 4.149; 7.82; Ant 4.215; 10.92), Philo (Migr 172; Leg 3.87; Abr 185, 263) and others, Pilch (2016, 191). Although care should be taken not to carry the social situation of the first century CE back into the world of Proverbs, this saying is a clear instance of the correctness of Pilch’s argument as regards this particular motif. 97 Pilch (2016, 192). 96

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

343

less prudence. But for a crooked person there is only one result, namely that society will despise him. This view is also found in the Mezudat David, where the first two words of the proverb are commented on by saying that “every man is praised (‫)ישובח‬ according to whether his prudence is much or little, but he whose heart turns away (‫ )נטה‬from wisdom will be for scorn (‫)לבזיון‬.” According to Ralbag, the prudent are praised because wisdom is generally good for people, while the crooked of heart cannot contribute in such a way and is therefore an object of disdain by society. Malbim, again, makes the intellect dependent on purity of heart. With such purity, prudence becomes a public credit, but a crooked heart conversely disrupts understanding. Chrysostom, using the Septuagint’s rendering of ‫ לפי‬as στόμα (mouth), naturally sees the prudent person’s speaking as the reason for his receiving compliments, whereas to him the “slow-minded” person of the second hemistich (νωθροκάρδιος) is lazy. He contrasts intelligence with laziness, the first of whom has a good social reputation and the latter is mocked.

12:9 Better a disregarded man who yet has a slave than one who acts important and lacks bread. Toy considers the rhythmic pattern to be either 3+3 or 3+2, but the latter is preferable, since the segolated noun ‫ לחם‬is stressed on its first syllable, which is the reason the Masoretic maqqeph was provided to avoid the clogging of stressed syllables. This is also why Gemser’s scanning (4+3) should not be accepted.98 The Septuagint (δουλεύων ἑαυτῷ) and the Peshitta (Íþóæ ÿäþãx) as well as one Hebrew manuscript (‫ עובד לו‬99) read the first hemistich as praise for a lowly man who serves himself, that is, works for himself. BHS mentions a proposal by Tur-Sinai, viz. to emend the ‫ ד‬to ‫ר‬, resulting in the defective spelling of ‫( עבור‬produce), which is accepted by Fox. Although both alternative readings are thinkable, neither is necessary as a substitute for ‫( ֶע ֶבד‬slave) in the Masoretic Text (see the exegesis below). The Codex Leningradensis, as opposed to the Codex Aleppo, has an obvious pointing error in the Hitpael participle of the second half, where it reads ‫ ִמ ְמּ ַת ַכּ ֵבּד‬instead of the correct ‫מ ִמּ ְת ַכּ ֵבּד‬. ִ

The verb ‫ קלה‬Niphal (participle ‫ )נקלה‬does not necessarily imply poverty, but means to be regarded as unimportant (cf. the cognate verb ‫[ קלל‬be light, inconsequential] and the cognate noun ‫[ קלון‬ignominy, embarrassment]). Of course, a person can be so regarded because of his poverty (cf. 1 Sam 18:23), 98 By itself, the first hemistich could have four stresses, but the second hemistich must have two and therefore four in the first would result in the unlikely pattern of 4+2. 99 Kuhn (1931, 25) finds it better to delete the waw in ‫ ועבד‬to follow this reading. His argument, viz. that working for oneself is the ground for being despised, is however unconvincing, since work is a virtue in sapiential literature (cf. two verses on in v. 11; also 13:4; 14:23 etc.).

344

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

but that is not a necessary cause for or element of being of humble social status (cf. Isa 3:5; 16:14) and can therefore not be used as argument for emending the word for “slave” in the text. Toy argues that people of modest means could afford or inherit a slave. Without denying the importance of hard work, the point of the proverb is therefore not so much to encourage hard work in service of oneself (‫ )עובד לו‬or to harvest produce (‫)עבור‬,100 but rather to criticise social dishonesty. It highlights, on the one hand, the contrast between being of lowly status yet with sufficient means and, on the other hand, putting on airs of social importance without even basic sustenance.101 It could be summed up as follows: V. 9a regarded as unimportant owning a slave

:: ::

V. 9b feigning importance owning even less than sustenance

To be seen as unimportant by others contrasts clearly with putting on a show to be seen as important by others. But both are relativised by what follows in each case. At least having a slave alleviates social lowliness, while having no food on the other hand shows how futile faked social posture is. The contrast between owning a slave and having nothing to eat does not weaken the “better than” comparison (Fox), but enhances it. Indeed, the comparison between a lowly man owning at least something and a fake acting as if he were the man spoken of in 31:23, unmasks the vanity of braggadocious102 self-importance. The proverb is paralleled by Sir 10:27: κρείσσων ἐργαζόμενος καὶ περισσεύων ἐν πᾶσιν ἢ περιπατῶν δοξαζόμενος καὶ ἀπορῶν ἄρτων (It is better to work and have enough of everything than to go around extolling yourself and lack bread) 100 So Fox; similarly already Schultens (et sibimet servus [and unto himself a servant]) and early commentators such as Rashi (‫[ בעיני ו ונעשה עבד לעצמו טוב נקלה‬Better is he who is lowly in his own eyes and who became a slave unto himself]), Symmachus and Luther (see Delitzsch, who points out that that would require the Hebrew ‫ לנפשו‬instead of ‫)לו‬. 101 Cf. 13:7, which is not quite parallel, but does illustrate that appearances of rich and poor can be misleading. The proverbs in 12:9 and 13:7 are not counted a pair by Heim (2013, 439); cf. Snell (1993, 57), who groups 12:9 with 15:16; 15:17; 16:8; 17:1 according to formal characteristics (as proverbs of the better x+ than y+ type); cf. also Luchsinger (2010, 167, 223 [FN 73]) for a list of proverbs of this type in the second collection of the book. Schipper takes the Niphal in 12:9 to be reflexive (“regard oneself lowly”), which is possible but improbable, for that would rather mean humbling oneself than acknowledging one’s humble standing (cf. Delitzsch, Plöger, Waltke, Sæbø). Even so, the substance of the latter would not differ significantly from what Schipper arrives at. 102 For the adjective, cf. Donald J. Trump (NBC News, 26 September 2016); here, however, reference to neither ‫( חסר־לחם‬v. 9) nor ‫( נעוה־לב‬v. 8) is intended. Cf. below, the note on 13:3.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

345

If dependent on Prov 12:9, Ben Sira would illustrate the work motif applied by some rabbis in their interpretation of the proverb. Rashi interprets the verse as a contrast between one who becomes a slave/works in his own interest (see above) and one who regards menial tasks as below his social station. The latter will eventually not have enough to eat. The contrast between the benefits of hard labour and the futility of shunning it for reasons of vanity is echoed in the Talmud,103 however without direct reference to the proverb. Ralbag sees the fortunes of those who do lowly work for themselves and those who think themselves important reversed. The humble one will be honoured and the haughty one will ultimately be disgraced. The Vilna Gaon interprets similarly, but still offers a metaphorical understanding. It notably is better to be humble and serve oneself by asking help in Torah study than being a know-all and ending up knowing everything about nothing. On the other hand, Nahmias reads the proverb together with the previous one, seeing in the lowly person the one who uses his abundant prudence (‫רוב שכלו‬, thus not manual labour) to develop into a position to buy slaves (‫)עבדים ושפחות‬. He regards the braggart as a rich man with a crooked heart (‫ )עשיר ובהעוות לבו‬who will not attain the blessing spoken of in Ps 128:2. Such a connection may indeed be the reason why the two sayings in vv. 8 and 9 were juxtaposed by the editor. John Cassian104 quotes the proverb together with 13:7 as a biblical confirmation for his criticism of those who try to enrich themselves by posing as knowledgeable Christian teachers while themselves in need of instruction. Chrysostom offers an almost homily-like interpretation of the Septuagint text. Connecting it to 6:6-8, he extols the value of work over against those who think it is not only hard, but also shameful. On the contrary, there is no shame in working either in one’s own employ or in another’s. The reason is that all who work, do so to avoid hunger. While there is shame in hunger, there is none in working hard for food. Therefore all work is ultimately in one’s own service.

12:10 The righteous knows the need of his animal, but even the mercy of the wicked is cruel. According to Toy and Gemser, the proverb is organised in a pattern of 4+3 stresses. However, the munaḥ in the first word (‫)יוֹד ַע‬ ֣ ֵ is a conjunctive and the tiphḥa in the second word (‫ ) ַ ֭צ ִדּיק‬is a disjunctive separating it from the following word, which indicates that the Masoretes scanned the first hemistich as three beats to avoid a conglomeration of stressed syllables. The parallelism is antithetical, with a participial verbal sentence in the first half and a nominal sentence in the second. The latter contains the powerful stylistic feature of an oxymoron (a collocation of contradictory words), viz. “mercy is cruel.”105 103

Baba Batra 110a, see Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 218). Confer XXIV, 13 (NPNF II,11, 538). 105 Delitzsch denies the presence of an oxymoron. He thinks ‫ רחמים‬here means inwards = seat of feelings. But that would deprive the proverb of its distressing poignancy; see below. 104

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

The righteous man106 knows his animal’s ‫נפש‬. This noun has a broad semantic range: throat, breath, appetite, life, basic nature, essence, person, inner being, soul, seat of feelings and needs.107 In light of the second hemistich, where cruelty provides the crucial element of contrast with the first hemistich, the ‫ נפש‬must bear on what the righteous gives to the animal by way of kindness. The animal requires certain essential needs to be fulfilled. Since the third person masculine singular suffix in ‫( בהמתו‬his beast) indicates that livestock is meant, the righteous owner thus provides for the needs dictated by the nature of his animal’s species. ‫( בהמה‬animal, wild beast or livestock) can include cattle, camels, donkeys and mules, as well as sheep and goats (cf. Lev 1:2). Such animals primarily need adequate pasture or fodder, drink, shelter and rest.108 Of course it is in the interests of the owner himself to respect these needs and provide for animals who in turn contribute to his livelihood. But that is not the only reason for looking after them.109 In several Old Testament texts, both sapiential and non-sapiential, care of animals is commanded, described or implied.110 The prohibition in Deut 25:4 to muzzle an ox while he is threshing grain – for the nourishment of people, notably – is not merely advice for good husbandry, but a command.111 Therefore it has the well-being of the animal rather than that of the owner in mind, entailing that the ox must share in the same food source that his labour prepares for humans. Knowing the soul of an ox and knowing the soul of a human in distress is expressed by the same phrase (‫)ידע נפש‬112 and indicates an intimate personal familiarity with a situation that calls for appropriate action (cf. ‫ ידע‬in 27:23). Moreover, this kindness towards animals of labour is practised by God himself when he awards them the same sabbatical rest as for humans – and for the same reason (cf. Ex 20:10; 23:12; Deut 5:14f.). He nourishes even wild animals as they wait on God and pray for food (Ps 104:27f.; Job 38:41) and provides pasture for others (Job 39:5f.; cf. Lev 25:7). Finally, the God who feels compassion with the animals of Nineveh on an even keel with the people of the city (Jon 4:11) can credibly be pictured with the metaphors ‫ צדיק‬is masculine singular, while the antipode, ‫ רשעים‬in the second half, is plural. See HALOT, KAHAL, s.v.; cf. THAT II, 71-96. 108 Cf. Riede (2002, 57-64); for a general overview, cf. Borowski (1998, 45-51); AuS VI, 208-213. 109 For the occurrence of emotional attachment of humans to their animals and similar perceptions elsewhere in the ancient Near East, cf. Collins (2002, 238 and 243 [Hittites]); Foster (2002, 283 [Mesopotamia]); Teeter (2002a, 263 and 2002b, 358 [Egypt]); Brewer (2002, 452 [Egypt]). 110 For wisdom texts, cf. 27:23; Sir 7:22; legal texts: Ex 20:10; 23:12; Lev 25:6f.; Deut 11:15; 22:6f.; 25:4; prophetic texts: Isa 40:11; Ezk 34:23; Ze 13:17; Jon 4:11. 111 ‫( לא תחסם שור‬You may not muzzle an ox) does not use the mild negative form of the advisory style (‫ אל‬plus jussive), but the strong prohibitive form (‫ לא‬plus imperfect); cf. GKC 107o, 109c. 112 Ex 23:9 not only implies empathy but spells it out; cf. the similar phrase with ‫ זכר‬in Deut 5:15. 106 107

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

347

of a shepherd’s care for his flock as described in Ps 23. His people should know and trust him just as the ox and the donkey of Isa 1:3 do and they should praise him as all animals do together with the humans of Pss 145:21 and 150:6.113 All of this seems far from Paul’s mind when he allegorises Ex 25:4 in 1 Cor 9:9 (cf. also 1 Tim 5:18). On the grounds of Prov 12:10 and the supporting cloud of witnesses above – also the Good Shepherd of Isa 40:11 and Matt 10:4f., 11-15 – Paul’s rhetorical question to the Corinthians, “Is it about oxen that God is concerned?” should be resolutely answered, “Certainly, Sir!” Those who preach the bread of life may feed off the grain they thresh (they are seldom muzzled anyway), but they are certainly not the exclusive beneficiaries of God’s concern.

The second half of the proverb brings the opposite side. To be sure, it does not forbid slaughter and the consuming of meat, but it censures cruelty. By contrast to the humane manner of the righteous, the wicked is cruel. The oxymoron makes it clear that the cruelty spoken of here is extreme. The ‫רחמים‬ (mercy, compassion) of the wicked is cruel (‫אכזרי‬, indeclinable adjective). According to Delitzsch, ‫ רחמים‬here means the bowels where the emotions are seated, and not the compassion itself.114 According to him, this is supported by the Septuagint, but the Greek word used there (τὰ σπλάγχνα) can, like the Hebrew ‫רחמים‬, mean both the bowels and the tender feelings and thus provides no actual support. In any event, this reading overlooks the power of the oxymoron. Saying that the mercy of the wicked is cruel, compares the attitudes of the righteous and the wicked so that the one can be seen not only in opposition to, but also calibrated relative to the degree of the other. To the righteous kindness is kindness and cruelty is cruelty, but to the wicked “kindness” is on a par with what is normally cruelty. That indeed introduces the principle of a minori ad majorem, but not in the sense that cruelty to the lesser beings (animals) suggests even more intense cruelty, or kindness to superior beings (humans) suggests more kindness.115 The relativity pertains to the intensity of the minds of the opposing human types. At the point where the wicked reaches his moral best, it still is no better than what would be terrible on the normal ethical scale. How much worse, then, must his normal or premeditated cruelty be! In other words, the highest moral summit attainable by the wicked is no better than what the worst lapse of a righteous person would be if it were to come to that (which can happen, see above on 11:31 and 12:3).116 113

Cf. further Pss 36:7; 104:14, 17f. For the English edition of the commentary, M.G. Easton translates “compassion,” which clashes with Delitzsch’s exposition. In the German original Delitzsch translates the Hebrew to match his exegetical opinion: Das Gemüt der Gottlosen ist unbarmherzig (The mind of the wicked is merciless). 115 Waltke interprets in this way, with reference to Matt 25:23. 116 This is comparable to, though not the same as the idea that it “is worse for a liar to tell the truth than of [sic] a lover of truth to lie,” as Dietrich Bonhoeffer put it. Van Leeuwen and 114

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

Schematically: ‫צדיק‬

‫רשע‬

good

bad

= “good”

very bad

= “normal”

The oxymoron is neither ironic (saying the opposite of what the words express) nor sarcastic (saying what one means with taunting scorn), but comes near to both through the sharp use of counterpoise, namely of one relativised by the other. This acumen of the proverb confirms that Riede117 is right in his judgement that the second hemistich takes the saying beyond the level of its primary meaning. The treatment of animals becomes the vehicle for judging cruelty in principle, and by virtue of the parallelism also of kindness in general. It is not the same as metonymy where an ox, sheep or pig can stand for human types. Neither is it a matter of reasoning a minori ad majorem (from less important animals to more important humans), but happens because the keenness of the oxymoron concentrically extends the scope of the whole saying.118 According to Rashi, the kindness required here includes not only the animals, but also the rest of the household. In the Talmud the principle is even taken so far as to require a farmer to feed his animals before he feeds himself (Gittin 62a). Yonah Gerondi (13th century) relates the proverb to the requirement that the commands of Waltke loosely paraphrase the idea. In the original Bonhoeffer’s argument is that “what is worse than doing evil is being evil” (Bonhoeffer [1949] 1966, 64-65). In as far as Prov 12:10 suggests that in principle the wicked is not capable of doing anything kind, it would indeed mean that they are evil. It seems to me that the proverb’s oxymoron nevertheless focuses on just how cruel a wicked person can act, which is a powerful statement that he cannot do good at all. 117 Riede (2002, 64). 118 In Fuhs’s reading, the human kindness of the proverb mirrors the kindness of God towards his creatures (cf. below on the exposition of the Mezudat David).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

349

God are to be personally obeyed. Since God’s mercy includes humans and animals, humans must be personally merciful to each other. Several rabbis handle the difficulty of the oxymoron ingeniously. Rabbi Bahya (13th century, Spain) distinguishes the mental souls and the animal souls in humans (similarly Ralbag in the 14th century). Whereas the righteous attends to the mind, wicked people show kindness to their animal souls or bodily lusts, which is actually cruelty to their minds because it obstructs wisdom. The Mezudat David credits the righteous with having acquired the characteristic of compassion, which must be shown to domestic animals in the same way that God shows it to wild animals. On the other hand, the wicked inwardly have a cruel heart even when outwardly they seem to be performing acts of kindness. The Vilna Gaon handles the oxymoron similarly. Whereas the wicked’s kindness to their own bodily needs are actually cruel because it leads to bad health, the righteous is disciplined in this regard so as to remain healthy. He also opens another dimension: a cruel person overfeeds his animals, which may seem kind, but he only does so to make the beasts work harder and therefore displays real cruelty. Chrysostom interprets the proverb with the help of a minori ad majorem reasoning. Both in his homily on Rom 15:14119 and in his Proverbs commentary he relates the kindness towards animals as lesser creatures to the kindness towards humans as superior creatures. In the homily he uses this reasoning as an illustration of how gentle the saints really are – so kind that they are even kind to animals as well as humans. Athanasius of Alexandria120 uses the second half of the verse as a welcome source to rebuke the tormentors of the martyr Eutychius by saying that they have “bowels without mercy.” John of Damascus (c. 675-749 CE)121 quotes the first half of the proverb together with Deut 5:14 in a polemic against a materialistic mentality, since he thinks people may be induced towards God when both humans and animals are required to rest one day a week. John Cassian (360-435 CE)122 quotes the whole verse in an argument that Christians should be filled with the divine “heart of compassion” for others and that even monks should not be too strict on others, or else they would fall into the same sins that they condemn in others. Melanchthon makes interesting observations when he applies the kindness that animals should receive to people as well. He begins a lengthy discourse with the statement that just as God prescribes justice, he also prohibits cruelty, which is the opposite of justice (quæ opposita est iusticiæ). He thus explains ‫ צדיק‬as a just person (iustus) and, typical of his hermeneutics, appeals to the New Testament (Jas 3:13) to say that mercy supersedes judgement (misericordia superet iudicium), although he adds a rider: id est rigorem iuris (that is, the rigour of the law). The bold claim follows that exactly that is what is stated by this proverb: Ita hîc dicit Salomon: In viro iusto bonitatem & misericordiam esse, non solum erga pares, sed etiam erga inferiores (Solomon here says the same: In a just man there is goodness and mercy, not only as regards equals, but also as regards inferiors). According to him, the proverb speaks of kindness towards servants and should be applied generally by those in government. Thereby he applies the a minori ad majorem principle (animals to people) and, also typical of an enlightened humanist thinker, quotes classical sources (Xenophon) in support.

119 120 121 122

Hom XXIX in Rom 15:14 (NPNF I,11, 546). Hist Arian VII, Par 47 (NPNF II,4, 292). De Fid Orth XXIII (NPNF II,9, 95). Confer XI, 10 (NPNF II,11, 419).

350

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

12:11-12 11 Who works his land will have enough bread, but who pursues empty things lacks sense. 12 The wicked desires the net of evil people, but the root of the righteous yields. These two verses have given interpreters headaches over the centuries (see McKane). Already the ancient versions betray their difficulties with the Hebrew text. In the Septuagint an extra proverb is inserted between vv. 11 and 12, which bears evidence of the translator’s endeavour to make sense not only of v. 11, but also of v. 12. I would agree with EE that this extra verse “must be seen against the background of M 12:11-12” (the Masoretic Text of these two verses). The three Greek verses read as follows: ὁ ἐργαζόμενος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν ἐμπλησθήσεται ἄρτων, οἱ δὲ διώκοντες μάταια ἐνδεεῖς φρενῶν. (Who works his own land will be satisfied with bread, but who goes after empty things is of poor sense) ὅς ἐστιν ἡδὺς ἐν οἴνων διατριβαῖς, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ὀχυρώμασιν καταλείψει ἀτιμίαν. (Who has joy in amusements of wine, will leave behind dishonour in his own fortresses) ἐπιθυμίαι ἀσεβῶν κακαί, αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐν ὀχυρώμασιν. (The desires of the wicked are bad, but the roots of the pious are in fortresses)

The Greek v. 11B is a creation of the translator in his effort to make sense of vv. 11-12. Indirectly he thereby shows how he read the two verses together and what he made of them. In my opinion the two verses of the Hebrew (particularly v. 12) do not present such a severely corrupted text as is often claimed (cf. BHS, EE and several commentators such as Toy, Gemser, McKane, Whybray). V. 12 in the Hebrew makes reasonable sense (similarly Barucq, Clifford, Waltke, Schipper) and together the two verses are not only intelligible, but also contain evidence that they may well have been intentionally edited together. I am therefore not as pessimistic as Plöger who even calls his own conjecture a “chasing after wind,” and would concur with Schipper that there is hardly reason to emend the Masoretic Text, even if my suggestions differ from his in several respects. V. 11 is to be scanned 3+3, where the use of the maqqeph in both hemistichs is necessary to avoid a stress clutter, and v. 12 has a rhythmic pattern of 4+3. Toy and Gemser seem uncertain here, which should probably be attributed to the textual uncertainty they experience. First we attend to the

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

351

structure of the two verses and then to the text-critical matters together with the exposition. Vv. 11-12 can be read as a couplet in chiastic order: Who works his land will have enough bread,

but who pursues empty things lacks sense.

The wicked desires the net of evil people,

but the root of the righteous yields produce

V. 11a is obviously about tilling the land and obtaining the harvest, thus the result of enough food. V. 12b is not as obvious, but there is enough evidence to show that it too is about agriculture.123 Clifford takes ‫( יתן‬third person masculine singular imperfect Qal of ‫[ נתן‬give]) as an elliptical expression for ‫( נתן פרי‬give fruit, yield produce) and in support refers to Lev 26:4, 20 and Ps 1:3.124 It is true that the land and plants themselves rather than the roots are the subjects in these cases (so Toy), but this is offset by several considerations. First, the roots are also mentioned in connection with planting and bearing fruit (Ezk 17: 6-9), where it is also said that a vineyard only gives fruit when its root is intact (Ezk 17:7); the fact that a land yielding produce after rain makes the absolute use of the verb ‫ נתן‬in this sense viable,125 especially in a context where tilling the land and harvesting its produce is explicitly present and connected in a crosswise parallelism. So there is no reason to read ‫( איתן‬steadfast, secure) instead of ‫( יתן‬cf. BHS, BHQ, Toy, Kuhn,126 Gemser, Fox and others). V. 11b may refer to empty people or to empty things (‫)ריקים‬. With several Greek versions127 and older commentators such as Delitzsch and Wildeboer it is better to keep to the neuter, since pursuing them does not mean to follow their lead, but to track them. The net (‫)מצוד‬128 of evil people (v. 12a) is such an “empty,” negative thing. It is a hunting net, used for trapping unsuspecting 123 Heim (2013, 290) acknowledges the metaphor of the root (‫ )שרש‬in v. 12 and its relation to agriculture, but is not as interested in the connection of vv. 11 and 12 as in the clear proverbial pair in 12:11 and 28:19, which only differ in their respective last concepts (empty head and empty stomach). 124 Cf. further Ezk 34:27; Zech 8:12; Pss 67:7; 85:13. So also Rashi and Schultens. 125 So also the Vulgate (proficiet [will flourish]) and the Peshitta (}Îþæ [will sprout]; cf. the same Aramaic root ‫ שווח‬in the Targum of Prov 27:25). McKane simply declares it to be “hardly” possible, but offers no substantiation. 126 Kuhn (1931, 25-26). This is part of a rather extravagant conjecture (“The foundation of the wicked remains [only] a moment [‫]רגע‬, but the root of the righteous is permanent [‫)”]איתן‬. Kuhn does not connect the two verses, but tries to integrate them by means of textual criticism spanning both verses. He adds and discards so pervasively that it can rather be called re- or overwriting than reconstruction. 127 Septuagint (μάταια), Aquila and Theodotion (κενά). 128 ‫( ׇמצוֹד‬hunting trap; cf. Job 19:6; Qoh 7:26; // II ‫[ ֵח ֶרם‬net for trapping small game or fish] and used with ‫סוּר ים‬ ִ ‫[ ֲא‬fetters]) is an alternative form of ‫צוּדה‬ ‫( ְמ ׇ‬hunting net or its content; Ezk 12:13; 13:21; 17:20; parallel to ‫[ ֶר ֶשׁת‬net]), from the root ‫( צוד‬hunt; cf. Prov 6:26), not ‫( ְמ ׇצ ד‬inaccessible place), and not at all an Aramaic infinitive of the verb (Wildeboer).

352

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

prey to one’s own advantage.129 A wicked person desires130 to use a net to ensnare those they want to entrap in order to make quick profit (as in 1:11-13, 17-19). It is thus not a “notion that one evildoer desires what another evildoer has trapped,”131 but relates closely to the Piel participle in v. 11b: someone who goes after victims. Delitzsch, using a phrase from Augustine’s Confessions (VI, 18), visualises it as chasing vana et inania (guileful and futile things), cf. Deut 32:47, prey to be emptied out and plundered.132 That means they practise the opposite of the honest labour for an honest living spoken of in v. 11a, namely schemes for getting rich quick and without labour (as pictured in 1:10-19). Acting in this way is therefore the opposite of wisdom and in straightforward language is said to be exactly that – such people lack sense. To sum up: Who farms hard and honestly, is rewarded with sufficient food (v. 11a), because what he has sown yields a ripe harvest (v. 12b).133 But who senselessly chases after other people is stupid (v. 11b), for that is committing evil entrapment (v. 12a). Reading the two lines as a couplet reveals a parallelism network: V. 11

V. 12

a) who works his land

a) the wicked person

will have enough bread

desires the net of evil people

↓ :: ↑

↓ :: ↑

b) but who pursues empty things

b) but the root of the righteous

lacks sense

yields

129 Therefore the word is not II ‫( ׇמצוֹד‬mountain fortress), which – in the light of the fact that the wicked and the evil are equated in 4:14 – solves the perceived problem of what sense it makes that a wicked person (‫ )רשע‬can desire the fortress of evil people (‫)מצוד רעים‬. 130 Here ‫ ח ֵֹמד‬is to be vocalised as a participle, cf. Gemser; also EE on the “implicit vocalization.” 131 So Fox’s understandable objection to Clifford’s translation, “the catch of evil people,” but Clifford’s comments (“frenetic pursuit of vanity” and “frantically chasing rainbows”) do not need his translation. 132 The masculine plural (‫ )ריקים‬is used and the distinction between “empty things” and “empty persons” is blurred, since the victims themselves are as much the prey as what they own. 133 Cf. Ps 126:6. Compare the baritone aria from Part I of Josef Haydn’s oratorio, Die Jahreszeiten: “Der Landmann hat sein Werk vollbracht / Und weder Müh’ noch Fleiß gespart. / Den Lohn erwartet er / Aus Händen der Natur ...” (The farmer has done his work / And spared himself neither effort nor diligence. / The reward he expects / From the hands of Nature …).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

353

Read in each other’s light, the force of the parallelism within and between the two verses yields the following: • The hard worker and the wicked are mutually exclusive types. • The former labours honestly, the latter seeks evil schemes at the cost of others. • Who chases after unfair things and the righteous are mutually exclusive. • The former is empty-headed, the latter harvests sufficient crops. • The hard worker is righteous, the shadowy schemer is wicked. Comparing 12:11 to its near doublet in 28:19 highlights a significant difference. In the latter case he who pursues ‫ רקים‬is not called empty-headed, but ends up being sated with poverty. In 28:19 ‫ מרדף רקים‬can therefore only mean “who pursues empty things” in the sense described by Delitzsch as “things without solidity and value ... and, in conformity with the contrast, not real business.” Although we do not need to strain the import of correspondences in the vicinity (of which there are several, not only in the case of 12:11,134 but also in that of the doublet, e.g. between 28:19 and the verse preceding it),135 it is clear that this “twice-told proverb” has varying foci in the two places where it stands.136 The empty-headedness of the pursuer in 12:11b is associated with his use of aggressive methods and his equation with the wicked (12:12a), whereas in 28:19b the phrase ‫ ישבע־ריש‬is used not only to echo the verb of the first hemistich, but also and primarily to create a pun with a dash of irony (sated with bread :: “sated” with poverty). Advice similar to that given in v. 11a is offered by Amenemope:137 Plough your fields and you will find what you need, You will receive bread from your threshing-floor. The parallel in both halves is remarkable. Although agriculture can serve as an example for any work, the fact that the readers of Amenemope were educated scribes and not labourers (Fox), does not mean that farm work itself is not commended in such proverbs. Over the centuries, rich land owners have let their labourers do the hard work and to this day often use the first person singular to describe it (not an unknown phenomenon in other walks of life either). Yonah Gerondi has a straightforward interpretation of v. 11, finding as he does work necessary to acquire both food and understanding, which is echoed by Nahmias with the negative view of idleness found in the Talmud (Ketuboth 59b), notably that it leads to stupidity (‫)שעמום‬. Rashi however adduces a literal and a metaphorical interpretation, since to him working the land means literally producing food138 as well as 134 Heim (2013, 289-290) mentions derivatives of the root ‫עבד‬, forms bound with ‫חסר־לב‬, and the noun ‫ לחם‬for 12:9-11. Scherer (1995, 100) asserts words for basic needs, such as ‫לחם‬, ‫ נפש‬and ‫שבע‬. 135 Such as participial constructions and common thematic contents pointed out by Heim (2013, 290); see the comments on 28:19 in Vol. IV. 136 Snell (1993, 37-38) classifies the proverb as one of eleven sets of “whole verses repeated with two dissimilar words.” 137 Amenemope VIII, 17-18 (AEL II, 152); cf. also 6:6-8; 10:5; 13:23; 20:4; 24:27, 30ff.; Sir 7:15. 138 Cf. the positive and negative sides of this work as reflected in the Talmud (Sanh 58b).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

regularly studying. As for v. 12, Rashi offers essentially the interpretation proposed above, both regarding the idea of preying on others (v.12a) and the root that yields produce (v. 12b). Nahmias suggests a novel idea of what the empty things may include – one may squander one’s time by studying useless things like apocryphal books. But he too considers the “giving root” of v. 12b to mean that the worked land will yield fruit. To this the Mezudat David adds the nuance that, while tilling the soil is indeed opposed to the useless things spoken of in v. 11, one can see in v. 12 that the worker’s own roots yield the harvest, meaning that an honest farmer is independent of external help (Pseudo-Ibn-Ezra thinks that the root yields produce because the wicked cannot destroy it). From the perspective adopted in my argument above, the proposal by Rabbi Bahya (Spain, 13th-14th century) is intriguing, viz. that vv. 11 and 12 are to be taken together. The juxtaposition of a person who works for a living and a person who chases empty things (v. 11) suggests that the latter will covet the success of the former, which is a sin, especially if he starts coveting criminal plunder. So, the work of v. 11a protects one against coveting the success of v. 12b, and chasing empty things of v. 11b seems to be associated ad pejus with the violence of v. 12a. Thus Bahya, while centring the two verses on the theme of coveting, suggests a thematic chiasmus between the same units that I have marked out above. His contemporary, Hame’iri, offers a simple defence of agriculture as an occupation more necessary than others for Jews. But in the 19th century Malbim allegorises v. 11 so that the land represents the soul and the different aspects of labour become different aspects of tending the soul – weeding out what is wrong, planting wisdom and irrigating knowledge so as to achieve the spiritual nourishment of the soul. In the Apostolic Constitutions (c. 3rd century CE),139 v. 11 is quoted as part of biblical support for the idea that Christians who do not work must not eat. John Chrysostom, working with the Septuagint, sees v. 11 as an admonition to work and against idleness, but greed should not be a motivation to obey. The addition to v. 11 in the Septuagint gives him cause to assure those given to “alcoholic pleasures,” that they will reap dishonour, but the rest of the textual difficulties seems to be too much for Chrysostom and he only promises mercy to those who “eye softness.” In his Third Easter Letter, Athanasius140 uses the Greek version to argue for spiritual activity, lest idleness bring multiple evil spirits into an empty heart (cf. Matt 12:43). Some Medieval Latin manuscripts have an addition to the proverb saying that a careful person in a tavern will relinquish contumely. In the Postilla to Proverbs attributed to John of Varzy (†1278) the author comments that this gloss is not in the text that the Venerable Bede (c. 673-735) had earlier commented upon and finds it to be rather in the character of a postilla than of a gloss.141 This seems plausible to me, since the addition is an expository embellishment of v. 12b. Philipp Melanchthon gives an extended exposition of v. 11, but leaves v. 12 uncommented. Commending the goodness of labour, he uses v. 11 to support his conviction that all people should be taught to conduct also their “external life” (externam vitam) in accordance with the word of God and have joy in labour. In his typical way he makes the point that diligence is a virtue, quoting negative examples from classical history of people who can be regarded as chasers after empty things (v. 11b) as well as New Testament confirmation (cf. 1 Thess 2:9; 2 Thess 3:8). 139

Const VIII (ANF VII, 425). Easter Letter III, 3 for AD 331 (NPNF II,4, 513); cf. above on 11:26. 141 See Smalley ([1949] 1986, 92), who judges that the postilla referred to by John must be that by Hugh of St. Victor (†1142). 140

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

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12:13-14 13 In the transgression of the lips is a trap of the evil, but the righteous escapes from trouble. 14 From the fruit of his mouth a man will be sated with what is good, and the deed of a man’s hand comes back to him. Here we have another group of two sayings, this time a group not by virtue of a structural pattern as in vv. 11-12, but closely associated through the common theme of speaking142 and doing. Gemser opts for 4+3 as the rhythmic pattern of v. 13, but Toy scans 3+3, the latter of which is correct in my opinion. The conjunctive munach accent with ‫ מוֹ ֵ ֣ קשׁ‬connects it to the following word (‫)ר ע‬, ָ which has the disjunctive atnach to separate it from what follows. For v. 14, Gemser wavers between 4+3 and 3+3, but it would be difficult to validate the former pattern because it would force the acceptance of one maqqeph and rejection of the other in the first hemistich. Here too I would agree with Toy and scan 3+3 (the penultimate word in the second half also carries a conjunctive accent with the last word, viz. a merka). As for the text-critical issues, there is neither reason to read ‫ נוקש‬for ‫ מוקש‬in v. 13a, nor to delete ‫ טוב‬in v. 14a, or to accept the Qere reading as Hiphil instead of Qal ‫ ישוב‬in v. 14b (see below). The word ‫( שפתים‬lips) in v. 13 is, like ‫( פי‬mouth) in v. 14, metonymic for the act of speaking. The motif of speaking occurs in several of the following verses (cf. vv. 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25), but caution is called for in the endeavour to identify refined architecture behind it.143 The parallelism of v. 13 is antithetic and that of v. 14 is progressive (called “synthetic” by Waltke). That means that the two stichs cannot stand in symmetrical parallelism. But even so there is a far-reaching and meaningful parallelism between the lines:

142 Cf. “lips” and “mouth” as organs of speech (Waltke), which are prominent metonyms in these verses. 143 According to Schipper the presence of both the trap image in vv. 12 and 13 and the use of the motif of speaking in the following verses argue against an overarching group in 12:14– 13:13 as proposed by Scoralick (1995, 198-201). Not unlike Scoralick, Fuhs takes 13:2 as a Janus looking backwards and forwards simultaneously, but Waltke judges that 12:13-14 is a Janus between the verses surrounding them, starting at v. 1 and ending at v. 28, whereas Scoralick finds a subunit 12:14–13:2 to be both forwards and backwards looking (cf. Murphy’s reservations and Sæbø’s outright surprise at her overall argument). As the detailed exegesis shows, there are indeed several proverbs with such affinities to what goes before and what comes after them, as well as many thematic overlaps and catchwords. But precisely because much can be said for more than one among views such as those mentioned, I am reluctant to accord them too much weight in endeavours to uncover sophisticated patterns, and sometimes even complicated medium to long-range designs.

356 V. 13 a) bad speaking with negative result (entrapment) :: b) positive result only for the righteous

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12 :: :: ↔

V. 14 a) good speaking with positive result (sated with the good) ↕ b) general deed-consequence principle

V. 13a can be understood in several ways: The phrase ‫( מוקש רע‬trap of evil) can contain a subjective genitive, meaning that a trap set by an evil person exists in the transgression144 of the lips. Or the genitive can be objective, meaning that it is a trap in which an evil person is caught. Third, ‫ רע‬can be taken as an adjective, meaning that the trap is qualified as evil or dangerous. If we read v. 13 without recourse to v. 14, the antithesis between the first and the second hemistichs invites the reader to relate the idea of escaping with that of falling into a trap. If it is the righteous (‫ )צדיק‬who escapes, then an opposite is suggested for the first hemistich, which can only be the bad person, namely the one called ‫רע‬, who would be the same as the often used ‫ רשע‬or wicked person.145 In terms of the parallelism, this bad person is thus expected to fall into the trap. Simultaneously it is intimated what makes him a bad person. He sets a trap for others, notably by a “transgression of the lips,” which could be telling lies, spreading false rumours or misleading others so as to ensnare them. Such a verbal trap can thus be called “evil” in every respect – it is dangerous, it is set with evil intent, it has a bad result for the one who devised it. In the context of v. 14b (see below) – which affirms the general effect of the deed-consequence nexus, that is, both the negative and the positive results for the respective deeds inducing them – the reader is prompted to recognise both sides of the nexus at once: he that sets a trap for others, will himself fall into it (a well-known idea, cf. 26:27; 28:10; Qoh 10:8; Ps 7:16).146 On the other hand, the righteous person escapes from trouble (‫)צרה‬. Since it does not refer to trouble caused by the trap of words, it is a general statement. Accordingly, it not only proclaims that the snare set by the evil person will have no effect on the righteous, but it also extends the specific scenario of a verbal ambush to a universal truth covering in principle all forms of adversity. This is how both the Septuagint and the Peshitta understood the proverb: 144 Kuhn’s conjecture that ‫ פשע‬should be read as ‫( שׂעף‬perhaps “ambiguity”), which should be assumed to be the same as ‫סעף‬, of which the vowels are conceded to be uncertain, then surmised to have undergone metathesis, and finally supposed to have acquired its meaning from the root ‫( סעף‬divide in two), cf. Ps 119:113, is very creative but guesswork in equal measure. 145 ‫ רע‬can be an adjective (cf. 15:15; Qoh 12:14) as well as a noun (as in 4:14; 11:21; 14:19). The use of this word makes the polyvalent understanding of the phrase possible, since a trap can be something evil (as in Qoh 9:12, where the synonym ‫ מצודה‬is used for the trap), but it can hardly be described as a person of wicked character (‫)רשע‬. 146 For a general discussion of the topic, cf. Janowski ([1994] 1999, 265f.); see above, Introduction Par. 6.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

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δι᾽ ἁμαρτίαν χειλέων ἐμπίπτει εἰς παγίδας ἁμαρτωλός, ἐκφεύγει δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν δίκαιος. (Through a sin of the lips the sinner falls into traps, but the righteous man escapes from them) ? ¿þÚ ËЏĀã zÎóéx ¿ćàÎ𠜠f¿æøà{s èã ¿úÙx| Õáò{ (Through a sin of his lips the evil man is caught, but the righteous man escapes from calamities)

Schipper points out that the noun ‫ צרה‬is often used in the Psalms for existential distress (e.g. Pss 20:2; 22:12; 25:17, 22; etc.) and that the Hiphil of the verb ‫( יצא‬cause to go out, thus: liberate) can also be used with Yahweh as the subject (so Ps 143:11). Since the Qal is used here, the righteous man is credited for achieving his escape by virtue of his own conduct (cf. 11:8, where a passive verb is used). This does not mean that the proverb denies divine involvement in principle, since God remains the ultimate warrant of the sapiential order of things. But the human being is nevertheless required to keep the injunctions of wisdom so as to obtain the positive result. Accordingly, only the righteous person features in the antithetic second hemistich. Since v. 13b formulates the escape of the righteous person in general terms, it suggests the underlying principle of the nexus between attitude and consequence, even though only the positive side is expressed. Nevertheless, the parallelism with the contrasting v. 13a invites thinking first and foremost of an escape from any harm planned for him by the trap of words. The relation between the two halves of v. 14 is different, however. This verse contains no antithesis within itself. The first hemistich concerns a specific instance of positive speaking, this time in contrast with the specific use of the negative motif of speaking in v. 13. The second hemistich confirms both sides of the principle on which both the first hemistich and the negative opposite in v. 13 depend. Although such an opposite is not mentioned in v. 14, it is mentioned in v. 13. Therefore the progressive parallelism in v. 14 undergirds the positive content of its own first half as well as the positive and negative statements of the whole preceding verse. The fruit of one’s mouth is the words one produces.147 The metaphor of fruit denotes that the words are edible, therefore life-giving nourishment, which is confirmed by the verb ‫( שבע‬be sated). Those who hear the speaking are thus According to an often cited proposal by Shupak (1984/85, 481-483), ‫( מפרי פי־איש‬from the fruit of a man’s mouth) may suggest influence of an Egyptian idiom prt n/m r’ (what comes from a man’s mouth), since pri and perî could have been confused; the former is the Egyptian verb for “go forth” and the latter is the Hebrew noun for “fruit” (cf. Waltke and Schipper). If such influence did take place, it could also reflect an intentional pun between the Egyptian verb and the Hebrew noun (Fox). 147

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

fed and the speaker is nourished as a consequence. This is a particularly clear instance of the deed bringing about its own consequence. If what the good a person speaks is fruit from which (partitive ‫ )מן‬he himself may enjoy, then the deed and its consequence blend. That is also why the Ketib reading ‫ ישוב‬in the second hemistich is better than the Qere ‫ישיב‬. The former is in the Qal (it comes back), while the latter is Hiphil (he causes to come back). The Qal suggests that human deeds generally have their own boomerang effect (‫)גמול ידי־אדם‬.148 The Hiphil of the Qere suggests an effort by the Masoretes to create explicit room for the intervention of God.149 But the Qal in the last halfverse denies this possibility just as little as the Qal ‫ יצא‬in the first hemistich, since God is the one who has created and upholds the order (God’s “mysterious hand ... present in the processes of the world,” as put by Van Leeuwen and quoted approvingly by Fox).150 Both verses are “twice-told proverbs.” V. 13 has a parallel saying in 29:6 (cf. further 18:7 and, for the idea of a trap, 13:14; 14:27). V. 14a resembles 13:2a; 18:20a.151 The saying in 29:6 has a broader scope than that of 12:13, speaking as it does of an unspecified transgression of an evil man and not of a transgression consisting specifically of speaking. The syntax differs as well (in 29:6 ‫ צדיק‬opens the last half-verse but ends it as in 12:13) and the righteous do not just escape harm, but positively rejoice.152 In the case of 12:14a, there are similarities with 13:2a and 18:20a. In both of the latter, one word occurs that does not occur also in 12:14a (‫[ יאכל‬13:2a] instead of ‫[ ישבע‬12:14a] and ‫[ בטנו‬18:20a] instead of ‫[ טוב‬12:14a]).153 148 The parallelism between words of the mouth and deeds of the hands shows that no division exists between speaking and doing (Waltke); saying something is doing something (cf. ‫ דבר‬that can mean both a spoken word and a deed performed). 149 So e.g. Whybray, Clifford and EE; cf. Waltke, Schipper and, with restraint, Murphy and Tuinstra. 150 See above on v. 13 and the references to the Introduction and Janowski (1994) given there. 151 Trying to iron out what he perceives as uneven, Kuhn (1931, 26) conjectures that ‫ִבּ ְטּנוֹ‬ should be read in 12:14a as in 18:20 (however, with doubled ‫ ט‬and shewa mobile, which is not the case in 18:20), and the verb in the Hiphil (‫יע‬ ַ ‫)יַ ְשׂ ִבּ‬. He translates, “he will satisfy his belly.” But the whole proposal is arbitrary and depends on the further guess that ‫ טוב‬has erroneously found its way here from 13:2 (“scheint aus 13,2 hier eingedrungen zu sein”). 152 Cf. Heim (2013, 291-295, esp. 292f.), who extensively discusses the parallels, including aspects such as the editorial positioning of the sayings in what he regards as the respective clusters. Cf. also Snell (1993, 40), who classifies the two proverbs in his category 1.4, under: “Whole verses repeated with four or more dissimilar words.” 153 Heim (2013, 295-303) starts his discussion of these three variants with a critique of Snell (1993, 50), who suggests – correctly, in my opinion – that the relationship between 12:14a and 13:2a is slightly closer than the relationship between either of them with 18:20a. The classification of all three in Snell’s category 2.2 of twice-told proverbs (“Half-verses repeated with two dissimilar words”) seems wrong to Heim. He notably claims that there is only one dissimilar word between 12:14a and both of the other two proverbs, which would point to Snell’s category 2.1 (variants with only one dissimilar word). However, Snell’s view can be defended, because 18:20a contains two words (‫תשבע‬, ‫ )בטנו‬that are dissimilar to their counterparts in both 12:14a (‫ישבע‬, ‫ )טוב‬and 13:2a (‫יאכל‬, ‫)טוב‬, whereas the latter two half-lines only contain one dissimilar word in their mutual relation (‫ יאכל‬for ‫ )ישבע‬and are therefore indeed slightly closer

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

359

Between vv. 13 and 14 the Septuagint adds another saying, ὁ βλέπων λεῖα ἐλεηθήσεται, ὁ δὲ συναντῶν ἐν πύλαις ἐκθλίψει ψυχάς. (Who looks on gently will be treated with mercy, but who confronts [people] in the gates will distress souls)

There is no recognisable Hebrew source for this saying (so EE), but it does show thematic resemblance with the two verses between which it has been inserted. The motif of speaking is clearly present, especially confrontational speaking during litigation in the town gates, by which one tries to outsmart an opponent (cf. the Hebrew v. 13a). The first hemistich of the Greek addition, again, states the principle of alignment between deed and consequence (cf. Hebrew v. 14b). Schipper points out that a general statement of the close affinity between deeds and their consequences such as 12:14b (and similar sayings in the Book of Proverbs, see below) has many parallels in Egyptian texts of the first millennium BCE. He illustrates it with tomb inscriptions from the 10th to the 8th century:154 One rewards the virtuous according to his excellence, one loves him who knows nothing reprehensible.

And: The virtuous is rewarded with that which he himself has done.

In order to illustrate the negative side together with the positive, some similar sayings from the same period may be added. So for example the even clearer formulation of the principle in a figurine inscription:155 Who does good, to him the same is done, who does evil, to him is done likewise. A passage from Amenemope156 offers an instance quite comparable to 12:14a with an agricultural image containing the motifs of a tree, fruit and the implicit motif of speaking. A hot-tempered person is likened to a tree growing indoors; it is no good and causes its own end as firewood. But who is prudently unassertive and quiet is like a tree in a meadow that produces sweet fruit to delight people, thus rewarding itself with the care received in a garden.157 to each other than to 18:20a. Since Snell’s point is about dissimilar words and not different lexemes, the third person masculine singular in ‫ ישבע‬and the dissimilar third person feminine singular in ‫ תשבע‬have to be part of the equation despite the fact that the same root is used. 154 Schipper cites Jansen-Winkeln (1999, 117), notably Cairo 42226 and 42227. 155 Cairo JE 36945 (from Karnak), line 13 front; Jansen-Winkeln (2001, 167 [cf. 168, Endnote 6]; see also 29-30). 156 Amenemope VI, 1-10; see AEL II, 150f.; cf. ANET, 422. Lyu (2012, 101) refers to this comparison in the context of his discussion of “binary anthropology” in Proverbs and Egyptian wisdom literature. 157 The word for “garden” is uncertain; see Römheld (1989, 134).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

In rabbinic interpretation each of the two verses is usually treated in its own right. According to Rashi, the Generation of the Flood, to whom words about the unprofitability of serving God (cf. Job 21:15) are ascribed, caught themselves in the trap of those very words, while Noah as ‫ צדיק‬escaped (v. 13). The same principle is set out in the interpretation of Ramaq, Ralbag and the Mezudat David. Hame’iri stresses the importance of the tongue both for the righteous and the wicked. The former guard their tongues and escape trouble, while the latter fall prey to the greatest potential danger, viz. the tongue (the same two-sided principle is espoused in the New Testament in Jas 3:1-12, however without clear reference to the Proverbs text; cf. also Leviticus Rabbah 33:1 for an anecdote of tongue being good meat and also bad meat; further Amenemope VI, 7 referred to above). The motif of fruit is extended by Yonah Gerondi (13th century) to mean that whoever speaks “fruitfully” so that others profit, will share the same “fruit” of the reward to which his words have directed them (v. 14). The Vilna Gaon applies the idea to the relation between friends, viz. a man who admonishes a friend who does wrong. If that leads to a good result, the admonisher will be rewarded for what the receiver has done to make amends. Gerondi interprets the last hemistich of v. 14 as a reference to punishment. This enables him to explain the ketib and qere in such a way that neither punishment by God nor the fact that the sinner is author of his own punishment is denied. The danger that Hiphil could imply that God causes a bad deed to be effective in punishing the doer and thus that God is part of a bad deed, is avoided. That is what the Qal ketib is for, namely, to show that the sinner brings his own sin to completion in its effect on himself, however without taking God out of the equation. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra only plays on the verb ‫ יצא‬in v. 13: a trap “goes out” from the wicked, and the righteous “goes out” of the trap. Chrysostom only comments on the first half of the additional verse following v. 13 in the Septuagint. He obviously can make nothing of it and merely claims that it refers to “right things.” On v. 14 he says that virtue lies in words to a greater extent than in deeds. Jerome158 quotes v. 13a as one of a whole array of biblical references in his argument that peace can only be obtained when one takes the Book of Proverbs seriously. The context is his controversy with Rufin sparked by translational differences. The implication is that Rufin has fallen into the trap of his own words and that Jerome is the righteous one. Surprisingly – at least for me – in the light of the generic character of v. 14b, I have found no further use made of this verse in patristic literature. Melanchthon merely gives a few short paraphrasing notes on vv. 13, 17 and 23 as injunctions concerning truthful speaking and modesty about one’s knowledge. His commentary only commences again with Chap. 13. Calvin159 begins the eighteenth chapter of Book III of his Institutes with the problem of interpreting the many scriptural texts – among them Prov 12:14 – on the rewarding or retribution of good deeds. As one could expect, this needed special attention in light of the sola gratia of the Reformation. Calvin’s answer is to accept that humans are rewarded according to their works, however only in the sense of an “order of sequence” and not in the sense of the cause of such reward. It is thus no more than a “mode of expression” allowing us to maintain that works are not opposed to grace because they only express the pursuit of the final reward given sola gratia.

158 159

Adv Rufinum III, 43 (NPNF II,3, 540). Inst III/18,1.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

361

12:15-16 15 The way of the fool is right in his own eyes, but who listens to counsel is a wise man. 16 A fool – on the [same] day his anger is made known, but who conceals an insult is a shrewd person. The third consecutive proverb pair160 is not about speech, but about the distinguishing characteristics of the fool and the astute person. The fact that these two proverbs have been placed among verses where speaking is the theme (vv. 13-14) or a prominent motif (vv. 17-19, 22) makes it understandable that Meinhold finds the motif of speech implicitly present and that several commentators think along similar lines.161 But even if the claim is not refuted, and even if it is the placement that suggests the presence of the idea of speech, the motif is only recessive in the service of characterising the fool and his counterpart (see below on v. 15). Waltke agrees that vv. 15-16 are a pair, but then divides them again as respectively the introduction to a whole unit in vv. 15-28 and the opening of a subunit on speech (vv. 16-23). The rhythmic pattern is 4+3 in both stichs (so also Gemser, but Toy scans v. 15 as 3+3 and hovers between a Siebener and Doppeldreier in v. 16162). They are connected by the catchword ‫( אויל‬fool), but also by the foolish selfevaluation of the dolt as opposed to the wise man, and by the public manifestation of his folly (similarly Schipper), again in contrast to his counterpart. Thirdly, the two stichs are linked by the similar syntactic shape of their respective second halves. Both begin with a Qal participle (Waltke) and, as far as the subject and predicate of the two b-sentences are concerned, both are syntactically ambivalent in the same way. Both verses have the same antithetical parallelism, which binds them: 15 What the ‫ אויל‬thinks of himself 16 How the ‫ אויל‬expresses himself

:: ::

behaviour characterising a wise man behaviour characterising a wise man

In v. 15 the fool’s judgement about his own behaviour in general is highlighted. In the first hemistich it is summarily stated that the fool’s “way,” i.e. his way of doing things, is right in his own opinion.163 That means he 160 For vv. 15-16 as a pair, cf. Toy, Meinhold, Plöger, Whybray, Fuhs, Van Leeuwen, Waltke, Fox, Sæbø and (with some reservation) Murphy. 161 Cf., for instance, Waltke, Lucas, Perdue and Yoder. Krispenz (1989, 60) thinks that the audience “involuntarily” (“unwillkürlich”) understands such sayings under the impact of the proverbs with explicit reference to speech. 162 Irrespective of whether or not the verb in v. 16a is emended from Niphal to Hiphil, I can see no reason to somehow combine two of the four words in this hemistich to form one stress unit. 163 For the use of ‫ עינים‬with ‫ ב‬and suffix (in the eyes of ...) to express that a person thinks himself to be right, cf. 16:2; 21:2; 28:11; 30:12; further variants: 21:2; 26:5, 12, 16; 28:11.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

thinks his behaviour is always right, which amounts to the most overbearing hubris.164 Therefore he lacks the humility necessary for being wise (cf. the opening verse of this chapter and 4:11-13) so that he discards good advice (cf. 11:14; 15:5, 22).165 What he thinks of himself does not necessarily imply speaking (pace Meinhold) and can be made known by obstinate behaviour just as clearly as by saying things about himself. How far-reaching the consequences of pig-headedness vis-à-vis good advice can be is illustrated by the young King Rehoboam (1 Kgs 12:8, 12-16). No wonder, then, that the second hemistich directly identifies the fool’s opposite as the person who listens to ‫( עצה‬counsel, good advice). In this case not the latter’s self-evaluation, but his characteristic pattern of behaviour is in focus. He always listens to counsel (the Qal participle ‫ שׁ ֵֹמ ַע‬connotes continuity), which of course implies that someone gives the advice verbally. However – as in English – the receiver’s listening means more than auditory registering, notably translating it into actual practice. This is the person who follows the advice referred to all over the Book of Proverbs.166 Waltke is therefore right that the whole of v. 15 “resonates with the vocabulary of the prologue” (by which he means 1:8–9:18). It also resonates with the basic principle of humility without which one cannot realise that one’s own knowledge and insight have limits and/or that one’s own actions can be wrong. This attitude is described in a variety of ways and is found not only in the first nine chapters, but also in the rest of the book (e.g. 15:33; 16:18; 18:12; 29:23 [on the importance of humility] and 10:8; 13:13; 19:20 [on accepting advice]). Schipper points out a corresponding Egyptian usage of the same idiom. In the Demotic Teaching of Ankhsheshonq (not later than of Ptolemaic date, 4th century BCE) listening to advice is praised and it becomes clear that even a wise teacher benefits from asking for advice:167 Do not be discouraged168 in a matter where you can ask (advice). Happy is the heart of him who has made a judgement before a wise man. A wise master who asks (advice), his house stands forever.

164 Cf. Vol. I, 56-57 on 1:2, where the opposite mindset is presented as a prerequisite for wisdom. 165 In 4:11-13 the advice to be accepted is directly linked with the ideas of a way to walk and the humility to accept ‫( מוסר‬discipline). 166 Cf. the admonitions to listen to the good advice of the father/teacher as they occur in the poems of Prov 1–9, such as 3:1-2; 4:1-2; 5:1-2; 6:20-21; 7:1-3; likewise in the short sayings from Chap. 10 onwards, e.g. 19:20; 23:19, 22; 25:10. 167 Ankhsheshonq 12, 7-9; transl. Lichtheim (AEL III, 168); the first line, usually dubbed “x”, is missing in all the columns). 168 Schipper quotes the translation “heartless,” but Lichtheim (AEL III, 182) argues that the word šcṱ-ḥꜢ.ṱ (trimmed of heart) describes a temporary condition, as in 15, 24-25. On the wise who, for their own benefit, themselves have to listen, cf. Vol. I, 60-61 on 1:2.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

363

The translation and exposition given above take ‫ שׁ ֵֹמ ַע‬as the subject of the sentence in v. 15b and ‫ חכם‬as the predicate (who listens to counsel is wise) – so Mezudat David, McKane, Plöger, Meinhold, Murphy, Alter, Schipper. Syntactically, it is also possible that ‫ שׁ ֵֹמ ַע‬is the predicate and ‫ חכם‬the subject (a wise man listens to counsel) – so Ralbag, Toy, Oesterley, Clifford, Fox. Both alternatives boil down to basically the same meaning, but there is a slight difference in focus. If ‫ שׁ ֵֹמ ַע‬is the subject, then the act of listening to counsel is emphasised; the question is not how wisdom can be fleshed out, but how one who listens to counsel can be tagged. Moreover, with ‫שׁ ֵֹמ ַע‬ the subject, the syntax would be the same in both hemistichs (subject → predicate, subject → predicate). Listening to advice is the antithesis of conceit (v. 15a) and the first alternative should therefore be given preference. The following proverb (v. 16) also begins with the ‫אויל‬, but now says how he typically behaves when angered. His anger169 becomes known “on the day,” i.e. the same day that his wrath is kindled. The Masoretic Text vocalises ‫ יודע‬as Niphal, but the Septuagint reads the same consonants as Hiphil and thus translates ἐξαγγέλλει (proclaims). This is followed by the Peshitta, Targum and Vulgate as well as other Greek versions such as Theodotion and Symmachus and adopted by Kuhn and EE170 as a “tighter parallel” to the last hemistich about dealing with anger. Whether Niphal or Hiphil, both halfverses still describe how the individuals in question deal with anger. The Niphal makes sense in another respect. The catchword ‫ אויל‬is a casus pendens, which isolates and therefore emphasises it. This also makes room for another emphasis, viz. on the immediacy of his anger becoming public, expressed by ‫( ביום‬on the [very same] day). Thus the fool with his propensity to uncontrolled outbursts is highlighted. The counter-pole then follows in the contrast provided by v. 16b, which is also stylistically closely connected to the first hemistich, viz. by the k- and s-sounds in the last word of v. a and the first word of v. b (respectively ‫ כעס‬and ‫)כסה‬. In v. 16 the second hemistich is also syntactically ambiguous, although in this case only a slight focus shift makes up the difference between the alternatives. ‫ כ ֶֹסה‬can be the subject of the sentence in v. 16b, with ‫ ערום‬the predicate (who conceals an insult is shrewd) – so McKane, Plöger, Meinhold, Murphy, Schipper.171 Syntactically it is also possible that ‫ כ ֶֹסה‬is the predicate and ‫ערום‬ the subject (a shrewd man conceals an insult) – so Toy, Oesterley, Clifford, Fox. If ‫ כ ֶֹסה‬is the subject, then the act of concealing insults is emphasised; 169 That ‫ כעס‬means “anger” rather than “sorrow” is clear from the context (so Delitzsch and Plöger). 170 BHS regards the Hiphil as thinkable, but BHQ only notes the divergent reading of the versions. 171 In this case Alter is not in the list, since he sees the syntax of v. 16b as the inverted image of the syntax of v. 15b.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

the question is not how shrewdness can be defined, but how one who conceals insults should be tagged. Moreover, with ‫ כ ֶֹסה‬the subject, the syntax would be the same in both hemistichs (subject → predicate, subject → predicate). Concealing insults is the antithesis of letting it be known on the spot (v. 16a) and the first alternative should therefore be given preference. “Covering” an insult cannot mean covering it up, since that would imply adding injury to insult by first hurling abuse at people and then hiding it, which cannot be commended. It thus means patiently not countering such abuse from others,172 which reflects a fully sapiential mentality, as 26:4 shows. What is commended, is the calmness of quietly putting up with calumny (Schipper: “einstecken”) rather than venting one’s anger as the fool does. The statement in 17:27 confirms the wisdom of calm restraint as a general rule and 17:28 underlines it with the humorous remark that even an ‫ אויל‬who shuts his trap can be (mis)taken for a wise man. The motif of keeping silent vis-à-vis an adversary who, by contrast, pours out his feelings is also found in the Teaching of Amenemope:173 Settle in the arms of the god, Your silence will overthrow them. The crocodile that makes no sound, Dread of it is ancient. Do not empty your belly to everyone, And thus destroy respect of you; Broadcast not your words to others, Nor join with one who bares his heart. Better is one whose speech is in his belly Than he who tells it to cause harm. ... First gain insight from [your adversary’s] answer, Then keep still and you’ll succeed. Leave it to him to empty his belly*... ... Settle in the arms of the god, Your silence will overthrow them.

Not just the bare motif, but also its use in comparison with the unwise one who blurts out everything is of importance here. It is interesting that the Egyptian text makes an explicit religious reference, which is not the case in the 172 In Latin the same idiom (tegere contumelias) occurs with this sense, see Terentius, Hecyra, l. 166 (of a virtuous wife who successfully can “conceal the insults” from her husband); cf. Kuhn (1931, 26). 173 Amenemope XXII, 7-16; XXIII, 2-4, 10-11 (transl. Lichtheim [AEL II, 159]; for XXIII, 4-5*, Römheld [1989, 171] prefers, “Leave it unheeded in his presence, since he empties his inner feelings”; cf. also ANET, 424).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

365

biblical couplet. Amenemope even frames the lines about the preference for keeping one’s thoughts to oneself as opposed to spilling one’s guts by a repeated couplet advising refuge in the divine arms174 (XXII, 7f. and XXIII, 10f.). A note on variant repetitions of Proverbs Heim finds Chap. 12 special in terms of variant proverb repetitions. He devotes seventeen pages to parallels of vv. 15a and 16b he finds in the book.175 His analysis is detailed and sophisticated, and particularly complex in the material relating to v. 15a. This is primarily attributable to the number of parallels, which would de facto amount to “five-times-told” instead of “twice-told” proverbs (to imitate Snell’s phraseology). Heim’s Set 45 is notably made up of no less than Prov 12:15a // 16:2 // 21:2 as well as 14:12 // 16:25, while his Set 46 comprises Prov 12:16b // 12:23a. Analysing the variations and similarities as well as the contexts – sometimes revising his earlier views of 2001 – he detects several formal patterns, but there is great diversity in the degree of relations between the variants and their respective contexts. Much of his analysis supports his conclusion that the editorial activity responsible for the parallels points to the thorough consideration of their placement. One may for instance find new impulses for the interpretation of 16:2 and 21:2 in the light of Heim’s considerations (addressed to the king or not addressed to the king, encouragement or warning?). But the actual harvest of new dimensions of meaning and theological relevance is rather meagre relative to the enormous effort of the research. That does not subtract from the investigation, since the analysis establishes that variant repetitions were indeed “part and parcel” of the editorial work.176 This is well illustrated where one of our present proverbs, 12:16, is concerned. Heim finds the differences between the parallels in vv. 16 and 23 first to concern no shift in meaning, but only a signal of the presence of a variant repetition (where “shrewd” in v. 16 becomes “shrewd man” in v. 23). He also judges another variant to be a “real” difference, but only “one of nuance, rather than essence” (where “insult” in v. 16 is substituted by “knowledge” in v. 23). These considerations seem to me to confirm the stance taken in the Introduction to this volume of the commentary, viz. to respect interpreting the proverbs in their own right and also associations between them, where they present themselves.177 Rabbinic comment on these verses is often of a paraphrasing nature, but sometimes quite interesting expansions of the topic are offered. Ramaq, Ralbag and the Mezudat David relate the two hemistichs of v. 15 in as far as they see the inflated self-estimation of the fool as the reason why he does not want advice and therefore is the opposite of the real ‫חכם‬. Gerondi builds the element of desire into his explanation of v. 15: the fool is in special need of advice because he is blinded by his desires, whereas the wise man knows that his desires may cause him to err in private matters and for 174 Römheld (1989, 172) takes the pronominal third person in the framing couplet to refer to the divine arms that will be “outstretched,” whereas Lichtheim (AEL III, 163) thinks it refers to the adversaries who will be “overthrown.” On both counts the silent is vindicated. 175 Heim (2013, 303-315 and 315-319 – respectively on the parallels of v. 15a [Set 45] and those of v. 16b [Set 46]). 176 Heim (2013, 319). 177 Cf. above, Introduction, 2.2.3.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

that reason he values advice. Rashi, Nahmias and the Midrash connect v. 16 with the Creation Narrative. The Midrash notably relates the first hemistich to Adam, who sinned on the same day that he was created. In the same vein Rashi associates the second hemistich with the divine Sage, who covered Adam’s sin so that God did not have to destroy what he had just created. Nahmias presents the rationale: Gen 2:17 says that Adam would die on the very day that he eats the forbidden fruit, but Ps 90:4 equates a human day to a thousand divine years, which is why Adam lived about so long (Gen 5:5). Patristic use of these proverbs is rather scarce. Cyprian178 quotes v. 16 as one of a string of verses from the Old and the New Testaments (including Prov 16:32) to substantiate his claim that anger must be overcome because it leads to sin. Jerome179 cites both verses together with v. 13 (see above). The fool who over-estimates himself and quickly shows his anger seems to be recognised in the person of Rufinus, Jerome’s adversary. John Cassian180 has a whole chapter on anger management as an important topic for monks. He quotes v. 16 together with many other scriptural texts (among them Prov 25:8 and 29:11) to substantiate the necessity of restraining anger in order to avoid sin. Chrysostom gives a rational explanation of why the fool always thinks he is right. The fool is doubly wrong, first by being an idiot and second by not realising he is sinning. If one is on the wrong way it is because one mistakenly thinks it is the right way, and if one is stupid one thinks oneself to be of sound mind. On the other hand, it is clever to ask advice when one needs it, instead of blundering along. As for v. 16, Chrysostom attributes the outburst of rage to impatience that cannot come to grips with one’s anger.

12:17-19 17 Who breathes faithfulness, pronounces the truth, but a lying witness – deceit. 18 There is one who speaks recklessly like sword stabs, but the tongue of the wise is a remedy. 19 A truthful lip is established for ever, but a deceitful tongue just for the blink of an eye. These three proverbs are about three aspects relating to truthful speech. The idea of the truthfulness of witnesses in v. 17 focuses on the legal aspect, v. 18 is about the social effects of speech, and v. 19 highlights the aspect of permanence. The motif of speaking is clearly present in all six the hemistichs. Even so not speech itself, but its use in the context of truth and dependability bind the three lines together. According to Gemser (with some hesitation), v. 17 has 4+3 stresses, but Toy scans 3+3, apparently on the grounds of two adjacent stressed syllables at the end of the first hemistich in ‫יַ ִגּ֣יד ֶ ֑צ ֶדק‬. This is supported by the Masoretic conjunctive stress (munach). Although Toy does 178 179 180

Adv Iud III, 8 (ANF V, 535). Adv Rufinum III, 43 (NPNF II,3, 540). Confer XVI, 27 (NPNF II,11, 459).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

367

not expand, the same argument seems to underlie his choice for 3+3 in v. 18 (taking ‫ ַמ ְד ְק ֣רוֹת ָ ֑ח ֶרב‬as one beat, avoiding adjacent stresses, again as a consequence of a segolated noun and preceded by the same conjunctive stress as in v. 17). V. 19 can be read as 3+3 on account of the maqqeph with the first word (so Toy), but the maqqeph in the second half cannot have the same function, since the last two words (‫)ל ֣שׁוֹן ָ ֽשׁ ֶקר‬ ְ must be one beat, once again because of a segolated noun linked to a preceding word with munach. Therefore a Siebener (4+3) should be scanned with Gemser. Vv. 17 and 19 have a similar syntactic structure. Each consists of two verbal sentences and a verb gapped in the second hemistich.181 V. 18 deviates from this pattern and has a participial clause in the first half and a nominal sentence in the second. Scherer182 adds the terminological parallels of ‫אמונה‬, ‫אמת‬, and ‫ שקר‬in vv. 17, 19 and 22. But ‫ אמת‬only occurs in v. 19, so that it cannot be called a “consistent” usage (German: “durchgängig”). Although this does not make the three proverbs a poetic tercet, they do seem to be editorially linked in a careful way. Whybray, for instance, thinks that the placing of v. 18 between two proverbs on lying links the damage caused by inconsiderate speech with that of intentionally untruthful speech, and Scherer183 speaks of the “mental richness of the redaction.” 12:17 Who breathes faithfulness, pronounces the truth, but a lying witness – deceit. The antithetical parallelism in v. 17 is straightforward. It contrasts witnesses who can be relied upon for the truth with undependable witnesses who deceive. However, this is articulated in a sophisticated way, which befits the importance of the topic in an oral culture (cf. Van Leeuwen and the judgement of Whybray that the verse is not as “trite” as it may appear). The first word may be read as a noun or as a verb.184 Read as a verb in the Hiphil, it 181 Alter notes the gap in v. 17b, but does not comment on v. 19b. The verb ‫ נגד‬is easier to picture with ‫ מרמה‬as object (v. 17) than to think of ‫ כון‬as indicating only a moment’s stability (v. 19). But it is thinkable because the point is the contrast between the length of time that something remains standing. 182 Scherer (1999, 106). 183 Scherer (1999, 107). 184 Cf. 6:19 (and Vol. I, 270 of this commentary for reasons why it should not be taken as a noun there); also 14:5, 25; 19:5, 9. Fox calls the Hebrew word “problematic” in his commentary, but in EE he finds the Hebrew of the whole proverb “unproblematic.” As far as the sense is concerned, there is no real difficulty here, whether one reads ‫ יפיח‬as a verb or as a noun in the construct state (a witness of faithfulness; McKane calls the evidence for the proposal “exiguous”) with reference to Ps 27:12 and the Ugaritic ypḥ (cf. Watson [2017-2019, 83-92], for support for an etymology linking the word with Arabic bwḥ (disclose). In any case there is no reason to follow Kuhn (1931, 27) by emending the form to ‫יע‬ ַ ‫( י ִֺפ‬third person masculine

368

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

means “to breathe,” in this case “to breathe out.” Reiterer185 opts for the idea of emphatic speaking in ‫פוח‬, but the lack of a matching element in the antithesis of the second hemistich makes this less likely. Whereas 6:19 contains the word in a negative statement concerning habitual spreading of false testimony, here it is a positive assertion186 referring to a dependable type of person who always testifies truthfully. The general validity is then expressed by the asyndetic (conjunctionless) joining of two phrases in a causal affiliation (Fuhs: “Kausalnex”): He breathes faithfulness, [therefore] he pronounces truth or: [Since] he breathes faithfulness, he pronounces truth

Breathing faithfulness (cf. v. 22, so Tuinstra) is a fundamental quality that manifests in speaking (‫ נגד‬Hiphil)187 truth. ‫ צדק‬denotes what is right, including testimony in court.188 Hence the translation given above. The second hemistich brings the antithesis. The noun ‫( עד‬witness) indicates that giving testimony in the judicial sense is primarily although not exclusively meant (cf. the Decalogue, Ex 20:16; so Yoder). It stands in the construct state with an objective genitive, viz. ‫( שקרים‬untruths, lies). The plural (a witness of lies) means that a fundamental characteristic is used to typify the kind of witness who habitually has no regard for the truth.189 The second half-verse has no verb, which makes it necessary for the reader/listener to supply the verb ‫יגיד‬ (he pronounces) from the first half and thus to contribute to the proverb by providing the element that rounds off the antithesis: singular Hiphil imperfect of ‫יפע‬, let shine), not even with an appeal to the Septuagint, which has ἐπιδεικνυμένην πίστιν (obviously honest). 185 ThWAT VI, 538-543; cf. Scoralick (1995, 213-214). 186 “Truth-telling should be as instinctive as breathing” (Yoder). However, Delitzsch points out that, in the other cases just cited, ‫ פוח‬is used with ‫( כזבים‬lies), and only here with ‫אמונה‬ (faithfulness). 187 In Proverbs, ‫ נגד‬Hiphil is found only here and at 29:24; ‫( צדק‬what is right) can in a context such as this also mean “truth” (cf. 8:8, where the motif of speaking is also present; see KAHAL, 470). 188 Already Döderlein (1778) linked the habit of generally speaking truth or untruth to dependability or undependability in court; cf. 19th century commentators like Delitzsch and Wildeboer. Schipper also makes the connection, but suggests that the use of ‫ פוח‬points to an “organic process” in which the truth is not merely communicated, but as it were streams from the mouth of the sapiential speaker. 189 The Septuagint has δόλιος (deceptive), leading BHS to propose ‫( ְמ ַר ֶמּה‬Piel participle of ‫[ רמה‬deceive]). But the Greek word is not used for people, for which reason the Greek cannot here be used to emend the Hebrew; it rather understood the Masoretic ‫ ִמ ְר ׇמה‬as “something misleading.” Citing Prov 12:17, McCreesh (1991, 91) states that ‫“ ִמ ְר ׇמה‬refers to anything that is opposed to ‫משפט‬, from cheating via treason to (especially) lying, which perfectly suits the context in this proverb.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12 V. 17a who breathes faithfulness pronounces truth

:: ::

369

V. 17b a witness of lies [pronounces] deceit

The topic of truthful and false testimony occurs often in the Book of Proverbs, both in the poems (6:12, 19) and in the sayings (14:5, 25; 19:5, 9, 28; 21:28; 25:18). Whether by virtue of this fact or a possible “organic” view of actually constituting truth by letting it flow forth from the mouth, it is clear that the principle is of fundamental significance for judicial practice (so Fox). Schipper offers an Egyptian parallel as support for the idea of an “organic process” in the use of the motif of speaking. He refers to the Demotic Teaching of Ankhsheshonq,190 approvingly quoting the translation by Hoffmann and Quack,191 which can be rendered as follows: Tell everybody the truth; let it become one with your mouth. If the verb in the second half means “to become one,” as Hoffmann and Quack suggest, truth fuses with the mouth of the speaker. Then the mouth can be understood as an organ rather than a metonymy. That would conceive of the ideal learner’s mouth as a truth producing organ. But it is also possible to understand the text in a similar, though not identical way: Speak truth to all men; let it cleave to your speech.192 In this rendering the mouth is a metonymy for speech and cleaving for close association. So, the pupil should learn to let truth permanently be a feature of what he says. In favour of this interpretation, the previous line (13,14) may perhaps be quoted: Do not speak in two voices. This assumes that people can speak truth and untruth from the same mouth, which therefore cannot sometimes be a truth organ and sometimes not. But even without an “organic” concept, when truth is spoken, it is dispersed in the world around the speaker, as “breathe out” in the proverb suggests. Moreover, Bühlmann (supported by Hausmann) provides further backing for such an interpretation.193 He points out the correspondence of the Hebrew ‫( הגיד צדק‬tell what is right/truth) with the Egyptian phrase ḏd mꜢc.t (speak what is right/truth), which suggests that speaking the truth aligns with the world order.

When living up to the injunction of the proverb, the speaker thus contributes to the well-being of society, both in the administering of justice and in general.194 This seems to me what the proverb primarily states. It is addressed not only 190

Ankhsheshonq 13, 15. Hoffmann & Quack (2007, 287); their German translation reads: “Sag jedermann die Wahrheit, laß sie mit deinem Mund eins werden.” 192 English translation by Lichtheim (AEL III, 169), not by me. 193 Bühlmann (1976, 99); Hausmann (1995, 203). 194 A central aspect of Hans Heinrich Schmid’s interpretation of ancient Near Eastern wisdom, is the idea that sapiential practice actually constitutes stability and contributes to it; Schmid (1966 passim; cf. 21-22 [Egypt], 124 [Mesopotamia], 152, 159f. [Israel]; cf. also Bühlmann [1976, 94]). 191

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

to judges (Waltke), but to all who are confronted with the responsibility to establish the truth for the benefit of society, although judges are advised to consider people’s general record in matters concerning the truth in order to weigh their testimony in a trial (Clifford and Lucas). Rashi, Ralbag and the Mezudat David understand the proverb to relate general attitudes to truth with testimony given in a judicial procedure. Rashi specifically interprets the presence of the root ‫ צדק‬to refer to the purpose of the truthful witness, viz. to give just testimony in order to declare the innocence of the innocent (‫עגות צדק‬ ‫)לזכות הזכאי‬. Conversely, these commentators expect a person who is usually untrustworthy, to be so in a trial as well. The Targum and Ramaq turn the direction of the logic around: whoever gives false testimony in court is generally a deceiver (Targum: ‫ )רמאה‬or a deceitful man (Ramaq: ‫)איש מרמה‬. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra skips the verse, perhaps finding it so straightforward that it does not need further exposition. Chrysostom does not theologise the proverb, but only stresses the opening of the Septuagint version: the words ἐπιδεικνυμένην πίστιν (what is manifestly honest) show that the inner quality of such testimony is credible. Melanchthon on the other hand, does theologise the verse by means of the Reformation principle of interpreting one text of Scripture with another. Quoting vv. 13 and 22, he finds “a certain sequence” (aliquot sequentia) in the sayings about truth and untruth. Consequently, the principle of lying lips as an abomination to God (v. 22) should be fixed in our minds as epitome of many sayings about the topic, including this one.

12:18 There is one who speaks recklessly like sword stabs, but the tongue of the wise is a remedy. On the rhythmic difficulty, see above (introductory section to vv. 17-19). The first hemistich consists of a de facto nominal sentence, since the noun ‫( יש‬existence) and the participle ‫( בוטה‬he who speaks recklessly) plus a comparative phrase with ‫ כ‬can be analysed as follows: There is one

who speaks recklessly

like sword stabs

It is possible to see an ellipsis in the sentence in that a noun for “words”, i.e., those uttered by the reckless speaker, is omitted (so Fox). Then “reckless speaker like sword stabs” stands for “a reckless speaker of words like sword stabs,” and the comparison would be between the words and sword stabs. But the comparison can also be between the act of speaking and the act of stabbing, so that no ellipsis is present. As Clifford points out, where ‫ יש‬195 plus participle occurs in the Book of Proverbs, it connotes a type of person who characteristically does (or experiences) 195 Luchsinger (2010, 322) calls ‫ יש‬an exception to the fact that expression of the phatic (communicative) function of language is scarce in Proverbs (cf. 11:24; 13:7).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

371

certain things (cf. 11:24; 13:7, 23; 18:24). The first hemistich thus refers to a kind of person who habitually speaks in a way that harms others like one who hurts people by stabbing them.196 The participle ‫( בוטה‬root ‫ בטה‬or ‫)בטא‬ has raised some discussion. In the Qal and Piel it may have the generic meaning “to speak” (cf. Sir 5:13) or the more specific meaning “to speak recklessly.” Fox opts for the former on the grounds that “only some speakers are dangerous,” which to me does not seem to decide the semantics necessarily. But most commentators prefer the negative nuance as in Lev 5:4 and Ps 106:33 (e.g. Toy, Volz, Gemser, Plöger, Meinhold and others). In my opinion the latter is the most probable because it provides the contrast required by the positive speakers of the second hemistich. The harm done to others by irresponsible speaking is not necessarily a consequence of malice and can just as well be caused by rashness or other forms of carelessness. The hapax legomenon *‫ מדקרה‬is a stab, from the root ‫( דקר‬to stab), which can be administered with a sword or a dagger. The contrast is wise speech, which shows that irresponsible usage of words is unwise (cf. Qoh 10:13). Here the tongue stands for the act of speaking (metonymy) and is part of a metaphor proper. The tongue = speech of the wise is either healing or medication. ‫ מרפא‬I197 may mean the healing itself (cf. 4:22; 6:15) or the remedy that brings it about (cf. 13:17; 16:24; 29:1). Since the contrast with the first hemistich requires a parallel to the instrument that brings about harm, the choice should fall on that which brings about healing. Referring also to other cases where wise speech or wisdom itself brings healing (such as 3:8; 4:22; 16:24), Stewart says succinctly that “wisdom or doing virtuous acts constitutes a restorative elixir.”198 So, the wise speak with therapeutic effect. Not being “primarily interested in winning debates,” they speak with social insight “to contribute to the ‘health’ of the community” (McKane). Words can be both destructive and constructive (cf. 18:21) – an insight for which the Epistle of James in the New Testament is famous (cf. Jas 3:8-10). It should however also be pointed out that the sapiential tradition regards not only mild speech as positive. Also sharp, even harsh language can be commended. Reproving words, for instance, are not only spoken by unwise people, but are often used by sages (e.g. 1:8; 4:1; 10:17; 15:32; 23:12) and even by Lady Wisdom herself (e.g. 1:25, 30; 8:33; 9:8). To be sure, these words can be sharp (cf. Qoh 12:11) and 196 Although several commentators refer to the “metaphor” of words as offensive weapons, in this verse it is strictly speaking not a metaphor, since the direct comparative particle ‫ כ‬is used. Nevertheless, it is clear that the image is the same. 197 There is also an identical noun ‫ מרפא‬II from the same root ‫רפא‬, meaning “soft,” “gentle” (cf. 14:30; 15:4; cf. Luchsinger [2010, 278]). 198 Stewart (2016, 189); Hausmann (1995, 195), links the healing spoken of here to its ultimate aim, viz. life, so that this kind of speech “enables” (“ermöglicht”) life, cf. also 10:11.

372

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

even so be wholesome (cf. Qoh 7:5; 10:12). Schipper quotes two sayings from Achiqar Column 6199 to show that both the danger of a sharp tongue and the healing power of speech are known to Achiqar as well: ... the ambush of the mouth is stronger than the ambush of fighting. Do not treat the word of a king lightly – let it be a healing for your [flesh]. Likewise, insight in the positive value of words is to be found in the New Testament (Heb 4:12; Rev 1:16; cf. Isa 49:2). The Jewish tradition pays more attention to this proverb than the Christian. Rashi takes the first half quite literally. The speaker intended here causes other people to kill, hence such speech causes murderous actions and therefore amounts to complicity in literal killing. The antithesis is peace-bringing speech by which the wise achieve healing, presumably because they offset the speech by which the unwise stir up strife. But Gerondi suggests that the wise can frustrate the dangerous speech by unmasking the reckless.200 Some rabbis interpret the dangerous speech as slander, whereas the opposite is not only to avoid slander, but to encourage people to repent of their ways (so Ralbag and the Mezudat David). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra refers to Lev 5:4 for the meaning of ‫בטה‬, which he explains as ill-advised speech (using the alternative spelling ‫)בטא‬. According to him, the damaging aspect of such speech is slander (‫ לשן‬Hiphil), by which everyone encountered is slain (‫ דקר‬Niphal, Isa 13:15). Ramaq and Nahmias, on the other hand, retain the previous verse’s setting in a court of law. Accordingly, the first hemistich is interpreted as a reference to a false witness and the second to the wise speaking in defence of the innocent who is then “healed” in this sense. Chrysostom only notes that those healed by the words of the wise are healed from the wounds inflicted by the sword of the unkind speakers. Melanchthon has nothing to add to the general perspective on speaking in vv. 13-22 (see above at the end of the previous section).

12:19 A truthful lip is established for ever, but a deceitful tongue just for the blink of an eye. For the parallel with the syntactic structure of v. 17, see above (introductory notes to vv. 17-19). The rhythmic pattern is either 3+3 (Toy) or 4+3 (Gemser). The latter is preferable, while the first two words should not be rhythmically equated with the first two words of 13:5 (Delitzsch), where a syllable with segol and not hateph segol follows on the maqqeph. In the second half the maqqeph is also problematic, since the last two words (‫)ל ֣שׁוֹן ָ ֽשׁ ֶקר‬ ְ must be one beat. Reading the second ‫ עד‬as a stress beat also makes sense in light of its alliterative and chiastic relationship to the ‫ עד‬immediately preceding 199 Col. 7, l. 99-100; my citation according to the Cowley numbering (for a summary and discussion of the different numbering systems, see Gianto [1995], 88); cf. ANET, 428. ‫( ארב‬l. 99) is sometimes read ‫( אדב‬instruction), and the lacuna at “flesh” is sometimes reconstructed as “brother.” 200 Cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 223).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

373

it. Here the verb of the first hemistich is gapped in the second and should be supplied from the parallelism by the reader/hearer. The chiasmus is built up as follows: subject lip metonymy predicate fleeting duration (‫)עד‬

predicate perpetual duration (‫)עד‬ subject tongue metonymy

Waltke points out that ‫ לעד‬and ‫ ועד‬are placed back to back for the sake of alliteration, which heightens the antithesis. The reference of the metonymies is the same (speaking or speaker), but their qualities are opposites (truthful :: deceitful). So are the predicates diametrically opposed (perpetual duration :: fleeting201 duration). But what does this mean? It seems to me that there are at least four mutually non-exclusive possibilities, one of which works with synecdoche202 (referring to the speaker) and the others with metonymy proper (referring to the spoken): • People who speak truthfully are established, but liars last only a moment. This accords with the deed-consequence nexus; cf. the wicked who will be no more in a little while (Ps 37:10, 35f.), the exalted who cease to exist after a moment (Job 24:24), and the righteous who will be established for ever while the wicked will be blown away (Prov 10:25). Finding a pun in ‫( ֵעד‬witness) and the preposition ‫ ַעד‬in the phrase ‫ועד־ארגיעה‬, Van Leeuwen supports the view that it is the honest or lying speakers themselves rather than what they say that are established or pass away. • A truthful statement has lasting value, but a deceitful assertion evaporates. This seems to be what Waltke means by saying that the truthful “lip” or speech conforms to God’s created order. It then is in tune with established order, while the opposite goes for the liar whose speech is an abomination to God (cf. v. 22). • A somewhat less theological203 variant of Waltke’s take is that true statements endure because their truth will be demonstrated, while all that has 201 The unusual term ‫ ארגיעה‬may be a first person singular cohortative Hiphil of ‫רגע‬ (HALOT, KAHAL), a cognate and perhaps denominative of the noun ‫( ֶרגַ ע‬blink of an eye, moment) – “a deceitful tongue [lasts] until I blink” (see GKC 120g). Fox finds it far-fetched and follows Saadia by assuming a by-form of the noun ‫ ֶרגַ ע‬with prosthetic aleph; similarly Pseudo-Ibn Ezra (‫ ;)האלף נוסף‬cf. GKC 90f. In several languages the use of an equivalent verb in a comparable way is not uncommon. Cf. the now famous auto-obituary of Emily Debrayda Phillips: “So ... I was born; I blinked; and it was over” (The Independent, 6 April 2015). 202 I.e., a specific type of metonymy in which a part stands for the whole (lip and tongue stand for the whole person who speaks). 203 Whybray finds this proverb less theological than v. 22 and thinks it possible that v. 22 is a theological interpretation of v. 19 (see below).

374

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

been mendaciously said passes away by being proved false and thus becoming irrelevant (Fox). This insight is a cultural universal and is expressed in various forms, e.g., Veritas nunquam perit; “Honesty lasts longest;” and “A lie has short legs.”204 Whether or not we experience the validity of the claim itself, it expresses a legitimate way of reading the proverb. • A truthful statement is firm and therefore dependable, but a deception is by definition unstable, since it “stands,” i.e., seems true, only as long as the deception lasts. This includes being unmasked when the truth emerges, but also when the deceiver reneges and such statements rapidly change, for instance when Pharaoh repeatedly changed his tune to Moses (cf. Ex 8:8f. and 15; Ex 28f. and 32; Ex 9:27f. and 34f.; Ex 10:16f. and 20).205 While the metonymy of body parts can refer both to the speaking persons (synecdoche) and to what they say, none of these possibilities can be discarded. The very character of the pithy aphorism invites polyvalence so that readers/hearers are not forced to choose one at the expense of the others and can apply the proverb with different foci in different contexts. Rashi interprets the proverb much like the option mentioned under the third bullet above. As for the first half, truth is simply believed in his opinion. This may in itself be a problematic judgement, but he also adds the dimension of the speaker, viz. that people will be keen to listen to a person who is known to speak truthfully. The second half to him means that deceit perishes in a moment. His reason is interesting – deceit has no feet (‫)השקר אין לו רגלים‬. This recalls a colourful explanation of ‫( שקר‬deceit) and ‫( אמת‬truth) in the Talmud.206 The letters ‫ש‬, ‫ ק‬and ‫ ר‬each have only one foot on the line of writing and together they demonstrate the instability of what the word represents, while the letters ‫א‬, ‫ מ‬and ‫ ת‬are firmly based and therefore stable and lasting. Moreover, the consonants spelling “deceit” are next to each other in the alphabet and therefore show that untruthfulness is common, whereas the letters spelling “truth” are at the beginning, in the middle and at the end, symbolising that truth is a much more isolated phenomenon. The Mezudat David, comments in the line of the fourth option offered above: a lie only lasts for the period of time that it is spoken, but soon afterwards is unmasked for what it is, when the truth is revealed. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra emphasises the idea of the first option above, focusing on the speaking persons. Who speaks truthfully will for ever be established in peace, but who speaks untruthfully will suddenly “perish from the world” (or: “eternity,” ‫)יאבד מן העולם‬, which is suggested to the interpreter by ‫ ארגיעה‬having an aleph added to the root ‫( רגע‬moment), the same letter with which ‫( אבד‬perish) begins. Chrysostom points out that the word γλῶσσα (tongue) occurs in both this proverb and the previous one, but with diametrically opposed intentions. According to v. 18 the tongue brings healing, but according to v. 19 it is wicked. Therefore the natural tongue is not evil per se but morally neutral. According to Hill,207 it is typical 204 205 206 207

On rabbinic parallels to this thinking, see below on Rashi. For the New Testament, cf. Matt 24:35 par.; Eph 4:14; 6:14. Shabbat 104a; cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 223). Hill (2006, 224).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

375

Antiochene theology that nature itself is not corrupt. It can thus be inferred from the two proverbs together that the individual humans are responsible for their deeds.

12:20 Deceit is in the heart of those who plan evil, but for those who counsel peace, there is joy. Several commentators combine this proverb with vv. 21-23 as a unit.208 Others rather find the unit in vv. 13-23,209 and yet others propose further combinations.210 There is some evidence to which appeals in defence of such combinations can be made. However, there is – understandably – very little consensus as far as the extent or the thematic quality is concerned, so that I will treat the proverbs individually, without denying editorial care in their placing.211 In any case, the theme of speaking is lacking in vv. 20-21 and only comes up again in v. 22.

The two nominal clauses of the verse are rhythmically organised as 3+3 (so Toy).212 The Septuagint offers a fairly literal rendering of the Hebrew and interprets the noun ‫( שמחה‬joy) by the verb εὐφρανθήσονται in the passive indicative future tense (they will be gladdened); similarly the Peshitta À{z À{ËÐ …{Íà (there will be joy for them), and the Vulgate: sequitur eos gaudium (joy will follow them). There is thus no reason to accept the proposal suggested in BHS to read ‫( מ ָֹרה‬sorrow) in the first hemistich or even Toy’s proposal to emend the last word of the second hemistich to ‫משפט‬ (justice). Such proposals spring from a sense of unease at the parallelism, which is obviously antithetic and therefore often thought to require a more precise parallel. The parallelism is antithetic but complex, since the seeming imprecision prompts the reader/hearer to consider exploiting its inherent suggestiveness. If the recipient notices that the logic of the parallelism requires each hemistich to contain the opposite of an element from the respective other hemistich, the parallelism is completed: V. 20a [unhappiness experienced] deceit in the heart of the planners of evil

208

← → ::

V. 20b joy experienced [trustworthiness in the heart of] the counsellors of peace

E.g. Waltke, however within a wider unit of vv. 15-28. E.g. Scherer (1999, 102) and Hermisson (1968, 176); both find the theme of speaking and silence to be present in “almost” (German: “fast”) all of these verses. 210 E.g. Krispenz (1989, 167 [vv. 15-23]), Scoralick (1995, 206-207 [vv. 14-23 and overarching 12:13–13:2]), Heim (2001, 153-155 [vv. 13-23 and extending to vv. 16-23 + 25]). Meinhold (vv. 13-22) and Sæbø (vv. 13-20), depending on Bühlmann (1976, 298-302). 211 For a fuller discussion, see above, the Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 12. 212 Gemser scans 4+3, but in no grouping of the words ‫ בלב־חרשי רע‬can the maqqeph be ignored, since that would necessitate adjacent stressed syllables. 209

376

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

The “disjointed” (Fox) element in the two halves is represented above by square brackets. It is often rightly remarked that the joy mentioned in the last word is not an antithesis of the deceit mentioned in the first word.213 This fact calls for a reread of the first hemistich in the light of the second, which enables the reader to understand that deceivers will not experience joy. In the same way, the concomitant opposite can be supplied to the thought of the last hemistich from the first one, viz. that those advisers who work for peace do not do so by means of deception, but work with trustworthy honesty. Those who plan evil for others do so by deceit, and they do so premeditatedly, since the dishonesty is already in their hearts.214 They will not experience joy, that is, their evil will come back on them (Clifford). On the other hand, peace (‫ )שלום‬is not only the absence of fighting, but includes common well-being.215 Those who work to achieve it will experience the joy for themselves and for others benefiting from the common well-being resulting from their efforts (Fuhs). Therefore the proverb retains a highly topical value for all times as the powerful of the world and their advisers plan the flow of prosperity and thus the well-being or lack of it in society. The antithesis is highlighted by the chiastic structure: deceit counsellors of peace

planners of evil joy

Although the statements in the proverb are descriptive indicatives, they positively teach pupils what is wrong and what is right.216 This is exemplified in rabbinic interpretation, which can either subtly suggest what pupils should avoid or welcome, but it can also be quite explicit, as Gerondi shows. He uses the first hemistich to warn about the concrete case of someone wishing to use another for taking revenge on a third person. That reveals the presence of deceit in his heart and he should not be believed. 213 Malbim construes the two concepts as opposites by extending the semantic range of both to include anything that destroys or preserves the world. Some (e.g. Gemser, Scott, McKane; cf. Whybray) propose to escape the difficulty by understanding the deceit to mean “selfdeceit.” But ‫ מרמה‬never means that, and even if it does, it provides no antithesis to ‫שמחה‬ (so Fox). 214 According to Niemeier (2003, 209) the heart as receptacle should rather be seen as a metaphtonemy (combination of metonymy and metaphor, see the commentary on 10:11 above) than as an ordinary metonymy; cf. Luchsinger (2010, 246-247). This does not seem probable in the present case because the heart as receptacle for treachery can be a metonymy for the organ of mental activity (Luchsinger, 2010, 247), but not a metaphor for the thinker/planner at the same time, as that is already expressed by the participle in the genitive construction ‫חרשי רע‬. 215 See Whybray, Yoder, and Schipper; cf. THAT II, 919-935; ThWAT VIII, 40. 216 See Essay 2 (“Learning in the Indicative”) in the Introduction above.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

377

The Midrash Mishle records a rabbinic opinion (attributed to Rabbi Levi) that associates a theological principle with the plurals used in the proverb rather than the singular. The plural is used to suggest the seat of the emotions, which is located in the two kidneys.217 The right kidney houses the good inclination and the left kidney the evil inclination. That represents the doctrine of the ‫ יצר הטוב‬and the ‫יצר הרע‬. However, as Schipper points out, in the context of Prov 10–15 one would naturally expect the plural. Rashi and the Mezudat David explain the association of deceit and (the absence of) joy in analogous ways. According to Rashi, those who plan evil are so occupied by thinking of their deceit that there is no place for joy in their minds, while it stands to reason that the counsellors of peace do not have this problem and therefore do have joy. The Mezudat David specifies somewhat further, but uses the same logic: the planners of evil are so worried that their deceit will be found out that they cannot be happy, whereas the absence of such fear makes the counsellors of peace happy. On Malbim, see the exegesis above. Athanasius (298-373)218 quotes the first hemistich in his polemic against the Arian Asterius the Sophist of Cappadocia († c. 341), in defence of the Nicene view of the essential unity of the Father and the Son. He brands the Arians as those who imagine evil with deceit in their hearts, but makes no further exegetical use of the proverb. Chrysostom (347-407) ignores the first half of the proverb and only paraphrases the second by saying that those who want219 peace will be the first to reap good things, and thus be glad (εὐφρανθήσονται). Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)220 quotes v. 20a, arguing that deceit is mostly but not necessarily a way to reach an evil end, since evil can be perpetrated by simple violence without deceit.

12:21 No evil will befall the righteous, but the wicked are full of harm. If the first maqqeph in the stich is counted the rhythm is 3+3 (Toy), if not, it would be 4+3 (Gemser). Both are possible, but the Masoretes preferred the former. The versions testify to an interpretative problem with the verb ‫אנה‬ in the first hemistich. In the Piel it means to cause someone to encounter or experience something (Ex 21:13), and in the Pual to be caused to encounter, with the object expressed by ‫ ל‬or ‫( אל‬Ps 91:10). An evil act or its effect can be denoted by ‫( און‬Fox) as well as by ‫( רע‬Waltke), cf. Clifford. The proverb can thus be understood either way: • The righteous will be taken hold of by no form of evil, but the wicked are filled with evil (intentions or plans to cause others trouble). 217 218

374.

Visotzky (1992, 141). De Decretis V, 20 (NPNF II,4, 163). On Proverbs in the Arian dispute, see Vol. I, 373-

219 The Septuagint has βουλόμενοι (want); cf. the verb βουλεύω (deliberate), which would suit the Hebrew ‫חרש‬, although βουλόμαι can also be associated with a decision after deliberation. 220 Summa Theologica II.ii.55.4.

378

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

or: • No effects of evil will befall the righteous, but the wicked are full of villainy. Despite translating, “No trouble shall befall the righteous man,” which invites the second understanding, Fox opts for the first possibility. He contends that the first hemistich “does not promise blanket immunity to all misfortune,” but rather asserts “that the righteous will not succumb to evil plans and deeds.” 221 It is true that 24:16 and 25:26 “concede that the righteous can suffer temporary setbacks,” but these setbacks are what they bring over themselves, not what is done to them. These cases concede that the righteous can succumb to what is wrong.222 Moreover, while it is true that the sages were aware that the deed-consequence nexus cannot explain everything,223 that does not mean they had an alternative formula that could neatly synthesise the nuances involved so as to account for the exceptions as much as for the rule.224 On the contrary, they often categorically express the general rule (e.g. 10:22; 19:17; 26:27f.; 28:17f.; 26f. etc.), but elsewhere just as categorically show their awareness of the many exceptions (e.g. 19:21; 20:24; 21:30-31). The general rule cannot adequately encompass human experience – some things are simply incomprehensible (30:1-4, 18f.). The fact that the verb in the first hemistich is in the imperfect (‫ )יאנה‬and the verb in the second in the perfect (‫ )מלאו‬suggests that the first refers to an event that will not happen, whereas the second refers to a state of mind. No bad event will befall the righteous, while the wicked are already filled with wickedness (cf. Yoder). Since the nouns can refer to both wickedness and its effects, Meinhold, Clifford and Schipper plausibly point out that the iniquity of the ‫ רשעים‬will also unleash its effects on them.225 As Meinhold puts it: “The evil that in the end has its effect on the wicked people is within them,” which he connects with v. 20a, where evil is said to be “in the heart” of the wicked. This may be a reason why the two proverbs have been edited into each other’s vicinity. 221 Similarly Delitzsch, although his argument is not strong, and Fuhs, who reckons that the fate of the righteous is “perhaps” (“wohl”) not meant here. However, many older as well as recent commentators argue the opposite. For instance, Wildeboer finds that precisely “this verse expresses the principle of retribution very drastically indeed.” Toy calls it a formulation of “[t]he doctrine of full compensation in this life.” Likewise, Boström [1990, 122] states that the sentence “is in line with others on the security of the righteous, but its radicalness is remarkable;” Van Leeuwen attests the verse a “rhetorical force” in support of the “basic pattern of good and evil consequences.” Similarly Oesterley, Ringgren, Scott and Tuinstra; cf. also Heim (2001, 156: “he will never experience any harm”) and Yoder. 222 See Fox’s own interpretation of 25:26, with reference to 24:16. 223 Cf. the Introduction to Vol. I, 39-46. 224 Lucas seems to agree when he declares v. 21 to state “a general principle, which is not to be taken as an invariable rule,” but he offers no argument. 225 Fox compares the evil within the evildoer with a poison they have devoured.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

379

Meinhold and Fuhs also point out a chiastic relationship in the contents of the two proverbs: V. 20

bad people

good people

V. 21

good people

bad people

Plöger sees the translation given by the Septuagint as an effort to construe a connection with v. 20. The first hemistich has: οὐκ ἀρέσει τῷ δικαίῳ οὐδὲν ἄδικον (No injustice will be pleasing to the righteous man) The verb ἀρέσκω (please, be pleasing) seems to reflect a reading of the Hebrew consonants as ‫( יִ נְ ֶאה‬EE), the third person masculine singular Qal of ‫( נאה‬be pleasing, nice), which also corresponds with the Peshitta: fÀĀïx „Ëã ¿úÙx| ÁüÃÆà üÚóý ¿ćà (A matter of fraud will not be pleasing to a righteous man) and with the Targum: ‫לא שפיר לצדיקא מדעם דעאתא‬ (Something wrong will not be pleasing to a righteous man) The Vulgate has: non contristabit iustum quicquid ei acciderit (Whatever may befall the just man will not sadden him)

While there is no direct link between vv. 20 and 21 in the Hebrew text, Plöger sees the Greek translation as an attempt to show that the counsellor of peace (v. 20b) has no pleasure in injustice, which would amount to the same logic as that which we have found in the “disjointed” parallelism of v. 20. The same would then apply to the Peshitta and the Targum that both follow the Septuagint. The Vulgate denies that the just man will be saddened, not by injustice as in the other versions, but by whatever befalls him. Waltke may be right that “the versions attempt to avoid the difficulty of harmonizing this promise [sc. in v. 21a] with human experience.” Whether intended or not, that is what they in fact have done. The Vulgate makes the righteous steadfast even under adversity, and the other three evade the promise of a “blanket immunity.” Rabbinic interpretation has a preference for the option mentioned under the first bullet above. The noun ‫ און‬is taken to mean the sinful act, and the verse becomes a basis for the teaching that God watches over a righteous person (i.e., who has already avoided sin) to avoid sinning again. Hence Rashi can claim that no evil deed will fall upon the righteous in the sense of inadvertently yielding to it (similarly Yonah Gerondi,

380

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

with reference to 1 Sam 2:9). The contrasting case is just as true, because one sin leads to another (cf. Pirqe Aboth 4:2).226 Thus the Mezudat David can explain the verb ‫ מלא‬to mean that the wicked “are filled” with evil in the sense that they fill themselves up with it to the point of the impossibility not to sin (so Gerondi, cf. the principle of re-sinning in the Talmud227). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra maintains this line, referring to Ex 21:13, where the verb ‫ אנה‬is also used. The righteous will never have an evil reputation, while the wicked will be filled up with all manner of bad things/ words. Chrysostom provides an inductive exegesis of the Greek text. In the same way that injustice is not pleasing to the righteous, justice is not pleasing to the wicked. What counts, is not what may or may not happen, but that every person is accountable for decisions made. Thomas Aquinas228 explains the first hemistich in light of the question whether there was sorrow in Christ, which, if true (cf. Matt 26:38; Mark 14:34), would suggest that he was not a “just man” (iustus) in terms of Proverbs. With reference to Augustine, 229 Thomas states that the Stoics denied the presence of sorrow in the virtuous, but limits the denial to things pertaining to reason and not to “exterior” things. Therefore Christ did have sorrow, but it was a “propassion, not a passion.” A similar argument with similar sources was also espoused in Paris more or less at the same time. Citing Augustine’s reference to the Stoics and the three good passions, Smalley230 has shown how the Vulgate version of v. 21a was used in medieval Paris “in order to harmonise Solomon with the Apostle” (Paul). In a postilla on Proverbs ascribed to Nicholas Gorran of Paris (†1295), the author is confronted with a question similar to the one faced by Thomas. Gorran quotes the first hemistich of v. 21 in an endeavour to align the Vulgate version with the thoughts of Paul on sadness found in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. His technique is to use the ideas of Peripatetic and Stoic philosophers (gleaned from Augustine’s De Civitate Dei). Whereas the Stoics are negative about all sorrow, Plato and Aristotle accept some moderate passions, including moderate sorrow, as wise and rational. Therefore Paul’s distinction between positive and negative sadness (cf. 2 Cor 7:10) does not contradict the Vulgate’s claim that the just man will be saddened by nothing (non contristabit iustum quidquid [sic] ei acciderit) (cf. 2 Cor 2:1-9). Although these issues may seem peripheral to readers of the 21st century, they do show that the Book of Proverbs was not irrelevant to medieval theological reflection.

12:22 Deceitful lips are an abomination to Yahweh, but those who practice truth are his delight. Once again the problem of adjacent stressed syllables at the maqqeph makes the rhythmic pattern of 4+3 (Gemser) less likely than 3+3 (Toy). Although most commentators compare the abomination (‫ )תועבה‬and the favour (‫)רצון‬ of the Lord in v. 22 to these elements in 11:1, the proverb is not normally 226 227 228 229 230

Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 225). Yoma 86b. Summa Theologica III.15.6. De Civitate Dei xiv, 8. Smalley (1986, 129-130).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

381

placed alongside 11:20. Neither Heim nor Snell lines them up for parallel comparison, but 11:20 and 12:22 do fit the criteria for Snell’s category 1.4 of “twice-told proverbs,” namely whole verses repeated with four or more dissimilar words:231 ‫ו רצונו‬

‫עקשי ־ לב‬

‫תועבת יהוה‬

11:20

‫ו עשי אמונה‬

‫שפתי ־ שקר‬

‫תועבת יהוה‬

12:22

‫תמימי דרך‬ ‫רצונו‬

Heim does point out, though, that both chapters have two references to ‫יהוה‬, viz. in 11:1, 20 and 12:2, 22.232 As the next mention of ‫ יהוה‬only comes in 14:2, it is possible that the editor intentionally inserted a reference to ‫יהוה‬ after nineteen proverbs without one (in the previous chapter, the interval after 11:1 was eighteen proverbs). According to Schipper, one “almost” has the impression that the editor found the proverb stretch working exclusively with inner-sapiential regularity inordinate, so that in v. 22 he “almost abruptly” highlights the theological dimension. That may be, but it does not account for the even longer stretch of 32 verses now following without mention of ‫יהוה‬. Nor does it explain why this had to be done by suddenly returning to the theme of speech after two proverbs on other topics.233 Whybray surmises that v. 22 is an interpretation of v. 19, which de facto it is because it provides the theological reasons for the contents of v. 19, but it still does not explain the thematic deviation in the preceding verses.234 If not proof of a coherent cluster, neither does all of this suggest heedless editing. Luchsinger moots the question of whether the lip and the tongue in v. 22a should be interpreted as general metonymy or as a specific synecdoche.235 According to him, a general metonymy for the act of speaking would mean that God hates dishonesty itself, but a synecdoche would mean that he hates the person telling lies. As Luchsinger argues, the parallelism with the unequivocally personal “doers of truth” (‫ )עשי אמונה‬in the second half supports the latter interpretation. But the issue entails other aspects, viz. whether the genitive construction ‫ תועבת יהוה‬is a subjective or an objective genitive236 and whether being repulsed and hating can be identified. If the genitive is subjective, God loathes something, if it is objective, something repulses God. Since ‫ תועבה‬can also be used with the preposition ‫( ל‬cf. 24:9; Gen 43:32) 231

Snell (1993, 40), whose use of shaded blocks to indicate dissimilarity I imitate. Heim (2013, 356); three of them in the combination ‫תועבת יהוה‬, the exception being 12:2, where the opposite judgement of God is expressed. 233 See the note at the beginning of the exegesis of v. 20. 234 This remains true even considering the terminological parallels between v. 22 on the one hand and vv. 17, 19 on the other hand – including the chiastic correspondence of ‫אמונה‬ and ‫ – שקר‬as pointed out by Scherer (1999, 106). 235 Luchsinger (2010, 238-239). 236 Similarly, the denominative verb ‫ תעב‬can have ‫ יהוה‬as object (Ps 5:7) or subject (Ps 106:40); cf. THAT II, 1051-1055. 232

382

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

or with ‫( לפני‬Deut 24:4), the objective genitive is the most likely. The same is suggested in this verse by the parallelism: those who practice honesty delight God; those who speak deceitfully repulse him.237 God’s being repulsed can sometimes be equated with his hating the same object (e.g. 6:16, where the following verses show that there too the synecdoche issue is present). But that is not necessary and in any case does not mean a static permanence. For instance, God loathed Israel (Ps 106:40) but even so he then changed his mind, relented and showed them his mercy again (Ps 106:44-46). So, the popular theological question raised by Luchsinger (does God hate the sin or the sinner?238) does not seem topical in this proverb. The second hemistich also contains a theologically relevant issue. The participial construction ‫( עשי אמונה‬doers of truth) is, again, an objective genitive, people “do” truth. As a durative, the participle suggests that not just a momentary true statement is meant, but an ongoing expression of inner trustworthiness, (so Delitzsch and Schipper). That certainly includes telling the truth, but the verb ‫ עשה‬emphasises that “doing” truth means more than words alone and must encompass an ongoing life of practising trustworthiness. Clifford finds that it evokes John 3:21, which indeed carries the same idea: “Who does the truth, comes to the light, that his deeds may be manifested.” With equal justification Meinhold and Van Leeuwen compare the motif in the Epistle of James, although the formulation “doers of the word” differs slightly from “doers of the truth” (Jas 1:22-25). In neither case can direct influence of the proverb be asserted, but the basic idea corresponds. Several commentators, such as Oesterley, Gemser, McKane, Fox and Schipper refer to parallels in Egyptian literature. A particularly close parallel is found in Amenemope:239 God hates the one who falsifies, A great abomination to him is the strife in the body.240 Hate and abomination are parallels, and the object of the divine hatred is untruth. Ramaq (12th century) gives an expanded judicial interpretation that includes the second hemistich. To him the false lips are false witnesses and those who practise truth are the judges who do not believe false witnesses (‫)שלא יאמינו לעדי שקר‬. Gerondi (13th century) explains the doers of truth as those who keep their word, while the liars will not come before the Shechinah. This idea is also found in the Talmud, where it is said that four classes of people who speak sinfully, among them liars, will not be 237 See the discussion on 3:32 (Vol. I, 194), and Clements (1996, 220) on the antisocial connotation of the word in Proverbs. 238 Cf. 6:16-19; Pss 5:6; 11:5; Mal 1:2-3. 239 Amenemope XIV, 2-3 (AEL II, 154; ANET, 423). 240 Fox explains the expression as “duplicity” or strife between two conflicting thoughts in the mind.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

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tolerated in God’s presence.241 Ralbag (14th century) appreciates that words and deeds should be congruent. He balances the words of the first hemistich with the deeds of the second, saying that “it is not enough for a person that his words are true if his deeds are not right” (‫)לא יספיק לאדם שיהיו דבריו אמת אם לא תהיינה פעולותיו כן‬. Despite the differing focus of Ralbag’s opposition of speakers :: doers and James’s hearers :: doers (Jas 1:22) the logic is the same. The Mezudat David (18th century) explains the false lips as false witnesses, which suggests a link with the ‫ עד שקרים‬in v. 17. In the Treatises of Cyprian,242 the injunction “that we must not lie” is elucidated by a single quote of v. 22a: “Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord” – and nothing more. That specifically this proverb should be chosen from all the biblical texts about truth (including the Decalogue) is interesting in itself. Theodoret of Cyprus (c. 393-466) makes a long list of what “Solomon the Wise” says of evil speaking, among which is also the uncommented first half of this proverb. Whereas Chrysostom skips the verse, Melanchthon distils the essence of all the proverbs on truth from this one. According to him, an abominatio (‫ )תועבה‬does not only indicate rejection, but also a mixture of indignation and a certain pain (significat ... indignationem mixtam cum dolore aliquot). God experiences pain when false testimony is given.243

12:23 A shrewd man conceals knowledge, but the heart of fools cries out folly. According to Gemser, the rhythm is 4+4, with one beat per word. Toy thinks the pattern is ternary, but Gemser has the better case because the emphasis in the two last words of the first hemistich falls on the respective penultimate syllable. The participle in the first clause is again an indication of a durative244 inclination – the shrewd person is always inclined to hold back his knowledge, while the fool will actively blurt out his at every opportunity that may present itself. The first hemistich contains two words that may be open to misunderstanding. The first is the adjective ‫ערום‬, which – like the cognate noun in 1:4245 – does not have negative connotations, but refers to the ability to make intelligent decisions. The other is the verb ‫( כסה‬cover),246 which can mean “cover up” in malam partem (as the Piel does in 10:6, 11), but also “cover over” in bonam partem (cf. the Piel in 10:12). In the present proverb it has a positive meaning, as the antithetic parallelism shows. However, in this context 241

Sotah 42a; however, here it is not substantiated with the proverb, but with Ps 101:7. No. 104 (ANF V, 555). 243 Cf. above on vv. 13-14. 244 Cf. the durative use of the participle in v. 22b (‫)עשי‬. 245 See Vol. I, 59; cf. further 8:5, 12 (for the noun) and 12:16, 23; 13:16; 14:8 et al. (for the adjective). 246 The Septuagint read this word as the noun ‫( ִכּ ֵסּא‬throne, Greek θρόνος), which is understandable, since words with the third root consonants in ‫ א‬or ‫ ה‬are often interchanged, especially in later forms of Hebrew. But there is no reason to accept with Plöger that this must have been the original reading. 242

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

it does not mean benevolently overlooking a transgression by someone else, but being reticent about one’s own merit, in other words, being modest instead of wearing one’s heart on one’s sleeve. Waltke mentions that the same idea is found in Amenemope. He quotes the most resembling lines:247 Better is one whose speech is in his belly than he who tells it to cause harm. Also the much earlier Ptahhotep has similar advice:248 Concentrate on excellence, Your silence is better than chatter. Speak when you know you have a solution, It is the skilled who should speak in council; Speaking is harder than all other work, He who understands it makes it serve.

This recalls the parallel between vv. 16 and 23, to which Heim pays extensive attention.249 While Heim finds differences between the parallel vv. 16 and 23, he judges these to represent no shift in meaning, but only a signal of a variant repetition (‫ ערום‬in v. 16 becomes ‫ אדם ערום‬in v. 23). The other significant variant is, according to Heim, “one of nuance, rather than essence” (‫ קלון‬in v. 16 is substituted by ‫ דעת‬in v. 23). Nevertheless, the meaning of the words saying what a shrewd person does, is totally different in the two cases. In v. 16 the shrewd man can take an insult and in v. 23 he does not broadcast his knowledge to all and sundry (similarly Schipper). By the same token, the clear relationships of these verses among themselves as well as with others (such as 13:16; 15:2 and the wonderful 17:28) call for attention precisely to the uniqueness of each.250 The thrust of the proverb is therefore that a wise person is not as talkative as a fool, which is a well-established sapiential theme in Proverbs, Egypt and Mesopotamia (cf. also, within biblical wisdom literature, Job 13:5 and Qoh. 4:17ff.; 6:11; 10:12ff.). The motif of the wise person’s silence is calibrated by the contrast to the fool’s loquaciousness and therefore does not mean that he keeps his knowledge for his own benefit.251 On the contrary, he is often said to speak and teach wis247 The selected lines are XXI, 15-16; this passage was already called a “striking parallel” by Oesterley. For the whole relevant passage, Amenemope XXI, 7-16; XXIII, 2-4, 10-11 (AEL II, 159; ANET, 424), see above on vv. 15-16 and further literature cited there. On further Egyptian and Aramaic instances of the wisdom of keeping silent, cf. on 11:12-13 above. 248 AEL I, 70. Yoder also quotes this passage, as well as Ankhsheshonq 15, 16: “Muteness is better than a hasty tongue” (AEL III, 171). 249 Heim (2013, 303-315 and 315-319). See above on vv. 15-16, especially the note on variant repetitions at the end of that section. 250 Cf. above, Introduction, 2.2.3. 251 So Wildeboer; cf. Delitzsch, who speaks of “the ‫א ָדם ָערוּם‬, ‫ ׇ‬homo callidus, who possesses knowledge, but keeps it to himself without bringing it forth till an occasion presents itself for setting it forth at the right place, at the right time and to the right man.” Yoder thinks the wise discern “when, how, and with whom they share what they know.” Cf. on 11:12-13 above.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

385

dom, and words in season are praised (cf. 10:11, 13, 20; 15:2a; 15:23; 17:7; 23:9; 25:11; 26:5). The fool’s lack of knowledge is evident to all (cf. 15:2b; 18:7; 29:20; Qoh 10:3), often with reference to the heart as the centre of the inner human.252 Rashi interprets that a wise person will be discreet about his wisdom and therefore will also conceal foolish things. Riyqam says that the wise man conceals knowledge until the right time to speak about it, while the fool reveals his own folly by blurting it out. But Ramaq thinks that the reason for concealing it is to avoid forgetting it (an idea that would resonate with 10:14 in terms of a storage metaphor). Hame’iri has a similar view, substantiating the “covering” of knowledge with the need to think it through carefully until it is mature and ready for being brought out. The Mezudat David regards the concealment as a technique to reserve the revealing of knowledge only to those who are worthy of it. Malbim, however, focuses on the difference between an ‫ אויל‬and a ‫כסיל‬. The former does not believe in wisdom because he does not understand it. The latter is not an ‫אויל‬, but calls out his unbelief (‫)אולת‬, that is, claims scepticism to cover up that his evil inclination has tempted him away from wisdom. So this is a cover-up in malam partem by the fool and not in bonam partem by the wise. As for the Septuagint θρόνος (throne),253 Chrysostom explains the “intelligent man” (ἀνὴρ συνετός) as a throne so that wisdom can have a permanent seat in such a human. Augustine254 only uses the phrase (“throne” instead of “conceal”) to provide a proof text that an ethically good Christian becomes a seat of God, for the proverb says: “The soul of the righteous is the seat of wisdom.” This implies that wisdom is personified to be God, perhaps under the influence of the extended use of Prov 8 in the early Christological debates.255 Melanchthon ends his commentary on Prov 12 with this verse. According to him, the proverb “prohibits boasting and displaying wisdom” (prohibit iactantiam et ostentationem sapientiæ), requires modesty in giving opinions, specifically including those about dogmatic controversies. Unqualified people, such as inept writers, should refrain from opining about things they do not understand. “The astute person” (astutus)256 does not offer judgements except when absolutely necessary and on weighty matters. This seems to accommodate the problems experienced in the theological debates of the early Reformation period.

12:24 The hand of the diligent will rule, but the slack will be forced to draft labour. Both hemistichs have three stresses (Toy257 and Gemser). The syntax of the second sentence is identical to that of the first; the subject comes first in both 252 Cf. Hausmann (1994, 178-186); Krüger (2009, 97); also on 4:23 (Vol. I, 227) and the notes on 10:8; also 10:14, 20 above; 18:2. 253 See the text-critical footnote above. 254 In Ps XCVIII [Latin Bible, = Ps 99 Masoretic Text] (NPNF I,8, 483). 255 See Vol. I, 367-368, 371-374. 256 The Vulgate has: homo versutus (the skillful person). 257 Toy does consider the possibility of a 2+3 pattern, but nevertheless opts for 3+3. The Masoretes added a maqqeph to the first word, which does not really show preference for 2+2,

386

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

and the predicate last. This suggests that the focus is on the types of people in question, although what will happen to them is not unimportant at all. The contrasting anthropological types are the diligent and the slothful. It is worth noting that the word count of the subject and predicate phrases differ in the two hemistichs, the second half inverting that of the first half: V. 24a V. 24b

Phrase i subject: two words (‫)יד־חרוצים‬ subject: one word (‫)רמיה‬

Phrase ii predicate: one word (‫)תמשול‬ predicate: two words (‫)תהיה למס‬

Like the Hebrew noun ‫( זרוע‬arm), the noun ‫( יד‬hand) can often be a metonym for several kinds of power.258 Since it is used here with the verb ‫משל‬ (rule) one might be inclined to think that dominion is meant (cf. Ps 8:7). But Oesterley points out that the verb never has that meaning in Prov 1–9 and 10:1–22:16, even though it occurs fairly often in these chapters.259 He supports his point by the fact that in this proverb the position from which one “rules” can be achieved by diligence, which is not the path to dominion as exercised by princes or nobles. Since the opposites of the diligent are reduced to becoming draft labourers, the diligent who “rule” are rather people in a position of authority for supervision over minor workers (so Oesterley, also Hausmann260). In any event, “the hand of the diligent” is a synecdoche for people who do their duty diligently. While there is a straightforward and simple antithetical parallelism between the diligent261 and the slothful,262 the contrast to what happens to the diligent is provided by the idea of people who are forced to do corvée labour, i.e. to but there is no obvious reason to avoid stress on ‫( יד‬cf. Luchsinger [2010, 107] on the use of the maqqeph and virtual disjunction, for which he lists 12:24 as one of nineteen cases in Prov 10:1–22:16). 258 For instance, physical power (Isa 28:2), authority (1 Chron 18:3), control (Prov 18:21), military power (1 Sam 23:7) et al.; cf. THAT I, 670-671. 259 E.g. 16:32; 17:2; 19:10; 22:7; in later collections it can have what Oesterley calls “its ordinary meaning” (23:1; 28:15; 29:2, 12, 26). 260 Hausmann (1995, 68). She rejects Plöger’s submission that the self-sufficiency or independence of the diligent is meant. As she indicates, the verb ‫משל‬, although not meaning “to rule” as a prince would, on the other hand should not be watered down as much as in Plöger’s interpretation. 261 In this meaning ‫ חרוץ‬is only found in the Book of Proverbs (10:4; 12:24, 27; 13:4: 21:5); among the six (or, according to others, seven) ‫חרוץ‬-words in the Hebrew Bible, this one is ‫ חרוץ‬VI in KAHAL, but ‫ חרוץ‬I in BDB and ‫ חרוץ‬V in KBL; on ‫( חרוץ‬gold), which is ‫חרוץ‬ I in KAHAL and KBL, but ‫ חרוץ‬V in BDB, see below the discussion of the Septuagint version of the proverb. 262 The same two Hebrew words occur again in v. 27ab (both singular). Plöger sees a thematic connection between vv. 24 and 27, but denies any compositional relevance (cf. also Whybray [1994, 99] and Tuinstra). On the other hand, Scherer (1999, 108) highlights the inversion of the order found in v. 24ab, which he does see as part of the substantiation for a unit in vv. 24-28. Cf. the Introduction to this chapter, and Paragraphs 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 in the Introduction to Vol. II of the Commentary.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

387

work under the supervision of superiors (cf. 1 Kgs 4:6; 5:14). The noun ‫רמיה‬ is an abstract (slackness). It may here be used in different ways: • as a simple abstract slackness will lead to draft labour • as the genitive of an elided ‫( יד‬hand of the slack, or the slack hand)263 [the hand of] the slack will be for draft labour or: [the hand of] slackness will be for draft labour • as an abstractum pro concreto, thus denoting a slack person264 the slack will be for draft labour or: the slack will serve as (‫ )היה ל‬draft labourers In defence of the last option, Donner argues on the basis of evidence from Alalaḫ and Amarna265 that the cognate Akkadian word massu does not mean “draft labour” (“Dienstverpflichtung, Fronarbeit”) but “draft labourer” (“Dienstverpflichtete, abhängige Arbeiter, Fronarbeiter”). Therefore ‫ מס‬in Gen 49:15 means that the tribe of Issachar were drafted labourers, while the personal collective is necessary in 1 Kgs 5:27 and at least possible in all other instances except Est 10:1 (cf. Delitzsch’s reference to 11:29b, where he judges the noun ‫[ ֶע ֶבד‬servant] to stand for ‫)מס‬. ַ He does however concede that Prov 12:24 is a difficult case and that it illustrates that the meaning could also have developed from the personal collective in biblical Hebrew to the abstract “draft labour.” These considerations lead to five options, all of which are possible. Summarised: The hand of the diligent will rule, but slackness will lead to draft labour. The hand of the diligent will rule, but the hand of the slack (ellipsis) will be for draft labour. The hand of the diligent will rule, but the hand of slackness (ellipsis) will be for draft labour. The hand of the diligent will rule, but the slack will serve as (‫ )היה ל‬draft labourers. The hand of the diligent will rule, but the slack will be forced to (‫ )היה ל‬draft labour.

All five boil down to the same message: The promise of a position of authority or power for those who are diligent, and the threat of draft labour for those 263 By virtue of the parallelism, the elided ‫ יד‬can be supplied from the first hemistich with relative ease (already suggested by Delitzsch). The genitive does not have to be a genitivus qualitatis, but it is possible: [hand of] slackness = slack hand (cf. 10:4, where the hand – expressed by ‫ – כף‬is qualified by the genitive ‫)רמיה‬. This would suggest that the diligent hand becomes a ruler’s hand and the slack hand becomes a labourer’s hand. 264 So Waltke, (see GKC 83c). Writing about Gen 49:14-15, Donner (1994, 186) considers the latter two possibilities, but in this context his focus is on ‫ מס‬and he consequently does not choose. 265 Donner (1994, 185).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

who are slack and sloppy.266 The proverb thus inculcates diligence by appealing to the expected desire of pupils to attain a position of status in society, and by applying its negative counterpart, viz. the fear of being treated harshly, if one does not develop this virtue.267 In both the positive and the negative form, this illustrates the correctness of Stewart’s observation: “in many respects, the book of Proverbs is a manual of desires, for much of the book turns on identifying what humans desire, what they should desire, and where those desires may lead.268 The Septuagint deviates from the Masoretic Text: χεὶρ ἐκλεκτῶν κρατήσει εὐχερῶς, δόλιοι δὲ ἔσονται εἰς προνομήν. (The hand of the chosen will rule readily, but the deceitful will be for booty) The use of ἐκλεκτός is probably influenced by ‫ חרוף‬I (choice gold), which occurs in Proverbs several times (3:14; 8:10, 19; 16:16; cf. Zech 9:3; Ps 68:14).269 εὐχερῶς (easily) has no equivalent in the Hebrew text and according to EE is added to create a wordplay with χείρ (hand), which it certainly does de facto. The Hebrew ‫ רמיה‬can also mean “deceit(ful),” which was understood by the Greek translator as a better contrast to the chosen ones who will rule. But the rendering of ‫ מס‬with προνομή (booty, prey) is difficult, since being prey is less plausible as an antithesis for ruling than service or labour. Rashi simply declares that the diligent are the upright (‫)ישרים‬, and that ‫תמשול‬ (will rule) means ‫( תעשיר‬will make rich). The hand, that is, a metonymy for human activity, thus rules the financial environment successfully. To Ralbag it still is diligent people (the hand as synecdoche for the working human being) who rule over other people. He explains the nexus between diligence and power via an intermediary step: “By their diligence they acquire wealth to rule over people” (‫בחריותם יקנו הון למשול‬ ‫)על האנשים‬. Several rabbinic commentators work with the meaning “deceit” for which ‫ רמיה‬can also be used. So Hame’iri and Gerondi, while Nahmias states that deceitful people will have to pay tribute to the diligent ones, which explains both the wealth of the diligent and the subservience of the deceitful. The same is done by Malbim, according to whom the deceitful are lazy anyway, so that both semantic possibilities of ‫ רמיה‬are in effect conflated. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, however, goes another way by using other scriptural verses to explain this proverb. To him, the diligent are upright (as Rashi had thought before him and Malbim would think after him), but he also adds something. The slack will bring their own punishment upon themselves, as the ostensibly slack warrior of 1 Kgs 20:40 had to hear from the king: “you yourself 266 Delitzsch points out that in 11:29b ‫( ֶע ֶבד‬servant) represents ‫( ַמס‬tributary service), which would rather support the concrete personal sense favoured by Donner. Nevertheless, even if being a servant does not necessarily include being a conscripted labourer, the basic idea is indeed the same in both 11:29b and 12:24b. 267 On the anthropological types of the diligent and the lazy in Proverbs, see Hausmann (1995, 66-69). 268 Stewart (2016, 136-137). 269 So EE; see above the note on the different ‫חרוץ‬-words in the lexicon entries.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

389

have determined your own punishment.” This is then confirmed by a quotation from Josh 7:5 in a play on the alternative meaning of ‫( מס‬melting, cf. Job 6:14): “the heart of the people melted away” (‫ ;ימסו‬third person masculine singular Niphal imperfect consecutive of ‫)מסס‬. The Mezudat David also reads ‫ מס‬with a qamets and interprets it as “melting,” which is what will happen to the deceitful. Chrysostom is very brief and only one aspect of the Greek version interests him, viz. that the elect (sc. of God) will rule considerately. He either takes εὐχερῶς to mean that the rule will not so much be attained easily as be an easy burden to carry for those subjected to it, or that the measures taken by the ruler will be well considered. In the light of his only other remark, which praises the resourcefulness and creativity of virtue, the latter seems the most probable. Nicholas Gorran of Paris (†1295) makes use of the verse once in the Proverbs postilla ascribed to him (see above on v. 21). He quotes the Vulgate:270 Manus fortium dominabitur; quae autem missa est tributis serviet. (The hand of the strong will rule but who is negligent will serve with tribute) Gorran says that this is directed against those who rebel against the church. He understands the tribute in a literal sense, referring to the many secular rulers who reduce the church to servitude, while tribute should only be paid to God. This is his only political comment and quite in line with the conventional theology of his time.271

12:25 Anxiety in a man’s heart depresses it, but a good word elates it. The rhythm is three beats per hemistich. There are several instances of gender incongruence in the verse and various proposals have been made for understanding the consonantal text as it is or to emend it text-critically. Clifford also finds the syntax odd, but that would only be the case if the first hemistich is a conditional construction (“If there is anxiety in a man’s mind, let him quash it”272). Fox points out that such an elliptical conditional is unnatural for biblical Hebrew. For that reason a conditional reading is perhaps to be regarded as somewhat expedient. The conditional reading may perhaps have been influenced by a discussion in the Talmud273 about the interpretation of the proverb. 270

MS Oxford, Merton College 169, folio 21. Smalley (1986, 122-123). 272 So the translation of JPSV; the verse is similarly understood in the rabbinic tradition (see below). Clifford perhaps means that this translation renders an odd syntax, because he rejects it for destroying the antithesis and unduly stretching the meaning of ‫( שחה‬depress). 273 In Yoma 75a the verse is cited and two readings are suggested for the first hemistich: “If a man has anxiety in his heart, he should tell it (‫יחנָּ ה‬ ֶ ‫ )יְ ִשׂ‬to others” or: “... he should remove it (‫יחנָּ ה‬ ֶ ‫)יַ ִשּׂ‬.” The first suggests the verb ‫ שיח‬and the second ‫ נשח‬Hiphil (Fox). The Talmudic passage has clearly influenced Meinhold (see below), since he explicitly quotes it. 271

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

Concerning the incongruence between the feminine subject and the masculine verb in the first hemistich, Plöger suspects that the second hemistich exercised retrospective influence. Waltke states that gender disagreement between a feminine subject and a masculine verb is not exceptional. According to Gesenius,274 this phenomenon (when the predicate stands second) is “partly” due to manifest errors in the text, but he also lists many cases where such incongruence occurs “for special reasons.” One of these is attraction, where a word adopts a discordant form under the powerful attraction of another form. This seems to support Plöger’s suggestion that the second hemistich – where the gender congruence of subject and verb is intact – influenced the change of an expected feminine verb to a masculine one. Clifford thinks that the noun ‫איש‬ (man) had this effect. In fact, both Plöger and Clifford may be right. As for the feminine suffixes with a masculine antecedent ‫לב‬, Wildeboer suggests that the fact that ‫ לב‬shows two feminine forms in the plural, viz. ‫( לבות‬Ezk 16:30) and ‫( לבבות‬1 Chron 28:9), could have influenced the choice of feminine suffixes with ‫ לב‬as their antecedent. This, again, seems to provide collateral to Waltke’s further submission275 that the second hemistich adapts its sounds to those of the first for the sake of assonance between ‫ יְ ַשׂ ְמּ ֶחנָּ ה‬and ‫יַ ְשׁ ֶחנָּ ה‬. An alternative is the proposal by Clifford, that the ‫ ה‬of the suffixes should have been pointed with an o vowel for the masculine. In the same strain, Fox (also McKane and Scott) proposes to make both feminine suffixes masculine by the relatively minor textcritical emendation of supplying a waw to make them masculine: ּ‫ יַ ְשׁ ֶחנְ הו‬and ּ‫יְ ַשׂ ְמּ ֶחנְ הו‬. Although possible, this also seems artificial, and is neither applied nor referred to in his handling of the text in EE. Also the creative proposal by Meinhold to interpret the first verb as a jussive (“One should try to suppress worry in a human heart”) seems forced and ignores the first feminine suffix or conceals it in translation while making ‫ דאגה‬a kind of casus pendens. The proposal by McCreesh276 seems the best solution to the problems of verb and suffix gender. He concedes that “as an example of good grammar the proverb fails.” But the masculine preformative of the first verb (‫ )יַ ְשׁ ֶחנָּ ה‬can be explained as accommodation to the second verb (‫“ )יְ ַשׂ ְמּ ֶחנָּ ה‬for the sake of euphony.” So can the feminine suffixes be explained as euphonic rhyme with the first word, which is brought about by accommodation to the a sound in an energic suffix with double n (cf. Yoder). The Septuagint tries to come to grips with the verse by making the antithesis clearer but also by adding a concept:277 274

GKC 145u. Cf. below on the much earlier proposal and argument of McCreesh. 276 McCreesh (1991, 40-42). 277 The Peshitta follows the Septuagint, but omits characterising the “man” of the first half as “just.” 275

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

391

φοβερὸς λόγος καρδίαν ταράσσει ἀνδρὸς δικαίου, ἀγγελία δὲ ἀγαθὴ εὐφραίνει αὐτόν. (A fear-provoking word upsets the heart of a just man, but good news makes him happy) This makes for a full antithesis in the verse: it is words that have the power to depress as well as to uplift. The frightening word and the heartening word are antitheses, while their depressing and uplifting effects are also antitheses. The Hebrew is better interpreted with Toy as a “progressive antithesis,” where all the elements do not fit like a glove, but where the problem of the first hemistich is turned into its opposite (antithesis) by an extra element added as the solution to the problem (the good word).

For all these difficulties, the essence of the proverb is clear enough: First, there is “internal worry that depresses from within and [then comes] a word from outside that lifts one’s spirits” (Clifford, with reference to the “good words” that King Rehoboam was advised to speak in order to assuage the disquiet of the elders of Israel [1 Kgs 7:12]). The theme of speaking thus appears – but only in the second hemistich – after a short interval (cf. vv. 13-19, 22). The organisation of the motifs is thus: V. 25a

[i]

V. 25b

[iii]

anxiety good word

→

[ii] anxiety worsened (depressing)

→

[iv] elation (uplifting)

In the first half, the anxiety feeds on itself and drags itself further into the vortex. But then, in the second half, a crucial new motif is added (in the box above). The good word is not merely the antithesis of a noun in the first hemistich (‫)דאגה‬, but the antidote of the whole a-hemistich. The stylistic addition of a new element is also the added element “from outside” (Clifford) that turns the progressively worsening situation into real progression – the joy of healing. Therefore the parallelism is antithetical in as far as the two hemistichs contrast, but the progression from step [i] to step [iv] justifies Toy’s term “progressive antithesis.” The good word can be good news, but in the light of the passage in 1 Kgs 7 it should rather be understood as a kind word from someone else. The uplifting spoken word is a concrete example of the goodness of “a word in season” (15:23; 25:11). The kind word is said to do for a depressed spirit what David’s music did for King Saul in his melancholy (1 Sam 16:23). Thus the verse provides a dissenting opinion to 18:14 with its rhetorical question implying that there is no antidote to depression. Ben Sira agrees that there certainly are ways to counter distress and sorrow, and himself speaks the “good word” proactively for the benefit of his pupil. Beginning with a rather droll description of the distraught person mentioned in Prov 12:25a, he continues

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to say things that counter the depressed state of mind and advises a fundamental disposition of cheerfulness:278 20 21 22 23

βλέπων ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ στενάζων ὥσπερ εὐνοῦχος περιλαμβάνων παρθένον καὶ στενάζων. Μὴ δῷς εἰς λύπην τὴν ψυχήν σου καὶ μὴ θλίψῃς σεαυτὸν ἐν βουλῇ σου. εὐφροσύνη καρδίας ζωὴ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἀγαλλίαμα ἀνδρὸς μακροημέρευσις. ἀπάτα τὴν ψυχήν σου καὶ παρακάλει τὴν καρδίαν σου καὶ λύπην μακρὰν ἀπόστησον ἀπὸ σοῦ· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἀπώλεσεν ἡ λύπη, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὠφέλεια ἐν αὐτῇ.

(20 He looks with his eyes and sighs like a eunuch who embraces a girl while sighing. 21 Don’t give yourself over to sorrow, don’t torment yourself with pining. 22 Joy of heart is a person’s life, and rejoicing is a man’s longevity. 23 Indulge yourself and comfort your heart, and chase sorrow far away from you. For sorrow has ruined many, and it has no benefit)

It would go too far to say that the proverb also requires a cheerful disposition in principle (Murphy). But it is neither a banal statement of the obvious nor simple carpe diem advice. For it not only asserts how positive joy is or what can be achieved by kind words, but also shows sensitivity for the mental affliction of other people (cf. 15:13, 15, 30; 17:22; 25:25). In accordance with the contrast in the two hemistichs, rabbinic exegesis emphasises two main ideas. Although not always with equal emphasis or as antithesis, they tell people not to be overcome by worry and distress.279 On one hand, the first half of the proverb requires people with worry in their mind to suppress (‫ שחה‬Hiphil) that anxiety (‫)דאגה‬, which is not surprising in the light of the feminine suffix. On the other hand, they should share it with someone who can offer consolation (‫ שמח‬Piel), as the second half suggests. Rashi recommends Torah study to overcome the concerns, but also leaves room for the constructive words of a friend.280 Ralbag recommends trust in God as the way to subdue the worry, and Hame’iri regards it as the afflicted person’s own responsibility to overcome the distress, but also to undertake “a good thing” (‫)דבר טוב‬, that is, reflecting on the will of God. An interesting version of the subdue motif is given by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra. The afflicted should suppress the ‫דאגה‬ (the commentator explicitly uses the noun for the suffix) and bring happiness with “a 278

Sir 30:20-23. Cf. also the famous carpe diem of Qohelet, e.g. Qoh 8:15; 9:7-9; 11:10

et al. 279 The fundamental idea is reminiscent of Jesus’ guidance not to have troubled hearts, followed up by thoughts undergirding the exhortation (e.g. John 14:1-6; 16:6-7, 20-22; 27-28). 280 Cf. above on the two readings reflecting these two perspectives in the Talmud (Yoma 75b).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

393

good thing” (‫)דבר טוב‬. The anxiety will leave, as it is said in Job 41:14: “and sorrow is turned to joy before him.”281 Malbim also focuses on the afflicted person himself, since unchecked anxiety can become calamitous. The Vilna Gaon interprets the Hiphil of the verb ‫ שחה‬to mean that the heart of the afflicted person is brought low. For him, as for Rashi, the study of Torah is the best antidote. Chrysostom gives a rather laborious exegesis of the Greek (see on the Septuagint above). A troubling word upsets a righteous man and good news makes the same man happy: Good news about others makes him happy instead of envious and bad news about others does not distress him more than necessary. As opposed to the wicked, he contains his feelings.

12:26 A righteous man helps his friend navigate [the way], but the way of the wicked leads them astray. In the light of its problematic first hemistich, little can be said with certainty about this proverb. However, to start with, at least three things are relatively clear. The verse is made up of a verbal clause in each of its two hemistichs; its rhythmic pattern consists of three beats per hemistich; the verse as a whole has a chiastic syntactical organisation. The chiasmus may be schematised: V. 26a

‫צדיק‬ subject (one word)

‫יתר מרעהו‬ predicate (two words)

V. 26b

‫תתעם‬ predicate (one word)

‫ודרך רשעים‬ subject (two words)

The first hemistich has been deemed “hardly recoverable” (Toy), “so corrupt as to be meaningless” (Oesterley), “seriously corrupt” (Whybray), even “incomprehensible” (Fox), and so on. An array of emendations have been proposed and several efforts have been made to make sense of the text as it stands, but the uncertainty has not been eliminated. Of course one can just declare non liquet, but not without having shouldered the responsibility of the exegete to first make an own endeavour to deal with the text. Perhaps the best way to go about the difficulties is to list possible translations282 and then to discuss them one by one. 281 Hebrew: ‫( ולפניו תדוץ דאבה‬and before him dismay leaps/dances). The verb can also denote dancing for joy, and the noun with ‫ ב‬is tantalisingly similar to ‫דאגה‬, both in form and meaning. Thus the joyous leap taken by dismay must mean that sorrow is turned into joy (so also in the KJV). 282 Clifford mentions three as a “summary” by Alonso-Schökel, but adds another of his own. Although a good proposition in my opinion, he offers no supporting argument.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

V. 26a (a) A righteous man seeks out his pasture [ּ‫יָתר ִמ ְר ֵעהו‬ ֻ is read283] (b) A righteous man is delivered from harm [‫יֻתּר ֵמ ָר ָעה‬ ַ is read284] (c) A righteous man departs from evil [‫ יָ ֻסר ֵמ ָר ָעה‬is read285] (d) A righteous man searches out his friend [no emendation to consonants or vowels286] (e) A righteous man lets his friend seek out [no emendation to consonants or vowels287] In the ancient versions no help is to be found: Septuagint: ἐπιγνώμων δίκαιος ἑαυτοῦ φίλος ἔσται (A fair advisor will be his own friend) Peshitta: ¿úÙx| ßáã ¿Þᜠ㠿ÃÓ ÍäÐüà (The righteous man gives good advice to his friend) Targum: ‫( טב מן חבריה צדיקא‬The righteous man is better than his friend) Vulgate: qui neglegit damnum propter amicum iustus est (Who ignores loss for a friend is just)

(a) The first option requires no consonantal emendations, but three vowels have to change. The verb would then be ‫ תור‬Qal (search out), which is often used in the sense of exploring the topography (cf. Num 13:2, 16f., 21, 25, 32; 14:6f., 34, 36, 38) and can therefore account for the idea of searching for a pasture. Such an understanding would also give a reasonable parallel to the second hemistich. Gemser accepts this and interprets it as a metonymy for finding what is really necessary in life (cf. the metaphor of the way in the second half). McKane objects that this is not the “right kind of antithesis” to v. 26b while it leads to an antithesis between the moral discernment of the righteous and the lack of it in the wicked. He also objects that the third person suffix in the last half must then refer to the wicked. These objections are not strong, assuming as they do that such an antithesis would somehow be inappropriate and that the suffix must refer to another unnamed party. So, on the first submission, the proverb would mean that the righteous plan sensibly for the path of life, whereas the way, i.e. the behaviour of the wicked leads them astray (cf. 2:12-15, 18-22; 4:18f., 26f.; 5:5f.; 7:2527; 9:6).

283 Hitzig, Delitzsch and others. A variant is the earlier proposal by Döderlein (1786): “The righteous man seeks out a good location for himself.” He explains the good place as a place for sustenance, which accommodates the noun ‫( מרעה‬pasture). He rather than Hitzig (1858) should thus be regarded as the father of this line of interpretation. 284 Emerton (1964, 193), Fox (in AB, not EE). 285 Toy, Ringgren, BHS (not followed in BHQ). 286 Waltke. 287 My option below; similarly Van Leeuwen, Yoder, Schipper; cf. also McKane, who however takes ‫ תור‬to mean “show the way” and differs with regard to the suffix in the second hemistich.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

395

(b) Another option altogether is proposed by Emerton and Fox (but is not reflected in EE Proverbs).288 Fox claims that the emendations only involve vocalisation, but that is incorrect. If only the vocalised (spoken) character of the consonant ‫ ה‬in ‫ ֵמ ָר ָעה‬were affected (now becoming a mater lectionis), one could have made the statement. But the consonantal text is changed because the waw of ּ‫( ֵמ ֵר ֵעהו‬irrespective of its carrying the ū-vowel) is dropped in writing. Fox accepts Emerton’s proposal to take the first word as the third person masculine singular imperfect Hophal of ‫( נתר‬Hiphil loosen), and interprets it metaphorically as indicating release from bondage (cf. Isa 58:6; Pss 105:20; 146:7). The conjecture is possible and can point to variants in 11:6a, 8a (albeit with different verbs), but the proverb’s antithesis is weakened on two counts. First, there is no parallelism between what is done to the righteous (passive) and what the wicked do by their deeds (active). Second, the metaphor of the way is restricted to the second half and has no parallel in the first. (c) The third possibility is to emend the ‫ ת‬in the first word to ‫ ס‬to achieve the third person masculine singular imperfect Qal of ‫( סור‬deviate) and to read ‫ ֵמ ָר ָעה‬as in the previous option. This is hesitatingly suggested by Toy while conceding that “there will then be no distinct contrast between a and b” in the verse. Ringgren accepts Toy’s emendation but is very tentative and calls the first hemistich “completely unclear.” BHS mentions this emendation as an uncertain second option, and BHQ drops it altogether. According to Fox, the samek-taw confusion is unlikely. Toy’s remark about the parallelism additionally discourages the proposal. (d) Waltke maintains the text as it stands. For the use of ‫ תור‬Hiphil meaning “search out” he refers to Judg 1:23. In the Judges passage the Hiphil ‫ ויתירו‬is causative (“and they sent out for intelligence information” – Waltke’s translation). The Hiphil with e is not necessarily a problem, since a shortened Hiphil imperfect with this vowel does occur.289 Waltke treats the Hiphil as an indicative, according to which the righteous man seeks out a good friend and the proverb becomes an admonishment on the choice of a confidential friend. But in my view his endeavour to construe the second hemistich as a contrasting parallel to friendship 288 He follows Emerton (1964, 191-193), who first suggested and argued for the emendations shown above. Distantly related to this, Scott posits the reading ‫מ ָר ָעתוֹ‬, ֵ translating, “The good man survives his misfortune,” but offers no argument or evidence – neither for the emendation nor for the verb as such. 289 Cf. Emerton (1964, 191), who finds a Hiphil jussive with e “unsuitable in this context,” which is perhaps what prompted Meinhold to state that the Hiphil jussive (with e) can “stand for the indicative” and to translate accordingly (“causes to search out”). Schipper, who also cites Emerton at this point, translates as a causative jussive (“should cause to search out”).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

(the way of the wicked “does not include listening to wisdom or having close friends who direct them in the ways of righteousness”) is somewhat forced. (e) Finally, the Masoretic Text can be retained but interpreted differently. In light of the parallelism, Yoder accurately states that the verb ‫תעה‬ (Hiphil lead astray) in the second hemistich “suggests the parallel verb in the first line is about directing people rightly.” That is what the Hiphil verb ‫ תור‬means in our proverb.290 The righteous man lets his friend291 seek out. It connotes a search in a “careful, diligent and penetrating examination” (Waltke). He gives directions, but the (re)search must be undertaken by the receiver himself. The root is mostly used of topography (see references above under [a]), but also of sapiential research (Qoh 1:13; 2:3; 7:25) and religious consideration (Num 15:39). Here it can be understood similarly, namely as a sapiential investigation described in terms of working out the right way, in other words, articulated by means of the road metaphor,292 which I have glossed as “help to navigate.” Meinhold and Van Leeuwen interpret the causative to mean that the righteous person helps his friend to find his own way in life, which is fully sapiential (cf. 1:10; 3:6). Schipper arrives at the same result by taking the jussive ‫ יָ ֵתר‬to mean that the righteous “would/should like to let his friend research.” From this he draws an important conclusion: the social concern of the righteous and the wise is not limited to socio-economic issues (he calls it issues of social ethics), but also entails helping others to find the right way. On the other hand, the lifestyle and conduct of the wicked lead themselves (Waltke), not others (McKane), astray. This leads to uncertainty and failure (cf. 4:19) and even death (cf. 2:18). If they are too ignorant to help themselves, they can’t help others either. In this way the two hemistichs do complement each other. The proverb is certainly difficult, as can be gauged from the textual confusion in the early versions, the pessimistic expectations as to the recoverability of the text, but also from the many text-critical endeavours undertaken anyway – and, of course, from the diverging interpretations. However, in my opinion, the last option has more to commend it than the other possibilities listed. The grammar can be explained, the parallelism remains intact, the imagery is 290 Cf. Judg 1:23, the only other place where ‫ תור‬occurs in the Hiphil: “And the house of Joseph gave directions to search out in Bethlehem.” 291 The noun is ‫( ֵמ ֵר ַע‬friend, close friend), not ‫( ֵר ַע‬friend, neighbour) plus preposition ‫;מן‬ ִ cf. 19:7, where the noun also occurs. With suffix the first syllable may have a shewa (as in 19:7) or a tsere (as in Judg 14:20; 15:2, 6). 292 Cf. Prov 4:19; 5:8; 8:2; 9:15; 10:29; 11:20; 12:15; 13:6; 14:12; 15:9, 19; 16:2, 9, 25; 21:2; 21:8; 29:27; 30:19f.; cf. Zehnder (1999, 294-385) for the noun ‫דרך‬, and the note on the “ground metaphor” in Vol. I, 66-67. Gen 37:15-17 has an example of literal directions given to a straying (‫ )ת ֶֺעה‬youngster.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

397

understandable, and no textual surgery is necessary. Moreover, reading the two stichs in light of each other – as one should – they augment each other: Vs. 26a [righteous ways] the righteous man helps his friend navigate the way [to a positive end]

← :: → :: ←

Vs. 26b the way the wicked [helps nobody] leads astray themselves

From the second hemistich we can supply the insight that what the righteous does, entails the opposite of the wicked way and that the righteous way leads to a positive end for all involved. With the help of the first hemistich we can notice the implication that the wicked helps nobody and is thus useless to anybody. The Septuagint adds two hemistichs between the Greek version of v. 26a & d (a, b in Hebrew): ἐπιγνώμων δίκαιος ἑαυτοῦ φίλος ἔσται, αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνεπιεικεῖς. ἁμαρτάνοντας καταδιώξεται κακά, ἡ δὲ ὁδὸς τῶν ἀσεβῶν πλανήσει αὐτούς. (A fair advisor will be his own friend, but the opinions of the wicked are unfair. Evil will pursue sinners, and the way of the wicked will lead them astray) The translator obviously had difficulty with the Hebrew text, but the reference to an advisor (ἐπιγνώμων can be a judge or an advisor) still betrays an inkling of what ‫תור‬ means. The Greek v. 26b gives a new contrast to the good advisor’s opinions, and the Greek v. 26c augments the wrong road of the last hemistich by having evil going after them on the errant way. Likewise, the Peshitta, having the righteous man give good advice to his friend (see Syriac text above), preserves the echo of good sapiential advice even better. This is eroded in the Targum (The righteous man is better than his friend), but the ¿ÃÓ (good) of the Peshitta is preserved in the word ‫ טב‬of the “better than” construction in Aramaic. However, almost all of this has been lost by the Vulgate and all it has in common with the other versions is the general concept of altruistic help for others. Rashi interprets the first word as “outdo” (‫ יתר‬Piel [add, do extra]) and associates it with the Piel participle ‫מותר‬, which to him means that the righteous is outstanding in beneficence and therefore disregards wrongs done to him. This noble attitude is contrasted by the wicked who always do harm to others. Several rabbinic interpretations use the proverb to address the problem of the non-operation of the doctrine of retribution. Hame’iri simply maintains the superiority of the righteous over the wicked, despite appearances. Rabbi Moshe Alshich (16th century, Safed) sees the World to Come as the rectifying factor. He also refers to v. 25 and finds that the suffering righteous should be told that he is righteous (cf. the “good word”), which would make him happy. Clearest of all is the rationalisation in the Mezudat David.

398

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

When the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper, the prosperity leads the latter to persist in wickedness, of course to their own detriment. The Vilna Gaon and Malbim follow a different line by concentrating on the positive aspect of righteousness. The former sticks to the meaning “spy out” for ‫ תור‬and thinks that the good deeds, always kept secret by the modesty of the righteous, should be searched out and then replicated. Malbim distinguishes between the righteous and the wise (which is not done in the Book of Proverbs). A righteous person without wisdom seeks the right way by consulting his neighbour, which the wicked never does (which also does not square with reality). Chrysostom’s exegesis is again rather strained. A righteous judge is his own friend means that he judges what his friend does and, if it is a sin, he forgives him. On the other hand, even a forgiven sinner will be pursued by trouble if he does not stop sinning.

12:27 A slack person does not chase his game, but a man’s wealth is valuable when he is diligent. The rhythm is once again 3+3 (four words in each half, but also a maqqeph in each). As it stands, the Masoretic Text consists of one verbal and one nominal clause. But the proverb as a whole contains several problems. Often commentators find the two halves of the verse unrelated (e.g. Toy) or undertake transpositions in the text (e.g. Murphy) or make more extended alterations to the text (cf. BHS). In this proverb, it is the second hemistich that presents the most difficulty, but the first one demands a crucial decision that contributes to the way in which the problems of the second are approached. The opening half-verse is straightforward, but contains a hapax legomenon that is vital for the interpretation of the second. The Hebrew form ‫ יחרך‬occurs only here in the Old Testament. The root ‫ חרך‬is often thought to denote the catching or ensnaring of game (Septuagint, Peshitta, Targum as well as the Arabist Fleischer293). But Delitzsch objects to Fleischer’s etymology and concurs with Schultens’s alternative view, viz. that the Arabic equivalent points to the meaning “chase” or “start up.”294 As for the alternative view that the verb means “to roast,” (so already Ewald), several remarks must be made. It is not correct that the verb occurs only here in the Old Testament (so Yoder). The hapax legomenon goes for this specific form of the verb, but the verb 293 Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer, Arabist in Leipzig from 1836, whose student Delitzsch was. Here, as often, Delitzsch cites from his notes made in a lecture series by Fleischer on the Book of Proverbs. 294 Delitzsch argues that ‫ חרך‬as supported by Fleischer’s appeal to Arabic would require ‫ حرق‬with qaph (‫ )ق‬and not kaph (‫ ;)ك‬whereas the Arabic ‫ حرك‬in the second conjugation means “to chase up,” especially to start up game in the hunt (specialius [here Delitzsch misquotes as speciatim] excitare prædam e cubili).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

399

itself occurs in the Aramaic part of the Book of Daniel (3:27) as Hithpaal, the passive of “singe,” which semantically is not the same as “roast”. But the root is attested in post-biblical Hebrew and Aramaic, meaning “burn” as well as “roast.”295 So this meaning is still possible. If we opt for “roast,” it would mean that the sluggard already has the carcass at home but is too lazy to make it edible or to preserve it a little longer (Schipper), which is an improbable idea (see below). If we opt for “chase,” it would mean that the sluggard is unwilling to make the strenuous effort of hunting and therefore deprives himself of the bounty available to those who are willing to work for it. It is unlikely that a man who is too lazy to even roast what is already there, would have been prepared to undertake the much more demanding task of preparing for the hunt, chasing up the game, hunting it down and bringing it home. I therefore opt for the hunting activity (Schultens, Delitzsch). The feminine noun ‫( רמיה‬slackness) with its masculine verb is again used as an abstractum pro concreto, just as in v. 24, where the alternative hemistich also contains ‫( חרוץ‬for further examples of the sapiential view on sloth and diligence, cf. 6:9-11; 10:4, 26; 13:4; 15:19; 19:15, 24; 20:4; 21:5, 25; 22:13; 24:30-34; 26:13-16; 31:27). As I did in the case of the first hemistich in the previous proverb I will base the discussion of the second hemistich here on a listing of translations that reflect several different possibilities for reading and understanding the text. V. 27b (a) but the property of a diligent person is valuable296 (b) but a diligent person has valuable property297 (c) but a precious possession of a man is diligence298 (d) diligence is rare wealth for a man299 (e) but a diligent man captures rare wealth300 (f) but a diligent person (roasts) the precious wealth of the earth301 (g) but the wealth of the honourable man is pure gold302 (h) a man’s wealth is valuable when he is diligent303

295 Dahood (1982, 61) has shown that the Ugaritic ḥrk occurs together with the root ḥmm in the causative conjugation, meaning “to heat up,” which however in itself does not provide proof of specifically roasting rather than any other form of heating up. 296 Plöger, with inversion of the last two words; so also Tuinstra; similarly Murphy. 297 Sæbø. 298 Delitzsch. 299 Heim (2001, 157). 300 McKane. 301 Waltke. 302 Fox; cf. Alter, who combines ‫ יקר‬with ‫ חרוץ‬and not with ‫אדם‬: “but a man’s wealth is precious gold.” 303 My proposal similar to those of Meinhold, Hausmann (1995, 67), Scherer (1999, 97) and Schipper.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

Most of the proposals below have much to commend them, but also aspects that are weaker. Still, all deserve consideration. (a) Plöger inverts the order of the last two words and reads them ‫חרוץ יקר‬. That enables him to interpret ‫ חרוץ‬as an adjective qualifying ‫ אדם‬and to translate accordingly. The only validation he offers, is that his presentation aims at demonstrating the inability of laziness to provide sustenance, as opposed to the permanent value of goods gained by diligence. But that is the result of his exegesis, not its substantiation. Moreover, all the cited attempts do the same, which shows that the basic thrust of the proverb is clear enough and that the difficulty resides in the detail. The idea that property acquires its wealth from the diligence by which it is acquired is correct, but does not need an emendation. (b) Sæbø gives a translation suggesting the same inversion of the last two words. However, he offers no argument for it and only has a note on “roast” and its abstract-for-concrete subject in the first half. (c) Delitzsch retains the text, but the English version of his commentary translates ‫ חרוץ‬as an abstract, meaning “diligence.” In his own German version, Delitzsch also translates with a noun, viz. “Fleißigsein”304 and further on claims that this is a shortened form for ‫( היותו חרוץ‬his being diligent). He then expounds it to mean that the most precious possession (“das kostbarste Besitztum”) of a human being is the quality of being diligent. So the English translation of the Delitzsch commentary by Easton is correct. But Delitzsch disturbs the parallelism between 305 ‫ צידו‬and ‫הון‬. The venison (‫ )ציד‬missed by the sluggard has a counterpart in something of value that the diligence produces, which can only be the wealth (‫ )הון‬of the second hemistich. (d) The same objection can be made to the proposal by Heim. He uses the abstract noun “diligence” as a translation for ‫חרוץ‬. But this word never means that (Toy), for which reason Delitzsch had to perform a complicated manoeuvre to get around it. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a sage saying that diligence is a rare wealth if the book contains so many injunctions to be diligent, mostly driven by the motivation of desire306 (see the references given above). (e) McKane also calls the wealth “rare,” but he does not equate it with diligence. To him, the wealth that can be acquired is the special reward to be had if one is diligent. One can “capture” wealth by being diligent. 304 The whole hemistich is translated from the Hebrew, “aber ein kostbar Gut des Menschen ist Fleißigsein.” 305 The proposal by Kuhn (1931, 28) to emend to ‫( צורו‬his rock), so that ‫( א ֶֺדם‬jewel) can be read instead of ‫ ָא ָדם‬and the imagery of the second half can be construed to be about stones and jewels, is fantasy. 306 Cf. Stewart (2016, 107-110, 135-138).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

401

That is logically conceivable, but the Hebrew word order does not allow for it. To achieve this, one assumption has to be based on another. First, it has to be assumed that ‫ אדם‬and ‫ יקר‬have to be transposed (not the same inversion as that undertaken by Plöger);307 that results in: “wealth rare, man diligent.” Second, it has to be assumed that a verb like “capture” is implicit in the second half. It cannot be a gapped verb, since it is not present in the first hemistich either,308 and simply has to be a supposed implication, which is very weak. (f) Waltke has perhaps the most original proposal for maintaining the Masoretic Text. He accepts the barbecue option in the first hemistich and interprets the third person suffix in ‫ צידו‬as a genitive of mediated object (“for himself”). This is to maintain a direct parallel with the second hemistich. According to Waltke, the verb ‫ הרך‬is gapped in the second half. The diligent person has something to roast while the sluggard can roast nothing “for himself” because he has nothing to roast. What the diligent person has to roast, is “the precious wealth of the earth.” Waltke argues that the noun ‫ אדם‬can also denote the earth,309 which seems to be the case in 30:14; Jer 32:20; Job 36:28; possibly also Zec 9:1 (cf. 13:5), where the phrase ‫ עין האדם‬is thought to mean “the surface of the earth” (cf. ‫ עין הארץ‬Ex 10:5; Num 22:5). But in these cases the text is either uncertain or the usual meaning “humankind” is equally possible. Moreover, we do not need to understand the word on the basis of such uncertainty, since the parallelism can also be maintained in another way. I will discuss this under [h] below. The last hemistich does not have to maintain the hunting image310 to remain parallel to the first clause, but can be generic and still be understood that way under the impact of the hunting image (see below). (g) Fox, following Emerton for the first clause, reaches the same overall result as several other commentators, namely that the point of the proverb is to contrast the “illusory character” of the sluggard’s gains (I would say, the absence of any gains) and the value of a worthy man’s achievements. But he does so in his own way, notably interpreting ‫ יקר‬as “honorable” and ‫ חרוץ‬as “gold” (cf. 3:14; 16:16; 8:10, 19). That destroys the contrast lazy :: diligent and therefore impairs the parallelism of the two halves. As Fox says, ‫ יָ ָקר‬usually means “precious” so that he has 307 So Gemser, Barucq, Ringgren, Tuinstra and others. Here the word order 1324 is followed (as in the Septuagint and Peshitta; cf. 1:13 and 24:4, where ‫ הון‬and ‫ יקר‬also occur together), while Plöger puts the half-verse in the order 1243 (as the Vulgate and the Targum do); cf. BHQ *42. 308 For this reason Gemser has to emend the first half to read ‫ דרך( הדריך‬Hiphil, trample on, construed to indicate the catching of prey) instead of ‫יהרך‬. 309 Cf. ‫אדמה‬, Gen 2:7. 310 Cf. NIDB II, 918.

402

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

to appeal to rabbinic Hebrew or an Aramaism to validate the meaning he needs. Moreover, it seems artificial to give up a well-known antithetical parallel to ‫( רמיה‬the contrasting words were just used in v. 24 as well) without any necessary reason. (h) The way for my own proposal has been smoothed by a number of commentators who – while differing among themselves on details – concur that the value of a man’s wealth depends on his diligence. The adjective ‫חרוץ‬, often used as a substantive, is added as “apposition in a wider sense”311 to the phrase ‫הון אדם יקר‬. The proverb does not contrast the moral quality of diligence with physical things like food. The material asset is what is prized, but diligence is what produces its value. Whatever the sluggard may have, if he is too lazy for the strenuous work of hunting for meat, he will remain hungry. But the one who is prepared to work, here represented by regular hunting, can make whatever he has acquired retain its value. The parallelism states an unmistakable antithesis between sloth and diligence, which is a well-established sapiential topos. The sluggard is not prepared to hunt and the diligent person notices the value of his property. The antithesis is not a bland arrangement of symmetrical building blocks, each with a oneto-one opposite in the alternative hemistich. Some things are expressly said in the second half and are left unsaid in the first, but are necessarily implied there. Likewise, one crucial thing is expressly stated in the first half and left unsaid but implied in the second half. The only direct antithetical nouns are the abstractum pro concreto ‫( רמיה‬lazy person) in v. 27a and the substantival adjective ‫( חרוץ‬diligent person) in v. 27b. For the rest, the explicit elements in each hemistich supply the undergirding for the unexpressed antitheses in the respective other hemistich (indicated below by square brackets and arrows for the direction of the parallel impact). V. 27a sluggard does not hunt [no meat] [remains hungry]

:: → ← ←

V. 27b diligent man [works] wealth retains value

The specific motif of hunting thus stands for work in general, wealth in general includes food, and value retention includes hunger avoidance. Hence the proverb inculcates diligence by holding up its reward. By the same token it warns against slothfulness by encouraging the reader/hearer to imagine its troublesome consequence. By working with antitheses and not with synonyms, both halfverses nevertheless say essentially the same. 311

Cf. GKC 131p.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

403

Rashi connects the proverb with v. 26 and does so with the help of the ambiguity of ‫( רמיה‬slack person or deceitful person). The wicked person is one whose way will lead him astray (v. 26b) so that he will not roast the prey come by through deceit.312 Similarly, Gerondi infers that the wicked person will have no benefit from wealth obtained by deceit, while Ramaq says that will be the case because others will steal from him in turn. Riyqam interprets the verb as “singe” (noticed by Delitzsch in his critique of the translation “roast”) and applies it to hunted birds whose feathers are singed so that they cannot fly away. According to him, dishonest hunters will not even be able to secure their gains in this way, for the birds will fly away too quickly. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra expressly mentions the Aramaic evidence for the meaning of the verb ‫“( חרך‬singe”) and cites Dan 3:27 to show that such a hunter will not be able to cook the meat because it will be quickly singed/burnt and thus spoilt. He also gives the alternative explanation that to ‫ חרך‬something means singeing hunted birds and that the deceitful person will not be able to do that because all that he contrives will fail. The Mezudat David uses the idea of singeing, but to argue that deceitful hunters do not singe the feathers in order to deceive prospective buyers and therefore will find that the birds fly away. As for the second hemistich, Rashi too inverts the order of the last two words in order to attain the sense that a ‫חרוץ‬, which he interprets as an honest man, finds that his wealth is precious. On the other hand, the Mezudat David interprets ‫ חרוץ‬as gold (cf. above on Fox’s translation). A righteous person who performs charity will find that his wealth is like gold that does not corrode and therefore is permanent.

12:28 On the way of righteousness is life, so that going on her path would involve no death. This proverb is the third in a row to present difficulties with the state of the text. Again the second hemistich is the most problematic. Various emendations have been proposed and accepted, even by those who do not find them quite satisfactory. What we can say, is that the rhythm is once more 3+3 (as in all the proverbs since v. 20, bar v. 23) and that each hemistich is made up of a nominal clause. But it is not even certain that the parallelism is antithetical. That will be the case if the two halves centre on respectively life and death, but there is also a recently revived tradition that both halves are about life, which would make the proverb a synonymous parallelism or, according to one of the manifestations of this interpretation, a progressive parallelism. We can begin by considering the first hemistich, which is – at least grammatically – relatively uncomplicated. “On the path of righteousness is life” is a straightforward translation, but reflection on what its sense might be, reveals deeper lying issues. The motif of the path of righteousness immediately 312 Cf. on 10:4 for the ambiguity of ‫ רמיה‬and the use made of it by Rashi and other Jewish interpreters.

404

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

confronts us with the metaphor of the way (which need not be expressed by the usual ‫דרך‬, but can also be present where ‫ ארח‬or a relevant verb of movement is used).313 First, does the genitive construction explicate that the path leads to righteousness (genitivus explicationis) and has to be travelled by all who wish to arrive at righteousness?314 Is this the path that righteousness herself goes?315 Or does the path stand for behaviour, and righteousness for that by which the behaviour is characterised (genitivus qualitatis), therefore “righteous behaviour”? Second, what does it mean that life “is” on this path? Is life also a traveller along the path and, if so, to which destination? Does life meet the traveller along the way (as Delitzsch claims in the context of his argument for the idea of immortality in the second hemistich)? In light of the widespread metaphor of the way which often stands for human behaviour,316 the expression is best explained to mean that righteousness qualifies the human conduct: “righteous behaviour.” Going the path of righteousness therefore means to spend a career practising righteousness. Then the assertion of the nominal clause that life “is” on this path must mean that it will accompany the righteous person along the way. That is to say that this will not only happen at the destination, but along the path on which life is to be found. Life is not merely found where the path stops at the end of a human’s existence, which would muddle the metaphor by paradoxically implying that there is no life before death. Rather, life is a companion throughout the journey on the path. Who takes these ideas to heart will thus enjoy an extended span of life imbued with righteousness. The second hemistich is what causes commentators the most headaches. Roughly, two possibilities crystallise around the vocalisation of the penultimate word, either with patah as it stands in the Masoretic Text (‫)אל‬, ַ or pointed with segol (‫)אל‬ ֶ as attested by the ancient versions and Hebrew manuscripts other than the Masoretic Text. These groups correspond to commentators who think the second clause contains a negation of death in some way, and those who think that something goes or leads to death. But either way, there are several variations within each group.

313 Cf. Sandoval (2006, 56-57), who finds the concept of the way in the use of both words in this verse “one of the important images that unite the book” as well as “an important hermeneutical guide,” continuing its prominence in chaps. 1–9 into chaps. 10–31 as well. 314 If a person can go after Wisdom and find her (cf. 8:17), then it is quite a credible idea that one can go after righteousness in the same way (pun not intended). 315 If Wisdom herself can go along a way – to be sure, on precisely the ‫( ארח־צדקה‬8:20) – then righteousness can also be conceived of in such terms. 316 Cf. Vol. I, 66-67 and the references given there; also the major work on the topic by Zehnder (1999, 294ff., 385ff., and 420ff.).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

405

(a) Some scholars read the last hemistich as a reference to immortality (e.g. Delitzsch, Gesenius,317 Dahood318 and Waltke). Delitzsch delivered a spirited argument that wisdom literature “makes a beginning” with expressing the concept of immortality in the Old Testament. His grounds are that this would be a natural outcome of the constant contrast between life and death in Israel’s sapiential literature. He refers to 14:32b, and in his commentary on that verse argues in the same vein. In his remarks on both proverbs he claims that “wisdom” has coined a bold new term in ‫ל־מוֶ ת‬ ָ ‫ ַא‬to indicate immortality. However, he is careful to emphasise that this is only a beginning in the direction of a fully-fledged doctrine of immortality. Referring to Luther and early interpreters who agreed that ‫ אל‬here has a negative significance, he also gives further grounds for his view. First, he declares that the problematic ‫נתיבה‬, which has no mappiq, nevertheless should be read with the third person feminine singular suffix. That is why the Masora put a line above the he (‫יבֿה‬ ָ ‫ )נְ ִת‬in place of the dot within it, which has the same force as a mappiq (the he raphatum pro mappicato).319 He thus translates, “the way of its path...” As for ‫( דרך‬way), he rightly states that it can also mean the distance or the stretch of the journey along that way (cf. Gen 30:36). His conclusion is thus that walking “in its [sc. of righteousness] path is immortality.” Even the Gesenius grammar (see citation above) acknowledges the core element in Delitzsch’s argument. While conceding that the ancient versions understood the last two words of the proverb differently, we are told, “‫ ַאל־‬... may be used to form a compound word, as in Prov 12:28 ‫ל־מוֶ ת‬ ָ ‫ ַא‬not-death (immortality).” A foothold is thus provided to those who stand by the Masoretic punctuation of the verse. Although not dependent on this, Dahood extensively supports Delitzsch’s fundamental point with a philological argument from Ugaritic. He translates the second hemistich much like Delitzsch (“[a]nd the treading of her path is immortality) and supports this with the Ugaritic use of blmwt (not dying). blmwt occurs in parallelism with Ugaritic ḥym (Hebrew ‫)חיים‬. In 2 Aqht VI, 25-32, Aqht may ask for life, for blmwt, and be given it as a protracted banquet with the gods. Dahood also cites other Ugaritic texts, among which he deems Text 125, 14-15 to prove that blmwt means “not dying” in the sense of immortality. He argues that bl ṭl (no dew) in 1 Aqht 42-46 – about the drought in Baal’s absence – equals the Hebrew ‫ל־טל‬ ַ ‫( ַא‬no dew) in 2 Sam 1:21, so that it should not be surprising to find ‫ל־מוֶ ת‬ ָ ‫ַא‬ here.320 Fox objects that “the particle ‫ ַאל‬negates only imperatives and jussives, 317 Gesenius (GKC 152g) states that ‫ ַאל‬may be used to form a combined word and mentions ‫ל־מוֶ ת‬ ָ ‫ ַא‬in Prov 12:28 as example (although he is aware of the diverging ancient versions). 318 Dahood (1960, 176-181). 319 There are in fact a number of Hebrew manuscripts that do have a mappiq, as Dahood (1960, 179) mentions, citing the listing by De Rossi (1798, 114). 320 Dahood (1960, 177-178); although citing Dahood, Scoralick (1995, 205) remains undecided.

406

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

not nouns” but immediately follows this up by saying that, “[w]hen it is directly attached to a noun, a jussive notion or imperative notion is implied by context, as in 2 Sam 1:21” et al. So it can negate nouns after all. Moreover, some verbs in Ps 121 and Jer 46 are negated by ‫ ַאל‬and cannot be imperatives or third person jussive commands (Fox) or negative wishes (Fox in EE). In Ps 121:3-4, the first hemistich may be a negative blessing (not stumbling), but in the second hemistich the phrase ‫ ואל־ינום‬can hardly leave open the possibility that God could fall asleep by wishing that would not happen (“may he not slumber”) – especially not before the immediately following forceful ‫( הנה לא־ינום‬he certainly does not slumber). ‫אל־ינום‬ can be seen as a subjunctive:321 “[Y]our guardian would not slumber; the guardian of Israel does not slumber, does not sleep,” i.e., seeing that your guardian does not slumber at all, that would be the case in this instance too. In Jer 46:6 there are two such subjunctives: In the context of a routed army having turned to flight, it is stated that nevertheless “the swift would not escape and the warrior would not get away” (‫)אל־ינוס הקל ואל־ימלט הגבור‬, for that is word of the Lord, i.e., it is unthinkable that they would ever get away. These arguments make it unnecessary to deal with a point not accounted for by Dahood, viz. that there is a direct equivalent for the Ugaritic bl in Hebrew ‫( ַבּל‬not), a negative particle that often occurs in Hebrew, especially in poetic texts (cf. Ps 141:4, where ‫ אל‬and ‫ בל‬are both used). If there is such a close connection between the Ugaritic and Hebrew concepts of “non-death” that they in fact are identical, one may perhaps ask why this is not expressed in the same lexemes available in both languages. That could conceivably be because the religious content of “non-death” differs – in Ugarit immortality (cf. the offer of life with the gods received by Aqht), and in Israel before the time of the Book of Daniel, a normal lifespan not cut short by early death (cf. Ps 78:31; Jer 6:26).

If it is possible that ‫ ַאל‬may negate nouns as well as non-imperative verbs, it does not mean that the proverb claims immortality for the righteous. That is the position taken by the next group of commentators. (b) This second possibility also accepts the reading ‫ ַאל‬rather than the emendation ‫אל‬, ֶ however without regarding it as a reference to immortality (e.g. Meinhold, Scherer,322 Sæbø and Schipper323). Meinhold points out that ‫אל‬ usually stands with a jussive, but that this can sometimes be omitted as in 8:10a and 17:12b.324 He maintains the text, but reads the third person feminine singular suffix with ‫( נתיבה‬although he does not discuss it).325 He finds the proverb a fitting end to the chapter, but denies that the editor responsible 321

A contingent, subjective negation (GKC 152f). Scherer (1999, 97, 119). 323 Oesterley oscillates between his translation, which fits this reading, and his comments, which prefer the emendation to ‫אל‬. ֶ Cf. also his wavering in the commentary on 15:24 (about the significance of “upward” and “beneath” for what he calls “a somewhat advanced conception of the hereafter”). 324 Cf. also Scherer (1999, 97) and Sæbø for the elided verb. 325 The consonantal ‫ נתיבה‬can be the masculine form ‫ נָ ִתיב‬with the feminine suffix; there is also a feminine status absolutus of the same word, which would require a consonantal emendation if it is to have the suffix (*‫יבתוֹ‬ ָ ‫)נְ ִת‬. 322

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

407

for its placing did so because of any idea of immortality. Like the other commentators in this group, Schipper, in my opinion correctly, concurs that the way of righteousness (v. 28a) is a life orientated in terms of righteousness, and this is what saves one from trespassing in the sphere of death. (c) Many commentators find the combination of the noun ‫( ָמוֶ ת‬death) with the negative particle impossible (Toy, Gemser, Tournay,326 McKane, Plöger, Murphy, Clifford, Fox, et al.). I have already given reasons for not accepting this view, but some further remarks may be added. McKane follows Tournay (see article just cited) by reading ‫ פתי בא‬for ‫ נתיבה‬and the preposition ‫ֶאל‬ for ‫( ַאל‬resulting in, “but the way of folly leads to death”). This would indeed be preferable to ‫( תועבה‬abomination) proposed in BHS, or ‫( משובה‬deviation) proposed by Gemser. But McKane’s main point is that an antithetical parallelism is required because it dominates in this chapter. But such a deviation from the dominant antithetical form in favour of a “synonymous” parallelism may span the ending and beginning of chapters (cf. 11:31 and 12:1; see Waltke; cf. Schipper on 13:1ff.). If option (b) above is accepted, that would also be the case here. The grammar of the second half is not garden-variety Hebrew, but neither is the phrase ‫“ דרך נתיבה‬meaningless.” The first word can, in addition to the physical road (and the metaphorical uses of the term), indicate the going on the road, the journey, as well as the distance or the span from point A to point B.327 Thus commentators such as Delitzsch (“Wandeln” [“walking”]), Dahood (“treading”), Scherer (“Gang” [“going”]),328 and Waltke (“journey”) cannot be faulted for this choice. It is therefore not necessary to hazard a guess which word was used. The translation and discussion offered above should exemplify my preference for the second possibility, since it can make sense of the saying’s gist and provide a good parallelism while text-critical guesstimates become unnecessary. The proverb states that embarking on a career defined by righteousness, constitutes a choice for the road where life is. On this journey one can know that the shadows of death do not lurk by the roadside (cf. 1:11f.). The saying does not promise life after death, a resurrection or immortality but it does envisage a course through the world (cf. 6:23ff.; 10:17) without being entrapped by death. Rabbinic exegesis often interprets ‫ צדקה‬as charity, and its use in the proverb – quite in accordance with the road metaphor – as the practice of charity (e.g. Rashi, Gerondi, Nahmias and others). Rashi explains ‫ל־מוֶ ת‬ ָ ‫ ַא‬traditionally, namely that such a person will not die, but Ramaq ascribes the opinion that the charitable person will live 326 327 328

Tournay (1962, 495-497). See THAT I, 457. Scherer (1999, 97).

408

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12

longer to the simple fact that death is the punishment for sin. Nahmias interestingly deals with the phrase on two levels: first, the charitable will live years longer, and second, they will not die spiritually (which in turn may be understood either as spiritual immortality or a vibrant spiritual life). According to Gerondi, the charitable person will be rewarded by extra years of life. But Ralbag sees the reward as eternal life, which may also be the intention of the Mezudat David when it formulates ‫( לא ימצא את המות‬he will not find death). Bahya, like Nahmias, has a twofold view of the phrase: on the one hand, the doer of good deeds may ensure that he does not die before his time, and on the other hand he may find that he lives longer than his allotted time as a reward for his charity. In an injunction that Christians should not live in anger against each other, the Apostolic Constitutions329 appeal to the Septuagint version of the proverb’s second hemistich, “but the ways of those who bear a grudge are unto death” (ὁδοὶ δὲ μνησικάκων εἰς θάνατον). This is merely a dictum probantium, quoted on one level with several others from Matthew, Ephesians, Psalms, Isaiah and others. Chrysostom does not comment on the verse in his commentary on Proverbs, but he does quote the Septuagint of the second hemistich in three sermons. One is on Eph 4:31-32 and the others on Matt 25:1-30 and Heb 11:28-31.330 In all three he warns against strife and grudges in the church, and uses the proverb to add weight to his argument by showing that “even under the Old Testament” there was understanding that this should not be so, for those who are guilty of it are on “the ways unto death.” Likewise, the proverb (together with Lev 19:17f.) is a text for John Cassian331 to argue a minori ad majorem that grudges should not be borne in the church if even the “old law, thought to be a little slack,” already guards against expressing anger in deeds or harbouring it in one’s thoughts. John Calvin332 uses the Hebrew proverb in an exposition of his doctrine that humans are saved by grace and not by works. Even so, he quotes the proverb (together with Prov 20:7 and some passages from the Book of Ezekiel) to argue that one could be saved by the practice of righteousness, but not a single one “of the sons of Adam” has such integrity. Still, he accepts that the biblical proverb shows that the good works of believers, although only partial and imperfect, are “a step on the way to immortality” – the only rider is that the good deeds of those whom God has taken up in his covenant of grace, he judges by grace and not by their merit. A final note on the concepts in Prov 12:28: Even if it cannot be shown that the famous words of Jesus in John 14:6 represent a reception of this verse, the close parallel of their constituent elements to those of the proverb is remarkable: “I am the way and the truth and the life, no one comes to the Father except by me.”

329 Const II, vi, 53 (ANF VII, 419); cf. also II, vii, 1 – an introduction to a whole section on the “Two Ways, the Way of Life and the Way of Death,” which (together with Deut 30:15) references the proverb thoroughly but indirectly, as could be expected in the treatment of such a topic. 330 Hom XVI In Eph (NPNF I,13, 128; Hom LXXVIII In Matt (NPNF I,13, 460); Hom XXVII in Hebr (NPNF I,14, 490). 331 The Twelve Books of Institutes VIII, 15 (NPNF 2,11, 262). 332 Inst III/17, 15.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 12 John 14:6a Prov 12:28a

the way ἡ ὁδὸς ‫ארח‬

the truth ἡ ἀλήθεια ‫צדקה‬

409 the life ἡ ζωή ‫חיים‬

In the Hebrew Bible, ‫ צדקה‬can also mean “truth,” like ‫( אמת‬e.g. Isa 45:23). Interestingly, in the follow-up clause (John 14:6b), Jesus too makes no mention of immortality or the like, but he does promise the Father’s presence to anyone who goes on his way/truth/life.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 13

Bibl. Boström 1928, 139-144; Dahood 1960, 176-181; Emerton 1984, 91-95; Freuling 2004, 109-110; Heim 2001, 159-170; Hermisson 1968, 176-177; Hildebrandt 1992, 433-444; Krispenz 1989, 63-70; Millar 2020, 50-53, 80-81, 126-127, 144-145; Pilch 2016, 31-36; Scherer 1999, 120-140; Scoralick 1995, 215-222; Stewart 2016, 184-191.

Themes and motifs It has often been pointed out that the contrast of ‫ צדיק‬and ‫ רשע‬is not as prominent in this chapter as it has been until now (only in vv. 5, 6, 9, 25) and that the chapter contains no Yahweh sayings at all. That does not mean that there is no religious dimension to the chapter, as the exegesis will show. A clear and obvious theme is that of education. Meinhold thinks vv. 1-11 are about the education to be a wise son and Schipper conceives of the chapter as an example of what a lecture (“Lehrrede”) in the form of short sayings might have looked like. Neither assertion can be denied, but the same claim could be made for any batch of such proverbs in the book.1 Schipper also filters his idea through the concept of ‫( מוסר‬discipline) to call the whole spectrum of the chapter “imperatival teaching” (“imperativische Unterweisung”).2 In any event, the education theme is expressly present in the chapter (vv. 1, 14f., 18, 20, 24). Combined and intertwined with it are the motifs of speech (vv. 2, 3, 5), wealth (vv. 7, 8, 11), desire (vv. 12, 19, 23, 25) and the perspective of the future (22, 23, 24), which is narrowly associated with the idea of longing or desire. Chapter organisation Several commentators agree broadly about grouping the sayings of this chapter in three clusters, but other commentators differ in various respects. Schipper concedes that the chapter is clearly stamped by individual proverbs to a greater extent than the previous three chapters. It is therefore not surprising to find a whole spectrum of proposals differing from each other to greater or lesser degrees, which will be cited summarily below. It is also not 1 This seems to be conceded by Schipper (2018, 595) when he says that any single proverb already belongs to didactic literature and intends education, but he still makes the assertion (2018, 742). 2 By “imperatival teaching” he means strict education in which the pupil is the object of education, as opposed to “indicative teaching,” where the pupil is the subject of his own learning (Schipper [2018, 45-48]). I use equivalent terms to respectively denote admonitory injunction to behavioural patterns, and sentential teaching of facts; see Introduction, Essays 1 and 2. On the concepts involved in education, see also Hausmann (1995, 168-178).

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 13

411

surprising that Schipper finds the teaching (“Lehre”) of the chapter only discernible after repetitive readings.3 The unit that Meinhold and Schipper consider to be about the education of the wise son (vv. 1-11) does not seem to contain the motif itself in more than v. 1. Waltke and Heim concur broadly with Meinhold and Schipper, but both see two shorter clusters at the opening: Waltke identifies a smaller section on speech (after the introductory v. 1) in vv. 2-6 and another on wealth in vv. 7-11. The former theme is however present only in vv. 2, 3 and 5, and the latter only in vv. 7, 8 and 11. Heim4 does basically the same, but adduces words “from the semantic field of speech,” oddly including words such as ‫( אכל‬eat), ‫( נפש‬throat, desire), ‫( אוה‬yearn) and ‫( דשן‬grow fat), while not accounting for v. 9 and only tenuously for v. 10 in his second group. Hermisson, whose analysis predates those of the other cited commentators by several decades, presents the same grouping of proverbs as they do, but seems to notice a looser association of verses of themes and catchwords rather than artistically forged units.5 The last two putative clusters are identical in the demarcation of all five commentators but they only partially typify the units similarly. For vv. 12-19: “longing satisfied” (Meinhold, Heim, Waltke) and “speech, longing and hope” (Schipper). Here Hermisson is quite clear about the “group”; vv. 12 and 19a correspond about the idea of desire and fulfilment, but the theme is not the same throughout and any suggestion of a centred structure is disturbed by irregularities in the placing of sayings.6 For vv. 20-25: “future of the wise son” (Meinhold), catchwords (Heim), “eternal destiny” (Waltke), “the present and the future of the pupil” (Schipper). Here too Hermisson points out the loose nature of the editing of these proverbs; he calls vv. 20-25 a “chain of proverbs” (“Spruchkette”) and the relation of vv. 23 and 24 to v. 22 an “associative” assemblage (inheritance – tilling – discipline). A summary may provide a synopsis: Hermisson

Meinhold

Waltke

Schipper

1-6 speech

1 introduction 1-11 wise son, im2-6 speech peratival education

7-11 wealth (partly)

7-11 wealth

7-11 wealth

12-19 desire fulfilled (partly)

12-19 desire 12-19 desire 12-19 desire fulfilled fulfilled fulfilled

1 introduction 2-6 speech (partly)

1-11 the wise son

Heim

20-25 proverb chain 20-25 son’s 20-25 catch- 20-25 eternal future words destiny

3

12-19 speak, desire, hope 20-25 son’s present and future

Schipper (2018, 779). Heim (2001, 159-169). Cf. however, the groupings by Scherer (1999, 125-136, summary on 135): vv. 1-2, 3-4, 5-9 (artistic but, he admits, not immediately clear), 10-23 (however, v. 10 not clearly so), 12-19 (but questionable), 24-25. 5 Hermisson (1968, 176-177). 6 Hermisson (1968, 177). Yoder does accept a concentric pattern in these verses, but has to stretch her description of the themes of vv. 14 and 17 as well as of vv. 15-16 in order to uphold that (also doubted by Hermisson and by Scherer [1999, 129]). She does however assert a loose connection of word repetitions in vv. 2-4, as does Whybray, who adds vv. 5-6 and 7-8 (as well as vv. 21-22) on the basis of “common elements of vocabulary” and very general thematic relationships. Van Leeuwen has: vv. 1-4; 7-8; 10-11; 12-19; 21-22 and singles in between. 4

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Krispenz has a completely deviating take. She separates vv. 15-25 out, and within this a smaller unit consisting of vv. 15-21, mentioning sound patterns and particularly alliteration as criteria.7 But this is weak and sometimes barely noticeable (e.g. when an alliteration on ‫ ע‬is claimed). She finds this inner unit a “mere string” (“reine Reihe”) that has to be salvaged by a “linear development” of thought. But this is very vague and sometimes necessitates less convincing endeavours to align looser and tighter parallelisms in adjoining verses (cf. vv. 15-16). Scoralick8 differs yet more. To her, vv. 3-13 belong together and are introduced by v. 2. They connect backwards to the previous sections and do not have such a thoroughly composed order (“durchkomponierte[r] Ordnung”) as those in 12:14–13:2.9 In her opinion, vv. 12f. cement the two halves of Prov 10-15.10 However, her concept is hard to follow and has not been quite convincing. Other commentators merely ignore the issue (e.g. Murphy, Clifford and Fox).

This overview gives a kaleidoscopic picture even where there is some convergence of opinion. In this light, it would be wise not to overstretch thinkable relations between proverbs lest we risk defining artistic units into existence. Social background The chapter again seems to suggest reference to affluent landed society. Schipper points to vv. 11 and 23 and surmises that injustice by the rich may be suggested in the latter proverb. He also moots the possibility that the messengers of v. 17 may suggest employees of the elevated administrative class who could send out messengers. Both are possible but remain conjecture.

7 Krispenz (1989, 63-70); her idea of sound patterns is accepted by Scherer (1999, 132), although he deviates from her in particulars. 8 Scoralick (1995, 215-222). 9 Similarly Fuhs identifies 12:14–13:2 as a closely structured unit, followed by miscellaneous slacker combinations with intricate networks of partly conceptual and partly formal correspondences. 10 According to Scoralick (1995, 218-224), 13:14-25 slots in with 14:1-27, which cannot occupy us further in the present context.

TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 13

I translate the proverbs individually, unless it is practical to discuss several at a time, which does not imply that such verses make up an integrated poem. Only where close relations are palpable, I present them together. The focus on individual proverbs will in turn keep sight of the literary context in which the particular sayings find themselves. 13:1 A wise son [listens to] a father’s discipline, but a scoffer does not listen to rebuke. The proverb is an antithetical parallelism organised in a 4+3 rhythmic pattern, as Gemser scans it. Toy however considers the proverb a ternary stich, which is unlikely because, if the maqqeph is not calculated, it would cause a knot of stressed syllables. The proverb consists of one nominal and one verbal clause, but the verb of the second half suggests what is to be supplied in the first half by virtue of the parallelism. Although syntactically normal, the statement “A wise son is a father’s discipline,” is unusual and difficult to understand.11 But, having read the second hemistich, the suggestive force of the parallelism invites the reader12 to understand that the opposite of ‫לא שמע‬ (does not listen to) should be understood in the opening hemistich, as the brackets indicate in the translation above. This is what the Septuagint did. In the obviously antithetical proverb, the clever son must practise the opposite of what his counterpart does. So, the translator explicated the antithesis of two types of son and made the result of their behaviour unequivocal: υἱὸς πανοῦργος ὑπήκοος πατρί, υἱὸς δὲ ἀνήκοος ἐν ἀπωλείᾳ.

(A clever son is obedient to his father, but a son who does not listen is in destruction)

11 To Delitzsch, Meinhold and Fox the construction denotes that the son incorporates the father’s discipline, that is, the son or his wisdom is the product of his father’s discipline. 12 Millar (2020, 80) says with reference to this verse that proverbs speaking of two characters are particularly open, which is illustrated by how the Greek and Syriac versions respond to the Hebrew text.

414

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

The Septuagint accounts for the difficult juxtaposition13 in the Hebrew of v. 1a by retaining a verbless construction but substituting an adjective (ὑπήκοος [obedient]) for a noun (‫[ מוסר‬discipline]). In light of the second hemistich the reader can then infer that the clever, obedient son does not experience destruction. The solution of the Peshitta is not identical, but functions in the same strain: f€zξćà ñãĀþã ¿ćäÚÞÐ Áü f˾æ À¾Ý âÃúã ¿ćàx ¿þÚ ÁüÂ{ (A wise son obeys his father, but a bad son who does not accept reproof will perish)

Not a syntactical gap,14 but a logical lacuna in the first hemistich (what happens to the clever son?) is thus filled in the light of the second hemistich (the bad son perishes). So, the second Syriac hemistich provides information that amplifies the reader’s understanding of the first: the clever son does not perish. The Targum also fills out what it perceives as necessary to balance the proverb (so Delitzsch): ‫בר חכימא מקבל מרדותא דאבא‬ ‫וברא ממקנא לא מקבל בעתא‬ (A wise son accepts discipline from his father, but a scoffing son does not accept the threat)

In the Masoretic Text, the “blunt juxtaposition” of “a wise son” and “a father’s discipline” in the nominal clause ‫( בן חכם מוסר אב‬v. 1a) is clarified by the statement in the verbal clause of v. 1b that a scoffer does not listen to (‫ )לא ישמע‬rebuke. Since the first hemistich is difficult but syntactically normal (“A wise son is a father’s discipline”), it contains no actual lacuna. Neither the phrase ‫ לא ישמע‬nor half of it (‫ )ישמע‬can properly be said to have been gapped from v. 1a,15 but the disobedience about which ‫ לא ישמע‬in the 13 Fox, following Williams (1980, 41), calls it “blunt” or “stroboscopic” juxtaposition (cf. 13:18; 14:8, 30; 15:15; 19:11). The two substantives in the nominal clause are not “comfortably” accounted for. But exactly that constitutes a challenge to the reader to become involved in assigning meaning as other forms of information in the opening half would have done if they were not withheld. 14 According to Miller (2005, 43-44), who describes linguistic ellipsis in Hebrew and other languages, regressive ellipsis is only allowed when the gapped verb is in the final position. But this does not apply to nouns, which can often be elided and supplied backwards (e.g., in English, the farmers welcomed [the rains] and the golfers regretted the rains; and in German, er begrüßt [die Nachbarin] und sie ignoriert die Nachbarin), especially where retrograde pronominal reference would be awkward (for instance – as in the examples just given – the use of “it” or “them” to refer to “rains,” or “sie” to refer to “die Nachbarin” when there is another “sie” nearby). 15 Waltke sees a gap here (likewise Van Leeuwen, Tuinstra, Schipper and others), but no hole/gap can be seen where it ought to be. Waltke also finds a gap in v. 22, where he thinks

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

415

second clause speaks, informs the reader what the fatherly discipline mentioned in the difficult nominal clause intends: acceptance by the son of rebuke or reproof, the classic form of discipline (cf. 1:2, 23, 25, 30; 3:11; 5:12; 6:23; 12:1; 13:1, 8, 18; 15:5, 10, 31f.; 17:10; Qoh 7:5 etc.).16 By the same token, we also know that the scoffer is unwise because he lacks the discipline that is the prerequisite for being wise (1:3). In several proverbs the ‫( לץ‬scoffer) appears as the one who is immune to discipline (cf. also 9:7f.; 15:12). In 21:24 he is explicitly called “insolent” (‫)זד‬, “haughty” (‫)יהיר‬, and displaying arrogant presumptuousness (‫עברת‬ ‫)זדון‬.17 He lacks the basic prerequisite for becoming wise (cf. 15:33; 16:18; 18:12) and is therefore the antithesis of the wise son with whom the proverb begins. Therefore his speaking betrays his lack of discernment18 (similarly Meinhold). McKane finds this proverb significant because it shows that “an important constituent of the stance of a wise son is teachability.”19 If one is not willing to accept a reproof, one is not willing to concede wrongdoing and therefore cannot improve. No thought is given to the possibility that the father may be wrong or unfair and that the son indeed does not deserve reproach. It is taken for granted that the father always is right and that the son must have transgressed, even if he can already be called wise. He has to “learn obedience,” which shows a striking resemblance to that which is said of Christ (Heb 5:8).20 Schipper points out the similarities between 10:1 and 13:1. He then emphasises the Qal perfect of ‫ שמע‬in this verse and relates it to the three preceding chapters: the son mentioned in 10:1 has listened to his father, while he who has not listened can only be a scoffer. Even if this is overstating the argument, we can agree that 13:1 marks a new beginning, looking back to Chaps. 10-12 and forward to what follows in Chaps. 13-15 (Schipper says 14-15, but the present chapter cannot be excluded if the logic is to hold). In that ‫( חיל‬wealth) in v. 22b has been gapped in v. 22a. But this is doubtful because it is not necessary for ‫ נחל‬Hiphil (give an inheritance) to have a direct as well as an indirect object. 16 Cf. on 1:2, Vol. I, 56-57. 17 Cf. Fox (2000, 42). 18 So Richardson (1955, 170), who proposes “babbler,” but concedes that this translation is uncertain. Cf. Hausmann (1995, 12-13) on the differences of opinion concerning ‫לץ‬. 19 This can be accepted without concurring with McKane’s choice to adopt the conjecture by Driver (1940, 174), who emends ‫ מוסר‬to the Pual participle ‫( ְמיֻ סּר‬is disciplined) or Driver’s earlier conjecture (1932, 144) to derive ‫ אב‬from ‫אוב‬, a by-form of ‫( אהב‬love). Neither is it necessary to follow Wildeboer, Oesterley, Gemser and BHS by supplying ‫ ה‬in order to attain the Qal form (‫א ֵֹהב‬, Wildeboer and Gemser vocalise ‫)א ֵהב‬. ָ Note: Oesterley credits Steuernagel (1910) with “the excellent emendation ‫אהב‬.” That refers to the third edition of HSAT, but the translation in the first edition of Kautzsch (1894), before Steuernagel joined the panel of authors, already emended likewise and translated “liebt” (loves). 20 Waltke also compares the Suffering Servant, who has an open ear “to listen like the pupils” (Isa 50:4f.). Cf. also Phil 2:8, where Christ is said to have become “obedient”, the same word used by the Septuagint in this proverb (ὑπήκοος).

416

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

my view, this also speaks in favour of keeping v. 1 apart from the following verses rather than including it in a cluster.21 Rashi seems to have no problem understanding the verse in a way unthinkable to Delitzsch, viz. to fill out the first hemistich with the help of the second half, however with two other Hebrew verbs (‫ שאל‬and ‫ )אהב‬as an explanatory aid, and of course without the negation. The son “asks for and loves the discipline of the father” (‫שואל‬ ‫)ואוהב מוסר אב‬. However, he immediately adds a second rabbinic understanding: “Some say it is on account of the father’s discipline that he became so” (‫וי״א בשביל‬ ‫)מוסר האב הוא‬. This suggests reading the first hemistich as a nominal clause, meaning that the son now “is” the father’s discipline in the sense of representing its results. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra’s only comment on the verse is that the verb should be supplied in the first hemistich. Nahmias (14th century) and the Mezudat David (18th century) turn the logic around – if a son appears wise, it can be inferred that his father has disciplined him, while the scoffer has not been disciplined. Ramaq is quite ingenious by interpreting ‫ שמע‬not as “listen,” but as “hear.” A father will only discipline a son whom he knows to be wise, because wisdom entails that the son will accept the rebuke when he errs even if he is wise already. On the other hand, the father does not bother to reprimand a son who will scorn it, so the scoffer never gets to hear rebukes and cannot become wise. Gerondi (13th century) and Malbim (19th century) stress the importance of admonishing children early in life, for that is their formative time. I have not found any use made of the proverb in early Christian literature. But it is interesting to note Waltke’s reference to Heb 5:8. Although there is no evidence of direct reception of the proverb, it is worth noting the similarity (cf. also above on the Carmen Christi in Phil 2, where Christ is said to have “become obedient”).

13:2-6 2

From the fruit of a man’s mouth he eats the good, but the desire of the treacherous is violence.22 He who watches his mouth guards his life, but he who opens wide his lips, for him there is ruin. It craves while there’s nothing – the appetite of the sluggard, but the appetite of the diligent will be satiated. The righteous man hates a deceiving word, but the wicked man becomes a stench and ashamed. Righteousness will guard the blameless of way, but wickedness subverts the sinner.

3 4 5 6

These verses are loosely edited together. The motif of speech itself is only present in vv. 2, 3 and 5. But there are external connections by means of catchwords, such as ‫ נפש‬in vv. 2, 3 and 4, however in different meanings (desire, gullet, life, appetite); further ‫( פה‬mouth) in vv. 2 and 3, and the root 21 22

Cf. above, the Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 13, under “Chapter organisation.” Or: but the gullet of the treacherous [has to eat] violence.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

417

‫ צדק‬in vv. 5 and 6.23 The verses do not combine under a common theme and therefore cannot be given a superscription. 13:2 From the fruit of a man’s mouth he eats the good, but the desire of the treacherous is violence.24 The proverb consists of a verbal clause in the first hemistich in antithetical parallelism with a nominal clause in the second. The rhythmic organisation is a classic sapiential Siebener (4+3). The words used make an ambivalent reading possible, that is, not merely a matter of ambiguity that would demand a choice between two possibilities but making it possible to find and integrate more than one level of meaning at the same time. Both in biblical and rabbinic Hebrew ‫ נפש‬in the second hemistich may mean “desire” (so Rashi), but it is also possible that it may mean “gullet” (so Fox). Then the verb has to be gapped in the second half and supplied by the reader: “the gullet of the treacherous [eats] violence.” However, if the latter is the only understanding possible, the two hemistichs would be “poorly related because the mouth is the source of the fruit in the A-line while the gullet is the consumer of lawlessness in the B-line” (so Fox himself). But the proverb is richer than that. A pointer to a solution may be the similar images in 4:17 and 19:28. In the former text the idea of eating and drinking wickedness and violence means consuming the profits gained by violence, but it can also be a metaphor for not being able to live without violence, or it can be both.25 In 19:28 the wicked devour injustice as a metaphor for the “ingesting of evil” (Clifford), identifying with evil. The present proverb also suggests such nuances, which results in a good parallelism of the two hemistichs. In the a-verset, the ‫( איש‬intended is the wise man) speaks with his mouth and then eats the fruit produced by his speaking. If the mouth produces fruit it must be by speaking and if the speaker eats the fruit so produced, it means the speaker enjoys the positive yield of fruitful speech. The mouth is thus not only the source of the fruit, but also its recipient, the organ of speaking as well as the organ of consuming. Therefore the two aspects of the mouth together are a lucid expression of the deed-consequence nexus. There is however yet another side to this. Waltke is right in pointing out that the producing and eating of food is an intentional pun. Not only does the speaker himself 23 V. 6 can be understood to indicate the result of the truthfulness practised by the ‫ צדיק‬as stated in v. 5, which of course is ‫ צדקה‬and is followed by the safety of being guarded. 24 Or: but the gullet of the treacherous [has to eat] violence. 25 See on 4:17 in Vol. I, 218-219.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

enjoy the good consequences (rewards) of his speaking (cf. 12:14), but the fruitful words also nourish the hearer of the teaching (cf. 10:21; 11:27). The third person masculine singular in the verb can be understood as personal (the speaker eats) and equally well as impersonal (one, i.e. the pupil, eats). In the b-verset the ‫ נפש‬is parallel to the speaking mouth and does the same type of double duty in the proverb. It denotes both the desire for violence (its source) and the necessity of having to swallow violence as a consequence. This is also a pun, for desiring violence must mean craving to use words (cf. the speaking of the first hemistich) for inflicting violence on others (cf. 10:6, 11; 11:9), and having the violence in one’s own gullet means having to swallow it oneself (cf. 11:27). In the translation only one of these two aspects can be represented, but in the Hebrew ‫ נפש‬carries a double entendre to match both ‫ פה‬as the organ of speech and ‫ אכל‬performed by the organ of eating.26 Summary: V. 2a fruit mouth speak, source of produce ... ● for nourishment of others ● eat – own enjoyment the good (positive product)

V. 2b [violent backlash] ‫נפש‬-desire for ... source of violence ● to the detriment of others ● ‫נפש‬-gullet – swallow to their own detriment violence (negative product of desire)

The injustice of inflicting violence on others is specified by the genitive in the construction ‫( נפש בגדים‬the desire/gullet of the treacherous). The participle Qal of ‫ בגד‬denotes those who deceive others. The use of this verb in the Book of Proverbs (2:22; 11:3, 6; 13:15; 21:18; 22:12; 23:28; 25:19) always involves deception in its anti-social manifestation (as opposed to its use in the matrimonial, political, cultic and theological spheres).27 The polyvalence of this proverb is well suited to rabbinic exegesis, which understandably often offers straightforward expositions. Rashi explains the eating of fruit in terms of the Mishnah, where the study of Torah is mentioned as the most important of four activities “the fruits of which a man eats in This World, while the principal [fruit] remains standing for him in the World to Come” (‫שאדם אוכל פרותיהן בעולם הזה והקרן‬ ‫)קימת לו לעולם הבא‬.28 Not so much speaking as the study of Torah is rewarded by “fruit” in this life and in the next. On the other hand, treacherous people are those who “desire” violence. Ignoring the second half, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra interprets only the first hemistich to mean that the speaker will enjoy the good (‫ )טוב‬from his good words (‫ )מדבריו הטובים‬spoken to others in the world. Other rabbis balance the two hemistichs clearly: the good man will eat a good reward and the treacherous will “eat” 26 27 28

See the alternative translation in the footnote to the translation above. Cf. THAT I, 262-263. Pe’ah 1:1.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

419

the violence inflicted on them by others or by the violence perpetrated by themselves, which will happen both in This World and in the World to Come (Ramaq, similarly the Mezudat David). The Vilna Gaon relates this to the word ‫נפש‬, which he interprets as the soul of the treacherous that will suffer in both worlds. This is interesting, because he takes the idea of retribution to its logical end. As the ‫ חמס‬of the treacherous is verbal violence, so they will suffer from verbal violence in This World and their souls will suffer the same even in the World to Come. Rashi’s understanding of the first hemistich to refer to the study of Torah is perhaps not coincidental, for there is a well-established rabbinic tradition that prohibits profiting financially from speaking/teaching Torah, albeit not with direct reference to Prov 13:2. Already Hillel the Elder (1st century BCE) warned against such gain.29 In the instances cited above, the “fruit of a man’s mouth” is not explicitly identified as teaching Torah, neither is the enjoyment of the fruit portrayed as remuneration by others – although it might be construed that way. But there are also rabbinic exceptions to the rule, for instance where remuneration for the teacher is not required of poor pupils whereas rich pupils do have to pay. Other examples arise when the payment is interpreted as compensation for loss of time or for looking after the children rather than for the simultaneous act of teaching them Torah.30 Nevertheless, the two options stand in tension. That is also the case in the New Testament, where both possibilities are found as well. Without direct reference to Prov 13:2, those who teach the gospel are sometimes allowed to live off that activity (1 Cor 9:14; Gal 6:6)31 as opposed to the charge of Jesus given to the apostles to preach and heal for free because they themselves have received it for free (Matt 10:8).

13:3 He who watches his mouth guards his life, but he who opens wide his lips, for him there is ruin. The proverb has a rhythmic pattern of 4+3 (so also Toy and Gemser, who each consider a different alternative as well, but 4+4 and 3+3 are highly unlikely). The two versets contain significant stylistic features, a fact that emphasises the importance afforded the well-attested theme of guarded speech. Syntactically, both hemistichs are nominal clauses, the first of which has two participial phrases (‫ נצר פיו‬and ‫ )שמר נפשו‬while the final hemistich contains only one (‫)פשק שפתיו‬. This “break in the sequence of participles ... draws attention to the concluding remark of the proverb,” as McCreesh32 puts it. Not only the break in the row of participial phrases, but especially the casus pendens at the last one (‫)פשק שפתיו‬, with which the second hemistich begins, puts emphasis on the final words. That is the inherent effect of a pendens construction, since 29

Aboth 1:13; for several further sources, cf. Nedarim 62a; Str-B I, 561-562. Taanith 24a; Leviticus Rabbah 30; Str-B I, 563-564. According to Arzt (1953, 45-46), the salaries of teachers were generated by fees and general taxes; cf. Crenshaw (1998, 10-11), who points out that these salaries were so small that they were not even taxed. 31 Cf. Str-B III, 401. 32 McCreesh (1991, 96; further 97-98 for his detailed analysis of stylistics in the proverb). 30

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

it keeps the logic of the idea pending for a moment, i.e., it holds the final concept back, and only then finalises it with the help of a pronominal element in the predicate.33 Finally, v. 3bii is set apart from the rest of the proverb by being the only phrase without a participle and is therefore emphasised. Moreover, sound patterns play an important part in the stylistics of the verse. ‫ נ ֵֹצר‬rhymes with ‫( שׁ ֵֹמר‬v. 3a) and ‫( נַ ְפשׁוֹ‬ending of v. 3a) with ‫ְמ ִח ָתּה‬ ‫( לוֹ‬ending of v. 3b); there is alliteration on n, p, r and additional sibilants (v. 3a) and on p, ś and t (v. 3b); assonance of o occurs (in both halves, in addition to the vowels in the rhyme). The sound play is associated with a remarkably symmetrical syntactic pattern.34 The whole ensemble of stylistic features combine to isolate the last two words for emphasis (see below). Millar even finds an acrostic in “the first letters of the words in vs. 3,” which for her is the centre of a unit (vv. 2-4) that focalises the ‫נפש‬, namely ‫נ פ ש נ‬ ‫פ ש‬. However, she disregards the last two words (the two that are emphasised) as well as the fact that the last ‫ ש‬is a śin, not a šin.35 The effect of the carefully crafted proverb is to conjure up surprise in the reader who reaches the end, thus suggesting that the ruin of the garrulous bigmouth36 will come as suddenly and unexpectedly as the grammatical surprise sprung on the reader by the syntax. The roots used in the first half suggest the guarding of a gate (so Fox), either a city gate37 or a house door. A near parallel in concept, metaphor and terminology can be seen in Ps 141:3, where the speaker implores God to “set watch” over his mouth and to “guard” his lips, using the same two roots as in our proverb (‫ שמר‬and ‫)נצר‬.38 In this proverb, the concern is not the 33 On the casus pendens, see GKC 116w, 143d (referring to the “isolation and prominence” of the subject in a casus pendens) and 159i. 34 This feature is emphasised by McCreesh, who adds the observation that the syntax of both hemistichs consists of a parallel participle + genitive 3× and then “breaks down” in the middle of the second hemistich through the addition of the noun ‫ מחתה‬+ a preposition with suffix (‫)לו‬. Moreover, at the same point the casus pendens occurs in the third genitive construction. McCreesh (1991, 97f.) also finds that the sound patterns “imitate the grammatical ְ but that is not so parallelism in that both ‘break down’ at the same point,” that is, at ‫מ ִח ָתּה לוֹ‬, obvious to me, since ‫ ְמ ִח ָתּה לוֹ‬participates in the rhyme with ‫נַ ְפשׁוֹ‬. Luchsinger (2010, 197) also notes the interplay of stylistic elements to achieve a significant surprise effect at the end (apparently independently, although he does elsewhere cite McCreesh). Cf. also Fox, who finds further alliteration of n, p and sibillants, even chiastically. 35 Millar (2020, 144). Nevertheless, I agree that such an invitation to work out the possibilities trains the reader to internalise Proverbs’ logic (2020, 145). 36 Barucq thinks that the proverb is ambivalent (eating restraint :: over-indulgence alongside careful :: careless speech), but McKane shows that guarding the mouth and stretching the lips cannot mean that. 37 Cf. NIDB II, 522-523 for the defensive character of city gates from the Middle Bronze Age on. For a guard on the lookout at a city gate, cf. 2 Kgs 17:9; in Ezra 4:42 a whole force seems to have been identified as “gatekeepers.” 38 Although there is a thematic difference, the first hemistich is very similar to the second half of 16:17. Cf. also Prov 21:23, where two hemistichs are used to say the same as half of 13:3 (see Delitzsch), so that the former is not as densely packed with stylistic features as

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necessity to watch out for what goes into the mouth, but for what goes out of the mouth.39 That in itself intimates that speaking is a dangerous thing, which is then confirmed and even augmented by the ending of the second hemistich – it is a matter of life and death (so Perdue, Yoder), because the catastrophe of the blab will be total destruction (‫ )מחתה‬and come as unexpectedly as the syntax change in the middle of the last hemistich. The use of ‫ פשק‬Qal (spread open) in the last hemistich is also remarkable. The word occurs only twice in the Old Testament, the other instance being Ezk 16:25, where the Piel is used of an adulterous woman spreading open her legs to strangers. Waltke may be justified when, with reference to 5:3, he considers the possibility that the speaker’s lips (‫ )שפתיו‬may have a sexual connotation. Then the words spoken may be understood as lewd language, which does not have to exclude the natural meaning of opening the mouth wide so that the words gush forth unrestrained (so Meinhold), or that the words of a bigmouth are foolish, which according to 18:7 is not only a fact, but also causes his ‫( מחתה‬ruin) (Schipper). The multivalent proverb can be legitimately interpreted in terms of all the components of “spreading the lips wide open”: braggadocious,40 obscene and foolish blabbering suddenly brings ruin. The warning against too much and reckless speaking is well established in the Book of Proverbs (e.g. 10:6, 8, 11, 14; 11:9, 11, 12; 12:13, 17f., 19; 14:3; 15:1, 10; 16:27; 17:4; 18:7f., 20f.; 21:6; 26:22-25, 28; 29:5)41 and elsewhere in the Old Testament (e.g. Pss 39:2; 141:3; Qoh 5:1f., 5f.; 10:20). But the same goes for other ancient Near Eastern wisdom literature. The image in the last example just cited from the Book of Qohelet has a strong affinity with what is said in the Aramaic Wisdom of Achiqar:42 More than all watchfulness watch43 over your mouth and harden your heart over what you hear. For a word is [like] a bird, and who sends it out is a man without un[derstanding].

In the Babylonian Counsels of Wisdom watchfulness over the mouth and opening it wide occur twice, some 100 lines apart,44 in both cases with much the same motifs as in our proverb: the present proverb (see “Set 3.1” identified by Snell [1993, 53]; despite the thematic difference, Heim [2013, 334-347] arrays these two proverbs with 16:17b and 19:16a as a group). 39 Cf. Matt 15:11, 17-19 par. for the idea of the dangerous effects of what comes out of the mouth. 40 See above, the note on the adjective in the commentary on 12:9. 41 Cf. Hausmann (1995, 191-196, 199-205). 42 Col. 7, l. 98; my citation according to the Cowley numbering; for a summary and discussion of the different numbering systems, see Gianto (1995, 88); also ANET, 428. 43 Aramaic ‫ = נטר‬Hebrew ‫נצר‬. 44 Counsels lines 26, 131, 133; cited according to the numbering by Lambert ([1960] 1975, 100/101, 104/105); cf. ANET, 427 (with different numbering).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 Let your mouth be kept in check and your speech be restrained. Do not spread open your mouth, guard over your lips, ... What you quickly blurt out will pursue you later.

Also in Egyptian wisdom the motif is well attested in the Demotic literature, for instance in the Instruction of Amenemope (Ramesside Period, 19th20th Dynasties):45 Do not start a quarrel with a hotmouth ... ... sleep before speaking An example from the Demotic Instruction of Ankhsheshonq (of Ptolemaic date):46 Muteness is better than a hasty tongue. Rashi makes the connection with Ezk 16:5 and uses it to determine what the bigmouth speaks about. He spreads his mouth wide “to speak all his mind (‫ )כל רוחו‬continually, [derived] from ‘and you spread wide your legs,’ which is about wideness.” Although Rashi remains tantalisingly brief, he does invite the idea of lewd words. The sexual connotation is clear in the opinion of Nahmias, who thinks the words spoken with such lips do contain sexual innuendo (cf. the “lips” in 5:3). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra also cites Ezk 16:25 and uses a comparison (‫ )כמו‬to expound what kind of an opening of the mouth we have here, notably an “opening like ‘you spread open your legs’.” That is not pleasing (to God) and leads to the speaker’s ruin. The Mezudat David names a similar object for the act of speaking, viz. “all that comes over his heart” (‫)כל העולה על לבו‬. That is, unfettered blither will bring catastrophe. This does not necessarily have the connotation suggested by Rashi and especially Nahmias, but the interpretation of the first hemistich indicates that “guarding the mouth” means to avoid saying “a forbidden word” (‫)דבר הנאסר‬. Similarly, Yonah Gerondi thinks that a wise person only speaks once his heart has considered the issue, vis-à-vis the one whose heart is simply overwhelmed by thoughts (cf. Mezudat David). Malbim thinks that the mouth signifies thoughtful, wise speech, whereas the lips signify superficial speech. In the First Epistle on Virginity attributed to Clemens Romanus47 (actually more than a century later than him, i.e. beginning of the 3rd century) there is a partial quotation of the proverb, claiming that “the perfect man” is the one who keeps watch over his tongue (cf. Prov 21:23 – mouth and tongue), while his counterpart speaks “whatever comes to his mouth” (cf. the similar idea in the Mezudat David). In his Apology against Rufinus, Jerome48 has a collection of citations and quotations from the Book of Proverbs to extol the virtue of guarded speech. Among them 13:3 is little more than a link in a chain, but it does show that Jerome interpreted the first half of the 45 Amenemope V, 10, 13 (AEL II, 150); cf. also VI, 7; XXII, 7-16; XXII, 2-4 et al.; cf. Schipper; Oesterley. 46 Instr Ankhsheshonq XV, 16 (AEL III, 171); cf. also XII, 24; XIII, 16; XVII, 10, 25; XXIII, 4. 47 I Clementia XI (ANF II, 59). 48 Apol adv libros Rufini III, 43 (NPNF II/3, 540); for the background of this argument, cf. the notes on the reception of 12:14; cf. also on 13:16.

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verse to speak of guarding the soul,49 while the second half says that the rash speaker terrorises himself. Athanasius50 makes ad hoc use of the last hemistich to justify fleeing rather than suicide in the face of persecution. Self-destruction would mean Christians become a terror unto themselves, as the proverb has it, which is not defensible. An interesting aspect of Chrysostom’s commentary on this verse, with which he commences the exposition of Prov 13, is that he applies it directly to his readers and himself. Speaking in the second and the first person plural, he points out that Christians who guard their mouth preserve their life, while those who are rash of tongue scare themselves. He offers a straightforward interpretation of the Greek text with no endeavour to filter the meaning through a New Testament lens.

13:4 It craves while there’s nothing – the appetite of the sluggard, but the appetite of the diligent will be satiated. The verse consists of four stresses in four words and three stresses in three words.51 The syntax of the first hemistich is remarkable because of the third person masculine singular suffix in ‫ נפשו‬and the positioning of ‫( ואין‬and there is nothing). A word-for-word rendering exposes how little sense it makes: “It craves and there’s nothing his appetite the sluggard.” The use of ‫ נפש‬with suffix after ‫ ואין‬seems to be the prime difficulty. First, this calls for a text-critical consideration. ‫ נפשו‬is represented in neither the Septuagint nor Symmachus, the Peshitta or the Vulgate. For this reason BHQ thinks that it was absent in the Hebrew Vorlage of these versions, whereas EE takes the opposite view on the grounds that the notion of desiring in the translation (ἐπιθυμία) could have been deemed sufficient to account for the noun. In my opinion, the latter view is preferable because ‫ נפש‬can mean both “appetite” and “desire.”52 There is thus no need to accept the idea in BHS to delete ‫ נפשו‬altogether, which also renders the knock-on emendation superfluous, viz. that the feminine participle (going with ‫)נפשו‬ be read as masculine (to go with ‫)עצל‬. Several proposals have been made to explain the unusual syntax. (a) The o-vowel may be a normal suffix (“his appetite”), to which ‫ עצל‬is added as a permutative or clarifying variant for the third person masculine (so Delitzsch). But this seems forced as it is difficult to see why an unspecified pronominal element would be used at all if it needs a clarifying noun that could have been used in the first place.53 (b) Delitzsch already rejected the idea that the o-vowel is a cholem compaginis (an o of connection) 49 This is in fact what the Septuagint does: ὃς φυλάσσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ στόμα, τηρεῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχήν (Whoever guards his mouth keeps his soul), cf. Delitzsch. 50 Apol de Fuga XVII (NPNF II/4, 261). 51 Gemser identifies the rhythm as 4+3; Toy calls it “ternary,” which is difficult to understand in the absence of an explanation. 52 The Greek has ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις ἐστὶν πᾶς ἀεργός (Every sluggard is in yearning). 53 Reading only ‫ ;נפש עצל‬see BHS; the emendation was actually proposed by Ehrlich; cf. Gemser and Whybray.

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because this would be the only instance of a vocal case ending in all of wisdom literature. In any event, its explanation is conjectural and doubtful.54 (c) The o may be the third person masculine singular suffix after all, not as a clarification, but as a calculated pronominal anticipation of the genitive, which occurs several times in the Bible and in the Gezer calendar.55 (d) Wildeboer thinks that this would be an Aramaism, which would usually also have the preposition ‫ ל‬before the genitive. Therefore he regards the o-vowel with ‫ נפש‬as a survival of an old nominative and not as a suffix.56 In favour of this explanation one could appeal to the phrase ‫( חיתו־ארץ‬animals of the earth) in Gen 1:24 and Ps 79:2, because the masculine suffix -o would not suit the usually feminine ‫ארץ‬. But this argument is not cast in iron, for ‫ ארץ‬can indeed – if seldom – be construed as masculine (BDB), e.g. Ezk 21:24 (‫)ארץ אחד‬.57 In all other instances of the phrase and its parallels the genitive following the o is masculine, thus: ‫( חיתו־יער‬its animals of the bush) in Ps 50:10 and Ps 104:20 as well as Isa 56:9b; ‫( חיתו־שדי‬its animals of the field) in Ps 104:1 and Isa 56: 9a. Importantly, in yet other cases a masculine plural genitive is preceded by an agreeing plural suffix: ‫( נחשתם כל־הכלים‬their bronze of all the vessels) in Jer 52:20, and ‫( באם הכהנים‬their entering of the priests) in Ezk 42:14. The suffixes in these latter cases show that the addition to the first noun in the construction cannot be an obsolete nominative ending and must be a suffix. The phenomenon of an anticipatory pronoun occurs often enough in Hebrew that an explanation by recourse to Aramaic is unnecessary.58 All the examples mentioned by Wildeboer (derived from GKC) can be explained as a pronoun anticipating the genitive: ‫( בנו צפר‬his son of Sippor) in Num 23:18; ‫( בנו בער‬his son of Beor) in Num 24:3, 15; ‫( מעינו־מים‬its source of the water) in Ps 114:8.

The function of this is firstly to delay the genitive ‫עצל‬: the identity of the one who craves while there’s nothing, is held back and thereby given emphasis. At the same time, this also explains the placing of ‫ואין‬. This little phrase is brought forward from an expected position at the end of the hemistich. → ‫מתאוה עצל ואין‬ the sluggard craves but there’s nothing [expected word order] ‫מתאוה ואין עצל‬ he craves but there’s nothing the sluggard [inversion of ‫ ואין‬and ‫→ ]עצל‬ ‫ מתאוה ואין נפשו עצל‬it craves but there’s nothing the appetite of the sluggard [insertion of ‫]נפשו‬

The position of the sluggard is delayed on both counts. That is why we can agree with Fox that the first hemistich becomes a miniature riddle of sorts. Who craves in vain – someone’s appetite – yes, the sluggard’s! 54 So GKC 90k. Cf. Scherer, who mentions the different possibilities but does not argue for any one of them; he does however translate ‫ נפשו‬as “die Kehle” (the throat) without rendering the last syllable as a pronominal suffix. 55 So Fox, who cites ‫( בבאו האיש‬at his entering of the man) in Ezk. 10:3, with further references to Ezk 42:14 and Jer 52:20. 56 Plöger follows this idea and cites one of Wildeboer’s examples, viz. ‫( חיתו־ארץ‬the animals of the earth) in Gen 1:24; cf. GKC 90o, where Wildeboer’s illustrations come from. 57 Cf. also GKC 122l, for the phenomenon that nouns denoting place often have variable gender (even in the majority of cases). 58 Quite apart from Wildeboer’s procedure to then invoke the Aramaic idiom (namely, that a preposition ‫ ל‬is often added) to reject it.

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Second, the unusual syntax strengthens the connection between the two hemistichs by using the same noun in both, which in turn highlights the contrast. Both character types have an appetite, but the presence of the identical word strongly underlines the antithesis – totally unfulfilled (nothing) as opposed to totally fulfilled (satiated).59 The desire expressed by the noun ‫נפש‬appetite and by the verb ‫ אוה‬Hitpael allow a generic interpretation, that is, physical hunger and thirst (e.g. Deut 12:20; 14:26; 2 Sam 23:15), sexual desire (e.g. Ps 45:12), or spiritual longing (e.g. Isa 26:9; Ps 42:2; 63:2; cf. Clifford). Whether one simply longs to satisfy the physical desire for food and drink or for other achievements in life, the point of the proverb is that one has to be active and work for it in order to enjoy the results (cf. Ps 128:1-2, so Murphy, Yoder, Tuinstra). 60 Finally, by placing this saying after two proverbs containing one instance of ‫ נפש‬each (vv. 2 and 3), the redactor can make the catchword connection unmistakable (see Waltke), even if the connection is rather external (talking as well as consuming with the mouth, even though the organ itself is not explicitly mentioned).61 There is an interesting parallel to the first hemistich in the Demotic wisdom literature: [There is] he who (cannot) eat, yet desires much food.62 Although formally interesting because of the parallel between desiring and not having, both in this line and Prov 13:4, the theme and thrust are different in the Egyptian text. Here the topic is gluttony, the thrust being to teach the folly of desiring more 59 The verb ‫( דשן‬Qal be fat; Piel make fat; Pual be fattened) is used in bonam partem, e.g. of prosperity (Deut 31:20) and festivity (Ps 23:5) or a physical good condition (Prov 11:25); cf. also 20:4; 21:25. Alter renders, “thrives” or “is luxuriant” (he takes the last ‫ נפש‬to mean “life”). 60 Whybray thinks the literal sense is the only relevant one in this case, assuming that the background of the proverb is that of the small farmer who “has literally nothing to fall back on if he fails to produce his own food.” Such a straightforward meaning is certainly not excluded, but the exclusive assumption is not justified. Gemser ([1937] 1963, 63), on the other hand, states that the negative or positive results of negative and positive actions, as encoded “in almost every saying of the collection 10–22:16,” do not exclude what he calls “higher moral norms and motives” (“höhere sittliche Normen und Motive”). 61 The “purely formal or external” character of the link created by ‫ נפש‬is espoused by Whybray on the grounds of a lack of thematic connection between vv. 3 and 4. Lucas finds v. 4 an extension of v. 2a “in the same way as 12:14b extends 12:14a,” but the difference is that in one case we have a single proverb while in the other a thematic effect between two nearby but separate proverbs has to be postulated. As the text stands, the logical comparison can however be drawn. Scherer (1999, 126) claims that successful speech as the result of good education (v. 1) will become a way of satisfying desire. It is of course difficult to deny that, but it cannot be described as a thematic conception of the proverb, for then anything in Proverbs would be thematically related to any other motif in the book. That could, again, be claimed in theory, but it stretches what is intended by the idea of a thematic link. 62 Papyrus Insinger V, 20 (AEL III, 189).

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food when one has already eaten too much (cf. the following lines on craving wine while still under the influence of “the night before,” and still going for women despite having no sexual appetite). That is something different from desiring what one cannot have because one is too lazy. Rashi applies a twofold interpretation, yielding a twofold meaning. Focusing on the second hemistich, he declares that the upright (‫ )ישרים‬eat from the toil of their hands. Their diligence thus proves that they are upright. That is the simple meaning (‫)פשות‬. Telescoping both hemistichs together, he then offers an allegorical sense (‫)משל‬, viz. that those who study Torah will have glory, while the sluggard will see it but not achieve it. Gerondi also takes the two halves together, but – in accordance with the Talmudic injunction (Meg 6b) not to believe one claiming to have studied hard in the Torah without achievement63 – turns the logic around. If one desires without achieving, it only shows that one is a sluggard. This assumes that no exception to the rule exists. Malbim thinks the soul (‫ )נפש‬will be rewarded for the bodily exhaustion caused by hard study. The contemporaries Jerome and Chrysostom quote according to the Greek version of the first hemistich (ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις ἐστὶν πᾶς ἀεργός [Every idle man is caught in his desires]). Jerome (342-420) uses it in several letters as a teaching to show how a monastery should be run, namely with hard work like cultivating fruit, beekeeping, fishing, scribal work and the like.64 He does the same in his advice about how virgins should occupy themselves, such as reading, praying, weaving and helping others.65 Chrysostom (347-407) simply uses the half-verse to state that “every idle man” includes the rich, who also become victims by wasting their wealth through laziness. John Cassian (c. 360-435) entertains the same thought but keeps it in general terms and links it to 1 Thess 4:11, apparently used as motivation for diligence of which the proverb speaks.66 He also uses the proverb as biblical substantiation for a claim that worldly desires should be discarded, since the presence of desire testifies to sloth of heart, which does not stand out as one-sided because the Greek of the second hemistich does not refer to the desire of the diligent, but to the hands of the manly.67

13:5 The righteous man hates a deceiving word, but the wicked man will become a stench and be ashamed. The proverb has a rhythm of 3+3 (so Toy). Gemser also considers 4+3, but this is less likely, since a segolated word follows on the maqqeph. That differs from the first two words of 12:19, where a syllable with hateph segol and not a full segol follows; therefore the comparison between the two cases by 63 See Rosenberg ([1988] 2001, 74); despite the restriction to Torah study in the Talmud – cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 231) – a somewhat harsh verdict, particularly on theological dropouts who did try. 64 Epist CXXV, ad Rusticum, 11 (NPNF II/6, 248). 65 Epist CXXX, ad Demetrias, 15 (NPNF II/6, 269). 66 Inst Coen X, 21 (NPNF II/11, 311); cf. the opening of the chapter with a reference to Prov 28:19 as well as 23:21 on the link between idleness and poverty. 67 Confer XXIV, 2 (NPNF II/11, 532).

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Delitzsch is not relevant for the scanning. The stich has a chiastic structure, beginning with a clause in which the object comes first, with the subject only following after the verb. In the second half of the proverb the subject comes first followed by two verbs, so that this hemistich technically carries two sentences. Summary: ‫צדיק‬ ‫יבאיש ויחפיר‬

‫דבר־שקר ישנא‬ ‫ורשע‬

The typical antithesis between the righteous and the wicked is immediately obvious, but the two outer poles of the chiasmus need closer scrutiny. Often commentators have tried to construe a precise parallelism by explaining ‫ יבאיש‬Hiphil as transitive (to make to stink = bring disgrace);68 others think of an internally transitive Hiphil (be stinking), also an ingressive (become stinking).69 Grammatically, both the transitive and intransitive readings are possible and perhaps even intended. While the righteous hate the dishonesty of deceiving others, the wicked harm others by bringing them into disgrace. However, the addition of ‫( חפר‬internally transitive Hiphil, be ashamed, display shame) suggests that the preceding imperfect ‫ יבאיש‬hides another dimension, apart from a simple transitive. The last hemistich stands out for containing two sentences, and the chiastic organisation of the whole verse suggests an inverted parallelism between the righteous and the wicked. Deborah Green70 has pointed out a helpful perspective to use in the interpretation of our proverb (although she focuses on other texts). She shows that the concept of stench is used as the “Aroma of the ‘Other’” and is used to typify a person or group as outcasts:71 “They may be physically located within a larger group but objectified as a means of being metaphorically pushed out. ... When referring to such people, 68

So, for instance, Schultens, Delitzsch, Gemser, Ringgren, Plöger, Van Leeuwen, Schipper. So Alter, Clifford, Whybray (who calls it “internally intransitive”), Waltke, Fox; cf. GKC 53d and e. 70 In the third chapter of her book on smells and odours (2011, 64-116). 71 Green (2011, 94-95). Examples from her chapter on the Hebrew biblical literature include (some added by me): The Israelite elders accuse Moses and Aaron of making them stink to Pharaoh (Ex 5:21); Israel made itself stink to the Philistines (1 Sam 13:4); David in the service of the Philistines has made himself stink to his own people (1 Sam 27:12); the Ammonites made themselves stink to David (2 Sam 10:6; cf. 1 Chron 19:6); Ahitophel advises Absalom to stink to his father (2 Sam 16:21). In these examples of ‫באש‬, Green (2011, 96-97) also identifies an affinity with the concept of shame (‫)בוש‬, that is, the shame of the outcast, which is relevant for the interpretation of Prov 13:5. In support of this association, one could also cite Isa 54:4, where ‫ בוש‬is also paralleled with ‫( חפר‬show shame), the other word used in the second hemistich of our proverb. 69

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 the Hebrew Bible commonly employs the term ba’ash (‫)באש‬, meaning to have a ‘bad smell’ or ‘to stink’. As such, the term becomes a colloquialism; that is, the people do not actually reek or have a malodorous scent, but references to them employ such figurative speech to objectify them, implying that they are in some way odious, bad, decaying, even dead to the rest of the population. ... The substitution of people [vis-à-vis dying or rotting animals] as the direct object or subject of the verb ‘to stink’ (‫ )באש‬conveys that these people engender disgust among the majority, ruling class, or leadership.”

Applied to our proverb, this well-attested Hebrew idiom helps us to notice a reciprocal parallelism in which the two hemistichs augment each other. People seen to have harmed the establishment, make themselves stink to the dominant group, that is, hated,72 and are rejected. In terms of mainline society they are marginalised and therefore put to shame. V. 5a ‫צדיק‬ hates deceitful word/deed [enjoys social standing] [is honoured]

:: → ← ←

V. 5b ‫רשע‬ [loves deceitful word/deed] becomes a social stench is put to shame

So, we notice a parallelism that is not at all defective as some think. Arriving at the beginning of the second hemistich, the chiastic position of ‫ רשע‬directly after the contrasting ‫ צדיק‬makes it clear to the reader that the last half is to be understood in the light shed on it by the first. Information missing in v. 5b is thus provided by v. 5a:73 if the righteous hates deceit, then the wicked must be of an opposite predisposition, he loves deceit. Learning now that such a deceitful person is cast aside by society and comes to shame, the reader/hearer has new information to reread v. 5a in this light: the righteous enjoys the opposite of social disgust and shame, namely has a high standing and is honoured. All of this is well known in sapiential literature.74 But Millar75 points out yet another aspect: the proverb may be offered as a directive (advice for the future) or an evaluation (condemnation for past deceit) in different circumstances.

72 Even “in the eyes of” the dominant group (Ex 5:21) – not in their nostrils, showing that we have a colloquialism. They have thus made themselves an object of disgust, displeasure and hate. 73 In the figure above, as often in the figures given in the commentary on the previous chapters, the square brackets show which elements are the complements brought over from the respective other hemistich in the direction of the arrows. 74 Examples of social rejection for the wicked: 11:26a; 22:10; 24:24; their coming to shame: 3:35b; 11:2; 12:8b; 18:3; by contrast, honour for the righteous: 3:3-4, 35a; 11:26b; 12:8a; 21:21. On social sanctions for non-compliance and honour as the pivotal value, cf. Pilch (2016, 189-193). 75 Millar (2020, 126-127).

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Another consequence of this reading is that we need not follow the imperative of BHS to read ‫( יביש‬third person masculine singular Hiphil imperfect of the verb ‫[ בוש‬be ashamed, thus: make ashamed]) in the second hemistich.76 In light of the force of the parallelism that requires and enables involvement by the reader/hearer, it is preferable that we concur with the assertion by Fox that ‫ יבאיש‬is a pun on the roots ‫( בוש‬be ashamed) and ‫( באש‬stink). Likewise, the ambivalent ‫( דבר‬word, thing) in the first hemistich. The meaning “word” is a thematic link to the motif of speech in vv. 2-3. But the scope of “deceit” becomes even wider if the other meaning, “thing,” is understood. The righteous person does not only desist from saying deceitful words, but also from acting deceitfully – which would then mean that the wicked one can be just as devious in his acts as in his words. Rashi notices that the deceit spoken of in the first half is implicitly present in the second. To him that means that the wicked accepts and uses such a deceitful word to pour disgrace and shame on its victim. Conversely, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra posits the view that the righteous remains the subject in the second half, which he does by explicitly clarifying that the ‫ רשע‬is “the one who longs for a word of deceit” (‫)החפץ דבר שקר‬ and thus must be the object of the embarrassment and shaming meted out to him by the righteous. That is Pseudo-Ibn Ezra’s only comment on the proverb. Gerondi and the Mezudat David also understand it that way, namely with the assumption that the reader will understand that the victims of deceit are also the implied objects of being made socially unacceptable. For Malbim, the two Hiphil verbs refer respectively to what the wicked does behind the victim’s back and to his face. He nevertheless mentions the possibility that the righteous can equally well be understood as the subject of all the verbs in the proverb. Then it means that the righteous both hates deceit and embarrasses or shames the wicked. It also carries the implication that the wicked, as antithesis of the righteous, practises deceit and thus deserves such treatment. Chrysostom does not comment on the first Greek hemistich, but paraphrases the meaning of the second by stating that the kind of shame that the wicked will suffer, is a lack of confidence (οὐχ ἕξει παρρησίαν). However, he does manage to draw a positive conclusion from the proverb, viz. that one should have confidence in the face of injustice – even if the perpetrator is a king.

13:6 Righteousness will guard the blameless of way, but wickedness will subvert the sinner. The rhythmic pattern is evidently 3+3. There are two verbal clauses arranged in exact parallelism: 76 This conjecture, plus other possibilities are however much older and even involve further variants, such as ‫ יבש‬as an equivalent of ‫ בוש‬and the so-called Hiphil II forms with an o-vowel in the preformative; cf. Delitzsch, who compares 2 Sam 19:6.

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fem. sing. subject [‫]צדקה‬77 fem. sing. subject [‫ו]רשעה‬

– –

third person fem. sing. imperfect verb [‫]תצר‬ third person fem. sing. imperfect verb [‫]תסלף‬

– –

sing. object [‫]תם־דרך‬ sing. object [‫]חטאת‬

The verse is missing in some Greek manuscripts, e.g. the Codex Vatianus and the Codex Sinaiticus, but it does appear in the Codex Alexandrinus: δικαιοσύνη φυλάσσει ἀκάκους, τοὺς δὲ ἀσεβεῖς φαύλους ποιεῖ ἁμαρτία. (Righteousness guards the blameless people, but sin makes all the wicked people worthless) The Hebrew ‫ רשעה‬is thus taken as the object of the verb and understood as a metonymy for concrete people (plural), while ‫( חטאת‬sin) is taken as the abstract subject singular (ἁμαρτία). So do the Peshitta (zĀÚÔÐ €zÎÙËÂ{ ¿ÚÔÑà{ [but his sin will destroy the wicked]) and the Vulgate (impietas autem peccatorem78 subplantat [wickedness overthrows the sinner]).

However, the grammar, syntax and style allow several interpretive possibilities. • The abstract nouns ‫( תֹּם‬blamelessness, innocence)79 and ‫( חטאת‬sin) can be metonymies standing for concrete people associated with these concepts, thus blameless and sinful people. • ‫( חטאת‬sin) can be taken as the nomen regens80 of a gapped ‫ דרך‬to match the similar (but explicit) genitive in the first hemistich, thus “the sinful of way” = “the sinful way.” • ‫ חטאת‬can be interpreted as either the subject or the object of the verb ‫סלף‬ (subvert),81 thus either “wickedness will subvert the sinner” or “the sinner will subvert wickedness.82 The interpretation represented by my translation above can be justified by the following arguments: • The two abstract nouns blamelessness (‫ )תֹּם‬and sin (‫ )חטאת‬are metonymies, that is, they stand for people who are blameless and people who are sinful, Cf. 10:2b = 11:4b for ‫ צדקה‬used similarly as subject (Tuinstra). Some manuscripts have vero peccato, which does not affect the meaning. 79 Not ‫( ַתּם‬innocent person) as BHS seems to suggest that the Septuagint (ἀκάκους) read it (cf. also Whybray), because the Greek translator could have understood an abstract noun as metonym for a concrete person. The same argument holds true for the opinion of Oesterley, Ringgren and BHS that the last word ‫( חטאת‬sin) should be read ‫( ַח ָטּא‬sinner), and McKane who considers ‫( חטאים‬sinners); cf. some Vulgate manuscripts that have peccatorem. 80 So Waltke (cf. GKC 128a); this would require the absent genitive (a) to be supplied and then (b) to be declared epexegetical (cf. IBHS 9.5.3c), “way” being clarified by “sin” or “sinfulness.” 81 For ‫ סלף‬Piel (overturn, subvert, undermine), cf. 21:12 and, with God as subject, 22:12. 82 Fox, Schipper. In neither case are Gemser and BHS to be followed by emending ‫רשעה‬ to ‫ ;רשעים‬both appeal to the Greek plural, but nothing is gained; cf. 11:5 for ‫ רשעה‬singular used in the same way. 77 78

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

431

because the sinfulness cannot be understood as an abstract in this clause. If that were so it would have meant that wickedness subverts sin, entailing that the object and subject overlap and make no sense. • If the two abstracts are metonymies, then the translation offered by Waltke (“the blameless way” and “the sinful [way]”) cannot be right. The blameless of way as an epexegetical construction would then have to be an abstractfor-concrete metonymy (construct state) characterising a noun (genitive). However, the way is hardly characterised by metonymical blameless people, although it can technically be characterised by the abstract noun “blamelessness.” The question is what sense a rather tautologous claim would make by stating that blamelessness is guarded by that with which it overlaps. Therefore the genitive “of way” is rather an attributive genitive in which the genitive noun (way) characterises the preceding abstract noun ‫ תֹּם‬as a metonymy for blameless people status constructus (people blameless in terms of their way = conduct). A gapped ‫ דרך‬is not needed in the second hemistich, since the abstract-for-concrete “sin” (‫ )חטאת‬already equals people of sinful conduct.

It is grammatically possible that ‫ רשעה‬and ‫ חטאת‬can both be either subject or object of the last hemistich. However, as Fox points out, the roots ‫ רשע‬and ‫ צדק‬are normal antitheses in Proverbs. Moreover, the parallelism also makes it likely that the first word of the second hemistich is the subject like the first word in the opening verset. Therefore it is at best conceivable that a suggestive ambiguity may be intended, as Schipper suspects. Then sin destroys itself as well as the sinner.83 Therefore the proverb states that righteousness itself will keep guard over the one whose acts are blameless, while wickedness will overthrow the one whose acts are sinful. That expresses the deed-consequence nexus in its expected form, viz. that the deed comes back on its perpetrator, not on itself. The typical pair of righteousness and wickedness (roots ‫ רשע‬and ‫ )צדק‬are personified as agents that respectively guard and overthrow those who practice them. According to Delitzsch, the two opposites represent “a twofold inner relation to God” exerting influence on the conduct of those so disposed (similarly Van Leeuwen, Murphy, Fuhs, Fox and others). The proverb thus shows that not just the act itself brings about its consequence, but the underlying disposition of righteousness or wickedness induces what deeds people do and is therefore also involved in the ensuing consequences. It is noteworthy that the acts of ‫ נצר‬and ‫ סלף‬that are here ascribed to righteousness and wickedness are ascribed to God in 22:12. Although the focus 83 However, Fox objects that “‘[w]ickedness will ruin sin’ makes little sense.” Logically it may be interpreted as a perverse expression of a deed-consequence nexus, namely as the self-destruction of wickedness; cf. the classic exposition by Klaus Koch ([1955]1972). But the formulation would be rather strained – allowing for a kind of pecca fortiter mentality: wickedness destroys not so much the sinner as the sin, which indeed is rather forced.

432

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

is different in the latter proverb, it does remind us that the consequences of deeds are not simply the outcome of an automatic mechanism that operates ex opere operato.84 Whether v. 6 was originally intended as a comment on v. 5, where the righteous and the wicked also feature (suggested by Whybray, cf. Lucas) remains a surmise, but as they now stand they are associated in as far as the consequences of righteousness and wickedness are expressly stated only in v. 6. The end of the proverb is given a pointed significance by Rashi (1040-1105). Recognising the metonymy, he states that the noun ‫( חטאת‬sin) is to be understood “like [the word] ‘sinner’” (‫)כמו חוטא‬. He explains the abstract ‫ חטאת‬as an indication that the intended ‫( חוטא‬he who practises sin) is so thoroughly sinful that he is called “sin” as if he can be identified with evil. With a reference to 19:3, Rashi declares this to be the cause of his downfall (‫)סלוף‬. The Mezudat David (18th century) specifies the ‫ צדקה‬of the first hemistich as charity, identifying the blameless of way as a person who “gives charity” (‫ )הנותן צדקה‬with uprightness and not with ulterior motives. This kindness is what will count in his defence. On the other hand, wickedness itself leads its practitioner “on a crooked path to let him stumble on it” (‫)בדרך מעוקל להכשל בה‬.85 Neither the early nor the later interpretation implies that the consequences of human deeds come about without divine agency. This can be seen clearly in expositions from the intervening centuries, viz. of Gerondi (11801263) and Hame’iri (c. 1249-1316). The former uses the insight that one sin leads to another (cf. Pirqe Aboth 4:2), which is a well-known rational expression of the same idea, viz. being led by sin on a crooked path until one stumbles. Only then does the punishment come. Hame’iri explicitly states that the ensuing punishment is from heaven. Clemens Alexandrinus (c. 150-215)86 uses the first hemistich (together with 11:5) as support for his argument that accepting the faith leads to forgiveness, but that should not lead to frequent repentance, because one should not sin again as before. If his “way” (conduct) is kept right as the proverb says, that means it has to stay blameless from conversion on. John Chrysostom (c. 347-407) leaves the proverb uncommented, which probably is to be explained by the fact that it is missing in some major Greek codices (see above). Much later, Nicholas Gorran of Paris (†1295)87 quotes the first hemistich according to the Vulgate (Iustitia custodit innocentis viam [Justice guards the way of the innocent]) with the Aristotelian Nicomachean Ethics88 in order to argue that justice is the most perfect of all virtues.

84 Cf. the Introduction to this Volume, Par. 6 and the literature cited there; also Koch’s view that Yahweh only cooperates marginally to achieve ‫( צדקה‬THAT II, 523-525). 85 The explanation of the verb ‫ תסלף‬by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra (c. 1190) points in the same direction. Contrasting the straight path of the righteous with its opposite, he says, “The word ‫תסלף‬ is like ‫[ תעות‬it makes crooked], like ‘it perverts the business of the righteous’ (Ex 23:8).” The wicked is thus corrupted further by his own wickedness. The actual punishment can only follow later. 86 Strom II, XIII (ANF II, 361). 87 Smalley ([1949] 1986, 128-129). 88 Eth V, 1, 1129b.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

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13:7 There is one who acts rich, yet has nothing, one who acts poor, yet has great wealth. Toy scans the verse as either 2+2 or 3+3, while Gemser scans 4+3 or 3+3, both of whom suggest uncertainty. This is not surprising, since rhythm is not a matter of mere mechanical calculation. The pattern 2+2 seems the most probable to me, as indicated by the conjunctive accents binding ‫ יש‬and ‫מתעשר‬, ‫ ואין‬and ‫כל‬, as well as ‫ והון‬and ‫רב‬. That would also sit well with the fact that both hemistichs are carried by a single ‫ יש‬at the beginning, so that the surface structure of the proverb is technically one sentence (there are x+, y+). A simple rhythm is equally well suited to the relatively simple linguistic structure of the proverb that increases rather than limits the possible ways in which it can be understood. Both participles in the verse are dependent on the quasi-verb ‫( יש‬existence = there is), which can also be regarded as gapped in the second hemistich (there is x+ [and there is] y+). In each case a clause with ְ‫ ו‬is appended to the participle, in v. 7a the negative quasi-verb ‫ ָאיִ ן‬89 (nonexistence = there is not), and in v. 7b a nominal clause with unexpressed verb “is.”90 ⎧ ‫מתעשר‬ ⎪ └ ‫ואין כל‬ ‫ יש‬there is ⎨ ⎪ ‫מתרושש‬ ⎩ └ ‫והון רב‬

who acts rich but there is nothing who acts poor but [there is] great wealth

The second hemistich is not introduced by a conjunction (usually copulative waw), which also suggests that the two halves are closer to each other than one would suspect at a glance. The contrasting elements in both halves are finely balanced. In v. 7a the phrase “non-existence of all” consists of two words, balanced in v. 7b by the two words “great wealth” (‫)הון רב‬. However, the adjective ‫ רב‬is not only needed to safeguard the symmetry of the number of words, it is also necessary to balance the motif of the total absence of property with the contrasting motif of abundance of wealth.91 The phrase “there is not all” may logically mean that some – but not all – is there, or that absolutely nothing is present. When an inclusive like ‫ כל‬is used with a negative particle, the normal idiom in biblical Hebrew expresses the latter 89 So vocalised in the absolute state; in the construct state as here, with e: ‫אין כֹּל‬, ֵ “a nonexistence of all” = “there is nothing.” 90 In the second hemistich the antithesis of “there is nothing” requires a positive nominal clause, thus with unexpressed verb “is.” 91 In connection with these two word pairs in the emphatic final position of each hemistich, Moss also says that the proverb “provokes thought by the absence of specific circumstances.”

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

meaning. The type of person mentioned in the first half is thus a person who acts as if he were rich but in fact has nothing at all. By contrast, the one who acts as if he were poor actually has a mass (‫ )רב‬of wealth (‫)הון‬, not just modest possessions. The main issue for the interpretation of the proverb is the conjugation used in the two participial verbs, respectively the Hitpael and its equivalent for ayin-waw/yod verbs, the Hitpolel. Because of the various possibilities of this conjugation, Van Leeuwen can call the verse “wonderfully ambiguous” (the same phrase is used by Waltke), while other commentators call the proverb paradoxical. It is indeed all of this, although I would rather call it “multivalent” because there are more than two ways in which it can be read. In addition to being reflexive, the conjugation can be factitive (makes himself rich/poor), it can be estimative (thinks himself rich/poor), or it can be ostentative (presents himself as rich/poor).92 Several commentators opt for the ostentative reading in a negative sense. Already Hame’iri pointed out that the Hitpael can be used like that.93 In the same vein, Meinhold and Schipper accept this as the primary reading, but remain alert to a multi-levelled potential in the proverb. Others opt for the factitive reading (at least in their translations) while reckoning with the ostentative.94 Yoder translates the Hitpael as factitive but seems to prefer understanding that as self-deception, which comes near to an ostentative (or, in Waltke’s terms, estimative) understanding. Yet others do not notice or exploit the potential of the Hitpael,95 although Fuhs does mention the paradoxical character of the two statements in the verse. If such reading options are spun out, a whole variety of alternatives emerges. (a) The proverb can be understood as a statement in the indicative that nevertheless “warns the reader against pretense and pretension” (Fox, citing Hame’iri).96 Although the text does not suggest any motives underlying the feigning of wealth or poverty, one may think of pretending to be wealthy for the sake of social esteem97 and feigning poverty to avoid having to 92 The ostentative can be neutral (show oneself to be x, e.g. Ezk 38:23) or negative (pretend to be x, e.g. 2 Sam 13:5); cf. Waltke, who describes the ostentative, but regards it as an estimative as well. He provides further examples in IBHS 26.2b, c and f. 93 Cf. Fox, Waltke, Plöger, McKane, Alter, and Murphy; probably also Wildeboer who seems to take the stem in the same way as he does in 12:9. 94 Oesterley, who is criticised by Whybray for overinterpreting the text, although Whybray himself concedes an openness of the proverb to different interpretations. 95 Scherer (1999, 127); Fuhs. 96 Already Plöger and Meinhold interpreted along these lines, as opposed to Delitzsch, who finds the judgement of 12:9 implied here. 97 Somewhat in the sense of Achiqar (Syriac MS Cambridge, Co. Add. 2020, No. 75; Conybeare et al. [1913, 109]) when he warns, “My son, do not put a gold ring on your finger if you are not wealthy, so that fools do not mock you” (cf. also Oesterley [1929, xl]).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

435

give alms. But the proverb can only be found pertinent in situations such as these because it does not mention any motivation. If it did, its applicability would have been restricted to only that which is expressed. Despite the lack of a moral discernment between dishonest acquisition of wealth or laudable giving away all to charity,98 the proverb does invite the reader to understand it as a warning against dishonest posturing. But there may also be a more positive way of interpreting posturing. Among the possibilities mentioned by Meinhold is that a wealthy person who can avoid being seen as rich has a better chance to avoid becoming the target of robbery as well. Appearing poor is safer, because one could then preserve one’s property, while swaggering one’s wealth to impress the public would court unwanted attention of those who wish to get their hands on it.99 The proverb may further be understood to highlight the contrast between self-deception and deceiving others (Yoder). Self-deception entails the estimative nuance of the Hitpael (wrongly think yourself rich or poor and thereby deceive yourself). On the other hand, the intentional deceiving of people about one’s affluence entails using the Hitpael in an ostentative way (feign wealth or poverty to achieve other goals). Similarly, the proverb may be interpreted to address self-perception and being perceived by others (Schipper). One may estimate oneself rich without realising what real wealth is, or one may judge oneself to be poor without recognising the capital that one really has available to work with.100 According to Clifford, the proverb relativises the value of wealth and poverty: “Money or its lack does not define a person,” which implies the same principle. Oesterley sees a contrast between a spendthrift and a miser in the proverb. That is obviously possible – one who has wealth and squanders it as if it is unlimited is bound to suddenly find himself poor (cf. Luke 15:1314), while a miser spends nothing and therefore has more than appearances suggest. Oesterley simultaneously offers a second take, viz. that some are satisfied with little (and presumably therefore seem poor but are actually richly satisfied), while others are never satisfied with having wealth (and presumably therefore keep accumulating it without realising the poverty of their unfulfilled dissatisfaction101).

98 So Riyqam, implying that each action leads to its opposite as a consequence. Cf. Matt 19:21; Mark 10:21; Luke 18:22. 99 Schipper points out that this possibility is also expressed in an Egyptian sapiential prohibition from Ramesside times (Ostracon Petrie 11, 2): “Do not boast with wealth that is not yours; or else it may provoke theft or the transgression of laws.” 100 So Van Leeuwen, referring respectively to Rev 3:17-18 and Luke 19:11-27. 101 Cf. Qoh 5:12-13 :: 18.

436

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

All of these possibilities are concrete manifestations of the general principle that appearances can be misleading. Several rabbis stress the multivalent character of the proverb. According to Rashi, one level of meaning is the obvious motif of feigning one’s financial situation to be the opposite of what it really is. But it may also mean that a person may make himself rich despite starting from nothing or suddenly bring himself from wealth to poverty. Third, a person who enriches himself by wickedness will become poor, whereas one who impoverishes himself through kindness to others, will become wealthy. The latter interpretation is also favoured by Riyqam, while a variant – especially as it pertains to the second hemistich – is offered by the Mezudat David, perhaps influenced by Rashi. Hame’iri criticises both sides of the feigning motif, since playing rich will lead to real poverty, and feigning poverty will lead to the neglect of the obligation to perform charity to the really poor. But Ralbag adds a different perspective. Far from being equally bad, it is better to feign poverty than the opposite because being perceived as poor shields one from being a target for mischief, which seems to be suggested by v. 8 as well (cf. [b] above). The Vilna Gaon interprets the motifs of wealth and poverty to be metonyms for knowledge or ignorance of Torah. Charles Dickens found it necessary to unmask the feigning of knowledge to bluff unsuspecting architecture students and the public,102 but the Vilna Gaon shows that it is also found in theological schools – which can be corroborated by close observers to this day. Malbim also relates the proverb to spiritual values, but not just as metonyms. Since wealth is not itself a spiritual value, one may be suddenly left poor (cf. Qoh 5:12f.). But when used for charity, money can gain spiritual wealth in the form of blessing in the World to Come. John Chrysostom seems to be at a loss about how to deal with the proverb. He commends pretending poverty rather than pretending wealth, but gives neither reason nor consequence. He merely states that wealth provides no grounds for arrogance and poverty no grounds for humility. Cassian103 (360-435) quotes the proverb together with 12:9 in support of his argument that teachers of the Christian truth who wish to become rich through their teaching may find that this pursuit leads to their own loss, as though putting their gains in a bag with holes (Hag 1:6). They are the ones who make themselves out to be rich but actually have nothing. This verse is the first one commented on in the 1550 exposition of Prov 13 by Philipp Melanchthon. He does not spiritualise the proverb, but he does theologise it by reading it as an expression of God’s will in economic matters. Differentiating between those who administer their affairs carefully and those who are given to useless show of pomp, the fundamental message according to Melanchthon is that negligence displeases God, since he wants us to use his gifts with reverence (vult nos suis donis reverenter uti).

13:8 The ransom of a man’s life is his wealth, but a poor man hears no threat. The pattern of stresses is 3+3, with the maqqeph causing a rhythmically pleasing arrangement of syllables in both hemistichs. The proverb can be 102 103

Cf. the architectural training facility run by Seth Pecksniff in Martin Chuzzlewit. Conf XXIV, 13 (NPNF II/11, 537).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

437

read in several ways, but the one represented by the translation above seems to do the antithetical parallelism the best justice. The antithesis of the hemistichs is manifest, but how its constituent elements should be understood is controversial. Meinhold divides the options for the overall meaning in two main categories, one illustrating the advantage of wealth and the other showing the advantage of poverty. The precise interpretation depends on the way the nouns ‫ כּ ֶֹפר‬and ‫ גְּ ָע ָרה‬are understood. A ‫ כּ ֶֹפר‬is a ransom in the sense of a payment to buy off a threatening punishment.104 Delitzsch excludes this as a possibility in our present proverb because, in the contrasting parallel of the second hemistich, the poor would be taken as a slave in lieu of payment if he cannot otherwise defray what is required,105 in this case for his life, as the parallelism shows (Delitzsch). ‫כּ ֶֹפר‬ can however also be a ransom paid to gain freedom (Isa 43:3). Fox rejects this possibility with reference to Delitzsch’s illustration of a robbery scene such as described in 1:11-14, claiming that the term is not used for “that kind of ransom.” But the Deutero-Isaiah text shows that it can indeed be used like that, even if the scenario is a threat other than that of highway robbery. This would also resonate with Ps 49:8f., where ‫ כּ ֶֹפר‬is used parallel to ‫פּ ְדיוֹן‬, ִ which Fox does regard as a word suitable for the price of liberation. As for ‫גְּ ָע ָרה‬, Fox (like Toy and Oesterley) states summarily, but without substantiating examples, that this noun does not mean “threat” but “rebuke.” But many instances can be cited where “threat” is the more appropriate meaning.106 Moreover, the cognate verb ‫ גער‬Qal can, in addition to “rebuke,” also mean “threaten” (Ps 68:31, where the wild animals in the reeds can threaten [‫]גער‬, but certainly not rebuke). Therefore this reading of the proverb can be summarised as follows: When necessary, for instance in unstable social situations such as that described in 1:11-14, a rich person can use his wealth to buy off his life somewhat like the victim of a “protection” racket. But a poor man never even hears a threat (‫ )גערה‬from those who can only gain from extortion if the victim has the means to pay. Then the antithetical parallelism can be sketched accordingly:

104

Cf. Ex 21:30; 30:12; Num 35:31f.; also Prov 6:35, where it is used negatively. Cf. Ex 25:39, 47; 2 Kgs 4:1; Neh 5:4f. 106 So several older commentators, for instance, Delitzsch, Nowack, Strack, and others. E.g. 2 Sam 22:16 / Ps 18:6; Isa 30:17; 50:2; 51:20; 66:15; Pss 76:7; 104:7; Job 26:11. Cf. KBL, KAHAL. Especially McKane and Murphy favour this option; also Alter seems to prefer it, but mentions the other as another possibility (similarly Whybray and Tuinstra). There is no reason to agree with Steuernagel, followed by Gemser, BHS (not BHQ) and others, to emend the text to ‫( לא מצא גאלה‬finds no redemption) or with Gemser, followed by Fox and others, to speculate that the phrase was mistakenly taken over from v. 1b. 105

438

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

V. 8a rich (‫ )עשר‬man

::

V. 8b

can afford a ransom (‫)כפר‬ implication: pays it because his life (‫ )נפש‬is at stake [is threatened for a pay-off]

→ → → ←

poor man (‫)רש‬ [cannot afford a ransom] [does not have to pay] [his life is not at stake] hears no threat (‫)גערה‬

The straightforward opposites of a rich man and a poor man provide the basis for understanding what is said and suggested in the proverb as a whole. Read in the light of the explicit and implied elements in the a-hemistich, the reader understands their opposites to hold good for the b-hemistich. And, reread in the light of the b-hemistich, it can be inferred that the wealthy do risk hearing such threats. The advantage of wealth is that one can use it to stave off death threats, and the advantage of poverty is that one does not have to worry about becoming the target of extortion. That makes the proverb memorable and poignant – even poverty has its advantages (cf. the contrast of 10:15). Of course, this does not mean that poor people have no problems, but only that this is one illustration that wealth does not guarantee peace of mind.107 Nevertheless, the end effect of both hemistichs is positive. Both the rich and the poor can escape calamity. The antithesis lies in the contrasting reasons of paying and not paying. Apart from this interpretation there are several other ways in which the proverb can be read, not all equally convincing. (a) Already in the 18th century Döderlein proposed to interpret the second hemistich as a question. It would then have to be a rhetorical question, meaning that the poor man only hears rebukes. The question what the rebukes would be for, as well as what they would be thought to achieve, remains unanswered. Hearing rebukes is, further, a poor antithesis to paying a ransom (which also has to be forcefully demanded before it will be forthcoming). (b) According to Fox, the second hemistich means that a poor man “does not heed a rebuke.” As far as ‫ גערה‬in the sense of rebuke is concerned, this has already been answered above. Fox also claims that ‫ שמע‬must mean “intentionally listen to” because he does not find it in the meaning “hear unintentionally” elsewhere in Proverbs. However, it does occur in this meaning in wisdom literature108 and it does make sense here, whereas 107 Similarly, Wildeboer, McKane and Murphy. Cf. Qoh 5:11f., where the same principle is illustrated in terms of abundance or lack of food and the respective consequences in the lives of rich and poor people. 108 Cf. Qoh 7:21; Job 15:8; 26:14; 42:5; in fact it does occur in Proverbs with this sense, cf. Prov 20:12 (even if in the participle Qal).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

439

“pay heed to” does not. Opting for the latter meaning also construes a weak antithesis to the statement of the first hemistich and thus forces the conclusion that the second hemistich is “both irrelevant and untrue” and leads to a further conjecture that ‫ לא שמע גערה‬has been mistakenly copied from 13:1b.109 (c) Taking ‫ גערה‬as a threatening rebuke, Waltke also thinks that the poor man does not pay heed to a rebuke,110 however because his lack of resources to save himself means that he has no motivation for listening. Fox calls this “too convoluted to be persuasive.” Even if that may be a somewhat harsh verdict, this reading does make it difficult to see what didactic value such a proverb would have. (d) Schipper opts for the interpretation that the poor man has not listened to rebuke, for which reason the pauper is now in trouble.111 That would not only imply that being obedient to sapiential rebuke leads to wealth, but it would also make this idea the pivotal point of the proverb. This is possible in terms of the deed-consequence connection, but in this proverb the rich man would first have to be thought of as wise and the poor man as a fool. In turn it would beg the question why the rich man needs to buy himself out of trouble, while nothing is said about the (presumably worse) lot of the poor man. Of course, that is logically conceivable, but it requires a quite circuitous chain of thought to arrive at a rather bland statement. (e) Plöger reads the proverb much like my proposal, but – in my view unnecessarily – takes it as ironic black humour,112 which stands the “bright side” of poverty on its head: poverty cannot protect, money can. Do we need irony to make such a self-evident idea proverbial material? Yoder also finds irony in the proverb, but situates it in the first hemistich: “wealth exposes a person to legal and illegal attempts by others to take 109 This guess is also put forward by Toy and Oesterley (cf. Clifford), as well as the claim, likewise unsubstantiated, that ‫ גערה‬nowhere else means “threat.” The conjecture itself is accepted by Heim (2013, 331), however not as a scribal mistake but as an “incomplete” parallelism. He argues that each hemistich implies its own opposite and that the “opposite” of v. 8b is to be retrieved from v. 1a. Heim makes vv. 1b and 8b one of his variant sets and discusses its ramifications in six pages (2013, 329-334). However, it requires first finding a clue at distance and then reconstructing an assumed absent half-verse from what could be the opposite of a half-verse, using material imported from eight verses away. Ingenious as it is, this does not so much prove the proverb “set” as assume it. 110 Similarly Sæbø, who wishes to stress the connection with the “word clan” (“Wortsippe”) relating to the didactic function of discipline. This is thinkable from the perspective of the didactic tendency of v. 1 and the similar vocabulary in v. 1b, but is not necessary when v. 8 is interpreted in its own right. 111 Cf. also Scherer (1999, 120), to whom Schipper refers; also the similar translation by Meinhold. 112 So also Fuhs, and considered a possibility by Whybray.

440

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 it away.” She suggests a connection to the previous verse, which may well be due to the redactional placing of the two proverbs alongside each other (see above on v. 7).

Although I prefer the exegesis presented above, the overview of other possibilities makes it fair to say that the proverb is open to several interpretations, from “money can save, poverty can’t” to “if money can save, poverty does not even have to.” Once again we find that short proverbs can be vehicles for several uses in diverse contexts both literary and extra-literary.113 Rabbinic exegesis has shown resourcefulness in handling the proverb. Rashi takes ‫ נפש‬as the human soul and interprets wealth as an instrument to redeem one’s soul, namely by using it for charity. The second hemistich then becomes a rider – the means of redemption works only if the poor is not insulted in the process. Likewise, the Mezudat David sees charity as a ransom for one’s soul. As an alternative, Rashi also follows the midrashic tradition that the wealth mentioned together with a poor man can refer to the half-shekel given annually by rich and poor alike to finance the sacrificial service, which equalises the wealthy and the poor. Since it is for sacrifice, this money redeems the soul of both rich and poor. His third alternative is that the wealth or poverty concerns knowledge of Torah or lack of it. Knowing Torah saves, but not knowing it entails doing what is wrong. Radaq’s exposition follows the same logic as my proposal above.114 The Vilna Gaon interprets that the money is a gift of God to save one’s life, while poverty is a safeguard against even being threatened. Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) develops an argument for frugality as important for the journey to heaven, interpreting the proverb’s concept of ransom as the “true wealth of the soul.”115 In the same strain Origen116 also explains riches as that which is truly good and poverty as its opposite, which is to be rebuked.117 Chrysostom follows a more literal line. First, he limits the benign effect of money to that which has been earned by righteous labour. Then he also explains the second hemistich to mean that the poor are no threat to others and are therefore not threatened by others. In a sermon on Acts 11:19 he quotes v. 8a together with Gal 2:10 and Matt 19:21 to illustrate that the power of giving alms is greater than any sin, because it can redeem the soul.118 Neither Melanchthon nor Calvin interpret the proverb – perhaps not quite surprising for Reformation theologians, considering the idea that one can redeem one’s soul with money.

113

On possible redactional connections with v. 9, see below on that verse. It is not unclear why Radaq can say that the poor will be at ease (so Fox), since the context obviously means that they will at least be unmolested for ransom they do not have. 115 Paed III,7 (ANF II, 281); cf. also Strom III (ANF II, 392): Pretium redemptionis anima, propriæ judicantur divitiæ (True riches are judged to be the price of redeeming the soul), which seems to allude to the proverb. 116 Contra Celsum VII, 21 (ANF IV, 619). 117 So also Peter of Alexandria († c. 311), Epist Canon XII (ANF VI, 277); similarly Jerome, Epist XXII ad Eust (NPNF II/ 6, 581) and in other letters; also Ambrose, Epist LXIII (NPNF II/10, 470), defending the virtuous use of material wealth; finally John Cassian, Conf III,9 (NPNF II/11, 324). 118 Sermon XXV, In Act XI:19 (NPNF I/11, 166). 114

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13:9 The light of the righteous shines brightly, but the lamp of the wicked is extinguished. The rhythmic pattern is 3+3, six stresses in six words (so Toy and Gemser). The verb of the first hemistich (‫ )שׂמח‬is well-known in the meaning “be glad,” “rejoice.” But it is also attested in both Ugaritic (šmḫ) and in Akkadian (šamāḫu) respectively meaning “shine” and “flourish.”119 Therefore there is no reason to follow BHS in emending the text to ‫( יזרח‬he beams). There may also be personification involved (so Murphy, also Heim120), in which the light of life would be presented as joyful, that is, it would represent a happy life (cf. the contrast with the unhappy snuffing out of the lamp in the second hemistich).121 Schipper points out that the metaphor of light/lamp is relatively limited in the Book of Proverbs (by the same token, one might add, so is the concomitant opposite). But it does occur in this book as well as in other sapiential books. Thus, in 24:20, where the second hemistich is identical to 13:9b, the snuffed-out lamp is parallel to not having a future (‫)לא תהיה אחרית‬, i.e., coming to an end. That also seems to be suggested by 20:20, where the lamp of those who curse their parents is extinguished,122 while in Job 21:17 the extinguished lamp equals the demise to which the wicked succumbs. Two texts in the Book of Qohelet testify to light and darkness themselves representing life and death. In Qoh 6:4 the lifelessness of a stillborn and its memory are covered in darkness, and in Qoh 11:7-8 seeing light equals life while darkness represents the decline of the elderly on the way to death. Darkness can express negative experiences of entrapment and fear prior to death, while the opposite is expressed by light and a lamp,123 as happens in Job 18:5ff. The metaphors also occur in Prov 4:18-19, viz. light for positive progress and darkness for stumbling on the road of life.124 119 Greenfield (1959, 144f., 147); Driver (1951, 180); both indebted to Ginsberg (1945a, 3-10 and 1945b, 15-23). These examples may involve “archaic” texts, as Fox remarks, but the root in this meaning is nevertheless attested, both in Northwestern Semitic and in Akkadian, which clearly fits the image. The Peshitta understood the Hebrew text along these lines. Reading |{üæ, it uses another verb (|{), which however can also mean “shine,” “flourish” and “rejoice;” the Targum uses the same Aramaic verb in the same conjugation as the Syriac, viz. ‫נרוז‬, and is possibly dependent on the Peshitta; cf. the Vulgate’s translation laetificat, which glosses the Hebrew ‫ ישמח‬in the Piel (gladdens). 120 Heim (2013, 348). 121 Light (‫ )אור‬and joy (‫ )שמח‬are also associated in Qoh 11:7-8. Although ‫ אור‬is not the subject of the verb expressing the joy, the sense is clear (cf. the fact that the light is also called “sweet” [‫)]מתוק‬. 122 Cf. the association of a long life and honouring the parents in Ex 20:12. 123 This is emphasised by Waltke, according to whom it symbolises “success and wellbeing” and therefore “the quality of ... life.” Cf. the remark above that an element of personification in the proverb would suggest a happy quality of life rather than only life itself. 124 Cf. 6:23, where the commandment is a lamp and sapiential teaching is a light on the way towards obtaining life.

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The proverb is a straightforward parallelism, not only in terms of its antithetical content, but also syntactically: V.9a Subject: Verb: + (‫)ו‬ V.9b Subject: Verb:

singular noun in the construct state with plural genitive (‫)אור־צדיקים‬ Qal imperfect third person masculine singular (‫)ישמח‬ singular noun in the construct state with plural genitive (‫)נר רשעים‬ Qal imperfect third person masculine singular (‫)ידעך‬

Nevertheless, its positive verdict on the righteous and negative verdict on the wicked can be understood in one of two ways or in both together. First, it can be applied to what these human types experience in their life, viz. prosperity and adversity respectively. Or it can be understood to say that the righteous will be endowed with life whereas the wicked will come to an end. Finally, it can mean both – for the righteous a long life filled with prosperity, and for the wicked death preceded by adversity. The nexus of deed and consequence is declared in all cases: prosperity or adversity along the way of life; the reward of life itself as opposed to the punishment of death; an extended life filled with prosperity as opposed to adversity leading to death. A further dimension is added if the proverb is considered in relation to the literary context into which it has been redacted. Even though we cannot speak of a proverb cluster, it is possible to see the use of the roots ‫ צדק‬and ‫ רשע‬in vv. 5-6 as an anticipation of the same two roots in v. 13.125 That means that vv. 7-8 are framed by vv. 5-6 on the one side and v. 9 on the other. We may agree with Hermisson’s idea126 that v. 9 could have been added as a sort of “corrective” to the somewhat “materialistic” sound of vv. 7-8, as Scherer calls it, by introducing an ethical criterion for measuring human fate in life. But both in the light of my interpretation of v. 8127 and because the terminology ‫ צדק‬and ‫ רשע‬with some sound play of ‫ ר‬and ‫ ש‬seems somewhat slender substantiation, I doubt whether Scherer’s view can be justified that vv. 5-9 form “an artistically composed unit.” At this point the Septuagint adds a further stich: ψυχαὶ δόλιαι πλανῶνται ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, δίκαιοι δὲ οἰκτίρουσιν καὶ ἐλεῶσιν. (Deceptive souls ramble about in sins, but the righteous are compassionate and merciful)

125 126 127

So Scherer (1999, 127-128), Fuhs and Schipper. Hermisson (1968, 177). See above on v. 8, option (d).

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The motif of aimlessly rambling around seems to illustrate or comment on v. 9b (Hebrew and Greek) in terms similar to Prov 4:19. As the Greek text stands, the idea that the righteous show compassion, may offset a callous understanding of v. 8b, which in the Greek version states, πτωχὸς δὲ οὐχ ὑφίσταται ἀπειλήν (a poor man cannot withstand a threat).128 Rashi exploits the late meaning “jump” for ‫ דעך‬to explain the flickering jump of a lamp’s flame just before going out. Ramaq and Pseudo-Ibn Ezra relate the light of the righteous to the sun, which shines permanently, while the lamp of the wicked is only temporary. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra undergirds this with a reference to Ps 19:6, where the sun is pictured as a warrior who rejoices to run his course in the service of God. In this way he offers biblical support for the combination of joy and shining in the verb ‫שמח‬. For the second hemistich he alludes to Prov 20:27 (The spirit [‫ ]נשמה‬of a man is the lamp of the Lord) to provide a biblical footing for the contrast of permanent light and temporary lamp. Gerondi (1180-1263) has comparable ideas, but emphasises the constant joy of fulfilling God’s commandment, even under duress. Conversely, the lamp of the wicked only shines when it has oil, that is, as long as the body functions physically. But after that, the permanent joy of the righteous is lacking in the wicked. In the 18th century the Mezudat David continues the basic notion of light (and lamp) as metaphors for the soul, founding it on the claim that the soul derives from the divine light. Both shine, but the soul of the wicked is extinguished while the soul of the righteous will rejoice for ever. In the same century, the Vilna Gaon explained the light of the righteous as a metaphor for the reward of Torah study. It is ever increasing and thus outshines the occasional sins committed even by the righteous. On the other hand, the wicked do not study Torah, so that even their good deeds are like the flickering flame of a dying lamp. In the Christian tradition, Clement of Alexandria129 (c. 150-215) finds support in the second hemistich for his suggestion that the succession of generations is intended to promote immortalisation by progress. He strings together v. 13b, Job 18:5, Gen 24:16 and Mark 5:34 to produce a kind of Gnostic purity concept. Since the wicked have their lamp put out, they are eliminated from the line of progress. Only those born from “our mother, the water” (baptism) are denuded of sin and return to the womb (Job 18:5) to attain immortality. Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389)130 held an oration on baptism at Constantinople on the day after the Feast of Lights (January 381). Understandably, it is replete with biblical references to light (and fire). The Greek version of v. 13a (Light for the righteous is everlasting [φῶς δικαίοις διὰ παντός]) is given no less than the second place in the long list). No real exposition is given and the ambivalence of the Hebrew verb ‫ שמח‬is not considered, but it is noteworthy that the single hemistich from the proverb follows on Ps 97:11, where light is in parallelism with joy, and both hemistichs of the psalm are explicitly cited by Gregory. Another Cappadocian Father, Basil the Great (c. 330-379),131 argues that darkness could not have preceded light, for the heavenly hosts prior to creation could not have existed in darkness. The first hemistich provides a biblical footing, since it speaks of light that “is always a light to the righteous.” This caused Paul to speak of us as taking part “in the light” of the heritage of the saints (Col 1:12), while it contrasts 128 129 130 131

The same two verbs are used in the Greek version of Ex 33:19 (cf. Rom 9:15). Strom IV, 25 (ANF II, 439). Bapt Oratio XL, 36 (NPNF II/7, 373). Hexaemeron, Hom II, 5 (NPNF II/8, 62).

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with those condemned to “outer darkness” (cf. Matt 8:12; 22:13). John Chrysostom also emphasises the Septuagint’s reference to the permanence (διὰ παντός) of the light for the righteous, but does so for his own purpose. We are taught to always maintain joy, even under duress. Eight centuries later, Gerondi would apply the same thought to the joy of fulfilling God’s commandments (see above). Melanchthon skips the verse and Calvin does not cite it in his Institutes.

13:10 The inane causes strife by insolence, but with those who accept counsel there is wisdom. The rhythm is 4+3 (so also Gemser).132 The first word (‫ ַ)רק‬is text-critically uncertain. Some retain the Masoretic Text (e.g. the Targum [‫]לחוד‬, Delitzsch, Wildeboer, Meinhold, Tuinstra, Waltke133). Others omit ‫ק־בּ‬ ְ ‫( ַר‬e.g. Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the Vulgate, Toy, Oesterley, Clifford), emend to ‫[( ַר ע‬bad] cf. BHS) or re-point to ‫( ֵרק‬the Septuagint,134 Peshitta,135 Gemser, McKane, Plöger,136 Whybray, Hausmann,137 Fox; cf. Yoder). In the latter case, the meaning “empty” or “empty-headed” results (cf. Judg 9:4; 11:3; 2 Chron 13:7). This seems the best option, because the restrictive ‫ רק‬logically cannot be correct, since there are many other causes of strife than arrogance (Plöger, Fox).138 Moreover, the logical problem cannot be eliminated by merely declaring that the restriction does not apply to ‫ זדון‬but to ‫( מצה‬Delitzsch, Meinhold), which not only gives an unnatural word order, but is also arbitrary. Finally, the second hemistich begins with the preposition ‫ את‬and not with the nota accusativi; the first half, however, begins with a noun, which suits the rhythmic pattern of the Siebener discerned by Gemser. No consonantal change is necessary. The sense of the proverb is that the empty-head who acts with arrogance causes strife in the community, whereas those who accept advice are wise. The former speaks without listening to others and the latter deliberates 132 Toy scans 3+2, which accommodates the maqqephs; but see presently on the textual criticism. 133 Also Murphy, who twice misspells ‫ רך‬for ‫רק‬. 134 So BHQ: κακός is obtained via ‫ ֵרק‬rather than via ‫( ַר ע‬bad); BHS considers both, but finds ‫ ֵרק‬to “possibly” be the better option, comparing 2 Sam 6:20 and Matt 5:22. 135 The Peshitta has ¿þÚ ¿þæü (a bad man), which more or less tallies with Greek κακός. 136 Whybray, Tuinstra and Schipper mention Plöger as a retainer of the text, but that can only refer to his annotation section, where he mentions the retention of ‫ ַרק‬as a possibility without opting for it; in his commentary proper, Plöger explicitly rejects this possibility (“kaum richtig”). 137 Hausmann (1995, 281). 138 Millar (2020, 50-51) offers a way out by suggesting that the restrictive ‫ רק‬qualifies the whole clause (“only this: by insolence comes strife”). But “only” implies that the restriction is thought of in terms of something else, which is however not apparent.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

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carefully before speaking, which is a central sapiential virtue139 (cf. 3:7; 11:14; 12:15; 15:22; 19:20; 20:18; 22:20f.; 24:6). In this proverb the parallelism is antithetical, but the two halves again complement each other: V. 10a the inane, empty-headed are insolent [do not accept advice] cause strife [have no wisdom]

→ ← → ←

V. 10b [not empty-headed] seekers of advice [do not cause strife] have wisdom

Rereading the first hemistich in the light of the last provides the information that the inane are not only arrogant, but in their insolence also do not accept counsel from others and are unwise. Considering the last hemistich in the light of its predecessor fills the information gaps (again in square brackets) in v. 10b so that we know that those who value counsel are, by contrast, not empty-headed, while their wisdom is the opposite of a source of strife. Waltke sums up: “Hubris, the foolish-impertinent comportment of all kinds of fools,140 evokes strife as it opposes the proper ordering of society under God according to the norms of morality”, whereas their counterparts have “the modesty to acknowledge the limitations of their knowledge and the humility to allow themselves to be corrected, criticized, and led to a better plan of action” and therefore their “knowledge of reality and of the right order”141 leads to peace. Rashi takes ‫ ַרק‬in the restrictive sense, but ‫ זדון‬in a broad sense as “wickedness,” which produces the rather banal statement that one causes strife “only” by wickedness (similarly Ramaq). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra says that the word ‫ זדון‬means ‫( רשע‬evil) and, referring to ‫מצה‬, compares Isa 41:12 to show that wicked men of strife will vanish. Ralbag however prefers a social explanation: who associates with malicious people obtains from them the capability to cause strife, whereas those who associate with good counsellors, obtain wisdom from them. Somewhat in the same sense the Vilna Gaon later interpreted the Niphal participle in the second hemistich to refer to continuous consultation with others, which suggests a habitual lifestyle.142 The Mezudat David focuses on deeds: those whose deeds (‫ )מעשים‬are malicious cause strife, but those who act modestly after receiving counsel are wise because they stir up no quarrel. Chrysostom has a very short, almost cryptic, exposition. He uses the Septuagint, which renders: 139 According to Stähli (THAT I, 752), ‫ יעץ‬can even be said to have originated in the sapiential tradition. 140 Cf. Vol. I on 1:2, 7; 3:7; 8:13; also below, 15:33; 16:5, 18; 18:12; 26:12; 29:23; cf. Hausmann (1995, 291-292, 298). 141 On this concept, see Vol. I, 19-28 (§8.2). 142 Cf. the note in Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 234), to the effect that God himself sets the example with the consultative plural in Gen 1:26, indicating that, if God can consult the angels, consultation of the lesser by the higher should also take place among humans.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 κακὸς μεθ᾽ ὕβρεως πράσσει κακά, οἱ δὲ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιγνώμονες σοφοί. (A wicked man does wicked things with hubris, but those who know themselves are wise)

He seems to attend to the Greek version of the second hemistich only, interpreting it as avoiding being suspected of evil acts and thus of being reproached by others. The Niphal participle of the second Hebrew hemistich is understood as reflexive by the translator and enables Chrysostom to regard the introspective wise as those who do not practise evil. Philipp Melanchthon finds the proverb a reminder that hubris is a natural trait of some people who desire to surpass others by any means and thus cause discord. The more people of this kind exist, the more strife comes. In characteristic fashion, Melanchthon gives examples from Roman history, notably the associates Marius and Sulla and the allies Pompey and Julius Caesar, whose rivalry eventually turned the partners against each other. While discord causes great calamities, God wants harmony. Therefore conflict should not be raised rashly, as the second Hebrew hemistich implies.

13:11 Wealth [acquired] from nothing decreases, but who gathers by hand increases [it]. The verse has a readily identifiable rhythm of 3+3. Each hemistich consists of a normal verbal sentence. In this proverb there are also obvious gaps that can be filled by means of the parallelism: V. 11a wealth [acquired] from nothing decreases

→ ← ↔ ↔

V. 11b [it = wealth] who gathers by hand increases

The object of the last hemistich is elided and suggested by the mentioning of wealth in the first hemistich.143 The gathering mentioned in v. 11b represents the method of acquisition and reveals that its counterpart implied in v. 11a must be the idea of acquiring.144 The other two elements in the parallelism (indicated by double arrows) are direct and explicit.

143 Therefore this is preferable to interpreting ‫ ירבה‬as an internal Hiphil (he causes himself to expand), which would weaken the parallelism considerably. Waltke also mentions this possibility but rightly opts against it. See below on the aspects involved on the text-critical level. 144 One of the two possibilities for the use of ‫ מן‬mentioned by Millar (2020, 53), viz. the comparative (“less than”) is therefore unlikely; it is difficult to see how wealth can devalue to less than nothing.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

447

However, depending on the text-critical judgement called for by the first hemistich, the verse can also be read in quite another way. The Septuagint translates: ὕπαρξις ἐπισπουδαζομένη μετὰ ἀνομίας ἐλάσσων γίνεται, ὁ δὲ συνάγων ἑαυτῷ μετ᾽ εὐσεβείας πληθυνθήσεται· δίκαιος οἰκτίρει καὶ κιχρᾷ. (Possessions hurriedly acquired with lawlessness decrease, but who gathers for himself with piety will be increased; the righteous one is compassionate and gives loans)

The translator seems to have read the second Hebrew word as the Pual participle ‫( ְמב ָֹהל‬made in haste).145 The addition of μετὰ ἀνομίας (with lawlessness) shows that he intends the idea of rushed activity to convey illegality (so Plöger). He thus (a) reads a word with metathesis of consonants and (b) presents an additional interpretation. The latter explains why he added a third verset to balance the wrongdoing with a righteous counterpart. According to the reading of the Septuagint, the proverb would be about the folly of trying to get rich quickly as opposed to patient labour (cf. 10:22; 20:21; 28:20, 22). The parallelism would then be: V. 11a wealth [acquired] with haste and illegality decreases

→ ← ↔ ↔

V. 11b [it = wealth] who gathers with piety is increased + V. 11c is righteous ⎫ is compassionate ⎬ ⎭ lends

But there is no reason to emend the Hebrew text. Not only because its handling by the Greek translator can be explained satisfactorily, but, more importantly, because the Masoretic Text makes perfect sense. Although grammatically possible, the wealth does not become less than a ‫( הבל‬puff of wind),146 145 This is mentioned by Driver (1932, 144) and followed by Fox. However, Driver’s reference, not to the consonantal Masoretic Text, but to a Qere ‫ מבהלת‬in 20:21 offers meagre support. He himself rejects it and instead prefers a Pual participle ‫ מהבל‬without metathesis, claimed to mean “got by scheming,” appealing to ‫ תהבלו‬in Ps 62:11, which itself is an uncertain text. Note: In this regard BHQ (43*) erroneously cites Driver’s article “Problems in the Hebrew Text of Proverbs” (1951), which does not even mention the verse on the page cited by BHQ (180); the correct reference is to his earlier article “Problems in Proverbs” (1932), as given above. The presence of the haste motif is often accepted, e.g. Wildeboer, Toy, Volz, Gemser, Ringgren, Scott, Whybray, Murphy, Clifford and Weigl (2010, 162-163). 146 So Umbreit, Alter, and Fox.

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since ‫ הון מהבל‬is one idea, as suggested by the punctuation in several manuscripts147 (“wealth proceeding from ‫)”הבל‬. The issue is not the speed with which wealth is acquired, but the manner in which it has been come by, which is called “windy” and “unsubstantial” by Delitzsch and “nothingness” by Schipper,148 so that it has no substance. The proverb thus articulates a universal insight: Wealth built up gradually through consistent effort (McKane) can be developed and grow. But wealth that just falls out of the blue diminishes. The former has a dynamic initiative behind it, the latter nothing (‫)הבל‬. Schipper refers to a similar idea in the Instruction of Amenemope:149 When wealth comes to you by theft, It will not stay with you through the night. When day comes, it is no longer in your house, Their place is seen, but they are not there. Although crime rather than “nothingness” is here seen as the source of fleeting wealth,150 the logic is the same. Some rabbis interpret the negative source of the wealth to be injustice as opposed to labour (Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, ‫)שקר‬, or robbery and theft (Ramaq, ‫ גנבה‬and ‫)גזלה‬, similarly the theft and violence mentioned by the Mezudat David (‫ גזל‬and ‫)חמס‬. But Rashi creates a symbolic interpretation by reading ‫ הבל‬as ‫( חבל‬bundle).151 This takes up the motif of bundles as used in the Talmud.152 Whose wealth in Torah study is acquired in big bundles, that is, much at a time, finds his learning diminishing. The quantity makes careful attention to quality impossible, with the result that the benefits fade away. Thence it has to be inferred that whoever studies little by little, that is, thoroughly, keeps the wealth of the study longer. Chrysostom only pays attention to the Greek rendering of what corresponds to the Hebrew first hemistich. The ideas of hastily as well as illicitly acquired goods are mentioned, but Chrysostom develops this in another direction. If the basis is insecure, anything depending on it will also be, as the examples of feet and a body, a foundation and a building, a root and its plant, and a spring and the water above it show. But this presents the problem that the nexus between basis and consequence cannot always be seen. Nevertheless, the disappearance of illicit wealth will take place at a later stage, if not in the perpetrator’s lifetime, then it will happen to those who succeed him. Clement of Alexandria uses the proverb twice. In both cases he summarily quotes the first hemistich (without the idea of haste). In the first instance153 147 With a maqqeph or conjunctives, e.g. the Bomberg Edition (Venice 1521) and others; listed by Delitzsch and accepted by him. 148 So also Sæbø, Heim (2001, 164). 149 Amenemope IX, 16-18 (AEL II, 152; ANET, 422); cf. Römheld (1989, 157-158). 150 The ‫ הבל‬in Prov 13:11 is sometimes also interpreted this way; see above on the interpretation of the Septuagint and below on some rabbinic interpretations. The Peshitta interprets the wealth of v. 11a to be ¿ćàÎï èã (from crime); the Targum likewise (‫ )מן עולא‬cf. œ Hebrew ‫( עולה‬iniquity). 151 Explained in this way also by Nahmias. 152 Avodah Zarah 19a; Eruvin 54b. 153 Instr III, 12 (ANF II, 293).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

449

the quotation is introduced by the statement that this biblical text is specifically directed at householders. In the second case,154 Clement uses it to argue from the negative to the positive: since it is said that wealth diminishes if acquired by iniquity, we can infer that wealth honestly obtained is not condemned. Melanchthon also theologises the proverb. He finds it a straightforward economic proverb (præceptum œconomicum) and cites Cicero in support of its simple exposition. The theological slant is that frugal labour (parsimonia) does not primarily serve one’s own benefit, but is a virtue because God wills that we respect its fruit as his gifts.

13:12 Deferred hope makes the heart sick, but a desire being fulfilled is a tree of life. The proverb consists of a nominal clause in each hemistich and is arranged in a rhythmic pattern of 3+4. Gemser regards the first half to contain four beats as well, but that would pile up emphases. The Masoretes therefore inserted a maqqeph to show that ‫ מחלה‬and ‫ לב‬have been forged into one stress unit. The two nominal clauses make up a conceptual as well as a syntactic chiasmus with the subjects spanning the predicates in the middle: ‫מחלה־לב‬ (is what sickens the heart) predicate

‫תוחלת ממשכה‬ (deferred hope) subject

‫תאוה באה‬ (a desire coming true) subject155

‫עץ חיים‬ (is a tree of life) predicate

In the Hebrew text, the topic addresses aspects of the psyche (called the “inner human being” by Schipper and “the psychological mechanisms” by Fuhs) under specific conditions.156 The subjects of the clauses mention diametrically opposed stimuli to the human mind and the predicates express the corresponding psychological effects brought about by each stimulus. The proverb may be considered a “mere” observation about experiences most people know (Ringgren, Meinhold), and is often treated as 154

Strom III, 6 (ANF II, 391). So also Rashi, who remarks that the hemistich is “inverted” (‫מסורס‬, Pual participle masculine singular of ‫)סרס‬, by which he indicates that the expected positions of the subject and the predicate have been inverted. That is precisely what brings about the chiastic structure of the proverb. That in turn goes well with the diametrical opposites created by the psychological effects and their respective impulses. 156 The Septuagint offers a totally different version with a divergent thematic focus. Since it provides no grounds for text-critical intervention, it is better discussed on its own (see below). 155

450

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

obviously devoid of moral content (cf. Toy, Whybray, Murphy, Clifford). While it undoubtedly is a straightforward statement, it has more to it than meets the eye. Stewart has shown how central the concept of desire is in the Book of Proverbs. In light of its “ubiquity” she finds it a basic motivational “model” and devotes a whole chapter of her monograph to it (although she neither discusses 13:12 nor v. 19, and both are missing in her index). The quotation from Jonathan Dollimore with which she opens her chapter is particularly relevant for this proverb.157 He finds that “the very nature of desire is what prevents its fulfilment,” which gives the topic a twist not developed by the proverb. It would mean that, on the one hand, the very nature of ‫תוחלת‬/‫ תאוה‬causes a sick heart and, on the other hand, once it is fulfilled, it disappears.

The Pual of the verb ‫( משך‬Qal: draw out, drag) occurs only here and in Isa 18:2, 7.158 Together with the noun ‫ תוחלת‬it must mean that hope is “drawn out” in an unfavourable sense, in other words, that it extends unfulfilled over a long period. The predicate also contains a participle, the feminine singular participle Hiphil of ‫( חלה‬Qal: be sick, Hiphil: make sick). In the nominal clause this expresses what the deferred hope is – a sickmaker, that is, it makes the heart sick.159 This is indeed the psychological effect, but the heart does not stand for the emotions alone. In light of the symbolism of the tree of life in the parallelism (see below), it rather stands for the whole personality160 and includes psychosomatic effects (cf. 18:14, where the bodily dimension is quite apparent by virtue of the parallelism, as well as 17:22).161 Endlessly frustrated hope can lead to depression and all the ailments that go with it. The image of the tree of life in the second hemistich occurs several times more in the Book of Proverbs and is used in a variety of meanings. In 3:18 it is a metaphor for wisdom as a source of life; in 11:30 the fruit of righteousness not only nourishes, but itself also becomes a tree that can bear further fruit to sustain life (so already Evagrius Ponticus, see above on 11:30); in 15:4 gentle speaking has a life-supporting effect.162 The image only occurs in the Book of Proverbs and in Genesis (cf. Gen 2:9; 3:22, 24), which indeed 157

Stewart (2016, 130-169); Dollimore (1998, xvii). No other forms of the Pual except the participle masculine and feminine singular are attested, nor are any forms of the Piel. 159 Syntactically, the participle can participate in both nominal and verbal characteristics and can therefore take the determining word in the accusative, which is the case here (‫;)לב‬ cf. GKC 116k; for its use as predicate in a nominal clause, which applies here (‫)מחלה‬, cf. GKC 116m and IBHS 37.3. 160 Krüger (2009, 97), speaks of the heart as the organ that in general stands for the “inner human” (so does Schipper, commenting on this proverb); cf. above on 12:8. 161 Cf. also 10:28; 11:7 (so Schipper, it seems, who in a lapsus calami refers to 11:1 instead), where ‫( תוחלת‬hope) is partnered by its synonym ‫( תקוה‬hope, expectation). 162 All of this remains valid whether the life motif intended is everlasting life or the present quality of life as mooted by Bauks (2015, 26). 158

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

451

recalls Gen 3:24, as Dell puts it.163 Nevertheless, Schipper is right that we should think in terms of a common motif lying behind the image usage in Gen 2-3 and the proverb, rather than in terms of a direct reference by the latter to the former.164 The last word of the verse is the feminine singular Qal participle of ‫בוא‬ (come). The use of the participle can, but does not necessarily have to mean that the fulfilment still lies in the future (cf. Meinhold and Schipper), since a fundamental principle based on a general observation is presented as a universal truth. The two possibilities nevertheless remain thinkable. (a) In favour of the first, it can be argued that not actions, but the human psyche is the focal point. Therefore people can persevere as long as they have a positive prospect of the future fulfilment of what they hope for. The proverb can thus be understood to say that the psychological difference between those who (still) have hope and those who (no longer) have hope is what counts. (b) Secondly, the argument can start from the parallelism. The parallel hemistich refers to hope that initially exists, but remains a carrot on a stick and therefore turns into frustration. In the second hemistich the opposite must consequently be a desire that does not remain a phantom and thus becomes real, which by virtue of that reality proves to have produced authentic sustenance of the person who entertained it. On both counts, the proverb is not devoid of ethical relevance at all. It implies advice that hope must be kept alive in order to motivate and encourage people (Van Leeuwen), and that people should not be given false hopes, which includes realism in what one hopes for oneself (Tuinstra). The proverb as a whole therefore implies respect for the hopes of people (Fox, with reference to 3:28). Or, with William Butler Yeats’s Cloths of Heaven: 163 Dell (2006, 62); for the argument, see the commentary on 3:18 (Vol. I, 173-174) and the reference there to Marcus (1943, 117); also, Bauks (2015, 25), who points out the high incidence of semantic parallels between the relevant proverbs and Gen 2-3. For the ancient Near Eastern context, see Perdue (2000, 103) and particularly Krispenz (2004, 301-318, esp. 302f.). Emphasis on the element of secure rootedness in the metaphor (Luchsinger [2010, 282]) is perhaps stretching it somewhat. 164 It has to be pointed out, though, that the shared idea of desirability in Prov 13:12 (‫)תאוה‬ and Gen 3:6 (‫ תאוה‬as well as ‫ )חמד‬does not concern the same tree, as Schipper seems to suggest. In the Genesis verse it is the Tree of Knowledge, not the Tree of Life appearing in the proverb; the two can hardly be conflated by explaining the “and” in Gen 2:9 as an explicative waw (cf. Ska [2008, 11-12]; Bauks [2015, 23, 24]; for arguments to the contrary, see Krispenz [2004, 301-318]). The principle was already noted by Evagrius Ponticus (346-399) in his scholia on Proverbs; he leaves 13:12 uncommented, but he does make the remark in his scholion on 11:30 (see above on that verse).

452

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 But I, being poor, have only my dreams; I have spread my dreams under your feet; Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.

The Septuagint is completely different from the Hebrew. It reads: κρείσσων ἐναρχόμενος βοηθῶν καρδίᾳ τοῦ ἐπαγγελλομένου καὶ εἰς ἐλπίδα ἄγοντος· δένδρον γὰρ ζωῆς ἐπιθυμία ἀγαθή. (Better is one who begins helping with the heart than one who promises and leads to hope, since a good desire is a tree of life) The Hebrew ‫ תוחלת‬seems to be represented twice. First misread as ‫( ְתּ ִח ַלּת‬beginning of) and translated by ἐναρχόμενος (making a beginning) in the Greek v. 12a, then read as it stands in the Hebrew text and translated as εἰς ἐλπίδα (to hope).165 The difficult Greek text seems to be motivated by the wish to prevent condoning what was thought to be sinful “desire” as such.166 That would also explain the addition of ἀγαθή (good) to ἐπιθυμία (desire). The thrust of the Greek saying would be that offering help is better than raising false hope.167 The Peshitta is different still, although the Syriac v. 12a seems to be influenced by the Greek v. 12a. The last two hemistichs (Syriac v. 12bc) are difficult to reconcile with each other: f{Ëðäà Áüþãx ¿þæs ü {z ÄÓ Ÿ èã ÄÓ fÁüÃê ¿ćàx {z ? fÁüÃé ÀĀÚã ¿ÚÐx ¿çáÙs{ (Better is the person who begins to help than the person who depends on hope, and the tree of life brings hope) In addition to his short but insightful remark about the “inversion” in the verse (see above), Rashi applies the proverb to the history of Israel. After receiving the promises of God, the sins of Israel prevented the fulfilment of the promises, which caused the people “sickness of heart” (‫)מחלת לב‬, and only when they “fulfil his desire” (‫ )עושין רצונו‬it will become a tree of life for them. Hame’iri (c. 1249-1316), on the other hand, sticks to the individual level and gives it a clear ethical relevance. A person should keep promises made to others quickly, lest the one to whom a promise was made is kept waiting so long that sickness of heart results. Referring to Mic 5:6 and Neh 9:17, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra regards the hope (‫ )תוחלת‬spoken of here as an expectation (‫ )תקוה‬that has been cut off in the sense of a chance missed. This suggests the application of the proverb to Israel in the line of Rashi. In the Talmud (Ber 32b) there seems to be an implication that the heartache resulting from

165 According to Delitzsch, the Septuagint’s rendering should be explained in the first instance (v. 12a) from ‫ יחל‬Hiphil (wait), and from ‫ חלל‬I Hiphil (begin) in the second (v. 12b). On this submission, it should be the other way around, but it is anyway difficult to explain ἐπαγγελλομένου in terms of either proposal by Delitzsch. 166 Cf. the Tenth Commandment, where the synonymous root ‫ חמד‬is used in the version of Ex 20:17 and the root ‫ אוה‬is used alongside it in the version of Deut 5:21. 167 So EE, with a detailed discussion, especially of the Greek but also of the Syriac version.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

453

unanswered (unfulfilled) prayer can be remedied by turning to the study of Torah. The Vilna Gaon similarly imports the ideas of prayer and Torah study. He relates the first half to the result of a prayer for worldly things that can remain unfulfilled, while the second half envisages Torah study, which always is a tree nurturing life. The Mezudat David sees a succession between the situations of the two hemistichs, but without the help of the concepts of prayer and study. When one suffers heartache as a result of a delay in the fulfilment of a promise, it is healed when the promise is at last kept. John Chrysostom explains v. 12ab in the Septuagint as a statement in line with 3:28. It is better to begin right away with giving help with one’s heart than to make mere promises and thus leave the receiver with no more than (vain) hope to live by. On his contemporary Evagrius Ponticus, see above and on 11:30. Without attention to the motif of fulfilment, Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)168 quotes the second hemistich to claim that it is “good and pure desire” (bona et munda desideria), i.e. for God, that becomes a tree of life. In his Treatise on the Love of God, the French theologian of the Counter-Reformation, Francis de Sales (1567-1622)169 quotes the first hemistich in a context about pain caused by love, with references to Ps 41:3 and Cant 5:8. Even if the intention is metaphorical, ‫ תוחלת‬is interpreted as erotic desire.

13:13-14 13 Who despises a word will be pledged by it, but who fears a precept, will be rewarded. 14 The teaching of a wise man is a fountain of life to avoid the snares of death. These two proverbs are not a unit in the sense of a composed couplet. Each can stand on its own, yet they are redacted together in close association, thereby contributing to what they communicate. V. 13 has a rhythmic pattern of 4+4 (note the conjunctive accent at the second syllable of ‫יח ֶבל‬ ֣ as well as the de-emphasising segol instead of ṣere in the last syllable), and v. 14 has 4+3 in as many words. V. 13 is a rather symmetric antithetic parallelism: V. 13a: participle with noun object + passive imperfect V. 13b: participle with noun object + passive imperfect V. 14 syntactically subsumes the second hemistich under the first.170 The first half contains the nominal main clause and the last half contains the final clause. Semantically, the verse is of the type called “synthetic” or “constructive” parallelism by Lowth, where the last member of the parallelism rounds off the first one (an “integral distich,” in the terminology used by 168 169 170

Strom III, 17 (ANF II, 401). In Book VI, Chapter 13; de Sales ([1616/1884] 1997, 270). The same type of parallelism with similar syntax and vocabulary is found in 14:27.

454

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

Delitzsch). Not only the semantic, but also the syntactic and rhythmic aspects just pointed out contribute to its formation.171 V. 14a: subject expressed by a subjective genitive + predicate by an objective genitive V. 14b: final clause with infinitive and the preposition ‫ ל‬172 + object in an objective genitive

There are noticeable conceptual links between the two proverbs. The ‫דבר‬ (word), ‫( מצוה‬precept) and the ‫( תורה‬teaching) provide different words for the sapiential education imparted by the sages. The “word” (v. 13a) is a general indication of an oral dictum by the teacher, the “precept” (v. 13b) in the parallelism must be a synonym in the broad sense, that is, it must refer to something said by the teacher. Still, the precept goes beyond the word by being more specific (not general indicative utterances, but specific injunctions in the imperative or jussive). These words must be “synonymous,” since they are imbedded in antithetic statements about the bad consequences of a negative and the good consequences of a positive attitude to them. who despises will be kept liable

:: ::

who fears/respects will be rewarded.

According to v. 13, whoever despises the wise words will still remain bound by them. The verb ‫ חבל‬I (Qal bind, take in pledge)173 in the Niphal does make good sense.174 The word of the wise, once spoken, places the hearer under an obligation to which he will be pledged. On the other hand, who respects the spoken precept will be rewarded. In this case, the account is squared, whereas an unpaid account remains the liability of the one who discarded it (so Delitzsch, Toy, Plöger, Meinhold, Scherer,175 Clifford, Tuinstra and others). This interpretation is particularly supported by the parallelism between ‫יחבל‬ and ‫ – ישלם‬debit :: credit, owing payment or receiving payment (Wildeboer, Clifford, Yoder).176 It fits the thinking behind the deed-consequence nexus, 171 Lowth ([1787] 1835, 24 and 48-49); for full quotations of the relevant passages and discussion, see Luchsinger (2010, 123-124). In addition to the semantic focus of Lowth, these dimensions of parallelism have been given increased attention by scholars in recent years; see the Introduction above, Par. 3.2 and the references to Hrushovski, Kugel, Alter and Berlin given there. 172 Cf. the series of clauses wit ‫ ל‬in 2-4, 6. 173 As opposed to ‫ חבל‬Qal (act corruptly), Niphal (it goes badly, + ‫ ל‬as ethical dative [so Murphy]). The homonyms are not always given consistent root numbers in various dictionaries, e.g. ‫ חבל‬I for “pledge” and ‫ חבל‬II for “act corruptly” (HAW, BDB, HALOT, KAHAL) and sometimes ‫ חבל‬II for “pledge” and ‫ חבל‬III for “act corruptly” (KBL). This is occasionally reflected in the references made in commentaries (e.g. Clifford, who uses ‫ חבל‬II for “seize something as a pledge”). 174 Fox declares otherwise, however without argument; so also Whybray, although more reservedly; cf. McKane and Alter; Gemser and Yoder do not choose. 175 Scherer (1999, 121). 176 Therefore no grounds exist to read the Qal instead of the Pual of ‫שלם‬, which is forced by the assumption that only Fox’s interpretation of ‫ יחבל‬is correct; so also Ehrlich, Kuhn

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

455

which is not only found all over sapiential literature generally (both where it is affirmed and where it is questioned), but is typical specifically of this chapter.177 According to Gemser, the parallelism of ‫( דבר‬word) and ‫( מצוה‬precept) calls to mind Deut 30:11-14 as general concepts of both sapiential and divine teaching (cf. also 16:20), which is developed by Fuhs to suggest the inner unity of the formation of faith and conscience. McKane opposes the idea that it should be interpreted “in the framework of Deuteronomy” and argues that the ‫ מצוה‬in sapiential usage indicates the authority of the utterances of the wisdom teacher and not of God. In turn Lucas reacts to McKane’s proposal by warning against overemphasising the distinction between sapiential and deuteronomic teaching, since Proverbs suggests that the fatherly teaching is an extension of the divine command.178 Schipper carefully weighs the relevant arguments – not only the echoes of Deut 30, but also the deuteronomic idea that “fear of the Lord” is the way in which one obeys the divine precepts (Deut 5:29; 6:2; 8:6; 13:4; 17:19; 28:58). Moreover, four of the seven other instances of ‫ ירא‬in Proverbs (3:7; 14:2; 24:21; 31:30, as opposed to 3:25; 14:16; 31:21) also have God as object. On the other hand, Prov 13 is the only chapter in the book in which ‫ יהוה‬is not explicitly mentioned, while sapiential education and the “discipline” of the human teacher (cf. v. 1) are central in the chapter. He reaches the convincing conclusion that the teaching by the human sage is indeed called “Torah,” as was the divine revelation to Moses, but in wisdom literature it lacks the “nomistic overtone in the sense of the divine Law.” We do not need that sense – indeed, we do not need Deuteronomy – to understand “Torah” in Proverbs, but the sapiential enterprise is not devoid of an order upheld by God. V. 14 uses a metaphor to express the advantages of accepting this Torah teaching. As the two verses now stand, edited together as they are, their mutual association influences their meaning. Paying attention to the sapiential words and having respect for the precepts expressed by them (v. 13) entail a life-giving reward (v. 14). As Perdue points out, ‫( מקור חיים‬fountain of life) is a metaphor for sapiential teaching.179 But at the same time it denotes what that teaching brings about. Scherer paraphrases both as the power of wisdom (1931, 30), BHK and BHS, but not BHQ. 177 So Schipper; see also his summary of the thrust of Prov 13 (2018, 778-779). 178 On the relationship of God as the guarantor of the creational order and wisdom as human teaching about that order, see the Introduction to Vol. I, Par. 7 pp. 12-14; on the relation of empirical observation and theological conviction, see the Introduction to Vol. I, Par. 8.3 (pp. 28-39); for a broad perspective of the complex of issues involved, see Boström (1990, passim); for a basic statement of what is at stake, see Clifford (1999, 32-33). 179 So, for instance, in 10:11. In 14:27 “the fear of the Lord” is called a fountain of life and in 16:22 “insight” is given the same epithet. Both are the results of sapiential teaching and neither can be identified with it. Nevertheless they still imply what Perdue claims, namely, that sapiential teaching is an ultimate source of life. Cf. Ps 36:10 for the same phrase in a cultic

456

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

to protect from the “negative possibility of death,”180 to which we can compare 15:24b. It sustains life like water sustains all living things. Although v. 14 does not contain an antithesis, its second hemistich does contain an opposite metaphor. Over against the fountain that gives life, there are the snares that cause death. But because the latter is what those who drink from the fountain of life are protected from, the meaning is the same. The motif of a snare is also a well-established sapiential metaphor (cf. the snares of death in 14:27, the dangerous snares of 12:13; 18:7; 20:25 and 29:6.181 Such a snare is what those who do not heed the teaching of wisdom fall into and what this teaching diverts the obedient from. Fuhs points out the alliterative use of the m-sound both in this double-clause sentence and in the similarly structured 14:27. Whereas Fox thinks that the two metaphors “seem rather stereotyped and do not work well together,” Fuhs points out that they are “metaphors for the ultimate experiences of human existence.”182 Two further notes should be added regarding v. 13: First, Schipper points to an Egyptian parallel of the idea that a wise word should not be despised. He quotes from the Demotic Instruction of Ankhsheshonq: Disdain ruins a great man.183 Second, the Septuagint makes an addition to v. 13: υἱῷ δολίῳ οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀγαθόν, οἰκέτῃ δὲ σοφῷ εὔοδοι ἔσονται πράξεις, καὶ κατευθυνθήσεται ἡ ὁδὸς αὐτοῦ. context; cf. also ‫( מקור חכמה‬fountain of wisdom) in Prov 18:4, which is also predicated upon wise words being spoken. 180 Scherer (1999, 130). Volz (1911, 143), making a general comment on perceptions of the value of wisdom, remarks that “life” as a core sapiential word embodies all that is good, both externally and internally, such as a long life, wealth and health, a good conscience and serenity of mind; the sages use this to convince their pupils that these things are the reward for acquiring sound wisdom (here ‫)שכל‬. For the explicit mention of life and/or death in sapiential perspective, cf. 7:27; 9:18; 11:19, 30; 12:28. 181 Cf. the image of 1:17 (although with a different noun); also Ps 18:5-6, where the same imagery is expressed with other words, interestingly, with a water image in a negative sense; cf. also Ps 116:3. 182 Fuhs uses a term reminiscent of the philosophy of Karl Jaspers (“Grenzerfahrungen menschlicher Existenz”), who indeed applies it to the same ultimate experiences as those mentioned in the proverb. According to Fuhs, the similarity of 13:14 and 14:27 shows that they should even be regarded as markers of a compositional unit, which one does not have to accept in order to appreciate his understanding of the two verses. According to Heim (2013, 355358), the parallel with 14:27 can be explained by the wish to place a suitable proverb between the life imagery of v. 12 and the motif of fear in v. 14, which was realised with the help of related imagery in 14:27, but minus the expression “fear of the Lord,” which would maintain the presumably intended avoidance of mentioning Yahweh in Prov13 as a whole. This is quite possible, but not provable (Heim uses the subjunctive mood “may be” and adds “perhaps” to indicate the uncertainty). 183 Instr Ankhsheshonq XII, 10 (AEL III, 168).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

457

(For a deceitful son, nothing will be good, But for a wise servant, things will go smoothly, And his way will be prosperous) This echoes the Hebrew text of 17:2 (so EE) and gives examples of both human types intended by the two hemistichs of 13:13. The rabbinic use of the two proverbs understandably focuses on the reward/punishment for people’s acceptance or otherwise of Torah. According to Rashi, whoever scorns Torah is scorned by Torah and becomes collateral to it (thus harms himself). This adumbrates the smart combination of the two possibilities to interpret ‫יחבל‬ (be harmed, be pledged) by several rabbis. Rashi (11th century) cites the Midrash Tehillim to Ps 34:1 with reference to 1 Sam 21:14-16 to show that David should not have questioned God’s creation of madmen, since he needed madness to save his life. Ramaq (12th century) and Nahmias (14th century) illustrate the principle with another reference to King David, who only cut off a small piece of Saul’s garment and found that his own garments could not warm him when he became old (1 Sam 24:5 and 1 Kgs 1:1). In the same vein Bahya (13th century) illustrates how disdain for Isaac (Gen 26:16, 26-31), Joseph (Gen 37:28; 42:6) and Jephthah (Judg 11:1-10) came back to haunt the perpetrators.184 Hame’iri (1249-1316) in turn illustrates the proverb with reference to the Egyptians who did heed Moses’ word about the imminent plague of hail and therefore were the only ones who could save their animals (Ex 9:19-21). The Mezudat David generalises the saying to the effect that scorning any one of the commandments in the Torah is simply tantamount to inflicting harm on oneself. Coming to v. 14, Rashi says that the Torah of a wise man is a source of life in that it teaches him to avoid the snares of death, while the Mezudat David makes the same point some 700 years later by identifying the snares with sins named by the Torah. About the same time, the Vilna Gaon combines his interpretation of both verses. Where the verb ‫ שלם‬in v. 13 suggests completeness,185 he compares the 248 positive commandments with the 248 organs in the human body – if only one organ is discarded the health of the complete body is adversely affected and amounts to self-harm. Likewise, if only a single precept is scorned, the integrity of the whole human person is disturbed. On the other hand, v. 14 is not about individual precepts, but about the Torah as a whole, which is the very source of life itself. Finally, PseudoIbn Ezra only paraphrases v. 14 after simply declaring that scorn for a command (v. 13) will bring punishment. Christian attention to the verses is much more meagre. Athanasius186 only quotes the Septuagint form of v. 13, not v. 14. To him, it is merely a proof text for the argument that whoever is deceitful (δολίος), thus not pure, may not take part in the Christian Passover at Easter (1 Cor 5:7). Chrysostom’s interpretation of the Greek of v. 13 proper goes in the same direction as the basic idea of Rashi, who scorns anything that is scorned by it, which amounts to self-harm. But he also has a short comment about the son and the servant mentioned in the Greek addition to the verse. Freedom or slavery are of no consequence, what counts and makes a difference, is the presence of virtue and vice. At this point in the chapter, Philipp Melanchthon says that the 184 A similar interpretation, notably that little things should not be scorned, was already given by Saadia Gaon (882-942). 185 However, Ramaq, Hame’iri and Ralbag interpret the root ‫ שלם‬not as completeness but as peace and tranquillity. 186 Sixth Easter Letter, 11 (NPNF II/4, 522).

458

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

sayings “now following” (sequentes sententiæ) mostly speak of correct moral life according to the word of God. This probably refers to vv. 14-22, since one more saying (v. 23) is discussed before he moves on to Prov 14. John Calvin quotes v. 13b precisely, but without identifying the verse (which occasionally happens in his Institutes). He uses the hemistich as a proof text in his endeavour to square the doctrine of salvation by grace with the manifest motif of positive and negative retribution in the Bible.187 See above on 12:14 for Calvin’s argument.

13:15 Good insight bestows favour, but the way of the treacherous is fixed. There are difficult as well as relatively clear elements in the verse. The syntax is clear: a verbal sentence followed by a nominal sentence. As for the rhythmic pattern, Gemser regards both 4+3 and 3+3 as possible. The three stresses in the second hemistich are not problematic, but to achieve three in the first hemistich, one would have to ignore the maqqeph in ‫יתן־חן‬, which is indeed lacking in some codices (Delitzsch). Four stresses would demand ignoring both maqqephs. But if we maintain them (to which also the punctuation in the Codices Aleppo and Leningradensis points), the first hemistich must be scanned as two stresses, thus resulting in 2+3 for the proverb. The verse seems to have been edited into its present position because it “complements the preceding” (Fox), showing as it does what social benefits flow from the source of life offered by the teaching of the wise. What is not so certain is whether the last word is text-critically sound and what it means. ‫ איתן‬usually means “steadfast” or “persistent.” Through the centuries there have been endeavours to explain the word in terms of the parallelism. Ramaq interpreted ‫ איתן‬to mean persistent in the sense of stubborn, indicating that these people cannot be brought off their wicked ways even by the strictest teaching of the wise, which is not an unknown idea in the sapiential tradition (cf. 17:10; 27:22). Schultens takes a similar view, calling the way of the treacherous pertinacissime tensum (going on most steadfastly). Under influence of the Septuagint, which translates ἐν ἀπωλείᾳ (in destruction), the text is often emended to ‫אידם‬ (their ruin).188 Delitzsch develops an extended but contrived argument for “uncultivated” by construing a putative development from the idea of steadfastness via the concept of hardness. Driver189 suggests that the rare negative particle ‫ ִאי‬has been omitted and that the hemistich originally read, “and the way of the wicked is not steadfast,” which is ingenious but conjecture. Creative but wayward is the 187

Inst III/18, 1. So for instance Wildeboer, Toy, Oesterley (who argues for this interpretation but translates “rugged”), BHS, Gemser, Ringgren, Plöger, McKane, Alter, Murphy, Fox (commentary and EE), Scherer (1999, 121), Sæbø, and others. 189 Driver (1951, 181). 188

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

459

suggestion by Kuhn190 to emend the whole second verset to ‫( וְ ע ֵֹר ְך ְבּגָ ִד ים נָ אוֹת‬and fits out with beautiful clothes), which eliminates the parallelism.

Schultens has found support among several exegetes (although probably independent of him). The idea that the treacherous steadfastly extend their ways, i.e. of treachery, means that they do not change. They remain the same and do not have the insight to develop a lifestyle that finds favour in society. Meinhold advances this as one of two possibilities; the other is that the motif of hardness or roughness (so Scott; already suggested by Delitzsch) may indicate the contrast cultivated insight :: uncultivated roughness. Schipper decides for the first option. Against claims that steadfastness in the Old Testament is always a positive concept he argues that ‫ איתן‬can indeed carry negative overtones. With reference to Job 12:19 he contends that the word’s semantic range of persistence (cf. Gen 49:24; Num 24:21) can in fact be used in a negative sense.191 In any event, whether or not the word is used negatively in Job does not determine whether the argumentative line adopted by Ramaq is correct.192 His point is that treacherous people remain as they are and that no insight can bring them off the wicked road. From this perspective, one can see that the parallelism between the two hemistichs is actually mutually reinforcing, as we have often found in the chapters above:193 V. 15a good sense gives favour [is not fixed = not monolithic]

:: → ←

V. 15b way of the treacherous [does not lead to favour] is fixed = monolithic

If good sense “gives” favour, it must mean that the behaviour in which the good sense manifests itself, brings favour to the sensible person.194 ‫ טוב‬in ‫ שכל־טוב‬may be taken either as an adjective with the masculine noun ‫שכ ל‬ (good sense), or as a noun ‫ טוב‬195 in the objective genitive after ‫( שכל‬sense 190

Kuhn (1931, 30). It should be noted that in Job 12:19 the word itself (‫אתנים‬, those who stand firm or well-established) is not semantically negative but neutral. However, it does participate in a context the thrust of which is negative. Since what is ‫ איתן‬can come to a fall, the use of the word does not have to connote only a safe kind of durability. 192 To “remain as one is,” is itself semantically neutral, and as such is here used in an unfavourable judgement about the treacherous. 193 For instance, vv. 2, 8 and 10 in this chapter; further 10:6, 8, 13; 11:2, 18; 12:2, 6, 17, 20, 27 etc. Reading parallelism in this way shows that Oesterley’s rather blunt declaration that the two hemistichs are “not properly antithetic” is unwarranted. 194 Like Waltke and Yoder (on Ramaq, see below), Weigl (2010, 298-299) seems to think of favour in the eyes of God as well as humans, although he cites the proverb in the context of a comparative discussion of the idea of reliability, not only in Achiqar, but in ANE wisdom as a whole. 195 The use of ‫ טוֹב‬as a substantive is often difficult to distinguish from the adjectival use (cf. KAHAL, s.v. ‫)טובה‬. Apart from the use of the adjective as a substantive, e.g. ‫רעים וטובים‬ (bad people and good people) in Prov 15:3, it often occurs in the meaning “the good,” e.g. Gen 2:17; 16:6; Deut: 1:39; Hos 8:3 etc., and the genitive construction in Jer 6:16. 191

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

of the good). On both counts, sensible behaviour is contrasted with the “way” of treacherous people. The basic metaphor of the way here stands for the behaviour196 of the treacherous. By virtue of the parallelism the reader or hearer can therefore identify the implication: the deeds of the treacherous do not result in ‫חן‬, favour, social acceptance and the concomitant benefits. With a pinch of salt we may paraphrase with the help of a modern application of the metaphor of the way: Good insight bestows favour, but the way of the treacherous leads nowhere.

In this sense v. 15 exemplifies the principle laid down and augmented in vv. 13f. Apart from translating the last word of the proverb by ἐν ἀπωλείᾳ (in destruction), which has text-critical implications (see above), the Septuagint differs by having three versets in v. 15: σύνεσις ἀγαθὴ δίδωσιν χάριν, τὸ δὲ γνῶναι νόμον διανοίας ἐστὶν ἀγαθῆς, ὁδοὶ δὲ καταφρονούντων ἐν ἀπωλείᾳ. (Good insight gives favour, and knowing the law belongs to good intelligence, but the ways of the deceitful are in destruction) The second Greek verset is almost identical to an addition between 9:10 and 11 in the Greek (τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι νόμον διανοίας ἐστὶν ἀγαθῆς), where it underscores the last half of 9:10 proper. Although not explicitly, these references to νόμος seem to intend the Law of Moses (so EE; cf. Greek 6:23; 9:10a; 13:15; 28:4, 7, 9; 29:18). Rashi interprets the proverb quite frankly. To him, ‫ שכל‬is to act with knowledge and wisdom, whereas the ways of the treacherous are harsh on other people and therefore harsh on themselves as well. To Ramaq, ‫ שכל‬means insight to do what is good (‫)לעשות טוב‬.197 If this insight with its moral dimension is put into practice, the one who does so finds favour with God and with fellow humans,198 which expresses the classic retribution scheme. On the other hand, the ways of the treacherous are hard (‫ )חזק‬in the sense of stubborn, meaning that they cannot change, not even under the influence of the insight of a wise person (‫)משכיל‬. Hame’iri attaches an injunction to accept the counsel of those who have insight because they have favour with all people. The treacherous are those who are untrue to their obligation to do good and cannot change their ways. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra calls the treacherous ‫( חזק וקשה‬hard and harsh) because they have no insight, whereas those who do have insight find favour because of the way they speak, that is, as a result of a specific application of their insight. For explicating the last verset, Malbim offers a metaphor: the ways of the 196 See on 1:15 (Vol. I, 80-81), where the metaphor of the way is first used in the Book of Proverbs. 197 This is in line with a general principle explicated in the Talmud (cf. Yoma 86a), viz. that wisdom combined with practising the good is praised by society. 198 Mezudat David: ‫( חן בעיני כל‬with all people).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

461

treacherous are harsh like hard earth that is useless for any produce and therefore does not merit cultivation. All those who relate ‫ שכל‬to the practice of the good, in fact accept the impact of the antithesis given on the first level of the sketch above: doing treacherous things is to practice wisdom’s opposite. The rabbis who stress this link, may have been influenced by the possibility that ‫ טוב‬in ‫ שכל־טוב‬can be an objective genitive noun (sense of the good) rather than an adjective (see above). Even if that is not necessary to achieve their interpretation, it is a possible reading and would have the same result. The parallelism by itself shows this and conforms to the concept of wisdom as practical behaviour rather than abstract theory.

13:16 Every shrewd person acts with knowledge, but a fool spreads out folly. The proverb is a simple antithesis in two verbal sentences with three stresses in each (so also Toy and Gemser). The first hemistich can be read in several ways: (a) According to the Masoretic reading, as translated above, which maintains the maqqeph and qamets hatuph (every shrewd person acts with knowledge).199 (b) Deleting the maqqeph and vocalising with a long ō (a shrewd person does everything with knowledge).200 (c) A third possibility would be accepting the proposal to transpose the second and the third words,201 resulting in ‫ ;כל יעשה ערום בדעת‬this would in turn entail two possibilities, viz. (i) that ‫ יעשה ערום‬defines ‫ כל‬in an attributive relative clause202 (everything that a shrewd person does, is with knowledge), or (ii) without a relative clause203 (a shrewd person does everything with knowledge). There are only minor differences between these possibilities. Readings (b) and (c ii) give the same meaning, while (c i) only differs in that a slight shift 199

Plöger, Meinhold, Clifford, Murphy, Alter, Van Leeuwen, Fox, Waltke, Sæbø and

others. 200 So the Peshitta, Vulgate, BHS, Hitzig, Ringgren, McKane, Heim (2013, 320; cf. below) and others. 201 So Toy, but Plöger points out that this is the word order that one would expect if ‫כֹּל‬ (everything) instead of ‫( ָכּ ל־‬every) were meant (similarly Wildeboer). However, the fact that it does not stand there, favours the interpretation of the Masoretes rather than that of the Syrian and Latin translators. 202 This is clearly what Pinkuss (1894, 174) means in his comment on the Peshitta (“alles, was der Kluge thut [¿ćäÙüï ËÃïx âÝ], geschieht mit Bedacht”), but he erroneously prints ‫ יעשה בדעת‬instead of ‫)יעשה ערום‬. Toy seems to correct this unobtrusively, but also errs by implying that Pinkuss describes the inverted word order in this way, which he does not do. 203 So Scott.

462

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

in focus from the person doing it to the act of doing is observable. Option (a) makes the same basic point, but highlights that acting with knowledge is a characteristic of every shrewd person. There are no exceptions. That sharpens the antithesis, because the generic difference between the shrewd person and the fool is made the pivotal point of the proverb. In his comparison of the “variant repetitions” of this verse with 12:23 and 15:14, Heim204 makes the important point that these examples illustrate how different possibilities can exist alongside one another without the reader having to choose. Although his nuancing is not identical to what I have just presented, the conclusions are valid. Particularly (a) that ambiguity is a valuable rather than a weak aspect of poetry, and (b) his warning that analysis is not “a hard and fast science with simple rules that do not allow exceptions” and that it “does not need a neat categorization of each parallelism,”

The shrewd person is the opposite of the fool. Nothing negative is necessarily associated with shrewdness. The attribute of cleverness or astuteness (‫)ערמה‬ is neutral. When applied to a negative purpose, the root can sometimes be used to indicate cunningness (like the cognate adjective ‫ ערום‬in Gen 3:1, or as a substantive ‫ ערומים‬in Job 5:12), but in the Book of Proverbs the noun and the adjective are often used to refer to astuteness as a feature of intelligence (e.g. 8:5; 12:16, 23; 14:8; 22:3).205 A notable parallel hemistich to v. 16a is found in Sir 18:27a, where the motif of careful foresight as an element of astuteness also occurs. Volz, referring to our proverb in his comment on Sir 18:19-27, believes that this motif can be regarded as the core trademark of sapiential education.206 The verbs in both hemistichs have generated some discussion. On the strength of Arabic ‫( غشى‬cover) and the “interchange” of verbs between Hebrew ‫( כסה‬cover) in 12:23 and ‫עשה‬, Driver207 moots the existence of a Hebrew root ‫ עשה‬III meaning the same. Waltke accepts this on account of what in his opinion would constitute a better parallelism (the same as that in 12:23). However, while the wise can be said to “cover”208 his knowledge in the sense of hiding it, i.e., being modest about it, he cannot be said to 204 Heim (2013, 21-23); 15:2 is included in his group (Set 47) as well as in that of Snell (1993, 40-41), but Snell excludes 15:14 as only sharing, in his opinion, a cliché with 12:22; 13:16; 15:2 (1993, 46). 205 See on ‫ ערמה‬in 1:4 (Vol. I, 59). 206 Volz (1911, 169). 207 Driver (1954, 243). 208 Prov 12:23; cf. Ezk 17:17, which in itself is problematic. Moreover, extending the supposed meaning “cover” to “take cover” (so Waltke) seems forced to fit the purpose. Heim (2013, 320) points out that “variations within variant repetitions are not necessarily synonymous,” while “correspondences between expressions in parallel slots are rarely precise synonyms.” He regards the ‫ עשה‬III derivation as viable, but thinks it would in that case rather be a pun, with both meanings intended (cf. above on his appreciation of ambiguity).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

463

cover up “everything” (‫)כל‬, since there is much that he is obliged to reveal when teaching young pupils.209 It should therefore not be surprising that HALOT and KAHAL are uncertain about the two roots, while KBL does not even mention such a root in Hebrew. According to Fox, the meaning “spread out” makes little sense for the verb ‫ פרשׂ‬Qal in this context, and he emends to ‫ פרשׁ‬Hiphil (spew). He finds Clifford’s translation “display” to be forced, but if a sail (Isa 33:23) or a field banner (Isa 11:10; 18:3) can be “spread out,” “unfolded” or “displayed” to be visible to all, there is no reason why a fool’s presentation cannot be described by the same root ‫ פרשׂ‬when he puts his folly on display as in 12:23 and 15:2 (cf. the same principle in the irony of 17:28). A vendor spreading out his merchandise for a public commercial display (Delitzsch, Gemser, McKane, Clifford, Fuhs) is easier to imagine than a spitting snake (cf. 23:32).210 The text does not have to be repointed to become ‫יפרישׁ‬, since a fool does not have to spit venom aggressively when advertising his folly, while the image of a spitting snake would rather connote danger to others than the unveiling of inner stupidity by the subject. Summary of the parallelism: V. 16a every shrewd person acts with knowledge [does not make a public show]

:: → ←

V. 16b a fool [= every fool] [does not act with knowledge] publicly spreads out folly

The opposite of “every shrewd person” is “every fool,” suggested by the parallelism. If the shrewd kind’s actions are typically informed by their knowledge, their foolish counterparts don’t act that way. If the foolish kind unfold their folly for all to see, the force of the antithesis suggests that their clever counterparts do not make an advertising show of their knowledge (which is exactly what 12:23a claims negatively and 15:2a positively). Rashi follows the Talmud211 in contrasting King David (1 Kgs 1:1-4) with King Ahasuerus (Est 2:2-4) as examples of wise foresight and foolishness, since only one maiden was sought for David while all the maidens in the kingdom were ordered before the Ahasuerus. The former had the cooperation of all fathers, the latter exactly the opposite. This is creative embellishment, but overlooks the fact that the foresight with which David is credited (actually that of his courtiers) did not include expecting 209 Cf. further the critique by McKane of Driver’s use of Gen 6:14 in support of his argument: if we were to follow Driver, we would have to suppose “two different senses in two successive phrases” for ‫עשה‬, which is unlikely. 210 Spitting snakes as an established metaphor may be conceivable in an Egyptian but not in an Israeli context. 211 Meg 12b; here the contrast between the two kings is attributed to Yehudah haNasi, together with a full quote of the proverb.

464

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

that, at his age, he would not be up to the challenge of a young maiden in his room. Conversely, if the label of foolishness were deserved at all, it should be put on the courtiers of the Persian king for contemplating that the king would be able to work through all the beautiful girls of the empire at all – although their initiative was very successful from a Jewish perspective, it was catastophic for the most important courtier in their own ranks. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra makes sure that the verb ‫ עשה‬can only be understood to mean “do” by adding ‫( דבריו‬his deeds)212 and explicitly refers to Gen 3:1 as explanation of what ‫ ערום‬means (shrewdness without moral dimension). The Mezudat David interprets the word ‫( דעת‬knowledge) as foresight, while the Vilna Gaon and Malbim specify it as ascertaining the propriety of an act before it is performed. Jerome213 argues against his adversary, Rufinus (345-410), by quoting a long list of proverbs. He makes the Book of Proverbs his source for the defence of peace through wisdom. Jerome hopes Rufinus, if he does not want to listen to Jerome, would listen to what Solomon says against Rufinus and others like him when he opposes wisdom to folly. For this purpose, he quotes the second hemistich, balancing it with a statement that the evil man perpetrates evil things in his violence. Thus he equates folly with evil and uses the proverb along with several similar ones in his polemic against Rufinus, whose sympathetic translation of Origen was unacceptable to Jerome.

13:17 A wicked messenger falls into trouble, but a trustworthy envoy is a cure. The first hemistich is a verbal clause and the second nominal. The rhythmic pattern is clearly 4+3, with one stress to every word. As vocalised by the Masoretes, the first word stands in the absolute and not in the construct state (pace Schipper).214 So, the proverb declares that the messenger himself is wicked,215 not that he is the messenger of a wicked sender. What he is guilty of, can be pinpointed with the help of the parallelism. Therefore it is best to consider the two types of messenger and, to be sure, the verdict of the two hemistichs in tandem. Since the bad messenger is contrasted with a trustworthy one, his wickedness consists of the opposite of the latter’s reliability. He is thus a messenger who cannot be counted on to fulfil his obligation to the one who sent him, the assignment of the envoy (see below for an illustration of what this kind of behaviour could entail). Thus he is untrustworthy by character or habit. 212 Ramaq achieves the same result by adding ‫( מעשהו‬his work). He also mentions a second interpretation, viz. that ‫ בדעת‬means ‫( בעבור‬for the sake of), that is, he does what he does for the sake of knowledge, so that he can teach knowledge (‫)ללמד דעת‬. 213 Apol adv libros Rufini III, 43 (NPNF II/3, 540); see above on 12:14 and 13:3. 214 The absolute state has a qamets, as here (‫)מ ְל ׇאְך‬. ַ The construct state would have had a patah (‫;)מ ְל ַאְך‬ ַ cf. Delitzsch. 215 Which is how Schipper himself translates despite his remark just cited.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

465

In terms of the deed-consequence nexus, he thus falls into trouble – not necessarily before he can deliver his message, but because of the damage he has done. That, in turn, is suggested by the effect of the trustworthy envoy. A ‫ ציר‬is a messenger with a high rank who could handle foreign relations and even military matters.216 In the construct state, he is qualified by the plural of ‫( ֵאמוּן‬faithfulness), which is a pluralis intensitatis and indicates complete faithfulness.217 According to the nominal clause of v. 17b, this envoy is a cure. A ‫ מרפא‬can be either the healing itself (e.g. 4:22; 6:15; 29:1) or the agent used to bring that healing about (e.g. 12:18; 16:24). If the trustworthy envoy functions as a cure, something must be in an unhealthy state. The picture conjured up by the proverb can be imagined as a careless messenger who has disrupted relations between his employer and the receiver of the message and/or between himself and his employer. The bad messenger thus caused harm (‫ )רע‬or potential harm to others and then fell into it himself (cf. Qoh 10:8; Ps 7:16-17).218 In addition to diplomatic affairs, the assignment could also involve business matters, such as agricultural products or commercial vendibles.219 Gemser points out that it is not only in the Book of Proverbs that a dependable messenger is highly valued (cf. 15:23, 30; 22:21; 25:13), but that this was a common phenomenon in the ancient Near East.220 A straightforward example is found in the Egyptian Instruction of Ptahhotep (6th Dynasty, Old Kingdom):221 If you are a man of trust, Sent by one great man to another, Adhere to the nature of him who sent you, Give his message as he said it. Guard against reviling speech, Which embroils one great with another; Keep to the truth, don’t exceed it But an outburst should not be repeated. The general theme was a prime topic in the education of Egyptian officials-to-be. For instance, in the opening lines of the Instructions of Amenemope (Ramesside Period, 19th-20th Dynasties), the proper handling of messages and errands is seen as part of the very goal of teaching.222 It is warned that accepting a precarious messaging 216 Waltke shows that the ‫ ציר‬can have international status and mentions Isa 18:2; 57:2 (should be 57:9); Jer 49:14; Ob 1:1 as examples of his ambassadorial rank. 217 Delitzsch explains the plural as connoting “in the full extent of the idea,” like ‫עד אמונים‬ in 14:15 (should be 14:5). 218 Similarly Waltke, who refers to 2 Kgs 5:26-27; Matt 25:26; Luke 16:1. 219 Cf. Crown (1974, 366-370), for the importance and status of messengers and envoys in the Tell El-Amarna Letters and the Old Testament in general. 220 In addition to the examples given here, see the references by Gemser, Oesterley, Tuinstra, Schipper and others. 221 Ptahhotep VIII, 144-151 (AEL I, 65; ANET, 413). 222 Amenemope, Prologue I, 6 (COS I, 116; ANET, 421); cf. Römheld (1989, 22-23).

466

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

assignment should be avoided,223 as should be wrongdoing or even the perception of self-enrichment in the course of the errand:224 If you are sent to transport straw,225 Stay away from its container. If a man is noticed on a fraudulent errand, he will not be sent on another occasion.

V. 17a itself as much as the Egyptian warnings about what to do and to avoid shows that such behaviour did take place in the ancient Near East. Together they illustrate a concrete situation the underlying principle of which is expressed by the first half of our proverb. The second half can also be understood against such a background. An unreliable messenger could cause disruption between the sending and receiving parties, which can be repaired if another envoy is dependable. The “healing” can be brought about by tactful negotiation and accompanying measures by which the damage and strained relations are repaired. A similar understanding is mooted by Meinhold, while Waltke considers it probable that ‫( רע‬evil) is a pun on both the untrustworthy messenger’s “moral evil and the calamity that comes to him.” While the result for the bad messenger is explicitly stated, we do not hear directly of any profit for the good one. However, reading the two hemistichs in the light of each other, we can infer several things from the parallelism:226 V. 17a a wicked messenger falls into trouble [is a contamination]

:: → ←

V. 17b a trustworthy envoy [does not experience trouble] is a cure

Just as it is not said what reward the good envoy receives, so it is not said what the felony is that makes the other one bad (‫)רשע‬.227 But the parallelism makes it possible to see that the faithful envoy will not experience the evil that his opposite number falls into. That not only justifies Meinhold’s surmise that the trustworthy envoy will somehow profit by his work, but, by virtue of the power of the parallelism, suggests it. Likewise, the healing effect of 223

Amenemope IV, 8-9 (COS I, 116; ANET, 422); cf. already Oesterley. Amenemope XV, 15-18 (COS I, 119; AEL II, 155). Even if the assignment (also) entails goods, the challenges and consequences of acting as go-between are comparable; cf. Römheld (1989, 68, 70). 225 In light of Ex 5:7-18, an important commodity in the building industry. 226 Waltke calls the parallelism “imprecise,” which it only is in the sense that every element of one hemistich does not have a precise counterpart in the other. But, as we have often found from Chapter 10 onwards, the important function of the parallelism to facilitate implication makes it conceptually symmetrical. 227 Weigl (2010, 113) thinks the misdeed is twisting the message to his own advantage. Although that is not excluded, it is neither stated nor suggested; the general terms used in v. 17a rather indicate that it includes all possibilities for causing havoc. 224

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

467

the good envoy on others and their affairs (and therefore also on himself) makes it clear that the ‫ מלאך רשע‬not only plunges himself into misfortune, but also makes a mess of the interests of other people. Therefore the conjecture to re-point the Qal verb form ‫ יִ פֹּל‬to turn it into a Hiphil ‫ יַ ִפּל‬228 is not only unnecessary but it would be an impoverishment, since the proverb would then only say that he causes harm to others and nothing about harm to himself, while the Qal leaves room for his own misfortune and the parallelism for his social nuisance. Rashi illustrates the first half of the proverb with Balaam, who was a messenger of God but interfered with the message contrary to the will of God and was therefore killed (Num 22:20, 35; 31:8). The second half is, in his opinion, illustrated by Moses, who was also a messenger of God, but a faithful one (‫נאמן‬, the same root as ‫)אמונים‬, that heals.229 Emissaries who remedy the detrimental work of earlier emissaries are identified by the Vilna Gaon in the good spies sent by Joshua (Josh 2) and the negative spies sent earlier by Moses (Num 13:22). The only interpretation offered by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra is that the dependable envoy becomes a healing to the one who has sent him (‫)לשלחו‬. Malbim makes the proverb an allegory of the human soul as God’s envoy on earth who can either fulfil or neglect its mission on earth and consequently reap the appropriate reward in the hereafter.230 There is one statement in the 4th century Apostolic Constitutions231 in which the Septuagint version of the first hemistich is related to the human characteristic of arrogance. It ignores the Greek reading βασιλεὺς (‫ מלך‬for ‫)מלאך‬, to claim that any arrogant person (θρασύς) will fall into mischief, perhaps implying, a maiori ad minorem, that what goes for a king goes for anyone. Such an implication seems clear in the application by John Cassian (4th-5th century) of the first Septuagint hemistich together with 21:13 to substantiate his claim that even a monk will fall into the sins he condemns in others when his condemnation is done with inhuman severity.232

13:18 Shameful poverty implies one who lets go of discipline, but who heeds reprimand will be honoured. Like the previous verse, the rhythmic pattern of this one is 4+3, with one stress to every word (so also Toy and Gemser, although Toy leaves open the possibility of a ternary pattern, but does not substantiate). There is also a syntactic similarity in that both proverbs consist of one nominal and one verbal clause. However, in v. 17 the first hemistich is verbal and the second 228 So BHK, BHS but not BHQ; proposed by Wildeboer, Toy, Oesterley, Scott, Plöger, Scherer (1999, 121) and many others (the earlier listed by Toy and the more recent by Tuinstra). 229 So also Nahmias, who regards the giving of the Torah via Moses as an act of healing. 230 See Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 239). 231 Con Apost VII, 1, 8 (ANF VII, 467). 232 Cassian, Conf II, 10 (NPNF II/11, 419).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

nominal, while in v. 18 it is the other way round. Further, the hemistichs form a logical chiasmus:233 v. 18a

cause

(‫)פורע מוסר‬

→

consequence (‫)ריש וקלון‬

v. 18b

consequence (‫)יכבד‬

←

cause

(‫)שומר תוכחת‬

The first hemistich has two clauses simply juxtaposed. The same kind of construction is found in 13:1, called “blunt” and “stroboscopic” juxtaposition respectively by Fox and Williams.234 In the first hemistich, this works like a normal nominal predication with the subject at the beginning (poverty and shame as a hendiadys = a conglomerate of poverty and shame = shameful poverty)235 and the predicate at the end (one who lets go of discipline). Even if translated awkwardly, for instance, “shameful poverty is one who lets go of discipline,” it would still mean that shameful poverty implies236 a lack of respect in the one so affected for the basic prerequisite of all wisdom, namely ‫( מוסר‬discipline), which entails accepting authority.237 The second hemistich is more explicit, beginning with the subject in a participial construction (‫ )שומר תוכחת‬and ending with a predicate in the passive (‫)יכבד‬. Interestingly, the predicate of v. 18a and the subject of v. 18b stand next to each other as the inner points of the chiasmus, which is stylistically highlighted by the fact that both consist of a Qal participle masculine singular (‫ פור ע‬and ‫ )שומר‬followed by the respective objects, which in turn 233

Similarly Meinhold. See above, the commentary on 13:1 and the notes on Fox and Williams. Therefore it is unnecessary to insert ‫ ל‬before ‫( פורע‬which is done by McKane, following Toy, and others; cf. BHS). 235 Similarly Waltke, however not reflected in his translation. Avishur (1971-1972, 17-81) prefers to speak of “syndetic parataxis” because of an element of synonymity in the two elements involved in what is usually called hendiadys. Likewise, Lillas (2012, passim), in a massive study of the labelling of the phenomenon, uses the same term and specifically speaks of “attributive noun syndesis” where a reinterpretation of one of the nouns is possible (2012, 288). She has collected all the cases in Proverbs that she regards as candidates for the phenomenon and shows that they make up an appreciable portion of those in the whole Old Testament. Prov 13:18, which she classifies as a case of two dissimilar nouns, also features in her extensive list (2012, 567). Nevertheless, neither author can avoid using the term hendiadys, which I too will not attempt, even if I do not dispute the arguments for the dissimilarity between the phenomenon in classical literature and the Hebrew Bible. 236 Commenting on 13:1, Fox describes the same phenomenon as an implication: “ ‘X (is) Y’ means ‘X implies Y’ or ‘Y is the cause of X.’” He continues by referring to our present proverb as well as 14:8, 30; 15:15; 19:11. 237 On ‫( מוסר‬discipline), see 1:2, 7 and Vol. I, 56-57, 62-63. Sæbø calls ‫ יסר‬and ‫ מוסר‬the primary group of cognates (“Wortsippe”) to which the whole theme of education is attached (see also his own article in THAT I, 738-742). Stewart (2016, 78) argues, rightly in my opinion, that the concept is “at the heart of the book’s purpose,” and that the formation of pupils’ capacity for “complex moral reasoning” is tied to this concept (see also the note below on her contribution). 234

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

469

are synonyms (‫ מוסר‬and ‫ תוכחת‬238). Those who accept the corrective reprimand of authoritative teachers, are the opposite of those who do not, and thus also experience the opposite, which means that they are respected and honoured in society. The proverb expresses the default position of the deed-consequence nexus in sapiential literature: negative consequences where the tenets of wisdom are not respected, and positive consequences where they are. But there is more to it. This does not mean that all poverty can simply be ascribed to the rejection of discipline, or, to put it in positive terms, there is a poverty that calls for kindness and sympathy rather than censure. There are several arguments that support the rider that accompanies the nexus of deed and consequence. • Several proverbs rein in a doctrinal or mechanical automatism of such a kind.239 • The hendiadys of shame and poverty points to a caveat – only poverty brought upon oneself by deeds, justifies the inference that such a person has his own disregard for the fundamental tenet of wisdom to blame for the misfortune. • What Sandoval calls “the literary and moral Gestalt of the book” indicates that such images have the function of “motivational symbols.”240 Rather than endeavour to explain the mystery of existence, these symbols seek to persuade, prompt and give incentive to learners. • This is further supported by the antithesis of both the concepts of “honour” and “rich reward”241 in the single root ‫ כבד‬on the one hand, and the two motifs of poverty and shame as the semantic counter-pole. The nexus of deed and consequence is clearly present, but the built-in caveat about the exceptions to the rule precludes making a dogmatic principle of it. The difficulty of the first Hebrew hemistich is dodged by both the Septuagint and the Peshitta. Both take the participle ‫ פורע‬to mean “remove” or “eliminate,” but the Greek regards ‫ מוסר‬as the subject and the Syriac understands it as the object:

238 On ‫( תוכחת‬discipline, reproof, correction), see the commentary on 10:17; cf. 12:1; 15:5, 10, 31f.; 27:5. 239 Cf. 3:13-15; 8:18-19 (Sandoval [2006, 174-175]); 14:31; 17:5; 19:7; 21:13; 22:9; 28:27 (Sandoval [2006, 181-186]); 10:4 vis-à-vis 10:22 (Stewart (2016, 119). See Vol. I, 39-46 (§ 8.4, the essay on the possibilities and the limits of the deed-consequence nexus in the Book of Proverbs). 240 Sandoval (2006, 177). The motivational function of such proverbs receives thorough attention in a whole chapter of the study of poetic ethics in Proverbs by Stewart (2016, 102129, esp. 119, with reference to the act-consequence model); it also implies her “Model of Desire,” which is the third of her overarching category “Models of Mûsār” (2016, 130-169); for Prov 1:1-10, cf. Sandoval (2006, 71-75). 241 See Fox, following Ehrlich.

470

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 πενίαν καὶ ἀτιμίαν ἀφαιρεῖται παιδεία (Teaching takes away poverty and dishonour) À{xüã èÚáÔÃã Áüï‹{ ÀÎçÞêã (Poverty and dishonour annul teaching)

In doing so, the Greek text undergirds the straightforward concept of deed and consequence, while the Syriac propounds the pessimistic opposite, somewhat akin to Qohelet (cf. Qoh 10:1). As far as I can see, this proverb does not feature very prominently in classic rabbinic exegesis. Rashi (1040-1105) and Gerondi (1180-1263) do little more than paraphrase the first half. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra does basically the same with the first half, but interestingly refers to Ex 5:4, where the root ‫ פרע‬Hiphil is used in the sense of letting someone stay away from work (in Pharaoh’s mouth!). To him, that proves that the censure is given in the proverb because “not accepting discipline” means “not actively rushing to embrace it,” which is a theological amplification of the saying. Ramaq (12th century) however explains the second half by supplying the logical subject of the passive verb ‫ יכבד‬in the light of 1 Sam 2:30, where it is said that God honours those who honour him.242 In so doing, he also implies that accepting reproof from God is honouring him. John Chrysostom comments on the Greek version of the proverb with mild moral criticism of the Old Testament. In the days of ancient Israel, poverty and dishonour went hand in hand, but, while he does not directly dispute that teaching can take away poverty, he does say that wealth cannot provide that necessary teaching. Hill observes that Chrysostom does not take the opportunity to develop the idea of or refer to enrichment by the poverty of Christ (2 Cor 8:9).243 In Melanchthon’s commentary of 1550 the verse is not commented on, but in the early Nova Scholia version of 1529 it does feature. There Melanchthon illustrates the fool who does not respect discipline by means of a comparison with Pharaoh (cf. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra!). Like the king of Egypt, such a person will have to learn by hard experience. He also makes a case for theologising the proverb as a call to penance, which is a form of being disciplined, so that learning the hard way does not become necessary. To this end he first refers to the parable of the fig tree in Luke 13 (he means vv. 6-9), to show that acceptance of God’s command to bear fruit is necessary for avoiding being totally uprooted. He then cites Isa 26 (he means v. 16), viz. that Israel called out to God when they felt his discipline (‫)מוסר‬, which shows that Israel indeed accepted God’s reproof for their sins. Such use of the Reformation principle of “interpreting Scripture through Scripture,” which to Melanchthon entails situating single sayings on the narrative line of the whole Bible, is typical of his hermeneutics.244

13:19 A desire come true is pleasant to the soul, and it is an abomination to fools to turn away from evil. The first hemistich is a verbal sentence and the second nominal. Each word has one stress so that the rhythmic pattern is 4+4. Gemser finds the same, but 242 243 244

The exposition of Delitzsch amounts to very much the same. Hill (2006, 225). Cf. Loader (2017, 61).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

471

Toy assigns no pattern to the verse, since he regards both hemistichs as displaced and without the respective halves that ought to accompany them.245 Although Toy’s opinion is understandable because at first sight one might indeed imagine a fit between the two hemistichs to be lacking. But that is the case only superficially (see below). The first half of the proverb contains a seminal utterance for those commentators who would argue that vv. 12-19 contain a cluster made up of sayings the theme of which is, they claim, the “fulfilment of desire.”246 There certainly is correspondence between vv. 12 and 19a about the idea of desire and fulfilment, but the theme is neither equivalent nor steadily developed in the intervening verses. Any suggestion of a centred structure is disturbed by irregularities in the placing of sayings. Moreover, one could Rorschach the motifs and ideas in these verses into relating to unlimited contexts. I would thus rather align my position with the stance taken by Hermisson, viz. that vv. 12 and 19a do indeed correspond as far as the idea of desire and fulfilment is concerned, but that the thematic variety of the verses in question does not warrant regarding them as a structured group. Additionally, according to Hermisson, the idea of a centred structure is disturbed by irregularities in the placing of sayings.247 Finally, it should be added that the fulfilled desire spoken of in v. 19 is something quite different from that in v. 12 (see below).

The feminine singular participle Niphal of ‫ היה‬qualifies ‫( תאוה‬a desire come into being, that is, into realisation) and ‫ ערב‬Qal (be sweet) has the generic meaning of being pleasant. The first hemistich thus states that a desire coming true is an experience of a pleasant occurrence, but it does not say who has the positive experience. In the second hemistich, finding something a ‫תועבה‬ (abomination)248 is a negative experience, and in this case both the cause of the feeling of abhorrence and the type of person undergoing it (respectively turning away from evil, and fools) are mentioned. There is thus a lacuna in the first hemistich, viz. that we are not told who has the pleasant experience 245 Toy refers to 13:12 for the first hemistich and to 29:27 for the second. This seems to be echoed by BHS, where it is surmised that a hemistich or a full stich has dropped out at this point. McKane also treats the two half-verses separately; Kuhn (1931, 30) tries to construe harmony by conjecturing that the last two words should be read, ‫( מוסר רע‬bad discipline), meaning that the fools will receive “bad punishment.” But ‫ מוסר‬is discipline in a positive sense, intended to educate people to be wise so as to reap the reward (cf. the previous verse), and would not be called “bad” or “evil.” 246 See the discussion, table and references above in the section on “Chapter Organisation” in the Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 13. For Meinhold, Heim and Waltke vv. 12-19 are about “longing satisfied.” Schipper prefers “speech, longing and hope.” On the other hand, Stewart (2016), who finds the concept of desire central to the Book of Proverbs (see the notes in the commentary on vv. 12 and 18 above), pays no attention to this proverb in her book. Fuhs does not consider the parallel with v. 12 significant, but does think that both hemistichs of v. 19 as they now stand summarise a “small unit” in vv. 14-19. 247 Hermisson (1968, 177). 248 The word ‫ תועבה‬is usually found in the stock phrase ‫( תועבת יהוה‬for instance, in 15:8), but 13:9 is one of a few where it occurs not only alone (as in 6:16 and 28:9), but where the context also does not suggest that it is an abomination felt by Yahweh (8:7; 16:12; 26:25; 29:27); see Heim (2013, 366).

472

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

of a desire being fulfilled. But, as we have often found in the short sayings from Prov 10:1 onwards, we should fill such gaps by rereading the first half in the light of the second. In this proverb, that offers three possibilities: (a) We could follow Riyqam by assuming that the parallelism is antithetic and then infer from v. 19b that the opposite of the fools must be meant in v. 19a, that is, the lacuna is filled by the motif of the righteous or the wise, who then find a fulfilled desire pleasant. But we do not have to assume that. (b) Turning away from evil (v. 19b) is evidently a good thing (symbol: +) and having an experience of abhorrence is clearly a bad thing (symbol: -). The logical subject of the pleasant emotion can however also be undesirable, so that the parallelism is not antithetical but “synonymous.” The lacuna in v. 19a can equally well be filled with a negative type (symbol: -) such as the fools in v. 19b. A fulfilled desire is something positive and naturally affects one’s awareness positively (symbol: +). So fools have joy when their desire to do evil is fulfilled. (c) A variant of this result would also be obtained if we decide that the statement in the first hemistich is too general to be restricted to either the righteous (so Fox, in opposition to Riyqam) or the fool. Then the argument would be: The fact that fools find it abhorrent to turn away from evil things (as demanded in 1:15 and 4:14-15), illustrates the fundamental psychological insight that the human tendency generally delights in desires coming true. It follows that fools actually yearn to do evil, which is a known observation of the sages (cf. 4:16-17 and 9:17). The proverb has the logical form of a chiasmus: v. 19a [+] positive experience (‫[ ← )תערב לנפש‬-] bad (= desiring [bad]) (‫)תאוה נהיה‬ v. 19b [+] good (= avoiding bad) (‫[ → )סור מרע‬-] negative experience (‫)תועבת כסילים‬

The proverb works with opposites, but because the good is negatively experienced (v. 19b), that amounts to the same as desiring the bad implied in v. 19a. Likewise, when a bad desire is relished (v. 19a), it amounts to the same as proceeding along the way of evil expressed in v. 19b. The parallelism is therefore not simply “synonymous,” but the impact of its parts on each other adds value to the insight it expresses. The plusses, so to speak, succumb to the minuses. To relish a bad desire is to abhor the good and amounts to not turning from the evil way, but actually continuing along it.249 249 Delitzsch comments on the fact that fools (‫ )כסילים‬and not the wicked (‫ )רשעים‬are mentioned here: “Folly is that which causes that men do not break free from evil, for it is the deceit of sinful lust which binds them fast thereto.”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

473

The verb ‫ סור‬implies the metaphor of the way, which stands for doing things (cf. 15:24; 16:6, 17). Relishing bad desires leads to practising evil. As opposed to v. 18, this proverb seems to have generated a lively interest among rabbinic commentators. Rashi also reads the ‫ כסילים‬of the second half back into the first. The first hemistich must mean that fools gratify their own desires. That is why they abhor turning away from evil – their natural inclination is not to walk the way of the good. The latter is the same as the way of wisdom, which seeks to do what God desires and thus pleases him. Since fools seek their own gratification – which is the same as fulfilling one’s own desires – the desire fulfilled according to the first hemistich must refer to the bad desire of fools. See above on Riyqam (born 1105, the year of Rashi’s death), who applies the same principle of rereading the first hemistich but arrives at the opposite conclusion due to his a priori assumption that the proverb is antithetic. Yonah Gerondi (13th century) and Nahmias (14th century) interpret the first half to mean that the sweetness of desire fulfilled in the present, only lasts a short while. Gerondi appeals to the Niphal participle ‫ נהיה‬as a present tense to support the claim, which explains why the wicked keep following the way of evil, namely, to chase after repeated momentary pleasures. Nahmias, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, the Mezudat David and others take ‫ נהיה‬to mean “broken”250 which construes an antithesis to the last hemistich: a broken desire to sin gives satisfaction to the wise, while fools continue along the way of sin.251 To Ramaq fulfilled desire is to accept reproof (which aligns with v. 18) and equals the wish to do God’s desire, as opposed to fools who seek to do only their own. Malbim offers a metaphorical reference to the soul as God’s emissary, which recalls v. 17. When the human being fulfils God’s will the reward follows, otherwise the punishment in Gehinnom. The Vilna Gaon later echoes this tradition, as well as an allusion to Moses, which was already suggested by Rashi and Nahmias. Chrysostom follows the Septuagint in ascribing the desires of the first hemistich to the pious (ἐπιθυμίαι εὐσεβῶν). He seems to suggest that mortals should desire the opposite of “external things,” like fasting, prayer, and similar things that purify the soul.

13:20 Who goes with the wise will become wise, but who consorts with fools will be harmed. Whether we read the Ketib or the Qere in the first hemistich, the rhythmic pattern of the saying as a whole (3+3) as well as its thrust remains the same. The translation above is done according to the Qere, which is supported by the parallelism. 250 In support, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra explicitly quotes words from Dan 8:27, understood as, “I was broken,” and Nahmias quotes Daniel 2:1, where the same verb is used to indicate that the king’s sleep was “disturbed” (‫)ושנתו נהיתה עליו‬. 251 Schultens picked up the importance of the Niphal participle, the broken desire and the references to the two Daniel passages. Since he does speak of the Rabbini, it must be inferred that he was influenced by at least some of them like Nahmias, Pseudo-Ibn Ezra and most probably by his near-contemporary, David Altschuler (1695-1753, Mezudat David). However, he does not cite any of them directly.

474

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

Ketib: ‫רוֹע׃‬ ַ ֵ‫ת־ח ָכ ִמים וַ ֲח ָכם וְ ר ֶֹעה ְכ ִס ִילים י‬ ֲ ‫ָהלוְֹך ֶא‬ [Go with the wise and become wise, but who associates with fools will be harmed.] Qere: ‫רוֹע׃‬ ַ ֵ‫ת־ח ָכ ִמים יֶ ְח ָכּם         וְ ר ֶֹעה ְכ ִס ִילים י‬ ֲ ‫הוֹלְך ֶא‬ ֵ [Who goes with the wise will become wise, but who associates with fools will be harmed.]

The Ketib reading has a double imperative in the first hemistich. The first verb is the infinitive absolute Qal of ‫הלך‬, which can stand for the imperative,252 and is followed by the second person masculine singular imperative Qal of ‫( חכם‬be wise, become wise). When one imperative (or functional imperative) is followed by another, the second expresses a consequence that will certainly ensue,253 so that the first option above could be paraphrased, “Go with the wise and you will certainly find that you become wise.” This is quite possible, but when read in light of the second hemistich, the parallelism makes the Qere reading preferable, which is probably why the Qere has been supplied by the Masoretes.254 It is therefore not surprising that the major ancient versions also follow the Qere.255 The second person of the imperative ‫ ֲח ָכם‬and the virtual imperative ‫ ָהלוְֹך‬would not go well with the undetermined third person of the participle ‫ ר ֶֹעה‬and the Niphal third person masculine singular ‫ יֵ רוֹ ַע‬256 at the end. The two Ketib forms for which Qere has been proposed are dependent on each other and either have to be accepted together or rejected together.257 On both counts the alliteration of gutturals and bilabials would remain intact. To this play on sounds the paronomasia of ‫ ר ֶֹעה‬and ‫רוֹע‬ ַ ֵ‫ י‬in the second half forms a counterpart. However, the main point remains the same: in terms of the nexus of deed and consequence, a positive attitude or conduct produces positive results and the opposite happens with negative conduct. In this specific saying the positive pole is wisdom and the negative is folly. But the proverb also contains 252

GKC 113bb. GKC 110g. 254 Several commentators nevertheless follow the Ketib, e.g. Toy, Gemser, Scott (“If you would become wise, seek the company of wise men”), Meinhold, Murphy, Fuhs, as opposed to Delitzsch, Ringgren, Plöger McKane, Clifford, Alter, Tuinstra, Waltke and others who opt for the Qere. 255 So most Greek witnesses as well as the Syriac, Aramaic and Latin versions. 256 The Septuagint misread the resh of the verb as a dalet and translates the supposed Niphal verb ‫ יודע‬as γνωσθήσεται (will be known, found out). In KAHAL, where the Niphal ‫רוֹע‬ ַ ֵ‫י‬ is presented as a hapax legomenon (†), 11:15 is overlooked, while Schipper is aware of both instances of the Niphal in Proverbs, but incorrectly cites the first as 11:30. He translates as though the verb is Qal (wird böse = becomes bad) but interprets it as Niphal (dem wird es böse ergehen = he will fare badly). On the other hand, Delitzsch both translates and interprets as though the verb were Qal, though without substantiation. 257 For this reason, the two forms may well be variants of the proverb (so EE); but the Qere variant may just as well be the result of a redactional opinion that the imperatival form is inelegant. 253

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

475

a specific extra element, pointing as it does to the importance of the consequences resulting from the company one keeps,258 the choice of which is either wise or foolish. This succinctly sums up the central aspect of the extended warning about bad company offered in the poems of Prov 1–9 (for instance, 1:7-19)259 and the repeated encouragement to seek the company of wisdom (for instance, 1:23; 4:7-8; 8:1ff.; 9:3-6). A similar warning is given by Achiqar. The text is damaged, but enough can be made out to recognise the warning not to fraternise with a bad man or accompany him on the way.260 The same principle is found in the Demotic Instruction of Ankhsheshonq, whose threefold statement in the indicative is just as powerful a warning:261 The friend of a fool is a fool; the friend of a wise man is a wise man; The friend of an idiot is an idiot. According to Rashi, walking with the wise means learning from them, and being friends with fools entails being broken. This is taken up in the 18th century by the Mezudat David and explained as learning from the respective types, being influenced by them and therefore reaping the respective consequences. These rabbinic commentators associate the verb ‫ רעה‬with the noun ‫( ֵר ַע‬friend), whereas the Vilna Gaon associates ‫ רעע‬with ‫( ַר ע‬evil) which to him suggests – despite the Niphal – that the companions of fools will “become evil.” But, perhaps influenced by Yonah Gerondi, he also finds in it an allusion to the participle Qal of ‫( רעה‬shepherd, leader), which is dealt with in the Pirqe Abot (4:20) by intimating that it is better to be the tail of a lion (following behind it) than the head of a fox (leading it). The Midrash Mishle begins its attention to the chapter at this verse. The proverb is explained with a parable putting almost exclusive emphasis on the social aspect of the saying. The first hemistich can be compared to entering a perfumer’s shop – the sweet odour scents one’s garments for a long time. The second can be compared to entering a tanner’s shop – the stench clings to one’s clothes merely because of having been there. Society will judge anyone keeping company with sages to be a sage himself, and anyone walking with fools will be regarded as a fool.262 The social dimension is also strongly emphasised by Bahya (1255-1340),263 whereas Malbim emphasises the difficulty of becoming the friend of the wise. To him, the verb means “to follow humbly behind,” which entails a long learning process under the guidance of the wise, whereas becoming the friend of fools is easy and quick. The Constitutions of the Apostles, a set of rules from the 4th century, simply quotes the Septuagint version of the proverb as an injunction to one aspect of the “two ways”, that is, the way of life and the way of death.264 Chrysostom finds the motif 258

So Van Leeuwen, Clifford, Fox and others. Cf. the same warning in the short sayings: 22:24; 28:7; 29:3 (where ‫ רעה‬is also used). 260 Column xi, l. 163f.; see Cowley (1923] 1967, 225; ANET, 429). 261 Instr Ankhsheshonq XIII, 6-7 (AEL III, 169). 262 Visotzky (1992, 68). 263 Cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 240-241), who produces his own set of biblical examples of how association with wise people can lead to good results (e.g. Gen 13:12; 14:12) and how association with bad people results in trouble (e.g. Num 16:32). 264 Con Apost VII, 1, 8 (ANF VII, 467). Cf. above on v. 17, which is quoted in the same paragraph of the Constitutions. 259

476

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

of a journey the only thing in the proverb worth commenting on. He thinks “most of the time” a journey is meant, thus not an association. Quoting Sir 19:30 to the effect that only one’s clothes or a laugh can show what a person really is, so much more is travel beneficial if shared. He ignores the second hemistich, including what it could mean if heedless people are “known” (γνωσθήσεται). One feels that his attention to this proverb is not the showpiece of the best Chrysostom can offer.

13:21 Evil pursues sinners, but the good rewards the righteous. The rhythmic pattern is again ternary (Toy and Gemser)265 and the verse consists of two verbal sentences. There are several ways in which the proverb, especially the second hemistich, can be read. Even so, the basic point being made is clear enough. Schipper points out that the use of ‫( חטאים‬sinners) and ‫( צדיקים‬righteous people) evokes a religious suggestion (cf. 1:7-19). The sinners come to harm while the opposite fortune befalls the righteous. It is thus a straightforward instance of the correlation of deed and consequence. But both the syntax and the relation of the two hemistichs to each other are the interesting aspects. In both halves the syntax is conspicuous because each sentence begins with the object and not the verb or even the subject. In the first case that is clear from the third person feminine singular verb (‫ )תרדף‬for which only the feminine singular (‫ )רעה‬can serve as subject. In the second half both the nota accusativi with the plural object (‫ )את־צדיקים‬and the masculine singular verb (‫ )ישלם‬with the masculine singular ‫ טוב‬show that the former is the object and the latter the subject. Several commentators however prefer either an undetermined subject or a passive with implied logical subject, which may be construed as impersonal or to imply God (who is never mentioned in Prov 13). The options may be summarised as follows: (a) Several commentators think with Delitzsch that the second half is construed with a double accusative, which would require as the subject either an indefinite “person” (Meinhold, Schipper) or “he” referring to God (Plöger, Fox): “one/he rewards the righteous;” alternatively, it could be glossed by a passive (Delitzsch, Clifford, Alter, Fuhs): “the righteous are rewarded with good.”

265 The second maqqeph, which de-emphasises the ṣere of ‫ ישלם‬to segol, binds the last two words into one stress unit, but the first maqqeph carries the rebia mugrash (a rebia preceded by a geresh), which is a disjunctive accent and thus requires two stresses on ‫יקים‬ ִ֗ ‫ת־צ ִדּ‬ ַ֝ ‫וְ ֶא‬.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

477

(b) Following the Septuagint (καταλήμψεται), Wildeboer (with some hesitation) and Gemser alter the text in order to maintain ‫ טוב‬as the subject.266 They need an emendation with the help of ‫ נשג‬Hiphil (reach), Gemser even with the third person plural suffix (‫)ישיגם‬:267 “the righteous, the good will reach them.” (c) Without reverting to textual emendation, ‫ טוב‬can be the subject of the second hemistich in the same way that ‫ רעה‬is the subject of the first. Gemser could have kept his idea that ‫ טוב‬is the subject without burdening it with an unnecessary emendation (so Ringgren and Waltke). In my opinion, as argued above, this is the best option for which the parallelism offers strong support. V. 21a

V. 21b

3. ‫רעה‬ ↑ subject ↓ ‫טוב‬

2. ‫תרדף‬ ↑ verb ↓ ‫ישלם‬

1. ‫חטאים‬ ↑ object ↓ ‫את־צדיקים‬

The effect of the unusual syntax is to alert the hearer/reader to an unusual element of the content, namely a colourful use of metonymy. ‫( רעה‬the bad, evil, misfortune) is used metonymically, it pursues sinners as though it were an officer of justice or, as Fox pictures it, a demon. ‫ רדף‬is used in the Piel, which is the intensive conjugation, suggesting a relentless hunt. Schipper points out the military use of the term (cf. Ex 14:4, 8, 9) and its use in 11:19, where it is the bad man who pursues evil, compared to which 13:21 makes the hunter become the hunted. Evil itself turns upon those who would seek to bring it on others. In the same way ‫( טוב‬the good) itself repays the righteous who practise it (cf. Ps 23:6, where the good and kindness are presented as the agents of themselves in the same terms as here [likewise Van Leeuwen]). Rashi paraphrases that the evil pursuing the sinners is their own wickedness that causes their downfall. Yonah Gerondi (1180-1263) interprets the pursuit as a chase in which their own evil makes them fall into worse evil, ultimately leading to their ruin. Likewise Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, who says their own evil not only pursues them, but actively brings them to a fall (‫)ותפילם‬. In the 18th century the principle is expanded by the Mezudat David by stating that the pursuit consists of an accusation, which seems to suggest a judicial process. On the other hand, the good deeds of the righteous 266 Toy follows the Septuagint to read ‫ ישג‬Hiphil and render, “good fortune is the lot of the righteous.” 267 It results in an awkward casus pendens in the accusative noun. Although an object can also be placed in a casus pendens at the beginning of a sentence (e.g. Gen 13:15; 21:13; 35:12; 47:21; cf. GKC 143d), Waltke rightly observes that this is impossible as a retroversion from the Septuagint, which leaves no room for an extra pronoun. In any event, it overlooks the careful alignment of the second hemistich with the first, to which we will presently turn.

478

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

do aid them by preventing them from submitting to sin, but their reward then comes from God – so Ramaq (12th century) and Hame’iri (13th/14th century). The Vilna Gaon ingeniously undergirds this interpretation by suggesting that the ‫ טוב‬that repays them is the divine commandments, because God’s commandments are ‫טוב‬.268 The good that the righteous do therefore rewards them with more opportunities to do good and thus increases the reward they ultimately receive from God. John Chrysostom interprets the use of the Greek verb καταδιώκειν (chase, hunt) to refer to the speed with which the punishment of the wicked will come. It seems to suggest an awareness of the problem that retribution often cannot be seen and to offer consolation with the blind assurance that it will be quick. Melanchthon does not comment on the verse in his 1550 commentary, but does discuss a theological implication in the earlier Nova scholia of 1529. Here his only purpose is to defend the position that God is righteous, even if we cannot observe the smooth functioning of the doctrine of retribution. He uses the well-established argument that, if the wicked are not punished in this life, it will necessarily come after death.

13:22 A good man will bequeath an inheritance to his son’s sons, but stored up for the righteous is the wealth of the sinner. The first hemistich is a simple verbal sentence, while the predicate in the second has a passive participle Qal of ‫( צפן‬hide, store up). The rhythmic pattern marked out by the Masoretic pointing is 3+4, but 4+4 is also possible (Gemser), since the syllable count on both sides of the maqqeph rules out any stress pile-up. There are several aspects that this proverb has in common with the previous one, perhaps enough to regard them as a proverb pair. First and most obvious is the chiastic order of the roots ‫ חטא‬and ‫ טוב‬spanning the beginning and end of both v. 21 and v. 22 (stressed by commentators like Yoder, Lucas and several others): V. 21

‫טוב‬

V. 22

‫חוטא‬

‫חטאים‬ ‫טוב‬

Second, one element in the syntax of v. 22b is similar to that of the clause organisation of v. 21, namely that the subject in the second hemistich comes last in both cases;269 however, that does not go for the first hemistich (v. 22a). Thirdly, the ‫ צדיק‬appears in one half of both proverbs (however, in the case of v. 22, in the ‫חטא‬-hemistich and not in the ‫טוב‬-hemistich as in v. 21. Finally, there is a thematic similarity between the two proverbs. On this 268 269

Cf. Neh 9:13, where the commandments (‫ )מצות‬are explicitly called ‫טוב‬. Here too a participle (‫ )צפון‬is used as the predicate, which occurs frequently (GKC 116m).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

479

level, v. 21 makes the very general claim that evil befalls sinners while the good becomes the fortune of the righteous. V. 22 narrows down the general assertion appreciably by restricting it to financial and social wealth (see below), and even further to the aspect of the inheritance of such wealth. It is therefore quite understandable that the two proverbs were edited to stand next to each other, but not that they were conceived together and composed to make each other intelligible. They do not need each other to be understandable and, since each can be read and understood in its own right, they should be so discussed. Only afterwards can we appreciate if and how one may illuminate or illustrate the other.270 The verb ‫ נחל‬Hiphil (give as possession, give as an inheritance) can be used with the accusativus personae et rei (the person receiving and the thing given) or, as here, with the accusativus rei unmentioned.271 The receivers of the good man’s inheritance are his grandchildren. There is no accusativus rei to say what the inheritance consists of, but “wealth included status and honor rating as well as possessions.”272 The good man bequeaths his possessions as well as his “social capital” (Schipper) to his grandchildren. Not just his children, but also his further offspring benefit, which signifies the family solidarity over generations (cf. 1. Chron 28:8).273 The other side of the coin is to have an estate that could be bequeathed to one’s heirs, but to have no offspring, which to Qohelet is wrong and a terrible misfortune (Qoh 4:7-8).274 Equally bad is to lose one’s wealth to others before death, so that there is no inheritance anyway (Job 28:8; Qoh 6:1-2). That would ipso facto mean that no offspring receive any inheritance. Such a situation seems to be intended in the second hemistich. Having ‫( חיל‬strength, wealth) stored up (‫)צפון‬, the sinner also possesses an inheritance. But in his case it has been stored up for the benefit of others (cf. Whybray). The sinner will find that his wealth turns out to have been preserved for people other than his heirs or even himself (28:8; cf. 11:8, where according to Tuinstra the idea of the wicked 270 See the Introduction to this volume, Par. 1.1 and 2.2.3; cf. also Hermisson (1968, 182); Weeks ([1994] 2007, 39). 271 The receiver can also have the preposition ‫ל‬, as in 1 Chron 28:8. 272 Pilch (2016, 49); cf. 2:1, where it is clear that spiritual goods can also be “stored up” (‫ ;)צפן‬this was already made explicit by Volz (1911, 193-194), but McKane only reckons with an inheritance of material goods. 273 Schipper argues, with reference to Ex 34:7, that it is possible for the merit of the fathers to be carried over to the “children’s children” in the same way that the guilt of one generation can be carried over to the following generations (cf. also Ex 20:5); Lucas relates the idea to the lack of a clear concept of life after death, meaning that apparent injustice is rectified on earth in this way. For the continuance of family heritage, see Moss (2015, 64). 274 Cf. Qoh 2:18-21, which can refer to the calamity of having to leave one’s possessions to strangers and, in any event, having to do so while being uncertain whether the one who takes over the wealth is a fool; cf. also Qoh 2:26; 5:12-13; Job 27:13-17; Sir 11:1819.

480

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

as substitute for the righteous is a possible reading). Fox and Schipper cite various Egyptian parallels pointing in the same direction. Amenemope says,275 An oppressor of the weak … His wealth will be seized from his children’s hands, His possessions will be given to another.

In the Papyrus Insinger it is said,276 Great is the affliction of those who left the [right] path at leaving their savings to another.

The proverb not only affirms the deed-consequence nexus as a matter of certainty, but also caters for the many cases in everyday experience where it can not be seen to work. Where that seems to be the case, the discrepancies are “hidden” (‫ )צפון‬as the inheritance is, and will one day become reality to the benefit of the righteous and the detriment of the sinners. Thus the theory is saved in this proverb (see below on Malbim).277 This reaction in itself is however relativised by many others showing the insight in sapiential circles that the workings of life are not reducible to a single formula, as is done, for instance, in the very next verse.278 Rashi interprets the first hemistich as a reference to both the material and the other merits of a good man that will reach his grandchildren. For the second hemistich he finds an illustration in Est 8:2, where it is said that Esther appointed Mordecai over the estate of the wicked Haman. Ralbag focuses on the generational aspect, viz. that the good man can bequeath not only to his sons but also to his grandsons, whereas the sinner cannot bequeath anything, not even to the sons of the very next generation. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra makes certain that the reader does not interpret ‫ טוב‬in terms of the previous verse (“the good”), but as a “good man.” He explicitly quotes Job 27:17 as a good exposition of the second hemistich. Malbim takes the proverb as the answer to the question forced by the previous verse: Why does actual experience provide so many instances that query whether the sinners are chased down by evil and the righteous rewarded by good fortune? The answer is that the good reward is stored or hidden, so that the sinners who now seem to enjoy their wealth will lose it in future and the righteous will find that the just retribution now seeming lacking appears from its hidden state in future. The non-functionality of the nexus between deeds and consequences that fit them is explained as a temporary matter. Chrysostom has nothing to comment apart from making certain that the Septuagint’s mistranslation of ‫( ינחיל‬he will bequeath) by κληρονομήσει (he will inherit) is turned around to mean “he will let inherit” instead of making the good man undergoing the “ultimate curse” of having to inherit children and grandchildren. Evagrius of Pontus interprets the “wealth of the ungodly ones” (πλοῦτος ἀσεβών) as “vice” 275

Amenemope VI, 8, 2 and 7-8 (AEL II, 152). Pap. Insinger XVIII, 17 (AEL III, 200). 277 Deferment to the future is an explanatory technique also found in Ps 37:10; cf. Loader (2001a, 9). 278 Cf. further 19:21; 20:24; 21:30-31; for a full discussion, see Vol. I, 39-46. 276

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

481

(κακία). This is of no use, since the righteous will destroy it through their good teaching either now or in the age to come.279 In a letter to Vincentius (Letter 93, dating from 408), Augustine280 quotes the second half of the verse in support of the first aspect of his point that no one rightly owns anything if he does not possess it as a righteous person (divine right) or if it has been forfeited according to the laws of earthly sovereigns (human right). In these cases, one’s possessions are “stored up for the righteous.” This is the last verse left uncommented by Melanchthon before resuming at v. 23, albeit only to proceed with Chap. 14.

13:23 The tillage of the poor may be plenty of food, but being swept away without justice does happen. The rhythm is 3+4, since the first two words are connected with a maqqeph, and the o-sound has been de-emphasised to a qamets hatuph, which makes Gemser’s consideration of four possible combinations questionable.281 The proverb may be read in several ways. (a) First, it may be taken as two nominal sentences: The tillage of the poor is [= yields] plenty of food and there is a blowing away without justice

This implies that the normal state of affairs is that the poor have abundant food. It can be objected with Toy and others that an owner of land known to yield abundant food, cannot be called “poor,” and that in that case no connection between the two halves is apparent. (b) A second option is to construe a contrast between poor and rich by paraphrasing:282 Even the tillage of a(n) (industrious) poor man yields plenty of food but (the rich) are swept away through (their) injustice

This tries to create a classic deed-consequence saying, but supposes so much that it is rather a creative paraphrase than a reasoned interpretation. (c) Third, the text can be emended to yield opposing social classes. For instance, Fox revocalises the first word with a patah to achieve “a great man”283 instead of “plenty,” and the next word with a ṣere to make it 279

Gohl (2017, 46). Epist ad Vincentium xii, 50 (NPNF I/1, 400). 281 Gemser presents it in his shorthand as 3(4)+3(4), which suggests four different possibilities. 282 This rendition seeks to convey what Toy intends in his paraphrase, which in turn is influenced by the suggestions made by several older commentators like Ewald, BertheauNowack and Delitzsch. 283 That is, “a powerful man.” Although this translation of ‫ ַרב‬is understandable, “great man” is usually understood in a positive sense. This understanding is already present in the Targum. 280

482

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13 the masculine singular participle Qal of ‫ אכל‬to be translated as “devour” instead of the noun “food.” The great man devours the tillage of the poor and some people are swept away without justice

The emendations are however not necessary in an attempt to create a sensible unity, for instance, by having the second hemistich repeat the basic idea of the first (the poor are indeed swept away when the powerful unjustly usurp their yields). (d) Finally, my suggestion (as translated above) is to leave the text unchanged and to interpret the first hemistich as a concessive clause284 and the second as the matrix clause. What Beckman285 says by way of opening his discussion of the concessive clause in Biblical Hebrew, fits this proverb perfectly: “A concessive clause leads one to be surprised by the matrix clause, because the situations that the two clauses denote are typically thought to be incongruent.” The supposed incongruence in the proverb accounts for the attempts at construing an antithesis between rich and poor or strong and weak. But in Biblical Hebrew the concessive clause, in English usually introduced by “although” or “in spite of the fact that,” can begin with a nominal clause. The first example given by Beckman illustrates this (Num 9:7): “We are unclean due to a corpse,286 why are we debarred from offering?” That is, although we are indeed unclean, there is no reason why we may not offer.

In the same way our proverb introduces the concessive part with a nominal clause: although the tillage of the poor man may indeed yield abundant food, the fact is that people are simply swept away through injustice. Therefore the proverb is not a comment on any putative strong man devouring the assets of the poor (like the one in the parable of Nathan, 2 Sam 12:17), but a qualification of the basic sapiential claim that good deeds (in this case industrious work) always lead to success (in this case enough food). Of course, it is hard work that brings wealth to the labourer in the first place, exactly as 10:4 promises and 13:4 confirms. That is the theory of the pure deed-consequence nexus. But it is equally true that injustice can sweep away the small farmer who has worked hard and has not deserved such treatment (cf. Isa 5:8; Am 4:1; Mi 2:2; Prov 10:15; 14:20; 18:23; 24:11-12). Therefore the nexus of deed and consequence remains the basis, but that does not mean that it is not sometimes subverted. Injustice is injustice precisely 284 The predicate of a nominal clause such as the first hemistich can also be expressed with a jussive (or an optative); see GKC 141f. 285 Beckman (2013, 537). 286 ‫אנחנו טמאים לנפש אדם‬.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

483

because the deserved result of honest labour is swept away by the powerful. The proverb employs the same rationale as the impeccable logic of traffic rules that are to be considered true and valid, even though they do not guarantee that innocent pedestrians cannot be swept away by offenders jumping a traffic light. Rashi takes the Masoretic vocalisation and accentuation seriously and theologises the interpretation on that basis. According to him, the abundance of food represents the abundance of Torah, and the tillage of the poor represents the efforts of pupils who still lack full knowledge but interact with their teachers. Thus, much Torah comes into the world through pupils who discuss Halachah with their teachers.287 An alternative interpretation is however that the abundant harvest is indeed produced, but swept away if the farmer does not give the necessary tithes for the support of others, which would then be the lacking justice. The Targum’s understanding that the produce of the poor is devoured by the rich is also found in the Yalkut Hamachiri,288 however with the rider that the wealth of such powerful rich people themselves will also be swept away if they do not look after the poor. The Vilna Gaon (18th century) accepts this as a fact of life, saying that the world needs the poor to do this kind of work for them, although he does ameliorate it by adding that that is precisely the reason why the wealthy should also give to the poor. In the 19th century, Malbim also rationalises the existence of a poor class, saying that God knows the poor would not work the land if they became wealthy. He then plasters it over with the idea that the merits of righteousness would no longer benefit the world if the righteous were to become rich (which contradicts the simple logic of deed and consequence). In any event, God’s justice remains beyond human understanding. As far as I can see, Chrysostom is the only patristic authority who comments on the proverb. He of course does so on the basis of the Greek version: δίκαιοι ποιήσουσιν ἐν πλούτῳ ἔτη πολλά, ἄδικοι δὲ ἀπολοῦνται συντόμως (The righteous will pass many years in wealth, but the unjust will perish quickly) The Greek version turns the denial of the deed-consequence nexus in the Hebrew text on its head, and Chrysostom says that the principle advocated by the Septuagint often occurs despite the fact that the non-operation of the retribution idea may seem to be a frequent phenomenon. However, Melanchthon finds the proverb so important that he resumes his commentary here after a break of eight verses and ends his commentary on the whole chapter with a full page on it. He calls it an “economic saying” (dictum œconomicum) that pronounces preference for mediocre faculties (mediocres facultates) combined with diligence. Then he transfers the principle to other spheres of life, for instance, to be humble and “mediocre” in society while at the same time being superior in faith and diligence.

287 The benefit that pupils may bring to their teachers is also mentioned in the Talmud (Taanit 7a). 288 Similarly Ralbag (12th century) and Pseudo-Ibn Ezra (14th century). The Yalkut Hamachiri is by Machir ben Abba Mari, probably dating from the 13th century and is a kind of midrash on the Prophets, Psalms, Proverbs and Job; see Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 242).

484

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

13:24 Who withholds the rod hates his son, but who loves him visits him with discipline. The proverb consists of two stichs with a rhythmic pattern of respectively 4 and 3 beats (so Toy and Gemser), one beat to each word, which makes it a typical Siebener often found in sapiential literature. The first three verbs are participles and the fourth (‫ )שחר‬is a Piel perfect third person masculine singular. The latter verb is a denominative of ‫( ַשׁ ַחר‬dawn) and in the Qal accordingly suggests seeking something early, but in the intensive Piel stem it rather connotes intensity or eagerness in the seeking (cf. Job 24:5). Here it has a double accusative, as pointed out by Wildeboer and Schipper (the third person masculine singular suffix is the direct object and ‫ מוסר‬is the indirect object). The perfective form does not mean that the visiting of the son with discipline is seen as a past action, but has a “present/habitual significance (‘the gnomic perfective’).”289 The first hemistich contains a sound play. Two words have the vowel pattern o + e in one word + o in the next word, which is repeated in the following two words: again o + e in one word + o in the next. ‫א בנוֹ‬ ְ ֵ‫שׂוֹנ‬ o e o

/ /

‫חוֹשְׂך ִשׁ ְבטוֹ‬ ֵ o e o

This brings about an assonance with the effect of internal rhyme, as Fox calls it. He also remarks on the abundance of sibilants, which not only goes for the first hemistich, but for both: only one word in each hemistich has no sibilant, viz. the last word of the first hemistich (‫ )בנו‬and the immediately following word opening the second half (‫)ואהבו‬. These techniques bind the two hemistichs together and simultaneously emphasise their contrast entailed in the antithetical parallelism. V. 24a if a man withholds the rod (practice)

V. 24b when a man loves his son (principle)

(principle)

he hates his son

(practice)

he visits discipline on him

The elements of the antithetic parallelism correspond crosswise. Semantically, the opening participial phrase about sparing the rod (v. 24ai ‫ )חושך שבטו‬has its counter-piece in the verbal phrase about visiting discipline (v. 24bii ‫שחרו‬ 289 So IBHS 30.4; cf. also what GKC (106n) call the perfectum confidentiae to express facts that “are undoubtedly imminent and, therefore, in the imagination of the speaker, already accomplished.”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

485

‫)מוסר‬. But syntactically, the first (“who withholds the rod,” v. 24ai) makes up the subject phrase and the second (“hates his son,” v. 24aii) is the predicate phrase. Likewise, the semantic opposite of loving the son (v. 24bi) is hating him (v. 24aii), but syntactically the hating is part of the predicate phrase in v. 24aii, while loving is part of the subject phrase in v. 24bi. In the first hemistich the argument thus moves inductively from the observation of what actually happens in fatherly education (practice) to the conclusion that such education is generally bad (principle), but in the second hemistich it is deductively argued from the given that the father educates lovingly/well (principle) to the conclusion that this will entail the actual application of discipline (practice). It is thus not true that inductive thinking is a hallmark of the older typical Israelite wisdom and deductive thinking part of a later wisdom imported from grand systems in other traditions, as Westermann would have us think.290 In this intricate web of connections the proverb builds on the solid sapiential premise that education and discipline go hand in hand (cf. 1:2291). On the concept of discipline in sapiential education, see on 1:2 (Vol. I) as well as the exposition of 10:13 above, particularly the note on corporal punishment, where references to secondary literature are given. It bears emphasising that the principle of discipline in education was no less important in Israel than elsewhere in the ancient Near East. The severity of physical discipline in education is not only striking in this proverb, but is also encountered in many others (cf. 10:13; 17:10; 19:18, 25, 29; 20:30; 22:15; 23:13f.; 26:3; 27:22; 29:15). However, the fact that ‫ מוסר‬292 is also present in v. 13:1 is no reason to follow Plöger in interchanging this verse and the following one so that the whole chapter could end with the concept with which it begins. In fact it doesn’t, and the most we can do about it is to speculate that a ring composition of sorts would have been nice if the last two proverbs were inverted. The recurring presence of the concept of discipline – be it expressed by the noun ‫ מוסר‬or the verb ‫ יסר‬or related words like ‫( תוכחת‬reproof)293 or by the drift of the proverb – does not make 13:24 and the others just cited “twice told” proverbs in the sense of Snell. He works with verbal repetitions and their revisions, not with recurring ideas.294 Similarly, the verse does not 290 E.g. Westermann (1990a, 12; 1991, 38, 42-44; also 1990b, 515-516), in which he was followed by Golka (1993, 115); cf. Loader (1999, 211-233) and the Introduction above (Par. 2.2.1) as well as the essay “On the Concept of Order” in Vol. I of the commentary, 19-28, esp. 24-25. 291 See Vol. I of the commentary, 56-57. 292 On ‫ מוסר‬and the root ‫יסר‬, see THAT I, 738-742. 293 Cf. on 1:23 (Vol. I). 294 Accordingly, Snell (1993, 121) includes a list of the proverbs where the roots ‫ אהב‬and ‫ שנא‬occur together, which includes this proverb.

486

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

participate in one of Heim’s sets of variant proverbs and he only incidentally refers to it in connection with corporal punishment as a phenomenon.295 Pilch296 finds this proverb one of the verses in the book that documents how boys in ancient Israel were taught “to suffer in silence and assert their manhood.” He goes on to compare the pampering of boys by their mothers, to which the discipline of the father seems to have served as an antidote, and finds it justified to suggest “male fear of the power of Middle Eastern women.” This may have been a reality, but it would still be a form of misogynistic patriarchalism. At least for this commentator, it is difficult to see how harshness towards boys helped to deal with fear of women. It is equally difficult to follow Waltke in simply ascribing the moral chaos of Western civilization or contemporary young people’s “evil ways” to “[t]he failure of the apostate Western world to continue the biblical practice” [meaning harsh physical punishment – J.A.L.]. A system of assaulting the backs of boys with sticks (10:13; 19:29; 26:3) to the point of almost killing them (19:18) was never a guarantee against the moral chaos of crime, violence and war. It may be that some “parents may now hate what they see” – as Waltke surmises – because they think they should have dished out more hidings.297 But there are very many children who now hate what they see in the chaos created in their world and still being inflicted on it and their chances of a wholesome life by the wholesomely disciplined generations of their parents and grandparents. The LXX presents an almost word for word, if somewhat palliated,298 translation of the Hebrew, only leaving the third person masculine singular suffix in ‫ אהבו‬unrepresented at the surface level of the Greek. It is therefore no surprise that this proverb is not annotated at all in EE. Already Ben Sira was explicit in his development of the theme of strict punishment (cf. Sir 30:11-12). Rashi (11th century) interprets the root ‫ שחר‬to indicate “morning”, which is then explained as the morning of life, when the child is still young (‫)לבקרים‬. Ralbag (14th century) offers the same idea, adding the reason that the child Heim (2013, 277). Pilch (2016, 183). 297 Clifford asserts the exact opposite: “It goes without saying that this paradoxical language cannot be used as an argument for the corporal punishment of children.” His fundamental point is right, but he is wrong in thinking that it does not need saying, as Waltke’s comment amply illustrates. Even stronger is Fuhs in his condemnation. While upholding the principle of authority and the idea that who does not want to listen must bear the consequences, he inveighs against teachers or fathers who angrily clobber away at boys, calling them people who themselves lack ‫ מוסר‬and who show psycho-pathological symptoms (“psycho-patologische Symptomatik” [sic]). Meinhold rejects using the verse as defence of violence, but he waters it down somewhat, while Yoder and Schipper avoid a direct answer to the issue. Luchsinger (2010, 225-226) speaks of the subjectivity of assigning positive or negative value to physical punishment. However, he only descriptively presents the difference between such views in ancient and in modern times as well as within the Old Testament itself (cf. Ex 2:13; Job 2:7). 298 Claiming the loving father “carefully” (ἐπιμελῶς) instructs his son. 295 296

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

487

is susceptible to influence at that age. Hame’iri (14th century) judges strict discipline to be the way to find and eradicate a child’s faults, and the Mezudat David (18th century) thinks that failure to correct children amounts to hating them, while Malbim (19th century) opines that too much pity for the child amounts to self-love of the parent and therefore to hatred of the child. God chastises whom he loves in this world (quite explicitly stated in 3:11-12) for the sake of atonement in the next. In the Yalkut Shimoni (13th century) it is generally stated that the discipline required from parents should be modelled on that of God himself.299 In the New Testament the motif of God who chastises whom he loves is taken up as well (cf. 1 Cor 11:32; Eph 6:4; Heb 12:5-11; Rev 3:19), which, however, does not necessarily reflect reception of this specific proverb. The concept is also found in the Montanist “Theodosus Excerpts” (also called “Excerpts of the Prophets”).300 Here God is said to have mixed fear with goodness, like the foul taste of wholesome medicine and the painful chastising for the benefit of children. Chrysostom sees “sparing” the child as tantamount to spoiling. But he does seem to soften the harshness by using an argumentum e silentio in the interpretation of the second hemistich: since the text says nothing of excessive punishment, it must mean that children should be corrected “diligently.” Cyprian301 extends this proverb (along with 19:18) to apply to correcting the wrongdoings of domestic servants. Harsh punishment of even young children is advocated in the Constitutions of the Apostles (4th century):302 “Subject them with cutting strokes and subjugate them from infancy, while you teach them the Holy Scriptures” (!). Melanchthon does not comment on the proverb. Calvin has nothing on the verse (indeed, nothing on Prov 13, apart from an unidentified quotation of v. 13b303).

13:25 The righteous eats until his appetite is satisfied, but the belly of the wicked remains empty. The rhythmic pattern is 4+3, again one beat to each word.304 The antithetical statements seem simple enough, but contain several elements that are not so straightforward as one might think. First, there are no less than three pairs of antitheses (righteous :: wicked, satiety :: want, appetite :: belly305). But they are not spread symmetrically 299 On illustrations of this idea by the Vilna Gaon from older sources, see Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 243). 300 Exc Proph IX, vii (ANF VIII, 44). 301 Testim III, 105 (ANF V, 555). 302 Const IV, ii, 11 (ANF VII, 435-436. 303 Inst III/18, 1; see above on v. 13. 304 Scherer (1999, 134-135) finds end rhyme in the final word of v. 24 and of v. 25 (‫מוסר‬ and ‫ )תחסר‬as well as a pair of proverbs at the end corresponding to a pair at the beginning (vv. 1-2). There is certainly a thematic correspondence (strict education and the motif of eating), which justifies calling these four verses a frame around the chapter, but not to deny a closer association in vv. 2-6 (see above on the Chapter Organisation with Table and literature). 305 So Clifford; Murphy mentions only the first two, while Sæbø focuses only on the ‫צדיק‬ and the ‫רשע‬.

488

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

through the two half-verses. Each of the six elements occupies a different place in the syntactical organisation of the respective hemistichs. ‫נפשו‬

‫לשבע‬

‫תחסר‬

‫רשעים‬

‫אכל‬

‫צדיק‬

‫ובטן‬

• As can be seen in the diagram, the righteous (‫ )צדיק‬makes up the subject of the first hemistich, but the motif of the wicked (‫ )רשעים‬in the second constitutes only half of the subject phrase (the nomen rectum of the genitive construction). • Similarly, the second conceptual antithesis, having enough to eat (‫אכל‬ ‫ )לשבע‬:: experiencing want (‫)תחסר‬, only partly corresponds to the syntax, since the verb expressing want makes up the whole predicate of the second hemistich, but its counter-pole is split over more than one component of the predicate in v. 25a. • Finally, the antithesis of appetite (‫ )נפש‬:: belly (‫ )בטן‬is divided between different syntactical units altogether, respectively one third of the predicate in v. 25a (‫ )לשבע‬and half of the subject phrase in v. 25b (‫)ובטן‬. Next, all of this may be read in several ways, leading to distinct meanings: (a) The proverb may be understood as a statement of the classic sapiential schema of reward and punishment for righteousness and wickedness respectively (Delitzsch, Toy, Fox, Waltke and others). (b) Second, the righteous eats just as much as he needs, while the wicked overindulges (Plöger). According to this reading, the proverb becomes a saying about moderation and excess. Delitzsch points out that this would have required the preposition ‫ עד‬instead of ‫ ל‬with ‫ אכל‬and that an adverb like ‫( תמיד‬always) would have accompanied the verb; see also under (c). (c) Third, the righteous is always content with what he has to eat, while the wicked always craves more (Jerome [Vulgate: insaturabilis], Ramaq). That would make the contrast one of contentment and greed. But the fact that this antithesis is integrated with the righteous/wicked antithesis makes it an ethical matter and not merely one of prudence, i.e., it is more than a matter of “control of one’s appetite” (Fox, although it cannot be denied that greed can encompass much more than eating). (d) In the fourth place, some also see scope for a metaphorical or spiritual dimension in the satiety and hunger (Waltke, Yoder). It is of course possible to understand eating and hunger metaphorically, but, as Toy notes, there is no incentive in the text itself to suggest this.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 13

489

The best is therefore to understand the proverb as an expression of the correlation of the fortunes of those who have the sapiential mindset of the righteous and those who are characterised by the opposite mindset, namely wickedness. Nevertheless, Van Leeuwen makes an important remark concerning the concept of moderation. Even if the proverb does not primarily contrast moderation and excess, it does express an expectation of the measure of the reward. The sages did not regard reward and punishment to operate mechanically. As can be seen clearly in the prayer of 30:8 (the only prayer in the Book of Proverbs), they did not expect the kind of wealth mentioned in 10:4 as a matter of course: “Give me neither poverty nor wealth, let me enjoy only the food I need.” According to the deed-consequence nexus, abundance must theoretically increase with steadily practised deeds of righteousness, but the sages knew that the theory does not work inexorably and they accepted that the reward itself has its limits. Schipper stresses that the reward is not ascribed directly to God, but is to be achieved by human adherence to the sapiential teaching. According to him, this distinguishes the proverb from what is found in Egyptian wisdom, where the enjoyment of abundance is explicitly linked to the godhead.306 The Midrash Mishle (c. 9th century) interprets the proverb firstly as a reference to one who partakes lavishly of the words of Torah, and secondly to one who has consumed no words of Torah. It also mentions a variant, viz. that such study should continue throughout life, since emptiness will be the punishment of those who did study in their youth but then forgot and neglected to rehearse it.307 Although Malbim (19th century) did not spiritualise the verse, he did link eating no more than what is physically necessary to a spiritualised view of ‫נפש‬, since eating sparsely is for satisfying the soul, not the stomach. Rashi thinks that the two hemistichs mean it always seems to the righteous that they are satisfied, while it never seems so to the wicked. Of course, this provides several ways of getting by the obvious fact that the wicked sometimes prosper whereas the righteous often do not. Some six hundred years later, the Mezudat David seems to develop a variation of these ideas by stating that the wicked fill themselves with unhealthy food and therefore always feel the need for more, while the righteous do not make that mistake and only eat to satisfy the soul. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra also addresses the discrepancy between the principle of reward and reality. He refers to Ps 37:25 and explains that the righteous are not provided with what they do not need in this world, while the wicked will not receive what they have enjoyed in this world. John Chrysostom notices the discrepancy between the non-operation of the proverb’s reward-and-punishment principle and the reality that can be observed plainly in everyday life. But his only answer to the question why that is so, is “that virtue by itself may be virtue.” Presumably that means that virtue does not need to be verified by the experiences of the virtuous.

306 307

Schipper cites the tomb stele no. 1949 [21] in the Liebig-Haus, Frankfurt. See Visotzky (1992, 69).

INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 14

Bibl. Boström 1928, 144-150; Dahood 1960, 176-181; Hausmann (1995, passim); Heim 2001, 171-191; Hermisson 1968, 177-178; Hildebrandt 1992, 433-444; Millar 2020, 49-50, 59-60, 98-99, 134-136, 138-139; Pilch 2016, 50-55; Sandoval 2006; Scherer 1999, 141-164 (rather than pp. 95-119 as Sæbø and Schipper cite it); Scoralick 1995, 218-230; Whybray 1994, 100-103.

Themes and motifs As one might expect, commentators often point out that, after a complete absence in the previous chapter, the divine name is used again in Prov. 14. This is indeed so, but needs to be qualified. ‫ יהוה‬is only mentioned three times (vv. 2, 26, 27), all of them as part of fixed expressions. In v. 31 God is referred to as the “Maker” (‫ )עשה‬of the poor (‫)דל‬.1 Whereas Plöger notes the fact without endeavouring to infer any relevance from it, Schipper offers a comprehensive theological interpretation of its pertinency for both chapters. According to him, Chap. 14 functions as a kind of rider to its predecessor. While the previous chapter offers sapiential torah without mentioning ‫ יהוה‬at all, Chap. 14 shows how folly destroys what wisdom has built up. In the end only ‫ יהוה‬remains. In this way, Schipper provides a valuable insight, which, however, the reader can obtain without recourse to an intricate composition theory (see below on Chapter organisation). Not the righteous vis-à-vis the wicked, but the prudent vis-à-vis the fool is the prominent opposition in the antithetical sayings (Sæbø, Schipper). The theme of inner human conditions and emotions is prominent in vv. 10-14 (to which 12:25; 13:12, 19; 15:15, 20 may be compared), relations between rich and poor and especially the king and society (vv. 28-35). Royal proverbs appear here for the first time in the collection. Chapter organisation Commentators are often uncertain about the organisation of the chapter (so Murphy).2 Whybray finds no signs of an “integrated structure” but offers 1 For Whybray, these few suffice to call the references to God “comparatively frequent” in the chapter. 2 Cf. Whybray (1994, 100); Murphy finds the variant sayings adduced by Scoralick (1995, 223) unconvincing as “genuine structural elements.” He calls the catchwords collected by Krispenz (1989, 168-170 [not pp. 68-70 as Schipper has it]) a “rocky” course of thought (it is worth pointing out that Krispenz does provide such a table, but does not discuss Chap. 14 at all in her treatment proper).

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 14

491

very little substantiating argument for what he does combine (cf. his column in the table below). Nevertheless, he does think that “small, mainly thematic, groups may be tentatively postulated.” Sæbø and others3 find a “looser” structure in this chapter than in Chap. 13. I would be inclined to interpret observations such as these to provide even further confirmation of the point I argued in the discussion above about the chapter organisation of Prov. 13. A glance at the table below4 will show that there is very little agreement among commentators who do find such groupings on where the groups or clusters or units are and what they look like – which again invites caution. Hermisson

Meinhold

1 links to 13:25 1-3 actions of 2-14 diverse sub- women & men combinations 4 isolated verse 5-9 discernment

Heim

Whybray

1-3 chiasmus in 1 1-3 & 3, around 2

24-35 syntax

1-9 opposition stupidity :: wisdom

4-9 speech-related 6-8(9) words, intellectual vocabulary

15-22 subgroups, 10-14 knowledge 10-14 knowledge 12-13 partial overlap of self of self, diverse catchwords 15-18 human types

Schipper

10-14 connections by means of words

15-18 intellectual 15-18 types

15-18 thematic and formal unit (cf. stupid and clever)

19-24 social con- 19-22 catchwords, 19-21 duct and conse- wordplay in 20-21 quences (Plöger 25-28 also includes 2324)

19-27 unit glued by “Themenverse” expressing fundamentals

similar 25-27 verses re- 23-27 begins with 29-30 lating to others proverb pair; further alliteration

28-35 framed as a unit by ‫ מלך‬and paronomasia

28-35 the rule of 28-35 intellectual 34-15:3 [“no kings and moral charac- … signs of … terisation integrated structure”] 3 Cf. for example, the positions of Wildeboer, Toy, Gemser, Murphy etc. Scott ([1965] 1981, 17) goes even further by not characterising only this chapter in such terms, but by including the whole of Prov. 10:1–22:15 in his verdict that all of it is “amorphous” and the result of a “gradual accumulation of the material.” 4 Only a few examples are included and the arguments (or lack of them) are only summarised in telegram style, but they are representative of what the various commentators do put forward.

492

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 14

Without a detailed discussion of the “structural proposals,” a remark by Murphy may suffice to characterise the examples given in the table (and similar ones). He says, “There is simply no consensus on how to break down the units, because the criteria change so quickly – at one time, catch words, but at another time themes.” On one hand, the sixty proverbs in what has become Chapters 13 and 14 have been edited to stand where they do. This holds good whether one works under the influence of the medieval chapter divisions or not, whether one agrees with Hermisson5 on association between 14:1 and 13:25 as a link between the two chapters or not, or whether one accepts a hiatus after the end of Chap. 146 or not. One could even accept many of the observations made by the commentators cited above and others.7 But on the other hand, that does not necessarily constitute evidence for the identification of units and clusters in the chapter. The elements of putative evidence are as diverse and inconsistent as Murphy says, and often merely supposed rather than demonstrated to be criteria. If many (or most or even all) of the observations are defensible or even correct but nevertheless lead to so many and widely differing pictures of the chapter organisation, then perhaps the only thing they show is that we can find such structures if we want them to be there. That would be the Rorschach principle of defining them into existence, but it may at the same time also be due to the “openness” of the proverbs in the whole book. Even so, the material in the text allows the reader to notice, emphasise and deemphasise features in ways serviceable to various configurations. Social background Older interpreters took the references to the king as an indication of a background in the time of the pre-exilic monarchy (e.g. Delitzsch). But Schipper argues with reference to Krüger,8 that the way the royal references are made equally well fits the Achaemenid monarchy of Persian times. He also finds indications in v. 4 of an agrarian background, but cautions against overinterpretation, since the saying is a general proverb using agrarian references as example for a general principle. Still, the proverb assumes hearers/ 5

Hermisson (1968, 177). For instance, at 15:3; so Whybray; cf. Fox on 14:35, who comments on rabbinic commentaries (Ramaq and Hame’iri) that pay no heed to the medieval chapter division introduced by Stephen Langdon of Canterbury only in the 13th century. 7 Cf., for example Lucas, who works with longer as well as shorter units and single lines, and Yoder, who works more reservedly along these lines. 8 Krüger (1997, 212-213). 6

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 14

493

readers who are familiar with the terminology and background of a farming community. According to Schipper, the proximity of v. 4 to v. 5 with its reference to judicial testimony could suggest education for the youth of an elite society to respect ethical behaviour in both the economic and the judicial spheres of society. As the intention of the redactor, that is quite possible.

TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 14

There are several “twice told” proverbs in this chapter, of which Schipper has made a convenient list with reference to where they are treated by both Snell (1993) and Heim (2013). They are best discussed at the appropriate places in the exegesis below. 14:1 It is the wise among women who gets her house built up, but folly – with her own hands she tears it down. The rhythmic pattern depends on whether the text is emended or not. Toy finds the text “in disorder” and does not provide a translation apart from speculative renderings of various thinkable emendations.9 One proposal is to read the problematic first hemistich by vocalising the first word with qamets hatuph instead of patah as in 9:110 (see below on the “twice-told proverb”) and deleting ‫נשים‬,11 but there are several reasons not to do so.12 First, ‫ נשים‬is attested by several witnesses, albeit in different ways, notably the Septuagint in the plural (σοφαὶ γυναῖκες [wise women]),13 the Peshitta in the singular (ÀĀäÚÞÐ ÀĀæs [the wise woman]) and the Targum in a different construction (‫[ חכימתא דנשיא‬the wise one of = among women14]). Moreover, there is no reason to claim with Murphy (followed by Fox, EE and others) that ‫“ נשים‬overloads the line.” Waltke calls this 9 Toy’s speculations (A wise woman builds her house, / A foolish woman with her hands tears it down; Wisdom builds her house, / Folly tears it down) are thinkable but speculative nevertheless; in the end, he makes no decision. On the other hand the speculation by Kuhn (1931, 31) is fanciful, if creative: he requires us to read, ‫( חכמה תשים באיתן ביתה‬wisdom situates her house on firm [ground]). 10 For the form, cf. 24:7; Ps 49:4; Judg 5:29. 11 So BHS (but not BHQ), EE, Oesterley, Gemser, McKane, Murphy, Fox, Tuinstra and others. 12 So (for a variety of reasons and with different outcomes) Plöger, Meinhold, Clifford, Waltke, Schipper and others; some retain the Masoretic consonantal text but are prepared to re-vocalise the patah in the first word with qamets hatuph (e.g. Tuinstra, Heim [2013,108]). At this point I would like to improve on what I wrote in my commentary on 9:1 (Vol. I, 381, n. 13), to the effect that qamets hatuph should “probably” be read in 14:1 instead of patah. The reasons given in the main text here are stronger than what to me seemed a probability at that stage. 13 Even though the Vulgate here has the singular mulier (woman), Jerome uses the word in the plural when he quotes the text in a letter to Oceanus (Epist Ocean XLIX, 5 [NPNF II/6, 144]). 14 Often agreed to in substance by the rabbis, e.g. Rashi (see below).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

495

view “arbitrary,” quite understandably, since it is merely declared as a fact but not substantiated. Four words in the first hemistich plus three in the second, each carrying one beat, constitute a typical Siebener, which often occurs.15 ‫ נשים‬only presents an overload to a reader who has already decided that the word should not be there. If the first word is taken as an adjective (‫)ח ְכמוֹת‬, ַ 16 it is plausibly an adjectival substantive and thus the nomen regens of a genitive of relation involving social structure, where each separate individual is personally represented. In such cases, the plural of persons can be construed with a singular in the predicate17 (Waltke: the wise among women). But if revocalised to make it a noun (‫)ח ְכמוֹת‬ ָ it has to be the singular subject of the verb as in 1:20 and 9:1. Another option is to retain the spelling with patah even for a noun, with Schipper’s argument that the Masoretes wanted to avoid any personification of wisdom as in Prov 1–9, since wisdom is not personified elsewhere. But that does not help much in terms of its own logic, for if wisdom is seen in the role of a builder, it is still personified, even if not identified with Lady Wisdom of Prov 1-9 and labelled by whatever term one chooses for the technique. One could of course argue that a singular wisdom of the first hemistich could be paralleled by an abstractum pro concreto in the second. Then ‫אולת‬ must be a metonymy for a foolish woman while the wisdom spoken of in the first hemistich would be a metonymy for a wise woman (Fox). But ‫ַח ְכמוֹת‬ as an adjectival substantive, would still be a be personification of wisdom. If ‫ נשים‬is retained after ‫ ַח ְכמוֹת‬as Schipper prefers, it would strain the construction itself too much to contain a personification (such as the tautologous female-personification-of-wisdom [‫]ח ְכמוֹת‬ ַ of women [‫)]נשים‬. On these grounds I opt for an understanding of the first hemistich similar to (but not identical with) Waltke’s, which goes back a long way in the rabbinic tradition, e.g. Rashi and the Vilna Gaon (albeit with different exegesis, see below). In light of the above, the parallelism of the verse can be summarised as follows: V. 1a ‫ַח ְכמוֹת נשים‬ gets built her house [by herself]

15 16 17 18

಩ :: :: ←

V. 1b ‫אולת‬ tears down it with her hands = by herself18

See above the Introduction 3.3 on Rhythm and Metre. This also occurs in Judg 5:29, where the verb is however plural. On the construction, see GKC 145l. So Riyqam in the 12th century.

496

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

Physical construction work was not the task of a woman, but a woman with wisdom (31:26) surely could and had to build up her ‫ בית‬as a centre of activities and people, that is, a household in the sense of production for and maintenance of the ‫( בית‬31:27) and in the sense of care for the members of the ‫( בית‬31:15, 22). As the whole poem of 31:10-31 demonstrates, each concrete activity of such a mater familias constitutes an act of constructive prudence, even if she had servants. The gap in the first hemistich over against the word ‫( בידיה‬with her [own] hands) in the second is filled by rereading the first half in the light of the second. Thus the destructive force of folly, standing for foolish activity, is pitted against the constructive power of wise activity. The wisdom in the heads of women stands for judicious creativity (metonymy) and simultaneously is a building activity actually undertaken (metaphor). When a metonymy combines with a metaphor, it is a case of metaphtonymy.19 Since the wisdom of women is mentioned in the first half, the folly of the second half refers to women whose actions are the opposite. Wisdom is thus a quality that enables the building up of a household, and folly is what causes its being torn down. If Fox is right that the personifications (of wisdom and folly) in Prov 1–9 were likely inspired by this verse, then perhaps it was because those who were responsible for the personifications appreciated the amplified power of what we call metaphtonymy. Snell identifies 14:1a and 9:1a20 as a repeated half-verse with one dissimilar word but does not offer conclusions about what this contributes to the exegesis. On the other hand, Heim21 provides an extended discussion in support of his proposal that folly tears down the same house that was built with wisdom (v. 1a), that is, not her own house. But he nevertheless arrives at the conclusion that the whole point of the proverb is to show the destructive force of folly as opposed to wisdom. Therefore, it does not seem decisive whether the last suffix of the verse refers to the same house as v. 1a or folly’s own house.22

When the question is asked why the motif of women is chosen to make this point, it may be answered that the woman is certainly not a symbol for abstract wisdom. The “model of desire,” to which Stewart23 devotes a whole chapter of her book on the shaping of the moral self in Proverbs, requires the inculcation of desire as a didactic strategy. Wisdom is primarily portrayed 19 The term was devised by Goossens (1995, 159-174 = 1990, 323-340). For the phenomenon, terminology and references, see above on 10:11, 13, 31. 20 Snell (1993, 45) places them in his category 2.1, and the two of them plus 24:3 as “a half-repeated verse with two dissimilar words.” Discussing this phenomenon (where the meaning in the repeated verses or half-verses is essentially the same) and clichés (where the meaning is not essentially the same), he sets out these comparisons again, without interpreting them (1993, 17-18). 21 Heim (2013, 198-201). 22 The latter view is taken by Murphy and Heim (2013, 198). 23 Stewart (2016, 130-169).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

497

as attractive by virtue of her character, not her sex appeal, which is quite clear in this proverb and in 31:10-31. But it also entails a risk when young males are addressed in suggestive terms.24 Nevertheless, an attractive woman is a poignant image for motivating young males to want her for her virtues. So, the images of the women in the two hemistichs are not merely abstractions of the good and the bad, but – even when they do represent the good and the bad – they do not abandon the concrete level, since they offer attractive advice that it is advantageous to want and thus to choose a wise woman as a wife (similarly Waltke, Fox).25 While Schipper is right that the contrast between wisdom and folly is central in the proverb, that does not mean that the strong imagery of the two types of women can be ignored.26 The theological weight of the contrast is rightly important to Schipper, but the way it manifests itself is a practical expression of its relevance for the education of young males. In this regard, Delitzsch goes too far in claiming that the woman is of even more importance than the father of the house, for which he is rightly criticised by Hausmann.27 In the rabbinic tradition, the reception of the proverb usually focuses on the wisdom of the woman of the household. The proverb is understood as a statement of what is told elsewhere in the Bible: the one who maintains the household is the wife (an insight that, however, does not vindicate the exaggerated stance taken by Delitzsch referred to above). So already Rashi in the 11th century, who refers to the story of On (Num 16), who was saved by his prudent wife from implication in the revolt against Moses. This is dependent on the Talmud where it is clear that the determining influence in the household is a woman, both positively as shown by the wife of On and negatively as in the case of Korah’s wife (Sanh 109b-110a).28 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra (12th century), Radaq (13th century), and Ralbag (14th century) go the same way, showing that the building intended is not architectural and refers to the enhancement of the well-being of the household. Ralbag’s older contemporary, Hame’iri, provides support for the view espoused above, namely that the boys being educated are taught that choosing a wise wife constitutes a material investment. Later rabbis find a more spiritual meaning in the proverb. For the Vilna Gaon (18th century) the wife has to be interpreted allegorically as one’s soul and the house as the everlasting 24 Stewart (2016, 166); cf., for instance, 4:6; 8:17; also the environment of extended sexual advice, both negative and positive, e.g. 2:16-19 and the entire Chap. 5. 25 The proverb’s openness to be read as teaching the power of the opposites “wisdom” and “folly” and as advice to young men for choosing a wife is not treated in the important monograph by Millar (see 2020, 1 and 5-9), which is to a large extent devoted to such openness. I have called this “ambivalence” or “ambiguity,” and do not regard these terms as negative. 26 Cf. the fundamental characterisation of the proverb genre given by Millar (2020, 6-7): “A proverb is by definition a truth in the public domain.” The very choice of this genre, she claims (in my opinion, rightly), legitimises other and new interpretations. 27 Hausmann (1995, 151). Cf. also Meinhold who seems sympathetic to the general idea of Delitzsch, but more careful in his formulation. 28 Cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 245; Rosenberg [1988] 2001, 79-80). Compare also the Midrash Rabbah 17:12, where the ability to make even good men wicked and wicked men good is attributed to the wife.

498

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

dwelling in the World to Come. For Malbim (19th century) ‫ אולת‬refers to any sceptic who doubts the Torah and thereby annihilates the positive edifice of wisdom. As far as I can see, the Christian reception of the proverb is rather meagre. John Chrysostom defends the value of women, even though he himself is not averse to denounce female shortcomings,29 which does suggest the necessity for such a stance in his society. He expressly explains the reference to the “hands” of the unwise woman (ἡ δὲ ἄφρων) as meaning “with her very own hands” (ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτῆς), that is, by herself – thereby anticipating Riyqam by some eight centuries. On the other hand, the Constitutions of the Apostles line up the proverb with Prov 11:22; 12:4; 18:3; 21:9; 31:10ff. and others as obvious support for the idea that a woman is subject to her husband.30 In a letter to Oceanus, Jerome31 offers an allegorical interpretation of the proverb. Referring to 31:10ff. he claims that women, whom he explicitly qualifies as “wives,” are the churches, that is, the brides of the bishops. Their task is to maintain the domains of their bishops. Melanchthon does remark on Prov 14, but only in vague and general terms (with the exception of vv. 12 and 28).

14:2 Who walks in his uprightness fears Yahweh, but who is crooked in his ways despises him. Like the previous proverb, this one also is a Siebener, 4+3 beats in seven words. The syntax shows a symmetrical pattern: ‫ירא יהוה‬ Participle + obj.

‫בישרו‬ Qualification + suffix

‫הולך‬ Participle

‫בוזהו‬ Participle + obj.

‫דרכיו‬ Qualification + suffix

‫ונלוז‬ Participle

All the verbs are participles. In v. 2a the first participle is followed by a prepositional phrase (the walker in his uprightness), and the second is followed by a genitivus objectivus (‫ יהוה‬is the object of the fearing). V. 2b also begins with a genitive construction, where the nomen rectum specifies the nomen regens,32 while the object of the last participle is added in the form of a pronominal suffix. Although the sentences contrast semantically, they are syntactically identical.33 Both hemistichs can be read in two ways (similarly Fox). 29

Hill (2006, 225). Const Apost I/iii, 8 (ANF VII, 395). 31 Epist Ocean XLIX, 5 (NPNF II/6, 144). 32 For a passive participle in the construct state (here in a kind of genitivus respectus), see GKC 116k. 33 This proverb illustrates well what Greenstein (1982, 44) sees as parallelism proper, viz., analogous to the use of the term in geometry, “the repetition of a syntactic pattern” (cf. Millar [2020, 55]). 30

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

499

(a) The first noun phrase can be taken as the predicate and the second as subject:34 Who fears Yahweh walks in his uprightness Who despises him is crooked in his ways (b) The other way around is equally possible:35 Who walks in his uprightness fears Yahweh Who is crooked in his ways despises him But there is a difference in focus. It can be said with Fox that option (b) makes a less obvious point. It neither simply restates what would have been the obvious assumption of the sages and their pupils (viz. that anyone who fears God would be upright/honest), nor does it merely state the negative side of the assumption (viz. that people who do not fear God make their deeds crooked36). While the obvious default meaning constitutes one legitimate level on which the proverb can be understood, the formulation also allows another, equally legitimate focus that adds another dimension. The second level is that those who are upright demonstrate fear of God by their actions (even if they don’t say so),37 and those whose ways are crooked demonstrate contempt for God (even if they do not explicitly deny him). The shift in focus of (b) does not stand in tension with (a), but highlights the conviction that fear of or faith in God necessarily manifests in the practice of everyday dealings,38 so that the fear of God is absent where the deeds of uprightness are absent and present where the deeds are present.39 On the other hand, it also highlights that the opposite “ways”40 of conduct necessarily manifest the opposite attitude to God, viz. contempt (cf. below on Ramaq, 34

So, for instance, Delitzsch, Meinhold, Waltke. So, for instance, Plöger, Clifford, Fox, Schipper. 36 Fox thinks that it is not self-evident that the honest necessarily fear God or that the dishonest hold him in contempt. Logically that is so, but it was self-evident for the sages and the ancient belief generally (cf. Pss 14:1ff. and 53:2ff., where the incompatibility of wisdom with the denial of God and with evil deeds is expressly stated). 37 I do not think the remark by Waltke, that “[p]agans may walk uprightly, not knowing the Lord,” which in itself is perfectly true, provides valid grounds for taking ‫ ירא יהוה‬as the only credible subject in this proverb. Within the sages’ frame of reference sapiential virtue was unthinkable without the fear of God. 38 Cf. Plath (1963, 63): “The ‫ … יראת יהוה‬can only be known in actu.” 39 This formulation seems to me quite compatible with the view of Becker (1965, 226f.), followed by Hausmann (1995, 267), that the ethical aspect has an essential role in the concept of the fear of God without being the exclusive aspect. On the contrary, it includes awe and acknowledgement of God. 40 Schipper points out that the verb ‫ לוז‬Niphal (be crooked = wrong, bad) is always used in connection with the metaphor of the way in Proverbs, thus suggesting deviation, the wrong road; cf. 2:15; 3:32 and Luchsinger (2010, 272) for further examples. In this proverb, the second hemistich mentions the ‫( דרך‬way) explicitly, while it is implied in the first, where the verb ‫( הלך‬walk) is used. As for the positive opposite, Schipper also refers to an Egyptian 35

500

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

who thinks that all sin is sin against God). The second syntactic option adds a dimension of urgency, much as the insistence on actual good deeds as an expression of faith in God, which is so prominent in the Epistle of James.41 The proverb thus acquires an aspect of “critical questioning” (kritisches Hinterfragen) of sapiential thinking that would work with human experience only (so Schipper). This provides an interesting perspective on the placement of the proverb just after a chapter in which Yahweh is not mentioned at all. But the critical dimension also applies to the second level: who walks upright as envisaged by Chap. 13, is a fearer of Yahweh (‫ )יְ ֵרא יהוה‬just as, in Jesus’ terms, a tree is identified by its fruit. Rashi (1040-1105) presents little more than a paraphrase. He maintains the most natural interpretation of the suffix in the second hemistich as a reference to God, whereas Hame’iri (14th century) and the Metzudat David (18th century) think it refers to the subject of the first hemistich, that is, they scorn those who have an upright character. On the other hand, the third person masculine singular suffix in the first hemistich seems to be central for the Vilna Gaon (18th century). He interprets it as a reference to the “uprightness” specific to the nature of every distinct person. The characters and inclinations of people differ, and individuals should work out for themselves where their strengths and weaknesses lie so that they can determine what their personal application of the principle should entail. Already in the 12th century Ramaq saw the gist of the proverb in the insight that all sin is ultimately sin against God. Chrysostom, interestingly, finds a kind of multi-levelled aspect in the first hemistich. Unfortunately, he does not work it out, but says that not only does the fear of God cause walking honestly in humans, but also the other way around: walking honestly also causes people to fear God. I have not found a similar idea among the patristic theologians. Neither have I found any exposition of the verse in the Fathers or Medieval reception. Melanchthon does not comment on the verse (neither in the 1550 nor in the 1559 editions of his Proverbs commentary) and Calvin only cites vv. 21 and 26 in Book III of his Institutes.

14:3 In the mouth of a fool is a shoot of pride, but the lips of the wise will protect them. The proverb can be scanned as a 4+3 line, but 3+3 is also possible if the conjunctive maqqeph is accepted despite the disjunctive silluq and tipha praepositivum. The main issue in this proverb is how to understand ‫ח ֶֹטר‬. It is often taken to mean a rod (so Oesterley, Gemser, McKane, Clifford, Scherer,42 Alter, Waltke, Fox, Millar43) and often as a sprig or shoot (so Delitzsch, Toy, parallel in a grave stele from the 22nd dynasty: “How beautiful it is to go upright on the way of the god” (CG 42208 [41] Cairo). 41 E.g. Jas 2:17, 22, 24. 42 Scherer (1999, 141). 43 Millar (2020, 49).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

501

Plöger, Meinhold, Van Leeuwen, Whybray, Fuhs, Yoder, Tuinstra, Schipper). In biblical Hebrew the word only occurs here and in Isa 11:1, where it is clearly a shoot sprouting from a tree. One would expect ‫ ֵשׁ ֶבט‬if a rod or stick (Septuagint βακτηρία) were meant (cf. 10:13; 26:3) and understand the genitive to mean a stick intended for punishment of the fool’s arrogance (unless one emends ‫ גאוה‬to ‫ גוה‬as in 10:1344). The first hemistich makes perfect sense with the text unchanged: The mouth, the first metonym for speaking in the proverb, sprouts hubris, overbearing arrogance which does harm to others (similarly Bühlmann.45) Along with other aspects of speech, the disservice to the community by harmful talking, including this kind, is a well-attested motif in proverbs46 (cf. 10:8, 11, 13, 14, 18-21, 31; 11:9, 11-13; 12:6, 13, 14, 17, 18; 15:1, 2, 4, 7).47 It is a mark of the fool and leads to a bad result for him. The punishment for arrogance is also well represented in the book (cf. 16:18; 18:12; 29:23). This is the topic of the second hemistich. In v. 3b there is also a textual problem, although the general sense is not in doubt, whichever way the issue is decided. The second clause obviously claims that the lips of wise people will protect them. Should the last word ‫( ִתּ ְשׁמ ֵוּרם‬will protect them) be retained, or should it be emended to ‫?תּ ְשׁ ְמרוּם‬ ִ The former would be a third person feminine singular imperfect of ‫ שמר‬with the third person masculine plural suffix, and the latter would be the third person feminine plural with the third person masculine plural48 suffix. The appeal to Ex 18:26 (‫ )ישפוטו‬and Ruth 2:8 (‫ )תעבורי‬for the existence of unreduced vowels in the prefix conjugation in support of maintaining the Masoretic text (so Waltke49) is weakened by the fact that the cited cases involve neither pronominal suffixes nor third person feminine plural forms of the verb. Therefore the most probable explanation for the Hebrew text is that it entails metathesis of the waw and the resh and that we should read the verb as ‫( ִתּ ְשׁ ְמרוּם‬they will protect them). 44

This is proposed by BHS, but it has no basis in the Hebrew text and is not followed by

BHQ. 45

See Bühlmann (1976, 127-129). Especially in Prov 10–15, see Moss (2015, 79-89). Hatton (2008, 150) counts this proverb among those in Chaps. 10–15 that “link loquacity to folly and restraint in speech to wisdom.” Although the proverb does address the theme of speech, its focus is not speech and silence per se, but whether or not the use of speech is arrogant and dangerous. 47 It is worth noting that 10:13, which in its general thrust is very close to 14:3, is not a “twice-told” proverb in the sense of Snell, since there is only one word they have in common (‫)שפתי‬. 48 The suffix is the third person masculine plural, not singular, as Fox has it. 49 The reference was already made by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra as early as the 12th century. 46

502

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

Whether reference is made to a stick or a to sprig that is used against others, for instance when it later becomes a stick,50 or whether the last word is emended or not, the sense is clear. Those who speak arrogantly and do harm to others in the process, do so to their own detriment, whereas those who use speech wisely, are protected from such self-inflicted harm. The parallelism can be summarised as follows: V. 3a in the mouth of the fool is a shoot of pride [will turn on them]

಩ ←

V. 3b on the lips of the wise [is no arrogance] will protect them

The metonyms for speaking are evidently balanced out, and the sinister fool is the clear antithesis of the wise. But then come two gaps that help to construct the meaning of the proverb as a whole. If the shoot of pride means arrogance in the speaking of the ‫אויל‬, then the antithesis must be that the speaking of the wise displays no such thing. However, only after having read the second hemistich to its end can we see that the fool will be castigated by his own weapon. For we can now fill the gap left where this could have been said. The protection given to the wise by their mode of speech must have its counterpart in the implied opposite to be meted out to the foolish. Rabbinic exegesis usually sees the ‫ ח ֶֹטר‬of the first hemistich as a rod with which the arrogant harm others or as a stick with which they are beaten for their arrogance, that is, the deed-consequence nexus in general or in the form of a deed falling back on its perpetrator. Rashi illustrates it with Ex 5:2, which shows that the haughty words of the Pharaoh against God come back to bite him. Ramaq thinks reference is made to the tongue, which the arrogant use as a stick against others. The Vilna Gaon also interprets the stick as an offensive instrument (apparently aggressive speech), whereas the wise keep quiet to safeguard themselves from having to endure such a beating (cf. 26:4). Sometimes the image of a tree is introduced. Both 14th century rabbis Nahmias and Gerondi are examples. The former saw the mouth as the tree sprouting from the heart. When the heart is arrogant, the fruit borne by the branch (presumably the tongue) shows that. The latter refers to the different word in Isa 11:1 (‫)שׁ ֶבט‬ ֵ as a ground to interpret the proverb as a reference to a branch that produces the pride. But Pseudo-Ibn Ezra (probably 12th century) turns it around and explicitly declares the ‫ ח ֶֹטר‬to mean a ‫שׁ ֶבט‬, ֵ with which the fool hits other people, while the lips of the wise guard them against also speaking arrogantly. On the other hand, Ralbag sees the mouth of the arrogant simply as the cause of their being beaten themselves. A third aspect is found in the Mezudat David, namely that the lips of the wise protect them from speaking arrogantly, which means that the speaking organ of the wise itself withholds them from speaking things that can lead to their downfall.

50 In some parts of sub-Saharan Africa an idiom is often used, saying that a fool plucks a sprig to spank himself with it (for reasons of decorum, the full wording is not given here).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

503

Chrysostom has a whole exposition based on a comparison with 10:3 (Septuagint). He poses the question how a rod can be used in a positive sense (10:3), that is, for the education of someone in need of betterment, whereas in this proverb the rod is a negative instrument of insolence (βακτηρία). He only seems to be concerned with preventing any idea that the two proverbs contradict each other. Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)51 gives directions for those who live together, including their speech. He uses the proverb to warn against jibes and insults among such people. Ambrose of Milan (339-397)52 interprets the rod of the mouth as an instrument of punishment against the speaker himself. It serves as his scriptural support for the idea that selfpunishment in the form of the pangs of conscience is the worst chastisement there is. Jerome (342-420)53 cites the verse (also 18:2 and Isa 32:5) in his argument with Rufinus (345-410) about the orthodoxy of Origen, claiming that the rod of arrogance is fulfilled in Rufinus’s harsh words against Jerome. Neither Melanchthon nor Calvin pays attention to the proverb.

14:4 Where there are no oxen, the trough is empty, but a bounty of crops comes through the strength of the ox. Gemser rightly scans the proverb as a 4+4 line, not taking the maqqeph in the second hemistich into consideration.54 Toy does not substantiate explicitly but seems to take the stich as a couplet representing two lines of 2+2 each, which at least rhythmically amounts to much the same thing. On the surface, the proverb seems very simple, but is replete with interesting features of style, mainly relating to the meanings of the words chosen, to stylistic structure and to sound play. (a) The first is the use of interlocked puns Puns are crucial to the basic meaning of the proverb. ‫ ֵאבוּס‬can be a trough for the grain intended as fodder for the oxen, but it can also be used in the wider meaning of a receptacle in which harvested grain is stored (so Delitzsch with reference to the cognate noun ‫ ַמ ֲא ֻבס‬in Jer 50:26, which is there used with the wider meaning of a storeroom for grain).55 Second, both as noun and adjective, ‫( בר‬with patah, but with qamets when in pausa) can be used for several 51

Clement of Alexandria, The Instructor II, 7 (ANF II, 251). Ambrose, Duties of the Clergy III, iv, 24 (NPNF X, 72). 53 Jerome, Apol against Rufinus III, in Theodoretus, Life and Works of Rufinus III (NPNF II/3, 519). 54 That is in order because the qamets hatuph in ‫בוּאוֹת‬ ֗ ‫ב־תּ‬ ְ֝ ‫ ָר‬is only introduced for the normal holem (and therefore provided with a conjunctive accent because of the supposition that a maqqeph is called for. 55 This remains valid irrespective of whether it is a Hurrian loanword as stated by Waltke, following Albright ([1955] 1969, 11 n. 3). Cf. also Isa 1:3 and Job 39:9, to which Delitzsch does not refer. 52

504

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

meanings (grain, empty, clean). All of this opens the possibility of a number of puns (similarly Fox): • No oxen – the trough is empty56 (‫ – )בר‬not needed because there are no animals • No oxen – the trough has grain (‫ – )בר‬not devoured by animals • No oxen – the trough is clean (‫ – )בר‬not sullied by animals These possibilities should not be seen as “difficulties” or “problems” and played out against each other (so McKane, Whybray and others). The punning possibilities offer a richness in the applicability of the proverb, all of which seem to me to supplement one another. Where there are no oxen, the fodder trough is of course going to be empty because there are no animals to fill it for. The trough in the sense of a receptacle can therefore be used to store grain, because it will be unsoiled and not need any cleaning. But these dimensions conjured up by the complex pun boil down to the simple fact that it is bad farming practice to attempt growing a crop without the benefit of cattle for ploughing, threshing and transport. There are many possibilities for the resourceful farmer who combines crop farming and cattle farming. Doing away with some of them, whether to save costs in the form of animal acquisition, fodder, shelter and similar expenses, is simply stupid, because crop farming becomes much more cumbersome if not impossible without the power of animals. Therefore the financial losses outweigh the savings that may be made by doing away with them. That is said expressly by the second hemistich: a multitude of income is to be generated by harnessing the power of the ox, both in the literal and in the metonymic sense. The laus bovis of the second hemistich makes it abundantly clear that the richness of the puns and the diversity they entail culminate in the insight that farming cannot succeed without this asset. The rich diversity of the agricultural world is played upon by the rich diversity of readings (or hearings) conjured up by the proverbial “wit of one.” There are so many possibilities of generating an income from agriculture as there are possibilities of generating a sensible reading of this proverb. Therefore it is hard to understand how McKane can deny that the saying urges taking good care of farm animals. Of course, it does not say so expressly, but it does say so much better than expressly (cf. 12:10; Deut 25:4). The proverb describes how things are, that is, it makes a point. This educational style often actually is an injunction, as in this proverb. As I have argued in the Introduction, most didactic material is presented in this form, not in the imperative or jussive.57 The proverb thus teaches the wisdom of investing 56 57

So Gemser, Scott, Plöger, where “clean” and “empty” overlap (cf. English “cleaned-out”). See above, Essays 1 and 2 in the Introduction.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

505

in draught animals for reasons of sound economy. Such investment entails the necessity of managing it well, which here means taking good care of farm animals (similarly, Delitzsch, Waltke and others). Therefore McKane’s sanguine declaration, “[t]he supposition that the verse is an injunction to take good care of farm animals … is not well-founded,” deserves the reply: On the contrary, it is very well founded. If it is claimed, as McKane himself does, that “draught animals are an indispensable asset for a farmer and that without them his labour is unproductive,” then the proverb states that it is wise to invest in such animals, the extension of which is that good care of this asset should be taken.58 The statement is not formulated in religious terms, but in the sound logical terms of sapiential advice. (b) The second stylistic feature is the combination of two chiasmi While also important on the level of the basic meaning of the proverb, the use of chiasmic ordering adds sharpening of the focus. The parallelism is clearly antithetical, in a form usually called “imprecise.” In fact, it is very precise, despite the fact that the opposite of “oxen” is not “strength.” We may summarise it as follows: V. 4a in the absence of oxen

V. 4b produce is bountiful

}

{

the trough is empty

}

{ byof antheoxstrength

The absence of oxen is paralleled crosswise, not by the presence of oxen, but by the presence of a vital aspect of cattle, viz. the strength of the ox. The several negative aspects of the pun on the result of having no oxen, are paralleled by a single positive aspect, viz. bountiful produce. The focal point of the proverb is emphasised both by this chiasmus (pointed out by Waltke) and by a second (pointed out by Schipper). The whole verse is spanned by the first chiastic arrangement of the motifs of animals and the material produce that depends on them: animals – produce, produce – animals. The second is the smaller chiasmus of the two middle words. They are written with the same two letters, but in opposite order and with opposite meanings:59

58 Cf. below on the topic of uncertainties in cattle husbandry, often present in Sumerian proverbs. 59 The phenomenon of chiasmus of sound as well as meaning in biblical poetry is treated by Kselman (1977, 219-223).

506

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14 ‫ב‬

‫ר‬

– empty

‫ר‬

‫ב‬

– bounty

The two chiasmi function like concentric circles. The outer one integrates the proverb with all its words, puns and implications. The inner one brings its point into sharper focus still by choosing and arranging the two words that visually, so to speak, put the economic core of the topic into high definition. (c) The third feature is the play on sounds Fox remarks that the “labials” b and p control the flow of the proverb.60 They do occur in each word except the last and, if we assume that both letters ‫ ב‬and ‫ פ‬were pronounced as the bilabial plosives [b] and [p] when the proverb originated, they do influence the musicality of the proverb. But the ‫ ב‬without dagesh has become a voiced labiodental fricative [v] and the ‫ פ‬without dagesh has become a voiceless labiodental fricative [f]. Since that happened, the prominent sounds in the proverb flow can be said to be [v] (3×), [b] (2×) and [f] (1×), which still catches the ear and therefore attention. Waltke finds an assonance between ’ēbûs and tebû’ (sic). The assonance exists only in the repetition of the vowel u. However, together with the alliteration of the consonants just discussed, it contributes to a musicality in the stich that makes the proverb memorable, especially if we consider that the assonance occurs in words immediately preceding and following the inner chiasmus of ‫ בר‬and ‫רב‬.61 Tuinstra, following Alster, cites a Sumerian proverb that expresses the care a farmer has for his cattle: He who has money, is happy, he who has grain, feels comfortable, but who has live-stock, cannot sleep.

The cattle farmer is kept awake by his worries over the welfare of his cattle, whether they are safe and have fodder and water. The Sumerian saying thus implies that cattle are necessary for cultivating grain and making money.62 Alster introduces the group of which this proverb is part by stating, “Harvesting, animal husbandry, and the uncertainties involved in these are very much 60 Scherer (1999, 145) finds the presence of ‫ ש‬and ‫ ר‬in the respective last words of vv. 3, 4 and 5 an alliterative argument for the closer association of these three verses. If that is true, it however does not contribute to the reader’s understanding of what the association consists of. 61 This proverb is not discussed by McCreesh (1991) in his monograph on poetic sound patterns in Prov 10–29. 62 UET 6.2, 265:2-5. Sumerian text and English translation in Alster (1996, 8-9). Draught animals and their care were a prominent issue in Sumerian agricultural administration; cf. Maekawa (1997, 122-123).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

507

in the centre of the Sumerian proverbs,” which supports the interpretation given above, viz. that investing in livestock implies caring for the animals. Rashi offers an allegorical exposition of the proverb, in which the absence or presence of oxen refers to the absence or presence of Torah teachers. If there are none, there is no Torah knowledge to sustain others, while their presence would mean the opposite. Hame’iri sees the proverb as the expression of a principle showing the pros and cons of investing: oxen incur running costs, but they also produce results. This view was taken up by Rabbi Moshe Alshich (Safed, 16th century), who stressed that the disadvantages of having oxen are offset by the advantages. Post-Enlightenment rabbis seem to concentrate on the basic insight of Rashi, namely that oxen and the trough refer to scholars and the presence of spiritual sustenance. So the Mezudat David argues that taking up the yoke of the Torah leads to the benefit of knowledge. The Vilna Gaon applies allegorical techniques to the effect that both the oxen and the trough are the pupils – if there are no co-students to study with, the individual student becomes empty. But then, if a student is worthy like an ox that gores with its horns (!), then he can produce much knowledge together with his teacher by asking goring/penetrating questions. Malbim relates the two types of oxen with diligence and sloth. The former ox works in the field and simultaneously grazes, while the lazy one consumes what is in the trough already. So ploughing for Torah learning produces nourishment for the intellect and for the soul, which can be enjoyed in the hereafter. Chrysostom is unsure of what the proverb means. Referring to the first hemistich, he says that the meaning “seems” to him that poverty befalls the lazy, but then he adds a rider. If not that, it means benefits can only be reaped if there is planning, since farming with oxen has to be well managed. Gregory the Great (540-604)63 makes use of the Latin rendering of the second hemistich (ubi autem plurimae segetes ibi manifesta fortitudo bovis) to spiritualise the proverb. The Latin gives him the chance to focus on the bountiful result as testimony to the merit of the ox (where there is much increase, there the strength of the ox is manifest64). That gives him the opportunity to praise Eulogius, bishop of Alexandria, who had drawn “the plough of the tongue” over the ground of the hearts of the hearers with the result that there was an increase of the faithful, whom Gregory regards as God’s harvest.

14:5 An honest witness does not lie, but a false witness breathes out lies. According to Gemser, the rhythmic pattern is 4+3, but Toy thinks it should be scanned as 3+3. A ternary line seems the best choice because the word ‫ עד‬has the conjunctive munah in both hemistichs. In the first hemistich it is, moreover, followed by the disjunctive tipha, which keeps the following two words apart and thus avoids two head-to-head stresses. 63

Epist. xlii, To Eulogius (NPNF II/13, 102). This had already been prepared by the Septuagint: οὗ δὲ πολλὰ γενήματα, φανερὰ βοὸς ἰσχύς, with the focus on the evidence of an ox’s strength rather than on the causal relationship between ox power and produce. Of course, the one does not deny the other, but in the Septuagint/Vulgate the focus is sharper on what can be inferred from a good crop. 64

508

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

Like its predecessor, the proverb seems simple enough, but it also uses the stylistic feature of the chiasmus to help identify the focus of the topic. Therefore the application of the figure is not merely ornamental. The chiasmus is built both by the syntax and the words used. Syntactically, the subjects of the two clauses65 make up the outer phrases and the predicates feature as the middle phrases. As for the word selection, the noun ‫( עד‬witness) is placed as the nomen regens in the genitive construction that opens the verse as well as in the genitive construction that closes it. Schematically: ‫לא יכזב‬

‫עד אמונה‬

predicate

subject

‫עד שקר‬

‫וזפיח כזבים‬

subject

predicate

The subject of the first hemistich is a “witness of ‫אמונה‬,” which signifies steadfast trustworthiness. He is therefore a person of permanent truthfulness, a genitivus qualitatis that describes the character of the witness: he is intrinsically an honest person. An individual whose very character is marked in this way, will thus never tell a lie. On the other hand, the (chiastically) opposite witness is also characterised by means of a genitivus qualitatis, viz. he is a witness of deceit.66 It is therefore as typical a characteristic of this type of witness to deceive in court or in a context where testimony is needed to settle an issue justly as it is in everyday matters.67 This kind of person not only tells a fib now and then, but habitually lies. That is very effectively expressed by the choice of verb in the second hemistich. ‫( פוח‬Qal: breathe) in the Hiphil signifies the action of exhaling. Therefore deceit is naturally spread by this kind of witness. To him, it comes as frequently as breathing out, which thus exemplifies his inner character (so also Waltke) and, of course, makes him a habitual perjurer when under oath (cf. 19:5, 9). There are similar sayings in 12:13, 17 (the latter has the same idea in two hemistichs); 14:25; 19:5, 9; 21:28; 25:18. The second hemistich is similar to 6:19a, and is one of Snell’s68 “twice-told proverbs.” It belongs to his category 2.0, comprising “half-verses repeated with spelling variations.” 65 Fox points out that Hame’iri turns the syntactical units of the second hemistich around, taking as he does ‫ וזפיח כזבים‬as the subject and ‫ עד שקר‬as the predicate (but who breathes out lies is a false witness), which is not impossible, but a forced choice, especially in this verse. 66 Tuinstra is probably right in suspecting that, in the light of the Decalogue and Deut 19, the expression ‫ עד שקר‬is juridical in origin. 67 Cf. Millar (2020, 203) for examples of untrustworthy speech from daily life (e.g. 20:14; 22:13), further terminology for this kind of speaking (e.g. ‫נרגן‬, ‫ הולך רכיל‬etc.), their importance in court, and the religious judgement that it is a breach of faith and an anti-social deed (so Klopfenstein [1964, 353; 1971, 261-264]). 68 Snell (1993, 43).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

509

Heim69 first thought that the verse is tautologous, but later, discussing it together with 6:19 as part of a “variant set” of proverbs, he changed his mind, apparently under influence of the German idiom “im Brustton der Überzeugung sprechen” (to speak in a low register to suggest sincerity).70 I do not think this is a legitimate argument, especially not in light of the fact that ‫ פוח‬in the Hiphil also means “snort with disdain” (Ps 10:5), “show anger,” (Ezk 21:36) or “incite” (Prov 29:8). Moreover, the contrast of the honest witness who does not tell a lie even once (‫ כזב‬Piel) and the dishonest one who spreads deceit with every breath (‫ פוח‬Hiphil) expresses the fundamental trait of character, which a speculative pitch of the voice does not do. Tuinstra points to the motif of false witnessing in Amenemope, where the advice is given to neither injure someone else in writing, nor give false testimony with the spoken word.71 Schipper illustrates the negative side of the topic from the sayings of Achiqar, who claims that his nephew “was a falsely violent witness unto me,” and asks, “who, then, does me justice?”72 Schipper then illustrates the positive side of truthful witnesses with a plea of a Hebrew harvest worker (7th century BCE) for the return of his confiscated garment. The worker claims all his co-workers will testify that he in truth is guiltless.73 To Rashi, the proverb is merely about truthfulness and deceit in court, while PseudoIbn Ezra skips the verse altogether. However, the Mezudat David sees more than court procedure in the verse. Who always speaks the truth, will also do so when called upon to give evidence in court. Who habitually spouts lies even in small matters, will also give false evidence when justice is to be done in court. The Vilna Gaon in turn makes a veritable theological repository of the verse. He sees that the word of central importance in the verse is ‫( ֵעד‬witness) and then links the proverb with the basic commandment of the Torah, namely the Shemac of Deut 6:4, which says:

‫( שמע ישראל יהוה אלהינו יהוה אחד‬Hear, Israel, The Lord our God, the Lord is One) The framing words each have their final letter, respectively ‫ ע‬and ‫ד‬, written much bigger than the surrounding letters.74 Together they spell the word for “witness” (‫)עד‬. ֵ According to him, it means that reciting the Shemac is an act that bears witness 69

Heim (2001, 176, also 152, 155). Heim (2013, 184-185). Cf. on 12:7 for the etymology of ‫ פוח‬discussed by Watson (2017-2019, 83-92). I also do not think the rendering of one member of such a “set” should be determined by the question whether or not it obscures the variant repetition in quite another part of the book, which is what Heim (2013, 181) does. In my own rendering of 6:19a (see Vol. I, 251), I have taken into consideration the composition of the unit of which it is part (6:6-19). There the hemistich participates in a list of phenomena where all the other verbs are participles (6:17-18), which requires v. 19a to be rendered suitably. 71 Amenemope xvi,20 – xvi,1 (ANET 423, COS I, 119). 72 Achiqar 9, 140; cf. Cowley ([1923] 1967, 217). 73 The Yavneh Yam Ostracon 3.41 (COS III, 78). 74 Cf. the Codex Leningradensis, which is densely written. 70

510

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

to the oneness of God, the only and unique God. Moreover, the middle words of the Shemac (‫ )יהוה אלהינו‬correspond to the beginning of the Decalogue, the First Commandment of which prohibits recognising any other God. Since this encompasses all positive and negative commandments of the Torah, reciting the Shemac means that the faithful witness undertakes to fulfil all the commandments of the Torah.75 Book V Section I of the Apostolic Constitutions (4th century) ends with a reference to this proverb. It is stated that those who have departed this life for the sake of the truth and did not renounce it (renouncing the truth = lying), are real martyrs. Since they witness to the truth they believe in, they are worthy to be believed.76 Neither Chrysostom, nor Melanchthon or Calvin have anything to say about the proverb.

14:6 The scoffer seeks wisdom, but there’s nothing, however, knowledge is for the perceptive who shows himself swift. The proverb has three stresses in each hemistich. Toy claims that the pattern is 4+3 and Gemser also regards that as a possibility alongside 3+3. But the first two words form a stress unit that avoids a stress conglomeration, which is strongly indicated not only by the maqqeph but also by the de-emphasising vowel change from ṣere to segol in ‫שׁ־ל֣ץ‬ ֵ ‫בּ ֶקּ‬. ִ 77 Waltke (followed by Schipper) thinks vv. 6 and 7 are linked by the “catchword ‘knowledge’ (‫ )דעת‬in connection with other wisdom vocabulary known from the book’s preamble (1:2-7).” But a single root (‫ )ידע‬used as a noun in v. 6 and as a Qal perfect in v. 7 can scarcely be a criterion to identify the presence of catchwords. First, ‫ ידע‬is such a common word that it occurs all over the book and therefore is an unlikely candidate for being a distinctive marker for these two verses. These commentators feel the need to pull other words78 into the equation in order to strengthen the case for a catchword connection. But that seems to me rather to dilute the case, since it implies awareness that the ‫ידע‬-argument cannot stand on its own feet. By the same token, these words cannot fulfil the purpose, because they too occur not only in the preamble to the book, but in many places. Finally, apart from ‫ידע‬, they are not shared by the two verses, which to me seems to weaken rather than strengthen the effort to create a proverb pair with this argument.79 Therefore we must interpret the proverb in its own right. 75

Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 248). Const Apost V/I, ix (ANF VII, 442). 77 This is confirmed by the Masoretic accents, which are munah-munah-atnah, that is, two conjunctives and one disjunctive in the first hemistich, thereby marking three accents in the hemistich; cf. Luchsinger (2010, 105), who mentions several further examples of this pattern often found in the first hemistich of proverbs. 78 ‫לץ‬, ‫חכמה‬, ‫נבון‬, ‫כסיל‬. 79 More claims of connections within Chap. 14 are adduced in order to bring out the meaning of v. 6. For instance, Scherer (1999, 145), Fuhs and Schipper (2018, 784) point out that 76

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The Septuagint obviously could make little sense of the Hebrew text and offers a translation that effectively rewrites it: ζητήσεις σοφίαν παρὰ κακοῖς καὶ οὐχ εὑρήσεις, αἴσθησις δὲ παρὰ φρονίμοις εὐχερής. (If you seek wisdom with bad people, you will not find it, but with thoughtful people insight is yielding)

Although a new subject is created for both hemistichs and the problem of a scoffer searching for wisdom is avoided, the general thrust of the Greek is the same as that of the Hebrew, for which reason Plöger’s verdict that it is “superficial” is perhaps somewhat harsh. The interpretation of the Hebrew proverb is determined by the first hemistich. Fox gives two ways in which v. 6a can be understood. Both are indeed possible, but they are so close in sense that they practically say the same thing. (a) The hemistich can say that the scoffer seeks wisdom, but nothing is

found. The Piel perfect ‫ ִבּ ֶקּשׁ‬suggests that he has sought wisdom but the result was nothing. Since it is stated as a general truth, it means that a scoffer, having sought wisdom, regularly finds that the search has failed. As Fox states, this reading is supported by 17:6, where the fool is presented as trying to buy wisdom with money. Again, using ‫אין‬, it is there added that the fool has no understanding/mind (‫)אין ־לב‬. Whichever of the fifteen or so possible readings of that proverb80 is chosen, it is clear that the fool cannot obtain wisdom because he lacks the right “heart” or attitude. (b) The other possibility is that the scoffer seeks wisdom, but there is nothing to be found. That means that the effort only produces the result that the scoffer “cannot find it within him” (Riyqam, Fox). A fool does not have the capacity within him to harbour wisdom, that is, the corollary of that which he does have in his constitution, namely folly (27:22). The “nothing” (‫ )אין‬in him amounts to a lack of sapiential capacity, which keeps him in the state of “no understanding.” ‫ אין‬occurs in v. 4 as well as in v. 6. That is a fact and cannot be denied (albeit that the word is first used in the status constructus as part of a genitive construction and then in the status absolutus). Fuhs only declares: “Das ’jn aus [v.] 4 wirkt nach” (The ‫ אין‬from v. 4 continues to have an effect), but does not say anything about what that effect might be. Even if it could explain why the two proverbs stand near each other, it does not contribute to our understanding of this proverb. Another case is the claim that v. 6 is an application of v. 2 (Fuhs). It is true that the fool does not fear God (cf. 1:28-29) and that the fear of God is the only inner disposition that enables one to be wise (1:7; 10:9), but we know that from many proverbs of which v. 2 is only one and not a key to unlock v. 6 (Schipper implies as much when he first establishes the fact that the basic disposition is necessary to find wisdom and only then refers to Fuhs’s view on the putative application of v. 2). 80 Cf. Loader (2012c), where 17:6 and its various possibilities of interpretation are discussed in detail.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

(c) The only difference between the two readings is a matter of focus: the one states that the scoffer cannot obtain wisdom from without and the other that he does not have it within him. But both require the same inner disposition of the “heart.” Since this disposition is marked by arrogance, he is called a “scoffer,” that is, one who scoffs at the basic requirement of wisdom, namely humility (cf. 1:2-3). On both counts he begins and ends with the same inner deficit. So, if wisdom is not for the scoffer, for whom is it then? The answer is given by the second hemistich: it is for the one who does have the right attitude, that is, the ‫( נבון‬the understanding or perceptive person). He finds that the acquisition of wisdom is for him (preposition ‫ל‬, not ‫)אל‬. In the context of the first hemistich that of course means it is relatively easily attainable, but not effortlessly or “lightly,” as most translations have it.81 The book’s many admonitions, voluminous advice and repeated appreciation of discipline in the learning process82 make it clear that education is no easy matter and cannot be taken lightly. ‫ נָ ָקל‬may be the pausal form of the Niphal third person masculine singular perfect of the verb ‫( קלל‬be light, easy, quick), but it may also be the Niphal participle masculine singular of the same verb. Since ‫ דעת‬is feminine, it can neither be the subject of the verb nor the antecedent of the participle.83 Perceptive people themselves have to be sharp and work hard. My preferred translation is therefore, “[b]ut knowledge is for the perceptive who shows himself swift.”84 These are the pupils who are quick to accept sapiential teaching and therefore are ‫( נבונים‬cf. 1:5; 10:13; 16:21; 17:28; 19:2585), as opposed to those who are quick to accept evil (1:16; cf. Isa 59:7). In the end, the proverb makes its statement in the standard antithetical way: on the negative side, it criticises any endeavour at a wisdom grab by frivolous people (whose typical behaviour the sages did picture their pupils 81 Similarly Yoder, who puts “easy” in inverted commas and also regards the ease to only be “comparatively” so. 82 Cf. 5:12-13; 10:13; 12:1; 13:24; 17:10; 19:25, 29; 20:30; 22:15; 23:13f.; 26:3; 27:22. See also above, the note on corporal punishment in the ancient Near East (at 10:13) and Vol. I, 56-57 on 1:2; Crenshaw (1998:166-167). 83 Thus it is neither to be translated, “knowledge comes easily for the perceptive,” nor “knowledge is an easy matter for the perceptive.” Delitzsch, who translates “knowledge is easy,” simply declares that the masculine participle is here a neuter for the feminine participle, which seems to make a virtue of necessity. A century earlier, Schultens translated, scientia intelligenti, facile (the knowledge of the intelligent, easily). He does not use facile as the neuter of the adjective facilis (easy), but rather as the adverb (easily). Schultens seems to mean that the knowledge comes easily rather than that it is easy. He defends his translation by calling the syntax Abruptior Syntaxis, but this is only marginally better defensible than the proposal by Delitzsch. 84 Cf. Isa 30:16, where the parallelism clearly shows this meaning for the Niphal of ‫קלל‬. 85 In 19:25 the ‫ נבון‬is the antithesis of the ‫לץ‬, as in 14:6.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

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capable of engaging in86), and on the positive side it commends sharp application to the sapiential enterprise. Rashi interprets the first hemistich to say that the scoffer does not find the wisdom he seeks in his heart (akin to what we have seen above under option “b” on Riyqam). Ramaq keeps it simple by saying that the scoffer is too busy scoffing to be able to find wisdom. Gerondi on the other hand, has a more complicated interpretation. According to him, the scoffer’s mocking stems from the absence of the fear of God. On the positive side, there are three levels, namely wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, all three concepts present in the verse. Understanding is higher than wisdom and knowledge the highest of them all. Whereas the scoffer cannot even advance from ground zero to reach the first level, the ‫ נבון‬has already reached the second stage, so that the highest level of knowledge will be easier to achieve, since every level builds on the previous one. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra thinks that the proverb was written for the denigration of the scoffer and in praise of the understanding. The scoffer claims to be seeking for wisdom, but to the understanding man knowledge comes more easily from his recollection of what he has learnt. Somewhat similarly, the Mezudat David thinks that the second hemistich states that the ‫ נבו ן‬finds knowledge easily because he is used to it. Clement of Alexandria87 quotes the verse according to the Greek to argue that wisdom cannot be found among the wicked generally, since evil and wisdom cannot be aligned (referring to 10:31 and Sir 19:22). However, he does find non-sapiential speaking present in eloquence used to confuse people. In comparable vein, Jerome (342420)88 quotes the proverb along with a list of others, spanning the Book of Proverbs from 3:29 to 30:14, to argue against those who speak evil and against the orthodox faith. John Cassian89 (360-435) quotes Germanus citing the Greek form of the verse together with Deut 32:31 and Prov. 21:30 to concede that the devils attack with some sort of order, but that real method and system is only found among the upright.

14:7 Go away from a foolish man, for you have not come to know lips of knowledge. Gemser’s scan of 4+3 stresses in the stich should be accepted, since only the last maqqeph involves avoiding adjacent stressed syllables. The second hemistich is not an antithesis of the first, but completes it. Toy does not comment on the rhythmic pattern because he finds the verse too complicated textually. Clifford finds the verse “one of the most difficult sayings90 in the book.” 86 That is why they found it necessary to warn against it. Cf. 23:29-35, where a vivid picture of such facetiousness among their pupils is painted. Volz (1911, 185) also regards frivolousness and a “falsche Lebenshaltung” (wrong attitude to life) as typical characteristics of the ‫ לץ‬and mentions this proverb among others as evidence. 87 Strom I,10 (ANF II, 310). 88 Jerome, Apol against Rufinus III, in Theodoretus, Life and Works of Rufinus III (NPNF II/3, 540). 89 Conf VII, xvi (NPNF II/11, 368). 90 In fact, the verse is not a saying, but an exceptional admonition (see Van Leeuwen).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

There is much difference of opinion about how to translate it, but the general sense is not difficult at all: who keeps company with fools never finds that they have learnt any knowledgeable words from them. Nevertheless, the difficulty experienced by various readers of the Hebrew text to deal with details expressing that general sense, is already evident in the ancient versions as well as in later commentaries. The Septuagint creates a new proverb: πάντα ἐναντία ἀνδρὶ ἄφρονι, ὅπλα δὲ αἰσθήσεως χείλη σοφά. (Everything is against a foolish man, but wise lips are weapons of insight) And similarly the Peshitta: Íà {z ¿ćáÂÎúé „Ëã âÝ ¿ćáÞé ÁüÃÆà ? ? ¿ćäÚÞÐx ÀÎóé ÀĀïËÙx ¿çÙ|{ (To a foolish man everything is totally adverse, but wise lips are weaponry of knowledge) The Targum stays closer to the Hebrew: ‫אזל בארחא אחריתא מן קדם סכלא‬ ‫דלית בשפותיה ידיעתא‬ (Go another way from the presence of a fool, for on his lips there is no insight) The Greek is perhaps trying to make sense of the Hebrew by reading ‫ כל‬instead of ‫ לך‬in the first hemistich and ‫ כלי דעת‬91 instead of ‫ בל ידעת‬in the second (and is followed by the Syriac). This creates an antithetical parallelism and brings the proverb in line with the antithetical trend in these chapters.

There are two possible avenues along which the Hebrew proverb can be interpreted. Both begin with differing understandings of the first hemistich, but in the end express a similar view. (a) The Vulgate presents the first clause as an injunction to “go towards a foolish man” (vade contra virum stultum). That would mean to go against him or to oppose him, which is how Ringgren understood it. He is followed by Heim92 and Fox.93 Heim appeals to Judg 20:3494 (where the verb is ‫ בוא‬and not ‫ )הלך‬and Num 2:2 (where the verb used is ‫)סבב‬, 91

Cf. the suggestion in BHS (not BHQ) that this reading may be adopted. Heim (2001, 174). 93 Alter translates “Go before,” and thus also regards ‫ מנגד ל‬as an indication of the direction towards rather than away from, but he does not substantiate it. 94 It should however be noted that many Hebrew manuscripts have ‫ מנגב‬instead of ‫מנגד‬ in this text. 92

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both signifying “a conscious movement towards something.” On this reading, the second hemistich of the proverb expresses the consequence of going against the foolish man (you will not encounter knowledgeable lips; so Heim). Waltke concedes that this is possible, but points out that the imperfect would rather be expected, whereas the perfect ‫ ידעת‬in the second hemistich makes a future perfect more likely.95 Thus we may paraphrase: Go to confront a foolish man, and you will find that you have not become familiar with knowledgeable lips. The advice is not given in the same vein as 26:5 (“Answer a fool according to his folly”), since in the latter proverb the advice is intended literally (confront the fool so that you can put him in his place), while in 14:7 it is intended with a dash of irony for a situation that might present itself (alright, approach the fool [= do not approach him] and you will realise in hindsight that you have learnt no knowledgeable words). (b) Most commentators interpret ‫ מנגד ל‬to mean “away from.” Schipper acknowledges the possibility of option (a), but argues that taking ‫מן‬ seriously in this proverb cannot be sidestepped.96 His point is that the interpretation should be orientated by that fact. He cites Ps 38:12 as well as Gen 12:1 and 1 Sam 10:2 to support his argument that “to go away from” is necessary. He favours a translation with a German imperfect, “du hast keine wissenden Lippen kennengelernt” (you have not come to know knowledgeable lips). To paraphrase: Go away from a foolish man, for you have not become familiar with knowledgeable lips. It implies that the pupil did come in the company of a fool, because he cannot go away from his presence if he never was there. In this case the perfect ‫ ידעת‬is not interpreted as a future perfect. This advice would then be given in the same spirit as 26:4 (“Do not answer a fool according to his folly”), since in both cases the advice is intended literally. Both interpretations boil down to the same thing: who keeps company with fools learns nothing knowledgeable from them. Rashi’s commentary on this verse is not much more than a paraphrase about not associating with a fool. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra thinks that the preposition ‫ מן‬in the much discussed ‫ מנגד‬should be understood to extend its influence to include the word ‫( ובל‬in the second hemistich) so that the meaning becomes: The pupil should go far away from one whom he knows to be a foolish man as well as from one of whom he is not certain to have knowledgeable lips. He appeals to Gen 49:25, where the

95 Cf. GKC 110g; in Prov 14:7 a perfect (‫ )ידעת‬and not a jussive is used after the imperative in the first hemistich, indicating a future perfect, for which the ordinary perfective form is used. On both counts, the preceding imperative can then be explained as a type of conditional, as in Isa 8:10; 55:2. 96 Cf. also HAL, KAHAL, Scherer (1999, 141), Fuhs, Van Leeuwen.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

preposition ‫ מן‬also appears at the beginning (‫ )מאל‬and extends its influence later in the verse (‫)שדי‬. In that way one can avoid becoming like the foolish man. Similarly also Yonah Gerondi (13th century) with reference to the preposition ‫ל‬, to the same effect. Also Hame’iri links the phrases, but in quite another way: the pupil should go away from the fool and admit that he did not know words of wisdom (thus, he found it out as a result of having been there). Acknowledgement of the limits of one’s knowledge should become a principle. The Mezudat David implies influence of 26:4 on the interpretation by stating that staying away from the fool helps to avoid becoming like him. John Chrysostom comments on the Septuagint version (see above) that for foolish people everything, even wealth, works to their detriment, while the wise are invincible because of the weapon of speaking good sense. John Cassian97 quotes the Greek in the same vein, viz. to support the claim that all works against a foolish man, even prosperity.

14:8 The wisdom of the shrewd is to have insight in his way, but the folly of fools is deceit. The rhythmic pattern is clearly 4+3, with one accent to each word. There is no reason to emend the infinitive ‫ הבין‬to the finite verb ‫( תכין‬she [i.e. wisdom] puts in order).98 The construction is similar to the nominal clause in 13:1 and a finite verb is not needed. Moreover, the parallelism would not profit by an emendation since understanding one’s way is indeed a sensible opposite of “deceit,” as can be seen in the following sketch of the parallelism between the two hemistichs: V. 8a the wisdom of the shrewd has understanding about the way to go

:: :: :: ಩

V. 8b the folly of fools is deceit = deceives [about the way to go]

The opening phrases of both hemistichs are built with the same construction, viz. status constructus plus genitive, both in the role of the subject in a nominal clause, but with contrasting meaning. Both are followed by a predicate, which is gapped in the last hemistich.

97

Conf VI, ix (NPNF II/11, 355). See BHS (proposed by Ehrlich). The appeal to 21:29 in support of this emendation is weakened by the Qere and the Septuagint as well as by some Hebrew manuscript evidence, all of whom read a text with ‫בין‬, as in 14:8. Neither does the Greek ἐν πλάνῃ warrant Winton Thomas’s proposal (1969, 285) of a Piel participle in the last word (‫)מרמה‬, since it improves neither the form of the word nor the sense. 98

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14 V. 8a the wisdom of the shrewd

[is]

status constructus + genitive subject

V. 8b the folly of fools status constructus + genitive subject

517

to understand his way infinitive + suffixed noun in a nominal clause predicate

[is]

deceit noun [plus nothing] predicate

There is an alliteration on the r and m sounds at the end and near the beginning of the verse (‫ ערום‬and ‫)מרמה‬, which helps – along with the parallelism – to bind the two hemistichs of the line together. In the first half, the infinitive ‫ הבין‬combines with ‫דרכו‬, to make up the predicate of v. 8a. In the second half this is paralleled by another nominal clause containing a genitive as subject (‫ )אולת כסילים‬plus the noun ‫מרמה‬ as predicate (v. 8b), again with a meaning that contrasts with its counterpart in the first hemistich. The only word in v. 8a that has no counterpart in the second, is the object of ‫הבין‬, namely ‫( דרכו‬his way). The gap that this leaves in the second half is to be filled by the reader, who can do so by virtue of the parallelism. The reader understands from v. 8a that the fools’ deceit has something to do with the way to go. The metaphor of the way, entailing as it does the way of conducting the decisions and actions of life, is used to state what wisdom is about: to give the clever learner understanding of how to conduct himself in life. But the foolish people don’t have this. Logically, that can mean they deceive themselves or others. Since the focus of the first part of the proverb is on what wisdom affords the clever, it is more probable that the second will state what folly (= the lack of wisdom) brings for the foolish. Thus the deceit spoken of must be self-deceit (so Plöger, Meinhold, Clifford, Fox, Tuinstra, Yoder, Lucas, and earlier commentators like Hitzig and Bertheau). Some commentators leave open both possibilities (so Waltke, Yoder and Schipper).99 Foolish people think they know how to proceed and what would benefit themselves, but that is exactly where they deviate from the right way.100 Wisdom brings about real insight for its possessor in the way to go and folly brings about imagined insight that leads astray. 99 Delitzsch, on the other hand, opts for the interpretation of a dolus malus, i.e. a malicious deceiving of others. According to him, the word ‫ מרמה‬is not used elsewhere in the sense of self-deception. Similar opinions are held by Wildeboer and, somewhat more carefully, Toy. But that does not seem to be an argument that can exclude the deceiving person him/herself from being the object of an action that is usually directed against someone else. Without denying that fools harm others along with themselves, Yoder argues for the idea of self-deception on the basis of the imagery: the fools’ folly disorients them, which means they think they are on the right way, but in fact stumble into harm (similarly Murphy). 100 Cf. especially v. 12 and its parallel 16:25; also 1:15f.; 10:17; 16:25; 19:21; 22:6.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

By its word choice, the first half of the proverb echoes the very beginning of the Book of Proverbs. There it says that the proverbs of Solomon are intended to give “understanding of the words of insight” (‫להבין אמרי בינה‬, 1:2b) and to give the simple “shrewdness” (‫ערמה‬, 1:4a). In 14:8 we learn what this entails in practice. Once one has wisdom, one has insight in the practical way of conducting life; cf. v. 15, where the clever person’s having insight in “his step” (‫ )אשרו‬means perceptiveness for taking the right step on the way of decision and behaviour (cf. Job 23:11; Ps 44:19). We can thus paraphrase the meaning of the proverb as, “Don’t fool yourself, think before you proceed.” Rashi finds the considering of ways as a display of wisdom. The antithesis, according to him, is that the folly of fools is caused by the deceit in their hearts. As far as the folly of fools is concerned, Ramaq interprets the folly as the cause of the deceit. The Mezudat David in turn thinks it is the careful analysis of one’s acts that will avoid impulsive behaviour, as opposed to the folly that causes planned deceit. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra is quite explicit about both sides of the equation: The wisdom of the clever helps him to understand his way, and the folly of a fool brings him to the practice of deceit (‫)תביאהו לעשות מרמה‬. Malbim provides an original interpretation by saying that the ‫ אולת‬is actually feigned scepticism – in other words, deceit – which the fool uses as an excuse to follow the way of the desires in his own heart rather than the teaching of wisdom. Clement of Alexandria (2nd-3rd century)101 quotes the Greek proverb together with 28:4f. in a commendation of the Stoic doctrine of living agreeably to nature and being kind, which imitates God. This is apparently what “the wisdom of the clever knows its ways” means to him. Chrysostom comments that the first hemistich praises the wisdom of knowing one’s own life, which is what “way” means here according to him. It entails never being diverted, which he explains – rather surprisingly – as abstaining from judging others.

14:9 Every fool mocks guilt, but among the upright there is favour. The first hemistich is a stumbling block for many commentators, and with good reason. It has been called “doubtful” (Toy), “dark” (Plöger), “obscure” (Yoder and EE), and “meaningless” (Fox in his commentary), while McKane finds the proverb “an unsolved problem” and Tuinstra credits it for having “successfully resisted all efforts at interpretation.” Whybray offers an extended discussion of the textual problems and finds just about everything “doubtful” or “questionable.” Whether it really is so bad, is however not so certain. Nevertheless, the verse certainly is a challenge. Although not all equally plausible, there are several possible ways to construe the meaning 101

Strom II,19 (ANF II, 369).

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of the Masoretic Text as it stands, apart from textual emendation, which can sometimes be quite extensive (for instance, Hitzig, Gemser and BHS; cf. Fox both in his commentary and in EE, as well as others102). Delitzsch takes the “sacrificial offering of fools” as the subject, evidently under the pressure of the singular form of the verb, but this strains the possibilities of construing a genitive relationship between the separated nomen regens and nomen rectum. Meinhold also takes ‫ אשם‬as the subject, but ‫אולים‬ as its object (“Guilt mocks [looks down on] fools [the arrogant]”), which Waltke rightly calls “infelicitous.” Schipper does the same in principle (“Guilt mocks fools”). Although he opts for this translation, he nevertheless points out the advantage of taking ‫ אולים‬as the subject. His only objection against this is that the relation with God he finds in the second hemistich would then be missing in the first. This can be countered by the observation that the favour with which their fellow humans treat the upright is the harmony they enjoy because of their undisrupted relation to God,103 which according to 3:34 is exactly the opposite of the relation between the ‫ לצים‬and God (Tuinstra). In my opinion, the Targum, Symmachus, the Vulgate and Luther strike the right chord in making the fools the subject (so also McKane, Murphy, Clifford, Yoder and others). The objection that the verb is third person masculine singular, while a plural subject would call for a plural verb form is “not a severe problem” (Fox), since it can be explained as a distributive plural.104 Already Hame’iri saw this possibility to understand it as the equivalent of ‫( כל אחד מן האולים‬each one among the fools). In English this corresponds to “every fool,” where “every” also takes the singular in the predicate. That would mean that it is typical of fools to make light of guilt, so that one can say that every single one of them is like that. If that were not the case, they would be redeemable, but they are not, as we learn from 27:22. An objection advanced by Fox is that fools would rather be “likely to calculate that a guilt offering is an easy way to appease God.” But treating the serious matter of a guilt offering with such irreverence would in itself be pouring scorn on 102 The Septuagint has οἰκίαι (the houses) in both hemistichs, perhaps because of reading ‫( אהלים‬tents) for ‫( אולים‬cf. BHQ, 43*f.) and ‫( ובית‬but the house) for ‫( ובין‬but between). This Ÿ Ù? ĀŸ • [their houses] in both hemistichs) has influenced the extended text of the Peshitta (…{Í œ and hence Hitzig (“the tents of the foolish” and “the house of the upright”); likewise the suggestions by Gemser (partly accepted by McKane and taken over by BHS). Similarly Alter, Fox for the first hemistich, and see his extended notes in EE. Toy, who even gives three possible translations, seems to have given up the “original reading of the first clause” as “lost.” Among further suggestions, cf. Driver (1951, 181), who suggests ‫ ובן‬or ‫( ובנו‬and they discern) for ‫ובין‬, and the unfounded speculation by Kuhn (1931, 32-33) to read the first word as ‫עולים‬ (the crooks). 103 Cf. Fuhs, who argues similarly. 104 Waltke refers to the same phenomenon in v. 1 and a similar case of apparent grammatical disagreement in 3:18. The plural of persons can indeed be construed with the singular of the predicate; cf. GKC 145l.

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it. Another objection by Fox is that the alternative meaning of ‫אשם‬, namely “guilt,” would not help, because fools would rather be likely to embrace guilt. But here the same logic applies: thinking nothing of being guilty can just as well be described as pouring scorn on the idea of being in a guilty state. Although we do not need to accept Clifford’s effort to deal with the combination of a plural subject and a singular predicate,105 he is on the right track about the general sense of the proverb. The fools “simply continue in their wicked behavior, whereas the upright by reason of their uprightness already enjoy divine acceptance and favor.” The ‫( רצון‬favour) may have been conceived of by the sage or the editor as the favour of God. Then the preposition ‫ בין‬will mean “among” (as in Isa 44:4, Hos 13:15; Job 24:11; 30:7); God’s favour will be present in their community. Or the favour may mean the mutual favour between (‫ )בין‬themselves, that is, the respect they have for each other. The focus of Rashi is on ‫ אשם‬as the making of amends by foolish sinners in order to receive mercy from God, like the golden objects offered by the Philistines to make amends for their foolishness (1 Sam 6:4-5). The Mezudat David takes ‫ אשם‬as a guilt offering to be brought by the fools, while upright people are pleasing to God without having to bring such a sacrifice. Ramaq thinks the fools scoff at the idea of a guilt offering or even at the idea of sin itself, for which reason they never hesitate to do crime. Sacadia reads ‫ אשם‬as the subject, meaning that the fools’ guilt mocks them in the sense of testifying against them. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra takes his cue from Gen 42:23, where it is said that an interpreter (‫ )מליץ‬stood between Joseph and his Hebrew speaking brothers. So the fools talk to one another about their wrongdoing like Joseph’s brothers. Hame’iri, on the other hand, interprets ‫ יליץ‬as “he/they make[s] sweet,” which would mean that the fools sweeten their own sin (see also above on Hame’iri’s view of the distributive plural). At the Seventh Council of Carthage (256 CE) where the baptism of heretics and those baptised by them was discussed, Lucius of Castra Galbae quoted the proverb in the Greek tradition: “The house of those who are contrary to the law requires cleansing.”106 It is inferred from this that all who have been baptised by people “contrary to the church” must first be cleansed and then be baptised again. Interestingly the Greek παρανόμοι (those against the law) has here become “those against the church.” A century later, John Chrysostom simply skips the verse.

14:10 The heart knows its own bitterness, and in its joy another cannot share. The rhythmic pattern of the verse is four stresses in the first half (one to every word) and three in the second (where the maqqeph pulls back the stress of the 105 Both the idea to explain away the mem in the first word by assuming it was an enclitic mem that was misread to make the word plural, and that the u-ending of the verb was misread because the word was written without the waw (scriptio defectiva) are only assumptions as well as unnecessary. 106 Conc Carth VII (ANF V, 567).

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verb to the penultimate syllable and thus prevents adjacent stressed syllables at the end of the verse).107 The parallelism is arranged in a chiasmus-like way: A subject

C indirect object of the predicate with suffixed qualification

–

B predicate

–

–

B predicate

–

C object of the predicate with suffixed qualification

A subject

There is a contrast of sorts between the two hemistichs, in that the first is an affirmative statement speaking of bitterness or sorrow,108 while the second is a negative statement speaking of happiness or joy. But the sense is the same: humans do not have access to the innermost feelings (‫נפש‬, the inner core, the very self) of others. This is a psychological statement (cf. 13:12, 19) about the limits of the human mind. Van Leeuwen and Waltke point out that the contrast of sorrow109 and joy are not opposites that would make for an antithetical proverb. Together they form a merism, that is, opposite poles representing the whole spectrum of what they encompass (cf. young and old, including the middle aged, etc.). In other words, humans cannot experience the innermost feelings of others at all. This does not contradict the Pauline injunction to rejoice with (μετά) those who rejoice and to weep with (μετά) those who weep (Rom 12:15;110 cf. Sir 7:34-36, so Van Leeuwen). Doing something with somebody else neither implies access to the deepest recesses of another’s soul, nor excludes communication. So the proverb denies the one but does not exclude the other. In so doing, it states the limits of human communication,111 even if sympathetic. Also, the verb ‫ ערב‬Hitpael (mix in) in the second hemistich does not deny that any 107 Both Toy and Gemser accept 4+3, although Gemser thinks that 4+4 is also possible and Toy thinks the same of 3+3, both of which are improbable because of the reason given above. 108 The noun used occurs only in the construct state (‫)מ ֣רּת‬, ָ and only here (with ‫ )נפש‬and in Gen 26:35 (with ‫ רוח‬but without double resh). In this proverb it is one of the rare cases where the resh is doubled with a dagesh forte (there are only seven more such cases in the Hebrew Bible, cf. GKC 22s). It is a derivative of ‫ מרר‬and can describe taste (e.g. Prov 27:7) as well as the emotional experience of sorrow or pain (see references in the footnote below and Prov 5:4). 109 Or bitterness, which is closely analogous to sorrow, as illustrated in the self-adopted name change of Naomi to Mara, because Shaddai had made things bitter for her (Ruth 1:20; cf. Job 27:2). 110 χαίρειν μετὰ χαιρόντων, κλαίειν μετὰ κλαιόντων. 111 See the discussion of v. 12 below, for the notion of the limits of all human knowledge.

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communication is possible, but, in the same vein as the first hemistich, denies the possibility to penetrate the innermost depths of another’s mind and thus to fathom such feelings. But even if complete Einfühlung (to use the Gunkellike term) is not possible, the proverb does not claim total isolation of individuals, which would run counter to the importance of family, society and social responsibility of individuals in the Old Testament. The Septuagint has a totally different, yet understandable rendering: καρδία ἀνδρὸς αἰσθητική, λυπηρὰ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ· ὅταν δὲ εὐφραίνηται, οὐκ ἐπιμείγνυται ὕβρει. (When a man’s heart is knowledgeable, his soul is sad, but when it is joyful, it is not mixed with arrogance) The “arrogance” results from misreading the last letter of the Hebrew verse (resh) as a dalet (‫)זֵ ד‬. The Greek version of the first hemistich recalls Qoh 7:4a (“The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning”), while the rendering of the second hemistich seems to add a rider to the thought behind the Hebrew of Qoh 7:4b (“and the heart of fools is in the house of merriment”). So, when on occasion the wise do experience joy, they do not fall into the trap in which fools are caught and thus don’t become overbearing. The Peshitta gives a quite possible rendering of the Hebrew proverb: Ÿ • • {Ë> ٟ ¿Ã Ÿ = À• ÎÙü • à˜ .Íþ™ ó E çœ à {œ z œ œ A A œ ݜ :¿æĀï • Ÿ • Ÿ • .¿ÙÌÝ¢ Îæ œ ÂA {œ œ Õáٜ Ā A æ˜ ¿à z ™ {œ Ë¢ Ñ (The knowledgeable heart is anxious for itself, and in its joy strangers do not share) ֵ is interpreted as an adjective (as it is in the Greek) Here the Hebrew participle ‫יוֹד ַע‬ and the verse as a whole (so EE) says that the wise rather keeps quiet, which is an authentic sapiential idea (cf. 11:12).

Schipper refers to the Demotic teaching of Ankhsheshonq (c. 4th century BCE),112 who repeatedly warns that one should not reveal the feelings of one’s heart to others, not even to one’s wife, let alone one’s servant. Only one’s mother can be trusted. The motif is comparable to that of this proverb, but they are not the same. The Egyptian warning does not deny the possibility of knowing another’s deepest feelings, but on the contrary presupposes it, or else the warning to refrain from divulging one’s mind would not make sense. Here the topic is rather the danger of being betrayed by others. Rashi finds the proverb an expression of the belief that rewards do not have to be shared with others. Just like an individual who does not have to share the reward for his toil in Torah study, so Israel, who had to endure bitterness in exile, will not have 112

Ankhsheshonq 13x, 16-18; AEL III, 169-170.

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to share their future reward. Later the Vilna Gaon had a similar take, but with the not unimportant nuance that only those who have had to put up with hardship for the sake of Torah, will be rewarded. But Hame’iri understands the proverb in a down to earth way: both negative and positive experiences should remain private matters. The verse also features in the Talmud (Yoma 83a). The first hemistich is used as the foundation for a rabbinic ruling on whether a sick person may break the fast on Yom Kippur: the self-assessment of the sick must be taken into consideration because only the patient knows the bitterness of his or her own soul. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra interprets the first hemistich in the light of the second. A human being knows the condition of the self because only that individual truly knows his/her bitterness or joy (‫כי הוא‬ ‫ )לבדו ידע המרירות והשמחה על האמת‬and others can share in neither the one nor the other. Chrysostom is at sea with the verse and probably used a variant text of the Septuagint.113 He finds the saying to be about good sense of the kind that scrutinises everything carefully. Melanchthon paraphrases that solace offered from without does not help an agitated heart.

14:11 The house of the wicked will be demolished, but the tent of the upright will flourish. The rhythmic pattern is clearly 3+3, with one beat to every word (so Toy, Gemser and Luchsinger114). The syntactical order is the same in both hemistichs115 and there is a clear case of assonance combined with alliteration in the middle word of both sentences (‫ רשעים‬and ‫)ישרים‬. Commentators often pose the question whether ‫( בית‬house) and ‫( אהל‬tent) have to be distinguished in this proverb (e.g. Waltke, Fox, and others). It seems to me that the question is to be answered on several levels. First, both nouns are used as metonyms for the people or families who live in them, which often occurs in the Old Testament. But the tent is also used metaphorically, as can be seen in the verb ‫ פרח‬Hiphil (bud, sprout, flourish) of which it is the subject.116 So the tent not only stands for a social unit of people, but 113

Cf. Hill (2006, 225). Luchsinger (2010, 51). 115 Luchsinger (2010, 80) gives a tree diagram of the first hemistich, showing its binary structure. Had he also sketched the second hemistich, it would have fully illustrated his point that this type of verset usually has no object with verbs, while the verbs are either intransitives or passives, and therefore only three words are necessary despite the binary structure. Cf. also Hermisson (1968, 152), who calls the noun phrase a “composite nominal clause” (zusammengesetzte[r] Nominalsatz). This is perhaps not the most accurate of terms, but he explains it (1968, 157f.) with the idea that not an action as it takes place is described in this common form of proverbial statements, but a human who is to be judged by his actions. 116 The parallelism would remain intact, but become less colourful if this fine nuance is destroyed by following the Septuagint (στήσονται) and reading ‫( יעמוד‬will stand); cf. BHS, 114

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is also spoken of as a plant that flourishes, meaning that they grow and have success. Thus it is an instance of metaphtonymy (the combination of metonymy and metaphor).117 As we reread the first hemistich in the light of the second, the metaphorical aspect of vegetative life and well-being contained in the second metonym however has a retroactive impact on the interpretation of the house in the first hemistich and its fate. The house may be a stronger physical structure than the tent, but becomes weaker to the point of annihilation due of the wickedness of the inhabitants, while the people in the portable home of nomads have good fortune due to their uprightness. Any distinction between the two structures is very subtle, entailing that the welfare of humans does not depend on outward qualities, but on the sapiential notion of rejecting wickedness in favour of living an upright life. The proverb is thus a quintessential expression of the nexus of deed and consequence.118 Rashi historicised the house of the wicked to mean the house of Esau. Ralbag ascribes the destruction of the house of the wicked to the withholding of God’s protection and maintains the nexus of deed and consequence explicitly by stating that the wicked cause their own misfortune by their deeds. By the same token, the flimsy tent of the righteous is more than preserved. Ramaq is original in interpreting the choice to live in tents as resistance to the pleasures of this world, which is rewarded with preservation by God. Nahmias interprets the proverb as a statement that the wicked regard the earthly life as permanent and therefore build permanent houses, while the upright understand life on earth as temporary and therefore live in temporary accommodation. Four centuries later, the Vilna Gaon construes the sense in the same strain. Malbim finds the proverb an indication that a tent can be more secure than a sturdily built house. Of course, the proverb does indicate as much, but it is not really a paradox, since the strength of sapiential virtue rather than material strength is basic to the sages. As far as I can see, the verse is not quoted directly in early Christianity. Nevertheless, the basic idea of its imagery was present in early church. In two places the image of the proverb as interpreted by Nahmias and the Vilna Gaon, viz. an earthly tent to be followed by a heavenly house, also occurs in the New Testament.119 Chrysostom does not comment on the verse, neither does Melanchthon or Calvin.

with reference to 12:7. Moreover, a vegetative image is used in 11:28 with the same verb (‫ )פרח‬to indicate the good fortune of the righteous vis-à-vis those who trust in material wealth. 117 See above on v. 1, also on 10:11, 13, 31 and the references to Goossens (1995, 159174 = 1990, 323-340). 118 Hausmann (1995, 47) points out that in this verse (and many others among the proverbs beginning at 10:1), the fate of the righteous and the upright as opposed to that of the wicked is only asserted as a fact and never supported by substantiation. This points to the almost axiomatic validity with which the nexus was understood, so that it becomes all the more understandable that the sages sometimes had to point out the limits of the axiom in the light of actual experience (cf. 16:33; 19:21; 20:24 etc.). The issue is discussed in Vol. I, 39-46, Essay 8.4 on “Retribution” and the Limits of Wisdom. 119 2 Cor 5:1 and 2 Pet 1:13.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

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14:12 There is a way straight before a man, but its end is ways to death. This verse is identical with 16:25,120 and the first hemistich resembles 21:2a.121 A further feature shared with other proverbs is noted by Berlin,122 viz. the fact that the parallelism contains a singular term (here ‫ )דרך‬as the counterpart of a plural (here ‫“ )דרכי‬for no apparent reason other than to create a morphologic parallelism.” Berlin does refer to Watters,123 who claims that this singular/plural type of parallelism is “necessary for metric reasons.” That, however, cannot apply here, for the rhythm would have remained the same if the penultimate word were singular (see below on a further possible explanation of the phenomenon in this verse). According to Toy, the pattern is 3+2, which accords with the final maqqeph in both hemistichs and the conjunctive Masoretic accents at the beginning. This proverb has been placed after v. 11 for a reason. Whereas the previous verse articulates the deed-consequence nexus as clearly as can be, v. 12 questions not only the rigidity of its categorical formulation, but also the principle itself.124 To interpret the proverb, Fox invokes 21:2 (humans think their behaviour will be beneficial, but God examines the inner guilt they implicitly deceive themselves about) and 2 Sam 16:7 (humans see superficially but God sees right into the heart). According to him, people deceive themselves by thinking they know the right way, but their better judgement could have told them that it is not the case. With most commentators, Millar125 gives a more convincing interpretation. In the sections of her book with the captions, “The Limited Human” and “The Limiting Lord,” she discusses the limitations of wisdom and the recognition of these limitations by real wisdom. One of her supporting texts is 14:12 = 16:25. “Reading the first colon, the reader is tricked into believing the beneficial prospects of this path. The 120 As such, it is one of the eight sets of more or less exactly repeated proverbs in the book (Snell’s category 1.0) and, among those, one of four sets that even lack spelling variants, as counted by Snell (1993, 35). The fact of the two verses being identical is mentioned by Delitzsch, but interestingly they are both left uncommented by Schultens, whose Latin translation is different in both cases. 121 Snell (1993, 144), compares 21:2 with 16:2 (his category 1.3), but 21:2a rather with 12:15a (his category 2.2). For an extended discussion of all these parallels, making up as they do Heim’s Set 45, see Heim (2013, 303-315). 122 Berlin ([1985] 2008, 45, 145). 123 Watters (1976, 105). 124 Millar (2020, 211) gives other examples of this phenomenon, such as 10:26-27; 19:2324; 22:12-14, with the insightful remark that the “proverbial form means that the world view never becomes a closed system.” 125 Millar (2020, 208-210); also her earlier article with the delightful title, “When a Straight Road Becomes a Garden Path: The ‘False Lead’ As a Pedagogical Strategy in the Book of Proverbs” (2018, 67-82).

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second colon forces him to rectify this and to acknowledge his mistaken impression.” This is indeed what happens, even if she formulates it somewhat provocatively:126 the first hemistich by itself can indeed mean that any person thinks a straightforward, easy and sensible path lies before them (and the reader may at first also think so). But when this is reread in light of the second hemistich, it turns out not to have been true at all. On the contrary, that way is now unmasked as deadly. Not only is there a limit to what people may know about each other’s innermost feelings (v. 10), but their knowledge about anything is limited. This verse is one of the many proverbs in the book where these limits are acknowledged.127 Millar calls them “ruptures,” which is what they are, since they undermine confidence in the deed-consequence nexus. These ruptures occur not only between Proverbs and Qohelet (as I used to think before the penultimate decade of the previous century, cf. 1 Cor 13:11 – and then follows v. 12 with validity for this century as well), they are also present within the Book of Proverbs itself. Neither of what Millar calls the “two modes of causality” is jettisoned. What I have called the “default position,” the deedconsequence nexus, is the set of go-to traffic rules for negotiating travel on the way of life. It stands side by side with the unfathomable divine mystery.128 Fuhs shows the theological implications of this exegesis with a deep sensitivity for both the mysterion itself and the human being. He takes Meinhold to task for near cynicism when the latter declares the ‫ איש‬of the first hemistich to be a person with a deficient self-esteem (“Selbstbewertung”). While Meinhold recognises much (!) of the fool in this person, Fuhs states that in such cases any question of guilt is obsolete and any advice inadequate. It does happen (for ‫ יש‬at the beginning of such sentences, cf. 11:24; 13:7; 16:25) that humans may deem a certain way of life as the only one viable, only to find that it peters out in catastrophe and even literal death. This may also relate to the parallelism between the singular ‫ ֶדּ ֶרְך יָ ָשׁר‬and the plural ‫י־מוֶ ת‬ ָ ‫( ַדּ ְר ֵכ‬cf. the notes above on Berlin and Watters). What to the observer initially seems to be a clear-cut straight way to a specific goal, in the end splits up into multiple paths diverging in all possible directions into the desert where every one becomes a cul-de-sac as it runs into death. In the case of 14:12 the singular-plural parallelism therefore does not merely carry a rhythmic or morphological effect but also makes thematic sense. 126 One could also say that the reader is helped out of the common underestimation of a dangerous course of action by being alerted in the second hemistich to the actual danger lurking (thus, a “pedagogical strategy”). 127 See Volume I, 39-46. 128 Millar appreciatively cites Fiddes (2013, 108) for his exposition of the two dimensions as “secular pragmatism,” which sees human limitations based on human nature, and “piety,” which sees those limitations based on divine nature.

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The idea that a road (singular) may initially be smooth and straight, but later branches out into various insecure paths (plural) leading to death was invoked by several rabbis over the centuries (for instance, the Mezudat David and the Vilna Gaon129). Rashi offers two different possibilities. The one is that a person may commit a sin and simply declare that it is no sin – apparently such a person goes on a road that would ultimately lead to the punishment for sin, but merely declares his way to be straight and sinless. The second explanation somehow declares the road that seems right to be the way of laziness which leads to catastrophe, as Esau had to find out (perhaps an allusion to Gen 25:29-34, where Esau seems too lazy to prepare his own food and as a result lost his right as the first-born). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra also explains that a man may think his way is clear to do as he likes, but in the end it may bring him to several paths ending in death. He appeals to Qoh 7:8 (“The end of a matter is better than its beginning”) to undergird the message that a wise man reckons with how a matter will end before he sets out. John Chrysostom offers basically the same in his exegesis of the Greek text. A way may seem right at first, but in the end it leads straight into Hades (ἔρχεται εἰς πυθμένα ᾅδου [Septuagint]). Therefore the teaching is that our thinking should not be fixed on the present, but rather on the future. In the Constitutions of the Apostles130 the Greek form of the proverb is directly applied to heretics, whose views may seem in order at the beginning, but eventually lead to the “bottom of hell.” The same judgement is made by Zephirinus, Bishop of Rome (†201),131 in his Epistle to the bishops of Egypt about those who have illegally deprived the bishops of their seats and property. Jerome quotes the proverb a few times in a general, rather vague way, first, in the Letter to the Virgins of Aemona and then in “The Life of Malchus, the Captive Monk.”132 At this verse Melanchthon resumes his commentary and is in his element. There are two basic points to the proverb, which to him is a prescription, viz. to guard against falling into errors, and against desire and coveting. Not resisting a swipe at “heretics,” he concludes that the only safe option to go along such an unknown road, is by God’s word, which is a light unto one’s feet (Ps 119:105). The exegetical principle of the Reformation, Scriptura sui ipsius interpres, again plays its role.

14:13 Even when laughing, a heart may be sad, and then the outcome of joy is grief. This proverb consists of a verbal clause followed by a nominal clause, organised in a rhythmic pattern of 2+3. So also Toy, who however thinks that 3+3 is possible too, while Gemser opts for the latter. That would require ignoring the first maqqeph and upholding the second. But when both are accepted,133 129 Cf. also the explanation by Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 252), who interprets the many paths resulting from the branching off as ways to many sins. 130 Const Apost II/i, 17 (ANF VII, 457). 131 Epist II Zephyrini ad Episc Aeg (ANF VIII, 611). 132 Respectively in Epist XI Virg Aem (NPNF II/6, 12) and Vit Malch (NPNF II/6, 331). 133 In support of this analysis, see Price (1990, 220) for the finer details in cases where several conjunctives precede the atnah. Depending on Price, Luchsinger (2010, 107) lists no less than nineteen cases where this pattern is found in Prov 10:1–22:16.

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we have only two stresses in the first half. Toy calls the parallelism “identical,” which it is not, as I will argue presently. By the same token, the parallelism is not antithetic either, but the second half goes beyond the first and thus extends its statement.134 Fox puts his finger on the pulse of the issue at hand. He thinks that the verb in v. 13a is modal,135 but that v. 13b “is phrased like an indicative statement, not a statement of possibility.” Therefore Fox concludes that “it is hard to determine whether the verse states a possibility or a fact.”136 Waltke reaches basically the same result, and Murphy finds the “modal nuance” to apply to v. 13a but then adds that its “tentativeness” somehow carries over to v. 13b. Clifford is laconic in his comment: “In colon A laughter and sadness coexist, whereas in B one emotion follows the other.”137 It may also be (and in my opinion is likely) that the consecutive emotions of the second half, as Clifford sees them, themselves constitute a consequence of laughter mixed with or compromised by the sadness mentioned in the first half. That would mean that in the end (‫ )אחרית‬only the sadness remains – perhaps in a worsened form – after coexisting with laughter. Similarly, Waltke, who however gives it a positive spin by referring to the general optimistic character of the book and finds it a pointer to salvation “beyond normal human experience.” Clifford’s interpretation seems convincing to me. In the same vein, Meinhold translates the verse, Sogar beim Lachen kann ein Herz Schmerz empfinden, und ihr, der Freude, Ende ist (dann) Kummer. (Even in laughter a heart can feel pain, and [then] her, that is, joy’s end is grief)

This contains the word “then” ([dann]) in parentheses, as Meinhold’s rendering of the particle conjunction ְ‫ ו‬with which the second hemistich begins, which suggests that the situations described in the two hemistichs should be understood as successive. The use of the particle ‫ גם‬at the beginning of the verse is a second indicator. ‫ גם‬does not only denote addition, but often is an 134 That is implicitly conceded by Toy himself when he first declares that the hemistichs are “identical,” stating that sadness may be “in” laughter (thus simultaneous with it), and then that joy “passes into” sorrow (thus that the mixed emotions at some later stage deteriorate into a single emotion). 135 Other commentators call it “potential,” so Waltke, who refers to IBHS Par. 8.4.2, also 32.3e and 4e. The phenomenon is well known and was already documented, discussed and illustrated as one of the uses of the imperfect in GKC 107r. 136 Fox does say however that the second hemistich “means that pleasure may issue [sic] in misery,” which makes it not only a statement of possibility, but also a later “outcome,” as he calls it. In my opinion, the verse provides a good illustration of polyvalence. The proverb can be understood in different ways and accordingly applied to different situations (see below). That is what makes it so interesting as a proverb. 137 Meinhold and Schipper read it in essentially the same way.

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emphasising particle.138 In this case it would mean that pain may be felt in the human heart not only when the usual signs like sighing or weeping are noticeable, but actually even in the unusual circumstance that a person laughs in a one-sided expression of a battle of mixed emotions raging within, or a totally opposite emotion inside. Whether at some point the battle is decided or the grief bursts out – in the end, it is always grief that prevails.139 This thought may indeed be compared to the general pessimism associated with Qohelet, as is often done, but it is not the same as Qohelet’s utterance that a sad exterior is an expression that things are good in the heart (cf. Qoh 7:1-4, esp. v. 3). In his context, Qohelet uses the motif of a sad exterior in bonam partem (it is a good sign), while the Proverbs text uses the motif of a happy exterior in malam partem (it is a tragic sign).140 Read in this way, the proverb may still be understood and applied in several ways. (a) In the broadest sense, it may simply “caution against ‘judging a book by its cover’” (Yoder) since appearances deceive (Murphy). The laughter and sorrow can then represent any conglomerate of conflicting emotions. (b) On a deeper psychological level, the saying may also comment on “how closely interwoven are happiness and heartache” (also pointed out by Yoder). (c) Likewise, with somewhat sharper focus on the anthropological dimension, it may show how complex people with their fleeting emotions are (Clifford). (d) The verse may simply make the pessimistic claim that “the party always ends” (Van Leeuwen; some find the notion of a party’s end very positive, though). (e) Again, the proverb may comment on laughter (not happiness or joy) as a disguise for deep-seated sadness (Fox). 138 So already BDB, s.v., with many examples, especially from the Book of Genesis; cf. also the essay devoted to the topic by Labuschagne (1966, 193-203). 139 This result would remain unaffected even if the suffixed ‫ ה‬of ‫ אחריתה‬is deleted altogether (so e.g. Plöger) or if it is moved to become the article with ‫( שמחה‬so, for instance, BHS, Murphy, Fox). In EE Fox states confidently that the emendation should “certainly” be undertaken. But already Delitzsch has shown that this type of syntaxis ornata occurs elsewhere as well, e.g. 13:4, Isa 17:6 et al. and is a precursor of the post-biblical genitive with suffix plus ‫של־‬, which in this case would have been ‫אחריתה של־שמחה‬. 140 Although Fuhs’s criticism of Delitzsch is warranted in so far as the latter understands v. 13b to state that it is not good for humans to give them over to joy, he perhaps goes too far in attributing this to “a certain Christian conception of the human.” Fuhs neglects to mention (a) Delitzsch’s addition that he means sensual joy, and (b) that precisely this view is found not only in several variegated Christian strands, but often also in the rabbinic reception of the proverb as well as elsewhere, of which Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 252-253) gives ample examples.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

(f) It may express the tragic motif of being pressured by society into flippant jocularity or required to laugh for the amusement of others, while being broken inside (as politicians and clowns do). Possibility (f) often appears as a motif in Western art. The clown who has to laugh whether he wants to or not, whose facial make-up with its down-turned mouth and dropping tear makes people laugh, is well known and often referred to. Perhaps that calls for another comment. The two most famous clowns in opera, Canio in Leoncavallo’s Pagliacci and the court jester Rigoletto in Verdi’s opera, both have arias with heart-rending expressions of the ideas in the proverb. Although no direct quotations are given, all the motifs are there as well as the “outcome at its end.” Both clowns have only sorrow in their hearts, both are compelled by their occupation to overlay it with laughter, and both come to the grievous ending of which the second hemistich speaks. Putting on his clown’s garment and making up his face, Canio commands himself, Tramuta in lazzi lo spasmo e il pianto, / in una smorfia il singhiozzo e ’l dolor. Ridi, Pagliaccio, sul tuo amore infranto! / Ridi del duol, che t’avvelena il cor! (Convert into jokes the distress and tears, / into a grin the sob and the pain! Laugh, clown, at your broken love, / laugh at the grief that poisons your heart!) True to our last verset, terrible tragedy follows as the last words ring out: “La commedia è finita!” The other operatic harlequin, Rigoletto, laments the fact that the basic human right to shed tears is denied him while he has to make others laugh. O rabbia, esser buffone! / Non dover, non poter altro che ridere! Il retaggio d’ogni uom m’è tolto: il pianto! (Oh rage, to be a buffoon! / Not permitted, not able to do anything but laugh! The heritage of every human is taken from me: to weep …) Weeping is in his heart, but his right to express it with tears is denied him. And sure enough, the end is again what the second hemistich foresees: tragedy – “Ah! la maledizione!” What Van Leeuwen says of Mozart’s music in general may be contested by some: “Even in an exuberant allegro, Mozart’s music is borne along on an undercurrent of sadness.” But it is certainly true of his Symphony Nr. 40 in G Minor K. 550. It cannot be coincidence that the same work was regarded by Robert Schumann as the perfect example of beauty and joyous colour, but by Josef Haydn as the expression of sad melancholy and doom. Rashi sees an instance of the deed-consequence nexus in the proverb. Citing Isa 65:14, where a future crying for sorrow is foreseen, he explains that God allows the heathens to laugh in this world, but later they will experience heartache. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra just paraphrases, but in such a way that he makes clear his view of outer laughter mixed with sorrow (v. 13a), which will be followed by grief which comes from / out of (‫)מן‬ the joy (‫[ מהשמחה‬sic]). Also in the view of the Mezudat David, the ending in grief is a punishment. The laughter to him is idle laughter, which equals turning one’s heart towards idleness and is therefore deserving of punishment (cf. Pirqe Abot 3:17,

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where the same idea occurs). The Vilna Gaon takes the laughter of the first half as levity because it can be mixed with sorrow, while the happiness of the second half is real but temporary. Both of them end up in sorrow, which should be understood as sorrow in this life. To my surprise, I could only find very little attention to this proverb in patristic literature, despite the strong ascetic tradition that could conceivably make good use of both its Hebrew and its Greek forms. Not even the monastic Evagrius Ponticus, who wrote a Scholia on Proverbs, comments on the verse. Perhaps the scarcity in patristic sources could be ascribed to the prevalence of the Septuagint, which was the version used by Evagrius and most Fathers. The Greek transmission of the first hemistich could indeed be understood as useful for ascetics (we do not mix pleasures into our strict life on earth). But the second is not so clear and even ambiguous. The Septuagint has, ἐν εὐφροσύναις οὐ προσμείγνυται λύπη, τελευταία δὲ χαρὰ εἰς πένθος ἔρχεται (In pleasures pain does not mix, but in the end, happiness comes to sorrow) But the Greek v. 13b does not necessarily have to contradict the positive ring given to the first hemistich. It could be interpreted that happiness finally comes in the place of sorrow (as a reward), but it could also mean that happiness becomes sorrow (which would be nearer to the Hebrew sense and not contradict the first Greek hemistich). The Codex Alexandrinus has a genitive (χαρᾶς), which is awkward (“the end of happiness comes to sorrow”). The Greek may be read as a reference to this life, but the Codex Alexandrinus could, albeit with some difficulty, be taken as a reference to a reward for those who had sorrow. This may reflect the difficulty facing monks of coming to terms with the verse and why it was not invoked more often.141 However, Chrysostom comments briefly on the Greek version, which turns the proverb on its head by denying that grief and happiness can mix. Without argument, Chrysostom says that one should (apparently while making merry) consider the future, when finally joy will turn into grief. That, again, does not sound very helpful to anyone who prefers sorrow now in order to gain the reward of happiness in future, either in this or in the coming life. In turn, Melanchthon, somewhat like Pseudo-Ibn Ezra and the Mezudat David, interprets the laughter spoken of in the proverb as excessive laughter. He quotes Martial – one of the many instances that, according to him, use the same idea: Sperne voluptates, nocet empta dolore voluptas (Spurn pleasures, pleasure bought with pain is harmful).

14:14 From his ways a relapsing heart will be sated, so will a good man from his deeds. A textual emendation is often made in the second hemistich, where the verb is gapped and must be supplied by the reader. Nevertheless, the general thrust 141

But cf. EE, where the drift is said to stay pessimistic, which makes it puzzling that the first half was given a positive slant by adding the negating particle οὐ, while the same was not done in the second half.

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of the proverb is clear. It is obviously a statement of the deed-consequence nexus, viz. that the behaviour (“ways”) of deviating people comes back on them and that the same applies to a good person. Whether the text is emended or not, the rhythmic pattern remains 4+3, at one stress per word. The translation above accepts the textual emendation. The first word of v. 14b is often emended from ‫וּמ ָע ָליו‬ ֵ (lit. and from on him) to ‫וּמ ַמּעֲ לָלָיו‬ ִ (and from his deeds). Still, leaving the text unchanged remains a possibility. The first word of the second half could be understood as “from what is on him,” and be interpreted with the Peshitta to mean “from the fear of his soul” Ÿ This could be taken to reflect the Septuagint “from (Íþó G x˜ èã). A A Ð ™ æœ x ÀĀá his thoughts” (ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν διανοημάτων αὐτοῦ).142 But even if this cannot be said to make no sense (Fox), it is forced and spoils the parallelism. On the other hand, the emendation can be defended as correction of an understandable double haplography of ‫ מ‬and ‫ל‬. The change was already proposed by Cappellus in the 17th century and is accepted by many (Delitzsch, Bickell,143 Bertheau, Toy, Gemser, Ringgren, Scott, McKane, Clifford, Tuinstra, Murphy, Waltke, Fox and others).144 Both the person who relapses, i.e. deviates from or regresses on the good or sapiential way, and the one who remains “good,” i.e. adheres to the norms of wisdom teaching, are “filled” (‫)שבע‬. The verb is gapped in the second hemistich, but is easily supplied from the first. However, once the reader or hearer supplies it, there is a new nuance to the verb, called a “neat ambiguity” by Murphy. ‫ שבע‬means “to have one’s fill,” but that may have a positive slant (have one’s hunger satisfied with good food) or a negative one (have to accept being stuffed with the bad consequences of one’s actions, cf. English “eat your words”). The general drift of the proverb leaves room for a variety of rabbinic interpretations, which is enhanced by the choice of words used, but also by the transmitted form of the Masoretic text. Rashi relates ‫( סוג‬move away) to ‫( סיג‬dross) and interprets it to indicate a wicked person whose heart contains a mix of dross. In the 18th century this was followed by the Vilna Gaon. Four centuries before him a similar interpretation by Hame’iri keeps closer to the Hebrew verb and interprets it as a heart that turns 142 Others among the older and more recent commentators who do not emend are Schultens, Plöger (who however seems to take the masculine singular suffix as a plural referring to the “ways”), Meinhold and Schipper (both of whom translate “what is on him”). Schipper rejects the emendation and says, “As opposed to this …” (“Demgegenüber …”) followed by an argument for exactly what the emendation expresses, viz. that the deeds of good and bad are equally subject to the nexus of deeds and their consequences. 143 Bickell (1891, 85, 199). 144 The proposal is not even mentioned in BHS (mistakenly referenced by Murphy and Fuhs); it is discussed but rejected by BHQ, who finds a twofold haplography unlikely. Ewald says a word like “deeds” (“Thaten”) is expected, but the simple explanation with haplography did not occur to him and he surmises ‫( מפעליו‬from his works) or ‫( מגמליו‬from his [good] deeds).

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away from reason. More or less the same view is taken by the Mezudat David who thinks that the heart spoken of turns away from God (cf. the reference to Isa 59:14, where the Hophal of the verb is used in a comparable way). As for the second hemistich, Rashi interprets ‫ מעליו‬as an indication that a good man is “above” a wicked one (above him: comparative ‫ מן‬+ on + third person masculine singular suffix).145 Ralbag understands the particle ‫ מן‬in a spatial sense and thus takes v. 14b to say that the good man will separate himself from “him” (= the wicked one). The idea is illustrated by a reference to Korah, Dathan and Abiram (Num 16:26), where Moses commands the others to turn away “from” them (‫ )מעל‬so as not to be punished together with them. In the context of this commentary, the most topical interpretation is given by Yonah Gerondi, whose exposition sounds as if it was offered late in the second decade of the 21st century rather than the 13th. The one with a heart going backwards only clings to his own opinions and never considers that he may be wrong. He never listens to advisers or sees his own shortcomings. He does not admit flaws in his thinking and takes impulsive decisions without being able to analyse or consider consequences. He is by no means an ‫איש טוב‬, who is the opposite of what he embodies. Now, there’s a rabbi. Ramaq and the Vilna Gaon offer another interpretation. They derive ‫ מעליו‬from the noun ‫( עלה‬leaf). The good man is sated (the gapped verb remains in force) by his leaves. The Vilna Gaon relates this to the notion of enjoying the fruits of one’s good deeds in this world (Isa 3:10). If the good person only takes enjoyment “from his leaves,” it means that he saves the actual fruits for the coming world. In his defence against Rufinus,146 Jerome strings together a long list of quotations from Proverbs (following the Greek tradition) in the hope, he says, that Rufinus might listen to God’s words if he will not accept what humans say. Among them is Prov 14:14a, which he applies to Rufinus. It is obviously intended as a threat, but depends on whether Rufinus is a “rash man,” which Jerome neither seems to doubt nor feels the need to substantiate. Chrysostom has a very brief comment, saying that the rash of heart “will be filled with his own ways.” He finds this enough proof to claim that nobody but the perpetrator personally will suffer the consequences of negative deeds. This is an extreme form of the doctrine of retribution but undermines itself by denying the all too real experiences demonstrating the opposite over centuries (of which the sages were very aware). Finally, Evagrius Ponticus tries to come to grips with the Greek text by asserting that the “bold-hearted man” will be filled “from his thoughts” (ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν διανοημάτων αὐτοῦ). In his terse note he seems to equate the thoughts of such people with virtuous practises.

14:15 The simple believes everything, but the clever one watches his step. The rhythmic pattern is 3+3 and the parallelism of the two hemistichs is reflected not only on the semantic level, but also by the precise correspondence on the syntactic level. In both verbal sentences the subject stands in the first 145 Although unlikely in the context, this by itself is not unthinkable, since ‫ מעל‬can mean “more than” (KAHAL) and ‫ על‬can also denote pre-eminence (BDB). 146 Apol contr Ruf, Par. 43, in the History by Theodoret of Cyprus (NPFP V/2, 3, 540).

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position, then come the respective verbs with notable assonance, and last the two objects, in both cases preceded by the preposition ‫ל‬. ‫ל־דּ ָבר‬ ָ ‫ָכ‬ ↑ object ↓ ‫ֲא ֻשׁרוֹ‬

‫ְל‬ ↑ prep ↓ ‫ַל‬

‫יַ ֲא ִמין‬ ↑ verb ↓ ‫יָ ִבין‬

‫ֶפּ ִתי‬ ↑ subject ↓ ‫ָערוּם‬

[ ְ‫]ו‬

The subjects of each hemistich are precise opposites, but the verbs need some explaining. The verb ‫ אמן‬in die Hiphil means “believe,” both in a general and in a religious sense. Here it obviously does not have a religious meaning (“faith” or “Glaube” in German, so Delitzsch with reference to Ps 106:24 where the issue at stake is believing / not believing the word of God). The theme in the proverb is that some people believe anything others dish up,147 which is dangerous and therefore has a negative connotation. Naïveté does not merely predispose a simple person to believe any word, but to regard anything at all presented to him 148 as factually true,149 not just any spoken word. Van Leeuwen, who says that the gullible “have no experience to judge words, persons, and situations” (italics added) helpfully shows that there are specific situations pictured or alluded to in the Book of Proverbs itself that show how easily people can be fooled by verbal as well as non-verbal tricks.150 The scope of the first hemistich is, thus, broader than just believing words, although these are of course included in “everything” and it is not for nothing 147 This fits the “profane” (“innerweltliche”) use of ‫ אמן‬Hiphil as opposed to its “theological use.” Rudnig-Zelt (2017, 85) includes this proverb in her list of “profane usages of ‫ אמן‬Hiphil,” in my opinion rightly. She also mentions two other relevant points in the Old Testament: first, scepticism is legitimate in profane speech, and, second, the proverb is one of only two cases where a formally positive statement is made with ‫ אמן‬Hiphil, although both of them concern misplaced belief (2017, 95-96). 148 Even if it is true that ‫ כל‬is not to be understood in a distributive sense (so Waltke, citing GKC 127b), it is also true that both in English and German “every” and “jeder” can be used in an encompassing sense rather than implying every single thing that has ever occurred. I prefer this translation because it has the hyperbolic effect of emphasising the helplessness of naïve people. Whybray, on the other hand, finds the restriction of ‫ דבר‬to the hearing faculty as “probably” better, which is also suggested by Sæbø’s translation. 149 Cf., for instance, the way Joshua foxed the people of Ai into believing that Israel was fleeing before them, only to realise it was an ambush when it was too late (Josh 8). The image of an ambush is used in Prov 12:6 to explain the effect of the words of the wicked (Millar [2020, 203]), showing that deceit in action is primary and amenable to clarify what deceptive words are. 150 According to Van Leeuwen, several scenes from Prov 1–9 illustrate the gullibility spoken of here, such as 4:14-15 and 7:7-8. The first conjures up a situation in which the inexperienced son can indeed be enticed into (1:10-19 could be added), while the second is part of an illustration showing how the callow youth is actually entrapped not only by the words, but also by the lewd appearance and actions of the strange woman (cf. 7:21-22).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

535

that the lexeme ‫ דבר‬can denote both “words” and (other) “things.” The people who are particularly susceptible to credulity are the simple. They are inexperienced and therefore prone to all kinds of outside influences, good or bad. Precisely that is why they need instruction in the sapiential teachings of the Book of Proverbs (1:4).151 Only with the help of this kind of teaching such a person can acquire ‫( ערמה‬the same root as ‫)ערום‬, as the preamble to the book envisages. If that is achieved, the same person would become the astute kind spoken of in the second half. The discerning person carefully observes every step taken on the way of life. ‫ בין‬can mean “ to understand” in both the Hiphil and the Qal, but also “to pay attention,” “observe,”152 which is the appropriate choice here (so Fox), because the second hemistich implies an intellectual component lacking in the naïve.153 The object suggests the well-known metaphor of the way, even though a noun for “way” or “path” is not used. Schipper observes that the word for “step” (‫ )אשור‬occurs often in the Psalms, but in the Book of Proverbs it is found only here. The second hemistich (not the first, as Fox says – probably a lapsus calami) restates the first hemistich of v. 8. But the idea has parallels in 22:3 and 27:12.154 Although I do not see why this proverb should be suspected of being tautologous, I do agree with Fox that it cautions the reader not to believe everything he hears and rather to watch his steps carefully. This again illustrates how a plain indicative presenting an observation of reality can function as an admonition.155 The Septuagint leaves an opportunity to interpret the verse in different ways: ἄκακος πιστεύει παντὶ λόγῳ, πανοῦργος δὲ ἔρχεται εἰς μετάνοιαν. (The innocent believes every word, but the clever can change his mind) Who is naïvely innocent (ἄκακος), believes anything, but the clever one (πανοῦργος) may change his mind. This suggests the outcome of the latter’s watching his step rather than a preventative faculty, since a change from one opinion to another implies it only happens once he realises that he is being taken for a ride (see below on the terse comment by Chrysostom). For ‫פתי‬, cf. Vol. I, 59. Especially in the Qal; cf. KAHAL, which cites many examples, e.g. Deut 32:7; Ps 5:2; with ‫ל‬: Pss 73:17; 139:2; Job 9:11; 13:1 etc. 153 Cf. Vol. I, 57. 154 Although 14:15 is not part of Heim’s Set 83 (which consists of 22:3 and 27:12), he does bracket 14:15 and 18 with that set and thus compares them. This makes sense in light of the thematic similarity, even though the necessary repetitive words for inclusion in a “set” or a “category” of twice-told proverbs, as Snell (1993) calls it, are not there. 155 Cf. the Introduction, Essay 2 on “Learning in the Indicative,” 151 152

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

The Peshitta in turn offers a little midrash of what “watching one’s step” entails: ¿ćáã âÞà èäÙÍã ÁüÃý fÿÚ èã ÄÓ Žüò ¿ćäÙüï{ (The simple person believes every word, but the clever one distinguishes between good and bad) Rabbinic reception of the proverb gravitates around two centres, viz. identification of who it is that the simple believe so easily, and what distinguishes the two mental dispositions mentioned in the two halves of the verse. Rashi identifies the people whose credibility is mooted as tell-tales. The gullible simply take them at their word, but the clever wait for the relevant facts to be established before deciding. PseudoIbn Ezra identifies them as untrustworthy counsellors who can get the callow to believe anything. The clever, on the other hand, only believe what is fit to believe (‫)רק מה שהוא ראוי להאמין‬, which assumes analysis and insight. For the Vilna Gaon, the simple easily believe the Evil Inclination within themselves. The clever however do not fall for the innate ‫יצר רע‬, but exercise their innate sense of right and wrong in order to weigh up the relevant issues before deciding. Finally, Malbim thinks those who are believed indiscriminately are wicked people, whereas the clever are not so easily caught, since they assess everything as to its spiritual benefits (with reference to v. 8 and 13:16). The rabbis who emphasise the underlying principle at stake do not necessarily contradict the thinking of the other group, but they highlight judiciousness and analysis as strategies for determining truth. Ralbag sees the proverb as a contrast between making a decision without analysing a given situation, as opposed to insight in that situation that would lead to the right response. Hame’iri takes a similar view, simply understanding the verse as an injunction to judiciousness about what one believes. Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 296-373)156 predictably warns the bishops of Egypt and Libya against the Arians. He quotes the verse at the Arians who in his view prey on simple people gullible enough to believe their heresies. Ambrose (c. 339-397)157 quotes the Greek first hemistich in bonam partem (see above on the Septuagint). His focus on the “innocent” is benevolent. They are those who have no deceit in themselves and therefore gladly believe that others will act as they do. He illustrates it somewhat later with Joshua and the Gibeonites, where Joshua is so piously “innocent” that he allows the Gibeonites to trick him into letting them live instead of killing them (Josh 9). Chrysostom merely states without argument that credulity is “surely” typical of folly (i.e., when the simple believe everything). He thus implies that one can be innocent (ἄκακος) and still do stupid things. Although he does not expressly comment on the second hemistich, he does imply that the innocent first was the victim of folly.

14:16 The wise man fears and turns away from trouble, but the fool acts arrogantly and feels secure. The rhythmic scheme is 4+3, one stress to a word. Each hemistich contains two short verbal sentences, with all the verbs in participial form. The four participles are arranged in a chiastic pattern: 156 157

Ad Episc Ægypt et Lyb I, 4 (NPNF II/4, 225). On the Duties of the Clergy III,10 (NPNF, 78), II,16 (NPNF II/10, 260-261).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14 ‫סר‬ turn away feel secure ‫בוטח‬

537 ‫ירא‬ fear act arrogantly ‫מתעבר‬

Where the fool charges into anything and still feels secure, the wise man is cautious and turns away. The unusual coupling of the verb ‫ בטח‬with ‫עבר‬ Hitpael shows that the fool should actually fear, which again indicates that ‫ ירא‬does not denote the fear of God,158 but wise caution (cf. 22:3; 26:17 – Fox). Moreover, the fear of God would not be an antithesis of feeling secure. The fools storm in where not only angels, but also wise men fear to tread. Another fine suggestion by Fox is that there may be a nice pun in the choice of ‫ בטח‬I (feel confident), since the meaning of ‫ בטח‬II (fall flat) may be suggestively alluded to – storming in where the wise and the angels fear to tread, could end in a bloody nose. This is further strengthened if one notices that the outcomes of both attitudes in the respective hemistichs are alluded to rather than blandly stated: turning away from ‫רע‬-trouble means avoiding ‫רע‬-harm, and barging in on situations means exposing oneself to the humiliation of falling flat. It is understandable that several commentators emphasise a close link between vv. 15 and 16 (e.g. Meinhold and Scherer159). As the simple believes anything (v. 15a), so the fool bursts in on anything (v. 16b). As the wise carefully watches his step for fear of putting a foot wrong (v. 15b), so the astute maintains an apprehensive caution (v. 16a).160 This may well account for the fact that the two proverbs have been edited to stand alongside each other, but it does not add to the sense that either makes when read on its own terms. On the other hand, Scoralick161 comes to the exact opposite conclusion, viz. that there is no link between vv. 15 and 16, but rather a caesura dividing vv. 8-15 and vv. 16-27.

158 The opposite is found in rabbinic interpretations (cf. below on Ramaq and Radaq). Waltke also thinks the fear of God is meant and finds a lack of validation in the views of those who differ (e.g. Toy, who interprets it as apprehensive caution, and McKane, who thinks it is a (healthy) fear of dangers “in a given course of action.” But Fox cites 22:3, where ‫רעה‬ “clearly means quarreling” (or at least trouble). When that is what the wise man turns away from, it is also what he fears. 159 Scherer (1999, 149f.). 160 Millar (2020, 97-98) also appeals to a direct contrast between vv. 15 and 16. In her discussion of prototype theory – where “categories are conceptualized in terms of their central members” – she uses the contrast between the wise man’s attention to his way in v. 15 and the fool’s quarrelsomeness in v. 16 to illustrate this aspect of the central characters of the sapiential categories of the wise and the foolish. Heim (2013, 361) also sees a connection between vv. 15 and 16, but only as far as the “intellectual vocabulary” goes, whereas a thematic link (short-temperedness) rather exists between vv. 16 and 17. 161 Scoralick (1995, 223).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

It is also understandable that several commentators like Murphy, Meinhold, Whybray, and Scoralick (cf. also Schipper and the exposition by Scherer just cited) take vv. 15-18 as a unit. These verses do pit wisdom and folly against each other, albeit with a variable vocabulary. But this fact involves two categories so broad that they cannot serve as a criterion for determining a “unit,” especially not in a book which as a whole is about wisdom as opposed to folly. Moreover, Scoralick, working with the same words as carriers of thematic content and especially as catchwords, comes to a different conclusion,162 viz. that the unit in question should be demarcated as vv. 815. So many variations based on converging criteria suggest that not the criteria, but what the interpreters choose to do with them, produces the results. As we have seen so far and will see in the discussion of the following verses, each proverb is understandable by itself and, although there are common features between them, these are neither necessary to determine the sense made by the individual proverbs in question nor do they provide an extra or deeper dimension of meaning from the perspective of a composition of sorts. The Septuagint envisages a more specific scenario involving specific human types: σοφὸς φοβηθεὶς ἐξέκλινεν ἀπὸ κακοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἄφρων ἑαυτῷ πεποιθὼς μείγνυται ἀνόμῳ. (The wise man, having come to fear, would turn away from the wicked, but the fool, putting his trust in himself, mixes with the lawless) The claim in BHS, that the Greek verb μείγνυμι (intermingle with) corresponds to Hebrew ‫ ערב‬Hitpael, is correct. But the observation in EE is equally true, viz. that the Septuagint could have understood the verb in the Hebrew (‫ עבר‬Hitpael) to mean “mingle with,” since it translates the verb in 26:17 along those lines (προεστὼς, engaging in).163 The Peshitta does not contribute to a decision which of the two Hebrew verbs were in the Vorlage of the Septuagint, since its rendering (ÕáÐĀã, mix oneself in) could be a translation for either Hebrew verb. No material change would result if the text is emended, but it does seem to me more likely that the Hebrew text contains a metathesis of the ‫ ר‬and the ‫( ב‬especially in the light of 26:17, where another word with the same consonants occurs into the bargain). Rashi interprets the wise man’s fear as fear of retribution and explicitly states that ‫רע‬ (evil, trouble) is to be understood as ‫( הרעה‬impersonal evil). That would mean that Rashi does not think the verb is used in an absolute sense (such as “show caution”), but has an implied object, which would have to be inferred from the last word of the hemistich. Hence his making the noun feminine. The wise avoids a bad outcome 162 The same goes for Hermisson (1969, 178), who had been arguing likewise almost thirty years earlier; his application of this kind of criterion (catchwords, thematic ideas and the recurrence of the consonants ‫שׁ‬, ‫ ר‬and ‫ )ע‬brought him to believe that the “unit” encompasses vv. 15-22. 163 It should be noted, though, that in 26:17 a good argument can also be made that ‫מתעבר‬ should be emended to ‫מתערב‬, as here.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

539

of a bad action, thus the retribution for it. By contrast, the fool transgresses and falls flat, or, alternatively, becomes complacent after his transgression. Ralbag explains the first hemistich in similar terms, while the second, according to him, means that a fool becomes angry and feels overconfidently secure (the root ‫ עבר‬can also carry the idea of anger, cf. the noun for anger, ‫ )עברה‬instead of having a healthy fear in his heart. Ramaq concurs as far as the last half is concerned, but maintains that the implied object of the fear spoken of in the first half, is God (similarly, Radaq). Yonah Gerondi thinks that the wise man does turn away from evil, but still fears that he has not quite succeeded.164 Gerondi creates a neat contrasting parallel thought by having the fool become angry – the source of many evils – and still feeling confident that no punishment will result. The Vilna Gaon thinks that the fool erroneously thinks himself secure because God will forgive his sins, which is not the case. This may have been influenced by Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, who also saw the fear referred to as the fear of God, and even goes so far as to refer to Deut 3:26, where Moses gets his wish to enter the Promised Land rejected because God is not willing to overlook past sins. Chrysostom skips the verse. Clemens Alexandrinus (c. 150-215)165 uses it (together with Prov 14:26) to show that there are different kinds of fear, some of which are good, i.a. the fear of God and the fear of falling away from God. Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 296-373) quotes the first hemistich in his argument that there is wisdom in human beings. Not the wisdom that is in the Essence of Christ, but the wisdom that, according to Ben Sira 1:9f., is “with all flesh.” He seems to imply that every person who fears and departs from evil, must be wise and must have at least an image of divine wisdom within them (and can thus be called to account). V. 16 is another proverb quoted at Rufinus by Jerome (342-420).166 It is one of the long list on the patristic use of v. 16 referred to above, which is employed in an argument against those who speak evil and against the orthodox faith.

14:17 A short-tempered man commits folly, and a man of schemes is hated. The pattern of stresses is four in the first hemistich and three in the second. So also Gemser, but Toy calls the rhythm “ternary,” which is unlikely. The maqqeph and the concomitant Masoretic accents do require a close association of the first two words, but that can also be intended to emphasise the qualitative genitive “short of anger” as a semantic unit.

164 Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 254) points out that this exegesis follows the Midrash Tanchumah (Lech Lecha 15), where it is expressly stated that the order of the words of the Hebrew Text have been inverted: “Who is wise and turns away from evil, is fearful” (‫)חכם וסר מרע ירא‬. There it is used with reference to 28:14 on the happiness of the one who always fears, and applied to Gen 15:1, where Abraham is told not to fear, which implies that he did fear the consequences of his earlier deed. 165 Strom VIII,8 (ANF II, 356). 166 Jerome, Apol against Rufinus III, in Theodoretus, Life and Works of Rufinus III (NPNF II/3, 540).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

The line does not contain a typical antithetic parallelism. The man who gets angry quickly is juxtaposed with the man who considers his actions, which does sound antithetical. But there is more to it. The noun ‫ מזמה‬can mean “discretion,” but thinking over possible actions before putting them into practice is not necessarily positive.167 When negative, “thinking over” is used in malam partem, thus scheming evil things.168 This is the meaning here, as can be seen in the negative verb at the end: such a person is hated. The short-tempered person’s irascibility implies cantankerousness towards others. It is called folly because the schemer designs to the detriment of others who hate him for it, so that he actually schemes to his own detriment at the same time.169 Since the short-tempered action is explicitly called “folly,” the same can be said of the action of the schemer, for his scheming turns against himself, so that he is hated. The verb, in turn, implies that the contents of the scheming were found out, which also shows that it was unwise. The Septuagint made the verse a full-blown antithetical proverb: ὀξύθυμος πράσσει μετὰ ἀβουλίας, ἀνὴρ δὲ φρόνιμος πολλὰ ὑποφέρει. (The irascible man acts without counsel, but the thoughtful man endures much) Having interpreted ‫ מזמה‬in bonam partem, the Septuagint then translates the verb as Qal (‫ )ישא‬instead of Niphal (‫)ינשא‬,170 which yields “bear” instead of “is hated.” To bear must mean to put up with much, which would mean that the thoughtful man patiently puts up with much that makes his counterpart angry quickly. Both the Peshitta and the Targum offer loose renderings. The Peshitta renders: ßáãĀã ¿ćà ËÃïx ƒÎÝ ¿ćáÚáù fëÚ㍠¿ćäÚÞÐ ÁüÃÅ{ 167 One may also devise evil or think evil thoughts, which is often found expressed by the same word in the Old Testament, including Proverbs, e.g. Prov 12:2; 24:8: Pss 10:2, 4; 21:12; 37:7; 139:20; Job 21:7; cf. also Jer 11:15, where the form ‫ מזמתה‬occurs. Millar (2020, 98) compares 12:16; 19:3; 20:3. In these cases the contrast is not thinking good or evil things, but the difference between quickly showing anger and not doing so and, in 19:3, that the fool’s action actually manifests inner anger against God. 168 Winton Thomas (1969, 286) emends to ‫( יִ נָּ ֵשׂא‬is exalted), Toy and McKane emend to ‫ישא‬ and translate “endures” and “holds office” respectively, while Gemser makes the same emendation and translates like Toy (“erträgt”). Kuhn (1931, 33) thinks a nun should be added, not deleted, to attain ‫( ישאנן‬stays calm). These are ingenious efforts at creating an antithetical parallelism to correct a problem that isn’t there. 169 This is an example of the social dimension of retributive order; see Freuling (2004, 57-61); Janowski ([1994] 1999, 264-266) discusses the involvement of others in meting out reprisals for wrongs done to them. He seems not to notice this verse as one of the instances in the Book of Proverbs. Millar (2020, 118), however, does cite it as a manifestation of the phenomenon. 170 This does not constitute overlooking the nun of the Hebrew text, but is a case of diathesis, that is, changing the mood of the verb, which often occurs in the Septuagint, as pointed out in EE.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

541

(The hasty man deliberates about nothing he does, but the wise man is temperate) The Targum has:

‫מאן דכריא רוחיה מתחשב סטיא‬ ‫וסאני לגברא דעריכא תרעיתה‬

(Who is rushed in his spirit is judged to go astray, and he is hated by the man whose thinking is extended) Both versions show the same desire as the Greek to construe a full antithetical parallelism.171 But the Hebrew text provides no grounds for emendation.

Since the verdict of the Hebrew proverb is equally negative on both types of foolish behaviour, the two hemistichs cannot be called an antithetical parallelism. However, it is not simply “synonymous” either, since it does contain a contrasting element.172 Even if foolishness is negatively judged in both hemistichs, the type of fool in the second hemistich is the complete opposite of the type in the first half. It thus does have an effect similar to that which an antithetical proverb would have, especially in the context where it now stands. As several commentators have pointed out, there is a kind of chain effect in the linking of first and second hemistichs. V. 17a contains the motif of the hothead in v. 16b, while v. 16a contains the motif of carefully watching one’s step found in v. 15b.173 The first hemistich of this verse occurs almost verbatim in v. 29b, but there is one dissimilar word ([‫קצר]־אפים‬, shorttempered, versus [‫ארך ]אפים‬, long-tempered) that makes all the difference.174 Amenemope also warns against the hothead, as Tuinstra points out. A storm that bursts like a fire in straw, so is a hothead in his hour.175 Rashi interprets the first hemistich to refer to someone who is hasty in exerting revenge, while Yonah Gerondi explains the schemes (plural) of the second hemistich as a whole array of negative things, such as hatred, gloating, arrogance etc. Nahmias links the first half to Qoh 7:9 (anger in the bosom of fools). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra only remarks on the first half and states that “short of anger” means a person who cannot control his anger and therefore does stupid things. The later Mezudat David thinks these thoughts are capricious, neither considering whether they are positive 171

See Tauberschmidt (2004, 192f.), also the earlier remarks by Plöger and Murphy. Sæbø calls it a “Langvers” (extended line) with a so-called “synthetic” parallelism. But it is no longer than a normal stich in Proverbs and there is no synthesis of two elements to produce another. 173 So already Delitzsch, at least as far as vv. 16 and 17 are concerned. Waltke finds different connections in vv. 16-17, but mistakenly assigns ‫( כסיל‬fool) to v. 16a; cf. also Schipper, who points out connections between the two verses. 174 Cf. Heim (2013, 358-362), who offers an extensive discussion of the variations and similarities in the two proverbs. This “twice-told” proverb is one of the six sets making up Category 3.1 as identified by Snell (1993, 53). 175 Amenemope V, 14f., AEL II, 150. 172

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

or negative, and that such a person is therefore hated by God as well as humans. Ralbag deviates with an interesting exposition. In his opinion, the first hemistich pronounces against the superficiality of over-hasty thinking, while the second hemistich discredits the opposite, viz. people who cannot make up their minds and endlessly mull over what to do. This leads to confusion in their own minds and to being hated by others. John Chrysostom (347-407) skips the verse entirely. In his treatment of the sin of anger, John Cassian (360-435) 176 quotes the first hemistich in the Greek rendering. An angry man acts without counsel, which means the negative effects of his anger override whatever importance or knowledge he might have. As could be expected, this is followed with the Septuagint of Prov 29:22, to show that anger makes things even worse than this, because an angry man digs up sin. Like Chrysostom, Melanchthon skips the verse in his commentary.

14:18 Simpletons inherit folly,177 but the clever are crowned with knowledge. The two verbal clauses each have three words and the rhythmic pattern is simple, viz. one stress to each word (3+3). The fundamental contrast of the antithetic parallelism, folly and knowledge, is positioned at the end of each verbal sentence. It is expressed by the last word in the respective hemistichs and is not part of the chiasmus in the proverb, showing as it does what the basic outcome of it all is. [‫]אולת‬ [folly]

|| ||

‫פתאים‬ subject: the simple

‫נחלו‬ verb: inherit

[‫]דעת‬ [knowledge]

|| ||

‫יכתרו‬ verb: wear as crown

‫ערומים‬ subject: the clever

Influenced by Driver,178 McKane revocalises the first verb to ‫נֶ ֱחלוּ‬, a Niphal form of a putative denominative verb from a noun found in 25:12, viz. ‫ֲח ִלי‬ (necklace). This would be a closer parallel to the verb in the second hemistich (being adorned by a necklace alongside being adorned by a crown). Although this is a creative thought, it is unnecessary. The noun ‫ח ִלי‬, ֲ which does not suffer from being conjecture, could just as well be used to achieve 176

Cœn Rem VIII, 1 (On the Spirit of Anger), NPFN II/11, 257. This hemistich confirms the reservations of Luchsinger (2010, 105f.) about the rule formulated by Price (1990, 267), namely that “the disjunctives used in the poetic books may have only one conjunctive serving them.” In v. 18a there are two conjunctive munah accents preceding the disjunctive atnah. Luchsinger gives several further examples in Proverbs where either hemistich can have two conjunctives serving one disjunctive. 178 Driver (1951, 181); others who adopt the proposal are Clifford and Alonso-Schökel. 177

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

543

the same result (suggested by BHS), but that would remove the syntactic chiasmus. Moreover, the emendation to both a noun and a conjectured verb would constitute an oxymoron, since folly is hardly something to wear as an ornament, while wisdom is pictured precisely in those terms (e.g. 1:9; 3:22; 4:9).179 Wisdom is acquired by accepting what is handed down by fathers or other teachers. It is indeed passed on from one generation to another, but that by no means absolves the pupil from having to work hard for it – on the contrary (cf. 1:4, 9, 32; 4:1-5, 20; 5:1). Those who are lazy do not take seriously the effort of gaining wisdom. Even if they themselves think they know better than collective experts (26:16), they will find that folly simply falls to them like the liabilities of a bad inheritance. And that becomes progressively difficult to handle without the astuteness they have disregarded. Not an altogether unheard-of phenomenon, and no less manifest in presentday public life than at the break-up of the united kingdom of Israel and Judah (1 Kgs 12). The proverb motivates pupils by picturing the undesirable outcome of an unsapiential attitude and by the desirable outcome of the opposite, which is cleverness and brings with it a reward. The ‫ פתאים‬are not incorrigible, but they are in need of sapiential astuteness. In fact, the Book of Proverbs was written for this reason and precisely for them, as 1:1-4 shows. They are thus encouraged to avoid the legacy of stupidity and strive to achieve the crown of knowledge rather than remain in the status of callowness. What we have here, is a good example of what Stewart calls “the model of desire,” to which she devotes attention in her book on the shaping of the moral self in the Book of Proverbs. The sages appeal to the innate desire in young men in order to encourage them to cooperate with their teachers in their sapiential training. Stewart says:180 “Desires prompt people to take all sorts of actions, which is a basic assumption on which the entire model of motivation in Proverbs relies. There would be no use in offering motivational incentives if they did not appeal to innate human desires. Wisdom is not figured as soiled rubbish for good reason! She is a woman, a crown, and a jewel, all items viewed as inherently desirable.”

Indeed. Here the desirable trophy of honour is the diadem of ‫( דעת‬knowledge), that basic ingredient of the wise person181 promised to the same ‫פתאים‬ in 1:4, so that they may acquire the ‫ ערמה‬that would make them ‫ ערומים‬who can make a success of life. 179 Likewise Waltke, cf. Yoder and Van Leeuwen, who says, “the proverb slyly suggest a royal dignity for all who are ‘crowned with knowledge’.” 180 Stewart (2016, 137). 181 Cf. Schipper, who shows that ‫ דעת‬is the basic category of “educational apprehension” (10:14; 11:9; 12:1, 23; 13).

544

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

Rabbinic exegesis of this verse does not seem to have been very fruitful. Mostly paraphrases are offered. For instance, that foolishness is the inheritance of the callow (Ramaq), while Malbim adds that they accept anything as one would accept an inheritance. As for the second hemistich, Rashi declares that the shrewd make a crown of knowledge and the Mezudat David adds that they glorify themselves with it. However, Gerondi adds an original dimension by claiming that the clever place a crown on wisdom (which makes ‫ דעת‬the object of the second verb) so that others, seeing their behaviour, presumably that with which wisdom is crowned, appreciate wisdom. Hame’iri is explicit when he states that people who see the deeds of the clever then praise wisdom and knowledge. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra skips the verse entirely. In the Christian tradition, John Chrysostom also skips the verse and so does Philipp Melanchthon. I could find no use made of the proverb in Patristic literature.

14:19 Bad people bow before good people, and wicked ones at the gates of the righteous one. The rhythm is 4+3 (so Gemser), but 3+3 is also thinkable (so Toy and mentioned as a possibility by Gemser).182 The parallelism is clear, but it is neither antithetical nor a simple repetition of the first half in the “synonymous” second. The basic idea of both halves is the same, but the second enhances the first, so that we can call it a complementary parallelism. There are two verbal clauses, but the verb is gapped in the second hemistich, so that both subjects (‫ רעים‬and ‫ )רשעים‬have the same verb (‫)שחו‬. The human types mentioned in the first half are described in generic terms (bad people and good people), and both are specified in the second half (wicked people and the righteous one). The term ‫ רשע‬is used for the loser of a legal case and the winner is the ‫צדיק‬. Justice was dispensed in the city gates (cf. Deut 16:18; 21:19; 22:24; Am 5:15) and civilian legal issues were settled there (Gen 23:10, 18; 34:20, 24; Ruth 4:4-11).183 Since the gate is the “gate of the people” (Ruth 3:11), it is not strange that the genitive construction is used here. The fact that it is here called “the gates of the righteous person” does not mean that he owns the gate, but that this person has pride of place in the circumstances sketched. Having been vindicated, this is his moment and his stage. On the other hand, the wicked are humiliated by having to 182 In the latter case the first two words of the verse are counted as one stress unit, which is possible in terms of the Masoretic accents. That would make the assonance and alliteration between [‫ ]שחו רעים‬and [‫ ]רשעים‬all the more conspicuous. 183 See NIDB II, 523, where corroborating archaeological evidence is given (benches between the outer and the inner gates as well as in the chambers of the gates). Waltke mentions 1:22; 8:3; 22:22; 24:7; 31:23, 31 to support that “gates” in Proverbs refer to “the complex city gate.” That is so, and although not all of these texts are concerned with court business, the references given above justify that the gates can be “a synecdoche for judgement,” as here.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

545

bow184 before him. The possibility to interpret the gate as meeting place of the wise is also mentioned by Hame’iri, to which Fox adds 24:7 as another instance where the wicked are humbled in the gate. In light of these considerations, the convergence of evidence favours the legal background. Another proposal is the idea that those who bow down to the good/righteous are supplicants (also mentioned by Hame’iri).185 The Septuagint gives the second hemistich its own verb (θεραπεύσουσιν [they will serve]), thereby suggesting that the wicked (ἀσεβεῖς in the Greek) are reduced to a sort of serfdom. The gist of the proverb “is not always true to experience,” as Waltke euphemistically puts it. All over the world, both ancient, modern and in between, human experience bears testimony to the exact opposite of the proverb’s claim, where goodness and justice are trodden under the feet of the powerful, be they individuals, corporations, governments or even acquiescent courts of law. But in this proverb we again have an example of the “model of desire,” as Stewart would say, and in that sense it is a continuation of the ideas of v. 18. Pupils are given a picture of the ideal state of things, how it should work. The good should be vindicated when justice is called for, they should have the status and the power “in the gate,”186 not the other way round. Appealing to the pupils’ desire to be honoured by society and revered by the people in the city gate, the sage suggests that they can only achieve these rewards along the sapiential way, that is, by being ‫טוב‬, good in the comprehensive sense, and by showing oneself to be a ‫צדיק‬, a righteous person in legal and moral terms. The sages knew very well that there are many situations where the ideal does not manifest itself. But that does not mean that it is wrong. By presenting it as a desirable ideal, the sages set it up as the educational compass to orientate their teaching so as to encourage their pupils to strive in the right direction.187 Rashi and Ramaq find the proverb a continuation of the preceding one. The “clever” of v. 18 are the “good” of v. 19 and the “simpletons” of v. 18 are the “bad” of v. 19. Once the wise have the crown of knowledge, the bad people will have to bow before them in homage. This will take place in future, which buys some time for the deedconsequence nexus to prove its correctness. Gerondi has another way of dealing with the discrepancy. He interprets ‫( לפני‬before) as ‫( בעיני‬in the eyes of), meaning 184 ‫ שחח‬Qal can refer to the state of being bowed down or humiliated, but also to the action of bowing down (parallel to the št-conjugation of ‫חוה‬, commonly cited as ‫ השתחוה‬from ‫[ שחה‬bow down, prostrate oneself]; cf. Isa 60:14). 185 See Fox’s references. It is possible, of course, that bad people appeal to the goodwill of the righteous, but it seems unlikely that the ‫ רשעים‬would here be cast in such a pitiable role that would rather be expected of others, such as the poor, the powerless etc. 186 Cf. Deut 16:18 for the city gate as location of court hearings. 187 Cf. the Introduction to Vol. I, 13 and especially Par. 8.4 on “Retribution” and the Limits of Wisdom, Vol. I, 39-46; also on 10:3, which shows that this discrepancy is introduced right at the beginning of the book’s second collection; and see the commentary on 13:25.

546

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

that bad people are despised in the opinion of good people. So, if the bad receive the opposite of what they deserve, they are still loathed by decent people. PseudoIbn Ezra thinks the good people observe the fall of the wicked and rejoice while the wicked can only grovel at their gates. Malbim, in turn, does not think of disdain for the bad, but interprets the (gapped) verb ‫ שחח‬to mean that they have to capitulate before the righteous because good takes precedence over evil. The Mezudat David has a much more literal take of the second hemistich and thinks the wicked will have to beg for food at the gates of the righteous, which simply upholds the theory of reward and punishment. On Hame’iri, see above. I could find no patristic citation of the proverb, nor does it feature in Melanchthon’s commentary or in Calvin’s Institutes. It is erroneously quoted in the NPNF notes to Jerome’s argument against evil speaking and contumely,188 not by himself, but in the annotations. The proverb however has nothing to do with the topic of Jerome’s argument (the proverb actually quoted by Jerome is 14:29).

14:20, 21 A poor man is hated even by his fellow, but the friends of the rich are many. Who despises his fellow is a sinner, but who is kind to the poor – how blessed is he! These two proverbs are discussed together because the second clearly provides an antipode to the first. That does not mean that they are a compositional unit.189 On the contrary, when the one provides a corrective to the other (as I will presently argue), then the second confronts the first from quite a different perspective, each standing on its own feet. The rhythm of v. 20 is 4+3 because adjacent stressed syllables are not a factor in the first two words. V. 21 has the pattern 3+3 because the participle Qal of ‫ בוז‬has an ā vowel and not a qamets hatuph.190 In v. 21b there is a Ketib and Qere issue. The Masoretic text has ‫ ֲענָ יִ ים‬as the Ketib,191 but ‫( ֲענָ ִוים‬the humble) as the Qere. At 3:34, EE has an extended discussion of the three cases in Proverbs where this pair occurs in Ketib and Qere (3:34; 14:21; 16:19) and points out that ‫ עני‬can mean both “poor” and “humble” (cf. Isa 66:2). In 14:21 it is not of consequence for the sense of the proverb, since the poor will most probably be society’s humble anyway (cf. Waltke).192

188 Jerome, Apol against Rufinus III, in Theodoretus, Life and Works of Rufinus III (NPNF II/3, 540). 189 Oesterley even says that we here have a “good illustration of the haphazard way in which the sayings in this collection are jumbled together” – which obviously goes way too far. 190 The verb is the participle masculine singular status absolutus of ‫( בוז‬despise). It could have had a qamets hatuph if the form were the absolute infinitive. 191 Pointed with qamets instead of hireq (‫)ענִ יִּ ים‬ ֲ in favour of the Qere reading (‫)ענָ ִוים‬. ֲ 192 Rosenberg (2001, 83); cf. also Waltke.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

547

The Septuagint has πένητας (hungry) in v. 21a. BHS regards this as a possibility, but Gemser and Clifford follow the Septuagint and read ‫( רעב‬the hungry) for ‫( רעהו‬his fellow) on the grounds of dittography of the second word in v. 20. But the mere declaration that hungry and poor “make better sense here,” is no substantiation. V. 20 is a simple statement of an observable fact (the similar idea with different formulation occurs in 19:4, 6-7193). Von Rad194 remarked half a century ago that the rich, when needing help under some circumstances (and some of them very often do), find many loving195 friends around them. Von Rad refers to Ben Sira 13:23, about the many who heed and extol such a powerful person whatever he says but don’t even take notice of a poor person who speaks, even giving him a shove if he stumbles (whether on a ramp or not).196 That is obviously how the world is, and the proverb leaves it at that. Or does it? As it stands, different individuals may feel themselves in a position to assess the content differently. According to Millar,197 one person may simply use it (a) to present a neutral record of what society is like, another may use it (b) positively as advice “about whom to befriend,” and yet another (c) may find such a social reality despicable and “pronounce the proverb in disapproval.” The first possibility can be combined with the second. One could read the description of a harsh society as material for selfexoneration in anything but neutral terms and simultaneously as guidance on who’s side one should position oneself for success in that society. No less than in ancient times, the second half of v. 20 is an all too factual “reality” in a political climate of socio-economic neoliberalism and austerity. And the first half of the proverb is all too clear about who can be thrown under the bus (or ox-wagon) as the price. “It is what it is”198 – without a hint of care or a suggestion of empathy. If employed in this way, the use of the proverb is as despicable as the reality it describes. But the editor does not leave it at that. He realises that the proverb can be read dispassionately or malevolently. Therefore he follows up the “neutral” statement of v. 20 by adding another proverb precisely here and thus ensures that the written edition of the proverbs leaves only option (c) open.199 There 193

The formulation is too dissimilar to qualify as a “twice-told proverb” in the sense of Snell (1993), but the concept is very alike. 194 Von Rad (1970, 154), citing this verse and pointing out the singular of the potential source of help for the poor. 195 Whybray calls the use of the participle “ironical,” for this “love” is insincere self-interest. 196 Fox finds the Ben Sira parallel so relevant that he quotes the whole passage (Sir 13:1923) verbatim. 197 Millar (2020, 79). 198 So Donald J. Trump, esq. (quoted from various broadcasts, CNN, ABC, NBC etc., August 2020). 199 Van Leeuwen correctly calls v. 21a a blunt condemnation of the behaviour described in v. 20a, saying that such behaviour is also stupidity because God does not tolerate it (citing

548

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

is a striking assonance on e and a in the first three words of each verse, which enhances their interaction. Whereas it is indeed a brutal reality that the poor (‫ )רש‬is held in contempt even by a person he knows, that is not how it should be, because it is a sin. The participle ‫ חטא‬can be translated as a noun (sinner), but also as a durative or continuous verb (he sins or is sinning) without making a difference to the sense. There has been a discussion whether this verb refers to sin in a religious sense or simply to a wrong attitude.200 But this is not a material issue, for a wrong attitude is unsapiential and as such would not conform to the fear of Yahweh, which is the principle of wisdom. Later in the chapter, disdain for the poor is explicitly called an insult to his Creator (v. 31, cf. 17:5a), which makes the religious aspect clear. As an accomplished Egyptologist, Schipper mentions several instances in Egyptian sources from the millennium between the 12th century (Ostracon Petrie 11)201 and the Ptolemaic period (Ankhsheshonq),202 where the motif of social responsibility towards those in need is favourably mentioned. Among these, he lists a private tomb inscription from about the 6th century that bases social kindness on the motif of the divine will,203 showing that the religious dimension of social responsibility was not at all foreign to cultures surrounding Israel. Tuinstra refers to the same idea in the Babylonian Counsels of Wisdom,204 in which it is advised, [S]how the feeble kindness, do not insult the downtrodden … do not sneer at them autocratically. With this, a man’s god gets angry, it is not pleasing to Shamash, who will repay him with evil. There is ample rabbinic reference to these verses. Rashi explains the hated poor man (v. 20) as poor in knowledge, one who knows no Torah. But some three centuries later Ibn Nahmias defended the literal meaning (similarly, Hame’iri and Mezudat David). According to Nahmias, not only people unknown to the poor man, but also i.a. 17:5; 29:13-14). Fuhs even says that, in the context of the Yahweh faith, v. 21 condemns such social ostracising as a transgression of the commandment to love one’s neighbour. Decades earlier Oesterley had done basically the same by simply offering Lev 19:18 as adequate commentary on v. 21, and by appealing to the use of ‫ אשרי‬to show (with reference to 16:20) that the blessing is from God. 200 See Scherer (1999, 152). Meinhold, Waltke and Fox choose for the former sense. Hausmann (1995, 86) mentions the fact that it can also have a “profane” meaning, but she does not opt for it as Scherer suggests. 201 TUAT.NF 8, 327 (translated by Roman Grundacker, not Gundacker). 202 “Let your benefaction reach him who has need of it” (Instr Ankhsheshonq XII 17 [AEL III, 169]). 203 Translated by Jansen-Winkeln (1999, 95-96), notably Cairo 38236. 204 The Counsels of Wisdom, lines 56-60 (Lambert [1960] 1975, 100-103); lines 61-65 advise the positive counterpart, which is very reminiscent of 2 Kgs 6:21-23; Matt 5:39; Rom 12:17-21; 2 Pet 3:9.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

549

his friends despise him because they expect no profit from him. If he is of use for their own profit, he is counted as a friend, but when they can’t use him anymore, he is jettisoned. As far as v. 21 is concerned, Nahmias nevertheless thinks that being kind with words is better than being kind with money, perhaps under the influence of the Talmud (Baba Batra 9b). Gerondi is quite explicit about the connection of the two proverbs in vv. 20 and 21. He is adamant that despising the poor is a sin even if the rich man has many friends and the poor practically none. To him, the participle Poel ‫( מחונן‬v. 21) means not only to be gracious but also to think favourably.205 Using the Ketib and Qere he argues that the spelling with waw complements the spelling with yod, since the humility of the poor must be respected. John Chrysostom paraphrases the two verses, saying that v. 20 is not meant to be understood as an exhortation, but merely as a report of what actually happens in human life. Nevertheless, he makes sure his readers understand that disrespect for the poor is a sin, since that is said explicitly in v. 21, which he also regards as a corrective of v. 20. The proverb is referenced by Calvin at an important point in his exposition of a central Reformation doctrine, namely where206 he has to defend his presentation of justification by faith, and not by works. In light of the many passages of both the Old and the New Testament “in which blessedness seems to be attributed to works,” he has to pay serious attention to the principle so often found in texts all over the Bible. He selects Prov 14:21 to cite as an example of one among these. As he often does, Calvin drives off the back foot. His argument is that no individual has all the qualities mentioned in these passages and therefore nobody can achieve full approbation of God by whatever merit. According to Calvin, passages such as v. 21b retain their validity, but what they affirm is only received by humans who first receive forgiveness of sins by the grace of God.

14:22 The devisers of evil go astray, don’t they? But the devisers of good are dependable kindness. The rhythmic pattern is 4+4 (so Gemser), while Toy calls it “ternary” (perhaps balancing a single stress unit in the first two words with one in the last two words, but he does not elaborate). There is a similar proverb in 10:17, where the first half has the same type of ambiguity as the second half in 14:22 and the second half there revolves around the motif of straying as the first half does here. Both proverbs can be read in more than one way (cf. the notes on 10:17). The two possibilities are convincingly described by Millar in her book on the openness of proverbs from 10:1–22:16.207 She finds two “polar character types” in the proverb, on the negative side the ‫( חרשי רע‬those who devise208 205 The Vilna Gaon extends the idea even further by interpreting the Poel to mean making others think well of the humble/poor. 206 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III/17, 10. 207 Millar (2020, 134-135). 208 ‫ חרש‬Qal: engrave; plough, prepare the field for the harvest; devise (3:29; 6:14; 18:12, 20).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

evil) and on the positive side the ‫( חרשי טוב‬those who devise good). These terms express that such people premeditate their actions, for devising means planning in advance. The former people go astray (‫ תעה‬Qal) like an abandoned woman in the desert (Gen 21:14) or a young man who has lost his way in the wilderness (Gen 37:15). The motif of straying implies the metaphor of the road, which often occurs in Proverbs. Straying means losing the right way. But, as Millar points out, the root may also suggest drunken staggering (Isa 28:7; Job 25:24-25) and may refer to moral deviation (2 Kgs 21:9). The suggestion is that the planners of evil do so premeditatedly, as it were like preparing a field (also ‫ )חרש‬to harvest a result. As Millar states, the image presupposes an ethical norm. The bad deviser goes astray and ends up destitute in the wilderness. Although it is not said that anyone who falls for his schemes ends up in the same trouble, it is clearly implied in the logic of the proposition and strengthened by the force contributed by the rhetorical question in which it is cast. Deeds and their consequences go hand in hand, which speaks to the natural human fear of getting lost in a dangerous environment. So the warning is: Don’t do it and don’t fall for it. The second verset may be read with a gapped or implied verb contrasting with “go astray” in the first half: dependable kindness “meets” the devisers of good.209 The unexpressed verb (Waltke) may (Delitzsch) or may not (Meinhold,210 Clifford) uphold the rhetorical question throughout the second hemistich. Delitzsch had already done the same, although he saw the second half as a nominal clause: Is it not so that kindness and dependability “are for” the devisers of good? Clifford’s reading is similar, although he makes the two nouns a hendiadys and the subject of a nominal clause: “steadfast love is with” the devisers of good. Finally, the hemistich may also be read with the devisers of good as the subject of the nominal clause (so Fox). In the translation above, I have opted for the same construction, as well as the hendiadys because within the image the kindness needs to be dependable if the recipient is to be protected from going astray. Further, the idea that sapiential persons may themselves constitute the very path implied, is mentioned in 10:17. This would be a case of metaphtonymy. Dependable kindness stands for a certain type of person (metonymy) and at the same time is a way (metaphor).211 But the readings just surveyed are all possible and 209 Millar draws an engaging comparison with Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress: Christian meets several characters on the road, like Piety, Charity, Watchful – all of them kind and dependable guides on the way. Likewise, the devisers of good find dependable guides and do not go astray. 210 Meinhold leaves open the possibility that the second half may be a nominal clause, so that the devisers of good may “be dependable goodness” personified, but in both possibilities he sees a direct statement rather than a rhetorical question. 211 See on 10:11 and the references there to Goossens and Radden.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

551

plausible. The many-sided message is: If you avoid evil schemes and plan what is good, you will be treated kindly by dependable people so that you won’t become destitute. Or, you can become a leader to whom people look up so that they can benefit from the virtues that you have acquired. The multivalence of the proverb extends an invitation to consider the options and contribute to what the proverb can mean in various situations. The Septuagint gives a double rendering of the whole proverb: πλανώμενοι τεκταίνουσι κακά, ἔλεον δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν τεκταίνουσιν ἀγαθοί. οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἔλεον καὶ πίστιν τέκτονες κακῶν, ἐλεημοσύναι δὲ καὶ πίστεις παρὰ τέκτοσιν ἀγαθοῖς. (People who stray devise evil things, but good people devise mercy and truth. The devisers of evil things do not understand mercy and faithfulness, but compassion and faithfulness are with good devisers) The Peshitta adds two versets after the first stich, probably under the influence of the Septuagint: ? ? èÙËÃïx èÚðÓ ¿ćàÎï fÀĀþÚ ? ? fÀĀÃÓ èÙÍáÝ èÙËÃï ¿úÙx|{ ¿çäÐĄã{ ? ? f…ÎáÝĀêæ ¿ćà ÀÎçäÙz{ ¿äÐă ÀĀþÚ €ËÃï œ ? ? f€z ÀĀÃÓ €ËÃï åï ÀÎçäÙz{ èÙx ÀÎçäÐüã (Evildoers who do evil go astray, but the merciful and righteous do all kinds of good things. Those who do evil do not understand kindness and faithfulness, but compassion and faithfulness are with those who do good) The Syriac has changed the subject of v. 22a from the strayers (as the Septuagint has it) back to the evil doers, which is nearer to the Hebrew, but the gist of v. 22ab does not differ substantially and is based on the Hebrew. But v. 22cd reflects the wish to represent the Greek addition in Syriac as well. The Greek translator possibly read ‫ חרשו‬instead of the participle ‫ חרשי‬and certainly read ‫( ידעו‬they understand) for ‫( יתעו‬they stray), both of which are understandable misreadings. There is no reason to emend the Hebrew text, including the with suggestion in BHS that we could read “a curse” (‫)א ָלא‬ ָ for the first word of the verse and “they plant” (‫ )יִ ְטּעוּ‬for the second.212 The first hemistich is paraphrased by several rabbis, saying that who devises evil will fall into the same evil he had planned (e.g. Gerondi, Ramaq, the Mezudat David and the Vilna Gaon213). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra also does that, but seems to add the further nuance that the punishment of having to stray around will be permanent. The second hemistich, however, elicits more ideas. The Vilna Gaon keeps ‫( אמת‬truth) and ‫חסד‬ 212

Both together are one of the rather fanciful conjectures by Kuhn (1931, 33). The Vilna Gaon illustrates the point with the scheming of Haman in the Persian court against the Jews and how he himself had to experience exactly what he had planned for Mordechai and the Jews (Est 7–8). 213

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

(kindness) apart by saying that the first refers to an exact = truly corresponding reward and the second to an extra reward over and above the satisfaction of the first. This holds good even if the plan was intended but could not yet be put into practice. According to the Mezudat David, planning what is good for others will actually be realised, which conforms to his (and the Vilna Gaon’s) interpretation of ‫אמת‬, viz. that the planned good things will come true. But those who made the plans will themselves be rewarded extra by ‫( חסד‬kindness). Malbim has an original idea: For him ‫( חרש‬plough) means to secretly plan. If people plan surreptitiously, they will go astray without anyone knowing about it so that they could not keep the devisers from deviating or bring them back to the right way. But those who quietly plan good for others can expect reward because they have had no self-centred ulterior motives.214

14:23 In all toil there is gain, but lip talk is just for poverty. The rhythm is 3+3 (Toy and Gemser).215 The first hemistich is made up of a verbal clause216 and the second is a nominal clause. The proverb seems quite straightforward, but – as often – it is richer than one might think at first sight. There are two pairs of opposites that make up the antithetical parallelism. The respective last words of the two hemistichs, “gain” (‫ )מותר‬:: “poverty” (‫)מחסור‬, are clear opposites, but the other pair needs a somewhat closer examination; “toil” (‫ )עצב‬and “a word of the lips” (‫ )דבר־שפתים‬are not such obvious opposites. Giving speeches (and sermons) does not necessarily have to be the opposite of toil and can in fact be quite hard work and come quite close to ‫עצב‬.217 On the other hand, speaking, which is ascribed a negative outcome in this verse, is often a very positive quality in the Book of Proverbs.218 But in this verse it must indicate a negative aspect of speaking, notably the contrasting parallel of “hard work,” which is idle talk. So the gist of the proverb is that profit can only be achieved by hard work, while “mere” talk in principle brings nothing.219 That is indeed what the proverb 214 This is reminiscent of the words of Jesus, that doing good to others should entail that one’s left hand does not know what one’s right hand does (Matt 6:3-4). 215 Gemser thinks that 4+3 may also be a possibility, which however cannot be the case, because a segolated noun follows after the first maqqeph (and not after the other two in the second hemistich). 216 Made so by the presence of ‫יהיה‬, which could have been left out, but is probably there to ensure three stress beats rather than two. 217 The word can sometimes have a negative connotation, as in 15:1 (“harsh”); Gen 3:16 (“pain in childbirth,” cf. the English “labour”); cf. the cognate nouns ‫“( ִע ָצּבוֹן‬hard labour,” Gen 5:29) and ‫“( ̇ע ֶצב‬trouble,” Isa 14:3) as well as the verb ‫ עצב‬II Qal (“discipline,” 1 Kgs 1:6). The whole phrase is used contemptuously in 2 Kgs 18:20 and Ps 59:13 (EE). 218 Cf. 10:11, 13, 20, 21, 31, 32; 15:23; 25:11 etc. 219 Heim (2001, 185) rightly points out that the use of the particle ‫ אך‬in the second half “elucidated that talk without action invariably leads to want, in the same way that the particle ‫“ כל‬stresses that ‘all’ hard labour is profitable.”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

553

says, but this insight frequently becomes a truism hackneyed by overuse in political exclamations to the effect that “we need deeds, not words” (conversely, Protestant preaching is not noted for its fondness of this idea). Another perspective is however necessary if justice is to be done to the sages. The proverb is another expression of the “fragmentary view of reality” spoken of by Millar.220 Those who only speak hot air may often enjoy huge gains, while those who toil hard in their daily labour often stay poor – not seldom to the advantage of those who do nothing but talk. But the proverb still is true, because it teaches young people what the world ought to be.221 If pupils observe that hard workers do not receive their due and that nothing is produced by the rich but empty words, their education has given them the perspective to recognise injustice for what it is, namely a perversion of what God’s world should be. That is what the prophets of the 8th century and later, as well as those who reworked their prophecies in the following centuries222 recognised and on which they based their socio-economic criticism.223 So there is not such a fundamental disparity between the sages and the prophets as has often been claimed. As in the previous verse, the Peshitta gives a double rendering of v. 23 as well: ¿Ùüã u¾Ý âÝ fÁÎãx €z ÁËÐ Āæs ‰øÙx âÞ dÀ{Íæ ¿ćäÚêÂ{ ¿ÑÚæ fzüãÎð üÙøÂx ¿çÙs{ f¿é¾ćã¾Ùüã u¾Ý âÝ ? ? f…{Íà üêÑã ¿ćàÎïx …{zÎóéx ¿ćááäã{ (In all you are worried about there is one advantage, and who is of little importance in his life will be peaceful and happy. The Lord heals all pain, but the speech of the wicked’s lips will harm them) Similar to v. 22 in the Peshitta, the first stich (v. 23ab) is dependent on the Septuagint, but the second (v. 23cd) seems more like an interpretation of a text similar to the Hebrew, perhaps under New Testament influence.224 Rashi paraphrases the proverb, but Gerondi offers an expanded interpretation. Any toil, not only manual labour, brings benefits, even if no income is gathered from the labour, because the very labour avoids idleness, which in itself is detrimental to human mental health. By the same token, idle words cause transgressions, as 10:19 says. Thirdly, the noun ‫ ֶע ֶצב‬also means “sorrow,” since it serves as a counterbalance 220

Millar (2020, 215); 13:4. see above on 10:4, 22. Cf. my analogy of traffic regulations that ought to work, but often don’t and nevertheless should be taught as true (Introduction Par. 6, and the comments on 13:23, where examples are given). 222 See Chaney (2014, 34ff.). 223 Cf., for instance, Isa 1:23; 5:8; Am 4:1; 5:8-12; 6:3-8; Mic 2:1-2; 3:1-3; 6:12. 224 See EE; cf. v. 23c with Matt 8:2-3; Luke 5:12-13; Jas 5:14-16; Apc 7:17; 21:4. 221

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

for exaggerated joy (somewhat like the logic advocated in Qoh 7:14). The Vilna Gaon has quite another take: if one speaks or boasts about a good deed that one still plans to do, that will become a loss, because speaking about it obstructs the fulfilment. Malbim applies both hemistichs to a situation of misfortune. One should feel sorrow about the sins that have caused the predicament, which brings the gain of repenting. But this should not only be idle lip talk, or further loss will be the result. Aaron remained silent after the death of his sons (Lev 10:3) and received the reward (so also Rashi). Chrysostom comments on the Septuagint, stating that “in everyone who takes care there is profit” (ἐν παντὶ μεριμνῶντι ἔνεστιν περισσόν), which for him means a rejection of too much indifference, while the opposite, namely not taking care, in his view amounts to a censure of indolence. He also cites the verse in the first sentence of his homily on John 1:43-44,225 interpreting it to state that “there is gain for every careful thinker.” Here he applies it to Philip, who immediately understood that Jesus must be the One prophesied about in the Law and the Prophets. That shows that he must have been a thoughtful man who gained immensely. Moreover, the quotation also seems an effective captatio benevolentiae as the very first words of a homily. In one of his Conferences, John Cassian (360-435)226 quotes the Greek verse as support for his argument that no virtue can be acquired without effort. In a later Conference227 he quotes the second Greek hemistich to warn against carelessness and vainglory. In yet another Conference,228 he uses the same hemistich to support the case for the reward of those who had to suffer for their faith in this world.

14:24 The crown of the wise is their wealth, the folly of fools is – just folly. The 3+3 verse consists of two nominal clauses. In the first, ‫( עטרת‬crown) can be the subject and ‫( עשרם‬their wealth) the predicate, thus: the crown of the wise is their wealth. Or subject and predicate can be the other way around, thus: their wealth is the crown of the wise. The first reading is taken by Fox to indicate that wealth in the sense of 4:9 consists of wisdom, and that is what decorates the wise (Fox). However, 4:9 does not say that wisdom is a crown or diadem, but that it provides229 it. Accordingly, the second syntactic option seems more probable: it indicates that the financial wealth of the wise is a distinction in society for them (cf. 8:18). The second nominal clause is often thought to be tautologous and pointless (Ehrlich, Gemser, Reider,230 Ringgren, Scott, Plöger, Whybray, McKane, Alter, Fox, BHS and others). But the repetition of ‫ אולת‬can also be an intentional tautology with a striking effect (Waltke, Murphy, Clifford, Meinhold, Van Leeuwen, Fuhs, 225 226 227 228 229 230

Hom XX (NPNF I/14, 68). Conf VII, vi (NPNF II/11, 365). Conf XIV, xvii (NPNF II/11, 444). Conf XXIV, xxvi (NPNF II/11, 545). ‫ נתן‬Qal (give) and ‫ מגן‬Piel (deliver). Reider (1952, 125): “too tautologous to be true” (!).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

555

Tuinstra, Yoder, Schipper and others231). I choose for the second possibility and will presently give the substantiation in light of several aspects of the textual criticism of the verse. Both the first and the second hemistichs have been subjected to substantial textual criticism. The LXX renders ‫ עשרם‬with πανοῦργος (clever man), which may be the result of reading ‫( ערמה‬cleverness).232 Reider however, citing an older source, thinks that the shin of ‫ עשרם‬was merely overlooked so that the Septuagint translator read it as the defective spelling of ‫( ערום‬clever).233 This seems probable to me. Alternatively, the Greek may reflect a desire to moralise the pecuniary crown of the wise into an intellectual one (EE). In any event, there are no grounds to emend the Hebrew text.

As far as the second hemistich is concerned, what should not be shared is the desire of many scholars to find a precise parallel for ‫( עטרת‬crown) by emending the first ‫ אולת‬to ‫( לוית‬the construct form of *‫לויה‬, garland, which only occurs in 1:9 and 4:9). As Waltke states, “antithetical parallels are often imprecise,” so that this does not constitute a convincing substantiation for emending. *‫ לויה‬and its equivalents are always used in a positive sense and the word is never connected with vice (Meinhold).234 To make sense, such an emendation must additionally assume that an irony is intended here. That is as conceivable as a mock crown of thorns (Matt 27:29), but even so the garland would have to be assumed to be recognisable as a ridiculous sign of shame. What is more, in the present form of the text, the parallelism itself contributes to a sharpness of the insight articulated in the proverb. The point of the proverb lies precisely in the repetition of the word (similarly Yoder).235 The first half of the proverb thus makes the point that the wise can show a visible token of their wisdom. The token is their crown, in other words, the visible sign of what wisdom bestows on them, which is wealth. Their absolute antithesis is brought into sharp focus in the second half, namely by the fools (‫)כסילים‬, who can also be recognised by something visible. That is their folly (‫ )אולת‬in the sense of foolish conduct (as in v. 17). But what does folly produce? – Just folly. Nothing sensible or usable. It reproduces itself 231 Oesterley retains the Hebrew text for his translation but mentions that the emendation of ‫ אולת‬gives an excellent parallelism. 232 So BHS; in his reconstruction of the Hebrew from the Septuagint, Gemser adds the third person masculine plural suffix to the same noun (‫ ;)ערמתם‬likewise, Ringgren. 233 Reider (1952, 125); he cites Schleusner ([1820-1821] 1822, Volume II, 635). The Schleusner lexicon, which was not available to me, is on the Septuagint, but concentrates on the Hebrew equivalents of the Greek words in the Septuagint, so Lust (1994, 256). 234 Cf. 14:18; 12:4; 16;31; 17:6. 235 Another proposition, by Reider (1952, 125), is to conjecture that the second ‫ אולת‬is etymologically related to a Semitic root ‫אול‬, supposedly meaning “be in front” and to argue from “infrontness” to “prominence.” But this is rather far-fetched and has not gained traction. Dahood (1963, 31-32) makes a “throne” out of the first ‫ אולת‬by relating it to Ugaritic alt (support), which is speculative and uncertain in itself and is not a good “parallel” for “crown” anyway. Unsurprisingly, it has also found no following.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

and stays that way, as 27:22 forcefully puts it (cf. 23:36) and Qohelet confirms (although he uses two synonyms of ‫אולת‬, namely ‫ סכלות‬and ‫)הוללות‬: what comes from the fool begins as folly and results in folly (Qoh 10:13; cf. Qoh 6:11). Summary: ‫חכמים‬ have: ‫עטרת‬

wise people

– –

‫כסילים‬ have: ‫אולת‬

crown

folly

‫עשר‬

wealth

–

‫אולת‬

still folly

foolish people

The unusual repetition focuses attention on the uselessness of folly, which is highlighted even more by the threefold assonance/alliteration with its contrast, ‫עטרת‬. The parallelism is not precise and should not be desired to be so. The parallel that matters, is the honourable achievement of wisdom as opposed to the revolting self-perpetuation of folly. One can say that 14:24 makes its point with asymmetric eloquence, whereas as 26:11 spits it out unappetisingly. Saadia Gaon (9th century) interprets wisdom itself as the crown of the wise, while the stupidity of fools gains them only more stupidity. For Rashi (11th century), the crown of the wise is their Torah study, while by contrast, the fools neglect the study of Torah. Ramaq (12th century) finds that wealth for the wise means that they use it responsibly, for which they are honoured, but wealth cannot purify the foolish from their folly (similarly the much later Mezudat David). Gerondi (13th century) reckons that wealth for the wise gives them social standing so that they can use it to bring about the fear of God among others, while rich fools inspire others to emulate their folly. In similar fashion Pseudo Ibn-Ezra relates the wealth of the wise with Qoh 7:11, and finds the sense to be that society honours the wise because of his wealth. Bahya (13th century) interprets the repetition of ‫ אולת‬to mean that wealth in the hand of a fool has a twofold detriment, viz. to the body and the soul. Nahmias (14th century) finds the contrast between the wise and the foolish to be that the former have qualities that can redeem them even when they err, but the latter have no such redeeming factor and therefore stay fools. Ralbag (14th century) sees the wealth of the wise as pecuniary means enabling them to study Torah. Chrysostom’s Greek text reads “wealth” and not “cleverness” as most other manuscripts of the Septuagint do. He also assumes that the wealth of the wise is used sensibly, but thinks that such wealth does not add to the glory that they already have because of their wisdom. His commentary on the second half is an apt reference to 17:16, which states rhetorically that even with money a fool cannot buy wisdom (and thus remains a fool).

14:25 A faithful witness is a saviour of lives, but who spouts out lies – pure deceit. The rhythm is 3+3 (Toy) rather than 4+3 (Gemser), because the conjunctive accent munah at ‫ עד‬avoids two adjacent stresses. The verse consists of two

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

557

nominal clauses, the first of which begins with a sub-clause serving as the predicate of the main nominal clause in v. a, whereas the second begins with a sub-clause serving as the subject236 of the main nominal clause in v. b. Containing as it does a chiastic order of the predicates and subjects of the two nominal clauses, the antithetical parallelism is nevertheless straightforward: v. 25a plural noun (‫)נפשות‬ – predicate of nominal clause noun (‫)עד אמת‬: subject – subject of nominal clause

}

v. 25b plural noun (‫)כזבים‬ – subject of nominal clause

}

noun (‫)מרמה‬: – predicate of nominal clause

The last word of the verse is the abstract noun ‫( מרמה‬deceit), which is a metonymy of the type abstractum pro concreto. It is reminiscent of the ending of the previous verse, but the noun in v. 24 states the result of selfperpetuating folly whereas in v. 25 the noun describes the liar. Here it is not tautologous. Deceit is not the same as a liar or a lie, since a lie does not necessarily deceive, although it tries to. That brings us to Toy’s point of the life setting in which the proverb is to be understood. Toy points out the thematic importance of the proverb when applied to the conduct of witnesses in a court of law. The term ‫( עד אמת‬faithful witness) as well as its equivalent, ‫( עד אמונה‬v. 5) and its opposite, ‫ עד שקרים‬false witness (12:17237), show that this is indeed the primary context for the proverb (cf. the Ninth Commandment, Ex 20:16; Deut 5:20). The high value placed on truthful witnesses for the judicial system to function at all is unmistakably clear in Deut 19:15-20,238 and a scenario pictured in 1 Kgs 21:9-13 (cf. Ex 23:1-2) shows that no less than the life of an accused can indeed depend on the honesty or mendacity of a witness. An honest witness may save the life of an innocent person in a situation such as described in Deut 17:6 (foreseen in the first hemistich), while a mendacious witness can indeed be said to incorporate the very concept of deceit itself if his testimony deceives 236 Cf. my comment on 6:19; of course ‫ יפח‬is a verb here, but it is part of a sub-clause making the subject of a substantival clause, as Delitzsch puts it (cf. also Meinhold, Waltke, Plöger, Clifford, Schipper; Fox contrasts his view here with his earlier comment on 6:19). In 6:19 it is part of a description of one of several things God hates, and as such qualifies a deceitful witness. Here it identifies a person who is not to be trusted. Cf. also 12:17 and 14:5. 237 In 12:17 the verb ‫ פוח‬Hiphil is used to say that the truthful speaker “breathes” truth, while the noun ‫ מרמה‬describes the deceitful witness. 238 Cf. above on v. 19 for the location of court sessions; also 19:5, 9, 28 for criticism of mendacious witnesses; further 24:28 for witnessing without just cause and 29:24 for the witness who withholds evidence.

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the judges and the community239 and leads to the conviction of an innocent person, as the story of Naboth’s vineyard shows.240 Ramaq construes the first half to say that the unjustly accused will be saved from death by a truthful witness. The Mezudat David explains that the truthful witness saves other victims when he testifies against a criminal, but saves the (innocent) accused if he testifies in his defence. The Vilna Gaon brings the idea of Gilgul (soul migration) into his explanation that a true witness saves both a robber and his victim from punishment after death, since the souls of both of them must return to the present world if the stolen goods were not returned while they were alive. Cyprian of Carthage (3rd century)241 Christianises the Septuagint’s version of the verse: ῥύσεται ἐκ κακῶν ψυχὴν μάρτυς πιστός, ἐκκαίει δὲ ψεύδη δόλιος. (A faithful witness will deliver a soul from evil but a deceitful man kindles falsehoods) Treating the benefits Christian martyrs derive from their martyrdom, he finds proof in the first Greek hemistich, where he understands the Greek noun for “witness” (μάρτυς) as a witness to Christ who remains steadfast despite persecution (whence, indeed, the English noun “martyr” in precisely this sense comes). Such a faithful242 witness saves “a soul,” where ψυχὴ is clearly also Christianised (not “life” as the Hebrew ‫)נפש‬, but the soul as in the tripartite anthropology held in the ancient church, that humans consist of body, mind and soul. This he does at the opening of a paragraph with many biblical references to undergird the conviction that martyrs for their faith are rewarded for their faith. It is not said whether the saved soul is the martyr’s own or the soul of another who is encouraged by the martyr, but the use of the singular suggests the former. John Chrysostom remarks on the constant recurrence of the Ninth Commandment’s intention in Proverbs, which according to him shows the “great force” of the prohibition to bear false witness.

14:26 In the fear of Yahweh there is strong security, and for one’s sons there will be a refuge. The tipha praepositivus at the second word is a disjunctive accent and holds the stress back from the following word, which highlights the Masoretic judgement that the maqqeph combination should be read as one stress unit. Both Toy and Gemser hold that the first hemistich thus has three stresses 239

The community may take part in the hearing and judgement, cf. Num 35:12, 24f. In the case of Naboth (1 Kgs 21) even the elders who were supposed to judge fairly and the queen herself were complicit in the deceit, the witnesses were necessary to deceive the public. 241 Test III, 16 (ANF V, 537). 242 πιστός (faithful) also relates to πίστις, (faith) and to Cyprian means “steadfast in the faith.” 240

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rather than four (which both commentators nevertheless think possible). The first half is a nominal clause and the second must be called verbal243 by virtue of the presence of the verb ‫היה‬. The metaphor implied by the preposition ‫ ב‬is important because it sets the tone for the imagery of the proverb as a whole. Used in the predicate of a clause of which the subject is ‫מבטח־ עז‬, it must mean that the fear of Yahweh is imagined as a space within which things and humans can find themselves, thus a building or a house.244 The first thing that can be said of this building is that ‫ מבטח־עז‬is in (‫ )ב‬it. I have translated this term as “strong security,” since ‫ מבטח‬is in the building and should therefore not be identified with the building (e.g. as “stronghold” or “fortress,” cf. Clifford, Fox). The imperfect third person masculine singular of the verb ‫ היה‬requires a masculine subject, which can only be ‫מבטח‬.245 The refuge is therefore provided by the security, which is the second metaphor in the opening hemistich. The first is the implied metaphor of the building called “fear of Yahweh,” that is occupied by the strong security guard together with the God-fearing man and his family. ‫ מבטח‬can mean “confidence” as the act of confiding (e.g. 21:22; 22:19; 25:19), as the object of the confidence (as in Job 31:24; Ezk 29:16), and as the state of being secure (as in Isa 32:18 and here). If the building is occupied by a strong security guard, it is safe inside and can therefore be a refuge (‫ )מחסה‬where the one whose home it is, can be assured of shelter for his children. In this verse the subject providing the shelter for the man and his family can only be the masculine noun ‫מבטח‬.246 243 It is not a nominal sentence as Whybray claims. ‫ היה‬is a verb, even if its meaning here (“there will be”) could just as well have been expressed by a nominal or “non-verbal” sentence. 244 Similarly Luchsinger (2010, 274-275), who speaks of “receptacle metaphors” (“GefäßMetaphern”), a concept from metaphor theory. 245 So Scherer (1999, 143). Hausmann (1995, 266) concedes that the grammar suggests otherwise, but still maintains that ‫ יהוה‬is the subject. Schipper also concedes the grammatical point, but nevertheless suggests – if with hesitation – an alternative, daring as it is by his own admission. He considers that the graphic similarity of “Yhwh” (‫ )יהוה‬and “is” (‫)יהיה‬, with a distant parallel in Ex 3:14, may suggest a reference to God. Perhaps that is indeed a little too bold. In my opinion, we need neither such a connection nor an explanation of the preposition as an indication of the “modal circumstance of a process or action” (Jenni [1992, 344-348]) to see God as the ultimate guarantor of the security mentioned in the proverb. It is quite clear that God takes centre position in the metaphor of the building, which is not for nothing the fear of Yahweh. So, God may not explicitly be called a ‫ מחסה‬and an ‫ עז‬as he is in the Psalms (for instance, in the famous Ps 46:2), but he puts all of this at the disposal of those who fear him. So, the metaphor of God himself as a fortress is not used here, but he is involved “in essence” (“der Sache nach”, as Schipper puts it). In the same way that Yahweh provides the believer with a safe path in Ps 37:23 and therefore “is the ultimate object of [the believer’s] trust” (Ps 37:3, 5) he is the object of trust in the proverb because it is he who provides the safe sphere (Millar [2020, 211]). 246 On this noun, see Hausmann (1995, 266).

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Summary: “in” implies a metaphorical space the space is the fear of Yahweh, a human expression of faith of which God is the object the space is inhabited by strong security as well as the God-fearer (© Fox) and his children all of whom enjoy the shelter

In a sermon delivered in the prison of Basel on 6 August 1961, Karl Barth gave an exposition of 1 John 4:18,247 in which he focused on the preposition ἐν in that verse: “In love there is no fear.” There is some irony in the fact that the “fear” (φόβος) mentioned there is anxiety and thus the diametrical opposite of the concept in our proverb. Nevertheless, it is intriguing that the use of the preposition “in” in both cases applies the same logic. According to Barth, ἐν shows that God’s love is conceived of as a space, a house within which one can be. That is the same as the logic that I have appealed to in the case of the Hebrew ‫ ב‬in the proverb. There is no fear/dread “in” the house of God’s love, because his love has “driven out” all anxiety (again the metaphor of a house). There is a difference, though. In the proverb, humans are required to first stand in awe of God in order to be admitted to the space where such peace of mind can be experienced. In Barth’s exposition of the Johannine passage, one has to do nothing but open one’s eyes and see the secure space within which one already is. The former is characteristic of sapiential thinking, the latter is characteristic of Barth’s theology. Rabbinic exegesis tends to declare God himself as the shelter. To Rashi, ‫ יהיה‬does not have an impersonal subject, but the subject lies in the third person masculine singular “he,” which refers to God. So also Ramaq and Ralbag, who take it as a future tense, thus a promise that God will be a refuge for the God-fearing man, while his merit will also ensure the protection of his children in future (similarly Pseudo-Ibn Ezra). The Mezudat David finds the fear of God to be the source of the man’s strength, while the believer’s merit will also protect his children. Several times the idea of a promise is used to account for the future indicated by the imperfect of the verb and by the concept of offspring. Rashi mentions Abraham who first was God-fearing and therefore received a promise of blessing for himself and his offspring (cf. at Gen 22:12, 17). The Vilna Gaon adds a rather general reflection. Trust in God can follow promises made by God (cf. Gen 12:2), but even without a promise people can put their trust in him (Deut 32:37; Ps 118:9). If the trust holds, then God will eventually promise to help him, and this promise is a powerful stronghold. Clement of Alexandria (2nd century)248 quotes the proverb together with v. 16 to argue against Basilides and Valentinus that fear is the cause of all things. Rather, he maintains, one should fear evil (Prov 14:16) and find hope and strength (the Septuagint has ἐλπὶς ἰσχύος) in the fear of the Lord (Prov 14:26). John Calvin249 cites 247 248 249

EVZ LP 001 Vinyl Recording by Evangelischer Verlag Zollikon, Zürich. Strom II, 8 (ANF, 356). Inst III/14, 19.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

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the proverb as material for his argument that, when believers feel their faith strengthened by a consciousness of integrity, it only applies a posteriori as a sign that God has called them. As a Reformer, he could not concede that any fear of God – as a human act – “can give full security.”

14:27 The fear of Yahweh is a fountain of life, to avoid the snares of death. Like its variant in 13:14,250 the proverb has a rhythmic pattern of 4+3. The only difference between the two variants is that in 13:14 the teaching of the wise is the subject of the nominal clause, and in 14:27 it is the fear of Yahweh. But that does not justify accepting Murphy’s view that the teaching of the wise “is now explicitly identified with the fear of the Lord.”251 They are both marked by the same metaphor, which means that they serve as a source of life. The teaching is an indirect source of life in the sense that it inculcates the fear of God, which is the direct source. The metaphor in the first hemistich (both in this proverb and in 14:13) can be read and understood as part of a completed nominal sentence: “The fear of Yahweh / the teaching of a wise man is a fountain of life.” But the parallelism with the second hemistich, which is not “synonymous,”252 has a special role to play. We here have a progressive parallelism, where the first half is rounded off in the second, notably in that a second metaphor amplifies the first. Something extra is said about what the fear of Yahweh / teaching leads to. Commenting on 13:14, Fox says that the two metaphors “do not work well together.” But, apart from the alliteration on the m-sound (which Fox mentions) it can be argued that they do work quite well. Working from the perspective of metaphor theory, Luchsinger253 points out that the fountain metaphor suggests an object from which something positive flows out, while the metaphor of the snare presents an object into which one falls. Apart from this, they also go together well in as far as both are relevant in a hunting setting. Syntactically, the second hemistich of the verse (called a “single-sentence couplet” by Fox), expands the sentence through what Luchsinger, following Cotterell and Turner254 calls the process of “expansion,” i.e., a complex structure and not just a coordination of two elements of the same grammatical 250 Snell (1993, 38) places the pair in his Category 1.2; Heim (2013, 353-358) gives an extended discussion of the two proverbs in his Set 51. 251 Similarly, Heim (2013, 356) calls them “interchangeable.” 252 Not even mitigated by quotation marks (cf. Heim 2013, 353). 253 Luchsinger (2010, 276). 254 Luchsinger (2010, 162-163); Cotterell & Turner (1989, 191); cf. Lunn (2006, 22).

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structure. In this case it is ‫ ל‬plus the infinitive construct of ‫( סור‬turn aside, avoid), which indicates the goal to live a life avoiding the pitfalls in which one may become ensnared. Where the metaphors of the first half create an expectation in the reader, the answer is fulfilled in the second half. Fox thinks vv. 26 and 27 have been edited alongside one another in order to continue the idea of the fear of God, and that this was done with the help of 13:14, while Heim thinks in the opposite direction, namely that the redaction of 13:12-14 was done with the help of 14:27 (see above on 13:13-14). In my opinion, both are thinkable, and it is difficult to decide for the one or the other. For the metaphor of the well or fountain, cf. Ps 36:10; Jer 2:13; 17:13 (Fox); for the metaphor of the snare or trap, cf. 12:13; 18:7; 29;6. See further the notes and references in the commentary on 13:14. The Mezudat David likens a fountain to be able to wash away obstacles to the fear of God that, again, washes away all snares of death. The Vilna Gaon links the verse to v. 26 by using numerical values. The first word of v. 26 (‫ )ביראת‬has the value of 613, which is the number of commandments (‫ )מצות‬prescribed to Israel, while the first word of v. 27 (‫ )יראת‬adds up to 611, which is the value of the word ‫תורה‬. Therefore the previous verse is about commandments and v. 27 about Torah. Chrysostom says that the fountain of life without fail keeps bubbling permanently, which seems to suggest everlasting life.

14:28 In a multitude of people lies a king’s majesty,255 and in the lack of populace lies a ruler’s256 destruction. If Gemser is right in scanning the rhythm as 3+4, we would have to ignore one of the two maqqephs and (if we opt for the first one) lengthen the qamets hatuph in the first word to the longer o of a holem. In any event, adjacent stressed syllables would have to be accepted. Otherwise the first hemistich would have to consist of two stresses and lead to 2+4 for the whole verse, which would be unusual. Toy thinks we could have 3+3, which can be achieved by taking the last two words of the verse together (which the merka accent allows, whereas the rebiac mugrash at the first two words of the second half require separation). A definitive choice is difficult without a subjective input, and a Doppeldreier seems most probable. 255 The feminine status constructus is probably a “gender doublet” for the usual masculine form ‫ה ָדר‬. ָ 256 The text does not necessarily have to be emended to read ‫( רוֹזֵ ן‬ruler) (cf. 8:15; 31:4), which is sometimes proposed (cf. BHS, EE), since a form ‫ ָר זוֹן‬II is also possible. But the emendation does seem sensible in light of the hapax legomenon which the present vocalisation would be when used for this meaning.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

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‫ ָעם‬usually means a whole people, but it can also mean an army (cf. 2 Kgs 13:7; 18:26). Even if Riyqam and Radaq opt for the latter, Fox is to be agreed with that the parallelism with ‫( לאם‬populace) requires the reference to be the nation as a whole. Schipper poses an interesting question as to the precise meaning of the parallel to ‫מלך‬, viz. whether we here may have a reflection of political realities in the Persian period, when there were several subordinate potentates257 in addition to the great king (according to Schipper, some elements in the following verses fit this period). Whether such a parallel is indeed present in the proverb, does not affect the point it makes. The majesty of the king is reflected in the number of subjects he rules over (and, mutatis mutandis, the standing of a subordinate local ruler depends on how many people are in his domain). If a kingdom is small,258 its king is simply not as powerful and glorious as the king of a big realm. Murphy says that there is no reason to suspect “any deep philosophical view about the nature of monarchy as deriving its power from the people.” Had he omitted the words “its power,” the statement would have been right. Kings, including those of Israel, have always derived their “authority” from a divine being (and have often been ruling with iron fists on that basis, even bringing themselves to a fall as a consequence). But in the same breath Murphy nevertheless acknowledges that kings are expendable also. He does that with reference to Hausmann’s charming comparison to 30:27, where one of the wonders of creation is commented upon. The armies of locusts are said to set out on their unstoppable conquests in exquisite order without the least need of a king.259 The message is unmistakable: royal power is nothing without the people, wherever the authority of the king is claimed to come from. That relativises and even undermines the power of the king but, on the other hand, McKane goes too far when he says that “there is no role for a king in the ordered world of men since Yahweh is king.” Hausmann correctly counters that the kingdom of Yahweh is never mentioned in the Book of Proverbs. She treats the proverb under the heading “Königskritik” and shows the presence of a wholesome critical attitude towards the king and the limits of monarchy. Plöger regards the reference to the king in v. 28 and in v. 35260 as a frame around a group of sayings. This is rejected by Murphy, since there “seems 257 Cf. Fox and Schipper, who refer to the Instruction for Merikare 15cd, where the “potentates” would rather be high officials than subordinate kings. 258 ‫ אפס‬is a poetic synonym of ‫( אין‬non-existence), logically meaning “no people, no king,” but in the context also states that the power of a king diminishes when the subjects diminish in number. 259 Hausmann (1995, 141). That is exactly how they are pictured in Joel 2:1-11; cf. Joel 1:4. Ants, locusts and other aspects of creation are often held up as examples from which the human world can learn; see the commentary on 6:6-8, Vol. I, 262-263. 260 These are the only two verses that mention the king in Prov 10–15; see Ansberry (2011, 81 on 14:28, 34). The king may perhaps be implied in 11:14; as for the latter verse,

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to be little unity to the intervening verses.” Murphy is undoubtedly right, but in fairness it should be mentioned that Plöger said so himself by conceding that the “frame” gives the verses in question only “a loose cohesion” (“einen leichten Zusammenhalt”). The proverb has attracted much effort from rabbis, which is not surprising in light of the relativised status of the king and the highly significant theme of the Davidic dynasty who rules “by the grace of God.” First, the saying is related to God. While Ralbag and the Mezudat David give a down-to-earth literal interpretation (military strength and royal majesty depend on the number of subjects), Ramaq does the same, but with a rider: if the king’s followers dwindle, it is likely to have been caused by the king’s lack of the fear of God. Gerondi relates the proverb to v. 27, saying the tranquillity springing from the fear of God mentioned there is better than that which could be enjoyed by a king. Rashi goes the full distance by saying that the reference to the king should be understood as a metaphor for God. That seems to make the problem worse, for God’s power or majesty cannot depend on how many people he has to rule over. The way out is an expansive explanation. If the many people counting as his subjects are righteous, then they are God’s glory; if not, his glory is diminished. But: God does not lose it, he himself gives his glory to others. Here several editions of Rashi’s work differ, which Rosenberg261 ascribes to the possible influence of censorship. The Salonica and Warsaw editions say that God, by way of speaking, gives some of his honour to pagan gods and allows their nations to rule over Israel. Elsewhere, this kind of reasoning is expanded in several ways, notably that there is greater honour in performing a mitzvah, reciting the Havdalah, reading and hearing the Megilla on Purim and even performing sacrifice duties in a group than as individuals or alone.262 John Chrysostom (347-407) sees a human person in the king of the proverb. He says “it seems” that the proverb exhorts those who rule as well as those who are ruled to yield to one another. Jerome (342-420)263 has a wayward explanation. To him Moses’ plea to be blotted out of God’s book if God is not willing to forgive the sins of Israel (Ex 32:32) is relevant to the proverb. He does not consider the possibility that Moses is offering to die vicariously for the people, but applies the principle of the captain going down with the ship. That is what the proverb says: no people, no potentate. In a sermon delivered at Carthage, Augustine (354-430)264 also sees a reference to God in the proverb. Proceeding from the axiom that Christ cannot lose his glory, he argues that all belong to Christ, since he has redeemed the world by his blood. Therefore the Donatists are wrong when they claim that Christianity has disappeared from the world except for Africa. In terms of the second hemistich, this dishonours Christ, and they should rather interpret the proverb to mean that all nations will come to worship Christ. From his perspective, the second hemistich, stating as it does the unthinkable, warns against Donatist doctrine. Some twelve centuries later, Philipp Melanchthon comes up with a totally different take. He sees the relevance of the relationship between king and people to lie in good governance of the ruler. A Ansberry (2011, 80-81) accepts that a broader social application is possible, but stresses the proverb’s relevance for “the particular duty of the royal institution” (cf. Millar [2020, 159]). 261 Rosenberg (1988] 2001, 85). 262 Examples, including the Midrash Mishle and Talmudic references, in Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 260). 263 Letter to Gaudentius, NPNF II,6, 260. 264 Serm Ps 86 (Lat 85), Par. 13 (NPNF I,3, 414).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

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father should look after his household, do good to them and rule them well. This idea is to be applied to princes. Their purpose is also to rule justly and do good to humankind. This brings them honour, as Paul claims when he writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor 1:14; 5:12), the Philippians (Phil 4:1) and the Thessalonians (1 Thess 2:19265) that they are his glory and his crown. In this way Melanchthon again uses the Reformation principle of interpreting Scripture by Scripture.

14:29 Who is patient is great in understanding, but who is short-tempered hoists up folly. The rhythm is 3+3 (Toy). Gemser thinks it is either 4+3 or 4+4, the first of which is thinkable, but not the second. Perhaps he arrived at four stresses in the second hemistich by allotting a stress to ‫ קצר‬and another one to the patah furtivum in ‫רוח‬, but that is hardly possible. The first half contains a nominal clause and the second half is similar, but contains the participle ‫מרים‬, which denotes a durative truth. The virtue of being “long of anger,” is expressed by a “spatial pun,” as Murphy calls it (‫ = ארך אפים‬long of nostrils). Its opposite is either ‫קצר אפים‬ (short of nostrils), which occurs in 14:17, or ‫( קצר רוח‬short of spirit), as here and in 16:32. Schipper suspects that the choice for the latter is made in order to highlight the contrast with ‫ארך אפים‬. This is probably correct, since in Proverbs the latter expression is only used in the two texts cited, and in both cases refers to a human emotional proclivity,266 while in the rest of the Old Testament it is only used of God. His patience is associated with his kindness, mercy and compassion.267 But where it is used of humans, it refers to their self-control as an aspect of sapiential understanding,268 being expressly qualified as such in this proverb (‫)תבונה‬. The patience of the wise person does not only entail anger management (cf. 19:11), but also other virtues, such as control over hubris (11:2; 14:16), care in the dissemination of knowledge (10:14; 12:23; 17:27), handling quarrels (15:18), and is of such overriding general importance that a patient person can even be said to outstrip a military hero (16:32). Hausmann goes further still by declaring that patience and insight are unified,269 which, at 265 Melanchthon quotes from this verse and turns it both ways: the Thessalonians are his crown of honour as he is also theirs. 266 Cf. Qoh 7:8, where the variant expression ‫ ארך רוח‬is used. 267 See Ex 34:6; Num 14:18; Neh 9:17; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 145:8; Joel 2:13; Jon 4:2; Nah 1:3. Cf. also Waltke, whose list differs slightly from Schipper’s. 268 Hausmann (1995, 16-17, 281), who gives several examples where the same motif and its opposite are expressed with variegated terminology. 269 Hausmann (1995, 282): “Langmut und Einsicht werden ineinsgesetzt.” She refers to 19:11, but the validity of her point seems even more plainly visible in 14:29: “Who is patient is great in understanding.”

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the very least, is to say that patience is a component of sapiential understanding. The fact that the patient person has understanding (‫ )תבונה‬makes that person discerning (‫)נבון‬, which in turn is synonymous with being a wise person (‫)חכם‬, as the parallelism in 1:5 shows. A person who displays the opposite characteristic must therefore be the opposite of the wise person. In the same way that the first hemistich leaves it to the reader to work out that a ‫ נבון‬or ‫ חכם‬is meant, so the second does not explicitly label the intended person an ‫ אויל‬or ‫כסיל‬. Rather, it lets the fool do it himself. The short-tempered person hoists up folly “for all to see.”270 The verb ‫ רום‬Hiphil (raise, hoist) makes excellent sense, evoking as it does the image of a banner hoisted up as a signal in Isa 49:22; 62:10 (‫)הרים נס‬.271 The same idea, but without the implied metaphor of the banner, is found in Prov 12:23 and 13:16. The banner identifies the one who displays it. Since the banner is ‫( אולת‬folly), it proclaims to all who see it that the one who hoists it is an ‫( אויל‬fool), who in turn is the same as a ‫כסיל‬. This implies that whatever the fool does, he broadcasts that he is a dolt and therefore reminds all who read the edited proverbs of v. 24b, where the only result of foolishness is more foolishness. Of course, the proverb can be associated with royalty (cf. 16:14; 20:2), but Murphy is right in rejecting efforts to limit the scope of this proverb to the court. The idea is too generally applicable than to allow restricting it to kings. Moreover, discussing the king’s wrath and his favour, Millar272 points out that wrath is unequivocally condemned in Proverbs (e.g., 14:29; 15:18; 22:24; 29:22), but that no moral commentary is offered when the king’s anger is the topic. As mentioned by several commentators (e.g. Tuinstra and Schipper), there are Egyptian parallels to the theme of the proverb. For instance, in the Instruction of Amenemope,273 Do not begin a quarrel with a hot-mouthed man, or prick him with words. Hold back before a foe …

270 Waltke; similarly already Bertheau, “dass er Narrheit davonträgt” (that he carries off folly) and Luther’s translation, “der offenbart seine Torheit” (he reveals his folly). 271 Cf. Isa 11:12; 13:2, where the same motif with another verb occurs (‫)נשא נס‬. Understood this way, there is no reason to agree with Whybray that it does not give a satisfactory sense or to follow the Septuagint by accepting the emendation to ‫( מרבה‬Hiphil participle masculine singular of ‫רבה‬, multiply) – see BHS. The same expression (‫ )מרים אולת‬is found in 3:35, but the parallelism there requires the other possibility for ‫ רום‬Hiphil (acquire); see Vol. I, 196. In 14:29 the Septuagint’s ἰσχυρῶς ἄφρων (exceedingly foolish) can be explained as a guess in light of the various possibilities to understand the Hebrew Hiphil participle (so EE). 272 Millar (2020, 175-176). 273 Amenemope V, 10-12, AEL II, 150; see further the notes on Prov 14:17 above.

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In the Papyrus Insinger it says,274 It is a divine gift to the godly that the god makes him patient… Rashi interprets the second hemistich to say that the short-tempered person carries off folly as his portion (which Delitzsch accepts and explains with a reference to Lev 6:8). The idea is that he receives it as a reward, but later realises that it is just foolishness. Hame’iri mentions the same as one possibility, but also adds other interpretations: the hothead makes his foolishness visible to all; or he elevates it to a superior position and thus unmasks himself (see above); he causes revolution, as in 1 Kgs 11:26, where ‫ רום‬Hiphil is used in the sense of raising the hand against the king. Gerondi comments that being slow to anger leads to being filled with understanding because such a person waits patiently until he is calm and thus avoids stupid decisions under stress, whereas his counterpart falls into exactly that trap. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra turns the subject and predicate of the first hemistich around to state that anyone who has understanding will also be one who has patience, while ‫ קצר רוח‬means that he cannot control his spirit and thereby elevates folly higher than himself. Malbim differentiates between the quick-tempered person of v. 17 (called ‫ )קצר אפים‬and the one mentioned here (called ‫)קצר רוח‬. The former is one who immediately erupts and therefore acts foolishly, whereas the latter buries his anger in himself (“spirit”) and therefore elevates it to a status he constantly has to think about. The Vilna Gaon also thinks that the quick-tempered person elevates folly to a position of prominence that all can see. Finally, the Mezudat David says that the angry person elevates foolishness above the understanding spoken of in the first half. In an epistle to Hero, Deacon of Antioch, Ignatius (c. 35-107)275 shortly refers to the proverb as support for his injunction to be long-suffering. For John Chrysostom, the Septuagint’s way of stressing the superlative of both opposites (πολὺς ἐν φρονήσει, “profuse in sense,” as opposed to ἰσχυρῶς ἄφρων, “exceedingly foolish) brings out the true intention of the proverb, since the former is the best illustration of folly and the latter demonstrates the ability to calmly consider all aspects of a matter before coming to a conclusion. Apart from his commentary, Chrysostom makes two further references to the proverb. First, in a sermon on Hebrews 10,276 he quotes the Greek version as part of his argument that the “abundant wisdom” of a long-suffering person shows that such a person is actually strong, which encourages Christians not to be faint-hearted (μικροψυχῶμεν). Concluding another sermon,277 he quotes the verse to the same end, but uses it as the climactic ending of the homily: the patience of the long-suffering leads to the attainment of the good things promised them in Christ. Jerome tells of the saintly Paula who quoted both hemistichs of the proverb to explain her patience in suffering.278 Cassian makes two references to the proverb. First, he quotes it (and 12:16) in an argument for the management of anger, which he associates with cowardice,279 and then in praise of patience,280 where he quotes the proverb together with 16:32 to argue that responding by an outburst of anger to being wronged is misguided because anger is not caused by an injustice, but by an inner weakness. 274 275 276 277 278 279 280

Papyrus Insinger XVIII, 16, AEL III, 200. Ep Her V (ANF I, 114). Hom Heb 10:19-23, par. 5 (NPNF I, 14, 456-457). Hom Heb 11:3-4, par. 8 (NPNF I, 14, 468-469). Epist CVIII to Eustochium (NPNF II, 6, 205). Confer XVI, 27 (NPNF II, 11, 459). Confer XVIII, 13 (NPNF II, 11, 484-485).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

14:30 A gentle heart is the life of the body, but jealousy is decay of the bones. The rhythm is clearly 4+3, one beat per word (So also Toy and Gemser). There are two nominal clauses, one in each hemistich, both of which begin with the predicate and end with the subject. The normal word order in classifying clauses is that the subject follows the predicate.281 The logic of the two statements itself makes it clear that the subject cannot open the respective clauses in this verse (a gentle heart can enliven a body, but a living body does not necessarily house a gentle heart; jealousy can cause rot in one’s inner constitution, but rotting bones do not cause jealousy). The body is usually singular (‫)בּ ָשׂר‬, ָ but the plural, which only occurs here, is used in a singular sense. Delitzsch takes it as a concretum pro abstracto, meaning “the bodily life in the totality of functions, and in the entire manifoldness of its relations.” Waltke follows this and calls it a “plural of extension,” of which he says elsewhere,282 “the plural quality is the result not of a countable multiplicity, but of a multiplicity that is nonetheless perceived as real.” His description suits this plural perfectly. Waltke and Schipper point out that the plural form in the first hemistich matches the plural ‫( עצמות‬bones) in the second hemistich, which contributes to the balance of the antithetic parallelism. The heart is described as “gentle.” As Meinhold points out, the heart is the seat of wisdom, and wisdom includes gentleness (cf. v. 29; 15:18; 25:15). The Hebrew word II ‫מרפא‬, from ‫( רפה‬be limp, slack), denotes calmness (as in Qoh 10:4) or gentleness (as in Prov 15:4).283 The opposite characteristic is called ‫( קנאה‬jealousy, anger), which is an emotion of animosity. Delitzsch quotes Schultens to say that the word expresses a “mental condition flaming and burning for indignation.”284 He accepts it, which cannot be faulted in cases where it refers to human emotions rather than to divine wrath based on God’s claim to his exclusive right (e.g. Deut 28:19; Ps 79:5; cf. the cognate adjective in ‫אל קנא‬, “a jealous God, e.g. Ex 20:5; 34:14 ). The point of the proverb is that the state of the human mind has influence on the body. That includes psychosomatic effects of human emotions (cf. 281 See IBHS 8.4.2a. According to GKC 141l, the order predicate-subject must be used when special emphasis is laid on the predicate, which is not the case here, but GKC also mentions that this order occurs frequently under other circumstances as well. 282 IBHS 7.4.1c. 283 The noun I ‫( מרפא‬healing, as in 4:22; 6:15; 13:17; 29:1, medicine, as in 12:18; 16:24), from ‫( רפא‬heal), occurs more often in Proverbs, and is preferred also for this proverb by Alter and Schipper. But II ‫ מרפא‬is nevertheless better in this case (so Gemser, Ringgren, Plöger, McKane, Sæbø), since it does not need the assumption that both hemistichs take an unhealthy body as their point of departure. See HALOT and KAHAL on both. This derivation was already defended by Hame’iri (last half of the 13th century). 284 Delitzsch quotes, affectus inflammans æstuque indignationis fervidus; however, these words are not found in Schultens’s Proverbs commentary of 1748.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

569

12:25; 13:12, 19; 15:13, 20) but also the wholesome effects of sound sapiential thinking (similarly, Meinhold). There are several texts in sapiential literature that illustrate the interrelatedness of knowing and feeling, for instance teachings such as offered in 24:13; 25:16; Qoh 11:10. Although they mostly are not concerned with gentleness and jealousy specifically, they are grounded in the consciousness that bodily experiences are often determined by the wisdom of the mind (or the lack of it). The Septuagint first makes a healer out of the gentle man spoken of by v. 30a in the Hebrew and then turns the second hemistich on its head: πραΰθυμος ἀνὴρ καρδίας ἰατρός, σὴς δὲ ὀστέων καρδία αἰσθητική. (The mild-tempered man is a healer of the heart, but a knowing heart is a devourer285 of bones) The first hemistich makes the heart the object of the healing brought about by gentleness. But the second Greek hemistich seems uncomfortable with it and even flatly contradicts the Hebrew v. 30b. It is also at odds with the general tendency in Proverbs to see wisdom as indispensable for good fortune and happiness (so EE). If the knowledgeable man’s own bones are meant, it would logically mean that knowing too much is dangerous (“ignorance is bliss”). However, that would be unsapiential. Following as it does on the first hemistich, the second would rather imply that the knowledge in the heart of a mild-mannered wise man can just as well devour an opponent. Somewhat like Shakespeare has Hamlet warn his emotional opponent,286 … though I am not splenetive and rash, yet have I in me something dangerous, which let thy wiseness fear … In any case, the Greek text does reflect the Stoicising287 connection of wisdom and sadness in the Greek 14:10a (cf. Qoh 7:4a).

The thematic similarity of vv. 29 and 30 is probably the reason why they stand together in Prov 14.288 There are no formal criteria that could testify to a literary unit of sorts in these verses, as suggested by various scholars. That includes the suggestion by Scherer that two proverbs on moderation and mental equilibrium follow on a proverb featuring the king (v. 28).289 Apart from the fact that the thematic focus of v. 28 is completely different, it seems rather implausible to connect words on patience and gentleness with the sources of a king’s power or weakness. On the σής (lit., moth) as a devourer, cf. Matt 6:20. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act V, Scene 1. 287 For this idea, cf. EE. 288 Hermisson (1968, 175), following Boström (1928, 153), only finds a common thematic similarity between the two proverbs. 289 Scherer (1999, 155-156), although he concedes that there are no formal criteria for this aspect of his chiastic composition in vv. 28-35; Hermisson (1969, 178) finds only the thematic similarity and no other connections in vv. 29-30; and even Scoralick (1995, 226), finds no clear connections between v. 28 and vv. 29-30 – despite her proposal of a large concentric composition in 14:29–15:8 (which differs from the one put forward by Scherer). 285 286

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

Rashi thinks that the gentle heart is a healer of the flesh in the sense that it can heal what is bad and in need of forgiveness in human life. Since people, as God’s creations, are “flesh,” a person with such a character among them can indeed be said to be the “life of the flesh.” But an angry person makes not only his own bones rot, but also everyone else’s. The idea of rotting bones in this proverb seems to have had a theological echo in the Talmud, where it is stated that the bones of the jealous will rot even after death.290 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra qualifies the wholesome heart as a mind who does not pay attention to anything he hears, and points out the irony of the bones rotting away while they are supposed to be pillars of the body. Yonah Gerondi interprets the gentle heart as tolerance and patience, which heal both body and sorrowful soul. The plural ‫ בשרים‬for the bodily aspect shows that all the limbs benefit by this healing. On the other hand, envy is not only bad for the flesh, but even for the strongest part of the human body, the bones. Hame’iri anticipated the modern scholars mentioned above by deriving ‫ מרפא‬from ‫( רפה‬see above). He also argued that the root ‫ קנא‬can have different meanings (both envy and anger), which could have had an impact on the Mezudat David, where the rot is attributed to anger. Bahya (13th-14th century) sees the healthy contribution of the good heart to life in the fact that it keeps people free from hatred and hostility and therefore healthy. The jealous person, on the other hand, is always plagued by the endeavour to be better than others and therefore is permanently under stress to achieve more even after success, and miserable after failure. Chrysostom makes a virtue of a difficulty by merely commenting, “In all cases the problem is excess.”291 Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389) defends his flight to Pontus with reference to the second Greek hemistich. His reading is obviously autobiographical in view of his own sensitive character, when he speaks of a sensitive and sad heart, which “is a very rottenness to the bones.”292 He makes a comparable reference to the verse in his funeral oration for his friend Basil (330-379),293 saying that Basil’s sympathetic character was a source of pain while his constant attention to others wasted away his heart, illustrating what the proverb says about a perceptive heart as a moth to the bones. Melanchthon understands ‫ מרפא‬as “healthy” and interprets the healthy heart (cor sanum) to be a life-giving good conscience. He finds support in 15:13: Bonum cor est iuge convivium (a joyous heart is matched with conviviality).

14:31 Who oppresses the poor insults his maker, but who is kind to the needy honours him. The stich has a ternary rhythmic pattern and both hemistichs contain two participles, although the second verb in the first half (‫ )חרף‬is Piel perfect,294 which isolates the next participle (‫ )עשהו‬as the object. In both hemistichs the subject clause concerns the relationship between humans and the predicate clause concerns the relationship of humans with God. The proverb has a chiastic order: 290

Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 152b; see Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 263). See Hill (2006, 226), who ascribes this to the obscurity of the Greek text. In my opinion, it was probably difficult for Chrysostom to make sense of a knowing heart that devours bones. 292 Oratio II, 57 (NPNF II, 7, 217). 293 Oratio XLIII, 42 (NPNF II, 7, 409). 294 A perfective expressing matters “of constant recurrence” and therefore “of common experience,” like the Greek gnomic aorist (GKC 106k; IBHS 30.5.1c; cf. 31.3e). 291

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14 ‫חרף עשהו‬ predicate with participle+suffix as object ‫חנן אביון‬ participial clause as subject

571 ‫עשק דל‬ participial clause as subject ‫מכבדו‬ predicate with suffix as object

Sandoval says that “[t]he line’s repeated use of the participle … hints that the saying is not simply offering an occasional command but is concerned with the formation of the hearer’s disposition.”295 Who treats the poor harshly, insults the work of the one who made him.296 The point is a serious one, since it makes a theologically explicit appeal to God’s creative activity. The poor too are the work of his hands and, as Jon Hartmere’s Sister Chantelle declares by expressing a traditional conviction,297 He simply opens up his heart, out come a-tumbling works of art! God don’t make no trash.

The participle ‫( ע ֵֹשׂה‬he who makes)298 suggests that creation was not just a one-off primeval event, but that every human since then is God’s handiwork. An insult to the poor is an insult to God’s craftsmanship and therefore an insult to God himself. It is not explicitly stated what the punishment will be for such contempt for God, but punishment is implied. Indeed, the parallelism in the similar proverb of 17:5 is explicit that punishment will not be absent for such behaviour (cf. 21:13 and the New Testament corollary, Matt 25:45). Therefore Sister Chantelle’s follow-up lines also have sapiential back-up: Ignit folks playing judge and jury – they’re the ones that gonna know God’s fury ’cause God don’t make no trash 295 Sandoval (2006, 146). He is undoubtedly correct, although he only counts three instead of four participles in the proverb. This does not undermine his point though, since the fourth participle (‫ )עשהו‬refers to God as creator of the poor and not to the people whose treatment of the poor is discussed. 296 Waltke points out that the verb ‫ עשק‬may also mean “slander” – so the Septuagint (συκοφαντέω, slander, oppress) and the Vulgate (calumnior, slander). In light of the parallelism, there may indeed be a double entendre: insulting the poor verbally is insulting God – just as much as oppressing the poor is. 297 Jon Hartmere and Damon Intrabartolo, Bare, Act II (where, however, the unkindness censured is not insulting the poor, but homophobia). 298 While the third person masculine singular suffix in ‫( מכבדו‬v. 31b) can only refer to God, the same suffix with ‫ ע ֵֹשׂה‬can refer to the poor or to the oppressor, implying what 22:2 makes explicit (Yoder). But, in light of the appeal to the creation motif, the most natural referent in v. 31a would be the poor. Perhaps there is a double entendre here: the oppressor insults the one who has made the oppressed, who is also his own maker (Delitzsch refers to both as bearers of the image of God by virtue of both being his creatures; similarly Van Leeuwen). That would even amplify the force of the saying, because by doing so, the oppressor derides the one who made him as well as the poor.

572

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

The idea that God is the maker of the poor does not mean that he condones their being kept in misery by others and their social structures. The antithetical verset encourages doing good to the poor as “a model of magnanimity,”299 here specifically as an act of honouring God (cf. the New Testament corollary, Matt 25:40). The idea of kindness to the poor occurs often in other proverbs, such as 19:17; 22:22-23 and 29:7, in which legal terminology is used.300 It is part of the sapiential virtue of practising justice in society, that is, shaping ethical life as it should be according to God’s will.301 Commentators often cite similar ideas in the Wisdom of Amenemope. For instance,302 Do not laugh at a blind man or mock a dwarf. Or cause hardship to a cripple or mock one who is ill [deranged] in the god’s hand. … The god is his builder, he tears down and builds up every day. Schipper also quotes Ankhsheshonq:303 Do not say, I did a good deed to this man, but he did not acknowledge it to me. There is no good deed except a good deed that you have done to one who is in need of it. The theme is also present in the Babylonian Counsels of Wisdom, where almost identical motifs are used to express it, and in the Prologue of the Codex of Hammurapi,304 299 So Millar (2020, 150; cf. 116). According to Washington (1994a, 183-185) a heightened concern for the poor should be attributed to the post-exilic urban sages who tempered the harsher views of their rural predecessors. Whether the social contrast of rural and urban backgrounds is accepted or not, the essential point cannot be overlooked, viz. that a harsh view of the plight of the poor is objectionable. 300 Sandoval (2006, 147) mentions terms like ‫( שער‬the city gate where legal affairs are settled), ‫( דין‬right, a cognate of the verbal root meaning to pronounce justice), ‫( צדיק‬the righteous as the one who prevails in litigation); cf. particularly 22:23, where God is said to plead the case (‫ )ריב‬of the poor, that is, to take part in the judicial process as the advocate for the oppressed. The religious motif and the motif of justice thus converge. The appeal to God’s creative work in 14:31 therefore cannot be said to exclude the motif of justice towards the poor, so that the kindness towards the downtrodden is not just a matter of incidental almsgiving, but should be seen as part of a wider context of social justice (cf. 11:1; 13:23; 16:24, 26; 19:17; 20:23; 23:10-11) and therefore of justice in general. 301 Cf. on 1:3, Vol. I, 58; also 3:27-28; 14:21-22; 28:8. 302 Amenemope XXIV, 8-11.14-15 (AEL II, 160; COS I, 121); compare also XXVI, 13-14 on the god who prefers the one who honours the poor to one who worships the rich (AEL II, 161). 303 Instr Ankhsheshonq XV, 5-6 (AEL III, 171). See above on v. 22 and the references given there. 304 See above on v. 22; on Hammurapi, see I, 31f., cf. XXIV, 71 (ANET, 164, 178; COS II, 336, 351).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

573

who claims that his laws bring justice to the land, so “that the strong might not oppress the weak.”

According to Schipper, this proverb highlights that generous treatment of the poor has implications for a person’s relationship to God. However, he suggests that the proverb need not imply an endeavour to change social injustice, but only expresses the wise person’s display of the correct relationship to God – a kind of combination between Washington’s “harsh” and “mild” variations. Schipper does so in the subjunctive mood (“könnte”) and leaves room for the possibility that his view goes too far, which in my opinion it does. Acts of kindness toward the downtrodden are the opposite of injustice and must therefore be acts in opposition to an unjust society. Moreover, what sense would it make that God rejects harsh treatment of the poor if that is not what has to be obeyed by the pupils of the sages no less than the audience of the prophets? The indicative statement shows that the requirement is a matter of general principle, not just an incidental matter of good taste. Comparison with the prophets’ social conscience reveals a difference in style, not in substance: sapiential serenity as distinct from prophetic invective. According to Ralbag, the performer of kindness to the poor spoken of in the second hemistich does not expect reward except by God, which is a way to honour God. The Mezudat David explains the first half as an insult to God because the oppressor implies that the Creator cannot save the pauper from a bully. The Vilna Gaon takes quite another view: not being kind to the poor causes the latter to complain to God about his poverty, which insults God, while helping him reduces his complaints to God. Malbim says that the poor were created so that the rich can be enabled to fulfil the mitzvah of helping the poor by doing ‫( צדקה‬good deed, justice).305 In the Constitutions of the Apostles306 the verse is quoted in support of speaking the truth, which interprets the verb συκοφαντέω not as slandering in general, but as speaking falsely against the needy. Chrysostom shares the idea that the poor were made poor by God, and that that excludes any justification of slandering them (the Septuagint has συκοφαντέω, see above). He appeals to Luke 16:9-31, where God in his opinion shows that he loved the poor Lazarus and not the rich man. In a homily on 2 Thess 3:3-5307 Chrysostom requires the disobedient to be censured so that they repent, and adds on the basis of 2 Thess 3:15 and Prov 14:31 that they should be reproved but not insulted. Jerome308 includes a quotation from this verse in his Apology against Rufinus, using the Book of Proverbs as his source for the defence of peace through wisdom. He sees himself as the oppressed and Rufinus as the oppressor. In a 305 See Ginsburg (1998 [2009], 263) for the idea that withholding help is ‫( עושק‬injustice), while giving it is justice; for the rabbis it is not coincidence that the rabbinic term for charity (‫ )צדקה‬has the same root as ‫( צדק‬justice). 306 Const Apost VII, i (ANF VII, 465). 307 Hom 2 Thess 3:3-5 (NPNF I, 14, 395). 308 Apol adv libros Rufini III, 43 (NPNF II,3, 43, 540); cf. also his polemical use of Proverbs in 12:14, 13:3, 16 and 14:3.

574

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

letter to Bosporius (bishop of Colonia, mid-4th century), Basil309 laments being suspected of anathemising a friend. He quotes the first hemistich of the proverb against those who spread this rumour and in defence of himself as the “oppressed.”

14:32 By his own evil the wicked will be thrown down, but the righteous seeks refuge in his innocence. The rhythmically straightforward proverb (3+3) contains a number of interesting features. There is one sentence in each hemistich, both sentences ending with the subject.310 The subjects stand outside the chiastic pattern constituted by the rest of the verse. The outer poles of the chiasmus consist of a prepositional phrase (‫ ברעתו‬and ‫ בתומו‬311) and the inner poles by the verbs (‫ ידחה‬and ‫)חסה‬: ‫רשע‬

||

‫ידחה‬

‫ברעתו‬

‫צדיק‬

||

‫בתומו‬

‫חסה‬

Beginning with the second hemistich, where the crux for the interpretation of the proverb is situated, we are confronted with a text-critical problem. As the last half of the verse stands in Hebrew, it reads, “the righteous seeks refuge in his death.” Some interpreters assume that death is the object of the trust and therefore argue that “it is not clear how death can be something to rely on” or that such a thought “runs contrary to the perspectives on death in this book” (Murphy; also Gemser, Ringgren). Waltke, Fuhs, Schipper and others do find the reading acceptable, and Clifford even calls the alternative offered by the Septuagint, viz. “in his innocence” (which would correspond to Hebrew ‫ בתומו‬or ‫ בתמו‬or ‫ )בתמתו‬for “in his death” rather insipid. But, as earlier commentators (Toy, Oesterley) as well as more recent ones (Murphy, Fox and others) have pointed out, the expectation of a life after death is foreign to the Book of Proverbs. It is possible though, as Plöger suggests, that those who fixed the Masoretic Text thought of God as the unmentioned object of a righteous person’s trust when death is approaching, since by that time belief in an afterlife was established. Waltke defends the Masoretic reading as original, claiming that “the process of dying, not the state of death, must be in view.” This is thinkable and was already championed by 19th-century scholars from such divergent positions on the theological spectrum as Delitzsch and Gesenius, 309

Epist LI, 42 (NPNF II,8, 154). This is interpreted differently by the Peshitta and the Targum, where ‫ רשע‬and ‫ צדיק‬are interpreted as the predicate (see below). 311 See below on the textual criticism and the theological implications involved. 310

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

575

as well as by later interpreters like Dahood and Barucq.312 The prospect of life after death or at least some form of “hope of eternal life” (Delitzsch) is defended by these scholars both here and in their comments on 12:28.313 Fox mentions two basic objections to this interpretation. First, according to him the verb used here, ‫חסה‬,314 governs the preposition ‫ ב‬plus the source of hope. Second, Fox follows Toy’s claim that the verb is not used absolutely in the sense of faith. Therefore the meaning cannot be that the righteous trusts in the unmentioned God in the sense of having faith when the time of death draws near. Although Fox uses less than two lines to make his point in rather oversimplified315 terms, that does not invalidate it. In the majority of instances the verb is used as here, with the preposition ‫ ב‬plus the locus where the refuge is sought (often also in the participle Qal). Therefore it should not be construed as an absolute use of the participle with God as the implied object of the trust. That makes the text-critical issue relevant. If we accept with the Septuagint316 that the object of trust is the opposite of ‫( רעתו‬his evil) in the first hemistich, then we would have a good antithetical parallel between the hemistichs. We would only have to assume a small textual inversion in the Hebrew transmission, viz. of ‫ מ‬and ‫ת‬, while the extra waw can be a dittography or simply a plene form (even with doubling of ‫)מ‬. Whether the Greek rendering was deliberately done for theological reasons317 or an accidental interchange of two consonants (EE), does not materially contribute to a judgement about the correct Hebrew text.

The proverb contrasts evil and righteous people, thus the guilt318 of the former and the innocence of the latter, as well as what they respectively do. But there is an element left unsaid in the second half, which has to be supplied from the first half by the reader, viz. what happens to the righteous (in square brackets below). Because the evil deeds of evil people are the cause of their being 312 Dahood (1960, 177-178). Berger (1991, 118-119) quotes a fragment from the Cairo Geniza (WCG 4,14): “Whoever loves another life, can also be comforted in death,” to which he compares a reference in the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch 14:12f. about the righteous leaving this life without fear. This may confirm the Masoretic reading (as does the Vulgate), but does not disprove its origin in a metathesis of consonants in the proverb (see below). 313 See the references and discussion on 12:28 above. 314 Extended notes on this verb are given by Waltke in the footnotes to his translation. 315 The verb does often occur with ‫( ב‬e.g. Isa 14:32; Nah 1:7; Prov 30:5; and frequently in the Psalms, e.g. Pss 2:12; 5:12; 7:2; 18:3; 25:20; 31:2, 29 etc.). But that is not always the case. It can also be used with another preposition (cf. ‫ תחת‬in Ps 91:4, Ruth 2:12). There is also a difficult case where the verb may be used without a preposition (Ps 17:7, so BDB), but this is uncertain. Cf. THAT I, 621-623. 316 The Greek reads, ὁ δὲ πεποιθὼς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὁσιότητι δίκαιος (but the righteous trusts in his piety). 317 So Geiger ([1857] 1928, 175). 318 ‫ ברעתו‬also occurs in Qoh 7:15, but, interestinly, in a statement with the opposite claim. Whereas the wicked lives long “through his wickedness” in the Qohelet text, he is overthrown by the same means in the Proverbs text (Schipper).

576

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

cast down (‫ דחה‬Niphal), the reader can infer that righteous people, who by definition are blameless (‫)תום‬, must experience the opposite, namely acceptance and protection. This is a thoroughly sapiential thought and a clear manifestation of the deed-consequence nexus. V. 32a by perpetrating evil deeds the evil person is thrown down

:: :: ಩

V. 32b seeking refuge in his innocence the righteous person [is accepted/protected]

Rashi interprets the second hemistich to mean that the righteous man “is confident” that he will go to paradise, whereas the wicked will be “cast off” from God. Gerondi and Ralbag both think that ‫ ברעתו‬means “in his misfortune,” that is, the wicked person’s misfortune, and that he then blames God for it, while the righteous keeps his faith. Ralbag adds that this remains so even at the good man’s death. Ramaq aligns the two halves of the verse by ascribing the wicked man’s being pushed away to his wicked plotting against the poor, and by adding that, when the wicked man’s death comes, the righteous one will trust in God. According to the Mezudat David, the wicked person becomes progressively wicked because of the cumulative nature of evil. The righteous man trusts in God even when death approaches, but also when the evil inclination in humans tempts him, because the thought of his death functions as a wholesome memento mori. Finally, the Vilna Gaon thinks the wicked is brought down by the same evil he had planned for others, citing Haman as an example (Est 7:10). On the other hand, a righteous man is protected even at death, and after that becomes a refuge for his children (cf. a similar idea in v. 26). Chrysostom seems to take the Greek text to imply that the righteous trust in the Lord and are thus justified by their own holiness.319 I do not find the reference to this verse by ANF320 justified. It seems to refer to another idea and would rather be more akin to v. 33.

14:33 In the heart of the discerning wisdom rests, but in the midst of fools it will make itself known. The proverb consists of two verbal sentences, the first with four and the second with three accents. The first hemistich could have been a nominal sentence (without the verb ‫ )תנוח‬and then would have been a statement that there “is” wisdom in the heart of the discerning. But the use of the verb ‫( נוח‬rest) is deliberate and important for determining the sense of the proverb as a whole. Both hemistichs begin with a prepositional phrase, thereby contrasting the inner constitution of a discerning person (singular) and the collective intelligence of a bunch of fools (plural). 319 Hill (2006, 226) comments that Chrysostom modifies the idea slightly in this way, although one would not expect an Antiochene theologian to have difficulty with the Greek text. 320 ANF VII, 414, Par. xxxvii (end).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

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If wisdom “rests” in the heart of a discerning person, it is not only situated there, but rests there quietly. The wise man does not exhibit his wisdom all the time, but keeps it serenely to himself, which can be expected from a reflecting man such as the type described in 15:28, and which in practice manifests as envisaged in 26:4 (“do not answer a fool according to his folly”). However, there are also situations when it is called for to express that wisdom, for instance among (‫ )בקרב‬a group of fools (plural).321 Since nothing but folly can be forthcoming from them, a situation obtains such as the one envisaged in 26:5 (“answer a fool according to his folly”). The nonsense or wickedness of the fools will then be exposed by the wisdom of the discerning person. This interpretation understands the Niphal of ‫ ידע‬as reflexive:322 the subject is ‫“ – חכמה‬it will make itself known,” because the discerning one will judge that the circumstances call for a rebuke. But the Niphal may also be taken as a simple passive: then ‫ חכמה‬is the logical subject – “it will be/ become known,” because in such company wisdom cannot but become patently evident. As in the previous proverb there is an element left unexpressed by a gap in the second hemistich, which can be filled in the light of the first. Since in the second half it is neither said what the fools have in their hearts nor what obtains in their group, it is left to the reader to connect the dots by a rereading of the first: V. 33a in the heart of the discerning person rests wisdom

:: :: :: ಩

V. 33b in the circle of fools is made known [wisdom in the place of a vacuum]

This does not mean that the fools accept the sudden appearance of wisdom among them and replace the folly in their hearts with wisdom. There is no suggestion in the text for such a surmise (cf. 27:22, where such an idea is regarded as impossible; also 13:16; 15:2). Therefore Delitzsch and Clifford cannot be right when they suggest that the meaning is that fools blurt out what little wisdom they have. Toy thinks the Niphal verb must mean “it is known” and construes it as some form of sarcasm, irony or humour before deciding on reading ‫אולת‬, which is supported by the Targum (see below). Winton Thomas323 picks up an ancient idea mooted by Ramaq, who connects the verb with an Arabic verb ‫( ودع‬suppress) and is followed by McKane. However, it is not only far-fetched, but also unnecessary to assume that an Arabic verb would be used here. Meinhold and Murphy see the solution in interpreting 321 322 323

Cf. 15:31, where ‫ בקרב‬plainly means “in the midst of” a group. Cf. IBHS 23.1e. Winton Thomas (1934, 236-238).

578

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

the second hemistich as a rhetorical question, but there is no interrogative particle to suggest this. The contrast in 14:33 is between the wisdom that fills the mind of a discerning person who happened to stumble into a group of palookas, and the collective emptiness that characterises the assemblage made up by them. The ancient versions no less than modern commentators were puzzled by the last half of the proverb (cf. BHS).324 The Septuagint merely makes the statement negative (οὐ διαγινώσκεται [it is not noticed]), which is also done by Theodotion and Aquila. As Fox remarks, the latter fact is probably an indication that the negative particle ‫ לא‬was present in at least some Hebrew manuscripts. The same is found in the Peshitta (ˆËُ ¿ćà [it is not known]).325 The Targum keeps the verb passive, but adds another logical subject (‫[ שטיותא תתידע‬stupidity326 is observed.]). Another solution of the perceived problem is offered by the Vulgate, which vocalises the Niphal imperfect as a Hiphil (‫)תּוֹד ַע‬, ִ and translates, et indoctos quoque erudiet327 (but it will also teach the uninstructed). Apart from lacking the critical slant of the Hebrew, the Vulgate actually comes close to the sense of the Hebrew, namely that wisdom is quietly at home in the heart of the discerning, but, if necessary, it will also teach those who are in need of instruction. Rashi emphasises the tranquility of wisdom in the heart of the discerning and interprets the second half of the verse to say that fools prattle out loudly what little wisdom they have like the noise of a bottle with only one coin in it. Hame’iri and the Mezudat David find the first half a statement about the care of the discerning person who does not address his wisdom to just anyone. Gerondi uses the image of a pleasant smell in a foul environment to illustrate the effect of a quiet sage among fools: merely the contrast between them makes his wisdom apparent. For Ramaq, see above on the etymology of ‫ידע‬. According to Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, the discerning man only lets his wisdom be known at the right time to teach others, but it is nevertheless known at all times in the midst of fools. Chrysostom does not interpret the lodging of wisdom within “a good man” in terms of tranquility, but in terms of permanence and security. John Cassian (360435)328 uses the first hemistich of the Greek version (ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀγαθῇ ἀνδρὸς σοφία [in the good heart of a man is wisdom]) to support his argument that no one in whom carnal passions, especially fornication, have the upper hand, can acquire spiritual knowledge. Which does pose a lingering question – not only for the type he has in mind in this conference with Abbot Nesteros. Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109)329 uses the same hemistich together with the idea of the Kingdom of God being within humans (Luke 17:21) to show that God himself dwells in us. The typical Anselmian 324 Schultens is perhaps the most creative in translating at quod in medio elumbium, evulgatur (and that which [= quod added and italicised by Schultens] is in the innermost part of stupid speakers is made known), which is syntactically impossible (similarly Toy). 325 Some commentators accept that the negative particle should be added in the Hebrew; cf. Wildeboer, Gemser, Plöger, BHS. 326 ‫ שטיותא‬would correspond to Hebrew ‫אולת‬, which is the reading preferred by Toy, Oesterley and others (cf. BHS); cf. the notes in BHQ on the versions. 327 EE mistakenly presents erudite instead of erudiet as the Vulgate reading. 328 Conf XIV, 16 (NPNF II/9, 444). 329 Meditatio I (§3) (London ed. 1903, 62).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

579

rational argument holds that this must be so, since God is wisdom. If wisdom lives within us and a king lives in his kingdom, God lives within all who are truly righteous. He thus interprets the “good heart” as the “soul of the righteous.”

14:34 Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is the disgrace of peoples. The rhythm is given as ternary by both Toy and Gemser, which indeed seems the only possibility. In addition to the maqqeph between the second and third words, there is a retarding accent in the second syllable of ‫תרומם‬, which makes it possible to avoid two sharply emphasised syllables next to each other. The syntax of the two hemistichs is shaped chiastically. The first hemistich begins with the subject and ends with the predicate; the second begins with the predicate and ends with the subject. Since the predicate in the first half is verbal and the predicate in the second half is nominal,330 the chiastic order is not so conspicuous, but becomes clear enough when summarised schematically: verbal predicate

‫תרוצם גוי‬

subject

‫צדקה‬

‫חטאת‬

‫חסד לאמים‬

subject

nominal predicate

The use of the noun ‫ ֶח ֶסד‬in the second hemistich has caused some discussion, both in ancient and in modern interpretation. ‫ ֶח ֶסד‬as a noun with the meaning “disgrace” occurs in Lev 20:17 (cf. also Sir 41:22). Apart from its use in the present proverb, the root is found only once in the Book of Proverbs, viz. in 25:10, where the verbal form is used. The meaning “disgrace” for the noun fits the proverb better than the alternative “condemnation” as proposed by Waltke (following Van Leeuwen331), since the antithetical parallel of being exalted is being disgraced – one does not necessarily have to be condemned to experience the opposite of honourable exaltation. Where v. 28 makes the prestige of a political leader dependent on the number of people who look up to him, v. 34 declares that the stature of the nation itself332 depends on its upholding justice, not on its strength or the number 330 On the word order in the second verset, see above on v. 30 and the reference to GKC 141l given there. 331 Van Leeuwen (1988, 58). 332 Meinhold, perhaps not inappropriately, calls this the “außenpolitische Sicht” (perspective of foreign politics). Schipper uses basically the same terminology when relating vv. 28-34 to Achaemenid royal inscriptions. That there are parallels cannot be denied, but in my opinion these are so general that it would be daring to draw from them more specific consequences about literary relationship.

580

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

of its people. Where there is justice, the nation is exalted (cf. the verb in 4:8). The two outer poles of the chiasmus, ‫( צדקה‬righteousness) and ‫( חטאת‬sin), constitute the two basic antitheses of the proverb. The opposite of justice is presented as pure sin. Lack of justice equals injustice, it is ‫( חטאת‬sheer sin), which means fundamentally offending God.333 What disgraces a people, is the quintessential sin of injustice. No less than in ancient times, this may still – or especially – be a dimension to be taken seriously where the appellative “this great nation” is all too fondly bandied. Rashi understands the singular ‫( גוי‬nation) to refer to Israel and the plural ‫לאמים‬ (peoples) to be the heathen nations. He and several other rabbinic authorities interpret ‫ חסד‬as ‫ חסד‬I (kindness), which of course necessitates further explanation. Israel is exalted because of its charity (often the meaning of ‫ צדקה‬in rabbinic literature). When the heathen nations perform charity (‫ חסד‬I), it is a Robin Hood act of sorts, which derives what it gives from what has been robbed from others. Ramaq explains the ‫חסד‬-kindness of the heathens as sinful because it is performed in the service of other gods. Ginsburg334 gives a whole list of Talmudic interpretations from Baba Batra 10b to account for the difficulty that heathen nations indeed perform valid kindness. Among these are explanations as: they only do it to live longer, for own political gain, self-glorification, and the like. An interpretation of Rabbi Nechunya ben Hanakeh reported in the Talmudic tractate attaches the word ‫ חסד‬I (kindness) to the first hemistich as an expansion of the subject of the verbal clause, so that it applies to Israel. Both ‫ צדקה‬and ‫ חסד‬thus elevate Israel, while the nations simply “are” sin. John Chrysostom skips the verse in his commentary. Much later Gregory the Great (540-604) begins his letter to Brunchild, Queen of the Francs, by quoting the proverb. It serves to support his request that a papal commission be accepted to investigate claims about the wicked lives of priests in her kingdom, so that she and her offspring are not punished for tolerating it. Gregory suggests that her kingdom could avoid disgrace and obtain honour if she agrees to an investigation by the commission.

14:35 The favour of a king is for a clever servant, but his wrath is for one who acts shamefully. The proverb has a ternary rhythm (so Toy) and Gemser’s choice for 4+3 seems to rely on a word count despite the maqqeph. But, by means of the first hemistich of this proverb, Luchsinger335 illustrates that words linked by a maqqeph in poetry often have a subsidiary meteg before the maqqeph, which draws the words in question together to form a single rhythmic unit. The first hemistich consists of a nominal clause, while the verb ‫ היה‬in the second is central to the interpretation of the last half of the proverb (see below). 333 334 335

Cf. Knierim, THAT I, 545 (and 547 for God’s reaction to it). Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 265). Luchsinger (2010, 103).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

581

This issue is linked to the use of the preposition ‫ ל‬in the first hemistich, where it evidently means that the favour of a king is to the benefit of a clever servant, which would be a courtier on whose astuteness the king depends. It is thus the dativus commodi without suffix, the dative of the advantaged person, meaning that the king favours the clever servant. The second hemistich speaks of the opposite of the king’s favour, namely his wrath that must be directed against somebody. The only candidate in this context is the opposite of an astute courtier, which is expressed by the Hiphil participle of ‫בוש‬, thus one who acts in a shameful way. That suggests that the preposition ‫ ל‬is gapped in the second half of the saying, which was already noticed by Hame’iri, correctly, in my opinion.336 Delitzsch merely claims that “[t]he syntactical character of the clause does not permit the supplying of ‫ ל‬from 35a.” But he offers no substantiation. Fox mentions Hame’iri, but, also without argument, thinks that the verb ‫“ תהיה‬probably” prevents the gapping of the preposition and he therefore regards the wrath (notably of the king) to be a metonymy for its own object (notably the courtier who acts shamefully). The Hebrew accordingly would say, “the object of his wrath is one who acts shamefully,” which can then be rendered in more idiomatic English. With Tuinstra, I see no reason why the gapping is syntactically impossible so that we should need recourse to a metonymy of this kind. The verb ‫ היה‬has the same function as the missing verb in a nominal clause such as v. 35a. If ‫ל‬ is possible in a nominal clause where ‫ היה‬is present in the deep structure, it is also possible where ‫ היה‬is visibly present in the surface structure and can therefore be elided. Then the presence of ‫ היה‬can be no obstacle for the gapping of the preposition. In this case, the elided ‫ ל‬fulfils the natural function of the dativus incommodi, the dative of the disadvantaged person. The proverb functions as advice in the indicative for those who work in the presence of the king to be careful. In an absolute monarchy (and its cognates) a courtier who displeases the ruler could find himself fired or worse. The proverb is open to but does not itself consider the possibility that a courtier who shames the king may be right and ethical, while the one who is called astute may only be clever at keeping himself and his position safe and therefore nothing more or better than a sycophant.337 Given the despotic character of oriental kingship, the latter situation was the simple reality for 336 In poetic parallelism the gapping of a first hemistich preposition is not uncommon. GKC 119hh shows that “the governing power of a preposition is sometimes extended to the corresponding substantive of the second member” (which is what we have in this proverb, namely the Hiphil participle ‫[ מביש‬he who acts shamefully]). 337 This is an example of the “openness” of the proverbs, one of the “subversive elements” contained in them, as Millar (2020, 189-190) calls the phenomenon. The courtier may be a paradigm for emulation or an example of selfish cowardice worthy of disdain even if he can keep himself safe.

582

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

one who wishes to stay safe on his majesty’s service. In later political contexts it should not be the reality, but all too often is. Therefore it is hard to follow Waltke in finding the proverb a categorical admonishment for kings as well as royal servants. He states that the proverb “admonishes the king to promote competence, loyalty, and efficiency,” but that it “also admonishes officials to show themselves competent and incisive … and be marked for promotion by not exposing themselves to scandal and criticism.” The proverb describes how things actually are, and in that sense Fox is right in rejecting Ehrlich’s suggestion that the proverb states a desideratum rather than a fact (cf. the similar view of Meinhold). But a statement may indeed and often does function as advice338 for the learner to work out what would be appropriate in specific contexts.339 Several proverbs picture the danger of being in the royal service or the presence of the king and his mood swings, e.g. 16:13-15; 19:12; 20:2; 21:1.340 Schipper illustrates from the 26th Dynasty (7th-6th centuries BCE) what the special favour of the king could look like, such as gifts of food and staff to work for the courtier.341 From the Sayings of Achiqar he quotes a warning about the danger of evoking the king’s anger, which is “swifter than bolts of lightning.”342 Herodotus is quite colourful in describing the anger of the Persian king Xerxes.343 Neither the rabbinic nor the early Christian reception of the proverb seems to have been extensive. Yonah Gerondi sees the proverb as a reference to God as king. The first half shows God’s preference for being served in sincerity, while the second half is critical of service to God for ulterior motives or because of mechanical habit. Nahmias reads it as an injunction that the king should favour a wise servant/courtier, but should deal wrathfully with those whose behaviour is shameful (cf. above on Ehrlich). PseudoIbn Ezra is interesting in that he explicitly opts for an elided preposition ‫ ל‬in the second hemistich. However, in his paraphrase he lets one ‫ ל‬pertain to the servant (‫)לעבד‬ because of his cleverness (‫ )בעבור שכלו‬and another to the king (‫ )למלך‬because the king becomes angry on account of the shameful acts by which the servant has done harm to the king. The Vilna Gaon interprets the proverb as a saying on God’s wrath that can be conciliated by a righteous (= wise) servant, while the wicked (= inept) servant retains God’s wrath. See above on Hame’iri and the gapping of the preposition ‫ל‬. 338 As Fox himself states a few sentences further, when he speaks of the proverb’s “advice” and paraphrases it with an imperative: “Don’t irritate the king!” 339 See Essay 2 on “Learning in the Indicative” in the Introduction above. 340 While anger is usually criticised in the Book of Proverbs (cf. 14:29; 15:18; 22:24 etc.), this does not apply to the king’s anger, so Millar (2020, 175; cf. 175-189 for her thorough treatment of the king’s favour and wrath). Examples also in other biblical books: Qoh 8:3f. and 10:20; 1 Sam 18:6-13; Est 2:21; 3:5; 5:9. 341 Brooklyn Papyrus, 47.218.135. 342 Achiqar vii, 101. One could add the whole passage vii, 100-104, which embroiders on the necessity of taking the king’s words seriously and being swift in acting on his command. 343 For instance, the famous passage about venting his anger on the Hellespont and the head of the bridge builders whose work was destroyed by a storm (The Persian Wars 7,34f.), another tantrum at sea in 8,118), or his outburst at a benefactor who asked for his son to be excused (7,39).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 14

583

John Chrysostom has a down-to-earth interpretation. He finds the proverb an exhortation on the basis of purely human affairs. It discourages idleness in people, so much so that even the king wants people to be well-disposed (a rather banal thought, perhaps born of being at a loss of what to make of the verse). Other Church Fathers do not seem to have been interested in using the proverb. It is also left uncommented upon in Melanchthon’s commentary.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 15

Bibl. Boström 1928, 150-157; Dahood 1960, 176-181; Hausmann 1995, 178-185; Heim 2001, 147-159; Heim 2013, 208-213; 267-273; 320-328, 373-383; 387-391; 392-398; Hermisson 1968, 178-179, 180-181; Hildebrandt 1992, 433-444; Krispenz 1989, 71-79; Millar 2020, 47-49, 59-60, 97-99, 136-139, 206-208; Pilch 2016, 55-63; Sandoval 2006 (passim), Scherer 1999, 165-188; Scoralick 1995, 226-237; Whybray 1994, 103-106.

Themes and motifs As far as the collections of short sayings are concerned, the chances are that a commentator would not be far off the mark when calling the thematic content of a chapter “varied.” That is what Sæbø says of Chap. 15, adding that this is especially so because certain themes partly overlap or are intertwined. That may be the case, but by the same token such themes are associated with one another. For instance, the theme of human speech makes up between a third and half of the chapter (according to Sæbø present in vv. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22-23, 26, 28, 31-32), which shows a certain centripetal tendency, without however constituting evidence for closely-knit clusters (see below).1 Further, when a wise son listens to the reprimand of his father (v. 5), speech and education are inextricably intertwined, which is a natural association rather than a manifestation of a complicated diversity. The same goes for the presence of the themes of parental education and education by a teacher (e.g. vv. 2, 7, 12, 31), the classic opposition of the wise man and the fool (vv. 2, 5, 7, 12, 14, 20, 21) or the righteous and the wicked (vv. 6, 8-9, 28-29). Several interpreters comment on the theological bent of the chapter. Almost a third of the chapter is made up of “Yahweh verses.”2 Not only is prayer mentioned more than once (so Perdue; cf. vv. 8, 29), but there is an emphasis on God himself as the final authority for all sapiential themes. It is the credit of Schipper to have emphasised this trait as a characteristic of the chapter. That everything related to ethical acts is related to God is common in the ancient Near East. However, the noteworthy observation by Schipper is that God is not only conceived of as associated with such behaviour. He is also and (it seems to me) primarily involved in the essence of human wisdom as manifestation of the fear of the Lord right through to its practical consequences. 1 Perdue points out that the theme of language/speaking is also an overarching theme in all of Prov 10:1–22:16, which means that it should not be overemphasised as a feature of specifically this chapter. 2 These are: vv. 3, 8, 9, 11, 16, 25, 26, 29, 33.

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 15

585

Therefore the final verse (v. 33) can be called a “final thematic verse” with Schipper, expressing as it does both the tendency in the chapter to associate discipline with the concept of wisdom itself (for instance v. 5, also vv. 31, 32), and simultaneously with the fear of the Lord.3 Therefore sapiential deeds do not only have to do with inter-human dealings, but also with the dealings of human beings with God. Chapter organisation Antithetical proverbs become less than hitherto, a trend that will be continued from Chap. 16 onwards. For Chap. 15, Murphy comes to basically the same conclusion with much the same argument as in the previous chapter. I again agree with his main point, and will only give a summary in which the discrepancies between differing views about the way the chapter has been organised can be seen. Hermisson

Meinhold

Heim

Whybray

Schipper

1-5 (7)

1-4

1-4

?

1-4

8-11 (6)

5-12

5-12

8-11

5-12

12-15, 16-18

13-19

13-18

12-14

13-18

20-23 (19)

20-24

19-23

15-17

19-24

18-19? 25-29 29-33

25-33

24-27

20-23 (24)

28-33

25-33

25-33

The criteria for these demarcations are sometimes thematic or supposedly thematic similarities, sometimes catchwords, occasionally at a distance with no clear consequences for the coherence of alleged clusters. Sæbø illustrates this when he says that there are “free standing” single proverbs in the chapter that are not quite “without relationship” to “the rest of the proverbs in the chapter” (e.g. v. 6 has some connection with the opposition righteous/wicked, and v. 7 with the theme of speech as well as the opposition wise/foolish). Hermisson repeatedly points out that the status of some of the proverbs within or between groups is unclear (e.g. vv. 5, 6, 7), that catchword contacts are tenuous, that v. 29 can link backwards and forwards without having the compositional function of a Janus verse, and that v. 30 has nothing to do with its surroundings. Whybray seems to use the terms “formal” and “thematic” 3 Similarly Whybray, who judges that the Yahweh-proverbs (which he seems to regard as a theme, at least for this purpose) and those teaching wisdom for daily living (a second theme) converge in v. 33.

586

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 15

as the same thing (cf. especially vv. 8-11). For him, vv. 25-33 make up a group on the grounds of catchword-like terminology, while it is impossible to identify a “thematic thread.” Boström4 even thinks that a number of similar sounds in vv. 23-28 is a sufficient criterion to take these verses together as a group. Other commentators find paronomasia present as well, but these and their effects are only presented vaguely.5 We could continue in this vein,6 but the above should suffice to demonstrate that the issue of the chapter’s organisation is a rather mixed box. I have given only representative examples to illustrate the difficulties involved. Of course, neither lack of consensus nor being outside the box as a minority of one proves that any opinion is wrong, but the summary suggests that this box is so mixed that it is better to consider the proverbs in their own right. That said, the uncertainties about such proverb groups do not invalidate the readers’ possibilities to see neat little piles of proverb jewels (to borrow Fox’s rather sharp image).7 Readers can recognise potential in the text that could lead to interesting and valuable contributions. For example, the fundamental motif of the fear of the Lord in parallel with the humility spoken of in the last verse can be related to several of the verses in the rest of the chapter, not least the beginning about soft-spoken mildness of speech (so Meinhold). But that is not evidence for a poetic composition or its “real meaning.” Moreover, even if we do not work with longer clusters in the chapter, that does not preclude our recognising certain pairs of proverbs in it. The above arguments notwithstanding, there are several pairs of proverbs (Sæbø says 10). These do not constitute original couplets, i.e. short poems consisting of two lines, but are editorial placements of the redactor. This insight allows us to discuss a pair together without violating the independence of the stichs in every couplet. Social background Under this heading Schipper lists the “twice told proverbs” (or parts of proverbs),8 with which he associates a high degree of reflection. One neither has to share nor to doubt his suspicion that the chapter was written for its 4

Boström (1928, 153). Krispenz (1989, 171); Scoralick (1995, 128-129; 221-237). 6 Cf. both differences and overlapping in the groupings of Scherer (1999, 168-183) with those of Meinhold, Heim with Scherer, and Lucas with Schipper, all of which fit in the pattern just sketched. 7 Fox (2009, 481); cf. the Introduction above, 2.2.2, on Fox’s reaction to the work of Heim. 8 At the end of his introduction to the chapter he provides a helpful list of those that occur in this chapter and elsewhere in the book, with equally convenient references to the works of Snell (1993) and Heim (2013) where such (partial) doublets are treated. 5

Introduction to the Exegesis of Chapter 15

587

present literary context to realise that, apart from 22:17–24:22, the influence of the Teaching of Amenemope can also be observed in this chapter (cf. especially vv. 16-17) and in other parts of the book. That, in turn, invites the suggestion of the chapter’s origin in learned circles, which would be prosperous communities. Schipper finds ideas about such things as bribes and unfair profit (v. 27) as well as contentedness with what one has as opposed to desiring great wealth (v. 16) to be topical for socially affluent circles. Perhaps one could even think in terms of an institution of learning (“Lehrhaus”), particularly if the plural ‫( חכמים‬vv. 12, 31) is seen as the teaching staff (cf. Sir 53:21). These thoughts would probably have been welcomed by Heaton in his book on the Israelite “school tradition.”9

9 Cf. Heaton (1994, 68, 83), where he rather summarily uses this proverb in support of his argument.

TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF CHAPTER 15

The first two proverbs in the chapter constitute a pair (so Meinhold, Van Leeuwen, Murphy, Fox, Sæbø and others, while Plöger has a nuanced view, viz. that v. 2 “primarily” makes its own statement even while interacting with v. 1). The Septuagint suggests a connection of the opening proverb in Chap. 15 with 14:35 by prefixing an extra hemistich to the verse: ὀργὴ ἀπόλλυσιν καὶ φρονίμους. (Anger destroys also the intelligent)

This lends support to those who see a link between the beginning of Chap. 15 and the ending of Chap. 14.10 Since the two verses stand immediately alongside each other, they do interact. Whereas 14:35 focuses on what provokes the king’s anger, 15:1 expands the principle to be generally valid and not only for a dangerous situation in the royal court. 15:1 does not mention the king, but, standing as it does immediately after 14:35, the interaction of the two verses allows v. 1 to be understood as relevant both generally and specifically in a royal court situation. In any event, it would not address diplomatic style in court only.11 15:1-2 1 2

A gentle answer turns back wrath, but a hurtful word stirs up anger. The tongue of the wise enhances knowledge, but the mouth of fools bubbles up folly.

The rhythm of v. 1 is 3+2. Gemser seems to depend on a word count (as he did with 14:35) and scans 4+4, but this time there is both the maqqeph and the unusual dagesh forte in the ‫ ר‬to account for. It is the dagesh forte conjunctivum, occurring as it does after a tone-bearing ‫ ˗ֶה‬and maqqeph.12 Toy scans 3+3, but has to maintain the first maqqeph in v. 1b while ignoring the second. 10 For instance, Scherer (1999, 156) Waltke, Fox, Sæbø and others; Scherer even recommends urgently (“dringend”) that 15:1 together with 14:35 be incorporated with the preceding verses in Chap. 14 rather than with the rest of Chap. 15. 11 Cf. Scoralick (1995, 97). 12 GKC 20c, where this verse with the unusual doubling of the ‫ ר‬is used as one of the illustrations of the rule; when there is no maqqeph, it is sometimes called the dagesh forte firmativum or dagesh euphonicum. Cf. above on 11:21 and the discussion of the phenomenon given there.

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V. 2 is quaternary, which both Toy and Gemser accept, if with some hesitation. Both proverbs are antithetical, a form of parallelism that gradually becomes less often employed from this point in the book onwards. A soft, gentle answer that turns back anger means that at least it makes the anger subside and at best even reverses it13 (‫ שוב‬Hiphil: cause to turn around and go back). The noun ‫ ַמ ֲענֶ ה‬does not simply mean any reply, but a thoughtful reaction to a serious issue. Tuinstra, who devotes a whole excursus to this noun, points out that the noun only occurs 6 times in the Old Testament, as opposed to the 316 times that the cognate verb occurs. Of these 6 cases, 3 are in the Book of Proverbs, counting this verse and 16:1, while the third case is 16:4 (where it however means “purpose”). Especially 16:1, which is about the divine gift of an appropriate answer after careful human thinking, shows that v. 1a refers to the cautiously considered verbalisation of a proper reaction to a serious matter. The antithesis follows in the second hemistich. The opposite of a well thought-through reaction is a hurtful word, which, by virtue of the parallelism should be understood as an ill-considered utterance that causes damage and distress (‫עצב‬, which indicates pain or hurt of several kinds). As could be expected, its consequence is the opposite of the soothing effect of mild language: it causes anger to flare up (‫)עלה‬. V. 2 draws the speakers themselves into the equation. As a proverb, it can be understood quite adequately without v. 1. The tongue (as a synecdoche for human speaking) makes knowledge good (‫ יטב‬Hiphil).14 But, since knowledge as the central sapiential category is already good, the proverb says that knowledge becomes even better when spoken by a wise man. Ehrlich, following Riyqam, explains the enhancement in aesthetic terms, that is, the tongue of the wise makes the knowledge stylistically pleasing (so also Meinhold, Plöger, Clifford, Waltke, Fox and others). That would mean that teachers with the ability to couch their teaching in attractive stylistic forms also improve the contents by making it even more memorable. The sages thought about this and affirmed it (cf. 2:10; 15:23, 26; 16:24; 23:8; 25:11f.; Qoh 12:10; also Ps 45:2).15 At least some lecturers on the Book of Proverbs would perhaps subscribe to the idea. The independent contribution that Plöger ascribes to v. 2, is therefore its affirmation of the enhanced value of well formulated wisdom. But in its edited position the verse also works in tandem with v. 1. The calm words 13 Cf. the same logic in 25:15, where the power of gentle speech is described with a strong metaphor. 14 Since this makes excellent sense, there is no reason to follow BHS by reading ‫( תטיף‬third person feminine singular Hiphil of ‫( נטף‬drip); so Bühlmann, Clifford, Fox, and others. As Clifford points out, in Hebrew the mouth can be said to drip honey, but not the tongue. 15 This fact makes the rejection of Meinhold’s aesthetic explanation by Fuhs questionable. For the purpose, Fuhs appeals to “the right word at the right time,” but in 15:23; 25:11 etc. that is an aesthetic criterion; see Loader (2011, 2.2.3, 2.2.4). Cf. also on Melanchthon below.

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spoken of in the first verse not only have a soothing effect, but they are spoken by wise people (‫)חכמים‬, and the hurtful words that cause anger are the blabbering of stupidity by fools (‫)כסילים‬. The second proverb of the pair thus additionally ensures that the sapiential nature of calm thoughtfulness and the folly of malice are made explicit. Although there is no parallelism proper between the two proverbs, their editorial connection associates thoughtful kindness with wisdom and beauty, while the aggression of hurtful language is associated with foolishness and blabbering. Moreover, the fact that this proverb pair follows directly on 14:35 would additionally suggest that its general impact is wide-ranging, but also has a specific political dimension. Of which large swaths of the present-day world claiming to be “democratic” certainly cannot be reminded enough. Several commentators remark on the parallels between these proverbs and sapiential texts from Egypt, e.g. McKane, Fox, Schipper and others, even as early as Oesterley. Ptahhotep (Old Kingdom, 6th dynasty)16 advises silence, and Anii (Middle Kingdom, 18th dynasty)17 advises an ordinary man to keep silence and occasionally offer a “sweet” word to calm a superior’s heart when the latter speaks “sourly.” Amenemope (New Kingdom) teaches the same concepts.18 Some rabbinic comments on v. 1 boil down to paraphrases, e.g. Bahya (13th century) and the roughly contemporary Gerondi. However, the latter adds an important hermeneutical point, notably that the proverb states an objective fact on one level, but on another level also gives advice for the correct conduct.19 Also 18th century commentaries, such as the Mezudat David and the Vilna Gaon, paraphrase. Here, again, the latter adds an interesting dimension. He interprets ‫ חמה‬as the culminating manifestation of anger in deeds, whereas ‫ אף‬is the initial phase of anger. Accordingly, a gentle reaction can roll back wrath that has already advanced to the level of practical retaliation, while offensive speech can cause wrath to spring up even where it had not even existed before. Another original exposition is given by Moshe Alshich of Safed (16th century).20 According to him, there is no contrasting parallelism in v. 1. The ‫ דבר עצב‬spoken of in the second half is to be interpreted as an act of affliction for a sin, by which the speaker appeases God’s anger. Gerondi, like Riyqam (see above), explains the “making good” of knowledge in aesthetic terms, that is, arranging sapiential teaching in beautiful words. The Mezudat David explains it similarly, though not as teaching knowledge “beautifully,” but “clearly.” As for v. 2, the Mezudat likens the babbling of the fools to a spring and its stream that never stops flowing, which may be dependent on the interpretations of Ramaq and Hame’iri some centuries earlier. For Ralbag, the stream flows from the hearts of the fools’ audience, 16 Ptahhotep, Maxim 3, l. 70: “You will make your value exceed his [the opponent’s] by silence;” Maxim 4, l. 80: “Do not vent your heart against your opponent.” AEL I, 64. 17 Anii 9, ll. 7f. AEL II, 143; COS I, 114. 18 Amenemope V, 10-11: “Do not begin a quarrel with a hot-mouthed man or provoke him with words.” AEL II, 150: COS I, 117. 19 This is often found not only in rabbinic works, but also in the Book of Proverbs itself. The phenomenon is discussed in the Introduction, Essay 2 under the title “Learning in the Indicative.” 20 See Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 267).

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suggesting that foolish talk has an even more destructive effect on a greater circle than the original audience. The additional hemistich in the Septuagint quoted above has had some attention in Christian reception. The Constitutions of the Apostles21 uses v. 1 simply to say that a bishop should not succumb to anger. In his commentary, Chrysostom remarks that even pagans know that anger can make the prudent become undone. The rest of the verse to him is proof that stirring up or calming anger is a matter of those humans who cause it, not those who undergo it. In his Treatise on the Priesthood,22 Chrysostom uses v. 1 in support of his idea that anger management is even more difficult than ascetic hardships required of those who want to be priests (he uses v. 2 as a kind of comment on v. 4, see below on that verse). Athanasius23 asks the Emperor to reinstate ousted bishops and subtly presents himself as a speaker of a “soft word,” so that the Emperor should listen to him. Jerome24 quotes the added hemistich of the Septuagint in his transmission of a list of texts (apparently by a little-known African bishop) to argue against Pelagians by showing that all humans are sinners. Finally, the verse is offered by Cassian25 as proof that anger is a sin. Melanchthon’s commentary on Prov 15 ranges wide and includes references to the New Testament and classical authors that would not readily occur to modern exegetes. Nevertheless, there are recognisable points of contact. The mildness mentioned in v. 1 notably relates to Jesus’ beatitude, “Blessed are those who make peace” (Matt 5:9). Melanchthon tends to the interpretation of v. 2a that finds gracefully formulated knowledge to become more pleasing and thus more commendable (fit gratior & commendatior). He thus associates vv. 1 and 2 closely. As can be expected of a church reformer, he provides a boundary for the mildness by paraphrasing 1 Pet 3:15 (surprisingly, without the rider of modesty at the end of the verse) to argue that we should always be prepared to account verbally for our faith, but that we should also know that not everything calls for a fight (non omnibus causis pugnandum esse). Thus, theological debate in the spirit of a mild communication, which is more in the spirit of Melanchthon than of Luther.

15:3 The eyes of Yahweh are everywhere watching the evil and the good. The rhythmic pattern can be read with Gemser as four beats in the first half plus three in the second, or with Toy as three beats in each. The former would necessitate the maqqeph to be ignored and the o-vowel in the first word to be lengthened. I see no objection to Gemser’s choice for a Siebener, but the Masoretes opted for the latter. Toy calls the parallelism “continuous,” which in fact describes what the second hemistich does. It can also be called “progressive,” since the continuation develops the content of the first hemistich further (cf. 11:30). The whole proverb consists of one nominal 21 22 23 24 25

ANF VII, 397. NPNF I,9, 59. Apol ad Const (NPNF II,4, 253). Contr Pelag II (NPNF II,6, 467). Inst Coen (NPNF II,11, 257).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

sentence, since the feminine plural participle ‫ צפות‬qualifies the dual feminine construct ‫עיני‬. Whereas the previous pair and the following proverb are about speech, this one is about seeing, God’s observing with his eyes. It is difficult to accept Meinhold’s effort to overcome this. According to him, the “root group for “ ‘good’ ” integrates the verses. He does not mention the Hebrew adjective ‫( טוב‬used nominally) in v. 3 and the Hiphil imperfect of the cognate but distinct root ‫ יטב‬in v. 2. The referential meanings of their connection are also tenuous, since making something aesthetically pleasing (v. 2) and being good in terms of a moral judgement (v. 3) are quite distinct, apart from the fact that the one concerns knowledge and the other human beings. Waltke and Fuhs take v. 3 between vv. 2 and 4 as a theological (Waltke) basis for the surrounding verses. For the edited text as it stands, such a relation could be argued, but the theological force of v. 3 can also be quite strong and meaningful without the interaction between the proverbs on human speaking and divine observing. God’s eyes are “in every place,” and he watches closely26 evil things/ people and good things/people. The two plurals may mean, “what bad people do and what good people do,” but also “which bad things (people do)” and “which good things (people do)”. Even with a minor modification in focus, the sense remains the same. God observes bad and good people, which implies that he holds them to account for what they do, or the contrasting of the bad and the good would not make sense. This is so “in every place,” that is, everywhere.27 If the indicative can be used to teach pupils how to act, which it can and often does,28 this is a very impressive warning. Delitzsch makes a sensitive observation about the order of the references to ‫ רעים‬and ‫טובים‬. According to him, the proverb has an alarming as well as a comforting side and therefore first speaks of the alarming idea that God sees every evil thing that people do anywhere, in order to end with the comforting thought that he also observes every good thing done by them.29 Cf. the feminine participle in 31:27, used with ‫הליכות‬, i.e. the ways or actions of others. 27 For a reason I cannot fathom, Clifford finds it necessary to deny that the proverb affirms God is all-seeing. If I understand him correctly, his claim that “every place” means both frequented and inaccessible, holy and profane places (cf. Ehrlich, to whom Clifford refers), contributes nothing to this purpose. See below on v. 11 for an explicit elaboration of God’s omnivision and therefore omniscience. McKane takes the two proverbs in vv. 3 and 11 closely together in his “Class C” and similarly links God’s omniscience with his unfailing reward and punishment. 28 See the Introduction, Essay 2, where this issue is dealt with. 29 Fuhs has a similar take, though not with the exact pastoral impact of Delitzsch: for evil people the all-seeing, omniscient presence of Yahweh must be disturbing, for good people however it is comforting. 26

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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As he often does, Schipper cites Egyptian parallels relevant to the present proverb. Tomb texts from the early Ptolemaic period and from the 26th dynasty refer to the deity’s categorising of human deeds in “good” and “evil,” which amounts to a judgement.30 Even if somewhat distant, the correspondence with the clear opposition of good and evil people/deeds in v. 3 is present and readily visible. For Ramaq, the anthropomorphic mention of God’s eyes means the divine knowledge (i.e. about everything). Two 14th century rabbis, Ralbag and Nahmias, are of basically the same opinion, emphasising as they do the suitable divine retribution that can be expected to follow. Later, in the Mezudat David, this view is developed by means of the idea that it is futile to try hiding from God. This nuance suggests that the focus is on the evil people with their characteristic deeds, since the good do not need to obscure from God what they have done. The Vilna Gaon’s interpretation of the verb ‫ צפה‬comes up with an ingenious kind of theodicy: According to him, the verb implies a long-range observation by God. Since this observation can stretch far into the future, God may see that a wicked person could yet have good offspring, for which reason God allows the wicked person to prosper in the present. Or, if the wicked does have a couple of good deeds to his credit, God may indulge him in this life in order to use up his credit until nothing is left for the World to Come. In his treatise on the Lord’s Prayer,31 Cyprian of Carthage (3rd century) advocates a quiet and modest way to pray, in unobtrusive places such as the bedroom. He seems to suggest the idea of soft-spokenness and humility found in v. 1 as well as “every place” mentioned in v. 3. Without directly referring to these verses, he then quotes v. 3 together with Jer 23:23f., which suggests that God also takes note of what happens in secluded places. Cyprian thus took the three verses together in the service of his view of prayer. He repeats the idea in his Testimonia,32 again quoting both the proverb and the two Jeremiah verses. Basil (330-379) uses the verse for quite another purpose. In a homily on the creation of living things,33 he comments on the little sea urchin that seems to sense the threat of advancing tempests before humans can. This knowledge can only have been imparted to it as an aspect of divine wisdom by God, who is everywhere and sees every conceivable little thing, even a sea urchin.

15:4 The balm of the tongue is a tree of life, but crookedness in it is a shattering of the spirit. The rhythmic pattern is, like the previous and the following two proverbs, a Siebener of 4+3 (Gemser), rather than 3+3 (Toy), because the dehi at ‫לשון‬ is a dominant accent. Each half has one nominal clause, standing in antithetical parallelism. The motif of the tongue obviously reintroduces the theme of speech, and does so by first remarking on the constructive function the tongue can have. 30 31 32 33

The Petostris tomb text (Text 55, ll. 2-3); Tomb Inscription (London BM 83). Treatise IV, 4 (ANF V, 448). Test III, 56 (ANF V, 547). Hexaemeron, Hom VII, 5 (NPNF II,8, 93).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

Whereas v. 1 sees the possibility of mild speech to roll back (‫ )ישיב‬already existing damage, v. 4 introduces the concept of healing for the same purpose. That implies an existing illness, which can be healed by the tree of life. In this proverb the tongue is said to be a balm or medicinal remedy with the effect of the tree of life (cf. 16:24 for the healing effect of speech, both for the spirit and the body). Several such trees were known for their healing effects, such as Balanites aegyptiaca in Transjordan, the Arabian desert, and Africa, of which the leaves and fruit were used to prepare a balm for the healing of wounds (cf. the “Balm of Gilead”, Jer 8:22; 46:11).34 Whereas in 3:18 wisdom itself is the life-sustaining tree, in this proverb it is the tongue, in other words, one of the practical manifestations of wisdom is the tree that produces balm with healing properties (cf. above on v. 1). The expression ‫( עץ־החיים‬the tree of life) occurs only in the Book of Genesis (Gen 2:9; 3:22, 24) and in Proverbs (3:18; 11:30; 13:12; 15:4). ‫עץ־חיים‬ has generated some controversy over its relationship with ancient Near Eastern mythology and Proverbs.35 The antitheses found in the relevant sapiential texts show that the tree is associated with healing effects, that is, with sustaining life. Similarly, the life-giving tree of the Paradise Narrative keeps life going by sustaining the integrity of life. Sustenance for and healing of life are closely related, since both bring about the integrity of life (which is what wisdom is said in 3:16 to have available). ‫ עץ‬in the construct state suggests that “the” tree of life does refer to the tree said in the Paradise Narrative to give life. An inexact parallel is that Prov 3:18 emphatically mentions taking hold of her (‫ חזק‬and ‫)תמך‬, which is also the case in Gen 3:22, although the verbs differ (‫[ שלח יד ולקח מן‬reach and take from]).36 E.g., in Gen 3:24 reaching for the tree ends in taking from its fruit while in Prov 3:18 it refers to laying hold of wisdom itself (and not of its fruit). Nevertheless, it is clear that wisdom is the tree in the metaphor. Marcus’s argument that the tree is a medicinal or healing agent, cannot be rejected simply because Prov 3:16 speaks of “grasping” rather than “eating.”37 Eating from a tree cannot be done without taking hold of it, and many uses of trees and other plants are known where the remedy is not eaten but applied. The opposite is, accordingly, harshness of tongue. The noun ‫( סלף‬crookedness) is used in 11:3 as a characteristic of treacherous people and has destructive effects. That is consistent with its use in 15:4. As opposed to the gentle 34

See NIDB I, 386. See Vol. I, 173-174 on Prov 3:18, where the controversy since Marcus (1943, 117) is summed up. 36 Cf. also Gen 3:3, where the fence around the torah not to eat from this tree explicitly forbids to even reach for it or touch it (‫)נגע‬. 37 Cf. the discussion and references in Vol. I of the commentary on 3:18. 35

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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tongue that heals, any crookedness “in it” breaks the spirit of the one on the receiving end. The feminine singular suffix with the preposition ‫ ב‬refers to the tongue (‫ לשון‬can be feminine as well as masculine). If the tongue is a tree that can help to sustain life, it can also maim life by shattering the spirit, causing emotional pain (cf. Isa 65:14). The image may also suggest Balanites aegyptiaca, since the branches are recurved (‫ )?סלף‬and spiny. Thrashing somebody with such a stick would inflict a flagellation, which conjures up a vivid depiction of the intensity of mental hurt meted out to fellow humans. The crookedness may be deceit or treachery, but the antithesis of gentle words rather is harsh or unkind words (deceit often has the appearance of kindness). Two stylistic features are worth noting. For one, in v. 4b there is assonance of vowels, particularly the segol, as well as alliteration of the bilabial bet, and perhaps (if read with spirantisation) of the labio-dentals pe (f) and bet (v). Second, v. 4a contains a rich example of metaphtonemy, that is, of the combination of metonymy and metaphor.38 This time two metonymies are intertwined with a metaphor. The tongue stands for speaking (metonymy), but simultaneously it is a tree (metaphor); over and above that, the metaphorical tree in turn stands for the healing balm it produces (another metonymy). The Septuagint creates a progressive parallelism by adapting the second hemistich: ἴασις γλώσσης δένδρον ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ συντηρῶν αὐτὴν πλησθήσεται πνεύματος. (The healing of the tongue is a tree of life, he who guards it will be filled with spirit)

V. 4a stays close to the Hebrew (ἴασις, like ‫מרפא‬, can mean the remedy used to heal as well as the healing process). But the second hemistich deviates. The participle συντηρῶν (he who watches over) is used to translate the noun ‫סלף‬, which is taken as the verb ‫( פלס‬cf. 5:21). The Hebrew ‫( שבר‬shattering) is read as ‫( שבע‬be full, sated). This is confirmed by the independent rendering of the Peshitta, which, while deviating yet again, also contains the Syriac verb ñÃé (= Hebrew ‫שבע‬, satisfy):39 ? €z ¿çáÙs ¿çþàx ÀÎÚés f¿ÚÐx fÍçã ñÃêæ €z{ă¾ò èã âÝsx{ (The healing of the tongue is a tree of life, and who eats of its fruits will be satisfied from it) 38 Cf. the commentary on 10:11 above; for the terminology (also in connection with speaking actions), see Goossens (1995, 159 [originally 1990, 323]). 39 For a detailed text-critical account of the second hemistich, see EE, to which I am indebted.

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Oesterley compares the whole of Sir 28:13-18 on the destructive power of the tongue. While the general analogy is clear, v. 17 in the Ben Sira passage is especially notable: πληγὴ μάστιγος ποιεῖ μώλωπα, πληγὴ δὲ γλώσσης συγκλάσει ὀστᾶ. (The stroke of a whip makes a mark, but the stroke of a tongue breaks bones)

Only the negative side of the tongue’s power is considered (cf. Jas 3:1-12, where its destructive power is also predominant), but the interesting aspect is that the tongue is seen as something with which people can “strike” others and break their bones or spirit. The Peshitta thus has the same two-sided warning as the Hebrew text. First an injunction to contribute to the healing of people who have already been hurt by speaking mildly, and then a warning not to use harsh or crooked language that would hurt others. The proverb is antithetical in its indicative style, but in both hemistichs it gives the same injunction in substance. This is another case of a pedagogy that “includes both a carrot and a stick”40 (no pun intended, but nice anyway). Compared with v. 1, we could speak of a “twice-told proverb” as far as the conceptual or thematic make-up is concerned, but not the words used to express them.41 Both Ramaq (12th century) and Gerondi (13th century) interpret the healing tongue as words of ‫ מוסר‬that heal people of folly. That leads to a long life in the same way that eating fruit from a life-giving tree has that result. Gerondi finds it important that the receiver of the disciplinary instruction should have a positive attitude towards it, just as the fruit of any tree can only be of benefit if one actually plucks it to be able to eat it. The medicinal suggestion is there, but the words of discipline are even better than medicine, since medicine can cure a disease, but it cannot lengthen a life, whereas sapiential ‫ מוסר‬can do that. Bahya ben Asher ben Halawa (1255-1340) sees the tongue as a remedy for spiritual maladies, which is proven by the way Moses converted Jethro by telling him about God (Ex 18:5-12). Ralbag (14th century) and the Mezudat David some four centuries later interpret the ‫ מרפא לשון‬in the same way as the mild tongue of v. 1. The detrimental aspect of speech can cause irreparable damage to the spirit (Gerondi) and is severely censured in the Talmud (Baba Metzia 59a). Rashi understands the ‫ רוח‬of the second hemistich as wind, not spirit, since the east wind is used to punish the wicked (cf. Ex 14:21). So, the one with a crooked tongue will himself be broken through the wind of punishment. The Mezudat David interprets the same word (‫ )רוח‬as desire, claiming that a harsh speaker will have his desire broken, that is, his wishes unfulfilled. In the Talmud (Arachin 15b) the proverb is used to argue that there are two remedies for slander: study of the Torah, which is the tree of life, and second, breaking the spirit in the sense of humbling oneself. Malbim (1809-1879) integrates both motifs to arrive at a different interpretation. A slanderous tongue is the 40 So Stewart (2016, 104), who quotes this proverb as an example of a variety of negative and positive stimuli for the motivation of pupils. 41 Which is why they are not listed as such be either Snell (1993) or Heim (2013).

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symptom of a broken spirit in the sense of a troubled mind, for which the only treatment is the study of the Torah. As opposed to the rabbinic reception of the proverb, it does not seem to have had much impact in patristic literature. Chrysostom interprets the Septuagint to mean that who watches his speech will find that attitude to be a wellspring of spirit, which in this verse to him seems to mean power. The abusive speaker, on the other hand, only provokes others. He ends his comment on v. 4 by quoting the Greek v. 2: “The tongue of the wise knows good things, but the mouth of the fools will swallow bad things”,42 however, without further comment.

15:5 A fool despises the discipline of his father, but who heeds correction is clever. The rhythm is 4+3 at one beat per word. Waltke sees a chiasmus in the “antithetical parallels” of the two hemistichs. That is indeed the case, since the contrasting concepts are arranged crosswise, but this does not mirror the syntactical units, which are in straight parallelism: A

B

fool subject

B despises fatherly discipline predicate

subject heeder of correction

predicate A he is clever

The second hemistich is important for interpreting the first. However, there are two possibilities for parsing the last verb in the verse. ‫ ירעם‬as vocalised in the Masoretic Text is either the third person masculine singular imperfect Hiphil of the verb ‫ ערם‬II (be clever, shrewd),43 or the imperfect Qal. In the former case it would be an internal Hiphil.44 In the latter it can be ingressive, which would indicate a transition from one state into another (as in 19:25) and would then be translated by “become clever.” But it can also be a stative imperfective (so Waltke45), which indicates a continuing occurrence or situation (as in this proverb) and is translated by “is clever.” Since the prefix conjugation in Proverbs normally (though not always, cf. 19:25) denotes a habitual present (Waltke), this option is the most likely here.46 The Septuagint has ἀναγγελεῖ κακά (proclaims bad things). Cf. 4:1 ‫( ערמה‬cleverness, shrewdness) and ‫ערוּם‬, Gen 3:1 (clever, shrewd). The form also occurs in 19:25 and 1 Sam 23:22; cf. GKC 63n. 44 So Waltke; there are a few instances of i-imperfects in biblical Hebrew, e.g. 2 Kgs 7:6 (‫ )טמן‬in addition to the forms just cited. According to GKC 47i the i-sound mostly occurs as e (the “movable” ṣere). 45 Waltke appeals to GKC 47i, where it is implied, but not expressly said of this verse. 46 So also Delitzsch, with reference to Jerome and Luther. 42 43

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

The first hemistich does not say what a fool will become, but what he is. He is a person who despises the constructive educational discipline of the father – that is in essence what defines a fool, in this clause shown by ‫אויל‬ as the subject.47 When we read the second hemistich in the light of the first, the parallelism thus indicates that the counterpart of the fool typically does the opposite of what a fool himself does – he accepts correction and shows his character to be the opposite of the fool’s. He therefore is clever. Accepting correction can of course lead to growth and improvement, but that does not mean that doing a clever thing leads to becoming clever for the first time. That is how Fox’s formulation (and translation) can be understood (first be wise, then become clever), but it contains an inner contradiction. Heeding discipline is the clever thing to do right from the beginning. The unstated aspect of the first hemistich can indeed be supplied from the second (cf. Fox), and is, accordingly, that anyone who despises discipline is not clever and therefore justifiably called an ‫אויל‬. Fuhs points out that this description of what a fool is and what the opposite attitude entails, actually manifests a basic selfevaluation. Disdain for sapiential guidance implies imagining oneself wise and independent of teaching, which is pretentious hubris48 and even worse than folly, as the hyperbole of 26:12 puts it (cf. also 26:16). On the other hand, accepting it, even in its strictest form (e.g. 13:24; 22:15; 23:13f.; 29:17), is a way to avoid this pitfall (cf. 26:5; also 1:29-32) and to build a successful life (cf. 4:13; 15:33; 16:18;18:12; 29:15). Schipper quotes two passages from Ptahhotep (of which one is the same as that cited by Fuhs). In the second passage there are four lines of interest to us:49 If a man’s son accepts his father’s words, no plan of his will go wrong. … The fool who does not hear can do nothing at all; he sees knowledge in ignorance, and usefulness in harmfulness. Yonah Gerondi relates v. 5 to the image of a tree in v. 4. Just as one has to be willing to take the fruit from a tree in order to benefit from it, so one can only benefit from 47 Cf. v. 10, where the despiser of instructive ‫ מוסר‬receives the punishing variety of ‫מוסר‬, whatever he thinks of it. Scherer (1999, 170) is right that v. 5b extols the value of correction (he calls it “education”), and that v. 10 warns against despising it, but so does v. 5a, so that there is no reason to construe a special compositional relationship between vv. 5b and 10. 48 Fuhs does not mention the concept in his exegesis of this verse, but his argument, including his comparison with the early wisdom of Ptahhotep (l. 564f.) does point in the same direction. 49 The first passage is from Ptahhotep ll. 564-565; the second ll. 575-578; Schipper quotes them in reverse order and also compares the Demotic Ankhsheshonq 28,x+10 (AEL III,180): “Another’s instruction does not enter the heart of a fool; what is in his heart, stays in his heart.”

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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discipline if one decidedly wishes to embrace it. But, according to him, the second hemistich adds another dimension, namely that a willing reception has to be followed up by storing the discipline in one’s heart, which means not forgetting it and putting it into practice (somewhat like the New Testament injunction in Jas 1:22; cf. Rom 2:13). Hame’iri finds the scorning of discipline at worst when it concerns the correction offered from one’s own father, while Ralbag seems to take the first half as a rule of thumb for identifying a fool (cf. the exposition above). Pseudo-Ibn Ezra gives a technical description of what the verb ‫ נאץ‬entails by equating it with ‫מעס‬ and referring to 5:12, where the object of the verb ‫ נאץ‬is ‫ תוכחת‬rather than ‫מוסר‬. The Mezudat David may intend the same, but does not do more than paraphrase the Masoretic text.

15:6 In the house of the righteous there is abundant wealth, but the produce of the wicked is troubled. Gemser scans the rhythm as 4+3, but 3+3 (Toy) is probably better, because of the adjacent stressed syllables in the first two words, which is also indicated by the conjunctive munah and the disjunctive dehi accents provided by the Masoretes. With most commentators, a two text-critical issues require an emendation at ‫ בית‬and ‫ובתבואת‬.50 A bet, for the necessary preposition ‫ב‬, is to be supplied to the first word (read: ‫)בבית‬, which is attested by the Septuagint, Peshitta and Targum. Its absence in the Masoretic Text can be explained as haplography (Gemser, “haplologisch”). The opposite is to be done at the beginning of the second hemistich. This time, the preposition ‫ ב‬is to be deleted as dittography of the preceding ‫( ב‬read: ‫)ותבואת‬. Possibly the intervening waw was overshadowed by yet another ‫ ב‬following in the middle of the same word (similarly EE), which is supported by the Peshitta, Targum and some Hebrew manuscripts. Under these circumstances, it is not warranted to invoke the lectio difficilior rule with Waltke in order to maintain the Masoretic Text as it stands. The last word, ‫נֶ ְע ָ ֽכּ ֶרת‬, requires a morphological note. It is a hapax legomenon and can be parsed as the feminine singular Niphal participle of ‫עכר‬ (be disturbed, troubled) with in pausa vocalisation. Grammatically, it can be explained as “an independent relative and a gerundive”51 (that which is troubled). Since this makes sense, there is no need to follow Toy, Oesterley and others to delete the ayin so as to read ‫( נכרת‬cut off).

50 51

See BHS; cf. BHQ. See IBHS, 23.3d, 37.5.a.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

The proverb is another of the many “disjointed” ones that invite the reader’s involvement in assigning meaning. The ‫( צדיק‬righteous) and ‫( חסן‬wealth) in the first half are clearly antithetical parallels to respectively the ‫( רשע‬wicked) and the ‫( תבואה‬produce) of the second. But ‫( רב‬abundant) and ‫( נעכרת‬troubled) are not clear opposites. “Troubled produce” calls for further reflection. It is not surprising that the proverb is one of Millar’s examples quoted in full and discussed for its “literary openness” in her book on the phenomenon of openness in Proverbs.52 There are two main options for the interpretation: (a) The reader may find a “progression” in the proverb, as Millar calls it, namely from the idea of the abundant quantity of wealth to the idea of its quality. Such a reading focuses, not on the assertion that the righteous are blessed with much wealth, but on the quality of the income of the wicked, which is impaired by troubles and anxiety. The first hemistich poses no problem in terms of the traditional nexus of deed or attitude and consequence. But the second hemistich contains an assumption that has the potential to question the traditional axiom. Generating income is success, and when the wicked achieves that, it is not so easily explicable (cf. 10:22). The traditional view of the nexus is then upheld by relativising the possessions of the wicked with reference to the unfavourable conditions under which such possessions are held. It is a well-known strategy to downplay inexplicable success (cf. 10:2, 16b; 15:16; Pss 37:16-17; 49:17-18; Qoh 5:13, 16; 6:2, 3-5 etc.). (b) However, noticing the “mismatched” elements in the parallelism, the reader may also create a balance in the proverb. Reflection on the fundamental antithetical nature of the righteous/wicked opposition suggests that there are two gaps in the proverb. For one, the wealth of the righteous is quantified but not qualified, and second, the income of the wicked is qualified but not quantified. The antithetical basis of the proverb suggests that the reader generate suitable concepts of quality as well as quantity where they are missing. This can be done by reversing those elements that are provided by the disjointed words, and then supplying them in the respective perceived gaps of both hemistichs. As a result, the disjointedness is resolved. Millar puts it as follows: The righteous-wicked word pair signals balance in the proverb; what applies to one of them cannot apply to the other. If the righteous has abundant wealth, the wicked cannot; if the wicked has troubled produce, the righteous cannot. The interpretation strategy is to take the unbalanced term from each colon and to reverse it to the opposite colon.53 52

Millar (2020, 59). In my terminology, the strategy would be: The two unbalanced terms are taken from their respective hemistichs, reversed, and inserted into the gaps in the opposite hemistichs. 53

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

601

This could be schematically summarised as follows:54 V. 6a in the house of the righteous there is abundant [and untroubled] wealth

:: Ϋ ಩ ಧ Ϋ

V. 6b among the wicked there is [minimal and] troubled produce55

The Septuagint adds two hemistichs at the beginning of the verse: ἐν πλεοναζούσῃ δικαιοσύνῃ ἰσχὺς πολλή, οἱ δὲ ἀσεβεῖς ὁλόρριζοι ἐκ γῆς ὀλοῦνται. (In abundant righteousness there is much strength, but the wicked will perish roots-and-all from the earth)

These hemistichs as well as the following two in the verse also serve the purpose of undergirding the traditional conviction that good aligns with good and bad with bad. The condition of the Hebrew text (see above) may have been part of the reason that the proverb was thought to need augmenting. Several rabbis relate the proverb to historical traditions that serve as illustrations of how the verse should be understood. Rashi interprets the house of the righteous as the temple in Jerusalem that David built (since he made all the preparations). This house was a strength for Israel, but became ruined through the “bringing in” (‫ )תבואה‬of an idol by the evil King Manasseh (2 Kgs 21:7-12). Ralbag interprets ‫ תבואה‬as “arrival,” so that the meaning becomes that the strong house is destroyed when a wicked person enters it. According to Malbim, a house is strong if it is built on righteousness, but if “wicked produce” is introduced through alliances with wicked people (that is, if the righteous assets are mixed with assets accruing from fraud and theft), then the house will be destroyed, as illustrated by 2 Chron 20:37. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra in particular relates the proverb to several historical references, such as 1 Chron 34:30 on the pious Josiah letting his people into the purified temple with its riches, which then fell prey to the wicked who devoured the assets of Judah (Ezk 22:25), with the end result the judgement over the house and the city as pronounced by Jeremiah (6:19). While Chrysostom does not comment on the verse, Evagrius Ponticus reproduces all four hemistichs of the Septuagint and comments by a single quote from Matt 5:20: “If your righteousness does not abound more than the scribes and the Pharisees, you may not enter the kingdom of heaven.” The abundance of the Greek (and Hebrew) text is interpreted – somewhat in a rabbinical line – as abundance of righteousness. The Greek proverb’s reference to destruction is interpreted as “not entering the kingdom of heaven,” which equals being destroyed. 54 Millar (2020, 59-60) goes on to stress a significant rider, notably that such reversals are imprecise and open the proverb up to further interpretations. For instance, ‫( נעכרת‬troubled) may be reversed in several ways depending on the nature of the “trouble” intended to be addressed in a particular use of the proverb; it may be peace, dependability etc. Likewise, the reversal of ‫( רב‬abundant), may be minimal, inadequate or dwindling. 55 Yoder relates the wealth (‫ )חסן‬of the righteous to stored assets (cf. Jer 20:5; Ezk 22:25) and the income (‫ )תבואה‬of the wicked to comparatively short-lived profit (e.g. 3:9; 10:16; Job 31:12).

602

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

15:7 The lips of the wise spread knowledge, but the heart of fools what is not right. Both Toy and Gemser scan the rhythmic pattern as 4+3, but the Masoretic accents favour 3+3. The same conjunctive and disjunctive accents as those at the first two words of the previous verse are used here, but the same problem with an emphasised syllable in the third word is not present in v. 7. Therefore the first hemistich can have four stressed units. The first hemistich contains a verbal clause and the form ‫ יְ זָ רוּ‬is quite regular and in no need of emendation.56 It is the third person masculine plural imperfect Piel of ‫( זרה‬scatter). The natural nuance of the Piel is intensive, thus in this use “spread,” “disperse,” “sift.” It is mostly used in an unfavourable sense (e.g. Ps 44:12; Jer 31:10; often in Ezekiel, cf. 5:10, 12; 12:14, 15 etc.), but also in a favourable sense (e.g. Ps 139:3 [“sift”]) or neutrally (Job 37:9 [north wind], and the passive in 1:7). The intensive conjugation suggests a thorough spreading as would be done when a farmer disperses seed to every corner of his field. That is how the lips of the wise spread knowledge. The lips are a metonymy for the speaking sage, and the dispersing is an incomplete metaphor (so Waltke) for sowing the seed of wisdom far and wide. By contrast, fools do the opposite. As Clifford points out, the heart is parallel to the lips, and the two concepts are a fixed pair both in the Book of Proverbs (cf. 10:20) and elsewhere (e.g. Isa 29:13). The lips (or the mouth) are an outlet for the contents in the receptacle of the heart where knowledge is kept and thinking is done.57 Murphy and Waltke briefly suggest that the lips and the heart in the two hemistichs complement each other. To the extent that they need each other in terms of the parallelism, that seems to me quite correct. The mentioning of the fools’ heart in the second hemistich compels the reader to reconsider the first hemistich. The lips of the wise can only spread the knowledge that was thought out carefully and stored (so Waltke) in their hearts. Fools, one would expect, blurt out the contents of their heart without careful consideration of the contents and the way in which it is imparted. It seems to me that this is just what the expression 56 Changing the text on supposed grounds of a “better meaning” is unconvincing. For instance, Driver (1932, 144) who only involves the vowels (to a and o) in order to infer a root ‫ זרר‬and ends up at “babble” via an Arabic cognate; Toy follows Frankenberg by changing to ‫[ יִ ְצּרוּ‬preserve; cf. 20:28] on the grounds of the repeated destructive use of ‫ זרה‬elsewhere; Scott emends to ‫( יורו‬root ‫)ירה‬, making the lips “teach” knowledge. 57 Cf. Luchsinger (2010, 274-275) for the idea of “receptacle metaphors” (“Gefäß-Metaphern”), a concept from metaphor theory, which can be used for the heart (cf. on 10:20) and even for the fear of the Lord (cf. above on 14:26).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

603

‫ לא־כן‬says. It can mean “not steadfast” (Clifford) or “not honest (Hame’iri).”58 As adjective, ‫ כן‬denotes what is right, and Fox has shown that even as a noun it can be combined with the negating particle ‫לא‬.59 My translation above represents the ellipsis of the verb ‫ זרה‬Piel in the second half: the lips of the wise spread out knowledge, and the heart of the fools [spread out] what is not right, that is, they disperse the opposite of knowledge. Summary:60 V. 7a [from the heart] the lips of the wise spread (carefully reflected) knowledge

ಫ :: ಩ ::

V. 7b [directly via the lips] the heart of fools [spread] (unreflected) nonsense / what is not right / untrue

The wise cannot spread sapiential knowledge if it does not come from the heart as the seat of reflection.61 By the force of the parallelism, fools must also be understood to spread their ideas, but their ideas are rashly blurted out by the lips without having been thought through. This idea is the background of the biting humour of a saying like 17:28 – even a fool will be reckoned as wise if he keeps his trap shut (cf. also 15:2; 17:27; 18:7; 20:3; 29:20 et al.). For Rashi (11th century), the verb ‫ זרה‬is related to ‫( זֵ ר‬crown) and means “to crown”: the lips of the wise “crown knowledge.” Accordingly, ‫ לא־כן‬indicates that fools do not do that, meaning that what they speak, is not true gold.62 Somewhat akin is the much later view of the Vilna Gaon (18th century), namely that the wise adorn knowledge by speaking with clarity (cf. above on v. 2 about enhancing the beauty of wise speaking). Ralbag and Hame’iri (both 14th century) render ‫ זרה‬as I have translated it above. As for the second hemistich, ‫ לא־כן‬is explained in a variety of ways, all more or less usable in different situations: fools cannot spread knowledge (Ramaq); Ralbag and Hame’iri explain that fools do not know how to spread ‫ כן‬in both cases from ‫כון‬, denoting firmness and hence dependability or honesty, adjectivally “right;” cf. the Ivrit affirmative particle “yes,” “so.” 59 He cites Deut 32:21 (non-god); Isa 31:8 (non-man as well as non-person); of special interest for this proverb is 2 Kgs 7:9, where “we are doing ‫ = לא־כן‬what is not right” uses the exact expression we have here. 60 Ordinary brackets indicate what is implied by the use and non-use of “heart;” the double arrow indicates mutual filling of gaps in the respective other hemistich; as elsewhere in this commentary, the single arrow indicates the direction of the impact from one hemistich to the gap in the other. 61 See above, Introduction, Par. 4 and Krüger (2009, 91-106, esp. 97-99) on the heart as organ of thought. 62 For criticism of this view and the editions in which it appears, see Rosenberg ([1988] 2001, 88). 58

604

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

knowledge; Gerondi relates the verb to the motif of winnowing (cf. Ruth 3:2), saying that the wise winnow, that is, purify their words, while fools do not have the capacity to do that. With reference to Jer 31:10 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra relates the first half of the proverb to Israel’s scattering and subsequent gathering, the knowledge of which will then be widely taught to those who come after. Chrysostom interprets the Greek version to say that the lips of the wise show good sense “even” in external things, while the heart of fools is corrupt, “even” in the deep recesses of the heart. Gregory of Nazianzus63 (4th century) briefly refers to the Septuagint version (χείλη σοφῶν δέδεται αἰσθήσει [The lips of the wise are bound to knowledge]) in a row of virtues cited in defence of his flight to Pontus. Leo the Great64 († 461) cites the second hemistich to argue that the unwise (for him, the obstinate and the fickle in need of admonishing) are “unlike” the heart (sic) of the wise, since the latter is stable due to its good persuasions, while the former is volatile and fickle.

15:8-9 Yahweh loathes the offering of the wicked, but favours the prayer of the upright. Yahweh loathes the way of the wicked, but who pursues righteousness he loves. The following two verses are evidently a proverb pair. They are marked by an identical rhythmic organisation (4+3), by word patterns and similar syntax, as well as the prominent idea of an abomination to Yahweh (‫)תועבת יהוה‬.65 In the respective opening hemistichs this idea is expressed by a subjective genitive and can therefore be translated with an equivalent verb, such as “loathe.” Syntactically, the two opening halves form a chiasmus, since ‫תועבת יהוה‬ is the predicate in both but stands after the subject in v. 8 and before it in v. 9: ‫תועבת יהוה‬

‫זבח רשעים‬

(v. 8a)

‫דרך רשע‬

‫תועבת יהוה‬

(v. 9a)

The contrasts of both statements follow in the respective closing halves, which are nominal clauses with the object in the first position and the predicate in the last. The two closing versets are syntactically similar, but only 63

Defensio Par. 95 (NPNF II,7, 223). Regula Pastoralis I, 18 (NPNF II,12, 42). 65 Schipper mentions these two words (‫ תועבה‬and ‫ )יהוה‬together with ‫ רשע‬as “catchwords” that link the two verses, while Waltke regards ‫ תועבה‬and ‫ רשע‬as “catchwords,” and (inverting the order in which they occur in the two verses) he counts ‫ ישר‬and ‫ צדקה‬as “synonyms,” which, strictly speaking, they are not although they do contribute to the linking of the two verses. Waltke does not refer to the divine name ‫ יהוה‬as a stylistic factor, but could have mentioned the whole phrase ‫תועבת יהוה‬, particularly with its chiastic order (see below), as a strong indicator of a proverb duo. 64

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

605

in v. 8 there is a strong combination of both alliteration and assonance in the two nouns expressing the antithetical types of person: ‫( רשעים‬the wicked) and ‫( ישרים‬the upright), which is however not replicated in v. 9. The closeness of the two stichs in the pair is attested in the so-called Damascus Scroll, where the two lines are collapsed into one:66 ‫כי כתוב זבח רשעים תועבה ותפלת צדיקים כמנחת רצון‬ (For it is written, “The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination, but the prayer of the righteous is like an acceptable grain-offering.”) Even if the divine name is avoided, which is typical of CD, the equivalence of prayer and sacrifice is a religious trait of the community associated with the Dead Sea scrolls. That this is an interpretation of the biblical text of Prov 15:8 is evidenced by the quotation formula ‫( כי כתוב‬for it is written). The understanding is basically the same as the idea espoused by Riyqam in his interpretation (see below).

The two verses together state what is loathsome to God and what is acceptable. Their basic point is that this question is decided by one’s inner attitude (Delitzsch, Meinhold). The positive aspect is an upright disposition (being a ‫ישר‬, v. 8b) and its concomitant expression in the practical pursuit of righteousness (‫מרדף צדקה‬, v. 9b). The negative aspect is being a ‫רשע‬, which represents the opposite of uprightness and justice (v. 8a and 9a), namely insincerity. Whatever the latter type of person performs, even ostensibly pious acts, such as bringing a sacrifice or offering a prayer,67 it is more than unacceptable to God, it even loathes him. Perhaps the best-known illustration of the principle is the story of Samuel’s rejection of Saul’s appeal to sacrifice when he disobeyed the command of God (1 Sam 15, esp. v. 22). Aspects of the cult are mentioned only sparingly in the Book of Proverbs (3:9; 7:14; 17:1; 20:25; 21:3, 2768; 28:9; cf. 15:29 on prayer). The oftenassumed cult-critical stance of sapiential literature is not supported by this verse (so Delitzsch, Plöger, Meinhold, Yoder, Tuinstra, Schipper and others; similarly Waltke).69 What is under scrutiny is the sincerity with which cultic acts like sacrifice and prayer (cf. Deut 26:1-15) are offered. If a sacrifice or 66 The text also occurs in CD XI, 20-21 and was copied in 4QDf 5, i 14 (see the note to ‫ ישרים‬in BHQ 46*). 67 According to Fox, the sacrifice and the prayer “serve as a single concept here.” In terms of the parallelism they indeed have the same function, representing as they do the cult (cf. Whybray for their co-existence and Meinhold for the argument that prayer is not contrasted with sacrifice). 68 On the near identity of 21:27a and 15:8a, that is, a half-verse repeated, see Heim (2013, 363-368). 69 See Perdue (1977, 157). However, Schipper rightly calls for caution against overgeneralisation, since there indeed is a critical tendency in Proverbs toward the ‫זבח‬-sacrifice (cf. 7:14; 17:1; 21:3, 27).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

prayer is offered by a ‫רשע‬, it is insincere by definition and therefore an abomination to God (cf. 28:9, where the prayer of one who disregards the law is expressly called so). If it is offered by one who pursues ‫צדקה‬, it is sincere and the giver is loved by God. The latter person is not merely called a ‫צדיק‬, but “one who pursues righteousness.” The intensive Piel participle ‫מר דף‬ connotes an active urgency in chasing after the practice of justice in everyday life, which is the diametrical opposite of the way (‫ )דרך‬pursued in life by the wicked. According to Meinhold, v. 9 gives the general principle, which encompasses the particular instance mentioned in v. 8. Schipper describes the relationship of the fundamentally equal sayings as opposing forms of communication with God (v. 8) amplified by the opposing lifestyles that characterise their very existence (v. 9), which boils down to basically the same idea. Fuhs maintains the balance in his own way by stating that such utterances about the cult in the Book of Proverbs do call to mind the cult-critical tendency of the prophets (cf. Isa 1:10-17; Jer 7:22-23; Hos 6:6; Am 5:21-25) but also resemble certain Psalms where the critical stance towards the cult is tempered by the motif of sincere intentions (cf. Pss 50:8-14 [to which I would add v. 15]; 51:16-19). Several commentators cite Egyptian parallels to the basic statement of the proverb pair. In a text70 from the late 3rd millennium BCE it is said, The character71 of the righteous is rather accepted than the ox (sacrificed by) the sinner. The same idea occurs in a much later Demotic song:72 He does not accept an ox from the strong, only to overlook (his) oppression afterwards. … The grain-offering of the righteous is what he (Amun) sees. Following a tradition in the Midrash Tehillim (102:1), Rashi historicises the sacrifice and the prayer, making them refer to the abominable sacrifices of Balak and Bileam (Num 23:1) and the acceptable prayers of Moses. Riyqam construes an insightful combination of the two stichs, thereby collapsing them into one.73 That results in showing that God loathes the sacrifice and the prayer of the wicked, while favouring both sacrifice and prayer when offered by the upright. For Ramaq, God abhors sacrifices taken from stolen goods (similarly Pseudo-Ibn Ezra), but Malbim is quite clear 70

Instruction for Merikare, l. 127f. (AEL I, 106). The term used here constitutes a pun (Fox), since the word bit can mean “character” as well as “loaf of bread.” Tuinstra’s Dutch translation renders, as I have, with “character.” 72 A Demotic song from the Persian Period, XXV, 7-8 (TUAT.NF 8, 385-386). Günter Vittmann, who did the German translation, relates these lines of the song to Prov 15:8 and Am 5:22; cf. Schipper, who quotes these parallels as well as other more general Egyptian sayings about favour for “the righteous” and disgust for “the wicked.” 73 On the similar use of the proverb pair in Qumran and related literature, see above. 71

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

607

that what is at stake here is the sincerity of intentions. The Piel in v. 9 (‫ )מרדף‬is taken as causative by Ramaq to argue that God loves those who cause others to practice justice. That leads to the conclusion that, if sinners repent, the prayer of the contrite is sufficient even without a sacrifice. Accordingly, Ramaq can also interpret the ‫דרך‬ (way) mentioned in v. 9 as the general shape of a human’s life, including intentions. Thinking about sinning is consequently worse than the actual deed itself, an idea found also in the Talmud (the opening sentence of Yoma 29a). The Vilna Gaon explains the sacrifice as a peace offering which is voluntary, but even so it is unacceptable when brought by the wicked. Clemens Alexandrinus74 (c. 150-215) quotes v. 8 in a rather cumbersome defence of the Mosaic Law as the highest source of all ethics. Gregory the Great (540-604)75 quotes v. 8b as an embellishment for his praise of the Visigoth king Reccared, for converting a whole nation from the Arian to the Catholic faith. Philipp Melanchthon makes full use of the chance presented by v. 8 to church Reformers to explain why external sacrifices and rituals cannot bring salvation. Such an idea would amount to superstition underpinned by ceremonies without the need for sincere morality. V. 8a applies “when the justice of a good conscience is not present” (cum non adest iustitia bonae conscientiae). John Calvin76 makes full use of v. 8 to claim, on the basis of Isa 1:13-16, that God is “nauseated” by the observance of the law, quickly adding that such is only the case where observance is not sincere. By linking the verse back to Prov 1:7 and 9:10 (which Calvin references indirectly), he argues that acceptable observance of the law (deeds) begins with the fear of the Lord’s name (faith), which suits the Reformation view of faith and works very well indeed.

15:10 Discipline is a bad thing for the one who abandons the way – who hates correction will die. The proverb consists of 4+3 stresses (so also Gemser, but Toy scans it as 3+3). It has a nominal clause in the first hemistich and a verbal clause in the second. The parallelism is “synonymous” (Schipper), but in the sense of a forward moving, progressive parallelism, since the second hemistich takes the thought of the first a step further. The opening statement is ambiguous. ‫ רע‬can be an adjective (bad, wrong, evil, fierce), but it can also be a substantive (an evil person [e.g. Pss 5:5; 10:15], or that which is bad, wrong or evil [e.g. Pss 52:14; 73:8; Qoh 9:3]). The latter possibility is chosen by Murphy and Clifford, to which I align my view (“Discipline is a bad thing for one who abandons the way”). In this case, the one who finds discipline a bad thing is directly parallel to the one who hates correction, while his leaving the (right) way indicates what he does in his life, and his death indicates what will happen to him as a result. No wonder people who think negatively of educational discipline (‫ )מוסר‬hate its 74 75 76

Strom II, 18 (ANF II, 365). Epist cxxii, (NPNF II/13, 35). Inst III/14, 8.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

verbal expression in corrective reproof (‫)תוכחת‬. If their low opinion of discipline leads them astray from the right path,77 their hatred of its expression will certainly lead to their death. The parallelism can be summarised as follows: v. 10a discipline/education ‫מוסר‬ regarded as bad ‫רע‬ > going astray ‫עזב ארח‬

v. 10b correction/reproof ‫תוכחת‬ hated ‫שונא‬ > dying ‫ימות‬

The alternative reading, which is followed by most commentators, interprets ‫ רע‬as an adjective: “A harsh/severe/painful/bad discipline is for him who abandons the way.” Although grammatically possible, the problem with this (cf. Clifford and Fox) is that ‫ מוסר‬does not mean punishment, but disciplined education (which can, of course, be severe). In Proverbs it is always seen as a good thing and is never called “bad,”78 while this would be the only place where it is. On the submission of ‫ רע‬as an adjective, the discipline would be meted out to those who have left the sapiential way, that is, it would be punishment. Fox correctly argues that “death cannot be said to discipline or educate someone, for then no change is possible.” Nevertheless – and despite denying that ‫ מוסר‬means punishment – Fox sticks to that meaning for the word in this proverb. His only way out is to declare that it must have been said facetiously. For these reasons, it seems best to interpret ‫“ רע ל‬something bad in the eyes of = in the opinion of” as Clifford suggests with reference to 1 Sam 29:7. Fools disregard discipline, they even hate having to listen to correction and rather go on a path that leads not to life, but to the realm of the dead (v. 24; cf. 4:19; 5:5-6, 8; 10:17). The Septuagint deviates from the Hebrew: παιδεία ἀκάκου γνωρίζεται ὑπὸ τῶν παριόντων, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντες ἐλέγχους τελευτῶσιν αἰσχρῶς. (The education of the innocent is known by those who pass by the way, but they who hate reproofs will perish shamefully) The Greek translator misread ‫( עזב‬leave) as ‫( ערב‬pass by). Further, there is an innerGreek error, where the “innocent” is the result of a technical error, viz. ἀκάκου for κακοῦ, which would have been the translation of ‫( רע‬see EE for details). This is of no direct text-critical relevance, but it does illustrate the influence of the Septuagint 77 On the metaphor of the way, see on 1:8-19; it is normally called the ‫דרך‬, but may also be called ‫ נתיבה‬or ‫( ארח‬e.g. 5:6; 8:10; 10:17;15:10, 24); for the use of ‫ ארח‬in this sense, see Zehnder (1999, 385-401). 78 This also goes for 7:22, where – if read as a noun – the word seems to refer to the punishment of a fool. But the text is corrupt and ‫ מוסר‬should be vocalised with o and e, meaning “chain” or “trap;” cf. Volume I, 313, on the problematic verse in Prov 7.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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tradition on the Syriac, even where the latter is closer to the Hebrew. In this case it maintains the progressive parallelism of the Hebrew. €z ¿ÚáÅ ÀĀþÚ èÚïËÙ èÚáÙsx À{xüã .…{Îäæ ÀÎçêÞã èÚçéx èÚáÙs{ (The discipline of those who do not know shame is exposed, and those who hate reproof will die) In any event, the Septuagint understands the Hebrew text to speak positively of innocent people whose education is publicly visible and those who hate sapiential reproofs to be visited by death. It thus construes an antithetical parallelism out of the progressive synonymy of the Hebrew versets in which the public respect of the first Greek hemistich has its counterpart in the shame in which those people will die who disdain correction. Rashi interprets the ‫ מוסר‬as suffering and thinks it is punishment for the one who abandons the path of God. Nahmias (14th century) shares the view of Rambam79 (12th century) that hating corrective admonishment (‫ )תוכחת‬is one of twenty-four sins that stand in the way of repentance) and therefore necessarily must lead to death. Yonah Gerondi (1180-1263) rates it worse to hate admonishment than going astray from the right path, because leaving the path does not exclude returning after learning the consequences, whereas hating the experience of being reproved excludes that possibility as well. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra links the two hemistichs closely, saying that whoever leaves the right way will find the ensuing discipline hard and difficult to gain knowledge from, since such a person will not be able to receive it at all. Who hates admonishment (‫ )תוכחת‬will die because of never ever understanding discipline (‫)מוסר‬. Cyprian of Carthage (c. 220-258),80 known for his strict views on accepting repentant apostates, uses the proverb’s second half together with the first half of v. 12 to underscore his views on stern discipline of clergy consorting with virgins, both for the men and the women. Somewhat akin to the opinion of Gerondi, Evagrius Ponticus (346-399) comments on the basis of the Septuagint that the biblical texts usually known as “commandments” are here called “reproofs” (ἐλέγχους) because the commandments reprove sinning humans for their own good.

15:11 She’ol and the Abyss are (open) before Yahweh – how much more so the hearts of humans! Toy regards the rhythmic organisation as ternary, but this does not take account of the accents at the beginning and the end of the verse. There is a retarding tipha at ‫ואבדון‬, so that the Masoretes likely favoured one stress per 79 In the Hilchot Teshuva 4:2 Rambam (Maimonides) lists hatred of being corrected as the fifth among the sins that prevent repentance: ‫והשונא את התוכחות שהרי לא הניח לו דרך תשובה‬ (and he who hates the admonishments; because that will not leave him a way to repentance). This indeed seems to be a quotation from Proverbs, even though he uses the plural of ‫תוכחת‬ with the article, ‫ דרך‬rather than ‫ארח‬, and the article with plene spelling in ‫השונא‬. 80 Epistle lxi (ANF V, 358); see below on the reception of v. 12.

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word, which alleviates the stress on adjacent syllables in ‫ואבדון נגד‬. Moreover, the stress on ‫ בני‬near the end makes it possible to interpret the second maqqeph as a connection of two words that constitute one concept (‫בני אדם‬ are humans, not the children of a man) without interfering with the emphasised syllables. That makes Gemser’s analysis of 4+3 preferable. Both hemistichs are nominal clauses and the parallelism is progressive. There is some confusion among commentators about the terminology to be used for the logic of the argument. Schipper correctly calls it an argumentum a maiore ad minus, which would indicate that it is an even greater feat to be able to see into the obscure country of the underworld (the major) than to see into the hearts of immediately present humans (the relatively minor). Therefore the reader can more readily accept the validity of the latter. Delitzsch argues the same, but erroneously calls the syllogism a minori ad majus (seemingly based on the supposition that the underworld is “the lowest region of Hades,” i.e., lower than the earth disk). He is followed by Toy, who says the argument is “a conclusion from the less (sic) to the greater.”81 The proverb is quite clear that God knows the thoughts of humans (cf. v. 3 above). Plöger even thinks of it as omniscience (Allwissenheit). That God knows everything is indeed attested in the Old Testament,82 but there are several examples of the contrary as well.83 This proverb however uses the argumentum a maiore ad minus to say not only that God knows the human heart and even everything that happens in the world, but even more than that. If ‫ שאול‬and ‫אבדון‬ are “before” him, it means they are in his sight.84 The two words have the same referent, namely the place of destruction (root ‫ )אבד‬that is the underworld (‫ )שאול‬where the dead have a blurred, shadowy existence.85 So unclear is this realm that Israel could not develop a distinct conception of what it entails. Now if these recesses of ultimate mystery are known territory to God 81 Meinhold too thinks that the argument moves from the smaller to the greater, where for him the world of the dead is “smaller” than the world of the living. He does not say why, but he does add “angeblich” (allegedly), also not saying who made the allegation. Whybray says the conclusion is of the type a fortiori (from the stronger), meaning “how much more” (formula: ‫)אף כי‬, by which he means the same as Scherer (1999, 172), who describes it as “eine Steigerung des Grades der Gewißheit” (a heightening of the degree of certainty), that is, in v. 11 the degree of certainty is greater for the “easier” when it is measured by the “more difficult.” The legal formula is, qui potest plus, potest minus (who can do the greater, can do the lesser). 82 E.g. 1 Kgs 8:39; Pss 44:22; 139:1-4; 147:5; Isa 40:28; Jer 11:20; Ezk 11:5; Dan 2:22; 1 Chron 28:9. 83 For instance, Abraham must first pass a test before God knows whether he really fears him (Gen 22:12), that is, he tests the hearts of humans to find out what is inside (Deut 8:2; 2 Chron 31:31; Prov. 17:3; Ps 139:23-24). On the topic as a whole, see Carasik (2000, 221232). 84 Delitzsch relates the meaning of ‫ נֶ גֶ ד‬to its etymology: “‫ נֶ גֶ ד‬acc. adv.: in conspectu [in sight of], from ‫ נָ גַ ד‬eminere, conspicuum esse, [to be conspicuous];” cf. v. 3 above on God’s seeing every place, and Job 26:6 on the “nakedness” and “openness” of the ‫ שאול‬and ‫ אבדון‬before God. 85 ‫ אבדון‬is used parallel to ‫( קבר‬grave) in Ps 88:12 (Waltke); in Ps 139:8 its near-synonym ‫ שאול‬is used as the antithesis of ‫( שמים‬heaven) and denotes the place where one lies for the sleep of death.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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(cf. Ps 139:8) but totally unknown to humans (Job 11:7-8), the mystery of God is awesome and the limit of human perception is utterly restricted. There are three aspects of meaning to the powerful saying. (a) God knows all about human beings By virtue of its a fortiori (‫ )אף כי‬character, the saying is focused on the human heart. That means the limitless knowledge of God entails that he must of course also be fully aware of what goes on in human hearts, i.e., the whole scope of their consciousness and thought. That is the primary utterance of the proverb. (b) There are severe limits to human knowledge But if we reread the first hemistich in the light of the second, then we may find cause to also apply Delitzsch’s typification a minori ad majus, albeit on other grounds. By making its primary point on the basis of the first hemistich, the proverb ipso facto implies that humans have no access to the extremities of divine knowledge. Human knowledge per se is severely limited, so that even its sapiential mode cannot provide all the answers. Although this is the secondary point in the proverb’s logic, its content is extremely important for grasping the sages’ fundamental appreciation of the fact that their wisdom can advise, guide and build character, but by no means answer all ultimate questions. (c) Despite its limitations, the human mind itself is still unfathomable Plöger is right that the proverb also suggests the unfathomable depths of the human mind. Although Plöger does not offer substantiating argument, his assertion is corroborated by the logic of the proverb’s parallelism, which is powered by the yardstick applied in the first hemistich. If the sage has to appeal to divine knowledge of the very extremities of reality to argue convincingly that God knows the human heart, then knowing the human mind is no mean feat itself. Despite its limitations, especially relative to divine knowledge, and despite being the minor element in the argument, the recesses of the human mind are also unfathomable (Plöger calls it “die Unergründbarkeit der menschlichen Herzen”). Moreover, this is supported further by the motif of abysmal depth in the first hemistich. If God can perceive the depths of “the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns”86 (maior) how much less effort (minus) does it cost him to discern the depths of those hearts still present in the land of the living (cf. Fuhs)! That brings us full circle to the main point of the saying ([a] above; cf. 20:27): God, and only he, knows all that is in the hearts of the human phenomenon.87 86

Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act 3 Scene 1. In the narrative literature, the nearest text to this effect is perhaps God’s pronouncement to Samuel (1 Sam 16:7). Humans can only evaluate others by what is external, but God sees what is in the human heart (cf. 1 Chron 28:9). 87

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

This proverb encourages the reader to stand in awe before the unfathomable world of life and death, of knowledge laced by ignorance, of theology and anthropology. It inculcates not only fear of God in the sense of being afraid of him who “is watching you, everywhere, always” (so Fox), but in the sense of wonder before him and his world, where even the insignificant is also unfathomable. Therefore Schipper can say with good reason that v. 11 is theologically one of the “top sayings” (“Spitzensätze”) in the sentence literature between Prov 10 and 22. The wonder it attests to is what William Brown – without citing it, though – has highlighted as crucial for understanding Proverbs (and the rest of wisdom literature). Under the felicitous title of Wisdom’s Wonder, he shows that wonder is the central interpretative category as “an emotion born of awe” and nothing less than “fear seeking understanding.”88 Neither the rabbis nor the Church Fathers seem to have been overly fascinated by the proverb. Rashi calls the relationship between the two hemistichs a case of “light and heavy” (‫)קל וחומר‬89 and applies the a fortiori conclusion proposed above. Everything in the underworld is revealed to God, therefore he also knows the thoughts of humans. The Mezudat David gives the same interpretation. Yonah Gerondi finds the idea that God always knows what is in human hearts cause to ban all evil thoughts from the heart. The Vilna Gaon interestingly counters a misconception that God is too holy to be occupied by impurity. Since he does perceive the most impure place imaginable, he can also be occupied with the impurities in human hearts. Chrysostom says that “the people of olden times” were right to believe that God sees and judges also the human thoughts and deeds done in secret. He seems to mean Israel, for, as Hill points out, he is content to leave it with this Old Testament text and does not appeal to a New Testament corroboration such as Rom 8:27, which he could have done.90

15:12 The scoffer does not like correcting (coming) to him, to the wise men he will not go. Toy scans 3+2, which is thinkable but deviates from the Masoretic reading, while Gemser keeps to the accentuation and scans 4+3, which is the most natural pattern, although 4+4 is also a theoretical possibility. What the scoffer does not like, is being on the receiving end of reproof. The object of his dislike is put in the absolute infinitive Hiphil of ‫( יכח‬reprove, give correction), not the Hophal (be reproved, be given correction), which does not exist for this form. 88

Brown (2014, 24 and passim). The formula uses the conjunction “and” and is therefore applicable both ways (from the light to the heavy, as well as from the heavy to the light). 90 So Hill (2006, 226). 89

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

613

The Hiphil infinitive is usually translated by a passive in English (e.g. Toy, Oesterley, Murphy, Clifford, Waltke, Fox), sometimes also in German (Meinhold). Most German commentators however translate by an active, corresponding to English “that one corrects him” (e.g. Delitzsch, Gemser, Ringgren, Scherer,91 Sæbø, Schipper). Such translations,92 whether active or passive, are actually periphrastic, which could be justified further by the fact that the absolute infinitive can be used in the place of any finite form of the verb, in which case it naturally needs circumscription in translation. The parallelism is again progressive. The scoffer’s insolence (cf. 9:7-8) does not allow him to welcome corrective words, which implies that he thinks he does not need them, thus is wise of his own accord. That is arrogance by definition (explicitly said so in 21:24) and contradicts the very foundation of sapiential education (cf. 1:23, 25, 30; 3:11; 12:1).93 Therefore it can be safely said that he will not go to anyone among the wise people (plural). In the second hemistich the Septuagint has a preposition that does not normally translate the Hebrew preposition ‫אל‬, which is used here. It says, μετὰ δὲ σοφῶν οὐχ ὁμιλήσει (with wise people he does not converse)

The verb ὁμιλέω (keep company, converse) together with the preposition μετά (with) can refer to associating with somebody, either by going along in their company, or by conducting extended conversation. That does not say the same as the Hebrew expression ‫ הלך אל‬in v. 12, which rather refers to going to or approaching someone. The Greek translation may have been influenced by 13:20, where becoming wise is the expected result of going along with (‫ )הלך את‬the wise in an extended association (cf. EE).94 The Septuagint was followed by the Peshitta (åï [with]), but not by the Targum (‫[ לות‬to]). V. 15 in Hebrew judges that the scoffer will not even make a limited call on the wise, which a fortiori excludes becoming a pupil for a longer period. Nothing would be gained by following the surmise in BHS that we should emend ‫ אל‬to ‫את‬, since even one visit to the sages would expose the scoffer to what he dislikes. 91

Scherer (1999, 165). Plöger paraphrases, “Nicht liebt der Spötter, wer (sic) ihn zurechtweist,” in which the nominative “wer” is difficult. The rebuker is the subject of the reproof, but primarily the object of the dislike. Scott dodges the active/passive issue by translating, “An arrogant man has no love for his critic,” as if the infinitive stands for a participle, which is theoretically thinkable. 93 Cf. Essay 1 (Virtue between command and advice), §C.2, in the Introduction to this volume; also on 13:1 and the references given there. 94 Cf. also the later practice that pupils associate so closely with the teaching rabbis that they actually “go” (= travel) with them. 92

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

Ralbag and the Mezudat David paraphrase the proverb. Malbim surmises that the reason for the scoffer’s mocking is that moral law cannot be demonstrated rationally. Still, the scoffer avoids even rational argument because he just hates it. The Vilna Gaon points out that the scoffer’s avoiding the sages also causes him to lose the relative reward for at least going to Torah study, even if he does not actually study. Commenting very briefly on the verse, Chrysostom ignores the scoffer and only comments that the major contribution of the sages is to reprove those who do wrong. Cyprian of Carthage95 quotes the first half together with the second half of v. 10 as though they make up one proverb. According to him, he who dislikes reproof will die in disgrace.

15:13-14 A joyful heart makes the face look good, but in heartache there is a broken spirit. The heart of the understanding seeks knowledge, but the mouth of fools feeds on folly. Toy finds the rhythmic pattern 3+3 in both verses, while Gemser scans both as 4+4. I would agree with Gemser that v. 13a carries four stresses,96 and with Toy that the second half of v. 13 carries three.97 Conversely, Toy is right in my opinion that v. 14a has three stresses, while Gemser is right that the second half of v. 14 has four stresses.98 Thus: 4+3 and 3+4. The two verses are a proverb pair. Fox points out that vv. 13-17 are threaded together by what he calls the catchwords ‫ לב‬and ‫טוב‬. That indeed is the case, but it does not preclude vv. 13-14 being a pair at the beginning of the thread. According to Fox, vv. 13-17 (with the exception of v. 14) “define the conditions for good cheer and describe its benefits.” However, they also contain contrasting motifs for the elements of good cheer to consider.99 V. 14 as the exception in the string shows not only what the foundation is for the good cheer of v. 13a, but also what underlies its opposite in the antithetical v. 13b (Waltke calls them the “sources” of respectively the joy and trouble). 95

Epistle lxi (ANF V, 358); see above on the reception of v. 10. Toy probably reads with the munah and the tipha at the first two words, but there is no problem with the distribution of stressed syllables to warrant avoiding emphasis on the last syllable of ‫ייטב‬. 97 In v. 13b Gemser’s view would unnecessarily create adjacent stresses on both sides of the maqqeph. 98 In the first half, the de-emphasising of vowels from sere to segol before the maqqeph is necessary, whereas opting for the Qere instead of the Ketib in the second half has no implications for the stress pattern. 99 Cf. also Tuinstra, who acknowledges the existence of some keywords “in the middle part of this chapter,” but also points out that there hardly are similarities of content. It should be pointed out as well, however, that the motifs of cheer and wretchedness in v. 15 do call to mind the theme of the preceding proverb pair. 96

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

615

According to v. 13a, the disposition of a joyous heart is not only beneficial for one’s health, as 17:22100 states, but it is also visible in the joyful person’s face (cf. however, 14:13 for a differing perspective). In the second hemistich the noteworthy aspect is that there is not a movement from inner cause to outward effect,101 but from one inner aspect to another. ‫ ַע ְצּ ַבת‬is the construct state of ‫ע ֶצּ ֶבת‬, ַ and with ‫ לב‬as its nomen rectum it signifies hurt experienced in the heart. The preposition ‫ ב‬can indicate location (“in”) or agency (“through”). In the former case, it would mean a broken spirit is latently present in an aching heart, that is, the potential to develop into a broken spirit is contained in an aching heart (sorrow becomes depression). The second possibility (agency) states that heartache introduces something even worse than itself. It thus suggests an escalation: through heartache comes a broken spirit (sorrow introduces depression). On both counts it is clear that a deterioration in the human condition can set in as a result of the inner pain of the heart. A comparison with the rhetorical question in 18:14 put forward by Heim, may suggest what this entails. A broken spirit is unbearable. According to 18:14a, the human spirit can sustain a person in sickness, but when heartache brings with it a broken spirit as 15:13 pictures it, there seems to be no way out – the “vital powers, the inner energy and drive” (Van Leeuwen) are gone. V. 14 provides the foundation for all of this. Joy can be expected where wisdom is found (explicitly and repeatedly said in Qoh 8:1, even if Qoh 7:3 claims that a serious countenance can also indicate inner well-being). This is confirmed in the first hemistich, where the discerning person’s heart is said to seek after knowledge. The second hemistich says that, by contrast, the mouth of fools feeds on folly. ‫ רעה‬is a pastoral term and can be transitive, meaning to graze a flock (= give them to eat) as well as intransitive, meaning to graze in the grass (said of the animals). In this verse the pastoral metaphor underlies both. Both the singular verb with the singular mouth and the parallelism itself suggest the latter: as the discerning seek the nourishment of knowledge, so the mouth (Qere) of fools feeds on folly.102 That means they feed on what they already have, like the ruminating animals implied by the verb ‫רעה‬. That fits the hopelessness spoken of in v. 13b. Seeking knowledge is positive, it brings joy and happiness. But chewing the same cud of folly over and over again, means stagnation – no way out. 100

See Heim (2013, 368-373) for a detailed comparison of the two similar verses. The “somatic effect” in the terminology used by Heim (2013, 371). 102 McKane’s emendation of ‫ ירעה‬to ‫( י דעה‬root ‫דעה‬, associated with Arabic ‫[ دعا‬desired, asked, demanded]) follows a suggestion for another text by Winton Thomas (1969, 284-285). In 15:14 McKane translates the conjectural verb as “consorts,” but this is not only no improvement – it is precarious, has no support in the manuscripts or versions, and diminishes the parallelism. 101

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

Rashi has a unique interpretation of v. 13. According to him, God’s joy and sorrow are intended. If humans make God glad or sad by their obedience or disobedience, he shows them his cheer by fulfilling their wishes or he encounters them by his anger. Hame’iri sees v. 13 as an injunction to be happy while maintaining a realistic spirit rather than a sad one and thereby breaking one’s own spirit. He complements it by his view of v. 14, notably that the prudent should intensely keep up the search after knowledge until they find it (cf. the intensive Piel ‫)יבקש‬. Similarly, Malbim seems to find an implied injunction in the idea of searching for knowledge, since it has to lead to adaptations being made in practice. Gerondi stresses the big impact of the condition of the human mind on the body, and links the two verses as a pair: the prudent have happiness as a consequence of seeking knowledge. Nahmias and the Mezudat David paraphrase, but the Mezudat adds two original thoughts: in v. 13 the concept of a broken spirit warns against a loss of self-esteem, and in v. 14 it associates the verb ‫רעה‬ with the noun ‫( רע‬companion), which would mean that fools, seeking their own kind, befriend folly as their companion in life. Athanasius of Alexandria (298-373) twice uses v. 13.103 First, in a description of the Egyptian hermit Antony (†356), he illustrates the man’s humble character. According to Athanasius, Antony was always recognisable by his cheerful countenance, which was a gift of God. Second, Athanasius finds v. 13 useful for the defence of his own innocence, which the Emperor might infer from the appearance of his face (!). Nicholas Gorran of Paris (†1295) interprets v. 13a under the impact of the treatise De Anima by the Persian philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sina, (†1037). He interprets the Vulgate text104 to mean that joy holds a twofold benefit for the mind, viz. the strengthening of natural virtue, and the strengthening of the human spirit against dissolution by broadening its scope.105

15:15 All the days of the poor are bad, but a cheerful heart is a perpetual feast. The rhythmic pattern 3+3 (Toy) is better than 4+3 (Gemser), since the maqqeph and qamets hatuph at the beginning call for one stress unit. Both halves contain nominal clauses. The verse has a chiastic organisation, however with an extra element woven in without taking part in the chiasmus: (A) temporal qualification: all the days

(B) quality: bad

[person: the poor]

(B) quality: feast B

(A) temporal qualification: [person: the cheerful] perpetual

103 Athanasius, Vit Ant 67 (NPNF II/4, 214).; Ad Const 12 (NPNF II/4, 242): The mere countenance of his accusers should show their falsehood, as v. 13 says. 104 Cor gaudens exhilarat faciem (A glad heart exhilarates the countenance). 105 Smalley ([1949] 1986, 128); see on 12:22 above for Gorran’s treatment of the motif of sadness.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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The element in square brackets above is the type of person involved in the two contrasting statements. In order to decide what the proverb as a whole says, we must determine whether the ‫( עני‬the poor or the afflicted) and the ‫( טוב־לב‬the cheerful heart)106 concern the same or different persons. If they are not the same, the proverb would be a factual statement describing the stark contrast of social reality as it is (cf. 10:15; 18:11, 23). But if the two intended persons are the same, a whole new dimension becomes visible. The fact that this element is kept in both hemistichs without taking part in the chiasmus, suggests that the contrast they carry is not as absolute as elements A and B in the chiasmus. Elements A and B are fixed and stable in the chiastic pattern, but the words for the human aspect are not – there is something special about their floating presence in the middle of the first and at the beginning of the second hemistich. If they concern the same person, the proverb is not a neutral statement devoid of empathy. On the contrary, it would relativise the statement that poor or afflicted people may indeed experience all (‫ )כל‬their days as unfavourable, by the idea that there nevertheless remains a hopeful dimension. When we reread the first hemistich in the light of the second (Yoder), we find an apokoinou construction, where an element in the first half also holds good for the second (so Meinhold). That brings a modification of the expectation generated by a superficial reading into the fray: even if all the days are still objectively as dark in the second half as in the first, the inner disposition of a cheerful heart can make all of those bad days “a perpetual feast.”107 Most commentators agree that the second half of the proverb adds a qualification to the statement of the first half.108 An exception is Whybray, who thinks that the two hemistichs contradict each other flatly.109 But an inner resilience that can come to terms even with extreme harshness does not water down the “absoluteness,” since the subjective ability to deal with it does not contradict the objective hardship. On the contrary, the harsher circumstances are, the more sense it makes to point out possible ways to live through the inescapable. One look at the practice of the Stoics should be sufficient evidence for this. The Stoic principle is formulated by Epictetus of Nicopolis (c. 50130 CE) as follows:110 ‫ טוב־לב‬is a genitivus epexegeticus (Waltke, Schipper); see IBHS, Par. 9.5.3c. There is no need to emend the text by adding the preposition ‫ ל‬or by vocalising ‫ טוב‬with u instead of o, as proposed in BHS. A cheerful heart can be described as a perpetual feast. Not only a literal banquet, but just about anything can be presented figuratively as a feast to convey that it is pleasant or positively experienced in some way. Such a figurative use of the concept of a feast is not only possible in Hebrew, but also in English, Dutch and other languages. 108 See especially Delitzsch, but it is already implied in the Mishnah and the Talmud (cf. below). 109 According to Whybray, the “absoluteness of the statement” in v. 15a should not be overlooked (for which he criticises McKane). It seems to him that the second hemistich was a popular proverb on its own and simply contradicts the first. 110 Epictetus, Diatr II, 5, ll. 4-5. 106 107

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15 ὁύτως τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου ἔργον ἐκεῖνο˙ δίελε τὰ πράγματα καὶ διάστησον καὶ εἰπὲ “τὰ ἔξω οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί· προαίρεσις ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί. ποῦ ζητήσω τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ἔσω ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς.” (So, the main task for life is the following: distinguish things and weigh them up, then say, “External things are not under my control; but choices are under my control. Where shall I look for the good and the evil? Within me, in those [choices] that are my own.”)

This is not at all a denial of suffering, but takes it seriously by reflecting on how to be able to cope whether one’s reality is adverse or not. The typical advice of Stoic philosophy is to seek a way within oneself, in the moral options of the mind. Likewise, the proverb remains far from glossing over the severe realities of life. Albeit on a much smaller canvass, it shows that the inner disposition of humans can indeed fortify sufferers against the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Therefore Fuhs can appropriately credit the proverb with “a noteworthy perspective from within” (“eine bemerkenswerte Innenperspektive”). Even if driven by another generator than the Stoics or the New Testament, the proverb calls to mind the cheerful serenity of Paul and Silas when they were mistreated and incarcerated on trumped up charges (Acts 16:23-25), or the gratitude permeating Paul’s letter written from the prison of another city to the congregation in Philippi. The Septuagint deviates from the Hebrew: πάντα τὸν χρόνον οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν κακῶν προσδέχονται κακά, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἡσυχάζουσιν διὰ παντός. (At all times the eyes of bad people expect bad things, but the good always rest) It is probably right that the Greek explains the Hebrew as “repose,” in order to avoid a hedonistic understanding as encouragement to excessive drinking (EE). The Pirke Abot (4:1) defends the idea that an enjoyable life is indeed possible under all circumstances, if one is happy with whatever one has been apportioned. Rashi qualifies the first half of the proverb by making it refer to one’s diet. If a poor person eats fine food on the Sabbath or a holiday, his unaccustomed stomach reacts negatively. Therefore all days are bad for him. But Rashi111 also thinks the proverb implies that people should be content with whatever they have, which can make all of their time seem like a feast. The Vilna Gaon focuses on the first hemistich and interprets the poor person as the one who is always dissatisfied with whatever they have, and therefore always unhappy. A variant of this idea is given around the same time (18th century) by the Mezudat David, which however seems harsh on the poor by ascribing their misery to jealousy of those who have more so that they become the authors of their inability to enjoy whatever they do have. 111 Rashi also refers to the Talmud Sanhedrin, where several examples of a bad and a good life are given, e.g. having a bad wife vs. a good wife, being fussy vs. tolerant, being ill-tempered vs. longanimous (Sanh 100b-101a); cf. Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 274).

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Chrysostom (347-407) reads the first half of the Greek version as an explanation why some people (here: the wicked) are always disturbed. They always expect evil, so that they are always uneasy, whether the expected misfortune sets in or not. Chrysostom’s contemporary, Evagrius of Pontus (346-399), has a single note to the Greek proverb, notably that the “rest” spoken of here as a mark of good people, is “abstention of vice” (ἀποχὴ κακίας).112 St John of the Cross (1542-1591) quotes the second hemistich in the Latin tradition as a description of the state of mind enjoyed by the bride of Christ: “A secure mind is like a perpetual feast” (secura mens quasi iuge convivium).

15:16-17 Better a little with the fear of the Lord than a big treasure and turmoil with it. Better a portion of vegetables where there is love than a fattened ox and hatred with it. With Toy, the rhythmic pattern of both verses is to be marked as 3+3, which also accords well with the Masoretic accents.113 The two verses make up a clear proverb pair.114 They share a manifest thematic link as well as a catchword (‫ )טוב‬that probably are reasons why the proverb in v. 15 and the proverb pair in vv. 16-17 were placed next to each other. The meaning of ‫ טוב‬in v. 15 (cheerful, part of an epexegetical genitive with ‫ )לב‬differs from its use in vv. 16-17, where it twice introduces a “better” saying (in a comparative construction with ‫)מן‬. But the theme in v. 15 involves an implicit comparison in which a negative situation is juxtaposed to a positive counter-pole. That is what the ‫טוב‬-sayings in vv. 16-17 do explicitly. The parallels in vv. 16 and 17 are clear and encompass every unit of each hemistich. They may be summarised115 as follows: ‫מעט‬ ‫יראת יהוה‬ ‫אוצר רב‬ ‫מהומה‬

v. 16 little (-) fear of the Lord (+) big treasure (+) turmoil (-)

ಫ ಫ ಫ ಫ

‫ארחת ירק‬ ‫אהבה‬ ‫שר אבוס‬ ‫שנאה‬

v. 17 vegetable portion (-) love (+) fattened ox (+) hatred (-)

As usual, the minus and the plus signs (-) and (+) above indicate respectively the negative and the positive motifs in the text.116 The double arrows indicate the alignment of 112

See Gohl (2017, 48). Gemser is uncertain about his suggestions and even includes some highly unlikely possibilities, including 5+4 for v. 17. 114 Rightly called a “pre-redactional proverb pair” (“vorredaktionelle[s] Spruchpaar”) by Scherer (1999, 176), that is, they were a pair before being incorporated in the context where they now stand. 115 Waltke also gives a summary (not in columns), but omits ‫ אוצר רב‬and ‫שר אבוס‬. 116 Cf., for instance, Sandoval (2006, 133); further, Luchsinger (2010, 223-224), who discusses the formal aspects of these two verses at relative length; also Fox, who offers a whole 113

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“little” and “much” in v. 16 with “little food” and “much food” in v. 17, as well as the alignment of the “harmony” and “disharmony” motifs in the first verse with those in the second verse. The vertical lines in the figure above highlight the alignment of little/modest and much/opulent as well as harmonious and disharmonious within each verse individually. Although both verses are “better” sayings and therefore not what usually is called a parallelism, the positive and negative motifs in the a- and b-halves of each stich stand in oppositional tension, while the configuration of the related motifs in the two complete stichs is identical. Therefore it would not be wrong to refer to the relationship of the two full stichs as a “synonymous” parallelism – both make the same fundamental point.

}

little + harmony ; much + disharmony [antithetical arrangement of motifs] “synonymous” little + harmony ; much + disharmony [antithetical arrangement of motifs] parallelism

In v. 16 the generic meaning of “little” (‫ )מעט‬is specified by its counterpart in the second hemistich, viz. “big treasure” (‫ )אוצר רב‬and therefore refers to modest financial resources.117 Since the parallel in v. 17 (‫ )ארחת ירק‬suggests that at least a meagre meal is available, v. 16 rather speaks of modest means than abject poverty, although “the force of the comparison should not be lost” (Murphy). Under certain circumstances, eking out a meagre existence is better than great wealth, notably when the former is accompanied by the fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of all wisdom (1:7; 9:10; cf. 30:3), and the latter by turmoil. The preposition ‫ ב‬is the ‫ ב‬of association118 in both hemistichs, to be translated by “with.” This use of the preposition shows that the verse does not present us with an instance of run-of-themill “Armenfrömmigkeit” or the piety of poverty (contra McKane119), for it does not claim that poverty is better in principle than wealth.120 What it does say, is that when poverty is accompanied by the fear of the Lord and when wealth is accompanied by tumultuous conditions – then poverty is better than wealth, even if that in itself questions the deed-consequence nexus, because in terms of the nexus those who fear the Lord should be wealthy.121 The noun excursus on better-than proverbs at the end of his discussion of vv. 16-17; and the detailed work by Perry (1993, esp. 40-44), on which both Fox and Luchsinger draw. 117 Millar (2020, 71) states that the implicit equivalence of v. 16a and v. 17a (the first two double arrows in my figure above) accordingly fleshes out the significance of the terms (presumably my [-] and [+] in v. 16, and again [-] and [+] in v. 17). 118 See BDB, KAHAL, GKC 119n, Van der Merwe et al. (1999, 354). 119 McKane even invokes the New Testament (Mark 10:25 par.) to claim that “wealth is inimical to the fear of Yahweh,” which runs counter to the whole idea of reward for wisdom and piety. 120 It is however understandable that the utterance can be a source of comfort or even seen as a confirmation when read in circles inclined to regard poverty as a state of piety. 121 On the relativising of poverty and wealth by the fear of the Lord, cf. Sandoval (2006, 132-134) and Millar (2020, 153). Even where the ‫ יראת יהוה‬is not explicitly mentioned, the relativising by a value that manifests the fear of the Lord is often in evidence throughout the Book of Proverbs, e.g. 3:14; 8:11, 19; 16:8, 16, 19; 17:1; 19:1, 22; 28:6. Cf. the detailed discussion of 15:16 and 16:8 by Heim (2013, 376-383).

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‫ מהומה‬may suggest agitation and anxiety as a result of having to protect the wealth (such as envisaged by Qoh 5:10, 12; 6:2) or violence and robbery (such as described in Prov 1:1-19). In the light of its counterpart in the first hemistich, namely the fear of the Lord, perhaps violence is primarily intended, without however excluding disquiet. Nevertheless, v. 16 acknowledges (and so does v. 17 in principle) that it can and does occur that pious people who fear the Lord (and thus practise the principle of wisdom) fall into material difficulties (which is, for instance, denied by Ps 37:25). Likewise, it can and does happen that those who accumulate wealth by injustice and violence indeed own a whole treasury full of valuables (despite the denial of Prov 1:18-19). The proverb turns the nexus of deed and consequence on its head.122 Waltke tries to alleviate the dilemma by saying that this is only “for a season” and that in the end the nexus is always restored.123 But that is not borne out by human experience. In my opinion the best response to the dilemma is not an attempt at an unattainable harmonisation, but simply the acceptance that it expresses a mystery – as the whole Book of Job shows. True, Job is “restored” in the end, but despite his rebellious reaction to God. And his pious friends are chastised despite their pious defence of God.124 God is not bound to a system as they thought him to be. We don’t know the answer. Non liquet. So, all the epigrammatic proverbs can and should do, is to sometimes highlight the one aspect and sometimes the other. Qohelet’s view has never been refuted, notably that even if the wise think they know how to figure out God’s work, they still don’t (Qoh 8:17).

Basically the same goes for v. 17. The same ‫ ב‬of association occurs in the second hemistich of this verse too. The portion of vegetables is a simple dish. The noun ‫ ארחה‬is etymologically related to the word for a road and may have indicated a simple provision for the road. It is also used for allowances given to prisoners of sorts.125 Tuinstra accepts the connection and similarity with v. 16, but makes the perceptive remark that an additional element in v. 17, should not be overlooked. It consists of the inner attitude in the relationships of humans towards each other, namely that the respective inclination expressed in love and hate is part of what relativises poverty and affluence. That is certainly right, since ‫ אהבה‬and ‫ שנאה‬are aspects of human relations among themselves. In v. 17 the Septuagint uses two words to translate the love spoken of in ‫ואהבה שם‬: πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ χάριν (for the sake of love and favour). A plausible explanation is offered by EE that this is done to clarify how love can be “there” (‫)שם‬, which may have suggested that love is somehow in the vegetables. The Peshitta read the Hebrew as a status constructus, making it ‫אהבת‬, and vocalised the following word as ‫ֵשׁם‬ 122

Cf. Van Leeuwen (1992, 29). Also in the Introduction to Volume II of his commentary 2004, 107-109. 124 Cf. Loader (2001a, 3-23), where I give my take on endeavours to “solve” the theodicy. 125 Jer 40:4; also 2 Kgs 25:30 = Jer 52:34; here Waltke confuses the names of Jehoiakim and Evil-Merodach as well as those of Zedekiah and Jehoiachin. 123

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(name, reputation; cf. Prov 22:1; Qoh 7:1): ¿ćäýx ¿ÂÎÐ{ (love of name), meaning it is better to have a simple meal with people who esteem you than an opulent meal with people who hate you. Commentators often point out that vv. 16-17 are based on Amenemope IX, 5-8, which itself is closely paralleled by Amenemope XVI, 11-14:126 IX, 5-8 Better is poverty in the hand of the god than wealth in the storehouse. Better are bread loaves with a happy heart than wealth with vexation.

XVI, 11-14 Better is praise with the love of people than wealth in the storehouse. Better is bread with a happy heart than wealth with vexation.

The rabbis often summarise and paraphrase both verses. Rashi’s explanation of the wealth of v. 16b is (with reference to Am 3:9) that it was accumulated by illicit methods due to the lack of the fear of God. He only illustrates v. 17 by favourably comparing the small offering by a poor but righteous person to the rich offering by a wealthy but wicked person. But the Midrash Mishle recounts an extended legend about Solomon’s experience when he was temporarily deposed as king. A rich man treated him to a lavish meal, but made him sad with anecdotes of the time when he was in power. The next day a poor man invited him to a modest meal, but consoled him with God’s oath in Ps 132:11 that he would regain the throne. When that indeed happened, Solomon wrote this proverb.127 For Ralbag (1288-1344) v. 16 says it is better to have less wealth earned in the fear of God than great wealth with people shouting that the wealth was earned illicitly (suggested by ‫)מהומה‬. Hame’iri (12491316) finds the meaning of v. 17 to be that it is better to serve travellers a modest meal of vegetables with friendliness than luxurious meat with anger, while the Mezudat David merely sums up the verse. Gerondi (1180-1263) seems to combine the sense he finds in both verses – preferring simple food with friends to delicacies with enemies means that one would also prefer having less worldly possessions for the sake of love and the fear of God. Bahya (1255-1340) applies v. 16 to Torah study: it is better to study less Torah with understanding than too much resulting in becoming mentally upset and confused. As for v. 17, he understands it as a directive to be satisfied with what one has and to avoid greed. Like Bahya, the Vilna Gaon (17201797) takes v. 16 figuratively: a small volume of Torah study in the fear of God is better than much study for the sake of self-aggrandisement. Much less use of the verses is made in Patristic literature. Chrysostom’s commentary on the Greek text is not as clear as one might have wished. A small portion with the fear of God is better than great treasures without fear, which seems to apply the idea of safety to the whole proverb. Enjoyment (of modest provisions) by the faithful is better than affluent life in the (insecure?) present.128 V. 17 shows that enjoyment does not consist of a lavish display. But in his Sermon on Col 1:1-2129 he is clearer, where, in somewhat of an overinterpretation with the help of an oblique reference to the verse, he says that a bread crust with freedom is preferable to thousands of dainties with slavery. Roughly at the same time in the 4th century, Ambrose 126

Respectively in AEL II, 152 and 156. See Visotzky (1992, 77). 128 Here even the translation with notes by Hill (2006, 140-141, 226) does not bring us much further. 129 Sermo Col 1:1-2 (NPNF I, 13, 261). 127

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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of Milan130 quoted v. 17a together with 17:1a in an argument on appropriate behaviour of the clergy. He uses the proverbial material as support for his insistence that the clergy should not seek after money. Much earlier, Clemens Alexandrinus (c. 150c. 215)131 had already used v. 17 in a lengthy argument “On Eating.” He argues for moderation in meals rather than excessive eating, in the course of which he finds it necessary to point out that the herbs spoken of in this verse are not love, but are to be taken with love.

15:18 The irascible man stirs up strife, but who is slow to anger quiets conflict. The ternary pattern proposed by Toy is in accordance with the Masoretic accents and takes seriously the avoidance of accumulating stressed syllables, whereas Gemser’s preference for a quaternary pattern seems to be based on the word count. While a degree of subjectivity in this regard cannot be avoided (and while one does not necessarily have to agree with the Masoretic accents), Toy’s reading seems to me the better one, since the last two words have to be taken together as one stress unit. The same is not strictly necessary as far as the first two words of the proverb are concerned, but if they are taken together, the two monosyllables in the verse are treated consistently. This proverb is about the idea of strife, which is also present in vv. 16-17. But there it functioned to give profile to the overarching theme of inner versus outward values. While nothing could be objected to the remark by Scherer132 that the ethical dimension of v. 18 promotes the avoidance of strife and conflict as unavoidable for shaping a happy life, this does not subsume the verse with the previous two verses as a unit of an encompassing composition. It makes sense on its own, even if it can sensibly be related to the foregoing two verses. The epexegetical genitive, ‫( איש חמה‬man of heat), contains a metaphor for anger.133 As such it is also ambiguous. It can mean an angry man or a man generally susceptible to anger.134 The latter is the case here, as the antithesis in the second hemistich makes clear (a man slow to anger135 is not just a man who is cool-and-collected at a particular moment in time, but one with 130

Duties of the Clergy II, xxi (NPNF I, 10, 60). Paid II, 1 (ANF II, 241). 132 Scherer (1999, 176). 133 Fox points to its use in 22:24 (where the plural form ‫ חמות‬occurs), which is certainly of Egyptian provenance and therefore strengthens the argument for this proverb as further evidence that more than 22:17–24:22 is dependent on Egyptian wisdom (see below). 134 Cf. 26:21, where the equivalent is ‫( איש מדונים‬man of strife). 135 In the Codex Leningradensis, the ‫ ך‬in ‫ ארך אפים‬omits the normal double point for a final kaph, but the Aleppo Codex and others do have it. 131

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

a mild personality in general). The danger of anger or of an inclination to anger is pointed out often in the Book of Proverbs (cf. 14:29; 22:24; 28:25; 29:22; also Sir 28:8-11).136 As in this proverb, the irascible man may cause strife137 where there is none, but he may also worsen it where it is already present (e.g. 26:21). Such proverbs address the concern for harmony in society (Whybray) and do so both from the negative side by warning against the disruptive force of anger in the community, and from the positive side by stressing the constructive energy of a cool head. In the second hemistich, ‫ ישקיט‬is Hiphil, which may be an inner transitive (e.g. Isa 7:4; 57:20) and thus may mean the same as the Qal (be calm), but here it obviously is transitive, because it has a clear object in ‫( ריב‬conflict, strife). The activity mentioned in the second hemistich is open to two interpretations: who calms down a strife either intervenes in an existing quarrel between others and pacifies the situation by mediating, or keeps calm in a conflict and thereby makes peace with his adversary (cf. Matt 5:9, where the expression may also moderate or offer peace). The proverb can thus be applied accordingly, as situations require. The first hemistich of this proverb and the first half of 29:22 have long been recognised as a “twice-told proverb” (to borrow the term first coined by Snell [1993]).138 There is only one word that differs, namely ‫( אף‬anger), which is substituted in 29:22 for ‫ חמה‬in the present verse. The Septuagint offers two translations of the proverb, while it is not certain which is the original translation and which is secondary: v. 18 ἀνὴρ θυμώδης παρασκευάζει μάχας, μακρόθυμος δὲ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν καταπραΰνει. (A hot-headed man prepares contentions, but a patient person calms down even a developing one)

136 Cf. Millar (2020, 175), who points out that wrath is commonly condemned, except in the case of the wrath of the King, where moral commentary is not given. 137 ‫( ָמדוֹן‬strife) occurs several times in the Book of Proverbs and is derived from the root ‫( דין‬pronounce judgement between adversaries), which suggests the clashing of opponents in a judicial ‫( ריב‬dispute). According to Tuinstra, the noun is never used in a judicial sense. Nevertheless, it can still evoke the association, and in two cases it is used in association with ‫( ריב‬17:14; 26:21), where the legal sense of the latter is also disputed (cf. Waltke). The noun has a contracted plural ‫( ְמ ָדנִ ים‬6:19; 10:12); cf. also the form ‫( ִמ ְד יָ נִ ים‬18:18) and the possible Qere vocalisation of ‫( ִמ ְדוָ נִ ים‬18:19; 26:21); apart from this verse, two further proverbs use it as the object of ‫ גרה‬Piel (28:25; 29:22). 138 So Ewald, Bertheau, Delitzsch and Wildeboer (the latter two also compare 28:25); cf. the detailed discussion by Hausmann (1995, 297-298) and especially Heim (2013, 383-387); cf. also Sir 28:11.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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and: v. 18A μακρόθυμος ἀνὴρ κατασβέσει κρίσεις, ὁ δὲ ἀσεβὴς ἐγείρει μᾶλλον. (A patient man extinguishes quarrels, but an impious person rather stirs them up) Waltke thinks that the latter (called v. 18a) was the original Greek version, which was only later prefixed by a Greek version closer to the Hebrew (cf. the order of the hemistichs), arguing that the Peshitta and Targum probably were influenced by the Greek v. 18A (cf. BHQ). But EE differs and regards v. 18A as the later addition, despite the fact that the Syro-Hexaplar seems to suggest that the first translation is the original one (using as it does an obelus after it). Still, EE finds resemblances with the Greek 28:2 in 15:18A. Be that as it may, this issue affects neither the textual criticism nor the interpretation of the Hebrew verse.

As in the case of vv. 16-17, several commentators139 point to affinities of v. 18 with Egyptian literature, such as Amenemope (see above on vv. 1617). Schipper however links the theme of the destructive and beneficial effects of respectively irascibility and even-temperedness to the danger of involving oneself with an existing conflict. In a cautionary word against interference in the strife of others, the Demotic Instruction of Ankhsheshonq140 provides another perspective on the second hemistich of the Hebrew proverb, supported in Israel’s sapiential literature, e.g. Prov 26:17 and Sir 11:9. But the second hemistich does not have to mean “stand back and make peace in your own conflict” rather than “broker peace between other parties in conflict” (see above), since both are possible in the Hebrew text, which accords well with the openness to multiple interpretations that occurs so often in the Book of Proverbs. Rashi simply paraphrases the verse, but he does interpret the second half to mean that a person who is slow to anger does not intervene in the strife of others and allows the anger of the adversary to subside by itself. The Vilna Gaon explicitly says that a hottempered person causes a conflict where there was none, while a tranquil person can calm a conflict that has already become heated. After v. 17, John Chrysostom only resumes his commentary at v. 27 and thus skips v. 18 for the purposes of his commentary. Jerome141 argues against his adversary, Rufinus (345-410), by quoting a long list of proverbs. He makes the Book of Proverbs his source for the defence of peace through wisdom. In this case, he quotes the first hemistich to intimate that Rufinus is the quarrelsome person and thus pits the Bible against his opponent. Ambrose142 quotes the first half of the proverb to argue that 139 140 141 142

E.g. Oesterley, Gemser, Whybray, Murphy, Yoder, and others. Ankhsheshonq 19, 11f. (AEL III,174). Apol adv libros Rufini III, 43 (NPNF II, 3, 540); see above on 12:14 and 13:3. Ambrose, Epist LXIII (NPNF II, 10, 465).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

anger may have a reason, but it must also be restrained or else it will become sin (referring to Ps 4:4[5] in the same sense as the quotation in Eph 4:26).

15:19 The way of the sluggard is like a hedge of thorns, but the path of the upright is a highway. As Toy and Gemser agree, the rhythmic pattern is 4+3. Both hemistichs consist of nominal clauses. In Chap. 15 the sluggard is mentioned only here (Plöger), although the word expresses a classic sapiential topic (cf. 6:6-11; 10:26 etc.). What is noteworthy about the parallelism in this proverb is the so-called “imprecise” antithesis between the sluggard (‫עצל‬, singular) and the upright (‫ישרים‬, plural). BHS follows the Septuagint’s translation (ἀνδρεῖος [diligent]) and is confident that we should accordingly emend the Hebrew to ‫חרוצים‬ (industrious), which would be in agreement with what the Septuagint sometimes does when the context of this Hebrew word seems to require it (cf. 10:4; 13:4).143 But the emendation is not only unnecessary, it would also eliminate a subtlety in the Hebrew text. (a) First, the antithesis of the parallelism suggests that laziness is “nonupright.” This entails that laziness is dishonest because such a person does not fulfil the requirement of honest work for achieving success.144 Since diligence is exactly what 10:4 demands as the right (= sapiential) way of life, being upright can indeed be a suitable opposite of being a sluggard. (b) Second, a path can also be “straight” or ‫ ישר‬in the sense of “right” (e.g. 14:12; 16:25) and it can be “made straight” in the sense of being easy to travel on (‫ ישר‬Piel, 3:6; Isa 45:7). One can “walk in one’s uprightness” (14:2, ‫ ;הולך בישרו‬cf. 4:11), which means who does that, is upright and can count on having an evened road.145 This is further supported by 143 Further examples are given by Toy and Fox (commentary and EE). A proverb that would also have been a case in point, viz. 21:5, is missing in the Septuagint. Several commentators, like Toy, Gemser, McKane and others accept the emendation, while Plöger does not himself take the step, but has understanding for the decision of those who do. Tuinstra too does not expressly opt for the emendation, but does find the contrast of the sluggard with the upright quite peculiar and somewhat of an overreach. 144 Already Wildeboer pointed out that the “upright” are industrious, by which he implied that the antithesis between the sluggard and the “upright” is in order. 145 The form ‫ ְס ֻל ָלה‬is the defectively written feminine passive participle Qal of ‫( סלל‬build up, heighten), used of a road constructed to facilitate travel. EE suspects that the first two vowels should be interchanged, since 4QProvb writes it in plene form with the ‫ ו‬indicating the u-sound in the first syllable (‫)סוללה‬, which would represent an earlier form of the passive

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the cognate noun ‫( מישרים‬honesty, uprightness, the most generic term for what is right), which occurs in the programmatic opening of the book where the basic concepts of sapiential teaching are listed (1:3). So the root ‫ ישר‬is quite suited to indicate both a fundamental sapiential characteristic and to be suggestive in the context of a path to travel on. But the path of the sluggard is the opposite; it is described in 22:5 as a way overgrown by thorns, with which the crooked have to contend. It resembles the field of the sluggard pictured in 24:30-31, where no path is even noticeable. Therefore: who is lazy is unsapiential and goes on a way strewn with difficulties. None of this is incompatible with the suggestion by Van Leeuwen that the condition of the sluggard’s path is due to his being too lazy to maintain it properly (also reminiscent of the neglected field mentioned in 24:30-31). The inactivity of the sluggard is thus directly responsible for a life in which any prosperous advance is obstructed by thorny obstacles.146 Neither is it incompatible with Murphy’s idea (already suggested by Riyqam) that the difficult path is an excuse for inactivity and going nowhere. That would be analogous to the ludicrous excuse of the sluggard that there is a lion on the road that prevents him from going out (26:13). The different possibilities of reading the proverb offer several ways of applying it to people who either fall short of the sapiential work ethic or practise it: 1. Inertia is dishonest, expecting to enjoy without effort what others must work for. 2. Those guilty of it should expect the going to be tough and even dangerous in life. 3. Conversely, the upright who are willing to put the sapiential work ethic into practise will find the going good in life – thus the classic nexus of deed and consequence. 4. By being too lazy to work, the sluggard causes literal impediments and dangers for himself in life. 5. He uses existing impediments and dangers in the world as justification to (continue) doing nothing rather than doing something about them. participle Qal (cf. IBHS 22.6 and GKC 53u, the paragraph probably intended by the reference to “GKC §58” in EE). Whether the latter stood in what has become the Masoretic Text or not, has no impact on our understanding of the verse. 146 ‫( חדק‬thorn) is also attested in Mic 7:4, where it is used parallel to ‫( משוכה‬alternative spelling with ‫ שׂ‬as well as with plene vowel; hedge); perhaps solanum incanum, a prickly shrub occurring in the Middle East. ‫ משכה‬is also found in Isa 5:5 (but with alternative spelling – plene ‫ ו‬and doubling of the ‫)כ‬. The fact that it occurs together with ‫ חדק‬suggests that a whole thicket of the shrub is probably intended.

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6. He uses illusory impediments (so already Hame’iri) and dangers as a pretext for dodging the requirement for honest work, which would exacerbate the dishonesty that is anyway inherent in sloth (see above). The colourful polyvalence of the proverb opens it up to various interpretations,147 even if it opens with the negative aspect of the sloth/thrift topic and thereby highlights it. Therefore the proverb is primarily a warning against laziness, but its metaphors invite the reader to consider them as part of a whole system of “building blocks in the linguistic construction of reality”148 – thereby facilitating the making of further moral judgements (such as dishonesty, honest work, cover-up, deed-consequence nexus). According to Rashi, the sluggard feels hedged in, but the upright experience going on a well-travelled road. Malbim thinks that the good way is the well-trodden way to wisdom, to which the sluggard has no access because he cannot subdue his desires. The Mezudat David shares the idea of the sluggard’s fantasised impediments with Hame’iri (see above) and takes the second hemistich to intimate that the upright will find the means to overcome whatever hindrances they may encounter. The Vilna Gaon conjures up an interesting picture of the negative way beginning as a broad and easy way, but in the end becomes full of insurmountable obstacles, while the good way begins as a narrow way requiring hard work but in the end becomes a way to reach a prized goal (cf. Jesus’ image of the wide and the narrow ways in Matt 7:1314). Clement of Rome (c. 96)149 associates the laziness with idle talk and consorting with virgins, which is a way strewn with thorns. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330-395)150 sees the sluggards of the proverb in those who were enthusiastic for a strict life of faith and then became lax and no longer wanted to work – which brings them on a way of thorns. John Cassian (360-435)151 quotes the first half in his criticism of idleness.

15:20-21 A wise son delights a father, but a fool of a man despises his mother. Folly is a joy to one who has no sense, but a man who has understanding walks straight. Toy succinctly says of both verses, “Antithetic, ternary.” But the rebiac mugrash in both b-hemistichs suggests that a 3+3 rhythm is thought possible only in v. 21. In v. 20 there is no problem with adjacent stressed syllables 147

Cf. Millar (2020, passim). Stewart (2016, 181), who uses the quote from Perdue (1994, 60) in her argument about the meaning of metaphors for moral reasoning. 149 Epistle I, 10 (ANF VIII, 58). 150 De Virg Chap. xxi (NPNF II, 5, 369). 151 Inst Coen Chap. xxi (NPNF II, 11, 274). 148

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and therefore no maqqeph, indicating that the Masoretes scanned v. 20 as 3+4152 and v. 21 as 3+3 (not as 4+4 for both proverbs, as Gemser has it in his table of rhythmic patterns). Some commentators, like Delitzsch, Whybray and Scherer,153 closely connect vv. 20, 21 and 23. But even so vv. 20-21 form a proverb pair (so Plöger, Sæbø, Yoder and others), which has been demonstrated by Schipper with reference to Hildebrandt.154 The motifs, called the “prototypes” and the “antitypes” by Schipper, are arranged in a chiastic pattern: v. 20a wise son (‫)בן חחם‬

v. 21a senseless (‫)חסר ־לב‬

v. 20b fool of a man (‫)כסיל איש‬

v. 21b understanding man (‫)איש תבונה‬

Fuhs finds a smaller chiasmus, also involving the “prototype” and the “antitype,” built into the two halves of v. 21. The one who has no sense155 and the man of understanding156 form the inner positions of the chiasmus: V. 21a finding folly a joy V. 21b

‫איש תבונה‬

‫חסר־לב‬ going straight

The first verse of the pair (15:20) has a parallel in 10:1. It is one of Snell’s “twice told” proverbs and discussed extensively by Heim.157 According to him, “a powerful message” is conveyed by the differing formulation, namely that 10:1 speaks of “a foolish son” (‫)בן כסיל‬, while 15:20 has “a fool of a man” (‫)אדם כסיל‬158 The first of these is a hyponym for the second, since all sons are persons but not all persons are sons. Therefore 10:1 motivates boys 152 In the pointing of v. 20 in both the Codex Aleppo and the Codex Leningradensis a maqqeph is found before ‫אב‬, which makes the first hemistich into a unit of three beats, while the second hemistich clearly consists of four (thus 3+4). The same happens in the identical 10:1bc, while the slightly different 15:20b also has four beats. 153 Scherer (1999, 177), who appeals to the thematic similarity of the motif of joy (which, Fuhs points out, is rather a different kind of joy in v. 20 and v. 21). 154 Hildebrandt (1988, 209). 155 Cf. 6:32; 7:7; 9:4, 16; 10:13; 11:12; 12:11; 17:18; 24:30; also 12:9. 156 Cf. 2:6, 11; 8:1; 10:23; 11:12; 14:29; 15:21; 17:27; 18:2; 19:8; 20:5; 21:30; 24:3; also 28:16. 157 Since it differs from 10:1 in that it contains two dissimilar words, it belongs to category 1.2 in the listing by Snell (1993, 38), and is discussed in detail by Heim (2013, 208-213). The fact that it is aligned so closely with v. 21 to form a chiasmus supports the idea of a pair constructed from existing proverbs. 158 Several versions (the Septuagint, Peshitta and Targum) and Hebrew manuscripts here have the same formulation as 10:1bc (‫)ובן־כסיל‬. The reason may be to “tighten the parallelism with ‘father’” (EE) or, additionally, the influence of 10:1b (Toy, Waltke).

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to act wisely so as to bring happiness to their parents, but 15:20 speaks of a foolish adult man and shows the conclusion that can be drawn from his foolishness, namely that he is a despiser of his mother. This seems plausible, but in my opinion it should not be overinterpreted. The proverb in 15:20 also seeks to motivate boys, but is pungent (Heim’s word) because it shows that the mother is not only caused sorrow, but in fact even despised by her own son. Nevertheless, the feelings of the parents are not the focal point,159 since their feelings are used both here and in 10:1 for motivating young men to wise behaviour. In both cases an appeal is made on the youth’s sense of honour, a typical paradigm of motivation in the book.160 On the equal importance of the father and mother within the parallelism and on the rabbinic and early Christian treatment of the idea, see the commentary on 10:1b above.

The second half of the proverb pair (15:21) begins with the negative type called the ‫( חסר־לב‬the one lacking insight). He is so imprudent that folly gives him joy, the irony of which constitutes a strong denunciation. This has a parallel in 10:23 and a positive counterpart in 21:15. The second hemistich contains the metaphor of the road. “He makes the going straight” is plainly a reference to an upright way of living (see above on v. 19), which consists of practicing justice (see on 11:5). Therefore we can concur with Meinhold that not only mental deficit (“geistiger Mangel”) and rational insight are mentioned, but also the moral capacity granted by God to those who maintain the right attitude towards him (3:6). The sapiential, moral and religious dimensions are not kept separate. On the rabbinic and early Christian reception of v. 20, see the commentary on 10:1b. As for v. 21, Rashi (11th century) takes care to explain that the first hemistich is not understood to mean that the senseless find joy itself to be folly (somewhat along the lines of Qoh 7:2-4). Something of this sort was indeed proposed by Bahya (Spain, 13th century), but in the sense that a joyful person without sense is drawn to foolishness, whereas the experience of joy will influence an understanding person positively. Ramaq (12th century) interprets the Piel ‫ יישר‬to mean that the man with understanding consciously chooses the morally straight path. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra (probably 12th century) regards making the way straight to mean that the understanding man goes the way of truth, which excludes occupying himself with folly. The Mezudat David (18th century) interestingly applies the force of parallelism to carry the idea of joy in v. 20a forward into the second hemistich of v. 21: a man of understanding has his joy in walking on the straight road. In the same vein, the Vilna Gaon (18th century) supplies the motif of joy to the second hemistich. The man of understanding rejoices in the straight path,

159 But the inference is justified that the parents and their happiness are important aspects of Israelite anthropological ideals (so Hausmann [1995, 106-107]). 160 See Stewart (2016, 110).

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but feels remorse when he does something foolish. This distinguishes him from the senseless man who has no remorse but only joy in doing a foolish thing.

15:22 Plans are thwarted when counsel lacks, but through a multitude of counsellors each one succeeds. Both Toy and Gemser take the rhythm as 3+3, while Gemser reserves the option of four stress beats in the first hemistich as a possibility. However, that is improbable, for it would necessitate both monosyllable words in ‫ְבּ ֵ ֣אין ֑סוֹד‬ to be stressed. The Masoretes inserted the conjunctive munah at the alef to combine them into one stress unit and thus also scanned three stress units in the first hemistich. An interesting play with grammatical forms contributes to the effectiveness of the proverb. ‫ הפר‬is the absolute infinitive Hiphil of ‫( פרר‬break) in the wellknown use as a gerund, which is a verbal form used as a noun. “There is a breaking of plans when (‫ )ב‬there is no counsel” or “A breaking of plans comes through (‫ )ב‬no counsel.” Whether ‫ ב‬is taken in the first or the second sense makes no difference to the meaning. On both counts the first half says that plans come to nothing if they are not made on the basis of sound counsel. The word for counsel used here can sometimes carry the notion of a secret (e.g. Am 3:7 and several times in Proverbs, such as 11:13; 20:19; 25:9)161 or be used in a general sense, either of positive advice as here, or of negative machinations (as in Ps 83:4). What kind of “breaking” should be understood, depends on the context (thwart, undermine, discredit etc.).162 In the second hemistich the verb (‫ )תקום‬is the third person feminine singular imperfect Qal of ‫( קום‬it will stand = be realised). The singular form of the verb with a plural subject (‫ מחשבות‬is the antecedent picked up by the feminine singular pronominal element in the verb) has the force of a distributive: each one of them.163 Clifford thinks this usage of the grammatical possibilities reinforces the overall contrast involving numbers in the proverb: “[P]lans (plural) fail for want of counsel (singular) but a plan (singular) succeeds because of advisors (plural).” Fox’s comment on v. 22: “This saying shows an appreciation of collaborative wisdom, as in Prov 11:14; 20:18; and 24:6.” So it does. But Yoder adds a word in season (v. 23!) when she points out that even well-devised human plans in the end can only come to pass when they coincide with the plan (‫ )עצה‬of God, for which she cites 19:21 (cf. also 16:1). 161

See below on Nahmias and the Vilna Gaon. See Waltke for a list of possibilities with examples. 163 See GKC 145l and m, for a whole range of cases where the singular of the predicate is used with a plural. 162

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

The Septuagint has completely reinterpreted the Hebrew of the proverb.164 ὑπερτίθενται λογισμοὺς οἱ μὴ τιμῶντες συνέδρια, ἐν δὲ καρδίαις βουλευομένων μένει βουλή. (They confound plans who do not honour assemblies, but in the hearts of those who deliberate, counsel remains) This may have been influenced by the difficulty of the incongruence of plural and singular in the Hebrew verse, but the argument of EE is convincing, namely that the Greek version has made the recommendation to have many counsellors into an affirmation of public assemblies, which did exist among Jews of the Hellenistic period. Rashi does little more than paraphrase the first hemistich. Some three centuries later, however, Nahmias exploited the fact that the noun ‫ סוד‬is used for “counsel” and not ‫עצה‬. According to him the plan shared by many members of the counselling group has to remain secret, which is what ‫ סוד‬means as opposed to ‫עצה‬. Otherwise it could be leaked and become fruitless.

15:23 There is joy for a man in the response of his mouth, and a word on its time – how good it is! The rhythm is ternary (so Toy).165 The second hemistich takes the idea of the first a step further (progressive parallelism) by making a statement on the general effect of the spoken word, not just on the speaker personally. There are two nominal clauses, the second containing an exclamation, which has the effect of underscoring the contents. The topic is speaking well (cf. 10:11; 15:1; 25:11). Waltke mentions that the expressions used in this proverb for speech itself (b) and its evaluation (a) are organised crosswise between the two halves of the proverb: joy (a) word (b)

response (b) good (a)

As the suffix of the third person masculine singular in ‫( פיו‬his mouth) indicates, the first hemistich is about the satisfaction that a speaker166 can derive 164 It is followed by the Peshitta, in which, as EE points out, the Greek is given a converse rendering (“They who honour the assembly make their plans pass, / and by many counsellors it is established”). 165 Gemser finds four stresses in the first hemistich, but may have overlooked the Masoretic accents and the maqqeph in the first hemistich. 166 The speaker is human and cannot be a metonymy for “the broad sweep of human activity” (Millard [2020, 213]) as Clifford would have it. Millard also takes issue with McKane’s idea (on 16:1) that the answer of the tongue is Yahweh’s word, since the motif of God’s tongue is unknown.

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from something he himself has said, not just the delight of hearing another person responding with a good answer to a third party (Fox). The reply here intended must be a specific kind of ‫( מענה‬answer), which can only be a fitting response to what an interlocutor has said. This has been helpfully shown by Delitzsch, even apart from the question of the spoken word’s “time” in the second hemistich. He refers to Job 32:3, 5, where it is twice said that Elihu became angry at Job’s three friends Eliphaz, Bildad an Zophar because they condemned Job “without finding an answer” (‫)לא מצאו מענה‬. Despite uttering their condemnations, there was “no answer in the mouth of the three” (‫אין‬ ‫)מענה בפי שלשת‬. The friends in fact often replied to Job’s arguments with speeches of their own, but these were not valid refutations of what Job had said. Therefore they were no answers in the real sense. So, no delight at all, but anger was elicited in Elihu.

That the second hemistich is not just a “synonymous” parallelism repeating what the first says, can already be seen in the syntactic organisation employed for the exclamation. It begins with a casus pendens,167 in which the subject is held until the exclamation follows. Instead of a reiteration of the first hemistich, the second continues its idea by amplifying and indeed intensifying it with more information and an exclamation. First, the answer is qualified by ‫( בעתו‬on its time). Giving an effective answer “on its time” does not only mean answering on the appropriate time, but doing so effectively in the service of the speakers themselves and of others.168 As v. 28 shows, a good answer does not only have to be timed, but also has to be well conceived, thought through and well spoken (Qoh 11:10). Being able to speak well was one of the kalokagathia in Israel, which revealed character169 and qualified a person to serve even in the royal court (1 Sam 16:18; cf. Ps 45:2). What an asset that is, can be appreciated by all who follow political debates and know that one can address an issue at the appropriate time and still make a hash of it. But if it is done well in such circumstances, it gives other people and even powerful ones satisfaction, which leads to favourable results, as Joseph demonstrated in the Egyptian court (Gen 41:37-40).170 So, the word in season is not extolled as pleasing just because every event was thought to have a word 167 The following main clause (‫ )מה טוב‬does not have to contain the retrospective pronoun often occurring after a casus pendens; cf. GKC 143aβ. 168 So Bühlmann (1976, 81); McKane ([1970] 1977, 177) stresses the preference of the sages for constructive speech in the service of the community, as opposed to destructive speech (10:32; 11:9). 169 Millard (2020, 202). 170 And Portia in the court of Venice (The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene 1), who did speak words appropriate to the occasion, as did Shylock, but achieved success by doing it brilliantly – cleverly construing them so that their literal meaning can have an unexpected effect, and, to crown it all, delivering them with dramatic tension. That is what carried the day, impressed the Duke, and gave Gratiano in the admiring audience a fourfold ‫שמחה‬.

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lying “in readiness” for it.171 On the contrary, the speaker must observe, think through and only then speak, as Hushai did when confronted with his adversary Ahitophel (2 Sam 17:1-14). For the value and wholesome effect of such words (cf. also 10:20f.; 12:18; 15:31f.). Schipper cites two late Egyptian instances where both the motif of the wholesome effect of speaking and that of speaking at the right time are found in different texts. In the Demotic teaching of Ankhsheshonq it is said,172 Do not say something when it is not the time for it. And in a tomb stele from Ptolemaic times, it says,173 How beautiful is it to do something effectual through words! In this case even the form of the exclamation, used in the Hebrew proverb, is applied to underline the importance of the insight. The Septuagint has another proverb in this place. οὐ μὴ ὑπακούσῃ ὁ κακὸς αὐτῇ οὐδὲ μὴ εἴπῃ καίριόν τι καὶ καλὸν τῷ κοινῷ. (The bad man will never obey it, nor ever say something suitable or good for the common good) It shows some influence of the Hebrew text, which may be due to the impact of v. 22 (cf. EE). Perhaps the feminine αὐτῇ is a pointer in this direction, since it seems to have βουλή of v. 22 as antecedent. Rashi (1040-1105) explains the first hemistich in a twofold way, based on the Talmud Erubin 54a. A man who answers softly, will be loved for it and can therefore be pleased. But reference to the mouth can also indicate that sages who have memorised the Torah and are therefore able to answer questions orally, find that joy follows. When a question about the timing of festivals and the like (“its time” in the second hemistich) is put, the answering expert himself finds joy in replying. So Rashi too rereads the first hemistich in the light of the second. Yonah Gerondi (1180-1263) warns against being satisfied with superficial answers, even if they are true. It is better to say only what is really appropriate in a situation. Bahya (12551340) illustrates with the impropriety of saying joyful things when people are mourning (cf. 25:20) or sad things when they rejoice. The Vilna Gaon (1720-1797) thinks the saying can support a scholar if he knows the answer to a question of halacha, and also if he appreciates the necessity to only give opinions in appropriate circumstances.

171 So Fox, with reference to Qoh 3:1-9, which however does not address the art of wellconceived speaking, but, in Zimmerli’s words, “die fallende Zeit” (falling time, i.e., time in terms of its inescapable content). 172 Ankhsheshonq 12, 24 (AEL III, 168). 173 Now in the Pushkin Museum, Moscow, No. 4102, l. 7 (after the citation of Schipper).

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15:24 The path of life goes upwards for the discerning, so that he may turn away from She’ol below. Two rhythmic patterns are possible. Toy opts for the pattern 3+3, reading as he does with the Masoretic accents. Gemser scans 4+4, which does not follow the Masoretes, but in this proverb is quite possible. The parallelism is progressive, because the final construction (‫ למען‬plus infinitive in the second hemistich) indicates the purpose of the upward path spoken of in the first half. The main issue in the proverb is how to interpret ‫( למעלה‬upwards)174 in the first hemistich and ‫( מטה‬below) in the second. The first has the preposition ‫ל‬ (towards) prefixed to it, but the second has not because it is already preceded by another preposition one word earlier, viz. ‫( מן‬from) to go with ‫( סור‬turn away). On both counts these are antitheses (up :: below, and towards :: away from), just as life and death are. However, the parallelism is not antithetic, since “upwards” and “away from below,” indicate the same direction. But it does contain antitheses. The path of life leading upwards ipso facto leads the discerning away from the underworld,175 which is where all go when they die. As often, the metaphor of the road here indicates the life lived on earth. If ‫ שאול‬is the abode of the physically dead, its counter pole must be physical life. Therefore there is no reason to understand the genitive construction with which the proverb begins (‫ארח חיים‬, the path of life) as the path towards life, which would logically force the interpretation that people already living are on their way towards life, which either is nonsensical or further forces the interpretation of ‫ חיים‬to mean “everlasting life” as opposed to “this life” – which cannot be upheld for ‫ חיים‬in the Old Testament; moreover, the phrase ‫ ארח חיים‬would have to denote a way through this life towards everlasting life – which it does not do elsewhere in the Old Testament; cf. the commentary above on 12:28, where this issue is also present and discussed at length. The conclusion is: The saying promises neither life after death nor a resurrection or immortality, but it envisages a course through the world without being entrapped by death and oriented in a positive direction towards God (cf. 6:23ff.; 10:17); cf. Toy, Oesterley, Gemser, Plöger, Meinhold, Tuinstra, Sæbø, Yoder, Lucas; similarly Fuhs, who however leaves open the possibility that the text may also intend a faint suggestion of a life not threatened by death. 174 ‫ מעל‬is derived from the verb ‫( עלה‬go up), probably as a noun indicating the upper part or top; it only occurs in adverbial or prepositional phrases, often (as here) with the ‫ ה‬locale to indicate direction. 175 The connotations of “up” and “down” (respectively positive and negative) are particularly clear in Qoh 3:21. In English, “up” can have both connotations (e.g. “up the social ladder” as opposed to an “uphill struggle”); for “down,” cf. to feel “down” as opposed to feeling “upbeat”.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

Not all interpreters agree, however. Waltke thinks that “upward … as an antithesis to downward in connection with the grave implies eternal life above and beyond the grave.” Even Delitzsch, while asserting that “Chokma appears to be pointing the possessor of wisdom upwards, and begins to shed light on the darkness of Sheôl,” still thinks it happens “only as a foreboding and an enigma.”176 Oesterley also thinks that the hereafter is implied “[a]s this verse stands.” He then eliminates the problem by deleting the two words causing it. McKane maintains that the ideas of “a blessed immortality” and “an after-life of punishment” are impossible for the time of the composition (as do the majority of modern commentators). Without mentioning Oesterley, he consequently follows him by deleting ‫ למעלה‬and ‫ מטה‬on the assumption that they were added in order to reinterpret the proverb for a time in which “heaven and hell” were thinkable. Such an interpretation finds some support in the Septuagint, which reads, ὁδοὶ ζωῆς διανοήματα συνετοῦ, ἵνα ἐκκλίνας ἐκ τοῦ ᾅδου σωθῇ. (The thoughts of an intelligent man are ways of life, so that, avoiding Hades, he may be saved) According to McKane, the Hebrew text can accommodate “downwards” to the underworld, but not “upwards” toward everlasting bliss. Therefore he deletes the two terms in question. Still, the Greek text does not say that the intelligent man goes to heaven, but that his thinking keeps him from the road to death (as envisaged in 7:2527; cf. 12:28). Tuinstra mentions an Egyptian text called “Sayings for the Way of Life,”177 which could echo the idea that wisdom is something for use on a road to be followed in this life. He also cites the praise for a deceased person as “one who did not leave the right path and did not forsake the right road.”178 This seems to suggest that the “right road” is a path for this life.

Deleting the troublesome words is however unnecessary. Toy’s argument that “upward” as used here is simply the negation of “beneath” and describes continuing life on earth above the underworld, only strengthens the case presented above why such a measure is superfluous. The message is: Being discerning as the sapiential tradition advises is a prosperous and life-affirming way to go. This can be determined without recourse to putative connections and cross-connections between v. 24 and vv. 19-23 as set out by Scherer.179 176 Delitzsch argues in the same fashion in his comments on 12:28 and 14:32b. A similar view is also espoused by Wildeboer, who denies any reference to an everlasting life after death in the proverb, but nevertheless thinks that this proverb, like 12:28, carries the germ of what later became the New Testament conviction of a life after death. 177 Instruction of Amunacht (probably between 1177 and 1158 BCE). 178 Citing De Meulenaere (1986, 139). 179 Scherer (1999, 176-178), with criticism of Scoralick (1995, 231) for neglecting semantic fields in her analysis, but with appreciation for Krispenz (1989, 76) for regarding v. 24 as

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

637

In rabbinic literature, the proverb is taken as a declaration that wisdom leads to life in the world to come. Rashi thinks that ‫ למעלה‬is similar to ‫ ממעל‬in Isa 6:2, which makes reference to the stance of seraphs “above” God, which means “in the service of.” So there is a “path of life” ready in heaven for the benefit of the wise person, which sounds like some prepared plan (however, this does not account for the ‫ ה‬locale indicating direction). The Mezudat David thinks the intention is that for the discerning person the path of life ascends upwards to God whence it came, and that it thus does not descend to Gehinnom (hell, not just the general realm of the dead as in the biblical use of ‫)שאול‬. This sounds very much like a reaction to the rhetorical question in Qoh 3:21. Bahya (14th century) has an original thought, claiming that ‫ ארח‬is used rather than ‫ דרך‬because the former relates to the participle Qal of the verbal root ‫ארח‬ (travel), meaning a (travelling) guest.180 So the wise person considers himself to be merely a temporary guest in a roadside inn and knows that he is on his way to his permanent residence.181 The Vilna Gaon considers humans to be in a constant state of spiritual instability, therefore constantly needing to move up lest they fall down. Therefore the discerning person chooses the path that leads up, so that he can be saved from ‫שאול‬. In his Scholia (No. 142) Evagrius of Pontus interprets the ὁδοὶ ζωῆς (ways of life) as the practical virtues that lead to knowledge. He implies that this knowledge (cf. the thoughts of the intelligent, v. 24a) in turn enables the one who has obtained it to be saved from Hades.

15:25 The house of the proud Yahweh will tear away, but he will secure the boundary of the widow. Two verbal sentences in antithetic parallelism make up the proverb. The rhythmic organisation is a clear-cut Siebener (4+3), with one stress beat per word. The syntactic pattern is chiastic: (‫יסח )יהוה‬ 182

‫גבול אלמנה‬

‫בית גאים‬ ‫ויצב‬

The verbs with their subjects (‫ יהוה‬and the third person masculine singular pronominal element in ‫ )ויצב‬make up the inner points and their objects (respectively the house of the proud and the boundary of the widow) form the outer frame. In 2:22 ‫ נסח‬means “tear out,” but here it evidently means “tear down” (Schipper). The second verb may look like a jussive (e in the second syllable a summary of the preceding verses, which makes it clear that true happiness is associated with the road that leads to life and away from the underworld. 180 Cf. English “wayfarer.” 181 Cf. 2 Cor 5:1, where the temporary sojourn on earth is mentioned, and Heb 4:11, where the journey to heaven is implied. 182 Waltke also describes the x-pattern, but – uncharacteristically – rather infelicitously: “the boundary of the wicked” should be “the boundary of the widow.”

638

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

instead of the expected î), but sometimes it can also be so vocalised in the indicative imperfect, as Deut 32:8 shows (Delitzsch). The “proud” are the arrogant who lack the most basic attitude required to be wise, namely to accept authority, primarily of teachers and God (cf. 3:11; 12:1). But in this proverb it goes further than that. Commentators often rightly state that the “proud” people stand for the oppressors (Waltke calls it a metonymy for those who exalt themselves against humans and thus also against God). The widow, again, is the classic figure representing helplessness (so, among others, Yoder, Hausmann,183 Van Leeuwen, Sæbø), which is well documented in the Old Testament as the antithesis of arrogant oppressors and the helpless. In this proverb she serves as representative for all oppressed people; so Meinhold, who gives many examples from “all three parts of the Hebrew Bible;” likewise, Scherer184 Van Leeuwen, Plöger, and others, indicating how widespread the phenomenon was and how important it was regarded in all the literary forms of ancient Israel. The widow is a woman without a male protector (for which reason she could return to her pre-nuptial family, as illustrated by Orpah in the Book of Ruth), which makes such a woman very exploitable, especially since she has limited access to protection from the courts (cf. Fox). She is often mentioned with the other two typical figures of social weakness, viz. the orphan (‫)יָ תוֹם‬185 and the foreigner (‫ )גֵּ ר‬who has come to the land (Deut 10:18). Frequently she is also mentioned parallel to other weak people, such as the ‫( ָענִ י‬the poor, Zech 7:10) and the ‫( ַשׁ ֻכּ ָלה‬childless woman, Jer 18:21). In the Torah comprehensive prescriptions are given for the treatment of widows (e.g. Deut 14:28-29; 16:11, 14; 24:17-22; 27:19). They are to be treated with objective fairness, their socially weak status neither being taken advantage of nor affording them unfair preference (Ex 23:3; Lev 19:15). Such clear legal stipulations, sayings (Prov 14:31; 19:17; 22:9; 23:19), as well as narratives (e.g. 2 Kgs 8:5), prophetic texts (e.g. Isa 5:8186) and even a whole biblical book like Ruth,187 show that there must have been good reason to combat exploitation of the socially weak in Israel. Prov 15:25 addresses this situation.188

The syntactic chiasmus matches the x-pattern of the contents exactly. Whereas the self-assertive oppressors stand against the powerless widow, what happens 183 Hausmann (1995, 155) points out that direct intervention of God in defence of the poor is typical of prophetic, but not of sapiential literature. That shows the importance of the topic for the sages even more. 184 Scherer (1999, 178). 185 A good description of the oppression the widow had to contend with, is given in Job 24:2-3: removing of landmarks, seizing of flocks, and animals needed by widows and orphans for sustenance (so Yoder). 186 For Old Testament statistics of ‫א ְל ָמנָ ה‬, ַ see THAT I, 169. 187 In the story of Ruth the theme of widowhood and its social and financial vicissitudes is dominant, without the word ‫ ַא ְל ָמנָ ה‬being mentioned. This demonstrates that a word and a concept are not the same thing, as is often assumed in (mostly) older literature (also in German literature: Wort and Begriff). 188 Cf. Fensham (1962, 134-137); also Sandoval (2006, 145-153).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

639

to her is diametrically opposed to what happens to them (similarly Plöger). Their property is destroyed and hers is secured. That assumes that she has land. Women did not usually own land, but there are exceptions (Num 27:111; Ruth 4:3, 9; 1 Kgs 17:1-24; 2 Kgs 4:1-7; 8:1-6). Nevertheless, despite the exceptions and the cases where they do seem to have had direct recourse to the courts,189 their legal leverage was restricted so that they were reliant on their husbands or male relatives. If there were none, they were dependent on the goodwill of the community. Even the injunction to respect the boundaries of property owned by all other people (Deut 19:14, which is echoed in Prov. 22:28, 23:10) was difficult to apply by widows with limited or no male backup. Therefore such prescriptions had to be bolstered with religious warnings – either that Yahweh himself190 will oversee the case of the widow and associated powerless (22:22-23; 23:11), or by threatening transgressors (21:13; 23:11), even with a serious divine curse (Deut 27:17). On the positive side, God can be involved in the issue as an incentive for reward, because helping the poor is a loan to God himself (19:17). In Prov 15:25 the divine intervention features in both hemistichs, negatively in the first and positively in the second. The first half is a warning that landgrabbers (Isa 5:8) will find that their houses will be destroyed (as Isa 5:9 says). The second half of the proverb declares that God will establish justice (cf. Mic 4:3), so that no one will intimidate any owners of vines and fig trees on their land (cf. Mic 4:4). The same situation was also known and criticised elsewhere in the ancient Near East, for instance, in Amenemope VII, 11 – VIII, 16:191 Do not move the markers on the borders of fields, nor shift the position of the measuring cord. Do not be greedy for a cubit of land, nor encroach on the boundaries of a widow. … Recognise him who does this on earth: He is an oppressor of the weak, … His house is an enemy of the town, his storage bins will be destroyed; his wealth will be seized from his children’s hands. 189 Fox claims that they had no direct access at all to the courts, which seems to be contradicted by 2 Kgs 8:5-6 and perhaps also the story of the daughters of Zelophehad in Num 27:1f. 190 Strongly endorsed by Fuhs; this verse is one of the proverbs advanced by Millar (2020, 117) in her (warranted) rejection of the grand proposition by Koch ([1955] 1972, 130-180) that the agency behind the nexus of deed and consequence is impersonal, “with Yahweh relegated to the position of midwife.” 191 Cited by Meinhold; partly quoted in Dutch by Tuinstra; for the full text, see AEL II, 151.

640

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

Rashi (11th-12th century) applies the second hemistich as a reference to the restitution of Jewish homes to their owners who return after having been exiled. While Ramaq simply paraphrases, Radaq (both 12th century) sees a prayer in the verse, notably for the demolition of Edom (standing for Rome) and the reinstitution of the borders of the exiled widow Israel. Similarly, Gerondi (13th century) applies the proverb to a “widowed nation,” meaning a nation deprived of its own land. He also points out that some interpret the verse as a prayer for the protection of widows and orphans and for the humiliation of oppressors (so Fox). Gerondi links the proverb with v. 24 (the way going up, i.e., into the hereafter). Who focuses on the present era becomes arrogant and thinks of his house as permanent, but will find that it is destroyed (Ps 49:12ff.).192 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra sees a connection of the first hemistich to 2:22, where it is expressly stated that the wicked will be exterminated from the land and those who deceive others will be “torn” (‫ )יסחו‬out of the land. These are robbers who forcefully appropriate possessions belonging to their neighbours. Malbim stresses that God will intervene on the side of the widow on whose property the arrogant encroaches. The Vilna Gaon sees the house of the arrogant as Edom, and expects the expansion of Israel’s territory when Edom is destroyed. I found no use made of the proverb in patristic literature, which was a surprise in light of the prominence of widows and care for them in the New Testament (e.g. Mark 12:41-44; Luke 7:11-17; Acts 6:1; 8:39; 1 Tim 5:3, 5; 16; Jas 1:27) as well as the arrogant rich (e.g. Luke 12:16ff.; 16:19ff.).

15:26 The plans of an evil man are an abomination to Yahweh, but pleasant words are pure. The rhythm is unusual, which may be a reason why Toy deviates from his normal practice of giving his view on the rhythm in a short note. According to Gemser, it is 4+3, which he prefers to the abnormal pattern of 4+2, to which the Masoretic accents point.193 Gemser’s scan seems to prefer the unusual but not impossible presence of a stressed syllable followed by another to what would be an unorthodox pattern of one verset with four stresses plus another with only two stresses. The former is the lesser of two hurdles and leaves us with a stich of seven stresses to seven words. The verse is made up of two nominal clauses with an identical syntactic arrangement: 192 Cf. the parable of Jesus in Luke 16:19-31 about the arrogant rich man and the poor Lazarus, according to which not merely his property, but he himself is destroyed in this life and in the hereafter. For Gerondi’s idea of the humiliation of the arrogant rich, cf. also Luke 12:16-21. 193 The first word of the second hemistich (‫ )וּ ְ֝טה ִ ֹ֗ר ים‬has the double marking rebiac mugrash, which is a strong disjunctive accent, but the following two words (‫)א ְמ ֵר י־ ֹֽנ ַעם‬ ִ have the maqqeph, which is a conjunctive or binding sign. That avoids two adjacent stressed syllables, but results in a pattern of 4+2 accents, which is quite irregular.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

641

‫מחשבות רע‬

‫תעבת יהוה‬

subject

predicate

‫אמרי־נעם‬

‫וטהרים‬

subject

predicate

The fact that the predicate stands in the first position both times highlights the contrast between purity and impurity. The second half of the proverb is often thought to be “unclear” (so, for example, Lucas). Toy thinks that the second verset “cannot be original,” since the parallelism “calls for something which is not an offence to Yahweh.” According to him, ‫( טהור‬pure) is not a proper contrast to ‫( תועבה‬abomination), since the correct contrast to ‫ טהור‬should be ‫( טצא‬unclean). But this objection is hardly acceptable. First, because antithetical parallelism seldom works with precise lexicographical opposites. In the second place, the possible cultic background of the terms in question no longer plays a role in the proverb. Finally, the adjective ‫ טהור‬does not always have to be used in a cultic sense (e.g. Lev 7:19), but can also describe the quality of metals (e.g. Job 28:19) and be used in a general sense (e.g. Ezk 36:25). As Schipper points out, the friendly words (an expression also occurring in 16:24) are linked to God. The antithetical relationship with the first half shows that the words intended are pleasing to God, because they contrast with plans that are abominable to him (and so are very close in meaning to ‫[ רצונו‬his pleasure], the normal antithesis to ‫[ תועבה‬Fox]). Moreover, in this light the hemistich is analogous to v. 8b (which also follows on a ‫ תועבה‬saying in v. 8a). In both cases pleasing words are related to God, in v. 8 directly, and in v. 26 mediated by the parallelism. The parallelism can be summarised: v. 26a abomination to Yahweh inward plans evil man

:: ಩ :: ಩

v. 26b pure [to Yahweh] pleasant expressions [good man]

It is neither said that the pleasant words are spoken by the opposite number of the evil man of the first hemistich, nor that they are pure in the eyes of Yahweh. But once one has read the first hemistich, this information is provided for understanding the second half. In addition to the expressly stated contrast of abominable and pure, the proverb also contrasts the inner plans of people and the outward expression of those thoughts, as well as evil people

642

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

with (implied) good people. Possible cultic overtones may linger, but in this proverb the utterance is ethical.194 The Septuagint reflects the translator’s own idea of what the parallelism should entail: βδέλυγμα κυρίῳ λογισμὸς ἄδικος, ἁγνῶν δὲ ῥήσεις σεμναί. (An abomination to the Lord is unjust thinking, but the words of the pure are respectable)

The parallelism of the Hebrew text probably seemed as problematic to the Greek translator as to later commentators (see above on Toy’s protestations), which was solved by a Greek rendering that involved a word order not present in the Hebrew. The word for “pure” (ἁγνός) is drawn into the subject of the nominal clause and placed in the first position of the second hemistich, which then results in a chiasmus that supplants the direct parallelism of the Hebrew: predicate

subject

βδέλυγμα κυρίῳ

λογισμὸς ἄδικος

ἁγνῶν δὲ ῥήσεις

σεμναί

subject

predicate

The Hebrew contrast between thinking/planning and spoken words is maintained, whereas the unmentioned speakers of the words are now introduced by using the Greek adjective ἁγνός (pure)195 as a substantive, so that the speakers of these words are no longer implicit as in the Hebrew, but expressed. The utterances of these people are respectable because they themselves are “pure” people. The Greek does not change the ethical drift of the Hebrew, but perhaps makes it easier for the readers of its time to understand its expression. Ramaq interpreted the first words as the thoughts of an evil person, but the alternative reading (“thoughts of evil,” that is, evil thoughts or plans) is favoured by the Mezudat David, where it is interpreted as intentionally camouflaged thoughts. That means a person says kind things, but the plans they hide behind the misleading words are evil. In Ramaq’s opinion, the purity of the words of the good people is like pure silver, without dross. In turn, Ralbag combines the two hemistichs in the sense that the thoughts of pure people (‫ )טהרים‬become pleasant (‫)נעם‬. At v. 26 John Chrysostom resumes his exposition that was interrupted after v. 17. However, it is very terse. He limits his attention to the first half, merely saying that there is much to examine not only in deeds and actions, but also in thought. Here 194 Similarly Schipper, but with a slightly different emphasis: even if the context of Prov 15 suggests that the proverb expresses an ethical category by virtue of the purity concept, a cultic dimension still is present. Cf. Yoder on the blurring effect of the use of cultic language in a moral sense. 195 Like the Hebrew ‫טהור‬, the Greek ἁγνός can also be used in a ceremonial (Phil 4:8) as well as an ethical (2 Cor 7:11) sense.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

643

he uses two synonyms for a concept present in neither the Hebrew nor the Greek text (deeds), and ignores the concept of words altogether, even though it occurs in both the Hebrew and the Greek.

15:27 Who makes unjust gain disturbs his house, but who hates gifts will live. The rhythmic pattern is 4+3. Toy seems to prefer 3+3, but offers no argument and accepts 4+3 as well. The patah furtivum in ‫בּוֹצ ַע ָבּ ַצע‬ ֵ avoids the problem of two stressed syllables, so that we may agree with Gemser on 4+3. Two verbal clauses are used, the first with a participle for the main verb and the second with an imperfect. The syntax is again patterned crosswise to form a chiasmus: subject

predicate

‫בוצע בצע‬

‫עכר ביתו‬

‫יחיה‬

‫שונא מתנות‬

predicate

subject

The verb ‫( עכר‬trouble, disturb) has already been used in v. 6. The parallelism with the verb ‫( חיה‬live) suggests that the house this person destroys is his own household,196 that is, his family including his own life. Making unjust gain (‫ )בוצע בצע‬is a figura etymologica, where the verb and its object are etymologically related, which draws attention and is thus stylistically highlighted. The phenomenon of unjust gain is already mentioned in 1:19,197 where it is expressly said that such behaviour costs the perpetrator his life. Conversely, in 28:16 hating unjust gain is said to bestow a long life. In v. 27 the destruction of the house belonging to the unjust gain grabber is specified by its parallel in the last hemistich, where the one who hates gifts is promised that “he will live” (prefix conjugation Qal). In the same way, the character of the gifts also becomes clear. As Waltke states, a (‫ מתנ)ה‬is a gift with or without ulterior motives, but in sapiential literature it always appears as a gift with the intention of influencing the decisions of others to one’s own advantage (cf. 17:23; 18:16; 19:6; 21:14; Qoh 7:7). In other words, it is a bribe. So, the unjust gain is the profit made by the receipt of bribes, which is denounced 196 So Gemser, Ringgren; Waltke cites the example of Gehazi (2 Kgs 5:20-27), who destroyed his house and offspring by overturning his master Elisha’s rejection of Naaman’s gift and accepted it (probably inspired by Saadia Gaon, see below). 197 Cf. 1 Sam 8:3; cf. the different but similar formulation, Isa 33:15; Jer 22:17; Ezk 22:13.

644

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

in the Torah (Ex 23:8; Deut 16:19). According to this proverb, it is selfdestructive and illustrates the general declaration made by 5:22.198 The antithetic parallelism is again clear on the stylistic level (seeking bribes :: hating bribes, destroying a household :: living a life), but when the two hemistichs are taken together, they give the same warning against bribes and therefore support each other in their educational effect.199 Several commentators (e.g. Oesterley, McKane, Tuinstra, Schipper) refer to Egyptian texts that parallel or illumine the proverb. So Amenemope:200 Do not accept a gift of a powerful man and deprive the weak for his sake.

Ankhsheshonq says,201 Do not accept a gift if you are not going to make a contract. In the Septuagint an additional proverb is added at this point (v. 27A): ἐλεημοσύναις καὶ πίστεσιν ἀποκαθαίρονται ἁμαρτίαι, τῷ δὲ φόβῳ κυρίου ἐκκλίνει πᾶς ἀπὸ κακοῦ. (By deeds of kindness and loyalty sins are cleansed, and by the fear of the Lord everyone turns away from evil) It is a translation of the Hebrew proverb at 16:6. In its position in the Septuagint it can be read as a general positive counterpart of 15:27. Prov 15:27A is the first of a series of drastic differences between the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint, spanning 15:27–16:9 (see the excursus below). Saadia Gaon (10th century) compares Gehazi’s destroying his own house (see above) by accepting gifts, and cites the opposite mentality displayed by Elijah (2 Kgs 5:27) and Abraham (Gen 14:23), who rejected even neutral gifts. Rashi interprets ‫בוצע‬ ‫ בצע‬as being greedy for gain (which is also found in some English translations, e.g. Toy, Oesterley, Murphy). A fortiori the verse then means that he who hates gifts, as 198 In the Septuagint (“The taker of gifts destroys himself, / but who hates gift taking is saved”) the major concepts in the Hebrew text – unjust gain and gifts, house destruction, and the promise of life – are all correctly interpreted as bribes (δωρολήμπτης and δώρων λήμψεις), self-destruction (ἐξόλλυμι ἑαυτὸν) and being saved (σῴζειν). 199 The unambiguous condemnation of bribes in this verse is not contradicted by the positive evaluation in 13:8 of wealth as a ‫( כּ ֶֹפר‬ransom) for the rich man’s life. The spirit of that proverb cannot be equated with the view of the Demotic Papyrus Insinger (Eleventh Instruction, X, 8; AEL III, 193), where the effect of a bribe is stressed in the context of a system of selfprotection (see Schipper, who refers to Prov 13:8 in that connection). A ransom is not the same as a bribe and paying it is not unjust gain for the payer; cf. the commentary on 13:8 and the references given there. It is moreover quite doubtful whether Prov 15:27 can be pitted against 17:23 (as Pilch [2016, 186] does). According to Pilch, this illustrates a case of “normative inconsistency,” whereby contradictory situations are considered and a choice is made “that should yield a positive outcome.” However, bribes are always deemed to yield a positive outcome (17:8) by the receiver and the giver alike and is nevertheless constantly condemned as evil in sapiential literature. Even 17:8 does not commend or condone bribing but describes its effect. 200 XXI, 3-4 (AEL II, 158). 201 17, 6 (AEL III, 172).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

645

a person who is not greedy, must also hate the kind of robbery that bribing in essence is. Ramaq (12th century) remarks that hating gifts, meaning as it does to hate unjust gain, does not mean hating money itself. Pseudo-Ibn Ezra however, connects the proverb to judges and high officials who are corrupted in favour of those who can bribe them and equates them with the princes denounced in Ezk 22:27. Gerondi (13th century) expands the theological significance of the proverb with the idea that any form of unjust gain introduces the principle of lust in a person. Those who hate it however show that they wish to live by the help of God and their own labour. His near contemporary, Bahya, sees life without accepting gifts as possible only for people who trust in God, who will provide their sustenance. The provision of sustenance by God for those who trust in him is also mentioned by the 18th century Mezudat David. That is rewarded with a long life, which only God can give. The Vilna Gaon thinks that who hates gifts, will joyfully live long because they are not stressed by having to wait for gifts that may or may not come. Ignatius (c. 35-107)202 makes a short reference to v. 27A (as backing for an admonition to support the poor), but not to v. 27 itself. John Chrysostom (347-407) comments on both proverbs. First, he interprets the bribe as corruption of the receiver rather than the giver, for it is the former who comes under pressure to commit many crimes. Second, v. 27A is thought to indicate how sins can be atoned for as well as how sin can be avoided altogether. Similarly, John Cassian (c. 360-435)203 uses v. 27A in the context of an argument on the fruits of penitence. He says that compassion and faith can “sometimes” remove the stains of sin. Excursus on the Greek Version of Prov 15:27A–16:9 Between 15:27 and 16:9, three verses of the Masoretic Text (15:31; 16:1; 16:3204) are not represented in the Septuagint, two Septuagint verses (16:7; 16:8) have no equivalent in the Masoretic Text, and three further verses in the Septuagint (15:28A; 15:29A; 15:29B) are relocated from respectively 16:7, 8 and 9 in the Masoretic Text. This results in the whole range being one verse shorter in the Septuagint (fourteen verses) than in the Masoretic Text (fifteen verses). The Greek text is as follows:205 15:27A ἐλεημοσύναις καὶ πίστεσιν ἀποκαθαίρονται ἁμαρτίαι, τῷ δὲ φόβῳ κυρίου ἐκκλίνει πᾶς ἀπὸ κακοῦ. (By deeds of kindness and loyalty sins are cleansed, and by the fear of the Lord everyone turns away from evil) 202

Epist Hero, V (ANF I, 114). Confer XX, 8 (NPNF II,11, 500). 204 Not counting 16:4, which is missing in the Septuagint, but the proverb appearing at 16:9 in the Septuagint resembles the Hebrew proverb that now stands at 16:4 in the Masoretic Text. 205 At this point there is a handy table in EE (also, with some variations, in the earlier work by Fox [2009, 1009]), providing a bird’s-eye overview of the verse sequence in the Septuagint and the corresponding verse numbers of the Masoretic Text. There is perhaps some unclarity as to the matching of the first and second hemistichs of both the Greek and the Hebrew texts, particularly in the presentation of the Greek 16:2 a, b compared to the Hebrew 16:2 a, b, and the relation between the Hebrew 16:4 and both the Greek 16:2 and its 16:9. A similar summary is also provided by Scoralick (1995, 56), although not in tabular form. See also Tuinstra, who gives a Dutch translation of the relevant verses. 203

646

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

15:28 καρδίαι δικαίων μελετῶσιν πίστεις, στόμα δὲ ἀσεβῶν ἀποκρίνεται κακά. (The hearts of righteous people think on loyalty, but the mouth of wicked people answers with evil) 15:28A

(corresponds to 16:7 in MT)

δεκταὶ παρὰ κυρίῳ ὁδοὶ ἀνθρώπων δικαίων, διὰ δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ φίλοι γίνονται. (Acceptable to the Lord are the ways of righteous people, through them even enemies become friends) 15:29 μακρὰν ἀπέχει ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ ἀσεβῶν, εὐχαῖς δὲ δικαίων ἐπακούει. (God stays far from the impious, the prayers of the righteous he hears) 15:29A

(corresponds to 16:8 in MT)

κρείσσων ὀλίγη λῆμψις μετὰ δικαιοσύνης ἢ πολλὰ γενήματα μετὰ ἀδικίας. (Rather little income with righteousness than much produce with injustice) 15:29B

(corresponds to 16:9 in MT)

καρδία ἀνδρὸς λογιζέσθω δίκαια, ἵνα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ διορθωθῇ τὰ διαβήματα αὐτοῦ. (Let the heart of a man plan righteous things, so that his steps may be made straight by God) 15:30 θεωρῶν ὀφθαλμὸς καλὰ εὐφραίνει καρδίαν, φήμη δὲ ἀγαθὴ πιαίνει ὀστᾶ. (The eye that sees good things gladdens the heart, and good news refreshes the bones) 15:32 ὃς ἀπωθεῖται παιδείαν, μισεῖ ἑαυτόν· ὁ δὲ τηρῶν ἐλέγχους ἀγαπᾷ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. (Who rejects instruction hates himself, but who pays attention to reproofs loves his soul) 15:33 φόβος θεοῦ παιδεία καὶ σοφία, καὶ ἀρχὴ δόξης ἀποκριθήσεται αὐτῇ. (Fear of God is instruction and wisdom, and the beginning of honour is to respond to it)

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16:2 πάντα τὰ ἔργα τοῦ ταπεινοῦ φανερὰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, οἱ δὲ ἀσεβεῖς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κακῇ ὀλοῦνται. (All the works of the lowly are open before God, but wicked people will perish on a bad day) 16:5 ἀκάθαρτος παρὰ θεῷ πᾶς ὑψηλο κάρδιος, χειρὶ δὲ χεῖρας ἐμβαλὼν ἀδίκως οὐκ ἀθῳωθήσεται. (Impure before God is every haughty heart, who gives his hand in surety will not remain unpunished) 16:7

(differs from 16:7 in MT) ἀρχὴ ὁδοῦ ἀγαθῆς τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια, δεκτὰ δὲ παρὰ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ θύειν θυσίας. (The beginning of the good way is to do righteous deeds, more acceptable to God than the offering of sacrifices)

16:8

(differs from 16:8 in MT) ὁ ζητῶν τὸν κύριον εὑρήσει γνῶσιν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης, οἱ δὲ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦντες αὐτὸν εὑρήσουσιν εἰρήνην. (Who seeks the Lord will find knowledge with righteousness and who seek him uprightly will find peace)

16:9

(resembles 16:4 in MT) πάντα τὰ ἔργα τοῦ κυρίου μετὰ δικαιοσύνης, φυλάσσεται δὲ ὁ ἀσεβὴς εἰς ἡμέραν κακήν. (All the works of the Lord are [done] with justice, the impious is held for the evil day)

There has been much debate about how these discrepancies came about. Should they be ascribed to redactional work in the Hebrew transmission, to relocations brought about in the Greek transmission, or to the translator? According to Tov,206 the differing order of the proverbs in this section as well as the plusses and minuses in the Septuagint point to differing Hebrew recensions, one of which is reflected in the Masoretic Text and the other in the Septuagint. This is opposed by Scoralick,207 who thinks that a creative translator must be responsible for the differences. She remarks that Tov’s claim can easily be made by one who presupposes a relatively arbitrary order of proverbs both in the Hebrew and in the Greek texts.208 She, on the other hand, finds it significant that in four cases within the section, the Tetragrammaton of the Masoretic 206

Tov ([1990] 1999, 51-52). Scoralick (1995, 56-61). 208 Scoralick (1995, 57). However, it has to be said that Tov ([1990] 1999, 52) states that the sequence of “most” (not all) sayings in these chapters is “loose” (Tov does not say arbitrary, “willkürlich” or “beliebig”) and that each saying is “more or less” independent (i.e., some may have more connection to surrounding sayings than others do). By the same token, Scoralick works from the opposite supposition, which may also slant the interpretation of evidence. 207

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

text is not translated by κύριος as usual, but by θεός, a fact that has also impressed Tuinstra. However, this is not as significant as she presents it, since it often happens (more than a fifth of the occurrences of the Tetragrammaton in the book, according to EE). So, we have no conclusive argument that the variations are to be attributed to a creative translator. D’Hamonville209 proposes the thesis that not an early, but a late reworking of the Hebrew text created the differences. He also works with the rendering of ‫ יהוה‬by θεός. His argument is based on the observation that the ratio of cases where the Greek uses θεός for ‫ יהוה‬is high in these verses. But this seems to me a very narrow basis for such a fundamental proposal. Moreover, it does not take the use of other lexemes in the bloc into account (see below).210 In my opinion, it seems best to accept a non liquet situation in which we can neither fully explain the relocations in the section, nor the absence in the Septuagint of verses that are present in the Masoretic Text. However, what EE calls an “enhanced … cohesiveness” in the Greek version of this section does seem to be borne out by the spread of several words in the section: the root δικαί- (indicated above by underlining), and the lexemes πίστις (double underlining), καρδία (simple bold), παιδείαν (broken line) and the phrase παρὰ θεῷ (italics). This could only have been done by the translator. Although it does not bring about a tight cohesion,211 it may be evidence of the translator’s hand in providing a Greek rendering of a Hebrew text already containing relocations. At any rate, the cluster that came about in these verses, is not an integrated, closely crafted composition.

15:28 The heart of the righteous reflects in order to answer, but the mouth of wicked people blurts out evil things. Toy judges the rhythm as ternary, which probably suggests that he follows the Masoretic accents at the first and the last word pairs. But there is no reason why the most natural pattern of 4+4 (one accent per word) as proposed by Gemser should not be accepted. Both the subject of the first hemistich (‫ )צדיק‬and the object of the second (‫ )רעות‬show that the proverb is about an ethical virtue and the lack of it. The verb ‫ הגה‬Qal212 can mean “to murmur” or to “consider.” In light of the infinitive of purpose213 ‫ לענות‬it must mean the latter in this proverb (so most 209

D’Hamonville (2000, 45-47). Another objection is made by Fox (EE), namely that the whole theory presupposes that the Hebrew redactors of Proverbs ignored 15:33–16:9. That this could happen is possible but highly unlikely. 211 In this regard Fox (EE) speaks of the “cohesiveness” enhanced within the unit, which is a somewhat vague term. I would rather describe the phenomenon by the text-linguistic terminus technicus “cohesion” (that is, the formal connections of the components on the surface) as opposed to “coherence” (the thematic flow or fundamental constellations within a text); cf. RDLW II, 280. 212 In the Book of Proverbs the verb occurs only three times, the other two being 8:7 and 24:2. 213 See GKC 114f ; IBHS 36.2.3d. 210

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

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commentators) rather than the former (so Meinhold). Since the heart is the organ of thought, ‫ לב‬is a synecdoche for the act of thinking. The righteous thoughtfully consider before responding.214 Of course that is an intellectual act, but not only that (cf. Toy), because a ‫ צדיק‬speaks the opposite of evil, that is, what is ethically right. On the other hand, the wicked are evil and say evil things (‫)רעות‬. But in their case too, another dimension is part of the equation, namely the opposite of rational consideration, which is its absence. They simply bubble out215 continuously (cf. above on 15:2), which in view of the contrast means they blurt out thoughtlessly.216 The parallelism can be summarised: v. 28a the heart of the righteous reflects

:: ::

v. 28b the mouth of the wicked

to answer [good things]

:: ಧ

[thoughtlessly] blurts out evil things

The reflective thinking of the first hemistich is left without counterpart in the second, while the quality of what is spoken is gapped in the first half and mentioned only in the second. However, the power of the parallelism enables the reader/hearer to supply the idea of thoughtless blabbering from the motif of reflection in the first half, and to infer the positive quality of what is answered from its opposite in the second half (confirmed, of course, by the fact that it is a righteous person who does the speaking). The Septuagint worked along these lines. It inferred from the “bad things” that the things contemplated by the righteous must be positive, which it construed as social kindness. What the righteous people consider, is loyalty (translated by πίστεις as the equivalent of ‫)חסד‬. Rashi only stresses the reflective character of righteous people, but centuries later the Mezudat David emphasised the opposite tendency of the wicked. This (certainly correctly) exploits the verb ‫ נבע‬Hiphil (bubble, flow like a fountain) to suggest the continuous flow of words made possible by the lack of reflection. Bahya (13th-14th century) finds the purpose of the antithesis in the opportunity offered the reader to emulate the one and avoid the other. An interesting addition is that he associates ‫ ַל ֲענוֹת‬with 214 For Hausmann (1995, 190), good speaking can only happen after first thinking matters through, which she adduces against Bühlmann (1976, 185-186) who suggests an internal discussion with the self. 215 Cf. Millar (2020, 205-206) on the image of water that streams (‫ )נבע‬down a wadi, sometimes a positive, life-sustaining phenomenon (Ps 110:7), sometimes a dangerous torrent, for which she refers to Prov 15:2, 28 as illustrations. Words can wreak the same destruction as such a wadi when it overwhelms people (cf. Ps 94:4). 216 Ankhsheshonq (7, 23-24) warns against hastily blurting out whatever comes to one’s mind (Schipper).

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‫( ֵל ָענֹת‬to be humbled) in Ex 10:3. The righteous thus think humble thoughts and accordingly speak with humility. According to Pseudo-Ibn Ezra, the righteous think how they can speak pleasingly to people (‫ יטב‬Hiphil, cf. v. 2a). He backs up the contrast of good and bad speaking with references to Ps 49:4 (positive) and Ps 94:4 (negative). Athanasius (298-373)217 quotes the second half of the proverb to object to wicked people intruding into the church in order to take part in the feast. They praise God only for that purpose, which is not acceptable, since the proverb says that the wicked speak wicked things. Athanasius appeals to Paul, who according to him denies that admitting wicked people is admissible, since there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor 6:14). On the other hand, Evagrius Ponticus has a much more lenient approach. He appeals to v. 28A (“enemies become friends”) to argue that those already in the church should see to it that Christ can say to all, established members and newcomers alike, “I no longer call you servants, but friends” (John 15:15). A Note on Proverbs 15:29-33 A glance at the table under “Chapter organisation” in the Introduction to this chapter shows that several commentators take the verses at the end of Prov 15 as a cluster or as two clusters. Even commentators not in the table and some who keep proverb clusters at arm’s length, such as Weeks218 and Fox, think that these verses are linked in some way. That is indeed the case, but the verses do not form a closely-knit group. Their association is loose, so it is appropriate that Fox calls vv. 29-33 a “proverb string.” It is perhaps even more appropriate when one thinks of his own critical image of proverbs in neat little piles of jewels.219 These last proverbs of the chapter can indeed be thought of as a little string of pearls or gems rather than as a neat little heap, and not so very symmetric at that. Fox describes the string as follows: “Verses 29-33 form a proverb string, with vv. 29-32 sharing the theme of hearing. Verse 31 speaks about hearing reproof, and vv. 32-33 continue the topic of reproof, using the word musar ‘discipline.’” That sounds more symmetric than the verses really are. Not just “the theme” of hearing, but different motifs220 that have to do with hearing; not just catchwords, but different lexemes associated with aspects of hearing; not just different lexemes for reproof, but different combinations of the differing terms – all of this makes for a quite asymmetric string. 217

Easter Letter VII, for AD 334 (NPNF II, 4, 524). Weeks (1999, 66), in a critique of scholars who propose Yahwistic reinterpretations by means of insertions, denies any thematic connection of v. 29 with its context, while Fox speaks of the shared theme of hearing. Weeks does however concede that v. 29 is “linked” to a “series” in vv. 30-32 via the root ‫שמע‬, claiming that this provides “a more convincing explanation for the position” of v. 29 together with the following three verses [my italics]. Catchword links thus do not constitute thematic unity, but can provide evidence of a looser redactional positioning of proverbs. 219 Fox (2009, 481); see the Introduction, Par. 2.2.2, and the Introduction to Chapter 15 above. 220 Motifs are concepts or the smallest units of meaning (RDLW II, 638), carried by words and are the building blocks for a theme, which is a thought constellation, built up out of various subordinate elements (RDLW III, 634). 218

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

651

• Vv. 29 and 30 do share the root ‫שמע‬, but the first one means God’s responding favourably to a prayer (German “erhören,” not “hören”). And, in the parallelism of v. 30, the root ‫ שמע‬stands in the passive participle and is used as a substantive meaning “news.” Moreover, it goes hand in glove with seeing, whether one emends the text or not. • Vv. 31 and 32 likewise share the root ‫ שמע‬with each other, but in the meaning “pay heed to” or “obey,” with ‫תוכחת‬-reproof as its object, once (in v. 32) in antithetical parallelism with ‫מוסר‬-discipline. • V. 33 does share the ‫מוסר‬-discipline with v. 32, but not the different – albeit related – ‫תוכחת‬-reproof.221 It ends with the motif of humility as a precondition for honour. So the associations are asymmetric – strung together redactionally and therefore worthy of being kept in mind as such, but not sufficiently so to be treated as a poetically polished construction.222 Therefore I will discuss each in its own right, while not losing sight of the fact that they hang by a string.

15:29 Yahweh is far from the wicked, but he hears the prayer of the righteous. Toy scans this verse too as ternary, this time apparently not allowing the same accents at the beginning to influence him as in the previous verse. Gemser has 3+4, which must be an error, since both hemistichs have three words only – thus, 3+3. The proverb begins with a nominal clause that opens with the predicate (v. 29a) and follows it up by a verbal clause that ends with the predicate (v. 29b). The antithesis between hearing a prayer and being far from people means that the latter entails not reacting positively to prayers. That is borne out by several cases where the nearness of God and people to each other is mentioned in the context of prayer or where the prayers spoken by people come near to God (e.g. Ps 119:169-170; 1 Kgs 8:59). Clearer still is Deut 4:7: “Which great nation has gods so near (‫ )קרוב‬to them as Yahweh our God whenever we call (‫ )קרא‬to him?” In the rhetorical question this means that he is near when the people call to him. He has an enduring favourable 221 The fact that ‫ מוסר‬and ‫ תוכחת‬are often associated does not mean that they are identical. ‫ מוסר‬is the more generic term and can contain or give ‫( תוכחת‬e.g. 6:23); so Fox himself ([2000, 34]). While ‫ תוכחת‬is reproof or a correction, ‫ מוסר‬has a broader semantic range; it can be more than the instrument to get a lesson across, viz. the lesson itself, the substance of the lesson, and even moral teaching; see Fox ([2000, 35]) on 4:1, 13; 8:10; 19:20 and elsewhere. Cf. also Heim (2013, 396), who only says the two words are “near synonyms,” linking vv. 31-33. But this only works in two groups: vv. 31-32 around ‫ תוכחת‬and vv. 32-33 around ‫מוסר‬. 222 Even Heim (2013, 397) has to acknowledge that his section 15:28-33 has a “less integrated nature;” cf. also his earlier work on the delimitation of 15:28-29 in Heim (2001, 203-204).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

inclination towards their prayer. Not only the favourable reaction to (hearing of) a specific prayer is expressed here, but also the principle of God’s benevolent approachability. This is echoed in the clearest terms possible when Ps 145:18 states that God is near (‫ )קרוב‬to all who call (‫ )קרא‬to him in truth. Likewise Isa 55:6: If God is to be sought while he allows himself to be found, then the following admonition to call (‫ )קרא‬on him while he is near (‫ )קרוב‬is an admonition to pray while he is prepared to respond favourably. The opposite is that God remains far (‫)רחוק‬ from people. As the famous opening of Ps 22 attests, he then neither answers their prayers nor does he actually help them when they call (‫ )קרא‬upon him (Ps 22:2-3, 12, 20).

With all its terseness, the proverb says the same. When God is far from the ‫ רשעים‬of the first half, it means he does not answer their prayer, but also that he does not actually help them. For, if God’s being far from them is the opposite of his being near to them, it entails more than reacting adversely to a specific prayer. It means that God has left them and is not approachable by such people.223 Reading the two hemistichs in each other’s light thus enriches the proverb. v. 29a Yahweh is far from the wicked [the prayer of the wicked] [he does not hear / respond with help]

→ → ← ←

v. 29b [Yahweh is near] [to the righteous] the prayer of the righteous he hears / responds with help

The parallelism suggests that the reader should supply a retroversion of the a-hemistich in the b-hemistich, as well as a retroversion of the b-hemistich in the a-hemistich.224 Backed up by the use of the concepts of “near” and “far” in the Old Testament, the proverb thus says that God allows himself to be approached for help by the righteous but not by the wicked. In the Midrash Mishle the proverb is contrasted with Ps 145:18 (see above). Solomon’s wisdom is said to be more “severe” than that of his father David, for David says that God is near to all who call unto him,225 while Solomon says he is far from the wicked. That leads to the interpretation that God is only far from those who never 223 For the near-far contrast and textual evidence illustrating its significance for God’s approachability in prayer, see Loader (1971, 30-31). While reaching the same basic conclusion, Yoder suggests another substructure for the hearing and non-hearing in this proverb. It does not seem to me correct that the proverb “leaves open why” God is remote from the wicked. It can only be because they are wicked, just as he hears the prayer of the righteous because they are righteous. As Hausmann (1995, 237-238) illustrates with examples from Prov 10– 16, all kinds of positively evaluated humans receive diverse expressions of God’s help and approval. Therefore it seems unnecessary to look for substantiation in the idea of self-distancing by the wicked as in Ps 10. 224 This is one way in which such “imprecise antitheses,” as Waltke calls the contrasts of far :: hear and prayers of the righteous :: the wicked can be clarified. In this verse, the actual antithesis of “be far” is “hear,” and the antithesis of “be near” is “not hear.” 225 It is conceded that David spoke of calling “in sincerity;” that would however undermine the difference between the two statements, since those who call “in sincerity” are not wicked.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

653

repent at all, while he hears the prayers of those righteous people who pray for the whole congregation and not only for themselves (cf. ‫צדיקם‬, plural). Similarly Nahmias (14th century). Gerondi (13th century) thinks the proverb continues the previous verse and he interprets the righteous as those who are broken-hearted,226 to whom God is near (‫ )קרוב‬according to Ps 34:19. Hame’iri (13th-14th century) takes vv. 27-29 as a unit on how judges should act (no bribes, careful reflection, prayer for guidance [cf. 1 Kgs 3:9]). The Vilna Gaon (18th century) uses the motifs of speaking in prayer and God’s hearing of prayer to draw a graphic comparison, namely that God is as near to the righteous as the mouth is to the ear. Malbim (19th century) strives to explain the perceived difficulty of the verse (and Ps 145:19) that God changes his position relative to whether humans pray or not. He does this by stating that it is the humans who come closer to God or distance themselves from him by their actions.

15:30 The light of the eyes gladdens the heart, good news refreshes the bones. I agree with Toy that the rhythmic pattern is ternary, since the maqqeph at ‫ לב‬indicates that there is only one stress in the last two words of the first hemistich. The proverb has two verbal clauses, both with a verb in the Piel and body parts as the object. There is no need to emend the first word to ‫( מראה‬as BHS notes),227 which hangs together with the crux interpretum of the proverb. Fox thinks that the emendation is necessary because ‫( מראה‬sight, root ‫ראה‬, see) is a better parallel to ‫( שמועה‬news, root ‫שמע‬, hear). He also thinks that the meaning “vitality makes the heart glad” is thinkable (cf. 1 Sam 14:27, 29; Ps 13:4 and Prov 29:13). Although he declares this possible, he finds it “still awkward and tautologous.” Next, he rejects the idea that the bright eyes are those of the glad person, because it would mean that the light of the eyes is the effect and not the cause of joy,228 as the parallel of the good news requires (which is not necessarily so, see below). Then he objects to the solution of Delitzsch, who is followed by “most commentators” when they interpret the bright eyes as the eyes of others. According to Fox, that is wrong because the light of the eyes “is not used in this way” elsewhere. In fact, it is. Notably in 1 Sam 14:27, 29, to which Fox himself refers, where the concept is quite clear. 226 Presumably the broken-hearted are identical to those who reflect, or mumble (v. 28: ‫ )הגה‬in prayer. 227 Especially not the Hophal participle, as Winton Thomas (1969, 287) proposes. 228 So does Delitzsch. Murphy thinks the light of the eyes betrays the inner joy of the heart, without considering the Piel imperfect of ‫ שמח‬or whether those eyes reflect something else, which then gladdens the observer. On the ancient Mediterranean idea of light emanating from living beings, see Pilch (2016, 186-187); cf. the remark by Jesus that the eye is the lamp of the body (Matt 6:22).

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

Jonathan, like the rest of King Saul’s soldiers, was stupidly forbidden under oath to eat before the looming battle against the Philistines. Jonathan does not know about the curse and innocently eats some honey, as a result of which his eyes grow bright. He asks his comrades to look at him and notice how his eyes are shining, which he himself could feel, but not see. The warriors see and then positively intervene with the king to save Jonathan’s life. The ones who see the shining eyes do not see joy, but an improved physical condition because of the prince’s blood sugar level. The bright eyes reflect wellness and that is what brings gladness, the correlate of which is the happy intervention of the soldiers for Jonathan because of what they judge to be his great deed (1 Sam 14:45).

This interpretation gives not a weaker, but a better parallel to the second hemistich’s hearing of good news and its consequence. A positive observation and the reception of positive news both have a constructive result in the body – the heart is gladdened and the bones are fattened, that is, they become stronger.229 For the positive effect of constructive communication, cf. also 25:25. Schipper cites a greeting in one of the Lachish letters, in which the wish is:230 May Yahweh let my lord hear peaceful and good news. The Midrash Mishle thinks that the students of Torah make the heart happy when they know how to answer questions (they apparently are the eyes looking into Torah). It quotes the second hemistich together with Ps 19:9, which says that the divine commandments gladden the heart and enlighten the eyes. Rashi cryptically suggests something similar, but also gives a “simple meaning,” viz. that a beautiful thing like a vegetable garden or a river brings happiness and cleanses the heart of sorrow. According to the Mezudat David, the second hemistich means that new interpretations of the Torah (“good news”) nourish people.231 According to Yonah Gerondi, the proverb highlights the prevalence of hearing to seeing, since, read in conjunction with v. 31, hearing enables us to listen to wise admonitions (similarly Bahya). The Vilna Gaon balances the two: the kind of seeing that gladdens the heart refers to reading the written Torah, while hearing something good refers to hearing the Oral Torah being expounded. Chrysostom comments only on the second half of the Greek proverb. If the eye beholds good things, it brings joy to the heart, but the point is: what good things? His example seems to mean that some “good things” do not bring joy, since beholding gold brings sorrow. For him, the proverb teaches that, for real joy, one should behold beautiful things in creation, such as the sky, the sea and the land, but not things that delight us while corrupting the soul. 229

See the exposition and references on 3:8 in Vol. I of the commentary. Cf. Waltke, who warns that the use of the expression “good news” does not necessarily mean that a blessing formula is present. 231 For a story in the Talmud (Git 56b) about Yochanan ben Zakkai’s meeting with the future Emperor Vespasian and their witnessing the literal fattening of the bones (Prov 15:30b) and the literal shrinking of bones (Prov 17:22), see Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 284). 230

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

655

15:31 The ear that listens to the reproof of life will dwell among the wise people. The rhythm is 4+3, with one stress to every word (so also Toy and Gemser). The whole verse consists of a single sentence,232 with the subject in the first and the predicate in the last hemistich. The proverb contains what McCreesh233 calls “a well-formed pattern of phonic links.” The most prominent of these is the assonance in ‫תּוֹכ ַחת‬ ַ ‫שׁ ַֹמ ַעת‬, with additional alliteration of the t-sound. McCreesh also mentions the sequence of the o-vowel and sibilants and a sequence ‫ח‬-‫ת‬-‫ ח‬in the first hemistich as well as velar sounds and a-sounds in the second hemistich. Although the first link is clear, “this analysis is somewhat complicated,” as McCreesh himself admits. His pointing out a pattern on the ‫ח‬- and ‫ת‬-sounds and particularly the effect of ‫ חיים‬and ‫ תלין‬to end the respective versets is however convincing. The ear (‫ )אזן‬is a synecdoche for the whole person, in this case one who learns from the wise. By using this figure, the proverb focuses on the overriding importance of listening. The pupil has to listen to ‫( תוכחת‬correction, reproof), meaning he has to heed it. As part of the sapiential discipline (‫;מוסר‬ see the note on Prov 15:29-33 above), the acceptance of correction is a basic prerequisite for attaining wisdom. Willingness to listen in the sense of paying obedient attention is a manifestation of the humility spoken of in v. 33. The importance of this mentality is made quite clear in the genitive construction that follows. ‫( תוכחת חיים‬the reproof of life) is a genitivus explicationis of the type indicating purpose.234 It gives the expected result of the strict, corrective training. The reproof of life is thus a reproof leading to life. That by itself is worth being humble for, but the second hemistich has an extra incentive for the pupil. Who accepts this, will “dwell” among the wise. The verb ‫ לין‬means to stay overnight and in poetry becomes a synecdoche for remaining or dwelling (cf. Job 17:2; 19:4; Isa 1:25; Jer 4:14 and others).235 Here it is Qal imperfect third person feminine singular because the noun of the subject (‫ )אזן‬is feminine. Being accepted in the social circle of the wise is a powerful incentive for submitting to the discipline of sapiential education. By promising a place in the esteemed circle of the wise, the proverb addresses 232 This is the only proverb in the collection 10:1–22:16 that contains a single simple sentence and does not occur in the Septuagint. 233 McCreesh (1991, 52-53). 234 GKC 128q; it is also called a genitive of effect; so Waltke (cf. IBHS Par. 9.5.2c). 235 Thus Waltke, but in 19:23 the verb seems to have the literal meaning “sleep overnight.” See HALOT, KAHAL, s.v. Schipper moots the question whether the verb may be taken literally to indicate pupils being taken into a kind of boarding school, as is intimated in Sir 51:23 (cf. Fuhs, who however does not touch on the controversial possibility of a school). This is conceivable, but not provable.

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Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

the desire for being honoured in society. As such, it is an excellent example of one of the motivational paradigms identified and described by Stewart,236 although she does not cite Prov 15:31. Scherer237 regards the motif of listening in the verse as an appropriate idea to bring the subcollection of Prov 10– 15 to an end (which in his opinion is found in v. 32). In Egyptian instructions the value of listening is also highly praised. The Instructions of Ptahhotep (Old Kingdom) are a prime example. In the epilogue the advantages of listening are very prominent and it even begins with the topic: If you listen to my sayings, all your affairs will go forward. … He who hears becomes a master hearer. … Useful is hearing to one who hears. Hearing is better than all else, it creates goodwill. … He who hears is beloved by the god, he whom the god hates does not hear.238 The Midrash Mishle states that scholars who listen to rebuke deserve sitting among the wise – which sounds much like the paradigm of motivation just referred to. The Mezudat David is clear about the claim. It declares that willingness to listen to reproof results in abiding presence among the wise, constantly hearing them and permanently benefitting. This is not a fleeting association, because ‫ לין‬indicates permanency and not just staying over for one night. To Gerondi the verse indicates that it is just as appropriate for people who are not real Torah scholars to be in such company. It is beneficial to all, because the scholars appreciate being honoured in this way and the learners may acquire characteristics that they did not have earlier. The Vilna Gaon concurs and adds that just being in the presence of wise people is beneficial.

15:32 Who neglects discipline, despises himself, but who listens to correction acquires sense. According to the Masoretic accents, the rhythm is 4+3 (Toy). The munach under ‫ ֣קוֹנֶ ה‬is a conjunctive accent and connects the last two words, as does the dagesh forte conjunctivum in ‫לּב‬. ֽ ֵ Both sentences in the proverb are equally 236 Stewart (2016, 110-111); cf. Also Millar (2020, 196-197), who gives several examples of the luring effect exerted by the prospective reward of social esteem, and Pilch (2016, 190), who calls honour “the pivotal social value” that “permeated every aspect of public life.” 237 Scherer (1999, 185). 238 AEL I, 73-76. As these few excerpts show, the idea is strongly developed in this text.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

657

structured: the subject phrase with a verb in the Qal participle with its own object (the two “near synonyms” ‫ מוסר‬and ‫)תוכחת‬, followed by the verb phrase in which the main verb also stands in the Qal participle plus an object. In this way a direct symmetrical parallelism is created to express the clearcut antithesis. v. 32a who neglects discipline despises himself/life

:: :: :: ::

v. 32b who listens to correction acquires sense for life

The proverb is thematically related to the previous one, but adds an antithesis, which is lacking in v. 31. This is probably the reason why they were edited to stand next to each other in the loose additive way intimated above.239 Who neglects (cf. 13:18) discipline despises his ‫נפש‬, which may be his life or his inner being, that is, himself. Since the two do not exclude each other, both may be playing a role in the saying. Such a person despises himself (cf. the similar expression in 29:24) because he is harming himself even if he does not do so consciously. At the same time, this may also endanger his very life (cf. v. 10b; 6:32), since he will not be receiving the training that leads to the maintenance of life. The opposite is true of the person who does pay heed to correction, namely acquiring a heart. According to 19:8, anyone who acquires a heart (‫ה־לּב‬ ֭ ֵ ֶ‫ ֽקֹנ‬240) loves his ‫( נפש‬his life or himself241). Acquiring the organ with which thinking is done, means he has the mind with which he can learn and assimilate the wisdom necessary for the benefits of life. Schipper, citing Meinhold and Fuhs, stresses the unavoidable necessity of the strict teaching for anyone who wishes to live. Ramaq (12th century) has a radical interpretation of the first hemistich. Neglecting discipline amounts to a suicidal wish, because ‫ נפש‬also means life itself. Its converse is the heart (‫)לב‬, which according to him is the knowledge and fear of God. Ralbag (14th century) however interprets ‫ נפש‬as the human soul, which enables him to give a moral explanation: reproof is necessary for the soul, because that is the way to improve one’s character (similarly Gerondi [13th century]). The Vilna Gaon (18th century) relates the human ‫ נפש‬to the human will. He regards the discipline of the soul to be disciplining one’s own will in God’s service, which will result in God’s diminishing the will of other people before the will of the one with a disciplined soul. Who is not willing to undertake this discipline will find (in the line of Pirqe Aboth 2:4) that God will not fulfil his wishes. The opposite mentality will acquire a mind that will know which is the right road. 239

See above, the Note on Proverbs 15:29-33 (after the discussion of v. 28). In this case the expression has both the connective dagesh and the maqqeph. 241 In 19:8a the Septuagint translates ‫ אהב נפשו‬by ἀγαπᾷ ἑαυτόν (loves himself); in 15:32 the Greek translation for ‫ מואס נפשו‬is μισεῖ ἑαυτόν, which Meinhold calls “exactly the correct opposite to v. a.” 240

658

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

15:33 The fear of Yahweh is the discipline of wisdom, and before honour goes humility. The rhythm is 4+3, that is, one stress beat per word (so both Toy and Gemser). The proverb consists of two nominal clauses. The first hemistich contains an issue that involves the crux interpretum (as in v. 31, although this time not a text-critical issue). The concept of the fear of Yahweh ends the sub-collection. Occurring as it does fourteen times as a phrase in the book, Yoder is justified in calling it “the book’s resounding refrain.”242 The phrase begins and ends the first collection (Prov 1–9) and indeed the whole book (Prov 1–31).243 The parallelism is progressive and can be summarised as follows:244 v. 33a fear of God ⎫ is ⎬ discipline of wisdom ⎭

v. 33b ⊃

humility goes before honour

The crucial point is how to understand the statement that the fear of Yahweh “is” the discipline (disciplinary teaching/instruction) of wisdom. As far as this proverb is concerned, Weeks245 takes the Hebrew ‫ מוסר חכמה‬to mean that instruction teaches pupils to be wise. That enables him to argue that the wisdom taught in this way brings the pupil to fear God, thereby challenging the consensual view that the fear of God leads to wisdom. Weeks appeals to 22:4 in support of his view. However, that proverb does not say that one must submit to teaching, but that humility is a prerequisite for the fear of Yahweh and its benefits. So 22:4 does not contribute to a decision whether 15:33 does indeed mean that wisdom (teaching/discipline) precedes the fear of Yahweh. He also adduces 15:33 as evidence to this end, but only says that his idea of understanding the divine 242 Yoder (2009, 6): 1:7; 2:5; 8:13; 9:10; 10:27; 14:2, 26f.; 15:16, 33; 16:6; 19:23; 22:4; 23:17; plus twice in the imperative (3:7; 24:21). 243 The “framing” uses of the phrase show variations in the choice and order of words. In 9:10 the words ‫ יראת יהוה‬end the sentence, whereas they open 15:33, as in 1:7; in 15:33 not ‫( תחלת חכמה‬the beginninga of wisdom) as in 9:10, but the construction ‫( ראשית חכמה‬the beginningb of wisdom) is used, as in 1:7, except that in 1:7 ‫( דעת‬knowledge) is used and not ‫חכמה‬. The exact phrase ‫ יראת יהוה‬is used in a description of the woman of valour (31:30), which provides the final frame of the book in terms of the fear of Yahweh. It can be counted as a fifteenth instance of the phrase in the book, even if the grammatical analysis differs from the other fourteen instances (see Volume IV, on 31:30). 244 The symbol ⊃ in the figure means “is included in” – one can only fear God / submit to the discipline of sapiential teaching if one is humble (but, conversely, one can be humble/ submissive without fearing God, witness the Dickensian Uriah Heep). 245 Weeks ([1994] 2007, 117-118 and 2010, 120-121).

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

659

will through wisdom “seems” to be expressed in 15:33, which “apparently” means that one must submit to teaching before receiving the rewards of fearing God. Weeks’s main concern is to challenge the near consensus that the fear of Yahweh precedes wisdom. That the fear of Yahweh as the “beginning” (‫ ראשית‬or ‫ )תחלה‬leads to wisdom,246 or that it is the essence of wisdom,247 is therefore unacceptable to him. On his submission, the view of Fox (also Oesterley, Perdue, Plöger, Yoder and others), that wisdom begins with the fear of Yahweh and leads to (more of) it, stands the relation of the two concepts on its head.248

However, Weeks’s theory is effectively opposed (in a paper exemplary for its irenic style) by Schwab.249 He first shows that 22:4 is at best highly ambiguous, from which follows that it is not conclusive evidence. Another argument by Schwab is that the use of ‫( תחלה‬beginning) in 9:10 is unusual in that it describes the relation between two abstract notions, which allows not only temporal or spatial but also logical precedence. Moreover, Schwab adduces Sir 25:24 (“From woman is the beginning of sin and because of her we all die”). The sin of Eve was the “beginning” in the sense of the first step, thus ‫ תחלה‬as first part of a series, in accordance with Weeks’s understanding of the word. But the obvious intention of the verse is to blame a woman for the existence of sin, that is, its origin is explained. These observations also apply to ‫ראשית‬. Finally, Job 28 is about the question where wisdom is to be found, and in Job 28:28 the answer is given: “The fear of Yahweh, that is wisdom, and shunning evil is understanding.” If one proverb may say that sense/wisdom is acquired by listening to wise reproof (v. 32b), then the next may say that accepting discipline likewise leads to wisdom (v. 33a). And that is what the fear of Yahweh “is” in the nominal sentence. The fear of Yahweh entails instruction that leads to wisdom (so Luther’s translation, Delitzsch, Wildeboer, Gemser, Plöger, Schipper; cf. also Clifford, Alter, Waltke and Tuinstra, who go in the same direction). Millar250 summarises it as follows: 246

Von Rad (1970, 92 [Eng. 66]), McKane, Meinhold and others. Wildeboer, Gemser. 248 Schwab (2013, 659-661) offers additional arguments as well. 249 Schwab (2013, 652-662). Schwab does err in his treatment of what he sees as Weeks’s handling of the genitive in 15:33. He claims that Weeks (2010, 121) takes “instruction of wisdom” as an objective genitive, which, Schwab thinks, enables Weeks to “easily” harmonise the verse with his theory of wisdom’s priority of the fear of God. But Weeks neither explicitly says nor does it in either of the publications cited by Schwab (Weeks 2007, 117118, and Weeks 2010, 120-121). For his purpose, Weeks could have taken ‫ מוסר חכמה‬as a subjective genitive. Then the logic would be: the fear of God is instruction (‫ )מוסר‬that is given by the subject (the subjective genitive in the nomen rectum), viz. wisdom (‫ )חכמה‬಩ wisdom in its function of instructing precedes the fear of God. Not: the fear of God is instruction (‫)מוסר‬ that is given to the object (the objective genitive in the nomen rectum), viz. wisdom (‫ )חכמה‬಩ the fear of God precedes wisdom. Schwab may perhaps have confused the subject-predicate ambivalence in the nominal clause that makes up the first hemistich (cf. Delitzsch) with the subjective-objective options in a genitive construction. 250 Millar (2020, 212). 247

660

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15 “In ‘the fear of the Lord’ (‫)יראת יהוה‬, the recognition of human limitedness has been given contrite religious orientation, entailing willing and obedient submission to divine superiority. It is the beginning (‫ )ראשית‬of knowledge, its ‘best part,’ ‘first manifestation,’ and ‘prerequisite’.”

Yoder also summarises the idea by saying that v. 33 “begins by identifying discipline … with ‘fear of the LORD.’ One is tantamount to the other. The second line [verset] then invites a rereading of the first. As humility precedes honor …, so ‘fear of the LORD’ precedes wisdom. It is the prerequisite.”

In Volume I of this commentary, I argued that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom in the sense of the first step along the way of wisdom. For the sages it is both a point and a line, as life begins at birth (Qoh 3:2) without stopping during the long life promised to the wise (Prov 9:11; 10:27). But I also argued that the fear of God sets the limit of wisdom.251 It is the end of wisdom in the sense that the knowledge of the sages goes no farther than their perimeter and by no means has all the answers – and they knew it. There is a dimension to reality that wisdom and the wise cannot fathom. That is why there are so many discrepancies, unclarities and mysteries (for instance, in the deed-consequence nexus), all maintained in the collected proverbs. To have this insight is to experience awe. Awe before the Awesome, before God. It is fear of God in the sense described by Rudolf Otto as the beginning of religion itself. According to Otto,252 the “raw” fear that awakens in humans goes through a developmental phase to acquire a new evaluative function. Is this not what Prov 15:33 suggests? The fear of God is the beginning, but through the ‫ מוסר‬of the sages it is developed and crafted to become the ‫ חכמה‬that should be inculcated in humans. The prerequisite for this is a humble spirit at its beginning, but also farther along the way of wisdom, even when the honour and rewards come, humility remains. It continues to manifest the basic mentality of awe before the mysterium tremendum, and thus the ‫ יראה‬stays as basic as it was at the beginning. It is not for nothing that Otto provided his opus magnum with a leading quote from Goethe253, on its title page as well as its cover: Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes Teil Wie auch die Welt ihm das Gefühl verteure Ergriffen fühlt er tief das Ungeheure. (To shudder is the best aspect of humanity However the world begrudges it that feeling Profoundly moved it deeply feels the Awesome)

251 252 253

Volume I, 63. Otto (1924, 15-16). Faust II/1, 6272-6274.

Translation and Exegesis of Chapter 15

661

An ending like this to a chapter like Prov 15 with its nine Yahweh-sayings and its reflective theological character, makes it impossible to read Prov 10– 15 as early secular sayings that were later domesticated by Yahwistic ideals. On the contrary, it is a closing invitation to read the sub-collection as a sapiential discourse based on the theological thought of the introductory poems in Prov 1–9. Rashi merely comments that humility (v. 33b) causes honour to follow it, which seems to be an endeavour to make sure that the idiom in the Bible itself is correctly understood (similarly, the Vilna Gaon). The importance of humility for the rabbis is illustrated by the story that a voice from heaven decreed that the halacha of the school of Hillel should be followed rather than the halacha of the Shammai school, because the former were so humble as to always cite the Shammai school’s opinions before their own.254 As for the first half of the proverb, the rabbis who did comment on it are clear: the fear of God precedes wisdom, just as humility leads to honour (cf. Yoder). So Pseudo-Ibn Ezra and the Mezudat David. However, the Vilna Gaon also recognised the ambiguity that has occupied us in the treatment of this proverb. According to him, both the view that the fear of God leads to wisdom and the view that the fear of God results from wisdom, are possible. He holds that both are true. In an argument that the morally bad cannot possess true knowledge, John Cassian (c. 360-435)255 quotes the first hemistich, but does not elaborate on his exegesis of the verse. Leo the Great (†461)256 gives pastoral directions for the admonishing of humble and arrogant people. He merely incorporates the biblical text as part of his injunctions, quoting many texts that suit him as necessary. Among those is part of v. 33. The humble should be told what the second half of Prov 15:33 says (“Humility goes before glory”) and the arrogant should be told what Prov. 16:18 says (“Haughtiness goes before the fall”).

254 255 256

See Ginsburg ([1998] 2009, 287). Confer XIV, 16 (NPNF II, 11, 443). Past I, xvii (NPNF II, 12, 41b).

INDEX OF AUTHORS

Albright, W.F. 181, 182, 503 Alonso-Schökel, L. 393, 542 Alster, B. 506 Alter, R. 3, 25, 26, 30, 134, 136, 154, 167, 174, 193, 197, 200, 212, 213, 217, 241, 244, 268, 278, 363, 367, 399, 425, 427, 434, 437, 447, 454, 458, 461, 474, 476, 477, 500, 514, 519, 554, 568, 659 Ansberry, C.B. 20, 206, 252, 563, 564 Antonioz, S. 123 Arzt, M. 419 Attridge, H.W. 148 Avishur, Y. 468 Baron, S.W. 138 Barr, J. 179, 310, 311 Barrett, C.K. 148 Barth, K. 560 Barucq, A. 350, 401, 420, 575 Bauer-Kayatz, C. 61 Bauks, M. 307, 450, 451 Becker, J. 37, 499 Beckman, J.C. 482 Behnke, P. 87 Ben Zvi, E. 122, 123, 124, 291, Berger, K. 136, 137, 315, 575 Berlin, A. 26, 27, 89, 95, 99, 100, 102, 107, 114, 139, 150, 151, 190, 201, 257, 275, 454, 525, 526 Bertheau, E. 6, 7, 8, 98, 155, 167, 168, 216, 217, 272, 336, 481, 517, 532, 566, 624 Bickell, G. 25, 532 Black, J.A. 256, 439 Bonhoeffer, D. 34, 88, 295, 347 Borowski, O. 346 Boström, G. 13, 14, 198, 206, 216, 315, 410, 490, 569, 584, 586 Boström, L. 38, 378, 455 Brenner, A. 331, 332 Bretzke, J.T. 13 Brewer, D.J. 346 Broshi, M. 138 Brown, W.P. 43, 148, 163, 170, 612

Brueggemann, W.A. 190, 191, 285 Bryce, G.E. 16 Bühlmann, W. 155, 156, 159, 161, 200, 202, 247, 335, 369, 375, 501, 589, 633, 649 Calvin, J. 108, 129, 360, 408, 440, 444, 458, 487, 500, 503, 510, 524, 546, 549, 560, 607 Carasik, M. 610 Carr, D.M. 32 Carrigan, H.L. 177 Ceresco, A.R. 159 Chaney, A.R. 553 Clements, R.E. 382 Clifford, R.J. 8, 11, 13, 21, 37, 80, 81, 83, 89, 95, 99, 106, 107, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 127, 134, 138, 139, 146, 154, 160, 168, 173, 174, 175, 181, 185, 196, 198, 202, 203, 217, 220, 222, 230, 231, 233, 234, 238, 252, 255, 263, 264, 268, 272, 273, 278, 287, 288, 293, 296, 303, 307, 310, 327, 331, 338, 339, 350, 351, 352, 358, 363, 370, 376, 377, 378, 382, 389, 390, 391, 393, 407, 412, 417, 425, 427, 435, 439, 444, 447, 450, 454, 455, 461, 463, 474, 475, 476, 486, 487, 494, 499, 500, 513, 517, 519, 520, 528, 529, 532, 542, 547, 550, 554, 557, 559, 574, 577, 589, 592, 602, 603, 607, 608, 613, 631, 632, 659 Coleman, S.M. 276 Collins , B.J. 25, 137, 346 Collins, T. 30, Conybeare, F.C. 339, 434 Cook, J. 48, 135, 182, 403 Cotterell, P. 561 Cowley, A. 372, 421, 475, 509 Craigie 10 Crenshaw, J.L. 10, 42, 52, 132, 133, 136, 321, 419, 512 Crown, A.D. 183, 465 Cunningham, G. 256

664 Dahood, M. 200, 226, 315, 405, 406, 407, 410, 490, 555, 575, 584 Dalman, G. 103, 328 Delekat, L. 231 Delitzsch, Fr. 6, 7, 80, 81, 87, 95, 98, 99, 106, 114, 120, 129, 130, 134, 136, 139, 142, 146, 160, 168, 169, 174, 179, 180, 186, 189, 193, 195, 199, 211, 216, 217, 222, 223, 225, 226, 230, 231, 234, 253, 258, 261, 268, 272, 273, 278, 288, 291, 294, 297, 303, 307, 311, 318, 321, 325, 331, 335, 336, 344, 345, 347, 351, 352, 353, 363, 368, 372, 378, 382, 384, 387, 388, 394, 398, 399, 400, 403, 404, 405, 407, 413, 414, 416, 420, 423, 427, 429, 431, 434, 437, 444, 448, 452, 454, 458, 459, 463, 464, 465, 470, 472, 474, 476, 481, 488, 492, 497, 499, 500, 503, 505, 512, 517, 519, 525, 529, 532, 534, 541, 550, 557, 567, 568, 571, 574, 575, 577, 581, 592, 597, 605, 610, 611, 613, 617, 624, 629, 633, 636, 638, 653, 659 Delkurt, H. 91 Dell, K.J. 18, 19, 24, 32, 33, 79, 85, 96, 103, 105, 210, 281, 451 Dickens, C. 242, 436 Dobbs-Allsopp, F.W. 25, 29, 30 Döderlein, J.C. 119, 368, 394, 438 Dollimore, J. 450 Donner, H. 387, 388 Driver, G.R. 189, 261, 283, 296, 415, 441, 447, 458, 462, 463, 519, 542, 602 D’Hamonville, D.M. 648 Ehrlich, A.B. 119, 230, 268, 423, 454, 469, 516, 554, 582, 589, 592 Ellingsen, M. 314 Emerton, J.A. 315, 394, 395, 401, 410 Ewald, H. 4, 79, 145, 146, 226, 272, 300, 336, 398, 481, 532, 624 Fensham, F.C. 638 Fiddes, P.S. 526 Finkelstein, I. 138 Fitzgerald, J.T. 132, 133, 321 Foster, B.R. 204, 346

Index of Authors Fox, M.V. 1, 7, 15, 18, 21, 23, 24, 27, 31, 37, 44, 53, 60, 68, 69, 79, 80, 86, 87, 90, 94, 95, 96, 99, 102, 107, 109, 110, 113, 114, 119, 120, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 146, 150, 154, 155, 160, 163, 164, 168, 172, 173, 174, 175, 178, 179, 189, 193, 197, 198, 201, 202, 211, 217, 220, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232, 234, 237, 242, 244, 252, 255, 258, 259, 264, 266, 267, 271, 272, 273, 277, 278, 280, 281, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289, 291, 294, 297, 299, 300, 303, 304, 307, 312, 318, 322, 324, 327, 328, 329, 331, 335, 338, 339, 340, 343, 344, 351, 352, 353, 357, 358, 361, 363, 367, 369, 370, 371, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 382, 389, 390, 393, 394, 395, 399, 401, 403, 405, 406, 407, 412, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 424, 427, 429, 430, 431, 434, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 444, 447, 451, 454, 456, 458, 461, 463, 468, 469, 472, 475, 476, 477, 480, 481, 484, 488, 492, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 504, 506, 508, 511, 514, 517, 518, 519, 520, 523, 525, 528, 529, 532, 535, 537, 545, 547, 548, 550, 554, 557, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 574, 575, 578, 581, 582, 586, 588, 589, 590, 598, 603, 605, 606, 608, 612, 613, 614, 619, 620, 623, 626, 631, 633, 634, 638, 639, 640, 641, 645, 648, 650, 651, 653, 659 Frankenberg, W. 602 Freuling, G. 38, 82, 118, 206, 289, 315, 410, 540 Fuhs, H.F. 20, 44, 45, 80, 107, 117, 125, 134, 136, 143, 146, 155, 166, 169, 178, 188, 190, 198, 216, 220, 223, 224, 233, 234, 243, 252, 267, 272, 273, 280, 290, 299, 302, 311, 316, 348, 355, 361, 368, 376, 378, 379, 412, 431, 434, 439, 442, 449, 455, 456, 463, 471, 474, 476, 486, 501, 510, 511, 515, 519, 526, 529, 532, 548, 554, 574, 589, 592, 598, 606, 611, 618, 629, 635, 639, 655, 657

Index of Authors Garr, W.R. 309, 310 Geiger, A. 575 Gemser, B. 31, 79, 95, 98, 101, 105, 106, 112, 118, 119, 120, 126, 130, 134, 145, 146, 154, 159, 174, 181, 186, 195, 197, 198, 199, 216, 220, 223, 230, 246, 251, 252, 254, 258, 267, 268, 271, 272, 282, 286, 297, 298, 302, 306, 309, 320, 330, 331, 337, 340, 343, 345, 350, 351, 352, 355, 361, 366, 367, 371, 372, 375, 376, 377, 380, 382, 383, 385, 394, 401, 407, 413, 415, 419, 423, 425, 426, 427, 430, 433, 437, 441, 444, 447, 449, 454, 455, 458, 461, 463, 465, 467, 470, 474, 476, 477, 478, 481, 484, 491, 494, 500, 503, 504, 507, 510, 513, 519, 521, 523, 527, 532, 539, 540, 544, 547, 549, 552, 554, 555, 556, 558, 562, 565, 568, 574, 578, 579, 580, 588, 589, 591, 593, 599, 602, 607, 610, 612, 613, 614, 616, 619, 623, 625, 626, 629, 631, 632, 635, 640, 643, 648, 651, 655, 658, 659 Gerstenberger, E. 61, 63 Gese, H. 63, 64 Gianto, A. 372, 421 Ginsberg, H.L. 441 Ginsburg, E. 115, 151, 152, 158, 170, 187, 204, 215, 224, 234, 235, 239, 245, 265, 274, 279, 285, 298, 299, 308, 345, 372, 374, 380, 426, 445, 467, 475, 483, 487, 497, 510, 527, 529, 539, 564, 570, 573, 580, 590, 618, 654, 661 Goering, G.S. 35, 36, 184 Gohl, J.M. 94, 290, 309, 481, 619 Goossens, L. 122, 202, 220, 496, 524, 550, 595 Gordon, R. 10 Graetz, H. 116 Green, D.A. 163, 301, 427 Greenfield, J.C. 203, 204, 441 Greenstein, E.L. 3, 25, 27, 498 Gregory, B.C. 95 Grintz, J.M. 8, 17, 19 Händel, G.F. 341 Hartenstein, F. 307

665 Hatton, P.T.H. 82, 137, 139, 140, 141, 206, 261, 281, 501 Hausmann, J. 37, 79, 90, 92, 112, 146, 153, 154, 156, 160, 165, 169, 180, 182, 188, 198, 210, 235, 237, 247, 258, 261, 277, 281, 291, 298, 301, 315, 322, 327, 330, 341, 369, 371, 385, 386, 388, 399, 410, 415, 421, 444, 445, 490, 497, 499, 524, 548, 559, 563, 565, 584, 624, 630, 638, 649, 652 Healy, J.F. 161 Heaton, E.W. 587 Heiligenthal, R. 136 Heim, K.M. 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, 19, 32, 79, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 96, 103, 105, 106, 113, 114, 115, 118, 120, 122, 125, 126, 130, 131, 132, 136, 139, 143, 144, 153, 163, 165, 166, 188, 190, 196, 199, 202, 206, 207, 208, 210, 212, 217, 223, 224, 235, 236, 248, 251, 252, 266, 273, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 290, 296, 299, 306, 307, 312, 315, 316, 317, 320, 325, 339, 340, 341, 344, 351, 353, 358, 365, 375, 378, 381, 384, 399, 400, 410, 411, 421, 439, 441, 448, 456, 461, 462, 471, 486, 490, 491, 494, 496, 509, 514, 515, 525, 535, 537, 541, 552, 561, 562, 584, 585, 586, 596, 605, 615, 620, 624, 629, 630, 651 Held, M.P. 102, 231, 647 Hermisson, H.-J. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 62, 80, 104, 140, 188, 198, 206, 207, 210, 216, 233, 235, 236, 266, 275, 280, 281, 315, 316, 317, 375, 410, 411, 442, 471, 479, 490, 491, 492, 523, 538, 569, 584, 585 Hildebrandt, T. 9, 10, 16, 79, 82, 198, 266, 410, 490, 584, 629 Hill, R.C. 89, 97, 100, 135, 187, 200, 232, 239, 250, 274, 305, 329, 374, 470, 498, 523, 570, 576, 612, 622 Hitzig, F. 15, 105, 106, 130, 139, 174, 186, 189, 199, 225, 230, 231, 253, 272, 275, 303, 394, 461, 517, 519 Ho, A. 227 Hoffmann, F. 369 Holt, E.K. 122

666

Index of Authors

Hrushovski, B. 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 112, 134, 166, 172, 454 Huxel, K. 190 Irwin, W.A.

206, 307

Jacobs, L. 310 Janowski, B. 38, 307, 356, 358, 540 Jansen-Winkeln, K. 359, 548 Jaspers, K. 456 Jastrow, M. 161 Jenni, E. 127, 180, 559 Jepsen, A. 227 Kaiser, O. 185, 186 Kautzsch, E. 415 Keller, C.A. 243 Klopfenstein, M.A. 56, 508 Klopper, F. 68 Koch, K. 38, 431, 639 Kramer, S.N. 133 Krispenz, J. 7, 16, 18, 79, 80, 82, 85, 101, 103, 125, 153, 206, 207, 208, 210, 225, 235, 266, 280, 281, 315, 317, 361, 375, 410, 412, 451, 490, 584, 586, 636 Kruger, P.A. 68, 86 Krüger, Th. 34, 36, 54, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 93, 103, 104, 112, 125, 144, 153, 160, 165, 166, 169, 179, 180, 186, 188, 194, 197, 341, 385, 450, 492, 603 Kselman, J.S. 206, 228, 505 Kugel, J.L. 26, 29, 151, 454 Kuhn, G. 341, 343, 351, 356, 358, 363, 364, 367, 400, 454, 459, 471, 494, 519, 540, 551 Kuropka, N. 13 Labuschagne, C.J. 290, 529 Lam, J. 189, 228, 231 Lambert, W.G. 156, 295, 421, 548 Landy , F. 275 Lang, B. 10, 44 Lange, A. 136, 137 Lemaire, A. 42 Leuenberger, M. 243 Leoncavallo, R. 530 Levy, J. 161 Lichtheim, M. 132, 156, 249, 362, 364, 365, 369

Lillas, R. 468 Lindenberger, J.M. 127, 133 Lohfink, N. 56 Longman, T. 11, 13 Lowth, T. 25, 88, 453, 454 Lucas, E.C. 18, 82, 85, 93, 103, 118, 125, 149, 182, 206, 208, 223, 226, 230, 236, 242, 259, 280, 293, 316, 317, 320, 331, 361, 370, 378, 425, 432, 455, 479, 492, 517, 586, 635, 641 Luchsinger, J. 101, 102, 117, 159, 160, 163, 182, 194, 202, 223, 233, 241, 243, 251, 275, 306, 308, 344, 370, 371, 376, 382, 386, 420, 451, 454, 486, 510, 520, 523, 527, 542, 559, 580, 602, 619, 620 Lunn, N.P. 561 Lust, L. 333, 472, 555, 645 Luther, M. 43, 74, 75, 314, 344, 519, 591, 597 Lyu, S.M. 283, 285, 359

106, 217, 266, 332, 478, 122, 213, 300, 381, 499, 561,

405,

Maekawa, K. 506 Maier, C. 331, 332 Margolis, M.L. 271 McCreesh, T.P. 145, 154, 181, 230, 231, 232, 269, 275, 278, 390, 419, 420, 506, 655 McKane, W. 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 44, 63, 79, 81, 83, 95, 96, 130, 134, 136, 139, 142, 146, 154, 155, 156, 167, 174, 175, 182, 188, 193, 197, 199, 200, 203, 217, 222, 226, 231, 241, 252, 254, 264, 273, 288, 306, 324, 331, 334, 341, 350, 351, 363, 367, 371, 376, 382, 390, 394, 396, 399, 400, 407, 415, 420, 430, 434, 437, 438, 444, 448, 454, 455, 458, 461, 463, 468, 471, 474, 479, 494, 500, 504, 505, 518, 519, 532, 537, 540, 542, 554, 563, 568, 577, 590, 592, 615, 617, 620, 626, 632, 633, 636, 644, 659 McNutt, P.M. 242, 243 Meier, S.A. 183 Meinhold, A. 19, 83, 85, 87, 93, 95, 96, 103, 104, 109, 110, 117, 118, 125, 126, 130, 134, 136, 137, 139,

Index of Authors 146, 154, 155, 160, 165, 168, 169, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 186, 188, 193, 194, 197, 198, 199, 207, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 232, 234, 236, 242, 246, 252, 254, 255, 256, 261, 264, 266, 268, 272, 273, 280, 281, 287, 291, 293, 302, 303, 309, 310, 312, 316, 317, 330, 332, 334, 336, 338, 340, 361, 362, 363, 371, 375, 378, 379, 382, 389, 390, 395, 396, 399, 406, 410, 411, 413, 415, 421, 434, 435, 437, 439, 444, 449, 451, 454, 459, 461, 466, 468, 471, 474, 476, 486, 491, 494, 497, 499, 501, 517, 519, 526, 528, 532, 537, 538, 548, 550, 554, 555, 557, 568, 569, 577, 579, 582, 585, 586, 588, 589, 592, 605, 606, 610, 613, 617, 630, 635, 638, 639, 649, 657, 659 Melanchthon, Ph. 4, 13, 97, 98, 103, 111, 115, 117, 121, 129, 141, 147, 152, 171, 184, 192, 198, 211, 215, 216, 218, 221, 235, 239, 240, 245, 246, 250, 251, 254, 257, 262, 265, 274, 279, 286, 290, 292, 295, 298, 302, 305, 309, 313, 314, 323, 335, 340, 349, 354, 360, 370, 372, 383, 385, 436, 440, 444, 446, 449, 457, 470, 478, 481, 483, 487, 498, 500, 503, 510, 523, 524, 527, 531, 542, 544, 546, 564, 565, 570, 583, 589, 591, 607 Mettinger, T.N.D. 142 Michaelis, W. 149 Mieder, W. 67, 68, 257 Millar, S.R. 22, 27, 34, 82, 110, 113, 114, 135, 143, 146, 170, 190, 210, 228, 235, 259, 261, 288, 410, 413, 420, 428, 444, 446, 490, 497, 498, 500, 508, 525, 526, 534, 537, 540, 547, 549, 550, 553, 559, 564, 566, 572, 581, 582, 584, 600, 601, 620, 624, 628, 639, 649, 656, 659 Miller, C.L. 414 Mondin, B. 129 Moriarty, F.L. 238, 239 Moss, A. 8, 11, 21, 97, 107, 139, 234, 273, 322, 433, 479, 501 Mouser, W.E. 113, 114

667 Mozart, W.A. 530 Murphy, R.E. 1, 17, 68, 69, 71, 79, 80, 85, 95, 96, 115, 117, 134, 139, 146, 150, 154, 167, 169, 172, 174, 186, 194, 198, 203, 206, 208, 212, 222, 224, 231, 234, 237, 255, 263, 264, 273, 282, 287, 288, 296, 299, 303, 306, 310, 315, 322, 327, 335, 338, 339, 340, 355, 358, 361, 363, 392, 398, 399, 407, 412, 425, 431, 434, 437, 438, 441, 444, 447, 450, 454, 458, 461, 474, 487, 490, 491, 492, 494, 496, 517, 519, 528, 529, 532, 538, 541, 554, 561, 563, 564, 565, 566, 574, 577, 585, 588, 602, 607, 613, 620, 625, 627, 644, 653 Nänny, M. 28, 97 Nel, P.J. 41, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63 Niemeier, S. 376 Niccacci, A. 293 Nissinen, M. 123, 124 O’Connor, M.P. 25, 29 Oesterley, W.O.E. 8, 26, 95, 98, 124, 132, 134, 146, 150, 151, 154, 159, 174, 193, 220, 223, 234, 244, 258, 266, 273, 275, 291, 302, 306, 310, 324, 336, 363, 378, 382, 384, 386, 393, 415, 422, 430, 434, 435, 437, 444, 458, 459, 465, 466, 467, 500, 546, 548, 555, 574, 578, 596, 599, 613, 625, 635, 636, 659 Ogden, G.S. 56 Otto, G. 41, 49, Otto, R. 660

118, 152, 230, 287, 339, 406, 439, 494, 590, 644,

Pardee, D. 26 Park, S.J. 30 Paterson, J. 10 Pedersen, J. 110, 243 Perdue, L.G. 95, 159, 217, 361, 421, 451, 455, 584, 605, 628, 659 Perry, T.H. 620 Petersen, J. 148 Pilch, J.J. 84, 85, 91, 100, 102, 103, 113, 125, 139, 169, 197, 206, 210,

668

Index of Authors

213, 228, 235, 237, 242, 243, 256, 257, 281, 304, 315, 332, 342, 410, 428, 479, 486, 490, 584, 644, 653, 656 Pinkuss, H. 461 Plath, S. 37, 499 Plöger, O. 5, 19, 46, 87, 95, 102, 103, 113, 118, 132, 134, 137, 139, 146, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 172, 173, 174, 178, 182, 186, 188, 193, 197, 198, 200, 202, 207, 218, 222, 226, 230, 234, 236, 247, 251, 254, 255, 264, 267, 272, 273, 275, 280, 287, 291, 293, 299, 303, 310, 312, 322, 328, 338, 344, 350, 361, 363, 371, 379, 383, 386, 390, 399, 400, 401, 407, 424, 427, 434, 439, 444, 447, 454, 458, 461, 467, 474, 476, 485, 488, 490, 491, 494, 499, 501, 504, 511, 517, 518, 529, 532, 541, 554, 557, 563, 564, 568, 574, 578, 588, 589, 605, 610, 611, 613, 626, 629, 635, 638, 639, 659 Quack, J.F.

369

Radden, G. 122, 202, 220, 550 Rendsburg, G.A. 32, 101 Richardson, H.N. 415 Richter, W. 63 Ricoeur, P. 65, 70, 72 Riede, P. 346, 348 Ringgren, H. 118, 130, 174, 197, 230, 258, 267, 268, 280, 287, 298, 331, 378, 394, 395, 401, 427, 430, 447, 449, 458, 461, 474, 477, 514, 532, 554, 555, 568, 574, 613, 643 Rorschach, H. 21, 48, 318, 471, 492 Römheld, D. 359, 364, 365, 448, 465, 466 Rüger, H.P. 136, 137 Rylaarsdam, J.C. 10 Saebø, M. 15, 80, 82, 85, 92, 95, 101, 107, 125, 134, 146, 154, 174, 178, 190, 193, 197, 200, 206, 207, 223, 236, 242, 256, 275, 278, 280, 310, 315, 317, 324, 337, 340, 344, 355, 361, 375, 399, 400, 406, 439, 448, 458, 461, 468, 487, 490, 491, 534, 541, 568, 584, 585, 586, 588, 613, 629, 635, 638 Saggs, H.W.F. 133

Sandoval, T.J. 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 100, 169, 206, 209, 404, 469, 490, 571, 572, 584, 619, 620, 638 Sawyer, J.F.A. 146 Schechter, S. 94, 136 Scheffler, E.H. 56 Schipper, B.U. 12, 20, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 81, 83, 84, 118, 119, 178, 184, 291, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 307, 310, 312, 315, 317, 319, 325, 328, 331, 334, 335, 339, 340, 344, 350, 355, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 364, 368, 369, 372, 376, 377, 378, 381, 382, 384, 394, 395, 396, 399, 407, 410, 411, 412, 414, 415, 421, 422, 427, 430, 431, 434, 435, 439, 441, 442, 444, 448, 449, 450, 451, 455, 456, 459, 464, 465, 471, 474, 476, 477, 479, 480, 484, 486, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 497, 499, 500, 501, 505, 509, 510, 511, 515, 517, 519, 522, 528, 532, 535, 538, 541, 543, 548, 555, 557, 559, 563, 565, 566, 568, 572, 573, 574, 575, 579, 582, 584, 585, 586, 587, 590, 593, 598, 604, 605, 606, 607, 610, 612, 613, 617, 625, 629, 634, 637, 641, 642, 644, 649, 654, 655, 657, 659 Schleusner, J.F. 555 Schmid, H.H. 46, 96, 160, 168, 227, 369 Schultens, A. 4, 95, 106, 119, 174, 241, 272, 294, 322, 338, 344, 351, 398, 399, 427, 458, 459, 473, 512, 525, 532, 568, 578 Schumann, R. 530 Schwab, Z. 114, 659 Schwienhorst-Schönberger, L. 31 Scoralick, R. 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 31, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 103, 125, 153, 165, 166, 188, 198, 206, 207, 210, 230, 235, 236, 244, 267, 268, 273, 280, 281, 299, 315, 316, 355, 368, 375, 405, 410, 412, 490, 537, 538, 569, 584, 586, 588, 636, 645, 647 Scott, R.B.Y. 9, 11, 13, 15, 130, 174, 230, 268, 376, 378, 390, 395, 447, 459, 461, 467, 474, 491, 504, 532, 554, 602, 613

Index of Authors Seitel, P. 67 Sekine, S. 50 Shakespeare, W. 110, 569, 611 Shupak, N. 132, 136, 357 Silver, M. 138 Ska, J.-L. 451 Skehan, P.W. 15 Skladny, U. 14, 168 Smalley, B. 103, 354, 380, 389, 432, 616 Snell, D.C. 8, 17, 19, 79, 80, 104, 114, 132, 136, 196, 212, 222, 248, 251, 252, 282, 307, 325, 339, 344, 353, 358, 359, 365, 381, 421, 462, 485, 494, 496, 501, 508, 525, 535, 541, 547, 561, 586, 596, 624, 629 Stähli, H.-P. 445 Steuernagel, D. 415, 437 Stewart, A.W. 43, 90, 100, 103, 161, 163, 191, 277, 278, 281, 283, 284, 285, 297, 305, 322, 371, 388, 400, 410, 450, 468, 469, 471, 496, 497, 543, 545, 596, 628, 630, 656 Story, C.I.K. 182 Strack, H.-L. 437 Stuart, D.K. 25 Stupperich, R. 13 Tauberschmidt, G. 541 Taylor, A. 67 Teeter, E. 35, 36, 184, 346 Terrien, S. 39, 330 Thatcher, M. 242 Thomas, D.W. 13, 69, 129, 164, 200, 305, 377, 380, 516, 540, 577, 615, 653 Thompson, J.M. 10, 16 Toperoff, S.P. 72 Tournay, R. 15, 315, 407 Tov, E. 261, 647 Toy, C.H. 8, 26, 31, 79, 94, 95, 99, 100, 102, 112, 114, 116, 134, 135, 139, 146, 154, 157, 167, 172, 174, 178, 186, 190, 193, 194, 197, 198, 199, 201, 207, 217, 223, 225, 230, 234, 244, 254, 263, 266, 267, 272, 273, 277, 280, 282, 286, 290, 291, 298, 302, 303, 306, 309, 310, 312, 320, 321, 324, 330, 331, 334, 337, 338, 340, 343, 344, 345, 350, 351, 355, 361, 363, 366, 367, 371, 372,

669 375, 377, 378, 380, 383, 385, 391, 393, 394, 395, 398, 400, 407, 413, 419, 423, 426, 433, 437, 439, 441, 444, 447, 450, 454, 458, 461, 467, 468, 471, 474, 476, 477, 481, 484, 488, 491, 494, 500, 503, 507, 510, 513, 517, 518, 519, 521, 523, 525, 527, 528, 532, 537, 539, 540, 544, 549, 552, 556, 557, 558, 562, 565, 568, 574, 575, 577, 578, 579, 580, 588, 589, 591, 593, 599, 602, 607, 609, 610, 612, 613, 614, 616, 619, 623, 626, 628, 629, 631, 632, 635, 636, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 648, 649, 651, 653, 655, 656, 658 Tsumura, D.T. 178 Tuinstra, E.W. 80, 83, 85, 89, 118, 125, 126, 136, 160, 161, 164, 169, 174, 179, 185, 192, 193, 194, 197, 198, 208, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 233, 234, 241, 256, 259, 264, 278, 280, 283, 287, 291, 294, 295, 300, 304, 311, 318, 332, 334, 336, 358, 368, 378, 386, 399, 401, 414, 425, 430, 437, 444, 451, 454, 465, 467, 474, 479, 494, 501, 506, 508, 509, 517, 518, 519, 532, 541, 548, 555, 566, 581, 589, 605, 606, 614, 621, 624, 626, 635, 636, 639, 644, 645, 648, 659 Tur-Sinai, N.H. 189, 343 Turner, M. 561 Umbreit, F.W.C.

447

Vance, D.R. 30 Van der Merwe, C.H.J. 620 Van der Watt, J.G. 148, 165 Van Leeuwen, R.C. 15, 16, 26, 86, 118, 125, 139, 146, 160, 169, 172, 173, 178, 186, 193, 195, 198, 223, 224, 233, 234, 243, 244, 259, 263, 264, 267, 273, 280, 287, 288, 293, 294, 296, 300, 302, 303, 306, 311, 312, 324, 328, 331, 339, 347, 358, 361, 367, 373, 378, 382, 394, 396, 411, 414, 427, 431, 434, 435, 451, 461, 475, 477, 489, 501, 513, 515, 521, 529, 530, 534, 543, 547, 554, 571, 579, 588, 615, 621, 627, 638 Vayntrub, J. 133 Verdi, G. 530

670 Visotzky, B.L. 115, 151, 270, 272, 274, 305, 377, 475, 489, 622 Volz, P. 8, 10, 11, 21, 154, 242, 256, 278, 371, 447, 456, 462, 479, 513 Von Hoffman, F. 4 Von Rad, G. 8, 9, 60, 61, 186, 289, 547, 659 Wagenknecht, C. 13 Waltke, B.K. 1, 3, 7, 15, 16, 17, 68, 69, 73, 80, 83, 85, 87, 88, 93, 95, 101, 104, 106, 116, 117, 118, 120, 127, 128, 139, 142, 143, 146, 150, 154, 155, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 167, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185, 186, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203, 208, 211, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 228, 230, 231, 233, 234, 236, 237, 240, 241, 243, 246, 248, 251, 253, 254, 260, 261, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 272, 273, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 316, 317, 320, 322, 324, 325, 328, 330, 334, 336, 338, 339, 342, 344, 347, 348, 350, 355, 357, 358, 361, 362, 370, 373, 375, 377, 379, 384, 387, 390, 394, 395, 396, 399, 401, 405, 407, 411, 414, 415, 416, 417, 421, 425, 427, 430, 431, 434, 439, 441, 444, 445, 446, 459, 461, 462, 465, 466, 468, 471, 474, 477, 486, 488, 494, 495, 497, 499, 500, 501, 503, 505, 506, 508, 510, 515, 517, 519, 521, 523, 528, 532, 534, 537, 541, 543, 544, 545, 546, 548, 550, 554, 555, 557, 565, 566, 568, 571, 574, 575, 579, 582, 588, 589, 592, 597, 599, 602, 604, 605, 610, 613, 614, 617, 619, 621, 624, 625, 629, 631, 632, 636, 637, 638, 643, 652, 654, 655, 659 Washington, H.C. 140, 572, 573 Watson, W.G.E. 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 97, 105, 159, 182, 192, 231, 328, 367, 509 Watters, W.R. 525, 526

Index of Authors Weeks, S. 7, 22, 23, 31, 39, 42, 79, 96, 150, 151, 479, 650, 658, 659 Weigl, M. 447, 459, 466 Weinberger, Y. 115 Weiner, I.B. 316 Weitzman, M.P. 176 Westermann, C. 10, 44, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 90, 94, 96, 243, 245, 485 Whybray, R.N. 5, 9, 10, 15, 46, 56, 80, 83, 85, 94, 96, 104, 106, 125, 135, 139, 146, 154, 155, 160, 169, 174, 178, 197, 198, 199, 203, 208, 217, 222, 230, 234, 244, 252, 254, 257, 260, 264, 267, 273, 278, 280, 294, 296, 304, 310, 317, 321, 322, 324, 328, 331, 339, 341, 350, 358, 361, 367, 373, 376, 381, 386, 393, 411, 423, 425, 427, 430, 432, 434, 437, 439, 444, 447, 450, 454, 479, 490, 491, 492, 501, 504, 518, 534, 538, 547, 554, 559, 566, 584, 585, 605, 610, 617, 624, 625, 629 Wildberger, H. 159 Wildeboer, G. 8, 79, 80, 93, 103, 118, 119, 134, 138, 139, 146, 154, 169, 174, 200, 201, 220, 230, 234, 252, 254, 263, 273, 290, 291, 300, 303, 322, 336, 340, 351, 368, 378, 384, 390, 415, 424, 434, 438, 444, 447, 454, 458, 461, 467, 477, 484, 491, 517, 578, 624, 626, 636, 659 Williams, J.G. 79, 414, 468 Yoder, C.R. 5, 37, 79, 107, 118, 138, 146, 154, 160, 169, 193, 198, 203, 204, 217, 220, 222, 224, 225, 227, 230, 242, 253, 254, 255, 257, 268, 269, 273, 282, 288, 300, 324, 331, 361, 368, 376, 378, 384, 390, 394, 396, 398, 411, 421, 425, 434, 435, 439, 444, 454, 459, 478, 486, 488, 492, 501, 512, 517, 518, 519, 529, 543, 555, 571, 601, 605, 617, 625, 629, 631, 635, 638, 642, 652, 658, 659, 660, 661 Zehnder, M.P. 148, 227, 396, 404, 608 Zimmerli, W. 40, 60, 61, 634 Zunz, G. 139

INDEX OF RABBINIC AND PATRISTIC SOURCES

Alshich of Safed 397, 507, 590 Ambrose of Milan 144, 295, 440, 503, 536, 622, 625 Anselm of Canterbury 192, 578 Antony the Hermit 616 Aquila 262, 296, 306, 351, 444, 578 Athanasius of Alexandria 162, 187, 295, 335, 337, 340, 349, 354, 377, 423, 457, 536, 539, 591, 616, 650 Basil the Great 443, 570, 574, 593 Cassian, John 253, 257, 279, 292, 335, 345, 349, 366, 408, 426, 436, 440, 467, 513, 516, 542, 554, 567, 578, 591, 628, 645, 661 Chrysostom, John 89, 90, 91, 94, 97, 99, 100, 103, 108, 111, 115, 117, 121, 127, 128, 130, 134, 145, 152, 158, 167, 173, 184, 187, 195, 200, 218, 221, 224, 232, 233, 235, 239, 245, 250, 253, 257, 262, 265, 270, 274, 279, 286, 290, 292, 295, 298, 302, 305, 309, 323, 326, 329, 333, 335, 337, 340, 343, 345, 349, 354, 360, 366, 370, 372, 374, 377, 380, 383,385, 389, 393,398, 408, 423, 426, 429, 432, 436, 440, 444, 445, 446, 448, 453, 457, 470, 473, 475, 476, 478, 480, 483, 487, 489, 498, 500, 503, 507, 510, 516, 518, 520, 523, 524, 527, 531, 533, 535, 536, 539, 542, 544, 549, 554, 556, 558, 562, 564, 567, 570, 573, 576, 578, 580, 583, 591, 597, 601, 604, 612, 614, 619, 622, 625, 642,645, 654 Clemens Alexandrinus / Clement of Alexandria 119, 158, 205, 215, 229, 253, 279, 289, 290, 332, 432, 443, 448, 449, 453, 503, 513, 518, 539, 560, 607, 623 Clemens/Clement of Rome 422, 628 Cyprian of Carthage 158, 162, 290, 295, 366, 383, 487, 558, 593, 609, 614

Evagrius of Pontus 94, 97, 290, 309, 450, 451, 453, 480, 531, 533, 601, 609, 619, 637, 650 Gerondi 93, 134, 140, 141, 144, 154, 157, 162, 170, 184, 187, 192, 204, 215, 221, 224, 239, 249, 250, 253, 257, 262, 265, 285, 301, 305, 323, 326, 329, 334, 340, 348, 353, 360, 365, 376, 379, 380, 382, 388, 403, 408, 416, 422, 426, 429, 432, 444, 470, 473, 475, 477, 502, 516, 533, 539, 541, 544, 545, 551, 553, 556, 564, 567, 570, 578, 582, 590, 596, 598, 604, 612, 616, 622, 634, 640, 645, 654, 656, 657 Gorran, Nicholas of Paris 380, 432, 616 Gregory the Great 507, 580, 607 Gregory of Nazeanzus/en 295, 570, 604 Gregory of Nyssa 279, 628 Hame’iri 91, 99, 112, 121, 165, 170, 180, 204, 221, 265, 354, 360, 385, 388, 432, 434, 436, 452, 457, 487, 492, 497, 500, 507, 519, 520, 523, 532, 536, 546, 548, 567, 568, 570, 582, 590, 599, 603, 616, 653 Hugh of St Victor 354 Ignatius

124, 239, 392, 460, 508, 544, 578, 622,

152, 190, 245, 274, 332, 372, 407, 443, 513, 549, 576, 609, 653, 389, 443,

137, 250, 397, 478, 516, 545, 581, 628,

175, 180, 221, 567, 645

John of Varzy

103, 354

Malbim 91, 99, 134, 158, 173, 224, 231, 240, 298, 308, 323,

112, 177, 250, 328,

115, 195, 262, 329,

121, 215, 279, 332,

128, 218, 289, 335,

672

Index of Rabbinic and Patristic Sources

337, 343, 354, 376, 377, 385, 388, 393, 398, 416, 422, 426, 429, 436, 460, 464, 467, 473, 475, 480, 483, 487, 489, 498, 507, 518, 524, 536, 544, 546, 552, 554, 567, 573, 596, 601, 606, 614, 616, 628, 640, 653 Mezudat David 93, 97, 108, 121, 128, 134, 137, 140, 144, 146, 152, 157, 162, 163, 165, 173, 184, 195, 198, 218, 221, 229, 232, 233, 235, 245, 250, 253, 257, 262, 279, 285, 289, 292, 295, 298, 305, 306, 308, 323, 326, 329, 332, 334, 342, 343, 348, 349, 354, 363, 365, 370, 372, 374, 377, 380, 383, 385, 389, 397, 403, 408, 416, 419, 422, 429, 432, 436, 440, 443, 445, 448, 453, 457, 460, 464, 473, 475, 477, 487, 489, 500, 502, 507, 509, 513, 516, 518, 520, 527, 531, 533, 541, 544, 546, 548, 551, 552, 556, 558, 560, 562, 564, 567, 570, 573, 576, 578, 590, 593, 596, 599, 612, 614, 616, 618, 622, 628, 630, 637, 642, 645, 649, 654, 656, 661 Philo 136, 342 Pseudo-Ibn Ezra 117, 147, 174, 177, 184, 201, 214, 225, 227, 230, 232, 249, 273, 283, 285, 294, 295, 324, 326, 331, 332, 334, 354, 360, 370, 372, 373, 392, 403, 416, 418, 422, 443, 445, 448, 452, 457, 467, 470, 473, 477, 480, 497, 501, 502, 509, 513, 520, 523, 527, 530, 531, 541, 544, 546, 551, 560, 578, 582, 599, 601, 604, 630, 640, 645, 650, 661

164, 221, 262, 305, 337, 374, 429, 460, 483, 515, 536, 567, 606,

170, 224, 265, 313, 340, 380, 432, 464, 489, 518, 539, 570, 609,

Radaq 193, 270, 285, 298, 440, 497, 537, 539, 563, 640 Ralbag 91, 93, 99, 128, 137, 151, 152, 165, 187, 195, 240, 250, 263, 289, 292, 295, 305, 340, 343, 345, 349, 360, 363, 365, 370, 372, 383, 388, 392, 408, 436, 445, 457, 480, 483, 486, 497, 502, 524, 533, 536, 539,

542, 556, 560, 564, 573, 576, 590, 593, 596, 599, 601, 603, 614, 622, 642, 657 Ramaq 99, 107, 111, 117, 127, 136, 137, 140, 173, 198, 201, 204, 227, 233, 235, 240, 250, 257, 265, 295, 302, 305, 307, 308, 326, 327, 329, 332, 337, 340, 360, 365, 370, 372, 382, 385, 403, 407, 416, 419, 443, 445, 448, 457, 458, 459, 460, 464, 470, 473, 478, 488, 492, 499, 500, 502, 513, 518, 520, 533, 537, 539, 544, 545, 551, 556, 558, 560, 564, 576, 577, 580, 590, 593, 596, 603, 606, 607, 630, 640, 642, 645, 657 Rambam 157, 165, 180, 609 Rashi 90, 91, 93, 97, 99, 106, 108, 111, 115, 117, 121, 124, 128, 134, 137, 140, 152, 162, 164, 173, 177, 180, 192, 195, 198, 201, 204, 221, 227, 229, 231, 232, 234, 239, 245, 249, 253, 257, 262, 264, 265, 268, 270, 274, 279, 285, 289, 292, 295, 298, 305, 308, 313, 326, 337, 339, 342, 344, 345, 348, 351, 353, 354, 360, 366, 370, 372, 374, 377, 379, 385, 388, 392, 393, 397, 403, 407, 416, 417, 418, 419, 422, 426, 429, 432, 436, 440, 443, 445, 448, 449, 452, 457, 460, 463, 467, 470, 473, 475, 477, 480, 483, 486, 489, 494, 495, 497, 500, 502, 507, 509, 513, 515, 518, 520, 522, 524, 527, 530, 532, 533, 536, 538, 541, 544, 545, 548, 553, 554, 556, 560, 564, 567, 570, 576, 578, 580, 596, 601, 603, 606, 609, 612, 616, 618, 622, 625, 628, 630, 632, 634, 637, 640, 644, 649, 654, 661 Riyqam 99, 286, 304, 305, 385, 403, 435, 436, 472, 473, 495, 498, 511, 513, 563, 589, 590, 605, 606, 627 Rufinus 360, 366, 422, 464, 503, 513, 533, 539, 546, 573, 625 Saadia Gaon 90, 324, 373, 457, 556, 643, 644 Sulpitius 274 Symmachus 306, 344, 363, 423, 444, 519

Index of Rabbinic and Patristic Sources Theodoretus 383, 503, 513, 533, 539, 546 Theodotion 222, 244, 245, 306, 351, 363, 444, 578 Vilna Gaon 124, 128, 177, 180, 228, 229, 274, 285, 323, 328,

91, 162, 184, 232, 289, 329,

99, 108, 170, 173, 192, 195, 235, 239, 293, 298, 332, 337,

112, 174, 215, 245, 301, 345,

116, 175, 218, 253, 313, 349,

673 360, 393, 398, 419, 436, 440, 443, 445, 453, 457, 464, 467, 473, 475, 478, 483, 487, 495, 497, 500, 502, 507, 509, 523, 524, 527, 531, 532, 533, 536, 539, 549, 551, 552, 554, 558, 560, 562, 567, 573, 576, 582, 590, 593, 603, 607, 612, 614, 618, 622, 625, 628, 630, 631, 634, 637, 640, 645, 653, 654, 656, 657, 661

Zephirinus

527