Protection of Assets: Security Officer Operations [Hardcover ed.] 1934904163, 9781934904169

Citation preview

PROTECTION OF ASSETS

SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS

PROTECTION OF ASSETS

SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS

ASIS International | 1625 Prince Street | Alexandria, VA 22314 USA | www.asisonline.org

Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International ISBN 978-1-934904-16-9 Protection of Assets is furnished with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services. It is designed as a ready reference and guide to the covered subjects. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy of contents herein, it is not an official publication and the publisher can assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written consent of the copyright owner. Printed in the United States of America.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ASIS International (ASIS), the world’s leading society for security professionals, originally founded in 1955 as the American Society for Industrial Security, acquired Protection of Assets in December 2003. The acquisition of this work underscores the Society’s leadership role in professional education. It is the sincere desire of ASIS and its editorial staff to continue to enhance the value of this important reference. Protection of Assets, which has been in existence since 1974, is recognized as the premier reference for security professionals and the publisher wishes to acknowledge the two founding authors and subsequent editors. Timothy J. Walsh, CPP

Richard J. Healy, CPP

Timothy L. Williams, CPP Managing Editor Editorial Associates David G. Aggleton, CPP Milton E. Moritz, CPP Mike Hodge, J.D. Sanford Sherizon, Ph.D., CISSP Timothy J. Walsh, CPP, Editor Emeritus As we move forward, confronted with issues that present a challenge to the security industry, our mission is to ensure that Protection of Assets provides the strategic solutions necessary to help st professionals meet the demands of the 21 century and beyond. We also pledge to assemble a group of subject matter experts who will enhance this manual as necessary to achieve our mission.

Michael E. Knoke, CPP Managing Editor Eva Giercuszkiewicz, MLS, Project Manager Evangeline Pappas, Production Manager Peter E. Ohlhausen, Technical Editor

PREFACE

OBJECTIVES OF PROTECTION OF ASSETS This Protection of Assets (POA) reference work is provided for a single, basic reason: the previous unavailability of such a comprehensive resource. Although the availability of security literature is growing rapidly, with general and specialized texts, it has not been possible—until now—for a business manager or protection professional to find current, accurate, and practical treatment of the broad range of protection subjects, strategies, and solutions in a single source. The need for such a comprehensive resource is quite widespread according to the editors, writers, and many professional colleagues whose advice has been sought in compiling this text. The growing size and frequency of all forms of asset losses, coupled by the related increasing cost and the complexity of countermeasures selection, demand a systematic and unified presentation of protection doctrine in all relevant areas, as well as standards and specifications as they are issued. Of course, it would be presumptuous to assume that any small group of authors could present such material unaided. It is, therefore, a fundamental objective of Protection of Assets to draw upon as large a qualified source base as can be developed. The writers, peer reviewers, and editors attempt to distill from the available data, common or recurrent characteristics, trends and other factors, which identify or signal valid protection strategies. The objective is to provide a source document where information on any protection problem can be obtained.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

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READERSHIP Protection of Assets is intended for a wide readership: all protection professionals and business managers with asset protection responsibility. The coherent discussion and pertinent reference material in each subject area should help the reader conduct unique research that is effective and organized. Of particular significance are the various forms, matrices, and checklists that give the reader a practical start toward application of the security theory to his or her own situation. The manual also serves as a central reference for students pursuing a program in security or asset protection.

DIALOGUE We hope that Protection of Assets becomes an important source of professional insight for those who read it and that it stimulates serious dialogue between and among security professionals. Any reader who is grappling with an unusual, novel, or difficult security problem and would appreciate the opinions of others is encouraged to write a succinct statement describing the problem and send it to us at ASIS [[email protected]]. At the reader’s request his identity will not be disclosed, but the problem will be published with invitations for comment. Readers are also encouraged to communicate agreement or disagreement with strategies or applications recommended in the manual and to suggest alternatives. We reserve the right to publish or refrain from publishing submitted material. The editors also solicit statements of reader opinion on matters of asset protection policy in which a cross-sectional view would be helpful.

SUPPLEMENTAL TRAINING Readers with supervisory or management responsibility for other security and asset protection personnel may find the manuals to be a useful resource from which to assign required readings. Such readings could be elements of a formal training syllabus and could be assigned as part of related course sessions. Another approach would be to assign the manual chapters over a calendar period, to be read in their natural, numerical sequence or in any other special sequence relevant to the subscriber’s particular needs. With all these objectives in mind, we present to you Protection of Assets, in the sincere belief it will enhance your expertise in the security field.

Michael E. Knoke, CPP Managing Editor July 2011

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

CONTRIBUTORS The success of this publication is directly related to the peer review process recognized by most professions. Security professionals, members of academia and other subject matter experts were involved in contributing current information, conducting research, reviewing submissions, and providing constructive comments so that we are able to provide a publication that is recognized as the “go to” reference for security professionals worldwide. It is with sincere appreciation that I wish to thank the below named individuals who contributed to Protection of Assets.

Teresa M. Abrahamsohn, CPP

James P. Carino, Jr., CPP

Richard H. Frank, CPP

Sean A. Ahrens, CPP

Sue Carioti

Kenneth M. Freeman, CPP

Marene N. Allison

James S. Cawood, CPP, PCI, PSP

Peter J. French, CPP

Randy I. Atlas, CPP

Richard E. Chase, CPP

Mary Lynn Garcia, CPP

George J. Barletta, CPP

John C. Cholewa, III, CPP

John W. Gehrlein, CPP

Mark H. Beaudry, CPP

Tom M. Conley, CPP

Eva Giercuszkiewicz, MLS

Regis W. Becker, CPP

Geoffrey T. Craighead, CPP

Gregory A. Gilbert, CPP

Brent Belcoff, CPP

Michael A. Crane, J.D., CPP

Frederick G. Giles, CPP

Howard J. Belfor, CPP

Bruce A. Dean, CPP

Timothy D. Giles, CPP, PSP

Adolfo M. Benages, CPP

Fritz X. Delinski

David H. Gilmore, CPP

Lawrence K. Berenson, CPP

Edward P. De Lise, CPP

Christopher Giusti, CPP

Alexander E. Berlonghi

David A. Dobbins, PSP

Brian D. Gouin, PSP

Raymond J. Bernard, PSP

Clifford E. Dow, CPP

Richard P. Grassie, CPP

Henri A. Berube

Christina M. Duffey, CPP

Benjamin P. Greer

Martin T. Biegelman, J.D.

Brandon Dunlap

Steven R. Harris

Daniel E. Bierman, CPP, PSP

Cheryl D. Elliott, CPP, PCI

Richard J. Heffernan, CPP

Patrick C. Bishop, CPP

James W. Ellis, CPP, PSP

Ronald D. Heil, CPP

Dennis R. Blass, CPP, PSP

William R. Etheridge

Chris A. Hertig, CPP

Keith C. Blowe, CPP

Gregory Alan Ewing, CPP, PSP

William T. Hill, CPP

Paul F. Boyarin, CPP, PCI

Kenneth G. Fauth, CPP

Ronald W. Hobbs, CPP

Tom Boyer

Lawrence J. Fennelly

Mark D. Hucker, CPP

Pete Brake, Jr., CPP

Donald J. Fergus

W. Geoffrey Hughes, PCI

Darryl R. Branham, CPP

Eugene F. Ferraro, CPP, PCI

John L. Hunepohl

Joseph P. Buckley, III

James H. Fetzer, III, CPP

Gregory L. Hurd, CPP

Lucien G. Canton, CPP

Michael T. Flachs, CPP

Gregory W. Jarpey, PSP

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Sheila D. Johnson, CPP, PSP

Gerald A. O’Farrell, CPP

Shari Shovlin

Thomas R. Jost

Peter E. Ohlhausen

Marc Siegel, Ph.D.

Diane Horn Kaloustian

Leonard Ong, CPP

Dennis Smith, CPP

Cathy M. Kimble, CPP

Harm J. Oosten, CPP

Stan Stahl, Ph.D.

R. Michael Kirchner, CPP

S. Steven Oplinger

Paul J. Steiner, Jr., CPP

Glen W. Kitteringham, CPP

Denis A. O’Sullivan, CPP

Pamela M. Stewart, PCI

Michael E. Knoke, CPP

Jaime P. Owens, CPP

Dan E. Taylor, Sr., CPP

Terrence J. Korpal

Gerard P. Panaro, J.D.

Lynn A. Thackery, CPP, PSP

James M. Kuehn, CPP

James F. Pastor, Ph.D.

Mark L. Theisen, CPP

David Lam, CPP

David G. Patterson, CPP, PSP

Dave N. Tyson, CPP

Robert F. Leahy, CPP, PSP

John T. Perkins, CPP

Darleen Urbanek

Robert E. Lee

Karl S. Perman

Karim Vellani, CPP

Todd P. Letcher

Kevin E. Peterson, CPP

Barry J. Walker, CPP

Cynthia Long

Charlie R. A. Pierce

Michael W. Wanik, CPP

Emblez Longoria, CPP, PSP

Patrick K. Quinn, CPP

Roger D. Warwick, CPP

Richard E. Maier, CPP

Roy A. Rahn, CPP

Fritz Weidner

Loye A. Manning, CPP, PSP

John D. Rankin, CPP

Richard C. Werth, CPP

Robert L. Martin, CPP

William G. Rauen, CPP

Allan R. Wick, CPP, PSP

Roger B. Maslen, CPP

David L. Ray, LL.B.

Anthony S. Wilcox, CPP

Judith G. Matheny, CPP

Joseph L. Rector, CPP, PCI, PSP

Donald S. Williams, CPP

Edward F. McDonough, Jr., CPP

Ty L. Richmond, CPP

Reginald J. Williams, CPP

Richard A. Michau, CPP

Lisa M. Ruth

Richard F. Williams, CPP

Bonnie S. Michelman, CPP

Jeffrey J. Ryder, Jr., CPP, PSP

Timothy L. Williams, CPP

Owen J. Monaghan, CPP

Mark A. Sanna, CPP

Coleman L. Wolf, CPP

Patrick M. Murphy, CPP, PSP

Stephen Saravara, III, J.D., CPP

Richard P. Wright, CPP

Carla Naude, CPP

Charles A. Sennewald, CPP

Richard Y. Yamamoto, CPP

James W. Nelson

Dennis Shepp, CPP, PCI

Scott S. Young, CPP

Robert L. Oatman, CPP

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE CONTRIBUTORS Chapter 1. UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

Security Officer Utilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of Officers Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.1 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.2 Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.3 Escort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.4 Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.5 Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.6 Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.7 Dealing with Disturbed People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.8 Special Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Officer Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5.1 Private Security Officer Selection, Training, and Licensing Guidelines 1.5.2 Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline. . . . . . . . 1.5.3 Canadian General Standards Board CAN/CGSB-133.1-99 . . . . . . . 1.5.4 Personal Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7.1 Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 Uniforms and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9.1 Vertical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9.2 Shamrock Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9.3 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.10 Proprietary Versus Contract Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.11 Legal Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.11.1 Security Officer as Peace Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.11.2 Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 2. SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.1

Personnel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Location or Combination of Activities . 2.1.2 Necessary Human Being . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Training and Competency . . . . . . .

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Salaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Post Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Post Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Security Officer Schedule . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Rotating Shifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 Time Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6 Computerized or Automated Scheduling 2.3.7 Work Site Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.8 Personnel Database . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.9 Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.10 Proprietary Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.11 Contract Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.12 Maximizing the Straight Time Schedule . General Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Post Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1 Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Officer Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.1 Security Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2 Database Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3 Manual Log Format . . . . . . . . . . . . Management Use of Reports and Logs . . . . . . . 2.8.1 Data Capture and Trend Analysis . . . . 2.8.2 Failure to Use Reports and Logs . . . . .

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Chapter 3. ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

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Vigilant Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Studies of Similar Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Behavioral Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis of Personality Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Work Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Mechanical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Physical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 Big Five Model of Personality . . . . . . . . . Personal Communication, Training, and Supervision 3.6.1 Changes in the Work Environment. . . . . . 3.6.2 Interaction with Other Employees . . . . . . 3.6.3 Enhancing Observation Capabilities . . . . . 3.6.4 Testing and Post-Testing . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.5 Analyzing Job Performance . . . . . . . . . .

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3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8

Serious Misconduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Misdirected Punishment and Rewards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Offsetting the Effects of Task Simplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Chapter 4. TRAINING THE SECURITY OFFICER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.1 4.2

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4.7 4.8

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History of Security Officer Training . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Apprenticeships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Key Training Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Retention and Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 Education, Training, and Development . . . Benefits of Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Improved Job Performance . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Ease of Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Procedure Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Staff Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.5 Reduced Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.6 Legal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identifying Training Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training Program Assessment and Design. . . . . . . 4.5.1 Behavioral Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Designing the Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.3 Training Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.1 Lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.2 Case Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.3 Job Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.4 Distance Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.5 On-the-Job Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.6 Mentoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Training Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Obstacles to Providing Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8.1 Budgetary Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8.2 Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8.3 Lack of Management Expertise in Training . 4.8.4 Stereotypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8.5 Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.1 Off-Duty Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.2 Tuition Reimbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.3 Recognition Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.4 Integrated Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

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63 64 65 65 67 67 67 69 69 70 70 70 70 71 72 73 74 74 75 76 76 76 77 77 78 78 78 79 79 80 81 82 82 84 84 84 85 85

xi

4.9.5 Video Collaborations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.6 Selling Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.7 Supervisory Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.8 Internships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.9 Formal and Informal Training Efforts . . . . . . . 4.9.10 Government and Private Studies . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.11 Training Guidelines and Standards . . . . . . . . 4.10 Roles of Security Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.1 Management Representative . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.2 Intelligence Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.3 Enforcement/Compliance Agent . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.4 Legal Consultant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.5 Physical Security or Crime Prevention Specialist . 4.11 Future Trends in Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11.1 Shifting Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11.2 Government Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11.3 Self-Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11.4 Training Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 5. SELECTING AND ADMINISTERING THE SECURITY SERVICES CONTRACT . . . . . . . 107 5.1

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108 108 112 112 113 113 113 115 116 116 118 122 123 123 124

Appendix A: Sample Scope of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix B: Sample General and Special Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix C: Sample Operating Agreement for Security Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125 127 133

5.2

5.3

5.4 5.5

Client Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Request for Proposal . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Scope of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 General and Special Orders . . . . . 5.1.4 Bidders’ List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Agency Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Operating Agreement . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Bidders’ Conference . . . . . . . . . Bid Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Sample Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Incentive Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . Contract Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Legal Considerations. . . . . . . . . Administration of the Operating Agreement.

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APPENDIX

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 TABLE OF FIGURES 1-1 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7

Criteria Covered in ASIS Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline . Post Activity Flow Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary Post Hour Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complete Schedule of Security Officer Post Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proprietary Security Officer Force Shift Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Officer Schedule Days-Off Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Checklist for Analyzing Performance Failures: Sleeping on Post . . . . . . . . . . . . Physical Demand Analysis for Security Officer Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Three Basic Principles of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Job Instruction and Learner Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test/Post-Test Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Measures of Contract Security Agency Suitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contract Security Service Straight Time and Billing Rates in Wage Step . . . . . . . Contract Security Overtime, Training, and Short-Term Supplemental Service Rates Contract Security Service Annualized Equipment Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contract Security Fringe Benefit Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contract Security Bid Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contract Security Service Adjusted Base Rates (16,000+ Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . .

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

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10 26 26 27 28 29 51 53 57 57 59 117 118 119 120 121 121 122

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CHAPTER 1 UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS

In the early days of private security operations, security personnel were known as watchmen. Later, they began to be called guards. Today, the preferred term is security officer or protection officer. In some setting the term may be loss prevention officer. Perhaps the most visible element of the private security sector, the uniformed security officer operation has evolved into a multibillion-dollar, worldwide industry. Although the general public may still tend to view security officers solely as guards, proprietary and contract officers in uniform or civilian clothing actually perform a wide variety of duties. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to unprecedented public and media scrutiny of airport security personnel. A finer appreciation of the duties and responsibilities of security officers resulted, and it is likely that regulatory agencies will set more stringent requirements for those personnel over time. Already we are seeing the regulatory dynamic changing as California and Ontario now regulate both proprietary and contract officers. This is a marked departure from the tradition in both North America and Europe where only contract officers were subject to licensing and training requirements. In addition, some jurisdictions regulate other types of protective personnel, such as door supervisors, repossession agents, and locksmiths. This trend may escalate as governments attempt to generate revenue through licensing fees. As security responsibilities have grown, so has the need for higher-quality security personnel. Protection officers are also providing a more diverse array of services for their employers and clients. There is a shift toward more highly trained personnel offering a greater return on investment. By leveraging technology, smaller numbers of personnel can perform more job tasks, some of which are not strictly within the rubric of security. Contemporary protection staffs are being asked to assist in communications, customer service, transportation, and other functions.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.1 Security Officer Utilization

Additional growth is taking place in regions experiencing civil unrest and warfare. As companies move into new areas for energy exploration, they often face armed adversaries. Heavily armed security forces have been used to meet this threat. The number of security officers is rising. After September 11, 2001, security staffs in the United States increased by 13 percent, totaling more than 1 million jobs in 2002 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). By 2008, the number had risen to 1.1 million, about 55 percent of whom were employed by contract agencies (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). About six out of seven worked full-time. Many of the rest were moonlighting law enforcement officers.

1.1

SECURITY OFFICER UTILIZATION Security officers are best used as part of a complete protection plan, not as a stand-alone resource. The security plan is based on an understanding of the risks it is designed to control and officers are but one strategy. Because they are expensive, their use should be evaluated periodically. Other protection resources, such as hardware and electronics, should also be considered. Security professionals can most effectively convince management of the need for security by quantifying and prioritizing the loss potential with a strategic plan that applies to the entire organization. The U.S. Department of Labor forecast that employment of security officers would grow by 14 percent between 2008 and 2018, which is faster than the average for all occupations. About 152,000 new jobs were expected to be created in that period because increased concern about crime, vandalism, and terrorism heightens the demand for security (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). In Canada, employment growth for the security industry is above average. Just as in the United States, researchers expect a strong need for security officers, based in part on 9/11 (Job Futures, 2007). However, even before the 9/11 attacks, the security officer and private investigator occupations grew at five times the rate of growth for all Canadian industries from 1991 to 2001 (Sanders, 2005). Protection officers are also being used in more environments than ever before. In some cases they are replacing public police or soldiers. Security officers may patrol downtown areas or military installations; monitor heavily populated areas like stadiums, shopping centers, or large apartment complexes; or transport prisoners or detainees.

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.2 Public Relations

1.2

PUBLIC RELATIONS Security officers play a public relations role when they perform their protection duties and represent an employer. They are often the first contact a visitor, customer, vendor, or employee has with an organization. The way they deal with people has a marked effect on the initial impression made by the organization. Security officers can also help form and maintain good relationships between the security department (in-house or contract) and others in the organization. By being involved in a security awareness program, officers can impact the attitude of employees to report or decrease security risks. Courtesy and efficiency are essential. Some people are antagonistic toward anyone in an enforcement position. However, well-trained officers who are courteous, act with restraint, and use good judgment can overcome such resistance. Security personnel must convey to employees that certain rules must be followed, but they must also treat employees in a fair and understanding manner. Officious or careless security officers may harm the protection program. On the other hand, if an employee refuses to cooperate with an officer who has performed his or her duty properly, the uncooperative employee should be referred to a supervisor for disciplinary action.

1.3

NUMBER OF OFFICERS REQUIRED The number of officers required for a facility is determined by several factors, including the following: x physical complexity and size of the facility x number of employees x nature of work x number of entrances (and hours they are open) x value and amount of assets being protected x number of patrols needed x number of escorts and special assignments needed Assuming that security officers work 40 hours a week, each post that is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, requires a minimum of 4.2 officers. However, to compensate for sick, vacation, and holiday leave, each post requires 4.5 officers. Organizations that provide longer vacations to senior personnel or who have greater training requirements may require as many as five full-time officers per post.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.4 Basic Functions

The supervisory force is usually supplemented with clerical, communication, training, and supply support personnel. The number of support personnel required depends on the size and complexity of the security force.

1.4

BASIC FUNCTIONS Whether developing a proprietary or contract security organization, it is necessary first to identify the tasks that the security force will be required to perform. The basic functions of a security officer force include the following: x control of entrances and movement of pedestrian and vehicle traffic x patrol of buildings and perimeters x escort of material and personnel x inspection of security and fire exposures x monitoring of assets from a central control facility x emergency response x dealing with disturbed people x special assignments These functions are explained below.

1.4.1

ACCESS CONTROL A primary function of the security officer is access control, which is the regulation of movement into, out of, and within a designated building or area. Controls are placed on people, forms of transportation, and materials (Fay, 2002, p. 161). Typical security officer instructions concerning access control include the following: x Ensure that all employees are who they say they are and are wearing visible badges at all times within the facility. x Provide all visitors with special passes. Regulate their access through an established authorization permit process. x Identify and report any person in the facility without proper identification. Some people may be detained temporarily. x Report individuals who attempt to bring alcoholic beverages or other contraband into the facility or who appear to be under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.4 Basic Functions

x Identify and question individuals who remove property to ensure that they have a property removal pass or are otherwise authorized to remove the property. x Monitor materials entering and leaving the facility. x Monitor vehicles entering and leaving the facility. Those vehicles may include watercraft, aircraft, and land-based vehicles (such as trains, buses, heavy equipment, cars, motorbikes, and trucks). 1.4.2

PATROL Officers on patrol observe a wide variety of people, assets, and locations. They report hazards and deficiencies in the protection program so that changes can be made. Patrols are generally divided into two categories—foot patrols and vehicular patrols. Either way, the officer should patrol the assigned area systematically, frequently backtracking and taking unexpected routes. The officer should try to observe people and locations on the assigned route without being noticed. The officer must also have an intimate knowledge of the patrol area and be aware of shortcuts, dead ends, construction work, and any other factors that might affect response. Knowledge of the hazards and legitimate activities in the area is also required. Observation is a prime task for the officer on patrol. The officer should carefully regard all aspects of the environment. When anything out of the ordinary occurs, the officer should evaluate the situation and take the necessary steps. Particular care should be taken when monitoring individuals. On patrol, officers commonly look for the following, among other conditions: x unsecure doors, windows, or other openings x suspicious persons, vehicles, or circumstances x disorder or unusual activity—anyone under the influence of alcohol or other substances, unusual groups of people, disorderly individuals, or quarrels x hazardous conditions, such as water or other fluid leaks, fire hazards, and malfunctioning equipment x equipment operating at the wrong time x problems with fire-fighting equipment x violations of company security or safety policies

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.4 Basic Functions

1.4.3

ESCORT Security personnel should not be required to escort visitors and customers on company property. Doing so takes officers away from their protection tasks. Whoever invited a visitor should be responsible for escorting him or her at the site. However, it is reasonable for security officers to escort people carrying large sums of money or special information or property. Officers should also provide escorts when requested for employee safety—such as walking an employee to the parking lot at night. Officers may also escort those who need assistance due to an illness or physical disability. Such assignments usually require little time but may require the officer to be particularly alert.

1.4.4

INSPECTION Inspection may be performed along with other assignments, such as patrol. Officers may also conduct special inspections for fire hazards; unlocked doors, safes, and windows; and other security and safety concerns. In many locations, security personnel, due to their 24-hour presence, are expected to monitor mechanical equipment and inspect fire-extinguishing equipment.

1.4.5

MONITORING Increasingly, security monitoring is conducted from centralized security control centers. A typical security control center may contain the controls for systems that operate closedcircuit television (CCTV), access control, fire alarm controls, elevator, building lighting, duress alarms, and emergency call stations. These centralized control centers may be responsible for a single location or may monitor sites across an entire country. Control center security personnel must be comfortable with electronic systems, computers, and a sometimes high-stress environment.

1.4.6

EMERGENCY RESPONSE Security personnel have a responsibility to be prepared for emergencies that could occur at their particular site. It falls to security officers to direct, coordinate, and carry out the responses established by security management. Emergencies that security officers might have to respond to include the following: x fire alarms, both legitimate and nuisance x bomb threats (via telephone or mail) x bombings x suspicious packages

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.4 Basic Functions

x hazardous material (hazmat) releases, inside or outside a building x medical emergencies x mechanical and other equipment failures x elevator entrapments x extreme weather, such as floods, tornadoes, ice storms, wind, and heat x terrorist actions x other criminal actions, including hostage taking, gunfire, or bombings x building collapses x building evacuations, both partial and full

1.4.7

DEALING WITH DISTURBED PEOPLE This section addresses situations involving persons who are mentally ill, under the influence of alcohol or illegal substances, temporarily unable to control themselves due to physical or emotional trauma, or otherwise behaving in an irrational manner that could result in injury to themselves or others. Dealing with disturbed people requires sensitivity. The goal is to prevent harm from the person’s acts and to control the person with a minimum of injury, discomfort, or embarrassment. The first objective is the immediate concern of responding security personnel, but the second may be overlooked in the course of the response. After the apparent danger passes, witnesses will reflect on how the disturbed person was handled. If it appears that the disturbed person was treated poorly or inconsiderately, people will criticize the security officer’s behavior, forgetting the risks present at the time of the incident. The problem can be further complicated if the disturbed person and the responding security personnel are of different sexes or ages. A reluctance to make physical contact under these circumstances may result in an unacceptable delay by the security forces. As in all tactical scenarios, handling the situation requires skillful improvisation by security personnel. Still, security officers should be trained in employer policies on these situations, especially regarding the use of physical force. Though not all policies require a written procedure, in cases like these where specific guidelines are required, it is highly recommended to have one in place.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.5 Officer Qualifications

The most important consideration is bringing the person into custody and eliminating the immediate danger. Other considerations include the following: x the legal liability of the participating security forces and the enterprise if injury or other harm results x the legal liability of the security forces and the enterprise if the disturbed person is not restrained and then injures others x employee/community/public/media relations, as they may be affected by the conduct of security officers Undue concern with legal liability may result in action that is too little, too late. Adequate insurance coverage should already have been provided, and it should protect both the enterprise and the security personnel. Such coverage should be reviewed with the insurance department. Even for self-insureds or those who retain the risk, economic concerns should not exclusively determine the response. The publication of the policy will, in part, remedy the liability and public relations problems. Although the conduct of security personnel still remains critical in any given situation, the existence of the policy is evidence to others that serious thought has been given to the subject.

1.4.8

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS In many facilities, the security force is on duty around the clock, and the officers may be the only personnel available for special assignments. They may be needed to act as messengers, communications coordinators, or drivers, for example. However, diverting officers from security tasks to miscellaneous services erodes the facility protection program.

1.5

OFFICER QUALIFICATIONS In some organizations, the qualifications for employment as a security officer are so low that essentially any applicant can be hired. In other organizations, the duties of the position are complex or highly sensitive and the qualifications extremely high. Government regulations on security officers vary across jurisdictions and may pertain only to particular industries. Every organization with assets to protect is responsible for setting the qualifications of an effective security officer. The qualifications should be based on the duties in the job description. The initial interview should be conducted by a human resource specialist.

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.5 Officer Qualifications

1.5.1

PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER SELECTION, TRAINING, AND LICENSING GUIDELINES The Private Security Officer Selection, Training, and Licensing Guidelines document was developed by the Private Sector Liaison Committee (PSLC) of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The PSLC includes members from the National Sheriffs’ Association, the National Association of Security Companies, and ASIS International. The guidelines provide the following minimum criteria for private security officers (Private Sector Liaison Committee, 2002): x If they will work unarmed, they must be at least 18 years of age. x If they will work armed, they must be at least 21 years of age and comply with U.S. Public Law 104-208 Section 658 (known as the Lautenberg amendment), which forbids anyone convicted of domestic violence (felony or misdemeanor) from possessing a firearm or ammunition. x They must possess a valid state driver’s license (if applicable). x They must not have — been convicted or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a felony in any jurisdiction, — been convicted or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty, or acts against governmental authority, including the use or possession of a controlled substance within a seven-year period, — been convicted or pled guilty or nolo contendere to any crime in any jurisdiction involving the sale, delivery, or manufacture of a controlled substance, or — been declared by any court to be incompetent by reason of mental disease or defect (unless the declaration has been removed or expunged). x For a state criminal record check and an FBI criminal history check before permanent employment as a private security officer, they must submit — two sets of fingerprints, — two passport photographs, — their name, address, date of birth, social security number, and citizenship status, and — a statement of conviction of crimes. These actions must be taken before arming any private security officer. x They must furnish information about all prior employment. The employer should make a reasonable effort to verify the last seven years of employment history and check three personal references. x They must pass a recognized preemployment drug-screening test.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.5 Officer Qualifications

The guidelines also suggest the following applicant criteria for non-regulated security officer employment: x high school education or equivalent x military discharge records (DD 214) x mental and physical capacity to perform the duties for which they are being employed x for armed applicants, successful completion of a relevant psychological evaluation to verify that they are suited for the duties for which they are being considered The guidelines note that U.S. federal law mandates that candidates for employment must be citizens or possess legal alien status prior to employment. 1.5.2

PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER SELECTION AND TRAINING GUIDELINE In 2001, ASIS International recognized the need for increasing standards for private security officers. Hence, the Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline was developed. The guideline offers U.S. national minimum criteria for the selection and training of all security officers, both contract and proprietary. The guideline provides minimum criteria in three categories. (See Figure 1-1.) State Regulation of Private Security Regulatory body with oversight and enforcement State fees to support the enforcement process Regulatory body or company registration

Employment Screening Criteria General requirements

Training (hours and testing)

Citizenship

Training topics

Personal information

Annual training

Social security number

Pre-assignment firearms training

Education

Post-assignment firearms requirements

Insurance

Criminal history

Individual security officer license

Employment verification

Private security officer registration

Registrations/licenses and certifications

Background investigations

Fingerprints and drug screening

Pre-assignment, postassignment, and annual training

Photographs

Armed security officer training

Training Criteria

Annual firearms training

Credit check Physical ability

FIGURE 1-1 Criteria Covered in ASIS Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.5 Officer Qualifications

1.5.3

CANADIAN GENERAL STANDARDS BOARD CAN/CGSB-133.1-99 In Canada, the Canadian General Standards Board has promulgated CAN/CGSB-133.1-2008, Security Officers and Security Officer Supervisors, which is a minimum criteria standard that organizations must meet in order to supply guard services to the government of Canada. Using that standard, individual provinces manage the licensing of security guards. In 2003 and 2004, several provinces began to review their own, existing legislation, much of st which is decades old and not reflective of the 21 century security industry. Future legislation is likely to mandate training and standards for all security personnel, not just contract officers.

1.5.4

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES The essential personal attributes for a private security officer are as follows: x good character x proper behavior and ability to handle people x neat appearance x knowledge of the job x education x ethics

Character An officer should be honest, courageous, alert, well-disciplined, and loyal. Because officers are the custodians of company and employee property, the need for honesty is obvious. Security department regulations should state—in writing—that all officers are required to be scrupulously honest. Failure to prevent damage to or theft of property, acceptance of bribes or gratuities, or permitting the violation of company rules should be cause for discipline, including dismissal. Because an element of danger is always involved in a protection operation, an officer who lacks courage is of little value. Officers must display courage in incidents of physical danger and during emergencies. Courage is also required to report fully and accurately all violations of company rules and to enforce protection policies on company property. Continued alertness is essential and might mean the difference between life and death. Duties such as patrol tend to become monotonous over time because of their routine nature. However, the purpose of such routine responsibilities is to protect personnel and the facility,

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.5 Officer Qualifications

a task that may involve danger. Officers must be constantly alert for their own protection as well as the protection of company property and employees. Prompt obedience and proper execution of all orders given by superiors is always necessary. Regulations usually specify that an officer must never leave his post until relieved or ordered to do so and that the officer must not allow personal opinions to influence job performance. The officer must be loyal to the job and company, and all decisions must be based on what is best for the organization. The officer must also be discerning with confidential information. Because the officer often works alone and unobserved, strength of character is an important qualification.

Behavior The security officer is usually the first contact a visitor or employee has with the organization. The manner in which the officer functions greatly affects that person’s perception of the company. Three important factors relate to behavior: courtesy, restraint, and interest. Security officers must display the best behavior at all times—especially when they are uniformed in distinctive attire—because they must retain the respect of others. Courtesy is the expression of consideration for others—it eliminates friction and makes personal associations pleasant. By demonstrating consideration for others, the officer can obtain the cooperation of others, which is essential. Whether answering questions, giving directions, or enforcing rules or traffic regulations, officers must be courteous. Restraint must be stressed in the officer training program. Officers should act without haste or undue emotion, avoid abusive language, avoid arguing, and avoid force if at all possible. A calm, dignified behavior engenders respect and is more effective. While on duty, tolerance for the opinions of others must always be shown. An officer must also have an interest in the job. Without interest and satisfaction, he or she may develop a poor attitude toward the public and employees.

Appearance Good personal appearance is essential for an overall good impression. If visitors gain a good impression of the organization, employees in the facility will have more respect for the officers and for the security organization. This, in turn, boosts the morale of the security organization as a whole. An individual officer can influence—either favorably or unfavorably—the opinions of many people. Whether in a uniform or plainclothes, officers should appear neat and well-groomed.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.5 Officer Qualifications

Knowledge of the Job Learning is an ongoing process for the security officer. Requirements or rules and locations of areas or personnel requiring protection change frequently. It is vital that the officer be thoroughly familiar with the facility and have complete knowledge of the organization to be able to perform the public relations aspect of the job—giving information to employees and outsiders. The officer must also be familiar with federal, state, and local laws, company rules and regulations, criminal procedures, safety, fire protection, emergency plans, and first aid.

Education The education level of security force personnel has changed notably since earlier reports criticized the level of education and the low competency of people employed as officers in the private sector. Many organizations are retaining larger portions of risks formerly insured commercially, and there is increased emphasis on quality performance with concomitant emphasis on adequate qualification. Better-educated candidates are available in the employment pool. The academic community has responded to the continued rapid growth in private security as well. Security-related certificate and degree programs are currently available throughout the United States, Canada, and other countries. Many graduates from these courses take entry-level employment in security while preparing for a higher position.

Ethics A security officer may have all other personal attributes listed, but without ethics the package is incomplete. The International Foundation for Protection Officers (2010) promulgates a code of ethics, which states that a protection officer shall do the following: x Respond to the employer’s professional needs. x Exhibit exemplary conduct. x Protect confidential information. x Maintain a safe and secure workplace. x Dress to create professionalism. x Enforce all lawful rules and regulations. x Encourage liaison with public officers. x Develop good rapport within the profession. x Strive to attain professional standards. x Encourage high standards of officer ethics.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.6 Training

1.6

TRAINING Officers’ duties determine their required training. Traditional duties include patrol, pilferage control, control of entrances and exits, and prevention of sabotage or other hostile acts against the facility. Training is discussed in depth later in this book.

1.7

WEAPONS Many states have legislation requiring that armed officers be licensed by the state and mandate minimum qualifying standards for the issuance of licenses or permits to carry firearms. The cost of such training and the time required to meet the training criteria lead many organizations to opt for unarmed officers. In Canada, armed security officers are a rarity—with only cash-in-transit officers carrying weapons. One of the greatest liabilities an organization faces involves issuing deadly weapons to security officers. Liability is obvious when the weapons are issued to proprietary officers. Some assets protection managers think that when a contract security vendor is used and the outsourcing contract is properly drawn, most of the liability is shifted to the vendor. However, legal actions usually involve anyone remotely associated with a situation. Payment for the vendor services indicates an acceptance of the vendor’s management style and practices; thus, crucial policies and protocols should be prescribed by the organization that employs the vendor. The decision on whether to arm an officer should be based on the existence of one or both of the following conditions: x There is a greater danger to life safety without the weapon. x The officer may reasonably be expected to use fatal force. If officers are armed, the management of the facility assumes several responsibilities: x proper training of the officers to be armed x selection of the appropriate firearms and ammunition x proper maintenance of the firearms by a qualified gunsmith x maintenance of records of the foregoing actions x an adequate level of liability insurance

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.7 Weapons

Officers must be thoroughly proficient in the use of arms before carrying them. Training includes proper handling of firearms and live range firing for qualification. The live range firing should be conducted using the weapon carried by the officer, and the records should include the serial number of the weapon. Each weapon has its own firing characteristics, and the officer should be able to testify to complete familiarity with the weapon in a firing situation. It is equally important that officers be trained to use the firearm in situations potentially encountered at the facility. Weapon retention must also be part of the training. Refresher training must be provided periodically. If officers are permitted to carry privately owned firearms on duty, standards for the type of firearms and ammunition must be set and enforced. An alternative is to prohibit carrying privately owned weapons. Employer-owned firearms and ammunition should be issued at the start of a tour of duty and collected at the close of the tour of duty. The insurance carrier must be advised that security officers are carrying firearms. If a contract security agency provides armed security officers to protect the facility, all the above considerations must be included in the contract for the service. Firearms may be appropriate when large amounts of cash are regularly handled and robbery is a risk. In that case, armed security officers are a greater deterrent than unarmed officers, and the deterrence of robbery attempts will reduce the general life-safety risk. However, one must also consider the risk of a gun battle to bystanders. The strategic value of issuing weapons is that potential assailants may be dissuaded from attacking a target if they know they will face armed resistance. However, it is essential that the quality and quantity of defensive weapons be an obstacle to the potential assailants. For example, one or two security officers armed with handguns may not deter robbery attempts if the target is attractive enough and no other countermeasures are used. Combining armed security officers with other countermeasures, such as vehicle control, fence and boundary security, and hardened locations could create a stronger deterrent. Similarly, shoulder weapons at hardened or defensible positions along the attack access route may be a more formidable deterrent than handguns. Firearms might also be justified when a single security officer is assigned to a post or escort duty in a locale where felonious attacks have happened or are anticipated. Examples of such locations are remote gate posts and high-crime areas that require exterior patrol. An alternative may be to avoid the use of security officers and substitute other countermeasures, such as remote surveillance or intrusion alarms.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.7 Weapons

1.7.1

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Aside from security officer competency, other matters should be considered with respect to the use of deadly weapons. They include the following: x conditions when weapons may be issued x specific people who get a weapon x type of weapon and ammunition issued x quality and reliability of the weapon at time of issue x repair and maintenance of the weapon by a qualified armorer x accountability for the specific weapon and its ammunition x specified training with the weapon x conditions when weapons may be used x safety precautions surrounding the issuance and carrying of weapons x return or surrender of the weapon when not required for authorized use x secure storage for weapons when they are not issued and in use (weapons unloaded, separated from ammunition, and locked away in an approved storage container) x accurate records of each of the preceding points Weapons that are in large supply, that are in an area prone to theft by terrorists or other adversaries, or that are extremely dangerous (automatic weapons) need additional controls. Storage in a reinforced building, intrusion detection, armed patrols, dual access, etc. should be considered as part of a defense-in-depth protective system. Applicable government standards and insurance carrier requirements should be exceeded in these instances. The use of weapons that are not considered lethal, such as impact weapons, electronic devices, and aerosols, should also be covered in policy statements. Such statements put the enterprise on record as to the propriety of weapons use and form the basis of the weapons training program.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.8 Uniforms and Equipment

1.8

UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT Most organizations supply security officers with uniforms and equipment. Doing so ensures that the uniforms are, in fact, uniform in appearance and properly fitted to each officer. Complete seasonal uniforms, including inclement weather clothing, are usually issued. Consideration must be given to the type of duty performed and the laundry or dry cleaning cycle when determining the number of uniforms issued. Many organizations have adopted the approach of making officers recognizable without appearing authoritarian. This is accomplished by having officers wear casual attire, such as plainclothes with shoulder or pocket patches. Company policy should address whether uniforms should be worn off duty, including travel to and from work. A policy allowing the uniform to be worn only when on duty precludes adverse publicity should an officer become involved in an incident on his or her own time. As for equipment, an officer assigned to control access at a lobby desk may only need minimal equipment, whereas an officer on roving patrol might require a flashlight, a means of communication, a weapon, and a notebook.

1.9

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Organizational structure is the formal pattern of interactions and coordination designed by management to link the tasks of individuals and groups in achieving organizational goals (Bartol & Martin, 1998). Originally, most security forces were patterned after military or police organizations. Some forces today are led by a security chief as the senior officer, followed by the ranks of captain, lieutenant, sergeant, and officer. The current trend is to abandon the military or paramilitary model and organize along supervisory lines used by businesses. It is more common to find the entry-level position designated as security officer and the first level above as supervisor. Higher levels are identified by conventional management titles, such as assistant manager, manager, director, etc. The efficiency of the security force depends on the adequacy and skill of its supervisors. Security managers may also give specific supervisors operational responsibility by delegating authority in order to see how they handle responsible decision making and security force oversight. Unless officers are properly trained and closely supervised, they may not provide the protection required.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.9 Organizational Structure

Security officer supervisors are selected on the basis of their knowledge of the job and demonstrated administrative and leadership abilities. When selecting a candidate for a supervisory position, it is important to ensure they have the base skills required to be able to meet the expected performance levels of the higher level position. They also need to be given special training so they can keep current with new developments and methods. Some organizations prefer to rotate the assignments of supervisors to prevent cliques and ensure familiarity with all phases of security officer duties. The two reasons for testing the security operations program are to identify residual risks and identify necessary changes within the organization. Several models of structuring a security operation are described below. 1.9.1

VERTICAL MODEL In the vertical model, also known as the hierarchical model, authority comes from the top or senior manager and flows down through a series of managers and supervisors until it stops with the front-line staff. The most effective managerial style for supervisors is to acknowledge credit for good performance and be objective when noting deficiencies. They must also be able to administer disciplinary action as a corrective measure, not just a punishment. Managers and supervisors need to maintain high personal standards in their own performance, to set an example and to motivate their subordinates. The art of delegation includes giving responsibility with commensurate authority and holding the employee fully accountable for use of that authority. The number of organizational levels varies. The organization chart can be seen as a series of pyramids connected to and within other pyramids in the organization.

1.9.2

SHAMROCK MODEL This model is based on the three-leafed shamrock (Dalton, 1995, p. 134): The first leaf represents a small core of professionals, managers and skilled technicians. Their skill sets have been identified as being absolutely critical to the organization. This small group is apt to interact in a more collegial manner in a traditional boss–subordinate relationship. The organization is flat and information flows freely between the participants. Considerably larger than the first, the second leaf consists of third-party suppliers who have been chosen for their expertise and ability to provide quality service. Such contractors may often employ former members of the organization. The third leaf consists of part-time and temporary workers who are employed as needed. Commonly known as the flexible work force, these are employees who require minimal support and draw a greater identity from their profession than from the company. This is not to say they lack loyalty and commitment to the company when on the payroll.

This model is not perfect. Vetting of third-party employees is still required, and it is still necessary to ensure that temporary and part-time workers are properly trained, qualified, and available.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.10 Proprietary Versus Contract Officers

1.9.3

NETWORK MODEL Also called the flattened, horizontal, or open model, the network model, can be compared to a computer network. Employees are connected not just to their immediate supervisor and to those whom they themselves supervise, but also to many others in the organization. In addition, the security department is networked to other departments. In the network model, the emphasis is not on vertical or horizontal reporting relationships but instead on people coming together for particular tasks and then disbanding or regrouping as needed. Although the network model may not be the best fit for front-line staff with static positions and responsibilities, it provides flexibility for one-time needs and for security management to leverage their skills for the greater good of the organization.

1.10

PROPRIETARY VERSUS CONTRACT OFFICERS Organizations may use proprietary officers, contract officers, or a mix. Arguments can be offered for any configuration. In the 1990s, the trend toward staff reductions and outsourcing seemed to favor the contract method. For example, General Motors converted its large proprietary security force to a contract operation. Historically this pattern has been common when budgets are tight. Another configuration is a hybrid security force wherein proprietary supervisors oversee contract front-line officers. In this case, the relationship is known as principal-agent. Contract security firm representatives usually reduce costs to sell their service. This can be misleading, and on occasion contract service adopted on a low-bid basis proves disappointing. Often, the level of service is lowered to compensate for the lower price. To avoid this, it is the responsibility of the organization requesting the security service to develop detailed bid specifications that clearly spell out the requirements, including wages, benefits, and performance expectations. This way one can avoid low-bid, poor-performance results after the contract has been awarded. Ensuring satisfactory performance can be a problem for the enterprise electing to contract for security officers. With performance specifications, it is easier to hold a contract security company to a standard of quality. Regulating the security activity not only requires licensing of the controlled business but also licensing or registering security employees. Before assuming that a proprietary security force is the way to go, security management should conduct an analysis of the operational and cost advantages of in-house versus contract security. Tasks normally handled by the contractor, such as a recruitment program, application processing and personnel screening, training, benefit administration, discipline, and open post coverage would have to be handled within the proprietary security group. Other concerns, such as general liability, workers’ compensation, and labor relations must also be taken into consideration.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.11 Legal Concerns

1.11

LEGAL CONCERNS

1.11.1

SECURITY OFFICER AS PEACE OFFICER Security executives are divided in their opinions on peace officer status for security officers. Opponents point out the serious consequences of a status that may give the security officer police authority outside the facility, thus exposing the employer to extended liability. Some jobs, however—such as traffic handling on public streets or parking enforcement— may require deputization. When officers are deputized, it is customary and prudent to limit the scope of their authority to the actual security officer duties. Security managers should be familiar with state civil statutory law regarding labor. A local police chief might have the authority to mobilize all police officers, including security officers with peace officer status. That act could reduce the guard force at a time of public emergency.

1.11.2

INSURANCE Most organizations recognize their probable liability for all actions of officers on duty. However, they cannot protect the officer from being separately sued or charged criminally. Therefore, officers remain primarily liable for their own conduct. Experience has shown, nevertheless, that plaintiffs in such cases perceive the employer to have deep pockets and will seek, by any available theory of liability, to make the employer a principal defendant. Most enterprises do not carry special liability insurance for officers because they are covered by the provisions of a commercial liability policy. In instances where officers are deputized, a limited added coverage is usually provided through the indemnity bond required for protection by the local government. This, however, protects the public only. If a claim were made on the bond, the employing company might be subject to a suit by the bonding company for the amount paid out, if it would be liable in a civil suit for damages caused by the officer’s actions. When employing a contract security organization, the existence and adequacy of the insurance coverage provided by the company for the employees who are deployed should be verified. The insurance requirements of the client should also be included in the agreement between the contract security organization and the employing enterprise. It is not necessary to apply a condition where the contractor firm is an insurer. Whether the client company wants to be designated as an additional named insured depends on the policy language, which varies among carriers. At a minimum, the client should have valid and current certificates of insurance—issued by the contract agency’s insurance carrier—that show the agreed limits of coverage accompanied by the carrier’s undertaking to notify the client of any change in or cancellation of coverage.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS 1.11 Legal Concerns

In sum, security personnel are a vital component of most asset protection programs. Their selection, training, and management have a tremendous impact on the level of protection they can offer. Organizations today require more-committed, better-trained, and betterqualified individuals for security positions than they did in the past. Security personnel should be supervised by asset protection management and not placed as the sub-operation of another department.

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CHAPTER 2 SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE

Despite efficiency gains due to technology and, in some settings, a shrinking of the security force, security officers still represent the largest segment of security sector employees and are the largest cost element in the majority of security operating budgets. The deployment of security officer personnel must be guided by rational and objective business criteria, including a thorough assessment of the protection needs of organizational assets. Once the need has been established, the next important task is to ensure that security officers are scheduled and assigned cost-effectively.

2.1

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS In this step, the security manager determines how many posts and officers are required to protect the assets of the facility. Post orders are based on standard operating procedures (SOPs), which should be site-specific. The SOPs are a compendium of procedures for the security group to follow in day-to-day operations. They may also include emergency response procedures. By specifying organizational expectations, SOPs help managers determine post requirements. A security officer post is any location or combination of activities for which a trained human being is necessary. That definition includes three key concepts: x a location or combination of activities x necessary human being x training and competence to accomplish the required activities

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.1 Personnel Requirements

2.1.1

LOCATION OR COMBINATION OF ACTIVITIES The location or combination of activities may be a stationary (fixed) post or a roving security officer patrol (patrol post). This location may feature desirable or undesirable activities that require the presence of a security officer. Alternatively, the location may be a predetermined spot, such as an employee, visitor, or contractor checkpoint or a central control facility.

2.1.2

NECESSARY HUMAN BEING The necessary human being concept means that the particular characteristics and reactions required at the post require human capabilities. Each post is likely to demand a combination of cognitive (knowledge), psychomotor (physical), and affective (attitudinal) skills. A human being is needed if the post requires the ability to x discriminate among events, persons, circumstances, or physical objects based on complex and varying criteria; x conduct rational dialogue with people face-to-face and discern next actions based on such communication; x use physical force or the threat of physical force to restrain one or more persons; x exercise judgment to determine a logical course of mental or physical activity in response to circumstances that may vary randomly; and x provide reports detailing their activities on an ongoing basis. The requirements above are for qualities at the post. If they are applied at a location other than the proposed post, staffing may not be required at the post. For example, a “persontrap” with interlocking or revolving doors might be used to control entry or exit at an access point. Using CCTV, audio transceivers, card readers, and other technology, access control might be completely automated with a human response required only in case of a problem. Where personal recognition for access-control purposes is required, under low-density queuing, a remote operator could control three or four access points.

2.1.3

TRAINING AND COMPETENCY Training and competency imply the possession of the necessary skills and knowledge to accomplish an assigned task. Without post-specific training, security officer effectiveness is reduced and raises a question of the actual need for the post. When potential or actual losses require a post, proper training must be developed to ensure that the assigned security officer is effective. Competency refers to an individual’s ability, skills, and qualifications to perform the necessary duties. In addition to the mental ability to complete administrative tasks and make judgments, the security officer must also have the physical ability to observe, listen, report, and function in emergencies.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.2 Salaries

As was detailed earlier, one can find numerous guidelines on the selection and general training of security officers. In addition, job-specific and site-specific criteria for physical and mental abilities should be included as screening criteria for prospective proprietary and contract security officers. In an effective screening process, the physical and mental requirements are part of the job description.

2.2

SALARIES There is a growing realization that security officer salaries need to be commensurate with the responsibility of their position. Security personnel are often the backbone of an organization’s protection program and are responsible for the security and safety of people, physical assets, and information. The demands of the occupation have never been higher. They deserve salaries that allow them to concentrate on their jobs and not worry about meeting basic needs. They often work too many hours in a day, too many shifts without a day off, or hours at a second job. Security personnel require education, training, and experience. Paying a fair salary will go a long way toward allowing them to obtain all three, leading to a win-win situation for the employee and employer. Better salaries also lead to lower turnover and hence to lower turnover costs (McNally, 2004, p. 17). Turnover costs—due to advertising, interview time, background checks, hiring, new employee processing, and training—generally run to 25 percent or more of the employee’s annual salary. Additional costs are associated with lost productivity until the new employee is up to speed, the expense of covering terminated employees’ hours, and a decline in customer satisfaction. High turnover also weakens a security operation’s performance.

2.3

SCHEDULING

2.3.1

POST HOURS Once the need for a post is established, the next step is to determine when it should function. A post may be used to control access and to monitor employees entering and exiting the workplace during regular working hours, and it may be closed at other hours. Alternatively, the post may be staffed only at high traffic periods or when needs arise. In determining what post hours are necessary, the security manager should discuss and analyze security requirements with the primary management clients affected by the post. Doing so ensures that operating needs and requirements are understood. It is also helpful to

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

chart the level of activity at the post throughout a 24-hour, seven-day period. If movement is heavy for brief periods and light or nonexistent for longer periods, the post will be more costeffective if open only during the peak periods. Some level of off-peak activity may have to be transferred to another post in order to satisfy operating requirements. The same technique should be followed for posts that control vehicular movement, transfer of property, and other activities. Figure 2-1 indicates a simple technique for documenting activity.

Hours:

2400

0300

0600

0900

1200

1500

1800

Event:

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

2100

2400

Legend: A—night shift meal period B—truck gate opens C—day shift enters/night shift leaves D—day shift meal period E—day shift leaves/afternoon shift enters F—afternoon shift meal period G—afternoon shift leaves/night shift enters

FIGURE 2-1 Post Activity Flow Schedule

2.3.2

POST SCHEDULE The schedule lists the number of hours in each shift when the post is staffed. If a post opens or closes at an hour other than the start or end of the guard shift, a notation of the actual clock hour should be made to facilitate the next stages of schedule development. Figure 2-2 shows how a preliminary schedule of post hours can be developed. Post

Days 0700–1500

Afternoons 1500–2300

Nights 2300–0700

Command

8 hours (7 days)

8 hours (7 days)

8 hours (7 days)

Truck gate

8 hours (M–F)

4 hours (till 1900 M–F)

Closed (7 days)

Pedestrian gate

8 hours (+2 O/T, M–F)

8 hours (M–F)

Closes 2300 (7 days)

Warehouse

8 hours (M–F)

Closes 1500 (7 days)

Closed (7 days)

Patrol

8 hours (7 days)

8 hours (7 days)

8 hours (7 days)

FIGURE 2-2 Preliminary Post Hour Estimate

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

2.3.3

SECURITY OFFICER SCHEDULE Next, the actual security officer schedule must be developed. Two techniques are useful for this. The first is appropriate for use with contract security officer services and indicates whether a particular post requires a full-time or part-time security officer. It is a restatement of the security officer hours required, by shift and by post. (See Figure 2-3.) Post

Sun.

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

Fri.

Sat.

Total

Command

8

8

8

8

8

Truck gate

—

8

8

8

8

8

8

56

8

—

40

Pedestrian gate

—

10

10

10

10

10

—

50

Warehouse

—

8

8

8

8

8

—

40

Day Shift (0700–1500)

Patrol

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

56

Total Hours

16

42

42

42

42

42

16

242

Command

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

56

Truck gate

—

4

4

4

4

4

—

20

Pedestrian gate

—

8

8

8

8

8

—

40

Warehouse

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0

Patrol

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

56

Total hours

16

28

28

28

28

28

16

172

Command

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

56

Truck gate

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0

Pedestrian gate

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0

Warehouse

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0

Patrol

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

56

Total hours

16

16

16

16

16

16

16

112

Grand total

48

86

86

86

86

86

48

526

Afternoon Shift (1500–2300)

Night Shift (2300–0700)

FIGURE 2-3 Complete Schedule of Security Officer Post Hours The second technique is useful when managing a proprietary security force. The typical North American work week is 40 hours of straight time over five consecutive days. For positions covered by fair labor standards and by wage and hour laws—including most security officer positions—work that exceeds 40 hours or five days requires premium pay.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

The same is true under the usual collective bargaining agreement, often for jobs not covered by statute. It is important to establish a work schedule that does not unnecessarily involve premium or overtime pay. However, managers must also take into consideration scheduling vacation time and other replacement time, which may require overtime hours. In the method illustrated in Figure 2-4, a numeral—rather than a name—represents any one officer assigned over a conventional workweek. This technique shows post coverage and quickly reveals errors, such as split days off, scheduling of more than five days, and back-toback shift assignments. It also indicates the minimum number of officers necessary to achieve proper staffing for the force. This requirement is represented by the highest numeral indicated in the schedule. Post

Sun.

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

Fri.

Sat.

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

Day Shift (0700–1500) Command Truck gate

—

3

2

2

2

3

—

Pedestrian gate

—

4

4

4

4

4

—

Warehouse

—

5

5

5

5

5

—

Patrol

6

6

3

3

3

6

6

Supernumerary*

—

—

—

—

6

—

—

Afternoon Shift (1500–2300) Command

7

7

7

7

7

8

8

Truck gate**

—

10

8

8

8

10

—

Pedestrian Gate

—

9

9

9

9

9

—

Warehouse

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Patrol**

10

10

8

8

8

10

10

Supernumerary*

—

—

10

—

—

—

—

11

11

11

11

11

12

12

Night Shift (2300–0700) Command Truck gate

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Pedestrian gate

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Warehouse

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Patrol

13

13

12

12

12

13

13

Supernumerary*

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

*

The last officer for each shift is available on one day for which no need is scheduled. This is less expensive than using overtime to cover the post on the other four days. ** Officer works four hours (till 1900) on the truck gate post and four hours (1900–2300) on patrol, M–F.

FIGURE 2-4 Proprietary Security Officer Force Shift Schedule Note: Each numeral in a cell represents a particular officer.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

2.3.4

ROTATING SHIFTS In many facilities, the security force rotates over all three traditional shifts in some systematic way. This means each officer, at preset intervals, must move from day to afternoon to night shift or to an intermediate relief shift. When the actual change occurs between shifts, it is important that the individual officer have sufficient time off for rest before returning to work. This means several days off, preferably three or more consecutive days (Miller, 2010, p. 22). Officers who are not adequately rested may be inattentive, fall asleep, have accidents, or experience losses in cognition.

2.3.5

TIME OFF Figure 2-4 shows—by the absence of a numeral—which days an individual officer is off duty. To check that days off are consecutive, a days-off chart (as in Figure 2-5) should be appended to the basic officer schedule. The sample schedules are based on eight-hour shifts, but 12-hour shifts are also common.

Officer

Days Off

Officer

Days Off

1

F,S

8

S,M

2

S, M

9

S,S

3

S,S

10

W, T

4

S,S

11

F,S

5

S,S

12

S, M

6

T, W

13

T, W, T

7

F, S

FIGURE 2-5 Security Officer Schedule Days-Off Recapitulation Based on Figure 2-4 2.3.6

COMPUTERIZED OR AUTOMATED SCHEDULING Most scheduling software for police or private security organizations will work for scheduling a security force. The programs are usually modular. The basic unit may provide the ability to schedule personnel to posts. Additional modules may provide time and attendance recording or payroll administration. For the contract security company, other features might include client billing or job cost control. The programs provide reports, charts, and graphs, and the data can usually be exported to other programs. Security features include levels of access authorization, ranging from read-only capability to authority to change information in data fields. To produce the best schedule, the programs analyze work requirements and cross-reference the database of available personnel.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

Some programs automatically report the arrival and departure of the officer at the post. The officer simply telephones into the system and inputs the site number, officer identification number, and individual password. Using caller ID and a list of associated post numbers, the system rejects any call from a telephone other than at the post. 2.3.7

WORK SITE REQUIREMENTS A detailed analysis of post and time requirements must be performed, regardless of whether the scheduling is done manually or with software. Requirements include the following: x identification of each post by type—such as fixed, vehicular, or foot location—and post number x start and stop times for each shift of operation, by day x number of officers required for each shift and each day x any special personnel requirements listed by shift if applicable x names of any personnel who are not assigned to the post

2.3.8

PERSONNEL DATABASE The personnel database includes a profile of each employee, including the following information: x name, address, and telephone numbers x employee number x shift and overtime preferences x maximum number of hours the employee is allowed to work x availability of the employee (particularly important for a part-time officer) x special training, certification, and qualifications ( a “skills inventory”) x vacation allowance and specific days requested x scheduled training days x posts from which the officer is excluded x other considerations, such as physical limitations

2.3.9

SCHEDULES Combining site work requirements with personal information, the programs can generate schedules to optimize the use of available personnel. Overtime can be avoided, and when an additional officer is needed, the programs can consider the travel time from the potential officer’s home to the site, the officer’s scheduled hours, and the overtime policy.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

2.3.10

PROPRIETARY FORCE For a proprietary security officer, factors other than post hours and shift time must be considered. The number of paid holidays required for each security officer must be calculated into the work schedule. Because some collective bargaining agreements set forth refusal options about working a regular holiday, it is important to pay attention to agreement language. In addition, sick time should be factored into any schedule. If the information is available, calculating the average sick time taken by the security officer force over a two-year period provides a basis for estimating sick days in future years. It is important to note the actual distribution of sick days, as more time off is generally taken during the winter months. Other absences will also occur—for jury duty, family illnesses, or emergencies. With a proprietary force, these unscheduled absences are usually covered by overtime. For small security officer forces, this can be an expensive event. In addition to overtime pay, other costs include fatigue, impaired morale, and degraded alertness. These costs may be too high to justify the apparent economy of a tight basic schedule.

2.3.11

CONTRACT FORCE The client and the agency usually agree to the basic schedule when a contract guard force is in place. The agreement sets forth the total number of officer hours required in a given week. It then becomes the responsibility of the agency to provide individual officers at the required posts to cover scheduled hours. Even though the staffing problem moves from client to agency, the solution to scheduling conflicts, time off, and related concerns may not be any easier. Theoretically, the agency has a broad personnel base from which it can draw additional officers when necessary. The additional officers typically come from other client assignments to fill vacancies caused by unscheduled absences of personnel at a client location. In practice, the replacement may never have been assigned before to the particular client location. Such a guard cannot become familiar with post requirements in one or two hours, and an inexperienced officer may cause more harm than good. If the agency is required to supply relief officers from those regularly assigned to the facility, overtime will help achieve the desired result. For large client accounts, the guard agency might periodically assign personnel from other client positions for occasional relief work. That approach allows them to gain experience with the facility.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.3 Scheduling

2.3.12

MAXIMIZING THE STRAIGHT TIME SCHEDULE Planned overlapping of shifts is one way to schedule additional personnel at peak periods without overtime. If a typical eight-hour shift includes a meal period of either 30 minutes or one hour, that has the same effect as extending the officers’ presence at the facility by the same amount of time. A shift from 0700 to 1500—if it includes a meal period of one hour— will run from 0700 to 1600. If the second shift is normally scheduled from 1500 to 2300, the period between 1500 and 1600 would see all personnel from the day shift and the afternoon shift on duty together because the one-hour meal would extend the first shift’s duty. This overlap is useful to cover peak events such as plant shift changes or office breaks. But the meal breaks mean that the officers take time away from their duties. Meal periods can be treated as unpaid depending on company policy or bargaining agreements, if any. Planning meal periods can be particularly difficult if the force is small or consists entirely of fixed posts. Solutions include creative use of patrol officers, temporary closing of fixed posts, and assigning a security supervisor to cover posts during meal breaks. However, if a proprietary force is working under a collective bargaining contract, then regular use of a supervisor to do an officer’s work may lead to a grievance. Officers should log their meal periods just as they report their other activities. If an incident occurs, the log may allow verification of whether an officer was on a meal break or should have been at the post.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.4 General Orders

2.4

GENERAL ORDERS General orders have been adopted by various control forces throughout history. Military police, municipal police departments, state police agencies, and contract security firms have all used some form of general orders. General orders may be thought of as canons or bodies of principles for protection officers. Some commonly used general orders are as follows: x Familiarity, fraternization, and unnecessary conversation with persons while on duty is prohibited. A professional is objective and does not show favoritism to any particular person. Further, a protection officer on post or patrol must be vigilant. Hanging out with one’s friends does not promote vigilance. x Officers will maintain a military bearing. They will wear their uniforms neatly. They will extol professionalism in their dress and deportment. This primarily applies to uniformed forces; however, plainclothes officers (such as retail loss prevention agents, doormen, and personal protection specialists) must still carry themselves with a professional bearing. They must be customer-friendly as appropriate to their present duties, but they must also project themselves as knowledgeable, precise, and committed. x Smoking on duty is prohibited, as is eating on duty. Both smoking and eating should be done within the confines of a private, secluded place such as a lunch room, break area, or ready room. x All statements to the media will be made by the designated media spokesperson or public information officer (PIO). Protection officers are not to make statements. Instead, protection officers must know the workings of an organization; they must be intimately familiar with the organizational structure; and they must be supportive of that structure. Media relations professionals must craft their statements carefully; if they do not, panic may ensue during emergencies, reputations may be ruined, or investigations may be sabotaged. x Security officers must enforce regulations diplomatically. They must respect others and not be uncivil or make unnecessary use of authority. They must not abuse their position; rather, they must understand that they are both enforcement/compliance agents of the property management and representatives of management. x Officers shall not wear the employer’s uniform or use the employer’s equipment without authorization. This is an important consideration as officers are representatives of their employers and clients. Operationally this becomes an issue when officers work for a second employer or stop in public places going to and from work.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.5 Post Orders

x Officers will promptly report any criminal conviction to their employer. Obviously, any criminal convictions reflect negatively on the officer and the employer. Reporting convictions may also be a licensing requirement where a state board can rescind the officer’s license (Wilson & Brookshank, 1999, p. 263). x Officers will not leave their post unless properly relieved. Posts must not be left “open” for any reason. Continually manning certain critical posts is an operational necessity in all protected environments. x Officers leaving a post will brief their relief fully and pass along any orders that have been issued. This ensures a complete transfer of daily intelligence and instruction. Such a practice is essential to the maintenance of a safe, secure, stable environment.

2.5

POST ORDERS Post orders are the most important written instructions for the security force. Post orders do the following: x Express the policies of the protected enterprise. x Summarize required officer duties. x Avoid the problems of word-of-mouth instructions. x Provide a basis for site-specific training. Clear and understandable post orders are important in serious incidents that may call into question the integrity, competence, or capacity of an officer. Not every potential scenario can be described in post orders. Innovation, flexibility, and improvisation are important qualities in any security officer. However, it is an indication of poor management when an officer uses poor judgment in responding to an incident that should have been foreseen but for which there were no clear instructions. Post orders should be developed with the following criteria in mind: x Each order deals with a single subject. This criterion enables the officer or supervisor to locate a policy or procedure quickly when consulting the orders for guidance. It also facilitates revision or cancellation when circumstances change. x Each order is as brief as possible. The order is an action document intended to state clearly what must be accomplished and when. Reasons for an order can be explained in other parts of the training program.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.5 Post Orders

x Each order is written in simple, easy-to-understand terms. The orders should be written in a basic version of the language spoken where the facility is located. A few other considerations are as follows: — An officer with a 12th-grade education (or less) should not be expected to read and understand the professional language or jargon of someone with an advanced education. — Reading time is inversely related to reading comprehension. The longer it takes to read a passage, the less likely it will be accurately understood or remembered. Reading time is a function of both the structure of the passage and the reading skill of the individual. (This is one reason for requiring and validating a minimum literacy level at the time of hire.) — The use of vocabulary should emphasize plain meaning and avoid jargon, nuances, and ambiguity. If three individuals familiar with the enterprise read and cannot agree on the clear meaning of a passage, sentence, or instruction, it must be rewritten. x Orders are indexed in detail. To permit swift location of relevant orders, a thorough, cross-referenced index should be prepared and maintained. Topics should be listed in several ways. For example, an order on emergency snow-removal procedures for an unexpected blizzard should be indexed as “Snow removal, emergency procedures” and “Emergency procedures, snow removal.” Post orders should be available at each guard post. They must be kept current and accessible. They are the vital link between the requirements of the client and the ability of the security officer to effectively meet those requirements. In a fixed post, post orders should be stored at a designated location. For a patrol post in a vehicle, the post orders should be carried in the vehicle. For officers on foot patrol, it is inconvenient to carry a large volume of post orders. Officers may carry electronic devices, such as personal digital assistants (PDAs), that access post orders as well as provide for reporting and information sharing. If post orders are in paper format, one approach to making them convenient to carry is to produce a photoreduced version of the post orders—for only that post—in a size that can be carried in the uniform pocket. Each set of post orders should be reviewed periodically to ensure that the orders are current and complete. Post orders require a coordinated effort. Care must be taken to ensure that no contradictory orders are in use. This can occur with complex systems, and electronic reporting or a large number of posts can contribute to the problem. Management must maintain a single, consistent set of instructions at all times.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.6 Supervision

2.6

SUPERVISION Shift supervisors train and direct the shift officers, are front-line managers, and are the key to mentoring, staff turnover, and employee satisfaction. They lead teams that are responsible for responding to a wide variety of situations that may arise episodically. Shift supervisors must understand the site’s requirements, management’s needs, and their own role within the organization. The quality of assets protection is a direct function of local training and local supervision. Training occurs when a supervisor observes the ongoing performance of an officer and provides feedback in response to situations that were not correct or where the officer appeared unsure or confused. Other training is provided when new material is introduced that requires familiarization by the individual officer or the entire shift. A common practice is a formation at the beginning and end of each shift. During the few minutes available at these times, a theme or concept—such as the gist of one of the new important orders—can be explained to the assembled officers. They can also be told to read the order when time permits during the shift. Training also occurs when new security personnel are introduced to the site. If opportunity and budget allow, one can pair the new staff member with the supervisor or an experienced patrol officer for extended periods. A security operation’s responsibilities do not decrease when a new employee comes aboard; the full slate of tasks still need to be accomplished. The quality of training is directly proportional to the quantity of training. Log sheets and files should be kept to track the training of a new officer. Training log sheets take the various site responsibilities and reduce them to a series of tasks. As the training file is worked through, the trainer and trainee initial each task, verifying that training for that particular responsibility has been completed. The training log sheet can also form the basis for post order checklists, which patrol officers can carry on their person. To ensure the post order is read and to reinforce the training, the supervisor can later visit each post and do the following: x Ask one or more specific questions about the new order. x Observe the officer in an actual situation involving its application. x Set up a hypothetical situation requiring the officer to show a working knowledge of the order. This procedure takes a few minutes and should be a routine part of the supervisory post visit.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.6 Supervision

To accomplish training objectives, the supervisor must visit each guard post. Some supervisors ignore this fundamental point and stay at the command or other fixed post for most of the shift. The result may be poor performance on the other posts and an increase in issues requiring supervisory intervention. Radios, PDAs, public address systems, cellular telephones, and other devices eliminate the need for a supervisor to remain at a fixed post. The supervisor should make regular—but unscheduled—visits to all posts and also have instant communication with appropriate elements of the security force. The supervisor can observe the condition of the post, officer, environment, and level of activity. By also observing the general conditions along the route from post to post, the supervisor provides an additional supplemental patrol. A better alternative—unless prohibited by collective bargaining terms—is to have the supervisor perform some post relief. The supervisor would staff the post when the officer is away. This practice provides the best insight into what occurs at the post. Supervisors themselves need special training in management, human relations, interpersonal communication skills, labor and criminal laws, emergency response, and other issues. This training should be available prior to promotion to supervisor to the greatest extent possible. Is should also be continuous while the supervisor occupies a supervisory position. 2.6.1

EVALUATIONS An ongoing problem in guard force management is performance rating for security personnel. Absent an incident that establishes unusually good or poor performance, an individual officer’s shift-long activities may not be evaluated at all. The lack of evaluation causes problems at salary review time. A partial solution is the regular assessment and recording of officer performance by supervisors after every post visit. The assessment must include at least the following items: x personal appearance and condition of the officer x physical condition of the post x availability and condition of all required personnel and post equipment, including the post orders x quality of officer response to training questions or situations x quality of officer response to actual situations arising at post during the visit

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.7 Security Officer Reports

The supervisor should record all observations and then transfer the data into a program for security force management. As officers or shifts change, different supervisors can make independent observations. At regular intervals, the security manager can review performance and ratings to determine whether additional training or counseling is needed. These performance evaluations should be used to ensure that staff and supervisors receive regular feedback on both positive and negative performance. Coaching and leadership go hand in hand. Coaching is “the process of giving motivational feedback to maintain and improve performance” (Lussier & Achua, 2004, p. 185). The process should maximize the employee’s potential to the benefit of both the employee and employer.

2.7

SECURITY OFFICER REPORTS It is often said that security officers are the eyes and ears of management. However, the information developed by the officers is frequently not communicated to management. This lack of communication could be attributed to several factors: x Individuals drawn to security may be action-oriented, not word-oriented. x Information that is reported may not appear to be acknowledged or acted on. x The report process may not encourage careful fact processing. x The organization may lack the infrastructure needed for data collection. It is not uncommon to see officers’ daily officer reports stating, “Reported 0700. Nothing unusual. Relieved 1500.” Several days of such reports should suggest to the security manager that the post is not necessary, that the officer lacks training, or that the officer is not reporting properly. It may be beneficial for the manager to ask the officer not to record that the area is secure but instead to record what the officer did to make it secure. Post orders should require reporting of specific incidents, such as the signing out of keys, providing of escorts, and assistance to contractors. Report forms that force positive statements are better than those that expect the officer to formulate a narrative. Officer reports should be filed electronically to make their information searchable and sortable. A Web-based platform aids accessibility and makes the security program more transparent to management. This may be a particular concern in a contract security setting where a client organization can see exactly what is going on. It also helps motivate the

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.7 Security Officer Reports

protection force. Periodically, the security manager should use the accumulated information to assess and reinforce security officers’ performance. 2.7.1

SECURITY LOG The central report document is the security log. It is a primary record of significant events affecting facility protection made contemporaneously by security officers.

2.7.2

DATABASE LOG Incident management software can be configured for the input of security officer reports and logs. The information can be retained in a security force database that can be relational to the main incident database. Thus, all events pertinent to a specific location or date and time can be retrieved in a readily understandable format. To make it easier for staff to develop the incident database, one method is to use a drop-down menu of incident types. Over time, the security manager can refine the drop-down list to include the types of incidents that are actually occurring. An automated log format enhances efficiency. The date and time of entries are automatically generated. The officer logs onto the system with a unique identifier and password and enters events into the system. The event entry is given a unique, consecutive event number. Entries are recorded in real time and are immediately available to supervisors and managers from both contract and proprietary organizations. Entries can be made using a desktop or laptop computer or terminal or a hand-held data entry device. Once officers complete a log entry, they can retrieve but not edit it. Changes or corrections are entered as subsequent entries. Editing is reserved for higher-level supervisors. The software’s database management and report-generating capabilities may be expensive, but they present a great tool for guard force administration and should be included if possible.

2.7.3

MANUAL LOG FORMAT Manual security logs are uncommon but still exist in some operations. Whether manual or electronic in format, security logs generally fall into two classes: the main or control log and the individual post log. The first is the cumulative, consecutive history of significant events on every guard shift. The post log is a local record of the events involving a particular post. For example, if post orders require the security officer to count people or vehicles passing a certain point, the count numbers might be recorded in the post log. There may also be a corresponding statement in the main log, stating that the post was to make specific counts on that day. The post log would be a historical fact statement. The entry in the main log would point to the existence of the historical record.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.7 Security Officer Reports

Security logs vary, depending on the protection mission. However, all logs must contain certain information to be useful later. For each item recorded, the log should include the following: x Entry number. This enables the entry to be located or referenced easily. x Day of the week. This is normally abbreviated. x Hour of the day. This is listed in military time. x Category label. This is a one- or two-word term on the nature of the entry. For example, “Weather” could refer to a statement of weather conditions. The category permits rapid scanning of the page to locate particular entries. x Incident or event description. This is a short statement, often using symbols or codes for brevity. x Reference. This includes the name, date, number, or other identification of another report or document that contains more information about the logged incident. A good example would be a reference to a detailed complaint. A typical log entry for a routine weather report might read as follows: Entry#

Day

Hour

Category

Item

Ref.

36

Mon.

0700

Weather

75°F, clear and bright

None

To ensure that manual log entries are not altered or eliminated, they should be written in ink and used in consecutive order. If a change or correction is needed in any entry, it must be made under a new event number as a separate item.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE 2.8 Management Use of Reports and Logs

2.8

MANAGEMENT USE OF REPORTS AND LOGS Aside from the historical value and audit opportunities that reports and logs have for security management, they also have value for the general management of the facility. Security force reports and logs have been used as an authoritative source to establish a variety of facts: x weather conditions on a given date x receipt of a telephone call x precise time an event occurred x presence of particular people at the facility Security reports and logs are admissible in legal proceedings as entries made in the regular course of business and are therefore exceptions to the evidentiary rule against hearsay. The admissibility is pertinent in litigation, arbitration, or administrative matters in which the entry is the only evidence of the event. To qualify, the report or log must x be regularly maintained, x be maintained by a person as part of his or her regular duties, x record an event of which the recorder had personal knowledge or which was reported to the recorder by one who had personal knowledge and a duty to report.

2.8.1

DATA CAPTURE AND TREND ANALYSIS Data capture and trend analysis help the security manager determine the effectiveness of the program and fine-tune it. The process shows what is working and what is not working. It may also justify the department’s existence by detailing security incidents and security staff’s responses. Trend analysis enables the security manager to determine whether events are part of a trend. If so, the security program can be altered to address the trend.

2.8.2

FAILURE TO USE REPORTS AND LOGS A source of security officer dissatisfaction is the apparent failure of management to read reports and logs. Security managers should read reports and logs in a timely manner, acknowledge items of significance, and arrange for corrective action. When a security officer reports an item, such as a broken exit sign light, and it goes unfixed for weeks, the officer may begin to think that no one cares and may stop reporting the problem. Scheduling and controlling the security officer force is of paramount importance. The proper allocation of human resources is a fundamental responsibility of the security manager. A great deal of effort is required to motivate the department and maximize its potential. As the cost of security personnel continues to rise, it is essential that the security manager get the most out of them.

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CHAPTER 3 ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE

The duties of the security officer can range from the mundane to the highly complex. Officers often work alone and experience little direct supervision. They are expected to take personal risks other employees are told to avoid, as well as to deal with the entire spectrum of human behavior. They make decisions that can affect the personal well-being of others and millions of dollars in physical assets. Moreover, because of the importance of first impressions, an inefficient or indifferent security officer will have an adverse effect on visitors, other security employees, and the general work force. From both fiscal and human perspectives, efficient security officer performance is a critical aspect of an asset protection program. Management must take action to ensure optimum job performance by this expensive and valuable resource. The consequences of poor staff development will be quickly recognized when a major incident occurs. Excellence in security officer performance requires attention to the traditional issues of pay, supervision, and deployment. In addition, job analysis, training techniques, the workplace environment (including corporate and departmental cultures), and ergonomics must all be considered. The security manager and the security officer supervisor must be able to identify deficiencies and determine what corrective action is required and when.

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.1 Vigilant Performance

3.1

VIGILANT PERFORMANCE The term vigilant performance has a special significance in security operations. The quality of vigilance can be described in the following contexts: x dictionary: keen attention to detect danger; wariness x physiology: the global responsiveness of the nervous system to external (sensory) and internal (muscles, tendons, and joints) stimuli x psychology: unspecified function of the central nervous system that enables an individual to respond effectively to the infrequent and uncertain occurrence of specific, often low-order intensity stimuli in a monotonous environment In part, vigilant performance is an expectation requiring nurturing and opportunity. Of course, it is the security officer who must recognize, embrace, and deliver that vigilant performance. It follows, therefore, that proper employee selection is vital. Stress leads to behavior patterns that can adversely affect job performance and the physical and mental health of an individual. A study for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, noted the stress associated with “low utilization of one’s abilities, low participation, low job complexity, limited opportunities for future advancement and the lowest levels of social support.” This is an accurate description of many security officer jobs. The following are elements that can affect vigilant performance: x Work area design, particularly with regard to space, light, heat, and noise. A security officer working in a guard shack with insufficient heating and air conditioning may be more concerned about keeping warm or cool than about completing his or her assignments. A good work area also requires appropriate chairs and desks. x Human engineering of the tasks performed or the equipment operated. Often, people are only as good as their equipment or task design. x Human visual and auditory acuity. This refers to the officer’s physical ability to observe an area effectively by eye and ear. x Human detection, identification, and recognition capabilities. Expected events should be reviewed frequently to improve officer vigilance and the detection capabilities. x Human attention and information processing performance. This refers to the officer’s ability to detect an event and respond in the desired manner. x Job analysis. This is the systematic collection and recording of information about the purpose of a job, its major duties, the conditions under which it is performed, required

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.2 Studies of Similar Conditions

contacts with others, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform the job effectively (Bartol & Martin, 1998, p. 318). A detailed job analysis should be prepared for each position. There needs to be a fit between the security officer, the position, and company expectations. x Training. Security staff need general training in a wide variety of topics, such as report writing, patrol techniques, and emergency response. They also need site-specific and equipment-specific training and testing. A lack of attention to training will certainly lead to a negative impact on vigilant performance. x Workplace environment, including corporate and departmental cultures. Management styles and organizational cultures may affect officers’ vigilance. Because various departments are managed differently, the security officer may receive contradictory messages from other departments or may see staff treated differently within the department itself. This may occur especially in a security department containing both contract and in-house officers. x Quality control. This is a way of establishing departmental and organizational expectations, and vigilant performance is defined through expectations. x Morale. To achieve and maintain vigilant performance, security staff must feel good about themselves and the job they perform. Low morale can lead to complacency, inattention to duties, increased turnover, tardiness, absenteeism, and excessive sick time (Vellani, 2001, p. 90). x Management advocacy for security staff. Management can reinforce vigilant behavior and performance by serving as advocates for security officers.

3.2

STUDIES OF SIMILAR CONDITIONS There is a dearth of research on performance failures in guard operations. However, studies have examined workers in other occupations where vigilant performance is important. For example, a U.S. Department of Transportation analysis of long-haul trucking accidents indicates that 40 percent are caused by sleeping or drowsy drivers. Like truck drivers, security officers often experience monotony and an increase in fatigue as a shift progresses, leading to a gradual loss of alertness. In some ways, the phenomenon of road hypnosis affecting truck drivers resembles the “sleepwalking” of security officers. Neither individual is actually hypnotized or asleep in these conditions, but both can almost completely lose the ability to respond to a sudden change in the situation. In any situation involving undesirable activity by a security officer, one should not immediately concluded that the individual does not want to perform the job correctly. An unbiased, root-cause analysis should be completed to identify all the conditions that may have contributed to the problem. Removing the officer does not mean the problem is solved.

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.2 Studies of Similar Conditions

Research into vigilant performance can be traced back to at least 1932, when early studies were made of visual inspection tasks in assembly line operations. However, the most significant work began during World War II, when studies examined the performance of ships’ lookouts and radar and sonar operators. The tasks of those operators were sedentary and involved long periods of waiting with no signals received. These studies revealed that the operators did not perform at peak efficiency for more than 30–60 minutes, even when a failure could have serious operational consequences. In Man and the Radar Displays (1962), Baker reports that his study of British wartime records indicated that “if all radar watches had been only one-half hour long, enemy submarine detections would have increased by fifty percent.” An ASIS CRISP (Connecting Research in Security to Practice) Report—Fatigue Effects and Countermeasures in 24/7 Security Operations (Miller, 2010, pp. 50-51)—found that automation often places a human into a monitoring role, which is not usually handled well. A few of the problems associated with automation and human monitoring are as follows: x increased monitoring load for the operator with concomitant attention lapses x high degree of operator responsibility with little to do x loss in manual skill proficiency by the operator x out-of-the-loop problems for the operator x automation replacing human pattern recognition abilities with less competent sensors x creation of the “cry wolf” syndrome whereby a high false alarm rate causes the operator to ignore indications of system malfunction so that malfunction rates detected drop nearly to zero x inadequate displays that do not support optimal operator performance and do not allow for individuals’ differing abilities to remain vigilant x automation problems being misdiagnosed so that erroneous corrective measures are taken x failure to recognize subtle vigilance problems until after a large number of automationrelated accidents Miller researched the effects of fatigue and countermeasures with police officers and other shift workers. Several serious issues surfaced from the research, including the incomepatibility of humans with nighttime work; the problems associated with schedule changes; and the effects of fatigue (acute and chronic). Accident rates increase substantially around 0300. They also rise at 1500 due to circadian rhythms. Individuals awake for more than 17

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.2 Studies of Similar Conditions

hours are likely to reach a dangerous level of mental fatigue (p. 34). Chronic fatigue can set in whenever sleep debt accumulates. Both acute and chronic fatigue impair alertness and decrease cognitive ability. To counter decreased vigilance, it makes sense to reevaluate how human assets (protection officers) are viewed. Management should assess officers’ interaction with technology so that technology enhances rather than diminishes officer performance. Management and subordinates should be educated on the challenges posed by fatigue as well as available countermeasures. Officers’ schedules should allow for meaningful rest, including at least two nights of unrestricted sleep between shift changes and limitations on days worked consecutively and hours worked per shift. Increasing the lighting level during the evening hours and keeping the work environment cool can increase alertness. While anathema to traditional managerial thinking in much of the world, consideration should be given to allowing naps where possible. 3.2.1

BEHAVIORAL THEORIES This section highlights the work of five behavioral scientists who have the most relevance to security officer functions. A brief summary of some of their concepts follows. The theories are detailed in other sections of Protection of Assets.

McGregor Douglas McGregor’s key concept is that every supervisor relates to subordinates on the basis of assumptions termed Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X holds that the average worker is by nature indolent, dislikes work, lacks ambition, avoids responsibility, is passive, is easily led, is gullible, and must be molded to meet the needs of the organization. This is done by exhortation, driving, punishing, and rewarding, on the assumption that the worker is indifferent to the needs of the organization and is incapable of self-discipline. Theory X is personified in the hard-driving authoritarian manager. Theory Y assumes that work is natural and can be satisfying or punishing, depending on the circumstances. This theory holds that individuals are capable of assuming greater responsibility and seek it in the proper work environment. They are also able to exercise selfdirection, motivation, ingenuity, and creativity. Theory Y represents involvement, contribution, and commitment by all workers.

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.2 Studies of Similar Conditions

Maslow Abraham H. Maslow identified a hierarchy of needs, beginning with the most basic physical needs: x physiological: needs geared toward survival x safety and security: needs concerned with the economic, physical, and mental wellbeing of the individual x social or affiliation: the desire to be liked and accepted or to belong x ego: needs concerned with knowledge, independence, achievement, status, self-confidence, recognition, appreciation, and the respect of others x self-actualization: needs related to an inner urge to actualize individual potential (also expressed as “what a person can be, he must be”) Needs are driving forces and the most effective motivators. However, a satisfied need is no longer a motivator; providing more of the same may not result in improvement. As the needs at one level are met, people begin to strive to satisfy higher ones. However, this is not always done in a precise, well-defined order—even though it is futile to appeal to higher-level needs before the lower-level needs have been satisfied. Basically, each individual is multi-motivated, and the yearning for need satisfaction continues throughout life. Therefore, while the lower-level needs are more demanding, the higher-level needs are the most effective and enduring as motivators. Recognition of the employee can be a powerful positive influence.

Herzberg Frederick Herzberg’s major contribution is disproving the theory that the removal of the causes of job dissatisfaction and low morale automatically result in improvement and that motivation and lack of motivation are at opposite ends of a continuum. He provides a twodimensional model involving what he describes as hygiene or maintenance factors and satisfiers or motivators. Hygiene factors appeal to an individual’s avoidance mechanism and generally relate to working conditions. They include such elements as employer policies, communications, job security, fringe benefits, working environment, supervision, and interpersonal relationships. The satisfiers or motivators are elements that make the job more challenging and lead to personal growth and development. They include earned recognition, achievement, a sense of contribution, increased authority and responsibility, growth, and advancement. According to Herzberg, both sets of factors are necessary, but they serve different purposes. The causes of lack of motivation and job dissatisfaction must be removed, but doing so does

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Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.2 Studies of Similar Conditions

not necessarily motivate an individual to improve job performance. In certain cases, motivators can overcome the negative effects of poor hygiene factors, but the reverse is seldom true. Ideally, the manager should work to provide a proper balance between the hygiene factors and the motivators, while at the same time allowing for individual preferences.

Argyris According to Chris Argyris, traditional organizational principles, structures, and procedures are incompatible with the mental health of employees. Such ideas as task specialization, chain of command, unity of direction, tight budgets, and controls are calculated to make subordinates passive and submissive, allowing them to have little direction of their own work. As a result, workers become apathetic, engage in self-protective defense mechanisms, or just fight the system.

Bennis Warren G. Bennis’s theory attempts to avoid the polarization of human relations versus scientific management, and employee satisfactions versus organizational requirements. In his view, the organization can be an adaptive, problem-solving, innovative system operating in and coping with rapidly changing environments. Bureaucracy and the “organization man” will have no place in future organizations, according to Bennis. Instead, future organizations will have free and full communication regardless of position; reliance on consensus rather than coercion or compromise; influence based on competence rather than on power; a climate that allows for the expression of emotions as well as task-oriented actions; and an acceptance of conflict, coupled with a willingness to deal with it rationally. According to Bennis, the major organizational challenges of the future include the following: x integration: synthesizing employee needs and management objectives x social influence: distributing authority and power effectively x collaboration: managing and resolving conflicts x adaptation: responding appropriately to changes induced by the environment x revitalization: dealing with problems of growth and decay

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.3 Analysis of Personality Traits

3.3

ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY TRAITS An officer who excels in a Theory X organization may be a disaster in a Theory Y environment. The individual’s job knowledge, proficiency, and personality traits should be matched to the requirements of the assignment. One method of achieving a better match is to consider the individual’s introvert/extrovert personality traits. An introverted personality is better adapted to performing monotonous tasks. An introvert is generally quiet, retiring, and reserved; plans ahead and distrusts impulses of the moment; avoids excitement; keeps feelings under control; and is essentially nonaggressive. An extroverted personality is less adapted to performing monotonous or sedentary tasks. The extrovert generally possesses an outgoing personality; is impulsive; is more likely to take chances; is uninhibited; is sociable with others; craves excitement and variety; likes to be on the move; is sometimes unreliable; and can be aggressive with others.

3.4

WORK ENVIRONMENT Security officers may need to operate in a wide variety of work situations and rapidly changing conditions. Officers may use automated systems, such as visitor management systems, geographic information systems (GIS), and communications systems. Posts may be sedentary or may involve lengthy vehicle or foot patrols. All posts generally share a set of environmental concerns—such as working space, heat, light, and noise—that may or may not be amenable to modification.

3.4.1

MECHANICAL ENVIRONMENT The working space assigned to a fixed security post is generally inadequate in a number of respects. Often the design and location of the structure do not enhance officers’ ability to see and hear. Poor air circulation can cause wide fluctuations in the interior temperature, which can be unhealthy at worst and uncomfortable at best. A prolonged elevation of heat levels may cause a serious loss of vigilance and may result in security officer drowsiness. Security officers often work alone. The only contact they may have with supervisors is by telephone. The inactivity and isolation of the post can induce sleep in the healthiest of individuals. This is a natural process for all human beings. One should recognize that there may be extenuating circumstances when a security officer is discovered sleeping on post. If disciplinary action is required, the supervisor should handle the matter promptly and with sensitivity.

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.4 Work Environment

In such a case, it may be possible to use a simple failure analysis checklist. A sample checklist is shown in Figure 3-1. Security managers can adapt the list to ensure equitable discipline for performance failures and to determine what changes in the work area might reduce the incidence of gross performance failures. • • •

Is the security officer in good health?

• • • • • • •

Were there any changes in the shift schedule that affected this officer?

Was any medication used that may cause drowsiness or diminish alertness? How many hours of sleep did the security officer have in the previous 24 hours before assuming the post? How many hours had the officer been awake before reporting to work? How many hours was the officer on post before falling asleep? What was the inside temperature of the area at the time of discovery? What were the lighting levels in the area at the time of discovery? Did the security officer have any active functions to perform at the post, or was there enforced inactivity? How was the “sleeping on post” detected or reported?

FIGURE 3-1 Checklist for Analyzing Performance Failures: Sleeping on Post Even a well-designed system can contribute to officer performance failures if principles of human behavior are overlooked. For example, is it possible that a multiplicity of signals or response functions may occur simultaneously? Both behavioral theory and practical experience suggest that overlapping of signals and response requirements will create confusion in the mind of the security officer and may lead to a serious performance failure. Likewise, the constant, passive monitoring of closed-circuit television systems can produce rapidly diminishing vigilance, and a failure to detect unwanted events may result. Some of these problems can be corrected by first simulating a worst-case condition and then working out a drill response sequence to ensure the security officer can respond appropriately. It may be easier to rotate officers at one- to two-hour intervals to maintain vigilant performance. Today’s control centers may be the hub of activity for a single site or multiple sites. Multiple work stations and a variety of equipment monitoring security and other building systems make for a demanding environment.

Closed-Circuit Television Closed-circuit television (CCTV) can extend a security officer’s effectiveness. However, watching television monitors is a passive, almost hypnotic activity. Conversely, observing 20 monitors can be highly stressful. Ergonomics should always be considered in the design of a CCTV console. The design of the system should incorporate display and annunciation

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.4 Work Environment

features to enhance officer efficiency and maximize the usefulness of the system. Sequential display of several camera images—where possible—can reduce both the number of monitors required and the hypnotic effect. A video motion detector can sense a change in a camera image and alert the security officer. Further, consideration should be given to rotating staff regularly out of this demanding environment. Even the most vigilant officer cannot maintain the necessary alertness forever.

Access Control Systems Access control systems are symbolic of today’s technological security advances. Such systems may be connected to many other systems, including CCTV and building management systems. Their overall design must lend itself to vigilant performance. For example, if there is no way to verify door alarms, officers will quickly learn to ignore them.

Fire Alarm Systems Fire alarm systems, if improperly managed, can quickly reduce vigilant performance. A poorly managed system can cause both legitimate and illegitimate alarms to rise to unacceptable levels. When exposed to false alarms, people learn to ignore the potential danger. Diligence is required to manage fire alarm systems to ensure that the maximum effectiveness is achieved.

Miscellaneous Several other systems tend to end up, by default, being monitored by security staff in the control center. Because security personnel are often the only people available 24 hours a day, they are often tasked with managing a system on behalf of another department or asked to act as backup during off-hours. Examples include elevator monitoring equipment, lighting control, mechanical area inspections, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems. Without proper training and testing and a determination of whether the staff can respond to the additional requirements, the security officer may feel overloaded and unappreciated. These are two factors that can quickly lead to performance failures. 3.4.2

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT In analyzing the security officer operation, physical stress must be considered. Physical standards may vary according to the job assignment, but the types of physical factors listed in Figure 3-2 are generally found in most security officer positions. The physical capabilities of the uniformed security officer should be evaluated with these standards in mind. In the hiring context, preemployment screening is fairest and most efficient when it uses a detailed list of physical requirements against which the applicant can be measured.

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ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE 3.4 Work Environment

Physical Factors

Sensory Factors

Function

Avg. Hours

Total hours on feet

6

Standing

4

Walking – level surfaces

2

Climbing – stairs or ramps

1

Crouching or squatting