Princes, posts and partisans: the army of Louis XIV and partisan warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678) 9789047402411, 9789004131767

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
List of Tables (page ix)
List of Maps (page xi)
List of Plates (page xiii)
Acknowledgements (page xv)
Abbreviations (page xvii)
Note on Money (page xix)
Introduction (page 1)
Chapter One The Dutch War in the Netherlands (page 12)
Chapter Two Organizing the Imposition of Contributions and War Taxes (page 42)
Chapter Three The Garrison Force and Partisan Warfare (page 89)
Chapter Four Raids (page 132)
Chapter Five Field Armies as Source and Target of Partisan Warfare (page 179)
Chapter Six The Defense of the North of France (page 215)
Chapter Seven Blockades (page 269)
Epilogue (page 319)
Bibliography (page 329)
Index (page 335)

Citation preview

PRINCES, POSTS AND PARTISANS

General Editor

KELLY DEVRIES , Loyola College

Founding Editors

THERESA VANN PAUL CHEVEDDEN VOLUME 18

Sf, “ iIH os = > < = Wat CS AEG lp

1632.

PRINCES. POSTS AND PARTISANS The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in

the Netherlands (1673-1676) BY

GEORGE SATTERFIELD

a BRILL LEIDEN - BOSTON 2003

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Satterfield, George. Princes, posts and partisans : the army of Louis XIV and partisan warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678) / by George Satterfield. p. cm. — (History of warfare, ISSN 1385-7827 ; v. 18) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-13176-0 (alk. paper) 1. France—History—Louis XIV, 1643-1715. 2. Netherlands—History—1648-1714. 3. France—History, Military. 4. Dutch War, 1672-1678. 5. France—Foreign relations— 1643-1715. [. Title. IL. Series.

DC127.6.838 2003 949 .2'04—dce21

2003050218

ISSN 1385-7827 ISBN 90 04 13176 0 © Copyright 2003 by Koninklyke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy rtems for internal or personal use 1s granted by Koninklyke Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 019235, USA. fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

for My Parents, Elizabeth and David Satterfield

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CONTENTS

List of Tables occ ccccccceccceccsecceccececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeaeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeaaags 1x List Of Maps oe. ceccccccsscsecccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeennnnnneeeeeeeceeeeeeseseeeeeeeeeeeeees x]

List of Plates oc eeccccceccceceeresetetstseeeseesessetettitttteeeees XII Acknowledgements ........cccccccececeeeeetttttetittisteeeeeeeeeeeteettttieneers XV

Abbreviations 00.0... ccecceeeeteeeeereeteeeereieiiieeteeeeeee: XVI Note on Money ou..ceeecccccessseeececeesseeseeeeeeeseessseeeestttessessesseeseess XIX TntrOduction .o.cceeccccccceceeeccccccceceeeeeeseeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeaeeseeeeeeeeaaeneeeeeeees |

Chapter One

The Dutch War in the Netherlands ou... eee: |2

Chapter [wo Organizing the Imposition of Contributions and War LAXCS eee eeccccceececececeeeeeesssesseeeesecesesesssesssssessessssessttssssesesssesteeee 4D

Chapter Three

The Garrison Force and Partisan Warfare... = B89

Chapter Four Raids ceeccccccccccccceceessesssssessssssseeesseeessessssssesessessttteeeee 13D

Chapter Five Field Armies as Source and ‘Target of Partisan Warfare ....... 179

Chapter Six

The Defense of the North of France 0... = 215

Chapter Seven Blockades ..... ccc eeeeecccececeeeesseseeeeeeeeeeesessssssssssssstetssesssttsssesseesestees — 209

EpPilOQue oo. ecceeeceeeeeeeeeeesseneeeetteeeeecececesecessssssstsesesesssssssttteeeeeeeee OLY

| aXe (o>, Guerre 3) Bibliography o...eceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeesestetttttststtttessssssseeeeeee O29

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LIST OF TABLES

Table | French Garrisons in the Netherlands, 1673-1676, p. 48 Table 2. Regulation of French Passports, Overland ‘Traffic, 1673, p. 64

Table 3. Regulation of French Passports, River Traffic, 1673, p. 69

Table 4 Contributions Received at Maastricht, from 31 October 1677 to 19 April 1678, p. 81

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LIST OF MAPS

Map One The Netherlands’ Theater of War, 1673-1678, p. 11 Map Two The Bureaus of Contributions and Départements, 16731678, p. 50 Map Three ‘The French Blockades of Cambrai and Valenciennes, 1676-1677, p. 296

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LIST OF PLATES

(Between pages 12 and 13)

From Alain Manesson Mallet, Les travaux de Mars (Paris, 1672)

(Newberry Library, Chicago): Plate 1. Cavaliers, figure 34 Plate 2. Grenades, figure 25 Plate 3. March of an army in enemy territory, figure 187 Plate 4. Forts, figure 347: a) a triangular fort with demi-bastions; b) a triangular fort with double demi-bastions; c) a triangular fort with a full bastion; d) a redoubt or a square fort; e) a fort in the ¢enaille pattern (zig-zag trace); f) a square fort (redoubt) with demi-bastions; g) a square fort with double demi-bastions; h) a fort in the pattern of a shirt (with sleeves);

1) and 1) star forts with five and six points; k) a fort in the. pattern of a crowned work

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have incurred many debts of gratitude in my pursuit of princes, posts and partisans. I am especially grateful to John Lynn who served as my thesis advisor at the University of Illinois. As others can testify, John Lynn is the foremost authority in America on the French

army from 1610-1815. Lynn is also a tireless and dedicated mentor. He helped me to gain an Olin Fellowship sponsored by the unit for Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois in 1999-2000, saving this study from the scrap heap of unfinished dissertations. Kelley De Vries of Loyola College read the manuscript and energetically provided the basic advice that I followed throughout the process of revisions; and Marcella Mulder my editor at Brill provided those vital, final words of

encouragement. |

Many others have helped with useful suggestions and comments. Derek Croxton, Clare Crowston, Martha Pollack, Clifford J. Rogers, Brian Sandberg, Paul Sonnino, and Ed Tennace all listened, read and commented on papers that I presented on partisans and partisan warfare from 1992-1995. I wish to single out two persons, who exercised a particularly positive influence on my development as an historian, and the development of this study. Carl Ekberg, a first-class teacher of history, encouraged and developed my budding interest in seventeenth cen-

tury France. He encouraged me to read at an early stage in my career the major French historians of the seventeenth century and the published memoirs of the period. Geoffrey Parker (now at The Ohio State University) led me to first consider partisan warfare as

a topic of interest by his “tip of the iceberg’ metaphor used to describe the actual portion of fighting in early modern warfare that comprised grand operations. His broad and deep understanding of the seventeenth century and his excellent suggestions would benefit the work of almost any young historian. Gratitude 1s also owed to Professor Corvisier of the Sorbonne:

during a short visit to the University of Illinois he made me feel welcome in the Archives de Guerre before I had even crossed the

XV1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Atlantic. I would also like to single out the encouragement of John Guilmartin at Ohio State University. The staffs of the various research libraries and archives where I worked were extremely helpful and patient, especially the staff at the Bibliotheque Royale Albert, the Archives Générales du Royaume, and the Archives de Guerre at Vincennes where I worked amidst some of the loveliest surroundings imaginable one spring and sum-

mer. Madame Chompy, Colonel Paul Gaujac, Madame Claude Ponnou, and the rest of the staff deserve credit for making the Archives de Guerres one of the most welcoming places a scholar could imagine. I wish to also thank the equally professional staff of the Newberry Library in Chicago for a well-spent research fellowship in the summer of 1992. The collection of early modern military treatises at the Newberry ranks as one of the finest anywhere. Lastly, I would like to thank many friends, both old and new and some not mentioned here: Madeleine Fernandez in New Jersey; Bob Dushay, Vicky Fry, Carl Glenister, Tom Hogle, and Alan Levinson at SUNY Morrisville; and, Amy Zook who never once doubted the importance of partisans and petite guerre, even during a cold, wet Parisian spring that caught us both off guard. More than anyone else, my parents made it possible for partisan warfare to emerge from the shadow of the Sun King’s grand operations and finally bask in the light of historical knowledge. ‘This book is dedicated to them.

ABBREVIATIONS

Archwal Sources

AAE CP Archives des Affaires Etrangéres, Correspondance Politique

AG Archives de Guerre

AGR Archives Générales du Royaume

AN Archives Nationales, Paris BG Bibhothéque du Ministére de la Guerre Recueil Cangé (collection of military ordonnances, sometimes referred to as, Saugeon)

BN Bibliotheque Nationale de France

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| NOTE ON MONEY One louis dor (a gold coin) was worth ten French lures. Three French lwvres were worth one écu. One lwre was worth one patagon.

One lire was worth 20 sous. A Netherlander florin was worth 1.5 French lures. One “franc” was the equivalent of one French lure.

| BLANK PAGE

INTRODUCTION

The dying lieutenant urged on his men, “My friends, there is the road to glory, do not dwell on me and go to your duty.” Fatally struck in the chest by a musket ball, Lieutenant Seneville of the Picardy Regiment mustered the strength to point out the party of Spanish infantry concealed in a sunken road, and bid his men to attack.’ Seneville had been detached to protect foragers outside the main camp of Louis XIV’s army that bloody day in May of 1675. He was not the only one to die in the skirmish. ‘The two Bellemare brothers died in the same fusillade that felled Seneville. The younger

was slain on the spot; the older died the next day, barely able to form a word when Louis XIV came to visit the wounded. Earlier that day, some French officers had spotted a hermit. Halfjoking, they asked him if he might have seen a Spanish party nearby, since the last few days several French foragers had inexplicably disappeared. [The hermit gestured toward a large expanse of trees not far from the French camp and said there were about 100 men hidden there. Hearing of the enemy party, Louis XIV sent Colonel La Fitte with a detachment from the élite Gardes du Corps to kill or capture the Spanish. Lieutenant Seneville, some companions from his company in the Picardy Regiment, and the Bellemare brothers volunteered for the fight. About 50 Spanish soldiers were encountered in the woods, and they immediately tried to retreat when discovered. La Fitte however had enveloped them with a part of his command. ‘Trapped at the sunken road, the Spanish soldiers presented their muskets and fired. After disrupting the French, they broke off and fled in small groups. One group of the Spanish infantry, pur-

sued by some French, ran right into a swamp, where the water reached to the middle of their chests. ‘They could not reload their weapons, and so they surrendered. ‘The Spanish party had been quietly following the French from wood to wood for eight days. ' The incident is described in the journal of Paul Pellisson (1624—93), royal historiographer, who wrote what he heard from the officers and men in the army of Louis XIV. Paul Pellisson, Lettres historiques de monsteur Pellisson, 2 vols. (Paris, 1729),

vol. 2, pp. 259-267.

2 INTRODUCTION The road to glory that Lieutenant Seneville urged his companions to pursue, their mission to drive the Spanish from the woods and to make the surrounding land safe for French forage parties, was a path that many other soldiers followed during Louis XIV’s Dutch War (1672-78). Contemporaries of Lieutenant Seneville took

notice of the smaller actions of the Dutch War; nobles and commoners alike read about “petite guerre” (small war) or the “war of partisans.” ‘The Gazette de France gave frequent descriptions of actions of French partisan warfare, including raids to compel the adversary’s

civilians to pay contributions (war taxes paid in money or in kind), daring escalades of castles and fiercely contested skirmishes in the countryside over forage. During the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715), the first historians of the Dutch War pieced together reports of various battles and sieges from journals like the Gazette and then embellished their narratives with some of the actions of partisan warfare to enliven the sieges.* Modern historians have had the advantage of access to volumes of letters and memoirs left by the king and his military officials. Although the carefully catalogued documents are filled with accounts of partisan warfare, those who have discussed

the military aspects of the Sun King’s reign with authority, Joél Cornette, André Corvisier, John Lynn, Camule Rousset, Guy Rowlands

and John B. Wolf have, with the notable exception of Lynn, left the smaller actions of war parties and detachments by the wayside.’ This work departs from what historians have normally empha-

sized about the combat of the Dutch War: its battles and sieges. While both were important—paintings, commemorative medals, prints and poems gave them double importance as propaganda—this study

> The first history of the Dutch War was composed by Gatien de Courtilz de Sandras, Hstowre de la guerre de Hollande. Ou Von voit ce qui est arrwé de plus remarquables

depuis Pannée 1672 jusques en 1677 (Yhe Hague, 1689). Written more to propagandize than for any other purpose, the first version was nothing more than a liberal translation and adaptation of the Dutch Hollandize Mercurius, a periodical begun in Holland in 1668 by “ordonnatie van de Staten” or by order of the States General. > Joél Cornette, Le rot de guerre. Essai sur la souvraineté dans la France du Grand Siécle

(Paris, 1993); André Corvisier, Louvois (Paris, 1983); John Lynn, The Grant of the Grand Stécle: The french Army 1610-1715 (Cambridge, 1997); also, Lynn, The Wars of Lows XIV, 1667-1714 (London, 1999), pp. 113-159; Camille Rousset, Histozre de Louvois, 4 vols. (Paris, 1864); Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army Under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701 (Cambridge, 2002); and, John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York, 1968), pp. 213-265.

INTRODUCTION 3 concentrates instead on the French conduct of “petite guerre” or partisan warfare. ‘This book examines the character and function of French partisan warfare and how it fit the strategic goals of Louis XIV during the Dutch War, specifically in the Spanish Netherlands from 1673-78." Following the French attack on the Dutch Republic, 1672-73, it was in these rich lands that most of the fighting of the Dutch War would take place. Louis XIV repeatedly sought to add portions of the Spanish Netherlands to his domain, and this desire was the driv-

ing force behind his aggression in the Dutch War. Guarded by numerous fortifications and defended by Spanish, Dutch and Imperial soldiers, nowhere else was victory more violent and costly for French

armies than it was in the southern Netherlands. The Dutch War killed close to 350,000 soldiers on all sides; and like Seneville and the Bellemare brothers, the majority of these casualties fell in the Spanish Netherlands from 1673-78.° Although now associated with guerrilla fighters, the term partisan in the time of Louis XIV literally meant a leader or adherent to a party. In terms of war this meant a parti de guerre, and partisan warfare involved those actions of war conducted by special parties or detachments from the regular army. Partisan warfare resembled a double-edged sword. It functioned both to keep French garrisons and field armies supplied and to prevent the most elemental of necessities from arriving in the camps and fortresses of the Spanish and their allies. For the Spanish, partisan warfare may have been even more vital. ‘The military actions of both sides conjured a baroque nightmare of fire-raids, blockades and grand forages in the Spanish Netherlands and northern provinces of France. Dozens of modern fortifications in the Netherlands blocked the path of armies victori-

ous in battle, negating triumphs in the field. According to Louis XIV’s chief military engineer Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban: A battle lost in the Low Countries normally has few consequences, for the pursuit of the defeated army continues only for two, three or four

" See Map One, p. 11. ’ ‘The estimated loss 1s based on Gaston Bodart, LL.D., Losses of Life in Modern Wars (Oxford, 1916). (Bodart did not include losses in sieges or partisan warfare, but I have added my own estimate of these to his figures.) Charles Tilly places the number of those killed at 342,000. See, Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 165-166.

4 INTRODUCTION leagues, because the neighboring fortresses of the enemy halt the victors and provide refuge for the vanquished, saving them from being totally ruined.°

With stalemate on the battlefield, partisan actions took a role of primary importance in the attritional, siege warfare that ensued. In a general sense, partisan warfare consisted of almost every military action besides those of armies when deployed for siege or bat-

tle. Hardly a day went by during the Dutch War in the Spanish Netherlands without some kind of raid or small expedition sent out to forage, take prisoners, or enforce payment of contributions. While field armies disappeared into winter quarters, sometimes six to seven months out of the year, French war parties unceasingly carried death

and destruction to the enemy: burning stores of forage in towns, storming strongholds and castles, disrupting the flow of supplies and engaging enemy parties conducting their own “petite guerre.” In one of the few book-sized narratives of the war, Gatien de Courtilz, the publisher of D’Artagnan’s memoirs, observed in his dramatic style

that during the winter of 1675/76: The war blazed so much on the one side and the other that winter, which is customarily a time of repose for men of war, differed not at all from the campaign, except that one returned from time to time to recover in his winter quarter. Skirmishes occurred and they were so fierce that they resembled some battles.’

Courtilz added that “to fuel the flames” the king dispatched “men of experience” to the fortresses along the frontiers. Like “little generals,’ Courtilz explained, they led parties of cavalry and infantry in sorties against the enemy. An experienced lieutenant from the Maison du Roi, Jean de Puilly de Lancon, hurried off to St. Quentin to lead several such parties against Spanish raiding detachments from Cambrai and Valenciennes.® With the first days of spring, when the armies regained the field, small operations conducted by both sides ® Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban, “Traité de l’attaque des places” (Manuscript in the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection at the Hay Library, Providence, R.L.), quoted in Geoffrey Parker, “In Defense of the Military Revolution,” in The Miltary Revolution Debate, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder, Colorado, 1995), p. 349. ’ Sandras, Histoire, vol. 2, p. 1. ®° Thid., p. 2. Langon, a lieutenant in the Gardes du Rot company of the Gardes du Corps since 22 February 1675, was given his orders of command of the garrison at

: St. Quentin on 4 November 1675. He was also colonel of a regiment of cavalry and had served at the battle of Seneffe.

INTRODUCTION ) continued and wreaked more havoc on troops and the surrounding countryside than did the grand operations. Whole campaigns might pass without a great battle, as in 1676 when the French army engaged only in sieges and partisan warfare.’ Yet despite the preponderance of evidence, most historians have remained content to discuss only

the major actions of the Dutch War and have left the every day war unexplored.

Typically a book of this nature begins with a discussion of the scholarly literature. However, there is precious little to say about the literature of partisan warfare because it remains extremely thin. In Giant of the Grand Stécle, John Lynn complains that the army of Louis XIV was virtually “an invisible giant,” hardly seen at all by historians. If the army as a whole remains so invisible, what chance have we to catch a glimpse of partisan warfare? Lynn’s theory of war-as-

process gives some importance to partisan warfare. According to Lynn, war-as-process has five characteristics, “the indecisive charac-

ter of battle and siege, the slow tempo of operations, the strong resolve to make war feed war, the powerful influence of attrition, and the considerable emphasis given to ongoing diplomatic negotiations.”!’ Lynn places partisan warfare into a broad context, giving it an importance it deserves both in making war feed war and in the phenomenon of attrition. The epilogue of this book takes under consideration the theory of Carl von Clausewitz and its interpretation by Hans Delbriick, which define limited war as typified by a strategy of exhaustion. While neither Clausewitz nor Delbriick focused

on the partisan actions of the Dutch War, their concepts apply. Exhaustion is attrition, and attrition is war-as-process. Historians have commented about various aspects of small operations in early modern Europe, such as forage raids, Brandschatzung or the fire tax in the Thirty-Years’ War (1618-48) and English Civil Wars (1642-51), but no study has focused jointly on all of the activities of partisan warfare, analyzed its tactics, or discussed it in relation to other military operations. Instead, historians have tended to

” The earl of Orrery, observed in a treatise on the art of war published in 1677: “Battells do not now decide national quarrels... For we make war more like foxes, than like lyons; and you will have twenty sieges for one battell.” Roger, earl of Orrery, A Treatise on the Art of War (London, 1677), p. 15, quoted in Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution (Gambridge, 1988), p. 16.

' Lynn, Wars, pp. 367-76.

6 INTRODUCTION isolate aspects of partisan warfare and to discuss these in two general contexts: the supply of armies and the impact of war on civillan populations.

The fodder appetite of early modern armies, a crucial war supply that partisans often struggled to attain, has become the subject of intensive investigation and disagreement. G. Perjés first discussed army provisioning and emphasized the general need of armies to forage for fodder on campaign.'' Martin van Creveld followed with the most widely read, but at times misleading, analysis of the forage requirements of early modern armies on campaign.'’ His discussion should be considered in the light of John Lynn’s critique.’ Fritz Redlich discussed sixteenth and early seventeenth century German

mulitary entrepreneurs and their propensity to plunder to keep their companies supplied and intact.'* Perhaps even closer to the focus of this book on the French army experience of partisan warfare in the Netherlands during the Dutch War has been Jean Mossay’s study of the French intendancy of Maubeuge.'? Mossay concentrated on one of several military intendancies that supported the Sun King’s armics in the Spanish Netherlands—but one that began its functions in 1678, just missing the Dutch War. Ronald Ferguson examined contribution policy in Germany during the wars of Louis XIV. He discussed how the French used fire-raids and imposed contributions— war taxes assessed on unfriendly villages—in the Rhineland region." However, while Ferguson’s work comes close to paralleling this study,

he only dealt with contribution policy, mainly focused on the Nine

'' G. Perjés, “Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century,” Acta Aistorica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 16, nr. 1-2 (1970),

pp. 1-52. ' Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977).

John A. Lynn, “The History of Logistics and Supplying War,” and “Food, Funds, and Fortresses: Resource Mobilization and Positional Warfare in the Wars of Louis XIV,” in John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, Colorado, 1993), pp. 137-160. Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force. A Study in European Economie and Social History, 2 vols. Beihefte 47 and 48 of Viertahahrschrifi fir sozial und wrriscahfisgeschichte (Wiesbaden, 1964-65). Jean Mossay, Les Intendants du Hainaut a Maubeuge, 1678-1720. Société archéologique et historique de l’arrondissement d’Avesnes, vol. 23 (Avesnes-sur-Helpe, 1971).

‘© Ronald Thomas Ferguson, “Blood and Fire: Contributions Policy and French Armies in Germany (1688-1715),” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1970.

INTRODUCTION / Years’ War and War of Spanish Succession, and omitted the full range of partisan warfare.

To this literature should be added the work of Van Houtte and Gutmann, who both discussed the impact of war on civilians in the southern Netherlands. Hubert van Houtte’s detailed study of “occupations” made extensive references to contributions and the organization of resistance to enemy (French) partisans.'’ Myron Gutmann examined the short and long-term effects of war on the Low Countries.'® This included, but was not limited to, the impact of partisan

warfare. |

Despite the works mentioned above, discussion of French partisans and their activities has been all bits and pieces. André Corvisier called the War of Spanish Succession “a war of partisans,” but said almost nothing about it in detail.'’ Lynn discussed partisan warfare in Grant of the Grand Siécle and the Wars of Lows XIV, but more or less “en passant.” Given the extremely thin treatment of the topic, it is essential here to begin with the sources and build step by step, relying on the archives, not on an existing secondary literature. Unlike the sieges and battles of the Dutch War, most actions of partisan warfare, like the French attack on the Spanish party previously presented, must be reconstructed before they can be under-

stood. A major task of this book has been to do exactly that: to reconstruct events of small war, and discuss and relate them to the larger battles and siege operations of French armies. Most of the research was conducted in the Archives de Guerre of the Section Historique Armee de ‘Terre SHAT). The skirmish in which Lieutenant Seneville sacrificed his life informs us that (on at least this occasion)

basic military planning, discipline and tactics were employed (a double envelopment); mounted troops fought on foot; the king was aware of the action; nobles volunteered and morale was high; and it took place in woodland rather than open country. When numerous other events similar to this skirmish have been reconstructed and

” Hubert van Houtte, Les Occupations étrangéres en Belgique sous l’ancten régime, 2 vols.

Recueil de Travaux Publiés par la faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de ?Université de Gand, vols. 62-63 (Ghent and Paris, 1930). ' Myron P. Gutmann, War and Rural Life in the Early Modern Low Countries, (Princeton, 1980). Philippe Contamine, ed., Histowre militaire de la France, series editor André Corvisier

(Paris, 1992), vol. 1, p. 540. * Lynn, Grant, pp. 538-46 and Wars, pp. 69-70.

6 INTRODUCTION interpreted, considered alongside policies and operational directives,

then basic conclusions about partisan warfare can be reached and their impact on the Dutch War considered. ‘The importance of a complete portrait of partisan warfare, and not mere parts, 1s underlined by the passing insights of other historians. As John Lynn pointed

out in his study of the French army in the seventeenth century: “It would be a mistake to devote a discussion of combat exclusively to the conduct of great battles or sieges, because much of the fighting between foes took place in lesser engagements, fights between small bodies of troops, between opposing war parties.”*! A similar obser-

vation was made by Geoffrey Parker in his study of the Spanish Army of Flanders: “Although military historians have tended to confine their attention to the formal engagements of the war, to the sieges, battles and major manoeuvers, these events formed only the tip of the iceberg of military conflict.””?

It is unfortunate that partisan warfare has been left out of our histories of the Dutch War, and this failure extends beyond the realm of military history. The Sun King’s wars not only settled boundaries

and the political fates of thousands, but they acted as a force that changed the character of the French monarchy and drove its bureaucratic expansion in matters related to war and finance.

The focus on partisan warfare in this book concerns more than clever tactics, ambushes and daring assaults. It indirectly deals with broader historical problems: the military revolution and the nature of the French state under Louis XIV.*? Guy Rowlands has recently analyzed the relationship between the style of government practiced by Louis XIV and the French army. Noble officers and king worked

together often to benefit the one and the other: “Many of the supposedly authoritarian reforms—such as inspectors and tighter con*! Lynn, Giant, p. 538. See also the discussion of small operations, what the English called the “actions” of war, in Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’

Wars (Gambridge, 1972), pp. 12-19. * Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp. 12-13.

*° An interesting analysis of the style of Louis XIV’s government during the Dutch War can be found in Jean-Christian Petitfils, Lowzs XIV (Paris, 1995), pp. 217-247. Petitfils emphasizes how Louis XIV brought into his government, and successfully manipulated, the most important families of France, leading to a consensus style of royal government. For the administrative functions and social background of army intendants, see Douglas Clark Baxter, Servants of the Sword: French Intendants of the Army, 1630-70 (Urbana, Ilhnois, 1976), p. 20.

INTRODUCTION 9 trol of pay and expenditure mechanisms—were inspired as much by a desire to save officers from short-sightedness, as to clamp down on abuse.”** This study places the focus on military operations, rather than on administration, but it does so mainly because it is believed that this different perspective will help us understand better the nature of the dynastic state of Louis XIV. The methods and goals of par-

tisan warfare are held up as a kind of mirror of the war-making and governing potentials of the French state from 1673-78, not a gilded one such as installed in the Salon de Guerre at Versailles, but perhaps one giving a truer reflection. It will tell a story that reveals the weaknesses of the Sun King’ state: the necessity of raids

to gather war taxes to pay for the very cost of war; the limits of dynastic authority over local officials involved in partisan warfare; the importance of fortifications, large and small, in covering infantry troops. It will also tell a story that reveals its strengths: the care and discipline exercised over troops in garrison, the steady resupply of magazines, the integration of raids and blockades by small parties of troops into strategy. This volume discusses how the French con-

duct of partisan warfare met the overall war aims of Louis XIV, and how partisan warfare reshaped French strategy and ultimately decided how long the war would last, how many young men would be buried in the Netherlands and how many would make it home. This volume concludes by affirming that Louis XIV’s Dutch War was primarily a war of exhaustion, as understood by Delbriick. Such attritional conflicts were not new, but this struggle was fought more deliberately and with better instruments, than those known in previous decades.” The French armies of the seventeenth century certainly benefited from the centralizing forces of the monarchy, becoming

more disciplined, professional and malleable to the royal will. The war against Spain from 1635-1659 transformed the army from an assemblage of relatively independent formations with various alle-

giances to a proud, royal army. ‘he operational conduct of war

“+ Rowlands, The Dynastic State, p. 266. “To conclude, one can say with a fair degree of certainty that Louis XIV’s determination to accommodate the interests of his noble subjects was responsible for the great growth in the standing army.”

* In stark contrast to this improved reputation of the army of the Bourbon monarchy in the decade of the Dutch War, see the miserable conduct of French armies before Louis XIV, as discussed by David Parrott, Richeleu’s Army, War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642 (Cambridge, 2002).

10 INTRODUCTION changed accordingly for the French: systematic exaction of contributions and an improved system of supply replaced wild marauding; raids to deprive local resources and blockades of garrisons, leading to shorter sieges, replaced long or useless blood-lettings in siege lines;

and increased reconnaissance actions diminished the possibility of accidental-encounter battles. As this study demonstrates for the Dutch

War, French military officials not only coordinated and conducted partisan warfare on a tactical level, but also used it, though imperfectly, in pursuit of strategic goals. It is hoped that this book will improve our understanding of partisan warfare in early modern conflicts in general, as well as its cru-

cial importance in the Dutch War. Ultimately, the descriptions, analyses, and conclusions reached here imply the need to reevaluate warfare not only for Bourbon France, but also across Europe, and not only for the Dutch War, but for early modern warfare as a whole.

~ + Lis

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THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 13

contributing to an alliance that put a halt to French conquests in the Spanish Netherlands during that war, the Dutch had not only opposed Louis XIV in a venture that he had found personally gratifying, but also a time honored French policy of pushing their northern frontier further from Paris. French hostility toward Spain and the Spanish Netherlands dated to the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-1659, an extension of the ‘Thirty Years’ War. During that war, Spain repeatedly invaded France from

the Spanish Netherlands and bitterly fought the French over the lands of Picardy and Artois in northern France. At the conclusion of the war, a defeated Spain agreed to the payment of a large dowry to Louis’ new bride, the Spanish princess Marie ‘Thérése; upon payment, she, as the only surviving child of Philip [V’s first marriage,

would renounce her claim to the Spanish succession. ‘The dowry went unpaid. Louis took this affront to his dynasty as a sign of latent hostility. While recognizing the right of Philip IV’s son (the offspring of a second marriage) to the entire Spanish succession, Louis declared his queen’s “just pretensions” to some of the Spanish Netherlands.’

He made her claim on the basis of an obscure law of inheritance or “devolution” observed in parts of the Netherlands that only recognized the claim of a child of the first marriage. In 1667, facing an unprepared Spanish adversary, French troops overran most of the Spanish Netherlands. It looked lke an incredible victory for Louis. He was stopped short of total conquest, however, when the following year a ‘Triple Alliance formed under the leadership of Johan De Witt of the Dutch Republic and Sir William Temple of England.

Sweden joined as the third partner in the alllance. Rather than fight a major war against the Triple Alliance, Louis negotiated for a favorable peace. ‘The conquering French Marshal Turenne felt as if he had been struck “with a club on the head.’* The whole French court felt the disappointment of their king, who at thirty-one years of age identified himself with Alexander the Great. Almost as soon as the smoke cleared on the battlefields, the king, “feeling his youth slipping away,” wanted another war and looked

* F.A.M. Mignet first emphasized dynastic politics as the primary cause of the Dutch War. Négociations relatwes a la succession @’Espagne sous Louis XIV, 4 vols. (Paris,

1835-42). See also, Carl J. Ekberg, The Failure of Louts XIV’s Dutch War (University

of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 3-4 and p. 110. * Ekberg, The Failure, p. 116.

14 CHAPTER ONE for one sooner rather than later.2 The French, however, had to engage In a circuitous route to another war, because the Spanish Netherlands now enjoyed protection of treaties under the terms of the ‘Triple Alliance that promised them foreign aid should they be attacked. Louis, with some logic, planned to break apart the ‘l'riple Alliance by diplomacy and then deal later with his queen’s claims to the Spanish Netherlands. Uhe idea of an invasion of the Dutch Republic, which appealed to the king’s immediate desire for war, was soon added to the French strategy. An assault on the Spanish Netherlands was put aside, but no one doubted that these were the territories that Louis wanted. Louis at the end of the Dutch War claimed that he had a “premonition” that the war would ultimately fall on the Spanish Netherlands, but how this would arrive was never worked out in advance of the French invasion of the Dutch Republic.° As the historian Paul Sonnino observed, “First, the war emerges as the object of the king’s desires, slightly attenuated... Perhaps the war was natural, economic, or expected, but the king’s advisors were not so sure. Whether they favored or opposed it, all of them acted

as if the future were open.” How much Louis dwelled on his fleeting youth or noble pursuits,

like war, and the extent to which the Dutch War followed from these, may never be known with certainty. More certain, kings of France, beneath only God, made arbitrary distinctions between personal interests and raison d’état. With a pronounced love of glory and filled with ambition, Louis embraced important values of the aristocratic order in France and in Europe. Louis expressed his view on glowre in practical terms: “A King need never be ashamed of seeking fame, for it is a good that must be ceaselessly and avidly desired . . . Reputation is often more effective than the most powerful armies.’® Glory, or reputation, helped secure the early modern state in a turbulent political environment both against domestic and foreign ene-

| mies. ‘he French king took seriously the part of warrior and inspired his noble servants and soldiers; the men in the French army were

> Sonnino, Ongins, p. 7. ° Cited in Ekberg, The Failure, p. 173. Sonnino dated Louis’ Mémoires de la guerre to 1678. ’ Sonnino, Ongins, p. 7. * Louis XIV, Oeuvres de Louis XIV, (eds.) Philipe Grimoard and Philippe Grouvelle,

6 vols. (Paris, 1806), vol. 5, pp. 67-8.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 15 thought to have a different bearing with the king present. Often he would ride conspicuously, with marshal’s baton and red plumed hat, around the perimeter of their camp; or he might inspect the siege lines himself, rolled plans under one arm, accompanied by the engineer the comte de Vauban. Observers liked to point out the king’s steady hold over his troops, and the noble example he set. Soldiers believed they could win great victories with the king present, and in the end, Louis justified their belief. The formidable reputation of his armed forces mattered as much to the king as defensible frontiers. At the outset of the Dutch War, Louis XIV had no coherent mil-

itary strategy other than to “annihilate” or “punish” the Dutch. Further consideration of the avowed “punitive” aims of the French

invasion of the Dutch Netherlands, leads one to believe that the invasion was not that different from later expeditions against Algiers or the Republic of Genoa. This punishment, however, took on huge cimensions. It was, after all, in response to the participation of the

“ungrateful” Dutch in the Triple Alliance that had stopped short French conquests in the nearby Spanish Netherlands.

In preparation for the invasion of the Dutch Republic, and the ultimate goal of isolating the Spanish Netherlands, French diplomacy

and money scattered the ‘Triple Alliance to the winds. Louis won over the penurious but self-indulgent Charles Hl of England in 1670 with the promise of subsidies (Treaty of Dover). The neutrality of Sweden, though more reluctant than the English monarchy, was simlarly bought. Through the offer of money, Louis likewise gained the

support of the Bishop of Minster, Bernard Galen, and joining him with out-stretched hands was the Elector of Cologne, Maximillian

Henry, whose lands would serve as a point-of-entry for the French invasion force. Bernard Galen of Minster appeared sufficiently warlike. Supported by English subsidies during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67), he had invaded the Dutch Republic. ‘The bishopprince thrilled at the roar of cannon and fireworks, as entertainment, while sipping chocolate on the grounds of his castle. All of Louis’

allies were eager to despoil the rich Dutch Republic of wealth or land.’ It has been reasonably suggested that economic motives lay

” Georg Depping, Geschichte des kriegs der Miinsterer und Colner im Bundnisse mit Frankreich

gegen Holland in den fahren 1672, 1673 und 1674 (Miinster, 1840).

16 CHAPTER ONE behind the war that began in 1672; certainly the neighbors of the Dutch envied the trading success of the mercantile republic." As it turned out, Louis formed an alliance against the Dutch and in the process dealt one way or another with all of the protectors of the Spanish Netherlands. However, Louis wrongly anticipated that

the remainder of Europe’s courts and governing assemblies would remain passive while he marched against the Dutch Republic at the head of the greatest army assembled in Europe since the days of ancient Rome. This turned out to be mere wishful thinking, despite the best efforts of his diplomats to make it true. As one might expect from a war designed in part to gratify a personal desire, the French war strategy was haphazard at the beginning. Although supply and organizational preparations for the war were excellent, military objectives remained vague if they existed at all. Louis was not sure until almost the last moment if he should assail the main Dutch fortress of Maastricht, which blocked the path of his invading forces, or attempt to bypass it. Surely this matter should have been resolved before the invasion. Further, according to the meticulous research of Sonnino, “no one ever dreamed of taking Amsterdam” and the “extreme difficulties of the enterprise” were emphasized to Louis.'' The subsequent course of the French invasion showed that the French eventually did intend to take Amsterdam, and numerous other fortified towns that fell along the way. But the

path of conquest was only worked out along the trail to the north. No one anticipated the speed with which the Dutch outer defenses collapsed.

Almost one month after the French invasion, the Dutch made a generous offer of peace that basically dismembered their republic

and placed France in a position to annex the entire Spanish Netherlands, but Louis rejected it out of hand. The diplomatic historian Mignet has blamed the French war minister, suggesting that Louvois feared that he would lose influence at a time when he and Louis were close associates and personal friends, while the military historian John Lynn blames Louis, who was a “lifelong victim of

© Simon Elzinga, “Le prélude de la guerre de 1672,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne, vol. 2 (1927), pp. 348-366. See also, by the same author, Het voorspel van dan oorlog van 1672: De economisch-politieke betrekkingen tusschen Irankryk en Nederland in de jaren

1660-1672 (Haarlem, 1926). '' Sonnino, The Onigins, p. 7.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 17 recurrent bouts of arrogance.”'* Arrogance and the capacity to follow poor advice probably both played roles in his crucial mistake, because Louis had not given adequate thought to what would constitute victory over the Dutch and what gains would allow withdrawal of his forces to be used in the eventual subjugation of the Spanish Netherlands. No plan was on hand for an offensive against the Spanish Netherlands and one did not exist until the summer of 1673. This much seems certain. The Sun King initially failed to think very far ahead for his Dutch War. After the invasion of the Dutch Republic, and occupation of most of its territory, though not Amsterdam, the French king’s advisors eagerly counseled him to not appear as an aggressor toward Spain. The French were afraid that England upon seeing French armies turn against the Spanish Netherlands would feel threatened and withdraw from its alliance with France. At first, only the efforts of Louis’s closest advisors prevented him from throwing down the gauntlet, bidding him wait for Spain to commit some act of aggression first. The

French tried to induce Spain to declare war by making raids and forages in the Spanish Netherlands. This they succeeded in doing, and Spain entered the war, fighting for continued sovereignty over its Netherlands in October 1673. But Louis not only failed to first crush the Spanish Netherlands’ Dutch protector, his aggressive actions

precipitated the formation of a greater alliance of powers in support of Spain (and the Dutch) than the one he faced before the invasion of the Dutch Republic. In fact, reaction inside the Dutch Republic produced the staunchest opponent of Louis X1V—Prince William of Orange. As a result of the shortsighted French war strategy, the war to crush the Dutch was gradually replaced in 1673, piece-by-picce, by a general war (still called the Dutch War) between France and a great alliance. Brandenburg would join the Dutch first in December

1672, but then leave the war, and return later in 1674. The other Alhes, bound on 30 August 1673 by the Treaty of The Hague, included the Dutch Republic, several German principalities, the Austrian Habsburg monarchy under Emperor Leopold I, and Spain. Spain would hesitate to declare war, until forced by the aggression of France, in October of that year. The Allies avowed not only to restore to the Dutch their territory occupied by the French, but even

Mienet, Négociations, vol. 4, pp. 27-38. Lynn, The Wars, p. 115.

18 CHAPTER ONE to give back nobly to Spain the conquests the French made in 1667-68. England would soon waver in its support for Louis and sion a separate peace with the Dutch in February 1674. Sweden would join France against the Allies in 1675, but this was counterbalanced by Denmark’s entry into the war on the side of the Allies the same year. The Dutch War became a European war. How tronic the Sun King’s words before the war, when he took up a pen to advise his heir: “One can pardon the feebleness of mediocre minds who are concerned only for the present... but those with greater and more elevated gifts ought to... look ahead... so that they will never be reduced to making precipitous judgments.””!° Fortunately for Louis, as poorly conceived as his Dutch War ini-

tially was, he showed talent in the operational aspects of the war. He also learned as the war progressed to think more strategically in advance. His soldiers would win most of their battles, make conquests in the face of the Allied opposition, and give the Sun King a moral victory and an honorable peace. ‘The complete conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, however, eluded the Sun King. 2. The Onslaught

The first fighting of the war broke out at sea in April 1672 when an English fleet surprised a Dutch merchant convoy returning from the Mediterranean, and on land in May when Louis’ invasion army proceeded north toward supply depots secretly prepared in advance. The invasion by land proceeded relentlessly. The Dutch defenders were caught unprepared by the scale of the French onslaught. ‘Uhat

month of May was a glorious one for French armies. Dutch garrisons capitulated after only token resistance, some without firing a shot. The fortresses were hardly worth defending, “Decay was most evident in the bricks-and-mortar (or rather sand-and-slime) aspect of the Dutch fortresses.”'* The French simultaneously besieged Rheinberg,

Wesel, Burick, and Orsoy. Here was a feat of arms that Louis hoped

would please the public. On the last day of May 1672, Louis told Colbert what was on his mind as the French invasion force brushed

'° Cited in Wolf, Lowzs XIV, p. 216. '* Dufty, The Fortress, p. 8.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 19 aside feeble Dutch resistance: “It seemed to me so important for the reputation of my arms to begin this campaign with an affair of great éclat... I hope no one will complain that I have failed public expectation.”'? The only major obstacle left to Louis was the Rhine River, and its waters were low after an unseasonable winter. Louis chose to cross the river near the town of ‘Tolhuis, and in another incident worthy of propaganda, French nobles, without orders to do so, suddenly crossed the Rhine River, shouting, “Kull! Kull!’ as they emerged drenched and bloodthirsty on the far bank. Swarms of cavalry followed after them. Even the elderly Prince de Condé was swept up

by the emotion of the moment, he demanded a rowboat to carry him across and shouted encouragement to others until on the far bank his hand was smashed by a Dutch musket shot. The meager Dutch guard at Tolhuis was overthrown, but at an unnecessary price in French blood. ‘Yo his credit, Louis was appalled by this impromptu military action, though this did not prevent him later from allowing

it to be memorialized as a huge plaster medallion on a ceiling at Versailles with himself as a Roman Emperor driving a chariot over the northern barbarians.'°

The French invasion force, operating in three separate corps, totaled perhaps 118,265 infantry and 26,763 cavalry. Another 100,000 camp followers (servants, washerwomen, bakers, courtiers, and spec-

tators) may have accompanied the three separate corps for at least part of their route. ‘The numerous artillery and baggage train employed

close to 40,000 horses. According to an English source, which is unusual for its exactness, “This year, the Dutch had 76,000 foot and 13,942 horse and 2,000 Dragons on pay, besides their fleet at Sea.”'’

After the crossing of the Rhine, Louis consolidated his army into two corps and, following the advice of Louvois, dispersed many of his troops in the conquered Dutch forts. After rejecting the Dutch peace proposal, his diminished army faced a formidable task to try to conquer the Dutch provinces of Utrecht and Amsterdam, and they nearly succeeded. Only the painful decision of the Dutch to open

the sluices and cut the dykes on 22 June and flood the polders Oc5euvres de Louis XIV, vol. 3, p. 183, 31 May 1672.

' Lynn, Wars, p. 114. The French figures come from the Mercure Hollandots, vol. 1, p. 59. The other figures come from Anon, Abstract of the last Dutch War from 1672, when ut began, to the

end of 1674, pp. 336-339.

20 CHAPTER ONE around Amsterdam, turning the mercantile capital into an island fortress, staved off immediate catastrophe. The last major Dutch stronghold to surrender to the French was Utrecht, which fell on 30 June. While the French invaders finally stalled before the rising floodwaters

in the last week of June, the English and French fleets, and their accompanying landing force, were even less successful. On 7 June

an outnumbered Dutch fleet intercepted the combined fleets and fought it to a bloody draw in the Battle of Sole Bay, then fell back closer to the coast, maintaining control of the narrow waters. ‘he combined fleet then completely shattered when a three-day summer storm struck the North Sea in July, sinking several English vessels, seriously damaging others, and sending several thousand French landing-troops scurrying back to quarters in Yarmouth, England. ‘The naval setback, and the unexpected flooding of the countryside by the Dutch, should have spelled an end to the aggressive design of Louis XIV to “punish” the republic. Louis, however, surveying his newly won conquests, still had war in his heart. Despite failure at sea, French success on land seemed overpow-

ermg. On 20 August, a pro-Orange mob murdered and hung upside down Johan De Witt and his brother Cornelis, preparing the way for Prince Wiliam of Orange to assume the executive affairs of the Dutch Republic. One opponent of the French, the Marquis of Beauveau, who joined the war after the Holy Roman Empire decided to intervene, summed up the mood of the French, when he observed that they in 1672 “conquered in one month 32 defensible towns, it will pass as a prodigy for centuries to come.”'® Indeed, the French king returned to St. Germain near Paris in July 1672, still hopeful for more prodigies, leaving Marshal ‘Turenne and Lieutenant-General Luxembourg to command his quartered armies in the Dutch Republic and to hold on to what had been gained. During the fall and winter, French garrisons plundered mercilessly to compel surrender. In the course of their partisan warfare, they took hostages, burned in some villages, and gathered contributions from those desiring to be spared fire and sword. That same winter the French failed to take advantage of a brief freeze of the flooded polders to make significant headway against the defenses of Amsterdam. '® Marquis de Beauveau, Mémoires du Marquis de Beauveau, pour sero a ’'Histotre de Charles IV, Duc de Lorraine et de Bar (Cologne, 1688), p. 364.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 2 | Over the winter of 1672/73, honoring his dynastic ties to Prince Wiliam of Orange over promises to Louis, Frederick William of Brandenburg came to the aid of the Dutch Republic. Showing his concern over naked French aggression, Emperor Leopold of the Holy Roman Empire sent additional reinforcements to join the Brandenburgers. This first Allied expedition to relieve pressure on the Dutch was short-lived. After a late start and poorly conducted winter cam-

paign, Frederick William soon quit the war in June 1673 after the French Marshal Turenne outmaneuvered his army and plundered his domains in western Germany with part of the army that Louis XIV had left in the Dutch Republic. Meanwhile, in December 1672,

the Dutch struck back at France. Prince William of Orange, supported by the Spanish Count of Monterey, led a Dutch army south through the Spanish Netherlands and laid siege to Charleroi, the base of French operations in the Dutch Republic. ‘The French garrison

was too amply supplied to submit to this inspired but ill-considered venture in the middle of winter, and Prince William lifted the siege, the first of several failed Dutch sieges during the war.

As the campaign season began in the second year of the war: “The king’s thirst for martial glory was unslaked.”'’ Unable to com-

plete the conquest of the Dutch Republic, and angered at Spanish involvement in the attack on Charleroi the previous December, Louis

gradually shifted his interest away from the Dutch Republic and toward the Spanish Netherlands. He opened negotiations with the Dutch, but then proceeded against their fortress of Maastricht, one of the strongest in Europe. Left partly blockaded after the invasion of the republic the previous spring, and following a siege masterfully directed by Vauban, the fortress surrendered on 30 June 1673. ‘The French viewed this as another prodigy of war; Pierre Mignard painted

Louis at Maastncht. Once again, he was depicted as a conquering Roman Emperor. ‘The comte d’Estrades, later elevated to the marshallate, was appointed governor of the new conquest. Although the court mourned the loss of Lieutenant-General D’Artagnan in the siege, a crucial link to the French conquests in the Dutch Republic was established.

The decisive action that year was not at Maastricht, but at sea where the combined English and French fleet once again tried to Ekberg, The Failure, p. 116.

22 CHAPTER ONE force a landing on the Netherlands. Admiral De Ruyter and a Dutch fleet of warships turned them back. After the running Battle of ‘Texel (21 August 1673), in which the Dutch soundly defeated the combined fleets through superior seamanship, the French landing force of 8,000 troops retreated and disembarked from their Newcastle colliers. ‘hey were stranded at Yarmouth until their final evacuation back to France. The naval defeat dashed any hope Louis retained for a complete conquest of the Dutch Republic; moreover, the problems caused by French troops quartered in an English town led to acrimony between the two allies. While French troops brawled with Englishmen in taverns, the English accused the French of deliber-

ately “sabotaging their efforts at sea to prevent the English from acquiring a foothold on the Dutch Coast.”*” All through the summer, Louis slowly realized the hopelessness of the Dutch venture and increasingly reflected on war against the Spanish Netherlands. After

the siege of Maastricht, he finally drew up war plans for an inva-

sion of the Spanish Netherlands. One month after the Battle of Texel, he prepared detailed orders to submit the entire Spanish Netherlands to contributions, a definite prelude to war. The opponents of French aggression however rallied again from across the Rhine River to Amsterdam and Madrid. Louis XIV turned to face the growing threat of the Holy Roman Empire. ‘That summer French troops occupied the Imperial Duchy of Lorraine, the Imperial cities of Alsace, and the Imperial Electorate of Trier. In the process, they closed as tightly as possible the invasion routes to

France that lay across the Moselle and Rhine Rivers. Emperor Leopold reacted predictably to this latest example of French agegres-

sion; he jomed with Duke Charles [IV of Lorraine and the Dutch Republic in adhering to the Treaty of The Hague on 30 August 1673 to stand up to Louis XIV. The Emperor brought allies and

troops with him later in the year. The Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector of Palatine, the Elector of ‘[Trier (whose capital was occupied), the Duke of Brunswick and the Duke of Luneburg contributed

*° Carl Ekberg, “From Dutch to European War: Louis XIV and Louvois are tested,” French Historical Studies (Spring, 1974), pp. 393-408. Anon, Abstract, describes

the altercations in Yarmouth. For the Dutch military effort on sea and land, see, Robert Fuin, De Oorlog van 1672 (Groningen, 1972); W.J. Knoop, La République des provinces unies en 1672 et 1673 (Bois-le-Duc, 1854); and J.R. Bruyn, De oorlogvoering ter zee in 1673 in journalien en andere stukken (Groningen, 1966).

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 23

contingents of soldiers to turn back the French invaders. On the eastern bank of the Rhine, from August to November, ‘Turenne maneuvered a French corps in an attempt to prevent Montecucolli who commanded the Imperial army from making a juncture with the Dutch army in the Electorate of Cologne. Operating well beyond the reach of French supply convoys, lacking operational mobility that only an adequate supply source can provide, he failed in this endeavor and the Imperial army and Dutch army united near Bonn, the capital of the French ally the Elector of Cologne.?!

By the end of the summer, tensions had mounted precipitously between Spain and France. Louis desired this escalation, hoping to engage the Spanish in warfare especially now that French troops occupied Maastricht and the Electorate of Trier. Though no battles were fought, the French recalled that the Count of Monterey had provided support to the Dutch when Prince Wuliam besieged Charlero1

in December 1672, and there were other incidents of Spanish cooperation with the Dutch, notably the demolition of the walls of the

town of Binche.* Meanwhile, small actions preceded open war between France and Spain. Local French commanders tried to incite the Spanish by a series raids and disruptive forages by detachments

of cavalry. In October 1673, after repeated violations of her territory, Spain plundered the area around the French fortress of Ath and declared war. Almost immediately after war was declared between France and Spain, Louis XIV’s German ally, the Elector of Cologne, lost his capital of Bonn to the combined Dutch and Imperial army on 12 November 1673. ‘The loss of Bonn and the occupation of the Electorate

of Cologne by Dutch and Imperial troops made precarious the con-

tinued French presence in the Dutch Republic. The Imperial and Dutch commanders gained confidence at the siege of Bonn. English broadsheets proudly labeled the victorious Allies the “Confederates” and openly sided with them against the French ally of their king. Soon after, the Elector of Cologne and the Bishop of Minster sued

*! Carl Ekberg, “The Great Captain’s Greatest Mistake: Turenne’s German Campaigh of 1673,” Miltary Affairs (now the Journal of Military History), (3 October 1977),

ae: Binche was between the French fortress of Charleroi and the Spanish fortress of Mons. The French viewed it as an important post in the Sambre River Valley in the event of war with Spain.

24 CHAPTER ONE for peace with the Dutch and joined the Allies against France. On 16 June 1674, unpaid, the troops of the Elector mutinied, but by that time Louis had already decided to abandon his conquests in

the Dutch Republic. | A coalition of powers opposed Louis XIV. Certainly he had hoped

to bring war with Spain, but he got a far broader conflict than he wanted. His one major ally, England, deserted him. The pressure of mercantile interests forced Charles Il to make a separate peace with

the Dutch in February 1674 at Westminster. The former Dutch colony of New York was returned to the English, after a brief Dutch reoccupation, and other colonial territories changed hands between the two mercantile empires. As a result, the French forces left in the

Dutch Republic were outflanked with no possible support by sea. Arrayed against France at the beginning of 1674 were the Dutch Republic, Spain, the Austrian Habsburg monarchy, the Bishop of Minster; the electors of Palatine, Trier, Cologne, and Mainz; the Landgrave of Hesse; and the dukes of Lorraine, Brunswick and Liineburg. Brandenburg, still hurting from its defeats suffered at the hands of ‘Turenne, for the moment remained neutral. A sizeable part

of “Germany” marshaled against France. The remaining German

allies of France, the Elector of Bavaria and Duke of Hanover, remained loyal, but they proved too weak to join France outright amidst so many enemies. 3. A Defenswe Campaign

There were no grand operations from October 1673 to May 1674 in the Spanish Netherlands. Partisan warfare preceded major operations during winter, and Louis realigned his forces to meet the new strategic situation. In the partisan war, the French cast their net of contributions in an orderly, systematic fashion and stopped the delivery of letters from the Spanish Netherlands. Monterey ordered

that “letters of consequence be sent only be sea.”*? Armed parties of French troops confiscated property belonging to those subjects preferring Spanish service, but whose families still resided in terri-

tory conquered by France in the last war. Parties of French and

* Mercure Hollandots, vol. 1, p. 63.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 25

Spanish troops fought over castles to gain advantage in the siege wartare that would predictably ensue. At the same time, Louis began the crucial withdrawal of French garrisons from the Dutch conquests.

He must have come to the realization sometime in the summer of 1673 that war strategy required serious reflection and was not so simple as conducting brief campaigns of éclat: ... | had my troops separated in Germany, in Holland, in Flanders, on my frontiers and scarcely any in my kingdom. My enemies were posted in such a way as to be able to block the retreats and assembles that I would like to make and to prevent each separate part from being able to undertake anything. So it was necessary to place myself in another position, and to take from them the initiative that they had over me... It seemed necessary for me to resolve to lose nearly all of my distant conquests, and to consider making them in places from where I would be able to attack and defend.** The official news of the States General, the Hollandtze Mercurius, proclaimed, “France abandons the glorious provinces!”*? However, as a

result, French troops concentrated closer to their supply bases in France, and the strategic pendulum swung back to a more even balance between the French and their multiple opponents. Crucial for Louis XIV, however, was the continuation of English neutrality. England, in combination with the other hostile states, could prove overwhelming for the Bourbon monarchy. In May 1674, Louis’ army invaded the isolated Spanish province of Franche-Comté on the eastern frontier of his kingdom. Perhaps less prepared for defense than were the Dutch, the decrepit defenses of Franche-Comté were easily breeched.*® Franche-Comté, conquered

once in 1668, was this time attached to France for good. For the remainder of 1674, the French waged a defensive campaign in the Spanish Netherlands as Louis withdrew his forces from the Dutch Republic. The Prince de Condé led a small army across the Spanish Netherlands to join Marshal Bellefonds, who, after resisting royal instructions to abandon Dutch territory, finally agreed and had organized the withdrawal. Condé joined Bellefonds near Maastricht,

Provintien.” ** Oe5uvres de Louis XIV, vol. 3, pp. 453-455.

* Hollandzte Mercurus, February 1674, p. 53. “France verlaten de overheerde *° See Piepape, Histoire de la Réunion de la Franche-Comté a la France. Evénements diplo-

matiques et militares, 2 vols. (Paris, 1881).

26 CHAPTER ONE where the French captured the forts of Navagne and Argenteau to secure their position there. Condé next maneuvered his reinforced army

of 40,000 to cover the frontier of France. By early summer he faced a slightly superior combined Dutch and Spanish field army commanded jointly by Prince William of Orange and Count Monterey.’’ Detaching frequent reconnaissance parties, Condé managed to foil

the Allied army and prevent it from undertaking any siege of a French fortress, until he ran short of supphes and withdrew back toward Charleroi. At that critical moment, an Imperial army under

the command of the Count of Souches joined the Allied army, increasing it to more than 60,000 combatants. In the second week of August, with his troops refreshed, Condé seized a singular opportunity to catch the superior Allied army in a difficult situation when

its van became detached from the main body. The resultant battle of Seneffe on 11 August, the bloodiest day of the war, resulted in heavy losses on both sides. A total of 24,000 men were killed or wounded in the carnage. ‘The French Maison du Roi sacrificed itself in repeated charges; French and Dutch infantry battalions exchanged volleys at terrifyingly close range; and Imperial cavalry joined the combat and smashed against battered ranks of French infantry. After

the battle, “not a single soul remained” of six battalions of Dutch infantry that had struggled to withstand the first French assaults against the rear guard. Monsieur de Launoy, a French secret agent in the Allied camp, also mentioned to Estrades that in the French pillage of the Allied baggage train, “I lost all of my papers and my ciphers and 1,500 pustolles that I had in the coffers of His Highness. Voila, I am reduced to poverty!*? The Allied army, having lost the entire Dutch baggage train and field treasury, disengaged under the moonlight. The French also disengaged but did not completely with-

draw, taking responsibility for the wounded and dead. [here were no victors at Seneffe. As Mademoiselle Sévigné indicated to her cousin, “We have lost so much by this victory that without the Te Deum and some flags brought to Notre Dame, we would believe

we had lost the battle.”

*’ For Condé’s campaign see Jean Beurain, Histoire de la campagne de M. le prince de Condé en Flandre en 1674 (Paris, 1774). *® Mienet, Négociations, vol. 4, pp. 305-306. *° Marie de Rabutin-Chantal de Séviené, Lettres de Madame de Sévigné, 12 vols.

(Paris, 1822-23), vol. 1, p. 353, quoted in Lynn, Wars, p. 126.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 27 On the very day after the bloody clash with the French at Seneffe, Prince William received reinforcements and a month’s supply of pay for his troops. He planned on a siege of a French fortress. Louvois

reacted by sending the king’s best engineer Vauban to the frontier to organize defenses. But the French did not deflect Prince William from his goals; his own ally did. The Imperial commander Souches disagreed over which French fortress to attack. ‘The Allies argued and then finally settled on Oudenaarde. Angered by the dispute, Souches failed to give orders for the digging of siege trenches once his corps occupied its quarters. He even feigned sickness to avoid war counsels with Prince William. ‘The siege was doomed, and the two armies made their withdrawal under the cover of morning fog. After the two commanders agreed to march toward Ghent, Souches turned about, forced the Dutch rear guard off the road to continue its march waist deep in water, and took his army the opposite direction on the high road toward the Empire.” Yet despite the twin failures at Seneffe and Oudenaarde, Prince William persisted that summer. He led his army back to Dutch territory and reinforced his subordinate General Rabenhaupt, who had clamped a siege on Grave, the last French holdout in Dutch territory. Rabenhaupt had already suffered grievous losses at the hands of the well-supplied and motivated French garrison. ‘The enterprising commander of the defense made numerous sorties, exploded mines, and harried the Dutch infantry from their trenches on several occasions. Condé bragged on behalf of his protégé to Estrades, “There is nothing more beautiful than the defense made by Monsieur Chamilly.”*' The defiant fortress eventually fell in December, but only after the garrison was reduced to eating their horses, and Louis personally ordered Chamilly to surrender.*’ For his efforts, the French court acclaimed the comte de Chamilly a great hero, and he enjoyed a brief celebrity status.

© Stephen B. Baxter, Wilkam IIT and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650-1702 (New York, 1966), pp. 118-120. Louvois was also aware of the command problem in the Allied army. He promptly informed Lieutenant-General Luxembourg. Louvois to Luxembourg, 30 September 1674, AG, A' 401, fo. 67. ‘' Louis de Bourbon to Estrades, 25 October 1674, BN, Fonds Clairambaut, 881,

fo. , : 27 he repugnance of French soldiers for the horse flesh is described in Chamilly to Louvois, 20 September 1674, AG, A' 401, fo. 20.

28 CHAPTER ONE The campaign of 1674 ended with the Imperial army trudging back across the Spanish Netherlands, pillaging everything along route.

On its way to the Rhine River, it demanded contributions and dispersed some troops in winter quarters in the neutral principality of Liége, blocking Maastricht. ‘The French garrison chose to ignore the German troops and continued to make bold raids. Following the words of the official Gazette, they “never return from them without loot and prisoners.”*’ ‘This ineffective blockade of Maastricht and the

sanguinary conquest of Grave was all the Alles had to show after a year of continuous offensive operations against the French. Prince William sadly commented: “I have nothing to blame but myself, although I should have been better supported.”

4. Lsolating the Prizes

The French campaign in 1675 followed on the heels of the partisan war conducted by the French garrison at Maastricht in its attempts

to win control of the Meuse River Vally. The stretch of the river that flowed between Maastricht and France was mostly within the territory of the neutral principality of Liége. Control of the Meuse was critical to the French as it was a vast gate, which swung both ways between the Empire and the Spanish Netherlands. At the end of 1674 the Imperial army had ensconced itself on the river in the Liégoise towns of Huy and Dinant, blocking communications between

Maastricht and France. Although the French garrison at Maastricht could do little about these Imperial garrisons, parties of French troops

from the aggressive La Marine Regiment and detached dragoons from Maastricht convinced the remainder of the Imperial army to seek safer quarters across the Rhine: one French attack in the dead of winter on Theux involved over 2,800 troops and two cannons. Later in March 1675, Estrades successfully bribed the governor of the fortress of Liége, which guarded the neutral capital of Liége, and the place fell into French hands without a shot being fired. Excepting

> Gazette, 18 October 1674, from Maastricht. ** William to the Count of Ossory, November 1674. Correspondentie van Willem LIL en van Hans Willem Bentinck, eersten graaf van Portland, ed. Dr. N. Japiske, 5 vols. (The

Hague, 1927-1937), vol. 2, p. 527.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 29 the Imperial garrisons remaining at Huy, Dinant, and the Spanishowned town of Limbourg, the Germans had mostly left the Meuse River Valley by March 1675. Dusting off his war plan from the summer of 1673, Louis decided to support the partisan war actions of the garrison of Maastricht with a major operation of war. Back in the summer of 1673, Louis had hoped to conduct a “sweep” of the Meuse and make himself “master of all the strongholds the Spanish possess from Liége to

Grave.” Of course, in 1675 Grave was no longer a concern to Louis as it had been in 1673. Now the object was to clear a path from France to Maastricht, a more modest goal. Louis had not been alone in his desire to remove the numerous Allied garrisons in the vicinity of Maastricht. At around the same time that Louis made his war plan in the summer of 1673, Gondé employed the same expression as Louis, “sweep,” to describe what he felt had to be done with the Spanish and Dutch partisans in the vicinity of Jiilich.°° On other occasions during the Dutch War, it would be difficult to determine the origin of the operational plans of the French. Louis frequently

sought and was given recommendations by his closest advisors. Sometimes, as in the case of the campaign of 1675, ideas were shelved for a year, and then adapted to a new strategic situation and implemented. Often writing the orders, and amending them, the final decision governing French military operations was always the king’s alone. In May 1675 Louis led his campaign army across the Netherlands toward Maastricht, following almost the same route Condé took the previous spring. He then posted his army as a “corps d’observation,”

and covered the activities of a separate, smaller corps under the command of Marshal Créqui and his subordinate Rochefort. ‘They

would carry out the actual sieges of Dinant, Huy and Limbourg. Along route, the French king received artillery, bridging equipment, munitions and rations from French-owned fortresses in the Sambre and Meuse valleys both for his own army and to assist the separate corps. Dry forage was also transported, since the country fields were

still barren. In effect, the corps of observation functioned like a

” Louis XIV, “Diverse Vues” in Louis XIV, Ocuvres, vol. 3, pp. 434-41.

1s Louis de Bourbon to Estrades, 22 July 1673, BN, Fonds Clairambaut, 581, fo.

30 CHAPTER ONE “mobile” fortress, sheltermg the siege corps under Créqui and Rochefort

and maintaining it with a steady flow of supplies. All three fortresses fell to the French. It was a successful campaign and a sound example of the opera-

tional art of war as practiced then. The French corps of observation remained distant, two to three days, but close enough to pose a threat to any force attempting to prevent the French sieges. As it turned out, Prince Wiliam was unable to assemble his army in time

to disrupt the sieges. One of the great secrets of French success throughout the war was Louis’s ability to assemble his armies, weeks in advance of the Allied forces. ‘This was the result of Louvois’ wellmanaged system of magazines and the net of contributions of money

and dry forage that replenished magazines. By the end of June the French had cleared the Meuse of Imperial garrisons. A French curtain of posts—castles, redoubts and fortresses—guarded the banks of the Meuse and assured communications between Maas-

tricht and France. ‘The king returned to Versailles in July 1675 and left the duc de Luxembourg in command of the main force, known as the Army of Flanders, with instructions to prevent Prince William from making any gains. ‘Thus, the French returned to the defensive in the middle of summer, and already recommendations were made to the king, almost as personal requests, concerning the goals and objectives of the next season’s campaign. Luxembourg essentially suc-

ceeded in his defensive task that summer, although the Allies took

Binche, despite the fact that the French had refortified and garrisoned it. By controlling the Meuse, the French now made it far more difficult for an Imperial army to march into the Netherlands and join the other Alhed armies operating there.

5. Lumbling Down the Defenses

‘The final three years of the Dutch War brought the army of Louis XIV to an even higher level of military reputation in Europe. When Louis XIV went on the offensive in the Spanish Netherlands in 1676,

he was admirably holding his own in other theaters of the war. In January 1676, the king made preparations for an offensive campaign

in the Spanish Netherlands. The purpose of partisan warfare was realigned to meet a new, more aggressive strategic shift in the king’s

outlook. Now that that the Meuse was secure, and French maga-

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 3]

zines filled by the gathering of contributions, more was possible. During that month, as precursor to major operations, a detached corps of troops from the French garrisons captured the twin strongholds of Ecaussines, interrupting Spanish communications between Brussels and their vital fortress defenses at Mons, Valenciennes and Cambrai. In March, Louis prepared two corps: one commanded by the brother of the king, Monsieur, marched on the Spanish fortress of Condé, while Louis led in person the other that struck at Bouchain. Although these were smaller fortresses, by the standards of the Spanish

Netherlands, the town of Condé contained a population of only 5,000, they were important as supporting defenses of Gambrai and Valenciennes. The garrisons, fatigued and depleted by months of bitterly contested partisan actions with the French, succumbed to the French almost as soon as the French arrived in force.’’ Prince William

attempted to disrupt the French sieges, and for a brief moment, he faced off the corps commanded by Louis near the village of Heurtebise in May. ‘The marshals with Louis counseled him against giving bat-

tle, and he deferred; he would later regret this decision, as he never again would have the opportunity to command in battle.**> Deciding that the French position was too strong, Prince William retired his army beyond French artillery range. The French conquests remained. With no hope of relief, the plight of the Spanish during the spring of 1676 was symbolized by the figure of the physically shaken, seventy-five year old governor of Bouchain, who finally climbed out of the cellar where he sought refuge, to surrender his fortress.’

The objectives for the campaign having been met, Louis gave instructions for the French garrisons in the Netherlands to establish blockades, further reducing the capacity of Valenciennes and Cambrai to withstand siege. Desertion increased within the Spanish army. A

turncoat, the baron de Quincy, deserted the Spanish garrison of Valenciennes, joined the French, and in June led a detached corps to ravage the countryside around Valenciennes and Cambrai. ‘Two cavalry battles took place. The first engagement fought on 10 June between Quincy’s command and desperate Spanish troops from the

*’ ‘The population figure is found in Sonnino, Origins, p. 32. *® Rousset, Histoire, vol. 2, pp. 220-227 discusses the “lost opportunity” and the surrounding controversy over the decision at length. * Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 2, p. 75.

32 CHAPTER ONE beleaguered garrisons ended in a bloody draw. One Spanish soldier, Don Gabriel Buendia, killed eight French troopers. The second battle on 19 June saw the Spanish narrowly defeated in a contest that could easily have gone the other way. Now controlling the surrounding

countryside, the French blockades of Cambrai and Valenciennes ensued in earnest. Detachments of French troops occupied Crespin, the castles of Brossetul and Bitermont, among others. In a debacle worse than Rabenhaut’s siege of Grave, the Dutch army bled itself white in head-on attacks against the defenses of Maastricht that summer. In fact, the raids for contributions from the French garrison at Maastricht and the burning of homes of prominent Dutch citizens had incited the republic to compel Prince Wiliam

to do something, no matter how difficult from a military point of view. [he capture of Maastricht was a forlorn hope since the French fortress had not been effectively blockaded and was plentifully supplied with munitions, and money and forage from contributions. Further, Louvois instructed the intendant of Maastricht to carry out a brutal requisition before the siege began, arguing: I do not understand why if Maastricht should be attacked it would be necessary to increase the soldier’s ration, in view of the fact that the

bread wage, beer and meat... the inhabitants furnish with no charge... As soon as a town is besieged, it is necessary to help yourself to everything that the bourgeois have for the subsistence of the garrison.”

In August Marshal Schomberg marched to relieve the garrison. Upon arriving near the besieged fortress, Schomberg fired a pre-arranged

signal salvo from 32 cannons; giving it one last effort, the Dutch bravely but unsuccessfully attacked outworks and then withdrew in haste.*' This marked the third failed siege of the war for the Dutch. Weeks later the French at Maastricht requested special equipment to dredge up cannon dumped in the Meuse River during the retreat of the Dutch.” French troops continued their blockading activities during the fall. They occupied several strategic posts around Mons.” ‘They captured

© Louvois to Dumouceau, 4 January 1675, AG, A' 456, fo. 6. 7 Lynn, Wars, p. 147. *” La Borde to Louvois, 3 September 1676, AG, A! 503, fo. 9. * Humiéres to Louvois, 3 February 1677, AG, A' 543, fo. 14.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 33 and garrisoned Maubeuge, and they permanently conquered Bavay

in December. In order to blockade St. Omer, posts on the north bank of the Aa River and the canal were captured including the “Old Castle” near the Lake of St. Eloy and the villages of Watten and Arques. Earlier in the summer Marshal Schomberg captured Aire, and later Marshal Humiéres captured the Spanish fort of Linck. ‘Throughout the entire year the French peeled away at the outer layer of Spanish defenses in a combination of small and major operations.

As fall turned to winter, the French intensified their blockading activities in order to weaken the defenders’ resolve to prolong the struggle in the spring. Detachments occupied villages and castles, and they constructed redoubts and threw out barriers along roads. French parties of troops tightened their patrols around the Spanish defenses. In compliance with instructions from Louvois, Quincy’s mounted troops turned the land surrounding Valenciennes and Cambrai into a snow-covered no man’s land by systematic plunder and the destruction of villages. Valenciennes was proclaimed officially blockaded on 22 December and Cambrai on 28 December, rendering contraband any goods that attempted to enter the places. 6. Into the Breech

The French strategy of wearing down the major Spanish garrisons by blockades in the second half of 1676 led to their collapse and surrender to Louis’ campaign armies in March and April 1677. ‘Uhe Sun King struck his blows with snow still on the ground both to beat the Dutch army to the field and to take advantage of the misery in the Spanish garrisons. Valenciennes surrendered after eighteen

days of siege on 17 March, and Cambrai on 17 April after twentysix days of siege." The garrisons capitulated after surprisingly tough resistance given their lack of men, munitions and food. The civilians in the towns were more willing to submit; the garrisons, on the other hand, had been the hardcore of the Spanish Army of Flanders.

* For the siege of Cambrai, see Achille Durieux, Le stége de Cambrai par Louis XIV

(Cambrai, 1877). For the siege of Valenciennes, see A. Dinaux, Szége et prise de Valenciennes en 1677 par Louis XIV (Valenciennes, 1856).

34 CHAPTER ONE But there was no chance of relief. The Allied army under Prince Wiliam that had painfully assembled at Dendermonde, while the French siege of Valenciennes progressed, was unable to prevent its final ordeal. It struck toward Artois to face the French threat to St. Omer. On the French side, no such problem in concentrating and maintaining their forces so early in the season was encountered. French artillery and baggage horses received the “forage from contributions” and soldiers, although often drenched and bone cold in the March snows and rains, ate their rations that had been prepared weeks in advance. ‘The French campaign truly proceeded at a relentless pace that year. St. Omer proved to be the more difficult Spanish fortress for the French to conquer. In addition to its well-designed bastions, a vast flooded zone that extended into a swamp shut off one avenue of the

French attack and allowed for a trickle of reinforcements to enter the fortress. Ihe French lacked sufficient forces to blockade all of the passages to St. Omer, and those that were guarded were weakly held. ‘To make matters worse for the French, a chilling rain soaked the French infantry in their siege positions for the first three days and nights of the siege. heir muskets and artillery were unusable. When Prince William attempted to upset the siege of St. Omer, Monsieur and Marshal Luxembourg resoundingly defeated his army at the Battle of Mount Cassel. Despite the strong defensive position that William occupied in this battle, the French infantry drove him from the field. The Dutch lost 10,000 killed, wounded and captured,

while the French killed and wounded amounted to 3,200. Rather than pursue the remnants of William’s army, the French looted his baggage train and took prisoners. Narrowly, the Allied army escaped a total catastrophe.* St. Omer finally surrendered to the French on 22 April.*®

After two years of offensive operations, Louis was on his way to subjugating the Spanish Netherlands. ‘The invasion of the Dutch Republic must have seemed a distant memory. In 1675 the French had dealt the Imperials a serious defeat by seizing control of the

® Lynn, Wars, p. 150. * For the campaign of 1677 in its entirety see Primi Visconti, La campagne du Roy Trés Chretien en 1677, avec les partecularités du siége de Valenciennes, de Saint-Omer et

de Cambrai et de la bataille du Mont-Cassel (Paris, 1678); and, P,J.E. Smyttre, La bataille du Val de Cassel de 1677, ses préludes et ses suites (Hazebrouck, 1865).

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 35 Meuse River Valley, and in 1676 they had effectively reduced the Spanish and Dutch armies to the point were they could barely resist

further French assaults. In 1677, before the month of May, the French conquered three important Spanish fortresses: Valenciennes,

Cambrai and St. Omer. By breaking these defenses, they opened the way for major operations directed either at Ghent and Antwerp

in the west near the coast, Brussels in the center, or Mons and Namur, left isolated in the southeast corner. ‘The consequences of the Battle of Mount Cassel were more serious for the Dutch than

those of Seneff in 1674. At the opening of that campaign, they already fielded 10,000 fewer soldiers than the previous year. ‘Their army was reduced to around 60,000 effectives, and of these, Prince Wiliam could only bring around 30,000 to battle. Another 30,000 or so were kept in garrison or served guarding convoys of supplies.*’ At about the same time as the Dutch defeat at Mount Cassel, French dragoons exploited a gap in Dutch defenses near Ghent and Antwerp, to plunder and burn villages. Refugees from the countryside drove carts filled with their most precious belongings to seek shelter in Antwerp and Ghent, overburdening the charitable services available in those towns. ‘The financial burden of the war, however, impacted the French and their opponents the same. On the Dutch side, deputies in the States General pleaded that the people could not “endure any

longer the war with France, deprived of their commerce.” That summer negotiations began in earnest at Niyymegan between the French and Dutch through the mediation of Charles II and his brother the Duke of York. While negotiations proceeded, determined to strengthen the hand of the Allies, Prince William re-gathered his troops. With the arrival of several contingents of Imperial troops, brought by the bishop of Osnabrtick by way of the lands of the Dutch Republic, he prepared

a counterstroke. He hoped to undo at least some of the damage caused by Louis’ campaign in March and April. ‘Uhe Spanish General

Louvignies scrapped a few battalions together and appeared at the Allied camp. He suggested a siege of Charleroi, but Prince William intended this maneuver to draw out Luxembourg’s army for a decisive

*” Mienet, NVégoczations, vol. 4, p. 468.

* Tbid., vol. 4, p. 460.

36 CHAPTER ONE battle. Only if Luxembourg demurred would William undertake a full-scale siege.*” It seemed a desperate maneuver. Louis and Louvois watched the Allied campaign unfold that summer with their usual attentiveness. While continually strengthening the new French conquests, they shifted detachments from Marshal

Luxembourg’s campaign army from one place to another. By the middle of July, Prince Charles of Lorraine marched his Imperial army toward the Meuse, threatening to cross no matter how difficult the French made it for him. Louvois immediately cancelled orders to further diminish the main field army commanded under Luxem-

bourg. Instead, on 16 July, he ordered Marshal Créqui to take a reinforced detached corps and “cover the fortresses on the Meuse.”” About three weeks later, on 5 August, Prince William, the Duke of Villahermosa, and the bishop of Osnabrtick occupied siege positions

around the French fortress of Charleroi. Not far away, the young Duke of Lorraine camped his Imperial corps at Mouzon on the Meuse River. ‘The French did not come out to fight as Prince William had hoped. Créqui maintained his watch on the Meuse, and Luxembourg maintained a strong defensive position just beyond Charleroi.

The Allies, unable to draw the French into a trap, and unwilling to prosecute a siege without support from the Duke of Lorraine, withdrew toward Brussels. Meanwhile, practically unopposed, the busy and methodical French garrisons in the Netherlands established a blockade around Mons and extended one around Ypres. By occupying more posts, includ-

ing St. Ghislain, which fell on 5 December 1677, they closed in around both Mons and Brussels. Even at sea, the French pressured the Spanish Netherlands. From Dunkirk, French privateers in February 1678 attacked four Dutch vessels in frigid northern waters, and plundered grain and other provisions destined for Spanish garrisons. With

the Spanish garrisons and towns suffering because of French raids and blockades, Prince William could only hope for a miracle in desperate battle or the arrival of the English in strength as 1678 began.

” Baxter, Wilham ITT, p. 145. ”” Louvois to Créqui, 16 July 1677, AG, A', fo. 1.

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 37 7. English Intervention and the Peace of Nymegan

For the campaign of 1678, Louis XIV departed from his conservative strategy of following on the success of French blockades as the Alhes expected and turned his attention to a fortress that had been tormented by French raids for contributions. One of several gates for English entry into the Netherlands, Ghent was a natural objective in 1678 for strategic reasons. On 10 January 1678, the English and the Dutch hastily signed a treaty at The Hague for the “General Reestablishment of Peace.” The English pledged military support on the side of the Allies at some undisclosed future date if the war did not end soon. In February 1678 the English Parliament voted the necessary funds to equip and send an army of 40,000 men to protect the Spanish Netherlands. French diplomacy had not succeeded in maintaining English neutrality, or could it have been expected to so long as French armies continued their conquests toward Antwerp, a city of vital concern to English trade interests. After failing to broker a peace and preserve the careful neutrality of England, Charles II observed of Louis XIV, with considerable truth: I had not expected that such a great king, who can make so glorious a peace, and who will remain not only the arbiter, but the master of his neighbors and of all Europe, prefers better to continue the war, and cares nothing to see me exposed to losing my crown for remaining too attached to his interests.”'

The French ambassador noted the comment and reported it to Louis XIV. The momentum of victory, however, was with French arms, and although Louis desired peace by the end of 1677, he possibly believed that a better peace, and more glozre, could be attained with one more campaign in 1678. According to an official account (état) recorded on | January 1678, 279,610 men served in the army—by far the largest military establishment in Europe. As the French historian Camille Rousset pointed out: “Instead of exhausting the resources of France, the war seemed to increase them.””?

Before an English army arrived, Louis XIV decided to close in on the maritime flank of the Spanish Netherlands. Adept at deception, Louis feinted as if he intended to besiege Charlemont, a small >! Mienet, Négociations, vol. 4, p. 542. »” Rousset, Histowe, vol. 2, p. 478.

38 CHAPTER ONE fortress that Dutch negotiators kept holding out to him. It lay far in the southeast corner of the Spanish Netherlands on the upper Meuse River. He then left his court (with the gossips and spies) behind at ‘Tournai, and suddenly appeared before the gates of Ghent with an army, hurriedly assembled in secret by Marshal Humiéres. To the last moment, the Spanish were terribly confused, and even reinforced Ypres. ‘The siege of Ghent lasted only ten days from | March to 11 March. Ypres, with its 3,500 strong Spanish garrison demoralized and exposed by the fall of Ghent, fell next to the French

army. The Duke of Villahermosa in one of his last decisions as Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands ordered the town fathers of Antwerp to break their dykes and flood the countryside in imitation of Amsterdam in 1672, which they duly did. The English were appalled by the shrewd French move, and to appease his coun-

trymen, Charles If had no choice but to immediately dispatch the Duke of Monmouth with several battalions of red coats (1,400 men)

and 100 men of his personal guard to Ostende and Nieuport and thence to Bruges. In London, French triumphs brought more denunciations of Charles I] and Louis XIV and further consternation.

The panic that swept the Spanish Netherlands in the summer of 1678 was almost as great as that which struck the Dutch Republic in 1672. In Brussels, fear aroused by the siege of Ghent was almost palpable. As a Gazette correspondent recorded, emotions in Brussels

ran high: “If in the end this town so important to Spain and to Holland is taken the same misfortune will occur more often, if one does not make peace.””* The tragic loss to the Allies of the third most important city of the Spanish Netherlands, Ghent, followed quickly by Ypres, was soon capped by the French capture of Zoutleeuw

in Brabant where two entire regiments and their commander surrendered to a French detachment. Defenses were breached everywhere and pandemonium ensued. Baron Quincy’s detached corps volant plundered the outskirts of Brussels with impunity. In the village D’Ixelles, literally underneath the walls of Brussels, a French party took the village’s entire herd of cattle. The main quarters of

»* Gazette, 14 March 1678, from Brussels. “Our generals and our governors are always surprised: and the most Christian king presses the sieges in such a manner

that Te us great difficulty to assemble the troops in time.”

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 39 assembly for the Dutch army in the Spanish Netherlands were horribly exposed. A newly installed French garrison at Ypres could wreak the same havoc in the province of Flanders; Bruges was blockaded.” For a moment, at the end of April, all that stood between the French and Brussels, according to a correspondent of the French Gazeiie, were the Duke of Osnabriick’s Brunswicker troops quartered around

the city. Essentially, the Dutch ran out of space and adequate supplies trom the Spanish Netherlands necessary to support their failing Spanish ally in 1678.°’ In June, the Dutch field army scraped together contingents from fortress garrisons and the navy. It razed the castle of Rupelmonde and tried one final offensive. But the time for peace had come; the States General no longer saw a benefit in continued fighting. ‘The French crown was deeply in debt, and Louis was satisfied with the fortified towns he would take away from Spain. French and Dutch delegates signed the ‘Treaty of Nymegan on 10 August. After peace had been concluded the armies fought one last battle. On 14 August, unaware of the signing, Prince William directed

an attack against the main French army under Luxembourg, who had almost compelled Mons to surrender through a blockade with-

out a formal siege. Luxembourg, caught unawares at the dinner table, soon recovered and skillfully deflected six hours of Dutch and English frontal assaults on his strong positions, although both of his

flanks were turned.*? Thousands bravely fought and died in this useless bloodletting near the abbey of St. Denis. Perhaps, fearing a breakdown in the peace process as this last attack by the Dutch indicated, the French blockade of Mons continued even after the peace of Niymegan was signed by Spain on 17 September 1678. By the terms of the treaty, France won certain fortified towns and surrendered others. Louis raised a double barrier of fortresses that arched

formidably across the Low Countries, leaving the frontier of the north far stronger than at any time in the past or in the future. In

»” “We fear the great destruction that the garrisons of Ypres and Ghent will cause in the country that remains to us.” Gazette, 3 April, 1678, from Brussels. ” Gazette, 24 January 1678, from Brussels. *’ Gazette, 28 March 1678, from Brussels. *’ For the battle of Saint-Denis, see W.J. Knoop and R. Fruin, Willem IIT en de slag van Saint-Dens (The Hague, 1881).

40 CHAPTER ONE 1679, following the peace, the Hotel de Ville of Paris awarded Louis with the title “the great.”

8. Consequences

Some seventy years after the last cannon shots crashed into fortress walls, the Dutch War attracted the talent of Voltaire. “France was then at the height of its glory,” he said after the fashion of historians of his day, “the name of her generals stamped with veneration; her ministers were regarded as more capable than the advisors of other princes; and Louis was like the king of all Europe.”*” The war, Voltaire determined, had been a successful enterprise for France,

and Louis XIV seemed to tower over the world in the 1670s and 1680s. The Dutch War has ever since been regarded as a victory for French arms—or at least an “equivocal victory.” Not all glory, the Dutch War killed thousands, cost millions, and it troubled the minds of many. ‘The combined civilian and military

casualties of the Dutch War are difficult to ascertain. he number of casualties sustained in battle and siege was only a good guess made by commanders. Slight wounds often resulted in blood potsoning, and death often followed in a matter of days. Using a standard work written by Dr. Gaston Bodart as a base for conjecture, deaths and injuries in regular battles and sieges (the latter which Bodart neglected) for both sides may have reached 250,000, or the loss of about 42,000 human beings each year of the six-year war.°! Approximately 36,000—and this is no more than an estimate—from both sides were killed or wounded in the numerous, smaller actions,

or about 6,000 each year of the war. Bodart also did not include the deaths, perhaps numbering in the hundreds, of soldiers who were either the victims of a harsh “military justice” or neglect as prisoners of war. If one adds those civilians killed by disease, especially

* Voltaire, Le seécle de Louis XIV (Berlin, 1751).

°° For John B. Wolf, the treaties of peace were “obviously a victory, and yet they were only a modest victory, perhaps even an equivocal one.” See, Wolf, Louzs XIV, p. 265. °' Between one-third, 117,000, to one-half of these losses, 175,000, were French. The total population of France was between 16 and 19 million at the time. Gaston Bodart, LL.D., Losses of Life. See also, Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington, Kentucky, 1983).

THE DUTCH WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS 4 dysentery: the total of those wounded and killed probably reaches closer to 350,000.°° Toward the end of the war, on 2 January 1678, a French official requested the cooperation of all French governors

to aid returning veterans along a planned route of march from French-occupied Maastricht to a newly constructed home in Paris for those disabled by the war, the Hotel des Invalides. A long column of wounded and crippled passed through village after village

that winter, reminding those at peace of the horrors of the war. Especially touching was an additional request by the official at Maastricht for horse-drawn carts to transport “those without leg.”® The political legacy of the war wounded Europe just as its gunfire

maimed men. Within a decade, an even greater war grew out of the fears and mistrust left behind.*' Oblivious to the grave challenges

that awaited him, Louis XIV wrote with contentment in his memories dedicated to the education of the dauphin: “I wished to reim-

burse myself by the rights of conquest... and to console myself thus for an end of a war that I had fought with both pleasure and

success. °° |

*? Dysentery was unnaturally rampant in the regions where armies passed through. Myron P. Gutmann, War and Rural Life in the Low Countries (Princeton, 1980).

°° Dumouceau to Louvois, 2 January 1678, AG, A! 612, fo. 1. ** The wars that followed included: the War of Reunions (1683-1684), the War of the League of Augsburg or Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) and the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713). The Dutch War, unlike these other wars, with the important exception of the brief War of Reunions, is correctly represented by French historians as the least justifiable of all of the wars of Louis XIV on moral grounds—an unprovoked attack by the leading monarchy in Europe on a republic that posed no immediate threat, militarily or otherwise. ” Cited in Wolf, Lows XIV, p. 265.

CHAPTER TWO

ORGANIZING THE IMPOSITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND WAR TAXES

Partisan warfare performed essential roles in the early modern strategies of exhaustion. By garnering resources—money, war material,

and fodder—and denying them to the enemy, partisans helped to maintain friendly armies and wear down hostile forces. During the reign of Louis XIV, the French would regularize and organize these functions as no European power had before.

Louis XIV anticipated the conduct of partisan warfare in the Netherlands by signing the key ordinance on 23 September 1673 that established the bureaus of contributions.’ ‘The men responsible for these offices set the jaws of a giant trap, which soon closed, pressing most of the Spanish Netherlands. The bureaus of contributions imposed war taxes on the Spanish Netherlands, backed by the dou-

ble threats of plunder and fire. From this combination of terror, a double, strategic benefit accrued to the French: removal of Spanish

war resources reduced the ability of the Spanish to defend the Netherlands, and meant a corresponding increase in French war resources. Although the greatest share of French war finances in the treasury of the Extraordinaire des Guerres came from the Trésor royal and

the Controller-General, contributions and related war taxes from opponents’ lands were vital. ‘Total returns of contributions to the Sun King’s war treasury in the Netherlands may have averaged 13 million hures a year from 1674-1678. This was about 15.3°% to 16.6°% of expenditures by the Extraordinaire des Guerres in 1678, 78 or 85 mil-

lion liwres, a year when the army was at maximum size.’ After the

' BG, Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Roi, concernans les contributions a lever sur les sujets

Espagnols, 23 September 1673, Collectzon des ordonnances milttaires 1112 jusquwa 1801,

edited by the marquis de Sauvageon, vol. 23, no. 21. The ordinance followed, almost word for word, a similar ordinance composed at the onset of the War of Devolution (1667-68) that was only briefly tested. * See below pp. 75-77 for how I arrive at the figure of 13 million dures of contributions per year. I rely on Rowlands for an estimate of the total “state disbursed expenditures.” Guy Rowlands’ estimate of what contributions provided in the 1670s,

ORGANIZING THE IMPOSITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS 43

war taxes were methodically gathered and tallied every three months, intendants of contributions spent them to supply French fortress gar-

risons. Lhey paid the expense of forage for the garrison’s complement of horses. They also paid some of the compensation of the garrison force—about 70,000 men and half the total French strength in the theater of war. Contributions also provided specie for repayment of interest on loans, and served as a pool of emergency funds to allow a field army to remain in the field against the foe. They could be used as rewards for conspicuous service, or to ransom prisoners, maintaining the loyalty of troops and especially the officer corps. While French garrisons devoured tens of thousands of Flemish florins each month, they depleted the financial underpinnings of the government of the Spanish Netherlands whose hard-pressed inhabitants also paid the bill of the Spanish and some of that of the two

other Allied armies. Cool calculation on the part of Louvois and Louis XIV, both apprentices during the later stages of French involvement in the war with Spain (1635-59), resulted in a contrived attempt

to break the moral resolve of the Spanish Netherlands with war taxes, well before their towns were besieged. ‘They also hoped to spare the French treasury as much money as possible. The trap’s most ferocious teeth consisted of detached companies of dragoons, which had been locally raised by the fortress governors and subordinate commanders. ‘The duty of the men in these companies charged with enforcing contributions, and with securing much of their hard won sustenance, extended to crossing rivers, assaulting prepared defensive positions, burning villages and taking hostages. Penetrating into the fields, bogs and woods of the Netherlands, like

foxhounds in advance of the hunting party, the companies of dragoons ventured beyond the fortress base of operations to places as far as Antwerp, further still to the archbishopric of Cologne, and they even revisited the Dutch Republic. The detached dragoon companies were unique in several ways, but the most obvious was the

fact that they took a direct share of the plunder from those who dared refuse the French war tax. They were, from an admunistrative 12.6% to 13.7% of “total state-disbursed expenditures on land forces,” are close to my own, although his total for contributions derive from one document from 1678, a year which probably saw a decline in regions that could contribute to the French as a result of conquests made by Louis’ armies. Without complete account books, this matter will not likely be settled any more accurately. See, Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State, pp. 365-366.

44 CHAPTER TWO perspective, on the margin of Louis XIV’s army, but central to the overall war effort. The prospect of loot fired their ambitions. Many of them volunteered their services to the governors of French fortresses

during the first days of the war with Spain. A few joined before Spain declared war, trespassing the verges between kingdoms and trying to arouse the enmity of an old foe—in which they succeeded.

Other French troops compelled the payment of contributions, but few served as frequently or as enthusiastically as the detached companies of governor’s dragoons.

1. The Garrison Force and the Campaign Army

In practice, two French forces fought in the Netherlands from 1673-1678. One was the field army able to fight full-scale battles and conduct formal sieges, but dispersed into winter quarters when the weather turned bad. The other was a fortress-based force, divided into 39 major garrisons from the sea to the Moselle River, capable of delivering small, repeated hammer blows year-round and _ protecting the frontier.’ Throughout the Dutch War, field and garrison forces each numbered about 70,000 men on average but varied in

strength from one month to the next. Each one maintained separate finances, separate commands, organized differently and specialized in different military operations. The garrison force retained its own officers of artillery.* At least as practiced in the Netherlands, a field army was assigned a separate war treasury, and unlike the garrison force, the source of its funds appears normally to have come not from contributions but from the Extraordinaire des Guerres. In 1675,

for example, the field army began with 3,300,000 dures in its war chests. Over the first three months of the campaign, it consumed 2,029,445 lwres (676,481 lures per month).? The historian Jean Mossay, who made a detailed study of the bureau of contributions at Maubeuge

(added to others at the conclusion of the Dutch War in 1678), per° For purposes of this study, the theater of war encompasses the region roughly from Pas de Calais to Luxembourg. See Map One and Figure Two below of French garrison towns, fortresses and zones of contributions. * For example, Intendant Le Boistel at Dunkirk requested how many artillery specialists should serve in the garrisons of his department. Boistel to Louvois, 17 March 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 3. > Robert to Louvois, 3 September 1675, AG, A! 457, fo. 27.

ORGANIZING THE IMPOSITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS 45

ceived two distinct wars within war: a war waged from the bureaus of contributions (garrisons of fortresses) and a war waged by the commanders of field armies.® Nevertheless, despite differences between the field and garrison troops, they shared allegiance to Louis. Soldiers

switched between the two forces, and Louvois coordinated their respective financial resources, supply requirements, and military oper-

ations. Reliance upon two distinct forces owed its existence to old patterns and continued utility, not to any official policy. These different

bodies of troops complimented one another, lending the air of an effective machine to French military operations.

2. The Organization of Bureaus of Contributions

The intention of the ordinance of 23 September 1673 was to give warning of the imminence of war to officials and most importantly, it established bureaus of contributions in accordance with procedures based on lessons from the past. Le ‘Tellier, who remembered wars

when French troops pillaged and sacked “with great abandon,” intended the ordinance to serve as a corrective to “abuses” committed in previous levies of contributions and the related matters of

passports and safeguards. During the prolonged war with Spain, 1635-59, French fortress governors had operated as if they ruled tiny independent states, collecting contributions for revenue and obeying, or disobeying, as they saw fit. Fortress governors would still play

a role in the new system, but Louis resolved that they would not flout his authority. The ordinance carefully emphasized that the administration of contributions would rest firmly in the hands of the intendants now. The ordinance further dealt with passports, documents purchased

by those who wished to avoid pillage on the open roads, and with safeguards, paid by communities that had paid contributions and wanted to enjoy protection of the king of France against marauders. [he crown, acting only through its intendants, reserved to itself the right to issue both passports and safeguards and collect the fees. The ordinance clarified and emphasized that fortress governors had * Mossay, Les Intendants, p. 96. The same basic administrative framework of bureaus

of contributions functioned until the very end of the wars of Louis XIV in the

Netherlands in 1713.

46 CHAPTER TWO no right to issue passports in their own names and collect the fees for passports or safeguards (as during the War of 1635-59 when they were more akin to barons of plunder than lieutenants of the monarchy).

Louis carefully divided the responsibilities of gathering contribu-

tions between fortress governors and intendants. The intendants directed where contributions were imposed, and if a fire-raid was necessary to enforce payment. Fortress governors were left only with the military responsibility to dispatch forces as directed by the king’s administrators: “to carry out those executions which will be required

of them by the aforesaid Intendants.”’ On 25 May 1674, Louvois emphasized this point to the comte de Chamilly, the newly-appointed governor of Grave: As to contributions, His Majesty expects that you will push them as far forward as you are able and that you will also send parties into the country to execute the villages that resist as often as the Commissioner Desmadrys will require of you.®

The governors of fortresses were not “to meddle in any fashion,” according to the ordinance of 23 September 1673, with where contributions would be imposed. ‘The money raised by contributions, safeguards and passports was entirely managed by the intendants that turned over copies of receipts of contributions to the war minister, the marquis de Louvois, who by the ordinance of 23 September 1673 maintained a rigorous control over the accounts in the name

of the king.” He demanded frequent reports from the intendants, and often used them to keep an eye on fortress governors and their activities. Ihe fortress governors reluctantly accepted their diminished role, as Intendant Damorezan explained: “Monsieurs the governors naturally remain unconvinced of the benefits of passports and contributions, because they are not allowed to concern themselves

with such.” !” |

An extensive network of bureaus of contributions with corre-

sponding départements, covering specific regions, made the task of

’ BG, Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Rot, concernans les contributions... 23 September

1673, vol. 23, no. 21. * Louvois to Chamilly, 25 May 1674, AG, A' 380, fo. 67. ” Baxter, Servants, pp. 196-197, emphasized the adversarial nature of the relationship between intendants and fortress governors. But, more often, family rivalries complicated the issues at stake and sometimes intendants and fortress governors worked remarkably well together.

ORGANIZING THE IMPOSITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS 47

imposing contributions more efficient. In several respects, and not by accident, these military departments bore similarities to the générafités within France supervised by provincial intendants. From the low-

lands of the coastal west to the rugged hills of the Ardennes in the east, eleven military departments answered to the bureaus of contributions. These departments were based on fortresses on or near

the frontier with the Spanish Netherlands: 1) Dunkirk, 2) Saint Venant, 3) Courtrai, 4) Douai, 5) Ath, 6) Oudenaarde, 7) Le Quesnoy, 8) Philipeville, 9) Charleroi, 10) Maastricht and 11) Thionville. ‘The

military departments, unequal in population and size, were supervised by seven intendants from seven “headquarters” bureaus of contributions, as follows: Robert assisted by Le Boistel (Dunkirk), Gaboury

(Saint Venant), Le Peletier de Souzy assisted by Valicourt (military departments of Courtrai, Douai and Ath—with headquarters at Lille), Talon (Oudenaarde), Damorezan (Le Quesnoy and Philippeville— with headquarters at Charleroi), Dumouceau (Maastricht) and Chariel (Thionville).'' The entire northern theater of operations was covered from these offices, which reported directly to Louvois. The bureaus of contributions served not only as headquarters for managing contributions, passports and safeguards, but also took on

a variety of other military activities. They served as centers for “confiscations” of property belonging to disloyal subjects or those in the service of Spain or the Holy Roman Empire.”’ Since they reported direct to the war minister, the bureaus of contributions also served as centers for clandestine operations of war: espionage, sabotage, kidnapping and assassination. Clandestine operations mostly fell beyond the scope of partisan warfare, since they often involved no more than a handful of individuals acting in secrecy and not detachments or war parties. They were, however, an important part of the war effort of all sides. On several occasions, the French plotted assassinations and attempted to bribe high officials within the garrisons that opposed them. On one occassion, Intendant Le Boistel at Dunkirk corresponded with Louvois

and laid out his plan to seize one of the gates to the citadel of the fortifications of Ypres. On another, when Louvois heard about the

'° Damorezan to Louvois, 22 January 1674, AG, A! 404, fo. 88. '' BG, Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Roi, concernans les contributions... 23 September

1673, vol. 23, no. 21. ' BG, Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Roy, portant iyonction a tous Cavaliers, Dragons

& Soldats, nez dans le Pays... 30 November 1673, vol. 23, no. 32.

48 CHAPTER TWO propaganda activities of the Imperial diplomat Baron of Lisola, one broadside of his began “Stop Here True Liégoise and read the abominable actions of the perfidious and disloyal French!” Louvois autho-

rized a French intendant to plan the assassination of the baron.'° Table 1: French Garrisons in the Netherlands, 1673-1676"

Picardy Ath Citadel of Laon Town and citadel of ‘Tournai

Town and castle of Guise Orchies

Town and castle of St. Quentin Town of Doua

Town and castle of Ham The Fort de Scarpe Town and castle of Peronne

Citadel of Amiens Artois

Town and citadel of Doullens Town and citadel of Arras Town and citadel of Montreuil Saint Venant Castle of the town of Boulougne Béthune

Fort Mont-Hulin Hesdin

Fort Niolet Bapaume

Town and Citadel of Calais Town and Fort of Aire (1676) Fort of Richeban

Hainaut

Flanders Avesnes ‘Town of Gravelines Landrecie Town and citadel of Dunkirk Le Quesnoy

Fort de Bois Bouchain (1676)

Bergue Saint Vinox Condé (1676) Fort Louis Town and citadel of Phalippeville Fort Francois Town and citadel of Charleroi

Town and citadel of Lille Town and citadel of Beaumont Town and citadel of Courtrai Town and citadel of Binch Oudenaarde

Occupied in the Dutch Republic Duchy of Limbourg Town and citadel of Maastricht (1673) Town and castle of Limbourg (1675)

Town and citadel of Grave (only

from 1672-74) Duchy of Luxembourg Thionville

Montmédy

‘> For the coup at Ypres see Louvois to Le Boistel, 4 July 1674, AG, A'. The plot continued into 1675: see, Louvois to Humiéres to Louvois, 28 January 1675, AG, A’ 448, fo. 69. For the assassination plot see Rousset, Histoire, vol. 2, p. 3. 't Those in italics served as either a seat of a department for the administration

ORGANIZING THE IMPOSITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS 49

The bureaus of contributions under the direction of Louvois performed a variety of functions during the Dutch War. Each bureau of contributions served as a regional fountain of royal authority, pouring forth various ordinances and royal orders. French intendants of contributions concerned themselves, among other things, with the safety of highways as lines of communication. Intendant Le Peletier, for example, once proposed to cut away openings at angles in the tall hedges that often bordered (and prevented the erosion of)

elevated roadways that crossed his department. At the freshly cut openings, he further proposed to raise plank bridges over the drainage ditches, “five or six horses in width.” By making these angled openings in the hedgerows and throwing plank bridges across the ditches,

the French intendant hoped to make it difficult for an enemy war party to lie concealed beyond the hedge rows in the countryside and

provide an escape outlet for preyed-upon travelers. If somehow a hostile party remained unnoticed and sprung an ambush, then travelers might escape by making a run for the nearest plank bridge and safety. Le Peletier delegated the physical task of breaking up the hedgerows and constructing the plank escape bridges to the royal officers who normally cared for the highways." The bureau of contributions was the seat of government for an unusual hybrid region—one engulfed by war and the conflicting sovereignties of two early modern states. Each department, overseen by a single intendant of contributions, included: (1) lands in the Spanish

Netherlands, and of neighbors like the archbishopric of Cologne, where French contributions were imposed, and (2) French lands around

the fortress headquarters subject to more regular forms of taxation.

The ordinance of September 1673 set clearly defined zones of contributions. ‘Che contributing region of each fortress generally fol-

lowed the logic of existing natural and traditional boundaries. The department of the French fortress at Courtrai, for example, extended over the following enemy territories: “the old part of Ghent, the Franc de Bruges, all Spanish territory beyond the canal of Bruges

of war taxes or as a bureau headquarters for intendants of contributions. Louis de Gaya, Lvart de la guerre et la maniére dont on la fait a present (Paris, 1677), pp. 161-170.

' Le Peletier to Louvois, 2 January 1675, AG, A! 456, fo. 2.

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94 CHAPTER THREE Genoa.'* Garrisons were not completely static, but fluctuated in size during the war. At Maastricht, for example, on 8 January 1674, the duc de Luxembourg mustered “a little more than 6,000 men” in the garrison. At the attached outpost of Maaseik, further down the Meuse River and commanded by chevalier de Perien, Luxembourg counted 2,000 men.’ The comte d’Estrades, governor of Maastricht, counted

on a total garrison force of close to 8,000 men in 1674. Many of the same formations of troops that Luxembourg observed once in garrison at Maastrict in January 1674 remained there throughout the war, but there were changes. On 15 March 1676, Estrades requested from the war minister to keep at Maastricht the Picardy battalion, three battalions of La Marine, two battalions of Bourbonnolis,

one battalion of Carignan, one battalion of Jonzac, four Swiss companies; and, for a mounted arm, the Rouvray, Melac and Nonant.

Estrades pointed out that in the dragoon companies, “there were many good partisans that knew well all the roads.”'® In the meantime, Maaseik had been abandoned and razed. From the time that Marshal Luxembourg made his inspection in January 1674 to March

1676, the Maastricht garrison declined from near 8,000 to nearer 6,000. Few French garrisons, however, were as large as the one at Maastricht even at its 1676 strength.” How many men served each year in the semi-permanent French garrison force in the north from 1673-78? In fact, it is difficult to calculate the total number of troops committed to active garrison

duty in the Netherlands at any particular time during the war. Battalions and squadrons marched between fortress garrisons, smaller

‘+ Montbron to Louvois, 2 May 1675, AG, A! 449, fo. 114. The garrisons of Lille, ‘Tournai and Courtrai at one time included Alsatians: troops from “several regiments of infantry and several troops of cavalry that the archbishop of Strasbourg had raised and passed into French service.” Louvois to Conde, 8 May 1674, AG, A! 380, fo. 17. ' Luxembourg to Louvois, 8 January 1674, AG, A' 383, fo. 117. The garrison included “the Piedmont Regiment with 36 companies, those of d’Auvergne, Sourches,

Bourbonnois, La Marine and the battalion of Piedmont [infantry] and Royal... and five companies of Swiss.” The troops at Maaseik included “the battalion of Picardy, one of Carignan and three companies of Swiss, of which one is understrength, which in total makes 50 men over the 2,000 ordered by the king, beyond that there are over 200 sick left from the field army troops.” 6 Estrades to Louvois, 15 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 343. '’ However, in early April 1677, Courtrai contained a garrison of around 6,500

men. Also, before it fell to the Dutch in 1674, the garrison of Grave included around 4,000 men.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 95

outposts, and occasionally field armies, as the situation demanded. Louvois often ordered these movements. On 8 October 1674, for example, Louvois ordered the duc de Luxembourg to finally replace regiments sent from the garrisons of Maastricht and Maaseik and to reinforce the corps under the command of ‘Turenne in Alsace by two regiments.'® It was common practice to attach squadrons of gar-

rison cavalry to a field army at the beginning of a campaign, in order to provide its convoys and foragers additional security. ‘Chis practice might have reduced by several thousand the troops in garrison for part of the year. Some elements of garrisons, such as mili-

tia and certain battalions of Swiss, rarely appeared to have been attached to the field army and were more fixed. The Boulonnoise militia, for example, was raised by ordinance on 11 October 1672 and does not seem to have ventured often beyond its respective garrisons.'” French garrison commanders had a variable force to work with, but it included a few consistently available elements.

Vauban once counted the number of troops in the semi-permanent garrison force, but left us only with his recommendations that umply actual strengths. When he inspected the garrisons in the départe-

ment (the war zone) responsible to Louvois, he pointed out that if Louis XIV “had five or six fewer [fortresses] that I know well, he will be stronger by 12,000 to 14,000 men,” because these garrisons could return to field armies. In other words, the average size of the French garrisons of “five or six fortresses” was 2,383 men.” In the same letter, however, Vauban discussed how garrisons of 1,000 men might be adequate for the defense of more advanced fortresses like Oudenaarde and Charleroi (if well-supplied with munitions). Eleven departments of contributions based on key fortresses, including the centerpiece of Lille, and twenty-eight other strongholds, with an average garrison, of perhaps 1,700 men, supplemented by about 3,900

‘ Louvois to Luxembourg, 8 October 1674, AG, A' 401, fo. 103. The infantry component of the militia which on paper totaled 2,000 men was divided among garrisons as follows: 600 at Arras, 200 at Hesdin, 100 at Bapaume, 300 at Douai, 400 at Lille, and 200 at Ardres. The cavalry component of the miltia was divided as follows: 200 at Lille, 50 at Arras, 50 at Douai, 50 at ‘Tournai, and 50 at Oudenaarde. BG, Recueil Cange, Lettre du Roy a M. le Duc d’Aumont concernant Vemplor de la Milice Boulonnoise, 11 October 1672, vol. 22, no. 198. ”” Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, vol. 2, pp. 202-205. According to Rousset, the recommendation was delivered as the first installment of a two-part argument sent by

Vauban on 21 September and 4 October 1675.

96 CHAPTER THREE troops in detached governors’ companies scattered throughout the war zone, would have totaled close to 70,000 men in garrisons.”! ‘The large size of this force can be explained in part by the 1,000-man

minimum that Vauban thought was necessary for the defense of advanced fortresses and the fact that this garrison force was continuously committed to a struggle with its Spanish counterpart over

mastery of the surrounding countryside. The burden of partisan warfare fell on the men in the garrisons, a force roughly equal in numbers to the one employed in French field armies in the same theater of war.”

3. Detachments and Detached Companies

The risky and dirty work of partisan warfare fell to relatively small bodies of troops. The composition of the war parties composed of regulars was a matter of some complexity. Company officers invested *' ‘This figure is calculated by counting 39 fortresses in the war zone, and includes

50 men per company of governor’s dragoons, and 50 men per company commanded by the major of the fortress, which means there theoretically were at least 78 of these companies totaling 3,900 men. Excluded from this count are the companies recruited by lieutenant governors of the king and those of assistant majors, because it 1s not certain how many of these officials actually recruited a detached company of dragoons. If we average Vauban’s low estimate of 1,000 per garrison and his high estimate of 2,383 per garrison, the average garrison probably contained 1,700 men. From adding these estimates together then, 70,200 men, always fluctuating in number by several thousand, served in the semi-permanent garrison force in the theater of war. This is a tentative estimate, until more conclusive evidence is found. The old figures by Belhomme do not give garrison strengths dur-

ing the Dutch War, but they do provide a post-war (1679) figure of 43,180 of infantry alone in garrison for all of France out of total infantry strength of 112,942. See the appendix in Corvisier, Louvois, pp. 514-515. Victor Belhomme, Histowre de infanterie en France, 5 vols. (Paris, 1893-1902). Belhomme’s figures are for all of France, and not just the Netherlands. Belhomme further informs us that there were

5,520 men in the detached companies in 1672; 7,520 in 1673; 19,580 in 1674; 23,880 in 1675; 25,920 in 1676; and 24,850 in 1677. Not all, of course, served in the Netherlands’ theater of war. * A royal account or état released for official use on | January 1678 listed 279,610

troops under arms. 116,370 men served in garrisons throughout France and its dependencies in January 1678. About 70,000 of these served in the garrisons of the northern war zone, stretching from Dunkirk to Thionville. 163,240 men served in field armies—of which, around 70,000 served in either the Army of Flanders or the Army of the Meuse, leaving 93,240—a number which included the troops in service along the mountain border with Spain, or returning from Sicily, in Alsace and probably the provincial militia commanded by governors. The ééat is cited in Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, vol. 2, pp. 477-78.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 97

their own resources in their units and were thus understandably hes-

itant to lose men, horses, and equipment on petty military operations. Ideally, in order to spread risks and minimize the potential loss to any one officer, war parties should combine small contingents belonging to several different officers. Also, should a raid prove particularly lucrative, parceling out the troops would spread the gain to a larger number of officers. ‘his practice known as “making detachments” suited the actions of partisan warfare. In April 1674 Intendant

Dumouceau explained how a detachment for a fire-raid was made by taking “18 to 20 mounted men from each company of the garrisons of Maastricht and Maseick to make a very severe execution upon the Brabant at Sans Ouen which is the place that has always refused orders and which does not desire to contribute.””? As Louis de Gaya explained: A detachment is a certain number of officers and soldiers that the general requires to be furnished by regiments in order to be used, as he deems appropriate. Detachments are composed of different companies

in order to divide between them the fatigue and loss which might occur.*"

This practice spared officers, men, and, not to be forgotten, the horses. Once, before attempting two, simultaneous fire-raids, Estrades remarked to Louvois that it was necessary to wait two wecks to give the officers of the cavalry time to “put their young horses in a con-

dition to serve.” Presumably, he meant two weeks were needed to accustom the horses to the rider’s bit.*° At one point, only half of the horses in the companies of the garrison at Maastricht were fit for raids. ‘The cavalry officers complained to Estrades that they “can-

not keep their horses fit for war on ten pounds of hay and five pounds of straw and three containers of oats, a horse eats this much in four hours and the rest of the day and night they have nothing.”

** Dumouceau to Louvois, 15 April 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 58. “ Gaya, L’Art de la Guerre, pp. 141-44. Although Louis XIV exercised greater authority over the royal army than had been the case with previous French monarchs, the army remained proprietary and the use of detachments was the most equitable way to disperse loss. » Estrades to Louvois, 2 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 32. *° Estrades promised Louvois that these double fire-raids would be completed

before opposition forces had time to assemble to oppose the raids. Estrades to

Louvois, 2 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 34. .

98 CHAPTER THREE In November 1674, the regiments of Melin and Rouvray [Rouvré] together could mount only 200 horses capable of raids of ten leagues or more in distance. ‘The rest of the horses were so weak, that they were incapable of carrying riders, but as Estrades also pointed out, like the more fit horses, the weak ones also consumed forage.’’ Such problems, while seemingly trivial by modern standards, were essential to the conduct of war. While the principal of combined detachments solved one prob-

lem, that of spreading risk, it created another. Polyglot, ad hoc, detachments created the possibility for sensitive disputes of honor between men of the same rank from different regiments. In July 1674, disputes heated up between cavalry, infantry and dragoon officers detached together; the governor of Avesnes begged the court for an ordinance to regulate matters.” Finally, as in so many other matters regarding honor and position, Louis XIV intervened with a royal ruling in 1676 that established a hierarchy of command based on seniority of service and attempted to settle matters.” It probably did not prevent disputes, but it at least offered a guide for peacefully resolving them. Gaya tells us, as does the royal ordinance of 1676, that detachments considerably varied in size and required appropriately ranked officers to command them. A detachment of

2,000 to 3,000 men required at least the presence of a brigadier general and numerous other officers in the chain of command. Eight

hundred men required a colonel in charge who was supported by a sub-major, the appropriate number of officers, and 36 sergeants.

Three hundred to 400 men fell to the command of a lieutenant colonel; a captain commanded 50 men to 300; a heutenant could command 30; a sub-heutenant (ensigns and cornets) could take charge of 25.°° These procedures were formalized after 1676, but generally

reflected practice from at least the beginning of the Dutch War.

*’ He might have added that all of the cavaliers continued to receive full wages and rations from the king. The Schomberg Regiment of cavalry had only 130 cavalrymen left in six companies. Estrades sent it to the more distant and smaller outpost at Maaseick where it might make a difference. ‘he unit of measure for oats was a peck or sack-full called a pzcotin. Estrades to Louvois, | November 1674, AG, A! 402, fo. I. *® Broglie to Louvois, 9 July 1674, AG, A! 399, fo. 42. ” BG, Recueil Cangé, Réglement qui sera observé par les officiers et commandants de troupes

légeres de cavalarie dans les armées du rots, 10 April 1676, vol. 23, no. 116. ”” Gaya, L’Art de la Guerre, pp. 141-44.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 99

The military value of detachments depended on the ability of the men who composed and commanded them and this varied widely in an army as large as that of Louis XIV. The principle of making detachments had the advantage of allowing commanders to pick their troops, including the choice of subordinates who could have some technical expertise, knowledge of terrain features of the country, or general experience in leading detachments. Further, junior officers in garrisons sometimes “volunteered” to serve in detachments to gain experience and establish their reputations, giving an unusually high proportion of officers to men. Overall, a detached force maintained the cohesion of small groups, men who shared quarters and associ-

ated together, even off duty, and gained the advantage of varied talent. A detachment from a garrison often presented a strong combination of experience and cohesion to the foe. A few regular formations, like the sturdy infantry battalions of La Marine at Maastricht, participated successfully in partisan warfare. However, most fortress governors preferred their companies of dragoons and picked detachments of regulars. As Humiéres once pointed

out, among the regulars in the garrison at Lille there were “only weakly mounted troops and hardly in any condition to serve.””! Instead of relying upon a large corps of regulars in the Lille garrison to conduct partisan warfare, Humucres favored “two hundred picked cavalry from the garrison of Arras, the Fusiliers of Flanders Regiment and a squadron from the St. Sandoux Dragoon Regiment.”*”

St. Sandoux was the governor and grand bailiff of the town and citadel of Tournai by provisions of 2 January 1675, and his regiment raised on 8 December 1674 was undoubtedly filled with men who knew the local paths and hideaways. Intendant Chariiel at Thionville, in the rough country of the Ardennes, had even less enthusiasm for regulars engaging in partisan warfare than did Humieres: Simply men fit for routine duty, lacking both the ability and knowledge to venture into the surrounding countryside... the majority of the cavaliers and soldiers were inappropriate.”

Certainly, regulars in garrisons were adequate for the resolute defense

of the fortress. Successful French defenses of Grave (1674) and *' Humieres to Louvois, 29 August 1676, AG, A’ 502, fo. 185. * Thid. 8 Thid.

100 CHAPTER THREE Maastricht (1676) were quite epic, but their regular defenders not noted for the lively and risky actions of partisan warfare. Regular officers, according to Chariiel, worried over how to maintain their companies and fretted over their debts and the financial burden of command in the Sun King’s Army. They were afraid of desertion, loss of horses and damage to clothing and equipment. ‘They avoided

exposing their commands to action when they could. Le Peletier offered a similar observation in December 1673, explaining that while

Spanish garrisons detached small parties of troops to master the countryside: “I have not witnessed at any of our fortresses a single officer who requests to venture out on a party, or even indicates the slightest interest.’”*

The performance of regular officers when detached to smaller outposts declined even further, at least in official opinion. Le Peletier once suggested to Louvois, after a frustrating review of the poor performance of the garrison at the outpost of Menin on the Lys River, that he treat the officers and their soldiers there differently—motivate them with money instead of harsh words. Only then, might they perform their duties, believed Le Peletier. His solution, not an

uncommon one, involved providing the troops at the outpost of Menin with double pay, “so that they would risk their soldiers more freely” in accomplishing their duties.” Perhaps, with their expenses better met, the regular officers at Menin would act more boldly. On the same day he proposed this solution, Le Peletier found that sieur Desmolins at the castle of Communes, who commanded a detached company, “serves very usefully and with much zeal and activity.” However, Desmolins had received from the crown since only “25 écus [75 lwres| of funds to maintain his troops,” since he had entered

the outpost. Le Peletier thought he “surely deserves better, or an increase, or a just compensation.””*° Other forms of motivation were

less kind to the men involved. During the summer of 1675, the Spanish so resoundingly beat one French party that Le Peletier thought it would be a good idea to punish the French survivors, to make an example of them, “in order to encourage the others.” ‘The French party of 80 men from Lille had encountered a Spanish party *t Le Peletier to Louvois, 30 December 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 316. °° Le Peletier to Louvois, 28 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 156. °° Tbid. French officers received an appointement as their salary that also served to furnish necessities for troops under their command.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 101

of “near the same number” from Aire in the countryside near Bailleul. It was “completely defeated,” according to Le Peletier. ‘The soldiers,

it was said, had abandoned their officers in the fight. All of the officers (maybe three or four men) were either killed or taken prisoner. Only three French enlisted men were killed, seven wounded,

and “around 20 taken prisoner.” About 70 men, according to Le Peletier, returned to Lille, led by two sergeants. Since the soldiers returned to garrison and their duty, the excuse that they had “abandoned” their officers was possibly unfair. Yet, “to encourage the oth-

ers,” they were all arrested and placed under the custody of the comte D’Aigremont the lheutenant governor of Lille. Le Peletier informed Louvois that: “Monsieur the Marshal Humieéres will put them before a military tribunal in order to have them decimated or run the gauntlet.”*’ The reason for uninspiring performance of regulars in partisan warfare had not only to do with the hardships of partisan warfare, but also with pecuniary interests and the extensive culture of honor among officers. Officers were expected to maintain their regiments partly out of their own savings; this made command a financial drain, but the social ethos pressured officers to present themselves, and their troops, in a noble manner. Just as the first noble of the kinedom, Louis XIV, pursued a glory that sometimes overshadowed rational policy, the king’s regular officers also gave priority to glory than to the effective conduct of military operations. Military operations hazarded the money that they poured into their companies. Not surprisingly, intendants and governors were most likely to compare regulars with detached companies that engaged precisely for the kind of action that promised a portion of the plunder, further supplemented by a double wage from the king. Detached companies were far more motivated to take risks. Regular troops, receiving

regular wages, no matter how brave or skillful, had less reason to face the hazard of raids. Thus, for all these reasons, at the same time the bureaus of contributions were established, French fortress governors tended to the recruitment of detached companies for the conduct of partisan warfare.

*’ Le Peletier to Louvois, 25 July 1675, AG, A' 457, fo. 11. The expression, to decimate, was borrowed from the Roman practice of having soldiers draw lots; every tenth man was executed as a lesson to the others.

102 CHAPTER THREE 4. The Recruitment of Dragoons and Partisans

In partisan warfare detached companies of dragoons and _ fusiliers

made an impact far out of proportion to their actual numbers. A measure of their importance and utility was revealed by an instruction from Louvois to Marshal Créqui in July 1677: The King has learned that [Spanish] parties from Luxembourg ride with impunity between the Meuse River and the Moselle River and as that could only come about by your attaching the detached companies to the field army, which normally serve to protect and preserve the frontier region, His Majesty has commanded me to make known to you that He desires that you return them immediately, and that you not remove them for any reason.”

In order to injure the Spanish garrisons at their most vulnerable point, their recovery of war taxes from French territory, the French needed troops who were as knowledgeable of the country as Spanish war parties. They needed troops that could elude larger bodies of troops, strike fast and hard, and then retire to safety behind French fortress walls. ‘To counter hostile partisan operations, and to conduct their own raids, the French turned to the governor’s companies of dragoons that compared favorably to the use of regular troops in partisan warfare. A letter from Louvois to Marshal Humicres, on 31 December 1676, revealed, again, how the war minister appreciated the value of detached companies: ... As it will be necessary to maintain several companies of cavalry

in the different small posts of the castellany of Lille in order to cutoff the enemy parties which will attempt a penetration, I believe that the intention of his majesty will be to recruit toward this end two com-

panies from the countryside, and to give them to men capable of acquitting themselves well.”

In other correspondence, the men who served in these companies were sometimes called partisans and their companies called partisan companies. Partisan warfare also engaged individual experts and their followers recruited from the area of operations who were also called partisans, because of their value as guides and expertise as leaders

of detachments or war parties. These men were often attached to 8 Louvois to Créqui, | July 1677, AG, A! 533, fo. 2. *“ Louvois to Humiéres, 31 December 1676, AG, A! 485.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 103

the staff of the fortress governor and accorded the rank of a reformed

lieutenant or reformed captain, that is to say, an officer who held no permanent command. When needed, the governor would appoint them to command a particular detachment on a particular mission. Somewhat confusing, the word partisan was also used in an honorable manner to describe the special ability or bravery of one of the king’s regular soldiers in the conduct of parties, often part of a field army and usually an officer.”’ It was even considered important for

nobles of the highest birth to participate in partisan warfare as apprentices. Marshal Bellefonds encouraged a client, the future Marshal

Villars, to “learn the craft of the partisan” as it would serve him in the future when he would command larger detached bodies of troops around the main army of the enemy. This broad usage of the word partisan might be even more confusing to early modern specialists because it blurred expected social categories. The partisans who served in the detached companies were hardly noble, many were even former criminals, as will be seen, while the officers of Louis XIV’s regular regiments at the time of the Dutch War were almost entirely from the ranks of the French noble order and demanded greater respect. For the remainder of this study, it might be useful

to keep in mind that partisan could mean in the parlance of the day: 1) a regular French officer or soldier from one of the king’s regiments who excelled at small war; 2) one of a small group of specialists who a fortress governor or other French official employed

in actions of small war; or 3) the men that served in the independent companies of dragoons and fusiliers maintained by fortress governors.

To wage partisan warfare, governors like Humiéres and Estrades, and their subordinates, recruited and organized detached companies. Many of the dragoon companies were recruited almost immediately

after the outbreak of war with Spain in October 1673. On 13 November 1673, at Le Quesnoy, the comte de Broglie, raised a company of dragoons. At Ath, on 16 November 1673, another company of dragoons was raised, the dragoon company of Monsieur de Pertuis.”!

* Claude Villars, Mémozres du Marechal de Villars, édition de Vogiie, 2 vols. (Paris,

1887), vol. 1, pp. 13-14. *' The comte de Pertuis had been governor of the town and castellany of Courtrai since 1668. In 1669, he was made grand bailiff of the town and castellany. On 10 December 1673, he raised a regiment of dragoons that was disbanded on 27 October

104 CHAPTER THREE Also on 16 November 1673, the comte d’Estrades formed a company of dragoons at Maastrict.*? Du Rencher, governor of Le Quesnoy,

was given permission on 26 January 1673 to raise a company of dragoons (before war with Spain).*° His company proved to be of such utility, and the demands of the war so much greater, that on 8 December 1674, the king signed letters establishing the Rencher Dragoon Regiment—and occasionally the formations of governor’s companies did evolve into standing regiments, joining the regular establishment of the king’s troops.** Most of the companies of detached

dragoons enrolled between 40 and 60 men, but some were larger. The company of Pertuis Dragoons raised in November 1673 reached 100 men, after Pertuis requested a larger company.” By the end of 1673, every fortress governor in the French part of the Low Countries, if they did not already possess one, would have their own company of dragoons to conduct partisan warfare. The officers of the gover-

nor’s staff also raised detached companies, doubling or probably tripling the number of partisan companies to include over 3,000 men. One such company was the Boece Company; René de Briand de Boece was major of the fortress at Lille, and he was typical of other French fortress majors who raised detached companies.” These “detached companies,” franche, as this name partly implied, were raised as independent units from the overall force structure.” The soldiers who served in them may have been older on average

1676. Courtrai was returned to Spain by the treaty of Nijmegan in 1678, and Pertuis ended his service to the king as the governor of Menin, 12 April 1679. See under Pertuis in Pinard, Chronologie historique militaire, 8 vols. (Paris, 1760-78). ® For the establishment of this company see under Estrades in Pinard, Chronologie.

One of the partisans that troubled Maastricht was from the castle of Erkelenz, which Bellefonds captured. *8 See under Du Rancher in Pinard, Chronologie.

* Bellefonds wrote from Tournai on 7 January 1674 that there were only 30 out of 45 cavaliers in a company who could “march well, the stress of the campaign having worn the horses down to their gums.” Bellefonds to Louvois, 7 January 1674, AG, A! 383, fo. 94. *® Courcelles to Louvois, 13 January 1674, AG, A' 404, fo. 53. *© Calvo to Louvois, 9 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 22. Boece had been major of the fortress of Lille since 3 February 1671. *” "The expression compagnies franches was generally employed. It carried the same meaning as governors’ companies. By the War of Spanish Succession, such companies were still variously described as: “The detached companies of fusiliers, including those of the majors of fortresses, as well as those of partisans which are between the Meuse and the Moselle.” See, for example, Projet pour la garde de la frontere entre la Mer et (Alsace, BN, Acq. nouv. fr. no. 375.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 105

than the young country squires who served in the king’s cavalry reg-

iments or the adventurous men from Paris and other towns who joined the king’s infantry. Nancré mentioned as much to Louvois once: “Our companies of dragoons are well-mounted and armed, and filled entirely with veteran soldiers.”*® The king provided them with a double supply of forage, because the men owned two horses each:

Monsieur de la Brétesche captain in the Melin Regiment told me that he could raise a company of volunteers who will be mounted without any cost to the king. And that these men will go out continuously on the war path and that they request a double ration of forage because they will have two horses each, I can not tell you Monseigneur if the thing will succeed. It is a proposal that Brétesche has made to me.”

The Brétesche Dragoons, eventually raised and enlarged to a regimental command, took part in numerous actions of partisan war-

fare right through Louis XIV’s next wars, the War of Reunions (1683-84) and the Nine Years’ War (1688-97), where the then Brigadier General Brétesche and his dragoons were involved infamously in the devastation of the Palatinate (1689). With double rations of forage, a spare horse for each man, and hope for a share of the plunder, the king gave the governors’ companies additional means and motivation to succeed.

The company of Brétesche Dragoons and other companies of detached dragoons contained in 1673 the kind of men who were individually singled out as “partisans.” Frequent examples of the use of this term can be found when governors’ companies were discussed. On 8 March 1676, Brétesche recommended to Louvois that Montbrison, a maréchal de logis be offered the position of cornet in his company of dragoons.*” Estrades admired the young Montbrison, called him a “very brave man” and a “good partisan,” and assured Louvois that he was very capable.’' One year later, in March 1677, Estrades exclaimed to Louvois that at Maastricht they were “completely disconcerted” after an encounter with the enemy resulted in the wounding of a certain sieur de Boux who served as “a captain in rank but *® Nancré to Louvois, 15 November 1674, AG, A! 402, fo. 51. * Dumouceau to Louvois, 8 January 1675, AG, A! 456, fo. 10. *” "Today a non-commissioned officer in the French army, a maréchal de logis was in the seventeenth century a low ranking officer, often concerned with quartering. | Estrades to Louvois, 8 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 234.

106 CHAPTER THREE without a company” in the Brétesche Company. Estrades described him as “an honorable man and a good partisan.””* Both Montbrison

and Boux were partisans in the eyes of Estrades: both men were ageressive and knowledgeable. One of the more interesting of the detached companies was raised

at Oudenaarde in April 1675. The Du Pont Company, commanded by Captain Du Pont, was given the same “high wage and same high pay as the company of fusiliers” with the understanding that it receive special training for the guard and service of river craft, designed by Chamilly and built at Oudenaarde.”’ These paid professionals were to drill two or three days a week, at least one session involving prac-

tice in a mock river crossing—like later day commandos before a raid. Competent handlers of light oared boats could not be made over a few weeks, so attached to this company were “six or eight” civilian helmsmen who received twenty sous (approximately one lure)

a day when employed. Over the course of the war, the Du Pont men would cross the Escaut River and spearhead several raids on the Pays de Waes (between Ghent and Antwerp) to compel it to pay contributions.

Other partisan formations were raised as the war progressed. For example, Daniel de Violaine commanded three separate military formations of partisans during the course of the war. In 1672, he was a major in the Burgundy Regiment, which, despite its name, was a formation entirely recruited from “men of the country” that served

in garrison in the departments of Le Peletier. Later, on 18 April 1677, after having been promoted to leutenant governor of Oudenaarde, Violaine received a commission to raise there a detached com-

pany of infantry fusiliers and a detached company of dragoons.” Officers were selected on the basis of merit, and preference was sometimes shown to those who spoke another language useful for spreading the net of French contributions.” Finally, governors, licutenant governors and majors of fortresses in other theaters of war

* The rank given the sieur de Boux was capitain reformée. Estrades to Louvois, 24 March 1677, AG, A! 536, fo. 381. *> Louvois to Chamilly, 1 April 1675, AG, A! 449, fo. 3. ** Violaine was made leutenant du rot or lieutenant governor of Oudenaarde on 24 September 1675. *»’ For example, Melac chose as a major in his company a partisan named Rives, “who speaks good German and has served in all of the parties under La Brétesche.” Estrades to Louvois, 5 February 1675, AG, A’ 448, fo. 87.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 1Q7

raised detached companies; perhaps the most well-known was the company of Du Fay dragoons at the fortress of Philippsburg that ravaged the villages of the Palatinate in the summer of 1674. ‘Uheir actions helped cause the emotionally unbalanced elector of that principality, John George, to challenge Marshal Turenne to a duel.?” Some of the formations in Louis XIV’s army, such as the Fusiliers

de Flandres, Pertuis, and Vierzet, became entire regiments of dragoons or infantry. But this should not obscure their purpose—they were originally filled with “local” men who qualified as partisans. A consideration of the “reform” or demobilization of the Vierzet Regi-

ment in 1676 reveals that these large formations had almost all of the same attributes of the smaller partisan companies. At the beginning of 1675, the Vierzet regiment was not in the service of Louis XIV but instead in the service of the principality of Liége. Its Liégoise officer, the baron of Vierzet, however, betrayed the town of Liége and turned the neutral fortress over to the French in March 1675. He made off quite handsomely for his treason. After Louis XIV gave Vierzet the government of the Pontoise and a pension of 12,000 twres, his entire regiment followed him into the service of France, and dwindled in size, the entire regiment totaling no more

than 200 men. In 1675, Estrades mentioned to Louvois that with just two reorganized companies from this regiment, “being composed

of partisans,” would cause “more harm in the country to the enemies than two regiments.” One company Estrades proposed to leave

to the heutenant colonel of the regiment, the other he wished to sive command of to a certain Beaulieu. Further, he wanted to make the companies a corps délite by drawing into them men from all of the other regiments in his garrison—a practice of dubious merit that existed in Louis XIV’s army for the creation of other élite corps.”’ Eventually, it was settled to split the regiment into four companies of 50 men each, the standard size of a detached company. The majority of men in the companies of the “reformed” Vierzet originated from the Netherlands, or nearby territories in the Rhineland region of the Holy Roman Empire where Estrades frequently directed fire-raids. According to Estrades, they were a group of men: °° ‘In fact, the Palatinate was no more devastated by the French in 1674 than several places in the Netherlands where Imperial troops pitilessly plundered in 1674-75. See Visconti, Mémoires, p. 27.

»’ Estrades to Louvois, 15 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fos. 343-359.

108 CHAPTER THREE “very appropriate... to serve well and to go out on party for contribution payments, these are all fine partisans and good guides.” They were armed with flintlock muskets, like the detached compa-

nies. Command of the regiment and the first company, the company of honor, fell upon a lieutenant colonel described as “a man of service... a vigorous man and a good officer... from the frontier near Strasbourg.” ‘The second company was reserved for a Frenchman named “Haudeville” who was “a captain in the Regiment Royal.” ‘The third and fourth companies were commanded by Cumons,

a lieutenant in the Piedmont Regiment and “one of our best partisans,’ and Beaulieu, “a very brave man,” who was originally from the Duchy of Jiilich. Estrades filled the companies with leutenants reformées——a rank typical of partisans.” And he hoped “to derive tremendous service from these four companies.” Estrades pointed out

a hidden strength of this regiment of 200 partisans to Louvois: The majority of the soldiers are from this country, and their relatives draw them away and hide them when they are out in parties, which they do not do for the others.”

Thus, the partisans of the Vierzet Regiment could suddenly disappear into familial homes, vanishing into quiet villages, as if there

were no Vierzet Regiment, and, just as suddenly, recompose themselves at Maastricht or at some other designated place near their childhood haunts to strike again.°' The organization of the Regiment

of the Fusiliers of Flanders (recruited locally from Flanders), and other “partisan” regiments may have been similar to that of the Vierzet.

Not all partisans served in a particular regiment or company. Some partisans seemed to have served, apart from any specific formation, and instead as members of a small, select group of “officers

without command” which were attached directly to the staff of a fortress governor. Labels used to describe this variety of partisans included gens de contribution (men of contributions) and coureurs de partis

8 Thid. ”’ In the French army, reformée ranks were accorded to officers no longer required

in their original units. ‘They received reduced pay. °° Estrades to Louvois, 15 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fos. 343-359. °' Louvois to Calvo, 19 July 1677, AG, A' 533. Louvois instructed Calvo to make this levy “as soon as he found the soldiers.”

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 109

(literally, party runners). Such independent partisans usually kept a few of their own men, whom they paid out of pocket with a share of the plunder. Louvois once told D’Ortiz (or D’Orties, a French variant of that Spanish name) that “since there were some men from Bapaume who are good to send “on party,” he could make use of them, but “the king does not wish to maintain them, and it will be necessary for them to take their subsistence from the plunder that they take.”°? When Grave was besieged in 1674, the comte d’Estrades

devised a method for relaying messages that relied on the use of his “gens de la contribution.” Disguised as peasants, his partisans made daring crossings of the Dutch lines to take money and bring news of the siege back to Maastricht—and sneaked out valuable Dutch hostages from the besieged fortress.°? The Mercure Hollandois referred

in February 1676 to a French soldier from Hesdin as the sieur de Mongobert, “one of the most famous runners of parties in all the Army of France.”°* The marquis de Chamilly, who commanded the garrison at Oudenaarde, referred to one of his subordinates as “Malis a partisan from Oudenaarde,” who did not serve in any specific formation.” In December 1675, Estrades sent “some partisans” along with 200 dragoons to La Levreti¢re who commanded the stronghold

at Stavelot. Set apart from the dragoons, in Estrades’ use of language, they vowed to Estrades that they would cross the Rhine River and submit the Hare Country to contributions.®° At Maastricht in 1678, Calvo told Louvois: “I sent out eight days

ago three partisans named Picart, Montfort and La Croix with 35 men each who rendezvoused at Malmedy.”®’ The partisans and the men they commanded do not appear to have been attached to any particular formation, although almost always in official correspondence, the unit to which a soldier belonged or commanded, or his rank, was mentioned alongside his name, even when he served in a detachment or party. Similar to these three detachments of 35 men were the 36 men Ensign Jacob from the garrison at Maastricht was selected to command in March 1676. His object was to lead a raid

*2 Louvois to D’Ortiz, 20 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 103. °° Estrades to Louvois, 27 September 1674, AG, A! 401, fo. 58. “Mercure Hollandois, February 1676. * Chamilly to Louvois, 20 June 1677, AG, A' 539, fo. 86. °° Estrades to Louvois, 29 December 1675, AG, A! 453, fo. 163. 7 Calvo to Louvois, 10 February 1678, AG, A! 585, fo. 78.

110 CHAPTER THREE to disrupt a horse fair in the Dutch cavalry’s forage quarters and steal as many horses as he could. Jacob’s men were “all partisans,” according to Marshal Estrades. Such “party runners,’ “men of contributions” and partisans created quite an impression on the noble-born officers of Louis XIV’s army. As the last chapter showed, the intendants Le Peletier (at Lille) and Dumouceau (at Maastricht) employed significant sums taken from the accounts of contributions as “gratifications” to handsomely reward such partisan leaders and their followers. As André Corvisier recognized: Beginning in 1673, the king kept in the fortresses of the frontier small groups of partisans that recetved a wage and regular rations of forage, some gratifications for important intelligence that they discovered

and a cut of the take when they made some prizes. These partisans belonged to the fortress governors.”

The reformed officers and their bands of partisan specialists fought

for a share of the plunder, in addition to any personal bounties received from the crown. The sort of man who joined one of the governors’ companies of dragoons, and certain regiments of dragoons or fusiliers, probably possessed the air of a brigand. It was clear from the beginning that the main motivation behind joining a company of dragoons or serving as a partisan was the prospect of plunder. Sometimes over half of the men in the dragoon companies were deserters from the Spanish

side. Even Louis XIV knew that former highwaymen and other criminals might be of service in partisan warfare; in 1676, he called

on criminals and deserters to enlist in the Quincy Regiment that consisted of partisans: With regard to those of his subjects charged with a crime, who for fear of chastisement or punishment, have fled his [Low] Countries and other places of his frontier, in order to join the troops of the enemies; His Majesty orders them and moreover very expressly enjoins them to immediately return and in the same time of one month of the day of publication of the present, and to take part in the cavalry regiment of the sieur Baron of Quincy, that he raises and presently establishes

8 Corvisier, Louvois, p. 202.

*’ According to Jean Mossay, the detached companies attracted “adventurers, unemployed men, highwaymen, deserters, who had precisely chosen this profession in order to devote themselves to brigandage.” See Mossay, Jntendants, pp. 331-32.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE Il] afoot, in which they will be received, and therein will be able to remain in all safety; His Majesty assuring them that by serving there as they must, and distinguishing themselves from others in all occasions, He will accord them grace and absolution of their crimes.’”°

The Baron of Quincy himself, who would lead this regiment of crim-

inals (and deserters) in numerous actions of partisan warfare from 1676 to the end of the war, was a deserter from the Spanish garrison of Valenciennes. According the Mercure Hollandois, Baron Quincy,

who had served the king of Spain as a colonel of a regiment of cav-

alry had “finally allowed himself to be corrupted by the pretty promises of the French.” He deserted his post at Valenciennes and took with him his entire regiment, excepting six “cavalrymen” and “ten or twelve officers.” Quincy was soon made a brigadier of cavalry. His son-in-law, however, did not follow his example of treason and remained faithful to the cause of Carlos II, and he traveled to Brussels to “advance his fortune” there.’ The hope for wealth through plunder unquestionably drew men to partisan warfare; however, Louis would not allow them to profit simply as they would have liked. ‘The monarchy attempted to regulate the process of turning plunder into cash and the apportioning of the take. A war-time market of auctions dispensed with all of the “legitimate” plunder taken by French parties. The day of auctions was advertised well in advance and generally took place in the main square of the fortress town. The “major of the fortress” composed an inventory of the goods. Ihe town notary was there to maintain

a separate record. Those who made final bids had one hour to deliver the cash or the sergeant major of the garrison arrested them.” We can imagine these auctions as raucous affairs with bidders shouting above curious onlookers eyeballing the displayed loot—the post-

script to much of the activity of partisan warfare was thus written in the bills of sale at these markets. In 1676, Louis XIV put his signature to a réglement for the division of these spoils of war.’”” Plunder

” BG, Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Roy, pour obliger tous Cavaliers, Dragons G Soldats

sujets de Sa Mayesté... de revenir a son service, 15 February 1676, vol. 23, no. 105. "' Mercure Hollandois, February 1676, p. 51. ” De Ville, De La Charge, pp. 494-97. BG, Recueil Cangé, Réglement des Villes frontiéres de France et Pays conquts, qui sont Jermées de Murailles et Ponts-levis, 20 July 1676, no. 124. Even the swords of French officers killed were considered: they belonged to the major of the garrison.

112 CHAPTER THREE taken by war parties from garrisons was shared as follows: two-thirds

of the bill of sale went to the major of the fortress garrison; the remaining one-third went to the adjutant major. These officers, the most frequent leaders of war parties, shared a portion of the proceeds with the men who served in the parties, paying them their share of the plunder. If either of these officers was absent on the day of auction, then the proceeds went to the captain-of-the-gates, next in the chain of command of the éat-major of a fortress. Individuals attracted to the life of a partisan, took advantage of the opportunities of war and switched sides when personally convenient. More than 60 percent of the troops in the Pertuis Dragoons at Courtrai were deserters from Spanish garrisons.” On 16 September 1674, Estrades informed Louvois that one named the sieur de Bastires was “assembling a quantity of Frenchmen and gens de pays (or locals)

who had deserted and testified strongly of their desire to return to the service of the king.”” Also in 1674, the Baron de la Marzelle

deserted to the French. He was a man, according to Intendant Dumouceau at Maastricht, who could attract “numerous men of quality from the country into the king’s service.”’® Soon after Marzelle’s

desertion, he received a cavalry regiment to command to attract as many “men of quality” as possible. Sometimes these arrangements, switching sides in the middle of war, were even initiated with formality. In August 1675, a cavalryman in the Spanish Regiment of Royal Cravates composed a letter addressed to the commander of the French Boulogne garrison, requesting, “to return to the service of the king.” The French commander thought the cavalier who had a “good military bearing’ might make a good maréchal de logis—an unnecessary officer for a garrison, and thus probably in this context

a euphemism for a partisan. Unfortunately for the French, there were a good number of local French subjects who enlisted in Spanish

service in 1673-74. At Ath, Du Chaunoy, after questioning some prisoners, determined that the men captured were all from his own department—from the castellany of Ath. As these men who had

™ Courcelles to Louvois, 13 January 1674, AG A! 404, fo. 53. ” Estrades to Louvois, 16 September 1674, AG, A! 392, fo. 113. Pinard spelled his name as La Bastie. If, it was the same man, according to Pinard, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier in October 1680. See under La Bastie in Pinard, Chronologie.

‘© Dumouceau to Louvois, 15 July 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 200.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 113

jommed the Spanish “knew the roads better than others,’ and “having no right to make war like the true subjects of the king of Spain,”

Du Chaunoy requested that Louvois inform him on how to deal with these prisoners.’’ The fate of the men was probably a trip to La Juste, the gallows, as 1t was when the Spanish captured Spanish subjects in the service of the French.

Naturally, some French governors showed concern about the employment of deserters as partisans in their dragoon companies, but it did not stop them from recruiting such men. Deserters might remain in contact with their former employers. The Spanish Intendant Claris was thought to have disguised men as deserters and then sent

them to seek employment in the companies of French governors. Such men may have assisted in the planning of a mysterious fire that engulfed and consumed the entire fortress magazine of Ath in January 1676—a severe blow to the French preparations for the campaign that began in March that year. Several practices within the governors’ companies remained at odds with the regulations for Louis XIV’s army. Men in the governors’ companies seem to have disregarded the prohibition against keeping wives and serving in a garrison in their native towns. When Intendant Benoist inspected man-for-man the governors’ companies

in his department, he found that most were married. Recognizing that this was in contradiction to regulations, Benoist tried to make them seem otherwise in compliance with the king’s wishes: They are not from towns where they serve and have never lived there [he tried to put a positive light on the situation], some have brought their wives and the others have left them in the villages where they are; thus I believed I could leave the soldiers in the companies otherwise I will ruin them.”

Problems of marriages and local origin were apparently wide spread; earlier in March 1674, Louvois informed the always conscientious Bellefonds that: The king has not prohibited the recruitment of local men into the companies of fusiliers that his majesty has given to the majors of

” Du Chaunoy to Louvois, 8 March 1674, AG, A' 404, fo. 211. ”® Benoist to Louvois, 6 December 1675, AG, A! 457, fo. 123. The Boese Company, for example, already mentioned above, did not serve at Lille where it was formed, but at Maastricht.

114 CHAPTER THREE fortresses but only he has prohibited the recruitment of local men who reside and keep a wife in the fortress or where the company is stationed.”

Other standards of military conduct were occasionally ignored to the favor of partisans (and fortress governors who employed them). Le Vacher once discovered that in the garrison of the fortress of Charleroi: “There were four dragoons occupying the barracks of Chasenn with their private possessions and with their families.” The four dragoons belonged to a newly raised detached company. And, not only were children playing and bawling about in the barracks, but their fathers

had opened up a tavern. Despite this disregard of the prohibition against wives, and probably in contradiction of barrack’s regulations, the comte de Montal did not want to upset the men by forcing them

to close their business and remove their families. As Intendant Le Vacher pointed out to Louvois: “If we dislodge the dragoons, they will quit the company, and they are his best guides.”®? Military expediency wisely took precedence here over other concerns, economic or symbolic. For all their trouble, the governors’ companies earned

their place in the Sun King’s Army.

5. Associates of the Garrison Force

Further removed from the regular organization of Louis XIV’s garrison force were those civilian men who assisted as spies and collaborators in making fire-raids for contributions and setting ambushes. These men were not the same as “secret correspondents” who provided strategic intelligence, or of the same social standing. Although they did not form part of the garrison, the fortress governors employed these men in the conduct of partisan warfare. In December 1676, Louvois instructed Du Chaunoy to send “men from all directions in

order to secretly be informed by them of places where they |the Alhes] will make depots of forage or of grain.”*' Louvois wanted spies deployed, “men” not soldiers were specified, probably local inhabitants motivated by money. It was hoped by Louvois that these

” Louvois to Bellefonds, March 1674, AG, A! 379, fo. 206. *° Le Vacher to Louvois, 3 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 8. *' Louvois to Du Chaunoy, 22 December 1676, AG, A! 485, fo. 214.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 115

men could then advise Lieutenant General Nancré where to lay an

ambush for an Allied convoy. For the benefit of the garrison at Maastricht, civilian spies gathered information concerning the location and names of villages in the Rhineland that were not on French

maps, so that they could be assessed contributions. Estrades once explained in January 1676 to Louvois of the essential role played by one of the men he employed, named Benissance, in the ambush of

a Spanish party led by Captain Léon, or The Lion, “who is their ereat partisan.” As soon as Léon had crossed the Fagnes River, Benissance, described by Estrades as a former lieutenant colonel in the king’s army and a resident of Spa, set out immediately to warn the French. Benissance then took an officer from Maastricht named Montfort with 100 cavalry to a place where Léon was expected to pass through. Sure enough, Léon was intercepted where Benissance had indicated, on a path in the county of Stavelot. In the accurate volley of the French ambushers, the Spanish party lost 19 men killed or wounded and 45 taken prisoner (this out of a total of 50 cavalry and 30 dragoons, or 80 percent losses). Only “the Lion” and a few of his comrades escaped. (He would be captured in August 1676.) Estrades pointed out to Louvois: “I have always received the best

recommendations for the service of the king from the sieur de Benissance.””

Characters like Benissance, civilians who assisted the governors and partisans in intelligence matters and clandestine operations were not always to be trusted as another report by Marshal Estrades at Maastricht revealed. On 13 January 1676, Estrades informed Louvois of a scheme to secretly install Frenchmen in Cologne, to kidnap the heavily guarded Marquis of Grave (whose marquisate owed contributions to Maastricht). “The one called Dubois” arrived at Maastricht to explain the plan personally to Estrades. He proposed that Estrades send sixteen “well-mounted” men, that they have money to live for one month and that they enter the town of Cologne, three at a time, and from different gates disguised as deserters. Dubois promised to give them “billets” (promissory notes used in exchange for wood, candle and bed) to lodge in different houses—a common practice. Dubois did not know precisely when the marquis of Grave would pass through Cologne, but he explained it was a matter of urgency

* Estrades to Louvois, 5 January 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 17.

116 CHAPTER THREE that he have some men near him “to get the job done.” This proposition, admitted Estrades, seemed to Calvo and himself “quite difficult to carry through and equally fantastic and uncertain.” Estrades was particularly concerned about the French soldiers who might remain for some time masquerading as deserters in a well-policed German town like Cologne. He feared that soon the magistrates would discover their plot. Estrades added that he had heard that Dubois is a “big rogue” and that there was proof that he had bribed away eight dragoons from the garrison at Maastricht in the past.’ What became of Dubois may never be known, and Estrades never followed through with the plan. Men like Dubois were schemers who planned to profit by the war. ‘They probably placed themselves at the disposal of any fortress governor on the frontier willing to pay for their services— French or Spanish.

6. Weapons and Basi Tactus

The governors’ companies and the party runners, partisans, stood out from the rest of Louis XIV’s army. Not only were they different from regulars because of their double wages and conditions of service, but also they bore weapons and employed tactics more suited for partisan warfare. No regulations existed for the arming of the governors’ compa-

nies of dragoons; it was up to the whim of individual governors. However, the preponderance of evidence suggests that these troops probably resembled the other dragoons in Louis XIV’s army. The king’s regular dragoons were particularly well-armed: carrying a double-

edged cavalryman’s sword, a flintlock, a pistol and a hatchet (about the size of a sailor’s boarding hatchet). The flintlock seems to have been the primary weapon of partisan

warfare in the 1670s, predating its universal adoption by French infantry by about three decades. ‘The caliber and length of the weapon

was supposed to accord with an ordinance of 6 February 1670 that required that all flintlocks be “three feet and eight inches from the

touch hole of the lock to the mouth of the barrel and the caliber shall be such to bear a ball one twentieth of a French pound weight.”®* ®° Estrades to Louvois, 12 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 105. * BG Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Roy Portant le nombre des Haute payes que sa

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 117

In effect, the ball was 15 mm: the standard caliber used by the French until the late nineteenth century. ‘The ordinance further instructed that commissioners would oversee target practices with the weapon, one in March and one in October, in which each soldier would fire one round from his weapon. Flintlocks were popular with governors’ companies, and regular troops detached for partisan warfare, because of their lighter weight, no glowing match, and their greater accuracy. Chambellé at Bethune once emphasized the importance of the fusil (or flintlock) for partisan warfare: It will be neccesary to order each captain of this garrison to have four

flintlocks in their company. We cannot make war parties without flintlocks.”

On 10 March 1674, Marshal Bellefonds explained to Louvois the necessity of keeping flintlocks in every fortress’s magazine “since we

are unable to conduct sorties with [matchlock] muskets, and those [flintlocks] that are in every company and which should be there, are not shared between soldiers, and are only employed when those

who have them are commanded [into detachments].”°° Once a soldier received a flintlock, he was reluctant to give it up. French infantry constantly violated the ordinance of 1670 restricting the number of flintlocks allowed in each company, which had been established at four. Louis XIV ordered in 1675 that those flintlocks beyond

the four needed for detachments in every company be sold and the money reemployed to purchase matchlock muskets.°’

The principal drawback to the weapon was mentioned in an English military treatise in 1680: “apter to misgive than Muskets [matchlock] through the defect of the Flints and Springs.” ‘This tendency to “misgive” or misfire prevented official adoption of flintlocks by the regular infantry battalions of the French army until the begin-

ning of the War of Spanish Succession. Until then, most French infantry carried more dependable and heavier matchlock muskets.

Mayesté veut d’oresnavant estre entretenués en Chacque Compangnie... la maniere dont les Soldats

dicelles devront estre armez et habillez..., 6 February 1670, vol. 22, no. 92.

® Chambellé to Louvois, 18 December 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 262.

' 3 :cletonds to Louvois, 10 March 1674, cited in Griffet, Recuezl de Lettres, VOl. om BG Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Rot réiterer les défenses faites aux Capitaines @Infanterre davoi dans leurs Compagnies (a Vexception de celles de fusthers et de Grenadiers)

plus de quatre soldats armés de fusils, 25 February 1675, vol. 23, no. 52.

116 CHAPTER THREE | ‘Their smoldering match was a dead give away in a night attack and practically useless in wet weather. Many partisan actions involved crossing rivers and other water obstacles, further rendering a matchlock musket a weapon of dubious value in partisan warfare. Fortunately, not all French infantry were furnished with matchlocks. Historians often point out the four flintlocks issued per company as an example of the internal army debate between matchlock and pike enthusiasts versus flintlock enthusiasts.*® More to the point, the four flintlocks

required by royal ordinance were probably intended to provide at least some of the infantry (from each company) the capability to form detachments—partisan operations of war demanded a suitable weapon of their own. The French actually settled on a practical balance between battlefield steadfastness and firepower, and the demands

of the war of detachments. Since the misfire rate of flintlocks was high and muzzle-loading weapons took long to reload, dragoons who carried flintlocks could be expected to be equipped with deadly, plug bayonets.®” Essentially a long “double-edged” blade one foot long fitted to a dowel shaped wood handle, the bayonet was tightly “plugged” in the barrel of the flintlock by grasping the arms of its guards.’” The obvious drawback of this weapon system was that the soldier could not simultaneously protect himself with the bayonet and fire his weapon. ‘The plug bay-

onet was not nearly as revolutionary as the socket bayonet that Vauban introduced about twenty years later, because the socket variety allowed the soldier to load and fire with the bayonet in place.”! 8 BG, Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance du Roi pour obliger les capitaines ou Commandans des compagnies soit de Gendames, chevau-legers ou Dragons et d’Infanterie davowr leurs Cavaliers,

Dragons ou Soldats, montés es armés comme i convient, 16 May 1676, vol. 23, no. 120.

Louis XIV ordered from the camp at Heurtebise that two thirds of the infantry

should be armed with matchlock muskets and bandoleers and that one third should be armed with pikes. ‘The repetition of certain specifications in the ordinance in the middle of the war suggests that troops rearmed themselves, tending to discard pikes in favor of flintlocks and to discard their long swords (mentioned in the ordinance) for shorter varieties. ® Tbid.

”° Lynn, Giant, p. 464. "! "The bayonet, which was not standard issue in any of the armies in Flanders between 1654 and 1678, was also highly favored by partisans: “The Bayonet is very useful to Dragoons, Fusiliers, and Souldiers, that are commanded out on Parties;

because that when they have fired their Discharges, and want Powder and shot, they put Hast of it into the mouth of the Barrel of their Pieces, and defend themselves therewith as well as with a Partizan.” See Anon. English Military Discipline or the Way and Method of Exercising Horse G Foot (London: Robert Harford, 1680).

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 119

Numerous skirmishes in partisan warfare, as this study will proceed to demonstrate, involved one volley followed by a bayonet assault. Since sorties or raids required speed and stealth to be successful, some dragoons on raids may have left behind their swords, especially when detached on foot. Eighteenth-century writers on partisan warfare suggested that it was an unnecessary encumbrance, “fit only for the parade ground.””’ In clashes between mounted forces, individual combats with swords, occurred, although not nearly as frequent, or causing as much death and injury, as well-aimed exchanges

of mounted musketry and pistol shot. Still, mounted actions were often decisive in skirmishes as well as in battles and the importance of the classic edged weapon, called a saber, but not yet curved,

should not be minimized at the time of the Dutch War. When mounted troops fought one another, and they did so with frequency,

the sword became the primary weapon after the first discharge— often a discharge at arm length. Other edged weapons appeared in partisan warfare. The smaller dragoon hatchet was considered a use-

ful weapon for decades after the Dutch War. Eighteenth century treatise writers continued to see merit in the war hatchet, as well as long-bladed hunting knives, which were easily carried and just as deadly.

French soldiers on party had to face “shot-guns,” or blunderbuses,

and a host of other weapons not normally used by regular troops on either side during the war. In one engagement, for example, the chevalier de Lau, a leutenant in the Warnin Cavalry Regiment, was wounded by a “mousqueton” (flintlock shotgun) blast that struck him across his body. Such weapons might have found their way into the

hands of French dragoons of the governor’s companies from local

sources or after the dead were stripped on battlefields.” Rifled, fliintlock “carbines” equipped some of the élite companies of the reg-

ular cavalry formations (the equivalent of grenadier companies in the infantry) and some, depending on the preference of the governor or other commanding officer of the fortress, were available to

”’ Grandmaison thought “the flintlock and the bayonet are the only necessary arms for infantry, the sword only being fit for the parade ground.” M. de Grandmaison, La Petite guerre, ou traite du service des troupes legeres en campagne (1756), p. 19.

°° On 2 January 1676, marquis de Pradel told Louvois of the loss of chevalier de Lau, a lieutenant, who died of wounds across his chest from a mousqueton or blunderbuss blast. Pradel to Louvois, 2 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 21.

120 CHAPTER THREE detached companies as well. Dragoons could aim and accurately fire these short barreled, rifled versions of the flintlock from the seat of the saddle when at rest, possibly breaking the shock of an opposing cavalry charge.”* More often, they would use them on foot. When engaged in combat on foot, troops from the detached companies sometimes used hand grenades and specially charged “fire” bullets; these were used to smash through barriers as well as to kill the opponent. Boulets a feu or fire bullets were used by Ensign Jacob in his raid in April 1676 and so too were grenades. ‘he ingredients for these combustible munitions were hardly a French military secret. According to a home-spun recipe by the anonymous author of The English Military Discipline:

When one has a mind to charge Bombes, hollow Bullets, Fire-pots, and all sorts of Fire-balls; let him take one part of Salt-peter, the eightpart of Gamphire, and as much fine Powder, mingled therewith with

the hand, and put all into a hollow Bullet with quick match.”

Dragoons tossed grenades one after another at men guarding barriers, and at troops on the parapets of redoubts, and even into houses and other places where the enemy might be surprised at close quarters. Estrades noted in his report of the village defense made by Ensign Jacob and his 36 partisans that “grenades served them well.’””°

One attack with grenades occurred as the result of a ruse by a Swiss ofcer and provides evidence of how devastating the fragmentation grenade was (and remains) as a weapon. According to the Gazette, a French party from Maastricht, led by a Swiss officer, encountered

and defeated an enemy party furnished with passports from the Spanish intendant at Namur. The Swiss officer then took the passport of a dead officer from the Spanish side. “Not long after,” the party of twenty-eight men from Maastricht encountered sixty Dutch cavalry. One of the Dutch officers solicited and examined the passport possessed by the Swiss officer. Finding that it was signed by

“t The carbine version of the flintlock equipped the companies of the mounted Royal Guards. In 1679, Louis XIV signed an ordinance authorizing the establishment of two carbine-equipped troopers in each company of line cavalry (cavalerielegere). ‘These men were chosen among those “most skillful at shooting.” BG (Vincennes) Receuil Gangé, Ordonnace du Roi, portant quil y aura dorénavans deux Carabiners dans Chaque Compagnie de Cavalene, 26 December 1678, vol. 24, no. 76. » Anon, English Military Discipline.

°° Estrades to Louvois, 19 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 412.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 121

the intendant at Namur, he invited the Swiss officer and his party to a nearby inn for refreshments, believing they were allies from Namur. Completely oblivious that they were about to socialize with

the enemy, some of the Dutch gently tended to the horses in the village cemetery, while dozens of other Dutch cavaliers entered the

tavern and began drinking and eating, awaiting their comrades. Observing all of this, the Swiss officer and his men secretly prepared some grenades, then smashed windows and tossed them in the tav-

ern. In the meantime, the few Dutch in the cemetery, tending the horses, were surprised, surrounded and fired upon. In all, the French

captured thirty-eight horses, and also took a Dutch heutenant and nineteen of his cavalrymen. ‘The Dutch captain, a cornet, a quartermaster and dozens of cavalry troopers were blown to pieces and left for dead in this unnamed place of mayhem.”’ Few sources speak to us from the perspective of the individual sol-

dier during the Dutch War, but later evidence (1709) enlivened by the colorful story-telling of the Inshman Peter Drake from the battle of Malplaquet (1709) suggests at least the chaos and ferociousness of mounted combat in the age of Louis XIV and some interesting

details concerning how one managed to ride and shoot at the same time:

I could see nothing round me but the enemy, and having lost much blood, I resolved to surrender myself prisoner. In order to do this, I took my carrabine, cocked it, having my sword hanging at my wrist, and took my reins of my bridle in my mouth, and thus marched up

to a fresh squadron [of cavalry]... I rode up to the commanding officer, and begged quarters. He had a pistol cocked in his hand; told me in the German language, which I understood, calling me a “French

houndsfoot”; that he would give me quarters with a brace of balls, lodging the muzzle of his pistol on my right shoulder, and firing at the same time; I was resolved not to be behind hand with him, and to sell my life as dear as I could. As soon as [ heard the word, I fired my carrabine; so that his shot and mine went off instantaneously. I shot the upper part of his head, and he tumbled forward: I saw his brains come down; his ball only grazed my shoulder...”

” Gazette, 2 August 1675, from Maastricht.

8 The incident described occurred at the battle of Malplaquet shortly after a mortar bombardment that drove back the French. Peter Drake, Amuiable Renegade: The Memorrs of Captain Peter Drake, 1671-17535 (Stanford, 1960), pp. 166-67.

122 CHAPTER THREE Mention was made earlier, in chapter one, of the Spanish dragoon who killed eight French troopers in a single action in 1676. Such prodigious efforts were made possible by physical ability, steady nerves

and by employing several single-shot firearms in rapid succession, causing multiple injuries or death to the intended targets, (the carbine, followed by one or two pistols fired at arms length, or by actually touching the opponent), and highly skilled riding and, if this was not enough, sword combat ability as well. In the above passage, Peter Drake employed a leather strap to keep his sword dangling from his wrist when his hands were occupied, as was the practice. Veterans in the saddle could easily switch from pistol to sword, the one killing at a range of a few feet as well as the other. Achieving surprise and march security were crucial in partisan warfare, and any discussion of weapons should include mention of how parties concealed their cross-country movements. ‘Treatises in the eighteenth century on partisan warfare suggested that partisans may have worn inconspicuous clothing to blend into the countryside better. Although uniforms were not yet the rule, colonels and captains often outfitted their men in the same cuts of cloth. Instead of the more common light gray doublets trimmed in red and blue and worn by the regular formations, dragoons and partisans apparently opted for coats of field blue, forest green, yellow ochre and drab chestnut. Local tailors in the garrison town would have finished the suit of clothes with cuffs, buttons and adornments following the governor’s livery or personal taste. (Later, in the eighteenth century, forest green would become the universal uniform color of dragoons and special units of riflemen or light troops such as Rogers’ Rangers of American Revolution fame).”’ Partisan formations on raids tried to avoid detection as best as possible—barking dogs in villages could be their worst enemies, according to an eighteenth century writer.'”” On more the one occasion, the unexpected ringing of church bells in the hostile distance signified to partisans that they should stop dead in their tracks and implement their withdrawal plan. ‘The troops

that Ensign Jacob commanded in the raid of April 1676 traveled with the company of “three good guides” to ensure that they reached ”’ Grandmaison preferred blue. “Blue, as the least visible, is the most appropriate color for these troops.” Grandmaison, Petite Guerre, p. 17. Wo Jeney, Le partisan, ou Vart de faire la petite guerre avec success selon le géme de nos

jours... (The Hague, 1759), p. 42.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 123

their destination rapidly and without mishap. As soon as the sun had set, Governor Estrades (according to his account) gave Jacob what might have been standing orders for a detachment sent on a raid: “march only at night and rest and conceal your party in woods or clumps of reeds in the middle of marshes during the day so as not to be discovered by the garrisons of enemy strongholds.”’'’' Retreat

routes were important, and detachments often left smaller groups behind to secure river fords or keep an eye out over villages that might be used for a hasty defense in the event the raiders were discovered. Even larger raids involving hundreds of troops required stealth. On 13 April 1677, the lieutenant governor of Maastricht, the comte de Calvo, informed Louvois that he sent that day “Monsieur

de Melac with 400 cavalry to execute in the country of Antwerp.” Calvo was forced to consider the size of the Spanish and Dutch garrisons in quarters around Antwerp and the risk they posed to the detachment of 400 under Melac. ‘They could trap the raiders by superior numbers—although Calvo boasted to Louvois that Monsieur de Melac “is certainly knowledgeable enough to avoid them in case they were stronger than him.”'®

Once combat was engaged, partisan formations on foot fought using the same volley fire tactics used by troops in large battles. In fact, large battles can be thought of as a series of small engagements in which men fought in relative isolation from one another, facing their own opponent in their own part of the battlefield. Volley fire

and steadiness under fire were as important in combats between smaller detachments as in larger battles. When fighting on foot, armed with single shot weapons that killed at a distance and which required precious seconds to reload and fire again, any fortified position, or position offering cover, was of benefit to smaller bodies of

troops. This emphasis on cover included troops engaged in large battles where entire woods and villages were occupied and reinforced

in battles fought by the Sun King’s armies. Similarly, many partisan actions between dismounted detachments took place around cemeteries, churchyards, villages and walled farms which one side had occupied for their defensive value.'*’ Ensign Jacob’s raid, for

Ol Estrades to Louvois, 19 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 412. ‘2 Calvo to Louvois, 13 April 1677, AG, A' 537, fo. 77. ‘S Van Houtte, Les occupations, vol. 1, p. 18.

124 CHAPTER THREE example, ended with the pursued French raiders trapped in a walled village where they constructed a barrier behind the gates and held off their Dutch attackers as the sun set. When finished, their barrier resembled a sort of defense known in fortress architecture as a “trace retriata”—a wall hidden behind a wall.'"* Mounted partisan engagements, large or small, demanded steadiness and group cohesion no less than those fought on foot—sometimes one unbroken squadron was more valuable than entire regiments paralyzed by confusion and disorder. Most infantry actions were decided within minutes of the first vol-

ley—as troops who judged the carnage unendurable ran away in confusion, instinctively falling back and seeking shelter behind ditches

or in woods. Prisoners were very often taken in partisan actions. Generally, however, there was no “all-out” pursuit, because victorious detachments feared ambushes and wished to avoid further contact with the enemy. Although reports described pursuits of defeated detachments by mounted troops (who could get out of trouble easier) to within artillery and musket range of fortifications, these probably were dangerous displays of bravado. The ambush was, of course, a favored tactic of war parties. It was

not unusual for French war parties to stay in the countryside for some time, and they might spend days in woods or marshes to set ambushes. Often ambushes were prepared to trap hostile parties upon their return from raids, but they were also sometimes set to trap travelers who were unfurnished with proper passports, powerful individuals marked for kidnapping or assassination, as well as enemy partisans. During the first week of January 1676, Estrades informed Louvois that he often sent parties “hunting” near Hasselt in Brabant, and, thanks to the rugged terrain, 600 cavalry and some infantry were able to make their posts in defiles, “without obliging the cavalry of [Hasselt] to sortie.” Estrades could note to Louvois

with pleasure that: “Our parties from this garrison have defeated two enemy parties from a garrison which could not be there [at Hasselt] more miserable; the desertion of their troops continues, if that lasts 1t will be necessary that they send a new garrison.” In one encounter, a lieutenant in Boece’s company (forty men) was attacked

'+ Earlier uses of the trace retriata are discussed in Christopher Duffy, Scege Warfare. Lhe Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660 (London, 1979).

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 125

two leagues from Hasselt by thirty Dutch or Spanish cavalry from the garrison of Hasselt. The French dragoons fired a volley that killed eight cavalrymen. They then charged with bayonets and seven more cavalrymen surrendered along with the commanding lieutenants

who were wounded by the volley. In the melee, three more cavalrymen were killed by the French. ‘Uhe French lieutenant was shot

by a pistol in the thigh and his horse was killed.'® It often happened that officers were among the first killed in such volleys, and the only logical explanation is that they were specifically targeted. The French governor Estrades painted some of the best “word pictures” of actions of partisan warfare in his letters to Louvois, and described one in late March 1675 particularly well. A partisan from chevalier de Perien’s company (the former commander of Maastricht’s

outpost at Maseick) took twenty-four men to an ambush position near a road just outside of Bergen-op-Zoom in the Dutch Netherlands.

After waiting for an entire day, a coach drawn by six horses came rolling down the road. It was surrounded by an escort of two officers and twelve cavalrymen. The entourage included several business-like figures, burghers from the town, according to Estrades. The French war party opened fire and “the majority of the cavalry troopers fled.”

The rest were captured and included the two officers, a Reformed minister, the “secretary of the town,” four other prisoners and seventeen horses. ‘lo avoid being slowed down, the partisans detached the horses and left the carriage on the road. Estrades exclaimed with obvious satisfaction to Louvois, “there are thirty-two leagues between

here and Bergen-op-Zoom—that ought to remind the Dutch that the garrison of Maastricht will seek out even the fringes of their most distant towns.”'’°? The question might be asked, why did the mounted Dutch party not try to escape the French partisans who were no doubt on foot when they fired their decisive volley. The old Irish campaigner Peter Drake would have answered that the French aimed and shot the horses first, not the men, who were too valuable as hostages, and once one of the carriage horses was killed, the carriage could go no where.

> “The dragoons from the first volley from their flintlock muskets killed eight, both heutenants were wounded, the dragoons charged so vigorously the enemies that they captured seven and the lieutenants and eleven were left dead the rest saved themselves to Hasselt.” Estrades to Louvois, 9 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 125. ' Estrades to Louvois, 2 April 1675, AG, A' 449, fo. 9.

126 CHAPTER THREE 7. The Dark Side of Partisan Warfare

Although they successfully supported the French presence in the Netherlands, partisans and their brutal trade sometimes brought with them an excessive and illegal violence, a harshness that was inflicted both on civilians and other soldiers. ‘The dark undercurrent of partisan warfare was evident and especially disturbing to officials charged

with maintaining order, discipline and justice, both in armies and among the civilian population. The ability of the French monarchy to elicit the cooperation of local authorities and office holders in the

defense of the north remained a distant goal and was beyond the means of the blunt military force of the “absolute” monarchy. Adding

to this dark side of partisan warfare, far from recruiting the most virtuous men into partisan formations, or even strictly enforcing the rules of military conduct within them, the detached companies proved to follow their own rules on occasion and were motivated by plunder and not fear of the prisoner galleys or gallows. ‘Chese conditions were present on both sides of the war-torn frontier. Once fire and pillage were unloosed against the countryside as part of the king’s war effort, some soldiers appropriated these brutal methods for their own behalf. Civilians, including the increasing number of homeless, also joined renegade soldiers and deserters to form bands of highwaymen. Such men exacerbated the violent tenor of life in the war zone. As a minor example, the Mercure recorded the temerity of several men at the end of December 1676 who deliv-

ered notes to bourgeois of Brussels, demanding that they bring a certain sum of money to such a place as they indicated, failing which they threatened to kill them on the first occasion they encountered them.” Blackmail and fire-raids, the threat of burning or murder in order to make financial gain was a criminal enterprise that both individuals and states turned to advantage. ‘The bourgeois in Brussels

warned a magistrate of the threat, and several guards were hid in ambush near the appointed place where the ransom was to be collected. After the guards had waited for “some time,” the blackmailers appeared and were apprehended. ‘Their mask of anonymity removed, it turned out that these criminals were three soldiers from the Spanish

garrison of Brussels.' 107 Mercure Frangois, December 1675, pp. 571-572. Although crimes took place with-

out war, war influenced the manner in which crime was organized and conducted.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 127

The boundary between the legitimate soldiers of the opponent and simple highwaymen was well-defined in law, but French authorities were sometimes unsure with which they were dealing with. More than once, a band of highwaymen stepped out of the shadows when officials discussed partisan warfare. Intendant Chartiel at Thionville requested detached companies of dragoons in 1674 particularly to prevent: Enemy parties from passing into the countryside and [for] trapping all

those who venture into it, punishing without mercy all the rag men and highwaymen who control the woods and roads, and who join themselves sometimes to [partisans] in order to extend their contributions, quickly putting an end to all the raids, and suppressing all the thefts of these bandits and Croats of the woods.'”*

Rag men? Bandits? Croats of the woods? The men to whom Charuel referred were possibly highwaymen, but they equally performed

a military function by helping the Spanish parties at Luxembourg to extend their contributions. This world of outlawry in the forests of the Ardennes no doubt troubled Chartiel’s thoughts, as exemplified by his severe words that sought order and justice. He was not alone in these fears. Humiéres noted that the real threat in 1676 to the peace of the castellany of Lille was no longer from parties of Spanish troops, but rather from “quantities of soldiers and deserters without vocation who haunt the woods of this country.” The majority of these men, according to Humiéres, originated from the Spanish garrison of Aire, “having deserted as soon as the place was invested.”'”” Humiéres suggested that these troops were French originally, and fled to escape the hangman’s noose. Perhaps, the men Chartiel noticed were in fact “rag men,” haunting the woods and plying their trade of highway robbery from there, men who were ex-soldiers, or ex-partisans.

Deserters that formed bands of highwaymen in the war zone of the Netherlands and surrounding regions were not peculiar to the Dutch War but part of a long story. In January 1655, for example, “some cavalry troops” abandoned the king of Spain’s cause and took up their own by seizing a fortified house called Reyneque, south of ‘Trier, probably not far from the scene of Créqui’s defeat in 1675.

‘8 Chariiel to Louvois, 21 July 1674, AG, A! 407. ' Humiéres to Louvois, 19 September 1676, AG, A! 503, fo. 82.

128 CHAPTER THREE The Spanish governor of nearby Thionville reacted strongly, not so much because they were deserters (they would have been too difficult to bring back alive anyway), but “to prevent them from incommoding the lands of his contribution, and to force them to look elsewhere for their subsistence.”!'®

It was customary during the Dutch War to give passports to the leader of a party of soldiers on one’s own side in order to differentiate

them from bands of highwaymen, which proliferated as a result of the dislocations caused by war. Highwaymen often disguised themselves as soldiers with appropriately colored neck scarves or some other emblem of feigned allegiance and appeared suddenly out of the woods, filth clinging to their clothes, barefoot and deadly weapons in hand, to terrorize and to rob travelers—even high-ranking officials. Without a signed passport, regular soldiers, often as shabbily dressed

as highwaymen, might otherwise be stopped and assailed by other regulars on patrol. Governors and intendants on both sides, often corresponding with another during the war on matters requiring reprisals, cooperated in the issuance of passports to parties during the Dutch War. They also discussed limiting the minimum size of parties that should be allowed to sortie from fortresses with passports. Smaller parties, known as “parties bleu” if they contained less than nineteen men on foot or less than fifteen mounted, tended to be confused with highwaymen.''' Both sides agreed on the convention of at least attempting to keep these minimum numbers in a legitimate party of war. Governor Estrades once condemned to death five Spanish soldiers caught as a party of less than twenty men, and without a signed passport:

I held a hanging of five thieves from the garrison of Limbourg who stole from our peasants from the lands under contribution when bringing their victuals to Maastricht. ‘They did not have any passports there-

fore the Prince of Nassau the governor of Limbourg could find no redress and has recognized that these were thieves.'” 10 Relations Véritables, 6 January 1655, Brussels. Consider also, Recueil Cangé, “Ordonnance pour Arreter tous Voleurs, Vagabons, meme les gens de guerre qui seroient joints a eux, volans et pillans a la Campagne, ou qui cherchent a faire des Prisonniers a Quinze lieues a la ronde de la Ville de Paris, 20 February 1657, vol. matte te (Vincennes) Recueil Cangé, Lettre du Roy a Maréchal de Humiéres, au sujet des Contributions, 13 May 1677, vol. 23, no. 162. ‘2 Estrades to Louvois, 14 February 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 114.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 129

Both sides were concerned with defeating the unseen enemy of oper-

ations of war in the Netherlands, the highwaymen who stole from civilians placed under contributions on both sides. There was irony in the official uneasiness with respect to highwaymen, because a roguish mentality, another aspect of the darker side of partisan warfare, reached to the highest levels of leadership. Following the agreement of the Pays de Waes to pay some of the contributions it owed in 1676, several French officials received personal gifts of money and other items. While in the custody of Humie-

res, hostages not only negotiated the payment of contributions for the Vieuxbourg of Ghent, but also a special premium paid directly to Humiéres and other French officials (who Humiéres claimed had worked on their behalf for an overall reduction in the owed contributions): In Paris to a friend, who worked on behalf of the aforesaid moderation... 4,800 florins; to Marshal Humiéres, in execution of the promises made to him, when he was at Lokeren... 17,600 florins; to la Follade (probably the future Marshal de la Feuillade, then a colonel in the French Guards)... 132 florins; to the marquis de Chamilly, governor of Oudenaarde ... 900 florins; to the heutenant governor, Violaine .. . 2,520 florins [probably Violaine, the dragoon colonel and the leutenant governor at Oudenaarde]; to Monsieur Talon, intendant resident at Oudenaarde, for gratuities... 657 florins and 12 sous; and to the same a box of orange flower tablets and two baskets of apples (one of apples from China and the other of orange apples)... 60 florins; and to the same, two Dutch cows... 200 florins.'!°

Entering into informal partnerships, fortress governors and partisans

may have worked together to plunder and benefit themselves as much as the French army. Before prizes could be divided and shared, they had to first be declared “fair” by the intendant, inventoried and

prepared for public auction. Of course, some partisans may have hid their loot outside the gates—buried treasure—but then this might not have been necessary. At Avesnes-sur-Helpe, the judgment of Intendant Damorezan as to the fairness of prizes was ignored by the governor of the fortress,

the comte de Broglie. Broglie apparently made excuses to avoid returning property, which Damorezan had judged as wrongly confiscated. Broglie behaved in this manner, according to Damorezan, ''S Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 431. Citing a document reprinted in Annales du Cercle archéologique du Pays de Waes, vol. 28 (1910).

130 CHAPTER THREE “in order to enrich himself.” When the victims, mostly French peasants, pleaded their cases through the courts, Broglie reportedly threat-

ened them and “drew matters out so long that the peasants seeing themselves committed to great expenses... abandoned the goods which belong to them.” Commerce was interrupted “by the persecutions of partisans upon the merchants” such that if unjust prizes were not returned, then Damorezan feared all commerce in his department would “surely cease.”''* It is difficult to imagine a more ruthless personality than Broglie—even by the hypocritical ethical standards of Louis XIV’s court. After the war was over, thousands of men who had served both sides in detached companies, or as bands of partisans, suddenly found they were no longer in demand. Having few options, some of these

men continued the trade they had practiced in time of war. As late as 1685, following the brief war (1683-84) between France and Spain,

and a full seven years after the Dutch War, renegades left printed handbills to demand contributions for personal profit and set fires to enforce their extortion. Louis XIV signed another ordinance in 1685, related, but sadly different in purpose from the one he signed with so much optimism twelve years before in 1673.'? The king condemned outlaws, if caught either committing acts of arson or leaving demands threatening to do so, to be burned alive in public execution.

8. Conclusion

‘The need to ensconce half of French forces behind fortress walls and the fact that field armies only campaigned for half the year contributed to the very slow pace of military operations in the Spanish Netherlands. Louis XIV and Louvois probably had a different con-

ception of strategic time than do modern generals and heads of state—in fact, the Sun King probably thought of reaching strategic goals in years and not in months. War in the seventeenth century

‘+ Damorezan to Louvois, 19 July 1674, AG, A' 457, fo. 7. '' BG, Recueil Gangé, Ordonnance... pour ceux qui auront briilé quelque Mason, & pour ceux qui auront écrit ou envoyé des Billets contenans menace de briiler, 6 March 1685,

vol. 25, no. 24.

THE GARRISON FORCE AND PARTISAN WARFARE 131

was a time-consuming process, similar in this regard to the protracted insurrections conducted by guerrillas of later centuries. In an environment of long wars of attrition, fortress-based partisans pro-

vided much-needed resources that eased the burden on the royal treasury. Partisan activities helped shape the operational flow of the war. Also, for Louis XIV, a conservative strategy that emphasized careful partisan operations in conjunction with grand operations was bet-

ter than one based on wild gambits, or in imitation of campaigns in Germany where provinces were sometimes gained and abandoned

in the same month.''® One mistake in a campaign in the Spanish Netherlands, one unnecessary counter-march, and a whole year or longer might be required to make good the inevitable set-back due to the loss of a fortress. Louis XIV and Louvois proceeded cautiously and took a little over two years (1673-75) to impose contributions and protect the frontier—no French sieges of Spanish fortresses

took place during this period. In those years, the French garrison force struggled mightily to master the countryside—on both sides of the frontier. As a successful result of the cumulative effect of these smaller operations, the king spent the last three years of the Dutch War planning the conquest of Spanish fortresses and negotiating a favorable peace.

''8 An entire country could be lost too. When Montecucculi outmaneuvered Turenne and the Allies captured Bonn in 1673, he forced Louis to abandon all the conquests in Holland and French allies in the region.

CHAPTER FOUR

RAIDS

In early October 1674 an Imperial general forbade the inhabitants of the county of ‘Tirlemont from paying contributions to the French garrison at Maastricht. ‘The French governor of Maastricht, the comte

d’Estrades, replied by plundering those villages in Tirlemont that refused contributions. Consequently, when nearly 2,000 Imperial cavalry menacingly appeared by the village of Waremme, ready to take

for themselves the rich stores of grain owed as contributions to the French, they left disappointed.’ French war parties had already plundered everything within “eight leagues.” Confident that he had left nothing for the enemy, Estrades told Louvois: “Having removed all that was there, I do not believe that they will remain very long.”’ The garrison at Maastricht continued to gather contributions over

the next three months as the Imperial force tried to blockade Maastricht. According to the Gazette, in January 1675, French raiders “oreatly unsettled the entire region.”” Later that month, the Imperial

army gave up its attempt at a blockade, and except for a few outposts, retired to winter quarters behind the Meuse River. The importance of contributions (and other war taxes) to individual French garrisons was evident throughout the Dutch War, but especially so when a garrison prepared to withstand the blows of an Alhed siege or the hardship of a blockade. When the threat of siege appeared, Louvois instructed fortress governors to raid and plunder ageressively in order to ensure payment of contributions, preparing

the battlefield in advance. To prepare for an expected siege of Avesnes-sur-Helpe in September 1674, Louvois wanted the comte de Nancré to assist in the accumulation of a magazine of oats and to conduct more “executions.”* This was also the case in early sum-

mer 1674, when a Dutch field army commanded by General ' Estrades to Le Tellier, 18 October 1674, AG, A' 401, fo. 156. * Estrades to Louvois, 18 October 1674, AG, A! 393, fo. 122. > Gazette, 13 January 1675, from Kleves. * Louvois to Luxembourg, 30 September 1674, AG, A' 401, fo. 74.

RAIDS 133 Rabenhaupt blockaded the French garrison at Grave. The French at Grave attempted to enforce payment of contributions in the land of Cuyk, the Barony of Breda, and others, despite the blockade. On 19 June a French detachment from Grave pillaged and then set demolition charges around the Dutch castle of Muydelas, destroying this rallying point for a region that refused to pay contributions to the French. Meanwhile, another detachment from Grave plundered near the Dutch town of Niyymegan, taking around 200 horses, firewood

and wagons from peasants who had not paid contributions.” On 29

June, after Chamilly warned Louvois that the Dutch had closed around Grave, Chamilly detached another war party to “execute” several villages in Spanish Gelderland who had refused to pay contributions.® Grave had already received plunder from the French army retreating from the Dutch Republic and the new contributions jammed the remaining space available in the fortress. The fortress brimmed with barrels of gunpowder, bundles of forage, spare horses, sacks of grain and numerous carts. Lord Rabenhaupt warned the nearby inhabitants in Ravenstein not to bring any goods for sale to Grave on penalty of death.’ Chamilly retaliated by banning trade with the nearby town of Niymegan and sent French war parties into

the countryside around the town to plunder any travelers unfurnished with a French passport.’ Over the summer, bands of men from around the countryside armed and avenged themselves; both French and Dutch employed such parties in the partisan warfare fought over control of local supplies and the gathering of intelligence. Louvois and other French officials exchanged letters concerning the continued safety of Dutch hostages at Grave, and it was decided to

move them to Maastricht secretly.’ The recovery of the contributions was made almost impossible when Prince William dismissed and appointed new magistrates and officers in the various towns that

previously had negotiated payments to the French.'° Rabenhaupt finally besieged Grave in August 1674. In the end, the defenders » Chamilly to Louvois, 19 June 1674, AG, A' 398. © Chamilly to Louvois, 29 June 1674, AG, A' 398, fo. 194. ‘ Desmadrys to Louvois, 8 June 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 124. ° Desmadrys to Louvois, 6 July 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 177. ” The hostages from the Dutch town of Deventer were alone valued by the French at 30,000 écus (90,000 livres). Louvois to Dumouceau, 13 June 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 135, '° Desmadrys to Louvois, 19 June 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 148.

134 CHAPTER FOUR consumed horses for nourishment, but the Dutch paid a high cost in lives to conquer this last French-held stronghold in their territory. This chapter will discuss the French conduct of raids. The French carefully managed raids, both at the operational and tactical level.

Three general categories of raids will be considered here: 1) fireraids; 2) assault raids and 3) special purpose raids. Several large fireraids on the Pays de Waes, involving thousands of troops, bridging units and artillery will also be discussed. Through consideration of the variety of French raids, it will become apparent that raids indisputably represented the most frequent type of French military operation during the Dutch War, as had been the case in previous wars. Raids far outnumbered siege operations or open field battles. Fireraids, the most common type of raid were usual and regular actions of war; they were not spontaneous, nor did they signify a crisis in the administration or supply of the French army. A consideration of raids demonstrates that military discipline and basic tactical concepts and formations typified raids. Volley fire, envelopments, and infantry assaults supported by cavalry on the flanks, all found a place in raids. The majority of raids simultaneously fit within a larger context of military campaigns and a forward system of re-supply of French garrison forces through the enforcement of war taxes, (as opposed to

one in which all supphes are brought up from “the rear,” as was mainly the case with French field armies). Fire-raids specifically per-

formed a vital function in this regard. Raids could even be used as leverage when negotiating the procurement of supplies for the field armies by purchase. For example, in 1674, Louvois told Intendant Dumouceau that if the burghers at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) did not furnish a requested quantity of wheat at the current price, their territorial dependencies “would not be left peacefully in their proclaimed neutral status.”'' Louvois coordinated the general direction of French raids to meet strategic objectives as well as supply needs. Louvois, although never putting his thoughts in a comprehensive policy statement, repeatedly made clear in correspondence that fire-raids would both serve to undermine the loyalty of officials in the towns and vil-

lages of the Spanish Netherlands and to enforce payment of war taxes and thereby extract and drain the wealth of the country. Uhe total payments of contributions, at some eleven million dwres on aver-

'' Louvois to Dumouceau, 11 January 1674, AG, A! 379, fo. 43.

RAIDS 135 age each year, gave proof of the effectiveness of the threat and umpact of fire-raids. French garrisons constantly made raids to enforce payment of contributions, passports and safeguards. ‘hey often made

their largest raids in winter when frozen rivers and the absence of detachments from field armies made them more likely to succeed. As this chapter will demonstrate, raids also inflicted casualties and damage on the forces of the opposition with minimal exposure of the overall strength of the attacker, and this was as important as the collection of war taxes.

1. Fire-Raids

My Lord, following your orders, we entered at dawn yesterday the village of Kekern and its lands, two leagues along have been thoroughly

pillaged and nearly all burned. We began to spread the fires at the end closest to Antwerp, which is only a good half league away, and finished by the other end, and withdrew ourselves. We have stayed until ten o’clock in the morning today three leagues from Antwerp in order to increase the fear caused by the conflagration. It is difficult to imagine that they will not contribute everything, and I will not forget to reach by tomorrow where you ordered me."

The destruction of the township of Kekern near Antwerp in April 1677 was one of many fire-raids conducted by French parties to enforce payment of contributions during the Dutch War. Most fireraids involved three separate actions. The first action involved plunder, which according to Colonel Melac, was “thoroughly” done in the case of Kekern. ‘The second action involved torching buildings in a systematic manner. During the Kekern raid, fires were started at both ends of the village so that the flames would spread widely.

During the midst of this, the 400 troops under the command of Melac never forgot the purpose of their mission. When summoned,

they stopped plundering, began starting fires and later (in the same day) ended their work and “withdrew” as a disciplined milltary formation. The third purpose of a raid was as a show of force: Melac’s command bivouacked as a military formation and remained

over night in the vicinity of Kekern, as the hamlet burned, not ' Melac to Calvo, 26 April 1677, AG, A! 537, fo. 132. This is an unusual letter to find in the archives, since it is between less than senior-level French commanders.

136 CHAPTER FOUR departing until ten the next morning “to increase fear” in nearby villages and Antwerp. At this point, although Melac failed to mention it, raiders often took hostages, further securing the payment of contributions. Finally, the entire action was part of a larger plan from start to finish that was controlled by Louvois. After the mission was complete, Melac knew to appear the next day, “where you ordered me.” The fire-raid had two purposes: the first was to force payment of the contributions owed by the villages near Antwerp, and the second was its role in the operational plan for spring 1677. Louvois hoped that the “conflagration of Kekern” would divert the attention and military resources of the Dutch and Spanish away from the French attacks about to fall on Valenciennes and Cambrai.'” The size of French fire-raids varied. Governor Estrades at Maastricht

considered “a large detachment” sent on a fire-raid as consisting of

18-20 cavalry detailed from every company in the garrison of Maastricht, which totaled about 2,000 troopers.'* Normally, fire-raids

involved between 100 to 1,000 French troops, and involved anywhere from several detached dragoon companies to one or more battalions and squadrons of both infantry and cavalry. Some fire-raids were actually more akin to sabotage: a few men, disguised as peasants or vagabonds and residing in hostile country for days or weeks, would do their work in a single night under cover

of darkness and then slip away to their garrison. Although forbidden by general custom and agreement, Louvois did not hesitate to order the use of parties of less than twenty soldiers on fire-raids. On 15 February 1675, Louvois recommended to the new governor of Oudenaarde, Governor Chamilly, to disguise several soldiers as peas-

ants and to have them secretly enter the town of Ghent and during the night set fires in the outlying villages. “That joined to the party that you will send subsequently might force the country to submit to contributions.”'’ ‘The suggestions of Louvois never seemed

‘> Melac would lead raids in the German Palatinate (The Holy Roman Empire) in December 1688, commencing the most notorious plundering of a province during the reign of Louis XIV. Melac perfected his profession, however, by burning in the Spanish Netherlands during the Dutch War. See Ferguson, Blood and fure, pp. 102-103. '* Estrades to Louvois, 15 April 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 58. The objective of the

fire-raid was to gather contributions from the Duchy of Brabant in the Spanish Netherlands.

' Louvois to Chamilly, 15 February 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 116.

RAIDS 137 to have surprised the marquis de Chamilly. Chamilly had already sent two soldiers (probably partisans from his staff) disguised as peas-

ants on a mission to burn a house. The objective of French fire-raids seldom was the indiscriminate devastation of an entire region; rather it was the receipt of the owed contributions. French intendants of contributions were careful to designate a village or several villages for destruction. On 18 April 1674, for example, Intendant Talon at Oudenaarde reflected over the

destruction caused by French war parties from the garrison there and the impact on the Pays d’Alost. As Intendant Talon informed Louvois, he had marked for destruction “three of the best villages.” Talon then bragged to the war minister after describing the destruc-

tion of the raid: “I hope this month to get to the bottom of the 300,000 lwres that I have promised you.”'® The destruction of three villages in a castellany, or their partial destruction, normally sufficed to encourage the remainder of villages in a castellany to pay contributions. Whether large, like the detachment of cavalry led from Maastricht

by Colonel Melac in April 1674, or small, like the use of individual men ordered to burn single houses, most fire-raids had limited goals. French raiding parties attempted to kidnap local officials and take them hostage—a common practice that both sides used to enforce payment of contributions. According to historian Hubert van Houtte: “The hostages, taken after a military execution, were most often the bailiff, or, in his absence, the greffier, one or two échevins, or even simple notables.”'’ Estrades once informed Louvois, for exam-

ple, that a French party returned to Maastricht with “17 bailiffs or village mayors as prisoners,” after having also executed villages in Julich."* The prison at Maastricht filled with hostages as the war continued: a French account dated 11 September 1677 at Maastricht listed in the Duchy of Limburg eighteen villages where “we can take prisoners for not having entirely furnished what they owe.”'’ When

on 16 December 1677, sieur Ardenoux of the Lauzier Dragoon

© "Talon to Louvois, 16 March 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 2. Also cited on page 182, Chapter Five. '’ Van Houtte, Les Occupations, vol. 1, p. 198. '8 Estrades to Louvois, 10 February 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 96. Estat des Villages au Pays de Limbourg, ou Von peut prendre des prisonniers... AG, A!

964, fo. 138.

138 CHAPTER FOUR Regiment returned from a raid for contributions in the Dutch Marquisette of Bergen-op-Zoom, where he had burned two villages called

Hos and Rutsen, he took five of the “principal inhabitants of those villages hostage.””° Trailing behind Ardenoux on horseback, the bound

hostages entered Maastricht where they were held until their ransoms were paid and arrangements made for the payment of contributions. The fortuitous kidnapping of a single wealthy merchant might result in payment of contributions for an entire bailiwick, or even a whole town. For example, a French war party from Charleroi captured on the open road the Abbot of Helesein Monastery along with a “fat” merchant named Wimers from Louvain. According to

Intendant Dumouceau at Maastricht, the merchant was so rich he could personally pay all of the contributions that the town of Louvain owed to Maastricht. It was in the hope of having the merchant sent on to Maastricht for the recovery of contributions that Dumouceau not only related the incident to Louvois but also sent a letter to the receiver of contributions at Charleroi for the transport of the merchant to Maastricht.*! There, he would join other hostages. As for the plump, well-dressed merchant, if Mr. Wimers decided not to cooperate and personally pay the contributions owed by Louvain, then he would remain an indefinite guest of the garrison at Maastricht.

The parts of the Netherlands that refused contributions to the French were considered by Louvois as places in rebellion, and the French took full advantage there, plundering food, taking cavalry remounts, and seizing cattle. According to Myron Gutmann, who examined a Liégoise chronicle of the Dutch War, on 6 August 1677: French troops from the garrison at Maastricht visited the village of Herve, a local center of pasture farming to the east of the Basse-Meuse.

They burned several houses and took all the cows, a ternble catastrophe for a community supported by its dairy herds. The villagers paid a large sum to ransom their cattle.”

* Calvo to Louvois, 16 December 1677, AG, A' 584, fo. 112. *' Dumouceau to Louvois, | January 1675, AG, A!’ 456, fo. 1. *” Gutmann, War in the Low Countries, pp. 43-44. Not all communities, however, were dependent upon one commodity for survival like Herve, so confiscating a single commodity (cattle, sheep, etc.) probably was not that effective in guaranteeing payment of contributions. As Gutmann pointed out in his study, most of the communities of Liége practiced mixed farming.

RAIDS 139 French fire-raids involved plunder as well as fire. ‘The more valuable

loot, as pointed out in the previous chapter, was later auctioned off to the highest bidder in the marketplace of French fortress towns. Some goods, however, were retained for operational uses. In October

1674 a war party from Maastricht captured 200 horses, which the garrison kept to build up its inadequate stock of horses.”

In order to maintain further control over destruction, and its impact, French intendants of contributions not only marked specific villages, but sometimes specific properties for destruction. On one

occasion, two French parties, each composed of thirty men, sent from Maastricht to execute villages in the vicinity of Limbourg selected

individual houses for destruction. As Estrades explained on 5 February 1675 to Louvois, “They returned yesterday evening from their execution and have burned eight of the principal houses, and upon their return encountered two parties of the enemy that they defeated and took twenty-two prisoners.”** French officials also decided sometimes to give especially harsh treatment to prisoners (hostages). When

Commissioner Desmadrys at Grave told Louvois on 25 June 1674 that the contributions owed by Dutch towns would begin to be paid, his belief rested on the fact that he had publicly made known his intention to imprison the hostages under harsh conditions (cramped cells, poor food)—unusual treatment for prominent bourgeois. It was meant to outrage other bourgeois in the Dutch Republic, who might someday face a similar fate.*” On 26 June, however, representatives of the inhabitants of the Dutch towns of Asperen, Lochem, Leerdam, Vianen, Culemborg and Buren (Gelderland) failed to arrive outside the gates of Grave to pay their contributions. Desmadrys immediately directed Chamilly to send a war party to burn down several houses belonging to the hostages, “hoping that that will make them [the towns] more punctual in the future.” ‘To ensure that he burned the homes belonging to the hostages, and no others, Desmadrys used a spy in the region to whom he had promised 50 écus for his services.”° The French used a combination of limited but precise measures to ensure the payment of contributions.

> Gazette, 22 October 1674, from Cologne. “+ Estrades to Louvois, 5 February 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 87. * Desmadrys to Louvois 19 June 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 148. *° Desmadrys to Louvois, 26 June 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 159.

140 CHAPTER FOUR 2. Opposition to Raiding Parties

Many French fire-raids met opposition from enemy forces and from

civilians caught in the path of war. Such occurred in March 1677 when a veteran corporal from La Marine Regiment leading a war party on a raid in Jiilich encountered an Allied party of eighty that he attacked. ‘The French war party killed thirty and took eleven pris-

oner.”’ As another example, in January 1675, when La Brétesche returned from a fire-raid to Maastricht, his party of 200 dragoons encountered a mounted Spanish party from Limbourg (also on a fire-raid). A night engagement ensued. Outnumbered two to one, 200 French against 100 Spanish, the Spanish war party was defeated

and dispersed. In the confusion that followed this cavalry combat under moonlight, the French war party captured a Spanish treasurer of the army, ten cavaliers, and the “most famous partisan that they have in the country named Jean le Blanc.” On his return to Maastricht, Brétesche burned several villages in the bailiwick of St. ‘Truiden that

owed contributions (hay and oats) to Maastricht. Leaving the burn-

ing villages behind, and before taking the road to Maastricht, he encountered yet another party of Spanish troops. [his time, he took four prisoners and learned from them that the Spanish had posted the Regiment of Monterey dragoons at ‘Tirlemont, which had recently been joined by four Dutch regiments. And, as the prisoners revealed, more troops from Mechelen and Louvain were expected, raising the total at ‘Tirlemont to a corps of near 4,000 men. One consequence

of French fire-raids was that they often forced the movement of sionificant numbers of Allied troops during winter quarters, normally a time of refit and repose.” French dragoons, organized and equipped

by the fortress governors and majors, earned double their keep in this way.

To oppose French raids, the government in Brussels divided the major river lines of their country into sectors. Officers detailed from

the regular army took charge of the local militia in each sector. Every village furnished militia in squads of five to twenty men. The ©

“7 Calvo to Louvois, 16 March 1677, AG, A! 531, fo. 80. °° Gazette, 24 January 1675, from Maastricht. “They have told us that the enemy is assembling a corps of 4,000 men at Tirlemont.” Also, Estrades to Louvois, 24 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 59.

RAIDS 14] total complement of squads from each village, varying according to the size of the village, normally ranged from 60 to 400 men. A corporal commanded each squad, and there was a hierarchy of command above the squad-level that included: sergeant, lieutenant, captain,

sergeant major and a surintendant (supply officer). ‘To ensure that villages did their utmost to repel the French invaders, widows without sons or servants of age to bear arms paid a tax, according to their means, called the auderlinckgeldt. ‘The “widow tax” was used to furnish weapons to those militiamen who could not afford them. ‘The

vast majority of militiamen, however, afforded and used their own weapons. According to Van Houtte, 75 percent of the militia came equipped with either matchlock muskets or flintlocks, the remaining 25 percent were armed with pikes and halberds.*? Knowing that untrained hands might not effectively use these weapons against a determined French assault, the militiamen were to bring shovels and picks to buttress their defense with makeshift fortifications. ‘They, and regulars, often resisted behind earthen redoubts, or, with the approval

of the lord, in a castle. Observers posted in church bell-towers gave defenders warning when groups of suspicious or menacing riders appeared in the distance. A French fire-raid on the county of ‘Tirlemont in September 1674 was typical in many respects of the stubborn defenses that the French often confronted. ‘The county of Tirlemont, near Louvain and hence west of Maastricht, was a region that constantly resisted payment of contributions to the French. On 2 September 1674, not long after the battle of Seneffe, the fifteen-year old chevalier de Rouvré led from Maastricht a detachment of 300 cavalry troops and 100 dragoons (the dragoons were from governor Estrades’ company) on a raid into ‘lirlemont. To enter ‘Tirlemont from Maastricht, Rouvré’s detachment crossed the Gette River, eluding the local militia defenses.

Upon arriving at ‘Tirlemont, Rouvré dismounted some of his dragoons; they attacked the garrison of a castle that had been protecting the local population, took some 200 peasants as hostages and set fires in two villages that had refused payment of contributions. The dragoons and cavalry marched on in their path of destruction, instilling fear throughout the county of ‘Tirlemont. The entire raid consumed six days. Rouvré’s detachment approached to within “range

* Van Houtte, Les occupations, vol. 1, pp. 20-21.

142 CHAPTER FOUR of fantlock” of Louvain, and within clear sight of its towering cathe-

dral, put the torch to two “fat villages” and took some prominent bourgeois as hostages. ‘Then the dragoons rode to the outskirts of Diest where they set fire to several summer “pleasure houses.” Leaving

a trail of destruction behind them, they returned to the Gette River to make their crossing back to Maastricht. The way back across the Gette was not as easy as the initial crossing. ‘The river was now defended. Nearly 1,000 armed peasants, 400 infantry from a Spanish garrison, a company of dragoons and around 400 cavalry guarded the two main fords of across the river. A reconnaissance by some of the dragoons discovered the one that allowed the quickest crossing. As could be expected, the better ford also enjoyed the strongest defense, with about 400 militia, 150 infantry, and forty dragoons from the Spanish garrison of Zoutleeuw, a fortified

town on the Gette. Some of the defenders occupied a house that set near the river, flanking the ford. ‘The remaining defenders covered the other crossing, but were too far away to support their comrades. Such area defenses could only hope to slow the raiders, not destroy them. Only a similar sized force of regular troops could dec-

imate the raiders, and in the middle of winter, when troops dispersed in winter quarters, it was difficult to assemble such a force. The French raiding detachment resolved to fight its way across. The Estrades dragoons spearheaded the attack. It crossed the river on horseback, dismounted on the opposite bank, and advanced on foot toward the defenders. At first, the dragoons made little progress, reforming and advancing slowly (supported by parties of mounted

cavalry on their flanks). Once sufficiently near the enemy, they charged with bayonets. Most of the militia defenders fled; others offered only feeble resistance. The dragoons set fire to the fortified house and possibly twenty-two soldiers perished. he French did not

pursue. Some of the survivors of the attack retreated to a “wellentrenched” position not far from the ford. The remaining defenders scattered, and some of the more demoralized militia covered over three miles to seek out the concealment of a marsh. When the crossing had been accomplished, and the hostages taken to the other side of the river, Rouvré took account of losses: thirty-three French soldiers were killed, eighteen in Estrades’ company alone. A musket

shot in the chest wounded one young officer, a cornet named Montbrisson. In addition, eighteen horses did not make it back to the stables at Maastricht. It was on 8 September 1674 that Rouvré

RAIDS 143 returned to Maastricht with more than 200 hostages. Pastors and other churchmen from the ruined region arrived at Maastricht in the days that followed to arrange payment of contributions to the French king. Estrades reported that: This execution has created quite a stir. The entire countryside had taken up arms to support their border defenses confident at preventing our parties from crossing the Gette River, but we proved the contrary.”

In the ensuing days, burghers from as far as Louvain came to negotiate contribution payments, fearing perhaps the loss of their summer “pleasure houses” as had happened outside of neighboring Diest. Determined and combat experienced, the Maastricht garrison had overwhelmed the local defense using basic tactics and good reconnaissance.

3. Assault Raids

In some circumstances, French raiders grappled with defending troops, assaulted enemy soldiers in winter quarters, and destroyed defensive

works. When a walled town or castle refused contributions, as was sometimes the case, the French mounted an assault. If successful, they would proceed to plunder and burn the place, in accordance with the laws of war. After French parties from Maastricht raided into the County of Stavelot, for example, terrorizing its inhabitants from the Ourthe River to the Girelle River, Estrades informed Louvois

that it will be necessary “to take several castles on the passages for the security of our parties which could have difficulty returning.” Alhed garrisons posed a serious flank threat to French raids. Estrades once complained that the Spanish garrison at Limbourg allowed neither contributions nor French parties to pass within “one league.””!

Thus, Limbourg prohibited the inhabitants of the duchy from paying contributions to the French at Maastricht.” On 28 June 1674, * Estrades to Louvois, 9 September 1674, AG, A! 392, fo. 28. *! Estrades to Louvois, 6 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 20. A major French slege operation would be undertaken in 1675 to permanently remove this threat to French raids and the transport of contributions to Maastricht. * From their fortress-outpost of Limbourg, only a few miles east of the Meuse, the Spanish also disrupted diplomatic communications with Paris. As the French ambassador at Liége pointed out to Louvois, a detached party succeeded in over-

144 CHAPTER FOUR Estrades was obligated to send a war party into the territory of Limbourg in an attempt to trap some of the garrison’s parties. While one party distracted the Limbourg garrison, Estrades sent a raiding detachment through its territory to the bishopric of Munster, a for-

mer French ally in the region, to burn for contributions. As a further precaution against the Spanish garrison at Limbourg, Estrades deployed 200 men to secure a ford on the Roer River and cover the retreat of the raiding detachment sent to Miinster.*? The use of a rear guard or covering party was a standard tactic in French fireraids, but even more in evidence where there was opposition, such as offered by the Spanish garrison at Limbourg from 1672-1675. The French “hunter” party sent to ambush the ambushers was also a common practice in the war for contributions. When possible, the French attempted to drive troops from their winter quarters and out of zones where they hoped to impose contributions. One successful assault took place in February 1675 near Limbourg. Estrades “accorded” a party of forty picked dragoons to a cornet named Isaac from the garrison at Maastricht to plunder the first boat to pass on the Meuse River, “two leagues” from Huy. Isaac accomplished this task and stayed with his prize until nine in the evening, when he decided to venture further, using the captured vessel to cross the river. Later that night, he arrived at a village called Boucet where some Imperial troops lodged in winter quarters. ‘The village was between two other winter quarters at Neuville and Plainevaux. Marching down the main road through the village, Isaac and his dragoons encountered thirty Imperial infantry, which had formed line in front of the Captain’s quarters. Isaac charged the infantry, driving them into the house. For two hours, the dragoons besieged the Imperial soldiers, and then decided to launch an assault that brought the dragoons crashing into the house. In the aftermath, the French captured the captain, a lieutenant, three other officers, their personal belongings, spare clothing and 500 écus. ‘Ten

Imperial soldiers surrendered, and the French took 17 horses. As Estrades pointed out, if the party had been larger, Isaac could have attacked the neighboring garrisons and, with similar fortune, brought

taking a French boat on the river, causing the loss of a French mail pouch. Descariéres to Louvois, 17 June 1674, AG, A! 398, fo. 152. ** Estrades to Louvois, 28 June 1674, AG, A! 398.

RAIDS 145 over 100 prisoners to Maastricht. Instead, Isaac and the dragoons he commanded contented themselves with plundering the small village and departed around four in the morning. They returned to the boat on the Meuse, and made good their return to Maastricht. Estrades boasted to Louvois that the enemy captain was “a man of good birth” and he joined in the prison at Maastricht other Imperial commanders of distinguished families: the Count of Corbels, the Count of Veterani and the Marquis of Doria.** The garrison at Maastricht captured these officers in a subsequent action to be discussed next—throughout the winter of 1675 the French harassed and

made assaults on the Imperial army winter quarters in the principality of Liége.

French assault raids often pursued several difficult objectives at once, confusing the defenders and economizing force. To facilitate the imposition of contributions over the principality of Liége, on 13 January 1675, Estrades set out with 600 cavalry, 200 dragoons, 2,000 infantry, two light cannons and a petard (an explosive device used to blow open gates) to break the defenses of two well-defended towns. Upon arriving near Dalem, Estrades ordered Melac, Rives, Montbrison

and de la Tour to cross the river at Chesnay and proceed to assault

the Imperial troops in garrison in the town of Theux, between Verviers and Spa in the Marquisette of Franchimont. ‘Three companies of Imperial cavalry and a company of Imperial dragoons were garrisoned at ‘Theux—a significant obstacle in the way of the imposition of contributions in Franchimont. While the assault against ‘Theux was carried out, Estrades, accompanied by Colonel Maqueline

of the Piedmont Regiment, marched with infantry and artillery, toward the town of Verviers. As a rear-guard for both detachments, Estrades held in reserve Melin, commanding 400 cavalry and 100 of the dragoons, between Limbourg and Verviers. Melin promptly seized the ford at Chesnay, necessary as an avenue of retreat should

the more than 1,000 Imperial cavalry quartered in the region assemble.

In preparation for the assault on the town of Verviers, Estrades made a reconnaissance—another common tactic employed in raids. Following this, Estrades gave instructions for an advance party to prepare to place a mine (petard) against a section of the town wall.

** Estrades to Louvois, 14 February 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 114.

146 CHAPTER FOUR Choisy and Rogon, who commanded the reconnaissance party, returned however, with unfortunate news. ‘They assured Estrades that the wall was five feet in thickness, with several flanks, and the men

would be exposed to withering fire. Further, Estrades learned that the preparation of the mine would take considerable time. Also, as the officers from the reconnaissance party pointed out, there was no way to bring the artillery into a range sufficient to damage the walls because of the rugged ground surrounding the town, which was perched on a cliff overlooking the Vesdre River. Estrades abandoned the assault. Instead, he sent several small war parties from the raiding force to plunder and to take hostages in the villages surrounding Verviers. Meanwhile, the attack on Theux was carried forward. ‘The French caught the Imperial troops in the village by surprise. Part of the garrison managed, after others were killed fleeing, to retreat to a house near the village cemetery. There, after a brief resistance, they were

overwhelmed—the French exploded a petard on the gates of the house and entered, taking prisoner all of the men inside. Other French troops meanwhile plundered the village, ransacking homes (for having supported an Imperial garrison and denied contributions to Maastricht). Three counts of the Empire, who were captains of cavalry, Pio, Veterani and Doria, all apparently Italians, were taken prisoner. ‘he French also captured three lieutenants, two cornets, and, adding insult to injury, the standard of the Pio Regiment. The raiders added over 150 horses to the plunder, and then to the stables of Maastricht. The personal baggage of the Italian officers was ransacked. Losing ten men dead themselves, the French killed more than sixty Imperial soldiers in the assault on Theux.” Similar Allied defenses extended to the lower Rhineland region of the Holy Roman Empire (Germany), where local militias and regu-

lars combined forces to resist the spread of French contributions from Maastricht into their lands. In January 1676, after a bout of exceptionally mild, dry weather, and the rivers having receded, Marshal Estrades, once again, resolved to conduct two simultaneous

raids: one in the Electorate of Cologne (formerly an ally of Louis XIV) and the other in the Electorate of Trier.°° De La Levretiére

* Gazette, Maastricht, 17 January 1675. °° Estrades to Louvois, 5 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 17. Estrades noted to

RAIDS 147 prepared to make the raid on the Electorate of ‘Trier with 300 cavalry and 100 dragoons; a partisan named Rose would conduct the raid on Cologne with 400 cavalry and 200 dragoons. For his raid on Trier, Levretiére requested “Monsieur Petardier,” a humorous title for the expert at such explosive devices, whom Estrades sent “in order to attempt a petarding” of the Castle of Ravacouts—blowing its gate apart. [he destruction of this castle, pointed out Estrades, would assure the contributions of ‘Tréves.” On the morning of 5 January, the two detachments quietly departed from the fortress of Maastricht, crossing the Meuse, on their way into lands of the Holy Roman Empire.”’

Nearly 1,000 troops participated in each of the two raids. ‘The combined forces were similar in size to those employed by Chamilly and Humieéres against the Pays de Waes (discussed below). The raids extended over several days, while Estrades, who remained at Maastricht, anxiously awaited news of their progress.*®

After five days, on 10 January, Rose returned to Maastricht from Cologne. He had attacked a “very strong castle” three leagues from Bonn; this post, Mulheim “had been always against us and prevented the country for six leagues around from contributing.” During the attack, the dragoons dismounted and beat back a spirited charge by

around fifty men who defended the lower court, which was surrounded by a moat some sixty feet wide and ten feet in depth and full of water. ‘The dragoons then formed two assault parties. A lieutenant in the Montefranc company, named Duclos, swam across the moat with twenty dragoons. At another place, a reformed lieutenant

named Roties swam the moat with twenty-five dragoons. Roiies reached the other side first and charged across the outer court, chas-

ing the remaining defenders into the castle keep. He then turned and lowered the drawbridge to allow Rose to cross the moat with the cavalry. Roties then swam a second moat surrounding the castle keep, reaching another drawbridge, which he promptly lowered. The

lord of the castle of Mulheim with four of his servants was seen escaping 1n a rowboat and then running through a garden, finally

Louvois that Jiilich, neighboring Cologne, would soon also be raided for contributions that 1t owed to Maastricht in the form of oats.

°8 Calvo to Louvois, 9 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 22. Also, Estrades to Louvois, 9 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 125.

146 CHAPTER FOUR vanishing into some woods. ‘The French pillaged the castle. Estrades later observed: “It is the best which is in all of the country of Cologne

and they found there a large amount of goods and booty.” After the pillage, the party commanded by Rose burned several villages between Bonn and Cologne, “so that one could see the fire from one village to the next.” ‘The French relied on intimidation to secure payment of contributions: fire, plunder and marching in force with flags waving and drums beating all served the same purpose. Hostages

were taken back to Maastricht to secure the payment of contributions.” Estrades informed Louvois that: Rose strongly praised Roties. He is a reformed lieutenant. If you find

it just to make of him a reformed captain, he well merits it by his services. His father is a gentleman and dwells between Otiaren [Waren]

and Gimblours. He is one of the best partisans of this garrison."

Estrades also commended Captain Rose in his report to Louvois. Without Rose, who, after his return to Maastricht, had been sent to the fortified castle of Huy, Estrades believed that:the castle of Milheim

would have rendered the fire-raid useless “as it had done the other two times that our troops had been there.” What happened to the raid launched on the Electorate of ‘Trier? On 12 January, Estrades still had not received word from Levretiére.*!

It was after dusk the next day when Levretiére’s detachment from the Electorate of Trier finally arrived at Maastricht—with hostages.*”

Levretiére reported to Estrades that he had assaulted a town and burned in nine villages. In the assault, the French prepared to petard the gates of the town of Manderskeit; its defenders surrendered before the gates were blown sky high. All of its dependencies submitted to

contributions. Levretiére then marched east toward the town of Cochem on the Moselle River to a castle “thirty-four leagues from Maastricht.” The French learned, however, that its garrison included 400 soldiers and 800 “well-armed” peasants—a force too strong for Levretiére’s party to reckon with.*? These defenders of the castle at Cochem refused to allow the surrounding countryside to contribute. *” Estrades to Louvois, 12 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 105. See also same letter (original) AG, A' 498, fo. 24. ' patrades to Louvois, 12 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 105. ® Calvo to Louvois, 14 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 29. * Estrades to Louvois, 14 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 199.

RAIDS 149 Some inhabitants of the town of Cochem (not the castle), however, took matters in their own hands and went to see Levretiére. “Upon

his word they have promised that they will go to speak to the Intendant in order to arrange contributions,” as Calvo, the Lieutenant Governor of Maastricht, related to Louvois.** Following the promise

of the people of Cochem to arrange payment of contributions, Levretiére went on, for good measure, and pillaged and burned “seven large villages” of the dependency of CGochem, leaving only the churches standing where presumably the inhabitants sought refuge. Levretiére then burned two more villages on the Moselle River where

militia had attempted a defense but were routed by a determined French attack. (The defenders escaped into nearby woods as soon as the attack began.)

: After these far-ranging and multi-pronged raids to the electorates of Cologne and Trier, Estrades explained to Louvois that: “The cavalry will have need of repose having marched twelve days without halting except for grazing.”*” He did not mention French casualties but surely some resulted from the combats that had ensued.

4. Special Purpose Raids

In addition to extending contributions to regions with stubborn defenders, the French garrison force in the Netherlands conducted other raids, some supported fire-raids, and some harassed Allied

defenders of the Netherlands and burned their stockpiles of forage. Along the border facing Luxembourg, the French settled in part on a strategy of counter-fire-raids to keep the Imperial and Spanish garrisons in the Ardennes preoccupied and unable to mount fire-

raids of their own. In July 1674, nearly 400 enemy cavalry from Luxembourg had successfully “burned some houses within two leagues of Metz.’*® Louvois responded by instructing the marquis de Rochefort,

the general officer responsible for Metz, ‘Toul, Verdun, the Frenchoccupied Duchy of Lorraine and the Duchy of Barrois, “to prevent the inhabitants from being obligated to contribute.” Louvois urged

* Calvo to Louvois, 14 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 29. » Estrades to Louvois, 14 January 1676, AG, A!’ 486, fo. 199. © Louvois to Rochefort, 16 July 1674, AG, A' 380.

150 CHAPTER FOUR Rochefort to post cavalry detachments at Metz and at ‘Thionville and raise companies of dragoons in the province. In a separate instruction to Intendant Chartiel, Rochefort was further challenged by Louvois to manage a more effective area defense. Intendant Chartiel, however, had another strategy in mind: he hoped to keep the garrison of Luxembourg preoccupied, defending itself against French fire-raids from Maastricht, and thus unable to mount raids of its own. Chariiel even wondered why these counter-fire-raids were

not taking place already, to which Louvois rephed with a hint of indignation: “It is not so extraordinary that the garrison of Maastricht has not made raids in Luxembourg since the month of April, as the

Imperial army has been in position since to be able to cut off the parties.”*’ Louvois concluded this exchange of letters, however, by recognizing the merits of the intendant’s argument for counter-fireraids. Louvois instructed Estrades to make raids into Luxembourg as soon as the Imperial army left the region, “wherever Monsieur Chartiel requests of you that will be necessary for the contributions of Thionville.”*? A policy of counter-raids along the eastern frontier with Spanish Luxembourg was adopted. Counter-raids and other raids were sometimes intended to simply disrupt and fatigue the opponent while hopefully enforcing payment

of contributions and taking plunder. Throughout the winter of 1675-1676, the marquis de Chamilly sent smaller parties into the Pays de Waes to plunder river traffic. Ghamilly informed Louvois on | January 1676 that a war party of sixty men on foot, near the village of Nesle, between Ghent and Dendermonde, had burned two large river boats on the Escaut River in broad daylight. One was loaded with hay and the other with merchandise of various sorts. ‘The French war party, commanded by an officer of the Burgundy Regiment, faced fire from the armed barge crews: one French soldier was killed, and two others were wounded.” ‘The French boarded the boats, and the two barge masters were taken hostage and brought to Oudenaarde. According to Chamilly: “It is not possible that the enemies can maintain the commerce of this river free at the present.”””

*” Louvois to Chartiel, 16 July 1674, AG, A’ 380. *® Louvois to Estrades, 16 July 1674, AG, A’ 380.

. Haamnilly to Louvois, 1 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 11.

RAIDS Id] As long as the river remained unimpeded by ice, other French war parties harassed boat traffic, reminding local merchants to send for French passports.?! The French had become such a permanent presence there that they were able to map the region; on New Years’ Day, Chamilly told Louvois that he was sending him maps of Ghent and Dendermonde as soon as the first courier arrived. Louvois wanted

more detailed maps to follow the operations.” On 12 January 1676, Chamilly informed Louvois that he contin-

ued to “worry my neighbors on the Escaut River.”°*? Several days } before, Chamilly had sent a party of eighty men on foot of which fifty remained on the Bruges Canal for the security of the others. The party of thirty crossed the canal and marched to the Sas de Gand (Sas-van-Gent) where they attacked a large river boat, which put up a stubborn defense. ‘Che boatmen, or soldiers, killed a French

soldier from the Burgundy Regiment, and a French sergeant was badly wounded. Despite the initial resistance, the French had the advantage in numbers, and several of the boatmen jumped overboard “in fear that they would be taken to the prison at Oudenaarde,” surmised Chamilly. The French soldiers fired a volley and at least

one of the bullets struck and killed a prominent merchant from Ghent.”* The sound of the shots, however, attracted defenders from

along the canal, and this soon put an end to the raid, preventing the French war party from setting fire to the now empty boat as they had intended. ‘The war party turned back to the Canal of Bruges

to join the covering detachment and returned to Oudenaarde. As frequently happened, returning from the raid, however, the French encountered an opposing war party of 150 infantry that left Ghent, crossed the canal and awaited them. The French only learned news of this party a quarter of an hour before the encounter.” The French had been looking for their adversary, because, according to Chamilly, “the garrison here has an ascendancy over the enemies

°*' Chamilly promised to release the two boatmen. He hoped by releasing them with passports to convince others to purchase passports. Chamilly to Louvois, 19 January 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 35. *’ Chamilly to Louvois, | January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 11. °° Chamilly to Louvois, 12 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 139. * Chamilly to Louvois, 19 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 35. Chamilly later learned that the rich merchant had his leg shattered by the musket shot and that he cied worth more than 400,000 jrancs. > [bid.

152 CHAPTER FOUR and has always beaten them everywhere weak or strong, the officer who commanded them who was a lieutenant of my grenadiers decided

to attack them at whatever place they encountered them.”® The leader of the French war party learned that the enemy infantry of 100 was in a village, now within flintlock range. They had halted for the evening, entered several houses and were drinking with their hosts. Around the houses, where they made merry, some stood watch.

These sentinels spied the French as they entered the village, and hurried to warn the others. Lieutenant La Garde, who led the French party, saw them running, and he directly attacked the houses. ‘The

ensuing combat took place “two hours after midnight,’ and was fought mainly through the windows of the houses. Men shot into and out of the windows, igniting and tossing grenades at close range. Four French soldiers were wounded, and two killed. La Garde was

shot in his chest but kept his suffering silent for fear that it would cause the men near him to lose heart. He continued to lead until he collapsed from the loss of blood, but not before forcing the defenders from the houses. Although most escaped, three of the Allied sol-

diers were killed. No prisoners were taken, but in their haste to escape, the defenders left behind forty of their flintlocks. Darkness made pursuit of those who had fled impossible.

The French party returned to Oudenaarde on 9 January, arriving exhausted at the gates of the fortress around 8 AM. Lieutenant

La Garde and the other French wounded had been placed on a farmer’s cart. La Garde died two days later from his wounds. Chamilly hoped that Louvois would agree to replace his fallen officer with the lieutenant that Chamilly thought the best in the regiment.°’? Chamilly

understood the importance of selecting officers who merited their position. ‘The best officers to lead raids were men who led by example, men who demonstrated a balance of physical courage and human-

ity, deserving of the respect of others. The raid met the goal of Chamiully: to cause unease and difficulty for the Spanish defenders of the region. River raids occurred with frequency in the Netherlands, offering

ideal targets: slow-moving and often richly laden river boats. In February 1676, the comte de Nancré led a party from Courtrai to

” Chamilly to Louvois, 12 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 139. °” bid.

RAIDS 153 plunder and then burn a barge, rumored to be filled with cash for the Spanish army, on the Brussels Canal.’? Nancré sortied with 200 mounted troops, after having been notified where the barge could be expected. According to the Mercure Hollandois, the French commander of dragoons failed to find his intended target. Arriving about thirty minutes too late, he burned instead an empty boat, which was

tied to a dock near the town of Tielst. Then, upon receiving word that a detachment of enemy cavalry had sortied from Brussels, he hastily retreated to Ath.°? Why the story made its way into the pages of the Mercure might be explained by the fact that the Allies counted

as victories unsuccessful raids mounted by the French, because of the hardship and expense inflicted on the raiders. ‘he French probably would not have disagreed, but instead may have derived some satisfaction from the alarm they caused the Spanish defenders. Toward the end of February 1676, Chamilly decided to give another alarm to the garrison at Ghent, part of a strategy to wear the defenders down during the winter. On | March, a war party of eighty cavalry under the command of Violaine set out in the direc-

tion of Ghent. The cavalry departed at 11 AM and arrived at 3 PM, directly across from the eastern gate of Brussels. ‘The French fooled the sentries into thinking that they were a returning detachment from the garrison. Advancing towards them at a casual pace, “petit pas,” a leutenant of the Orléans Regiment (a cavalry regiment) with 15 mounted troops overwhelmed the unsuspecting guards at the first barrier. Following this, the remainder of the cavalry galloped toward the drawbridge leading into the town. It was hastily

raised at the last minute. One of the sentinels of the barrier was captured along with three other soldiers from an advanced post. On the road to the drawbridge, “five or six bourgeois of the town” were surprised and taken as hostages. No troops sortied from Ghent to pursue the intrepid French raiders although there were twenty-four companies of cavalry and dragoons in the town.”

Throughout the Dutch War, but particularly in its later stages, the French conducted supply raids. As opposed to forage operations,

intended to gather fodder for the use of one’s own field armies,

*’ Chamilly to Louvois, 11 February 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 556. ”” Mercure Hollandois, February 1676.

°° Chamilly to Louvois, | March 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 94.

154 CHAPTER FOUR supply raids aimed to destroy enemy stockpiles of both animal forage and grain. In July 1676, at Oudenaarde, the marquis de Chamilly reported to Louvois that his war parties had taken over 300 wagons and carts filled with forage within five leagues of Oudenaarde and “in different places.” The French war parties wasted or burned what their horses could not immediately consume, “so that the enemies will not be able to help themselves to it.”°' Similar to Chamilly’s destruction around Oudenaarde, Estrades sent parties from Maastricht that on 2 March 1676 burned two villages only “three-quarters-ofan-hour from Hasselt where there had been some forage assembled for the enemies.” On 8 March 1676, Estrades informed Louvois,

that the parties from Maastricht continued to seek out forage “in the vicinity of villages” and to burn “in the most distant.”°? Both Chamilly and Estrades shared a common problem in the spring and summer of 1676: the Allies threatened to besiege both Oudenaarde and Maastricht. Raids designed to destroy forage stockpiles escalated when Estrades

planned to demolish the milling operations that sustained the entire Imperial army in the Rhineland. This clever fortress governor and occasional diplomat hoped to “unease” the enemies of the French king. Estrades sent two secret agents to the place of the intended target on a reconnaissance mission. ‘The Imperial army had estab-

lished a pontoon bridge over the Rhine near Cologne to support their winter quarters there. Near the pontoon bridge, over 200 boats were docked together and six water mills were in operation, grind-

ing the grain that fed the Imperial army. From a previous reconnaissance, Estrades learned that thirty musketeers only guarded the pontoon bridge. For the expedition to succeed, according to Estrades,

the French had to gain the cooperation of a miller. This was the task of the two “trustworthy” men whom Estrades sent to Cologne.

The miller owned six boats that the French needed: the pontoon bridge and the mills had to be attacked by water, since the banks were heavily defended by German troops in winter garrison. Once the French had gained use of the boats, with 100 dragoons and 100 cavalry on board them and “combustible kindling wood and some fire bullets that the cavalry could easily carry, I believe that the affair

*' Chamilly to Louvois, 27 February 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 89. °2 Estrades to Louvois, 8 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 234.

RAIDS 139 wil succeed.””? On 12 March, the two secret agents sent a letter to Estrades informing him that the guard of the pontoon bridge had been reinforced to 200 men, “because of the frequent parties which come to the gates of Cologne.” Estrades called off the raid until the guard dropped back to its original strength.°* The raid was probably suspended for good, when it was learned that the guard remained in place, or other events pressed the French garrison at Maastricht. Estrades frequently directed supply raids against the more numerous adversaries who often surrounded and threatened Maastricht. On 27 February 1676, Estrades informed Louvois that “the main reason which obliged me to occupy the castles, which are between Huy and Liége and to put there some cavalry and dragoons, was to consume the forage which is in these quarters, this has succeeded so well that the Enemies have been unable to take any of it.” Estrades

believed there would be no forage left in the area by the end of March, because he planned to destroy the castles left in the region where the peasants (or grain merchants) stored it. Wherever Estrades learned forage had been amassed, as he informed Louvois: “I send a party to burn it.” As a result of his raids, Estrades believed that “the enemies could not hold any corps of cavalry on this side of the Demer River” in the principality of Liége.® In fact, there was a naturally close connection between supply raids to destroy forage and grand operations, so much so, that sometimes detachments sent to destroy forage were soon immediately made available to join field armies in a campaign. In July 1677, Louvois ordered St. Ruhe to assemble a corps of cavalry in Hainaut to plunder forage and grain from the area around Mons—the corps would be near enough to Marshal Luxembourg’s camp that it could join him in a day’s march, in case Prince William maneuvered toward Oudenaarde and forced Luxembourg to give battle.°° If the opponent

could not be driven away by destruction of his forage, then at least he might by stymied by equal or superior numbers in a field force. Other French raids in the Netherlands were aimed at preventing the Allies from establishing garrisons in castles that might interrupt

3 Estrades to Louvois, 3 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 180. ** Estrades to Louvois, 12 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 281. *. Louvois to Luxembourg, 19 July 1677, AG, A' 533, fo. 8. °° Estrades to Louvois, 27 February 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 105.

156 CHAPTER FOUR the spread of French contributions. On 2 January 1675, for example, Louvois informed Estrades that, based on his information, the Imperials and Spanish hoped to take the town of Visé, directly between Liége and Maastricht on the Meuse River. In order to prevent this, Estrades prepared to send nearly 1,500 men from the garrison at Maastricht, infantry and cavalry, and in one or two days to dismantle the place in such a way that it would be of no use to the enemy.°’ Poor weather delayed the operation for several weeks. After a bout of good weather, Estrades sent Colonel Maqueline of the Piedmont Regiment, with 1,200 men. Maqueline secured the town, occupied defensible positions in the countryside around Visé, and deployed parties of cavalry and dragoons around the town in a security perimeter. Meanwhile, a detachment of infantry and demo-

lition experts set charges and began blowing apart sections of the curtain walls encircling the town. More than 6,000 Imperial and Spanish troops were in winter quarters near the town.” Later, as a result of the success of this operation, Estrades resolved to demolish

“all the castles which are in the vicinity of the Meuse in order to prevent the Imperials from taking advantage [of them] in the next campaign, and in order to make the passage from Maastricht to Liége, entirely free.” The party from Maastricht plundered the town, and all of the grain stored there was removed to Maastricht. Following

the destruction of the town’s walls, the owners of the grain were informed that they would be recompensed in cash at Maastricht, but the grain would remain in French hands.” There was resistance to French fire-raids. The “well-entrenched” position on the Gette River, where Spanish milita defenders retreated following the French raid on ‘Tirlemont in 1674, represented the principle defense the Allies employed to oppose French fire-raids. A series of such inter-locking positions, known as redoubts, formed a barrier along the Escaut River, in hopes of frustrating “invasions”

by the French who wanted to impose contributions on the lands beyond the river, the Pays de Waes. The Pays de Waes included three local governments: the castellany of the Waes, Vieuxbourg of Ghent and the castellany of Dendermonde. The region nestled like

°*’ Louvois to Estrades, 2 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 8. °° Gazette, 31 January 1675, from Maastricht. Gazette, 7 February 1675, from Liége.

RAIDS 157 an emerald triangle between the North Sea coast with Bruges on one end, Ghent and Antwerp at the other ends. It was covered in the west by the Ostende-Bruges Canal and between Bruges and Ghent by the Bruges-Ghent Canal. The engineered defenses along the Escaut River covered the region from Ghent to Antwerp, and the Grand Canal provided another barrier from Brussels to Antwerp.

5. Lhe Pays de Waes Invasions

The first French fire-raid in the Pays de Waes may perhaps never be known with certainty. From at least the fall of 1673, the French raided the Waes. In that year, a chronicler in the Spanish Netherlands recorded that “all of western Flanders was converted into a desert.” Further, the chronicler noted the “continual pillage and violent executions of the [French] garrison of Courtrai up to the walls of Ghent;

and the burning of Destelbergen, Heusden, Laerne and Loochristi

by the troops of generals Humiéres and Chamilly.”’? Between 1675-1677 the French conducted larger raids, eventually involving thousands of troops: infantry, dragoons, cavalry, pontoon bridges, portable rafts and artillery. In January 1675, the governor of Lille, Marshal Humiéres, and the marquis de Chamilly, the new governor of Oudenaarde, planned a large fire-raid into the Vieuxbourg of Ghent and the castellanies of Waes and Dendermonde. ‘The hero of the siege of Grave, a man

praised by Louis XIV at court in January 1675, the marquis de Chamilly, personally led this first attempt to break through the line of defenses that the Spanish had built along the Escaut River. On

9 February 1675 Chamilly departed from Oudenaarde. He commanded a detachment that was well-prepared for crossing the Escaut. They brought with them a number of portable, water-proofed leather rafts, which Chamilly, who enjoyed a variety of skills and crafts, had

himself invented. The leather rafts were easily transported as their wood frame collapsed to form a kind of long valise that the soldiers could transport strapped to their backs.’’ Despite the preparations, Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 124. ' Louis XIV visited Oudenaarde on 12 June 1676, and saw these rafts. Pellisson pcorded the ang s impression of the rafts as “very pleased.” Pellisson, Lettres, vol.

» PP: 110.

158 CHAPTER FOUR Chamilly sensed danger before leaving Oudenaarde. His fears were not so much because of the swollen river (which had spilled over its banks) or the unpredictable currents but were more related to enemy troops in the area. “This cannot but be difficult on account of the guards posted there,” he reflected two days before departing. If the river guard discovered the French, they would warn the Spanish garrison at Ghent or nearby Dutch troops in winter quarters to assemble and overwhelm the French raiders. ‘Two days after Chamilly had made known his fears, on 11 February 1675, Louvois received disappointing news—the expedition had floundered. As the French war party was upon the banks of the Escaut, and in the midst of crossing, a patrol of fifteen men walked head on into the French. Finding themselves surprised, the French troops had no choice but to give

away their secret. They fired on the enemy. It did not take long before the French shots were reverberating through the countryside on the opposite bank: alarm cannon were fired, alerting the garri-

son at Ghent. Overwhelmed by sheer numbers, the patrol wisely surrendered—but, ironically, not one of its members had been hit by the noisy French fusillade that awoke the countryside. From the opposite bank, a few French, who already were across, used their leather rafts again and furiously returned across the river. (Presumably, the rafts kept weapon, powder, and perhaps clothing dry, but required

some paddling effort while the soldier kneeled or sat in the mansized devices.) When Chamilly’s war party returned to Oudenaarde after its first Waes “invasion,” it had no more to show for its exertions than the few prisoners, most of who were officers reformés. Chamiully

decided that all he could do was to leave the Pays de Waes in a state-of-alarm, shaken by his attempted river crossing, and hope that jittery patrols and numerous false alarms would wear down the Allied garrisons and eventually put them off guard.” Louvois suggested to Chamilly on 15 February 1675 to wait for

the “terror” in the country to subside before trying another raid: “His Majesty hopes that when it will be a little more calm from its present nervousness for you to try to send other parties there.”” After a few weeks passed, on 27 February, Chamuilly informed Louvois

” Chamilly to Louvois, 1] February 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 101. See also, Chamilly to Louvois, 11 February 1675, AG, A' 486, fo. 556. * Louvois to Chamilly, 15 February 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 116.

RAIDS 159 that he was ready to make another attempt at crossing the Escaut River, and all that held him back was that Marshal Humiéres had ordered him to transfer all of the cavalry in his garrison and the élite Fusiliers of Flanders to the French fortress of Ath. Upon the return of his cavalry, Chamilly promised, he would try again.” It was during this time that Chamilly, with Louvois’ support, turned to subterfuge to compel the Pays de Waes to pay contributions by sending soldiers disguised as peasants to burn houses. Indeed, for the remainder of February 1675, Chamilly and Louvois concentrated in their correspondence on how to break through or elude the defenses

along the Escaut River. They were excited by the shared belief, based on strategic intelligence from a secret correspondent, that “Villahermosa is more embarrassed than ever, neither able to find money nor to raise troops.”” A practical man, Chamiully believed that the inhabitants of the Pays de Waes desired to save their property from fire-raids and genuinely wanted to pay contributions to the king of France. Only their governor, who made any payment of contributions to the French punishable by death, prevented them making an agreement with the French. (Ihe governor also had sent for a regiment of Dutch infantry, recently lodged in nearby Bruges.) ‘The combination of militia guarding the river, earthen redoubts covering the fords and the arrival of a Dutch infantry regiment would make a river crossing more difficult than before—even if the country people were prepared to pay contributions.’”? Chamilly bided his time and assembled his forces to face

the strengthened defenses that now opposed him. ‘The Violaine Dragoons were back in garrison at Oudenaarde. ‘The former major of the fortress of Grave, who had received the royal commission for

the dragoons, arrived to take command. Chamilly described the detached company as “quite handsome.”’’ The new company seemed to boost Chamilly’s spirits.

On the night of 6 April 1675, Chamilly led another surprise raid across the Escaut River, this one against a suburb of the town of Ghent in the Castellany of the Vieuxbourg de Ghent. Forty grenadiers

™ Chamilly to Louvois, 27 February 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 139. ” Chamilly to Louvois, 11 February 1675, AG, A! 486, fo. 556. See also, Chamilly to Louvois, 11 February 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 101. ’° Chamilly to Louvois, 27 February 1675, AG, A’ 448, fo. 139.

Tbid.

160 CHAPTER FOUR and twenty men, described as especially “handy with axes,” led the attack. The Courtrai Dragoons, the Violaine Dragoons, the Fusiliers de Flandres Regiment and 200 musketeers followed them. Almost immediately, the attacking column of grenadiers and ax-wielding men overwhelmed two small guard houses, bayoneting and hacking to death the occupants. hey crossed two barriers and established themselves on the palisade of the covered-way which surrounded the suburb; the rest of the attacking force followed. On the covered-way, a grassy Clear-fire zone that sloped downward from the old walls of the suburban town, seven companies of the Spanish Montalto Regiment

took position to block the French. Near dawn’s light, the French advanced toward their opponent. The Spanish regiment reportedly defended itself “quite vigorously,’ but when surrounded, it beat a retreat. The French next escaladed a section of the walls. ‘Chey plundered and burned the suburb town of Ghent. “Several houses were burned,

and two officers were taken prisoner” along with twenty-three sol-

diers and eleven burghers. “More than eighty remained on the place”’—the dead of the Montalto Regiment from the combat on the covered-way. Chamilly and his men returned home to Oudenaarde,

finally victorious.’® But, the contributions from the Vieuxbourg of Ghent were not forthcoming. In fact, Chamilly would have to try again—several more times before the inhabitants of the countryside near Ghent would pay any contributions to the French. In the meantime, a whole summer would pass before another “invasion” across the Escaut River was attempted. The campaign season of 1675 prohibited a large-scale “invasion”

of the Pays de Waes until the very end of the summer. On 11 September 1675, under morning moonlight, Chamilly departed from

Oudenaarde to raid again the Pays de Waes. He brought with him on this occasion: 290 dragoons, 950 infantry from the Oudenaarde garrison, three small cannon and a pontoon bridge. A specially trained

detached company, the Du Pont Company, had been drilled in the

use of the pontoon bridge for just such an occasion as now presented itself. ‘The small corps marched to the village of Wichelen on

the banks of the Escaut where it arrived the next day. At about 5 AM on 12 September, an advance party of Du Pont troops pad® Gazette, 15 April 1675 from Oudenaarde.

RAIDS 161 dled across in their leather rafts. Supported by the fire of cannon, the grenadiers routed the peasant militia on guard at the redoubts facing the river.” The rest of the French crossed over the pontoon bridge, but on reaching the other bank, they were counterattacked by militia. After a brief exchange of fire, the militia withdrew— several were killed and at least seven taken prisoner. Chamilly sent forward several smaller detachments commanded by De La Motte. ‘These marched into the village of Wichelen, secured

the cemetery (surrounded by a chest-high wall like most cemeteries in the Netherlands and consequently an excellent defensive site) and occupied another defensible position in advance of the main body, making a secure route for the rest to pass through. Crossing at the head of 500 infantry and 120 dragoons, Chamilly routed the remainder of the militia companies that had defended the other redoubts and had attempted a counterattack. In total, the French assaulted five such redoubts along the banks of the river. ‘Then, the plundering and burning commenced: 400 houses were burned in Wichlen and other villages of the Castellany of Vieuxbourg, along with two “castles” and several grain mills. During the pillage, the garrison at Ghent sortied, but believing it faced a more numerous foe, it withdrew from the scene of destruction. French losses were slight: three killed and seventeen wounded.” In October, the French mounted another large raid, the third ventured into the Pays de Waes during 1675. This tme Marshal Humieres accompanied Chamilly and the raiders. Eight hundred cavalry, 3,000 infantry, four cannons and two “flying bridges” or pontoon bridges made up the invasion force. ‘The raiders marched within sight of

Ghent and crossed the Escaut River under cannon fire from the defenses of the town. A battalion of the Burgundy Regiment, supported by a battalion of the Conti Regiment (about 1,800 troops in all) and two cannon provided supporting fire, raking the positions of the defenders, while the remainder of the force (nearly 2,000) crossed over on the pontoon bridges. French fire overwhelmed the

” According to a chronicle of a certain Vande Velde in the Pays de Waes, rural guards from Saint-Nicholas (south of Antwerp on the Escaut River), Sinay and Belcele were tasked in 1675 with preventing a French corps from crossing the Escaut, but were driven back with heavy losses, Van Houtte, Les Occupations, vol. . 117.

' 0 Gasrite 16 September 1675, from Oudenaarde.

162 CHAPTER FOUR Spanish regulars and militia in the outworks, and the French “sword in hand” took the positions. Two “small forts” fell to the attackers

in succession. After the mélée had ended, more than 100 of the enemy were thought killed. The French captured a Spanish captain of dragoons, two infantry captains and more than eighty soldiers. The earthwork defenses were smashed, and the vicinity of Ghent was burned and plundered. According to the Gazette, which related the account given by Humiéres to Louvois, nearly 1,200 houses were burned. ‘The Burgundy and Conti battalions, supported by artillery, fired volley after volley of suppressing fire at the Allied infantry on

the ramparts of Ghent during the pillage. The defenders replied, according the French version, with over 400 volleys of their own during the course of the action. ‘The Burgundy Regiment sustained thirty casualties in this hot exchange of fire. “This daring action has terrified the enemy and has obliged all the Country which 1s behind Gand [Ghent] and up to Anvers [Antwerp] to pay contributions.”®! According to a Spanish chronicler, the attack took place as follows: In the month of October 1675, the French were advised that the garrisons of Ghent and Dendermonde were weak, and resolved to attempt an escalade on both of the fortresses. Parties from Calais, Dunkirk and Gravelines under the command of Humiéres and Chamilly with 4,000 men and five cannons arrived on 7 October before the Escaut River, downstream from Ghent, near Destelbergen. The river was not yet guarded except by rural militia. The French tried to cross, and the peasants fired. The noise of the volleys attracted 300-400 men from the garrison of Ghent, who joined the rural guards. The volleys became more devastating. The French, trying to throw a bridge across, fired on the cannon and guards, and the troops were able to cross, with great losses. The battles lasted for over two hours, the rural guards fled to Ghent. The French burned and pillaged Destelbergen, Loochristi,

Heusden and Laerne. The next day, they abruptly decamped.”

Both the French account and Spanish chronicler agreed that a power-

ful raid was mounted by the French; that it succeeded in breaking the river defenses around Ghent; and that several towns were pillaged

and burned in the Pays de Waes.

*! Gazette, 14 October 1675, from Oudenaarde. * Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, pp. 117-118.

RAIDS 163 On 19 January 1676, Chamilly told Louvois that the continual alarms that he gave the Pays de Waes had fatigued the Allied troops in quarters there. Chamilly had purposefully added to their fatigue. On 15 January, a small French party of six drummers, twenty cav-

alry and three trumpeters had arrived on the banks of the Escaut River, and at 2 AM began blaring, beating and making such a com-

motion as to convince the defenders on the other side that a raid was underway. At Ghent and Dendermonde, according to Chamilly, the warning cannon was fired: This which made all of the troops at Brussels and Malines and Bruges

to march. They have resolved not to march anymore when the cannon at Ghent fires and to send two Dutch regiments to the Pays de Waes.*

Also by 19 January, Chamilly could inform Louvois that commerce on the Escaut River was “very interrupted.’®** On 17 January, two

Dutch infantry regiments had arrived in the Pays de Waes in an effort to defend the region more successfully. But, the arrival of the troops may have done more harm than good. ‘The Waes, as Chamilly

observed, was “extremely ruined and burdened.” At Ghent, the burghers refused to pay the governor-general of the Spanish Nether-

lands any more war subsidies—about the only source of revenue besides contributions for the government. ‘The town of Ghent made known to the governor-general that 1t was impossible to pay subsicies due to the fact that the country had been burned and the troops,

which were quartered there made it difficult for them to find “a penny.” It was not only fire-raids that crippled the region, but also the quartering of Dutch and Spanish troops there to defend against fire-raids. According to the reports received by Chamilly, the Spanish

gave 500 francs (a colloquial expression for lwres) to each of their companies of dragoons and cavalry in garrison and hoped to give them 500 more to reestablish them at full-strength with recruits. Chamilly, however, was skeptical: “AIl of the troops, infantry as well as cavalry, are assuredly in a very poor condition, all the talk about increasing the size of the companies is but a song.” It was rumored that many men had refused commissions in the ranks of the Spanish

“because of the little money that it offered.” Support in 1676 for °° Chamilly to Louvois, 19 January 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 35. * Tbid.

164 CHAPTER FOUR the Spanish crown seemed conspicuously lacking among the Wallons

and Flemmings. It was further rumored that those who did join the Spanish king as newly commissioned officers received half of what was promised them.” As April approached, Louis XIV explained his plan for the 1676 campaign to the French commanders who had been charged with

raids on the Pays de Waes. The king had decided as part of the plan to deal a devastating blow to the Pays de Waes—one that would

both complement the main siege operations and finally force that country to pay contributions. While the king led the main field force

in a siege of Condé, Humieres and Nancré would each conduct a diversionary raid before the campaign began. Supported by Chamiully,

Humieres would lead a raid on the Pays de Waes. After “this execution,” he would march to Weteren arriving around 15 April. From there, he was to return the troops to their garrisons or else join them | to the king’s siege force at Condé. Meanwhile, Nancré would conduct a strategic forage around the castle of Benissaret and block the road from Brussels to St. Guislain, preventing any Spanish reinforcements from reaching Condé and keeping the king informed of any large troop assemblies by the Dutch and Spanish.” Unlike the previous raids on the Pays de Waes, Humiéres planned to enter the region from its back door, across the canal of the Sas de Ghent, and approach it from the west. On 9 April French troops marched from ‘Tournai and Lille on the road toward Oudenaarde, massing for the raid upon the Pays de Waes. From Oudenaarde, the raiding force marched to Courtrai, where its commander Marshal Humiéres arrived at noon on 10 April. The raiders set out again that night. Humiéres promised to send Louis XIV a messenger as soon as he had crossed the canal of the Sas de Ghent.” The crossing of the canal was a difficult proposition, and in some respects 1t took on an aspect of the more famous crossing of the Rhine in 1672 by Louis XIV’s army. ‘The Fort de Rouge (Fort Red) covered the main ford. Humiéres hoped that a vigorous charge across

the ford by a part of the command, as well as massed firepower to suppress the guns and infantry in the entrenchments around the fort,

°° Chamilly to Louvois, 19 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 35. ®° Louis XIV to Humiéres, 9 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 184. *” Louvois to Louis XIV, 10 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 177.

RAIDS 165 would enable the French to get across. He then planned to march out of range of enemy artillery. A Dutch infantry battalion from Hulst supplemented the regular garrison of the fort, and other detachments, including 700 Flemish militia, joined the defenders. According to Humieres, the first French across “vigorously” assaulted

the defenders, despite their “good entrenchments.” After several volleys of French cannon and musket fire, the defenders abandoned the entrenchments facing the river (but not the entire fort). ‘The action was not without its heroics: the majority of the French officers had swum the canal; encouraged by the brave example, their men followed. The action was won by the élan of the French officers and the resolve of the soldiers on foot who followed and withstood the fire of the entrenched defenders. Humiéres did not reform his troops for an attack on Fort Rouge, however, and the artillery in the Dutch fort continuously killed French soldiers throughout the action. On

the night of 12-13 April 1676, the French raiders bivouacked on the Canal of the Sas of Ghent, further upstream and well beyond artillery range.

After the crossing, Humiéres moved to the next phase of the raid, which involved turning the Escaut River flank of Dendermonde and falling on the Pays de Waes from its rear, completely encircling it. At dawn the next day, raiders marched to the village of Lokeren on the Escaut River. Chamilly remained behind the main force with a rear guard. When Humieres was within “a half league” of the village, he sent the comte de Bulonde to secure a camp for the evening. A brief skirmish began. Upon arriving within musket range of the hamlet, Bulonde’s dragoons encountered a troop of the enemy, which they pursued to the bridge at Lokeren, capturing several prisoners. Before sending Bulonde toward Lokeren, Humicres had sought out any news of the Spanish, their numbers and where they assembled their army to oppose the “invasion”. A leutenant of the Villahermosa Guards Regiment, captured in the skirmish near the Lokeren bridge, told Humiéres that there were upwards of.7,000 men ready to dispute the passage through the village. Shortly after the interrogation of the captured heutenant, other prisoners assured Humieres that the Duke of Montalto and the Prince of Vaudemont were near with 2,000 cavalry (not 7,000), including several companies of the Guards Regiment of the King of Spain and the guards companies belonging to several Spanish generals of cavalry, some dragoons and 400 infantry from the garrison of Dendermonde. The prisoners assured

166 CHAPTER FOUR Humieéres that the Duke of Villahermosa had marched to occupy Lokeren “with all of the troops of Spain which had orders to arrive there.” Yet, Villahermosa himself and the main Spanish contingent had not yet arrived. Humieéres resolved to attack the forward Spanish detachment of 2,000 before night and before they could be reinforced. He sent a messenger to notify Chamilly, who commanded the rear guard, to

join him immediately with the rest of the troops and artillery. Observing the increasing numbers of prisoners, the French troops morale remained exceptionally high, according to Humieres. A battle was fought near Lokeren Bridge, making it the second battle of importance resulting from the raid. The enemy resistance at the bridge was “very resolute,” according to Humieéres. ‘The Spanish

forces engaged (reinforcements continued to arrive up to the last moment) may have numbered close to 2,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.°° The French sent forward some of their toughest troops: the Navarre battalions and the St. Sandoux, Andenne and Béthune dragoons led the attack, supported by artillery. The French guns pounded

the Spanish ranks that blocked the way to the bridge. After some particularly effective artillery shots and murderous volleys by the Navarre infantry and some dragoons at very close range, the Spanish were routed. ‘Chey abandoned the town, some of their standards and four pieces of cannon that they had brought with them but had not yet deployed. While the bridge defenders fled, however, a Spanish demolition detachment coolly set fire to the plank bridge. Humieres, caught by the pulse of the engagement, and the chevalier de Souvre

and several officers from the Navarre Regiment, dismounted and sword in hand swam the river while the bridge burned. Having made it over himself, Humicres judged it possible for others to follow. He

sent orders for the Cravattes Regiment, a dragoon formation, to cross. The Orléans Regiment followed. As they arrived, Bulonde took

command. The French pursued the defenders in a running fight through a small village opposite Lokeren, capturing two flags and more prisoners, until the Spanish troops saved themselves by vanishing into the grass “prairies” of the Castellany of Dendermonde. The battle at Lokeren Bridge ensured the success of the raid. ‘The battle resulted, on 13 April, in the arrival of several individual deputies

*8 Louvois to Nancré, 15 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 205.

RAIDS 167 from the village of St. Nicholas (the capital of the Castellany of the

Pays de Waes) at Humiéres’ camp to negotiate their payment of contributions. The French marshal explained to Louvois, however, that he did not want to arrange anything unless it was for the “whole country.” The St. Nicholas deputies proposed to negotiate for the whole, but Humieéres did not think it prudent. Instead, he wanted present, for any agreement regarding contributions, a grand bailiff

(or a bishop) and a “prominent person” from each one of the 25 villages that composed the Waes. Moreover, Humiéres wanted hostages.

The delegation from St. Nicholas promised Humieéres to return the next morning (morning of 14 April) at the camp.”

It appeared that the Pays de Waes might pay some of the contributions owed since the beginning of the war. At 11 AM on 14 April, Humicres wrote that the house where he stayed “was full of hostages from not only the Pays de Waes but also the Vieuxbourg de Gand.’”*? On 15 April 1676, Louvois received a letter from Marshal

Humieres that indicated that the Pays de Waes was entirely submitted to contributions. Further, local bailiffs were in French custody.”' On 16 April 1676, Humiéres wrote to Louvois from the camp

at Weteren informing the minister that he had submitted not only the Castellany of the Waes to pay contributions, but as well the town of Ghent, the Vieuxbourg of Ghent, and the Castellany of Dendermonde.” Before he departed Weteren, Humieéres launched several assaults against the forts which had been observed during the march up the Escaut River. This was difficult, as he explained, because they were “within musket range the one from the other.” “They made a frightful defense because of that.’*’ Although the defenders were routed,

the earthen defenses remained behind: their destruction would be

* Humiéres to Louvois, 13 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 192. Also reprinted in Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 2, pp. 35-36. Van Houtte uses the letter of AG, A’ 488, fo. 319. " Tbid. "' Humiéres to Louvois, 15 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 203. (The same day, Louvois wrote a letter to Humiéres requesting that he bring the bailiffs with him so that Louvois could personally negotiate with them.) ” Humiéres to Louvois, 16 April 1676, AG, A' 499, fos. 1-2. In his march to Weteren, Humiéres reported that at a “half a league” he had seen six forts “with

anes ... well-palisaded and parapets,” guarding the Escaut River.

168 CHAPTER FOUR inserted into a clause in the general treaty of contributions for the region. According to the treaty, the very same peasants who had labored to build the defenses on orders of the Spanish, now would dismantle them on orders of the French. Humieres then recrossed the Canal of the Sas-de-Gand bringing with him the prisoners: the bailiffs, the Grand Bailiff of the Pays de Waes and the “eschevins,” or aldermen, of all the principal places of the Pays de Waes.” At the end of April, Louvois received from Humiéres a copy of the treaty regulating contributions between the “Pays de Waes, the Vieux Bourg [of Ghent], and the Pays de Terremonde [or Dendermonde],” signed on 20 April 1676. ‘The total amount due from the Pays de Waes was significant: 900,000 florins to be paid in three installments. ‘The agreement required the Vieuxbourg of Ghent to pay the cost of transporting its contributions to Flanders and to pay the entire amount of contributions owed since the year beginning in October 1673 and ending in October 1674. ‘There were to be three equal payments, the first on 20 June 1676 (in three months), the second on 20 July 1676, and the third on 20 September 1676. With respect to the present year, the treaty required that they pay immediately. “Le pays [de Waes],” recorded Pellisson, “has promised 500,000 écus (1,500,000 dwres) for the time being, and 500,000 lures per year as long as it will last.”’’ There also was a demand inserted in the treaty that the entrenchments and forts built along the Escaut River be torn down by January 1677. ‘The treaty was signed by the hostages (taken by Humiéres) who had been brought in humiliation

to the French camp at Condé. They were subsequently transferred to confinement at the fortress of Tournai.”® In addition to paying the previously owed contributions, both Vieuxbourg of Ghent and Dendermonde would pay 10,000 écus (60,000 lwres) in May 1677. However, if they dismantled the field fortifications along the Escaut River, the French would remit this sum to them. Thus, the Pays de Waes and its neighbors were finally and at last officially submitted to contributions in April of 1676. The French may have greeted this broad treaty for an entire “pays de contributions” with excessive optimism, however, since none of the Waes’ governments showed

“+ Humiéres to Louvois, 16 April 1676, AG, A! 499, fo. 1. ” Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 2, pp. 17-19. °° Traité pour le paymens des Contributions, AG, A' 499, fo. 59.

RAIDS 169 much interest in paying their contributions or dismantling fortifications,

after the French left. Humieres’ raid in March 1676 secured some owed contributions, but it failed to produce subsequent payments. Six months later, on 7 September 1676, Louvois wrote to Chamilly, concerning “the villages of the Pays de Waes, where you have sent fire-raids.” Louvois advised Chamilly that: All that I can tell you is to lose no opportunity to torment all of that country there, until the inhabitants will have entirely satisfied what they owe. And the King, does not doubt that you have profited from the absence of the Duke of Villahermosa on the Great Highway, to send yet more [parties] to burn in the Waes, Dendermonde and the Vieuxbourg de Ghent and to take prisoners.”

One month later, on 6 October 1676, Louvois learned that Chamiully

had raided once again into the Vieuxbourg of Ghent. I pray that you will continue to take as many prisoners as possible and will have pillaged and burned until those men have carried out their bargain either in money or credit, and will not cease until we have directed you that it has actually been done.”

Shortly after this raid, on the night of 8 October 1676, over 200 houses were burned in Malste, a suburb village of Ghent.” Raids on the Pays de Waes would continue until the final fall of Ghent in April 1678. The Allies could not allow some regions, vital to the Allied defense of the Netherlands, to submit to contributions, and the only way for the French to dominate them was to conquer and to occupy them.

*’ Louvois to Chamilly, 7 September 1676, AG, A' 484, fo. 294. Also reprinted in Van Houtte, Les Occupations, volume 2, p. 41. See the same letter, Louvois to Chamilly, 7 September 1675, AG, A' 503, fo. 29. 8 Louvois to Chamilly, 6 October 1676, AG, A' 484, fo. 460. Also reprinted in Van Houtte, Les Occupations, vol. 2, pp. 41-42. ”° “According to what the partisan told me,” Chamilly informed Louvois. The partisan who commanded the party of 50 men, however, was only able to take five prisoners, “quite miserable.” Chamilly to Louvois, 9 October 1676, AG, A’ 503, fo. 180.

170 CHAPTER FOUR 6. Conclusion

French fire-raids were not equivalent to wild marauding, but they did full the Netherlands’ with violent destruction. Officials generally maintained firm control over the use of raids and suppressed marauding by garrison troops. ‘They forbade illegal acts of self-serving violence by individual soldiers. Ordinances prohibited the unauthorized

sortie of troops and marauding. When French troops entered a friendly town for winter garrisoning, a review was held and the “usual prohibitions will be known to prevent all disorder, and to very expressly forbid all soldiers from entering other dwellings, other

than those assigned to them, and in the gardens or other places of inhabitants, from cutting there any trees, or taking anything else, on penalty of death.”'°® For the most part, these rules seemed to have been obeyed. Partisans who desired the life of the outlaw had to desert their company and garrison. ‘Throughout the frontier, French

intendants made a major effort to finish construction of new barracks and to keep a close eye on their troops. Military ordinances, and the new barracks, increasingly separated the world of soldiers from the rest of society, drawing a sharper line in the process between military raids and acts of brigandage. Episodes of disorder and theft, appearing in no particularly great

number during the Dutch War, led to inquiries and often ended up on the desk of Louvois. For example, French soldiers were not supposed to leave their quarters (barracks or lodging rooms) after the retreat was sounded. This did not prevent a foolish brawl of “sergeants

against soldiers” from breaking out at a tavern in Hesdin on 19 December 1673. At an “indecent” hour, a sergeant was badly wounded. Louvois read the details of the entire incident.'”' French officers were

held accountable, when their troops, without given orders, “foraged and beat the countryside.” Officers were held liable to paying the costs of damages caused by the men in their command. After civil-

100 An ordinance of 1651 (repeated in 1706) made known the concern of Louis XIV to protect the property of his own subjects from the petty thievery and damage caused by soldiers. De l’Entrée © arrivée des Troupes dans les Villes, Places & leux de leur Garnison, ou Quartier-d’hyver, Book ‘Two, Article Five of Chevalier de Sparre, Code Militaire, Ou Compilation des reglemens et ordonnances de Louis XIV Roy de France et de Navarre, Faites pour les Gens de Guerre depuis 1651 jusques a present (Paris, 1707).

'°' Scaron de Longue to Louvois, 8 February 1674, AG, A! 404, fo. 127.

RAIDS 17] lans were compensated for their loss, soldiers were often put to death.'*’ Certainly some fortress governors, partisans and other mem-

bers of the garrison force did not always follow the ordinances of Louis XIV to the letter—but at least they had to have known of negative consequences. Governor Estrades at Maastricht once complained to Louvois of the bad example of the troops from the field army who “committed disorders” in the countryside that were in plain view of his garrison troops.'”’ Overall, the evidence on such matters indicates that the French garrison force, if not the field armies, kept a disciplined bearing over the course of the war.'"* The temptation of plunder lived in the culture of garrisons, especially the

dragoon companies, but it only occasionally erupted in the commonest forms of crime associated with civilians as much as soldiers.

Large detachments sent on raids with a lieutenant general or brigadier present typically behaved well and maintained a military bearing. It was only the smaller war parties that caused increasing concern to French officials and their Spanish counterparts in matters of discipline and control. An armed party of less than 100 men sent to war was prone, indeed primed, to commit acts of violence against civilians. The Duke of Villahermosa (governor-general of the

Spanish Netherlands after 1675) composed an ordinance “in order to remedy the disorders which the parties of the troops of Spain make.”'®? In response, Marshal Humiéres issued his own ordinance to prevent French parties from causing similar “disorders” in French territory. Humiéres sent a sample copy of the one made by the Duke of Villahermosa to Louvois on 21 December 1675 to forewarn Louvois

of the Spanish statute. Then, on 29 December 1675, Humieres sent to Louvois a copy of his own ordinance, explaining to Louvois that he had composed it because: The inhabitants of the open country have complained so frequently to

the Estates [of French Flanders] of the damages caused to them by ' BG (Vincennes), Recueil Cangé, Ordonnance Du Roy pour obliger les Troupes de ses Armées a vwre le méme bon ordre au dela des Frontieres, 14 April 1668, vol. 22, no. 16.

’ Estrades to Louvois, 11 June 1675, AG, A' 450, fo. 32. aS oldiers may have found it easier to sortie from camps in the field, plunder, and return to camp than from fortress garrisons. On 19 August 1672, Luxembourg threatened to impose the death sentence on any soldiers who dared to sortie from his camp near Utrecht and “pillage the countryside.” See Luxembourg to Louvois, 19 August 1672, AG, A' 277, fo. 74. ' Humiéres to Louvois, 21 December 1675, AG, A! 453, fo. 149.

172 CHAPTER FOUR the troops of the King, and the bailiffs having made great appeals to me to try to remedy these.. .'%°

A chief merit of the ordinance drafted by Humieéres, so he thought, was that he had it composed “in the most common language possible in order to assuage the spirits of the peasants.”'°’ Spirits were low in the French countryside. So important was it to Humieéres that his handiwork be accepted, that he presented it to Louvois as something that was already done, having already sent it to the printer. (The bailiffs even distributed hand written copies within their jurisdictions to calm the peasants, before the printed ones were available.) Any consideration of raids, especially fire-raids, needs to take into

account the terrible impact of their destruction and the resultant depopulation. Inhabitants from villages that owed contributions some-

times fled their homes after they saw fires rage through neighboring villages. In October 1674, parties from Maastricht “made havoc in such a way that the folks of the country flee in all directions.”!” The receipt of contributions from abandoned villages was slowed, if not completely halted. ‘The depopulating of villages was exacerbated by other factors too, beyond the control of French intendants of contributions, and compounded the problematic use of fire. In the principality of Liége, after a few villages there had paid contributions to

the Imperial army in 1674, the Intendant Damorezan at Charleroi made impositions on them in retaliation, following instructions from Louvois. But, he feared that this double burden of contributions on the Liégoise villages would force the majority of inhabitants “to abandon their homes” especially because “they were ruined during the last campaign, either by our armies or those of the enemies.”!” On 3 January 1675, Intendant Dumouceau warned Louvois that

if the fire-raids continued at their current pace, in addition to the havoc caused by Imperial (German) troops who plundered there, the | county of ‘Tirlemont, and the neighboring principality of Li¢ge, would

soon be completely ruined and an uninhabited wasteland:

. Humiéres to Louvois, 29 December 1675, AG, A! 453, fo. 161. 108 Cova 11 October 1674, from Liége. A series of French raids were concentrated on the German principality of Kleves, timed to take effect prior to an assembly of the Estates of Kleves in Wesel (on the Rhine River) and its deliberation over whether or not to pay contributions to the French at Maastricht. '" Damorezan to Louvois, 14 January 1674, AG, A' 466, fo. 9.

RAIDS 173 I implore you My Lord to understand that I do everything humanly possible that [ can for the account of the contributions, but I pray that you understand that if I burn in numerous locations that will considerably diminish the contributions. I know that despite the rigor that I hold for the quarter of Tirlemont, it has not come to pay its contributions. I hope that by decreasing it, that it will come easier. It is necessary to take into account that instead of increasing the receipt of contributions that it will surely decrease every year, the country being ruined by the crossings of gens de guerre, and it is a pity to see the villages where the Germans have been.!''°

About the same time, on 4 January 1675, Louvois requested the complete account books maintained by Dumouceau. So armed with irrefutable numbers, Louvois made it clear, once again: “the king

wishes that we place under contribution all of the lands that pay anything whatsoever to the Imperial troops.”''' Characteristically, Louvois took the view that no degree of harshness was enough when it came to gathering contributions from enemy territory, and doubly so if it gave any assistance (willingly or not) to the king’s “enemies.” ‘he unfortunate inhabitants of ‘Tirlemont were caught between two fires.

After four years of fire-raids, in some regions, a reduction of contributions was the only way to ensure payment. By June 1678, the destruction in the Castellany of Alost, and the resultant depopulation, led Le Peletier to conclude that: It will not be possible to recover the remainder of the four years of contribution, owed by the villages of the Castellany of Alost of which part is abandoned, and, I believe that in making a reduction in knowledge of the reason of those who have most suffered we will take more than by executions which will produce nothing.''”

The exaction of contributions reached their logical and terrible conclusion when the few remaining inhabitants in some regions could no longer pay the burden of war. By the summer of 1678 the French, and their adversaries, though for different reasons, were ready to

_ make peace. The French struggle to compel the Pays de Waes to pay contributions did not end in 1677, or even in 1678. On 24 March 1678,

'° Dumouceau to Louvois, 3 January 1675, AG, A' 456, fo. 5. ‘' Louvois to Dumouceau, 4 January 1675, AG, A!' 456, fo. 6. ''? Le Peletier to Louvois, 11 June 1678, AG, A' 613, fo. 22.

174 CHAPTER FOUR after Louis XIV had conquered Ghent, the French made an imposition of 48,000 écus on the Franc de Bruges, which still held out what it owed the French. On 9 June 1678, Intendant Bréant, now at Ghent, informed Louvois that he continued to pressure the eight villages of the Vieuxbourg of Ghent to pay the rest of their contributions, and he assured Louvois that they would pay soon.'!’ This was an assurance that Louvois had heard many times during the war. [here seemed to be no end to the problem of recovering contributions, even after the conquest of Ghent had positioned French troops deep in Flanders and within easy striking distance of all of Brabant and Spanish Gelderland. As the war continued, Louvois drew more pessimistic conclusions and became harsher in his outlook. Not all fire-raids conducted by the French were aimed at destruction of specific houses or even the partial destruction of entire villages. ‘They sometimes intended to destroy whole villages. Such “total war” waged mercilessly on civil1ans mostly came late in the war, and often it was motivated by political or diplomatic reasons—an eagerness to conclude the war at

all costs. On 19 July 1677, Louvois instructed Calvo to burn in Jiilich, Cologne and others “within the contribution of Maastricht.”'" The garrison of Maastricht sortied and commenced to steal horses,

take hostages and burn villages in six different bailliwicks in the Rhineland.''? At the same time, Louvois informed Intendant Dumouceau that he had received the copy of the ordinance that Dumouceau had composed in reprisal to the demands for contributions made by General Spaen, upon “the peoples of contribution of Maastricht.” ‘The French, according to Louvois, would demand from these people double what they actually paid to Allied troops. When instructing Intendant Dumuceau to demand double contributions as reprisal, Louvois struck his harshest tone yet in the war: If the parties of Maastricht instead of contenting themselves with burn-

ing in a village burned the entire village, the executions will have a

''S Bréant to Louvois, 9 June 1678, AG, A' 613, fo. 34. According to the official journal of the Spanish Netherlands, the Relations Véritables, in addition to the imposition on the Franc de Bruges, the French demanded 800,000 florins from Ghent. The town paid 700,000 florins for which the town magistrates imposed a perpetual tax on houses called the huysgeldt. See, Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 416. ''* Louvois to Calvo, 19 July 1677, AG, A! 533.

'? Calvo to Louvois, 9 March 1677, AG, A! 531, fo. 71.

RAIDS 179 better effect. It is necessary that in the future that the parties burn the entire villages in Julich and secure the country for the contribution to which all the villages will be taxed, without doing this you will never submit that country.'!®

Then, a few weeks later, on 2 August 1677, Louvois made it known to the garrison commander Calvo that Louis XIV personally wanted Calvo “to ruin the country of Cologne, as much as possible, since the Elector [of Cologne] had entered into an alliance with the Emperor against His Majesty after having received so many favors.”''’ For Calvo, this essentially meant that after August 1677, if not before, fire-raids into the Holy Roman Empire (Germany) no longer had as their sole objective the recovery of contributions. Instead, they equally aimed at utter devastation, burning entire villages. ‘This shift in French

strategic thought needs more careful consideration. Perhaps here arose the rationale that would later justify Louis’s orders to burn entire cities in the Palatinate at the start of the Nine Years’ War. Fire-raids were undertaken in 1677 in Cologne for revenge and pos-

sibly as a warning to wavering or reluctant German principalities that might be tempted to follow the example of the Elector of Cologne

and take sides against France. Whatever the political reason, both the account of contributions and the Rhineland Germans ended up as losers.

The methods used by the French to gather contributions became increasingly brutal in the Spanish Netherlands. By the summer of 1678, quartering troops and general burning already replaced the more discriminating fire-raid as the main method to gather what contributions were left unpaid by the Pays de Waes, and those owed by other regions.''? On 30 December 1678, weeks after both Spain and the Dutch Republic had officially ratified their peace treaties with France, Bréant informed Louvois that since the exchange of ratifications had been made, “it has not been possible for to us to take anything from the villages of the Castellany of Alost, of this which left to be owed to the king from the last imposition.” Bréant

''? Louvois to Dumouceau, 19 July 1677, AG, A! 533. ''7 Louvois to Calvo, 2 August 1677, AG, A! 533. 8 See also the example of Verviers in Daniel Berlamont, “Occupations militaires et finances urbaines au XVII° et XVIII° siecles: ’example verviertois.” Annuazre @Fistowe Liégorses, vol. 13 (1972),

176 CHAPTER FOUR then informed Louvois that he planned to send Montbron with his regiment of dragoons to execute each village in Alost—villages where he was very near or already quartered with his regiment—“to make

it understood to the peasants that the [new] regime of the intendant [normal relations with their new monarch, Louis XIV] will not be observed until they have entirely satisfied their contributions.” Bréant

advised Montbron to take hostages and send them to the prison at the citadel of ‘Tournai. Further, Bréant ordered the Bezons Regiment (cavalry) to Alost: “the mestre de camp being the best to compel the peasants to pay the rest of what the owed.”!"” The French were still attempting to collect contributions owed by

the eight villages of the Vieuxbourg of Ghent (and other parts of the Spanish Netherlands) after the treaties of Nyymegan concluded

the war. On 25 October 1678, Le Peletier sent to Louvois a copy of an ordinance for the recovery of contributions in the Castellany of Alost—long exposed to repeated raids by the French.'’? Bréant, in a letter dated from Ghent, 4 November 1678, informed Louvois that the troops detached from Luxembourg’s army were quartered “yesterday and today in the villages of the dependency of Ghent.”!”!

, The purpose of this quartering of troops in the villages of the dependency of Ghent (when France and Spain were officially at peace) was to recover what was owed in contributions. The bailiwicks would each pay for the cost of quartering French troops. ‘The troops could

just as easily have returned to a French town, or one of the new conquests. During the winter, the occupation may have veered out of the normal control that French officials exercised over troops. An ordinance in February 1679 attempted to discover some of the more notorious bullies in the ranks of the French occupiers by allowing local officials to be present and serve in reviewing parties when the garrison assembled, “to give advice to the commissioners of any violators that they might observe among the troops.”!”? It was, undoubtedly, an unpleasant occupation for the people of Ghent.

The struggle for contributions continued in the same manner against the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire, exposed to ' Bréant to Louvois, 9 November 1678, AG, A! 614, fo. 88. '29 Le Pelletier to Louvois, 25 October 1678, AG, A' 614, fo. 51. 21 Bréant to Louvois, 4 November 1678, AG, A! 614, fo. 72. '*° Sparre, Code Militaire, Book Two, “Des Revués des Troupes,” Article II.

RAIDS 177 the raids of Maastricht since 1675, and still at war with France. Intendant Robert clarified to Louvois in a dispatch dated 24 October 1678 that he well-understood that “the intention of the king is that Julich furnish the entire expense of the troops that are lodged there without it costing anything to His Majesty.”'* A brutal occupation

replaced fire-raids there as well as in the Spanish Netherlands, although at least in the case of Jiilich, Louis XIV would remain officially at war with Emperor Leopold I until 1679. It was the only method left available to the French to recover contributions. In Julich,

fire-raids launched from Maastricht, which continued into October 1678, produced little or nothing: “The officers which have returned from executions in Julich uphold Monseigneur that there is nothing left to burn on this side of the Roer River.”'”

Just as the inhabitants of parts of Germany and the Spanish Netherlands continued to suffer under the burden of war taxes, even after official hostilities ended, so did some French civilians. In Decem-

ber 1678, knowing that it would help in recovering contributions, Louvois ordered Le Peletier to communicate to his department that French subjects should pay in full any unpaid contributions owed to the king of Spain. Le Peletier probably found this an easy task to facilitate because the parts of his department where contributions had been imposed by the Spanish were no longer part of France: “the castellanies of Ath, Oudenaarde, and Courtrai... were all to be returned to Spain [and] the Spanish will take such measures that it pleases for them to pay.”!” The inhabitants of Maastricht had it easier. As preparations for the evacuation of Maastricht continued with “toutte dilligences” in October 1678, its inhabitants, subjected to Spanish contributions during the war, were told by the French authorities, on behalf of the Dutch who had not yet arrived, to not pay their remaining contributions—Maastricht was given back to the Dutch by the treaty of Nymegan. Its subjects were never recognized as French subjects, and so, as the Dutch reasoned, they should not

pay the remainder of their contributions to the Spanish.'”

3 Robert to Louvois, 24 October 1678, AG, A' 614, fo. 54. '2t Dumouceau to Louvois, 9 October 1678, AG, A! 614, fo. 20. ') Le Peletier to Louvois, 31 December 1678, AG, A!’ 614, fo. 182. © Dumouceau to Louvois, 9 October 1678, AG, A! 614, fo. 20.

178 CHAPTER FOUR Thus, there was a kind of logic to raids, one that could be interpreted rigorously or with flexibility, as victor deemed proper. Without examining these raids and the calculus of compensation they

engendered, the pattern of early modern warfare remains illusive. Putting them in the formula, it becomes understandable, though still far from simple.

CHAPTER FIVE

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET OF PARTISAN WARFARE

he maneuvers and grand forages of French field armies caused damage similar in scale to fire-raids. Even experienced intendants and fortress governors seemed amazed at how completely a field army in a forage operation could strip bare several bailiwicks, or an entire castellany, denuding it of grain, hay and straw. Damorezan, concluding his “business of contributions for Charleroi” in January 1674, noted that “contribution payments have been extremely reduced

by the maneuvers of the armies.”' Intendant Le Peletier expected fewer contributions from the Castellany of Alost in March 1674, where “the army commanded by Monseigneur the prince de Condé had left neither grain, forage or money.”” In places where French field armies had stayed beyond several days during the campaign season, contributions normally dwindled. ‘Thus, French field armies, which often maneuvered to protect French fortresses, inadvertently placed strain on the garrison’s supply systems, which were based on contributions. ‘The strain was not sufficient, however, to cause the entire system of contributions to breakdown, but it does reveal the dual aspect of operations during the Dutch War: petite guerre waged by the garrison force to secure its supplies, and grand operations conducted by field armies that also struggled to secure supplies in the theater of war. The beginning of each campaign season renewed a series of smaller actions around the opposing field armies, and these operations lasted until the troops dispersed to winter quarters. When a French field army assembled in April or May and, in three or four columns of

march, began tramping through the lowlands, detachments of hostile Allied troops observed its every movement. Parties hid within woods and peered between branches, avoiding French covering

' Damorezan to Louvois, 22 January 1674, AG, A! 404, fo. 88. * Talon to Louvois, 16 March 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 2.

180 CHAPTER FIVE detachments. They installed themselves in bell towers or observed from town walls. When the occasion presented itself, they ambushed isolated groups of French foragers and parties of French troops. ‘They also attacked vital convoys. Marshal Créqui once observed in April: “There was occasion for many inconveniences since the woods were

full of small parties; during our march, I encountered myself two [parties] of the enemy who were roughly dealt with, some were killed and the others taken prisoner and brought to Avesnes.”’ Small, violent clashes of partisan warfare absorbed the resources of both sides through the zone of operations. The partisan dimensions of war often had important consequences for the main field armies. Armed parties on both sides scouted enemy movements and seized prisoners who provided essential intelligence.

Partisans served as the eyes of armies and garrisons. ‘The fragile nature of the supply system that maintained armies in the field during the Dutch War made them particularly vulnerable to small actions of war. Detachments sought to disrupt communications, attack for-

agers, and destroy convoys. Both sides sought to deny the flow of crucial supplies from the countryside that bordered an army’s route of march and to impede the movement of supplies from fortress magazines. Lack of supplies could lead officers to take matters in their own hands and send troops marauding. According to Francois Nodot, “[I]f an army lacks bread for several days, the soldier wul be forced to leave his unit to go marauding.’” If successfully pursued, coordinated partisan attacks could expose an adversary’s plans, force him to retreat for lack of supplies, or cause operational paralysis. Understandably, field armies took countermeasures to fend off the partisan threat. Maneuvering close to the enemy, field commanders

often made critical use of detachments and parties: to reconnoiter fortress garrisons, to observe town gates and bridges, to cover the

route of march, and to secure camps. To feed horses and men, armies depended on parties to forage for fodder, gather crops, and round up livestock. One of the common uses of detachments from field armies was to raid for cattle and sheep. In the summer of 1675,

* Créqui to Louvois, | April 1675, AG, A' 449, fo. 1. * Francois Nodot, Le munitionnaire des armées de France (Paris, 1697), p. 567. Cited

in Lynn, Giant, p. 399.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 181

Intendant Robert reported to Louvois the success of French raids from the army camp for fresh supplies of meat: “The parties of Lancgon and Rozen have brought together to us 1,023 cattle and 330 sheep which I have since distributed.” Field commanders sometimes detached close to one-third of the army in sequential maneuvers known as grand forages. Long bundles of hay and straw, and baskets of firewood and garden vegetables were all laboriously car-

ried by man and horse to camp. Field armies moved through the “economic” zone of war, devouring its surplus, and sometimes replen-

ishing it with monetary expenditures made by troops to suttlers and peasants. Covering detachments ensured the local sources of supply and countered the threat of hostile parties. Harsh measures signaled to peasants that to resist French forage operations would only bring violent retaliation. On one occasion: two peasants held prisoner from the campaien of 1673, charged with killing a French cavalry soldier, were summarily executed in February the next year. On the other hand, it was one of the realities of war in the seventeenth century that a destitute army, broken in discipline, frightened away peasants and the goods they brought for sale, while a well-supplied and disciplined army attracted peasants and, consequently, attained greater access to local supplies.’ This chapter discusses the partisan warfare fought in the countryside in connection with field armies; this kind of fetete guerre involved

both troops detached from field armies and from fortress garrisons. Activities to be considered will include intelligence gathering by recon-

naissance parties, the consummate struggle waged by detachments from field armies for local supplies and the transit of convoys.® Although common to wars from the Romans onward, the extent of these supporting activities of partisan warfare, in particular during the mid-seventeenth century, demands attention.

» Robert to Louvois, 21 July 1675, AG, A! 457, fo. 9. ° Dumouceau to Louvois, | February 1674, AG, A' 404, fo. 112. ’ Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 3, p. 11. As an example: “Several peasants who brought with them other provisions, having been pillaged this morning by some soldiers, the King has commanded that we make an exact investigation, and moreover to pay the peasants what they claim their merchandise was worth.” ° For the uses and methods of acquiring strategic intelligence during the reign " (0. XIV, see Lucien Bély, Espzons et ambassadeurs au temps de Lows XIV (Paris,

182 CHAPTER FIVE 1. Intelhgence Gathering

French field armies and garrison forces deployed numerous parties for reconnaissance purposes. Intelligence gathering efforts from both sources sometimes overlapped, producing an almost daily picture of

the opponent’s actions and potential that eventually reached the desk of Louvois. Condeé’s intelligence gathering actions in September 1674 as well as those of Marshal Humicres, governor of Lille, follow-

ing the battle of Seneffe, may be taken as typical. Condé informed Louvois: I still do not have news that the enemies have marched today, although Monsieur d’Auger is in the countryside with a large party of 300-400 mounted troops, and as I have still three or four other parties outside

they have told me nothing, this convinces me that I will soon have some news from one or the other.”

The French reconnaissance parties did not have a free hand. Condé also noted that in the last “four or five days” d’Auger (or Dauger) had beaten back “three or four” screening parties from the Allied army. D’Auger had also captured numerous foragers, and Condeé’s

confidence in him remained unshaken. He concluded that “this

| assuredly is a man who perfectly renders service.”'? Meanwhile, as Condé took advantage of the services rendered by d’Auger, Humiéres

seconded them by sending a party from the garrison of Tournai, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cagnosle of the Piedmont Regiment. Cagnosle, “who 1s a very brave officer that everyone highly respects,” arrived at Humiére’s headquarters around midnight on 12 September 1674 with 12 prisoners, infantry and cavalry. The prisoners confirmed that “the armies of the enemies were camped along the villages of Blaston, ‘Iimbruge, and Peuvé.”"'! Parties from French fortresses scoured the countryside during the campaign season for signs of enemy forces. On 12 April 1677, Pertuis sent a corporal from his company of fusiliers (the governor’s com-

pany) with ten men to “gather intelligence on the enemies.” ‘This little venture netted the maréchal de camp of Prince William’s company of guards and four other maréchaux de camp of his Regiment of

i Condé to Louvois, 6 September 1674, AG, A’ 392, fo. 1. Ibid. II Hasratéres to Louvois, 13 September 1674, AG, A' 392, fo. 85.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 183

Household Guards, including two guardsmen, resplendent in their blue cloaks. It was learned by Pertuis and Louvois that the Allied headquarters was lodged in the village of Langquemar. The prisoners also informed Pertuis of the impact of the battle of Cassel on the Allied army, a battle which the Alhed army lost. Pertuis asked Louvois how to dispose of the prisoners since it was the practice,

according to the prisoners, that when they (the Dutch) captured guards of the French king, they returned them as a matter of protocol with all of their personal possessions.'* In all probability, the captured guards were not freely returned, but ransomed by the French since Dutch guards were included in the comprehensive treaty with the Dutch concerning ransom of prisoners.

Correspondence to the court records that there were plenty of capable men like the corporal employed by Pertuis. ‘The attempt to take prisoners often required great daring, sometimes it succeeded and other times it cost the French dearly. At dawn on 20 July 1677, one brave raid rudely interrupted the breakfast of a Dutch count, the Count of Lippe, who had carelessly lodged in a house “within a musket shot of the camp.” Since his lodging was targeted for a raid, another party (or peasant-informer) must already have visited the area for the French and laid out the details. For the occasion, Captain Longueval led the raid and commanded twenty cavalrymen

detached from the Gournay Regiment to kidnap the count. In an effort to confuse the Dutch, Longueval ordered his men to proceed directly through the Count of Lippe’s door, as if they were Allied soldiers expected for breakfast. After a brief fracas with some Dutch servants, the dismounted French cavalrymen captured the surgeonmajor of the Nassau Regiment, the chief steward that served Lippe and nine men, who claimed to be valets. The entire equipage of the count also fell into French hands. Everyone at the breakfast table surrendered, except the Count of Lippe, who apparently escaped.'” Once committed to action, commanders of French reconnaissance

patrols demonstrated steady nerves and a desire to impress their superiors. On 12 August 1676, as the Count of Waldeck directed the Allied army toward Louvain, a French party of 30 cavalry closely followed. ‘Their daring led them into a trap. Desiring to get a better

Pertuis to Louvois, 12 April 1677, AG, A' 537, fo. 70. '’ Luxembourg to Louvois, 20 July 1677, AG, A' 539, fo. 547.

184 CHAPTER FIVE view of the advancing enemy, they found themselves surrounded. A Dutch detachment of 150 cavalry had coolly waited until the French

party inserted itself between the enemy cavalry and the marching columns. ‘The Dutch horsemen then pressed home a charge that captured Lieutenant Jancourt and three French cavalrymen. ‘The rest

of the French party somehow escaped. When news of the fate of Lieutenant Jancourt’s party reached Montal, the governor of Charleroi,

he did not hesitate to dispatch another party. Around midnight this

party returned, but its intelligence did not satisfy Montal, so he promptly sent them back “with some fresh men in order to know exactly their [Waldeck’s army] march and their number.”'* ‘Thus, in a period of 24 hours, the fortress governor of Charleroi constantly strove to stay abreast of developments at the enemy’s camp even at some cost to his force. Sometimes attempts to gather intelligence on the enemy was about all that occurred during a campaign. Most of the losses of the contending French and Alhed campaign armies in the brief winter campaign of 1673-1674 resulted from raids for prisoners. In January 1674, not long after an aborted Imperial attack on Nymegen, the marquis de Chamilly posted a “small party” in the village of Nuitz between Bonn and Cologne to keep informed of the movements being made by the Imperial troops. ‘The detachment scored a notable

success when it ambushed and took prisoner the Count of Stracy, a captain of cavalry in the Imperial Holstein Regiment. ‘The Count of Stracy joined several of his men already taken prisoner by “small parties” that Chamilly had posted at various places in the Rhineland countryside.'’ No major battle occurred that winter, and French and Alhed armies retired back to their quarters by the second week in January. A threatening maneuver by a field army or increased concern over an impending siege or battle heightened the importance of keeping parties in the country to gather intelligence. Concerned over a winter attack on the French post at Dinant in January 1676, Estrades, the most independent and capable of the French fortress governors, maintained small parties outside of Maastricht in the countryside near the quarters of the Allied army to learn of the “enemies’ prepa-

'* Montal to Louvois, 12 August 1676, AG, A! 502, fo. 165. Chamilly to Louvois, 16 February 1674, AG, A' 384.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 185 rations.” (He also employed personal spies at Louvain and Mechelen in order to keep abreast “if they assemble troops.)”’® Marshal Humieéres, in French Flanders, had to contend with the

problem of where the expected blow might fall after the battle of Seneffe. The army of Prince Wiliam threatened French fortresses in September 1674. Louvois anxiously instructed Humiéres at Lille to not remain “closed in,” but instead to keep numerous war parties in the countryside to keep abreast of the movements of the Allied army. Ihe war minister displayed in his instructions his insatiable appetite for up-to-date intelligence of an operational nature, and he also pointed to a potential problem: under threat of siege, commanders may have shown a reflexive tendency to restrict their parties and shut out the outside world.

The same directions to dispatch additional parties applied if bat- | tle seemed imminent. During the summer of 1676, “numerous” par-

ties left the camp of the French army commanded by Marshal Luxembourg “in order to be forewarned if a larger corps came in his [Luxembourg] direction.” On 20 July, one of these parties commanded by Captain La Chapelle observed from its concealed position that as of 6 AM there were still tents within the Alhed camp “decorated like those made in Brussels,” the capital of the Spanish Netherlands. This meant to Luxembourg, that the Spanish contingent was still joined to the main Dutch field force—a vital matter to Luxembourg, who had to decide how long to keep his force in its present defensive position. As a postscript to this useful and daring reconnaissance, La Chapelle claimed to have narrowly escaped with his party when a patrol of Spanish troops fell upon him in his hiding place. No prisoners were taken by either side. Not all reconnaissance actions involved small numbers; reconnaissance detachments could include thousands of men. Such great parties were called corps @observations by the authors of military trea-

tises. In August 1675, when the Allied army camped near Binche and the French at Brugelette, the French field commander Marshal Luxembourg detached nearly 1,400 mounted troops (800 cavalry and 600 dragoons) to take prisoners and to gain intelligence concerning

the enemy army. The marquis de Renel, a dragoon colonel, commanded this observations corps at brigade strength." '? Estrades to Louvois, 9 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 125. '’ Gazette, 26 August 1675, from Charleroi.

186 CHAPTER FIVE Held to the defensive by Louis XIV’s strategic plan for 1674, the actions conducted by the prince de Condé exemplified the enormous efforts that French field commanders expended in gathering operational intelligence. In July 1674, the prince de Condé detached his friend and subordinate, Lieutenant General Luxembourg from camp

with approximately 10,000 men, a train of artillery, supply carts (filled with biscuit) and a mobile field hospital. ‘(he detached corps

marched east for the French fortress of Philippeville where they encamped and could follow the movements of an Imperial army on the opposite bank of the Meuse River.'® By sending smaller parties on reconnaissances, Luxembourg learned not only the approximate size of the Imperial Army, 20,000 men, but also the location of its headquarters at Spontin (east of Dinant on the German side of the Meuse).'” On 18 July, following Luxembourg’s arrival near Philippe-

ville, the marquis de Souches, the commander of the Imperial army, thought better than to try to force a passage in broad daylight across the bridge at Dinant. Instead, he directed his army further north

up the river valley so as to take either the road to Namur or Huy.” French parties followed his every step. Meanwhile, Condé sent other

detachments to reconnoiter the Dutch army at its position near Brussels. On 16 July, the Dutch army marched, taking the road west to Louvain where it encamped on 18 July at Bierbeeck. On 19 July, the Dutch marched to Bertem, probably either in an attempt to confuse the French or to secure forage supplies. At Gondé’s headquarters, inteligence reports and Luxembourg’s dispatches painted the picture: the two allied armies were attempting to join forces. Under cover of darkness on the night of 23-24 July, the Imperial army laid a bridge of boats across the Meuse south of the Spanish fortress at

Namur. Some 18,000 troops crossed the river and took the road north to Longchamps to join the Dutch army at Perwez. Luxembourg dutifully reported each of these movements to Condé, who passed the information along to Louvois in his almost daily correspondence.

'® Gazette, 16 July 1674, from Philippeville. ” Gazette, 16 July 1674, from the Camp d’Ettines Basses, [probably Estinnes-au-

val, near Binche]. Pierre de Segur exaggerated when he referred to this army as “around 30,000”—though it is possible that he reached this figure by a reading of Luxembourg’s correspondence. See Pierre de Segur, Le marechal de Luxembourg et le prince d’Orange 1668-1678 (Paris: Calmann-Levy, n.d.), p. 305. °° Gazette, 18 July 1674, from Mariembourg.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 137

On 9 August, elements of three armies—Imperial, Dutch, and Spanish—joined together in one body with more than 60,000 combatants, an army certainly large enough to challenge Condé’s army, then numbering around 40,000 strong. Three days later, the battle of Seneffe tested both sides and resulted in a narrow French victory. 2. Prisoners and Peasants

Questions of reliability naturally arose when it came to gleaning information from prisoners of war. When the royal historiographer Pellisson made his entry for the siege of Valenciennes in 1677, he noted the size of the Spanish garrison as near 2,000 foot soldiers and 600 mounted, which he himself doubted. Pellisson observed, “it would be quite small for the grandeur of the fortress.” ‘The estimate Pellisson used was based on the word of a captured officer. ‘The historian dryly commented that “these type of people always lie.”*' The captured officer additionally informed the French command that the small garrison was furnished with an abundance of munitions and

that “nothing was lacking.” The vigilant townsmen had a number of water pumps ready to put out any fires and several other “similar machines” for putting out fires. Suspiciously, the officer also brought to French attention a letter from the Marquis of Richebourg,

the governor of Valenciennes. It purported that no matter how strongly resolved the defenders of a fortress “a place which is not rescued, does not fail to be taken.” The officer may have been trying to unsettle the French with his estimation of the garrison’s preparedness while at the same time tactfully attempting to save his master’s honor by emphasizing the overall hopelessness of their situation.

In the estimation of the comte de Montal, and most other French commanders, prisoners provided more reliable intelligence than that passed on from peasants, the other major source of information in the war zone. “Enclosed is a dispatch that d’Haspré wrote to me

yesterday from Binche,” Montal once informed Louvois: , Two days have passed since he was in that region, with 100 mounted

troops, it provides you with what we know, and not the rumors of *! Pellisson, Lettres, 9 March 1677, from the camp before Valenciennes.

188 CHAPTER FIVE peasants subject to Charleroi... a party of my dismounted dragoons brought yesterday seven natural born Spanish prisoners that they took at the head of their camp.”

Nevertheless, the French frequently used peasants to gather intelligence, both about opposing garrisons and field forces, and they used peasants in some rather surprising ways. Some peasants, a general term encompassing a variety of social and occupational groups in the country, traveled between opposing field armies as sutlers and did a lucrative business in selling fresh eges, pipe tobacco, snuff and a variety of useful objects to soldiers and officers. Unquestionably both sides made use of such men and women. But so important was the task of gathering intelligence, that the French offered significant sums of money to more intrepid souls willing to take on greater risks or travel greater distances. During the late summer of 1674, concerned about growing signs of an immi-

nent siege, the commander of the French garrison at Grave, the marquis de Chamilly, promised a bounty payment to local peasants who could trap and capture deserters from the Dutch army.” The unfortunate men who deserted from the nearby Dutch army commanded by General Rabenhaupt thus risked falling victim to roving

bands of flintlock-armed Boers [Dutch peasants]. While bountyhunters hauled in deserters, other enterprising peasants served as spies, gaining French money. From a peasant, Intendant Colbert Maulevrier learned of the failed Imperial assault on the French outpost at Nijmegen during the winter of 1673. The enterprising peas-

| ant had traveled a great distance to deliver the news to Maulevrier. As a reward, Maulevrier presented him with ten gold coins, Jowzs d’or, equivalent to about 100 dures. According to the report made by the peasant and sent on to Louvois: an Imperial assault was recently repulsed at Nijmegen and the Germans retreated after losing between sixty to eighty men. Among the dead were some of their “most distinguished officers.” With the prospect of gratifications, some peasants and townsmen voluntarily formed invisible watches around fortress garrisons and field armies, making reconnaissance patrols even more risky. St. Jean, 2 Montal to Louvois, | May 1676, AG, A! 499, fo. 60. ** Chamilly to Louovis, 8 June 1674, AG, A' 398, fo. 127. “* Colbert de Maulevrier to Louvois, 25 January 1674, AG, A’ 384, fo. 11, and “Relation de ce qui s’est passé...” 20 January 1674, fo. 16.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 189 a mestre de camp on the Spanish side, once boldly crossed a ford over the Sambre River at Montigny-sur-Sambre with 200 cavalry on the

night of 31 August-1 September to reconnoiter the French fortress of Charleroi. Vigilant peasants foiled his effort. A Spanish officer proceeded on foot to within view of the fortress and silently drafted a drawing that detailed where Allied siege batteries could be established and noting all of the slopes, recesses in the earth, and ridges that afforded a modicum of cover from the French cannon along the ramparts.” But Damorezan learned from local peasants about this hostile topographical survey. He notified Montal, who with the assistance of “about five or six peasants” found the Spanish officer and recovered the sketch book. In the process, he learned how the Spanish viewed the defenses of Charleroi. Although Damorezan told Louvois a siege was unlikely, the French took new precautions. What happened to the numerous prisoners captured, the consequence of reconnaissance actions? Official scenes of the Dutch War, described in ink by the historian Pellisson, and depicted symbolically in oll painting and fountain sculpture (as allegory at Versailles), some-

times portrayed prisoners and their captors. The prisoners appear bound at the wrists and their heads lowered, presented before a French marshal or the King. Prisoners captured by the French in the countryside were robbed of their weapons and often other valuables.*° In stark contrast, entire garrisons of fortresses were often allowed, after a brave defense behind walls, the “honors of war,” in the form of a capitulation treaty. ‘They would march out, not as prisoners, but with heads held high, drums beating, flags flying— and with their weapons and matches lit, guns ready to fire. The experience of prisoners taken by parties was quite different from the troops allowed to honorably exit a surrendered fortress. ‘The loss of weapons, clothing or other personal effects as plunder was often the

consequence when a party captured men in the countryside. Such prisoners experienced not only a measure of disgrace, but often financial loss (horses, for example, could make up a sizable personal

* Damorezan to Louvois, | September 1675, AG, A! 457, fo. 23. °° The Marquis de Chouppes, a lieutenant general in an earlier with Spain, 1635-59, noted the practice of disarming prisoners. Chouppes recalled in his memoirs that in 164]: “Prisoners of war were always disarmed.” Marquis de Chouppes, Meémotres du Marquis de Chouppes, lieutenant général des armées du roi, ed. M.C. Moreau

(Paris, 1841), p. 8.

190 CHAPTER FIVE investment)—a fate not usually experienced by members of an entire garrison, surrendering to a besieging army. Most prisoners captured in the open country surrendered “at dis-

cretion.’ When on 9 March 1676, Humiéres received information concerning a Spanish party from Aire numbering 27 dismounted cavalrymen marching in the direction of the village of Seclin, he dispatched Captain Rouville of La Reine Regiment with fifty mounted

cavaliers and ten Fusiliers of Flanders, to round up the intruders. Rouville caught up with the Spanish detachment near Seclin. ‘The party from Aire, outnumbered, retreated into a cemetery to defend itself. Rouville dismounted his troops and attacked. After “withstanding two volleys,” the Spanish retreated into a church and then up into its bell tower. Rouville took the survivors prisoner “at dliscretion,” although surely their resistance was as brave as that of any fortress garrison that surrendered and was granted a capitulation. The maréchal de logis (a partisan) of Humieres’s own company was wounded and had his horse killed, in addition “three or four cava-

hers were killed or wounded.” From the ransom of the prisoners, Humieres hoped to buy a new horse for the maréchal de logis “who did not have one for use in the country.”” Other times, the ransacking of the personal possessions of prisoners taken by French parties in the open country does not seem to have been as acceptable. Louvois wrote to Montal toward the end of May in 1676 on this subject, concerning the honor of no less than Prince William of Orange: I have received some protests from the side of the Prince of Orange

that you have returned the postilions of his army... without their horses or their tabards, and worse these have been sold. As what has been done is contrary to the King’s intentions, [ am obliged to tell you, to return to those who were damaged the value of their horses and tabards and that you prevent in the future a similar thing from ever happening again.”°

lhe postilions of the prince could have received a worse fate than losing their horses and distinctive coats. Sometimes even surrender “at discretion” was not given by one war party to another in encounters of partisan warfare. Instead, no

“7 Humiéres to Louvois, 10 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 251. 8 Louvois to Montal, 30 May 1676, AG, A! 499, fo. 234.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 19]

quarter was given. On 6 August 1675, the governor of Oudenaarde, the marquis de Chamilly, detached the dragoon commander Violaine with eighty horse to learn what he could from the disposition of the Alhed army camped along the Dendre River. On his return from this reconnaissance, Daniel de Violaine and his party of 80 were

charged “from all angles” by 150 Dutch cavalry. In the ensuing struggle, twelve French soldiers were killed, five wounded and four taken prisoner. But of the Dutch party of 150 men—eighty men (53 percent casualties) were killed. No quarter was given. For all of this,

Violaine learned, from one man spared from the slaughter and taken prisoner, that the Allied army had not changed its camp.” Like many encounters in partisan warfare, when men were surprised at close quarters, they grimly turned to face their foes and accepted

the possibility of death. No quarter was expected and none was given.

he Spanish also seem to have forgone taking prisoners on occasion in encounters of partisan warfare. In April 1676, the Spanish commander Colonel Massiette, took between sixty and seventy men of his regiment from Luxembourg on an official journey to Brussels. A smaller French party commanded by St. Jean, who had hidden his troops in some woods, ambushed them near Marche-en-Famine. The first French volley killed Massiette. None of the other shots, however, hit their marks—the French probably aimed at the colonel and riddled his body with shot. As a result, all of the French were killed, except one man spared to report the carnage to his superiors: This so enraged the Spanish, because [the colonel] was a very brave soldier, that they threw themselves with such fury upon the French, and not wishing to give any quarter, so well that they left only one to escape and take the news [of the slaughter].”°

Animal rage played its part in the heat of combat, then as now. ‘Their instinctive turn toward the muzzle flashes may have saved the

Spanish, who witnessed the death of their beloved commander. It certainly sealed the fate of the French marksmen. Once deprived of their immediate usefulness, as bearers of fresh news, some prisoners were absorbed into the ranks of their captors.

* Chamilly to Louvois, 6 August 1675, AG, A! 451, fo. 28. °° Mercure Hollandois, April 1676, pp. 162-163.

192 CHAPTER FIVE Others were ransomed or exchanged according to carefully composed treaties that stipulated exactly the ransom value of different prisoners of varying ranks, including the postilions of Prince William’s entourage.”' In addition to ransom payments, captor’s expected reim-

bursement for the expense of feeding and lodging prisoners, if prisoners were to be returned.” Le Peletier remarked once in frustration concerning some sixty Spanish or Dutch prisoners held from the time that Condé’s army was encamped at Chiévre (to 8 November 1673): “the expense of nourishment for these prisoners will amount to more than their ransom.”*’ For those prisoners not ransomed or languishing in dungeons, however, it was the golden age of the military recruiter. Somewhat callously, contemporaries used the word débaucher for inducing a prisoner of war to switch armies, escaping

confinement by turning his coat. On 31 July 1674, Condé told Estrades how satisfied he was to learn of the desertion of “some French soldiers from the army of the prince of Orange,” and, “to incorporate them in the battalions of your garrison.” These were probably double turncoats, but Condé did not seem to mind. Similarly, reflecting on the fate of Alhed prisoners captured in 1677, St. Pouenges

believed that at least several of the soldiers from the English regiments in Dutch service were excellent potential recruits.** Otherwise, taking prisoners was uneconomical. Unless they were absorbed into

the ranks of the captor, common prisoners taken in reconnaissance patrols were a burden to their captors. Beyond their immediate usefulness in divulging information, or employment in French ranks, prisoners did not seem to hold much interest for the French other than for the prestige that naturally fell on the captors following a successful military action. After the siege of Bouchain, in the French camp, the court hanger-ons goaded Louis XIV to return the miserable garrison of Bouchain, numbering only around 800, to Prince Willam’s army, in order to show that “they

*' BG, Recueil Cangé, Traité d’echange G rangon des prisonniers de guerre... faits par les armes des couronnes de France, & par celles des Etats Generaux des Provinces-Unes. 21

May 1675, vol. 23, no. 70. * “Although immediate responsibility for feeding prisoners fell to the state that held them, the bill for their upkeep was to be paid by the state that the prisoners had served.” Lynn, Grant, p. 427. > Le Peletier to Louvois, 8 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 29. ** Louis de Bourbon to Estrades, 31 July 1674, BN, Fonds Clairambaut, vol. 681, fo. 821. St. Pouenges to Louvois, 1 August 1677, AG, A! 540, fo. 15.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 193 did not fear to enlarge his army.” In a rare moment of sober thought at the height of a glorious occasion, he calmly replied to them that he would have done so “if the garrison had been bigger and better.” Overall French prisoner losses due to enemy reconnaissance parties can only be roughly estimated. Le Peletier mentioned that while

the French army commanded by Condé remained encamped at Chiévre(-Brugelet), near Mons, it lost sixty prisoners. Authorities kept track of such losses, because under the terms of an en exchange car-

tel, the French agreed to provide sustenance for French troops held by the enemy. Since Condé encamped for thirteen days, his average daily loss was about six men taken as prisoner. At that perhaps typical rate, a French army of 40,000 might loose 540 prisoners during a sixty-day campaign. This represents an attrition rate of pris-

oner losses (not counting casualties from small actions, illness or desertion) during a campaign of sixty-days of 1.35 percent for an army of 40,000 men. How did French field commanders respond to the ever present threat posed by Allied parties seeking prisoners, not just by reconnaissance parties, but also by those intent on disrupting forages?

3. Protecting a Field Army on the March

French field commanders rarely arrayed their troops on the march in view of fighting a battle, since battle was usually not anticipated. Often they arranged their columns to minimize losses to partisan operations. Once an army decamped and began its march, commanders feared the loss of prisoners to enemy parties who followed the path of march, taking stragglers and deserters. ‘To prevent such losses, the army formed into four or perhaps five advancing columns marching side by side to protect the most vulnerable and precious elements of the army—royal carriages, treasury, artillery, and supples. Such deployments had nothing to do with any anticipation of great engagements and everything to do with taking precautions against the hazards of partisan warfare. The march of Louis XIV’s army of about 50,000 men around Spanish-held Mons, from the village of Gevries to the villages of

°° Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 3, p. 75.

194 CHAPTER FIVE Haisne St. Pierre-St. Paul, in May 1675 typified French practice during the Dutch War.°*® The Spanish fortress of Mons constituted the principal “hornet’s nest” of war parties directed against advancing

forces. ‘The French first reconnoitered the vicinity to watch for ambushes; next, advance parties secured the route of march, and only then did Louis cautiously skirt Mons with his main columns. From the perspective of a simple soldier in the ranks of the Sun King’s army, partisan warfare around the perimeters of an army posed a more persistent lethal threat than did rare sieges or battles. The campaign of 1675 brought no battle and only three minor sieges. The closest to danger most of the troops in the army came in 1675 was the sound of excited shouts, and gunfire, occasionally heard in the distance from partisan actions. So constant was the threat that armies continually took precautions. For example, the march of the French campaign army on 22 May 1675 and the preparations to thwart Spanish parties adhered

to a careful progression of security activities. [he day before the march, on 21 May 1675, a detachment from the Camp at Gevries (or Givries or Gevrys), accompanied by the king and prince de Condé, challenged the Spanish defenders on the outworks at Mons. The purpose was twofold: 1) to intimidate the Spanish garrison there,

to keep it “shut-in,” by making it believe that the French might be

preparing to lay siege, and 2) to raise the morale of the French troops as they passed near one of the strongest enemy fortresses in the Netherlands. Perhaps also, it served to embolden the King and the nobles in his entourage. The French detachment rode within sight of the fortress and inspected its outworks. After their reconnaissance, Louis gamely gave his consent to a group of volunteer nobles and cavalry troopers to form line and approach the glacis of

the fortress, to verbally challenge and attempt to draw out the Spanish—and to demonstrate their courage to the French king and their fearlessness to the foe. The Spanish garrison cavalry played deaf and did not accept the offer. They calmly remained in column—within musket range of supporting infantry, who stood ready

°° Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 2, pp. 254-258. For the march of Louis XIV’s army during the campaign of 1675, see: BN, Réserve, Table des Cartes des Marches & Campemenis de l’Armée du Roy pendant la Campagne 1675, Ordre de la Marche de l’Armée. Pellisson esti-

mated the size of the campaign army at least at 50,000 on 23 May after Humieéres joined the squadrons and companies under his command (about 10,000).

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 195 on firing steps behind the palisade.’’ While the Spanish garrison did not take the challenge, a detachment of Spanish troops from Mons approached the French camp and stole some grazing horses.

The evening and night before the march, the French field commanders took more serious security actions. ‘Two covering parties, one of 150 cavalrymen and another of fifty cavalrymen, saddled their horses and made as unobtrusive a departure from the camp as possible. The stronger party rode into the St. Antome woods, less than a mile from the fortifications of Mons. Woods provided excellent cover for detachments of troops, and the French made constant use of them in their campaigns in the Netherlands. The party in the St. Antoine woods made camp, and undoubtedly posted several vedettes

forward to keep an eye on the Spanish at Mons.** They had the responsibility of warning the main body of the army should any Spanish detachments slip out and cross the grassy plain that surrounded the fortress town. ‘This detachment of 150 men thus helped to secure the most exposed flank of the marching columns, the northern flank facing Mons. The other party, fifty strong, left camp later

that night under cover of darkness. They took up a position on the southeastern flank of the march, facing the more distant Spanish fortress at Namur. This smaller party also had the responsibility of guarding against enemy parties, certainly from Namur, but perhaps also troops from Mons, attempting an end-run around the army. The French detachment climbed a small hill crested by woods and surmounted by the abbey of Bonne Esperance. Hidden in this elevated post, the cavalry troopers stayed through the next night and day (May 22-23) to watch over French foragers gathering hay and straw in the small villages below Bonne Esperance. ‘This secured the vulnerable southeastern flank.*”

Next in the sequence of security actions, French commanders, several hours before dawn on the day of the march, took precautions to protect the camp location. An advance party composed of a detachment designated as the Gardes du Camp accompanied by

*” Gazette, 22 May 1675, from the camp de Gevry. ** The responsibility of posting sentinels, according to a military treatise by Jean Billon, was normally left to a corporal. Jean Billon, Les principes de Vart miltacre (Rouen, 1641), p. 15. * BN, Réserve, Table des Cartes des Marches & Campements... 1675, Ordre de la Marche de VArmée pour mecredy vignt deuxteme jour de May.

196 CHAPTER FIVE special supply officers known as fouriers, pushed ahead of the main

body to secure the new camp at Haisne St. Paul-St. Pierre. Once this party, under command of D’Hauteville, the Maréchal de Camp du

jour, reached the site of the camp, the guards provided a cordon of posts and patrols around the perimeter. The brigade fouriers then safely proceeded to mark the ground for the rows of tents as soon as dawn light permitted.*° At daybreak on 22 May 1675, the remainder of the king’s army formed into marching columns. In accordance with the decision of Louis XIV, the army formed into four marching columns. Each column contained its own advance guard, main body and rear guard. Parties of cavalry were detached to protect the flanks and rear of each column. Everything was based on order and security. Acting as a shield, the strongest column on the left covered the rest of the army from the garrison at Mons. Renel, a dragoon colonel,

commanded the advance guard of this column. It included the Colonel-General Regiment of dragoons and four squadrons from the

Tilladet brigade. The main body of the advance guard consisted mostly of the infantry: the Vaisseaux brigade, the French and Swiss Guards, the Navarre brigade and the cavalry of the St. Aoust brigade. Magalotti commanded the main body. ‘The rear guard of the strong column was commanded by Fourbin and included the elite of the army: the Garde du Corps and the Regiment of King’s Musketeers. It was a column that emphasized strength and mobility. Forming the right flank of the army, four squadrons of the Dauphin Regiment of dragoons led the way, followed by the Lancon brigade. The main body of this column, commanded by Soubise, followed next with the Gendarmerie, the Picardy brigade, the Du Roy brigade, and then the rear guard trailed with four squadrons of Gendarmerie, commanded by Chazeron. This column was also composed of fairly élite formations and quite capable. ‘The two interior columns were indeed weaker and more vulner-

able. ‘he first, to the left, contained the supply carts and artillery accompanied by two battalions of the Fusiliers Regiment, flintlock-

armed regulars who habitually served with the artillery and who should not be confused with the governors’ companies.*! A squadron *© According to the dictionary of Furetiére: “Fourriers mark the lodging for the king and all of his court when he travels...” Furetiére, Dictionnaire (1690).

* The Fusiliers Regiment eventually became known as the Royal Artillery Regiment.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 197

of the Langon brigade led the column, and four squadrons of the Tilladet brigade covered its rear. This column filed down a road. The second interior column, to the right of the first and in the safest position, included the treasury and the court. This column did not have the benefit of an actual road, as the slower moving artillery in the other interior column took precedence here. ‘he second column counted among its celebrities Madame de Montespan (the King’s mistress), other ladies and gentlemen of the court, and the historian Pellisson; all bouncing along in private and royal carriages over cow tracks through country fields. Six hundred infantry detached from various battalions and who guarded the campaign treasury curiously observed the court travelers. The money bags were held fast in solid chests with huge iron locks and chains, the keys in the hands of the intendant of the army. The rear guard that followed the court—and

the money—was composed of four squadrons from the Tilladet brigade.

Security not only influenced the route and order of the march, but also the conduct of the soldiers. The troops marched with their weapons loaded. Infantry kept their matches “lit.” To avoid false alarms in such a situation, Louis XIV strictly prohibited the troops from firing their weapons unless they received a direct order from their officer. So that they could hear this order, speaking in the ranks was forbidden. Arguing, fighting or swearing earned a fist or the flat

of a sword to the side of the head. Soldiers were prohibited from breaking ranks, and the “ordered distances” between soldiers were to be carefully maintained. ‘These general orders came from the hand of the King, and were composed in the field.** To keep the supply

carts moving along in order, pennants in the livery colors of the brigade commanders marked the property of the separate brigades in the supply train. All told, it was a colorful, disciplined host that purposefully maneuvered, without too much pomp and noise, through the spring countryside. Once the army settled into camp, and beyond its neatly laid rows

of tents and baggage carts, hundreds of men were posted and concealed in the surrounding countryside. These men, the camp guard, included both a grande garde and a garde ordinaire, which despite their

” BN, Réserve, Table des Cartes des Marches @ Campements... 1675, Ordre de la Marche de VArmée pour mecredy vignt deuxieme jour de May. Billon also advised against

soldiers talking while marching, or while posted on guard. Billon, Les principes, p. 7.

198 CHAPTER FIVE different designations, were both composed of four squadrons, around

800 men in total. Because this particular camp was in the midst of Spanish fortresses, the camp guard was supported by 100 dragoons and 200 musketeers, detached from different units. The total force protecting the camp was therefore around 1,100 men, about three percent of the strength of the army. The guard detachment occupied the strongest posts afforded by the surrounding terrain: they occupied woods, walled farm-houses, villages and bell towers, all within a “one hour distance” from the king’s headquarters in the camp.

The officers of the camp guard looked mainly to secure the “avenues that led toward the camp, in other words, the most likely approaches for an enemy party. They also set up posts near certain fields and villages to watch over the foragers and soldiers who would

collect straw the next day. The commanders of the guard took care not to establish posts too far outside the main forage cordon, since guards set too far away could be cut off by enemy parties and themselves taken prisoner. After each post around the cordon was occupied, sentinels ventured further out. In case the enemy was seen, they would either fire a warning shot or hurry back to silently warn the larger party, according to the circumstance. Before the Dutch War, when the French army seldom used flintlocks, Jean Buillon advised that musketeers (with matchlocks) be careful to conceal their match at night so that the enemy could not see its glow from a distance.*’ Only after taking all of these precautions against enemy parties was the army safe in its new camp, and could begin foraging. To an incredible extent, the need for forage and the threat of small parties shaped the daily routines of soldiers in Louis XIV’s army.

4. Foraging for the field Army

The actual task of foraging was carried out at the lowest level, by a kind of military family, a chambrée or military household: a group

of soldiers that shared quarters in camp, usually four soldiers and servants, had they any. They composed the military household.

* Billon, Les principes, p. 16. By the Dutch War, most of these sentinels were probably equipped with flintlocks.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 199 Typically, while the army was encamped, the household, when called upon by commanding officers, contributed two of its members, probably on a rotational basis, to join the grand party of foragers.** The

foragers, who could number in the thousands on any given day in a grand party, worked for the benefit of their fellows in the household back in camp—what they took they brought back to share. The cavalry, after cutting green forage, ransacking the barns, and pillaging other buildings where peasants concealed their forage supply, bundled the hay and straw in rope satchels, trusses, and slung them across the backs of their horses. ‘The cavalrymen then walked beside their horses, back to the camp, barefoot. (Boots and spurs were often left in camp, as they were too cumbersome for heavy work in the fields.) Infantry soldiers meanwhile might fill their own campaign sacks, or large wicker baskets (kept in the company supply wagon), with firewood, garden vegetables, almost anything they could use at camp. After the day’s work was done, horses were watered and rested, and soldiers arranged straw for bedding; soldiers or servants gathered water and prepared soup or ragouts in iron kettles, marmites, over open fires.” Clothes might be mended. The day’s work done, the troops would engage in card-playing, dice, and, no doubt, gossip and story-telling.

To imagine the fate of a household unable to gather the simple necessities, is to understood the grave importance of securing local supplies for a field army. Soldiers endured great physical hardship

in the open country, as they marched ten to fifteen miles a day. Straw separated them from the cold ground at night. Hopefully, vegetables and other food scavenged from the country provided

“ For example, during the campaign of Louis XIV in 1677, Louis gave the following orders: “Every day of the march two soldiers by chambrée will be detached,

once the army will have arrived in camp, in order to search for straw, wood, or vegetables, and it shall be expressly forbidden to take anything else on penalty of death, and their ofhcers held accountable.” In other words, stealing a chicken earned the death penalty, but it was expected for wood, vegetables and straw to be gathered. BN, Réserve, Table des Cartes des Marches & Campemens de l’Armée du Roy Pendant

la Campagne 1677, p. 33. Members of the chambrée were also tasked with weapons maintenance and taking the bread rations from the “park of supplies.” *® According to the marquis de Vauban, the ideal chambrée should come equipped

with a “cauldron or marmite with its cover, formed flat, each a wood spoon, a knive, a bill hook or small hatchet, one or two tin cups, and if possible, several larger hatchets, some saws, mattocks and campaign buckets.” Vauban, Ozsiétes, p. 290.

200 CHAPTER FIVE desperately needed nutrients, to supplement their rations of bread, but there was no counting on such delicacies. Horses collapsed and died when not properly fed. From an eighteenth century treatise on war, the absolute necessity of foraging, as valid then as during the Dutch War, is clearly recognized: If one can succeed at it, deprive it [forage] from the enemy, or harass them when they make it, its cavalry will soon be without resource, the infantry will go without its supply carts and the artillery unable to be transported. ‘The most numerous army reduced to this extremity 1s necessarily obliged to remain on the defensive, however inferior in force and troops of the army which it opposes; its maneuvers will aim only to subsist, and all of its plans will be come to naught.*°

It is no wonder that field commanders insisted on numerous security precautions before setting out to forage. Both the French and their adversaries harassed one another’s foragers mercilessly. ‘Typically, in the nearly deserted countryside immediately surrounding a French camp, the peasants having fled, parties

of hostile troops attempted to penetrate unnoticed through the cordon of forage guards established to protect foragers. If successful, the enemy would bear down on the unprotected foragers, catching them by surprise.*’ Another stratagem involved placing a party in ambush before the day of the forage. Around 17 August 1675, the French governor of Charleroi learned of a forage that the Alhed army was making with around eleven squadrons of cavalry near Nivelle. The next day, a French party of forty cavalrymen placed themselves in ambush so successfully that, to their astonishment, as the sun rose over the summer fields of grain, they found themselves surrounded by thousands of foragers binding “trusses,” filing sacks and generally going about their business. One false move and the French party would have been captured to the man. Instead, they hugged the earth and waited for about six hours; when the foragers

*© Lancelot Turpin de La Crisse, E’ssaz sur Vart de la guerre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1764),

. P "The crucial forage came in two varieties: dry and green. Dry forage was any combination of hay, oats, barley, and, especially in the German regions, an addition of chopped straw, carefully cured and stored after the harvest to give horses a “full” feeling. Green forage consisted of the hay, oats and barley cut in the fields while still green, not fully ripened, but mature enough not to make horses sick. It had to be consumed immediately.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 201

were preparing to leave, they rose up and charged from their hiding place, surprising the stragglers of the tired and heavily laden forage column. As a result of their tenacity, no more than forty French soldiers were able to bring back to Charleroi ten prisoners and ten spare horses.*® Because parties established ambush positions in advance

of a forage, one of the most dangerous duties in the war was to serve on a forage reconnoitering party, to establish an area as clear and free of enemy parties before the forage began. ‘hese advance parties were often attacked. The ambushers then retired, delaying and frustrating the forage that day by their show of force. On 30 August 1674, the comte de Saint-Aoust was killed when leading a French advance party of twenty infantry—his body was later recovered by foragers and taken to Ath for burial.” In the spring of 1675, Louis XIV was fortunate to command an army of over 50,000, a force large enough not only for grand operations but also for providing security in partisan warfare. But the French were not always so blessed. ‘The smaller the army, the more difficult it found its cavalry tasks: simultaneously foraging, guarding the camp, and maintaining a sufficient reconnaissance force.’ Créqui’s fate at Kons-Saarbrucken near ‘Trier in 1675, demonstrated the need for sufficient numbers to peform multiple roles. One half of his cav-

alry was out foraging when the Imperials attacked. Only by accident did he see the enemy columns in the distance, approaching his camp. Surprised and with only a small cavalry arm available, Créqui suffered the only battlefield defeat inflicted on the French during the

Dutch War.’' The slightest enemy threat often sent an army weak in cavalry retreating to safer grounds, for lack of cavalry made it * Humiéres to Louvois, 19 August 1675, AG, A' 451, fo. 104. " Gazette, 1 September 1675, from the camp at Brugelette. °° In the war fought between France and Spain between 1635-1659 smaller armies on both sides led to numerous battles between detachments of foragers and detachments intent on disrupting forages. Twice in two months in 1655, ‘Turenne’s army fought pitched battles with the Spanish Army of Flanders to protect its foragers. The number of troops involved was considerable, especially in proportion to the size of the armies. In July 1655, twenty-two French squadrons that escorted a grand forage drove back a Spanish attack, capturing 600 prisoners. See, Grandpré to Mazarin, 8 July 1655, AAE, Pays Bas 35, fo. 345. In August 1655, the Spanish won a victory. Six French squadrons were routed. See, Turenne to Mazarin, 16 August 1655, AAE, Pays Bas 35, fo. 409. °' Rousset, Histotre, vol. 2, p. 174. The enemy columns were Imperial troops. The young Duke of Zell commanded them. As Rousset pointed out, “it was not defeat [for the French], it was rout.”

202 CHAPTER FIVE almost blind. At the camp of Florenville on 16 June 1677, Marshal

Schomberg reported to Louvois that the small number of troops under his command made it necessary: “To be mounted nearly every

night, it being very difficult to be warned of those who could fall on the most vulnerable parts of our camp.” Schomberg was well-

advised to be on the alert in light of what happened at KonsSaarbrticken two years earlier. Rival field armies often exchanged blows as they labored to secure

forage for their horses and deny it to the enemy. Throughout July of 1677, the duc de Luxembourg and Prince William battled in each other’s forage spaces. ‘he results were typical of the partisan war-

fare that surrounded every army in the countryside. On | July, for example, the Dutch ambushed a small French forage party of twenty cavalry in a village near Alost (Aalst), between Ghent and Brussels. After an advanced guard of “several cavaliers” under the command

of the comte du Plessis entered the village, they were fired upon: two of the foragers were instantly killed. ‘The incident was all the more upsetting to the French, because the burghers of Alost had given permission for French forages to take place on the outskirts of their town, in return for deductions in their contributions. ‘They had, according to Luxembourg, also advised him that the area was clear of the enemy. In retaliation for “the wicked conduct” of the burghers of Alost, Luxembourg demanded the equivalent of 3,000 lwres and 300 head of cattle in reprisal. Before the end of the day, French foragers had already rounded up 100 cattle. On the same day as the ambush, a French party on reconnaissance near the Dutch

camp encountered a Dutch detachment and pursued it up to the sentry line of its own camp before breaking off the chase.” Luxembourg reported no further incidents for four days. On 5 July, however, Luxembourg decided, because of other encounters with Dutch parties, to retain under his command three regiments of dragoons (Colonel-General, Dauphin and Fincaron), while relinquishing at Louvois’s insistence the Ruvignies Regiment to the garrison at Oudenaarde.** Louvois also demanded that as soon as the

°*? Schomberg to Louvois, 16 June 1677, AG, A’ 539, fo. 15. ** Luxembourg to Louvois, 7 July 1677, AG, A! 539, fo. 321. Also, St. Pouenges to Louvois, 8 July 1677, AG, A' 539, fo. 370. ** Luxembourg to Louvois, 5 July 1677, AG, A! 539, fo. 197.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 203

threat passed, the dragoons also should be released to serve as a protection against Spanish and Dutch contribution raids near the coast. Luxemboug had another reason for retaining the dragoons, the Dutch army threatened to maneuver closer to Oudenaarde, and Luxembourg apparently anticipated giving battle. Luxembourg, however, became so preoccupied with the struggles resulting from forage raids that on 30 July he wrote a detailed letter to Louvois describing his procedures exactly. ‘This is significant, not only because of what it tells us about grand forage operations, but because it reveals just how important the smallest details were to a marshal of France: I do what I can to bring to the King’s army as much order as possible, above all when it is a question of forages where we go by wings. The brigadiers ride at the head of their brigades, all the colonels and officers at the head of their regiments, the cavaliers with their weapons are mounted in their saddles, marching together like regular army columns, but with this difference: to make foraging easier, the cavalers wear no boots, they have sacks, each one quiet large, with their ropes and their pistols kept in their belts, all the valets marching behind the third rank of the squadrons and out of which they make one or two [ranks] according to the number of them that one encounters, the general officers march at the head of the entire corps. Instead of allowing the foragers to run footloose into the fields, they halt the columns, each squadron takes its parcel of land to forage, and the officers remain mounted to look over the surroundings to see that they are secure, and to ensure that the foragers do not spread apart. In this way no one gives more than a little trouble to the officers...”

Luxembourg also noted in the same letter that he had “some difficulty

in retaining the infantry at the beginning from setting off with the cavalry to forage.” He added: “But now, the infantry seeing the cavalry leave to forage watch them without mixing with them and setting off.°® Given the need of all soldiers for bountiful forage, it was

no wonder that the infantry wanted to mix with the cavalry. Presumably, the infantry gathered supplies on other days or received

them from other sources, according to the operational situation of Luxembourg’s army.

” Fuxembourg to Louvois, 30 July 1677, AG, A!’ 539, fo. 678. °° Thid.

204 CHAPTER FIVE 5. The Struggle of Convoys

Foragers took necessary risks when they made their daily trips to and from camp. But so too did the bearers of other crucial supplies that supported armies: the numerous civilian teamsters, porters, and soldiers that conducted and protected convoys that included hundreds of wagons and two-wheeled carts. ‘These convoys, ponderously

slow, brought the bulk of the French army’s bread rations, barrels of gunpowder, and other munitions. ‘They were primarily organized

and protected by troops of the garrison force. In this sense, the 70,000-man garrison forces served not only as defenders and raiders,

but also as a vital logistic link to the roughly equal numbers in French field armies in the theater of war. Some convoys assembled early, before the actual campaign, and transported goods to certain fortress magazines in advance of the campaign. Others, smaller in number, hauled goods shorter distances to the armies in the countryside once the campaign began. Like the parties of foragers, convoys made tempting targets in partisan warfare. And, also like the forages of field armies, the convoys required the use of large numbers of troops, as escorts. The larger convoys demanded entire squadrons of cavalry, sometimes even several brigades.

In the spring of 1678, in order to escort 300 wagons loaded with oats from Dinant to Phillipeville, two regiments of cavalry marched up river from Maastricht to Dinant. The French then learned that

the Imperial army had assembled nearly 1,500 cavalry and 600 infantry to prevent the convoy from arriving safely. Louvois took heed and instructed Schomberg, who commanded all forces between the Meuse and Sambre rivers, to march an additional corps of eleven battalions of infantry and twenty squadrons of cavalry to Philippeville to secure a safe passage for the convoy. Thus, several thousand troops were occupied escorting the convoy.’ The successful preparation and conduct of convoys to fortress magazines and to campaign armies required careful planning and reconnaissance. The French often sent convoys in stages, staggering them one after another, until a magazine was sufficiently resupplied. Before the campaign of 1675, several large convoys were sent to the frontier magazines, in preparation for the King’s campaign in the Meuse

°” Gazette, 17 May 1678, from Charleville.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 205

River Valley, and these operations provide a useful case to consider

in further detail. ‘The organization and care of the convoys was entrusted to Marshal Créqui and Governor Estrades. On 2 March, a huge convoy of grain assembled 3,600 wagons, each carrying two flintlock-armed militiamen, yielding a total of 7,200 men. This convoy departed from the fortress town of Guise and headed for Charleroi

on the Sambre River. Créqui, who was then at Avesnes, formed an

army corps out of detachments from the garrisons between the Sambre and Meuse rivers, in order to ensure the safe arrival of the convoy at Charleroi.°? As Créqui formed this corps at the end of February, he caused concern to the Imperial garrison commanders at Huy and Dinant. [he Imperial commanders at Huy and Dinant feared a siege was imminent, and augmented their garrisons.” At the end of March, another of the convoys—sent in preparation for the King’s campaign of 1675—assembled 3,000 wagons. ‘The

escort consisted of two small corps, each consisting of infantry and cavalry detachments. The convoy proceeded to just beyond the range

of the cannon of the Spanish garrison at Charlemont, and then turned and crossed the Meuse River over the ancient bridge at Givet.

French troops forced the Spanish troops in the town to abandon their quarters, and withdraw to the safety of the fortress of Charlemont.

The well-armed convoy was simply too overpowering for them to attempt to resist it. After the convoy arrived safely at its twin destinations, Philippeville and Charleroi, Créqui dispersed the two escort-

ing corps into their garrisons.”

On another occasion that spring, in preparation of the King’s campaign, Governor Estrades organized and personally led a convoy from Maastricht to the fortress of Li¢ge, which had fallen into French hands in March without a shot fired. Facing a shortage of carts for the task, the veteran Estrades used a common technique from the era of the Thirty Years’ War. He first sent Colonel Melac under cover of darkness with the cavalry carrying “600 sacks of wheat flour” on horseback and the mounted dragoons with sacks of biscuits hanging over their horses’ necks. He marched the next day with 1,600 infantry and 250 wagons laden with shot, gunpowder,

8 Gazette, 5 March 1675, from Charleville. ” Gazette, 28 February 1675, from Liége. °° Gazette, 31 March 1675, from Philippeville.

206 CHAPTER FIVE wheat flour, and surgical equipment for an army hospital. Melac, as instructed, waited with the mounted troops at camp in a village halfway between Maastricht and Liege. All during the night, Melac sent out “some parties on the right flank in order learn the latest from enemies.” When the wagons and infantry caught up to the cavalry in the village, they all marched straight for Liége, arriving safely.°! Not all convoys made it safely to fortress magazines, as the Spanish

knew from an earlier experience in 1675. On 8 January 1675, a Spanish convoy sent to replenish the magazines at Mons was intercepted and destroyed by the French. From spies or else reconnaissance parties, Louvois learned weeks before that the Spanish were preparing a “large convoy” to carry unmilled grain from Cambrai to nearby Valenciennes and from there to Mons. Having determined to destroy the convoy, Louvois instructed Estrades to dispatch parties to search on one side of the Aisne River, while Broglie observed the other side of the river; groups of French soldiers, disguised as peasants, watched and waited along the roads.°? Humiéres posted couriers at St. Amand and “elsewhere to keep informed of the activities of the Spanish in their preparation of the convoy.”” All considered, the French mounted a well-coordinated search-and-destroy mission. I'he convoy was sighted and attacked by the troops commanded by the comte de Broglie. All of the cavalry and dragoon squadrons available in garrison at Le Quesnoy, Philippeville, Charelroi,

Landrécies and Avesnes soon assembled and participated, overwhelming and destroying the convoy. Six thousand sacks of grain were recovered and carted back to French garrisons, thousands more were burned or “abandoned” to the cavalry.” After convoys replenished magazines at fortresses, others hauled the goods to the armies in the field. ‘Ihe result: fiercely contested fights for convoys around encamped armies. The successful ambush of a smaller, secondary supply convoy could result in horrible destruc-

tion and loss of life. On 17 August 1675, De Braque took charge of a convoy of wine casks, on its way to the French army encamped at Brugelet, a post favored by French field commanders when guard-

°' Estrades to Louvois, 2 April 1675, AG, A! 449, fo. 8. *? Louvois to Humiéres, 1 January 1675, AG A! 432, fo. 3. °° Humieéres to Louvois, 4 January 1675, AG, A’ 448, fo. 19. + Gazette, 13 January 1675, from Avesnes.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 207

ing the frontier. De Braque furnished an escort of one squadron of cavalry and around 150 infantry. ‘The convoy departed Ath and was to regroup first at ‘Tournai. “Three leagues” from ‘Tournai, it was ambushed by around 400 to 500 Allied cavalry. The Frenchmen bravely fought it out hand-to-hand with the ambushers. Amidst the ringing of steel and gun shots, the captain commanding the cavalry squadron, who was the son of Marshal Créqui, perished. Molineuf and La Fare, captains in the Normandy Regiment, were also killed. Of the three companies making up the squadron, only twenty French cavalrymen survived. While mounted troops fought furiously, most of the infantry escaped the chaos, and, according to Humieéres, a remnant of the convoy fled to the nearby castle of Guiberchies. After this fight, a small number of French cavalry heroically stood their eround and fought off the ambushers, and in the process the total

loss of the French escort mounted to 80 percent of its effective strength.”

6. Condé and the Cattle War of 1674

The ambush of convoys, and a hard-fought struggle waged against foragers, had near disastrous consequences in the summer of 1674 for the prince de Condé, who commanded the French field army in a defensive campaign. Just before the campaign began, a French spy had warned: “The Dutch hope greatly that the armies of the king will not subsist the entire campaign season, and that provided that they are resisted for three months they will self-destruct.” Prince William put this strategy into action, and patiently waited from May to the middle of July for limits of the French supply system, time, and nature to do its worst to Condé’s army, before attempting to undertake a major operation. Consideration of Condé’s campaign of 1674, and his supply difficulties, underlines the intensity of the partisan warfare around campaign armies and its impact on the course of a campaign.

*®° De Braque to Louvois, 18 August 1675, AG, A! 451, fo. 95. See also, Humiéres

to Louvois, 19 August 1675, AG, A' 451, fo. 104. Humiéres may have painted a better picture of the disaster than it merited. He claimed only twenty-five to thirty cavalrymen were killed. De Braque, who was there, spoke to Louvois in his letter in more somber tones.

208 CHAPTER FIVE The campaign unfolded with fanfare and meticulous logistic plan-

ning. ‘he prince de Condé arrived at Arras accompanied by 100 “gentlemen,” officers, and two large squadrons,” proclaimed the Gazette de France. On the evening of 5 May 1674, the town fathers of Arras regaled the Prince with a splendid banquet. The next day, Condé showed up at Tournai where well-stocked magazines within the fortress could sustain the army for several weeks, and he took notice of the nearly 1,000 cattle, exacted from the lands of contribution, grazing on the covered-way. Over the next several days, the

held army assembled in stages at Tournai: infantry marched to Tournai from strongholds and fortresses in French Flanders, Artois, Picardy and the frontiers of Champagne; cavalry regiments arrived from further away—from the villages of the Somme and Oise valleys, where they had wintered. Intendant St. Pouenges was attached to the army and charged with the details of logistics: providing for-

age to the horses as they arrived and lodging and rations to the troops at the quarters of assembly. In advance of the assembly, con-

voys of grain and forage had pushed their way by barge on the Scarpe River to Tournai (from Arras and Douai) as early as March.”

Encamped on the left bank of the Escaut River, within range of the cannon of ‘Tournai, the army grew by 10 May to forty-four battalions of infantry, 121 squadrons of cavalry and ten of dragoons— in all about 45,000 men. It was an auspicious beginning to an almost disastrous campaign. On 12 May, the French Army of Flanders, as it was christened, turned east and arrived at its next camp at Leuzeen-Hainaut. For the next eleven days, the French Army of Flanders proceeded steadily across Hainaut, and then across parts of Brabant

and the principality of Liege; eventually it rendezvoused with the retreating corps under the command of Marshal Bellefonds, who completed a strategic withdrawal that had begun nearly one year ago.

The army of the prince de Condé continued to progress steadily (unopposed by an Allied field army) across the Netherlands during the second and third weeks in May, however, it suffered numerous

°° According to the Résumé de opérations, AG, A' 398, Condé departed 3 May 1674

from Chantilly and arrived on 6 May at Tournai, after having consulted with St. Pouenges on the supply of the army that was assembling at Tournai. ‘The Spanish assembled at Brussels and at Malines and the Dutch around Bergen-op-Zoom.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 209 desertions and illness.°’ The Dutch remained encamped near Malines

for the month, while the nearby Spanish contingent camped along the Brussels’ Grand Canal, which runs to Antwerp.®® The Dutch army, in particular, was given to marauding and pillaging the country of its ally between Antwerp and Brussels that spring. In the second week of May, a French war party from the Pertuis Fusiliers, from Courtrai, attacked one of these marauding parties of Dutch troops. Three Dutch soldiers were killed.’ On the morning of 24 May, nineteen days after the arrival of Condé at Tournai, Bellefonds’ corps, excepting a few regiments that stayed at Maastricht, crossed the Meuse over the bridge at E1xjsden and joined Condé’s army, raising its numbers to 51,000 men, according to Intendant St. Pouenges.’ After the rendezvous, troubles began as the Spanish garrison force

commenced to harass the Prince’s army. ‘Toward the end of May, Condé turned to backtrack to the French frontier. He withdrew his army west to guard against the threat of a siege by the Allied army under Prince Wiliam, which finally began to stir. In early June, the Spanish attempted to prevent cavalry reinforcements from the garrison at Ath from reaching the army. In one incident, the marquis de Coetlogon, a captain in the D’Eragny Regiment, was ambushed on his way to Condeé’s army. Fortunately for Coetlogon, although he lost his personal equipage during the ambush, a detachment commanded by Roqueville arrived in the nick-of-time and repelled the ambushing Spanish party in a lively skirmish three leagues outside of Ath. Roqueville took several prisoners and forced the rest of the

| Spanish party to flee.’' In another ambush, the Spanish governor of Enghien, Colonel Massiette ambushed a column of draft horses sent

from Ath and bound for the artillery at Condé’s camp. (Colonel Massiette, an imaginative partisan leader, was a brother of the gov-

ernor of Luxembourg.) In the engagement, the French retained a °’ Beaurain, Histoire de la campagne, p. 27. The army had “many sick, and desertion was considerable.” Louvois desired a review of the army to punish the negligent officers. Louvois to Condé, 23 May 1674, AG, A' 380, fo. 49. 8 Gazette, 3 June 1674, from Ath. ® Pertuis to Louvois, 16 May 1674, AG, A! 398, fo. 46. The governor of Courtrai was unsure if he should return a Dutch prisoner captured despite the requests of the prisoner’s commanding officer, because the Dutch prisoner was a native of a village within the government of Courtrai. ” St Pouenges to Louvois, 24 May 1674, AG A! 398, fo. 80. "' Gazette, 11 June 1674, from Ath.

210 CHAPTER FIVE sight edge, and the escort successfully defended the reinforcements:

the detachment from Ath numbered around 400 cavalry, while Massiette’s party (the ambushers) numbered only around 250 men.” Condé was gradually forced into a grueling struggle just to maintain his army in the field. Another skirmish outside of Condé’s camp occurred on 17 June. ‘The marquis de Roncherolles was escorting a large convoy from Landrecies to Condé’s camp. Upon receiving word

that a party of sixty horse from Cambrai were in the vicinity, Roncherolles detached an equal number from the escort of around 1,000 cavalry and in an ensuing skirmish took 16 prisoners from the Cambrai party.” At the Camp de Viulle-sur-Haisne, Intendant Roberts informed Louvois, however, that the partisan warfare around Condé’s camp was not always in his favor: “As we are here in the midst of enemy fortresses, we are always losing everyone, by desertion, and by those that the enemy takes while on forage or marauding.” Lack of abundant forage diminished the effectiveness of French cavalry squadrons.

On 28 June, searching for fresher fields to forage, Condé marched his army even closer to the enemy, from Ville-sur-Haisne to Brugelette

between Ath and Mons. From there, he could also more closely observe the combined Allied army, which was still encamped outside of Brussels and along the Grand Canal.” The Allied field army, although assembled and ready, had not moved from its supply base

for two months. In the meantime, continued desertion and illness threatened to destroy Condé’s army, despite the successful arrival of

several convoys of biscuit rations from Ath and ‘Tournai and the arrival of nearly 1,000 cattle from Lille on 30 June.”

” Gazette, 23 June 1674, from Brussels. > Gazette, 23 June 1674, from Landrecies. According to the Gazette, 18 June 1674, from Lille, on June 17, a convoy of 1,200 carts “loaded with all types of munitions and rations, with twenty-two cannons, arrived at Conde’s camp from ‘Tournal and nearly as many arrived from Ath, “such that never before had anyone seen such a large convoy all at the same time.” ™ Robert to Louvois, 21 June 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 151. Gazette, 30 June 1674, from Brussels. The Gazette gives the spelling Bergelet while Condé’s correspondence gives the spelling Brugelette. The Spanish army under the command of the Count of Monterey was camped outside of Brussels, while the Dutch were camped at Semps, Gazette, 14 July 1674, from Brussels. ”© Robert composed a memoir on 25 June to regulate the distribution of cattle that war parties succeeded in taking: three cows per battalion each day and one cow per squadron of cavalry each day. According to the official memo, the total

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 21]

In July, the convoys began to arrive less consistently, and when they did, it was not enough. One convoy carrying sacks of flour from Ath and escorted by around sixty infantry was set upon by a Spanish party of thirty cavalry from Valenciennes. The officers of the convoy had allowed the foot-soldiers to ride on the carts so they were dispersed. ‘The Spanish did so well that they captured all of the draft horses in the convoy.’’ The deteriorating supply situation was so bad that, from the prince de Condé down to individual cap-

tains, the officers now encouraged troops to break camp and to maraude: “Ihe misery is just as great amongst the officers so that they can help with nothing and they find some usefulness when the soldiers take some prize,” according to Le Peletier, who kept informed

of conditions in the field army.’’ On 10 July a Spanish war party ambushed another convoy: a convoy bearing 3,500 sacks of flour and 500 sacks of unmilled grain en route to Condé’s army. It was completely destroyed.” According to Robert, the convoy was lost because “since withdrawing from the fortresses all of the cavalry and the dragoons, it will now be impossible to send any convoys from France.”

lwo days later, on 12 July, another party from Cambrai disrupted Condeé’s supply route to the fortresses in French Flanders.*” On 15 July, Louvois advised Rouillé at St. Quentin to delay the transport

of a convoy of grain to Le Quesnoy. The lack of cavalry, most of which had been sent to reinforce the campaign army in case of a battle, deprived the convoys of their necessary escort.®' Thus, the threat of battle was also working to destroy Condé’s army, because it tied available cavalry and dragoons to the main camp, instead of actively securing lines of communication and supply. The prince’s sojourn at Brugelette was almost over.

On 14 July the French army decamped and marched to Ettines Basses (Estinnes-au-val), driven not by any intention to oppose the Allied army more effectively, but simply to subsist easier. The new

needs of the army reached 208 cows a day. A thousand cows should have lasted five days according to Robert’s system of distribution. In fact, the meat does seem to have been consumed by | July when Condé wrote an official memoir to Louvois describing his predicament.

ean to Louvois, 5 July 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 173. Robert to Louvois, 10 July 1674, AG, A’ 405, fo. 186. * St. Geniez to Louvois, 15 July 1674, AG, A! 399, fo. 70. *' Louvois to Rouillé du Coudray, 15 July 1674, AG.

212 CHAPTER FIVE camp was safely within the vicinity of the French fortress at Charlerot.

The camp at Ettines Basses was a strong one, on one side flowed a brook called the Piéton and on another side the Sambre River. The bastions of Charleroi looked over the lands surrounding the encamped army. Upon arriving at Ettines Basses, Intendant Robert worked to raise the morale of the troops with more regular supplies, and by 16 July, the improvement had become obvious enough that Louvois congratulated Robert for the re-establishment of “order and discipline in the army.”®’ Condé’s army was so well-disciplined that they did not risk stealing a chicken, according to the Gazette: “this makes the peasants bring their goods, as during a march: and it 1s so well provided with all kinds of provisions that it lacks nothing.’ The army was saved. Louvois, however, was not entirely satisfied with the new camp, as he would have preferred that the field army live at the expense of the enemy and not the department of Charleror— “sans charge au Pays du Roy.”®* Only by retreating from the enemy

and toward his own base of supplies at Charleroi was Condé able to preserve his army in the summer of 1674. It was an operational decision based on the fragile French supply system and, perhaps more important, the numerous attacks made by the Spanish garrison force on the lines of supply leading to the various forward positions of the French field army. In retreating, however, Condé left the frontier of the kingdom momentarily exposed and gave the initiative over to the Allied field army. Prince William took advantage. He united his army with the Imperial corps commanded by Souches and marched towards the French frontier. He was stopped, but just barely, at Seneffe in August—the last victory won by the great Condé.

7. Conclusion

French commanders during the Dutch War carefully coordinated the smaller actions of war in support of field armies, and they were usu-

ally successful in achieving their larger goals. By frequent recon-

®. Louvois to Robert, 16 July 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 204. On July 15 a convoy of 200 carts departed Rocroi under the command of the marquis de Fourilles. 3 Gazette, 15 July 1674, from Charleville. ®t Louvois to Robert, 16 July 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 204.

FIELD ARMIES AS SOURCE AND TARGET 213 naissance detachments and occasional employment of local peasants and spies, operational level intelligence was systematically gathered

and brought to the attention of the demanding and tireless eyes of War Minister Louvois. For the most part, the marauding behavior of French field armies, commonplace in the Thirty Years’ War, was

replaced by more controlled and deliberate supply actions on the local level that gave greater operational flexibility to French field forces. Procedures were established for march security and forage operations.

An extensive array of fortress magazines, and carefully planned convoys, normally kept French field armies well-stocked with those supplies not readily available in the countryside. These tendons of supply became targets of Allied parties and detachments, and sometimes, as in the case of Condé’s campaign in 1674, attacks on French logistics scored significant blows. In extreme cases, French troops faced with starvation resorted to marauding. However, in the main, the Dutch War witnessed, at least in the case of French field forces, the birth of a more modern style of military operations, and consideration of partisan warfare in direct support of field armies throws light on this development. French operations emphasized sieges and smaller actions of war that aimed at attrition. The French command believed that Allied field forces, like fortress garrisons, could be challenged without battle and gradually and more effectively destroyed by attrition. ‘Their belief reflected their own concerns of age-old problems that afflicted French field armies as well as the Allied field armies. The emphasis on actions of partisan warfare that supported French field armies also recalled much of the military experience of past wars. Forage operations and raids for supplies in the Spanish Netherlands, as in

the past, drew numerous troops, (as much as 30 percent of total strength in grand forages) and resources into their violent vortices. French commanders conducted war in a way that suited operational circumstances, and the organizations and resources available to them from 1673-78. The will-o’the-wisp of decisive battle, while occasionally pursued, was not critical to success or failure for them,

as it would be for Napoleon. In the Netherlands, a French operational emphasis on attritional warfare and sieges was unlikely to change when nearly half of the total opposing forces in the theater of war were safely sheltered behind fortress walls. Moreover, Allied field armies, like French field armies, were transitory and seasonal

214 CHAPTER FIVE threats, constrained by weak or indifferent public credit markets and the unpredictable length of the campaign season. In conclusion, the French partisan war in support of field armies demonstrated new discipline, effectiveness and polish, and for the

most part met the challenge of the strategic and operational problems confronting the field armies of the French state. What Michael Howard observed about the development of war in the eighteenth century, as this chapter has demonstrated, was already true in the reign of Louis XIV: As the guerre de postes, small-scale skimishing in woods and villages on the fringes of the main military forces, became more general in eighteenth-century warfare, so the need developed for specialists to under-

take it.”

Louis XIV’s field armies and garrison force in the Netherlands already possessed these specialists: dragoons, the governors’ companies and partisans. Where lacking, detachments composed of men armed with fliintlocks and bayonets, usually picked troops, made up the difference.

French forces conducted partisan warfare around field armies with finesse and expertise, meeting the challenge of gathering intelligence, securing local supplies and protecting convoys. As the next chapter

considers, however, the task of protecting the northern frontier of France against equally skillful raiders from the Allied side proved more difficult.

* Howard, War, p. 98.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE

For most of the Dutch War, detachments of Allied troops raided the

north of France. In August 1672, barely three months after the French invasion of the Dutch Republic, a detachment from the Dutch

garrison of Maastricht eluded the patrols dispatched from French fortresses and raided villages near La Capelle. One French official requested an order from Versailles that once published would serve as a warning to the villages in the Spanish Netherlands, “that if they offer retreat to any Dutch parties, they will be held responsible for the damages.”' Officials at villages around Arras recorded “disorders made by several parties from the garrison of Maastricht,” and advised

the war ministry of measures taken to trap raiders in the future.’ They also mentioned villages in the Spanish Netherlands, then officially

at peace with France, that had provided assistance to the Dutch raiders. When Louis XIV captured Maastricht in June 1673, after twenty-five days of siege, he removed a nuisance to French inhabi-

tants in the north. But, by October 1673, a more dangerous raiding foe replaced the Maastricht garrison. War with Spain exposed the north of France, “le nord,” to the reach of multiple fortress garrisons closer than Maastricht. ‘Thereafter, Spanish raiders consistently imposed contributions, inflicted casualties on French garrisons, laid waste military supplies, and caused fear in the north. Raids by Dutch parties also continued from their many fortresses, and although not as devastating as those by the Spanish, they caused enough havoc in February 1674 for Marshal Bellefonds to write a letter to Louvois suggesting that a peace settlement be reached with the Dutch because of the damage caused by their raiding parties.’ How did Louis XIV shield his northern frontier from enemy raids? To do so, he turned not to his field armies but to his garrison forces,

' Roquepinet to Louvois, 23 August 1672, AG, A! 277, fo. 175. * Montpezat to Louvois, 3 August 1672, AG, A! 277, fo. 14. > Bellefonds to Louvois, 17 February 1674, AG, A' 384, fo. 283.

216 CHAPTER SIX buttressed by militia. Fortress governors and other local officials tried to protect the villages and towns by dispatching militia patrols, mounting counter-raids, and creating defensive strong points. French counterraid operations involved more than use of detachments of troops to confront enemy raiders or to conduct reprisals. French fortress gov-

ernors deployed mounted detachments from the garrison force that tried to stop or trap enemy parties in a year-round struggle. Both the kine’s regular troops and the governors’ companies of dragoons performed vital services. The French garrison force was sufficient in numbers, and available, but it was not entirely successful at preventing Spanish and Dutch raids. The fact that the king’s officers shared the burden of maintaining troops out of their own pocket made them reluctant to lead these troops on dangerous patrols in the countryside. ‘The men in dragoon companies interested in offensive operations that netted plunder sometimes neglected the routine defensive duties assigned to garrisons, such duties as patrolling. René de Pérouse Desbournays, the king’s inspector-general and frequent visitor of garrisons, noted in 1675 that “the detached companies of the éats-maors of the fortresses

do not serve like the rest of the infantry, as their patrols are weakly mounted.”* Their negligence violated sections of a royal reglement.° Few, if any, troops in the king’s army looked forward to skirmishes with the enemy when there was no prospect of gaining booty. The governors’ dragoons, and French regulars, preferred instead the fireraid, or even a decent chance to smash the enemy’s main army in battle and to plunder its baggage train. Yet, experienced troops were sorely needed to defend the frontier. French militia, no matter how brave, could not withstand a determined attack by Allied line cavalry or infantry. Detachments of Allied raiders held the advantage gained by surprise. An uncertain, sometimes uncooperative, level of support from local justice officials made the task of mounting an effective defense doubly difficult for French governors and general officers. In parts of the Netherlands, added to France by the peace treaties of 1659 and

; Desbournays to Louvois, | November 1674, AG, A! 453, fo. 1. > BG, Recueil Cangé, Reglement fait par le Roy, concernant le Commandement, (Ordre, & la Discipline... dans les Villes G Places ou elles tiendront garnison, 12 October 1661,

vol. 20, no. 157.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 217 1668, some inhabitants showed a tendency to favor the former Spanish regime over the newly installed French one. While the French received

excellent strategic intelligence during the Dutch War, information regarding raiders from local sources was often faulty or completely lacking. ‘The defense of the frontier demonstrated in more ways than one the limits of what military force and royal government could reasonably accomplish in wartime. Proficient at siege warfare and conducting raids, the army of Louis XIV found protecting the north against raiders a more difficult proposition. 1. The Allted Threat

Stories of Alhed raids printed in the Mercure Hollandois suggested the

importance that the Spanish attached to gathering war taxes and the intensity of their raids. Official French sources often confirmed

the stories of raids, and despite the biased interpretation in the Mercure, the dramatic events, for the most part, did occur. According

to one of its official-sounding pronouncements entered in January 1676, the Spanish Marquis of Conflans organized a raid from Namur —

directed against a French garrison in the town of Chatelet. Of particular importance to Conflans, and his reason for the raid, was the fact that the inhabitants of Chatelet, instead of paying contributions to the Spanish, had welcomed a French garrison. Conflans marched there at the head of a mixed force of approximately 400 infantry and 200 cavalry to overrun the garrison.® On the frigid eve of 2 January 1676, around 2 AM, Conflans led his troops over the walls of the town “by ladders.”’ They pushed aside the militia night watch and were soon marching through the streets. The startled French garrison of about 100 troops might have been slaughtered, had they not requested quarter. The town inhabitants paid a high price for sending an invitation to a French garrison force. In the hours that followed the assault, the Spanish plundered the small burg; the inhab-

itants were terrorized as shops and homes were violated and fires

* A town near the French fortress of Charleroi (on the Sambre River). It is now part of Charleroi metropole.

’ Montal to Louvois, 4 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 58. Montal’s report confirmed the details of the Mercure story, and provided Louvois with information not found in the news gazettes.

218 CHAPTER SIX started. Ihe Spanish sent a message to towns throughout the Sambre

and Meuse region not to place their destiny in the hands of the French, who as the readers of the Mercure learned, slept during a surprise attack. From the French garrison, the raiders symbolically took a valuable pair of kettle drums, six pack mules and all of the personal baggage of the marquis de Seisac [Seysac], along with “a decent amount of other loot.”* Montal explained to Louvois that the Spanish raiding force left by the same route it had arrived. It departed

around 5 AM, meaning the raid and pillage was conducted with great efficiency, speed and discipline. The raiding party was composed “for the most part of natural Spaniards.’” The Chatelet encounter was not the only Spanish raiding activity in the winter of 1676, according to the Mercure. Around the same time that the town of Chatelet was plundered, another Spanish party from Namur seized a boat that plied the route between Maastricht

and Liége on the Meuse River. Possibly informed by a spy, the Spanish party took hostage an abbot, disguised as a well-dressed merchant, who had forbidden his abbey to pay contributions to the Spanish. The same Spanish party, now advancing down an open road, later encountered and defeated a French party that was escorting a real merchant. From the defeated French, the Spanish party took several horses and captured the merchant who was kept as a hostage at Namur until his ransom was paid.'® In February 1676 a Spanish party from Namur encountered several French supply wag-

ons and three merchants on their way to Charleroi. ‘he Namur party gave chase to the small escort, which it routed, and then set about the pillage of the untended wagons. The Spanish scattered and wasted what they could not carry and unlimbered the draught horses, returning to Namur with the horses and eight French prisoners.'' In the following month of March, a Spanish party from : Namur ambushed another French supply column. ‘That party returned to Namur with a small herd of cattle that had been destined for the French troops at Charleroi.'? The Mercure Hollandots did not always

° Mercure Hollandois, January 1676.

” Montal to Louvois, 4 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 58. '° Mercure Hollandois, January 1676. '' Mercure Hollandois, February 1676. 2 Mercure Hollandois, March 1676.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 219

mention casualties in these partisan actions, but the French, being the losers, likely suffered the worst. In the case of the night attack on Chatelet, a walled town within a mile of the French fortress of Charleroi, the entire garrison surrendered. If the garrison at Namur conducted just three actions of war per month, as the January evidence from the Mercure suggested, then, for the total of 72 months of war, October 1673 to September 1678, the Spanish garrison force at Namur possibly engaged in over 200

actions of war against their French enemy. Namur was but one Spanish fortress; there were nearly seventeen other similarly impor-

tant garrisons in 1674. Thousands of large and small raids issued from Spanish garrisons during the course of the war. Against the French garrison force, the Spanish normally mustered no more than 20,000 regular troops based in fortresses and fortified towns. Perhaps half as many town militia and nobles—the troublesome gendarmerie organized in mounted companies supplemented these. Spanish authorities called the latter to arms in 1676, and, like the militia, the gendarmerie were capable of playing only a minor defensive role. The regulars and partisans in the Spanish garrison force, on the other hand, showed a remarkable capacity for raids and ambushes. Walloon formations in particular earned a reputation for discipline and bravery that persisted into the eighteenth century. Bravery, however, did not make up for the fact that the Spanish could not draw many troops from garrison duty to supplement the field army. The Spanish promised to put a substantial body of troops in the field, but almost always fell short. According to historian Stephen Baxter, in 1674, “Monterey undertook to provide a field army of 25,000 men as well as supplies and wagons for the Dutch. He could do neither the one nor the other. What troops he could bring together were needed to garrison the fortified towns of the Spanish Netherlands. And there was never enough forage for the Dutch horses or beer for the men. As a result the soldiers became disorderly, and it was some time before the Prince could restore discipline.”'’ In 1674, the Spanish actually contributed closer to 9,000 men to the Allied field army—confirmed by the number of troops

in the Spanish contingent at the battle of Seneffe. This number

> See, Baxter, William ITT, p. 114.

220 CHAPTER SIX declined as the war continued. In fact, the entire military establish-

ment declined, as is evident from the falling number of rations requested from the Estates of the Belgian provinces: 23,000 in 1673; 15,000 in 1674; 18,000 in 1676; 15,000 in 1677."* The infantry com-

plement of individual Spanish garrisons demonstrated the meager Spanish manpower relative to the French. The average strength of the infantry component of ten fortress garrisons was close to 1,000 men in 1675, as deduced from a French intelligence report for the benefit of the prince de Condé.'” Of course, this did not include the cavalry and dragoons that the Spanish retained as part of their garrison force structure. Cavalry and dragoons within the Cambrai garrison during February 1676, for instance, reached 1,500 men, and they constituted a principal raiding force of the Spanish garrisons. In August 1675, the Spanish were able to assemble a detached corps for purposes of raiding French territory that included: 4,000 Dutch

infantry, loaned by Prince William; 5,000 Spanish cavalry; 1,200 Spanish dragoons; and 4,000 “natural” Spaniards serving as infantry. The total Spanish component of this force assembled in 1675 was around 10,200, according to the French estimation.’ In theory, the Spanish court of Madrid and its Belgian provinces were supposed to share the cost of defense. According to Van Houtte, however, the provinces took care of themselves without any financial help from Madrid: Soon they received no more than half of it [the subsidy] and, at the beginning of the second half of the 17th century, they received nothing anymore, such that all of the military expenses fell on Belgium itself.'”

To meet the expense of war, the Spanish administration in Brussels, hike the French, established a system of contributions. Spanish bureaus of contributions, headed by intendants, set the level of war taxes and Spanish fortress governors organized and sometimes led raids.'® ‘Their ‘* Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 39 and p. 48. In terms of actual monetary expense: 18,000 rations a day in 1676 cost 4,500 florins each day or 1,642,500 florins for the entire year (one ration cost five sols and one florin was the equivalent of 20 sols). The Estates were not always capable of meeting this requirement, throwing the burden of financing the war on the receipt of contributions. AG, A! 453, 15 December 1675, fo. 139. ‘© Chamilly to Louvois, 6 August 1675, AG, A! 457, fo. 35. '’ Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 39. ‘8 "The Spanish intendancies of contributions and cottisations were, in fact, created

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 221 bureaus of contributions included headquarters at several towns and

fortresses: Nieuport, Ypres, St. Omer, Ghent, Winckel, Cambrai, Mons, Namur, Limbourg, Venloo, and Luxembourg. In addition, a bureau in Brussels, supervised by the Auditor-General Henri Van Eyck and his brother oversaw all the other offices.'? When the villages of the enclave French territory of Oudenaarde were struck early

in the war by Spanish war parties and quickly settled what they owed, their payments were recorded as cottisations since the Spanish

did not recognize the inhabitants of Oudenaarde as true subjects of Louis XIV, and cottisations were thought of as the normal taxes expected by those Spanish subjects dwelling in lands illegitimately occupied by Louis XIV. The Spanish bureaus divided French territory into quarters or districts of contributions, in the same manner that the French offices of contributions divided the Spanish Netherlands

into departments. The Spanish bureau at Cambrai, for example, covered in its district: “all inhabitants between the rivers of the Authie,

Somme and Oise.” During the Nine Year’s War, as Van Houtte points out, the Spanish gathered 9,072,361 florins in the first six years of the war.” With more fortresses available in 1673, they cer-

tainly gathered more during the Dutch War: forty-three account books from the Dutch War have survived in the Archives des Chambres des Comptes.”!

Despite slender human resources, the Spanish districts for war taxes were not wishful thinking. Spanish war parties from Cambrai and Valenciennes continually trespassed Picardy until April 1677. ‘To some extent, they made up in skill and bravery for what they lacked

in numbers. They raided villages far up the Authie and Somme rivers, winding their way into the Santerre region. ‘The French inhab-

itants were forced by royal order to destroy their bridges so as to

on 25 July 1668. Before this date, officials similar to intendants of contributions were titled receveurs and contrerolleurs, according to an ordinance of 30 September 1667. Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 60. Van Houtte discussed the difference between coétisations and contributions in Occupations, vol. 1, p. 165.

°° The districts were outlined in an ordinance dated 30 September 1667. See Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, pp. 157-163.

*' These books need more careful attention and unfortunately I was unable to fully use them because of the difficult hand-writing style of the copyists. AGR (Brussels), Archives des Chambres des Comptes, Comptes des Contributions, Cottsations, Sauvegardes, etc., levées sur les terratowes occupés par la France au XVIT* siécle, Inventaire 6.

222 CHAPTER SIX impede Spanish raiders. On 28 February 1676, the commander at Arras, presented to Louvois a plan to destroy the bridge of Marcoins on the Escaut (Scheldt) River—to prevent continued fire-raids into Artois.** In fact, bridges were burned or blown to pieces by explo-

sive charges throughout the north.” Yet in the eastern part of the war zone, Spanish parties from Namur and Luxembourg sacked and burned villages across the Sambre and Meuse rivers. French ofhcials exchanged information and debated how to respond to the raids

led by Spanish fortress governors. Massiette, governor of Luxembourg, composed a letter demanding contributions when he was at Neufchateau, an advanced post of Luxembourg between Sedan and Bastogne in the Ardennes. Addressed to French officials, “to Messieurs of the district of Neufchateau,” the demand showed how the Spanish

expected to gather contributions from France and indicated why Massiette and his brother were so feared: Monsieur, as I am here with orders to establish the contributions that the King claims over your frontier, as I have done in the Duchies of

Champagne, Bar and Lorraine, and since I propose to do so with much gentleness, you may send a person from the side of your district to come to find me and to arrange with me what they should pay by quarter and this within two days in default of which I will be extremely dissatisfied to be obliged to treat them with the utmost rigor in accordance with my orders. I am in the meantime, Monsieur, Your Very Humble Servant.”

The letter reached the desk of Louvois. The French resolution to capture the fortress of Luxembourg after the Dutch War resulted from the destructiveness of raids made by its garrison and outposts during the Dutch War. From Ostende to Luxembourg, the entire extent of the frontier with France, the Spanish garrison force received contributions that at least equaled the amounts the French received from the Spanish Netherlands. ‘These contributions, possibly between eight and ten million florins a year, constituted a higher percentage of Spanish receipts than such an amount figured as a percentage of French receipts. ‘The Spanish war budget was proportionally smaller. Le * Humiéres to Louvois, 25 February 1676, AG, A’ 498, fo. 83. *° D’Aigremont to Louvois, 13 February 1675, AG, A! 486, fo. 577. D’Aigremont promised Louvois to destroy another bridge on the Escaut River. ** Copy of mandement or letter of demand, 21 January 1674, AG, A! 416, fo. 23.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 223

Peletier provided the figures of Spanish demands imposed on his departments, not receipts, as follows: “I will tell you only that as much as I can judge mine our heavier than his on the [French] castellanies of Courtrai, Oudenaarde, Bergues, and Furnes, but much

less than what he makes on the castellany of Lille. Mine do not exceed hardly four millions on Spanish Flanders, and only amount to five million and one third on the totality of Flanders, in contrast that imposed by Lord D’Ophem on the castellany of Lille climbs upwards to six and a half millions.”* During the “third term and last term” of contributions in 1675, the villages of the castellanies of Oudenaarde and Courtrai—the last one consisting of 105 separate communities—paid 551,072 florins in contributions or cottisations to

the intendant of Ghent.*? The approximate contributions collected from the two French castellanies of Oudenaarde and Courtrai, assuming the amount remained constant and was collected in full, reached

in one year more than two million florins in one year.’’ Although from separate years, together contributions imposed on the French castellanies of Lille, Oudenaarde and Courtrai may have reached eight and a half million florins a year. Even a half million florins could stretch a long way for the support of a military establishment that never exceeded 25,000 men. In terms of forage expenses, according to the Baron de la Barliére in 1677, 1t cost the Spanish 103,440 florins to pay for the forage consumed by 6,896 horses over a period

of one month—an exact number that probably reflected the total number of mounted troops in the field army contingent of the Spanish forces.” One million florins sufficed to pay the forage bill for about 7,000 horses for ten months and probably longer, especially considering that from May to September the glacis of fortresses and local meadows were covered with varieties of grass, forage vert. Contributions

from French lands paid these forage bills. On a local level, fortyone villages in the Castellany of Oudenaarde appeared to have paid sums on average of 3,938 florins each for the last two quarters of 1675—ftrom May to October, or a total of 161,458 florins, or more than 320,000 florins for a year. Other castellanies, Bergues, Furnes,

* Le Peletier to Louvois, 10 April 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 49. °° AGR (Brussels), Archives des Chambres des Comptes, Inventaire 6, no. 24438. *7 551,072 multiplied by four fiscal quarters equals 2,204,288 florins. * Baron Barli¢re to Intendant Claris, 28 October 1677, AGR (Brussels), Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, Inventaire 28, no. 584.

224 CHAPTER SIX among them, also paid contributions to the Spanish. War taxes, however, had to serve multiple purposes. The Spanish garrisons required rations, weapons, clothing and pay for their services.

When pay was not forthcoming troops in garrisons marauded: only the loot that they took and contributions kept them on the muster rolls. In February 1675, the pay situation for Spanish troops began to fall apart: “all the enemy troops in Flanders cause enor-

mous havoc since they have not been paid,’ observed the French garrison commander of Oudenaarde.* On 5 November 1675, the treasurer-general of the Spanish Netherlands, Philippe d’Ennetiéres

Des Mottes, informed Villahermosa that all that remained in the entire Spanish military treasury was a mere 20,000 florins.” It was hardly enough to make a gift to nobles let alone pay for an army. Two days later, on 7 November 1676, Des Mottes argued for the absolute necessity of contributions for their defense. He explained to

the Governor-General, the Duke of Villahermosa, the following: “Moreover our cash reserves are in the condition known to Your Excellency, and the gendarmene [nobles called to arms by feudal oblig-

ations] in such need that it will be necessary to support it as well... This support can only derive from contributions.”°' Without contributions, like those from French Oudenaarde, there would have been no effective Spanish defense of her northern possessions. Des Mottes warned Villahermosa that the army would have to be at least partly disbanded.

Further to the advantage of the French, the Dutch held back some of their military manpower from assisting their Spanish ally: thousands of able-bodied men served in their excellent war fleet, about 30,000 in 1674; another 30,000 protected their homelands from French fire-raids from Maastricht.*? In 1674, in addition to Dutch and Spanish forces, an Imperial Army of about 20,000 men, with about 10,000 women, rampaged through the Spanish Netherlands,

after which it blockaded Maastricht by occupying villages and

* Chamilly to Louvois, 8 February 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 4. °° Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 110. *' Des Mottes to Villahermosa, 7 September 1676, AGR (Brussels), Secrétairerie

d’Etat et de Guerre, Inventaire 28, no. 584. * Some Dutch garrisoned defenses in the Spanish Netherlands around Louvain, Brussels and Antwerp, since not enough Spanish defenders could be found for their defense. See, Baxter, Wilham IIT, p. 113.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 225

castles in neutral Liége. Overall, the French held about a two-toone advantage in the theater of war. Excluding the Allied troops struggling to defend the Dutch provinces, approximately 140,000 French soldiers (half in garrison) faced 80,000 Allied soldiers from Dunkirk to Luxembourg. Yet, despite the odds favoring them, the French army proved incapable of effectively defending their exposed territories against Allied raids.

2. The Unstable Frontier

In the name of asserting greater control along the frontier, Louis’s ordinance of 19 October 1673 revoked all “permissions, passports, safeguards or safe-conduct passes” granted by the king “or by his lieutenant generals, and other officers” in time of peace. Effectively, this forced all Spanish travelers in the kingdom to leave or make themselves known to French authorities. In Paris, it led to a police raid on the Spanish embassy and the confiscation of papers (and possibly ciphers or code books). ‘The king commanded all “subjects,

vassals and servants” to oppose the Spanish, “by sea as well as by land.” All communications and commerce with the Spanish Netherlands

were prohibited. However, soon after the ordinance was fixed in “all

of his towns, maritime as well as others, and in all the ports, harbors, and other places of his kingdom,” it became apparent that more strenuous efforts were needed to protect the kingdom. The subjects of Louis XIV did not always oppose the Spanish raiders as ordered, courre sus. Far from it, they sought to preserve their possessions anyway they could. If it meant paying contributions, they paid them despite the official position of the court at Versailles. To a certain extent, the words of the ordinance were devoid of meaning——a resumption in travel and trade between Spain’s dominions and France, although incomplete and not totally free, soon provided the monarchy with revenue from passports and import duties. The resumption of legitimate trade for the sake of gain from pass-

ports and taxes opened up the frontier to the movement of people from one side to the other for purposes of business, or, unintentionally, other purposes. In January 1674, a royal ordinance per-

mitted free trade between Spanish lands placed under French contributions and French-fortified towns, and French lands placed under contributions and Spanish-fortified towns. In September 1674,

226 CHAPTER SIX Governor Broglie explained to Louvois how, with the approval of the king, “they close their eyes” to the transport and sale of French

wine in the Netherlands, and “the commerce in passports” was resumed.*’ The king soon made an important exception, however, for any transport of French grain to Spanish-fortified places. Those who smuggled remained a problem, as they had been in peacetime, but it depended on who was smuggling and what was being smuggled. Local officials were supposed to prevent French peasants from selling their grain to Spanish fortress garrisons, a practice which not only helped the Spanish, but also undermined the military supply efforts made on behalf of the French army. In this regard, as with the prohibitions against paying contributions, local justice officials did not seem to have always cooperated in the manner the monarch wished. Louvois wrote to the marquis de Hocquincourt, governor of Peronne, on 3 January 1675 that, “despite the kine’s prohibitions against allowing grains to leave France to the Spanish countries, they still receive a large quantity.” Various other governors were advised of this problem and Hocquincourt, D’Orty [d’Ortiz], St. Geniez, Pradel, Roncherolles and Rencher were ordered

to send “parties frequently in the country, and to confiscate all of the grains they find crossing from the lands of the King to those of the enemies.””*

Spanish raiding strategy encouraged the illicit transport of grain to their fortified places. Du Chaunoy at Ath told Louvois in April 1674 that the Marquis of Richebourg, the governor of Condé-sur’Escaut, had signed demands requiring that all inhabitants of the French king in his department “immediately transport in the space of four days all of their forage and grain to Condé on penalty of pillage and fire.” Du Chaunoy asked Nancré to prevent this by posting notices in market squares to forbid the movement of forage and

grains, and to retaliate against those who attempted to meet the Spanish demand. Trade and war presented an ever-changing kaleidoscope of policies and variations of policies to the people of the north. In November

1675 trade in one part of the Netherlands between the “subjects of * Broglie to Louvois, 21 September 1674, AG, A' 401, fo. 26. ** Louvois to Hocquincourt, 3 January 1675, AG, A’ 432, fo. 39. Also, same letter, Louvois to Hocquincourt, 3 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 12. * Chaunoy to Louvois, 15 April 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 55.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 227

the King and those of the Catholic King” was officially sanctioned by treaty. The treaty allowed for free trade on the Meuse River and

the Sambre River, and “all surrounding land.” The treaty also included trade between France and “Holland” on the same rivers. “All sorts of merchandise permitted, all type of grains,” but the treaty forbade contraband: “like cannons, mortars, petards, bombs, grenades, muskets, flintlocks, shotguns, pistols... and other weapons, artifices and assortments serving war.” ‘The tariff treaty of 1664, as modified

by a unilateral French declaration in 1667, established the rate of duties charged by the French on the trade between the Netherlands and France. Of particular note in the treaty, passports were to be given “free of charge” to “general munitioners” (grain dealers) and their agents, in accordance with signed certificates furnished by inten-

dants and mutually respected by both sides. In effect, the Sambre and Meuse region was open to traffic and trade of all sorts by 1675.*°

Against this background of business-as-usual, trade and travel, the French and Spanish raided, burned and gathered contribution payments from each other’s villages and towns. War and plunder, trade and profit uneasily coexisted in the Netherlands and the French north.

Official French policy in the north sought to prevent, or at least slow, the Spanish recovery of contributions and other war taxes. Despite formal agreements made by many French communities to pay contributions to the Spanish, some of the communities in the castellanies of Lille, Courtrai, Oudenaarde and the ‘Tournésis, speci-

fically those situated between the Scarpe River, Escaut River and the Lys River, might be prevented from contributing “at least for a while,” by taking advantage of French defenses built up along these rivers. Le Peletier figured that the difficulty the Spanish would encounter in recovering the contributions might even compel them to moderate their demands.*’ Louvois consented to Le Peletier’s plan

to prevent the country between the Escaut, the Lys and the Scarpe rivers from contributing: “So that the difficulty that the Spanish will have in submitting them [to pay contributions] will work toward

°° BG (Vincennes) Recueil Cangé, Trailé pour le retablissement du commerce entre les sujets du roy, & ceux du Roy Catholique dans les Pays Bas Espagnols, 25 October 1675,

vol. 23, no. 88. °’ Le Peletier to Louvois, 16 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fol. 75. (There were 86 towns and villages in ‘Tournésis alone.)

228 CHAPTER SIX weakening them.” Thus, the strategy of encouraging resistance to paying enemy contributions was pursued not only to spare the king’s subjects, but to inflict losses on the Spanish garrisons which were forced to make fire-raids. The policy of slowing the Spanish recovery of contributions was clearly articulated, when on 22 December 1676, Louvois instructed Le Peletier: “His Majesty believes that it 1s to his interest to deprive the enemies of the means to receive promptly

the money of the parts of his country that he cannot prevent from being allowed to contribute.” Recognizing the importance of contributions to the Spanish, Le Peletier told Louvois in 1676: “It is certain that this fund is their only resource to sustain the war.” When Spanish war parties began burning homes and pillaging, local officials often quickly agreed to authorize payment of contributions and even represented their communities in the negotiations at Spanish fortresses. On 9 November 1673, Le Boistel informed Louvois that the magistrates of the towns of Bergues and Furnes in coastal Flanders had not yet returned from Brussels where they had gone to arrange their contributions.*” Louvois responded to this news by bolstering the defenses along the coastal villages and harbors with reinforcements of local militia (the Boulonnais). He told Le Boistel

that the sieur de Bourlie would place garrisons in the castles of the castellanies of Bergues and Furnes, if Le Boistel judged it appropriate.*' Meanwhile, the magistrates of Bergues and Furnes received royal orders to discontinue their talks with the Spanish on the subject of contributions. How effective were these measures? ‘They were certainly not completely effective, if we judge by the account books

maintained by Jean de Mystere at the Spanish-fortified town of Nieuport. His account books, kept in Flemish, noted until the very end of the war the contributions and safeguards paid from “the town and castellany of Furnes and eight dependent parishes; in the castelanies of Bourbourg and Bergues-Saint-Winoc, and the villages of the territory of Dunkerque.”” French authorities faced a puzzling range of behavior in the north. Some local inhabitants valiantly tried to block the advance of raid-

*8 Louvois to Le Peletier, 20 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 107. * Le Peletier to Louvois, 16 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 75. * Le Boistel to Louvois, 9 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 37. *! Louvois to Le Boistel, 8 November 1673, AG, A' 340, fo. 34. * AGR (Brussels), Chambres des Comptes, Inv. 6, nos. 24445-24450.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 229 ing detachments and the intrusion of war taxes into their lives. Other

villagers tried to avoid contributions by abandoning their homes, entire families fleeing to barely accessible woods and marshland. Many, probably most, arranged to pay rather than endure worse hardships. Local strategies for survival varied according to circumstances, as can be seen by a Spanish raid to a region south of St. Quentin along the Sambre River. In one village, raiders fought through

resolute peasant defenders; in other villages, they simply passed through as a reminder to inhabitants who had already agreed to pay contributions.

At 10 PM on Sunday 19 May, the garrison at St. Quentin fired five cannon shots to alert the countryside that a Spanish raid was underway. ‘The first place the Spanish struck was the village of Vendeuil. ‘They attacked at dawn. The peasant defenders were prepared when the raiders arrived, all of the village livestock had been removed and hidden elsewhere. Men stood ready with loaded muskets or sharpened farm implements in hand. These normally peaceful civilians were prepared to shoot and to hack the raiders to death. Several Spanish dragoons were killed in the assault. Fifteen battlehardened squadrons, around 1,200 cavalry and dragoons, however, proved too much for the brave defenders of the little village.” Even

more overpowering, the Spanish brought with them several pack horses carrying sacks of grenades. The Spanish lit and threw the grenades at the defenders at the barricades. As gun shots ripped through the air and grenade explosions shook the earth: “They attacked this village by all avenues and forced it after a quite vigorous resistance,” explained the French governor of St. Quentin. Some of the inhabitants of the village, hearing the explosions and seeing the men falling back, retreated to the village church. Some of these tried to defend the church from the walls of the adjoining graveyard, but they were overwhelmed and soon the church doors were battered down. Most of the rest of the people of Vendeuil probably saved themselves rather than the church, fleeing in all directions. No massacre occurred, according to the official French sources.

* 'This force was composed of cavalry from Cambrai and “neighboring garrisons.” One thousand mounted troops, although not all were cavalry, represented about fifteen percent of the total mounted arm of the Spanish Army of Flanders— if, the total was about 7,000 swords. Rouillé du Coudray to Louvois, 22 May 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 102.

230 CHAPTER SIX The Spanish raiders plundered the church, normally a sacred place left alone during time of war, and burned “half of the houses” of

the village, and then sent a small party forward to the village of Travecy.™

The smaller Spanish war party of twenty men that rode to ‘Travecy would make its way through several other French villages. They did

not plunder or burn in Travecy, since its inhabitants had arranged before the raid to pay contributions. The same party marched on to Fargniers. On passing by the French fort at La Fére, the French fired some cannon, but the shot missed and ricocheted harmlessly along the ground. The parish of Fargniers was not burned or pillaged either. It too “had previously composed for its contributions,” observed the governor of St. Quentin. ‘The small party returned and

joined the larger detachment and the whole marched northeast to the village of Remigny. Remigny had been entirely abandoned, not a soul stirred there, either to greet the Spanish or to shoot at them. But, to teach other Picards to not abandon their homes and avoid paying contributions, the Spanish detachment burned around thirty houses and a mill. From the ghost village, now in flames, the raiders

marched on to a walled-farm called Gibercourt, which they plundered, burned, and left smoldering. They continued to the village of Clastres. Clastres occupied land belonging to the Monastery of St. Simon. The Spanish remained there for nearly two hours, taking refreshments and arranging contributions with the monks. At four in the afternoon, the Spanish detachment passed through the village of Grand Essigny near St. Quentin and turned north to Cambrai. The French garrison at St. Quentin detached around “five or six” infantry marksmen, who hid in some woods (probably all the flintlocks

available from one company of infantry). The French fired on a Spanish dragoon who straggled behind, whom they wounded and took prisoner. ‘The prisoner informed the French that the Spanish detachment originally planned on a greater raid across the River Oise, but the peasant defenders of the village of Vendeuil had spoiled their plan.

French attempts to prevent inhabitants in the north from paying contributions sometimes caused grief and were often 1gnored by “ The Spanish may have lost six officers, a sergeant, twelve cavaliers, fifteen dragoons, and thirty-one other men wounded. Rouillé du Coudray to Louvois, 22 May 1674, AG, A! 405, fo. 102.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 231

inhabitants who wanted to pay and be left alone. In February 1674, Le Peletier reported to Louovis that the Marshal Bellefonds should already have “given orders to the Estates of Lille, and of ‘Tourna, to recall their deputies from Bruges and from Valenciennes, and to break off negotiations in which they went to enter on the subject of contributions.” Le Peletier pointed out further that the open country “is far more alarmed by the prohibition against paying contributions than they ever were by the exorbitant demands made upon them [by the Spanish].”* Le Peletier made an important distinction in the struggle for contributions between “open country” or plat pays and “walled towns.” Walled towns more easily defended themselves than “open country.” Municipal authorities could also marshal more men for the defense. While the military revolution witnessed the replacement of many medieval walls by new bastion fortification systems, it did not render older walls totally useless. Wherever men fought in the Netherlands, walls of any sort proved of value. Only gradually did redoubts replace castles at river fords. Larger towns often preferred to keep their old walls and gates as protection against raiders (and smugglers), while citadels and outworks (using bastions and regular artillery fortress design) were constructed to deter any larger armed force from conquering the town. Open country, on the other hand, was a dangerous and uncomfortable place for civilians to be in time of war. Taxed by the Spanish but vexed by French military officials in a variety of ways, some people became angry and chose to help the Spanish. “All the precautions that we take... serve only to ruin and vex the country,” reported Intendant Chartiel to Louvois in 1674, when attempting to explain the failure of local militias mobilized to protect the French countryside from Spanish raids.*° Humiéres wrote to Louvois on 10 September 1674 from ‘Tournai, explaining “in all

of the places that the King has conquered, I have not found one where the people were less disposed to the service of the King than

the one of Tournai.” During the time that Humiéres was there in September 1674, he had to jail several townsmen for fighting with loyalists and shouting pro-Spanish slogans: “Vive ’Espagne!’*’ The

* Le Peletier to Louvois, 2 February 1674, AG, A’ 404, fo. 114. *© Chartiel to Louvois, 21 July 1674, AG, A' 407, fo. 44. ” Humiéres to Louvois, 10 September 1674, AG, A' 392, fo. 36.

232 CHAPTER SIX Spanish assuredly had an easier time of exacting contributions from the ‘Tournésis, despite the best intentions of the French Grand Bailiff St. Sandoux, a competent partisan and colonel of dragoons, because of the pro-Spanish sentiments of many of the local inhabitants. When local residents did decide to arm themselves, it often appears to have

been not so much to oppose Spanish raiding detachments as to oppose unlawful groups of Spanish mauraders; and when they succeeded in capturing or killing these men, they demanded some compensation from officials of the king as if they had accomplished their task with the king’s interests in mind all along.” Bailiffs and mayeurs of villages and towns along the frontier should have functioned as a second layer of defense—“behind the lnes.” Through the authority vested in their offices, local officials were tasked with preventing peasants and town people from paying contributions. The reach of royal government, however, lightly touched the bailiffs, échevins and mayors of the hundreds of smaller villages in the north.’ For the French, seeking compliance from local justice officials proved almost as difficult as defeating the elusive Spanish raiders in battle. After two years of war, for example, on 21 December

1675, Humiéres wrote to Louvois from the Castellany of Lille that he was composing an order “to compel the bailiffs and gentlemen of the law: to warn the Governor whenever some party of the enemies passes through.”*® Three months later, in March 1676, the draft

reached print, and it was given the official stamp as a royal ordinance and publicly posted. Humiéres assured Louvois that he meant

to enforce the ordinance. “At present,” admitted Humiéres on 9 March 1676, “few bailiffs actually provided this warning.””! ‘There is little evidence to suggest that bailiffs became any more effective in their deputed tasks as the war continued. As long as their fortress bases were secure, Spanish war parties frequently marched in and

out of French territory, and, if Humieres’ concerns were genuine,

* For example, Pertuis to Louvois, 7 February 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 90. Twelve mauraders from the Spanish garrison of Condé were captured, and the local peasants requested a “recompensation” for their efforts. * See entry in Furetiére, Dictionnaire. “Eschevin: An officer who is elected by the inhabitants of a town in order to tend to their common affairs, such as the maintenance and appearance of the town.” °° ‘Humieéres to Louvois, 21 December 1675, AG, A' 453, fo. 161. *' Humiéres to Louvois, 10 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 251.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 233

without so much as a church bell rung to warn of their presence in the French countryside. Intendant Le Peletier once advanced the idea (in a letter to Louvois)

of publicly beating mayors and bailiffs who failed to cooperate sufficiently. He mentioned, although probably not seriously, burning French villages that paid contributions to the Spanish, exiling their bailiffs and other justice officials, and, if that was not enough, demolishing their homes and sending their families packing—erasing their progeny from public service as well. In the same letter in which Le Peletier discussed these measures, he also persuaded Louvois that in some places the attempt to enforce prohibitions against paying contributions was impractical. Some places, like Ath and Oudenaarde,

surrounded by Spanish territory, were too exposed to enemy war parties, and there were not enough posts occupied by the king’s troops to provide a reasonable defense. The tone of his letter actually suggested to Louvois that Le Peletier was considering compromise and more reasonable alternatives than the utter uselessness of trying to prevent the payment of contributions in “exposed” regions.

Spanish raiding strategy frequently solicited the cooperation of local inhabitants of French lands, both in efforts to gather contributions and to destroy French military targets. A sabotage of the French magazine at Ath in December 1675 demonstrated the tenuous loyalties of the inhabitants of newly conquered territories—those

added in 1659 and especially in 1668. Louis XIV had proclaimed in 1667 that he considered as “reconquered former subjects”—an interesting contrast to the later concept of “liberated”—the inhabitants of the ‘TVournésis, Lille and Lalleu and the castellanies of Courtrai,

Oudenaarde and Ath. But, the French garrison force was, in effect, occupying lands that if not overtly hostile, were at least unsympathetic.” From 1673 on, the French garrison at Maastricht was similarly surrounded and threatened by an indifferent, sometimes hostile, population of Liegoise. ‘Che Liegoise tried to hide by their proclaimed

neutrality, which was more show than fact.

The details of the sabotage incident at Ath are worth consideration.’ On 31 December 1675 at 1 PM, six wagons filled with

* Croquez, L’Intendance, p. 21. °° The sabatoge of magazines was also a favored operation with the French. Near

the end of the war, Le Peletier gave De Chaunoy at Ath a mémoire to burn the

234 CHAPTER SIX bundles of forage rolled through Ath and stopped outside its magazine. ‘They had arrived from the village of Lourpe in the Castellany of Ath. Two hired guards, according to a later investigation, named Bourdeau and Duquesne (from the castellany of Ath), inspected the contents of the wagons and made a receipt for the record. Upon unloading one of the wagons, they found two bundles (dottes) of straw

partially and freshly burned. It was odd and should have acted as a warning to the two men hired to guard the magazine, but it did not. In fact, the remainder of the carts was not examined at all, according to the accounts of witnesses. In the meantime, a man from the village of Lourpe, Francois Boucard, approached the guards. He asked if the straw was very valuable and entered into a “typical conversation of local peasants.” No suspicion was aroused in those who witnessed the conversation, as the guards seemed to know the man. Later, toward the end of the unloading, Boucard took a walk around the grounds of the magazine, saying that he had arrived with those from the village who were being paid for the unloading of the straw.

It was later revealed that, shortly after the interchange, Boucard started three small fires in the park of the magazine that did not noticeably begin to burn until around 7 PM in the evening. By then, it was too late. The magazine, filled with dry forage, was soon swept by flames. Only a small portion of forage, painstakingly saved, survived the flames. Subsequent investigation determined that the fire

started in the middle of the magazine, and if the winds had been as usual, according to Nancré, the entire town of Ath would have burned along with the magazine.”*

According to the governor, the comte de Nancré, who assumed the blame, the principal reason for the fire was his use of local men, gens du pays, “whom it is difficult to trust.” Even while the magazine burned, Nancré ordered some twenty dragoons to depart, accompanied by a maréchal de logis, who was probably a partisan leader, to enter the village of Lourpe and arrest Boucard. Frangois was gone. His neighbors in the village, evidently not wanting trouble, told the

magazines at Wilvorden, following a proposal from Louvois. Le Peletier to Louvois, 29 January 1678, AG A! 612, fo. 51. And, the Spanish-side sabatoge of Ath was not unique. In September 1676, Calvo informed Louvois on the progress of a trial of several individuals accused of having burned forage stored in the magazine at Maastricht. Calvo to Louvois, 13 September 1676, AG, A' 503, fo. 57. *t Nancré to Louvois, 2 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 23.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 235

French party where he hid: a nearby abbey. From this abbey, it was soon learned, Boucard, accompanied by a monk, had proceeded in safety to the Spanish fortress of Condé. ‘The maréchal de logis and dra-

goons returned to Lourpe and instead arrested all of the other men who had brought hay wagons to Ath. While these sweeping arrests took place in the village of Lourpe, Nancré gave orders to arrest Bourdeau and Duquesne, the guards of the magazine, and anyone else employed at the magazine that day. (There was a guard of sixty soldiers and an officer whose responsibility 1t was to post six sentinels every day around the magazine.) The magazine itself was enclosed by a double palisade, and with the patrols of sentinels making their rounds, it was thought impossible for someone to enter without one of the patrols being warned.®? Nancré concluded that someone on the inside, a member of the guard, must have turned traitor.

The next morning, Nancré made a tour in force of the town of Ath. The gates of the town were shut, deliberately preventing commerce, but that did not prevent someone from “the surroundings of Ath” to attempt to smuggle a letter through addressed to the Duke

of Arscot, the Spanish governor of Condé-sur-l’Escaut who had arranged the sabotage. [he conspiracy was discovered by the interception of the letter at 8 AM; the orders that the Duke of Arscot had given were to set the fire on ‘Thursday, 2 January, at eight in the evening. But, as Nancré dryly commented to Louvois, “his orders

were followed prematurely and because of that better served than he could have imagined.” On this evidence, it was clear to Nancré that the sabotage of the grain magazine at Ath involved a circle of local “French” conspirators in collaboration with the Duke of Arscot.

As a postscript to this story: the council of war that met to punish the conspirators reached its decision in September 1676 when six guards were chosen to be burned at the stake, except one who was spared by the man charged with the execution and presumably escaped. he officer or sergeant charged with the execution was sentenced to a penalty of six years in the galley fleet of the king.’’

»> Nancré to Louvois, | January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 13. °° Mémoire de M. le Comte de Nancré sur Vincendie arrivée au magasin de fourage a Ath,

2 January 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 26. °? Nancré to Louvois, AG, A! 503, fo. 83.

236 CHAPTER SIX Clandestine attacks and armed incursions by Spanish war parties challenged the composure and dignity of French officials to the very end of the war. The Tournésis and the Castellany of Lille were still prohibited from paying contributions as late as 1676—although they paid anyway, four times a year. Guillaume Bricquet maintained the Spanish accounts of contributions for Tournésis (and Ath, Avesnes and Quesnoy, and after 1676, French-occupied Bouchain and Valenciennes). Jean-Baptiste Stuvaert at Ypres recorded the contributions paid by Lille. ‘The French in 1676 resumed previous defensive efforts in the Castellany of Lille, to slow payments to the Spanish, and continued their ongoing battle of words with village and town officials. Marshal Bellefonds ordered in February 1676 the Estates of Lille to recall their deputies from Bruges and Valenciennes, where they had gone to arrange payment of contributions with Spanish authorities. The French prohibitions against payment of contributions seemed to have been enforced in varying degrees and according to the availability of troops and the shifting objectives of military operations. During the French blockade of Ypres in 1677, it was absolutely forbidden upon penalty of death for French peasants to go there and pay contributions. Upon learning during the blockade that six villages in the Castellany of Lille went to pay contributions to Ypres, D’Aigremont sent men to arrest the bailiffs and eschevins of the villages and confined them to the dungeons of the fortress where they would remain until further word from Louvois. ‘The commencement of an official blockade meant that the law of the blockade replaced the law of contributions. The garrison commander D’Aigremont, with a hint of ruthlessness, told Louvois: “I have received your orders in which you have made clear to monsieur the Intendant the intentions of the king concerning that matter.”°? Garrison troops, often troubled by the local authorities who denounced their petty thefts and misbehavior, now arrested local law officials in the name of the

King of France. They also participated in a more active, military defense of the northern frontier—the efforts of local officials and passive ordinances were not sufficient to prevent or delay payment of contributions to the Spanish.

*® D’Aigrement to Louvois, 11 January 1677, AG, A! 564, fo. 6.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 237 3. Castles and Rwer Defenses

Walled towns, castles, and the prepared defenses of villages performed vital functions in partisan warfare. Known as posts in the military lexicon of the period, they provided shelter and cover for soldiers, animals and forage. Posts also served as points of access or denial over rivers—the only natural obstacles to detachments and armies in the Netherlands.” As “gateways” they could support raids,

or cut off the retreats of opposing raiders. Along the Meuse, Somme, | Lys, Escaut and Scarpe rivers, posts covered the strategic interstices between fortresses. ‘To make sure that the river “highways” of the Netherlands between fortresses were covered, French intendants and

military governors oversaw the call up of communal militias and directed them in the building and garrisoning of earthen redoubts along river fords, filling in the gaps between castles and the fortified towns. The Spanish did the same on opposite river banks. When sufficiently numerous, within supporting distance, and backed by a field force, a string of French posts along a river could tfrustrate the plans of a field army. During the period of relative French military control of the Meuse River (1675-1678), Louvois planned

to keep the Imperial army from entering the Spanish Netherlands by a firm defense along the Meuse River line. He hoped the Imperial field army would eventually disintegrate, trapped in the poor farm country of the heavily forested Ardennes, where forage supplies were scarce. Louvois explained his attritional strategy of partisan warfare to Marshal Créqui. With the small army corps under Créqui’s command, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, behind the wall of “rivers

and of posts,” the marshal could contain the enemy in the “awful countries” that lay to the east of the Meuse River.*’ In fact, Créqui had inspired Louvois to come up with the directive by his conduct of the army corps he commanded that summer. He also earned some praise from court:

>’ See under entry in Fueretiére, Dictzonnaie. “Poste. Place that one chooses, where

one makes a stand, where one lodges, where one camps. The science of a general is to know how to choose a good post, to supply it well, to defend his post well... Never should a soldier quit his post, he should stay there until one relieves him, or until he is forced from his post.” °° Louvois to Créqui, 16 July 1677, AG, A' 533, fo. 2.

238 CHAPTER SIX The King has viewed with pleasure that you have been persuaded that

the time that the army commanded by Prince Charles has spent in Lorraine cost him 4,000 or 5,000 men, it appears that the march that he will make on this side of the Moselle will cost him dearly ..., since the peasants of Luxembourg will not afford [contributions] any more than those of the Messin Country, and... without doubt the Germans, homesick to return to their side of the Rhine, will desert considerably.”

The loss of 4,000 or 5,000 men equaled the losses sustained in some major battles fought during the Dutch War. Besides the attrition of the Duke of Lorraine’s Imperial army corps in the summer of 1677, the redoubts, castles, and walled villages on the Meuse and Sambre rivers served another purpose: preventing the spread of Spanish contributions to the Duchy of Champagne and the rich province of Brie. Along the Sambre River and the Meuse River, the French struggled from 1673 to 1675 against Spanish and Imperial troops to control key castles that dominated stretches of the rivers. The Sambre

River formed a barrier from French Charleroi that reached east to Namur, a key Spanish fortress, where the river emptied into the Meuse River. During the winter of 1674/75, the comte de Broglie, governor at Avesnes, held the responsibility of watching the Sambre River and preventing any incursions or raids from Mons and Namur, or Dinant and Huy (garrisoned by Imperial troops). Reports reached Louvois that Imperial troops intended to occupy several castles in the Sambre Valley and the Meuse Valley, flanking the French defenses. According to the chevalier de la Hilli¢re, the Imperial troops hoped to occupy the fort of Mariembourg and reestablish its walls, previously dismantled by the French. Louvois ordered the comte de Broglie to establish garrisons in several castles to prevent the Imperials from occupying Mariembourg.” Six days after Louvois warned him, Broglie captured the castles of Eclebe, ‘Trélon, Beaumont, Chimay, Labuissiére,

Fumont and a castle called Solre(-sur-Sambre), which was of added importance because it guarded one of the few intact bridges over the Sambre River. With these seven castles occupied, Broglie informed

Louvois on || January 1675, that, “we are guarding nearly the entire river.”°? Although true, neither the river nor the French castle gar-

°! Tbid.

** Louvois to Broglie, 4 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 17. °° Broglie to Louvois, 11 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 31.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 239 risons completely prevented payments of contributions from the villages between the Sambre and Meuse rivers. On occasion, the French actually requested permission before detaching a garrison to occupy a post in the Netherlands. In the village of Thuin, on the Sambre River a few miles south of the towers and

steeples of French-held Charleroi, townsmen prepared defenses in January 1675 by tearing apart the high stone walls that surrounded

private gardens on the outskirts, which could provide cover to an Imperial or Spanish force bold enough to cross the river so near Charleroi. ‘The comte de Broglie sent a letter to the town-fathers of Thuin representing to them that the King of France would assist in their defense, if they so requested.” On another occasion, however, Broglie was informed that the Imperials were preparing to install a garrison within sight of the French fortress at Chareleroi in the castle of Chasselineau near the village of Chatelet. Requesting permission to install troops seems to have been a mere formality and was followed by immediate occu-

pation whether agreed to or not. [he comte de Broglie responded to this threat by writing to Lieutenant Governor Betau at Charleroi, to warn the inhabitants of Chatelet and then to preempt the arrival of Allied troops by immediately installing a garrison of 100 troops from Charleroi in the castle of Chasselineau.” From his residence at Charleroi, Governor Montal proposed neutrality for Chatelet, Chasselineau, Fosse [Fosses-la-ville] and Rochefort, and he requested from Louvois permission to demolish the fortifications of the village of ‘Chuin, which lay downstream (west) from Charleroi on the Sambre River.” ‘These measures, stretching French resources, in part led to

the rout of the French garrison force at Chatelet two weeks later in a night attack by a detachment from Namur previously described. Typical of the strategy to seize posts and keep the raiders at a

distance were the standing orders issued on 29 January 1675 to Tbid. °° Broglie to Louvois, 14 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 35. °° ‘The French captured the town of Thuin in October 1675. According to the Spanish Count of Berlo, a grand bailiff, in a letter to the Messieurs of the Council of Liége: “Fourteen or fifteen batallions came here Friday before ‘Thuin the night of ‘Vhursday and Friday, dressed several batteries; yesterday morning... They [the burghers] surrendered, and have as a garrison now three compagnies franches of Swiss of 200 men each and a French regiment.” Copre de lettre du comte de Berlo..., 27 October 1675, AG, A! 457, fo. 71.

240 CHAPTER SIX Marshal Créqui, who was named by the king to command French troops in the region between the Sambre and the Meuse during that winter. Créqui was ordered to organize the defenses of the region: “Your principal occupation should be to prevent the enemies from

taking any post between the Sambre and Meuse... [and] establishing their contributions beyond the Meuse and extending them to Guise and St. Quentin.” For this, Créqui relied on the fortress gov-

ernors in the region and especially on two cavalry commanders: Chazeron, who had command over French garrisons at fortresses of

Guise and St. Quentin, and thus could oppose any raids that the garrison of Gambrai might attempt; and Colonel d’Auger who covered the Meuse River.”

On the upper Meuse River around Charleville, French militia were called upon to improve earthen defenses along the river and to keep vigilant watch over fords in order to prevent Spanish and Imperial war parties from crossing and carrying out raids for contributions. On 3 January 1675, Louvois ordered Lieutenant Governor De Termes to allow no exceptions when it came to obligating peasants, with pick and shovel or flintlock musket, to serve on the royal corvée (mpressed labor force which counted as a deduction when calculating the royal tax). The militia was organized for the “security and conservation of the country which is on this side of the Meuse.”

After constructing redoubts at the fords along the river, the men were to perform guard duty there. All peasants within ten “leagues” of the Meuse River had to perform guard duty at the fords. A royal ordinance was published and posted in the villages in the region to ensure that everyone would be aware of their militia obligation. The official letters and ordinance conjure up an image of orderliness and efficiency. ‘The tax rolls for the fazlle were used to maintain a record of those who owed service and those who had performed it. ‘Those who failed to show at the appointed locations were fined 25 sous for each day that they failed to appear.®? At Donchery, on the Meuse River between Charleville (present-day Charleville-Méziéres) and Sedan, the bridges were destroyed in 1674 and the fords strewn with

°’ Louvois to Créqui, 29 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 76 bis. The following garrison commanders were to receive orders from Créquy: Madaillon at Philippeville, Montal, Broglie, Rocherolles, Rancher, Bridieu, La Hilliere, Cossé, Palaizeau, ‘Termes, Bourlemeont.

*’ Louvois to Termes, 3 January 1675, AG, A' 432, fo. 41.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 241

obstacles for riders and men on foot so that no further militia levies

would be required—the manpower in the region already being stretched. ‘The redoubts, if possible, were turfed to prevent erosion, and where poor soil prohibited growth of grass, masonry retaining walls were constructed with their flanks angled to allow for intersecting fields of fire to the front and rear. Redoubts were equipped with small-bore cannons that could swivel on their forked-rests called arquebuzes a croc. De ‘Termes, who was charged with these defenses,

was requested to provide a memo of how many he needed and where they would be employed. Partisans also occupied these engineered defenses. A certain Captain Des Tours wanted to raise a new company of “local men” for the defense, but instead Louvois authorized Des Tours to augment his existing company to 140 men, and to always maintain eighty of these men, patrolling along the river.” Louvois gave similar orders regarding the militia and redoubt defenses of the Meuse River, to the marquis de Palaiseau, the governor of Charleville, and to other commanders along the upper Meuse River: “As there is nothing presently more important than to prevent the enemies from making the country on this side [of the river] contribute.””°

A combination of river defenses, militia, and a mobile reserve of troops turned back an attempted raid into Champagne in January 1675. On 16 January, Imperial cavalry and infantry from the garrisons at Dinant, Huy, the two towns of Givet, and Spanish troops from Luxembourg under the Baron of Massiette, assembled. ‘The next day, 17 January, a party from the Spanish garrison at Namur, joined them, bringing five cannons and a mortar. ‘They were joined

shortly after by a train of copper pontoon boats (an imitation of the French innovation), and sixteen wagons filled with munitions. On 18 January, the Baron of Louvignies, commander of the cavalry in the Spanish Army of Flanders, joined the Imperial corps at

the village of Carignan. He brought with him more troops from Spanish garrisons, increasing the size of the Allied corps to near 4,000 men, possibly more. (According to Estrades, on 24 January ” Tbid. © Louvois to Palaiseau, 3 January 1675, AG, A' 432, fo. 47. He sent the same

orders to: De La Hilhere, governor of Rocroi; the comte de Cossé, governor of Meziéres; the comte de Bourlement, governor of Stenay; and Villeneuve, lieutenant of the king for his government of Verdun.

242 CHAPTER SIX 1675, Louvignies and Massiette marched towards Champagne with a corps of 8,000 men and six cannon.)"! The combined Imperial-Spanish corps split its forces: part to secure

their passage and part to carry out the actual operation. Most of the Alhed infantry remained at Carignan, a village on the Chiers River, just east of Mouzon, to guard the pontoon bridges that the troops had built across that river. If the Allied troops would reach the Meuse River and cross it, they would be in a position to erupt into the villages and granaries of Champagne, burning and looting, forcing it, or parts of it, to contribute. To counter this possibility, two detached companies of dragoons from Charleville, north of Sedan, and several detachments of picked militia sallied from their defenses

to patrol up and down the river, seeking the raiders out. It was as experienced a force as could be commanded. ‘They occupied posts along the Bar-des-Ardennes, a stream that flowed only a short way in a northerly direction and emptied into the Meuse River near Charleville. ‘Their positions along this stream formed a second line behind the Meuse River. Meanwhile, from Sedan, Colonel d’Auger sortied with nearly 800 French cavalry to catch the Allied troops in the flank wherever they attempted to cross the Meuse River. His task was essentially to be in the right place at the right time.” On the morning of 22 January, a party of Imperial troops, crossing the pontoon bridges over the smaller stream at Carignan, advanced with around 1,500 horse. By late morning, they passed near the can-

non of the French fortress of Stenay—-which promptly fired and killed several of their cavaliers. Around noon, the small corps arrived

where they believed they could cross the Meuse River, near a cas-

tle called Dun. They expected to find barges and boats there to cross. But, after one of the keepers of the castle warned the men in the village, the boats retired to the other side just before the Imperial troops arrived. ‘This crossing having failed, the Imperials dispatched smaller parties to search for a suitable ford to traverse the river, which was quite broad in some places. Meanwhile, on the French side of the river near Dun, Colonel d’Auger arrived with his force to trap the raiders as soon as they crossed. ‘The Alhed parties searched

for an appropriate crossing in vain; they remained at Dun until nearly 9 PM before finally giving up and returning to Carignan. ‘' Estrades to Louvois, 24 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 59. ™ Gazette, 21 January 1675, from Sedan.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 243

Probably the next day, from their camp at Carignan, a smaller Imperial-Spanish party, consisting of about 200 cavalry supported by several hundred infantry, attempted to slide past the French defenses and cross the Meuse River at Mouzon, where the French had demolished the bridge. However, the Allies were unable to overcome the resistance of some 700 dismounted French dragoons as well as “battle-

hardened” peasants that defended the crossing under the command of Colonel d’Auger who must have somehow anticipated their maneuver. Baron Louvignies, who commanded the Allied probing party, lost several officers and soldiers in the action near the demol-

ished bridge at Mouzon.’ Colonel d’Auger maintained his small corps for several days more in the countryside on the opposite bank, anticipating another river-crossing by the Allied detached corps. ‘Uhe Allied detached corps, however, returned to garrison after the last check at Mouzon, and the frontier was secured from a large eruption of Allied raiders into Champagne.”

The threat of fire-raids by Imperial troops and the Spanish garrison at Luxembourg, however, did not recede after the massive raid in January 1675. In July 1677, eleven militia companies of fifty men each mobilized in Champagne and marched in summer heat to frontier villages for the defense of the duchy. Governor de La ‘Tour of St. Dizier assumed command of the rural militia, and tried to organize an effective defense against Allied fire-raids.’? Given this con-

tinued state of readiness in 1677, it can only be assumed that the raiders from Luxembourg succeeded in breaching the river defenses in places. As the Spanish governor of Luxembourg claimed in 1674,

they had probably imposed contributions in parts of Champagne and extended their levy of contributions to other parts. Along the Lys River, the French occupied some castles, lost or destroyed others, and built redoubts to make Spanish parties seek out longer routes in order to reach the Castellany of Lille and other lands in French Flanders and Picardy. The prince de Condé informed

Louvois of the condition of the castles of La Motte and Marillon and concluded that they could not withstand even a “mediocre attack”

” Gazette, 26 January 1675, from Mouzon. ™ Gazette, 27 January 1675, from Sedan. > Nombre des Compagnies de malice mises sur pied en Champagne suwans les ordres de sa Mayesté et les leux ou serons postée les Compagnies dans le 20 Fuilles 1677. Ensemble les noms

des Commandans. AG, A' 564, fo. 102.

244 CHAPTER SIX and “that they could be a terrible detriment if the enemies should seize them at the end of a campaign [1674].”’° Condé advised that they be razed to the ground. Other castles were also marked for destruction. On 16 April 1676, Le Peletier intended to travel to the castle of Gomines (between the French posts of Menin and Armentiéres

on the Lys River) with an engineer named Vollant and peasant laborers in order to ensure the complete destruction of the castle.” Apparently, the castle of Gomines had been breached in 1674, but not sufficiently to prevent its use by Spanish raiders. In January 1675, Marshal Humiéres informed Louvois of a new post, a redoubt or fort at Armentiére: As we no longer have the castle of Gommine [Comines] I believed that it was appropriate to place in the redoubt of Armentiére the sieur des Mollins with sixty men, because the captains that we detach there do not do their duty very well.’

Des Mollins, after one month in his new post, defeated a Spanish war party from Ypres, taking four prisoners among whom was one “Le Pape.” “Pape” was “one of the most famous brigands in the country.” Humicres boasted that he was brought to Lille where “he will soon be hung,” having advised his judges beforehand “to make a sound and brief judgment.” That was the purpose of redoubts and garrisons in castles, to block crossings over rivers, and to force Spanish raiders to make long detours, a detour which Le Pape appar-

ently did not take. The garrison of Ypres, however, continued to gather contributions from the exposed French territories around it: Jean-Baptiste Stuvaert, receiver of contributions in the quarter of Ypres, sold passports, delivered safeguards and gathered contributions from the castellanies of Lille, Courtrai and the verge and town of Menin until Ypres was captured by a besieging French field army in 1678.°° Throughout the Netherlands, and surrounding regions, the French,

Spanish, Dutch and Imperials fought for the control of posts. In the

© Louvois to Humiéres, 7 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 21. ” Le Peletier to Louvois, 15 April 1676, AG, A’ 405, fo. 56. “© Humiéres to Louvois, 4 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 19. ” Humiéres to Louvois, | February 1675, AG, A’ 448, fo. 81. °° AGR, Archives des Chambres des Comptes, Inv. 6, nos. 24461-24466. Szx comptes, rendus par fean-Baptiste Stuvaert... du 12 october 1673 [to 1678].

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 245

Moselle and Ardennes region, the French covered rugged distances to remove their adversaries from a post used to conduct fire-raids. In February 1675, the garrison which was at Fort de Lizel, “seven leagues” from French-held Trier, made several raids for contributions and also prevented villages from arranging contributions that the French had demanded. The French governor of ‘Trier detached sleur Xumenes, a colonel of the Royal Roussillon Regiment, with

400 men for this expedition. His troops vigorously attacked the defenders at the palisades: “Everyone found in the outworks was killed or captured.” ‘The village near the Fort de Lizel was pillaged. Meanwhile, the French governor of ‘Trier sortied with two compa-

nies of dragoons and one company of cavalry in order to oppose any reinforcements that an Allied garrison at Bernecastel might send to frustrate the operation.®' As elsewhere in the theater of war, the removal of an opponent from a castle may have slowed the recov-

ery of contributions, but it did not halt the return completely. Maximilien-Antoine Baillet, the Spanish receiver-general for Luxem-

bourg, made notations in his account books throughout the war for payments received from “subjects of France, Lorraine, countries

ceded and usurped by France, Stavelot and Malmédy, as well as rights of passe-ports distributed by the department of Luxembourg.”®

Some lords of castles served in the armies of either Spain or France, and these men could not declare their estates neutral. ‘Their estates were often fought over. Other lords served neither side and claimed neutral status for their homes, creating a problem for belligerents who wanted to install garrisons there. In 1675 Humiéres learned from Pertuis at Courtrai that the Spanish had installed a 100-man garrison in the castle of Vimandal, three leagues from Bruges on the road from Diksmuide (Dixmude). This

surprised Humiuéres, because he knew the castle belonged to an Imperial general, the Duke of Neubourg. Humiéres complained to Louvois that he had always believed that the lands belonging to Neubourg were neutral, and he had always respected their neutral status. “I think that it would not be too difficult to push them out, but it is necessary to bring cannon there,” he added. Louvois received

*! Gazette, 21 February 1675, from Trier. "2 AGR, Archives des Chambres des Comptes, Inv. 6, nos. 24470-24478. Neuf comptes rendu par Maximilten-Antoine Baillet... du 12 octobre au 11 octobre 1678.

246 CHAPTER SIX Humieéres’ complaints and suggested in response: “If you believe you can boot out the enemies from the castle of Vimandal, you can take your measures for it since the lands of M. de Neubourg [or Newbourg] do not enjoy any neutrality.”® As one post was captured by the “enemies” or razed to the ground,

another was often occupied in its place. At the time the Spanish occupied Neuboureg’s castle of Vimandal, and soon after were “booted

out” by the French, they also placed a garrison in another Flemish castle called Ghuistel, between Bruges, Diksmuide and Ostende.™ It

probably served as well as the Duke of Neubourg’s castle as an advance post to press contributions into French territory. Once the French occupied a castle, they normally did not leave unless they destroyed its defenses first. Marshal Humiéres once gave counter-orders to Monteiuraul: to not accord neutral status (as Louvois had ordered) to the castles of Vimandal and another called Ghistette,

since the French had not received evidence of a reciprocal neutral status granted from Duke Villahermosa. ‘The castles remained occupied by their small French garrisons.” The casualness with which the “neutrality” of castles and towns was disregarded perhaps is best illustrated by an incident that came

about when the lord of Vireux (who had a castle on the Meuse River south of Givet) wrote a letter to Broglie at Avesnes asking the latter to rid his castle of its unwelcome German guests. ‘The lord of Vireux promised to allow the entry of French troops to chase out

the Germans, but on condition that they not remain as a permanent garrison. Broglie instructed Intendant Madaillon to formalize the agreement in writing with the lord of Vireux, but he told Louvois that he had no intention of keeping his word: “That affair is advantageous for us. Whenever it suits us, we will easily find some excuse to put in as many troops as we need.”*® Although the fate of Vireux’s castle is obscured by the multitude of other issues of importance during the war—one can assume that the tough-minded Broglie installed

a French garrison when it suited him.

°° Louvois to Humiéres, 8 January 1675, AG, A! 448, fo. 23. *+ Humieres to Louvois, 4 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 19. °° Spanish parties dispatched from Ypres and Ghent constanly worried about these castles and their garrisons, according to a letter by Humiéres to Louvois, 10 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 251. °° Broglie to Louvois, 14 January 1675, AG, A’ 448, fo. 35.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 24/

Military necessity prompted both the French and the Spanish to ignore claims of neutrality with impunity. For example, Louvois wrote

to Humiéres on 2 January 1675 approving his plan to maintain a garrison in the castle of D’Houpelines even though the lord of the castle protested that he maintained the castle in “perfect neutrality.”

Louvois pointed out to Humiéres that the nearby village and the floodlocks were not included in the treaty of neutrality, therefore the occupation of the entire grounds, including the castle, was legally justifiable.*’ The Spanish were equally active at occupying posts and installing garrisons where they were probably not justified, like the French at D’Houpelines. The length of the Escaut River was important to the French garrisons at Lille, ‘fournai and at Oudenaarde, as well as to the Spanish at Ghent and Ypres. As discussed in Chapter Four, many small and large clashes occurred there during the war. ‘The Escaut generally flows from south to north; as it passes to the North Sea, it becomes, in Flemish, the Schelde. (For the English, who have also known its troubled banks, it is known as the Scheldt.) In the first weeks of war

in 1673, the Spanish broke canal locks that paralleled the river in their territory between Ghent and Oudenaarde, and flooded nearby lands. ‘his rendered sections of the river unnavigable, except to the smallest oared boats. The topography of the river was altered further in the war. [he French captured castles and razed them with explosive charges, leaving only ruins along the river’s banks. Before the river reached Ghent, the Spanish fortified its banks and manned forts along several miles of its length to the sea, preventing French parties from easily crossing and raiding the fertile land of the Pays

de Waes. The French viewed the Escaut as an invasion route into their own territory, one that threatened the entirety of French Flanders and the rest of the north. For the defense of the Escaut and its more southern tributary, the Scarpe, Louis XIV authorized the levy of the

Boulonnaises militia in August 1670, well before the Dutch War began.*® Militia and detachments from French garrisons defended posts from Arras to Douai, along the Escaut and the Scarpe. The militia took defensive positions, but other detachments of the French

*’ Louvois to Humiéres, 2 January 1675, AG, A' 448, fo. 7. °° BG, Receuil Cangé, Ordonnance du Rot, concernant la levée de troupes Boulonnoises, 3

August 1670, vol. 22, no. 118.

248 CHAPTER SIX garrison force pushed up the Escaut in an effort to further block Spanish parties from Ghent and Ypres. Pertuis, the commander of the garrison of Courtrai, once suggested

the occupation of a castle along the border of the Castellany of Courtrai, in order to support existing French defensive posts along the Escaut River. He proposed to place in it Marigny, “one of the heutenants of his dragoons and a man of great determination.” Marigny would command 100 to 150 infantry and thirty to forty dragoons. According to Le Peletier: “that will notably confine the parties of Ghent and of Bruges and assist in the establishment of contributions on the other side of the canal.” Le Peletier explained that the castle occupied a place barely “two leagues” from the Canal

and about “three leagues” from Deinze. The lower courtyard was walled and protected by towers. It also possessed a good moat “full of water” and the keep had another moat “very deep,” but, “it is true that there is not in any of that proof against cannon.”” In October 1673 the Spanish seized the castle of Warlin on the Scarpe River, near Marchiennes and two-thirds of the way from Valenciennes (Spanish) to Douai (French). Condé resolved to remove

the Spanish, and on 3 November 1673, he marched a small corps toward Warlin to accomplish this.°? An even smaller Spanish detachment shadowed his march, unable to do more. Curiously, this expedition provided some inconvenience for the garrison at Douai, rather

than offering it any immediate relief. On 7 November, Valicourt informed Louvois that the movements of Condé’s troops in the area

around Douai, and of the Spanish corps around Bouchain, had slowed down the transportation of forage (contributions) into Douai.”'

The next day, however, on 8 November, and shortly after the cannon commenced to batter the walls, the castle of Warlin fell into

French hands. Condé lost “two or three” soldiers killed and ten wounded. Le Peletier, who seemed not to have liked the idea of an assault on a castle in November because the countryside was sodden and the roads muddy, observed that it was providential that a few days without rain had allowed the operation to take place when it did:

8 Le Peletier to Louvois, AG, A! 380, fo. 13. ° Tbid. *' Valicourt to Louvois, 7 November 1673, AG, A! 380, fo. 23.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 249 I believe that we would still be there if the weather had not been extremely favorable for aiding the transportation of the cannon, which took more than fifteen hours to cover around one quarter of a league from the place where it had been disembarked to the place marked for the battery and they joined the carriage horses of their princes with 200 of the sturdiest draft animals.*”

The prince de Condé left a garrison: De La Motte Gondcourt, a captain in the élite infantry Regiment du Roi, and fifty men remained

with orders to entirely level the outer courtyard (presumably this meant dismantling smaller buildings) and to cut down all of the trees within musket range to make the post more defensible. Condé also

decided to leave fifty men each at three nearby castles: Ruieulay, Lalain (Lallaing), and Rache (Raches)—all situated near the Scarpe River. At about the same time that the French occupied these four castles in the vicinity of Douai and near the Scarpe River, they took other castles in other places. Choisy informed Louvois on 9 November

1673 that the comte d’Estrades had ordered him to visit a castle five leagues from Maastricht, captured the day before. ‘This unnamed

castle fell the same day as Warlin to the prince de Condé.” On 15 April 1674, Le Peletier informed Louvois that he had given

the war minister’s orders to Humiéres for the destruction of “two castles on the Scarpe.” Humiéres, to be sure that the decision by Louvois was appropriate, wanted to inspect the castles first, indicating his concern that they might just as easily be defended with smaller garrisons. At the same time, Bellefonds gave orders for the occupation of several castles between the province of Artois and the Castellany of Lille as blocking positions against raids from the Spanish garrisons

at Aire and Saint-Omer. The garrisons of the French posts along the Scarpe River were supposed to patrol and conduct joint search missions, seeking Spanish

parties. Bellefonds ordered the commanders of the posts “to frequently send parties in coordination into the countryside and to join themselves at certain rendezvous.” These defensive measures were not enough, however, to prevent enemy parties over a period of two nights from taking more than twenty hostages from the ‘Tournésis

” Le Peletier to Louvois, 8 November, AG, A! 380, fo. 29. "3 Le Peletier to Louvois, 8 November, AG, A' 380, fo. 29. See, Choisy to Louvois, 9 November 1674, AG, A' 380, fo. 40.

250 CHAPTER SIX and the Castellany of Lille, or from leaving numerous broadsheets justifying their imposition of contributions as not too “exorbitant.””

4. Ambushing the Raiders

Desperate struggles were fought in the countryside of the Netherlands to foil the raiders. A particularly blood-drenched account of one sent

by Chamilly to Louvois in July 1675 revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the French attempt to react to Spanish raiding detach-

ments and catch them in the country. Rumor reached Chamilly at Oudenaarde that a Spanish party had spent the night camped at a village only one-and-a-half leagues away, and that it was composed of forty men on foot. ‘The report was only partially correct; a Spanish

party had camped over night in the castellany of Oudenaarde, but it was stronger than the French were led to believe. Not knowing the true strength of their opponent, Chamilly ordered Violaine to take thirty mounted dragoons and twenty cavalrymen from the Grenonville Gompany to drive the Spanish party “to the gates of Ghent.” Grenonville volunteered to accompany the French detachment and Chamilly readily consented, since, as he explained, “there was need for many officers.” The French found the raiders three leagues out from Oudenaarde near another village. The Spanish actually numbered sixty men. When the French troops arrived, they discovered the Spanish party positioned on a sunken road, and about to cross a moat around a village that they intended to plunder and burn. On the opposite bank, the mounted Frenchmen were unable to cross the moat to reach the Spanish, who began to withdraw to a small wood. The French dragoons, led by the officers, however, dismounted and crossed

the moat with their flintlocks held above their heads. Captain Grenonvile, the volunteer, led the twenty cavalry galloping to another

location, avoiding the moat, where they maneuvered to cut off the Spanish from withdrawing to the woods. Surrounded, the Spanish defended themselves “with an enraged stubbornness.” A smaller ditch

covered the Spanish troops from the French dragoons who had to fight their way across before coming into close quarters with the foe.

** Le Peletier to Louvois, 2 February 1676, AG, A! 404, fo. 114.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 251 In the combat that followed, the French lost three cavalrymen killed, while four cavalrymen and five dragoons fell wounded. Also a cornet was wounded, and a maréchal de logis suffered a mortal wound. The Spanish losses were heavier: twenty-eight soldiers killed, along with “a guide of importance who was among their troops and from this country.” ‘The remainder of the Spanish detachment surrendered

to the French and was taken prisoner to Oudenaarde. The bloodshed did not end there. One of the captured Spanish, a lieutenant in the Grimbergue Regiment who had broken his leg, had it amputated the next day, according to Chamilly, who spared no detail of the losses in his report.” Other reports of French defensive efforts in the open country revealed that the French fought well, employed sound tactics, but were often misled by poor intelligence. Sometime during the late evening, around 10 PM, on 10 February 1676, the French garrison

commander at Douai, St. Geniez, was alerted that around 150 Spanish cavalry and fifty dragoons, under the command of a renowned

partisan leader, baron de Feu (Baron Flame), had sortied from Cambrai. It was believed at Douai that the Spanish war party rode in the direction of Bapaume. The next morning, around 8 AM, St. Geniez ordered the chevalier de Cagnol of the Royal Piedmont cavalry regiment at Douai, to oppose the raiders. ‘The plan called for 150 troopers to post themselves between Cambrai and the Spanish war party, to block their line of retreat. [he Spanish party, instead of going in the direction of Bapaume, was believed to be posted at Vitry-en-Artois with another, smaller party of about fifty dragoons at the mill and bridge of Arleux. The French troops commanded

by the sieur de Conty captured a dragoon who said that some Spanish raiders commanded by a captain and two other officers guarded the passage. Caegnol ordered his troops to approach and attack the enemy. The

French were not able to close in at first because the Spanish had destroyed the bridge and they gave a fierce volley from their carbines and shotguns. A French officer had his horse shot out from under him and his right arm broken, but he still managed to cross near the bridge with those troops that Cagnol had and cross on foot. While he gave his orders, Gagnol took two successive bullets just

> Chamilly to Louvois, 2 July 1675, AG, A' 450, fo. 116.

252 CHAPTER SIX above his knee, covering his boot with blood and splintered bone. Another bullet struck Cagnol’s shoulder, and several passed through his coat. His horse was shot from under him. But all of this did not prevent him from crossing the debris of the bridge with his men. Meanwhile, the chevalier de Grimaldy, a captain in the same regiment who commanded the second squadron, mounted and looked desperately for an alternative place where he could cross the river to flank the enemy and support his wounded comrade and the others who had crossed the Escaut on foot. Fortunately for them, he succeeded before the Spanish fired again. Grimaldy took the enemy from the rear, either capturing or killing those Spanish who defended the crossing. The Spanish captain and two other officers were taken prisoner and brought to Douai. In all, the French detachment captured twenty-seven prisoners and forty-seven horses. ‘(Two French

troopers were wounded, one horse killed and a horse wounded. Cagnol, hampered by his multiple wounds, could not catch up to the Baron de Feu, who took part of the Spanish raiding party safely to a defile of the Ecluse River and from there to Cambrai.”” On another occasion, when the Spanish raided for contributions near St. Quentin, a fierce cavalry fight ensued instead as the garrison at St. Quentin intercepted the raiders. Word reached the Marquis

of Pradel at St. Quentin, around 10 PM on 31 December that a party of Spanish, numbering nearly 600 mounted troops were in the countryside, apparently on their way to pillage and burn several villages late in paying their contributions. Ten warning shots were fired

from the cannon at St. Quentin to alert the surrounding countryside as to the presence of the Spanish raiders. The French commander of the garrison Lanc¢con proposed to Pradel

that he order the cavalry to mount. They sortied with around 300 horse, and having been informed of the place where the enemy was, they rode directly for them. They found the Spanish party, which, forewarned of their approach, formed into line of battle in nine troops. Langon was convinced that the Spanish had divided their cavalry into two separate detachments, and he faced only one. In fact, part of the Spanish cavalry had been detached to the village of Grand Essigny (Essigny-le-Grand) which it had successfully plun-

dered and burned. Lancon decided to fight the troops that faced © St. Geniez to Louvois, 11 February 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 551.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 253

him. ‘The French charged, and two of the nine Spanish squadrons broke under the impact and took flight. As Langon went to the assistance of a French squadron that had been counter-charged in the flank during the engagement, a volley from some well-placed Spanish

dragoons shattered his nght arm between the elbow and his shoulder and killed his horse. Nevertheless, the Spanish squadrons were routed. ‘The French took twenty-eight prisoners in the action. The Baron of Lorsi, the Spanish commander of the cavalry at Valencinnes, was one of those captured. Pradel requested that if Lancgon’s wound

was mortal that the king would have the kindness to maintain his government for Langon’s son.’ In mid-January 1676, another detachment of French cavalry troops

prepared to seek out and trap an anticipated raid by the Spanish. Although no immediate action ensued, the preparations taken underlined Louvois’s determination to prevent fire-raids into French ter-

ritory. The gravity of not having the corps prepared in time was evident in the menacing tone of Louvois: I have received the letter that you took the trouble to write me on the 17th of this month, and I have given an account of it to the King, His Majesty has Judged it appropriate for you to be prepared to more

easily be able to oppose the enemy raids, to make ready the Des Roches Regiment and Calvo Regiment at St. Quentin, and the King hopes that having a larger corps together you will be able to serve yourself more usefully, however it is necessary that you make the cavalry officers understand who will be under your command, that if their

companies are not complete by the first of next month, they will assuredly be punished.”

The reason for Louvois’ insistence on preparation was that at the end of January 1676, he had received intelligence that the Spanish intended a far-ranging fire-raid in a region known as the Ponthieu, beyond the Authie River. De La Fitte was to assemble his cavalry to meet the raiders from St. Omer and Aire in the countryside. He was to warn Montbron, who had orders to assemble the cavalry at Arras and Douai, and, at the same time to march with the cavalry from Ham, St. Quentin, and Peronne to give battle to the Spanish raiders “on their return.”””

*” Pradel to Louvois, | January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 3. > Louvois to De La Fitte, 21 January 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 40. ” Louvois to De La Fitte, 28 January 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 52.

254 CHAPTER SIX Although opposed in the countryside, the Spanish never relented in their efforts to extend contributions. On 28 May 1676, Spanish raiding parties freely burned and pillaged between the walled towns of Peronne and Roye. Several villages in the Santerre, panicked by the fires and the printed demands, submitted to pay contributions. The Santerre was within sixty miles of Paris and just beyond the gates of Amiens and Corbie. Louis XIV had left Baron Caines in charge of a garrison at the newly conquered fortress of Bouchain to guard against just such an event. ‘The Spanish raid left the baron in disgrace. Although the campaign season was hardly over, the partisan war of detachments to blockade the garrisons of the Spanish fortresses in the Cambrésis had only begun. It would last almost up

to the day an assault trench was broken before Cambrai the following spring.

The failure of Caines was probably typical of others whose task it was to stop the Spanish raiders in the French countryside. Caines

had failed to outwit an opponent that held the initiative, able to choose where and when to strike and where and when to withdraw. Caines had received intelligence of the raiders departure and dispatched his subordinate D’Augier with 1,800 horse and instructions to cut the raiders off from their fortresses. D’Augier either moved too slowly or received inadequate intelligence, because he never quite found the trail of his opponent. According to what the royal historiographer Pellisson had heard around the king’s headquarters in camp in the Netherlands: the raiders even “amused themselves by taking booty and beasts.”'°" Not all French ambushes were destined to succeed, even when

the Spanish walked into them. In February 1676, for example, a party of raiders, assembled by the Spanish from their garrisons of Aire and St. Omer, raided into the Boulonnais region where they burned the village of Liannes. The French were waiting: Brigadier Romecourt commanded a mixed force of cavalry and some infantry,

amounting to about 100 men. ‘The ambush was feebly executed, because thirty French cavalry were killed and the rest of the detachment put to flight. The victorious Spanish party pillaged the village of Liannes “and returned with good loot.?"!

' Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 3, p. 100. '°' Mercure Hollandois, February 1676.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 299

To prevent future raids by the Cambrai and Valencienne garrisons, Gaines was replaced by Montbron, a man of proven abilities, and the French adopted a new strategy in the summer of 16706. Montbron would command a detached corps which had the task of posting itself near the Spanish fortresses of Gambrai and Valenciennes, actively patrolling and seeking to give battle to any troops that might sortie to raid in France. On 2 June 1676, Louvois reminded Montbron of instructions given to him by the king: Montbron would command

a corps that His Majesty judged appropriate “to forage entirely the Cambrésis and the Prevoté of Valenciennes, to prevent the garrison|s] from making any raids into France and to incommodate these two towns as much as the ‘law of contributions’ permits.”'’? Montbron

was to arrive at the newly-conquered French fortress of Bouchain as soon as possible in order to oversee the assembly of this corps. On 3 June, Louis XIV detached three field pieces from the Camp de Niverasselt with artillery officers, twenty-five caissons, and with a supply commissioner “so that nothing will lack for the subsistence”

of Montbron’s corps. On 8 June 1676, the king detached two regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry from his camp at Neer Hasselt to serve under the marquis de Montbron. Besides the battalions and squadrons mentioned in the estat sent to Montbron—

there were also other cavalry to be drawn from the garrisons of Douai, Condé and Quesnoy, as needed by Montbron.'"’ Montbron was told that he would find Baron de Quincy, “who has a perfect knowledge of the country,” at Bouchain. Montbron was advised “to profit” from the consul that Quincy could offer him. The turncoat Baron Quincy had desired for some time to come over to the service of Louis XIV. Quincy, who commanded a regiment at Valenciennes, knew the defenses and weaknesses of the Spanish first-hand.'** At Oudenaarde, Chamilly told Louvois on 11 February 1676 that the “enemies” were publishing that Baron Quincy

had left them to join the French.'” Indeed, later, according the Mercure Hollandois, Baron Quincy, “had served the King of Spain as

colonel of a regiment of cavalry [and] had finally allowed himself

'? Louvois to Montbron, 2 June 1676, AG, A' 499, fo. 247.

' Thid.

'* Louvois to Valicourt, 21 January 1676. ‘® Chamilly to Louvois, 11 February 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 556.

256 CHAPTER SIX to be corrupted by the fancy promises of the French.” He deserted

his post at Valenciennes and took with him his entire regiment, excepting six cavalrymen and “ten or twelve officers.”'° Quincy, in a letter from Douai, on 25 February 1676, had nothing but flattery for Louvois and Louis XIV who he now served. He wanted to reassure them of his loyalty and perhaps was troubled by official Spanish threats of decapitation if he were captured.'°’ Louis XIV would eventually promote him to the rank of brigadier of cavalry. While Mont-

bron remained at Bouchain to coordinate operations, including a convoy to be sent to Douai, Quincy took field command of the detached corps. His first action was a reconnaissance of the area around Cateau-Cambrésis. He then approached the Spanish post of Crévecoeur, in order to observe more closely the garrisons of Valenclennes and Cambrai. Quincy would soon participate in the greatest

clash of the Dutch War fought to prevent a fire-raid. On 9 June 1676, after Montbron joined the command in the field, Quincy took a war party from the detached corps and foraged almost

within artillery range of the guns at Cambrai. Don Pedro Zavalas, the governor of Gambrai, took the opportunity to prepare his command on the night of 9-10 June. Eight hundred infantry and all of the cavalry that could ride assembled in the dark on the esplanade of the fortress. Oblivious to these preparations, Quincy and his detachment camped nearby between Douai and Bouchain. Instead of heading toward Amiens or St. Quentin, as the French might have expected, the Spanish raiders first rendezvoused with some troopers from nearby

Crévecoeur. Their strength grew to twenty-three squadrons or 1,500 men including the 800 infantry. They made a hasty camp between Cambrai and French-held Bouchain. When Quincy received word at four in the morning of 10 June that Spanish raiders had sortied from Cambrai, a bugle call sounded in a panic. His force assembled and only “several sick troopers and a few others escorting a convoy of hay wagons from Bouchain to Douai” failed to rush south to trap the Spanish between the frontier and Cambrai—even Montbron

showed up momentarily at the camp in the midst of the excitement

198 Mercure Hollandois, February 1676, p. 51.

'°7 Quincy to Louvois, AG, A' 487, fo. 38. His son-in-law, however, did not follow his example of treason and remained faithful to the cause of King of Spain. He travelled to Brussels to “advance his fortune” there. Mercure Hollandois, February, 1676.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 297

before continuing on to Douai with the convoy.'*® But they had taken the wrong direction. It was not until Quincy and his 1,300 troopers reached Casteau-Cambrésis that further word reached him of the actual whereabouts of the Spanish. Quincy had to back track and face the Spanish who blocked his line of retreat to Bouchain. Perhaps, however, the Spanish had never intended to raid, but all along had planned to trap the detached French corps. Quincy’s reconnaissance parties spotted the Spanish two hours after skirting Casteau-Cambrésis. The Spanish saw the French at the same time. The Spanish horse and foot was seen to assemble quickly into two lines—the foot probably interspersed between the cavalry squadrons in their usual four-deep formation. Quincy admired the efficiency of his opponents and, meanwhile, marshaled his own ranks. ‘The Spanish advanced steadily forward to meet Quincy and his troopers; “their bearing appeared good, and in fact they advanced towards us with some fierceness,” Quincy later wrote.'"? The distance between the two sides closed.

Quincy took up his post at the head of the first line on the right wing. [he French right charged forward. With only three squadrons, he broke ahead of the rest of the line and attacked the Spanish left. Quincy advanced steadily, enduring a volley, and crashed through the first line of Spanish squadrons backed by supporting infantry. The French rushed on until they came to blows with the second line, which repelled them. Recoiling, the French reformed and now took the shattered first line from the rear. The Spanish left lost its cohesion under the impact of Quincy’s successive charges. Squadrons dissolved as troopers reeled about in various directions. Infantry soldiers were cut down or scattered for safety.

Meanwhile, the Spanish right had charged the French left. They pushed through the French lines, breaking French squadrons along the way. So successful was the Spanish attack that they took five standards, which the captors wisely folded up and stuffed in their pockets to avoid the wrath of any French cavaliers who might spot them with their company standards. After a violent shock, Quincy regrouped the French right and led three squadrons in a dashing

‘8 Montbron to Louvois, 11 June 1676, AG, A! 500, fo. 10. ' Quincy to Louvois, 19 June 1676, AG, A! 500, fo. 25.

258 CHAPTER SIX charge against the Spanish right, crossing the battlefield with about 150 determined men.

Throughout the half-hour of combat, one Spanish squadron of dragoons that “remained firm in the middle of the battlefield, having allowed everyone to pass it by” prepared a surprise for Quincy’s three squadrons, commanded by Lille, Maillet, and Pinconnel. ‘The French bumped right into the deadly mass of mounted Spanish dragoons. “That squadron which I had not at all been able to see was surrounded with leaderless, fleeing men on all sides,” as Quincy later lamented, “gave us a charge from the rear.” ‘The squadrons led by Lille and Maillet broke under the impact, leaving Quincy alone with only Pinconnel’s men who were élite dragoons from Quincy’s own regiment. Lille, a major in the Bridieux Regiment, and Maillet chased

after their dispirited men in an attempt to rally them. Meanwhile, Quincy, leading Pinconnel’s dragoons and a scattering of officers who remained from the broken squadrons, fought the Spanish and finally compelled them to flee. ‘The Spanish crossed a defile, reformed

in good order and turned about to face the French. Too late to make a difference, Servon and Vandeuvre managed to rally a few cavalrymen and hold the French left, and assured Quincy that “less

succeeded.”!!° |

vigorous and less experienced men than they would not have Quincy’s command was too disorganized by the furious Spanish

charge against the French left, and the surprise to their center, to pursue their opponents. The Spanish, seeing the French in disarray, reformed their own troops into a semblance of a column, and withdrew to the gates of Gambrai without much to fear from the scattered French squadrons. Nearly 200 dead from both sides lay on the fields. Many of the French wounded would later die, after hearing their last rites on a moldy bed of straw in a military hospital at Douai.''! The Spanish

: dead on the battlefield numbered between eighty and 100 men. Around fifty French cavalrymen were among the dead equaling the

number of Frenchmen killed earlier in the spring at the siege of Condé.''’ “Six or seven” French troopers were captured and ended

1° Thid.

''l Estat des officiers blessés... AG, A' 500, fo. 3. ''2 Quincy to Louvois, 19 June 1676, AG, A!’ 500, fo. 25-35.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 259 up in the prison at Cambrai awaiting an exchange. Many more were

injured, the majority by musket and pistol shots, others by sword blows, and at least one from falling off his horse and being trampled.'!’ In fact, the Spanish account claims that the French withdrew from the field first, giving a slightly different story of the battle. According

to the Spanish version, the governor of Cambrai did not leave until lOQ AM, and brought 200 additional infantry with him. He quickly assumed command of the main force and the Spanish crossed the Escaut River to meet the French. Although the French were onethird stronger than the Spanish, who claimed to have only thirtyeight squadrons, the Spanish charged the French so vigorously that they were collapsed; but soon the French rallied. According to the Spanish version, the squadrons on the Spanish left, “returned to the charge with more fury.” The battle was “hot and stubborn and lasted around one hour.” And, according to the Spanish, it was the French who “finally gave in,” and after having “taken heavy casualties, the

French abandoned the field of battle” to the Spanish, which lay between the villages of Nave and Avennes-le-Sec. The Spanish officers acquitted themselves well, according to their own version: Baron de

Torcy, “did on this occasion all that one could hope from a man of valor and good upbringing.” Other officers mentioned from the Spanish garrison included Colonel Haby, Menzaga, the Count of La Motterie, and a dragoon colonel named Hartman. Most conspicu-

ous of all that day was Baron Dongelberg who “was the first to strike the enemy lines,” receiving four wounds. Not to be forgotten, Don Gabriel Buendia killed eight French troopers “with his own hands.” ‘he French regiments of Hocquincourt and Bridieux were “torn to pieces.” ‘The Spanish captured twelve standards, rather than the five the French claimed to have lost, and a pair of kettle drums. They also brought back several prisoners to Gambrai. The Spanish admitted as losses: baron de Jauche, a volunteer, who had galloped

too far ahead in the charge, and was taken prisoner; a captain captured; count of La Motterie, who received a light wound; and interestingly, “the Intendant” had his horse killed under him.''* Short on manpower, the Spanish threw everyone at the French, even apparently the intendant at Cambrai who joined in the combat.

5 Estat des officiers blesses... AG, A' 500, fo. 3. ‘Mercure Hollandois, 1676, pp. 271-81.

260 CHAPTER SIX For Quincy, the most important result of the encounter on 10 June 1676 was that the Spanish “could not quibble that we had not pushed them back to the gates of Cambrai, nor the great loss that

they had suffered.” Quincy had dealt a blow to the prestige and confidence of the garrison of Cambrai, if not its ability to mount further raids for contributions. Unquestionably, the battle had been a bloody draw for both sides, but the Spanish side had less blood to give.

5. Reprisals

In response to the fire-raids of their enemies, the French launched

reprisals. Some took place at a local level and remained on that level, a kind of duel between enemy intendants and fortress governors. For example, the French took offense when the Spanish Governor of Ypres retained hostages from the French village of Marcq, “although

they had entirely satisfied their contribution.” In reprisal, Marshal Humieres detached a war party to kidnap the bailiff of the village of Meuse Eglise and the greffier of the Castellany of Bailleul. Further,

Intendant Desmoulins warned the Spanish governor that unless the French hostages were released, the Spanish officials captured would not only be kept prisoners, but the French intended to send other raiding parties to kidnap more inhabitants from the gouvernement of

Ypres. [he governor of Ypres claimed to be surprised, and the Spanish Intendant Desmoulins told the French that the hostages could not be released until their contributions had been paid.'’ In this manner, an isolated incident spiraled into a series of small but bitter incidents of violence, unimportant to the war objectives of both sides, but nevertheless a drain on resources. Such localized reprisal actions took place from almost every frontier garrison, diluted French resources, occupied those of the Alles, but accomplished few strategic objectives.

The law of reprisal extended to the smallest of matters, including confiscations of property belonging to individuals. In January 1674, Intendant Talon at Oudenaarde explained to Louvois how a Spanish

‘' Le Peletier to Louvois, Mémoire de M. le Peletier de Souzy par luy envoyé avec la lettre ci-dessus, [April 1674], AG, A! 405, fo. 44.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 26]

war party captured three boats filled with wine near St. Amand. The French merchants told Talon that they had purchased passports

at Valenciennes for the cargo, but the Spanish were not content, claiming the merchants were supposed to purchase the passports instead from Condé. ‘The boats and cargo were declared a valid prize and sold at Condé. ‘The aggrieved French merchants requested Talon to launch raids as revenge and compensation.''® More dramatic were threatened Spanish reprisals against men who

had turned traitor to Madrid, and the French responses on behalf of these men. In January, 1678, the intendant at Maastricht threatened raids in kind on the lands belonging to His Catholic Majesty to protect Baron Vierset’s property, who had turned the keys of the fortress of Liége over to the French in 1675.''’ Louis took deadly serious any pledge that he made to protect men such as the Baron of Vierset who switched sides to render him personal service. On another level, an overall increase or escalation of contributions in reprisal began almost as soon as the war broke out. When it was learned that the Dutch and Spanish demands for regular contributions had exceeded those of the French along the Flemish coast, Louvois wrote on 8 November 1673 to Le Boistel. Louvois ordered him to retaliate by making demands that were “equally excessive” as those imposed on the King’s subjects in his department. Le Boistel was to insert in his printed demands for contributions a special note

“that this 1s in reprisal to those of the governors of the Spanish fortresses and those of Holland.”!!® Further, Louvois told Le Boistel, in response to Dutch demands for contributions from the Castellany of Furnes, that he should demand a contribution in reprisal “for the one that the Dutch demand on the terres de sa Mayesté.”''? The printed

note had an obvious propaganda value by making the French-side look more just than it was. On the same day that Le Boistel prepared to issue his demand, Louvois wrote Le Peletier to also take reprisals in his departments and to issue a second demand just as “excessive” and “unreasonable” and “to stipulate that this 1s a consequence of the failure of the Spanish to set their demands on the

''© Talon to Louvois, 11 January 1674, AG, A! 404, fo. 39. ''7 Dumouceau to Louvois 2 January 1678, AG, A! 612, fo. I.

- hes to Le Boistel, 8 November 1673, AG, A! 340, fo. 35.

262 CHAPTER SIX level of those of the last war.”'’° In this general way, all along the frontier in November of 1673, from one department to the next, French demands for contributions increased above their original October level in reprisal for the level set by the Spanish and Dutch in November. However, it did not convince the Spanish or the Dutch to lower their demands.

At the strategic level, the problem of reprisals and escalating demands led to two different French schools-of-thought about contributions: that held by Louvois and that embraced by intendants of contributions. Louis XIV wisely avoided direct involvement in the debate, upholding his interest in conserving the safety and well-being of his subjects on the frontier. Louvois, acting in the king’s name, took the approach from about 1673-74 that raising the level of contributions to counter Spanish demands was a necessary means to improve the French supply position, while keeping the cost of the war under control. ‘The intendants of contributions shared this position for most of the war; although with each escalation in reprisal, they doubted its wisdom. As more than one intendant pointed out: the heavier the burden of contributions in a region, the fewer the contributions that were actually recovered. From about 1675 to 1678, Louvois took the position that the French, if unable to gain more in contributions, should retaliate by dispatching fire-raids, and launching reprisals while escalating demands for contributions. He saw this

strategy as a way to ruin the Spanish Netherlands and bring the war to a successful conclusion sooner. By 1676, the war had already

caused Louis to resort to massive borrowing, and the role of contributions in financing the overall cost of the war diminished proportionally. Louvois probably came to believe that as a financial expedient contributions were still valuable, but as a strategic weapon they had more merit.

As early as 1673-74, through the use of reprisals, both Louvois and Le Peletier hoped that the heavier demands for contributions

made by the French would bring the subjects of the Spanish Netherlands to complain to officials and these officials to the Governor-

General Monterey, that the Spanish intendants would be obligated to “to relieve those of His Majesty.” Early in the war, in 1674, Le

"° Louvois to Le Peletier, 8 November 1673, AG, A' 340.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 263

Peletier even hoped a general treaty would be negotiated for all of Spanish Flanders and French Flanders, regulating the contributions levied by both sides. But, as Le Peletier pointed out in 1674, he saw no “opening” for a “treaty of convenience” and did not see equally with whom one would negotiate it.'*! Le Peletier favored moderating contributions rather than imposing greater levels. The French hope persisted in the spring of 1674 that perhaps the Spanish, once pressured, would relent and reduce their initial contributions to the same rate that French subjects would have paid the French king in taxes—as occurred in the War of Devolution (1667— 1663). Le Peletier confessed, however, that he doubted the French could succeed, because he knew that for the most part, the French already taxed the Spanish Netherlands more heavily than the Spanish

taxed the French lands. Furthermore, the Spanish were unlikely to agree to a reduction in their demands, since they appeared to need them more than the French, especially the six-and-a-half million florins from the Castellany of Lille.

By 1674, Le Peletier and Louvois both understood that there existed little chance of turning back the clock to a lower level of contributions set in 1667 (such apparently had been the wish of Louis XIV), but it took some convincing for Louvois to finally understand that the French had already raised the bar in terms of Spanish

demands for contributions from French territory. Le Peletier carefully made his argument to the war minister: If the intendants of Spain wished to become reasonable about it and not demand from the people subjected to His Majesty for one year

but the same that they pay the King, you do not doubt at all that his Majesty would reduce his contributions to the same footing, I have had the honor of explaining to you thoroughly and at length by a letter of the twenty-fifth of February the detail of the conduct that I hold by your orders in the imposition of contributions by which you should be able to know that generally per year my impositions on Spanish

Flanders are more heavy than those of Lord Dophem on French Flanders with the exception of the Castellany of Lille that he taxed exorbitantly and for at least one quarter above the proportion of my impositions.'*”

. Le Peletier to Louvois, 10 April 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 49. — * Thid.

264 CHAPTER SIX In this context, reprisals, as a means to force the Spanish to reduce their contributions, were difficult to justify, since the French already asked for more in contributions than did the Spanish. More worrisome was the fact that the Spanish would raise their contributions

| to meet French levels. On 10 April 1674, Le Peletier informed Louvois that he had printed the notice to compel the communities

in his department to meet the payment of the imposition “that I made by your order of last March.” Yet, as Le Peletier indicated to Louvois, “the complaints of the Estates of Lille were that the Spanish

would impose an equal amount, or more, on the subjects of the king.”

Humieres, was uncertain about the wisdom of the escalating levels of contributions—a policy favored by Louvois. Humiéres requested that Le Peletier suspend the execution of the new demand until further orders from Louvois, and, further, Humiéres “burdened” Le Peletier with the task of making a memo of “everything that has passed concerning contributions since his arrival in Flanders.” Le

Peletier told all of these things to Louvois in a carefully planned argument to convince Louvois that the war miunister’s policy was drifting in the wrong direction, and that the French needed to show restraint in the business of escalating demands of contributions.'”’ Yet, the Spanish continued to raise their demands for contributions to match those of the French in the first year of the war, help-

ing Louvois to further justify his policy that the French should continue to increase their demands and conduct reprisal raids. In July 1674, Le Peletier conceded to Louvois in a defeated tone that “Tt is true, My Lord, that the Spanish make a new demand of contributions.” ‘The Spanish intendants were hardly swayed by the French

escalation in demands in April 1674 and might have been grateful for 1t. Le Peletier went to great lengths to be certain that this new Spanish demand was set at a higher level and did not replicate the same level as the last period of contributions. He desperately wanted to believe that the Spanish were not raising their demands to meet those of the French. He wrote to the “college,” the church governing body, of Courtrai to clarify if the Spanish had set new demands

at a higher rate. Finally, he had to report to Louvois: “I believe I

5 Le Peletier to Louvois, 9 April 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 43.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 2695

can tell you in advance that it is a new [different] demand.”'** The Spanish Intendant Dophem at Ypres had imposed as much as 300,000 florins on the Castellany of Courtrai in 1674, and Le Peletier believed

the new demand would exceed this one, because he himself had demanded even more from the department of the Spanish intendant.'” The pattern of reprisals and escalating demands continued the following year. In August 1675, the Spanish intendants decided to raise

their levels of contributions. As winter quarters approached, new French reprisals were authorized to retaliate. Although Louvois probably hoped that sweeping counter-demands for greater contributions

and fire-raids in reprisal might cause Spanish intendants to reduce their overall demands for contributions, he likely also believed they might weaken the respect of the subjects of the Spanish Netherlands for the government in Brussels. According to Van Houtte: “Here we touch on Louvois’ second guiding principal: make the people suffer, in such a manner as to force them to insist that their sovereign make peace.”'*© He thought that fire-raids, if destructive enough, might cause the people, led by the local gentry, to rebel against Spanish authority—“faire crier les peuples.” If nothing else, reprisals would further degrade the supplies and monetary resources available to Spanish

garrisons and enhance those of the French. For Louvois, there were strategic benefits to reprisals and escalating demands for contributions. The escalation of contributions by both sides allowed the French to pursue the war against the Spanish Netherlands more aggressively.

By 1676, Louvois used reprisals to devastate, not to retaliate. Greater counter-demands and the amount of destruction inflicted on Spanish villages could amount to double or more what the Spanish and their Allies demanded or inflicted on French villages. Baron Quincy, for example, received instructions from Louvois in 1676 that: If the enemies burn (in Artois), pillage or if they make the villages of the dominion of the King furnish by force forage, His Majesty wants for you to impose twice as much by reprisal in the region of Brussels. '*’

"+ Le Peletier to Louvois, 10 July 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 184. ' Le Peletier also acknowledged that he imposed 4,300,000 diures on the département of Dophem [Spanish Flanders] in 1674. “© Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, pp. 110-112. "’ Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 97.

266 CHAPTER SIX On occasion after 1676, the French set their demands at triple the level exacted by the Spanish. On 14 September 1676, Louvois instructed Le Peletier that if the Spanish Intendant Claris at Gambrai

directed any executions against the French, who had been forbidden from taking forage as contributions to Cambrai, he was to make as reprisal “three times as much at the gates of Brussels and Ghent.” To justify these demands, Louvois told Le Peletier to insert notes in the demands explaining the reason for the reprisal, shifting the moral

blame over to the Spanish. Further concerned that the Spanish Intendant Claris might convert demands for forage into zmpositions ordinaires, or money, Louvois advised Le Peletier to raise his own contributions imposed on the Spanish Artois and the villages nearest Brussels and Ghent—“‘in order to make the people cry out against the Spanish.” Late in the war, Louvois showed callousness not only toward the enemy, but also toward the sufferings of French subjects compelled to make contributions to the Spanish. He may even have welcomed Spanish demands for contributions, because he could then authorize as punishment for these French subjects the payment of additional taxes

to the crown. When Louvois found out that the inhabitants of the Castellany of Lille had arranged to pay contributions to Valenciennes

in September 1676, he advised Le Peletier to not “amuse himself with verbalizing against the communities,” but rather to make them pay for the winter quarters of the French campaign army, “double what they paid to the enemies.”!”* In short, the main problem regarding reprisals was that they esca-

lated into a “rupture of contributions” in which both sides raised demands for contributions, causing more destruction. In 1675, the Spanish and French decided to meet and negotiate an end to the escalating levels. Neither side was sincere, and they arrived at the bargaining table at the town of Deinze each with a different agenda in mind. [he French desired to convince the Spanish to reduce their contributions, and the Spanish hoped to use the negotiations to gain a respite from French fire raids, and suspend the use of fire, at least while the negotiations proceeded. Neither side got what it wanted.'” 8 Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 2, pp. 127-28. > Hubert Van Houtte, “Les conferences franco-espagnoles de Deynze,” Revue d’Fistorte Moderne, 2 (1927), pp. 191-215.

THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH OF FRANCE 267 6. Conclusion

Throughout the north, the French failed to completely prevent pay-

ments of contributions to the Spanish. In fact, the French never believed that such an achievement was even possible. It was not even a question that some of the Alhed raiders would make it through,

or that many, if not most of the inhabitants in the most exposed castellanies would pay contributions rather than risk complete ruin. The point of French partisan warfare in defense of the north was

not to seal off the frontier utterly, an unlikely proposition in any case. Louvois and the intendants and governors dispatched war parties, prepared defenses, issued ordinances, cajoled local officials, and organized militia with the intention of slowing and disrupting the Spanish imposition and collection of contributions. When possible, the French hoped to inflict casualties on the Spanish garrison force. French raids of reprisal and escalating demands for contributions

also intended to inflict harm on the inhabitants of the Spanish Netherlands and to break their moral resolve. In terms of slowing the gathering of contributions and eroding the strength of the Spanish garrison force, the French were reasonably successful. The defenses along the Meuse River were especially effective: had they not existed, the entire Duchy of Champagne would

have paid a huge contribution payment each year to Luxembourg. However, French defenses along the Lys and Scarpe rivers also inflicted casualties on Spanish raiders, and even peasants fought hard |

in parts of the north, such as those around St. Quentin in 1674. Hundreds of Spanish soldiers were probably killed or wounded in their raids for contributions each year—a considerable number when one remembers that the total Spanish force in the Netherlands seldom exceeded 20,000 men. Driving the Spanish garrisons from their fortresses was the only sure means to prevent Spanish raids. The example of the French conquest of Maastricht in 1673 provided the French with a model for the remainder of the war in the Spanish Netherlands. Skirted by Louis XIV’s main armies in the attack on the Dutch Republic in 1672, the Dutch garrison soon began to make trouble for the French north. ‘The French responded by a loose blockade, then a tighter one, and finally a siege directed by Vauban himself. Local inhabitants, men and women, were threatened with severe punishment for

268 CHAPTER SIX ( violating the blockade.’ Detachments and war parties conducted the blockading operation, months in advance of the arrival of the French siege army, commanded by Louis XIV. The final aspect of partisan warfare to be considered by this study was the French strategy of blockades of Spanish fortresses from 1676-78 that preceded sleges.

'30 Ordonnance de Monsieur le Comte de Chamilly au camp de Sluze portans deffense aux sujets du Roy d’avotr aucun commerce avec les habitans de Mastrick, 14 August 1672, AG,

A! 277, fo. 15. Punishments were harsh: men caught trading with the enemy would be treated as prisoners of war and held in captivity until ransomed by their families or community, and women publicly whipped. Men who were caught trading

with the Dutch garrison a second time would be sent the French galley fleet as convicts.

CHAPTER SEVEN

BLOCKADES

French blockades of Alled-held fortresses and fortified towns demon-

strated the full power of partisan warfare. In Louis XIV’s operational scheme, blockades not only fit into the measures and counter measures of war taxation, they also became an essential technique of conquest. Blockades in the Netherlands wore down an enemy who would then either languish or fall to the hammer blows of a formal siege. According to the marquis de Vauban, who directed forty-eight sieges in the service of Louis XIV over his long career, a siege nor-

mally required twelve steps, from investment to final assault.' Yet, | before the talented engineer unrolled his charts and plans to direct

this ultimate act of early modern warfare, the French had often imposed a blockade that had reduced the capacity of the besieged garrison to defend itself; thanks to the enervating power of the blockade, some steps of the siege might be skipped, and the whole process of the siege shortened.

The law of war separated the whole period of the blockade and the siege from “normal times of war.” ‘The blockading force normally forbade all commerce with the isolated town, and all prizes taken during a blockade were considered fair under the laws of war.’ The conditions of the surrender of St. Omer in 1677 made this clear when the time came for the French conqueror to reconcile with the

local population for the damages caused by war. In the “terms of conditions” in the treaty for the surrender of the garrison of St. Omer in 1677, “article six” made clear that all the horses and mules taken by the French from the Spanish garrison (who owned their own mounts) before the beginning of the siege “belonged to those

' These are summarized in Joél Cornette, Chronique du régne de Louis XIV (Paris, 1997), pp. 226-28. * The Alhes adhered to the same customs. Six weeks before the official block-

ade, Desmadrys reported to Louvois that the Dutch had attached notices in villages around Grave to forbid commerce with the town. Desmadrys to Louvois, 8 June 1674, AG, A' 405, fo. 124.

270 CHAPTER SEVEN who took and sold them as just plunder and they were no more able to be returned than other plunder such being the nature of plunder.” In the margin, perhaps for the sake of compassion, the duc d’Orléans deviated from the standard capitulation agreement terms and wrote: “The horses and mules taken during the siege and the blockade will be returned.”’ In other words, any horses or mules taken as soon as the blockade officially began would be returned. As a further example of the distinction made between blockades and other situations of war, when the Spanish Intendant Claris left Brussels

to attempt to enter one of the blockaded fortresses of the Escaut River, Louvois informed his commanders around the fortresses that they “should now be treated as invested towns.” Louvois insisted that the French commanders should treat the Spanish official with ereat courtesy, but refuse him entry and demand that he turn around.* Finally, the savant and dictionary compiler Antoine de Fueretiére portrayed the blockade as something more inclusive than the investment, but closely related: T’o occupy the passages from where they bring supplies and other vital

necessities into a fortress. It is also at the beginning of a siege the occupation of posts that will become the main quarters.”

French blockades during the Dutch War involved the use of detachments and war parties; they were not the work of entire field armies. Therefore, blockades fit completely under the rubrique of partisan

wartare. In fact, they went on during the time of winter quarters, when the great armies dispersed and the countryside belonged to partisans.

From 1676, Louvois began loose blockades to degrade the mulitary capability of Spanish fortress garrisons and to preserve French territory from raids. Detachments of French troops struggled miles beyond the walls of Spanish fortresses they sought to isolate. In this war of outposts: church steeples, town walls, and castles took on a

new significance in war. Once they cleared the enemy from the

> Conditions que Monsieur... a accordées ci-devant gouverneur du pays d’Artois pour la capitu-

lations a faire a la rendition de la ville de St. Omer aux armes de sa Maesté, Article Six.

AG, A! 537, fo. 130. * Louvois to Catinat (circular letter to Cezen, St. Ruhe, Bulonde and other commanders of the blockade), 29 December 1676, AG, A' 485, fo. 314. > See entry under dbloquer in Furetiére, Dictionnarre.

BLOCKADES 271 countryside, French troops had either to occupy these places, convince the rightful lords or officials to sign articles of neutrality, or

else reduce the property to piles of rubble and ash. The French improved the defenses of the posts they opted to maintain with earth redoubts, barriers and entrenchments. While denying reinforcements and supphes to Spanish fortress garrisons, 1676-78, French detachments of cavalry from the blockading forces raided villages near the

target fortresses. Parties stole livestock and set ablaze any forage found. Baron Quincy explained to Louvois in June 1676: Without a doubt, Monseigneur, the consumption of the grains of this country will cause this winter a terrible scarcity among the enemies, who otherwise do not know where to find the money to purchase it; thus left deprived of their bread, you take away the use of their weapons and in consequence their country.°

This chapter first considers how blockades fit into French operations. It discusses some of the details of blockades and weighs the tactical

challenges faced by the French, in particular at the blockades of Cambrai, Valenciennes, and St. Omer from June 1676-March 1677. It concludes with an analysis of the French blockade of Mons and

the strategic situation in 1678. That year, the Alles turned aside from their original negotiating demands and anxiously made peace with France, accepting most of Louis’s terms. Louis XIV and Louvois began to practice a new, “operational” style of offensive war that was more sophisticated than previous methods of conducting offensive

campaigns, although it should be pointed out that the term “mulitary operations” was an eighteenth century invention.’ Blockades were nothing new to warfare in the Netherlands; the Prince of Parma conducted several blockades in his campaigns of reconquest in the 158Qs, including ones around Brussels and Antwerp, but these Spanish blockades were against rebellious towns that failed to coordinate their

resources and Parma easily had his way with them.’ The French enforced blockades in the years 1676-78 against staunch Dutch and

® Quincy to Louvois, 23 July 1676, AG, A' 500, fo. 262. ’ The archivists in the Archives de Guerre of the état-major of the French army possibly used the term first in the eighteenth century. These men were tasked with ordering the correspondence of Louis XIV’s wars in volumes, and they added a resume des opérations at the beginning of some of the volumes. * See Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, 1979), p. 215.

272 CHAPTER SEVEN Spanish adversaries rather than mere townsmen. ‘The operational emphasis on blockades led Louis XIV and Louvois to perceive military actions in interrelated and mutually supporting terms, rather than as discrete expeditions. It constituted a kind of “operational revolution.” ‘The French sieges of Valenciennes, Gambrai and St. Omer in 1677 were the culminating events in a carefully coordinated crescendo of military actions of war that preceded them by months.

1. Blockades and Military Operations

The tough, in-depth Spanish defense in the Netherlands, in tandem with Louis’ conception of the overall strategic situation, accounted for the prominence of blockades in French offensive operations from 1676 to the end of the war. By the decade of the Dutch War, fortress defenses physically projected further into the surrounding countryside. ‘The initial point-of-attack was no longer just beyond effective musket range, but rather several hundred yards away, or more, where the besieger would commence an attack on a detached field work that blocked his path to the ravelins, demi-lunes, and bastions of the main fortifications. The defenses of Valenciennes in 1677, described by Louvois to the French Ambassador to England, Honoré de Courtin, were more like three separate fortresses: each was a concentric layer

of defenses that had to be broken through at one point before the next layer could be attacked—Louvois noted that this sophistication in the fortification of Valenciennes was new, achieved since the last time he had seen Valenciennes.” The defenses of Cambrai included the old walls of the town, shaped like an irregular trapezoid, adjoined to a massive citadel constructed during the reign of Charles V that set at the small end of the trapezoid. Bastions and ravelins supported the main walls of these defenses. The northern angle of the fortress complex included a fortified castle. ‘The castle of Selles was defended by a double crowned work and another smaller defensive position

before it. At the western extremity of the defensive complex, the Spanish set the fort de Cantimpré. The entire complex was enveloped

” Rousset, Histowre, citing Louvois to Courtin, 18 March 1676.

BLOCKADES 273 by a palisaded covered-way.'® By the time of the Dutch War, complex local defenses in-depth were standard in most places of strategic importance in the Netherlands. Usual outworks buttressing the walls included redoubts, crowned works, ravelins, half-moons, and, beyond that, inundations. Older castles and smaller earthen forts guarded roads and river crossings near fortresses. The first half of the seventeenth century saw the period in which engineers experimented with the idea of in-depth defense. “This layering in-depth achieves new dimensions in the proposals of [comte Blaise Francois de] Pagan [1604-1665] and [Samuel] Marolois [1572-1627] ...?"'

These defenses compelled commanders to take a broader perspective of siege warfare. Dutch military cartographers, who closely followed the work of military engineers in the Low Countries, increasingly emphasized the area lying beyond the walls of the main fortification. French maps of Spanish fortresses produced in the Dutch

War, like those made by the marquis de Chamlay, also reflected a growing concern with the topography surrounding fortresses." Chamlay’s maps that accompanied the king’s march orders showed roads, hills, woods and other topographical features as well as fortress defenses. Military cartography did more than describe towns and their defenses. It increasingly included abstract representations of a

more practical nature, more like modern military maps with use made of basic symbols and colors to represent villages and even marching columns of troops. ‘This trend was part of a long process that may have begun in the late sixteenth century, but it seems to have reached a particularly crucial phase of development around the time of the Dutch War, just before many of the modern symbols of war would enter map-making in the eighteenth century. A French mulitary atlas in Louis XIV’s collection from the period of the Dutch

' Durieux, Srége, pp. 29-30. '' Martha Pollak, Military Architecture, Cartography and the Representation of the Early Modern European City. A Checklist of Treatises in the Newberry Library (Chicago, 1991), m 2 For example, BN, Réserve, Table des Cartes des Marches et Campements de VArmée

du Roy pendant la Campagne de 1675. For a study of Ghamlay and his contribution to military operations, see Ronald Dale Martin, “The Marquis de Chamlay, Friend and Confidential Advisor to Louis XIV: ‘The Early Years, 1650-1691, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1972. For Dutch military cartography, see F.WJ. Scholten, Muilitarre topografische kaarten en stadsplattegronden van Nederland,

1579-1795 (Alphen aan den Rin, 1989).

274 CHAPTER SEVEN War combined both detailed maps of fortifications with more general maps of surrounding lands.'’ For even more detailed and upto-date representations of fortress defenses, French commanders turned

to topographical sketches, often rendered from a vantage point at an angle where an attack was most promising, and to models, for their own fortresses, now magnificently displayed at the Musée des plans en reliefs at the Invalides in Paris.'* The king’s military commanders recognized the sophisticated engi-

neering involved in modern fortification. ‘They also knew that no matter how dense and strong fortifications might be, without an adequate and well-supplied garrison, the defenses were quite hollow. The blockade as an action of war negated some of the advances in fortification. By seizing posts around fortresses and denying supplies and reinforcements along central routes, the French hoped to diminish the number and energy of defenders able to guard the bastions, palisaded covered-ways, and crowned works. A garrison with reduced

effectives, little food, and shaken morale, might fall to a combination of sapping, bombardment, and assault in a matter of days or weeks, rather than the months required by a full-scale siege. A curious characteristic of Louis XIV’s Dutch War was that as the formidable defenses of artillery fortresses reached their highest pitch of perfect coordination, they capitulated in less time than ever before, at least when besieged by the French. This was part of an important evolution in French thought about war. Offensive strategy turned away from an older concept in which “expeditions” pursued discrete, high-risk objectives, towards a new concept of war in which several large and numerous small actions, coordinated by accurate maps, joined to form coherent military operations designed to achieve strategic goals. As historian Guy Rowlands

observed, during the reign of Louis XIV “the direction of strategy was not so much centralised as properly coordinated for perhaps the first trme since the 1550s.”'? Michael Howard makes the argument

' BN, Cabinet des Estampes. Sébastien de Pontaut de Beaulieu, Les Glorieuses conquestes de Louis le Grand. .., 2 vols. '* For example, see BN Réserve, Charleroi et les environs vers V’Occident. This map,

as its title suggests, showed the “surroundings” of Charleroi “toward the west” and its defenses. For fortress models and representations in general, see Nicolas Faucherre, Places fortes, bastions du pouvoir (Rempart, 1986).

| ' Rowlands, The Dynastic State, p. 287.

BLOCKADES 2795 that before Napoleon: “Perhaps only Marlborough had shown a com-

parable capacity to visualize a campaign as a whole instead of as a series of discrete sieges and battles—to discern the object for which all military operations were conducted.”'® By this, Howard was probably thinking of how Marlborough’s campaigns so often resulted in the battlefield defeat for the French and Marlborough’s subsequent

conquest of French fortresses. Louis and Louvois may have been first, however, to tie large and small operations toward the destruction of the opponent’s “strategic center of gravity.” Between 1676-78 in the Netherlands, this meant the systematic conquest of the Allied base of fortresses, without which they could not effectively operate

in a military sense in the Spanish Netherlands. As Geoffrey Parker has argued, in the early modern Netherlands there was no one strate-

gic center of gravity, but instead multiple centers.'’ The French adopted an attritional strategy that depleted the numbers of defenders within the vast layers of fortifications. Multiple blockades could be and were pursued simultaneously across the map, preparing the way for a sequence of sieges. Taking advantage of new artillery and reserves of munitions, better cartographic resources and first-rate engineering talent to meet the demands imposed on the offensive by the in-depth defense, Louis XIV and Louvois, with the assistance of

the marquis de Chamlay, introduced in the Dutch War a more methodical style of war in the years after 1675 and, in so doing, the example of modern military operations. From Versailles or in the

field, they coordinated operations in the Netherlands on a year-

horseback, sword in hand.'® round, day-to-day basis like chiefs-of-staff, rather than as princes on

As to be expected from pioneers, the marquis de Louvois and

the king made less than perfect use of their authority in operational

'° Howard, War, p. 83. '’ See Geoffrey Parker (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph

of the West (Gambridge, 1995), p. 115.

’ Before this more effective “cabinet style” of war could be managed, a view and label established by the historian Camille Rousset in the nineteenth century, Louvois first had to contend with the sensitive likes of politically powerful military commanders like Condé, who retired in 1675, and Turenne, who was killed in a reconnaissance party the same year. Most scholars agree that 1675 marked an important change for the French “high command,” but the notion of “cabinet style” warfare has been criticized by Guy Rowlands, “Louis XIV et la strategie de cabinet, mythe et réalité,” Revue Historique des Armées, 222 (2001), pp. 25-34.

276 CHAPTER SEVEN planning. Louvois realized that the king would undertake some sieges only following systematic blockades, but that, according to the royal

will, other sieges would commence without initial blockades. The king in 1678, for example, chose a separate “expeditionary” course of action, a throw-back to the older style of war. The French had blockaded Mons from 1677-78, but Louis XIV looked elsewhere in 1678. ‘The French king chose a fortified town that the French had never blockaded—Ghent. The siege of Ghent in March 1678 resulted

from a strategic need to address the threat posed by English military intervention that winter, and the king designed an elaborate feint that tricked the Spanish into not reinforcing its garrison in time. ‘Tons of grain and other supplies were assembled in French garrisons in the vicinity of Charleroi to make it seem to the Spanish that the French intended to attack a fortress other than Ghent. ‘The feint succeeded in large measure because the French had shown the Spanish and Dutch that they would probably follow-up their blockading operations as in the previous campaign——and most historians

have judged that the Ghent campaign displayed the subtle grasp Louis XIV had over operational matters by forgoing the obvious. For the remainder, including the siege of Ypres in 1678, Louis XIV attacked fortresses he had blockaded, taking advantage of the opportunities that these presented. Since several different blockades simultaneously proceeded from 1676, the king was able to make choices and confidently proceed on the offensive between 1676-78, without much fear of having chosen incorrectly, while the eyes of the French court and Europe followed him in the monthly reports of the Gazette and other official news journals. It may also be suggested that the siege of Ghent still followed on the trail of partisan warfare, if not a blockade, because the French had thoroughly plundered the region surrounding Ghent in fire-raids from at least 1675. Interestingly, the alternative to an attritional strategy of blockades and sieges—the pursuit of the destruction of the opposing Allied field army in battle— never entered the discussions of Louis and Louvois in the context of the Netherlands. Such a proposition, though sporadically successful for Marlborough in the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713), may have seemed unnecessary or overly costly to the two French strategists who believed they could successfully pursue their agenda of conquest without risk of battle. Louis XIV and Louvois prudently sought to mitigate against failure and royal embarrassment—a matter of grave strategic impor-

BLOCKADES 277 tance to a divine monarchy in which political stability increased through an aura of military invincibility. By blockading as many Spanish fortresses as reasonable, Louis and Louvois protected the reputation of the monarchy, avoiding ventures that might fail. Caution ruled where no strategic center of gravity existed; the strategic center of gravity of the Spanish Netherlands was dispersed in multiple points in the strongholds of the Spanish and the mobile Allied field

army. [he marquis de Vauban proposed a list of fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands that if conquered by the French would enhance the defensive position of the kingdom in the north. Yet Louvois and

the king constantly and opportunistically evaluated the changing course of war (including simultaneous blockades) and on-going diplomacy. [hey consulted and determined anew each year the best direc-

tion to take in siege warfare, searching for the right solution to a favorable outcome to the war. The king certainly bore in mind Vauban’s opinions concerning the best fortresses to take to enhance France’s defensive position in the north, but Vauban’s suggestions by no means directed the French to attempt the relief of the Dutch siege of distant Maastricht in 1676 or to take Ghent in 1678. The simultaneous prosecution of several blockades presented Louis XIV with a menu of strategic possibilities. Louvois and the king fell short

in their strategic planning only when they did not fully take into account the strategic importance of royal finances, which deteriorated as the war continued. As Michael Howard pointed out in regard to battles: “There was little point in winning... if there were not to be any resources left over for a campaign the following year.”””

And the same was true for siege warfare. Louis XIV was actively involved in major operational decisions and often the planning stage of siege of operations. On one occasion in July 1677, the war minister made the mistake of presenting arrangements for a siege to Louis without having consulted with him first on the details. ‘he king informed Louvois: I am amazed at not hearing from you since your arrival at Conde, but by your letter that I recetved on the 18th, I see the reason that you have been unable to write, the conversations that you have had with M. de Schomberg and everything done in order to imvest the fortress of [of Aire]. I have nothing to add of importance to the details,

' Howard, War, p. 49.

278 CHAPTER SEVEN except to tell you with satisfaction that [ approve of the measures taken to attack Aire and cause worry for other fortresses.”°

In the same letter, Louvois appears to have wanted to leave Maastricht

to its fate, allowing it to be reconquered by the Dutch, but Louis told him that such a choice “gave him pain.” It was Louis XIV, at the palace of Versailles, who decided to break the siege and send Schomberg’s army across the Netherlands after it had conquered Aire. The king gave his plan for the Maastricht operation to Louvois, having just read Louvois’ ideas for the Aire operation. Interestingly,

he ended the letter by reminding Louvois to not leave him out of important matters again: “... you will take care to update me more often, and I will give you my intentions. I approve of all that you have done to gather rations and munitions.”*' Yet, Louvois continued to send more than information to the king, and the king’s intentions depended (whether he liked it or not) on the substance of the proposals that Louvois gave him. Although understanding the various technical aspects of warfare and certainly setting the strategic compass of the war both in terms of grand strategy and theater strategy, such as which fortresses to

attack or preserve, the king left important operational details to Louvois. In turn, individual fortress governors and intendants, that managed partisan warfare, proposed discrete military projects or small expeditions to Louvois that were specific to the region in which they held command. For example, on 23 April 1676, Nancré at Ath pro-

posed the occupation of the castles of Bitermont and Brosseuil in order to favor communications between Ath and the new French conquest of Condé.*? The same spring that Nancré studied his map,

Hoquincourt at Peronne proposed a siege of Gambrai and, as preliminary, the occupation of several postes around that fortress in order to blockade it.*? Louvois reviewed their suggestions, and many oth-

ers every week, and fit them together in a mental map, if not an actual map, that contained posts of French detachments, tightening around the principal Spanish fortresses in the Netherlands. At times during the course of the years 1676-78, Louvois may have been

. rane de Roy a Lowvois, 21 July 1676, AG, A' 500, fo. 244. 22 Namen to Louvois, 23 April 1677, AG, A! 499, fo. 27. * Hoquincourt to Louvois, 6 May 1676, AG, A! 499, fo. 100.

BLOCKADES 279 uncertain of where the king ultimately intended to strike in a forthcoming campaign. Regardless, he gave orders, approving or disapproving projects—keeping in mind a basic strategy of attrition that would culminate in sieges often with the king present. In turn, these plans once put into effect, and supported by the personal relationship of Louvois with the king, helped Louis XIV determine where

to strike in force next. The king made up his mind as to which strategic objectives to pursue usually between January and February each year. (Before 1675, the vicomte de Turenne and the prince de

Condé also participated in the process of making strategy at this stage in the winter months.) When the king made up his mind, resulting operational plans were generally made known to only a small coterie of individuals. In 1678, three persons, according to Rousset, “Louis XIV, Louvois, and Le Peletier de Souzy”, kept the secret of the projected siege of Ghent. Humiéres would learn of the plan later in February.” The fact that their campaigns beat the Allies to the punch, thanks to an excellent system of contributions and fortress magazines, gave the French an added confidence in war. When Louis XIV appeared at the head of French field armies in 1676-1678, war—“‘the final argument of kings”’—took on a fool-proof aspect that protected the monarchy from embarrassment and loss of reputation.

2. The Castle Expeditions: 1676

The campaign of 1676, resulting in the French capture of Condé and Bouchain on the Escaut River, was preceded and supported by the capture of the twin castles of Ecaussinnes d’Enghien, the Harchies castle, and raids against Allied forage supplies. Even while a French field army besieged Condé, partisan actions continued as diversionary operations and in support by seizing posts to prevent the besieged

fortresses from receiving any reinforcements. The larger, strategic purpose of the sieges of Gondé and Bouchain, and the supporting partisan actions in 1676, was to draw a ring of fortified posts anda zone of destruction around the more important fortresses of Gambrai,

Valenciennes, St. Omer and Mons.

*+ Rousset, Histoire, vol. 2, p. 484.

280 CHAPTER SEVEN Knowing only that the general direction of war necessitated a French attack on one of the Spanish fortresses on the Escaut River (Valenciennes and Cambrai) or possibly Mons, Marshal Humieres made preparations in January 1676 for an expedition to capture Ecaussinnes-d’Enghien. In the style of older expeditions, it aimed to “be of benefit to the king’s service” without knowing the king’s next move. [he expedition had important consequences in the Netherlands,

since the twin castles guarded supply and communication routes between Brussels and the Spanish fortresses on the Escaut River and Mons.” The Ecaussinnes expedition also initiated a more aggressive

French strategy in the Spanish Netherlands and the beginning of French blockades.

Marshal Humieéres readied for the purpose, with the consent of

Louvois, a small corps of infantry, dragoons and cavalry, in all approximately 8,000 troops with some artillery in support. ‘Che prepa-

rations for this expedition to be conducted in the middle of winter took several weeks.*° A major challenge of assembling the expedition was a recurrent one for winter expeditions: a shortage of suitable draft horses to haul artillery. Marshal Humieres resolved this by deciding to take along in his detachment only two 24-pounder siege cannons. I[’o these he later joined four other cannon with troops

detached and sent under the command of the comte de Montal. He set out from Lille to Tournai on 21 January. The next day Humiéres arrived at Ath, taking command of his detachment of garrison troops and two siege cannons sent by Chamilly from Courtrai and Oudenaarde for the expedition.*’ he difficulties posed by weather in the expedition to Ecaussinnes reminded those in command why armies of the day did not normally campaign in winter. When on 23 January the expedition set out from Ath, all seemed well. Humiéres cheerily observed, as only

* The castles at Ecaussinnes were an entrepost between Brussels and Mons, where the Spanish could, according to Humiéres, garrison 2,000 to 3,000 cavalry or dragoons in security in the outer courts of the castles. *° Humiéres to Louvois, 15 January 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 30. In total the force may have reached 5,000 infantry and about 3,000 cavalry and dragoons, and two 24-pound cannons that Humiéres brought from Lille—standard French siege guns. *’ Estrades put the total force of the expedition at around 12,000 men and six 24-pounders. Estrades to ’abée d’Estrades, 2 February 1676, BN, Fonds Clairambaut, vol. 582, fo. 3. The Mercure Hollandois put the force at 8,000 men from the garrisons of Charleroi, Lille, Tournai and other places. Mercure Hollandows, 1676.

BLOCKADES 281 a soldier would, that there was a “lovely freeze” and the mud was frozen solid so the cannon could pass. It did not last: as darkness descended, the temperature unexpectedly rose above freezing. Later, it rained. Humiéres and his small corps were forced to remain under shelter at their camp near Soignies, unable to start as early as usual

on the next day because of the rain. When they did set out, the cannon soon became stuck in the mud of a road. Humieéres later confessed his fear that they would never dislodge the cannons. Fortunately for the French, the commissioner-general of artillery, Du

Metz, was present on this expedition, overseeing the fate of these two cannon. [he guns were pulled out, and Du Metz more actively directed the transport of the cannon for the remainder of the journey. [hrough cold, rain and mud, Humiéres marched in the center of the expeditionary force with five battalions, and Chamilly marched in the rear guard with his detachment from Oudenaarde. A “considerable corps of cavalry and dragoons” plodded behind the marching infantry and along the flanks of the expedition as it prosressed toward its objective. While Humiéres marched from Ath and Soignies, Montal’s mounted troops, 200 cavalry and dragoons, arrived at Ecaussinnes-d’Enghien on the night of 23 January and occupied positions along all routes leading to the twin castles, following the usual practice of “investing” a fortress.** Spanish troops, probably detached from Mons, successfully skirmished with Montal’s advance party and captured about

thirty-six French. They were taken to Brussels where the Spanish learned from the prisoners that the French garrison at Maastricht had plans to seize the town of Herk-de-Stad in the principality of Liége.* Humiéres’s command marched undisturbed and arrived at Ecaussinnes-d’Enghien in the darkness of early morning on 24 January.

The cannon under Humiéres, however, struggled behind with its escort of cavalry and dragoons and would not arrive until the next day. After the successful completion of the mission, Marshal Humieres

would take the occasion to instruct his friend Louvois on the realities of war: “I believe it is my duty to inform you that you should

“8 ‘The comte de Montal arrived with the cavalry and the dragoons “d’entre Sambre et Meuse.” Suete de Mercure, vol. 4, pp. 355-56. * The revelations of the French prisoners are told by the Mercure Hollandozvs, January 1676.

282 CHAPTER SEVEN never count in this country on enterprises where it is necessary to bring large cannon in the middle of winter.”* During the day of 24 January, a group of the defenders in the garrison of the castle called La Folie, sortied to the one known as Ecaussinnes in order to reinforce its garrison. “They did this with tremendous bravery... killing numerous Frenchmen.”’'! The same day, Humiéres, without pausing to rest the troops, ordered an attack on the two outer courts of the castles. A battalion from the Picardy Regiment launched the assault on the outer court of the castle of La Folie, called the “lower one” by the Dutch Mercure. At the same time, a battalion from the Montepezat Regiment assaulted the outer court of the castle called Ecaussinnes. While these attacks were under

way, a battalion of infantry from the Normandy Regiment seized several houses at the foot of the castles. ‘(The defenders of the outer courts of both the castles and houses were forced back without the loss of many French casualties.

The situation remained in this state, with all of the defenders pushed into the keeps of the castles, through the next day, 25 January,

when the French cannon finally arrived on the scene. It rained that day, however, and the ground became soft again. Soldiers pulled and pushed the guns all day, as men with shovels dug in the rain to build a battery position that would protect the artillerists. The battery position was not finished until the night of 25-26 January.” Once prepared, the cannon fired continuously throughout the night.” Another sapping action commenced; Chamilly’s troops pushed a trench forward so that they could eventually dig toward the base of the keep of Ecaussinnes and set a mine to blow it apart. By the early morning hours of 26 January, after twelve close-range

cannon volleys had battered a section of the walls of Ecaussinnes, the garrison surrendered. La Folie withstood “over a hundred volleys,” being somehow more durable, or the garrison more stubborn. In the end, neither castle was worth occupying. Humieres told Louvois

that he had been misinformed as to their condition. All together,

°° Humiéres to Louvois, 26 January 1676, AG, A’ 486, fo. 301. *' Mercure Hollandots, January 1676. °° Suite de Mercure, vol. 4, pp. 355-56. 3 Thid.

BLOCKADES 283 the French captured around seventy men including the commanding officers.** Within the castle of Ecaussinnes, the French discovered a quantity of forage, hidden by peasants from villages that lay nearby the two castles. It was decided to destroy the castles. In order to create adequate breeches in the walls numerous fourneaux, explosive charges, were set,

due to the “very hard and very thick” walls. Du Metz began working immediately and throughout the day of 27 January, employing all of the teamsters, artillerists and laborers (peasants hired for the occasion). A razing operation, often as time consuming as a siege, required a covering force. Humiéres replied to one of Louvois’ letters that 1t was “by necessity” that he stayed at the camp of Ecaussinnes

on 26 January. During the assault on Ecaussinnes, the Duke of Aarschot had sortied in force from Mons to disrupt Humiéres’s attack,

but he departed too late. ‘Troops also marched out of winter quarters in Brussels and took to the roads leading south—but uselessly. On 27 January 1676, Humiéres advanced his corps to Soignies to cover the destruction of the castles from a position closer to Ath.”

On 28 January, late in the day, the walls of the two castles of Ecaussinnes-d’Enghien crashed down. Humieéres dared not stay long

at Soignies. Instead, he proceeded directly for Ath where the prisoners captured in the attack remained until exchanged.”*° Following the assault on Ecaussinnes, Humiéres had planned to march to the canal of Brussels and break several of its locks, flooding and ruining countryside that provided forage and grain to the “enemies,” however, the weather dictated a different course of action. Humiéres instead gave orders “to send the troops back to their garrison in order to rest them.”*’ According to Humiéres, the troops had suffered too

*+ Humiéres to Louvois, | February 1676, AG, A! 486, fo. 368. °° “So that the bread does not lack,” Humiéres sent the comte de Gouvray with 500 cavalry to guard the road to Charleroi from where it arrived by small carts. Humieéres to Louvois, 26 January 1676, AG, A’ 486, fo. 301. °° The same day that Humiéres made this proposal to Louvois, he mentioned that he held as prisoner from the castle of Ecaussines the sieur de St. André, major of the Leyde Regiment, who commanded the garrison at Ecaussines, along with seventy of his men. They were deposited at Ath, which Humiéres passed through on his return to Lille. The remainder of the garrison managed an escape before the French closed in. °’ Humieéres to Louvois, 26 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 301.

284 CHAPTER SEVEN | much because of the continual rain and the bad roads to undertake any further assaults.°? Chamilly, likewise, led his troops back to Courtrai and Oudenaarde. The destruction of the castles of Ecaussinnes left a deep impression on the rest of the Spanish Netherlands and its army. At this time Baron Quincy brought over his entire regiment of cavalry from the garrison of Valenciennes, as he was unwilling to remain trapped in an impending siege. Chamiully informed Louvois on 11 February 1676 of the desertion of Baron of Quincy who left the Spanish garrison at Valenciennes to its fate and decided to join the French.” He also reported that Villahermosa “has been equally persecuted since that time by all of the malcontents who are in great number among whom one must count the two Massiettes who have arrogantly spoken of their own interests.”*” The destruction of the castles also caused a considerable commotion in Brussels. The nobles of Brabant were “totally outraged” over the destruction of the two castles. Some nobles petitioned the Duke of Villahermosa to receive neutrality for their country castles. “These were two of the handsomest and largest homes of this country, several gentlemen have requested from me neutrality for their castles,” reported Humieres. Other nobles demonstrated their dissatisfaction through more violent means.*' A riot in the streets, instigated by nobles who paid off an armed mob, left two soldiers dead. Realizing that other nobles in the Netherlands feared their homes would be next, Humieres seized on the opportunity to further drive a wedge between the landed nobility and the government in order to deprive the Spanish of secure lines of communication between their fortresses. On 1 February 1676 Humiéres wrote Louvois propos-

°° Humieéres to Louvois, 29 January 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 348. *. Chamilly to Louvois, 11 February 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 556. * Tbid. What was left of Quincy’s regiment was given by the Duke of Villahermosa to the sieur de Massiette, a sergeant major in Spanish service. Villahermosa also

declared that all of the property and wealth of Baron Quincy in Brussels to be confiscated. Villhermosa also published a pardon for all those that deserted with Quincy if they returned in three weeks and they could re-enter the King of Spain’s service by joining the companies and regiments of their choice. Louis XIV countered by a declaration that the wealth of all those born in the pays conquis in the service of Spain to be confiscated. Mercure Hollandois, March 1676, pp. 98-99. *' According to the Mercure, the castle of Ecaussinnes belonged to “a gentilhomme from Nivelle.” Mercure Hollandois, March 1676.

BLOCKADES 285 ing a general treaty for the neutrality of all castles of nobles.*? In his letter, Humiéres explained to Louvois why such a bold idea might

succeed: “the nobles have strongly protested the razing of the two castles and have made great complaints of it to the Duke of Villahermosa.”** Humiéres showed initiative and promised neutrality to a castle belonging to a noble at Eripon that lay on the grand highway between Brussels and Mons.** With Ath already a nuisance to the Duchy of Brabant, and the French having cleared a path by capturing the Ecaussinnes: the grand highway between Brussels and Mons was exposed and in danger. After the Ecaussinnes operation, and probably upon learning that

the king planned to besiege Bouchain and Condé in the spring, Humicres suggested an assault of Harchies castle, which lay north-

east of the Spanish fortress of CGondé.* Harchies, according to Humieéres, was a post very “accommodating” to the enemy, helping to maintain communications between the fortresses of St. Ghislain and Condé. As such, it also sat astride the route between Mons, Valenciennes and Cambrai. Marshal Humieéres, the comte D’Aigremont, the comte de Nancré,

and du Metz went on the attack. As with the assault on the castles at Ecaussinnes, supply difficulties and poor weather caused problems for the expedition. On Friday, 23 February, Humiéres departed from

Tournai. ‘The roads were so wretched from rain that he was only able to arrive at Harchies on the morning of the next day. Nancré, with swifter moving cavalry, had arrived the preceding night, but failed in his aim to invest and isolate the castle. The night of 23-24 February, twenty-five men from the Spanish garrison at Condé slipped

through the French cavalry patrols by taking a water route over the inundation around Condé and then a nearby lake. They disembarked from small boats and reinforced the garrison—diminishing, in the process, the strength of the garrison of Condé. Humieres, facing a

. Humieéres to Louvois, | February 1676, AG, A’ 498, fo. 52. 4 Hanieres to Louvois, 1 February 1676, AG, A' 486, fo. 368. See original of letter, AG, A' 498, fo. 52. Also spelled as Eripou. Humiéres required from the Lord of Eripon a reciprocal neutrality arrangement with the Spanish valid for one year, but before acting, he asked Louvois for his intentions on the matter. (On 9 February, Louvois approved that neutral recognition be given to the castle of Eripon.) Louvois

to Humiéres, 9 February 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 66. * Humiéres to Louvois, 14 February 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 69.

286 CHAPTER SEVEN stronger adversary when he arrived early on 24 February, sent a courier to Oudenaarde to summon more troops.” As soon as the cannon arrived, after dusk, du Metz began work on establishing a battery—‘“within pistol range” of Harchies. In sup-

port, the Picardy battalion formed “very near the moat” and battalions from Piedmont and Du Roy took positions to the right of the Picardy battalion. Under the cover of darkness, a commander named Florence led the Piedmont and Du Roy battalions over several cause-

ways across narrow, wet ditches that surrounded the moat of the castle. They had made the causeways themselves by filling the ditches with fascines. But, the moat was first crossed by means of an oared

boat that had been carelessly left by the defenders. ‘The sieur de Richebourg, a lieutenant in the Piedmont Regiment, next penetrated the wall of the outer court by means of the cover afforded by some buildings built next to the wall. Secure in the barns, his men uncovered a portion of the wall that was crumbling from age, and broke through with pick axes.” Soon, Frenchmen were everywhere. They organized and formed a barrier within to protect themselves from a sortie from the castle keep. ‘he commander of the castle, observing these proceedings and unable to stop the establishment of the battery, surrendered at about 2 AM. Humieéres did not exercise the “most extreme rigors of war” on this occasion since the battery had not fired, and, in his words, “the Spanish would chastise them enough for their poltroonery.” ‘The garrison was disarmed, and allowed a safe passage to the Spanish fortress of Condé. ‘There had been forty-two men in the castle and enough munitions to hold back the French for a considerably longer time. The French suffered relatively light casualties: no more than “five or six” soldiers wounded. Humiéres with Nancré and Metz entered the castle at dawn on 25 February to take measure of the walls and judged how to go about razing the castle.** The marshal

judged that he had “never seen a castle anywhere better than this one: the moat of the keep is very good... the towers and the gates are fourteen to fifteen feet in thickness, whereas on the side of the inundation one could not approach it.” It was built of sandstone so

. Faameres to Louvois, 23 February 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 82. 8 HHumiares to Louvois, 23 February 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 82.

BLOCKADES 287 thick that Humieéres did not think that the cannon would have had much effect.” Later on 25 February, Humiéres reported to Louvois: “IT have razed it in such a manner that it will be impossible for them

to ever be able to put a person there.” The destruction completed, Humieéres observed that the commander of Harchies castle did not dare go to Condé “for fear of chastisement and proposes to enter

as a simple cavalryman in the French company of the sieur de Ramilly.”°' Intimidated by the fate of the castles of Ecaussinnes and Harchies castle, five lords of castles would soon sign letters of neutrality, promising the French that they would not allow Spanish garrison

troops within their castles. The castle strongholds of the Netherland countryside collapsed around its fortress garrisons; the “communications grid” of the Spanish Netherlands was disrupted. On 26 February 1676, Louvois congratulated Marshal Humieéres for the successful assault on Harchies castle. After its surrender, Humiéres sent neutrality documents to the Count of Boussu for the castles of Boussu and Liquerque, in accordance with the king’s wishes—depriving the government in Brussels of the two strongholds.°? Humiéres informed

Louvois that 1t would be necessary, in case the Spanish did not accord a neutral status to Bernissart castle, which was only about two-and-half miles from Harchies, to raze it. “Some dragoons of the St. Sandoux Regiment were once posted there,” noted Humieres to Louvois.”°

During the siege of Harchies, Humiéres also reflected on the prospect of seizing the post at a bridge on the Haine, a stream that generally flowed between Charleroi and Condé. His thoughts on the matter, described in a letter to Louvois, revealed the practical limits to where the French could establish themselves to blockade Spanish

fortresses. ‘he village, probably Montroel-sur-Haine, was open and, according to Humieres, a small detachment would not be in security there even after they had constructed flanking redoubts around the bridge “at the entrances” or aux testes of the place. Humieéres also doubted the value of guarding the bridge, since the stream was so narrow, although deep, “that a good horse could jump it.” Further,

© Thid.

" frumieres to Louvois, 25 February 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 83. 2 Humiéres to Louvois, 10 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 91. °° Humiéres to Louvois, 23 February 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 82.

288 CHAPTER SEVEN even if the French parapeted the defenses of the bridge and its village, “the enemy could come very easily from Condé and from St. Ghislain with cannon, and it will be impossible then to resist them.” To defend against an artillery attack, two measures would have to be taken: 1) make the redoubts “cannon proof” and 2) establish a large garrison there.** ‘These issues considered, the main ones in determining the feasibility of occupying a post, Humiéres was convinced that the bridge at Montroel-sur-Haine might have to be left alone and open as a Spanish gate to reinforce and supply Condé from Mons.

3. 1676: Blockades Take Form

After Humiéres had penetrated the defenses of the Spanish Netherlands

during the winter of 1676, Louis and Louvois planned for the campaign, and decided upon the sieges of Bouchain and Condé, both fortified towns on the Escaut River that supported the larger Spanish fortresses upstream (toward France) at Valenciennes and Cambrai. Part of their plan involved a vast fire-raid on the Pays de Waes, led by Marshal Humieres, distracting the Dutch and Spanish from their

own campaign preparations and from the main objectives of the French. ‘The French garrison force would further take an active part in the sieges by conducting diversionary raids. Louvois assigned gov-

ernors Montal and Nancré the tasks of destroying forage supplies and capturing posts useful to prevent reinforcements from reaching either Condé or Bouchain. ‘These raids, unlike fire-raids which aimed at securing forage or payments of money, but which continued along-

side forage raids, set a pattern that in conjuction with blockades would continue to the end of the war. Part of the preparations for the campaign also involved clandestine actions—the sabotage of forage and grain magazines in Spanish garrisons. On 7 April 1676, Marshal Estrades informed Louvois of the success of one of these operations. ‘The magazines at Zoutleeuw were burned; most of the

town went up in flames as well, only thirty-six houses were left standing.”

+ Tid. » Estrades to Louvois, 7 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 158.

BLOCKADES 289 Meanwhile the French garrisons at Maastricht and Oudenaarde conducted other forage raids in order to make the countryside of centrally located Brabant as well as the principality of Liege difficult places for the Allied army in the Netherlands. On 27 February 1676, Estrades informed Louvois that, “the main reason which obligated me to occupy the castles, which are between Huy and Liége and to

put some cavalry and dragoons there, was to consume the forage which is in these quarters, this has succeeded so well that the enemies have been unable to take any of it.” Estrades believed there would be no forage left in the area by the end of March, because he planned to destroy the remaining castles in the region where the peasants stored it. Wherever Estrades learned forage had been amassed,

as he informed Louvois, “I send a party to burn it.” The marshal believed “the enemies could not hold any corps of cavalry on this side of the Demer River” in the principality of Liége.°® Similarly, at Oudenaarde, Chamilly reported to Louvois that his war parties had taken 300 wagons filled with forage within five leagues of Oudenaarde

and “in different places.” What the horses of the French war parties could not immediately consume, the French wasted or burned, “so that the enemies will not be able to help themselves to it.”°’ On 6 March 1676, Estrades informed Louvois, that the parties from Maastricht continued to seek out forages “in the vicinity of villages” and to burn “in the most distant.”°?

Louvois ordered the comte de Nancré to conduct several diversions issuing from the French fortress of Ath at the beginning of the campaign of 1676. He was to conduct over 1,000 mounted troops: to feign an invasion of the Pays de Waes across the Escaut River, to feign sieges of Mons and St. Ghislain, and to seize control of the castle of Bernissart. In addition, Nancré was “to make a demonstration,” along the road from Mons to Brussels in order to consume

forage and to harry whatever reinforcements Villahermosa might attempt to send from Brussels.” After returning from his maneuvers against the Escaut River in the direction of the Pays de Waes, and in preparation for these diverse activities, Nancré assembled five days

°° Estrades to Louvois, 27 February 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 105. *’ Chamilly to Louvois, 27 February 1676, AG, A' 487, fo. 89. ** Estrades to Louvois, 8 March 1676, AG, A! 487, fo. 234. »? Louvois to King, 7 April 1676, AG, A! 483, fo. 107.

290 CHAPTER SEVEN worth of biscuit for his men and oats for the horses. Everything was

to be ready by the night of 15 April so that his cavalry and dragoons could march on the morning of 16 April. ‘hat day Nancré departed Ath and reached Mons, appearing before the gate that faced Brussels, about “two hours past noon,” in compliance with Louvois’ very detailed instruction. Nancré’s troops occupied a broad front in their southeasterly march toward Mons—convincing its gar-

rison that he led many more cavalry than he did in actuality, and that these Frenchmen were the lead elements of a besieging force. Upon Nancré’s arrival, the drummers of the dragoons, and “fifteen or twenty” other drummers that he brought on extra mounts, beat several different types of drum rolls signifying to the Spanish that a large force of infantry was arriving on the scene. The deception was quite elaborate. Under cover of darkness on

that very same night, from Ath, Colonel Lusbourg commanded around 400 mounted troops (detached from the regiments of Arnolfiny, Prouville, Lusbourg and St. Sandoux) and headed to the gates of St. Ghislain. These troops, like those sent to Mons, made “a great

noise with the kettle drums and the other drummers” in order to convince the garrison at St. Ghislain that they were the “head of a column of troops,” arriving to lay siege. Nancré himself then departed

“one hour before dawn” from the mock siege at Mons and arrived at the scene of the other mock siege near St. Ghislain to ensure that at first hght on 17 April Lusbourg abandoned the sham attack and took his troops to secure the bridge at Montroel-sur-Haine. Lusbourg seized all of the boats that he found there and made a river descent on the castle of Bernissart, assaulting the castle by water at nine in the morning on 17 April. While Colonel Lusbourg secured this post, Nancré broke up the mock siege at Mons and sent the majority of the squadrons there to reinforce Lusbourg at the castle of Bernissart. Nancré then returned to Ath and sent out “spies” and forage “parties” on the road to Brussels to learn everything that passed in that region.” Until 21 April, Nancré continued to send these parties, burning forage wherever it was found and maintaining the watch along the Brussels-Mons highway.®!

°° Louvois to Nancré, 11 April 1676, AG, A' 498, fo. 185 bis. *' Louvois to King, 7 April 1676, AG, A' 483, fo. 107.

BLOCKADES 29] The comte de Montal at Charleroi was also assigned a special role at the beginning of the campaign. At noon on 14 April, he slowly assembled the artillery and munition wagons of the garrison of Charleroi on the covered-way of the fortress, making it seem like the French were preparing to conduct a siege near this base of operations. On the morning of 17 April, he put all of the artillery and wagons back behind the walls.” As another diversion, this one after the siege of Condé had already commenced; Montal conducted a raid on 19 April with nearly 1,000 cavalry. At around 10 AM, Montal’s detachment reached the outskirts of Mons.®’ The garrison of Mons sortied to meet the French. A lively cavalry battle ensued and the Spanish garrison was forced to withdraw. They fell back to their “barriers at the Golden Gate of Spain.”®* According to Montal, if infantry had not rushed out and covered several ditches for their retreat, Montal’s detachment would have captured the mounted defenders. Montal estimated that about twelve or thirteen men were killed or wounded from the Spanish garrison in the action. From the barriers of the fortress at Mons, Montal’s raiders proceeded to reach a crossing of the Sambre River in order to proceed to the village of Le Roeulx in the direction of Brussels. Along the way, however, several of the defenders followed close, and Montal gave orders to chase them away and several skirmishes took place.

In one combat, the French pursued the defenders up to the Pont d’Aubour (probably the village of d’Obourg on the Sambre River near Mons). Here, they needed to cross in order to reach their destination of Le Roeulx and be in position to forage around Brussels and keep an eye out for Allied military preparations. Montal’s cavalry charged across the bridge. ‘The infantry defenders, caught unaware,

rushed too late to the barrier and shot at the backs of the Frenchmen as they crossed. Birague, a captain in the Estrades Regiment, galloping over the bridge in pursuit of some Spanish cavalry, received a shot from a flintlock that struck him in his right shoulder. A “gentlemen” who “belonged to Montal,” named du Faux, was wounded in the back of the head by a glancing shot, and one horse was killed.

** Louvois to Montal, 10 April 1676, AG, A! 498, fo. 178. . prontal to Louvois, 21 April 1676, AG, A' 499, fo. 19.

292 CHAPTER SEVEN These were all of the French casualties. By the time the Spanish had fired their field guns the French were mostly across, and in addition their shots were “poorly aimed.”® The next day, 20 April, and the following night the cavalry commanded by Montal camped near Le Roeulx “in order to consume there the forage and to await the parties that I had sent.”°° A reconnaissance party that Montal

had sent in the direction of Brussels reported no “enemy” movements on the main road to Mons. Montal departed the destructive little camp on 21 April at nine in the morning and marched about seven miles north to Braine-le-Comte. From there he detached a party to reconnoiter around Halle. Unable to detect anything worth reporting, except perhaps rumors of the damage caused by Nancré’s parties operating nearby, the entire command arrived back on the French side of the Sambre River at Binche around ten that evening.

“There is no more forage in that country, as I have ordered the last of it plundered and the houses where it was found burned.”®’ In the meantime, the king’s army besieged Conde. On the morning of 17 April, as Montal ended his mock sieges, Marshal Créqui invested the fortress of Condé with a force of French cavalry. [he next day, 8,000 troops arrived to prepare the siege lines under the direction of Vauban. Créqui organized the Listenois dragoons and led an assault epée a la main that forced Spanish defenders from the redoubts of ‘Tirecelles (or T'yrechelle) and Vauchelle—out

works that defended the approach to the fortress. Also on 18 April, the French galotes or special-built armed river galleys arrived by wagon to complete the investment of the surroundings of Condé,

since a flooded zone of the Escaut River made the fortress into peninsula. Louvois assured Louis “that nothing more shall enter Conde.’ On 19-20 April, marshals Schomberg, Humiéres, Lorge and La Feuillade arrived with the rest of the besieging force, and the artillery corps began constructing its firing batteries of cannons and mortars. Louis XIV arrived on 21 April and sappers opened the attack trench that night. Fresh from the Waes raid, the active comte de Chamilly, received a slight wound when leading parties of

: Montal to Louvois, 21 April 1676, AG, A' 499, fo. 19. Tid. 67 Mental to Louvois, 21 April 1676, AG, A' 499, fo. 19. °° Louvois to the King, 8 April 1676, AG, A! 499, fo. 235.

BLOCKADES 293 soldiers to the dangerous head of the trench. Despite the boasts of Louvois, the Spanish reinforced the garrison with around 300 soldiers by means of small boats that eluded the French galiotes and crossed the vast flooded zone and lake on the night of 23/24 Apmil. During that night, French mortar shot plunged down on the fortified town, destroying several houses. As sappers excavated tons of earth around the clock, bucket by bucket, the French attack trench irresistibly advanced toward the palisaded defenses of the covered way.

There it paused. On the night of 25/26 April at the signal of all the cannon of the batteries firing at once, a French assault pierced a section of the counterscarpe. ‘The momentum of the attack carried the French to several detached bastions, which also fell—the defenders poured like a mob into the town. That night the governor of Condé, the count of Ostiche, asked to surrender his fortress and its garrison of around 1,000 men. In all, during this grand action of war, the French lost just sixteen officers wounded, four mortally wounded and around sixty soldiers killed or wounded.” Such a feat of arms was only possible if the Spanish garrison force had already been shaken, demoralized and unwilling to put up a fight. While the French undertook the siege of Condé, they also continued their raids and the struggle to control castles near Spanish fortresses. Around 29 April, Nancré learned that a large number of Spanish horses grazed the fields surrounding the fortress of Mons. From the garrison of Ath, he sent colonels Servon and Ramilly with a large party of cavalry and some of Nancré’s dragoons. One hundred horses were captured in the raid, enough to outfit an entire squadron of cavalry. ‘The Spanish garrison at Mons only succeeded in sending a small detachment of infantry to challenge the mounted French party. Nancré’s dragoons repulsed the infantry from Mons and sent them fleeing towards the town gate. Three dragoons and a lieutenant in the Servon Regiment were wounded during the raid.”

* These were the total casualties—more men had been harmed in the struggle of partisan warfare waged over the winter in the “invasion” of the Pays de Waes, diversions and raids to destroy forage. “Journal du Siege de Condé avril 1676,” Louvois to Le Tellier, 27 April 1676, AG, A' 499, fo. 45. See also, Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 2. On the evening of 21 April, when the attack trench was opened, only ten Frenchmen were killed and a similar number wounded. Humiéres narrowly escaped becoming a casualty when a bullet passed through the crown of his hat, “two fingers above the hat band.” Nancré to Louvois, 30 April 1676, AG, A! 537, fo. 146.

294 CHAPTER SEVEN This was the second raid around Mons in two months. Through a combination of such attacks and capturing castles, the Spanish garrison at Mons was constantly harassed and lost men, horses and sup-

plies of forage during the spring of and summer of 1676. It was unable to effectively support its neighbors to the southwest on the upper reach of the Escaut River. While the garrison at Mons struggled to defend its immediate surroundings against French raiders, a separate corps d’armée commanded

by Monsieur, the duc d’Orléans, and assisted by Marshal Créqui and Vauban besieged Bouchain on 2 May. By this time, however, Prince William had led the Allied field army into the area, and threatened to disrupt the French siege. Louis XIV, stepping aside from the majesty of his role as sovereign and listening like a soldier,

followed the council of his generals and did not attack the Allied army at Heurtebise when the operational situation clearly did not require such sacrifice on the part of his troops and such risk to the king. ‘Che French position was a strong one at Heurtebise, and the choice to attack was an operational decision for Prince William to make, not Louis, who correctly held his army in a defensive position covering the siege of Bouchain. Within a span of four days, the outer works of Bouchain were almost completely leveled by cannon shot.’ On 11 May, after nine days of siege, the fortress surrendered to the king’s brother. Five days earlier, Hoquincourt at Peronne proposed a siege of Cambrai, beginning with an occupation of several

“ates” around the fortress in order to blockade the garrison.” The strategic purpose of the sieges of Bouchain and Condé had always been to blockade Gambrai and Valenciennes. Without know-

ing when the king would decide to besiege the fortresses, it made sense to continue to “shut-in” their garrisons by occupying all the bridges, fords and posts surrounding the fortresses. The arrival of Baron Quincy on the French-side in February, a subsequent promotion to brigadier in the king’s army, and the equipping of his regiment of cavalry underlined this purpose. His unit, composed of many deserters and convicts, was soon installed as part of the French garrison at Bouchain and Condé.’”? Quincy’s troops were already

” Rousset, Histoire, vol. 2, p. 227. ” Hoquincourt to Louvois, 6 May 1676, AG, A! fo. 100.

Quincy to Louvois, 20 May 1676, AG, A! 499, fo. 177. Louvois ordered

BLOCKADES 2995 bloodied that spring and continually remained mounted in order to impose a loose blockade around Valenciennes and Cambrai. Quincy’s son, who commanded one of the companies in his father’s regiment,

lost eight cavalrymen killed and seven prisoners in one encounter with the Spanish garrison of Cambrai. Quincy, though, had other

concerns on his mind. Since there was a price on his head, he wanted to bring the war to a rapid and successful end. He began to make arguments to Louvois as to how to blockade the Spanish fortresses that remained on the Escaut River; they jutted into French territory like pieces of a broken rampart, gashed by the French conquests of Bouchain and Condé. Quincy proposed the construction

of redoubts at “little expense” to the French. Quincy thought the French could begin their blockade on the stream of the Sensée, which flowed between the Scarpe River and the Escaut River; where he suggested placing the redoubts at the villages of Férin, Goeulzin and a walled-farm called Ferguerette. ‘he erstwhile baron also hoped to prevent the Spanish from entering Ostrevant (the country between

Valenciennes and Douai) and to free the road between Bouchain and Douai. “We will deprive the enemies without doubt of more than 400,000 dwres of contributions, disrupt the trade of their towns of Cambrai and Valenciennes and enrage their people.” ‘These words either helped to change Louvois’s own attitude toward the war, or

else they were prescient, because Louvois could not have agreed more with Quincy’s hard-handed and practical approach to French operations.”

4. 1676: The Blockade of Cambrai, Valenciennes and St. Omer

Quincy outlined the details of his plan, which Louvois accepted, of how to blockade Cambrai and Valenciennes. He urged Louvois to

give him overall command of the cavalry at Bouchain, Condé, Quesnoy and Douar—the main French garrisons involved in the blockade of Valenciennes and Cambrai. Among the first of Quincy’s

Quincy to leave three companies of his regiment at Condé and six companies at Bouchain. Quincy requested instead that he leave one squadron at Bouchain and two squadrons at Douai, “and we can make war all the better against those of Cambrai.” “™ Quincy to Louvois, 21 May 1676, AG, A' 499, fo. 177.

CHAPTER SEVEN

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BLOCKADES 313 that direction, if you judge to have need of it for an action.”'*’ That

fall, Prince William tried to draw the French into a battle near Mons : by preparing a mock siege of Charleroi, but the French remained distant and watched the comic preparations for the siege of Charleroi with only mild interest. Montal gave orders for the French cavalry

to forage as if there was no Allied army, and the Dutch commander of artillery was captured when attempting to scout a position for a battery. The Dutch commander-in-chief pulled his army back from the region, and the French blockade of Mons continued to the end of 1677. Throughout the Netherlands, the Spanish faced increased shortages of grain and forage, and the wide blockade of Mons no doubt

contributed to these shortages. In October 1677, after more than three years of war, the Spanish Baron de Barliére thought 1t would

be impossible to find the money, shelter or forage for the nearly 7,000 horses in the province of Spanish Gelderland, where they were

to spend the winter feeding and resting. He also thought his presence there “would serve only to be witness to the revolution of a province and the entire loss of the cavalry of Your Excellency.”!*® On 4 December 1677, Marshal Humiéres invested St. Ghislain, assaulted the outer works on 10 December, and accepted the garri-

son’s surrender the next day. This closed the ring to the west of Mons. Only a narrow corridor of men and supplies could trickle down to Mons from Brussels, harassed and ambushed by French detachments from Ath and Charleroi.

At Mons the suffering of the local inhabitants reached a new crescendo in January 1678. On 3 January, Louvois instructed Montal that it had “occurred to the king,” that the best way to prevent any

, supplies from entering Mons would be to “make a desert of the villages two to three leagues around the town,” and “to make as many disorders” in order to force the inhabitants to “leave their houses.” If local officials made complaints, he was to make sham claims of being “very upset” about the licentious conduct of French troops. Louvois sent identical instructions to the other commanders of the blockading forces, Escalainvilliers and St. Ruhe.'*” "7 Louvois to Luxembourg, 19 July 1677, AG, A' 533, fo. 8. °° Barliére to Intendant Claris, 28 October 1677, AGR (Brussels), Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, Jnventatre 28, n° 584. 2 Louvois to Montal, 3 January 1678, AG, A! 595, fo. 19.

314 CHAPTER SEVEN On the day the depopulating of the villages around Mons was to begin, at around 10 AM on 4 January, the Prince of Vaudemont foiled the French and entered the fortress with an Allied force of 150 infantry and 250 cavalry.’ After that reinforcement, the garrison at Mons numbered thirteen regiments of Dutch and “several Spanish troops.” French war parties destroyed the bridges on the roads in the vicinity of Mons. Outside of Mons, along a ridge, the French seized several posts, giving them a clearer perspective of the blockaded town below. Chief among these posts was St. Denis, where Prince William would attempt to break the blockade of Mons and

dislodge a covering French army later in the summer in the last open field battle of the Dutch War—the battle would not dislodge the French. In the meantime, Marshal Humicres led his garrison forces and pulaged around Ninove, Geraardsbergen and Enghien “where the inhabitants had not brought contributions to where they had agreed.”'”!

Louvois informed Humieres that, “the king has resolved to make all the demonstrations that he will esteem most appropriate in order to increase the fears of sieur de Villahermosa and to fatigue the Spanish troops.”'** In response to the blockade of Mons and the movements made by Humiéres, whose command numbered about 10,000 men, the Dutch army marched to the vicinity of Malines and Brussels, in a constant state of readiness during the harsh January.'*’ The Duke of Villahermosa was forced to recall regiments of cavalry that he had sent into Dutch Brabant to recuperate during the winter as well as regiments that had marched into Holland, fearing an immediate

French siege. Dutch and Spanish consumed forage stored in the spring during these winter maneuvers. ‘The Spanish, having determined that the French would not occupy any useful posts closer to Brussels, worked feverishly to dismantle the fortifications of Halle— nine miles from Brussels.'**

9 Nancré to Louvois, 4 January 1678, AG, A! 595, fo. 22. Also, see the Gazette, 10 January, from Brussels. ! Gazette, 24 January 1678, from Brussels. ‘5? Louvois to Humieéres, 4 January 1678, AG, A! 595, fo. 25. '3 Gazette, 9 January 1678, from The Hague. The Prince of Orange gave orders to maintain all of his troops in winter quarters in a state of readiness. In the meantime, the Count of Waldeck had full power to conduct affairs as he saw fit in concert with the Duke of Villa~-Hermosa. Gazette, 24 January 1678, from Antwerp. ‘+ Gazette, 10 January 1678, from Brussels.

BLOCKADES 315 8. The Collapse: 1678

Peace finally came in 1678 as serious Spanish resistance in the Netherlands collapsed. “All of this country suffers in extreme misery,” noted the correspondent of the Gazette in Brussels. Over the winter, refugees from around Brussels flocked toward the relative safety of Antwerp.’ Many Spanish troops were withdrawn to the north where their horses could find forage; many deserted, joining the throngs of homeless. So decimated were Spanish forces that by 1678, the principal Spanish fortresses were mainly garrisoned by either Dutch or Imperial troops.'*° During the third week in January 1678, a party of cavalry commanded by Desclainviliers trapped and defeated 300 new recruits of Dutch infantry who had attempted to enter Mons.'”’

In contrast to the demise of the Spanish garrisons, the French troops at Ath received a convoy of nine wagons laden with money from Lille in February 1678, and supplies and money flowed to every other French garrison almost unchallenged by Spanish detachments.'* In good spirits, French war parties from Ath burned the empty wind mills outside of Mons in February 1678. In the province of Brabant, French fire-raids executed several villages, “the inhabitants having failed to bring contributions.”'*’ Wherever one looked in the Spanish

Netherlands in 1678, it appeared that the French had been there and left their trademark of fire and plunder. No later than January 1678, Louis XIV made the decision to take Ghent, a conquest that he probably had not considered before English intervention. Safe behind its walls, Ghent was one of the more populous and important cities in the Spanish Netherlands. It served as a “general depot for the Allied armies and favored by this means the execution of their projects.”!*? According to an official chronicler of the town, Ghent had in 1662, 494 streets and 6,607 houses, which according to Joseph Neves has been since calculated as sufficient

'3° Gazette, 7 February 1678, from Brussels.

° ‘The fortress of Luxembourg, for example, was garrisoned by 1,200 Imperial troops. Gazette, 14 February 1678, from Brussels. 8’ Gazette, 17 January 1677, from Ath. '38' Gazette, 14 February 1678, from Brussels. 9 Thid. 140 AG, A! 595, Avertissement.

316 CHAPTER SEVEN housing to give the town a population of around 40,000 inhabitants, all tightly packed together within medieval walls.'*! The economic prosperity in the decade prior to the Dutch War, and the dislocated from the Dutch War, had probably swelled the population by several more thousand by 1678. Although Ghent was not blockaded in

the same way as Mons, the countryside surrounding it had been severely plundered and burdened with war taxes as a result of French fire-raids into the Pays de Waes. Some villages were entirely burned and deserted as a result of raids: The countryside was terribly ravaged. The villages of Bellem, Vynct, Deurle, Landegen, Meerendré, Hansbeke, Haeltert, Lootenhulle, Bachte, St. Denis and Laethem were entirely burned and those of ‘Tronchiennes, Leerne-St-Martin, Leerne-St.-Marie, Vosselaere, Meyghem et Poesele partly burned.'”

Ghent would fall in March after less than two weeks of siege.'* 9. Conclusion

Ultimately, the most successful defense against raiders attempting to impose contributions was to take away their fortress strongholds by blockades and formal sieges. Even French subjects along the fron-

tier seemed to have realized that their best defense was a good offense that aimed to destroy the enemy bases. ‘To further the siege of Cambrai, a fortress that harbored a garrison that had burned and plundered numerous French villages, 7,000 peasants from Picardy arrived when ordered, and energetically dug the siege lines, “despite the bad weather.” Not only did they arrive for this back-breaking but necessary work, but “each has brought his /fusz (flintlock musket), which they were not asked [to do].” Furthermore, so antagonistic toward the Spanish garrison at Cambrai were these peasants that they let it be know that they would “go to take the town if the King would permit them.” Louis XIV commented, in a boastful,

tt Joseph E. Neéve, Gand sous Voccupation de Lows XIV. 1678-1679, 1701-1706, 1708 (Gand, 1929), p. 12.

2 Tbid., p. 16. ' The French garrison of Courtrai had burned and plundered completely the villages of Landegem and Nevele: “up to the churches.” Ibid., pp. 16-17.

BLOCKADES 317 Rabelesian style, that he “could have had 20,000 if he had wanted.”'* When Cambrai fell, the raids on Picardy ceased. In the eyes of the Picards, who had so willingly participated in prosecuting the sieges of both Cambrai and Valenciennes, the fall of those fortresses signified a dramatic change for the better. For the village and town officials, the threat of fire raids and contributions was over, for a time. The entire region that had once been held in terror by the garrisons of the Spanish strongholds now requested from their monarch a return to the conditions of peace. The king willingly accorded them this grace, and Louvois responded in his majesty’s name to their requests. ‘The vital bridges over the Somme and the Authie rivers, which had been demolished to prevent the extension of Spanish contributions, were to be rebuilt at once. In a regal tone befitting a monarch, Louis XIV proclaimed his reason to Louvois: “As it 1s only just to return to the people the facilities necessary for their commerce.”'* The French strategy of blockades, time-consuming as it was, proved

to be prudent and effective. When the natural process of siege warfare was hastened in the Netherlands, the result was often deadly failure.'*® As practiced by the French, the business of siege warfare encompassed many things, as this study has hopefully demonstrated. The French retained an edge in partisan warfare, essential for the conduct of seventeenth-century campaigns, to the end of the Dutch War. Through blockades, they merged this partisan mastery with their superiority in siege warfare, multiplying French operational effectiveness and ensuring the glory of Louis XIV.

'* Pellisson, Lettres, vol. 3, pp. 197-201. ‘= Louvois to Breteuil, | June 1677, AG, A! 532. ‘© There were several Dutch sieges during the war, prosecuted without proper blockades in advance: Charleroi (1672 and 1677), Maastricht (1676), and Oudenaarde (1674). They cost the Dutch dearly, and all of these sieges were lifted. As Christopher Duffy observed, “the allies were gratifyingly incompetent at the business of siege warfare.” Duffy, The Fortress, p. 12. Even though the Dutch General Rabenhaupt enforced a blockade around Grave for several months, the fortress garrison defended itself for ninety-three days once the siege began.

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EPILOGUE

“Upon a certain science,” to borrow that expression favored by Baron Quincy when estimating the strength of opposing garrison forces, the

French conduct of partisan warfare served the war aims of Louis XIV well.' The king’s strategy was a variation of the strategy that the German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and, later, the historian Hans Delbriick called Ermattungsstrategie (the strategy of exhaustion or attrition). “In LEvmattungsstrategie, the battle 1s merely one of

several equally effective means of attaining the political ends of the war and is essentially no more important than the occupation of ter-

ritory, the destruction of crops or commerce, and the blockade.” The French strategy of exhaustion emphasized partisan warfare over

the mass bloodshed of battles and made partisan warfare equal to sieges aS a means of attaining the objectives of the war. The gathering of war taxes, raids and blockades were as essential as sieges in French strategy, and more so than full-scale battles. The efforts of French war parties in combination with larger actions of war in the Dutch War gave France its strongest border ever in the north.”

' There can be little question that Louis XIV thought in terms of limited conquests in the Spanish Netherlands. Never once did he propose to retain all of the conquests he made. As early as the fall of 1677, if not sooner, Louis XIV showed interest in the creation of security barriers, not only one for France, but also a barrier for what remained of the Spanish Netherlands. He desired for France, “an equivalent which might be equally useful and which shall cover the frontiers of his kingdom.” See, Mignet, Négoczations, vol. 4, p. 466, citing from the dispatches of MM.

d’Estrades, Colbert and d’Avaux to Louis XIV and to Pomponne, | October 1677. * Gordon A. Craig “Delbriick: The Military Historian,” in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986), pp. 341-42. The concept of strategy of exhaustion is closely related to “war-as-process,” as defined by John Lynn. Both stress the

attritional nature of war. ° Out of the territorial rearrangements that resulted from the Peace of Niyymegan, Vauban raised a first line of defense: Dunkirk, Bergues, Furnes, Fort de la Kenocq, Ypres, Menin, Lille, ‘tournai, Fort de Mortagne, Condé, Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy and Maubeuge. French redoubts would cover the Grand Canal of Ypres to the Lys River and the Lys to the Escaut River in the next war, providing the French with a continuous line of fortifications. A “second line” of fortresses buttressed the first line, and France, an oft-invaded kingdom at the crossroads of the might of England, the Dutch Republic, Spain and the Empire in Germany, was more secure in the

north.

320 EPILOGUE x Ok In reference to the wars that plagued Europe from 1618-1660, historian Jeremy Black concluded: “The strains of prolonged warfare led rulers to desire effective military instruments, but they also made them difficult to provide. It is difficult to see how the warfare of the mid-seventeenth century justified the theory of a military revolution.”* Jeremy Black observed that much of the fighting at midcentury was “inchoate.” Further consideration needs to be given to the French conduct of war in the decades of the 1640s and 1650s. However, as David Parrott observed for the 1630s, studies will probably demonstrate that French field armies, which normally totaled less than 20,000 men, ended operations at midsummer and then marauded for weeks on end. During this earlier conflict, French fortress governors were often disobedient, and raids for contributions were conducted for the benefit of individual garrisons—who even reached special agreements with Spanish garrisons on how to divide up the plunder and war taxes of a region.° In short, the French conduct of war before the Dutch War was guided more by local considerations of survival or attainment of personal gain than considerations of strategy; a true strategy of exhaustion was not possible, although some sieges and “expeditions” were pursued, they failed for lack of

supplies as often as they succeeded. It was the intervention of the Commonwealth of England on the side of France in 1655 and the collapse of imperial Spain that brought peace in 1659. Like medieval

armies before them, the French in the Thirty Years’ War fought a war of damnificare or maximum damnum or demolicionem—a war of havoc

and destruction and burning and looting.° The French conduct of partisan warfare during the Dutch War, 1672-78, stands in contrast to the rough experiences of French field armies and garrison forces in the first part of the seventeenth century. It justifies the theory of a military revolution characterized by greater government control over expanded armies. French partisan * Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800

(Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1991). » For the logistical and administrative problems of the French army during the period 1635-1642, see David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642 (Cambridge, 2002). ° HJ. Hewitt, The Organization of War under Edward ITI: 1338-62 (Manchester, 1966), p. 100.

EPILOGUE 321 warfare, including fire-raids and blockades, was carefully coordinated to contribute to French strategic goals. Louis XIV and Louvois began

to practice in 1676 a new form of war that emphasized coherent military operations; it may, in fact, be called a revolution in “military operations.” ‘The French dynastic state began to take a wider perspective of war; it did not merely concentrate on the individual tactical problems posed by single fortresses or the logistic problems

of supplying an army, but saw how it all fit together in a single operational problem both for themselves and their opponents. ‘This

shift in thought about war would not have been possible without serious and far-reaching military reforms in the decade before the Dutch War, whether one calls these reforms a “revolution” or not— the effectiveness and nature of French military operations from 1676 to the end of the Dutch War give proof that significant change had taken place. If the expression “absolutism” has any relevance to the government of seventeenth century France, it applies to Louis XIV’s per-

sonal management of his armed forces in the Dutch War and the array of royal officials who supported him in this endeavor.’ In the case of France, where decades of civil war and instability postponed the measures of reformers, it was a belated military revolution. ‘To

be sure, not only would reform come only after the Peace of the Pyrenees, it would never eliminate key shortcomings in the French practice of war. In particular, the Bourbon monarchy never managed to pay for its wars from taxation and government finance alone, thus the need for resources collected through partisan warfare. ‘There were other continuing defects as well. Field armies occasionally did plunder for very limited periods during the 1670s, and high placed officials still dipped into funds. Petty thievery by soldiers survived, all of this, giving credence to the “dark legend” of the old regime. Officers and soldiers in the garrison force seem even to have conspired to benefit from the French strategy of exhaustion, by ensuring that each received substantial plunder. Nevertheless, Louis XIV and Louvois exerted far greater control over the forces engaged—

’ According to the military revolution argument: technical changes in weapons and drill, essential aspects of the military revolution, led to increased manageability of armies, and increased administrative capacity to service larger armies. See, for example, John Lynn, “Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660,” french FNistorical Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, Fall 1985, pp. 176-191.

322 EPILOGUE even those engaged in burning and plundering—than had previous French monarchs.

x ok x There is no question that Bourbon financial shortfall rendered essential the contributions and plunder extorted by war parties, but partisan warfare also played a role beyond logistics. It intertwined with battle and siege in the strategy of exhaustion that typified the wars of Louis XIV. Raids and blockades gradually destroyed enemy forces and helped to compel peace. The actions of detachments and war parties may have seemed less

spectacular to Frenchmen than did Condé’s gallant charges or Vauban’s conduct of siege warfare, but they proved essential. Viewed out of its strategic context, French partisan warfare during the Dutch

War might seem to fit into a brutal and chaotic tradition of war that stretched back to the age of castles and mounted knights. According to one historian, for centuries wars in the Netherlands included a “strategy of accessories where each combatant or group of combatants, often in an incoherent and discontinuous fashion, fought primarily for immediate material profit.” Contemporaries had an expression to describe this kind of warlike activity on a reduced scale. It was guerre guerroyante, made up of losses and recaptures, surprises, incursions, ambushes and sallies. ‘War is... above all made up of pillaging, often of sieges, sometimes of battles.’ Moreover, because of a lack of money, men, supphes and provisions,

many plans failed to mature: ‘A campaign brought to a conclusion constitutes an exception, an enterprise which defies the rule.”

However, when viewed as an integrated aspect of French strategic planning, there was very little that was incoherent about the French conduct of partisan warfare during the Dutch War. Louvois saw the details of raids, war taxes, and other actions of partisan warfare in a larger framework that also included finances and logistics, sieges, maneuvers and the battles of field armies, actions on multiple fronts and on-going diplomatic initiatives. In a broad sense, Louis XIV and

* Charles Gaier, Art et organisation milttatres dans la principauté de Liege et dans le comté de Looz au Moyen Age (Brussels, 1968), p. 216.

EPILOGUE 323 Louvois mastered military problems that had troubled commanders in Europe for centuries and showed the way to new forms of warfare and the pursuit of coherent military strategies. Perhaps, the first printed definition of partisan warfare or pettte guerre appeared in the dictionary edited by Antoine Furetiére (1690); it was a collaborative work of the French Academy slowly progressing from the beginning of the king’s personal rule. Furetiére wrote: “One

calls, petite guerre, the raids which are made by detached soldiers, when they go on party,” and to “pzcorée.” He further defines the verb “picorer” as: Picorer: Petite guerre, pillage that soldiers who are detached from their

corps make: this we also call to go upon the maraude. This word is modern, and was not in use during the last century.”

In fact, in the 70 years that followed Furetiére’s Dictionnaire, a handful of mulitary treatises, some emphasizing the term petze guerre or

small war in their title and all devoting pages of explanations to solely explaining petite guerre, would appear in French, English and German, the latter translated as kleinen Kneg.'" ‘The lexicographer of the late seventeenth century had not yet penetrated the specialized domain of partisan warfare when the Dutch War began, and _historians have since looked to the eighteenth century for the origins of

light troops and the tactics of small unit actions. Yet the tactics of light troops in the eighteenth century was fully developed by the Dutch War, if not before. In the mind-set of Louis XIV’s soldiers, partisan warfare and other larger actions of war probably were not so separate, but as the words suggested only distinctive in regards to size—they were equally elements of the same strategy of exhaustion. It was not until the eighteenth century that a hierarchical distinction and preference for grand operations over petite guerre was made in theoretical treatises on war. As this study has demonstrated,

for the Dutch War at least, partisan warfare and the operations of

” See under entry, petite guerre, in Furetiére, Dictionnaire.

The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely representative: Grandmaison, La petite guerre ou traité du service des troupes legeres en campagne (Paris, 1756); M. Le Cointe, The Science of Military Posts, for use of Regimental Officers, who _fre-

quently command Detached Partes, translated from French (London, 1761); Baron de Wiist, L’art militaire du partisan (La Haye, 1768). Roger Stephenson, Mihtary Instructions for Officers Detached in the Field: Containing a Scheme for Forming a Corps of Partisans (Philadelphia, 1775).

324 EPILOGUE field armies pursued the same strategic objecttves—with more emphasis given to partisan warfare to attain these objectives. Detachments

from the garrison force and field armies cooperated in an intricate combination of raids and sieges, producing almost the military equiv-

alent of the tense multiple effects that drew the eye inward to the central subject in the baroque manner of painting then fashionable in art. The Dutch War bore witness to increased operational control of military units and planning that became at once more complex and more focused than the simpler “expedition manner” of war and “war of havoc” that preceded.

kok Like the administrative reforms of the military revolution, this “revolution in military operations” was critically important, even if it had

its limitations. It would be a mistake to see partisan operations as simply ancillary to those of field armies; partisans had an importance quite their own. The French fought battles and conducted sieges during the Dutch War to support French garrison troops in their war of raids and blockades designed to wear down the Spanish. This role reversal can be seen most clearly in the French attempt

to break the morale of the Spanish garrison forces in the southern Netherlands through partisan warfare in the summer of 1676. hen, Louvois increased the intensity of plundering and burning of forage in areas immediately surrounding the Spanish fortresses; he replaced the law of contributions with the law of the blockade." Because of the unique character of the Spanish Netherlands, war conformed to specific parameters.'* Nowhere else in Europe, with the possible exception of the Dutch Republic, were so many fortified positions crammed in such a compact space. Yet French strategy was aimed at seizing and retaining territory in the face of the great potential for resistance threatened by such fortresses. In the Spanish

'' Van Houtte, Occupations, vol. 1, p. 111. ' In fact, throughout the seventeenth century the particular measures taken for supply and the varying ability of battles to alter the balance in a theater of war created regional variations in warfare. For example, fewer fortresses in the upper Rhine meant that contribution raids came from field armies and battles were more important there. Field armies were the fortresses in Germany.

EPILOGUE 325 Netherlands, the “engineered battlefield,” as John Lynn so aptly described the bastion system, reached beyond its outworks and the glacis and included nearby defensible villages and castles, which in turn overlapped the posts and outworks of neighboring fortresses, sometimes less than several hours march away.'’ The: engineered battlefield of the Spanish Netherlands encompassed, in effect, entire swaths of practically interlocking defenses in the countryside. True, the imposing bastion stood as the objective and key to this defense,

but the other layers of defense were just as important in the role played by each. War in the Spanish Netherlands called not only for expertise in the tactics of siege warfare, but also skill in solving the operational problems it posed. ‘The French recognized that it required expert partisans and detached parties of troops employed in a host of activities to wear down the foe before the first siege gun unlimbered."* Prior to the French sieges of 1676, 1677 and 1678, a war of blockade weakened enemy garrisons, lessening their eventual resistance to Bourbon armies. In October 1673, the monarchy established zones of contributions that covered the entire Spanish Netherlands, and where necessary French troops “executed” villages by fire-raids and plundering. The trap laid by French contributions made it increasingly difficult for the garrisons of Spanish fortresses to find forage for their horses and grain to make bread rations. Some French fireraids to enforce payment of contributions took the form of “invasions” and often were directed toward rear areas, like the Pays de

Waes, where the Dutch army quartered and the Spanish foraged their horses, and where the inhabitants were forbidden to pay contributions to the French.'? On the French side of the frontier, peasants constructed redoubts, militia patrolled, and squadrons of regular cavalry and the companies of fortress governors stood ready to deny

Spanish garrisons the abundant stores of grain to their front in France. [his choking isolation of Spanish garrisons from a distance, although not entirely successful in covering the French frontier, was followed by tighter blockades of which the details often sprung from

> Lynn, Grant, pp. 547-93. ‘* In the important “front-line” garrisons, like Oudenaarde, Maastricht and Lille, the king kept some of his best troops. ' See under entry quartier de forage in Furetiére, Dictionaire. “Forage quarter... to place cavalry troops in a location where they will easily nourish their horses.”

326 EPILOGUE observations made by the garrison commanders and intendants. “Such

a place would be useful to His Majesty ...,” or “One should consider establishing ...,” were frequent phrases used by commanders and intendants in letters to Louvois. ‘Toward July 1676, it all emerged

as a coherent strategy in the mind of Louvois—“les blocus” or the blockades. Along the way to exercising dominance over the country, precautions were taken; the French seized almost any building of military value, including the bell towers of churches. ‘The blockading troops, who were never too numerous, were organized in detachments that numbered in the dozens; they captured villages and castles that sat astride lines of communications leading to one of the fortresses the king desired: St. Omer, Valenciennes, Gambrai, Ypres, and Mons

were the main targets. Once ensconced in their posts with individual supply arrangements made, closer to the more heavily defended objective, parties of French troops sortied and ambushed parties from the garrison sent to forage or impose contributions.'® Detachments of cavalry and dragoons plundered the villages on the outskirts of the fortress, where local forage stored for consumption by the garrison was either consumed or burned. French detachments set upon the convoys of supplies and reinforcements sent to aid the garrison, and reconnoitered and harassed field armies sent to rescue the blockaded fortresses. There was little romance in these activities of small war; the disciplined, blockading force aimed to break the spirit and starve the garrison into submission before the actual siege began. Inured by experience and proud tradition, both the Spanish defenders and the French blockaders were tough opponents in this other, often overlooked, dimension of siege warfare. From the summer of 1676 through the spring of 1678, the Spanish garrison force was progressively weakened, the recovery of contributions from French territory disrupted and slowed. When the king appeared at the head of field armies during campaigns and lay sieges, Spanish garrisons soon surrendered. By the summer of 1678, the forage cantonments of Allied cavalry (in country villages) and the

billets of infantry (in walled towns) were threatened. The foes of Louis XIV ended the war clinging to a few blockaded positions. Had the war continued but one more year, it could be argued, the entire

'° The French expression in constant use during the Dutch War to describe a well-fortified post was hors d’insulte.

EPILOGUE 327 Netherlands would have fallen into French hands. In fact, most of it already had. French historian Jean Milot neatly summarized the character of war in the late seventeenth century, and in so doing, the goal of Louis XIV’s Dutch War strategy after 1673: “To lose its magazines, is for an army, indivisible by nature, to experience a diminution in its zone of maneuver; and to lose its bases in a province,

is to be forced to abandon it.”'’ By that time, however, the other leading princes of Europe had identified Louis XIV of France as their greatest threat. ‘hey combined on other fronts to prevent the French king’s conquest of the entire Spanish Netherlands, and the French king finally exhausted his financial resources.

kK Ok French partisan warfare transcended the dictates of necessity. War parties accomplished more than making up for the shortfall in Bourbon finance, although it is hard to overemphasize the significance of con-

tributions and other war taxes imposed by partisans. “Little war” also played an essential role in the “big picture” of French strategy of exhaustion. We are only beginning to understand those aspects of early modern warfare beyond battle and siege, but we know enough

to be certain that partisan warfare was of the greatest importance.

'’ Jean Milot, “Un probléme opérationnel du XVII* siécle illustré par un cas régional,” Revue du Nord n. 209, v. LIL (1971), p. 291.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Manuscript Sources

Parts

Archives des Affaires Etrangéres Correspondance Politique (CP), Pays Bas: 33,

(AAE) 34, 35, 36, 37.

Archives Nationales (AN) Series G’: 1774. Bibliothéque Nationale (BN) Fonds Francais: 4181, 4188, 4189, 4192, 4193, 4221, 4222, 4223, 4224. Fonds Clairambault: 448, 501, 581, 582, 681, 881, 950. Nouvelles Acquisitions Frangaises: 203, 373, 375. Cabinet d’Estampes Réserve Vincennes

Bibhothéque de la Guerre (BG)

Archives de la Guerre (AG) Series A‘: 208, 209, 210, 312, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 388, 391, 392, 393, 395, 398, 399, 401, 402, 404, 405, 407, 416, 417, 432, 433, 434, 435, 440, 441, 442, 444, 448, 449, 450, 451, 453, 455, 456, 457, 466, 467, 468, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 505, 513, 514, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 543, 546, 547, 564, 566, 582, 595, 612, 613, 614, 700, 701, 703, 704, 887, 1053, 1054, 1055. Brussels

Archives Générales du Royaume Archives des Chambres des Comptes: Inventaires 6

(AGR) Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre: Inventaires 28

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BLANK PAGE

INDEX

Aa, River, 300 bailiffs, 167-68, 172, 232-33, 236, 260 Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), imperial city Ballet, Maximilien-Antoine, Spanish

of, 134 receiver-general of contributions at

Aarschot or Arscot, Spanish duke of, Luxembourg, 245

governor of Condé, 235, 283, Bapuame, town of, 25]

abatis, 53 Barliére, baron de, Spanish absolutism, 321-22 commander, 313 Aigremont, comte d’, French lieutenant _ battles,

governor of Lille, 101, 236 Kons-Saarbrucken, 201-02

Aire, Spanish Netherlands fortified Lokeren Bridge, Battle at, 165-66 town of, 33, 77, 101, 127, 190, 249, Mount Cassel (April, 1677), 34-35,

254, 277-78 183, 310

Alost, Spanish Netherlands castellany Nineteenth of June, 298 of, 73, 137, 173, 175-76, 179, 202 Saint Denis (14 August), 39, 314

Ambliss, woods of, 77 Seneffe (11 August 1674), 26, 73,

ambushes, see tactics 185, 212, 219

Amiens, French town of, 254, 256 Sole Bay, naval battle of (7 June Amsterdam, Dutch city of, 16, 19-20, 1672), 20

22, 38 Tenth of June, 256-59 61, 135-36, 157, 162, 271, 311, 1673), 22 315 Bavay, town of, 33, 301-02 Arleux, town of, 251, 298 bayonets, see weapons

Antwerp, city of Spanish Netherlands, Texel, naval battle of (21 August

244 marshal, 20

Armentiéres, french fortified town of, Beauveau, marquis de, imperial Arras, French fortified town of, 90, 99, Bellefonds, Bernardin Gigault, marquis

208, 215, 247 de, French marshal, 25, 58, 89,103,

Artagnan, Pierre de Montesquiou, 113, 117, 208-09, 215, 231, 236, comte d’, lieutenant-general, 4, 21 249

Artois, province of, 13, 34, 75, 249, Bernissart, castle of, 164, 287, 289-90

265-66 Benoist, French intendant, 113

assassination, 47, 124 Bergen-op-Zoom, Dutch town and

Ath, French fortified town of and marquisate of, 125, 138

bureau of contributions, 47, 55, Bergues, French fortified town of, 223,

58, 66, 68-69, 74, 79-80, 92, 103, 228

112, 159, 177, 201, 209-10, 226, Berthier, French intendant at Le 233-36, 278, 280-81, 283, 290, Quesnoy, assistant to Damorezan, 54

312-13, 315 Béthune, French fortified town of, 77, Netherlands, 141 billets (notices), 55

auderlinckgeldt, tax on widows in Spanish 117

Auger, d’ or Augier, French Billon, Jean, French military theorist, commander, 182, 240, 242-43, 254 198

Authie, River, 253 Binche, town of, 30, 185, 187, 292,

Avesnes-sur-Helpe, French fortified 311

town of, 98, 129, 132, 180, 206, Bitermont, castle of, 278

236, 238, 246 Black, Jeremy, historian, 320

336 INDEX blockades, Cagnosle or Cagnol, chevalier de, legal distinction of, 269-71 French lieutenant colonel of

importance in French strategy, Piedmont Regiment, 251-52, 182

324-326 Calvo, comte de, French leutenant

Boece, René de Briand de, French governor of Maastricht, 116, 123,

major of the fortress of Lille and 149, 174-75 dragoon commander, 104, 124 Cambrai,

Bonn, imperial city of, capital of Spanish Netherlands fortified town electorate of Cologne, 23, 147-48, of, 4, 31, 33, 51, 66, 136, 206,

184 210, 211, 220-21, 230, 251-52,

booty, see prizes 254-56, 258-59, 260, 266,

Bouchain, Spanish Netherlands fortified 272-73, 280, 294-95, 316 town of, 31, 78, 236, 254-55, 257, blockade of, 271-72, 288-311, 317,

279, 288, 294-95, 297 326

boulets a feu, “fire shot,” see weapons carbine, short-barreled, rifled flintlock,

Boulogne, French fortified town of, see weapons

112, 254 Carlier, Pierre, French intendant of

Boulonnoise or Boulonnaises, French contributions, 61

militia regiment, 95, 228, 247 Carlos II, Brabant, duchy of Spanish king of Spain (r. 1665-1700), 111 Netherlands, 58, 84, 89, 174, 208, Guards Regiment of, 165

284, 305, 314-15 castles, importance in the Dutch War, Roman Empire, 17 244-45, 249, 272-73, 278, 312,

Brandenburg, electorate of Holy 155-56, 161, 228, 231, 237-38, Braine-le-comte, Spanish Netherlands 325

town of, 312 Casteau-Cambreésis, Spanish

Breda, Spanish Netherlands town of, Netherlands town of, 256-57, 301

61 Catinat, Nicolas de Saint-Gratien,

Bréant, French intendant, 174—6 French brigadier general, 301

Brétesche, sieur de la, French dragoon Cezen, comte de, French commander,

commander, 105, 140 301-02

Brandschatzung, 5 Chambellé, French commander of

Bricquet, Guillaume, Spanish intendant earrion at fortress of Béthune, 77,

of contributions, 236 117

Broglie (or Brogha), comte de, French chambrée, 198-99 governor of Avesnes-sur-Helpe, 103, | Chamilly, comte de (later marquis de),

129-130, 206, 226, 238-39, 246 French lieutenant-general, governor

Brosseuil, castle of, 278 of Grave (and later Oudenaarde),

Bruges, Franc de, Spanish Netherlands 27, 46, 73, 76, 84-86, 106, 109,

town of and canal of, 38-39, 51, 133, 136-37, 139, 150-53, 157-66, 57-59, 151, 157, 159, 163, 174, 169, 184, 188, 191, 250-51, 255,

231, 236, 245, 248 280-83, 289, 292

Brunswick, duke of, see Osnabriick, Chamlay, marquis de, practical advisor

bishop of, Ernest Augustus and military cartographer to Louis

Brussels, seat of government of the XIV, 273, 275

Spanish Netherlands, 31, 36, 38-39, | Charlemont, Spanish fortified town of,

53, 67, 140, 153, 157, 163-64, 191, 37, 205 202, 210, 220, 265-66, 270-71, Charleroi,

289-92, 313-15 dragoon company of, 84

Bulonde, comte de, French French fortihed town of and bureau commander, 165, 300, 303-04 of contributions, 21, 23, 26, 36, 47, 59, 66, 95, 172, 184, 188-89,

Caines, baron de, French commander 200-01, 205-06, 212, 218-19,

of Bouchain (1676), 254-55 239, 276, 291, 313

INDEX 337 Charles HU, king of England, 15, 24, Courtin, Honoré de, French

35, 37-38 ambassador to England, 272

Charles, V, duke of Lorraine (1643-90) Courtrai, French fortified town of and

(nephew of Charles IV), 36, 238 bureau of contributions, 47, 49, 52,

Charles IV, duke of Lorraine 57, 68, 73, 78-79, 82, 103, 152,

(1604-75), 22 157, 164, 177, 222-23, 227, 233,

Charleville, French fortified town of, 244-45, 248, 264-65, 280, 283

240-42 Créqui, Francois, sieur de, French

Chariiel, Jacques, French intendant of marshal (1629-87), 29-30, 36, 102, contributions at Thionville, 47, 99, 180, 201, 205, 207, 237, 240, 292,

100, 127, 150, 231 294

217 of, 256

Chasselineau, castle of, 239 Crespin, town of, 297, 302-04 Chatelet, French town near Charleroi, Crévecoeur, Spanish Netherlands town

cing grosses fermes, 52 Creveld, Martin van, military

clandestine operations, 47 historian, 6 Claris, Spanish intendant of

contributions, 67, 113, 266, 270, Damorezan, French intendant of

303 contributions at Charleroi, 46-47,

Clausewitz, Carl von, 19th century 52, 57, 59, 61-63, 66-68, 70, 83, German military theorist, 5, 319 86, 129-30, 172, 179, 189, 301

Cochem, castle of, 148 débaucher, 192

Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, Deinze,

Controller-General of Finances Franco-Spanish Conferences of, 266

(1663-85), 18, 42 Spanish Netherlands town of, 248

Cologne (Koln), imperial city and De La Fitte, French cavalry

electorate of, 23, 115, 146-48, commander, 253

154-55, 174-75, 184 Delbriick, Hans, 19th century Comines, castle of, 244 Germany military historian, 5, 9, compagnies franche, see governors’ 319

companies Demer River, 155

Condé, Louis II de Bourbon, prince Dendermonde, Spanish Netherlands

de, 19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 168, 182, town of and castellany of, 34, 59, 186, 192, 207-10, 212, 220, 244, 150-51, 156, 163, 165-68

248-49, 285, 322 Denmark, kingdom of, 18

Condé, Spanish fortified town of, 31, départements, of contributions, 46, 95

66, 74, 164, 194, 211, 226, 235, desertion, deserters, 126-30, 210, 294 255, 258, 279, 288, 294-95, 297 Desbournays, René de Pérouse, confiscations, French policy of, 47, Inspector-General of infantry, 216

74-78 Desmadrys, French intendant of

Conflans, marquis de, 217 contributions at Grave, 46, 61, 139

contributions, Des Mottes, Philippe d’Ennetiéres,

78-86 Netherlands, 2

estimates and uses of French, 42, treasurer-general of the Spanish

policy of French, 42-60 Desmoulins, Spanish intendant, 260

Controller-General of Finances, Destouches, French intendant, 61 see Colbert, Jean-Baptiste detached companies, see governors’

convoys, 204-07, 210-11 companies

Cornette, Joél, historian, 2 detachments, of regulars, 96-103 corps d’observation, 185 Dinant, Liégoise town of, 28, 184, 186,

corvée, 240 204, 238, 241 Corvisier, André, historian, 2, 7 Dixmude, Spanish fortified town of, cottisations, 221-23 245

courre sus, 225 Dophem, Spanish intendant, 265

338 INDEX Douai, French fortified town of and Ferguson, Ronald, historian, 6 bureau of contributions, 47, 55, 66, Feu, Spanish Netherlands baron of,

79, 82, 247-49, 251-52, 255-58, 251-52

295 flintolock ( fust), see weapons Dover, Treaty of (1670), 15 fodder, see forage . Drake, Peter, Irish mercenary, 121-22, forage, forages and “grand forages,” 6, 125 17, 55, 78-79, 83-84, 97-98, 105, Duffy, Christopher, historian, 12 164, 179-81, 198-204, 210, 213, Du Chaunoy, French intendant of 219, 223, 234, 248, 255, 266, 271, contributions, 57, 59, 66, 68-71, 279, 289, 300, 302, 304, 325-26

112, 114, 226 fortress governors, French, 90-93

Du Fay, detached company of Fort de Linck, 299

dragoons, 107 Fort de Lizel, 245

Du Metz, French commissioner Fort Rouge, 164-65

299 (1674), 25, 68

general of artillery, 281-83, 286, Franche-Comté, French conquest of

Du Pont, French detached company Frederick Wilham [, prince-elector of trained for river crossings, 106, 160 Brandenburg, 21 Du Rencher, French governor of Le Fueretiére, Antoine de, savant, 270

Quesnoy, 104 Furnes, French town of, 223, 228, 261

Dumouceau, French intendant of

contributions at Maastricht, 47, 54, Gaboury, French intendant of

55, 60, 82, 84, 89, 97, 110, 112, “conquered territory” and

172-74 contributions at Saint Venant, 47

Dunkirk, French fortified town of and Galen, Bernard von, bishop of bureau of contributions, 36, 47, 225, Miinster, 15, 144

228, 300 gardes du camp, 195 gardes ordinatre, 197

Ecaussines, Spanish Netherlands castles, Gaya, Louis de, author of L’art de la

31, 93, 279-83 Guerre (1677), 92-93, 97-98

échevins or eschevins, 232, 236 Gardes du Corps, 1, 196

Enghien, Spanish Netherlands town of, garrisons, size and composition of

312 French garrison force, 93-96

“engineered battlefield”, 325 Gelderland, Spanish Netherlands

Escaut River, 55, 59-60, 106, 150-51, province of, 57, 174, 313

156-67, 208, 222, 227, 237, Gendarmerie, Spanish nobles and

247-48, 252, 259, 270, 279-80, militia, 2, 219 289, 294-95, 297, 305, 311 Gette River, 156

Escluse River, 252 gens du pays, 234

Espionage, 47, 58, 66, 115, 188, 213, Ghent,

218 Spanish Netherlands city of, 37-38,

Estrades, Godefroy, comte de, 51-52, 59, 136, 150-51, 153,

French marshal and governor of 158-69, 174, 176, 202, 247-48, Maastricht (1673-78), 21, 27, 28, 250, 266, 276-77, 315-16 68, 94, 97, 103-04, 106, 107-10, Castellany of Vieux Bourg de 112, 115-16, 120, 123, 125, 128, Ghent, 129, 156-69, 174, 176 132, 136-37, 139, 142-48, 154-57, glowe, 12, 14 171, 184, 192, 205, 241, 249, governors’ companies, 89, 91—93,

288-89 103-114, 147, 182, 216

Estrades, governor’s company of grand garde, \97 dragoons, 103-04, 142, 291 gratifications, 84—86, 110

état-maor, 91-93, 112, 216 Grave, fortified town of and

expeditionary style of war, 274-75 marquisate of, 46, 73, 92, 99, 109,

Extraordinaire des Guerres, 42, 44, 51] 115, 133, 139, 157, 159, 188

INDEX 339 Gravelines, French fortified town of, La Fére, French fortification, 230

82 La Motte, sieur de, French lieutenant

grenacles, see weapons governor of Ath, 92, 300, 309

Grimbergue, Spanish regiment of, 251 Landrécies, French fortified town of,

guerre de postes, 214 206 Guise, French fortified town, 205, 240 Le Blanc, Jean, Spanish Netherlands Gutmann, Myron, historian, 7, 138 partisan, 140

Le Boistel, French intendant of

The Hague, contributions at Dunkirk, 46-48, Anglo-Dutch Treaty of, (10 January 61-62, 228, 261 1678, 37 Léon, Spanish captain and famed Allied Treaty of, (30 August 1673), partisan, 115

17 Leopold I, emperor of Holy Roman

Hainaut, province of, 155, 208 Empire (r. 1657-1705), 17, 21-22, Halle, Spanish Netherlands town of, 177

67, 292, 314 Le Peletier de Souzy, Michel, French

Harchies, castle of, 287 surintendant of finances and

Hasselt, Spanish Netherlands town of, contributions at Lille, 47, 49, 52,

154 55-59, 61, 69-70, 74, 79-80,

hatchets, see weapons 82-85, 87, 91, 100-01, 110, 173, Henry, Maximillian, imperial elector of 177, 179, 192, 211, 227-28, 231,

Cologne, 15, 23 233, 244, 248-49, 261-65,

Hesdin, French town of, 170, 299 266, 279

Heurtebise, 31, 294 Le Quesnoy, French fortified town of highwaymen, 126-130 and bureau of contributions, 47, 5), Hoquincourt, marquis de, French 77, 103-04, 206, 211, 304, 312

governor of Peronne, 226, 278, 294 Le Tellier, Michel, Secretary of State

hostages, 20, 153, 218, 249, 260 for War (1643-77), 45, 88

Houpelines, castle of, 247 Le Vacher, French intendant, 114

Houtte, Hubert van, historian, 6, 141, Liége, neutral principality of, 28, 68,

221, 265 80, 145, 155-56, 172, 205-06, 208,

Howard, Michael, military historian, 218, 225, 233, 261, 281, 289

165 Lille,

214, 274 lieutenant reformées, see also under

Hulst, Spanish Netherlands town of, partisans, 108

Humiéres, Louis de Crevant, marquis French fortified town and seat of de, French marshal, 33, 67, 75, 91, government of French Flanders,

93, 99, 101-103, 127, 129, 147, 51, 57, 59, 79-80, 82-83, 87, 91, 157, 159, 161, 171-72, 164-69, 95, 99-102, 110, 127, 157, 164, 182, 185, 190, 206, 231-32, 244, 182, 210, 223, 227, 233, 243, 246-47, 249, 260, 264, 280-88, 247, 249-50, 263, 266, 280 292, 299-300, 302-03, 305-06, 309, estates of (traditional assembly of

312, 315-14 castellany of Lille), 83, 127,

Huy, Liégoise town of, 28, 138, 144, 231-32, 236, 243-44, 264

155, 238, 241 Limbourg, Spanish town of in Meuse River Valley and duchy, 29, 84,

intelligence gathering, 182-87 137, 139-40, 143-44

122-23 183

Linck, Fort de (Spanish fort), 33, 299

Jacob, French ensign and partisan, Lippe, count of, Dutch commander,

James, duke of York, brother of Lisola, Baron of, imperial diplomat, 48 Charles II, king of England, 35 livestock, 181, 202, 207-212, 229, 271 Julich, Imperial territory of, 29, 108, Longueval, French captain, 183

137, 140, 174-75, 177 loot, see prizes

340 INDEX Lorraine, imperial duchy of, 22 matchlock (musket), see weapons Lorsi, Spanish cavalry commander at Maubeuge, town of, 6, 33, 44, 302,

Valenciennes, 253 311

Louis XIV, king of France. (Louis Maulevrier, Colbert, French intendant,

appears throughout this study, and 188

has been omitted here.) mayors, 232-33

Louvain, Spanish Netherlands’ city of, Mazeick, Dutch (French) town of,

84, 138, 140-42, 183 94—95, 97, 125

Louverste, castle of, 300 Mechelen or Malines, Spanish

Louvignies, baron of, Spanish general Netherlands town of, 140, 163, 314

of cavalry, 35, 241-42 Melac, French colonel of cavalry, 123,

Louvois, minister of war. (Louvois 135-137, 145, 205-06

appears throughout this study, and Menin, French fortified town of, 244

has been omitted here.) Mercure Hollandows, 153

loyalty oaths, 74-78 Meuse River, 73, 101, 144-45, 147, Luneburg, duke of, 22 156, 186, 204, 209, 218, 227, Luxembourg, Francois-Henri, duc de, 237-38, 240-42, 246, 267 French marshal, 20, 30, 36, 39, Mignard, Pierre, French painter, 21 71-72, 94-95, 185-86, 191, 202-03, militia (local forces), 56, 95, 142,

306, 312 159-62, 165, 216, 228, 237,

Luxembourg, duchy and city of, 51, 57, 240-43, 267, 316, 325 149, 155, 222, 225, 243, 245, 267 Milot, Jean, historian, 327 Lynn, John, historian, 2, 6-8, 325 Mongobert, sieur de, French partisan, Lys River, 100, 227, 237, 243-44, 267 109 Monmouth, English duke of, 38

Maastricht, Dutch (French) fortress of Mons, and French bureau of contributions fortified Spanish town of, 31-32, 36,

of (from 1673), 16, 21-23, 25, 39, 67, 69, 155, 194, 206, 210, 28-29, 47, 51, 55, 60-2, 80, 84, 89, 279-280, 283, 290-92, 294,

94-95, 97, 98, 100, 109-110, 115, 314-16

120, 123, 132, 136-50, 154-56, blockade of, 271, 276, 311-314, 316,

171-72, 174, 177, 204, 206, 215, 326

218, 224, 233, 249, 261, 267, ‘Monsieur’, (see Orléans duc d’)

277-78, 289 Montal, comte de, French commander

Mairson du Roi, 4, 26, 306 of Charleroi, 114, 184, 187, 190,

Madaillon, sieur de, lieutenant 218, 239, 280-81, 288, 291-92, 303, governor of Philippeville, 92, 246 305, 312

mandement, 54 Montalto,

Maqueline, French colonel of Piedmont duke of, 165

Regiment, 156 Spanish regiment of, 160 commander, 275 93, 253, 255-56, 298

Marlborough, duke of, English Montbron, French governor of Arras, maréchal de camp du jour, 196 Montecucolli, imperial general, 23 maréchal de logis, 112, 190, 234-35, 251 Monterey, Don Juan Domingo de

Marolais, Samuel, French military Zuniga y Fonseca, count of,

architect, 273 governor-general of the Spanish

Marzelle, baron de, French partisan Netherlands (1670-75), 21, 23, 53,

and colonel of cavalry, 112 58, 67-68, 75, 262

Massiette, Monterey Dragoons, Spanish regiment Spanish governor of Enghien and of, 140

partisan commander, 191, 209-10, Mormal, forest of, 77

284 Moselle River, 22, 102, 148-49, 245

Spanish governor of Luxembourg Mossay, Jean, historian, 6 and brother of above, 209, 222, mousquetons (blunderbusses and

241-43, 284 shotguns), see weapons

INDEX 341 Mouzon, town of, 36 parti de guerre, 3 Miulheim, castle of, 147 parties bleu, 128

Mystere, Jean de, Spanish intendant of partisans, 3, 94, 102-116, 126-130,

contributions at Nieuport, 228 140, 170, 240, 244

passports, regulation of and sale of,

Namur, Spanish Netherlands fortified 60-69, 124, 128, 151, 225 town of, 121, 186, 195, 218-19, Pellisson, Paul (1624-93, royal

222, 239, 241, 305 historiographer, 1, 53, 168, 187,

Nancré, comte de, French lieutenant 189, 197, 254, 307

general, 58, 71-72, 115, 132, 152-3, Perien, chevalier de commander of

164, 226, 234-35, 278, 286, French fortress of Mazeick, 94, 125 288-90, 293, 303, 312 Peronne, French fortified town of, 254,

Neubourg, Spanish Netherlands duke 294

of, 245-46 Pertuis, comte de, governor of

New York, colony of, Courtrai, 103-104, 182-83, 209, 245 Nieuport, Spanish town of, 38 petite guerre, 2, 4, 179, 181 323

Nimegan, Philip [V, king of Spain, [3

Dutch town of, 184, 188 Philipeville, French fortified town of

negotiations at and Peace of (10 and bureau of contributions, 47, 57,

August/Franco-Dutch and 17 92, 186, 204-06 September/Franco-Spanish), 35, Picardy,

39, 86, 133 , 177 French province of, 13, 243, 317

Nivelle, Spanish Netherlands town of, regiment of (see under Regiments)

312 Pio Regiment, imperial regiment, 146 pistols, see weapons

officiers reformés, 158 plans en reliefs, 274

Oise River, 230 plat pays, 23)

Ophem, comte d’, Spanish intendant plunder, treatment of, see prizes of contributions at Ypres, 58, 83 posts, 147, 237, 244, 270-71, 274, Orléans, Philippe I, duc de, brother of 278, 297, 309 Louis XIV, known as “Monsieur”, prisoners, 124, 187-93, 299, 308

34, 270, 294, 310-11 prizes, adjudication of, 129-30,

Orrery, Roger, earl of, author of A 269-70 Treatise on the Art of War (1677), 5

Ortiz, d’ (d’Orties), French Quiévrain, town of, 302

109 255, 295

commander, garrison of Bapaume, Quesnoy, French fortified town, 236,

Osnabrtick, bishop of, duke of Quincy, baron de, 31, 38, 110-111,

Brunswick, Ernest Augustus, 35-36, 260, 255-58, 265, 271, 283, 294-95,

39 297-98, 302-03, 305, 308, 319

Ostende, Spanish Netherlands town of,

38, 51, 222 Rabenhaupt, Karel, Dutch general, 27,

Oudenaarde, French fortified town of 132-33, 188 and bureau of contributions, 27, raison d’état, 14 51-52, 73, 76, 92, 95, 136-37, Ravacouts, castle of, 147 150-52, 154-55, 157-60, 164, 177, Redlich, Fritz, historian, 6

191, 222-24, 227, 233, 247, 250-51, redoubts, 58, 156, 159-62, 231, 237,

255, 260, 280, 283, 286, 289, 311 240, 243-44, 271, 273, 302, 325 regiments, French cavalry,

Pagan, comte Blaise Francois de, Arnolfiny, 290 French military architecht, 273 Bezons, 176

Palaiseau, marquis de, French governor Bridieux, 258-59

of Charleville, 241 Calvo, 253

Parker, Geoffrey, historian, 8, 275 Corsica, 93

Parrot, David, historian, 320 Cravattes, 166

342 INDEX Gendarmerie, 196 Piedmont, 145, 156, 182, 286

Des Roches, 253 Royal Roussillon, 245

Gournay, 183 Vaisseaux, 196

Hocquincourt, 259 Renel, marquis de, colonel of

Langon, 196-97 dragoons, 185, 196 La Reine, 190 reprisals, 216, 260-66 Lusbourg, 290 Rhine River, 19, 22

Marzelle, 112 Richebourg,

Melin, 98, 145 marquis of, Spanish governor of Orléans Regiment, 153, 166 Valenciennes, Condé, 187, 226 Prouville, 290 sieur de, heutenant in French

Quincy, 110 Piedmont Regiment, 286

Ramilly, 293 Robert, Louis, sieur de, zntendant de

Royal Piedmont, 251 Varmée and intendant of contributions

Ruvignies, 202 at Dunkirk, 47, 177, 210-12 Saint Aoust, 196, 201 Rochefort, Henri-Louis d’Aloigny, Saluce, 93 marquis de, French marshal 1675,

Servon, 293, 312 29-30, 149-50

Tilladet, 197 Roger’s Rangers, 18th century partisan

Warnin, 119 formation in North America, 122

regiments, French dragoons, Roncherolles, marquis de, French Fusiliers of Flanders, 99, 107-08, commander, 210

159-60, 190 Rousset, Camille, historian, 2, 306 Colonel-General, 202 commander, 141-3 Dauphin, 196, 202 Rowlands, Guy, historian, 2, 9, 274 Fincaron, 202 Royal Cravates, Spanish dragoon Lauzier, 137-38 regiment of, 112 Melac, 94, 123 Roye, French fortified town of, 254

Brétesche, 105, 140 Rouvré, chevalier de, French dragoon

Montal, 84 Ruyter, Michel de, Dutch admiral, 22

Montbron, 176

Nancré, 293, 312 sabotage, 47, 159, 233-36 Nonant, 94 safeguards, Pertuis, 103-04, 110, 112, 209 Company of Royal Safeguards,

Rencher, 104, 301 French military formation, 71-72, Renel, 185 225 Rouvré, 94, 98, 142, 299 administration of French, 70-74

St. Sandoux, 99, 166, 287, 290 St. Géniez, French fortress commander

Vierzet, 107-108 of Douai, 66, 251

Violaine, 92, 159-60 St. Ghislain, 36, 164, 288, 290, 304, 313

regiments, French infantry St. Omer,

Bourbonnois, 94 Spanish fortified town of, 33-35,

Burgundy (partisans), 86, 106, 150, 249, 254, 269, 279, 298-99

161-62 blockade of, 269-72, 288-311, 326 Carignan, 94 army, 72-73, 192, 208-09 Conti, 161-62 St. Pouenges, French intendant of the

Du Roi, 196, 249, 286 St. Quentin, town of, 4, 211, 229-30, Fusiliers (of the artillery), 196 240, 252, 256, 267

Jonzac, 94 St. Sandoux, French governor of La Marine, 28, 94, 98, 140 Tournai, 99, 232

Montpezat, 282 Saint Venant, French fortified town of Navarre, 166, 196 and bureau of contributions, 47 Normandy, 92, 207, 282 Sambre, River, 204, 212, 227, 229, Picardy, 1, 94, 196, 286 238, 240, 291-92, 302

INDEX 343 Sandras, Gatien de Courtilz de, Souches, count of, Imperial general,

journalist and historian, 2, 4 26, 27, 68, 186

Santerre, French region of, 254 Southwald Bay, naval battle of (see Scarpe River, 208, 227, 237, 248-49, Sole Bay, naval battle of)

267, 295 sples, see esplonage

Schelde River (see Escaut River) Stavelot, county of in Spanish

Schomberg, Frederick Herman Netherlands, 115, 143

(Fredéric-Armand), duke of Stenay, French fortified town of, 242

(1615-90) French marshal, 32, 33, strategy, of exhaustion (also attrition, 202, 204, 277-78, 292, 298-99, 306 war-as-process), 5, 9, 319

Selles, castle of, 272 Stuvaert, Jean-Baptiste, Spanish

SIEGES, 236, 244

Séviené, Mademoiselle de, 26 intendant of contributions at Ypres, Aire, French siege of, 277, 299 Sweden, kingdom of, 18 Argenteau, French siege of (1674), swords, see weapons 26

Bonn, Allied siege of (1673), 23 tactics, used in partisan warfare,

Bouchain, French siege of (1676), 116-25

31, 192, 294 Talon, French intendant of

Burick, French siege of (1672), 18 contributions at Oudenaarde, 47, Cambrai, French siege of (1677), 51, 61, 73, 86, 137, 260-61

34, 307-08 taxes (domestic impositions) used for

Charleroi, Dutch siege of (1672), 21, war finance, 51-52, 240

23 Temple, Sir Wilham, English diplomat, 313 Texel, naval battle of (21 August

Charleroi, Dutch siege of (1677), 36, 13

Condé, French siege of (1676), 31, 1673), 22

291-93 Theux, French raid on, 28

Ghent, French siege of (1678), Thérése, Marie de, queen of

37-39, 276 France, 13

Grave, Dutch siege of (1673), 27, Thionville, French fortified town of

29, 109, 133 and bureau of contributions, 47, 55,

Maastricht, 61, 99, 127-28, 150

French siege of (1673), 2] Tielst, Spanish Netherlands town of, 153 Dutch siege of (1676), 32, 277-78, ‘Tirlemont, Spanish Netherlands county

298 of, 132, 140, 156, 172-73

Navagne, French siege of (1674), 26 ‘Lorcy, baron of, Spanish commander,

Oudenaarde, Alhed siege of (1674), 259, 298

27 Tournai, French fortified town of and

18 249, 280

Orsory, French siege of (1672), 18 Tournésis, 38, 79, 99, 164, 168, Rheinberg, French siege of (1672), 176, 207-10, 227, 231-33, 236, 247, St. Omer, French siege of (1677), Trésor royal, 42

34-35, 309-11 Trier, imperial electorate of, 22-23,

Valenciennes, French siege of (1677, 146-48, 201, 245

33-34, 187, 305-07 Triple Alliance, Treaty of (1668),

Wesel, French siege of (1672), 18 13-15 Ypres, French siege of, 276 Turenne, Henri de La Your

Soignies, Spanish Netherlands town, d’Auvergne, vicomte de, marshal of

281, 303 France, 13, 20-21, 23, 58, 95, 279

Sole Bay, naval battle of (7 June Tyrchelle, redoubt of, 297 1672), 20

Somme River, 221, 237, 317 uniforms, 122, 71-72 Sonnino, Paul, historian, 14 ustencile, 72

344 INDEX Utrecht, Dutch city, province, and 147, 150, 156-69, 173, 175, 288-89,

French conquest of, 19-20 292, 316, 325

Waldeck, count of, Dutch commander, Valenciennes, 183-184 Spanish Netherlands fortified town war-as-process, theory of, 320, 324

of, 4, 31, 33-34, 66-67, 74, 111, Warlin, castle of, 248-49

136, 187, 206, 211, 221, 231, wars,

236, 248, 255, 259, 266, 279-80, Devolution (1667-68), 12, 61, 263

283, 295, 317 English Civil (1642-51), 5

blockade of, 270-72, 288-311, 326 Franco-Spanish (1635-59), 9, 13

defenses of, 272 Nine Years’ War (1688-97), 6-7,

248 276

Valicourt, French intendant of 175, 221

contributions at Lille and Douai, Second Anglo-Dutch (1665-67) 47, 54-55, 61, 66, 68-69, 78-79, Spanish Succession, (1701-1713), 7,

Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre, sieur de, Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), 13 military engineer of Louis XIV, 3-4, weapons, used in partisan warfare,

15, 21, 95-96, 118, 199, 267, 269, 116-125, 152, 188, 198, 240-41,

298, 306, 308, 322 250, 316

Vaudemont, Spanish Netherlands Westminster, Anglo-Dutch Peace of

prince of, 165, 314 (February 1674), 24

Verviers, town of, 145-46 William, Prince of Orange, 17, 20-21,

Vierzet, 26-28, 30-32, 34-36, 39, 68, 133, Liégoise baron of, 107, 261 155, 182, 185, 190, 192, 202, 207, regiment of partisans, see Regiments, 209, 212, 220, 294, 299, 310, 311,

French dragoons 313-14

Villahermosa, Witt, Cornelius de, 20

Don Carlos de Gurrea, de Aragon y Witt, Johann de, 13, 20 Borja, duke of, Governor-General Wolf, John B., historian, 2 of the Spanish Netherlands (1675-78), 38, 166, 169, 171, 224, Ximenes, sieur de, French colonel of

246, 284, 298, 305, 314 Royal Roussillon Regiment, 245

Guards Regiment of, 165 Villars, Claude-Louis-Hector, marquis Yarmouth, English town of and French

de, French marshal, 103 amphibious force, 20, 22

Vimandal, castle of, 245-46 Ypres, Spanish fortified town of, 36,

Violaine, Daniel, sieur de, colonel of 38-39, 43, 51, 58-59, 236, 244, dragoons, lieutenant governor of 247, 260, 265, 276, 300, 305, 326 Oudenaarde, 92, 106, 153, 191, 250

Voltaire, 40 Zavalas, Don Pedro, Spanish governor of Cambrai, 256

Waes, Pays de, region in Spanish Zoutleeuw, Spanish fortified town of, Netherlands, 58-59, 106, 129, 134, 38, 142, 288

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1. HOEVEN, M. VAN DER (ed.). Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10727 4 2. RAUDZENS, G. (ed.). Technology, Disease and Colonial Conquests, Sixteenth to

faghteenth Centuries. Essays Reappraising the Guns and Germs Theories. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11745 8

3. LENIHAN P. (ed.). Conquest and Resistance. War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11743 1 4. NICHOLSON, H. Love, War and the Grail. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12014 9 5. BIRKENMEIJER, J.W. The Development of the Komnenian Army: 1081-1180.

2002. ISBN 90 04 117105 6. MURDOCH, S. (ed.). Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12086 6 7. TUYLL VAN SEROOSKERKEN, H.P. VAN. The Netherlands and World War f, Espionage, Diplomacy and Survival. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12243 5 8. DEVRIES, K. A Cumulatiwe Bibhography of Medieval Military History and Technology. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12227 3

9. GUNEO, P. (ed.). Artful Armies, Beautiful Battles. Art and Warfare in Early Modern Europe. 2002. ISBN 90 04 11588 9 10. KUNZLE, D. From Criminal to Courtier. The Soldier in Netherlandish Art 15501672. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12369 5 ll. TRIM, DJ.B. (ed.). The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Miltary Professtonalism. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12095 5

12. WILLIAMS, A. The Knight and the Blast Furnace. A History of the Metallurgy of Armour in the Middle Ages & the Early Modern Period. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12498 5 13. KAGAY, DJ., VILLALON, L,J.A. (eds.). Crusaders, Condottier, and Cannon. Medieval Warfare in Societies Around the Mediterranean. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12553 1 l4. LOHR, E., POE, M. (eds.). The Miltary and Society in Russia: 1450-1917. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12273 7

I5. MURDOCH, S. & A. MACKILLOP (eds.). Fighting for Identity. Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12823 9 lo. HACKER, B.C. World Military History. Annotated Bibliography 1967-1997. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12997 9 17. MACKILLOP, A. & 8. MURDOCH (eds.). Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers c. 1600-1800. A Study of Scotland and Empires. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12970 7 ISSN 1385-7827

18. SATTERFIELD, G. Princes, Posts and Partisans. The Army of Louis XVI and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678). 2003. ISBN 90 04 13176 0 19,

20. MACLEOD, J. & P.) PURSEIGLE (eds.).. Uncovered Fields. Perspectives in First World War Studies. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13264 3 21. WORTHINGTON, D. Scots in the Habsburg Service, 1618-1648. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13575 8 22. GRIFFIN, M. Regulating Religion and Morality in the King’s Armies, 1639-1646. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13170 1