Press freedom in contemporary Japan 9781138189591, 9781138647039, 9781315626222, 1315626225

Pt. 1. The politics of press freedom -- pt. 2. Legal landscape -- pt. 3. History and culture wars -- pt. 4. Marginalizat

1,206 56 4MB

English Pages (xiii, 322 pages ): illustrations [337] Year 2017

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

Press freedom in contemporary Japan
 9781138189591, 9781138647039, 9781315626222, 1315626225

Table of contents :
Pt. 1. The politics of press freedom --
pt. 2. Legal landscape --
pt. 3. History and culture wars --
pt. 4. Marginalization --
pt. 5. PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion.

Citation preview

PRESS FREEDOM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

In twenty-first century Japan there are numerous instances of media harassment, intimidation, censorship and self-censorship that undermine the freedom of the press and influence how the news is reported. Since Abe returned to power in 2012, the recrudescence of nationalism under his leadership has emboldened right-wing activists and organizations targeting liberal media outlets, journalists, peace museums and ethnic Korean residents in Japan. This ongoing culture war involves the media, school textbooks, constitutional revision, pacifism and security doctrine. This text is divided into five sections that cover: • • • • •

The politics of press freedom; The legal landscape; History and culture; Marginalization; PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion.

Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan brings together contributions from an international and interdisciplinary line-up of academics and journalists intimately familiar with the current climate, in order to discuss and evaluate these issues and explore potential future outcomes. It is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand contemporary Japan and the politics of freedom of expression and transparency in the Abe era. It will appeal to students, academics, Japan specialists, journalists, legal scholars, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and those engaged in human rights, media studies and Asian Studies. Jeff Kingston is Professor of History and Director of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan. He is the author of Japan’s Quiet Transformation (2004) and Contemporary Japan (2011).

PRESS FREEDOM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

Edited by Jeff Kingston

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 selection and editorial matter, Jeff Kingston; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Jeff Kingston to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Kingston, Jeff, 1957– editor. Title: Press freedom in contemporary Japan / edited by Jeff Kingston. Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016028223 | ISBN 9781138189591 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138647039 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781315626222 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Freedom of the press—Japan. Classification: LCC PN4748.J3 P74 2017 | DDC 323.44/50952—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016028223 ISBN: 978-1-138-18959-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-64703-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-62622-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

CONTENTS

List of illustrationsviii Notes on contributors ix Acknowledgementsxiv Introduction: press freedom in contemporary Japan Jeff Kingston

1

PART I

The politics of press freedom

15

  1 Media muzzling under the Abe administration Aurelia George Mulgan

17

  2 The right-wing media and the rise of illiberal politics in Japan Koichi Nakano

30

  3 A pooch after all? The Asahi Shimbun’s foiled foray into watchdog journalism Martin Fackler

40

  4 The Hatoyama administration and the outing of the establishment media Michael Penn

56

vi Contents

  5 NHK: the changing and unchanged politics of semi-independence Ellis S. Krauss   6 Abe and press oppression: guilty, not guilty or not proven? Michael Thomas Cucek

64 76

PART II

Legal landscape

91

  7 Chilling effects on news reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society” Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

93

  8 Japan’s designated secrets law Arthur Stockwin

110

  9 State secrets and freedom of the press in Japan Kenta Yamada

119

PART III

History and culture wars

133

10 Press freedom under fire: “comfort women,” the Asahi affair and Uemura Takashi Tomomi Yamaguchi

135

11 Letter campaigns, the Japanese media, and the effort to censor history Alexis Dudden

152

12 Remanufacturing consent: history, nationalism and popular culture in Japan David McNeill

160

13 NHK, war-related television, and the politics of fairness Philip Seaton 14 Pointing the bone: a personal account of media repression in Japan Gregory Clark

172

186

Contents  vii

15 Tabloid nationalism and racialism in Japan Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

195

PART IV

Marginalization211 16 Media marginalization and vilification of minorities in Japan Debito Arudou

213

17 Media side-lines the sit‑in protest in Takae, Okinawa Akihiro Ogawa

229

18 A historical perspective on press freedom in Okinawa Hideko Yoshimoto

242

PART V

PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion

253

19 Spin over substance? The PR strategies of Vladimir Putin and Abe Shinzo Tina Burrett

255

20 Japan’s global information war: propaganda, free speech and opinion control since 3/11 Nancy Snow

274

21 The Japan Lobby, press freedom and public diplomacy Jeff Kingston

285

Index309

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures 10.1 10.2 10.3 13.1 19.1 19.2 19.3

Uemura speaking at a lecture organized by the Japan Congress Threatening postcards sent anonymously to Uemura A protest sign blaming Uemura for tarnishing Japan’s image Forms of fairness in war-related broadcasting Public approval of Abe and the LDP 2013 LDP 2012 election poster Putin approval and disapproval ratings 2013–2014

137 143 144 174 263 264 266

Tables 13.1 Special reports on Hotto Nyūsu Hokkaidō in August 2015 13.2 NHK Specials broadcast in 2015

177 178

CONTRIBUTORS1

Debito Arudou (Hawaii Pacific University and the University of Hawaii at Manoa) is an advocate for Non-Japanese residents in Japan and author of numerous academic journal articles and books, including Embedded Racism: Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination, Japanese Only: The Otaru Hot Springs Case and Racial Discrimination in Japan and Handbook for Newcomers, Migrants, and Immigrants to Japan. His regular column has appeared in The Japan Times since 2002. www.debito.org. Tina Burrett is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University, Japan. She holds a Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences from Cambridge University. Her publications include Television and Presidential Power in Putin’s Russia, Routledge, 2013; “Russia’s Competing Nationalisms and Relations with Asia” in Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered, Jeff Kingston (ed.), Routledge, 2015; “Abe Road: Comparing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Leadership of his First and Second Governments”, Parliamentary Affairs, 2016; and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Britain and Japan, 2017 (forthcoming). Gregory Clark, educated at Oxford, served as an Australian diplomat in China and the Soviet Union before resigning to protest Canberra’s Vietnam War policies. Since 1969 he has lived and worked in Japan first as a correspondent and then as an academic attached to three universities. The strong response to his 1978 book The Japanese Tribe (in Japanese) gave him an unusual access to Japanese society, details of which can be found at www.gregoryclark.net. He speaks/reads Chinese, Russian, Japanese and Spanish. Michael Cucek is a political consultant, advising clients in diplomatic, business and financial communities on Japanese politics. His blog Shisaku: Marginalia on

x  Contributors

Japanese Politics and Society was for many years a primary source of analysis and comment on the Japan scene. He is currently teaching history and politics at Temple University Japan and Waseda University. From 1992 to 1994 he was a research associate in the New York news bureau of TV Asahi, working on the production of nightly news and special reports for the network’s innovative flagship program News Station. Alexis Dudden is Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. Her work focuses on the political use of the past in the present. She is author of numerous essays, blogs and books including Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States. She is currently on a Fulbright Fellowship in Seoul researching Northeast Asia’s numerous maritime disputes. Martin Fackler is Research Fellow at the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, a Tokyo-based think tank. He worked for two decades as a correspondent in Asia, including six years as Tokyo bureau chief for The New York Times. In 2012, he was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for reporting on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Martin has written several books in Japanese, including Taming the Watchdogs: Political Pressure and Media Self-Censorship in Abe’s Japan (2016). Jeff Kingston is Director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan. He has edited Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered (2015), Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan (2014) and Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis (2012) and is author of Nationalism in Asia: A History Since 1945 (2016) and Contemporary Japan (2013). In addition to various book chapters and scholarly articles, he writes Counterpoint, a weekly column for the Japan Times. Ellis S. Krauss is Professor Emeritus at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at University of California, San Diego, where he taught for 20 years. He has published eight authored or edited books and over 70 articles on postwar Japanese politics and on U.S.–Japan relations, including a co-authored book with Robert Pekkanen, The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP: Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions (2010), and Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News (2000). David McNeill is a Japan-based journalist and academic. He writes for The Irish Times and The Economist and he was formally a correspondent for The Independent and The Chronicle of Higher Education. He is an adjunct professor at Sophia University in Tokyo and an editor of the Asia-Pacific Journal. Among his publications is the acclaimed account of Japan’s 2011 disaster, Strong in the Rain, coauthored with Lucy Birmingham. He lives in Tokyo with his wife and two children. Aurelia George Mulgan is a professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. Most recently she has jointly

Contributors  xi

edited The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy (2015) and authored Ozawa Ichiro and Japanese Politics: Old Versus New (2014). Her articles have appeared in Journal of Japanese Studies, Japan Forum, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Asia Policy, Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs and other journals. Koichi Nakano is Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University. Recent English publication includes: “Political Dynamics of Contemporary Japanese Nationalism” in Jeff Kingston (ed.), Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered (Routledge, 2015) and Disasters and Social Crisis in Contemporary Japan: Political, Religious, and Sociocultural Responses, eds. with Mark R. Mullins (2015). Akihiro Ogawa is Professor of Japanese Studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He completed a Ph.D. in anthropology in 2004 at Cornell University, followed by two years of postdoctoral work at Harvard University’s Program on U.S.–Japan Relations and Department of Anthropology. He then taught at Stockholm University, Sweden, from 2007 to 2015. His publications include The Failure of Civil Society? (2009), which won the Japan NPO Research Association Book Award in 2010. Michael Penn is President of the Shingetsu News Agency and author of the book Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US–Japanese Alliance (2014). He was born in Los Angeles, CA, and has lived in Japan for nearly two decades, working first as a university lecturer and more recently as a journalist. His main academic specialization concerns modern relations between Japan and the Islamic world. Lawrence Repeta is a professor of law at Meiji University in Tokyo. Lawrence is a member of the Japan Civil Liberties Union (www.jclu.org) and other civil society organizations. He is the author of many works on Japan’s constitutional issues, including Japan’s Constitutional Past, Present and Possible Futures, with Colin P.A. Jones, in Allison and Baldwin (eds.), Japan: The Precarious Years Ahead (2015) and Limiting Fundamental Rights Protection – the Role of the Supreme Court, in Kingston (ed.), Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan (Routledge, 2014). Yasuomi Sawa is an investigative reporter at Kyodo News. His recent work includes investigations of extreme crowding at public shelters for abused children and of the government’s failure to track the school enrollment of 10,000 immigrant children. He also covered the United Nations while posted in New York and researched British journalism at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University. He is the author of Humanising the News: the British Way of Crime Coverage. He joined Kyodo in 1990 after graduating from the University of Tokyo.

xii  Contributors

Mark Schreiber, born in the United States in 1947, is a permanent resident of Japan, where he has resided and worked most of his adult life as an advertising copywriter, freelance writer and translator. He is best known for his books on crime in Japan, reviews of English popular fiction set in Asia, and nearly 35 years of newspaper and magazine columns, covering mainly incidents and issues reported in Japan’s weekly magazines and tabloid press. Philip A. Seaton is a professor in the Research Faculty of Media and Communication, Hokkaido University, where he is the convenor of the Modern Japanese Studies Program. He is the author of Japan’s Contested War Memories (Routledge, 2007), Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border (co-edited with Svetlana Paichadze, Routledge, 2015), Local History and War Memories in Hokkaido (Routledge, 2015), and numerous articles on war, memory and heritage tourism. His website is www.philipseaton.net. Nancy Snow is Pax Mundi Professor of Public Diplomacy at Kyoto University of Foreign Studies. Snow is Professor Emeritus in the College of Communications at California State University, Fullerton. Most recently she was a Social Science Research Abe Fellow and Visiting Professor at Keio University (2013– 2015) and a Fulbright Professor at Sophia University (2012). The author, editor or co-editor of ten books, including two translated into Japanese (Information War; Propaganda, Inc.), Snow divides her time between Tokyo and Kyoto, Japan, and upstate New York. Arthur Stockwin is the emeritus professor of St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He was director of the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, between 1982 and his retirement in 2003. He is a graduate of the University of Oxford and of the Australian National University in Canberra, where he taught between 1964 and 1981. He is author of The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism, Governing Japan, and other publications. William Wetherall began life in the United States in 1941 but has resided most of his life in Japan and is now a Japanese national. An independent researcher and writer, his articles on nationality, history, anthropology, race, minorities, medicine, suicide, popular fiction, and woodblock prints; his translations of several works of Japanese fiction; and many of his own short stories and essays are published on his Yosha Bunko, News Nishikie, and Steamy East websites. Kenta Yamada is Professor of Media Law, & Journalism, Department Chair, Department of Liberal Arts & Journalism, Senshu University, 2012–; Visiting Fellow, the Human Rights Centre of Essex University, 1989–1990; Executive Director, Chair of Freedom of Expression Committee, Japan P.E.N. Club; Director, JCLU (Japan Civil Liberties Union); Director, Access-Info Clearinghouse Japan; Director, The Japan Society for Studies in Journalism and Mass Communication;

Contributors  xiii

Director, The Japan Society of Publishing Studies. Author of several books including: (in Japanese) Law of Journalism (3rd), Ho-to-journalism (法とジャーナリ ズム 第3版), Gakuyo-shobo (学陽書房), 2014; Freedom of Press, Genron-nojiyuu (言論の自由), Minerva-shobo (ミネルヴァ書房), 2013; 3.11 (Great East Japan Earthquake) and Media, 3.11-to-Media (3.11とメディア), Trans-view (ト ランスビュー), 2012; Future of the Journalism, Journalism-no-yukue (ジャー ナリズムの行方), Sansei-do (三省堂), 2011; “Encyclopedia of the Journalism, Gendai Journalism Jiten (現代ジャーナリズム事典)” (Ed.), and Sansei-do (三 省堂)”, 2014. Tomomi Yamaguchi is an associate professor of Anthropology at Montana State University. Her research has been focusing on social movements in Japan, especially feminism and conservative, right-wing movements. Her recent publications include “ ‘Gender Free’ Feminism in Japan: A Story of Mainstreaming and Backlash,” Feminist Studies, 40, no.3 (2014): 54, and a co-authored book, Umi wo Wataru Ianfu Mondai: Uha no Rekishisen wo Tou (with Nogawa Motokazu, Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Emi Koyama), Iwanami Shoten, 2016. Hideko Yoshimoto is a professor at Yamaguchi Prefectural University. Her recent book U.S. Public Diplomacy and Occupation of Okinawa: Camouflaging garrison state’s dilemma (2015) received the 43rd Iha Fuyu Okinawa Study Award. She was a Fulbright visiting scholar at George Washington University (2012–2013). She has an M.S. in mass communications, San Jose State University, California (1994) and is a member of the Kappa Tau Alpha, journalism honor society. Her research interest is U.S. information policy towards Okinawa during the Cold War.

Note

1 Orthographic note: In the text, Japanese names appear in Japanese order (surname + given name) while all contributor names are in given in Western style (given name + surname).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to all of the contributors who made time to meet tight deadlines and impart their astute analysis. Our shared concerns about the subject of press freedom and the freedom of expression in twenty-first century Japan animate this project. We are grateful also to the many journalists, media experts and others who shared their insights with us. Over the past few decades I  have gotten to know dozens of journalists and learned much from them about the world, work and life, and hope that this volume serves as a down payment on all that I  owe these hard working, curious, often questing and ever generous souls. They sacrifice much to keep us informed and deserve more appreciation for promoting good governance, transparency and accountability by shining a light in dark corners and exposing what powerful interests would prefer to obscure. This volume honors their work. Gratitude also to my colleagues at Temple University Japan, who provided support and time that enabled me to launch this project and edit this volume, especially Dean Bruce Stronach; Associate Dean Alistair Howard; Jonathan Wu, Assistant Dean for Academic Programs; and Mariko Nagai, Director of Research. Eriko Kawaguchi and Mai Mitsui have provided invaluable administrative support, while Tom Boardman, our librarian, has been helpful in tracking down material and alerting me to relevant publications. This project owes much to Leanne Hinves at Routledge, who commissioned this volume, and her colleague Lucy McClune for shepherding it through the editorial process. We are also indebted to the copy editing of Christina Tang-Bernas. Finally I  would like to thank my wife Machiko for her support and understanding, and Goro and Zoe, whose irrepressible zest for life and endearing “dognalities” have inspired and sustained.

INTRODUCTION Press freedom in contemporary Japan Jeff Kingston

In twenty-first century Japan there are numerous instances of media harassment, intimidation, censorship and self-censorship that undermine freedom of the press and influence how the news is reported. According to “Reporters Without Borders,” between 2012–2016, during Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s tenure, Japan plunged 50 places to 72nd out of 180 nations in the global ranking of media freedom. This decline is attributed to Diet passage of “special state secrets” legislation in 2013 and a series of media muzzling initiatives, orchestrated campaigns of harassment and the ousting of prominent television news anchors and commentators critical of Mr. Abe. This volatility in the rankings also reflects the very small differences that divide nations, so it is best understood as a rough indicator of an ongoing trend. Separately, in April 2016, drawing on extensive interviews with Japanese journalists, media executives and government officials, David Kaye, the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, blasted censorship, weak legal protections, press clubs and media intimidation in Japan. The Abe government’s prickly response suggested that it had no doubts about the tenor of Kaye’s quite critical assessment. Ironically, according to a small investigative journal with a solid track record of scoops, Kaye and a Japanese lawyer assisting him were subject to government surveillance during his visit that included monitoring their movements and whom they met. (Facta 2016) Allegations that the Abe administration ordered the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the nation’s spy agency, to keep tabs on Kaye suggests that concerns among media watchdogs and journalists about draconian methods that encroach on press freedom are warranted. (Fackler 2016) The two damning international appraisals of press freedom in Japan in April 2016 came on the heels of threats by Takaishi Sanae, Japan’s Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, to revoke the broadcasting licenses of

2  Jeff Kingston

television stations deemed to be biased. In Diet interpellations in February 2016, Takaishi’s warning suggested that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is taking off the gloves in the media arena. Problematically, bias is in the eyes of the beholder, and in this case the minister with power to revoke broadcast licenses implied that overly negative coverage of her party’s initiatives or record will be viewed unfavorably. She argued that her remarks were not intended as a threat, merely a statement of law, but according to UN rapporteur Kaye, drawing on Japanese legal experts’ advice, “this legal view is not dictated by the Broadcast Act itself, and second, the statement has reasonably been perceived as a threat to restrict the media” (Kaye 2016; see also Yamada Chapter 9). Timothy Garton Ash (2016) notes there are widespread threats to freedom of expression around the globe, intensified by the internet and urbanization, and makes a powerful case why these need to be thwarted, partly in order to preserve a vigorous and independent press that is the sina qua non of liberal democracy and an open society. Certainly such threats are not the monopoly of authoritarian regimes, and the techniques are not inevitably violent or draconian. In fact, there is a case to be made that insidious methods are more effective because they are harder to trace, bamboozling the credulous while providing cover for apologists and thus impeding accountability. In the following chapters none of the authors argue that the curtailment of press freedom, encroachment on the freedom of expression, purges of critical journalists or campaigns of media harassment are unprecedented, or indeed unique to Japan. But, almost all the authors believe the situation has become significantly worse since 2012 under Prime Minister Abe, as there has been an intensification of the various media fettering initiatives episodically invoked by his predecessors. If judged against its peers, in 2016 Japan was the second lowest ranked member of the Group of Seven economically advanced democracies, ahead only of Italy, and ranks just 29th in the 34-member Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, ahead of only Greece, Italy, Israel, Mexico and Turkey.

Press intimidation It is unlikely that the government would actually suspend any broadcasting licenses because it would appear overly authoritarian, intolerant and embarrassingly peevish. But just making noises about doing so sends a chilling message, a shot across the bow of an already cowering media that may constrain coverage. Takaishi’s warning came just as PM Abe announced that he is committed to revising the constitution, a highly controversial issue, as polls indicate the majority of Japanese oppose his agenda. This is reminiscent of the warning issued by the LDP on the eve of the 2014 upper house Diet elections, calling on the media to be fair and balanced; economic data was suggesting Abenomics was failing, as the economy was in recession, and household income was stagnant. There was thus concern that the media might focus on such issues and harm the

Introduction  3

ruling coalition’s election chances, so on November 20, 2014, the LDP sent a letter to broadcast networks requesting impartiality and fairness during campaign coverage and took the extraordinary step of suggesting a balance in the selection of guests, their number and speaking time. In the United Kingdom similar rules apply to broadcasters, but for Japan this explicit demand by the dominant party on the election eve smacked of political meddling and proved a source of embarrassment when revealed to the public. In 2014, the LDP’s concerns were overwrought, as the opposition was fragmented and in disarray, but in 2009 the LDP was ousted in part because during that year the media focused on how its deregulatory policies favored the wealthy and had accentuated income disparities in Japan, a message that resonated powerfully in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. (Kingston 2010) The power of the media to make or break governments is precisely why the Abe government is keen to clip the media’s wings and has been aggressive in going after its critics. For example, in an off-the-record meeting with journalists in February 2015, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, reportedly criticized an unnamed television program for bias, a warning that everyone understood was directed at TV Asahi. That same month, Koga Shigeaki, a popular television pundit, claimed he was being axed from TV Asahi’s Hodo Station news program due to his criticism of Abe. In 2015, the NHK 9 PM news anchor Okoshi Kensuke was also ousted due apparently to his critical commentary and clash with an Abe crony, while in 2016 there was a purge of other prominent newscasters and pundits critical of Abe as media organizations bowed to government pressure. (See George Mulgan Chapter 1, Nakano Chapter 2) In 2016, a cabinet minister, Yamamoto Ichita, drew further attention as the LDP’s Internet pitbull, skewering foreign journalists in social media for negative coverage of Abe. The Japan Times reported that “Yamamoto says his actions, dubbed hissatsu chokkainin (a tough guy who meddles), are not aimed at squelching freedom of the press. But critics see sinister echoes of the LDP’s notoriously heavy-handed attitude toward domestic media and the Abe government’s apparent wish to control how its policies are reported.” (Japan Times 2016)

Press clubs and beholden media The press club system (kisha clubs) embeds journalists at ministries, agencies and other organizations they are assigned to cover, enabling them to develop close ties and gain privileged access to official sources, but handicaps them from divulging much of what they know in order to maintain that access. The collaborative and sometimes collusive relationship implicit in this system precludes investigative journalism aimed at uncovering what authorities don’t want the public to know. (See Fackler Chapter 3; Nakano Chapter 2) Hence journalists pull their punches and repeat and reinforce official narratives, relying on “access journalism” and accepting the co-optation that entails. Anyone transgressing this system runs the risk of losing access and harming their career. But in clinging to this privileged

4  Jeff Kingston

access, the media suborns itself and thus becomes beholden to the officials and institutions they are supposed to cover without “fear or favor.” The same can be said of journalists in the White House Press Corps post-3/11 when for a time a patriotic haze descended and critical analysis of government policies was unofficially “suspended.” Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair famously feuded with journalists who asked tough questions and used access to punish and reward. So the criticism of Japan that follows is not meant to imply that it is uniquely guilty of hardball techniques, or that the Japanese media is alone in pulling its punches, but there is a case made here that the institutionalization of this situation is pervasive, supported by the mainstream media and the government, and quite problematic. UN rapporteur Kaye called for the dismantling of the press clubs because they undermine journalistic independence and enable the government to manage the news. In 2009, newly elected Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio announced his intention to disband press clubs, but this infuriated mainstream journalists, who enjoy the exclusive access press clubs provide, and subsequently disappointed freelancers and other non-kisha club journalists when he failed to deliver. Perhaps this helps explain why the media proved relentlessly critical and helped hound Hatoyama from office after only 10 months. (See Penn Chapter 4) Regarding the symbiotic relationship between media and government embodied in the press clubs, Kaye wrote, “The media bears a significant share of responsibility for its vulnerability. Indeed, if journalists in Japan had professional media-wide institutions of independence, solidarity and self-regulation, they would likely be able to resist with ease attempts at Government influence. But they don’t. The so-called “kisha club” system, or press clubs, value access and exclusion, to the detriment of freelance and online journalism.” (Kaye 2016) Japan’s dramatic slide since 2012 in the global ranking of press freedom issued by Reporters Without Borders may exaggerate the situation, but it is a rough barometer and, combined with several other data points, suggest that indeed the situation is worsening. Being a journalist in Japan is not dangerous like in many other countries where there is a risk of beatings, imprisonment and murder. But there are other ways to curtail press freedom and induce self-censorship, especially when editors, managers and publishers normally shun the risks associated with confronting powerful interests. The film “Spotlight” won the Oscars for best picture and best original screenplay at the 2016 Academy Awards. It is a film about the Boston Globe’s investigative journalism unit that in 2003 won a Pulitzer for uncovering a sex abuse scandal involving scores of pedophile priests in the Boston diocese and a cover-up that reached into the higher echelons of the Church. The Church, firmly embedded in Boston’s crusty establishment, tried to quash the story, but in the end the zealous reporters prevailed. Interestingly, the Spotlight team of investigative reporters discovered that their newsroom colleagues were complicit, long ignoring widespread allegations and victims offering testimony, so the Boston Globe was also exposed for abetting the Church’s cover-up.

Introduction  5

Japan could use a few spotlights, but the Establishment has the dimmer switch firmly in hand. Columbia University’s Gerald Curtis says, The big difference is that the US media stands up to power, as the Spotlight movie documents, and the Japanese media all too often kowtows to it. It is the pressure from people in senior management and middle aged reporters who want to be considered for promotion . . . who engage in censoring themselves and those who work for them . . . the salaryman mentality keeps everyone in line . . . He adds, There are many talented and courageous journalists in Japan but the media’s craven abdication of its responsibility to defend them and to protect freedom of speech is what needs to be put in the spotlight. (Interview April 2016) There might never be a Japanese version of Spotlight because Japanese journalists and their editors are so co-opted and intimidated that they dare not tackle stories that uncover systemic, institutionalized wrongdoing, and too often truckle to the powers that be. They fear that even if they did, powerful institutions could never be taken down because the judicial system is rigged in their favor. So why bother? Instead, readers are fed trivial but titillating sex and financial scandals that suggest the media is doing its job and that readers are being given “All the News Without Fear or Favor.” But are they? Publishers are wary of an unfavorable legal environment and a massive spike in financial penalties imposed on media companies in defamation lawsuits over the past 20 years – the playing field is tilted in favor of those who prefer to keep their misdeeds under wraps. (See Repeta and Sawa Chapter 7) This discourages the media from publishing stories that might provoke a lawsuit, thereby embracing self-censorship as a risk management strategy. In addition, there are also third-rail taboos in Japan that deter even the most resolute reporters and editors because the consequences can be ugly, as the Asahi Shimbun learned in 1987 when a rightist shot and killed a reporter in its newsroom. These days, newspapers are primarily businesses where accountants, lawyers and moguls rule the roost, taking some of the bite out of the watchdogs. Alas, it is a system that encourages journalists to keep their heads down, conveying little of what they know that might antagonize the powerful. And they have good reason to doubt that their employers will cover their backs in the event they do pull the trigger, as discussed below regarding the 2011 Fukushima nuclear debacle. A Japanese investigative journalist requesting anonymity, who also teaches in a university, says it may not only be a problem of a spineless media, suggesting that the public shares journalists’ deference toward authorities. Having taught undergraduate journalism, he says many students have quite negative reactions

6  Jeff Kingston

to Western-style investigative journalism. Thus, in his view, the public accedes to a co-opted media, and given this context, encourages or at least tolerates the timidity and toadying involved. Despite evident concerns over official and unofficial restrictions on freedom of expression, the Japanese public seems resigned to the situation. Indeed, a 2015 Pew Poll “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech,” indicates that only 45 percent of Japanese respondents agreed with the statement, “it’s very important that the media can report news without censorship in our country,” below all European countries surveyed and 10  percentage points below the global median of 55 percent.

Hardball In addition to the nation’s spy agency, the Abe government also relies on media organizations and right-wing groups to assail its opponents. In 2014 there was an orchestrated campaign by neo-nationalist groups denouncing the liberal Asahi newspaper for its coverage of the comfort women story, and hounding reporters with death threats, which enjoyed public support from Prime Minister Abe. (See Yamaguchi Chapter 10; Fackler Chapter 3) The media countercharge against Asahi was led by the Yomiuri and Sankei newspapers, staunch conservative supporters of Abe and his agenda. The relatively liberal Asahi has long been a powerful critic of the LDP and Abe’s revisionist history and plans to revise the constitution. For example, in 2005 the Asahi reported about Abe’s interference with an NHK documentary program about an international tribunal about comfort women and violence against women in war held in Tokyo at the end of 2000. (See Nakano Chapter 2; Cucek Chapter 6) But embarrassing powerful politicians and antagonizing conservatives eager to rehabilitate Japan’s wartime actions comes at a cost. In August 2014, the Asahi issued a mea culpa for its coverage of the comfort women story of sexual slavery, apologizing for a handful of stories published in the 1980s and 1990s that relied on the discredited testimony of a WWII veteran. The Yomiuri and Sankei pounced on this admission of wrongdoing even though they too had also published articles relying on the same fabrications. They used this issue to discredit the Asahi and to promote the revisionist narrative that minimizes, mitigates and even denies the comfort women system. The Asahi has also been a bastion of opposition to Abe’s agenda of constitutional revision and patriotic education and won the Japanese equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize for its post-2011 investigative reporting on the Fukushima nuclear disaster. This made it a target of the “nuclear village,” or proponents of nuclear power in industry, politics, government, unions, media and academia. (See Fackler Chapter 3; McNeill Chapter 12) Abe is an outspoken proponent of bringing Japan’s idled nuclear reactors back online, so Asahi’s withering coverage exposing the prevailing culture of complacency, regulatory capture and cost cutting measures that compromised public safety proved inconvenient. Despite award-winning coverage, the Asahi investigative team became embroiled in scandal over a story

Introduction  7

it wrote on May 20, 2014 that suggested the workers at the Fukushima Daiichi plant had disobeyed the plant manager’s orders and fled to the Fukushima Daini plant 10 km away. The implication was that the exodus was akin to a mutiny, and the workers had decamped because they feared for their lives, punching holes in the prevailing heroic narrative of the Fukushima Fifty selflessly doing whatever required to contain the nuclear disaster. In fact, Yoshida says his instructions were probably garbled and misinterpreted, but he never actually told workers to leave the Fukushima Daiichi site, but also did not tell them not to leave, so the Asahi overstated the situation in a somewhat sensationalist way. Given the hammering over its reporting on sex slavery, and sharp declines in circulation, management was in damage control mode. As a result, it retracted the exodus story and punished key reporters on the investigative team. This constitutes yet another example of the media being harassed by Abe’s supporters for unfavorable coverage. The commercial television station TBS has also been caught in the crossfire of Abe’s media wars. Back in 2013 it was banned from LDP press conferences because of alleged bias in its critical reporting about Abe’s energy deregulation policy. Such retaliation for one broadcast seemed excessive, and within ten days the LDP withdrew the ban, but the damage was done. The Abe administration came off looking overly sensitive to legitimate criticism and churlish in how it responds to media scrutiny. Later in 2013, Mino Monta resigned from his enormously popular TBS morning news program, ostensibly because his son was involved in a robbery incident. Mino was acerbically critical of Abe’s policies, slamming him on a daily basis, so his removal from one of the most popular morning news programs in the nation was a boon for the government, making the circumstances of his departure all the more curious. TBS woes have continued, as in April 2016 the right-wing Association of Television Viewers Who Demand Compliance With the Broadcast Law announced plans to launch a “national campaign” targeting TBS, over alleged biased reporting. (Brasor 2016) It has threatened to pressure sponsors to pull ads from the station if TBS doesn’t address the “problem.” Given the wariness of companies about courting controversy, this campaign aimed at reducing ad revenues is not farfetched. This Association, founded in 2015, claims that the network aired one-sided coverage of the controversial security bills passed by the Diet in 2015, thus violating the Broadcast Law, which mandates “fair” coverage. Fair in this sense means not critical of Abe, even though a majority of the Japanese public opposed this legislation, and there were numerous large demonstrations against it. Press freedom, however, depends on the media’s right to offer critical analysis of government policies without retribution. This campaign of intimidation targeting the station and its commercial sponsors, who don’t have anything at stake in the political battles over the security legislation, thus appears to be a blatant example of blackmail. Similarly, in June 2015 a group of young LDP lawmakers discussed how to punish the Okinawan media’s critical reporting about the Abe administration’s controversial collective security legislation that many Japanese worried would lift constitutional constraints on Japan’s military forces and put the nation at risk

8  Jeff Kingston

of being dragged into war somewhere, sometime at the behest of Washington. An invited guest to the meeting, Hyakuta Naoki, a prominent right-wing novelist and Abe crony, called for the destruction of media organizations critical of the government. The group suggested punishing recalcitrant media organizations by targeting their ad revenues by pressuring sponsors to refrain from placing ads. Such threats jeopardize the constitutionally guaranteed “freedom of expression.”

Contesting national identity Since Abe returned to power in 2012, the recrudescence of nationalism under his leadership has emboldened right-wing activists and organizations targeting liberal media outlets, journalists, peace museums, and ethnic Korean residents in Japan. (See Nakano Chapter 2; McNeill Chapter 12) This book elucidates the impact on press freedom in Japan and what this portends in terms of Japan’s identity as a constitutional democracy based on transparency, accountability and freedom of expression. The Japanese government has even taken the fight to the U.S., lobbying a textbook company in New York in early 2015 to alter its depiction of Japan’s comfort women system of wartime sexual slavery. In addition, diplomats regularly lobby editors of newspapers in the U.S. and Europe to complain about critical coverage and in one documented case tried to smear the professional reputation of a German journalist because he criticized PM Abe and his support for an exculpatory revisionist history. (Kingston Chapter 21) Reactionaries have also targeted progressive historians for what they deem “masochistic history,” trying to derail a forthright reckoning of Japan’s shared history with Asia that presents detailed accounts of Japanese wartime atrocities and misdeeds. An Open Letter with nearly 500 signatures from scholars around the world specializing in Japan was presented to the Japanese government and media in support of academic freedom, followed by a similar letter presented by 16 associations of Japanese historians. (See Dudden Chapter  11) Both letters called on the Japanese government and media to support “as full and unbiased an accounting of past wrongs as possible.” The right-wing press denounced the signatories, impugning their motives, ironically reinforcing their point. Throughout 2015, Abe’s spin-doctors worked hard to ensure that the Abe Statement regarding the 70th year anniversary of Japan’s surrender drew maximum publicity, distracting attention away from the failures of Abenomics while managing expectations in such a way that it lowered the bar of what Abe needed to say to gain kudos. Given Abe’s revisionist views, there was considerable speculation about what he would and would not say and the likely impact on relations with China and South Korea, two nations that felt the brunt of Japanese imperial aggression from 1895–1945. On August 14, 2014 the Abe statement, approved by the Cabinet, elevated a myopic and exonerating revisionist narrative of history to Japan’s official policy.

Introduction  9

The vague and ambiguous references to past misdeeds, the inadequate recognition of Japanese aggression and the horrors inflicted, the minimalist nods toward contrition and declaring an end to apologies became state policy. This marked a watershed in Japan’s postwar history that dug a deep diplomatic hole and tarnished the nation’s praiseworthy achievements over the previous seven decades. Ironically, given Abe’s intention of making a statement focused on the future, his slippery circumlocutions about history only heightened scrutiny of Japan’s wartime past and apparent perpetrator’s fatigue. There was a very interesting contrast in the 70th anniversary commemoration statements by Abe and Emperor Akihito that highlights the ongoing political divide between the revisionists and the understanding of most Japanese about how the nation got to where it is today. Citing the deaths of more than 3 million Japanese during World War II, and the deprivation that prevailed, Abe asserted: “The peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices. And therein lies the origin of postwar Japan.” This is the revisionist conceit: that all that carnage caused by a reckless war of aggression was worthwhile because it is the basis for the peace and prosperity now enjoyed by contemporary Japanese. Emperor Akihito, however, spoke for most Japanese on August  15 when he repudiated this revisionist assertion that wartime sacrifices begot contemporary peace. He said, “Our country today enjoys peace and prosperity, thanks to the ceaseless efforts made by the people of Japan toward recovery from the devastation of the war and toward development, always backed by their earnest desire for the continuation of peace.” Peace and prosperity, in the Emperor’s view, did not come from treating the Japanese people like cannon fodder during the war, but rather was based on their postwar efforts to overcome the tragedy inflicted by the nation’s warmongering leaders, who provoked and prolonged the suffering that was endured. The Emperor clearly did not honor the senseless waste of Japanese lives as the foundation of twenty-first century Japan, as the prime minister did, and instead gave credit where it was due – to the people and their relentless commitment to peace. The subtext here was a not-so-subtle suggestion that Abe is leading the nation away from this peaceful path with his legislation targeting the pacifist Constitution. This commemoration gap between Abe and revisionists, and majority opinion, is at the heart of Japan’s ongoing culture wars focusing on national identity. (See McNeill Chapter 12) Contemporary Japanese are refighting the battles of the past with the Abe government trying to promote an exonerating and valorizing revisionist history of wartime Japan in textbooks and the media that impinges on academic and press freedoms. In 2012, Abe and the LDP formally proposed that the constitutional guarantee of free speech be curtailed. This is based on their vision of Japan’s identity. They say the Constitution must be changed because it is based on western values rather than Japan’s traditional values, and thus is not suitable. In March 2016, however, Abe acknowledged that most Japanese do not support his plans to revise the Constitution, suggesting that the values and norms encompassed in this document are

10  Jeff Kingston

embraced by the nation and that his version of Japanese identity, rights and values doesn’t resonate with the people. The 2014 Specially Designated State Secrets Act provides the state with more extensive powers to withhold information and to punish those who share it and journalists who access and report about such information. (Stockwin Chapter 8; Yamada Chapter  9) The trend towards greater transparency and accountability that gained momentum since national information disclosure legislation came into effect in 2001 is being rolled back. To be sure, government censorship is far worse in China and more dangerous in many countries where journalists risk murder, incarceration and beatings, but Japan’s democratic values are under assault at a time when the government is proclaiming its shared values with the U.S. and other leading democracies. Notably, the attacks against liberals and liberal media outlets by conservative politicians and pundits have intensified in the twenty-first century. This ongoing culture war involves the media, school textbooks, constitutional revision, pacifism and security doctrine, battles that are instructive about the divisions that have long polarized Japanese society that draw on dramatically different views of the wartime period 1931–45.

Press freedom at risk What does Japan have to fear from this nationalist resurgence? This volume features contributions from academics and journalists, and some who straddle both professions, about the state of play in Japan regarding press freedom with in-depth analysis of specific issues and cases. The range of chapters covering press freedom from various angles will help students of Japan now, and hopefully enable future scholars looking back at this period, to better understand the contests over identity, nationalism and press freedom as they assess the resilience of Japan’s democratic norms and institutions. It is also important to document evident backsliding on transparency, freedom of expression and tolerance in contemporary Japan. There is no other book in English on the state of press freedom in twenty-first century Japan, and this volume addresses that need. Our project is a transnational, interdisciplinary collaboration that involves leading experts in their fields targeting an audience of undergraduates and interested observers. Our contributors have backgrounds in media studies, communications, history, political science, law and anthropology. Approaching Japan from the perspective of press freedom enables readers to better understand this complex society while interrogating some misleading assumptions and stereotypes. Given the global importance and influence of Japan, it is essential to comprehend contemporary crosscurrents involving the media and longstanding political battles over national identity and democratic values. As such, this book addresses a range of topics that are of compelling interest to students and general readers curious about a nation that will play a key role in the most dynamic region in the world, one that is increasingly affecting lives and futures around the globe.

Introduction  11

The chapters are organized along common themes as follows. Part I The politics of press freedom includes chapters by two journalists – Martin Fackler and Michael Penn – and four political scientists – Aurelia George Mulgan, Nakano Koichi, Ellis S Krauss and Michael Thomas Cucek. With the exception of Cucek, they argue that the Abe administration has engaged in a concerted campaign to intimidate the media, censor the news and promote a right-wing agenda that impinges on press freedom in significant ways that undermines Japan’s identity as a democracy based on constitutionalism and the rule of law. Cucek counters by arguing that the situation is not quite so dire and asserts that the popular backlash in defense of press freedom is a sign that democracy remains vibrant and that it is important not to exaggerate the actual impact of the Abe government’s rhetoric and initiatives on press freedom. Part II The legal landscape includes a co-authored chapter  by legal scholar Lawrence Repeta and Kyodo News editor Yasuomi Sawa, and two chapters on the 2014 Specially Designated State Secrets Act by political scientist Arthur Stockwin and Kenta Yamada, a professor of media law and journalism who has served as director of the Japan Civil Liberties Union. Repeta and Sawa explain how libel laws and privacy protection statutes in Japan constrain the media because of the potential legal liabilities, as damage awards have soared and the judicial playing field is tilted in favor of those being reported about. Stockwin examines the 2014 secrecy legislation, explaining how some analysts argue that the public discourse has been misleading and alarmist, but he also points out the potential pitfalls of handing the government so much discretionary authority without independent oversight and the risk of mission creep as bureaucrats resist transparency and accountability. Yamada explains the concept of freedom of expression in the Japanese context, drawing comparisons with Germany and how the two nations remain haunted by the legacies of the wartime past in ways that significantly differ in terms of press freedom. He also draws readers’ attention to growing intolerance towards dissent in contemporary Japan, the manner in which the judiciary and various laws have impinged on the constitutional freedom of expression, stifled the public’s right to know and how the secrecy legislation threatens press freedom, all in the name of “normalizing” the nation. Part III History and culture wars examines several cases of censorship, intimidation, vilification, discrimination and personal attacks. Yamaguchi Tomomi elucidates the orchestrated right-wing attacks on an Asahi journalist Uemura Takashi, Alexis Dudden describes the revisionist campaign to discredit academics who oppose their efforts to censor history, while David McNeill examines contests over history in pop culture and the media. Philip Seaton scrutinizes how NHK covers and commemorates wartime Japan, finding a more nationalistic programming in recent years. Gregory Clark tells his own story about being ostracized following attacks by a reactionary pundit for the Sankei newspaper. Finally, Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall examine anti-Korean nationalism, contested identities and hate speech. Part IV Marginalization shifts attention to how media coverage pushes some stories to the periphery and distorts perceptions of minorities. Arudou Debito’s

12  Jeff Kingston

chapter details how the media marginalizes and vilifies minorities by exaggerating the threat they pose to Japan as a means to bolster a xenophobic, exclusionist nationalist identity. Akihiro Ogawa focuses on a recent anti-U.S. base sit-in protest that few outside of Okinawa have ever heard of and how protestors and local residents’ grievances have been sidelined in the media and the courts. Hideko’s Yoshimoto chapter analyzes the arc of history, stretching from the U.S. Occupation of Okinawa (1945–72) to the twenty-first century anti-base movement, as related to press censorship. Part V PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion examines the PR strategies and public diplomacy efforts aimed at shaping public discourse about Japan and burnishing its image. Tina Burrett sees similarities with the media management style of Russian President Vladimir Putin, while Nancy Snow draws comparisons with U.S. President George W. Bush. Burrett explaining how Team Abe and Team Putin seek to stoke patriotism, while managing their image and nation rebranding strategies. In her view, Abe emulates rightwing parties in Europe and Putin by emphasizing national pride, social order and stability. And like Putin, Abe has curtailed press freedom and distracted the public from various shortcomings by relying on nationalist rhetoric and posturing. Public diplomacy and communications expert Nancy Snow draws parallels between Team Abe’s heavy-handed approach to the media and similar missteps by the George W. Bush Administration post-9/11. She and Jeff Kingston also analyze Japan’s public diplomacy and global information war. Snow suggests that encroachment on freedom of expression taints Brand Japan and undermines democracy. In their view, echoing the conclusions of many other contributors, the Japanese press kowtows too readily to government media minders and caves in to intimidation, while the public seems overly tolerant of a co-opted press. Kingston argues that Japan is increasingly playing hardball in the public diplomacy realm, and this has largely been counterproductive especially over history issues. In his view, caviling over memory wars focuses global attention on Japan’s worst moments, and thus Abe and fellow revisionists are unwittingly undermining Japan’s national interests and sabotaging its public diplomacy.

References Brasor, Philip (2016) “Kiss of death for press and TV freedoms”, Japan Times, April 24. Fackler, Martin (2016) “The silencing of Japan’s free press”, Foreign Policy, May 27, http:// foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/the-silencing-of-japans-free-press-shinzo-abe-media/. Facta (2016) “国連派遣「表現の自由」調査官を官邸が監視” (Prime Minister’s Office Monitors UN Freedom of Expression Investigator), Facta, 122, June, https:// facta.co.jp/article/201606009.html. Garton Ash, Timothy (2016) Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Japan Times (2016) Osaki Tomohiro, “Abe insider wages one-man campaign to challenge foreign media over reporting ‘mistakes”, April 19.

Introduction  13

Kaye, David (2016) “Preliminary observations by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression”, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, April  19, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19842&LangID=E. Kingston, Jeff (2010) Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

PART I

The politics of press freedom

1 MEDIA MUZZLING UNDER THE ABE ADMINISTRATION Aurelia George Mulgan

Dislike of media criticism has led to a crackdown on freedom of the media in both electronic and paper formats under the Abe administration (2012–). This is a worrying development that has even been picked up by the international press1 and by international organizations such as Reporters Without Borders, which moved Japan down its global “freedom of press” rankings in both 2015 and 2016 (Asahi Japan Watch 2015a; Adelstein 2016).2 This chapter  examines the Abe administration’s range of media-muzzling behaviors, its primary targets, political objectives and impact, as well as its political causes and consequences. While the strongest attacks have been reserved for the more “liberal” or left-wing media, particularly the Asahi newspaper (Asahi Shimbun) and TV Asahi, not even foreign journalists and the public broadcaster NHK are immune. In various ways the Abe administration, including Prime Minister Abe Shinzō himself, his office (Kantei) and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are pressuring media organizations across the board with a view to muting criticism of the government and engendering a distinct pro-government bias in media coverage. Their actions risk violating Japan’s Broadcast Law and even the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, press and all other forms of expression. The prime minister and his government find media criticism galling because they face so little from within the ruling party and from opposition parties in the Diet. A system of strong prime ministerial leadership has taken hold, which brooks little resistance from countervailing forces, including media critics.

Types of media muzzling The list is long of the media-muzzling behaviors to which the Abe administration has increasingly been prone. It includes: interpreting media criticism as “unfair”

18  Aurelia George Mulgan

coverage, calling for “fair and neutral [namely uncritical] reporting,”3 labelling criticism of the government and its policies as media “bias,” complaining directly to television broadcasters about the content of their programs, intimidating media organizations by threatening to put pressure on their sponsors, summoning and then grilling media executives about their broadcasts, making angry protests to political reporters about critical coverage of the prime minister’s handling of particular issues, objecting to curb-side interviews and refusing to grant media interviews4 or to appear on TV programs until broadcasters apologize, threatening media organizations with action under the Broadcast Law,5 and calling for restrictions on newspapers that oppose the government’s policy.6 In addition to these “sticks,” the government has used “carrots” to win over media companies and representatives, granting exclusive interviews and scoops to certain favored newspapers7 and inviting executives and journalists to enjoy the prime minister’s hospitality, including meals and golf outings.8 Another less obvious but potentially effective form of media muzzling has involved the exercise of influence over staff appointments to commercial and public broadcasting companies.9 Such behaviors are not unique to the Abe administration in Japan nor internationally (Kingston 2015a) but are now setting the tone of government-media relations in Japan. In comparison with previous administrations, not only have cases of government guidance to broadcasters increased, but the Abe administration also stands out for its aggressive interference in media coverage, for its paranoid response to criticism (Iinuma 2015) and for its attempts to intimidate media critics. These developments have prompted a slew of criticism from a range of expert and academic observers. For example, Sugita Atsushi, professor of Political Science at Hosei University, observes, “The current administration is making too many interventions in the media. These could curtail even the public’s expressions of political opinions” (Asahi Japan Watch 2014). In a similar vein, professor of Media Studies at Hosei University, Mizushima Hiroaki, comments, “The Abe administration has shown a pronounced stance of monitoring the media and complaining about ‘slanted’ reporting when it does not suit their intentions” (Asahi Japan Watch, 2015c). Former editor in chief at Newsweek Japan, Takeda Keigo, went further, saying, “The Abe government is showing an obsession with the media that verges on paranoia . . . I have never seen this level of efforts to micromanage specific newspapers and TV programs” (Fackler 2015). Even the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun has called on the government to “refrain from heedlessly interfering in the content of programs” (2016). Moreover, it is a partisan organization – the ruling party – that is frequently in the front line of actions calling the media to account. Tahara Sōichirō, a wellknown MC for news programs for many years, describes this behavior as “interference in the press by political power” (Tahara, Ōtani and Kamematsu 2015). In fact, as Ōishi notes, “intimidating TV shows on the grounds of fairness and justness is something of a ‘forte’ for the LDP – the LDP has developed ‘wiles’ in a long history of using this tactic” (2015), which he describes as “repetitive interference” and “groundless tyranny” (2015).

Media muzzling under Abe  19

One egregious example was the letter sent in late November  2014 by the director-­general of LDP’s Information Bureau, Fukui Teru, to TV Asahi complaining about “unfair” coverage of Abenomics after its calls for newspapers and TV stations to “show fairness” in their coverage during the run-up to the 2014 Lower House election. As Mizushima points out, it was unprecedented for the ruling party to act in this way by making specific complaints about a particular program, which he characterized as “a sort of threat” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015c). Subsequently in April 2015, the LDP’s Research Commission on Information and Communications Strategy summoned executives from both NHK and TV Asahi to question them at LDP Headquarters about the contents of their respective Close-Up Today (Kurōzuappu Gendai) and Hodo Station (Hōdō Sutēshon) programs respectively. NHK was accused of “staging” the program on Close-Up Today, while the issue for TV Asahi involved perhaps the most celebrated case of apparent political interference, forcing the Abe administration to deal with accusations that it pressured TV Asahi to drop outspoken guest commentator, Koga Shigeaki, from Hodo Station (Firstpost 2015). In this particular episode Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide appeared to be in the frontline of both applying and then denying any pressure on the media (Asahi Japan Watch 2015c). Koga had mentioned Suga by name and said that there was pressure from the Kantei regarding his leaving the program, which Suga completely dismissed (Mainichi Shimbun 2015a). The interference was condemned as “excessive political intervention” (Mainichi Shimbun 2015b) for the purpose of “[giving] the impression that the government and ruling party were monitoring the TV stations and would issue complaints for the purpose of ‘intimidating’ all broadcasters” (Tanaka 2015). In reality, both programs involved issues in which the ruling party should not have interfered and where it should have been left to the broadcasters to investigate for themselves (Tahara, Ōtani and Kamematsu 2015). The news anchor for Close-Up Today, Kuniya Hiroko, was subsequently removed from her position because, it is speculated, she conducted a probing interview of Suga on the subject of the new security legislation (Australian Financial Review 2016; Kingston 2016).10 Such pressure is likely exerted with the full knowledge, if not the tacit encouragement, of LDP President Abe Shinzō whose “glass jaw” is fully on display in his personal relations with journalists and media organizations (George Mulgan 2015). As assistant professor of Political Science at Bunka Gakuen University, Shirai Satoshi, observes, “[Abe] is refusing to accept criticism from citizens and the media. Such an attitude is not suitable for a prime minister” (Asahi Japan Watch 2014). Even in the Diet, Abe’s glass jaw is evident in the face of embarrassing statements and questions from opposition party members; he retaliated with verbal barbs and heckled his opponents while condemning their similar behavior. Abe’s acute sensitivity to anything that smacks of criticism reflects a disrespect for the role of an independent media in the democratic process in enforcing government accountability and an unenviable predisposition to retaliate with complaints, counter-attacks and other kinds of defensive action (Brasor 2014). His conduct displays ignorance of the difference between state power and the media

20  Aurelia George Mulgan

whose job it is to check that power. In fact, in this and other respects, such as its rejection of the constitutionalist view that state power should be scrutinized and checked by citizens, the Abe administration displays a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic politics, press freedom and of human rights as natural and universal (Iinuma 2015).11

Primary targets While no newspaper or broadcaster is necessarily immune, there is no doubt that the prime minister, his government and the ruling LDP have reserved their strongest attacks for the left-wing media, particularly the Asahi newspaper and TV Asahi, which are known to be critical of Abe and the LDP (Iinuma 2015).12 Asahibashing has even progressed to the point where a university came under threat for appointing to an academic position a former Asahi journalist who had reported on the Japanese “sex slave” issue. (See Yamaguchi in Chapter 10) The attacks have also extended to the foreign media in a way that is pointed and personal, and puts the Foreign Ministry in the position of chief instrument of the Abe administration’s “denial diplomacy” on war history issues. A journalist from the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) who left Japan in April 2015 described “the suffocating atmosphere for reporters under the Abe administration” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015d) after coming under attack from the Foreign Ministry for having published a critical story about the Abe administration’s “revisionist view of history” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015a). In a similar episode, the Tokyo correspondent of an American newspaper received an email from an official at the Japanese Embassy in Washington criticizing the journalist’s source of comments on wartime sex slaves (Takeda 2015).

Political objectives and impact Given these developments, it is difficult not to conclude that the Abe administration and LDP are trying to “control the message,” cow the media into submission and silence criticism of the prime minister and his government. (See Nakano Chapter 2) In particular, it seeks to intimidate those sections of the media whose basic political stance is one of fundamental opposition to the government’s conservative policy agenda, especially on issues involving the constitution, Japanese defense, nuclear power, human rights and so on. As Fackler (2015) argues, the aim is to ease the path for policies that have not garnered broad popular support such as rewriting the constitution, expanding the scope of military action by the country’s armed forces and restarting nuclear power plants. While the Abe government’s media-muzzling attempts have been counterproductive internationally (See Kingston Chapter 21; Kingston 2015a), ­self-censorship by domestic media critics is becoming more apparent amongst those now more inclined to “play it safe” by yielding to pressure from the administration and ruling party and by confining coverage to reporting that is either bland or broadly

Media muzzling under Abe  21

supportive of the government, while omitting material that could be construed as critical.13 As an editorial in the Mainichi Shimbun opines, “the media now tends to surmise [what the administration wants] and cower” (2015a). Tahara describes the process as “the mass media today . . . [becoming] extremely ‘weak-kneed’ . . . cowering even before the political powers actually exert any pressure. Their cowering is allowing the administration to take advantage of them” (Tahara, Ōtani and Kamematsu 2015). Even the formerly outspoken Hodo Station is avoiding the risk of official ire by censoring its coverage of events and moderating its criticism of the government (Fackler 2015).14 Its popular frontman for a decade, Furutachi Ichirō, has also left the show. Such a response from the media runs the risk of their crossing the line from “watchdog” and guardian of the public interest to “lap-dog” or even “pet dog,” where broadcasters and newspapers become mere publicity agents for or protectors of government interests.15 (See Fackler Chapter 3) In the latter role, the Japanese media fails to undertake one of the primary duties it has under the Broadcast Law to disseminate accurate information to the public at large, another key function in a democracy.16 These days, the public broadcaster NHK, particularly under its Abe-appointed chairman, Momii Katsuto, tends to act as more of a PR organ for the government despite being required by law to operate independently of pressure from political authorities (Morris-Suzuki 2005; also see Krauss Chapter 5).17Although NHK is scrupulous in obtaining cross-party commentary on key political issues and policies,18 it has been known to omit from the news, items that might be considered embarrassing to the Abe government (Hopkins 2014). Abe and NHK have a history, given NHK’s submission to Abe’s previous interference in the program it ran on the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal in 2001. As chief cabinet secretary at the time, Abe met with senior NHK staff to discuss the content of the documentary due to be aired on the tribunal. In the wake of Abe’s visit, crucial alterations were made to the content of the program, which a media whistleblower revealed resulted directly from pressure from Abe and the Minister of Economy and Industry at the time, Nakagawa Shōichi (Morris-Suzuki 2005). The episode revealed a system of “reverse accountability” in which the public broadcaster behaved as if it were accountable to key politicians and the government of the day, instead of holding them to account. (See Krauss Chapter 5) At the time, Abe very successfully shifted the focus of debate from the issue of political intervention in NHK to the need for “fairness and balance” in journalism, a principle to be selectively applied only to programs, articles or media organizations adopting politically critical positions. (See Seaton Chapter 13) The upshot was a media pushed by the government further to the right, with critical voices subdued or self-censored out of fear of political retribution (Morris-Suzuki 2005). Abe made a similar accusation about the NHK Close-Up Today program, saying it was at fault for falsifying its news report and thus violating the provisions of the Broadcasting Law, particularly Article 4, which states that “reporting shall not distort the facts” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015e). The Minister of Internal Affairs and

22  Aurelia George Mulgan

Communications, Sanae Takaichi, had also issued an admonition to NHK on the matter (Asahi Japan Watch 2015e). For these actions, the government and ruling party were later rebuked by the Broadcasting Ethics and Program Improvement Organization (BPO), which concluded that they were “ ‘nothing but pressure’ on NHK’s broadcasting freedom and autonomy” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015e). Moreover, Article 4 is a guideline for self-regulation by the broadcasters, not grounds for intervention by or interference from the government, particularly as Japan’s broadcasting system is essentially a self-regulatory (jishu kisei) one. Indeed, Article 5 of the law stipulates that broadcasters “shall stipulate standards for the editing of broadcast programs . . . and edit the broadcast programs in compliance with such” (Asahi Shimbun Digital 2015). The purpose of the law is to have broadcasters create their own editing standards based on the guidelines provided in Article 4 (Asahi Shimbun Digital 2015), and in this context, the BPO is the primary body for self-regulation, having been established by NHK and the Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association. Even the BPO may not be immune from government interference, however, given a suggestion from the LDP for the government to intervene in the organization by having government-related personnel and former bureaucrats join the body for the purpose of “solving problems” that may arise in the future (Jiji Press 2015). Ironically, in its attempts to stifle media freedom, it is the current Abe government itself that is at risk of violating Article 1 of the Broadcast Law, which guarantees independence for broadcasters in order to ensure freedom of expression.19 Moreover, Article 3 of the law prescribes that “Broadcast programs shall not be interfered with or regulated by any person except in cases pursuant to the authority provided for in law,” which is relevant where the LDP takes upon itself the right to make requests and thus pressure broadcasters. This provision, as Ōishi (2015) points out, “calls for political and social authorities not to interfere with or regulate broadcasters through non-regular routes.” The Abe administration may even be at risk of violating Article 21 of the constitution that underpins freedom of expression.20 (See Repeta and Sawa Chapter 7; Yamada Chapter 9)

Political causes and consequences The Abe administration finds media criticism extremely galling because it faces so little from within the ruling party itself and from the opposition parties in the Diet, who are overwhelmingly weak. Within his own party, the prime minister is in a very strong position as the result of leading it to victory in four elections, which have delivered the ruling coalition two-thirds of the seats in both houses of the Diet. The anti-mainstream faction within the LDP has virtually disappeared, so there is no anti-Abe faction or any force that is critical of Abe in the party (Tahara 2015). The anti-mainstream faction traditionally guaranteed diversity of views on major issues and “prevented the party from getting out of control” (Tahara 2015). The lack of such a faction these days means that there are no “relentlessly critical eyes” (Tahara 2015) in the party that would counter the mainstream group on issues such as Abenomics and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense,

Media muzzling under Abe  23

and so there is no heated internal party debate on these issues. The strongest internal party rebellion gets is requests from backbenchers for the Kantei to advance reform cautiously. The situation has been described as “Abe the all-powerful” (Yomiuri Shimbun 2015a). Abe’s unassailable position in the party and strong policy momentum is giving rise to a top-down system of “Kantei rule” where the prime minister’s office has seized the policy initiative and become the “single strong body” (kantei ikkyō) in the policymaking process (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2015). In fact Japan’s very much more powerful executive under Abe is bordering on a presidential, even authoritarian, style of prime ministership. Central to this is the “spin control” by which the Kantei attempts to control the media and “crush” inconvenient media sources by various means (JFN Online 2015). The strengthening of the power of the prime minister and his office resulting from the political and institutional reforms of the previous decade or more has been conducive to this development, which has made it easier for Abe to use his power more blatantly and even subdue factions within the ruling party (Asahi Shimbun Digital 2015). The prime minister and Kantei’s dominance over the ruling party is matched by its dominance over the bureaucracy. The Yomiuri reports that the new Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs established in May  2014 is “one of the marquee features of the Abe administration’s drive to promote ‘initiative by the Prime Minister’s Office’. The bureau oversees the personnel affairs of roughly 600 administrative vice-ministers, bureau chiefs, deputy bureau chiefs, and other senior staff at central government ministries and agencies” (Yomiuri Shimbun 2015b). Power of appointment is designed above all to ensure a more compliant bureaucracy. These institutional developments reinforce the features of Abe’s personality and political style that result in such patent attempts to control the media. Abe has very strong policy views, is articulate and skilful at marketing them and brooks no opposition to them from any quarter. If anything, he and the Kantei are impatient with the political process and prone to punishing those who stand up to him. Tashiro Yōichi, professor of Ōtsuma Women’s University, alleges that one of Abe’s four faces is that of “a bully who ignores customary rules and different opinions to pursue his own passion and interests and tenaciously and insidiously bullies and retaliates against those who defy him” (JAcom 2015). As for the party structure, it is a case of “one strong; many weak” (ikkyō tajyaku), without a single, strong, credible major opposition party in the DPJ. Diet management is not a problem given the ruling coalition’s two-thirds majority in the Lower House and majority in the Upper House, while within the ruling coalition itself, the Kōmeitō is a moderating but uncritical force.

Conclusion Media muzzling has become particularly salient under the Abe administration with several prominent cases capturing both domestic and international attention. Although parallels exist internationally and with previous Japanese governments,

24  Aurelia George Mulgan

the concerted nature of the Abe administration’s attempts to pressure and retaliate against the media in both printed and electronic form, particularly commentary critical of the prime minister, his party and policies, are of particular concern. All arms of the government appear to be involved, including Abe himself as prime minister and LDP president, the ruling LDP, prominent Kantei personnel such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga, and the relevant ministers. In the face of such concerted political pressure, the media is already showing signs of moderating their criticism and a significant weakening of their independence from government influence. Indeed, the government’s hardline strategy and targeted retaliation against perceived media criticism appear to be working, with meek submission now characterizing the response of broadcasting and other media companies to the atmosphere of intimidation that prevails under the current administration. Such developments seriously question the extent to which Prime Minister Abe and his political allies understand the critical importance of an independent media in enforcing government accountability in a democracy.

Notes 1 An article in the New York Times reported on the apparently successful attempts of the Abe administration to intimidate the media (Fackler 2015). Similarly, an article in the South China Morning Post gave extensive coverage to allegations of Japanese journalists being muzzled by the Abe administration (Ryall 2015). 2 The reason why the French-based Reporters Without Borders lowered Japan’s ranking to 61st in 2015 was because of the possibility that journalists could face jail under the State Secrets Protection Law that took effect in December  2014. The American non-government organization, Freedom House, also expressed concern about curbs on freedom of the press in Japan for the same reason (Asahi Japan Watch 2015a). In 2016 Japan’s ranking fell a further 11 places to 72nd, even lower than Tanzania (Adelstein 2016). In contrast, the 2010–2012 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration was so open about making information public that Japan rose to No. 11 in the ranking of freedom of press (Uesugi 2014). Given current trends under the Abe administration, however, it is likely that Japan’s ranking will fall even further. See also below. 3 In November 2014, the LDP sent “letters of request” to NHK and major commercial TV broadcasters in Tokyo calling for “fair and neutral” reporting on the election (Asahi Japan Watch 2015b). The letters even went into detail about the selection of guest speakers and themes, how much time should be allocated to each of them and the way in which curb-side interviews should be used so as not to place disproportionate emphasis on one-sided views etc. The Japan Federation of Commercial Broadcast Workers’ Unions subsequently criticized the LDP for urging this action saying, “We strongly protest the ruling party’s intervention in (media) reporting” Asahi Japan Watch (2014). Even an editorial in the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun observed that “The government has adopted the unified view that a program introducing only specific candidates during an election . . . lacks political fairness” (2016). See also below. 4 In June 2013, for example, the LDP protested that Tokyo Broadcasting System’s news program “News 23” “was not fair or just” and notified the station that it would refuse to respond to any interview requests from the program. The LDP’s refusal was lifted only when the News Bureau Chief wrote a letter of apology saying, “we will take the matters that the party pointed out seriously” and pledged that they would provide “fair and just coverage” (Egawa 2015). 5 This has included making references to possible contraventions of the law and to the government’s authority to stop broadcasters from broadcasting through its power to

Media muzzling under Abe  25

6

7 8

9

10 11 12

grant and revoke broadcasting licenses. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC) is the relevant regulatory and supervisory authority under the Broadcast Law (and Radio Law) and can take action against broadcasters through its power to grant broadcast licenses every five years. In February 2016, for example, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Takaichi Sanae, threatened to close down broadcast stations that failed to observe rules on political impartiality. The government also exercises direct and indirect authority over the public broadcaster NHK. It appoints members of NHK’s board of governors and NHK’s budget is approved by the Diet, which means that the Diet “holds the power of life or death over NHK” (Tanaka 2015), and as long as the LDP has a Diet majority, NHK “cannot revolt against the ruling party” (Tanaka 2015). Moreover, MIAC and NHK have a special relationship whereby staff are exchanged between the two organizations (Tanaka 2015). All these forms of state power and influence over both public and private broadcasters make them “institutionally susceptible to political influence” (Mainichi Shimbun 2015a). In June 2015, LDP politician Ōnishi Hideo told an internal party Culture and the Arts Roundtable (Bunka Geijutsu Konwakai), whose members were close to Abe, that the best way to punish media organizations was to cut off their advertising revenue and that he wanted approaches to be made to the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). He had two newspapers in Okinawa in mind, given their opposition to widening the security role of Japan’s military forces. In the light of these comments, the managing editor of one of the newspapers, Shiohira Yoshikazu, expressed concern about Japan’s shift towards totalitarianism and away from democracy. The polarization of newspapers into conservative and liberal poles was consolidated after the inauguration of the second Abe administration in December 2012, particularly as a result of these kinds of “newspaper-controlling tactics” (Shūpure News 2014). Brasor (2014) reports that during Abe’s first two years in office, he had dinner with the heads of media organizations more than 40 times, including the Asahi Shimbun. Iinuma (2015) also reports that the chairman of TV Asahi, Hayakawa Hiroshi, is said to be close to Abe and was attempting to distance the broadcaster from the Asahi Shimbun. The pro-government bias in the programming of the public broadcaster, NHK, has been attributed to the personnel decisions for the position of chairman (Momii Katsuto) and members of the Board of Governors (e.g. ultraconservatives such as Hyakuta Naoki and Hasegawa Michiko) being made “under the auspices of Prime Minister Abe” (Shūkan Posuto 2014). A  member of the board of governors described Abe’s interference in the selection of Momii as “something of a different dimension [from the ‘Abe-coloured’ personnel decisions such as the Bank of Japan Governor and ­Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau]” (Sentaku 2013). The reason was that “Abe is trying to change NHK into a station that is convenient for him. He threatens political neutrality and the freedom of the press and threatens the very foundation of democracy” (Sentaku 2013). As for commercial TV stations, Kishi Nobuo’s son, Abe’s nephew, joined Fuji TV as a staff member in 2014, which gave rise to speculation because Abe is considered to be close to Fuji TV Chairman Hieda Hisashi. Finance Minister Asō Tarō’s nephew joined TBS earlier, also prompting comments that “TV stations are becoming filled with the relatives of executive members of the administration” (Shūkan Posuto 2014). She was one of four TV news anchors who either left or were removed from their positions in 2015–16. See Kingston 2016 for detailed coverage of Kuniya’s departure from NHK in April 2016. Another manifestation of this is the LDP’s constitutional reform draft, which would exempt actions that “harm the public good or public order” from the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech. Brasor (2014) describes the Asahi newspaper as “the only national daily to fulfill at least part of its mission to speak truth to power.” Kingston (2015b) also reports that there was a concerted campaign by conservative media rivals to discredit the Asahi in 2014, which was supported by Abe and reactionaries.

26  Aurelia George Mulgan

13 Self-censorship in the Japanese mass media is not a new phenomenon and is said to arise from a lack of appreciation of the significance of freedom of expression (Matsui 1990). McNeill (2014) reports on the media self-censorship evident in the coverage of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown and the nuclear industry more generally. He also notes that because Japan’s media is highly concentrated and dominated by six major companies, it is highly susceptible to political pressure. This suggests that media selfrestraint and vulnerability to political pressure are not phenomena that have emerged under the Abe administration but are institutionalized in Japan. However, McNeill has also been quoted as saying that under the Abe administration, “Japanese news organizations seem to have become excessively cautious about criticizing the powers that be at a time [when] some outlets have effectively turned into Abe supporters” (Mori 2014). 14 Perhaps even more pernicious has been the atmosphere of “closed conformity” that such attacks have created not only amongst media players but also amongst the broader public, extending even to the content of educational textbooks, where publishers are facing pressure to keep to the official line on subjects like the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and the treatment of sex slaves by Japanese armed forces during WWII (Fackler 2015; Iinuma 2015). 15 See also Morris-Suzuki 2005. 16 Article 4 of the Broadcast Law “prescribes that [broadcasters must ensure] that their broadcasting is politically fair, does not distort the facts and clarifies the points at issue from many angles where there are conflicting opinions” (Mainichi Shimbun 2015a). See also below. 17 Momii is widely quoted to have once said, “The NHK is the branch office of the Kantei.” 18 Brasor (2014) describes NHK as “doctrinaire in its dull-as-dirt even-handedness.” 19 Professor Emeritus at Nihon University, Kotake Tetsuya, explicitly argues that the administration and ruling party are contravening Article 1 of the Broadcast Law (Asahi Japan Watch 2015f). Article 1 defines the law’s objective as “to ensure freedom of expression through broadcasting by guaranteeing the impartiality, truth and autonomy of broadcasting” and to “enable broadcasting to contribute to the development of sound democracy.” 20 Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other forms of expression. However, in practice, it is restricted by numerous statutes, which have been upheld by the Supreme Court, and hence is not sufficiently protected against government infringement in Japan (Matsui 1990).

References Adelstein, Jake (2016) “How Japan came to rank worse than Tanzania on press freedom”, Los Angeles Times, April 20, www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-japan-press-freedom20160420-story.html. Asahi Japan Watch (2014) “Abe, LDP becoming prickly with media reporting on Lower House election”, November  29, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/ AJ201411290046. Asahi Japan Watch (2015a) “Editorial: Ministry’s ‘public relations’ with foreign media tarnishing Japan’s reputation”, April  29, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/views/editorial/ AJ201504290070. Asahi Japan Watch (2015b) “Editorial: LDP’s intervention in broadcasting unacceptable”, April 17, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/views/editorial/AJ201504170037. Asahi Japan Watch (2015c) “LDP targeted TV program on ‘Abenomics’ while calling for neutrality”, April  11, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/AJ2015 04110041.

Media muzzling under Abe  27

Asahi Japan Watch (2015d) “German journalist’s parting shot to Abe over press freedom causes stir”, April  28, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/AJ2015 04280075. Asahi Japan Watch (2015e) “Abe rejects watchdog’s criticism of government pressure on NHK”, November  11, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/AJ2015 11110036. Asahi Japan Watch (2015f) “LDP panel targets TV station that aired criticism of Abe’s office”, April 18, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201504180043. Asahi Shimbun Digital (2015) “(Genron kūkan o kangaeru) Seiji kenryoku to media, Sogabe Masahiro san, Kanehira Shigenori san, Nishida Ryōsuke san” [“(Thoughts about forums of speech) Political authority and the media, Sogabe Masahiro, Kanehira Shigenori, Nishida Ryōsuke”], April  28, http://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S11727802. html?iref=comkiji_txt_end_s_kjid_DA3S11727802. Australian Financial Review (2016) “Tokyo brooks no opposition, especially in the media”, February 20. Brasor, Philip (2014) “Abe isn’t impressed with media criticism”, Japan Times, December  27, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/27/national/media-national/abe-isntimpressed-media-criticism/#.VmzJ3YRLdUM. Egawa, Shōko (2015) “Seiken gawa kara no rokotsu na terebikyoku e no atsuryoku to wa? Hōsute mondai o kangaeru” [“Open pressure on TV stations from the administration? A thought on the Hodo Station issue”], Mulan, April 8, www.mulan.tokyo/article/72/. Fackler, Martin (2015) “Effort by Japan to stifle news media is working”, New York Times, April  26, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/world/asia/in-japan-bid-to-stifle-media-isworking.html?_r=1. Firstpost (2015) “Japanese media self-censorship grows in Shinzo Abe’s reign”, February  24, http://m.firstpost.com/politics/japanese-media-self-censorship-grows-shinzoabes-reign-2119021.html. George Mulgan, Aurelia (2015) “Abe’s glass jaw and media muzzling in Japan”, The Diplomat, May  8, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/shinzo-abes-glass-jaw-and-mediamuzzling-in-japan/. Hopkins, Steve (2014) “Horror outside busy Tokyo railway station as man calmly sets himself on fire in protest at Japan’s defence policy”, Daily Mail Australia, June 20, www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2674771/Man-calmly-sets-fire-outside-busy-Tokyo-rail way-station-protest-Japans-defence-policy.html. Iinuma, Yoshisuke (2015) “Clampdown on the media: Threatening the licenses of broadcasters”, The Oriental Economist Report, 83(5): 11–13, May. JAcom (2015) “Sagaken chijisen to Nōkyō ‘kaikaku’, Tashiro Yōichi, Ōtsuma joshi daigaku kyōju” [“Saga gubernatorial election and JA ‘reform’, Tashiro Yōichi, Professor of Ōtsuma Women’s University”], January  22, www.jacom.or.jp/proposal/pro posal/2015/proposal150122-26313.php. JFN Online (2015) “Hōdō sutēshon no Koga Shigeaki shi no kōban mondai” [“The issue regarding Koga Shigeaki’s leaving Hodo Station”], April 22, From the podcast “Sādo pureisu Gekkan Uesugi Takashi Nyūsu no mikata [“Third Place: Uesugi Takashi’s Way of Reading the News”]. Jiji Press (2015) “Jiji dottokomu: Terebi Asahi ni ‘chūritsu’ yōkyū  =  sakunen 11 gatsu, ‘Hōsute’ mondaishi  – Jimin” [“Jijicom: LDP demands ‘neutrality’ from TV Asahi, views issue regarding ‘Hōdō Sutēshon’ last November as problematic”], April 20. Kingston, Jeff (2015a) “Foreign media feels the heat from prickly government minders”, Japan Times, May  2, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/02/commentary/ foreign-media-feels-heat-prickly-government-minders/.

28  Aurelia George Mulgan

Kingston, Jeff (2015b) “Testy Team Abe Pressures Media in Japan”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, April 16, http://japanfocus.org/events/view/251. Kingston, Jeff (2016) “Hiroko Kuniya’s ouster deals another blow to quality journalism in Japan”, Japan Times, January  23, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/01/23/ commentary/hiroko-kuniyas-ouster-deals-another-blow-quality-journalism-japan/#. VsppXISRBUN. Mainichi Shimbun (2015a) “Shasetsu: Terebikyoku chōshu, Seikentō wa kainyū o hikaeyo” [“Editorial: the questioning of TV stations, The ruling party should refrain from interfering”], Mainichi Shimbun, April  17, http://mainichi.jp/articles/20150417/ org/00m/040/005000c. Mainichi Shimbun (2015b) “Listening: Dai 2 kai: Kenryoku ni yoru kainyū to teikō = Kyōtodai kyōju Satō Takumi” [“Listening: No. 2: Intervention by the authorities and resistance = Professor of Kyoto University Satō Takumi”], May  14, http://mainichi.jp/journalism/listening/news/20150514org00m070003000c. html. Matsui, Shigenori (1990) Freedom of Expression in Japan, Paper presented to the XIII Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Montreal, Canada, August  19–25, http://faculty.allard.ubc.ca/matsui/articles/Freedom%20of%20Expres sion%20in%20Japan.pdf. McNeill, David (2014) “Japan’s Contemporary Media”, in Jeff Kingston (ed.), Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan. New York and London: Routledge, 64–75. Mori, Mayumi (2014) “Japanese media fall behind Western journalists in criticism of racism”, Asahi Japan Watch, October 8, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/ AJ201410080059. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2005) “Free speech  – Silenced voices: The Japanese media, the comfort women tribunal, and the NHK affair”, Japan Focus, August 13, www.japan focus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/2305/article.html. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2015) “ ‘Kantei shudō ga irokoku, 16 nendo yosan’an, san’insen e gyōkai hairyo” [“Strong characteristics of Kantei’s leadership, Budget proposal for fiscal 2016 shows consideration for industries in preparation for Upper House election”], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December  25, www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLZO9552 0470V21C15A2EA1000/. Ōishi, Yasuhiko (2015) “Jimintō Abe seiken, kyōgaku no hōdō kainyū & genron dan’atsu! Ki ni iranakereba terebikyoku chōshu ya shuzai kyohi” [“LDP and the Abe administration’s astonishing interference in the media and suppression of free speech! They refuse to respond to interviews and inquiries if they are not happy”], Business Journal, April 22, http://biz-journal.jp/2015/04/post_9687.html. Ryall, Julian (2015) “Japanese journalists are being muzzled under Abe, warns media commentator”, South China Morning Post, April 21, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/ article/1770137/japanese-journalists-are-being-muzzled-under-abe-warns-media-com mentator. Sentaku (2013) “Kantei ga mokuromu ‘NHK shihai’ ‘jiki kaichō jinji de’ ugomeku Kasai Yoshiyuki” [“Kantei eyes ‘controlling NHK’, Kasai Yoshiyuki takes covert action in relation to the ‘personnel decision for the next chairman’ ”], October, www.sentaku. co.jp/category/politics/post-3044.php. Shūkan Posuto (2014) “Kantei terebi shihai shinkō, Shushō no oi ga Fuji nyūsha, Asō shi oi wa TBS zaiseki” [“Kantei’s control of TV progresses, Prime Minister’s nephew joins Fuji TV, Asō’s nephew is part of TBS”], March 28, www.news-postseven.com/ archives/20140320_246386.html.

Media muzzling under Abe  29

Shūpure News (2014) “Bōshi beteran kisha ga keishō! Abe Kantei no ‘shinbun shihaijutsu’ de kiken na bundan ga sen’eika shite iru” [“A  veteran reporter for a paper rings warning bells! A  dangerous separation is intensifying as a result of the Kantei led by Abe’s ‘newspaper controlling tactics’ ”], September  17, http://wpb.shueisha. co.jp/2014/09/17/35800/. Tahara, Sōichirō (2015) “Tahara Sōichirō ‘Nishikawa Kōya shi ni hihan no koe ga agaranai Jimintō no bukimi sa’ ” [“Tahara Sōichirō ‘The eeriness of the LDP that does not criticise Nishikawa Kōya’ ”], Shūkan Asahi, March  13, http://dot.asahi.com/ wa/2015030400085.html. Tahara, Sōichirō and Ōtani, Kōta (Blogos editorial department), and Kamematsu, Tarō (2015) “Ima no terebi wa ‘yowagoshi’, seiji kenryoku ni tsukekomu suki o ataete iru ~ Tahara Sōichirō” [“TV today is ‘weak-kneed’ and allowing political powers to take advantage ~ Interview with Tahara Sōichirō”], Blogos, April  17, http://blogos.com/ article/110279/. Takeda, Hajimu (2015) “Ministry contacts foreign correspondent about source in ‘comfort women’ article”, Asahi Japan Watch, April  28, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/ behind_news/politics/AJ201504280084. Tanaka, Yoshitsugu (2015) “Kenryoku no media kainyū wa itsu de mo doko de mo aru’ [“Intervention in the media by the authorities exists anytime and anywhere”], The Journal, April 20, http://ch.nicovideo.jp/ch711/blomaga/ar774750. Uesugi, Takashi (2014) “Nyūzu Opuedo” [“News Op Ed”], November 29, www.youtube. com/watch?v=Q2TLTB8V1Uk. Yomiuri Shimbun (2015a) “Abe’s power play/Prime minister adept at handling personnel matters of factions”, March 8, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001985893. Yomiuri Shimbun (2015b) “Abe’s power play / Suga overcomes party objectors, bureaucracy”, March 9, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001987799. Yomiuri Shimbun (2016) “Autonomy and fairness essential to ensure freedom of broadcasting”, February 15, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002749936/.

2 THE RIGHT-WING MEDIA AND THE RISE OF ILLIBERAL POLITICS IN JAPAN Koichi Nakano

As we try to make sense of the rise of illiberal politics with a particular focus on the role played by the media, it is of utmost importance that we first take a look at the historical roots of two of the most striking features of press-state relations in modern Japan. First, there is the extraordinarily close tie between the press and the state, in terms of both personnel and money. Second, as the state divided and conquered the press by making the most of these intricate ties, key concepts that the state agents mobilized in their attempt to silence the media critics have been “impartiality” (fuhen futō), “neutrality” (chūritsu), and “fairness” (kōsei). As Sasaki Takashi argued, “Ever since their inception, Japanese newspapers have had the character as devices for the dissemination of information for the government or power, and while there has been some changes in the appearance, that character remains essentially unchanged.” (Sasaki 1999: 8–9).

Late-development and the press According to Sasaki, there are three ways in which the Meiji state can be said to have “sponsored” the press in its early years. First, the state practically subsidized the press by purchasing a large number of copies (Sasaki 1999: 46–47). Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun (today’s Mainichi Shimbun) as well as Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun (later absorbed by Yomiuri Shimbun) benefited from such arrangements. Amounting to as much as twenty-five to thirty per cent of the revenue, this was no negligible amount of de facto subsidy for the fledgling papers. Second, the government appointed some papers, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, for instance, as the semi-official conveyors of its news releases (dajōkan goyō) – a practice that boosted the sales of such papers (Sasaki 1999: 48–49, 84–87). This continued on until the founding of Kanpō as the official news media (of laws, ordinances, and personnel appointments) in 1883, which led to a nearly forty per cent drop in the

Right-wing media and illiberal politics  31

circulation figures of Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun. Third, secret government funds were also provided as subsidies to such newspapers as Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun, Jiji Shimpō (founded by Fukuzawa Yukichi), and even Asahi Shimbun for several years (Sasaki 1999: 80–84, 90–95). It is well-known that, as a late-developing country, the Japanese state often played a leading role in founding and nurturing such various key industries as banking and steel, but it is of great interest that similar patterns of state-led modernization were to be found in the news industry as well. In early modern Japan, most of the newspapers fell into either of the two categories – “big papers” (ō shimbun) that engaged in political debates from strong partisan standpoints, or tabloid-like “small papers” (ko shimbun) that traded in gossip and entertainment. In that context, the Meiji state sought to nurture newspapers that would disseminate information and lead the public opinion from a pro-government standpoint, but overtly pro-government newspapers were not very popular, and consequently, limited in their influence (Sasaki 1999: 42). As a result, the government attempted to assist the establishment of a new genre, the “medium papers” (chū shimbun) that report seemingly “neutral” news. The eventual success of Mainichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun placed these “neutral” medium papers in the mainstream of the newspaper industry in Japan. Moreover, the intricate ties between the state and the press were not limited to (often covert) financial support from the former to the latter. The personnel connections were as extensive, and far more overt. For instance, the pro-government Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun was particularly close to the Chōshū clique, and by 1891 it was under the direct control of Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru. The paper was headed by Itō Miyoji, chief secretary of the Privy Council and trusted aide to Itō Hirobumi – in secret, because it was against the law for an official to hold another office in the private sector. Reacting to this move, Matsukata Masayoshi of the Satsuma clique countered by founding Keisei Shimpō, in spite of the fact that he was then prime minister. Overall, Mainichi Shimbun (both Osaka Mainichi Shimbun and Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun) has at times invited bigwig politicians and bureaucrats to serve as its president (former premiers Hara Takashi and Katō Takaaki, for instance), while Asahi Shimbun (both Osaka Asahi Shimbun and Tokyo Asahi Shimbun) developed extensive relationships with former bureaucrats of the Ministry of Interior in particular. The Yomiuri Shimbun, an old “small paper” that was acquired by Shōriki Matsutarō, an ex-elite police bureaucrat, eventually grew to become the newspaper with the largest circulation in the whole world.

Continuities and changes in the postwar era Once Asahi Shimbun, the last national paper to remain critical of militarism, shifted its position and began contributing to the war effort after the 1931 Manchurian Incident, press freedom and truthful reporting of news disappeared from Japan. What is striking, however, is the fact that all of the major national dailies

32  Koichi Nakano

that have been referred to in this chapter survived the postwar reforms and disruptions intact. In other words, the U.S. Occupation forces (1945–52) disbanded none of the papers that actively collaborated with the wartime regime and none saw fit to close themselves as an act of contrition. Ogata Taketora, the public “face” of Asahi Shimbun in the prewar period, not only served as a state minister and president of the intelligence bureau in the final years of the war, but also continued to rise up the political ladder as chief cabinet secretary and deputy prime minister, as well as ascending to the presidency of the Liberal Party, once he was de-purged following the end of the occupation in 1952 and resumption of Japan’s independence. Shōriki, too, swiftly regained control of the Yomiuri newspaper/ Nippon TV empire after his de-purging and went on to become a member of the Diet, an active promoter of nuclear power, probable CIA asset, and a minister of the Science and Technology Agency. The newspapers themselves, in general, became more liberal and more critical of state power in the newly democratized Japan, but some of the old habits that developed during the wartime persisted in the postwar era. The much criticized press club (kisha kurabu) system is an obvious case in point. The wartime government tried to control the media by organizing them into press clubs, and as one of many institutional continuities in postwar Japan, they survived the spate of U.S. occupation democratization initiatives as the clubs proved to be a handy way to manage the news and a cozy arrangement for the journalists as well, serving as an insiders’ information cartel. Through the club system, some of the most powerful men in the Japanese media rose and prospered. The now elderly emperor of the Yomiuri media empire, Watanabe Tsuneo, saw his career blossom in conjunction with the success of Nakasone Yasuhiro’s political career in the 1970s and 1980s. Most mainstream news organizations in Japan have not adopted a sweeping ban on journalists’ participation in government councils. It boggles the mind to think how the journalists can critically examine the government policies they actively take part in formulating in the first place. Hara Toshio, formerly of Kyodo Press, noted, The biggest sin of the press club system is not only that it is a closed information cartel, but also that the agenda-setting initiative of public debate in Japan is thus held by government ministries, parties, and big businesses. News sources thus control the news, and while the media is mobilized to lead public opinion in a certain direction, the journalists are hardly aware that that is a problem. (Hara 2009: 198) This may indeed be among the most lasting and pervasive wartime legacies, the happyō (announcement) style journalism that makes a mockery of the Fourth Estate’s presumed role of holding the government accountable. Even though news organizations today are not as dependent on the state for money or personnel as in the wartime period, the prevailing mindset is still very much one of dependency

Right-wing media and illiberal politics  33

and subordination to the state. So much of what passes as “news” in Japanese newspapers and television programs amount to mindless, uncritical announcement of government initiatives and policies.

Accusation of “bias” and demand for “impartiality” The press was generally repentant about the wartime collaboration with militarist leaders in the early postwar period and adopted a critical attitude towards the conservative government agenda. Change began in the 1970s when the Sankei Shimbun shifted to the right, adopted an overtly pro-government, pro-LDP stance, and started to criticize the other newspapers as “biased” and left-leaning (Kawasaki and Shibata 2004: 92). Further change occurred as Yomiuri Shimbun, too, began to shift to the right in the 1980s as Watanabe, a close associate of Nakasone (prime minister between 1982 and 1987), rose to take increasing control of the media empire. The fact that the press was now divided between pro-government, right-­leaning papers and critical, liberal papers is not necessarily a matter of concern. After all, it is both normal and desirable in a liberal society to have a diversity of views represented by the media. What is both interesting and worrisome at the same time in the Japanese case, however, is that a less unified media environment did not lead to a freer, more open, and more pluralistic and vibrant press culture in the subsequent years, but instead resulted in the considerable decline in press freedom that we witness today. What is key here is the specifically Japanese and highly repressive use of the term “impartial” (fuhen futō) in press history – a term that has been commonly used as a guiding principle of journalism in Japan. For instance, the first sentence in Asahi Shimbun’s mission statement prescribes that the Asahi should “affirm impartiality, uphold press freedom, and contribute to the completion of a democratic state and establishment of world peace.” Similarly, Article 1 of the Broadcast Law says “The purpose of this law is to regulate broadcasting so as to conform to public welfare and to achieve its sound development subject to the following principles: (i) To guarantee that broadcasting is disseminated to the greatest extent possible to the general public and that its benefits are achieved; (ii) To ensure freedom of expression through broadcasting by guaranteeing the impartiality, truth and autonomy of broadcasting; (iii) To enable broadcasting to contribute to the development of sound democracy by clarifying the responsibilities of the persons involved in broadcasting” (italics added). A seemingly harmless term, “impartiality” was first introduced to the Asahi mission statement in the immediate aftermath of what is called the Hakkō Incident of 1918 (Imanishi 2007: 18–24). The government was angered by critical press coverage of the Rice Riot and singled the Osaka Asahi Shimbun out, threatening to ban its publication. As the other papers also fell silent, Asahi chose the path of survival, by accepting a complete surrender to state power as a newspaper. After having replaced its top management and nearly all of its editorial board, the new

34  Koichi Nakano

editor-in-chief wrote that, having become the target of a police investigation, the Asahi “has come to realize that recent coverage and analysis seriously lacked moderation and showed biased tendencies.” (Imanishi 2007: 23). Vowing to change its ways, the Asahi adopted a mission statement that was to be shared by both its Osaka and Tokyo editions that included the following sentence: “To affirm impartiality, with a mind of fairness and selflessness, based on justice and humanity, and to aim at moderate and apposite criticism, and fast and certain reporting.” Imanishi Mitsuo points out that “the proof of the Asahi’s complete surrender was the ‘impartiality’ promised in the mission statement. This was nothing other than a pledge of loyalty that the Asahi should not engage in ‘biased criticism of the government’ ever again.” (Imanishi 2007: 24). He further points out that what made the Asahi vulnerable to government intimidation was its hidden past – that it used to receive secret funds from the government (Imanishi 2007: 24–27).

Rise of political illiberalism The first signs of the newly pluralistic and vibrant political debate in the press deteriorating quickly into an intolerant, illiberal mood came in the late 1990s, when some of the right-wing press, including the Sankei group, started to escalate the rhetoric employed in attacking what they saw as biased, left-leaning media. The attack launched represented nothing other than a closely coordinated campaign that brought certain right-wing media groups, most notably the Sankei and Bungei Shunjū groups, together with intellectuals and celebrities, religious organizations, and last, but by no means least, a new generation of conservative politicians, joined against what they saw as a “biased” media offensive to propagate an “anti-Japanese,” “incorrect,” and “masochistic” history view (Tawara 1997). What they were reacting against was the perceived “sell out” on the so-called history issues by the liberals as seen in the Kōno Statement of 1993, the Murayama Statement and the Asia Women’s Fund of 1995, and the textbook revision of 1997 that led to all the approved junior high school history textbooks have reference to “comfort women.” For them, there was an urgent need to “take Japan back.” The association for the new revisionist textbook (Atarashī Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukurukai) was launched at the end of 1996 and beginning of 1997, and the influential Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) was established in 1997. In the same year, Abe Shinzo and his associates (including Nakagawa Shōichi) also set up the Young Parliamentarians’ Group that Considers Japan’s Future and the History Education. Seiron of the Sankei group and Shokun! of the Bungei Shunjū group were both monthly magazines that provided some of the most visible media platforms for the right-wing, revisionist cause. It is not just to do with the readership itself, but also the fact that these magazines continued to place highly visible adverts in newspapers as well as on the commuter trains, exposing hundreds of thousands of

Right-wing media and illiberal politics  35

more people to the lurid headlines, thus amplifying the influence of these media vehicles. Jōmaru Yōichi showed that there was an unmistakable escalation in the pejorative language by recording the number of times the word “anti-­Japanese” (hannichi) appeared in articles in Shokun! and Seiron over the years: only 2 articles between 1969 and 1989, 6 articles between 1990 and 1994, 26 articles between 1995 and 1999, 24 articles between 2000 and 2004, and no less than 52 articles between 2005 and 2009 (Jōmaru 2011: 390). As the right-wing media reinforced this revisionist campaign, NHK (Japan’s public broadcaster) and Asahi Shimbun were involved in an incident that subjected them to considerable political pressure. This was in relation to a mock court on the “comfort women” (sex slaves) issue that was held in December 2000. As NHK prepared a documentary program around the event, Abe, then deputy chief cabinet secretary, together with Nakagawa, told the NHK management in a meeting that they expected the program to be “balanced and fair” (kōhei de kōsei), after having shared their own revisionist views on the subject (Kawasaki and Shibata 2008: 34). The exchanges between NHK management and these government politicians took place at a time NHK was seeking support for its annual budget, which needed to be approved by the Diet. As a result of direct intervention from the top management, the documentary program was tampered with almost beyond recognition before it went on air. As a whistle-blower emerged, in January 2005 Asahi Shimbun reported that Abe, a rising star and already touted as a possible successor to Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, and Nakagawa exerted pressure on NHK during the making of the 2001 documentary program. The two politicians and NHK counterattacked, and while Asahi Shimbun seemed initially ready to hold its ground, in September of the same year the paper’s president apologized that the investigation leading to the article was not thorough enough, even though Asahi’s own third-party commission on the issue concluded that the report was accurate and that there was no need for correction or retraction. Kawasaki and Shibata argue that one of the reasons why the Asahi seemed to have capitulated needlessly was to do with the persistent attack that it was “leftist and biased,” and found itself increasingly isolated. In fact, the LDP not only threatened to deny access to Asahi reporters but also set up a special project team to investigate the papers problems and scandals, past and present (Kawasaki and Shibata 2008: 52–60). At the end of the day, NHK and Asahi Shimbun, the leading news organizations of postwar Japan, fought against each other and jointly lost their reputation, and in the meantime, Sankei Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun took the position that NHK should not have made such a “biased” mock court a subject of a documentary program in the first place, and that it was only normal for the NHK management, and even the government politicians, to have intervened in the editorial process. Watanabe, chairman and editor-in-chief of Yomiuri Shimbun, wrote in Shokun! that “A decent politician with prior knowledge should naturally have demanded cuts (of interviews of former “comfort women” from the program), and if he didn’t, then he is not a suitable politician. This, and that politicians should not

36  Koichi Nakano

interfere with journalism in general, are two completely different things.” (cited in Kawasaki and Shibata 2008: 89).

NHK and Asahi Shimbun under sustained attack Thus, the period between the late 1990s and the 2000s marked a sharp rise in political illiberalism both within the LDP and the right-wing media. In retrospect, however, the worst was yet to come – at that time, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was becoming a viable alternative to the LDP, and consequently, partisan competition became increasingly vibrant. The first Abe government (2006–07) that succeeded Koizumi was short-lived in part because it was mired in a series of ministerial scandals, which the media enthusiastically reported on. As a result of the furore, the DPJ was turning into a real challenger, and when the moderate Fukuda Yasuo replaced Abe after his abrupt resignation, Yomiuri’s Watanabe tried to serve as a broker between the two parties to form a grand coalition. It was after the DPJ took power in 2009, and imploded in 2012, that the illiberal turn of both the LDP and the right-wing media reached a whole new level. The difference is significant. They not only accuse and bully their political and media rivals as “biased,” but following the virtual demise of the DPJ (and the entire opposition with it), they also now increasingly impose their view as “impartial,” define criticism as biased, and determine what constitutes “neutrality.” The electoral rout suffered by the DPJ in December 2012 created an unprecedented situation in postwar Japan, as for the first time, the country was not only left without a significant opposition party to speak of, but was also equipped with a couple of right-wing “satellite” parties of the LDP further to its right on some issues. The party system in Japan has never lacked balance to this degree, but without an opposition or an alternative to keep it in check, let alone to threaten its hold on power, the LDP under Abe could now move to dominate parts of the public sector that were until then considered to be “neutral” and “independent” from political influence. Abe, thus, proceeded to make a series of political appointments to the governorship of the Bank of Japan (Kuroda Haruhiko), the director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Komatsu Ichirō), and the chairman of NHK (Momii Katsuto) aimed at advancing his agenda. In addition to Momii, a revisionist buffoon who remarked “NHK could not possibly say left when the government says right” at his inaugural press conference, Abe also arranged the appointment of two other political cronies to the management board of NHK: Hasegawa Michiko, who eulogized the suicide of an extreme right-winger in the offices of Asahi Shimbun, and Hyakuta Naoki, a best-selling novelist and ideological chum of the Prime Minister. In spite of persistent calls for resignation from within and out NHK, Momii continues to serve as its chairman, and there is now a widely shared view that NHK news has become little more than government propaganda. (See Krauss Chapter  5; Seaton Chapter  13) Using its control over top personnel appointments and the leverage of budget approval, the Abe government has succeeded

Right-wing media and illiberal politics  37

in comprehensively co-opting NHK and imposed its standards of “impartiality” and “neutrality.” Moreover, the Yomiuri Shimbun has also shed all pretense of independent, critical reporting of news and abnegated the paper’s role as a government watchdog. It appears that, with the emergence of a serendipitous opportunity to revise the constitution, a longstanding Yomiuri objective, it decided to join the Sankei Shimbun as government cheerleader. With the ruling coalition on the cusp of achieving the two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet needed to revise the constitution, the Yomiuri’s abandonment of journalistic ethics not only tilts the playing field in favor of Abe’s LDP but also makes it a significant factor in isolating and discrediting the liberal media. With NHK firmly under control, and with the Yomiuri and Sankei newspapers as loyal pitbulls, the Abe government launched an all-out war against Asahi Shimbun – in relation to “biased” and “inaccurate” reporting on the “comfort women” issue that was based on the false Yoshida Seiji testimony in the early 1990s. (See Fackler Chapter 3; Yamaguchi Chapter 10) In reality, the Asahi was by no means alone in having based some articles on the Yoshida testimony  – Yomiuri and Sankei relied on it too. Nevertheless, the Asahi Shimbun was singled out and was made subject to a concerted campaign of vilification by the government and right-wing media, accused of having sullied Japan’s name by spreading the “misunderstanding” that the “comfort women” were “sex slaves.” Succumbing to pressure, the Asahi retracted the Yoshida testimony-related articles and issued an apology in August 2014. The Abe government is now using the Asahi apology as a weapon in its international revisionist campaign. In February 2016, at the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Japanese government representative cited the Asahi apology to make the case that there was no coercive recruitment of “comfort women” by the Japanese military, and that their characterization as “military sex slaves” in the UN Coomaraswamy Report was based on the false Yoshida testimony that Asahi propagated and therefore erroneous. Many observers would agree that the Asahi Shimbun has largely lost both its bark and bite as a watchdog, particularly on the issue of historical revisionism. Having been wrong-footed by its previous reliance on discredited testimony, the right-wing attempt to besmirch the Asahi for having smeared Japan’s reputation by spreading “inaccurate” news from its “biased” standpoint has succeeded to a substantial degree domestically – though few, if any, foreign correspondents, diplomats, and students of Japan would agree that their understanding of the “comfort women” issue was based on Asahi reports.

Government imposition of “impartiality” With NHK and, to a degree, the Asahi muzzled, and the unequivocal support of right-wing media, the Abe government successfully pushed through the controversial security legislation in summer 2015. An overwhelming majority of law

38  Koichi Nakano

scholars and a clear majority of public viewed Abe’s gambit enabling Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense as unconstitutional, but only a couple of news programs were bold enough to carefully cover the widespread civil society protest against his legislation, and those that did soon faced the LDP and rightwing media’s ire as the next targets. Hōdō Station of TV Asahi and News 23 of TBS, both evening news programs aired by private broadcasters, were noted for their temerity in offending the government by criticizing Abe’s security agenda. Both Furutachi Ichirō, who hosts Hōdō Station, and Kishii Shigetada, an anchor of News 23, had their contracts terminated as of March 2016, and many in Japan find it hard to believe that that was a sheer coincidence. Indeed, Kishii was singled out as a target of a campaign by a group of rightwing intellectuals and celebrities that placed a full-page advert, which appeared in the Sankei Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun in November denouncing him for having violated Article 4 of the Broadcast Law. The Article stipulates that the broadcasters “(i) shall not harm public safety or good morals; (ii) shall be politically fair; (iii) its reporting shall not distort the facts; (iv) shall clarify the points at issue from as many angles as possible where there are conflicting opinions concerning an issue.” Once again, the accusation centered around such concepts as “fair,” “impartial,” and “neutral.” The group calls itself the Association of Citizens who Demand the Observance of the Broadcast Law and is obviously well funded. Needless to say, the group has not so far objected to news programs that disproportionately report only on the government side of the story. It placed another expensive full-page advert on the Yomiuri in February 2016 denouncing what it claimed to be “TV totalitarianism” that infringed upon the people’s right to know by offering a disproportionately critical coverage of the designated secrets law and security legislation. As the Abe government targets formal revision of the constitution, which requires a simple majority in a national referendum (once approved by two-third majorities in both houses of the Diet), the government has reasons to further tighten its grip on public debate and crack the whip on the media. Such moves are closely coordinated by the government. Takaichi Sanae, the right-wing Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications with oversight powers over the media, instigated controversy in February 2016 as she stated in Diet interpellations that it was possible for the government to shut down a broadcaster if it deemed a news program had repeatedly violated Article 4 of the Broadcast Law – in other words, the government can judge whether a program (or a broadcaster) is sufficiently “fair.” It is not necessary to actually invoke the act because the media has been intimidated by the mere threat of action. We are, thus, dangerously close to the type of state-press relations that prevailed in the wartime era. The government gets to decide and impose what it considers to be “fair,” “impartial,” and “neutral” to the detriment of press freedom. If the press performs its designated role as the Fourth Estate and criticizes the LDP government, in the current atmosphere there is a high risk of being labeled as politically biased, with potentially dire consequences in terms of lost budget

Right-wing media and illiberal politics  39

or revenues and denial of access to government news sources at a time when the LDP appears to be the only game in town for the foreseeable future. In order to avoid such a plight, self-censorship is the safer path, denying the public the critical analysis of a free press that is the sine qua non of a healthy democracy.

References Hara, Toshio (2009) Jānarizumu no Kanōsei (Potential of Journalism). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Imanishi, Mitsuo (2007) Shimbun Shihon to Keiei no Shōwashi (Newspaper Shōwa History of Capital and Management). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha. Jōmaru, Yōichi (2011) Shokun! Seiron no Kenkyū (A Study of Shokun! and Seiron). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Kawasaki, Yasushi and Shibata, Tetsuji (2004) Kenshō Nihon no Soshiki Jānarizumu NHK to Asahi (A Review of Organized Journalism: NHK and Asahi). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Kawasaki, Yasushi and Shibata, Tetsuji (2008) Soshiki Jānarizumu no Haiboku Zoku NHK to Asahi Shimbun (Defeat of Organized Journalism: NHK and Asahi Revisited). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Sasaki, Takashi (1999) Media to Kenryoku (Media and Power). Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha. Tawara, Yoshifumi (1997) Dokumento Ianfu Mondai to Kyōkasho Kōgeki (Documentation: Comfort Women Issue and Textbook Offensive). Tokyo: Kōbunken.

3 A POOCH AFTER ALL? The Asahi Shimbun’s foiled foray into watchdog journalism Martin Fackler

On Oct. 3, 2014, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stood in the Diet to denounce one of Japan’s most prominent media institutions. “It is a fact that its misreporting has caused numerous people to feel hurt, sorrow, suffering and outrage,” Abe told members of the budget committee of Japan’s House of Representatives. “It has caused great damage to Japan’s image” (Lower House 2014). The target of the prime minister’s ire was the Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s second-largest newspaper and long-time opponent on the left to Abe’s revisionist efforts to recast World War II-era Japan in a more positive light. (See Yamaguchi Chapter 10) Abe was pressing the attack against his old nemesis after the Asahi’s sudden retraction that August of more than a dozen articles from the 1980s and 1990s about Korean “comfort women” forced to work in Japanese wartime military brothels. With these accusations, Abe was adding his voice to one of the most dramatic and revealing episodes in postwar Japanese journalism. In the months that followed the Aug. 5 retractions of the comfort women articles, the Asahi, a 135-yearold newspaper that has been a flagship of the progressive left and that prided itself on being Japan’s quality paper, fell under a withering barrage of public criticism led by the prime minister and his allies on the resurgent right. To the surprise of even many of its opponents, the newspaper seemed to surrender to its critics without much of a fight, putting more effort into displays of public contrition that included the removal of its president, punishments of journalists, and a tamping down of critical coverage. The taming of the Asahi reverberated across Japan’s media landscape, setting off a domino-like series of similar capitulations by other major news organizations that removed outspoken newscasters and commentators in a veritable purge of critical voices from the public discourse. But often lost in the emotions over wartime history is the fact that the most consequential journalistic casualty of the Asahi’s capitulation was not its decadesold comfort women coverage or even the collateral damage of sacked television

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  41

announcers. Rather, it was a major investigative article by the Asahi on a seemingly unrelated topic, the 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima that the newspaper had originally trumpeted as a historic scoop. More importantly, the embattled newspaper renounced not just the article, but a new investigative unit that had produced it along with the rest of the Asahi’s hardest-hitting coverage of the disaster. The new unit had been launched three years earlier with much internal fanfare as an effort to lead the Asahi into a new era of watchdog-style reporting. Prosaically named the Investigative Reporting Section, or Tokubetsu hodo bu, the new unit’s staff of some 30 hand-picked reporters and editors proved an instant success, winning Japan’s top journalism award two years in a row for their exposés of official disinformation and mismanagement related to the devastated Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. At the time, these accomplishments appeared to hold the promise of luring back readers who had been forsaking traditional media for the Internet. Yet in the blowup over the comfort women stories, the Investigative Section, and the scoop that was supposed to be its crowning achievement, became the biggest sacrifices offered up by the newspaper to mollify its critics. While the section was not completely eliminated, it was punished with staff cuts, a reduced output of stories, and the reassignment of its top journalists to other parts of the newspaper to hold desk jobs or write on non-political topics. Just as significantly, its remaining reporters were also waved off Fukushima, the national trauma that the section had made its name covering, and that remains far from resolved, or even fully understood. Indeed, the events in the fall of 2014 appeared to mark the demise of one of the most serious efforts in recent memory by a major Japanese news organization to embrace a more independent approach to journalism, and break away from Japan’s collusive, access-driven reporting exemplified by its so-called press clubs. The reasons for this setback are numerous. The Asahi’s retreat attests to the power of a strong and determined administration to shape opinion, at least at the elite level, and enforce conformity within Japan’s public sphere. It also bears testimony to the financial decline of Japan’s newspapers, the world’s largest by circulation, due to the Internet; rival dailies actually led the attacks on the Asahi not only to curry favor with the Abe government but also to make blatant attempts to steal the Asahi’s readers. Some elements of the story are rooted in the unique history of journalism in Japan, such as the lack of shared professional identity among reporters that let them become instruments for the nuclear establishment’s political agenda. Other elements are common to journalists outside Japan, such as the inherently disruptive nature of investigative reporting, which can lead to damaging collisions with the powers that be. Those risks were keenly experienced by the reporters of the Asahi’s Investigative Section, who said they felt surprised and betrayed when the newspaper decided to retract the Fukushima story.1 (A retraction is a complete refutation of an article; it is the most drastic action a newspaper can take against something it

42  Martin Fackler

has published.) The reporters said they had been told of this decision only hours before a snap press conference, held aptly on Sept. 11, where Asahi President Kimura Tadakazu declared the article to have been erroneous, bowing deeply in apology before a bank of flashing news cameras. Even more humiliating, Kimura also apologized to the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co., or Tepco, the company the Asahi had been criticizing for its failure to prevent the accident and keep the public fully informed in its aftermath. This was also a personal setback for Kimura himself, who had supported the Investigative Section, and who ended up resigning in December to take responsibility for the article.“We gave the impression that plant workers fled,” said Kimura, who also announced the demotion of a top editor. “We deeply apologize to readers and the people at Tokyo Electric Power Co.” A  day later, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, top spokesman of the Abe government, urged the Asahi to work harder to restore Tepco’s tarnished honor (Japan Times 2014). The article that caused this ignominy had been published on May 20, splashed across page one with the headline, “Violating Plant Manager Orders, 90 Percent of Workers Evacuated Fukushima Daiichi” (Asahi 2014). When the article ran, it was already well known that most of the roughly 700 plant workers had left during the darkest hours of the disaster, after a huge earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 caused a crippling loss of cooling power at the plant. (Those who remained behind were later dubbed the Fukushima Fifty, though the actual number was closer to 70.) The Asahi article appeared to break new ground by saying the workers had in fact fled the plant in violation of orders to remain given by the plant’s manager, Yoshida Masao. The article made an immediate splash by challenging the dominant narrative of a heroic Yoshida leading workers who risked their lives to regain control of the plant and thus save Japan. While Yoshida himself had actually defied orders from Tepco headquarters at crucial moments, the narrative of Yoshida and the valiant Fukushima Fifty saving the plant later served the nuclear industry’s purposes by giving the public the reassuring image of the plant manager firmly in control during the crisis and plant workers as selflessly working for the greater good. The Asahi article seemed to punch a hole in both of those claims by reporting that Yoshida had actually lost control of most of his plant’s workers, who the article implied had abandoned the plant for fear of their lives. Much of the article’s impact came from its source: Yoshida himself. More precisely, the reporters behind the scoop, Kimura Hideaki and Miyazaki Tomomi, two of the Investigative Section’s top journalists, had obtained a transcript of testimony that Yoshida gave to government investigators before he died of cancer in 2013. The 400-plus-page document, drawn from 28 hours of spoken testimony by Yoshida about the disaster, had been kept secret from the public. What is more, the Asahi revealed that the government was also still keeping secret the transcribed testimonies of another 771 people who had witnessed the accident or been involved in the response.2

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  43

The article was an investigative coup, a fact that the Asahi unabashedly played up in its own ad campaigns. But then in late August, as criticism of the Asahi’s comfort women coverage was reaching a crescendo, two newspapers that had openly sided with the Abe government suddenly got copies of the Yoshida transcript on Fukushima, which they used to publish page-one attacks on the credibility of the Asahi article. “Asahi Report of ‘Evacuating Against Orders’ At Odds With Yoshida Testimony,” declared an Aug. 30 headline in the centrist-conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s and the world’s largest newspaper. The Yomiuri and the other newspaper, the more right-wing Sankei Shimbun, claimed that their liberal rival had misrepresented Yoshida as saying workers had knowingly violated his orders, when in fact Yoshida said in the transcript that his orders had simply not reached them in the confusion. This criticism, which does have merit, will be discussed in more detail below. Here, it is important to note the newspapers used the Yoshida transcript to heap opprobrium on the Asahi instead of probing more deeply into the disaster itself. Nor were these attacks on the Asahi limited to newspapers on the political right. (Japanese newspapers have clear ideological leanings that make them resemble their counterparts in the openly partisan British press.) Despite the fact that it did not get its own copy of the transcript, the liberal Mainichi Shimbun still found a way to publish a front-page article refuting the Asahi’s Yoshida scoop by quoting from the Kyodo News wire service, which had obtained a copy. Thus Japanese newspapers on the right and left joined in accusing the Asahi of damaging Japan’s global reputation through its “misinformation” about the actions of plant workers, echoing the criticisms they were making at the time of the Asahi’s comfort women coverage (Mainichi 2014; Yomiuri 2014). Reporters at the Asahi say that the newspaper initially intended to defend its Fukushima scoop. They said the newspaper had gone so far as to prepare a story, scheduled to run in early September that was to have rebutted the accusations and provided additional evidence to support the article’s assertions. However, that rebuttal was never published. Instead, it was held after another public blowup, this time over the Asahi’s decision not to publish a popular columnist’s criticisms of the newspaper’s handling of the comfort women retractions. Then came the Sept. 11 press conference where the Asahi officially disavowed the Fukushima story. After that, the Asahi announced demotions and docked pay for a half dozen editors and reporters whom it deemed responsible for the Fukushima-Yoshida scoop. Top journalists in the Investigative Section were removed; Kimura, the reporter behind the scoop, received a salary cut and was given a clerical job making travel arrangements for other reporters covering political elections. The newspaper also created the Committee on Regaining Trust and Revitalization, made up of four members including a journalist, a lawyer, a sociologist, and a Nissan car executive, to find ways for the Asahi to restore its reputation. In January, the committee issued a final report declaring that the Asahi had erred by demonstrating

44  Martin Fackler

“an excessive sense of mission that they ‘must monitor authority’ ” (Trust Committee 2015). Reporters in the Investigative Section still recall the report’s conclusion as a death sentence for their unit, which the Asahi had launched in October 2011 to lead its embrace of a new approach to journalism. From the start, an iconoclastic tone was set by the new section’s first head, Yorimitsu Takaaki, a gruff, straightspeaking editor who was a rarity within the Asahi because he was not a lifelong employee, but had been hired away mid-career from a small regional newspaper, the Kochi Shimbun, for his award-winning investigative work there. Yorimitsu made waves within the newspaper by posting a sign over the new section’s desks announcing “Datsu Pochi Sengen,” or “No More Pooches Proclamation” – a declaration that his reporters would no longer be the kept pets of the press clubs, but journalistic watchdogs unafraid to go after Japan’s vested interests. Under Yorimitsu and his successor, a highly regarded senior editor named Ichikawa Seiichi, the Investigative Section’s exposés of official disinformation and mismanagement related to the devastated Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant won The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association Prize, the local equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize, two years in a row, in 2012 and 2013. Yorimitsu and the reporters under him saw themselves as waging a battle over the future of Japanese journalism. The Investigative Section was a challenge against the extreme form of insider journalism prevalent in Japan, where cozy ties between reporters and official sources are nurtured by the press club system. The clubs themselves are nothing more than rooms in Japan’s major government agencies where the journalists covering those agencies are stationed; many resemble poorly maintained faculty lounges, with rows of old desks and a few worn-out sofas, often occupied by napping reporters. The problem is not the clubs per se so much as the passive mindset that they nurture: an almost total reliance for information on official sources, who are thus able to shape coverage. As a result, big national newspapers and broadcasters tend to act as uncritical conduits for information given to them, producing coverage that reinforces the official narratives put forth by the elite bureaucrats at the center of Japan’s postwar political establishment (Freeman 2000; Fackler 2016). Such stenographic reporting is also found in other nations such as the United States, where it is called “access journalism,” a term often used derisively. Dean Starkman defines this as reporting that limits itself to “gaining inside information about the actions or intentions of powerful actors before they are widely known.” Starkman contrasts this to the competing approach of investigative reporting, which he defines as “a willingness to expose malpractitioners as well as malpractices, to challenge official accounts of official institutions, and do it while those institutions were still powerful.” In American journalism, investigative reporting’s roots stretch back to the early twentieth century muckrakers, who exposed the misdeeds of industrialist robber barons. This makes it the well-established counterbalance to access journalism; in fact, Starkman says, “the tension between

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  45

the two can be said to define the field” of journalism in the United States (Starkman 2014). While the same tension does exist in Japan, the field is much more heavily tilted in favor of access reporting. This is due to the nation’s very different historical trajectory and particularly its strongly statist formation into modern nationhood. Before World War II, the central government expanded its powers with increasingly draconian censorship laws that tamed an originally feisty press into serving as a nationalist mouthpiece for empire building and militarism. This mobilization of the media continued after 1945, albeit in less overtly coercive fashion, when major newspapers and broadcasters embraced a mission of enlightening the public about the actions of the powerful civilian ministries guiding Japan’s economic recovery. Seventy years later, and the mainstream media are an integral part of the bureaucratic-led political order that took shape in postwar Japan, sharing the same educational backgrounds and elite identities as the ministry mandarins who run the country. In this environment, it is not surprising that the ideal of the press serving as an independent watchdog on the powerful has been underdeveloped. The American experience has produced a press that, in its best moments, has embraced a more neutral, and at times adversarial, stance that requires maintaining a distance from the officials whom they seek to hold accountable on behalf of the public. The press has taken a very different role in Japan, where the society tends to envision itself not so much as a marketplace of competing interests as a community seeking unity through conformity and compromise. While Japanese journalists also express a need to monitor authority, they do so via a more cooperative model of government-media relations, in which they are literally embedded in officialdom through the press clubs. The downside is the dependence that this arrangement creates, which pressures journalists to withhold criticism or avoid politically sensitive topics that might alienate officials and other powerful actors. While Japan has had flashes of brilliant investigative reporting, such as the exposure in the 1970s of bribes to a prime minister by U.S. aircraft maker Lockheed, contentious journalism is more likely to be found outside the respectable mainstream, such as in Japan’s colorful but raunchy tabloid press. It was this extreme version of access journalism that the Asahi’s Investigative Section had set out to challenge. Reporters in the new section described themselves as loners and “oddballs” (henjin) who had failed to fit into the team-based reporting of the Asahi’s mainline Political, Economic, and Social sections. They also said that under Yorimitsu, the new section tried to hold itself to the higher journalistic standards of investigative reporting overseas, such as requiring reporters to use the actual names of people quoted in stories whenever possible, instead of the pseudonyms common in much of Japanese journalism. They said Yorimitsu gave reporters a broad mandate to range across the Asahi’s rigid internal silos in search of topics, even if that meant tromping on the toes of other sections. He also gave them the freedom to depart from the strictures of access reporting,

46  Martin Fackler

encouraging them to challenge the official versions of events put forth by powerful actors. “We could tell all,” said Watanabe Makoto, a former reporter in the section who quit the Asahi in March  2016 because he felt blocked from doing investigative reporting. “We weren’t forced to hold back to preserve relationships with sources” (Watanabe 2016). Yorimitsu called the new section the newspaper’s first venture into what he called true investigative journalism. He said that while the Asahi had assembled teams in the past that it called “investigative,” this had usually just meant being freed from the demands of daily reporting to take deeper dives into scandals and social issues. He said the new section was different because he had his journalists not only gather facts, but use them to build counter narratives that challenged the versions of events put forward by authorities. “Until 2014, the newspaper was very enthusiastic about giving us the time and freedom to expose the misdeeds in Fukushima, and tell our own stories about what had happened,” said Yorimitsu, who after the Fukushima retraction was reassigned to a Saturday supplement to write entertainment features. “We were telling the stories that the authorities didn’t want us to tell.” (Yorimitsu 2016) The new Investigative Section placed its heaviest emphasis on the Fukushima disaster. The section’s crowning achievement was an investigative series called Purometeusu no wana, or “The Promethean Trap,” a play on the atomic industry’s early promise of becoming a second fire from heaven, like the one stolen from the gods by Prometheus in Greek mythology. Since the series began appearing daily in October  2011, it has published some of the most path-breaking and ambitious reporting on the Fukushima disaster to appear in Japanese. Some of the Promethean series’ more provocative topics have included a gag-order placed on radiation experts and other scientists not to discuss the nuclear accident with the press, the first detailed reporting in Japanese on the failure of the government to release computer-generated radiation dispersal forecasts to help evacuating residents avoid fallout, and the still politically explosive question of whether or not Tepco had asked the government for permission to evacuate the plant. (Tepco says no, the prime minister at the time, Kan Naoto, says it did.) The Promethean series also spawned some larger investigative articles, including an exposé of shoddy practices and corner-cutting in Japan’s multi-billion dollar radiation cleanup that won the 2013 Newspaper Association award. These were promising accomplishments for a new section that had been created to regain readers’ trust after the Fukushima disaster. In the months following the accident, which spewed radiation over a large swath of northeastern Japan, the Asahi and other news organizations faced growing public mistrust for their initial failure to challenge official cover-ups of the reactor meltdowns and their dangers. This prompted what appeared to be genuine soul-searching at the Asahi that led to the Investigative Section’s creation. At the same time, the new section was not cut from whole cloth. It was actually an upgrade of an earlier push into investigative

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  47

reporting by the Asahi begun in 2006, after a bruising clash with Abe that in hindsight appears a harbinger of the more dramatic events of 2014. In January 2005, the Asahi had reported that Abe, then a rising Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker and young revisionist firebrand, had pressured Japan’s national broadcaster, NHK, into censoring a TV news program on comfort women. Abe pushed back, saying the Asahi got it wrong, a charge that seemed to get support when NHK also denied the accusation. Forced to justify its article, the Asahi appointed a third-party committee to look into its report; in July, the committee concluded that while the article appeared to be generally correct, the newspaper had made errors, including a failure to do sufficient reporting to back up its claims (Jacobson 2005). Unlike 2014, however, the Asahi reacted to the NHK blowup by deciding to strengthen its investigative coverage. Until that time, investigative journalism had been an irregular function of the Shakaibu, or Social Section, which was mainly responsible for crime and local coverage much like the Metro Desk at a large U.S. newspaper. The Social Section’s last truly significant investigative accomplishment had been in 1988, when it exposed insider stock trading by politicians in what became known as the Recruit Scandal. To lead a new push into investigative reporting, the newspaper turned to Sotooka Hidetoshi, a mild-­ mannered, charismatic former New York and London correspondent who had risen to become the Asahi’s general editor. In April  2006, Sotooka created an independent Investigative Team comprising of about ten journalists who reported directly to him. The Team’s first big story was an uncovering of accounting fraud by major electronics companies; when those companies threatened to pull advertising if the story ran, Sotooka said the Asahi’s top management stood behind him and his team. “We realized that in the Net era, independent, investigative journalism was the only way for a newspaper to survive,” Sotooka recalled in an interview (Sotooka 2015). Indeed, the digital revolution was finally catching up to Japan’s newspapers, whose enormous circulations had at first seemed to be protected behind the invisible barrier of the Japanese language. While a real sense of crisis would not grip the industry for a few more years yet, the trend lines were already clear by 2006, with circulation numbers in a gradual but inexorable decline. The Asahi, which had peaked with a circulation of about 8.4 million in 1997, was slipping below 8.0  million, according to the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulations. (The rate of decline accelerated after Fukushima and then again after the 2014 scandals, dropping to 6.6 million in the second half of 2015. It is a similar story at the Yomiuri, which has seen circulation fall from more than 10 million to 9.1 million, according to Audit Bureau figures.) According to Sotooka and others, the Asahi’s response was to try to differentiate itself from its rivals by aspiring to be Japan’s quality paper, including an increased emphasis on watchdog reporting. It took a step in this direction in December 2008, when the newspaper’s president at the time, Akiyama Kotaro,

48  Martin Fackler

decided to hire Yorimitsu, then a 51-year-old nationally known investigative reporter. This was an unorthodox move by a company that tended to employ only young recruits fresh out of college. It also required persistent courting of Yorimitsu, who was skeptical of the Asahi’s commitment to investigative reporting. A year later, he was put in charge of the new investigative unit, which was also renamed the Investigative Reporting Center in 2009. But it was the Fukushima disaster, and the resulting wave of public distrust, that proved the biggest spur. Seven months after the accident, the investigative unit was enlarged and elevated to a “section,” or bu, within the newspaper’s organizational hierarchy, putting it on par with the bigger, more established Political and Social sections that have traditionally vied for control of the newspaper. “The Asahi Shimbun believes such investigative reporting is indispensable” for its future, President Kimura declared in an annual report in 2012, the year he took over as president. The new investigative section “does not rely on information obtained from press clubs, but rather conducts its own steadfast investigations that require real determination” (Asahi Shimbun 2012). But the section’s successes also contained the seeds of its downfall. Within the newspaper, Yorimitsu’s “no more pooches” proclamation was seen by many journalists in more established sections as an arrogant dismissal of their work. There was also resentment over what was seen as the privileged treatment given the new section by President Kimura. The Investigative Section made powerful enemies outside the newspaper as well for its refusal to observe the increasingly narrow boundaries being placed on mainstream media coverage of Fukushima via the press clubs. The Promethean series continued to put a daily spotlight on the grim realities on the ground around the devastated plant, including the plight of evacuees and radiation-related health concerns, that the nuclear village and its political allies would just as soon the nation forget. As a result, the Investigative Section was falling out of synch with other national media, whose coverage increasingly reflected an elite consensus that it was time to move beyond the accident and return to the pre-Fukushima norm. These differences became particularly acute after the pro-nuclear Abe administration took office in December 2012 with plans to restart Japan’s idled reactors despite widespread public misgivings about their safety. Its refusal to join in this collective myopia may explain why the Asahi was eventually singled out. According to Hanada Tatsuro, a professor of journalism at Waseda University, Japan’s political elites were desperately trying to undo the political damage from the disaster, which had given the public a rare glimpse at the usually hidden flows of money and patronage that bind together the bureaucratic establishment. Fukushima, writes Hanada, had suddenly lifted away the lid to expose the true workings of power for all to see  .  .  . This was the machinery of politicians, bureaucrats, industry, labor unions, pro-nuclear academics and mainstream journalists. The recovery from the political disaster took precedence over the recovery of

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  49

the disaster-struck communities, as the cover was put back in place to once again hide these mechanisms of power from public view. (Hanada 2015) With its relentless focus on Fukushima’s problems, the Investigative Section was undermining these efforts at (re)obfuscation. Its coverage was also galling other media, who regarded it as an unwelcome reminder of their own failures to offer similarly independent coverage. Hanada says this was particularly true of the Fukushima-Yoshida scoop with its claims that workers had fled the plant, which he says was seen as an implicit criticism of other journalists for having abandoned their responsibility to serve as monitors on authority (Hanada 2015). All this made the Asahi’s Investigative Section vulnerable when it finally slipped, as it appeared to do in the Yoshida article. According to the transcript of Yoshida’s testimony, the former manager does indeed say that some 650 workers evacuated the plant in violation of his orders to stay. What the Asahi’s critics dispute is the newspaper’s account of how and why they did so. They say that while the Asahi article paints a picture of workers ignoring Yoshida’s orders as they fled the plant, the transcript shows that what Yoshida in fact said was his orders had probably not been properly conveyed to the workers, who believed they were following his instructions when they withdrew, suggesting a more orderly evacuation. As the Asahi’s critics correctly point out, Yoshida told investigators that his orders had become garbled in a miscommunication that he compared to a dengon geemu, or “telephone game,” in which a whispered message is passed through a line of people until the last person gets an unrecognizable version. On the other hand, whether that means the Asahi actually got the story wrong is also debatable. A  close reading of the newspaper’s original story shows that it never actually states the withdrawing workers had knowingly violated Yoshida’s orders. It just says that the workers evacuated to the relative safety of the nearby Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant “in violation of” (ni han shite) orders to stay. If the article can be faulted, it is for failing to include Yoshida’s own assessment that his orders were improperly transmitted. The omission of that crucial point did arguably give many readers the misimpression that workers had ignored Yoshida as they fled the plant.3 Other media leaped on this ambiguity as a chance to further discredit the Asahi. The first was the right-wing Sankei on Aug. 18, followed 12 days later by the Yomiuri and then, on Aug. 31, by the liberal Mainichi, as discussed above. These efforts to demolish the Fukushima article had clear benefits to Japan’s nuclear establishment by casting doubt on the Asahi’s critical coverage just as the Abe administration was moving to restart reactors idled since the Fukushima catastrophe. This fact, and the attacks’ impeccable timing just as the Asahi was on the ropes over the comfort women retractions, has led many journalists and scholars to see a political hand behind them. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Sankei and Yomiuri, two newspapers known more for close ties to the Abe government than hard-nosed investigative reporting, had suddenly and in quick

50  Martin Fackler

succession obtained copies of the Yoshida transcript, which was still kept secret in the prime minister’s office. This has led to widespread speculation in Japan – so far completely unproven – that copies of the secret testimony were strategically leaked by the prime minister’s office in order to take out the Asahi when it was already weakened. (e.g., Litera 2014). If this speculation is true, it would mean that political pressure played a major role in the Asahi’s retreat from investigative journalism. It would also be consistent with what media scholars here have described as the Abe government’s skillful use of leaks and access to shape news coverage. According to ex-journalist turned media scholar Hara Toshio, the Abe administration has proven adept at exploiting the weaknesses in Japan’s access journalism by playing to the media’s desire for exclusive inside information. Hara said one way the administration has done this is by limiting group access to Abe via press conferences or unscripted encounters with the media gaggle in favor of what he calls the granting of an unprecedented number of one-on-one interviews, which are awarded to cooperative media (Hara 2015; also Tokuyama 2014). Not surprisingly, the Asahi has gotten few interviews, and even after its 2014 mea culpa still found itself last in line. This was true in late November of that year, after the prime minister had called national parliamentary elections, when the Asahi was allowed to interview Abe only after he had already spoken to not only Japan’s other major newspapers, television networks, and wire services, but also more than a half dozen low-brow tabloid “sports papers” and even a foreign publication, The Economist. Another form of access that critics say the administration has used to co-opt journalists has been invitations to private dinners with Abe. According to a careful combing of the prime minister’s published daily schedules by the Tokyo Shimbun, the prime minister supped with media executives and senior reporters on more than 40 different occasions between December  2012 and the same month two years later, including at least twice with Asahi President Kimura (Tokyo Shimbun 2014). According to one magazine journalist’s account of the dinners, Abe used them to dangle promises of improved access in order to convince an unwary President Kimura into retracting the comfort women articles, which was actually a trap that Abe had set to crush the newspaper (Nakamura 2014). Kimura has dismissed this account as fiction. Other Asahi journalists concur, saying that the retractions were actually made with the opposite intent: strengthening the newspaper’s hand to do even more hard-hitting reporting about the Abe government by finally clearing away a long-festering problem. This was also the conclusion in an otherwise critical report by the Asahi Shimbun Co. Third-Party Committee, a committee of outside experts that the newspaper had gathered in October 2014 to look into its handling of the comfort women retractions. The retractions appeared in an Aug. 5, 2014 article that stretched over four pages as it recounted an internal investigation conducted that spring and summer in which a team of journalists retraced steps of the war veteran, Yoshida Seiji, who died in 2000. (Confusingly, the men whose testimony was at the center of the retracted Fukushima article and the retracted comfort women stories were both

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  51

surnamed Yoshida but not related.) According to the article, the reporting team could find no evidence to verify Yoshida’s claims of having forcibly rounded up hundreds of Korean women to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese military. It concluded by declaring that the Asahi was retracting its Yoshida-based stories; the newspaper later clarified this number to be 13 news stories and three other articles by outside contributors published between 1982 and 1994 (Third Party 2014). In a report released Dec. 22, the Third-Party Committee – a group of seven academics, ex-diplomats, and journalists – concluded that the newspaper made the retractions because it anticipated political pressure from the Abe government. Based on interviews with Asahi journalists and executives, the report said that fears began building within the newspaper as early as mid-2012, when the first signs appeared that Abe might make a successful second bid to become prime minister. (He was named prime minister after the Liberal Democratic Party reclaimed power with an election victory in December of that year.) Kimura, who had just become the newspaper’s president in June, began hearing rumors in the autumn that the LDP might subject him to the humiliation of being summoned to the Diet to be grilled about the Asahi’s past use of Yoshida as a source for comfort women stories. “This became a motive for preparatory investigations” about the Yoshida stories, the report said (Third Party 2014). Those fears came to a head in the spring of 2014, the report said, when the Abe government began in earnest to re-examine the Kono Statement, Japan’s 1993 landmark apology to the former comfort women. The report said the newspaper felt vulnerable to attack largely because of its failure to refute its Yoshida-sourced comfort women stories in the mid-1990s, when the aging veteran’s testimony was first discredited. Revealingly, the report also describes a growing anxiety within the Asahi that other major media might turn against it, “concentrating their criticism on the coverage.” According to the report, the Asahi decided to retract the stories and publish an article about the results of the internal investigation to blunt what was sure to be stiff criticism of the newspaper’s failure to come clean sooner. Those fears proved well founded, though no one within the Asahi anticipated the ferocity of the right-wing backlash that the retractions unleashed. While the Yoshida stories represented only a small portion of the Asahi’s overall coverage of the comfort women issue, Abe’s allies on the revisionist right seized on the retraction to discredit not just the newspaper but whether Japan had committed war crimes at all. An dubious new narrative sprang up, which few in Japan at the time dared to challenge, that not only had the Asahi used Yoshida to supposedly fabricate the entire comfort women issue, but had also defamed Japan by spreading these falsehoods to the rest of the world. The attacks also expanded beyond verbal criticisms to become what two veteran foreign journalists have characterized as a concerted campaign to “sink the Asahi” by driving the embattled liberal newspaper out of business (McNeill and McCurry 2014). Asahi subscribers found glossy brochures published by the Yomiuri in their mailboxes blasting the Asahi’s alleged transgressions against Japan’s

52  Martin Fackler

national honor. This attempt to poach readers, dubbed “Project A” within the Yomiuri, backfired: circulations declined at both dailies in late 2014, according to the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulations, suggesting that the back-stabbing had simply turned off readers to all newspapers. Journalists within the Asahi say that two factors eventually convinced the newspaper to seek to appease its critics at the expense of the Investigative Section. One was early internal reports of a sharp increase in cancelations of subscriptions and ad sales, which created a whiff of panic about the newspaper’s economic future. Such fears had already become very real for Asahi employees since 2010, when eroding sales had forced the newspaper to cut salaries and reduce staff with offers of early retirement packages (FACTA 2010). Reporters worried that the scandals could accelerate these declines into a fatal hemorrhaging of readers and advertisers. Added to this fear was the alarming realization that other newspapers were circling the wounded Asahi like sharks drawn to blood. One Asahi reporter, Kitano Ryuichi, said the fact that its media peers were ganging up on it actually had an enormous psychological effect on the newspaper, making it feel isolated and even more vulnerable. “We found ourselves standing all alone,” said Kitano, one of the reporters who had investigated Yoshida Seiji’s claims to kidnapping Korean comfort women. “The administration didn’t even have to criticize us because the media did it for them” (Kitano 2015). Finding every major newspaper aligned against it, including even the liberal Mainichi, must have been a compelling warning to the Asahi that it had strayed beyond the acceptable bounds of Japan’s tightly knit political and media establishment. But the failure of other newspapers to stand with the Asahi also points to another feature more directly relevant to our discussion of Japanese journalism: a weak sense of shared professional identity among journalists. It is revealing that other newspapers did not respond to the Asahi’s pillorying with a show of professional solidarity, such as by condemning it as an assault on fellow journalists or freedom of speech. Rather, they evidently saw a chance to benefit their own newspaper at the Asahi’s expense, both economically and politically. We have already seen how the Yomiuri went so far as jump on the Asahi’s travails as a chance to woo its readers. These reactions attest to the fact that loyalty to company supersedes bonds of common professional interests that link journalists across news organizations. This lack of a shared identity may be a product of the recruitment process by which aspiring Japanese reporters are hired straight out of college and then trained within their companies, where most spend their entire careers. This is in contrast to their American counterparts, who are more likely to go to journalism school and follow more peripatetic career paths. The preeminence of company identity is also evident in the reaction of the Asahi’s own journalists to the crisis. Put simply, many appeared to choose preserving their company and its privileged position in postwar Japanese society,

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  53

even if that meant discarding its newfound journalistic ideals and sidelining the journalists who had tried to advance them. They were making proclamations about the high ideals of journalism, but when push came to shove they tossed those ideals away. When the chips were down, they saw themselves as elite company employees, not journalists. (Yorimitsu 2016) Whatever the motives, the newspaper’s resolve to defend the FukushimaYoshida story quickly crumbled in early September. The growing chorus of external criticism led many Asahi journalists to conclude that the story was simply too toxic to defend. At a specially convened meeting on Sept. 3, senior reporters from all the newspaper’s main sections “expressed views that were almost entirely harsh” about the article, said a report in November by a committee – the third appointed by the Asahi that fall – to look into the newspaper’s handling of the Fukushima-Yoshida story. Two days later, top editors held another meeting where the general editor decided that the newspaper had no choice but to apologize, at which point the debate shifted to whether to issue a correction or retract the story altogether. The report said editors debated into the predawn hours of Sept. 11 before agreeing to retract the article (Press and Human Rights 2014). According to one book that purports to be an inside account by disgruntled Asahi reporters, this reversal was the result of an internal revolt against the Investigative Section by reporters in other parts of the newspaper. The book asserts these other reporters attributed the problems with the Fukushima-Yoshida scoop to the hubris of the Investigative Section, which was resented for its success and seen as having grown too cocky. Resentment had also been brewing among career-long Asahi reporters toward Yorimitsu’s dismissal of the press clubs, which continued to be the bread and butter of coverage by reporters in the powerful Political and Social sections. The blowup over the Fukushima-Yoshida article gave these opponents the chance they had been waiting for to usurp President Kimura and his favored reporting group, and regain control of the newspaper (Asahi Reporters 2015). The result was that just three years after its creation, the Investigative Section was the biggest sacrifice that the Asahi offered up to appease its critics. (Another was the career of President Kimura.) In the fall of 2014, the Investigative Group was reduced by a third to about 20 reporters and editors, with most of its top journalists gone. While the Asahi’s new president, Watanabe Masataka, still speaks of the importance of investigative reporting, reporters still in the section say they face far greater restraints on what they can say and have been allowed to write fewer articles by a newspaper that has simply lost the stomach for the risks inherent in such reporting.4 Some current and former Asahi journalists, including Sotooka, insist the reversal is temporary, and that investigative reporting will make a comeback. However,

54  Martin Fackler

some scholars and former section reporters say the setback was just too severe. They say the Asahi’s decision to punish its own journalists will discourage others in the future from taking the same risks inherent in investigative reporting. Worse, they said that the Asahi seemed to lapse back into the old, access-driven ways of Japan’s mainstream journalism at a time when steepening falls in subscription rates at all national newspapers shows the public actually desires something different. This is a conclusion shared by Kawai Hiroyuki, a lawyer who co-authored a meticulously researched defense of the Fukushima-Yoshida article and the two reporters who wrote it. “Aren’t many of the journalists who attacked those two immersed up to their necks in the press club system, and just writing articles based on their cozy ties with authority?” Kawai wrote. “Reporting cannot abandon its mission of criticizing and monitoring authority, and must not surrender to those who curry favor with authority” (Kaido and Kawai 2015).

Notes 1 Between February 2015 and January 2016, I interviewed more than a dozen current and former Asahi journalists, many of whom held key positions at the newspaper at the time when the events described happened, including in top management and the Investigative Reporting Section. Most asked not to be named because they were still working at the newspaper. 2 Prompted by the Asahi story, the Cabinet Secretariat made the Yoshida transcript public in September  2014 on its Web site. (For the link, see Cabinet Secretariat 2014.) An English summary by the Asahi Shimbun is available at: www.asahi.com/special/ yoshida_report/en/ 3 I was among the journalists who read the original Asahi article as saying that fleeing workers knowingly violated orders, an alarming scenario that I wrote up in a report for The New York Times that ran under the headline “Panicked Workers Fled Fukushima Plant in 2011 Despite Orders, Record Shows.” Once the problems in the Asahi story became apparent, I wrote a second story with the new revelations, “Fukushima Workers Who Fled May Have Received Garbled Orders, Reports Say.” 4 There are two notable exceptions: an April 2015 exposé of payoffs to doctors by pharmaceutical companies, and an October 2015 article on payments by the construction industry to members of an environmental oversight committee that approved construction of a new U.S. air base at Henoko in Okinawa. Watanabe Makoto, a reporter who co-authored the former story, said it was inspired by an earlier investigation into similar practices in the United States by ProPublica (Watanabe 2016).

References Asahi Reporters (2015) Asahi Shimbun: Nihongata soshiki no hokai. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju. Asahi Shimbun (2012) “The Asahi Shimbun corporate report 2012”, www.asahi.com/shim bun/csr/english/2012.pdf. Asahi Shimbun (2014) “Shocho meirei ni ihan, genpatsu tettai Fukushima Daiichi, shoin no 9 wari”, May 20. Cabinet Secretariat (2014) “Seifu jiko chosa iinkai hiaringu kiroku”, www.cas.go.jp/jp/ genpatsujiko/hearing_koukai_3/hearing_list_3.html.

Asahi’s foray into watchdog journalism  55

Fackler, Martin (2016) Taming the Watchdogs: Political Pressure and Media Self-­ Censorship in Abe’s Japan. Tokyo: Futaba. FACTA (2010) “ ‘Nanto kyokuraku’ Asahi Shimbun no soki taishokusei”, June, https:// facta.co.jp/article/201006008.html. Freeman, Laurie Anne (2000) Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hanada, Tatsuro (2015) ‘Yoshida chosho kiji torikeshi jiken no ronriteki kaibo,’ Iigakari: genpatsu Yoshida chosho kiji torikeshi jiken to Asahi Shimbun no meiso. Tokyo: Nanatsumori Shokan. Hara, Toshio (2015) Abe seiken to janarizumu no kakugo. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Jacobson, David (2005) “Asahi revisits NHK censorship allegations”, Online Journalism Review, July 31, www.ojr.org/050730jacobson/. Japan Times (2014) ‘Daily Asahi Shimbun retracts faulty Fukushima story, sacks top editor,’ September 12. Kaido, Yuichi and Kawai, Hiroyuki (2015) Asahi Shimbun “Yoshida chosho hodo” wa goho dewa nai. Tokyo: Sairyusha. Kitano, Ryuichi (2015) Interview November 12. Litera (2014) “Asahi goho mondai wa mekuramashi da! Masukomi ga kakusu Yoshida chosho no osoroshii honshitsu,” September 2, http://lite-ra.com/2014/09/post-425.html. Lower House (2014) “Japan house of representatives budget committee,” October  3, www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/001818720141003002. htm#r=s&r=s. Mainichi Shimbun (2014) “Fukushima genpatsu jiko, ‘Higashi Nihon kaimetsu to omotta,’ Yoshida chosho, ‘Zenmen tettai’ hitei,” August 31. McNeill, David and McCurry, Justin (2014) “Sink the Asahi,” Number One Shimbun, November, www.fccj.or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/488-sink-the-asahi.html. Nakamura, Yoko (2014) “Asahi Shimbun Kimura shacho, Abe shusho ‛kyokumitsu kaidan’,” Zaiten, March. Press and Human Rights Committee (2014) “Final report of the Asahi Shimbu’s Press and Human Rights Committee”, November 12, www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/prc20141 112.pdf. Starkman, Dean (2014) The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark: The Financial Crisis and The Disappearance of Investigative Journalism. New York: Columbia University Press.. Third Party (2014) “Final report of The Asahi Shimbun Co. third-party committee”, December 22, www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/3rd.html [abridged English version available at www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/report20150728e.pdf]. Tokuyama, Yoshio (2014) Abe kantei to shimbun: nikyokka suru hodo no kiki. Tokyo: Shueisha. Tokyo Shimbun (2014) “2 nenkan de 40 kai ijo, medeia to shusho, ayaui yoru kaishoku”, December 20, www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/tokuho/list/CK2014122002000136.html. Trust Committee (2015) “Final report of the Asahi Shimbun‘s committee on regaining trust and revitalization”, January 5, www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/. Watanabe, Makoto (2016) Interview April 18. Yomiuri Shimbun (2014) “Asahi no “meirei ihan-tettai” hodo, Yoshida chosho to zure,” August 30. Yorimitsu, Takaaki (2016) Interview April 20.

4 THE HATOYAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE OUTING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT MEDIA Michael Penn

In January  2009, the ostensibly center-left Democratic Party came to power in the United States led by Barack Obama with a public mandate to pursue “Change We Can Believe In.” In September  2009, the ostensibly center-left Democratic Party of Japan came to power led by Hatoyama Yukio with a public mandate to affect “Regime Change” in Tokyo. On the face of it, one might have expected Washington to embrace the DPJ’s crushing electoral victory as a manifestation of the very same international progressive movement that President Obama had championed during his impressive 2008 presidential campaign. At the very least, one might have expected considerable appreciation for the fact that the one-party era in Japan had finally come to an end after decades of entrenchment. However, Washington policymakers had grown quite comfortable with the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which had been content to follow the main lines of American foreign policy even when it suffered serious political costs for doing so (Taggart-Murphy 2015). US-Japan policy was shaped by a small band of “alliance managers,” who had established personalities and preferences. Dissenters were kept at a safe distance from policymaking. These cozy arrangements transcended the Republican-­ Democrat divide, and in fact, senior positions in the Obama administration went to individuals who represented, in effect, the “Democrat wing” of the more-orless united “alliance manger” community. Moreover, the Pentagon – which had come to play a leading role in US foreign policy in general – was still under the same leadership as previously. Robert Gates was reappointed as defense secretary, symbolizing the triumph of continuity over change. The shift from Bush to Obama did not entail even a modest rethinking of American policy toward Japan. It was business as usual. The landslide victory of the DPJ, therefore, was greeted not with celebration, but with caution and even suspicion (van Wolferen 2010). Washington

Media targeted PM Hatoyama  57

policymakers wanted Japan to follow their lead, and they did want not to waste time dealing with the sensitivities of an untutored ally. Busy American officials had bigger fish to fry in crisis areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the near-meltdown of the US financial system in the wake of the Lehman Shock. These attitudes were reflected by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who described the DPJ victory in the following terms: “It’s a change which is dramatic given fifty years of LDP governmental leadership, but I am very confident that the strength of our relationship and our alliance will stand the test of any political changes.” Her phrasing inadvertently revealed that Clinton viewed “political changes” in Japan as a “test” that the alliance would have to patiently weather. One could safely assume, therefore, that the DPJ victory wasn’t a positive development for the alliance. Similarly, Admiral Timothy Keating, head of the Pentagon’s Pacific Command, told the media, “I’m very confident, almost certain, that there will be – maybe some discussions about certain aspects of US-Japan military alliance – but writ large no significant change.” Again, the subtext was apparent: Change is bad (Ennis 2012). The negative attitude of senior Obama administration officials toward the DPJ emerged into fuller public view in October 2009 when the Washington Post published the following, much-discussed passage: A senior State Department official said the United States had “grown comfortable” thinking about Japan as a constant in U.S. relations in Asia. It no longer is, he said, adding that “the hardest thing right now is not China, it’s Japan.” The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said the new ruling party lacks experience in government and came to power wanting politicians to be in charge, not the bureaucrats who traditionally ran the country from behind the scenes. (Pomfret and Harden 2009) The unfavorable comparison to China and the inference that the DPJ was little more than a pack of amateurs was a slap at the new Japanese ruling party – as well as a potent warning to them. Washington was clearly annoyed by most of the major initiatives coming out of the early Hatoyama administration. The cancellation of Japan’s participation in the Indian Ocean operation (in which the Maritime Self-Defense Forces had been refueling US–led forces in Afghanistan) was part of that, but so were other issues like the new Japanese prime minister’s sweeping vision of an East Asian Community. For decades, the American strategic position in East Asia depended on the political divisions within the region, especially between Japan and China. Hatoyama’s vision of an international alignment with China threatened to bring the two East Asian giants together in a way that would leave the United States on the outside looking in. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell stated this directly in a September 2009 interview with TV Tokyo: “It’s important for Japan and the countries of East Asia that they work closely

58  Michael Penn

together, they interact, that they have high-level dialogue. It’s not in America’s interest to see a dialogue or a formation come together that excludes the United States” (Hayashi 2009). The public pretense that all was well with the US-Japanese alliance was dropped almost entirely with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ October 2009 visit to Tokyo. The bluntness of Gates’ demeanor was almost universally acknowledged. The flashpoint was the issue of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma relocation in Okinawa, in which the desires of the local Okinawan people and the desires of Washington were in sharp contrast (See Yoshimoto Chapter 18 and Ogawa Chapter 17). As one of its last acts in government, the LDP had rammed through passage of a bill consenting to the earlier bilateral agreement to relocate the US Marines to Henoko beach. The DPJ had been clear during the campaign leading up to the August 30 elections that they did not consider itself bound by the LDP’s agreement and that they would seek to move the US Marines at Futenma out of Okinawa, and preferably out of Japan. Once the DPJ came into power, Washington pretended not to notice these campaign promises and was soon pressing hard for the Hatoyama administration to betray its supporters – and its own Okinawan lawmakers – by accepting in full and without further negotiation the earlier agreement on base realignment. This was the unmistakable message that Secretary Gates brought with him during his October visit. Standing at a press conference beside new Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, Gates declared that it was “time to move on” (Sieg 2009). Gates demanded that the Japanese not only implement the agreement in full, but to do so “expeditiously.” As a further gesture emphasizing his deep displeasure with DPJ resistance, Gates declined an invitation to dine with the Japanese Defense Minister. Michael Green – once a high-level George W. Bush administration official and now holding the position of Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies – did not bother to hide his glee at Gates’ tough stance. Writing for a Foreign Policy magazine blog, he contributed a piece titled “Tokyo Smackdown,” noting with approval that “Gates’ message in Japan this week was no-nonsense” and had “sent shudders through Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan.” Green went on to offer disingenuous analysis that the DPJ’s landslide victory had nothing to do with foreign policy issues, citing only a poll showing that most Japanese still felt that the US-Japan alliance should be preserved in one form or another. He described the DPJ foreign policy position as “extreme” before moving on to conclude, Gates had no choice but to splash cold water on the DPJ . . . There is some risk that the ever-populist DPJ will now try to use a spat with the United States to increase votes before the election next year. But Gates is a shrewd judge of his counterparts. He knows that a crisis in the U.S.-Japan alliance would split the DPJ and turn much of the media against Hatoyama, particularly given the strong public support for the alliance and the growing

Media targeted PM Hatoyama  59

menace from North Korea and China. Meanwhile, Hatoyama was letting the DPJ leadership play with firecrackers in a room full of dynamite. Letting the alliance drift posed the greater risk. (Green 2009) The Hatoyama administration was, in fact, coming under attacks not only from Washington, but also the Japanese government bureaucracy, conservative political parties, and – our main subject here – the mainstream Japanese media. Under daily assault from these many enemies and rivals, the Hatoyama administration put up nothing in the way of a coordinated defense and threw no political punches of its own. Rather than push back at critics, members of the ruling party let their own divisions begin to get the best of them. The issue of US forces in Okinawa was where the strands came together most clearly. By the time of Gates’ visit, Defense Minister Kitazawa was offering his prime minister no help on this issue at all, simply saying that the existing plan to build a new US Marine airbase at Henoko was probably unavoidable. Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya, who had told an audience in August that, “If Japan just follows what the United States says, then I  think as a sovereign nation that is very pathetic,” was reversing his stance only two months later in the wake of the Obama administration’s threats (Tisdall 2009). Okada proposed his own plan that the functions of the US Marine airbase at Futenma be integrated into the nearby US Air Force base at Kadena, but he soon backed off even that degree of independent-mindedness vis-à-vis the United States. Hatoyama’s cabinet ministers were not cooperating with him on the Okinawa base issue even two months into the new regime. The Japanese mainstream media’s approach to the Hatoyama administration, and his struggle to satisfy the contradictory demands of various constituencies, was striking. In the wake of a landslide electoral victory in which a single opposition party outperformed the long-ruling LDP for the first time, one might have expected there to be something of a honeymoon period. While this might not necessarily be true of the more ideologically conservative newspapers such as the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, or the Sankei Shimbun, one might have predicted it in the newspapers generally regarded as being center-left, such as the Asahi Shimbun or the Mainichi Shimbun. After all, these latter newspapers had been critiquing the former conservative ruling party for decades and the victory of the DPJ’s “regime change” might have been seen as a fulfillment of what they had long advocated. In the event, however, the hostility of all five of Japan’s largest daily newspapers was consistent and unrelenting. When this overwhelmingly negative media tone was pointed out to Hatoyama Yukio in a May 2015 interview, the former prime minister indicated that he too was still mystified by the Japanese media’s hostile attitude toward him: This is something that I also want to ask. As you said, during my administration, I thought I had created many good policies, such as child benefits, free

60  Michael Penn

high school tuition, policies for the disabled and those concerning medical bills, for people that are in weak positions socially. However, these policies were either altogether criticized, or not reported on at all. Behind the scenes, whether it be liberal or conservative, there was strong dislike and ill feeling towards my administration. (Interview with the author, May 2015) On the Futenma base relocation issue, Hatoyama remained ambiguous for months at the outset of his administration, trying to assure the Obama government that he would handle the issue responsibly, while simultaneously assuring the people of Okinawa that he would “at the least” move the US Marines airbase outside of their prefecture. While Hatoyama maintained an air of confidence, no one knew what possible solution he might have in mind. It was in the spring of 2010 that the nebulous Hatoyama plan finally began to emerge. His proposal was that the new US Marines airbase could be constructed on Tokunoshima, a large island northeast of Okinawa lying within the jurisdiction of Kagoshima Prefecture. Had this plan been realized, it would have minimally fulfilled his campaign promise to relocate the Futenma Marines outside of Okinawa Prefecture. One of Hatoyama’s huge difficulties, however, was that the Tokunoshima islanders were completely opposed to hosting the US Marines, and in one protest in April about half of the island’s entire population turned out to express resistance. Moreover, as already mentioned, the major cabinet ministers were not willing to assist their own leader in the face of the US government’s open threats. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi was the only senior official on Hatoyama’s side. In an interview with the Ryukyu Shimpo in February 2011, Hatoyama explained, It seemed as if my ideas were scornfully dismissed. The Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry, while they should have been thinking through the base transfer issue with me, instead chose to give priority to what had been agreed with the United States. Once, after summoning two senior members of these ministries to my residence and telling them that we would constitute a team to deal with this, stressing the importance of confidentiality, the matter was reported in the following day’s papers. I was greatly saddened. (Ryukyu Shimpo 2011) The Japanese senior bureaucracy was actively sabotaging the prime minister on the Futenma relocation issue in collusion with the major media outlets. It was perfectly appropriate for the newspapers to report what was being leaked to them by senior bureaucrats. But, at the same time, the Japanese mainstream media was utterly failing to explain to the people the true nature of the power struggle that was going on or to treat the leakers with a due degree of skepticism. The leaks from the bureaucracy were not being set within the broader context, whether

Media targeted PM Hatoyama  61

it be the Hatoyama administration’s stated desire for a foreign policy process more independent of the United States, the bureaucrats’ hostility to policy leadership by elected politicians, or the views of the overwhelming majority of Okinawans whose territories had disproportionately hosted the US military forces in Japan for sixty-five years and had supported local DPJ candidates for that reason. The final outcome of the struggle is well known. By the end of May  2010 Prime Minister Hatoyama had completely surrendered. He betrayed his campaign promise and re-endorsed the Henoko base construction plan. Shortly thereafter, he resigned as prime minister and handed over the leadership reins to Finance Minister Kan Naoto, under whom he hoped that the DPJ “regime change” moment might have a second chance. The reason that Hatoyama Yukio enunciated to the general public in May 2010 for his abrupt and humiliating policy reversal was that “In terms of the role of the Marine Corps in the totality of all US forces in Okinawa, the more I learned, the more I have come to realize their interoperability. I have come to believe that it was the only way to maintain deterrence” (Asahi Shimbun 2010). In other words, Hatoyama’s Tokunoshima plan needed to be abandoned not simply because of the political resistance of the islanders but because a US Marine airbase on that island would not meet the operational needs of the US military. In a scathing article on the Hatoyama administration titled “Political Games Have No Place in Security Policy” written by Funabashi Yoichi, it was observed that “the United States rejected moving the helicopter group to Tokunoshima because it was unworkable from a military operational standpoint.” Funabashi concluded that “It is desirable to have a bipartisan consensus between the largest ruling and opposition parties on the core elements of national security policy, in particular the Japan-US alliance” (Funabashi 2010). While Funabashi was certainly correct that domestic “political games” should not guide Japan’s foreign policies, what he was really saying in this context was that bureaucrat-led foreign policymaking should remain undisturbed no matter which party is elected and that the preferences of the general public – such as, for example, popular support for the Ozawa Ichiro line that the US-Japan alliance should become “more equal” – had no place in Japanese diplomacy. It’s worth pointing out that Funabashi Yoichi was at that time the editor-inchief of the nation’s leading “liberal” newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, which, as noted, might have been expected to be sympathetic to Hatoyama’s desire to represent the overwhelming majority view of the Okinawans and had itself in the past criticized many aspects of how the US-Japan alliance was managed under the LDP. In this case, however, Funabashi’s was simply another voice arguing the issue from the perspective of the US alliance managers and the senior bureaucrats of the foreign and defense ministries.(See Ogawa Chapter 17) In May 2015, Hatoyama responded: The bureaucrats think that it is better for LDP politics to continue so that, for example, they can continue the problematic practice of amakudari, which

62  Michael Penn

they benefit from and are grateful for. The DPJ government asserted that we should change bureaucrat-based politics into people-based politics. This did not please the bureaucrats very much. Therefore, it is now apparent that the bureaucrats on the surface did not criticize us, but were concentrating their energy on trying to make sure that the DPJ government did not last. Those bureaucrats were giving information that only they could access  – information from within the government offices and inside the administration – to journalists in the press club system. Because this kind of collusion continued to take place, the big media, wanting to continue to access the information that only they could access from the press clubs, developed a cordial relationship with the bureaucrats who wanted a return to the LDP government. (Interview with the author, May 2015) The failure of the Hatoyama administration as well as the “liberal” establishment media has recently been revealed as deeper than previously realized. In a February 2016 article published, ironically enough, in the Asahi Shimbun, it was learned that Foreign Ministry bureaucrats had convinced Prime Minister Hatoyama that his Tokunoshima plan was impractical because, as a secret document stated, it would violate an important US military standard: I  remember being briefed by the Foreign Ministry and other government officials (on the U.S. operational regulations), Hatoyama told The Asahi Shimbun. I was told that it was impossible to relocate the units to outside a radius of 65 nautical miles from their training grounds, and it was the biggest factor behind my decision to give up the Tokunoshima relocation plan. (Nikaido 2016) But as the Asahi Shimbun reports in 2016, the US military apparently had no such operational standard, and the Foreign Ministry will not even “confirm the existence” of the secret document that the Asahi Shimbun possesses. The newspaper notes in the typically anodyne fashion of the Japanese major media that these facts are “raising the possibility that the document was compiled only to pressure Hatoyama to scrap his plan to move functions of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Tokunoshima island.” As previously noted, the Asahi Shimbun’s own former editor-in-chief, Funabashi Yoichi, had at the time denounced Hatoyama’s Tokunoshima plan as “unworkable from a military operational standpoint.” All of the other major newspapers were offering the same analysis. The February 2016 Asahi Shimbun article, however, clearly suggests that this whole argument was a total fabrication of senior Foreign Ministry bureaucrats who were actively working against the policy preferences of their nation’s prime minister. Hatoyama Yukio and the DPJ government deserve blame for allowing themselves to be manipulated so easily and for not developing their own independent

Media targeted PM Hatoyama  63

sources of information. They were, after all, well aware that the bureaucracy was hostile toward them  – though they may have underestimated just how far the bureaucrats were willing to go to derail them. But, beyond the inexperienced ruling party, the role of the mainstream Japanese media also emerges as particularly shameful. Rather than give the Japanese public a balanced account of the fierce power struggle that was going on within the halls of government, the media simply used their cozy contacts with senior bureaucrats to publish leak after damaging leak about the Hatoyama administration, never stopping to question the political agenda or the self-interested motives of the leakers. It would now appear that some senior Foreign Ministry bureaucrats became so confident about their channels to the media that they fabricated a document purporting to explain a nonexistent US military policy in the full expectation that both the prime minister as well as the mainstream press would simply accept their authority without double-checking the veracity of this critical and perhaps decisive information. In sum, the period of the Hatoyama administration represents a rich case study about the true nature of the Japanese mainstream media. Through the press club system and their own inclinations, the media have become intertwined with the Japanese government bureaucracy to a degree that is unhealthy for an ostensibly democratic society. Whether they pretend to be conservative or liberal, the media’s own behavior has outed them as fundamental allies of the bureaucratic status quo.

References Asahi (2010) “ ‘Koyaku wa senkyo no toki no to no kangaekata’ 4-nichi no Hatoyama shusho (2),” Asahi Shimbun, May 4. Ennis, Peter (2012) “The US, Japan, and Okinawa,” Dispatch Japan, April 11. Funabashi, Yoichi (2010) “Political games have no place in security policy,” Asahi Shimbun, June 8. Green, Michael (2009) “Tokyo Smackdown,” Shadow Government blog, Foreign Policy, October 23. Hayashi, Yuka (2009) “Japan Promotes Asian Economic Bloc,” Wall Street Journal, October 9. Isamu, Nikaido (2016) “Document found that led Hatoyama to drop Futenma relocation outside Okinawa,” Asahi Shimbun, February 23. Pomfret, John and Harden, Blaine (2009) “U.S. Pressures Japan on military package: Washington concerned as new leaders in Tokyo look to redefine alliance,” Washington Post, October 22. Ryukyu Shimpo (2011) “Hatoyama zen shusho ichimon itto,” Ryukyu Shimpo, February 13, p. 3. Sieg, Linda (2009) “Gates Pushes Japan on U.S. Troop Shift Plan,” Reuters, October 21. Taggart-Murphy, R. (2015) Japan and the Shackles of the Past. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tisdall, Simon (2009) “Japan tries to loosen the US leash,” The Guardian, August 10. van Wolferen, Karel (2010) “America’s tragedy and the blind free world,” Professional Luncheon, Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, November 16.

5 NHK The changing and unchanged politics of semi-independence Ellis S. Krauss

In 2000 I  published the first book in English on NHK (Krauss 2000), Japan’s mammoth public broadcasting service. Previously, there had been hundreds of books and articles, perhaps thousands, in Japanese, but foreign Japan specialists1 had paid little attention to the organization despite its importance. Even today, with over 10,000 employees, revenues and expenditures of over $6.5 billion, and with its flagship 7pm news program still among the highest rated news programs on the air, there have been few subsequent scholarly articles in English on the subject. This is a shame, because in the decade and a half since my book appeared, subsequent developments have been very interesting, especially NHK’s relationship to government and politics. In this article I explain how political authorities, especially the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have influenced NHK, and the effect of that influence on the television news that millions of Japanese citizens watch each night. I then examine how this intervention has influenced NHK’s development and to what extent the LDP’s attempts to control NHK have changed (or not) during the past 15 years. NHK, along with its British counterpart and organizational model, the BBC, today face their greatest challenges to their journalistic independence in their long and proud histories.

NHK: background Pre-WWII radio broadcasting in Japan began with a few private companies, but realizing the importance of the medium to the state, in 1926 the government merged these companies into a public interest national monopoly, and NHK was born. With the rise of the military’s influence in government and the Pacific War, NHK increasingly became a propaganda arm of the state. The American Occupation (1945–1952) were determined to change this and to “democratize”

NHK: the politics of semi-independence  65

broadcasting in general and NHK in particular. It reestablished NHK as an independent public broadcaster on the people’s behalf. After internal debate, the Occupation authorities were also determined to set up commercial broadcasters in competition, thus making Japan one of the earliest democracies to have both a public service broadcasting agency as well as a full range of commercial competition. (Krauss 2000: 89–94). The organizational model of NHK closely resembled the BBC in the U.K. Indeed, as a quasi-independent corporation, without government share in ownership or capital, deriving all of its income from receiver fees directly collected by the broadcaster and not from the public treasury, with fee levels being approved by government as a separate decision from the general budget, and appointment of its CEO by its governing body (Board of Governors) rather than directly by the state, and the CEO having the authority to appoint the rest of management, it is just like the BBC. The only point on which it differs is that it is parliament as a whole and thus the ruling party that decides fee levels and not, as in Britain, the bureaucracy and cabinet (Krauss 2000: Table 4, 104). When one adds in the fact that the Broadcast Law in Japan promulgated toward the end of the Occupation in 1950 guarantees the autonomy of broadcasting (along with its impartiality and integrity) and clearly prohibits interference in programming and content – except with legitimate legal provisions (Krauss 2000: 96–97)  – NHK may rank along with the BBC as having possibly the most independent institutionalized environment of any public broadcaster in the world.

Broadcasting the news What made NHK such an important institution in Japanese society and politics for most of the postwar period was its dominance of television news and how trusted it was by the Japanese public. After the end of the Occupation until the early 1960s, NHK wasn’t particularly known for its news programming. With the rapid dissemination of televisions and the appointment of Maeda Yoshinori, a former newspaper journalist and NHK commentator, as president in 1964, however, this was all to change. Maeda determined that NHK was going to become dominant in news because “the soul of public broadcasting is news” (Krauss 2000: 128) and wanted it to compete with the huge and widely disseminated national newspapers. To fulfill this goal he built up the quantity and quality of news programming, expanded the recruitment of smart and talented reporters, elevated their status within the organization, and pushed through construction of a huge new Broadcasting Center with state of the art equipment (Krauss 2000: 129). Much of NHK’s large newsgathering and processing organization was modeled on the national newspapers. By the 1970s and continuing until the late 1980s, NHK television news became the most dominant news source in Japan. Surveys in 1980 showed that between a third and three-quarters of television viewers watched NHK morning, noon, and evening news broadcasts, with the flagship program being its 7pm evening

66  Ellis S. Krauss

news. NHK television news were not only the most important source of news in Japan, it was also the most trusted. A 1997 survey found that NHK was the most trusted institution in Japanese society, more trusted than newspapers and the courts, and far more trusted than commercial broadcasters, the National Diet, and the government. None of the commercial competition could match this news audience during this period, or NHK’s invested resources and attention to the news. One-third of NHK’s entire programming in the 1980s and nearly half of its channel time in the 1990s was devoted to news (Krauss 2000: 4), and it had a vast network of 1,000 journalists in its many local bureaus throughout the country. In fact so dominant was NHK news that the commercial broadcasters saw competing in this field as an unprofitable endeavor and did not invest many of their resources in news programming, but rather focused on drama and entertainment (Krauss 2000: 206). So what did the large audience see when they tuned into NHK news? How was the state portrayed? I did some content analyses during the 1983–1985 and 1996–1997 periods. I found that politics/government and society were two or more times more likely to be represented as items in the broadcasts than economy and foreign/defense items (Krauss 2000: 28). Thus the state figured prominently in television news coverage. When it came to which political actors were featured in all these political stories, NHK tended to cover the national bureaucracy (35–40 percent in the two time periods, respectively), political parties (22–31 percent), and new policies (15–28  percent) far more than other political actors. Especially surprising was how little the prime minister, cabinet, and Diet, i.e., politicians themselves, were featured: between 5 percent minimum for prime minister in the earlier time period–15 percent maximum for the Diet in the later time period, and the cabinet never exceeding 10 percent (Krauss 2000: 30). There was no consistent political party bias in the news reporting, as coverage of government and opposition parties was generally very balanced (Krauss 2000: 33–34), a finding supported by other content analysis studies (Kobayashi 1982). The portrayal of the bureaucracy and state as “active agents of the public represents the most dominant theme and the highest priority story, and those stories are treated in an extremely factual, neutral, and impersonal way” (Krauss 2000: 35). Is this emphasis on the state bureaucracy, rather than politicians, and portraying it in such a strictly neutral and un-dramatic way typical of all public broadcasters in industrialized democracies? When I compared NHK’s coverage to European counterparts, I found that in fact NHK was fairly unique. The BBC had far less coverage of the bureaucracy and much more of the prime minister and cabinet, was more informative and interpretive, and had more visuals and had far more dramatic visuals accompanying its stories. France 2 also covered the president and cabinet far more, the bureaucracy overwhelmingly less, had far more analysis and commentary by journalists, with clearly less balance and neutrality, and more action and dramatic visuals. Italian, German, and Swedish public broadcasters

NHK: the politics of semi-independence  67

again covered the bureaucracy much less than NHK with more reporting on parties, politicians, and parliament (Krauss 2000: 40–52).

The puzzle and its solution How NHK portrayed the state presents us with an interesting puzzle. Why would one of the most – perhaps the most – formally independent public service broadcasters in the democratic world portray government so blandly; focus on bureaucracy rather than the prime minister, cabinet, and other politicians; and offer no real interpretive analysis of politics and government? Naturally, no public broadcaster can display obvious bias and must try to be balanced in its approach to government and opposition because it must be responsive to all parties and segments of the political public. However, no other public broadcaster in the U.K., France, Germany, or Italy, even though they are ostensibly as or usually less independent of government, portrays the state the same way, and all present politics and government with more interpretation, drama, and focus on politicians. So why is NHK so different despite its supposed autonomy from the state? It was an attempt to find the answer to this puzzle that was one of the main motivations of my research. I looked for the answer less in the formal institutionalized structures of NHK’s relationship to the state, and more in the informal, sometimes non-public, institutional features of that relationship. Some of these informal ways in which the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were able to pressure NHK were unexpected consequences of the formal institutional rules that were supposed to help keep NHK somewhat independent. The procedure for approving NHK’s budget, for example, was supposed to avoid the government directly holding its budget hostage to “good” behavior, i.e., positive coverage of the government. Thus, NHK’s revenues were collected directly by NHK from receivers’ fees not by the government itself, the Diet as a whole had to approve its annual budget and any fee increases rather than the prime minister and cabinet, and by custom that vote was an “up or down” vote on the whole budget without modifying particular items in it. However, these procedures actually result in the government having a covert means to pressure NHK, especially at budget time and when NHK needs a fee increase to balance its budget. As a former NHK president and news executive, Shima Keiji, put it, “The greatest issue (for politicians) is trying to control the news and public opinion through NHK. And it is NHK’s budget approval in the Diet, which becomes the stage for that direct interference.” (Krauss 2000: 108). Usually the pressure applied is covert, as NHK and the key NHK politicians enter into quiet negotiations that include politicians’ complaints about NHK coverage or even specific programs. Occasionally, however, this pressure becomes public. In 1979, a series of issues involving NHK revealed how the LDP’s behind-the-scenes pressure on NHK works. First, its request for a fee increase had been approved by the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) prior even to its submission to its own Board

68  Ellis S. Krauss

of Governors, despite there being no legal requirement for the LDP to approve a fee increase at this stage of the process. Second, opposition to the fee increase among other LDP members and executives combined with their dissatisfaction with NHK lead to their criticism of NHK programming and attachment of a rider to the budget bill that insisted NHK be non-partisan and unbiased in its programming. And finally, when a court ordered NHK to turn over a videotape and NHK refused, criticism of NHK programming intensified, and the LDP delayed passing a fee procedure revision and even threatened to establish a party investigative committee of NHK (which it finally quietly dropped). This case clearly reveals the LDP’s ability to intimidate NHK through various covert and overt means if it does not like its programs or behavior (Krauss 2000: 109–122). The LDP also exerts influence over NHK by its role in appointing NHK’s president. According to the law, however, NHK was supposed to be protected from government interference in the selection of its chief executive officer. The law specifies that NHK’s Board of Directors appoints the CEO, but since the government, almost always the LDP, chooses the board it indirectly influences selection of the CEO. Moreover, the LDP and prime minister wield direct influence by approving, or vetoing, the Board’s choice in advance, and in this consultation process the LDP factions, the business community, and the bureaucracy all have some say. In effect, appointment of the NHK president is subject to machinations similar to cabinet and other personnel decisions within the LDP itself. The third channel by which the state can influence NHK has nothing to do with its formal legal structure but rather with the combination of its newsgathering organization and its personnel policies. NHK’s news organization was originally modeled on the giant Japanese newspapers, and its journalists have always been integral members of the infamous “reporters’ clubs” (kisha kurabu). These organizations, technically private “clubs” of journalists and therefore not publicly regulated, are found in every major institution of Japanese society. They are the bases from which delegated specialized reporters from the large national newspapers and NHK (but not magazines; even the commercial broadcasters rely on their related national newspapers in the clubs) cover that institution. These are especially important in covering politics and government as they allow close access to politicians and officials, but at the cost of becoming highly dependent on their major sources and afraid to alienate them. Laurie Freeman, whose book is a major study of these institutions in the Japanese media, describes them as an “information cartel” (Freeman 2000). Even after leaving the reporters’ club, NHK political reporters often continue their close relationship with key politicians and officials, becoming something like lobbyists for NHK within the LDP later in their careers. This may give NHK some access to and influence over these powerful government leaders, but of course it also gives the LDP another “pipe” into NHK to both discover what is going on within the organization and exercise influence on it (Krauss 2000: 161–164). The informal relationship between NHK and government authorities and political actors does not stop there. Government agencies routinely convene several

NHK: the politics of semi-independence  69

“advisory councils” involving private sector personnel and former bureaucrats to advise them on new policies and policy revisions before they formulate policy for the party and government. Media personnel, including many from NHK, routinely are appointed to these councils, thus further intensifying the incestuous relationship between NHK and the state (Krauss 2000: 164–166). Finally, NHK has been integrally entwined with the state since its origins by its development of new media technology. In the 1980s this involved satellite broadcasting and high-definition television, the latter an NHK invention (although analog; digital high-definition was invented by an American firm). Intended initially as a means to eventually make NHK less vulnerable to government budget pressures by spinning off some private companies and raising revenues, it nonetheless entangled NHK further with the government. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications helped to sponsor and oversee these technological initiatives, creating a form of “industrial policy” in collaboration with NHK, and the bid for autonomy ended up attracting more criticism and pressure from the LDP because the US applied pressure to use its satellites, transforming it into a bilateral trade dispute (Krauss 2000: 177–204). Thus through manipulation of the formal legal budget procedures, informal selection process for its executives, personal channels, institutional networks, and new technological initiatives, the state has ample ways to influence, intimidate, pressure, and constrain NHK as an organization despite the formal-legal mandate for its independence. To be clear, these relationships are, to some extent, a two-way street. The fact that budgets and fee increases involve negotiations, and political desk reporters maintain close ties with those they used to cover, and NHK can call for support from its bureaucratic patrons, give it some counter-influence over the LDP and government. Moreover, NHK’s labor union, Nippōrō, was led for a while in the 1970s by a subsequent Socialist Party Diet member who maintained influence within NHK, ensuring that the broadcaster maintained a degree of political neutrality in line with its mandate as a public service broadcaster (Krauss 2000: 170–174). NHK and the state are less two creatures eyeing each other warily, occasionally coming into conflict – as the “watchdog” metaphor of the democratic press would have it – than two octopi, constantly locked in a multi-tentacle embrace jockeying with each other, but in which the state/LDP is the larger and more powerful of the two and usually prevails. Under these circumstances, NHK’s survival depends upon its ability to not alienate the LDP and government too much, even if it doesn’t always do their bidding. The result is a news process designed to ensure a non-controversial news product that only informs but almost never explicitly offends. From the gathering of the news by reporters in reporters’ clubs highly dependent on their sources  – and most of those are in the government bureaucracy, not in clubs connected to elected leaders – to a vertically integrated and specialized news editing process constantly monitoring itself and overseen by higher executives to ensure nothing too clearly interpretive or offensive is broadcast,

70  Ellis S. Krauss

NHK produces a bland news product as described above. The puzzle I initially framed about how such an overtly independent news agency can produce such pabulum isn’t a puzzle after all – it is the result of NHK’s informal relationship to the state. Despite strong challenges to its ratings by the new, innovative, and interpretive news programs developed in the late 1980s by commercial stations (especially TV Asahi’s “News Station” late-evening program), NHK could not fundamentally change its plodding style. It attempted a more informal “anchor”-centered (rather than news reader announcer-centered) news program in the later evening, put its 7pm news into a new, more modern studio setting, and had journalists responding to questions from the announcer and used visuals more frequently, but could not escape its “hard news,” non-interpretive, non-controversial style (Krauss 2000: 204–240).

Subsequent developments: scandal, pressure, and then a respite from the LDP NHK’s relationship to the state has if anything become more precarious subsequent to the publication of my book, as the decade and a half from 2000 to 2015 saw NHK beset by more difficulties and scandals than at any other time in its history. As the new millennium dawned, NHK was facing increased commercial competition in addition to the challenges of the Internet, digital communications, satellite data broadcasting, social media, and mobile phones communication. Then mid-decade, a series of repeated scandals by employees were revealed, almost all involving embezzlement or padded or false expense or expenditure reports and payments. For example, NHK had to file a criminal complaint against a producer (who was later arrested for fraud) for making payments to a company for nonexistent work, other NHK producers filed claims for business expenses for trips they never took, a former NHK local bureau chief forged receipts for non-existent meals, and other employees had clearly directly embezzled funds. All these scandals involved tens of millions of yen. So intense was the public reaction to these revelations of malfeasance that over 100,000 viewers out of 25 million nationwide were refusing to pay their subscription fees, many in protest against the scandals. Although only a small fraction of NHK’s total revenue, this boycott soon grew to over 400,000 subscribers. This also got the attention of the LDP and government, which threatened a major cut in NHK’s 2005–2006 fiscal year budget, the first since 1950. Under increasing pressure, NHK’s President Ebisawa Katsuji resigned in mid-tenure. Ebisawa was one of those NHK presidents who had come up through the News Division and had close ties to the Tanaka/Takeshita faction. That the current Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō was from the major rival faction in the LDP probably did not help his cause. NHK presidents that have thrived by the factional sword, have also been cut down by it (Krauss 2006: xii–xiv; Krauss 2000: 144–148). Almost simultaneously, NHK was embroiled in another scandal, but this time involving interference in the content of its public affairs programming. In 2001,

NHK: the politics of semi-independence  71

NHK had broadcast a program on “Comfort Women,” the thousands of women and girls, many of them Korean or Chinese, who had been recruited to serve as sexual slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War. The Asahi Shimbun reported in an article on January  15, 2005 about allegations made by an NHK chief producer who charged that part of that program had been edited out because of political pressure from two LDP politicians, the current Minister of Economics and Industry Nakagawa Shōichi and Abe Shinzo, former LDP ­secretary-general and a rising star in the party. Both were thought to be from the more nationalist wing of the party on history issues. The producer charged that NHK executives met with the two politicians before the program was aired, and they complained it was biased and should not be aired. NHK did broadcast the program but with the offending parts cut (Krauss 2006: xiv–xiv). NHK denied the charge of political interference completely, said that Nakagawa had never met with an NHK executive, and although Abe had, the meeting had no impact on the final editing of the program. It also sent a written protest to the newspaper, and the anonymous NHK executive cited in the report identified himself and said he was misquoted in the article. No one knows or may ever know the truth of the allegations in this incident. Regardless, almost lost in the unproven charges and counter-charges were some key unanswered questions: why was an NHK executive meeting with an LDP politician right before a controversial program was to be aired, and did they discuss the program at all? If so, why? Did the fact that this incident took place about the time that NHK’s budget was to be approved in the Diet, a particularly politically vulnerable time for NHK, play a role? If even the meeting and discussion of the program took place at all, it might constitute a clear case of political interference and a possible violation of the Broadcast Law’s protections (Krauss 2006: xv–xvi). Abe achieved recognition as secretary-general of the LDP under the popular reformist Prime Minister Koizumi and rode the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s to further prominence. In 2006, upon Koizumi’s retirement, he became president of the LDP and prime minister. His use and abuse of NHK to further his rightist causes continued when he ordered NHK’s international broadcasts to emphasize the abductions more, even though NHK had already been spending one-third of news content on the issue (Onishi 2006). Abe’s popularity didn’t last long and after the party lost seats in the 2007 House of Councilors election, Abe experienced health problems and resigned. When the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power by a landslide for the first time in the 2009 general election, things seemed to change, and NHK’s reporting struck some observers as freer, having been temporarily released from the covert and overt pressures of the LDP; moreover NHK also seemed to cooperate more with the new party in power in other ways (Cucek 2010). The DPJ’s first prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, however, was widely considered to be a disaster and had to resign after only nine months in office. (See Penn Chapter 4) His initially popular successor, Kan Naoto, had the misfortune to be in office when the horrible triple-disaster (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor

72  Ellis S. Krauss

meltdowns) of March  11, 2011 (universally referred to in Japan as 3.11, much as the terrorist attacks of September 11 are referred to as 9/11) occurred. As the public broadcaster, NHK is mandated by law to aid in the prevention and mitigation of disasters, and the Japanese public usually looks to it, rather than the commercial networks, in times of crisis, especially disasters. A  content analysis of NHK and two commercial networks shows that by and large NHK fulfilled this role fairly well during the extended multiple crises, concentrating on keeping the public informed and providing it with practical information, especially for evacuees and those in the affected areas, whereas the commercial networks focused on the more dramatic events and images emerging from the disaster (Tanaka 2013). NHK, however, did show bias in reporting about the nuclear disaster, banned experts who early on called the meltdowns and voiced criticism of nuclear power, and did not call Tepco out on the blatant lies it circulated about Kan in order to shift blame long after it had to recant. The public, however, blamed Kan for mishandling the disaster (when in fact it was the nuclear power company Tepco that caused the problems), and he resigned, only to be replaced by another short-lived successor, paving the way for the LDP’s return to power in 2012 under PM Abe Shinzo.

Abe Shinzo and NHK: the lose-lose of intimidation For most of the postwar period, NHK covered politics, government, and public affairs as a relatively tame, non-interpretive but balanced broadcaster. In the industrialized democratic world, it stood out for its unusually staid, non-visual and nondramatic, factual coverage of the national bureaucracy and limited coverage of elected politicians. This results from the covert, multiple, and behind-the-scenes ways in which the long-running LDP-led governments quietly manipulated the institutional framework in which NHK operated and pressured the broadcaster, sometimes in direct but secret violation of the injunction against interference with program content. This resulted in a precarious balance, and only occasionally punctuated equilibrium, in which the LDP prevented NHK from becoming very interpretive, oppositional, or investigative in its coverage of politics; NHK otherwise was able to survive under LDP dominance and not become too overtly biased in favor of the LDP. Because of this ostensible factual, non-dramatic approach and balance, the public overwhelmingly trusted the information it received from the broadcaster. The consequence, as I  argue (Krauss 2000), is that NHK inadvertently functions to legitimize the Japanese state, the coalition of perpetually dominant LDP, and the influential national bureaucracy that emerged in the postwar period. Abe’s and the LDP’s haphazard crusade to dominate all the media, especially NHK, and prevent any negative coverage of the party or government at all, has upset this established balance. No longer content with primarily covert, behindthe-scenes pressure and manipulation, Abe and the LDP now directly and overtly

NHK: the politics of semi-independence  73

intimidate the broadcaster through the unprecedented appointment of a political crony as president, by blatantly threatening it, and by even forcing the ouster of offending journalists. (See George Mulgan Chapter 1) There is no precedent for this kind of public intimidation and attempted control in all of postwar Japanese media political history. Indeed, the closest equivalent that comes to mind in any democratic country is the Nixon-Agnew campaign against the media in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That was ended only by the revelations of Watergate. Given the different media norms and institutions in Japan, it is unlikely that any such investigative reporting, with similar results, either by the public or commercial broadcasters or by the printed press, will occur. NHK thus may remain in a very precarious position, unable to throw off either the covert or overt shackles that now tightly bind it to the government. If it does try to resist, it will only see its budget cut further, its journalists forced out, and itself subjected to further pressure. But if it doesn’t resist, just in order to survive, it will remain the docile lapdog it has become. Public broadcasters like NHK and the BBC in the U.K. are under threat. New media alternatives, tightened budgets, increased competition, and the threat of privatization loom in both countries, and their governments are resorting to stepping up the pressure (Heath 2015; Higgins 2015). The common denominator for both NHK and the BBC is that the political opposition in both countries is now moribund and ineffective, and the conservative parties are enjoying what appears to be a long honeymoon in office. Without the prospect of an opposition taking power, the governments have no fear of overtly pressuring the public service broadcaster. This creates a virtuous circle for the parties in power, but a vicious one for the broadcaster: a dominant political party feels freer to intimidate the broadcaster, and this intimidation may cow the broadcaster and thus reinforce that party’s dominance. There is, however, another ironic, unrecognized, negative counterpoint for the LDP (and possibly the BBC too). Through its covert influence and pressure, the LDP reaped non-analytical, non-oppositional coverage that the public trusted implicitly, thus enhancing the effectiveness of that coverage for the government. Now that its influence, or one may say control, has become more explicit, assertive, and obvious, the public may grow more wary of NHK’s coverage and trust it less, diminishing the value of NHK’s often deferential coverage of the government. Thus, both NHK and the LDP may lose from these new controls of the LDP over NHK. Ultimately, however, the greatest losers are the public and Japanese democracy itself.

Note 1 The exception is Henry Laurence of Bowdoin College, who has written and continues to write on public broadcasting in Japan and Britain.

74  Ellis S. Krauss

References Cucek, Michael (2010) “Media shifts make Japan harder to read”, East Asia Forum, January  14, www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/14/media-shifts-make-japan-harder-to-read/ (Accessed January 2, 2015). Deutsche Welle (2015) “Media in Japan under growing pressure to toe the line”, DW (Online), April  30, www.dw.com/en/media-in-japan-under-growing-pressure-to-toethe-line/a-18420514 (Accessed January 19, 2016). Freeman, Laurie (2000) Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. George Mulgan, Aurelia. 2015. “Shinzo Abe’s ‘Glass Jaw’ and Media Muzzling in Japan”, The Diplomat (Online), May 8, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/shinzo-abes-glass-jawand-media-muzzling-in-japan/ (Accessed January 26, 2016). Hayashi Kaoru (2014) “How NHK Lost Its Way”, Nippon.com. July 23, www.nippon.com/ en/currents/d00125/ (Accessed January 19, 2016). Heath, Allister (2015) “Ditch the license fee and force the BBC to compete for its audience”, The Telegraph (Online), July  15, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/bbc/11742631/ Ditch-the-licence-fee-and-force-the-BBC-to-compete-for-its-audience.html (Accessed December 18, 2015). Higgins, Charlotte (2015) “The battle for the BBC”, The Guardian (Online), July 14, www. theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/14/battle-for-the-bbc (Accessed December 18, 2015). Kingston, Jeff (2014) “Testy Team Abe Pressures Media in Japan”, Japan Focus (Online), April 16, http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4827/article.html (Accessed April 26, 2014). Kingston, Jeff (2016) “Hiroko Kuniya’s ouster deals another blow to quality journalism in Japan”, The Japan Times (Online), January  23. www.japantimes.co.jp/ opinion/2016/01/23/commentary/hiroko-kuniyas-ouster-deals-another-blow-qualityjournalism-japan/#.VqfAIlMrJR0 (Accessed January 24, 2016). Kobayashi Yoshiaki (1982) “Terebi Nyūsu no hōdō ni kansuru naiyō bunseki”, Keiō Daigaku Hōgaku, 55(9), September. Krauss, E.S. (2000) Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News. 1st ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Krauss, E.S. (2006) NHK vs. Nihon seiji. 1st ed. Trans. J. Gotō. Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha. Krauss, E.S. and Nyblade, Benjamin (2005) “ ‘Presidentialization’ in Japan?: The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan”, British Journal of Political Science 35(2): 362. Kyodo Staff Report (2014) “NHK governor withheld payments for license fee”, Japan Times (Online), February  28, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/28/national/nhkgovernor-withheld-payments-for-license-fee/#.Vq1ZoRipIq4 (Accessed January  30, 2016) Kyodo Staff Report (2015) “LDP scrutinizes NHK, TV Asahi scandals; press freedom advocates irked”, The Japan Times (Online), April  15, www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2015/04/15/national/ldp-scrutinizes-nhk-tv-asahi-scandals-press-freedom-advo cates-irked/#.VqfIMVMrLdc (Accessed January 26, 2016). Mitchell, Jon (2015) “In preparation to join U.S. wars Japan dismantles freedom of the press”, Freedom of the Press Foundation (Online), December 15, https://freedom.press/ blog/2015/12/preparation-join-us-wars-japan-dismantles-freedom-press (Accessed January 26 2016).

NHK: the politics of semi-independence  75

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2014) “Free and fair? NHK and the Tokyo election”, East Asia Forum (Online), February  28, www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/06/free-and-fair-nhkand-the-tokyo-election/ (Accessed January 30, 2016). NHK, Corporate Overview, www.nhk.or.jp/corporateinfo/english/corporate/index.html (Accessed December 24, 2015). Onishi, Norimitsu (2006) “Japan Rightists Fan Fury over North Korean Abductions”, The New York Times (Online), December  16, www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/world/ asia/17japan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (Accessed January 26, 2016). Reporters Without Borders (2015) “2015 World Press Freedom Index”, http://index.rsf. org/#!/index-details (Accessed January 26, 2016). Ryan, Kyla (2014) “NHK Ignores Tokyo Self-Immolation”, The Diplomat (Online), July 1, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/nhk-ignores-tokyo-self-immolation/ (Accessed January 26). Tanaka Takenobu (2013) “NHK’s Disaster Coverage and Public Value from Below: Analyzing the TV Coverage of the Great East Japan Disaster,” Keio Communication Review, 35. Yoshida, Reiji (2015) “DPJ Lawmakers grill Momii over his performance as NHK chairman”, Japan Times (Online). February  19, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/19/ national/politics-diplomacy/dpj-lawmakers-grill-momii-over-his-performance-as-nhkchairman/#.VQ1W2HIPIQ4 (Accessed January 30, 2016). Yoshida, Reiji, Mie, Ayako and Johnson, Eric (2014) “Momii’s rise tests NHK’s reputation”, Japan Times (Online), February  2, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/02/ national/momiis-rise-tests-nhks-reputation/#.Vq1zbDYrJR0 (Accessed February  4, 2014).

6 ABE AND PRESS OPPRESSION Guilty, not guilty or not proven? Michael Thomas Cucek

Since returning to power in 2012, the administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his Liberal Democratic Party stand accused of conducting a campaign aimed at curtailing press liberties and muting the voices of critical journalists – a process that Nakano Koichi described as an “emasculation” of the Japanese media (Harding 2015). However, while equating the actions of the Abe administration with castration makes for vivid copy, it probably overstates the differences between the powers of persuasion of the current administration and its predecessors as regards to press freedom. It furthermore elevates, without great reason, the protagonists of today, while ignoring the news elite’s habitudes of complicity in the destruction of their reportorial virility. It also exaggerates the damage inflicted, offering a confusing binomial sense of loss (Have v. Not Have) of the media’s powers. For the skeptic, two questions loom: 1

Are the actions of the Abe administration as regards to press freedom truly unprecedented?

and 2

Is the evidence of stifling of critics irrefutable?

This chapter evaluates these two questions against the standard list of incidents invoked as evidence of the Abe administration’s hostility and malfeasance: •

reminders from administration officials, including by the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, that the Broadcast Law requires broadcast networks be unbiased in their reporting.

Abe and press oppression  77

• •

• •

• • •

vilification of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper by government officials,1 including Mr. Abe himself, for alleged damage done to Japan-South Korea relations and Japan’s image abroad (Kotler 2014). the June  2015 meeting where junior LDP lawmakers suggested targeting the advertising revenue of news media critical of the administration, and an invited guest suggested a shutdown of Okinawa’s two main local newspapers (Asahi Japan Watch 2015a). Mr. Abe’s cultivation, through small group dinners and private functions, of good relations with the top management of all the nation’s media groups, regardless of that group’s basic political orientation. complaints by Mr. Abe and other government officials of news organizations cherry picking negative views to frame government actions (Asahi Japan Watch 2014), in addition to a Japanese diplomat’s undocumented accusation against a journalist suggesting he was acting as an agent of China in criticizing Mr. Abe’s revisionist history (Germis 2015). the peculiarly proximate non-renewal of the contracts of three major television news program anchors and commentators in early 2016. the dramatic increase in the penalties against possible government whistleblowers and potential penalties against journalists for revealing government secrets under the Special Designated Secrets Act of 2013. Japan’s declining position in the Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontieres, hereafter “RSF”) rankings of press freedom.

Despite this lengthy indictment, the skeptic still does not come away with the sense of a truly historical and highly damaging assault by the Abe administration upon the capacity of journalists to do their jobs. First, Abe and his allies are not necessarily behaving in a manner heretofore unseen, essentially an unfocused and counterproductive legacy harassment of the media  – with a twist of government bureaucrats participating in overt expressions of disdain. Second, while one newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, has had to weather verbal attacks by the Abe government, the paper’s most lethal enemies are not the Abe government, but the Asahi itself and other news media groups. (cf. Fackler Chapter 3) Third, while the government has been accused of fostering self-censorship, there is no demonstrable case of consequences that can be unequivocally attributed to intimidation or threats by the Abe government. Fourth, while the passage of the Specially Designated Secrets Act increased punishments for journalists revealing secrets, it has not broadened the definition of secrets nor significantly increased the capacity of prosecutors to prosecute journalists. (cf. Stockwin Chapter 8, Yamada Chapter 9) Fifth, while the termination of the contracts of several prominent television announcers and commentators has been called a political housecleaning, not one of the non-renewals has been directly ascribed to Abe administration action or pressure. Sixth, the RSF survey, while widely quoted, is an impressionistic and arguably misleading index.

78  Michael Thomas Cucek

It sure looks awful Before making the skeptical case questioning the seriousness of the actions by Mr. Abe and his collaborators, this author admits that Abe and his colleagues have not made the task easy. One can compile a long list of the actions taken and statements made by the members of the Liberal Democratic Party, members of the Abe administration and Mr. Abe himself that could be construed as a vendetta against the media. Since Mr. Abe’s reelection to the LDP presidency in 2012, there have been an extraordinary number of reports regarding disputes involving the news media and his administration. Too often it has seemed that persons close to Mr. Abe are unwilling to accept a common sense reading of the first sentence of Article 21 of the Constitution: “Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.” (Constitution of Japan ). Yet, when the charge is “suppression’ of press freedom, is there sufficient proof to support a guilty verdict?

We have seen this all before The actions of Abe, his fellow cabinet members and members of the LDP do not represent a clear break from past practices (See Krauss Chapter  5). Abe is infamous, and rightly so, for having interfered with the production of a four-part documentary broadcast in January  2001 on the NHK education channel about the Japanese imperial army’s history of sexual violence and sexual exploitation during World War II. The episode in question focused on a mock trial concerning this record and the mock verdict issued finding Emperor Showa (the posthumous name for Hirohito) guilty of war crimes. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, accompanied by fellow staunch nationalist Nakagawa Shoichi, visited NHK headquarters on 29 January 2001, the day before the program was to air, to recommend (or demand; interpretations vary) changes to the program before it could be broadcast (Japan Times 2005). The NHK episodes eventually did air, but minus the segment about the mock trial verdict against Emperor Showa. Replacing the verdict was a conservative historian’s critical commentary. Retellings of the 2001 incident omit some relevant framing. Abe and Nakagawa were not the only politicians interfering with the NHK program episode in question. For example on 26 January 2001, just four days before the program was to air, Minister for Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications Katayama Toranosuke, also a member of the LDP, told visiting NHK executives that the contents of the proposed program had to be truthful and unbiased (Tawara 2016). While later narratives of the program have focused on the intervention of the colorful political blue bloods Abe and Nakagawa, NHK executives had already been warned to back off by the relevant government minister before the pair’s arrival. As for the infamous February 2016 Diet interpellation where Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae asserted that her ministry had

Abe and press oppression  79

the power to revoke the operating license of a broadcast network for biased programming, it too has a history. By far the most famous invocation of this latent power was the Tsubaki Incident (Tsubaki Jiken) of 1993. Tsubaki Sadayoshi, the director of the news bureau of terrestrial broadcaster TV Asahi, boasted of having willfully violated Article 4 of the Broadcast Act requiring fairness in programming, this in order to encourage the overthrow of the then LDP-led government. Tsubaki made his claim in a private broadcaster’s briefing. His boasts became a national scandal after the gist of his remarks were published in a newspaper of a rival news group. The LDP, which was in opposition, demanded the revocation of TV Asahi’s broadcast license for illegal bias – the ultimate form of sanction. The controversy died down after Tsubaki, summoned to testify in the Diet, recanted his alleged claims of biased reporting. The nation’s media groups then lined up in defense of their profession (Berger 1995). Had the LDP been in power at the height of the Tsubaki crisis, rather than in opposition, the consequences might have been far more serious for TV Asahi.2 The Tsubaki Incident made a lasting impression upon the LDP. In party lore, television bias did indeed turn the electorate against the LDP in 1993, in part due to the tremendous influence at the time of TV Asahi’s flagship 10 pm newscast News Station and its unconventional and highly critical host Kume Hiroshi (Berger 1995). After Tsubaki, TV Asahi and its sister newspaper the Asahi Shimbun became the repeated targets of LDP harassment, with seemingly no statute of limitations on the LDP’s capacity for vengeance (Sudō 2004). As far as making threats against advertising revenues of commercial news organizations, the current LDP young turks are not innovators in this either. In 1968 Igarashi Haruo, the former director-general of the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations, boasted that threatened advertising boycotts had had a significant dampening effect on newspaper reporting about the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty revision (Ampo) crisis (Shimbun Roren 1971, as cited in Maruyama 2015). The actors in this case were corporations, but they were clearly acting at the behest of the LDP and the national government. The Ampo crisis, pitting the LDP government of Abe Shinzo’s grandfather Kishi Nobusuke against Japan’s militantly pacifist, left-wing labor unions, deeply affected the young Abe Shinzo. The reporting at the time fostered his contempt for “a great deal of the news media.” In his view, the news media opposed the revision of the Security Arrangements out of nothing more than intellectual sloth (Abe 2013).

Know thine enemy: the Asahi Shimbun’s confession and the aftermath In an unprecedented and unexpected move on 5 August 2014, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper printed a massive retraction of a series of highly influential and politically explosive articles. (See Fackler Chapter 3) Right-wing and nationalist organizations and individuals had long criticized the Asahi for having been

80  Michael Thomas Cucek

the first to print the falsehoods of Yoshida Seiji, a wartime labor recruiter from Yamaguchi Prefecture.3 On the four full broadsheet pages of the paper’s August 5 morning edition, editors published a special report retracting sixteen articles printed between 1982–1997 containing statements by Yoshida that could not be corroborated. The Asahi editors admitted relying on Yoshida’s testimony even after it was discredited and had not properly repudiated the articles containing the false claims. Hoping to put the scandal behind them, the editors said the paper had reflected (hansei)4 on the implications of having published the articles. Retraction of the 16 articles and the assertion of belated “reflection” sparked a firestorm of condemnation from politicians and conservative media rivals. Rather than lay the matter to rest, the Asahi’s mea culpa only fed the Japanese rightwing characterization of the Asahi as having an essentially evil and unpatriotic character. Opportunistically, and in stark contrast to the unity displayed after the Tsubaki Incident, other media groups reveled in the Asahi’s political troubles and indeed stoked them. (See Yamaguchi Chapter 10; McNeill Chapter 12; McNeill and McCurry 2014). Prime Minister Abe himself openly and repeatedly abused the Asahi for its publication of what he deemed false news reports damaging Japan-South Korea relations and Japan’s international image (Martin 2014). Overwhelmed, a humiliated Asahi arranged for the appointment of an outside committee to look into the Yoshida Seiji controversy and recommend changes to the Asahi’s reportorial and editorial practices (Nakagome 2014). The Asahi indeed deserved condemnation – but not for having erred in publishing Yoshida’s falsehoods. Virtually every media group, including the Yomiuri and Sankei that lead the anti-Asahi campaign, had done so until historians of all stripes declared Yoshida a serial liar. If the paper and its editors should be condemned for anything, it was for staggering naiveté. The retractions were published without preliminary groundwork: the staff did not consult with the Abe administration or with fellow newspaper groups, feeling out their likely responses in the event the Asahi should print retractions. It did not secure from the Japanese government, as the Japanese government made sure to do from the South Korean government in its own apology as regards the comfort women (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015),5 a promise in advance that an admission of error would result in a permanent resolution of a controversy. By not extracting a promise from its opponents and rivals to support the paper if it admitted fault, the Asahi created an opportunity for the government to institutionalize a lie: that Asahi articles are the root cause of fractured South Korea-Japan relations and Japan’s poor international image (Mamiya 2015). The shaming of the Asahi Shimbun for printing Yoshida’s lies, once the exclusive province of Japan’s lunatic fringe, became fair game for Japanese bureaucrats and rival media groups (Ikeda, and Misawa 2016).

Cowing into self-censorship? The Asahi’s retraction of the Yoshida Seiji-inspired articles transpired at the same time as the paper issued a second apology for misleading readers as to actions of

Abe and press oppression  81

workers at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in 2011 and retracted the article (See Fackler Chapter 3; Martin 2014). Staff morale at the Asahi reportedly plummeted. The Abe government’s criticisms were petty and demoralizing but hardly the main cause of the loss of faith in, and at, the Asahi, the most prominent of the anti-Abe government news outlets. Staff and management simply lost sight of their responsibilities to look after their own interests. However, a similar loss of morale claimed to be spreading throughout all news media organizations is allegedly the handiwork of Mr. Abe. Since returning to power in 2012, Prime Minister Abe has been engaged in what at times seems a frenetic program of dining out and golfing with the top executives of Japan’s media giants. These outings have been not only with longtime recognized media “Friends of Abe” like Fuji Television Chairman Hieda Hisashi or Yomiuri Group Chairman Watanabe Tsuneo, but also top executives from the Asahi and NHK media groups (Shigeyama, 2015). According to freelance journalist Koga Shigeaki, this intense, personal socializing creates a climate of fear inside news media organizations. Reporters are now unsure whether or not executives will protect and support them or line up with their new friend Abe Shinzo should the reporters try to publish or broadcast stories or commentaries critical of Abe government policies (Koga 2015a). Given the corporate cultures inside Japan’s news media organizations, Koga’s scenario of top-down internal pressure is plausible. Top media executives have clearly failed as leaders, not grasping or caring that their socializing with Abe creates a conflict of interest (The Economist 2016). They could be generating a corporate atmosphere where reporters, without even being asked, trim their critical reporting. However, neither Koga nor any other Abe critic has come forth with a smoking gun proving a person was fired or reassigned, or a news report was cancelled, due to a directive from a top executive known to have socialized with Prime Minister Abe. Koga has claimed media executives have told him off-the-record that they have received warnings from the Abe administration to not book him on their shows (Koga 2013). He has not, however, provided evidence corroborating his claims. Furthermore, as Ellis Krauss has documented, politicians calling up news media in order to complain or engaging in petty acts of vengeance are a consistent feature of Japanese media-politician relations (Krauss 2000 and Krauss Chapter 5). A stronger case for the generation of a climate of self-censorship can be made as regards the comments of Minister Takaichi made to the Diet on 8 February 2016. Asked if she would wield her power to revoke a broadcast license under the Article 4 provision, Takaichi replied that she did not imagine herself doing so, but could not promise that she or any of her successors would not.6 (Sankei 2016) Takaichi’s testimony may be seen as posing a threat toward freedom of the press. That is certainly the way most of the public has viewed the comments, with two out of three respondents to a Kyōdō News polls finding her remarks constituting a threat to press freedom (Kyodo News 2016).7

82  Michael Thomas Cucek

The Takaichi testimony remains, nonetheless, only a restatement of what the current broadcast law allows, qualified by the minister’s admission that she cannot predict the future – which she indeed cannot. Her testimony did not deviate significantly from similar Diet testimony given by her predecessors (Sankei 2016). Indeed, if Minister Takaichi’s goal was to foster a climate of fear in the news media, she has failed badly. Since making the remarks, she and the Abe government have been the target of unified intense criticism (Asahi Japan News 2016) and even mockery.8 In an oft-kilter attempt at sarcastic humor in the Diet, Takaichi acknowledged this failure, saying she had not only failed to generate an atmosphere where self-censorship takes place, she had created its exact opposite.9 Similarly falling flat were letters sent to the nation’s broadcasters by the Prime Minister’s office prior to the December  2014 elections reminding the nation’s broadcasters of their Article 4 obligations to report the news in a fair manner. Rather than intimidating the news media, the letters, once their contents were leaked, became an embarrassment for the government (Japan Times 2014). Furthermore, while the current anti-LDP political opposition in the Diet excoriates the Abe government for using the powers of the Broadcast Law to suppress reporting it does not like, the opposition’s position has not always been so abstemious. When Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro was receiving fawning coverage from soft news programs in 2001, opposition parties demanded that the fairness provisions of the Broadcast Law be invoked to halt the love fest (Washington Times 2001). Intimidation of journalists has emerged during the time of the second Abe Cabinet. However, the intimidation has been in the form of vitriolic and visually arresting newspaper advertisements published by private groups. One such advertisement in particular, published on two full pages of the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Sankei Shimbun in 2015 seems to have played a role in the TBS terrestrial broadcast network decision to not rehire veteran news commentator Kishii Shigetaka for the 2016–2017 season (Suzuki 2016). However, as in the case of politicians complaining to editors about the contents of programs, scurrilous and outraged newspaper advertisements attacking political players are a part of the traditional media environment in Japan. While the Abe administration’s policies and politics may be creating an atmosphere where the authors of such advertisements feel more assured, no one has provided evidence the Abe administration itself is behind the appearance of the advertisements such as those that vilified Kishii.

The specially designated secrets act: for whom tolls the bell? Critics asserting a dramatic shift toward restriction of the freedom of the press are on firmer ground when they cite the 2014 Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Act. This Act, which the Abe administration proposed and the LDPKomeito coalition pushed through the Diet in December 2013, creates a class of

Abe and press oppression  83

Specially Designated Secrets that, if revealed by either a politician or a member of the bureaucracy, can result in up to 10 years imprisonment. Journalists can be prosecuted for publishing a Specially Designated Secret or encouraging the leakage of a designated secret. A penalty of up to five years in prison looms for what amounts, according to many legal scholars, to journalists doing their jobs (See Stockwin Chapter 8; Yamada Chapter 9; Repeta 2014). The logic of multiplication seems irrefutable in this instance. The 1970 conviction of journalist Nishiyama Takichi for encouraging a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreign Ministry to pass on proof of a U.S.-Japan agreement the Government of Japan said did not exist led to Nishiyama being sentenced to one year in prison. Penalties for a similar act under the Specially Designated Secrets Act would be five times worse. However, an increased potential length of possible prison sentences does not necessarily imply a sweeping expansion in the power of Japanese administration to cow journalists. There has not been, in what would have been a much more damaging expansion, a broadening of the definition of what is illegal behavior. What is remarkable about the Act is indeed its narrow or even petty focus on past incidents. The language of the Act indicates a fixation on the Nishiyama case, where his culpability hinged on his having received the secret information thanks to his sexual relationship with a MOFA bureaucrat, a married woman. The 2014 Act specifies that a journalist collecting information in the public interest in an otherwise legal manner is not prosecutable unless the means employed to learn the Designated Secret is “extremely inappropriate” (Repeta 2014). Ostensibly, as long as the means by which a journalist learned a Designated Secret was neither abusive nor manipulative, arresting a journalist under the Act would require the prosecutor to assert that news-gathering itself was an “extremely inappropriate” form of behavior. While not impossible, it seems unlikely the Prosecutor’s Office would see profit in taking a blatantly political stance toward the guarantees of press freedom in the Constitution.

Victims, but of what? The years 2015 and 2016 have seen the departures of some very familiar faces from the nation’s television news. These include the aforementioned commentators Kishii and Koga from TV Asahi programs and in April  2016 the anchors Furutachi Ichirō and Kuniya Hiroko. Furutachi had helmed the successor program to News Station called News Gathering Station (Hōdō sutēshon), preserving, in a less showy manner, the quizzical reportorial tone of his predecessor Kume. Kuniya had been the anchor for Close up Gendai (Kurozu appu gendai), a thirtyminute documentary and talk show examining current social or economic issues in depth, since the show’s first broadcast in 1993. The Ian Fleming rule is “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action” (Fleming 1959). The near contemporaneous non-renewals of the contracts of Kishii, Furutachi and Kuniya would seem to invoke the rule.

84  Michael Thomas Cucek

However, the ages of the terminated and of their programs need to be taken into account. Furutachi at the time was sixty-one and had helmed News Gathering Station for twelve years. Kuniya was fifty-nine and had helmed Close Up Gendai for twenty-two years. Kishii was seventy. Institutionally speaking, Furutachi and Kishii were past official retirement age, while Kuniya was on the cusp of it (In contrast, Takeda Shinichi, the host of the nation’s most watched news program, the 7 pm broadcast on NHK, is at the time of this writing only fortyeight). Kishii, Furutachi and Kuniya thus had been doing the same job in the same way for a very long time (the more youthful Takeda, by contrast, began work at his current assignment in 2008). Costs issues also have to be taken into account. The lengthy terms of service of the departed trio and their advanced ages meant they were by winter 2016 comparatively expensive contract employees. In not renewing the contracts of these superannuated stars, the networks were cutting their payrolls. Special mention is reserved for Koga Shigeaki, the one television personality who has claimed retaliation for his commentary, taking his case to the pages of the New York Times (Koga 2015b). While a pungent critic, Koga seems to have barred himself from broadcast television by indulging in increasingly sanctimonious and idiosyncratic behavior. The final straw came in an on-air accusation during a News Gathering Station broadcast that the Abe administration had ordered his removal, an assertion that host Furutachi immediately dismissed (Asia Japan Watch 2015b). To date, neither Furutachi nor Kuniya have publically ascribed their departures to pressure from the Abe administration on their networks. Kishii, who is still a member of the editorial board of the Mainichi Shimbun, has chosen to dwell not on his firing, but on Minister Takaichi’s reading of the Broadcast Act, an event which took place after TBS made the decision to not renew his contract (Kishii, Tahara, Torigoe, Otani, Akihiro and Aoki 2016). Finally, it should be noted that the 2016 report on press freedom in Japan of David Kaye, the United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of expression, emphasized that Japanese media self-censorship is still overwhelmingly structural in nature, emanating from the kisha club system and the corporate cultures of Japanese media companies, rather than actions of the Abe administration officials or Abe himself (Kaye 2016a).

We grade ourselves In most articles or writing on press freedom under Abe, the statistical measure of deterioration invoked is the RSF Index of Press Freedom. It is true that since Mr. Abe became prime minister, Japan’s RSF rank has fallen precipitously. Japan’s rank was 11th in the world in 2009 under DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. It was 53rd in 2013, the first year of Abe’s second term in office. The rank for 2016, after three years of Abe, is 72nd in the world, beneath Papua New Guinea (55th), El Salvador (58th), Hungary (67th) and Tanzania (71st).

Abe and press oppression  85

That those four countries and new democracies and semi-authoritarian states like them should rank above Japan in terms of press freedom should immediately give pause to anyone relying on the RSF rankings as a credible cross-national index. The reliability of the ranking is questionable because of its extreme volatility. Japan’s ranking on the RSF list since it was first compiled in 2002 is as follows: Year Rank 2002 11 2003 44 2004 42 2005 36 2006 51 2007 37 2008 29 2009 18 2010 11 2011 NA 2012 22 2013 53 2014 59 2015 61 2016 72 The volatility of Japan’s ranking is astonishing. It also seems unanchored, seemingly tied to specific events or legislation. Difficult to swallow, for example, is the dramatic decline of press freedom under Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro, a PM whose relationship with the news media was, if anything, characterized as being too friendly and warm (Kabashima and Steel 2007). Prime Minister Abe seems a particular bugbear of the RSF rankings, with Japan’s rank dropping to 51st during his first term in office in 2006–2007, and from 22nd to 53rd after he returned to power in 2012. A glance at the methodology of the RSF rankings gives a hint at the potential sources of this extreme volatility. First, the RSF rankings are insufficiently comparative and thus skewed. The number ranking is based on data assessments made on a country-by-country, not transnational, basis. A  questionnaire is sent to selected informants who offer their own impressions of the current situation of the news media and any changes that have taken place in the last year, only in their own country. There is no attempt to elicit comparative views from country informants regarding how their situation compares to other countries. Control for cross-national differences is restricted to an indicator of abuses derived from reports by journalists in each of the survey countries about incidents of violence and intimidation. The abuses indicator is used to “weight the qualitative analysis of the situation of the country based upon the replies to the questionnaires”

86  Michael Thomas Cucek

(Reporters Sans Frontieres 2016), but is essentially meaningless in terms of quantitative analysis. A second source of distortion is test subjects themselves. They are experts selected by the RSF from out of the ranks of “media professionals, lawyers and sociologists” (Reporters Sans Frontieres 2016). The possibility of the three categories of experts exaggerating the extent to which the news media is repressed in their country is significant, particularly among the news professionals category. Rather than an international index of press freedom, the RSF methodology might be better described as a collation of national indices of the ups and downs of feelings of autonomy or agenda setting powers. When the news professionals feel they have control over the agenda, they will assess the glass in their country as half full. As they lose control over the agenda, they are more likely to rate the glass as being half empty, or worse. This reformulation, seeing the RSF as merely measuring media mood swings over time, explains the swoon in the rankings during the otherwise freewheeling Koizumi era. As Japan news professionals and academics viewed Koizumi’s manipulation of symbols and casuistry less favorably, they naturally viewed his continued dominance as threatening to their control of the agenda. The swoon during Abe’s second term, for different reasons too numerous to enumerate here, can plausibly be attributed to a similar loss of control – which is not the same as a deterioration in freedom.

Keeping it all in perspective It is best to conclude with the assessment of a truly high-quality, transnational comparative assessor: David Kaye, the UN special rapporteur for freedom of expression. In delivering his report on the press freedom in Japan on 19 April 2016, he made the following statement: “I do want to start by saying that it’s very clear there is a strong commitment in Japanese society to the freedom of opinion and freedom of expression. It’s reflected in Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of speech, freedom of the press and prohibits censorship. It’s reflected in the fact that Japan is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And it’s reflected in facts on the ground.” (Kaye 2016a, author’s emphasis) In his April 19 written statement, Kaye is not quite so sanguine, addressing many of the incidents and issues raised above and in other chapters of this book (Kaye 2016b). After reading the Kaye report, one cannot help but be struck by the pigheadedness of the Abe administration and Abe himself, aggravating journalists without justifiable reason. It is this impunity, perhaps, which gives the Abe administration’s relations with press freedom an aura of historical significance. The actions of Abe and his associates

Abe and press oppression  87

are not appreciably different from what LDP politicians have done in the past. As UN rapporteur Kaye found out in his tour, the evidence of a dramatic change in press freedom is meager and impressionistic: no one has been charged with a crime, no publication has ceased publication due to government action. Nevertheless, an attitude of “What we are doing smells bad and we don’t care” permeates interactions between the Abe administration and the press. It poisons the atmosphere to the point where the presumption of innocence becomes the presumption of guilt.

Notes 1 In a statement read to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Deputy Foreign Minister Sugiyama Shinsuke, the head of the Japan delegation, singled out the Asahi Shimbun for sole criticism, saying, “The story that ‘The Imperial Army of Japan on orders hunted down large numbers of women on the Korean island of Cheju’ is a falsehood reported as fact. The Asahi Shimbun reported upon this story in a big way, and this has had a huge effect on not just the dispute between Japan and South Korea but on international society as well” – even though all of Japan’s main newspapers had used the false claims in their reporting on the comfort women issue (Ikeda and Misawa 2016). 2 It is a matter of historical irony that in his infamous briefing, Tsubaki made specific reference to Takaichi Sanae as a politician whose election was stymied by his network’s biased reporting (Berger 1995). 3 Yoshida had claimed to have taken part in Japanese military raids on the island of Cheju, capturing hundreds of Korean women in order that they would be made sexual slaves serving in brothels monitored and maintained by the Imperial Army. Researchers found it impossible to verify any of Yoshida’s tales of “the hunting down of women,” leaving it likely his tales were entirely fabricated. Subsequently, he admitted as much (Martin 2014). 4 The Asahi editors’ choice of the word hansei (“reflection”) rather than the clearer shazai or owabi (both meaning “apology”) was a perhaps too clever-by-half decision. For decades, right-wing politicians and commentators had been insisting that the Japan’s government’s use of hansei as regards Japan conduct in the 1930s and the 1940s should be translated into English as “apology” and “deep remorse.” Asahi’s editors’ cheeky parroting of the right’s duplicity only made its enemies angrier, a selfindulgence the company later realized was a mistake (Asahi Shimbun Co. Third Party Committee Report 2014). 5 For the record, there are two “official” versions of the 28 December 2015 agreement in between the governments of South Korea and Japan on the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. The first, www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html, differs from the second, www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html, by a single digit in the URL. The first version also makes no mention of an amount for the fund that is to be established, while the second mentions an amount of “approximately 100 billion yen” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). 6 “If we are dealing with a broadcaster who has failed, despite repeated requests by the Ministry, to improve at all, I cannot promise I will not act. As for my never taking action in the future, I cannot promise that. I do not think that I will ever use (my powers) during my time in office. However, if such facts present themselves, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications of that time will make a determination.” (Takaichi remarks as reprinted in Sankei 2016). 7 Asked whether Takachi’s remarks indicated a threat to broadcast freedom, 29.4 percent of respondents said, “Definitely” while another 38 percent “If I had to choose, I would say they pose a threat” (Kyodo News 2016).

88  Michael Thomas Cucek

8 An example of the comedic reaction is a 17-syllable satirical poem (senryū) sent in by a reader to Tokyo Shimbun, which published the poem on its editorial page on 21 February 2016: Raijin ka Dempa o tomeru Sugoi kata She is like, what, the God of Lightning? “She who stops electromagnetic waves” Amazing exalted person. (Tokyo Shimbun 2016) 9 “Looking at what has been written about me in the news over the last week, you cannot say that the news media is withering away. Persons attached to the news media have expressed what they felt they should express, with great pride.” (Asahi Digital 2016)

References Abe, Shinzō (2013) Atarashii kuni e [Toward a New Country]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 23. Asahi Digital (2016) “Takaichi shi ‘Media wa ishuku shite inai’ Jibun e no hōdō o rei ni” [“Ms. Takaichi: ‘Media is not withering away’, offers coverage of herself as example”], February 16, www.asahi.com/articles/ASJ2J3K64J2JUTFK003.html Asahi Japan Watch (2015a) “EDITORIAL: Lawmakers’ remarks about media underscore LDP’s arrogance”, June  26, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/ AJ201506260087. Asahi Japan Watch (2015b) “Abe critic claims on air he was axed from TV program at behest of management”, March 29, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/politics/ AJ201506260087. Asahi Japan Watch (2016) “Top TV journalists slam communications minister’s ‘shameful’ remarks’ ”, March 1, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/social_affairs/ AJ201603010060. Berger, Paul (1995) “Exploring the intersection of government, politics and the news media in Japan: The Tsubaki Hatsugen incident”, MIT Japan Program Working Paper 95–04, https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/17127. Constitution of Japan, Kantei website, Tokyo, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_ government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. The Economist (2016) “Anchor’s away”, February  20, www.economist.com/news/ asia/21693269-criticism-government-being-airbrushed-out-news-shows-anchors-away. Fleming, Ian (1959) Goldfinger. London: Jonathan Cape. Germis, Carsten (2015) “On my watch: Confessions of a foreign correspondent after a halfdecade of reporting from Tokyo to his German readers”, Number 1 Shimbun, April 2, www.fccj.or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/576-on-my-watch/576-on-my-watch.html. Harding, Robin (2015) “Shinzo Abe accused of ‘emasculating’ Japanese media’ ”, Financial Times, June 21, www.ft.com/content/79420f36-1e13-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79. Ikeda, Teiichi and Misawa, Noritake (2016) “Gaimushō ga Asahi basshingu? Kuni no sekinin chisaku miseru” [Is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bashing? Downplaying the national responsibility”], Tokyo Shimbun, February 23, p. 28. Japan Times (2005) “Abe admits telling NHK to censor TV program”, January 13, www. japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/01/13/national/abe-admits-telling-nhk-to-censor-tv-pro gram/#.VtXmlJx4bIU. Japan Times (2014) “LDP letter to broadcasters urges neutral poll campaign reporting, draws criticism”, November  28, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/28/national/

Abe and press oppression  89

ldp-letter-broadcasters-urges-neutral-poll-campaign-reporting-draws-criticism/#. VtpWq-bsS7Q. Kabashima, Ikuo and Steel, Gill (2007) “How Koizumi seized the leadership of the LDP”, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 8(1): 95–114. Kaye, David (2016a) “The freedom of expression in Japan”, FCCJ YouTube channel, April 19, www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4Ldjp9XegI. Kaye, David (2016b) “Preliminary observations by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr.  David Kaye at the end of his visit to Japan (12–19 April  2016)”, Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights website, April 19, www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=19842&LangID=E. Kishii, Shigetada and Tahara, Soichiro, Torigoe, Shuntaro, Otani, Akihiro and Aoki, Osamu (2016) “Japan’s journalists speak out (English)”, FCCJ YouTube channel, March 24, www.youtube.com/watch?v=30tQyF50kx0. Koga, Shigeaki (2013) Riken no fukkatsu: “Kokumin no tame” to iu sajiutsu [The return of the politics of vested interests: the fraudulent manipulations of the so-called “For the People”]. Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 178. Koga, Shigeaki (2015a) “The chilling of freedom of expression of Japan?” FCCJ YouTube channel, April 16, www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVdaxxJqQOM. Koga, Shigeaki (2015b) “The threat to press freedom in Japan”, New York Times, May 20, www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/opinion/the-threat-to-press-freedom-in-japan.html. Kotler, Mindy (2014) “The comfort women and Japan’s war on truth”, New York Times, November  24, www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/opinion/comfort-women-and-japanswar-on-truth.html. Kyodo News (2016) Public Opinion Poll of February 20–21, reprinted in Tokyo Shimbun, February 23, 2016. Krauss, Ellis (2000) Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 81. Mamiya, Jun (2015) “ ‘Asahi Shimbun’ coverage of the comfort women issue through the years”, Nippon.com, May 1, www.nippon.com/en/features/h00074/?pnum=1. Martin, Alexander (2014) “President of Japanese Newspaper apologizes for errors”, Wall Street Journal, September  11, www.wsj.com/articles/president-of-major-japanesenewspaper-apologizes-for-errors-1410439554. Maruyama, Shigetake (2015) Abe kaiken kūdetā to media shihai [The Abe coup d’état destroying the Constitution and directing the media]. Tokyo: Akebi Shobo, 67. McNeil, David and McCurry, Justin (2014) “Sink the Asahi!”, Number 1 Shimbun, November  4, http://www.fccj.or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/488-sink-the-asahi/488-sink-theasahi.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) “Japan-ROK foreign minister’s meeting”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, December  28, http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_ 000365.html. Nakagome, Hideaki et  al. (2014) “Asahi Shimbun Co. third party committee report, Abridged”, Asahi Shimbun Corporation website, December  22, p.  30, http://www. asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/report20150728e.pdf. Osaki, Tomohiro (2016) “Sanae Takaichi warns that government can shut down broadcasters it feels are biased”, Japan Times, February 9, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/09/ national/politics-diplomacy/minister-warns-that-government-can-shut-down-broad casters-it-feels-are-biased/. Reporters Sans Frontieres (2016) “Methodology”, Reporters Sans Frontieres website, 13 May 2016, https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology.

90  Michael Thomas Cucek

Sankei News (2016) “Nani ga mondai? Minpō kanbu ‘Yatō naze sawagu no ka’ Minshū seiken jidai mo onaji toben” [“Management of commercial broadcasters wonder, ‘What’s the problem?’ Under the DPJ Government the Diet response was the same”], February 17, www.sankei.com/entertainments/news/160217/ent1602170008-n1.html. Sudō, Haruo (2004) “Terebi Asahi ni taisuru Sōmushō genju chui shobun ni tsuite no kenkai” [“Thoughts on the strict warning issue by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to TV Asahi”], Declarations/Appeals of the Media Research Institute, September 13, www.mediasoken.org/statement/view.php?id=43. Suzuki, Nobuyuki (2016) “Hihan hōdō e no atsuryoku kyoka” [“The strengthening of pressures against critical reporting”], Tokyo Shimbun, February 16, p. 28. Tawara, Yoshifumi (2016) Abe Shinzō no honsei [Abe Shinzō, his true colors]. Tokyo: Kinyobi KK. Tokyo Shimbun (2016) “Jiji senryū” [“Senryū poems of the times”], February 20, p. 5. Washington Times (2001) “Koizumi media attention draws fire”, July 27, www.washington times.com/news/2001/jul/27/20010727-024452-9113r.

PART II

Legal landscape

7 CHILLING EFFECTS ON NEWS REPORTING IN JAPAN’S “ANONYMOUS SOCIETY” Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of “speech, the press and all other forms of expression,” Japan’s national Diet, courts, and government agencies have adopted laws, court decisions and policies that create serious obstacles to the exercise of these rights, especially freedom of the press. Because ordinary Japanese people rely heavily on news organizations for information concerning matters of broad public interest, these restrictions significantly limit the people’s right to know and their ability to understand and influence public policy. This chapter describes various forces that limit the scope and depth of news reporting, including litigation against news organizations, restrictions on reporting criminal prosecutions, and limitations on access to government information.

1  Protecting privacy in Japan’s “anonymous society” (tokumei shakai) Japanese law and custom are weighted heavily toward protecting privacy and confidentiality, thus erecting significant barriers against news organizations that pursue stories for a broad audience. The term “anonymous society” (tokumei shakai) is sometimes applied to describe the result. The conflict between privacy and news reporting appears most directly when individuals sue news organizations for disclosing their identities. Such suits have become commonplace, and courts often rule in favor of plaintiffs, so reporters and news executives must consider the risk of litigation as one significant factor that limits the range of their work. Descriptions of several cases follow.

1.1  Sixteen surrogate children When Thai police alleged that a Japanese man in his twenties was the surrogate father of sixteen babies found in Bangkok in August 2014, he quickly came under

94  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

media scrutiny. Although the man, Shigeta Mitsutoki, refused to grant news interviews, his motives and background attracted energetic public debate, along with issues like the ethics of reproductive medicine and reasons why Thailand became a capital of surrogacy. The notoriety of the Shigeta case prompted Bangkok to tighten regulations on hosting surrogacy. Shigeta broke his silence in Japan with suits against several weekly magazines that claimed their use of his name in on-line advertisements violated his privacy. In the lawsuit against the Weekly Bunshun, for example, Shigeta claimed that he is “a genuinely private citizen” and that his becoming a surrogate father in Thailand is a private matter. He further argued that society would be interested “mainly in knowing the reality of surrogate delivery . . . Disclosure of the plaintiff’s name is not meaningful or necessary” (Shigeta 2015). Shigeta’s counsel emphasized that Japan’s major newspapers and broadcasters had withheld his name. Bunshun rebutted by saying that “specific facts including real names” enable people to scrutinize stories with deeper understanding, quoting Phillip Graham’s statement that “Journalism is the first rough draft of history.” The publisher also argued that Shigeta’s identity as a crime suspect charged by Thai police and investigated by the International Criminal Police Organization is itself of great societal interest. Moreover, because this is not just an ordinary surrogacy case, but an unprecedented and extraordinary case that led to massive public debates that changed the law, it is a matter of broad public interest. In fact, the Thai National Assembly adopted new regulations on reproductive medicine as a result. Finally, Bunshun stressed that global media outside Japan had already published Shigeta’s name. A Tokyo District Court panel rejected these arguments, ruling that Bunshun and other weeklies should withhold the name of this individual at the heart of a news story even though he was identified as a criminal suspect in public records and his name was disclosed to the world outside Japan. The cases were ultimately settled. Although the settlement terms have not been disclosed, all disputed content was deleted.

1.2  Anonymous death row Japan’s juvenile law prohibits publishing the identities of persons subject to court process “for crimes committed while a juvenile,” meaning under the age of twenty. Because there is no exception, it is illegal to publish the names of death row inmates sentenced for juvenile crimes. (The minimum age for the death penalty is eighteen.) This regulation drew public attention when the Supreme Court upheld a death sentence for a minor in 2012. Four of the five national newspapers published the name of the defendant Otsuki Takayuki in violation of the rule, and they were joined by a large majority of local papers. It was the first disclosure of the legally protected identity of Otsuki by the news media in his decade-long prosecution.

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  95

The Asahi explained that “those subjected to punishment by which the nation takes life should be disclosed” (Asahi Shimbun 2012), while the Yomiuri similarly claimed that there is a serious public interest in the death penalty and “once the death sentence is finalized, he lost the opportunity of rehabilitation” thus eliminating a primary reason for confidentiality (Yomiuri Shimbun 2012). The Mainichi and Tokyo Shimbun, however, chose not to name Otsuki and a few regional newspapers joined them. Tokyo Shimbun Editor Oba Tsukasa has argued that although the likelihood of a defendant’s rehabilitation after a final death sentence may be very low, “there are systems of retrial and amnesty, so the possibility is not zero.” According to Oba, “we should maintain his anonymity until actual execution” (Oba 2012: 41). Thus, like the court in the Thai surrogacy case, Oba prioritizes the interest of the individual at the heart of the story over that of the general public. Oba was joined by prominent members of Japan’s legal profession, including Utsunomiya Kenji, the president of Japan Federation of Bar Association (JFBA), who said the disclosure was a “clear violation of the juvenile law and extremely deplorable.” To support his position, Utsunomiya cited international standards, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Utsunomiya 2012).1

1.3  Name no names in court cases In March 2000, a brief story in the Mainichi Shimbun identified Professor Harashina Takao of Saitama Medical University as the defendant in a sexual harassment suit filed by a former patient. Harashina is well known as a pioneer in transsexual medicine. After the case was dismissed, Harashina countered by suing the Mainichi, the former patient and her attorney for defamation and privacy invasion. Tokyo District Court ruled against the Mainichi, declaring that the sexual harassment suit is a private matter. In the court’s view, Harashina is not a “so-called celebrity or very influential to the society,” and therefore it was not necessary to disclose his identity. The Court also ruled against the patient’s lawyer for disclosing the doctor’s identity and other statements made at a press conference. The Mainichi was ordered to pay 1.1 million yen and the lawyer 550,000 yen. On appeal, the Tokyo High Court overturned this decision. However, “noname” rulings like the District Court decision have strong support in Japan’s legal community. For example, the leader of a judges’ study group said “there is suspicion that the High Court decision might have been rather too lenient in permitting (the Mainichi) to disclose (Harashina’s) identity; a majority of our group members saw no need to use his name in the story” (Suzuki 2008: 61).

1.4  “Journalism needs no names” The three cases described above illustrate a long tradition against reporting names in news stories. A 1976 Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”) Report

96  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

took the position that disclosing the identities of criminal suspects and defendants conflicts with the presumption of innocence: “Crime coverage should basically be limited to coverage of criminal acts. Even if [. . .] it is necessary to report other related facts like motives or the suspects’ life, we cannot acknowledge disclosing their identity to be reasonable or necessary.” (JFBA 1976: 104–105). The 2014 JFBA “Declaration for Action on Human Rights” reinforced this position: “In order to minimize victimization by news reports, crime stories should basically be written without using the names of people including crime suspects, defendants, victims, and those who are related to them” (JFBA 2014: 64–65). The “principle of reporting with anonymity” (tokumei hōdō shugi) was made popular by Crimes in Crime Reporting, (Hanzai Hōdō no Hanzai) an influential 1984 book on journalism ethics by Asano Kenichi. Asano labeled reporters “pen-holding cops” for carelessly identifying suspects and thereby creating a presumption of guilt in the public mind and damaging people’s lives. He wrote that “[Concealing names] does not affect the reality of reporting or its power to pursue the truth” and “[I]n most crime stories, news value does not come from people’s identities” (Asano 1984: 180). Asano’s book appeared in the midst of a series of saturation-coverage news stories that commanded wide public attention in the early 1980s. Some, like the successful prosecution of a prime minister for accepting bribes, undoubtedly deserved intense coverage as matters of great public interest. Others, most notably the shooting of a young woman on honeymoon in California, were of less importance, but seized the public imagination and dramatically increased sales of weeklies and other publications. The rugby term “scrum” came to be applied to the crowds of news reporters pursuing individuals they deemed newsworthy. Asano’s book was partly a reaction to such examples of extreme reporting. Asano’s book has had broad influence. His “principle of reporting with anonymity” became a key concept in Japanese journalism ethics.

2 Defamation Like cases alleging violations of privacy, defamation claims are governed by the general tort provision of the Civil Code, which simply states that anyone who has “intentionally or negligently infringed any right” or “legally protected interest of others” must compensate the victim (Civil Code, Article 709). The nineteenth century drafters of this provision left the definition of rights and legally protected interests, including claims for privacy violations and defamation, to the courts. Judges have defined the “legally protected interest” in a defamation case to be the plaintiff’s reputation, which involves society’s evaluation of his “character, virtue, honor and trustworthiness” (Okamoto 2012). The courts have placed a heavy burden of proof on news organizations and other defendants in defamation cases – and they often lose. In order to succeed, defendants must show that (1) the allegation was of public concern, (2) the

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  97

statement was made solely for the benefit of the public and (3) the allegation was true or the defendants had reason to believe that the statement was true (Okamoto 2012). Courts can rule against defendants who fail to prove any of these elements. Thus, defendants can be held liable even for true statements that do not satisfy the other elements. Of special concern to the news media, Japan’s courts have not adopted a rule comparable to the American “actual malice” doctrine, so they do not gain additional latitude when writing stories about politicians, senior government officials and other public figures.2 To the contrary, Japan’s national politicians and other public figures have won many defamation actions. When Japan’s news editors decide whether to publish stories that show public figures or others in a negative light, they must consider the possibility that their subjects will retaliate in court. A critical element in this calculation is the expected size of compensation to be paid if a case is lost. Damages awards were considered relatively insignificant until a 2001 Report by a panel of judges recommended sharply increased compensation3 (Hanrei Times 2001). This recommendation followed soon after an LDP report complained that damage amounts were too low to discourage suits against politicians and others (Okamoto 2012: 94; Repeta 2015: 20–21). Since then plaintiffs have filed suits demanding more than one hundred million yen (approx. US $870,000 at 1 US $ = 115 yen) and courts have ordered compensation in excess of ten million yen in numerous cases (approx. US $87,000 at 1 US $ = 115 yen). An analysis of sixty-seven court decisions between 1994 and 2009 indicates that a general increase in compensation began in 2001 (Momioka 2013: 600). The average award between 1994–2000 was just 1.38 million yen, but nearly tripled to 3.56 million yen between 2001–2009. The largest award so far has been 42,900,000 yen (approx. US $ 373,000 at 1 US $ = 115 yen) imposed on the publisher and writer of a 2007 Weekly Gendai story that alleged champion Sumo wrestler Asashōryu and other wrestlers had fixed matches. The large amount was partly due to the large number of plaintiffs – thirty, including the wrestlers and the Japan Sumo Association – but also exhibited the harsh attitude of the courts toward weekly magazines. In its 2009 judgment, Tokyo District Court pointed out that the magazine’s interviews with wrestlers had been very brief, concluding that “we must say the investigation was extremely sloppy” (Yamada 2010: 62). An executive of the publisher called the decision ridiculous, asserting that some wrestlers had admitted involvement in match fixing and then submitted contrary statements to the court (Japan Times, Mar. 28, 2011). Sumo is Japan’s native national sport, and its champions are major celebrities. The threats posed by the costs of defending defamation claims and the risk of a significant damages award mean that investigative reporters must tread carefully – especially if their work criticizes well-heeled players. Two cases illustrate this threat.

98  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

2.1 Targeting investigative journalists with defamation suits Stories by freelance reporter Yokota Masuo, published in the popular Weekly Bunshun in May 2010 and in a later book,4 exposed harsh labor conditions at a factory in China and shops in Japan owned by the popular apparel maker Uniqlo. Yokota’s stories conveyed the outrage of former and current managers who worked 300-hour months at peak seasons and gave a voice to Chinese factory workers, who told of abusive conditions. Uniqlo claimed the stories were false and responded with a civil defamation lawsuit against the publisher, demanding payment of 220 million yen, retractions of the story in major newspapers, withdrawal of all copies from circulation and an injunction blocking further distribution. Tokyo District Court dismissed the case after a two-year legal battle. The court admitted the credibility of statements by shop managers and Chinese workers, finding that some portions of the stories were factually true and that Yokota had adequate reason to believe that other portions were true. This was clearly a victory for the publisher and for Yokota. However, an investigative news website reported that Yokota has been “so completely worn out by two years of litigation that he fears additional lawsuits by Uniqlo and he even wants to revise [the title and lead of the story of the court decision to a milder one in order to avert another legal conflict]” (Watanabe 2013). Even though Uniqlo did not name author Yokota himself as a defendant, he was required to sort through all the evidence, ask his sources to make statements to be submitted in court and deliver his own testimony. He was devastated by the ordeal. Investigative journalist Kazama Naoki of the Weekly Toyo Keizai, a respected financial magazine, had a similar experience. His 2003 story exposed illegal conduct by the leading employment agency Crystal in its placement of low-wage temporary workers. Crystal demanded payment of one billion yen and a public apology in its suit against Toyo Keizai. Kazama learned of the heavy burden carried by defendants under the law fashioned by Japanese courts. He was warned that “Unless you bring enough evidence to court, you may lose the case even though your story is the absolute truth.” He suffered from the quandary faced by investigative reporters in this position: “We cannot drag whistleblowers or others in the industry [who secretly assisted his reporting] to court, yelling ‘Here is our evidence!’ ” (Kazama 2009: 17). Kazama was saved by his meticulous notebooks of interviews. The court ruled that his notes verified forty out of forty-three statements that Crystal labeled defamatory. However, the judges ruled that the remaining three were published without adequate reason to believe in their truth and ordered Toyo Keizai to pay compensation of three million yen. In one of the three, the court said it was wrong to describe a twenty-six-year-old temporary worker’s death from a heart attack as an “overwork death” (karōshi), “because the worker’s parents did not file a lawsuit

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  99

[against Crystal], and the interview was conducted only by telephone” (Kazama 2009: 19). Kazama calls this reasoning “contrary to common sense.” The case was settled after an appeal to the Tokyo High Court. According to Kazama, the substance of the settlement was “equal to total withdrawal of the lawsuit [by Crystal]” (Kazama 2009: 21). But he recalls that “through this lawsuit, I keenly realized the significance of damage in money, time, and mind. Even though it was a true story [. . .] those in the report can launch legal attacks demanding huge compensation due to their superior financial power. This threat can easily block other related stories that might have followed, and can ultimately smother journalism. It is a horrifying reality” (Kazama 2009: 21). There have been other similar cases. Fear of such litigation can have a significant impact on news reporting.

2.2  Criminal defamation Free speech advocates around the world have long decried criminal prosecution for defamation as an excessive restraint on free speech. For example, in 2012 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression wrote that “criminal defamation laws are inherently harsh and have a disproportionate chilling effect on free expression. Individuals face the constant threat of being arrested, held in pretrial detention, subjected to expensive criminal trials, fines and imprisonment, as well as the social stigma associated with having a criminal record” (United Nations 2012: paragraph 84). Article 230–1 of Japan’s criminal code penalizes public statements that cause injury with fines and imprisonment of up to three years. Japanese police and prosecutors apply this provision often, including prosecutions for statements made online (Mehra 2007). For example, in 2014 criminal defamation charges were filed in more than 700 cases, and prosecutors brought 184 of those cases to trial (Ministry of Justice 2015). All defendants were found guilty in the courts of first instance (Supreme Court 2015). News reports suggest that the vast majority of these cases do not involve journalists or news reporting; instead they concern harassment, such as “revenge porn” and other smear attacks in social media, letters with obscene language, or false allegations of stalking. Nonetheless, the government can apply Criminal Code 230–1 against the news media and has done so in the past. Two of the best-known prosecutions involved fringe news magazines known for aggressive reporting.

2.3  Uwasa no Shinso and Rokusaisha In July  2005, investigators from the Kobe prosecutor’s office raided Rokusaisha, a publisher in nearby Nishinomiya. The search came two years after it published books that implied a scout employed by the Hanshin Tigers baseball team was murdered, and two employees of the team were involved. Investigators also

100  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

pursued Rokusaisha over a series of books on Aruze Corporation, a gambling machine manufacturer. The book exposed details of the private life of Aruze board members. The president of Rokusaisha, Matsuoka Toshiyasu, was arrested on the day of the raid (Kyodo News 2005). Kobe District Court found Matsuoka guilty of criminal defamation and issued a suspended sentence of fourteen months in prison. The judges stated, “the defendant defamed the victims for a long period with excessive expression, whose motivation was irresponsible and self-centered. This act should be criticized as verbal violence committed in the name of the freedom of expression” (Kyodo News 2006). The conviction was upheld on appeal. Another target was the monthly magazine Uwasa no Shinso (“The Truth Behind The Rumors”). Its editor-in-chief Okadome Yasunori was found guilty of criminal defamation and sentenced to a prison term of eight months, suspended for four years. The charges were based on two stories. One accused a popular mystery novelist of plagiarism, and another said that a well known marketing consultant used ghostwriters. The court judged that these claims were not factually true and moreover, that the defendant had no “reasonable ground to believe they were true” (Tokyo District Court 2002). When editor-in-chief Okadome shut down Uwasa no Shinso in 2004, he reportedly said the “soaring compensation payouts awarded by courts in privacy and defamation-related suits in recent years prompted him to step away from the 25-year-old scandal rag, which targeted politicians, elite bureaucrats and celebrities” (Matsubara 2004). Although there do not seem to have been any prosecutions involving major news organizations for many years, the law’s chilling effect is undeniable. Okadome’s conviction and the closure of his publication sent an alarming message to the entire news industry: aggressive reporting may lead to aggressive prosecution. When the president of Rokusaisha was charged and then convicted, media coverage was low-key, and there was little debate among the experts.

3  Limiting news coverage of criminal trials There are few news categories that attract more attention than criminal prosecutions. Everyone has a strong interest in maintaining a high standard of public safety and in confirming that police power is exercised in a responsible manner. And everyone involved in the news business is well aware that tales of crimes – especially sensational crimes or crimes involving celebrities  – sell the news. So reporting crime and criminal prosecutions is high on the agenda of all news media. Article 82 of Japan’s Constitution recognizes the immense public interest in criminal prosecutions and other trials by declaring that “Trials be conducted and judgment declared openly.” Despite this unambiguous statement, Japan’s legal community has conspired to spin a web of secrecy around criminal trials.5 Journalists face countless obstacles in reporting criminal prosecutions.

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  101

The veil of secrecy descends at the time of arrest. In general, suspects can be detained up to twenty-three days before an indictment is filed. During this period, police and prosecutors interrogate suspects at will, while the suspects themselves are often prohibited from seeing anyone other than attorneys and immediate family members. Suspects have no contact with the news media. When reporters try to build a story at this stage, their primary sources are often leaks from police interrogators. Defense counsel are obvious sources of information, but they are barred from interrogation sessions so they may learn of confessions and other client statements only after the fact. And they may hesitate to speak to the press to protect client confidences. Even after an indictment is filed and trial commenced, reporters face other obstacles. In particular, defense counsel and their clients are subject to a relatively new restraint on talking to the press, created by laws passed in 2004.

3.1  “Unintended use” of trial evidence (mokutekigai shiyo¯) In response to widespread complaints that trials take too long, new rules created a pre-trial procedure that requires defense and prosecution to identify the issues and provide the other side with access to evidence in order to prepare for trial (Code of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 316–4, et seq.). This new procedure was a boon for defense counsel because there is no general rule requiring the government to disclose all evidence to the defense (Johnson 2002: 62). Under the new procedure, defense counsel can get a relatively early look at evidence the government plans to present in court. But, there is a catch. Another new provision strictly prohibits defendants and their counsel from using disclosed evidence for any purpose other than preparing for trial (mokutekigai shiyō, meaning “unintended use”). Thus, news reporters may request to see this evidence, but defendants and their lawyers are prohibited from showing it to them. Disclosure in violation of this rule is punishable by fines and prison terms of up to one year (Code of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 281–4, 281–5). This prohibition came into focus in May 2013 when a prosecutor filed a disciplinary procedure with the Osaka Bar Association against attorney Sadamoto Masami for sharing his client’s interrogation video with an NHK reporter, who later aired the footage on national television.6 The video played a key role in gaining an acquittal by discrediting the prosecutors’ allegation that the defendant confessed to strangling a victim to death.7 The NHK program focused on the value of video-recording in identifying false confessions. Prosecutor Ueno Yuji alleged that Sadamoto’s disclosure violated the “unintended use” prohibition. Sadamoto argued that his act was legal and justifiable, as the video is “important material describing the process of confessions that are contrary to the deposer’s intent,” showing that “investigators sometimes cherrypick their preferred information and even modify or fabricate it.” He claimed that revealing such injustice serves an important public interest (Osaka Bar Association 2014).

102  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

After eight months of deliberation, the bar association panel concluded that his act did violate the unintended use prohibition, but “giving weight to . . . his intentions, the propriety of his means, and the lack of actual harm,” that discipline was not appropriate (Osaka Bar Association 2014). The “unintended use” rule has quickly become an entrenched feature of Japan’s criminal trials. Some bar associations have even adopted ethical rules cautioning members against unauthorized disclosures. Many reporters complain that it hamstrings their work. The rule was applied in the infamous Ashikaga case, which involves a 1992 murder conviction based on a false confession. The defendant was ultimately released from prison in 2009 following a re-trial that resulted in acquittal. Audiotapes of the defendant’s 1992 confession were first disclosed to defense counsel in 2009. Defense attorney Sato Hiroshi spoke regularly with news reporters but was required to withhold the tapes due to the prosecutors’ insistence on the rule (JFBA 2009). Creative application of the unintended use rule has even affected law schools. In 2006, Tokyo prosecutors blocked a Japanese equivalent of the “Innocence Project,” in which criminal justice experts and law students at Waseda University inspected court records together. The prosecutors said that allowing students to examine records serves an educational purpose separate from trial preparation and therefore violates the rule (Kyodo News 2008).

3.2  Trial records The most authoritative source of information on any criminal trial is the trial record itself. However, Japan’s courts interpret the Code of Criminal Procedure to require that all records in criminal trials be sealed throughout the duration of the trial and all appeals.8 Like other members of the public, news reporters are blocked from access. In order to establish rules governing the preservation of and access to trial records after appeals are exhausted and court decisions final, in 1987 the Diet passed the “Records of Completed Criminal Litigation Act” (Law No.  64 of 1987). Oddly, this statute provides that trial records are not to be maintained by the courts, but by the prosecutors’ office in the jurisdiction where the case was initially filed. Article 4 declares the general rule that such records must be disclosed to anyone who requests them. However, this rule is subject to broad and vague exceptions; it is a perfect example of a case where “the exceptions have swallowed the rule.” Access under this law was tested in some high profile cases soon after it took effect. One involved the renowned freelance journalist Egawa Shoko, known for her work investigating police misconduct and wrongful convictions. When Egawa sought access to court records concerning the prosecution of a police officer for rape of a female detainee in a police jail, her request was denied on the ground

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  103

that disclosure would damage public order and morals, hinder rehabilitation of the offender (a police officer), and injure reputations of related persons. The official who denied this request told her, “The idea that everyone may access records is just what’s written in the law. The reality is, we disclose almost nothing.” (Egawa 1990: 33). After Egawa filed suit, the prosecutor offered to voluntarily disclose the text of the judgment and another 31 documents. She later found them to be “irrelevant to my interest.” Moreover, the very reason the officer gave for denying her the bulk of the records is that she is a journalist and was planning to write about the case (Egawa 1990: 35). Egawa’s suit was fruitless. The court declined to order access beyond the prosecutor’s voluntary offer. Another case that arose soon afterward concerned a request to examine records involving the prosecution of one of Japan’s most powerful politicians. Kanemaru Shin, who held the position of vice president of the ruling political party at the time, was prosecuted for failing to report donations of several  million dollars in 1992. Kanemaru admitted to receiving the money and resigned his position. A great uproar arose when Kanemaru escaped the expected criminal trial because prosecutors applied a special procedure that did not require him to appear in court and agreed to an extraordinarily light punishment with no prison time. After the court decision was final, a news industry researcher filed a request to examine the trial record. Provided access to only superficial portions of the record, he filed suit, arguing that Article 82 and other provisions of the Constitution guaranteed his access to the files. But the trial court ruled against him, ordering only limited disclosure. He appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, but in 1992, the Court upheld the trial court action, ruling that no constitutional rights were involved. Thus, the trial of one of Japan’s most powerful politicians for improperly receiving a large sum of money took place essentially in secret (Nakamura et al. 1994). The 1987 law remains in effect today. Prosecutors continue to enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether and what portions of trial records to disclose. For their part, news reporters continue to make requests. For example, when veteran Mainichi Shimbun reporter Dai Hiroshi requested records from a bid-rigging case in 2014 that involved many former high-ranking government officials, he was told, “[W]e’ll let you see nothing – if anything, only the text of the judgment. Of course, any private and personal information in it will be blacked out. We will never disclose anything else.” The official implied that the disclosure policy prioritizes financial interests over journalism by saying, “we won’t disclose – especially because you are going to run a story on it. If you intended to use the record for something like an insurance payment, that would be different” (Dai interview 2016). Some reporters have had somewhat greater success, but this seems quite serendipitous – a key feature of the system is its decentralized nature and the nearly unlimited discretion exercised by local prosecutors’ offices.

104  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

3.3  Court decisions Although reporters are generally barred from examining court records, they can certainly read the decisions written by judges, albeit after cases are decided. But even this opportunity comes with limitations. Only a small portion of court decisions appear in generally available publications. As neatly summarized by a Japanese judge, “[T]here is no general practice of case reporting in Japan, and public or private publishers select cases without disclosure of the selection criteria” (Okamoto 2012: 90). Moreover, the cult of anonymity has penetrated even here. Publishers of court judgments began removing parties’ names in the 1980s, replacing them with “X,” “Y” or “Kōno Tarō” (the Japanese equivalent of John Doe). Now it seems that almost all publishers anonymize court judgments, except for special cases. A few judgments are published by courts online, but again names are removed, obstructing the efforts of reporters who might seek interviews. Deleting names removes a vital human element from the generally available litigation record.

4  The “right to be forgotten” A so-called “right to be forgotten” has recently attracted attention in many countries. In 2015, a Japanese court explicitly recognized such a right and ordered the scrubbing of Internet websites that carried details of a criminal prosecution that ended in a guilty verdict only three years earlier (Kyodo News 2016). But two decades ago the Supreme Court endorsed the notion that publication of details of past crimes is an unacceptable violation of privacy. Author Isa Chihiro won the coveted Oya Soichi Non-Fiction Prize in 1977 for Gyakuten (“Reversal”), a book in which he documented criminal court proceedings from the perspective of a juror.9 The defendant at the center of the story sued Isa for violation of privacy. In its 1994 judgment against the author, the Supreme Court wrote that the defendant has a right to rehabilitation and re-entry to society “unhindered by disclosure of facts related to past crimes.” By the time the book appeared, the defendant had acquired a “legally protected interest to prevent the facts related to his past crime from disclosure” (Oishi 2005).

5  “Personal information” protection laws Reacting to widespread fears of “identity theft” and other breaches of confidential personal data, the Diet enacted a package of “personal information protection” laws in May 2003. A key provision creates a nearly boundless definition of “personal information”: “information concerning living persons such as names, dates of birth and other writings by which a specific individual can be identified” and requires organizations that handle a large volume of personal information to specify the purposes for which they gather personal information, insure that the information was gathered with the approval of individuals concerned,

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  105

safeguard against leakage of the information to third parties and take other measures. Reporters say this is another hurdle to be surmounted in getting information, providing an easy excuse for organizations to reject reporters’ requests for information (Repeta 2015: 32–34). Japan’s 2001 national information disclosure law provides a tool for reporters to examine government files that would otherwise be inaccessible. Reporters have filed many thousands of information requests and harvested government information to produce many valuable stories. But they must contend with the ethos of the “anonymous society” even here. The law is so riddled with exemptions and other barriers that critics have labeled it a “non-disclosure law.” The defects include onerous fees and broad categories of exempt information. Reflecting the deeply entrenched preference for anonymity, the law exempts information “where it is possible to identify a specific individual from a name, date of birth or other description,” “where it is possible to identify a specific individual through comparing the said information with other information,” or “disclosure of the said information is likely to cause harm to the rights and interests of an individual.” This exemption is subject to some limitations; it requires disclosure of the identities of public officials for information related to the performance of official duties (Law No. 42 of 1999, Art. 5[1]). Nonetheless, this is by far the most commonly cited exemption to information disclosure, and reporters and other requesters receive documents liberally sprinkled with black ink to insure that no identities are disclosed.

6  Final comments We believe the very strong demand for anonymity in Japan is linked to a very weak sense of a “public sphere” in which all members of society participate in discussing and resolving matters of common interest. The reverse side of this coin is a general reliance on government to attend to such matters, reinforcing its paternalistic status. Of course, government authorities are willing to accommodate the reticence of the people. Anonymity works both ways. If government agents can also act in anonymous ways, then they can be largely unaccountable for their actions. If the people do not actively participate in the public sphere, they have little need for access to court files or other government records. This allocation of roles is reflected in the Japanese language, in particular through use of the Chinese character commonly used to express the concept of the public: 公. Something is surely lost in translation. Whereas in English, terms like “the public,” the “general public,” or “the public at-large” clearly refer to the people, in the Japanese language, “public,” represented by the character 公, carries a strong implication of government authority. This difference raises a critical question when we confront terms like the “public interest” (公益or 公共の利益) or “public order” (おおやけの秩序)used by some who propose constitutional change. Does the term “public interest” reflect the needs of the people – or of the government? Is “public order” defined by the people – or by the police?

106  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

Journalists are change agents. Their efforts to investigate and report the news disrupt the unwritten agreement between people and government wherein the people remain anonymous and the government unaccountable. As we have seen, these efforts must overcome numerous legal and institutional obstacles. Moreover, they must contend with Japan’s culture of respect and politeness. They must be very cautious in dealing with both ordinary people and government authorities. Differences in journalistic traditions and practices came under the spotlight when the Nihon Keizai Shimbun acquired the Financial Times in 2015. The Guardian delivered this comment: “Mainstream Japanese journalism is not corrupt, but it is respectful, like the culture around it . . . but it is also possible for respect to shade into the kind of incurious deference to power which lets scandalous behaviour flourish.” (The Guardian 2015) Japan’s custom of respect and deference certainly affects everyone, including journalists. But journalists face many other obstacles created by law and custom as they seek to report the news.

Notes 1 In addition to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the statement cited the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the “Beijing Rules”), which call for respect of juveniles’ privacy and ban publishing the identities of juvenile offenders in principle. It further asserted, “the name of the juvenile, who is a private citizen, is not an indispensable element in reporting. What is rather indispensable is to report the background and causes of the case in order to prevent recurrence of similar crimes” (Utsunomiya 2012). 2 In a historic 1964 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that freedom of speech and other constitutional rights protected the New York Times from a very large defamation judgment issued by Alabama state courts. In overturning the Alabama judgment, the Supreme Court created the constitutional doctrine of “actual malice,” which requires that a public official who sues for defamation must show that the publisher acted with knowledge or in a reckless manner that the story was false. Thus the court decided that the great public interest in the actions of public officials justifies granting publishers an extra margin for error not available in other cases. New York Times v. Sullivan, United States Supreme Court, March 9, 1964 (376 U.S. 254). 3 The report had immediate effect. In a February  2001 libel decision, Tokyo District Court ruled in favor of actress Reiko Ohara and ordered a weekly magazine to pay the previously unheard sum of 5  million yen (assuming a rate of 115 yen  =  $1.00, approximately $43,000). The following month baseball star Kiyohara Kazuhiro doubled this figure, winning an award of ten million yen in his suit against another weekly magazine. 4 Yokota Masuo, Uniqlo Teikoku No Hikari To Kage (“Light and Shadow in the Uniqlo Empire”) (Bungei Shunju, 2011). 5 The bias toward secrecy in Japan’s judiciary is so strong that until a Supreme Court decision in a contested case in 1989, the courts actually prohibited spectators from taking notes of their courtroom observations. As an exception to this rule, members of the courthouse “reporters club” were allowed to take notes. An English translation of the Supreme Court decision is available in Lawrence W. Beer and Hiroshi Itoh, The Constitutional Case Law of Japan, 1970 through 1990, (Repeta v. Japan, Case 46) p. 627 (University of Washington Press, 1996).

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  107

6 Instead of filing criminal charges, the prosecutor sought disciplinary action by Sadamoto’s bar association. In a major postwar reform, a new attorneys’ law granted exclusive authority to bar associations to administer such discipline. See Lawrence Repeta, “The 1949 Attorneys Law – Private Lawyers Gain Autonomy, Foreign Lawyers Find a Path to the Law,” in John O. Haley (ed.) Law and Practice in Postwar Japan: The Postwar Reforms and Their Influence (Blakemore Foundation and International House of Japan, 2010) 7 Leaders of bar associations and other rights advocates have demanded for years that police interrogations be completely videotaped with limited success. Video recording has been introduced in selected cases, primarily cases involving serious crimes that can lead to saiban’in (lay judge) trials. In response to continued pressure to expand the practice, the Diet House of Representatives passed a bill that would expand video recording of interrogations in 2015, but this bill was allowed to expire without action by the House of Councilors. See Kyodo News, “Police expand recording of entire interrogations,” Japan Times, April  23, 2015. www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/23/ national/crime-legal/police-expand-recording-entire-interrogations/#.VtuHsox94y6 (accessed March 6, 2016) 8 There is no provision of law that directly prohibits news reporters or others from examining records in ongoing trials. Article 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the general rule that “Any person may inspect the case records after conclusion of the case . . .” Japan’s legal community generally accepts the reverse implication of this sentence that no person, except for the defendant or other parties to the case, may inspect case records prior to conclusion. 9 The case was tried in Okinawa in the early postwar period when it was under U.S. jurisdiction. Okinawan courts conducted jury trials at that time.

References Asahi Shimbun (2012) Editor’s Note, February 21, 2012. Asano, Ken’ichi (1984) Hanzai Hōdō no Hanzai, (Crimes in Crime Reporting).‑ Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo. Courts in Japan (2015) “Numbers of defendants in ordinary first trials,” www.courts.go.jp/ app/files/toukei/032/008032.pdf. Dai, Hiroshi (2016) Interview with Yasuomi Sawa, January 30. Egawa, Shoko (1990) “Shiru kenri to keiji kakutei soshō kiroku hō” (“The right to know and records of criminal trials”), Shinbun Kenkyu, 470: 31–35. The Guardian (2015) Editorial, “The Guardian view on media globalisation: good news for the Financial Times”, July 23. Hanrei Times (2001) Special report: “The calculation of damage amounts in litigation seeking payment of damages” (Tokushū: songai baishō seikyū soshō ni okeru songai gaku no santei) 1070: 4–9. Japan Federation of Bar Associations (1976) Human Rights and News Reporting. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha. Japan Federation of Bar Associations (2009) “Statement re-requesting electronic recording of interrogations on occasion of retrial of Ashikaga case,” October 22, www.nichi benren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2009/20091022.html (Accessed March  1, 2016). Japan Federation of Bar Associations (2014) “Jinken no tame no kōdō sengen 2014” (“Declaration for Action on Human Rights 2014”). Japan Times (2011) “Weeklies getting the gavel for targeting public figures” (Sentaku magazine translation), Mar. 28. Johnson, David T. (2002) The Japanese Way of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

108  Lawrence Repeta and Yasuomi Sawa

Kazama, K. (2009) “When my exclusive was sued, notebooks saved me” (“Sukupukiji ga utaerareta toki, daigaku nōto ga watakushi wo tasuketa”), Journalism, 14–21, October. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun. Kyodo News (2005) “Publisher arrested for criminal defamation, attorneys charge ‘suppression of free speech’ ” (Meiyō kison de shuppansha shachō taihō; bengōdan: “hyogen no jiyū dan’atsu”), July 12. Kyodo News (2006) “Rokusaisha’s head convicted, Kobe District Court condemns ‘verbal violence’ ”, (Rokusaisha shachō ni yūzai hanketsu; “kotoba no bōryoku” to Kobe chisai), July 4. Kyodo News (2008) "Limits on evidence use obstructs investigation of false arrests; in the U.S., such evidence proves innocence" (Enzai chōsa kobamu shiyō seigen; kaiji shōkō, bei de ha mujitsu shōmei), July 2. Kyodo News (2016) “Japanese court recognizes ‘right to be forgotten’ in suit against Google,” The Japan Times, February  27, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/27/ national/crime-legal/japanese-court-recognizes-right-to-be-forgotten-in-suit-againstgoogle/#.VtTpoox94y4 (Accessed March 1, 2016). Matsubara, Hiroshi (2004) “Crackdown has publishers running scared,” The Japan Times, April 3. Mehra, Salil K. (2007) “Post a message and go to jail: Criminalizing internet libel in Japan and the United States,” University of Colorado Law Review, 78: 767. Ministry of Justice (2015) “Yearly trend of prosecutors’ decisions: Indictment and dismissal”, www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Xlsdl.do?sinfid=000031242295. Momioka, H. (2013) “The sanctioning and deterring function of compensation in defamation lawsuits: A statistical analysis of cases in which journalism organizations are sued,” Hogaku Shimpo, 583–620, March. Tokyo: Chuo Daigaku Hogaku Kai. Nakamura, Y., Hironaka, J., Iida, M., Sakai M., and Yamada, K. (1994) Keiji Saiban to Shiru Kenri (“Criminal Trials and the Right to Know”). Tokyo: Sanseido. Oba, Tsukasa (2012) “Refraining from ‘rushing to name a name’: A conclusion that the Chunichi and The Tokyo Newspapers found,” Journalism, 41–48, June. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun. Oishi, Yasuhiko (2005) Nonfikushon sakuhin ni okeru zenkatō jujitsu no kōhyō (“Disclosure of criminal records and other facts in nonfiction works”), Bessatsu Juristo, 179: 92 (commenting on Feb. 8, 1994 decision of Supreme Court, 3rd Petty Bench). Okamoto, Noriko (2012) “The protection of reputation in Japan: A systematic analysis of defamation cases,” Law and Social Inquiry, 37: 89. Osaka Bar Association (2014) “Ketteisho” (Record of Decision), January 15. Repeta, Lawrence (2015) “ ‘Personal information,’ media control, and government power – Legislative battles in Japan, 1999–2003,” Meiji Law Journal, 22: 9–35. Shigeta, Mitsutoki (2015) Request for Injunction, filed with Tokyo District Court, April 28. Supreme Court (2015) “Shihō tōkei heisei26 nendo keiji jiken hen, dai33 hyō” (2014 Judicial statistics, criminal cases section, chart no.33) Suzuki, Kazunori (2008) “An alleged defamation and privacy invasion case including unjust lawsuit, a newspaper report about the filing and the press conference,” Hanrei Times, 1257: 45–61. Tokyo District Court (2002) “Judgment”, March  20, www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_ jp/851/005851_hanrei.pdf. United Nations (2012) Larue, Frank, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,” June  4, p.  84, www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/ A-HRC-20-17_en.pdf.

Reporting in Japan’s “anonymous society”  109

Utsunomiya, Kenji (2012) “Shōnen no jitsumei hōdō wo ukete no kaichō seimei” (“The President’s Statement Reacting to News Reports Naming a Juvenile”), February  24, www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/statement/year/2012/120224_2.html (Accessed January 10, 2016) Yamada, T. (2010) “Defamation and expensive compensation: Reporter and part-time scholar argues the constitution,” Hogaku Seminar, 62, April. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha. Yomiuri Shimbun (2012) Editor’s Note, February 21. Watanabe, M. (2013) Editor’s Note, My News Japan, November 15, www.mynewsjapan. com/reports/1925 (accessed April 7, 2016).

8 JAPAN’S DESIGNATED SECRETS LAW1 Arthur Stockwin

Japan’s 1947 Constitution, still in operation and textually unamended (but contested by the Abe Government first elected to office in December 2012), contains a clear guarantee of freedom of speech. Article 21 states: “Freedom of assembly and association, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.” On 6 December 2013 the National Diet passed a “2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law” (tokutei himitsu hogo hō), which was widely attacked by many journalists and academics, among others. (See George Mulgan Chapter 1; Cucek Chapter  6) For many years, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm, LDPled governments had wished to legislate for tighter protection of State secrets. Relevant legislation already existed, going back many decades, but in the view of many on the right-wing of the LDP, it needed a great deal of strengthening. The second Abe Government fully controlled the House of Representatives following its election to power in December 2012, and then, in July 2013, it also gained a more or less impregnable majority in the three-yearly elections for the House of Councillors, meaning that the former problem of a ‘twisted Diet’ (nejire kokkai) was a thing of the past, though there was no guarantee it would not recur following some future general election. Now that the coalition government of the LDP and Kōmeitō were between them in firm control of both houses of the National Diet, Prime Minister Abe acted quickly to realise one of his major projects, namely to legislate for a comprehensive and greatly strengthened system of legal protection of State secrets. Professor Lawrence Repeta, of Meiji University in Tokyo, is inclined to argue that the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law was another part of Abe’s grand design of revising the 1947 Constitution by re-interpretation, as with the later Collective Defence legislation. In this case, however, it was article 21 of the Constitution

Japan’s designated secrets law  111

that he had in his sights. In Repeta’s words: “The demand for greater government secrecy powers is an obvious adjunct to the LDP’s longstanding demand for fundamental constitutional change designed to enhance state power and limit individual rights.” (Repeta 2013; Repeta 2015) From September  2013, when the essence of this new law was announced, an often bad-tempered debate developed, involving both Japanese and international organisations and commentators, pitting against each other the principles of the right to know (shiru kenri) and of protection of State secrets. The LDP Secretary-­General, Ishiba Shigeru, set the tone of the debate by comparing those who were demonstrating against the bill with terrorists, though he later withdrew this remark. (Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 2013) When the bill went into effect, a year after the publication of its text, the Foreign Press Club of Japan made a rare public statement, saying that: It seems to suggest that freedom of the press is no longer a constitutional right, but merely something for which officials ‘must show sufficient consideration’. (Pollmann 2014) A year earlier, the standing committee of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Japan made a statement relating the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law to the Constitution and to basic concepts of democracy: While information disclosure is the basis of democratic decisions, the law, whose definition of special secrets is extremely wide and vague, will put the administrative branch of government above the Diet, which under the Constitution is ‘the highest organ of state power’, and ‘sole lawmaking organ of the state’. And the law will carry the danger of limiting the Diet’s right to conduct investigations relating to government as guaranteed by the Constitution, thus threatening the constitutional principle that ‘sovereign power resides with the people’. (Japan Times 12 December 2013) On the other hand, conservatives had long argued that protection of State secrets in Japan was inadequate and that the legal situation was too much skewed in favour of the right to know. Successive US governments also from time to time complained that Japanese procedures for keeping State secrets were too lax and put pressure on Japan to tighten them up. Such arguments, however, could be seen as flawed in the sense that legal protections for freedom of information were not as advanced as in many other developed countries where freedom of information acts operated and where State secrets were nevertheless well protected. In retrospect, it seems clear that the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law (or perhaps more specifically, the Abe Government’s use of that law) should be seen in the context of its ambition to enter into a closer and more reciprocal defence

112  Arthur Stockwin

relationship with the United States, as represented by the “collective defence” legislation that came into effect in September 2015. The Japanese Government was under pressure from the Obama Administration to tighten up its secrecy rules, given that closer defence co-operation with the US armed forces would mean sharing of sensitive information. The new legislation covered national security, diplomacy, what were termed “designated dangerous activities” and counter-terrorism. At least four areas of concern and criticism soon developed in relation to the law. The first of these was that the term “designated State secret” is not adequately defined, and that government ministries and agencies could decide on their own what constituted a “designated State secret.” Heads of government ministries and agencies were given the ultimate power to decide what actually constituted a State secret, and although a list of information categories was contained in the appendix to the law, the appendix gave examples rather than attempting a definition, so as to give maximum flexibility to the branches of government involved. (Repeta 2014) Second, specialists in constitutional law insistently made the criticism that there was no adequate mechanism to oversee the administration of the law. This criticism led to much discussion about the most appropriate methods of handling disputes stemming from the administration of it. Committees were set up to report on the administration of the law, the prime minister was supposed to make an annual report to the committee, but it only had advisory powers. A third type of criticism related to the punishments the law prescribed for those who violated its provisions. This remains perhaps the most contested aspect of the law. Government officials found to have leaked information concerning a designated secret face a gaol term of up to 10 years. Journalists who obtain such information ‘in an inappropriate manner’ face a gaol term of up to five years. There was a case several years back where a journalist obtained classified information from a government official with whom he was having an affair, and this is regarded under the Law as typically ‘inappropriate behaviour’. Criticism in part concerned the apparent harshness of the punishments prescribed but more importantly perhaps on the dangers that journalists would apparently face in trying to unearth what was really going on behind the scenes in the corridors of power. Given the relative uniformity of information published in the media as a result of the controversial “press club” system, this appeared to be a further restriction on the freedom of journalists to carry out their most important tasks of informing the public about what was really going on. In the words of Lawrence Repeta: Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, the secrecy law appears to ratchet down this protection to the simple requirement that state authorities show due care (hairyo) for such fundamental rights as they go about their business. (Repeta 2014)

Japan’s designated secrets law  113

A fourth area of criticism relates to the fact that so-called ‘designated secrets’ need not be revealed until up to 60  years have passed, although a government ministry or agency needs to seek permission for it to remain secret at regular intervals over the years from its determination as ‘secret’ – years beyond 30 requiring cabinet approval. (Repeta 2014) This contrasts with 30 years in the case of the United Kingdom, where there is a possibility that this may be reduced to 20 years. Moreover, in Japan there appears to be no prohibition of government ministries and agencies destroying embarrassing or otherwise sensitive information, nor is public comment required before such documents are destroyed. A researcher has discovered through careful probing that the Defence Ministry routinely destroyed secret documents relating to the Self Defence Forces Law revision, from 2001 onwards. In fact, the issue of document destruction is covered by the Public Records Act, according to which such destruction requires permission from the prime minister (Repeta 2014). The issues outlined above were developed by a large majority of commentators on the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law, which became the subject of intense antagonism and denunciation by many legal experts, academics, journalists and commentators. Not all such comments and criticisms went into great detail about the law and its implications, but it was clear that there was a general sense that the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law needed to be treated, not simply in its own terms, but as part of a concerted package being promoted by the right-wing and nationalistic government of Abe Shinzo, whose general intention was to weaken human rights and freedoms and replace democratic norms by a semi-authoritarian style of government in which those who took public issue with government policy would risk harassment by the authorities and might well face severe sanction. Repeta cites the case of a respected journalist, whose careful researches revealed that successive governments had lied over a long period about policies allowing US naval vessels to carry nuclear weapons into Japanese ports (against a longstanding policy of not allowing the “introduction” (mochikomi) of nuclear weapons into Japan). His sources were retired officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After his findings were published, he was visited by a “high government official,” who told him that he had violated the National Public Employees Law by soliciting secret information from retired officials. Although no action was taken against him, he was subjected to harassment clearly designed to induce fear of prosecution (Repeta 2014). There is, however, a rather more favourable analysis of the law expounded by the constitutional law specialist Professor Kimura Sōta, whose advice on the subject I requested early in 2014. Professor Kimura made the following points: First, the term “designated dangerous activities,” which was causing controversy for its apparent lack of clear definition, was in fact defined in considerable detail in the law. For instance, article 12/2 refers among other things to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the means of transporting and

114  Arthur Stockwin

delivering them, their development, manufacture and use, activities relating to the export and import of goods acknowledged to involve a particularly high risk of being used. In addition, it includes activities designed to further the actions of other States, as well as to bring about serious harm to Japan and the security of the Japanese people, where it is feared such harm will occur. The definition, written in bureaucratic language, is extremely lengthy and the above is only a small part of it. In Kimura’s opinion, the law also carefully delineates the responsibilities of ministries and agencies in relation to “designated State secrets.” He gives the example of a situation where somebody leaks the address of a Self-Defence Forces facility, which in most cases would not be a matter affecting security and therefore would not be relevant under the law. Second, criticism of the mechanisms put in place for administering the law is in part inappropriate because the relevant committee is staffed by highly competent members with high-level legal and other relevant expertise. On the other hand, Kimura realises that in contemporary Japanese society there is widespread suspicion of bureaucrats and lawyers, so that it would be difficult to obtain extensive popular confidence in the administrative apparatus that was being established. Third, on the question of harsh punishments for government officials and journalists, Kimura’s opinion is as follows: journalists who tempt (sosonokasu)2 officials are subject to punishment. Those, however, that obtain information by means other than through leaking by a government official (without journalistic sosonokashi activities), or where a journalist has received information revealed by a government official on that official’s own initiative, are not subject to punishment. Information designated as especially secret is confined to information that, if leaked, would create “important damage” to Japanese security. Thus the threat to news-gathering only affects inappropriate news-gathering. Any potential damage to press freedom is not great, according to Professor Kimura. Fourth, on the rule written into the law that designated secrets may not need to be released for up to 60 years, Kimura argues that the category of “special secrets” is fairly restricted. Although the period is long, the scope of secret information is narrow. Fifth, concerning the practice of government bodies destroying sensitive information, his opinion was that this was not the business of this particular law and should be dealt with by other laws. Presumably he means the Public Records Act, mentioned above. Sixth, according to Professor Kimura, the law provided a sufficient measure of democratic accountability. What seems particularly intriguing about Professor Kimura’s opinions on the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law is that he is a trenchant critic of the Abe Government, which he sees as “extremely dangerous,” and he is strongly opposed

Japan’s designated secrets law  115

to revising the Constitution restricting civil liberties. But he places the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law in a different category, arguing that the origins of this legislation predate the Abe Government. Among the points he makes are the following: 1 2 3 4 5 6

The preparation of a law on State secrets has come very late. The law originated from the pre-Abe DPJ Administration, and was carefully prepared involving excellent constitutional specialists. Its inspiration is therefore very different from the right-wing ideology of the Abe Government. The media, however, distrusting the behaviour of the Abe regime, are sceptical about the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law and regard it as a bad law. It is eminently possible that the establishment of the law may lead to the practice of ignoring its actual text. Therefore, rather than criticising the text, he thinks that it is future practice under the law that should be criticised. The ultranationalist (kokusuishugiteki) aspect of the Abe Government is extremely dangerous, and he is entirely against constitutional revision restricting civil liberties. But the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law should be distinguished from the nationalism of the Abe Government.

Areas of application Whatever the merits of Kimura’s arguments, it seems clear that the scope of the law is, potentially or actually, extremely broad, covering a number of politically contentious issues, as well as potentially contentious issues where successive governments may be determined to marginalise them in public discourse, through the control of information regarding particular issues. This creates serious obstacles to investigative journalism in a media environment in which really serious investigative journalists are probably outnumbered by those prepared to report news more or less as given to them by government agencies or other Establishment organisations without going to too much trouble to discover the truth of what they are being told.3 In other words, the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law reinforces an already existing atmosphere of conformity within large segments of the media that tends to stifle investigative journalism and divert media (especially TV) attention towards intellectually undemanding popular programming. One is reminded of Prime Minister Abe’s grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, who in the middle of the Security Treaty revision crisis of 1959–60 told journalists that the only sections of newspapers that he could be bothered to read were the sports pages. One issue area where, even before the new law was introduced, journalists faced adverse pressure was that of “secret agreements” with the United States to permit US naval vessels to enter Japanese ports with nuclear weapons on board in violation of Japan’s official position banning the “introduction” (mochikomi) of nuclear weapons into Japan.4 According to Repeta, a journalist who had written articles about secret agreements, on the basis of interviews with retired

116  Arthur Stockwin

government officials, was told that he had induced his interviewees to violate the National Public Employees Law. Even though he was not prosecuted, he was subjected to serious intimidation. (Repeta 2014: 32) One contemporary issue of high political sensitivity is Okinawa island, where free discussion of the military base problems is likely to be severely hampered by the application of the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law. Whether to move the US Marine Futenma Airbase at Ginowan City to the coastal area of Henoko in a rural area of northern Okinawa has long been contentious,5 strongly opposed by the Okinawa governor and much of the local population. This issue has been bubbling along for years, but the Abe Government plainly wishes to settle the issue in favour of Henoko, by force if necessary. The 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law is a potentially powerful weapon in his hands. (Repeta 2014: 15–16. The second issue is that of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power station meltdown following the devastating earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011. Many aspects of the disaster, including the performance of the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) in failing to secure the plant before it was inundated by the tsunami, its frantic and failed attempts to stabilise it following the disaster, longer term efforts to prevent radioactive leakage, evacuation of residents in areas badly affected by radiation and whether to permit their return, as well as policy towards securing the plant, became matters of intense controversy. The disaster took place while the DPJ was in power, but after the LDP returned to office in December 2012, the issue of secrecy assumed prominence. There are concerns that the results of two government-initiated investigations into the Fukushima nuclear accident, and scores of interviews made available online in the summer of 2012 under the DPJ, might never have seen the light of day had there been a state secrets law at the time. The Abe Government has not subsequently invoked its secrecy powers on nuclear issues, in part no doubt because the prefectural administration in Fukushima, though politically conservative, had unanimously opposed the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law, (Repeta 2014:15) and also because of the enormous prominence that the issue had assumed throughout Japan. There has also been much concern among journalists about how far they would be able to report fully issues of restarting nuclear power stations elsewhere that had been shut down in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, as well as questions relating to preparation for possible attacks by terrorists. Plainly some of these matters required a proper application of secrecy rules, but it seems clear that Japanese journalists faced more serious obstacles to their pursuit of the “truth behind the scenes” than their counterparts in other comparable countries.

Conclusions Even taking into account Professor Kimura’s arguments, I think that we need to consider how far the Abe Government is prepared to ride roughshod over the texts of laws and Constitutional conventions in its pursuit of its right-wing nationalist agenda. There are particular areas of policy where the implementation of the

Japan’s designated secrets law  117

2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law may be particularly harsh and inimical to the principal of freedom of information. Apart from those cases already mentioned, the development of defence policy following the passage of the Collective Defence legislation in September 2015 is an obvious candidate for the application of the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law. The case of Okinawa is one of rising tension between a government determined to enforce its (and Washington’s) will in relation to base relocation, and a local population that is seriously opposed to this plan. The nuclear meltdown in the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (3/11) also created multiple confrontations and sensitivities, which in certain circumstances could get out of hand and tempt the government to make use of the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law. There is more justification for the Law’s application in anticipation of possible terrorist attacks, but official anti-terrorist measures need to be understood in at least broad terms by the electorate, so that to wrap the whole issue in secrecy would be unwise from the standpoint of national interest. Quite apart from such high profile issues, there is a risk that the law gives carte blanche to government ministries and agencies in concealing corruption or other kinds of malfeasance or abuses of power, or indeed of maladministration and incompetence. This is because the oversight mechanism is inadequate, lacking autonomy in the review and potential rejection of classification of documents as “special secrets,” leaving this important process entirely in the hands of bureaucrats disinclined to clip the wings of their colleagues. Moreover, the judiciary is very sensitive to political pressures due to the vetting process for promotions and thus has been co-opted by the government, rarely ruling against the state in cases that involve exercise of power or constitutional challenges. For these reasons the new secrecy legislation generates considerable disquiet concerning the possibility of “mission creep” in a context where insufficient checks and balances could facilitate broader application beyond the letter of the law in ways that might obstruct the public’s right to know. This discussion takes us into areas far wider than the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law and brings in the Constitution and constitutional procedures more generally. Whether this particular law is good or bad, a belated attempt to protect State secrets or an attack on freedom of speech in breach of article 21 of the Constitution, needs to be discussed within the context of a government of the hard right, whose concern to protect freedom of speech is essentially subordinate to its desire to create a society in which the primacy of patriotic loyalty to the State and traditionalist group identification outflanks personal rights and freedoms. This situation is not, however, simply a result of innovation by the Abe Government. Ever since the formation of the LDP in the mid-1950s, there have been important elements within the ruling party that have favoured relatively authoritarian methods over those normally associated with democracy. In any case, in the 1950s democracy as it had emerged from defeat in war and foreign occupation was still a fragile plant,6 so that authoritarian doctrines were able to attract an attentive audience on the nostalgic conservative right-wing. Almost any government entranced by the possibilities for it of ruling in an authoritarian manner will

118  Arthur Stockwin

give priority to creating so far as possible a single political discourse under its close control.7 If the media cannot be co-opted into such an enterprise, they will be coerced or suppressed. If such regimes are to be avoided, an absolutely crucial factor is the maintenance of a competitive balance between government and opposition. In the case of contemporary Japanese politics, this also implies the need for a balancing of views within the single party that arrogates to itself the role of “party of power,” namely, the LDP. For a given political party, the prospect of perpetual power is naturally tempting, but at the same time it risks descent into authoritarian rule. How far this has already happened in Japan is a matter of dispute. But the signs of movement towards suppression of free speech and media freedoms are indeed troubling.

Notes 1 This is a shortened version of Chapter 7 of Arthur Stockwin and Kweku Ampiah, Rethinking Japan: The Politics of Contested Nationalism, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield (Lexington Books), forthcoming, 2017. Reproduced by permission. 2 The verb sosonokasu, and verbal noun sosonokashi, may be translated in various ways: tempt, entice, allure, inveigle (into doing something), seduce, stir up, incite, put (somebody) up (to doing something), egg on (to do something). The term has a definite sexual connotation and would be appropriately used in the case mentioned above of a journalist who received secrets from a government official with whom he was having an affair. 3 This should not be taken as a wholesale indictment of Japanese journalists, who for the most part seek to report the news in an environment where conformity with official formulations has been widely regarded as meritorious rather than lazy. This atmosphere is not something merely abstract, but on occasion may be reinforced by serious threats, as we shall see. 4 The present writer recalls watching on Japanese TV footage of sailors disembarking from a US aircraft carrier that had entered a Japanese port. Journalists waylaid one sailor, asking him in laboured English whether nuclear weapons were on board the vessel. The sailor replied, with a broad grin on his face: “Keep talking, man.” 5 This was the principal issue that forced the DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio to resign in 2010. 6 This is not meant to imply that democracy was entirely a foreign import. Far from it, since as the historian Banno Junji argues, democratic ideas and institutions were far from absent before the outbreak of war with China in 1937. Junji Banno, Japan’s Modern History, 1857–1937: A New Political Narrative, Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2014. 7 Contemporary examples include the governments of President Putin in Russia and President Erdogan in Turkey.

References Pollmann, Mina (2014) “Japan’s troubling state secrets law takes effect”, The Diplomat, December 18. Repeta, Lawrence (2013) “Japan’s democracy at risk – The LDP’s ten most dangerous proposals for constitutional change”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 11(28): 3, July 22, 2013, www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3969. Repeta, Lawrence (2015) “Raising the wall of secrecy in Japan – The state secrecy law of 2013”, Meiji Law Journal, 21: 13–34, at 31, March 2014.

9 STATE SECRETS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN JAPAN Kenta Yamada

Japan ranked a record low 72nd in the World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders in 2016. The negative evaluation of governmental policy on media including new bills restricting press freedom has led to this low ranking. Fundamentally, freedom of expression should be guaranteed in principle, with few exceptions, but the exceptions are increasing at the expense of the principle. As a result, journalists are finding it increasingly difficult to perform their watchdog role and facilitate the public’s right to know. Moreover, legal and political developments are endangering freedom of expression. Government encroachment on freedom of expression has gained momentum in the twenty-first century, but especially under the Abe administration (2012–). As of 2016, there are two noteworthy points in the government’s attitude, both of which are intriguing because of the historical influences behind them. One is the longstanding media control by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the dominant political party since 1955, involving the expansion of central government control over broadcasting administration. (See Krauss Chapter 5) The second is the Abe administration’s media strategy, one that reflects his support for historical revisionism and his eagerness to put an end to the “post-war regime.” (See McNeill Chapter 12)

Freedom of expression, Japanese style In wartime Japan (1931–45), magazine editors could not gather, let alone write freely, without risk to personal liberty and/or their lives. Even though freedom of expression was guaranteed under the Meiji Constitution at that time, the “within the limits of law” clause allowed it to be overridden by the Wartime Special Laws such as the Public Security Preservation Laws, which suppressed dissent or criticism of the government.1 Then, for a quarter of a century after WWII ended in 1945, free speech was severely restricted in Japan. During the seven years of the

120  Kenta Yamada

US occupation 1945–52, there were taboo subjects and censorship that banned reporting about the atomic bombings and crimes committed by US military personnel. In Okinawa Prefecture, where the US military exercised administrative control until 1972 and its bases occupied about 30 percent of the total Okinawa mainland, crimes such as rape by US soldiers were common, but under the “permission” system, reporting about such crimes was suppressed. (See Yoshimoto Chapter 18) Under the new 1947 Constitution, freedom of expression became a guaranteed right. Reflecting upon the preceding war, people wanted utmost respect for civil liberties and individual rights, and not to allow the state to trample upon them. Japanese military systematically mislead the people by censoring the news and lead them into a tragedy that brought disaster to Japan and much of Asia. As a result, Article 21 of the Constitution is quite clear: Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor the secrecy of any means of communication be violated. No exceptions, but there is a gap between what is written and what is practiced, and it is here that the media can play an important role in making sure the public is aware. There is much to learn from Edward Snowden’s valuable exposure of the extent of this violation of citizens’ privacy by the US all over the world, including tapping the conversations of political leaders of allies like Japan and Germany. Many countries clearly allow exceptions to protections of press freedom and freedom of expression. For example, Germany bans certain opinions and expressions deemed harmful to the society in the name of promoting democracy and preventing a recrudescence of fascist pro-Nazi sentiments. In that sense, Japan and Germany remain haunted by their wartime legacies in terms of how they deal with free speech, adopting different strategies to protect democracy and ward off the ghosts of authoritarian excesses. Another important point to note is that authorities in Japan have relied upon self-regulation by publishers and broadcasters regarding sensitive subjects, without much active government involvement to ensure compliance. There is a shared understanding of where the line is drawn and what crosses the line. For example, with regard to the confidentiality of interview sources, reporters don’t have the right to refuse testifying, but they are usually not forced to go to court, in order to protect their journalistic activities. The authorities rely upon the media’s awareness of its social responsibility, rather than enforcing restrictions and limiting the flow of information. This approach reflects a consensus that top-down control by the state does not foster respect and dignity, and does not contribute to the building of a truly harmonious and democratic society.

The mass media Japan’s guarantee of freedom of expression has not caused any major social problems, largely due to the mass media’s self-regulation. Self-regulation works very

State secrets and press freedom in Japan  121

well in protecting freedom of expression in Japan due to the fact that the traditional mass media has been careful and responsible in exercising its rights, mindful of the powerful influence they have in society. Japan is one of the few nations, if not the only one, where all people have equal and affordable access to newspapers, TV, magazines and books. TV broadcasts are free throughout the country, newspapers are delivered to homes every morning, while a variety of magazines and books are available at bookstores that are within easy reach. This vast reach of the mass media in a highly literate society has a great influence on the flow of information. For example, about 50  million newspaper copies are circulated daily, and moreover, most of them get delivered to subscribers’ homes every morning on schedule. This reliability of the delivery system helps maintain the high level of circulation at roughly one copy per household. No other country with a population of 100 million or over sustains such a high subscription rate. Also, no country with population of less than one billion has such a large circulation. In order to maintain this large circulation, most newspaper companies tend to eliminate partisanship as much as possible and strive for neutral coverage and impartiality, which also generally characterizes reporting in Japan. With respect to broadcast media, there is the law that requires full coverage, and this means that anyone who owns a TV set can watch TV virtually free of charge.2 With NHK, a media organization susceptible to government influence (see Krauss Chapter 5), funded by the fees collected from viewers3 (hence a “public” service), and private broadcasting corporations, which run on advertising revenues, coexisting and competing with each other, viewers have access to a variety of channels. The mass media plays a critical role during elections. While election candidates are subject to strict regulation on their campaign activities, the mass media provides election-related information and analysis for the voters without restrictions. Furthermore, the government purchases space in the papers, TV and radio, for all political candidates, equally and free of charge.4 Such a powerful mass media naturally bears great social responsibility, which goes hand in hand with ethical autonomy. What is particular to Japan is that it is the whole industry, rather than the individual journalists or corporations, that promotes this model of operation. For example, there is the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association for the newspaper industry, the Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association for the private broadcasting industry and the Japan Magazine Publishers Association for the magazine industry, all of which exercise a strong leadership role in enforcing appropriate self-regulation. Such industrywide discretion facilitates a social framework where inappropriate expressions are curtailed. For example, there is industry-wide support for a self-imposed limit to prevent overheated coverage of crime or accident victims or offenders.5 The publishing industry also sets zoning rules and advisory stickers for what are deemed “harmful” books for the youth. In addition, the industry decided on its own code of ethics, and individual companies are sanctioned if they are found to be violating it. In

122  Kenta Yamada

the 1990s, in order to further enhance ethical reporting, the broadcasting industry established an independent body that handles complaints.6 One of such independent organizations is the Press Club. Such discretionary methods are subject to harsh criticism because they can be arbitrary and open to abuse. However, in reality, at least in the past, the industryled regulation played a vital role to protect freedom and ensure balanced coverage while limiting government involvement. For example, with regard to discriminatory words, including those of a racist nature, the industry has imposed an extremely powerful self- regulation that is rarely found in other parts of the world, to the extent that they have been said to “create” taboos. It is important to note that this system is starting to deteriorate, but the fact remains that it remains the foundation of journalistic activities in Japan.

Curtailing freedom of expression In twenty-first century Japan, intolerance of dissent is spreading in Japan. For example, in 2008 the Japan Teachers’ Union (which is a union of teachers for elementary, middle and high schools), a labor union considered to be left-wing in outlook, was denied the use of the space they rented for their research meeting.7 In 2008 a meeting to advocate against domestic violence (DV) by TsukubaMirai city in Ibaraki, on the outskirts of Tokyo, was cancelled because it could not secure rental space. Also, in 2008 a meeting to discuss the “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was cut short, due to disruptions at the venue. The level of intolerance has increased dramatically, to the extent that in the past few years there have been a series of cases where municipalities withdrew support for meetings (to discuss the Constitution) or citizens’ groups were denied ads on public transit systems that were previously allowed in the past. Public halls are starting to deny study sessions on legislation and the Constitution, citing the “political nature” of such meetings. Similarly, state and private universities are refusing to rent out space for meetings that are “political in nature.” Film screenings and museum exhibitions are also affected. Public facilities denied screenings of the film Yasukuni in 2007.8 Many private movie theaters also cancelled the screenings in fear of attacks by extreme right-wing organizations. In 2012, photo exhibitions focusing on the “comfort women” were forced to cancel,9 and in 2014, a peace-themed haiku was denied printing in the municipal journal.10 In 2015, a public museum was requested to remove a work of art created by a world-famous artist because the work was deemed to be political in nature.11 It is understandable that hotels and movie theaters need to run their businesses freely and be considerate to their guests, neighboring residents and facilities. Also, public facilities need to remain politically neutral. However, those involved in the dissemination of information and publicly owned facilities do share social responsibility to provide space for free speech and expression. They must recognize that the biggest contribution they can make for the society is to provide physical space and time, a public forum that facilitates unrestricted expression.

State secrets and press freedom in Japan  123

There are legitimate concerns that freedom is at risk in Japan as the government reconsiders security doctrine, counterterrorist measures and the war-renouncing Constitution. The government claims that this is required to transform Japan into a “normal country” modeled after Western nations, but these changes could undermine the Japanese Constitution, and the public has voiced concerns in numerous loud and large demonstrations that this so-called normalization challenges prevailing post-WWII values and norms they wish to protect against Abe’s inroads. The control of information by the state, tightening rapidly since the turn of the century, goes directly against the “information disclosure” movement of the 1980s.12 When a self-defense force personnel was prosecuted in 2008 because of a newspaper article in 2005, it was for the breach of defense secrets, as defined in the 2001 revision to the Self Defense Law (自衛隊法, jieitai-ho). An expert physician of juvenile crimes was prosecuted because of a description published in a book in 2007, which became the first case where a criminal charge was applied due to breach of confidentiality.13 In these cases, the reporters and editors were not prosecuted. Overall it may appear that the government is lenient with the media, but in reality, people will share less information with reporters out of fear for potential consequences. This intimidation will have a more powerful chilling effect in controlling speech and curtailing press freedom than arresting the reporters themselves. Reporting on the judiciary is also constrained. For example, the lay judge system that was introduced in 2009 places a very strict confidentiality obligation compared to other countries with a jury and lay judge system.14 Moreover, the court personnel have been known to be present and interrupt the press interviews or apply pressure on the press to stop broadcasts concerning verdicts in some cases. Even before the lay judge system was introduced, the Supreme Court would provide the reporters with a list detailing what is to be released and what is not to be released about its rulings; any transgressors risked losing access. Moreover, the government is skillfully taking advantage of the general attitude in the public favoring the “national interest” and “maintenance of social order,” and using this leeway to build a sense of national identity according to its more conservative inclinations. For example, school textbooks are provided free of charge in Japan for the “compulsory education” years (from ages 6 to 15), but only the textbooks that pass content reviews by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are allowed.15 As part of this textbook certification system, it is required that the government’s points of view are clearly reflected in text content; as a result, some historical facts, especially the misdeeds committed by the Japanese military during WWII, are whitewashed or deleted.16

Three phases in government media policies Next, it is crucial to understand the history of politics and media, based on the involvement of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led government in the broadcasting industry. The first phase lasted over 30 years between 1950 and the mid1980s, when the government largely refrained from intervening in broadcast

124  Kenta Yamada

programs. The post-war broadcast legislation, established under the US occupation, comprises the “three basic laws of radio waves” – the Broadcast Act (放送 法, hoso-ho), which regulates contents; the Radio Wave Act (電波法, Denpa-ho), which regulates the business, and the Radio Regulatory Committee Establishment Act (電波監理委員会法, Denpa-kanri-iinkai-ho), which governs the independent administrative organizations. The goal at that time was to establish sound press and reporting practices as part of constructing a democratic social system. The Broadcast Act, which was enacted in 1950, clearly stated that its purpose was “to ensure that broadcasting contribute to the development of healthy democracy.” The law stated the “broadcast program editing freedom” in the subsequent provisions, and it is clear that the system was created precisely to guarantee freedom of broadcasting. Therefore, while it is certainly broadcasters’ responsibility to report the truth and avoid political bias, the law laid out the overall ethical guidelines and established autonomy from state control.17 For two years beginning in 1950, the Radio Regulatory Commission prevented any government intervention in broadcasting. After the occupation ended in 1952, the committee was immediately disbanded, and its licensing authority was transferred to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (now Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). Even after that, the government regarded the Broadcast Act as the code of ethics and did not interfere with individual programming content. Of course, broadcast stations were not completely free to do what they liked. Below the surface, there were instances of programs being cancelled and news anchors forced to step down due to political pressure. However, there were supportive social movements as well; there would be independent showings of the cancelled programs, and production staff would leave the firm to protest firing of news anchors.18 All this was to change. In the second phase, which spans the late 1980s until around 2000, the government began to scrutinize individual broadcast programs. In the beginning, it had merely sent requests to the viewers’ council set up at each station. However, in 1990, it clearly transferred authority to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to judge whether a program violates the law or not. The premise is that the law is not merely a code of conduct, as previously held, but rather is a binding and enforceable law, so that any violation is not merely an ethics violation but instead constitutes an illegal action. Examining the instances of so-called “administrative guidance,” one notices that from 1985 to 1993, the government intervened repeatedly in the late-night “vulgar” programs, making the intervention more of a “norm.”19 The 1993 Tsubaki Incident and the following sessions at the National Diet mark the time when such governmental interventions were retroactively justified.20 (See also Cucek Chapter 6) Around the same time, a number of laws were proposed, including the Media Regulation provisions, amid mounting criticisms against the mass media for violating human rights.21 In this sense, the push for more regulations by the government had some support from the citizenry. “Regulatory pressure” against the press is also seen in defamation cases, as settlements skyrocketed from a maximum of

State secrets and press freedom in Japan  125

approximately 500,000 yen, to nearly ten times that figure, once even reaching a record 39.6 million yen in the Supreme Court. This was a class action lawsuit fielded by 32 sumo wrestlers for a series of articles. (Also see Repeta and Sawa Chapter 7) Moreover, the “reputation” of a politician is highly protected, and the situation is quite opposite from that in the US, where the freedom of criticizing public figures is ensured. The third phase runs from the early 2000s to date. Cases of “administrative guidance,” that is, advice given to individual TV programs by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, rapidly increased, and at the same time, the government no longer refrained from exercising executive powers over the operation of the stations. The first Abe administration (2006–07) and the subsequent Abe administrations since 2012 have increasingly tightened the government’s grip on broadcasting corporations. This is obvious by looking at the sharp increase in the instances of “administrative guidance.” It is official that the government now can freely intervene in the broadcasting industry. In addition, new laws have been enacted to directly regulate press activities; a few examples are the Emergency legislation (Armed Attack Response Act 2003 [武力攻撃事態対処 法, Buryoku-kogeki-jitai-taisyo-ho] and Civil Protection Act 2004 [国民保護法, Kokumin-hogo-ho]), Agreement on media coverage (at the time of the dispatch of Self Defense Force in the War in Iraq), and the controversial Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS) that came into effect in 2014.22 The LDP-led government has begun to clearly show less tolerance towards those objecting to government policies. This has become clear by incessant questioning, demands and protests harassing broadcasting stations. Japan’s broadcasting administration is unique in that the government (Ministry of Internal Affairs) controls issuing of broadcasting licenses, creating a conflict of interest whereby the party in power can muzzle the media that criticizes its policies or airs debate about issues that the government finds awkward. For this reason, to protect press freedom and freedom of expression, it is imperative that the government refrains from threatening to withdraw broadcast licenses from stations that express criticism or demanding changes in program content. However, in 2016 Takaishi Sanae, the Minister of Internal Affairs, did make such a threat, sparking widespread condemnation. In the Broadcast Act, each broadcasting station establishes its own program editorial standards, and corrections are broadcast if it airs something that does not meet that standard. In addition, each station has a viewers’ council that acts as a voluntary self-check organization. In addition, there is a third-party-like BPO that acts as a media self-regulatory organization and focuses on human rights protections and improvement of ethics. Despite all these safeguards, since 2013, the LDP-led government has actively intervened on numerous occasions, protesting against individual programs it regards as dissentient, quoting the “political fairness” provision in the Broadcasting Act and demanding “offenders” submit corrective plans.23 This new assertiveness and pattern of intimidation is based on an incorrect legal interpretation of

126  Kenta Yamada

the Broadcasting Act, pretending it is a legally binding act, rather than a code of ethics. Based on this twisted interpretation of the law, the Abe government is making judgments about what is good and bad in individual program content and issuing intrusive administrative guidance, requiring status reports and essentially demanding “business improvement” according to LDP preferences. Such intervention by government agencies puts the current discretion-based system of broadcasting law at risk and encroaches excessively on press autonomy. As mentioned above, the government expressed its “unified opinion” in February 2016 that the Minister of Internal Affairs can withdraw a broadcasting license if he/she determines that either a series of programs or a single program failed “to include any particular view on a dividing political issue.” This lowers the hurdle significantly for government intervention and increases the risk of bias in favor of the government to the detriment of democratic discourse, freedom of expression and the right to dissent. (cf. Cucek Chapter 6) In parallel with these political movements, there is also a trend on social media to criticize “biased” coverage against the current administration. In order to avoid trouble, broadcast stations have started to cave in to what appears to be an orchestrated backlash by rightists by limiting critical commentary. In 2016, three news anchors deemed critical of the government all left their positions at the same time, smacking of a purge aimed at placating Abe’s neo-nationalist supporters and kowtowing to the government.24 There is no smoking gun proving this was forced by political powers, but it does seem there was an orchestrated campaign to oust one commentator by placing incendiary ads and, as argued elsewhere in this volume (See George Mulgan Chapter  1), it is hard to imagine this was a mere coincidence. Certainly this development raises suspicions that there was internal pressure within the stations, thereby undermining viewers’ trust in news programs.

2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law Every nation has the need to protect classified information for the sake of defense and/or diplomacy, and thus there are secrecy laws restricting access to, and dissemination of, sensitive information. However, the government should not determine such classification arbitrarily or without limitation. It has to work within a controlled system, and the government needs to be held accountable and subject to autonomous monitoring in designating secrets. Otherwise, the citizens’ “right to know” as guaranteed in the Constitution is rendered meaningless, undermining democracy and curtailing transparency and accountability. This is why the 2014 Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Law (特定 秘密保護法, Tokutei-himitsu-hogo-ho), steamrolled through the Diet in 2013, has attracted widespread condemnation in Japan and around the world. Indeed, “Scrutiny of official attitudes to freedom of expression should be unproblematic, and indeed a priority, for a democratic country like Japan,” said Article 19, a London-based watchdog group advocating transparency and information disclosure. The amount of classified information had been increasing since the 2007

State secrets and press freedom in Japan  127

revision of the Self Defense Forces Act and the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement), but the new legislation expands the definition of “secrets,” and it now encompasses a range of diplomatic and public security information. Particularly important is the severe restriction this imposes on reporting activities, because now the law openly prohibits any detection or disclosure of any information that the government designates as secret. Previously, secrecy in Japan has been ensured by imposing the obligation of confidentiality on the recipient, while there has been no punishment for journalists actively trying to access classified information. As an exception, under the Japan-US Security Treaty, US military secrets received special treatment, in which both the disclosure and attempts to access such secrets were banned and subjected to punishment.25 There was also a provision in the National Public Service Act (国家公務員法, Kokka-koumuin-ho) that punished approaching a government employee for the purpose of obtaining classified information. There were so few exceptions because of a consensus that any system that criminalizes attempts to access information can be “exploited” by the government, as was bitterly experienced during WWII. This is why the “crime to detect and collect information” under the old Constitution’s Military Secret Protection Act (軍機保護法, Gunki-hogo-ho) was not adopted after the war. The 2014 law thus represents a significant departure from post-WWII norms, but the government was unable to make a convincing case for doing so because there have been no major damaging leaks, so it resorted to citing pressure from the US, which was portrayed as reluctant to share top secret information in the absence of a stricter secrecy regime in Tokyo. The 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law establishes a legal basis for punishing those involved in leaking or obtaining classified information, but the Provision Against Expanded Interpretation, adopted to placate critics, states that “When this Act is applied, its interpretation must not be expanded to unfairly violate the fundamental human rights of the citizens.” It appears that the law is also giving consideration to the freedom of expression, including the freedom of news reporting. However, despite this conciliatory gesture, there is an implication that reporters’ activities could potentially be considered “illegal,” and the state retains the right to determine what is legal and illegal, and what is secret and not, without independent review. In doing their jobs, reporters regularly interview government officials to elicit confidential information and insights. Once the reporter establishes trust, the official may choose to reveal some secret or share some confidence, essentially the longstanding, widely tolerated practice of the “deliberate leak.” Formally, this may be a criminal act, but the court has not considered it as a violation of the law. This has helped realize freedom of reporting and the right to know. The government assures the public that it will not intrude on or criminalize this practice even after the introduction of the new 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law, but there are widespread doubts.

128  Kenta Yamada

First, courts will determine what are “legitimate business activities,” the criteria of which is left to a prosecutor, practically making it the government’s call. In Japan, the rate of conviction is close to 100 percent once prosecuted, indicating that ultimately the ruling is all up to the government. There is no clear criteria for determining what is proper and improper between reporters and government employees, forcing them to rely on the faint expectation that the court will do the right thing. But this depends entirely on the government’s discretion, so even if the government doesn’t actually incarcerate or fine anyone for violating the 2014 law, the news media will become more careful about exposing governmental information, fearing the potential consequences. There is a famous case involving a Mainichi Newspaper reporter who obtained a secret memo about the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. The Supreme Court and government cites this incident to show that press freedom is protected as long as the press activities are “legitimate.” In actuality, the reporter was convicted based on the “violation of ethics.” In that case, the court determined the reporter’s activity was “not legitimate” because he seduced a Ministry of Foreign Affairs female clerk and enticed her to share secret information with him. This case demonstrates that whether a certain press activity is legitimate or not depends upon the ethical view held by the prosecutor or the judge, the ultimate authority that makes that call. It is the nebulous discretionary power granted to authorities to determine what is and not a breach of ethics that raises concerns because it creates a grey area of uncertainty and is open to abuse. Similarly, the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law also grants the government considerable leeway in determining what is a violation or not and by allowing for jail sentences that are twice as long compared to the previous rule; the new law applies psychological pressure on reporters that inhibits them from pursuing stories and doing their job. This is nothing short of a threat to the freedom of the press. In addition, up until 2014, it has been the act of incitement that was a punishable crime, but the new law also defines “deception” as a crime. This means if the interviewee testifies that he or she “was deceived” into giving away secret documents, then it will automatically make the reporter a criminal, regardless of whether his reporting activity was legitimate or not. Moreover, typically leakage crimes required evaluation of whether the leaked content really needed protection and was a legitimate secret. However, the new law only requires that the information be classified as a secret without any independent review mechanism. It is utterly unacceptable that efforts since the 1980s by the government, in response to citizens demands, to embrace transparency and information disclosure as the basis of good governance will go down the drain as a result of this new law. It is also worrisome that the 2014 Specially Designated Secrets Law stipulates that merely trying to acquire classified information is a punishable crime. This criminalization of intention invites invidious comparisons with the ‘thought police’ in wartime Japan, especially since in this Kafkaesque labyrinth the journalist might not even know he or she is requesting something designated secret

State secrets and press freedom in Japan  129

since such classification is itself secret, but are liable to prosecution for soliciting such information.

Disregarding the right to know In 2015 the government adopted a controversial set of bills designed to enable the nation to exercise the right of collective self-defense. This new legislation has essentially gutted the constitutional constraints on the military enshrined in Article 9, sparking worries among the public that sometime, somewhere for dubious reasons Japan will be dragged into a conflict at Washington’s behest. The new legislation also establishes criteria for the government to declare a state of emergency when it can suspend civil liberties and normal democratic processes to cope with an extraordinary situation. Under such circumstances, freedom of expression and press freedoms can be suspended solely at the government’s discretion should it determine the nation is facing an existential crisis. This emergency legislation will directly affect press organizations in other ways as well since they are “designated public institutions.”26 Since 2003, during an emergency, broadcasting stations (mainly television) are asked to broadcast and collect information according to government instructions, submit the information collected, or dispatch their employees to government offices.27 Under the current system, this is merely a request, but this may become mandatory as the government strengthens its authority. This “designated public institutions” system started with the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law 1961 (災害対策基本法, Saigai-taisaku-kihon-ho) and gradually expanded to include nuclear disasters (Nuclear Emergency Response Measures Act 1999, 原子力災害対策特別措置法, Gensiryoku-saigai-taisakutokubetu-sochiho), which can be called a man-made disaster, and war (Civil Protection Act 2004). The latest addition is the National Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious Diseases Act 2012 (新型インフルエンザ対策特 別措置法, Singa-Influenza-taisaku-tokubetu-sochiho). At times of natural disasters, it is normal to expect the media to play a social role and to broadcast prompt and appropriate contents. But even in emergency situations, imposing such obligations on newspaper and broadcasting stations goes directly against the current Constitution. This backsliding is all the more ominous in light of plans to revise the Constitution to curtail rights and liberties and strengthen government authority and citizens’ duties. The Liberal Democratic Party’s constitutional amendment proposal, which was announced at the end of 2012, contains a provision that “people must be aware that freedom and rights do not come without responsibility and duties, and must not violate public interest or disrupt public order.” The right to pursuit of happiness also became a conditional right with the clause “as long as it is not contrary to the public interest and the public order.” This is exactly the reversal of the current constitution and is reminiscent of the Meiji Constitution in which the single clause “within the law” stripped people of their rights. The LDP’s proposal confers

130  Kenta Yamada

absolute power on the state while suppressing individual’s rights and freedoms for the sake of the so-called “national interest.” This LDP proposal also encroaches on freedom of expression and clearly excludes “activities with the purpose of harming public interest and public order, and to organize with such purpose” from the right to freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. But who decides what is in the public interest? It is further problematic that the government has failed to amend the 2001 Freedom of Information Act to strengthen government recognition of the “right to know” and clarification of the “conditions for exception.” The Abe administration is working to enable the nation to crack down on dissent and calling this “normalization” of the nation. This idea of becoming a “normal” country is propelling Abe’s efforts to amend the Constitution, especially Article 9. By doing this, the administration claims that Japan can become a legitimate independent country with its own army, exercising its right to collective selfdefense and thereby contributing to global security. While opinion polls show that a large number of respondents consider the Constitution to be “old-fashioned” and “not in touch with reality” and therefore “should be amended,” a majority still wishes to retain Article 9 because they see it as a brake against unrestrained militarism and the demands of the US alliance. Constitutional debate in Japan is extremely limited, and the public is in general unaware of what is planned and why it is important. Abe’s government is trying to prioritize the national interest over individual freedom and rights, a revanchist agenda out of synch with twenty-first century democratic values and norms in Japan. Suppressing and intimidating the press is a means to stifle the necessary debate and scrutiny his agenda deserves. As we have noted, freedom of the press has become increasingly restricted in the past 15 years. It is unacceptable that the government is intentionally facilitating an environment in which the press cannot help the public hold the government accountable by monitoring what authorities are doing. The cocoon of impunity being established under the new secrets legislation goes against principles of good governance and endows the ruling party with too much discretionary power to stifle criticism and opposition. This contravenes the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitution, a watershed, or perhaps Waterloo, in Japan’s postWWII democracy.

Notes 1 The Constitution of the Empire of Japan (大日本国憲法, Dai-nihonkoku-kenpo), Article 29 “Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.” 2 The Broadcast Act (放送法, Hoso-ho), Article 15, states that NHK shall transmit domestic broadcasting “far and wide throughout Japan.” Privately owned broadcasting corporations are obliged to make an effort to do the same, and in reality, provide coverage in the same areas as NHK. 3 This is the only system in the world where viewers are required to make such payments. NHK collects the fees, but as of 2016, only about 75 percent of the subscribers are paying.

State secrets and press freedom in Japan  131

4 Programs (on TV and radio) and ads (on newspaper) where election candidates announce their manifestos and careers. 5 So-called “media scrum” response 6 Broadcasting Ethics and Program Improvement Organization (BPO) 7 In 2008, the Prince Hotel, which is a major hotel chain in Japan, agreed to rent its space for the educational research meeting, but later cancelled the contract due to concerns about the attacks by the extreme right-wing organizations. The court later ruled that the cancellation of the contract was illegal and awarded compensation in damages. 8 A movie about Japanese views towards WWII. 9 A case where an ethnic group protested and demanded the exhibition of the “Juju Project” at the Nikon Salon to be cancelled. The exhibition was held in the Tokyo location as planned, with added security measures, but it was cancelled in the Osaka location. 10 Saitama City’s journal denied printing of the haiku by the city’s Haiku Club member, because it was about Article 9 of the Constitution. 11 Museum of Contemporary Art in Tokyo was asked to take down its “Art Exhibition for Children: Whose Place is this?” by Makoto Aida. 12 In Japan, in 2001, the Administrative Information Disclosure Law (Freedom of Information Act 情報公開法, Zhoho-koukai-ho) was enacted. The Public Records Management Act (公文書管理法, kobunsho-kanri-ho), which would work in tandem, was enacted 10 years later, in 2011. The Information Disclosure Law was probably not far from the world standard at that time, but since it has never been revised for 15 years, it has become quite obsolete. Specifically, the conditions for exceptions are arbitrary and vague, and it fails to take digitized information into consideration. It also does not stipulate the “right to know.” 13 Kusanagi Atsuko, I have decided to kill my dad, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007). The doctor who was responsible for evaluating a juvenile case shared the boy’s written oral statement and the evaluation document with the writer and the editor, who asked to see those documents. The documents appeared in the book almost as a whole, and this became a social problem. 14 Act on Criminal Trials with Participation of Saiban-in (裁判員法, Saiban-in-ho), enacted in 2004. It is similar to jury systems abroad. Persons selected by lottery participate in trials in court and, together with professional judges, decide on the ruling and sentencing. 15 This certification system of school textbooks has been a subject of lengthy and numerous lawsuits contending that it is a form of censorship forbidden by the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that it was constitutional, given that the freedom of printing similar contents outside of textbooks is guaranteed. 16 This is regarding sensitive issues such as “comfort women,” “Nanjing Massacre,” “collective suicides in Okinawa,” the role of the Japanese military and various territorial disputes. 17 Suzuki Hidemi, Yamada Kenta and Sunagawa Hiroyoshi, Deciphering the Broadcast Law, (Tokyo: Shojihomu, 2009) 18 Yamada Kenta, “Taking Another Look at the Post-War Broadcast Journalism,” Gekkan Minpo, August and September Issues, 2015 19 Defined by the Administrative Procedures Act (行政手続法, Gyosei-tetuduki-ho), Article 2, Paragraph 1, Number 6, as “guidance, recommendations, advice, or other acts by which an Administrative Organ may seek, within the scope of its duties or affairs under its jurisdiction, certain action or inaction on the part of specified persons in order to realize administrative aims, where such acts are not Dispositions.” 20 The Tsubaki Incident is a controversy caused by Tsubaki Sadayoshi, a news executive at Asahi Broadcasting Corporation at the time, who spoke at a private meeting of the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters and implied that TV broadcasting does not need to be politically fair. 21 Protection of Personal Information Act (個人情報保護法, Kojin-zyoho-hogoho), Human Rights Protection Bill (人権擁護法案, Jinken-yogo-hoan), Bill on

132  Kenta Yamada

2 2 23

24 25 26 27

protecting youth from harmful social environment (青少年有害環境対策基本法案, Seishonen-yugai-taisaku-kihon-hoan). Yamada Kenta, Law and Journalism, 3rd Edition (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 2014). In an unconventional move, prior to the 2014 general election of the House of Representatives, the Liberal Democratic Party issued a written statement requesting each broadcasting company to ensure balanced coverage of political issues. More details can be found in How to Realize Better Transparency in the Society by Miki Yukiko and Yamada Kenta (Tokyo: Senshu University Press, 2016). Kuniya Hiroko on NHK, “Close-Up Gendai,” Kishi Shigetada on TBS, “News23” and Furutachi Ichiro on TV Asahi, “Hodo Station.” Special Criminal Law for US military (刑事特別法, keiji-tokubetsu-ho) sets a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment This system is intended to be designated as a “public institution” to a particular private company or organization on the basis of the government’s instructions. Armed Attack Response Act and Provision in the Civil Protection Act (See before).

PART III

History and culture wars

10 PRESS FREEDOM UNDER FIRE “Comfort women,” the Asahi affair and Uemura Takashi Tomomi Yamaguchi

Introduction On August 5, 2014, the Asahi Shimbun released the results of its reexamination of past coverage of “comfort women” (Asahi Shimbun 2014). The paper admitted that testimony provided by the late Yoshida Seiji, in which he stated that he captured and forcibly transported “comfort women” in Korea during WWII, was a fabrication, and retracted sixteen articles that were related to Yoshida’s comments from the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequently, protests against the Asahi and its reporters intensified with a vengeance. Many papers, magazines, books and television talk shows, ranging from conservative to more liberal ones, criticized the Asahi for its comfort women coverage and belated mea culpa. Conservative politicians, including government leaders, openly condemned the Asahi. On the street, particularly in front of the Asahi Shimbun company headquarters in Tokyo and Osaka, there have been frequent demonstrations by right-wing groups against the company. On the Internet, attacks against the Asahi have soared to unprecedented levels, making Asahi-bashing a major social phenomenon since 2014. (See Fackler Chapter 3) In this situation, one journalist in particular stood out as a target: a former Asahi reporter, Uemura Takashi, who took early retirement from the company in March 2014. Uemura had never written any articles drawing on the discredited testimony of Yoshida Seiji, belatedly repudiated by the Asahi. Yet, Uemura was attacked and accused of fabricating two stories that he wrote in the early 1990s on the first “comfort woman” to go public with her experiences, South Korean Kim Hak-sun. Earlier in 2014, intense Internet harassment combined with anonymous protest calls, letters and emails cost Uemura a position as professor he was to assume at a university in Kobe. The Asahi’s “re-examination” in August, which concluded that there were no fabrications in Uemura’s articles and thus the paper

136  Tomomi Yamaguchi

would not retract them, ironically made the situation worse. By that time he was an adjunct lecturer at Hokusei Gakuen University in Hokkaido, and that university became subject to an intense campaign of threats to fire him. Uemura and his family were also threatened, leading him to file lawsuits against his critics and their publishers for defamation in January and February 2015. Why was Uemura Takashi, who wrote only a few articles on “comfort women” in the 1990s, singled out as the target of vehement attacks by the right two decades after publication? Since the mid-2000s, I have been conducting field research on so-called grassroots right-wing movements, and around 2010, I began to notice Uemura’s name on placards that I saw in demonstrations against “comfort women” by xenophobic ultranationalist groups. The reporter’s name sounded unfamiliar to me in connection with this issue, despite my familiarity with other prominent Asahi reporters who had written about the “comfort woman” issue, such as the late Matsui Yayori, who organized the International Women’s War Crimes Tribunal after her retirement from the company in 2000. And yet I  saw Uemura’s name mentioned in these demonstrations more than that of anyone else as a “fabricator” of the “comfort woman” issue and a “traitor.” Introduced by an Asahi reporter, I met Uemura for the first time in October 2014, when the vilification campaign was at its peak. Since then, I have been following Uemura’s case and his subsequent lawsuits, and more generally, the “comfort woman” issue and the attacks against the Asahi by the Japanese right and the government.

What were the criticisms against Uemura? Uemura Takashi wrote two articles on Kim Hak-sun, the first “comfort woman” to come forward to tell her story in 1991; he was then a 33-year-old reporter at the Osaka city news section of the Asahi Shimbun. It was these two articles that made Uemura the target of denunciations by nationalists for over two decades, branded him as the fabricator of information that brought the “comfort woman” issue in the spotlight. The first article he wrote, published August  11, 1991, was headlined “Even now the tears come with that memory: former Korean comfort woman overcomes reticence to speak out half a century after the war. Korean organization records her story,” and was the top story of the city news section of the Osaka edition of the Asahi Shimbun that day (Uemura 1991a; Uemura 2015a). The article reported the content of a tape-recorded interview with an anonymous former “comfort woman,” who spoke about her experiences for the first time in public. Three days later, on August 14, the anonymous woman revealed herself to be Kim Hak-sun at a press conference in Seoul. Uemura listened to the tape at the office of “The Korean Council to Address the Issue of the Volunteer Corps” in Seoul and wrote his article on this basis, as he was unable to meet her in person at that time. After he filed the article, Uemura returned to Osaka, not knowing that Kim’s press conference would take place in just a few days.1 While many media outlets from

Press freedom under fire  137

FIGURE 10.1 Uemura

speaking at a lecture organized by the Japan Congress of Journalists on February 17, 2015 in front of an image of Kim Hak-sun

Photo by Tomomi Yamaguchi, with permission secured from Uemura Takashi.

South Korea wrote stories on Kim Hak-sun’s press conference, the Hokkaido Shimbun in Japan was the only one that conducted an independent interview with Kim, and they published their article on August 15. Given that his original article was so quickly followed by these more dramatic events, Uemura recalls that his August 11 article did not receive much attention at the time. It nonetheless became historically significant as the first article to contain a first-hand account of the experiences of a “comfort woman.” The second piece that Uemura published on the issue was an article in the Osaka edition of the Asahi, dated December 25, 1991. The headline reads: “My youth gone forever. Half a lifetime filled with bitterness. Former military comfort woman Ms. Kim Hak-sun files a lawsuit against the Japanese government” (Uemura 1991b). The article covered the lawsuit that Kim and other former “comfort women” had brought to the Tokyo District Court in December. It was based on an interview conducted with her by her team of lawyers, and Uemura reported about the interview with the permission of the legal team. It was first time that Uemura met Kim. The initial criticism in print of Uemura appeared in the April  1992 issue of Bungei Shunjū magazine, in an article written by conservative critic Nishioka Tsutomu, entitled “What was the ‘comfort woman issue?’ ” (Nishioka 1992).

138  Tomomi Yamaguchi

Nishioka was the editor-in-chief of Gendai Korea magazine then, and as of 2016, a professor at Tokyo Christian University, as well as the president of the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea. In the article, Nishioka voiced his opposition to the lawsuit filed against the Japanese government by Kim Hak-sun and other “comfort women” and supported by the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families, as well as the visit of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi to South Korea and his apologies there concerning the “comfort women” issue. He then pointed a finger at those he considered to be responsible for this situation: the Japanese lawyers and the media, especially the Asahi and the reporter who wrote the first article, Uemura Takashi. The two major points in Nishioka’s criticism of Uemura’s two 1991 articles are: (1) Uemura’s alleged confusion between the “women’s volunteer corps” (general mobilization to fill various jobs) and “comfort women” in the August 11 article; and (2) Uemura’s failure to include information about Kim Hak-sun having attended kisaeng school (a school for training female entertainers) in the December 25 article.2 Nishioka, and later other nationalists, argue that the confusion of the “women’s volunteer corps” with “comfort women” implied that the recruitment process of Kim Hak-sun involved coercion, kyōsei renkō (forcible transport). Nishioka also claims that not mentioning Kim’s attending kisaeng school could also give the impression that the recruitment method was of a forcible nature, and “we cannot avoid concluding that Uemura intentionally hid certain facts” (Nishioka 1992: 308). In fact, however, newspapers, including the conservative papers Yomiuri and Sankei, had relatively extensive coverage on the “comfort woman” issue at that time, and many of them, not just the Asahi and not just Uemura, used the term, “women’s volunteer corps” to refer to “comfort women,” as it was in common use in South Korea at that time (Asahi 2014; Kimura 2015; Uemura 2015a; 2016; Yoshikata 2015). Uemura rebutted Nishioka by pointing out that having a background as a kisaeng does not in any way excuse a woman’s being made a “comfort woman” and forced into sexual servitude against her will, and thus for him, her kisaeng background was not relevant to the story he wrote (Uemura 2015a). Furthermore, Nishioka commented in his 1992 article that Uemura’s mother-inlaw was a board member of the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families, an organization that later spearheaded the lawsuits on behalf of former “comfort women,” including Kim Hak-sun, and thus, Uemura should have been extra-careful in his reporting. However, Uemura’s source of information concerning “comfort women” was the Korean Council, unrelated to the Association of Pacific War Victims. After the publication of the Bungei Shunjū article, a conservative think-tank, the Japan Policy Institute (Nihon Seisaku Kenkyū Sentā) interviewed Nishioka for the April 1992 volume of the organization’s news magazine. In the interview, Nishioka again emphasized Uemura’s not mentioning Kim Hak-sun’s kisaeng school background, and the magazine editor added that the report was not objective because he had a relative in a leadership position in a victims’ support organization (Nihon Seisaku Kenkyū Sentā 1992: 7). Since then,

Press freedom under fire  139

the Japan Policy Institute, which enjoys close ties with LDP politicians, including the current prime minister, Abe Shinzo, has continued to work with Nishioka and playing a significant role in spearheading conservative criticism about the “comfort woman” issue. Starting with the 1992 article, Nishioka has relentlessly criticized Uemura in the mass media, thus focusing right-wing ire against him. In the early 1990s, however, the criticism against Uemura was largely confined to a limited circle of conservative newsletters and magazines. Nishioka initially asserted that Uemura had a “significant misunderstanding of the facts,” which is a much milder critique than subsequent accusations of intentional fabrication. At that time, the Asahi found nothing problematic in Uemura’s articles, and he himself did not publish a rebuttal. On August 4, 1993, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei issued a statement concerning “comfort women” that reads, “A  government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitment” (Kono 1993). Right-wing forces argue to this day that Kono’s acknowledgement that the “comfort women” were forcibly recruited by the Japanese military is the root of the “comfort woman” problem, one that was due to the Asahi’s coverage of the issue, especially the articles drawing on the testimony by Yoshida Seiji from the 1980s and Uemura’s articles on Kim Hak-sun in 1991. From 1993 to 1996, Uemura was stationed in Tehran as a correspondent, and he was not involved with the “comfort women” controversy, especially since the issue was relatively muted in public discourse at the time.

The scapegoating of Uemura By 1997, information about “comfort women” had been added to all junior high school history textbooks, triggering a sense of urgency among right-wing groups. Revisionists argued that Japanese history education was “masochistic” and undermining love of nation among young Japanese. The rising tide of historical revisionism in the mid-1990s, prompted by the history textbook issue, also sparked bashing of the Asahi and Uemura Takashi concerning coverage of the “comfort woman” issue. In particular, a number of politicians, including the current prime minister, Abe Shinzo, who was a member of the House of Representatives at that time, played a significant role in some of the key moments in the rise of historical revisionism and “comfort woman” denial. The establishment of the Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukuru Kai) in 1996 was especially significant in spreading historical revisionism, denying and downplaying Japan’s war responsibility and the “comfort woman” system, as the organization effectively widened the range of people, including “ordinary citizens,” who became aware of their ideas

140  Tomomi Yamaguchi

(Oguma and Ueno 2003). Many conservative politicians were active participants in the revisionist history movement as well and founded a group of young LDP politicians, the Young Diet Members’ Group for Japan’s Future and History Education (Nippon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku wo Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai). Abe Shinzo was the group’s secretary. The group published a book entitled Doubts about History Textbooks (Rekishi Kyōkasho eno Gimon) in 1997, which includes a group discussion on “comfort women” with Nishioka Tsutomu as participant, and short pieces by Abe Shinzo and other politicians. In his article, Abe states that as a result of study group meetings held by the Young Diet Members’ Group, it became clear that the articles based on Yoshida Seiji’s testimony by the Asahi Shimbun were a complete fabrication, and that its reporting mistakenly conflated the women’s volunteer corps and comfort women, alluding to Uemura’s articles (Nippon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku wo Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai 1997: 448). Nishioka began to intensify his criticisms of Uemura and published an article in the May issue of Shokun! magazine in 1997 (Nishioka 1997) and a piece in the July 1998 issue of Seiron magazine (Nishioka 1998). In his 1997 article, he referred to the Uemura articles as “extensively reporting complete lies” (Nishioka 1997: 69), while in the 1998 article, Nishioka referred to Uemura’s articles as “completely fabricated reporting” (Nishioka 1998: 47) for the first time and criticized him for intentionally failing to mention the kisaeng training. In these articles, Nishioka went further to assert that these intentional fabrications benefited Uemura’s mother-in-law, and he should therefore be censured by the Asahi Shimbun company, marking a significant escalation of his 1992 criticism. Nishioka also harshly criticized Uemura’s assignment to Asahi’s Seoul bureau in 1997. In these 1990s publications, the fundamental line of revisionist arguments that would henceforth be deployed was laid out. Revisionists denied the involvement of the Japanese military in the forcible recruitment of “comfort women,” and repudiated the Kono statement’s admission of state responsibility. Thus, although the recruitment process is not central to the argument that the Japanese “comfort station” system – or the system of sexual slavery – constituted a violation of human rights, the nationalist discourse has been fixated on the “forcible” nature of the recruitment: by denying the coercive nature of the recruitment, they seek to stoke skepticism about the entire issue. The revisionists also rejected the 1996 “Coomaraswamy Report,” prepared for the UN Commission on Human Rights by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, which characterized the comfort station system as military sexual slavery. Revisionists maintain that the number of Korean “comfort women” recruited for the Japanese military was far lower than the number claimed by historians. Furthermore, the “comfort women” issue itself is dismissed because revisionists consider it to be based on false accusations, fabrications and mendacious testimonies by the “comfort women.” The next wave of revisionist criticisms against the “comfort women” issue came in 2000, when right-wingers protested against the International Women’s

Press freedom under fire  141

War Crimes Tribunal, which former Asahi reporter Matsui Yayori played a key role in organizing. The tribunal claimed that Emperor Hirohito was guilty of crimes against humanity, and right-wingers, from mainstream conservatives to the extreme right, rose in protest. LDP politicians Nakagawa Shoichi and Abe Shinzo pressured NHK to change the content of a documentary on the tribunal, a story the Asahi broke in 2005. The organizer of the Tribunal, VAWW-NET, then sued NHK for censorship (Yoneyama 2002; Field 2007; Nagata 2014). According to Watanabe Mina, the secretary general of the Women’s Active Museum of War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo, the NHK incident made the Japanese media, with the exception of some local media such as in Okinawa, reluctant to cover the “comfort women” issue. Reporting on the issue declined substantially (Interview with Watanabe cited in Yamaguchi 2013). The conservative Sankei, however, became the exception. The daily paper and its monthly magazine, Seiron, have reported on the “comfort women” the most extensively of any media since the NHK incident, promoting the denial narrative, even as liberal media withdrew. In the late 2000s, with the election of Abe Shinzo as prime minister in 2006, the Japanese media started to report on the “comfort women” issue once again. In March 2007, Abe made a statement denying the forcible nature of the “comfort woman” system, which angered the international community – especially the United States, which later passed House Resolution 121 in July 2007, asking the Japanese government for a formal apology for its engagement in the “comfort woman” system. Given this international outcry, conservative media published many articles and books on “comfort women.” The criticism of Uemura’s articles on “comfort women,” and the image of him as a “fabricator,” were revived and disseminated in the writings of conservatives published in weekly and monthly magazines and books. In June 2007, Nishioka Tsutomu published, A Clear Guide to the Comfort Woman Issue (Yoku Wakaru Ianfu Mondai) (Nishioka 2007). I have heard from conservative activists that this book is one of the core texts for their movement on the “comfort women” issue. Moreover, in the 2000s, the Internet became a significant means of spreading the image of Uemura as a “fabricator,” via blogs, message boards, online videos and social networking services. From the mid-2000s, when the xenophobic ultranationalist movement, such as the Citizens’ Group Refusing to Tolerate Special Rights for Koreans in Japan (Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, better known as Zaitokukai) arose, online-based criticism of Uemura spread to the streets, taking the form of demonstrations and rallies, in which Uemura’s name and photo were often displayed on placards carried by activists (Yamaguchi 2013). The right-wing has labeled certain individuals as being “haisen ritokusha” (those who benefit from Japan losing the war), such as leftist lawyers, scholars, activists and journalists, with Uemura Takashi often being singled out. Embodying the “evil” of the Asahi, Uemura has been transformed into the iconic target for attacks by groups ranging from mainstream conservatives to xenophobic ultranationalists. Uemura said that he heard from a fellow Asahi reporter that he was being criticized on the Internet sometime around 2010, but he did not care much about

142  Tomomi Yamaguchi

such criticism then. “It’s just usual for us, newspaper reporters to be criticized,” Uemura told me in January 2016.3 Uemura was also shielded from criticism at that time because he was an employee of the Asahi and protected by it, with all communication funneled through the company’s public affairs section. In addition, the Asahi had not found anything wrong with his reports in the early 1990s. Uemura took early retirement from the company in March 2014, even though he had had to give up on his original plan to start a new career as a college professor because his prospective employer, Kobe Shōin Women’s University, which had offered him a tenured position, rescinded the job offer as a result of vehement criticism targeting him and the university. Following his resignation from the Asahi, he had to start fighting his accusers himself.

The second Abe administration and Asahi bashing In December 2012, Abe Shinzo became prime minister for the second time. When he ran in the election for the LDP leadership in September  2012, his platform included the replacement of the Kono statement with a new statement. Then, immediately before he became prime minister, on November 6, 2012, Abe signed his name to a paid advertisement entitled “Yes, we remember the facts” in a local New Jersey paper, The Star-Ledger, along with a group of Japanese conservative intellectuals, journalists and politicians, which denied the coercive nature of the “comfort woman” system.4 Given this context, once he became prime minister in December 2012, discussion about the Kono statement came quickly to the fore. Due to pressure from the international community, the government was constrained from outright rejecting the Kono Statement, but the government assigned a group of intellectuals to conduct a review of the statement and issued a report in June 2014. In this political context, attacks against Uemura reached a crescendo in 2014. First, an article appeared in Shūkan Bunshun’s February  6, 2014 issue entitled “Asahi reporter, ‘fabricator of comfort women,’ to become professor at exclusive women’s college” (Shūkan Bunshun 2014). This article was followed by ubiquitous attacks against him on the Internet, along with threats and persistent nuisance phone calls to his prospective employers, Kobe Shōin Women’s University, and later Hokusei Gakuen University in Hokkaido, aimed at denying him employment. The attacks against Uemura further intensified in August 2014, with the Asahi Shimbun’s release of its “re-examination” of the paper’s coverage of the “comfort woman” issue. According to Uemura and other Asahi reporters involved in the “re-examination,” the review was undertaken in order to restore Uemura’s reputation (Uemura 2016).5 The re-examination determined that Uemura did not “fabricate” his articles, but the bashing against him only intensified with criticism of the Asahi. Some of the critics even attributed articles relying on Yoshida’s testimony, subsequently retracted by the Asahi, to Uemura even though he had never written any articles drawing on that testimony. The attacks extended to Uemura’s family, especially his high school student daughter, who was subject to vicious attacks on

Press freedom under fire  143

the Internet, even including death threats. The fact that he is married to a Korean woman, and that his daughter is half-Korean, may have been a factor in the frequently racist quality of the attacks against Uemura and his family (Uemura 2015a). Since the “re-examination” was published, articles criticizing the Asahi appeared in newspapers, magazines and conservative newsletters, and criticism against Uemura has spread even further on the Internet. In street demonstrations by the right-wing that I observed, the participants shouted that the Asahi fabricated the “comfort women” issue, and Uemura’s name has consistently appeared in their speeches, on the placards and on leaflets handed to passerby. Uemura is repeatedly denounced as “the reporter who fabricated the ‘comfort women’ issue.” Protesters demand that Uemura appear in the Diet to be questioned on his “intentionally false” reporting, along with the president of the Asahi. Moreover, as part of the so-called “history wars” being waged by the Japanese right in the United States and the United Nations since 2012 (Sankei Shimbun 2015), the Asahi has been criticized for disseminating fabricated misinformation about the “comfort woman” issue abroad, thereby damaging Japan’s international reputation. In particular, the Asahi has been blamed for the erection of “comfort woman” statues overseas and the alleged bullying of Japanese residents  – especially children – in local communities abroad, although no official reports have been

FIGURE 10.2 

Threatening postcards sent anonymously to Uemura

Photo by Tomomi Yamaguchi, with permission secured from Uemura Takashi.

144  Tomomi Yamaguchi

FIGURE 10.3 A protest sign blaming Uemura for tarnishing Japan’s image in a demon-

stration at the Tokyo HQ of Asahi Shimbun by the right-wing, Gambare Nippon! (Cheer-up Japan!) group

Photo by Tomomi Yamaguchi, with permission secured from Uemura Takashi.

filed on bullying, and nobody has produced concrete evidence of its occurrence (See Schreiber and Wetherall Chapter 15; Koyama 2014; Schreiber 2014). As a result of intense criticisms against the company, the Asahi instituted a third-party committee to examine the paper’s past coverage of “comfort

Press freedom under fire  145

women,” distinct from the in-house re-examination of 2014. According to this committee’s report released on December 26, 2014 (Asahi Shimbun 2016), there is no evidence of Uemura’s privileged access to information via his mother-inlaw, a board member of the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families. However, the report states that Uemura’s use of the term, “women’s volunteer corps” may have “invited misunderstanding among readers,” and suggests that he should have explained more about Kim’s background of having attended a kisaeng school. Although the report concludes that allegations of intentional fabrication by Uemura are groundless, attacks against him did not abate. He decided that the only way to restore his reputation was to seek judicial vindication.6

Uemura fights back Uemura had maintained his silence regarding these attacks for many years. In 2014, however, when he faced the risk of losing all employment, and with his family members, especially his daughter, facing attacks and even death threats, he decided to fight back, alongside his supporters. His first struggle involved the possibility that Hokusei Gakuen might not renew his teaching contract. Citizens of Sapporo initiated a movement to support Uemura and Hokusei Gakuen University. Uemura started to write as well. The essay that he wrote in the January 2015 issue of Bungei Shunjū magazine, published on December 10, 2014, was his first attempt to spell out his claims in public. Uemura made an unusual choice in publishing his rebuttal in the conservative Bungei Shunjū given that it was the first magazine to criticize him in its April 1992 issue. He decided it was important to publish his rebuttal in the very magazine that had initiated the campaign against him 23 years earlier; he wanted to target the readers who were most critical of him (Uemura 2015a, Uemura 2016: 140). Since then, he has published many articles in various liberal magazines, such as Shūkan Kinyōbi and Sekai, and published a book with Iwanami Shoten in 2016, entitled The Truth (Shinjitsu) (Uemura 2016). Uemura started to speak out in public as well. The first public symposium featuring Uemura was held in Sapporo on December 20, 2014. In fact, I was the first presenter at the symposium, followed by Uemura delivering the keynote address. The venue was filled with tension, because the organizers and supporters knew that Uemura might attract violence by right-wing activists who had been issuing various threats, but these fears were unrealized. Since then, Uemura has been giving public talks at various locations throughout Japan, mostly invited by journalists’ and citizens’ groups, and outside of Japan as well (Field and Yamaguchi 2015; Lee 2015; Looser 2015; Hirano 2015; Uemura 2015c). He has been interviewed by Japanese and international newspapers, TV stations and independent journalists, including the conservative Sankei that has been extremely critical of him. He was interviewed by two Sankei reporters in July 2015, and Uemura recalls it as a major triumph, as the reporters had no rebuttal to his arguments, including the Sankei’s past coverage of “comfort women” in which the paper also conflated the “women’s volunteer corps” with “comfort women” and used the term “forcible

146  Tomomi Yamaguchi

recruitment,” precisely what the Sankei had been criticizing Uemura for doing (Uemura 2016: 165–172; interview with Uemura in January 2016). On January 9, 2015, Uemura filed a lawsuit at the Tokyo District Court against Nishioka Tsutomu and the Bungei Shunjū Company, which publishes Shūkan Bunshun magazine (Uemura 2015b; Uemura Ōentai 2015). Two press conferences in 2015, at the Tokyo District Court press club and the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ) were packed with journalists and TV cameras, indicating heightened interest in the Uemura case. On February 10, 2015, he filed another lawsuit in the Sapporo District Court against conservative journalist Sakurai Yoshiko and her publishers, for Sakurai’s characterization of Uemura’s reports as “fabrications,” and her questioning of his qualifications as an educator. Nishioka, Sakurai and other conservative reporters claimed that what they said and wrote was legitimate criticism consistent with their constitutional right to freedom of speech and did not constitute defamation. (See Repeta and Sawa Chapter 7) The conservative media also claimed that as a journalist, Uemura should not depend on the legal authority of the courts but should fight with his pen. Uemura responded that branding him a “fabricator” is a serious defamation of his character as a professional journalist. In fact, Uemura’s case is not the only one for which the accusation of “fabrication” has become the main point in a court battle. Historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki, professor at Chuo University, sued a former member of the House of Representatives from the Restoration Party of Japan (as it was then known), Sakurauchi Fumiki. At a press conference held at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on May 27, 2013, Sakurauchi stated that Yoshimi’s scholarly book on “comfort women” (Yoshimi 1995) was a “fabrication.”7 Yoshimi lost his case in the Tokyo District Court in January 2016, which ruled that the assertion of “fabrication” was only a critique. Yoshimi appealed. Hence, the issue of “fabrication” is not fought only by Uemura, but also by a prominent scholar, the first to find documentary evidence about the “comfort women system,” pertaining to whether it was accurate to depict it as “sexual slavery.” Both Uemura and Yoshimi are thus similarly maligned as “fabricators” because they presented testimony and unearthed documents that helped bring an end to a half-century of collective silence, averted eyes and official denial about the “comfort women” system. They are inconvenient voices that revisionists seek to silence or discredit because they exposed what had long been suppressed, thereby threatening to derail plans to rehabilitate Japan’s shabby wartime past. Looked at historically, the two articles that Uemura wrote on Kim are significant because she went on to play a crucial role in the history of the global movement by former “comfort women” and helped focus attention on wartime violence against women. And that is exactly why he has become a scapegoat.

Self-censorship by the media and pressure from the government The Uemura case is much more than a personal attack, serving as a pretext for sowing doubts about the very existence of the “comfort woman” system and

Press freedom under fire  147

denigrating the testimonies and struggles of the “comfort women” who have followed the brave act of Kim in coming forward as survivors. Attacking the Asahi by disparaging Uemura as a fabricator is a tactic to handcuff the liberal media and dismiss all the “comfort women” as fabulists. This is one of the most prominent examples in postwar Japan of the suppression of press freedom and the resulting self-censorship on the part of the media. Most of the media were already reluctant to report on the “comfort women” issue subsequent to the pressure applied against NHK in 2001 by LDP politicians, including Abe Shinzo, concerning its coverage of the 2000 International Women’s War Crimes Tribunal. The only exception to this self-censorship was the conservative Sankei, but that is because it was leading the charge to revise, downplay and whitewash this sordid chapter of Japan’s wartime conduct. The anti-Asahi campaign sent a chilling message that encourages even greater self-censorship among journalists and media corporations. According to Uemura: I can understand how young journalists who are looking at the current situation could become afraid and tremble in fear. Journalists working for a major media company receive a high salary and can write articles just by attending press conferences at press clubs. Their job becomes summarizing explanations offered by smart bureaucrats. It’s different from journalism in its real sense, which is supposed to challenge the wrongdoings of those in power. Do you think such journalists would write on the (“comfort woman”) issue after seeing Uemura, a senior reporter, being bashed like this? . . . I think the “comfort woman” issue has become taboo. If a reporter works on the “comfort woman” issue seriously and enthusiastically, it is likely that he/she will be bashed. They may be called spies or something. It feels awful. In my case, even my daughter was bashed. (Interview January 2016) He also asserts that within the Asahi now, except for a few committed reporters, there is a widespread reluctance to report on the “comfort women” issue because journalists are intimidated by the potential consequences and uncertain if their employer will stand by them if subjected to attacks. In that sense, Uemura thinks that “my case has had a major influence on the state of journalism in Japan.” The “re-examination” article was supposed to clear the air and facilitate more coverage on the “comfort woman” issue by the Asahi, but this did not happen. Since then, apparently caving in to revisionist harassment, the Asahi has printed only a limited number of articles on this issue. Asahi reporters tell me that it has become extremely difficult to write on “comfort women” in the paper since then, and even in the few cases when they can do so, it tends to take a long time as drafts are subject to multiple revisions and stringent checking before editors will sign off on the article. The Asahi also has not protested much about the orchestrated nature of the derogatory coverage of Uemura’s articles nor has it reported much about Uemura’s court cases. Uemura, and many other reporters, use the term, “ishuku

148  Tomomi Yamaguchi

kouka” – or the effects of self-censorship – to describe the current, cowed state of the Japanese media. The effects of self-censorship are not limited to the Asahi. Other liberal papers are also afraid of publishing on the Uemura case and the “comfort woman” issue. For example, Hokkaido Shimbun, the local paper in Hokkaido Prefecture, has not published much on the Uemura incident even though he lived there and was employed at the local Hokusei Gakuen University. Two Hokkaido Shimbun reporters, Hasegawa Aya and Tokosumi Yoshifumi, have been closely following Uemura and the Hokusei Gakuen issue, but most of their articles have been published elsewhere, in weekly and monthly magazines, not in the Hokkaido Shimbun, because their own paper was reluctant to publish their stories. In 1991, the Hokkaido Shimbun was the pathbreaking paper that interviewed Kim Hak-sun when she first came forward, but the political climate has become much more threatening for press freedom. The paper followed the example of the Asahi, conducting a “­re-examination” of its past coverage on the issue and apologizing for its past reporting based on the testimony of Yoshida Seiji on November 17, 2014.8 Currently, the Hokkaido Shimbun is attempting to institute a policy that would ban its reporters from publishing their articles in other venues without the permission of the company (Ogasawara 2016), apparently in response to Hasegawa and Tokosumi’s having done so on this sensitive issue. This effort signals intensified editorial self-censorship exerted over journalists to avoid “taboo” topics, further undermining press freedom. The self-censorship of the media (see Fackler Chapter 3) is going even further as the Abe administration and the Liberal Democratic Party are openly criticizing and pressuring the media, and now it is extending to the international arena, including the United Nations. In February 2016, Sugiyama Shinsuke, the Japanese delegate to the Committee to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), denied that “comfort women” were “forcefully taken away,” and also said that the assertion that the number of “comfort women” was “200,000 persons” is an estimate that lacks evidence, referring to the Asahi’s admission in its 2014 re-examination of “its confusion with comfort women of the Women’s Volunteer Corps” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Here, Sugiyama is clearly referring to the article written by Uemura. The Asahi sent a letter of complaint to MOFA, asserting that the paper did not claim that the estimate of 200,000 “comfort women” was based on a conflation of comfort women and the women’s volunteer corps (Asahi Shimbun 2016). Thus, it appears that the Japanese government is now using the same antiAsahi tactics in its official statements, not only in the domestic sphere, but also at the United Nations, as those adopted by conservative intellectuals, journalists and activists. The Japanese government has also attacked the Asahi, seizing this opportunity to control the media and reinforce revisionist claims, thereby denying women’s human rights. Moreover, they are also using attacks against the Asahi as a means of uniting right-wing supporters of the government that are divided on the issue of the 2015 diplomatic agreement on the “comfort woman” issue between the South Korean and Japanese governments. Hence, Uemura’s

Press freedom under fire  149

struggles shed light on multiple problems evident in contemporary Japanese society, ranging from the surge in historical revisionism and ultra-nationalism, to the harassment of the media in order to intimidate journalists and editors and promote self-censorship, thereby curbing press freedom.

Acknowledgements I would like to express my special thanks to Uemura Takashi, Hasegawa Aya, Tokosumi Yoshifumi and other newspaper reporters for sharing their stories and insights with me. I would also like to thank Jeff Kingston, Bethany Grenald and Norma Field for their valuable comments and editorial support. Funding to support my research in Japan was provided by the Scholarship and Creativity Grant of Montana State University.

Notes 1 The organization’s official name in Korean is “Hanguk Chongsindae Munje Daech’aek Hyobuihoe” and in Japanese, “Kankoku Teishintai Mondai Taisaku Kyōgikai.” As I did in the translation of Uemura’s essay published in the January volume of Bungei Shunjū (Uemura 2015a), I will use the literal English translation, “The Korean Council to Address the Issue of the Volunteer Corps” although the organization itself chose as its official English name, “The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.” 2 Kisaeng are women who perform music and dance at venues such as parties. 3 Interview with Uemura Takashi, January 6, 2016 in Sapporo. 4 The image of the ad, “Yes, we remember the facts” is posted on the website of the Women’s Active Museum of War and Peace. www.wam-peace.org/wp/wp-content/ uploads/2012/11/20121104_The_Facts.pdf (accessed on March 17, 2016). 5 Interviews and personal communications with reporters who were involved in the “reexamination” of the “comfort woman” coverage. 6 Interview with Uemura, January 6, 2016 in Sapporo. 7 Yoisshon  – Yoshimi Saiban Issho ni Action! website, www.yoisshon.net, accessed March 20, 2016 8 Other papers have also apologized for their past coverage of the “comfort women” issue. A  prominent example is the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, known to have extremely close ties with the government, which issued an “apology” for the use of the term “sex slave,” and retracted the references in November 2014 (Penn 2014).

References Asahi Shimbun (2014) “Thinking about the comfort woman issue,” August  22, 2014, www.asahi.com/topics/ianfumondaiwokangaeru/en/ (Accessed March  17, 2016, The original Japanese article is dated August 5). Asahi Shimbun (2016) “Report (Abridged) the Asahi Shimbun Co. third-party committee,” December  22, 2014, www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/report20150728e.pdf (Accessed April 17, 2016). Field, Norma (2007) “The courts, Japan’s ‘military comfort women,’ and the conscience of humanity: The ruling in VAWW-net Japan v. NHK”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 5(2), February  2, http://apjjf.org/-Norma-Field/2352/article.html (Accessed March 21, 2016).

150  Tomomi Yamaguchi

Field, Norma and Tomomi Yamaguchi (2015) “The impact of ‘comfort woman’ revisionism on the academy, the press, and the individual: Symposium on the U.S. tour of Uemura Takashi,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13(33): 1, August 9, http:// apjjf.org/2015/13/33/Norma-Field/4360.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Hirano, Katsuya (2015) “A  reflection on Uemura Takashi’s talk at UCLA,” The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13(33): 4, August  9, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/33/Kat suya-Hirano/4363.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Kimura, Kan (2015) “Discourses about comfort women in Japan, South Korea, and international security,” International Relations and Diplomacy, 3(12), 809–817, December. Kingston, Jeff (2015) “Testy team Abe pressures media in Japan.” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4827/article.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Kono, Yohei (1993) “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on the Issue of ‘Comfort Women’,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Koyama, Emi (2014) “Beikoku ni okeru ‘ianfu’ zō to Nikkei Shakai” (The “comfort woman” statues in the U.S. and the Japanese American community), Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū (The Report on Japan’s War Responsibility), November 83: 25–31, Winter. Lee, Eunah (2015) “Reflections on the symposium at Marquette university: “Integrity of memory: ‘Comfort women’ in focus,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13(33): 2, August 9, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/33/Eunah-Lee/4361.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Looser, Tom (2015) “Talking points: Brief thoughts on the discussion with Uemura Takashi at NYU,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13(33): 3, August 9, http:// apjjf.org/2015/13/33/Tom-Looser/4362.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Nagata, Kozo (2014) NHK to Seiji Kenryoku: Bangumi Kaihen Jiken Tōjisha no Shōgen (NHK and Political Power: The Testimony by the Person Directly Impacted by the Incident of the Forced Modification of the TV Documentary). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Consideration of the seventh and eighth periodic reports,” February 16, 2016, Geneva (Summary of remarks by. Mr. Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Question and Answer Session.) www.mofa.go.jp/ files/000140100.pdf (Accessed October 16, 2016). Nihon Seisaku Kenkyū Sentā (1992) “ ‘Kantō intabyū ‘jūgun ianfu’ mondai no shinsō” (Front page interview: The truth about the “comfort woman” issue), Asu eno Sentaku, 75: 4–7, April. Nippon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku wo Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai (1997) Rekishi Kyōkasho eno Gimon (Doubts about History Textbooks). Tokyo: Tentensha. Nishioka, Tsutomu (1992) “Ianfu mondai towa nandattanoka” (What was the comfort woman issue?), Bungei Shunjū: 300–315, April. Nishioka, Tsutomu (1997) “ ‘Ianfu mondai’ daremo gohō wo teisei shinai” (‘The comfort woman’ issue: Nobody corrected the wrong report.) Shokun! 66–77, May. Nishioka, Tsutomu (1998) “Ianfu ‘kokka baishō’ hanketsu wo sasaeru daishimbun no tsumi” (The crime of the major paper that supported the ‘state redress’ judgment”), Seiron, July: 44–53. Nishioka, Tsutomu (2007) Yoku Wakaru Ianfu Mondai (A Clear Guide to the Comfort Woman Issue). Tokyo: Sōshi-sha. Nogawa, Motokazu and Hayakawa Tadanori (2015) Zouo no Kōkoku: Uhakei Opinion-shi “Aikoku” “Kenchū, Kenkan” no Keifu. (Advertisements of Hatred: Right-Wing Opinion Magazines and its Genealogy of “Patriotism,” “Hate-China, Hate-Korea”). Tokyo: Gōdō Shuppan.

Press freedom under fire  151

Ogasawara, Jun (2016) “Hokkaidō Shimbun-sha ga ‘genron no Jiyu’ seigen e byoyomika” (Hokkaidō Shimbun may be close to limiting ‘freedom of the press’.) Shūkan Kinyōbi, March 25: 39–41. Oguma, Eiji and Ueno Yoko (2003) Iyashi no Nashonarizumu (Comforting Nationalism). Tokyo: Keiō Daigaku Shuppankai. Penn, Michael (2014) “The Yomiuri Shinbun takes pride in its shame: Expurgating Japan’s ‘sex slaves,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://apjjf.org/-MichaelPenn/4814/article.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). The Sankei Shimbun, Trans. by Komori Yoshihisa (2015) History Wars: Japan – False Indictment of the Century. Tokyo: The Sankei Shimbun. Schreiber, Mark (2014) “Tracking Southern California’s Elusive ‘Bullies’ ”, Number 1 Shimbun, FCCJ (The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan), September 30, 2014, www.fccj. or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/471-tracking-souther-california-s-elusive-bullies/471tracking-souther-california-s-elusive-bullies.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Shūkan Bunshun (2014) “ ‘Ianfu netsuzō’ Asahi Shimbun kishaga ojōsama joshidai kyōjuni”, (Asahi reporter, ‘fabricator of comfort women,’ to become professor at exclusive women’s college). Shūkan Bunshun, February 6: 28. Uemura, Takashi (1991a) “Omoidasuto imamo namida: Moto chōsenjin jūgun ianfu sengo hanseiki omoi kuchi hiraku, Kakoku no dantai kikitori”, (Even now the tears come with that memory: former Korean comfort woman overcomes reticence to speak out half a century after the war. Korean organization records her story,) Asahi Shimbun, Osaka Head Office Edition, August 11, 1991. Uemura, Takashi (1991b) “Kaeranu jinsei han no hansei, nihon seifu wo teisoshita moto jūgun ianfu Kim Hak-sun san”, (My youth gone forever. Half a lifetime filled with bitterness. Former military comfort woman Ms. Kim Hak-sun files a lawsuit against the Japanese government, Asahi Shimbun, Osaka Head Office Edition, December 25, 1991. Uemura, Takashi, trans. and introduction by Tomomi Yamaguchi (2015a) “Labeled the reporter who “fabricated” the comfort woman issue: A  rebuttal,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13(1): 1, January 6, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/1/Tomomi-Yamagu chi/4249.html (Accessed March 17, 2016). Uemura, Takashi, trans. by Norma Field (2015b) “Journalist who broke comfort women story files 16.5 million yen libel suit against Bungei Shunju: Uemura Takashi’s speech to the press,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, January 9, 2015, http://apjjf.org/Uemura-Takashi/4813/article.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Uemura, Takashi (2015c) “A chronicle of my American journey: The things I learned,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13(33): 5, August  9, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/33/ Uemura-Takashi/4364.html, accessed March 20, 2016. Uemura, Takashi (2016) Shinjitsu: Watashi wa “Netsuzō Kisha” Dewa Nai (The Truth: I am not a “Reporter who Fabricates”). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Uemura Ōentai (ed.) (2015) “Netsuzō Kisha” Dewa Nai: Futō na Basshingu niwa Kusshinai (I am not a “Reporter who Fabricates”: I Won’t Succumb to the Unjust Bashing against Me.) Yamaguchi, Tomomi (2013) “Feminizumu no shiten kara mita kōdō hoshu undō to ianfu mondai.” (The Action Conservative Movement and the comfort woman issue from the viewpoint of feminism). Journalism, 282, November. Yoneyama, Lisa (2002) “NHK’s censorship of Japanese crimes against humanity,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, VI(1): 15–19, Winter. Yoshikata, Veki. Trans. by Jullie Higashi. Introduction by Norma Field and Tomomi Yamaguchi (2015) “ ‘Comfort women’ denial and the Japanese right,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/30/Yoshikata-Veki/4350.html (Accessed March 20, 2016). Yoshimi, Yoshiaki (1995) Jūgun Ianfu (Comfort Women). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

11 LETTER CAMPAIGNS, THE JAPANESE MEDIA, AND THE EFFORT TO CENSOR HISTORY Alexis Dudden

In late November 2014, a Kyodo wire service piece reported that the office of the Japanese Consul General in New York would demand the American publishing house McGraw-Hill change and delete passages in one of its world history textbooks. I read this news and dropped my head on my desk and said, “Enough.” The sections of the textbook in the crosshairs involved the history of Japanese state-sponsored military sexual slavery in the 1930s and 40s. Then, as now, the contents are not the point: this was an overt governmental attempt to interfere with academic freedom. Efforts to whitewash and deny the well-documented history best known euphemistically as the “comfort women” have long frustrated many who research and write about it. Yet, the audacity of the current administration of Abe Shinzo struck me anew. It would go so far as to intervene in a foreign textbook, raising all sorts of issues including how the Abe administration opposes academic freedom in general, how Japanese taxpayer money funds such wrong-headed public diplomacy, and the growing acceptance of historical denial in Japan. Without question, this moment raised critical issues extending well beyond the political use of history in modern Japan (what I research and write about). The complexity of the issues at hand prompted me to discuss what was going on with a wide range of colleagues. These discussions aimed to consider how best to address this state-sponsored effort to will away and deny historical evidence of the history of a state-sponsored crime against humanity. Countless bloggers in Japan would decry the events that followed as part of a vast “anti-Japanese” conspiracy. By chance the annual meeting of the American Historical Association was scheduled for early January  2015 in New York City. I contacted several historians who work on Japan, empire, and world history and who were already planning to attend the conference and invited them to get together informally to talk about these issues in Japan and elsewhere. As a result, 20 or so of us gathered and talked for an hour.

The effort to censor history  153

Among others, the prominent Russian historian Nikolay Koposov joined. Koposov is now teaching in the United States, the result of having been purged from his home institution in St. Petersburg for publishing criticism of Vladimir Putin’s understanding of history (Spiegel 2012). Most usefully, he emphasized that what was taking place in Japan  – similar for him to Russia under Putin in some ways  – was the political use of memory in the name of history. He maintained that explaining this distinction as broadly as possible was critical because unlike history wars, memory wars have the capacity of leading to actual war. We decided to write a “Letter to the Editor” to our organization’s monthly magazine, Perspectives on History, and on March 2, 2015, our letter, “Standing With Historians of Japan” appeared (Dudden 2015). Usually, this publication circulates to several thousand people, advertising jobs and trends in the field. Most readers are professional historians based in the United States. Ironically, however, our effort to introduce the topic of our concern – a state-led attempt to censor history and the growth of a culture that limits academic expression in Japan – had already “gone viral” on the Internet. The letter was also already the subject of hundreds of print news articles and television and radio spots predominantly in the Korean media, although major international presses picked it up too, including The Washington Post. Noticeably, at this juncture, prior to the letter’s appearance in print, the Japanese media was avoiding the story for reasons that remain purely speculative: were Japanese journalists simply unaware (how could they be)? Was the daily barrage of print articles and TV reports in the Korean media not sufficiently newsworthy for Japanese audiences? We may never know the reason for the mainstream Japanese press’ avoidance of this letter despite its widespread dissemination on the Internet coupled with its blanket coverage in Korea. Of far greater concern is the eruption of the fury of those whom I came to call the “hate bloggers” in Japan. I began receiving countless “black mails” to my public email and physical address (in Japanese and English) – including threats of violence and even murder – from readily traceable addresses based in Japan. The most common theme was “How dare you #@&*# (insert expletive) foreigner blame Japan??!!” with an occasional “Die, You Korean Whore!” thrown in the mix. Several things became clear: for the most part, people were not interested in the contents of the letter because in their thinking what mattered was that the letter was either “pro-Korea” or “anti-Japan;” the issue was expanding exponentially and devolving solely into a Korea versus Japan dynamic that had not been our intention (on March 1, 2015 South Korean President Park Geun-hye referred to the letter in the nation’s annual speech to commemorate the March  1, 1919 Korean Independence Movement), and those of us involved became more committed to the cause of drawing international attention to the Abe administration’s efforts to curtail and even censor historical enquiry. ***

154  Alexis Dudden

With these experiences and concerns in mind, the Japan studies scholars among us decided to meet again. Fortunately, many of us already planned to attend the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies scheduled for late March 2015 in Chicago. Our purpose was to write a bigger and bolder appeal, and we had in mind the efforts of the October 2014 letter from Japan’s Historical Science Society. We wanted to affirm deep solidarity with its members and with colleagues in Japan who were continuing to face increasingly constrictive pressures on their research, teaching, and publication. Moreover, in the midst of the toxic parsing of our effort as “anti” this or “pro” that, we wanted to attract the mainstream Japanese media to focus on the original intent: government interference in issues of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression in Japan today. The unanticipated Internet tornado that had enveloped our January effort taught us to keep this second effort to ourselves until it was ready to go. To the surprise of many, therefore, on May 5 we published our “Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan” in English and Japanese on the Internet website H-Net and sent a copy in both languages to the prime minister’s Cabinet Communications Office (H-Net 2015). We also sent copies to the Historical Science Society. Shortly thereafter, independent journalist, Peter Ennis, interviewed me together with my co-coordinator, Jordan Sand of Georgetown University, for a Toyo Keizai piece, “Anatomy of the Open Letter,” giving a detailed account in English and Japanese of the writing and editing and signature gathering process that brought the letter into being (Ennis 2015). Here, then, is a good place to consider aspects of our efforts to engage the mainstream Japanese press. Suffice it to say, our approach was extremely basic to the extent at times of almost absurd naiveté. Nonetheless, and germane to issues of media expression in Japan now and moving forward, our collective dealings with reporters from the major newspapers and television networks made us palpably aware of spoken and unspoken apprehensions across the spectrum. Individually and collectively we sensed unease among the Japanese journalists with whom we spoke about how they would – or could – address the government’s official positions. The Sankei Shimbun has been a notable exception, appearing throughout to publish whatever it wants, undaunted by the facts. The media attention that the first letter drew, coupled with an expanding international discussion about how Prime Minister Abe would address Japanese modern history in his forthcoming speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, made us fairly confident that our effort would gain notice. Moreover, among the names of supporters of the “Open Letter” were some of the most prominent scholars of Japanese studies in the world, including four Pulitzer Prize winners and several recipients of the emperor’s medals of honor. The only time that Jordan Sand and I made any attempt to directly influence a Japanese media response stemmed from our strong hope to disaggregate the effort from the pernicious “anti-Japan”/”pro-Korea” discourse swirling around it as well as the history of sexual slavery that informed its core concern. Thus, 24  hours before we published the letter and sent it to the prime minister’s office, we offered

The effort to censor history  155

it exclusively to the Yomiuri Shimbun because most people regard this newspaper as the government’s staunchest supporter. We never heard back. There was no thought of a press conference. There were too many of us, and we were without organizational backing. After the H-Net editor posted the letter online, I sent the link with PDF attachments individually to fifteen reporters whose business cards I  had on my desk. Most work for Japanese papers, and I sent copies also to contacts at The New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters, Bloomberg, and the Korean news agency Yonhap. Suffice it to say, the press collectively ran with it. Regardless that for some I will remain the face of “antiJapan”/“pro-Korea” – or maybe because of it—I was thrilled that Reuters’ Linda Sieg, based in Tokyo, broke the story, demonstrating for the record the international nature of the story. The best part came next with hundreds of entreaties from around the world from fellow Japan studies scholars that boiled down to “Sign me up!” As a result, we established a new website to gather additional signatures and a cut-off date. On May 19, 2015, we published the final iteration of the “Open Letter” with nearly 500 signatures (Sieg 2015). *** What did the letters do, if anything? There has been a negative counter letter writing campaign of course, beginning with a March  2015 effort by Hata Ikuhiko that revealed he was working in collusion with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to denounce us. A number of other efforts followed, with the latest ironically appearing in March 2016 in The Japan Times just as I submitted this essay, naming me together with Andrew Gordon of Harvard as “bigots” and bad teachers for continuing to teach the history of militarized sexual slavery the way we do: with factual evidence and not fantastical stories that will it away (Yamashita 2016). In face of this never-ending cycle of tedium, however, those of us involved may like to think that our letters helped remind people of the fundamental privilege and responsibility of living in an open society. The historians’ letter and the “Open Letter” were followed by various additional campaigns in Japan, ranging from historians’ groups within Japan that numbered in the thousands of supporters to a major collaborative effort by Korean and Japanese historians. Also, as the debate grew surrounding the passage of Japan’s new security legislation during the summer months of 2015, a number of letter campaigns took place among legal scholars opposed to the unconstitutional nature of the new laws. And yet, at the same time, the Abe administration shows no signs of curtailing state-sponsored efforts to shape historical understanding. In fact, we may be back to the beginning again. In September 2015 hundreds of scholars of Japanese and Asian studies throughout the United States, Canada, France, and so on began receiving unsolicited packages of the same books in our university mailboxes. Most of us who received this mass mailing had signed the “Open Letter” the

156  Alexis Dudden

previous May. I later learned that a number of American congressmen and their aides were also handed copies of these same books by Japanese parliamentarians visiting Washington, D.C.’s Capitol Hill during Japan’s extended September holiday, “Silver Week.” Many received packages of the same books several times. I got one text eight times, making it appear as if the sender thought that my owning multiple copies would convince me of it merits. Most of the mailings are traceable to Fujisankei Publications related addresses  – some with Tokyo postal cancellations, some from Washington, D.C., and others via a distributor in Santa Monica, California (GAHT-US Corporation). For the most part, the packages contain two books: a Sankei Shimbun publication with the awkward title History Wars: Japan – False Indictment of the Century that has English and Japanese sections containing the identical history-denying contents and Getting Over It! Why Korea Needs to Stop Bashing Japan, the English translation of a racially charged Korea-bashing book written by Sonfa Oh of Takushoku University. I had already received Oh’s book in English and Japanese several times, often paired with Asia University’s Higashinakano Shudo’s wellknown Nanjing massacre denying text, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction; A Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Copies of this book included a leaflet from The Tokyo Foundation hawking its worth. The recent mass mailing differed from anything before, however, in terms of scale and brashness. It revealed, moreover, that the administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was involved. In late September, LDP parliamentarian Inoguchi Kuniko sent additional copies of the books History Wars and Getting Over It! to the same several hundred scholars together with a personally signed letter on her official government stationary explaining that we  – the recipients  – needed to learn from them. (See Kingston Chapter 21) Premising her Yale University doctoral degree and presuming complete ignorance on the recipients’ part – among whom include world renowned professors of Japanese and Asian studies at Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Georgetown universities and elsewhere  – Inoguchi writes in her letter that due to “unfortunate” circumstances involving “individuals” who would “incorrectly distort” East Asia’s “regional history of the 20th century  .  .  . due to their current domestic political ambitions,” she has found it necessary to provide each of us with copies of these books published by a “media company and a scholar.” Inoguchi’s condescension notwithstanding, its significance rests in laying bare disturbing developments in Japan concerning state-led efforts to shape historical understanding. Those like Inoguchi who share the history deniers’ fundamentalist conviction that only a small number of untrustworthy and ideologically suspicious outsiders alone misrepresents Japanese history, now occupy places of such power in Abe’s Japan that they no longer even try to hide governmental involvement in their campaign. Around the world, government officials use their privileged positions and taxpayer funded budgets to try to sway public opinion at home and abroad to advance

The effort to censor history  157

their interests. Consider programming on state-sponsored media outlets such as “Voice of America.” Notwithstanding, supporters of the current Japanese government’s minority effort with regard to the so-called “history problems” run so afoul of Japan’s national interests – both in economic and security terms – that it remains frustrating that Japanese citizens remain largely unaware of what goes on in their name and also at their expense. Failure to understand actions, such as this recent mailing campaign, and how counter-productive it is, likely amplifies a generalized rancor that the world singles out Japan for blame, a sentiment that the media helps stoke with sensationalized reporting. While to some Japanese our criticism of Japan’s wartime misdeeds and contemporary apologists’ efforts to rehabilitate such actions may appear to be “Japan-bashing,” it would be misleading to assume that most Japanese support this disingenuous sophistry. Both of the texts that Inoguchi wants overseas scholars to read and presumably to agree with are replete with denialists’ themes common within Japan. In some countries, however, in some instances, sentences in these books would constitute hate speech, and in other places such as Germany would bring criminal charges of Holocaust denial. To the point, Inoguchi endorses books in which a primary target for denial and whitewashing is the history of Japan’s state-sponsorship of military sexual slavery in the 1930s and 40s. In place of historical analysis, the routine dictum is declared: “There is no evidence of coercion of victims into the system.” No counter argument is offered, nor is any evidence to the contrary despite the abundant documentary and oral material unearthed, analyzed, and published to critical acclaim in part by some of the very scholars to whom Inoguchi sent her mailing. Following a logic that would please George Orwell in 1984: “If we say it is true, it is true.” And, if we deny it happened, it didn’t. For American recipients of this mass mailing, the Sankei Shimbun publication’s History Wars really stands out because of a chapter entitled, “Is America Japan’s Enemy?” More than anything else, these pages seek to absolve the Japanese state from legal and moral responsibility for the nation’s actions during its history of empire and war. To challenge this aim is to be an “enemy of Japan,” generating a long and illustrious list of Americans, Asians and Europeans who oppose the selective amnesia and willful distortions favored by Japan’s revisionist historians. Unsurprisingly, fury focuses on use of the term “sexual slavery,” which is absurd in the context of U.S.-Japan relations. To begin, the U.S. State Department uses the term “sexual slavery.” Right away, therefore, it appears that those involved with the Sankei Shimbun book  – as well as those who advertise it  – would define the American government as an “enemy of Japan.” This inane logic unhinges entirely with the example used to prove the point  – an August  2014 event at the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, a venue just about as friendly to official Japan and the U.S.-Japan Alliance as one can imagine. The book lists by name several well-known U.S.-based scholars and analysts of East Asian politics, as well as the South Korean ambassador to the United States, singling them out for harsh criticism because of their use of the term “sexual slavery.” Readers are, thus, made to understand that anyone who uses the term “sexual slavery” for the

158  Alexis Dudden

history more broadly known by its wrong-headed euphemism of “the comfort women” is axiomatically an “enemy” of Japan. Ironically the author of the Sankei book History Wars appears ignorant that his accused “enemies of Japan” are among Washington’s staunchest supporters of Prime Minister Abe’s desired changes to Japan’s security posture. Looked at differently, it might be expected that the denialists would target people perceived as “easy” hits, such as those who promote gender rights. Yet to name well-known “Alliance Managers”? Likely, the author knows that he can spin whatever version of reality he wants to because his readers don’t know better and, as subscribers to the reactionary Sankei Shimbun, are predisposed to dismiss any criticism of Japan or PM Abe as “anti-Japanese.” On this note, it is important to remember that until recently one of Inoguchi’s roles in the Abe administration included promoting the value of women in society as acting chair of the LDP’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Women in Society. Also, she directed the “project team on the role of women in diplomacy and international contributions” (女性活躍・外交と国際貢献PT). How might historians of the future understand a parliamentarian charged with promoting greater gender equality who herself disseminates falsehoods about a gendered crime against humanity? On top of these books, yet another mysterious mailing found its way to the university addresses of many of the same overseas scholars shortly after the initial mass campaign that included Inoguchi’s letter. This additional thin package did not include any books. It contained, however, another letter endorsed by a different LDP-affiliated politician, Toita Yoshiuyuki, an Ishigaki Island city council member among others. Dated October 3, 2015, and denouncing Okinawan Governor Onaga Takeshi for what the senders claim is Onaga’s “propagating erroneous information on human rights of Okinawans to the international community,” the authors want recipients to know instead that Okinawans “are Japanese and proud of the fact that the military base in Okinawa shoulders the burden of defending Japan.” Interestingly, this mailing is signed by Ganaha Masako, who lists herself as “Head of Delegation to the U.S. Council Meeting on Human Rights in Geneva.” Likely Ganaha meant “U.N.” – not “U.S.”—but more important than typographical errors are the same sets of questions that arise with the other mass mailings: Who is organizing this campaign in the name of Japanese citizens? Who is paying for it? The mailing concerning Okinawan base issues lists a Naha address, yet the postal cancellation reads “Shinjuku” for this expensive international air mailing complete with color-printed copies of newspaper coverage of Toita. *** This undesirable information barrage shows no signs of slowing down. More unfortunate, those involved appear increasingly emboldened and significantly

The effort to censor history  159

funded. Certainly, the books and other materials are entirely within the category of “free speech,” but at the same time, it is critical to note the inherently “pricey” nature of this campaign, which by definition silences the majority of Japanese citizens’ views by pre-empting their inclusion in the conversation. A number of us in the U.S. have contacted colleagues in Japan urging cooperation to try to map out what is going on. This is the opposite of being “antiJapanese” or “Japan bashing.” All of us in the crosshairs of this (dis)information campaign – whether directly harassed by “black mails” and death threats as I am or simply disgusted by it all – feel that this broad, government-backed effort should be of concern to all Japanese, and indeed all who support freedom of speech and oppose sexual slavery. Simply put, what is taking place now in the name of socalled Japanese public diplomacy is at once a grotesque policy failure supported by Japanese taxes, which at times include open acts of hate that are seen by the rest of the world as emblematic of Japan.

References Dudden, Alexis (2015) “Standing with historians of Japan”, Perspectives on History, March, www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/march2015/letter-to-the-editor-standing-with-historians-of-japan. Ennis, Peter (2015) “Anatomy of the open letter,” Dispatch Japan in Toyo Keizai, May 16. H-Net (2015) “Open letter in support of historians in Japan,” https://networks.h-net.org/ system/files/contributed-files/japan-scholars-statement-2015.5.4-eng_0.pdf. Sieg, Linda (2015) “Western scholars press Japan’s Abe on history,” Reuters, May 19. Spiegel, Gabrielle (2012) “Scholar-in-exile finds a temporary Haven”, Perspectives on History, 53(3), September, www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspec tives-on-history/september-2012/scholar-in-exile-finds-a-temporary-haven. Yamashita, Eiji (2016) “Challenging the “20 American historians,” The Japan Times, March 9.

12 REMANUFACTURING CONSENT History, nationalism and popular culture in Japan David McNeill

Scramble, a Tokyo rock group, can be found in some of the city’s smaller venues, belting out punk songs shrill with nationalist rage. Their fans, mostly male, often come to gigs dressed in black boiler suits and carrying hinomaru (rising sun) flags. In “Kill the Gooks,” Scramble singles out Korea for lying about Japanese war crimes, and Japan’s most popular liberal newspaper Asahi Shimbun for amplifying such mendacity (Scramble 2013). “Sever diplomatic ties,” “Smash Korea,” sings lead vocalist Riko. Young Japanese, she says, are fed up living under the shadow of events that occurred 70 years ago. “School textbooks will eventually stop teaching lies about Japan’s past.” Not that it matters, she adds; most children don’t remember a thing about them.1 She certainly doesn’t. Such naked displays of Japan’s snarling, xenophobic id are rare: Noisy venting of rightist causes has for decades been the preserve of a small clique of ultranationalists, ignored by the vast majority of ordinary Japanese. Much of Japan’s mainstream popular culture strives for a bland, cloying commercialism; one of the reasons why the members of Scramble, who want to rouse the nation from its postwar pacifist slumber, sing with such intensity. Yet, it is not as rare as it once was. Manga comics taking up similar themes to Scramble sell in the millions. The most popular movie of recent years eulogizes wartime kamikaze pilots. Bookstore shelves groan under the weight of popular titles reeking of social malaise, either shilling a soft-focus romanticized nationalism or condemning Japan’s shifty, mendacious neighbors. Japan’s school textbooks are barometers of the national political climate. They have been under intense scrutiny for decades because of the ideologically contested legacy of Japan’s colonialism, aggression and defeat in 1945. Partly as a result, they are mostly bone-dry recitals of dates and facts, carefully monitored by education bureaucrats. The scrutiny began under the Allied occupiers, who reviewed the fascist-tinged kokutai no hongi, or cardinal principles of the unity

History, nationalism and popular culture  161

of Japan, and attempted to scour the educational system of its overt militarism and emperor worship. When the foreign occupiers departed in the early 1950s, Japanese conservatives, who intensely disliked the Allied liberal reforms, moved with some success to reverse them and dictate what could be taught about the past. (Yoshida 2000) From the late 1960s, however, against the background of a surge in popular opposition to Japan’s military alliance with the United States, the Vietnam War and a general questioning of establishment principles, grassroots challenges to history censorship began to emerge among teachers, historians and journalists. The iconic figure in this shift was historian Ienaga Saburo, who fought a 30-year legal battle against the authorities over textbook censorship. A key moment came in 1982, when protests from China and South Korea forced Japan’s education ministry to back down over demands that Ienaga remove or revise several passages from his textbook. Arguably, the high-water mark of progressive teaching of history in Japan came in the 1990s, when all junior high school textbooks included some reference to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre. In 1996, the Ministry of Education announced that social studies and history textbooks would mention for the first time the “comfort women” issue, referring to thousands of women across Asia corralled into Japanese military brothels. In the late 1990s, the 83-year-old Ienaga won the right to inform Japanese children about Japan’s bio-warfare Unit 731 (Hein and Selden 2000). These perceived victories by progressives, as well as almost a decade of post-Cold War scholarship, sent nationalists back on the offensive. A rising politician called Abe Shinzo helped lead the fight back against “masochistic” views of history (Narusawa 2013). A lobby group, the Society for History Textbook Reform, led by Nishio Kanji, a specialist in Nietzsche, was set up to help shift the educational focus away from the sordid wartime past and instill patriotism in Japan’s listless youth. Kobayashi Yoshinori, a manga cartoonist with a reputation for jagged humor, was a supporter who gave the group a much-needed cachet and a huge audience among the under-thirties. Nostalgic nationalism was partly driven by anxiety over Japan’s faltering economy and what Gavan McCormack calls the unresolved contradictions of the postwar Japanese state, notably the condescension and humiliation inherent in its “semi-dependent orientation” toward the United States (McCormack 2002). This educational project remains a work in progress. Despite the backing of prominent neo-nationalist politicians, textbooks produced by the Society are used by a tiny percentage of Japanese schools. One of the few things Abe accomplished in his first, inglorious term as prime minister from 2006 to 2007 was a reform to the education laws making it compulsory to teach children patriotism. In 2015 the Education Ministry mandated that school textbooks must reflect the government position on history and territorial issues. All but one history textbook dropped references to “comfort women” and most have toned down criticism of the Japanese military’s involvement in mass suicides among Okinawans in 1945—another historical raw nerve. (CEDAW 2016) Textbooks that passed the latest (2016)

162  David McNeill

government screenings contain even less about the history of World War II and hew far more closely to the official government line on Japan’s territorial disputes with South Korea, China and Russia2 (Japan News 2016). Japanese textbooks, says former premier Murayama Tomiichi, are a product of the tense compromise between the victors and losers of 1945, and the progressives and traditionalists who have duked it out ever since. “The state could not make up its mind how to teach the war,” he says.3 The upshot is that while they hardly provide students with a detailed narrative of Japanese aggression and colonial rule, and certainly downplay the most sordid episodes of 1933–1945, neither do they reflect the arch-revisionist view: that Japan was waging a war of liberation against white colonialism in Asia, and that its soldiers were culturally and morally incapable of committing the war crimes attributed to them. “Japanese textbooks seem the least likely to stir patriotic passions,” concludes Stanford University’s Daniel Sneider, in a careful and wide-ranging comparison of textbooks in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. “They do not celebrate war, they do not stress the importance of the military, and they tell no tales of battlefield heroism. Instead they offer a rather dry chronology of events without much interpretive narrative” (Shin and Sneider 2011; Sneider 2016). His colleague Peter Duus concurs: “What is striking about Japanese public memory of the war is the lack of consensus about its meaning . . . For the majority, it is remembered as a war that brought grief both to fighting men and the home front; for others, it is a war of liberation fought by brave soldiers whose struggles laid the groundwork for the postwar decolonization of Asia; and for still others, it was a cruel war of aggression for which the Japanese have not yet fully atoned” (Duus 2008). Clearly, this lack of consensus is frustrating for those, such as Scramble’s lead singer, who would rather deliver a sharper ideological blow to Japan’s educational cerebral cortex. Neo-nationalists with much more influence bristle that education mandarins endlessly parse Japanese textbooks, while their Chinese, South Korean and American equivalents are straightforward, even triumphalist narratives of national derring-do. As novelist Hyakuta Naoki rhetorically asks: “Why should Japanese take all the blame for what occurred in the past?”4 While campaigning for Tamogami Toshio, the former Air Self-Defense Force chief of staff who was running for Tokyo governor in 2014, Hyakuta famously called the March 1945 firebombing of Tokyo and the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which collectively killed perhaps 300,000 people, “cruel massacres.” It wasn’t only the Japanese who committed war crimes, and there was no reason to teach such things to children, he said. “I want to first teach children what a wonderful nation Japan is.” Such sentiments are hardly new. But Hyakuta, a former TV scriptwriter, has been more successful than most in repackaging nationalist frustrations into popular narratives. His book, “Eien no Zero,” or “The Eternal Zero,” about kamikaze pilots attacking American ships in 1944–1945, has sold five million copies and been turned into one of the most watched Japanese movies ever. (Economist 2014a) Both book and film update the kamikaze trope—the hero rebels against

History, nationalism and popular culture  163

the military, but eventually accepts his mission and goes out in self-immolating glory.5 Thus, though the story meanders for dramatic effect, it ends up satisfyingly at the right-wing terminus: kamikaze willingly died for their country.6 Abe clearly recognized a kindred ideological spirit in Hyakuta, helping to put him in 2013 onto the 12-member board of NHK, Japan’s giant but troublesomely “liberal” public broadcaster (Hyakuta has since resigned). Abe’s other appointees included Hasegawa Michiko, author of an essay eulogizing an ultra-rightist who committed ritual suicide in protest outside the hated Asahi newspaper. “There could be no better offering,” gushed Hasegawa, who said the suicide made the emperor “a living god again.” Ultimately, however, it was not Hasegawa’s esoteric contribution but new president Momii Katsuto who exposed the government’s attempt to bring NHK to heel (See Philip Seaton Chapter 13) In his first press conference, Momii triggered a furor when he said it was “only natural” that NHK should follow the government line on Japan’s bitter territorial disputes with its neighbors. “When the government says ‘left,’ we can’t say ‘right,’ he said. Wisely, Momii has avoided media scrutiny ever since. The Abe appointees have repeatedly denied editorial interference—as they must.7 But one of the outcomes of their stewardship has been to increase incentives for media workers to engage in greater self-censorship. (See Krauss Chapter 5) Perhaps the clearest example is the compilation of the “orange book,” an internal censorship manual that compels NHK’s international broadcasting operations to side with archconservatives in the government, in some cases flouting Japan’s official position (Lloyd Parry 2014). For example, the book instructs editors, translators and copywriters to “in principle” not give an explanation about what “comfort women” were: “Do not use ‘be forced to,’ ‘brothels,’ ‘sex slaves,’ ‘prostitution,’ ‘prostitutes,’ etc.” While careful not to deny the Nanjing Massacre, the book says the 1937 destruction of the Chinese capital by the Imperial Japanese Army must be referred to only as “the Nanjing Incident.” “ ‘The Nanjing Massacre’ is used only when directly quoting remarks made by important people overseas etc., and the fact that it is quotation must be made clear.” On Yasukuni, the Shinto shrine that venerates Japan’s 2.4  million war dead, including war criminals, NHK employees must avoid English expressions such as “war-related shrine,” “war-linked shrine” and “war shrine.” It is doubtful that Abe has read the work of Antonio Gramsci, but the Italian communist’s analysis of the struggle for hegemony in modern capitalist states resonates in the turf-war over NHK’s output. Gramsci saw culture as a place where opposing sides fight for the “manufacture of consent” over the ideas and beliefs that dominate society. While raw power is exercised through the bureaucracy and other agents of the state, it is through cultural institutions such as the media that the ruling class fights to achieve hegemony and public consensus by portraying its ideology as common sense. The struggle to legitimize ruling ideas is simpler in state-capitalist China. Chinese textbooks, under direct government control, rehearse the history of Japan’s

164  David McNeill

1933–1945 invasion in grim detail. In 2002 they were revised to give them a more strongly nationalist tint, downplaying the pre-1949 civil war and emphasizing national unity against Japan. The Nanjing massacre was given more space, “complete with graphic descriptions of Japanese atrocities.” (Sneider, Ibid). Beijing uses mass entertainment to stoke anti-Japanese sentiment too, funding, for example, over 200 movies a year on the heroic Communist resistance to the invaders (Economist 2014a). China’s “patriotic education” policy helps explain why anger targeting Japan seems to be growing the further World War II recedes into the past.

Populist nationalist literature Hyakuta is part of an upsurge in what might be dubbed populist nationalist literature. Other examples include Yamada Muneki’s Hyaku-Nen Ho (The Hundred Year Law) and Arikawa Hiro’s Soratobu Kouhoushitsu (Public Affairs Office in the Sky), in which the female protagonist, as a sort of proxy for Japan’s spoiled, feckless youth, undergoes a reappraisal of her attitude toward the Japanese SelfDefense Forces. The book was turned into a television drama, with the cooperation of the SDF, which praised it for contributing to the “knowledge and understanding” of military equipment, uniforms and good manners in the forces (MOD 2016). Arguably, the godfather of the aggressively nationalist literary form is Kobayashi Yoshinori. For nearly 20 years, Kobayashi has helped millions of young Japanese fill in the gaps left behind by their potted textbook histories with manga (or perhaps more accurately, as Rumi Sakamoto suggests, heavily illustrated political essays) that celebrate imperial Japan’s military achievements and dismiss its record of war crimes (Sakamoto 2008). Like Hyakuta, Kobayashi is driven by anger at Japan’s modern predicament—its lack of diplomatic and military autonomy and subservience to American power, and by nostalgia for the patriotic selfsacrifice embodied by bushido. (Ibid). Kobayashi’s books, most famously, Sensoron (On War), have helped popularize rightist ideas and carved a path for similar expressions of disgust at Japan’s neutered postwar role. Like the American conservative right, he has also legitimized a sort of anti-intellectualism, sneering at the elitism of liberal academics, journalists and politicians, who, he says, produce much of the rationale for the nation’s confused pacifism. Kobayashi’s appeal is partly that he embodies a pure form of righteous nationalism, unsullied by the needs of grubby realpolitik. Though he favors rewriting Japan’s Constitution, he disagrees with the Abe government’s expedient political methods for getting there. “I’m not one of those who says we should defend at all costs the peace constitution; I am staying we should protect constitutionalism at all costs,” he said in 2015 (FCCJ). “It is the only way to keep governments from running amok.” Even if, as conservatives argue, the constitution was forced on the Japanese people, he added, at least it means the military is under civilian control. “Without that, we’re lost.”

History, nationalism and popular culture  165

Kobayashi’s iconoclasm is suggestive about the amorphous nature of rightwing populism, despite sharing certain concerns: Reviving conservative values and the emperor cult, rewriting the constitution, and re-arming Japan against perceived threats to its survival. The extreme end of populist nationalism shades into xenophobia and racism. Shelves in many Tokyo bookstores brim with popular titles known as kenchū-zōkan—“dislike China, hate South Korea.” (See Schreiber and Wetherall Chapter 15) Three of 2014’s best-selling paperbacks belonged to the hate genre (Economist, 2014a). One popular author, Bunyu Ko, a naturalized Taiwanese and professor at Takushoku University, has written a string of books arguing that China, Taiwan and South Korea owe their economic success to Japan. In the graphic manga Chugoku Nyumon (Introduction to China), he says the Chinese are incapable of democracy, have the world’s leading sex economy and are the source of most of Asia’s contagious diseases. China, he says, not Japan, was the aggressor in the Pacific war. Best-selling manga, such as Uramiya Honpo (Revenge Inc.) and Karate Shokoshi Kohinata Minoru (Little Karate Lord Kohinata Minoru), engage in what Matthew Penney calls “shocking anti-Americanism fantasies,” meeting the brutal and caricatured violence of US soldiers in Okinawa, Japan’s southernmost prefecture, for example, with even more grotesque (and righteous) retribution (Penney 2009). Such manga call to mind the anti-Japanese war comics that several generations of British boys grew up reading—now considered irredeemably racist. The current in Japanese popular culture was once quite different. Before becoming a showcase for narcissistic jingoism, manga embodied the ideals of postwar pacifism, argues ex-Asahi journalist Mizuno Takaaki.8 Most famously, Astro Boy (Osamu Tezuka), Barefoot Gen (Nakazawa Keiji) and Onward Towards Our Noble Deaths (Mizuki Shigeru) looked unflinchingly at the country’s misdeeds. Antiwar movies such as “The Burmese Harp” (1956), “Fires on the Plain” (1959) and “The Human Condition (1959-1961)” are among the most bitterly candid ever committed to celluloid. One of the more telling signs of Japan’s recent shift in cultural attitudes has been the attempt by school boards to banish Barefoot Gen from libraries (Asahi Shimbun 2014). Another has been the targeting of “progressive” museums by nationalists contesting the reliability of evidence of war atrocities (Seaton 2015).

Beautiful Japan It would be misleading—not to mention flattering—to lay this complex cultural current at the door of the Abe government. Clearly, it has been building for years. The Democratic Party government of 2009–2012 was not above manipulating the media. Yet, the mythologizing of Japan’s past, the increasingly parochial nationalism and the yearning for renewed military prowess all find echoes in Japan’s two best-known recent political tracts: Utsukushii Kuni e (Toward a Beautiful Japan) by Abe Shinzo and Totetsumonai Nihon (Incredible Japan) by his manga-loving predecessor, Aso Taro.

166  David McNeill

The Abe era has been accompanied by two related trends: the decline of critical voices in the mainstream media and the rise of what Abe Hiroyuki (2015) calls the rise of self-satisfied media narcissism. The latter finds expression in a “deluge” of television programs and books extolling Japan’s supposedly unique virtues. Just one book, Tsuneyasu Takeda’s Nihon Wa Naze Sekai De Ichiban Ninki Ga Aru No Ka (Why Is Japan the World’s Most Popular Country?) has sold more than half a million copies. At the center of the blurring of politics and entertainment is Dentsu, the world’s largest advertising agency, which handles public relations for Abe’s Liberal Democrats (LDP) and filters the bulk of commercial TV airtime. Critics say Dentsu’s clout has long allowed it to massage and suppress stories, from the Morinaga Milk Scandal of 1955 to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis (Honma 2012). Its contemporary role is to help create an atmosphere “favorable” to the government, says Koga Shigeaki, a former bureaucrat-turned political critic.9 According to Koga, the LDP, via Dentsu, “is spending a fortune to distribute a message and create a mood” online, on television, in women’s fashion magazines and even in boys’ comics emphasizing that China is dangerous and Japanese citizens must rally around their leader. Control over the media message has been fought for decades but, Koga asserts, “What’s new is that in the past there would have been opposition. The Abe government is a new species—it is playing chicken with the media, and winning.” Part of this strategy has entailed a campaign of intimidation against critical journalism. One result has been the disappearance from the airwaves of Japan’s most outspoken television anchors: Furutachi Ichiro, Kishii Shigetada and Kuniya Hiroko. Kishii used his news slot on Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) to question legislation expanding the nation’s military role overseas. His onair fulminations prompted conservatives to take out newspaper advertisements accusing him of violating impartiality rules for broadcasters. Kuniya had the temerity to probe the government on the possibility that the new security legislation might mean Japan becoming embroiled in other countries’ wars (Economist, Guardian 2016). These sharp-elbowed tactics against critics are matched with charm offensives for media bosses. Abe has dined on dozens of occasions with the country’s top media executives, often at their place of work. In 2015 he met Yomiuri Editor-inChief Watanabe Tsuneo several times, along with Okubo Yoshio, the president of broadcaster Nippon TV, and the bosses of the Mainichi Shimbun and Fuji TV. Such gatherings blur the line between politics and journalism, as the flattery of access makes media bosses beholden and indebted. In many cases, the meetings are not reported, unreported or misreported by the same newspapers, depending on their ideological color.10 Producers at Asahi and NHK say the impact has been to weaken their organizations’ taste for a political fight with the government.11 The Asahi’s critical coverage arguably climaxed, for example, on May 20, 2014, when it published a story based on the leaked testimony of Yoshida Masao, the manager of the Fukushima

History, nationalism and popular culture  167

Daiichi nuclear plant during the 2011 meltdown. (See Fackler Chapter 3) The scoop (所長命令に違反) claimed that 650 panicked onsite workers had disobeyed orders and fled during the crisis. The Asahi’s claim, challenging the popular view of the workers as heroes who risked their lives to save the plant, was strongly contested by the industry, the government and Asahi rivals, particularly the right-leaning Sankei Shimbun, which blamed the confusion at the plant on March 15 and 16, 2011 on miscommunication. Finally, on September 11, 2014, Kimura Tadakazu, the Asahi president Kimura Tadakazu announced the retraction of the article, the dismissal of the paper’s executive editor Sugiura Nobuyuki and punishments of several other editors. The highly damaging announcement cheered Asahi critics and stunned journalists at the newspaper, who say they were kept in the dark beforehand.12 Lawyers, journalists and academics expressed puzzlement at Kimura’s retraction. While the factual details of the Yoshida testimony were open to interpretation, there was little doubt that despairing onsite plant workers had abandoned their duties during the worst of the crisis. “The content of the article and the headline were correct,” insisted Kaido Yuichi, a lawyer who blames the retraction on political pressure (FCCJ 2014). An independent press monitor might have settled the controversy, but the Asahi relied on its in-house Press and Human Rights Committee to probe the story and discipline those behind it. The Asahi’s mea culpa followed another even more damaging retraction a month earlier, over a series of articles in the 1990s on “comfort women.” (See Yamaguchi Chapter 10) Yoshida Seiji, the source for some of these stories, had long been discredited and the Asahi’s retraction was years overdue. Yet, the reaction on the political right was not only to question the newspaper’s entire reporting but to blame it for damaging Japan’s reputation abroad and poisoning ties with its neighbors. In the right’s narrative, the Asahi articles triggered the 1993 Kono Statement, acknowledging the army’s role in forcing the women into sexual slavery. In response to Abe’s remarks in the Diet that seemed to downplay the coercive nature of their recruitment in March 2007, the U.S. Congress adopted House Resolution 121 calling on Japan’s government to “formally acknowledge and apologize for the comfort women episode.” In fact, the Yoshida memoir and Asahi’s reporting of it had nothing to do with HR 121—so said the group of experts who helped write it. The scholars were moved to make this clear after the liberal Mainichi newspaper reported exactly the opposite after interviewing them. “All of us were astonished,” they recalled (Asia Policy Point 2014). Nuclear power and history are two sensitive areas. Yet, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the attacks on the Asahi are ideologically driven. Many of the newspaper’s leading critics have joined a national “anti-Asahi Shimbun” committee, led by neo-right lawmaker Nakayama Nariaki. Over 20,000 people, led by Watanabe Shoichi, an emeritus professor at Sophia University, have demanded an apology from the newspaper for “spreading erroneous facts to international society.”

168  David McNeill

The Asahi scandal prompted some to resurrect the old wartime vision of the media as a blunt instrument of state power, notably Kase Hideaki, co-author of the revisionist bestseller Falsehoods of the Allied Nations’ Victorious View of History, as Seen by a British Journalist with Henry Scott Stokes. “I hope we can force the Asahi to change its stripes and admit its past mistakes,” he said. “It did many good things, including supporting our last war in liberating the rest of Asia” (McNeill and McCurry 2015). Of course, such views are still widely considered extreme, but it was notable that throughout the Asahi’s difficulties, Abe sided with its critics and declined to defend the principle of a broad, pluralist media.13 This brief survey does not exhaust official attempts to roll back the limited autonomy of the media in Japan. The passage of the 2014 Specially Designated State Secrets Law in 2014 expands the bureaucratic state’s discretion to keep information under wraps. (See Stockwin Chapter 8, Yamada Chapter 9). Breaching secrets will be punishable by up to 10 years in prison and up to a ¥10 million fine. Members of the Abe government have hinted at revoking broadcasting licenses of overly critical networks. Allies have openly proposed shutting down newspapers deemed hostile to government’s policies.14 Harassment of media professionals has been a staple of the government policy menu. In April 2014, the LDP summoned NHK and Asahi TV executives to dress them down for recent reporting failures, in a show of official force clearly designed to intimidate. Government ministers have essentially boycotted critical forums, such as the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. The endpoint of the transformation of Japan’s media is not clear, but the trajectory certainly is. The Abe government is encouraging the emasculation of the critical media and the growth of a smug cultural populism. At the same time, it has massively increased Japan’s official PR budget at home and abroad. A campaign of “strategic communications,” with a budget of over half-a-billion dollars, has been launched to counter negative images of Japan and cultivate a generation of pro-Japanese foreign commentators (Sieg 2015). Japanese embassies and consulates have been instructed to be more proactive in challenging perceived slights, such as foreign textbooks that stir the history pot. Brookings, Carnegie, CSIS and other think tanks have been given millions of dollars to promote Japan; millions more have gone to support chairs at universities such as Columbia, Georgetown and MIT. Other governments, including the United States, Great Britain, China and South Korea do the same (indeed, Japan’s campaign is partly driven by fear that it is losing the PR fight with the latter two countries), but the scale of the campaign, at least for Japan, is new (See Snow Chapter 20 and Kingston Chapter 21). Watchdog journalism, always an embattled project, is in retreat as conservative forces aligned with the state increasingly demand a less autonomous line from the nation’s media. Similar fights rage elsewhere, but Japan’s defense of media freedom has been weakened by the press club system with its cosseted and co-opted army of well-paid journalists. It would be a mistake to view all this as a one-way process. The Abe government’s attempt to muzzle critical voices has triggered plenty of reaction.15 Yet, it is clear that the media are in danger of slipping further

History, nationalism and popular culture  169

down the route toward pandering to the government and ultimately becoming an instrument of state power. It is hardly surprising that some journalists and editors now reach for battle analogies to describe their relationship with the government. “Japan is in a situation that is essentially a war on the truth,” said Suganuma Kengo, chief editor of Tokyo Shimbun (McNeill 2015) “We are on the frontlines.” So, in her own way, is Riko of Scramble – just on the other side.

Conclusion One of the more striking developments of the last three years in Japan has been the normalization of ideas about the world and the past that would have once been considered extreme. This battle of ideas, especially over the history of World War II, has raged throughout the postwar period. But the Abe administration has tipped the balance to the right, partly by delegitimizing counterarguments and co-opting and marginalizing critics. Perhaps its greatest innovation has been to realize it has to win the culture war before it can remake Japan along neo-nationalist lines. The government’s determination to resist international scrutiny, while at the same time diverting rivers of taxpayers’ cash to a PR campaign designed to reshape the narrative, has not gone unnoticed. Japan has steadily declined in global rankings of media freedom since 2011. A United Nations investigator who came to look into this decline in 2016 expressed “serious concern” that media freedom is being jeopardized. All the signs are that the government cares little about such foreign blowback, however, so long as it controls the narrative at home. The question for ordinary Japanese people then is whether this is in their best interests, and what might they do to stop it?

Notes 1 Personal interview, April 6, 2014. 2 The Yomiuri Shimbun gave its editorial approval for the changes thus: “Descriptions of modern and contemporary history in high school textbooks have become even more accurate and balanced.” (my emphasis) March 21, 2016. 3 Personal interview, July 29, 2015, Tokyo. 4 Personal interview, March 31, 2015, Tokyo. 5 Hyakuta’s kaizoku to yobareta otoko (A Man Called Pirate), which has sold over 1.7 million copies, is also inflected with patriotic themes, telling the story of a brilliant businessman who helps Japan rise from the ashes of defeat. 6 For a very different view, see Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History (2002) University of Chicago Press. 7 The Broadcast Law says governors must make “fair judgment concerning public welfare.” 8 Personal interview, March 12, 2016. 9 Personal interview, February 13, 2016. 10 Commentator Ikegami Akira notes, for example, that The Yomiuri reported a January 2016 dinner meeting between Abe and Yomiuri Editor-in-Chief Watanabe Tsuneo

170  David McNeill

1 1 12 13 14

15

but not the details of what was discussed, or who paid. The Nikkei didn’t report that its chief editorial writer had also attended. 池上彰, “安倍氏は誰と食事した?“朝 日新聞, Jan 29, 2016. www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S12183068.html (Last Accessed March 21, 2016) Personal interviews, February 7–9, 2016. Personal interview with Kimura Hideaki, journalist with the Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 2015. Kimura was one of the disciplined journalists. After the retraction, Abe said the false information spread about the comfort women issue had “damaged Japan’s honor in international society.” http://blogs.wsj.com/ japanrealtime/2014/09/12/abe-conservative-press-jump-on-asahi-apology/ Hyakuta, then ex-governor of NHK, told a meeting of 40 lawmakers close to Prime Minister Abe, that Okinawa’s two biggest newspapers should be shut down. Ryukyu Shimbun, “Novelist Hyakuta attacks Okinawan media at LDP’s meeting; ‘The two newspapers of Okinawa should be shut down.’ ” http://english.ryukyushimpo. jp/2015/07/01/19051/ (Last Accessed Nov. 7, 2015) One reaction, for example, has been a run of scoops by the more aggressive weekly tabloids, most notably Shunkan Bunshun. See also the reporting in Tokyo Shimbun.

References Abe, H. (2015) “A Sober look at ‘Amazing Japan,’ ” Nippon.com, April 7, www.nippon. com/en/currents/d00164/ (Accessed March 19, 2016). Asahi Shimbun (2014) “City tells schools to pull ‘Barefoot Gen’ manga from libraries,” March  20, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201403200083 (Accessed March 19, 2016). Asia Policy Point (2014) “Scholars adamant that Yoshida memoirs had no influence in US,” September  25, http://newasiapolicypoint.blogspot.jp/2014/10/scholars-adamantthat-yoshida-memoirs.html (Accessed May 2, 2015) CEDAW (2016) “Report of the United Nations Committee on the elimination of discrimination against Women”, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Docu ments/JPN/CEDAW_C_JPN_CO_7-8_21666_E.pdf (Accessed March 24, 2016). Duus, P. (2008) “Japan’s teaching on war doesn’t deserve bad press”, https://education injapan.wordpress.com/edu-news/japans-teaching-on-war-doesnt-deserve-bad-press/ (Accessed March 15, 2016) Economist (2014a) “mission accomplished”, March 1. Economist (2014b) “Bilious  – popular culture in Japan”, July  5, www.economist.com/ news/asia/21606338-no-more-guilt-tripping-say-young-bilious. Economist (2016) “The anchors away”, February 20. FCCJ (2014) Kaido Yuichi, Kamata Satoshi and Hanada Tatsuro: “Crisis of Asahi and Japanese Journalism”, press conference at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, December  16, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35kkfAGN87U (Accessed March 20, 2016). FCCJ (2015) Yoshinori Kobayashi, press conference at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, August  10, 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3ANuN_e1qo (Accessed March 20, 2016). Hein, Laura and Selden, Mark (eds.) (2000) Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Honma, Ryu (2012) Dentsu and Nuclear Coverage (電通と原発の報道). Tokyo: Akishobu. Japan News (2016) “Textbooks change on ‘comfort women,’ ” March 20.

History, nationalism and popular culture  171

Kaido, Y. (2015) 朝日新聞「吉田調書報道」は誤解ではない、隠された原発情報と の闘い (“The Asahi Newspaper’s Yoshida Report was Correct”, Tokyo. Lloyd Parry, Richard (2014) “Japan’s BBC bans any reference to wartime ‘sex slaves,’ ” The Times, October 17, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article4239769. ece (Accessed March 16, 2016). McCormack, Gavan (2002) “New Tunes for an Old Song: Nationalism and Identity in Post-Cold War Japan,” in Roy Starrs (ed.), Nations Under Siege: Globalization and Nationalism in Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 137–168. McCurry, Justin (2016) “Japanese TV anchors lose their jobs amid claims of political pressure,” The Guardian, February  17, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/ 17/japanese-tv-anchors-lose-their-jobs-amid-claims-of-political-pressure (Accessed March 29, 2016) McNeill, D. (2015) “Just doing its job: Tokyo Shimbun points to the truth,” No.1 Shimbun, July, http://www.fccj.or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/632-just-doing-its-job-tokyo-shim bun-points-to-the-truth/632-just-doing-its-job-tokyo-shimbun-points-to-the-truth.html (Accessed March 29, 2016) McNeill, D. and McCurry, J. (2015) “Sink the Asahi! The ‘Comfort Women’ Controversy and the Neo-nationalist Attack”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 13(5): 1, February 2, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/5/Justin-McCurry/4264.html#sthash.Jlwip3Bh.dpuf (Accessed March 29, 2016) Ministry of Defense, Japan (2016) “Interaction between the ministry of defense and the SDF, and the local community and Japanese citizens,” www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ pdf/2013/48_Part3_Chapter4_Sec3.pdf (Accessed March 12, 2016) Narusawa, M. (2013) “Abe Shinzo: Japan’s new prime minister a far-right denier of history,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 11(1): 1, January  14, http://apjjf.org/2013/11/1/Naru sawa-Muneo/3879/article.html#sthash.J5bpg7IJ.dpuf (Accessed March 8, 2016). Penney, N. (2009) “Nationalism and anti-Americanism in Japan  – Manga wars, Aso, Tamogami, and progressive alternatives,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 17–2–09, April 26, 2009, http://apjjf.org/-Matthew-Penney/3116/article.html (Accessed March 19, 2016). Sakamoto, R. (2008) ‘Will you go to War? Or will you stop being Japanese?’ Nationalism and History in Kobayashi Yoshinori’s ‘Sensoron’. Japan Focus, January 14, 2008, http://apjjf.org/-Rumi-SAKAMOTO/2632/article.html (Accessed March 18, 2016) Seaton, P. (2015) “The nationalist assault on Japan’s local peace museums: The conversion of peace Osaka”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 13(30): 2, July 27, 2015, http://apjjf. org/2015/13/30/Philip-Seaton/4348.html (Accessed April 4, 2016) Sieg, Linda (2015) “Japan global PR message could misfire with focus on wartime past, Reuters”, February  10, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-diplomacycampaign-idUSKBN0LE0O920150210. Shin, Gi-Wook and Sneider, Daniel C. (2011) History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories. Routledge, 70–132. Sneider, D. (2016) “Divided memories: History textbooks and the wars in Asia,” Nippon. com, March 19, www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00703/. Yoshida, Takashi (2000) “A Battle Over History: The Nanjing Massacre in Japan,” in J.A. Fogel (ed.), The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

13 NHK, WAR-RELATED TELEVISION, AND THE POLITICS OF FAIRNESS Philip Seaton

Introduction On 25 January  2014, incoming NHK President Momii Katsuto caused controversy at his inaugural press conference. In addition to comments that an institution equivalent to Japan’s notorious ‘comfort station’ (military brothel) system existed in ‘every country’ during the Second World War, he stated that NHK’s stance should not differ too much from the government on issues such as territorial claims. By saying ‘When the government is saying, “Right,” we can’t say, “Left,” ’ he seemed to indicate that NHK would abandon its obligation as Japan’s public broadcaster to ensure ‘political fairness’ and would align more closely with the right-wing stance of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s government (Yoshida, Mie and Johnston 2014). This chapter investigates whether, following Momii’s statement, NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, Japan’s public broadcaster) is indeed saying ‘right’ rather than ‘left’ in broadcasting relating to the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (hereafter, simply ‘the war’). Content analysis of NHK’s war-related programing in 2015 and comparison with similar surveys conducted in 2010 and 2005 demonstrates that while superficially maintaining its obligation to be ‘politically fair’ under the Broadcast Act, NHK became ‘fairer’ to nationalists and the government. This constitutes a measurable outcome of the government pressure on broadcasters discussed in many of the other chapters in this volume.

The politics of ‘fairness’ in broadcasting The Broadcast Act of 1950 states that one of the purposes of the act is ‘To ensure freedom of expression through broadcasting by guaranteeing the impartiality, truth and autonomy of broadcasting’ (Article 1-ii). Editorial freedom is guaranteed by

NHK, war memory and politics  173

Article 3: ‘Broadcast programs shall not be interfered with or regulated by any person except in cases pursuant to the authority provided for in laws,’ and editing is governed by four principles in Article 4: ‘(i) It [the broadcaster] shall not harm public safety or good morals; (ii) It shall be politically fair. (iii) Its reporting shall not distort the facts; (iv) It shall clarify the points at issue from as many angles as possible where there are conflicting opinions concerning an issue’. NHK and commercial broadcasters are governed by this law, which stipulates a balance between the right of editorial freedom and the obligation of political fairness. Close scrutiny of how NHK reports war issues also has a long history. For example, in 2001 during the ‘program revisions issue’, debate erupted over whether pressure from right-wing politicians, including Abe Shinzo, caused lastminute changes to the content of an NHK documentary (broadcast on 29 January 2001) about the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo in December 2000 (Morris-Suzuki 2006). Japanese citizens are NHK stakeholders as license fee payers, so NHK has long been the target of public pressure too, particularly from right-wing publications. Seiron published a total of 153 monthly columns by Nakamura Akira called ‘NHK Watching’ up to March 2010, and many books denounce NHK as biased, unpatriotic or traitorous (for a recent example, see Nishimura 2014). These critiques have frequently revolved around war history issues. Rather than the classic media role of ‘watchdog’ for those in power, therefore, NHK has often been the ‘watched dog’. (See Krauss Chapter  5) Debates over NHK’s broadcasting continue among self-appointed guardians of media fairness and factual accuracy. Two spectrums of ‘politically fair’ frame the debate in relation to the war: from ‘nationalistic fair’ to ‘progressive fair’, and from ‘pro-­ government fair’ to ‘anti-government fair’. In practical terms, the differences derive from how broadcasters ‘clarify the points at issue from as many angles as possible where there are conflicting opinions concerning an issue’ (italics added). This is best explained via an example. If the prime minister visits the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to pay his respects to the war dead, broadcasters have a controversial issue to report and are obliged to present various angles. Broadcasters typically present the shrine’s history, the background to the visit, the prime minister’s explanation of his actions, comments by other political party leaders and international reaction (typically Chinese and South Korean official statements). More in-depth reports include Japanese voices for and against from experts or ‘people in the street’, opinion poll data, and additional international reaction (Seaton 2008). The Broadcast Act stipulates ‘as many angles as possible’ for controversial topics. However, the more wide-ranging the angles, the closer the reportage gets to ‘progressive fair.’ The idea of respecting diverse views is itself liberal, and the more opponents of Yasukuni Shrine visits are asked to comment, the more likely that critical statements regarding Japanese aggression, war responsibility and the feelings of war victims in other countries will feature. Conversely, the narrower the angles (particularly if critical foreign voices are ignored) and the more that

174  Philip Seaton

pro-government fair

progressive fair

nondescript non-controversial neutered

nationalist fair

anti-government fair FIGURE 13.1 

Forms of fairness in war-related broadcasting

‘factually incorrect’ statements about Japanese ‘aggression’ are excised, the closer reportage gets to ‘nationalistic fair’. ‘Pro-government fair’ is when oppositional angles to the prime minister’s visit are presented in a way that makes them seem numerically or evidentially weak. ‘Anti-government fair’ is when oppositional angles constitute a potent critique of the prime minister. At the middle of Figure 13.1 is a space in which the media is nondescript, noncontroversial or neutered. Nondescript broadcasting comprises factual accounts of events or verbatim retransmission of political or other actors’ statements, although disproportionate publicity to particular actors, or conversely ignoring them, itself generates a bias issue. Non-controversial war-related reporting typically refers to representations of Japanese civilian victimhood, such as in air raids. Individual suffering is presented in detail but decontextualized from politicized war narratives, and the reportage invariably culminates in the moral, ‘. . . so war should never be repeated’. Within Japan’s contested war memories, in which bitter divisions exist over questions of war responsibility (Seaton 2007), this narrative format is the most ‘apolitical’ way to represent the war. Finally, neutered reporting is when broadcasters fear the consequences of taking a stance and compile broadcasts with banal or evasive commentary. The façade of fairness is preserved by presenting various angles but nothing of consequence has been said. In these circumstances, to test the hypothesis that NHK’s stance has shifted according to Momii’s statement (‘When the government is saying “right” we can’t say “left” ’), two forms of evidence are required: first, a shift in the balance of broadcasting (both the topics addressed and comments/analysis within programs) away from more progressive stances (namely critical of Japanese aggression), through nondescript, non-controversial and neutered topics, and toward

NHK, war memory and politics  175

nationalistic topics (namely affirmative regarding Japanese actions); and second, a shift in the balance of broadcasting away from stances critical of the government and toward stances supportive of the government (Figure 13.1). The latter requires consideration of another variable: the shifting position of the Japanese government. Broadly speaking, there are two overlapping twentyyear periods that mark the apogee of a progressive-influenced official war narrative. The period 1993–2012 is when the sufferings of people across Asia and the Pacific were mentioned in the prime minister’s address at the National Ceremony to Commemorate the War Dead on 15 August. The practice was started by Hosokawa Morihiro in 1993 (Wakamiya 1999: 28), but discontinued by Prime Minister Abe in 2013. The period 1995–2014 is when the 1995 Murayama statement formed the basis for all Japanese government apologies. The Murayama statement was effectively replaced by the Abe statement in 2015, despite government claims (parroted by NHK) to the contrary. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, 2009–2012, was progressive on war issues (particularly in the Hatoyama and Kan years, 2009–2011). This is indicated by Prime Minister Kan Naoto’s apology to South Korea in 2010 to mark the centenary of Japan’s annexation of the Korean peninsula, and the lack of any visits by cabinet ministers to Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August (the first time this had happened since records began in 1985). ‘Anti-government’ comments in 2010, therefore, include conservative voices that expressed the same ideological stance as ‘pro-government’ comments in 2015.

War-related television in 2015 Content analysis of NHK’s war-related programing was carried out in 2015. The period of the survey was from 31 July to 22 August  2015, namely the period from one week before the Hiroshima anniversary (6 August) to one week after the war-end anniversary (15 August). Programs on Japan’s seven terrestrial channels (NHK General, NHK Educational and the five commercial channels) were recorded if television listings in newspapers indicated war-related content or if the program had been advertised as containing war-related content in an earlier program in the survey. In addition, major weekday news bulletins on five channels were recorded and scanned for war-related content. The NHK bulletins recorded every day were the national news bulletins Ohayō Nippon (Good Morning Japan, Monday to Friday, 7:00 to 7:45) and Newswatch 9 (Monday to Friday, 21:00 to 22:00), and the local news bulletin in Hokkaido (where the television survey was conducted), Hotto Nyūsu Hokkaidō (Hot News Hokkaido, Monday to Friday, 18:10 to 19:00). A total of 257 programs were recorded/viewed and confirmed to contain warrelated content. Of these, eighty-nine programs were on NHK General and ten programs were on Educational Television (ETV). This constituted approximately forty-two hours of programing after all non-war-related sections were edited out. The average length of war-related content was around twenty-five minutes  per

176  Philip Seaton

program on NHK, although one program could range from a feature-length drama to a one-minute news item. Based on this database, three forms of analysis are conducted: first, the style and content of news reportage; second, the content of documentaries and commemorative programing; and third, the coverage of government statements and the 15 August war-end anniversary. The results from the 2015 survey are crossreferenced with results from similar surveys conducted in 2010 and 2005 to determine shifts in stance over time.

The style and content of news reportage NHK television news comprises reports in two main categories. First, news items are reports about an event or development that day. They are typically two to four minutes long but can be much longer for a major story. Second, special reports are pieces of investigative journalism (typically four to ten minutes) that do not address news specific to that day. Both news items and special reports can be supplemented by studio commentary (from an NHK journalist) or interviews (with an invited guest). In the case of war-related broadcasting around major anniversaries, broadcasters prepare special reports in advance and intermingle these with news items from the day in a long war-related section of the program. In general, the shorter the news item, the more likely that it lies within the nondescript, non-controversial and neutered area of Figure 13.1. Longer news items and special reports incorporate comments and analysis from more angles. They also go through a more rigorous planning and editorial process during which the policies of the broadcaster are discussed. The subjects of special reports, therefore, reveal more clearly the broadcaster’s working definition of ‘fair’. The total amount of war-related content in Ohayō Nippon, Newswatch 9, and Hotto Nyūsu Hokkaidō during the survey period was 157 minutes, 179 minutes and seventy-six minutes respectively. The majority of broadcasting fit into the nondescript, non-controversial and neutered categories, and featured ­non-controversial depictions of Japanese victimhood. In addition to long reports about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were stories about repatriation from Manchuria, troop ships torpedoed off Taiwan, air raids and baseball players who died during the war years. Most Newswatch 9 reports were in this category, but others about the kamikaze and the discovery of a submarine wreck had a conservative military history angle. The key feature of Newswatch 9’s coverage, however, was the long interview with Abe Shinzo on 14 August about his statement on the seventieth anniversary of the war. This, as will be discussed below, was clearly ‘pro-government fair’. By contrast, progressive reportage that portrayed the suffering of non-Japanese was limited to two reports on Ohayō Nippon. The first was about the son of a war criminal executed for killing two prisoners of war and his visit to Edinburgh to reconcile with the ‘Railway Man’ Eric Lomax (18 August). The second was about a Japanese lawyer helping Chinese people who suffer health problems caused by

NHK, war memory and politics  177

poison gas shells left behind in China by the Japanese military (21 August). Both were after the 15 August anniversary, making them postscripts to the main commemorative season, and the total of thirteen minutes meant that only three  per cent of the total duration of war-related reporting in the three news programs had been on progressive topics. The only other allusions to war responsibility were in a report (Ohayō Nippon on 4 August) about a visit by DPJ leader Okada Katsuya to Seoul on 3 August at which he shared hopes with President Park Geun-hye that historical difference could be overcome, and an opinion poll on 11 August indicating forty-two  per cent of people supported and fifteen  per cent opposed the inclusion of an apology for Japan’s past aggression and colonial rule in Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming statement. The marginalization of narratives of aggression was particularly noticeable on NHK’s local news bulletin in Hokkaido. In 2015, Hotto Nyūsu Hokkaidō broadcasted an eight-part series of special reports called ‘Hokkaidō to sensō’ (Hokkaido and War). Each report lasted six to eight minutes and focused on an individual witness whose experiences fit into a variety of representative local war narratives. The topics are indicated in Table 13.1. Hokkaido has a characteristic set of local war memories. There is a prominent narrative of local aggression stemming from Hokkaido’s history as a nineteenth century colonial acquisition, the high rates of forced labor (Korean, Chinese and indentured) on construction projects and in Hokkaido’s mines during the war, and the crackdowns by the Special Police (tokkō keisatsu) on Hokkaido’s active labor and proletariat movements from 1925–1945 under the Peace Preservation Law. In previous surveys of Hokkaido television news in 2010 and 2005 these have featured prominently. In 2010, one report in the special report series that year (9 August  2010) was about the forced laborers who died building a railway bridge in Shari town near Shiretoko. Likewise in 2005, an eight-part series of special reports contained a report about a man tortured by the secret police (9 August 2005) and another about Japanese lawyers representing Chinese victims of forced labor (16 August) (Seaton 2016: 76). In other words, there was a conscious editorial decision to include such topics in special reports in previous years and to exclude such topics in 2015. TABLE 13.1  Special reports on Hotto Nyūsu Hokkaidō in August 2015

No. Subject

Date

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

4 August 5 August 6 August 7 August 10 August 11 August 13 August 17 August

The Nemuro air raid Naval bombardment of Muroran Suicides of settlers in Manchuria Refugees in Hokkaido after the war A girl whose grandfather died in the Battle of Okinawa Repatriation from Manchuria to Hokkaido Toyohira Bridge (in Sapporo) during the war The emperor’s radio address, kamikaze, the Soviet invasion of Sakhalin

178  Philip Seaton

Documentaries and commemorative programs Documentaries, like special reports, are the programs from which the editorial stance of NHK can be inferred. The flagship documentaries are NHK Specials. In 2015 there were ten documentaries broadcast during the period of the survey. While none were on overtly progressive topics, some did raise progressive issues about the war and engaged Japanese actions. Secret room war (2 August) analyzed recordings made in Australia of interrogations of Japanese prisoners of war. An incident in which Australian civilians were killed was briefly mentioned, and the confession of a soldier who had executed a Filipino guerilla was shown to his surviving relatives for the first time. How the hatred escalated (7 August) presented the Pacific War in its raw brutality through American and Japanese propaganda films, including extensive color archive footage of dead and wounded soldiers (both Japanese and American) and testimony by American soldiers of what it was like to fight the ‘fanatical’ Japanese. The day we went to war (11 August) recounted the Japanese military’s use of child soldiers during the Battle of Okinawa and appealed to younger viewers by reconstructing their testimonies in anime format. The anime included scenes of merciless beatings during training, which was the most explicit visual representation of military brutality in any of the documentaries. Women’s Pacific War (13 August) included brief Burmese testimony of Japanese army lootings in a documentary primarily about the experiences of nurses sent to the war zones to tend to Japan’s injured. Two documentaries verged more towards conservative military history narratives: Kamikaze (8 August) and The Pacific War in color (15 August, discussed below). The two documentaries about the A-bombs focused on Japanese civilian victimhood disconnected from broader responsibility issues and fell into the non-controversial category (but were nevertheless powerful representations of war suffering). In short, none of the documentaries were progressive as none portrayed or condemned Japanese aggression. The China War, the main theater of Japanese aggression and killing from 1931 to 1945, received virtually no attention apart TABLE 13.2  NHK Specials broadcast in 2015

Date

Title

2 August 6 August 7 August 8 August 9 August

Secret room war: Unearthing the voices of Japanese prisoners of war What happened under the mushroom cloud How the hatred escalated: War and propaganda Kamikaze: How did the tactic spread? Visiting ‘that kid’: Seventy years of the Yamazato elementary school hibakusha Anime document. The day we went to war: Confessions of child soldiers Women’s Pacific War: Records from battle zones of military nurses The Pacific War in color: Three years and eight months, a record of Japan Overcoming postwar seventy: What can Japanese people do? The unknown first week of the postwar

11 August 13 August 15 August 15 August 16 August

NHK, war memory and politics  179

from testimonies of soldiers in the documentary The unknown first week of the postwar (16 August) describing how they did not believe or know about Emperor Hirohito’s radio address ending the war. Conversely, the tone was not nationalistic (presenting an affirmative image of the war) either. A strong ‘war is bad’ theme ran through all the documentaries. The clearest message was of Japanese victimhood. The many graphic depictions of war suffering (testimony and archive footage of the dead and injured) were almost exclusively of Japanese. The instances listed in previous paragraphs are the sum total of depictions of the war’s effects on non-Japanese. In the past, NHK has produced progressive war documentaries on various topics including the Nanjing atrocity, the ‘comfort women’, forced labor and Japanese war crimes. These tend not to be broadcast during the somber commemorative season in August. Nevertheless, in the ten documentaries in August 2015, totaling over ten hours of air-time, there were only the briefest of glimpses of any Japanese war responsibility issues. Another indicator of reticence in 2015 to engage the effects of Japan’s war actions on others was NHK’s flagship commemorative event, or more accurately, the lack of one. In 2005 and 2010, NHK made Nihon no, Kore Kara (Japan, from now on) the grand finale of its commemorative programing. A  panel of guest experts debated issues with around fifty ordinary members of the public. There were thirty-four programs in this format on various topics broadcast between 2005 and 2011. In 2005, Japan in Asia (Ajia no naka no Nihon, broadcast 15 August 2005) was a general discussion about Japan at postwar sixty, and the program included extensive discussion of war responsibility issues (Seaton 2007: 128–30). In 2010, the hundredth anniversary of the annexation of Korea, the program was called Discussing Japan and South Korea’s Future Together (Tomo ni katarō Nikkan no mirai, broadcast 14 August 2010). In both 2005 and 2010, these programs focused on Asia, which inevitably introduced extensive responsibility issues into the discussions. The studio guests included non-Japanese, which allowed for some uncompromising criticisms of Japanese war conduct. Debate also occurred between Japanese people of different opinions on war issues. The format preserved NHK’s fairness because it provided a ‘platform for debate’ and enabled views from ‘as many angles as possible’. NHK’s presenters simply acted as ‘referees’ and cooled down the debates when things got too hot. Ultimately, however, this was ‘progressive fair’, with conservatives and nationalists placed on the back foot by the format. The 2010 program, for example, was ostensibly about building better Korean–Japanese relations, and many participants expressed conciliatory, forward-looking views. But, when one Japanese participant said that Japan had acted in accordance with norms of the day in colonizing Korea, there was a strong reaction from Korean participants. One of the guests, film director Sai Yōichi, commented that people with such views were ‘not qualified to talk about history’. The discussion threatened to overheat, and after the program there was a vitriolic response online from nationalists towards Sai and NHK (Seaton 2011: 296–299).

180  Philip Seaton

The Nihon no, Kore Kara format was discontinued in 2011. Giving voice to ordinary people makes for frank discussion, but it has its risks, particularly in a live broadcast or studio debate format. These risks, in an age of increased media scrutiny and ‘intimidation’, seem to have resulted in a broader demise of ‘voices from the street’. Sunakawa Hiroyoshi, Iwasaki Sadaaki and Mizushima Hiroaki, while discussing the reduction in the number of street interviews in news bulletins, cite an incident in which Prime Minister Abe had appeared live on TBS’ News 23. He was presented with voices from the street critical of Abenomics. Afterwards, the LDP sent a letter to the six television stations in the Tokyo area calling for political neutrality ahead of the December 2014 elections (Sunakawa, Iwasaki and Mizushima 2016: 24–25). In the context of war-related television, such pressures help explain why comments from members of the public have been curbed or programs inevitably end with the acceptable ‘apolitical’ line, ‘Peace is precious and war should never be repeated.’ In 2015, therefore, there was no flagship commemorative event to end NHK’s war-end anniversary coverage. The early evening news bulletin News 7 reported on various commemorative events, including the National Ceremony to Commemorate the War Dead at Budōkan Hall. None of these reported events addressed the war either critically or affirmatively. Then, in news about three cabinet members who had worshipped at Yasukuni Shrine, all three were allowed to say why they visited the shrine (to thank the war dead), and there were no oppositional voices apart from the customary calls from South Korea and China for Japan to sincerely face the past. After the news, from 19:30 there was a documentary Kusakari ni sasageta jinsei (A life devoted to cutting the grass) that eulogized a gardener in Fukui prefecture who had tended a memorial to Japan’s war dead for fifty years. Gardening may be ‘apolitical’, but the tone of reverence to Japan’s war dead was not. From 20:00 there was an NHK Special Karā de miru Taiheiyō Sensō (The Pacific War in color), which presented wartime footage digitally remastered in color. This general military history of the war from Pearl Harbor to Japan’s surrender contained no hint of Japanese aggression. Japan’s presence in China from 1931 was mentioned in one sentence, the countries occupied after 1941 were ‘the colonies of the other powers’, and the only representations of other Asians were of them smiling in propaganda videos of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Meanwhile, numerous color images of dead or wounded Japanese soldiers and cities incinerated in bombing spoke graphically of Japanese suffering. After another news bulletin at 21:00, from 21:15 there was a second NHK Special about contemporary conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, which tapped into ubiquitous views of ‘war should not be repeated’ but did not address Japanese war history. In three-and-a-quarter hours of war-end anniversary commemorative programing, therefore, the emperor’s comments of hansei (remorse) at the Budōkan Hall and thirty seconds of criticism from China and Korea about Yasukuni visits were the only indications of the ‘history issue’. The documentary about tending were unambiguously conservative. Compared to 2005 and 2010, progressive

NHK, war memory and politics  181

discussions of Japanese actions had all but disappeared and were replaced by programing of a conservative hue.

Prime Minister Abe’s 14 August statement The final case study focuses on 14 August 2015, when Prime Minister Abe made a statement to mark the seventieth anniversary of the war end. (See Kingston Chapter 21) In previous case studies, the focus has been on situating NHK on the progressive to nationalist scale. In this section, the focus is on levels of pro- or anti-government reportage. In mainstream media, before Abe’s statement was delivered, much of the debate centered on whether four key phrases from the Murayama statement of 1995 would be retained: shinryaku (aggression), shokuminchi shihai (colonial rule), tsūsetsuna hansei (sincere remorse) and owabi (apology). The Murayama statement (Murayama 1995) read: [Japan], through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. The Abe statement (Abe 2015) read: Incident, aggression, war – we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of self-determination of all peoples throughout the world . . . . Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. While the keywords appeared in both statements, they meant very different things. Nevertheless, News 7 presenter Taketa Shinichi took at face value the sentence in the statement: ‘Such position [sic.] articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future.’ This was despite comments included in the bulletin from DPJ leader Okada Katsuya and historian Yoshida Yutaka that the use of these keywords was ‘not Abe’s own’ or ‘indirect’. NHK was plugging the government’s disingenuous explanation that this was indeed a continuation of previous positions. Ultimately, commentators to both the left and right of the government concurred on the discontinuity: right-wing academic Watanabe Shōichi gave the statement ‘ten out of ten’ in the right-wing magazine Will precisely because it had undone the Maruyama statement (Watanabe 2015), while a series of articles in the October 2015 edition of the progressive magazine Sekai dissected its faults and retreats from the Maruyama statement.

182  Philip Seaton

The impression that NHK was exhibiting ‘pro-government fair’ tendencies was reinforced by Newswatch 9. Abe was interviewed for around forty minutes on 14 August. The opening images were of him giving his statement. Then, presenter Kōno Kenji asked ‘What did you want to convey most?’ before reporter Tanaka Izumi summarized the key points. Thereafter, presenters Kōno, Suzuki Naoko and political editor Hara Seiki asked questions about the statement, and later about the restart of nuclear reactors (idle since 2011). The questions were tame and, judging by the notes Abe consulted from time to time, had been supplied in advance. He was allowed to answer with virtually no interjections or follow-up questions. The interview simply became a platform for Abe to justify his position. NHK was not acting as a menacing watchdog, but rather, a docile lapdog. (See Fackler Chapter 3) Other elements of this bulletin also indicated ‘pro-government fair’. Following standard procedure, various positions regarding Abe’s statement were presented starting with a round robin of party representatives: New Komeitō (the LDP’s coalition partner) was naturally positive, the DPJ was critical and casted doubt on Abe’s use of keywords, the Japan Innovation Party said the statement was forward-looking, the Communist Party criticized Abe for abandoning the Murayama statement, the Party for Future Generations was happy that future generations would no longer need to apologize and the Social Democratic Party criticized Abe for not using the keywords as his own. NHK ‘fairly’ alternated positive and negative views in even numbers. In the round robin of international reaction, however, favorable comments outnumbered critical comments three to two: the United States came first and welcomed continuity with previous statements; there was no official Chinese response yet, but two typical voices from the street said Japan needed to face history; Korean television news reportedly said Abe’s ‘apology’ was in the past tense; and Indonesia and Australia both positively welcomed the statement. While reporting Chinese and Korean reactions is standard, including American views is less common, while Indonesian and Australian reactions are rare. The selection of countries swung the balance in favor of creating an overall image of positive international reaction. In short, Newswatch 9 provided an uncritical platform to Abe for him to explain his policies (as it had also done for Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio in a five-minute interview on 7 August) and selected reaction that exhibited ‘progovernment fair’. This was in marked contrast to 10 August  2010, when Prime Minister Kan Naoto issued an apology to Korea to mark the centenary of the annexation of the peninsula by Japan. First, however, here are the ‘Murayama keywords’ as used in Kan’s statement (Kan 2010): I would like to face history with sincerity. I would like to have courage to squarely confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own. Those who render pain tend to forget it while those who suffered cannot forget it easily. To the

NHK, war memory and politics  183

tremendous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology. This statement reflected, even surpassed, the Murayama statement as a forthright apology. In her introductory comments, Newswatch 9 presenter Aoyama Yūko cited the words ‘apology’, ‘remorse’ and the ‘handing over’ of historical documents to South Korea as the key points. Reported Korean reactions were positive, regarding both the statement and the handing over of documents. Keio University professor Okonogi Masao commented how Kan had converted the wording of the war apology into an apology for colonialism. However, the bulletin also noted oppositional voices. In particular, Abe Shinzo, then in opposition, was sharply critical: ‘All these issues were settled fully and finally by the [1965 Japanese– South Korean] Treaty on Basic Relations. By reopening such issues, it will undoubtedly spark calls for individual compensation. This is asking for trouble.’ Critical voices from within the DPJ were also mentioned. Of the other parties, New Kōmeitō called the statement forward-looking. This bulletin, therefore, was largely ‘pro-government fair’, but because Kan had issued a progressive statement, NHK was also ‘progressive fair’. The critical comments made by Abe in 2010 were considerably sharper than any critical comments he faced following his statement in 2015 (and sound ironic following his cabinet’s ‘resolution’ of the ‘comfort women’ issue on 28 December 2015 with a new apology and fund for ‘comfort women’). However, on numerous other occasions (such as on 15 August 2006, when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine), NHK news has included voices equally critical of conservative actions by government officials. It is difficult to conclusively say that NHK was more ‘pro-government fair’ in 2015 than at other times. If there was a shift, it was the replacement of ‘anti-government fair’ with increases in nondescript, uncontroversial and neutered reporting.

Conclusions The content analysis of war-related programing in 2015 and comparative analysis with 2010 and 2005 clearly indicates that changes occurred within NHK. While maintaining its journalistic procedures for ensuring ‘fairness’, there was an unmistakable shift from ‘progressive fair’ towards ‘nationalistic fair’ in the aggregate content of war-related programing in 2015. This was not achieved by shifting programing at the right hand end of the spectrum further right. The right-wing limits of what NHK can say did not shift (conservative military histories are nothing new on NHK – see Seaton 2007: 117). What happened was a reduction in programs addressing progressive issues and a shift away from formats that enabled ‘progressive fair’ (such as studio debates or including ‘voices from the street’). Determining whether NHK was more ‘pro-government fair’ than before is more complicated because of shifting government positions from the relatively conservative LDP to the more progressive DPJ (2009–2012) and back to the LDP

184  Philip Seaton

from 2012. In 2010, NHK’s reporting could be argued to be ‘­pro-government’ under the Momii maxim ‘if the government is saying “left,” we cannot say “right” ’. What seems to have changed most under PM Abe is NHK’s ability to be ‘anti-government fair’ as voices critical of the LDP government are marginalized or ignored. The surprise news on 28 December 2015 that the South Korean and Japanese governments had resolved ‘finally and irreversibly’ the ‘comfort women’ issue serves as a microcosm of the situation. Six months earlier, during the Newswatch 9 interview with Prime Minister Abe, a nervous-sounding Hara Seiki asked what could be done to improve ties with South Korea given the ‘so-called military comfort women issue’ (‘iwayuru jūgun ianfu mondai’). This timid question used the terminology preferred in right-wing circles to indicate skepticism about the responsibility of the Japanese military (as expressed by Momii in January  2014) and was the obligatory wording in NHK news throughout 2015. But, on 28 December 2015, Foreign Minister Kishida’s statement (Kishida 2015) simply referred to the comfort women issue (ianfu mondai, minus the inverted commas and “iwayuru jūgun”). NHK news immediately changed its wording to match the government. The abiding impression created by this incident, and more generally by warrelated programing in 2015, was of ‘compliant NHK’. NHK has become more afraid to have an independent stance, challenge the government or tackle sensitive issues. A public broadcaster like NHK (and its cousins worldwide like the BBC) has a specific role to play within a diverse national media, and it generally takes its obligations to be ‘fair’ far more seriously than commercial broadcasters. If state-controlled media is the hallmark of an authoritarian state, then a healthy public broadcaster is usually a sign of a mature liberal democracy. NHK’s slide from public broadcaster towards being a compliant (perhaps even ‘quasi-state’) broadcaster, therefore, speaks not only about changes in NHK’s internal affairs. It is also a barometer of the overall state of democracy in Japan.

References Abe, S. (2015) “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe”, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_ abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html (Accessed February 23, 2016). Kan, N. (2010) “Statement by Prime Minister Naoto Kan”, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/ statement/201008/10danwa_e.html (Accessed February 23, 2016). Kishida, F. (2015) “Announcement by foreign ministers of Japan and the republic of Korea at the joint press occasion”, www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html (Accessed February 23, 2016). Morris-Suzuki, T. (2006) “Free speech – Silenced voices: The Japanese media, the comfort women tribunal, and the NHK affair”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 4(12), http://apjjf.org/-Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/2305/article.html (Accessed February 23, 2016). Murayama, T. (1995) “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama: ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ ”, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/ murayama/9508.html (Accessed February 23, 2016). Nishimura, K. (2014) NHK bōkokuron: kōkyō hōsō no ‘tsumi to batsu’, soshite ‘saisei’ e no michi. Tokyo: KK Bestsellers.

NHK, war memory and politics  185

Seaton, P. (2008) “Pledge Fulfilled: Prime Minister Koizumi, Yasukuni and the Japanese Media”, in J. Breen (ed.), Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 163–188. Seaton, P. (2011) “The centenary of the annexation of Korea in the Japanese media”, Japan Space, 9: 275–307. Seaton, P.A. (2007) Japan’s Contested War Memories: The ‘Memory Rifts’ in Historical Consciousness of World War II. London: Routledge. Seaton, P.A. (2016) “Narratives of War in the Hokkaido Media”, in P.A. Seaton (ed.), Local History and War Memories in Hokkaido. London: Routledge, 60–87. Sunakawa, H., Iwasaki, S. and Mizushima, H. (2016) “Abe seiken no kainyū ni ishuku suru terebi kai”, The Tsukuru, 22–32, January 2016. Wakamiya, Y. (1999) The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms With its History of Aggression in Asia. Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation. Yoshida, R., Mie, A. and E. Johnston (2014) “Momii’s rise tests NHK’s reputation”, The Japan Times, February  2, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/02/national/momiisrise-tests-nhks-reputation/#.VpijNDYTGFI.

14 POINTING THE BONE A personal account of media repression in Japan Gregory Clark

In some of the more primitive Australian aborigine tribes, the tribal witch-doctors would expel undesirables by pointing a bone at them. They were then expected to wander off into the surrounding desert and die. Tokyo, with its recent moves to drive out progressive TV commentators from the airwaves, seems to be moving in the same direction. The witch-doctors – the commentators of the Right – are busy with their attacks on them. Now marked with the stigma of rightist disapproval, these progressives have been silenced, left to spend what could be years wandering in the political wilderness. I relate later my own similar experience with the Japanese media. How did Japan get to this unpleasant state of affairs, and why? Both the society and the media in the immediate postwar years through to the eighties were strongly pacifist. Even today elements of Japan’s attractive familial democracy survive. For example there are weekly one-hour Sunday debates on political topics sponsored by the semi-official NHK (Japan Broadcasting Association) organization in which representatives from each of the significant political parties or opinion groups will be invited to join. The carefully moderated exchanges of opinions could be a model for any democratic society. In the Diet, the rules of parliamentary democracy seem strictly observed. Debates, whether on TV or in the Diet, show a village-style democracy, with both sides knowing each other and keen to avoid personal conflict. The main media have moved strongly to the Right, but the Asahi and Mainichi media groups still back progressive causes. However the tide is now working against the attractive postwar consensus that for the most part kept Left and Right from attacking each other. To justify the pressure on progressive TV commentators, Tokyo is claiming that political neutrality is a condition for an airwave license. But no such condition is imposed on the biased commentators at conservative TV channels. And when it comes to

A personal account of media repression  187

print media the bias is unconstrained. The Sankei group with its antagonism to China, its enthusiasm for militaristic causes and its desire to see Japan rearmed in lockstep with the US is the leader of the right-wing media. The Yomiuri group that has relentlessly promoted the present government line on foreign policy issues is not far behind. Rarely do they make any attempt to present opposite views. The Asahi and Mainichi groups do try to maintain some kind of balance, but populist nationalism seems to give them little choice but to support the official line on territorial issues. Asahi also suffers from its wartime and prewar record of promoting hysterical militarism, and postwar from its failure to note properly China’s domestic policy excesses. The powerful Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) group has been the joker in the pack. (See Krauss Chapter  5) Helped by massive advertising revenues it has a strong influence on Japanese educated opinion, and for much of the postwar era through to the seventies it supported both progressive economic and foreign policies. It only moved to its present generally conservative approach after the 1990s. Largely for family reasons (my father, the Keynesian economist Colin Clark, was a frequent guest writer and lecturer for the Nikkei), I used to have a close relationship with this flagship newspaper. They even gave me an office on their editorial floor. My opinions were often used in commentaries, and I appeared once on their important Keizai Kyoshitsu (Economic Classroom) page. Matters cooled somewhat in 1990 when I identified in a Hong Kong weekly the author of a series of anonymous articles giving valuable insider clues to Chinese politics prior to and during the Cultural Revolution era. This Nikkei reporter, Samejima Keiji, was imprisoned for years in China, and his release had taken years to negotiate (Beijing had insisted he was a spy). With typical paternalistic care, Nikkei had wanted to keep his name out of print even if that violated the journalistic rule that authors of major scoops should be named. It was only when I criticized their shift to conservative support for austerity, supply-sider polices in the wake of the 1991 Bubble collapse that things changed. Initially, under the Keynesian prime minister, Miyazawa Kiichi, Japan had successfully used fiscal stimulation to try to create a much-needed soft landing from the Bubble’s collapse. But after 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, relying on mistaken advice from US supply-siders and encouragement from the Nikkei, adopted fiscal austerity, a tax increase and loan recovery policies. I went to much trouble preparing the statistical material needed for an op-ed for the Nikkei pointing out the need for fiscal stimulus and demand side policies aimed at boosting consumption, but this was refused, rudely. This setback upset me greatly. As with the Vietnam disaster over which I had resigned from Australia’s foreign service in 1964, I  could foresee the years of economic disaster to come. Invited to write by the conservative magazine Voice I criticized Nikkei and the fact they did not seem willing to publish contrary views. The Nikkei people were furious. I received a formal letter of complaint. Requests for articles and comments dried up completely.

188  Gregory Clark

It was a good example of Japan’s familial approach. One moment you are regarded as a member of the group ‘family’ and treated warmly. But the moment you criticize, you are persona non-grata. Never in the years since has Nikkei given proper voice to those who disagree with its rigid anti-Keynesian approach. If anything, it has become even more rigid in its advocacy of ‘fiscal discipline’ even as the failure of austerity policies under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) became obvious. In the West, a financial newspaper faced with the lack of success for the policies it advocated would feel some obligation to publish contrary opinions, or at least allow some form of debate. Certainly the UK-based Financial Times (which the Nikkei bought in 2015) has been very happy to give page space to contrary opinions. One wonders whether Nikkei will continue to respect this editorial freedom. Nikkei’s shift from economic liberalism to economic conservatism has been paralleled by a very similar shift on foreign policy issues. The NHK has made much the same shift. I became fairly closely involved with them in the early eighties, being invited often to join roundtable discussions that openly aired progressive views contrary to the then dominant Liberal Democratic Party. These anti-establishment programs often reflected the bias of an individual producer with little hint of control from the top. For several years I used to be invited regularly by a progressive producer to give the NHK late night (rebroadcast the following day) program shiten ronten where speakers would have complete freedom to talk, and even criticise, for up to fifteen minutes on any topic of interest without any hint of censorship. At times he would encourage me to be more critical. Freedom of speech and ideas permeated most of TV and other media at the time, though I could see how easily a reversal might happen. Today the reversal is in full swing, with progressive magazines closing down while new right-wing publications are proliferating. The highly conservative chairman of the partly government-funded Central Japan Railway company, Kasai Yoshiyuki, has had his company publish a magazine Wedge, handed out for free on his trains and now on commercial sale. Without any pretense of impartiality it pushes a harsh right-wing line over China, territorial disputes and many other foreign or domestic issues. No one seems to object, or even notice. Is this really what a government-funded railway company should be doing? True, some of the right-wing or pro-government bias we see today can be ascribed to a backlash against the excessively left-wing bias of the postwar years; heiwa boke or ‘pacifist dreaming’ was how they often criticised it. But increasingly a fascistic element – the nation as an emotionally bound collective with the right to suppress anything that seems to harm that collective  – is beginning to raise its head. There have been many attempts to explain Japan’s unusual society. My own attempt sees Japan as a ‘tribal collectivist society’, able to develop by retaining and refining its original communalistic, village-based and then feudalistic ethic during the many years of isolation. (Clark 1978) Some north European societies are similar – Britain and Germany especially. Lacking strong ideologies of

A personal account of media repression  189

their own, they too have tended to move in emotionally collectivist, nationalistic directions. But because their isolation was not as complete as Japan’s, they have also been influenced by the more reasoned, rationalistic ideologies from southern Europe. The British were even able to refine their collective ethic into the kind of democracy we see occasionally in Japan. For a time, with exposure to both Confucian and Western influences, it seemed possible Japan would want to move in a similar rationalistic direction where debate and the conflict of ideas would be tolerated. But the collectivist ethic proved too strong. Without a much stronger progressive media than we see today, it could easily evolve into a blind emotional nationalism similar to that of pre-war Germany. True, Japan’s current and still evolving collectivist ethic to date has had many good aspects. They include the extraordinary honesty of the Japanese, the consideration shown in day-to-day relationships, the attractive lack of legalism, the use of polite requests rather than punitive fines to encourage good behavior (the NHK, for example, survives on receiving fees paid voluntarily by a large percentage of the population; the laws mandating payment are rarely invoked). It is assumed that people will behave because that is the consensual will of the society. And as in post-feudal Britain and Germany, a strong work ethic focused on pride gained from manufacturing skills survives. But the many weaknesses in this ‘tribal’ ethic are also not hard to find. For a while during the kokusaika (‘internationalisation’) boom I found myself invited to join many different policy making or consultative committees all seeking to create the impression of national consensus on everything from introduction of summertime daylight savings to fixing up the economy and the education system. The foreigner presence was supposed to give them the appearance of international approval. But while attractive in their seeming openness (in briefings I  would sometimes receive documents stamped secret), in reality these committees and commissions do little to change decisions already made at the top. They are there to give an impression of national consensus supporting government policies and the media reports about them in that vein. Several times I saw the carefully prepared recommendations of a committee upended crudely by bureaucratic diktat. Then there are the tribalistic taboos – bans on the discussion of delicate topics based on the consensual atmosphere rather that dictates of some religious ideology. The imperial family is one; in the absence of strong ideology it plays a crucial role in holding the Japanese ‘tribe’ together. Others are also based on a consensual need to prevent friction or confusion (a Japanese no-no) in the Japanese homeland. And many seek to prevent critical discussion of Japan’s various territorial claims, or the claims against it. In this situation the concept of objectively argued rights and wrongs is weak. Morality becomes situational, with the particular interests of the collective at the time – whether local or national – as the main criteria. To be rikkutsupoi (reliant on logic and argument) can be a criticism. A controversial statement by a business or political leader will be examined to reveal its shin-i, its true meaning, with the implication that the speaker is entitled to avoid the truth. The much discussed

190  Gregory Clark

Japanese value of honne and tatemae (one’s real intent as opposed to one’s action or words made to conform with what society wants or expects) belongs to the same category of situational logic. Goals are laid down by the kuuki – literally ‘air’ but meaning the prevailing mood and consensual atmosphere. So protest becomes like fighting air, literally, even if your goals are worthy. Failure to be able to ‘read’ the kuuki is one of the larger political sins. An unpleasant sign of fascistic tendencies is the way those who protest too strongly can be labeled as hi-nihonjin – a non-Japanese. But these shifts from progressive pacifist to what we see today did not come easily; changing consensual targets takes time. Today it may sound incredible, but until the seventies being openly anti-China was the kiss of death for a politician seeking to be prime minister; Sato Eisaku (1964–1972) only got the job by deviously promising to open relations with Beijing. He had in 1964 promised to visiting Beijing trade minister Nan Han-chen that he would restore relations, only to turn in favor of Taiwan the moment he gained power. This in turn led to the discrediting of the liberal pro-Japan grouping around Liao Cheng-chih, which in turn helped the rise of the Cultural Revolution fanatics and led to the imprisonment of the China-based Nikkei journalist mentioned above. Conservative policies have gained ground slowly by nashi kuzushi (whittling down, bit by bit). One day Tokyo would decree that the NHK use the prewar term ‘nippon’ rather than ‘nihon’ to describe Japan. A year or two later it would be that soldiers can be sent abroad as military attaches. Or that the anti-war Article 9 of the Constitution does not prevent Japan joining in peace-keeping operations. Or that even something called ‘collective defense’ is legitimate (history tells us that most wars of aggression claim to be wars of defense). Or, that the principle of military subordination to civilian bureaucrats is out of date, and so on. Eventually we are enveloped by a new consensus or mood endorsing policies that would have been unthinkable a generation or so earlier. Now with LDP mutterings that Japan’s tame-cat communist party can be accused of advocating revolutionary violence, we are getting close to real fascism. Who could have predicted that 70 years ago? As in the prewar years, violence too has been used to change the consensus. In 1987 a gunman entered the newsroom of the Nishinomiya bureau of Asahi Shimbun and shot journalist Kojiri Tomohiro, who died soon after. Another journalist, Inukai Hyoe, was seriously injured. Soon after, a nationalistic group called Sekihotai sent a letter claiming responsibility and stating that “We do not accept anyone who betrays Japan. We sentence all Asahi Shimbun employees to death.” Soon after, Asahi began to moderate its progressive bias; in Japan’s familial enterprises, protecting the lives of one’s staff is the top priority. For some reason Japan’s normally efficient police have been unable to track down the perpetrator of this and other attacks on Asahi facilities, or even to tell us what Sekihotai is. Today the attacks on Asahi and its employees consist mainly of sniggering, snide references in the right-wing media, the popular low-grade shukanshi ‘weekly magazines’, especially to Asahi’s occasional reporting mistakes (over the ianfu -comfort women – issue especially), delivered with the kind of childish

A personal account of media repression  191

glee that belongs in the kindergarten. The same childish delight can be seen in the way the right-wing Japanese media report setbacks in the economy or leadership of South Korea, now bitterly disliked by the Right for its ianfu (comfort women) criticisms of Japan’s past military occupation. This dislike is curious since if Japan is to have viable policies in East Asia against imagined enemies, it cannot afford to antagonize South Korea. But in Japan, feelings or situational moods can win out over logic, or even fact. One wonders how the right-wing will react as Taiwan presses its ‘comfort women’ claims. In 1971, journalist Nishiyama Takaichi reported for the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper that Tokyo had a secret $4  million agreement with the US to cover the costs for Okinawa farmland that was requisitioned for military bases. Tokyo denied the agreement existed but somehow was able to gain a conviction against Nishiyama for revealing state secrets even though it denied that any agreement existed. Years later a copy of the agreement was found in US archives. With the newly discovered document placed in front of the TV cameras, together with the senior Foreign Ministry official Yoshino Bunroku (already retired) who had signed the document, you would assume Tokyo would be contrite, abashed or remain silent, but instead the prime minister of the day stood up in the Diet and categorically denied that the agreement existed. At over 80 years of age Nishiyama is still fighting for exoneration and justice. Point blank denial of inconvenient facts is unfortunate, even if it does help to retain the image of collectivist unity. The attempt to deny the ‘comfort women’ issue is an especially egregious example. In foreign policy, the determination to deny inconvenient facts can get out of control. One has only to read the text to the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty to see that Japan renounced ‘all right, title and claim’ to something called the Kurile Islands. But today it insists that these renounced islands did not include the Southern Kurile Islands – the so-called Northern Territories – despite the fact that many maps and official Japanese statements at the time said they were included. Questioned about these contradictions, Japanese officialdom will simply say they were mistakes, or that they were contradicted by a 1855 treaty, or that they were later retracted and so on. And we as adults are expected to believe that this allows Japan to insist it is 100 percent in the right and the other side (Moscow) totally wrong and aggressive in upholding its territorial claims. But the media go along unquestionably with the official position. Doubters are quickly silenced. Ironically, if Japan admitted the facts, and the US-Soviet maneuvering that led to Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru being forced to sign the territorial renunciation clause in the peace treaty, Japan’s legal position would be much stronger. But that would be too rikuttsupoi. Tokyo prefers to stick its collective head in the sand and pretend that what happened did not happen. A similar situation exists over the disputed Senkaku islands. Japanese officials and journalists present at the Japan-China 1972 and 1978 talks on the establishment of relations all confirm that it was agreed a decision over the ownership of the islands was to be made in the future. Today Tokyo simply insists this did

192  Gregory Clark

not happen despite the fact that the senior foreign ministry (MOFA) official also present, when in retirement, agreed that it did happen. Tokyo insists the islands have always been Japanese inherent territory from time immemorial (koyuu no ryodo). So immemorial that the Japanese name for the islands had to be borrowed from the English – Pinnacle Islands. Western media, ignorant as ever of East Asian events, make something of what they see as the fact Beijing calls the islands Diaoyutai and Taiwan says Tiaoyutai. In fact both use the same Chinese word. It means Fishing Platform, as no doubt it was for many Chinese fishermen in the past till Japanese fish processors moved in toward the end of the nineteenth century. The difference in name is simply the difference in the romanizations used by Taipei and Beijing. The inconvenient fact that Taiwan also claims the islands and has a mountain of historical and other data to prove China’s historical claim is largely ignored. But you cannot say that. Contesting the territorial claims of the nation-collective is one of the larger taboos. The media  – NHK especially  – constantly refer to the islands as ‘Japanese territory’. By any rule of media integrity they should say ‘Japanese claimed territory’. In effect the media are acting as propaganda agents of the government. It is left to Western critics to dig out the facts. And now even school textbooks are being mobilised to confirm the official views on territorial disputes. The North Korean abduction issue lies even closer to the top of the taboo list. In 2004 Abe Shinzo, now prime minister and then chief cabinet secretary, had a problem. He had accompanied then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to Pyongyang in 2004 on what seemed to be the final stage for solving the so-called abductee problem with North Korea. Pyongyang had already released what it said were the remaining five surviving members of the 13 people it had admitted to having abducted from Japan during the 70s and 80s. Its leader, Kim Jong-il, had apologized. He was willing even to order their already adult children born in North Korea to go to Japan. But if the abductee issue was resolved, the raft of agreements that went with this breakthrough – aid to North Korea, possible reparations, opening of formal relations and so on – would force a major change in Japan’s pro-US diplomacy. North Korea could no longer be regarded as an enemy justifying the militarization Mr. Abe wanted for his country. So he suddenly announced that North Korea retained many more abductees that it was refusing to release. To the eight that Pyongyang acknowledged had died, he added an extra four that he said Tokyo knew about for sure, and the possibility that dozens, even hundreds, of Japanese whose whereabouts had become unknown over the years were also being held by the regime. In short, Pyongyang was lying when it said the problem had been resolved. Japan must continue to apply pressure until each and every one of the suspected abductees is returned. One key proof of Pyongyang’s mendacity Mr. Abe said was a DNA test on a cremated bone that Pyongyang had presented as proof that one known abductee, Yokota Megumi, had died. The test showed the bone belonged to someone else, he said. On this flimsy basis all the agreements Tokyo had negotiated since 2002 for

A personal account of media repression  193

better relations with Pyongyang had to be cast aside and sanctions imposed. This, despite the fact that two top scientific magazines in the West, Nature and Science, had featured special articles saying DNA testing of charred bones was impossible and ridiculing Abe’s claims to the contrary. Other details about the dubious identity and movements of the alleged DNA tester (all the subject of a detailed Wikipedia entry for ‘Yokota Megumi, DNA controversy’) made it clear that Abe was deliberately trying to prolong the dispute with Pyongyang. At this point, a responsible media in any responsible nation would have followed up on all this – the DNA claim especially since it made Japan look stupid internationally. But not in Japan. The right-wing moved in to back up the Abe claims, with well-funded organizations demanding the return of all abductees. The image of the beautiful Yokota Megumi languishing in North Korea, plus the anguish suffered by her parents, were made the centerpiece of official abductee propaganda. Any move by the parents or others to accept a Pyongyang open invitation to visit Megumi’s daughter, Kim Hye Gyong, in North Korea or a third country was frowned upon. An independent journalist who defied the ban and gained a very interesting and revealing interview in Pyongyang, later broadcast on the Fuji TV channel in 2005, was condemned as a virtual traitor to Japan. Needless to say, none of the dozens or hundreds of alleged remaining abductees have been found (the long-dead body of one of them was found under a boat near where I live in eastern Japan). But the media continue to cover the kabuki performances performed by the now bloated special bureaucracy, which Tokyo says is needed to resolve the alleged abductee problem. The anguished parents have been taken around Japan, and even to meet US President Bush, to insist that solidarity and pressure be maintained. Yet when the parents finally met the daughter in a third country (Mongolia) in 2014, they did not ask her what had happened to her mother. (I was able to meet the parents later and ask why. They said they were told not to do this since it might derail efforts to release other abductees.) The affair has become yet another of the taboo topics shackling Japanese media and, needless to say, any chance of normalizing Japan-North Korea relations. In 2009 one of Japan’s few genuinely impartial investigative journalists, Tahara Soichiro, revealed on Asahi TV that a Foreign Ministry source had confirmed to him that Yokota and one other much publicised abductee had indeed died, as Pyongyang had been insisting. He was soon hit with a claim for large emotional distress damages from the relative of an alleged abductee (those rightwing groups pushing the abductee rescue cause are well endowed). No one came to Tahara’s defense, and he has since gone into complete silence on the abductee issue. I too was to be a victim, though in very different way. In 2008 on the US-based NBR Japan Forum website set up mainly for discussions among non-Japanese scholars interested in Japan, I had posted a brief comment saying Tokyo’s handling of the Yokota Megumi DNA issue seemed fabricated. I  agreed that there had been a genuine abductee problem, but Tokyo’s overall handling of the matter was suspicious. Soon after, a notorious Sankei

194  Gregory Clark

Shimbun attack columnist, Komori Yoshihisa, used his widely read blog to say that one Gregory Clark, vice-president of Akita International University, was claiming the entire abduction issue was dechiage (faked). Komori followed up with a long column in Sankei attacking both the NBR forum as a nest of Japanhaters (in fact it is sponsored by a US military-related organization, and the majority of contributors are neutral or favorable to Tokyo) and myself as someone at a prefectural university receiving official funds seeking to distort the education of young Japanese minds. As with Komori’s attacks on others receiving official funds whom he sees as lacking sufficient pro-Japanese patriotism, Sankei refused to publish any denial or retraction. Most have suffered serious setbacks as a result. The Japan Institute of International Affairs was forced to suspend an attempt to produce an independent commentary column simply because Komori did not like the contents. Sankei’s influence is strong. In my case, the setback was even more spectacular. Almost overnight, invitations for me to give talks and appointments to committees (of which there had been many in the past) dried up. The prefecture authorities queried my university appointment. A just-announced appointment of me as outside director for the large trading company, Mitsui & Co., was immediately, and rather crudely, withdrawn. I began to realize that being cast out into the ‘desert’ by a bone-pointing witch-doctor was not the exclusive behavior of primitive Australian tribes.

Reference Clark, G. (1978) The Japanese Tribe – Origins of a Nation’s Uniqueness, Simul Shuppan Kai (in Japanese).

15 TABLOID NATIONALISM AND RACIALISM IN JAPAN Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

1  Introduction: history and terminology William Wetherall and Mark Schreiber In separately authored reports we examine some examples of nationalism and racialism, related to Japan-Korea relations and social problems in Japan, in tabloidesque print and electronic media in Japan. Both reports involve historical issues, which are supposed to be the province of history. Our reports are not about the issues, however, but about how states, advocacy groups, and individuals cook and serve the past to feed one or another school of history or life today. The past itself remains undigested as people argue and even take to the streets over what happened and why, and over the consequences.

Terminology If words matter – do we speak of comfort women, sex slaves, or prostitutes, or do we use such terms as we find them? Do we differentiate Koreans, Chosenese, and Choreans in Japan, as people commonly do in Japanese, or label them “Zainichi,” which some do and some don’t – or racialize them as “ethnic Koreans,” an English expression which has no foundation in Japanese? Do we use “North Chosen” and the “Democratic People’s Republic of Chosen,” which reflect Japanese usage – or “North Korea” and the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which favor English reductions of the distinctions between “Korea” and “Chosen”? And what do we call speech and actions the speakers and actors call criticism or satire, but their dissenters call hate? Many English sources conflate different Japanese terms or morph them into different metaphors. Writers and editors do this to simplify the stories, comply with a style sheet, or conform to customary or ideological usage. This often results

196  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

in misinformation or distortion. We respect the diverse voices of our sources and the ability of our readers to hear them as spoken. To this end, we translate all Japanese expressions into English equivalents that preserve their distinctions and metaphors. We comment on their meanings when necessary. “Tabloid” is our word for any conveyance of news, information, or opinion about an issue or topic in a sensational, provocative, or gossipy manner, irrespective of the medium or whether journalistic or academic. We use “nationalism” in the generic sense of “nashonarizumu” in Japanese. It can mean anything from “love of country” (aikoku) to the blood-and-soil “ethnonationalism” (minzokushugi) that generates much of the emotional heat in tabloid history.

2 Anti-Korea nationalism in Yukan Fuji and rumors of bullying in America Mark Schreiber This article reports how Yukan Fuji, an evening tabloid with a par-for-its-niche circulation of about 1.5 million, became the main news medium in Japan for activists opposed to the international movement to erect monuments that memorialize comfort women as sex slaves. It then describes my investigations of allegations, reported in Japan’s mass media, that Japanese children in the United States were bullied on account of the monument movement.1

Anti-Korea nationalism in Yukan Fuji 2013 and 2014 witnessed one Japan-Korea or Japan-China diplomatic spat after another. There were periods in which stories about Korea or China, or both, got top billing day after day in Japan’s news media. Yukan Fuji, an evening tabloid launched in 1969, began to stand out on account of its daily barrage of sensationalized Korea stories. Its bright yellow on orange or black front-page headlines, and the banners that highlight its top stories on display racks at station kiosks, are hard to miss. Convenience stores also sell it, and I often buy it for my daily pop-culture fix. In October 2013, I noticed that the front page of practically every issue had negative news about Korea (Kankoku). It seemed the editors had reserved space for a Korea-bad-news story-of-the-day, as though they took malicious delight in exposing Korea as a troubled country. My first story on Yukan Fuji’s Korea reporting ran in The Japan Times on 12 October 2013. The paper continued to highlight Korea-related features on its front page practically every day. I revisited the paper’s reportage in a longer article that came out in the Number 1 Shimbun on 29 December. Two other journalists also questioned whether Yukan Fuji was indulging in bashing (Arai Rokki and Ueda Chiaki, “Radicalization ‘sells’/The ‘whys’ of dislike-Korea (ken-Kan) reportage,” Tokyo Shimbun, 5 October 2013). And another writer, also commenting on Yukan

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  197

Fuji, asserted that “racism (reishizumu) has become entertainment” (Kato Naoki, in No hate!, Tokyo: Korocolor, November 2014). In addition to its apparent obsession with payback for what are called “antiJapan” (han-Nichi) attitudes in Korea and China, Yukan Fuji is one of the main vehicles in the popular press for views of history that de-vilify Japan’s imperial past. It runs several columns by conservative and right-wing Japanese and foreign contributors who share such views. The foreigners, whether or not they are lapdogs, play roles like those of the racially exotic people who are paid to endorse Japanese products and even Japanese culture in commercial advertising. Nationalistic and romantic views of Japan past and present have become commodities (See my 22 March 2014 article in The Japan Times). Yukan Fuji’s oddest foreign mouthpiece for conservative causes is Tony Marano (b1949), also known as Texas Oyaji or Texas Daddy, alluding to where he lives. He is odd because his activities in Japan and overseas depend on his Japanese handlers, Fujiki Shun’ichi and Fujii Mitsuhiko (b1972). Both are professional publicists who oppose anything they deem “anti-Japan” – along with “communism” and “liberalism.” They chaperone Marano around the world at some expense to help them promote their views, which he shares. Comfort women: Japan-America counter-attack: Texas Oyaji: “Korea is/and Koreans are liars” (Kankoku/jin usotsuki) declared the top story on the front page of Yukan Fuji’s 25 December 2013 edition. The story announced the “JapanU.S. alliance” between Fujii and Marano. The alliance came about after Fujiki read in the 1 November edition of Yukan Fuji the top front page article headlined Manga war over Japan-Korea comfort women issue breaks out. The article reported Fujii’s call for support for his project to counter Korean “lies” about comfort women with “facts” at a French comic book festival. Fujiki called Fujii and offered Marano’s help. Marano – a politically conservative YouTube vlogger in America with practically no followers – has picked up a small fandom in Japan, thanks to Fujiki, who set up a “Texas Daddy Japan Secretariat” at his company in Kumagaya. The office manages Marano’s affairs in Japan, including a website with an on-line “Texas Daddy Official Goods Store” that hawks Marano-themed coffee mugs, cellphone ornaments, and T-shirts, along with his books. In July  2013, Marano got some attention for the dramatic and vulgar way he publicized a 1944 U.S. Army report that described “comfort girls” as “prostitutes” – hence his usefulness to Fujii’s “facts” campaign. As of December 2013, however, Marano was still a nobody in Japan. Yukan Fuji quickly became the most prominent print-media publicist for what might be called the Fujiki-Marano-Fujii trio – because they almost always travel and appear together. Fujii appears to be the best connected. His comfort-women activism began in August 2013 when he founded Rom-Pa Project to “break [confute] the arguments” (ronpa) of the sex-slave school of history. The comic book he wrote for the French exhibition, The J Facts (Les Faite J), was backed by a long list of well-known conservatives and rightists, beginning with the top cadre

198  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

of the Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact (SDHF), some Happy Science (HS) activists, and others who share the view that the United States forced Japan to resort to war in 1941, and that allegations of “Japanese racism,” and of “atrocities” like “Sex Slaves” and “Nanking Massacre,” are fabrications or misrepresentations of historical facts. The most notable of several other activists, who at times has joined the trio in Japan and overseas, is Yamamoto Yumiko, the head of Nadeshiko Action. Nadeshiko Action is the combat control center for Japanese women around the world who oppose the sex-slave school in the name of “justice and peace.” Yamamoto honed her public relations and media skills as the Secretary General of Zaitokukai (see Wetherall’s following report), which she left in 2012 to form Nadeshiko Action. Another important associate is the comic story writer and illustrator Hasumi Toshiko. Using various names, Hasumi has drawn a few comic strips about the trio’s activities, including some in which she herself has participated. Fujii publicized her comic strip about comfort women, which Yukan Fuji serialized from February to June 2014. Hasumi is now best known as the creator of Hey! I’ll be a refugee! (So da / Nanmin shiyo!, Tokyo: Seirindo, December 2015), a collection of cartoons and commentary she calls “satirical” but critics condemn as a “hate book” that should be banned because of the ways it appears to denigrate minorities. Most of her fire is aimed at Chosenese and others she calls “Zainichi” (see Wetherall). But she also blasts activists, and the book’s final story skewers apathetic Japanese as Japan’s real enemy. Hasumi’s book was produced with the editorial cooperation of Fujiki as the director of Marano’s promotional office. Marano defended the book and Hasumi in his weekly Yukan Fuji column and on his YouTube channel, and Fujii, Fujiki, and Hasumi defended the book on Fujii’s Rom-Pa Project channel. But Channel Sakura’s conservative founder and main program host Mizushima Satoru (b1949) denounced Hasumi’s insensitive language and sweeping stereotypes. The keyword in the title of Fujii’s comic is “the facts.” It is also the keyword in the titles of SDHF-backed paid counter-sex-slave publicity in some American newspapers in 2007 and 2012. Since no later than September 2013, “thefact.jp” has been a Happy Science registered website. Its earliest videos refute the view that comfort women were sex slaves. They also feature interviews with Kase Hideaki (b1936), a leading “revisionist” who contends that the United States and other countries dominated by white racists wanted to force Japan into a war, and that Japan’s aim in the Great East Asia War was to liberate Asia’s colonies and fight racial discrimination. That Yukan Fuji should be a vehicle for conservative opinion comes as no surprise, given its relationship with Sankei Shimbun, Japan’s most conservative national daily, and the Fujisankei Communications Group to which both belong. Yukan Fuji ran an ad for a Happy Science Press book that refutes the “Nanking massacre.” But the ad looked more like a news report, and some critics wondered

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  199

if the paper was pushing Happy Science views, or allowing the line between publicity and content to be blurred out of revenue interests. “China and Korea, shut up!” (Chu-Kan, damare!) blared the headline of the first installment of Marano’s weekly column in Yukan Fuji, on the front page of its 11 January 2014 edition, concerning their criticism of Premier Abe Shinzo’s Yasukuni Shrine visit on 26 December 2013 two weeks earlier. Marano’s “liars” and “shut ups” – and his casual though at times uncouth humor – reverberated around the Internet to the delight of some nationalists. The same month, rumors I had earlier heard of Japanese children being bullied in the United States, which Fujii himself had mongered, began flying again.

Rumors of bullying in America In the fall of 2013, I noticed that some media in Japan were alleging that Japanese children were being bullied in America on account of putatively anti-Japan attitudes, such as those ascribed to the erection of sex-slave memorials that victimized Koreans and vilified Imperial Japan. Intrigued by all this, I began chasing the bullying stories, half expecting to uncover another hoax. I was still on a high from having just debunked a Japanese magazine report about a disease-spreading eyeball-licking craze among teenagers, which some major foreign news media, quick to believe anything bizarre about Japan, had recycled as true without batting a skeptical eye (Schreiber, Number 1 Shimbun, August 2013, The Japan Times, 21 December 2013). On 30 July 2013, the city of Glendale, in California, erected a sex-slave memorial in the city’s Central Park. The day marked the 6th anniversary of California Congressman Mike Honda’s House of Representatives “sex slave” resolution. In mid-January 2014, Matsuura Yoshiko (b1948) and Tsujimura Tomoko (b1973), assembly women from Suginami ward and Komae city in Tokyo, visited Glendale with a delegation of the National Association of Local Legislators Opposing Comfort Women Statue Placement. On 28 April 2014, I met both women at a restaurant near Yasukuni Shrine, where they had been soliciting signatures supporting their attempt to get the Japanese government to take a firm stance against the sex-slave monuments in America, and to protect overseas Japanese from harassment. When I  pressed them for concrete evidence of bullying, Tsujimura pulled a two-page list out of her briefcase. She made a show of confiding to me as if she were revealing a state secret. She allowed me to photograph the list on the condition I wouldn’t use it. She implied that the contents had been compiled from discussions with “constituents” in Southern California, and that the original materials were in a secure place. Studying my copy of the survey summary, I spotted some of the cases Matsuura and Tsujimura had described in their newsletters, blogs, and widely reported news conferences. The summary rang another bell too. I dug out my copy of the 6 March 2014 issue of the weekly magazine Asahi Geino, which had gone on sale

200  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

on 25 February, the day the two women described some of the bullying cases at a press conference at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. The titles on the cover declared “Putting spit in ramen, railing children ‘You smell like fish’ / Intensifying worldwide / “Anti-Japan harassment movement’ (including state) of [by] low-life Koreans (gesu Kankokujin).” The four-page lead story described 11 harassment cases and attributed their source to Matsuura, who is pictured. Five of the stories in the survey summary are cited in their entirety – verbatim. The article gave the most detailed account of Matsuura’s allegations of bullying I have seen anywhere in mass media. It noted that the cases were responses to a questionnaire distributed “before [her] visit with the cooperation of local countrymen,” meaning Japanese. It said the survey concerned “harassment of [by] Korea-related [descent] residents” (Kankoku-kei jumin no iyagarase). The title of the survey on my copy of the summary is “Things [you] feel are unpleasant experiences tasted by countrymen due to Japan-Korea relations” (Nik-Kan kankei no koto de hojin ga ajiwatte iru fuyukai-na keiken to kanjite iru koto). Asahi Geino debuted in 1947 as an entertainment tabloid and became a weekly magazine in 1956. Now arguably the sleaziest of Japan’s men’s weeklies, printing a slightly sub-par 170,000 issues a month, it makes some room between the sleaze for political titillation. In 2014 it rivaled Yukan Fuji’s barrage of discontent about Korea. And from 11 April through 25 December that year, it ran a weekly column by Marano. The column’s title translates to “Texas Oyaji rams his black-ship cannon into anti-Japan states!” (Tekisasu Oyaji no han-Nichi kokka ni kurofune-ho o buchikomu ze). This alludes to Commodore Perry’s fleet of black gunships that forced Japan to open its ports to foreign vessels in the 1850s. Savvy readers may take “cannon” and “ram into” for sexual wordplay. Savvier readers may recall that, in the late nineteenth century, Chosen was the object of Japan’s gunboat diplomacy. My first bullying story came out in Number 1 Shimbun on 30 September 2014. The very next day, I discovered that Liberal Democratic Party Upper House member Yamatani Eriko (b1950) had reported allegations of bullying after she and her delegation visited the sex-slave memorial at Palisades Park in New Jersey in May 2012. I noted that fact in my second bullying piece, which ran in the 25 April 2015 edition of The Japan Times. I agreed to Tsujimura’s and Matsuura’s no-citation terms because I wanted to see the firmest evidence I was likely to get. Most of my sources were journalists, writers, and activists. Most were based in southern California, including Glendale, and some were Japanese. And most took one or the other side of the monument issue. But all of my queries drew blanks. No one was able to corroborate that any children had been bullied. The Japanese consulate in Los Angeles reportedly received some responses to its calls for complaints of harassment but would not comment on specifics for reasons of confidentiality. While trying to stay out of my own story, at times I felt as though I had been drawn into a hall of smoke and mirrors. A promise is a promise, but I feel free

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  201

to divulge what Matsuura’s and Tsujimura’s survey summary did not contain. Namely, not one of its 17 respondents mentioned the statue in Glendale or otherwise alluded to the comfort women issue. In my opinion, not a single allegation of harassment in the survey warranted reporting to a public authority or otherwise making it a public issue. A Japanese journalist – who settled in Glendale, writes for regional media, and participated in the regional movement to oppose the Glendale memorial – said there was considerable tension, but felt some of the complaints were expressions of paranoia. As of this writing, we have only hearsay confirmation of bullying. No matter how plausible the reported cases, no child or adult has publicly claimed being bullied. One has only to believe or not believe the hearsay – to flip a coin between adages like “where there’s smoke there’s fire” or “you can’t prove a negative.” In the meantime, the battle over the monuments rages on. Reviewing my email, in reply to someone who asked what I  thought about the battle, I wrote – “I don’t have a dog in the sex slave fight. Let the scholars and experts duke it out. When the media goes off on irrational tangents over such issues, that’s grist for the mill.” A local reporter I queried who wished to remain anonymous got email from people claiming there had been bullying, but none of the emailers came forth with leads to the bullied children. As for why the rumors of bullying hadn’t become grist for the mill in America, the reporter said – “Without hearing from the child being bullied, witnesses to the bullying or school verification, or seeing the incident myself, there is no story for us . . . in my mind.” In other words, if there’s no who, what, when, and where, let alone why and how, then there’s no news. Japan is not without its share of like-minded journalists and commentators. By the summer of 2014, some were suggesting – while conceding that some of the reported cases might be true – that there was no proof of widespread bullying. Even some participants on Internet boards known mainly for their rumor mongering and abusive language, voiced skepticism. I concluded there was no hoax – just political exploitation of an emotional situation, which is pretty much the nature of the beast.

3  Zaitokukai and the Japanese roots of Zainichiism William Wetherall The word “Zainichi” inherently designates “foreigners in Japan” (Zainichi gaikokujin), but in status quo Japan it is used as a word to designate “Zai­ nichi = Koreans/Chosenese in Japan (Zainichi Kankokujin/Chosenjin).” Seeing just this you can understand how peculiar the existence of Koreans/Chosenese in Japan (hereafter Zainichi) is. Foreigners who are neither migrants (imin) nor refugees (nanmin), in other words Zainichi, exist in Japan with special rights (tokken) called “Special Permanent Residence Qualification” (Tokubetsu Eiju Shikaku) (hereafter “Tokuei”). And these special rights called Tokuei permit residence in Japan practically unconditionally to Zainichi, and moreover

202  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

permit even their children and grandchildren – Zainichi 10th generation, 100th generation – to inhabit and live off [Japan] (sumitsuki kisei suru) for as long as Japan continues to exist.

This erroneous definition of “Zainichi” – an imprecise term that has no legal currency – is the work of lexicographers in the Association of Citizens Who Will Not Tolerate Zainichi Special Rights (Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai). Zaitokukai was established on 2 December 2006 to publicize the misgivings its members have about the favoritism shown some aliens in what I call the SPR Law, which in 1991 defined Special Permanent Residents (Tokubetsu Eijusha) or SPRs. The SPR status consolidated a number of existing exceptional statuses going back to 1952 and even 1945. Zaitokukai’s founder, Sakurai Makoto (b1972), promised he would disband the group when the SPR Law was repealed. He needn’t worry, though, as within his own lifetime, the law will die of natural causes, for SPRs are rapidly approaching extinction. Zaitokukai’s notoriety peaked in domestic and global print and electronic media in 2013. By 2015, the group had retreated from the streets – along with the anti-hate groups that had formed to oppose the way Sakurai and a few others had been expressing their scorn and disdain for the people Zaitokukai’s definition equates with parasites who have special rights. Zaitokukai’s claims are of the rotten-apple-in-the-barrel kind that are made by people who simply don’t like apples. In Sakurai’s vocabulary, “good Zainichi” is an oxymoron. He also believes that under present conditions “Zainichi” should not be allowed to naturalize – that making it easier for them to become Japanese is itself an intolerable “Zainichi special right.” In this report, I focus on two individuals whose encounters with Sakurai have been very different. My object is to understand why many conservatives and even some liberals – who reject hate speech, racism, and inequality – question the merits of the SPR Law decades after the Occupation of Japan (1945–1952), when the population it defines as a virtual caste originated. I will also briefly touch upon the “hate speech” issue that caught and then lost public attention along with Zaitokukai. I will not, here, discuss the political, social, or legal history of Koreans and Chosenese in Japan, or the SPR Law and SPR demographics.2

The origins of Zaitokukai When accepting his election as Zaitokukai’s first chairman on 20 January 2007, Sakurai Makoto spoke about its political stripes, grievances, and mission. “Shimin no Kai” (association of citizens) has left-wing connotations, he said, but the name is intended to stress that Zaitokukai is a citizens group (shimin dantai) (applause). There are about 600,000 Zainichi  – 1,000,000 if you include naturalized (kika shita) or latent (senzai-teki-na) Zainichi. They claim to have been forcibly brought, but practically all came to and remained in Japan of their own

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  203

volition. Disproportionately large numbers are yakuza and welfare recipients, he also said, citing statistics. He opposed both Korea-related (Kankoku-kei) and Chosen-related (Chosen-kei) schools but especially the latter. They follow the curriculum of North Chosen (Kita Chosen). 5 bad Japanese soldiers cross a river. Chosen soldiers kill 2 of them. How many Japanese soldiers are left? The students shout Long Live Kim Jong Il, then scream discrimination when a Japanese university refuses to accept them. Zaitokukai seeks to rectify this, Sakurai said, then surrendered the mike to Mikage Soshi, one of two deputy chairmen. Mikage stated that email from Zaitokukai members, and Internet forums, show a shared anxiety (fuan) and fear (osore) about issues that people found scary (kowai) and terrifying (osoroshii) – especially the history problems (rekishi mondai) with Korea. And it seemed Zai­ nichi were using these problems and fears to abuse their special rights. Arai Kazuma (b1978), the other deputy chairman, took the podium. I’m Arai of the Chosen race (Chosen minzoku no Arai desu) [Chosen (ethnic) nation]. I first knew I was Zainichi when I was in elementary school. As for receiving special rights on account of being Zainichi, I myself didn’t. [But] looking [at this] objectively, it is a fact that [North Chosen related] Soren and [Korea related] Mindan have interests (riken) as pressure groups (atsuryoku dantai). And I want to rectify this as [someone of] the same race (onaji minzoku). As for what sort of position [Zainichi] should go about living in Japan’s society, from the Zainichi side – I naturalized and am a Japanese (kika shite Nihonjin nan desu) – but I’d like to ask [this] from the Zainichi side.

Disillusionment and moving on On 2 December 2007, Arai notified Zaitokukai that he had decided to leave the organization. He said he had begun to question its principles and ways, and had come to the conclusion that the SPR qualification was not a “special right” but a right that “Zainichi Koreans and Chosenese” have as a matter of course – “unlike other aliens, for whom the qualification is not recognized,” he added, incorrectly. He also cited his personal environment and health problems as reasons for quitting. On 8 December, Zaitokukai’s other officers, regretting that they were unable to talk him out of leaving, accepted his resignation, expressed their appreciation for his great contribution to the organization’s development and his year of service as its vice president in charge of IT, and wished him well. By the end of April 2008, four months later, Arai had taken down his popular “koreanthe3rd” blog. His interests in the “Zainichi question” (Zainichi mondai) were practically gone, he said, when announcing its deletion. He wanted to devote his time to his work and private life. In the meantime, a number of Koreans and Chosenese, and Japanese who used to be Koreans or Chosenese, have continued to be openly critical of the stances

204  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

and activities of certain Korean and Chosenese activists, and of pro-Korea and pro-North Chosen interest groups. In Japan, as in other societies, water is thicker than blood. Arai did what hundreds of thousands of Koreans and Chosenese in Japan have done since 1952, when remnants of the Japanese progenitors of the SPR population, defined as of 1945, lost Japan’s nationality. After molting into a “Zainichi” cocoon that was not of his making, he emerged a Japanese and flew off with an identity that made more sense to him. Arai tells his story in 3rd Generation Zainichi (ZAINICHI Korian za saado SANSEI, Tokyo: Ookura Shuppan), a collection of his “koreanthe3rd” posts from December 2004 through November 2005. The book was published on 2 December 2006, the day Zaitokukai was born. It is a very insightful account of his life and thoughts (and afterthoughts) as he considered, and then finally applied for, permission to naturalize. Arai possessed (then) the nationality of Korea (Kankoku no kokuseki), and to that extent he considered himself a “Zainichi Korean” (Zainichi Kankokujin). But it meant nothing to him. He regarded himself as being of the Chosen [ethnic] nation [race] (Chosen minzoku) but stated that he had no sense of having Chosen [ethno] nationality [ethnicity, raciality] (Chosen no minzokusei). Upon naturalizing, he would consider himself a Japanese of Chosen descent (Chosen-kei Nihonjin) – referring to the Chosen peninsula as the geographical territory that had been a part of Japan from 1910 to 1945/1952.3 Arai feels that there is no relationship between [ethno] nationality [ethnicity] (minzokusei) and [civil] nationality (kokuseki). He didn’t say so, but following his logic, if he were to claim to possess a “minzokusei” (ethnonational character, ethnonationality, racioethnicity, raciality, ethnicity), then it would have to be “Japanese” – defined by the language, culture, and society into which he was born and raised, hence his sense of being at home in Japan, and even his politics. Koreans who complain about Japanese prime ministers who visit Yasukuni Shrine, he says, should be the first in line to honor the spirits of the Chosenese enshrined there . . . as Japanese, he could have added. Sakurai himself, as of 1 December  2014, left Zaitokukai after serving four successive two-year terms as its elected chairman. His pretext for leaving was to allow the group to go forward without the burden of his legacy. Prominent rightists had joined leftists in condemning his blanket contempt for Koreans and Chosenese as racism and xenophobia. And court decisions against him, and against Zaitokukai largely because of him, constituted a political liability. Most conservatives seem to accept the SPR Law and SPRs as a legal fait accompli of political settlements following World War II. The main issue is whether SPRs – aliens treated almost but not quite the same as Japanese – should be allowed to vote and otherwise be treated entirely like Japanese while remaining aliens. Only 70 percent (about 350,000 in 2015) of all Koreans/Chosenese (about 500,000 in 2015) are SPRs, and there are considerably fewer every year. While 98 percent of SPRs are Koreans or Chosenese, the other 2 percent represent nearly 50 other nationalities, and some SPRs are stateless.

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  205

People I call “nationalityists” – including some former SPRs – insist that SPRs who want to vote should become Japanese. “Zainichi SPRs” I call “Zainichists,” however, insist that SPRs deserve to be treated like Japanese because they originated as a Japanese population.

Zainichiism vs. Nationalityism Lee Sinhae (b1973) wears chogori at press conferences and represents her multiple names in multiple scripts and dialects, including those of Pyongyang (Ri) and Seoul (I). I am spelling her name here as she represents it in alphabetic script as the author – Lee Sinhae/Ri Shine – of her autobiographical Tsuruhashi tranquility: An anti-hate chronicle (Tsuruhashi annyon: Anchi heito kuronikuru, Tokyo: Kage Shobo, 17 January 2015). Lee, like Arai and Sakurai, gained her following as an Internet activist. Unlike Arai, with whom Sakurai cultivated a working relationship, she became the favorite target of a number of anti-communist netizens, including Sakurai. Speaking at Zaitokukai’s inauguration ceremony, Arai seemed uncomfortable on stage. Sakurai thrives on public exposure and creates his own limelight. Lee has family and other reasons not to vilify the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang, and this has made her a lantern for anti-North Chosen moths like Sakurai. She doesn’t seem to relish public scrutiny, but she faces the spotlight when it turns on her, and in many videocast debates she has been an anvil to the hammers of her adversaries. Lee espouses one of the three schools of what I call “Zainichiism.” The most fashionable school, adopted by race-box fanatics like Sakurai and some (including foreign) journalists and academics, use “Zainichi” (which some writers in English reflexively racialize as “ethnic Koreans”) to embrace all people in Japan who have a drop of putative “Korean” or “Chosenese” or “Chorean” (Korian) blood in their veins. The second most common school uses “Zainichi” in the manner of Zaitokukai’s definition, as a pronoun for all Korean/Chosenese aliens in Japan, and erroneously equates them with SPRs. Lee’s brand of Zainichiism comes the closest to making legal sense in a civil society that takes historical statuses seriously. Nationalityists don’t like it because its proponents advocate that SPRs should be allowed to vote like Japanese – which threatens the commonsense notion of nationality as a fundamental requirement for participation in a state’s popular (national) sovereignty. In a 16 November  2013 marathon discussion on Channel Sakura’s So-TV, focusing on the “Zainichi question,” Lee responded to provocative queries about her “identity” (aidentiti) by Murata Haruki (b1951), a political activist with ethnonationalist leanings, who opposes suffrage for aliens. Murata said some nonSPR Koreans feel that giving other Koreans special rights simply because they have been in Japan longer is discriminatory. Lee contended that the rights weren’t special but a matter of course. Murata countered that they were provided, and that her taking them for granted was wrong.

206  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

Murata spoke of Korean/Chosenese SPRs who when in Seoul seek help at the Japanese embassy, or in America go to a Japanese consulate, because they can’t speak Korean. “What are they?” he said. “They’re not Japanese Koreans (Japaniizu Korian), not Nikkei Kankokujin [Japan-related Koreans]. So what are they?” “Zainichi Koreans,” Lee said. “In that case,” Murata said, “shouldn’t they abide by Korea’s laws, have contact with Korea’s culture, read Korea’s papers, watch Korea’s news, and vote in Korea’s elections?” “Zainichi. We’re Zainichi,” Lee said. “So you’re foreigners,” Murata said, still baiting her. “Zainichi. Not foreigners,” she said. “We’re Zainichi.” Lee’s insistence that she is not an alien but a “Zainichi” – as though “Zainichi” was a nationality in its own right – was greeted with amusement by others around the table, including two other Korean/Chosenese SPRs. Her Internet detractors immediately mocked her remark. But even Murata understood exactly what she meant, whatever he thought about her “we Zainichi deserve to be treated like Japanese” attitude. Lee, in stressing that the progenitors of “Zainichi” like herself had been Japanese, implicitly asks: How can people whose existence in postwar Japan spans over 70 years and four generations – who until 1952 had been Japanese, and whose pre-1945 roots in Japan go back over a century to 1910 when Japan annexed Korea into its sovereign dominion as Chosen – be treated like aliens? Lee’s nationality (kokuseki) is Korea (Kankoku), but she calls herself a 2.5 generation Zainichi Chosenese (Zainichi Chosenjin 2.5-sei). Like Arai and some others, she celebrates her descent from the population of Chosenese who lost Japan’s nationality in 1952. Like Arai did at times in his book, she too has sometimes called herself a “Zainichi Chorean” (Zainichi Korian) – using “Korian” to encompass everything “Korean” or “Chosenese” – while adding that she is neither a Korean (Kankokujin) nor a foreigner (gaikokujin). She has also said she thinks that “everyone with Chosen peninsula roots is ‘Zainichi’ ” (Chosen hanto ni ruutsu ga areba minna “Zainichi” da) – whatever this means. Unlike Arai, though, she won’t be able to participate in Japan’s political society if she clings to her SPR status and people opposed to alien citizenship, like Murata, have their way – and they probably will. The Constitution’s definition of sovereignty as an inherent right of nationals (kokumin koyu no kenri), like the SPR Law, will stand. But the standoff between nationalityists and SPR Zainichists will wither away by the middle of this century, when there will be few if any Special Permanent Residents in Japan.

What’s in a word? The last line of the definition cited at the outset of this report likens “Zainichi” to parasites that have infested Japan. Whether or not this was intended to suggest

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  207

that “Zainichi” should be eradicated, does such a characterization constitute hate speech (heitosupiichi)? At a hate-speech symposium in 2015, Kise Takayoshi (b1967), a “counterhate speech” (han-heitosupiichi) activist, objected to the titles of two separately authored but similarly titled books – 100 questions and 100 answers to permanently silence [China] [Korea/North Chosen] – published by WAC. “What is the best way to permanently silence (eikyu ni damaraseru) someone?” Kise asked Hanada Kazuyoshi (b1942), the “Right face, Right!” videocaster cum editor (at the time) of WAC’s monthly magazine WiLL, then answered his own question – “Think a bit and you’ll understand. It’s genocide (jenosaido).” “Silence means to break someone’s argument (ronpa) to the point they can’t counter-argue (hanron),” Hanada told Kise. “To read this in a way that links it with genocide is warped. Do you not understand even that much Japanese? Your way of reading is wrong.” During 2013, Japan witnessed a scattering of widely publicized demonstrations, some in Osaka’s and Tokyo’s “Korea towns” (Koria-taun), involving hate speech. Groups opposed to “Zainichi special rights” and alleged abuses clashed with groups that denounced the allegations and the xenophobic manner in which they were often made. Most demonstrators on all sides peacefully waved flags and banners and placards and left the dirty work to the thuggish elements in their ranks. Some “special rights” objectors chanted “Cho-sen-jin, KO-RO-SE!” (KILL Chosenese!). Some “counter-racist” (tai-reishisuto) activists brandished “Heito buta, SHI-NE!” (Hate pigs, DIE!) signs, sporting images of Zaitokukai’s founder and then chairman Sakurai Makoto, or flipped middle fingers and flashed tattoos. Local passersby and tourists who didn’t know what was happening might have thought they had stumbled into a rumble between two gangs. By the end of 2015, Japan’s social and legal immune system had stopped this outbreak of a virus that has been incubating in Japan since the Allied Occupation from 1945 to 1952. It was not the first outbreak, and the virus continues to fester in remission. The anti-“special rights” protests began shortly after Zaitokukai’s birth in 2006 and escalated. They stimulated widespread anti-hate vigilantism and inspired numerous anti-hate publications and Internet initiatives. A Supreme Court decision against Zaitokukai and some of its members in 2014, and a warning issued by the Ministry of Justice in 2015 directly to Sakurai, by then no longer a member of Zaitokukai, have also been effective in keeping intolerance in Japan within the tolerable limits of what I call “normal pathology” – the price of freedom in a democratic society. Japan’s laws – including the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Penal Code, and a number of international conventions – have provisions that broadly proscribe racial discrimination and the sort of physical and verbal acts that are typically motivated by hate. All have been applied in court precedents favoring victims. In response to public expressions of hatred and intolerance by some Zaitokukai members and others, a few municipalities have passed ordinances that categorically

208  Mark Schreiber and William Wetherall

proscribe “hate speech.” On 24 May 2016, the National Diet passed a bill for a “Law concerning the promotion of initiatives directed at the elimination of inappropriate discriminatory speech and behavior toward persons originating outside this country (honpou-gai shusshin-sha).” The law was promulgated and came into force on 3 June 2016. The “national-origin anti-discrimination law,” as I  call it, recognizes the responsibility of the national government to work with local governments to promote an awareness of the unacceptability of verbal and other acts that express contempt for, or advocate the exclusion from society of, people whose national origins are other than Japan and their descendants, who are legally residing in Japan. Since this also covers Japanese of putatively foreign ancestry, the law does not need to specify nationality. Nor does it need to racialize national origin, avoidance of which is consistent with Japan’s objections to the racialization of national origin in some other countries. Key wording in the law mirrors the phrasing of an article in the Penal Code that defines crimes of intimidation. The law thus makes it easier to enforce standing laws that have already been applied to egregious xenophobic acts, without empowering the state to police racial identity, race relations, or related thoughts. Defenders of free speech condemn hate speech but worry that arming the government with censorship laws would discourage or muzzle questioning the legitimacy or the behavior of any legally defined or self-styled group that feels it deserves special rights or protection from criticism. The manga writer and author Kobayashi Yoshinori (b1953) doubts that Ainu constitute a bona fide “[ethnic] nation” or “race” or “people” (minzoku), and he questions “Ainu interests” (Ainu riken). But the psychiatrist, writer, and TV personality Kayama Rika (b1960) equates his attitude toward “Ainu” with denialism and hate speech. So what do they do? Kobayashi and Kayama, who make their livings marketing social and political commentary, staged a civil showdown in “The Ainu Debate” and “Hate Speech” (“Ainu ronso” to “Heitosupiichi”, Tokyo: Tsukuru Shuppan, 5 June 2015). The book dramatizes the difficulty of questions like what constitutes a minority [ethnic] nation (shosu minzoku), and whether people who identify as Ainu deserve special treatment in the age of equality. It also exemplifies a healthier alternative to authoritarian laws that could terminate thought. If Lee were to accuse Sakurai of being a professional demagogue, he would call her a professional victim. In 2014 she sued him for things she alleges he said about her that she considers hateful. In 2015 he countersued her for things she supposedly said that he claims are malicious. I give her my moral support and a slight legal edge. Yet I feel that the issues both litigants raise would be better addressed in public debates with thicker skins and more humor.

Notes 1 Here I  revisit, with the advantage of more information and hindsight, the topics of several reports I  wrote for The Japan Times and the Number 1 Shimbun between

Tabloid nationalism and racialism  209

2013–2015. Rather than repeat what I  have already written, I  will merely mention related articles while presenting new findings and sharing some back stories and thoughts about the issues. 2 For more information, including primary sources related to this report, see relevant articles on my Yosha Bunko website (yoshabunko.com). 3 “1945/1952” denotes the period between Japan's loss of Chosen, Taiwan, and other territories when it surrendered in 1945, and its renouncement of all “right, title, and claim” in the peace treaty that came into effect in 1952. Since Japan's nationality is linked to household registers within its sovereign territory, Chosenese and Taiwanese domiciled in Japan remained Japanese during this period.

PART IV

Marginalization

16 MEDIA MARGINALIZATION AND VILIFICATION OF MINORITIES IN JAPAN1 Debito Arudou

The Japanese media (print, broadcast, cyber) and Japanese Government (GOJ) are shaping Japan’s national discourse on minorities in Japan in a racialized manner.2 Going beyond differentiating between citizens and foreigners (as all nation-states do), GOJ policy campaigns systematically defame non-Japanese residents and promote racial discrimination in the media.3 After more than a decade of being portrayed by the highest levels of government as criminals and terrorists, foreigners (gaikokujin or gaijin) have seen their public image changed from essentially “misunderstood outsider” to “social threat.” This has been difficult to counteract, because non-Japanese residents lack sufficient media access to present a counter-narrative. In fact, harassment of foreigners has gotten so bad that local governments are drafting legislation to curtail “hate speech” (heito supiichi), an encouraging but long-overdue response.

Overview Japan’s media enjoys the highest penetration and concentration of daily newspapers in the world, and the tenth largest number of television sets (99 percent of all households, watching on average 17.9  hours  per week) in the world (Gamble and Watanabe 2004: 33; Economist 2005: 90–94). Media campaigns, both in terms of popular culture and public policy, are very effective in disseminating information and influencing Japanese public opinion. However, domestic minority voices are underrepresented in Japan’s media. There are a few ethnic newspapers/magazines published in Japan in Japanese and other languages (including Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, and English, not to mention the Burakumin Liberation League press in Japanese), and a few regional “free papers” (e.g., Metropolis, JapanZine, etc.), but most focus on “news and events” bulletin-board-style information rather than “hard news.” Broadcasting in foreign

214  Debito Arudou

languages is strictly regulated by the Japanese government (Gamble  & Watanabe: 43; Krauss 2000: 196–198), while national-level newspapers in English, the Japan Times/International Herald-Tribune and The Japan News (Daily Yomiuri), plus online Asahi Japan Watch, Mainichi Daily News, Japan Today (which Sankei Shimbun took over in 2015), and Kyodo News/Jiji Press wire-based services etc. are almost entirely controlled by Japanese publishers; the only newspaper independent of a Japanese media conglomerate is The Japan Times. The other English media outlets have very few in-house foreign-language reporters, so consequently “domestic news” generally comes from in-house articles translated from Japanese. The international wire services like AP, Bloomberg, Reuters, and a shrinking number of foreign correspondents for newspapers and television are widely disseminated, but there is very little independent domestically-generated professional journalism in Japan, even in foreign languages.

Misrepresenting minorities in Japan’s media As a result, voices of the non-citizen and ethnic-minority communities in Japan are often muted if not ignored. For example, a special Cabinet of Japan Survey (2013) on Long-Term Residents of Japanese descent (nikkei teijuu gaikokujin) asked “Japanese nationals” (kokumin) if they were aware of Nikkei foreigners currently living in Japan under a special visa status. South American laborers of Japanese descent have been given special long-term work visas since 1990, but nearly half of respondents (46.4 percent) answered they were not aware of this policy. This underscored the invisibility of minority representation in Japan’s dominant media discourse, and their exclusion from the “public sphere” of influence regarding the national social consensus (Habermas 1962). As a columnist for The Japan Times since 2002, and a spokesperson for several minority causes, I have extensive personal experience covering and influencing domestic media campaigns that were disparaging or unfavorable to non-citizens and minorities (Arudou 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2006b et al.). In some cases, domestic media debates have inadvertently or deliberately misrepresented my views on minority issues (both when translated into Japanese, and even when originally presented in Japanese), due to editorial filtering or anticipated Japanese readership biases. For example, in a 5 1/2 year survey (1999–2005) of 114 Japanese-language mainstream daily print media articles dealing with the Otaru Onsen Case the term “racial discrimination” (jinshu sabetsu) was clearly and specifically referred to as the cause of discrimination in only one article.4 (See Arudou 2006a; 2006b) In all others, jinshu sabetsu was used only in the context of a claim by the plaintiffs (or the rulings of the Sapporo District and High Courts) and was never cited as a specific cause of this issue. Instead, euphemisms and misleading terms were used, not rendering it as “discrimination” at all, attributing the issue to manners (manaa), cultural differences and misunderstandings (bunka no chigai, gokai, etc.), Japanese shyness towards foreigners (sometimes referred to as an “allergy”

Media marginalization of minorities  215

[arerugii]), or tangential causes, such as the excluders allegedly protecting their businesses from foreign crime or from customers’ alleged fear of foreigners. In other words, even after being adjudged specifically as “racial discrimination” by two Japanese courts of law, the Japanese media treated it as merely the opinion of the parties involved, not an objective fact of the case. This editorial slant in Japan was also acknowledged by the United Nations Human Rights Council (2010), which concluded that, “It seems that [racial discrimination] is something that the state in question prefers to avoid as a term.” This case study illustrates how the media shapes public discourse profoundly. The Otaru Onsen Case was thus framed as two camps with arguments of equal merit: the “maligned foreigner” vs. the “troubled bathhouse business” (not “the discriminated against” vs. “the discriminator/racist”). For the sake of “balance,” media editorial policies could not report on allegedly discriminatory practices without also interviewing discriminators for “their side of the story,” an “evenhandedness” that lent unwarranted credibility to those who discriminated. It also disseminated bigoted views about “foreigners” for other discriminators nationwide to justify their own exclusionary actions (Arudou 2015: 37–78). Meanwhile, domestic and international English-language media showed little reservation in calling the issue one of “racism” from the outset, in stark contrast to the apologist discourse within Japanese-controlled media. Thus, enfranchised dominant majority actors in Japan’s media are able to stifle debate on discriminatory discourse involving disenfranchised minorities, while the disenfranchised lack a “right of reply” to defend themselves. This lack of checks and balances leads to excessive stereotyping of minorities in Japan’s media, including – in extreme examples – hate speech and propaganda.5

Official criminalization of foreigners In May 1999, the National Police Agency (NPA) launched the “Committee for Policy against Internationalization” as a “public security measure,” specifically to “undertake suitable policies and laws against foreign crime for provincial police agencies, and strengthen their investigative organs” against “bad foreigner groups,” “foreign crime groups,” and “illegal overstayers” in “our country” (Arudou 2006a: 139–140; 2006b: 206–207). This committee, and the rhetoric deployed, provide a window into embedded NPA mindsets towards non-citizens: The committee’s very title, “Kokusaika Taisaku Iinkai,” does not use the more neutral word “policy” (seisaku) – it uses “policy countermeasure” (taisaku), suggesting it is counteracting some problem. That “problem,” however, is not “foreign crime” (gaikokujin hanzai), but rather “internationalization” (kokusaika) itself. Thus in terms of setting a tone for a national-level discourse, this committee problematizes not what illegal acts foreign individuals might commit, but the process of domestic change due to Japan’s interaction with the outside world. It therefore officially legitimized a line item in the public purse to fund government activities specifically targeting non-citizens and their “internationalizing” influence. Within

216  Debito Arudou

a year, NPA funding had materialized for police notices, banners, and pamphlets nationwide specifically warning the Japanese public to be wary of “bad foreigners” (furyou gaikokujin) and “foreign crime” (even though the crimes mentioned were also being committed by Japanese nationals, and in far larger numbers).6 State-sponsored xenophobia became a regular event. The NPA began issuing widely reported semiannual reports and press releases highlighting “foreign crime.” In addition, since 2004 there have been annual criminalization campaigns, such as the month-long “Campaign for Policies against Illegal Foreign Labor” denoted by a huge banner stretched across transport hub JR Shinagawa train station. Further, NPA campaigns enlisted Japanese celebrities and other public notables to draw attention to “foreigners” as potential criminals, asking the public’s cooperation in finding, reporting, and combating Japan’s internationalization. NPA crime reports demonstrate a clear bias. The NPA’s annual White Papers differentiate crime into kokumin versus gaikokujin, with the media providing no comparison between them in scope or scale. In 2009, for example, there were a total of 30,569 cases of crime committed by all foreign nationals; for kokumin, the corresponding figure, not including traffic violations, exceeded 1.5 million cases, nearly 50 times greater.7 However, the NPA focuses instead on the purported rise of foreign crime in its semiannual campaigns, while the media dutifully reports this propaganda, as we shall see below, without analysis. There is a history behind these campaigns. Herbert (1996: 196–228) traced the arc of NPA White Papers after they introduced a new term, rainichi gaikokujin (“visiting foreign nationals”), into Japanese crime reportage from 1987, thereby indicating a new breed of crime as a byproduct of Japan’s “internationalization” and foreign labor influx. Herbert concludes that police reporting and media reaction successfully aroused suspicion and criminalization of non-citizens, portraying Japan as “defenseless against international crime” (ibid, 198). This also established a template for future campaigns that, according to Herbert, manipulate statistics, provoke moral panic in the media, and justify relevant policing budgets. Thus, by the time of the creation of the “Committee for Policy against Internationalization,” the NPA had a track record of stoking xenophobia for profit. As the 2000s proceeded, the NPA normalized statistical manipulation, creating perpetual “foreign crime rises” for the media to disseminate. For example, in their September 2002 periodic foreign crime report, the NPA announced the number of crimes committed by foreigners on temporary visas had jumped by 25.8 percent from the previous year, and serious crimes like murder, robbery, and arson likewise were up 18.2 percent. Despite sharper rises in crime numbers committed by Japanese in the same time period, the mass media headlined not only that foreign crime had increased, but also that foreigners are three times more likely than Japanese to commit crimes in groups. Moreover, the media message went beyond statistics to speculate on the latent criminality of “foreigners.” A  Kyodo news article (July 23, 2010) reported The number of foreigners rounded up last year on suspicion of being involved in criminal activities was about 13,200, down roughly 40 percent

Media marginalization of minorities  217

from 2004 when the number peaked. ‘The extent of how much crime has become globalized cannot be grasped through statistics,’ the [NPA White Paper of 2010] says, attributing part of the reason to difficulties in solving crimes committed by foreigners – more likely to be carried out by multiple culprits than those committed by Japanese. Thus, the NPA was arguing through the media that “foreign crime” was too complicated to be quantifiable, obviating the need for numerical analysis of actual crimes. Efforts to discount or discredit any decrease in “foreign crime” continue to the present day. From 2009, NPA coined the word hanzai infura (crime infrastructure) to refer to “things and organizations that are the basic foundation of crime,” such as cellphones under fake names, fake websites, false marriages, false adoptions, and fake IDs. Although this “crime infrastructure” assists thieves of any nationality, the NPA focuses on foreign culprits, with the majority of their examples depicting crimes involving “foreigners.” Meaning that even if “foreign crime” numbers are smaller than “Japanese crime” numbers, the NPA claims that there must be a statistical understatement, because the latent “groupism” of “foreign crime” causes discrepancies compared to “Japanese crime” (ironically countering the stereotypical meme of “Japanese groupism”).

Media complicity Japan’s media has been complicit in GOJ propagandizing through a lack of critical analysis of the data. Despite extensively researching each semiannual NPA “foreign crime” campaign, I found no NPA press release or mainstream domestic media article comparing “foreign crime” to “Japanese crime,” or to total crimes committed in Japan. Such a comparison would have revealed the following logical and statistical discrepancies: 1

2

3

Crime committed by non-citizens accounted for 1  percent ~ 3  percent or less of all crime in Japan, and in many cases, crime rates were lower for non-­citizens than citizens as a proportion of the population. Further, in 2011 foreign crime numbers dropped below 1993 levels – despite the foreign population doubling since 1993, but there was no deflator to account for that. The alleged “rapid rise” (kyuuzou) in “visa overstayers” (fuhou taizaisha, rendered in NPA publications more colorfully as “bad” or “illegal foreigners” [furyou/fuhou gaikokujin]) was in fact a complete fabrication; violations have almost without pause fallen from a 1993 peak by nearly 80 percent (Ministry of Justice 2015). The NPA counted “illegal visa overstays” (fuhou taizai, subsumed under a more ominous-sounding category of “special penal offenses” (tokubetsu houhan kensuu), as part of total “foreign crimes.” However, visa violations are not the same genre of crime, as a) they are “victimless crimes,” unlike violent crimes (kyouaku hanzai) such as rape or murder, and b) they are crimes that

218  Debito Arudou

4

Japanese citizens, by definition, cannot commit, as citizens have no visa to overstay. However, this statistical legerdemain inflated gross “foreign crime” statistics by as much as a third. If visa violations were removed, the “foreign crime” rate was actually substantially below the (rising) “Japanese crime” rate. Finally, the NPA generally reported “foreign crime” rate changes in terms of percentages rather than raw numbers, thereby exaggerating the situation. That is to say, if one case last year becomes two cases this year, this is a rise of a small number (1)  – but mathematically a 100  percent increase. Thus an increase in already small numbers in non-citizen crime became markedly more sensationalized than the much larger numbers (but smaller proportional rises) in Japanese crime.8

NPA “foreign crime” campaigns become illogical The official firewall between kokumin and gaikokujin in crime reportage have been taken to a logical extreme where foreigners become perpetually “othered.” For example, in 2008, foreign crime statistics fell again from the previous year, and by a double-digit percentage. This should be good news, but during the NPA’s foreign crime media campaign, Kyodo News parroted the official announcement calling this crime drop a rise (putting the word “high plateauing” (takadomari) in the Japanese headline), while portraying it as a fall in the English translation headline. Let us cite the English version of the article to appreciate the NPA’s propagandizing tactics: *** Number of crimes committed by visiting foreigners down TOKYO, Feb. 28, 2008 (AP) – (Kyodo News): “The number of crimes committed by foreigners visiting Japan dropped for the second straight year to 35,800 last year, down 10.8 percent from the previous year, after hitting a peak in 2005, the National Police Agency said Thursday. “However, the number of crimes detected by police during the five-year period from 2003 to 2007 increased some 70 percent from the period of with an NPA official stressing the need for further crackdown on them . . .” [sic] *** This sloppy translation of the second paragraph is better understood by looking at the Japanese original (literal translation by the author): ***

Media marginalization of minorities  219

“On the other hand, when looking at the number of cases committed within five-year periods, comparing the number of crimes committed between 2003–2007 and 1993–1997, there has been a 70 percent rise. The NPA says, “Although there have been some rises and falls, in recent years it’s ‘been stopped at a high point’. From now on it will be necessary to for us to strengthen our crackdown even more.” *** Consider this method of statistical manipulation and the inevitable conclusions drawn: The NPA has arbitrarily chosen a five-year time frame from the past (even though the foreign resident population was smaller), noted that the crime rate was lower than the current five-year time frame, and called the current time frame a comparative rise. This is bad science, yet Kyodo reported it without scrutiny (or a proofread translation). Furthermore, the logical conclusion is a further crackdown against “foreigners” – for even if foreign crime fell to zero, the NPA could argue that this is due to their strict policies and therefore the crackdown must be maintained. Japan’s media gave officials great latitude to play other rhetorical games. When evidence was inconclusive that non-citizens were involved, the media nevertheless reported NPA claims that certain crimes were “possibly committed by foreigners” based upon circumstantial evidence, such as an alleged modus operandi (teguchi), e.g., a crime having a “violent nature” or being “daring” (daitan). Media also reported largely unsourced claims that certain business sectors were more likely to be “breeding grounds for crime,” and that international gangs were infiltrating Japan through the domestic criminal gang infrastructure thanks to “globalization.” “Foreign criminals” were also portrayed as more heinous than Japanese. For example, in the Japanese cop movie “Heavenly Sins” (Tengoku no Taizai 1992), one scene shows a victim’s face boiled off in a kitchen; the detectives theorized aloud that this crime was so wicked that a “foreigner” must have done it (their hunch turned out to be correct). Similarly, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro wrote in his regular Sankei Shimbun column (Ishihara 2002: 98) about being convinced by police reports that certain heinous crimes must be committed by Chinese due to their dastardly nature, since Japanese criminals would never be so despicable. In a subsequent Sankei column (May 8, 2011), Ishihara attributed Chinese criminality to “ethnic DNA” (minzokuteki DNA), further racializing the debate. A latent bunker mentality towards foreigners is evident in GOJ policies. For example, consider an undated joint statement (circa November  2010) from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), entitled “Recovery of Public Safety,” on international terrorism, cybercrime, and the presence of non-citizens in Japan [English original, emphases added in italics]: In the past Japan was proud of its image in the world of being an exceptionally safe country, but in recent years, the number of criminal cases that

220  Debito Arudou

have been identified by the authorities has increased remarkably, while the clearance rate has dropped drastically and remains at a very low level, which makes the deterioration of public safety an issue of grave concern to the nation. In particular, exceptionally violent crimes attracting public attention and the occurrence close at hand of many offences committed by youngsters or by foreign nationals coming to Japan are making people uneasy about the maintenance of public order . . . Under such circumstances, the Government, aiming at restoration of Japan as “the safest country in the world,” inaugurated the Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures against Crime, which formulated in December  2003 “The Action Plan for the Realization of a Society Resistant to Crime,” and the Conference is actively promoting comprehensive measures such as various countermeasures against crime including shoreline countermeasures, the consolidation of a social environment under which it is difficult to commit crimes, and the strengthening of the structure of agencies and organs responsible for public safety . . . thus trying to secure the safety of the public and ease the fears and the anxiety of the Japanese people. (Signed: Criminal Affairs Bureau, Correction Bureau, Rehabilitation Bureau, Immigration Bureau, Public Security Intelligence Agency, and Public Security Examination Commission) The subtext is that Japan’s erstwhile “safe” past has been disrupted by exogenous influences, and public order must be restored for the sake of “the Japanese people” (as opposed to all residents of Japan, including foreigners). Thus, despite almost all crime and terrorism in Japan being committed by kokumin, the NPA’s narrative is that crime flows into an otherwise peaceful Japan. These racialized mindsets percolate through the media, as anti-crime campaigns focus less on the crime and more on the nationality of the criminal. But it also goes beyond nationality and into visual depiction: NPA flyers and announcements use racialized images (e.g., big noses, darker skin, and other “foreignized” features) to depict “foreign” culprits. Thus the NPA has encouraged the public to racially profile, asking them to be on the lookout not just for non-citizens, but also for people who looked “different” and “suspicious” (fushin) (Arudou 2015: 100–108, 149). The result is that the frequency and saturation of NPA media campaigns have long depicted non-citizens as a social bane and threat to public security, overshadowing their valuable contributions as workers and tax payers, and, as we shall see below, affecting their human rights in Japan. Why is “foreign crime” such an easy and unquestioned target? As noted above, the domestic media is loath to acknowledge the role of Japanese racism, yet this is a key factor in the scapegoating of foreigners. Further, without a countervailing narrative or “right of reply” representing minority views, their voices are excluded from mainstream media discourse unless they are supportive of it. Criticism of Japan by non-Japanese is often dismissed as “Japan-hating,” “Japan bashing,” and “anti-Japan” (han-nichi).

Media marginalization of minorities  221

But another subtle reason is the sociology of crime: If crimes committed by “Japanese” go up, then the public will be critical of the police for not doing their job of crime prevention. However, if crimes committed by “foreigners” go up, the criticism tends to go the other way – foreigners shouldn’t be in Japan if they’re going to commit crime. Thus the NPA were given a clear incentive structure and an easy target: As long as “foreigners” were officially portrayed as social destabilizers, the NPA was given more latitude and budget to preserve public safety by embracing tougher policies targeting “foreigners.” It also influenced public policy as lawmakers piled on.

Denigrating “foreigners” for political gain Japan’s legislators have used “foreigners” as a meme to couch new social ills. For example, on April 9, 2000, newly-elected Tokyo Governor Ishihara gave his infamous “Sangokujin Speech” before the Ground Self-Defense Forces in Nerima, Tokyo. He worried aloud about sangokujin (“third-country nationals,” a derogatory term used to refer to people from the former Japanese colonies of Korea and Taiwan) and also “bad foreigners” (furyou gaikokujin) who were allegedly repeat committers of “heinous crimes” (goku’aku hanzai). He claimed they might riot in the case of a national emergency, and called on the SDF to maintain vigilance. However, domestic media analysis about this event missed the mark, debating less about whether Ishihara’s claims were accurate or exaggerated, but rather about whether the use of the epithet “sangokujin” was offensive or discriminatory. Public debate also overlooked the more serious problem – enforceability: How was the SDF to decide who was “foreign” in the event of a “foreigner” roundup? This left Japan’s visible non-Asian minorities (Arudou 2015: 8) vulnerable to racial profiling while ethnic Koreans, Taiwanese and Chinese might blend in. Furthermore, amid several disparaging statements about non-citizens that Ishihara would make in subsequent years, Ishihara took high-profile steps against “foreign crime,” including appointing Takehana Yutaka, former chief in the NPA’s Department of Public Safety, as his Vice Governor. Ishihara also promised to find and “boot out” any “illegals,” placed the first police surveillance cameras in parts of Tokyo with high non-citizen populations, and launched several ­highly-publicized raids of purported “hotbeds” (anshou) of “foreign crime” such as Shinjuku, Ikebukuro, or Roppongi – which he alleged were places where even the yakuza “feared to tread” (habakaru). Other politicians joined in. For example, on November  2, 2003, Kanagawa Governor Matsuzawa Shigefumi stated that “foreigners” were “all sneaky thieves” (kosodoro) and that because Ishihara had cracked down on “foreigners” in his jurisdiction, they, along with juveniles and other gangs, had migrated to neighboring Kanagawa Prefecture. Under press scrutiny, Matsuzawa then “clarified” his remark to “some” instead of “all,” and added, “There is a marked rise in the number of cases in which some foreigners who enter Japan on working and other visas remain (in Japan) illegally and commit heinous crimes. My view is that such crimes need to be stamped out.” He retracted his remarks entirely the next day but was not forced to resign.

222  Debito Arudou

Foreigner bashing even reached the highest levels of government. On September 22, 2003, no fewer than three ministers in Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro’s newly-launched Cabinet focused on “foreign crime” as the political issue du jour. Justice Minister Nozawa Daizou explicitly stated that one of his policy goals would be to “make Japan the world’s safest country again.” In the same cabinet announcement, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported National Public Safety Commission Chairman Ono Kiyoko stating that she would “strengthen policy against foreign and youth crime.” “Foreign crime” was also highlighted by Public Management Minister (and future prime minister) Aso Taro on NHK News. These soon became formal policies. In December  2003, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, in conjunction with the Immigration Bureau and NPA, announced a campaign to “reduc[e] the number of illegal foreign residents by half in the next five years to ensure public security.” By December 2004, an “Action Plan for Preempting Terrorism” was passed by this Cabinet, with explicit provisions made “to prevent terrorists from entering Japan,” thus targeting foreigners in specific as terrorists. These policies also encouraged racial profiling of visible minorities at hotels and other private-sector businesses (Arudou 2015: 101–107).

Japanese media stokes xenophobia The “foreign crime wave” peg gained momentum in the Japanese media. Newspapers and television shows featured specials about foreign crime, reporting on bag snatching, Chinese lock-picking gangs, visa overstaying, and a general debasement of Japan’s public morals (fuuki). The Sankei Shimbun (May  1, 2000), in an article on “a six-fold rise in foreign crime over ten years,” also reported that Chinese gangs were “targeting” Japanese. Again, these reports came out with no comparison to crimes committed by citizens, little grounding in scope or scale regarding crime numbers or frequencies, and far fewer counterbalancing articles on how law-abiding foreign residents were also serving Japan as workers and taxpayers. Reporters have confided to me that they have little time for analysis of crime statistics. Since the NPA disseminates the information shortly before press deadline, reporters wind up merely parroting the NPA’s bias. The clearest example is the Mainichi Shimbun’s articles of February 8 and 9, 2007 that headlined a 35-fold increase in regional foreign crimes, while the next day’s English translation of the same article headlined an overall decrease in foreign crime. A Mainichi editor explained in an interview with me that the headline was adjusted as per the “preferences of their readership,” as the “impact would be different.” This bias is part of a larger pattern, as the Yomiuri Shimbun has done the same for its Japanese and English versions (Arudou 2015: 208–209). In a survey of news articles in the Asahi Shimbun between January and July 1998, Nara University Sociology Professor Mabuchi Ryougo noted that foreign crime was 4.87 times more likely to be covered than crimes by Japanese.9 This was, however, before the NPA’s “Committee for Policy against Internationalization” had created a more systematic media

Media marginalization of minorities  223

cycle on “foreign crime,” not only instilling fear in the public towards “foreigners” as phenotypes, but also whetting the public’s appetite and curiosity about “foreigners and their underground activities.” Businesses were also capitalizing on the fear of, and lurid interest in “foreign crime.” (Arudou 2006a: 195–209). For example, the Shukan Asahi weekly tabloid (February 25, 2000) ran an advertisement for new “foreigner-proof locks”: “Are your anti-theft measures okay? Now damages from foreign robber gangs are increasing very rapidly. This is an era when investments in safety must also be made at Western levels.” Trade paperbacks went on sale about both “foreign crime,” foreign victims of crime, and the seedier side of alleged “underground foreign lifestyles” (including prostitution, fake marriages, fake citizenships, and other unlawful profiteering). Television specials on crime (modeled on the U.S. reality show “COPS”) showed Japanese miscreants mixed in with citizens going about their daily lives, while non-citizens were only shown if they were being apprehended. Nippon Television’s 2-hour special on crime (September 16, 2003) devoted more than 25  percent of its airtime to foreign crime; Tokyo Governor Ishihara came on after every foreign-specific segment to remark on the cruelty of Chinese crooks and the need for more police. This media-generated fear of “foreign crime” found a receptive audience. Many “Japanese Only” establishments began claiming that “foreign crime” was why they refused foreign customers (Arudou 2015: 37–76).

Propagandizing the reinstitution of fingerprinting Another case of the media supporting official propaganda ensued with the resumption of a fingerprinting program for all non-citizens entering Japan after November 20, 2007. On the previous day, a Yomiuri Shimbun editorial parroted GOJ justifications for the program that focused on foreigners as terrorists (English original): The main objective of the revised law is to block terrorists and foreign criminals from entering the country. If it is proven to be effective, Japan’s reputation as a safe country will be bolstered . . . Japan will host the Group of Eight summit meeting at the Lake Toya hot spring resort in Toyakocho, Hokkaido, next year. Together with strengthening immigration checks, we hope the government will take all possible means to ensure coastal security and prevent terrorism in this country . . . On the day of reintroduction, networks and newspapers carried news in real time about concerns for human rights, the malfunctioning fingerprint machines, and angry tourists. However, not one network interviewed a non-Japanese resident or immigrant, or showed video of the demonstrations against fingerprinting by Japanese citizens outside the MOJ. This included NHK, whose 7PM News devoted three minutes to reiterating the government’s line about the need for

224  Debito Arudou

protecting kokumin from the outside world. NHK’s 9PM News devoted six minutes to positive feedback from a couple of visiting foreign tourists, but no word from any foreign residents of Japan whatsoever. NHK’s BS News at 10:50PM did not carry the story at all. The day after reinstitution, the Nikkei, Sankei, and Yomiuri dailies all had the same morning edition headlines: “Five foreigners caught.” However, the Sankei admitted that the five were apprehended for passport irregularities, not information linked to their fingerprints. Thus, although foreigner fingerprinting had been abolished in Japan as a “violation of human rights” in 1999, the media offered no critical commentary on its reintroduction and instead only disseminated GOJ justifications. In sum, the dominant national discourse on “foreigners” insists that all noncitizens must be policed, with the domestic media acting as cheerleader for government policy rather than watchdog, abnegating its role in protecting foreigners’ civil, political, or human rights from abuses (see Schreiber and Wetherall Chapter 15). The consequences are apparent in insensitive/denigrating public invective towards Japan’s minorities, including cases of hate speech.

The normalization of hate speech One famous case of hate speech and profiteering from lurid public interest was the publication of the magazine-book Gaijin Hanzai Ura Fairu 2007 (“The Underground Files of Gaijin Crime 2007”) (Arudou 2007), available at bookstores and convenience stores nationwide from January 31, 2007. Its cover, with racialized caricatures of “gaijin,” highlighted the role of the police in saving Japan from “devastation” (juurin) from the foreign influx. Inside it featured “evil gaijin” (goku’aku gaijin) such as Chinese, South Koreans, Iranians, Brazilians, Filipinos, and Africans/African Americans, creating “lawless zones” (fuhou chitai) within Tokyo. It included a screed on how Japanese criminals may be taking refuge in the cruelty of “foreign crime,” and illustrations showing light-skinned Japanese being victimized by “foreigners.” A photo inside called a black man a “nigger” (nigaa), a manga depicted how Chinese commit horrible crimes against Japanese because they are Chinese, and an essay focused on the lives of Korean women in the sex industry, speculating on whether their genitalia smelled like kimchi. The overall theme was that crime is a function of foreigners “targeting Japan” (nihon o nerau), with a list of danger ratings of fourteen different countries. Although statistics on “foreign crime” were included, there was again no comparison with Japanese crime statistics. Similar sweeping denigration of “foreigners” without much evidence or scientific rigor is common in the Japanese media. Reportage emphasizes “cultural differences” (bunka no chigai), “linguistic barriers” (gengo no shouheki), “unruliness” (oh-abare), or even “invasive propagation” (zoushoku). Some claims were surreal, including alleged stinginess of foreign tourists or foreign takeovers of Japanese businesses. Other claims are more concrete and template-setting for entire industries, such as the domestic media support for the 2011 sacking of CEO

Media marginalization of minorities  225

Michael Woodford, whistleblower of rampant corruption at Olympus Corporation, who was reported as having a “style of management incompatible with traditional Japanese practices.” The hegemony of this exclusionary discourse became apparent a year later when Donald Keene, a renowned author on Japan, reportedly commented that he had naturalized to “encourage,” “endure hardships with,” and “show solidarity” with “the resilient spirit of the Japanese people in a traumatic situation” as a fellow Japanese citizen – unlike, he added, the “foreigners” who had allegedly left Japan after the Tohoku multiple disasters in March  2011. This “flyjin” narrative suggesting that most gaijin flew out of the country in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdowns was a gross exaggeration, but because it appealed to what people wanted to think about unreliable foreigners, the media found it an irresistible meme that became resilient in public memory.10 To the media’s delight, Keene also weighed in on the foreign crime meme, joking, “As a Japanese, I swear not to commit any crimes” (nihonjin to shite hanzai o okosanai koto o chikaimasu).11

The media and human rights Sustained GOJ media propaganda have undermined the human rights of Japan’s foreign residents. According to an April  2003 GOJ Cabinet “Public Survey on the Defense of Human Rights” conducted every four to five years, 3,000 Japanese respondents (not foreigners) aged twenty and over were asked whether they agreed with the following statement: “Foreigners should have the same protection of human rights as Japanese.” A little over half (54.0 percent) of all respondents agreed, marking a significant decline from 65.5 percent in 1997, 68.3 percent in 1993, and 61.8 percent in 1988. The reason for this downward trend, according to the Mainichi Shimbun (April 12, 2003) quoting the MOJ’s Bureau of Human Rights, was due to “a sudden rise in foreign crime.” In the subsequent 2007 Survey, the support rate for non-citizens equal rights had rebounded to 59.3 percent, but the percentage of people agreeing with the opposite option, “It can’t be helped for people who do not have Japanese citizenship to not have equal rights with Japanese” also rose to its highest level since the surveys have been conducted: 25.1 percent. Given the role of the media in shaping national discourse about foreigners, and not offering sustained critical analysis of official pronouncements, it bears heavy responsibility for encouraging the view that fellow non-citizen humans are not entitled to equal human rights.

Conclusions Differentiating between people by citizenship is the norm in nation-states. However, the differentiation, “othering,” subordination, and demonization of foreigners has become so entrenched in Japan that not only do their actions come under intensified scrutiny, but also their very presence in Japan is portrayed as a possible risk to Japan in terms of public security and social cohesiveness.

226  Debito Arudou

The media is a powerful channel for this process of demonization, pandering to both the government and their audiences. Instead of acting like a guardian of civil liberties and human rights, the media acts more often like the getaway driver. Negative images of foreigners abound, and relatively few countervailing views are presented. Media apologists may highlight tight deadlines in the news cycle as a reason for not critically engaging the government’s distortions and vilification of foreigners, but editors also confide that there is a strong public appetite for xenophobia and thus happily cash in on such sentiments, thereby whetting the public appetite for more. In this vicious cycle, the media has not played a responsible role in raising public awareness about the benefits of, and indeed the need for, a growing foreign population in the context of a rapidly-aging society. Instead, immigration is represented in stark terms as a threat to the integrity of the nation and its culture, and a ticking time bomb of crime and chaos. The media therefore bears significant responsibility for stoking intolerance in Japanese society and promoting distorted perceptions that undermine the nation’s ostensible agenda of globalization, ranging from education and business to boosting tourism and human rights. There are, however, encouraging signs of change. In March  2014, the first real case of Japanese media discourse on “racial discrimination” occurred in the aftermath of a “Japanese Only” banner appearing at an Urawa Reds soccer game in Saitama Stadium, barring “foreigners” from a section of the bleachers allegedly reserved for diehard fans. After initial doubt in the media as to whether this constituted actual “racial” discrimination, J-League Chair Murai Mitsuru and Urawa Reds management officially condemned the practice as jinshu sabetsu, indefinitely banned the fans who put up the banner from the stadium, and imposed an unprecedented punishment of one home game played to an empty stadium. There has also been progress on curtailing hate speech, as Osaka adopted the first local ordinance banning it in January 2016. It has been a long time coming, but media coverage of shocking 2013 rallies in Tokyo calling for the killing of all ethnic Koreans “good or bad,” and in Osaka for a “massacre” of Koreans on the scale of the 1937–38 Nanjing Massacre, have attracted significant international attention and calls from the UN for the establishment of a law against hate speech. The Japanese media have debated these issues very actively in recent years, and time-worn concerns, expressed by the public, media, and GOJ about the abridgment of freedom of speech, have stalled but not stopped the establishment of a hate-speech law. Can Japan’s minorities ever gain an influential voice in Japanese society? Probably not, given the constant denigration of minorities to the point of nonexistence (as Japan continues to claim it is a “homogeneous society”). As other chapters in this volume elucidate, Japan’s media lacks autonomy and is craven in the face of power. The government bullies and threatens enough to ensure the media is compliant, more lapdog than watchdog, so mainstream media offers little hope for Japan’s non-citizen residents. The Internet might play a subversive

Media marginalization of minorities  227

role, as citizen journalists bypass the gatekeepers of the news and offer alterative views that can become quite influential (South Korea is an example that demonstrates the possibilities), but Japan’s Internet is already riddled with unfettered hate speech against minorities; how it will play out is unclear. Only time will tell if some empowerment or perpetual disenfranchisement is the fate of minorities in Japan’s public sphere.

Notes 1 Abridged from “From Foreign Fetishization to Fear in the Japanese Media”, Chapter 7 of Arudou Debito, Embedded Racism: Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination (Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). Used with permission from the publisher. 2 “Racialization” and racial discrimination are defined for the purposes of this chapter as the process of differentiation, “othering,” and subordination. See more thoroughly Arudou 2015: xi–xxvi, 15–34. 3 “Defamation” is defined as “a statement that injures a third party's reputation” (Cornell University Law School Dictionary). 4 The author, a naturalized Japanese citizen, was one plaintiff in a lawsuit in Hokkaido against a public bathhouse that barred entry to anyone of non-Japanese appearance. 5 I define “hate speech” as “speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation” (Random House Dictionary et al.), consistent with the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 20.2: “the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,” which Japan ratified in 1979. As for “propaganda,” Webster’s says “doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts, or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause.” However, I am also fond of The Problem of the Media (2004) author Robert W. McChesney’s succinct interpretation: “The more people consume your media, the less they’ll know about the subject, and the more they will support government policy” (my emphasis) (Greenwald 2004, minute 50). See also Arudou 2010. 6 See for example Arudou Debito, “Police ‘foreign crime wave’ falsehoods fuel racism.” Japan Times, July 8, 2013. 7 Ibid. 8 More discussion at www.debito.org/crimestats.html. 9 See Mabuchi, Ryougo, Shimbun Hanzai Houdo ni okeru Yougisha no Kokuseki [Newspaper crime reportage by nationality of suspects], publisher unknown, 2003. This title is currently out of print, but an archive of his 2003 lecture on the subject is available at www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~mabuchi/lectures_nara/nwsppr_ntnlty.htm. 10 See “Donald Keene should engage brain before fueling ‘flyjin,’ foreign crime myths.” Japan Times, April 23, 2012. 11 March 7, 2012 press conference covered by ANN News.

References Arudou, Debito (2005a) “On racism and xenophobia in Japan.” Report submitted to United Nations Special Rapporteur Doudou Diene on July 6, Tokyo. Arudou, Debito (2005b). “ ‘Gaikokujin’ Nyuuten Kinshi to iu Jinshu Sabetsu,” in Okamoto Masataka (ed.), Nihon no Minzoku Sabetsu: Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Jouyaku kara Mita Kadai. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 218–229.

228  Debito Arudou

Arudou, Debito (2006a) Japaniizu Onrii: Otaru Onsen Nyuuyoku Kyohi Mondai to Jinshu Sabetsu, 2nd ed. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Arudou, Debito (2006b) Japanese Only: The Otaru Hot Springs Case and Racial Discrimination in Japan, 2nd ed. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Arudou, Debito (2007) “Gaijin Hanzai magazine and hate speech in Japan: The newfound power of Japan’s international residents”, Japan Focus, March 20. Arudou, Debito (2010) “Propaganda in Japan’s media: Manufacturing consent for national goals at the expense of NJ residents.” Linguapax Asia: A Retrospective Edition of Language and Human Rights Issues. Collected Proceedings of Linguapax Asia Symposia, 2004–2009. Linguapax Institute, Pubs. November. Arudou, Debito (2015) Embedded Racism: Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield. Cabinet of Japan (Naikaku) (1999, 2003, and 2007). “Public Survey on the Defense of Human Rights” (jinken yougo ni kansuru yoron chousa). Cabinet of Japan (2013) “Nikkei Teijuu Gaikokujin ni kan suru Tokubetsu Yoron Chousa” [Special public opinion survey on Nikkei Long-Term Residents], February  28, Archived at the Cabinet Secretariat website at www8.cao.go.jp/survey/tokubetu/h24/ h24-nikkei.pdf. The Economist (2005) Pocket World in Figures 2006. London: Profile Books. Gamble, Adam and Watanabe Takesato (2004) A Public Betrayed: An Inside Look at Japanese Media Atrocities and their Warnings to the West. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc. Greenwald, Robert (Director) (2004). Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch’s War on Journalism (documentary). Carolina Productions, University of South Carolina. Habermas, Jurgen (1962) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: MA: MIT Press. Herbert, Wolfgang (1996) Foreign Workers and Law Enforcement in Japan. London: Kegan Paul International. Ishihara, Shintaro (2002) Nihon Yo. Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun Shuppansha. Krauss, Ellis S. (2000) Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ministry of Justice (2015) Honpou ni okeru Fuhou Zanryuusha ni tsuite [Regarding the number of illegal overstayers in our country], courtesy of www.moj.go.jp/nyuukoku kanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00051.html. March 20. United Nations Human Rights Council (2010) “Transcription of the Japanese government CERD review (76th Session),” February 24–25, Geneva, Switzerland.

17 MEDIA SIDE-LINES THE SIT‑IN PROTEST IN TAKAE, OKINAWA* Akihiro Ogawa

I first visited Takae in August 2010. Located in the small village of Higashi‑son in the Kunigami‑gun area in the northern tip of Okinawa Prefecture, Takae is more than three hours away by car from Naha, Okinawa’s capital, and is thus truly in the midst of a “jungle.” People call the area yanbaru, a term in the local Okinawa dialect for an ecologically sensitive area of sub‑tropical mountain forests. Although nearly inaccessible to the public, Takae is only a ten-minute helicopter ride from Camp Schwab, a US Marine Corps (USMC) airbase. Camp Schwab is adjacent to Henoko, where the Japanese and US governments jointly intend to relocate the current Futenma airbase, one of the most significant and controversial exemplars of the US presence in Okinawa. In visiting Takae, my primary purpose was to cover the residents’ round‑the‑clock sit‑in protest against the continuing construction of US military helipads in the area. Takae is located next to the seventy‑eight km2 Jungle Warfare Training Center, the only US military installation of its kind in the world. This is where US military personnel were trained before being dispatched to fight in the Vietnam War in the 1960s. On April 15, 2015, Okinawa’s local daily Ryūkyū Shimpō (2015a) reported about several pictures taken inside the training area at that time. The pictures showed a so‑called “Vietnam village” that existed at the time where the US military set up a mock Vietnamese village and had residents of Takae dress up as Vietnamese farmers for guerrilla warfare training drills. Since 2007, the Defense Ministry’s Okinawa Defense Bureau has been constructing new helipads in the Jungle Warfare Training Center for use by the US military. The six new helipads will be used by the USMC and encircle Takae. However, this construction has hardly been reported, a marginalised story in mainstream Japanese media.

230  Akihiro Ogawa

I am working outside Japan. To remain informed about current events in Japan, I previously subscribed to the international edition of the Asahi Shimbun, a major Japanese daily. A couple of years ago, the newspaper started distributing a digital edition, which allows for easy access to their articles, a trend that overcomes the barriers of national boundaries. In addition to the Asahi, I am now able to monitor five other major newspapers, namely, the Yomiuri, Mainichi, Nikkei, Sankei, and Tokyo; these Tokyo‑based newspapers are all available in Melbourne, Australia, via the Internet. Before visiting Takae in 2010, I  could not recall reading about it in any of the national newspapers. I learned of Takae through my correspondence with a research colleague and an old friend from high school, Yasushi Ikeo. He is an international relations specialist by academic training and has been conducting extensive fieldwork in Okinawa for more than two decades. In contrast, I often read articles about Henoko, another protest site against the US military in Okinawa that has been reported several times in mainstream national dailies and other media. However, Takae was an unheard-of story. My curiosity as a researcher and a former wire service reporter in Japan compelled me to visit Takae. I wanted to see and confirm what was going on in such a small village of only 160 mostly self‑sufficient residents. Takae is set against the backdrop of a sub‑tropical environment recogized as an important habitat for more than 4,000 wildlife species, including 11 indigenous animals, such as the Okinawa woodpecker and rail, and 12 indigenous plants that cannot be found elsewhere in the world (WWF Japan 2007). This area also provides the main source of water for people living on Okinawa’s main island, as it hosts the Fukuji dam, the biggest one in Okinawa Prefecture. In this chapter, I  examine how the coverage of protests is marginalized in Japanese media, using as an example the protest movement in Takae. I explain how the Takae protest case has been reported in media outlets, including local Okinawa newspapers, such as the Ryūkyū Shimpō and the Okinawa Times, as well as in major national Tokyo newspapers. Issues on Takae received little attention from the Japanese major news media. Indeed, Tokyo media continuously ignored the Takae case, thereby creating a huge awareness gap among Japanese people as regards the on-going predicament faced by Okinawa residents. If you read local papers, you encounter local voices and perspectives on the base hosting issue, while the national media primarily refers to central government pronouncements and policies in the context of the US alliance. At times, it seems the national media is pandering to power as they marginalize local voices and dwell on geostrategic considerations and the amount of subsidies funnelled to Okinawa as a quid pro quo for base hosting. As one of Japan’s poorest prefectures, there is an implicit assumption that such subsidies are in the interest of the local people, and that anti-base sentiments are a sign of ingratitude and even a ploy to extract more central government funding. This chapter analyses one aspect of the Okinawan base hosting controversy that reflects badly on the objectivity and quality of contemporary Japanese journalism.

Media side-lines Takae protest   231

Sit-in protest in Takae against the US–Japan security politics In June 2015, the sit‑in protest in Takae marked its eighth anniversary. Takae residents, along with their supporters from aross Okinawa and all over Japan, have conducted a sit‑in demonstration against the construction of USMC helipads since July 2007. They have sought to prevent defence bureau workers from entering the construction site for new helipads. They take turns spending time at various tents set up adjacent to the four gates to the US Jungle Warfare Training Center, each being about two or three kilometers away from the next. Thus, the protest action requires a certain number of people to be effective. The construction of new helipads in Takae is ostensibly part of a joint attempt to reduce the burden imposed by the US bases in Okinawa. In 1996, the Japanese and US governments set up the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Districts in Okinawa (SACO) as a platform to discuss the US military bases in Japan that occupy 18.3 percent of the main land of Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 2015). The discussion ended with the 2006 Roadmap, an agreement stipulating that the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma would be returned to Japan. The US also promised to return half of the Jungle Warfare Training Center area to Okinawa. However, the return of this land was conditional upon the construction of a replacement facility in Henoko, with the same functions and capabilities as the Futenma base. The Japanese and US governments decided to construct six new helipads in Takae to enhance operations at the planned Henoko base. This new set is in addition to the 15 helipads already in use at Higashi-son where Takae is located. Takae residents consider this arrangement an unacceptable additional burden that weighs heavily on their daily lives and despoils the living environment. In particular, they are wary of the possible introduction of MV‑22 Osprey vertical take‑off and landing (VTOL) aircraft in the military training program. The stateof-the-art military aircaft has more destructive power, is capable of flying five times the distance carrying three times as much weight, and travels twice as fast as the CH‑46 helicopters currently in use. One resident told me, [T]he helicopters are so close that we can see from inside our homes the faces of the American pilots when they take off from the existing helipads when my family is eating lunch. On November  25, 2008, the Defense Ministry filed a provisional injunction at the Naha District Court against fifteen of the protestors for obstructing traffic (tsūkō bōgai). The group included an eight‑year-old girl who happened to be with her mother at the protest site; charges were later dropped against the child. For more than a year, while this issue was being deliberated at the Naha District Court, the Defense Bureau was not able to make much progress at site N‑1, where two new helipads are to be constructed.

232  Akihiro Ogawa

In a previous work, Ikeo and I  argued that this was a crucial development in Japanese social movement history, as it is one of the few cases in which the Japanese government prosecuted a peace movement (Ikeo and Ogawa 2010). The Takae residents are mostly farmers, and they are simply asking for a peaceful life. We argued that the presence of helipads breaches “the right to live peacefully” (heiwateki seizon ken), which is guaranteed by the Preface of the Japanese Constitution. This issue also infringes on other rights protected by the Japanese Constitution, such as freedom of thought and conscience (Article 19) and the freedom of assembly and association, speech, press, and other forms of expression (Article 21). Ikeo (2012: 85) argues that the Japanese state is trying to impose the construction of new helipads that undermine the people’s fundamental rights by relying on a compliant judiciary to ratify this decision. The state is duty bound to consult with local people to gain their understanding but only held one briefing session with Takae residents on February 1, 2010 from which non-residents were barred. During the session, Defense Ministry officials never talked about the training routes of helicopters when the new helipads become operational, the types of helicopters to be used, or the frequency of flights, a singularly uninformative briefing. In 2012, the Ospreys arrived at Futenma airbase, but no briefing sessions were conducted for the Takae residents. The Okinawa Times (2012a) reported on February  1, 2012 that defence minister Naoki Tanaka mentioned experimental flights by Osprey to test noise before commencing with full‑scale operations.

Local reports on court battles Two local newspapers in Okinawa published a series of stories about the Takae court case, including reactions of local residents and their supporters, as well as the actions taken by the Defense Ministry. None of this was reported in Tokyo’s media. Below I trace the developments in chronological order. The Ryūkyū Shimpō (2010a) reported that on January 29, 2010, the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a lawsuit with the Naha District Court against two resident leaders, Isa Masatsugu and Ashimine Gentatsu, accusing them of obstructing traffic. They were the leaders of the local residents’ group Herippado iranai jūmin no kai (or the Residents’ Association Against the Helipads). According to the Okinawa Times (2010), the first oral pleading was held in Naha on March 19, 2010; the article’s headline stated that the local residents sought to overturn the Defense Ministry’s helipad construction plans. The article clearly mentioned that the sit‑in action was just a social movement aiming to protect residents’ lives and Okinawa’s natural environment. The other defendant was quoted as saying, “The state summoned me to court for obstructing the helipad construction, but I  am only trying to protect my peaceful life.” Critics call the Ministry’s action a “SLAPP” or “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” Such lawsuits are defined in legal circles as retaliatory lawsuits intended to silence, intimidate, or punish people who use public forums to speak, petition, or otherwise oppose government policy on an issue. The Ryūkyū Shimpō

Media side-lines Takae protest   233

(2011a) reported that the Defense Ministry officials asked the Okinawa police if protesters at the construction site in Takae could be arrested. The Ministry’s intention was revealed during testimony in response to a question raised by Judge Sakai Ryosuke. Responding to Judge Sakai’s question about whether there were plans to arrest protesters if the situation became chaotic or disruptive, a ministry official acknowledged that there was. The Okinawa Times (2011) wrote that Judge Sakai encouraged the Takae residents and Defense Ministry to establish a dialogue because, the judge said, “I do not think the situation will change even [if] I issue a ruling.” However, the dialogue option proved unsuccessful (Ryūkyū Shimpō 2011b). Following up on the judge’s suggestion, the Takae residents and ministry officials met to set the rules for dialogue, but could not reach an agreement. According to the lawyers for the Takae residents, they simply asked for an explanation of the rationale of the construction of new helipads and the deployment of the Ospreys. However, minstry officials did not respond to this request. Although the officials had requested that the judge suggest this option for conflict resolution, apparently they found the resident’s request for clarification unreasonable. The residents had difficulty continuing the discussion under such circumstances and the trial resumed. Although this issue was still pending in court, the Ryūkyū Shimpō (2011c) reported that on the morning of November 15, 2011 the Defense Ministry recommended the construction of the new helipads at Takae in keeping with the partial return of the US Northern Training Area; construction workers only went as far as conducting a survey of the area as forty to fifty protesters rushed to the scene following the arrival of the ministry staff. Construction workers had not visited the site since February 2011, a nine month hiatus. One month later, the Ryūkyū Shimpō (2011d) reported that the trial concluded on December 14, and Judge Sakai would issue a ruling on March 14, 2012. The residents’ lawyers said that the action taken by the state and the judge’s ruling would instigate people’s criticism, and the state should acknowledge the Takae residents’ social movement, which had been “consistently non‑violent.” The lawyers further insisted that the lawsuit represented a SLAPP, and as such an abuse of power. According to the article, Ashimine said, “I want a society in which we can say no [to] what we don’t want” while Isa stated, “I believe it is reasonable to raise the voice of opposition against the aggressive construction.” On March 15, 2012, the Ryūkyū Shimpō (2012a) published a brief report on the March  14 ruling. The District Court ordered Isa to stop staging sit‑ins and other activities aimed at blocking the construction of the helipads. Isa’s sit‑in protest and raising of his hands to prevent gravel bags from being brought in were deemed to exceed the bounds of freedom of expression. However, the court dismissed the government’s claim that the other residents obstructed construction work. The Okinawa Times (2012b) pointed out the unusual nature of this trial: This is not a case [of] residents fil[ing] a complaint against the government; instead, the government filed a complaint against local residents. Before

234  Akihiro Ogawa

discussing the content of the ruling, we want to point out the extraordinary nature of the situation . . . The state sues its nation – this is a very oppressive, high‑handed way of solving the situation; the state refused dialogue with these people by itself . . . This kind of trial would never solve the actual problem like the helipads issue in Takae, which we really need to solve. Furthermore, the editorial mentions Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution that ensures the freedom of assembly and association, speech, press, and other forms of expression. This freedom encompasses the freedom of criticizing authorities. Upholding this freedon is a crucial way to prevent abuses of power, protect civil liberties, and thereby galvanize democracy. The state’s high-handed maneuvers are designed to quell social movements against the state and abridge democractic freedoms. The chilling effect on grassroots activism through SLAPPs represent a failure of policymaking and a shortcoming in Japan’s democracy, exposing a lack of transparency and accountability.

National media’s coverage of Takae As far as I know, the national media’s coverage on Takae was very limited. The national daily Asahi wrote a story on Takae for the first time on March 20, 2012 (Asahi Shimbun 2012a). It appeared in the editorial as “Regarding Okinawa helipads, discuss with local people, even now” (author’s translation). It was accompanied by a report on the decision made by the District Court a week earlier. While calling Takae another Henoko, Asahi’s editorial indicated where Takae is located for the benefit of most people in mainland Japan who have no idea where it is. The Asahi explained that it is a tiny village in the middle of a jungle in northern Okinawa, surrounded by the US military training centre on three sides and by the Pacific Ocean on the east side. Following the 2006 agreement with the US government, six new helipads for US military use were planned, one only four hundred meters away from a residential house. The Asahi (2012a) claimed as follows: The living condition of people in Takae is [similar to] living within the military base  .  .  . American helicopters are repeatedly turning above the residential houses and [their] noise is deafening. When the helipads are completely built, concerns over noise and even possibilities of crash are expanding. Many [issues] including flight routes and noise control are not fully explained. It is natural that people living in the area feel uneasy. The Asahi pointed out that the major reason for the turn of events and the ultimate court ruling was the insincere attitude taken by the Defense Ministry. Takae residents asked officials many times to explain the issue but were rebuffed. Instead, the government carried on with preparations for construction in 2007, sparking residents’ protests.

Media side-lines Takae protest   235

The opinion of Asahi’s editorial was sympathetic to the local residents, urging the state to have a dialogue with the residents primarily because the state filed a lawsuit brought without any explanation or dialogue. It noted that the court is located far from Takae, imposing an additional burden on the residents. Although the construction is within a US military base, the Asahi suggests that the Japanese government could have acted differently. It argued that the “people in Takae are simply asking for an explanation.” It continued, “The Okinawa Defense Bureau should have presented compassion to the local people, the same level [of] compassion [they extended] to the US military. [It] needs to answer the questions and propose measures.” Since that editorial article appeared, the Asahi began to pay more attention to Takae, although its coverage is still limited compared with that of the local newspapers. Examples include a story that the Asahi released half a year after the March 20, 2012 editorial. They ran a story (Asahi Shimbun 2012b) about the Japanese popular singer UA (pronounced as uua in Japanese) who migrated to Takae from Kanagawa Prefecture after the March 11, 2011 disaster. She chose to settle in Higashi‑son, of which Takae is part, largely because the area was not contaminated with radiation stemming from the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdowns. She visited Takae for the first time in 2007, and she was impressed with its rich, even mysterious forest environment. However, UA was also quoted as saying “[l]ife in Okinawa is [filled] with days constantly awaiting war; US military aircraft are flying on top of the forest, and cars carrying soldiers are going back and forth on the road.” UA continued, “I know about the US military base in Okinawa. But now I understand their (Takae residents) suffering a little bit by actually living here. I also understand what the mainland people pretend not to see . . . Why do they build military bases by destroying the forest? Why don’t they listen to voices from Okinawa?” UA speaks of Takae and Okinawa in her own live concerts both inside and outside of Okinawa, and at times joins the sit‑in protest with her one‑year-old son. The article concluded with UA’s comment, “The deployment of Ospreys gains national attention. I become a bridge between Okinawa and mainland Japan. That is my mission as a migrant from mainland Japan.” Another instance of attention to Takae was a documentary entitled Hyōteki no mura (The Target Village) directed by Mikami Chie. Mikami is a news anchor of Ryūkyū Asahi Broadcasting, the TV station in Okinawa known as QAB. The documentary was screened in fourteen prefectures across Japan, including Tokyo and Osaka, and a story covering this movie appeared in the Japan Times (2013), a major Japanese-owned English-language newspaper. The documentary focuses on Takae residents who speak of feeling “targeted” by the US military and the latter’s plan to build six new helipads in the surrounding area. Hyōteki no mura concentrates on the deployment of Ospreys as a symbol of the massive US military presence in Okinawa. The film closely follows the court battle between the national government, the Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Takae residents, as well as sit‑ins and other protest activities by the residents aimed at blocking the

236  Akihiro Ogawa

construction of the helicopter landing zones in the US military’s Northern Training Area. The Ryūkyū Shimpō (2013a) reviewed this film, citing an interesting comment about Takae’s low media profile by one viewer who said: “I didn’t know that the role of media had stopped to the extent that it has.” Mikami further said, “If people see the teary children of Takae in the film, they will no longer say that they want to uphold the Japan–US Security Alliance.” She continued, “People will change their minds for sure when they come to know what is going on in Takae . . . Through this film, I would like people to [consider] who . . . makes the children of Takae cry.”

Further court developments The local newspapers continued to report in detail on the court battle between Takae residents and the Okinawa Defense Bureau. The issues were not reported much in the national media, reinforcing the longstanding marginalization of Okinawa in general and the people of Takae’s struggle against the state. On June 26, 2013, the Ryūkyū Shimpō (2013b) reported on its front page that on the previous day the Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court rejected Isa’s appeal of the district court judgment against his protesting the construction of US military helipads in Takae. The Fukuoka High Court turned down Isa’s appeal for three reasons: (1) the series of actions taken by Isa exceed what is tolerable; (2) the lawsuit is not a SLAPP; and (3) the series of actions taken by the Okinawa Defense Bureau do not constitute abuse of power. There may have been national media reports on the Naha court decision but I was not able to find any, suggesting it was not considered a significant story. A year later, on June 18, 2014, both the Ryūkyū Shimpō and Okinawa Times reported the Supreme Court’s decision ordering the residents to stop activities aimed at blocking construction of the helipads. The residents lost the lawsuit, a major setback for all Okinawans who resent being handed the disproportionate burdens of maintaining the US alliance while yet again the national media didn’t think this was an important story. It was reported on the front page as the top news. The Ryūkyū Shimpō (2014a) succinctly summarized the seven-year judicial battle, noting that the Supreme Court ruled against Takae residents, calling for a cessation of protests to block construction and rejecting Isa’s appeal. The local newspaper followed up with an editorial on the following day (Ryūkyū Shimpō 2014b) asserting: The ruling is unjustifiable from the viewpoint of democracy in Japan . . . The resident opposing [the] construction asserted that he invoked his constitutional rights to express his ideas freely. He regarded the lawsuit by the Defence Bureau as vexatious and unjust. However, the court turned down his appeal without explaining [the] reasons, asserting that the lawsuit did not violate the Constitution. The decision made by the court lacked substance and was not adequately considered. It amounts to an abandonment of its mission to guard the Constitution and uphold human rights.

Media side-lines Takae protest   237

In the appeal court decision, the judge stated the obstruction of traffic was intolerable for the government. However, it did not give a specific explanation for the limits of acceptability. The Supreme Court upheld that decision. Conversely, the ‘limits of acceptability’ is an expression appropriated by residents to refer to issues such as noise pollution in lawsuits against the government. According to the principles of constitutionalism and popular sovereignty, the court has mistaken the essential for the insignificant by turning down the appeal from the resident on the grounds that their activities exceeded the limits of acceptability for the government. If the judiciary routinely supports the government’s stance, the consequences to society would be detrimental and significant. The local editorial added, We fear the court decision in the Takae case will lead to suppressing citizens’ rights to express themselves and protest against the government. We are also concerned the Japanese judiciary system will prioritize what the government and big companies want to do over human rights and democracy. However, we must not stop protecting human rights and democracy. Remarkably, Takae is at the forefront of international politics, although such a tiny village in northern Okinawa gets little national attention and, inexcusably, is mostly ignored in mainstream Japanese discourse about human rights and democracy. In fact, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in Geneva has written to the Japanese government requesting an explanation about the plan to relocate the USMC Air Station Futenma to Henoko, Nago. The Japanese government has denied any discrimination against Okinawan people and asserted that the current plan is the best option. These details appeared in an article in the Ryūkyū Shimpō (2012b) by a reporter covering a meeting of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Foreign Affairs Division. As regards the planned new helipad construction at Takae, the paper quoted the CERD report, “Residents and the local assembly members have continued to oppose the construction. We are concerned about this.” This is an example of how gaiatsu (foreign pressure) is invoked to express the views of the weak public versus the strong state because the high stakes make it dangerous for domestic actors to express similar sentiments. Regarding construction of new helipads in Takae and the possible deployment of USMC MV‑22 Ospreys there, in 2015 Okinawa Governor Onaga Takeshi expressed his opposition and his administration has consistently demanded that the Ospreys be removed from Okinawa (Ryūkyū Shimpō 2015b). Strong local opposition is repeatedly reported in the local newspapers. For example, in 2014, Seikyu Iju, a village mayor of Higashi-son, said at the village assembly, “I have strongly requested that the Okinawa Defense Bureau not [allow] its construction trucks [to] go through the village. I will block them physically” (Ryūkyū Shimpō 2014c). As mentioned earlier, this issue is not simply domestic politics or a local Okinawan issue; this relates to international affairs and the US alliance. These

238  Akihiro Ogawa

voices were silenced in the national media, helping to amplify a gap in perceptions between Okinawans and mainlanders that is a crucial blind spot in discussions concerning Japan’s security policy and the US alliance. Mainstream security discourse is thus based on a skewed understanding of the dynamics of hosting bases and citizen’s efforts to influence policies that vandalize their living environment and sense of tranquillity.

Concluding reflection The national media’s longstanding failures on Okinawan issues in general, and Takae in particular, highlight Japanese journalism’s weakness. I would say it is also the Japanese reporters’ negligence to reach out to grassroots movements, engage in conversation, share daily experiences, and develop trust. These elements are essential for understanding the dynamics of the anti-base movement and writing meaningful articles, but editors often have other agendas and getting along with the powers that be, and avoiding their wrath, leads to self-censorship. (See Fackler Chapter 3) But ignoring local people means losing potential news sources. The Ryūkyū Shimpō (2015c) reported on February 26, 2015 that local citizens confirmed that the US military had carried out MV‑22 Osprey aircraft training at a newly built helipad. Below is an excerpt: According to residents who saw the Osprey flight training, the aircraft landed on N4‑2 helipad once at 11:23 am, and flew over the sky in an area close to N4. At around 4:20 pm, another flew to the area and then landed on N4‑2 and N4‑1 helipads. Upon landing, the aircraft blew dust and generated huge noise. The paper then pointed out, The construction of two helipads in the N4 area was completed in July 2014. The Japanese government provided them to the US military on February 17 (2015). However, the military used these helipads two times before they were officially handed over. This was a follow‑up to an article by the same local paper 10 days earlier (Ryūkyū Shimpō 2015d) that the Japanese and US governments agreed to provide two touchdown areas in N4 area, which is the closest to Takae village, before returning the land occupied by the US military to landowners. In fairness to journalists, however, the job is demanding even when only covering specific beats; that is, going outside one’s beat to cover issues of interest is difficult to accommodate in one’s schedule, based on my experience. Before starting graduate school, I was a staff reporter at a major Japanese wire service for five years when I was in my late 20s. This type of grassroots coverage, soliciting information from the local people and raising awareness about a controversial issue,

Media side-lines Takae protest   239

would be a worthwhile pursuit for any journalist, but requires backing from editors and a major shift in how the media operates. I covered Tokyo financial markets for two and half years at the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Bank of Japan. Packed in a press club from nine am to nine pm (often even later), primarily expected to catch the comments of ministry officials and key businesspersons, many reporters based in Tokyo are exhausted in their daily routines. Worse, they become co-opted by their informants and come to see issues the same way or risk losing access (see Ogawa 2014). I was scared that I was losing my independent, critical mind as a journalist when I was working in the press club system that the government relies on to manage the news. Many reporters choose to survive without seriously considering these issues, essentially becoming dutiful salarymen rather than journalists; it is a safe choice and a well-paid, prestigious, and secure job. My experiences as a reporter in Tokyo were in stark contrast to my initial experiences when I  covered Gunma Prefecture, around 100  km away from Tokyo. I enjoyed the daily interactions with the local people, while covering the police, court, and government offices at the prefectural and municipal levels. Interaction with them was part of the real thrill for journalists, and I  was told by the most respected senior reporters, “You should meet one new person every day; we can make an appointment with whoever he/she is if you have this business card with this company’s logo.” (My employer, Kyodo News) Observing the current Japanese journalism as an outsider (but not entirely, since I know how Japanese journalists work), I realized that most of the Tokyo reporters lack the time and energy to meet local people in person, and there are no incentives to do so and disincentives for investigative reporting that challenges the state. In fact, how many Tokyo‑based staff reporters of major news media have visited Takae? None, I assume. I know they cannot do it technically, as only Okinawa‑based reporters are allowed to cover Okinawa. They cannot stray beyond prefectural borders, and I was even scolded by the bureau chief when I chased my informant to Yamanashi Prefecture from Gunma Prefecture without his permission. It was a ridiculous moment in my reporter’s life. It shows, nonetheless, that technicalities do limit media reporting. Indeed, the rigid structure of Japanese journalism limits not only the scope and depth of reporting, but also militates against compassion and service to the public. Under such a system, the “Takaes of Japan” will continue to be “unheard,” a convenience for the state that should be an embarrassment for the media.

Note * The chapter was written before July 2016, when the Japanese government resumed the Takae helipad construction, prompting considerable media coverage.

References Asahi Shimbun (2012a) “Okinawa heripaddo, imakara demo jimoto to hanashi wo” [“On Okinawa helipad, discuss it with local people, even from now”], March 20, www.asahi. com/ajw/paper/editorial20120320.html#Edit2.

240  Akihiro Ogawa

Asahi Shimbun (2012b) “Kichi wo kobamu haha to shite kashu UA san, Okinawa no itami uttaeru” [“Popular singer UA appeals for anti military sentiment among Okinawan as a mother”], September 9, www.asahi.com/special/futenma/SEB201209080070.html. Ikeo, Yasushi (2012) “Takae ku no helipaddo kensetsu hantai und kara mieru nichibei anzen hoshō taisei no mujun” [“Inconsistency of Japan-US Security arrangements: From the viewpoint of anti-construction of helipads, Takae, Okinawa”], Shakai shisutemu kenkyū, 25: 79–96. Ikeo, Yasushi, and Ogawa, Akihiro (2010) “Protecting the right to live peacefully: A report from Takae, Okinaw,” Global Change, Peace & Security, 22(3): 377–383. Japan Times (2013) “Film depicts Okinawans’ fight against Ospreys”, August  12, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/12/national/social-issues/film-depicts-okina wans-fight-against-ospreys. Ogawa, Akihiro (2014) “New Journalism in Japan: Using Independent Digital Sources for Social Research,” in Anthony Rausch (ed.), Japanese Journalism and the Japanese Newspaper: A Supplemental Reader, Amherst, NY: Teneo Press, 55–74. Okinawa Prefecture (2015) Okinawa no beugun oyobi jieitai kichi [Bases of US military and Japanese Self Defense Forces in Okinawa], www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/chijiko/ kichitai/toukeisiryousyu2703.html. Okinawa Times (2010) “Jūmingawa, kikyaku motomeru” [“Local residents asks the court for rejection”], March 20. Okinawa Times (2011) “Irei no hanashiai teian” [“Judge proposes to make a dialogue between the residents of Takae and officials of the Okinawa Defense Bureau”], August 26. Okinawa Times (2012a) “Osuprei kennai demo hikō” [“Osplays to schedule experimental flights in Okinawa Prefecture”], February 1. Okinawa Times (2012b) “Shasetsu: ‘Hyōgen no jiyū’ no keishi da” [Editorial: This is a disrespec of ‘freedom of expression’ ”], March 15, Ryūkyū Shimpō (2010a) “Bōeikyoku ga jūmin teiso, jumingawa wa kōgi seimei” [“The Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a suit against the residents of Takae, and the local residents released a statement against the bureau’s action”], January 30. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2011a) “Taiho shiya ni keibi irai” [“The Okinawa Defense Bureau asked the Okinawa Politce to put the arrest protesters in the construction site in Takae with a possibiltiy”], August 24, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-180838.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2011b) “Hanashiai ketsuretsu” [“Dialogue divided”], September 22. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2011c) “Takae heripaddo kensetsu, kuni ga kōji saikai” [“Japanese government restarts construction of the Takae helipads, resulting in stand-off with residents”], November 16, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-184128.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2011d) “Takae heri soshō ga kesshin” [“Litigation on Takae helipad was concluded”], December 15, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-185226.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2012a) “Jumin hitori ni bōgai kinshi meirei, Takae helippado” [“The district court order one resident not to obstruct”], March 15, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/ prentry-188665.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2012b) “Kenmin sabetsu wo hitei, seifu kokuren shokan ni kaitō e” [“Japanese government denies discriminating against the Okinawan people on the Futenma issue”], March 15, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-188663.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2013a) “QAB seisaku eiga ‘hyōteki no mura’ Mikami kantoku shireba kokoro ugoku” [“Ryūkyū Asahi Broadcasting Makes Documentary Film ‘The Target Village’ ”], September 5, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-212092.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2013b) “Nishin mo bōgai nintei, Jūmin zenmen haiso” [‘High court also approves traffic obstruction, Takae residents lose high court battle”], June  26, http:// ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-208595.html.

Media side-lines Takae protest   241

Ryūkyū Shimpō (2014a) “Takae soshō jōkoku wo kikyaku, saikōsai jūmin haiso ga kakutei” [“Supreme Court turns down Takae lawsuit appeal”], June 18, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/ news/prentry-227168.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2014b) “Shasetsu, takae soshō jōkoku kikyaku, tsumi bukaki saikōsai no seifu tsuijū” [“Editorial, The Supreme Court’s decision on Takae lawsuit is unjustifiable”], June 19, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/editorial/prentry-227203.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2014c) “Shūraku tsūko wa soshi, higashi sonchō, takae chakurikutai no kōji sha” [“Higashi Mayor to block US helipad construction vehicles from passing through village”], December 17, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-236054.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2015a) “Betonamu mura naibu shashin hakken” [“Pictures of Vietnam Village were found”], April 15, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-241771.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2015b) “Takae chakurikutai yōnin sezu, Onaga chiji hatsu no kenkai” [“Governor Onaga does not approve construction of helipads in Takae”], December 8, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-184731.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2015c) “Osupurei ga shin chakurikutai de hatsu kunren, higashi-son Takae” [“US military carries out Osprey training at new helipad in Takae for the first time”], February 26, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-239490.html. Ryūkyū Shimpō (2015d) “Helippado no senkō teikyō takae juminra ga kōgi” [“Takae residents protest against Japanese government agreeing to provide land for US helipads before returning region’s land occupied by US military”], February 16, http://ryukyush impo.jp/news/prentry-238973.html. WWF Japan (World Wide Fund for Nature Japan) (2007) “We demand and end to the helipad construction in the US armed forces northern training area”, July 14, www.wwf. or.jp/activities/2007/06/651814.html#eng.

18 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRESS FREEDOM IN OKINAWA Hideko Yoshimoto

Okinawa was under U.S. administration from 1945 until 1972. Despite reversion to Japanese administration in 1972, Okinawans remain ambivalent about their role as a garrison island still hosting most of the U.S. military bases. 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender, prompting debate among Okinawans about the legacies of war and their role as pawns in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In 1965, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku visited Okinawa as a guest of the U.S. as part of a public relations campaign called Operation Friendship to welcome the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to Okinawa since the end of the war in 1945. These PR concerns drew on intertwined anxieties: The U.S. still occupied only this part of Japan, Japan was a subordinate alliance partner, and Okinawans still felt resentment for being sacrificed by Tokyo at war’s end. Okinawans paid a high price in terms of lost lives and destruction of their island, and this war memory has not abated. The friendship theme was invoked again in 2011 in Operation Tomodachi (friendship) following the March 11 tsunami when U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa contributed to rescue and relief efforts in cooperation with Japan’s Self Defense Forces. This generated significant goodwill in Japan overall, but had little impact on Okinawan opinion concerning the base presence. This chapter analyzes the meme of friendship and what it exemplifies about the triangular relationship and the lingering legacy of the twenty-seven year U.S. administration and the press censorship that prevailed. In addition, I  analyze media representations of the current anti-base movement in Okinawa and how these are framed in the context of the alliance. Freedom of speech in Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of Japan, should be considered from a different perspective from that of mainland Japan, as it was separated from the mainland after World War II. Although the United States embraces and advocates civil liberties, the U.S. military and civilian administration controlled the freedom of speech of local Okinawan media and people

Press freedom in Okinawa  243

during the long occupation. Prior to Japanese surrender, the imperial government of Japan had suppressed the freedom of speech of Okinawans, but even after the WWII ended, throughout the Cold War, press censorship continued under the U.S. despite its professed ideals. The U.S. administrators controlled the freedom of speech of local civilians, using both hard and soft power, to support the U.S. military presence, since Okinawa was regarded as an important “keystone of the Pacific.” After the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972, the situation gradually changed, but a certain historical legacy of this militarism-centered censorship remains where the U.S. and Japanese military bases are concentrated. This chapter reviews the historical background of U.S.-occupied Okinawa and examines its legacy regarding freedom of speech in contemporary Okinawa.

1  Different memories In preparation for the U.S. Military postwar occupation of Okinawa, JCS 1231, called the Directives for Military Government for Japanese Outlying Islands, was issued on January 12, 1945. After landing on Okinawa, based on Section 18 of the JCS political directives, Admiral Nimitz issued a series of proclamations, called the Nimitz Proclamations, that abrogated Japanese laws and Tokyo’s control over these islands (Yoshimoto 2015: 93–98). These proclamations included some speech control ordinances for Okinawans, stating that all publications, and radio, telephone, and civilian communications, be censored. All Japanese imperialistic thoughts and activities were prohibited, and civilians who surrendered to the U.S. occupation forces were taken to civilian camps to prevent them from hindering the final U.S. invasion of mainland Japan. The Nimitz Proclamations were the first instance of postwar speech control in Okinawa. They proclaimed martial law over local residents and instituted capital punishment for anyone found attempting to disturb radio communications of the United States forces as well as those carrying weapons and/or spying. More importantly, local residents were prohibited from carrying radio receivers and/ or engaging in photography, printing, or publishing any newspapers, magazines, books or pamphlets. It also prohibited Okinawans from attending any meetings or movies. In addition, there was a ban on communicating and exchanging information with enemies (Japanese) through radio, telegraph, telephone, or written notes. The purpose of this wartime information control was to prevent espionage or spying. According to the records of the Legal Department of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter, USCAR), a successor organization of the U.S. Military Government for immediate postwar occupation, the Nimitz Proclamations was revoked by the issuance of another special proclamation No. 32 on July 5, 1949 (Yoshimoto 2015: 236). However, the U.S. Military Government did not officially announce this revocation, and Okinawans continued to live in fear of being arrested by the U.S. military police on suspicion of spying (Nakano and Arasaki 1965: 54). During the Battle of Okinawa

244  Hideko Yoshimoto

(April 1–June 22, 1945), Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC) investigated civilians while providing food and medical services. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, CIC continued to monitor “communist” elements in Okinawan communities until 1972 in line with Cold War concerns. As a result of this monitoring, even after the Nimitz Proclamations was revoked, Okinawans did not feel they enjoyed freedom of speech throughout the U.S. occupation period. Censorship was not only a result of JCS directives, but was also included in the field manual of the U.S. Department of Army and Navy. The field manual states that the Military Government needed help to establish a newspaper if the occupied territory had no newspaper. Since no mass media survived the Battle of Okinawa, the U.S. occupation force had to begin establishing a postwar newspaper in Okinawa. Uruma Shimpo, a handwritten mimeographed newspaper was the first in postwar Okinawa, launched in late July 1945 at a civilian camp with support from U.S. newswires such as the Associated Press and United Press. The field manual also stated that newspapers should be used for collecting local intelligence. Knowing the United States aimed to collect local intelligence from the Uruma Shimpo, Okinawan editors and reporters intentionally avoided writing and publishing local news. Therefore, foreign news dominated the early issues, but it was welcomed as the only information source for war-weary Okinawans. More importantly, on August 15, they found out about the Japanese surrender from this U.S. supported newspaper. It was a different experience from mainland Japan, where people heard about the surrender from the Emperor’s radio announcement. Since most Okinawans did not listen to the Emperor’s announcement accepting the Potsdam Declaration on August  15, 1945, their war memory regarding Japan’s surrender differs from that of mainlanders. Interestingly, Okinawans commemorate the end of World War II on June  23, the day the Battle of Okinawa ended, while mainland Japanese mark the occasion on August 15.

2  Democracy education The U.S. postwar programs for Okinawans were different from those for Japanese mainlanders. While postwar education programs in mainland Japan started soon after the General Headquarter of Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (GHQ/ SCAP) established its education unit, called the Civil Information and Education (hereafter, CIE) Section in Tokyo in October 1945, the first CIE activities began in Okinawa in early 1948, three years after the war ended. This was coincidentally at the same time as the enactment of the Smith-Mundt Act that determined U.S. public diplomacy policy throughout the Cold War. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 originally gave the Secretary of State authority over U.S. public diplomacy programs. However, in Japan and Okinawa, the Army exercised this power because it was the executive agency for the occupation. Thus this diplomatic role was transferred to the Army, and it became responsible for disseminating American democratic values. In this sense, it can be argued that U.S. public diplomacy toward Japan and Okinawa was colored by militarism from the very beginning.

Press freedom in Okinawa  245

In Naha, currently the prefectural capital of Okinawa, the CIE Department was established within the U.S. Military Government and dispatched its mobile units showing American movies all over the Ryukyu Islands including Miyako and Ishigaki, the westernmost islands close to Taiwan. Five information centers including libraries and community halls promoted the Smith-Mundt information programs to educate Okinawans about American democracy. In 1948, the CIE permitted publication of the Okinawa Times, the second postwar newspaper established by Okinawan editors and reporters. The first was the Uruma Shimpo that became independent of the U.S. military as a commercial newspaper and was renamed the Ryukyu Shimpo. However, the CIE censored the content of Okinawan newspapers, banning antiAmerican articles, ironically undermining America’s democratic principles and free speech in order to maintain U.S. administrative authority in Okinawa. The CIE programs for Okinawans served as a prototype for the style of U.S. public diplomacy typical of the United States Information Agency established in September 1953, including showing movies and promoting international student exchange programs. Five principle components of the U.S. public diplomacy programs were listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting (Cull 2008: xviii). Okinawan newspapers were regarded as media for listening to local voices and advocating U.S. political and cultural values. CIE’s information centers for cultural exchange, students and leader exchange programs and international broadcasting started in 1950–1951. Interestingly enough, those programs started in Okinawa prior to the establishment of the USIA by the Eisenhower administration, but the purpose of these programs was much more explicitly political and propagandistic in Okinawa than similar programs in mainland Japan. On September 1950, the first post-WWII prefectural-wide election was conducted. Prior to the election, three candidates expressed their political opinions in the Okinawan newspapers. Matsuoka Seiho, the Director of the Engineering Department of the Okinawan civilian government under the supervision of the U.S. Military Government, declared that good cooperation between Okinawans and the U.S. Military Government should be maintained. Taira Tatsuo, supported by farmers and teachers associations, called for the establishment of a local legislative body, but did not mention what country Okinawa should belong to. The third candidate, Senaga Kamejiro, who subsequently became a leader of the reversion movement calling for transfer of administrative authority from the U.S. to Japan, at that time did not mention that Okinawa should rejoin Japan and suggested that Okinawa should be independently governed. Taira was elected as Okinawan governor in the 1950 election. Taira later wrote in his memoir that voicing criticism against the U.S. military government was banned from speeches at any public meetings (Taira 1963: 149–150). The CIE democratization campaign emphasized American values, but in reality freedom of speech was not permitted. For example, the U.S. Military Government suspended the publication of Jinmin, a semi-official magazine of Senaga’s Okinawa People’s Party, for disclosing alleged corruption involving U.S. aid to Okinawa during the

246  Hideko Yoshimoto

election campaign period. Under the U.S. occupation, the Okinawan press was not allowed to serve as watchdog or hold the government accountable.

3  Press censorship In December  1950, the U.S. Military Government was abolished, and its successor, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), was newly established by the fourteenth amendment of the wartime directive JCS 1231. USCAR administered Okinawa until 1972, and CIE was reorganized as a division of USCAR and changed its name to Public Affairs Department in 1957. From 1957 to the reversion of 1972, the Public Affairs Department monitored the Okinawan press, and a news translation series called “news morgue” was used as a tool to acquire local information for the U.S. authorities. When news deemed “anti-American” developed, a USCAR public affairs staff visited the Okinawan pressroom and “advised” editors and reporters to be “cooperative or friendly” to the United States. The Okinawan press reluctantly agreed to such censorship because they feared suspension of publication. USCAR staff referred to their advisories as “psychological warfare” towards Okinawans, fully understanding the explicit intimidation (Yoshimoto 2015: 273–274). The 526th Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC) stationed at Fort Buckner kept watch over anti-American speech and activities viewed through the ­anti-Communist prism of Cold War anxieties, monitoring speech not only of political parties or labor unions, but also non-political study groups and women’s small reading clubs. Gathering local information or intelligence might be routine work for a peacetime government, but Okinawa under the U.S. administration was a peculiar case in that the local intelligence gathering by CIC served to buttress the military presence and stifle dissent. The U.S. not only circumscribed press freedom but also tried to influence the outcome of elections, thereby subverting democracy. In 1965, the Civil Administrator of USCAR monitored the political situation in each voting district of the Okinawan legislative election. USCAR supported pro-American candidates with campaign money from the “High Commissioner’s General Fund,” a discretionary budget for the U.S. theater commander in Okinawa who, as the highest ranking military officer, also served as high commissioner, the highest political post. 1965 marked a turning point in the reversion of Okinawa to Japan when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku visited Okinawa as the first postwar prime minister of Japan. At the same time, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Okinawa Democratic Party, both conservative groups, began to cooperate toward achieving reversion. This was matched by intensified negotiations between the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and USCAR regarding the Okinawa problem. USCAR public affairs officers planned a PR campaign called Operation Friendship to highlight the good relationship and military alliance between the United States and Japan, furnishing a local crowd waving Japanese flags with no smiles along the road of Sato’s

Press freedom in Okinawa  247

parade to suggest a lack of enthusiasm about reversion and filmed the orchestrated scenes. Meanwhile, another crowd of anti-base Okinawans made a large demonstration in front of the hotel where Sato was supposed to stay and demanded direct talks with the prime minister. Sato declined the petition from his prospective citizens and did not meet a representative of the group. Several pro-reversion demonstrators, including college students, were arrested. Unable to return to the hotel from a dinner party at Kadena Air Base, Japan’s prime minister stayed in U.S. military accommodations until the next morning. The Japanese press reported the event, focusing on Sato’s speech on arrival at Naha Airport, saying “Japan’s postwar will not end without reversion of Okinawa,” a line that became the political jingle for reversion. The Okinawan press reported favorably about Sato’s visit and the demonstrators. Interestingly, the American press reported satirically that the Japanese prime minister was “welcomed” by local “leftist mobs” and protected by the U.S. military. The U.S. media coverage was not welcomed by USCAR public affairs officers, but Washington started to realize the nature of the so-called “Okinawa problem” (Yoshimoto 2015: 326–327). The image of the Japanese prime minister rejecting direct talks with his citizens and seeking refuge in the U.S. military base is ironically suggestive about the postreversion triangular relationship between Tokyo, Okinawa, and the United States: Japan’s prime minister sides with the U.S. military interests at the expense of ordinary Okinawans, who don’t support the base. Operation Friendship attempted to highlight a favorable human relationship between the United States and Japan, but the spin-doctors could not camouflage the fact that the bilateral relationship was unequal and subordinated Okinawans to the Pentagon. In 1970, a traffic accident involving US servicemen ignited the brewing frustrations and bitterness of Okinawans, erupting into clashes that eventually involved some 5,000 Okinawans and several hundred American soldiers. The Koza riots exposed the anger of Okinawans fed up with Americans committing crimes involving islanders and not being held accountable for their actions. Rioters torched cars and establishments catering to soldiers and broke into Kadena Airbase where they razed some buildings, including the offices of the Stars and Stripes, the military’s newspaper. Dozens were injured and eighty-two people arrested for this outburst. Asahi Shimbun, a Tokyo-based newspaper, reported the riot in the front page as an “anti-American fire attack (yakiuchi).” However, the Okinawan newspapers described it as a “disturbance (soudou),” euphemistically minimizing the significance of what was an unprecedented, violent riot, reflecting the impact of U.S. press supervision. Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration in 1972. USCAR ended its role of supervising the local mass media and monitoring the people as Okinawa became a prefecture of Japan. But the U.S. military bases continued to occupy many parts of Okinawa prefecture, and Japan’s Self Defense Forces also came to Okinawa. Okinawan press positions toward the reversion were mixed, celebrating reversion

248  Hideko Yoshimoto

while criticizing the continued U.S. military presence. Even after reversion, however, the local press was not completely anti-base and remained ambivalent about the U.S. military presence, much like Okinawan political leaders, perhaps a legacy of the occupation era of censorship and pressure to stifle anti-American sentiments.

4  Press bashing Supposedly, freedom of speech in Japan, including Okinawa, is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. But how about press freedom in contemporary Okinawa? The press is expected to work as a watchdog, but unfortunately the Japanese media including the Okinawan press is often more like a “lapdog,” submissive after a long history of censorship by the U.S. and Japanese governments. (See Fackler Chapter 3) Episodically, there are moments of acute public anger that burst into the news, propelled by accumulated resentments. This was the case of the largest ever Okinawan demonstrations held in Naha in 2007 protesting textbook revisions instigated by then-Prime Minister Abe. The revisions called on publishers of secondary school textbooks to modify passages suggesting that Japan’s Imperial Armed Forces instigated group suicides by Okinawans during the Battle of Okinawa. For Okinawans this is tantamount to heresy as there are numerous eyewitness accounts by survivors, who recount how Japanese soldiers distributed grenades and did instigate group suicides. Abe’s efforts to blur responsibility sparked an angry backlash and lengthy battle that demonstrates that wartime history, and an abiding sense that Tokyo betrayed Okinawans, remain vibrant aspects of contemporary discourse among Okinawans that informs their anti-base sentiments. There is a David versus Goliath mentality as the one  million islanders stand up against the powerful central government, a scenario that played out on the tiny island of Taketomi, where in 2013 the Ministry of Education sought to override the local school board’s choice of textbooks and replace it with a more conservative text. (See McNeill Chapter 12) Such bullying tactics add fuel to the fires of local resentment. Okinawan governors have long tried to stonewall Tokyo on issues related to U.S. bases and campaign successfully by promising to stand up to Tokyo. But, Okinawa is one of Japan’s poorest prefectures and depends on central government subsidies and public works spending, giving the central government significant leverage. In 2014 former Governor Nakaima Hirokazu discovered the costs of betraying islanders’ trust as he lost his bid for reelection in 2014 because he had cut a deal with PM Abe, allowing work to proceed on the proposed Henoko base in exchange for a massive increase in subsidies. Nakaima had a record of opposing the base but probably figured that the base would go through no matter what he did, as Tokyo gets its way in the end, and thus bargained for a handsome price. But this pragmatic capitulation in the face of power transformed him into the Judas of Okinawan politics and lead to his defeat by Onaga Takeshi, who

Press freedom in Okinawa  249

opposed the Henoko base project. Onaga was a conservative politician supporting the LDP, but he transformed into an ardent opponent of plans to build a new base in Okinawa to replace the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma and rescinded the permission given by his predecessor to commence work on the new facility at Henoko. Legal battles with the central government ensued and remain unresolved as of April 2016, but as Ogawa argues in Chapter 17, the track record for mediation and court decisions is not favorable toward Okinawan interests, and whatever accord emerges, it is unlikely to resolve the simmering resentments caused by the disproportionate base-hosting burden; about 75  percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan are located in the islands, covering 18.4 percent of the islands’ total land area. The base issue is represented in various ways in the media, but overall the mainstream media tends to reflect central government views that prioritize the alliance over local concerns. Local opposition is sometimes portrayed as an artful shakedown, providing useful leverage in negotiations over how much the central government allocates to offset the burden of base hosting. Security concerns about China and North Korea are invoked to justify the U.S. military presence, while local opposition is often portrayed as the work of outside agitators because some mainlanders do join the demonstrations out of solidarity and a shared embrace of pacifism. But it would be misleading to suggest that outsiders are driving antibase demonstrations, as local concerns sustain the activism. This view is prevalent in the local media. (See Ogawa Chapter 17) 2015 marked the 70th anniversary year of the Battle of Okinawa and the end of World War II. The Okinawan press featured a series of article to commemorate their World War II experiences from spring to summer. Okinawan newspapers feature articles differed from those of mainland press in presenting at length the personal voices of those who experienced the war and postwar period. The Okinawa Times commemorated the anniversary year mainly with a series of “machidane” news, a type of interview-based community news focusing on ordinary people – a strong point of local newspapers. To commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa on June 23, 2015, the Okinawa Times carried English translations of those war memories. It was as if the war of seventy years ago has not yet ended. Thus, the dominant local narrative was anti-war because up to one third of the islands’ population, over 100,000 people, died in the Battle of Okinawa, sacrificial pawns in a war that was already lost. It is this experience of being caught in-between, and paying a staggering price, that informs Okinawan’s anti-U.S. base sentiments. This awkward arc of history stretching from the pre-surrender Japanese military’s transgressions as overlord in Okinawa to the postwar U.S. military’s arrogance of power as the occupying power makes locals acutely sensitive to Tokyo’s casual disregard of their voices and being treated yet again as a pawn, now in the Tokyo-Washington alliance. Ironically, this alliance is ostensibly based on shared values, including democracy, but the repeated election of politicians eager to downsize or close the bases and regain control over local affairs is superseded by the alliance, one that ignores the

250  Hideko Yoshimoto

democratic voice of Okinawans. Thus, the reversion of Okinawa has not altered the reality that Tokyo and Washington talk over the heads of locals, deciding their fate without their input, a situation in which the mainstream media is complicit. Traditionally, the mainstream Japanese press takes its cues from the government through “kisha clubs,” where reporters are fed news by officials and act more like stenographers than journalists. Thus, the national narrative privileges government views, while only local news media present a narrative based on local voices and perspectives. This is how Okinawans are marginalized in alliance discourse. They must endure the disproportionate base-hosting burden, preferably in silence, or face the consequences. On June 25, a study group promoting revision of the war renouncing Article 9 of the U.S. written Constitution adopted by Japan in 1947 lashed out against the Okinawan media for its criticisms of PM Abe’s security policies and efforts to strengthen the alliance at the expense of Okinawan interests. This Okinawan press bashing session was held at LDP headquarters in Tokyo. Hyakuta Naoki, the well-known right-wing author of The Eternal Zero depicting a WWII Japanese kamikaze pilot, was a guest speaker for the study group. He said that the two main Okinawan newspapers should be put of business, and others suggested that this could be achieved by cutting ad revenues by pressuring sponsors to stop advertising in these outlets. Okinawa was yet again in the crosshairs of unabashed militarists who, like in wartime, can’t abide to hear the Okinawans’ voices; in wartime Okinawa, locals caught speaking in Okinawan dialect could be summarily executed as suspected spies. The modern method of muzzling Okinawans was to squeeze their newspapers’ revenues. In the summer of 2015 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his ruling Liberal Democratic Party rammed through the Diet a set of security bills aimed at easing constitutional curbs on Japan’s military. Opposition parties criticized that the bills will make Japan into a garrison state again, and hundreds of thousands of citizens protested in front of the Diet against the bills, but to no avail. In comparison with the Okinawan press, the mainland media focused on the ideological debate regarding the pros and cons of Article 9, the war-renouncing clause of the Japanese constitution. The media representation of Tokyo-based newspapers did not convey the horrific realities of war experiences that are at the heart of Okinawan disquiet and media coverage. There is a fear that a clash of external forces will play out in Okinawa and concern that subordination of local concerns to larger geostrategic considerations will not end well for islanders. It is not about constitutional debate per se, but rather anxieties fueled by a sense that the winds of war are blowing again in East Asia and could prove a devastating typhoon for Okinawa. Do the bases make us safer or are they a bull’s eye? In Tokyo’s rightwing nationalist tabloids, those expressing such sensible worries are portrayed as Chinese agents selling the nation out, a groundless accusation that reminds Okinawans of dated Cold War propaganda. From the perspective of the Okinawan media it is Tokyo that is betraying the islanders, still beholden to the U.S. and following orders.

Press freedom in Okinawa  251

References Cull, Nicholas J. (2008) The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nakano, Yoshio and Arasaki, Moriteru (1965) Okinawa Mondai Nijunen (Okinawa Problem Twenty Years). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Taira, Tatsuo (1963) Sengo Seikai Uramenshi: Taira Tatsuo Kaisoroku (Postwar Politics Hidden History: Taira Tatsuo Memoir). Naha: Nanposha. Yoshimoto, Hideko (2015) Beikoku no Okinawa senryo to joho seisaku: Gunjisyugi no mujun to kamofuraju (U.S. Public Diplomacy and Occupation of Okinawa: Camouflaging the garrison state’s dilemma). Yokohama: Shumpu Publishing.

PART V

PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion

19 SPIN OVER SUBSTANCE? The PR strategies of Vladimir Putin and Abe Shinzo Tina Burrett

At first glance, Vladimir Putin and Abe Shinzo seem very different leaders, but on closer inspection the two have much in common. Both came back to lead their nations in 2012 after a period out of office. Putin won a third presidential term after a four-year sabbatical as prime minister during which his protégé Dmitry Medvedev ostensibly took the helm as president. Abe staged a more surprising comeback five years after his first premiership ended ignobly after just one year in September 2007. Both leaders owe their electoral success to their carefully crafted and constantly evolving public relations strategies. But the same PR strategies that sustain their present powerbase threaten to undermine their future legacies. Today, Putin and Abe lead countries facing comparable domestic political and economic difficulties, along with declining international status. In the 1990s, Russia lost its superpower status while simultaneously suffering an economic crisis. By the time Putin became Russian president in January 2000, at home and abroad, Russia was regarded as weak. Similarly, Japan lost its economic super power status following two decades of stagnation. In 1995, Japan’s gross national income accounted for 15 per cent of the world’s total but just 4.9 per cent in 2015. It will fall to a mere 1.7 per cent in 2100 if the current trend continues (Yoshida 2015). Compounding domestic insecurity and waning international influence, Japan is no longer the largest economy in Asia and number two in the global economy, after being overtaken by China in 2010. Facing mounting challenges, Putin and Abe came to office determined to resuscitate their countries’ pride and international image. In rebranding their nations, both leaders have linked economic and national revival. In a speech headlined ‘Japan is Back’ given in Washington in February 2013, Abe argued: ‘Japan must stay strong, strong first in its economy and strong also in its national defence’ (Pilling 2013). Once in power, both men leveraged their initial personal popularity to mobilise public support behind their plans for renewing national strength.

256  Tina Burrett

Putin and Abe sold their leadership to voters under the banner of political stability and economic growth. Headline-grabbing economic policies coupled with a savvy PR strategy delivered early successes. But today, it is clear that Russia and Japan are not becoming more political stable nor economically better off. The Russian economy contracted by four per cent in 2015, and disposable incomes have been falling since 2013 (Economist 2016). Since Abe was re-elected for a third term in December 2014, the Japanese economy has performed unevenly, falling into recession in mid-2014, swinging between quarters of growth and contraction in 2015 and then swooning in early 2016, with foreign investors heading for the exits amidst a gathering gloom. Growing public impatience with lacklustre economic performance has spurred a nationalist, anti-democratic turn in the policy-making and PR pronouncements of both leaders. This chapter  compares the evolution of Putin and Abe’s PR strategies. The first section below investigates the aims of these strategies. The main themes and target audiences for Putin and Abe’s PR communications are then analysed, followed by a discussion of the PR techniques employed by both leaders. The chapter concludes by examining recent negative developments for media freedom in Russia and Japan.

Political power and the purpose of public relations At its core, political power is about the relationship between leaders and their followers. Even in the most authoritarian regimes, leadership is an interaction between individuals, rather than action by one individual. As Robert Tucker writes, ‘Leadership is a process of human interaction in which some individuals exert or attempt to exert, a determining influence on others’ (1981: 11). James MacGregor Burns similarly focuses on the interaction between leaders and their followers in explaining political power: Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers. (1978: 18) A leader’s reputation is essential in convincing people to follow, or at a minimum to accept a leader. For Pierre Bourdieu, political power is largely symbolic. It is the process by which ‘agents confer on a person . . . the very powers they recognise in him’, giving that person credit to ‘impose beliefs’ and ‘recognised principles’ (in Bennister et al. 2015: 418). John Thompson similarly conceptualises political power as a form of symbolic power that imbues its holder with ‘the capacity to intervene in events, to influence the actions and beliefs of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms’ (2000: 98). In exercising symbolic power, leaders draw on various kinds of

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  257

resources, including their reputation, popularity and accumulated prestige, assets that Thompson terms their symbolic capital (ibid). Thompson argues that the use of symbolic power is not incidental or secondary to the struggle for political power, but essential to it: Anyone who wishes to acquire political power or to exercise it in a durable and effective fashion must also use symbolic power to secure the support of others within the political sub-field and within the broader political field. (2000: 102) Since a leader’s symbolic power depends on his stock of symbolic capital – that is his reputation and prestige – anything that threatens these resources may also weaken his capacity to exercise political power. The mass media, as the principal medium through which politicians in Russia and Japan communicate with ordinary citizens, is the primary means by which leaders accumulate symbolic capital. As a result, the media has become the key arena in which Russian and Japanese political elites play out their struggle for symbolic power. Given its impact on the accumulation and exercise of symbolic power, it is unsurprising that politicians of all hues devote considerable resources to influencing the media. Robert Entman writes that even democratic governments attempt to intimidate and influence the media: [P]erhaps the most thoroughly documented of all findings by communications scholars is that government officials and quasi-official elite sources heavily shape many dimensions of the news. (1989: 115) Despite the authoritarian tendencies of the Putin regime, nevertheless public opinion in Russia constitutes an important force in determining the outcome of inter-elite political struggles, if only ‘as a symbol of itself’ (Zasursky 2004: 95). Political commentator Grigory Vinokurov argues that public opinion played a significant role in the information wars waged between Russia’s oligarchs in the late1990s, even though it never became a reality and manifested itself only as a threat: The argument that the manipulators present as evidence of their own might to the arbiter on whom the making of decisions depends, is not the strength of public opinion, but precisely and solely the interpretation of this strength, and the imparting of an exaggerated significance of its form. (as quoted in Zasursky 2004: 95) In increasing his influence over the domestic media, Putin has attempted to build up his support among Russian citizens as a store of symbolic capital affording him greater leverage with Russia’s elites (Burrett 2011). Furthermore, although elections in Russia have ceased to be genuinely competitive under Putin, electoral

258  Tina Burrett

outcomes remain vital in conferring legitimacy on the system he has constructed since 2000. High voter turnout for Putin provides a popular mandate with which to replenish his stock of personal power, allowing him to circumnavigate elites who, given the opportunity, would hold him hostage to their interests. Although Japan is an established democracy, low levels of public interest in the political process renders politics an elite-centred pursuit, with power concentrated in the hands of professional politicians and bureaucrats (Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). As in Russia, however, public opinion matters in Japan as a symbolic resource in the competition between political elites. Japanese prime ministers who lose public confidence are quickly hounded from office. Personal approval ratings of 25 per cent or less are a cue for the prime minister’s rivals to strike (Burrett 2016). Maintaining public approval with an effective PR strategy is essential in pursuing, exercising and replenishing political power in both Russia and Japan.

Themes and target audience In his first year back in office from December 2012, Abe enjoyed approval ratings of 60–65 per cent, apart from a dip of approximately 10 per cent following passage of a controversial Secrecy Bill in November 2013 (See Stockwin Chapter 8 and Yamada Chapter 9), from which he quickly recovered (NHK 2015). Abe was able to build a broad coalition of public support by centring his PR campaign on plans to revitalise the Japanese economy. In no small measure, public optimism regarding Abe’s tri-partite economic strategy was central to his election as prime minister in December 2012. Dubbed Abenomics, this strategy is based on the ‘three arrows’ of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing and structural reforms. In May 2013, The Economist described Abe’s plan as ‘a mix of reflation, government spending and a growth strategy designed to jolt the economy out of the suspended animation that has gripped it for more than two decades’ (Economist 2013). The cover of the same issue of the magazine was emblazoned with a picture of Abe as an economic superman, wearing a mock-up of the famous comic-book hero’s outfit. After two lost decades, Japanese voters wanted to believe that Abe’s plan would be the magic bullet to save the economy. The details of his plan were less important to voters than Abe’s confident and consistent advocacy of his economic strategy. At Abe’s insistence, aggressive quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) led to a sharp drop in the value of the yen in 2013. This increased profits for Japan’s multinationals, whose overseas earnings suddenly became more valuable when converted back into yen, resulting in a record year for the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Confidence in the economy helped deliver victory for Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and their coalition partners New Komeito in the July  2013 upper house elections. Once commanding a majority in both parliamentary chambers, Abe turned his policy and PR focus from the economy to security reforms. Abe returned to power in December 2012 amid growing tensions with China over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a group of rocky islets in the

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  259

East China Sea. China’s assertiveness over the Senkakus, leading to multiple confrontations between Chinese and Japanese vessels around the islands, has been used to sell Abe’s constitutional and defence reforms to an electorate that maintains pacifist inclinations. Although many Japanese citizens share Abe’s concerns over growing insecurity in East Asia, fewer share his conviction that a more overt nationalist agenda is the answer. Data suggests that more than half of Japanese voters disapprove of Abe’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution to allow for collective self-defence (Yoshida 2014b). But voter disengagement and the absence of a credible alternative leader mean that the unpopularity of some of Abe’s security reforms has not threatened his electoral performance. A combination of biases in the electoral system, low voter turnout and weak opposition parties has given Abe a parliamentary majority based on support from less than a quarter of eligible voters. In the December  2012 lower house election that returned Abe to power, the LDP won fewer votes than in 2009 when it lost to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Turnout in 2012 was 59 per cent, 10 per cent lower than in 2009. In the 2013 House of Councillors election, in the proportional ballot, the LDP gained just 16 per cent of all available votes. At the 2014 general election, in the single member and PR ballots combined, the LDP received support from just 21.4  per cent of eligible voters, while turnout was 52.7 per cent, a new post-war low. Declining turnout at elections means Abe can afford to focus his PR strategy on mobilising the minority of Japanese voters who share his hawkish, nationalist ideology. Abe has adopted a similar PR strategy to that followed by right-wing parties in Europe – emphasising a set of beliefs that combine capitalism with social order, authority, stability and national pride. A strategy combining capitalism and nationalism is what Herbert Kitschelt calls the ‘master case’, and allows rightwing leaders, including Abe and Putin, to build a winning coalition of both blue collar and business class voters (1995: 19). Vladimir Putin first became Russian president following Boris Yeltsin’s dramatic resignation on New Year’s Eve 1999. As prime minister, Putin became acting president, positioning him to win presidential elections scheduled for March  2000. Putin’s popularity was boosted by his successful direction of the second war in Chechnya, which began with the Chechen invasion of Dagestan on 7 August 1999. It was the outbreak of war that prompted Yeltsin to promote the little-known Putin – then head of the Security Council – to the role of prime minister just two days after the Chechen incursion into Dagestan. As prime minister, Putin was able to capitalise on the patriotic emotions engendered by the Chechen conflict. Jingoistic coverage of the war on state-owned television helped Putin build his public image as a shrewd commander and strong leader. Prior to his appointment as premier, Putin was a relatively unknown figure outside the political elite. When he took office as prime minister in August  1999, only two  per cent of Russian voters identified Putin as their choice to replace Yeltsin (VCIOM 1999). But his obscurity was an advantage for Putin, allowing him to create his public persona from scratch. Television coverage showing Putin

260  Tina Burrett

planning tough action against Chechens terrorists, inspecting troops and taking part in martial arts competitions transformed him from a rather colourless state security officer into the strong leader Russians desired (Burrett 2011: 23). Basing his 2000 presidential campaign on the ambiguous slogan ‘Great Russia’, Putin was able to satisfy the competing expectations and interests of diverse domestic constituencies. In the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, Putin won by a wide margin, gaining support from neoliberals, post-Soviet communists and Russian nationalists alike. High economic growth during his first two terms sustained Putin’s approval ratings at an enviable 70 per cent. Following the 2008 global financial crisis – which hit the resource-dependent Russian economy harder than most – public support for Putin began to decline (Osipov 2012). Putin’s re-election for a third term in March  2012 was met by major public demonstrations. In response to these protests, Putin’s PR rhetoric shifted to focus on threats from alleged internal and external enemies. His domestic detractors have been labelled as a privileged elite, disconnected from the concerns of the majority of Russians outside Moscow. The best-educated elements of the population are portrayed as traitors to their country, perhaps in the pay of the United States (Krastev and Holmes 2012: 44). Similarly, in a speech in January 2015, Putin asserted that pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine were not just fighting the Ukrainian army but also a NATO-sponsored ‘foreign legion’ (Sperling 2016: 17). After losing the confidence of cosmopolitan Russians, Putin has turned for support to provincial Russia, to voters who fear territorial and cultural disintegration. Like Abe, in his third term, Putin has focused his PR strategy on engaging core supporters who share his conservative, nationalist instincts. At a campaign rally ahead of the March 2012 presidential election, Putin warned against ‘foreign threats’, and vowed to uphold Russia’s sovereignty (Clover 2012). The 2014 Ukraine crisis gave Putin the perfect opportunity to ignite nationalist sentiments on which to build a new base of anti-Western support for his leadership just as he was losing public backing based on economic performance (Treisman 2014). To maximise his patriotic capital, Putin chose Russia’s annual holiday commemorating victory in WW2 to make his first visit to Crimea after the peninsula was annexed by Russia in March 2014 (Luhn and Walker 2014). Putin’s Ukraine strategy worked as intended, re-inflating his flagging approval ratings. A public opinion survey conducted in March 2014 gave him an 80 per cent approval rating, up from 63 per cent a year earlier (Levada 2014). Pegging his domestic popularity to military campaigns in the former Soviet Union has boosted Putin’s support at home but undermined relations with neighbours and allies overseas. Outside Russia, Putin’s nationalism is much less appealing and even counterproductive to the state’s authority in the international arena. During his first two terms, assisted by his chief communications advisor Vladislav Surkov, Putin performed a delicate balancing act, crafting different PR messages for domestic and international consumption. The Russian president devoted considerable energy to sustaining the image of a democratic Russia overseas, while building an increasingly authoritarian system at home. Surkov, who studied

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  261

drama before turning his hand to politics, is the author of oxymoronic slogans such as ‘managed democracy’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ to describe Russia’s unique form of governance under Putin (Kommersant 2006). Following the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the 2014 annexing of Crimea, Putin has abandoned any pretence at playing by diplomatic or democratic rules. Increasingly, Russia’s internationally focused PR aims to sow discord targeting Western hegemony in the global system. In relation to Crimea, for example, Russia manipulated residual anti-colonial resentments in India, Brazil and South Africa to convince all three countries not to back Western-led sanctions against Moscow (Pomerantsev 2014: 23). Abe’s nationalism has also led to several own goals in the field of international diplomacy. Aiming to foster greater international support for Japan in its territorial disputes with China and South Korea, Abe set up a new office to coordinate policy and PR on sovereignty issues.1 It is doubtful, however, whether the extra resources devoted to PR on the Senkaku Islands has improved international understanding of Japan’s position. Officials’ efforts to build support for Japanese sovereignty by stressing solidarity with other nations facing territorial claims from China have been undermined by aggressive posturing and equivocation on historical issues from Abe and his LDP colleagues.2 By sending a tribute to an annual ceremony honouring Japanese war criminals and devoting precious parliamentary time to debating wartime sexual slavery (‘comfort women’) issues, Abe makes it difficult for other nations, especially those occupied by Japanese forces in WW2, to vocalise support for Japan on the Senkakus (McCurry 2014a). Abe’s assertive rhetoric on historical issues and on Japan’s relations with China has courted controversy beyond Asia. In January 2014, Abe caused quite a stir in Europe and the U.S. by likening Japan’s current relationship with China to that between Britain and Germany before WW1 (Asahi Shimbun 2014).

PR techniques In constructing their domestic and international communications, Putin and Abe draw on many of the same PR techniques. These techniques are compared below.

1  Personality politics Building a cult of personality as a mode of governance has been a Russian tradition from Peter the Great to Joseph Stalin. Putin has revived this tradition, attempting to mobilise support for his administration with a cult around his leadership rather than through shared ideological commitments (Goble 2015). Putin is a charismatic leader with a rare gift for theatrics. The proliferation of Putinimages presented by the press are internationally notorious: bare-chested outdoor man, biker, hockey star, fighter pilot, nightclub crooner and, most theatrically, the tamer of Siberian tigers (Schuler 2015: 137). But as Max Weber theorises, charisma is more about demand than supply. Charismatic leadership is most likely

262  Tina Burrett

to be found at times of crisis, where it appears to offer a way out of the current chaos. For Weber, although the charismatic leader may have exceptional skills, equally he or she may not in fact possess the ‘extraordinary’ qualities their followers perceive. Charisma is in the eye of the beholder (Bell 2011: xxv). The key to the phenomenon is that followers believe the leader to be superhuman (ibid: xxvii). When Putin became president in 2000, after more than a decade of political and economic turmoil, Russian voters wanted to believe that he was the hero for whom they had been waiting. But by 2012, they had grown tired of Putin’s PR stunts. Even his friend and spin-doctor Gleb Pavlovsky referred to Putin’s increasingly desperate antics as ‘narcissistic’ (Masuk 2012). Toughness has always been central to Putin’s image. But in response to his flagging popularity in his third term, on the advice of U.S. PR firm Ketchum, masculinity and militarism have become more obvious elements of Putin’s PR strategy (Somiya 2014). Putin is portrayed as Russia’s saviour, the embodiment of the country’s strength and its defender against Western powers seeking to emasculate the Russian nation (Sperling 2016). Although Abe has preferred to keep his shirt on, strength and bravado are equally as important to his PR message as they are to Putin’s strategy. Poor health was the official reason given for Abe’s 2007 resignation. But in staging his comeback, Abe’s PR team  – that includes former Prime Minister Koizumi’s imagemaker Isao Iijima – used Abe’s recovery to build a narrative of personal strength, drive and discipline in the face of adversity.3 To prove his newfound vigour, in his first 18 months back in office, Abe criss-crossed the globe visiting 42 countries. Despite his jet setting, however, Abe was unable to hold summits with leaders in Beijing or Seoul, his obfuscation when asked about Japanese atrocities in Korea and China during the first half of the twentieth century having derailed bilateral relations. But in refusing to kowtow to Chinese sensitivity over historical issues, Abe hoped to define himself as a tough defender of national interests. By visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine – that holds the souls of 14 Class A war criminals as well as commemorating Japanese war dead – in 2013 Abe dramatically demonstrated that he would not allow China to dictate Japan’s domestic and international policies. Domestically, Abe has little to lose in upsetting Beijing – as by September 2012, Japanese public distrust of China had reached 84.3 per cent (Wang 2013). Territorial tensions between China and Japan allowed Abe to follow his natural nationalist impulses in campaigning for re-election in 2012. Tough talk on security and diplomacy was backed up with images of Abe in military fatigues aboard a tank, reviewing the honour guard at the Ministry of Defence, and posing in the cockpit of an Air Self-Defence Forces (SDF) T-4 training jet. The latter stunt caused an outcry in China and Korea, as the number 731 emblazoned on the plane corresponds to the notorious unit in the imperial Japanese Army that conducted lethal experiments on Chinese and Korean colonial prisoners (Arudou 2013). Within the context of confrontation with China, Abe’s PR team correctly calculated that releasing his nationalist tendencies would prove a vote winner – a

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  263

risky strategy in a country where pacifist principles remain prevalent. Abe has been assisted in his reinvention from nationalist ideologue to commander-in-chief by Japan’s right-wing press. The prime minister is frequently featured flanked by the SDF on the front pages of Japan’s major conservative dailies. During his first year back in office, Abe was personally more popular than his party (Figure 19.1). LDP campaign posters for national elections in 2012 and 2013 were emblazoned with photos of a resolute looking Abe with the slogan ‘Take Back Japan’ (Figure 19.2). The party’s economic strategy was stamped with Abe’s personal brand. Abenomics set the media abuzz with talk of bold reforms. Yet, far from a revolution, Abe’s economic plan looks a lot like what Japanese governments have been doing for twenty years, only with better marketing (Pesek 2014: 186). The verdict on Abenomics may still be out, but successful or not, Abe is the only Japanese prime minister with an economic theory bearing his name.

2  Momentum To keep the spotlight focused on their leadership Putin and Abe’s PR operations rely on a constant stream of policy announcements, public appearances and international visits, all transmitted to the public via traditional and new media. Abe’s PR team have won plaudits for their use of Twitter and Facebook to keep control of the political message and directly interact with voters.4 At the start of 2016, Abe had almost 60,000 followers on Twitter, compared to 1,900 for his 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Abe FIGURE 19.1 

LDP

Public Approval of Abe and the LDP 2013

Source: Seiji ishiki getsurei chōsa [Political Awareness Monthly Survey], accessed at www.nhk.or.jp/ bunken/yoron/political/index.html on 2 April, 2016.

264  Tina Burrett

FIGURE 19.2 

LDP 2012 election poster

predecessor, Prime Minister Noda. Understanding that a striking image is worth a thousand words, Abe’s spin doctors cannily engineer photo opportunities to send symbolic messages. In 2013, to demonstrate his commitment to the business community and win their support for his inflationary policies, Abe became the first

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  265

prime minister in a long time to attend the New Year’s reception of the influential Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (Legewie 2013). The same month, to send a message of openness, television cameras were invited to film the first cabinet meeting of the year, instead of the traditional photograph of ministers sitting stiffly in the antechamber (Sieg 2013). The liberal inclinations of first lady Akie Abe have also been deployed with great aplomb by her husband’s PR team. Her support for LGBT rights, scepticism of nuclear power and love of Korean pop culture serve as a useful counterbalance to Abe’s nationalist politics (Japan Times 2014). To create the illusion of progress, Abe’s advisors have mapped out a steady stream of economic policy announcements. Womenomics – the prime minister’s plan to improve Japan’s poor record on female appointments in politics and the boardroom  – is perhaps the best example of why Abe’s economic policies are more PR than reality. In November 2013, Abe hailed a government survey finding that women’s participation in the labour market had hit a record 63 per cent. What Abe did not mention, is that most of these women are part time and temporary workers, receiving low pay, few benefits and no job security (Pesek 2014: 193). The weakness of Japan’s opposition parties helps Abe get away with such blatant spin. Few Japanese prime ministers have understood the transformative power of political theatre. But Abe’s PR team have been effective at creating political drama through which to demonstrate Abe’s leadership qualities. For example, prior to his re-election as prime minister, Abe picked a fight over monetary policy with the then-governor of the BoJ Shirakawa Masaaki. In so doing, Abe was able to demonstrate his decisiveness, dedication to economic recovery and willingness to take on the establishment. The BoJ was a well-chosen target, as it is of little interest to the Japanese public and has few connections with vested interests within the LDP. The element of surprise is also part of Abe’s political stagecraft. His decisions to visit Yasukuni, reinterpret rather than revise Japan’s constitution, and to call a snap general election in 2014, all took commentators by surprise. Unexpected actions have helped both Abe and Putin remain at centre stage. Putin’s interventions in Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015 surprised the world. Domestically, his foreign adventures were a PR masterstroke, stoking patriotic passions, reinforcing government narratives and drawing attention away from everyday hardships. Thanks to his role as the embodiment of an internationally resurgent Russia, Putin has managed to improve his popularity during one of the worst economic crises in recent Russian history. Despite tumbling oil prices and Western-led sanctions that sent the Russian economy into recession in the third quarter of 2014, Putin’s approval rating hovered around 80 per cent (Figure 19.3). The Kremlin’s influence over Russian television guarantees Putin’s adventurism maximum exposure. Despite the Internet’s growing presence, television remains the most important medium of political communication in contemporary Russia. Among the young and middle-aged, however, the Internet is making significant progress. Putin’s PR team are thus working hard to establish a strong

266  Tina Burrett

100.0 90.0

80

80.0 70.0

64

40.0

83

82

86

69

60.0 50.0

86

64 35

35

30.0

65

34

30

16

20.0

18

10.0

13

15 14

0.0

Approve FIGURE 19.3 

Disapprove

Putin approval and disapproval ratings 2013–2014

Source: www.russiavotes.org.

online profile. Special sites have been set up to promote Putin and his policies, including Kremlin.ru, the president’s official site, but also unofficial sites like Vladimirvladimirovich.ru. The Kremlin has also set up news sites to control the messages disseminated to Russian voters, including Strana.ru, Vz.ru and Rian.ru (Belousov 2012: 58). English-language rolling news network Russia Today (RT) was established in 2005 as a rival to the likes of CNN and the BBC to put the Russian government’s spin on international events.

3  On message Clear consistent messaging by all members of Abe’s government has created a positive cycle of policy expectation and execution during his second premiership. Even Finance Minister Taro Aso, infamous for his gaffes, has been on message on Abenomics. Abe’s first administration was undone by a series of scandals involving senior ministers and advisors that sank his approval rating to 29  per cent. A spell in opposition between 2009 and 2012 as well as a tighter PR operation encouraged greater self-restraint among LDP representatives during Abe’s first 18 months back in office.5 By autumn 2014, however, there were signs that PR discipline within the LDP was slipping. Abe’s government was hit by three scandals in as many weeks. In late September, three members of Abe’s cabinet were linked to groups promoting Nazi ideology and hate crimes towards Japan’s ethnic Korean community (McCurry 2014b). In October, two cabinet ministers were forced to resign over

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  267

accusations of election finance irregularities (Yoshida 2014b). Then, just days later, newly appointed minister Miyazawa Yoichi was forced to acknowledge that his staff had used office expenses to visit a sadomasochism-themed bar. Although these scandals hit Abe’s approval ratings, with no clear intra-party rival in sight, his position as prime minister remained secure. To minimise the chance of PR blunders, Abe has limited his exposure to spontaneous questioning by the media. On returning to office, he quickly abandoned the twice daily Q&A sessions with reporters that were skilfully used by Prime Minister Koizumi, but that tripped up many of his predecessors, including Abe (Sieg 2013). In his second term, Abe has preferred set piece interviews and press conferences with handpicked journalists. In the main, Japan’s media outlets have been willing to concur with the new rules of the game. If reporters write stories that the government or powerful companies don’t like, press-club membership can be revoked, sources and access dry up and advertising dollars evaporate, thus engendering a timorous media. Closed-door meetings between Abe and media executives are further weakening journalists’ appetite for confrontation with the government. In January 2016, Watanabe Tsuneo, editor-in-chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun hosted a dinner for the prime minister and representatives of some of Japan’s leading media outlets (McNeill 2016). Cosy relations between media proprietors and politicians are not unprecedented. Media tycoon Rupert Murdoch developed close relationships with both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. But although it is not publicly known what Abe discusses with media executives at social gatherings, a clear conflict of interest exists. Back in 2001, Abe pressured NHK to modify a documentary covering a people’s tribunal on Japanese war crimes against women, a case that rings alarm bells about current media-government collusion (Kingston 2013: 231–234). The second time around, Abe’s government has paid attention to the timing of its announcements as well as to the content of its communications.6 For example, negotiations with North Korea over Japanese abductees were put back on the table during the collective self-defence debate as a means of generating support for Abe, who made his name championing this issue in the past. To appease supporters of the pacifist constitution, collective self-defence was introduced along with measures for the SDF to take part in UN peacekeeping missions. Soon after raising the consumption tax in April 2014, the government announced plans to cut corporate taxes (Soble 2013). In December 2015, to placate Abe’s angry right-wing backers, a landmark agreement with Seoul on wartime sex slaves was followed by talk of further constitution revision and the establishment of a permanent joint SDF HQ (Tisdall 2015; Japan Times 2016). Finally, to limit political backlash, both the Secrecy Bill and the decision on collective self-defence were passed at the very end of a Diet session. On assuming office in 2000, Putin quickly concluded that the best way to keep unflattering stories out of the news was to keep information away from journalists in the first place. In an attempt to limit government leaks to the press, Putin shunned the personal friendship of journalists and encouraged members of his

268  Tina Burrett

government and administration to do the same. Putin created a ‘rapid reaction unit’ that was charged with discrediting any journalist or report criticising his administration. In 2002, Putin’s government initiated amendments to the law ‘On Elections’ that made it harder for journalists to ask candidates probing questions (Lambroschini 2003). To reduce unfavourable media coverage of the war in Chechnya, the Kremlin tightened rules governing the accreditation required to report from the province and set up a designated press service to provide journalists with positive information from the front. Like Abe, Putin has limited his exposure to unwanted questioning by avoiding unscripted press conferences and interviews. At every election since 2000, Putin has refused to take part in televised presidential debates with rival candidates, declaring himself too busy with his duties to take part in campaign activities (EIM 2000: 38). Fortunately for Putin, state-controlled television channels are always on hand to show precisely how energetically he is not campaigning all across the country. Again like Abe, Putin prefers set piece interviews to communicate with voters. Most important in this regard is Putin’s annual televised Q&A Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, a cross between a town hall meeting and interview format carefully choreographed to look spontaneous (Schuler 2015: 142). Voters call in questions or put them live to Putin in the studio, giving the impression of a direct link between the president and the people. During his 16  years at the top of Russian politics, Putin has made few PR blunders. A  rare misstep came early in his presidency following the sinking of the Kursk submarine on 12 August  2000. As it became apparent that offers of international rescue assistance had been accepted too late to save the stranded sailors, media indignation became focused on Putin, who had remained on holiday in Sochi throughout the incident. News reports on TV channels owned by Russian oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were especially critical of Putin (Burrett 2011). These reports drew unflattering comparisons between Putin’s secretive handling of the disaster and the conduct of his Soviet predecessors. Symbolically, the Kursk disaster allowed Putin’s opponents to question his election promises to restore Russia’s national pride and international standing (Sakwa 2004: 83). Negative media coverage threatened to undermine the president’s authority by weakening the public support on which it was based. The Kursk incident taught Putin that to retain popular confidence and achieve his ambitions to restore the power and prestige of the state, he must strip the oligarchs of their television empires and bring the media under Kremlin control.

Shooting the messenger In an attempt to silence criticism of their leadership, both Putin and Abe have moved to limit media freedom. In Russia, legal loopholes and the murky financial dealings of media-owning oligarchs have provided Putin with useful tools for restructuring the media sector. Soon after Putin became president, prosecutions were launched against media tycoons Berezovsky and Gusinsky, forcing both into

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  269

exile. In their place, the Russian media became financially beholden to entities close to the Kremlin, with negative consequences for press freedom. Although under the influence of the oligarchs Russia’s media fell short of the fourth estate ideal, they provided audiences with an imperfect form of pluralism. By the end of Putin’s first presidential term in March 2004, all of Russia’s main television channels and much of the print media had been brought under either direct or indirect state control (Burrett 2011). On Putin’s watch, harassment and violence against journalists in Russia has increased dramatically. New security laws passed in the face of on-going terrorism place draconian restrictions on what, when and where journalists can report. By 2016, Russia had slid to 148 out of 180 countries on the Reporters Sans Frontières World Press Freedom Index (RSF 2016). In 2015, the Committee to Protect Journalists ranked Russia the tenth most dangerous country in the world in which to be a journalist (CPJ 2015). Facing a barrage of criticism on the progress of Abenomics and a backlash again his security reforms, Abe has also attacked the bearers of bad news. Formal and informal pressure on the media by his government began soon after his return to power. In autumn 2013, Abe appointed four individuals with right-wing political views close to his own to the 12-member board of governors of national broadcaster NHK. The four then helped appoint Abe-loyalist and fellow ideological traveller Momii Katsuto as NHK’s new chairman. Momii immediately caused a stir by saying he would not challenge government policies on territorial issues and by defending Japan’s wartime sex slave system (Yoshida 2014a). In early 2016, three TV journalists known to be out of favor with the Abe administration left their posts in circumstances suggesting government pressure. Moreover, Abe has also changed the legal framework under which the media operate. The 2013 Secrecy Act includes increased penalties for journalists working with government whistleblowers. Ministers have also indicated their willingness to pressure journalists and punish their employers. In February 2016, Abe’s Minister of Internal Affairs Takaichi Sanae suggested that broadcasters who failed to show ‘fairness’ in political coverage could lose their licenses under a previously little used law mandating neutrality in the news (Washington Post 2016; see Yamada Chapter 9). The open intimidation of journalists represents a new low in government meddling with the media. The Abe administration also has the foreign media in its sights. Carsen Germis, the Tokyo correspondent for Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from 2010–15, claims government representatives refuse to speak to foreign reporters because they ask uncomfortable questions about Abenomics, nuclear energy and revision of the Constitution. Germis’ editor in Germany received a visit from the Japanese consul general who passed on objections from Tokyo after the newspaper ran one of his stories about Abe’s historical revisionism. The consul general accused Germis of peddling pro-Chinese propaganda in exchange for cash from Beijing (Germis 2015). Other foreign journalists recount feeling pressure and know that they risk being blacklisted by Abe’s press handlers if they criticise the PM’s policies. Abe’s international critics are labelled Japan-bashers, an

270  Tina Burrett

evasive manoeuvre that avoids engaging the facts. Under the auspices of Abe’s Internet strategy advisor, Upper House member Yamamoto Ichita, the LDP is monitoring foreign reporting on Japan and rebuking journalists on its website. Yamamoto contacts offending authors through social media or by commenting on their Internet publications. He and his tech-savvy team scrutinise articles by about 30 international correspondents for ‘mistakes’ about Abe’s policies. Yamamoto’s comments and any responses he receives are discussed as part of his weekly webcast (Nakazaki 2016). Government spin doctors also attempt to interfere with journalists’ choice of sources. Officials warned correspondents not to interview Nakano Koichi, a respected political scientist at Sophia University, whose critical assessments of Abe’s revisionist views on history are widely quoted in the international press (Kingston 2015). Successive Japanese governments have attempted to pressure the media, but the tactics used are uglier under Abe. Japan’s media remain more free and robust than their Russian counterparts. Yet in 2016, Japan fell to 72nd place on the Reporters Sans Frontières freedom index, down from 11th in 2010.

Conclusion Initially, Putin and Abe’s PR machines proved adept at both creating and meeting public expectations of their leadership. Later, however, as gaps appeared between reality and what was promised, both leaders increasingly drew on dramatic gestures and nationalist rhetoric to distract voters from their shortcomings. To stem his declining approval ratings and regain the political initiative, in December 2014, Abe called a snap general election. But in the absence of progress on the economy, his theatrics had little impact. Putin’s surprise interventions in Ukraine and Syria have been more successful in restoring his domestic popularity, but at the expense of Russia’s economic stability, international image and diplomatic relations. Reliance on personality politics has deprived Putin and Abe of a mandate for more than a few headline-grabbing policies, limiting the scale of their reforms. As progress on their agenda has slowed, both leaders have attempted to pressure the media for more favourable coverage. The goals of neither leader warrant gutting democratic institutions of their integrity. Sadly, shallow PR and a decline in media freedom may come to be the main legacies of both Putin and Abe.

Notes 1 The Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty (Ryōdo shuken taisaku kikaku chōsei-shitsu), www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo/index.html. 2 Author’s interview with official in the Office of Global Communications, July 2014. 3 Author’s interview with Japan Times journalist, June 2014. 4 Author’s interview with Fuji TV journalist, September 2013. 5 Author’s interview with LDP Diet member, July 2014. 6 Author’s interview with Japan Times journalist, June 2014.

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  271

References Arudou, D. (2013) “Japan brings out the big guns to sell remilitarization in U.S.” Japan Times, 6 November. Asahi Shimbun (2014) “Abe needs to acknowledge world’s concern about Japan-China tension”, January  29, www.asahi.com/ajw/article/views/editorial/AJ201401290033 (Accessed July 5, 2015). Bell, D.S. (2011) “Editor’s Introduction: Political Leadership in the Contemporary West”, in D.S. Bell (ed.), Political Leadership, London: Sage, xxi–xlii. Belousov, A. (2012) “Political propaganda in contemporary Russia,” Russian Politics and Law, 50(3): 56–69. Bennister, M.,‘t Hart, P. and Worthy, B. (2015) “Assessing the authority of political officeholders: The leadership capital index,” West European Politics, 38(3): 417–440. Burns, J.M. (1978) Leadership. New York: Haper and Row. Burrett, T. (2011) Television and Presidential Power in Putin’s Russia. London: Routledge. Burrett, T. (2016) “Explaining Japan’s revolving door premiership: Applying the leadership capital index,” Politics and Governance, 4(2), 36–53. Clover, C. (2012) “Putin turns up nationalist rhetoric”, Financial Times, February 23. CPJ (2015) “Getting away with murder.” Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org/ reports/2015/10/impunity-index-getting-away-with-murder.php (Accessed April  8, 2016). Economist (2013) “Abe’s Master Plan”, May 18. Economist (2016) “Russia’s wars: A strategy of spectacle”, March 19. EIM (2000) “Monitoring the Media Coverage of the March 2000 Presidential Elections in Russia: Final Report”, Düsseldorf, European Institute for the Media. Entman, R. (1989) Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Germis, C. (2015) “On my watch”, Number 1 Shimbun, April 2. Goble, P. (2015) “Putin’s personality cult exceeds Stalin’s ‘by every measure’.” Euromaidan, 30 April, http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/04/30/putins-personality-cult-exce eds-stalins-by-every-measure/#arvlbdata (Accessed April 6, 2016). Japan Times (2014) “First lady Akie Abe joins Tokyo rainbow pride parade,” April 27. Japan Times (2016) “Japan eyes permanent joint HQ for SDF,” March 13. Kingston, J. (2013) Contemporary Japan: History, Politics and Social Change since the 1980s. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Kingston, J. (2015) “Foreign media feels the heat from prickly government minders,” Japan Times, May 2. Kitschelt, H. (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Kommersant (2006) “Vladislav Surkov Razvel Demoikratiiu Na Suverennuiu i Upravliaemuiu [Vladislav Surkov Spreading Sovereign and Managed Democracy]”, Kommerant. ru, June 29, http://kommersant.ru/doc/686274 (Accessed April 11, 2016). Krastev, I. and Holmes, S. (2012) “An autopsy of managed democracy,” Journal of Democracy, 23: 33–45. Krauss, E. and Nyblade, B. (2005) “ ‘Presidentialization’ in Japan? The Prime minister, media and elections in Japan.” British Journal of Political Science, 35(2): 357–368. Lambroschini, S. (2003) “Under new media laws, journalists are damned if they do, damned if they don’t.” RFE/RL, September 19, www.rferl.org/features/2003/09/19092003164705. asp (Accessed October 21, 2010).

272  Tina Burrett

Legewie, J. (2013) “Polished PR, perception strategy fourth arrow in ‘abenomics’ quiver,” Japan Times, 22 April. Levada (2014) “Martovskie Reitingi Odobreniia i Doveriia [March Approval and Trust Ratings]”, Levada Center, March 26, www.levada.ru/2014/03/26/martovskie-rejtingiodobreniya-i-doveriya-2/ (Accessed March 30, 2016). Luhn, A. and Walker, S. (2014) “Vladimir Putin arrives in Crimea for Victory Day celebrations,” The Guardian, May 9. Masuk, E. (2012) “Gleb Pavlovskii: ‘Bol’she Vsego Putin, Po-moemu, Opasaetsia Stat’ Lishnim’ [Gleb Pavlovsky: ‘In My Opinion, Most of All Putin Must Be Wary of Excess’],” Novaya Gazeta, October 23. McCurry, J. (2014a) “China criticises Japan after Shinzo Abe honours war criminals as martyrs,” The Guardian, August 28. McCurry, J. (2014b) “Japan’s ruling party under fire over links to far-right extremists,” The Guardian, October 13. McNeill, D. (2016) “Face-off”, Number 1 Shimbun, April 4. Nakazaki, T. (2016) “LDP keeping close watch on foreign media reports on Japan,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 11. NHK (2015) “Seiji Ishiki Getsurei Chōsa [Political Awareness Monthly Survey],” www. nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/index.html (Accessed September 23, 2015). Osipov, I. (2012) “Rossiiane Ustali Ot Piara Putina [Russians Are Tired of Putin’s PR]”, Forbes, 24 October, www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/vlast/178751-rossiyane-ustali-ot-piaraputina (Accessed April 4, 2016). Pesek, W. (2014) Japanization: What the World Can Learn from Japan’s Lost Decades. Singapore: Bloomberg Press. Pilling, D. (2013) “Japan’s Thatcher: Meet the man determined to end the ‘lost decades,’ ” The New Statesman, October 24. Pomerantsev, P. (2014) “Yes, Russia matters,” World Affairs, October: 16–23. Rosenbluth, F.M and Thies, M.F. (2010) Political Change and Economic Restructuring. Oxford: Princeton University Press. RSF (2016) “2016 world press freedom index”, Reporters Sans Frontières, https://rsf.org/ en/ranking (Accessed April 21, 2016). Sakwa, R. (2004) Putin: Russia’s Choice. London: Routledge. Schuler, C. (2015) “Performing democracy Putin-style”, The Drama Review, Spring: 136–160. Sieg, L. (2013) “Analysis: Japan’s Abe rolls out strategic PR, policy campaign”, Reuters, January  11, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-strategy-idUSBRE90C0 HJ20130114 (Accessed March 18, 2016). Soble, J. (2013) “Japan’s Abe sets corporate tax cut target”, Financial Times, June 13. Somiya, R. (2014) “P.R. firm for Putin’s Russia now walking a fine line”, The New York Times, September 1. Sperling, V. (2016) “Putin’s Macho personality cult,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49: 13–23. Thompson, J.B. (2000) Political Scandal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tisdall, S. (2015) “Korean comfort women agreement is a triumph for Japan and the US”, Guardian, December 28. Treisman, D. (2014) “The two Putins”, CNN Opinion, March 4, www.cnn.com/2014/03/03/ opinion/treisman-two-putins (Accessed March 23, 2016). Tucker, R. (1981) Politics of Leadership. Columbia: University of Missouri. VCIOM (1999) “Presidential voting intentions”, Russia Votes, www.russiavotes.org (Accessed February 15, 2016).

PR strategies of Putin and Abe Shinzo  273

Washington Post (2016) “Squelching bad news in Japan,” March 5. Yoshida, R. (2014a) “Abe moves to boost control of bureaucrats”, Japan Times, May 27. Yoshida, R. (2014b) “Polling shows voters unclear about Article 9 reinterpretation: expert”, Japan Times, July 11. Yoshida, R. (2014c) “Abe’s damage control may have been in time to ward off further woes”, Japan Times, October 20. Yoshida, R. (2015) “Japan’s population dilemma, in a single-occupancy nutshell”, Japan Times, December 31. Wang, Z. (2013) “China and Japan really don’t like each other”, The Diplomat, August. Zasursky, I. (2004) Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. London: M.E. Sharp.

20 JAPAN’S GLOBAL INFORMATION WAR Propaganda, free speech and opinion control since 3/11 Nancy Snow

Events after 11 September 2001 brought to light debates about the revival of public diplomacy and the role of media propaganda in the domestic and global communications of the United States. Japan did not experience orchestrated terrorist attacks on the homeland that spawned a nationwide anti-terror neighborhood watch, color-coded security threat system, violent interventions in two Muslim countries, and an ideologically neoconservative policy called GWOT (Global War on Terror). Japan had a triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, and three nuclear meltdowns) known as 3/11, that led to many recovery phase initiatives, including the U.S. Armed Forces disaster relief assistance program, Operation Tomodachi (Feikert and Chanlett-Avery 2011), the rise of the celebrity diplomat Lady Gaga, who reassured the world that Japan was safe to visit again (Henderson 2011), and the recruitment of superstar Japanese girl group AKB48 in support of postdisaster municipal bonds (Warnock 2012). Further, Japan’s post-3/11 era shifted from Tohoku to Tokyo as the Age of Abe set in a Global Information War that is pitting pro-government vs. anti-government forces, pro-historical revisionists vs. anti-historical revisionists; and pro-secrets vs. pro-transparency warriors. Japan’s battle is not taking place as much globally as it is internally, and at ground central for information, Japan’s media and public relations system. Japan is taking many lessons from its former occupier-turned-chief-ally and military protector, the United States government, an appropriate teacher about how to use manipulative communications and the cult of personality to manage citizens after a national disaster (Healy 2008; cf. Burrett Chapter 19). Less than a year after the United States staged its ill-fated invasion of Iraq, I published a collection of essays called Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion Control Since 9/11. Its theme was that the search for truth in times of war and national crisis held consequences for the press and for the people. I grew up in a place with the longstanding designation, Land of the

Japan’s global information war  275

Free, but as an adult I came to know freedom within narrower dimensions. Freedom of the press is freer for those who own one. The press often operates as a propaganda organ for the state, what we envision to be a condition of totalitarianism, but in reality is just as prominent in a democracy. It’s just that the media bias is less noticeable.1 Objective journalism, fairness and impartiality, is the traditional operating principle in American journalism, until it becomes objectionable. In October 2001, the month of the U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan, CNN’s chairman Walter Isaacson sent a memo to all foreign correspondents that they seek more balance in their news stories, and by balance he meant that stories about civilian deaths include a reference to the thousands of deaths from terrorists on September  11 since it “seems perverse to focus too much on the casualties or hardship in Afghanistan” (Kurtz 2001). In Columbia Journalism Review (Cunningham 2003), managing editor Brent Cunningham questioned the American objectivity tradition, which had led to a condition in which journalists were becoming stenographers to power – passive recipients of news from official sources. The trickle-down effect of catering to what the wartime government wanted to hear had impacted even the smallest newsroom. A CJR intern called newspapers during the first few months of the war in Iraq and was told by an editor of The Tennessean that, despite the reality that letters to the editor were running 70 percent against the war, the newspaper chose to run more pro-war letters in the name of fair and balanced reporting of the news. Cunningham observes that objectivity “exacerbates our tendency to rely on official sources.” In the search for the “he said” and “she said” both sides of the equation in the news story, the reporter often adopts a collusive rather than a questioning posture towards the official frame. Sometimes it’s pure laziness, but laziness has costly consequences. The Tyndall Report, a weekly compilation of news broadcasts compiled by Andrew Tyndall, cited 574 stories about Iraq on the ABC, CBS and NBC “Big Three” broadcasting networks in the United States (September 12, 2002–March 7, 2003). Only 12 stories dealt with the aftermath of the war in Iraq. The Bush administration was quite mum on what would become of Iraq once the troops had accomplished their military mission. Ten years later, the war had cost nearly $2 trillion, over 100,000 Iraqi lives, 4,500 American soldiers, and 30,000 wounded (New York Times 2013). It wasn’t until I moved to Japan to conduct research about nation brand Japan and its image after March 11, 2011 that I came to see a lot of parallels between the post-9/11 media manipulation record in America and my post-3/11 experience in Japan. A year after 3/11, I was teaching media, culture, and politics at the prestigious Jesuit university located in central Tokyo, Sophia University. My mostly Japanese students were smart enough to get into the highly selective Sophia but not canny about media manipulation by the government to promote its agenda and the silencing of discordant voices. It seems evident that the government of PM Abe Shinzo (2012–) is heavy handed in opinion control and disseminating propaganda. But the media landscape was already skewed towards the vested interests as evident on March 12,

276  Nancy Snow

2011 when Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) lied about the Fukushima nuclear accident. A Tepco spokesman admitted in late February 2016, nearly five years later, that it tried to cover-up the nuclear crisis for two months after it was clear that three reactors were in a state of meltdown. “Tokyo Electric Power Co. said its officials were unaware of a company emergency manual that defined a meltdown as damage exceeding 5 percent of a reactor’s fuel” and had no explanation for why the manual had just been located (AP 2016). The reality that Tepco lied to the people and the press about what it knew and when it knew it at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant first gave rise to public demonstrations that The Economist (2012) referred to as Japan’s “nuclearphobia,” signaling a new era of resistance democracy. This alternative activism definition of the Japan Tourism Agency poster campaign “Japan, Rising Again” made the government management of foreign and domestic public affairs and public opinion goals more challenging; alas, Japan, like any other nation-state, recognized that it was more like everywhere else than it wished to admit, driven by loss of trust between publics and those in power. But it is not Tepco, as good as it is, that is the best example of Japan’s global information war. It is Japan’s prime minister who is the brand face of Japan’s slide into a media propaganda state. Abe 2.0 is the second act of what was thought to be a politician whose future in politics was finished after a one-year turn as prime minister (2006–2007) that was overshadowed by scandal and illness (BBC News 2007). When Abe was elected prime minister for a second time in December 2012, he returned triumphantly with a quiver of arrows in his public relations arsenal. Abenomics, and its Land of the Rising Sister counterpart, Womenomics, served to distract Japan’s public from the Abe administration’s global information war agenda, an agenda marinated in the neoconservative directives that followed 9/11. Prime Minister Abe’s focus on the economy was politically popular and even progressive. His administration received high marks in the global press for making Japan matter again in the eyes of the world that thought Japan’s best days were behind it. Making a society where “all women shine” was seen as a march forward in Japan’s traditional masculine and sexist global reputation, but in short order the Abe administration shifted its priority away from restoring the economy to politically divisive subjects like reforming Japan’s Constitution (Article 9) and proactively condemning and denying access to individual reporters, both foreign and domestic, as well as mass media industries (broadcast, print, publishing) for activities deemed counter to Japan’s image in the world and Abe’s agenda. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has even proposed codifying curbs on free speech that would undermine Article 21 of the 1947 Constitution: “In spite of the provision codified in the previous paragraph, activity and assembly in an attempt to disturb public well-being or public order will be prohibited” (Repeta 2013). The post-9/11 propaganda and opinion control by the G.W. Bush administration (2001–2009) and the Abe administration (2012–) show how democratic governments use manipulative media and public relations strategies to set and control opinion and rhetoric in times of national security crisis. While 3/11 was not a

Japan’s global information war  277

national security crisis, the significant deterioration of relations with China and sabre rattling over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, in addition to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, provided a pretext for Abe to act on his longstanding agenda of easing constitutional curbs on Japan’s armed forces and imposing new secrecy legislation that lessens transparency and accountability. In such an atmosphere, Japan’s public citizens need to develop strategies and confidence in ‘talking back’ to their government, with groups like SEALDS (Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy) offering one example of a revitalized protest culture not seen since the 1960s demonstrations against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The predecessor of SEALDS, from which many current members emerged, is Students Against Secret Protection Law (SASPL). Both of these emergency actions are direct responses to a central government that ignores majority public opposition to almost every one of Abe’s signature policies.(Kingston 2015). My comparative observations are meant to serve as a warning to Japan watchers about what is happening to political discourse in East Asia’s most developed democracy. Jacques Ellul, author of Propaganda, writes that “to warn a political system of the menace hanging over it does not imply an attack on it, but it is the greatest service one can render the system.”2 After 9/11, the U.S. quickly turned to the American president George W. Bush for instructions in how to deal with what was cast as a New Normal. Bush, along with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Bill Bennett of Empower America, espoused a militant unilateralism – either you are with the United States or you are with the terrorists. Representative Barbara Lee was the sole member of Congress (Hogan 2001) who voted against the resolution passed on September 14, 2001: “The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.” Her opposition was based on the words of the Very Reverend Nathan Baxter, National Cathedral Bishop, who said earlier on this National Day of Prayer and Remembrance: “We must not become the evil we deplore” (Welch and Fox 2012). Japan’s rallying cry “We’re here!” at one time referred to its roaring economy from the 1960s through the early 1990s, culminating in the 1989 economic chest beating of Ishihara Shintaro’s The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals. Even during the fractious trade war period of the 1980s, Japan’s rise to the second largest economy in the world was also seen as admirable. It was seen as a key global player, to be respected for its “defense-only” posture in security as a testimony to having been the only country in the world to suffer from atomic bombings. Japan’s economic rise seemed a natural consolation to its humiliating defeat as an imperial war regime. In the twenty-first century, with Japan’s economic decline, political leaders have embraced and promoted a more aggressive, neo-nationalist posture. (See Nakano Chapter 2) This posturing challenges the image of a beautiful and peaceful Japan that the country promoted for seven decades. Today, the slogan “Japan is back!” is much more likely to

278  Nancy Snow

conjure up images of surveillance drones and amphibious assault vehicles (Abe 2013; Foreign Affairs 2013), and as with any sudden change in a nation brand, be careful what you wish for because the world may not be ready to trust or accept this change. As the Japan Times (2014) noted: If the Abe government achieves its goal, it will pave the way for Japan to engage in military operations abroad with other countries, especially the United States. Such a change would completely alter postwar Japan’s basic posture of “defense-only defense,” which is designed to ensure it will not repeat the mistake of walking the path to war as it did in the last century – with tragic results for both the region and Japan. The “defense-only defense” posture helped Japan regain the international community’s trust in the postwar period. Abe Shinzo’s administration’s heavy-handedness with the media mirrors the approach of the Bush administration after 9/11, with similar roles for the press and public. The Bush administration used the 9/11 attacks to reshape an ideological narrative for the United States and expected the media to play the role of “rally ‘round the flag’ ” supporter, not an investigator or scrutinizer. Two weeks after 9/11, Bush told the American people to get back to their normal lives, which included entertainment and shopping. He urged Americans to “Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life, the way we want it to be enjoyed” (Bacevich 2008). It wasn’t the public’s role to ask questions. Abe Shinzo has done much the same with his efforts to what he calls, “overturning Japan’s postwar order.” His administration hasn’t bothered to explain much to the Japanese people about the proposed changes; rather, the changes were and are being made. For example, Abe has strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance with the passage in 2013 of the Special Secrets Protection Law and signed the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines in April  2015 that greatly expand what Japan is prepared to do militarily in support of the U.S. In September  2015, the Abe administration rammed through the Diet a series of bills that enable Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, meaning its military forces can come to the aid of U.S. military forces if they are attacked. It is Japan’s post-3/11 version of a “blank check” policy change, and any who questions this change risks having their allegiance to country questioned just as Rep. Barbara Lee had hers questioned. Abe has also established a national security council modeled on the U.S. that will enhance coordination in the event of a crisis. These changes have taken place despite opposition from across a wide spectrum, including constitutional scholars, academics, and students and public opinion polls showing very little support for these measures. Similar to the post-9/11 Bush administration, in Abe’s Japan either you are with Japan and the Abe government or you are undermining national interests, guilty of Japan-bashing, and siding with enemies like China and North Korea. Even the government’s use of the term “proactive pacifism” to describe the overhaul of Japan’s postwar security posture and gutting of Article 9

Japan’s global information war  279

of the Constitution are reminiscent of the euphemism ‘collateral damage’ popular during the Bush years (The Nation 2003). Mr. Abe wants us to think that Japan’s slicing and dicing of Article 9, which outlaws war as a form of conflict resolution, is really just reconstituted pacifism for the twenty-first century. He may not have, as of yet, test driven the proactive pacifism through an actual intervention in another country, but the sound and fury of his administration’s targeting of those who oppose his security agenda, constituting a majority of Japanese, is doing daily collateral damage to Japan at home and abroad. Under Abe, Japan has ratcheted up its global public relations and public diplomacy efforts, but there is a continuum from Cool Japan to Dark Japan. Beyond the “Cool Japan” lies a darker image of the archipelago, difficult to manage for the practitioners of Japan’ public diplomacy. The Abe government believes that shedding Japan’s peaceful brand image will allow Japan an opportunity to earn its rightful place among those countries that can fully back their words with the threat or use of force. But several Japanese politicians do not fully acknowledge the worst atrocities committed by Japan in World War II because they perceive that such acknowledgement will hurt Japan’s beautiful image. This “shiny” approach, like the Abe-led Womenomics initiative to create a society in which women shine (Abe 2013b), is in marked contrast to the “warts and all” strategy of journalist-turned-government propagandist, Edward R. Murrow, whose agenda under Kennedy at the U.S. Information Agency was to spread the truth about America. “Truth is the best propaganda” (Snow 2013). What Japanese leaders wish to present in their public diplomacy is a level of perfection in cultural superiority (Washoku-Japanese cuisine, Omotenashi-hospitality), and to be sure, Japan’s Big Power status in cultural presentation and refinement is admired around the world. At the same time, it creates vocal enemies or detractors who wish that Japan would just acknowledge its imperfections and past mistakes. A full airing of Japan’s past might have the best possibility to smooth over relations with China and Korea and would put an end to China and Korea’s using Japan’s historical amnesia to political advantage. (Snow 2016) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Cool Japan Fund (2013–) focuses on Japan’s global cultural appeal and popularity of its’ cuisine, fashion, manga, anime, including investments in upscale green tea cafes across the United States and a ramen chain in the U.S. and Europe. The Fund has little strategic purpose but to promote products that would surely be better marketed by the private sector instead of staid bureaucrats. In contrast, the darker narrative of Japan is difficult to promote overseas because it challenges the stereotypical image of Japan as happy, beautiful, and blemish-free.3 That picture includes: •

Abe’s historical revisionism, patriotic education, denial and downplaying of the comfort women issue antagonizes public opinion overseas, not just in the nations that suffered from Japan’s fifteen year rampage, 1931–45, and attracts negative media coverage: “U.S. Textbook Skews History, Prime Minister of Japan Says” (Fackler 2013; Fackler 2015).

280  Nancy Snow

• •



Targeting foreign journalists who are critical of PM Abe and his agenda by lobbying their editors and denying access (Snow 2013; Germis 2015). Intimidating domestic media in order to oust journalists who are critical of Abe and placing cronies at the top of NHK to ensure that its coverage is “fair and balanced,” which in practice is defined as pro-government (Yamamoto 2013; Snow 2014). To the extent that NHK is seen to be in thrall to the government, Japan’s international image suffers. (Kingston 2014). Becoming Washington’s “deputy sheriff” in Asia reduces Japan’s foreign policy autonomy and undermines its pacifist credentials in ways that diminish its credibility worldwide and its influence in East Asia (Hughes 2015).

Conclusion Japan is a dutiful student of the United States when it comes to manipulation of media messages. In the age of the War on Terror, it is widely acknowledged that media power in the U.S. is political power (Kamalipour and Snow 2004). Denigrating the news media has become a national pastime in the U.S. across generations, especially among younger people. A  recent survey by the Pew Research Center (Fingerhut 2016) reports a vast majority of Millennials (those born between 1982 and 1994) view the national news media in a negative light. Only 27 percent consider the news media to have any positive impact on society, which corresponds to the Boomers born after World War II (23 percent) or Generation X (26 percent). In Japan, the news media is used as an integral part of Japan’s cultural preservation. According to Dentsu Public Relations (2014), the Japanese media are “intertwined with Japanese culture and society. They see themselves as bastions against cultural decay and as beacons of light for all that is special and sacred about Japan. Indeed, in their determination to champion the national good, the Japanese media are at odds with Western counterparts that see their role more clearly as independent arbiters and defenders of free speech.” Well at least that is the PR spin on the situation. According to the 2016 Edelman Trust Barometer, Japanese trust in social institutions, which includes the media system, business, NGOs, and the government, is nearly 20 percent lower than the global average in 28 countries polled, 41 percent versus 60 percent, making Japan the world’s least positive public in respect to trust (Edelman 2016). Harvard University social capital scholar, Robert D. Putnam (2002) found that public trust in the mass media in Japan is only slightly higher than public distrust at between 50–60 percent, but the more recent survey from Edelman would suggest that public distrust as a whole is on the rise. Prime Minister Abe’s media charm offensive with domestic media bosses is making it harder for the press to scrutinize government policies, and thereby undermining its credibility, according to a group of high-profile Japanese journalists who agreed to speak about it in public at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan.4 “The Japanese press is the major source of information and misinformation about Japan,” says Karel van Wolferen in his book, The Enigma of Japanese

Japan’s global information war  281

Power (1989). This is a universal axiom, so what makes Japan different? Japan purports to be a parliamentary democracy that does not hinder the press from doing its job of reporting and analyzing the news. But the press in Japan is often cowed by the Japanese government and engages in self-censorship, understanding what is permissible and what is taboo and acting accordingly. Through the press club system, the government manages the news by managing access and deciding what gets reported and what gets marginalized. The Japanese media is craven and too often shrinks before power rather than exposing its abuses, but the moral lesson according to Barack Kushner, “is that a country’s own citizens are also never short of blame and need to take responsibility for their own government’s action as much as expecting their media to do the same. Media shape social discourse, but they equally respond to political apathy” (Kushner 2015). A political activist response alone, however steadfast the activists have been, is no salve in Japan. The Japan activists are largely marginalized and missing from any discussion in the news media. We don’t hear enough voices of dissent or those who call on the media to be a force for peace and justice, along the lines of Amy Goodman’s “Democracy Now!,” which she describes as “a global newscast with people speaking for themselves” (Stelter 2011). Japan is in dire need of not only an overhaul of its media system, but also a deeper understanding among the public about what the purpose of the media is in society. University curriculum in Japan should include study of media and democracy, and media literacy courses, which advocate for media in service to society; for the creation of media in the public interest and not for profit; and for a media system that can integrate alternative and independence voices into its opinion shaping. Where are the citizen journalists in Japan? What we see too often is a passive audience entertained by personal scandal. The media system in Japan does not educate the public about how to become active participants in a democratic society. But if there is no widespread recognition of the problem, then how can it be studied? Japan has no public relations curriculum to speak of outside of a few courses here and there. Public and media relations are learned on the job and are often rotational duties for bureaucrats (see Snow 2015). The Japanese university, which could establish a public communication curriculum, is, by-and-large, a way station to mark time for the job market, not a place where students are expected to engage in critical exchange of ideas (Nakano and Snow 2015). The study groups and conferences on Japanese journalism that I’ve participated in are largely studies of journalism as an industry and how it operates, not as a challenger to the power relations that drive Japan’s agenda. The paradox of Japan is a resilient and stable society driven by kizuna (bonds in human relations) against the backdrop of a weak political structure (Miura and Walker 2012). My concern now remains with Kushner’s assessment of Japan’s media and propaganda environment that perpetuates public passivity in asserting democratic rights and holding the government accountable. A passive public leads to a cowed press, which is a recipe for preserving a status quo that seems hell-bent on concentrating its own power and privilege at the expense of the public interest.

282  Nancy Snow

A media-muzzling atmosphere (see George Mulgan Chapter 1) taints Japan’s nation brand image of an open society. Undue pressure on a press, whose duty is to report and analyze the news, creates more critics than defenders of Japan. A  free and vibrant media system will report some good and bad news stories, but the current system of government overreach, and threats to shut down noncompliant press, is inflicting credibility damage to a country a few years removed from hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics. The government of Japan should be proactive in its support for an independent, open, and vibrant foreign and domestic media system, but with weak or passive public opposition, the arrogance of government power shadowing media will persist.

Notes 1 The Egyptian-American filmmaker Jehane Noujaim’s 2004 documentary, Control Room, compares the US Central Command (CENTCOM) coverage of the 2003 Iraq Invasion to Al Jazeera’s coverage. The Pentagon practice of journalists embedding with troops is a form of media propaganda not as blatantly obvious as the state propaganda shown in the 2014 documentary about North Korean society, The Propaganda Game. 2 Ellul’s comments about democratic propaganda apply just as much today as they did in the 1960s when he identified three great propaganda blocs: the USSR, China, and the United States. The only democracy among the three, the U.S., needed propaganda. “Historically, from the moment a democratic regime establishes itself, propaganda establishes itself alongside it under various forms. This is inevitable, as democracy depends on public opinion and competition between political parties. In order to come to power, parties make propaganda to gain voters” (p. 232). Alfred A. Knopf edition, 1965. 3 In 1960, the leading voice in broadcast journalism in America, Edward R. Murrow, narrated a Columbia Record Club production, Guided Tours of the World: Japan, featuring state-of-the-art technology of the day, a Panorama Colorslide Program. Fifteen years removed from World War II’s end, Murrow describes the country the way Abe might want us to picture it today: “A miniature wooden bridge arches gracefully over a green pond, while in the distance rises a mist from the verdant mountains. This is Japan. We see a country where feeling for beauty and love of nature are national characteristics. No other people makes a festival out of moon viewing, insect listening, and cherry blossom gazing.” 4 On March 24, 2016, six prominent names in Japanese journalism spoke out against the Abe administration’s media charm offensive that they believe is having a chilling effect on free speech and free press in Japan. The FCCJ press conference, “Japan᾽s Journalists Speak Out,” featured Kishii Shigetada, Tahara Soichiro, Torigoe Shuntaro, Kanehira Shigenori, Otani Akihiro, and Aoki Osamu. The public criticism was in the context of a slide in Japan’s Reporters Without Borders global ranking for press freedom since 2010 from No. 11 to No. 61. Noted at the briefing were the February 9, 2016 comments by Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s communications minister, who threatened to shut down television companies that flout rules on political impartiality.

References Abe, Shinzo (2013a) “Japan is back,” February 22, Washington, DC: CSIS, http://www. mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html.

Japan’s global information war  283

Abe, Shinzo (2013b) “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, at the sixty-eighth session of the general assembly of the united nations,” September 26, http://japan.kantei. go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html. Associated Press (2016) “Japan utility admits it delayed report of Fukushima meltdown”, New York Times, February  25, www.seattletimes.com/business/japan-utilityadmits-it-delayed-report-of-fukushima-meltdown/. Bacevich, Andrew J. (2008) “He told us to go shopping. Now the bill is due,” The Washington Post, October 5, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/03/ AR2008100301977.html. BBC News (2007) “Japanese prime minister resigns,” September  12, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6990519.stm. Cunningham, Brent (2003) “Re-thinking objectivity,” Columbia Journalism Review, July/ August, www.cjr.org/feature/rethinking_objectivity.php. Dentsu PR (2014) Communicating: A Guide to PR in Japan. Tokyo: Dentsu. The Economist (2012) “Japan and the atom: Nuclearphobia,” August 6, www.economist. com/blogs/banyan/2012/08/japan-and-atom. Edelman (2016) “Japan leads the world in distrust in 2016 Edelman trust barometer,” February 4, 2016, Tokyo, Japan. Ellul, Jacques (1962) Propagandes; original French edition. 1965/1973, English translations, Alfred A. Knopf and Vintage Books, respectively. Fackler, Martin (2013) “In textbook fight, Japan leaders seek to recast history, The New York Times, December  28, www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/world/asia/japan-fights-apolitical-battle-using-history-texts.html. Fackler, Martin (2015) “U.S. textbook skews history, prime minister of Japan says,” The New York Times, January  29, www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/world/asia/japans-pre mier-disputes-us-textbooks-portrayal-of-comfort-women.html. Feikert, Andrew and Emma Chanlett-Avery (2011) “Japan 2011 earthquake: U.S. Department of defense (DOD) response,” Congressional Research Service, March 22, http:// fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159781.pdf. Fingerhut, Hannah (2016) “Millennials’ views of news media, religious organizations grow more negative,” Pew Research Center, January  4, www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/01/04/millennials-views-of-news-media-religious-organizations-growmore-negative/. Foreign Affairs (2013) “Japan is back: A conversation with Shinzo Abe,” July/August. Germis, Carsten (2015) “On my watch,” Number 1 Shimbun, April 2, www.fccj.or.jp/num ber-1-shimbun/item/576-on-my-watch/576-on-my-watch.html. Healy, Gene (2008) The Cult of the Presidency: America’s Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Henderson, Barney (2011) “Tearful lady Gaga-san tells world Japan is safe,” Telegraph, June  23, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/8594765/Tearful-Lady-Gaga-santells-world-Japan-is-safe.html. Hogan, Bill (2001) “Alone on the hill,” Mother Jones, September 20, www.motherjones. com/politics/2001/09/alone-hill. Hughes, Christopher W. (2015) Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End? New York: Palgrave Pivot. Japan Times (2014) “Abe’s dangerous path,” January  27, www.japantimes.co.jp/opin ion/2014/01/27/editorials/abes-dangerous-path/#.VtJ0Dxg1jfM. Kamalipour, Yahya and Nancy Snow (2004) War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

284  Nancy Snow

Kingston, Jeff (2014) “Self-immolation protests PM Abe overturning Japan’s pacifist postwar order,” Japan Focus, July 7, http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4798/article.html. Kingston, Jeff (2015) “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s assault on Japan’s constitution,” Japan Focus, August 31, http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4371. Kurtz, Howard (2001) “CNN chief orders ‘balance’ in war news,” Washington Post, October  31, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2001/10/31/cnn-chief-orders-bal ance-in-war-news/0953cacf-77a4-4801-b99b-41a730e43ca7/. Kushner, Barak (2015) translator, Media, Propaganda and Politics in 20th-Century Japan. London, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 349. Miura, Lully and Walker, Joshua (2012) “The shifting tectonics of Japan one year after March 11, 2011,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States Policy Brief, March, www.gmfus.org/publications/shifting-tectonics-japan-one-year-after-march-11-2011. Nakano, Koichi and Nancy Snow (2015) “The Abe administration’s arrogance of power moment,” The Japan Times/The Huffington Post, July  16, www.japantimes.co.jp/ opinion/2015/07/16/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-administrations-arrogancepower-moment/#.VtUzORgcvfM. The Nation (2003) “War’s collateral damage,” The Editors, January 16, www.thenation. com/article/wars-collateral-damage/. The New York Times (2013) “Ten years after,” The Editorial Board, March 19, 2013, www. nytimes.com/2013/03/20/opinion/ten-years-after-the-iraq-war-began.html?_r=0. Putnam, Robert D. (2002) Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Repeta, Lawrence (2013) “Japan’s democracy at risk  – The LDP’s ten most dangerous proposals for constitutional change,” Japan Focus, July 15, http://apjjf.org/2013/11/28/ Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.html. Snow, Nancy (2013a), “Uncool Japan: Japan’s gross national propaganda,” Metropolis, November 7, http://metropolis.co.jp/features/the-last-word/uncool-japan/. Snow, Nancy (2013b): Truth is the Best Propaganda: Edward R. Murrow’s Speeches in the Kennedy Years. McLean, Virginia: Miniver Press. Snow, Nancy (2014) “NHK world and Japanese public diplomacy: Journalistic Boundaries and State Interests,” RIPE@2014 Conference Public Service Media Across Boundaries, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, http://ripeat.org/~qasvminy/library/2014/6949-nhkworld-and-japanese-public-diplomacy-journalistic-boundaries-and-state. Snow, Nancy (2015) “Deconstructing Japan’s PR: Where is the public?” in Jacquie L’Etang, David McKie, Nancy Snow and Jordi Xifra (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Critical Public Relations. New York and London: Routledge, 321–334. Snow, Nancy (2016) “Japan’s challenges in public diplomacy: An American vision,” French Institute of International Relations (ifri), February, www.ifri.org/en/publications/ enotes/asie-visions/japans-challenges-public-diplomacy-american-vision. Stelter, Brian (2011) “A grass-roots newscast gives a voice to struggles,” New York Times, October  23, 2011. www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/business/media/a-grass-roots-news cast-gives-a-voice-to-struggles.html?_r=0. Tyndall Report (2015) www.tyndallreport.com. van Wolferen, Karel (1989) The Enigma of Japanese Power. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Warnock, Eleanor (2012) “Japan gets AKB48 girls on the cheap”, Wall Street Journal, May  29. http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2012/05/29/japan-gets-akb48-bond-girlson-the-cheap/. Welch, David and Fox, Jo (2012) Justifying War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 373. Yamamoto, Nobuto (2013) “After Fukushima: New Public, NHK and Japan’s Public Diplomacy,” Keio Communications Review, No. 35.

21 THE JAPAN LOBBY, PRESS FREEDOM AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY1 Jeff Kingston

At the January  2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stumbled on the world stage when he warned of the dangers of complacency regarding the possibility of conflict between China and Japan, drawing a parallel between the UK and Germany on the eve of World War I when European diplomats were “sleepwalking” into the abyss. The media suggested it was a warmongering speech, based apparently on a misleading translation. Given that Abe made a pilgrimage to the Yasukuni Shrine only three weeks earlier on 26 December 2013, it is understandable that the press was primed to assume the worst. This is because Yasukuni is widely viewed as “ground zero” for an unrepentant, glorifying narrative of Japan’s wartime rampage in the years 1931–45. While Beijing and Seoul’s criticism of Abe’s visit to the shrine was anticipated, Washington’s swift and sharp rebuke was not. Abe probably thought he would get a pass from Washington, despite extensive behind the scenes lobbying warning him not to go to the shrine, including a phone call from Vice President Joseph Biden. This is because he had just closed a deal with then-governor of Okinawa Nakaima Hirokazu to proceed with plans to build a bitterly contested new U.S. Marine airbase in Henoko, Okinawa in exchange for a little over $20 billion in aid spread out over eight years. The base is important to the Pentagon, and Abe appeared to deliver on security what his predecessors could not. But he and his advisors misread Washington on history issues and paid the price. Champagne corks were no doubt popping in Beijing and Seoul celebrating Abe’s “own goal” at Yasukuni and media drubbing at Davos. There was also a war of words conducted in op-eds in Europe and the U.S. as usually dignified diplomats exchanged insults and invective, even invoking Harry Potter characters to vilify their counterparts. In The Telegraph (1/1/2013), for example, the Chinese ambassador to the UK wrote: “If militarism is like the haunting Voldemort of Japan, the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo is a kind of Horcrux, representing the darkest parts of

286  Jeff Kingston

that nation’s soul.” The Japanese ambassador replied, “East Asia is now at a crossroads. There are two paths open to China. One is to seek dialogue, and abide by the rule of law. The other is to play the role of Voldemort in the region by letting loose the evil of an arms race and escalation of tensions . . .” (The Telegraph, 1/5/2014). When President Barack Obama visited Tokyo in the spring of 2014, Abe was still in the doghouse. Obama pointedly brought up the comfort women issue saying that it is a crucial issue, one that he knows the Japanese public understands and one that he thinks Abe gets, following this up with further pointed comments in Seoul that could only be interpreted as critical of Abe. Indeed, Abe has spent his political career trying to trash the 1993 Kono Statement acknowledging state responsibility for coercive recruitment of comfort women, sparking a furor in 2007 when he quibbled about the degree of coercion used in recruiting the women who were used as sex slaves on Japanese military bases around the region. Washington nudged Abe way beyond his comfort zone when he concluded a diplomatic agreement with Seoul at the end of 2015 regarding the comfort women issue that paved the way for a meeting with Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama in Washington at the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2016. The agreement is unlikely to resolve the inescapable comfort women issues that roil bilateral relations and inflame public perceptions, but for Abe it was a big stretch. This helps explain why in early 2016 he announced his resolve to revise the Constitution as a way to appease supporters who were dismayed by what they view as Abe’s apostasy on the sex slave controversy. Despite these setbacks, Team Abe runs an impressive PR operation in Japan, managing the media quite effectively, limiting access, orchestrating press conferences and ensuring that Abe is not put in a position where he has to improvise, make unprepared remarks or answer awkward questions. But the ways and means that work in Japan don’t necessarily work in the global arena. Access for international correspondents working in Tokyo is the bait that the prime minister’s office dangles in exchange for favorable coverage. It is a cat-and-mouse game because the journalists don’t want to appear craven, and Team Abe is intent on squeezing out as many concessions as possible, such as magazine covers and puff pieces. It’s not always pretty, but that is how the game gets played. Former NY Times Tokyo bureau chief Martin Fackler told me that media minders at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) tried to get him to write a letter of apology in 2009 for his predecessor’s reporting about comfort women, threatening not to give him an interview with Abe if he refused to comply. He refused, never did get that interview and asserts this is a counterproductive strategy because it denies the government a chance to get its side of the story out there. And feuding with the NY Times does not seem an inspired policy to win influence in the U.S.

Japan Lobby and alliance management All governments manage the media, and every administration has a few spindoctors to massage the message. Tactics may vary, but governments hope to sway

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  287

public opinion in their favor. Key to understanding this lobbying process in U.S.Japan relations is the role of U.S. think tanks and American Japan hands who work as alliance managers and thus have a stake in the outcome and act accordingly in concert with Japanese counterparts, especially on security issues, but more generally as well. For example, the Trans Pacific Partnership is ostensibly about economic issues, but PM Abe’s decision to join was predicated on a geostrategic assessment that doing so would strengthen the U.S. security alliance and counter China’s growing influence in the region. Abe has delivered more than all of his predecessors combined on Washington’s longstanding wish list on security matters ranging from bases in Okinawa to easing constitutional constraints on Japan’s military forces, underscoring that the alliance is a subordinate relationship in which Americans dictate the terms. Ironically, in Abe, the U.S. has a willing accomplice who frequently calls for overturning the postwar order that his neonationalist constituency disparages as an unwelcome humiliation imposed by the U.S. to keep Japan weak, dependent and subordinate. PM Abe Shinzo is seen by Washington’s security wonks as their man in Japan, so his strengthening of the alliance seems to be a key achievement in bolstering ties. The Japan Lobby has evolved from an organization focused on trade issues to one that is funding and guiding public diplomacy regarding China, especially over security and history issues. In the twenty-first century Japan has found itself at cross-purposes with global perceptions about war memory, especially the comfort women issue, but President Xi Jinping’s openly assertive promotion of China’s regional hegemonic ambitions have facilitated an upgrading of U.S. security cooperation with allies and partners in Asia, including Japan. For example, in April 2015 Japan signed new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, the first since 1997, which greatly expand what Japan is theoretically prepared to do militarily in support of the U.S. in the event it is attacked. In September 2015, despite overwhelming public opposition, PM Abe rammed enabling legislation through the Diet that eases significantly constitutional constraints on Japan’s military forces and allows their dispatch anywhere in the world in the name of collective self-defense. Abe repeatedly reassured the Japanese public that his security laws won’t really have much of an impact, while in Washington he promised they would be a game-changer, a rhetorical maneuver that sowed dissatisfaction on both sides of the Pacific. While the Japanese public expresses concern that the Abe Doctrine will endanger Japan because Tokyo may eventually be dragged into conflict at America’s behest, Washington ‘alliance managers’ are quietly disappointed that after all the smoke cleared, it appears that what Japan will be able to deliver is a lot less than they thought Abe committed to. In trying to woo domestic and foreign support – both government and public – the media is only one battlefield in the larger war of public diplomacy, but a crucial one. Back in the 1980s when bilateral tensions between Japan and the U.S. were high due to trade imbalances, Tokyo engaged professional lobbyists in Washington to woo Congressional and media opinion. This is how the game is played, but in that febrile atmosphere, Pat Choate’s Agents of Influence (1988) struck a chord.

288  Jeff Kingston

The Japanese government was playing by established rules, but in Choate’s book it was portrayed as suborning the system while those who lobbied on Japan’s behalf were depicted as betraying their nation and abetting “the enemy.” Those were the days when a cascade of “revisionist” tomes hit the bookshelves, reassessing the U.S.-Japan relationship, dismissing the more benign views toward Japan that prevailed, and arguing that Japan had an advantage because it was not playing by the same rules, and the government was managing not only markets, but also trying to manipulate American public opinion. (Johnson 1982; Prestowitz 1988; Fallows 1994; 1995; van Wolferen 1989) The Cold War bargain of sacrificing U.S. economic interests to help Japan become a showcase of the superiority of the American system, and a stalwart ally hosting bases that allowed Washington to project its military might in Asia, was seen to be unsustainable and no longer justified. Hard as it is to imagine today, Japan was portrayed as the relentless juggernaut that would stop at nothing to prevail and establish a Pax Nipponica. There was even a multi-episode BBC documentary of that title, conjuring up warmed over “yellow peril” nightmares, reinforced rather emphatically by Ishihara Shintaro (1989) in his infamous The Japan That Can Say No. This polemic threatened, inter alia, to withhold key semiconductor parts from the U.S. military industry that would weaken its capabilities and advocated that Tokyo cozy up to Moscow. However, Ishihara’s gambit was ill-timed as the Soviet Union was already unraveling and in its death throes. Back in 1987, NY Times journalist Clyde Farnsworth drew back the veil on Japan’s lobbying efforts in Washington, where nations around the world seek to buy influence and shape policy outcomes. Farnsworth (1987) wrote, The Japanese, according to Congressional aides, spent more than $60 million last year for direct representation to improve their image and try to keep doors ajar in their biggest market. That’s four times the level in 1984. Japan’s interests have become increasingly intertwined with America’s, not only because the United States consumes about a fifth of Japan’s total production, but also because the Japanese investment here has mushroomed. Robert Angel (1996) further detailed Japan’s lobbying efforts, providing an insider’s perspective as he headed the Japan Economic Institute between 1977–84, an organization in Washington that played a key role in the Japan Lobby. He discounted the more alarmist portrayal of the Japan Lobby as exerting a “pernicious influence,” but detailed the hydra-headed effort in a manner that left no doubt about the extent of its activities and the unusual public/private cooperative nature of the enterprise: By Japan Lobby I mean Japan’s governmental and private sector efforts to influence the policy formulation and implementation processes of the United States through unofficial, non-diplomatic means. My definition of the Japan Lobby includes institutional and individual participants in both Japan and the United States. They share responsibility for target analysis, planning,

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  289

and implementation. But all important decisions are made in Japan, and Japan supplies nearly all of the funding. Japan Lobby participants on the Japanese side include government ministries and agencies, quasigovernmental and private-sector organizations, business corporations and organizations, academic institutions and their cooperative faculty, Japan’s version of think-tanks, publishers, public relations firms, and even political parties and the personal offices of well-financed politicians. In addition, Japan Lobby managers have established several foundations that channel amazingly generous funding to Lobby participants who would find it uncomfortable to receive such funds directly from the Japanese government. Angel asserted that every ministry was involved in disseminating the government line domestically and internationally, while corporate public relations departments and various foundations provided valuable support. The Japanese foundations, he argued, provide funds to experts and institutions that have a high degree of credibility with the U.S. public precisely because it was assumed that the opinions and assessments they espoused were untainted by financial inducements. The funding was thus channeled in ways that don’t impugn the independence and credibility of the beneficiaries. He alleged that the Japan Foundation established in 1972 under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the first and has been one of the most influential of these institutions, a key component of the Japan Lobby infrastructure. Aside from these efforts to sway public discourse, Angel wrote that “the Japan Lobby has found a way to support the political campaigns of elected officials without violating the law through announcements of intentions to invest in employment generating projects.” In Bamboozled (2002), Ivan Hall also draws attention to the unwitting and opportunistic dupes of Tokyo and the various ways that the Japanese government manages bilateral relations by influencing American perceptions. This is not exclusively a government effort, but Hall argues that it orchestrates ­non-government and quasi-government foundations, and media coverage, to incentivize positive assessments and coverage while deliberately sidelining awkward issues and critical observers. This shaping of bilateral discourse, what he terms the “mutual understanding industry,” has been a critical factor in facilitating closer ties and highlighting common ground and ostensibly shared values. The shared values nostrum emphasizes democracy and civil liberties such as freedom of the press, requiring a degree of cognitive dissonance on both sides of the Pacific in light of the marginalization of Okinawan democratically expressed preference in a series of elections and polls to the siting of U.S. bases in the prefecture and Team Abe’s orchestrated ouster of prominent television anchors and commentators critical of the prime minister. (Kingston 2015a, b; Kingston 2016.) In my opinion, The talismanic invocation of shared values provides an ideological foundation for pursuing common interests as defined by Washington. Shared values might best be understood as the mood music for getting Japan to

290  Jeff Kingston

dance to America’s tune, while making it seem that it is really only taking a principled stand based on its own ideals. Japanese leaders understand that as a client state, it is in Japan’s interest to take its cue about common interests from the United States. (Kingston 2015c)

Rising China From the late 1990s there has been growing anxiety about “Japan passing,” a fear that the U.S. is seeking closer relations with China, encapsulated in the G2 concept, at Japan’s expense. The phenomenon of “Japan passing” stemmed from President Bill Clinton’s nine-day visit to China in 1998, when he did not stop by Japan and consult with America’s major ally in Asia. At the time, a growing trade deficit undermined bilateral relations and led to what Tokyo referred to as “Japan bashing,” a term meant to dismiss any criticism of Japan. In the twenty-first century, there is concern in Tokyo that growing U.S.-China ties might undermine the security alliance, leaving Japan isolated in a dangerous and hostile neighborhood. At the extreme, Tokyo worries that the U.S. won’t come to its aid in a territorial conflict with China because it doesn’t want to risk its economic interests. The rapid rise of China as an economic and military power has transformed the geopolitical landscape in East Asia in ways that Japan finds threatening; double-digit annual growth in China’s defense spending, now treble Japan’s military budget; a more assertive foreign policy regarding regional territorial disputes; and unresolved grievances with Tokyo over history have had significant repercussions. The goodwill generated by Hu Jintao’s earlier smile diplomacy evaporated to Tokyo’s advantage. Xi Jinping’s maladroit diplomacy and muscle flexing has stoked an Arc of Anxiety in Asia that has undermined its interests and helped Japan overcome its own inept forays in public diplomacy. It’s no exaggeration to say that Japan’s most effective strategy is to let China alienate American public opinion all by itself. Japan should be reassured by public opinion polls in the U.S. that indicate a deep reservoir of goodwill, as 74 percent of Americans in 2015 express a favorable view of Japan. In contrast, this 2015 Pew Poll found that American attitudes toward China remain negative with 54 percent expressing an unfavorable view and 38  percent holding a positive view. (Pew 2015) Back in 2005, 43  percent were favorable to China while only 35 percent were unfavorable and thereafter until 2011 favorable views (51 percent) exceeded unfavorable views (36 percent). Since 2012, however, a majority of Americans have expressed negative views of China, a time when a rupture in Sino-Japanese relations developed over Tokyo’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands. There is no reason to believe, however, that Japan’s public diplomacy has had any role in this sharp negative swing in American opinion towards China. As Tokyo vies for influence and tries to nurture closer ties, it is benefitting from China’s clumsy diplomacy and “radar rattling” maritime forays. According to Pew, negative American views are driven by the

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  291

large amount of U.S. debt held by China, cyber attacks, trade deficits, Beijing’s growing military power, perceptions that a rising China is causing a loss of U.S. jobs, in addition to human rights and environmental issues. The U.S. media has been quite critical of China over a range of issues and in the U.S. Republican presidential campaign, Donald Trump has engaged in China bashing, although also tagging Japan for free riding on the U.S. military and suggested it, along with South Korea, develop its own nuclear weapons. In addition, the Obama Administration has adopted a neo-containment policy toward China in a bid to counter its regional hegemonic ambitions. The Obama pivot to Asia, or rebalancing, has involved upgrading defense ties in the region, including Japan, Australia, the Philippines and India, and tapping into regional concerns about what a rising China portends. This is the context in which the U.S. promoted TPP and opposed Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); only Japan among close U.S. allies stood with Washington by refusing to join China’s 2015 AIIB initiative.

Assessing Japan’s public diplomacy In Asia in Washington, Kent Calder (2014) calls Washington, D.C. the world’s, “preeminent agenda setting center.” This is because of the outsized power of the U.S. and the concentration of international organizations, foundations, think tanks and non-government and non-profit organizations involved in trying to shape policies and attitudes render Washington a crucial battleground for Asian governments. Asia’s pivot to Washington aims to influence U.S. policies, counter rivals’ similar efforts and nurture warmer relations at the expense of rivals. Calder, Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at SAIS/Johns Hopkins University in Washington, concludes that the heyday of Asian lobbying is past, “So formal lobbying on behalf of Asian interests, while quite intense in the 1970s and 1980s, appears to have been epiphenomenal and to have waned substantially over the past two decades, just as the pace of classical Washington lobbying itself appears to have done.” (Calder 2014: 131). Apart from Japan, the most determined Asian lobbyists in Washington are China, Taiwan and South Korea. Their lobbying has generated a competitive battle over territorial and historical memory issues that Calder thinks Tokyo is losing. Drawing attention to what he describes as Beijing’s more aggressive, extensive and successful lobbying efforts, Calder writes, To a greater degree than most foreign nations, China represents its interests in Washington by working through local American organizations with similar concerns, rather than directly. U.S.-China relations also involve a host of other semiofficial support organizations, including the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR), the China Institute, the U.S.-China Policy Foundation (USCPF), and the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China (CSCC). These bodies have collectively helped to stabilize

292  Jeff Kingston

China’s role in Washington, including agenda setting, early warning, public education, and informal lobbying. (Calder 2014: 145) He adds, “While these mediating NGOs have some analogue in U.S. relations with NATO, and to a lesser degree in American ties with Korea, they have no good parallel in U.S.-Japan relations.” (Calder 2014: 146) Perhaps, but Calder’s description of the China lobby seems quite analogous to what Angel writes about the Japan Lobby and the influential U.S.-Japan Council, which according to its website, “is a Japanese American-led organization fully dedicated to strengthening ties between the United States and Japan in a global context.” Moreover, Calder’s high appraisal of China’s lobbying efforts is unconvincing as its soft power efforts have fallen flat, and its lobbying is widely disparaged as heavy-handed and ineffective. In contrast to Beijing’s ostensible PR juggernaut, Calder writes, “over much of the past two decades, both the Japanese government and the country’s private sector had a remarkably low profile in Washington, even as their competition has grown more active.” Calder paints a picture of a receding Japan across-theboard with significant recent declines in Congressional exchanges, fewer thinktanks with Japan-oriented programs, fewer Japan specialists in Washington, and a shrinking number of Japanese students and researchers in the U.S. Yet on history issues, the Embassy has been assertively engaged, especially regarding the comfort women. Calder blasts the 2007 debacle when “the embassy spent substantial political capital trying to head off a congressional resolution of censure (H.R. 121) . . . that offended both major human rights and Asian American constituencies in the U.S. Congress and the Democratic Party. The struggle ended with a motion of censure, opposed by the Japanese Embassy in Washington, passing the U.S. House of Representatives.” It was not helpful that on June 14, 2007 conservative Japanese supporters of Abe’s apologist stance on the comfort women placed a full-page Washington Post ad blasting the resolution on the eve of the vote, making it awkward for Japan’s friends on the Hill to stave off the legislative censure as they had several times before. Calder (2014:186) also asserts there is a more proactive approach to mobilizing Japanese-Americans, “Since early 2009, when the U.S.-Japan Council (USJC), a group of Japanese American leaders devoted to maintaining effective working relations among American, Japanese, and Nikkei communities was founded, relations between the embassy and the Japanese American community have grown even closer.” The USJC was established at the instigation of Hawaiian Senator Daniel Inouye (1924–2012), the most prominent Japanese-American politician in U.S. history, who was an ardent opponent of Congressman Mike Honda’s comfort women campaign and a reliable supporter for Tokyo in the corridors of power.2 Below, we discuss this development regarding the anti-comfort women statue campaign in San Francisco. Calder is less impressed by what he characterizes as Japan’s inbred, hereditary diplomatic corps, concluding that it has not been terribly effective: “In bilateral skirmishes within Washington against East Asian neighbors over territorial and

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  293

historical issues, for example, the neighbors typically come out ahead, although Japan achieves its policy goals bilaterally with the United States on most important security questions.” (Calder 2014:188) Ringing the alarm bells, Calder adds, “Also in 2009 as much as 60 billion renminbi ($8.8 billion) was pumped into the Big Four Beijing media outlets (Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, China Radio International, and China Daily) to fund their global expansion.” China has also been nurturing closer relations with the 4 million Chinese American citizens of the United States, something he believes Japan has found more awkward due to wartime internment of Japanese-Americans. William Brooks (2013), a 35-year State Department veteran and adjunct professor of Japanese Studies at SAIS, agrees that Japan is losing out to China in the information wars waged in Washington between these East Asian rivals, writing, “it is increasingly the focus of an enhanced media-centered effort to favorably influence American views in the capital area and across the country on their respective countries. China, through its sophisticated CCTV World channel, has emerged as the clear technological leader in the de facto information-providing rivalry with Japan. It has set up a Washington bureau and stateof-the art programming that is as sophisticated as CNN’s, even to the extent of adding top-notch American anchors and reporters to present hard-hitting balanced news and features to a world audience. Japan has no comparable U.S.based programming.” In his opinion China has earned a super-achiever award for its English language media efforts, noting that the China Daily U.S. edition is available on Kindle for only $5 a month, China Watch is a free insert in major newspapers like the Washington Post, and CCTV broadcasts (with 2 channels in English) are readily available on satellite, cable and the Internet. All of this helps shape U.S. opinion toward China and gives it an opportunity to counter negative coverage in U.S. and other international media while also presenting human-interest stories that appeal to audiences. It also broadcasts grisly documentaries about the Sino-Japanese war that viscerally challenge the revisionist history tropes favored by PM Abe and other revisionists. But who actually watches CCTV and to what extent are they persuaded by Beijing’s propaganda? Nobody believes that press freedom exists in China for the very good reason it does not, and the intimidation and arrest of journalists for doing their job is routine. Moreover, China’s forays into social media have repeatedly back-fired as videos depicting various aspects of China such as the making of the thirteenth five-year plan seem more a cringe worthy parody of nation branding than crack public diplomacy.3 While Japan has NHK World, its level of professionalism pales in comparison to CCTV and, Brooks points out, it doesn’t tailor its programs to U.S. audiences the way that CCTV does. The Japanese media, in his view, is far better at disseminating news about the U.S. to the Japanese rather than conveying Japan’s views and influencing American public opinion. Instead, There seem to be endless fashion shows and cooking shows, and the emphasis on “Cool Japan” – programs centering on the wide-eyed views of young

294  Jeff Kingston

foreigners living in Japan regarding aspects of the country that appeal to them, or perplex them. Brooks concludes that, While China is making a tremendous effort to reach American audiences with a full platter of news, documentaries, special programming, and broadcasts out of Washington and New York, Japan seems to be slipping off America’s radar scope as information from domestic and Japanese news sources tailored for an American audience becomes a scarce commodity. In his view, by remaining passive in this lopsided information war, Japan’s media have punched below their weight in the U.S. to the detriment of Japanese interests. A veteran Japan hand with extensive government and academic experience warns that, The Abe administration has a bad reputation among some segments in Washington because of the history issue. That is well known. The problem here is the tendency for the GOJ to shun those who are critical of the Abe administration  – probably on orders from the political elite. Abe’s April 2015 speech to Congress helped repair his tattered image, but if he issues a statement in mid-August that is seen as watering down Japan’s previous apologies for wartime acts, then no matter how much money is poured into PR, it won’t buy any goodwill in this town. He will be pilloried. Perhaps, but Abe did not get pilloried for his evasive August 14, 2015 statement, perhaps attesting to savvy image management by PR firms hired by MOFA. An American insider with extensive foundation experience involving Japan explains, the Gaimusho has become much more serious about its public diplomacy efforts in the States. The Embassy has pumped a lot of money into the major think tanks in Washington in order to support Japan-related public events and projects. MOFA has also published glossy brochures in English that argue Japan’s position on various disagreements with China (and South Korea re the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute). Japanese funding is underwriting visits to Japan by young Americans and there is increased funding for English-speaking Japanese scholars who can more articulately argue Japan’s case in overseas academic forums and the like. So what we’re seeing now is a much more sophisticated and well-funded public diplomacy effort by Japan than in previous years. It’s hard to gauge how effective and influential this ultimately is – particularly in the universe of other countries’ charm offensives in Washington. True, it may be paying more than other countries, but it also has deeper pockets than most other

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  295

countries and, as far as its national interests are concerned, it cannot afford to be marginalized in the capital of its sole security guarantor. Moreover, Another dilemma for Japan is that it has to strike the right balance between public diplomacy and carrying out an all-out propaganda campaign. The latter might backfire if it’s seen as too heavy handed. For instance, I’m not sure but I don’t think that the GOJ is explicitly telling the think tanks that it’s funding to promote a specific message about history or territorial issues, etc. You might say that that’s implicitly expected through the financial support that the GOJ provides. That said, I’m not naive enough to think that all this money swirling around is of no concern whatsoever. I am somewhat concerned about the quality of objective analysis of Japan when so many American researchers and scholars depend on Japanese money for their livelihood. The Abe administration is particularly thin-skinned when it comes to outside criticism and I wouldn’t be surprised if it were to withhold funding from people that it considers “unfriendly” to its cause. So, I guess in the final analysis, Japan is certainly playing hardball in the public diplomacy realm (emphasis added). That may at times seem over the top but I do think there is a vigorous message war going on between China and Japan, and the GOJ has to do what it can to come out on top of that game. Brad Glosserman, Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS Hawaii and coauthor of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (Columbia 2015), says, if the question is the competition for influence WITHIN the US, I  don’t think Japan has much to worry about. There is interest, there is knowledge, there is suspicion and there is influence  – all are different outcomes and I  am not sure that China is getting much positive out of their Confucius Institute (CI) program; academics are very mixed, China specialists typically scathing and administrators more supportive – until there is an incident that exposes Beijing’s heavy hand. In short, the best thing for Japan to do is to let the CI project be and not compete. I would have thought that the head to head competition with Korea over the comfort women statutes would have shown that such crude behavior is a loser’s bet. He adds, the biggest issue is the lack of weight Japan brings to global issues and the global arena. Japan does seem like a presence that reflects an increasingly

296  Jeff Kingston

uchimuki (inward looking) mentality, a sense that the outside world is a hostile place, a sense that Japan is first and foremost Japanese, and of Asia, not in Asia, and certainly not in anywhere else. Overall, Japan projects disinterest in global issues not directly affecting it such that Tokyo seems an incredibly selfish actor. Either way, no one really cares about Japan’s preferences. There is little to worry about in terms of vying for U.S. support because, Japan has long had its group of supporters – the chrysanthemum crowd and alliance managers – that largely insulated it from the vicissitudes of waves of negative opinion. Absent some big screw up that harms US national interests, that buffer will remain. In his view, competition with China is a losing bet. Tokyo doesn’t have to engage in that competition directly; Beijing will prove its own worst enemy. Japan should not position itself as an enabler or excuse for bad decisions in China. It should do its own thing and let its own values shine through. It is thus perplexing to observe the counterproductive blunders of Abe’s brasher public diplomacy. Snow (2016) highlights the considerable room for improvement and strategies for a more effective public diplomacy.

Japanese lobbying and hardball4 Despite Calder’s more benign assessment of a bumbling, slow off the mark public diplomacy, Japan is not exactly a retiring wallflower. As noted above, the Japanese government, foundations and firms have developed an influential network in the U.S. that dates back to the 1970s, an era of acrimonious trade frictions. This Japan Lobby has tackled various other issues and is now a valuable weapon in Japan’s public relations war against China in the U.S. The Sunlight Foundation and ProPublica estimate that total Japanese spending on lobbying and public relations was $4.2 billion in 2008, putting Japan third behind the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom while South Korea ranked eighth with $2.9 billion (ProPublica August 18, 2009).5 And this lavish spending is not new as The Center for Public Integrity found in 2005, for example, that Japan and China/Taiwan both ranked among the top ten in terms of lobbying expenditures during the 1998–2005 period. (Calder 2014: 92) Calder’s overall portrait of the Japan Lobby is a far cry from Angel and Hall’s account in the 1990s and Choate’s in the 1980s. In his view there have been signs

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  297

of change since 2005 suggesting a more proactive and effective public diplomacy, but overall he still thinks Japan is losing this battle to its rivals from Seoul and Beijing. Brooks also suggests that Beijing has a much slicker, well-funded and effective media strategy and that there are very few efforts to project Japanese views in the U.S. It is important, however, not to confuse the quantity of funding with the quality of the public diplomacy, and it is not clear that China’s efforts have in fact been very effective. Problematically, the target audience sees that hand of the state behind all of these initiatives, thus undermining their credibility and impact. For example, China’s Confucius Institutes have drawn considerable criticism that suggests that they have not been effective in improving U.S. opinion towards China, but may have influence on the research agendas of China specialists and university departments’ hiring and public outreach activities (Sahlens 2013, 2014). There are signs of a more proactive Japanese public diplomacy, but as with the comfort women resolution battle in the U.S. Congress in 2007, the Embassy may be digging a hole, deepened by private efforts, in promoting a revisionist narrative of history that downplays Japanese depredations. It appears that the comfort women statues that are popping up around the U.S. are attracting similar Japanese government and nongovernmental efforts that are likely to back-fire, putting Japan into the crosshairs of history and gender. In 2015 Japan announced it would treble its budget for public diplomacy to $500 million, apparently a response to perceptions that the governments of China and South Korea are embracing a more assertive diplomacy aimed at tarnishing Japan’s reputation. Japan’s diplomats now can’t complain about a lack of firepower in what is often likened to a public relations war. Conservatives have long grumbled that Japan’s diplomats have been ciphers on the world stage, adopting a reactive and ineffective approach to countering misinformation and misinterpretation of government policies and initiatives. But based on Japan’s recent miscues, taxpayers have every right to complain that this gold-plated, brazen diplomacy is undermining Japan’s stature. This lavish funding was also justified in terms of funding Japanese studies at universities to counter China’s Confucius Institutes and to establish Japan Houses in London, Los Angeles and San Paolo. It is not clear what role the Japan Houses will play that is not already being played by various existing organizations, but the sites were selected due to sizeable Japanese communities, and it appears that they will serve to disseminate information and government views on issues that crop up in the media, promote soft power and generate sinecures for retiring diplomats. Public diplomacy is the art of convincing and seducing other governments and people in other nations to agree with, support or acquiesce to the policies and positions of the practitioner’s government. On this score Japan is not doing too badly, but there have been some unfortunate lapses. For example, in January 2015 Japanese diplomats visited the offices of a U.S. textbook publisher to complain about errors in a two-paragraph description of the wartime military “comfort women,” a bête noire of reactionaries and the government of Prime Minister Abe.

298  Jeff Kingston

The world history textbook in question does contain several errors, but the question is whether this diplomatic pressure was the best way to handle the problem. Presumably, diplomats understand the society in which they are representing their government so could have anticipated the resulting U.S. media backlash against Japan, one that questioned Tokyo’s stance on press and academic freedoms. Perhaps more successful are the “infomercials” that Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has run on CNN, one in 2016 focusing on the Rule of Law at Sea that highlights naval cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. China is not named, but is nonetheless implicated as the transgressor and common threat. These expensive forays into public diplomacy on international commercial television signal an end to Japan’s low-key diplomacy and suggest just how high Tokyo thinks the stakes are in the battle with China for global hearts and minds. The conservative Sankei newspaper advocates a more aggressive diplomatic stance on history issues that dovetails with the mission of Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), a neo-nationalist organization including numerous LDP Diet members, and a sprinkling of high profile pundits and presidents of companies and universities. From their perspective Japan has been too reticent and too polite; it needs to take the gloves off on the world stage. It does not seem to have occurred to them that this might be a counterproductive strategy and that on history issues it leaves Japan vulnerable to criticisms of whitewashing, backsliding and promoting an exonerating narrative that glorifies wartime and colonial excesses. Actually, Japan’s reticent diplomacy over the years has paid dividends as polls show that Americans rate Japan more highly on history issues than Germany, a nation usually held up as the model penitent. It takes confidence for a government to acknowledge and atone for the shameful past, build a track record of peace and believe that global support will follow. Polls indicate that Japan’s self-effacing style over the years has won widespread admiration for Brand Japan, but this is now at risk from the Abe government’s swaggering public diplomacy, a shift in tone that reflects more diffidence than confidence. Let’s examine a few instances where Japan’s hardball has back-fired.

Germis affair In an April 2, 2015 essay in the Number One Shimbun published by the Foreign Correspondent’s Club of Japan, veteran German journalist Carsten Germis wrote about his experiences of being harassed by the Japanese government basically for doing his job. (Germis 2015) In his view, the Abe government is overly sensitive to press criticism of his revisionist history and responds aggressively in trying to suppress such views. In twenty-first century Japan, there is far too much official paranoia that all criticism of Japan is aiding and abetting China and Korea. Officials everywhere get testy about negative coverage, and Japan is certainly not the only country where journalists are singled out for harassment. The intolerance towards criticism is

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  299

based on the erroneous belief that all criticism of the Japanese government, and/ or Abe, reflects anti-Japanese sentiments. Anna Fifield, the Washington Post’s Tokyo correspondent says, As we can see in the cases of NHK and Asahi being hauled over the coals for their reporting, the Japanese government is trying to silence anyone who doesn’t toe the government line, but the government has a much harder time restraining the foreign press in this way. That doesn’t mean they’re not trying. Like many other foreign journalists, I’ve been on the receiving end of unwelcome emails trying to influence my coverage on the history issue. (Interview April 2015) This can’t help Japan’s image. Germis argues that if Japan’s popularity in Germany has suffered, it is not due to the media coverage, but to Germany’s easily understood repugnance at historical revisionism. In this context, the Japanese government’s efforts to promote an exonerating and valorizing narrative of the wartime past are self-defeating. Germis revealed that, The paper’s senior foreign policy editor was visited by the Japanese consul general of Frankfurt, who passed on objections from ‘Tokyo.’ The Chinese, he complained, had used it for anti-Japanese propaganda. It got worse. Later on in the frosty, 90-minute meeting, the editor asked the consul general for information that would prove the facts in the article wrong, but to no avail. I am forced to begin to suspect that money is involved, said the diplomat, insulting me, the editor and the entire paper. Pulling out a folder of my clippings, he extended condolences for my need to write pro-China propaganda, since he understood that it was probably necessary for me to get my visa application approved. Me? A paid spy for Beijing? Not only have I never been there, but I’ve never even applied for a visa. If this is the approach of the new administration’s drive to make Japan’s goals understood, there’s a lot of work ahead. Of course, the pro-China accusations did not go over well with my editor, and I received the backing to continue with my reporting. If anything, the editing of my reports became sharper. The Japanese consul general subsequently alleged that he never made such allegations, possibly due to the misunderstanding of the editor or an error in translation. (Asahi 4/28/2015) Dr. Peter Sturm, the FAZ editor involved, informed me that the conversation with the Japanese Consul General took place in August 2014, explaining that, “The conversation was conducted in German, which the Consul General speaks excellently. Therefore there was no interpreter present.” (Personal communication April 28, 2015)

300  Jeff Kingston

Sturm added, I can confirm the Consul General made the remarks about Carsten Germis’ personal integrity exactly in the way Carsten reported. As far as our newspaper and me personally are concerned we never were “anti-Japanese” – or ever will be. I tried to tell the Consul General that our concern about certain aspects of policy, which had found their way into the columns of the paper were derived solely from a deep sense of friendship towards an allied country. In these times those who criticize Abe are often accused of Japan-bashing and venality. This is a convenient way to marginalize critical voices, suggesting that they have insidious motives and are helping, as alleged in the Germis case, Chinese propagandists in exchange for money and favors. It doesn’t seem to matter that no evidence was presented or that such allegations are demonstrably untrue. Labeling critics as Japan-bashers evades engaging the arguments and the facts and instead relies on cheap shot ad hominem attacks, tarnishing Japan’s image. Officials also warned several foreign correspondents, including Germis, not to interview Nakano Koichi, a respected political scientist at Sophia University. (See Nakano Chapter 2) Nakano’s critical assessments of PM Abe’s policies and revisionist views on history are widely quoted. The government’s press handler asserted that he is unreliable and steered journalists to sources that adhere to the government line, including a freelance foreign journalist who appeared on the scene in 2014 with no prior experience in Japan. Doing so only enhanced Nakano’s reputation because journalists understand that if the government is slagging him, it is probably because he speaks truth to power. Other foreign journalists confide that they have felt pressure and know that their reporting might jeopardize gaining access, as blacklisted reporters/newspapers don’t get interviews with Abe or his inner circle. Controlling the press has become more toxic in contemporary Japan because it involves government officials and those who do their bidding, impugning the professional integrity of journalists and their sources as a way to discredit the analysis. Spin doctors everywhere massage the message, wine and dine journalists, dangle access as an inducement and take umbrage at what they feel is unfair reporting, but what is now going on in Japan is getting more “Rovesque.” (See Snow Chapter 20) Karl Rove and Scooter Libby in the Bush Administration reveled in their power and intervened aggressively to push their storylines in ways that rewrote the rules of engagement with the press. Libby was convicted of a felony for his role in “Plamegate” that involved outing Valerie Plame a CIA agent, the wife of Joseph Wilson, an administration critic. Nothing that the Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office) has done so far comes close to that level of vindictiveness, but as Martin Fackler explains, Some degree of push back by governments against media coverage is normal in most democracies. For instance, I have dealt with White House press

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  301

handlers who will bite hard if they think reporters have misrepresented what the President said. On the other side of the coin, the Japanese government goes further in certain ways, playing this game of denying access to and bad mouthing journalists who don’t toe the line. I think they use these tactics because they probably work with the local press. I’m surprised that they’d think the same tactics would work on foreign press. (Interview May 2015) Ellis Krauss, a leading specialist on the Japanese media at the University of California-San Diego, told me, MOFA is trying desperately to please Abe for fear he will pick on them as a scapegoat. The media is cowed . . . This campaign reflects a huge insecurity, not confidence, about Japan, about their identity, about their history. He adds, the real mystery is why Abe and the Japanese media don’t realize how counter to Japan’s own national interests this is. War memory is an issue that Japan cannot win on. Right wing denials only help the Chinese and Korean nationalists (who are themselves irrational on this issue), and will alienate Americans, their strongest ally, and the Europeans and Australians, their natural democratic friends. In his view it’s not about apologizing, but rather it’s about denial, like Holocaust denial in Europe. The best thing the Japanese government and right wing can do for Japan’s own interests is just shut up on these issues. But, Abe’s advisors and supporters take a rather different view on national interests and, seeing the battles over history in terms of identity politics, insist on exculpatory revisionist narratives that draw international censure.

Churlish on UNESCO The Japanese government’s denunciation of UNESCO’s decision in October 2015 to inscribe China’s submission of “Documents of Nanjing Massacre” in the Memory of the World Register is both churlish and regrettably one-sided. Such fulminating damages Japan’s reputation because it sends a message that the government is seeking to downplay or deny the atrocities committed by Japan’s Imperial Armed Forces in the war of aggression it instigated against China. At the same time, UNESCO also accepted two sets of archives compiled by Japan, including a submission about mistreatment of Japanese POWs by the Soviet Union following

302  Jeff Kingston

the end of WWII; of 600,000 sent to Siberia, 60,000 never made it home. So Japanese accusations that Beijing is politicizing UNESCO seem self-serving and inconsistent. Oddly, Japan alone was allowed to position itself as a victim of WWII while nations victimized by Japanese imperialism are castigated for drawing attention to Japan’s misdeeds and subject to accusations of discrediting the Memory of the World Register. UNESCO did not accept China’s dossier on the comfort women, a decision that further undermines Japan’s intemperate attack on UNESCO’s alleged bias. In July 2015, the government also made a hash of the UNESCO designation of 23 Meiji Industrial Revolution sites after some very public wrangling with South Korea, with Tokyo also accusing South Korea of politicizing the process. Seoul had opposed the listing of seven sites honoring Japan’s modernization because they involved 57,900 Korean forced laborers, but finally acquiesced to Japan’s proposal. This is because Japan agreed to establish an information center that would acknowledge the forced labor and because Japan’s ambassador to UNESCO Sato Kuni stipulated, “Japan is prepared to take measures that allow an understanding that there were a large number of Koreans and others who were brought against their will and forced to work under harsh conditions in the 1940s at some of the sites, and that, during World War II, the Government of Japan also implemented its policy of requisition.” The meeting of minds was short lived as Foreign Minister Kishida asserted, quite wrongly, that “forced to work” does not mean “forced labor.” This peevish outburst was probably aimed at smoothing the ruffled feathers of benighted LDP constituencies, but that does not make his remarks any less fatuous and unbecoming of Japan’s top diplomat. Additionally, in the wake of the brouhaha, Japan dispatched an envoy to meet with Bulgarian Irina Bokova, the Director General of UNESCO, providing an opportunity to express a desire to appoint a permanent Japanese observer to the Memory of the World Register while conveying veiled threats about withdrawing Tokyo’s funding, and dangling the possibility of GOJ support should she decide to run for UN Secretary General, apparently contingent on accommodating Tokyo’s concerns

Flouting rule of law In the category of what not to do, resumption of whaling is a major stumble for Japan because it undermines its rule of law diplomacy in ways that antagonizes many of its major allies and others. In the war of words with Beijing, Tokyo has gained moral authority by criticizing its rival for not abiding by the rule of law and trying to change the status quo through unilateral military coercion. So Japan’s defiance of the International Court of Justice’s ruling that Japan’s research whaling program in Antarctic waters violates the terms of the 1986 moratorium of the International Whaling Commission is a major setback because in doing so Japan is exempting itself from the rule of law it otherwise assiduously upholds. When the ruling was issued in March 2014, Japanese foreign ministry spokesman, Shikata Noriyuki, told reporters that Japan respected the rule of law and

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  303

would abide by the decision. This was the right call because by agreeing to participate in the ICJ process, Japan and Australia committed to accepting the outcome. Subsequently, in 2015 Japan reversed itself and is now flouting the ruling by resuming the whale hunt in the Antarctic. This is not a good precedent to shore up Japan’s legal position in any potential future arbitration cases that might arise over territorial claims or EEZs. Moreover, in terms of public image in the U.S., Europe and beyond, whaling is a losing proposition, something that provokes a viscerally negative reaction. In 2016, for example, Japan’s research whalers killed over 200 pregnant minke whales out of a 300+ cull in the Antarctic, justifying this as essential to determine the age at which minke whales reach sexual maturity. This unconvincing argument failed to quell international opprobrium while disregarding the rule of law Tokyo frequently invokes in pillorying China’s territorial aggrandizement was an epic own goal. Domestically it’s also hardly inspired policy given that almost no Japanese consume whale, and the entire program is only viable with heavy government subsidies. Moreover, health authorities have found very high concentrations of mercury and PCBs in whale meat, advising pregnant women not to eat any at all. Pro-whaling advocates in the Japanese government and Diet may think they are justified on cultural and culinary grounds, but they are harpooning Brand Japan. Nevertheless, their transgressions pale in comparison to revisionists’ falsehoods seeking to rehabilitate Japan’s shabby wartime past.

Statues of reproach Like many other academics and journalists in Japan and the U.S., in 2015 I received copies of two books from Inoguchi Kuniko, an LDP member of the Upper House: History Wars: Japan-False Indictment of the Century compiled and published by the Sankei Shimbun and Getting Over It! Why Korea Needs to Stop Japan Bashing by Oh Sonfa, a professor at Takushoku University in Tokyo. The U.S.-registered Japanese nonprofit Global Alliance for Historical Truth claims credit on its website for the Sankei book distribution. Dr. Inoguchi laments that unnamed individuals with political ambitions have distorted twentieth century regional history and that “this distorted history has been exported into some areas outside of East Asia.” It is unlikely that these polemical jeremiads will convince anyone to change their mind and are more likely to incite a negative reaction in the U.S. because they read like propaganda. The Sankei slams China’s alleged backing of a comfort woman statue and Pacific War Museum in San Francisco, apparently misunderstanding the local politics of these initiatives. It conveniently overlooks how in 2013 Hashimoto Toru, as mayor of Osaka, sister city of San Francisco, drew the ire of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors with his comments justifying and downplaying the comfort women system. The Sankei raises the alarm about ongoing “History Wars” in the U.S., what it calls the main battlefield for public opinion, asserting that China is orchestrating discord between the U.S. and Japan. If so, Beijing is doing a lousy job as more Americans by far distrust China, by an

304  Jeff Kingston

almost 2:1 margin; only 38 percent of Americans have a high opinion of China while 74 percent have a favorable view of Japan. (Pew 2015) Local Bay Area activists report that before the Board unanimously approved the comfort women memorial in September 2015, the Japan Lobby was vigorously working behind the scenes to kill the resolution. Local Japanese-Americans privately confirm that disinformation was sowed and that they were pressured to lobby against the resolution, with continued Japanese corporate funding hanging in the balance. One wrote in an email: The Consulate General of Japan was not just actively lobbying against the proposed resolution on recommending a “comfort women” memorial in San Francisco, but also feeding false rumors to prominent members of Japantown establishment and pressuring them to support its effort to block the resolution, creating serious divisions within Japanese American community as well as in the larger Asian American community. Another referred to Japanese pressure brought to bear on Board members, with the implicit threat that Jtown’s political contributions may be at stake. But they took notice when the API (Asia Pacific Islander) Caucus of the California Democratic Party endorsed the resolution. We need more support from the Democratic leadership (endorsement letters, etc.) to push back against the ugly foreign government intervention on our political process. The Board disregarded spurious allegations about incidents of discrimination and bullying targeting ethnic Japanese children in Glendale, California after a comfort woman statue was erected there. (See Schreiber and Wetherall Chapter 15) It seems that Japan would do better to ignore these statue and memorial initiatives because intervention has repeatedly back-fired, throwing fuel on the fires of recrimination over the shared East Asian past of colonialism and war. Two new ones unveiled in October 2015 in Seoul, one placed by Chinese-American activists depicting a Chinese comfort woman, and an appeal to add a Filipina statue to the memorial, suggest the perils of Japan’s tactics. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and South Korean President Park Geun-hye understand something needs to be done about the comfort women issue, but they still have a way to go. It is unlikely that the December 28, 2015 “final and irreversible resolution” to issues surrounding the women who worked in wartime brothels at the Japanese military’s behest will prove to be much of a resolution at all. Indeed, the clever evasions and semantic parsing could easily unravel and become another bone of contention and trigger renewed mutual recriminations. The UN has issued a yellow card to Tokyo on the 2015 comfort women agreement, with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) stating it “did not fully adopt a victim-centered approach” and was evasive on responsibility for the human rights violations endured. In its March 2016 report, CEDAW also admonished Japanese leaders for ongoing disparaging statements about the

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  305

comfort women and urged the reinstatement of the comfort women issue in secondary school textbooks. Subsequently, on March 11, 2016, a group of UN human rights experts issued a statement rebuking the Japanese and South Korean governments for the diplomatic chicanery, insisting that they “should understand that this issue will not be considered resolved so long as all the victims, including from other Asian countries, remain unheard, their expectations unmet and their wounds left wide open.” They also expressed concern that the South Korean government “may remove a statue commemorating not only the historical issue and legacy of the comfort women but also symbolizing the survivors’ long search for justice.” Japanese politicians insisted that the 1 billion Yen Seoul was promised under the accord would not be paid until after the comfort woman statue across the street from the Japanese Embassy was removed, but throughout 2016, citizens maintained a 24/7 vigil around the bronze figure of a school girl to prevent its removal. Forcible removal risks igniting a firestorm of protest that would ensure the accord going up in smoke and perpetuation of bilateral discord no matter what the diplomats want to believe. The Japanese government transferred the promised funds in the summer of 2016 despite the statue’s continued presence and growing signs of South Korean discontent with the accord. Japan’s hardball tactics on the comfort women issue also involve crude campaigns in the U.S. What should we make of the Voices of Vietnam, a well-funded group that has hired former Minnesota senator Norm Coleman to be the point-man in demanding President Park Geun-hye apologize for Vietnamese comfort women who served some 320,000 Korean soldiers fighting at the behest of Washington in the Vietnam War? This organization held a press conference on October 15, 2015, in connection with Park’s summit with President Obama, timed to maximize publicity. In a Fox News op-ed published on the eve of the summit, Coleman demanded Park apologize to the Vietnamese victims of Korean sexual predations, writing, “Failing to make such an unequivocal apology would only undermine President Park’s moral authority as she presses Japan to apologize for the sexual violence perpetrated against South Korean ‘comfort women’ during World War II.” Apparently attacking Park is the main mission of an organization that seems, rather curiously, to have sprung up out of nowhere according to contacts in the Vietnamese U.S. diaspora. Certainly, amends to these women – there are an estimated 800 survivors who served Korean soldiers – and the thousands of children of mixed ancestry born to them are in order, but why hasn’t Coleman spoken out about the far larger problem involving U.S. soldiers? And, does Coleman think that the comfort women system is really the same as what happened in Vietnam? What is apparent is that Japan’s Foreign Ministry is hiring public relations firms and lobbyists as part of their public diplomacy initiatives in the U.S. (Wilson and Needham 2014). It’s about framing debates, swaying public discourse and opinion, influencing policies and attitudes, and image management, and this is what the professionals who maintain offices on K-Street in Washington, D.C. do for a living (Ackley 2015). These professionals plug Japan into their power networks, providing access, gathering intelligence, working the media, brokering deals, navigating the complex bureaucratic and political system and securing the

306  Jeff Kingston

services of key players who can be useful (Rabin-Havt 2015). This is how the game is played and where public diplomacy is conducted behind the scenes for hefty fees (Bogardus 2014).

Conclusion It is hard to reconcile Calder’s wallflower Japan with significant counter-evidence discussed above about a more aggressive public diplomacy as the hybrid public and private sector efforts of the Japan Lobby are playing hardball, especially on history issues, and ramping up overall lobbying efforts. Calder’s view that Japan’s public diplomacy has not been as effective as its rivals and inept in identifying and exploiting opportunities is also not convincing. Japan is not alone in hiring lobbyists and is not the only nation underachieving on its public diplomacy, but like China, its hardball tactics seem to be backfiring. Given the reservoir of goodwill in the U.S. public towards Japan, and favorable attitudes at the highest level of government that contrast with hostility towards China, Japan would be better served by a low key public diplomacy rather than the more imperious approach favored by Team Abe. The Japan Lobby is becoming more active under PM Abe and fighting counterproductive battles over history. It need not do so as a 2015 Pew Poll indicates that Americans rate Japan more highly on dealing with wartime history than Germany, the nation usually touted as the model penitent; 61 percent of Americans believe that Japan has apologized enough or has nothing to apologize for compared to 54 percent expressing similar views about Germany (Pew 2015). There is a risk that Japan’s newly aggressive strategy on wartime controversies will back-fire, undermining goodwill in the U.S. while roiling regional relations in northeast Asia. Japan has reaped the benefits of a more reticent, self-effacing diplomacy, one that acknowledged much more about wartime excesses than the Abe Cabinet is prepared to tolerate. The growing intolerance in Japan toward critics in media and academia handicaps Japan’s public diplomacy, while revisionist rewriting of history makes it look like it’s shirking responsibility. In short, hardball history initiatives represent a dead-end, and Japan would be better served in its PR battle with China by focusing on contemporary security and territorial issues and championing the rule of law where its case is far more compelling. Quibbling and caviling over memory wars that focus global attention on Japan’s worst moments is counterproductive. This distracts attention from Japan’s strengths and its enormous accomplishments over the past 70 years in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. In promoting a national identity that takes pride in the nation, it is this post-1945 record that merits the limelight. Thus, Abe and fellow revisionists are unwittingly undermining Japan’s public diplomacy.

Notes 1 This is a revised version of an essay published in the Asia Pacific Journal. May 1, 2016. 2 In June 2011, Inouye received a Grand Cordon of the Order of the Paulownia Flowers, the highest Japanese honor conferred on a foreigner who is not a head of state. He was only the seventh American overall and first Japanese-American to receive this award.

Japan Lobby, PR and diplomacy  307

He was decorated "to recognize his continued significant and unprecedented contributions to the enhancement of goodwill and understanding between Japan and the United States.” Hawaii 24/7, June 22, 2011. 3 “Now in China-13th Five Year Plan Now” see www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhLr HCKMqyM. 4 The focus here is on Japan’s public diplomacy and lobbying efforts, but it does appear that China engages in similar tactics through its Confucius Institutes in terms of influencing academia and the US-China Business Council that includes many Fortune 500 member firms that are experienced and adept at the art of political lobbying. In addition, Chinese-American groups are active, especially on war memory issues. Over the past two decades the growing heft of Chinese companies means they also can exert more influence in terms of where they decide to invest and the jobs that go with that. China, however, does not gets its way on many issues such as buying firms deemed to have national security importance, trade disputes and its growing assertiveness in the South and East China Sea, and polls suggest it has not charmed the American public. 5 China did not make the list, but whether this means low spending on lobbying or other reasons is unclear, and I have been unable to find comparable estimates of what China spends on lobbying.

References Ackley, Kate (2015) “Japan taps lobbyists to bolster U.S. ties”, Rollcall, April  27, www.rollcall.com/news/japan_taps_lobbyists_to_bolster_us_ties-241489–1. html?zkPrintable=true. Angel, Robert (1996) The Japan Lobby: An Introduction. JPRI Working Paper No.  27: December. Bogardus, Kevin (2014) “Japan turns to K Street amid calls for apology on WWIIera ‘comfort women’ ” The Hill, Feb 6, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/ business-a-lobbying/197599-japan-turns-to-k-street-amid-calls-for-apology-on. Brooks, William (2013) “Changing Influence of Chinese and Japanese Media in Washington and America” Unpublished manuscript. Calder, Kent (2014) Asia in Washington. Brookings. Fallows, James (1994) Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System. Pantheon. Farnsworth, Clyde (1987) “Americans who lobby for Japan”, NY Times, May  3, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/03/business/american-who-lobby-for-japan. html?pagewanted=all. Germis, Carsten (2015) “On my watch”, Number One Shimbun -Foreign Correspondent’s Club of Japan, April  2, http://www.fccj.or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/576-on-mywatch/576-on-my-watch.html (Accessed May 2, 2016). Ishihara Shintaro (1989) The Japan That Can Say No. Stanford, CA: Simon & Schuster. Johnson, Chalmers (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kingston, Jeff (2015a) “Are forces of darkness gathering in Japan?” Japan Times, May 16, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/16/commentary/forces-darkness-gatheringjapan/#.VuN3j0sXdFJ (Accessed March 12, 2016) Kingston, Jeff (2015b) “Testy team Abe pressures media in Japan” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May, http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4827/article.html (Accessed March 12, 2016) Kingston, Jeff (2015c) “In search of Japanese and American shared values” Japan Times, June  20, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/20/commentary/search-japaneseamerican-shared-values/#.VuN8OksXdFJ (Accessed March 12, 2016)

308  Jeff Kingston

Kingston, Jeff (2016) “Hiroko Kuniya’s ouster deals another blow to quality journalism in Japan” Japan Times, January  23, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/01/23/commen tary/hiroko-kuniyas-ouster-deals-another-blow-quality-journalism-japan/ (Accessed March 12, 2016) Pew (2015) “Americans, Japanese: Mutual respect 70 years after the end of WWII: Neither trusts China, differ on Japan’s security role in Asia. Pew Public Research Center: Global Attitudes and Trends, www.pewglobal.org/2015/04/07/americans-japanesemutual-respect-70-years-after-the-end-of-wwii/ (Accessed March 12, 2016). Prestowitz, Clyde (1988) Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead. New York: Basic Books. ProPublica (2009) “Adding it up: The top players in foreign agent lobbying” https://www. propublica.org/article/adding-it-up-the-top-players-in-foreign-agent-lobbying-718. Rabin-Havt, Ari (2015) “Bipartisan agreement: Foreign governments pay former senate leaders to sell TPP”, The Observer, June  11,http://observer.com/2015/06/manyforeign-governments-pay-k-street-big-money-to-peddle-tpp-to-congress/ Sahlens, Marshall (2013) “China U”, The Nation, October 30, www.thenation.com/article/ china-u/. Sahlins, Marshall (2014) “Confucius institutes: Academic malware”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 12(46): 1, November 17, 2014, http://japanfocus.org/-Marshall-Sahlins/4220/ article.html. Snow, Nancy(2016) Japan’s Challenges in Public Diplomacy: An American Vision. Asie Visions 81 (February). Paris: IFRI- Center for Asian Studies. van Wolferen, Karel (1989) The Enigma of Japanese Power. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Wilson, Megan and Vicki Needham (2014) “Japan launches major blitz on trade,” April  28, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/240254-japanlaunches-major-lobbying-blitz-on-trade.

INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italic indicate a figure or table on the corresponding page. abduction (rachi mondai): dechiage (faked), abduction issue 194 Abe, Hiroyuki 166 Abe, Shinzo: apology 182; August 14, 2015, 70th anniversary statement 181 – 3; glass jaw, display 19; impact 141; momentum 263 – 6; NHK, relationship 72 – 3; one-on-one interviews 50; power, return 8; press oppression 76; pressure, Asahi report 47; PR strategies 255; public approval 263; revisionist history, criticism 77; Utsukushii Kuni e (Toward a Beautiful Japan) 165 Abe administration: Abe 2.0276; appointees, editorial interference denials 163; Asahi bashing 142 – 5; behaviors 18; critical assessments (Nakano) 300; economic policies 265; enemies 79 – 80; media executives, closed-door meetings 267; media muzzling 17; political causes/consequences 22 – 3; political objectives/impact 20 – 2; propaganda/ opinion control 276 – 7; public diplomacy 296 Abe Doctrine 287 Abenomics 258; failures 8 access journalism 44 – 5; favoritism 45; strictures 45 – 6 “actual malice” doctrine 97 “administrative guidance” cases 125 Agents of Influence (Choate) 287

“Ainu Debate” 208 Akihito (Emperor) 9 alliance management 286 – 90; “alliance manager” community 56; “Alliance Managers” 158 American Occupation (1945–1952), impact 64 – 5 Ampo crisis 79 “Anatomy of the Open Letter” 154 Angel, Robert 288 “anti-Japan” (han-nichi) 220 anti-Japanese conspiracy 152 – 3 anti-Korea nationalism 196 – 9 Aoyama, Yuko 183 Arai, Kazuma 203 Arai, Rokki 196 Arikawa, Hiro 164 Armed Attack Response Act 2003 (Buryoku-kogeki-jitai-taisyo-ho) 125 Arudou, Debito 213 Aruze Corporation 100 Asahi Geino 199 – 200 Asahi Japan Watch 214 Asahi Shimbun 5, 31; affair 135; anti-Asahi campaign 147; articles, retraction 80; attack 36 – 7; bashing 142 – 5; broadcast license, revocation (demand) 79; company identity, preeminence 52 – 3; condemnation 80; confession/aftermath 79 – 80; coverage 6 – 7; criticism, power 6; early retirement packages 52; journalistic casualty 40 – 1; mission

310 Index

statement 33 – 4; morale, loss 81; “News Station,” late-evening program 70; “no more pooches” proclamation 48; political pressure 52; protest sign 144; Report 43; resistance democracy 276; retractions 41 – 2; retractions, appearance 50 – 1; retractions, intent 50 – 1; secret document, existence (confirmation) 62; Seiji falsehoods, criticism 79 – 80; sinking, campaign 51 – 2; taming 40; vilification 77; watchdog journalism, problem 40; whistle-blower, impact 35 – 6; Yoshida, usage 51 Asano, Kenichi 96 Asashōryu (Sumo wrestler) story 97 Ash, Timothy Garton 2 Ashikaga case, rule application 102 Ashimine, Gentatsu 232 Asia in Washington (Calder) 291 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 291 Asia Women’s Fund (1995) 34 Aso, Taro 222, 266 Association for Asian Studies, meeting 154 Association of Citizens who Demand the Observance of the Broadcast Law 38 Association of Citizens Who Will Not Tolerate Zainichi Special Rights (Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai) 202 Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families 145 Astro Boy (Tezuka) 165 Atarashī Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukurukai 34 Atsushi, Sugita 18 Aya, Hasegawa 148 “bad foreigners” (furyou gaikokujin) 216, 221 “balanced and fair” (kohei de kōsei) program 35 Bamboozled (Hall) 289 Bank of Japan (BoJ), quantitative easing 258 Barefoot Gen (Nakazawa) 165 Battle of Okinawa 243 – 4, 248 – 50 Baxter, Nathan 277 BBC, organizational model 65 Beautiful Japan 165 – 9 beholden media 3 – 6 Bennett, Bill 277 Berezovsky, Boris 268 bias: accusation 33 – 4; impact 37

Biden, Joseph 285 Big Four Beijing media outlets 293 Blair, Tony 4, 267 Bokova, Irina 302 Bourdieu, Pierre 256 – 7 Broadcast Act 2; Article r, violation 79; enactment 124; program editorial standards 125; purpose 173; stipulations 173 – 4 broadcasting: balance, shift 174 – 5; fairness, politics 172 – 5; war-related broadcasting, fairness (forms) 174 broadcasting, government intervention (Radio Regulatory Commission prevention) 124 Broadcasting Ethics and Program Improvement Organization (BPO) 22 Broadcast Law 17, 22; Article 1, statement 33; Article 4, violation 38; violation 7 Brooks, William 293 Bubble collapse (1991) 187 Bungei Shunjū: article, impact 138 – 9; Uemura rebuttal 145 Bungei Shunju group, Shokun! 35 – 6 bureaucracy, portrayal 66 “Burmese Harp, The” 165 Burrett, Tina 12, 255 Bush, George W. 12, 193; power 300; propaganda/opinion control 276 – 7 bushido 164 Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, establishment 23 Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, spying 1 Calder, Kent 291 – 3 “Campaigning for Policies against Illegal Foreign Labor” 216 Campbell, Kurt 57 – 8 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Japan, statement 111 CCTV World channel, usage 293 CEDAW see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Center for Public Integrity 296 Central Japan Railway 188 CERD see Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Cheney, Dick 277 China: anti-Japan (han-Nichi) attitudes 197; bashing (Trump) 291; Big Four Beijing media outlets 293; CCTV World channel, usage 293; Confucius

Index  311

Institutes 297; impact 290 – 1; lobbying efforts 291 – 2; patriotic education 164; ruling ideas, legitimization 163 – 4; security concerns 249; territorial aggrandizement 303 Choate, Pat 287 Chosenese 203 – 6; signs 207 Chosen-kei schools 203 Citizens’ Group Refusing to Tolerate Special Rights for Koreans in Japan (Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai) case 141 Civil Code, tort provision 96 Civil Information and Education (CIE) 244 – 5 Civil Protection Act 2004 (Kokumin-hogo-ho) 125 Clark, Gregory 186, 194 classified information, obtaining (punishment) 128 – 9 Clinton, Hillary 57 Code of Criminal Procedure, interpretation 102 Cold War bargain 288 collective defence: collective self-defence, impact 259; legislation 110 – 11; representation 112 collectivist ethic 189 colonialism 304 Columbia Journalism Review (CJR) 275 comfort woman statue, China backing 303 – 4 comfort women: hardball tactics (Japan) 305; issue, conclusion 304 – 5; issue, reporting 37; kidnapping, claims 52; memorial, approval 304; reference 34 “comfort women” 135; America, bullying (rumors) 196, 199 – 201; bullying, confirmation 200 – 1; claims 191; demonstrations 136; focus 122; government study 139; information, impact 158 – 9; interview 136 – 7; issues 261; lawsuits 138 – 9; newspaper coverage, re-examination 142 – 3, 147; references, deletions 161 – 2; reporting activities, restrictions 127; revisionist criticisms 140 – 1; Sankei coverage 145 – 6; system, denial 146; whitewashing efforts 152; “women’s volunteer corps,” confusion 138 Comfort women: Japan-America counter-attack 197 “Comfort Women” program, NHK broadcast 71

“Committee for Policy against Internationalization” (NPA) 215, 222 – 3 Committee on Regaining Trust and Revitalization, creation 43 – 4 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 37, 148, 304 – 5 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 237 Committee to Protect Journalists 269 company identity, preeminence 52 – 3 confidentiality, breach 123 Confucius Institutes 297 consent, remanufacturing 160 Constitution, Article 21 78 Consulate General of Japan, lobbying 304 Convention on the Rights of the Child 95 Cool Japan, continuum 279 Cool Japan Fund 279 – 81 Coomaraswamy, Radhika 140 Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC) 244, 246 court: battles, local reports 232 – 4; cases (no names), privacy (protection) 95; decisions 104; developments 236 – 8 Crimea, Russian annexation 260 crime coverage, self-imposed limit 121 – 2 Crimes in Crime Reporting (Hanzai Hōdō no Hanzai) 96 criminal defamation 99 criminal trials, news coverage (limitation) 100 – 4 Cucek, Michael Thomas 11, 76 “cultural differences” (bunka no chigai) 224 Cultural Revolution 190 Curtis, Gerald 5 Dagestan, Chechen invasion 259 Dark Japan, continuum 279 defamation 96 – 100; criminal defamation 99; suits, usage 98 – 9 “deliberate leak” practice 127 democracy: education 244 – 6; galvanization 234; “managed democracy” 261; resistance democracy 276; “sovereign democracy” 261 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): blame, deserving 62 – 3; landslide victory 56 – 7; LDP alternative 36; media bias against 59 – 63; Obama administration, negative attitude 57; power 56, 71; scapegoating of 56 – 9; war issues, progressiveness 175

312 Index

“Democratic People’s Republic of Chosen” 195 democratic press, watchdog metaphor 69 – 70 democratization initiatives 32 dengon geemu (telephone game) 49 Diaoyu Islands, sovereignty/dispute 258 – 9, 277 Diet: anti-LDP political opposition 82; collective self-defense 278 – 9; elections 2 – 3; interpellations 2, 38, 78 – 9; NHK budget approval 71; security bills 250; twisted Diet, problem 110 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law 1961 (Saigai-taisaku-kihon-ho) 129 disinformation, Investigative Reporting Section exposés 44 documentaries 178 – 81 “Documents of Nanjing Massacre” 301 Doubts about History Textbooks (Rekishi Kyōkasho eno Gimon) 140 Dudden, Alexis 11, 152 Duus, Peter 162 East Asian Community, vision 57 – 8 Ebisawa, Katsuji 70 Egawa, Shoko 102 – 3 Eien no Zero (The Eternal Zero) 162 – 3, 250 elections, mass media (role) 121 Ellul, Jacques 277 Ennis, Peter 154 Entman, Robert 257 establishment media, outing 56 Eternal Zero, The (Eien no Zero) 250 ethics, violation 128 “ethnic DNA” (minzokuteki DNA) 219 ethnonationalism 196 exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 303 Facebook, usage 263 – 5 Fackler, Martin 11, 20, 40, 286, 300 fairness (kōsei) 30; forms 174; importance 275; politics 172; politics, broadcasting usage 172 – 5 Falsehoods of the Allied Nations’ Victorious View of History (Kase and Stokes) 168 Farnsworth, Clyde 288 Fifield, Anna 299 fingerprinting, reinstitution (propagandizing) 223 – 4 “Fires on the Plain” 165 Fleming, Ian 83

“flyjin” narrative 225 forced labor, acknowledgement 302 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ) 146, 164; conference 200; Foreign Press Club of Japan, statement 111 foreigners: denigration, political gain 221 – 2; “foreign crime” 217; foreign crime, NPA campaigns 218 – 21; “foreigner-proof locks” 223; “foreigners,” national discourse 224; official criminalization 215 – 17 Fourth Estate, mockery 32 – 3 France 2, coverage 66 – 7 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 20, 269 freedom of expression: curtailment 122 – 3; government encroachment 119; Japanese style 119 – 20; official attitudes, scrutiny 126 – 7 freedom of information, protections  111 Freedom of Information Act, amendment failure 130 Freeman, Laurie 68 free speech 159, 274; constitutional guarantee, LDP proposal 9 – 10; guarantee 93 Fujii, Mitsuhiko 197 Fujiki, Shun’ichi 197 Fujiki-Marano-Fujii trio 197 – 8 Fukui, Teru 19 Fukushima disaster: devastation 44; Fukushima Fifty, heroic narrative 7; Fukushima-Yoshida story, newspaper defense (demise) 53; Investigative Reporting Section emphasis 46; nuclear accident, Tepco lies 276; orders, violation 49; plant 7; problems 7; public distrust 48; scoop, Asahi defense 43 – 4; story, Asahi retraction 41 – 2; workers, actions 80 – 1 Funabashi, Yoichi 61 Furutachi, Ichiro 21, 38, 83, 166 GAHT-US Corporation 156 “gaijin” (caricatures) 224 Gaijin Hanzai Ura Fairu (“Underground Files of Gaijin Crime, The”) 224 Gates, Robert 58 – 9 General Headquarter of Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (GHQ/ SCAP), education unit establishment 244 – 5

Index  313

General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 127 Germis, Carsten 298; affair 298 – 301 Getting Over It! Why Korea Needs to Stop Bashing Japan (Oh) 156, 303 Gaimusho, public diplomacy 294 global financial crisis (2008) 260 global information war 274 global issues, Japan disinterest 296 “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech” 6 Global War on Terror (GWOT) 274 government: advisory councils, convening 68 – 9; authorities, NHK (informal relationship) 68 – 9; media, symbiotic relationship 4; media policies, phases 123 – 6; officials, punishment 114; pressure 146 – 9 Graham, Phillip 94 Gramsci, Antonio 163 – 4 Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, propaganda 180 “Great Russia” slogan 260 Green, Michael 58 – 9 Ground Self-Defense Forces 221 Group of Seven, Japan ranking 2 Gusinsky, Vladimir 268 haisen ritokusha 141 Hall, Ivan 289 Hanada, Tatsuro 48 – 9 hansei (remorse) 80, 180 – 1 Happy Science 198 Hara, Seiki 182 Hara, Toshio 32 Harashina, Takao 95 hardball 6 – 8, 296 – 8 Hasegawa, Michiko 36 Hashimoto, Ryutaro 187 Hata, Ikuhiko (letter-writing campaign) 155 “hate book,” condemnation 198 hate crimes 266 – 7 hate speech (heito supiichi) 208; curtailment 213; normalization 224 – 5 Hatoyama, Yukio 56, 84; blame 62 – 3; policy reversal 61 Hatoyama administration: establishment media, outing 56; failure 62; media approach 58; plan, emergence 60 “Heavenly Sins” (Tengoku no Taizai) 219 “heinous crimes” (goku-aku hanzai) 221 heiwa boke (pacifist dreaming) 188

Henoko, US marine airbase (building) 59, 231, 234; Abe government settlement 116 Heritage Foundation 157 Hey! I’ll be a refugee (So da/Nanmin shiyo!) 198 “High Commissioner’s General Fund” 246 hi-nihonjin 190 hinomaru (rising sun) flags, carrying 160 Hirano, Hirofumi 60 hissatsu chokkainin 3 history: censor, effort 152; masochistic views, fight 161; revisionist view 20 “history problems,” minority effort 157 History Wars: Japan–False Indictment of the Century (Oh Sonfa) 156, 303 H-Net (website) 154, 155 Hodo Station, host 38 Hokkaido, war memories 177 Hokkaidō Shimbun reports 148 Holocaust denial 301 Honda, Mike 199, 292 Hotto Nyūsu Hokkaidō 175; special reports 177 House Resolution 121, passage 141 human rights, media (relationship) 225 Hyakuta Naoki 8, 36, 162, 250 Hyōteki no mura (Target Village, The) 235 – 6 ianfu (comfort women) 191 “identity theft,” fear 104 – 5 ideological commitments 261 – 2 Ienaga, Saburo 161 “illegal visa overstays” (fuhou taizai) 217 illiberalism, political illiberalism (rise) 30, 34 – 6 Imanishi, Mitsuo 34 impartiality, importance 275 impartiality (fuhen futō) 30; affirmation 33; demand 33 – 4; government imposition 37 – 9; introduction 33 – 4 incitement, act (punishment) 128 Index of Press Freedom (RSF) 84 – 5 industrial policy, form (creation) 69 “infomercials,” success 298 information, freedom (legal protections) 111 Information Bureau (LDP) 19 information cartel 68 information disclosure movement 123 Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion Control Since 9/11274 – 5

314 Index

“Innocence Project” 102 Inoguchi, Kuniko 156, 303 “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” discussion 122 International Court of Justice, defiance (Japan) 302 “internationalization” (kokusaika) 215 International Women’s War Crimes Tribunal, protests 140 – 1 intimidation, lose-lose 72 – 3 Inukai, Hyoe 190 “invasive propagation” (zoushoku) 224 investigative journalism, venture 46 investigative journalists (targeting), defamation suits (usage) 98 – 9 Investigative Reporting Center, renaming 48 Investigative Reporting Section (Tokubetsu hodo bu) 41; emphasis 46; operation, death sentence 44; sacrifice 53 – 4; vulnerability 49 Iraq, U.S. invasion 274 – 5 Isa, Masatsugu 232 Isaacson, Walter 275 Ishiba, Shigeru 111 Ishihara, Shintaro 277 Japan: anonymous society, news reporting (chilling effects) 93; anonymous society, privacy (protection) 93 – 6; bashing 159, 220, 290; Beautiful Japan 165 – 9; Chinese crimes 224; collectivist ethic 189; colonialism, legacy 160 – 1; comfort women issue tactics 305; constitution, revision 37, 265; constitutional debate, limitation 130; criminal code, Article 231 – 2 (public statement penalization) 99; current events, information 230; designated secrets law 110; deterrence, maintenance 61; enemy, American government designation 157 – 8; global information war 274; global issues 295 – 6; government, lawsuit 137 – 8; hating 220; history 160; illiberal politics, rise 30; Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 79, 127; lobby, alliance management 285, 286 – 90; lobbying 8; lobbying, hardball 296 – 8; lost nationality 204; media, rollback attempts 168; media-politician relations 81; military occupation, criticisms 191; minorities, vilification 213; nationalism 160; “normal country,” modeling 123;

nuclear power, criticism 72; official policy, history (revisionist narrative) 8 – 9; opinion 274; popular culture 160; populist nationalist literature 164 – 5; POWs, mistreatment 301 – 2; press freedom 1; press freedom, state secrets (relationship) 119; public diplomacy 279; public diplomacy, assessment 291 – 6; public diplomacy, budget announcement 297; public diplomacy, propaganda campaign (balance) 295; public relations firms/lobbyists, hiring 305 – 6; racialism 195; stagnation 255; tabloid nationalism 195; territory claim 192; textbooks, patriotic passions 162; “tribal collectivist society,” perception 188 – 9; tsunami 242; unilateral military coercion 302 – 3; United States, trade frictions 296; wartime past, narrative 299; xenophobic id, display 160 Japan Audit Bureau of Circulations 52 Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, influence 265 Japan Civil Liberties Union 11 Japan Economic Institute 288 Japanese Government (GOJ), impact 213 Japanese journalism: drama 40; future 44; objectivity/quality 230 Japanese media 152; emasculation 76; impact 222 – 3; marginalization 213; minorities, misrepresentation 214 – 15; repression, personal account 186 Japanese opinion, Nikkei group (impact) 187 Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) Report, criminal suspect identities disclosure 95 – 6 Japan Foundation, establishment 289 Japan in Asia (Ajia no naka no Nihon) broadcast 179 Japan Institute of International Affairs 194 “Japan is Back” speech 255 – 6 Japan Lobby 288 – 9; evolution 287 Japan News, The (Daily Yomiuri) 214 Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association 121; Prize 44 “Japan passing” phenomenon 290 Japan Teachers’ Union, meeting denial 122 Japan That Can Say No, The (Shintaro) 277, 288 Japan Times/International Herald-Tribune 214 Japan Today 214 JapanZine 213

Index  315

J Facts, The (Les Faite J), backing 197 – 8 Jiji Shimpō 31 Jinmin (publication) 245 – 6 jishu kisei 22 Jomaru, Yoichi 35 journalism: access journalism 44 – 5; Japanese journalism 40, 44; objective journalism, operating principle 275; watchdog journalism 168 – 9 journalists: private clubs 68; punishment 114 judiciary, reporting (constraints) 123 Kadena Air Base 247 Kaido, Yuichi 167 Kamikaze (documentary) 178 Kanagawa Prefecture 235 Kanemaru, Shin 103 Kankoku-kei 203 Kanpō (founding) 30 Kantei 17; rule, top-down system 23 Karā de miru Taiheiyō Sensō (The Pacific War) 180 Karate Shokoshi Kohinata Minoru (Little Karate Lord Kohinata Minoru) 165 Kasai, Yoshiyuki 188 Kase, Hideaki 168 Katayama, Toranosuke 78 Kawai, Hiroyuki 54 Kaye, David 1 – 2, 4, 84 – 7 Keating, Timothy 57 Keene, Donald 225 Keisei Shimpō 31 Keizai Kyoshitsu (Economic Classroom) page, importance 187 kenchū-zōkan 165 “Kill the Gooks” 160 Kim, Hak-sun 136 – 9 Kim, Hye Gyong 193 Kim dynasty, vilification 205 Kimura, Hideaki 42 – 3 Kimura, Sōta 113 – 14 Kimura, Tadakazu (apologies) 42 Kingston, Jeff 1, 12, 285 “kisha clubs” 250 kisha club system 4 Kishi, Nobusuke 115 – 16 Kishii, Shigetada 38 Kitano, Ryuichi 52 Kitazawa, Toshimi 58 Kitschelt, Herbert 259 Kobayashi, Yoshinori 164, 208; iconoclasm 165 Kobe Shoin Women’s University 142

Koga, Shigeaki 3, 19, 81, 166; commentary, retaliation 84 Koizumi Jun’ichiro 70 Koizumi Jun’ichiro 188, 262 Kojiri, Tomohiro 190 kokusaika (internalisation) 189 “Kokusaika Taisaku Iinkai” 215 Komatsu, Ichiro 36 Komori, Yoshihisa 194 Kono, Taro 104 Kono, Yohei 139 Kono Statement (1993) 34, 142, 286 Koposov, Nikolay 153 Korea, anti-Japan (han-Nichi) attitudes  197 koyuu no ryodo 192 Krauss, Ellis S. 11, 64, 81, 301 Kume, Hiroshi 79 Kuniya, Hiroko 19, 83, 169 Kurile Islands 191 Kuroda, Haruhiko 36 Kursk disaster 268 kuuki 190 Kyodo News 81, 218; wire service, Yoshida quote 43 Kyodo News/Jiji Press 214 Kyodo Press 32 late-development, press (relationship) 30 – 1 Lee, Barbara 278 – 9 Lee, Sinhae 205 – 6 legal environment, problems 5 “legally protected interest” 96 – 7 “legitimate business activities,” determination 128 letter campaigns 152 Liao, Cheng-chih 190 Libby, Scooter 300 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): election poster (2012) 264; Foreign Affairs Division, meeting 237; impact 2; Information Bureau 19; media control 119; Okinawa Democratic Party, cooperation 246; power, reclamation 51; public approval 263; public relations 166; Research Commission on Information and Communications Strategy 19; rule 17; “satellite” parties 36 liberal media, attacks 10 “linguistic barriers” (gengo no souheki) 224 Lockheed, bribes 45

316 Index

Lomax, Eric 176 “love of country” 196 Mabuchi, Ryougo 222 – 3 McNeill, David 160 Maeda, Yoshinori 65 Mainichi: Asahi discrediting 49 – 50; Tokyo District Court ruling 95 Mainichi Daily News 214 Mainichi Newspaper (secret memo) 128 Mainichi Shimbun 31; editorial 21; Takaichi report 191 malfeasance, revelations 70 malpractitioners, exposure 44 – 5 Marano, Tony 197 Maritime Self-Defense Forces, refueling 57 – 8 masochistic history 8 mass media 120 – 2; impact 257; responsibility 121 – 2; role 121; self-regulation 120 – 1 Matsui, Yayori 141 Matsuoka, Seiho 245 Matsuzawa, Shigefumi 221 media: beholden media 3 – 6; complicity 217 – 18; conformity 115 – 16; control 119; coverage, interference 18; establishment media, outing 56; executives, Abe administration (closed-door meetings) 267; freedom, stifling 22; government, symbiotic relationship 4; government media policies, phases 123 – 6; harassment 168; human rights, relationship 225; intimidation/influence, democratic governments attempt 257; marginalization 213; mass media 120 – 2; minorities, misrepresentation 214 – 15; negative media, impact 59 – 60; overview 213 – 14; paranoia 18; political causes/consequences 22 – 3; power 3; primary targets 20; repression, personal account 186; right-wing media 30; self-censorship 146 – 9; side-lines 229 media muzzling 17; attempts 20 – 1; behaviors 17 – 18; types 17 – 20 Megumi, Yokota (DNA controversy) 193 – 4 Meiji Constitution: Article 21 120; expression freedom guarantee 119 – 20 Meiji Industrial Revolution sites, UNESCO designation 302 Memory of the World Register 302 message, control 20 meteorologists, gag-order (placement) 46

Metropolis 213 Mikage, Soshi 203 Mikami, Chie 235 – 6 militant unilateralism 277 militarism: criticism 31 – 2; mouthpiece 45 Military Secret Protection Act (Gunki-hogo-ho) 127 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 192, 286, 289, 294; Abe, relationship 301; bureaucrat, sexual relationship 83; letter of complaint 148 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, sponsor 69 Mino Monta (resignation) 7 minorities, vilification 213 minzokusei 204 Miyazaki, Tomomi 42 – 3 Miyazawa, Kiichi 138, 187 Mizuki, Shigeru 165 Mizuno, Takaaki 165 mokutekigai shiyō: trial evidence, unintended use 101 – 2; trial preparation 101 Momii, Katsuto 21, 36, 163, 172 Mulgan, Aurelia George 11, 17 Murata, Haruki 205 Murayama Statement 34, 181 Murayama, Tomiichi 162 Murdoch, Rupert 267 Nadeshiko Action 198 Naha District Court, lawsuit 232 Nakagawa, Shōichi 21, 34, 71, 78; impact 141 Nakaima, Hirokazu 248 – 9, 285 Nakamura, Akira 173 Nakano, Koichi 11, 30, 76 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 32 Nakazawa, Keiji 165 Nan, Han-chen 190 Nanjing Massacre (1937) 161, 163 – 4,  198 Naoto, Kan 71 – 2; apology 182 – 3 nashi kuzushi 190 “nashonarizumu” 196 National Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious Diseases Act 2012 (Singa-Influenza-taisaku-tokubetusochiho) 129 National Association of Local Legislators Opposing Comfort Women Statue Placement 199 national campaign, launching 7

Index  317

National Ceremony to Commemorate the War Dead 175, 180 national identity, contesting 8 – 10 “national interest” 130; public perception 123 nationalism, term (usage) 196 “national-origin anti-discrimination law” 208 National Police Agency (NPA): “Committee for Policy against Internationalization” 215; crime reports 216; foreign crime campaigns, problems 218 – 21; information dissemination 222 – 3; semiannual reports, issuance 216; White Papers 216 – 17 National Public Employees Law, violation 113, 116 National Public Safety Commission 222 National Public Service Act (Kokka-koumuin-ho) 127 Nazi ideology, promotion 266 – 7 NBR Japan Forum 193 – 4 neo-nationalist supporters, Abe placation 126 neutrality (churitsu) 30 New Komeitō 182, 258 New Normal 277 news, broadcasting 65 – 7 news coverage, limitation 100 – 4 news reportage, style/content 176 – 7 news reporting, chilling effects 93 Nihon Keizai Shimbun 59, 187; Financial Times acquisition 106 Nihon no, Kore Kara format, discontinuation 180 Nihon wa naze sekai de ichiban ninki ga aru no ka (Why Is Japan the World’s Most Popular Country?) 166 Nikkei Kankokujin (Japan-related Koreans) 206 Nimitz Proclamations 243 Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) 64; Abe, relationship 72 – 3; attack 36 – 7; background 64 – 5; budget, approval procedure 67 – 8; budget, Diet approval 71; Close-Up Today program 21 – 2; content analysis 66; control 64; developments 70 – 2; fairness, politics 172; government authorities, informal relationship 68 – 9; institutionalized structures 67; LDP, impact 70 – 2; mandate 72; Nakagawa/Abe pressure 141; NHK Watching 173; NHK World 293 – 4; organizational model 65; politics coverage, LDP prevention 72 – 3;

position, problem 73; pro-government fair tendencies 182; puzzle/solution 67 – 70; scandal/pressure 70 – 2; specials broadcast (2015) 178; staff, Abe meeting 21; state, impact 67 – 8; television, news source dominance 65 – 6; vulnerability, reduction 69; war-related television 172; war reporting 173 Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference): establishment 34; mission 298 Nishioka, Tsutomi 137 – 9, 141 Nishiyama, Takaichi 83, 191 no names 95; journalism requirement 95 – 6 non-citizens, crime 217 non-disclosure law 105 “normal pathology” 207 North Chosen (Kita Chosen) 203 Northern Territories 191 North Korea: abduction issue 192; security concerns 249 Nozawa, Daizou 222 Nuclear Emergency Response Measures Act 1999 (Gensiryoku-saigaitaisaku-tokubetu-sochiho) 129 nuclearphobia 276 nuclear power, criticism 72 Nuclear Security Summit 286 Number One Shimbun essay 298 – 9 Oba, Tsukasa 95 Obama, Barack 56, 286, 305 Obama Administration, neo-containment policy 291 objective journalism, operating principle 275 objectivity, impact 275 oddballs (henjin) 45 – 6 Ogata, Taketora 32 Ogawa, Akihiro 11, 229 Ohayō Nippon (war-related content) 176 Okada, Katsuya 181 Okadome, Yasunori 100 Okinawa: anti-U.S. base sit-in protest 12; crimes 120; democracy education 244 – 6; local newspapers, shutdown 77; media, LDP punishment 7 – 8; memories 243 – 4; postwar U.S. military arrogance 249 – 50; press, Public Affairs Department monitoring 246; press censorship 246 – 8; press freedom, historical perspective 242; problem 247; reversion, secret memo 128; U.S. forces, issue 59; U.S. Military postwar occupation 243; see also Takae

318 Index

Okinawa Defense Bureau, compassion 235 Okinawa Democratic Party, LDP (cooperation) 246 – 7 Okinawa People’s Party 245 Okinawa Times 230, 232; trial awareness 233 – 4 Okoshi, Kensuke 3 Onaga, Takeshi 158; success 248 – 9 “one strong; many weak” 23 Ono, Kiyoko 222 Onward Towards Our Noble Deaths (Shigeru) 165 “Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan” 154 Operation Tomodachi 274 opinion control, Abe Shinzo 276 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2 Osaka Bar Association, disciplinary procedure 101 Osaka Mainichi Shimbun 31 Ospreys, deployment 233, 237 – 8 Otaru Onsen Case 214 – 15 Otsuki, Takayuki 94 – 5 owabi (apology) 181 Oya Soichi Non-Fiction Prize (1977) 104 Ozawa, Ichiro 61 Pacific War, The (documentary) 178 Park, Geun-hye 153, 286, 304 Party for Future Generations 182 Pax Nipponica 288 Penn, Michael 11, 56 “personal information” protection laws 104 – 5 personality politics 261 – 3 Perspectives on History 153 Pinnacle Islands 192 “policy countermeasure” (taisaku) 215 political climate, barometers 160 – 1 “political fairness” provision 125 – 6 political illiberalism, rise 34 – 6 political power 256 – 8 politicians, reputation (protection) 125 politics: illiberal politics, rise 30; NHK coverage, LDP prevention 72; personality politics 261 – 3 populist nationalist literature 164 – 5 postwar era, continuities/changes 31 – 3 pre-Fukushima norm, return 48 preparatory investigations, motive 51 press: bashing 248 – 50; clubs, dismantling 4; intimidation 2 – 3; late-development, relationship 30 – 1; regulatory pressure 124 – 5; victims 83 – 4 press censorship 246 – 8; legacy 242

Press Club, independence 122 press clubs 3 – 6; access-driven reporting 41; oppression 76 press freedom 1, 285; appraisals 1 – 2; attack 135; historical perspective (Okinawa) 242; rankings 17; risk 10 – 12; self-grading 84 – 6; state secrets, relationship 119 “principle of reporting with anonymity” (tokumei hodo shugi) 96 privacy protection: anonymous death row, privacy (protection) 94 – 5; anonymous society 105; news reporting, chilling effects 93; tokumei shakai 93 – 6 “proactive pacifism” 278 – 9 “pro-government fair” 173 – 4, 176, 182 – 3 “Project A” 52 “Promethean Trap” (Purometeusu no wana) series 46, 48 Promotion of Women in Society 158 pro-Nazi sentiments, recrudescence 120 propaganda 274; dissemination, Abe control 276 ProPublica 296 Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Act 82 – 4, 125; Law (Tokutei-himitsu-hogo-ho) 126 – 7; see also secrecy Provision Against Expanded Interpretation 127 “psychological warfare” 246 public diplomacy 285; assessment 291 – 6; propaganda campaign (Japan balance) 295; usage 297 – 8 “public interest” 105 – 6 “public order” 105 – 6 public relations (PR) 12; blunders, minimization 267; message 266 – 8; momentum 263 – 6; purpose 256 – 8; strategies 255; target audience 258 – 61; techniques 261 – 8; themes 258 – 61 Public Security Preservation Laws 119 – 20 “public sphere,” sense 105 “Public Survey on the Defense of Human Rights” 225 Purometeusu no wana (“Promethean Trap”) series 46, 48 Putin, Vladimir 12; approval/disapproval ratings (2013–2014) 266; charisma 262; momentum 263 – 6; narcissistic antics 262; nationalism 260 – 1; personal power, replenishment 258; PR strategies 255; public approval, maintenance 258; “rapid reaction unit,” creation 268 Pyongyang, mendacity 192 – 3

Index  319

racialism 195; history/terminology 195 – 6 radioactive leakage, prevention 116 Radio Regulatory Commission, impact 124 Radio Regulatory Committee Establishment Act (Denpa-kanri-iinkai-ho) 124 radio waves, laws 124 “Railway Man” (Lomax) 176 – 7 rainichi gaikokujin (“visiting foreign nationals”) 216 “rapid reaction unit,” creation 268 “rapid rise” (kyuuzou) 217 “Recovery of Public Safety” (MOJ) 219 – 20 Recruit Scandal 47 Repeta, Lawrence 11, 93, 110, 112 repetitive interference 18 reporters club (kisha kurabu) 68 Reporters Sans Frontieres see Reporters Without Borders Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontieres; RSF) 1, 4, 77; Index of Press Freedom 84 – 6; methodology 86; World Press Freedom Index 269 retrial/amnesty systems 95 revisionism, conceit 9 “right of reply” 215 “right to be forgotten” 104 right to know (shiru kenri) 111; disregard 129 – 30 “right to live peacefully” (heiwateki seizon ken) 232 right-wing media 30 right-wing movement: grassroots right-wing movements, research 136 rikkutsupoi 189 – 91 Ri Shrine 205 Rokusaisha (office raid) 99 – 100 Rokusaisha president, charges 100 Rom-Pa Project 197 – 8 Rove, Karl 300 rule of law, flouting 302 – 3 Rule of Law at Sea 298 Rumsfeld, Donald 277 Russia: “managed democracy” 261; “sovereign democracy” 261; television, Kremlin influence 265 – 6 Ryūkyū Asahi Broadcasting 235 – 6 Ryūkyū Shimpō 229 – 30, 232 – 3; film review 236; report 233 SACO see Special Action Committee on Facilities and Districts in Okinawa Sai, Yoichi 179 Saitama Medical University 95 Sakai, Ryosuke 233

Sakamoto, Rumi 164 Sakurai, Makoto 202 – 3, 205 Sakurai, Yoshiko 146 Sand, Jordan 154 “Sangokujin Speech” 221 Sankei group 34; Seiron 34 – 5 Sankei Shimbun 35 – 6, 59, 82 Sapporo District Court, lawsuit 146 Sasaki, Takashi 30 SASPL see Students Against Secret Protection Law Sato, Eisaku 190, 242 Sato, Kuni 302 Sawa, Yasuomi 11, 93 Schreiber, Mark 11, 195 SEALDS see Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy Seaton, Philip 172 secrecy: application areas 115 – 16; designated secrets law (Japan) 110; designated State secret, term (usage) 112 Secrecy Bill 258; see Specially Designated Secrets Law secret agreements, U.S. 115 – 16 Secrets Act see Specially Designated Secrets Law Seiron 34 – 5, 140 self-censorship 80 – 2, 84; effects 148 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 242, 247 – 8, 262 – 3; cooperation 164; facility, address (leak) 114 Self Defense Forces Act 127 Self Defense in the War in Iraq, dispatch 125 Self Defense Law 123 self-regulation, impact 120 – 1 semi-independence, politics (change) 64 Senaga, Kemejiro 245 Senkaku Islands: nationalization 290 – 1; sovereignty/dispute 258 – 9, 277 Sensoron (Kobayashi) 164 sex slave: controversy 286; restitution  199 sex-slave memorials, erection 199 sex slavery: issue 20; reporting 7 sexual slavery, term (usage) 157 – 8 Shakaibu (Social Section) 47 Shikata, Noriyuki 302 – 3 Shima, Keiji 67 – 8 “Shimin no Kai” (association of citizens) 202 – 3 shinryaku (aggression) 181 Shirai, Satoshi 19 Shirakawa, Masaaki 265 shiten ronten program 188 shokuminchi shihai (colonial rule) 181

320 Index

Shokun! 34 – 6, 140 Showa, Emperor (war crime guilt) 78 shukanshi (weekly magazines) 190 – 1 “Silver Week” 156 Sino-Japanese relations, rupture 290 – 1 sit-in protest, media side-lines 229 SLAPP see “strategic lawsuit against public participation” “small papers” (ko shimbun) 31 Smith-Mundt Act 244 – 5 Snow, Nancy 12, 274 “social order,” maintenance 123 Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukuru Kai), establishment 139 – 40 Soratobu Kouhoushitsu (Hiro) 164 sosonokashi activities 114 Sotooka, Hidetoshi 47 – 8, 53 – 4 So-TV 205 Southern Kurile Islands 191 South Korea-Japan relations, problems 80 Special Action Committee on Facilities and Districts in Okinawa (SACO) 231 Specially Designated Secrets Law (2014) 10, 77, 82 – 4, 125, 126 – 9; antagonism/ denunciation 113; inappropriateness 83; Tokutei-himitsu-hogo-ho 126 – 7; media conformity 115 – 16; origins 115; passage 278; punishments 112; punishments, legal basis 127; tokutei himitsu hogo hō passage 110; United States, relationship 111 – 12 “special penal offenses” (tokubetsu houhan kensuu) 217 Special Permanent Residents (SPRs) (Tokubetsu Eijusha) 202; qualification 203 – 4 special secrets category, restriction 114 spin control 23 “sports papers,” Abe interview 50 “Spotlight” (movie) 4 – 5 Starkman, Dean 44 state-press relations, wartime status 38 – 9 state secrets, press freedom (contrast) 119 Stockwin, Arthur 11, 110 Stokes, Henry Scott 168 “strategic lawsuit against public participation” (SLAPP) 232 – 4; lawsuit, contrast 236 Students Against Secret Protection Law (SASPL) 277 Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDS) 277 Sturm, Peter 299 sub-tropical environment 230

Sunlight Foundation 296 surrogate children, privacy (protection) 93 – 4 “suspicious” (fushin) 220 symbolic capital 257 tabloid, term (usage) 196 tabloid nationalism 195; history/ terminology 195 – 6 Tahara, Soichiro 18, 21, 193 Taira, Tatsuo 245 Takae (Okinawa), sit-in protest 231 – 2; Herippado iranai jūmin no kai (Residents’ Association Against the Helipads) 232; media side-lines 229; national media coverage 234 – 5 Takae residents, Supreme Court ruling 236 Takaichi, Sanae 2 – 3, 22, 38, 78 – 9, 269 “Take Back Japan” slogan 263 Takeda, Shinichi 84, 181 Takeda, Tsuneyasu 166 Takehana, Yutaka 221 Tamogami, Toshio 162 target audience, theme/public relations 258 – 61 Team Abe, television anchors/ commentators ouster 289 – 90 telephone game (dengon geemu) 49 Texas Oyaji (Texas Daddy) 197, 200 Tezuka, Osamu 165 Thatcher, Margaret 267 Third-Party Committee report 51 Thompson, John 256 – 7 Toita, Yoshiuyuki 158 Tokosumi, Yoshifumi 148 Tokubetsu hodo bu (Investigative Reporting Section) 41 tokumei hōdō shugi (“principle of reporting with anonymity”) 96 tokumei shakai (anonymous society), privacy (protection) 93 – 6 Tokyo, Okinawa stonewalling 248 Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) 166; Abe appearance 180 Tokyo District Court, case dismissal 98 Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco): apologies 42; lies 276; performance 116 Tokyo High Court, appeal 99 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun (Mainichi Shimbun) 30, 31 “Tokyo Smackdown” 58 – 9 Tokyo Stock Exchange, record year 258 Totetsumonai Nihon (Incredible Japan) 165 Toyo Keizai (lawsuit) 98 – 9 Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 287, 291

Index  321

Treaty of Basic Relations 183 trial evidence (mokutekigai shiyō), unintended use 101 – 2 trial records 102 – 3; disclosure, prosecutor discretion 103 “tribal collectivist society,” perception 188 – 9 Trump, Donald (China bashing) 291 Tsubaki Incident (Tsubaki Jiken) 79, 124 tsūkō bōgai 231 Tsuruhashi tranquility: An anti-hate chronicle 205 tsūsetsuna hansei (sincere remorse) 181 Tucker, Robert 256 TV totalitarianism 38 Twitter, usage 263 – 5 Tyndall, Andrew 275 Tyndall Report 275 Ueda, Chiaki 196 Uemura, Takashi 135; attacks, increase 142 – 3; criticisms 136 – 9; fabricator 141, 146; fight 145 – 6; lecture 137; lecturing 137; protest sign 144; scapegoating 139 – 42; threats, postcards (usage) 143 Ueno, Yuji 102 UN Commission on Human Rights, “Coomaraswamy Report” 140 “unintended use” rule 102 Uniqlo 98 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), impact 301 – 2 United Nations Human Rights Council 215 United States: economic interests, sacrifice (Cold War bargain) 288; Japan, military alliance 161; Japan, trade frictions 296; Marines, relocation 58; military, operational standard 62; public diplomacy programs, components 245; secret agreements 115 – 16; servicemen, traffic accident (impact) 247; U.S.-Japan alliance, LDP management 61 – 2; US Jungle Warfare Training Center 231 United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) 243 – 4, 246 unknown first week of the postwar, The (documentary) 179 “unruliness” (oh-abare) 224 Uramiya Honpo (Revenge, Inc.) 165 Uruma Shimpo 244; independence 245 USIA, establishment 245 U.S.-Japan Council (USJC), establishment 292

U.S.-Japan security politics, sit-in protest 231 – 2 Utsukushii Kuni e (Toward a Beautiful Japan) 165 Utsunomiya, Kenji 95 Uwasa no Shinso (“The Truth Behind The Rumors”), shutdown 100 “victimless crimes” 217 Vinokurov, Grigory 257 “visa overstayers” (fuhou taizasha) 217 “Voice of America” 157 “vulgar” programs 124 war: broadcasting, fairness (forms) 174; commemorative programs 178 – 81; reporting 174; reporting, NHK approach 173; television 172, 175 – 6 Wartime Special Laws 119 – 20 Watanabe, Masataka 53 Watanabe, Shōichi 181 Watanabe, Tsuneo 32, 166, 267 watchdog, media role 173 watchdog journalism 168 – 9 Weber, Max 261 – 2 Wedge 188 Wetherall, William 11, 195, 201 White Press Corps 4 Womenomics 265, 279 Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 21, 173 Women’s Pacific War (documentary)  178 “women’s volunteer corps,” “comfort women” (confusion) 138 Woodford, Michael 225 World Press Freedom Index (RSF)  269 xenophobia, Japanese media (impact) 222 – 3 Xi, Jinping 287 Yamada, Kenta 11, 119 Yamada, Muneki 164 Yamaguchi, Tomomi 11, 135 Yamamoto, Ichita 270 Yamamoto, Yumiko 198 Yamatani, Eriko 200 yanbaru 229 Yasukuni, ground zero 285 Yasukuni (film), screening 122 Yasukuni Shrine 199; opponents 173 – 4; prime minister visits 204; visits, China/ Korea criticism 180 – 1

322 Index

Yeltsin, Boris (resignation) 259 Yokota, Masuo 98 Yoku Wakaru Ianfu Mondai (A Clear Guide to the Comfort Woman Issue) 141 Yomiuri brochures, appearance 51 – 2 Yomiuri media empire 32 Yomiuri Shimbun 31, 35 – 6; change 33; prime minister dinner 267 Yorimitsu, Takaaki 44, 48; goal 82; mandate 45 – 6 Yoshida, Masao 42 – 3; transcript 43, 50 Yoshida, Seiji 37, 50 – 1, 167; discrediting 167; falsehoods 79 – 80; testimony 135 – 6, 148 Yoshida, Shigeru 191 Yoshida, Yutaka 181 Yoshimoto, Hideko 242 Yoshino, Bunroku 191

Young Diet Members’ Group for Japan’s Future and History Education, publication 140 Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun (Yomiuri Shimbun) 30 Yukan Fuji (anti-Korea nationalism) 196 – 9 Zainichi: 3rd Generation Zainichi (ZAINICHI Korian zo saado SANSEI) 204; anti-”special rights” protests 207; definition, error 202; question (Zainichi mondai) 203 – 5; term, usage 206 – 8 Zainichiism: Japanese roots 201 – 2; nationalityism, contrast 205 – 6 “Zainichi Korean” (Zainichi Kankokujin), consideration 204 Zaitokukai 198, 201; case 141 – 2; disillusionment 203 – 5; origins 202 – 3