Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition: A Philosophical Reappraisal of the Sources. Proceedings of the International Workshop held at the University ... 2016) [Bilingual ed.] 311066321X, 9783110663211

Table of contents :
Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction. The Presocratics from Derveni to Herculaneum: A New Look at Early Greek Philosophy
Part I: Orpheus and the Orphic Tradition
1. Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition: PGurob 1 and the Greek Magic Rolls
2. The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus
3. Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology
4. Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition
Part II: Pythagoreanism and Beyond
5. The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans
6. Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum
7. Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa
Part III: Heraclitus
8. Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus: A New Analysis of the Text and the Quotation of Heraclitus
9. Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance
Part IV: Empedocles
10. Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus
11. Empedocles on the Origin of Plants: PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666, Sections d, b, and f
12. Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update
Part V: Anaxagoras and his School
13. Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum: A Contribution to the History of Ancient ‘Atheism’
14. Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems, Book 2: PHerc. 1676, col. 2 + N 1081, col. 12 (= 61 A 4 DK; Test. 34.3 Lanata)
Part VI: Early Atomists
15. Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri: A Reassessment of the Sources
16. Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum
Part VII: The Sophistic Movement
17. The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus, A Sophistic Treatise on the Origin of Religion and Language: A Case for Prodicus of Ceos
Part VIII: The Papyrological Tradition and Doxographical Questions
18. Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods: Philodemus, Cicero, Aëtius, and Others
Indices
Index locorum
Index nominum antiquorum
Index nominum recentiorum

Citation preview

Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition

Studia Praesocratica

Herausgegeben von / Edited by Richard McKirahan, Denis O’Brien, Oliver Primavesi, Christoph Riedweg, David Sider, Gotthard Strohmaier, Georg Wöhrle

Band / Volume 10

Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition A Philosophical Reappraisal of the Sources Proceedings of the International Workshop held at the University of Trier (22–24 September 2016) Edited by Christian Vassallo

Funded by the Schwarz-Liebermann Stiftung im Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)

ISBN 978-3-11-066321-1 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-066610-6 ISSN 1869-7143 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019937407 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Contents Abbreviations 

 IX

Christian Vassallo Introduction. The Presocratics from Derveni to Herculaneum: A New Look at Early Greek Philosophy   1

Part I: Orpheus and the Orphic Tradition Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal 1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition: PGurob 1 and the Greek Magic Rolls   17 David N. Sedley 2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 45

Richard D. McKirahan 3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology  Marco A. Santamaría 4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 73

 91

Part II: Pythagoreanism and Beyond Leonid Zhmud 5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans  Kilian J. Fleischer 6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum  Aldo Brancacci 7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 161

 147

 111

VI 

 Contents

Part III: Heraclitus Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano 8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus: A New Analysis of the Text and the Quotation of Heraclitus   179 Graziano Ranocchia 9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance   221

Part IV: Empedocles Mirjam E. Kotwick 10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 251

Simon Trépanier 11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants: PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666, Sections d, b, and f   271 Giuliana Leone 12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 299

Part V: Anaxagoras and his School Christian Vassallo (with a Foreword by David Sider) 13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum: A Contribution to the History of Ancient ‘Atheism’   335 Michael Pozdnev 14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems, Book 2: PHerc. 1676, col. 2 + N 1081, col. 12 (= 61 A 4 DK; Test. 34.3 Lanata)   415

Part VI: Early Atomists Enrico Piergiacomi 15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri: A Reassessment of the Sources   437

Contents 

Tiziano Dorandi 16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 VII

 473

Part VII: The Sophistic Movement Andrei Lebedev 17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus, A Sophistic Treatise on the Origin of Religion and Language: A Case for Prodicus of Ceos   491

Part VIII: The Papyrological Tradition and Doxographical Questions Jaap Mansfeld 18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods: Philodemus, Cicero, Aëtius, and Others   609

Indices Index locorum 

 633

Index nominum antiquorum 

 679

Index nominum recentiorum 

 687

Abbreviations ANRW

AOP Arr.2 BNJ

CAG CatPErc Chartes CPF CPH

DAPR

DG DK DPhA GE EAGLL EGPh

EK FGrHist FHG FHS&G

Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini (eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung, Berlin/New York, 1972–. Archivio dell’Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi, Biblioteca Nazionale “Vittorio Emanuele III” di Napoli (cf. Manus online). Graziano Arrighetti (ed.), Epicuro: Opere, Turin 19732 (1st ed. 1960). Ian Worthington (ed.), Brill’s New Jacoby: The Fragments of the Greek Historians, 3 vols., Leiden 2015 (Jacoby online: http://www.brill.com/publications/ online-resources/jacoby-online). Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae, 23 vols. and 3 suppls., Berlin 1882–1909. Marcello Gigante (ed.), Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi, Naples 1979 (cf. http://cispe.org/language_en/biblioteca.mvd). Gianluca Del Mastro (ed.), Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi online, CISPE, Naples 2005 (cf. http://www.chartes.it). Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini: Testi e lessico nei papiri di cultura greca e latina, I: Autori noti, vols. 1*–1***, Florence 1989–1999. Christian Vassallo (ed.), Corpus Praesocraticorum Herculanense, in: Id., The Presocratics in the Herculaneum Papyri: Texts, Translations, and Commentary, Berlin/Boston, forthcoming. Christian Vassallo (ed.), Doxographica Anaxagorea in Papyris Reperta, in: Id., “Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum: A Contribution to the History of Ancient Atheism”, in this volume, pp. 339–368. Hermann Diels (ed.), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879; 19654 (repr.). Hermann Diels (ed.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, sechste verbesserte Auflage hrsg. von Walter Kranz, 3 vols., Berlin 1951–19526 (1st ed. 1903). Richard Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, 7 vols., Paris 1989–2018. Hermann Usener, Glossarium Epicureum, edendum curaverunt Marcello Gigante et Wolfgang Schmid, Rome 1977. Georgios K. Giannakis, Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek Language and Linguistics, 3 vols., Leiden/Boston 2014. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Early Greek Philosophy, in collaboration with Gerard Journée and assisted by Leopoldo Iribarren, 9 vols., Cambridge (MA)/London 2016; French edition: Les débuts de la philosophie grecque, édition, avec la collaboration de Gérard Journée et le concours de Leopoldo Iribarren et David Lévystone, Paris 2016. Ludwig Edelstein and Ian G. Kidd (eds.), Posidonius, vol. 1: The Fragments, Cambridge 19892 (1st ed. 1972). Felix Jacoby (ed.), Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, 16 vols., Berlin 1923–1958 (now CD-ROM ed., Leiden 2005). Karl Müller (ed.), Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, 5 vols., Paris 1841–1870. William W. Fortenbaugh, Pamela M. Huby, Robert W. Sharples and Dimitri Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, 2 parts, Leiden/New York/Cologne 1992.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-201

X  GG GGPh

GCS IGUR IPerg. IPPH

KPT

KRS LDAB LSJ

MansPr M&P

MP3

M&R1 M&R2

M&R3

M&R4

M&R5

 Abbreviations

Gustav Uhlig and Alfred Hilgard (eds.), Grammatici Graeci, 4 vols., Leipzig 1883–1910 (repr. Hildesheim 1965). Friedrich Überweg (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie; Hellmut Flashar, Dieter Bremer and Georg Rechenauer (eds.), Die Philosophie der Antike, vol. 1: Frühgriechische Philosophie, 2 parts, Basel 2013. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, Leipzig 1897–. Luigi Moretti (ed.), Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae, Rome 1968–1990. Max Fränkel (ed.), Die Inschriften von Pergamon, 2 vols., Berlin 1890–1895. Christian Vassallo (ed.), Index Praesocraticorum Philosophorum Herculanensis, in: Id., “A Catalogue of the Evidence for Presocratics in the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: APF 62 (2016) 78–108. Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou and Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou (eds.), The Derveni Papyrus, Edited with Introduction and Commentary, Florence 2006 (available online on the website of the Center for Hellenic Studies: http://dp.chs.harvard.edu/index.php?col=1&ed=KPT). Geoffrey S. Kirk, John E. Raven and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 19832 (1st ed. 1957). Willy Clarysse et al. (eds.), Leuven Database of Ancient Books online (cf. http://www.trismegistos.org/ldab/help.php). Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, revised and augmented throughout by Henry S. Jones with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie, Oxford 19409 (1st ed. 1843; with a revised supplement 1996). Jaap Mansfeld and Oliver Primavesi (eds.), Die Vorsokratiker, Stuttgart 20112 (1st ed. 1983). Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi (eds.), L’Empédocle de Strasbourg (P. Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665–1666): Introduction, édition et commentaire, Berlin/New York/Strasbourg 1999. Paul Mertens and Roger A. Pack (eds.), Catalogue des Papyrus littéraires grecs et latins online, Université de Liège: Centre de Documentation de Papyrologie Littéraire (CEDOPAL), ed. by Paul Mertens, 3rd ed. by Roger A. Pack, The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt, Ann Arbor 19652 (1st ed. 1952; cf. http://promethee.philo.ulg.ac.be/cedopal/index.htm). Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (eds.), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. 1: The Sources, Leiden/Boston 1997. Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (eds.), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. 2: The Compendium, part I: Macrostructure and Microcontext; part II: Aëtius Book II: Specimen Reconstructionis, Leiden/Boston 2009. Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (eds.), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. 3: Studies in the Doxographical Traditions of Greek Philosophy, Leiden/Boston 2010. Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (eds.), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. 4: Towards an Edition of the Aëtian Placita:  Papers of the Melbourne Colloquium, 1–3 December 2015, Leiden/Boston 2018. Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (eds.), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. 5: An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita, with a Commentary and a Selection of Parallel Passages, Leiden/Boston, in press.

Abbreviations 

OCD OF (vel PEG)

PCG PG PMG RE SGDI SFODa

SFODb

SH

SIG SLG SOD

SSR SVF

TAM TLG

TM

 XI

Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (eds.), with the assistance of Esther Eidinow, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford 20124 (1st ed. 1949). Alberto Bernabé (ed.), Poetae Epici Graeci Testimonia et fragmenta, II.1–2: Orphicorum et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta, Munich/Leipzig 2004–2005; II.3: Musaeus; Linus; Epimenides; Papyrus Derveni; Indices, Berlin/ New York 2007. Rudolf Kassel and Colin Austin (eds.), Poetae Comici Graeci, 8 vols., Berlin/ New York 1983–2001. Jean-Paul Migne (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus, omnium SS. Patrum, Doctorum Scriptorumque ecclesiasticorum: Series Graeca, 161 vols., Paris 1857–1903. Denys L. Page (ed.), Poetae Melici Graeci, Oxford 1962. August F. Pauly, Georg Wissowa, Wilhelm Kroll et al. (eds.), Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, 84 vols., Stuttgart/Munich 1894–1980. Hermann Collitz and Friedrich Bechtel et al. (eds.), Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften, 4 vols., Göttingen 1884–1915. Peter Stork, William W. Fortenbaugh, Johannes M. van Ophuijsen and Tiziano Dorandi, “Lycon of Troas: The Sources, Text and Translation”, in: William W. Fortenbaugh and Stephen A. White (eds.), Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes: Text, Translation, and Discussion, New Brunswick/London 2004, 1–78. Peter Stork, William W. Fortenbaugh, Johannes M. van Ophuijsen and Tiziano Dorandi, “Aristo of Ceos: The Sources, Text and Translation”, in: William W. Fortenbaugh and Stephen A. White (eds.), Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation, and Discussion, New Brunswick/London 2006, 1–177. Hugh Lloyd-Jones and Peter J. Parsons (eds.), Supplementum Hellenisticum, rev. by Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, 2 vols., Berlin/New York 2011 (repr. of the 1st ed. 1983 in only one volume). Wilhelm Dittenberger (ed.), Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, Leipzig 1915–1924. Denys L. Page (ed.), Supplementum Lyricis Graecis: Poetarum lyricorum Graecorum fragmenta quae recens innotuerunt, Oxford 1974. Peter Stork, Jan M. van Ophuijsen and Tiziano Dorandi, “Demetrius of Phalerum: The Sources, Text and Translation”, in: William W. Fortenbaugh and Eckart Schütrumpf (eds.), Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation and Discussion, New Brunswick/London 1999, 1–310. Gabriele Giannantoni (ed.), Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, 4 vols., Naples 1990. Hans von Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 1: Zeno et Zenonis discipuli; vol. 2: Chrysippi fragmenta. Logica et physica; vol. 3: Chrysippi fragmenta moralia. Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi, Leipzig 1903–1905; vol. 4: Indices, curavit Maximilian Adler, Leipzig 1924. Ernst Kalinka (ed.), Tituli Asiae Minoris, Wien 1901–. Maria Pantelia et al. (eds.), Tesaurus Linguae Graecae: A Digital Library of Greek Literature online, University of California, Irvine 2001– (cf. www//stephanus.tlg.uci.edu). Mark Depauw and Tom Gheldof, “Trismegistos. An interdisciplinary Platform for Ancient World Texts and Related Information”, in: Łukasz Bolikowski, Vittore Casarosa, Paula Goodale, Nikos Houssos, Paolo Manghi and Jochen Schirrwagen (eds.), Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries–TPDL 2013 Selected Workshops, Cham 2014, 40–52 (cf. http://www.trismegistos.org).

XII 

 Abbreviations

TP1[D] TP1[E]

TP2 TP3

TrGF Us. Van Haelst VH1 VH2

Georg Wöhrle (ed.), Die Milesier: Thales, mit einem Beitrag von Gotthard Strohmaier, Berlin 2009. Georg Wöhrle (ed.), The Milesians: Thales, Translation and additional material by Richard D. McKirahan, with the collaboration of Ahmed Alwishah, with an introduction by Georg Wöhrle and Gotthard Strohmaier, Berlin 2014. Georg Wöhrle (ed.), Die Milesier: Anaximander und Anaximenes, mit Beiträgen von Oliver Overwien, Berlin/Boston 2012. Benedikt Strobel and Georg Wöhrle (eds.), Xenophanes von Kolophon, in Zusammenarbeit mit Elvira Wakelnig, mit Beiträgen von Christian Vassallo, Berlin/Boston 2018. Bruno Snell, Stefan L. Radt and Richard Kannicht (eds.), Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, 6 vols., Göttingen 1971–2004 (2nd ed. vol. 1, 1986). Hermann Usener (ed.), Epicurea, Leipzig 1887. Joseph van Haelst (ed.), Catalogue des papyrus littéraires juifs et chrétiens, Paris 1976 (cf. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/GrandLat/research/christianpapyri.htm). Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt: Collectio prior, voll. I–XI, Naples 1793–1855. Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt: Collectio altera, voll. I–XI, Naples 1862–1876.

Note: The abbreviations of the names of ancient authors and their works generally follow those of the OCD. The acronyms for scientific journals are based on the conventions published in L’Année Philologique. Those of all the papyri can be easily found in the LDAB. As for the quotation criteria of the papyri, note that I have conventionally decided to distinguish the indication of the columns of the Herculaneum papyri from that of the columns of the Derveni Papyrus and of the Graeco-Egytian papyri: for the former Arabic numerals are used (except in those cases where a distinction is necessary, for example the columns of the papyri belonging to Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 2), for the latter Roman ones. This choice is due to the yet far from standardized state of the editions of the Herculanean texts and to the remarkably different criteria adopted by the various editors. This criterion, however, is not intended to isolate Herculanean papyrology from the other fields of the papyrological science: indeed, the very opposite is one of the main aims of this volume.

Christian Vassallo

Introduction

The Presocratics from Derveni to Herculaneum: A New Look at Early Greek Philosophy Tardi ingenii est rivulos consectari, fontes rerum non videre (Cic. De or. 2.27.117). This quotation, which Hermann Diels chose as the epigraph of his renowned Doxographi Graeci, best sums up the aim of the International Workshop Preso­ cratics and Papyrological Tradition / Vorsokratiker und papyrologische Überliefe­ rung held at the University of Trier on 22–24 September, 2016. On that occasion a team of specialists1 discussed some of the most famous papyrological texts, with special regard to the problems of interpreting and editing the testimonia of Presocratic philosophy. These texts hand down important pieces of evidence concerning not only the life and works of the Presocratics, but also their thought and reception in the history of ancient philosophy. Furthermore, they help to increase our knowledge of how Presocratic philosophy – through contributions to physics, cosmology, ethics, ontology, theology, anthropology, hermeneutics, and ‘aesthetics’ (especially poetry and music) – paved the way for the canonic scientific fields of European culture. In accordance with the aim of the conference,

1 I would like to mention and thank all them here: Katrin Beer, Alberto Bernabé, Aldo Brancacci, Gábor Betegh, Stephan Busch, Sylvana Chrysakopoulou, Tiziano Dorandi, Alexander Egorov, Holger Essler, Sandra Fait, Kilian J. Fleischer, Maria S. Funghi, Jonathan Griffiths, Victor Gysembergh, Oliver Hellmann, Gérard Journée, Mirjam E. Kotwick, Bärbel Kramer, Manfred Kraus, André Laks, Andrei Lebedev, Giuliana Leone, Jaap Mansfeld, Richard D. McKirahan, Gabriella Messeri, Glenn W. Most, Fabia Neuerburg, Valeria Piano, Enrico Piergiacomi, Michael Pozdnev, Graziano Ranocchia, Fabian Reiter, Marco A. Santamaría, Andreas Schwab, Johannes Schwind, David N. Sedley, Benedikt Strobel, Simon Trépanier, Piotr Wozniczka, and Leonid Zhmud. A special thanks goes to Georg Wöhrle, for his personal and scientific help at each stage in the organization of the conference, and to the president of the University of Trier Michael Jäckel, for supporting the initiative and accepting to introduce it. My gratitude also goes to my collaborators Spyridoula Bounta (in particular for the guided visit to the Papyrussamlung of the University of Trier), Dennis Kaden, Simon Keßler, Stefan Schließmeyer, and Tobias Tack. Many thanks to India Moore Watkins for helping me in general revision of the English texts; to Selene I. S. Brumana for translating Dorandi’s paper into English; and Leonardo Franchi for helping me to translate Brancacci’s paper into English. Obviously, I cannot forget the friendly cooperation of the administrative personnel of the University of Trier, especially of Pia Breit, Silvia Carlitz, Christiane Schwind, and Alexandra Wagner-Casser. Christian Vassallo, University of Calabria, Cosenza / University of Notre Dame, USA https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-001

2 

 Christian Vassallo

the papers tackled published and partly unpublished papyrological texts and, for the first time in the field of Presocratic studies, also consistently dealt with the Herculanean sources, including the Graeco-Egyptian rolls and the Derveni Papyrus. The present volume gathers the proceedings of this International Workshop and contains various contributions (both by the speakers and by some of the participants in the discussion) encompassing the entire history of Presocratic philosophy and its reception in antiquity, and dealing with several topics in early Greek thought from the Orphics to the Sophists.2 In doing so, the work conventionally accepts the wider meaning of the word ‘Presocratics’ adopted by Diels, whilst bearing in mind both the advantages and the downsides of this by now classical (and almost irreplaceable) label. The volume is divided into eight sections. Section 1 deals with Orpheus and the Orphic tradition. The first contribution by Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal (Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition: PGurob 1, and the Greek Magic Rolls) is devoted to PGurob 1 and the Greek Magic Rolls. Gurob Papyrus 1 (3rd cent. BC) is an important document relevant to the study of Orphism that describes a series of ritualistic provisions, including discursive sections in which ritual actions are emphasized, as well as the words that must be pronounced in the ritual. The paper examines in detail the features of the ritual (δρώμενα and λεγόμενα) and points out that they are found all together only in the Orphic tradition. Therefore, according to the authors we must stop saying that the Gurob Papyrus is an eclectic Eleusinian, Orphic, and Dionysian document, because it reflects a genuine, unadulterated Orphic ritual. Furthermore, Orphism’s connection with the magical papyrus is established in the paper in three ways: a) a Greek magical papyrus where Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal read: γράφε τὸν λόγον τὸν Ὀρφαικόν, b) a well-known formula, the so-called Ephesia Grammata, and c) the epodai in lead inscriptions from Crete and the South of Italy. In the same section, two interesting papers open the debate on the Derveni Papyrus, which continues with other contributions in the volume and deals with several philosophical aspects of this intriguing text. David N. Sedley (The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus) maintains that from col. VII down to

2 The only Presocratics not taken into consideration in the volume are Xenophanes and the Eleatics. In order to complete the inquiry, I refer to the collection of the extant evidence to be found in the CPF and, for the Herculanean testimonia, to Vassallo (2014) and (2016b) along with the list of the evidence to be found in the IPPH. For an overview, see also the appendix in Vassallo (2016a). With regard to Xenophanes, I refer now to the new edition TP3, of which a very interesting preview was given by Benedikt Strobel and Georg Wöhrle during the International Workshop at Trier.

Introduction 

 3

its ending in col. XXVI, the Derveni Papyrus is a cosmogonic commentary on an Orphic hymn. He argues that cols. I–VI are not, as has been assumed until now, a separate disquisition, but the opening part of the same commentary, addressing a now-lost initial lemma in which the Eumenides were invoked.  Starting from this hypothesis, the scholar seeks to identify the first five lemmas of the commentary, with the help of revised texts and interpretations of cols. I, IV, and VII of the papyrus. Richard D. McKirahan (Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology) examines in depth the cosmological aspects of the Derveni text. In particular, the paper addresses, in light of recent discussions, five controversial issues important for understanding the cosmology of the Derveni Papyrus, by attempting to answer the following questions: a) When did the sun first come into being? b) Where does night fit into the cosmogony? c) What is the meaning of ἐπικρατεῖν? d) In what sense are all things called Zeus? and e) Will the cosmos last forever? This outline of the papyrological tradition of the earliest Greek philosophy is completed by Marco A. Santamaría (Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tra­ dition). His contribution tackles the longest fragment from Pherecydes of Syros’ lost book, which comes from an Oxyrhynchus papyrus published by Bernard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt in 1897 (PGrenf. II 11 = fr. 68 Schibli). Two passages mentioning the author in two Herculaneum papyri must be added to this fragment: Phld. De piet., PHerc. 247, col. 6a (sin. pars).6–22 Henrichs and [Phld.] [Hist. philosoph.?], PHerc. 1788, col. 1 Vassallo, both of which are accurately examined by the scholar.3 Section 2 of the volume analyzes some topical aspects of the papyrological tradition of Pythagoreanism (and beyond). Leonid Zhmud (The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans) provides a very useful overview of the papyrological evidence for Pythagoras and (to a lesser extent) the Pythagoreans, which is collected in the CPF and now in the IPPH.4 The scholar shows how some of this scattered evidence can be coherently brought together and provides clues as to the history of Pythagoreanism, while also pointing to other evidence that is worthy of fresh consideration. Practically all the testimonia of the Herculaneum papyri come from Philodemus’ writings; they concern Pythagoras, not

3 The original version of Santamaría’s paper read in Trier contained a useful excursus on the Sayings of the Seven Wise Men as well. As is widely known, there are fragments of these Sayings in several papyri and ostraka from different periods and places, which were compared by the scholar with certain inscriptions and collections preserved through medieval manuscripts. As regards the papyrological tradition of Thales, I would like to refer to Vassallo (2015) esp. 280–293. 4 As regards the relationship between the Pythagoreans and the Derveni Papyrus, see Betegh (2013).

4 

 Christian Vassallo

the Pythagoreans, and are of a biographical more than doxographical character. Philodemus’ evidence reflects the early Hellenistic stage of the Pythagorean tradition, before the rise of Neopythagoreanism and the ps.-Pythagorean literature related to it. Later evidence reveals a new perspective on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans as the philosophical precursors of Plato. Kilian J. Fleischer (Philolaus’ Book[s] in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum) discusses a familiar piece of information concerning Philolaus in the light of a new Herculanean testimonium. Diogenes Laërtius (8.85) reports that Philolaus sold Pythagoras’ unpublished books to Plato and, as told in a kind of alternative version, that Philolaus’ relatives sold his book to Plato. In each version a huge amount of money is mentioned. Rather recently a passage of Philodemus’ History of the Academy (PHerc. 1691, col. 2) was discovered that seems to deal with the purchase of Pythagorean books through Plato and the history of their editions. Fleischer demonstrates how a reappraisal of the passage5 might shed some new light on its credibility and on the details of the transaction. In particular, the question is discussed of exactly which books were given to Plato and whether the whole episode should be regarded as more than a mere anecdote. Going beyond Pythagoreanism, Aldo Brancacci (Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa) tries to reconstruct the figure of Damon, the renowned musicologist admired by Plato and Diogenes of Babylon and indirectly criticized by Philodemus. The paper aims: a) to re-evaluate the traditional link between Damon and the Pythagoric tradition, without considering Damon as a Pythagorean; b) to criticize the thesis, which Andrew Barker and Robert W. Wallace endorse, according to which Damon is a Sophist; c) to assign Damon a specific cultural context, which makes him a major figure of Pericles’ circle within a historical period that precedes the theoretical distinction between ‘philosopher’ and ‘sophist’ and also the birth of Sophistic as an autonomous philosophical movement; d) to argue in favour of the authenticity of Damon’s Areopagiticus, whose existence Wallace has recently denied, without adducing any convincing evidence;6 e) to examine some Herculanean testimonia of Philodemus’ On Music, which stands out as a very important text that helps better illustrate the cultural objectives that Damon assigns music and, consequently, the nature of his collaboration with Pericles. Heraclitus is the specific focus of Section 3. Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano (Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus: A New Analysis of the Text and the Quo­ tation of Heraclitus) offer a novel analysis and interpretation of PDerv., col. IV based on the new papyrological and textual results that have emerged from 5 In the framework of a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship (EU Horizon 2020/Grant Agreement No. 703798 – AcadHist), Fleischer is working on a new critical edition of the Index Academicorum. 6 Wallace (2015) 77–97.

Introduction 

 5

Piano’s recent edition of the first columns.7 The focal point of the paper is the Heraclitus quotation, for which the two scholars propose a novel assessment by suggesting a new place for a hitherto unlocated fragment of the papyrus. The discussion of the Heraclitus quotation itself is preceded by a close textual analysis and interpretation of the first lines of the column. A re-examination of the Derveni author’s reasons for including a reference to Heraclitus at this point in his text offers some new suggestions about the role of the quotation within the general economy of the Derveni author’s argument. In this regard, the problem of the differences between the version preserved in the Derveni Papyrus and the versions transmitted through the medieval traditions of Heraclitus’ fragments B 3 and B 94 is also taken into account. The paper puts forward some new considerations concerning the question of whether the Derveni author was paraphrasing Heraclitus or quoting him verbatim, and, if the latter, of what the extent of the quotation could be. A closely related question that is addressed is whether B 3 and B 94 were originally joined in Heraclitus’ text or whether they were put side by side by the Derveni author exclusively on the basis of their content. The paper concludes with some more general remarks about the way in which the new text of col. IV contributes to a better understanding of Heraclitus and of the methods as well as the philosophical and religious views of the Derveni author. Further aspects of the papyrological tradition of Heraclitus are tackled by Graziano Ranocchia (Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance), who begins by focusing on the core of the Life of Heraclitus handed down by Diogenes Laërtius. As we know, this passage is a biographicocharacterological portrait in which the haughtiness and the superciliousness attributed to this philosopher are ridiculed for openly satirical and polemical purposes. In the past, substantial analogies have been detected with the moral-protreptic letter On the Relieving of Arrogance, amply quoted and paraphrased by Philodemus in the final section of PHerc. 1008 ([On Arrogance], cols.  10–24). Significantly, at the beginning of the letter (col. 10.16–26 Ranocchia), Heraclitus is pointedly included, along with other philosophers and poets, amongst those who became arrogant “on account of philosophy.” It is now possible to add further thematic correspondences between these writings to the similarities first identified by Wilhelm Knögel and Serge N. Mouraviev, which suggest that both texts originally belonged to the same philosophical tradition, whose goal was to describe and treat arrogance. This tradition could have encompassed a general illustration both of the vice and its treatment, as well as specific

7 Piano (2016) 65–82. See also Vassallo (2017b).

6 

 Christian Vassallo

examples in the form of lively portraits of ‘arrogant’ philosophers and poets, such as Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Hippias, and Euripides. Section 4 on Empedocles covers a wide range of problems and sources, beginning once again with the Derveni Papyrus. Mirjam E. Kotwick (Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus) argues, against the trend in studies on the presence of the Presocratics in this text, that the Derveni author indeed took inspiration from Empedocles’ physical theory. The paper defends this view with an analysis of how both authors explain the combination of heterogeneous particles during the early cosmogonic stages. It argues that the parallels between their accounts are pronounced and that, for the Derveni author, Empedocles’ view on Aphrodite’s power to unify was as promising as Anaxagoras’ view on the unification of unlike particles was insufficient. The paper of Simon Trépanier (Empedocles on the Origin of Plants: PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666, Sections d, b and f ) focused on the renowned ‘Strasbourg Empedocles,’ which contains the fragments of 74 lines belonging to Book(s) 1 (and 2)8 of Empedocles’ philosophical poem On Nature. The paper seeks to improve the text of section d, ll. 11–19 of PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666. In particular, the scholar tests the reconstruction advanced by Richard Janko,9 who proposes attributing sections f and b to the same column as section d and argues that all three sections are from col. 12 of the ancient roll. Several new suggestions are offered to improve the text and thereby support Janko’s reconstruction of the column. Trépanier departs from Janko primarily in arguing that the unity of ll. d 11–18 plus sections b and f can be proven more easily if we assume that the passage is a description of the origins of plants alone, not of animals or of living things in general. This, in turn, provides a new reason for thinking that section b, a catalogue of animals (but not plants) with the ‘hard/earthy parts’ on the outside, belongs to the bottom of the same column as section d. The catalogue – Trépanier argues – is offered to support an analogy in which the elemental structure of trees, with hard/earthy bark on the outside, is likened to those animals who are hard/earthy on the outside. The essay of Giuliana Leone (Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update) is entirely devoted to the Herculanean tradition of Empedocles, a topic that has been rarely tackled by the scholarship. With the exception of the Strasbourg Papyrus, all the papyri concerning Empedocles generally preserve either short quotations or references to his thought. In particular, the Herculaneum papyri transmit Epicurus’, Hermarchus’, and Philodemus’ reception of Empedocles, and in PHerc. 1012, which contains a work attributed to Demetrius 8 As is widely known, while M&P ascribe PStrasb. gr. Inv. 1665–1666 to Books 1–2 of Empedocles’ On Nature, Janko (2004) maintains that the papyrus contains only Book 1. 9 Janko (2004).

Introduction 

 7

Laco, we can also find quotations from Empedocles’ poem that are useful for the constitution of its text. Leone provides an important and updated study of these testimonia also in the light of some recent research in Epicureanism and of new editions of Herculanean texts. Section 5 of the volume focuses on the papyrological tradition of Anaxagoras and his School. Christian Vassallo’s paper (Anaxagoras from Egypt to Hercu­ laneum: A Contribution to the History of Ancient ‘Atheism’) comes with a foreword by David Sider, who is preparing a new comprehensive collection of the testimonia to Anaxagoras for the series Traditio Praesocratica. Vassallo offers the first systematic collection of all the papyrus evidence for Anaxagoras preserved in both Graeco-Egyptian and Herculaneum papyri, ordering them in six sections according to their content (Anaxagoras’ life and works; the charge of impiety; physics; theology; ethics; along with two testimonia considered spurious or dubious). The essay deals in particular with the testimonia that contribute to a better understanding of Anaxagoras’ conception of god(s) and elucidate certain questions concerning his alleged ‘atheism,’ along with the reasons for the charge of impiety levelled against him. The image of Anaxagoras as an ‘atheist,’ in addition to the ‘Enlightenment’ features of his thought, seems to be the outcome of a stratified doxographical tradition that the papyri significantly help to reconstruct. As regards the ‘Anaxagoreans,’ Michael Pozdnev (Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems, Book 2: PHerc. 1676, col. 2 + N 1081, col. 12 [= 61 A 4 DK; Test. 34.3 Lanata]) analyzes in depth a Philodemean fragment that preserves some remarkable examples of an allegorical Homeric exegesis attributed by the supplementary sources to Metrodorus of Lampsacus (the elder). Pozdnev firstly attempts to argue that this testimonium is not incompatible with the already known reflections advanced by Metrodorus and to illustrate the new doctrines that emerge from the fragment; secondly, he comments on the method of this Homeric scholar and, finally, seeks to uncover his goals. These aims are achieved by outlining the results obtained so far by those very few researchers who have tried to make sense of the seemingly absurd interpretations contrived by the famous critic. It becomes clear that in his reduction of myths to physical conceptions – mostly those attested for Anaxagoras – Metrodorus proceeds from particular Homeric contexts that contain semantic ‘hints’ that suggest specific allegorical readings. The relevant scenes were largely those open to moral censure. In full accordance with the spiritual requirements of his day, Metrodorus aimed to protect the heroes and gods of epic poetry (probably not only Homeric) against the charge of inappropriate behavior. In Section 6, a significant portion of the numerous testimonia to the Early Atomists in the papyri are taken into account. A study on some Herculanean

8 

 Christian Vassallo

sources in this field is carried out by Enrico Piergiacomi (Democritus’ Doc­ trine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri: A Reassessment of the Sources). The paper analyzes in depth four texts from the Herculaneum papyri (Epic. De nat. 2, PHerc. 1149/993, col. 109 Leone and De nat. 34, PHerc. 1431, cols. 20–21 Leone; Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, fr. 16 Schober and De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, cols. 29–30 Henry), which may implicitly report some philosophical tenets of the Democritean theory of εἴδωλα. It also challenges the reconstruction and the interpretation of a text recently edited by Richard Janko (Phld. De poem. 4, PHerc. 207, fr. 10), in which the scholar sees a clear, but in reality weak, reference to the simulacra of Democritus. Based on this analysis, Piergiacomi contends that the Herculanean texts contribute the following information or clarifications to our knowledge of Democritean theory: a) the simulacra are living beings, because they have some soul-atoms that are positioned and ordered in a way capable of generating life; b) some simulacra cause what the ancient Hippocratic practitioners called the ‘pulse,’ i.e. a violent, unnatural, and disturbing movement of the vessels, which is partly detached from the influence of the external environment, and partly dependent on us and our beliefs; c) the simulacra which determine the birth of the belief in the gods had their origins in the heavens; d) the simulacra of corpses transmit forms and colours that create an intense fear of death. The Section on the early Atomists is brought to a close by Tiziano Dorandi (Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum), who dwells on the papyrological tradition of the Democritean Anaxarchus of Abdera (c. 380–320 BC). Of this philosopher we have only three papyrological testimonia: a) PMich. inv. 4912a (= fr. 41 Dorandi), which speaks about the bold and scornful bearing displayed by Anaxarchus before the tyrant Nicocreon; b) Phld. De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, col. 35.11–34 Henry (= fr. 33 Dorandi), where Anaxarchus is mentioned, along with Zeno of Elea and Socrates, among those who, while not wise, behaved virtuously in the face of an unjust sentence; c) Phld. De adulat., PHerc. 1675, cols. 4.34–5.9 Capasso (= fr. 19a Dorandi), a passage that deals with the flattery shown by Anaxarchus towards Alexander the Great. The Section of the volume on the Sophists tackles only one aspect of a topic – the papyrological tradition of the exponents of the Sophistic movement – that has been in need of a complete reassessment for years. For an overview, see the CPF and, with regard to the Herculanean sources, the IPPH.10 However, many 10 In a forthcoming conference I will be holding at the University of Notre Dame during the Spring Term of 2019 (The papyrological tradition of the Sophists, with special discussion on the Herculanean evidence on Prodicus), on invitation of Gretchen Reydams-Schils (whom I would like to whole-heartedly thank for this opportunity), I will try to provide an up-to-date overview of the sources involved in this inquiry. Particularly interesting are PTura V 222.18–29 for Protagoras

Introduction 

 9

dubious papyri are involved in such a task: we need only consider the fact that in the forthcoming volumes of the CPF devoted to the unattributed fragments (Papiri Adespoti), about 3% of the texts are considered to belong to a Sophist or traced back to a Sophistic philosophical area. In his paper, Andrei Lebedev (The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus, A Sophistic Treatise on the Origin of Reli­ gion and Language: A Case for Prodicus of Ceos) attempts to draw an ‘intellectual portrait’ of the Derveni author. In particular, he argues that the author of the Derveni treatise (meaning the complete original text) was an Ionian Sophist and not a Presocratic philosopher in the sense of a φυσικός. His work – according to Lebedev – was not a special commentary dedicated to the Orphic theogony, but a work on the origins of religion and divine names, i.e. one belonging to the genre of Sophistic Kulturgeschichte. According to this perspective, which is also favoured by Albert Henrichs and Richard Janko (among others),11 Lebedev maintains that the work at hand may well have been perceived as ‘atheistic’ in its purpose since it literally dissolved the Olympian gods into the air. The author was not a religious Orphic himself; on the contrary, his work was polemically addressed to contemporary religious conservatives like Diopeithes, who venerated Orpheus as an ancient theologian teaching a creationist cosmogony and tried to ban the teachings of Ionian natural science and Anaxagorean astronomy in Athens. In the second part of his essay, Lebedev argues that the author of the Derveni treatise was in all probability Prodicus of Ceos, whose nickname Tantalos (i.e. ‘enemy of the gods’) was an allusion to his supposed ‘atheism,’12 There is a neglected piece of evidence in Themistius that describes how Prodicus produced an allegorical interpretation of the Orphic theogony and outlines Prodicus’ theory of the origin of religion (as the deification of what is useful) that is directly attested in PDerv., col. XXIV. For the first time, this attribution explains the reference to Prodicus in the context of Aristophanes’ parody of quasi-Orphic cosmogony in the Birds: Prodicus reduced Orphic theogony to Anaxagorean physics, so Aristophanes ridicules Prodicus (and not Orpheus!) and humorously aims to surpass Prodicus in absurdity by reducing theogony to ornithogony. At the end of the paper, Lebedev proposes that we date the Derveni treatise to the decade

(cf. Woodruff [1985]); PTura III 16.9–18 (cf. Binder/Liesenborghs [1966]) and PHerc. 1428 (Philodemus’ On Piety: cf. Vassallo [2018]) for Prodicus; POxy. XI 1364 + LII 3647 and POxy. XV 1797 for Antiphon (cf. G. Bastianini and F. Decleva Caizzi ap. CPF I.1*, 176–222, with bibliography). 11 Cf. Henrichs (1984); Janko (1997), (2001), and (2008). 12 A more cautious approach to the tradition which makes Prodicus a radical ‘atheist’ is to be found now in Kouloumentas (2018) and Vassallo (2018), who proposes a significant change above all to the piece of evidence by Philodemus’ On Piety.

10 

 Christian Vassallo

430–420 BC and discusses the possibility that col. V contains another extensive quotation from Heraclitus. The close relationship between the papyrological tradition and doxographical questions is finally studied in depth in Jaap Mansfeld’s essay (Lists of Prin­ ciples and Lists of Gods: Philodemus, Cicero, Aëtius, and Others), with a brilliant approach already employed by the scholar in his monumental work Aëtiana, which he has been editing with David Th. Runia for several years now.13 In this paper the Epicurean accounts and overviews of the doxai of philosophers (and poets) concerning gods in the remains of Philodemus’ On Piety and in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, Book 1 are compared in chapters 1.7 (Who the Deity is) and 1.3 (On Principles, what they are) of the Aëtian Placita, as well as in some other texts (Clement of Alexandria and Sextus Empiricus). The purpose of this search for affinities is to place these passages within a wider context. What we are dealing with here is not only the fundamental problem of the relationship between Cicero and Philodemus (viz. the Herculaneum papyri that hand down his works, in particular On Piety), but also the philosophical problem of hylotheism. A few remarks on passages dealing with Presocratic philosophers are included. Now that I have outlined the rich variety of this volume, I would like to stress again my gratitude to those who have contributed to its completion. Special thanks go to the Schwarz­Liebermann Stiftung im Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft and to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), for having funded both the International Workshop mentioned above and the present publication of its proceedings. I am extremely grateful to the editors of the Studia Praesocratica – Richard McKirahan, Denis O’Brien, Oliver Primavesi, Christoph Riedweg, David Sider, Gotthard Strohmaier, and Georg Wöhrle – for accepting to publish the volume in this prestigious series. The book is intended to be the first collection of studies specifically devoted to a multidisciplinary and very fruitful topic in Classics. There is good reason to believe that this subject will not fail to amaze in the next years, both because of reinterpretions of already known texts, and for the probable discovery of new texts that will open up innovative perspectives on Presocratic philosophy and its reception in antiquity.14 Finally, I wish to highlight that – as its subtitle suggests (A Philo­ sophical Reappraisal of the Sources) – the purpose of this volume is eminently 13 Cf. M&R1–5. 14 The importance and topicality of this theme is confirmed by the increasing number of books in the De Gruyter series Studia Praesocratica (SP) which is parallel to the Traditio Praesocratica (TP) series. With regard to this field of inquiry, I would like to recall that, thanks to further DFG funding and within the research project Die Vorsokratiker in den Herkulanensischen Papyri (VA 1030 / 1–1) that I have carried out at the University of Trier, another volume has been published

Introduction 

 11

hermeneutical and philosophical. It is addressed above all to historians of ancient philosophy, even though both papyrologists and Classical philologists will find new food for thought in its pages. On the methodological level, the book aims to bring back to their specific field of study (viz. philosophy and its history, as opposed to papyrology in the strict sense) numerous and relevant sources that are usually neglected by the majority of scholars of Presocratic thought and its tradition, owing to the prejudice according to which papyrological texts are the exclusive competence of papyrologists. It is not my task to explain here the (historical and academic) reasons for this prejudice, which – like all prejudices – amounts to a methodological, or even ‘ideological’ error! I hope that the results of this (first) systematic attempt to make philosophical papyrology a crucial component of the history of ancient philosophy, and in particular of Presocratic thought, will prove a welcome one that will mark a turning point in the scholarship in coming years.

References Betegh (2013): Gábor Betegh, “Pythagoreans and the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Frisbee Sheffield and James Warren (eds.), Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, London, 79–93. Binder/Liesenborghs (1966): Gerhard Binder and Leo Liesenborghs, “Eine Zuweisung der Sentenz οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν an Prodikos von Keos”, in: MH 23, 37–43 [= Carl J. Classen (ed.), Sophistik: Wege der Forschung, Darmstadt 1976, 452–462]. Henrichs (1984): Albert Henrichs, “The Eumenides and the Wineless Libation in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, 2 vols., Naples, II, 255–268. Janko (1997): Richard Janko, “The Physicist as Hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates and the Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 118, 61–94. Janko (2001): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus (Diagoras of Melos, Apopyrgizontes Logoi?): A New Translation”, in: CPh 96, 1–32. Janko (2004): Richard Janko, “Empedocles, On Nature I 233–364: A New Reconstruction of P.Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665–6”, in: ZPE 150, 1–26. Janko (2008): Richard Janko, “Reconstructing (again) the Opening of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 166, 37–51. Kouloumentas (2018): Stavros Kouloumentas, “Prodicus on the Rise of Civilization: Religion, Agriculture, and Culture Heroes”, in: PhA 18, 127–152. M&P: Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume).

as part of the AKAN­Einzelschriften series, one edited by Vassallo (2017a) and entirely devoted to Presocratic philosophy and its reception in antiquity.

12 

 Christian Vassallo

M&R1–5: Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Piano (2016): Valeria Piano, Il Papiro di Derveni tra religione e filosofia, Florence. TP3: Benedikt Strobel and Georg Wöhrle (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Vassallo (2014): Christian Vassallo, “Xenophanes in the Herculaneum Papyri: Praesocratica Herculanensia IV”, in: APF 60, 45–66. Vassallo (2015): Christian Vassallo, “Supplemento papirologico alle recenti edizioni dei Milesii: Praesocratica Herculanensia VIII”, in: APF 61, 276–316. Vassallo (2016a): Christian Vassallo, “Towards a Comprehensive Edition of the Evidence for Presocratic Philosophy in the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: Tomasz Derda, Adam Łajtar and Jakub Urbanik (eds.), Proceedings of the 27th International Congress of Papyrology, 3 vols., Warsaw, I, 315–345. Vassallo (2016b): Christian Vassallo, “Parmenides and the «First God»: Doxographical Strategies in Philodemus’ On Piety: Praesocratica Herculanensia VII”, in: Hyperboreus 22, 29–57. Vassallo (2017a): Christian Vassallo (ed.), Physiologia: Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and Its Reception in Antiquity, Trier. Vassallo (2017b): Christian Vassallo, Rev. of Piano (2016), in: Aegyptus 97, 267–275. Vassallo (2018): Christian Vassallo, “Persaeus on Prodicus on the Gods’ Existence and Nature: Another Attempt Based on a New Reconstruction of Philodemus’ Account”, in: PhA 18, 153–168. Wallace (2015): Robert W. Wallace, Reconstructing Damon: Music, Wisdom Teaching, and Politics in Perikles’ Athens, Oxford. Woodruff (1985): Paul Woodruff, “Didymus on Protagoras and the Protagoreans”, in: JHPh 23, 483–497.

Addendum As a sign of gratitude to the University of Trier, I would like to provide the reader with the Vorrede I held on September 22nd, 2016, as an introduction to the works of the above-mentioned International Workshop: Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, zunächst möchte ich dem Präsidenten der Universität Trier, Herrn Prof. Michael Jäckel, für sein Erscheinen und das Grußwort, mit dem er diese Tagung eröffnet hat, ganz herzlich danken. Ich danke ebenso Herrn Prof. Georg Wöhrle für seine große Unterstützung und das Vertrauen, das er mir stets gewährt hat. Ohne seine Hilfe wäre ich nicht in der Lage gewesen, diese seit langer Zeit geplante Tagung zu verwirklichen. Allen Freunden, Hilfskräften und Kollegen der Universität, den

Introduction 

 13

Mitgliedern des Faches Klassische Philologie und allen Teilnehmern, die meine Einladung angenommen haben, möchte ich meine tiefe Dankbarkeit ausdrücken. Es ist eine große Ehre, eine solche Veranstaltung an der Universität Trier organisieren zu können. Diese Hochschule zeigt eine immer größere Vitalität in Hinsicht auf die Geisteswissenschaften, von der Klassischen Philologie über die Philosophie bis hin zur Papyrologie. Deswegen scheint sie der beste Platz zu sein, um eine Tagung über die papyrologische Überlieferung der Vorsokratiker durchzuführen. Wie schon das Zitat Ciceros, welches Hermann Diels als Leitspruch seiner Doxographi Graeci wählte, besagt, ist es das Ziel der Tagung, aus den fontes rerum zu schöpfen und sie zu deuten und zu kommentieren, im Rahmen einer Debatte zwischen Experten der antiken Philosophie und der philosophisch orientierten Papyrologie. Seit Jahren ist die Universität Trier eines der wichtigsten Forschungszentren für das Studium der vorsokratischen Überlieferung. Ich möchte nur die im Verlag De Gruyter erschienenen Reihen Traditio Praesocratica und Studia Prae­ socratica erwähnen. Einige der maßgeblichen Herausgeber sind hier anwesend. Zudem möchte ich betonen, wie wichtig die Anwesenheit zahlreicher Vertreter der Redaktion des Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini ist. Dieses monumentale und verdienstvolle Werk wurde vor etwa 30 Jahren begonnen und wird bald zu Ende geführt. In den letzten 30 Jahren gab es sowohl im Bereich der philosophisch orientierten Papyrologie als auch der Vorsokratiker-Forschung viele neue Entwicklungen. Die Papyrologie qua Disziplin hat sich sehr verändert, neue Texte sind ans Tageslicht gekommen. Das Studium der Herkulanensischen Papyri, die von Anfang an nicht zum Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini gehörten, wurde gänzlich revolutioniert: von den multispektralen Abbildungen, von den neuen Methoden der Rekonstruktion der Rollen und von jüngsten Experimenten, verkohlte Stücke virtuell auszurollen. Zweifellos stehen uns in der Zukunft große Überraschungen bevor. In diesem Zusammenhang will die Tagung folgende Ziele erreichen: Geleistetes rekapitulieren und bewerten; einige noch lückenhafte bzw. unerforschte Bereiche vervollständigen; eine Brücke zwischen Fächern schlagen, die unter dem Dach der Altertumswissenschaften unbedingt zusammenarbeiten sollten. In der Hoffnung, dass diese Ziele erreicht werden, wünsche ich allen einen angenehmen Aufenthalt in Trier und eine fruchtbare Arbeit! Vielen Dank! Notre Dame, IN, USA 15 January 2019

Part I: Orpheus and the Orphic Tradition

Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition: PGurob 1 and the Greek Magic Rolls 1 Introduction Even though the Derveni Papyrus is a very important document, it is not the only papyrus relevant to the study of Orphism. There are others, although not very many, that are interesting, each one disclosing a different perspective. In this occasion, we refer to the Gurob Papyrus 1 and some Magical Papyri. Other papyri could be cited, like PSI VII 850 (OF 310),1 PBerol. inv. 44 (OF 383, 387–389, 392–393, 396–397),2 and the Bologna Papyrus (PBonon. 4).3

2 The Gurob Papyrus 1 2.1 The text The Gurob Papyrus 1 (found at the lower entrance to Fayum), dated to the middle of the 3rd cent. BC,4 consists of two columns with 30 and 26 lines respectively;5 in the first, approximately half of the first lines are missing, but it is possible to reconstruct a text that is quite legible. Only some isolated words can be read from 1 Cardin/Ozbek (2011); Jiménez San Cristóbal (2015a). 2 Jiménez San Cristóbal (2015b). 3 Jiménez San Cristóbal (2017). 4 Hordern (2000). Smyly (1921) dates it to the beginning of the same century and West (1983) 170, towards the end of the century. 5 Image in Hordern (2000) pl. III; Morand (2001) 208. Cf. http://www.trismegistos.org/tm/detail. php?tm=65667. Note: The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation has given financial support for the research for this paper (FFI2013–43126P and FFI 2015–65206P). We are very grateful to Monica Walker for the translation. The following abbreviations are used: OF = Orphicorum Fragmenta (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume); OA = Argonautica, OH = Hymni, and OL = Lithica. Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, Complutense University of Madrid (IUCR) https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-002

18 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

the second column. The first column was first published by Smyly6 and the full papyrus by Kern, an edition that was followed by others among which can be highlighted the one by Hordern.7 The following is the text and its translation:8 Col. I

  5

10

15

20

ἕκ]α̣σ̣τα ἔ̣χ̣ω̣ν̣ ἃ̣ εὕρ̣η̣ι ̣ τὰ] ὠμ̣ὰ̣ δ̣ὲ̣ σ̣υνλεγέ[τω ] ̣ ̣δ̣ι ̣ὰ̣ τὴν τελετήν. δῶρον δέξ]α̣τ’ ἐμὸν ποινὰς πατ[έρων ἀθεμίστων. ] σῶισομ με Βριμὼ με[ γάλη ] ̣ Δήμητέρ τε ῾Ρέα ] Κούρητές τ’ {ε} ἔνοπλοι ]ω̣μ̣εν ἵ]να ποιῶμεν ἱερὰ καλά ] ̣νηι κριός τε τράγος τε ] ἀπερίσια δῶρα. ] ̣ο̣υ καὶ ἐπὶ ποταμοῦ νομῶ̣ι   λαμ]βάνων τοῦ τράγου ] ̣τὰ δὲ λοι∖ ̣ πὰ∕⟦ ̣ ̣ ̣⟧ κρέα ἐσθιέτω ]ο̣ς μὴ ἐφοράτω ]χου ἀναθεὶς {εις} τὸ ἀνηιρ̣ε ]αλων εὐχή· ]νον καὶ Εὐβουλῆα καλῶ[μεν ] ̣ ̣ εὐρήας κικλήσκω[μεν ] ̣ ̣[ ̣] ι̣ τ̣ ̣ο φίλους σὺ ἀπαυάνας Δ]ήμητρος καὶ Παλλάδος ὑμῖ ν

Col. II [ ̣ ̣[ α̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣[ μ̣α̣τ ̣[ α̣ρα̣ ̣[ π̣ουσ[ ουνσ̣υ[ ῥάχος κι ̣ι ̣[ εὐχεσ[θνον π ̣[ μὴ ἔχη̣[ τι ἡμε̣[ θεν του[ τριχω ̣[ βλέπω̣[ καα̣ρ̣ ̣ ̣[ δωι λοι[ επ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣[ δια̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣[

6 Smyly (1921). 7 Kern (1922) 31; Tierney (1922); Colli (1977) 4 [A 69]; Bernabé (OF 578); Hordern (2000), who includes a detailed description of the papyrus; Morand (2001) 276–277; Tortorelli Ghidini (2006) 255. In addition, there are other studies and translations that can be cited, such as that of West (1983) 170–171 and (1993) 181–182 (that includes the text); that of Jiménez San Cristóbal (2002b) 110–114, (2008), and (2009), or that of Graf/Johnston (20132) 150–155 and 217–218. For more bibliography see OF 578. 8 We are following the edition of OF 578. In the text we have accepted only the integrations considered to be the most solid. In the commentary other proposals can be found. The complete critical apparatus can be found in OF 578. The sections in verse are conventionally shown in cursive. From now on we will refer to col. I simply by the line number. The references to column II will be col. II and the line number. The translation is that by Graf/Johnston (20132) 217–218 with slight modifications.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

25

Εὐβου]λεῦ Ἰρικεπαῖγε σῶισομ με ]η̣τα[ ] εἷς Διόνυσος. σύμβολα ]υρα θεὸς διὰ κόλπου ο]ἶ ̣ν[ο]ν ἔπιον ὄνος βουκόλος ] ̣ι̣ας σύνθεμα· ἄνω κάτω τοῖς ] καὶ ὅ σοι ἐδόθη ἀνήλωσαι ε]ἰς τὸν κάλαθον ἐ̣μ̣βαλ̣ῖν κ]ῶνος, ῥόμβος, ἀστράγαλοι, ]η ἔσοπτρος

θε̣ εκ̣ κ̣α[ γευ ̣ ̣ ̣[ ζε ̣ ̣ ̣[ πορει̣ ̣[ διο̣υ̣λ̣ ̣[ τ[

] having everything that he finds let him] collect the raw (meat) ] on account of the ritual. receive my gift] as the payment for law[less] ancestors… ] Save me, Brimo, gr[eat ] and Demeter Rea ] and the armed Curetes ] that we ] so that we will perform beautiful rites ] …ram and he­goat ] immense gifts. ] and along the river ta]king of the he-goat ] let him eat the rest of the meat ] let him not watch ] dedicating the chosen (piece) ] Prayer ] let us call -os and Eubouleus. ] let us call the wide (Earth?) ] the dear ones. You having parched of De]meter and Pallas to us Eubu]leus, Irikepaigos, save me ] … one Dionysos. Passwords l]yra?, god through the bosom ] I drank wine, donkey, hersman ] token, above below for the ] and what has been given to you, consume it ] put into the basket c]one, bull-roarer, knucklebones ] mirror

 19

20 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

The papyrus describes a series of provisions to celebrate a ritual (cf. τελετή, l. 3), that include discursive sections in which ritual actions (δρώμενα) are emphasized and the words that must be pronounced in the ritual (λεγόμενα). The δρώμενα are normally indicated in the 3rd person imperative in -τω (σ̣υνλεγέ[τω, l. 2, ἐσθιέτω, l. 14, ἐφοράτω, l. 15). The infinitive ἐ̣μ̣βαλῖν (l. 28) seems to be used for a similar mandatory function and it is possible that it was dependent on a principal verb, lost in the lacuna of the text. The λεγόμενα are of two types: hexametric verses and a kind of slogans. Regarding the latter, some are called σύμβολα (l. 23): ]υρα θεὸς διὰ κόλπου (l. 24), ο]ἶ ν̣ [ο]ν ἔπιον ὄνος βουκόλος (l. 25) and the other, σύνθεμα (l. 26): ἄνω κάτω (l. 26). Everything seems to indicate that this text was meant to be used in the rite, in contrast to the Derveni Papyrus, which is a theoretical treaty where certain practices and certain verses of Orpheus are tried to be explained.9 A plausible context for the Gurob Papyrus is offered by the papyrus of Ptolemy Philopator, from 210 BC,10 in which it is established that those who celebrate the rituals in honour of Dionysos need to be inscribed in the Archive and they need to deposit the sacred text that they used, sealed. In addition, it is possible that our exemplar could have been one of these sacred texts from the collection of the Philopator.11 The ritual act also included prayers, as indicated in the epigraph εὐχή in l. 17, in a verbal form of εὔχομαι in col. II.11, and (in the text of the λεγόμενα) in the exhortative subjunctives: καλῶ[μεν, in l. 18, κικλήσκω[μεν, in l. 19, and probably ]ω̣με̣ ν (l. 8) that we could read as καλ]ῶ̣με̣ ν or κικλήσκ]ω̣με̣ ν.12

2.2 The Orphic character of the text The word τελετή is mostly used to refer to rituals whose peculiar characteristic consists in that the relation that human beings establish with the divinity through them is not based, as in the case of civic rituals, in worshiping them, but in searching in such practices for a solution to the fears of the participants, the fear of sickness, of death, and what happens after it.13 Numerous texts attributed the foundation of τελεταί to Orpheus,14 and the characteristics of such rituals were purification and

9  Graf/Johnston (20132) 150. 10 OF 44 with bibliography, Graf/Johnston (20132) 218–219. 11 Wilamowitz (1931–1932) II, 378; Burkert (1987) 70–71; Herrero (2010) 54. 12 Both proposals by Janko ap. Hordern (2000). 13 Regarding the τελεταί, cf. Sfameni Gasparro (1988); Jiménez San Cristóbal (2002a); Schuddeboom (2009). 14 OF 546–562.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 21

the prospect of salvation. As we shall see, the content of the Gurob Papyrus conforms to these characteristics. Yet, the adscription of the text to a specific religious movement has been discussed: Smyly15 considered the text Orphic, although he also pointed out the presence of elements that, in his opinion, are reminiscent of Eleusis (Brimo, Demeter, Rhea, Pallas, and the Curetes) and the Mysteries of Sabazios. The fact is that based on our current knowledge, as we shall see, all these elements also appear in the Orphic sphere. For Tierney16 Ἰρικεπαῖγε (l. 22) was an unequivocally Orphic trait. Curiously Linforth, in his book on the testimonies regarding Orpheus and the possible Orphic rituals,17 completely ignores the document, while West18 believes that the text suggests the syncretism of various Mystery cults and points out Eleusinian elements, from the cult to Sabazios and maybe of the gold tablets, a point of view that should be the recipient of the same observations than those of Smyly. The Gurob Papyrus has been included, as we have seen,19 in the main editions of the Orphic texts and its latest editor, Hordern, unabashedly qualifies it as Orphic, so that it can be considered an exceptional testimony of one of the books used by Orphic celebrants to perform their rituals. Indeed, numerous sources tell us about the use of books by the followers of Orpheus,20 which seems to indicate that in the rites of this religious group the texts that referred to mythical predecessors and concrete ritual practices had a significant presence.21 We will review the elements of the ritual that can be determined in our text and we will point out some parallels.

2.3 The initiates and officiants In l. 15 ]ο̣ς μὴ ἐφοράτω excludes particular people from viewing parts of the ritual. Smyly proposed to reconstruct ὁ δὲ βέβηλ]ο̣ς μὴ ἐφοράτω, based in the well-known formula of numerous Orphic texts θύρας δ’ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι (“shut the doors, uninitiated”),22 but the reconstruction is not certain.23 15 Smyly (1921). 16 Tierney (1922) 78. 17 Linforth (1941). 18 West (1983) 171. 19 Cf. supra, n. 7. 20 Cf. Ar. Av. 966–990, in which a false diviner reiterates that a book must be read, Eur. Hipp. 954 (= OF 627), Pl. Resp. 2.364e and Schol. ad loc., 201 Greene (= OF 573) in which there are references to many books being used by the officiants; see also Dem. 18.259 and 19.199; Jiménez San Cristóbal (2002b); Henrichs (2003); Bernabé (2011) 32–35. 21 Jiménez San Cristóbal (2002b) and Bernabé (2008a). 22 Regarding this formula, cf. Bernabé (1996) 13–37. 23 See an alternative interpretation of the sentence in § 2.4.

22 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

Always in l. 25, if we understand ο]ἶ ̣ν[ο]ν ἔπιον ὄνος βουκόλος as “I drank wine, me the shepherd ass” we would have a first person reference of an officiant,24 designated with two known terms in the Mystery sphere: ὄνος and βουκόλος. The ass is cited in Aristophanes:25 ἐγὼ γοῦν ὄνος ἄγω μυστήρια, which appears to be a play on words between “I am an ass (mystes) that celebrates the Mysteries” and “I am an ass (animal) who carries the objects to celebrate the Mysteries,” and it is highly possible that the mystic meaning of the ass might have been the reason why he was chosen as the protagonist of the Golden Ass by Apuleius.26 Meanwhile, βουκόλος is documented as the appellation of the priests of Dionysos, especially in inscriptions from the Imperial period,27 and the name would be in consonance with the frequent identification of the god with a bull in Euripides’ Bacchae or in the invocations of the women of Elis.28

2.4 δρώμενα. 1) Sacrifices The papyrus informs us about a series of offerings and the way in which they were meant to be presented. In some cases, the λεγόμενα also contained references to the ritual. Even though we will come back to them again, we will also include them among the δρώμενα. The stage is the banks of a river, that can only be the Nile,29 probably in a prairie (ἐπὶ ποταμοῦ νομῶι ,̣ l. 12). An outdoors sacrifice is consistent with an Orphic context, since Orphic rituals are usually not celebrated within temples.30 The first preserved sentence (l. 1) has not received a convincing explanation.31 On the occasion of the telete, pieces of raw meat had to be gathered 24 There are other options of syntactic interpretation. On this point, see Hordern (2000) 139. 25 Ar. Ran. 159. 26 Tierney (1922) 85; García López (1993) 86, with bibliography. 27 The term seems to be as old as Eur. fr. 203 Κannicht, and in plural it is used as the title of a work by Cratinus (cf. Ath. 14.42.638d); an indirect testimony can be found in Ar. Vesp. 10 (τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρ’ ἐμοὶ βουκολεῖς Σαβάζιον); βουκόλοι are often present in Orphic literature (e.g. ΟΗ 1.10; 31.7; OL 463); cf. Luc. Salt. 79 (= OF 600 [I]), and in inscriptions, such as IG 12(9).262 (Eretria, 1st cent. BC), IPerg. 485.18 (1st cent. AD), IGUR 4.160 (= OF 585). Regarding βουκόλοι, the most exhaustive study is the one done by Morand (2001) 249–287, that includes a complete catalogue of Greek and Latin sources. 28 Eur. Bacch. 920 (ταῦρος ἡμῖν πρόσθεν ἡγεῖσθαι δοκεῖς); Carm. pop., PMG 871 (ἄξιε ταῦρε). 29 Graf/Johnston (20132) 151. 30 Hordern (2000) 137 accumulates references regarding the prairie of the Netherworld, but in our opinion this scene has very little to do with it. 31 The first word is uncertain, and neither is εὕρ̣η̣ι ̣, read as a verb by West, but it could be the dative of εὐρύς (Kern edits εὐρηι [sic] by the presence of εὐρήας in l. 19).

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 23

(τὰ] ὠμ̣ὰ̣ δ̣ὲ̣ σ̣υνλεγέ[τω, l. 2). The λεγόμενα specify that a sacrifice had to be celebrated (ἵ]να ποιῶμεν ἱερὰ καλά, l. 9) and that offerings were made by way of atonement (δῶρον, l. 4; ποινάς, l. 4; δῶρα, l. 11). The expression ποιῶμεν ἱερὰ καλά is frequently used to refer to the celebration of a sacrifice.32 Everything points out that a ram and a goat were probably sacrificed (] ̣νηι κριός τε τράγος τε, ll. 9–11).33 It would seem like a part of the ram had to be separated (λαμ]βάνων τοῦ τράγου, l. 13).34 That same part (and probably others) should be offered, possibly to the gods (]χου ἀνα‹τι›θεὶς {εις} τὸ ἀνηιρ̣ε[θέν, l. 16),35 while the rest of the meat was to be consumed by some of the participants (] .τὰ δὲ λοι̣∖πὰ∕ ⟦ ̣ ̣ ̣⟧ κρέα ἐσθιέτω, l. 14).36 Other people were forbidden to witness the consumption of the meat (]ο̣ς μὴ ἐφοράτω l. 15). It is indubitably a bloody sacrifice (κριός τε τράγος τε), which prima facie is contrary to the Orphic interdiction of sacrifice. Nevertheless, there are some indications that in the Orphic rituals, the one that is to be initiated could participate in a first bloody sacrifice, that would place him in the perverse position of the Titans devouring Dionysos, in order to then purify him or herself through a καθαρμός and henceforth maintain a ἁγνεία in which the initiate would not contaminate him or herself with bloodshed. Jiménez San Cristóbal37 refers back to the theory of the initiation rituals of Van Gennep38 and his scheme: rupture with the community, life on the margins and reintegration in the new community. According to this scheme, the bloody sacrifice and the consumption of meat supposed a rupture with the Orphic community and in order to reintegrate into society it was necessary to go through purification and abide by the precepts of the group. She also points out, in addition, that in the Greek religion the sacrifice constitutes the 32 Casabona (1966) 11–12. Regarding the correction ῥέξομεν of West (1993) 181–182 (= [1983] 171–172, without Greek text), that solves the metric, Hordern (2000) 136 prefers to maintain ποιῶμεν. We think that this is correct, taking into consideration that this would not be the only case in which the metric of a text of an Orphic ritual is broken due to the intromission of a ritual term; for example, in Lam. Pelinna OF 865.1 τρισόλβιε breaks the metric of the verse and appears in non-metric ritual sentences (cf. Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal [2008] 63 and 77). 33 The most likely proposal of integration for νηι is κοι]νῆι Tierney (1922), that he translates as “ram and goat together.” 34 Smyly (1921), who compares our text with Psell. De op. daem., p. 39 Boissonade, proposes that it would refer to the testicles, while Tierney considers it a reference to the heart, what seems more likely. The heart is the only part of Dionysos that was saved when the Titans devoured the god child (OF 314–316) and Clem. Al. Protr. 2.15.1 speaks of καρδιουλκίαι καὶ ἀρρητουργίαι. 35 ἀνηιρε|[θέν] Janko, better than ἀνηιρε|[μένον] Τierney, West, since ἀνηιρη| would be expected, cf. Hordern (2000) 137, who proposes that εις is a dittography and corrects ἀνα‹τι›θείς. 36 Cf. the parallels of Hordern (2000) 137. 37 Jiménez San Cristóbal (2009) 88. 38 Van Gennep (1909) 116–117 and 128.

24 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

basic experience of the sacred and is present in the initiation rituals to a new age group or of entry in a religious community, so that, as Burkert affirms, there is no initiation ritual without sacrifice.39 Several documents are consistent with the proposal that bloody Orphic rituals existed: the bone tablets of Olbia (OF 463–465), which could be a reminder of such an initiate sacrifice,40 the mention of a sacrifice in a Thurii gold tablet closely connected chronologically with the papyrus (OF 492.7), in which καλ{η}ὰ (...) ἱερὰ (with repetition of the ἱερά in l. 8) can be read, or in a passage of The Cretans by Euripides41 in which the commemoration of a first bloody sacrifice (τάς τ’ ὠμοφάφους δαῖτας τελέσας, v. 12, in punctual aorist, which indicates a past event) contrasts with a sustained purity (ἁγνὸν δὲ βίον τείνομεν, v. 9, with durative present, and τήν τ’ ἐμψύχων βρῶσιν ἐδεστῶν πεφύλαγμαι, vv. 18–19, with a perfect of state). Everything seems to indicate that it was the aforementioned ram and goat the ones that were consumed after the sacrifice in the telete. The Orphic gold tablets of Pelinna and Thurii quote a bull, a ram and maybe a goat that precipitate in the milk, in a formula of blessedness,42 but nothing indicates that these animals were sacrificed in a ritual. The fragmentary testimony of the papyrus does not help to determine what is the situation of the sacrifice in the ritual that is being described. It could exclusively describe the initiation ceremony, and not a τελετή one for the already initiates or it could be a set of various aspects of the ritual, since other parts regarding this issue already mentioned in the papyrus, like the pronunciation of σύμβολα, were not limited to a first initiation. If this is the case, it would be difficult to accept Smyly’s proposal ὁ βέβηλος (“the not initiate”) as the subject of μὴ ἐφοράτω (l. 15). It does not seem probable that the people who were not initiated were even present in the rest of the ritual. And if, according to our interpretation, the ones who are being initiated are the only ones that consume the meat, it would be more logical to think that the ones that could not see the bloody sacrifice would be the already initiated, who would participate in other parts of the ritual with those who are being initiated, but who would keep themselves ritually separated from the nefarious acts of bloodshed and the consumption of meat.

39 Burkert (1998) 86. 40 West (1982) 25 advances the hypothesis that these were emblems of membership in the thiasus: the bone tablet symbolizes the participation in the common sacrifice, cf. also Bernabé (2008b) 545. 41 Eur. fr. 472 TrGF (Kannicht) (= OF 567): cf. Casadio (1990) and Bernabé (2016). 42 OF 485–486 (Pelinna); 487.4 and 488.10 (Thurii). Regarding the meaning of the formula cf. Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 76–83. A goat can be read in OF 485.4, according to correction proposed by Méndez Dosuna (2009) αἶζα instead of αἶψα.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 25

2.5 δρώμενα. 2) Ritual omophagia? Another issue would be if the text alludes to a ritual omophagia43 or whether this meat is cooked over a fire, it is distributed around the faithful, reserving the corresponding parts for the divinity and the priest, and then is consumed in a banquet that follows the sacrifice in the same place.44 Despite the fragmentary state of the papyrus, the second possibility would be preferable, since the expression τὰ ̣ ̣ ̣ δὲ λοι∖ ̣ πὰ∕ ⟦ ⟧ κρέα ἐσθιέτω (l. 14: “that he might eat the rest of the meat”) does not mention that it had to be raw meat (as would be expected, due to the strangeness of the practice) and is, nevertheless, very usual in bloody sacrifices in other cults.45 It is true that Euripides clearly alludes to raw meat,46 and Plutarch47 says that the Titans drink the blood of the god, which could support the hypothesis that they ate their meat raw. An allusion to the omophagia in relation to the Dionysian Mystery cults also appears in Euripides’ Bacchae,48 in an inscription of Miletus49 and in other places.50 Even in a passage by Firmicus Maternus,51 the ritual dismemberment of a bull reproduces the one that the baby Bacchus suffered. But a passage by Clement and others describe how the meat is boiled.52 Everything points to the references to raw meat appearing in the sphere of myth or in the Christian critical commentaries, or maybe in denominations in the ritual sphere that allude to a mythical tradition, but that the ritual reality had to be different

43 Hordern (2000) 133 refers to the lack of testimonies regarding ritual omophagia. See, also, Henrichs (1978) 151–152 and n. 99, 100, who does not accept the omophagia of the Maenads, and who considers that it was more likely that the meat was previously cooked. Therefore, we do not believe that it is acceptable to read ωμοφα]γιαc in l. 26 as Hordern (2000) 139 suggests. 44 Festugière (1935) 374–375 [= Id. (1972) 40–41]. 45 Cf. the texts in which τὰ λοιπὰ κρέα or τὰ δε ἄλλα κρέα are used in these contexts for cooked meat, quoted in OF 578 ad. loc.: in the mysteries of Andania (SIG II3 736.96), in Halicarnassus, in the thiasos instituted by the testament of Posidonius (SIG III3 1044.40), or in an inscription of Cos (SIG III3 1025.23). 46 Eur. fr. 472.12 TrGF (Kannicht) (= OF 567.12): τὰς ὠμοφάφους δαῖτας. 47 Plut. De es. carn. 996c. 48 Eur. Bacch. 139: ὠμοφάγον χάριν (“delight of raw meat”). 49 OF 583.2–3: μὴ ἐξεῖναι ὠμοφάγιον ἐμβαλεῖν μηδενὶ πρότερον [ἢ ἡ ἱέ]ρεια … ἐμβάληι (“nobody is permitted to dispose of the meal of raw meat before the priestess … dispose of it”), cf. Sokolowski (1955) n. 48, pp. 123 and 125; IMilet 6.3.1222.14–23, with ample bibliography regarding the text. See also Bernabé’s notes on OF 583. 50 Cf. Dionys. Bassar. 9.39; Plut. De def. or. 417C; Schol. Clem. Al. Protr. 318.5. 51 Firm. Mat. Err. prof. rel. 6.5 (p. 89 Turcan). 52 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.18.1; Firm. Mat. Err. prof. relig. 6.3 (p. 88 Turcan). Cf. Henrichs (1972) 67.

26 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

and limited to cooked meat. If it is not plausible to accept, as Firmicus mentions,53 that the Cretes nibbled a live bull (vivum laniant dentibus taurum), why would we believe everything else? A parallel phenomenon appears in the versions regarding the behavior of the Maenads.54

2.6 δρώμενα. 3) Wine The consumption of wine during the ritual is alluded to in l. 25, where Hordern reads ο]ἶ ν̣ [ο]ν ἔπιον55 (Kern previously read οἶ|νον πί ̣[νων in the sequence νον π .[ in col. II.12). Wine is associated to the Orphic ritual in the gold tablets of Pelinna,56 where we read the expression: οἶνον ἔχεις εὐδαίμονα τιμάν (“you have wine, blessed privilege”), an obscure sentence that has been the object of several interpretations, from those who consider it to be an echo of the initiation ritual, to those who believe that there is a reference to a funerary ritual with wine libations, to those who see in it the expression of happiness that the deceased will enjoy in the Netherworld. These three interpretations are not really mutually exclusive, but they can be complementary to each other.57 There are other testimonies regarding libations and the consumption of wine during Orphic rituals, such as the reference in Demosthenes to Aeschines pouring wine to the participants in the rituals that his mother celebrated,58 the presence of wine in the otherworldly blessedness that awaits the initiates of Musaeus and Orpheus in the ironic description made by Plato,59 and there are also parallel examples to this expression in the Gurob Papyrus in the σύμβολα and συνθήματα of the Eleusinian Mysteries cited by Clement,60 but these similarities are not sufficient proof to consider that the

53 Firm. Mat. Err. prof. relig. 6.5 (p. 89 Turcan). 54 Henrichs (1969) 235–236 collects possible interpretations regarding this ritual; Henrichs (1978) 150–151 affirms that the intended omophagia is not but a particular type of a Dionysian sacrifice, whose ritual details are beyond us. Cf. Bremmer (1984) 274–275; Versnel (1990) 145; González Merino (2009) 157–161 and 272–275; González Merino (2010) 333–344; Alonso Fernández (2013); Porres Caballero (2013a); Porres Caballero (2013b) 72, 478–479. 55 Hordern (2000) 139. 56 OF 485–486. 57 Cf. Bernabé/Jiménez (2008) 84–89, where the discussion and a larger bibliography can be found. 58 Dem. 18.259. 59 Pl. Resp. 2.363c–d; cf. Plut. Comp. Cimon. et Luc. 1.2 (= OF 431 [I–II]). 60 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.15.3 and 2.21.3; cf. in addition Arnob. Nat. 5.26 (ieiunavi atque ebibi cyceo­ nem); see Hordern (2000) 134.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 27

Gurob Papyrus reflects the Eleusinian rituals. Moreover, Ferrari61 considers that the wine is limited to the initiation, so that the mystes is not only abstemious later, but also that he or she will not receive wine as a reward in the Otherworld.

2.7 δρώμενα. 4) Toys After the indication “to have eaten what was given,” the ritual includes “put in the basket,” quite possibly a cista mystica (l. 28: ε]ἰς τὸν κάλαθον ἐ̣μβ ̣ αλ‹ε›ῖν), a series of objects. Maybe there is another reference to the basket in col. II.22 ἐκ̣ κ̣α[λάθου.62 In addition, there are also things tossed into a basket in an Eleusinian formula.63 And the verb ἐμβαλεῖν significantly reappears in the expression ὠμοφάγιον ἐμβαλεῖν in an inscription from Miletus.64 From the list of objects that must be thrown into the basket we have “a cone, a bull-roarer, knucklebones, and a mirror.” There is a close parallel to this text in a description by Clement65 of the objects that were used by the Titans to deceive the god in a representation of the myth of Dionysos in a ritual, Clement quotes a verse by Orpheus:66 Cone, bull-roarer, toys of flexible members beautiful golden apples from the Hesperides of high pitch voice. And then he adds And from this telete it is not worthless to show you, to condemn them, the meaningless symbols: knucklebones, ball, spinning top, apples, bull-roarer, mirror, woollen flake.67 All the objects mentioned in the papyrus appear in Clement’s text, who adds six more, some of which or all could have been in the lost part of the papyrus. This is not the place to further develop the ritual value of each of the elements, something 61 Ferrari (2011). 62 Hordern (2000) 140 suggests as an alternative ἐκ̣ κ̣α[θαρῶν. 63 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.21.2 (σύνθημα Ἐλευσινίων μυστηρίων): ἐνήστευσα, ἔπιον τὸν κυκεῶνα, ἔλαβον ἐκ κίστης, ἐργασάμενος ἀπεθέμην εἰς κάλαθον καὶ ἐκ καλάθου εἰς κίστην. 64 OF 583.2: μὴ ἐξεῖναι ὠμοφάγιον ἐμβαλεῖν μηδενὶ πρότερον [ἢ ἡ ἱέ]ρεια ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐμβάληι. 65 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.17.2; cf. also Leonid. AP 6.309. 66 OF 306: κῶνος καὶ ῥόμβος καὶ παίγνια καμπεσίγυια / μῆλά τε χρύσεα καλὰ παρ’ Ἑσπερίδων λιγυφώνων. 67 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.18.1 (= OF 588 [I]): καὶ τῆσδε ὑμῖν τῆς τελετῆς τὰ ἀχρεῖα σύμβολα οὐκ ἀχρεῖον εἰς κατάγνωσιν παραθέσθαι· ἀστράγαλος, σφαῖρα, στρόβιλος, μῆλα, ῥόμβος, ἔσοπτρον, πόκος.

28 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

that has been treated repeatedly in other occasions.68 Suffice it to say that the rite described by Clement included a kind of representation of the dismemberment of Dionysos by the Titans and it is very telling that the elements of the ritual described by him in the 2nd/3rd cent. AD coincide point by point with those in the Gurob Papyrus, almost 600 years earlier. These coincidences cannot be casual and they suggest a deep continuity in the ritual practices of these religious groups.

2.8 λεγόμενα. 1) ποινή and salvation The ritual act included the recitation of verses and prayers, also in verse (cf. § 2.1). We will examine the passages that were part of the λεγόμενα in the ritual. δῶρον δέξ]α̣τ’ ἐμὸν ποινὰς πατ[έρων ἀθεμίστων (l. 4): This is a very plausible reconstruction done by West.69 The allusion to a ποινή and to some wicked ancestors fits perfectly into the Orphic myth of Dionysos and the Titans, and the need for human beings, born from their ashes, to pay for the Titans’ crime of having dismembered, cooked and eaten Dionysos child.70 Similar expressions are found in two gold tablets from Thurii,71 a fragment by Pindar,72 and a passage of the Rhapsodies,73 always referring to the need for human beings to be free from this evil Titanic heritage through ritual. Here the ritual includes offerings (δῶρον, cf. δῶρα in l. 11).74 In addition, there is also a reference to the ritual ποινή through θυσίαι and χοαί in the Derveni Papyrus.75

68 West (1983) 154–159; Tortorelli (2000); Jiménez San Cristóbal (2005) 342–349; Levaniouk (2007). 69 West (1993) 181. 70 Cf. Bernabé (2002). 71 OF 489.4 and 490.4, that we reproduce without diacritical marks ποινὰν δ’ ἀνταπέτεισ’ ἔργων ἕνεκα οὕτι δικαίων (“I have paid the price that corresponds to wicked actions”). 72 Pind. fr. 133.1–2 Maehler: οἷσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος / δέξεται. Cf. Bernabé (1999) 248–249, with bibliography. 73 OF 350: λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων (“liberation of the wicked acts of his ancestors [or wicked ancestors]”). 74 Tierney’s reconstruction Kαβείρων] before ἀπερίσια δῶρα (based on OA 27: ἀγλαὰ δῶρα Καβείρων) is not very convincing. A similar expression is found in Ap. Rhod. 1.19 and 4.1705, what appears to be an adaptation of the Homeric formula ἀπερείσι’ ἄποινα (Il. 1.13; 1.372; 6.46; etc.). 75 PDerv., col. VI.4–5: τὴν θυσ[ία]ν τούτου ἕνεκεν π[ο(ι)οῦσ]ι[ν] / οἱ μά[γο]ι ὡσπερεὶ ποινὴν.

ἀποδιδόντες. On the ποινή, cf. Santamaría (2005) and Graf/Johnston (20132 ) 146–147.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 29

σῶισομ με Βριμὼ με[γάλη (l. 5): This is the first of two appeals to salvation that appear on the papyrus.76 A very similar expression, σῶσομ] με, σωσίκοσμε, Δήμητρος κόρη, / σῶσομ με, σεμνή, νερτέρων ὑπερτάτη appears in an Orphic fragment (OF 830a.6–7).77 It is not clear whether this is a reference to being safe during one’s life time on earth,78 a type of prayer that we find, for example in the Orphic Hymn to Prothyraia, in which σῶζε refers to the request for a blissful delivery,79 or whether it refers to the salvation of the mystes after death. Already in the chorus of initiates in the parodos of Aristophanes’ Frogs appears twice σώιζω, directed to Soteira (probably Persephone) and to Demeter with a sense that seems to be otherworldly.80 And in a gold tablet from Pherae (Thessaly)81 the σύμβολον is intended to allow the entry of the initiated into the sacred meadows (presumably that of Persephone)82 and ἄποινος γὰρ ὁ μύστης, ‘the initiate is free from punishment’ is added, which implies that it is also speaking of salvation in the Hereafter in relation to Brimo. We can accept the possibility that the papyrus was referring to both.83 On the same gold tablet of Pherae, the name of Βριμώ appears for the first time, repeated and qualified as a σύμβολον84 and it referred most likely to Persephone. Βριμώ seems to have been originally a goddess of the dead who was worshiped in Pherae, but then it becomes an epithet for several goddesses, Demeter, Rhea, Hecate or Persephone.85 Within Orphic literature, the epithet is found, referring to Persephone, in the Argonautica attributed to Orpheus,86 alluding to Dionysos and the crime of the Titans, which is the reason why we should attribute this term to this goddess in this case. Δήμητέρ τε ῾Ρέα (l. 6): It does not seem ( pace Hordern)87 that we should reconstruct τε after Ῥέα (understanding that the goddesses would have been mentioned separately). 76 Cf. l. 22. 77 Cf. Morand (2001) 218–220. 78 For example Od. 9.430 (σώοντες ἑταίρους); Il. 21.238 (ζωοὺς [...] σάω); Pl. Cri. 44b (σώθητι). 79 OH 2.14. Cf. Ricciardelli (2000) 141. 80 Cf. Faraone (1997) 47, that also refers to this passage of the PGurob. 81 OF 493. 82 Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 155–158; cf. a gold tablet from Thurii (OF 487.6): λειμῶνας (...) Φερσεφονείας. 83 Cf. Pl. Resp. 2.364e in which the acts of the initiates produce a liberation “in life and death” (εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν). 84 OF 493. 85 Cf. Morand (2001) 278–279; Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 155–157; Graf/Johnston (20132) 150 and 196–200: cf. the bibliography cited in OF 99 n. to l. 17 in the app. crit. 86 AO 17. 87 Hordern (2000) 136: “Ῥέα / [τε] would be quite acceptable both metrically and in view of the preceding τε.”

30 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

In the Orphic sphere both goddesses are identified.88 Thus, it can be understood that the author considered one the name and the other the epithet or nickname of a single goddess. Κούρητές τ’{ε} ἔνοπλοι (l. 7): The Curetes are part of Orphic myths and rituals and their usual role is to take care of the gods during their childhood. They appear in the Rhapsodies,89 two full hymns in the corpus of the Orphic Hymns90 are dedicated to them, and in other texts even the same91 or a very similar formula appear.92 It seems to be a traditional denomination, as we found a very similar expression in Plato.93 References to sacrifice and invocations: This part in verse was closed with references to the celebration of the sacrifice and the offering of gifts, which have already been mentioned:94 ἵ]να ποιῶμεν ἱερὰ καλά / ] ̣νηι κριός τε τράγος τε | ] ἀπερίσια δῶρα. Afterwards the text of the papyrus once again goes back to the instructions of the celebration of the ritual.

2.9 λεγόμενα. 2) εὐχή Smyly95 considers that εὐχή (l. 17) “is probably a kind of heading,” which is quite possible even though, as Hordern96 indicates, “there is nο heading introducing the first prayer.” The εὐχή is found in the Orphic sphere in the gold tablet from Thurii OF 492.7 and in the PDerv., col. VI.1 as one of the procedures that μειλίσσουσι τὰς ψυχάς. ]νον καὶ Εὐβουλῆα καλῶ[μεν (l. 18): In the appeal at least two divinities are invoked. Eubuleus is another name given to Dionysos as it appears in the gold

88 For example in PDerv., col. XXII (= OF 398): ‘Γῆ̣’ δὲ καὶ ‘Μήτηρ’ καὶ ‘Ῥέα’ καὶ ‘Ἥρη’ ἡ αὐτή; or in the Rhapsodies (= OF 206.1): Ῥείη τὸ πρὶν ἐοῦσα, ἐπεὶ Διὸς ἔπλετο μήτηρ, / Δημήτηρ γέγονε. Cf. Bernabé (2010). 89 OF 198; 213; 267–268; 278–279; and 297, in relation to Dionysos. 90 OH 31 and 38. 91 OH (in Mus.) 20: Κουρῆτάς τ’ ἐνόπλους. 92 OH 31.1: σκιρτηταὶ Κουρῆτες, ἐνόπλια βήματα θέντες. 93 Pl. Leg. 7.796b: Κουρήτων ἐνόπλια παίγνια. 94 § 2.4. 95 Smyly (1921) 7. 96 Hordern (2000) 138.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 31

tablets from Thurii97 and in an Orphic hymn transmitted by Macrobius.98 Only the end of the first name remains, for which Πρωτόγον]ον (Smyly) or ἁγ]νὸν (West) have been proposed. ] ̣ ̣ εὐρήας κικλήσκω[μεν (l. 19): It is possible to read γα] ι ̣́α̣ς̣ εὐρήας.99 West proposed “and let [us] call upon [the Queen] of the broad [Earth].” The following sentence is more difficult: ] ̣ ̣[ ̣] ̣ι̣τ̣ο φίλους σὺ ἀπαυάνας. Tierney100 interpreted the verb in the ordinary sense of ‘sear’, following the idea that it referred to the punishment of the Titans.101 Δ]ήμητρος καὶ Παλλάδος (l. 21): Two goddesses, Demeter and Pallas, are mentioned in the genitive, the first is familiar to the Orphic rituals; it is the new name of Rhea when Cronos makes her the mother of Zeus in the Rhapsodies,102 and in a version of the death of Dionysos she reconstructs his body.103 The presence of the latter can be explained in the light of an Orphic verse that calls Athena Παλλάς and Σώτειρα,104 in the context of the myth of Dionysos and the Titans, because she was the one who saved the beating heart of the god when he had been dismembered.105 Εὐβου]λεῦ Ἰρικεπαῖγε (l. 22): Afterwards Dionysos is invoked through two of his epithets. The first could be Εὐβου]λεῦ, a plausible reconstruction, since it appears in the papyrus before, but we could also read βασι]λεῦ.106 Meanwhile, Ἰρικεπαῖγε is a strange epithet that with several reading variants is applied to Phanes in the Rhapsodies,107 so Smyly108 considered that in this case it could also refer to the same 97 OF 488.1, 489.2, 490.2, 491.2. The metric imposes the correction Εὐβουλῆα : -λεα pap. Zuntz (1971) 311 n. 1 believes that the presence of εἷς Διόνυσος (l. 23) excludes that Eubuleus is Dionysos. Morand (2001) 193 denies it with good reason. 98 Macrob. Sat. 1.18.12 (= OF 540.4). Cf. Ricciardelli (2000) 354–355; Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 102–104. 99 Bernabé ap. OF 578. Cf. West (1983) 171. 100 Tierney (1922) 86. 101 Cf. Hordern (2000) 138, who cites Ar. Ran. 194 for ὁ Αὐαίνου λίθος in Hades and the references to ‘thirstiness’ (αὖος) in the Οrphic gold tablets as indication that the verb is connected with the life after death. 102 OF 206. 103 That Bernabé calls the “Egyptian version” (cf. OF 57–59). 104 OF 316 105 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.18.1 (= OF 315). Cf. Tierney (1922) 81. 106 Graf/Johnston (20132) 151. 107 OF 135; 139; 143.4; 162; 167.2; 170; 241.1. Cf. also OF 134, with commentary. Regarding the explanation of the script cf. Hordern (2000) 138. 108 Smyly (1921) 6, followed by Kern (1922).

32 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

god, but it is much more likely109 that it alludes, just like Eubuleus, to Dionysos as there are many parallels of this use in the Orphic tradition;110 particularly interesting is the gold tablet of Pherae111 that has been repeatedly cited, in which the god is called Ἀνδρικεπαιδόθυρσον, not only because the epithet is mentioned as a σύμβολον, but also because the first element (which the word θύρσος follows) gives a reasonable explanation for the strange epithet Ἰρικεπαῖγε. Cf. the explanation of Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal: “Probably it (Ἀνδρικεπαιδόθυρσον) is a mystic name shaped as a composite of ἀνήρ ‘adult male’ and παῖς ‘child’, thus resulting in a hybrid suitable for referring to Dionysos as an ‘adult male-child’; afterwards the original name was probably altered in several forms as Ἠρικεπαῖος (OF 139; 143, 4; 170 etc.), Ἠρικαπαῖος (OF 135; 162) (…) [and here Ἰρικεπαῖγε]. The reverse process is, of course, possible, that is a name Ericepaeus (whose meaning was certainly already unknown even to the faithful) being deformed, by a kind of popular etymology, but the Pherae tablet is the oldest attestation of this name, for which reason we consider the first explanation more plausible.”112 At the end of the verse we can read ]η̣τά, for which there has been a number of different proposals, without being able to ascertain the validity of any of them.113

2.10 λεγόμενα. 3) σύμβολα and σύνθεμα Before the σύμβολα a formula appears that we do not know how the author of the papyrus would call, εἷς Διόνυσος (l. 23), which evokes a passage attributed to Orpheus by Macrobius and the ps.-Justin:114 εἷς Ζεύς, εἷς Ἀΐδης, εἷς Ἥλιος, εἷς Διόνυσος (“only one Zeus, only one Hades, only one Helios, only one Dionysos”). This statement seems to be in line with the Orphic tendency to assimilate various gods,115 but the full verse is not consistent with what remains of our papyrus.

109 OF 578 ad loc., cf. also Morand (2001) 192–193; Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 154. 110 Procl. In Ti. 1.336.15 (= OF 140 [XI]), Hesych. s.v. Ἠρικεπαῖος· ὁ Διόνυσος; inscription from Selendus in Asia Minor (TAM V 2.1256.5–6, 2nd cent. AD; OF 662). Morand (2001) 193–194 points out clear points of contact with the Orphic Hymns. 111 OF 493. 112 Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 155. 113 Cf. Hordern (2000) 138, who prefers ἀστεροπ]ῆτα West (cf. gold tablets from Thurii OF 489.5 and 490.5). 114 Macrob. Sat. 1.18.18; ps.-Just. Coh. ad Gr. 15.1 (= OF 543), who adds at the beginning of the verse the following: εἷς θεὸς ἐν πάντεσσι. 115 Versnel (1990); Bernabé (2010).

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 33

The word σύμβολα introduces passwords116 in the manner of a heading;117 such “passwords” would have been revealed to the mystes during the ritual and he or she should pronounce them in successive cultic celebrations,118 or, once dead, in his or her transit to the otherworld to be recognized as an initiate. We find σύμβολα in two gold tablets: one from Pherae and that from Entella. In the tablet from Pherae, these passwords are supposed to be said out loud to facilitate access to the “sacred meadows” by showing with it his or her condition as mystes;119 in the tablet of Entella120 the statement σύμβολα appears before a fracture, so that the formulae cannot be read. These σύμβολα recall those mentioned in the celebrations of Sabazios by the mother of Aeschines, as ἔφυγον κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον, as related by Demosthenes.121 ]υρα (l. 24): It would probably be the end of a first σύμβολον, for which Herrero proposes λ]ύρα,122 instrument of Orpheus and which fits with the presence of the lyre in the Mysteries with escatological connotations.123 θεὸς διὰ κόλπου (l. 24): “God on the bosom” is an expression that we find in a passage of Clement attributed to the cult of Sabazios.124 Clement explains that it is “a snake that crawls on the bosom of the celebrants, proof of the incontinence of Zeus,” which has led to the explanation125 that the ritual act would be a kind of commemoration of the sexual union of Zeus with Persephone in snake form. Such an interpretation does not seem appropriate in this context,126 but the term can 116 Müri (1976). 117 Cf. Smyly (1921) 7: “σύμβολα is probably a kind of heading (...) indicating that the following expression were mystic passwords, or test phrases.” 118 Cf. Firm. Mat. Err. prof. relig. 18.1 (p. 115 Turcan); Celsus ap. Orig. C. Cels. 6.22, referencing the Mysteries of Mitra. 119 Gold tablet from Pherae (= OF 493): σύμβολα· Ἀνδρικεπαιδόθυρσον. Ἀνδρικεπαιδόθυρσον. Βριμώ. Βριμώ. εἴσιθι ἱερὸν λειμῶνα. ἄποινος γὰρ ὁ μύστης. 120 Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 49 and 153–154. 121 Dem. 18.259. 122 Herrero (2007) 19 n. 13. 123 Cf. Hardie (2004). 124 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.16.2: Σαβαζίων γοῦν μυστηρίων σύμβολον τοῖς μυουμένοις ὁ διὰ κόλπου θεός· δράκων δέ ἐστιν οὗτος, διελκόμενος τοῦ κόλπου τῶν τελουμένων, ἔλεγχος ἀκρασίας Διός; Diod. Sic. 4.4 identifies Sabazios with the Dionysos who is the son of Persephone: φασὶ γὰρ ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Φερσεφόνης Διόνυσον γενέσθαι τὸν ὑπό τινων Σαβάζιον ὀνομαζόμενον. 125 Dieterich (1891) 37 [= Dieterich (1911) 97] refers to an act of symbolic adoption of the mystes. Cf. Harrison (1903) 593. Festugière (1932) 137–138 prefers to see a ἱερὸς γάμος. 126 The sexual atmosphere seems particularly far removed from the Orphic rituals and from Orphic life in general, which is characterized by unadulterated puritanism, cf. Burkert (1975) 97.

34 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

relate to that found in a gold tablet from Thurii, “I plunged beneath the lap (ὑπὸ κόλπου) of my lady, the subterranean queen.”127 Zuntz sees in the formula an allusion to the refuge of the faithful in the bosom of the goddess,128 but it seems more likely that it refers to a kind of second birth within the divine mother after death.129 This interpretation, which has important archaeological support,130 allows us to understand the phrase as meaning “(I will become) god through the bosom (of the Mother).” ο]ἶ ν̣ [ο]ν ἔπιον ὄνος βουκόλος (l. 25): This is an explicit mention of drinking during the celebration of the τελετή. Parallel examples are found in ritual phrases of the Eleusinian Mysteries cited by Clement.131 Wine is a regular feature in initiation practices and funerary libations, but also an essential component of otherworldly happiness.132 Its particular connotations make wine exceed the limits of ritual practice fulfilled in life to become a key symbol of the Orphic doctrine of salvation.133 ] ̣ι̣ας σύνθεμα (l. 26): The first letters should be the end of a word in the genitive, perhaps ]γι ̣́ας, but the ωμοφα]γι.ας proposed by Hordern seems to be too dubious.134 σύνθεμα (a late form of σύνθημα) is difficult to distinguish from σύμβολα. Smyly135 defined both as “Divided Words, resembling a sign and countersign.”136

127 OF 488.7: δεσποίνας δ’ ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας. διά in the formula of the Gurob Papyrus suggests that the sentence is being said while the action is taking place. Cf. Hordern (2000) 134. 128 For a discussion on these hypotheses see Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 29–132, with bibliography. 129 Dieterich (19253) 55; Burkert (1975) 97, who puts the sentence in relation with a passage at the end of Plato’s Republic (10.621a), where the souls, once their destiny is known, have to “pass under the throne of Need.” 130 Mainly feminine Anatolian, Cycladic and Minor Asian-Cycladic idols such as goddesses of life and death, Etruscan figures and terracotta statues, cf. Thimme (1985); Fridh-Haneson (1987); Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 130, with bibliography. 131 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.15.3: τὰ σύμβολα τῆς μυήσεως ταύτης ἐκ περιουσίας παρατεθέντα οἶδ’ ὅτι κινήσει γέλωτα καὶ μὴ γελασείουσιν ὑμῖν διὰ τοὺς ἐλέγχους· “ἐκ τυμπάνου ἔφαγον· ἐκ κυμβάλου ἔπιον” κτλ.; ibid. 2.21.2: κἄστι τὸ σύνθημα Ἐλευσινίων μυστηρίων· “ἐνήστευσα, ἔπιον τὸν κυκεῶνα” κτλ. 132 Cf. Casadio (1999). 133 On ὄνος and βουκόλος, cf. § 2.3. 134 Hordern (2000) 139. Cf. what has been said above § 2.5, in relation to this practice. 135 Smyly (1921) 7–8. 136 Cf. signa and responsa in Firm. Mat. Err. prof. relig. 18.1.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 35

ἄνω κάτω (l. 26): It could suggest the transit of the souls from the world above to the infernal one, in a similar way as βίος / θάνατος / βίος expresses the idea of the soul from Hades to our world in a bone tablet from Olbia.137 καὶ ὅ σοι ἐδόθη ἀνήλωσαι (l. 27): It seems to be part of the instructions (“and what has been given to you, consume it”) and not another σύνθεμα (the term is in singular). It probably refers to pieces of meat, cooked, that were distributed among those who were to be initiated so that they could eat it. The repertory of objects used in the ritual continues.

2.11 Column II Very little information can be obtained from col. II. Incomprehensible due to lack of context is ῥάχος,138 maybe ‘twig, branch’ of the vine,139 in II.10. There seems to be another reference to a prayer in II.11 (εὐχεσ[θ-); maybe οἶ|νον πι [̣́ νων could be read in l. 12, in which case it would mention again the consumption of wine; in col. II.13 there seems to be a prohibition to possess something (μὴ ἔχη̣[ maybe μὴ ἐχή̣[τω Wilcken140); in col. II.12 βλέπω̣[, “I see” is plausible (but βλέπω̣[μεν is also possible), and the consumption of another comestible seems to be alluded to in col. II.23 γευ ̣ ̣ [̣ , that Wilcken reconstructs as γεύ[σασθαι and that Hordern141 suggest that it could be interpreted as “of the Titans consuming Dionysos’ body,” while for II.15 πορει̣ [̣ suggests πορει ̣́α ̣ ‘journey’, probably in relation to Apollo carrying the relics of Dionysos to Delphi or to Athena taking the heart of the baby god to Zeus.142

2.12 Conclusions 1)

We can see that the literary and ritual elements in the Gurob Papyrus are found in several religious ambiances, but they are only found all together in the Orphic tradition. Similar expressions and ritual elements are maintained

137 Bone tablet from Olbia OF 463. Hordern (2000) 139 also puts in relation this expression with the pairs of opposites from the Olbia tablets (OF 464–465) and also with Heraclitus’ 22 B 60 DK (= fr. 33 Marcovich): ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή. 138 Maybe better ῥαχὸς, cf. ῥηχός ap. Hdt. 7.142, although ῥάχος is frequently found in the MSS. 139 Cf. Theophr. Caus. pl. 3.7.3. 140 Wilcken (1924) 71. 141 Hordern (2000) 140. 142 Cf. OF 578 for other similar dubious proposals on this part.

36 

2)

3)

4)

5)

6) 7)

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

in Orphic texts with similar chronology, but found in distant places, such as the gold tablets or the Derveni Papyrus, or in texts that refer to nearby phenomena in space, but separated by centuries, as Protrepticus by Clement of Alexandria. In addition, there are references that have been compiled in the Rhapsodies, on a date which we place between the 2nd and the 1st cent. BC, which is a clear indication that we are dealing with features of a phenomenon that extends in space, lasts for centuries, and excludes the question of occasional and independent facts. The use of books for religious practices defines the Orphics from the time of Euripides and Plato onwards. The papyrus could be considered to be one of the functional texts that the mystai used during the telete, which presupposes the existence of other texts where some aspects to which the papyrus alludes could have been developed at length.143 The Gurob Papyrus demonstrates the existence in Egypt of a complex mythology and a ritual in which several ecstatic divinities are implied, as they occur in the Orphic Hymns, but at an earlier period.144 The antiquity of a number of elements of the myth of Dionysos (the toys, the cista mystica, the intervention of Pallas) and the association of this myth to the τελετή and to the fate of human beings can now be attested, a combination that once more is especially significant because it predates Neoplatonic formulations by centuries. Although the vocabulary referring to the frantic aspects of Dionysism can be found, such as ὠμά, it seems clear that the wild and violent characteristics may belong to the myth, but not to the ritual, which seems to be mimetic and sweetened. The importance of wine in the ritual can be attested. The common elements, even in the minute details, that the papyrus presents with the Orphic gold tablets, with the Derveni Papyrus, with the Orphic Hymns, with the rites celebrated by Aeschines in honour of Sabazios, with the descriptions done by Clement,145 with the Rhapsodies, and with a wide range of diverse texts spread in space and time, excludes it from being a syncretic and isolated rarity, and it places the papyrus instead as an early link in a long chain of similar rites, which indicate the presence of a consistent

143 For example, the most probable model that provides the material to write the gold tablets could have been a Descent of Orpheus to the Otherworld, from which we have several references. Cf. OF 707–711. Regarding the question cf. Riedweg (1998) and Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 231–233. 144 Morand (2001) 276–282; Graf/Johnston (20132) 152. 145 Cf. Herrero (2010) 147–148 with a detailed comparison between the two texts.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 37

religious movement (but certainly not monolithic), since ancient times, that has its own ritual vocabulary and its own details in the ritual δρώμενα. 8) The rituals are clearly connected with salvation. 9) We must stop saying that the Gurob Papyrus is an eclectic Eleusinian, Orphic, and Dionysian document.146 It reflects an Orphic ritual, without quotation marks, and without adulteration. The Orphic cults are Dionysian and the Orphic Mysteries have common elements with the Eleusinian ones, since they have parallel rituals, with similar purposes, the main difference being that the latter are official and structured and the former are more free and dispersed in space. 10) The text can be a very enlightening example of the Orphic traditio (παράδωσις), i.e. how the sacred stories were transmitted to the mystai in the celebration of the mysteries. In this text, the story from beginning to end is not told, but alluded to symbolically by reference to the gods and the objects that the Titans used to coaxed Dionysos. In any case, there is no complete narrative of the myth. As a matter of fact, a story that includes cosmogonies, theogonies, religious stories like the death of the Titans and the origin and destiny of the soul is unknown as such until the Rhapsodies, which were compiled quite possibly between the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 1st cent. BC.147

3 Orphics and Greek magical papyri The connection of Orphism with the magical papyri is established in two ways: one is a Greek magical papyrus148 where we read: γράφε τὸν λόγον τὸν Ὀρφαικόν· “ασκει καὶ τάσκει” write the Orphic saying “askei kai taskei,” where obviously the three words stand here for the whole formula,149 because it is well-known. Indeed, it is the so-called Ephesia Grammata, that we cannot discuss here in detail.150 It suffices to mention the oldest occurrence, from the 4th cent. BC:151

146 Burkert (1987) 70–71. 147 As West (1983) wants, cf. Baumgarten (1998) 113 ff. 148 PMag. VII 450 (= OF 830 [I]). Cf. Edmonds (2013). 149 McCown (1923) 132. 150 Cf. Bernabé (2013). 151 Anaxil. Com. fr. 18.6–7 PCG.

38 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

ἐν σκυταρίοις ῥαπτοῖσι φορῶν   Ἐφεσήια γράμματα καλά. Carrying about, on little bits of stitched leather, lovely Ephesian letters.152 The Ephesia Grammata most probably did not have anything to do with Ephesos. This is indicated in a testimony in the Etymologicum Magnum:153 ἢ ἀπὸ ἐφεσίων τινῶν οὐσῶν ἐπαοιδῶν δυσπαρακολουθήτων, ὡς προείρηται· ὅθεν καὶ ἐφέσια λέγονται. Or it is because they are liberating incantations, hard to understand, as it has been said, the reason why they are called “liberating.” Wünsch154 explains ἐφέσια as a derivative of ἐφίημι, with the meaning of “to loosen”; so it would be better to write ἐφέσια without a capital letter. The complete formula was offered, with variants, by Clement of Alexandria155 and Hesychius156 and we present it here following the reconstruction proposed by Bernabé:157 ἄσκι, κατάσκι, αἴξ, τετράξ, Δαμναμενεύς, ἀᾱσία. In this same work, Bernabé tried to determine the origins of the formula, that can be clearly traced to a series of documents considerably old, most of them written in lead, and that combines all or a great part of the words that composed those Ephesia Grammata. Moreover, fragments were edited in the Orphicorum fragmenta.158 We are not surprised at the relation of magic with Orphism.159 In the Derveni Papyrus we can see how the Magi recite a spell to liberate the daimones that become an hindrance when they are performing a ritual160 and Plutarch warns

152 Transl. by Ch. B. Gulick. 153 Etym. Magn. 402.28. 154 Wünsch (1900) 84–85. 155 Clem. Al. Strom. 5.8.45.2 156 Hesych. s.v. Ἐφέσια γράμματα. 157 Bernabé (2013). 158 OF 830. 159 Cf. Martín-Hernández (2010). 160 PDerv., col. VI.2.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 39

that the magi ordered their possessed to recite and enunciate to themselves the Ephesia Grammata.161 There are other elements that agree to relate the Ephesia Grammata, the epodai and Orphism.162 The lead inscriptions come from the geographical zones where more gold tablets have been found, i.e. Crete and the South of Italy. Furthermore, there are a great coincidence of symbols between the former and the gold tablets. We will simply cite two examples: a) A goat that must be taken out of the garden (of Persephone) at milking time, which has an interesting parallel in the texts of the already mentioned tablets in which the initiate is assimilated with a goat that has fallen in milk and in the importance of milk and breastfeeding in Dionysian rituals.163 b) Damnameneus is one of the Dactyls of Ida, who are usually considered to be the authors of the Ephesia Grammata.164 We can see the Dactyls of Ida in relation to Orpheus and with the rituals supposedly founded by him in several literary passages.165 In these texts it can be seen that the Dactyls knew of ἐπῳδαί, and this is precisely what these texts that we mentioned are. In a study published by Bernabé and Martín-Hernández166 more points of contact are highlighted between the Getty Hexameters and the tablets, from which it can be inferred that there were close relations between the world of the Orphic Mysteries and that of these apotropaic texts. It could be said that the same or similar professionals, in close scenes (the south of Italy and Crete), offered from Classical times types of texts that were attributed to Orpheus, due to the prestige of this Thracian bard, and which were similar, but not the same, because they have different purposes: the tablets, eschatological, and the lead inscriptions, protection against the evils of this world.

161 Plut. Quaest. conv. 706e1–2: ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ μάγοι τοὺς δαιμονιζομένους κελεύουσι τὰ Ἐφέσια γράμματα πρὸς αὑτοὺς καταλέγειν καὶ ὀνομάζειν, (...), “for just as sorcerers advise those possessed by demons to recite and name over to themselves the Ephesian letters, (…)” (transl. by E. L. Minar Jr.). 162 Bernabé (2013); Bernabé/Martín-Hernández (2013). 163 See Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) 76–83. 164 Clem. Al. Strom. 5.8.73.1. 165 See AO 25, Diod. Sic. 4.43.1 (= Dionys. Scyt. fr. 18 Rusten), 4.48.6 (= Dionys. Scyt. fr. 18 Rusten) and 5.64.4 (= Ephor. FGrHist 70 F 104); cf. Bernabé (2000) 47–48. For the Dactyls connected to the cult of the Mother Goddess, cf. Strab. 10.3.22. Cf. also OF 519–523. 166 Bernabé/Martín-Hernández (2013).

40 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

References Alonso Fernández (2013): Zoa Alonso Fernández, “Maenadic Ecstasy in Rome: Fact or Fiction?”, in: Bernabé et al., 185–199. Baumgarten (1998): Roland Baumgarten, Heiliges Wort und Heilige Schrift bei den Griechen, Hieroi Logoi und verwandte Erscheinungen, Tübingen. Bernabé (1996): Alberto Bernabé, “La fórmula órfica ‘cerrad las puertas, profanos’. Del profano religioso al profano en la materia”, in: ’Ilu, Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones 1, 13–37. Bernabé (1999): Alberto Bernabé, “Una cita de Píndaro en Platón, Men. 81b (Fr. 133 Sn.-M.)”, in: Juan A. López Férez (ed.), Desde los poemas homéricos hasta la prosa griega del siglo IV d.C.: Veintiséis estudios filológicos, Madrid, 239–259. Bernabé (2000): Alberto Bernabé, “Tradiciones órficas en Diodoro”, in: Minerva Alganza Roldán, José M. Camacho Rojo, Pedro P. Fuentes González and Miguel Villena Ponsoda (eds.), Ἐπιείκεια: Studia Graeca in memoriam Jesús Lens Tuero, Granada, 37–53. Bernabé (2002): Alberto Bernabé, “La toile de Penélope. A-t-il existé un mythe orphique sur Dionysos et les Titans?”, in: RHR 219, 401–433. Bernabé (2008a): Alberto Bernabé, “Características de los textos órficos”, in: Bernabé/ Casadesús, 241–246. Bernabé (2008b): Alberto Bernabé, “Las láminas de Olbia”, in: Bernabé/Casadesús, 537–546. Bernabé (2010): Alberto Bernabé, “The Gods in Later Orphism”, in: Jan N. Bremmer and Andrew Erskine (eds.), The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations, Edinburgh, 422–441. Bernabé (2011): Alberto Bernabé, Platón y el orfismo: Diálogos entre religión y filosofía, Madrid. Bernabé (2013): Alberto Bernabé, “The Ephesia Grammata: Genesis of a Magical Formula”, in: Faraone/Obbink, 71–96. Bernabé (2016): Alberto Bernabé, “Two Orphic Images in Euripides: Hippolytus 948–957 and Cretans 472 Kannicht”, in: Jacqueline Assaël and Andreas Markantonatos (eds.), Orphism and Greek Tragedy, Berlin, 183–204. Bernabé/Casadesús (2008): Alberto Bernabé and Francesc Casadesús (eds.), Orfeo y la tradición órfica: un reencuentro, Madrid. Bernabé et al. (2013): Alberto Bernabé, Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal and Raquel Martín-Hernández (eds.), Redefining Dionysos, Berlin. Bernabé/Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008): Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, Instructions for the Netherworld: The Orphic Gold Tablets, Leiden/Boston. Bernabé/Martín-Hernández (2013): Alberto Bernabé and Raquel Martín-Hernández, “Orphica et magica. Rasgos órficos en las ἐπωιδαί suritálicas: consideraciones sobre los Hexámetros Getty”, in: Emilio Suárez de la Torre and Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, Mito y magia en Grecia y Roma, Barcelona, 117–148. Bremmer (1984): Jan N. Bremmer, “Greek Maenadism Reconsidered”, in: ZPE 55, 267–286. Burkert (1975): Walter Burkert, “Le laminette auree: Da Orfeo a Lampone”, in: Orfismo in Magna Grecia, Naples, 81–104. Burkert (1987): Walter Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults, Cambridge (MA)/London. Burkert (1998): Walter Burkert, Sauvages origines: Mythes et rites sacrificiels en Grèce ancienne, Paris. Cardin/Ozbek (2011): Marta Cardin and Leila Ozbek, “Orfeo e Dioniso: nuove indagini su un frammento mitografico trascurato (PSI VII 850)”, in: Studi e testi per il corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini: Papiri Filosofici: Miscellanea di Studi VI, Florence, 137–162.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 41

Casabona (1966): Jean Casabona, Recherches sur le vocabulaire des sacrifices en grec: des origines à la fin de l’époque classique, Aix-en-Provence. Casadio (1990): Giovanni Casadio, “I Cretesi di Euripide e l’ascesi orfica”, in: Didattica del Classico 2, 278–310. Casadio (1999): Giovanni Casadio, Il vino dell’anima: Storia del culto di Dioniso a Corinto, Sicione, Trezene, Rome. Colli (1977): Giorgio Colli, La sapienza greca, vol. 1, Milan (3rd ed. 1981). Dieterich (1891): Albrecht Dieterich, De Hymnis Orphicis, capitula quinque, Marburg [= Id., Kleine Schriften, Leipzig/Berlin 1911, 69–110]. Dieterich (1925): Albrecht Dieterich, Mutter Erde, Stuttgart (1st. ed. 1904). Edmonds (2013): Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, “The Ephesia Grammata: Logos Orphaïkos or Apolline Alexima Pharmaka?”, in: Faraone/Obbink, 97–106. Faraone (1997): Christopher Faraone, “Salvation and Female Heroics in the Parodos of Aristophanes’ Lysistrata”, in: JHS 117, 38–59. Faraone/Obbink (2013): Christopher Faraone and Dirk Obbink (eds.), The Getty Hexameters: Poetry, Magic, and Mystery in Ancient Selinous, Oxford. Ferrari (2011): Franco Ferrari, “La donna di Pelinna e i simposi oltremondani”, in: Prometheus, 37, 97–106. Festugière (1932): André-Jean Festugière, L’ideal religieux des Grecs et l’Evangile, Paris. Festugière (1935): André-Jean Festugière, “Les mystères de Dionysos”, in: RBi 44, 191–211; 366–396 [= Id., Études de religion grecque et hellénistique, Paris 1972, 13–63]. Fridh-Haneson (1987): Britt M. Fridh-Haneson, “Votive terracottas from Italy: Types and Problems”, in: Tullia Linders and Gullög Nordquist (eds.), Gifts to the Gods, Stockholm, 67–75. García López (1993): José García López, Aristófanes: Las Ranas, Murcia. González Merino (2009): Juan Ignacio González Merino, Dioniso: El dios del vino y la locura, Córdoba. González Merino (2010): Juan Ignacio González Merino, “᾽Ωμοφαγία, ¿término órfico?”, in: Alberto Bernabé, Francesc Casadesús and Marco A. Santamaría (eds.), Orfeo y el orfismo: Nuevas perspectivas, Biblioteca Virtual Cervantes, 333–344 (online: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/orfeo-y-el-orfismo-nuevas-perspectivas--0/). Graf/Johnston (2013): Fritz Graf and Sarah I. Johnston, Ritual Texts for the Afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic Gold Tablets, London (1st ed. 2007). Hardie (2004): Alex Hardie, “Muses and Mysteries”, in: Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, Music and the Muses: The Culture of Mousike in the Classical Athenian City, Oxford. Harrison (1903): Jane Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, Cambridge (3rd ed. New York 1959). Henrichs (1969): Albert Henrichs, “Die Mänaden von Milet”, in: ZPE 4, 223–241. Henrichs (1972): Albert Henrichs, Die Phoinikika des Lollianos, Bonn. Henrichs (1978): Albert Henrichs, “Greek Maenadism from Olympias to Messalina”, in: HSCPh 82, 121–160. Henrichs (2003): Albert Henrichs, “Hieroi logoi and hierai bibloi: The (Un)written Margins of the Sacred in Ancient Greece”, in: HSCPh 101, 207–266. Herrero (2007): Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, “Las fuentes de Clem. Alex. Protr. 2.12–22: Un tratado sobre los misterios y una teogonía órfica”, in: Emerita 75, 19–50. Herrero (2010): Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, Orphism and Christianity in Late Antiquity, Berlin. Hordern (2000): James Hordern, “Notes on the Orphic Papyrus from Gurôb (P. Gurôb 1: Pack 2464)”, in: ZPE 129, 131–140.

42 

 Alberto Bernabé and Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal

Jiménez San Cristóbal (2002a): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “Consideraciones sobre las τελεταί órficas”, in: José F. González Castro and José L. Vidal (eds.), Actas del X Congreso Español de Estudios Clásicos III, Madrid, 127–133. Jiménez San Cristóbal (2002b): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “Los libros del ritual órfico”, in: Estudios Clásicos 44, 109–123. Jiménez San Cristóbal (2005): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, Rituales órficos, Doct. Diss. Madrid (online: http://eprints.ucm.es/tesis/fll/ucm-t25949.pdf). Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “El ritual y los ritos órficos”, in: Bernabé/Casadesús, 731–770. Jiménez San Cristóbal (2009): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “¿Hubo ritos de paso cruentos en el orfismo?”, in: Synthesis 16, 83–97. Jiménez San Cristóbal (2015a): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “El PSI 850 (OF 310): Nuevas propuestas de lectura”, in: Jesús de la Villa Polo et al. (eds.), Ianua Classicorum. Temas y formas del Mundo Clásico III, Madrid, 53–62. Jiménez San Cristóbal (2015b): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “The Rape of Persephone in a Berlin Papyrus”, in: LEC 83, 237–260. Jiménez San Cristóbal (2017): Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “La escatología del Papiro de Bolonia (P. Bon 1.4 [P. Bon. inv. 24])”, in: María J. Albarrán Martínez, Raquel MartínHernández and Irene Pajón Leyra (eds.), Estudios papirológicos: Textos literarios y documentales del siglo IV a.C. al siglo IV d.C., Madrid, 21–53. Kern (1922): Otto Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta, Berlin (2nd ed. 1963; repr. Dublin/Zürich 1972). Levaniouk (2007): Olga Levaniouk, “The Toys of Dionysos”, in: HSCPh 103, 165–202. Linforth (1941): Ivan M. Linforth, The Arts of Orpheus, Berkeley/Los Angeles (repr. New York 1973). Martín-Hernández (2010): Raquel Martín-Hernández, Orfeo y los magos: La literatura órfica, la magia y los misterios, Madrid. McCown (1923): Chester C. McCown, “The Ephesia Grammata in Popular Belief”, in: TAPhA 54, 128–140. Méndez Dosuna (2009): Julián Méndez Dosuna, “¿Un nuevo testimonio de αἶζα ‘cabra’ en una lámina órfica?”, in: Ángel Martínez Fernández (ed.), Estudios de Epigrafía Griega, La Laguna, 369–375. Morand (2001): Anne-France Morand, Études sur les Hymnes orphiques, Leiden/Boston/ Cologne. Müri (1976): Walter Müri, “Σύμβολον: Wort- und sachgeschichtliche Studie”, in: Id., Griechische Studien: Ausgewählte Wort- und sachgeschichtliche Forschungen zur Antike, ed. by Eduard Vischer, Basel, 1–44. Porres Caballero (2013a): Silvia Porres Caballero, “Maenadic Ecstasy in Greece: Fact or Fiction?”, in: Bernabé et al., 159–184. Porres Caballero (2013b): Silvia Porres Caballero, Dioniso en la poesía lírica griega, Diss. Madrid (online: http://eprints.ucm.es/24575/1/T35156.pdf). Ricciardelli (2000): Gabriella Ricciardelli, Inni orfici, Milan. Riedweg (1998): Christoph Riedweg, “Initiation–Tod–Unterwelt: Beobachtungen zur Komunikationssituation und narrativen Technik der orphischbakchischen Goldblättchen”, in: Fritz Graf (ed.), Ansichten griechischer Rituale, Stuttgart/Leipzig, 359–398. Santamaría (2005): Marco A. Santamaría, “Ποινὰς τίνειν: Culpa y expiación en el orfismo”, in: Antonio A. Ezquerra and José F. González Castro (eds.), Actas del XI Congreso Español de Estudios Clásicos, 3 vols., Madrid, I, 397–405.

1 Two Aspects of the Orphic Papyrological Tradition 

 43

Schuddeboom (2009): Feyo L. Schuddeboom, Greek Religious Terminology – Telete & Orgia, Leiden/Boston. Sfameni Gasparro (1988): Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, “Ancora sul temine τελετή: osservazioni storico-religiose”, in: Sandro Boldrini (ed.), Filologia e forme letterarie: Studi offerti a Francesco Della Corte, 5 vols., Urbino, V, 137–152. Smyly (1921): Gilbert J. Smyly, Greek Papyri from Gurob, Dublin. Sokolowski (1955): Franciszek Sokolowski, Lois sacrées de l’Asie Mineure, Paris. Thimme (1985): Jürgen Thimme, “Die religiöse Bedeutung der Kykladenidole”, in: Antike Kunst 8, 72–86. Tierney (1922): Michael Tierney, “The Origins of Orphism”, in: IThQ 17, 112–127. Tortorelli Ghidini (2000): Marisa Tortorelli Ghidini, “I giocattoli di Dioniso tra mito e rituale”, in: Marisa Tortorelli Ghidini, Alfredina Storchi Marino and Amedeo Visconti (eds.), Tra Orfeo e Pitagora: Origini e incontri di culture nell’antichità, Naples, 43–80. Tortorelli Ghidini (2006): Marisa Tortorelli Ghidini, Figli della terra e del cielo stellato, Naples. Van Gennep (1909): Arnold van Gennep, Les rites de passage, Paris (repr. New York 1969). Versnel (1990): Hendrik S. Versnel, Ter Unus. Isis, Dionysos, Hermes: Three Studies in Henotheism, Leiden. West (1982): Martin L. West, “The Orphics of Olbia”, in: ZPE 45, 17–29. West (1983): Martin L. West, The Orphic Poems, Oxford. West (1993): Martin L. West, I poemi orfici, transl. by Marisa Tortorelli Ghidini, Naples. Wilamowitz (1931–1932): Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Der Glaube der Hellenen, 2 vols., Berlin (3rd ed. Darmstadt 1959). Wilcken (1924): Ulrich Wilcken, “Referate”, in: APF 7, 71–72. Wünsch (1900): Richard Wünsch, “Neue Fluchtafeln”, in: RhM 55, 73–85. Zuntz (1971): Günther Zuntz, Persephone: Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia, Oxford.

David N. Sedley

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 1 Introduction In the twenty columns running from col. VII to the end (col. XXVI) the text partially preserved by the Derveni Papyrus takes the form of a running commentary, lemma by lemma, on a theogonic poem attributed to Orpheus. The first six columns, by contrast, along with any small fragments that may precede them in the sequence, have always been regarded as different in genre: not part of the commentary as such, but a critical interpretation of various religious practices and beliefs. As far as I am aware, no attempt has yet been made to call into question this seemingly unparalleled division of the text.1 In the later tradition, it is normal for a commentary to start with a prologue, but the material surviving from PDerv., cols. I–VI does not seem to be prefatory to the main content of the ensuing commentary.2 At least, any such view of its role would need to be proposed and 1 Cf. Laks/Most (1997) introduction, 5, for the observation that the relationship between the two parts of the papyrus is among the questions that have insufficiently engaged scholars. Two decades later, that remains broadly true. 2 As noted by e.g. Frede (2007) 14. Note: Warm thanks (although none of those named should be assumed to agree with my contentions) to Valeria Piano and Gábor Betegh for a constant and unfailingly rewarding interchange of ideas; to Glenn Most for a searching critique of the penultimate draft; to André Laks, Radcliffe Edmonds and Richard Janko for invaluable discussions of various issues raised by the paper; to Valeria Piano also for her meticulous and generous advice on the viability of various restorations (reflecting her seminal work in Piano [2011]); to members of the audience at the September 2016 Trier conference for their questions and criticisms; and to Richard Janko for patiently filling in details of his newly emerging revised transcription, drawing on innovative photographic data, for which see now Janko (2016) and Kotwick (2017). I have chosen to use Janko’s transcription, the most recent full-scale revision of the text, as my own starting point, while acutely aware that like all previous reconstructions it remains provisional (as Janko [2016], himself underlines), and must await the evaluation of scholars who unlike me have the full range of technical skills required. Where I present re-edited texts, my app. crit. records the authorship only of the restorations I adopt, since I cannot pronounce on which of the many other readings are still palaeographically likely or even possible. Very extensive information on past conjectures can be found in the app. crit. of Janko (2002), and in that of Piano (2016) 63–82. David N. Sedley, University of Cambridge https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-003

46 

 David N. Sedley

defended, and no one seems to have attempted that yet. Nor could the religious disquisition plausibly be explained as the end of a separate work, merely sharing a papyrus roll with the commentary, since the transition from it to the commentary would have to be located, with scant plausibility, within a single column (the lower half of col. VI). My aim here is to construct a case for a simpler solution which has not yet been considered, let alone tested, that of assigning the whole of cols. I–VI to the commentary proper.3 Towards that end, I shall seek to identify the first lemmas cited from the Orphic poem, linking each to the corresponding portion of commentary.

2 Cols. I–VI as part of the commentary Two specific features seem to me to add impetus to the idea that the commentary is already under way in I–VI. First, the Furies – as for convenience I shall call the deities referred to here as the Eumenides and as the Erinyes, whether these are taken to be closely related or altogether identical – are repeatedly named in these opening columns: at the very least III.5, IV.9, and VI.9 (bis).4 Their function in these sentences, and in others where they seem implicitly present, is not always recoverable, but it is certainly diverse: thus in col. IV they are presented as Heraclitus’ way (in all probability

3 I shall speak for convenience of cols. I–VI, without excluding the likelihood that the commentary on the opening lemma started one or more columns earlier. Janko (2016) 10–11 has in fact identified what looks like an underlined omicron in the left margin of col. VI, just below l. 6, as a stichometric number marking line 1500 of the full text. If he is right, there was a good deal of other material before what the editors call col. I. The hypothesis of my paper, which identifies the badly burnt and barely surviving outer fragments of the roll with the start of the commentary, favours the hitherto universal assumption that these fragments were located at or very near the roll’s beginning. But if Janko’s proposal were to gain acceptance, there would be no insuperable problem about filling the extra space with appropriate material: not just an authorial sphragis, but a prologue, quite possibly including a full exposition of the author’s own cosmogonic theory (since in the preserved commentary this is presupposed rather than expounded); perhaps an introduction to the Orphic poem; even a transcript of it. The first step, though, is for Janko’s proposal to be considered and critically discussed from a papyrological point of view. 4 Valeria Piano warns me that the apparent references to Furies in cols. I.6 and II.3 are textually doubtful (the first of these warnings being now confirmed by Janko [2016] 15 and Kotwick [2017]), but that on the other hand there are further references waiting to be inserted, in the detached fragments G6.2 and G9a.2. Even if none of those currently confirmed proves to be in the small scraps surviving from cols. I–II, their prominence within what is agreed to be a continuous religious context must be significant.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 47

endorsed  by  the  commentator himself) of representing a cosmic principle concerned with the restoration of balance; whereas in VI.4–5 they are treated as giving meaning to a sacrificial practice which is explained as itself being a kind of penal restitution. It should be a credible hypothesis, therefore, that this long discussion was preceded by a lemma from the Orphic poem in which the Furies were mentioned or invoked by name, and that our commentator is drawing out the lemma’s multiple implications, both cosmological and religious. Here we might compare col. XX, which is certainly part of the theogonic commentary, but which in its preserved lines is focused on criticizing current understandings of religious ritual.5 We should therefore not be surprised to find a comparable theme included in cols. I–VI even if they too are taken to be part of the commentary. Much meticulous scholarship has been devoted to teasing out the rich religious content of cols. I–VI, and I know of no reason why any of those findings should be endangered if it were to turn out that the formal context is commentatorial rather than straighforwardly discursive. Indeed, some of the problems should be eased, since the passage would no longer have to be assumed to have had a progressive internal structure; instead, the juxtaposition of various topics would primarily reflect the fact that they were issues independently raised by the poem’s opening lemma. The second reason for hypothesizing that the commentary is already under way in these opening columns lies in a phrase in col. IV. It has proved particularly resistant to interpretation under the prevailing assumptions,6 but to my eye looks very much like an exegetical comment on a lemma. I read it as follows7: με]τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ[ρ] | οὐκ εἴ[α λα]μμάνειν̣ (3–4), “For he did not make it possible to take it (sc. some word or phrase) with ‘chance’.” The implied subject is, I assume, Orpheus, as regularly in the ensuing commentary, and the commentator is ruling out a certain construal of the lemma’s wording, in favour of a different one. We may compare VIII.4–12, where again two alternative grammatical construals of a lemma are distinguished, and the commentator’s preference indicated. I shall say more about this proposed reading in §§ 6–7, but for now I list it as prima facie support for identifying at the very least col. IV itself, but more probably the whole of cols. I–VI, as commentary on a lemma. A natural objection is that, by the Derveni author’s usual standards, six or more columns is surprisingly long for commentary on a single lemma, given that 5 On the problem that this poses for the accepted division of the PDerv. text, cf. Laks (1997) 124–127. 6 These difficulties are well illustrated by the attempts to translate and explain the lines in KPT, 130 and 153–154, on the assumption that the content is religious. 7 So far as the text itself is concerned, the completion με]τὰ has already been proposed by Parássoglou, and the rest is due to Tsantsanoglou, independently confirmed by Valeria Piano (pers. comm.). The only novelty I offer lies in my proposed interpretation of the words.

48 

 David N. Sedley

in the remainder of the papyrus lemmas occur at an average of at least one per column, probably two.8 However, the lemma I am postulating has every chance of being the poem’s opening, and it is an easily confirmed fact about ancient commentaries, like some modern commentaries, that the opening line or lines of the work often receive a uniquely thorough exegesis, verging on saturation.9 Such an imbalance could be intentional, to signal the special importance of the work’s opening, or may reflect initial ambitions of exhaustive coverage on the part of the commentator, ambitions which later lose momentum. In the present case I think the former explanation carries more weight. The author clearly has a substantial religious agenda to deliver, seemingly including his demonology and eschatology. Since in line with a well-established Hesiodic tradition he took the ensuing theogonic narrative to amount to a cosmogony, he may have preferred so far as possible to tie his cultic and religious material to a lemma preceding that narrative. An opening invocation of the Furies, it seems, provided him with just the right opportunity, especially given the role that the restitution of imbalances which they represent was to play in the cosmogony proper. A prominent issue which further prolongs the commentary in this early part of the text is the author’s methodology for exegesis of the Orphic text. It was usually in the prologue to an ancient commentary, much as in the introduction to a modern one, that general exegetical issues were addressed. Whether or not the Derveni commentary originally included such a prologue, it seems that while commenting on the first lemmas the author took every opportunity to support his exegetical methodology by pointing to textual evidence for Orpheus’ apparent endorsement of it. Thus in col. I, as I shall propose reconstructing it below, Orpheus’ decision not to start out in the manner typical of a treatise on nature, with postulates about the cosmic elements, is explained and justified (see § 3). And in col. IV, again on the reading that I will be offering, he cites the combined textual support of Orpheus and Heraclitus for a principle of universalizability: when Orpheus appears to speak of a particular case, we should look for the universal cosmic truth that it embodies (see §§ 6–7). With so much to be packed into the commentary on the opening lemma, it becomes less surprising that it should have run to six or more columns. However, for anyone who retains doubts about this, at the end of the next section I shall sketch in passing the alternative possibility that what I am calling the first lemma was in fact divided into two.

8 I rely on the figures of Betegh (2004) 96–97. 9 E.g. in Procl. In Alc. I, the number of Budé pages taken up by the commentary on each of the first eight lemmas is: (1) 28, (2) 5, (3) 5.5, (4) 21.5. (5) 8, (6) 5, (7) 4.5, (7) 7.5, (8) 4.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 49

3 The opening lemma If, as suggested above, the phraseology of col. IV reveals it to be part of the commentary on an opening lemma, what did that lemma say? The majority of the lemmas identified in the Derveni author’s commentary have at least approximate parallels elsewhere in Greek poetry, but it is not clear that this lemma, or at least the part of it under discussion in col. IV, does. That apparent lack makes our task harder, but not impossible. As well as referring to the Furies (see § 2 above) the lemma will, if I have understood IV.3–4 correctly (see further, commentary ad loc., § 7 below), have included the word τύχης (or Τύχης, if referring to a goddess of that name, cf. Hes. Theog. 360), closely enough preceded by a word that might have been mistakenly construed with it for the commentator to warn us against the error, and therefore almost certainly adjacent: I suggest τὰ τύχης. Of these, τά was probably understood by the commentator himself as nominative, because in l. 4 as I shall reconstruct it he takes this word to stand proxy in the poet’s mind for another nominative, κόσμος. The context will have been such that τά served as a relative or demonstrative pronoun, the two being functionally more or less equivalent in epic verse. One may therefore conjecture the content of the opening lemma to have been very approximately the following: κλῦτέ μου Εὐμενίδες, λώβης τε κακῶν τε βροτείων τιμωροὶ πάντων, τὰ τύχης ἔκτος δι᾽ ἀνάγκης προσδέχεται ποινήν. Hear me Eumenides, avengers of all the outrage and wrongdoings of mortals, which, not left to chance, await requital through necessity. There are, in the later Greek tradition, Orphic hymns addressed both to the Erinyes (Hymn 69) and to the Eumenides (Hymn 70, from which I have in fact borrowed the opening formula κλῦτέ μου Εὐμενίδες), even if these two sets of deities can, with some caution,10 be treated as interchangeable in the classical period. We cannot safely rule out the conjecture that our Orphic poem likewise started with an invocation of the Furies. Since the Furies seem to have no role in the ensuing theogonic narrative, they would presumably not be mentioned at the outset merely as all or even part of the poem’s theme (in the manner of the Homeric Hymns), a theme which in any case, as we shall shortly see, was to be announced only at a later point, in lemmas (3)–(4). So if the Furies were named 10 See Henrichs (1994). For the widespread cults of the Furies in the archaic and classical periods, cf. Brown (1984).

50 

 David N. Sedley

at the outset, but not for thematic reasons, the obvious alternative is that they were, for whatever reason, being invoked there. True, in the most obvious surviving forerunners – Homer, Hesiod, the Homeric hymns – the Furies have no known prehistory as poetic addressees. But we know too little about the genre to which this Orphic poem belonged, and would do well to treat the Derveni Papyrus itself as a better guide to its conventions than any known poetic antecedent can be. There is a reason why an opening address to the Furies has not yet even been entertained as a possibility. It has, quite understandably, been assumed that the Derveni Papyrus itself contains evidence for the poem’s having had a different opening. We know for sure that the poem deployed the well-known warning to the uninitiated that they should “put doors on their ears,” as it is paraphrased in col. VII. It has been universally and rightly agreed that this refers to the wellknown hexameter line φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας δ᾽ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι, to which I shall return in the next section. And that line has widely been assumed to have been the poem’s opening one. But suppose for now that, rather than starting the entire poem, this line itself was preceded by an invocation of the Furies. It then becomes possible that the opening sequence was: (1) invocation of the Furies, unfailing punishers of human wrongdoing; (2) an instruction that the uninitiated should now close their ears, it not being themis for them to hear what follows; (3–4) the poem’s topic; (5) start of the theogonic narrative. This conjectural structure is arrived at by continuing the above exempli gratia reconstruction of the poem’s opening, with the help of textual evidence that we will encounter in cols. VI–VII (see §§ 4–5), to which finally is added lemma (5), cited at VIII.2. (1) κλῦτέ μου Εὐμενίδες, λώβης τε κακῶν τε βροτείων] τιμωροὶ πάντων, τὰ] τύχης [ἔκτος δι’ ἀνάγκης προσδέχεται ποινήν. ] (2) φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας [δ’] ἐπίθεσθ[ε βέβηλοι,] (3) ὄφρα φῶ ἀμφὶ θεοὺς πρώ]τ[ους] ἔργ’ ο[ὐ]κ · ἀτ[έλεστα (4) οἳ Διὸς ἐξεγένοντο [περιφραδ]έος βασιλῆ. ος. (5) Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ π. α. τρὸς ἑοῦ πάρα κτλ. (1) Hear me Eumenides, avengers of all the outrage and wrongdoings of mortals, which, not left to chance, await requital through necessity (…)

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 51

(2) I shall make utterance to those for whom it is lawful: put on doors, you profane, (3) so that I may tell of accomplished deeds11 concerning the first gods (4) who sprang from Zeus the resourceful king. (5) Zeus, when from his father etc. Τhe transition from proem to narrative occurs at (4)–(5), formally marked by the asyndeton in (5).12 But why should such a poem start with (1) the address to the Furies, and only then proceed to (2) the warning to the uninitiated? An attractive conjecture is that the appeal to these avenging deities was intended to reinforce the ensuing warning. The comparatively unfamiliar idea that not only retribution for injustice but also the punishment of impiety is the province of the Furies,13 who act through unerring necessity, not chance, has an encouraging parallel in the late Hellenistic Orphic Hymn 70.4–5, addressed to the Eumenides: αἳ πάντων καθορᾶτε βίον θνητῶν ἀσεβούντων, τῶν ἀδίκων τιμωροί, ἐφεστηκυῖαι ἀνάγκῃ. (...) you who oversee the life of all mortals who act impiously, punishers of the unjust, set over necessity. Could this even be a distant echo of our Orphic poem? Scholarly discussions of the injunction14 regularly take it to have been the Orphic poem’s first line, but the evidence seems to me insufficient to enforce that conclusiοn. True, both the verse’s potential initial asyndeton and its frequency of quotation in later authors put one in mind of an opening line. And it does occur as first line of one poem, namely the (probably late Hellenistic) Jewish Testament of Orpheus, and as the opening of a much later prose work, Porphyry’s On Statues 11 For the preserved letters in (3), see p. 58 below. 12 For the asyndeton that typically marks the transition between announcing a narrative and embarking on it, see e.g. Hes. Op. 109. 13 I owe the possibility of such a connection to conversation with Gábor Betegh. Cf. also the ps.-Heraclitean Letter 9.3, where, as Mansfeld (2015) 86–87 points out, Hesiod’s 30,000 φύλακες who watch over human morals (Op. 252–254) are re-identified as the (comparatively few) Erinyes – a functional equivalence explored also, and in great detail, by Piano (2016) e.g. 152–160 and 171–172. The relevance of this is increased by what we will see to be the Derveni author’s own Heraclitean leanings. 14 E.g. West (1983) 82–84. The content of the present paragraph has benefited a great deal from discussion and debate with Valeria Piano.

52 

 David N. Sedley

(fr. 351 Smith). On the other hand, the only evidence similar in date to our Orphic poem is Empedocles’ functionally equivalent formula (31 B 3.4 DK), where the Muse is asked to convey “those things that it is lawful for short-lived beings to hear” (ὧν  θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν). This likewise is obviously prefatory, and explicitly part of a divine invocation, but is not his opening. Even if the line about ‘doors’ may have typically served as an opening, as it surely did, we cannot assume that it always did so, if only because it might well have had to compete for first place with other prefatory lines. And in particular, it would hardly have been natural for it to precede a divine invocation. True, it contains no initial connective, and asyndeton is normal syntax for a poem’s opening line. But asyndeton can be used for other purposes too: for example to mark a change of address (cf. Hes. Op. 9), or to introduce a gnomic utterance (cf. ibid. 293), both of which apply to our line.15 In this section I have assumed, as the simplest working hypothesis, that despite its length nearly the whole content of cols. I–VI is from the author’s commentary on a single lemma. However, the suggested opening of the Orphic poem, κλῦτέ μου Εὐμενίδες, borrowed from the later Orphic hymn to the Eumenides mentioned above, offers us a further refinement of that assumption: that the very first lemma, addressed in cols. I–II (quite possibly along with one or more earlier columns), was nothing more than an opening imperatival formula, represented in my reconstruction by the conjecture κλῦτέ μου, with the commentator then turning to the Eumenides only with a second lemma, which if so occurred before col. III, where the persistent talk of the Furies has already started. With or without such a sub-division of the Orphic poem’s opening lines into two lemmas, it remains highly credible, and consistent with the exiguous remains of cols. I–II, that in these very early columns the author addressed the implications of Orpheus’ invocatory formula. If Richard Janko’s reconstitution and transcription of col. I16 were to gain acceptance on papyrological grounds, it would, I suggest, invite completion along the following lines:17 15 Further alternatives for the ‘doors’ line’s construal in the Orphic poem are that it was not asyndetic there but was preceded by a connective phrase, e.g. ὡς δ᾽ ἐπιεικὲς / φθέγξομαι κτλ.; and that the construction was appositive, e.g. “Heed this warning: I shall (…).” 16 See n. 4 above for elimination of col. I’s supposed references to the Furies, and Janko (2016) 17 for the exclusion of some other readings hitherto reported. But the text proposed below is based on the data of Kotwick (2017), who reproduces Janko’s new provisional text of col. I. This differs substantially from the readings of the same column proposed in Janko (2008) 43, on which cf. the balanced critical cautions of Piano (2011) 26–29. I do not yet know how far Janko’s methodology has differed in arriving at his current version. Note that this reconstituted column corresponds only in part to what Piano (2016) 67–69 and 90–91 numbers as col. 0. 17 Janko’s own partial reconstruction, as represented in Kotwick (2017), is as follows: ]ιδ[ φυσι]κοῖς, καὶ κα[]αραλ̣[]αι τὰ σημε[ῖα ₍₎]οιρ[₍₎]

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 53

Col. I ]ιδ[ φυσι]κοῖς, καὶ κα[ ] π̣αραλ̣[λάξετ]αι τὰ σημε[ιωτὰ τῆς μ]οίρα̣[ς̣. πῦρ γὰρ 5 οὐχὶ] δ̣απ̣ανᾶ̣[ι τὸν ἥλ]ιον. π̣ρ̣οέ[γνω οὖν ἓ]ν ἕκαστον μερ]ίδι νείμ[ας ]α̣ η[], [κ]αὶ οὐχ] ὑπέθηκε[ν ὥ]σ̣περ φυσικ[ός, ἔφη δὲ οἷ]α θ̣εὸν̣ κατ]ὰ τὰ σημαι[νό]μενα εὐχα̣[ῖς θεοκλυ]τῶν. τί δ]ὲ τῶν †καω̣[] ἀνημμέ[νων ὄντω]ν̣ τοι̣ο̣ύ̣τω[ν 10 ὁ κόσ]μος ἀπ̣[ὸ ἀρ]χῆς τ̣[ι]ν̣[ο]ς ἂ[ν] μέν[οι ἣ οὐκ ἄλ̣]λ̣ο ἢ̣̣ π̣ο̣[σὴ μοῖρά ἐστι π]υρός; ὕδατος δ’ ε̣[ἶ]ναι δή[λησιν ψε]υ̣[δῆ σημ]εῖα ὁμοίως ἐστ]ι̣ν, ἕκαστα σημεῖα̣ ἀνθρώ[πινα ὄντα περὶ τοὺς θε]ούς. καὶ τ̣ἄ̣λλ᾽ ὅσα̣ [φα]μ̣ὲ̣ν̣ ο̣υ̣[ 3 φυσι]κοῖς Janko || 4 σημε[ῖα Tsantsonoglou || 6 μερ]ίδι Janko || 7 ὥ]σ̣περ Janko || 8 σημαι[νό]μενα εὐχα̣[ῖς Janko || 10 ἀπ̣[ὸ Janko || 11 π]υρός Tsantsanoglou || σημ]εῖα Janko || cett. Sedley

(…) for natural philosophers (…) the signs received will differ from the component.18 For fire does not consume the sun. Therefore he (sc. Orpheus) had prior knowledge when he assigned each single thing to a sector [of the world], and did not hypothesize19 in the manner of a natural philosopher, but instead said the sorts of thing that one says when invoking a god in accordance with signs resulting from prayers. Why, given that things ignited (…)20 are of such a kind, would the world have its stability from some principle which is nothing but a certain quantity of fire? And of water’s being subject to destruction there are δ̣απ̣ανα̣[ ₍₎]ιονοε[₍₎]ν ἕκαστον [μερ]ίδι νειμ[α]α̣ η[₍₎]αι [] ὑπέθηκε[ν, ὥ]σπερ φυσικ[ός, χρᾶν τιν]α θ̣εὸν̣ [κατ]ὰ τὰ σημαι[νό]μενα εὐχα̣[ῖς. ὅταν δὲ] τῶν τελετῶν κάω̣[σιν] ἀνημμέ[να ἱερά, δι]ὰ̣ τοιο̣ύ̣τω[ν χρησ]μὸς ἀπ̣[ὸ εὐ]χῆς τ̣[₍₎]ν̣[]σα[]μεν[ ]λ̣οη̣π̣ο̣[ π]υρός· ὕδατος δ’ ε̣[ἶ]ναι δη[λοῖ τοια]ῦ̣[τα σημ]εῖα. [καὶ γὰρ ἔστ]ιν̣ ἕκαστα σημεῖα̣ ἀνθρώ[ποις₍₎]ους καὶ τ̣ἄ̣λλ’ ὅσα̣ []μ̣εν̣ο̣υ̣[ 18 If the conjectured μοῖρα (4, 11), ‘portion’ or ‘part,’ is correct, it would be a mark of Anaxagorean influence: cf. 59 B 11–12 DK. 19 For ὑποτίθεσθαι and ὑπόθεσις used of assuming an initial explanatory set of principles in a scientific inquiry, cf. Hippoc. VM 1: ὁκόσοι ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἰητρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν σφίσιν αὐτέοισιν ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ, θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ἄλλ’ ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν (…); Arist. Cael. 3.5.303b10–11: ἔνιοι γὰρ ἓν μόνον (sc. στοιχεῖον) ὑποτίθενται, καὶ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ὕδωρ, οἱ δ’ ἀέρα, οἱ δὲ πῦρ, κτλ. 20 In l. 9 the trace reported by Janko as ω̣ is just the left tip of a horizontal, at an unusual height which he says (pers. comm.) matches one or two cases of omega elsewhere in the Derveni Papyrus but no other letter. My obelus is not meant to imply the presence of an uncorrected error: it is conceivable that if we had more text to the right we would find a scribal correction, perhaps to καύσει, “by combustion.”

54 

 David N. Sedley

likewise false signs, all of them being human signs relating to the gods. And all the other things that we say [are indestructible] (…) If, as I suggest, the opening lemma was or included the poem’s initial divine invocation, such a restoration makes ready sense. The implicit question is why, on our commentator’s interpretation of the poem as a cosmogony, was it appropriate for Orpheus to start it by invoking divine authority? Because, the answer goes, revealed divine signs are superior to ambivalent human signs. For example, when fire or water is under consideration as a major cosmic component, its nature cannot be accurately learnt from phenomenal fire or phenomenal water, neither of which manifests the kind of permanence that a cosmic component must have. Thus fire in our direct experience burns itself out, but cosmic fire, such as that constituting the sun, does not. If Janko (2016) is right to find a citation from Parmenides’ proem in the fragments of the column preceding this one, it could indicate that the same theme was already present there too. The superiority of divine over human signs (cf. 28 B 1.28–32, B 8.2–4, 55–61, B 19 DK), justifies approaching a divine authority for an understanding of the nature of the universe, as Parmenides describes himself as doing in his own proem. Plato too, we should recall, considers prayer the proper prelude to a cosmogonic narrative (Ti. 27c1–d1).

4 The second lemma If the sequence (1)–(2) is accepted, it becomes a credible hypothesis that the second lemma, namely the well-known injunction to the profane to put on doors, was introduced in the lost lower part of col. VI, and my aim in the present section is to confirm that this is indeed so. The formulaic line constituting the lemma is: φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας δ᾽ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι.21 I shall make utterance to those for whom it is lawful: put on doors, you profane. The hypothesis that it was cited verbatim in the lower part of col. VI explains why when we get to the top of col. VII this lemma is evidently already under discussion: for example, VII.3 θεμ[ι]τ̣ά picks up θέμις from it. Starting at VII.4 the author explains a general principle of Orphic exegesis, namely that no expression is used with its 21 For the exact wording of this injunction, see esp. Tsantsanoglou (1997) 124–128, and the evidence collected in Bernabé’s OF II.1, 2–14.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 55

merely superficial meaning, but always with some riddling religious function. He then remarks that that general principle applies even to the line about ‘putting on doors’ (8–10) – ‘even’, no doubt, because this line uniquely is addressed to the profane, who of all auditors might seem to have the least chance of deciphering any religious subtext. Why they nevertheless can aspire to understand it will become clear when we encounter the commentator’s own idiosyncratic interpretation of the line. First I shall set out the readings and restorations of col. VII in the editio princeps of KPT,22 but for present purposes I shall supply their translation just for ll. 7–11: Col. VII  ₍₎]οσε̣[  ὕ]μνον̣ [ὑγ]ι̣ῆ καὶ θεμ[ι]τ̣ὰ λέγο[ντα; ἱερουργεῖ]τ̣ο γὰρ τῆ]ι ̣ ποήσει. [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τ[ε τὴν τῶν ὀ]νομάτων λύ]σίν καίτ[οι] ῥηθέντα. ἔστι δὲ ξ̣[ένη τις ἡ] πόησις 5 κ]α̣ὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι [̣ γμ]ατώδης. [κα]ὶ [Ὀρφεὺ]ς αὐτ[ὸ]ς ἐ]ρίστ᾽ αἰν[ίγμα]τα οὐ̣κ ἤ̣θελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ̣[ι]ν δὲ μεγ]άλα̣. ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ̣ται μὲν οὖγ καὶ ἀ̣[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου ἀεὶ] μέχρι οῦ̣ [τελε]υτ̣α̣ί̣ου ῥήματος, ὡ[ς δηλοῖ] καὶ ἐν τῶι εὐκ]ρινήτω[ι ἔπει· θ]ύ̣ρ̣ας γὰρ ἐπιθέ[σθαι κελ]εύσας τοῖ̣[ς] 10 ὠσὶ]ν αὐτ[οὺς οὔτι νομο]θ̣ε̣τ̣εῖμ φη[σιν τοῖς] πολλοῖς  τὴ]ν ἀκοὴν [ἁγνεύο]ντας κατ̣[ὰ] ]σ̣ειτ̣[] ]ωι τ[ . . ]ε γ̣.[ . . .] . . [  ἐν δ]ὲ τῶι ἐχ̣ομ[έ]ν̣ωι πα[ 15 ]τ̣ε̣ι ̣γ[]κ̣ατ̣[ (7–11) In fact he is speaking mystically, and from the very first word all the way to the last. As he also makes clear in the well-recognizable verse: for, having ordered them to “put doors to their ears”, he says that he is not legislating for the many, but [addressing himself to] those who are pure in hearing (…) I find two problems with the translated portion of the column.23 One of them concerns ll. 9–11. The earlier part of the column (echoed at XIII.5–6) has emphasized the deeply enigmatic nature of all Orpheus’ verse-writing; yet the decoding of ‘put on doors’ 22 Janko’s text in Kotwick (2017) improves upon ed. pr. palaeographically, and I shall take account of it in offering my own text below. 23 I am not here evaluating the overall reconstruction of the column by KPT. However, their construal of ῥηθέντα (4) as qualifying ὀ]νομάτων (3) in a πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον construction (172) strikes me as scarcely credible.

56 

 David N. Sedley

here, despite purportedly illustrating that very feature, turns out on the contrary to be one that any reader would have understood without help. I shall return to this later. The second problem concerns the meaning of [εὐκ]ρινήτω[ι in l. 9. It is translated by Tsantsanoglou (1997) as “easy to distinguish”; in the above translation as “well-recognizable”; and by other scholars as “well-chosen” or “easy to interpret.” Such renderings, and even the editorial accentuation of it as paroxytone, treat εὐκρίνητος as if it were the verbal adjective of κρίνω, with prefix εὐ- added, on the model of e.g. εὐμνημόνευτος, “easy to remember,” derived from εὖ + μνημονεύω. But that model would have resulted in the (well attested) form εὔκριτος, not in εὐκρίνητος. Rather, this otherwise unattested24 word, if the reading is correct, can only be the verbal adjective of the verb εὐκρινέω, “clarify,” cognate with the adjective εὐκρινής, “clear,” and should therefore have been accented εὐκρινητῶι, not εὐκρινήτωι. Tsantsanoglou ([1997] 124) himself recognized that the latter model was the appropriate one for its formation, namely from εὐκρινέω, but nevertheless accented, translated and interpreted it as if it were constructed on the former model, e.g. “easy to recognize.” Conceivably it was in response to this linguistic anomaly that Janko (2002) went so far as to emend the text, substituting the thinly attested but not inappropriate verbal adjective εὐθ]ρυλήτω[ι which he translated “well-known.” Perhaps, though, we can extract adequate sense from the verb εὐκρινέω, and avoid the resort to emendation. In pre-imperial Greek the verb unfortunately has at most one attestation, a textually dubious and unhelpful one in Xenophon.25 On the other hand, in writers of the imperial era εὐκρινεῖν commonly means “clarify,” “elucidate,”26 and is the verb used in the Progymnasmata of the 5th-cent. AD rhetorician Nicolaus when he says that it is the job of philosophers to

24 I am assuming that we should set aside an isolated and very dubious reading in the early imperial medical writer Aret. SD 2.1.6 (= 43.5 Hude; for details see Tsantsanoglou [1997] 123–124), where εὐκρίνητοι has been introduced by way of editorial emendation for the transmitted εὐκρινήοι. Even if the emendation were accepted, it would be a rare medical technical term, of no plausible relevance to the PDerv. passage. 25 Xen. Hell. 4.2.6: (…) ὅτι τοὺς στρατευομένους δεῖ εὐκρινεῖν. But the last word is printed by O. Keller quite plausibly as εὖ κρίνειν, which if accepted would eliminate even this isolated attestation. If alternatively it is a genuine occurrence of εὐκρινεῖν, whatever it might mean here in Xenophon it offers little help with the PDerv. passage. It is translated by C. L. Brownson (Loeb edition) “select with care,” while LSJ suggest “keep distinct,” “keep in good order,” all of these apparently being guesses. 26 “Lucidity,” expressed as εὐκρίνεια and τὸ εὐκρινές, becomes a major theme in the rhetorical handbooks, probably boosting the popularity of the cognate εὐκρινεῖν for “elucidate.” Cf. already Pl. Soph. 242c1–2, ῥᾳδίως δ’ ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες, which 244a4–b1 shows to refer to the attainment of interpretative clarity.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 57

“elucidate allegories,” εὐκρινεῖν τὰς ἀλληγορίας (7.7).27 This latter seems a highly appropriate sense of εὐκρινεῖν for us to expect in VII.9. The εὐκρινητὸν ἔπος thus understood would be “the verse to be elucidated,”28 presumably indicating the lemma currently selected for decipherment.29 Assuming the above accentuation and interpretation of [εὐκ]ρινητῶ[ι, I offer a suggested text and translation of the whole of col. VII, revised so as to address both of the problems I have listed, along with a paraphrase of what appears to be lost at the end of col. VI. At some key points I have taken into account the new readings of Janko (2016), who also reports an adjustment to the line numbers in col. VII, adopted below. Col. VI

τὸ δὲ ἐχόμενον·] “φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας δ᾽ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι.”]  ] Col. VII  τὰ πρ]ά̣γ ̣ [ματα. τῶι δὲ πρ]οσέ[θηκεν οἷς ἔπεσι χρᾶσθαι θέ]μις, ἄ̣[σσα λώβ]ην ὀκ[νο]ί̣η καὶ θεμ[ι]τ̣ὰ λέγο[ι. ἐκεκάθ]αρ̣το γὰρ τῆ]ι ποήσει. [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τ[ε ταῦτα δι᾽ ὀ]νομάτων 5 φη]σίν, καίτ[οι] ῥηθέντα. ἔστι δὲ μ̣[υστικὴ ἡ] πόησις κ]α̣ὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι̣[γμ]ατώδης, [κα]ὶ ̣[Ὀρ]φ̣[εὺ]ς̣ αὐτ[οῖς ἐ]ριστ᾽ αἰν̣[ίγμα]τα οὐ̣κ ἔθελε λέγ ̣ ειν· [ἐν αἰν]ίγμ̣ασ̣[ι]ν δὲ τὰ κ]αλά. ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ τ̣ αι μὲν οὖγ καὶ ἀ̣πὸ [το]ῦ πρώτου καὶ] μέχρι οὗ̣ [τελε]υτ̣[αί]ου ῥήματος, ὡ[ς] δηλ̣ο̣[ῖ] καὶ ἐν τῶι 10 εὐκ]ρινητῶ[ι ἔπει]. θ̣ύρας γὰρ ἐπίθεσ[θα]ι ὁ κελ̣εύσας τοῖ̣[ς ὠσί]ν αὐτ[οὺς χρῆναι εὐ]σ̣εβεῖν φη[σιν] τ̣ο[ῖ]ς πολλοῖς̣̣, τὴν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐπῶ]ν ἀκοὴν [διορθο]ῦ̣ντας, καθ[ ]η[]υ̣ειτ̣[  ἐν τούτ]ωι τ[ῶι] ἔπε̣[ι 

27 Nicolaus goes on (7.12) to treat ἀναπτύσσειν, “unfold” or “unravel” as equivalent to εὐκρινεῖν. 28 I have chosen this formulation out of caution, in order to allow for the wide modal range of the -τός termination. Typically it signifies “φ-ed” or “φ-able,” but it can also, more appropriately to our passage, carry the force of a Latin gerundive, “φ-worthy,” “needing/due/deserving to be φ-ed,” this being for example a very common use of αἱρετός. 29 In the classical and Hellenistic periods the preferred verb for ‘elucidate’ would be not εὐκρινεῖν but διευκρινεῖν (or middle διευκρινεῖσθαι), as already at Pl. Prm. 135b2, and frequently in Polybius. It therefore seems possible that the fully correct reading of VII.8–9 would be ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ἐν τῶι ευκρινητῶι ἔπει. But it seems prudent to stick to the transmitted text.

58 

 David N. Sedley

15  ἐν δ]ὲ τῶι ἐχ̣ομ[έ]ν̣ωι πα[ρ᾽ αὐτά·  “ὄφρα φῶ ἀμφὶ θεοὺς πρώ]τ[ους] ἔργ᾽ ο[ὐ]κ̣ ἀτ[έλεστα” 1 litteras α̣̣γ ̣ huc rest. Janko || 2 litteras μισα̣ huc rest. Janko || 3 ]ὴν ὀκ[νο]ί η̣ leg. et suppl. Janko ||

litteras αρ̣ huc rest. Janko || 4 [τῆ]ι Tsantsanoglou || 5 μ̣[υστικὴ Janko || 6–7 Tsantsanoglou (sed

αὐτ[οῖς potius quam αὐτ[ὸ]ς leg. et coni. Janko) || 8 ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖται ... ἀ̣[πὸ το]ῦ Tsantsanoglou || 9 [καὶ] Betegh || οὗ Kotwick, cett. Tsantsanoglou || 10 [εὐκ]ρινη[τῶι Sedley (iam [εὐκ]ρινή[τωι Tsantsanoglou) || cett. et 11 ὠσίν Tsantsanoglou monente Burkert || 11 εὐ]σ̣εβεῖν Sedley (iam ἀ]σ̣εβεῖν leg. et prop. Janko) || φη[σιν τοῖς] Tsantsanoglou || 14 Janko || 15 ἐν δ]ὲ τῶι ἐχ̣ομ[έ]ν̣ωι Tsantsanoglou || 16 ἔργ᾽ ο[ὐ]κ̣ ἀτ[έλεστα] Janko || cett. Sedley

(VI) Next line: “I shall make utterance by the means by which it is lawful. Put on doors, you profane.” [He said ‘make utterance’ because he used his voice to do more than merely state] facts. And to it (VII) (…) he added which verses it was lawful to use, meaning whichever shunned outrage and spoke lawful things. For they had been purified by his poetry. And he is saying that it is not possible to say these things through the medium of words, even though they were said. His poetry is initiatory, and enigmatic for people to understand, and Orpheus had no wish to speak captious enigmas to them. But in enigmas fine things are found.30 So he performs holy discourse both from his first expression and right down to his last,31 as he shows even in the verse that is to be elucidated. For one who gives the instruction to put doors on the ears is telling the many that they should themselves act piously, by rectifying the way they listen to his verses, in so far as (…) in this verse [he says (…)], and in the following one, going further: “(…) so that I may tell of accomplished deeds concerning the first gods (...).” Let me start with the alternative restoration I have proposed for 10–12 (= 9–11 ed. pr.): “For one who gives the instruction to put doors on the ears is telling the many that they should themselves act piously, by rectifying the way they listen to his verses.” A construal along these lines has the advantage of appropriately illustrating the hermeneutic principle which the author says is being exemplified, namely that everything Orpheus says has a hidden religious force. For it emerges that the injunction does not, as typically (and no doubt correctly!) understood,32

30 At 7–8, where I propose [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ̣[ιν δὲ / [τὰ κ]αλά̣, editors have followed Tsantsanoglou in reading [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ̣[ιν δὲ / [μεγ]άλα̣. I find that the former reads more convincingly, being in effect a context-appropriate variant of the proverbial saying χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. 31 The common emendation to οῦ is not required. Τhis redundant οὗ after μέχρι has parallels in Herodotus, see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 123, and Kotwick (2017), comm. ad loc. 32 Cf. Pl. Symp. 218b5–7.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 59

indicate the secrecy of the ensuing revelations. Rather, Orpheus33 is urging the many, i.e. those not yet initiated, nevertheless to be pious, by listening through self-imposed ‘doors’ which – presumably by opening as well as closing them34 – they can use to elucidate, censor, purify, or otherwise rectify what they hear. By a curious kind of reflexivity, this sort of listening must be, or include, the very skill now on display, that of filtering out the superficial meaning of an Orphic verse and hearing instead its true but hidden meaning. So radical a hermeneutic transformation of the lemma is entirely in the style of the audacious decodings that follow in the rest of the commentary. It thereby exemplifies, better than the superficial exclusionary reading did,35 what the author has been saying in the opening lines of col. VII about the religious riddles concealed in every line of Orpheus’ poetry.36 The proposed reading would if correct make a significant difference to our understanding of the commentator’s religious or cultic outlook, suggesting that it is less elitist, secretive, esoteric and exclusionary than is widely assumed. Note for example that Orpheus’ word βέβηλοι is interpreted, not as altogether dismissive of the vulgar ‘profane,’ but as offering advice to the ‘many.’ Later on, at XXIII.1–3, we learn that a verse there under consideration “is unclear to the many (το[ῖς μ]ὲν / πολλοῖς ἄδηλον) but clear to those with correct knowledge,ˮ which further strengthens the impression that in the commentator’s view the many have not been barred by Orpheus from listening to the poem, but simply lack the hermeneutic skills to recognize its true meaning by themselves. It could even be the needs of such non-experts that the commentary is primarily designed to serve.37 How after all were the many supposed to recognize the real meaning of the advice to ‘put on doors,’ addressed especially to them, if not with the help of an expert interpreter? But, it may be asked, how could the second half of the lemmatized verse be interpreted as non-esoteric when the first half consists in the blatantly esoteric 33 The definite article in l. 10, (…) ἐπιθέσ[θα]ι ὁ κελ̣εύσας (...), suggests that the author’s exegesis of the ‘doors’ verse applies not only to Orpheus but to anyone who uses it. 34 I conjecture that from the end of l. 17 the papyrus read roughly “in so far as (καθό) [or ‘just as,’ (καθάπερ)] doors determine what is admitted and what excluded.” 35 KPT, 173 recognize that ll. 10–12 (as conventionally restored) do not treat the ‘doors’ injunction as enigmatic: they resolve the problem by suggesting that εὐκρίνητος means “easy to understand” and hence that the interpretation illustrates the foregoing words about Orpheus’ hidden meanings by providing a contrasting example, an Orphic utterance that is easily understood. 36 On the rationale of encoding and decoding in PDerv., see esp. Most (1997). 37 At XXV.12–13 we read that Orpheus did not want ‘everyone’ to know his hidden meaning, but that too falls far short of restricting its understanding to a closed group of initiates, allowing the prospect of enlightenment to anybody, provided they learn how to read him.

60 

 David N. Sedley

announcement φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί? Here too we must expect the unexpected. It seems that our commentator took this as meaning, not “I shall make utterance to those to whom it is lawful to do so,” but “I shall make utterance by the means by which it is lawful to do so.” On his reading, if so, οἷς is not a masculine dative indicating addressees, but a neuter instrumental dative indicating means.38 Let me expand. After citing the lemma, it looks as if our author started by commenting on its first word, φθέγξομαι, “I shall make utterance.”39 Why does Orpheus use this, and not a simple verb of saying? The author’s answer, I conjecture in the light of what will follow, is that Orpheus’ means of communication are not bare assertion: he performs a holy discourse (ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ̣ται, VII.7)40 with his words. It is after this that the author turns to the line’s continuation, οἷς θέμις ἐστί. He shows no sign of taking this to refer to Orpheus’ choice of audience (“to those to whom it is lawful”), but instead takes it as describing a means of communication that was religiously pure. Orpheus’ poetry ([τῆ]ι ποήσει, instrumental dative, elucidating Orpheus’ οἷς) is such a means (ll. 3–4). The commentator then, at VII.4–5, tries to explain further what legitimated Orpheus’ resort to the kind of ‘utterances’ described: the content of the poem was admittedly spoken (l. 5, καίτ[οι] ῥηθέντα), but the mere words spoken were not themselves sufficient to express its content. The deep meaning of Orpheus’ holy discourse is precisely the aspect of his poetry that cannot be captured by the surface meaning of his words. It is this concealment of meaning that is then further explained at ll. 5–9 in terms of Orpheus’ reluctant but justified use of riddling language. Finally, as we have already seen, at ll. 9–12 the kind of decoding needed to understand Orpheus’ puzzles is applied to the last part of the lemma, ‘Put on doors, you profane.’ And then, within a line or two, the commentary on this

38 This will not however be a complete surprise to anyone recalling the perceptive observation of Tsantsanoglou (1997) 126 that the Derveni author would be quite capable of taking οἷς here as neuter and instrumental. 39 That supposition makes sense of VII.2, if I am right that what Orpheus ‘added’ (πρ]οσέ̣[θηκεν: cf. XXIII.7, [Orpheus] εὐρὺ ῥέοντα προσέθηκεν; also XII.8–9, τὴν] προσθήκην εὐρὺν / ἐποιε̣ῖ̣το) was the words οἷς θέμις ἐστί, as it surely must be, since the author does not turn to the remaining component of the line, the ‘doors’ metaphor, till ll. 9 ff. 40 At VII.8 the editions print ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ̣ται (Tsantsanoglou), but we should consider the alternative ἱερ[ουργ]ε̣ῖ̣ται, since ἱερουργ-, at least in the substantival form ἱερουργία, is attested in classical Greek (Hdt. 5.83.3–84.1; Pl. Leg. 6.775a1), whereas ἱερολογεῖν/-εῖσθαι and ἱερολογία occur only in post-classical sources. On the other hand, col. VII is much more focused on holy discourse than on holy action, which is why I have cautiously opted for retaining the former restoration.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 61

lemma is at an end, because at VII.15 lemma (3) is already being introduced: ἐν δ]ὲ τῶι ἐχ̣ομ[έ]ν̣ωι, “And in the following verse (...).” If the above reconstruction of VI–VII were roughly right, it would entail that the ‘doors’ lemma was cited verbatim in the lost part of VI, because the commentator seems to have focused in turn on the exact wording of each of its three components: first φθέγξομαι, then οἷς θέμις ἐστί, and finally θύρας δ᾽ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι, before moving on (VII.15) to the immediately following line. In further confirmation that this lemma was quoted verbatim in VI, we may now return to ἐν τῶι / [εὐκ]ρινητῶ[ι ἔπει in VII.9–10. The epithet, however translated, and with or without emendation, has often fostered the impression that the verse was too well known to need quoting verbatim, or alternatively (if a little implausibly, given that it is explicitly addressed to the profane) that it was an ἀπόρρητον, a saying that could not be lawfully uttered.41 But if as I have proposed it is “the verse that is to be elucidated,” it is naturally taken as the author’s way of referring to the current lemma, that is, to the actual verse under discussion, already quoted42 and now undergoing the final stages of its decipherment.

5 Lemmas (3)–(5) So much for the second lemma. Lemma (3), as we have seen, was introduced at VII.15, ἐν δ]ὲ τῶι ἐχομ[ένωι (...), “And in the following [verse] (…),” and the line itself (VII.16) ended with a reference to “accomplished deeds,” ἔργ᾽ ο[ὐ]κ̣ ἀτ[έλεστα]. The strong probability that this was the transition to the theogonic narrative can be inferred from the immediately following col. VIII, where we find the commentator already deeply engaged in that narrative’s decipherment. This largely lost third lemma seems to have referred to the divinities who were to be the final products of the theogonic narrative. However, the missing first three and a half feet scarcely have room for their names, and I have suggested instead a formulation along the lines of [ὄφρα φῶ ἀμφὶ θεοὺς πρώ]τ[ους] ἔργ᾽ ο[ὐ]κ̣ ἀτ[έλεστα], “(…) so that I may tell of accomplished deeds concerning the first gods (...),” with lemma (4) further identifying them as the first divine offspring of Zeus (VIII.2, [ο]ἳ Διὸς ἐξεγένοντο []έος43 βασιλῆ̣ος), and lemma (5) starting a narrative about ̣

41 Thus Tsantsanoglou (1997) 124 and Jourdan (2003) 44. 42 Just four lines later, in Janko’s plausible new reading of VII.14 (p. 57 above), the reference to ἐν τούτ]ωι τ[ῶι] ἔπε̣[ι, (“in this verse”) can only be to the ‘doors’ line, but the expression does not by itself prove that it has been quoted rather than alluded to. 43 [περιφραδ]έος Janko : [ὑπερμεν]έος Tsantsanoglou, alii alia.

62 

 David N. Sedley

Zeus (VIII.4–5, Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ̣ π̣α[̣ τρὸς ἑο]ῦ πάρα θέ[σ]φατον ἀρχὴν / [ἀ]λκήν τ᾽ ἐν χείρεσσι ἔ[λ]α̣β[εν κ]α̣[ὶ] δαίμον̣α κυδρόν). In the commentator’s final citation (col. XXVI), (a) Zeus will be committing incest with his mother Rhea, and (b) the commentary will probably be concluding, the next column being blank. This pair of clues suggests that (a) the procreation of the offspring in question is by that point under way, and (b) the Orphic narrative nearing either its own end or, at any rate, a major break.44 The commentator will later, at XXV.11–12, refer back to what is ‘narrated’45 about the nature and size of the sun ‘at the start of the account’ (οἷος ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου / διηγεῖται). Betegh ([2004] 327–329) has convincingly argued that this means the opening part of Orpheus’ theogonic story (logos), and not the start of the Derveni author’s own book or commentary.46 If that is right, the logos in question will be identifiable as the narrative itself.47 As we will now learn by returning to col. IV, although Orpheus’ logos is framed in terms of particular divinities its real meaning is a universal cosmic one.

6 Column IV: text and translation Having witnessed the lemmatic structure of the commentary with regard to lemmas (2)–(5), we are now better equipped to return to the first lemma, which 44 It cannot be excluded that the Orphic poem was a short one, ending at or near this point in the narrative. There could be room for the author’s citation and discussion of the concluding births in the lost lower part of col. XXVI, before the agraphon. Alternatively, both poem and commentary may have continued (the latter, if so, in a further roll, cf. Janko (2016) 13, or the poem may have continued but the commentary stopped here. See also Piano (2016) 243. I thank Glenn Most and Valeria Piano for bringing this issue to my attention. 45 διηγεῖται could be translated “is described” or (with Betegh) “is explained,” but the specific sense “narrate,” recognized in Montanari though missing from LSJ, is already very common in Plato (e.g. Soph. 242c8, Criti. 110b4; cf. διήγησις as “narrative” at e.g. Resp. 3.392d2), and is the verb’s likely meaning at PDerv., col. XV.8 as well. 46 The reference is in fact, if we follow Betegh, to lemma (5), the first unmistakably narrative verse, which the author originally cited as early as VIII.3–5 and went on to decode at IX.5 ff. as explaining the cosmic distribution of fire. 47 There are actually multiple options for explaining the back-reference: (1) something said at the start of the author’s own book, whether this be (1a) in col. I or a lost slightly earlier column, (1b) (on Janko’s hypothesis, for which see n. 3 above) a much earlier beginning of the book, or (1c) the Heraclitus quotation in col. IV, whose detailed content we would in that case have to assume the author went on to endorse; (2) the very beginning of the Orphic poem; and (3), as favoured above, the beginning of Orpheus’ theogonic narrative. If (2) were correct, my contentions about the poem’s opening lines would need reconsideration.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 63

I have argued to be the Orphic poet’s opening invocation of the Furies, probably with roughly the following content: κλῦτέ μου Εὐμενίδες, λώβης τε κακῶν τε βροτείων τιμωροὶ πάντων, τὰ τύχης ἔκτος δι᾽ ἀνάγκης προσδέχεται ποινήν. Hear me Eumenides, avengers of all the outrage and wrongdoings of mortals, which, not left to chance, await requital through necessity. In support of such a reconstruction, I now offer a conjecturally restored text48 and translation of col. IV, viewed as part of the commentary on this lemma. ]ου ε  [ διὰ τῶν τιμωρήσε]ων, ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[εὶς πολὺ ἀξιοῦται ἐ]κδοῦναι μᾶλλ[ον ἢ] σίνεται̣. [“τὰ” δὲ ὡς “τάδε” ἔφη (με]τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ̣[ρ οὐκ εἴ[α λα]μμάνειν̣), ἆρ᾽ οὕτω̣ [μὲν φάς, νοῶ]ν δὲ “κόσμος”; 5 κατὰ [ταῦτ]α Ἡράκλε̣ιτος μᾶ[λλον τιμᾶι] τὰ κοινά, κἆτ᾽ [οὐ γρά]φ̣ ει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α· ὅσπερ ἴκελ̣[α ἰδίωι] λόγωι λέγων [ἔφη· “ἥλι ο̣ ̣[ς κόσ]μου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν ἀνθρώ[που] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἔχει, τὸ μ̣[̣έγεθο]ς οὐχ ὑπε̣ρβάλλων· εἰ γὰ̣[ρ οὔ]ρους ἑ[ωυτοῦ 10 ἐκ]β̣[ήσετα]ι, Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σιν.” ὁ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε ὅτι ἂν ἑὸν ὅρον ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι κ[ινεῖν τ]ὰ̣ δίκης [ ] θυο̣σ[ ]α δίκης [ ] μηνὶ τὰ κ[ ]ξ̣η̣τ̣αι τ̣ο[ 2 κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[εὶς et ἐ]κδοῦναι Tsantsanoglou || 3 μᾶλλ[ον ἢ] σίνεται̣ Tsantsanoglou || 4 potius ω̣ quam ο̣ vel α̣ legendum monet Janko, qui οὕτω̣[ς rest. || 5 [ταὐτ]ὰ̣ Tsantsanoglou || 6 ἴκελ̣α̣ Sider || ἔφη Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou || 7 κόσ]μου Piano et Janko, monente Lebedev ἀνθρώ[που] Janko || ἔχει Laks/Most, cett. Tsantsanoglou || 8 μ̣[έ̣ γεθο]ς̣ KTP, cett. Tsantsanoglou || 9 ἐκ]β.[ήσεται leg. Janko (iam ἐ]κ̣[βήσετα]ι̣ Parássoglou) || 9 ὑπελάμ̣[μανε ex F17 huc colloc. et (monente Most) rest. Piano || 10 ὑπερ]βατὸμ KTP || ]αδικησ ex F17 huc colloc. Piano || cett. Sedley

(…) and not in the way that, when balance is restored] by means of punishments, one who has displaced things that have been put in place is required to surrender an amount much exceeding the harm he does. 48 Although my choice of restorations is an independent one, my starting point for col. IV has been the text meticulously reconstructed by Valeria Piano (this volume). I find especially enlightening her important placement of F17, on which see Betegh/Piano, this volume, pp. 202–206.

64 

 David N. Sedley

He said “they” [ta] in the sense “these things here” [tade] (for he did not make it possible to take it with “of chance”): was he, while saying it thus, thinking “world-ordering” [kosmos]? It is on this basis that Heraclitus expresses greater respect for things that are universal, and thereafter does not write things that are particular. He gave what resembled a particular account when he remarked “The sun, according to world-ordering’s nature, has the width of a human’s foot, not exceeding its size; for if it does overstep its own boundaries, the Erinyes will find it out.” But the belief he was expressing was that whatever subjects its own boundary to transgression disrupts justice’s [foundations, and retribution will follow]. (…) of justice (…) month (…) The main innovative aspect here lies in the restorations I propose in ll. 1–6 and 9–10.49 The resultant text is best explained in a line-by-line commentary.

7 Exegesis of column IV 1–3: The central idea seems to be that in the human realm punishment requires restoration which considerably outweighs the harm done (cf. Hom. Il. 9.632–639): if I have stolen your cow, I must not only restore the cow to you, but also pay a substantial fine, or extra compensation. One possibility is that the commentator is offering his own paraphrase, interpretation or adaptation of the principle of retribution implied by the hypothesized opening lemma about the Furies: deficiency must be rectified by corresponding excess, and vice versa. However, it is hard to find any such principle of overcompensation in the Derveni author’s cosmogony, where the controlling intelligence seems simply to create and then maintain cosmic balance, notably by regulating the distribution of fire (cf. Kouloumentas [2007]). A principle of overcompensation might nevertheless have been at work elsewhere in his cosmology, notably with regard to the cycle of seasons, where excessive heat in summer can be seen as cyclically counterbalanced by excessive cold in winter, on a principle of restorative justice dating back to Anax49 The corresponding text of ll. 1–10 in KPT reads: θ]ε̣ῶν, / ὁ κείμ[ενα] μετ̣α̣θ̣[ε  ἐ]κδοῦναι / μᾶλλ[ον ἃ] σίνεται̣. [ ]τ̣ὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ̣[ρ / οὐκ εἴ̣[α λα]μμάνει̣ν̣. ἆρ᾽ οὐ τά[ξιν ἔχει διὰ τό]ν̣δε κόσμος; / κατὰ [ταὐτ]ὰ̣ Ἡράκλ̣ε̣ιτος μά[ρτυρόμενος] τὰ̣ κοινά, / κατ̣[αστρέ]φ̣ει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α, ὅσπερ ἴκελ̣α̣ [ἀστρο]λόγωι λέγων [ἔφη·] “ἥλι̣[ος ]ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν ἀνθρω[πηΐου] εὖ̣ρος ποδός [ἐστι,] / τὸ μ̣[̣έγεθο]ς̣̣ οὐχ ὑπε̣ρβάλλων εἰκ̣[ότας οὔ]ρους ε[ὔρους. / εἰ δὲ μ]ὴ, Ἐρινύε̣[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι· / ὅπως δὲ μηδὲν ὑπερ]βατὸν ποῆι κ[. See also, however, Piano’s much improved text in this volume, which is also the basis for the version in EGPh, VI 382–385; and of course Janko’s text in Kotwick (2017).

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 65

imander, 12 B 1 DK (= Ar 163 Wöhrle). But to judge from X.11–13, on the cycle of day and night, all that the Derveni author sees in such natural cycles is simple rebalancing: what the sun heats and loosens, the night cools and compacts again. I have therefore preferred a second option: that the paraphrase was in the lost lines introduced by the commentator as a potential misinterpretation of the retributive principle represented by the Furies in the opening lemma, one against which he is warning us: retributive justice in the cosmos is not an Anaximandrian cycle of transgressions and penalties, analogous to the human model of excessive appropriation and subsequent punitive restoration, but the steady maintenance of balance. 1 τιμωρήσε]ων: this could also be restored with κολάσε]ων, τίσε]ων or ποιν]ῶν, but τιμωρεῖν, along with its cognates, is the mot juste for retributive punishment. 2 ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[εὶς: κεῖσθαι serves as the perfect passive of τιθέναι (cf. LSJ s.v. τίθημι, “the Pass. [i.e. perfect passive] never occurs in Hom., and is generally rare, κεῖμαι being used instead”). So the reference is to changing the place (μετατιθέναι) of what has already been “put in place” (τίθεσθαι). The paired verbs are capable of a very wide scope, in principle covering both spatial location, as might arise in a cosmological context like the Heraclitean one that follows, and human laws or rules that have been “enacted” (τίθεσθαι) and are then violated. ἐ]κδοῦναι most frequently refers to ‘surrendering’ people, but is not confined to that, cf. Hom. Il. 3.458–459 (ὑμεῖς δ’ Ἀργείην Ἑλένην καὶ κτήμαθ’ ἅμ’ αὐτῇ / ἔκδοτε) and Hdt. 1.3. 3–4: με]τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ̣[ρ οὐκ εἴ[α λα]μμάνει̣ν̣, “for he (sc. Orpheus) did not make it possible to take it (sc. the word τά) with ‘chance’ (τύχης).” (For the commentator’s characteristic omission of a pronominal object, cf. cols. XIX.11, XXV.10–11.) Thus construed, the comment means that at first sight lemma (1) might appear to be making a universal statement, one quite generally about “the operations of chance” vel sim., τὰ τύχης; but that to construe it that way would not enable the remainder of the lemma (“the operations of chance outside through necessity swiftly incur a penalty”) to convey anything intelligible. This reading assumes that the commentator’s textual reference to the lemma picks out from it the single word τύχης, and not the phrase τῆς τύχης. The latter sequence is not metrically possible in hexameters, added to which the Orphic poet, following regular Homeric style, does not elsewhere use the definite article. Hence τῆς is almost certainly the commentator’s own addition, used to refer to the word τύχης. Strictly such a mention (as distinct from use) of the word τύχης should take the form μετὰ τοῦ τύχης, ‘with the word “τύχης”,’ but that strict practice is not in evidence in PDerv., where the use-mention distinction is sometimes

66 

 David N. Sedley

treated loosely, as at X–XI, XXVI.2–3. Compare Arist. Poet. 21.1457b12–13, “ἦ δὴ μυρί᾽ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν” [= Hom. Il. 2.272]· τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολύ ἐστιν, ᾧ νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται: here τὸ (...) μυρίον and τοῦ πολλοῦ should strictly have been τὸ μυρία and τοῦ πολλά. This Aristotelian parallel is also a reminder of the possibility that τύχη occurred in the lemma in some other case, and has been attracted into the genitive by the commentator’s με]τά. Nevertheless, the construal of the lemma suggested above, with the genitive τύχης, is the only way I have so far found to make sense of the commentator’s syntactic remark. 4 εἴ[α: When reporting or interpreting Orpheus’s discourse the Derveni author frequently uses past tenses: VII.6, IX.1, 10, X.2, XII.9, XIII.8, XIV.9, XVI.1, XVIII.3, 7 (bis), XXII.1 (bis), XXIII.7, XXIV.7. λαμβάνειν, to “take”, “understand” or “construe” words in a certain way, is not recognized by the lexicons I have checked, but see for example Arist. Top. 5.4.133b16, An. pr. 1.16.35b33 (plentiful further examples in Bonitz [1870] 423, col. 1). In the lemma as conjecturally reconstructed, τά (“which” or “they”) is intended to refer to specific items already mentioned, namely human wrongdoings, and that would seem to exclude restitutions at the cosmic level from the statement’s scope. The commentator, seeking a way to avoid that consequence, concedes that the desired universal scope cannot be achieved by construing τά with τύχης, and instead takes τά as “these things” read as equivalent to the deictic τάδε, which in turn stands proxy in the poet’s mind for “world” or “worldordering” in general (cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.132). Thus τά = τάδε = κόσμος. By an appeal to these equivalences, the lemma’s emphasis on the inevitability of retribution for human wrongdoing is reinterpreted as conveying, or hinting at, a law of cosmic restitution. Not only κόσμος, but by implication τά as well, is nominative, each retaining the grammatical status that τά had in the lemma. (For the absence of a definite article with κόσμος, see ad ll. 7–9 below.) When a whole phrase is being quoted verbatim with a verb of saying, it is of course common for it to retain its internal grammar (e.g. XIV.5). An isolated noun or finite verb, by contrast, is easily attracted into, respectively, the accusative or the infinitive, as if it were directly governed by the verb of saying, as happens at XII.8. But retaining the original word-form, as in the proposed reading, is no less correct, and is exemplified at XXI.1, θόρνηι δὲ λέγων, although the quoted word’s meaning is unknown. What is no doubt more unusual is the extension of the same usage from λέγειν to νοεῖν; but this too is natural, since direct comparisons of what someone (often an author) says with what he νοεῖ are common, e.g. Pl. Chrm. 161d1–2, 162b10, d5; Hp. mi. 365c8–d4; Prt. 347e1–2; Grg. 521a6–7.

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 67

5–10: As a parallel for the universalizing strategy which he has suggested Orpheus may have in mind, the author proceeds to compare Heraclit. 22 B 3+94 DK, which is likewise interpreted as using the regulative role of the Furies, this time in relation to the restricted dimensions of the sun, to assert a universal cosmic thesis. The Heraclitean saying is cited as making a specific-seeming (although according to the author generalizable) assertion about one way in which these divine powers maintain cosmic balance. 5 Ἡράκλ̣ε̣ιτος μᾶ[λλον τιμᾶι] τὰ̣ κοινά: (For the completion, cf. Heraclit. 22 B 55 DK, where προτιμέω expresses his own relative evaluation.) The commentator will have in mind Heraclit. B 2, τοῦ λόγου δ᾽ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ [Ionic for κοινοῦ], ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. Given Heraclitus’ preceding criticism in B 1 of ordinary people for failing to appreciate the very same λόγος as has now in B 2 been described as a ‘universal’ λόγος, his implicit preference for τὰ κοινά and low ranking of τὰ ἴδια will have seemed quite clear to our commentator. This implication remains even when one discounts from B 2 the words διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ, which some editors have mistaken for part of the Heraclitean quotation as given by Sext. Emp. Math. 7.133 (see Sedley [1992] 40 n. 52). On the shorter reading of B 2 which correctly omits these words, the ground on which according to Sextus’ interpretation one “should follow” the κοινὸς λόγος lies in the clearly implied spuriousness or inferiority of “private wisdom.” 6 κἆτ̣᾽ [οὐ γρά]φει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α: That is, after his implicit opening promise in 22 B 2 DK to focus on universal or common logoi and to ignore particular logoi, Heraclitus keeps to his word. The implication of chronological sequence conveyed by κἆτ̣᾽, ‘and thereafter,’ is justified, because B 2 came very soon after the opening of Heraclitus’ book in B 1 (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.133: ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει), and was therefore recognizably itself part of the book’s prefatory material: the remainder of the fragments, including the enigmatic remarks about the sun (B 3+94), will certainly have followed later, and the commentator’s claim is that they are all universal in scope, as B 2 guarantees, even where they may superficially seem particular. κἆτα is a crasis of καὶ εἶτα. The PDerv. scribe elsewhere writes iota mutum as adscript (e.g. λόγωι in the present line), so one might have expected κᾶιτ᾽. But the spelling of this particular crasis without iota mutum is so frequent in the MSS of 5th–4th cent. BC authors (e.g. Pherecr. Kra. 1.4, Cheir. 3.4 Meineke; Pl. Lys. 223a2, reading of BW; Grg. 457b5, reading of BTWFP; Eur. IA 84 [?]) that one should assume the word to have been commonly written and pronounced that way in the classical period. The anomalous spelling, that is, does not constitute an obstacle to the conjecture, but if anything lends it support. The oddity was often noted

68 

 David N. Sedley

and discussed by grammarians, e.g. Apollon. Dysc. De coniunct.  230.31–231.3: καὶ φαίνεται ὅτι δι’ οὗ ᾐτήσατο ὑποστολὴν τοῦ ι, διὰ τούτου οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τὸ εἶτα ἐγκεῖσθαι κατορθοῦσι  τὸν κἆτα.  ὡς γὰρ τὸ καὶ ἐμέ κἀμέ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ καὶ εἶτα, ἐνδεῆσαν  τῷ δευτέρῳι, ὑποσυνείληπται ἐν τῷ κἆτα. Apollonius in this same context (ibid. 229.23–230.3) makes it clear that he found the form κἆτα at Ar. Ran. 203 and Eur. Phoen. 598. See also, among others, Etymologicum Gudianum (s.v.): κἆτα ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ συνδέσμου καὶ τοῦ εἶτα ἐπιρρήματος γίνεται, καὶ ἀποβολῇ τῶν δύο ιι κάετα, καὶ κράσει κἆτα. ἴκελ̣α̣ [ἰδίωι] λόγωι λέγων: according to the commentator’s exegesis, Heraclitus’ statement about the sun, kept in bounds by the Furies, sounds like an account of a particular case, but is in fact Heraclitus’ way of drawing attention to a common or universal cosmic truth about transgression and recompense. Why is this parallel important to the author? Because Heraclitus, unlike Orpheus, can be read as actually declaring in B 2 that what is worth knowing is the universal (τὰ κοινά), as contrasted with the particular (τὰ ἴδια). Hence, the author infers, we can be confident that, despite the apparent particularity of Heraclitus’ logos about the Furies and the sun, it is in fact intended to have universal scope. This in turn licenses the corresponding proposal about Orpheus’ meaning. It is no accident that, in order to illustrate a principle about universalizability, the author has chosen this particular set of sayings from Heraclitus. He sees in them an august, quite possibly authoritative, antecedent not just for the hermeneutic principle itself, but also for two doctrinal theses: the dependence of cosmic balance on the kind of atonement associated with the Furies; and, as will become clear at XXV.9–12, the sun’s rigidly regulated size as an important token of this regulation (see further, Betegh [2004] 324–332, and cf. Sider [1997]). If the proposed restoration is right, the author’s apparent understanding of Heraclitean λόγος as simply an ‘account’ or ‘statement,’ which may be either particular or universal in content, adds further support for those – such as Betegh (2007), Piano (2016) ch. 8, and Edmonds (2019) – who have actively defended the presumed pre-Stoic dating of the PDerv. text, thereby opposing the contention of Brisson (2009) and (2011) that it is late enough to show Stoic influence. (Affinities between PDerv. and Stoicism are also helpfully catalogued by Jourdan [2003] and Casadesús [2010], prudently avoiding any explicit chronological inference.) With the advent of Stoic λόγος, the world’s omnipresent ‘reason,’ Heraclitus was quickly recruited as a precursor of Stoicism, and his usage of the term λόγος understood accordingly (e.g. Cleanth. SVF I 537, Hymn to Zeus 12–13: κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον ὃς διὰ πάντων / φοιτᾷ); whereas in the era of Plato, Aristotle, and

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 69

Theophrastus there is not yet any hint of the idea that Heraclitus postulated λόγος as a rational cosmic principle (cf. West [1971] 124–125). In l. 6, where I conjecture ἰδίωι, Janko/Kotwick choose ἱερῶι (Tsantsanoglou and Parássoglou). Since according to the photographs the letters chosen have to fill virtually the same space as the three letters [που] in the next line, the latter now replacing the previously favoured [πηίου] which Janko (see p. 70 below) estimates to be too long, the restoration ἰδίωι may gain an advantage. Iota being significantly narrower than other letters, ἰδίωι with its three iotas would be shorter than ἱερῶι with its two, and a better fit for the lacuna. There have been various other conjectures, however, some of which may likewise survive the proposed narrowing of the lacuna, or even gain by it: see Piano’s app. crit. in Piano (2016) 79, and updated in Betegh/Piano, in this volume, p. 181. 7–9: For the reconstruction of the Heraclitean quotation, see now especially Betegh/Piano (this volume), pp. 197–207. There is a growing consensus that the second word in l. 7 ends ]μ̣ου, and I accept their and Janko’s independent endorsements of Lebedev’s proposal κόσ]μου, in preference to Janko’s tentative alternative δρό]μου, “course” or “racetrack,” and to Most’s suggestion (pers. comm.) θεσ]μοῦ – although neither of these latter should be discounted. An especially important point to emerge from discussions during and after the Trier conference (I thank Glenn Most and Gábor Betegh in particular) is that κόσμος in the sense “world” is standardly preceded by the definite article, but that the absence of the article here in l. 7 is a genuinely Heraclitean trope: cf. Heraclit. 22 B 30 DK (following the best MSS, with Kahn [1979] 44–45), κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα: “Ordering, the same one belonging to all, neither any god nor any human made, but it always was, is and will be ever-living fire, kindled in measures and quenched in measures.” It seems (cf. Kahn [1979] 132–138) that κόσμος is not yet for Heraclitus the “world,” but a shared or universal “ordering” present in the world (a sense still alive at Pl. Grg. 507e6–508a4) – manifested especially, according to Heraclitus (cf. “kindled in measures”), by the fire of the sun, kindled anew every day (22 B 6 DK). In saying that no god or human made this shared ordering but that it has always been present and always will be, Heraclitus is not rejecting some bizarre creationist theory according to which the world may have been made by a human being: rather, it is his way of indicating that it is an eternal natural ordering. Given this background, and Heraclitus’ use of κατὰ φύσιν in B 1 and B 112 as well, the phrase κόσ]μου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν emerges with every chance of being an authentic part of the same original Heraclitean saying that also included B 3, according to which the sun has the “width of a human foot,” εὖρος ποδὸς

70 

 David N. Sedley

ἀνθρωπηίου. However, the authentic adjective ἀνθρω[πηΐου] may not, as previously believed, be preserved in PDerv.: Janko ([2016] 16) reports that the size of the lacuna suggests rather ἀνθρώ[που], a banalization of the original wording. We may consider taking the first Heraclitean sentence (ll. 7–8) as echoing the original text from which B 3 was excerpted, but should not assume complete accuracy of quotation. As for the commentator, he is apparently aware of Heraclitus’ archaic use of κόσμος without the article, because at l. 4 (as reconstructed) he imitated it in the thought he attributed to Orpheus, presumably in order to strengthen the parallelism between his two authorities. On the other hand, he no doubt sees in both occurrences of κόσμος (possibly the word’s only occurrences in PDerv.) a reference to “the world,” which would help confirm that both Orpheus and Heraclitus alike intended to speak about the cosmos as a whole rather than, as might at first appear, merely about specific cases. The second Heraclitean sentence (ll. 8–9) clearly draws its content from B 94, quoted by Plutarch as ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν, but again complete accuracy seems lacking. The author may well be quoting it from memory, which could also be why it seems to be only in ll. 10–12 that he remembers, and incorporates, the saying’s reference to Δίκη. 9–10: The reconstruction, though largely conjectural, illustrates the kind of completion needed in order to maintain the parallelism between the Orphic lemma and the Heraclitean dictum: in both alike, talk of the Furies meting out retribution is superficially about deities avenging individual human transgressions; but below the surface, it announces a universal cosmic law, one of retributive regulation. 14: μηνὶ, ‘month,’ suggests that the author, in accordance with his universalizing strategy, followed the Heraclitean sun example by pointing out that the same regulatory principle applies to the phases of the moon too (cf. cols. XXIV–XXV, and Heraclit. D 92 EGPh = CPF I.1**, 57, 4T), and indeed to every other part and aspect of the cosmos.

8 Retrospect The amount of restoration that I have attempted in cols. I, IV, and VI–VII exceeds what it would be prudent ever to print in an edition of the papyrus, where much

2 The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus 

 71

of it would properly appear, if at all, only in the commentary or app. crit. But on the present occasion my goal is to show that a certain alternative interpretation is compatible with the entire surviving text of the opening columns according to the latest transcriptions, and that would be hard to do without setting out a hypothetical reconstruction that goes well beyond the preserved parts of the text. How far future readings of the papyrus will cohere with the hypothetical reconstruction, and how far they will require its modification, remains to be seen. My main concern has been to bring to attention, and thus make available for debate, the hitherto neglected possibility that the opening columns of the Derveni Papyrus are an integral part of the anonymous author’s commentary. It was to demonstrate this possibility that I highlighted the advantages of distinguishing, and where necessary reconstructing, a series of lemmas that would jointly constitute most of the Orphic poem’s introductory lines – lemmas to whose exegesis cols. I–VII can, if appropriately restored, be seen as tied. Whether the resultant readings are credible is a question I must leave others to judge.

References Betegh (2004): Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation, Cambridge. Betegh (2007): Gábor Betegh, “The Derveni Papyrus and Early Stoicism”, in: Rhizai 4.1, 133–152. Bonitz (1870): Hermann Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Berlin. Brisson (2009): Luc Brisson, “Zeus did not Commit Incest with his Mother: An Interpretation of Column XXVI of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 168, 27–39. Brisson (2011): Luc Brisson, “Okéanos dans la colonne XXIII du Papyrus de Derveni”, in: Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, Eugenio R. Luján Martínez et al. (eds.), Tracing Orpheus: Studies of Orphic Fragments in Honour of Alberto Bernabé, Berlin, 385–392. Brown (1984): Andrew L. Brown, “Eumenides in Greek Tragedy”, in: CQ 34, 260–281. Casadesús (2010): Francesc Casadesús, “Similitudes entre el Papiro de Derveni y los primeros filósofos estoicos”, in: Alberto Bernabé, Francesc Casadesús and Marco A. Santamaría (eds.), Orfeo y el orfismo: Nuevas perspectivas, Alicante. Edmonds (2019): Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, “Misleading and Unclear to the Many: Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus and the Orphic Theogony of Hieronymus”, in: Marco A. Santamaría (ed.), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, Leiden/Boston, 77–99. Frede (2007): Michael Frede, “On the Unity and the Aim of the Derveni Text”, in: Rhizai 4.1, 9–33. Henrichs (1994): Albert Henrichs, “Anonymity and Polarity: Unknown Gods and Nameless Altars at the Areopagus”, in: ICS 19, 27–58. Janko (2002): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus: An Interim Text”, in: ZPE 141, 1–62. Janko (2008): Richard Janko, “Reconstructing (again) the Opening of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 166, 37–51.

72 

 David N. Sedley

Janko (2016): Richard Janko, “Parmenides in the Derveni Papyrus: New Images for a New Edition”, in: ZPE 200, 3–23. Jourdan (2003): Fabienne Jourdan, Le papyrus de Derveni, Paris. Kahn (1979): Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge. Kotwick (2017): Mirjam Kotwick, Der Papyrus von Derveni, Griechisch-Deutsch, Berlin. Kouloumentas (2007): Stavros Kouloumentas, “The Derveni Papyrus on Cosmic Justice”, in: Rhizai 4.1, 105–132. Laks (1997): André Laks, “Between Religion and Philosophy: The Function of Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Phronesis 42, 121–142.  Laks/Most (1997): André Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford. Mansfeld (2015): Jaap Mansfeld, “Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul with an Afterthought on the Afterlife”, in: Rhizomata 3, 62–93. Most (1997): Glenn W. Most, “The Fire Next Time: Cosmology, Allegoresis, and Salvation in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: JHS 117, 117–135. Piano (2011): Valeria Piano, “Ricostruendo il rotolo di Derveni: Per una revisione papirologica di P.Derveni I–III”, in: Papiri filosofici, Miscellanea di studi VI, Florence, 5–37. Piano (2016): Valeria Piano, Il Papiro di Derveni tra religione e filosofia, Florence. Sedley (1996): David N. Sedley, “Sextus Empiricus and the Atomist Criteria of Truth”, in: Elenchos 13, 19–56. Sider (1997): David Sider, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Laks/Most, 129–148. Tsantsanoglou (1997): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “The First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and their Religious Significance”, in: Laks/Most, 93–128. West (1971): Martin L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, Oxford. West (1983): Martin L. West, The Orphic Poems, Oxford.

Richard D. McKirahan

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology I begin this paper by sketching my views on two general issues that govern how we interpret the Derveni Papyrus and I will then take up five questions concerning the cosmology described in the papyrus on which there is not yet agreement.1 I use the following shorthand: (a) DA is the author of the text preserved in the Derveni Papyrus (I refer to him as the Derveni Author); (b) DC is the cosmology set out in the Derveni Papyrus (I refer to it as the Derveni Cosmology); (c) DP is the poem quoted and interpreted in the Derveni Papyrus (I refer to it as the Derveni Poem); (d) DM is the myth contained in the Derveni Poem (I refer to it as the Derveni Myth). The two general issues will receive brief treatment. First, the relation between DM and DC; second the use of Presocratic cosmologies in interpreting DC. The five questions about DC are the following. How early did the sun exist? Where does night fit into the cosmogony? What does DA mean by “dominate” (ἐπικρατεῖν)? In what sense are all things called Zeus (or in what sense is Zeus called all things)? Will the cosmos last forever? I have written on this subject before,2 but my purpose in this paper is not so much to defend my own published views as to consider more closely instances where they diverge from other interpretations.

1 How closely is DC related to DM? DA’s purpose is to give an interpretation of DM as it appears in DP. The interpretation given is not a commentary in any familiar sense. DA proceeds by quoting passages from DP and explaining their allegorical meaning. That is, in order to be understood DP needs to be decoded, and according to DA, the correct decoding is DC. But DC is very different from DP in its style and content – so different and as far as we know so idiosyncratic that where we do not have DA’s interpretation, any conjectures about how DA did interpret or would have interpreted any line of

1 See at least Betegh (2004); Bernabé (2007) and (2013). 2 McKirahan (2013). Richard D. McKirahan, Pomona College, California https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-004

74 

 Richard D. McKirahan

DP or any feature of DM are uncertain. Also, since DA is selective in what parts of DP he interprets, it is equally uncertain to assume in any given case that an element of the DM received an interpretation unless the interpretation is present in the surviving text. This situation is not improved by the uniqueness of the Derveni Papyrus as a document. Since there are no earlier examples of this scientific kind of interpretation of a religious text and no later texts that appear to be derived from the Derveni Papyrus, we have no evidence on which to predict what parts of DC that have not survived would have been like. For example, we have no evidence that indicates how closely we might expect DC to stick to DM or to earlier Greek (philosophical or mythological) cosmologies, or how internally consistent it might be. Further, it is incomplete; we do not know more about the contents of DP than the lines quoted in the Derveni Papyrus, nor do we know any more about the contents of DC than what survives in the same text. Lastly, DA is selective in his use of material from DP. There is no guarantee, in fact there is no reason to think, that DA gave allegorical interpretations to all personalities, episodes and details that he found there. My conclusion is that although it is inevitable that in interpreting the Derveni Papyrus we make use of assumptions (for example, that it has some connection with other Orphic cosmological texts), it is important to keep in mind that these assumptions are assumptions when it comes to deciding how confident we can be that any interpretation (including our own favored interpretation) is correct.

2 How appropriate is it to use Presocratic cosmologies as keys to understanding DC? It is agreed that DA interprets the ‘riddling’ message of DP as a cosmology of a familiar type found in many of the Presocratic thinkers. That is not to say that DC is exactly the same as any of these Presocratic cosmologies (in fact it is not), or that each of DC’s features is found in any of them. In fact some of its features are, such as the distinction between things-that-are (which are ungenerated and imperishable, hence everlasting) and things-that-are-now (which are generated and perish), which corresponds to what we find in several post-Parmenidean cosmologies. But that should not make us confident that other features have presocratic parallels as well. The uniqueness of the Derveni Papyrus and its contents, and its incomplete state (in particular the fact that its beginning has not survived) make it impossible to be sure what DA’s purposes and expectations were. (For example, we do not know what standards of consistency he set for himself and how closely and in what detail he intended to explicate DP.) It follows that the

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 75

practice of employing existing Presocratic cosmologies as guides to the contents of DC is based on an unwarranted assumption; the relation between DC and Presocratic cosmologies should be investigated after, not before, we have determined as best we can what the DC is in the light of the Derveni Papyrus alone.

3 How early did the sun exist? Here are two views. (A) (This is my view.) The pre-cosmic phase (allegorized as the rule of Kronos) was characterized by the total domination of fire; the first event in the cosmogony was the cessation of fire’s total domination. This occurred when a great deal of the fire was physically separated and removed far enough to allow for the cosmos to be formed, but not too far for it to play an important role in the workings of the cosmos. When it was removed to that place the fire became the sun; there was no sun before. (B) The sky and earth existed before the rule of Kronos and perhaps also before the sun. Kronos’ rule is characterized by a great accumulation of heat, a great concentration of fire particles that split from the sky and became closer to earth. The extreme heat produced by these particles (i.e., the sun) violently affects the particles of matter which were at rest, but which now collide without being able to configure things. Interpretation (B) is supported by a considerable amount of text. When Zeus from his father took the prophesied rule and the strength in his hands (VIII.4–5)3 DA interprets this passage of DP as an allegorical description of the removal of much fire from the fiery magma (IX.7–8), not destroying it since fire is a thingthat-is and so cannot be destroyed; its dominance was ended by removing it and bringing it far enough away so that it no longer prevents the (other) things-that-are from being compounded (IX.8). This event is described further later on. When Zeus, having heard prophecies from his father. (...) He swallowed the genital organ, who was first to spring out of the aithēr. Because in all his poetry he is speaking in riddles about things, it is necessary to discuss each word individually. 3 The quoted extracts from the Derveni Papyrus are collected in the Appendix of Texts, below, pp. 86–90. The translations given in this paper are from McKirahan (20112)

76 

 Richard D. McKirahan

Seeing that people believe that generation depends on the [genital organs] and that without the genital organs there is no coming to be, he used this ˪word, likening the sun to a genital organ, since without the sun it would be impossible for the things-that-are to come ˪to be as they are (…) (XIII.1–11) So, in DM Zeus takes “strength” from his father by devouring his genital organ and DA identifies the genital organ as the sun (XIII.9–11 and XVI.1). This is good reason to hold that in DM the sun existed before the cosmos was formed – in mythological terms that it existed in the reign of Kronos (if not before). Further support for interpretation (B) is found in another column. when the sun was being separated and confined in the middle (...)” (XV.3–4) This can easily be taken to indicate that the sun existed in the fiery magma of the pre-cosmic phase and that the first event of the cosmogony was its being separated from the fiery magma and confined in the middle. There are also grounds for holding that the sun and the earth as well existed even before the fiery magma phase. DA etymologizes “Kronos” as κρούων Νοῦς (“Mind that strikes” – that is, that strikes things against one another, XIV.7). And DA reports that Kronos was born to Helios (sun) and Ge (earth) because it was through the sun that he was the cause of their striking against one another. (XIV.2–4) This is evidence that in DM both the sun and the earth existed prior to the formation of the cosmos, and in fact prior to the fiery magma phase. Defenders of interpretation (A), however, can reply to these arguments. First and most important, the statement If the god did not want the things-that-are-now to exist, he would not have made the sun (XXV.9–10) gives strong support to interpretation A, since the things-that-are-not-now were unable to form during fire’s total domination, which ended when the sun was created. Second, the sun and the earth are parts of the cosmos. Before the cosmos existed, even if there was only a fiery magma in which fire entirely dominated

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 77

the things-that-are, and even if much of this fire was subsequently separated and removed and confined to a location a safe distance from the earth where the sun is now found, it is incorrect to refer to this fiery agglomeration of all the thingsthat-are (or even to the dominant fire within it) as the sun. We might put it like this: the matter of the sun was present and dominant in the pre-cosmic state, but it did not have the size, shape, and location of the sun and did not perform the sun’s function; the same holds for the earth. When DA refers to it in the contexts cited it is an anticipatory description, meaning no more than “the fire that would later become the sun.” Third, the fact that DM identifies Helios and Ge as the parents of Kronos is, as I suggested in my beginning remarks, insufficient reason to suppose that DA included that detail in DC.

4 Where does night fit into the cosmogony? Here are two views. (A) (This is my view.) Night came into being at the same time as the sun. What was left after the separation from the primal magma of most of the hot, bright fire was mostly cold and dark. Night was part of this residue and by cooling down what the sun heats during the day night plays an important role in the economy of the cosmos. (B) In DM Night is the first deity, corresponding to the initial state, which was characterized by indistinct darkness. Night is the first being, probably eternal, since she is not described as the daughter of any god nor is it said that she emerged from another being, whereas Ouranos is the son of Night (“son of evening,” Εὐφρονίδης, XIV.6). Since Ouranos was the first monarch, Night, his parent, did not reign. DC contains a corresponding phase in which there was “a state of confusion in which no individual things were distinct (...) A cold and passive darkness in which the particles of matter existed already. DA may have envisaged a collection of still particles, linked together by the cold that surrounds them.”4 A weakness of interpretation (B) is that DA nowhere refers to the phase of cosmic history that interpretation (B) postulates. Hesiod’s cosmogony, which has obvious parallels with DM, contains no discussion of the state that obtained before Chaos came into being, and just as Hesiod may not have had any views on what there was then, or whether there was anything at all, DA may not have had any views on what there was before Mind performed its activity of defining/ delimiting/determining (ὁρίζων). I will suggest one possibility shortly below. In any case, for reasons given at the beginning of this paper I am uneasy about using Hesiod as evidence for DC. 4 Bernabé (2013) 8.

78 

 Richard D. McKirahan

Interpretation (A) maintains that Night, the divine figure that plays an important role in DM, has no place in DC. In DC night is part of the cosmos; it is just what we think of as night: the darkness that we perceive between sunset and sunrise (XXV.4–6). As mentioned earlier it plays a critical role in ensuring cosmic stability by cooling what the sun heats during the day (X.11–13). Unlike the sun, night does not move. It is always there, but during daytime the sun’s presence dominates it, rendering it invisible (XI.1–4) and inoperative. In saying “Nor does Night give orders” (XIII.3) DA is apparently rejecting something in DM. I suppose that it is a reference to the oracles the DM attributes to the goddess Night (XI.1), since a divine oracle that you will do something or that something occur amounts to a command to do it or that it will occur. DA etymologizes “Ouranos” as ὁρίζων νοῦς (“defining/delimiting/determining Mind,” XIV.12). I have a tentative proposal about what this represents in DC. In the present cosmos we have transient things-that-are-now. These are constituted out of permanent things-that-are (XVI.2–8). During the fiery magma phase none of the transient things-that-are-now existed, but the permanent things-that-are did (IX.5–8), even though the dominance of fire during that phase prevented any of them from being manifest. They existed as tiny individual particles of their corresponding kinds. The difference between the fiery magma and the present cosmos amounts to a difference in the condition of the things-that-are. In the former they are kept separate; in the latter they are able to join together. In the former they are kept in rapid disorderly motion by the heat of the dominant fire; in the latter the alternation between day and night allows them to join together and form compounds and for there to be a lasting, orderly structure that involves orderly movement and change – a cosmos. Thinking along these lines we might suppose that in the phase before the fiery magma there was no motion at all. The abrupt and violent change that DM describes as Kronos seizing power from Ouranos amounts to the abrupt change from total stasis to total confusion. What, then, did defining/delimiting/determining Mind do? It brought about the condition in which the things-that-are existed, and it did so not by generating them (since they are ungenerated) but by defining/delimiting/determining their individual nature. Prior to the action of defining/delimiting/determining Mind, nothing determinate existed. No fire, no air, nothing that would count as an individual entity. We might think of some kind of proto-matter; something that has common points with Plato’s receptacle or Aristotle’s prime matter, something which by itself is nothing but which could and did become things of various sorts when defining/delimiting/ determining Mind did its work.

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 79

5 What does DA mean by “dominate” (ἐπικρατεῖν)? The word ἐπικρατεῖν (which I translate as “dominate”) appears six times in the Derveni Papyrus. Describing the fiery pre-cosmic stage, DA says whatever is kindled is dominated, and when dominated it is mixed with the other things. (IX.9–10) Later on he tells us that the things-that-are are called each one after what dominates (...) Air dominates all things as much as it wishes. (XIX.1–4) In addition he says that the particles of fire that constitute the stars are invisible because they are dominated by the sun (XXV.4–5) and they are dominated on account of their smallness. (XXV.6) Fire dominates in the fiery pre-cosmic stage and air dominates in the cosmic stage. In the fiery pre-cosmic stage fire is totally dominant; nothing but fire is visible (or would be visible if there were anyone to observe it), even though the (other) things-that-are are in the mixture. The dominant fire is mixed up with the other things-that-are and agitates them, so that they are prevented by the heat from combining to form things-that-are-now. Of course this does not mean that fire suppresses the existence of the things-that-are, which as noted above (p. 74) are ungenerated and imperishable, much less that it devours them and turns them into fire. This interpretation of fire’s domination is very different from the interpretation proposed very recently by Ekaterina Matusova. Matusova, correctly in my view, understands the sun’s domination of the stars during daytime:5 the stars 5 Matusova (2016) 125.

80 

 Richard D. McKirahan

still exist during the day but they cannot be seen because of the overwhelming light of the sun. She goes on to analyse the dominance of fire in the pre-cosmic ‘Kronos phase’ as follows: “whatever is seized by fire becomes deprived of its particular characteristics, because the seized matter becomes only food for fire and is ultimately destined to become fire.”6 This interpretation is based on a certain understanding of the description of the ‘Kronos phase’: (...) when fire is mixed up with the other things it agitates the things-that-are and prevents them from combining (IX.5–6). Significantly, Matusova renders (incorrectly) τὰ ὄντα not as ‘things-that-are’ but as ‘things to be,’ which suggests that they are not yet, and she appears to hold that they ‘are’ only after the ‘Kronos phase’ has ended. However, these lines support the view that the things-that-are (which are eternal) are not consumed by the fire, only agitated, and the extraction of most of the fire to form the sun did not save them from extinction, but merely allowed them to dominate locally and to form into temporary compounds – the ‘things-that-are-now.’ In the cosmic stage air dominates in a different way. It “dominates all things as much as it wishes.” The volition and control implied in the word “wishes” are reflections of the fact that the air is intelligent. But dominating as much it wishes suggests that it does not dominate to the same extent that fire did. Proof of this is that other things than air are visible in the cosmos. In fact, DA provides us with an example, the fire that constitutes the sun and the stars. We call these fire because (by the principle that “the things-that-are are called each one after what dominates” [XIX.1–2]) fire dominates in them. The stars are invisible during daytime because they are dominated by the sun. They are still there, but their puny light is overwhelmed by the sun’s brightness. But the fact that when we look up at the heavens (at different times of day) sometimes we see the sun and sometimes we see the stars means that these are cases where air does not wish to dominate globally and allows fire to dominate locally. This is how the cosmos can exist under air’s domination, how it can develop, how entities (things-that-are-now) can be generated and perish, as well as change and move. Air is in control overall. Air keeps the sun in its place and keeps the stars from joining to the sun, which would lead to another condition of excessive heat that would put an end to the cosmos (XXV.8–9). And air allows other things to dominate locally, temporarily, in the orderly progression which constitutes the cosmos.

6 Ibid.

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 81

6 (A) In what sense are all things called Zeus? or (B) In what sense is Zeus called all things? Both (A) and (B) are possible translations of XIX.2–3. Translators have preferred translation (A), but translation (B) has recently been proposed and defended.7 I believe that translation (A), in which “all things” is the subject and “Zeus” is the predicate, is correct, primarily because it makes the best sense in its immediate context, which is as follows: (…) the things-that-are are called each one after what dominates. According to the same principle all things were called Zeus. For air dominates all things as much as it wishes. (XIX.1–3) The word “for” (γάρ) in XIX.2 shows that this is intended as an argument whose conclusion is “all things were called Zeus.” The argument needs unpacking. Most importantly, Zeus is the allegorical name of the intelligent air that governs the cosmos. Making this substitution and rearranging the claims to give a clearer logical order, we have: (a) The things-that-are are called each one after what dominates. (b) Air/Zeus dominates all things as much as it wishes. (c) Therefore, according to the principle stated in (a), all things were called air/Zeus. From the point of view of logic, this is not very tidy: in (b) “as much as it wishes” is superfluous, and in (c) the past tense of the verb is unexpected. But the reasoning is clear enough. Still, it leaves an important question: how are we to understand the conclusion (c), which appears obviously false? This question provoked the recent paper mentioned above, whose author believes that the answer supplied by translation (B), which takes “Zeus” as subject and “all things” as predicate, solves it. The author believes that the reasoning goes through, but I disagree, since this amounts to changing (c) to (c*): Therefore, according to the principle stated in (a), air/Zeus was called all things. And this does not follow in any sense from (a) and (b). But if it is agreed that translation (A) is better in this respect than translation (B), there remains the obvious problem that not all things are called Zeus. I do not have the time here to go through the arguments offered in favor of translation (B) (which I do not find convincing). I shall just sketch my solution to the problem at hand. I suppose that 7 Matusova (2016) 130.

82 

 Richard D. McKirahan

if (as I think) translation (A) is preferable as it stands in context, and a plausible solution is found for the problem it raises I need do no more. I offer two solutions, a simple one and one that is more complex and, I think, more compelling. The simple solution is that although there are many different things in the cosmos that are called by different names (because different things dominate in them), the cosmos as a whole is dominated by air/Zeus and we can refer to it as such. We live in the reign of Zeus in the same way as the pre-cosmic state was the reign of Kronos. This would suit the context well enough, since in the previous columns DA has been speaking of the greatness of Zeus in similarly hyperbolic terms. It also finds support in the interpretation given above of DA’s assertion that in the cosmic phase air is dominant, but it “dominates all things as much as it wishes”: it dominates globally, but permits other things-that-are to dominate locally. The other (and not incompatible) solution is to consider the assertion (c) (“all things were called air/Zeus”) together with the equally difficult assertion: he himself/it itself, therefore came to be alone (XVI.9) If this statement is taken to mean that there was a period (even an instant) when there was only one entity, namely Zeus (or Air), this is incompatible with the ontology of DC, for which it is a fundamental principle that there never was nor will there ever be a time when the things-that-are were not or will not be. But there is good reason to suppose that this is not what DA meant to claim. In the first place, the statement is not part of DC; it is quoted from DP. And (doubtless because it is apparently at odds with the ontology and cosmology of DC) DA immediately afterwards offers an interpretation on which the statement is consistent with DC and avoids the apparent contradiction. Referring to this passage DA says: In saying this he [Orpheus, the supposed author of DP] shows that Mind, being alone, is worth everything [as] if the others were nothing. For without Mind it is not possible for the things-that-are-now to be [through them (?). Further in the next verse he says that Mind] is worth everything: [He is now] king of all things [and will be] afterwards. [Clearly (?)] Mind and [the king of all things (?) are the] same thing. (XVI.9–15) That is, DA interprets the assertion in DP that Mind “came to be alone” as meaning that the things-that-are-now, or generally the cosmos, could not exist if Mind had not come to be dominant; the (other) things-that-are, although existing eternally,

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 83

could not have formed a cosmos except under the intelligent guidance – that is, the dominance – of Mind (which in this phase of cosmic history is identified with air and Zeus). Thus DA, explaining further why all things are called Zeus, says: the intelligence of Zeus sanctioned the way in which the things-that-are, the things-that-come-to-be, and the ⌊things-that-will-be should come to be, and be, and cease. (XIX.5–7) So in that Zeus = Mind = intelligent air, (a) Zeus formed the cosmos, (b) Zeus alone “is worth everything as if the others were nothing,” and this is why (according to DA) (c) Zeus is the name of all things. We may find this explanation odd, but – odd or not – that is the message of these passages in cols. XVI and XIX.

7 Will the cosmos last forever? DA certainly appears to state that it will not: [Zeus] will continue to be its [air’s] name until the things-that-are-now are formed into the same state in which they were previously floating as things-that-are. (XVII.7–9) The same word, “floating” (αἰωρεῖσθαι),8 is found twice in col. XXV, where DA describes the tiny particles of fire that are the stars as now in air

floating far from one another. (...) Each of them floats in necessity in order for them not to come together with one another. (XXV.3–4; 7–8) So “floating” describes the situation of individual, uncompounded particles of things-that-are. At present such particles float in air, or, more generally, “in necessity” which I take to mean that the all-controlling air prevents them from coming together with one another. So XVII.7–9 will be saying that at some time

8 Cf. Funghi (1980) 185 ff.

84 

 Richard D. McKirahan

after now, the cosmos (the organized totality of things-that-are-now) will cease to be and the things-that-are will revert to a disunited and disorganized condition. I think that this is the correct interpretation; but there is more to be said since it has recently been argued that the reign of Zeus/air, that is, the present phase of cosmic history, will continue forever. Some textual basis is presented for this: the statements [A] This [air/Zeus] will be “last” (ὕστατον). (XVII.6) and [B] He is now king of all things and will be afterwards (ἔπειτα). (XVI.14) [A] seems to say that the present cosmos is the final state. However, it is important to note that it is in fact the beginning of the sentence quoted above, which in full reads: And he said that this will be “last” because it was named Zeus, and this will continue to be its name until the things-that-are-now are formed into the same state in which they were previously floating as things-that-are. (XVII.7–9) The sentence contains two apparently incompatible claims: (a) that the reign of Zeus is the final stage and (b) that the reign of Zeus will be succeeded by a different state. If the decision is to be made solely on the basis of the text of the Derveni Papyrus, it will be necessary to account for the potentially conflicting evidence. I believe that it is possible to do this and to preserve the obvious meaning of XVII.8–9, that the present cosmos will come to an end and afterwards the thingsthat-are will once again be unordered and uncombined particles. I will discuss the two pieces of apparently conflicting evidence in turn. First, in [B] the word “afterwards” (ἔπειτα) can simply mean that something will continue, with no suggestion that it will continue forever. There is ample evidence of this meaning in 5th-cent. BC texts. Herodotus’ statement that the Trojans then and afterwards (μετέπειτα) told the same story (that Helen was in Egypt, not Troy)9 does not imply that they are still telling it now and that they will do so forever. When the Chorus in Euripides’ Alcestis says that Admetus will have an unlivable life afterwards (τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον)10 it does not mean 9 Hdt. 2.118. 10 Eur. Alc. 243.

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 85

to imply that Admetus is immortal. And when Thucydides reports that the few Athenians who recovered from the plague believed that they were safe from disease for the future (ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον)11 he does not think that in their folly they believed that they would continue to live forever. In these passages the context makes clear that the time spans indicated by ἔπειτα and μετέπειτα are not unlimited. Since there were no Trojans alive for long after the city was destroyed at the end of the Trojan War, there were no Trojans to keep telling the Trojan version of the story. That is how we naturally understand Herodotus’s sentence. As for the passages in Euripides and Thucydides, they clearly are restricted to the lifetimes of Admetus in the one case and the plague-survivors in the other. In the case of the Derveni Papyrus, if the context sets a limit to the length of time that Zeus is the king of all, this will be the limit of Zeus’s reign. And this limit is stated expressly: Zeus will be the king of all until the things that-are-now are formed into the same state in which they were previously floating as things-that-are. (XVII.7–9) Second, the word “last” (ὕστατον) in passage [A] is taken from DP. This is worth keeping in mind. Whatever it may have meant in DP, what counts for present purposes is not how DP should be interpreted but how DA interprets it. In DP it refers to Zeus and it may mean that Zeus’s reign will never cease, but in the sentence in which it occurs in the Derveni Papyrus, it refers to air, not Zeus, as is clear from the translation below, in which the relevant sentence is to be understood as “he said that this [air] will be ‘last’ because it [air] was named Zeus, and this [Zeus] will continue to be its name (...).” Further this same sentence provides a context that sets a limit to how long, according to DC, this phase of cosmic history will last. Why it was called air has been shown above. It was thought to have come to be because it had been named Zeus, as if it previously were not a thing-that-is. And he said that this will be ‘last’ because it was named Zeus, and this will continue to be its name until the things-that-are-now are formed into the same state in which they were previously floating as things-that-are. (XVII.3–9)

11 Thuc. 2.51.

86 

 Richard D. McKirahan

If the present phase of cosmic history comes to an end and afterwards there obtains a state that had obtained before the cosmos was constituted, then there are two ways in which the present phase is last. It is the last phase so far, and it is also the last new phase. Another solution is also available: translate ὕστατον as “latest.” If the present stage is the latest nothing is said to prevent still later phases from occurring. On this rendering the difficulty disappears. Of course these are many more controversial topics in DC and I do not claim to have settled the few I have discussed here. But I hope that I have succeeded in clarifying some issues and that I have advanced the conversation around them.

Appendix of texts PDerv. Col. VIII.1–12  (…) he shows [in this] verse: who were born from Zeus, the [exceedingly mighty] king. And how they begin he shows in this: When Zeus from his father took the prophesied rule 5 and the strength in his hands, and the glorious divinity. It is not noticed that these words are transposed. This is how they should be taken: “When Zeus took the strength from his father and the glorious divinity.” When taken this way (…) not that Zeus hears 10 [his father] but that he takes the strength [from him]. If taken [the other way he might seem to have taken the strength] contrary to the prophesies. (…) Col. IX.5–10  5 Now knowing that when fire is mixed up with the other things it agitates the things-that-are and prevents them from ˻combining because of fomentation, he removed it far enough for it not, once it is removed, to prevent the things-that-are from being compounded. For whatever is kindled is dominated, and when dominated it is mixed 10 with the other things.

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 87

Col. X.11–13 By calling her “nurse” he says in riddles that whatever the sun dissolves [by heating] the night [combines by cooling] (…) 13 whatever the sun heated. Col. XI.1–10 (…) of Night. [He says] that she “proclaims oracles from the ˻[innermost shrine (ἄδυτον)],” intending that the depth of the night is “never setting” (ἄδυτον). [For] it does not set as the light does, but the sunlight overtakes it as it remains in the same place. 5 Further, “proclaim oracles” and “assist” mean the same thing. But it is important to consider what “assist” and “proclaim oracles” apply to. “Believing that this god proclaims oracles, they come to find out what they should do.” [After this] he says: 10 [And she] proclaimed all that it was [right] for him [to accomplish]. (…) Col. XIII.1–11 When Zeus, having heard prophecies from his father. For he did not hear this, but it has been shown in what way he heard. Nor does Night give orders, but he makes it clear by saying as ˻follows: He swallowed the genital organ, who was first to spring out of the aithêr. 5 Because in all his poetry he is speaking in riddles about things, it is necessary to discuss each word individually. Seeing that people believe that generation depends on the [genital organs] and that without the genital organs there is no coming to be, he used this ˻word, likening the sun to a genital organ, 10 since without the sun it would be impossible for the things-that-are to come to be as they are (…) Col. XIV.1–14

(…) spring out of the brightest and hottest, which had been separated from itself. And so he says that this Kronos was born to Helios (sun) and Ge (earth) because it was through the sun that he was the cause of their ˻ striking against one another.

88 

 Richard D. McKirahan

5 This is why he says, Who did a great deed. And the next verse, Ouranos (Heaven), son of Evening, who was the first of all to reign. Mind that strikes against one another he named ˻Kronos and says that he did a great deed to Ouranos, since he deprived him of the kingship. He named him Kronos from his 10 deed and the other things according to the [same] principle. For when all the things-that-are [? were not yet being struck, Mind,] as [defining (ὁρίζων) (?)] nature, [received the designation Ouranos. He says that he (?)] was deprived [of his kingship when the things-that-are were being struck.] Col. XV.3–5 For when the sun was being separated and confined in the middle coagulated them and it holds them fast, both those ˻above the sun 5 and those below. Col. XVI.1–15 It has been shown [that] he called the sun a [genital organ]. He also says that the things-that-are-now come to be from things-that-exist: Of the genital organ of the first born king, on which all the immortals grew, blessed gods and goddesses, 5 and rivers and lovely springs, and all other things that had then been born, and he himself, therefore, came to be alone. In these verses he indicates that the things-that-are existed always and the things-that-are-now come to be from things-that-exist. As for , “he himself, therefore, came to be alone,” in saying this he ˻shows 10 that Mind, being alone, is worth everything [as] if the others were nothing. For without Mind it is not possible for the things-that-are-now to be [? through them]. [Further in the next verse after this he said that Mind] is worth everything: [He is now] king of all things [and will be] afterwards. 15 [Clearly (?)] Mind and [the king of all things are the (?)] same thing. Col. XVII.2–9 Air was a thing-that-is before the things-that-are-now were formed, and it always will be. For it did not come to be but it was. Why it was called air has been shown above. It was thought to have come to be

3 Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology 

 89

5 because it had been named Zeus, as if it previously were not a thing that is. And he said that this will be “last” because it was named Zeus and this will continue to be its name until the things-that-are-now are formed into the same state in which they were previously floating as things-that-are. Col. XIX.1–7 (…) the things-that-are are called each one after what dominates. According to the same principle all things were called Zeus. For air dominates all things as much as it wishes. In saying “Moira spun” 5 they are saying that the intelligence of Zeus sanctioned the way in which the things-that-are, the things-that-come-to-be, ˻and the things-that-will-be should come to be, and be, and cease. Col. XXV.3–12 There are others too now in air floating far from one another, but by day they are invisible 5 because they are dominated by the sun, while at night it is evident that they are. They are dominated on account of their ˻smallness. Each of them floats in necessity in order for them not to come together with one another. Otherwise all that have the same property as those from which the sun was formed would come together in a ˻mass. 10 If the god did not want the things-that-are-now to exist, he would not have made the sun. But he made it the sort and size of thing as is related at the beginning of the account. Herodotus 2.118 When had reached the city wall they demanded Helen back together with the money Alexander had stolen, and reparations as well. But the Trojans told the same story then and afterwards (τότε καὶ μετέπειτα), both on oath and without an oath, that they did not have Helen or the money either, but that it was all in Egypt. Euripides, Alcestis 240–243 Observing the present misfortune / of the king, who has this excellent / wife but will have an unlivable / life afterwards (τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον).

90 

 Richard D. McKirahan

Thucydides 2.51 And such persons not only received the congratulations of others, but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half entertained the vain hope that they were for the future (ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον) safe from any disease whatsoever.

References Bernabé (2007): Alberto Bernabé, “The Derveni Papyrus: Many Questions and Some Answers”, in: HSCPh 103, 99–133. Bernabé (2013): Alberto Bernabé, “The Cosmogony of the Derveni Papyrus: The Last of the Cosmogonies”, in: Littera Antiqua (online: www.litant.eu) 7, 4–31. Betegh (2004): Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation, Cambridge. Funghi (1980): Maria S. Funghi, “Il mito escatologico del Fedone e la forza vitale dell’aiora”, in: PdP 35, 176–201. Matusova (2016): Ekaterina Matusova, “Between Exegesis and Philosophy: Philosophical Generalisations in cols. XVI, XVII and XIX of the Derveni Papyrus in Light of Interpretive Stragegy”, in: AGPh 98, 113–143. McKirahan (2013): Richard D. McKirahan, “The Cosmogonic Moment in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Richard Patterson, Vassilis Karasmanis and Arnold Hermann (eds.) Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, Las Vegas, 79–110. McKirahan (20112): Richard D. McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary, Indianapolis/Cambridge (MA) (1st ed. 1994).

Marco A. Santamaría

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 1 Introduction Antiquity bestowed two-fold honours on the evanescent and fascinating figure of Pherecydes of Syros (6th cent. BC): that of being the first prose writer1 and the first myth-maker to set foot in philosophical thought. Indeed, Aristotle famously included him among those “mixed” (μεμιγμένοι) theologians (that is, those who spoke about the origins of the gods), as he did not say everything mythically (μυθικῶς) and posited the first generative principle as the best, in which regard he is closer to the natural philosophers (such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras) than to the ancient poets, who do not place the first entities (Night and Heaven, Chaos or Oceanus) as the rulers, but Zeus, who appears later.2 This position as pioneer in the use of prose and precursor of philosophy renders Pherecydes an original author always worth revisiting. This paper will focus on a fragment preserved in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus, which narrates a peculiar cosmogony in the context of a wedding, and on two passages regarding his work and his life, respectively, from the Herculaneum library.

1 Most scholars think that this tradition is right: for example Schibli (1990) 4; Laks (2001) 10–11; Granger (2007) 137. The main information about Pherecydes’ life and work and a complete bibliography can be found in Macris/Goulet (2012). 2 Arist. Metaph. 14.4.1091b4–10 (= fr. 81 Schibli). Cf. Schibli (1990) 89–93 and Laks (2009), whom I follow in his proposal not to eliminate καὶ before τῷ μὴ μυθικῶς and to interpret it as “also,” assuming that, for Aristotle, Pherecydes is among the mixed thinkers (and can be distinguished from the poets) for positing the first generative principle as the best and also for not saying everything mythically. Palmer (2000) analyses Aristotle’s view on the theologians. On Pherecydes’ connections with early philosophy, see Granger (2007). Note: This article has been written within the framework of a research project supported by the Spanish “Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad” FFI2015–66484–P. Marco A. Santamaría, University of Salamanca https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-005

92 

 Marco A. Santamaría

2 The wedding of Zas and Chthonie ( PGrenf. II 11) Among the first documents to be unearthed by Bernard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt from the fruitful rubbish mound of Oxyrhynchus in the late 19th cent., a papyrus with two consecutive columns from Pherecydes of Syros’ book was found.3 It was published soon after, in 1897, in the second of two volumes4 previous to the Oxyrhynchus papyri series, which began a year later. The text is remarkable for being the longest literal fragment we possess of this author. It was identified by Walter Leaf on the basis of a quotation by Clement of Alexandria5 of ll. 14–18 of col. I, which allows the text of the papyrus to be reconstructed. It has been dated to the 3rd cent. AD and confirms the claims of Diogenes Laërtius6 that Pherecydes’ book was still available during their time. We can be sure that this papyrus is part of the complete book and not of an anthology thanks to the stichometric sign on the left of col. II.3, a stigma with the value of 600 indicating the line number. The extremely simple style and the Ionic dialect (ἡμέρη, σέο, ποιεῦσιν along with the form ποιοῦσιν) confirm that the text is originally from Pherecydes. PGrenf. II 11 (= Pherec. fr. 68 Schibli) Col. I

[αὐτῶι ποιεῦσιν τὰ ο[ἰ]κία πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐξετέ5 λεσαν πάντα καὶ χρήματα καὶ θεράποντας

3 The title that it bore, not attributable to the author, is not certain. The Suda Lexicon (s.v. Φερεκύδης = fr. 2 Schibli) calls it Ἑπτάμυχος ἤτοι Θεοκρασία ἢ Θεογονία, Seven­nook Mixing of gods or Birth of the Gods, but Damascius (De princ. 3.2.3, III, pp. 164–165 Westerink/ Combès = 124bis Ruelle = fr. 60 Schibli) speaks of a five-nook generation (πεντέμυχος γενεά). This led West (1971) 8 and 13, among others, to correct Ἑπτάμυχος into ῾Πεντάμυχος, which seems right. G. S. Kirk ap. KRS, 51 and 58–59 prefers Ἑπτάμυχος. According to Schibli (1990) 46–49, Pherecydes spoke of five nooks, so πεντέμυχος γενεά would be a correct description; the nooks were confused with the seven regions or μοῖραι he distinguished, which originated the reading ἑπτάμυχος, “a misunderstanding that may date to Hellenistic times” (ibid. 48). 4 Grenfell (1896) and Grenfell/Hunt (1897). 5 Clem. Al. Strom. 6.2.9.4 (= fr. 69 Schibli). 6 Diog. Laërt. 1.119 (= fr. 14 Schibli): Σώζεται δὲ τοῦ Συρίου τό τε βιβλίον ὃ συνέγραψεν; Celsus (2nd cent. AD) ap. Orig. C. Cels. 6.42 (= fr. 83 Schibli), offers a literal quotation of the book.

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 93

καὶ θεραπαίνας καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα δεῖ πάντα, ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα ἑτοῖ10 μα γίγνεται, τὸν γάμον ποιεῦσιν. κἀπειδὴ τρίτη ἡμέρη γίγνεται τῶι γάμωι, τότε Ζὰς ποιεῖ φᾶρος μέ15 γα τε καὶ καλὸν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῶ[ι] π̣ο̣ι ̣κ̣[ίλλει Γῆν καὶ Ὠγη[νὸν καὶ τὰ Ὠγηνοῦ [δώματα · · · · · · · · · ]π̣ι ̣[ · · · · · · · · · · · · · 1–2 [αὐ]τῶι Diels || 2 ποιοῦσιν P, cf. 11 ποιεῦσιν || 16–18 ex Clem. Al. Strom. 6.2.9.4 || 16 ποιεῖ Diels || 19 π̣ι Grenfell ̣ : γ ι̣ ι̣ ̣ West (…) for him (sc. Zas) they fashion the palaces both many and great; and when they had accomplished all these things, also the necessities and manservants and maidservants and as many other things as are necessary, when everything is ready, they perform the wedding. And when it is the third day of the wedding, then Zas fashions a robe both big and beautiful, and on it he embroiders Earth and Ogenos and the abodes of Ogenos (…)

Col. II

5

10

14 16

[βουλόμενος γὰρ σέο τοὺς γάμου̣[ς εἶναι, τούτωι σε τιμ̣[έω. σὺ δέ μοι χαῖρε καὶ σ̣ύ̣[νι]σθι. ταῦτά φασιν ἀν̣[ακαλυπτήρια πρῶτον γενέσθαι, ἐκ το̣ύ̣του δ̣[ὲ ὁ νόμος ἐγένε[το] καὶ ̣ θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρ̣[ώπ]ο̣ι ̣σιν. ἡ δέ μι[ν ἀμείβεται δ̣ε̣ξαμ̣[ένη εὑ τὸ φᾶ̣[ρος · · · · · · · · · · · · σ̣[ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · κ̣λ[ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · deest versus 1 θ ·[ · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

94 

 Marco A. Santamaría

1 [βουλόμενος Weil, Blass || 3 ϛ (600) in marg. || τιμ̣[έω vel τιμ̣[ῶ || 4–5 σ̣ύ̣[νι]σθι Blass : ̣ρ̣[ ̣ ̣] ισθι Grenfell || 10–12 suppl. Diels || 13 σ[ Grenfell : ε . [ West || 14 κλ[ Grenfell : ζ̣ι[ West || 15 ο̣[ Grenfell || 16 θρ̣[ Grenfell “(…) since I wish marriages to be yours, I honour you with this. Receive my salutation and be my consort.” These they say were the first anakalypteria, and hence arose the custom for both gods and men. And she responds, receiving the robe from him (…)7

The fragment is part of the narration of the wedding between Zas and Chthonie,8 two of the three divine primordial entities mentioned at the beginning of the work,9 along with Chronos. The sign for 600 in the left margin before col. II.3 indicates that the episode did not occur at the very beginning of the book, but rather in the middle.10 It probably took place after the first important episode of the story, when Chronos creates fire, pneuma and water from his own seed and deposits them in five nooks, giving birth to a generation of gods,11 and before another remarkable event, when the same god fights and defeats Ophioneus.12 The key sentence of this fragment was known to us through Clement’s quotation,13 but the papyrus provides us with the narrative context of the action. Zas weaves (ποιεῖ) a cloak, on which he embroiders (ποικίλλει) the earthly surface, including Ge and Ogenos (another name for Oceanus) and Ogenos’ houses14 as a wedding present for Chthonie.15 Clement quotes this sentence, in a long list of cases of plagiarism, as a piece of evidence that Pherecydes copied Hom. Il. 18.483 and 607,16 on Hephaestus’ representation of the earth, the heaven, the sea, and the 7 Transl. by H. S. Schibli. 8 On this episode, see West (1963) 164–167; (1971) 15–20 and 52–55; G. S. Kirk ap. KRS, 60–62; Lisi (1985) 268–269 and 272; Schibli (1990) 50–69; Scheid/Svenbro (1996) 63–66; Martínez Nieto (2000) 98–102; Granger (2007) 141–142 and 152–153; Saudelli (2011); and Palomar (2012). 9 Diog. Laërt. 1.119 (= fr. 14 Schibli). 10 If we suppose that each column contains 40 lines, there would be 15 columns before col. II; if we think in columns of 20 lines, there would be 30 columns. 11 Dam. De princ. 3.2.3, III, pp. 164–165 Westerink/Combès (= 124bis Ruelle = fr. 60 Schibli). 12 West (1963) 160–161. It is Orig. C. Cels. 6.42 (= fr. 78 Schibli). 13 Clem. Al. Strom. 6.2.9.4 (= fr. 69 Schibli): Φερεκύδης ὁ Σύριος λέγει· “Ζὰς ποιεῖ φᾶρος μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῶι ποικίλλει Γῆν καὶ Ὠγηνὸν καὶ τὰ Ὠγηνοῦ δώματα.” 14 The clearest precedent, as Saudelli (2012) 84 remarks, is Oceanus’ and Tethys’ houses (δόμοισιν) mentioned in Hom. Il. 14.202, where Hera claims to have been reared by them. She also indicates (84 n. 21) that Poseidon built houses in the depths of a lake (Hom. Il. 13.21–22: Αἰγάς, ἔνθα δέ οἱ κλυτὰ δώματα βένθεσι λίμνης / χρύσεα μαρμαίροντα τετεύχαται ἄφθιτα αἰεί). 15 In her intriguing article, Palomar (2012) 254–255 highlights the erotic connotation of the cloak, which in some vase paintings acts as a prolongation of the male’s body in the conjugal union. 16 Ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ’, ἐν δ’ οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν (483); ἐν δ’ ἐτίθει ποταμοῖο μέγα σθένος Ὠκεανοῖο (607).

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 95

ocean on Achilles’ shield. This author is right in connecting both passages, since Achilles’ shield is an image of the world,17 including even the sun, the moon, and the stars (18.484–485). Hephaestus’ work is also described with the verbs ποιέω and ποικίλλω.18 Since craftsmanship is typical of this god and of Athena, it is a remarkable novelty that another god should be presented fashioning objects. Specifically, weaving and embroidering a cloak was a feminine labour suitable for that goddess, not for a male god such as Zas.19 Pherecydes probably attributed it to him in order to shock the reader, making it clear that Zas may be similar to Zeus in name and importance, but his actions are very different.20 With this same purpose, to question the vision of the gods in the poetic tradition, he transforms the traditional names of the gods into his own variants (Zas, Chronos, Chthonie, Ogenos) and deliberately imitates the dactylic rhythm of epic poetry,21 but chooses prose to convey his divine narratives and mark them as a new kind of discourse. It is also possible that Pherecydes presented the manufacturing of the cloak as an image of his own work. By assigning Zas a task unfit for a male god, such as webbing and embroidering, he intended to show that the elaboration of an artistic product was a noble activity, similar to the composition of his book, which is not inspired by the Muses as is the case for poetry, rather it is elaborated with care to provide it with a rhythmic effect.22 In this way, Zas’ craftsmanship serves as an antecedent and model for Pherecydes to create a piece of art that can be described as ποικίλος, like the cloak that Zas gifts to Chthonie. The following text of col. I must have referred to other figures represented on the cloak and recorded the words of Zas to his bride, which ended with the first sentence in col. II. When Zas hands the cloak to Chthonie as his wedding present, he proclaims that these are her nuptials23 and he is honouring her with bestowal 17 It is called κόσμου μίμημα in Schol. ad Arat. 26.16. 18 Ἐν δὲ δύω ποίησε πόλεις (Il. 18.490); ἐν δ’ ἀγέλην ποίησε βοῶν (Il. 18.573); ἐν δὲ νομὸν ποίησε (Il. 18.587); ἐν δὲ χορὸν ποίκιλλε (Il. 18.590). 19 G. S. Kirk ap. KRS, 61: Zas undertakes an “unmasculine task”; Granger (2007) 152–153; Palomar (2012) 253. 20 Granger (2007) 152: “Pherecydes is all the more daring, even provoking, in his vivid portrait of his supreme god Zas as a creator-god.” 21 On this aspect, see Gheerbrant (2018) 380: “[Phérécyde] emploie les codes de constitution du discours dont il cherche à se distinguer (la poésie épico-théogonique en hexamètre dactylique), afin d’introduire une distance critique par rapport aux énoncés poétiques.” 22 Coexisting with the idea of inspiration, in Homer and the lyric poets the comparison of poetic composition with weaving is frequent, as Snyder (1981) showed. It is in the basis of the term ‘text.’ For the metaphors of poems as other kinds of artefacts, such as statues and buildings, see Ford (2002) ch. 5. 23 The main verb of εἶναι could well be H. Weil’s βουλόμενος, or a participle meaning “making known” or something similar (West [1963] 166); τοὺς γάμου̣[ς can allude to this particular union

96 

 Marco A. Santamaría

of the cloak. Pherecydes interrupts the narration with the remark that Zas’ and Chthonie’s wedding serves as an aition for the custom of the anakalypteria on the third day of weddings, in which the bride takes οff her veil and receives her presents from the groom.24 In the second sentence of the book, Pherecydes foreshadows that the name of Chthonie becomes Ge when Zas gives her the cloak (Χθονίῃ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζὰς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ).25 This means that when Chthonie, who embodies the subterranean part of the earth,26 wears the cloak that represents the earth’s surface,27 the image is transformed into the thing itself (called γῆ by Pherecydes) and Chthonie incorporates it as part of herself and becomes the earth in its entirety (called Γῆ). The transformation of the cloak is of enormous significance, since it turns the wedding into a cosmic event that prompts the definitive configuration of the world.28 Zas is revealed not only as an artisan, but as a true demiurge, a very unusual figure before Plato’s Timaeus, which crops up for the first time in Greek literature here.29 The fact that the cloak is called beautiful and is the result of a precise plan and a skilful task implies that the world (or at least its surface) is conceived as a kosmos 30 and responds to a teleological project.31 Furthermore, Zas’ words indicate that the cloak is not only a physical present, but an honor (τιμή), which establishes the earth and the Ocean as Chthonie’s sphere of influence,32 her γέρας, a term that simultaneously denotes gift and prerogative. Pherecydes must be following the Hesiodic tradition, since in the Theogony the supreme god, Chronos or Zeus, is the one who distributes γέρας or τιμαί to the gods.33 (West [1971] 20), which is likelier for me, or to weddings in general (G. S. Kirk ap. KRS, 61), which from this moment would be under her protection; for Schibli (1990) 62, both senses are present. 24 Harp. s.v.; Poll. Onom. 3.36; Hsch. s.v. ἀνακαλυπτήριον· ὅτε τὴν νύμφην πρῶτον ἐξάγουσιν τοῦ θαλάμου τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. On this costum, see Schibli (1990) 61–69. 25 Diog. Laërt. 1.119 (= fr. 14 Schibli). 26 See Lisi (1985) 268–269; Palomar (2012) 254; G. S. Kirk ap. KRS, 61: “Chthonie initially represents the solid structure of earth rather than its variegated surface.” 27 It is a kind of map: West (1971) 19; in 20 he calls it “cartographic robe”; Granger (2007) 152. 28 West (1963) 168; Schibli (1990) 54: “with the creation of land and waters, the Pherecydean cosmos is complete.” 29 Proclus (In Ti. 32c, 2.54.28 Diehl = fr. 27 Schibli) uses the verb δημιουργεῖν to describe the actions of Zeus (Zas). For the possible allusions to a creator god before the Timaeus, see Classen (1962). 30 See the brilliant formulation of Schibli (1990) 56. 31 I have taken most of this paragraph from Santamaría (forthcoming). 32 Schibli (1990) 52. 33 (Zeus) εὖ δὲ ἕκαστα / ἀθανάτοις διέταξε νόμους καὶ ἐπέφραδε τιμάς (74–75); (the gods) ὡς τιμὰς διέλοντο (112); (Chronos) ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ’ ἀγέραστος, / τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν (395–396); (Zeus) ὁ δὲ τοῖσιν ἐὺ διεδάσσατο τιμάς (885). See Schibli (1990) 52–53.

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 97

From a bibliological perspective, the Pherecydes papyrus is of enormous value because it preserves one of the extremely rare fragments from a book of early Greek prose, the only other case being a papyrus from a work of the 5th cent. BC, probably from Hellanicus of Lesbos’ Atlantis.34

3 Doxography on first principles (Philodemus’ De pietate) Two further testimonies regarding Pherecydes in the papyri are found in the Herculaneum library, one in Philodemus’ De pietate and the other in an untitled work, possibly by the same author. The first reference to Pherecydes appears in PHerc. 247, col. 6a (sin. pars) Schober, which is the continuation of PHerc. 1610, col. 3 Schober,35 from the so-called ‘second part’ of Philodemus’ De pietate. In this section, he condemns the ideas of the poets and theologians about the gods and shows their errors and impiety. The author forms long doxographical lists in which he summarizes the views of plenty of poets and mythographers on diverse main themes.36 The fragment we are going to deal with is devoted to the ideas of many authors about the first gods and ancestors of all the rest, a subject explored at the beginning of the second part of De pietate: Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1610, col. 3 + PHerc. 247, col. 6a (sin. pars) (p. 77 Schober [1988])37 col. 3 · · · διταγηιο · · · · τακαι τα τιν]ὲς δὲ τού[τους τὰ] σ̣ύμπαντά [φα-

34 Hellan. Lesb. fr. 19b Fowler (= POxy. VIII 1084, from the early 2nd cent. AD). In favour of Hellanicus: Thomas (2007) and Fowler (2013) 417–418 (“general probability is in favour of Hellanikean authorship. The style is early.”). 35 The first to realize this fact was A. Schober in his 1923 Königsberg dissertation: see Schober (1988) 77. 36 See Salati (2012) 211. 37 I follow Schober’s text (1988) 77, with some additions from Henrichs (1972) 77 and 78 n. 32; Fowler (2001) 7 (ad. Acus. fr. 6d) and Obbink (2011).

98 

 Marco A. Santamaría

5

σι τ]ε͙κεῖν. ἐμ μέν τισι]ν ἐκ Ν͙υκτὸς καὶ Ταρ]τάρου λέγεται τὰ π]άντα, ἐν δέ τισιν ἐ]ξ͙ Ἅιδου καὶ Δι10 · · ·]μ· ὁ δὲ τὴν Τιτανομαχίαν γράψας ἐξ] Αἰθέρος φησίν], Ἀκουσί[λ]αος δ’ ἐκ] Χάους πρώτου 15 τἆ]λ̣λα. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνα]φερομένο͙ι͙ς εἰς Μου]σ͙αῖον γέγραπται Τάρτ]αρον πρῶτον καὶ Ν]ύκτα [τε] καὶ // col. 6a τρίτον] Ἀ͙έρα γεγονέναι], ἐν δὲ τοῖς εἰς Ἐπι]μενίδην ἐξ Ἀέρος] καὶ Νυκτὸς 5 πάντα σ]υστῆναι λέγεται.] Ὅμηρος δ’ ἀποφαί]νετ’ Ὠκεανὸν ἐκ] Τηθ͙ύος τοὺς ἄλλ]ους γεννᾶν 10 θεοὺς “Ὠ]κεανόν τε θεῶν γέ]νεσιν καὶ μητέρα] Τ[ηθύ]ν” εἰπών· Ἄβα]ρ͙ις δὲ Κρόνον τε κ]αὶ [ Ῥ]έαν, οἱ δὲ 15 Δία καὶ] Ἥραν πατέρα καὶ] μητέρα θεῶν νο]μίζουσιν, Πίνδαρος] δ’ [ἐκ] Κυβέλης μ]ητρὸς ἐν τῶι· 20 “δέσπ]οιν[αν] Κυβέλαν] μα[τέρα],” Φερεκύδ]η͙ς͙ δ’ ὁ [Σύ]ριος · · · N (apographa Neapolitana PHerc. 1610, col. 3 et 247, col. 6a) 1610, col. 3 3 τού[τους Schober  : τούτ̣[ους Obbink || 6 suppl. Nauck || Ν͙υκτὸς Gomperz : ιουκτος N || 7 suppl. Gomperz ||

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 99

8 τὰ Nauck, π]άντα Quaranta || 9 ]κ Ν || spatium post αιδου in N || 9–10 Δι[| · · · ]μ Ν : Δι|[ός]{.} Quaranta : Αἰ|θέρ]ο͙ς͙ Nauck : Δι|[ώνη]ς͙ Janko : Δη͙|[οῦ]ς͙ fort. Fowler : Δι|ὸς ἅ]μ Obbink || 10–12 Titanomachia fr. 1 Bernabé || 12 ἐξ Nauck || 13–15 Acus. FGrHist 2 F 5 = fr. 6d Fowler || 14 suppl. Nauck || 15–19 Mus. fr. 81 Bernabé || 15 suppl. Sauppe || 16–17 suppl. Nauck || 16–17 –ως · · · |] καιον Ν : -οις · · · |]σ͙αιον Nauck || 18 Τάρτ]αρον Nauck : Τάρ]τ̣αρον Obbink || 19 καὶ Ν]ύκτα Zeller : τὴν Ν]ύκτα Gomperz : εἶτα Obbink || 247, col. 6a 1 τρίτον] Schober || ’A ͙έρα Bücheler : δερα N || 2–6 Epimenid. fr. 46 [II] Bernabé = fr. 6b Fowler || 2–4 suppl. Bücheler || 5 πάντα Schober : τὰ πάντα Bücheler : Τάρταρον Kern : τἆλλα Obbink || 6 λέγεται Schober : ἀλλὰ δὴ Obbink || 7 δ’ ἀποφαί]νετ’ suppl. Bücheler : δὲ φαί]νετ’ Gomperz in app. || 9 suppl. Schober : τοὺς θε]οὺς Gomperz || 10–12 Il. 14.201 || 10 θεοὺς suppl. Schober : πάντας Bücheler : ποεῖν Gomperz in app. || 11–12 suppl. Bücheler || 12–13 εἰ|[πών suppl. Bücheler || 13 Ἄβα]ρ͙ις Henrichs : Eἷς] τις Schober || 13–19 suppl. Bücheler || 20 [δέσπ]οιν[αν Henrichs || 20–21 Κυβέ|[λαν] ματ[έρα] Snell (Pind. fr. 80 Maehler) || 21–22 Φερε|[κύδ]η͙ς͙ δ’ ὁ [Σύ]ριος Bergk (Pherec. fr. 63 Schibli) (…) but some state that these gave birth to all things. In some (sc. writings) it is said that all things come out of Night and Tartarus, but in others out of Hades and (…), but who wrote the Titanomachy states that [all things] come from Aether, but Acusilaus states that all the rest comes from Chaos, who was the first. In the works ascribed to Musaeus it is written that Tartarus [was] first and Night, and third Air appeared, but in the [works] ascribed to Epimenides it is said that everything else was formed out of Air and Night. But Homer shows that Oceanus from Tethys begot the other gods, saying “Oceanus origin of the gods and mother Tethys.” And Abaris considers that Cronus and Rhea are the father and the mother of the gods; others, Zeus and Hera, but Pindar [says] that they (sc. the gods) are from Kybele the mother in the [verse]: “the mistress Kybele the mother,” and Pherecydes of Syros (…)

The papyrus ends just before the first principles according to Pherecydes were named, but it can be assumed that Philodemus mentioned Zas, Chronos and Chthonie, the three gods who appeared in the very beginning of the book,38 or at least Zas and Chthonie. It is even possible that he quoted this line, but he certainly did not borrow it directly from Pherecydes, but from doxographical sources. For these detailed accounts of theogonies, Philodemus must have drawn on the work of Eudemus represented by his fr. 150 Wehrli, probably a kind of “history of theology,”39 as well as his main source for myths in De pietate, Apollodorus of 38 Ζὰς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἦσαν ἀεὶ καὶ Χθονίη, Diog. Laërt. 1.119 (= fr. 14 Schibli). 39 G. S. Kirk ap. KRS, 19 n. 2. He is followed by Henrichs (1972) 78 n. 28 and Betegh (2002) 347. On Eudemus’ fr. 150 Wehrli see the excellent and independent works of Casadio (1999) and Betegh (2002). Fr. 150, quoted by Damascius (De princ. 3.2.3–3.3.3, III, pp. 162–167 Westerink/Combès = 124–125 Ruelle), is the only fragment of this work. Usener (1858) 17 assigned it to Τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορίας α´-Ϛ´, in his view wrongly listed among the works of Theophrastus in Diog. Laërt. 5.48, along with other titles on the history of geometry (5.48), astrology, and arithmetic (5.50) authored by Eudemus. Wehrli (1968) col. 658 did not accept this identification and thought it more probable that the fragment was part of Eudemus’ Physics (but Wehrli [1969] 121 postulated, with doubts, the belonging of fr. 150 to a “Geschichte der Theologie”). Usener’s idea has been accepted

100 

 Marco A. Santamaría

Athens’ Περὶ θεῶν (ca. 150 BC).40 Eudemus’ fr. 150 Wehrli was the main source for Damascius in his De Principiis, where he summarizes the beginning of the cosmogonies of Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Acusilaus, Epimenides, and Pherecydes.41 The coincidence in the order Acusilaus/Epimenides/Pherecydes in Philodemus and Damascius indicates that this was the order in Eudemus, their common source. In Philodemus’ account there is no systematic order of the testimonies,42 but in Damascius and, consequently, in Eudemus, the order is chronological.43 The only exception is the position of Acusilaus, who can be dated to the 5th cent. BC. The reason for this dislocation has been convincingly explained by Casadio:44 for Eudemus it was unavoidable to put Acusilaus just after Hesiod, due to his close dependence on this poet. Philodemus’ fragment offers evidence of the inclusion of Pherecydes in the doxographies among the theologoi, not the physikoi, that is, in mythography and not in philosophy, following Eudemus’ practice, which goes back to Aristotle.45

by Zhmud (20042) 559; (2006) 130 n. 51 and seems to me very likely. Betegh (2002) 353–354 convincingly argues against Wehrli’s position in 1968, but is skeptical of Usener’s proposal (355 n. 50). Cf. Henrichs (1972) 78 n. 28: “One should refrain from calling Eudemus’ rather obscure work a ‘history of theology’.” 40 For this work as the main source of De pietate, see Henrichs (1975) 6; Cameron (2004) 30, 102–103; Obbink (2011) 352; Salati (2012) 215. 41 Dam. De princ. 3.2.3–3.3.1, III, pp. 162–166 Westerink/Combès (= 124–124b Ruelle). It is likely that Musaeus was present in Eudemus’ account, but Damascius left him out, following the practice of other Neoplatonists (as Betegh [2002] 346–347 indicates), who must have considered him an unhistorical figure merely created to circulate poems in his name. Philodemus does mention Musaeus, possibly following Eudemus. 42 Henrichs (1972) 78. Salati (2012) 213 points out that this lack of order is common to all the references in the treatise. 43 Casadio (1999) 41–42; Zhmud (20042) 563, and (2006) 130. 44 Casadio (1999) 44. 45 In Metaph. 12.6.1071b27 and 12.10.1075b26 Aristotle distinguishes between θεολόγοι (comprising Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Pherecydes, and the Persian Magoi, at least) and φυσικοί. See Palmer (2000) and Zhmud (2006) 130–131. According to this distinction, when the project of writing histories of the sciences was undertaken in the Lyceum, Aristotle entrusted the compilation of the opinions of the nature philosophers to Theophrastus, who composed the Φυσικῶν δόξαι in 16 (or 18) books (Diog. Laërt. 5.46; 48) and the history of theology to Eudemus, whose work survives in fr. 150 Wehrli and deals only with the mythographers. See Zhmud (2006) ch. 4, esp. 125–127 and 130–131.

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 101

4 Pherecydes and the Spartan kings ( [Phld.], [Philosophorum historia?] ) The next testimony about Pherecydes of Syros, absent in the editions of his fragments,46 comes from a Herculaneum papyrus (PHerc. 1788) that contains a work of uncertain author and unknown title, recently re-edited and studied by Christian Vassallo.47 Although the work has been traditionally interpreted as polemic, Vassallo views it as a more or less neutral exposition of the lives and doctrines of several authors and claims that it probably belongs to Philodemus’ Philosophorum historia (Σύνταξις τῶν φιλοσόφων). Despite the fragmentary condition of its eight fragments, there are allusions to several Presocratics, such as (in the new order of the fragments proposed by Vassallo) Pherecydes (col. 1 Vassallo), Thales (col. 3 Vassallo), Pythagoras and Gorgias (col. 5 Vassallo), Empedocles (col. 6 Vassallo), Democritus (col. 7 Vassallo), and again Democritus along with Leucippus (col. 8 Vassallo). An argument in favour of the new arrangement of the fragments is the fact that the authors appear in a chronological order (with the exception of Gorgias in relation to Empedocles and Leucippus to Democritus). The text reads thus: PHerc. 1788, col. 1 Vassallo (= fr. 8 Crönert) - - -]νδ[ · · (·)]τω[- - - - -]ιου ἀρχῆς εν[- - - - -]κ͙α͙ὶ Φερεκύδ̣[ης - - - - -] Θεόπομπον [- - 5 - - -]τασ[ · · (·)] · , Ζευξ͙ίδ̣[- - - - -]τυα[ · (·)]ιης Ἀρχίδ̣[- -    Ἱπ]π̣οκρατίδας̣ αστ[- - - - -]στων[ · ]ηματ[ · ]α[- - 9 - - -]τενι[ · · · ] · [ · (·)]αρ[- - desunt versus plures 2 β]ίου vel βιβλ]ίου? prop. Santamaría || 3 suppl. Crönert || 4 κατὰ τὸν] Crönert || 5–7 Ζευξ͙ίδ[α|μος μὲν Ἀσ]τυα[ί]νης, Ἀρχίδ[α|μος δὲ rest. Crönert || 7 Ἱπ]ποκρατίδας͙ Santamaría  : Ἱπ]ποκρατιδαίας· τleg. ac suppl. Crönert || Ἀστ[υάγης Vassallo e.g. || 8 σοφι]στῶν [ῥ]ήματ[α] fort. Santamaría (...) of the rule (or: beginning) (...) and Pherecydes (...) Theopompus (...) Zeuxidamus (...) Archidamus (?) (...) Hippocratidas (...) 46 DK and Schibli (1990). 47 Vassallo (2017).

102 

 Marco A. Santamaría

The name Pherecydes may allude to the author from Syros or to the one from Athens, who are both mentioned by Philodemus.48 The identity of Theopompus is not certain either, because he may be the 4th-cent. historian or a king of Sparta, whose reign took place between the eighth and the seventh centuries. The other names, Zeuxidamus, Archidamus (this reading is uncertain) and Hippocratidas, correspond to members of the Eurypontid dynasty, but their mutual relationship is far from sure.49 According to Pausanias (3.7.5–6), the king Theopompus was the father of Archidamus, who died in his father’s lifetime. Archidamus was the father of Zeuxidamus, who succeeded his grandfather. Hippocratidas is not mentioned.50 Herodotus echoes a different tradition: in 8.131 he offers the genealogical line of Leotychidas II (491–476), which includes the sequence Theopompus/ Anaxandridas I/Archidamus I/Anaxilaus/Leotychidas I/Hippocratidas (great grandfather of Leotychidas II). Regarding the identity of Theopompus, it is possible that Philodemus names the historian as the source of his information about Pherecydes. In fact, Theopompus speaks about Pherecydes of Syros several times in his work. In his Mira­ bilia,51 he says that Pherecydes advised the Spartans not to honor gold or silver, since in a dream Heracles had instructed him to do so, and that same night the hero had enjoined upon the Spartan kings to obey Pherecydes. The historian 52 also states that Pherecydes was the first to write about nature and the gods (or nature of the gods?). There are other testimonia concerning Pherecydes’ connection with Sparta, all of them probably unhistorical:53 (a) Theopompus54 says that, 48 For the allusions to Pherecydes of Athens in De pietate see Salati (2012) 240–245. Recently, Fleischer (2019) suggested that PHerc. 1788, col. 1 contains a list of Spartan kings derived from the work of Pherecydes of Athens. 49 In l. 6 Crönert proposed Ἀσ]τυα[ί]ν̣ης, who could be the mother (or wife?) of Zeuxidamus or Archidamus, but the name is not documented anywhere. This name or a similar one may be present in l. 7 αστ[. 50 On the complex question of the Spartan kings in 7h and 6th cent., see Cartledge (2002 2) 292–298. Hippocratidas appears in a lyric fragment attributed to Simonides (S 319 SLG = POxy. XXXII 2623, l. 11). On this fragment, see Nobili (2012), who thinks (165, 176–177, and 180) that it belongs to an epinicion addressed to Zeuxidamus (mentioned in l. 6), son of Leotychidas II (king: 491–476; cf. Hdt. 6.71), and maybe also to Leotychidas himself; Hippocratidas is mentioned as Zeuxidamus’ ancestor. Plutarch attributes sayings to Theopompus (Apoth. Lac. 190a) and Hippocratidas (222a–b). 51 FGrHist 115 F 71, ap. Diog. Laërt. 1.116 (= fr. 16 Schibli). 52 FGrHist 115 F 71, ap. Diog. Laërt. 1.116 (= fr. 1 Schibli). 53 As West (1971) 3–4, Schibli (1990) 6, and Breglia Pulci Doria (2000) 174 point out. These testimonies may come from Theopompus, as West (1971) 4 remarks, but it is impossible to be certain. 54 FGrHist 115 F 70, in Porph. (fr. 408 Smith) ap. Euseb. Praep. evang. 10.3.6–9 (= fr. 22 Schibli); cf. Diog. Laërt. 1.116 (= fr. 16 Schibli), where Theopompus is not mentioned.

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 103

when Pherecydes was going from Olympia to Messene, he advised his host Perilaus to flee with his family, and soon Messene fell; (b) according to Plutarch,55 Terpander, Thales and Pherecydes received special honours in Sparta because with their poetry and philosophy “they accomplished the same things as Lycurgus”; Pherecydes’ warning with regard to gold and silver is similar to Lycurgus’ prohibition of coinage;56 (c) Plutarch also recounts that the Spartans killed Pherecydes and that the kings, following an oracle, preserved his skin.57 A problem with the identification of the Theopompus mentioned in the papyrus with the historian is that Philodemus never refers to him and the papyrus does not specify the sources about the philosophers’ lives and doctrines (with the possible exception of col. 3.8–9 Vassallo, which seems to allude to the fifth book of an author). Moreover, the presence of other members of the Eurypontid dynasty makes it likelier that Theopompus is the Spartan king. It would yield a sequence of three successive generations, since Theopompus is the father of Archidamus and the grandfather of Zeuxidamos. The latter is mentioned after Theopompus because he succeeded his grandfather in the reign, according to Pausanias (3.7.5–6). With regard to the identity of the Pherecydes that appears in the papyrus, he must be the one from Syros, given the several links with Sparta present in his biographical tradition. However, the temporal coincidence of Pherecydes with these kings is impossible or implausible. There are two chronologies for Pherecydes’ life, high and low. The high one is offered by the Suda (s.v. Φερεκύδης = fr. 2 Schibli), which says that he was born around the 45th Olympiad (600/596) and lived at the time of Lydian king Alyattes (605/560). The main testimonies for the low chronology are Diogenes Laërtius (1.121 = fr. 5 Schibli), for whom Pherecydes lived (γέγονε) in the 59th Olympiad (544/541), in possible allusion to his floruit, and Cicero (Tusc. 1.16.38 = fr. 7 Schibli), who states that he lived during Servius Tullius’ reign in Rome (578–535). A solution to this discrepancy, proposed by Rohde and accepted by Schibli,58 is to emend the reading of the Suda from με´ (Ol. 45) into μθ´ (Ol. 49 = 584/581), an attractive proposal. By consequence, Pherecydes’ birth can be posited c. 584 and his floruit c. 544. As for the Spartan kings, Theopompus was king during the First Messenian War, at the end of 8th cent. BC.59 If Zeuxidamus (or Archidamus I) and Hippocratidas really reigned, their 55 Ag. 10.6 (= fr. 23 Schibli). It is told also by Olymp. In Alcib. 162.104 Westerink (= fr. 24 Schibli). 56 West (1971) 4; Schibli (1990) 6. 57 Plut. Pel. 21.3 (= fr. 25 Schibli). For Sosibius (FGrHist 595 F 15, ap. Diog. Laërt. 1.115), the skin is that of Epimenides. Bremmer (1993) thinks that the story regarding Pherecydes is a later version. 58 Schibli (1990) 2. 59 Paus. 4.4.4, 4.6.5, who quotes Tyrt. fr. 5.1–2 West.

104 

 Marco A. Santamaría

respective reigns must have taken place in early or middle 7th cent. and in late 7th cent. or early 6th cent. BC. If we accept the Suda’s high chronology, at the end of Hippocratidas’ reign Pherecydes would have been in his twenties (in the best scenario), too early an age to establish any link with Sparta. However, the testimony need not be historical, as the rest probably are not. Taking into account the other fragments of the papyrus, Pherecydes of Syros is dealt with before other Presocratics, mentioned in an essentially chronological order. It is a remarkable fact, since it reflects a doxographic tradition different to the one reflected in De pietate, in which Pherecydes of Syros is included among the theologoi, poets and mythographers strictly separated from the physikoi, following the Aristotelian and Peripatetic distinction. In contrast to this practice, in PHerc. 1788 Pherecydes is the first of the philosophers of nature, or at least a forerunner that is worth studying alongside them.

5 Conclusions Pherecydes of Syros is one of the early Greek prosists more favoured by the papyrological tradition, not so much for the abundance of the references, but for the fortunate find in Oxyrhychus of a papyrus (PGrenf. II 11) containing a fragment of his book (probably the first prose work in Greek literature), one of the very scarce direct specimens of early Greek prose, along with a fragment in papyrus that may belong to Hellanicus of Lesbos’ Atlantis. This text of Pherecydes offers important details about one of the narration’s crucial episodes (if not the most crucial), the nuptials of Zas and Chthonie, who receives a beautiful cloak fashioned by the bridegroom as her wedding gift (anakalypteria). When Chthonie wears it, she is transformed into the earth and the cloak becomes its surface, which constitutes a cosmogony and renders Zas the clearest antecedent of the Platonic Demiurge. Apart from this papyrus, there are two mentions of Pherecydes in the Herculanean library. Neither of them offers relevant information about him, but they allow us to gain a better understanding of the contexts in which the traditions about this and other authors were formed and spread. In a fragment of Philodemus’ De pietate (PHerc. 247, col. 6a Schober) Pherecydes is named at the end of a thorough catalogue of the first gods according to several poets and mythographers. Philodemus follows the Peripatetic distinction between physikoi and the­ ologoi, among whom Pherecydes is included. In another fragment, perhaps from Philodemus’ Philosophorum historia (PHerc. 1788, col. 1 Vassallo), Pherecydes is mentioned apparently in relation to

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 105

several Spartan kings (or members of the royal family), a testimony absent in the editions of the author which should be added to other evidence of his connections with Sparta. Considering the other fragments of the papyrus, the mention of Pherecydes is the first of several references to the lives and doctrines of certain early philosophers, that essentially follows a chronological order. In contrast to the other Herculaneum papyrus, in this case Pherecydes is considered the first link of the chain formed by very renowed presocratic thinkers (plus a sophist, Gorgias), a rare and valuable testimony of a doxographical tradition alternative to the Peripatetic one, in which Pherecydes was placed in the ranks not of the physicists, but of the theologians.

References Betegh (2002): Gábor Betegh, “On Eudemus Fr. 150 (Wehrli)”, in: István Bodnár and William W. Fortenbaugh (eds.), Eudemus of Rhodes, New Brunswick, 337–357. Breglia Pulci Doria (2000): Luisa Breglia Pulci Doria, “Ferecide di Siro tra orfici e pitagorici”, in: Marisa Tortorelli Ghidini, Alfredina Storchi Marino and Amedeo Visconti (eds.), Tra Orfeo e Pitagora: Origini e incontri di culture nell’antichità, Naples, 161–194. Bremmer (1993): Jan N. Bermmer, “The Skins of Pherekydes and Epimenides”, in: Mnemosyne 46, 234–236. Cameron (2004): Alan Cameron, Greek Mythography in the Roman World, Oxford. Cartledge (2002): Paul Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, 1300–362 BC, London/New York (1st ed. 1979). Casadio (1999): Giovanni Casadio, “Eudemo di Rodi: Un pioniere della storia delle religioni tra Oriente e Occidente”, in: WS 112, 39–54. Classen (1962): Carl J. Classen, “The Creator in Greek Thought from Homer to Plato”, in: C&M 23, 1–22. Fleischer (2019): Kilian J. Fleischer, “Die älteste Liste der Könige Spartas: Pherekydes von Athen (PHerc. 1788, col. 1)”, in: ZPE 209, 1–24. Ford (2002): Andrew Ford, The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece, Princeton/Oxford. Fowler (2001): Robert L. Fowler, Early Greek Mythography, I: Text and Introduction, Oxford. Fowler (2013): Robert L. Fowler, Early Greek Mythography, II: Commentary, Oxford. Gheerbrant (2018): Xavier Gheerbrant, “Le rythme de la prose de Phérécyde de Syros. Mythographie en prose et poésie en hexamètre dactylique”, in: Mnemosyne 71, 367–383. Gomperz (1866): Theodor Gomperz, Philodem: Über Frömmigkeit, Leipzig. Granger (2007): Herbert Granger, “The Theologian Pherecydes of Syros and the Early Days of Natural Philosophy”, in: HSCPh 103, 135–163. Grenfell (1896): Bernard P. Grenfell, An Alexandrian Erotic Fragment and Other Greek Papyri Chiefly Ptolemaic (PGrenf. I), Oxford. Grenfell/Hunt (1897): Bernard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt, Greek Papyri, Series II: New Classical Fragments and other Greek and Latin Papyri (PGrenf. II), Oxford.

106 

 Marco A. Santamaría

Henrichs (1972): Albert Henrichs, “Toward a New Edition of Philodemus’ Treatise On Piety”, in: GRBS 13, 67–98. Henrichs (1975): Albert Henrichs, “Philodems De pietate als mythographische Quelle”, in: CErc 5, 5–38. Laks (2001): André Laks, “Écriture, prose, et les débuts de la philosophie grecque”, in: Methodos 1, 131–151 [= Id., Histoire, doxographie, vérité : Études sur Aristote, Théophraste et la philosophie présocratique, Louvain-la-Neuve 2007, 247–266]. Laks (2009): André Laks, “Une doxographie d’Aristote (Métaphysique, Nu 4, 1091A33–91B15) et le sens d’un καί (Phérécyde, 7A7 DK, F81 Schibli)”, in: REG 122, 635–643. Lisi (1985): Francisco L. Lisi Bereterbide, “La teología de Ferecides de Siro”, in: Helmantica 36, 251–276. Macris/Goulet (2012): Constantin Macris and Richard Goulet, “Phérécyde de Syros”, in: DPhA V, 296–300. Nobili (2012): Cecilia Nobili: “Un epinicio di Simonide per gli spartani (Simonide frr. 34 e 76 Poltera = 519 fr. 132 PMG/S 319 e S 363 SLG)”, in: Maria P. Bologna and Massimiliano Ornaghi (eds.), Novissima studia: Dieci anni di antichistica milanese, Milan, 151–180. Obbink (1996): Dirk Obbink, Philodemus. On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary, Oxford. Obbink (2011): Dirk Obbink “Orphism, Cosmogony, and Genealogy (Mus. fr. 14)”, in: Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, Ana I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, Eugenio R. Luján Martínez, Raquel Martín Hernández, Marco A. Santamaría and Sofía Torallas Tovar (eds.), Tracing Orpheus: Studies of Orphic Fragments in honour of Alberto Bernabé, Berlin/Boston, 351–353. Palmer (2000): John A. Palmer, “Aristotle on the Ancient Theologians”, in: Apeiron 33, 181–205. Palomar (2012): Natalia Palomar, “El manto nupcial de Zas: Obra y acción cosmogónica”, in: Eulàlia Vintró, Francesca Mestre and Pilar Gómez (eds.), Homenatge a Montserrat Jufresa, Barcelona, 251–264. Salati (2012): Ornella Salati, “Mitografi e storici in Filodemo (De pietate, pars altera)”, in: CErc 42, 209–258. Santamaría (forthcoming): Marco A. Santamaría, “The Emergence of the World in Early Greek Theogonies from Homer to Acusilaus”, in: Alberto Bernabé and Raquel Martín Hernández (eds.), Narrating the Beginnings. Saudelli (2011): Lucia Saudelli, “Le chêne et le voile de Phérécyde : Note sur un témoignage du gnostique Isidore (7 B 2 DK, F 76 S)”, in: REG 124, 79–92. Scheid/Svenbro (1996): John Scheid and Jesper Svenbro, The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric, Cambridge (MA). Schibli (1990): Hermann S. Schibli, Pherekydes of Syros, Oxford. Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De pietate Pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125 [= Id., Philodemi Περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg 1923]. Snyder (1981): Jane M. Snyder, “The Web of Song: Weaving Imagery in Homer and the Lyric Poets”, in: CJ 76, 193–196. Thomas (2007): Oliver Thomas, “Charting the Atlantic with Hesiod and Hellanicus”, in: ZPE 160, 15–23. Usener (1858): Hermann Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, Leipzig [= Id., Kleine Schriften, vol. 1: Arbeiten zur griechischen Philosophie und Rhetorik: Grammatische und textkritische Beiträge, ed. by Ludwig Radermacher, Leipzig/Berlin 1912, 71–87].

4 Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition 

 107

Vassallo (2017): Christian Vassallo, “P.Herc. 1788 ([Philodemi] [Philosophorum historia?]): Introduction, Edition and Commentary”, in: AnPap 29, 7–56. Wehrli (1968): Fritz Wehrli, “Eudemos von Rhodos”, in: RE, Suppl. XI, 652–658. Wehrli (1969): Fritz Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar, vol. 8: Eudemos von Rhodos, Basel/Stuttgart (1st. ed. 1955). West (1963): Martin L. West, “Three Presocratic Cosmologies”, in: CQ 13, 154–176. West (1971): Martin L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, Oxford. Zhmud (2004): Leonid Zhmud, “Eudemos aus Rhodos, Menon und weitere Aristotelesschüler”, in: Friedrich Überweg (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie; Hellmut Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophie der Antike, vol. 3: Ältere Akademie, Aristoteles, Peripatos, Basel, 558–565 (1st ed. 1983). Zhmud (2006): Leonid Zhmud, The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, Berlin/ New York.

Part II: Pythagoreanism and Beyond

Leonid Zhmud

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans I begin my overview of the papyrological evidence on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans not chronologically but from a chreia on Pythagoras the philosopher and grammar teacher, found on the school wooden tablet (41,5×13,5 сm) of the 3rd or the 4th cent. AD.1 Published more than a century ago, the chreia received its second birth after David Sedley’s brilliant paper, the first to interpret this text methodically.2 The tablet contains two exercises set by a teacher (γραμματικός) of a Greek school in Egypt to his students: on the verso, to conjugate all the optatives and participles of νικάω, and on the recto, to decline in all cases and numbers, which is to say fifteen times, the following chreia: T1.  ὁ Πυθαγόρας φιλόσοφος ἀποβὰς καὶ γράμματα διδάσκων συνεβούλευεν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἐναιμόνων ἀπέχεσθαι.

Both exercises were performed with a lot of mistakes, although the student’s cursory handwriting indicates that he was proficient enough in such matters.3 The origin of the exercise to decline a chreia (κλίσις χρείας) from the rhetorical progymnasmata, known to us first through Aelius Theon (1st cent. AD), was noticed soon after the tablet’s publication.4 This kind of the morphological exercise was later taken over from the rhetoricians by the teachers of the previous level, the grammarians.5 Interestingly, our grammarian, strictly following the

1 PBrLibr. Add Ms  37516.1 = Kenyon (1909) 29–30. Frederic G. Kenyon dated the tablet in the 3rd cent. AD, which was accepted until recently; see Cribiore (1996) no. 364. Sedley (1998a) 122 n. 1, relying on the suggestions of Guido Bastianini and Manfredo Manfredi, preferred the 4th cent. AD. He has been followed by Andorlini/Linguiti (1999) 681, Wouters (2007) 149, and Piano (2015) 382. 2 Sedley (1998a); for a shorter version see Sedley (1998b). 3 Mistakes: Weems (1981) 51, 54–55, 71–72, and 169–172; Lapini (2013) 3–7; Piano (2015) 385. Weems (1981) 74 and Sedley (1998a) 125 suggested that the student may have been of non-Greek origin, but see objections: Luzzatto (2004) 174; Wouters (2007) 151 n. 60; Lapini (2013) 9 n. 26. Handwriting: Weems (1981) 39–40; Cribiore (1996) 265 no. 364; Piano (2015) 382. 4 Brinckman (1910) 152–155. 5 Brinckman (1910) 153–155; Luzzatto (2004) 167–171; Wouters (2007) 147–152. Leonid Zhmud, Russian Academy of the Sciences, St. Petersburg https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-006

112 

 Leonid Zhmud

rules described in Theon’s Progymnasmata,6 gave to his students to decline not the chreia on Pythagoras the philosopher, which was well-known in the rhetorical tradition,7 but what I believe to have been his own composition unattested elsewhere.8 It is his liberty in dealing with tradition that generated many disputes on the meaning of his chreia. In the first interpretation of the text, Ronald Hock and Edward O’Neil9 translated it as follows: “Pythagoras the philosopher, once he had disembarked and was teaching writings, used to counsel his students to abstain from red meat.”10 The verb ἀποβάς, then, was taken absolutely as referring to Pythagoras’ arrival to Italy, and γράμματα as meaning “Pythagoras’ own writings.” Obviously, the witticism of the grammarian, who had Pythagoras teaching γράμματα, thus transforming him into his colleague, has gone unnoticed.11 Sedley, having affirmatively answered the question “Did ancient grammarians (…) have a sense of humor?”, offered several new interpretations of the chreia. According to him, its first part stated not that “the philosopher Pythagoras disembarked” – for this is unclear without context in a self-contained chreia – but that he “went off,” presumably from his philosophical school. In the second part, Pythagoras becomes a grammar teacher, since γράμματα διδάσκων has an absolutely standard meaning “to be a school-teacher” (in the case of Pythagoras’ own writings one would expect συγγράμματα).12 Sedley rightly stressed that the grammarian intentionally alluded to his own profession, although Pythagoras as a school teacher is entirely unparalleled in the biographical tradition.13 The third part is complicated, for the words ἐναιμόνων ἀπέχεσθαι contain not the advice to his students “to abstain from blooded creatures,” but, according to Sedley, a linguistic joke by a grammar teacher, originated from medical lexicography, namely, “to abstain from the word ἐναίμονες.” This is because ἐναίμων, -ονος, third declension, is a hapax legomenon that occurs only in the Hippocratic

6 Theon 101.3–103.2 Spengel = 94–98 Hock/O’Neil (1986). Cf. Brinckman (1910) 153. 7 Πυθαγόρας ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεὶς πόσος ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸ δωμάτιον παρέκυψεν ὀλίγον, δηλῶν διὰ τούτου τὴν βραχύτητα (Theon 99.6–9 Spengel). See Hock/O’Neil (1986) 334–335. 8 Hock/O’Neil (1986) 335; Luzzatto (2004) 172–175; Piano (2015) 387–388. 9 Hock/O’Neil (1986) 335. 10 Cf. Weems (1981) 22: “The philosopher Pythagoras, having gone ashore and being engaged in teaching literature, advised his disciples to abstain from meat.” 11 To be sure, in Hock/O’Neil (2002) 51–66 (still not taking into account Sedley [1998a] and [1998b]) “teaching writings” has been changed into “teaching literature” (62) and “teaching letters” (65). 12 Cf. the words γραμματοδιδασκαλεῖον, γραμματοδιδάσκαλος. 13 Sedley (1998a) 130–131.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 113

treatise De ossium natura (9, p. 194.22 Littré); everywhere else the term ἔναιμος, second declension, is used, so that the correct form would be ἐναίμων ἀπέχεσθαι. Sedley’s interpretation won wide acceptance,14 yet one could also hear the criticism of some of his points, to which I would like to add several arguments. Sedley was first to notice that ὁ Πυθαγόρας φιλόσοφος is not in normal word order. It should be, and probably was originally, Πυθαγόρας ὁ φιλόσοφος – “Pythagoras the philosopher.”15 Indeed, this is how all such chreiai begin (Ἰσοκράτης ὁ ῥήτωρ, Διογένης ὁ φιλόσοφος, etc.) and this is what, I would add, the student expected to hear during the dictation,16 for in the first line he added the article ὁ at the left hand margin already after he had written Πυθαγόρας.17 But if this was an awkward attempt to correct his error caused by “his mediocre standard of Greek,” why did he retain it in the same position 14 more times? Sedley’s explanation that this was done for consistency is not convincing. On the contrary, as Bodnár noted, “if someone copies a somewhat non-standardly formulated chreia (…), it would be a quite common error to drop the unexpected article at the head of the sentence, which then later could be inserted as a correction, to where it belongs.”18 Therefore, the original and untraditional beginning of the chreia was ὁ Πυθαγόρας φιλόσοφος ἀποβάς. This finds further support in the fact that ἀποβαίνω, when used absolutely, does not mean “to go away,” “to go off,” but only “to disembark,” which, as was mentioned above, does not make much sense here. Besides, the otherwise unattested withdrawal of Pythagoras from his philosophical school or even from philosophy19 would not suite a self-contained chreia either.20 Thus, though Sedley recommended resisting “the temptation to construe the sentence differently,” I cannot resist thinking that the most natural meaning of the first element, considered but rejected by him,21 is with φιλόσοφος taken predicatively: “Pythagoras having become (or turned out to be) a philosopher.”22 This would perfectly explain both the use of ἀποβάς and

14 Andorlini/Linguiti (1999) 682–684; Luzzatto (2004) 175; Wouters (2007) 149–150; Piano (2015). 15 Sedley (1998a) 129. 16 Dictation: Luzzatto (2004) 173; Piano (2015) 383. 17 Sedley (1998a) 129. See the image in Kenyon (1909) pl. V; Cribiore (1996) 265 no. 364. 18 Bodnár (2016) 9. See also Luzzatto (2004) 173–174 and Lapini (2013) 12–13. 19 Wouters (2007) 151: “when he had abandoned (philosophy) and was teaching grammar.” 20 Lapini (2013) 11. 21 Sedley (1998a) 129 and n. 15. 22 Cf. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκμὰν οἰκέτης ἦν Ἀγησίδου, εὐφυὴς δὲ ὢν ἠλευθερώθη, καὶ ποιητὴς ἀπέβη (Arist. fr. 611 Rose); καὶ “ὁ ἐγγὺς κυρίου πλήρης μαστίγων·” ὁ συνεγγίζων δηλονότι τῇ γνώσει κινδύνων, φόβων, ἀνιῶν, θλίψεων διὰ τὸν πόθον τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπολαύει· “υἱὸς γὰρ πεπαιδευμένος σοφὸς ἀπέβη, καὶ διεσώθη ἀπὸ καύματος υἱὸς νοήμων, υἱὸς δὲ νοήμων δέξεται ἐντολάς” (Clem. Al. Strom. 2.7.35); Ὥσπερ δὲ ἰὸς οὐκ ἂν εἴη βλαβερὸς ἑτέρῳ σώματι, ἀλλὰ τῷ δεχομένῳ μόνῳ,

114 

 Leonid Zhmud

the position of the article.23 Pythagoras did not leave philosophy to become a school teacher, on the contrary, he became a philosopher, and teaching grammar, advised his students to abstain from ensouled creatures, which incidentally was his most famous tenet. On the morphological level, the Egyptian grammar teacher wanted his students to decline both the aorist participle ἀποβάς and the present participle διδάσκων, thus making the exercise more advanced.24 The usage of συνεβούλευεν, instead of the more usual ἔφη or εἶπεν in chreiai of this kind, may have served the same purpose25 and, in any case, it caused the greatest difficulties for the student. On the didactic level, a bold link between philosophy and secondary schooling undoubtedly intended to make the latter intellectually more prestigious, which would better suite our non-standard teacher, “una persona colta e un bello spirito,” as Lapini puts it.26 Indeed, his profession certainly needed it. Here it is worth recalling a similar historical episode though with the opposite moral. Aristoxenus, the first biographer of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, “says in his On the Pythagorean Life that he heard of it (the friendship of Damon and Phintias) from Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily when he had lost his kingdom and was teaching grammar at Corinth.”27 Aristoxenus’ story of Damon and Phintias became famous, which helped to give wide currency to Dionysius’ miserable fate after his loss of power: it was mentioned among others by Philo of Alexandria, Porphyry, and the anonymous Chronicon Oxyrhynchi.28 There was a special proverb “Dionysius in Corinth,” on which Demetrius commented in On Style,

οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀποβὰς κακὸς ἑαυτὸν βλάψει, οὐκ ἄλλον (Hippol. Frag. in Prov. 16.1); καὶ ὁ ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννώμενος μάντις ἄριστος ἀπέβη (Artem. Onir. 4.67); Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Κλεινίου καὶ ῥήτωρ ἀπέβη τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀμείνων, τῆς οἰκείας δὲ φύσεως ἥττων (Choric. Orat. 8.1.16). See also Lapini (2013) 14 n. 42. 23 Lapini (2013) 10–14 (Pythagoras, cum philosophus evasisset et magistri operam daret, discipu­ lis suis persuasit etc.) and Bodnár (2016) 9–10 also prefer this reading. 24 Luzzatto (2004) 175–176; Lapini (2013) 9 n. 26; Piano (2015) 382–384. 25 Hock/Neil (2002) 62; Luzzatto (2004) 175–176. 26 Lapini (2013) 15. 27 ἔκ τε ὧν Ἀριστόξενος ἐν τῷ περὶ Πυθαγορικοῦ βίου αὐτὸς διακηκοέναι φησὶ Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελίας τυράννου, ὅτε ἐκπεσὼν τῆς μοναρχίας γράμματα ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἐδίδασκε (Aristox. fr. 31 Wehrli; transl. by G. Clark). 28 (…) Διονύσιος ὁ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, ὃς Σικελίας μὲν τύραννος ἦν, ἐκπεσὼν δὲ τῆ ς ἡγεμονίας εἰς Κόρινθον καταφεύγει καὶ γραμματιστὴς ὁ τοσοῦτος ἡγεμὼν γίνεται (Phil. De Joseph. 133). καὶ ἐξ ὧν Ἀριστόξενος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου αὐτὸς διακηκοέναι φησὶν Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελίας τυράννου, ὅτ’ ἐκπεσὼν τῆς μοναρχίας γράμματα ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἐδίδασκεν (Porph. VP 59). Διονύσιος ὁ δεύτερος τῆς Σικελίας τύραννος ἐκπεσὼν τῆς ἀρχῆς κατέπλευσεν εἰς Κόρινθον καὶ ἐκεῖ κατέμεινε γράμματα διδάσκων (POxy. I 12 = BNJ 255 F 4).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 115

using Aristoxenian material.29 Therefore, the fact that Dionysius, after losing power became a grammar teacher was widely known, in the rhetorical tradition as well, and it is possible though not certain that the Egyptian teacher also knew it. His own chreia, however, does not imply any lowering of Pythagoras’ social status. The third part. The expression ἐναίμων ἀπέχεσθαι is not unique: it occurs not only in Sozomen’s Historia Ecclesiastica (5th cent. AD), as Sedley thought,30 but also in the Christian writer Palladius (c. 364–c. 420) and, what is more important, in the Great  Magical Papyrus  of  Paris (4th cent. AD).31 All these texts, including the school tablet, belong to the same period and the same cultural area, Egypt and Palestine, and the formula ἐναίμων ἀπέχεσθαι means in them more or less the same as the traditional formula ἐμψύχων ἀπέχεσθαι,32 i.e. to abstain from meat (and sometimes from fish). If, then, the third part of the anecdote is connected with the Pythagorean tradition, there is no need to look for its original inspiration in medical lexicography. To put ἐναιμόνων ἀπέχεσθαι instead of ἐναίμων ἀπέχεσθαι would have probably been too exquisite a linguistic joke, even for a witty grammar teacher, let alone his audience. Instead, I believe this is a mistake made by the student, who made a lot of mistakes in both exercises. He could have easily misheard or misunderstood the rare and bookish word ἔναιμος, which occurs predominantly in medical or philosophical texts, and duplicated the syllable on, as ο and ω were regularly interchanged at that time in Egypt, including by this very student.33 Thus, however attractive Sedley’s suggestion is, the former school teacher and headmaster in me regards the more mundane variant as being more plausible. Two basic elements of Pythagoras’ chreia, biographical and doxographical, contain in nuce  the features and  peculiarities  of the late Pythagorean tradition. Normally, Hellenistic biographies and διαδοχαί, as far as they are known to us, did not have the special doxographical sections, so familiar from Diogenes Laërtius, the only exception being Pythagoras’ biographies, which, starting from the 1st cent. BC, tended to mix two earlier separate genres into 29 παράδειγμα τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς Φίλιππον· Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ· εἰ δὲ ἐξέτειναν αὐτό, Διονύσιος ἐκπεσὼν τῆς ἀρχῆς πτωχεύει ἐν Κορίνθῳ διδάσκων γράμματα, διήγημα σχεδὸν ἂν ἦν μᾶλλον ἀντὶ λοιδορίας (Demetr. Eloc. 241.7). 30 Sedley (1998a) 137 n. 31: καὶ οἴνου πάμπαν καὶ ἐναίμων ἀπέχεσθαι (Sozom. Hist. eccl. 1.12.11). 31 Ἥτις ἐναίμων μὲν καὶ ἐμψύχων εἰς ἄκρον ἀπέσχετο, ἰχθύος δὲ καὶ λαχάνων μετ’ ἐλαίου λαμβάνουσα ἐν ἑορτῇ, οὕτω διετέλεσεν ὀξυκράματι καὶ ξηρῷ ἄρτῳ ἀρκουμένη (Pallad. Hist. Laus., Vit. 57.2); Προαγνεύσας ζʹ ἡμέρας τοῦ τὴν σελήνην πα[ν]σέληνον γενέσθαι ἐναίμων καὶ ἀνεψε[τῶν] ἀπεχόμενος (…), Preisendanz/Henrichs (1974) no. 4, l. 63. 32 Thus Andorlini/Linguiti (1999) 684. See also Bodnár (2016) 6–7. 33 διδάσκον instead of διδάσκων in l. 5. See Weems (1981) 59; Cribiore (1996) 92.

116 

 Leonid Zhmud

one bio-doxography. This is true not only for Alexander Polyhistor’s Διαδοχαὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων that included Pythagorean Hypomnemata or anonymous Neopythagorean bio-doxography preserved by Photius,34 but also for Pythagoras’ biography in Diodorus Siculus, which is based mainly on Aristoxenus and devoid of any Neopythagorean influence.35 Yet the evidence of the Herculaneum papyri, deriving from the writings of the Epicurean Philodemus (c. 110–c. 35 BC), reflects rather the early Hellenistic tradition: it is, with one exception, biographical, not doxographical. Consequently, Pythagoras appears in Philodemus as a famous philosopher who did not have his own doctrines or writings. Before offering an explanation as to why this is so, I briefly comment on the testimonia individually. It should be noted in advance that practically all Philodemean papyri mentioning Pythagoras are incomplete and/or damaged; often we lack their immediate context, which, given Philodemus’ manner of quoting or paraphrasing all his opponents before refuting their arguments, further complicates interpretation of the text. This concerns specifically the group of evidence from Philodemus’ lengthy treatise On Rhetoric,36 in which he denied political and forensic rhetoric of the right to be called τέχνη. Here the Epicurean argued mainly against two kinds of opponents: on the one hand, rhetoricians claiming that rhetoric is absolutely indispensable in political matters and in any event more important than philosophy, and on the other, the Stoics, who believed that rhetoric, being a part of logic, can be best done by philosophers, in particular Stoic philosophers.37 They insisted therefore, as, for instance, Philodemus’ favorite adversary Diogenes of Babylon (c. 228–c. 140 BC) did, “that the Stoic sage is the only true politician and orator.”38 To this the Epicurean in compliance with the tradition of his school objected that rhetoric does not belong to philosopher’s business and that politicians effectively persuade common people thanks to their natural ability, which can be enhanced by practice and historical knowledge.39

34 Alexander Polyhistor: Diog. Laërt. 8.24–35 (= FGrHist 273 F 140); Anonymus Photii: Phot. Bibl. 438b–441b (= Thesleff [1965] 237–242). See Zhmud (2012) 71 and (2019). 35 Diod. Sic. 10.3–11 (= Thesleff [1965] 229–234). See Zhmud (2012) 72 and Schorn (2013). 36 The only complete edition still remains that by Sudhaus (1892–1896). The best modern introduction can be found in Dorandi (1990). For an updated bibliography see Longo Auricchio/ Indelli/Del Mastro (2012) 342–344. 37 Chrysippus: Diog. Laërt. 7.41–42 (= SVF II 295; cf. also SVF II 293 and III 698); Erbì (2009) 120–121. 38 Blank (2009) 76. 39 Blank (1995) 186–187 and (2009) 81–82; Erbì (2011).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 117

Our first evidence concerns the dramatic episode in Pythagoras’ life when he left Croton because of the Cylonian revolt. It is preserved in a fragment from Book 4 of On Rhetoric:40 T2.  Ἀναξαγό[ρα]ς [ὃς μασ]|τιγωθεὶ ̣ς τοὺ̣ς μώλ̣ω̣|πας ἐπεδείκνυεν | τοῖς δικ̣[α]σταῖς, καὶ Πυ|θαγόρα̣[ς, ὧ]ι Κύλων ὁ | Κροτωνιάτης ἐπα|γαγὼν πρ[ά]γ ̣ματα τῆς | πόλεως ἐξέβαλε, τοὺ | δὲ μαθητὰς ἀθροόυς | ἐνέπρησε, καὶ Σω[κρά]|της ὧι τὸ μὲν πρό[τε|ρον - - -.41 (…) Anaxagoras, who having being whipped, showed the judges the welts, and Pythagoras, whom Cylon of Croton making troubles expelled from the city and [whose] disciples he burned alive together, and Socrates, whom [first] (…)

The tradition of juxtaposing Anaxagoras and Pythagoras (and their schools), which goes back to the 5th cent. BC, is for the first time attested in the Dissoi Logoi: “What is it the sophists teach, if not wisdom and virtue? And what were the Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans, [if not teachers of these]?”42 The Sophist Alcidamas, a student of Gorgias, presented in his Φυσικὸς (sc. λόγος) an impossible biographical combination: “Empedocles went to listen to Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, emulating the latter in dignity of life and bearing and the former in his study of nature” (Diog. Laërt. 8.56 = 14 A 5 DK). Aristotle quoted Alcidamas’ contention that “the wise are honored by all”: thus, the Italiots rendered heroic honor to Pythagoras, just as the Clazomenians revered Anaxagoras.43 Unlike the early tradition, in On Rhetoric the conjunction of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras occurs in a context where philosophers are involved in political life, personally or via their students. Thus, in this fragment Pythagoras and Anaxagoras, accompanied by Socrates, figure as politically persecuted philosophers.44 While Anaxagoras’ tortures are unparalleled in the ancient tradition,45 the story of Pythagoras’ expulsion from Croton by Cylon and the burning of (almost) all his

40 Phld. Rhet. 4, PHerc. 245, fr. 7 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 180 (= 59 A 20 DK). 41 Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) fr. 6. See also Vassallo (2015a) T3, 112–121, and DAPR, T7. 42 (...) τί μὰν τοὶ σοφισταὶ διδάσκοντι ἄλλ᾽ ἢ σοφίαν καὶ ἀρετάν; [ἢ] τί δὲ ̉Αναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι ἦεν; (90 C 6.7–8 DK). 43 Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ γυναῖκα οὖσαν , καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσι ἔτι καὶ νῦν (Arist. Rh. 2.23.1398b10–20 = 14 A 5 DK). Judging by the context, τιμῶσιν implies specifically heroic honour, paid to the famous σοφοί rather than simply their veneration. See Clay (2010) 427. 44 Plutarch mentions the unjust condemnation of Socrates and Pythagoras, who was burnt alive by the Cylonians (De Stoic. rep. 1051a). 45 Sider (20052) 20 suggested that this episode may come from a comedy.

118 

 Leonid Zhmud

followers was reported by all the early biographers of Pythagoras.46 By Philodemus’ time it became a biographical vulgate that conflated two different events: the Cylonian conspiracy at the turn of the 5th cent. and the anti-Pythagorean revolt in the mid-5th cent., when many Pythagoreans were burnt in the house of Milo in Croton. Elsewhere in the same book, referring to Aristotle who quoted the proverb that a hare cannot survive in a pack of dogs, Philodemus expresses the contention that philosophers are an easy prey: they easily become the victims of sycophants and enemies, as Anaxagoras did.47 While συκόφανται certainly implies Anaxagoras and Socrates, who have been accused by malicious prosecutors and sentenced in a public trial, a more general word, δυσμενεῖς, is better suited to Pythagoras’ case, in which neither philosophical ideas nor public trial were involved. Starting from Aristotle and Aristoxenus, the tradition is unanimous that the conflict between Pythagoras and Cylon was personal and political; this is also true of the anti-Pythagorean outbreaks of the mid-5th cent. BC.48 In what way, if any, is Pythagoras related to political rhetoric in this evidence? Eduardo Acosta Méndez suggested that we have here, as in many other cases, a Philodemus’ paraphrase of his adversary who aimed to demonstrate the superiority of rhetoric over philosophy, unable to help his adepts in the dramatic circumstances of their life.49 Christian Vassallo, in this volume (p. 377), interprets the fragment as dealing with “the role of philosophy in relation to the rhetorician’s education and probably to his ability to gain an audience,” since all three philosophers failed to convince the judges and the people of their innocence.50 Both interpretations of the text imply that its author expected Pythagoras to rhetorically convince his political enemies, as if it were a court procedure or people’s assembly, and further, that he did not know or ignored the classical tradition of Pythagoras as a powerful speaker, attested by Antisthenes (test. 187 Prince = fr. 51 Decleva Caizzi), Dicaearchus (FGrHist [cont.] 1400 F 56 = fr. 40 Mirhady = fr. 33 Wehrli) and Timaeus (ap. Just. Epit. 20.4).51 Though both possibilities cannot be discounted, another context of

46 Aristox. fr. 18 Wehrli; Dic. FGrHistCont 1400 F 57a Verhasselt (= fr. 41a Mirhady = fr. 34 Wehrli); Neanth. FGrHist 84 F 30; Tim. ap. Just., Epit. 20.4.16–17. See Zhmud (2012) 97–102. 47 Phld. Rhet. 4, PHerc. 224, fr. 15.6–11 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 175: οἱ μὲν οὖν [φιλό|σο]φοι πανταχῆ τοιοῦτ[οι | φ]αίνονται· διὸ καὶ συκο[φάν|ται]ς καὶ δυσμενέσιν ἄ[γαν | εὐπρόσ]ιτο[ι] γείνοντα[ι, καθά|περ Ἀναξ]αγόρας οσελ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ For a new reading and analysis of this fragment, see Vassallo (2015a) 108–111. 48 Diog. Laërt. 2.46 (= Arist. fr. 75 Rose); Aristox. fr. 18 Wehrli. See Zhmud (2012) 97–102. 49 Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 231; also Erbì (2010) 71 n. 34. 50 Cf. Vassallo (2015a) 112–114 and (2016) 11–13. 51 Zhmud (2012) 97–99. See also below, n. 104 on Timon of Phlius.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 119

this fragment, similar to that of PHerc. 224, fr. 15,52 seems more plausible: Philodemus wanted to remind his readers what vicissitudes await philosophers when they are directly involved in politics. Another fragment from the same book again puts Anaxagoras and Pythagoras side by side: T3a.  ὥσπερ αἱ πολιτικὸν  τὰ πολλὰ τῶν 5 ἀνθρώπων ον | 6 ν ἐπιει|κ ] ποιεῖν λόγον  οἱ ποιηταὶ  ἀλλ’ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ [ταῦτ’ ἔμ]αθε[ν· εἰ δ]έ φησιν , ὡς Περικλῆς ἐ[λέγετο ἀκού]ε̣ιν Ἀ[ν]αξαγόρ[ου καὶ ]το [latet nomen in -ης] Πυ[θ]αγόρου  καὶ φυσικὰ  κατὰ τῶν δ53 Relying on Sudhaus’ tentative restoration of the very lacunose text, in which key notions are politics, rhetoric, poetry, and philosophy,54 one could read it in the sense that philosophy is more useful for politicians then rhetoric, thus, Pericles is said to hear Anaxagoras, while some other person, whose name is lacking, Pythagoras. Though it is not easy to find among Pythagoras’ disciples a suitable pendant for Anaxagoras’ student Pericles, we have to bear in mind that the 5thcent. tradition, preserved by Aristoxenus (frs. 18 and 43 Wehrli), made Pythagoras a teacher of the famous Italian legislators Charondas and Zaleucus.55 This tradition is reflected in Philodemus’ elder contemporary Posidonius.56 In this volume, Vassallo proposes a new reading of this Herculanean piece of evidence:57 T3b. desunt minimum versus 4 5 ₍₎] ὥσπερ αἱ πολιτικῶ.ν ₍₎]· τὰ πολλὰ τῶν [₍₎ ₍₎]γενου πρ[ὸς

52 See above, n. 47. 53 Phld. Rhet. 4, PHerc. 1104, fr. 7 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 299. 54 Cf. Phld. Rhet. 4, PHerc. 1007, col. 40a.3–8 Sudhaus (1892–1896) I, 220–221: the poets and even some of the philosophers are not inferior to the rhetoricians in their ability to praise (the gods?). 55 Zhmud (2012) 114. 56 “Zaleucus and Charondas (…) learned the legal justice they were to apply in Sicily and Greek Italy, then at the height of their powers, not in the public forum or legal office, but in the quiet holy retreat of Pythagoras” (Sen. Ep. 90.6 = fr. 284 EK, transl. by I. G. Kidd). 57 DAPR, T5, comm. ad loc.

120 

 Leonid Zhmud

₍₎]ημονου [₍₎ τῶν] ἀνθρώπων ον[₍₎ 10 ₍₎]ν ἐπιει[κ₍₎ ₍₎] ποιε̣ῖν λόγον [ ₍₎] οἱ ποιηταὶ [₍₎ ₍₎], ἀλλ’ ἐν φιλοσοφία[ι ₍₎] ἀθέ[ους δ]ὲ φησιν 15 ₍₎], ὡς Περικλῆς ἐ[λέγετο ἀκού]ε̣ιν Ἀ[ν]αξαγόρ[ου καὶ Δάμωνος]. τὸ Πυθ αγόρου [ ⁕ ₍₎] καὶ φυσικὰ 19 ₍₎] κατὰ τῶνδ[ Vassallo’s new reading considerably enriches Philodemus’ fragment; he takes its subject matter to be the role of philosophy in the educational process, which, if misused, can also lead to impiety as happened with Pericles, a student of Anaxagoras and Damon of Athens. With regard to Damon we can note, however, that unlike Anaxagoras, he has not been accused of impiety but ostracized for his political activity,58 so that atheism does not seem the most likely topic. A more conservative reading of PHerc. 1104, fr. 7 is offered by David Blank, who is preparing a new edition of Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric and generously shared a draft of this text with me:59 T3с.  desunt versus xi fere ] ὥσπερ αἱ πολιτικὸν ]τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ]γ ε̣ νου πρ[ 15 ]ημονου ] ἀνθρώπων ον ]ν ἐπιει[κ ] ποιεῖν λόγον ]οι ποιηταὶ 20 ] ἀλλ’ ἐν φιλοσοφία⟨ι⟩ ]αθε[]ε φησιν ] ὡς Περικλῆς ἐ[

58 Siewert (2002) 459–460; Wallace (2004); Roskam (2009) 36. 59 E-mail of 24.07.2017.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 121

]σιν Ἀ[ν]αξαγόρ[ου ]το Πυθαγόρου 25 ] καὶ φυσικὰ ]κατὰ τῶν δ[ As follows from Blank’s reading, Sudhaus’ restoration of ll. 22–23, ὡς Περικλῆς ἐ[λέ|γετο ἀκού]ε̣ιν Ἀ[ν]αξαγόρ[ου, is questionable, for Blank reads on l. 23 ]σιν Ἀ[ν]αξαγόρ[ου, whereas Vassallo’s conjecture καὶ Δάμωνος] on l. 23 is longer than the maximum number of letters per line in this column (l. 22).60 Still, it remains plausible that Anaxagoras figures here as Pericles’ teacher and that an analogous role was intended for Pythagoras. Anaxagoras and Pericles appear again in a similar context in the fragment of On Rhetoric’s Book 3,61 where Philodemus paraphrases Diogenes of Babylon. Firmly believing that Stoic philosophy is necessary for a good rhetorician and a politician, Diogenes brought an example of Pericles who frequented Anaxagoras and other philosophers, on which Philodemus objects that none of them was Stoic: 20 Περ̣[ι]κλῆς τοίνυν, ὃν [ἔ]φη̣̣ ἀνε̣[κ]τότατον γεγ̣ον̣έ[ναι τ]ῶ̣ν ἄλλων ῥητό[ρων, καὶ Ἀνα]ξ̣αγόρου καὶ ἄ̣[λλων τινῶν] ἤ̣κουσεν φι[λοσόφων, οἷς 25 μὲν ἴσως παρέβα̣λε, Στωϊκ̣οῖς δ’ ο[ὐ]δα[μ]ῶς κτλ.62 Therefore, Pericles, who, [as he (sc. Diogenes of Babylon) said], was the most tolerable among rhetoricians, attended Anaxagoras and some [other] philosophers, of whom he probably was a disciple, but in no ways Stoics (…) Generally, Philodemus believed that philosophy does not make a politician but it makes a good citizen and, therefore, a better politician.63 Specifically, Philodemus’ passages, where philosophical education of Pericles and other famous 60 “Each of its columns contained ca. 26 lines, each line containing 17–22 (avg. 21) letters. My reconstruction follows these general guidelines” (D. Blank, e-mail of 24.07.2017). 61 Phld. De rhet. 3, PHerc. 1506, col. 21.20–26 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 226–227 (= Diog. Bab. SVF III 25). 62 Indelli (2002) 235 (= DAPR, T4). 63 Phld. Rhet. 3, PHerc. 1506, cols. 11a.25–12a.3 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 267 (= Hammerstaedt [1992] 41); cols. 15.16–16.9 Sudhaus (1896) 271–272 (= Hammerstaedt [1992] 47).

122 

 Leonid Zhmud

political orators, such as Demosthenes, is mentioned, confirm that he positively evaluated this education without considering it decisive for their success.64 Though Pythagoras figures in only one such evidence (T3), an instructive parallel to this tradition is to be found in Plutarch’s short treatise On the Fact that the Philosopher Must Primarily Consort with Rulers. The work had as its goal the demonstration of the fact that the philosopher conversing with leading politicians makes them better and through them the whole society, for if he teaches privately, he creates calmness and quite only in one man, but if these teachings take possession of a ruler, a statesman, and a man of action and fill him with love of honour through one he benefits many, as Anaxagoras did by associating with Pericles, Plato with Dion, and Pythagoras with the chief men of the Italiote Greeks.65

Indeed, as mentioned above, Aristoxenus presented Pythagoras as a teacher of Charondas and Zaleucus (frs. 18 and 43 Wehrli), which was repeated by Posidonius (fr. 284 EK). According to Aristoxenus, until the mid-5th cent. BC the Pythagoreans belonged to the ruling élite of Magna Graecia and after that the Pythagorean Lysis fled to Thebes and became a teacher of Epaminondas (fr. 18 Wehrli). In an oration of Plutarch’s contemporary Dion of Prusa a familiar pair of politically influential philosophers, Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, appears again, this time Pythagoras visibly overshadows Anaxagoras. Dion goes as far as to explain the successes of Philip II of Macedon through the influence of Epaminondas, whose teacher was Lysis, a direct student of Pythagoras, and declares that the Athenians benefited inter alios from Pericles, the disciple of Anaxagoras; the Thebans from Epaminondas; the Romans from Numa, who, as some say, had some acquaintance with the philosophy of Pythagoras; and the Italian Greeks in general from the Pythagoreans.66

It is very likely then that PHerc. 1104, fr. 7 reflects the very tradition which has been elaborated further by Plutarch and Dion. In PHerc. 1004, containing Book 7 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric,67 Margherita Erbì recently suggested the name of Pythagoras be read. It appears in the context of Philodemus’ polemics concerning rhetoric with Diogenes of Babylon. While criticizing the rules of rhetoric as cunning tricks, the Stoic twice (cols. 57.8–13 64 Indelli (2002), esp. PHerc. 1506, cols. 3.32–4.10 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 205–206; PHerc. 1078/1080, fr. 7.7–17, PHerc. 1004, col. 105.7–14 Sudhaus (1892–1896) I, 380. Cf. also PHerc. 1004, col. 56.5–13 Sudhaus (1892–1896) I, 350. 65 Plut. Max. cum princ. 777a3–8, transl. by R. L. Fowler. See Roskam (2009) 163. 66 Dio Chrys. Or. 49.7 (transl. by H. L. Crosby). 67 Del Mastro (2012).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 123

and 62.4–10) quotes Heraclitus in support of his opinion: rhetorical education (ἡ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων εἰσαγωγη) is, according to the latter, κοπίδων ἀρχηγός – an accusation that another branch of tradition relates to Pythagoras.68 In Diogenes’ quotations the name of Pythagoras is lacking, but it appears between them (col. 60) in Philodemus’ own text: T4. 

5

10

νῦν γε διαν[₍₎ φιλοσόφωι χ[₍₎]ι π ίστει πρὸς [Πυθ]α  γόραν ̲ ̲τὸν φιλόσοφον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἔτι ταῦτα πάνυ στρογγύλως ἐπισκόψομεν εἰ καὶ δι’ αὐτους ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸ ς τα παραπλήσια πα λιν̲ ̲λογεῖν.69

Only five words in ll. 5–6 are related to Pythagoras, the paragraphos after l. 6 signifies the beginning of Philodemus’ recapitulation. Due to the lack of context it is very difficult to say what philosopher’s name is hidden in lacuna in l. 470 and what the phrase “because of the trust in the philosopher Pythagoras” means here (if the supplement is correct). It seems clear that this is not Philodemus’ own, but somebody’s else trust. Erbì’s interpretation is that a) Diogenes intentionally omitted Pythagoras’ name from Heraclitus’ quotation (col. 57); b) in Philodemus’ view the Stoic did this because of his “attitude of respect and consideration for Pythagoras and his doctrine.”71 This is extremely ingenious, and yet very difficult to prove. Given that Diogenes omitted Pythagoras’ name from Heraclitus’ quotation and Philodemus knew this, what could lead him to the idea the Stoic did this out of respect to Pythagoras and his doctrine?72 Except for Zeno’s Πυθαγορικά

68 Schol. Eur. Hec. 131 (= Tim. FGrHist 566 F 132 = 22 B 81 [II] DK = fr. 18 [b] Marcovich): κοπίδας δὲ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος οὕτως γράφων· “ὥστε καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ τὸν Πυθαγόραν εὑρόμενον τῶν ἀληθινῶν κοπίδων μηδὲ τὸν ὑφ’ Ἡρακλείτου κατηγορούμενον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν Ἡράκλειτον εἶναι τὸν ἀλαζονευόμενον.” 69 Phld. De rhet. 7, PHerc. 1004, col. 60 Sudhaus (1892–1896) I, 353 (= Erbì [2010] 70). 70 Salvatore Cirillo proposed Χρυσίππωι, Diogenes’ teacher. 71 Erbì (2010) 71. 72 Timaeus of Tauromenium, while quoting the same passage (see above, n. 68), openly accused Heraclitus of lying about Pythagoras, whom the historian held in great esteem.

124 

 Leonid Zhmud

(Diog. Laërt. 7.4), of which nothing is preserved, Pythagoras the philosopher was as good as nonexistent in Stoicism of the 3rd and 2nd cent. BC. To be sure, Diogenes, again quoted by Philodemus, relates an anecdote of Pythagoras, but it does not show any sign of particular respect towards the latter. Book 4 of Philodemus’ polemical treatise On Music, reconstructed by Daniel Delattre, presents (cols. 1–54) and then refutes (cols. 55–142) the views on music of Diogenes of Babylon,73 inter alia, the doctrine of a musical ethos, or the psychagogic and moral power of music, that was popular in Greek philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. For Philodemus, however, instrumental music, in contrast to rational emotions, was μελος ἄλογον and thus in no way able to inspire, console, or soothe the soul. The much damaged col. 42 contains the remnants of a wellknown anecdote about Pythagoras illustrating how music affects the soul by a slow and solemn spondaic tune. In the app. crit. of his edition Delattre suggests exempli gratia the following restoration, which he translates as follows: T5.  Πυθαγόραν δὲ [| εὐ]αγωγότερον [νεανιῶν | μεθυ]όντων καλέ[σαντα τι|να αὐλ]ητρίδα ν[ ἐπὶ | τὸ τἀ]ναν[τία] πά[θη ἐμποιεῖν | ]ους τὸ σπ[ονδεῖον | μέλος] καὶ τοῦτον [ Quant à Pythagore, [il réussit à obtenir un comportement] plus docile [de jeunes gens] qui étaient ivres, en invitant [une] joueuse d’aulos [à jouer] un air spondaïque [en vue de susciter en eux les affections contraires] (...) et celui-là (…)74

A fuller version of the anecdote, only with a male aulete accompanying the komasts, appears in Sextus Empiricus, who also criticized the theory of musical ethos and refuted the arguments of the Stoic adversaries they had in common with Philodemus: First in order, let us begin with the things customarily babbled about music by the many (…). Thus Pythagoras, when he once observed how youths who had been filled with Bacchic frenzy by alcoholic drink differed not at all from madmen, exhorted the flute-player, who was joining them in the carousal, to play his aulos for them in the spondaic melos. When he thus did what was ordered, they suddenly changed and became as temperate as if they had been sober even at the beginning.75

73 Barker (2001). 74 Phld. De mus. 4, PHerc. 1576, col. 42.39–45 Delattre (2007) I, 69. For a discussion of the anecdote, see Spinelli (2014) with bibliography. 75 ὁ γοῦν Πυθαγόρας μειράκια ὑπὸ μέθης ἐκβεβακχευμένα ποτὲ θεασάμενος ὡς μηδὲν τῶν μεμηνότων διαφέρειν, παρῄνεσε τῷ συνεπικωμάζοντι τούτοις αὐλητῇ τὸ σπονδεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐπαυλῆσαι μέλος· τοῦ δὲ τὸ προσταχθὲν ποιήσαντος οὕτως αἰφνίδιον μεταβαλεῖν σωφρο-

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 125

That Philodemus and Sextus Empiricus (perhaps, indirectly) used Diogenes’ work On Music is all the more likely as they share three further examples (on Clytemnestra, Socrates, and military music of the Spartans), reveal similar vocabulary and treat a number of common topics related to music.76 A different version of this anecdote appears in Cicero. Here, not wine but enthusiastic music causes erotic rage among the youths, the setting is more violent and the aulete is a man: The story is told that one time certain youths became aroused by the music of the tibia, as can happen, and they were about to break in the door of a chaste woman. Pythagoras then admonished the tibia player to perform a spondaic melody. When this was done, the slowness of the tempo and the dignity of the performer caused the raging fury of these boys to subside.77

Iamblichus relates the same version as Cicero, only in more detail (e.g. that the music was first performed in the Phrygian mode), whereas in Aristides Quintilianus the tale is replaced with Pythagoras’ advices to his students to give preference to the lyre over the aulos, for while the first cares for our rational nature, the second serves our worse part.78 From its first appearance in Diogenes, this anecdote illustrating how certain melodies can alter the disposition of the soul to the contrary has been used as an argument for the psychagogic and moral impact of music. But the theory of musical ethos, correct and incorrect modes and metres etc. was first formulated not by Pythagoras but by Damon of Athens79 and evolved by many thinkers including Plato and Aristotle. It has been linked with Pythagoreanism much later, νισθέντας ὡς εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔνηφον (Sext. Emp. Math. 6.7–8, transl. by D. D. Greaves). Cf. criticism at 6.23. According to Basil of Caesarea (De leg. gent. libr., 9), the auletes changed on Pythagoras’ advice the harmonia to the Doric one (spondaiс was a typically Doric rhythm), thus completely sobering a group of komasts. In Ammonius (In Porph. 13.24–28 Busse), Olympiodorus (In Pl. Grg. 5.4 Westerink) and Elias (In Porph. 31.11–13 Busse) Pythagoras simply advises the auletris to change the melody of the aulos, which relieves the youth of his erotic desire. 76 Greaves (1986) 24–26; Rispoli (1992); Spinelli (2014) 346 n. 31. Delattre (2006) argues that Sextus used Philodemus. 77 Cic. De cons. suis fr. 3 (= Op. IV 3, p. 339 Müller), transl. by C. Bower. Cicero was the source of Quintilian (Inst. 1.10.32), Augustine (C. Iul. 5.23), and Boethius (Inst. mus. 1.1). 78 Iambl. VP 112, followed by Syrianus (In Hermog. 22.3–10 Rabe); Aristid. Quint. De mus. 2.18, cf. Arist. Pol. 8.6.1341a21–24. 79 See recently Wallace (2015), Almazova (2016), and A. Brancacci’s paper in this volume. More skeptically Barker (2007) 47, 72–74, and 252. In PHibeh 13 an unknown author of the early 4th cent. BC, allegedly Alcidamas (see Brancacci [1988]), attributes the idea that some melodies make men courageous, others cowardly, still others just, etc. to the so–called harmonikoi, a trend in musicology which opposed the Pythagoreans in almost everything. See Barker (1984) 183–185. Wallace (2015) 97–100 sees in these harmonikoi the followers of Damon.

126 

 Leonid Zhmud

in the pseudo- and Neopythagorean literature,80 which makes the historicity of this tradition highly  improbable.81 Earlier evidence is limited to two notices in Strabo,82 the Pythagoras anecdote and a similar story about the Pythagorean Cleinias told by Chamaeleon of Pontus, the Peripatetic of the first generation: if it ever happened that he had difficulties because of anger, took up the lyre and played it. In response to those seeking the reason he used to say, “I am soothed” (πραΰνομαι).83

Chamaeleon’s considerations on musical ethos were known to Diogenes (and via him to Philodemus),84 so it is possible that the Pythagoras anecdote also derives from him. Several things, however, attest against this. Chamaeleon most probably borrowed the Cleinias anecdote from Aristoxenus, who authored a tale about Archytas tempering his anger and a number of other stories on Cleinias.85 Aristoxenus’ contention that “the Pythagoreans used medicine to purify the body and music to purify the soul”86 squares very well with the soothingcathartic effect of music in the Cleinias anecdote. The same verb πραΰνειν occurs in Aristoxenus’ explanation of the reason why music was introduced at banquets: as wine intemperately drunk weakens both the body and mind, so music by its harmonious order and symmetry (τῇ τάξει τε καὶ συμμετρίᾳ) assuages (πραΰνειν) and reduces them to their former constitution.87

The expression τάξις καὶ συμμετρία was a beloved Pythagorean topos in Aristoxenus (frs. 33, 35, and 37 Wehrli), but the ethical effect of the opposite musical forms and instruments (e.g. lyre/aulos), as believed by Plato and Aristotle, was 80 Porph. VP 30, 32; Iambl. VP 64–65 and 110–114, from Nicomachus of Gerasa, who used ps.– Pythagorean treatises. Whereas Porphyry’s description is limited to the cathartic-therapeutic effects of music, mentioned already in Aristox. fr. 26 Wehrli (see below, n. 86), Iamblichus provides a full picture of Pythagoras as the initiator of education through music. 81 Zhmud (2012) 285–288; Wallace (2015) 194–200. 82 1.2.3 seems to refer to Strabo’s contemporaries, in 10.3.10 the Pythagoreans are attached to Plato. 83 Ath. 14.18.624f–625a (= Chamael. fr. 5 Martano). 84 Phld. Mus. 4, PHerc. 1576, cols. 46.45–47.11, 131.28–35 (= Chamael., frs. 6–7 Martano). 85 Aristox. fr. 30 Wehrli (on Archytas): ἔφη δὲ λέγεσθαι καὶ περὶ Κλεινίου τοιαῦτά τινα; fr. 131 Wehrli (on Cleinias); Diod. Sic. 10.4.1; Iambl. VP 239 (on Cleinias, from Aristoxenus). 86 οἱ Πυθαγορικοί καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς (fr. 26 Wehrli). Aristoxenus himself, according to Theophrastus, used aulos for curing psychic disorders: Apollon. Mir. 49 = Aristox. fr. 6 Wehrli = Theophr. fr. 726a FHS&G with comments in Wehrli (19672) and Fortenbaugh (2011) ad loc. Cf. also fr. 720 FHS&G. 87 Ps.-Plut. De mus. 1147a2–5 (= Aristox. fr. 122 Wehrli), transl. by W. W. Goodwin.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 127

not. There is no secure evidence that Aristoxenus believed in such effect himself  88 or that he ascribed it to the Pythagoreans, let alone Pythagoras himself. Looking for the origin of the Pythagoras anecdote, one inevitably comes across a parallel version, quoted by Galen from Posidonius, where the protagonist is Damon: For why by the gods – I’ll ask this too of Chrysippus’ followers – when Damon the musician was present when a female aulete was piping a Phrygian tune to some young men who were drunk and acting crazily, why did he order her to pipe a Dorian tune, and they immediately ceased their demented carrying on?89

Martianus Capella, whose source was Varro, a scholar heavily  versed in Greek tradition, also preserved the tale with Damon and spondaic melos.90 This version is complete and, being closely connected with Damon’s teaching, has a greater chance of being original. The manic behavior of the youths was caused not by wine or music, as in two versions of the Pythagoras anecdote, but by their combined effect. Damon orders that the melody be changed from a Phrygian to a Dorian tune, which in the Pythagoras tale are attested separately (in Iamblichus and Basil). Now, it was Damon and his followers who assigned opposite qualities to the different musical forms,91 specifically, to Phrygian and Dorian modes. This is stated in the famous passage in Plato’s Republic (3.399a–400b), discussing good and bad harmoniai, metres, and rhythms and their opposite effects on human soul, which is commonly attributed to the influence of Damon.92 Some rhythms are appropriate for μανία (3.400b2) and some for its opposite.93 88 For a nuanced analysis, see Barker (2007) 249–259 and Rocconi (2012). Philodemus criticizes Aristoxenus for ‘Damonian’ ideas (Mus. 4, PHerc. 1576, col. 109.29–39 Delattre [2007] II, 203). 89 ἐπεὶ διὰ τί, πρὸς θεῶν, ἐρωτήσω γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου, Δάμων ὁ μουσικὸς αὐλητρίδι παραγενόμενος αὐλούσῃ τὸ Φρύγιον νεανίσκοις τισὶν οἰνωμένοις καὶ μανικὰ ἄττα διαπραττομένοις ἐκέλευσεν αὐλῆσαι τὸ Δώριον, οἱ δὲ εὐθὺς ἐπαύσαντο τῆς ἐμπλήκτου φορᾶς (fr. 168 EK, transl. by R. W. Wallace). 90 Ebrios iuvenes perindeque improbius petulantes Damon, unus e sectatoribus meis, modulorum gravitate perdomuit; quippe tibicini spondeum canere iubens temulentae dementiam perturbatio­ nis infregit (De nupt. 9.926). See Stahl (1971) 53–55. Martianus refers to Varro at 9.928. 91 See above, n. 79. 92 Ethos of harmoniai is discussed in 3.398c–399e7, ethos of rhythms in 3.399e8–400b. Since Damon is mentioned in 3.400b1, Wallace (2015) 141–144 and 179–181, relates to him only the second part, whereas the first “need not reproduce Damon’s views” (181). Thus also Barker (2007) 252 n. 29. The occurrence of Damon’s name in the middle of this discourse is not a decisive argument against his influence in the first part. 93 Before quoting the Damon anecdote, Posidonius refers to this very passage: “We shall prescribe for some a regimen of rhythms, modes and exercises of a certain kind, for others those of a different kind, as Plato taught us” (fr. 168 EK, transl. by I. G. Kidd).

128 

 Leonid Zhmud

If Damon was the protagonist of the original version, the tale has been transferred to Pythagoras94 as a more prominent figure most probably in the rich biographical tradition of the 4th–3rd cent. BC. Diogenes of Babylon, well familiar with the Peripatetic biography, relates the Pythagoras anecdote but reserves the theory of musical ethics exclusively for Damon, presenting it as follows: Moreover, when one asked if music incites all the virtues or just some of them, Damon, the musician, believed that [it will incite] the musician to all of them or nearly all. [For, he said] that the effect of singing and playing the kithara renders the child [not only more courageous and more temperate, but also more just (…)].95

After the 1st cent. BC, when Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans began to be associated with the well-known ideas of the ethical influence of music, the Pythagoras anecdote replaces the original one. What we find in Diogenes and Philodemus is an intermediate stage: Pythagoras is a hero of the anecdote that illustrates ideas attributed to Damon. In Book 10 (Περὶ ὑπερηφανίας) of On Vices Philodemus defines and criticizes different forms of arrogance.96 The book consists of two parts: in the first (cols. 1–10) the Epicurean offers his own reflections on the topic, in the second (cols. 10–24) he summarizes and quotes the protreptic letter On the Removal of Arrogance by a certain Aristo. This writer is identified either with the Peripatetic Aristo of Ceos (by the majority of scholars) or with the Stoic Aristo of Chios,97 both of the 3rd cent. BC. Introducing Aristo’s writing, according to which the principal source of arrogance is τύχη, Philodemus notes that philosophy itself, as he mentioned before (col. 6), can also be a reason why some people may appear (justifiably or not) arrogant, and adduces as an example a list of four philosophers: T6.  Ἀρίστων το[ί]νυν [γ]εγ̣ρ̣α̣φὼς Περὶ τοῦ | κο̣[υ]φίζ[ειν ὑ]περηφανίας ἐ|πιστολι[κόν] τ[ι ἴ]διον μὲν ἔ|παθε̣ν [τ]ῶ̣ν̣ δ[ι]ὰ τύχην ὑπερ|ηφ[ά]νων [κατ]ι[δ]ών, οὐ μό|νο[ν] διά

94 So Lasserre (1954) 62–63; Matelli (2004) 163 n. 38. 95 Phld. Mus. 4, PHerc. 1576, col. 22.4–15 Delattre (2007) I, 36, transl. by L. H. Woodward. Restoration of the last lines relies on PHerc. 1578, col. 100.37–45 Delattre (2007) II, 194–195. Philodemus mentions Damon two more times: cols. 34 and 147–148, see Wallace (2015) 157–165. 96 Phld. Vit. 10, PHerc. 1008, cols. 1–24 Ranocchia. The only complete edition: Jensen (1911); the second part: Ranocchia (2007); for the first part, see Indelli (2010). Critical discussion Tsouna (2007) 143–162; French translation: Tsouna (2010a). Bibliography: Longo Auricchio/Indelli/Del Mastro (2012) 350–351. 97 For earlier literature, see Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 208 nn. 34–35, for recent: Fortenbaugh/ White (2006); Angeli (2007) 9–10. Ranocchia (2007), (2016), and (2017) argues for the Stoic Aristo.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 129

τ̣[ιν’ ἀ]π̣ὸ ταύτης ὑπερ|ηφ[α]νού[ντω]ν, ἀλλὰ καὶ | δι’ ἃ προε̣ίπ̣[α]μεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ | δη̑[τ]α̣̣ καὶ δι’ αὐτὴν φιλοσο|φί[αν] πολλῶν δοξάντων, | ὡς [Ἡ]ρ̣ακλείτου καὶ Πυθαγό|ρου καὶ Ἐ[μ]πεδοκλέους καὶ | Σωκρ̣άτους καὶ ποιητῶν ἐνί|ων̣, οὓς ο[ἱ] παλαιοὶ τῶν κω|μωιδογράφων ἐπεράπιζον. Aristo, then, who has written an epistolary work On Relieving of Arrogance, was alone (?) in considering only that of those who become arrogant on account of (good) fortune, these being arrogant not only on account of circumstances deriving from that, but also on account of what we have mentioned earlier, and indeed many having given the impression of being arrogant on account of philosophy itself, such as Heraclitus and Pythagoras and Empedocles and Socrates and certain poets, whom the older comic poets used to censure.98

Since Philodemus/Aristo specify why these philosophers are considered arrogant only in the case of Socrates,99 while the rest seems to be mentioned elsewhere in Aristo’s letter,100 we have to turn to the biographical tradition on them and to what Philodemus previously said on philosophers’ arrogance. As opposed to Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Socrates, each of whom has had a long history of being specifically accused of different forms of arrogance (ὑπερηφανία, ἀλαζονεία, ὑπεροψία, ὕβρις, εἰρωνεία, etc.),101 Pythagoras figured in tradition as a person struggling with it rather than an object of censure. Following Wilhelm Crönert, the commentators referred to Diog. Laërt. 8.11 and 36 as to the examples of Pythagoras’ arrogance,102 yet σεμνοπρεπέστατος (8.11) by itself does not have negative connotations, it agrees better with the early description of Pythagoras’ σεμνότητα τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ σχήματος by Alcidamas and Dicaearchus103 than with his arrogance. The same σεμνοπρέπεια appears at 8.36 with a quotation from Timon of 98 Phld. Vit. 10, PHerc. 1008, col. 10.11–25 Ranocchia = Jensen (1911) 16–17 = Acosta Méndez/ Angeli (1992) fr. 4 = Fortenbaugh/White (2006) fr. 21a = Ranocchia (2007) 253. The restoration of the text’s first part is disputable; I reproduce the text of the last critical edition and Ranocchia’s translation; cf. Tsouna (2010b) 389. 99 Cols. 21–23 (= Acosta Méndez/Angeli [1992] fr. 5). Poets are represented by Euripides, col. 13.1–9. 100 Ranocchia (2007) 17; Angeli (2007) 12. 101 Heraclitus: Diog. Laërt. 9.1, 9.6, 9.15; Empedocles: Diog. Laërt. 8.66 (ὅπου δὲ ἀλαζόνα καὶ φίλαυτον ἐν τῇ ποιήσει), 8.70, 8.73; Socrates: Diog. Laërt. 2.25, cf. Pl. Symp. 219c7. See Indelli (2007) 279–283; Ranocchia (2007) 17–18, and in this volume. 102 Crönert (1906) 191 (s.v. Herakleitos); Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 215; Ranocchia (2007) 18. 103 On Alcidamas, see above, p. 117. Dicaearchus says: “He (sc. Pythagoras) arrived in Italy and appeared in Kroton, Dikaiarchos says, as a man who arrived with a lot of travel experience and was brilliant and well endowed by fortune as to his own natural disposition. With respect to his appearance, he was noble and great and had a lot of charm and beauty in his voice, in his character and in everything else” (FGrHist [cont.] 1400 F 56 = fr. 40 Mirhady = fr. 33 Wehrli; transl. by G. Verhasselt).

130 

 Leonid Zhmud

Phlius, who ridicules Pythagoras’ solemnity of speech, σεμνηγορίη.104 Revealingly, in the earlier passage, to which Philodemus himself refers (ἀλλὰ καὶ δι’ ἃ προε̣ίπ̣[α]μεν ἡμεῖς),105 he defends philosophers from unjustified accusations of arrogance because of τὴν σεμνότητα [κ]αὶ [τ]ῆς ὄψεω[ς] κα[ὶ] τοῦ π[αν]τὸ[ς] βίου (col. 6.19–21).106 The real ὑπερήφανος is not he who possesses these characteristics, but he who appears contemptuous and despises people by his actions (col. 6.27–33). If Philodemus considered gravitas as the most appropriate characteristic of a philosopher per se (exemplified by the Epicurean sage), then, in his view, Pythagoras must have belonged to those who, unlike Heraclitus and Socrates, only appeared to be arrogant διὰ φιλοσοφίαν. Philodemus’ attitude to Pythagoras, as far as we can judge from the available evidence, was either positive or neutral, as opposed to his criticism towards Socrates.107 As for Aristo, it is doubtful whether he meant Pythagoras among those maniacally hubristic people, who “believed to become gods from mortals.”108 The context of this column, especially the figure of Xerxes, whose arrogance is mentioned in the previous sentence, suggests that apotheosis of Hellenistic kings, rather than of Presocratic philosophers, is implied here. In any case, Pythagoras, unlike Empedocles, did not claim to become a god.109 A brief extract from Pythagoras’ biography has been found among the fragments of the PHerc. 1788 published by Crönert.110 He identified frs. 1–8 containing the

104 Τὴν δὲ σεμνοπρέπειαν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις δάκνων αὐτὸν ὅμως οὐ παρέλιπεν, εἰπὼν οὕτως· Πυθαγόρην τε γόητας ἀποκλίνοντ’ ἐπὶ δόξας / θήρῃ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίης ὀαριστήν (fr. 57 Di Marco). This refers to the tradition of Pythagoras’ public speeches, cf. above, p. 118. 105 We take his cross–reference in col. 10 as referring to col. 6 as the only one in the previous text that directly discusses philosophers. 106 Ranocchia (2007) 289; Indelli (2010) 328; Tsouna (2010a) 618. “Such critics misunderstand the manner in which sages relate to other people, and also ‘the nobility both of their appearance and of their [whole] life’ (VI.19–21),” Tsouna (2007) 150. Cf. Aristoxenus’ story on Damon and Phintias (fr. 31 Wehrli), where the associates of Dionysius the Elder mocking the Pythagoreans as braggarts (ἀλαζόνας) claimed that their dignity (σεμνότης) would collapse if they are really scared. 107 Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992). 108 ἢ τὸ θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων [ἑ]αυτοὺς γεγονέναι δοκεῖν (col. 16.24–25). See Ranocchia (2007) 322–323. 109 According to the story made up by Heraclides Ponticus, the first incarnation of Pythagoras’ soul was Aetalides, who was considered to be son of Hermes, then Euphorbus, Hermotimus, and a fisherman Pyrrhus (Diog. Laërt. 8.4 = fr. 86 Schütrumpf = fr. 89 Wehrli); Zhmud (2012) 232 n. 115. This is rather a reverse apotheosis. 110 Crönert (1906) 147, cf. 19–20. Recently it has been re-edited by Vassallo (2017), whose work was unavailable to me when I wrote this paper.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 131

names of Thales, Pherecydes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, Gorgias, and Stilpo as parts of the historiographical section of a polemical treatise by an unknown Epicurean. This opinion was widely accepted,111 yet recently some scholars have been inclined to ascribe PHerc. 1788, frs. 1–8 to an unidentified work of Philodemus himself.112 Fr. 4 of this small bio-doxographical collection deals with Pythagoras,113 whose name, however, is missing in the text: T7.  ἐν δὲ Κρήτηι κατελθὼν εἰς] || τὸ Ἰδαῖον ἄ]ν̣[τ]ρον [μετὰ τοῦ Ἐπιμενίδου] καὶ τὰ περὶ θε[ῶν παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐν] ἀπορρήτοις [μαθὼν ἀπῆρεν] ε̣ἰς Κρότωνα [καὶ 5 κατέστρεψεν ἐ]νενήκοντα [ἔτη βιοὺς καὶ ἐτά]φη ἐν Μετα[ποντίωι ἐντίμως]. (…) [and having descended into the Idaean cave on Crete with Epimenides] and [having learned from him] the secret teaching about the gods, [he departed] to Croton [and died] at the age of 90 [and was buried] in Metapontum [with honors].

As is easy to see, Crönert reconstructed two thirds of the text114 relying on Diogenes Laërtius’ biography of Pythagoras.115 One more parallel can be found in Porphyry’s passage, εἰς δὲ τὸ Ἰδαῖον καλούμενον ἄντρον καταβὰς (...) ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπέβη καὶ ἐν Κρότωνι ἐγένετο (VP 17–18), which derives from the Hellenistic biographical handbook, similar or identical to that used by Diogenes Laërtius.116 Crönert’ conjecture [μετὰ τοῦ Ἐπιμενίδου] has not been further supported,117 but the preserved part of the extract offers well known

111 See e.g. Dorandi (1982) 351; Indelli (2007) 285. Primavesi (2002) 186, and Obbink (2011), as quoted in Porter (2016) 186 n. 90, relate this treatise to the 2nd cent. BC. 112 Angeli (2003) 332–333; Vassallo (2015b) 102 n. 13, cf. Vassallo (2017). 113 = 14 A 13 DK = Timpanaro Cardini (1958) test. 13. 114 Dorandi (1982) 351 n. 32 speaks of “azzardate integrazioni.” 115 εἶτ’ ἐν Κρήτῃ σὺν Ἐπιμενίδῃ κατῆλθεν εἰς τὸ Ἰδαῖον ἄντρον· (...) καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις ἔμαθεν. εἶτ’ ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Σάμον, καὶ εὑρὼν τὴν πατρίδα τυραννουμένην ὑπὸ Πολυκράτους, ἀπῆρεν εἰς Κρότωνα (8.3); εἰς Μεταπόντιον ὑπεξελθεῖν κἀκεῖ τὸν βίον καταστρέψαι (8.40); ὡς δ’ οἱ πλείους, ἔτη βιοὺς ἐνενήκοντα (8.44). 116 Zhmud (2012) 75 n. 60. 117 It is mentioned in Diels’ app. crit. (14 A 13 DK) and Timpanaro Cardini (1958) test. 13. The fragment was not included in the recent editions of Epimenides: Toye (2007); Bernabé (2007) 126–128.

132 

 Leonid Zhmud

facts from the Hellenistic biographies of Pythagoras: his visit to the Idaean cave on Crete (ἄ]ν̣[τ]ρον), initiation into secret rites and teachings (ἀπόρρητα), emigration to Croton and death in Metapontum at the age of 90. Among the possible sources of this information Timaeus of Tauromenium seems to be the most suitable candidate, for his Pythagoras traveled to Crete and Sparta (Just. Epit. 20.4), lived long enough to become Empedocles’ teacher (FGrHist 566 F 14) and died in Metapontum venerated by the local citizens (FGrHist 566 F 131; Just. Epit. 20.4). Timaeus, however, sent Pythagoras to study the laws of Minos and Lycurgus,118 not to descend into the Idaean cave, so that a religious version of this journey with the secret rites, etc. is younger than him. Whereas the other seven extant columns of PHerc. 1788 relate, in varying degrees, to philosophical ideas and/or works of the respective thinkers, the testimonium on Pythagoras is purely biographical. This may be a sheer accident, but against the background of all Philodemus’ references to Pythagoras it would, on the contrary, appear to be a distinct tendency. Though Pythagoras the philosopher crops up in Philodemus’ texts more often than Anaxagoras and not much less than Democritus,119 his ideas never come to the foreground. Philodemus’ Pythagoras is a convenient example to use in a discussion (T2, T3, and T4), a character of anecdotes (T5), he often figures in the company of other philosophers (T2, T3, and T6). The Pythagoras of Philodemus’ sources and opponents, Diogenes of Babylon and Aristo, is pretty much the same. Generally, the figure of Pythagoras as known to Philodemus belongs to the first two centuries of Hellenism, when he was a part of the biographical rather than the philosophical tradition. The demise of the Pythagorean school after 350 BC and the lack of Pythagoras’ writings (or writings considered authentic) contributed to a situation where he turned out to belong to the distant philosophical past, hardly relevant to contemporary philosophers. In spite of Philodemus’ deep interest in the history of philosophy he lets Pythagoras appear in a doxographical context only once,120 in a long list of theologoi, historians, and philosophers from Thales to Diogenes 118 Timaeus ap. Just. Epit. 20.4: inde regressus Cretam et Lacedaemona ad cognoscendas Minois et Lycurgi inclitas ea tempestate leges contenderat (the same in Val. Max. 8.7 ext. 2); Iambl. VP 25: καὶ ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ καὶ ἐν Σπάρτῃ τῶν νόμων ἕνεκα διέτριψε. See Delatte (1922) 153. 119 See Vassallo’s IPPH IV 12–20 (Anaxagoras); X 32bis–56 (Democritus); XXXV 161–173 (Pythagoras). 120 Cf. a desperately short fragment of Phld. De rhet. 10, PHerc. 473, fr. 5 Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 303 [T8]: ἐπεὶ πᾶσ[α] | μὲν ἀρετή, [ο]ὐχ ἣ κατὰ | τοὺς ἥρωας ὑπῆρχε[ν, ἀλ]|λὰ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν [καὶ] | τοὺς ἐπάνω (“Since all virtue, not that which was with the heroes, but that which according to Pythagoras and his predecessors […]”). See the new reconstruction of the fragment in CPH XXXVI 172, with commentary.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 133

of Babylon, whose ideas of the divine are summarily stated and criticized at the end of the so-called ‘first part’ of On Piety. This theological doxography, following the framework established by Eudemus of Rhodes’ Θεολογικὴ ἱστορία and Theophrastus’ Φυσικῶν δόξαι,121 was compiled by some Stoic philosopher; Philodemus borrowed it and provided criticism from Epicurean positions; in turn, his acquaintance Cicero used this part of On Piety for the Epicurean overview of theological ideas in De natura deorum (1.10.25–16.43).122 Thus, though only one sentence related to Pythagoras is preserved on the papyrus, we have a rare opportunity to get closer to the original through Cicero’s extract123 and even learn the opinion of Alcmaeon of Croton, who preceded Pythagoras in Nat. D. 1.11.27: Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divin­ itatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus inmortalitatem dare. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal.124

Alcmaeon’s idea that the soul is immortal because of its constant circular movement similar to the movement of all divine heavenly bodies is attested in Aristotle and in Theophrastus’ Φυσικῶν δόξαι and due to this compendium became a common stock knowledge in Hellenistic philosophy.125 Criticism of Alcmaeon’s views stems from Philodemus, as follows from the remains of the papyrus:

121 Eudemus (fr. 150 Wehrli) treated among theologoi Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Acusilaus, Epimenides, and Pherecydes (see Zhmud [2006] 130–133), all of which occur also in Philodemus: Henrichs (1972) 78 nn. 28 and 33. The order of the Presocratics in the philosophical part of doxography (see Obbink [2002] 196–197) closely corresponds to that in Theophrastus, where the Ionians Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus were followed by the Italians and Atomists Xenophanes, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Metrodorus (see Zhmud [2013] 164–165). Philodemus or his source omitted Archelaus and placed Alcmaeon and Pythagoras (not in Theophrastus) before Xenophanes, and Heraclitus after Democritus. 122 H. Diels ap. DG, 529–550 demonstrated the close relationship of Nat. D. 1.10.25–16.43 with On Piety, yet he believed that Cicero and Philodemus both copied from the Epicurean Phaedrus’ Περὶ θεῶν. Cicero’s dependence on On Piety was suggested by Philippson (1939) 2462 and established by Obbink (2001) and (2002). For an overview of earlier theories, see Pease (1968) 39–42. 123 Caution is needed, as Cicero changed his source for his own purposes: McKirahan (1996). 124 Transl. by H. Rackham. Cf. Cic. Resp. 6.15: iisque (sc. hominibus) animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus quae sidera et stellas vocatis, quae globosae et rotundae, divinis animatae mentibus, circulos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili. 125 Arist. De an. 1.2.405a29–b1 (= 24 A 12 DK): παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ἀ. ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις· τοῦτο δ’ ὑπάρχειν

134 

 Leonid Zhmud

T9.  ̲ ̲θεωρεῖτα[ι· φαίνεται οὖν τὸ [θεῖον ἀνασκευάζ[ων. Πυ θαγόρου δ’ αὐτοῦ γ’ 5 οὐδέν φασί τινε[ς εἶναι τῶν ἀνα[φερ]ομένων παρὰ [τῶν μαθητῶν εἰς αὐτόν.126 (…) theorizes; therefore, he obviously destroys the divine. As for Pythagoras himself, some say that none of the writings ascribed to him by (his students?) belongs to him. Starting with Aristoxenus, Alcmaeon often appears as the Pythagorean and even as a direct student of Pythagoras.127 As a natural philosopher, Alcmaeon owes almost nothing to Pythagoras, however, his belief in the immortal soul is close to Pythagoras’ teaching of the immortal soul moving in a circle of rebirths. The order of names in Philodemus’ source, Alcmaeon/Pythagoras/Xenophanes, is peculiar. In the Hellenistic philosophical diadochai Pythagoras opens the Italian succession and Xenophanes follows the Pythagorean school, which included Alcmaeon. In Theophrastus’ doxography Xenophanes appears as the first Italian philosopher, while Pythagoras, being not a physikos, is absent and the place of Alcmaeon is unknown: he did not have the specific archai and thus did not figure in the more or less chronologically organized chapter Περὶ ἀρχῶν that opened the Φυσικῶν δόξαι.128 Πυθαγόρου δ’ αὐτοῦ γ’ emphasizes the contrast between the student, who authored a treatise from which his doxa comes, and the teacher, who did not have authentic works. Philodemus, or his sources, cautiously refers to τινές, though by his time this seemed to be a widespread opinion later becoming dominant.129 Diogenes Laërtius most probably derives this opinion from the biographer Sosiαὐτῆι ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένηι· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον. Aët. 4.2.2: Ἀ. φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον κατ’ ἀίδιον κίνησιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν καὶ προσεμφερῆ τοῖς θείοις ὑπολαμβάνει. Cf. also Clem. Al. Protr. 5.66. 126 Phld. Piet., PHerc 1428, fr. 10 Schober (1988) 113. The diple after l. 3 indicates transition from Alcmaeon to Pythagoras. See the new reconstruction with commentary of this Herculanean passage by Ch. Vassallo in this volume (DAPR, T17). 127 Zhmud (2012) 121–124. 128 Zhmud (2013) 159–166. See also Dyck (2003) 90. 129 According to Flavius Josephus, αὐτοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ὁμολογεῖται σύγγραμμα (Ap. 1.163).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 135

crates of Rhodes (fl. c. 180 BC),130 who may have been one of τινές. Sosicrates’ fellow native of Rhodes, Posidonius, representing the Stoic tradition, also noticed that “no work by Pythagoras is preserved for us” (fr. 151 EK). Less probable is Diels’ suggestion that Philodemus refers here to the story told by the biographer Satyrus (late 3rd cent. BC) about Pythagoras’ three books published by Philolaus and bought by Plato for a hundred minas.131 Pythagoras’ tripartitum was ignored by Hellenistic philosophy and barely existed outside the biographical tradition. Skipping the question of Pythagoras’ writings, Cicero presents his doctrine that has an unmistakably Stoic origin: Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commean­ tem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari deum (…) quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infixus aut infusus esset in mundo? As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god (…) Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world?132

Pythagoras himself offered no physical doctrine of the soul, only the religious one, and every Pythagorean philosopher had his own views on the soul different from the others.133 The theory of the divine world-soul, however, is not attested in ancient Pythagoreanism. It was ascribed to Pythagoras in course of his Stoicization during the Hellenistic period, when the Stoic school was dominant force in philosophy.134 Evidently, the compiler of the Stoic theological doxography experienced difficulties in finding a suitable source on Pythagoras’ views on the divine and, by analogy with Alcmaeon’s concept of the immortal soul, attributed to his teacher a familiar doctrine of the soul as a part of the divine world-soul.135 130 Ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόραν μηδὲ ἓν καταλιπεῖν σύγγραμμά φασιν διαπεσόντες (8.6); see Centrone (1992) 4189. 131 Diog. Laërt. 8.6; 8.9; 8.15. Hence Diels’ supplement τῶν ἀνα[φερ]ομένων παρὰ [τὰ τρία ἐκεῖνα βιβλία] (“except for those three books”). 132 Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.27–28 (transl. by H. Rackham). Cf. Id. Cato 78: Audiebam Pythagoram Pytha­ goreosque, incolas paene nostros, qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati, numquam du­ bitasse quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus; Tusc. 5.38: Humanus animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest. 133 Zhmud (2012) 387–394. 134 Pythagoras’ doxography in the Vetusta placita, especially the chapter on archai (Aët. 1.3.7), is another result of this process. See Zhmud (2016) 320. 135 On the world-soul in Stoicism, see Long/Sedley (1987) II, 319–321.

136 

 Leonid Zhmud

Similarly, the Pythagorean Hypomnemata presenting a largely Stoic body of cosmological and physical doctrines136 characterizes soul as “a detachment (ἀπόσπασμα) of aether, both the hot and the cold (…) it is immortal since that from which it is detached is immortal.”137 Another parallel comes from Sextus Empiricus’ discussion of the dogmatists’ theological views: In fact Pythagoras and Empedocles and the rest of the Italian crowd say that we have a certain commonality not only toward one another and toward the gods, but also towards the non-rational animals. For there is one breath reaching through the whole world like a soul, which also unites us with them.138

Thus, in the only case where Philodemus presents Pythagoras’ philosophical view this view turns out to be Stoic. Returning to Pythagoras’ pseudonymous writings mentioned by Philodemus and Posidonius, we have to take into account that these close contemporaries had in mind different types of literature and, respectively, that their positions were opposed. Philodemus indicates the need for caution in dealing with the works ascribed to Pythagoras and does not seem to use any of them. Posidonius admits that though none of Pythagoras’ writing has been preserved, to judge by what was written by some of his students, he held the same particular view on emotions in the soul as Plato.139 One more fragment leaves no doubt that Posidonius was obviously willing to infer Pythagoras’ doctrines from the writings of his students and followers in which the latter figured as a predecessor of Plato and Aristotle: Not only Aristotle and Plato held such views but still earlier there were others, and in particular Pythagoras. Posidonius too says that he, Pythagoras, was the first to hold the view, while it was Plato who worked it out and made it more complete.140

To understand what kinds of writings Philodemus and Posidonius had in mind, we have to recall that the first part of the 1st cent. BC witnessed the general turn 136 Cf. above, n. 34. See recently Long (2013); Laks (2013); Zhmud (2019). 137 Diog. Laërt. 8.28 (transl. by A. A. Long). Cf. Diogenes’ Stoic doxography: ζῷον ἄρ’ ὁ κόσμος. ἔμψυχον δέ, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος (7.143). 138 Adv. math. 9.127 (transl. by R. Bett). 139 Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν, αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συγγράμματος οὐδενὸς εἰς ἡμᾶς διασωζομένου τεκμαιρόμενος δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἔνιοι τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν (fr. 151 EK). Cf. Claud. Mam. De st. an. 2.3: Pythagorae igitur, quia nihil ipse scriptitaverit, a posteris quaerenda sententia est. 140 οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης μόνον ἢ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζον οὕτως ἀλλ’ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἄλλοι τέ τινες καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐκείνου πρώτου μὲν εἶναι λέγων τὸ δόγμα, Πλάτωνα δ’ ἐξεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκευάσαι τελεώτερον αὐτό (fr. 165 ΕΚ; transl. by I. G. Kidd).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 137

in Greek philosophy,141 which involved, inter alia, the revival of dogmatic Platonism and Aristotelianism and the birth of Neopythagoreanism, philosophy of which constituted a mixture of Platonism and Aristotelianism with additional Stoic views.142 The 1st cent. BC became a watershed between two categories of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, the traditional and the Neopythagorean ones.143 To the first category belong the texts ascribed to Pythagoras and his family members and written in Attic, Ionic or hexameter in the late 4th to 2nd cent. BC; they are preserved only in a small number of tiny fragments, often only their titles are known. Not all of them were philosophical in content but those which were did not impress contemporary philosophers, who mostly ignored them. The second category comprises philosophical treatises with a clear agenda written in or after the 1st cent. BC mostly but not exclusively in ps.-Doric under the names of known, unknown, and fictional Pythagoreans. Many of them came down to us in full or in excerpts, constituting the bulk of Thesleff’s edition.144 The principal aim of these treatises was to present Pythagoras and his school as the most important predecessors of the recently found or reestablished Platonic and Aristotelian dogmata.145 Now, Posidonius discerning in Pythagoras a precursor of Plato and Aristotle, clearly referred to this newly appeared literature attributed to the Pythagoreans, whereas Philodemus and his source had in mind the pseudepigrapha of the first category, ascribed to Pythagoras himself. This is why Philodemus, as we have seen, did not regard Pythagoras as philosopher whose theories could be accepted or disputed seriously; his interest was predominantly antiquarian and biographical. In the available corpus of Philodemus’ texts there is no clear trace of his use of the Neopythagorean pseudepigrapha, and he did not mention by name any Pythagorean (except for Alcmaeon, reconstructable from Cicero).146 This has an important implication for the question of the origin of the Neopythagorean pseudepigrapha: their most plausible birthplace is neither Southern Italy, nor Rome, but Alexandria.147 The following two passages from the anonymous commentary in Plato’s Theaetetus (1st cent. AD) preserved in a 2nd-cent. Graeco-Egyptian papyrus

141 See e.g. Sedley (2003).  142 Centrone (2014). 143 Cf. Zhmud (2019). 144 Thesleff (1965). 145 See e.g. the Anonymus Photii: Ὅτι ἔνατος ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου διάδοχος γέγονέ φησι Πλάτων Ἀρχύτου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου μαθητὴς γενόμενος, δέκατος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης (237.5–7 Thesleff). 146 There is one reference, rather critical, to the Πυθαγόρειοι in Phld. De mus., PHerc. 1497, col. 145.16–19 Delattre (2007) II, 301. 147 Southern Italy: Thesleff (1961) 30–32. Rome: Burkert (1961) 245. Alexandria: Zhmud (2019).

138 

 Leonid Zhmud

reflect the next stage of the Pythagorean tradition, when Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans have been already richly endowed with all sorts of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines and Plato was widely believed to be Pythagoras’ student and follower. Discussing the so-called growing argument, i.e. a logical puzzle about the identity of a person undergoing change over time, the commentator offers the following genealogy: the argument was first discovered by Pythagoras, then borrowed by Epicharmus, an acquaintance of the Pythagoreans, and later used by Plato, obviously due to his Pythagorean background: T10.  τὸν δὲ | [περ]ὶ τοῦ αὐξομένου | [λ]ό̣γον ἐκίνησεν | [μ]ὲν πρῶτος Πυθα|[γό]ρ̣ας, ἐκίνησεν | [δὲ] καὶ Πλάτων, ὡς ἐν | [το]ῖ ς̣ εἰς τὸ Συμπόσιον | [ὑ]π̣ε̣μνήσαμεν. The argument about that which grows was first posed by Pythagoras, but was also posed by Plato, as we noted in our commentary on the Symposium.148 T11. 

Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ[μιλή]|σας τοῖς Πυθα[γορείοις,] | ἄλλα τ[έ] τι ν̣ α εὖ [ἐδίδασ]|κεν δ[ρά]μ̣ατ̣[α, καὶ τὸ | περὶ τ]ο̣ῦ α̣ὐ̣ξομ̣[ένου, ὃ] | λ̣[όγῳ] ἐφοδ[ικῷ καὶ πι|σ]τ̣[ῷ ἐ]π̣έ̣ρα[ινε. Epicharmus, having been acquainted with the Pythagoreans, successfully put on stage a number of dramas, and in particular the one about the growing man, which he treated with a systematic and reliable argument.149

Recently Luigi Battezzato proposed a new reading of T11 that solves several difficulties of the original restoration: T11a.  Ἐπίχαρμος, ο[ἷα ὁμιλή]|σας τοῖς Πυθα[γορείοις] | ἄλλα τ[έ] τινα εὖ [ἀπέδω]|κεν δ[όγ]ματ[α καὶ τὸν | περὶ τ]οῦ αὐξομ[ένου] | λ[όγον] ἐφοδ[ικῶς καὶ πι|σ]τ[ῶς ἐ]πέρα[(ι)νε.] Epicharmus, since he was a pupil of the Pythagoreans, explained well a number of philosophical opinions, and brought to completion the argument about the growing man in a systematic and reliable way.150

The puzzle about the growing man, implied in Plato and directly linked with Epicharmus by Chrysippus,151 originally occurs in a fragment of his comedy featuring a debtor refusing to pay to the creditor under the pretext that today they 148 PBerol. inv. 9782, col. LXX.5–12 (= Bastianini/Sedley [1995] 454 and 456), transl. by D. N. Sedley. 149 PBerol. inv. 9782, col. LXXI.12–18 (= Bastianini/Sedley [1995] 458 = Epich. fr. 136 PCG), transl. by L. Battezzato after the Italian translation in Bastianini/Sedley (1995). 150 Battezzato (2008) 15; see also Álvarez Salas (2017) 180–181. 151 Pl. Tht. 152e; Plut. Comm. not. 1083a (= Chrysipp. SVF II 762). Plato was accused of plagiarizing Epicharmus by a certain Alcimus (Diog. Laërt. 3.9 = 23 B 1 DK = fr. 275 PCG).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 139

are not the same persons as yesterday.152 He first appeals to the pebble-arithmetic of the Pythagoreans:153 (A.) αἰ πὸτ ἀριθμόν τις περισσόν, αἰ δὲ λῆις πὸτ ἄρτιον, ποτθέμειν λῆι ψᾶφον ἢ καὶ τᾶν ὑπαρχουσᾶν λαβεῖν, ἦ δοκεῖ κά τοί γ’ ωὑτὸς εἶμεν; (B.) οὐκ ἐμίν γά κα. Debtor: If you wish to add a pebble to an odd number – or to an even one if you like – or if you take one away that is there, do you think it is still the same number? Creditor: Of course not.154 This, of course, by no means makes Epicharmus a student of the Pythagoreans,155 and Pythagoras the inventor of the argument. But first, did Epicharmus really mean Pythagorean theoretical arithmetic and not just practical computations, as some scholars believe? The answer is that practical arithmetic does not need and, thus, does not know odd and even numbers. It is Epicharmus’ fragment, where ἄρτιος and περισσός in their mathematical meaning first occur in Greek literature, whereas the practical and computational mathematics of Mesopotamia and Egypt did not have special terms for odd and even numbers.156 But occasional playing with the Pythagorean concepts does not make anybody a Pythagorean, the Pythagoreans walked only in groups, and since there was no Pythagorean community in Sicily at that time, Epicharmus did not have the opportunity to become a Pythagorean. He does not figure in Aristoxenus’ catalogue of the Pythagoreans (Iambl. VP 267) and no other author before 300 BC calls him a Pythagorean. The process of his Pythagoreanization took a long time.157 The first move was made by Pythagoras himself, who, according to the biographer Sotion (fl. c. 200 BC), wrote a book (a letter to or a dialogue with) Helothales the Father of Epichar­

152 Diog. Laërt. 3.11 (= 23 B 2 DK = fr. 276 PCG). See Sedley (1982). Kassel/Austin consider this fragment inauthentic: cf. Battezzato (2008) 11–16; Horky (2013) 131–137. 153 See Zhmud (2012) 272–273 and 409–411. 154 Epich. fr. 276 PCG (transl. by J. Barnes). 155 Cf. Horky (2013) 131–137, who exploits this possibility. 156 Jens Høyrup, e-mails of 17.09.2016: “(…) to my knowledge there were none – which of course does not necessarily mean there were none, but at least suggests that they were not so important as to have been understood and noticed by Assyriologists.” “I fully agree that the work on odd and even is not traditional Mesopotamian or Egyptian. It is something which grows out of ‘theoretical’ reflection (in the original meaning), quite likely on psephoi  – just as the figurate numbers.” 157 Epicharmus as Pythagorean: Plut. Num. 8; Clem. Al. Strom. 5.14.100; Diog. Laërt. 8.78; Iambl. VP 241 and 266.

140 

 Leonid Zhmud

mus of Cos (Diog. Laërt. 8.7), known only by its title. In its turn, a ps.-Epicharmean λόγος πρὸς Ἀντήνορα considered Pythagoras a citizen of Rome.158 Since Diogenes Laërtius, who relied in his biography of Pythagoras only on the Hellenistic sources, says that Epicharmus “heard” Pythagoras and included his ‘biography’ into the Pythagorean Book 8, we can be sure that by the 1st cent. BC this process had been finished. Starting at the biographical level, it then took on philosophical forms, so that in the commentary to Theaetetus Epicharmus develops the Pythagorean argument that is later used by Plato. The last text to which I would like to draw attention is the famous medical papyrus Anonymus Londiniensis (PBrLibr. inv. 137) of the 1st cent. AD.159 The central part of the papyrus contains a doxographical compendium of the 4th cent. BC covering some twenty theories of the origins of disease. Interestingly, the Pythagoreans Hippon and Philolaus are the only Presocratics to figure in this medical doxography (cols. XI and XVIII); all the other individuals mentioned here, except for Plato, were doctors. Such a choice is certainly related to the fact that since the 6th cent. BC the Pythagoreans had strong connections with medicine (including sportive medicine) and physiology. It is enough to note the names of Democedes, Alcmaeon, and Iccus, a trainer and doctor.160 Though for us this aspect of Pythagoreanism is usually obscured by a thick curtain of number doctrine which Aristotle presents as the official philosophy of the Pythagoreans, for the early Lyceum it was quite relevant, as were the views of the Pythagorean botanist Menestor reviewed by Theophrastus in his works on plants (DK 32). Since the late 19th cent. it was generally believed that the author of doxography was Menon, a student of Aristotle, for Galen testifies that it is agreed that a special medical doxography, Ἰατρικὴ συναγωγή or Μενώνεια, similar to Theophrastus’ Φυσικῶν δόξαι, will be written by Aristotle’s student Menon, though it is attributed to Aristotle,161 as this was the case with the author of Anony­ mus Londiniensis. More recently,162 however, many scholars tend to write on ‘Aristotelian doxography,’ on ‘Aristotle,’ ‘Aristotle-Menon’ or ‘Aristotle or Menon.’ Why 158 Plut. Num. 8 (= 23 B 65 DK = Thesleff [1965] 84). 159 Editions: Diels (1893); Manetti (2010); Ricciardetto (2014). 160 Zhmud (2012) 347–374. 161 Gal. In Hippoc. Nat. hom. 15.25.14–26.5 Kühn: εἰ τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἰατρῶν δόξας ἐθέλοις ἱστορῆσαι, πάρεστί σοι τὰς τῆς ἰατρικῆς συναγωγῆς ἀναγνῶναι βίβλους, ἐπιγεγραμμένας μὲν Ἀριστοτέλει, ὁμολογουμένας δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μένωνος, ὃς ἦν μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ, γεγράφθαι, διὸ καὶ Μενώνεια προσαγορεύουσιν ἔνιοι ταυτὶ τὰ βιβλία. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ Μένων ἐκεῖνος, ἀναζητήσας ἐπιμελῶς τὰ διασῳζόμενα κατ’ αὐτὸν ἔτι τῶν παλαιῶν ἰατρῶν βιβλία, τὰς δόξας αὐτῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀνελέξατο. Cf. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς Μενωνείοις (Plut. Quaest. conv. 733a9). 162 Especially after important and influential studies by D. Manetti, e.g. Manetti (1999).

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 141

do I think that the choice of Hippon and Philolaus as philosophers, whose medical theories deserve special attention, attests against Aristotle’s authorship? The fact is that Aristotle preferred not to mention these Pythagoreans by name, as was the case with Philolaus, whose astronomical system he ascribed to some anonymous Pythagoreans.163 Hippon was mentioned only twice, both times very briefly and with disdain,164 whereas his views and arguments, as many scholars suggested, were attributed by Aristotle to Thales and vice versa.165 Thus, we find in Aristotle no traces of an attentive interest to the opinions of Hippon and Philolaus, which the author of doxography amply demonstrates, expounding them accurately and in detail. He took the trouble to read two books by Hippon, he correctly refers to Hippon’s arche as “moisture” (ὑγρότης, τὸ ὑγρόν),166 while Aristotle’s transforms it into Thalesian “water” and never reveals that Philolaus’ archai were ἄπειρα and περαίνοντα (44 B 1–3.6 DK), not πέρας and ἄπειρον. Hence, there is much more reason to believe in Menon the student of Aristotle than in Aristotle the medical doxographer who was concerned about the Pythagoreans.

References Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992): Eduardo Acosta Méndez and Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Testimonianze su Socrate, Naples. Almazova (2016): Nina Almazova, “Daktylus und Enhoplios in Damons Rhythmuslehre”, in: Hyperboreus 22, 94–126. Álvarez Salas (2017): Omar Álvarez Salas, “Philosophy on Stage and Performance in Argument: Epicharmus vis-à-vis Western Greek Intelligentsia”, in: Heather L. Reid et al. (eds.), Politics and Performance in Western Greece, Sioux City, 163–192. Andorlini/Linguiti (1999): Isabella Andorlini and Alessandro Linguiti, “91. Pythagoras *, 2T”, in: CPF I.1***, 681–684. Angeli (2003): Anna Angeli, “Carlo Gallavotti e la papirologia Ercolanese”, in: Mario Capasso (ed.), Contributi alla storia dell’Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi, vol. 3, Naples, 301–390.

163 Arist. Cael. 2.13.293a18–b16. On the sole occasion when Aristotle names Philolaus, he cites his saying “there are thoughts which are stronger than us” (Eth. Eud. 2.8.1225a30). 164 Ἵππωνα γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας (Arist. Metaph. 1.3.984a5); τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων (De an. 1.2.405b2). 165 The argument that the semen of all living creatures is moist, which Aristotle (Metaph. 1.3.983b22–26) and Theophrastus (fr. 225 FHS&G) attribute to Thales was in fact Hippon’s (38 A 3 DK). 166 Manetti (1992) 461.

142 

 Leonid Zhmud

Angeli (2007): Anna Angeli, “Aristone, Epistola sull’alleggerirsi della superbia: Le tecniche espositive della κεφαλαίωσις filodemea (Philod., Vit. x coll. x 30–xxiv 21) e le metodologie della trattatistica sui caratteri”, in: SEP 4, 9–39. Auvray-Assayas/Delattre (2001): Clara Auvray-Assayas and Daniel Delattre (eds.), Cicéron et Philodème : La polemique en philosophie, Paris. Barker (1984): Andrew Barker, Greek Musical Writings, vol. 1, Oxford. Barker (2001): Andrew Barker, “Diogenes of Babylon and Hellenistic Musical Theory”, in: Auvray-Assayas/Delattre, 353–370. Barker (2007): Andrew Barker, The Science of Harmonics in Classical Greece, Cambridge. Bastianini/Sedley (1995): Guido Bastianini and David N. Sedley, “Commentarium in Platonis «Theaetetum» (PBerol inv. 9782)”, in: CPF, Parte III: Commentari, Florence, 227–562. Battezzato (2008): Luigi Battezzato, “Pythagorean Comedies from Epicharmus to Alexis”, in: Aevum(ant) 8, 139–164. Bernabé (2007): Alberto Bernabé, “Epimenidis testimonia et fragmenta”, in: OF II.3, 105–168. Blank (1995): David Blank, “Philodemus on the Technicity of Rhetoric”, in: Dirk Obbink (ed.), Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus, and Horace, Oxford/New York, 178–188. Blank (2009): David Blank, “Philodemus on the Impossibility of a ‘Philosophical Rhetoric’”, in: Frédérique Woerther (ed.), Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic Worlds, Hildesheim/Zurich/New York, 73–94. Bodnár (2016): István M. Bodnár, “Pythagoras the Philosopher and Grammar Teacher (PBrLibr. Add. Ms 37516 recto)”, unpublished manuscript. Brancacci (1988): Aldo Brancacci, “Alcidamante e PHibeh 13 ‘De musica’: Musica e retorica della musica”, in: Aldo Brancacci et al. (eds.), Aristoxenica, Menandrea, Fragmenta philosophica, Florence, 61–84. Brinckman (1910): Adolf Brinckman, “Aus dem antiken Schulunterricht”, in: RhM 65, 149–155. Burkert (1961): Walter Burkert, “Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica”, in: Philologus 105, 16–43; 226–246. Centrone (1992): Bruno Centrone, “L’VIII libro delle ‘Vite’ di Diogene Laerzio”, in: ANRW II 36.6, 4183–4217. Centrone (2014): Bruno Centrone, “The Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings”, in: Carl A. Huffman (ed.), The History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge, 315–340. Clay (2010): Diskin Clay, “The Hero Cult of Greek Philosophers”, in: Michael Gagarin (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece and Rome, Oxford, 427. Cribiore (1996): Raffaella Cribiore, Writing, Teachers and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt, Atlanta. Crönert (1906): Wilhelm Crönert, Kolotes und Menedemos, Leipzig. Delatte (1922): Armand Delatte, La Vie de Pythagore de Diogène Laërce, Bruxelles. Delattre (2006): Daniel Delattre, “Présence de l’épicurisme dans le Contre les grammairiens et le Contre les musiciens de Sextus Empiricus”, in: Joëlle Delattre (ed.), Sur le Contre les professeurs de Sextus Empiricus, Lille, 47–65. Delattre (2007): Daniel Delattre, Philodème de Gadara : Sur la musique, Livre 4, 2 vols., Paris. Del Mastro (2012): Gianluca Del Mastro, “Il PHerc. 1004: Filodemo, De rhetorica VII”, in: ZPE 182, 131–133. Diels (1893): Hermann Diels , Anonymi Londiniensis ex Aristotelis Iatricis Menoniis et aliis medicis eclogae, Berlin. Dorandi (1982): Tiziano Dorandi, “Note eraclitee: In margine al Symposium Heracliteum, 1981”, in: Elenchos 3, 347–353.

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 143

Dorandi (1990): Tiziano Dorandi, “Per una ricomposizione dello scritto di Filodemo sulla Retorica”, in: ZPE 82, 59–87. Dyck (2003): Andrew R. Dyck, Cicero: De Natura Deorum I, Cambridge. Erbì (2009): Margherita Erbì, “Il retore e la città nella polemica di Filodemo verso Diogene di Babilonia (PHerc. 1004, coll. 64–70)”, in: CErc 39, 119–140. Erbì (2010): Margherita Erbì, “Eraclito e l’inganno della retorica in Filodemo (PHerc. 1004, coll. 57–63)”, in: CErc 40, 65–74. Erbì (2011): Margherita Erbì, “La retorica nell’Epicureismo: Una riflessione”, in: CErc 41, 189–206. Fortenbaugh (2011): William W. Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus of Eresus: Commentary: Sources on Ethics, vol. 6.1, Leiden/Boston. Fortenbaugh/White (2006): William W. Fortenbaugh and Stephen A. White (eds.), Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation, and Discussion, New Brunswick/London. Greaves (1986): Denise D. Greaves, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Musicians, Lincoln/London. Hammerstaedt (1992): Jürgen Hammerstaedt, “Der Schlussteil von Philodems drittem Buch über Rhetorik”, in: CErc 22, 9–118. Henrichs (1972): Albert Henrichs, “Toward a New Edition of Philodemus’ Treatise On Piety”, in: GRBS 13, 67–98. Hock/O’Neil (1986): Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil, The chreia in Ancient Rhetoric, vol. 1: The Progymnasmata, Atlanta. Hock/O’Neil (2002): Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil, The chreia in Ancient Rhetoric, vol. 2: Classroom Exercises, Leiden. Indelli (2002): Giovanni Indelli, “Testimonianze su Pericle nei papiri di Filodemo”, in: CErc 32, 233–238. Indelli (2007): Giovanni Indelli, “Filodemo ed Empedocle”, in: Giovanni Casertano (ed.), Empedocle tra poesia, medicina, filosofia e politica, Naples, 277–288. Indelli (2010): Giovanni Indelli, “Le colonne I–X 10 di PHerc. 1008 (Filodemo, I vizi, libro X)”, in: Proceedings of the 25th International Congress of Papyrology, Ann Arbor, 323–334. Jensen (1911): Christian Jensen, Philodemi Περὶ κακιῶν liber decimus, Leipzig. Kenyon (1909): Frederic G. Kenyon, “Two Greek School-tablets”, in: JHS 29, 29–30. Laks (2013): André Laks, “The Pythagorean Hypomnemata reported by Alexander Polyhistor in Diogenes Laertius (8.25–33): a Proposal for Reading”, in: Gabriele Cornelli et al. (eds.), On Pythagoreanism, Berlin, 371–384. Lapini (2013): Walter Lapini, “Pitagora maestro di scuola (P.Br.Libr. Add. Ms. 37516, 1)”, in: Id., Testi frammentari e critica del testo: Problemi di filologia filosofica greca, Rome, 3–21. Lasserre (1954): François Lasserre, Plutarque : De la musique, Olten/Lausanne. Long/Sedley (1987): Antony A. Long and David N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge. Long (2013): Anthony A. Long, “The Eclectic Pythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor”, in: Malcolm Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge, 139–159. Longo Auricchio/Indelli/Del Mastro (2012): Francesca Longo Auricchio, Giovanni Indelli and Gianluca Del Mastro, “Philodème de Gadara”, in: DPhA V 1, 334–359. Luzzatto (2004): Maria T. Luzzatto, “L’impiego della ‘chreia’ filosofica nell’educazione antica”, in: Maria S. Funghi (ed.), Aspetti di letteratura gnomica nel mondo antico, vol. 2, Florence, 157–187. Manetti (1992): Daniela Manetti, “Hippo Crotoniates”, in: CPF I.1**, 455–461.

144 

 Leonid Zhmud

Manetti (1999): Daniela Manetti, “‘Aristotle’ and the Role of Doxography in the Anonymus Londiniensis”, in: Philip J. van der Eijk (ed.). Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity, Leiden, 95–142. Manetti (2010): Daniela Manetti, Anonymus Londiniensis: De medicina, Berlin. Matelli (2004): Elisabetta Matelli, “Musicoterapia e catarsi in Teofrasto”, in: BICS 47, 153–174. McKirahan (1996): Richard D. McKirahan, “Epicurean Doxography in Cicero, De natura deorum, Book I”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, 3 vols., Naples, II, 865–878. Obbink (2001): Dirk Obbink, “Le livre I du De natura deorum de Cicéron et le De pietate de Philodème”, in: Auvray-Assayas/Delattre, 203–225. Obbink (2002): Dirk Obbink, “All Gods are True in Epicurus”, in: Dorothea Frede and André Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, Leiden/Boston/Cologne, 183–222. Obbink (2011): Dirk Obbink, “Empedocles and Hellenistic Editions of the Presocratics”, Unpublished talk, Fondation Hardt, Geneva, 14 October 2011. Pease (1968): Arthur S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis “De natura deorum” libri III, Cambridge. Philippson (1938): Robert Philippson, “Philodemos (5)”, in: RE XIX 2, 2444–2482. Piano (2015): Valeria Piano, “Chr. 4 T.Br.Libr. Add Ms 37516, 1”, in: CPF II.2. Sentenze di Autori Noti e «Chreiai», Florence, 381–390. Porter (2016): James I. Porter, The Sublime in Antiquity, Cambridge. Preisendanz/Henrichs (1974): Karl Preisendanz and Albert Henrichs (eds.), Papyri Graecae Magicae, vol. 1, Stuttgart. Primavesi (2002): Oliver Primavesi, “Lecteurs antiques et byzantins d’Empédocle : De Zénon à Tzétzès”, in: André Laks and Claire Louguet (eds.), Qu’est-ce que la Philosophie Pré-socratique?, Villeneuve d’Ascq, 183–204. Ranocchia (2007): Graziano Ranocchia, Aristone: Sul modo di liberare dalla superbia nel decimo libro De vitiis di Filodemo, Florence. Ranocchia (2016): Graziano Ranocchia, “Diogene di Babilonia e Aristone nel PHerc.1004 ([Filodemo], [Sulla retorica], Libro incerto): Parte prima”, in: LPh 4, 95–130. Ricciardetto (2014): Antonio Ricciardetto, L’Anonyme de Londres : Un papyrus médical grec du Ier siècle après J.-C., Liege. Rispoli (1992): Gioia M. Rispoli, “Sesto Empirico e Filodemo contro i musici”, in: Abdallah H. S. El-Mosalamy (ed.), Proceedings of the 19th International Congress of Papyrology, 2 vols., Cairo, I, 213–248. Rocconi (2012): Eleonora Rocconi, “Aristoxenus and Musical Ēthos”, in: Carl A. Huffman (ed.), Aristoxenus of Tarentum: Discussion, New Brunswick/London, 65–90. Roskam (2009): Geert Roskam, Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum: An Interpretation with Commentary, Leuven. Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De Pietate pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125 [= Id., Philodemi περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg 1923]. Schorn (2013): Stefan Schorn, “Die Pythagoreer im zehnten Buch der Bibliothek Diodors: Quellen, Traditionen – und Manipulationen”, in: Monica Berti and Virgilio Costa (eds.), Ritorno ad Alessandria: Storiografia greca e cultura bibliotecaria: tracce di una relazione perduta, Tivoli, 179–259 [= Id., Studien zur hellenistischen Biographie und Historiographie, Berlin/Boston 2018, ch. 6].

5 The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 

 145

Sedley (1982): David N. Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion of Identity”, in: Phronesis 27, 255–275. Sedley (1998a): David N. Sedley, “Pythagoras the Grammar Teacher and Didymon the Adulterer”, in: Hyperboreus 4, 122–137. Sedley (1998b): David N. Sedley, “Pythagoras the Grammar Teacher (PBrLibr Add Ms 37516, 1)”, in: Papiri filosofici: Miscellanea di Studi II, Florence, 167–181. Sedley (2003): David N. Sedley, “Philodemus and the Decentralisation of Philosophy”, in: CErc 33, 31–41.  Sider (2005): David Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras, Sankt Augustin (1st ed. Meisenheim am Glan, 1981). Siewert (2002): Peter Siewert, Ostrakismos-Testimonien I: Die Zeugnisse antiker Autoren, der Inschriften und Ostraka über das athenische Scherbengericht aus vorhellenistischer Zeit (487–322 v. Chr.), Stuttgart. Spinelli (2014): Emidio Spinelli, “Sesto, Pitagora, la musica”, in: R. Loredana Cardullo and Daniele Iozzia (eds.), Κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή: Studi in onore di Maria Barbanti, Rome, 335–347. Stahl (1971): William H. Stahl, Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts, New York. Sudhaus (1892–1896): Siegfried Sudhaus, Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica, 2 vols. with Supplementum, Leipzig. Thesleff (1961): Holger Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period, Åbo. Thesleff (1965): Holger Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Åbo. Timpanaro Cardini (1958): Maria Timpanaro Cardini, I Pitagorici: Testimonianze e frammenti, vol. 1, Florence. Toye (2007): David L. Toye, “Epimenides (457)”, in: BNJ s.v. Tsouna (2007): Voula Tsouna, “Philodemus on Emotions”, in: BICS Suppl. 94, Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC–200 AD, vol. 1, 213–241. Tsouna (2010a): Voula Tsouna, “Philodème : L’arrogance”, in: Daniel Delattre and Jackie Pigeaud (eds.), Les Épicuriens, Paris, 617–629, 1269–1275. Tsouna (2010b): Voula Tsouna, Rev. of Ranocchia (2007), in: CR 60, 387–389. Vassallo (2015a): Christian Vassallo, “Testimonianze su Anassagora e altri Presocratici nel libro IV della Retorica di Filodemo: Presocratica Herculanensia V”, in: LPh 3, 81–146. Vassallo (2015b): Christian Vassallo, “On the Supposed Monism of Thales in PHerc. 1788 (= VH2 VIII 60, Fr. 6): Praesocratica Herculanensia I”, in: Hermes 143, 101–118. Vassallo (2015c): Christian Vassallo, “Die Überlieferung des Fr. 18 Marcovich Heraklits (= DK 22 B 81) in PHerc. 1004 (Philodemi De rhetorica, Liber VII): Praesocratica Herculanensia II”, in: Mnemosyne, 68, 185–209. Vassallo (2017): Christian Vassallo, “P.Herc. 1788 ([Philodemi] [Philosophorum historia?]): Introduction, Edition, and Commentary”, in: AnPap 29, 7–56. Wallace (2004): Robert W. Wallace, “Damon of Oa: A Music Theorist Ostracized?”, in: Penelope Murray and Peter J. Wilson (eds.), Music and the Muses: The Culture of Mousike in the Classical Athenian City, Oxford, 249–267. Wallace (2010): Robert W. Wallace, “Ethos and Greek Meter”, in: Maria S. Celentano (ed.), Ricerche di metrica e musica greca per Roberto Pretagostini, Alessandria, 77–90. Wallace (2015): Robert W. Wallace, Reconstructing Damon: Music, Wisdom Teaching, and Politics in Perikles’ Athens, Oxford. Weems (1981): Sarah M. Weems, Greek Grammatical Papyri: The School Texts (PhD Dissertation), University Microfilms Int., Ann Arbor.

146 

 Leonid Zhmud

Wehrli (1967): Fritz Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar, vol. 2: Aristoxenos, Basel/Stuttgart (1st. ed. 1945). Woodward (2010): Linda H. Woodward, “Diogenes of Babylon reading Plato on Music”, in: BICS Suppl. 107, 233–253. Wouters (2007): Alfons Wouters, “Between the Grammarian and the Rhetorician: The κλίσις χρείας”, in: Veronika Coroleu Oberparleiter, Ingrid Hohenwallner and Ruth E. Kritzer (eds.), Bezugsfelder: Festschrift für Gerhard Petersmann zum 65. Geburtstag, Salzburg, 137–154. Zhmud (2006): Leonid Zhmud, The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, Berlin. Zhmud (2012): Leonid Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, Oxford. Zhmud (2013): Leonid Zhmud, “Die doxographische Tradition”, in: GGPh 1.1, 150–174. Zhmud (2016): Leonid Zhmud, “Greek Arithmology: Pythagoras or Plato?”, in: Almut-Barbara Renger and Alessandro Stavru (eds.), Pythagorean Knowledge from the Ancient to the Modern World: Askesis, Religion, Science, Wiesbaden, 311–336. Zhmud (2019): Leonid Zhmud, “What is Pythagorean in the Pseudo-Pythagorean Literature?”, in: Philologus 163.1, 72–94.

Kilian J. Fleischer

6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum The Pythagorean Philolaus did not bear any obvious relation to the papyri from Herculaneum until rather recently. In 2012 Gianluca Del Mastro presented an editio princeps of PHerc. 1691, a ‘cornice’ which includes fragments from different papyri. The most extended fragment (‘pezzo’ 2) belongs to the same papyrus as PHerc. 1021, which means that it is a part of Philodemus’ Index Academicorum.1 The fragment preserves the remains of three columns which precede the beginning of PHerc. 1021.2 Since only the first few columns of PHerc. 1021 are devoted to Plato,3 it can be considered certain that several columns from the beginning of the papyrus dealing with the founder of the Academy were lost during the unrolling of the papyrus.4 Some lines of PHerc. 1691, col. 2 give a more or less continuous text. In this contribution I shall focus on the first part of col. 2,5 which according to Del Mastro 1 Del Mastro (2012). The latest edition of Philodemus’ History of the Academy (Index Academico­ rum or Historia Academicorum) was provided by Dorandi (1991). Prior editions: Bücheler (1869) and Mekler (1902). The edition of Gaiser (1988) only contains the first part of the work. For the sake of simplification, in this contribution I refer to PHerc. 1691, fr. 2 as PHerc. 1691. 2 Only the remains of col. 2 bear some lines of continuous text, while the other columns are preserved so poorly that no more than single words or parts of phrases can be identified. To be precise, the three columns of PHerc. 1691 consist of different layers (‘sottoposti’ and ‘sovrapposti’), so that this fragment actually includes the remains of more than three columns. 3 PHerc. 1021/1691 represents an opistograph and Philodemus’ provisional draft and working manuscript, whereas PHerc. 164 preserves some scanty remains of the final version of this work: see Dorandi (2007) 40–42. The columns written on the front of the papyrus and containing Plato’s life are cols. 1*, 1, 2, 3, and 5. On the verso cols. Z, Y, and X are devoted to Plato. 4 While the papyrus was only unrolled systematically and completely in 1795 (PHerc. 1021), a first attempt to unroll it had already been made earlier (between 1782 and 1795), probably in order to determine its state of conservation or content. See Del Mastro (2012) 279. 5 Quite arbitrarily, I have chosen the first 30 lines. Owing to the fragmentary state of the papyrus, we cannot tell exactly when Philodemus switched to another episode or aspect of Plato’s Note: This work has been made possible through a funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 703798  – AcadHist). The article only reflects the author’s view. I would like to thank Graziano Ranocchia and Nigel Wilson for their advice. Kilian J. Fleischer, CNR-ILIESI, Rome / Julius-Maximilian University of Würzburg https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-007

148 

 Kilian J. Fleischer

contains the episode of the purchase of Philolaus’ book(s) by Plato. I will offer some preliminary remarks and make some new observations without providing a complete new edition of the text, which will be done in my forthcoming comprehensive edition of the Index Academicorum. Del Mastro’s edition and translation read as follows: Phld. Ind. Acad., PHerc. 1691, pz. 2, col. 2.1–30: desunt fere lineae 2 ̣[±17 ̣[±8]π̣ρω[±6 5 ̣[±7]ε ̣ ̣ ̣[±6 δ̣ι ο̣ ̣[±4]ο̣νκ ̣[±7 χα[ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣κα[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ κατ᾿ ἄρχοντ̣α Πολ̣[ύζηλον ±4 γὰρ ἐκ[δ]ίδοσ[θαι] ν̣[ε]ωσ[τί. 10  οἱ μὲν ἀ̣ρχα[ῖοι] σφόδρα οὐδὲ κατ̣έμα̣[θον] οὐδ᾿ ἐξε̣τίθεσαν ὑπομ̣νήματα α̣ὐτο⸌ῦ̣⸍⟦ν⟧, τ̣ῶν δὲ [παρ᾿ ἐκ]εί̣νου ̣[ ̣] ̣ ̣ Περὶ φύσ[εως] κ̣[αὶ 15 τῶν̣ [Π]ερὶ ̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]ω̣ν ωσ̣ ̣ ̣οπ ̣ ̣τα[ ̣ ̣] π̣[ε]φ ύ̣ κασ̣ι̣ ̣νοτ̣[ ̣ ̣]π̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣ σ̣υ̣να[ ̣ ̣]οπ̣ον̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣   ̣ ̣] ̣ σ̣[υ]νεγρα[±8 20 ἀ̣λ̣λα ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ἀδιαφ̣[ορ]ο̣ ̣ π̣ρο̣σ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ο̣τ̣α ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣[±2 παρα̣λ̣α̣ ̣[±12 ν ̣ ̣[ ̣]ε̣ι ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ λίαις ε̣ν[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣[±3 25 να̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣]χ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]ι ̣α̣σ̣ ετ ̣ ̣ ̣δ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣[±9 γωι ̣ ̣κα[ ̣ ̣ ̣]ν[ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ κρι ̣ ̣ ̣να̣ ̣ ̣[±4] ̣ω̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ μαν̣[ ̣] ̣[ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣[±3 30   ασ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]τ̣ο̣ ̣ ̣ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣[±4 biography (the syntax of ll. 37 ff. suggests that Philodemus must have already changed the subject at least a few lines earlier). It is entirely possible that the topic has already changed at around l. 20.

6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum 

 149

6 Δ̣ι ο̣ ̣[νύσι]ο̣ν coni. Del Mastro || 8 ταῦτα Delattre || 13 [παρ᾿ Delattre || 13–14 ἐκ]εί|νου Janko || 23–24 [ὁμι]|λίαις coni. Del Mastro E, al tempo dell’arconte Polizelo (…) infatti, (…) essere pubblicati recentemente. Gli antichi non presero affatto in considerazione e neppure resero pubblici i suoi appunti; altri, invece, presso quello (…) Sulla natura e di quelli Su (…)6

First, it should be noted that Del Mastro argued that the columns of PHerc. 1691 should be placed close to the beginning of PHerc. 1021.7 A closer preliminary analysis of the stratigraphy and a bibliographical reconstruction let appear this hypothesis possible, but it is not excluded that the lost portion might have been in fact slightly more extended and a few columns were lost between PHerc. 1691 and PHerc. 1021. In order to discuss the assignment of this passage to the set of testimonies concerning the purchase of Philolaus’ book by Plato and to understand just what this passage deals with, we should take a look at the parallels for this famous acquisition. The testimonies are arranged according to apparently similar versions of this story. 1.

2.

3.

Diog Laërt. 8.85: Γέγραφε δὲ βιβλίον ἕν, ὅ φησιν Ἕρμιππος (= FGrHistCont 1026 F 69) λέγειν τινὰ τῶν συγγραφέων Πλάτωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον παραγενόμενον εἰς Σικελίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον ὠνήσασθαι παρὰ τῶν συγγενῶν τοῦ Φιλολάου ἀργυρίου Ἀλεξανδρινῶν μνῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ ἐντεῦθεν μεταγεγραφέναι τὸν Τίμαιον. ἕτεροι δὲ λέγουσι τὸν Πλάτωνα λαβεῖν αὐτὰ παρὰ Διονυσίου παραιτησάμενον ἐκ τῆς φυλακῆς νεανίσκον ἀπηγμένον τῶν τοῦ Φιλολάου μαθητῶν. Τοῦτόν φησι Δημήτριος ἐν Ὁμωνύμοις πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν (Dorandi8) Περὶ φύσεως, ὧν ἀρχὴ ἥδε (= 44 B 1 DK)· “ἁ φύσις δ’ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἁρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων καὶ ὅλος κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.”   Aul. Gell. 3.17: In eo libro Platonem philosophum contumeliose appellat, quod inpenso pretio librum Pythagoricae disciplinae emisset exque eo Timaeum, nobilem illum dialogum, concinnasset. Versus super ea re Τίμωνος sunt: καὶ σύ, Πλάτων, καὶ γάρ σε μαθητείης πόθος ἔσχεν, πολλῶν δ’ ἀργυρίων ὀλίγην ἠλλάξαο βίβλον,  ἔνθεν ἀπαρχόμενος γραφεῖν ἐδιδάχθης. Diog. Laërt. 8.6: γέγραπται δὲ τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ συγγράμματα τρία, Παιδευτικόν, Πολιτικόν, Φυσικόν·

6 Transl. by Del Mastro (2012) 286. 7 Del Mastro (2012) 282–283. 8 This excerpt as well as other excerpts from Diogenes Laërtius are cited from Dorandi’s (2013) new edition.

150 

 Kilian J. Fleischer

4. Diog Laërt. 3.9: Λέγουσι δέ τινες, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Σάτυρος (= fr. 10 Schorn), ὅτι Δίωνι ἐπέστειλεν εἰς Σικελίαν ὠνήσασθαι τρία βιβλία Πυθαγορικὰ παρὰ Φιλολάου μνῶν ἑκατόν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν εὐπορίᾳ, φασίν, ἦν παρὰ Διονυσίου λαβὼν ὑπὲρ τὰ ὀγδοήκοντα τάλαντα, ὡς καὶ Ὀνήτωρ φησὶν ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ “εἰ χρηματιεῖται ὁ σοφός.” 5. Diog. Laërt. 8.15: Μέχρι δὲ Φιλολάου οὐκ ἦν τι γνῶναι Πυθαγόρειον δόγμα· οὗτος δὲ μόνος ἐξήνεγκε τὰ διαβόητα τρία βιβλία, ἃ Πλάτων ἐπέστειλεν ἑκατὸν μνῶν ὠνηθῆναι. 6. Diog. Laërt. 8.84: Φιλόλαος Κροτωνιάτης Πυθαγορικός. παρὰ τούτου Πλάτων ὠνήσασθαι τὰ βιβλία τὰ Πυθαγορικὰ Δίωνι γράφει. 7. Iambl. VP 199: θαυμάζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ τῆς φυλακῆς ἀκρίβεια· ἐν γὰρ τοσαύταις γενεαῖς ἐτῶν οὐθεὶς οὐδενὶ φαίνεται τῶν Πυθαγορείων ὑπομνημάτων περιτετευχὼς πρὸ τῆς Φιλολάου ἡλικίας, ἀλλ’ οὗτος πρῶτος ἐξήνεγκε τὰ θρυλλούμενα ταῦτα τρία βιβλία, ἃ λέγεται Δίων ὁ Συρακούσιος ἑκατὸν μνῶν πρίασθαι Πλάτωνος κελεύσαντος, εἰς πενίαν τινὰ μεγάλην τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰν ἀφικομένου τοῦ Φιλολάου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν ἀπὸ τῆς συγγενείας τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μετέλαβε τῶν βιβλίων. The majority of scholars agree that the contradicting fragments should be interpreted to the effect that Philolaus published only one book with a Pythagorean content, written by himself and probably the first Pythagorean book on the market ever, whereas the acquisition of three books, ascribed to Pythagoras himself, is a 3rd-cent. BC invention intended to give credibility to the tripartitum forged in those years.9 Some core information was obviously combined with anecdotical inventions and the story was developed further. Walter Burkert claims that our oldest sources, Hermippus (his source) and Timon, are trustworthy inasmuch as Philolaus and the first appearance of a Pythagorean book really belong together, while the alleged plagiarism in Plato’s Timaeus should be regarded as an unsubstantiated hostile construction. In the course of time, Burkert says, one book became three books, Philolaus became Pythagoras himself, and 40 mines became 100 mines.10 Indeed, the hypothesis of such a transformation of the story is plausible, but some questions concerning the historical substance of the episode remain open. What was the exact title of Philolaus’ book, which was obviously on nature? What kind of relationship exists between Philolaus’ book and possible unedited Pythagorean ‘books’? Was Philolaus less of a creative, independent writer, and more of a publisher and compiler of doctrines which had

9 Burkert (1962) 208–212; Huffman (1993) 12–16; Zhmud (2013) 421–422. 10 See Burkert (1962) 210–211.

6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum 

 151

long been held by the Pythagoreans and which he made public for the first time? Was there really a purchase of whatever kind of book(s) by Plato or is the whole episode nothing more than a fiction based on (alleged) similarities between the Timaeus and a book by Philolaus? The new Philolaus testimony of PHerc. 1691 may shed some light on these questions, considering that Philodemus (1st cent. BC) uses relatively old sources which may have preserved some more original information which was later remodelled anecdotally. I would like to start with some minor observations on the testimonies already known. The pronoun αὐτὰ in the first fragment (Diog. Laërt. 8.85) implies an inconsistency which, as far as I can see, has not been explicitly noted yet. The plural refers to more than one book, which implies that Diogenes Laërtius changed – together with his source (ἕτεροι δὲ λέγουσι) – the underlying story or number of books. He is not talking about a single book anymore (βιβλίον ἕν), but about more than one book (tripartitum tradition). This fits well with the anecdotic character of this version, where Plato receives books as a reward for freeing a prisoner. This version is reported anonymously by Diogenes Laërtius. It is remarkable that the genitive τῆς φυλακῆς also occurs in Iambl. VP 199 in the context of an introduction to the story about the Philolaus book. The meaning and context of this word is obviously different in the two passages, so that its occurrence in both texts could be no more than a mere coincidence. However, I wonder whether a statement about the strict control over (and lack of publication of) Pythagorean doctrines was transformed into the prisoner story in some strange way, with τῆς φυλακῆς being a reminiscence of the more original phrasing. Admittedly, this is a very speculative hypothesis. At first glance, the price for the book Plato purchased from Philolaus, as reported by Hermippus (Diog. Laërt. 8.85), seems to be a curious anachronistic blunder: Ἀλεξανδρινῶν μνῶν τετταράκοντα. How can Plato have paid in Alexandrian mines, if Alexandria was only founded after his death? Burkert tentatively suggests a conversion of an original currency into a currency better known to Hermippus’ Alexandrian readership.11 This conversion might have already been made by the anonymous author he depends on (in this case an Alexandrian author as well). Denis Knoepfler, who conducted an in-depth numismatic inquiry into the term “Alexandrian” money, concludes that “Alexandrian” does not normally refer to the city of Alexandria, but to Alexander-money of a particular sort.12 11 Burkert (1962) 210 n. 41. Boeckh (1819) 21 regards a conversion as unlikely. 12 Knoepfler (1987). For our purpose the second part of his inquiry is more relevant: Knoepfler (1989) 224–230.

152 

 Kilian J. Fleischer

He believes that “Alexandrian” in our passage refers to King Alexander of Pherae. This seems very unlikely to me.13 Although his arguments for the identification of “Alexandrian” with “Alexander-quality money” are generally convincing in other cases, he does not take into account the word order Ἀλεξανδρινῶν μνῶν and ignores the evidence suggesting that the term “Alexandrian mine” was used for a special arithmetic unit in a monetary context.14 According to my own calculation, 40 Alexandrian mines equal 50 Attic (normal) mines.15 If Hermippus or his source did not commit a simple anachronistic mistake – which remains entirely possible – the juncture Ἀλεξανδρινῶν μνῶν must refer to a monetary (reckoning) unit (not currency!) used in Alexandria in the 3rd cent. BC. It was for this reason, then, that Hermippus or his source chose this unit. Regardless of any possible conversion, Hermippus’ amount differs from the 100 mines mentioned by other authors. The 100 mines might be a simplification and exaggeration in order to emphasize how extraordinary the price was, in particular in the context of Diog. Laërt. 3.9. However, the 40 Alexandrian mines (50 Attic mines) should not be regarded as the more realistic or trustworthy amount, assuming the transaction indeed took place. It might be only a pseudo-precise figure, whose reliability is called into question to some extent by the adjective ‘Alexandrian’ which might be justified – as I have just attempted to do – but nonetheless causes some annoyance. Now let us direct our attention to the papyrus. The letters πρω possibly derive from πρῶτον or πρῶτος and may reflect the expression πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι used by Demetrius of Magnesia (Diog. Laërt. 8.85), πρῶτος ἐξήνεγκε (Iambl. VP 199) or μέχρι (Diog. Laërt. 8.15). Our papyrus seems to confirm that something happened for the first time or someone did something for the first time, which might refer to the publication of a book by Philolaus. The reading δ̣ι ο̣ ̣ at the beginning of l. 6 almost inevitably suggests the restoration of Dionysius’ name in this context, but the traces are very dubious and allow for other letters, too. For sure, all our sources associate this purchase with Dionysius and/or Dion, but we should be careful in restoring this name or its beginning on the basis of the dubious traces and thus in suggesting a certain tradition of the version reported by Philodemus.

13 Why should Plato have used the money of a comparatively unknown local Thessalian tyrant for a transaction taking place in Syracuse or Southern Italy? And why should it be important to transmit the detail of the currency used for this transaction? Neither Plato had anything to do with this Alexander of Pherae, nor did Dionysius, Dion or Philolaus. The arguments brought forward by Knoepfler are not compelling and his assumptions and theories are rather far-fetched. 14 Hultsch (1864) 111–113 (De mina Alexandrina). 15 Hultsch (1864) 113 equates one Alexandrian mine with 1.25 Attic mines (i.e. 125 Attic drachmes or 150 Ptolemaic drachmes).

6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum 

 153

Del Mastro’s sophisticated supplement of the archon would provide a very precise dating of the transaction, which would hint at Plato’s second stay in Sicily in 367/366 BC, and hence be in accordance with the Dionysius-tradition. I do not necessarily wish to reject this conjecture, but a caveat might be in order. We have only χονταπολ in the papyrus, which might most likely be divided into χοντα and πολ, but even χον τα πολ is arguable. χοντα might be the acc. sg. or the acc. pl. (of an AcI construction), while πολ could indicate the huge amount paid by Plato or a quantity or repetition of whatever kind. We may imagine other supplements fitting the context of our passage. Furthermore, such a precise dating for a transaction is at least unexpected and remarkable (for why should it be so important to specify the exact year?). No doubt, the supplement of the name of the archon remains possible, but other possibilities might be well arguable. The subsequent γὰρ requires the end of a sentence or at least a syntactical caesura in the line before. Delattre’s suggestion ταῦτα is possible, but implies that many books were edited (for the first time), if the word before γὰρ does not refer to doctrines in general. The plural in the next sentence might hint at a plural before γὰρ. The question arises whether one book or more were published (made public), after they had already been circulating within the Pythagorean community, or whether only hitherto unpublished doctrines were published (made public) in a book first written for this purpose. One should at least remark that the whole passage is not bound to be connected to Philolaus. While certain parallels suggest that it is, it is quite possible that Plato simply purchased a Pythagorean book of a different sort. More importantly, the traces do not really favour the supplement of the verb ἐκ[δ]ίδοσ[θαι] and the word/transcription ἔμ̣π̣ρο̣ σ[θεν (before) is probable. Furthermore, I have some problems with the adjective ν̣[ε]ωσ[τί. Although ω cannot be excluded from a palaeographical point of view, a letter whose right foot is touching the ο at the bottom level is possible as well. Nevertheless, the expression οἱ μὲν ἀ̣ρχα[ῖοι] seems to refer to Pythagoreans of older generations. From Del Mastro’s translation and commentary it emerges that he regards σφόδρα οὐ|δὲ as belonging together. This is hardly arguable, since this juncture is not attested elsewhere. σφόδρα is used in connection with adjectives to indicate a higher degree (“very”) and usually follows the adjective.16 Hence, ἀ̣ρχα[ῖοι] σφόδρα should be read together and may indicate Pythagoreans of the very old generation. If this is not purely phraseological, it may imply that the author thinks of Philolaus as a Pythagorean of an old generation and of his predecessors as even older. This may be a hint as to the fact that even the old Philolaus had already died when the transaction took place and Philodemus’

16 LSJ s.v. σφόδρα (“with Adjs. it most freq. follows”).

154 

 Kilian J. Fleischer

source follows the tradition that Plato bought the books from a younger generation of Pythagoreans (Philolaus’ relatives) and not from Philolaus himself. For chronological reasons a purchase directly from Philolaus is highly unlikely and must practically be excluded, if the purchase really took place no earlier than 367/366. The verb κατ̣έμα̣[θον] does not fit the context smoothly and also the translation “presero (…) in considerazione” is problematic. The sense would not be obvious. However, the verb does not need to bother us, since it seems to me that there was a λ instead of a μ in the papyrus.17 The subsequent traces fit with the middle and upper part of an ε. The supplement κατ̣ελ̣εί[πον] is perfectly possible and goes very well with the imperfect ἐξε̣τίθεσαν. The expression καταλείπειν ὑπομνήματα is attested very frequently in ancient literature: Diogenes Laërtius alone uses it six times.18 The noun ὑπομ̣νήματα is a kind of zeugma referring to both verbs. The pronoun α̣ὐτο⟦ν⟧⸌ῦ̣⸍ only refers to the second verb. The whole sentence might mean: “The very old generation of Pythagoreans did not leave any works (of their own) behind, nor did they publish his (Pythagoras’) works (written remains).” Referring both verbs to Pythagoras’ works would not make much sense or would be strangely redundant. However, the traces may allow or even favour the transcription [ὡ]ς | ο· ὗτο⟦ν⟧⸌ς ̣ ⸍. As regards the verb ἐξε̣τίθεσαν, it might be worth mentioning a not yet published new reading in PHerc. 1021, col. 18.41 which I was able to make. One reads ἐ̣ξε̣τίθει and not συ]νετίθει in the papyrus. However, the verb in col. 18.41 obviously does not mean “to make a work public,” which is at best implied here.19 For the several meanings of ὑπομ̣νήματα and its use in the Index Academico­ rum and Philodemus I will only refer to Del Mastro’s commentary.20 α̣ὐτο⟦ν⟧⸌ῦ̣⸍ or ο· ὗτο⟦ν⟧⸌ς ̣ ⸍ mean Pythagoras, if it is not a reference to Philolaus, which is more unlikely.21 Incidentally, this would imply that Pythagoras was mentioned in the preceding lines. Philodemus’ emphasis that this generation did not make his writings public could imply that someone else (Philolaus or his relatives) did so. This would hint more at Philolaus’ publication of books by Pythagoras than of his own books. Normally Philodemus avoids ‘hiatus’ of the kind we find in the

17 The multispectral images (MSI) are misleading here, since what seems to be the saddle of an μ, or part of a λ, is in fact a hole in the papyrus. The rising oblique of an α is preserved and parts of the upper descending oblique. The angle of the oblique very clearly hints at a λ and a μ seems very unlikely. 18 Diog. Laërt. 1.16; 4.4; 4.24; 4.47; 8.87; 8.89. 19 Phld. Ind. Acad., PHerc. 1021, col. 18.40–41: δόγμα δ᾿ οὐδὲν οὐδ᾿ αἵ|ρεσιν ἐ̣ξε̣τίθει. 20 Del Mastro (2012) 289–290. 21 Cf. Del Mastro (2012) 290.

6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum 

 155

papyrus, be there ὑπομ̣νήματα | α̣ὐτο⟦ν⟧⸌ῦ̣⸍ or (more likely) ὑπομ̣νήματα [ὡ]ς. However, we are dealing here not with a genuine hiatus, but with scriptio plena which was also used in l. 10. Maybe Philodemus or his scribe here is following an original source very closely, since usually scriptio plena is not applied in the papyrus. Next, we obviously have a genitive, which is either part of a genitive absolute or a genitive partitive. The genitive ἐκ]εί̣νου is possible, but we should not discard the possibility that we originally had an accusative plural referring to the older generation of Pythagoreans, since κ̣α̣τ̣᾿ ἐκεί̣νους̣ 22 seems to fit the traces well. Assuming the singular, it seems to follow that someone different from the person to be identified with α̣ὐτο⸌ῦ̣⸍⟦ν⟧ must be meant. Without much doubt, this person would Philolaus, who, like Pythagoras, must have been mentioned before, since a reference to Plato is improbable. Περὶ φύσ[εως could be a title and there was possibly another title beginning with [Π]ερὶ ̣ in the papyrus. The τῶν, occurring twice, might either refer to books or “those things/the things written.” Yet, it is not entirely certain that we are dealing with actual titles here. For the sake of argument we could assume something like γεγραμμένων in the following lines, in particular if κατ᾿ ἐκ]εί̣νους̣ precedes it. In this case we would be dealing more with topics here than with titles in a strict sense. Assuming that we are dealing with title(s), the crucial question is, whether these are titles of works written by Philolaus himself or whether he is only mentioned as someone who edited the (alleged) works of Pythagoras. While the mention of a second title may militate against the tradition of one book by Philolaus, the mention of the title Περὶ φύσ[εως goes against the tradition of three books, since this very title is only associated with Philolaus.23 Note that there might be some syntactical difficulties in this line. The traces before Περὶ φύσ[εως hint strongly at τ̣ι, which migt be [ἔ]τ̣ι (κατ᾿ ἐκ]εί̣νους̣ [ἔ]τ̣ι is possible). I am skeptical that the traces in l. 16 really allow for π̣[ε]φ̣ύ and those in l. 22 for παρα̣λ̣α̣. The supplement σ̣[υ]νεγρα[ in l. 15 is possible and not unlikely, since the verb also occurs in other passages in the Index Academicorum and in contexts similar to ours. Yet, considering that an σ is uncertain, the simplex ἔγρα[ with a preceding word ending with a -σ ending is possible as well. Anyway, one wonders whether Plato or Philolaus is the subject of this verb and what ἀδιαφ ̣[ορ]ο̣ ̣ could mean, questions not touched upon in the editio

22 κ̣α̣τ ̣᾿ ἐκεί̣νου is possible as well, but not very likely. 23 However, the Φύσικον of the tripartitum might be an alternative title for περὶ φύσεως.

156 

 Kilian J. Fleischer

princeps. The possible adjective ἀδιαφ [̣ ορ]ο̣ ̣ in l. 20 might express the idea that the content of Plato’s Timaeus is not very different from the material he found in the books he purchased and consequently that we might be dealing with an early witness of the plagiarism-tradition. However, if we divided α and διαφ [̣ ορ]ο̣ ̣ into two single words, the passage could have quite the opposite meaning, namely that the Pythagorean book(s) and the Timaeus differed from each other. In any case, it is well arguable that the word (ἀ)διαφ ̣[ορ]ο̣ ̣ in the context of this passage refers to similarities or differences between a work of Plato and a Pythagorean work, be that in a hostile or neutral way. The adjective might have been used in a completely different context, but parallels may support the hypothesis that this word might be associated with the alleged plagiarism in Plato’s Timaeus. However, attractive as this hypothesis might be, the surviving traces and space do not support Del Mastro’s supplement and make the discussion above rather obsolete. For, it seems that the papyrus originally read δι᾿ αὐ[τ]ο-. Be that as it may, the fragmentary lines should prevent us from drawing any reliable conclusion. Some remarks about Philodemus’ sources will be made, before our results are summed up. Dicaearchus is Philodemus’ source for col. 1, for the beginning of col. 2 and at least for parts of col. 1*.24 Concerning our col. 2 of PHerc. 1691, it is possible that Philodemus has already begun to excerpt Dicaearchus25 and that the excerpt extended over several columns at least. For the use of a single author for a longer section in the Index Academicorum I may only mention that Antigonus of Carystus was obviously Philodemus’ only source for several columns and that we have a rather extended quotation from Apollodorus’ Chronica.26 Further, we know that Dicaearchus also wrote about Pythagoras and Plato and that he associated Pythagoras with Plato in a mathematical context, what to some extent supports the hypothesis that the passage in PHerc. 1691, col. 2 traces back to a work of Dicaearchus dealing with Plato.27 However, the supposed loss of several columns between PHerc. 1691, col. 3 and PHerc. 1021, col 1*, although not entirely certain, would question the hypothesis of a continuous excerpt to some extent.

24 The excerpt ends in col. 2.4. For Dicaearchus as a source, see Gaiser (1988) 97–100. For a new edition of the beginning of col. 2, see Verhasselt (2013) and Puglia (2018). It is not relevant for our purposes, whether col. Y on the back of the papyrus is from Dicaearchus as well: for a discussion, see Verhasselt (2013) 22–26 and now Verhasselt (2018) comm. ad loc. 25 For Dicaearchus in our papyrus, see Dorandi (2001) 343–350; Verhasselt (2013) and (2018). 26 Antigonus of Carystus was exploited in cols. 13–19 (partly col. 4, cols. Q, R, S): see Gaiser (1988) 129–131. Apollodorus was cited verbatim in cols. 26–32. 27 Dic. FGrHistCont 1400 F 56–59 Verhasselt (= frs. 40–42 and 45 Mirhady = frs. 33–36 and 41 Wehrli): see Verhasselt (2018) comm. ad loc. For the prior collection of fragments, see Mirhady (2001) and Wehrli (19672). On the nature of Dicaearchus’ Περὶ βίων, see Verhasselt (2016) 67–69.

6 Philolaus’ Book(s) in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum 

 157

Hermippus, whose work On Those Who Converted from Philosophy to the Exercise of Military Command and of Power Philodemus quotes in col. 11,28 mentioned the Philolaus episode, too (Diog. Laërt. 8.85: ὅ φησιν Ἕρμιππος [= FGrHistCont 1026 F 69] λέγειν τινὰ τῶν συγγραφέων). He refers to the one book version and states that Plato wrote his Timaeus on the basis of this book (ἐντεῦθεν μεταγεγραφέναι τὸν Τίμαιον). He could have been the source for Philodemus in this passage as well. Interestingly, he relies on an older anonymous source, which could have been Alexandrian, if the currency conversion really goes back to this source (see above). If it does not, however, the anonymous source of Hermippus (which in fact might first have been anonymized by Diogenes) could theoretically even be Dicaearchus himself. We know for sure that his works were known to Hermippus, since he is quoted by Hermippus in the above mentioned work.29 Hermippus might be a possible candidate for Philodemus’ source, since we know in his case for sure that he wrote about Plato’s purchase, but Dicaearchus seems to be the better choice, particularly because he is the source for columns (1*–2.5). However, the possible absence of several columns in between is not unproblematic. For sure, other (early) authors may also be posited as Philodemus’ source, but in any case is is not unlikely that Philodemus’ source is our earliest witness for the story. To sum up, the evidence suggests that the first part of PHerc. 1691, col. 2 deals with the purchase of a Pythagorean book or of Pythagorean books by Plato. Disappointingly, this is everything we can say for certain. Given the uncertain and partly impossible supplements in the first lines of the column, there is even a small chance that we are dealing with a different story here. Despite some textual improvements and new insights, the details of the episode reported by Philodemus remain rather obscure. It is possible that we have a precise dating of the transaction thanks to the name of an archon, but this reconstruction is not beyond doubt. We can read περὶ φύσ[εως in the papyrus. This is the title of Philolaus’ book and we may be dealing with a title here, but the occurrence of another possible title or indication of the content in the following line poses some difficulties. It is likely, albeit far from certain, that the passage reported the information that books belonging to Philolaus were acquired by or on behalf of Plato. If the

28 For the correct title of the work (Περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας εἰς στρατηγίας καὶ δυναστείας μεθεστηκότων), see Fleischer (2018a) 40–46. 29 Col. 11.18 (my own new supplement) and PHerc. 164, fr. 22. It does not seem likely that Philodemus used another work just a few lines later, after providing this long introduction to Hermippus: see Verhasselt (2015) 44–45. Hermippus seems to have quoted Dicaearchus, Hyperides, Phaenias and maybe other sources in PHerc. 1021, cols. 11 and 12. For Hyperides as one of Hermippus’ sources and the rendering of the excerpt, see Fleischer (2018b).

158 

 Kilian J. Fleischer

supplement of the archon is valid, chronological plausibility would require that Plato purchased the books from a third party (relatives of Philolaus’ or younger Pythagoreans). A connection to Philolaus’ own books in this passage is likely, though not certain. It is possible that Pythagorean books in general were dealt with or even books (allegedly) by Pythagoras himself. Although it cannot even be taken for granted that a notable purchase was mentioned in this passage  – perhaps the text only reported that the book(s) appeared on the market for the first time and Plato bought them – the remains of ll. 5–11 seem to suggest a remarkable transaction rather than an ordinary purchase. Dicaearchus could have been Philodemus’ source. His version of the story might have been rather similar to the early one by Hermippus (Diog. Laërt. 8.85). Assuming a Dicaearchean authorship, Philodemus’ passage would be our oldest witness for the purchase story. One should note that virtually all details of the episode to be found in PHerc. 1691 remain uncertain, although certain points of convergence with our most reliable and earliest sources would not be unexpected. As is so often the case with Herculaneum papyri, one is left with the impression that only a few more letters in these lines would be sufficient to provide new insight into the context and details of the transaction.

References Boeckh (1819): August Boeckh, Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes, Berlin. Bücheler (1869): Franz Bücheler, Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis, Greifswald. Burkert (1962): Walter Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon, Nuremberg. Del Mastro (2012): Gianluca Del Mastro, “Altri frammenti dal PHerc. 1691: Historia Academicorum e Di III”, in: CErc 42, 277–292. Dorandi (1991): Tiziano Dorandi, Filodemo: Storia dei filosofi: Platone e l’Academia (PHerc. 1021 e 164), Naples. Dorandi (2001): Tiziano Dorandi, “La tradizione papirologica di Dicearco”, in: Fortenbaugh/ Schütrumpf, 343–352. Dorandi (2007): Tiziano Dorandi, Nell’officina dei classici: Come lavoravano gli autori antichi, Rome. Dorandi (2013): Tiziano Dorandi, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge. Fleischer (2018a): Kilian J. Fleischer, “The Complete Title of a Work of Hermippus (FGrHist 1026 39,40) “, in: ZPE 206, 40–46. Fleischer (2018b): Kilian J. Fleischer, “Eine neue Hypereidesrede aus Herkulaneum: Gegen die Gesandten des Antipatros (PHerc. 1021, Kol. 11+12)”, in: ZPE 207, 21–38.

References 

 159

Fortenbaugh/Schütrumpf (2001): William W. Fortenbaugh and Eckart Schütrumpf, Dicaearchus of Messana: Text, Translation, and Discussion, New Brunswick/London. Gaiser (1988): Konrad Gaiser, Philodems Academica, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt. Huffman (1993): Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic, Cambridge. Hultsch (1864): Friedrich O. Hultsch, Metrologicorum scriptorum reliquiae, vol. 1, Leipzig. Knoepfler (1987): Denis Knoepfler, “Tétradrachmes attiques et argent «alexandrin» chez Diogène Laërce. 1re partie”, in: MH 44, 233–253. Knoepfler (1989): Denis Knoepfler, “Tétradrachmes attiques et argent «alexandrin» chez Diogène Laërce. 2e partie”, in: MH 46, 194–230. Mekler (1902): Siegfried Mekler, Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis, Berlin. Mirhady (2001): David C. Mirhady, “Dicaearchus of Messana: The sources, Text and Translation”, in: Fortenbaugh/Schütrumpf, 1–142. Puglia (2018): Enzo Puglia, “Qualche proposta di lettura nella Storia dell’Academia di Filodemo”, in: Paola Davoli and Natascia Pellé (eds.), Πολυμάθεια: Studi Classici offerti a Mario Capasso, Lecce, 365–376. Verhasselt (2013): Gertjan Verhasselt, “A New Reading in Philodemus’ Historia Academicorum (PHerc. 1021, col. 2) with Observations on Dicaearchus in col. Y (F 46B Mirhady)”, in: CErc 43, 17–26. Verhasselt (2015): Gertjan Verhasselt, “Hermippus on Chaeron of Pellene (Phld., Acad. Hist., PHerc. 1021 coll. 10,40–12,4 and PHerc. 164, frg. 22 and 24): Edition and Discussion”, in: CErc 45, 33–48. Verhasselt (2016): Gertjan Verhasselt, “What were Works περὶ βίων?”, in: Philologus 160, 59–83. Verhasselt (2018): Gertjan Verhasselt, Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker Continued, IV B: History of Literature, Music, Art and Culture, 9: Dikaiarchos of Messene [No. 1400], Leiden/Boston. Wehrli (1967): Fritz Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar, vol. 1: Dikaiarchos, Basel/Stuttgart (1st ed. 1944). Zhmud (2013): Leonid Zhmud, “Pythagoras und die Pythagoreer”, in: GGPh 1.1, 375–438.

Aldo Brancacci

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa It is not easy to define Damon’s ‘true’ place in the history of Greek thought. Traditionally associated with the ancient relationship between music and philosophy, he dominates its entire history: even Martianus Capella (5th cent. AD) remembers Damon in his De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii.1 Damon was without a doubt an important personality of his period: he had close ties with Pericles and, as Hans von Arnim has observed, he was one of the first theorists of music.2 Nevertheless, Damon’s musical studies focused not only on theory, but also on ethical and political practice. In particular, he classified the influence of music and melody on human character and behavior. Therefore, we should agree with Maria Timpanaro Cardini in considering Damon a man of learning and action during Pericles’ age.3 Scholars have generally considered Damon to be a Pythagorean. But this vulgata should not be taken for granted, particularly in light of the fragmentary nature of the Pythagorean tradition.4 For this reason, Timpanaro Cardini rightly placed Damon within in a specific section of her collection of Pythagorean testimonia devoted to “Pythagorean resonances” (Risonanze pitagoriche) in antiquity. The Italian scholar divides this last group of testimonia into two parts: the first part is composed of doctrines that presuppose knowledge derived from Pythagorean speculation; the second part contains several Presocratic thinkers who unequivocally show their Pythagorean background.5 Epicharmus, Hippon, Hippodamus, and Damon belong to this latter section. The abovementioned label “Pythagorean resonances” allows us to prudently analyze the matter without holding any dogmatic position on the vexata quaestio of Damon’s Pythagorean background. Recently, Robert W. Wallace has totally denied such a background, yet without convincingly demonstrating his position; in the wake of Andrew

1 Mart. Cap. De nupt. Philol. et Merc. 9.926 (= 37 A 8 DK = B 8 Wallace). 2 Von Jan (1901). 3 Cf. Timpanaro Cardini (1973) 347. 4 Cf. Zhmud (1997). 5 Timpanaro Cardini (1973) 336 and 340. Note: This paper has been translated into English by Christian Vassallo with the cooperation of Leonardo Franchi. Aldo Brancacci, University of Rome Tor Vergata https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-008

162 

 Aldo Brancacci

Barker, he includes Damon (quite arbitrarily) among the Sophists.6 Instead, I believe that the following passage of Plato’s Alcibiades I establishes a clear relationship between Damon and the Pythagorean tradition: Πυθοκλείδης μουσικὸς ἦν, τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος, καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, οὗ μαθητὴς Ἀγαθοκλὴς, οὗ Λαμπροκλῆς, οὗ Δάμων.7 Pythocleides was a musician, a teacher of serious music and a Pythagorean, who taught Agathocles, who taught Lamprocles, who taught Damon.8

The chronology of this succession, namely Pythocleides/Damon, is also confirmed by another passage from Plato’s Alcibiades I, where Pericles’ masters are explicitly ordered chronologically: [Alcibiades:] Yes, they say at any rate, Socrates, that [Pericles] became wise not by himself but by associating with many wise men including both Pythocleides and Anaxagoras. Even now, in spite of his age, he studies with Damon for this very purpose.9

The chronological anteriority of Agathocles in comparison with Damon is confirmed by a passage of Plato’s Laches as well, where Nicias relates him not to Lamprocles, but directly to Agathocles.10 This I too could tell you just as well as Laches, for to me quite lately [Socrates] recommended a music teacher for my son – Damon, a pupil of Agathocles and the most accomplished of men not only in music but in anything else you wish, a person worthy to spend time with young men of that age.11

According to the ps.-Plutarch’s treatise On Music, Pythocleides was a musician who was interested in theoretical questions: ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς † τοῖς Ἁρμονικοῖς Πυθοκλείδην φησὶ τὸν αὐλητὴν εὑρετὴν αὐτῆς γεγονέναι, αὖθις δὲ Λαμπροκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, συνιδόντα ὅτι οὐκ ἐνταῦθα ἔχει τὴν διάζευξιν ὅπου σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ᾤοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξύ, τοιοῦτον αὐτῆς ἀπεργάσασθαι τὸ σχῆμα οἷον τὸ ἀπὸ παραμέσης ἐπὶ ὑπάτην ὑπατῶν.12

6 Wallace (2015) 19–21 and passim. This work features a new (and welcome) collection of the pieces of evidence for Damon, along with a commentary. 7 Schol. in Pl. Alc. I 118c, p. 95 Greene (= 37 A 2 DK = A 3 Wallace). 8 Transl. by R. W. Wallace. 9 Pl. Alc. I 118c (= 37 A 5 DK = A 4 Wallace); transl. by R. W. Wallace. 10 Agathocles is also mentioned in Plato’s Protagoras (316e), where he is described as a great wise man. 11 Pl. Lach. 180c–d (= 37 A 2 DK = A 2 Wallace); transl. by R. W. Wallace. 12 Ps.-Plut. De mus. 1136d20–e2.

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 163

Before these lines, ps.-Plutarch had discussed the mixolydian as a poignant harmony befitting tragedy. He reminds his readers that Aristoxenus ascribed this harmonic invention to Sappho; then, under Sappho’s influence, the tragic poets combined this harmony with the Doric harmony (whose characteristics are magnificence and nobility).13 Unfortunately, at this point, ps.-Plutarch’s text presents a lacuna. Nevertheless, we can consider it derived from the same source of Aristoxenus. Here, Konrat Ziegler’s edition is conservative, but many scholars conjecture the word Ὑπομνήμασι next to Ἱστορικοῖς because a work with this title is ascribed to Aristoxenus.14 François Lasserre proposes this emendation: Ἱστορικοῖς τοῖς Ἁρμονικοῖς. From such a reading of the text, a relationship between Pythocleides and Pythagoreanism emerges.15 Even if Ziegler considers this part of the text a locus desperatus, he agrees with the substitution of φασί for φησί, showing that, in his view as well, Aristoxenus is the most likely source for the author. But read without emendations, the text also informs us that Pythocleides was a musician and that he was well-versed in theoretical inquiries concerning musical harmonies. The text also confirms a connection between Pythocleides and Lamprocles, showing how inquiries and discussions occurred in a context that was chronologically and culturally contiguous. The word σεμνόν has an aesthetic meaning: it corresponds to our adjective “serious/austere” and could indicate many categories of music.16 It could also refer to a specific musical harmony, i.e. πολὺ τὸ σεμνόν ἐστίν ἐν τῇ Δωριστί.17 The expression τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος was coined by Pythocleides, as he was interested in the aesthetic nature of music (in this case in the σεμνὴ μουσική). This stance may well have influenced many of the structural inquiries that Damon carried out. It is noteworthy that the determination of the mixolydian harmony is attributed to Lamprocles. Indeed, this fact confirms that this musical school also carried out (merely) theoretical research in this field. We can trust the scholium with regard to Pythocleides’ alleged interest in practical music 13 Ps.–Plut. De mus. 1136c–e, esp. d15–20 (= Aristox. frs. 81–82 Wehrli). 14 Cf. Diog. Laërt. 9.40 (= Aristox. fr. 131 Wehrli). 15 A more cautious solution than that proposed by Lasserre would read as follows: ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς τοῖς Ἁρμονικοῖς Πυθοκλείδην φασὶ τὸν αὐλητὴν εὑρετὴν αὐτῆς γεγονέναι (...). This proposal allows us to preserve the following φασί (that is, the lectio codicum), corrected by D. A. Wyttenbach with φησί. 16 Wallace (2015) 114 affirms that Aristoxenus (fr. 110 Wehrli = Ath. 14.14.621c) “characterizes the music of tragedy as semnos.” But this is not true, because, according Athenaeus, Aristoxenus maintains that the more austere hilarodia is a parody of tragedy, while the magodia spoofs comedies. 17 Ps.-Plut. De mus. 1136f14 (= Aristox. fr. 82 Wehrli).

164 

 Aldo Brancacci

instruction as well. Indeed, this interest seems to be confirmed by Aristotle’s testimonium handed down by Plutarch, which informs us that Pythocleides was the teacher of Pericles.18 Pythocleides’ interest in the aulos is the result of a shared characteristic of the Pythagorean circle: Athenaeus testifies that Euphranor, Archytas, Philolaus, and many other Pythagoreans played auletic music and that Euphranor and Archytas also wrote a treatise on the flute.19 For these reasons, we cannot agree with Wallace, who believes that the chronological data that emerge from the scholium “do not encourage” us to trust in the relationship between teacher/pupil. On the contrary, I think that these data are completely trustworthy. If Pythocleides was a teacher of Pericles, his activity should be dated to 480: therefore, it is also possible that he was the teacher of Agathocles, whose acme should be dated to the same period. Pythocleides, Agathocles, and Lamprocles were active earlier than Damon; therefore, Pythocleides could be the master of all three of these musicians. Indeed, this is not a diadoche of philosophers, an arrangement that could allow us to imagine differences of age between them as well as long-term apprenticeships. We have rather a succession of musicians: they could be almost equal in age, and their training could also be very short. As Timpanaro Cardini observes, the scholium is important for showing not only how Pythagoreanism developed theories concerning a mathematical line and the extension of harmony to a cosmological and ethical principle, but also how it developed a musical doctrine. Such a doctrine ranged over all artistic fields and encouraged the development of theories and models connected with musical practice.20 As for the Pythagoreanism of Pythocleides, Wallace maintains that “any implication about Pythagoreanism is also worthless.” But we do not find any demonstration of this stance in his volume. The scholar also seems to underestimate the diadoche: “Intellectual genealogies are a standard fabrication of the biographical genre.”21 But this stance is too general and devoid of any proof.22 We should rather follow the thesis of Jaap Mansfeld, who argues that a philosophical genealogy can only be established when it is possible to detect a clear theoretical affinity between 18 Plut. Per. 4 (= Αrist. fr. 364 Rose = 37 A 4 DK = A 9 Wallace: cf. infra): διδάσκαλον δ᾽ αὐτοῦ τῶν μουσικῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι Δάμωνα γενέσθαι λέγουσιν, οὗ φασι δεῖν τοὔνομα βραχύνοντας τὴν προτέραν συλλαβὴν ἐκφέρειν, δὲ παρὰ Πυθοκλείδῃ μουσικὴν διαπονηθῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα φησίν (τὸν Περικλέα). Cf. ps.-Plut. De mus. 1136d–e. 19 Ath. 4.84.184e (= 47 B 6 DK). It is uncertain whether the mentioned treatise on the flute can really be ascribed to Archytas: cf. Huffman (2005) 31–32. 20 Timpanaro Cardini (1973) 346. 21 Wallace (2015) 112 and 114. 22 Cf. Von Kienle (1961); Mejer (1978); and Glucker (1978) 161 and 343–344, followed by Giannattasio Andria (1989) 15–28 and Mansfeld (2008) 23–25.

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 165

its members.23 Nevertheless, the fact that a tradition connects Damon to a Pythagorean does not imply that Damon was himself a Pythagorean. It means, rather, that we are able to place him within a specific cultural context. Therefore, we should not consider Damon’s doctrines as automatically Pythagorean, nor should we demolish a valuable piece of evidence on his cultural education without reason. According to Andrew Barker, “Damon belongs to the later 5th cent. BC: he has to be included among the Sophists.”24 But Barker does not demonstrate this thesis. In the 5th cent. BC, there were many intellectuals and politicians who were not Sophists. In their turn, the Sophists did not disappear in the 5th cent. BC but continued their activity into the 4th cent. BC and beyond (focusing their interests on rhetoric and other disciplines even more closely). Moreover, it is not certain that Damon belongs to the 5th cent. BC; we do not know his birth and death dates. As Wallace shows, in this regard we can formulate two hypotheses: according to the first, Damon was born at the beginning of the 5th cent. BC (perhaps in 500), became counselor of Pericles in 460, and was ostracized in 444/443. The other hypothesis, first proposed by Raubitscheck,25 places his birth a generation after 500, re-dating his ostracism approximately ten years later.26 However, Barker has recently reaffirmed his point of view, arguing that the portrait of Damon (Barker has Plato’s account, especially the Laches, in mind) is the portrait of a Sophist very similar to Protagoras, Prodicus, and Gorgias; therefore, it is quite possible that he really was a Sophist.27 But one could object that Plato does not represent Damon as a Sophist: he speaks of him with regard and deference. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates also praises a musical thesis of Damon. But in the whole course of the Republic, Socrates treats Damon as an auctoritas, often agreeing with him and referring to his expertise for detailed studies that cannot be examined in full in his own expositions. The Sophists mentioned by Barker receive the opposite treatment from Plato. For instance, Protagoras, in the homonymous dialogue and in the Theaetetus, is strongly rebuked for both epistemological and ontological reasons. In the Gorgias, Gorgias’ concept of rhetoric is the target of a harsh elenchos. Likewise, Prodicus’ theory of language is handled with sarcasm. Hippias, who is Plato’s principal target in two dialogues, receives the same treatment. On the contrary, in Plato’s Laches, Damon is considered a master of music and a polished man, and in the Republic, he is presented as a musician and his theories are highly praised. 23 Cf. Mansfeld (2008) 24. 24 Barker (1974) 168. 25 Raubitscheck (1991) 332–336. 26 On this question, see Wallace (2015) 186–193. 27 Barker (2005) 65.

166 

 Aldo Brancacci

There are many reasons that prevent us from considering Damon a Sophist. First of all, he does not appear in Philostratus’ canon, where all the genuine Sophists (i.e. Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Prodicus, Hippias, Thrasymachus, Critias, and so on) are listed. Furthermore, the Sophists were generally itinerant philosophers: they taught by travelling from one city to another, and their teachings were directed at young people. Damon, however, belongs to a different tradition: he is not an itinerant philosopher (we have no evidence of such a lifestyle). Moreover, the fact that in Plato’s Laches the general Nicias praises Damon as a great διδάσκαλος and affirms that he is “suitable to teach youths,” clearly shows that Damon was not a sophistic master of political virtue or πολυμαθία. Sophists generally were foreigners in Athens, while Damon was Athenian. Protagoras came from Abdera, Gorgias from the far Leontini, Hippias from Elis, and Prodicus from Ceos. Each philosopher practiced teaching in different cities: in particular, Hippias, who taught in Sparta and in Sicily, changed his teaching method to fit his location. As for Gorgias, we know that he had great success in both Athens and in Thessaly, while Protagoras taught in Athens and in Sicily. Damon, instead, always lived in Athens, and the only reason for his departure from the city was the ostracism arising from his relationship with Pericles. Finally, we should consider the fact that the Sophists imparted their teaching (ἐπάγγελμα) for a price (μισθός). Their lessons were public and directed at people who aimed to pursue a political career, which implies that a Sophist was not a διδάσκαλος in the strictest sense of the word. In Plato’s Protagoras, the Sophist maintains that his ἐπάγγελμα is the skill that makes a disciple gradually ready to reach “the best,” viz. the εὐβουλία in public and private affairs, but above all in politics28 – he makes the distinction between himself and teachers of music, poetry, and gymnastics very clear.29 The tradition ascribes none of these elements (μισθός, ἐπάγγελμα, and public teaching) to Damon. Nor is a crowd of disciples attested for him. We know that Damon had a disciple, Dracon, but, exactly like Damon, he was teacher of music, not a Sophist. The image of Damon as a Sophist is probably derived by a cursory reading of Plutarch. We have already cited the first part of this text. Now we should analyze it in its entirety: Pericles’ teacher in music, most writers agree, was Damon (whose name, they say, should be pronounced with the first syllable short), although according to Aristotle30 the man had a thorough musical training at the hands of Pythocleides. Damon appears to have been a sophist

28 Cf. Pl. Prt. 318e–319a. 29 Cf Pl. Prt. 328b. 30 Arist. fr. 364 Rose.

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 167

of the highest order, who hid behind the name of music, concealing his cleverness from the people; he associated with Pericles like a ‘rubber’ for an athlete of politics and a trainer. However, it did not escape notice that Damon was using his lyre as a screen, and he was ostracized as a schemer of great designs and lover of tyranny, and he became a target for the comic poets. At any rate Plato [the comic poet] makes one of his characters inquire of him:31 “First of all, the, tell me please / For you are the Cheiron, they say, who raised up Pericles.”32

Plutarch combines different sources in this passage. At the beginning, he mentions Aristotle, who is also cited in another section of the Life of Pericles.33 From Aristotle, Plutarch draws information concerning the relationship between Pythocleides and Damon. The end of the testimonium cites the comic poet Plato, who satirizes the reasons behind Damon’s ostracism, especially those concerning the relationship between Pericles and Damon.34 The core of the Plutarchean passage is composed of two parts. The first part is very similar to the sections of Plato’ Protagoras that allude to the ‘crypto-sophists,’ viz. those who masked their knowledge through dodges, whereas Protagoras first publicly declared it. Protagoras defines some ancient wise men, like Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Orpheus, Musaeus, and some of his contemporaries, such as Iccus of Tarentum, Herodicus of Selymbria, and musicians like Agathocles, Pythocleides, and many others (καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί) as “masked Sophists.” It is quite possible that Plutarch was referring to Damon and to his ostracism in particular with this last phrase (“many others”).35 On the contrary, the second part of the core of Plutarch’s testimonium, where the relationship between Damon and Pericles and the vicissitudes of Damon’s ostracism are exposed, cannot derive from Plato’s Protagoras: indeed, Plato never mentions the allegations of μεγαλοπράγμων and φιλοτύραννος. Therefore, both Plato and Plutarch rely on a common source, which Olof Gigon identified as an earlier text of Protagoras. More precisely, Wallace identifies this source as a text belonging to the comical tradition, because it treats the figure of Damon and the cause of his ostracism ironically.36 Wallace’s thesis is convincing because it explains why the allusion to Damon has a negative nuance in Plutarch, while the accusation that he masked his knowledge through music does not indicate that Damon was a Sophist, but it means that he is portrayed as a conniving politician in order to justify his ostracism. Vice versa, Protagoras’ reference to wise men in the homonymous Platonic dialogue has a positive tone because it underlines 31 Pl. Com. fr. 207 PCG. 32 Plut. Per. 4 (= 37 A 4 DK = A 9 Wallace), transl. by R. W. Wallace. 33 Plut. Per. 9 (= 37 A 6 DK = A 10 Wallace). 34 On the comic Plato, see the accurate inquiry of López Cruces (2006–2007) 113–116. 35 On this topic, see Brancacci (2002) 11–32. 36 Gigon (1946); Wallace (2015) 122.

168 

 Aldo Brancacci

their knowledge. However, Protagoras does not consider them Sophists, because they did not reveal the political significance behind their teachings: this characteristic distinguishes the modern σοφιστής from the ancient σοφός. To sum up, Damon was not a Sophist but a member of Pericles’ circle. He was active in 462, when Anaxagoras arrived in Athens. The circle was composed of many thinkers, artists, and intellectuals, who introduced many innovative ideas in various fields of knowledge, developing new cultural themes. It is also well known that some members of the circle received roles from Pericles that allowed them to support his political action. Inside Pericles’ circle, Damon was the expert theorist of a new kind of music, founded on its ethical potential and on its ability to model humans’ souls. Pericles’ circle is chronologically and theoretically prior to the Sophistic movement. In the Athens of Pericles, the word σοφιστής most basically means teacher of τέχναι, as Antonio Capizzi observes. This notion covers a wide range of different types of people: “‘sophistes’ de la sculpture tels Phidias, aux ‘sophistes’ de la musique tels Pythoclidès et Damon, aux ‘sophistes’ de la mantique tels Lampon et, enfin, aux ‘sophistes’ de la médecine comme Hippon et Diogène d’Apollonie.”37 We could also add philosophers like Anaxagoras and Socrates to this list. Thanks to Pericles’ circle, Socrates knew Damon’s music, Anaxagoras’ physics, and Protagoras’ rhetoric. Nevertheless, Socrates did not adhere completely to a defined doctrine, nor did he agree with all the tendencies of the circle.38 At this period, there was no semantic and theoretical contrast between ‘sophist’ and ‘philosopher’ yet. Words like σοφοί and σοφισταί mean “expert” and “wise.” Only when Pericles’ circle dissolved and Protagoras gained prominency – the ‘official’ start to the Sophistic movement – did the verb φιλοσοφεῖν (and perhaps the terms φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία as well) begin to be used, probably by Socrates for the first time, with a different meaning from Thucydides’ usage of it.39 From Plato’s Laches, we learn about a relationship between Damon and Prodicus; it is a unicum in our tradition and, as Robert Mayhew argues,40 it shows the only strong connection that exists between music and logos in Greek culture of the 5th and 4th cent. BC. Damon’s theory on the formative and educational role of music in democracy gives a good justification for his relationship with Pericles. Indeed, Pericles was a statesman not only endowed with a concept of democracy consistent with Damon’s musical theory, but also educated in music by Pythocleides and then by Damon himself. 37 Capizzi (1986) 169. 38 Giannantoni (1971) 164–172. 39 Cf. Thuc. 2.40.1. 40 Cf. Mayhew (2011) 143.

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 169

It is natural to believe that Damon composed a work in order to explain his personal theories. In fact, it is not possible that the most innovative of Damon’s doctrines (they were admired by Plato and influenced late thinkers, i.e. Diogenes of Babylon), were not written in a treatise. It is also impossible to explain the long tradition of late thinkers who gleaned ideas from Damon and mentioned him, but without any reference to his work. In addition, we have unambiguous proof from an authoritative source of ancient tradition on the existence of this work: (…) num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, nam musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus uni­ versum complecteretur atque ut alius aliam sibi partem, in qua elaboraret seponeret?41 (…) Or [do you really suppose] that geometry in the hands of Euclid or Achimedes, or music with Damon or Aristoxenus, or even literature with Aristophanes or Callimachus were such entirely separate subjects that nobody embraced the whole field but each one chose for himself a different area to work in?42

All scholars attribute a work that, according to Philodemus, could be entitled Areopagiticus to Damon. However, some scholars think that Damon wrote two works: one that contained his own ethico-musical doctrines, which we should identify as the Areopagiticus; the other, with more technical content, which deals with specific musical issues. The tradition of Damon’s musical and theoretical doctrines would then be derived from the latter.43 Wallace is the only scholar who totally rejects the idea that Damon wrote a book. His thesis again lacks proof, and it is founded on a misleading method that we could easily define as ‘sophism’! First he conducts a historiographic inspection of scholars’ theses and conjectures concerning the content of Damon’s book; then he criticizes all these theses in order to conclude that Damon’s book is a ‘construction’ of scholarship.44 In spite of his intent, Wallace succeeds only in demonstrating that the ‘reconstruction’ of Damon’s book is questionable, or not totally persuasive. But he never really proves that this book does not exist. After that, Wallace resurrects Bücheler’s thesis, which argues that a passage of Philodemus’ Περὶ μουσικῆς concerning Damon does not actually have Damon himself as a source but rather a dialogue of Heraclides Ponticus that staged Damon. In examining another passage of Περὶ μουσικῆς on Damon, Wallace observes how Damon speaks here about the three virtues of ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, and δικαιοσύνη, which “are precisely the most 41 Cic. De or. 3.33.132 (= 37 B 1 DK = B 14 Wallace). 42 Transl. by R. W. Wallace. 43 Winnington-Ingram (1958) 21 maintains that it is not easy to determine whether “the Areop­ agiticus was the only publication of Damon.” Cf. Timpanaro Cardini (1973) 349. 44 Wallace (2015) 77–86.

170 

 Aldo Brancacci

important in Plato’s Republic” (but here one could object that the most important virtue in the Republic is σοφία) and argues that even this passage does not derive from Damon, but is “an elaboration of Damon’s teaching in the light of Plato’s ethics.”45 Nevertheless, Wallace’s and Bücheler’s conclusions do not agree: Bücheler admitted that a single book of Damon along with the supposed dialogue of Heraclides Ponticus probably existed. Wallace’s thesis also contrasts with that of Philippson, who supposed, as Bücheler did, that Philodemus’ Περὶ μουσικῆς derived not from Damon but from Heraclides, because Philippson denies the existence of Damon’s Areopagiticus as well. In conclusion, Wallace has no problem with affirming that, on one hand, everything we know about Damon from Philodemus is actually derived from the supposed dialogue of Heraclides (although its existence is not certain) and, on the other hand, that Damon’s Areopagiticus was never written. But, if Damon’s work did not exist, who was the Heraclides’ source on Damon? Following Wallace’s thesis, it seems that Heraclides, who in reality was a serious musician and chronicler,46 made all this up. But a thesis that destroys the whole tradition that it should explain is doomed to destroy itself! We must also consider the fact that Damon is never quoted in the surviving fragments of Heraclides Ponticus; therefore, the supposition that Heraclides wrote a dialogue dedicated to Damon is totally unfounded. Diogenes Laërtius transmits the list of Heraclides’ works:47 it contains a section of μουσικά, but none of these works refers to Damon. If Heraclides really spoke about Damon in his (supposed) work, he would have at least mentioned Damon’s name in the subtitle of that work. Furthermore, the existence of a work by Damon (it is not important for our purposes if this work was the Areopagiticus or something else) composed in the pre-Platonic age is attested by Plato, who remains our principal source on Damon. It is widely accepted that the pieces of information concerning Damon in Plato’s Republic stem from a work of Damon. Even Barker has recently considered it highly probable that Damon was Plato’s source with regard to the doctrine of the ἁρμονίαι laid out in the Republic.48 This passage of Plato’s Republic, grounded on the assumption that any introduction of a new kind of music represents an enormous danger for the polis, will illustrate our point: For styles of music are never changed without changing the most fundamental rules of the polis, as Damon says (ὥς φησί τε Δάμων) and I believe.49

45 Wallace (2015) 93. 46 See Barker (2009) 273–298. 47 Diog. Laërt. 5.86–88. 48 Barker (1974) 67. 49 Pl. Resp. 4.424c (= 37 B 10 DK = B 2 Wallace); transl. by R. W. Wallace.

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 171

Here Plato directly quotes Damon’s work, even if we are not entirely sure about the extent of the quotation, i.e. if it starts from the beginning of the sentence or with the second clause. Furthermore, Plato’s emphasis on this quotation helps us reject the unfounded hypothesis that Damon’s work did not exist. In this regard, Philodemus’ Περὶ μουσικῆς is another important source. Elsewhere50 I have already attempted to examine the following Herculanean piece of evidence, which I give here according to the reconstruction by Daniel Delattre: καὶ πολλοὶ λέ35 γουσι μηδὲν ἐπηνωρθῶσ]θ[α]ι κα[ὶ] το[ὺ]ς ὑεῖς – οὐδ’ ὑ[ε]ῖς ἡ[γ]οῦ[ν]ται – , πολλοὶ δ’, ὅτι νομίζ[ε]ται προσήκειν αὐτῆς μεταλαμβάνειν τοὺς ⟦π⟧ ⸌χ⸍αρί40  ̲ ̲εντ]ας, καὶ μετειληφέναι ]π[]νον μο[ 42 ]κ[]ν[]α[]ασι[]ωσ[ || καὶ Δά[μ]ων, εἰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς Ἀρεοπαγε[ί]τας ἔλεγε, καὶ μὴ τοὺς πλαττομένους, ἐφενάκι5 ζεν ἀτηρῶς. 51  (…) And many say that also their sons have in no way improved – nor do the sons [themselves] think it – and many that it is thought that the ‘nobles’ (vel ‘men of taste’) ought to engage in music, and to have been engaged in it (…) and Damon, if he said such things to actual Areopagites and not fictional ones, was deceiving them badly.52

Philodemus transmits several testimonia concerning Damon. A complete list of them is now available in the Index Praesocraticorum Philosophorum Herculanen­ sis recently edited by Christian Vassallo.53 These texts provide the background for the account of Damon’s doctrines. In other terms, Plato’s evidence for Damon

50 Brancacci (2008) 9–11. 51 Phld. De mus. 4, PHerc. 1497, cols. 147.34–148.5 Delattre (2007) II, 309–310 (= 37 B 2 DK = B 13 Wallace = IPPH IX 30). 52 Transl. by R. W. Wallace (with a few changes). 53 IPPH IX 29–32. All the Herculanean texts will be collected and commented by Christian Vassallo in his forthcoming CPH (sub X. Damon Atheniensis).

172 

 Aldo Brancacci

acquires a deeper meaning if we relate it with this other body of evidence. We should also take the fact that Philodemus had a very wide cultural background, including not only philosophy, but also literature and music, into account. He knew musical philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and Aristoxenus, and there’s nothing that prevents us from assuming that he had direct access to Damon’s work. Wilamowitz maintained that Philodemus knew Damon through Diogenes of Babylon’s On Music,54 as this work is the main polemic target in both Philodemus’ On Music and On Rhetoric. I am also convinced that Philodemus’ principal source was Diogenes of Babylon’s treatise: indeed, the Epicurean philosopher criticizes the thesis on the ethical influences of music, a thesis advocated by Diogenes’ work. But an accurate analysis of Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Music shows that the Epicurean was familiar with various fields of the philosophy of music, including the Academic (viz. Heraclides Ponticus) and the Peripatetic (viz. Chamaeleon) ones. Therefore, it is quite possible that Philodemus derived information on Damon from this vast tradition, even if that information is no longer available for us. Furthermore, we must remember that Damon is a figure that belongs not only to Plato’s dialogues, but also to Socratic literature as a whole, where we find several treatises Περὶ μουσικῆς (unfortunately we know no more than the titles of these works). Therefore, it is quite possible that (some of) these dialogues were about Damon and that Diogenes of Babylon was familiar with them,55 and that in turn, Philodemus knew them via Diogenes. In the fragment that I have quoted, the words ἔλεγε and πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς Ἀρεοπαγε[ί]τας sound as if they were directed at someone, and precisely at Areopagites. Therefore, the scholar’s deduction that Philodemus was referring to Damon’s Areopagiticus in this passage seems perfectly reasonable. It is appropriate to remember that after Ephialtes’ reform of Areopagus (462 BC), the authority of Athens’ most ancient council was drastically reduced and relegated only to judging murders and controlling public customs. It is also true that the role of the Areopagus was originally not very broad and that it gained breadth after its usurpations of power; therefore, Ephialtes tried to limit the power of the Areopagus by bringing it back to its origins.56

54 Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1921) 63, followed by Kemke (1884) xiv–xv, and Rispoli (1969) 253. 55 On the presence of Damon in the logoi Sokratikoi, cf. Lib. Declam. 1.157 (= A 25 Wallace = deest ap. DK). On the works On Music in Socratic literature, see G. Giannantoni’s Note 35 on Antisthenes ap. SSR IV. 56 Cf. De Bruyn (1995).

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 173

If we begin with this scenario, it is reasonable to suppose that Pericles intended to reform the paideia with Damon’s help (we should keep their relationship in mind) and to connect this reform with that of the Areopagus. If this hypothesis is reasonable, it is also reasonable to suppose that Damon’s Areo­ pagiticus was the manifesto of Pericles’ plan. But we should also keep in mind that Damon could have begun his work independently from the collaboration between himself and Pericles, as he could have started before this joint effort: the uncertainty of Damon’s chronology forces us to be cautious at every single turn. Philodemus’ doubt – namely if the words of Damon’s Areopagiticus were spoken in front of the Areopagites in the flesh or in a figurative sense – reinforces the impression that Philodemus was more than superficially familiar with Damon’s works. In fact, it is quite possible that the work was a figment of his imagination and that it was never really delivered before the Areopagus (unless when it was orally published for the first time); nevertheless, this understanding of the work does not deprive it of its political and cultural value in the slightest. We have the same impression if we examine another reference to Damon in Philodemus’ On Music, namely the second of the four references to Damon contained in the work included in Vassallo’s catalogue. In this case as well, I rely on Delattre’s reconstruction: Δ]άμων [μ]ὲν τοίνυν []φονε[]ν εἶπεν ἐν [ τ]ὴ ν μ[ουσι]κὴν [εἰς 40 τὰς πλείσ]τας ἀρετὰς χρη[σιμεύειν, λ]έγων δεῖν ᾄδοντ]⌊α καὶ κιθ⌋αρίζοντα τὸν π]⌊αῖδα μὴ⌋ μόνον ἀνδρε[ιό⌊τερον γί⌋νεσθαι καὶ σώ⌊φρο⌋45 νέστερο]ν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκ͙[αι- || [ότερον57

57 Phld. De mus. 4, PHerc. 1578, cols. 100.37–101.1 Delattre (2007) II, 194–195 (= 37 B 4 DK = B 12 Wallace = IPPH IX 32). Delattre’s French translation reads as follows: “Quant à Damon assurément, c’est [par fanfaronade] qu’il a dit [publiquement] que la musique est [utile à la plupart des] vertus, arguant que, en chantant et en jouant de la cithare, l’enfant doit devenir non seulement [plus] courageux et [plus] tempérant, mais aussi [plus juste] (…).” Wallace, on the grounds of a partially different reconstruction of the Herculanean evidence, translates: “Damon however (…) said in (…) that (?) music (?) is useful [for all] the virtues (…) and that in singing or playing the kithara a boy ought not only [to (…)] courage and moderation, but also [justice].”

174 

 Aldo Brancacci

In l. 39, Delattre wisely suggests “la restitution en lacune de ἐν | [πᾶσι] (« devant tout le monde »), étant donné qu’il s’agit ici très probablement d’un renvoi à l’Aréopagitique de Damon, auquel Philodème fait d’ailleurs allusion en col. 148, 1–5.”58 I have already studied this piece of Philodemean evidence on Damon in depth.59 Here, I would like only to reiterate that in the previous lines, Philodemus hands down the opinion of a vaguely defined group of people, the πολλοί, who believe that people devoid of natural temperaments (τοὺς ἀ[φ]υεῖς) cannot be trained in music. In contrast to this opinion, Philodemus opposes those of the πολλοί who are mentioned later in the text. After this section, we find a lacuna of two lines. It is probable that in these lines, Philodemus expressed his own opinion, namely that music does not have this kind of usefulness in and of itself.60 Finally, we find that the second part of the fragment is related to the first: this second section mentions Damon’s name. There are no doubts that τοὺς χαρίεν[τ]ας is the key term of the passage: it designates people who are provided with a sensitive and refined intelligence by nature. Therefore, we should not understand the opposition between τοὺς ἀ[φ]υεῖς and τοὺς χαρίεν[τ]ας as a contrast between different social classes, as Lasserre has asserted,61 but as a distinction of natural dispositions.62 This is completely compatible with Pericles’ concept of democracy and encompasses it perfectly. Protagoras’ concept of ethics can help us understand this point. Protagoras admits that all citizens partake in the life of the polis, because everyone has the potential to be σύμβουλος. But not all citizens are σύμβουλοι in the same way, because some of them – the people whom Damon calls χαρίεντες – have to study more and more extensively than others during their paideia.63 The name χαρίεντες allows us to appreciate the accuracy of Plato, who used the same word in the passage of Laches cited above (Nicias on Damon: ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσου βούλει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις).64 It is evident that Plato intentionally quotes a key word in Damon’s cultural project: this is another piece of evidence for Plato’s knowledge of Damon’s work. Now, Philodemus talks about a “baleful deceit”: what does this mean? From this question, we can determine the innovation that Damon brought to musical

58 Delattre (2007) II, 195 n. 1. 59 Brancacci (2008) 8–12. 60 Cf. Neubecker (1986) 116. 61 Lasserre (1954) 56. 62 Cf. Timpanaro Cardini (1973) 353. 63 Cf. Pl. Prt. 326c3–6. An analysis of this passage can be found in Kerferd (1981) 145 and Brancacci (2012) 84 n. 15; see also Vassallo (2012) 182–188. 64 Pl. Lach. 180d2–3 (= 37 A 2 DK = Α 2 Wallace).

7 Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa 

 175

paideia. I believe that Damon’s proposal was not limited to a generalized musical education. In Athens, musical learning had been already present since Ephialtes’ reforms, as the institution of χοροί in tragic contests shows (the training of χοροί required many skills and much musical knowledge from its citizens). Damon’s innovation consisted in recognizing the educational function of music not only as a project for its own sake or as a cultural endeavor, but also in determining the ethical possibilities and values of music. In other words, Damon’s theory makes him, in fact, a practicer of moral philosophy. The ethical value that Damon ascribed to music was well articulated with the principal political meaning of Pericles’ enlightened democracy, especially with the aim of propagating precepts, customs, and a particular lifestyle in order to create a cultured elite, the χαρίεντες, as an example for the other citizens.65 Damon’s way of thinking about music was the foundation of this project, not only because music had the crucial role of the basic training of this elite, but also because, inside the elite, every citizen educated in ethical values should be a part of an organic structure and a model for the other citizens. The whole democratic city, according to Protagoras,66 was conceived of as a model in a broad and absolute sense: the same sense that Pericles hinted at when, according to Thucydides, he defined Athens “the School of Hellas.”67

References Barker (1974): Andrew Barker, Greek Musical Writings, vol. 1: The Musician and his Art, Cambridge. Barker (2005): Andrew Barker, Psicomusicologia nella Grecia antica, ed. by Angelo Meriani, Naples. Barker (2009): Andrew Barker, “Heraclides and Musical History”, in: William W. Fortenbaugh and Elizabeth Pender (eds.), Heraclides of Pontus: Discussion, New Brunswick/London, 273–298. Brancacci (2002): Aldo Brancacci, “Protagora e la techne sophistike: Plat. Prot. 316d–317c”, in: Elenchos 23, 11–32. Brancacci (2008): Aldo Brancacci, Musica e filosofia da Damone a Filodemo, Florence. Brancacci (2012): Aldo Brancacci, “La pensée politique de Protagoras”, in: RPhA 30, 59–85. Capizzi (1986): Antonio Capizzi, “La confluence des sophistes à Athènes après la mort de Périclès et ses connexions avec les transformations de la société attique”, in: Barbara Cassin (ed.), Positions de la sophistique, Paris, 167–177.

65 Schachermeyr (1985) underlines this topic well. 66 Cf. Pl. Prt. 326c–328a. 67 Cf. Thuc. 2.41.1.

176 

 Aldo Brancacci

De Bruyn (1995): Odile De Bruyn, La compétence de l’Aréopage en matière de procès publics : Des origines de la polis athénienne à la conquête romaine de la Grèce (vers 700–146 avant J.-C.), Stuttgart. Giannantoni (1971): Gabriele Giannantoni, Che cosa ha detto veramente Socrate?, Rome. Giannattasio Andria (1989): Rosa Giannattasio Andria, I frammenti delle «Successioni dei filosofi», Naples. Gigon (1946): Olof Gigon, “Studien zu Platons Protagoras”, in: Id. (ed.), Phyllobolia: Für Peter von der Mühll zum 60. Geburtstag, Basel, 91–152 [= Id., Studien zur antiken Philosophie, ed. by Andreas Graeser, Berlin/New York 1972, 98–154]. Glucker (1978): John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy, Göttingen. Huffman (2005): Carl A. Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King, Cambridge. Kemke (1884): Johannes Kemke, Philodemus: De musica, Leipzig. Kerferd (1981): George B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge. Lasserre (1954): François Lasserre, Plutarque : De la musique, texte, traduction, commentaire précédés d’une étude sur L’éducation musicale en Grèce antique, Lausanne. López Cruces (2006–2007): Juan L. López Cruces. “Plutarch, Pericles 4.4: Plato Comicus on Damon”, in: Ploutarchos 4, 113–116. Mansfeld (2008): Jaap Mansfeld, “Sources”, in: Keimke Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, 3—30. Mayhew (2011): Robert Mayhew, Prodicus the Sophist: Texts, Translations, and Commentary, Oxford. Mejer (1978): Jørgen Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background, Wiesbaden. Raubitscheck (1991): Anthony E. Raubitscheck, The School of Hellas: Essays on Greek History, Archaeology, and Literature, ed. by Dirk Obbink and Paul A. Vander Waerdt, New York/ Oxford. Rispoli (1969): Gioia M. Rispoli, “Il primo libro del Περὶ µουσικῆς di Filodemo”, in: Francesco Sbordone (ed.), Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi, vol. 1, Naples, 23–286. Schachermeyr (1985): Fritz Schachermeyr, Pericle, transl. by Mauro Tosti Croce, Rome. Timpanaro Cardini (1973): Maria Timpanaro Cardini, Pitagorici: Testimonianze e frammenti, 3: Pitagorici Anonimi e Risonanze Pitagoriche, Florence. Vassallo (2012): Christian Vassallo, Filosofia e ‘sonosfera’ nei libri II e III della Repubblica di Platone, Amsterdam. Von Jan (1901): Karl von Jan, “Damon (17)”, in: RE IV, 2072. Von Kienle (1961): Walter von Kienle, Die Berichte über die Sukzessionen der Philosophen in der hellenistischen und spätantiken Literatur, Berlin. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1921): Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Griechische Verskunst, Berlin. Wallace (2015): Robert W. Wallace, Reconstructing Damon: Music, Wisdom Teaching, and Politics in Perikles’ Athens, Oxford. Winnington-Ingram (1958): Reginald P. Winnington-Ingram, “Ancient Greek Music”, in: Lustrum 3, 5–57. Zhmud (1997): Leonid Zhmud, Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im frühen Pythagoreismus, Berlin.

Part III: Heraclitus

Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus: A New Analysis of the Text and the Quotation of Heraclitus Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus has been the object of a great deal of critical attention ever since Walter Burkert noticed in 1983 that the text contained a citation of two fragments of Heraclitus (B 3 and B 94 DK).1 Burkert’s discovery received further confirmation when subsequently frs. g13G4 revealed Heraclitus’ name. The ongoing intense debate about the reconstruction of the first badly damaged columns of the papyrus renewed the discussion of the reference to Heraclitus in col. IV as well. The recent publication by André Laks and Glenn W. Most of the fragments of the Presocratics for Loeb and Fayard has added further elements to the debate. Their text is based on a new volumetric reconstruction of the scroll of the Derveni Papyrus by Valeria Piano,2 whose edition of the first columns up to col. VI has been adopted by the two scholars.3 In the meantime, Richard Janko has undertaken a thorough revision of all the fragments in view of a new edition of the whole papyrus. Janko’s preliminary results have now been published with a translation and commentary by Mirjam E. Kotwick.4 This paper hopes to further the discussion, by providing a new interpretation of the entire column, offering a systematic examination of the lines that precede the reference to Heraclitus and then the Heraclitus quotation itself, and proposing also new readings of the text. We first present an edition of the column, in 1 Burkert (1983). 2 Piano (2016b) ch. 2; the technical details of the volumetric reconstruction and the resulting edition of the first few columns are in Piano (forthcoming). 3 EGPh, VI.1, ch. 30. 4 Kotwick (2017); the volume, contains an introduction, translation and commentary in German by Mirjam E. Kotwick and a Greek text based on Richard Janko’s re-examination of the papyrus. Janko’s complete edition is forthcoming: cf. Janko (2016). Note: The starting-points for this paper were the new edition of col. IV by Valeria Piano (2016b) 76–82 and an unpublished paper by Gábor Betegh on the quotation of Heraclitus. The present paper is the result of intense intellectual exchanges and collaboration over a long time. Our deepest gratitude is to David Sedley who discussed with us successive versions of the paper, and to Maria Serena Funghi for her unfailing, continued support and papyrological expertise. Gábor Betegh, University of Cambridge Valeria Piano, University of Florence https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-009

180 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

which we do not insert the exempli gratia supplements for the first lines, which we will then examine and argue for in detail in the subsequent part of the paper. The edition is based on the text published in Piano (2016b). One notable novelty of the text – which, as we shall see, has important implications for the reference to Heraclitus – is the addition of fr. F17 below F15 (ll. 9–10, end, cf. below, § 3.3). The edition is followed first by a translation (which takes into account some of these supplements), and then by a line-by-line commentary. Special attention will be paid to the way in which the author introduces the quotation in ll. 5–6, and to the quotation itself, starting in l. 7. We will also discuss the extent of the quotation, and its relation to the alternative versions of the relevant fragments as preserved by Aëtius and Plutarch. The ultimate aim of this paper is twofold. We hope to shed some new light both on the contents of the column, and on its place in the papyrus as a whole. Moreover, we hope to offer some new insights about the text of Heraclitus, and its relation to Heraclitus’ other known fragments. PDerv., col. IV F7, G13, G4, H8, H46, F15, F17 ]ου ε[             ]ε̣ων ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ἐ]κδοῦναι μᾶλλ[ον ἃ] σ̣ίνεται ̣ [ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣₍₎] τ̣ὰ τῆς τύχης γ̣ὰ̣[ρ οὐκ εἴ ̣[α λα]μμάνει ̣ν̣. ἆρ᾿ ουτ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]ν̣δε κόσμος; 5 κατὰ [ταῦτ]α̣ Ἡράκλ̣ε̣ιτος μα[ρτυρόμενος] τ̣ὰ κοινά, __κατ̣[αστρέ]φ̣ει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α, ὅσπερ ἴκελ̣α̣ [ἱερῶι] λόγωι λέγων [ἔφη· ἥλιο̣[ς κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι, τὸ μ̣[έγεθο]ς̣ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων. εἰ γά̣[ρ τι οὔ]ρους ἑ[ωυτοῦ ὑπερβαλε]ῖ ,̣ Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι·5 τὰ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε 10  ὅπως μὴ εὖρος ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι κ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]α̣ Δίκης [ ] ̣ ̣ι θυο̣ ̣ [ ]α Δίκης [ ] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι ] ̣ ̣ ̣ ι̣[ ̣]ιζ̣[ 1 [τ]οῦ εδ̣[ Janko ap. Kotwick, []ου ε[ ΚPT : θ]ε̣ῶν ΚPT : περὶ τῶν θ]ε̣ῶν Janko (2008) fort. recte : διὰ τῶν τιμωρήσε]ων Sedley : ἐ̣ὼν Ferrari || 2 μ. ετ. α̣θ̣[εὶς tempt. Tsantsanoglou (1997) in comm., μετ̣α̣θ̣[έσθαι Tsantsanoglou (2014) fort. recte (cf. infra) : ante ἐ]κδοῦναι, μετ̣α̣θ̣[εὶς εἵλετο Ἐρινύσιν tempt. Tsantsanoglou ap. Kouremenos, μετ̣α̣θ̣[εὶς ὠφελεῖ διὰ τὸ tempt. Hammerstaedt

5 We have decided not to use quotation marks in this version of the text, because we would like to keep open the discussion about the identification of Heraclitus’ ipsissima verba.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 181

ap. Janko (2008), at brevius, μεταθ[εὶς πολὺ ἀξιοῦται Sedley; an μεταθ[έσθαι οὐ θέλων εἵλετο ? || 3 ἃ] KPT, Ferrari, Tsantsanoglou (2014), ἢ] Tsantsanoglou (1997), Janko (2008), Sedley : post ] σ̣ίνεται̣, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους vel τὸν κόσμον tempt. Tsantsanoglou (1997) fort. recte, an [τὸν κόσμον Ἐρινύσι ?, [τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φῦλα tempt. Tsantsanoglou ap. Kouremenos, [“τὰ” δὲ ὡς “τάδε” ἔφη με]τὰ Sedley : γ̣ὰ̣[ρ KPT || 4 αρουτω̣[ (vel αρουτọ[) leg. Janko (2016) fort. recte, qui ἆρ᾿ οὕτω̣[ς ἔχει coni., an ἆρ᾿ οὕτω̣[ς ἐστὶ (cf. infra comm. ad loc.)?, ἆρ᾿ οὕτω̣ [ μὲν φάς, Sedley, αρουτα̣[ leg. Tsantsanoglou (1997) qui τά̣[ξιν ἔχει coni., acc. KPT et Janko (2008), τα̣[κτὸς Piano, acc. EGPh : διὰ τῶ]ν̣δε Janko (2008) fort. recte (cf. infra, comm. ad loc.), ἐκ τῶ]ν̣δε Tsantsanoglou (1997), διὰ τό]ν̣δε KPT, ὁ διὰ τὸ]ν̣δε (sc. ὁ θεός) Piano, acc. EGPh, νοῶ]ν̣ δὲ Sedley || 5 [ταῦτ]α̣ Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou, [ταὐτ]ὰ̣ Tsantsanoglou (1997), KPT, Janko (2008), Janko ap. Kotwick : μα̣[ρτυρόμενος] Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou, μᾶ[λλον τιμᾶι] Sedley, μα[ρτυρήσας Janko ap. Kotwick || 6 κατ̣[αστρέ]φ̣ει Tsantsanoglou (1997), κἆτ᾿ [οὐ γρά]φ̣ει Sedley : τὰ ⟦κο̣⟧ ⸌ἴδ⸍[ι]α Janko ap. Kotwick : ἱερῶι] λόγωι vel [ἀστρο]λόγωι, (quod acc. KPT), vel φυσιο]λόγωι (quod brevius vid.) tempt. Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou, ἰδίωι] λόγωι Sedley, μυθο]λόγωι Tsantsanoglou (1997), acc. Laks/Most (1997a), Janko (2008) sed brevius ut vid., ἱερο]λόγωι Sider (1997) at brevius, τῶι ἱερο]λόγωι Ferrari at longius : fin. ἔφη Tsantsanoglou/Parássolgou, δηλοῖ Janko ap. Kotwick || 7 κόσ]μ̣ου leg. et suppl. Piano, Janko (2016), iam coniecerat Lebedev (1989); Janko (2016) etiam δρό]μ̣ου tempt., ἀλλ]ὰ̣ οὐ Tsantsanoglou (2014), ἀλ]λ̣᾿ οὐ iam Burkert (1983), ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ου KPT, κύκ]λ̣ου tempt. Tsantsanoglou ap. Kouremenos : cett. suppl. Tsantsanoglou (1997), ἀνθρώ⌊π⌋[ου] Janko (2016) || 8 εἰ γά̣[ρ τι Tsantsanoglou (1997), εἰ γά̣[ρ Janko ap. Kotwick, εἰκ̣[ότας KPT mon. Schönbeck, qui vestigia litt. κ̣[ perp. dispex. : οὔ]ρους KPT, Janko (2008), εὔ]ρους Tsantsanoglou (1997), Janko ap. Kotwick : ἑ[ωυτοῦ Tsantsanoglou (1997), ε[ὔρους KPT || 9 init. ὑπερβαλε]ῖ̣ vel ἐκβήσετα]ι̣ (quod acc. cett.) tempt. Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou, ἐκ]β̣[ήσετα]ι̣ Janko ap. Kotwick, εἰ δὲ μ]ή̣ Anonymus, Burkert (1983), ἑοῦ· εἰ δὲ μ]ή̣ KPT : τὰ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε post ἐξευρήσου̣[σι ex fr. F17 coni. Piano mon. Most, ἐξευρήσου̣[σιν. ὁ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε Sedley, [ Δίκης ἐπίκουροι (ex Heracl. 22 B 94 DK) Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou, acc. cett., post ἐξευρήσου̣[σι distinx. Burkert (1983), qui ταῦτα πάντα | ἤινικται ἵνα ἐπανα]βατὸμ in lacuna suppl., Sider (1987), qui πάντα γὰρ κολάζου|σιν ὅστις ἄν τι ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι, vel ἐπικουρήσουσι | γὰρ Δίκης ἐάν τι ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι κ[αὶ κολάσουσι tempt. || 10 [ὅπως μὴ εὖρος coni. Piano, ὅπως μὴ μηδὲν suppl. KPT, [ὅτι ἂν ἑὸν ὅρον Sedley, [ὅκως μὴ δρόμον Janko ap. Kotwick, [ὅπως μὴ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ Janko (2008) : ὑπερ]βατὸμ KPT, acc. cett. : κ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]α̣ Δίκης [ Piano ex fr. F17, an κ[ατὰ μέτρ]α̣ Δίκης ?, κ[ινεῖν τ]ὰ̣ δίκης Sedley || 11 ] ̣ ̣ι θυο̣̣[ leg. Piano mon. KPT (qui ]α̣ι θ̣ υο̣ ̣[ scrips.), ]α̣θυο̣ ̣[ Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou, θύο̣υ̣σ̣[ι coni. Lebedev fort. recte, ]ν̣ θύο̣υ̣σι ̣ Janko ap. Kotwick || 13 ] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι (potius quam  δυσμήνιτα vel ὀξυ]μήνιτα) Tsantsanoglou 1997, KPT, ἀ]μήνιτα κ[ Janko (2008), Ferrari || 14 ] ̣ ̣ ι̣ ̣ [ ̣] ιζ̣[ ̣ leg. Piano, ]ξ̣η̣τ̣αι τ̣ο[ ̣ leg. Janko ap. Kotwick, ] ̣  ̣ι π̣ ̣α̣ι ̣ϲ̣ε̣[ KPT, ]ϲ ̣ ι̣ ̣π̣α̣ιϲε̣[ Janko (2008) (ϲ1 iam dispex. KPT in app.) (…) he who change established views concerning the gods [vel established names of the gods?], rather opted for turning over . For he did not allow the world to admit what happens by chance. Is it then in this way, a world-order? In conformity with this, Heraclitus what is common, and overturns his own opinions, he who, telling things in a way similar to a discourse, said: The sun of the world-order, in accordance with its nature, is the width of a human foot, not exceeding its size; for if it exceeds to any extent, the Erinyes will find it out. He made supposition exceed (…) according to the of Justice (…) (…) of Justice (…) at the established month (...)

182 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

1 Lines 1–4: two alternatives 1.1 Line 2: ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[ The first two meaningful fragments of text in this line evoke two opposite notions: the participle from the verb κεῖμαι seems to refer to stability, whereas the verb μετατίθημι refers to the act of altering or changing something. Syntactically, the initial ὁ, together with the brevity of the lacuna between κειμ[ and μεταθ[, makes it highly likely that the ὁ is part of a participle expression, on which the accusative κείμ[ενα – the only possible supplement – depends as the direct object of the verb starting with μεταθ[. The verb κεῖμαι can be used in a physical and in a more abstract sense. If we understand it in the physical sense, and in view of the occurrence of the word κόσμος in l. 4, together with the tenor of Heraclitus’ text lower down in the column, the expression appears to refer to a stable or fixed physical or cosmological state, which someone, designated by the ὁ, has changed. Taking the verb κεῖμαι in a more abstract sense, however, results in a significantly different interpretation. In this usage, the verb, especially in its participial form, commonly refers to “established things,” such as opinions, beliefs, norms, or names, shared by a community. Taken in this sense, the agent designated by the ὁ has introduced a change in some such convention. Prima facie, the term κόσμος in l. 4 and the topic of the rest of the column favour the physical interpretation. In fact, this is how most commentators understand the expression, and take the ὁ to refer to the Νοῦς/θεός, the protagonist of the cosmogonical narrative that unfolds in the Derveni author’s exegesis of the Orphic hymn.6 As the author explains, the divine cosmic Mind brought about the present state of the cosmos by changing the state of the previously existing entities (cf. e.g. col. XV.9–10: ἐ̣[πόει τὴ]ν̣ νῦμ μετάστασιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἑτέρ̣[ων] | ἕτερ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτε̣[ρ᾽ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν). The author, moreover, explains that Mind acted on a plan with the intention of bringing about the present cosmic order (cf. esp. col. XXV.10–12 and infra, § 5). In light of this, it is tempting to take the subject of the next sentence in ll. 3–4 of col. IV still to be Mind: “For he did not allow the world to admit what happens by chance.” In sum, on this interpretation,  the author 6 Tsantsanoglou (1997) 107 explicitly excludes the idea that “the author might be referring to a change in the fixed meanings of words”; this line of interpretation has been further developed in KPT, 148–153. Piano (2016b) 78–80 favours the ‘conventionalist’ reading (i.e. involving the conventional names or beliefs modified or re-interpreted by the agent indicated by the ὁ in l. 2), without excluding the physical-cosmological one. Cf. also EGPh, VI.1, 382–386, who find the physical reading more plausible, without however excluding the alternative interpretation.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 183

would tell us in the first extant lines of col. IV that Mind created the present cosmic order by introducing some change in the previous state, and moreover, that in doing so, Mind was in complete control and did not allow anything to happen by chance (τύχη). Although this would give a coherent reading, the dominant usage of the verb κεῖμαι recommends some modification of it. Most importantly, as far as we could check, none of the occurrences of the verb refer to a state of things, as this reading would require. It is usually employed in referring to the position of things (cf. LSJ s.v.: “of places, to be situated, lie”). This is for instance what we find in a fragment of Philolaus, applied to a cosmological context: 44 B 17 DK: ὁ κόσμος εἷς ἐστιν, ἤρξατο δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὸ ἄνω διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς κάτω. ἔστι τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς κάτω. κτλ. The cosmos is one. It began to come to be from right up at the middle and from the middle upwards in the same way as downwards. For the things above the middle are located opposite to those below.

In view of this usage, the expression ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[ appears to refer to changing not the state, but rather the location, of things. The agent referred to by the ὁ could nonetheless still be the cosmic Mind. Indeed, the cosmogonic act of Mind consisted in removing the excess of fire mixed with the other elements, and placing it in the ‘middle’ to form the sun, so that the things both “above and beneath the sun” could condense and take a stable form (col. XV.1–5). This would correspond well with the quotation from Heraclitus in the next lines of col. IV, in so far as it might focus not only on the size, or width of the sun, but, as we shall see, also on its path and distance from the earth. If so, the expression ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[ would refer to Mind who removes the excess of fire from its previous location, and thereby creates and fixes the position of the sun. Once again, this seems to be a perfectly coherent picture. We would nevertheless suggest that it is at least as plausible to take the expression ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[ (l. 2) to refer to someone who changed (or with the addition of a negation, did not change) something related to established conventions.7 As mentioned above, the verb κεῖμαι and its participial form κείμενα are very often used in the abstract sense, referring to established laws, norms, customary beliefs or opinions. In addition, the 7 This latter interpretation has been adopted by Janko (2008) 48 and, though in a rather different way, by Ferrari (2010). Ferrari interprets the expression as a reference to Democritus, who would be called “he who altered the foundations (sc. of that which one entrusts to a prayer).” The position of Kotwick (2017) 118–120 is less clear; she seems to exclude, however, a reference to Nous, which is a constant feature of the physical/cosmological reading of the first part of the column.

184 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

expression ὀνόματα κείμενα standardly refers to the established usage of words. It is noteworthy that there are two other occurrences of the same verb in the papyrus, and in both cases it refers to the established usage of words or names: PDerv., col. XI.6–7: σκέψασθαι δὲ χρὴ ἐφ᾿ ὧι κεῖτα̣[ι τὸ] ῾ἀρκέσαι᾿ ̲ ̲κ̣α̣ὶ τὸ ῾χρῆσαι᾿ But one has to examine what (the words) ‘to prevent harm’ and what ‘to proclaim oracles’ refer to. PDerv., col. XXI.5–7:

῾ Ἀφροδίτη Oὐρανία’ καὶ ‘Ζεὺς’ καὶ ῾ἀφροδισιάζειν᾿ κ̣αὶ ῾θόρνυσθαι᾿ καὶ ‘Πειθὼ’ καὶ ‘Ἁρμονία’ τῶι αὐτῶι θεῶι ὄνομα κεῖται. ‘Aphrodite Ourania’ and ‘Zeus’ and ‘to engage in sexual activity’ (aphrodisiazein) and ‘to leap’ and ‘Persuasion’ and ‘Harmony’ are established names for the same god.

In fact, Herodotus already uses the verb in this sense,8 and we find frequent parallels in Plato.9 In particular, the verb appears in the neuter plural participle with ὀνόματα stated or implicit: Pl. Cra. 385e: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὁρῶ ἰδίᾳ [ἑκάσταις] ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κείμενα ὀνόματα. Pl. Cra. 397b: εἰκὸς δὲ μάλιστα ἡμᾶς εὑρεῖν τὰ ὀρθῶς κείμενα περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα καὶ πεφυκότα (cf. also ibid. 433c).

The following passage from Proclus, even though much later in date, is of special interest in so far as we find here the participle κείμενα together with the verb μετατίθημι in a context where the focus of the discussion is the nature of names and the way in which they are established. Procl. In Cra. 16.43–45 Pasquali: πρὸς δὲ τὸ τρίτον ὅτι τοῦτο αὐτὸ σημεῖον τοῦ φύσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα, ὅτι μετατίθεμεν τὰ οὐ κυρίως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κείμενα ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν.

These passages, and in particular the other two occurrences of the verb κεῖμαι in the papyrus, together with the Derveni author’s general interest in names and

8 Cf. e.g. Hdt. 4.184: ἁλέσι μὲν γάρ σφί ἐστι Ἀτάραντες οὔνομα, ἑνὶ δὲ ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν οὔνομα οὐδὲν κεῖται. 9 Cf. e.g. Pl. Soph. 257c: τῶν ἄλλων τὶ μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὒ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅττ’ ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 185

naming, offer strong grounds for preferring this reading. The verb μετατίθημι, which would occur here in the aorist participle or infinitive, would be appropriate to such a context, since it would refer to the act of “changing” some established conventions. Notably, the verb appears with this meaning both in the active and the middle voice. The middle voice seems slightly preferable in so far as it can express the greater degree of subjectivity in the act of changing something established: Pl. Cra. 384d: ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν· καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ὕστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου, ὥσπερ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἡμεῖς μετατιθέμεθα10 κτλ. I believe that any name you give a thing is its correct name. If you change its name and give it another, then new one is as correct as the old. For example when we give names to our domestic slaves (…)11 Epicur. De nat. XXV, PHerc. 1191, cr. 8, pz. II, -10. sup. 1–7 Laursen (= 20c.19–21 Long/Sedley): ἀλ|λ᾿ ε̣[ἰ] μ̣ὲν τοῦτο πράττ̣οι, τὸ | [μὲν] ἔ̣ργ[ο]ν ἂν ε̣ἴ̣η̣ [κ]ατα|[λεί]π̣ων ὃ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶ̣ν αὐ̣τ̣ῶ̣[γ] | [κατὰ] τὴν τ̣ῆ̣ς̣ α̣ἰτ̣ί ̣ας πρό|[λ]η̣ψ̣ιν ἐνν̣ο̣οῦμ̣εν, τ̣ὸ δ̣᾿ ὄ|[νο]μ̣[α] μετατε[θει]μ̣έ̣νο̣[ς] κτλ. (…) but if he did that, he would be allowing the action which we have in mind in the case of ourselves in accordance with our preconception of the cause, and he would have changed the name (…) Epicur. De nat. XXV, PHerc. 1191, cr. 8, pz. II, -8. sup. -1–4 Laursen (= 20c.30–32 Long/ Sedley  = fr. [34.28] Arr.2): .[ — ]φ᾿̣ [ἡμ]ῶν̣ | αὐτῶγ καλούμενον τῶι | τῆς ἀνάγκης ὀνόματι προσ|αγ[ο]ρεύε̣ι̣ν̣ ὄ̣νομα μόν̣ομ με|τατίθεται̣ κτλ. [by] calling what is said [to be done] by ourselves by the name of necessity, he is merely changing a name.

According to this reading, the column would open with a reference to someone who changed, or with the addition of a negation, did not change, established beliefs, norms, or names. The end of l. 1 might preserve the referent of κείμενα. The faint traces, compatible with the reading ]ε̣ων, make Tsantsanoglou’s proposed supplement θ]ε̣ῶν plausible, since it would fit with the religious topic of the first columns and, above all, with the peculiar interest of the author in divine names. If so, the agent referred to by the ὁ has changed (or did not change)

10 Cf. also Xen. Mem. 4.2.18: ἀλλὰ μετατίθεμαι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ἔξεστι; [Pl.] Min. 316c: ἐπειδὰν δ᾿ ἐννοήσω ὅτι οὐδὲν παυόμεθα ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους; Pl. Leg. 10.889e: τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ’ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα; Dem. 18.229: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ’ οὐ δίκαια λέγει μεταθέσθαι ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἀξιῶν; Id. 19.341. 11 Transl. by Ch. D. Ch. Reeve.

186 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

something relative to the gods, such as established beliefs or practices, or the name of gods. This reading could then nicely chime with the opposition τὰ κοινά / τὰ ἴδια, i.e. the contrast between commonly shared beliefs and individual ones, which introduces the Heraclitus quotation in ll. 5–6. The reference to Heraclitus would then pick up the thought introduced in the first lines. In the context of the Derveni Papyrus a reference to someone who changed/ did not change ideas or names connected to the gods could very well point to Orpheus himself. Even though according to the standard interpretation, the systematic commentary of the poem starts only in col. VII, nothing rules out that the previous columns already contain references to the religious authority, practice, and wisdom of Orpheus.12 Recent studies on the papyrus commonly accept that there is a clear affinity between the so-called ‘first’ and ‘second’ part of the papyrus, in so far as both parts are dominated by a clear didactic and exegetical intent.13 The usage of the verb κεῖμαι in relation to something established about the gods, such as their names, could also in this sense strengthen the affinity between the two parts of the papyrus. On the Derveni author’s interpretation, one of the defining traits of Orpheus’ activity is a concern for divine names, and in particular for using conventional names and conceptions with new meanings. As it is affirmed several times in the commentary, the poet “indicates his thought in current and customary expressions” (col. XXIII.7–8: ὁ δὲ [sc. Ὀρφεύς] σημαίνει τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην | ἐν τοῖς λεγομέν[ο]ις καὶ νομιζομένοις ῥήμασι). On the basis of these considerations, a possible reconstruction of the first lines would be: περὶ τῶν θ]ε̣ῶν | ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έσθαι οὐ θέλων εἵλετο ἐ]κδοῦναι κτλ. in relation to the gods, he who did not want to change established (names/expressions/ notions/beliefs vel sim.) opted for turning over (…)

12 One of the first studies that advances such a hypothesis is Ferrari (2011) 46–47. He suggests that perhaps it is possible to see a reference to a prayer attributed to Orpheus in the first column; Piano (2016b) esp. 85–90 is more cautious. Even though she recognizes the exegetic intent of the author already at the beginning of the text, she avoids making claims about the object of interpretation in the first columns. To find a reference to Orpheus already in col. IV is obviously fully compatible with David Sedley’s proposal in this volume, i.e. that the commentary of the poem is already well under way in col. IV, as, according to his suggestion, the entire preserved text of the papyrus is a commentary on the poem. 13 The didactic and exegetical intent of the author at the beginning of the text has been highlighted by numerous studies: cf. in particular Laks (1997), Most (1997), Obbink (1997), Betegh (2004) 349–372, Frede (2007), Calame (2014), Piano (2016b) 83–129.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 187

1.2 Lines 2–3: ἐ]κδοῦναι | μᾶλλ[ον ἃ] σ̣ίνεται ̣ We understand the verb ἐ]κδοῦναι as “entrust” (sc. someone a task), in accordance with most interpreters and translators. This meaning, which is much more frequently attested in texts from the Classical period,14 seems to suit the physical-cosmological interpretation of the first lines. We would like to maintain however that it makes perfect sense with the alternative, ‘conventionalist,’ reading as well: the author can be stating that he who changed (or did not change) opinions or names relative to the gods entrusted a certain divine agent, or agents, with some task, i.e. considered that that function belongs in the sphere of action of that divinity. If we go for that reading, we would need the following for a syntactically and semantically complete sentence: a) a finite verb on which ἐ]κδοῦναι depends; b) the object of ἐ]κδοῦναι to express what is being entrusted; c) a dative that identifies the deity, or deities, to which such task is assigned. Point b) is relatively easy to satisfy on the basis of the preserved text. The supplement μᾶλλ[ον ἃ] σ̣ίνεται̣ (l. 3) allows us to see in ἃ] σ̣ίνεται̣ the object of ἐ]κδοῦναι. Alternatively, we may conjecture a comparative conjunction, μᾶλλ[ον ἢ] σ̣ίνεται̣, something like “it is beneficial (…) rather than harming.”15 There does not, however, seem to be enough space in the lacuna to complete this sentence in a meaningful way. For these reasons, we conjecture a verbum volendi in the lacuna in l. 2, to supply a finite verb on which ἐ]κδοῦναι depends (point a) above), e.g. εἵλετο, to which μᾶλλον is syntactically connected. In

14 Cf. e.g. Pl. Tht. 151b: ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ; Xen. Eq. 2.2: ὥσπερ τὸν παῖδα ὅταν ἐπὶ τέχνην ἐκδῷ. Sedley’s interpretation (pp. 64–65 in this volume) requires an extension of the attested meaning “to give up” (LSJ, I: “give up, esp. something seized and detained unlawfully”). The sense suggested would imply that the restitution goes beyond giving back what has been “seized and detained unlawfully” (Hom. Il. 3.459; Hdt. 1.3.10; 1.157.10; 1.158.4; etc.): full restitution would involve paying an additional penalty. By contrast, Janko (2008) understands the verb as “publish,” according to a technical use of the verb which has occurrences only in later Greek prose and mostly in doxographic contexts (Diog. Laërt. 3.56: Θράσυλλος δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τὴν τραγικὴν τετραλογίαν ἐκδοῦναι αὐτὸν τοὺς διαλόγους; cf. also ibid. 4.32; 8.85; 8.89). Moreover, in Classical prose the verb in this meaning is always used in the passive (Isoc. 5.11: ὁ [sc. λόγος] πρότερον ἐκδοθείς; Arist. Poet. 15.1454b17–18: εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς): it is only starting with Plutarch (Rom. 8.9) and Diogenes that we find it in the active. 15 This is the proposal that Jürgen Hammerstaedt advances ap. Janko (2008) 48 and that is included in the apparatus above. Kotwick (2017) 119, thinks that the most likely construction is μᾶλλ[ον ἢ] σ̣ίνεται̣, but does not put forward any suggestions on how to complete the sentence.

188 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

this case μᾶλλον would function as an intensifier of the finite verb and not as a proper comparative.16 In addition, the presence of the Erinyes in the Heraclitus fragment (22 B 94 DK), as evidenced also in l. 9 of our column, and their involvement in maintaining cosmic justice and order, which seem to be opposed to what happens by chance at the end of l. 3, suggest that they might already make their appearance in the first lines of the column.17 As we shall shortly see, the author points out that Heraclitus expresses himself in a way which is comparable to someone who composes a hieros logos. This leads us to suggest that the commonality consists precisely in “entrusting the Erinyes” with overseeing and controlling “that which harms the cosmos.” The outcome would be that both Heraclitus and the agent referred to by the ὁ in l. 2 would express themselves in traditional terms by referring to these traditional divine beings, even when they speak about the cosmic order. They would both assign the role of overseeing and punishing cosmic transgressions to the Erinyes.18 This reading also reinforces the suggestion that the ὁ refers to Orpheus. Just like Heraclitus in the fragment quoted in the next lines of the column, Orpheus preserved the traditional name of the Erinyes, as well as the core of their traditional function, the surveillance and punishment of human transgressions, but extended their traditional role by entrusting them also with the policing of harmful acts in the cosmic sphere. Orpheus, just like Heraclitus in the fragment to be quoted in the next lines, “changed commonly-held opinions about the gods” (περὶ τῶν θ]ε̣ῶν κεί[μενα] μεταθ[εὶς vel μεταθ[έμενος). Or, even better, “without wanting to change established names/conceptions of gods” (περὶ τῶν θ]ε̣ῶν ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έσθαι οὐ θέλων), rather chose to entrust the Erinyes with the task of policing and preventing any event that could harm the cosmic order. In light of these considerations, we suggest, merely exempli gratia, the following reconstruction of the opening lines of the column: περὶ τῶν θ]ε̣ῶν ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έσθαι οὐ θέλων εἵλετο ἐ]κδοῦναι μᾶλλ[ον ἃ] σ̣ίνεται [τὸν κόσμον Ἐρινύσι.19

16 Cf. e.g. Thuc. 1.42.3: τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας σῶφρον ὑφελεῖν μᾶλλον; ibid. 2.40.2: οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν; Pl. Phdr. 241d: ὡς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον; Id. Leg. 1.626d5: δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι. 17 For a similar suggestion, see Tsantsanoglou (1997), KPT, 149–152, and Tsantsanoglou (2014). 18 The intensifying function of μᾶλλ[ον can then refer to the fact that this is in fact an extension of the traditional role of the Erinyes, but transferring it from the human to the cosmic sphere. 19 Alternatively, if one prefers to avoid the negation, the size of the lacuna allows also: μεταθ[εὶς εἵλετο Ἐρινύσιν ἐ]κδοῦναι vel μεταθ[έμενος εἵλετο σφίσιν ἐ]κδοῦναι | μᾶλλ[ον ἃ] σ̣ίνεται.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 189

1.3 Lines 3–4: ] τ ὰ ̣ τῆς τύχης γ ̣ὰ̣[ρ | οὐκ εἴ ̣[α λα]μμάνει ̣ν̣. ἆρ᾿ ουτ [̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ]̣ ν̣δε κόσμος; The restitution of γὰ̣ ̣[ρ at the end of l. 3 is almost certain, and indicates that we are close to the beginning of a sentence.20 It is true that, as Sedley has suggested, the expression ] τ̣ὰ τῆς τύχης γ̣ὰ̣[ρ may read like a lemma of the commentary,21 and it is also true that the very condensed style of this part of the text, such as the lack of a subject for οὐκ εἴ ̣[α and for λα]μμάνει ̣ν̣ (or of an object for it) may reinforce the impression that we are dealing with a lemma. We would nonetheless prefer to understand it as introducing an explanation of what has been previously said. As we can see from other parts of the papyrus, where the text is fairly securely restored, this usage of γάρ is well attested, and such a highly condensed style is not alien to the author’s prose.22 Accordingly, it is not unlikely that the implicit subject of the finite verb (οὐκ εἴ [̣ α) is carried over from the previous sentence, and is still the agent referred to as ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[. The implicit subject of the infinitival clause (i.e. λα]μμάνει ν̣ ̣) in turn could be that which has just been mentioned as the object of σ̣ίνεται̣ in the lost middle part of l. 3 – such as, in our exempli gratia reconstruction, [τὸν κόσμον. Despite the dense style, the sense seems clear. The negation at the beginning of l. 4 (οὐκ), shortly before the infinitive λα]μμάνει̣ν̣, is an indication that the Derveni author claims that someone – presumably the same subject as before – denies that chance happenings have a role (] τ̣ὰ τῆς τύχης), most probably in a cosmological context. The presence of κόσμος at the end of l. 4 is obviously highly significant in this respect. The reference to Heraclitus and the likely reference to the cosmic role of Dike in the final part of the column make it probable that it is through the agency of Dike and the Erinyes that chance events, which might jeopardise and harm the cosmic order, are avoided. Even if we think that these lines most probably mean something like the above, we are avowedly less certain about the precise formulation. The poor condition of the fragments, particularly near the edges, makes it difficult to confirm or disconfirm securely the palaeographic description by the editores principes of the visible traces after the tau of ουτ ̣[ in l. 4. According to them, the traces belong

20 In relation to postpositive γάρ in connection with expressions syntactically so closely connected that they form a semantic unity, cf. Denniston (19502) 95–98. 21 Cf. Sedley in this volume (§ 2). 22 Cf. e.g. col. VI.9–11 (ed. Piano): μύσται | Εὐμεν̣ίσι προθύουσι κ̣[ατὰ τ]αὐτὰ μάγοις· Εὐμενίδες γὰρ | ψυχαί ε̣ἰ σ̣ ιν, ὧν ἕνεκεν κτλ.; XX.1–3: […] ἀνθρώπ[ων ἐν πόλεσιν ἐπιτ̣ελέσαντες [τὰ ἱ]ε̣ρὰ εἶδον, | ἔλασσόν σφας θαυμάζω μὴ γίνωσκειν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε | ἀκοῦσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ μαθεῖν τὰ λ̣εγόμενα.

190 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

to a triangular letter, either alpha or lambda.23 This has however recently been questioned by Janko, who observed that the traces are more compatible with omicron or omega.24 A careful examination of the available images shows that in that area of fr. G4 the traces occupy the upper part of the line; this makes the presence of an omega (more than an omicron) plausible.25 If it is still possible to read οὐ τα̣[, the reference is most probably to the ordered state, τάξις or τακτός, of the cosmos, as many editors have maintained.26 The revision of the shape of the letter after tau however makes an interrogative clause more likely, beginning with ἆρ’ οὕτω̣[ς, as Sedley in this volume and Kotwick in the German edition of the text print it.27 However, unlike them, we suggest restoring ἆρ’ οὕτω̣[ς ἐστὶ διὰ τῶ]ν̣δε κόσμος;, supposing that ἐστί has the function as the main verb of the sentence: “Is it then in this way, due to them, (i.e. due to the controlling agency of the Erinyes, and the ensuing exclusion of chance events) that there is a world-order?”28 With the phrase διὰ τῶ]ν̣δε the author refers to the agency of the Erinyes, reinforcing what he said in ll. 2–3 – at least according to our suggested reconstruction of those lines. The fact that the referent of the deictic in the genitive plural (τῶ]ν̣δε) are the Erinyes, and not the immediately preceding ]τ̣ὰ τῆς τύχης, would be rendered obvious by the context.29 23 KPT, 68. 24 Janko (2016) 18, who suggests ἆρ’ οὕτω̣[ς ἔχει διὰ τῶ]ν̣δε κόσμος, accepted by Kotwick (2017). 25 Given the impossibility of a direct inspection of the papyrus with a microscope, it is inevitable to have to rely on the available images: very faded traces are visible after the tau around the halfway point of the height of the line. If these traces are indeed ink, omega is certainly preferable to omicron and alpha. Alpha remains possible since there is an oblique trace just after the tau. This trace, however, could also be explained as a particularly charred fibre. 26 If the reading ἆρ᾿ ουτα̣[ is preferred, we suggest: ἆρ᾿ οὐ τα̣[κτὸς διὰ τῶ]ν̣δε κόσμος;. The referent of the genitive plural would be the Erinyes. Compared to the text printed in Piano (2016a) 8–10, and accepted also by EGPh, VI.1, 382 (ἆρ᾿ οὐ τα̣[κτὸς ὁ διὰ τό]ν̣δε κόσμος;), we propose here a slight textual modification: due to what we argue for in this paper, a reference to the Erinyes (sc. διὰ τῶ]ν̣δε) in the maintenance of cosmic order, rather than a divine principle in the masculine gender (sc. ὁ διὰ τό]ν̣δε), which has been previously hypothesized. It should be noted that restoring ἆρ᾿ οὐ τα̣[κτὸς instead of ἆρ’ οὕτω̣[ς, as we suggest above, is essentially equivalent in terms of sense. 27 Cf. Janko (2016) 18, with the commentary of Kotwick (2017) 120. 28 Cf. e.g. Pl. Soph. 253b2 (περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων φθόγγους ἆρ᾿ οὐχ οὓτως;); see also Pl. Lys. 220a6 (ἆρ᾿ οὕτως φήσομεν;), [Pl.] Sp. 373a5–6 (ἆρα οὐδ᾽ οὕτω πώς σοι καταφανές ἐστιν;), Arist. Ph. 5.2.225b18–20 (ἆρά γε οὕτω καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ θερμαίνεται ἢ ψύχεται ἢ τόπον ἀλλάττει ἢ αὐξάνεται ἢ φθίνει;). 29 For a similar use of the deictic, referring not to the noun in the same gender and number closest to the pronoun, but rather to a referent that is understood from context, see Thuc. 2.42.3–4: ἀγαθῷ γὰρ κακὸν ἀϕανίσαντες κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὠϕέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔβλαψαν. τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε πλούτου τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη κτλ; ibid. 3.67.6: ἀμύνατε

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 191

By this rhetorical question the author would then appeal to the background notions of his audience, which would perfectly fit with the ‘conventionalist’ reading. In view of the conventional and generally accepted view about the policing role of the Erinyes, someone who wanted to stick to these conventional conceptions would surely want to ascribe the same task to them also at the cosmic level. If so, it is through the agency of the Erinyes that random events that might be destructive to the cosmic order are avoided. Isn’t it clear then, the author now asks, that it is through them that there is order in the cosmos?

2 Introducing Heraclitus 2.1 Lines 5–6: κατὰ [ταῦτ]α̣ Ἡράκλ̣ε̣ιτος μα[ρτυρόμενος] τὰ ̣  κοινά, | κατ̣[αστρέ]φ̣ει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α As the κατὰ [ταῦτ]α̣ indicates, the introduction of Heraclitus builds upon, and provides an illustration for, what was said in the previous lines. The legible parts of the remaining sentences moreover make it highly likely that the reference to Heraclitus involves the opposition between τ̣ὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδ[ι]α.30 As commentators customarily note, these are key concepts in Heraclitus’ extant fragments as well. It is thus prima facie tempting to think that the Derveni author is referring here to Heraclitus’ own use of this opposition, as exemplified for instance in 22 B 2 DK: Sext. Emp. Math. 7.133: τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. even though the logos is common, the many live as though they had their own thinking.

However, even if the author is indeed alluding to Heraclitus’ own use of the opposition,31 it is entirely conceivable that he gives a new meaning to it, connected to

οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῷ τῶν ‘Ελλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶνδε παραβαθέντι; ibid. 4.95.2: καὶ ἢν νικήσωμεν, οὐ μή ποτε ὑμῖν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς τὴν χώραν ἄνευ τῆς τῶνδε ἵππου ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐν δὲ μιᾷ μάχῃ τήνδε τε προσκτᾶσθε καὶ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἐλευθεροῦτε. 30 This remains true even if one accepts the new reading proposed by Janko in l. 6: τὰ ⟦κο̣⟧ ⸌ἴδ⸍[ι]α; cf. Kotwick (2017) 72. 31 This does not imply that the addressees of the text would have been expected to recognise or fully appreciate the reference to the Heraclitean usage of these terms.

192 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

his own argument in the preceding lines.32 If so, let’s see what the τὰ κοινά – τὰ ἴδια opposition can mean in light of what precedes. In this respect, the connection between τὰ κοινά and the κείμ[ενα of l. 2, understood as established names or shared beliefs, readily offers itself. It is moreover important to note that, irrespective of the interpretation of the first lines of col. IV, the Derveni author takes Orpheus to be someone who formulated his teaching by the use of customary expressions, even if his way of using those customary divine names and other expressions requires elucidation (cf. XXIII.7–8, already quoted above). This will also be true of Heraclitus’ saying in so far as he expresses his views about the maintenance and regulation of the cosmic order, and in particular the dimensions of the sun, by reference to traditional deities, the Erinyes. There is thus a shared feature which links the way in which Heraclitus and Orpheus (and according to our interpretation the agent referred to with the ὁ in l. 2) express themselves, and this shared feature is precisely the use of commonly accepted divine names to express a novel teaching. The Derveni author could moreover take Heraclitus’ use of commonly accepted divine names, as evidenced in the fragment to be quoted, as a manifestation of Heraclitus’ general preference for τὰ κοινά. It is, furthermore, tempting to see a reference to this commonality between Heraclitus and Orpheus in the words by which the Derveni author introduces the Heraclitus quotation: “saying things in a way similar to a discourse” (ὅσπερ ἴκελ̣α̣ [ἱερῶι] λόγωι λέγων [ἔφη). This brings us to the two verbs that come respectively between κατὰ [ταῦτ]α̣ Ἡράκλ̣ει̣ τος and τ̣ὰ κοινά, and then between τ̣ὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδ[ι]α. After much pondering, and not entirely satisfied, we finally had to admit that we are unable to come up with a better solution than Tsantsanoglou’s proposal to fill these gaps with the words μα[ρτυρόμενος]33 and κατ̣[αστρέ]φε̣ ι. The relevant sense of μα[ρτυρόμενος] could be seen analogous to Heraclitus’ own use of the term in 22 B 34 DK (= Clem. Al. Strom. 5.14.115.3): ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· 32 Sedley (in this volume, pp. 67–68) develops a similar line of thought with respect to the κοινά – ἴδια opposition in the framework of a different overall interpretation. 33 The supplement μα[ρτυρόμενος] requires a slight compression of the letters, but it is fully compatible with the length of the lacuna. The alternative μα[ρτυρήσας proposed by Janko and Kotwick fills a lacuna which is supposed to be a bit shorter than the one assumed by Piano’s edition, as is also shown by other supplements (e.g. l. 8: ἀνθρώ⌊π⌋[ου] Janko/Kotwick, ἀνθρω[πηΐου] Piano; l. 9: εἰ γά̣[ρ εὔ]ρους Janko/Kotwick, εἰ γά̣[ρ τι οὔ]ρους Piano). Following Piano’s volumetric reconstruction the only alternative on offer is the one David Sedley puts forward in this volume: μᾶ[λλον τιμᾶι], “Heraclitus expresses greater respect for things that are universal.” This reading is on the whole compatible with our suggested interpretation. One reason for us to favour μαρτύρομαι (on the meaning of which cf. n. 35) is the occurrence of a strictly related verb (i.e. μαρτυρέω) in 22 B 34 DK.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 193

φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι, “Unable to understand, even though they have heard they are like deaf people; this saying is witness to them: though present, they are absent.” The saying, φάτις, is a shared piece of knowledge, a κοινόν, but needs to be interpreted correctly; through this interpretation, the saying obtains a deeper, philosophically more sophisticated meaning.34 According to the Derveni author, Heraclitus would in a similar way “call as a witness”35 the way people commonly refer to the Erinyes, and how they conceive the role of the Erinyes in the human sphere, but would also give a philosophical and cosmological re-interpretation of that commonly held view. Incidentally, this reading could also strengthen our suggestion of introducing a negation in the sentence starting with ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[ in l. 2. The phrase μα[ρτυρόμενος] τ̣ὰ κοινά would thus correspond to a reference to someone who did not want to change established, commonly held ideas, or names, but who on the other hand did not use them completely in the same way as the many do. The verb at the beginning of l. 6, on which τὰ ἴδ[ι]α depends, poses greater difficulties. On the basis of the potential analogy with Orpheus, we would expect to find here something analogous to σημαίνει τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην at col. XXII.7, i.e. that by using τὰ κοινά, Heraclitus expresses his own ideas. There is however enough space for about five letters between κατ̣[ and ]φ̣ει, which hardly allow for a supplement with such a meaning. Once again, after much discussion and hesitation, we concluded that the best option is still to accept Tsantsanoglou’s supplement κατ̣[αστρέ]φ̣ει, with the meaning “inverts” (vel “destroys”), even if this poses a challenge for the interpretation of the sentence.36 With this supplement, the reference of τὰ ἴδ[ι]α remains 34 For a comparison between this occurrence of φάτις in B 34 and the two occurrences of PDerv. (cols. XVIII.3–4: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι κατὰ φάτιν ‘Μο̣ῖραν | ἐπικλῶσαι’ φασὶ[ν] ‘σφίσιν’; XXII.7–9: ἀνὴρ | γυναικὶ μισγό̣μενος ‘ἀφροδισιάζειν’ λέγετα̣ι κατὰ | φάτιν·), which focuses, however, on the differences, cf. Sider (1997) 131–132. 35 This meaning of μαρτύρομαι is usually attested with the accusative of a person (cf. LSJ s.v. 1 “call to witness, invoke,” c. acc. pers.), but cf. Ar. fr. 256.1 PCG: μαρτύρομαι δὲ Ζηνὸς ἑρκείου χύτρας. The verb has many occurrences in religious contexts, with reference to the gods, but also to inanimate objects like the earth in the expression: γαῖαν καὶ θεοὺς μαρτύρομαι (e.g. Eur. Phoen. 626). 36 The proposal has been accepted by the vast majority of editors: KPT, Janko (2008), Ferrari, Piano (2016a) and Piano (2016b), Laks/Most (2016), Kotwick (2017). The only alternative hypothesis is that of Sedley (in this volume, § 7, comm. ad l. 6). He proposes a form of γράφω on the basis of ]φ̣ει. Although intrinsically very attractive, the hypothesis necessitates treating κατ̣[ as part of a crasis of καὶ εἶτα, with no addition of the iota mutum: κἆτ’ [οὐ γρά]φ̣ει, “and thereafter does not write things that are particular.” Even though we prefer κατ̣[αστρέ]φ̣ει, it is significant that Sedley too, in his interpretation, suggests that the author toys with the pair κοινά/ἴδια, which creates a correspondence with Orpheus relative to the double semantic level of the Heraclitean text.

194 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

unclear. It can refer either to Heraclitus’ “own ideas”37 or to the personal ideas of other people, i.e. those who are targeted by Heraclitus’ criticism in B 2 and other fragments, such as B 34 in which the ξυνὸς λόγος is contrasted with people’s ἰδία φρόνησις.38 Prima facie, the latter solution seems preferable precisely for the reason that the thought chimes with what we find in Heraclitus’ other fragments. The sentence “Heraclitus, taking the commonly-held opinions as witness, inverts (vel destroys) people’s own individual ideas” makes perfect sense in light of the way in which Heraclitus himself used the κοινά – ἴδια contrast. But what then are the personal, idiosyncratic ideas of people that Heraclitus would overturn with the sentences to be quoted from him? The extension of the function of the Erinyes to the cosmological sphere might be such a reversal. In addition, in popular conceptions the Erinyes punish misdeeds that have already been committed, whereas in Heraclitus’ fragment their function seems to be primarily preventive. Yet it is unclear that the restriction of the Erinyes’ role to the human sphere, and focusing on punishment rather than preemptive surveillance, would constitute personal, individual, idiosyncratic opinions – if anything, they are commonly shared views. Moreover, this reading would imply that the Derveni author expects his readers to be familiar with Heraclitus’ rather intricate distinction between κοινά and ἴδια. There is, however, a further commonly held view which Heraclitus’ statement appears to “overturn.” For it was commonly held that rather than being overseen, the sun functioned as the overseer of all that is happening in the world. Since Homer, the sun had been described as that which “sees and hears all things.”39 In particular, it was the sun’s function to oversee that oaths were honoured and that perjurers were punished. Indeed, we find this idea picked up also in the etymology and explanation of τὸ δίκαιον in Plato’s Cratylus.40 This could then be a common conception that Heraclitus overturns by reference to the Erinyes: the sun, instead of being the overseer, is being overseen. Yet this generally shared idea about the role of the sun receives a further special significance in the context of Heraclitus’ own theory. For it is a corner-

37 The translations by Tsantsanoglou (1997), Laks/Most (1997b), Betegh (2004), KPT go in this direction. They translate τὰ ἴδ[ι]α with “his own beliefs.” 38 Janko (2008), Ferrari, Piano (2016b), Laks and Most in EGPh, VI.1, Kotwick (2017). 39 Hom. Il. 3.277: Ἠέλιός θ᾿, ὃς πάντ’ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ’ ἐπακούεις (~ Od. 9.109); cf. also, among others, Hes. Op. 267: πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας; Aesch. Cho. 985–986: ἀλλ’ ὁ πάντ’ ἐποπτεύων τάδε | Ἥλιος; Soph. fr. 752 TrGF (Radt): Ἥλι’, οἰκτίροις ἐμέ, | οἱ σοφοὶ λέγουσι γεννητὴν θεῶν | πατέρα πάντων. 40 Pl. Cra. 413b: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ‘διαϊόντα’ καὶ ‘κάοντα’ ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 195

stone of Heraclitus’ philosophy that fire is the supremely intelligent, rational principle, which, also in the guise of the thunderbolt, acts as the guarantor of the regularity of cosmic processes and justice.41 Why would then the sun, the most conspicuous concentration of the celestial, cosmic, intelligent fire, be in need of external surveillance and control? If fire is the divine rational principle which governs the cosmos, and “steers all things,” why would we need to put it under the supervision of the Erinyes and Dike? It might therefore be that what Heraclitus overturns by putting the sun under the surveillance of the Erinyes are precisely his own ideas about the supreme intelligence and governing role of fire. It appears that the alternative, which takes τὰ ἴδ[ι]α to refer to Heraclitus’ own ideas, might result in a less demanding and less strained interpretation. So, by making Dike and the Erinyes the guardians of the sun, Heraclitus in fact ‘overturns’ a centrally important part of his own theory, the intelligence and steering function of fire which is particular, ἴδιον, to his own theory. In this way, the Derveni author would identify a genuine tension between B 94 and other elements of Heraclitus’ philosophy. Just as important, by pointing out this apparent discrepancy within Heraclitus thought, the Derveni author could also pave the way for his own contrasting cosmological theory. For as we can learn in the later part of the papyrus, the Derveni author thinks that it is not fire, but rather air which is the intelligent divine cosmic principle, which brings about cosmic order precisely by controlling fire, and in particular by fixing the size of the sun (cf. esp. cols. IX, XV, XXV; infra, § 5). In a way, the Derveni author’s divine intelligent air has the same function that Heraclitus attributes to the Erinyes and Dike: it makes sure that the size of the sun remains fixed.42 It is tempting to think that the Derveni author, applying his customary exegetical techniques, would say that Dike in fact is just another name for the divine air in so far as it maintains cosmic (and human) order and justice, helped by the Erinyes.43 So, from the point of view of the Derveni author, Heraclitus uses the correct method when he expresses his own ideas by relying on customary divine names and conceptions, and ascribes the surveillance of cosmic order to the Erinyes – but precisely when he is following that laudable method, he reveals the weakness of his own particular theory which makes fire, instead of air, the intelligent governor of the cosmos. Heraclitus is correct in referring to the Erinyes and Dike in the cosmic context, but by doing so he overturns what is specific to his own theory.

41 Cf. e.g. 22 B 64 DK: τάδε πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός; B 66: πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται; B 16: τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι; 42 Betegh (2004) 346; Piano (2016b) 177–178 and 182–183. 43 Piano (2016b) 264–274.

196 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

2.2 Line 6: ὅσπερ ἴκελ̣α̣ [ἱερῶι] λόγωι λέγων [ἔφη In view of the previous considerations, and in accordance with most recent editors, we supplement ἱερῶι] before λόγωι. This adjective is well suited to introducing the reference to Heraclitus in so far as it highlights his use of divine names, the way in which it parallels Orpheus’ mode of expression, and the exegetical approach that, according to the Derveni author, this mode of expression requires.44 In col. VII, the Derveni author explains that Orpheus “did not want to say undefined enigmas, but great things through enigmas” ([κα]ὶ [Ὀρφεὺ]ς̣ αὐτ[ὸ]ς̣ | [ἀό]ριστ’45 αἰν[ίγμα]τα οὐ̣κ ἤ̣θελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ̣[ι]ν δὲ | [μεγ]άλα), to conclude that “he, thus, utters a sacred speech from the first to the very last word” (ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ τ̣ αι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀ̣[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου | [ἀεὶ] μέχρι οὗ̣ [τελε]υτ̣α̣ί ο̣ υ ῥήματος). Because Orpheus ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ τ̣ αι, his discourse requires special interpretative effort and an allegorical reading. Indeed, the Derveni author could refer to other fragments in which Heraclitus made use of the traditional names of the gods, such as Zeus (22 B 32 and 120 DK), Dionysos and Hades (22 B 15 DK). In all these fragments, we find a similar attitude towards these names: Heraclitus does not reject them but urges that they need to be properly understood, and the proper understanding involves a revision of the traditional understanding. The Derveni author claims that this is also how Orpheus used divine names. In fact, he could fully agree with Heraclitus’ statement about the name of Zeus: ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα (22 B 32 DK). Heraclitus, however, does not “utter a sacred speech from the first to the very last word” as Orpheus did, but instead said “things that are similar to (or resemble) a ἱερὸς λόγος.” The term ἴκελ̣α̣ drives a wedge between Heraclitus’ and Orpheus’ activity.46 The similarity in mode of expression notwithstanding, the Derveni author does not attribute any kind of sacred or religious authority to

44 Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou (1988); the supplement was accepted by Lebedev (1989) 40–41, Laks/Most in EGPh, VI.1, Janko ap. Kotwick (2017). Sider (1997) 135 n. 17, proposes ἱερο]λόγωι (which is too short), even though he also mentions ἱερῶι] λόγωι. More generally, our interpretation is close to Sider’s. We find especially helpful his conclusion that the passage on Heraclitus might create a further bond, at a formal level too, between cols. I–VI and the second part of the papyrus (cols. VII–XXVI), since the author does not only cite Heraclitus for the content of his text, but also remarks upon his style, just as he does with Orpheus before he starts citing him (cf. infra). 45 The supplement is by Ferrari (2007) 210, and has been adopted by Bernabé/Piano and Laks/ Most in EGPh, VI.1. By contrast, Tsantsanoglou (1997) 94 proposed ἐρίστ᾿, which has been accepted by KPT, Janko ap. Kotwick (2017) and Sedley in this volume (§ 4). The supplement fits the lacuna, since omicron and rho (which is partially visible) are narrower than kappa and alpha (almost entirely in lacuna) that have to be restored at the beginning of the previous line. 46 We owe this observation to Glenn W. Most.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 197

Heraclitus. Indeed, Heraclitus got the crucial theological and cosmological point wrong, in so far as he ascribed divinity, supreme rationality, and the function of organising the cosmos to fire, instead of air.

3 The quotation 3.1 Lines 7–9: The quotation of Heraclitus These introductory words are then followed by a quotation from Heraclitus. The presence of a paragraphos between ll. 6 and 7, together with the expression λέγων [ἔφη at the end of l. 6, recalls the way in which the Derveni author introduces verbatim quotations in other parts of the papyrus.47 And, indeed, as has been recognised already by Burkert,48 ll. 7–9 closely resemble two Heraclitean fragments that have reached us through independent sources: PDerv., col. IV.7–9 (ed. Piano) ἥλιο̣[ς κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι, τὸ μ̣[έγεθο]ς̣ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων. εἰ γά̣[ρ τι οὔ]ρους ἑ[ωυτοῦ] [ὑπερβαλε]ῖ ,̣ Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι· 22 B 3 DK (= ps.-Plut. Plac. 890c10 = Aët. 2.21.4, in the section περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου): Ἡράκλειτος εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου (sc. τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι). 22 B 94 DK (= Plut. De exil. 604a9–b1): ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν. Plut. De Is. et Os. 370d3–10: Ἡράκλειτος (…) φησί (…) ἥλιον (…) μὴ ὑπερβήσεσθαι τοὺς προσήκοντας ὅρους· εἰ δὲ μή, †γλώττας† μιν Δίκης ἐπικούρους ἐξευρήσειν.

Although the relationship between these independently attested fragments and the text in the Derveni Papyrus has been extensively discussed, new results in

47 Cf. esp. cols. XIII.3 (ἀλλὰ δηλ̣οῖ ὧδε λέγων) and XIX.8–9: (β̣ασι̣λ̣εῖ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰκάζει […] λέγων ὧδε). See also cols. X.11 (‘τροφὸν᾿ δὲ λέγων, with paragr.), XI.9 (τάδ᾿ [ἐπὶ τούτ]ω̣ι λέ̣γει), XIV.5 (διὰ τοῦτο λέγει), XVI.1–2 (ὅτι δὲ […] λέγει·, a quotation with paragraphos follows), XVIII.12 (διὰ τοῦτο λέ]γ̣ε̣ι the repetition of a part of a quotation follows without paragraphos and without starting a new line), XXI.1 (‘θόρνηι’ δὲ λέγ[ων] δ̣ηλοῖ, the repetition of a quotation follows without para­ graphos); for the use of paragraphoi, see below, p. 205. 48 See above, p. 179.

198 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

the papyrological and textual reconstruction of this part of the column necessitate a thorough re-examination of the question. Most importantly, F17, a fragment which remains unplaced in the editio princeps, is now included in the bottom section of the column. In view of this new reconstruction, we will in the following pages examine whether the wording in the Derveni Papyrus might be closer to Heraclitus’ original than what we find in Aëtius and Plutarch, and whether there are reasons to think that what was transmitted by Aëtius and what was transmitted by Plutarch originally belonged in the same stretch of text in Heraclitus’ book.

3.2 Line 7: ἥλι[ος κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι The line shows clear resemblance to the text of B 3 as transmitted in the chapter in which Aëtius lists different views on the size of the sun. The text in the papyrus, however, includes the phrase κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν, and has a different word order in the second half of the sentence. The supplement ἥλι[ος κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν was first suggested exempli gratia by Lebedev in 1989.49 As also Janko’s re-examination of the fragments confirmed, visible traces on the left edge of fr. g13.6 are compatible with a my, instead of the delta or lambda as had previously been reported.50 This rules out previous supplements, such as to read the possessive pronoun ἑωυ]τ̣οῦ between ἥλιο̣[ς and κατὰ φ̣ύσιν.51 With the new reading, we are looking for a noun in the genitive ending in ]μ̣ου. In view of the context of col. IV, the supplement κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν52 looks very likely. Just as important, both the expression κατὰ φύσιν and the word κόσμος, despite their absence from Aëtius’ text, have perfect Heraclitean credentials, and belong to the core vocabulary of Heraclitus. 49 Lebedev (1989). Piano read the my before -ου and independently came up with the supplement, but regrettably missed Lebedev’s suggestion in Piano (2016a) 11 (see however Piano [2016b] 79). Lebedev, however, suggested that the quotation started already at the end of the previous line, and supplemented [ἄρχει] | ἥλι[ος κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φύσιν, “The sun rules the Cosmos according to the natural order (…).” With this supplement the genitive κόσ]μ̣ου would depend on [ἄρχει]. 50 Janko (2016) 17–18. 51 This is the suggestion of Tsantsanoglou (1997) 94 and 109, accepted by Janko (2002). The most notable other suggestions are ἀλ]λ̣᾿ οὐ κατὰ φ̣ύσιν Burkert (1983), δρό]μ̣ου Lebedev (1989) in comm., κύκ]λ̣ου Tsantsanoglou in KPT comm. ad loc., μεθό]δ̣ου Janko (2008), ἀλλ]ὰ̣ οὐ Tsantsanoglou (2014). 52 Piano (2016a) 11. The supplement is accepted also by Kotwick. See also Sedley, p. 69 in this volume.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 199

The expression κατὰ φύσιν occurs in 22 B 1 and B 112 DK, whereas the word κόσμος is attested in B 30, B 89, and B 124 DK.53 Heraclitus’ use of this term is, moreover, often considered to be an important piece of evidence for the semantic development of the word starting from the pre-theoretical meaning “embellishment,” “(good/beautiful) order,” through “orderly structure,” to the technical sense of “world order” and “cosmos.” In fact, it is highly likely that Heraclitus himself contributed greatly to this semantic development. For instance, in 22 B 30 DK (on which see below), the term could either refer to an overarching “structure,” which, as Heraclitus explains, is common to all, or more specifically to the “cosmic order” or “world” tout court – or indeed to all of the above.54 It is remarkable that the term κόσμος is used without an article also in B 30 and B 89 DK. Even though this latter fragment is often considered to be a paraphrase rather than a verbatim quotation,55 it is still possible that it preserves an original Heraclitean iunctura in the expression ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον,56 as also a parallel formulation in Diogenes Laërtius seems to confirm: γίνεσθαί τε πάντα κατ’ ἐναντιότητα καὶ ῥει̑ν τὰ ὅλα ποταμου̑ δίκην, πεπεράνθαι τε τὸ πɑ̑ν καὶ ἕνα εἰ ̑ναι κόσμον.57 At any rate, the absence of the article before κόσμος can not only strengthen the Heraclitean credentials of the wording in the papyrus, but can add to the question of the semantic development of the term. Linguistic studies have highlighted the use of the definite article in the process of marking abstract concepts

53 The appearance of the expression τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων in the final part of 22 B 75 DK is customarily treated as a gloss. 54 For a careful examination of the problem, with bibliography, see Kahn (1979) 133–138, and Fronterotta (2013) 108–113, but also Havelock (1983) 24–27. Incidentally, we should note that the precise sense of the term in Heraclitus’ text is independent of the question how the Derveni author understood the term in general, and in l. 7 in particular. For, as the occurrence of the same word in l. 4 shows, he most probably already used the term in a more technical sense, and it is highly likely that he understood it in this sense in Heraclitus’ text as well. 55 See however Fronterotta (2013) 31 for a recent defence of authenticity. 56 For passages in which the article occurs in similar grammatical structures, cf. e.g. Aët. 2.1.2 (= 11 A 13b DK = Th 155 Wöhrle): Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τὸν κόσμον; Antiph. 5.16.2: ἕνα τὸν ἀγῶνα; Antisth. test. 152b.4 Prince (= fr. 47b.19 Decleva Caizzi): περὶ ταὐτοῦ τῷ εἶναι ἕνα τὸν λόγον τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος; Isoc. 12.91: περὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρμηθέντας καὶ κοινὴν τὴν στρατείαν ποιησαμένους; Pl. Leg. 12.942c: ἀλλ’ ἁθρόον ἀεὶ καὶ ἅμα καὶ κοινὸν τὸν βίον. 57 Diog. Laërt. 9.8 (= 22 A 1 DK); the passage is part of the same account, taken from Theophrastus’ doxography, containing a reference to the position of the sun which is relevant for our analysis (cf. infra, pp. 213–214). The similarity between the expressions occurring in the passages of Diogenes (or Theophrastus) and Plutarch (22 B 89 DK) has not been noticed by scholars.

200 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

in early Greek language and thought, and in this context Heraclitus’ prose has been quoted as an important example.58 In particular, occurrences of terms such as πῦρ or πάντα in Heraclitus, with or without the definite article have been used to showcase this phenomenon.59 All in all, the importance of the term κόσμος in Heraclitus, together with the notable absence of the definite article, are strong indications in favour of the authenticity of the phrase κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φύσιν.60 The appearance of the word κόσ]μ̣ου, however, creates a very peculiar syntactical construction: is it to be construed with the preceding ἥλιο̣[ς or rather with the immediately following κατὰ φ̣ύσιν? The word order in itself makes the former construction more likely. The phrase ἥλι[ος κόσ]μ̣ου would express that the sun is part, and indeed an essential part, of an overarching structure and order of things. This order is of course that of the cosmos – the world order itself. We thus find the same ambiguity between ‘order’, ‘orderly arrangement’ and ‘world order’ that we have seen in B 30. But is the alternative construction, i.e. to construe κόσ]μ̣ου with κατὰ φ̣ύσιν, clearly ruled out? This could, in fact, be an instance of precisely the type of syntactic ambiguity that, as already Aristotle noted, is so characteristic of Heraclitus’ style. Arist. Rh. 3.5.1407b11–18: ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὔφραστον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό· ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ’ ἃ μὴ ῥᾴδιον διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται” [= 22 B 1 DK]· ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί, πρὸς ποτέρῳ διαστίξαι. It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and easy to deliver, which amounts to the same. This cannot be so where there are many connecting words or clauses, or where punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus. To punctuate

58 Rosén (1988). 59 For πάντα cf. e.g. 22 B 10 DK: (…) καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα; for τὰ πάντα; cf. B 90: πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ɑʽ πάντων (…), where we accept, with most editors, ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα, proposed by Diels, instead of ἀνταμείβεται πάντα, transmitted by most manuscripts of Plutarch (a branch of the tradition has ἀνταμοίβηται; cf. also Diog. Laërt. 9.8: πῦρ εἶναι στοιχεῖον καὶ πυρὸς ἀμοιβὴν τὰ πάντα), and B 64: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνο'ς, where we prefer the transmitted reading τὰ δέ instead of τάδε, proposed by H. Boeder ap. Guthrie (1962) 471 n. 1 and accepted by most editors (cf., among the others, Marcovich [1978] 295–296, Kahn [1979] 82–83, who, however, translates “The thunderbolt pilots all things”; Fronterotta [2013] 147–149, EGPh, III.1, 176–177). For πῦρ and τὸ πῦρ, cf., respectively, 22 B 31 DK: πυρὸς τροπαί· πρῶτον θάλασσα (…) (~ B 90) and B 66: πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καῖ καταλήψεται. For an analysis focused on the presence or absence of the article in these fragments, cf. Rosén (1988) 48–55. 60 On this cf. also the observations of Sedley in this volume (§ 7, comm. ad ll. 7–9).

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 201

Heraclitus is not easy task, because often we cannot tell whether a particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says: “Though this truth is always men understand it not,” where it is not clear to which of the two clauses the word ‘always’ belongs.61

Aristotle’s observation is confirmed by many Heraclitean fragments.62 Among them B 112 DK deserves special mention in so far as it allows alternative syntactic constructions (indicated by the alternative translations) of the expression κατὰ φύσιν: 22 B 112 DK (= Stob. Ecl. 3.1.178): σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας. a. Being wise is the greatest of virtues, and wisdom is to speak the truth and act according to nature, heeding to it. b. Being wise is the greatest of virtues, and wisdom is to tell and do what is true, perceiving things according to their nature.

According to the first interpretation, followed by most scholars, the accusative ἀληθέα is the object of the infitive λέγειν. This construction, however, leaves the participle ἐπαΐοντας dangling. By contrast, the second interpretation provides a better sense for the expression κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας, which would also be in accordance with Heraclitus’ epistemological objectives as expressed also in 22 B 1 DK. On the other hand, this construction implies that the accusative ἀληθέα is the object also of the infinitive ποιεῖν. As Kahn has rightly noted, it seems that Heraclitus “has cunningly left us in suspense between two constructions.”63 This “cunning” syntactic ambiguity resembles in many respects the synctactic ambiguities of the version of 22 B 3 DK transmitted in the papyrus. In addition to 22 B 112 DK, we might also mention B 30. In this case, the construction is less close to the one contained in l. 7 of col. IV, and the ambiguity less marked. Nonetheless, the presence of term κόσμος, and the thematic links with B 3 + B 94 (on which see § 4 below) make the parallel notable. 22 B 30 DK (= Clem. Al. Strom. 5.14.104): κόσμον,64 τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. 61 Transl. by J. Barnes. 62 Cf. also the passages listed in Mouraviev (2006) 352–355; even though we do not always agree with Mouraviev’s grammatical analyses, the high number of passages remains significant. 63 Kahn (1979) 120–122 (citation from p. 122). 64 We accept, with Bollack/Wismann (1972) 131, Kahn (1979) 44, and Robinson (1987) 24 and 90, Clement’s text, which omits τόνδε; τόνδε has been integrated by Bywater, and accepted by most

202 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

a. The order, the same for all, was not created by any god or man, but it ever was, is and will be ever-living fire, rekindled and extinguished in equal measure. b. The order, the same for all, was not created by any god or man, but it ever was, is and will be: ever-living fire, rekindled and extinguished in equal measure.

In light of this, and even if construing κόσ]μ̣ου with κατὰ φ̣ύσιν is admittedly more strained, we cannot exclude the possibility that Heraclitus intended the phrase to be ambiguous.65 With the alternative construction, Heraclitus would emphasize that the very nature of this overarching order, the nature of the order of the cosmos, dictates that the sun is of this specific size, and that it retains this size. We would like to maintain that the cumulative effect of the above considerations is that the first words of l. 7 were most probably part of Heraclitus’ text. Consequently, ἥλι[ος κόσ]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι is to be preferred to Aëtius’ bare εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου. This is understandable, in so far as in his entry on the different views on the size of the sun, the doxographer only wanted to record the specific data, without Heraclitus’ further explanation. The doxographic context also explains why Aëtius used the normalised word order εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου instead of ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι as recorded in the papyrus.66

3.3 Lines 8–10: fr. B 94 and the new placement of fr. F17 Our edition for this part of the text differs from all previous editions due to the new placement of a fragment, F17, which gives additional letters at the end of lines 9–10. This addition in turn has notable consequences for possible supplements. It in fact rules out supplements that have been accepted by almost all previous editors, and have thus important implications for the reconstruction of the Derveni author’s use of Heraclitus’ text. Lines 8–9, on any reconstruction, do not coincide with either of the two different versions of fr. B 94 preserved in Plutarch’ De exilio and De Iside et Osiride respectively. However, as we shall shortly see,

editors, on the basis of Plut. De an. procr. in Tim. 104a and Simpl. In Cael. 294.4, who have κόσμον τόνδε, but omit τὸν αὐτὸν τόνδε. For the other passages related to this fragment, cf. Marcovich (20012) 262–267. According to the text transmitted by Clement, κόσμος has the general and traditional meaning of “order” (“the order, the same for all things […]”), while, if followed by the pronoun τόνδε, it assumes the technical sense of “world order.” 65 Cf. Sedley in this volumne, pp. 69–70. 66 As noted by Sider (1997) 139, the dactylic clausula ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι might be a further sign of the authenticity of the word order preserved in the papyrus.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 203

these differences become even more marked with the text adopted in our edition, motivated by the new placement of fr. F17. The placement of F17 has been proposed by Piano due to a morphological affinity of this fragment with the other fragments of col. IV,67 and for its thematic continuity, suggested by the presence of ΔIKHΣ in l. 2 of F17. In addition, the presence of ΥΠΕΛΑΜ̣[ in l. 1 of F17, fits well with the exegetical context. These very considerations had previously led Ferrari to place fr. F17 in col. IV,68 but above H46, in a position that appears untenable for papyrological reasons. Taking into account the typical form of fragments F/E and the kollesis preserved in H46 + F15, but not in F17, it is more appropriate to assign F17 a place in the bottom section of the column, as KPT had already correctly observed. Its positioning under F15 does not create problems with the kollesis, since the fragment would be placed entirely in the new kollema, and since it displays a good continuity of fibres with the pair of fragments g12G1 of col. V.69 An additional consideration that strengthens this proposal concerns the inventory number of the fragment and the way in which it is joined to fr. F15. Even though the numbers Fackelmann assigned to each fragment are not always indicative of the sequence that the fragments follow once re-arranged,70 the fact that F17 is now close to F15 and to other fragments bearing an inventory number that is not far from the one assigned to F17 is a consideration that supports our proposed reconstruction. According to this arrangement, fr. F17 has to be placed just below fr. F15 and the two pieces recreate a fragment F whose shape is analogous to the one recreated by the fragments F placed in the next circumference, namely frs. F13 + F12 + F11 that occupy the central part of col. V. The resulting sentence (or colon) starting at the end of l. 9 and continuing in l. 10 with an appropriate supplement, such as the one suggested below, can make perfect sense, whereas the appearance of Δίκης [ is perfectly in line with the context: ὑπερβαλε]ι ̣̑, Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι· τὰ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε 10  ὅπως μὴ εὐ̑ρος ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποη̑ι κ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]α̣ Δίκης [

67 Already noted by KPT, 115. 68 Ferrari (2010) 139; Ferrari (2014) 58–60. 69 Janko places F17 in col. III (ll. 1–3) of his new edition (Kotwick [2017] 70), but, given the highly fragmentary condition of the upper part of the column, his hypothesis is not grounded on strong material reasons. 70 On all this, see Piano (2011).

204 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

The two versions preserved by Plutarch differ in a number of respects; yet one thing that they do have in common is the presence of the epithet of the Erinyes Δίκης ἐπίκουροι. For this reason, all recent editors of the papyrus suggested supplying these words after νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι at the end of l. 9. The supplement is however now rendered impossible by the appearance of the letters ὑπελαμ̣[ at the end of the line. In place of the epithet of the Erinyes from Heraclitus’ text we now have the phrase τὰ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε, which is most probably an exegetical remark by the Derveni author, with Heraclitus as the implicit subject of the verb. The appearance of Δίκης [ at the end of l. 10 in turn might be part of a reference to the laws or measures (e.g. κ[ατὰ μέτρ]α̣ Δίκης) established by Justice in order to maintain the cosmic order. Dike will be mentioned two lines below, possibly in connection to the regular passing of time, and the order of months (μηνὶ τακ[τῶι in l. 13). In view of its presence in both versions of Plutarch, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι was most probably part of Heraclitus’ original, and its omission by the Derveni author might seem curious at first sight. Even if we suppose that his main focus has been on the Erinyes since at least col. III, Dike, as the repeated mention of her name indicates, still figures very prominently in his discussion. Moreover, the Derveni author would in all probability agree with Heraclitus that the Erinyes in both the cosmic and the human sphere act as the auxiliaries of Dike. Indeed, he makes a closely connected point in the previous column, when he characterises the δαίμονες κατὰ γῆς, among whom the Erinyes are listed, as θεῶν ὑπηρέται, “servants of the gods,” as agents of meting out punishment to unjust men.71 But perhaps this is precisely why the Derveni author does not feel the need to quote Heraclitus’ own statement that the Erinyes are Δίκης ἐπίκουροι. For he has already argued in the immediately preceding column that the daimones, among whom the Erinyes figure very prominently, function as the helpers of gods – and most importantly of Dike – in the mechanism of retributive justice. However, up until col. IV, as far as we can see from the fragments, the author’s focus was exclusively on the working of the Erinyes and retributive justice in the human sphere. It is only now, in col. IV, that he turns to another aspect of the same framework: how retributive justice is maintained in the cosmic sphere and what the role of the Erinyes is at the cosmic level. Although the author is in full agreement with Heraclitus that the Erinyes are Δίκης ἐπίκουροι, what he finds specifically interesting in Heraclitus at this point is not that, but rather that Heraclitus also extended the role of the Erinyes to the cosmic sphere. It is primarily the cosmic perspective – prominent from the beginning of col. IV – and

71 Cf. Piano (2016b) 173–175 and 182–183.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 205

the cosmic role assigned to the Erinyes that prompt the reference to Heraclitus, rather than the Erinyes’ tight bond with Dike, which he has already clarified previously. Note also that the supplement Δίκης ἐπίκουροι at the end of l. 9, as retained by most previous editors, makes it difficult to restore a meaningful sentence in the next line. In addition to a change of subject, the expression ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι in l. 10 requires a conjunction on which the subjunctive must depend, a negative particle, which is presumably required by the context, and a masculine or neuter object to be connected to ὑπερ]βατὸμ. The words Δίκης ἐπίκουροι would, on this reconstruction, entirely fill the lacuna available at the end of l. 9. This would mean that the expression would occur at the very end of the sentence, after νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι and not after the mention of the Erinyes. Moreover, it would prevent from supplementing further elements, mentioned above, that would be necessary to complete the phrase.72 With the new placement of fr. F17 and the resulting supplement τὰ δὲ] ὑπελάμ̣[μανε at the end of l. 9, we have to assume that, although the first part of the line with Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι is still closely following Heraclitus’s text, the end of the line already contains the Derveni author’s exegetical remarks. This might at first sight be in contrast with the use of paragraphoi and the mise en colonne used in the rest of the papyrus. First, in col. IV the citation starts at the beginning of l. 7 and is signalled by a single paragraphos. By contrast, the hexametric quotations from the Orphic poem are usually signalled by the presence of a paragraphos not only before but also after the quoted verse. This practice, however, is not followed systematically: an entire hexameter, or a part of an already quoted hexameter, can sometimes be indicated by a single paragraphos. Moreover, in some cases, a single paragraphos is used also to flag a significant new point or a turn in the argument, and not a quotation.73 Second, in the exegesis of the Orphic poem, quotations regularly occupy the full length of lines. To be more precise, the length of a line is determined by the length of a hexameter, so that there is a precise correspondence between stichos

72 This issue does not seem to be solved by Kotwick’s most recent edition: εἰ γά̣[ρ εὔ]ρους ἑ[ωυτοῦ] | [ἐκ]β̣ήσετα]ῖ ,̣ Ἐρινύε⌊ς⌋ νιν ἐξευρήσου̣⌊σι, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι⌋, | [ὅκως μὴ δρόμον ὑπερ]βατὸν ποῆι, “Denn falls sie über [ihre] Breite [hinausgehen sollte], werden die Erinyen sie ausfindig machen, die Helfer der Dike, [damit sie ihre Bahn nicht] überschreitet.” Besides the odd syntactical order, the supplement δρόμον seems to exceed the lacuna by one letter and, most importantly, does not seem to fit with the passive sense of the expression ὑπερ]βατὸν πο⟨ι⟩ῆι (i.e. “so that [the sun] does not make its orbit excessive”), on which see Ferrari (2011) 73. 73 For paragraphoi used for purposes other than marking quotations, see cols. XIII.5–6, XX.10–13, and XXIII.7.

206 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

and line in the column. By contrast, according to our reconstruction, the quotation from Heraclitus may not correspond to full lines. However, this is probably the only quotation from a prose work in the extant text, so we don’t have a direct comparandum. It is moreover worth noting that the same features of the mise en colonne recur in col. XI.6–9, where the author presents a commonly used assumption in the form of a prose quasi-quotation. This prose sentence is introduced in a new line, leaving the previous line significantly shorter, and is signalled by a single paragraphos. On the other hand, the commentary starts half way through l. 9, immediately after the end of the sentence quoted. 6 

σκέψασθαι δὲ χρή, ἐφ᾽ ὧι κεῖτα̣[ι τὸ] ‘ἀρκέσαι’, ̲ ̲κ̣α̣ὶ τὸ ‘χρῆσαι’. χρᾶν τόνδε τὸν θεὸν νομίζον̣τ̣[ες, ἔρ]χονται π̣ευσόμενοι ἅσσα ποῶσι. τὰ δ᾽ [ἐπὶ τούτ]ω̣ι λέ̣γει·

(…) It is necessary to consider on what basis (sc. the meaning of) ‘preserve’ and ‘give prophecies’ is based on: “Thinking that this god gives prophecies, they go and ask what they should do.” And after this (sc. Orpheus) says: (…)

These features would then be closely mirrored in col. IV: the prose quotation from Heraclitus starts in a new line, and is marked by a paragraphos, whereas the end of the quotation is not indicated graphically by starting the interpretative remarks in a new line. Where does all this lead us concerning the extent of the quotation? As we have argued earlier, l. 7 is likely to preserve Heraclitus’ original, or is at least closer to it than the bare statement in Aëtius. It is also clear that the following lines contain elements of B 94 as we know it from Plutarch. The consequences of the insertion of F17, i.e. the absence of the otherwise well-attested words Δίκης ἐπίκουροι, lead us to suppose that l. 9 does not continue the citation proper, but rather offers a paraphrase. This paraphrase might still contain words, or groups of words, of the original together with the Derveni author’s own rephrasing and remarks.74 But we might need to go further back in the text to mark the end of the quotation (or close paraphrase). Indeed, there are good reasons to think that the sentence starting in the middle of l. 8 with εἰ γά̣[ρ already marks

74 This editorial choice has also been adopted by Laks and Most, who only consider truly Heraclitean a few words in ll. 7–9: “ ἥλιο̣[ς” ̣ ̣ ̣]μ̣ου κατὰ φ̣ύσιν “ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός [ἐστι”, | τὸ μ̣[έγεθο]ς̣ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων. εἰ γά̣[ρ τι οὔ]ρους ἑ[ωυτοῦ | ὑπερβαλε]ῖ ̣, “ Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι”·.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 207

an interpretative paraphrase by the author. The εἰ γά̣[ρ, replacing the εἰ δὲ μή of Plutarch’s De exilio, in itself seems to be the Derveni author’s own exegetical expression,75 especially in view of the fact that it is followed by the phrase τι οὔ]ρους ἑ[ωυτοῦ | ὑπερβαλε]ῖ ̣, which again looks very much like an epexegetical repetition of what has just been said (τὸ μ̣[έγεθο]ς̣ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων). This type of repetition is not part of Heraclitus’ stylistic repertoire, but is a typical feature of the Derveni author’s exegetical style.76 In conclusion, we suggest that in l. 7, speaking about the size of the sun, its relation to the cosmic order, and what is according to nature, the Derveni author is closer to Heraclitus’ original than Aëtius. On the other hand, when he turns to the counterfactual scenario of the sun overstepping its measures in l. 8, the Derveni author paraphrases and explains Heraclitus rather than quote him, retaining some key expressions of the original. On the whole, there are good reasons to think that for this part of the text, Plutarch’s version in De exilio remains closer to Heraclitus’ wording.

4 Heraclitus’ B 3 + B 94: the cosmic and the human What are the implications of these results for the interpretation of B 3 and B 94 DK? Are there good reasons to think that they were originally parts of a single statement by Heraclitus, or were they rather joined together by the Derveni author? If they were not parts of the same statement, why does the Derveni author quote them together? And if they originally belonged together, how do the two parts of the statement relate to each other? These are the questions we set to examine in the following pages. The results of our previous discussion can in no way prove that the statement about the size of the sun being one human foot and the statement about the role of the Erinyes in ensuring that the sun keeps its measures originally belonged together. In particular, our suggestions that the text in the Derveni papyrus is closer to Heraclitus’ wording than Aëtius’, whereas for B 94 Plutarch’s De exilio is 75 This point has been brought to our attention by Ettore Cingano, during discussion of an earlier version of this paper at the Scuola Normale Superiore, at the research seminar organized by Glenn W. Most. On the same occasion, Most also emphasised that most occurrences of γάρ in Heraclitean fragments are most probably doxographical additions. We are grateful to both for these suggestions. 76 Cf. Betegh (2004) 101–102, with a list of instances in n. 28.

208 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

a better source than the papyrus leaves the question on a knife edge. Neither can the presence of one, but only one, paragraphos, offer us a definite answer. On the other hand, the contexts in which B 3 and B 94 DK turn up might still make it more probable that they appeared together in Heraclitus’ text. For it is easier to explain why Aëtius and Plutarch were interested in only one part of an originally more complex statement than to account for the fact that the Derveni author quoted or referred to the two together. What mattered for Aëtius was only to add one more entry to his chapter περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου; the bare datum that, according to Heraclitus, it is one human foot in width, sufficed. He therefore did not need either the qualification κόσμου κατὰ φύσιν or the reference to the policing function of the Erinyes. Plutarch, on the other hand, had good reasons not to include the specification of the dimensions of the sun in either of the texts in which he quoted, or referred to, B 94 DK. In the De Iside et Osiride he refers to Heraclitus in the context of a discussion of the benevolent or malevolent character of the gods, and the retributive mechanisms that both the mythologoi and the phi­ losophoi talk about. Plutarch then quotes Heraclitus to underscore the point that retributive justice operates even at the cosmic level, analogously to what happens at the human level.77 Clearly, no need to say anything about the dimensions of the sun. In the De exilio, he argues that it is after all not such a great inconvenience to be exiled on a desert island. Even though freedom of movement and action is only allowed within the well-defined area of the island, these constraints keep the individual safe from the annoyances and the petty occupations of city life. Indeed, even the planets “revolving in a single sphere, as on an island, preserve their station; for ‘the sun will not transgress his measures’, as Heraclitus says, ‘or else the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, will find him out’.”78 What is relevant for Plutarch’s argument is not the size but the orbit of the sun (and the other heavenly planets), and this is how he understands the reference to the μέτρα of the sun. In this context, the specification of the dimensions of the sun would have simply been out of place. Admittedly, the context in the Derveni Papyrus does not offer a conclusive argument in either direction. As we have seen above, for the Derveni author both the size of the sun in relation to the cosmic order and the surveillance function of the Erinyes are highly relevant. It is thus conceivable that he stitched together the two otherwise independent Heraclitean sayings, both of which he found apposite 77 Plut. De Is. et Os. 370c5–d10. 78 Plut. De exil. 604a6–10: ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ τοὺς πλάνητας οἰομένῳ τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἀστέρων πράττειν ἄμεινον. καίτοι τῶν πλανήτων ἕκαστος ἐν μιᾷ σφαίρᾳ καθάπερ ἐν νήσῳ περιπολῶν διαφυλάττει τὴν τάξιν· ‘ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα’ φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος κτλ; On this, see also Sider (1997) 140, who comes to similar conclusions.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 209

for his argument. It seems to us however that this is still the less likely option. To begin with, the specification of the dimensions of the sun in l. 7 is surely not directly relevant for the Derveni author’s case. Given that, as we have argued, he was only paraphrasing Heraclitus from l. 8 onwards, he could have simply said that the dimensions of the sun are fixed, and are κατὰ φύσιν, without evoking the curious view that it is the width of a human foot. Indeed, in so far as the primary focus of his discussion since the first part of the column has been the cosmic function of the Erinyes, he could have made his point perfectly well without quoting 22 B 3 DK at all. Much more important is the internal logic of the conjunction of B 3 and B 94 DK. It is a vexed question whether, and if so how far, Heraclitus was interested in cosmological and physical theories. But even if one believes, as we are certainly inclined to do, that he did have an active interest in such questions, it still seems to be the case that his primary focus was on the ‘big picture’ – how different phenomena and processes hang together so as to form a dynamic, well-regulated, coherent system. From this point of view, the skeletal statement about the size of the sun on its own, as we have it in Aëtius, appears unmotivated. It remains unclear why Heraclitus would pronounce himself on such a specific astronomical question in a matter-of-fact way. It is precisely the addition of κόσ]μ̣ου and κατὰ φ̣ύσιν which stresses that the size of the sun is not a bare contingent fact; rather, it is dictated by the overall cosmic order of which the sun and its specific dimensions are crucially important factors. It thus matters that the sun is of this particular size, and that it keeps this particular size – that is precisely why the auxiliaries of Justice, and the guardians of cosmic order, must ensure that the sun retains these dimensions. B 3, with the wording that we have in the Derveni Papyrus, and B 94 not only are in this way two statements about the size of the sun, but mutually interpret and reinforce each other. Because the sun’s specific size, dictated by its place in the world-order, is of cosmic importance, it is under the surveillance of the auxiliaries of Dike, and, conversely, the Erinyes police the sun because it is crucial that it maintain these specific dimensions. Note that both B 3 and B 94, each in its own way, put the size of the sun in relation to the human sphere, stressing further that this is not a mere astronomical question. The sun and its size, and we humans, with our measures, are parts of the same overarching system. This connectedness is expressed already by the specification that the sun is a human foot in width. As noted by Kirk, this is the only occurrence in which the foot, as unit of measurement, is characterized as a “human foot.”79 But the term ἀνθρωπηΐου is rendered even more emphatic by the

79 Kirk (1954) 282.

210 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

word order ἀνθρω[πηΐου] ε̣ὖρος ποδός as we have it in the papyrus and which gets regularised in Aëtius’ version (εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου). As we moreover learn it from the wording in the papyrus, it is by nature, κατὰ φ̣ύσιν, that the sun has this size, this particular size is of supreme importance for the cosmic order, but can be expressed by a human measure. Note also that with the word order in the papyrus κατὰ φ̣ύσιν is flanked by the two genitives, κόσ]μ̣ου and ἀνθρωπηΐου: the ordo verborum further emphasises that the connection between the cosmic and the human is by nature. The reference to the Erinyes expresses a further aspect of the same connectedness between the cosmic and the human. The jurisdiction of the Erinyes is traditionally limited to human affairs; there is no evidence that anyone before Heraclitus ascribed a cosmic role to them. By extending their sphere of action to such cosmic matters as the measures of the sun, Heraclitus thus hammers home the point that all these phenomena are parts of the same grand scheme, and that any transgression, human or cosmic, would be penalised in the same way, by the same forces. All in all, B 3 and B 94 thus express strongly related facets of the same idea, and respond to, reinforce, and interpret each other. For these reasons, we consider it highly likely that they formed part of the same stretch of text in Heraclitus’ original. Once again, we cannot conclusively prove this point – but the least we can say is that if B 3 and B 94 were not juxtaposed in Heraclitus’ text, the Derveni author made an extremely intelligent and perceptive move by connecting them. The complex picture that emerges from the conjunction of B 3 and B 94 moreover shows strong thematic and linguistic links to a number of other Heraclitean fragments. We have already referred to such connections with B 30.80 But it is worthwhile to quote the fragment again to highlight some further points of contact: 22 B 30 DK (= Clem. Al. Strom. 5.14.104): κόσμον, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

The fragment not only refers to the (world-)order (κόσμος), but also highlights its all-encompassing character: it is the same for all of us, and we are all part of it. The immediately subsequent reference to gods and men is a further indication that the scope of ἁπάντων should be construed in the broadest possible sense. The fragment then states that this all-encompassing order is identical to, or is primarily dependent on, the regularity of the changes of fire. This is precisely the

80 See pp. 199–202 above.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 211

order which would be destroyed if the sun, the most important concentration of fire, were to overstep its boundaries. Moreover, in B 30, the perpetual changes of fire occur according to due measures, μέτρα. Not only does the repetition of μέτρα express how the changes of fire occur within limits in both directions, quenching and flaring up, but the recurrence of the term also reinforces the feeling of the regular recurrence of these alternating processes. We cannot enter here into the vexed question whether or not Heraclitus was committed to the idea of periodic cosmic conflagrations of the Stoic type. Note, however, that the processes of flaring up and quenching of fire in B 30 do not need to refer to such an idea. Indeed, if flaring up referred to a total ekpyrosis, by parity of reasoning quenching would refer to a state in which all fire in the cosmos gets extinguished. Not only is this a highly unlikely scenario in Heraclitus’ cosmos, but it seems to go against the very idea of the everliving fire, πῦρ ἀείζωον, as expressed in B 30 itself. If so, the measures according to which fire flares up and is extinguished are likely to refer to the amount of fire blazing in the cosmos at any given time in different locations.81 It has been suggested by ancient and modern commentators that the daily renewal of the fire of the sun in B 6 (ὁ ἥλιος νέος ἐφ᾽ ἡμέρῃ ἐστίν, quoted in Arist. Mete. 2.2.355a13–14) is one particularly important instance and manifestation of the regular and orderly local quenching and kindling of fire.82 If the sun were to grow beyond its natural dimensions, this dynamic equilibrium of measured quenching and kindling would collapse. It is highly noteworthy in this respect that in the version of Plutarch’s De exilio – which, as we have seen, is most probably the closest to Heraclitus’ wording – the sun is said not to overstep its measures, μέτρα (οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα). By growing beyond its natural size (ε̣ὖρος / τὸ μ̣[έγεθο]ς̣), the sun would transgress its own measures, which in turn would cause a rupture in the measures of quenching and kindling, which constitute the “eternal life” of fire, and, according to B 30, the cosmic order itself. Note that B 30 can also function as a justification for the extension of the traditional sphere of action of the Erinyes. In so far as this “κόσμος is the same to all,” including humans and gods, and all the other things that make up the world, it makes perfect sense that the same agents ensure that nothing harms this overarching, all-encompassing order. Let us finally add that in view of the recurrence and importance of the term μέτρα in B 30 and Plutarch’s version of B 94, it is highly tempting to supply the completion κ[ατὰ μέτρ]α̣ Δίκης in l. 9 of our column. The Derveni author would

81 Cf. e.g. Fronterotta (2013) 109–110, with bibliography. 82 Alex. in Mete. 72.31 ff. Hayduck; Olymp. in Mete. 136.6 ff. Stüve; cf. Kirk (1954) 267–268.

212 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

thus be explaining that the Erinyes, Dike’s auxiliaries, would find out if the sun were to overstep the measures fixed by Dike. In this way, κ[ατὰ μέτρ]α̣ Δίκης would be the author’s interpretation of what it means that the sun has this particular size κατὰ φ̣ύσιν, drawing on the reference to the μέτρα of the sun in B 94, together with the connection between Dike and the Erinyes expressed in the same sentence. In explaining the μέτρα of the sun, up until now we have only spoken about its size. We have seen on the other hand that Plutarch in the De exilio understood the measures of the sun to be, or at least to include, its orbit. There is another Heraclitean fragment which might address this question. As has often been suggested, B 120 which speaks about the constellations that function as the limits, or boundary points, of dawn and evening (ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἡ ἄρκτος καὶ ἀντίον τῆς ἄρκτου οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός), is likely to be closely related to B 94 – in fact, Kahn calls it a commentary on B 94.83 We agree with Kahn that “dawn” and “evening” refer in the fragment to both the east and the west, and the regions of sunrise and the sunset, thereby marking the daily path of the sun. Moreover, in so far as the rising and setting of Arcturus were traditional indicators of the beginning of spring and autumn,84 it also functions as a marker of the annual cycle. Finally, as Kahn has suggested, the designation of Zeus as luminous, αἴθριος, might be a reference to heavenly fire even more generally. But even at a minimal interpretation, such as the one suggested by Kirk,85 and according to which the fragment simply “intended to stress the truth that the delimitation of dawn and evening will always lie between the north and the culmination of the sun’s daily journey through the sky,” the fragment speaks about the limits that the sun cannot overstep during its course in the sky. Seeing that practically all modern commentators link this thought to the μέτρα of the sun from B 94, it should not come as a surprise that Plutarch interprets these μέτρα as at least also including the limits of the sun’s orbit. There is, however, a further intriguing possibility raised by the very specification of the size of the sun in B 3. As has sometimes been remarked, there was a topos, a κοινόν, in Antiquity according to which the sun appears to be one foot in width. For instance Aristotle tells us that “Yet things do appear falsely even among those things concerning which one has at the same time a true conception: for instance, although the sun appears to be one foot across, one is convinced that

83 Kahn (1979) 161; cf. also Kirk (1954) 291–293 and Fronterotta (2013) 140–142. 84 Cf. e.g. Hes. Op. 566 and 610. 85 Kirk (1954) 293.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 213

it is larger than the inhabited earth.”86 Heraclitus might of course have thought that the sun is just as large – or rather as small – as it appears to be, as apparently Epicurus later did. Yet it is also conceivable that he did not want to make an assertion about the absolute size of the sun at all, but was concentrating rather on its apparent size, how big it appears to us. For the sun’s apparent size could change in two ways: either if it changed its absolute size, or if it diverted from its course, and therefore changed its distance from us. The apparent size is therefore the combination of the two aspects of the μέτρα of the sun. We might not be able ever to know how big the sun really is, or how many stades it is from the Earth. However, as long as it appears to us to be one human foot in width, we can know that it has kept its μέτρα, the cosmic order is not in jeopardy, and the Erinyes do not need to intervene. Once again, the emphatic adjective ἀνθρωπήϊος might very well serve to stress the human perspective in this specification of the size. A passage from Diogenes Laërtius might corroborate this picture. In 9.8, Diogenes starts the detailed exposition of Heraclitus’ views, most probably following Theophrastus’ account. Diogenes first explains that fire is the primary element for Heraclitus, and details the cosmic role of it. He then continues in 9.9 with the description of the “road that goes up and down,” which he interprets as referring to the interchange of elements, and connects to Heraclitus’ theory of exhalations. This then leads him to expound Heraclitus’ startling view according to which the heavenly bodies are hollow bowls, σκάφαι, which gather the hot, inflamed exhalations. Still following Theophrastus’ doxography, he then states: “(…) the flame of the sun is much brighter and much warmer; all other stars are further away from Earth, and for this reason, their light and their warmth are feebler; the moon, which is closer to Earth, moves within an impure region. The sun, instead, is situated87 in a transparent and pure region, and it is at an appropriate distance

86 Arist. De an. 3.3.428b2–4: φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πιστεύεται δ’ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης; cf. also Arist. De in­ somn. 1.458b29 and 2.460b18–19, Cic. Fin. 1.20.10–13 and Epicur. Ep. Pyth. 91; see also Phld. De sign., PHerc. 1065, col. 9.8–38 De Lacy, taken into account by Ch. Vassallo’s CPH XX 114 (s.v. Her­ aclitus Ephesius). For a collection of passages in which the sun is said to appear one foot across, see Marcovich (20012) 307–309. 87 We preserve κεῖσθαι, the unanimous reading of the manuscripts, against the emendation κεῖσθαι proposed by Bywater and Reiske, and accepted by modern editors, including Dorandi. Note that the verb does not need to exclude motion, as it does not do so in Philolaus’ 44 B 17 DK, discussed above on pp. 183–184. Surely, Philolaus does not want to say that τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς κάτω are stationary.

214 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

from us (σύμμετρον ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἔχειν διάστημα): this is the reason why the sun gives us the greatest warmth and light (…).”88 The phrase σύμμετρον ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἔχειν διάστημα has not received much attention. Some commentators, such as Kirk, even took it to be a Peripatetic addition with no basis in Heraclitus’ text.89 In light of our previous discussion, the statement, however, makes perfect sense. The distance of the sun relative to us is appropriate, or suitable, or of the right measure, considering the size of the bowl, the amount of fiery exhalation gathered in it, the characteristics of the region in which it is situated, and the way these characteristics affect the exhalations. This is why it can give us the right amount of heat and light. Our previous remarks about the centrality of the term μέτρα in relation to the size and the orbit of the sun highlight the appropriateness of the adjective σύμμετρον in this context. For it can retain a trace of the way in which μέτρα in the original fragments encapsulates the idea that the measures of the sun are dictated by the sun’s role and position within the all-encompassing cosmic order and relative to other components, humans, gods, and everything else, which jointly build up that order.

5 Col. IV and the Derveni Papyrus The new text of col. IV is not only thematically linked to the topics of its neighbouring colums, but creates strong links with the later parts of the text as well. As we have argued, this is true at least on two levels. First, according to our suggested interpretation, the lines leading up to the Heraclitus’ quotation broach the topic of how to use traditional divine names and commonly accepted conceptions about divine beings for the introduction of novel and non-customary ideas. This methodology will be central to the author’s exegesis of the Orphic poem. Second, col. IV introduces the cosmic perspective to the first columns, which otherwise mainly seem to discuss ritual and eschatological matters, and focus on the relationship between human souls and divine agents in the context of retributive justice. The main import of col. IV in this respect is to show that human and cosmic justice are parts of the very same overarching sytem, and are governed by 88 Diog. Laërt. 9.10.1–6: λαμπροτάτην δὲ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου φλόγα καὶ θερμοτάτην. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα ἄστρα πλεῖον ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἧττον λάμπειν καὶ θάλπειν, τὴν δὲ σελήνην προσγειοτέραν οὖσαν μὴ διὰ τοῦ καθαροῦ φέρεσθαι τόπου. τὸν μέντοι ἥλιον ἐν διαυγεῖ καὶ ἀμιγεῖ κεῖσθαι καὶ σύμμετρον ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἔχειν διάστημα· τοιγάρτοι μᾶλλον θερμαίνειν τε καὶ φωτίζειν. 89 Kirk (1954) 271. See the retort by Guthrie (1962) 483 n. 1: “Kirk translates [the word σύμμετρον] ‘commensurate’ and thinks that the word is evidence of Peripatetic expansion. But ‘commensurate’ does not fit the context, and the sense required is not Peripatetic.”

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 215

the same principles and maintained by the same agents. Any act or event which would jeopardise this well-ordered system will be avenged by the Erinyes.90 That applies to everything in the cosmos, from the mighty sun down to us humans. What is more, Heraclitus’ text highlights how a crucial element of this overarching cosmic order is precisely the special connection between the sun – in particular its measures, size and position – and the human world. Yet col. IV does not merely introduce the cosmic perspective in the context of the first columns, it also sets the scene for the predominantly physical and cosmological exegesis of the Orphic poem, thus representing a key for the convergence between cosmology and eschatology.91 The correct understanding of the rational and just order of the cosmos, and of the way it was created and has been maintained by the cosmic divine Mind, matters not only for itself, but especially because we, and our ψυχή, which is most probably made of air,92 are also part of the same overarching order. As the author expresses most clearly at col. XXV.9–12, the pivotal moment in this order is the creation of the sun according to a precise plan: τὰ νῦν ἐόντα 10  ὁ θε̣ὸς εἰ μὴ ἤθε̣λεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν ἥλιον. ἐποίησε δὲ τοιοῦτογ καὶ τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον, οἷος ἐν ἀρχῆι τοῦ λόγου διηγεῖ̣τ̣α̣ι. “If the god had not wanted to make the things that exist now, he would not have created the sun. Instead he made it of such shape and dimension as is stated at the beginning of the logos.”

Although this key sentence appears relatively late in the text, the forward reference to the “beginning of the logos” is a good reminder that the topic has been on the table from the start. But in view of the tenor of the preceding physical exegesis, it would be easy to take the expression τὰ νῦν ἐόντα more narrowly, as referring only to the various physical entities that emerge as a consequence of the creation of the sun. However, as we have seen in col. IV, and as the backward reference reminds us, the statement has a broader scope, and includes human beings and their place in the overarching order. Indeed, we are also among τὰ νῦν 90 All these issues are extesively analysed in Betegh (2004) 346–348 and Piano (2016b) 253–274. 91 Cf. Laks (1997) esp. 126, 133, and 140; Most (1997) esp. 131–135; Betegh (2004) 325–348; Piano (2016b) esp. 273–274. 92 This hypothesis has been advanced, independently, by Betegh (2004) 346 and Piano (2016b) 269–273, who show respectively that this conclusion can be reached from the physical as well as from the demonological aspects of the text.

216 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

ἐόντα, so our very existence depends on the divine Mind’s precise planning, and care for maintaining the constant dimensions and distance of the sun. In fact human beings, and the relationship between human beings and celestial bodies, are the very topic of the immediately preceding column. This time, however, the focus is on the moon: PDerv., col. XXIV A3, H6, D12, A4, H9, I20, D13, H15 ἴσα ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ [μέ]σου μετρούμενα· ὅσα δ[ὲ μ]ὴ ̲ ̲κυκλοειδέα, οὐχ οἷόν τε ‘ἰσομελῆ’ εἶναι. δηλοῖ δὲ τόδε· ̲ ̲‘ἣ πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεσσ’{ι} ἐπ᾽ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν’. τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος δόξειεν ἄν τις ἄλλως ἐρῆσθ̣αι, ὅτι, 5 ἢν ὑπερβάληι, μᾶλλον τὰ ἐόντα φαίν̣ε̣ται ἢ πρὶν ὑπερβάλλειν. ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῦτο λέγει ‘φαίνειν’ αὐ̣τ̣ήν, εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔλεγε, οὐκ ἂμ ‘πολλοῖς’ ἔφη ‘φαίνειν’ αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ ‘πᾶσιν’ ἅμα, τοῖς τε τὴγ γῆν ἐργαζομένοις καὶ τ̣οῖς̣ ναυτιλλομένοις, ὁπότε χρὴ πλεῖν τούτοις 10  τὴν ὥραν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν σελήνη, οὐκ ἂν ἐξηύρ[ι]σκον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἀρ̣ιθμὸν οὔτε τῶν ὡρέων οὔ̣τε τῶν ἀνέμω[ν ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] καὶ τἆλλα πάντα [ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]ην εκ[ ]σα εν[   ]ε̣ι ] ̣θατω ̣[ ]ι 15 ]νητουτ ̣[ ] ] ἄλλα ἐ̣όν̣[τα ]ς ]φ η ̣ ̣ϲ[  ] (...) they are equal, measured from the centre; but it is not possible that all those that are not circular be “equal-limbed.” This (verse) makes it clear: “she who shines for many mortals upon the boundless earth.” Someone might think that this verse is said in a different sense, namely that if she is at her maximum, the things that exist come to appear more than before she is at her maximum. But he (sc. Orpheus) does not say this, namely that she shines; for if this were what he was saying, he would have said that she shines not “for many” but rather “for all,” both for those who work the land and for those who sail, when it is necessary that they sail at the right season. For if there were no moon, men would not have discovered the number either of the seasons or of the winds (…) and all the other things (…) other things that exist (…).93

93 Transl. by A. Laks and G. W. Most.

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

 217

The last extant lines of the column are especially notable. The author does not say in so many words that the divine Mind created the moon specifically and exclusively for the benefit of human beings, but uses the same type of counterfactual construction that he uses in describing the relationship between the sun and the existence of τὰ νῦν ἐόντα. In col. XXV the author continues to describe the heavenly vault from a human perspective, by now including also the stars and the sun, focusing first on their differences in visibility (col. XXV.3–6: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νῦν ἐ̣ν τῶι ἀέρι ἑκὰς | ἀλλήλων α[ἰ]ωρούμεν᾽ ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἡμέρης ἄδηλ᾽ ἐστὶν | ὑ̣[π]ὸ̣ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπικρατούμενα, τῆς δ̣ὲ νυκτὸς ἐόντα | δῆλά ἐστιν). Then he stresses that the stars are made of the same particles as the sun, and therefore must, by necessity, be kept separated from it, so that the sun may keep its appropriate size (col. XXV.7–9: αἰωρεῖται δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν ἀνάγκηι, ὡς ἂμ μὴ συνίηι | πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ μή, συνέλθοι ἁλέα ὅσα τὴν αὐτὴν | δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη). This is already a clear indication that the current size of the sun is well planned, and must be kept constant. And this is precisely the point which leads the author to formulate the key sentence about the tight correlation between the creation of the sun and the current configuration of the cosmos (col. XXV.9–12, cf. supra). Analogously, in col. XXIV the author interprets the Orphic verse on the moon from a markedly human and teleological perspective, and points out that without the moon, there would be no agriculture and no navigation. Importantly, the reference to the role of the moon in these human activities is clearly the author’s own interpretative addition. The emerging picture is that just as the sun, and the constancy of its specific measures, are the conditions for the possibility of the existence of τὰ νῦν ἐόντα, so the moon, and its regular path and changes are the conditions for the possibility of the fundamentals of human civilisation. And of course, the creation of both sun and moon are parts of the same overarching system, carefully planned and realised by the divine Mind. The picture is completed with further details in the first lines of the next column (col. XXV.1–3). We now understand that Mind’s planning was careful enough that he fashioned the sun and the moon out of different ingredients  – such ingredients which are most suitable for the respective functions of the two celestial bodies. The sun is a source of light and warmth: this is why the god created it out of hot and light fire. The moon’s primary function is different. It is not a source of heat – so the god created it out of particles that are not hot (col. XXV.3: θερμὰ δ᾽ οὔκ̣ ἐστι). Neither it is a source of light: yet it consists of shiny particles (col. XXV.1–2: τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἡ σελήνη [λ]ε̣υκότατα μὲ̣ν | τῶν ἄλλωγ),94 which

94 Cf. also Kotwick (2017) ad loc.

218 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

makes the moon suitable to function as an indicator of time for all those who need it for their activities and who understand the significance of the moon’s phases: the moon, as the author says, does not “shine for all” but “for many.” Moreover, in the first lines of col. XXIV, the author goes to some lengths to explain that the moon is spherical. But only at regular intervals, at full moon, does it show itself to its utmost – this is when the moon ὑπερβάλλει (col. XXIV.4–5), without of course overstepping its spherical boundaries, just as according to Heraclitus and the Derveni author, the Erinyes, the ministers of cosmic and human justice, will never let the sun to overstep (ὑπερβάλλει) its measures. At any rate, the celestial bodies and we human beings are all parts of the same overarching order, planned and realised by the god. This is what Orpheus, according to the Derveni author, wants his disciples to understand. And this is the topic which, at least in the extant text, first gets introduced in col. IV. Let us end with a final, even more speculative, note. At the bottom of the remaining part of col. IV, in l. 12, the isolated word Δίκης appears again. Then, in l. 13 we have a few more legible letters: ]μηνιτακ[. In view of the context, it is very tempting to supplement ] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι, and understand it as a reference to something (conceivably the performance of some sacrifice, cf. l. 11: ] ̣ ι̣ θυο̣ ̣ [ and app. crit. ad loc.) that happens, or has to happen, in a specific month that has been ordered or assigned. But – provided the supplement is along the right lines – this month was surely not assigned randomly or by chance. For, as we have just learnt a few lines earlier, no chance things are allowed in this world, but everything is part of the overarching cosmic order governed by justice and maintained by the Erinyes. What the Derveni author explains in the rest of his text is that, if we interpret Orpheus’ enigmatic verses correctly, we can learn that this order would not have come into being if the divine Mind had not created the hot sun. And also, by the way, that we humans would have no way of telling when that assigned month is, had Mind not taken the trouble to create in addition the shiny moon, as part of the same overarching just order.

Abbreviations (app. crit.) Anonymus EGPh Ferrari

“Der orphische Papyrus von Derveni”, in: ZPE 47, 1982, 1*–12* (after p. 300) André Laks and Glenn W. Most (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume), VI.1, 373–435 Franco Ferrari (ed.), “P.Derveni, coll. 0–VI”, Center for Hellenic Studies, available online at:

8 Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus 

Janko ap. Kotwick KPT Piano Sedley Schönbeck Tsantsanoglou ap. Kouremenos

 219

Richard Janko’s textual proposals in: Kotwick (2017), also quoted as Janko/Kotwick in footnotes Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou, Kiriakos Tsantsanoglou (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume) Valeria Piano’s textual proposals in: Piano (2016b) 78–80 David N. Sedley, “The Opening Lemmas of the Derveni Papyrus”, in this volume, pp. 45–72 Loek Schönbeck, “Heraclitus revisited (Pap. Derveni col. I lines 7–11)”, in: ZPE 97, 1993, 7–22 Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou’s textual proposals reported and discussed by Theokritos Kouremenos’ in: KPT commentary

References Bernabé/Piano (online): Alberto Bernabé and Valeria Piano, P.Derveni cols. VII–XXVI, edition of the text with critical apparatus, Center for Hellenic Studies, available online at: . Betegh (2004): Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation, Cambridge. Bollack/Wismann (1972): Jean Bollack and Heinz Wismann, Héraclite ou la séparation, Paris. Burkert (1983): Walter Burkert, “Eraclito nel papiro di Derveni: Due nuove testimonianze”, in: Livio Rossetti (ed.), Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981, 2 vols., Rome, I, 37–42. Calame (2014): Claude Calame, “The Derveni Papyrus between the Power of Spoken Language and Written Practice: Pragmatics of Initiation in an Orpheus Poem and Its Commentary”, in: Papadopoulou/Muellner, 165–186. Denniston (1950): John D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, Oxford (1st ed. 1934). Ferrari (2007): Franco Ferrari, “Note al testo delle colonne II–VII del papiro di Derveni”, in: ZPE 162, 203–211. Ferrari (2010): Franco Ferrari, “Democrito a Derveni? PDerv. col. 4, 1–6”, in: PdP 65 (371), 137–155. Ferrari (2011): Franco Ferrari, “Frustoli Erranti: Per una ricostruzione di P.Derveni coll. I–III”, in: Papiri Filosofici: Miscellanea di studi VI, Florence, 39–54. Ferrari (2014): Franco Ferrari, “Democritus, Heraclitus, and the Dead Souls: Reconstructing Columns I–VI of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Papadopoulou/Muellner, 53–66. Frede (2007): Michael Frede, “On the Unity and the Aim of the Derveni Text”, in: Rhizai 4, 9–33. Fronterotta (2013): Francesco Fronterotta, Eraclito: Frammenti, Milan. Guthrie (1962): William K. Ch. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge. Havelock (1983): Eric A. Havelock, “The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics”, in: Kevin Robb (ed.), Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, La Salle, 7–82. Janko (2002): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus: An Interim Text”, in: ZPE 141, 1–62. Janko (2008): Richard Janko, “Reconstructing (again) the Opening of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 166, 37–51. Janko (2016): Richard Janko, “Parmenides in the Derveni Papyrus: New Images for a New Edition”, in: ZPE 200, 3–23.

220 

 Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano

Kahn (1979): Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary, Cambridge. Kirk (1954): Geoffrey S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge. Kotwick (2017): Mirjam E. Kotwick, Der Papyrus von Derveni: Griechisch-deutsch, Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert; basierend auf einem griechischen Text von Richard Janko, Berlin/Boston. Laks (1997): André Laks, “Between Religion and Philosophy: The Function of Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Phronesis 42, 121–142. Laks/Most (1997a): Andé Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford. Laks/Most (1997b): André Laks and Glenn W. Most, “A Provisional Translation of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Laks/Most (a), 9–22. Lebedev (1989): Andrei Lebedev, “Heraclitus in the P.Derveni”, in: ZPE 79, 39–47. Marcovich (2001): Miroslav Marcovich, Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary (Editio Maior), Sank Augustin (1st ed. Merida 1967). Most (1997): Glenn W. Most, “The Fire next Time: Cosmology, Allegoresis, and Salvation in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: JHS 117, 117–135. Mouraviev (2006): Serge N. Mouraviev, Heraclitea III.3.B/i: Recensio: Fragmenta, Sankt Augustin. Obbink (1997): Dirk Obbink, “Cosmology as Initiation vs. the Critique of Orphic Mysteries”, in: Laks/Most (a), 39–54. Papadopoulou/Muellner (2014): Ioanna Papadopoulou and Leonard Muellner (eds.), Poetry as Initiation: The Center for Hellenic Studies Symposium on the Derveni Papyrus, Washington, DC. Piano (2011): Valeria Piano, “Ricostruendo il rotolo di Derveni: Per una revisione papirologica di P.Derveni I–III”, in: Papiri Filosofici. Miscellanea di studi VI, Florence, 5–37. Piano (2016a): Valeria Piano, “P.Derveni III–VI: Una riconsiderazione del testo”, in: ZPE 197, 5–16. Piano (2016b): Valeria Piano, Il papiro di Derveni tra religione e filosofia, Florence. Piano (forthcoming): Valeria Piano, L’inizio del papiro di Derveni: Il rotolo e il testo, Florence. Robinson (1987): Thomas M. Robinson, Heraclitus: Fragments, Toronto/Buffalo/London. Rosén (1988): Haiim B. Rosén, “Early Greek Grammar and Thought in Heraclitus: The Emergence of the Article”, in: PIASH 7, 21–62. Sider (1987): David Sider, “Heraclitus B3 and 94 in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 69, 225–228. Sider (1997): David Sider, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Laks/Most (a), 129–148. Tsantsanoglou (1997): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “The First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and their Religious Significance”, in: Laks/Most (a), 93–128. Tsantsanoglou (2014): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “Some Desiderata in the Study of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Papadopoulou/Muellner, 1–18. Tsantsanoglou/Parássoglou (1988): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou and George M. Parássoglou, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Aldo Brancacci et al. (eds.), Aristoxenica, Menandrea, Fragmenta philosophica, Florence, 125–133 (also quoted as Tsantsanoglou/ Parássoglou in the app. crit.).

Graziano Ranocchia

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance The Book 10 of the extensive treatise On Vices and Their Opposing Virtues and Those in Whom and Concerning What Things They Occur1 by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara (c. 110–post 40 BC), which is preserved by PHerc. 1008, was notoriously devoted to arrogance.2 This is inferable from both the subject matter of the book and the subtitle [Περὶ ὑπερη]φανίας, which most likely was included in the (lost) initial title of the volume under the general title of the treatise.3 Of this book, the last twenty-nine columns (corresponding to about one third of the original text)4 survive today, whereof only twenty-five have been edited so far. After the editio princeps by Luigi Caterino dating back to 1827,5 the first modern edition of On Arrogance was published by Christian Jensen in 1911.6 I have recently offered a new critical edition of the last fifteen columns of the book (cols. 10–24),7 entirely based on an autopsy of the papyrus and on the multispectral images (MSI) produced by a team of Brigham Young University between 1999

1 Περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἵς εἰσι καὶ περὶ ἅ. The treatise On Vices, written, according to Cavallo (1983) 41–42 and 64, after 50 BC, aimed to analyse from an ethical point of view some important vices and the corresponding virtues in their genesis, subdivision and implications. From the subscriptio of On Arrogance it is inferable that the treatise included at least ten books. It was articulated into sections, including one or more books, each devoted to the treatment of a main vice, the vices akin to it, and the corresponding virtue. See Gigante (1990) 48–50; Gigante (2000); Capasso (2001); Capasso (2010); Ranocchia (2007) 1–4. 2 In this book the subscriptio is preserved (‘cornice’ 6), which includes the treatise’s title in its shortest form: Φιλοδήμου | Περὶ κακιῶν | ι′: Philodemus, On Vices, Book 10. For the different formulations of the title, see Capasso (2001). 3 See Capasso (1978); Blank (1999) 74–75; Blank/Longo Auricchio (2000) 141 and n. 42; Ranocchia (2007) 211–219. 4 According to mathematical calculations made on the basis of the information contained in the general inventory of the Herculanem paypri dating back to Antonio Piaggio’s time and redacted in, or after, 1782 (see Blank/Longo Auricchio [2000] and Blank [1999] for it), the original roll, to which PHerc. 1008 belonged, was longer than 6,178 m corresponding to about ninety-five text columns. See Ranocchia (2007) 227–229. 5 See Caterino (1827) 1–54. 6 See Jensen (1911). 7 See Ranocchia (2007) 251–281. Graziano Ranocchia, CNR-ILIESI, Rome https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-010

222 

 Graziano Ranocchia

and 2002.8 In this part of the book, Philodemus quotes freely and uninterruptedly a moral-protreptic epistolary work entitled On the Relieving of Arrogance (Περὶ τοῦ | κο̣[υ]φίζ[ειν ὑ]περηφανίας)9 that he attributes to an otherwise unknown Aristo, whose identity has much been debated. I have proposed with new arguments that we identify him as the heterodox Stoic philosopher Aristo of Chios († post 255 BC), a pupil of Zeno of Citium.10 Here I do not intend to dwell on this question again. The epistolary work On the Relieving of Arrogance, in the form handed down to us by Philodemus, is articulated into two distinct sections. While similar in content and purpose, these are partly different as far as their arrangement of the subject matter, genre, and style are concerned. The former (cols. 10.31–16.29), which is reported indirectly, is devoted to the general treatment of arrogance whereas the latter (cols. 16.30–24.23), reported as direct quotation, is devoted to a detailed analysis of vices similar to arrogance. While the former represents an important example of therapeutic discourse (or moral dissuasion), which through both positive and negative models invites us to struggle against the vice and to embrace the opposite virtue, the latter may be considered a precious example of that moral characterology (or ethology) which was especially recommended by the Stoic Posidonius and whose purpose was to delineate realistically and down to the smallest details each vice and virtue, setting before the eyes of the reader, as it were, a moral specimen to be either imitated or rejected.11 The exposition is interrupted (more frequently in the former section) by numerous allusions to concrete cases of humility and arrogance embodied by famous men of the past such as, in the former case, Dionysius the Elder, Dion of Syracuse, Pericles, and Alexander the Great; in the latter, Euripides, Demetrius Poliorcetes, Timocreon of Rhodes, Agesilaus, Xerxes, Hippias, and Socrates. The former are positive examples of famous men, who were able to turn a critical eye on themselves and place themselves on the same level as ordinary people, or who faced with equanimity both favourable and unfavourable vicissitudes. The latter, by contrast, represent negative models of equally prominent men, who thoroughly expiated their arrogance or whose vice developed into folly. These examples are proposed, respec8 On these, see Booras/Seely (1999). 9 For the meaning of this expression and, in particular, of the verb κουφίζειν when associated with a genitive of separation (‘relieve of’ or ‘set free from,’ and not ‘mitigate’ or ‘alleviate’), see Ranocchia (2007) 9–11. The new standard edition of the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας is Ranocchia (2007), which I follow for the corresponding quotations. 10 See ibid. 67–207. On Aristo of Chios in general and the significance of his disagreement with Zeno, see the fundamental work by Ioppolo (1980). 11 On the two sections of the letter and the moral-protreptic genres employed in it, see Ranocchia (2007) 27–35 and 138–149 respectively; on Stoic moral protreptic, see ibid. 49–52; on Posidonius, see Sen. Ep. 95.65–67 (= fr. 176 EK).

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 223

tively, as a model and as a warning to the reader. In introducing his exposition, Philodemus gives a short preamble, in which he illustrates the main elements of the writing he is quoting and his critical observations about the method followed by its author (col. 10.11–31): Ἀρίστων | το[ί]νυν [γ]εγ̣ρ̣α̣φὼς Περὶ τοῦ | κο̣[υ]φίζ[ειν ὑ]περηφανίας ἐ|πισ̣τολι̣[κόν] τ̣[ι ἴ]διον μὲν ἔ|παθε̣ν [τ]ῶ̣ν̣ δ[ι]ὰ τύχην ὑπερ|ηφ[ά]νων [κατ]ι[δ]ών, οὐ μό|νο[ν] διά τ̣[ιν’ ἀ]π̣ὸ ταύτης ὑπερ|ηφ[α]νού[ντω]ν, ἀλλὰ καὶ | δι’ ἃ προε̣ίπ̣[α]μεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ | δῆ[τ]α̣ καὶ δι’ αὐτὴν φιλοσο|φί[αν] πολλῶν δοξάντων, | ὡς [Ἡ]ρ̣ακλείτου καὶ Πυθαγό|ρου καὶ Ἐ[μ]πεδοκλέους καὶ | Σωκρ̣άτους καὶ ποιητῶν ἐνί|ων̣, οὓς ο[ἱ] παλαιοὶ τῶν κω|μωιδογράφων ἐπεράπιζον. Aristo, then, who has written an epistolary work On the Relieving of Arrogance, happened a  singular thing in considering only that of those who become arrogant on account of (good) fortune, these being arrogant not only on account of circumstances deriving from that, but also on account of what we have mentioned earlier, and indeed many having given the impression of being arrogant on account of philosophy itself, such as Heraclitus and Pythagoras and Empedocles and Socrates and certain poets, whom the older comic poets used to censure.

At ll. 16–26, Philodemus clarifies his criticism by highlighting the limits of Aristo’s moral aetiology. Several scholars in the past maintained that by these words the Epicurean philosopher intends to reproach Aristo for having only considered those men who became arrogant διὰ τύχην, i.e. on account of good fortune, thereby omitting those who became so διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, i.e. because of their philosophical reflection. To this latter category belonged, according to Philodemus, philosophers like Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Socrates, and some philosopher-poets, whom Aristo omitted to mention. Yet, this interpretation collides with the fact that Aristo himself in his writing mentions Socrates twice (cols. 21.36–39; 22.34–36),12 on whose person the whole portrait of the ironic man is shaped. Besides, the allusion, at col. 16.24–26, to some fellows who believed “to have become gods instead of men,” seems to hint at the ancient traditions on this subject concerning Pythagoras and Empedocles, as we shall see below. Finally, at col. 13.1–9 a biographical anecdote about Euripides’ arrogance is reported: as Euripides was fiercely targeted by older comic poets, he must be one of the poets vaguely alluded to here by Philodemus. For that reason, at least some fellows mentioned by Philodemus at col. 10 must have already been criticized by Aristo as well-known examples of arrogance. Hence, here Philodemus rebukes Aristo, not for having omitted to mention arrogant men of that kind, but, rather, for having ignored the particular nature and the specific origin of their vice by 12 Conversely, the allusion to the “Socratic memories” (Σωκρατι͙κὰ μνημονεύμα̣[τ]α) legible at col. 23.37–38 is not by Aristo, but by Philodemus.

224 

 Graziano Ranocchia

including them into the same category as those who became arrogant on account of their good fortune.13 It is a matter of fact that the arrogance, conceit, and boastfulness of certain philosophers were well-known in antiquity. As we shall see, the case of Heraclitus is illustrated by the important witness of Diogenes Laërtius’ life of this philosopher, where the author draws copiously upon a source hostile to the philosopher, which highlighted his haughtiness and misanthropy.14 Timon described him as “a shrill-voiced, cuckoo-like mob-reviler (κοκκυστής, ὀχλολοίδορος).”15 Pythagoras believed himself to be the son of Hermes and, because of his gravity, his disciples treated him as “Apollo descended from the Hyperboreans.” Also his grandiloquence (σεμνηγορίη) was ridiculed by Timon.16 Yet, amongst them Empedocles stood out the most: Timaeus considered him to be “boastful and selfish (ἀλάζωνα καὶ φίλαυτον).” Just like Anaximander, Empedocles liked to dress pompous, dramatic clothes and in the proem of his poem he defined himself as an “immortal god (θεὸς ἄμβροτος),” laying claim to divine honours.17 Even Socrates was described in Plato’s Symposium as insolent (ὑβριστής) and arrogant (ὑπερήφανος), and Alcibiades defined his ὑπερηφανία in terms of irony (εἰρωνεύεσθαι) and haughtiness (βρενθύεσθαι).18 In addition, in his Apology Xenophon alluded to his bold language (μεγαληγορία) during the trial.19 He was despised by the Epicureans precisely because of his irony, which they regarded as a kind of boastfulness.20 The Stoics themselves, who viewed him as their earliest forerunner, did not like the ironic and dissimulating Socrates typical of the Platonic tradition, above all because of his appropriation by the skeptical Academy from Arcesilaus onwards.21 As far as Hippias is concerned, his

13 See Mouraviev (1987) 22–23; Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 213; Ioppolo (1996) 717 n. 6, 718. 14 See Diog. Laërt. 9.1–6, 12–15 and below. 15 See Diog. Laërt. 9.6, and Capasso (1983) 451–454. 16 See Diog. Laërt. 8.4, 11, 36 (= Tim. fr. 57 Di Marco), and Di Marco (1989) 242–244. About Pythagoras, Luc. Pro laps. int. salut. 5, tells us that, in writing a letter, he was used to omitting the initial greetings, a fault which Aristo attributes to the insolent man in his Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας (col. 17.16–19). See Knögel (1933) 23 n. 1. 17 See Diog. Laërt. 8.66 (= Tim. Taur. FGrHist 566 F 2); 70; Suda s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλής and Gallavotti (1975a) 161; Gallavotti (1975b) 145–146; Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 215. 18 See Pl. Symp. 175e, 219c, 221c. 19 See Xen. Ap. 1.6.23; Mem. 4.4.4. 20 See Plut. Adv. Col. 1108b; Cic. Brut. 292 (= Epicur. fr. 231 Us. = deest ap. Arr.2) and also Quint. 2.17.15; Plut. Adv. Col. 1117d, 1118a, 1118d; Polystr. De cont., PHerc. 336/1150, col. 16.23–28 Indelli; Colot. In Pl. Lys., PHerc. 208, T. III, p 8a; T. IV, pp. 10b and 10d Crönert; Id. In Pl. Euthyd., PHerc. 1032, T. II, p. 5c; T. VI, pp. 10a and 10b; T. VII, p. 11c Crönert. See Kleve (1986) 228–232; Nardelli (1984) 525–528; Ioppolo (1996) 725 with nn. 25–26. 21 See Ioppolo (1995); Ioppolo (1996); Ranocchia (2007) 126–132; Ranocchia (2010).

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 225

presumption to master all human knowledge and all arts was well-known.22 Plato himself was described by Antisthenes as “full of conceit (τετυφωμένος)” and, in response, the former accused the latter of vainglory (κενοδοξία).23 The same exchange of charges is assigned to Plato and Diogenes the Cynic.24 Also some Hellenistic philosophers were charged with arrogance or similar vices, like Lycon and Chrysippus.25 Though Bion of Borysthenes sharply condemned τῦφος, he was himself described as “prone to indulge in conceit (τύφου).”26 In the writings of the so-called ‘diatribic’ authors, the incoherent philosopher was dismissed as boastful (ἀλαζών) and, conversely, the boastful man was immediately identified with the presumptuous and arrogant philosopher.27 More in general, the philosophers’ boastfulness (τῦφος) was a recurring topos in ‘popular philosophy’ and was sharply attacked by the Cynics and the Pyrrhonians. Timon ridiculed the philosophers puffed up by their empty knowledge and proposed as a paradigm the ἄτυφος Pyrrho, who was completely free from every opinion.28 Both traditions are found in Lucian, who in a passage of his Dialogues of the Dead – whose archetype is Menippus and where the Cynic imprinting is prevalent – levels a severe invective against the whole category by charging it with boastfulness, vainglory, conceit and presumption.29 On the other hand, in the Icaromenippus, where the skeptical-Academic tradition prevails, he criticises at length the conceited and boastful dogmatism typical of the philosophers of his time.30 Let us now come back to Heraclitus. From many passages of his Life handed down to us by Diogenes

22 See Pl. Hp. mai. passim; Hp. mi. passim; Phld. De sup., PHerc. 1008, col. 18.20–23 and col. 20.22–27. 23 See Diog. Laërt. 2.36; 6.7–8. 24 See Diog. Laërt. 6.26; ps.-Diog. Ep. 21.31.1 and Decleva Caizzi (1980) 57. 25 See, for Lycon, Ath. 12.69.547d–548b (= fr. 8 SFODa = fr. 7 Wehrli): ἐδείπνιζε (sc. Λύκων δὲ ὁ περιπατητικός) τοὺς φίλους ἀλαζονείᾳ καὶ πολυτελείᾳ πολλῇ χρώμενος. (...) ὑπ’ ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῆς πόλεως τόπῳ ἐν τῇ Κόνωνος οἰκίᾳ εἶχεν εἰκοσίκλινον οἶκον, ὃς ἦν ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποδοχάς, for Chrysippus, Diog. Laërt. 7.185 (= SVF II 1): δοκεῖ δ’ ὑπερόπτης τις γεγονέναι. τοσαῦτα γοῦν συγγράψας οὐδενὶ τῶν βασιλέων προσπεφώνηκεν. See Knögel (1933) 14 and Ioppolo (1996) 734. 26 Diog. Laërt. 4.47: [ὁ Βίων] ἔν τισι δὲ καὶ πότιμος καὶ ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου δυνάμενος. See Fiske (1920) 183. 27 See Ribbeck (1882) 5–51; Stowers (1981) 108–109 and n. 116, 116. See also Aristo of Chios’ ὁμοίωμα (Stob. Flor. 4.25.44 Hense = SVF I 386), which compares the young people who come out from the philosophical schools ready to attack anyone (even their own parents) to dogs that have just been adopted and will bark at anybody without distinction. 28 See Euseb. Praep. evang. 14.18.25 and 27; Tim. frs. 9 and 11 Di Marco, and Di Marco (1989) 138–139. 29 See Luc. Dial. mort. 20.8. 30 See Luc. Icar. 5–8 and Decleva Caizzi (1980) 64–65.

226 

 Graziano Ranocchia

Laërtius (9.1–17)31 a biased and hostile attitude towards him seems to emerge, as the author aims to ridicule and condemn Heraclitus’ haughtiness, disdain, self-sufficiency and misanthropy. Take some of the scathing expressions used to qualify his character and behavior (e.g. μεγαλόφρων and μεγαλοφροσύνη, ὑπερόπτης, καθάπτεται, ὑπερεῖδε, ἀναχωρήσας, μισανθρωπήσας) and the irreverent and paradoxical situations in which the philosopher is placed for derisive purposes or to highlight the fatal consequences of his arrogance (his abuse of other philosophers or fellow-citizens, his refusal to legislate or rule, his choice to deposit his σύγγραμμα in the Artemision to avoid its profanation by the mob, his playing knucklebones with youths, his withdrawal to the mountains, his vegetarianism, his arrogance towards King Darius, and finally his shameful death submerged in dung or devoured by dogs). Even the introductory sentence of the Life (μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ’ ὁντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης, “he was lofty-minded beyond all other men, and contemptuous”) seems to encapsulate the spirit and purpose of the whole account.32 Eduard Zeller,33 Rodolfo Mondolfo and Leonardo Tarán,34 and Jørg Mejer35 had already suspected that many sections of the Life of Heraclitus serve a precise satirical, polemical, and caricatural purpose. More recently, Serge N. Mouraviev, first in an article published in 198736 and then in the framework of his monumental collection of Heraclitus’ fragments and testimonies,37 has newly addressed this question, confirming his predecessors’ intuitions. Finally, Ava Chitwood, in her analysis of the biographical tradition concerning Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Democritus,38 has shown that the attitude of ancient biographers towards Heraclitus and his work was especially unfavourable and that this stance took the concrete form of biographical accounts which are exceptionally hostile to him.39 In particular, according to Mouraviev the text of the Life,

31 For the quotations from this work I rely on the new critical edition of Dorandi (2013), unless otherwise specified. 32 That μεγαλόφρων is here to be understood according to its pejorative meaning of ‘arrogant’, ‘haughty’, rather its positive one of ‘magnanimous’, ‘generous’ (cf. LSJ s.v.), is proven by its association with ὑπερόπτης. See, on this point, Kirk (1962) 3; Chitwood (2004) 60 and n. 5, 61. 33 See Zeller/Mondolfo (1961) 353 n. 61. 34 See Mondolfo/Tarán (1972) 17 n. 4, 29 n. 29, 286–287. 35 See Mejer (1978) 28. 36 See Mouraviev (1987) and (1996). 37 See Mouraviev (1999) xvi, 172–179; (2000) 610–614; (2003) 24–39, 155–174. 38 See Chitwood (2004). 39 See ibid. 3 and 59: “The key point to keep in mind when considering the life, and especially the death, of this profound philosopher is the extraordinary antipathy, even hatred, that he roused in his readers and biographers. Their hostility, evident to a certain degree in the lives of all the philosophers, reaches unprecedented heights when Heraclitus dies buried in dung.”

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 227

as it has been handed down to us, is the outcome of the superimposition of several supplements (‘compléments’ = doxography, letters, epigrams, and homonyms) and additions (‘additions’) onto an original core which he defines as the ‘base text’. In its turn, this would be the outcome of the combination of two or three sources, of which the first would be a ‘characterological study’ on Heraclitus’ arrogance.40 This study, along with a bibliographical source drawing upon a Hellenistic pinax and maybe also a chronological source depending on Apollodorus’ Chronicle, would be the principal archetype of the ‘base text’ of the Life.41 Mouraviev identifies its author with the unknown Aristo mentioned in the Life of Heraclitus (9.11) as the source of the anecdote about Euripides and Socrates previously reported in the Life of the latter (2.22) – and here omitted precisely for that reason – , and also, possibly, with the other Aristo referred to at 9.5 as the author of a biographical work On Heraclitus (Περὶ ῾Ηρακλείτου). From this latter work, an account of the philosopher’s death would derive that is apparently alternative to the one reported in the ‘characterological study.’42 Now, according to Mouraviev this Aristo is the same philosopher whose moral-protreptic letter On the Relieving of Arrogance Philodemus – as we have seen above – quotes extensively in his own On Arrogance. In this text, devoted to the delineation and therapy of this vice, Heraclitus must have been featured, along with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Socrates and Hippias, as an example of an arrogant philosopher.43 Wilhelm Knögel had already detected some resemblances between the portrait of the αὐθέκαστος included in On the Relieving of Arrogance (cols. 17.19–18.12) and certain sections of the Life of Heraclitus in Diogenes Laërtius.44 For Mouraviev, the similarity between these two texts is mainly demonstrated by the fact that a) both are studies of descriptive ethics; b) both have the characterisation of arrogance as their aim;45 c) one delineates Heraclitus’ arrogance and the other

40 See Mouraviev (1987) 1–17 and 26–33. A similar opinion is also held by Chitwood (2004) 60, for whom “as Mouraview shows, the whole passage can be taken as a character study in arrogance.” 41 See Mouraviev (1987) 17–21. 42 See Mouraviev (1987) 22–26. This scholar appears to be undecided with regard to the identity of this latter Aristo: in Mouraviev (1987) 24, 25 and n. 28, he suggests we identify him with the Aristo mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius at 9.11 with regard to the anecdote of Euripides and Socrates; in Mouraviev (2003) 169, he seems to identify him – albeit doubtfully – with a different person by the same name. 43 See Mouraviev (1987) 22–26. 44 See Knögel (1933) 75–78. 45 Although the term ὑπερήφανος does not ever occur in the ‘base text,’ it is found with reference to Heraclitus in a parallel passage of Tatian, on which I shall return below (Ad Gr. 3: τὸν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτον οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεξαίμην “ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιδαξάμην” εἰπόντα διὰ τὸ αὐτοδίδακτον εἶναι καὶ ὑπερήφανον).

228 

 Graziano Ranocchia

includes Heraclitus amongst the ὑπερήφανοι; d) both texts share the underlying thesis that “l’orgueillez et le hautain est costamment porté à parler et à agir déraisonnablement, en se contredisant, en se démentant lui-même, en se faisant du tort à soi-même.”46 What is also intriguing is the hypothesis that the ‘characterological study’ in turn had as its model a 5th-cent. BC comedy to be identified as the Κατακολυμβητής or Diver by one Croton (whom according to Mouraviev might possibly be the same person as Cratinus).47 This otherwise unknown drama, whose existence is only inferable from the Life of Heraclitus (9.12),48 had precisely the Ephesian philosopher as its polemical target.49 Indeed, the polemical and derisive way in which the author stigmatises Heraclitus’ character, his arrogance and misanthropy, his disdain for ordinary people, his autodidactic training, his refusal to legislate and reticence, the obscurity of his work, and the shameful and unlikely circumstances of his death strongly suggests as a model a comic drama whose purpose was to mock the philosopher’s haughtiness, just as Socrates’ and Euripides’ conceit had been ridiculed by Aristophanes.50 We know that, in the absence of biographical elements concerning archaic and classical philosophers and poets, it was usual for biographers of the early Hellenistic era (above all 46 Mouraviev (1987) 21. 47 Mouraviev (1987) 24 n. 27, (2000) 594, and (2003) 206 n. 258 suggests that Croton may be a corruption of Cratinus, the name of a representative of the Old Comedy who lived between 519 and 422 BC. Indeed, with the exception of the eponymous hero of the Italian town Croton (on whom see RE 11.2 [1922] s.v. Kroton), no other ancient personality by this name is known to us. Also from a phonetic and a palaeographical point of view, once we have rejected the indecipherable explanation κρα[τωνα]τῖνον advanced by Mouraviev (2000) 594 app., a possible transformation of Κρατῖνον into Κρότωνα (with the same consonants and the vocalic metathesis of α and ο between the first and the last syllable) does not appear totally unlikely. Also the addition, immediately afterwards, of the indefinite pronoun τινα, seems to betray the uncertainty of the author (or of a very ancient copyist) with regard to the identity of this unknown personality. The chronology for Cratinus, who was about twenty years younger than Heraclitus (for, according to Diogenes Laërtius [9.1]), the latter reached his acme between 504 and 501 BC) and who died forty or fifty years after him, stands to the chronology we have for Heraclitus just as Aristophanes’ chronology (c. 450–c. 385 BC) stands to those of Socrates (470/469–399 BC) and Euripides (c. 480–c. 406 BC). However, the hypothesis of a corruption of Cratinus’ name is unfortunately not confirmed by the manuscript tradition, which unanimously attests to the reading Κρότωνα. 48 Σέλευκος μέντοι φησὶν ὁ γραμματικὸς Κρότωνά τινα ἱστορεῖν ἐν τῷ Κατακολυμβητῇ Κράτητά τινα πρῶτον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κομίσαι τὸ βιβλίον· καὶ εἰπεῖν Δηλίου τινὸς δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ, ὃς οὐκ ἀποπνιγήσεται ἐν αὐτῷ. 49 See Mouraviev (1987) 24 and n. 27; and (2003) 155–156, 163, 165, 171. A different opinion is held by Mansfeld (2005) 336–337. 50 Mouraviev (2003) 165 and n. 139 would be right, therefore, to reject the idea put forward by Haussleiter (1964) 9 – in his turn invoking Weiher (1914) – according to which Heraclitus, differently from other ancient writers, was spared attacks from the Old Comedy dramatists.

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 229

within the Lyceum, where such a genre was especially cultivated) to draw this kind of ‘evidence’ from the Attic comic poets – even though it was simply a poetic invention – and to rework it by presenting it as historical facts.51 In particular, the gruesome circumstances of Heraclitus’ death would be designed to humiliate and mock him by displaying his thoughtlessness and setting him in a paradoxical situation, in which he is ironically obliged to experience the lethal consequences of his behavior and opinions.52 According to Mouraviev, the fundamental core and constitutive elements of the complex account of Heraclitus’ death (his vegetarianism, his dropsy, his dialogue with the doctors, his decision to try and treat himself, the tragicomic epilogue of his self-immersion into, or sprinkling with, dung) prove to the utmost degree not only the absolute historical untrustworthiness of this tradition, but also the comic origin of the information contained in the ‘characterological study.’ Mouraviev is right to maintain that this was not an occasional polemic but, rather, “a caricatural buffoonery” that served the purpose of making the reader laugh at the philosopher’s expense.53 Mouraviev is also probably right to claim that the existence of this story is the best proof that no certain evidence on Heraclitus’ death was available at the time.54 Moreover, we should not overlook the fact that the pungent dialogue between Euripides and Socrates about the content of Heraclitus’ work reported at 2.22 (Life of Socrates)55 and alluded to at 9.11 – a dialogue which, according to Mouraviev, belongs to the ‘characterological study’ – is formulated through sentences which can be traced back to iambic trimeters,56 and that the ironical expression Δηλίου τινὸς δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ, which is attributed immediately afterwards (9.12) to one of the actors of Croton’s lost comedy, occurs in almost exactly the same form in it.57 In 51 On Greek biography in general, see at least Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1881); Leo (1901); Dihle (19702); Gallo (1975/1980), (1997) and (2005); Mejer (1978); Lefkowitz (1981); Gigante (1986); Gentili/Cerri (1988); Momigliano (19932); Bollansée (1999); Schorn (2004); Chitwood (2004); Arrighetti (2006) 271–314. On Hellenistic biography in particular, see the contributions collected in Erler/Schorn (2007). 52 See Mouraviev (2003) 165, and also Chitwood (2004) 90, according to whom “the story of Heraclitus’ death remains one of the most grotesque and malicious on record, without a single redeeming factor in it.” 53 See Mouraviev (2003) 171. 54 See Mouraviev (2003) 173–174. 55 Φασὶ δ’ Εὐριπίδην αὐτῷ δόντα τὸ Ἡρακλείτου σύγγραμμα ἐρέσθαι, “τί δοκεῖ;” τὸν δὲ φάναι, “ἃ μὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἃ μὴ συνῆκα· πλὴν Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ.” 56 See, on this point, Kirk (1962) 8–10, Lefkowitz (1987) 153, Chitwood (2004) 76–77. 57 On the name of this fellow, the MSS diverge: while F has κράτητα, B and P1, the two oldest and most authoritative codices of Diogenes’ Lives, jointly attest an unintelligible κράτη, the result of a probable corruption. Mouraviev (2000) 594 app. (see also Mouraviev [2003] 206) has interestingly suggested that the reading to be preferred here is not the former, as almost all editors

230 

 Graziano Ranocchia

particular, the term κολυμβητής, ‘diver,’ seems to hint explicitly at the title of this lost drama (Κατακολυμβητής).58 For Mouraviev, it is also noteworthy that, in introducing Aristo’s Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας, Philodemus makes explicit reference to the attacks levelled by the older comic poets (ο[ἱ] παλαιοὶ τῶν κωμωιδογράφων) against arrogant philosophers like Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Empedocles and Socrates.59 Mouraviev has also shown that the so-called ‘characterological study’ probably stands at the origin of several other witnesses about Heraclitus’ life, character and death from subsequent writers,60 starting from Tatian.61 This author, who

have done so far, but rather the latter, which should be emended into κράτη. This is, no doubt, a convincing proposal (as Mansfeld [2005] 336 n. 3 himself seems inclined to admit) from both a text-critical and logical point of view. Indeed, a possible transition by aphaeresis from σωκράτη to κράτη is totally plausible and is curiously confirmed by a passage from Plutarch (De lib. educ. 4d) adduced by Mouraviev (2000) 594 app. where the reading, which is unanimously handed down by the MSS (κράτης) has rightly been emended by the editors into κράτης. Furthermore, the fact that Socrates’ name, rather than that of an enigmatic Crates, is to be read here is suggested by the fact that – as we know – the sentence assigned to this figure (Δηλίου τινὸς δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ) comes from Socrates’ reply to Euripides, reported by Diogenes at 2.22 and recalled, immediately before of our passage, at 9.11. It is for the same reason that, between βιβλίον and καὶ εἰπεῖν Δηλίου τινὸς δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ, P inserts the relative pronoun ὅν, which represents the subject of this clause and grammatically refers to the preceding κράτη. Certainly, the fact remains that whereas in the dialogue between Socrates and Euripides reported at 2.22 it is the latter who is said to have handed Heraclitus’ work over to Socrates, here it is Socrates himself who is said to have brought it to Athens. But this is only a minor discrepancy that is probably due to the two different sources (Aristo and Seleucus) on which Diogenes drew for his reconstruction of the anecdote: the latter (which leaves out Euripides) might represent an abridged and simplified version of the former (which was possibly more extensive and complete). 58  See Mouraviev (1987) 24 with n. 27, and (2003) 156 and, for a possible reconstruction of the original verses, Kirk (19622) 10. It is likely that this exchange of sentences played an essential role in the development of the drama, so as to justify its title and and its central subject. For the meaning of Δήλιος κολυμβητής, see Suda s.v. Δηλίου κολυμβητοῦ and Crusius (1889); Bruneau (1979) 83–88. 59 See Phld. De sup., PHerc. 1008, col. 10.19–26 Ranocchia and Mouraviev (1987) 24. 60  See, in particular, ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 5.1; Plut. De tuenda san. 136b; De comm. not. 1064a; Non posse suav. 1089f–1090a; Marc. Aur. Med. 3.3.4; Tert. Ad mar. 4.5; Hippol. Haer. 1.4.1; Procl. In Ti. 1.351.5 Diehl; Schol. in Pl. Remp. 6.498; in Pl. Tht. 179e Greene; Aristonymus ap. Stob. Flor. 3.21.7 Hense; Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 310 Sternbach; Anton. Mon. Mel. 1.59 (= PG 136.960c); Maxim. Conf. Serm. 56 (= PG 91.969a); Suda s.v. Ἡράκλειτος; ps.-Hesych. s.v. Ἡράκλειτος. 61 Ad Gr. 3: τὸν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτον οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεξαίμην “ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιδαξάμην” εἰπόντα διὰ τὸ αὐτοδίδακτον εἶναι καὶ ὑπερήφανον οὐδ’ ἂν ἐπαινέσαιμι κατακρύψαντα τὴν ποίησιν ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ναῷ, μυστηριωδῶς ὅπως ὕστερον ἡ ταύτης ἔκδοσις γίνηται. καὶ γὰρ οἷς μέλον ἐστὶ περὶ τούτων, φασὶν Εὐριπίδην τὸν τραγῳδοποιὸν κατιόντα καὶ ἀναγινώσκοντα διὰ μνήμης κατ’ ὀλίγον τὸ Ἡρακλείτειον σκότος τοῖς σπουδαίοις παραδεδωκέναι. τούτου μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀμαθίαν ὁ θάνατος

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 231

seems to hand down a version of the ‘characterological study’ which is alternative to, and independent from, that transmitted by Diogenes Laërtius, had largely been ignored by previous scholars. Now, the criteria adopted by Mouraviev in his reconstruction of the Life of Heraclitus have strongly been criticised – not without reason – by several scholars,62 and are far from reliable. Certainly, the existence of a biographical nucleus also containing elements pertaining to Heraclitus’ work and chronology cannot be denied, and the same applies to other sections respectively devoted to the doxography, the letters, the epigrams and possibly also the homonyms (the so-called ‘compléments’), all of which are possibly drawn from independent sources. Likewise, it seems evident that Diogenes frequently appended short supplementary texts to both the ‘base text’ and each of the other sections (the so-called ‘additions’). However, it is hazardous to attempt to establish a clear-cut delimitation within the Life between an original textual core (the so-called ‘base text’) and the different sources on which it draws. This is the case even if we assume that the supposed bibliographical source was written “in the purest πίναξ style,”63 or grant its stylistic dissimilarity from the ‘characterological study’ or the absence in it of any mocking attitude against Heraclitus: all facts that might suggest the existence of an originally independent bibliographical source, but which are not enough to allow us to determine the exact boundaries of this section of the Life. This applies all the more to the information about the philosopher’s acme and his age at death, information that Mouraviev believes can be traced back to a possible chronological source, but which, as he himself is compelled to admit, might also be due to Diogenes himself.64 What seems clear is that, whatever may be said about Mouraviev’s criteria for reconstructing the ‘characterological study’ and its precise boundaries within the Life, a considerable portion of the latter is constituted by a biographicalcharacterological portrait of Heraclitus, a sufficiently organic and uniform text aimed at ridiculing his μεγαλοφροσύνη, ὑπεροψία, and ὑπερηφανία (according to Tatian’s terminology).65 Today it can no longer be disputed that the intent of this portrait is caricatural and denigratory, as well-known scholars had already συνήλεγξεν· ὕδρωπι γὰρ συσχεθεὶς καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ὡς φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτηδεύσας βολβίτοις τε περιπλάσας ἑαυτὸν τῆς κόπρου κρατυνθείσης συνολκάς τε τοῦ παντὸς ἀπεργασαμένης σώματος σπασθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν. 62 See, on this point and, more in general, on the philological method followed by this scholar, Gigante (1996) 17–23, Nardelli (2001), Ranocchia (2004) 455–456, Boeri/Vigo (2003), Mansfeld (2005) 335–340, and (2009). 63 Mouraviev (1987) 18. 64 See Mouraviev (1987) 18–19. Mouraviev (2003) 156 seems more categorical. 65 See also, on this point, Chitwood (2004) 60: “Diogenes Laertius is at pains throughout to illustrate that trait – call it pride, arrogance, superciliousness, haughtiness, or simple contempt –

232 

 Graziano Ranocchia

suspected66 and despite Marcello Gigante’s peremptory protestations to the contrary.67 This portrait, however, does not constitute a genuine χαρακτηρισμός, since the latter, by definition, is a caricatural and stereotyped description of imaginary and generic characters who cannot be identified with historical figures. On the other hand, the text we are dealing with here is not a biography stricto sensu, although it can generically be assigned to the biographical genre; rather, it seems to share features of both genres.68 For this reason, it is perhaps more appropriate to classify it as a biographical-characterological portrait about a specific case of arrogance, that of the philosopher Heraclitus. Now, the comparison between this portrait and Aristo’s moral-protreptic letter On the Relieving of Arrogance, amply quoted by Philodemus in his On Arrogance, can be extended much further than Knögel and Mouraviev did. Indeed, from a stringent collation of these two texts it is possible to infer the following thematic analogies:

that was, to him and to others, most characteristic of Heraclitus and that was to culminate ultimately in complete misanthropy.” 66 See above. 67 See Gigante (1986) 86–93 and (1996) 17–23. 68 See also Mouraviev (1987) 21.

Aristo ap. Phld. De superbia

col. 20.6–10: καὶ τὸν ὄντως πολυμαθέστατον προσαγορευόμενον οἴεται (sc. ὁ δὲ παντειδ[ή]μων) πάντα δύνασθαι γινώσκειν καὶ ποιεῖν οὐχ οἷον ἑαυτόν.

col. 19.21–22: μόνος οἴεται (sc. ὁ αὐθέκαστος) περὶ πάντων φρονεῖν.

col. 20.4–33 (ὁ παντειδήμων).

PHerc. 1008, cols. 18.12–19.3: ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶν ὁ παντειδήμων ἀναπεπεικὼς ἑαυτὸ[ν] ὅτι π[ά]ντα γινώσκε[ι], τὰ μὲν µ͙αθὼν̣ παρὰ τῶν μάλισ[τ]’ ἐπ[ι]σταμένων, τὰ δ’ ἰδὼν ποιοῦντας μόνον, τὰ δ’ αὐτὸς ἐπινοήσας ἀφ’ α̣ὑτοῦ. (...) οἷος δὲ καὶ τ̣[ῶ]ν̣ μαθημάτων. ἀντιποιούμενο̣[ς πά]ντων κτλ.

(continued)

col. 20.6–10: καὶ τὸν ὄντως πολυμαθέστατον προσαγορευόμενον οἴεται (sc. ὁ δὲ παντειδήμων) πάντα δύνασθαι γινώσκειν καὶ ποιεῖν οὐχ οἷον ἑαυτόν.

9.1: μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ’ ὁντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης, ὡς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ col. 19.26–30: καὶ μηδὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἀναμαρτήτων εἶναι λεγόντων μηδ’ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ δῆλον ἐν ᾧ φησι, “πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον ἀπροσδέκτων συμβουλίας τοῦτον (sc. τὸν αὐθέκαστον) ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.” νομίζοντα φρονεῖν κτλ.

ii) The arrogant man believes to be superior to the wisest:

Diog. Laërt. 9.5: τέλειος μέντοι γενόμενος (sc. Ἡράκλειτος ἔφασκε) πάντα ἐγνωκέναι· ἤκουσέ τε οὐδενός, ἀλλ’ αὑτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ.

i) The arrogant man believes to be all-knowing and declares himself to be self-taught:

[Aristo] ap. Diog. Laërt. Vita Heracliti

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance   233

9.5: ἤκουσέ τε οὐδενός, ἀλλ’ αὑτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ.

9.3: Καὶ τέλος μισανθρωπήσας καὶ ἐκπατήσας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι διῃτᾶτο, πόας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας.

9.3: ἀναχωρήσας δὲ εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος κτλ.

iv) The arrogant man believes to be self-sufficient:

9.6: σημεῖον δ’ αὐτοῦ τῆς μεγαλοφροσύνης Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν Διαδοχαῖς· ἐκχωρῆσαι γὰρ τἀδελφῷ τῆς βασιλείας.

9.2–3: ἀξιούμενος δὲ καὶ νόμους θεῖναι πρὸς αὐτῶν ὑπερεῖδε διὰ τὸ ἤδη κεκρατῆσθαι τῇ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πόλιν. ἀναχωρήσας δὲ εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος μετὰ τῶν παίδων ἠστραγάλιζε· περιστάντων δ’ αὐτὸν τῶν Ἐφεσίων, “τί, ὦ κάκιστοι, θαυμάζετε;”, εἶπεν· “ἢ οὐ κρεῖττον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ μεθ’ ὑμῶν πολιτεύεσθαι;”

iii) The arrogant man refuses to collaborate with others, e.g. his fellow-citizens:

[Aristo] ap. Diog. Laërt. Vita Heracliti

(continued)

col. 20.2–4: καὶ λέγειν (sc. ὁ αὐθέκαστος) ἄν]θρωπο̣[ς] ὢν ἀνθρώπ[ων οὐκ ἔ]χειν χρείαν.

col. 19.25–26: κ[αὶ μ]η̣δὲ βοηθεῖσθαι (sc. τὸν αὐθέκαστον).

col. 18.19–31: κἄστι τοιοῦτος (sc. ὁ παντειδήμων) οὐ μόνον οἷον Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον [ἱ]στορεῖ Πλάτων, ὅσα περ͙ὶ τὸ ⌊σῶμ’⌋ εἶχεν αὑτῶι πεποιηκέν[αι] λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκε͙[υάζ]ειν οἰκίαν καὶ πλοῖον δι’ αὑτοῦ καὶ χωρὶς ἀρχιτέκτονος· καὶ γράφειν συνθήκας ἑαυτῶι δεομένας ἐμπειρίας νομικῆς· καὶ δούλους ἰδίους ἰατ[ρ]ε[ύ]ειν, μὴ μόνο͙ν ἑαυτόν (...)· καὶ φυτεύειν καὶ φορτίζεσθαι τὰ μάλισθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνιτικωτάτων κατορθούμενα.

col. 17.27–36 οἷος (sc. ὁ αὐθέκαστος) μηδενὶ προσαναθέμενος ἀποδημεῖν ἀγοράζειν πωλεῖν (...) τἆλλα συντελεῖν· κἂν προσερωτήσῃ τις, ὅ̣[τι] μέλλει ποιεῖν, “οἶδ’ ἐγώ” λέγειν. (...) καὶ παρακληθεὶς ἐπὶ συνεδρείαν βουλευομένω̣[ι] μὴ βούλεσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν εἰπεῖν.

col. 14.8–12: ὁ γὰρ ὑπερήφανος οὔτε συμπαραληπτικὸς ἑτέρων, ἅμα μὲν ὑπ’ οἰήσεως, ἅμα δ̣ὲ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπερφρ[ο]νεῖν

Aristo ap. Phld. De superbia

234   Graziano Ranocchia

col. 18.11–12: καὶ ζῆν δυνήσεσθαι (sc. ὁ αὐθέκαστος) γενόμενος ἐν ἐρημίαι.

col. 18.28–31: καὶ δούλους ἰδίους ἰατ[ρ]ε[ύ]ειν (sc. ὁ παντειδήμων), μὴ μόνο͙ν ἑαυτόν.

9.15: Δημήτριος δέ φησιν ἐν τοῖς Ὁμωνύμοις καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτὸν ὑπερφρονῆσαι, δόξαν ἔχοντα παμπλείστην.

9.14: “Ὁκόσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες ἐπιχθόνιοι τῆς μὲν ἀληθηίης καὶ δικαιοπραγμοσύνης ἀπέχονται, ἀπληστίῃ δὲ καὶ δοξοκοπίῃ προσέχουσι κακῆς ἕνεκα ἀνοίης. ἐγὼ δὲ νηστίην ἔχων πάσης πονηρίης καὶ κόρον φεύγων παντὸς οἰκειούμενον φθόνῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ περιίστασθαι ὑπερηφανίας οὐκ ἂν ἀφικοίμην εἰς Περσῶν χώρην, ὀλίγοις ἀρκεόμενος κατ’ ἐμὴν γνώμην.”

9.6: ἀνέθηκε δ’ αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ σύγγραμμα) εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν, ὡς μέν τινες, ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι προσίοιεν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημώδους εὐκαταφρόνητον ᾖ.

9.6: σημεῖον δ’ αὐτοῦ τῆς μεγαλοφροσύνης κτλ.

9.6: τοῖς δ’ ἔνι κοκκυστής, ὀχλολοίδορος Ἡράκλειτος.

9.1: μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ’ ὁντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης.

(continued)

col. 21.16–35: καὶ βρενθυόμενον ὠνόμαζον καὶ ἔτι νῦν ὀνομάζουσιν (...) τὸν (...) κατεμβλέποντα πᾶσιν καὶ παρεμβλέποντα καὶ τῆι κεφαλῆι κατασείοντα καὶ κατασμικρίζοντα τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας (...) μετὰ διασυρμοῦ καὶ μόλις που βραχείας ἀποκρίσεως ὑπεροχὴν ἰδίαν ἐμφαινούσης, ἄλλου δ’ οὐδενὸς ἀριθ͙µ̣ὸν ἐμποιούση͙ς͙.

col. 15.6–8: ὡς ἄδικον διὰ τοῦ ταπεινοῦν ἑτέρους ἑαυτὸν μετεωρίζειν.

col. 13.33–35: τὸν πεπεισμένον ἁδρὸν εἶναι τὸ πρὸς πάντας ὑπε͙[ρη]φανε[ύ]εσθαι.

vii) The arrogant man is convinced of his own excellence and despises other people:

9.3: Καὶ τέλος μισανθρωπήσας καὶ ἐκπατήσας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι διῃτᾶτο.

9.3: ἀναχωρήσας δὲ εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος κτλ.

vi) The arrogant man is a misanthrope and avoids the multitude:

9.4: [Ἕρμιππος δέ φησι] θεῖναι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ κελεύειν τοὺς παῖδας βολβίτοις καταπλάττειν.

9.3: τῶν δὲ (sc. τῶν ἱατρῶν) μὴ συνιέντων, αὑτὸν εἰς βούστασιν κατορύξας τῇ τῶν βολβίτων ἀλέᾳ ἤλπισεν ἐξατμισθήσεσθαι.

v) The arrogant man claims to be able to heal himself: 9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance   235

col. 21.16–27: καὶ βρενθυόμενον ὠνόμαζον καὶ ἔτι νῦν ὀνομάζουσιν (...) τὸν (...) κατασμικρίζοντα τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας.

col. 20.34–38: ὁ δ͙’ ὑπερόπτης (...) τα[π]ε[ινοῖ πλ]εο͙ναχ[ῇ].

Aristo ap. Phld. De superbia

9.12: φασὶ δ’ αὐτὸν ἐρωτηθέντα διὰ τί σιωπᾷ, φάναι “ἵν’ ὑμεῖς λαλῆτε.”

9.3: περιστάντων δ’ αὐτὸν τῶν Ἐφεσίων, “τί, ὦ κάκιστοι, θαυμάζετε;”, εἶπεν· “ἢ οὐ κρεῖττον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ μεθ’ ὑμῶν πολιτεύεσθαι;”

ix) The arrogant man is insolent, reticent or sarcastic in his responses:

col. 17.31–34: κἂν προσερωτήσῃ τις ὅ̣[τι] μέλλει (sc. ὁ αὐθέκαστος) ποιεῖν, “οἶδ’ ἐγώ” λέγειν. κἂν μέμφηταί τις, κατα͙μειδιῶν “ἐμὲ σύ;”

col. 17.12–14: καὶ ἀρ[ρ]ωστοῦντ’ αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν αὐθάδη) ἐπισκεπ̣τομένου φίλου μὴ λέγ ε̣ ιν πῶς ἔχ[ει].

col. 14.25–37: Τιμοκρέων γοῦν ὁ [Ῥ]ό̣δ̣ιος ὑπερήφανος ὢν πρὸς [μὲ ν] τὸ[ν] ὅτ{ι}’ εἰσῄει πυνθανόμενον ποταπός ἐστιν· “τοῦ κήρυκο[ς]” εἶπεν “ἀκούσει μικρὸν ὕστερον. [δι]αδοθέντος δὲ τοῦ λεχθέντος οὕτως ἀντέκοψε το͙ῖ̣ς θεωροῦσιν, ὥστε τὸν βραβε[υτὴν ἐκ]τείνοντ’ αὐτ[ῶ]ι τὴν ῥάβδον ἄιδο[ντι] Καστ[όρει]ο͙ν͙ μικροῦ καταπ͙αῦσαι· διόπερ ἡττημ[έ]νος ὅτ’ ἐ[ξ]ῄει ταὐτοῦ “ποταπ͙ό̣ς” ἐπερωτῶ[ν]τος “Σερίφιος” ἀπήν[τησεν].

9.14: “Ὁκόσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες ἐπιχθόνιοι τῆς μὲν ἀληθηίης καὶ col. 24.2–12: [ὅμοιοι] δ’ εὐτε[λιστὴς ἢ ἐξευτελισ]τὴς καὶ οὐδενωτὴς δικαιοπραγμοσύνης ἀπέχονται, ἀπληστίῃ δὲ καὶ δοξοκοπίῃ προσέχουσι κακῆς ἢ ἐξουδενωτὴς (...) διαφέρ͙[ο]ν͙τες ἀνέσει καὶ ἐπιτάσει [κα]τ̣αβολῆς ἕνεκα ἀνοίης.” τοῦ πλησίον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐξευτελιστὴς ἀπόν͙[τω]ν̣ τινὰ φαυλότερον δὴ δοκεῖ‹ν› παρίστησιν, ὁ δ’ ἐξουδενω̣τὴς ἴσον τῶι μηδενί.

9.12: φασὶ δ’ αὐτὸν ἐρωτηθέντα διὰ τί σιωπᾷ, φάναι “ἵν’ ὑμεῖς λαλῆτε.”

9.2: καθάπτεται δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν ἑταῖρον ἐκβαλεῖν Ἑρμόδωρον ἐν οἷς φησιν, “ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀποθανεῖν πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν.”

viii) The arrogant man humiliates and belittles others:

[Aristo] ap. Diog. Laërt. Vita Heracliti

(continued)

236   Graziano Ranocchia

9.14: “Ἡράκλειτος Ἐφέσιος βασιλέι Δαρείῳ πατρὸς Ὑστάσπεω χαίρειν. “Ὁκόσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες ἐπιχθόνιοι τῆς μὲν ἀληθηίης καὶ δικαιοπραγμοσύνης ἀπέχονται, ἀπληστίῃ δὲ καὶ δοξοκοπίῃ προσέχουσι κακῆς ἕνεκα ἀνοίης. ἐγὼ δ’ ἀμνηστίην ἔχων πάσης πονηρίης καὶ κόρον φεύγων παντὸς οἰκειούμενον φθόνῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ περιίστασθαι ὑπερηφανίην οὐκ ἂν ἀφικοίμην εἰς Περσῶν χώρην, ὀλίγοις ἀρκεόμενος κατ’ ἐμὴν γνώμην.” Τοιοῦτος μὲν ἁνὴρ καὶ πρὸς βασιλέα.

9.1: τόν γε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι, καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

9.1: “πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.”

col. 21.16–31: καὶ βρενθυόμενον ὠνόμαζον καὶ ἔτι νῦν ὀνομάζουσιν (...) τὸν (...) κατασμικρίζοντα τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας ἢ τοὺς, ὧν ἄν τις μνημονεύσηι, κἂν ὦσι τῶν μεγάλων εἶναι δοκούντων.

x) The arrogant man is insolent and contemptuous even towards the powerful and the great men of the past:

col. 21.16–34: καὶ βρενθυόμενον ὠνόμαζον καὶ ἔτι νῦν ὀνομάζουσιν (...) τὸν (...) κατασμικρίζοντα τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας (...) μετὰ διασυρμοῦ καὶ μόλις που βραχείας ἀποκρίσεως ὑπεροχὴν ἰδίαν ἐμφαινούσης.

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance   237

238 

 Graziano Ranocchia

The presence in both texts of so many convergences cannot be considered merely a coincidence. We thus find the pitiless characterisation of Heraclitus’ arrogance, on the one hand, and the inclusion of Heraclitus in the ranks of the arrogant philosophers, on the other; allusions to other arrogant philosophers and philosopher-poets in the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας;69 and the presence of the shared underlying idea that the arrogant man believes himself to be omniscient, speaks and acts haughtily and contemptuously in order to affirm his own excellence and humiliate others, tends to isolate himself from society in the belief that he is able to take care of himself, and ultimately ends up destroying himself because of this belief. All these elements, along with the numerous thematic analogies highlighted above, are bound to suggest a common reflection on this subject, possibly dating back to the early Hellenistic age, upon which various authors with the same, or even different, philosophical background(s) might have drawn. Certainly, while Aristo’s Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας comes across as a valuable example of moral characterology and therapy, what most distinguishes the biographical-characterological portrait which lies behind the Life of Heraclitus is a biographical interest. Whereas in the former text the focus is on the description of universal models of arrogance and of the vices akin to it, in the latter text the target is the arrogance of an historically well-defined figure. What we are presented with, then, is not a mere stereotype but a concrete case drawn from real life. At the same time, however, this case perfectly embodies many of the arrogant man’s features masterfully described by Aristo in his Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας. So, while it is true that the two texts cannot be considered the same, it is not unreasonable to suppose that both might be traced back to the same philosophical and literary tradition, encompassing both general descriptions of arrogance with a therapeutic purpose, like the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας, and biographies of famous people (philosophers, poets, etc.), whose arrogance was considered proverbial. The latter is reflected by the biographical-characterological portrait of Heraclitus which lies behind Diogenes Laërtius’ Life, as well as by the portraits of other famous ὑπερήφανοι, which we can imagine to have included philosophers and poets like Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Hippias and Euripides, to whom Aristo either explicitly or implicitly alludes in his Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας. No doubt, what is suspect here is the double mention of one Aristo in the Life of Heraclitus, to whom Diogenes first attributes an alternative version of Heracli-

69 On the specific case of Euripides, see now Ranocchia (forthcoming).

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 239

tus’ death (9.5 = fr. 23 SFODb = fr. 28 Wehrli)70 and then an exchange of sentences between Euripides and Socrates reported in the latter’s Life (2.22 = fr. 24b SFODb = fr. 30 Wehrli) and hence omitted here (9.11 = fr. 24a SFODb = fr. 29 Wehrli).71 It is likely that, as proposed by Mouraviev, this latter anecdote was originally a constituent part of the biographical-characterological portrait. Indeed, all the features of this episode (its playful and burlesque tone, the presence of Euripides and Socrates – two favourite targets of older comic poets – and the iambic metre of Socrates’ sentence) converge significantly towards that comic source, to which Mouraviev traces back the portrait in question, not without reason.72 Yet, the syllogism by which a) if an unknown Aristo is the source of the anecdote about Euripides and Socrates and b) if this was a constituent part of the biographical-characterological portrait, ergo c) the whole portrait must be attributed to this Aristo,73 is far from compelling and remains, therefore, no more than a simple hypothesis. As to the other mention of Aristo (9.5), namely as the author of an otherwise unknown Περὶ ῾Ηρακλείτου – presumably a biographical work similar to the Περὶ Ἐπικούρου assigned to him in the Life of Epicurus (10.14 = fr. 25 SFODb = fr. 32 Wehrli)74 – it is associated with a version of Heraclitus’ death which is apparently alternative to the one reported in the biographical-characterological portrait. Whereas in this latter version it is said that the philosopher, being sick with dropsy and having sought in vain to cure himself by plunging into dung, died from his illness, the Aristo mentioned at 9.5 asserts that the philosopher, having recovered from dropsy, found death ἄλλῃ νόσῳ. In other words, while in the former the denigratory intent is patent, as it is in the rest of the portrait, in the latter text, which Mouraviev regards as a later addition to the ‘base text,’75 this intent seems to be either absent or at least not immediately evident.76 Strictly speaking, if here we were to apply literally the formalistic method adopted by

70 Σωτίων δέ φησιν εἰρηκέναι τινὰς Ξενοφάνους αὐτὸν ἀκηκοέναι· λέγειν τε Ἀρίστωνα ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ τὸν ὕδερον αὐτὸν θεραπευθῆναι, ἀποθανεῖν δὲ ἄλλῃ νόσῳ. 71 Τὰ δὲ περὶ Σωκράτους καὶ ὅσα ἐντυχὼν τῷ συγγράμματι εἴποι, κομίσαντος Εὐριπίδου καθά φησιν Ἀρίστων, ἐν τῷ περὶ Σωκράτους εἰρήκαμεν. 72 See Mouraviev (1987) 22 and above. 73 See Mouraviev (1987) 26: “si (1) Aristone est la source de l’épisode Euripide-Socrate (comme nous l’apprende Diogène) et si (2) cet épisode fait partie intégrante de l’étude charactérologique (...) ergo toute l’étude charactérologique en question remonte à Ariston.” 74 For a discussion concerning the identity of Aristo the author of Heraclitus’ and Epicurus’ biographies, as well as of the Aristo to whom the anecdote of Euripides and Socrates is attributed, see Ioppolo (1980) 312–321 and Hahm (2006) 187–191. 75 See Mouraviev (1987) 5, 12, 25. 76 According to Ioppolo (1980) 318, the latter version was even functional to “a rehabilitation of Heraclitus’ death, which the decease from dropsy ridiculed.”

240 

 Graziano Ranocchia

Mouraviev to distinguish the ‘base text’ and its sources from later supplements and additions, we would be forced to conclude that the author of the biographicalcharacterological portrait cannot be identified with this latter Aristo. As it is the Peripatetic Sotion who reports the information in question, this Aristo has been identified by some scholars with the Peripatetic Aristo of Ceos.77 Hence, the author of the biographical-characterological portrait ought to be another Aristo. Yet, this inference too is far from compelling because it forces us to imagine that two authors by the same name, both mentioned in the Life of Heraclitus and both interested in his βίος, are in reality two different persons: an hypothesis theoretically not impossible,78 but frankly quite improbable. To explain this problem it is sufficient to postulate that the alternative version of Heraclitus’ death attributed to Aristo at 9.5 – and of which we know nothing – was as denigratory as that reported in the biographical-characterological portrait and, therefore, compatible with it. Dying “of another illness” does not necessarily mean dying of a nobler illness than dropsy.79 So, the two accounts need not to exclude each other, but could represent two different variations of a single original account.80 What is certain is that an unknown Aristo is the author of a moral-protreptic letter On the 77 See Knögel (1933) 76–78, Wehrli (19682) 65–66, and Gigante (1996), according to whom it is plausible to imagine that, when choosing to name his sources, the scholarch Sotion preferred to mention an exponent of his own school, which had always been keen on the biographical genre. For that reason, Knögel and Wehrli included this passage among the fragments of Aristo of Ceos (followed today by SFODb, 116–117). However, arguments in favour of the Stoic Aristo of Chios have been brought forward by Ioppolo (1980) 316–321, mainly on the grounds of the interest in (and esteem for) Heraclitus shown by exponents of Early Stoicism such as Zeno, Cleanthes and Sphaerus. See, on this last point, Long (1976). 78 So believes Hahm (2006) 188. 79 Just to give two examples, the alternative versions dating back to Hermippus (Diog. Laërt. 9.4; see also Tatian. Ad Gr. 3, and above) and Neanthes (Diog. Laërt. 9.4) can hardly be seen to present a more dignified death than the one from dropsy: according to the former, Heraclitus died from the spasms induced by the desiccation of the dung with which he had been sprinkled; according to the latter, he was devoured by dogs who failed to recognise him because of the dung that covered him. 80  Note, in this regard, that the three versions of the philosopher’s death that are reported by Diogenes and that may be traced back, respectively, to the biographical-characterological portrait, Hermippus and Neanthes, are perfectly compatible with each other: all of them feature the episode of the dung, which in Hermippus becomes the cause of the philosopher’s death; and in the first two dropsy is present, which, in the first case, is also the cause of his death. It is possible, therefore, that in the original source used by the author of the biographical-characterological portrait, Hermippus and Neanthes (possibly, as we have seen, a comedy of the ἀρχαία) these three versions represented a unique account, wherein all three elements (dropsy, immersion/ sprinkling with dung, and devouring by dogs) were present in succession, with only the last one proving lethal for the philosopher.

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 241

Relieving of Arrogance, a large portion of which is devoted to the characterisation of arrogance and in which Heraclitus was probably denigrated. It is equally certain that a biographer of this philosopher named Aristo is mentioned twice by Diogenes Laërtius in the Life of Heraclitus within or near an important section – the biographical-characterological portrait – which is totally centered on the stigmatisation of this philosopher and which, as we have seen, is closely related to the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας. Mouraviev, who in his article of 1987 still shared Knögel and Wehrli’s opinion that the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας should be attributed to Aristo of Ceos,81 consequently assigned to this Aristo also the biographical-characterological portrait which lies behind Diogenes’ Life.82 Nevertheless, in a footnote of the same article83 and, subsequently, in Heraclitea84 this scholar – taking once again an observation by Knögel as his starting point,85 along with an unpublished study of mine86 – follows a similar argumentation, only to reach a surprisingly different conclusion. At 9.5 of Diogenes’ Life, in a passage occurring within the biographical-characterological portrait, it is said of Heraclitus: Γέγονε δὲ θαυμάσιος ἐκ παίδων, ὅτε καὶ νέος ὢν ἔφασκε μηδὲν εἰδέναι, τέλειος μέντοι γενόμενος πάντα ἐγνωκέναι· He was surprising from his childhood when, still being young, he used to repeat that he knew nothing while, becoming an adult, [he used to repeat] that he knew everything.

This youthful confession of ignorance on Heraclitus’ part, which has probably not received enough attention so far, is found again in a witness belonging to a collection of eighteen short sayings with a Stoic-Cynic flavour, which Johannes Stobaeus (Flor. 3.21.7 Hense)87 assigns to a mysterious author under the lemma Aristonymus’ Small Volumes: Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστωνύμου τομαρίων· Ἡράκλειτος νέος ὢν πάντων γέγονε σοφώτερος, ὅτι ᾔδει ἑαυτὸν μηδὲν εἰδότα. [cum lemm. SMA] 1 ἐκ τ ̂ ἀριστων/υ nec plura S : ἐκ τῶν ἀριστων/ DERF : ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστωνος V : ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστωνος I 81 See Knögel (1933); Wehrli (19682) 52–63. 82 See Mouraviev (1987) 22–26. 83 See Mouraviev (1987) 25 n. 28. 84 See Mouraviev (1999) xvi, 172–180. 85 See Knögel (1933) 77–78. 86 See Ranocchia (1999). 87 This collection has been transmitted by the sole Florilegium, with the unique exception of Ecl. 2.31.85 Wachsmuth.

242 

 Graziano Ranocchia

Heraclitus, being young, was wiser than all others, since he knew that he knew nothing.

Aristonymus’ Small Volumes are sayings – mostly containing similitudes – thoroughly similar to another Stobaean collection entitled Aristo’s Comparisons, whereof they share the same philosophical imprinting, the same expressive form and often even the same contents. Setting out from an intuition by Valentin Rose88 and Karl Praechter,89 Anna Maria Ioppolo90 has advanced the supposition that Stobaeus’ Aristonymus is, in reality, the Stoic philosopher Aristo of Chios, whose name was accidentally corrupted in the manuscript tradition into that of the (otherwise unattested) Aristonymus.91 In support of this thesis Ioppolo has adduced a series of comparisons with philosophical doctrines which are indisputably attested for Aristo of Chios, finding in the collection significant parallels with theories that in Antiquity were typical of this philosopher. Alessandra Bertini Malgarini92 has come to a similar conclusion by collating some almost unexamined testimonies of the Florilegium pertaining to the two collections under discussion. More recently, I have extended this operation to most of the Trincavellian codices, an important family of manuscripts (siglum r) largely ignored by the last editor of the Florilegium, Otto Hense.93 From this study it has emerged that seven of Aristonymus’ eighteen sayings are attributed by various – and in some cases mutually independent – MSS to Aristo. Among these is also the saying under discussion here, which is assigned to Aristonymus by S and β and to Aristo by r and I. All this bears witness to a reciprocal confusion between the two collections in several important testimonies of the Florilegium. This confusion, however, must be anterior to Stobaeus since, while in some parts of the manuscript tradition several sayings of Aristonymus are ascribed to Aristo, all available MSS agree in attributing most of them to the former. For his anthology, therefore, Stobaeus drew upon two different collections of sayings entitled Aristonymus’ Small Volumes and Aristo’s Comparisons, which were already circulating with these titles before his time. The fact that a philosopher and promoter of morally rigorist theories named Aristonymus was already known before Stobaeus is proven by a passage from Book 5 of the anonymus commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, dating to the 5th cent. AD and, hence, probably coeval with Stobaeus. In this passage, our enigmatic fellow is credited with a specific moral doctrine 88 See Rose (1863) 612. 89 See Praechter (1913) 476–480. 90 See Ioppolo (1980) 321–325. 91 For the various hypotheses about the origin of this corruption, see Ranocchia (2011) 359–361, where new possible explanations are advanced in this regard. 92 See Bertini Malgarini (1981) 147–155. 93  See Ranocchia (2011) 345–356.

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 243

– that of the absolute indifference of the wise towards the intermediate goods between virtue and vice – which for its specific characteristics coincides exactly with the philosophical position of Aristo of Chios.94 Now, as has been observed, it is “difficult to imagine that there existed with the same name both a Stoic-Cynic philosopher who was a follower of Aristo of Chios’ doctrine of ἀδιαφορία and a collector of γνῶμαι interested, as much as Aristo of Chios, in Stoic and Cynic philosophy.”95 It may be inferred from this that in all likelihood the author of Aristonymus’ Small Volumes and the Aristonymus mentioned in the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics are one and the same person, and that this person must be identified with the Stoic philosopher Aristo of Chios. Now, if Aristonymus coincides with Aristo of Chios and a saying of his – that testifying to Heraclitus’ youthful confession of ignorance96 – is found again in very similar terms in the biographical-characterological portrait of this philosopher which lies behind Diogenes Laërtius’ Life (and also other parallel passages), then, according to Mouraviev, Aristo of Chios is the author of the whole portrait and, consequently, also of the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας.97 This is an argument in all respects similar to the one applied by this scholar to the anecdote about Euripides and Socrates that Diogenes attributes to an unknown Aristo at 9.11.98 Yet, here I must voice the same sort of reservations I expressed about the syllogism whereby if a)

94  See Anonym. in Arist. Eth. Nic. 5.13.1137a26–30 (= CAG 20.248.17–27 Heylbut): οἷς γὰρ οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτε δόξα οὔτε ἀρχὴ οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν (…), τούτοις οὐδὲ δίκαιόν ἐστι νεμητικὸν ἢ ἐπανορθωτικόν (…). διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀδιάφορα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λέγοντες καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἀξίαν τινὰ διδόντες αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἴσης αὐτὰ λέγοντες τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, ὧν ἦν πρότερον μὲν Ἀριστώνυμος, νῦν δὴ καὶ Πλατωνικοί τινες εἶναι προσποιούμενοι […], οὗτοι δὴ καὶ παντάπασι τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἄχρηστον ἀποφαίνουσι. See Ioppolo (1980) 241 with n. 101, 321 with n. 93; Ranocchia (2011) 356–359. 95  Bertini Malgarini (1981) 148. 96  The fact that the supposed Aristonymus appears to be laudatory towards Heraclitus (πάντων γέγονε σοφώτερος) should not be regarded as an obstacle to associating this passage with such a systematically anti-Heraclitean text as the biographical-characterological portrait reported by Diogenes. It is no coincidence perhaps that, in referring to Heraclitus, Aristonymus specifies νέος ὤν, thereby highlighting the fact that the philosopher behaved in such a way in his youth and hence implying that later he changed his view on the matter, abandoning his original confession of ignorance in favour of a diametrically opposed position. This is precisely what we are told in the biographical-characterological portrait, whose author, in order to stress this concept, uses the same expression (νέος ὤν) to be found in Aristonymus’ sentence. 97  See Mouraviev (1987) 25 n. 28: “si Aristonyme ap. Stob. III, 21, 7 = Ariston de Chios, alors il faut également attribuer au stoïcien: 1) la totalité de l’E(tude) C(haractérologique) (Περὶ ῾Ηρακλείτου) et 2) tous les autres extraits philodémiens du Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας”; Mouraviev (1999) xvi. 98  See above.

244 

 Graziano Ranocchia

a certain Aristo is the source of a piece of information and if b) this information recurs in the biographical-characterological portrait of Heraclitus, then c) the portrait in its entirety should automatically be attributed to this Aristo. Personally, I do not believe that if the Aristo mentioned, among many other sources, by Diogenes Laërtius at 9.5 and 9.11 is the Peripatetic Aristo of Ceos, it is possible to either assign or deny to this philosopher the entire biographical-characterological portrait and, consequently, Aristo’s Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας. Nor do I believe that, if Aristonymus coincides with the Stoic Aristo of Chios, we may for this simple fact assign to the latter both the biographical-characterological portrait and the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας. As we have seen, the soundness of both syllogisms depends on the trust we have in the structuralist criteria for reconstruction that Mouraviev applies to Diogenes’ Life of Heraclitus – criteria which, as already mentioned, have legitimately been criticised by several scholars.99 More in general, it does not seem appropriate to pass from one unknown to another, or from one kind of uncertainty to another, to reach definite, or even likely, conclusions. The author of the biographical-characterological portrait is unknown; the identity of Aristo the author of the Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας is still disputed; the identification of the Aristo mentioned twice in the Life of Heraclitus remains problematic; and, finally, the coincidence between Aristonymus and Aristo of Chios is most probable, yet not deductively inferable. With regard to the identity of the author of the biographical-characterological portrait of Heraclitus transmitted by Diogenes Laërtius in the Life of this philosopher – whether his name be Aristo or not, and whoever Aristo may he be – it will be best to maintain a prudent approach in the future.

References Acosta Mendez/Angeli (1992): Eduardo Acosta Méndez and Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Testimonianze su Socrate, Naples. Arrighetti (2006): Graziano Arrighetti, Poesia, poetiche e storia nella riflessione dei Greci, Pisa. Bertini Malgarini (1981): Alessandra Bertini Malgarini, “Aristonymos e/o Aristone di Chio”, in: Elenchos 2, 147–155. Blank (1999): David Blank, “Reflections on Re-reading Piaggio and the Early History of the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: CErc 29, 74–75. Blank/Longo Auricchio 2000: David Blank and Francesca Longo Auricchio, “An Inventory of the Herculaneum Papyri from Piaggio’s Time”, in: CErc 30, 131–147.

99  See above.

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 245

Boeri/Vigo (2003): Marcelo Boeri and Alejandro Vigo, “Los Heraclitea de Serge Mouraviev”, in: Méthexis 16, 101–103. Bollansée (1999): Jan Bollansée, Hermippos of Smyrna and his Biographical Writings: A Reappraisal, Leuven. Booras/Seely (1999): Steven W. Booras and David R. Seely, “Multispectral Imaging of the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: CErc 29, 95–100. Bruneau (1979): Philippe Bruneau, “Deliaca (III)”, in: BCH 103, 83–107. Capasso (1978): Mario Capasso, “Il presunto papiro di Fania”, in: CErc 8, 156–158. Capasso (1983): Mario Capasso, “Epicureismo e Eraclito: Contributo alla ricostruzione della critica epicurea alla filosofia presocratica”, in: Livio Rossetti (ed.), Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981, Rome, 423–457 [= Id., Comunità senza rivolta: Quattro saggi sull’epicureismo, Naples 1987, 59–102]. Capasso (2001): Mario Capasso, “Les livres sur la flatterie dans le De vitiis de Philodème”, in: Clara Auvray-Assayas and Daniel Delattre (eds.), Cicéron et Philodème : La polémique en philosophie, Paris, 179–194. Capasso (2010): Mario Capasso, “Per una ricostruzione del De Vitiis di Filodemo”, in: Traianos Gagos (ed.), Proceedings of the 25th International Congress of Papyrology, Ann Arbor, 97–104. Caterino (1827): Luigi Caterino, “Φιλοδήμου Περὶ κακιῶν”, in: VH1 III, 1–54. Cavallo (1983): Guglielmo Cavallo, Libri scritture scribi a Ercolano, Naples. Chitwood (2004): Ava Chitwood, Death by Philosophy: The Biographical Tradition in the Life and Death of the Archaic Philosophers Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Democritus, Ann Arbor 2004. Crusius (1889): Otto Crusius, “Δήλιος κολυμβητής”, in: Philologus 47, 382–384. Decleva Caizzi (1980): Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, “Τῦφος: Contributo alla storia di un concetto”, in: Sandalion 3, 53–66. Di Marco (1989): Massimo Di Marco, Timone di Fliunte: Silli, Rome. Dihle (19702): Albrecht Dihle, Studien zur griechischen Biographie, Göttingen. Dorandi (2013): Tiziano Dorandi, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge/ New York. Erler/Schorn (2007): Michael Erler and Stefan Schorn (eds.), Die griechische Biographie in hellenistischer Zeit, Berlin/NewYork. Fiske (1920): George C. Fiske, Lucilius and Horace, Madison. Gallavotti (1975a): Carlo Gallavotti, “Empedocle nei Papiri Ercolanesi”, in: Jean Bingen, Guy Cambier and Georges Nachtergael (eds.), Le monde grec : Pensée, littérature, histoire, documents : Hommages à Claire Préaux, Bruxelles, 153–161. Gallavotti (1975b): Carlo Gallavotti, Empedocle: Poema fisico e lustrale, Milan. Gallo (1975–1980): Italo Gallo, Frammenti biografici da papiri, 2 vols., Rome. Gallo (1997): Italo Gallo, Studi sulla biografia greca, Naples. Gallo (2005): Italo Gallo, La biografia greca: Profilo storico e breve antologia di testi, Soveria Mannelli. Gentili/Cerri (1988): Bruno Gentili and Giovanni Cerri, History and Biography in Ancient Thought, Amsterdam. Gigante (1986): Marcello Gigante, “Biografia e dossografia in Diogene Laerzio”, in: Elenchos 7, 7–102. Gigante (1990): Marcello Gigante, Filodemo in Italia, Florence. Gigante (1996): Marcello Gigante, “Aristone di Ceo biografo dei filosofi”, in: SCO 47, 17–23.

246 

 Graziano Ranocchia

Gigante (2000): Marcello Gigante, “Libri morali di Filodemo”, in: CErc 30, 119–124. Hahm (2006): “In Search of Aristo of Ceos”, in: SFODb, 179–215. Haussleiter (1964): Johannes Haussleiter, Zum Tode Heraklits von Ephesos, in: Altertum 10, 9–13. Ioppolo (1980): Anna M. Ioppolo, Aristone di Chio e lo Stoicismo antico, Naples. Ioppolo (1995): Anna M. Ioppolo, “Socrate nelle tradizioni accademico-scettica e pirroniana”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni (ed.), La tradizione socratica: Seminario di Studi, Naples, 89–123. Ioppolo (1996): Anna M. Ioppolo, “Il Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας: una polemica antiscettica in Filodemo?”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, 3 vols., Naples, II, 715–734. Jensen (1911): Christian Jensen, Philodemi Περὶ κακιῶν liber decimus, Leipzig. Kirk (19622): Geoffrey S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge (1st ed. 1954). Kleve (1986): Knut Kleve, “Scurra Atticus: The Epicurean View of Socrates”, in: Συζήτησις: Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante, 2 vols., Naples, I, 227–253. Knögel (1933): Wilhelm Knögel, Der Peripatetiker Ariston von Keos bei Philodem, Leipzig. Lefkowitz (1981): Mary R. Lefkowitz, Lives of the Greek Poets, Baltimore. Leo (1901): Friedrich Leo, Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form, Leipzig. Long (1975/1976): Anthony A. Long, “Heraclitus and Stoicism”, in: Philosophia 5–6, 133–156 [= Id., Stoic Studies, Cambridge 1996, 35–57]. Mansfeld (2005): Jaap Mansfeld, “Presocratics”, in: Phronesis 50, 335–345. Mansfeld (2009): Jaap Manfeld, Rev. of Serge N. Mouraviev, Heraclitea. Recensio III. Fragmenta Heraclitea : Textes, traductions et commentaire. B: Libri reliquiae superstites – Les fragments du livre d’Heraclite; III.3.B/i, Textus, versiones, apparatus I–III – Textes, traductions, apparatus I–III; III.3.B/ii, Apparatus IV–V: formae orationis – Langue et forme: apparats IV–V et schémas; III.3.B/iii, Ad lectiones adnotamenta – Annotations critiques (Sankt Augustin 2006), in: Mnemosyne 62, 113–116. Mejer (1978): Jørg Mejer, Diogenes Laërtius and his Hellenistic Background, Wiesbaden. Momigliano (19932): Arnaldo Momigliano, The Development of Greek Biography, Cambridge (MA)/London. Mondolfo/Tarán (1972): Rodolfo Mondolfo and Leonardo Tarán, Eraclito: Testimonianze e Imitazioni, Florence. Mouraviev (1987): Serge N. Mouraviev, “La vie d’Heráclite de Diogène Laërce : Analyse stratigraphique – Le texte de base – Un nouveau fragment d’Ariston de Céos?”, in: Phronesis 32, 1–33. Mouraviev (1996): Serge N. Mouraviev, “La Vie d’Heráclite de Diogène Laërce (II). Reconstruction du projet – Méthodes de travail et motivations – Structure du texte”, in: Maria S. Funghi (ed.), Ὁδοὶ διζήσιος: Le vie della ricerca: Studi in onore di Francesco Adorno, Florence, 371–383. Mouraviev (1999): Serge N. Mouraviev, Héraclite d’Éphèse : La tradition antique et médiévale, A. Témoignages et citations : 1. D’Épicharme à Philon d’Alexandrie, Sankt Augustin. Mouraviev (2000): Serge N. Mouraviev, Héraclite d’Éphèse : La tradition antique et médiévale, A. Témoignages et citations : 2. De Sénèque à Diogène Laërce, Sankt Augustin. Mouraviev (2003): Serge N. Mouraviev, Héraclite d’Éphèse : Les vestiges, 1. La Vie, la Mort et le Livre d’Héraclite : Textes et commentaires, Sankt Augustin. Nardelli (1984): Maria L. Nardelli, “L’ironia in Polistrato e Filodemo”, in: Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, 3 vols., Naples, II, 525–536.

9 Heraclitus’ Portrait in Diogenes Laërtius and Philodemus’ On Arrogance 

 247

Nardelli (2001): Jean-Fabrice Nardelli, Rev. of Serge N. Mouraviev, Héraclite d’Éphèse : La tradition antique et médiévale, A. Témoignages et citations : 1. D’Épicharme à Philon d’Alexandrie (Sankt Augustin 1999); Id., Héraclite d’Éphèse : La tradition antique et médiévale, A. Témoignages et citations : 2. De Sénèque à Diogène Laërce (Sankt Augustin 2000), in: Gaia 5, 168–177. Praechter (1913): Karl Praechter, “Zu Ariston von Chios”, in: Hermes 48, 476–480. Ranocchia (1999): Graziano Ranocchia, Aristone di Ceo o Aristone di Chio? Studio sull’autore del Perì toû kouphízein hyperephanías alla luce del PHerc. 1008, Tesi di laurea, Perugia. Ranocchia (2004): Graziano Ranocchia, Rev. of Serge N. Mouraviev, Héraclite d’Éphèse. La tradition antique et médiévale, A. Témoignages et citations: 3. De Plotin à Étienne d’Alexandrie (Sankt Augustin 2002); 4. De Maxime le Confesseur à Marsile Ficin (Sankt Augustin 2003); Id., Héraclite d’Éphèse. Les vestiges, 1. La Vie, la Mort et le Livre d’Héraclite. Textes et commentaires (Sankt Augustin 2003); 3. Les fragments du livre d’Héraclite: A. Le language de l’obscure. Introduction à la poétique des fragments (Sankt Augustin 2002), in: Elenchos 25, 447–461. Ranocchia (2007): Graziano Ranocchia, Aristone Sul modo di liberare dalla superbia nel decimo libro De vitiis di Filodemo, Florence. Ranocchia (2010): Graziano Ranocchia, “Il ritratto di Socrate nel De superbia di Filodemo (PHerc. 1008, coll. 21–23)”, in: Livio Rossetti and Alessandro Stavru (eds.), Socratica 2008: Studies in Ancient Socratic Literature, Bari, 299–320. Ranocchia (2011): Graziano Ranocchia, “Aristone di Chio in Stobeo e nella letteratura gnomologica”, in: Gretchen Reydams-Schils (ed.), Thinking Through Excerpts: Studies on Stobaeus, Turnhout, 339–386. Ranocchia (forthcoming): Graziano Ranocchia, “Un nuovo frammento adespoto della Commedia Antica (Philod. [de sup.] col. 13, 3–4 Ranocchia)”, in: SIFC (submitted). Ribbeck (1882): Otto Ribbeck, Alazon: Ein Beitrag zur Antiken Ethologie und zur Kenntniss der griechisch-römischen Komödie nebst übersetzung des plautinischen Miles gloriosus, Leipzig. Rose (1863): Valentin Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, Leipzig (repr. Hildesheim/New York 1971). Schorn (2004): Stefan Schorn, Satyros aus Kallatis: Sammlung der Fragmente mit Kommentar, Basel. Stowers (1981): Stanley K. Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans, Chico. Wehrli (19682): Fritz Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar, 6: Lykon und Ariston von Keos, Basel/Stuttgart (1st ed. 1952). Weiher (1914): Anton Weiher, Philosophen und Philosophenspott in der attischen Komödie, Diss. Munich. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1881): Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Antigonos von Karystos, Berlin. Zeller/Mondolfo (1961): Eduard Zeller, La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico (Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig 18925), I: I Presocratici; 4: Eraclito, ed. by Rodolfo Mondolfo, Florence.

Part IV: Empedocles

Mirjam E. Kotwick

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus Introduction Scholars of the Derveni Papyrus have given much attention to the clearly established influence early Greek thinkers such as Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, or Heraclitus had on the Derveni author.1 Empedocles, however, has not played any significant role in these investigations – and not without some reason. Given his Nous-cosmology, the Derveni author appears to align much more with Anaxagoras or Diogenes than with Empedocles. This led Gábor Betegh to conclude in his seminal study on the Derveni Papyrus that he “was unable to establish doctrinal correspondences” between the Derveni author and Empedocles.2 Only when scholars took into view the general “intellectual outlook”3 of the Derveni author, did they find and point to similarities between him and Empedocles. Empedocles can be seen as a kind of Orpheotelestes, for instance. As Christoph Riedweg points out, in 31 B 112 DK Empedocles describes himself as a ‘wandering priest’ who promises healing and purifications.4 Betegh states that Empedocles does not just adopt the “social and cultural role” of an Orpheo­ telestes; he even presents himself as a divine poet like Orpheus.5 Yet, apart from these rather general points of overlap between the persona of Empedocles’ Puri­ fications and the Derveni author there has been no investigation into whether we can after all detect traces of Empedocles’ Physika and his cosmological theory in the cosmological tenets of the Derveni author.6 1 Cf. Burkert (1968); Janko (1997); Sider (1997); Betegh (2004) 278–348. See also Burkert (2014) on Democritus and the Derveni Papyrus. 2 Betegh (2004) 278. 3 Betegh (2004) 278. See also Betegh (2001) 63–65. 4 Riedweg (1995). 5 Betegh (2004) 370–371. See also Betegh (2001). 6 In addition, and again from a more general perspective, one might ask whether the Derveni author’s allegorical interpretation of a mythical story as a physical account and Empedocles’ blending of myth and physics in his writings can be seen as two in some way parallel procedures: cf. Betegh (2001) 68. I will refrain from discussing this question here, since it deserves a paper of its own and should be investigated within the larger context of rationalistic approaches to myth in early Greek thought. I will here also refrain from addressing in depth the question whether Empedocles’ Mirjam E. Kotwick, The New School for Social Research, New York https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-011

252 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

In this paper I take a look at the relationship between Empedocles’ physical and cosmological thought and the Derveni author’s cosmology in order to see whether there really are not any “doctrinal correspondences” between the two.7 I will argue that there can indeed be found a trace of Empedoclean physics in the Derveni cosmology. The evidence for this can be gathered from both authors’ explanation of how particles combine into larger compounds. My claim is that the Derveni author’s explanation of how particles combine during the formation of the cosmos suggests that he relied on Empedocles’ description of the combination of elemental particles under the influence of Love. I claim that the Derveni author models his explanation of the combination of particles on Empedocles’ account of how Love unites elemental particles and that in doing daimonology (mainly in the Katharmoi) and the various mentions of daimones in the first columns of the Derveni Papyrus show any correspondence – a question that some scholars were inclined to affirm. Betegh (2004) 371 suggests that there is a link in terms of the structure of the works: “Both authors start out by focusing on the fate of the souls and introducing the main eschatological factors, and turn in a second step towards a general physical, cosmological account.” See also Betegh (2001) 65–66. Betegh’s assessment rests on the assumption that what we know as the first part of the Derveni Papyrus was also the first part of the original treatise (on the question whether our “first part” was the beginning of the treatise, see Janko [2016] 10–11). Janko (2005) 105–107 writes on the correspondence between the daimones in Empedocles and the Derveni Papyrus: “This [i.e. the meaning of daimones in col. 46 / VI of the Derveni Papyrus] is very different in detail from Empedocles, but becomes less so when viewed from a distance. For the new columns show that the author believed that souls pervade the world and are the same as daimones.” My own investigation into whether Empedocles’ daimones correspond with the daimones mentioned in the first part of the Derveni Papyrus led to the conclusion that they do not. In Empedocles, the term daimones has two different but structurally related referents. In the Purifications, the daimon is an exiled god who has committed bloodshed (B 112 and B 115) and who is punished through a series of incarnations into different mortal beings (B 117; cf. also B 127; see Primavesi [2008] and [2013] 713–721). In the Physika (B 59), daimones are the divine elements (B 6) that are being mixed to build different ephemeral beings (cf. 31 B 21.12 DK = Physika I 320; B 29, 31, 35.14; see Primavesi [2008] 255–265 and [2013] 707–709). On the correspondence between the daimones in the cosmic cycle of the Physics and the demonic cycle of the Purifications, see Primavesi (2013) 717–719; cf. also Laks (2005). In the Derveni Papyrus (col. 48 §24 J = VIII.5 KPT), the term daimon appears in a quotation from the Orphic poem (OF 5), where it refers to the god Protogonos (on which, see Santamaría [2016] 153–156). In the first part of the papyrus the daimones are described as “helpers of Justice,” and then as something like avenging spirits (see col. 43 §9 J = III.5–8 KPT). In col. 46 §17 J (= VI.1–8 KPT), the daimones are to be appeased by the Magoi’s incantations; according to the Derveni author, these daimones are souls (of the dead), which are also the addressees of sacrifices (cf. Henrichs [1984] 257, 262–263; Johnston [1999] 137–139; Ahmadi [2014] 491–497). Thus I find it difficult to see any substantial overlap between the term daimones in Empedocles and the Derveni Papyrus. 7 This paper deals with the question of how much Empedocles is in the Derveni Papyrus – not how much Orphism is in Empedocles (on that question, see Riedweg [1995] and Betegh [2001]) or how much Empedocles is in Orphism.

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 253

so he departs from his main cosmological models Anaxagoras and Diogenes. In making this claim, I take it as established that the Derveni author recycled the ideas of other Presocratic thinkers, such as Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia, and that the Derveni cosmology is thus a conglomeration of views that the author adopted and adapted from various early Greek philosophers. If a view that is (more or less) idiosyncratic to Empedocles is in some way present in the physical account of the Derveni author, then this overlap suggests that Empedocles was among the authors that the Derveni author used. Given that Anaxagoras is a contemporary of Empedocles and certainly was among the sources of the Derveni author, a clear overlap between Empedocles and the Derveni author points to a dependence of the latter on the former, rather than the former on the latter.

1 Empedocles’ account of how particles combine Two processes structure Empedocles’ cosmic cycle: a process of separation of elements (from the one to the many) and a process of combination of elements (from the many to the one).8 Love combines elements, leading to a state of total unification in the god Sphairos.9 Strife on the other hand dissolves the Sphairos and separates compounds of elements, leading to a state of total separation of four pure masses.10 Empedocles calls the cosmic force of Love by many names: Philie (Φιλίη) and Philotes (Φιλότης), which are personifications of nouns that describe the affection of love or friendship;11 Aphrodite (Ἀφροδίτη), the goddess of love;12 and

8 Empedocles’ conception of “elements” (which he calls “roots”) is a matter of some debate. For my purposes I take Empedocles’ elements to be roughly the same kind of basic building block as Anaxagoras’ basic ingredients (e.g., the hot and the cold) or the Derveni author’s “things that are”: they come in the format of particles that can be combined together and can be separated from one another. 9 Phys. 1.237–239 Primavesi (= 31 B 17.6–8 DK): καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, / ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, / ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει. “And these [sc. the elements] incessantly exchange their places continually, sometimes by Love all coming together into one, sometimes again each one carried off by the hatred of Strife.” Translations of Empedocles are by EGPh, unless otherwise stated. 10 Phys. 1.315–317 Primavesi (= 31 B 21.7–8 DK): ἐν δὲ Κότωι διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδρα πάντα πέλονται, / σὺν δ’ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται. “Under Hatred, all things are divided in form and are separated, while under Love they come together and desire each other.” On the timetable of the cosmic cycle, see Primavesi (2013) 704–707. 11 Phys. 1.238, 251, 289, 316 Primavesi (= 31 B 18, B 19, B 20.2, B 21.8, B 26.5, B 35.4, 13 DK). 12 31 B 17.24 (= Phys. 1.255 Primavesi), B 71, B 86, B 87 DK. In Hesiod’s Theogony (175–206), Aphrodite is born from the foam that surrounds Ouranos’ genital after it had fallen into the sea,

254 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

Harmonia (Ἁρμονίη), a personification of a word that describes the (means of) joining two or more things into one.13 In order to understand how compounds come about in the Empedoclean cosmos it is helpful to look at how Love and Strife as well as the elements themselves behave. There appears to be a division of labor between Love and Strife. While Love causes elements to combine into larger compounds and, in the end, the all-containing god Sphairos, Strife dissolves Love’s combinations and so brings about four completely separated masses of elements. Beginning with Aristotle,14 however, critical readers of Empedocles were dissatisfied with the division of labor between Love and Strife. According to Aristotle’s criticism, both cosmic forces in different ways combine and separate compounds, which makes one of them superfluous. Both bring about compounds: Love brings about elemental compounds and Strife brings about four masses. And both destroy compounds: Strife dissolves the compounds made by Love, and Love destroys the four cleanly separated masses and eventually all compounds by uniting them to the Sphairos. In order to defend and make sense of Empedocles’ distinction between the effect of Love and the effect of Strife, one has to look more closely not just at the actions of the two forces, but also at the objects that they combine and dissolve. Those objects are elements that are – pace Aristotle – not mere atoms, but elements that naturally behave in a certain way.15 Love unites heterogene­ ous elements into compounds, and in doing so she also separates or destroys after Kronos had cut it off. In B 128 Empedocles calls Aphrodite Κύπρις βασίλεια, relating her to Cyprus, as does Hesiod in Theog. 193–200. 13 31 B 27 and B 96 DK. Cf. also B 23.4 and B 122.2. The word ἁρμονία derives from the root ἀρ- (cf. ἀραρίσκω “to join,” “to fit together”). In the language of epic poetry, which Empedocles employs in his writings, ἁρμονία and verbs deriving from the root ἀρ- are used in a quite mechanical sense. In Od. 5.247–248, for instance, ἁρμονία and cognate words are used to describe how the bolts and fastenings join together in Odysseus’ raft (τέτρηνεν δ’ ἄρα πάντα καὶ ἥρμοσεν ἀλλήλοισι, / γόμφοισιν δ’ ἄρα τήν γε καὶ ἁρμονίῃσιν ἄρασσεν, “and he bored all the pieces and fitted them to each other, and he fit it (sc. the raft) together with bolts and fastenings”). A strong mechanical connotation is preserved in Empedocles’ use of the word (31 B 96.3–4 DK: τὰ δ’ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο / Ἁρμονίης κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηθεν, “And they became white bones fitted together marvelously by Harmony’s adhesives.” See also B 71, where Empedocles blends the works of Harmonia and Aphrodite when speaking of the creatures of our world as συναρμοσθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτηι, “fitted together by Aphrodite.” 14 See Arist. Metaph. 1.4.985a23–29 (= 31 A 37 DK); cf. also ibid. 1.8.989a25–26 and 3.4.1000b9–12. 15 See Primavesi (2012) 235–239 and Cherniss (1935) 190–191. Aristotle’s criticism rests on his conception of Empedocles’ elements according to which the elements are atoms that have no innate tendency to unite or separate. Aristotle seems to have derived this conception from the fact that Empedocles’ four elements do not change into one another (as Aristotle’s simple

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 255

conglomerates of homogeneous elements. Heterogeneous elements on their own are disinclined to combine;16 and so in joining unlike elements, Love acts against the natural inclination of those elements. Strife, on the other hand, dissolves compounds of heterogeneous elements. This dissolution of heterogeneous compounds sets free the elements and allows them to follow their innate tendency, which is to combine according to the principle of ‘like to like.’ 17 Strife dissolves the bonds that Love created among heterogeneous elements, and so creates the conditions whereby the elements move towards their like according to their natural inclination. Love, on the other hand, creates the conditions whereby the elements move against their natural inclination, and it does this in an ingenious way: she makes heterogeneous elements alike to each other, as Empedocles says explicitly in 31 B 22.5 DK: ὁμοιωθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτηι, “made alike by Aphrodite.” And so under the influence of Love the elements want to combine with what they otherwise would not want to combine with. To summarize the points of Empedocles’ view on the combination of elements, one can say that there are two ways in which elements combine: like elements combine on their own, and unlike elements combine under the influence of Love.

2 The Derveni author’s account of how particles combine The Derveni author’s view on how τὰ ὄντα, the existing things, combine in order to build larger compounds is expressed in col. 61 J (= XXI KPT). This view is expressed in the Derveni author’s interpretation of a passage in the Orphic poem that features the goddesses Aphrodite, Peitho, and Harmonia. The specific verse(s) about these goddesses must have been quoted at the end of col. 60 J (= XX KPT), which is lost to us. However, based on what we know about the events

bodies do) but – like atoms – are irreducible elements (cf. Arist. Metaph. 1.8.989a20–30; Cael. 3.6.304b23–305a14). 16 See 31 B 22.6–9 DK. 17 The principle of like-to-like is prominent in early Greek thought. See Müller (1965) ix–xix. On the principle of like-to-like in Empedocles, see 31 B 22 DK (= fr. 58 MansPr), B 37 (= fr. 84 MansPr), B 62 Nachtrag (= Pl. Lys. 214b2–5 = fr. 60 MansPr); A 20a (= Arist. Eth. Eud. 7.1.1235a9–12: τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον = fr. 59 MansPr), B 90 (= fr. 120 MansPr); cf. also B 110.8–9 (= fr. 125 MansPr). See Solmsen (1965) 134; Primavesi (2013) 698–702. See also Müller (1965) 27–65; O’Brien (1969) 305–313; Pierris (2005b) 213–215.

256 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

mentioned in earlier citations of the Orphic poem, we can assume that the original passage spoke about Aphrodite’s birth through Zeus, who after having swallowed the entire world brings about a new world (gods included). I quote the passage in full:18 [61] οὔτε τὸ ψυχ[ρὸν] τῶι ψυχρῶι. “θόρ{ν}ηι” δὲ λέγ[ων] δηλοῖ, [2] ὅτι ἐν τῶι ἀέρι κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα ἐκινεῖτο [3] καὶ ἐθόρνυτο, θορνύμενα δ’ ἕκατα συνεστάθη [4] πρὸς ἄλληλα· μέχρι δὲ τούτου ἐθόρνυτο, μέχρι [5] ἕκαστον ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σύνηθες. §72 “Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία” [6] καὶ “Ζεὺς” καὶ {αφροδισιαζειν κ̣αι θορνυσθαι και} “Πειθὼ” [7] καὶ “Ἁρμονία” τῶι αὐτῶι θεῶι ὄνομα κεῖται. ἀνὴρ [8] γυναικὶ μισγόμενος “ἀφροδισιάζειν” λέγετα̣ι κατὰ [9] φάτιν. §73 τῶν γὰρ̣ νῦν ἐόντων μιχθέντων ἀλλ̣[ή]λοις [10] “Ἀφροδίτη” ὠνο̣μάσθη, “Πειθὼ” δ’, ὅτι εἶξεν τὰ ἐ[ό]ντα [11] ἀλλήλ̣ο̣[ι]σι̣ν̣ (“ε̣[ἴ]κειν” δὲ καὶ “πείθειν” τὸ αὐτόν̣), “[Ἁ]ρμονία” δέ, [12] ὅτι πο[λλὰ “προσή]ρμοσε” τῶν ἐόντων ἑκάστω[ι]. nor the cold with the cold. He [Orpheus] by saying “he/she/it leaps” makes clear that they [i.e. the existing things] were moving in the air as small particles and were leaping. By leaping they all united with one another. They leaped onto one another until each came to its familiar. §72 Ouranian Aphrodite, Zeus, Persuasion, and Harmony are all names for the same god. When a man sleeps with a woman he is said in common parlance to “aphrodize” and “leap onto”. §73 For, when the things that exist now were mixed with one another, (the god) was named “Aphrodite”; and “Persuasion,” because the existing things gave way to each other (“giving way” and “persuade” are the same); and “Harmony,” because she fitted many of the existing things together with another.

Does this passage and the description of how particles combine reveal an Empedoclean influence on the Derveni author? In order to answer this question, we must first analyze the passage in its own right and then compare it with Empedocles’ views. The conventional reading of this passage is as follows:19 col. 61 J (= XXI KPT) starts with a fragmentary phrase that states that the cold does not do something to or with the cold (οὔτε τὸ ψυχ[ρὸν] τῶι ψυχρῶι). This phrase seems to be the end of a sentence. What is clear on the basis of the preserved phrase is that the author negates a certain action happening between like (in this case, cold) entities. Given the context in the rest of the column it seems reasonable to assume that the author

18 Quotations of the Derveni Papyrus are from the new text by Richard Janko as it appears in Kotwick (2017); line numbers are added here. On the new column numbering, see Janko (2016) 11–13. Translations are my own. 19 See Burkert (1997) 169; Betegh (2004) 255–256; Kouremenos (2006) 242–251; McKirahan (2012) 93–94.

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 257

says that cold elements do not combine with cold elements.20 According to the conventional reading, this negation of like-to-like combinations characterizes a state preceding the cosmogony of our world.21 In the next sentence (ll. 1–4, “θόρ{ν}ηι”22 δὲ κτλ.), the Derveni author describes a new stage.23 At this stage, the particles are moving in the air and jumping, and in doing so they unite with each other. As the following sentence in ll. 4–5 indicates, during this first stage of unification particles combine with each other whenever they meet their σύνηθες, or their “like,” as the adjective is mostly translated and understood in this passage.24 But there is a second stage of unification (ll. 5–7).25 The Derveni author explains this second stage through his allegorical interpretation of the Orphic gods Aphrodite, Zeus, Harmonia, and Peitho. This time, unlike elements combine (ll. 9–11): “Aphrodite” is used to term the combination and mixing of the elements that brings about our world; “Peitho” is used to term the manner in which those particles “give way” to each other; and “Harmonia” is used to term the manner in which the particles connect. This conventional reading of col. 61 J (= XXI KPT) is problematic in the following two respects. First, the assumption that there is a change from a pre-cosmogonic stage, in which like does not attract like, to a cosmogonic stage, in which like does attract like. Nothing in ll. 1–2 suggests that such a change occurred. The connection between the sentences is simply “θόρ{ν}ηι” δὲ (…), which suggests a continuation of an ongoing discussion rather than the introduction of an entirely new stage in the cosmogony. If that is true, then the second sentence (just as the first one does) speaks of a stage in which like does not attract like. Since it is still a stage in which particles are combining, we must assume it is a stage in which unlike elements combine. This leads to the second problematic aspect of the conventional reading. For, if we take the first half of l. 1 to describe how like does not combine with like, and the second half of l. 1 up to l. 5 to describe how elements do combine with their likes, we will

20 Janko (2001) 28 n. 164 suggests: (…), ὅτε συνεστάθη οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν τῶι θερμῶι] οὔτε τὸ ψυχ[ρὸν] τῶι ψυχρῶι and translates this as: “when neither the hot had come together with the hot nor the cold with the cold” (Janko [2002] 41 and 43). 21 Betegh (2004) 255: “possibly refers to the initial state.” Kouremenos (2006) 242: “before the cosmogony.” 22 The meaning of θόρ{ν}ηι in the Orphic poem is debated. For an overview, see Kotwick (2017) 289–291. 23 Betegh (2004) 255. 24 Janko (2001) 29 and (2002) 43: “its like”; Betegh (2004) 45 and 255–256: “its like”; KPT (“its like”); McKirahan (20102) 466: “its like.” The translation by Laks/Most (1997) 19 and EGPh VI.1, 421 is more accurate: “its fellow.” Jourdan (2003) 21 followed the latter (translating to “sa partenaire”), but in her commentary (91) she undoes this understanding by saying: “le processus constitutive décrit est régi par le principe de similitude, le semblable s’unissant vraisemblablement au semblable.” 25 Kouremenos (2006) 250.

258 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

then have to hypothesize a third stage (beginning at the end of l. 5) in which Aphrodite and the other goddesses are in effect. The goddesses must then represent a new stage because they obviously combine unlike particles into compounds that bring about our present world (τῶν γὰρ̣ νῦν ἐόντων μιχθέντων),26 as can be seen by the fact that our world consists of compounds of heterogeneous elements. In short, the conventional reading hypothesizes a significant change from a pre-cosmogonic stage to a cosmogonic stage, and is thus forced to hypothesize that col. 61 describes a three-stage-scenario – yet both assumptions seem to lack sufficient evidence in the text. The backbone of the conventional reading is the word σύνηθες. As I pointed out above, it is usually taken to mean “like.”27 If the word means “like,” then indeed the leaping is happening between like elements and we are forced to believe that col. 61 contains at least three stages because (i) in the first half of l. 1 the combination of likes is explicitly denied, and (ii) the combination of likes does not lead us to the constitution of our world. But what does σύνηθες actually mean? According to LSJ, it means “to be accustomed to”28 and “to live together,” and hence “to be acquainted, familiar, a friend.”29 True, the ancients tend to see friendship as something that happens between ‘likes.’ Aristotle notes, for instance, that friendship (between a former 26 Kouremenos (2006) 250. 27 This interpretation of σύνηθες was first suggested by Burkert (1968) 98 n. 9: “im Sinne des Prinzips ‘Gleiches zu Gleichem’.” 28 The only evidence for σύνηθες expressing “likeness” (“like each other in habits”) that LSJ provide is Thuc. 1.71.6: βουλομένων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμων εἶναι μενοῦμεν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅσια ἂν ποιοῖμεν μεταβαλλόμενοι οὔτε ξυνηθεστέρους ἂν ἄλλους εὕροιμεν, “If you are willing to show energy, we will stand by you; for we would then have no sanction for changing alliances, nor would we find others who are more congenial.” (transl. by S. Lattimore). The interpretation of συνήθης as “like each other in habits” (or “congenial” understood as stressing similarity in character) is not warranted by the context of this passage. The Corinthians criticize the Spartans for their passive behavior regarding the Athenian aggression. The sentence describing the Spartans as συνήθης comes at the end of the speech and is intended to underline the alliance between Corinth and Sparta (“congenial” in the sense of “pleasant,” “friendly”) rather than making a point about characteristics that both share. 29 See LSJ s.v. συνήθης. The noun ἦθος can mean “accustomed place,” “custom,” or “character.” The earliest occurrence of the adjective συνήθης (according to a TLG-search) is in Hes. Theog. 230, where among the children of Eris (“Strife”) Lawlessness and Recklessness are named and described as συνήθης to each other: Δυσνομίην τ’ Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλῃσιν. Most translates: “Lawlessness and Recklessness, much like one another.” However, the thought here seems not so much to be that these two are alike – after all they are two distinct things, one describing a state of a person, the other a state of a society – but rather that they often co-occur or cause each other: reckless human beings, i.e. those who are caught by ἄτη, bring about lawlessness within their group (on δυσνομίη, see also Solon’s fr. 4.31 West).

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 259

lover and his beloved) can persist when familiarity (ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας) makes them love their characters, which are alike (ὁμοήθεις).30 Yet the fact that Aristotle adds ὁμοήθεις ὄντες, “these being alike” clearly shows that likeness is not already implied in συνήθεια. For, συνήθεια first and foremost means “familiarity,” and indicates likeness only in some derived sense, while the word for “alike” is ὁμοήθης (not συνήθης!).31 Further, consider what Plato writes in passages in the Crito and Republic.32 At Crito 43a, Crito remarks that Socrates’ prison guard always treated him well. Crito refers to him as συνήθης. Clearly, there is no similarity implied.33 Second, in Resp. 2.375e, Plato writes the following: οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἠ ̑θος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πρᾳοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας τοὐναντίον. “You surely have observed in well-bread hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know.”34

In this passage, being familiar (συνήθης) is paired with being known (γνώριμος) and contrasted with being unknown (ἀγνώς). Similarity is not the basis for familiarity. Thus, when we find σύνηθες in the Derveni Papyrus it seems more correct to take it to mean that the combining particles are familiar and friendly with one another rather than that they are alike to one another. Such an interpretation fits well with the sentence given in l. 5, where we hear that Aphrodite causes the unification. And so one might take σύνηθες to describe the effect that “Aphrodite” brings about among the elements: she neither causes combination of random 30 Arist. Eth. Nic. 8.4.1157a10–12: πολλοὶ δ’ αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες, “But many lovers on the other hand are constant, if familiarity has led them to love each other’s characters, these being alike.” (transl. by W. D. Ross). 31 See also Eur. Alc. 40. Here Apollo describes his bow as σύνηθες – it is customary to carry his bow and his bow is dear to him, but not like him. 32 See also Pl. Grg. 510b1–c8: φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. (…) Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὤν (…), “I think that the one man who’s a friend of another most of all is the one whom the men of old and the wise call a friend, according to the saying of ‘like to like.’ (…) This leaves only a man of like character, (…) to be such a man a friend worth mentioning” (transl. by D. J. Zeyl, but changed). Here, Socrates transfers the Presocratic rule of like-to-like into the ethical realm. 33 Pl. Cri. 43a: συνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ, “He knows me by now, Socrates, I come here so often. And besides I’ve done him a good turn.” (transl. by Ch. D. Ch. Reeve). 34 Transl. by P. Shorey.

260 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

particles nor blind attraction of like to like, but an ‘enforced’ (“Peitho”) combination of various kinds of things that fit (“Harmonia”) and are friendly and dear toward (σύνηθες) each other.35 This new understanding of the passage solves all problems of the conventional reading and it does not require us to hypothesize three different stages in col. 61. The Derveni author simply gives his account of the combination of particles under the influence of Nous that brings about our world. In the first fragmentarily preserved line of col. 61, the author mentions that this unification process is not the simple one of like-to-like (e.g., in cold to cold). In ll. 1–5, we get a detailed description of the process, a description that is derived from words and names in the Orphic poem. Particles are in motion and leap, and combination happens when portions of things meet that are friendly to each other and that fit to one another. As the Derveni author’s interpretation of the Orphic gods in the subsequent lines (col. 61.5–12) makes clear, “Aphrodite,” “Peitho,” and “Harmonia” are the driving forces behind this mechanism: “Aphrodite” means that Nous makes heterogeneous things to like each other; “Peitho” means that Nous uses active force to make particles give way to each other; and “Harmonia” means that Nous combines het­ erogeneous things into larger compounds by making them fit to each other. Nous brings about our world by combining heterogeneous (rather than homo­ geneous) things. This understanding of Nous’ cosmic effect becomes all the more plausible when we look at a passage in col. 65 J (= XXV KPT). From this we can infer that Nous not only combines heterogeneous things, but also prevents the combination of homogeneous or like things. In col. 65, the Derveni author speaks about the stars, which consist of the same material as the sun, namely fire. He says: Col. 65 §§89–90 J (= XXV.3–9 KPT): ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νῦν ἐν τῶι ἀέρι ἑκὰς ἀλλήλων αἰωρούμεν. ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἡμέρης ἄδηλ’ ἐσ. τὶν ὑ[π]ὸ̣ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπικρατούμενα, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐόντα δῆλά ἐστιν, ἐπικρατεῖται δὲ διὰ σμικ[ρ]ότητα. αἰωρεῖται δ’ αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν ἀνάγκηι, ὡς ἂν μὴ συνίηι πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ μή, συνέλθοι ἁλέα ὅσα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη. “And there are also other particles that are now floating in the air far away from each other. But they are invisible at daytime, because they are dominated by the sun, yet during the night they exist visibly; they are dominated because of their small size. Each of them floats under constraint, so that they do not unite with each other. For otherwise, all those (particles) which have the same capacity as the constituents of the sun would unite into a mass.”

35 This understanding of συνήθης fits well with (and is reinforced by) the meaning of the corresponding noun συνήθεια (“intimacy,” “sexual intercourse,” “habit, custom”) as well as the adjective expressing the opposite ἀσυνήθης (“unaccustomed” or “unfamiliar”). The aspect of likeness is not present in these two words.

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 261

According to the Derveni author, Nous/air prevents the stars from uniting with one another. All stars are made of the same material that the sun is – they are made of the same kind of fire. If the stars were left to themselves and were not interfered with, they would naturally unite with one another, because they are alike and – so the underlying assumption – like is attracted to like. Their likeness is here not expressed through the adjective ὅμοιος (or a similar word) but through the expression τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν, “to have the same capacity.” That such like particles want to combine is plain to see in the case of the sun whose constituents are alike fire particles. The unification of the stars would lead to the catastrophic result of a super-sun. But this is not what Nous wants for his cosmos.36 Therefore, Nous must intervene and hold the stars apart under constraint (ἐν ἀνάγκηι) against their natural inclination. Now, the Derveni author identifies Nous with air, and Nous’ effort to prevent the fiery stars from merging consists in air’s regulation of how things are floating (αἰωρεῖται) in it. What happened at the beginning of the cosmos is in some way similar: Nous extracted fire from the primordial fire-mass, thus separating like things from one another.37 And so it fits very well with Nous’ overall cosmogonic strategy that “Aphrodite” – who, as we saw, is just another name for the effect of Nous – joins heterogeneous things to one another. The like-to-like movement is solely inherent in the things themselves, and the unlike-to-unlike movement has a source external to the things themselves.

3 A link between Empedocles and the Derveni Papyrus? We can now return to Empedocles, and we can easily see how closely related the Derveni author’s account of the combination of particles into complex compounds is to Empedocles. There are four salient points of agreement. First, both thinkers associate or represent the cosmic combination of particles with the mythical goddesses Aphrodite and Harmonia.38

36 Col. 65 §91 J (= XXV.8–12 KPT): τὰ νῦν ἐόντα ὁ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ἤθε̣λεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν ἥλιον. ἐποίησε δὲ τοιοῦτον καὶ τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον, οἷος ἐν ἀρχῆι τοῦ λόγου διηγεῖ̣τ̣α̣ι, “If the god had not wanted that the present things exist, he would not have made the sun. But he made it of such a kind and of such size, as is explained at the beginning of the story.” 37 Col. 49 §27 J (= IX.5–8 KPT). 38 One could object to this similarity by pointing out that the Derveni author only interprets Aphrodite, a figure in the Orphic poem, whereas Empedocles makes Aphrodite a character in

262 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

Second, the particles that are unified through Aphrodite and Harmonia are heterogeneous or unlike particles. The unlike particles, which normally resist unification, are made to desire each other only through the influence of Aphrodite (and made to combine with each other through the power of Harmonia): in the language of the Derveni author, they are συνήθης. Although we do not find the word συνήθης in the extant fragments of Empedocles, in B 22 he interestingly describes those elements that are enemies of “birth, mixture, and molded forms”39 and are thus not at all under the influence of Love (but rather borne by Strife: Νεικεογεννήτοισιν) as ἀ-ήθης “unwonted,” “strange” (B 22.8: πάντῃ συγγίνεσθαι ἀήθεα “in every way strangers to unification”). Since Empedocles used ἀ-ήθης to describe the elements under Strife and thus in the situation opposite to the rule of Love, he could very well have used συν-ήθης to describe the opposite situation (i.e. the elements under the influence of Love). With this Empedoclean background in place, the Derveni author’s usage of the word συν-ήθης appears to term quite fittingly the combining particles, that is to say particles in a situation that is opposite to what Empedocles terms ἀ-ήθης. Third, the successful combination of particles is a combination of particles that fit together. As we have seen above, both authors express this idea through the goddess Harmonia. The idea of fitness is expressed in another Empedoclean passage, which I would like to add here and compare with the wording in the Derveni Papyrus. Empedocles says that in the second zoogonic stage, which takes place under the rule of Love,40 creatures survive only when fitting parts combine. Simplicius paraphrases Empedocles’ verse and says (in Phys. 372.6–9 Diels; ad B 61; EGPh V.2, D 152): καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κεφαλὴ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώματι συνελθοῦσα σῴζεσθαι ποιεῖ τὸ ὅλον, τῷ δὲ τοῦ βοὸς οὐ συναρμόζει καὶ διόλλυται. ὅσα γὰρ μὴ κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον συνῆλθε λόγον, ἐφθάρη. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ νῦν πάντα συμβαίνει.

his story. This difference, however, is irrelevant for my present purpose since both authors take “Aphrodite” to signify a specific cosmological force – and I am here interested in this significance that both ascribe to “Aphrodite.” 39 Laks/Most translate the lines (B 22.6–7) ἐχθρὰ πλεῖστον ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων διέχουσι μάλιστα / γέννῃ τε κρήσει τε καὶ εἴδεσιν ἐκμακτοῖσι as “Enemies keep most distant from one another in birth, mixture, and molded forms.” It seems to be difficult to understand how elements can be most distant, but at the same time be borne, mixed, or molded together (“in birth […]”). It might therefore be more natural to take the datives γέννῃ τε κρήσει τε καὶ εἴδεσιν ἐκμακτοῖσι with ἐχθρὰ in the sense of “being enemies to birth, mixture and molded forms” (i.e. birth, mixture, etc. do not even occur because the elements are most distant to each other). 40 Cf. 31 B 59–61 DK.

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 263

And a human head, coming together with a human body, ensures the survival of the whole, but with a cow’s [sc. body] it is not adopted and is destroyed. For whatever did not come together according to an appropriate relation perished. It is in the same way that everything happens now too.

Compare such statements with what we find in the Derveni Papyrus: μέχρι ἕκαστον ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σύνηθες. The word συνήθης might very well also capture the notion of “fit” or “relative” (κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον συνῆλθε λόγον). Fourth, particles have the natural tendency to move toward like particles, and, what is more, there exists an external force – Love for Empedocles, Nous for the Derveni author, each represented by Aphrodite – that acts contrary to this natural tendency. Interestingly, both authors illustrate the natural tendency of like-tolike through an account of the motion of fiery particles: see Derveni Papyrus col. 65 §90 (quoted above) and Empedocles, for instance, 31 B 62.6 DK: πῦρ (…) θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι.41 Their accounts of fiery particles call attention to a further, quite specific point of agreement: both authors pun on ἥλιος. The Derveni author calls the fiery particles that could potentially be built into a second sun ἁλέα, that is a “heap” (ion. ἁλής “thronged,” “amassed,” att. ἁθρόος).42 Empedocles calls the sun ὁ ἁλισθείς, that is, “gathered together” or “bundle” of rays.43 Are these points of agreement between Empedocles’ concept of Aphrodite and the Derveni author’s account of how particles combine strong enough to warrant the conclusion that the Derveni author shaped his ideas according to what he found in Empedocles’ physical theory? A possible objection to drawing this conclusion could be that the notion of Aphrodite and Harmonia representing universal forces that unify unlike things is not unique to Empedocles, and consequently that the Derveni author could have taken his inspiration from somewhere else. According to Aristotle, for instance, already Hesiod and Parmenides posited the power of love (may it be in the figure of Eros or Aphrodite) as a cosmic force that triggers the formation of the world.44 Another more explicit example from

41 See also 31 B 110.8–9 and A 37 DK. 42 Janko (2001) 31 n. 180. 43 31 B 41 DK. See also Diog. Laërt. 8.77 (= 31 A 1 DK = EGPh V.2, D 128): καὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιόν φησι πυρὸς ἄθροισμα μέγα, “and he says that the sun is a large aggregate of fire.” 44 Arist. Metaph. 1.4.984b23–30: ὑποπτεύσειε δ’ ἄν τις Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος ἔρωτα ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχήν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν “πρώτιστον μέν” φησιν “ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων,” Ἡσίοδος δὲ “πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ’, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα | γαῖ’ εὐρύστερνος ... | ἠδ’ ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν,” ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τιν’ αἰτίαν ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνάξει τὰ πράγματα, “One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing – or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as a principle, as Parmenides does;

264 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

the Presocratic tradition can be found in the fragments of Philolaus of Croton (5th cent. BC).45 In 44 B 1 DK, Philolaus describes the nature in the cosmos (ἁ φύσις δ’ ἐν τῶι κόσμωι) as fitted together (ἁρμόχθη) out of unlimited and limiting things (ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων).46 In 44 B 6 DK, he gives a more detailed description of this process of fitting together these unlike things:47 ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ’ ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἁρμονία ἐπεγένετο ᾡτινιῶν ἄν τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ †ἰσοταχῆ† ἀνάγκα τᾷ τοιαύτᾳ ἁρμονίᾳ συγκεκλεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι. But since the principles existed, not being similar nor related as kindred, it would have been impossible for them to be arranged in a world if a harmony (harmonia) had not supervened, in whatever way this came about. Therefore the things that are similar and related as kindred had no need at all of harmony (harmonia), but as for the ones that are dissimilar and neither related as kindred nor †as equally fast†, it is necessary that these things be connected by this kind of harmony (harmonia) if they are going to maintain themselves in the world.

The two principles (i.e., καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων, the limiting ones and the unlimited ones) are highlighted as being unlike each other and so need the force of Harmonia to fit together. Unlimiteds and limiters have to be fitted together for the world to come about. The overlap between 44 B 6 DK and the ideas we found in Empedocles and the Derveni Papyrus is, at least on a general level, plain to see: like things fit together by themselves, whereas unlike things require an external force, such as Harmonia; the process of fitting together happens at the beginning of the formation of the cosmos. However, there are also clear differences. First, Aphrodite or Love does not play a role in Philolaus’ account. Second, the things that are described as being unlike and that are fitted together by Harmonia are of a different kind in Philolaus from those in Empedocles and the Derveni Papyrus. While Empedocles and the Derveni author speak explicitly of material elemental particles (i.e., earth, air, fire, and water in Empedocles, and “the things that are,”

for he, in constructing the genesis of the universe, says: – ‘Love first of all the Gods she planned.’ [28 B 13 DK] And Hesiod says: – ‘First of all things was chaos made, and then broad-breasted earth, and love that foremost is among all the immortals’ [Theog. 116–117, 120], which implies that among existing things there must be a cause which will move things and bring them together” (transl. by W. D. Ross). For Parmenides, cf. also 28 B 18 and 20 DK. On Eros in Hesiod, see Most (2013). On Eros and Aphrodite in Parmenides, see Vassallo (2016). 45 I am thankful to Leonid Zhmud for making me aware of this fragment at the workshop in Trier. 46 On limiters and unlimiteds in Philolaus’ philosophy, see Huffman (1993) 37–53. 47 Text and translation by A. Laks and G. W. Most.: EGPh IV.1, 12 D 5.

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 265

of which “the cold” is given as an example, in the Derveni Papyrus), Philolaus’ more abstract principles of unlimiteds and limiters, whatever they are exactly,48 certainly cannot be reduced to material elements.49 This can also be seen in 44 B 6.10–18 DK:50 here Philolaus analyzes the ἁρμονίας μέγεθος (“size of harmonia” or “size of the fitting together”) by means of musical scales.51 These differences distinguish Philolaus from Empedocles and the Derveni author, and at the same time underline once more the close relation between the latter two. Both use the principle of like-to-like and the effect of Aphrodite and Harmonia52 to explain how our world is built out of combinations of heterogeneous material particles. By contrast, Philolaus seems to apply the Presocratic concept of like-to-like attraction and harmony’s power to a more abstract conception of the world and its principles. In any case, the comparison with Philolaus indicates that the idea of a principle or goddess (may it be Aphrodite, Love, or Harmonia) that is supposed to explain how unlike things combine with one another was popular in Presocratic thought. Among those thinkers were also Empedocles and the Derveni author. The overlap that can be seen in their specific elaboration of this idea suggests that the Derveni author took inspiration from Empedocles. It’s clearly possible that the Derveni author could have followed Empedocles. Important to consider is whether the Derveni author would have had a good reason to follow Empedocles. I can see two reasons why the Derveni author would indeed depart from Anaxagoras, whom he follows in many other aspects of his cosmology, and draw from Empedocles when crafting his account of how the combination of particles at the beginning of the cosmogonic process led to the constitution of our world. The first reason comes from the demands placed on the Derveni author as an interpreter of the Orphic poem. Among the Derveni author’s efforts throughout his treatise is to show how Orpheus’ mythical story contains a physical account of the origins of the universe. Accordingly, when the Derveni author encounters 48 Huffman (1993) 37: “Philolaus simply does not tell us what he means by limiters and unlimiteds.” 49 Huffman (1993) 51; Graham (2014) 49–54. 50 These lines are presented in DK (based on the evidence in Stobaeus) as part of B 6 (although separated by a dash), but are actually an independent fragment. See Philolaus’ fr. 6a Huffman (= 44 B 6 DK) and Huffman (1993) 156–160 on the connection of fr. 6 Huffman (= 44 B 4 DK, par­ tim) and fr. 6a Huffman. 51 Huffman (1993) 44–45. Recently, Sassi (2015) argues that already in Heraclitus harmony has a musical meaning and that this could have influenced Philolaus’ usage of the term harmonia. 52 Or Nous, whom the mythical names Aphrodite and Harmonia represent according to the Derveni author.

266 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

the figures of Aphrodite, Harmonia, and Peitho in the Orphic poem he comments upon, he needs to develop a physical account that accommodates them. Empedocles’ Physika provide a prime example of how this can be done. In Empedocles’ physical account, the Derveni author finds Aphrodite and Harmonia representing the unifying effect that Love has on (heterogeneous) elemental particles. The second reason relates to the first, and it is that Anaxagoras’ cosmology of the early stages of the universe is insufficient, at least from the perspective that the Derveni author takes as an interpreter of the Orphic poem. In Anaxagoras’ account (as it appears in our fragments), no force that makes unlike particles combine with one another plays any significant role in the early stages of the cosmogonic process. In Anaxagoras’ story of how the universe begins to take shape, the focus is clearly on Nous and Nous’ setting off a rotary motion that effects a separating out of things from the original complete mixture (see 59 B 12–14 DK).53 Fragment 59 B 13 DK shows that the process effected by Nous’ movement is first and foremost separation (Simpl. In Phys. 300.29–301.1 Diels):54 ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν προσχρῆται (sc. τῷ νῷ), δῆλον, εἴπερ τὴν γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἔκκρισιν εἶναί φησι, τὴν δὲ ἔκκρισιν ὑπὸ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως αἴτιον εἶναι τὸν νοῦν. λέγει γὰρ οὕτως Ἀναξαγόρας· [59 B 13 DK] καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη· κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῶι μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι. But that he [sc. Anaxagoras] does use mind55 is obvious, because he says that generation is nothing other than separating out and that separation is due to motion, and Nous is the cause of motion. For he says: “And when mind began to cause motion, there was separating out from all that was moving, and whatever mind moved, all this was separated. But the rotation of the things that were moving and separating resulted in the production of a much greater separating.”

The basic steps in Anaxagoras’ cosmology towards building the world seem to be the following:56 starting from a mixture of everything, separation (due to rotation) and like-to-like movement bring about the basic features of our world (59 B 14–16

53 See also Curd (2007) 9–10. 54 I include in my quote the preceding lines in Simplicius’ commentary (see 59 B 13 DK), which are not part of EGPh V.2, D 29b and which I therefore translate myself; the rest of the translation is by A. Laks and G. W. Most. 55 Simplicius is here opposing Alexander of Aphrodisias’ critique of Anaxagoras’ inconsistent use of Nous as principle (Simpl. In Phys. 300.27–29 Diels). 56 (Ps.-?)Hippolytus provides a concise overview (59 A 42.2 DK = EGPh V.2, D 4): κινήσεως δὲ μετέχειν τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ κινούμενα συνελθεῖν τε τὰ ὅμοια, “All things participate in motion because they are moved by mind, and similar things are combined.” It is clear that the like-tolike movement is not imposed on the things by mind (see Sider [20052] 174 with n. 7).

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 267

DK).57 It is obvious that the mixing and combining of heterogeneous things are crucial processes in Anaxagoras’ overall theory,58 yet they do not play any significant role in his description of the cosmogonic process in its early stages.59 In this process the focus clearly is on the separating force triggered by Nous. In combining those two reasons the following speculation suggests itself. The Derveni author was confronted with the challenge of interpreting the Orphic goddess Aphrodite (accompanied by Peitho and Harmonia) as representing a physical effect of Nous during the formation of the universe. These figures are naturally associated with combination rather than separation, and so the Derveni author must account precisely for this. This need forced him to look for a model outside of Anaxagoras’ cosmology because, according to Anaxagoras, Nous’ job is confined to bringing about separation. In this situation, Empedocles’ cosmology and in particular his view on Aphrodite offered a most promising source of inspiration. For these reasons it is probable that the Derveni author took philosophical inspiration from Empedocles.60 By way of conclusion, I mention two implications of this claim. It first and foremost broadens the set of Presocratic thinkers who have so far been identified as sources for the Derveni author.61 The second concerns the Derveni author’s approach. In this paper I tried to show that the Derveni author modeled his allegorical interpretation of Aphrodite and Harmonia on the role Love plays in Empedocles’ physical theory, and that this move can be linked to the fact that Anaxagoras says little as to how heterogeneous things unite during the early phase of the 57 In addition to the rotary movement that causes separation, like-to-like movement results in the formation of the Earth and the aether. See 59 B 15 DK: τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν […] διερὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ζοφερὸν ἐνθάδε συνεχώρησεν ἔνθα νῦν γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν ἐξεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ αἰθέρος, “What is dense and what is moist and what is cold and what is dark came together to where Earth [or: the Earth] is now, while what is thin and what is warm and what is dry went outward to the farthest part of the aether.” On the notion of like-tolike in Anaxagoras, see Sider (20052) 173–175. 58 After all, everything is a mixture of everything (see e.g. 59 B 4 DK). Anaxagoras describes the process of combination by the verb συνκρίνεσθαι (see e.g. 59 B 17 DK). See Sider (20052) 136–137 and Curd (2007) 69. See also the discussion in McKirahan (20102) 221–225. 59 Since Anaxagoras starts off with complete mixture, he understandably does not need to account for mixing in the early stages of the cosmogony, but rather focuses on separation from the total mixture. 60 My focus here has been on the cosmogonic role of Aphrodite and the unification of particles. The Derveni cosmology might reveal an Empedoclean influence in other aspects, too. Possible candidates and subjects for further research are the generation of the heavenly bodies as well as the description of the comic whirl (δίνη). 61 Janko recently suggested that the Derveni author quotes a line from Parmenides in col. 39 J. See Janko (2016) 16–17 and Kotwick (2017) 107–108.

268 

 Mirjam E. Kotwick

cosmogony. If that analysis is correct, we learn something about the Derveni author’s strategy at large. The Derveni author’s focus is on the transformation and interpretation of the Orphic poem into a physical account of the universe.62 He is not committed to a particular cosmological theory, nor is it necessarily his effort to produce the most compelling cosmological theory. Rather, he draws from a wide range of thinkers in order to serve his own interpretative performance. In other words, the interpretative demands of the Orphic myth guide his thinking, and he builds his cosmology around the demands that the myth places on him. In our case the demand is to make sense of Aphrodite as a cosmic power, and, so the Derveni author seems to have reasoned, Empedocles provides the best answer to this demand.

References Betegh (2001): Gábor Betegh, “Empédocle, Orphée et le papyrus de Derveni”, in: Pierre-Marie Morel and Jean-François Pradeau (eds.), Les anciens savants, Strasbourg, 47–70. Betegh (2004): Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation, Cambridge. Burkert (1968): Walter Burkert, “Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker: Bemerkungen zum DerveniPapyrus und zur pythagoreischen Zahlenlehre”, in: A&A 14, 93–114 (= Id., Kleine Schriften III: Mystica, Orphica, Pythagorica, ed. by Fritz Graf, Göttingen 2006, 62–94). Burkert (1997): Walter Burkert, “Star Wars or One Stable World?”, in: André Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford, 167–174. Burkert (2014): Walter Burkert, “How to Learn about Souls: The Derveni Papyrus and Democritus”, in: Ioanna Papadopoulou and Leonard Muellner (eds.), Poetry as Initiation, Washington, 107–114. Cherniss (1935): Harold Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Baltimore. Curd (2007): Patricia Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia: A Text and Translation with Notes and Essays, Toronto/Buffalo/London. Graham (2013): Daniel W. Graham, Science before Socrates: Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and the New Astronomy, Oxford. Graham (2014): Daniel W. Graham, “Philolaus”, in: Carl A. Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge, 46–68. Huffman (1993): Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic: A Commentary on the Fragments and Testimonia with Interpretative Essays, Cambridge. Janko (1997): Richard Janko, “The Physicist as Hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates and the Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 118, 61–94. Janko (2001): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus (Diagoras of Melos, Apopyrgizontes Logoi?): A New Translation”, in: CPh 96, 1–32. Janko (2002): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus: An Interim Text”, in: ZPE 141, 1–62.

62 On the Derveni author’s interpretative method and the overall strategy behind it see Kotwick (2019).

10 Aphrodite’s Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus 

 269

Janko (2005): Richard Janko, “Empedocles’ Physica Book I: A New Reconstruction”, in: Pierris (a), 93–135. Janko (2016): Richard Janko, “Parmenides in the Derveni Papyrus: New Images for a New Edition“, in: ZPE 200, 1–21. Jourdan (2003): Fabienne Jourdan, Le Papyrus de Derveni, Paris. Kotwick (2017): Mirjam E. Kotwick, Der Papyrus von Derveni: Griechisch-deutsch, Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert; basierend auf einem griechischen Text von Richard Janko, Berlin/Boston. Kotwick (2019): Mirjam E. Kotwick, “Ἀνόητοι ἀμύητοι: Allegorical Interpretation in the Derveni Papyrus and Plato’s Gorgias”, in: CPh 114, 173–196. Kouremenos (2006): Theokritos Kouremenos, “Introduction, II–VII” and “Commentary”, in: KPT, 19–59 and 143–272. Laks/Most (1997): André Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford. McKirahan (20102): Richard D. McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary, Indianapolis/Cambridge (1st ed. 1994). McKirahan (2012): Richard D. McKirahan, “The Cosmogonic Moment in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Richard Patterson, Vassilis Karasmanis and Arnold Hermann (eds.), Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, Las Vegas/Zurich/Athens, 79–110. Most (2013): Glenn W. Most, “Eros in Hesiod”, in: Ed Sanders, Chiara Thumiger, Christopher Carey and Nick Lowe (eds.), Erôs in Ancient Greece, Oxford, 163–174. Müller (1965): Carl W. Müller, Gleiches zu Gleichem: Ein Prinzip frühgriechischen Denkens, Wiesbaden. O’Brien (1969): Denis O’Brien, Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle: A Reconstruction from the Fragments and Secondary Sources, Cambridge. Pierris (2005a): Apostolos L. Pierris (ed.), The Empedoclean Κόσμος: Structure, Process and the Question of Cyclicity, Patras. Pierris (2005b): Apostolos L. Pierris, “Ὅμοιον Ὁμοίῳ and Δίνη: Nature and Function of Love and Strife in the Empedoclean System”, in: Pierris (a), 189–224. Primavesi (2008): Oliver Primavesi, “Empedocles: Physical and Mythical Divinity”, in: Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, 250–283. Primavesi (2012): Oliver Primavesi, “Second Thoughts on Some Presocratics”, in: Carlos Steel (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha, Oxford, 225–263. Primavesi (2013): Oliver Primavesi, “Empedokles”, in: GGPh 1.2, 667–739. Riedweg (1995): Christoph Riedweg, “Orphisches bei Empedocles”, in: A&A 41, 34–59. Santamaría (2016): Marco A. Santamaría, “A Phallus Hard to Swallow: The Meaning of αἰδοῖος/-ον in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: CPh 111, 139–164. Sassi (2015): Maria M. Sassi, “How Musical was Heraclitus’ Harmony? A Reassessment of 22 B 8, 10, 51 DK”, in: Rhizomata 3, 3–25. Sider (1997): David Sider, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Laks/Most, 129–148. Sider (20052): David Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras, Sankt Augustin (1st ed. Meisenheim am Glan 1981). Solmsen (1965): Friedrich Solmsen, “Love and Strife in Empedocles’ Cosmology”, in: Phronesis 10, 109–148. Vassallo (2016): Christian Vassallo, “Parmenides and the «First God»: Doxographical Strategies in Philodemus’ On Piety: Praesocratica Herculanensia VII”, in: Hyperboreus 22, 29–57.

Simon Trépanier

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants: PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666, Sections d, b, and f This study aims to improve the text of section d of the Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles.1 In particular, I will test the reconstruction advanced by Janko (2004), who proposes attributing sections f and b to the same column as section d and argues that all three sections are from col. 12 of the ancient roll. I offer several new suggestions to improve the text and thereby reinforce Janko’s reconstruction of the column. My main departure from Janko will be to argue that the unity of ll. d 11–18 plus sections b and f can be better shown if we assume that the subject of the passage is a description of the origins of plants alone, not of animals or of living things in general. This in turn provides a new reason for thinking that section b, a catalogue of animals with hard, earthy parts on the outside, belongs to the bottom of the same column as section d. The catalogue is offered to support an analogy in which trees, where hard, earthy bark is on the outside, are likened to animals with hard, earthy outsides, such as conches, turtles, and hedgehogs. The study is in four parts. Part 1 introduces the papyrus, part 2 is my edition of the unified sections d plus f and b, while parts 3 and 4 offer various arguments and exegetical comments to support the reconstruction.

1 On Nature 1 and the position of section d: Janko’s Reconstruction The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles (PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666) was first published in 1999 by Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi (hereafter M&P). The papyrus consists of four main continuous ensembles or sections (a, b, c, and d) and a few

1 References to Empedocles follow the numbering from DK. For the testimonies of A series I have also consulted the edition of Aëtius Book 2 in M&R2. For the Strasbourg Papyrus, unless noted I quote from the editio princeps by Martin and Primavesi (M&P), who should be consulted for all papyrological and palaeographic specifics. Some of my introductory remarks in § 1 are recycled, with modifications, from the introduction to Trépanier (2017a). Simon Trépanier, University of Edinburgh https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-012

272 

 Simon Trépanier

smaller left-overs (e to k) in a nicely legible book-hand from the 1st cent. AD. The passages are not quotations, but the remains of an ancient edition, making it our first witness to the direct textual transmission of Empedocles’ didactic epic On Nature. The identification of the poem as the On Nature is secured by a number of overlaps with known fragments from that work. The papyrus marks a new era in the study of Empedocles, for its importance extends far beyond merely adding new lines to the corpus. The new evidence it brings to light has repercussions on a number of debates affecting the overall interpretation of Empedocles. Let me briefly touch on a few of them. The single most important advance provided by the papyrus is its demonstration of the unity of Empedocles’ thought, more precisely, the non-segregation of religion from science in his poetry. According to the standard reconstruction of the corpus, as found in DK, Empedocles was the author of two major but theoretically incompatible works, a scientific poem On Nature and a Pythagoreanreligious work, the Purifications. Now, however, we find that in ll. 5–10 of section d, Empedocles laments his meat-eating sins and refers to reincarnation. At a minimum, therefore, the reference to reincarnation in ll. d 5–10 shows that the On Nature also contained material on reincarnation, and the unity of Empedocles’ thought follows from it. Beyond that, however, the doctrinal details of that unity are controversial. I have argued my own version of this unity elsewhere, but will not enter that debate here.2 In another respect, the unity of Empedocles’ thought, as demonstrated by section d, strenghtens the case for the alternative reconstruction of the Empedoclean corpus in terms of one original work, against the standard division of Empedocles’ output between two poems as described above. That question, however, is complex and here the contribution of the papyrus is not as conclusive. In the interest of clarity I can put my own cards on the table by declaring that I belong to the single-work camp, but again space precludes a full airing of the issue here.3 At most, in my text below I print my supplement of nomos in line d 7, which I think is a reference back to the exile of the soul as first presented in fragment B 115, a fragment I would accordingly place in the proem of the On Nature – at least on the two work assumption. I will say a little more about this below, but again in this paper my focus is on the text of section d.

2 Very roughly, my own view is that the reincarnated soul was something like an early form of pneuma, a compound or mixture of air and fire that resides in the blood during life. See Trépanier (2014) for the daimon as a substance and body part, and Trépanier (2017a) for the cosmic habitats of soul. I offer a fuller examination of the relation of soul to the body in Trépanier (forthcoming). 3 My case for the single poem is Trépanier (2004), following Inwood (20012) and Osborne (1987).

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 273

If we leave the debate on the number of works aside, as a still-open question, then after the unity of Empedocles’ thought, probably the second most important contribution of the papyrus is the marked improvement it had made to our grasp of the structure of Book 1 of what I will call – for convenience – the On Nature. Thanks to the overlap of section a with the last lines of the 35-line fragment B 17, combined with a stichometric mark in the margin of that same section, it is now possible to specify the content and exact location of Book 1, ll. 232–300 of the On Nature. These lines contain what was most likely the main exposition of Empedocles’ doctrine of the cosmic cycle and its relation to the elements (= 1.232–290), followeed by a ten-line transition to what looks like biology or a discussion of the effects of Love and Strife on life (= 1.291–300).4 Section d, my subject, is the second-longest continuous section. No conclusive evidence for the location of section d has been so far identified. Because of the similarity of content between ll. d 11–18 with B 62 on the origins of plants, discussed below, known to be from Book 2 of the On Nature, M&P originally proposed that it belonged to that book. Five years later, however, in an important article, Richard Janko proposed some important modifications to this reconstruction. Janko argued 1) that section c, which is itself poorly preserved, but which overlaps with DK fragment B 20 (7 lines), is the top of the next column (11) of the roll, extending the continuous sequence from 1.232 to 308; and 2) that sections d, as well as f and b, should all three be placed in the next column, number 12 of the roll. If correct, that would make section d lines 1.331 to 360 of the On Nature, after a 22-line gap. We can best grasp Janko’s reconstruction if we try to place the extant papyrus sections within the columns of the ancient roll. In the simplified illustration below, the dotted lines represent the text known to us from the fragments, the full lines the text from the papyrus, while the highlighted sections give a rough idea of the physical extent of the papyrus, showing where the two texts overlap. Janko’s first suggestion, locating section c atop col. 11, has been accepted by others and I agree as well so I will not argue for it here. (The field is so small I am not sure it makes sense to call that a consensus.) After that, we face two separate questions. First, whether to place sections d, b and f together in the same column, and second, whether they belong to col. 12. Of the two, the location of section d

4 Section a contains 39 whole or partial hexameter lines spread over two columns, 9 lines in a (i), 30 in a (ii), and overlaps with and continues fragment B 17, Empedocles’ main exposition of the cosmic cycle. B 17 is securely identified as belonging to Book 1 of the On Nature by its source, the Aristotelian commentator Simplicius. In addition, the last line of section a (ii) contains a stichometric note showing it to be l. 300 of the roll, which means that we can reconstruct B 17 plus section a as one continuous stretch of text, see M&P for all details. For a defence of ll. 1.232–289 as devoted solely to cosmology, and a reconstruction of the text, see Trépanier (2017b).

274 

 Simon Trépanier

Col. 8

Col. 9

B 17.1/1.232--------------------------------------------------------------1.240---------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------B 17.31/1. 262/a (i) 1-B 17.35/ a (i) 5--------(=Arist Metaph.) ------1.270/ a (i) 9------------

Col. 10

1.271/ a (ii) 1______ ______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _________________ _______________ _________________ _________________ _________________ ________________ 1.300/ a (ii) 30 ___

Col. 11

1.301/c 1 __ 1.302/B 20. 1-------------------------------------1.308/B 20.7-----------(22 line gap)

(1.330)

Col. 12

1.331/d 1__ ____ _________ ____ _________ ____ ___ ___ f 1__ d 15__ __ ____ ________ f 4_ d 18______ f 8_ 1 line gap B 76.1-------------------b 2/B 76.3 -------------I.360/ b 6 ____

in col. 12 is not conclusibely provable, yet Janko is surely right that barring any positive evidence for placing section d elsewhere, the most economical assumption is that section d stood close by within the same papyrus roll, following upon ll. 1.232–308 and so ultimately from Book 1 of the On Nature. Thus, although I am not completely wedded to the position of section d as col. 12, for ease of reference I will adopt Janko’s numbering of the lines. More importantly, what I do help to offer is an improved text of d and through that, a vindication of Janko’s colocation of sections d, f and b in one column.

2 Empedocles PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666, sections d + f + b For the relative positions of the different sections d, f, and b, readers should refer to the figure above. For a virtual reconstruction of column d, I refer the reader instead to Janko (2004) 25–26, fig. 1, which combines the three sections in one image. As can be seen from the extant margins, section d belongs to the top of its column, b to the bottom of its respective column, while f contains the left margin of its text and the final letters of four line-ends from the previous column. From that it follows that, if Janko’s reconstruction holds, as a bonus we also have a few end-letters of the missing bottom 22 lines of the previous column. PStrasb. gr. inv. 1165–1666, sections d + f + b (ed. Trépanier) d 1/1.331



d 5/1.335

ἄν]διχ’ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλω[ν] π̣εσέ[ ̣ει]ν ̣καὶ π[ ̣ότ]μ̣ον ἐπισπεῖν πό]λλ’ ἀεκαζομέν[ο]ισιν, ἀ[̣να]γ κ̣ α[ίης ὕ]π̣ο λυγρῆς ]π̣ο[μ]έ̣νοις· Φιλίην δὲ [] νυν ἔχουσιν, Ἅρ]π̣υιαι, θανάτοιο πάλοι [ παρέσ]ονται. ⌊Οἴ⌋μ̣οι ὅτ(ι) οὐ πρόσθεν με δι̣⌊ώλεσε νη⌋λεὲς ἦμαρ, B 139.1 DK (?)

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

d 10/1.340

f1/d 15/1.345

f4/d 18/1.348 f 6/1.350 f 8/1.352 1.353

b 1/1.355

b 6/1.360 (?) 1.361 1.331

1.335

 275

˻πρὶν⌋ χηλαῖς̣ ⌊σχέ⌋τ̣λι’ ἔργα βορ̣⌊ᾶς πέρι μητ⌋ί̣σα ̣ ⌊̣ σθαι· B 139.2 DK νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐπὶ] τῶιδε νό[μωι κατέδ]ε̣υσα παρειάς. ἐξικ]ν̣ούμε[θα γὰ]ρ̣ πολυβενθ̣[έα χώρον], ὀ̣ΐω, ἡμῖν τ(ε) οὐκ] ἐθέλουσι παρέσσε[ται ἄλγ]ε̣α θυμῶι ἔνθαδε νῦν· ἡ]μεῖς δὲ λόγων ἐπιβ[ησόμ]εθ’ αὖθις κείνων· ἀλλ’ ὅτ]ε̣ δὴ συνετύγχανε φ[λογ]μὸς ἀτειρής ἐξεστηκὼς γ]ῆ̣ς, ἀνάγων π[ο]λυπή[μο]να κρᾶσιν μυρία δὴ τότε φῦλ]α̣ φυτάλμια τεκνώθ̣[η]σ̣αν οὐλοφυῶν, τῶν ν]ῦ̣ν ἔτι λείψανα δέρκεται Ἠ̣ώς. ὁππό[τε γὰρ πῦρ ὄρνυθ’ ἵν’] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι, δὴ τό[τ’ ἀνήϊξεν πυρὰ πολλ’ αὐ]γ ̣ῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι θεσπε[σίηι· ὄμβρου δὲ ὅσ’ ἀν λει]μ̣ῶνα λαχόντα χόρ̣[τος δένδρα τε γέντο, πέπηγεν δ’ α]ὖτε πέρι χθών. ὡς δ[᾽ ὅτε χαλ[κεὺς αἱ δὲ [φλόγες τὼς δὴ τότ’ ἔπηξαν γὴν περὶ δένδρα (?) τη[λεθάοντα [e.g. Consider among the animals how many have this structure: [τοῦτο μὲν ἐν κόγχαισι θαλασσονόμοις βαρυνώτοις   B 76.1 DK ἠδ’ ἐν πε]τ̣ρ̣αίο̣ισι κα[λύμμασι τοῦτ’ ὀστρείων ˻ἔνθ’ ὄψει⌋ χθόνα χρωτὸ˻ς ὑ⌋πέ̣˻ρτατα ναιετάουσαν·⌋ B 76.3 DK τοῦτο δ’ ἐπ’ αὖ]τε κραταιν[ώ]των ἄ[κροισιν ἐχίνων ˻ναὶ μὴν κηρύ⌋κων τε λιθορρίνων χ̣˻ελύων τε⌋ B 76.2 DK τοῦτο δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκ]ρ̣η.σ̣ι̣ν̣ κ̣εραῶν ἐλά[φων ὀριπλάγκτων. ἀλλ(ὰ) οὐκ ἂν τελέσαιμ]ι̣ λέγων σύμ̣[παντα γένεθλα [τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν μανὰ, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι πυκνὰ πέπηγε (?) (…) to fall apart from one another and meet their fate much against their will, [1 word] under harsh necessity. But [1–2 words] now holding on to Love Harpies, the lots of death [1–2 words] will be present. Woe that the pitiless day did not destroy me sooner, before I plotted horrible deeds with my claws for the sake of food! But now in vain on account of that law have I drenched my cheeks,   For we have come to a very deep place, I believe,   and against our wishes torments will beset our hearts

276  1.340

1.345

1.350

1.355

1.361

 Simon Trépanier

here now. But we will embark another time upon these matters. When an inextinguishable fire happened to have stood out from the earth, leading up a much-suffering mixture, countless life-sustaining tribes of whole-natures were begotten, whose remains still now the dawn looks upon. For when fire was rising to go to the furthest place, then many fires sprang up, with a terrible flash and roar. But all that obtained a share of rain along the meadow became grass and plants, and round about [them] earth was fixed. Just as when (…) A smith [gilds a statue? (…) [the flames then, just so, fixed earth around the trees] as they flourished (…) [Consider among the animals how many have this structure (?)] here in the sea-grazing, thick-backed nautilus and here in the stony mantles of oysters, where you will see earth residing atop of flesh; or here again on the summits of strong-backed hedgehogs yes, and of stony-skinned conches and turtles, or here on the crests of horned dear that roam the mountains. But I could never finish telling [you] all the races, [All that are fashioned soft on the inside, but hard on the outside (?)]

Unless specified, all supplements are from M&P edd. = all editors Janko = Janko (2004) P = Primavesi (2008) or Primavesi (2011), where different Rashed = Rashed (2011) GM = Gemelli Marciano (2013) All A testimonia cited are as in Vítek (2006) 1.333 [ση]π̣ο[μ]έ̣νοις West ap. M&P, edd. || ]. illegible trace || δὲ [καί Ε]ὔ̣ν̣[οίην]ν̣ M&P, GM: δ᾽ ἐ[ρατ]ὴ̣ν̣ Janko || [ἡμῖ]ν̣ P 1.334 θανάτοιο πάλοις̣ [ἡμῖν παρέσ]ονται M&P : [ἤδη παρέσ]ονται P 1.335–336 = 31 B 139 DK: οἴμοι ὅτι οὐ πρόσθεν με διώλεσε νηλεὲς ἦμαρ, /  πρὶν σχέτλι’ ἔργα βορᾶς περὶ χείλεσι μητίσασθαι, from Porph. De abst. 2.31 who relates

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 277

the passage to purifications: “All that remains for them is to make amends through purifications, διὰ τῶν καθαρμῶν (…).” On the discrepancies with B 139.2 see M&P. ˻Οἴ˼μ̣οι στ 1st hand; ˻Οἴ˼μ̣οι ˻ὅτ(ι)˼ 2nd hand, between dots. The model is Hes. Op. 174–179. 1.337 ἐπὶ] τῶιδε νό[μωι κατέδ]ε̣υσα scripsi. || ]τῶι δε and ]τῶι γε 1st hand. There is no ligature after οmicron, see Trépanier (2017a) 159. || ἐπὶ] cf. 31 B 9.5 DK: νόμωι δ’ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός. || [νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐν] τῶιδε νότ̣[ωι M&P, P || μάτη[ν τού]τωι γε νότ̣[ωι Janko The reference is to 31 B 115 DK, esp. 1–2: ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, / ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις. Plut. De exil. 607c places the passage in the proem: ὁ δ’ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας (…). On νόμος, see testimonia in Vítek (2006) “ad B 115” including Hippol. Haer. 7.29.23: τοῦτον εἶναί φησιν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς νόμον μέγιστον τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διοικήσεως λέγων ὧδέ πως· “ἔστιν (…) ὅρκοις” (1–2), ἀνάγκην καλῶν τὴν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς πολλὰ κατὰ τὸ Νεῖκος καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν εἰς ἓν κατὰ τὴν Φιλίαν μεταβολήν. Compare 31 B 135 DK: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ’ εὐρυμέδοντος / αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς. 1.338 πολυβενθ̣[έα χώρον] scripsi, cf. 31 B 118 DK: ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον; B 121.1: ἀτερπέα χῶρον πολυβενθ̣[έα δῖνον] edd. || On depth applied to a non-maritime context: Od. 17.316–317: οὐ μὲν γάρ τι φύγεσκε βαθείης βένθεσιν ὕλης / κνώδαλον; Plut. De exil. 607c: διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναφέρειν μηδὲ μνημονεύειν “ἐξ οἵης τιμῆς τε καὶ ὅσσου μήκεος ὄλβου” (B 119.1) μεθέστηκεν, οὐ Σάρδεων Ἀθήνας οὐδὲ Κορίνθου Λῆμνον ἢ Σκῦρον ἀλλ’ οὐρανοῦ καὶ σελήνης γῆν ἀμειψαμένη καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς βίον (…) 1.339 [ἡμῖν τ(ε) οὐκ] ἐθέλουσι scripsi || μυρία τ(ε) οὐκ] edd. 1.340 [ἔνθαδε νῦν. ἡ]μεῖς δὲ scripsi. Life in Hades via an Odyssean echo? At Od. 11.484–486 Odysseus addresses Achilles: πρὶν μὲν γάρ σε ζωὸν ἐτίομεν ἶσα θεοῖσιν / Ἀργεῖοι, νῦν αὖτε μέγα κρατέεις νεκύεσσιν / ἐνθάδ’ ἐών· [ἀνθρώποις. ἡ]μεῖς δὲ edd. || ἐπιβ[ησόμ]εθ’ 1st hand: ἐπιβ[ήσομ]εν 2nd hand, between dots: ἐπιβ[ησόμ]εθ’ edd.: ἐπιβ[ήσομ]εν M&P 1.341 edd. 1.342 [ἐξεστηκὼς γ]ῆ̣ς scripsi, cf. 31 B 53 DK: οὕτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τοτέ, πολλάκι δ’ ἄλλως; B 35.9–11, retreat of Strife: οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως /  τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου, / ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τ’ ἐνέμιμνε μελέων τὰ δέ τ’ ἐξεβεβήκει. || πάσιν ἅμ’ ἀλλήλο]ι ς̣ Janko: θνητῶν ἠνεκέ]ω̣ς Rashed, P (2011): αἰθέρι, καρπαλίμ]ω̣ς GM

278 

 Simon Trépanier

1.343 [μυρία δὴ τότε φῦλ]α̣ scripsi, φῦλα is supplemented at a (ii) 25 / 1.295: ὅ̣σ[̣σ]α τε νῦν ἔτι λοιπὰ πέλει τούτοιο τ̣[όκοιο,] / τοῦτο μὲν [ἂν] θηρῶν ὀριπλάγκτων ἄγ̣[ρια φῦλα]; 31 B 35.7 DK: τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν || [δὴ τότε καὶ τά ζῶι]α̣ Janko || [δὴ τότε πρῶτα ζῶι]α Rashed : [δὴ τότε πολλὰ ζῶι]α̣, · P (2011) 1.344 οὐλοφυῶν, τῶν ν]ῦ̣ν scripsi, cf. 31 B 62.4 DK: οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον. The οὐλοφυῆ are “whole natured” because asexual, see A 70 (= Aët. 5.26.4, DG, 438): Ἐ. πρῶτα τὰ δένδρα τῶν ζώιων ἐκ γῆς ἀναφῦναί φησι, πρὶν τὸν ἥλιον περιαπλωθῆναι καὶ πρὶν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα διακριθῆναι· διὰ δὲ συμμετρίας τῆς κράσεως τὸν τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θήλεος περιέχειν λόγον. αὔξεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῆι γῆι θερμοῦ διαιρόμενα, ὥστε γῆς εἶναι μέρη καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἔμβρυα τὰ ἐν τῆι γαστρὶ τῆς μήτρας μέρη. || [πάντι τρόπωι καὶ ν]ῦν Janko : [οὐλομελῆ, τῶν καὶ ν]ῦν Rashed, P (2011) 1.345 β]ῆι 1st hand: β]ῆν 2nd hand: β]ῆι edd.: β]ῆν GM || ὁππό[τε γὰρ πῦρ ὄρνυθ’ ἵν’] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι temptavi, cf. Il. 11.1–2 (= 19.1–2): Ἠὼς δ’ ἐκ λεχέων παρ’ ἀγαυοῦ Τιθωνοῖο / ὄρνυθ’, ἵν’ ἀθανάτοισι φόως φέροι ἠδὲ βροτοῖσι. Or e.g. a) ὁππό[τ’ ὄρουσεν πῦρ ὄφρ’] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι, b) ὁππό[τε πῦρ ἔτι νέρθ’ ὦρτ’] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆν c) ὁππό[τε γὰρ πῦρ ὦρτ’ ὄφρ’] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι. ὁππό[τε πῦρ ἀνόρουσεν ἱν’] is a bit too long, as is ὁππό[τ’ ὀρουσεν πῦρ θέλον] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆν. If we emend the extant subjunctive to the indicative, we could have ὁππό[τε πῦρ ἀνόρουσε καὶ] ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆ. Compare 31 B 30.1–2 DK: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα Νεῖκος ἐνὶμμελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη  /  ἐς τιμάς τ’ ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοι; and B 62.6: τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι. On the rise of the sun, Od. 3.1–2: Ἠέλιος δ’ ἀνόρουσε, λιπὼν περικαλλέα λίμνην, / οὐρανὸν ἐς πολύχαλκον, ἵν’ ἀθανάτοισι φαείνοι. On the place of the sun in Empedocles, cf. A 49: Ἐ. τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου περίδρομον εἶναι περιγραφὴν τοῦ πέρατος τοῦ κόσμου. For the final clause, cf. Il. 6.113: ὄφρ’ ἂν ἐγὼ βείω προτὶ Ἴλιον || ὁππό[τε δὴ γ’ αἰθὴρ μιχθ]ε̣ὶ̣ς τόπον Janko: ὁππό[τε δὴ γ’ ἀέρι μιχθ]ε̣ὶ̣ς Rashed : ὁππό[τε δ’ ἠλεκτωρ ἀρθ]ε̣ὶ̣ς P (2011). Compare also B 9.1 ed. P (2011): οἱ δ’ ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγὲν φῶς αἰθέρι (from Plut. Adv. Col. 1113 a–b) 1.346 δὴ τό[τ’ ἀνηΐξεν πυρὰ πολλ’ αὐ]γ ̣ῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι temptavi or δὴ τό[τ’ ἀναΐξεν πυρὰ γῆς αὐ]γ ̣ῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι. Compare Achilles’ flight from the Scamander at Il. 21.246–247: ὃ δ’ ἄρ’ ἐκ δίνης ἀνορούσας / ἤϊξεν πεδίοιο ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι πέτεσθαι. Otherwise, a running metaphor is attested in the doxography, e.g. 31 A 30 DK: ἐκ πρώτης φησὶ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων κράσεως ἀποκριθέντα τὸν ἀέρα περιχυθῆναι κύκλωι· μετὰ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα τὸ πῦρ ἐκδραμὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχον ἑτέραν χώραν ἄνω ἐκτρέχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ περὶ

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 279

τὸν ἀέρα πάγου. So perhaps: δὴ τό[τ’ ἀνέδραμε πῦρ ἐκ γῆς αὐ]γ ̣ῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι or δὴ τό[τε πῦρ προθέεσκ’ ἐκ γῆς αὐ]γ ῆι ̣ καὶ ἀϋτῆι. For αὐ]γ ̣ῆι compare Il. 9.206 ἐν πυρὸς αὐγῇ. For αὐ]γ ῆι ̣ καὶ ἀϋτῆι cf. Lucr. 1.722–725: hic Aetnaea minantur / murmura flammarum rursum se colligere iras, / faucibus eruptos iterum vis ut vomat ignis / ad caelumque ferat flammai fulgura rursum, as well as id. 5.783–787 || κλαγ]γ ῆι ̣ καὶ ἀϋτῆι edd. : δὴ τό[τ᾽ ἀνέπτοντ’ οἰωνοὶ κλαγ]γ ῆι ̣ καὶ ἀϋτῆι Janko : δὴ τό[θ’ ἕκαστα διετμήθη κλαγ]γ ̣ῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι Rashed, P (2011) Some other possibilities: 1) δὴ τό[τ᾽ ἀνέπτατο πῦρ ἐκ γῆς αὐ]γ̣ ̣ῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι / θεσπε[σίηι, compare Plut. De fac. 934b who quotes Il. 9.212–213: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πυρὸς ἄνθος ἀπέπτατο παύσατο δὲ φλόξ / ἀνθρακιὴν στορέσας, with 212 being an Empedoclean-sounding variant reading of the received text αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ πῦρ ἐκάη καὶ φλόξ ἐμαράνθη. 2) δὴ τό[τ᾽ ἀνεβλάστησε τὸ πῦρ αὐ]γ̣ ῆ̣ ι καὶ ἀϋτῆι. On flames and flowers, compare a) Aesch. PV 6–7: τὸ σὸν γὰρ ἄνθος, παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας, / θνητοῖσι κλέψας ὤπασεν; b) Lucr. 1.900 on Anaxagoras: flammai fulserunt flore; c) Id. 5.783–787: Principio genus herbarum viridemque nitorem / terra dedit circum collis camposque per omnis, / florida fulserunt viridanti prata colore, / arboribusque datumst variis exinde per auras / crescendi magnum inmissis certamen habenis. 1.347 θεσπε[σίηι· ὄμβρου δὲ ὅσ’ ἀν λει]μ̣ῶνα λαχόντα scripsi. Cf. 31 B 62.5–6 DK: ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες· / τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι; alternatively, ὕδατος δὲ ὅσ’ ἀν λει]μ̣ῶνα. On λαγχάνειν cf. B 96.2, and A 70, quoted at l. 1.343. || θεσπε[σίηι· τὰ δ’ ὑπαὶ γαίης κευθ]μ̣ῶνα λαχόντα Janko : θεσπε[σίηι· τὰ πρὶν Ὠκεανοῦ λει]μ̣ῶνα λαχόντα Rashed : κευθ]μ̣ῶνα λαχόντα P (2011) 1.348 χόρ̣[τος δένδρα τε γέντο, πέπηγεν δ’ α]ὖτε πέρι χθών scripsi; or χόρ̣[τος καὶ φυτὰ γέντο : ]υτο πέρι 1st hand : ]υτε πέρι, 2nd hand, τε between dots. For γέντο, cf. 31 B 98.5 DK: ἐκ τῶν αἷμά τε γέντο; for πέπηγεν cf. B 75: τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι μανὰ πέπηγε; for α]ὖτε πέρι cf. B 154: περὶ δ᾽ ἤγαγεν αὖθις ὀπίσσω || χόρ̣[τους τ’ ἐξεγένοντο, ὅπῃ εἴλ]υτο πέρι χθών Janko : χόρ̣[τους τ’ ἀνθεμόεντας, ὅπῃ εἴλ]υτο πέρι χθών Rashed : χόρ̣[τους ὅπῃ εἴλ]υτο πέρι χθών P (2011) 1.349 ὡς δ[’ ὅτε scripsi (cf. 31 B 84.1 DK: ὡς δ’ ὅτε τις) : ὡς δ[᾽ ὁπόταν edd. 1.350 χαλ[κεὺς Janko, cf. Hippol. Haer. 7.18: αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ κόλασις ἣν κολάζει ὁ δημιουργός, καθάπερ χαλκεύς τις μετακοσμῶν σίδηρον καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς εἰς ὕδωρ μεταβάπτων.

280 

 Simon Trépanier

1.351–352 αἱ δὲ [φλόγες τὼς δὴ τότ’ ἔπηξαν γὴν περὶ δένδρα (?)] temptavi, or αἱ δὲ [φλόγες τότε γῆν πυκινὴν πῆξαν περὶ δένδρα] or αἱ δὲ [φλόγες τότε ὧδε πεπήγασι γὴν περὶ δένδρα] / τη[λεθάοντα (cf. 31 B 85 DK: ἡ δὲ φλὸξ ἱλάειρα μινυνθαδίης τύχε γαίης, and for φλόγες; Arat. Phaen. 979, 999, 1034; B 86: ἐξ ὧν ὄμματ’ ἔπηξεν ἀτειρέα δῖ’ Ἀφροδίτη; B 73: ὡς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεί τ’ ἐδίηνεν ἐν ὄμβρωι, / εἴδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῶι πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι || τη[λεθάοντα cf. B 153b Vítek (2006) on trees τῶν γὰρ ὅσα ῥίζαις μὲν ἐπασσυτέρ’, [α]υτὰ̣[ρ ὕ]πε̣ρθε / μᾶνοτεροις ὅ̣ρπηξιν καταστῆ τηλ̣εθά̣ο̣[ντα] 1.353–360 = section b, after Janko 1.353 exempli gratia: ἄθρει δ’ ἐν ζώιοις ὅσα ταύτην τάξιν ἔχουσι, cf. a (ii) 13/1.283: [καὶ πο]τὲ μὲν γὰρ γαῖ(α̣) [ὑπ]ά̣τη θέει ἠέλ̣[ιός τε] / a (ii) 14/I.284: [νέρτα]τος, ἣν δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[άξιν ἔχουσι.] ap. Trépanier (2017b) 1.354 = 31 B 76.1 DK 1.355 [ἠδ’ ἐν πε]τ̣ρ̣αίο̣ισι κα[λύμμασι τοῦτ’ ὀστρείων] scripsi, cf. Plut. De fac. 927f: οὐδὲ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ μὲν ἄνω περὶ τὰ ὄμματα ἀποστίλβον κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ δ’ ἐν κοιλίᾳ καὶ καρδίᾳ παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον οἰκείως καὶ χρησίμως τέτακται. “ναὶ μὴν κηρύκων τε λιθορρίνων χελωνῶν τε” (31 B 76.2 DK) καὶ παντὸς ὀστρέου φύσιν, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καταμανθάνων “ἔνθ’ ὄψει χθόνα χρωτὸς ὑπέρτατα ναιετάουσαν” (B 76.2): [ἠδ’ ἐν πε]τ̣ρ̣αίο̣ισι κα[λύμμασι, τοῦτο δὲ πίναις] Janko 1.356 = 31 B.76.3 DK 1.357 [τοῦτο δ’ ἐπ’ αὖ]τε κραταιν[ώ]των ἄ[κροισιν ἐχίνων] scripsi. For ἄκροισιν cf. 31 B 3.8 DK: καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν: [θώρηξ δ’ αὖ]τε M&P: [θώρηξ δ’ αὖ]τε κραταιν[ώ]των ἁ[λίων τε παγούρων] Janko 1.358 = 31 Β 76.2 DK ˻ναὶ μὴν κηρύ˼κων τε λιθορρίνων χ̣˻ελύων τε˼, P κηρύ⌋κων γε 1.359 [τοῦτο δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκ]ρ̣η̣σ̣ι̣ν̣ κ̣εραῶν scripsi (a small curved trace is extant for the rho, compare the sequence κρατ in 1.357): ] μ̣ε̣λ̣ί̣α̣ι̣ κ̣εραῶν ἐλά[φων M&P: [ὄστρακα κα]ὶ̣ μ̣ε̣λ̣ί̣α̣ι̣ κ̣εραῶν ἐλά[φων ὀριπλάγτων] Janko 1.361 [τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν μανὰ, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι πυκνά πέπηγε (?)] or [(...) τυχόντα (?)], cf. 31 B 75 DK: τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι μανὰ πέπηγε, / Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμηισι πλάδης τοιῆσδε τυχόντα

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 281

3 Section d ll. 11–18: 31 B 62 DK and the origins of plants This section covers the reconstruction of ll. d 11 to 18 and the integration of the top part of section f to these lines. Section four deals with the bottom half of the column and the link to section b. Before arguing my case, I start with some questions of context, that is, the nature of Strife in Empedocles, the content of ll. 1–10, and look at the most potent parallel to ll. d 11–18, fr. B 62.

Strife in the cycle and section d For ll. d 1–18 as a whole, the unifying thread is a focus on the separating force of Strife, with Empedocles exploring its negative aspects over ll. 1–4, and its more creative aspects in ll. 11–18, where the separating action of Strife results in the ‘begetting’ of living beings. This bivalency of Strife is well attested in the corpus, where it applies equally to Love. Indeed, when Empedocles considers his two moving or psychological powers at their broadest, he views them as both destructive and creative. This comes out most clearly in the (macro)cosmic cycle where, according to the more standard, symmetrical reconstruction, the cosmic phases are produced by the interplay of the two opposite influences of Love and Strife, while the outer or ‘a-cosmic’ boundaries of the cycle are defined by the complete sway of one or the other over the four elements. Under the unopposed reign of Love, the elements form the Sphairos god, when they are all fused into a single blessed unity (see B 27–30). Under the reign of Strife the elements either arrange themselves into separate, concentric circles, or move about without regular motions and without forming any permanent mixtures or bonds – the evidence is unclear. In between, we have worlds like ours, where both powers operate.5 Within that wider context, therefore, the bivalency of Strife we find in section d is typical. More specifically, the material in ll. d 11–18 almost certainly describes the agency of Strife during its rise.

5 See esp. B 17.3–5 and now the papyrus at a (ii) 30 / 1.300: ὄψει γὰρ ξύνοδόν τε καὶ διάπτυξίν τε γενέθλη [ς], “for you will see the coming together and the development that is birth [life].” On the double cosmogony and zoology, cf. O’Brien (1969) 196–236; Trépanier (2003); Sedley (2007) 40–52 (with a novel twist). According to Aristotle, we now live in the world (but not the reign) of Strife (Gen. corr. 2.6.334a6).

282 

 Simon Trépanier

Lines 1 to 10 In ll. d 1–2, where we pick up the text mid-sentence, the negative aspects of Strife are to the fore. The subjects which “fall apart from each other” and “meet their fates” must be either whole animals or at least their limbs, and Empedocles relates the process to Necessity. Ll. 3 and 4, however, are harder to make out. (Above I have left the gaps blank as I am unsatisfied with all suggestions so far.) At a minimum Love is mentioned, most likely as a counter to the agency of Strife, then in l. 4 Empedocles mentions “Harpies” and “lots of death.” Although the meaning of these lines remains uncertain, Strife here appears related to death. Ll. d 5–10 then mark a break in the exposition as Empedocles suddenly and dramatically bewails his fallen state for his sins of meat-eating. As recognized by Martin and Primavesi (1999), and most since, these lines are the key passage for the unity of Empedocles’ thought. The overlap of d 5 and 6 with the previous B 139, known to us from Porphyry, who relates the passage to “purifications,” removes any doubt that the lines refer to the story of the exile of individual souls, which must therefore have had its place in the On Nature.6 Although I have printed my text of these lines above, my full case for their reconstruction is in Trépanier (2017a), and here I will only discuss my two most important departures from previous editors. The most important of all comes at l. 7, [νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ] τῶιδε νο[ κατέδ]ε. υσα ·· ·· παρειάς (or perhaps τῶιγε). There, based on a trace to the right of the omicron in the sequence τωιδενο, earlier editors posited a ligature after the omicron, leading them to posit that the missing letter was a tau and to supplement the whole word as notos ‘storm’ understood figuratively as a reference to tears. Thus M&P have μάτη[ν ἐν] τῶιδε νότ[ωι, while Janko (2004) proposes μάτη[ν τού]τωι γε νότ[ωι · · and renders the whole line “now to no end my cheeks I wet with tears.” But as can be seen in the detail picture in Trépanier (2017a) 159, the extant squiggle does not in fact support a ligature, and is no more than a lapsus calami.7 This then leaves the field open to speculation based on the first two letters alone. I propose

6 Porph. De abst. 2.31: “Since none is without sin, all that remains is for them to later be healed through purifications for their former sins of food. This would be like if one were to put the horrible deed before one’s eyes and to cry out, in Empedocles’ words: ‘Woe that (…)’.” The discrepancy between our text and B 139.2 could be a variant, rather than a mistake. 7 The trace goes up rather than across, as in other ligatures of omicron to tau. More importantly, it does not reach the edge of the papyrus and tapers in width as the pen is lifted off the page. Nor is there any evidence of abrasions on the edge of the papyrus, to lead us to think any ink has flaked off.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 283

instead [νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐπὶ] τῶιδε νό[μωι κατέδ]ε̣υσα παρειάς, “But now in vain on account of that law have I drenched my cheeks.” The word nomos is attested at Empedocles B 9.5, although not exactly in the same sense, but nomos as a reference to the law of exile of souls is well attested in our secondary sources.8 If correct, this passage would imply a reference back to the law that regulates the exile of the daimones as described in B 115, which would here be presupposed, and that in turn would add to the evidence for locating B 115 in the On Nature, most likely in the proem.9 This integration of the story of the exiled daimones into the story of the cosmos is the basis for my other supplements in d 5–10. Of these, let me mention only d 8 [ἐξικ]νούμε[θα γὰ]ρ πολυβενθ[έα χώρον], ὀΐω, “For we have come to a very deep place, I believe.” The notion of depth is guaranteed by the extant πολυβενθ[ so that if we combine that with my suggested supplement place, χώρος, rather than M&P’s δῖνος, ‘whirl,’ the passage can be taken as a hint – one among others in the corpus – at the doctrine of life in Hades. Once more this is not a claim I can substantiate here, but the idea is that Empedocles suggested, with respect to the exiled daimones, that their place of exile is identical with this, our current terrestrial life, which is Hades. This Pythagorean (?) notion of life in Hades is well attested in Plato, in particular the myth of the Phaedo, but again I refer the matter to my fuller discussion in Trépanier (2017a). Finally, this reading of ll. d 5–10 as an interjection and a reference back to the theme of the exile of the daimones is in part the reason why, following a suggestion from Sedley, I take ἐπιβ[ησόμ]εθ’ αὖθις at d 10 as promise to return to the topic of transmigration and exile, rather than, as in Primavesi and Janko, a transitional sentence signaling a return to the ongoing cosmologicals exposition.10 As I see it, Empedocles combined both themes in his poem, and cut back and forth between them. This allowed him not only to vary its content but also to keep the hearers on their toes. The exclamation found in d 5–10 is a ‘teaser,’ referring back 8 For my reconstruction of ll. d 5–10, see part 3 of Trépanier (2017a). For nomos, see for example Plot. Enn. 4.8 (6).1.18–20, who there paraphrases B 115: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε εἰπὼν ἁμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φυγὰς θεόθεν γενόμενος ἥκειν πίσυνος μαινομένῳ νείκει τοσοῦτον παρεγύμνου. 9 Even among upholders of the two-poem view, those who locate B 115 in the On Nature include Van der Ben (1975), Sedley (1998) 8–10, Graham (2010) F 8; for the Purifications: O’Brien (1981) and (2001); Gemelli Marciano (2013) no. 160; Primavesi (2011) no. 8. As some audience members helpfully pointed out in Trier, the deictic τῶιδε should imply a more proximate reference. For my attempted defense of it, see Trépanier (2017a). But otherwise the alternative reading τῶιγε can be used, which still presupposes the story of the daimones from B 115. 10 Janko renders: “but we’ll embark once more upon our tale.” Sedley’s suggestion is found in Osborne (2000) 336 n. 9.

284 

 Simon Trépanier

to the exile of the daimones and promising future revelations on the post mortem destiny of the soul. Yet, surely deliberately, it also holds back from full disclosure on these matters, ensuring that the audience remains keen for more.

Lines d 11 to 18 and fragment B 62 We can now begin to focus upon ll. 11–18 themselves. As noted above, M&P originally proposed locating section d as far away as Book 2 on the basis of its closeness to that fragment. Whether that provides good reason to locate section d in Book 1 was already doubted by Osborne (2000), but otherwise it is certainly true that B 62 is our best guide to the process described in d 11–18.11 Any attempt to make sense of ll. 10 to 18 has to start from here:

5

νῦν δ’ ἄγ’, ὅπως ἀνδρῶν τε πολυκλαύτων τε γυναικῶν ἐννυχίους ὅρπηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ, τῶνδε κλύ’· οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ’ ἀδαήμων. οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον, ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες· τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι, οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας οὔτ’ ἐνοπὴν οἷόν τ’ ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον. But come: how, of men and much-weeping women separating fire led up the benighted shoots, hear now. For the tale is not aimless or unlearnable. First, whole-natured forms sprang out of the earth, having an allotment of both water and heat. These fire was sending up, wanting to reach its like, nor were they yet displaying the lovely frame of the limbs nor voice (face?) nor organ local to man.

Our source for B 62, Simplicius, explains that these lines occurred in Book 2, before Empedocles described the emergence of sexual differentiation.12 The account of 11 Osborne (2000) 335–336 already voiced strong doubts about the placement of Book 2, before Janko suggested the new placement. 12 Simpl. In Phys. 381.29 Diels: εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἐν τῶι δευτέρωι τῶν Φυσικῶν πρὸ τῆς τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ γυναικείων σωμάτων διαρθρώσεως ταυτὶ τὰ ἔπη· “Empedocles says the following verses in Book 2 of the Physics, before the articulation of male and female bodies.”

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 285

sexual differentiation itself he does not quote, but what he does quote looks like a recapitulation of earlier content by Empedocles, in order to provide the setting for the emergence of this new phenomenon. In this recapitulation Empedocles describes the rise from the earth of the ‘benighted shoots’ of men and women, led along by ‘separating fire.’ As already noted above, this context of separation implies that in B 62 the agency – and hence world – of Strife is presupposed by Empedocles. As we can learn from the doxography, the passage also presupposes a prior cosmological context, in which air and fire have already begun to separate themselves out from the central mixture, A 30: He says that air was first separated off from the blend of the elements and poured round in a circle; after air, fire, springing out and having no other place [to go] springs out upwards [and lodges] under the solidified air. There are two hemispheres moving in a circle round the earth, the one wholly of fire, the other mixed from air and a little fire, which he thinks is night. The initial motion occurred from it so happening that a certain accumulation of fire caused it to start falling. The sun is not by nature fire, but a reflection of fire similar to that occurring off of water (…)13

In B 62 it is the upper fire that draws along, by the attraction of like to like, the fire within the earth, and so draws up the ‘whole-natured forms’ out from the earth. The central interpretative difficulty of B 62 is whether or not the ‘benighted shoots of men and women’ are the same things as the ‘whole natured forms’ of l. 4. Both alternatives have some plausibility. In favor of identity, Empedocles encourages us to see them both as drawn up by fire. Against it, he tells us that the ‘whole-natured forms’ grew out of the earth first, before men and women were on the scene.14 But if so, why then does he call them the shoots ‘of men and women’? What does seem certain is that the ‘whole natured forms’ must be plants. First, they rise from the earth. Second, as shown by testimonium A 70 (Greek text in the app. crit.), their designation as ‘whole natures’ is best explained as pointing to the absence of sexual differentiation among them: Empedocles says that trees first grew out of the earth, before the sun was gathered together and before night and day were separated. On account of the balance of their blend they contain the ratios of male and female. They grow by being pulled apart by the heat within the earth, so that they are part of the earth, as embryos are parts, inside the womb, of the mother.

13 Transl. by Inwood (2001) 171–172. 14 Wright (19952) 216–217 stresses the differences. Bollack (1965–1969) III 429, ad 510, combines them: “Les hommes, dans leur état de prototypes, sont assimilés à des végétaux.”

286 

 Simon Trépanier

That must be why Empedocles mentions them before launching into the origins of men and women: the introduction of sexual differentiation by Strife is the novelty he is about to describe. All in all, therefore, it is probably better to understand the ‘benighted shoots’ as plants. The epithet ‘benighted’ must reflect the fact, as related in A 70, that plants arose before the full separation of night and day. The point of calling them the shoots ‘of men and women’ would then be to anticipate the eventual continuity between those first forms of life and the more differentiated forms that succeeded them.15

The placement of sections d and f: the origins of plants We are now ready to undertake the reconstruction of the text. As recognized by all previous editors, the extant portions of the papyrus describe the same mechanism as in B 62. Separation by fire, here an ‘unwearied flame’ (φ[λογ]μὸς ἀτειρής), is the driving force leading to the production of living creatures, the things that ‘were begotten’, τεκνώθ[η]σαν. The link to Strife (and perhaps life in Hades) is further shown by the characterization of the thing led up as ‘a much sufferingmixture’, π[ο]λυπή[μο]να κρᾶσιν. Based on B 62, M&P therefore suggested that d 11–18 describes the origins of all living things, and accordingly supplemented l. d 13/1.343 to: ζῶι]α φυτάλμια τεκνώθ[η]σαν. In this they were followed by all subsequent editors. Now the word ζῶια ‘living creatures’ here is very poorly preserved. No great weight needs be attached to the word itself – at a stretch, it could include plants, alongside animals – but what I do want to query is the assumption that generated that particular supplement. Instead of animals or living creatures in general, I propose that we can make better sense of the passage on the slightly narrower basis that the origins of plants, and plants alone, is Empedocles’ subject. At the level of content, here then is where I part with Janko (2004), whose edition is built on a general zoogonic understanding of the passage, and the same goes for Rashed (2011) and Primavesi (2008) and (2011). At the papyrological level, however, that is, with respect to the reconstruction of the column, I stay with Janko beyond Rashed and Primavesi, who retain Janko’s collocation of section f with d but disregard the possible addition of b. But against them all I will argue that we can make more headway in reconstructing the whole sequence by staying closer to B 62 and the doxography. Not only that, but if the origins of plants is indeed the

15 Through transmigration perhaps? Beyond Simplicius himself, the Aristotelian context at Ph. 2.8.199b also strongly implies a discussion of plants, not animals.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 287

topic of these lines, I hope to show that the link to f becomes much stronger, while this also opens a new and very plausible thematic link to section b. We have already seen that if B 62 does refer to men and women, it does so only by specifying that they are yet to come, and that plants were first on the scene. More importantly, and now to start my positive case, the legible portions of sections d and f, prior to any supplements, can be unified around the topic of the origins of plants. Section f on its own offers 8 line-openings of no more than 2 to 4 letters each, but enough for us to be confident of most of the words. The first two lines offer a set of related temporal coordinating conjunctions ὁππότ[ε and δὴ τό[τε, not by themselves indicative of any specific content, but the third line preserves χόρ[ for which the most likely supplement, for lack of alternatives, is χόρ[τος, ‘grass’ or ‘fodder’ as first suggested by Janko. More tentatively, the first two letters of f 8/1.352 are compatible with the epithet τηλεθάοντα, known to us from B 153b Vítek (2006) where it is applied to trees. If so, the word δένδρα probably figured in the lost portion. Thus, even before we consider a single supplement to the text, we have two plausible connections between d and f on the subject of plants, and no mention of animals. With that as my entry-point, let us now consider gains to be made in reconstructing 1.341–352 once we assume that Empedocles is decribing the rise of plants, driven along by fire’s prior ascent to the heavens. (For parallels and alternative suggestions, see the app. crit. in section 2.) This ascent I understand as contained in the opening of my restored l. d 14/1.342 [ἐξεστηκὼς γ]ῆ ς, ἀνάγων π[ο]λυπή[μο]να κρᾶσιν, which specifies the prior separation of fire from the earth, as in the doxography, and gives more point to the participle ἀνάγων, which then has the exact same function as in B 62. In other words, we should assume that although much or most of the fire has now left the earth for the upper regions, there is also still much fire in the earth, cf. B 52: πολλὰ δ’ ἔνερθ(ε) οὔδεος πυρὰ καίεται, “many fires burn beneath the earth.” It is the fire seeking to reach its like in heaven that ‘leads up’ the growth of plants from the earth. For plants specifically I also therefore suggest as an alternative to ζῶι]α φυτάλμια at l. d 15/1.342 [μυρία δὴ τότε φῦλ]α φυτάλμια. The term φῦλ]α, ‘tribes’ or ‘race’ or ‘kind,’ is of course very general, but their description as φυτάλμια may also include the meaning ‘life-nourishing’ and therefore hint at plants (see also below). Next, and skipping 1.344–346, at d 17/1.347 I understand the participle λαχόντα as a neuter plural, either denoting the races and creatures or perhaps plural fires (see below on πυρά) produced by the multiple instances of these eruptions, as suggested by ὁππότ[ε and δὴ τό[τε, “whenever (...) then (...).” The element these creatures or fires ‘obtain a share of,’ in the genitive, I supply with ὄμβρου, ‘rain,’ as in B 62 (but ὕδατος also meets alla criteria, see B 21), while the act of creation, I propose, occurs along a ‘plain’ or ‘meadow’ ἀν λει]μῶνα, itself yet another indication of botanical content. Thus for 1.347/348 together we get: [ὄμβρου δὲ ὅσ’ ἀν λει]μῶνα λαχόντα / χόρ[τος δένδρα τε γέντο, which we can

288 

 Simon Trépanier

compare to B 62.5 (ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες), where we have a similar stress on fire and water. Ll. 1.344–346 present a number of challenges, for which there may be no definitive answer, only possibilities. Let me take them up in order of plausibility rather than in the order which they appear in the text. First is the enjambment over ll. 1.345/346. Throughout this study my central assumption has been that, if the ultimate agent of these changes is Strife, the more proximate cause, and the subject of the verbs in ll. 1.345/346 is fire. If so, then for 1.346 this subject allows me to supplement αὐ]γῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι / θεσπε[σίηι, · “with a terrible flash and roar,” as a description of fire’s eruption from the earth, rather than κλαγ]γῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι. For this specific point and for my reconstruction · of the passage as a whole, a number of Lucretian parallels are especially helpful, although I cannot analyze them here in any detail. The first of them, from the praise of Sicily in Book 1, an overtly Empedoclean passage, provides a combination of volcanic fire erupting from the earth, where roaring and the flash of fire are intermingled:

725

(...) hic Aetnaea minantur murmura flammarum rursum se colligere iras, faucibus eruptos iterum vis ut vomat ignis ad caelumque ferat flammai fulgura rursum.16 (...) here Aetna’s rumblings threaten that the angry flames are gathering again, that once more its violence may belch fires bursting forth from its throat, and once more shoot to the sky the lightnings of its flame.17

The second passage is unfortunately lacunose, but Lucretius appears to evoke Empedocles in describing how fire, according to a rival, non-Epicuran account, leaves the central earth for the outer heaven: at contra tenuis exponunt aeris auras et calidos simul a medio differrier ignis, atque ideo totum circum tremere aethera signis 1090  et solis flammam per caeli caerula pasci, quod calor a medio fugiens se ibi conligat omnis, nec prorsum arboribus summos frondescere ramos posse, nisi a terris paulatim cuique cibatum18 ***

16 Lucr. 1.722–725. 17 Transl. by W. H. D. Rouse (rev. by M. F. Smith). 18 Lucr. 1.1087–1093.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 289

but on the other hand [they] explain that the thin breezes of air and the hot fires are at the same time carried away from the middle; and that the whole firmament all about twinkles with constellations and the sun’s flame feeds through the blue sky, because all the heat fleeing from the middle gathers itself together there; and that the topmost branches of trees could not even produce leaves, if food were not [distributed] to each from the earth, gradually [supplied by an internal fire, (…)]19

Somewhat surprisingly, Lucretius suddenly turns to report that this rival account explained that this natural upward movement of fire what the means whereby nourishment form the soil reaches the top of the tree: it is drawn up from within the earth by the ascent of fire. Whatever else is going on here, Lucretius seems to have Empedocles in mind. Lastly a passage from Book 5 connects the Lucretian origins of plants with fire through its use of color and light imagery:

785

Principio genus herbarum viridemque nitorem terra dedit circum collis camposque per omnis, florida fulserunt viridanti prata colore, arboribusque datumst variis exinde per auras crescendi magnum inmissis certamen habenis.20 In the beginning the earth gave forth the different kinds of herbage and bright verdure about the hills and all over the plains, and the flowering meadows shone with the colour of green; then to the various kinds of trees came a mighty struggle, as they raced at full speed to grow up into the air.21

Lucretius denotes the brightness of the first plants by using the verb fulgeo, usually used of lightning. A more difficult problem over ll. 1.345–346 is how to reconstruct the missing verbs in the central gap. Our only positive clue is the end of l. 1.345, but unfortunately the verb is not fully preserved. If restoring the initial β is obvious, less obvious is the choice between the first hand’s aorist subjunctive, β]ῆι, and an infinitive ending, β]ῆν, suggested by the second hand, between two dots. (I exclude the first person, which seems highly unlikely.) As it is, the central gap deprives us of the evidence needed to decide between them. Janko opts for the subjunctive and fills the 14–15 letter gap with a participle, using the last three partial letters εις  to restore ὁππό[τε δὴ γ’ αἰθὴρ μιχθ]είς̑  . Although he is followed by others in this, I would rule 19 Transl. by W. H. D. Rouse (rev. by M. F. Smith). Compare this passage as well to the criticism of Empedocles on the nourishment of plants in Theophr. Caus. pl. 1.12.5. 20 Lucr. 5.783–787. 21 Transl. by W. H. D. Rouse (rev. by M. F. Smith). This passage, also noted by Rashed (2011), is immediately followed by a simile which is almost certainly connected to Empedocles’ fragment B 82.

290 

 Simon Trépanier

this option out on general grounds of context: if we are dealing with fire’s ascent to heaven from the earth, then the more obvious prepositional phrase εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον should stand until proven non-viable. To go back now to the choice between βῆν and βῆι, the infinitive, used to indicate finality, could produce an intelligible phrase, εἰς τόπον ἐσχάτιον βῆν, “to go to the furthest place,” which would be dependent on a verb of motion in the middle lacuna, either indicative or a participle. So, if the second hand is right, one could supplement ὁππό[τε πῦρ ἔτ’ ἔνερθ’ ὦρτ’] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆν or ὁππό[τ’ ἔνερθεν πῦρ ὦρτ’] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆν.22 Alternatively, if we go with the first hand’s β]ῆι, we can explain the aorist subjunctive as either final or stating a more general indefinite condition. So, if final, one attractive possibility, based on Homeric parallels, is ὁππό[τε γὰρ πῦρ ὄρνυθ’ ἵν’] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι, which I offer in my text.23 But other constructions are also possible, so perhaps e.g.: ὁππό[τ’ ὄρουσεν πῦρ ὄφρ’] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι or ὁππότ[ε γὰρ πῦρ ὦρτ’ ὄφρ’] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι. The second also makes the statement an explanation. What would otherwise be the most obvious reconstruction, based on B 30, where Strife ‘rises’ to his prerogatives, would give ὁππό[τε πῦρ ἀνόρουσε καὶ] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆ, but requires that we emend the aorist subjunctive to the indicative, which seems rather strong.24 Lastly, it could be that the missing verb states a more general and indefinite statement in the subjunctive, with ὁππό[τε meaning ‘whenever,’ so we could have e.g. ὁππό[τ’ ὀρόυσηι φλόξ καὶ] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι (“whenever fire springs up and sets out for the furthest place”). But even if there are too many possibilities to chose from, the meaning does not seem much in doubt. For 1.346 we also face an abundance of possibilities. A number of these I have listed in the app. crit., with relevant parallels, but for now I offer as one possible reconstruction δὴ τό[τ’ ἀνήϊξεν πυρὰ πόλλ’ αὐ]γῆ ι καὶ ἀϋτῆι or, with a slight variation, δὴ τό[τ’ ἀνήϊξεν πυρὰ γῆς αὐ]γῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι. If we put the two together, then largely exempli gratia, and without insisting on all details, this gives: 22 Or, combining B 30 and B 62.6, and keeping the mid-line caesura in mind, one could reconstruct ὁππό[τ’ ὄρουσεν πῦρ θέλον] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆν, but this is slightly too long for the available space. For my general reasons for preferring the second hand’s corrections, see Trépanier (2017b). In this instance I leave it open. The ending is between two dots, which may indicate some hesitation. 23 Based on Hom. Il. 11.1–2 (= 19.1–2): Ἠὼς δ’ ἐκ λεχέων παρ’ ἀγαυοῦ Τιθωνοῖο / ὄρνυθ’, ἵν’ ἀθανάτοισι φόως φέροι ἠδὲ βροτοῖσι. In section d, note the stress on dawn Ἠὼς in the extant previous line. The relative rarity of attested optative forms for βαίνω would justify the final subjunctive. 24 But adopted by Rashed (2011) and Primavesi (2011). For a subjunctive βῆι at line end, compare καταβαίνω, in 31 B 9.1 DK as in ed. Primavesi (2011) n. 54: οἱ δ’ ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγὲν φῶς αἰθέρι from Plut. Adv. Col. 1113a–b.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

f 1/d 15/1.345

d 18/1.348 1.345

 291

ὁππό[τε γὰρ πῦρ ὄρνυθ’ ἵν’] εἰς  τόπον ἐσχάτι[ον β]ῆι, δὴ τό[τ’ ἀνήϊξεν πυρὰ πολλ’ αὐ]γῆι καὶ ἀϋτῆι θεσπε[σίηι· ὄμβρου δὲ ὅσ’ ἀν λει]μῶνα λαχόντα χόρ[τος δένδρα τε γέντο, For when fire rose to set out for the furthest place, then many fires shot up from the earth with a terrible flash and roar. But all that upon the plain obtained a share of rain became grass and trees.

Lastly, this only leaves the gap at d 14/1.344, where I offer

 d 14/1.344

μυρία δὴ τότε φῦλ]α φυτάλμια τεκνώθ[η]σαν οὐλοφυῶν, τῶν ν]ῦν ἔτι λείψανα δέρκεται Ἠώς.

The suggestion οὐλοφυῆ was first made by Rashed (2011: 42–44), who, however, rejected it on grounds of space (once we combine it with τῶν ν]ῦν the result is too short by one letter space). Instead, Rashed offers οὐλομελῆ as an equivalent term. I prefer to keep οὐλοφυῆ but fill the missing letter by using the genitive plural, construed with φῦλ]α φυτάλμια in the previous line (cf. B 35.7: ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν).25 The epithet φυτάλμια, if now taken as a reference to the race of plants, would include the sense ‘generative’ (they are the first and eldest plants), but can also include the sense ‘nurturing’ or ‘nutritive’, which would resonate against Empedocles’ general Pythagorean abhorrence of meat-eating, and even more pointedly, against the specific reference to his own carnivorous behavior in the lines immediately above. The same might be said for the vegetal connotations of the term, φῦλα, which brings to mind φύλλον, leaf or plant. As for οὐλοφυῆ, its point would be to mark plants out as asexual beings, as opposed to sexuality divided animals and “the double race of men and women” mentioned earlier at

25 For other reasons, I am not inclined to accept οὐλομελῆ as a valid synonym for οὐλοφυῆ. First, οὐλομελῆ is not attested in the Empedoclean corpus. Second, where it does occur, the term is used by Parmenides to describe Being (28 B 8.4 DK). Starting from that, Rashed suggests a more specific doctrinal interpretation of the passage, which describes the ‘splitting’ or cutting apart of primaeval ‘whole-limbed’, ‘single-limbed’ creatures. His grounds for this are the parallel with Aristophanes’ myth in Plato’s Symposium (190d–191), where Aristophanes describes the splitting of original a-sexual whole beings. Although I fully endorse the parallel, I think that οὐλομελῆ is stronger than needed, for it suggests creatures more fully unified than plants, more along the lines of the divine Sphairos or the holy phren of 31 B 134 DK.

292 

 Simon Trépanier

a (ii) 27 / 1.297. Beyond that, however, an identity with ‘partless’ primordial creatures does not seem necessary.26

4 Sections d and f and the Link to Section b The second half of section f, ll. 5–8, is the opening of an epic simile, one which attracted a scribal note, the visible paragraphos after f 4 by the first hand. Most likely the simile was a small-scale Empedoclean technology-simile, in which some biological structure or process is likened to an artefact. In 31 B 100 DK the lungs are likened to a small water carrier, in B 84 the eye to a storm-lantern. Thus, following Janko, the word χαλ[κεὺς, “smith” seems the best guess for 1.350, which is doubly appropriate given the theme of fire as agent of transformation (1.341). And if so, then the most likely supplement for the nominative feminine plural at 1.351 is flames, αἱ δὲ [φλόγες. What then of the connection to section b? The last securely legible part of d 18 reads πέρι χθών, preceded by ]υτο according to the first hand, corrected above the line to ]υτε by the second hand. The noun ‘earth’ in the nominative preceded by the preposition περί shows that the preposition is not construed with the noun, but a missing verb. I return to the verb below but, before that, this bare mention of earth offers us a first connection to section b. The lines of section b, which we can supplement thanks to a partial overlap with fragment B 76, are an Empedoclean mini-catalogue of animal species with hard parts on the outside, intended to illustrate a situation “where you will see earth residing atop of flesh” (1.356 / B 76.3). Here as well, I suggest, assuming that the topic under discussion is plants provides a closer thematic link than animals or living things in general. Specif26 Aristotle discusses Empedocles’ belief in the asexual reproduction of plants in a number of places: see Gen. an. 1.23.731a, and esp. [De plant.] 1.2.817a and 1.2.817b14 ff., the source of 31 B 79 DK. But if Empedoclean plants are asexual, they certainly still have parts, which separate and come together via asexual pangenetic reproduction, that is, through all of the separate parts contributing to the seed. Notably, Aristotle at Ph. 2.8.199b9–13 complains that Empedocles gave no account in the creation under rising Love of hybrid plant-monsters like the men-bulls in B 60, but that he should have. Thus Aristotle understood Empedoclean plants to have parts, and therefore reproduction through separation and recombination of such parts. Unfortunately, the edition of the key relevant testimony (A 72) is itself problematic, since Diels (DG, 430) following Karsten (1838) has introduced the term ὁλοφυῆ into the testimony, over the received text, Aët. 5.19.5: Ἐ. τὰς πρώτας γενέσεις τῶν ζώιων καὶ φυτῶν μηδαμῶς ὁλοκλήρους γενέσθαι, ἀσυμφυέσι δὲ τοῖς μορίοις διεζευγμένας, τὰς δὲ δευτέρας συμφυομένων τῶν μερῶν εἰδωλοφανεῖς, τὰς δὲ τρίτας τῶν ὁλοφυῶν (MSS ἀλληλοφυῶν), τὰς δὲ τετάρτας οὐκέτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων κτλ. But this is not the place to try sorting this all out.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 293

ically, we can understand the notion of “earth on the outside” as a reference to earth as the outer bark of trees or the outer sheath on grasses and plants. The catalogue would thus be intended to support the simile, in which Empedocles compared fire’s work, in this case ‘fixing’ bark around trees, to that of a smith. Once more, the link can be no more than a suggestion, but it can be strengthened through some good parallels. The first, most proximate parallel comes from Plutarch, the source of B 83, which paraphrases a similar but not identical Empedoclean catalogue of animals with protective outer layers or at least either hard or dry parts on the outside, De fort. Rom. 98d: Certainly, in so far as chance and nature’s endowment at birth are concerned, the great majority of brute animals are better off than man. For some are armed with horns, or teeth, or stings, and Empedocles says, αὐτὰρ ἐχίνοις ὀξυβελεῖς χαῖται νώτοις ἐπιπεφρίκασι But as for hedgehogs, upon their backs sharp darts of spines stand bristling, and still others are shod and clad with scales or fur, with claws or cloven hoofs (φολίσι καὶ λάχναις καὶ χηλαῖς καὶ ὁπλαῖς ἀποκρότοις).27 The passage is close enough to be usefully exploited in reconstructing the rest of section b, which I have done in my text.28 The other examples Plutarch lists following 27 Empedocles’ use of metaphor to instructive effects rather than as mere ornament is well recognized, as attested by Plut. Quaest. conv. 683e: “especially since he was not in the habit of tricking out facts for the sake of elegant writing by using grandiose epithets, as if he were laying on gaudy colours, but in every case aimed at simple description of an essential fact or property. For instance, he applies the expression ‘earth that envelops a mortal’ to the body that clothes us, and ‘cloud-gatherer’ to the air, and ‘rich in blood’ to the liver.” (transl. by P. A. Clement and H. B. Hoffleit). For some further musings on the structure of plants, see Plut. Quaest. conv. 684a (the  speaker is Plutarch’s father): “So,” he went on, “consider whether Empedocles did not employ the term rather with this intention: whereas other fruits are encased by a phloios (‘husk’) on the outside (that is, they have what is called a rind, pod, capsule, or shell on the surface), apples have their phloios inside as a shiny, glutinous coat to which the seed is attached, so that the edible part surrounding all this on the outside is with good reason called hyperphloion (‘outside the rind’).” (transl. by P. A. Clement and H. B. Hoffleit). 28 The overlap of section b with 31 B 76 DK, known from two passages of Plutarch (Quaest. conv. 618b for ll. 1–3 and De fac. 927f for ll. 2–3), but with a different line ordnering, shows that the two are not the same passage. Such repetition with variations is common in Empedocles and there is no need to force them both into a single text. The same may apply to B 139 and section

294 

 Simon Trépanier

the quotation of B 83 match terms from other known passages, here especially claws, χηλαῖς, found above at 1.336/d 5. More broadly, the parallel shows the plausibility of connecting the catalogue found in section b as supporting evidence for the account of the origin of plants given in section d/f. By listing animals with earthy or hard outsides, animals that will have been familiar to his audience, Empedocles makes his account of fire fixing earth/bark upon trees easier to visualize. More remotely, but still pertinently, we can compare this specific process to the cosmogony of Empedocles’ 6th-cent. BC predecessor Anaximander, where an explicit comparison is made between the formation of the sky by means of a sphere of fire which grows around the upper air “like bark on a tree”: He says the earth is cylindrical in shape, and has a depth of one third its width. He says that part of the everlasting which is generative of hot and cold separated off at the coming to be of the world-order and from this a sort of sphere of flame grew around the air about the earth like bark around a tree (καί τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῶι περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῶι δένδρωι φλοιόν).29

This comparison is likely to have been known to Empedocles. In Anaximander, the comparison proceeds from the known, natural microcosm to illustrate the formation of the less-known macrocosm. Empedocles’ own account of the formation of the glassy shell of the heavens in A 30, quoted above, is similar enough to have been influenced by it, although following his usual manner it is based instead on a technological simile, glass making. In our passage, as noted above, l. 1.350’s χαλ[κεὺς suggests that Empedocles deployed a metallurgical analogy. Janko suggests inlaying, although perhaps gilding is closer, to illustrate the process whereby trees were covered in dry ‘earthy’ bark. The original could have looked like this:  αἱ δὲ [φλόγες τὼς δὴ τότ’ ἔπηξαν γὴν περὶ δένδρα (?)] f 8 / 1.352 τη[λεθάοντα The simile thus offers a credible means of relating the two extant mentions of earth at d 18 and b 3, which are also notable for their choice of the same term, χθών, instead of possible variants such as γή or αἶα. For the verb in l. 1.348, I therefore supplement πέπηγεν δ’ α]ὖτε πέρι χθών, siding with the second hand over Janko’s supplement ὅπῃ εἴλ]υτο πέρι χθών, and following some criticism of it by Rashed.30 d 4–5 above. Otherwise, the small catalogue at a (ii) 25 / 1.295–28 / 1.298 provides some obvious suggestions for filling out the lines. 29 12 A 10 DK (= ps.-Plut. Strom. 2, DG, 579 = fr. 4 Graham [2010] = Ar 101 Wöhrle [2011]). 30 Rashed (2011) 38.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 295

As a third and final parallel, we can note the similarity of this process with the set of fragments B 71, 73, and 75 that Simplicius quotes in his commentary to the De caelo, and who there states that they stood within close range to one another.31 The two latter fragments describe the agency of Love manufacturing limbs or body parts at the earliest stage of her zoogony, but B 75 shows that in this case Love’s work resulted in a reverse organization of the elements, one where the hard parts, the bones, found themselves in the middle of the body. Here is B 73, which uses imagery from baking or the firing clay to describe Love’s fashioning of what I infer are bones: ὡς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεί τ’ ἐδίηνεν ἐν ὄμβρωι, εἴδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῶι πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι In the same way did Kypris then, when she had moistened earth in rain, having fashioned it into shapes, gave them over to swift fire to harden. The ὡς δὲ τότε phrase in particular is identical to B 84.7, which introduces the depiction of Love’s fashioning of the eye in terms of the previously described storm lantern. From this context we can garner that B 75 is obviously a gesture towards a lost catalogue of animals with the ‘hard parts’ on the inside: τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι μανὰ πέπηγε, Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμηισι πλάδης τοιῆσδε τυχόντα (...) As many as are hard-set on the inside, but soft on the outside, obtaining such a shape by the devices of Kypris (...) Since Simplicius tells us that B 73 and 75 stood in the same vicinity, this in turn makes the pair a suitable parallel for our text, allowing us to posit a similar link between sections d and b via a metallurgical simile. The fact that the situation in B 73 is a symmetrical inversion of section d/f/b raises the suspicion that Empedocles intended his audience to notice these complimentary structures. Indeed, one significant asymmetry between the two processes is that in B 73 Love herself as ‘craftsman’ oversees the transformation, while fire is downgraded to her instrument, wheras in sections d/f/b fire alone effects the transformation. Such considerations raise issues of causation and design in Empedocles that are beyond

31 Along with B 86, B 87, and B 95; see Inwood (20012), context 45b, for the complete sequence.

296 

 Simon Trépanier

the scope of this paper.32 Overall, however, the passages are so close that B 75.1 suggests that a similar line, mutatis mutandis, may have stood after the last extant line of section b: b 6/1.360 1.361

ἀλλ(ὰ) οὐκ ἂν τελέσαιμ]ι  λέγων σύμ[παντα γένεθλα [τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν μανὰ, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι πυκνά πέπηγε (?)33

References Bollack (1965–1969): Jean Bollack, Empédocle, 3 vols., Paris. Gemelli Marciano (2013): M. Laura Gemelli Marciano, Die Vorsokratiker, vol. 2, Düsseldorf. Graham (2010): Daniel W. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge. Inwood (2001): Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, Toronto (1st ed. 1992). Janko (2004): Richard Janko, “Empedocles, On Nature, I 233–364: A New Reconstruction of P. Strasb. Gr. Inv. 1665–6”, in: ZPE 150, 1–26. M&R2: Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). MansPr: Jaap Mansfeld and Oliver Primavesi (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). M&P: Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). O’Brien (1969): Denis O’Brien, Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle, Cambridge. O’Brien (1981): Denis O’Brien, Pour interpréter Empédocle, Paris. O’Brien (2001): Denis O’Brien, “Empedocles: The Wandering Daimon and the Two Poems”, in: Aevum(ant) n.s. 1, 79–179. Osborne (1987): Catherine Osborne, “Empedocles Recycled”, in: CQ 37, 24–50. Osborne (2000): Catherine Osborne, “Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt: A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg”, in: OSAPh 18, 329–356. Primavesi (2008): Oliver Primavesi, Empedokles Physika I: Eine Rekonstruktion des zentralen Gedankengangs, Berlin/New York. Primavesi (2011): Oliver Primavesi ap. MansPr. Rashed (2011): Marwan Rashed, “La zoogonie de la Haine selon Empédocle : Retour sur l’ensemble ‘d’ du papyrus d’Akhmim”, in: Phronesis 56, 33–57. Sedley (1998): David N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge. 32 The contrast squares with Aristotle’s complaint in Metaph. 1.4.985a31–b3 that in practice fire is not just one of the four elements, but that it alone is usually opposed to the other three; he adds that this emerges from the study of Empedocles: ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν (οὐ μὴν χρῆταί γε τέτταρσιν ἀλλ’ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι μόνοις, πυρὶ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς δ’ ἀντικειμένοις ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, γῇ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι· λάβοι δ’ ἄν τις αὐτὸ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν). 33 Against this, Janko (2004) places section e, a column-top, at the top of col. 13.

11 Empedocles on the Origin of Plants 

 297

Sedley (2007): David N. Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London. Trépanier (2003): Simon Trépanier, “Empedocles on the Ultimate Symmetry of the World”, in: OSAPh 24, 1–57. Trépanier (2004): Simon Trépanier, Empedocles: An Interpretation, London. Trépanier (2014): Simon Trépanier, “From Wandering Limbs to Limbless Gods: Δαίμων as Substance in Empedocles”, in: Apeiron 47, 172–214. Trépanier (2017a): Simon Trépanier, “From Hades to the Stars: Empedocles on the Cosmic Habitats of Soul”, in: ClAnt 36.1, 130–182. Trépanier (2017b): Simon Trépanier, “Empedocles On Nature I. 273–87: Place, the Elements and Still No ‘We’”, in: Mnemosyne 70, 562–584. Trépanier (forthcoming): Simon Trépanier, “The Spirit in the Flesh: Empedocles on Embodied Soul”, in: Hynek Bartoš and Colin Guthrie King (eds.), Heat, Pneuma, and Soul in Aristotle and his Predecessors, Cambridge. Van der Ben (1975): Nicolaus van der Ben, The Proem of Empedocles’ Peri Physios: Towards a New Edition of All the Fragments, Amsterdam. Vítek (2006): Tomáš Vítek, Empedoklés, vol. 2: Zlomky, Prague. Wöhrle (2011): Georg Wöhrle (= TP2). Wright (1995): M. Rosemary Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, London (1st ed. New Haven/London 1981).

Giuliana Leone

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 1 Among the Presocratic philosophers, Empedocles has undoubtedly benefited the most from papyrology.1 As is known, the Herculaneum papyri were the first papyrus finds (in the 1700’s) to provide testimonia concerning Empedocles, though since then other finds have increased the number of them.2 Only recently, in 1999, Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi published the excellent editio princeps of the Strasbourg Papyrus (PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666),3 which contains the most extensive directly transmitted continuous text of Empedocles yet known, and which has allowed scholars to reconstruct a long sequence of his work On Nature.4 It has enriched our store of his fragments enormously, which are otherwise indirectly

1 The papyri of Empedocles discussed herein stand alongside a few other works by Presocratic philosophers which have been partially restored to us in direct transmission by papyri: the Περὶ ἀληθείας of Antiphon the Sophist (POxy. XI 1364 + LII 3647 and POxy. XV 1797), the Θεολογία of Pherecydes of Syros (PGrenf. II 11, on which see the contribution by Marco A. Santamaría in this volume), and, according to Janko’s (2002) attribution, Diagoras of Melos’ commentary in the Derveni Papyrus (but see also the thesis maintained by Andrei Lebedev in this volume). 2 On the quotations of Empedocles in the Greco-Egyptian papyri (i.e. PBerol. inv. 9782, cols. LXX.43–LXXI.6, PIbscher II.10–11; POxy. XIII 1609 + PPrinc. inv. AM 11224c, fr. a, col. II.4–13; PVatic. 11, col. I.23–28), cf. CPF I.1**, 145–150; on POxy. XLVII 3318 (= Hermarch. fr. 28 Longo Auricchio [1988]), cf. infra; see also Funghi/Roselli (1997) 59–61 and 66–69, on the possible attribution to Empedocles of a hexameter passage in PPetrie II 49e (= PLitLond. 159a) and PLitLond. 159b. 3 = M&P. 4 In his new edition, Janko (2004) reconstructs a full 131 continuous verses (vv. 233–364), all belonging, according to him, to Book 1 of Empedocles’ On Nature, including section d of the papyrus, which has been assigned to Book 2 by Martin and Primavesi (M&P, 110–111, 284, and 307–308). See now Primavesi (2008), (2012), and (2013). Note: I warmly thank Christian Vassallo, the organizer of the International Workshop Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition, for his kind invitation to participate and for accepting my contribution for publication in this volume. I also warmly thank Michael McOsker for translating this paper into English, for checking several controversial readings in PHerc. 1012, and for sharing with me some still unpublished papers; and David Sider for his careful revision of the text and his useful suggestions. Giuliana Leone, University of Naples Federico II https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-013

300 

 Giuliana Leone

transmitted,5 and nourished a lively critical debate to which the papers by Mirjam E. Kotwick and Simon Trépanier in this volume also contribute.6 This papyrus contains 74 verses, in varying states of disrepair, belonging to Empedocles’ poem On Nature, and these have shed light on various aspects of his philosophy and style, beyond establishing that certain verses which had been traditionally assigned to the Purifications actually belong to the other poem.7 Even if ascertaining the existence of the second treatise or the extent to which it is represented in the fragments proved to be impossible,8 the new text has supported the view of those scholars who did not believe in a rigid thematic distinction – physical and religious-demonological  – between the two works, although such a distinction had been suspected in the past.9 Furthermore, the dating of the papyrus to the later 1st cent. AD added to our knowledge of Empedocles’ Fortleben, especially since the roll was probably a scholar’s study-copy. Moreover, that Empedocles was read in Egypt, at least until the middle of the 2nd cent. AD, has been proven by the recent acquisition of a new directly transmitted text, conserved in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus (POxy. LXXIII 4938) and published in 2009 by Dirk Obbink,10 which contains the remains of nine hexameters about vision which, according to the editor, ought to come from a professional copy of the work, or possibly a series of extracts. It is reasonable to think that the presence in Egypt of a copy of the Epicurean Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles (in 22 books!), indicated by a book tag, or sillybos, for the ninth book found in Oxyrhynchus (POxy. XLVII 3318, dated to the 1st or 2nd cent. AD),11 shows not 5 Cf. DK. 6 For additional bibliography on the Strasbourg Papyrus, see Simon Trépanier and Mirjam E. Kotwick’s papers in this volume. 7 See e.g. fr. 31 B 139 DK = vv. 335–336 in Janko (2004). 8 Trépanier declares now himself for the ‘unitarian party,’ whose most important exponents are Osborne (1987) and Inwood (20012); Kotwick, on the other hand, continues to prefer the traditional thesis of two distinct works. See their contributions in this volume for the terms of the question, along with M&P, 114–119 and Primavesi (2013) 680–682. 9 On this topic, see at least M&P, 83–86 and 116–119. 10 See Obbink (2009). The identification was made possible by matching v. 2 with 31 B 88 DK (= Arist. Poet. 21.1458a4; cf. also Strab. 8.364, which draws on Apollodorus of Athens). 11 POxy. XLVII 3318 (ed. by R. A. Coles) = Hermarch. fr. 28 Longo Auricchio (1988), on which cf. Caroli (2007) 177–179. The papyrus confirms that the title of the work was Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα, repeatedly mentioned by Philodemus (cf. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 19.26–27 = ll. 544–545 Obbink [1996]; col. 35.14–15 = ll. 1000–1001 Obbink [1996]; col. 39.3–4 = ll. 1104–1105 Obbink [1996]; cf. Obbink [1988]). On the version of the title transmitted by Diogenes Laërtius (10.25 = Hermarch. fr. 25 Longo Auricchio [1988]), generally misinterpreted by scholars as a single work entitled Ἐπιστολικὰ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, Treatises on Empedocles in Epistolary Form, see Longo Auricchio (1988) 123–124 and now Blank/Longo Auricchio (2017) 18–20.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 301

only the fortunes of that work itself – which Porphyry, at least, was reading in the 3rd cent. AD12 – but also persistent interest in the philosophy of Empedocles. Hermarchus’ impressive Against Empedocles certainly represented the culmination of Epicurean polemic against the Agrigentine – a polemic that continued without interruption until the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda erected his monumental inscription in the first half of the 2nd cent. AD13 – but it, like the rest of his works, has not yet been found among the Herculaneum papyri. But these papyri have produced quite a few traces of this polemic, along with precious textual citations taken from Empedocles’ works and various references to him, all of which testify to a deep knowledge of his doctrine and the continual circulation of his poems within the Epicurean school, which in turn confirm that the Epicureans achieved a notable cultural level which has been too often denied.14 Further, the Herculaneum papyri have added many interesting elements to Empedocles’ Fortleben and testify to the notoriety that his poetry and doctrine enjoyed. As we will see, the Herculanean testimonia generally indicate clear disagreement about

12 Cf. Hermarch. fr. 34 Longo Auricchio (1988). 13 Here I limit myself to a few short notes on Diogenes’ anti-Empedoclean polemics, inasmuch as they stem from an epigraphic source rather than a papyrological one, like all the other texts considered in this paper (cf. infra). Empedocles’ doctrine of the elements appears among other Presocratic doctrines against which Diogenes directs his criticisms (frs. 6–7 Smith [1993], in particular fr. 6, II.2–4), although they are not developed in the surviving fragments (on Diogenes’ brevity, imposed by the constraints of his chosen medium for preaching salvation, cf. Roskam [2017] 247). In Leone (2007) 236–237, following Martin F. Smith, I expressed the conviction that the similarities between Diogenes and Colotes’ polemics (like those between Colotes and Lucretius, cf. infra), to which Ettore Bignone drew attention, could be owed to the use of the same source. I think that this source could be identified in Epicurus’ On Nature, Books 14–15 or even in the Epitome of the Books Against the Naturalists; Verde (2017) 86 does not completely rule out Bignone’s hypothesis; Roskam (2017) 260–261 also finds in Diogenes’ polemics a “Colotes approach,” though he recognizes that Colotes had no monopoly on it. In Leone (2017), I reaffirmed my position and tried to show how Diogenes followed his master Epicurus even in his polemical methods and tones, which use the weapons of ridicule but in which it is hard to find excessively harsh points; Roskam (2017) 245–246, on the other hand, emphasizes the differences. A reference to the doctrines that posit Empedocles’ four elements as the στοιχεῖα is found, immediately after a polemic against the Stoic doctrine on the elements, in fr. 100 Smith (2003), taken from the Maxims, on which see now Verde (2017) 81 and Gourinat (2017) 168–171. On Diogenes’ polemic against Empedocles’ doctrine on the transmigration of souls in frs. 41–42 Smith (1993), see the editor’s considerations (491–493), Rispoli (2007) 264–266, and Inwood (2009). It is also worth mentioning that the reductio ad absurdum used by Diogenes against Empedocles in fr. 42, discussed à propos of Diogenes by Roskam (2017) 256, is a typical technique of Epicurus’ polemics, as I showed in Leone (2017) 101. 14 On the inconsistency of the accusations of ignorance levelled against Epicurus, see Leone (1996) and (2000). McOsker (2016) speaks of a notable educational level of Demetrius Laco.

302 

 Giuliana Leone

many key points of doctrine between the Epicureans and Empedocles. On the other hand, in line with the well-known Lucretius’ verses devoted to the refusal of Empedocles’ doctrine,15 they denote a certain respect and consideration for their adversary that occasionally deviates into sarcasm or irony, but never hostility. Carlo Gallavotti, editor of Empedocles’ fragments in 1975,16 published in the same year an important study about references to him in the Herculaneum papyri.17 According to Anna Angeli,18 this study, on one hand, paved the way for a wider analysis of the complex relationship between Empedocles and Epicureanism, but on the other, gave more elements for defending the authority of the Herculanean texts in comparison with those known to us through the medieval tradition. In Gallavotti’s wake, Enzo Puglia,19 Italo Gallo,20 Tiziano Dorandi,21 and Dirk Obbink22 returned to the same topic in the 1980’s. In 2005, a conference devoted to Empedocles was organized in Naples by Giovanni Casertano: its proceedings23 contain four lengthy papers on the presence of Empedocles in Epicurus (by Giuliana Leone), Hermarchus (by Gioia M. Rispoli), Demetrius Laco (by Enzo Puglia), and Philodemus (by Giovanni Indelli).24 Puglia has recently published another contribution to this topic.25 In this study, I will attempt to provide an up-to-date status quaestionis on the Herculanean tradition concerning Empedocles. With this aim, I will re-examine old and new testimonia in light of the last editions of some papyrus texts, which have benefited a great deal from comparing the original manuscripts with the multispectral images (MSI) of the Herculaneum papyri,26 as well as recent studies that are concerned with this topic from various perspectives. This is not the place to lay out a complete picture of the presence and role of Empedocles’ thought in the long story of Epicureanism,27 nor to investigate whether or in what measure his doctrines could have been the origin of some

15 Lucr. 1.716–776, on which see Piazzi (2005) and Montarese (2012). 16 Gallavotti (1975a). 17 Gallavotti (1975b). 18 Angeli (2003). 19 Cf. Puglia (1984) and (1988). 20 Gallo (1985). 21 Dorandi (1989). 22 Obbink (1988) and (1996). 23 Casertano (2007). 24 Cf. Leone (2007), Rispoli (2007), Puglia (2007), and Indelli (2007). 25 Puglia (2015). 26 On which cf. Booras/Seely (1999). 27 On this desideratum, cf. Rispoli (2007) 269.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 303

forms of real or presumed dissidence within the Epicurean school,28 nor, least of all, to handle the much debated question of whether Empedocles could have been considered a precursor to atomism by Epicurus or his students, as some of our sources, which repeatedly bring Empedocles and Democritus together, suggest,29 so as to justify the relatively gentle tones of the anti-Empedoclean polemic in which the Epicurean school engaged. Such a wide-ranging work would require the careful re-examination of all the texts and testimonia available to us which could possibly be useful, and would go well beyond consideration of those passages in which Empedocles’ name or citations and clear references to his doctrines appear.30 I will also generally leave aside the non-papyrological sources which document important aspects of the anti-Empedoclean polemic that developed over time within Epicurus’ school, and I will limit myself to re-examining only the testimonia among the Herculaneum papyri in which Empedocles’ name appears or in which an implicit reference to him has been generally accepted in scholarship.31 In doing so, I intend to forcefully reaffirm, as Marcello Gigante taught, the importance of the Herculaneum papyri for the history of ancient philosophy, since they still have not always found the space they are owed, e.g. in the editions of the fragments of the Presocratics.32

2 The Herculanean testimonia containing Empedocles’ name, although included by Graziano Arrighetti in his edition of Epicurus,33 were left out of Gallavotti’s 28 On this topic, see Verde (2010) and McOsker (2017). 29 On the connections between Empedocles and atomism, see Kranz’s (1912) fundamental article; also Gemelli Marciano (1991). On the doctrine of vision in particular, I would refer to Leone (2012) 70–72. 30 For analogous considerations, cf. Leone (2007) 224. 31 There are 15 relevant texts collected in IPPH (cf. in particular XIV 86–87), for whose criteria of classification of the sources and the abbreviations cf. Vassallo (2016a) 79. An earlier overview of the Herculanean testimonia to Empedocles can be found in Dorandi (1989). 32 The importance of the Herculaneum papyri for the number, which is increasing as new editions are published, and the quality of the testimonia to the Presocratics has been emphasized by Vassallo (2016b) 315–319, who signaled the notable progress since DK and the persistent lacunae in some recent editions of the Presocratics (331–333) as well. I share his wish that the announced edition of Empedocles by Marwan Rashed will take appropriate account of the Herculanean testimonia reviewed below. 33 Cf. Arr.2, 272–273 (= fr. [29.28]) and 461–462 (= fr. [104]).

304 

 Giuliana Leone

studies. Italo Gallo, who focused on Hermarchus’ polemic against Empedocles, barely mentioned Epicurus’ texts,34 and by using Lucretius, whom he took to be a faithful reporter of Epicurus’ On Nature,35 he formulated the hypothesis that Epicurus himself had already launched the polemic against Empedocles. According to Gallo, Epicurus would have engaged in polemic only about physics, taking Empedocles’ On Nature as his particular target. Under assignment from Epicurus, Hermarchus in turn would have continued the polemic to other topics and attacked the Purifications as well.36 In light of the text in the Strasbourg Papyrus and recent studies mentioned above, Gallo’s hypothesis seems to be unconvincing, both because of the hard distinction it draws between the two works of Empedocles and because of the strict division of labor between Epicurus and Hermarchus’ work on Empedocles, which I consider implausible given the practice of syzetesis within the Epicurean school.37 In the same way, I, along with Dirk Obbink, consider it implausible that the student would have exceeded the teacher in proposing and composing polemics against Empedocles.38 Without absolutely denying, as a matter of principle, Hermarchus’ learning and original contributions, or those of other students, in the polemic against Empedocles just as in the other doctrinal developments of the school generally, I propose to demonstrate how Epicurus, particularly in his On Nature, treated several critical points of Empedocles’ doctrine from several points of view, thereby setting out in good measure the themes39 and tones of the polemic for his students as well. Empedocles’ name is one of few among the Presocratics to appear explicitly in Epicurus (the others are Democritus, Leucippus, and Anaxagoras).40 Epicurus usually did not name the targets of his polemics, either because his students and other well-honed interlocutors could easily understand who they were, or because of his well-documented habit of referring to adversaries through

34 Gallo (1985) 35 and n. 6. 35 Gallo (1985) 36. 36 Gallo (1985) 42–43. 37 Cf. Leone (2007) and Rispoli (2007) 252 n. 46. 38 Cf. Obbink (1996) 362. 39 In Leone (2007) 239–240, I put forward the hypothesis that the anti-Empedoclean polemics against demons and the τεράσματα mentioned by Plutarch (cf. Hermarch. frs. 50–51 Longo Auricchio [1988]) could go back beyond Hermarchus to Epicurus. See also Rispoli (2007) 262–264 and 267–269. 40 Cf. Epicur. De nat. 14, PHerc. 1148, col. 30 Leone (1984) (= Democritus) and ap. Phld. Adv. [eos qui se lib. nosse prof.] 1, PHerc. 1005/862, fr. 116 Angeli (1988) (= Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus), on which see below and Vassallo’s DAPR (T3) in this volume.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 305

nicknames derived from their doctrines41 or veiled allusions whose referents modern scholars are not always able to figure out. Furthermore, as we shall see, in some of the Herculanean testimonia, the name of Empedocles is associated with that of Epicurus in several ways. A fragment of Philodemus’ work Against Those Who Claim to Be Readers of the Books (PHerc. 1005/862 and 1485,42 fr. 116 Angeli [1988]),43 transmitted only in the Oxford and Neapolitan ‘disegni’, provides two quotations of Epicurus44 which were probably taken from a single text, most likely a letter – one thinks of the Letter to the Philosophers of Mitylene45 – if not from a book of the On Nature itself, as Anna Angeli proposed. In the first quotation (ll. 1–8), Epicurus alludes to his student days on Teos under Nausiphanes, “who played the sophist by reading the books of Anaxagoras and Empedocles and who made animated use of a stupefying subtlety in arguing about these questions” (π[ερὶ] | τοῦ σοφιστεύσα[ν]τος τἀ[ν]α|5ξαγόρου ἀναγι[ν]ώσκον|τος καὶ Ἐμπεδο[κλ]έους | καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τ[ε]ρθρε[υο]|μένου κατατεταμένω[ς]).46 The fragment, then, attests to Epicurus’ presence in a passage where Empedocles’ works, along with those of Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus,47 were not only circulating, but constituted the set41 In Leone (2007) 223 n. 13, I noted how the absence of Empedocles from the list of philosophers who had been objects of Epicurus’ λοιδορία could be considered prima facie a proof of Epicurus’ not completely negative attitude towards Empedocles. That list would be part of a hostile tradition going back to Timocrates and influenced Diog. Laërt. 10.108. 42 The presence of this title in PHerc. 1485 was announced for the first time in 2013 by Gianluca Del Mastro during the 27th International Congress of Papyrology held in Warsaw: see Del Mastro (2016). Capasso (1988) identified this papyrus as a second copy of PHerc. 862, which Del Mastro showed to be the lower part of the much better known PHerc. 1005, the only papyrus published by Angeli (1988). See also Del Mastro (2014) 184–187 and 324–325. 43 = Epicur. fr. [104] Arr.2. In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Nm]. 44 Angeli (1988) 241–251 convincingly claims Epicurus’ authorship, first affirmed by Crönert, for the two quotations which have been repeatedly questioned. Other arguments in favor of this identification can be found in Leone (2007) 227 and n. 36. 45 Three fragments of the indirect tradition (Epicur. frs. [101] and [103] Arr.2 and 111 Us.) make explicit reference to this letter, whose title and content are debated by scholars and whose authenticity has been doubted for a long time. Starting with Crönert, at least two more fragments— including PHerc. 1005, fr. 116 Angeli (1988)—have been ascribed to it because of the presence of the polemic against Nausiphanes which chimes with Epicurus’ fr. [103] Arr.2. For the terms of the debate, see Angeli (1988) 241–251 and Erler (1994) 114–115. 46 I translate the text in English on the basis of the Italian translation by Angeli (1988). The French translation in Delattre/Pigeaud (2010) 736 diverges at this point, where Daniel Delattre and Annick Monet print π[ρὸ] τοῦ (Vogliano) and σοφιστεῦσα[ι] τοῦ (Spengel) and translate: “(...), avant de jouer au sophiste tandis que celui qui lit les livres d’Anaxagore et d’Empédocle (...).” 47 The names of Democritus and Leucippus appear in the second quotation.

306 

 Giuliana Leone

texts for the lessons.48 Epicurus, therefore, would have had knowledge of Empedocles’ works from the beginning of his education – not just detailed knowledge of his doctrine, but, I think, direct knowledge based on the texts themselves.49 Empedocles’ name appears at the end of Book 14 of Epicurus’ On Nature (PHerc. 1148, cols. 39–43 Leone [1987]), where Epicurus provides precise instructions for the correct use of other philosophers’ doctrines, starting from correct linguistic practice.50 In col. 40,51 in particular, he stigmatizes the incoherent behavior of a muddled person (συμπεφο|ρημένος, ll. 8–9),52 who randomly joins together doctrines that are absolutely irreconcilable between themselves, therby doing violence to the concepts involved, whether they are his own or others’. This person, “although he speaks with intelligence about this doctrine of Empedocles, but without intelligence he joins it randomly and violently with this other one” (ll. 17–20: κἄν [τις] τό[δε] μὲν Ἐμπεδο|[κ]λέους λέ[γη]ι πρὸ[ς] νοῦν, τό|[δ]ε δ’ ἄν[ε]υ [νοῦ] τύχηι [συν]α[ρ]|20τῶν),53 finishes with ruining even those doctrines which turn out to be correct in some way, albeit accidentally.54 As opposed to this incorrect and incoherent behavior, Epicurus contrasts the correct attitude of the one who, because he recognizes their positive contribution,55 proposes to use different doctrines (whether originally of one or more thinkers), integrating them into his own doctrine, joining, at least, only those doctrines endowed with a certain deep harmony and coherence (τὸ | σύμφωνον

48 Margherita Erbì, who is preparing a new edition of the letters of Epicurus and with whom I had a profitable exchange of ideas about this text, is right to point out that his criticism is not directly against the texts chosen for lectures nor their contents, but rather against the method followed by Nausiphanes in his teaching. 49 Cf. Leone (2007) 228. For Sedley (1998) 20 n. 75, 125–126, 146, and 182–185, the polemic against Empedocles, like all Epicurus’ polemics on physical topics, would have Theophrastus’ Φυσικαὶ δόξαι behind it. 50 Cf. Leone (1987) 64–66. 51 In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Ts]. See Erler (2011) 19–22 on ll. 1–17. 52 My Italian translation “confusionario” coincides with the “‘mixed-up’ or ‘muddled’ individual” by Erler (2011) 20–21, who shares my general interpretation of the passage. At n. 66, he refers, for the negative force of the participle, to Pl. Phlb. 64e, Phdr. 253c, and Leg. 3.693a4, 7.805e5. In Delattre/Pigeaud (2010) 94, the translators Jacques Brunschwig, Annick Monet, and David N. Sedley prefer to understand the term συμπεφορημένος as “compilateur,” on the basis of Theophr. fr. 226a FHSG (cf. ibid. 1114 n. 22). 53 According to several interpreters—among them Montarese (2012) 217 n. 662, 228—Epicurus himself is hiding behind the indefinite pronoun [τις] (brilliantly conjectured by Usener) which serves as subject of the sentence. On the other hand, I believe, as emerges from my paraphrase of the passage, that the final lines of the column still treat the incorrect behavior of the συμπεφορημένος. 54 Cf. Epicur. De nat. 14, PHerc. 1148, col. 43.1–6 Leone (1987). 55 On the dialectical connection between Epicurus and his predecessors, see Leone (1987) 56.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 307

αὑτῶι καὶ ἀκό|λουθον)56 and which, at least, do not contradict each other nor his own doctrine. As Michael Erler has pointed out, it is clear that Epicurus, in outlining this general principle, is asserting for his own benefit the legitimacy of using others’ material while still claiming originality for his own doctrines – it is not clear whether or to what extent this is polemical – and, at the same time, he is describing a precise method for his students.57 Since col. 40 follows immediately on the polemic against Plato’s doctrine of the elements as found in the Timaeus (cols. 34–39 Leone [1984]), whose extreme self-contradictions and incoherence Epicurus took troubles to demonstrate,58 I consider it plausible that in the reference to Empedocles, we should not only see a generic example of the incoherent behavior of the συμπεφορημένος,59 but rather, the precise reference to Empedocles could implicitly allude to that incoherent combination (just like that of the Platonic theory of the elements) of Empedoclean qualitative principles with Pythagorean mathematical principles that are not compatible with them.60 On the other hand, recent studies have tried to find a positive evaluation of some doctrine of Empedocles in this passage (l. 17: τό[δε] μὲν) – as I myself suggested in my 1984 edition,61 but today think less probable – making πρὸ[ς] νοῦν (l. 18) a predicate to τό [δε] μὲν: thus Wigodsky62 suggested that the doctrine of the four elements was in question there, which Epicurus would have considered particularly important molecular combinations; thus Montarese63 nonetheless considers Wigodsky’s hypothesis implausible and poorly founded in the text and refers to other points of Empedocle’s thought 56 Cf. Epicur. De nat. 14, PHerc. 1148, col. 40.1–3 Leone (1987). 57 See Leone (2000) 29 and Erler (2011) 21–28. In the light of the method described at the end of the column at hand, one could agree with Montarese (2012) 82 n. 233, who thinks that here Epicurus could have mentioned Empedocles “as an authority from whom an undetermined thinker could borrow.” 58 The incoherence of Plato was, furthermore, a common polemical topic in the Epicurean school. Colotes, for example, attacked him for having blamed the terrifying fables of the poets about Hades and then ending up himself “transmiting the philosophical Muse into mythology” (Procl. In Remp. 2.105 Kroll). In Cic. Nat. D. 1.12.30 the Epicurean Velleius recalls Plato’s incon­ stantia through his arguments on the divine in the Laws, which contradict what he said earlier in the Timaeus. 59 Cf. Leone (1987) 53 n. 20, 60. 60 Cf. Leone (2007) 230 and n. 53. 61 Cf. Leone (1984) 33 and 101, where I translated πρὸ[ς] νοῦν as “in conformity with intelligence,” taking it with τό[δε] μὲν. 62 Wigodsky (2007) 526–530, 528 n. 23, and 529. The importance of the four elements and Lucretius’ debt to Empedocles for this doctrine are emphasized by Garani (2007) 13–15 and 228 n. 58. 63 The objections of Montarese (2012) 230 are based on Epicur. De nat. 14, PHerc. 1148, col. 34, on which see below.

308 

 Giuliana Leone

which could have received Epicurus’ appreciation, to which Lucretius, in turn, would allude in Book 1 of his poem with the expression quamquam bene multa ac divinitus invenientes;64 thus the translators of the On Nature in the Les Épicuriens collection – Brunschwig, Monet, and Sedley – render the passage as follows: “Et si quelqu’un dit quelque chose d’intelligent qui vient d’Empedocle, mais s’il se trouve qu’il lui accole quelque chose d’inintelligent (...).”65 Again, in another passage of Book 14 of the On Nature (PHerc. 1148, col. 34 Leone [1984]),66 Robert Philippson,67 followed by Graziano Arrighetti68 and myself,69 recognizes Empedocles70 – Epicurus does not name his adversary – as a proponent of a doctrine which, although wrong according to Epicurus in the determination of the στοιχεῖα, does not define their shapes. This fact contrasts with Plato’s view, which Epicurus considered even more ridiculous because of his pretension to define “a specific shape to fire or earth or water or air.” Moreover, regarding the mixtures and their properties, such a doctrine, Epicurus affirms, turns out to be at least more consistent with the elementary principles that the doctrine itself proposes. This is the passage:71 πρὸς τοὺς] || ὁρίζοντας σχῆμα π[υρ]ὸς ἴδιον ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ [ἀ]έρος, ὅτι γελοιότεροί εἰσι τῶν οὐχ ὁριζόντων μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς 64 Lucr. 1.736. Cf. Montarese (2012) 217 n. 662, 227–229; also Garani (2007) 7–16. Sedley (1998) 21 finds in Lucretius’ poem nothing more than a “qualified respect” for the Presocratic physicists in general, because of their physical (instead of theological) explanations of the cosmic phenomena. On the other hand, Sedley (2003) 11–12 notes that Lucretius, following Epicurus, could have approved Empedocles’ zoogonic theory at least as far as the survival of the fittest; but in general he criticizes Campbell (2003), who thinks that there was a direct connection between Lucretius and Empedocles, ruling out any mediation by Epicurus. In Leone (2014) and (2015), I argue that, as far as the actual use of Empedoclean material (especially metaphors and similes) goes, scholarly prejudices tend to devalue Lucretius’ dependence on Epicurus and to privilege excessively his dependence on Empedocles, both in the field of poetry and in that of doctrine. 65 ap. Delattre/Pigeaud (2010) 94. 66 In IPPH the fragment is included, though Empedocles’ name does not appear there, and classified as [Rc]. 67 Philippson (1937) 477. 68 Arr.2, 605. 69 Leone (1984) 86–89. 70 The translators of the passage ap. Delattre/Pigeaud (2010) 1114 n. 7 consider it possible; Montarese (2012) 81–83 is more skeptical on this point, but does not rule it out entirely. 71 Cf. Leone (2007) 231–232.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 309

5 παραθέσεις ὁμολογησάντ]ων ἂν ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσί]ως γίνεσθαί τινα σχημάτ]ων ἴδια εἴδη καθ’ ἑκάστην οὐ]σιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγ10  κρ]ισιν· οἱ μὲγ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν στ]οιχείο[ι]ς ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἀ]κόλουθον δέ τι τούτοις μ]ᾶλλον, οὕτω λέγοντες, λέ]γοιεν ἄν, καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὴν 15 τα]ῖς μείξεσι[ν] παραλλαγήν· οἱ] δὲ πρὸς τὴ ν . . . (...) [against those]72 who assign a specific shape to fire or earth or water or air, since they are more ridiculous73 than those who do not do so, but with regard to the mixtures would admit, willingly or not, that there are specific kinds of shapes relating to each compound which could be called fundamental. For the latter are greatly mistaken about the elements, but by expressing themselves in this way they would say something which is more consistent with them (sc. the elements),74 and generally speaking [they would endorse (?)] difference due to mixtures. On the other hand, [those] who (...) against (...).75 With regard to the expression οἱ μὲγ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν | στ]οιχείο[ι]ς ἁμαρτάνουσιν (ll. 10–11), Philippson compared Lucr. 1.734 ff., a passage which echoes the Herculanean text under consideration and contains a comparative evaluation between Empedocles and other thinkers, which also turns out in favor of Empedocles: hic tamen et supra quos diximus, inferiores / partibus egregie multis multoque minores,  / quamquam bene multa ac divinitus invenientes / (...) prin­ cipiis tamen in rerum fecere ruinas / et graviter magni magno cecidere ibi casu.76

72 On Epicurus’ use of the plural in reference to a single adversary, which happens several times in On Nature, Book 14, cf. Leone (1984) 87 and 90. 73 On ridicule as a ‘weapon’ in Epicurean polemics, see Gigante (2007). 74 Both Brunschwig, Monet, and Sedley ap. Delattre/Pigeaud (2010) 93 and Montarese (2012) 81 hypothesize that stronger punctuation is necessary here, while they prefer to remove any punctuation at the end of l. 15 (at the beginning of l. 16, Montarese accepts Hayter and Gomperz’s reading [οὐ]δὲ; [οἱ] δὲ, which I accepted into the text, is a conjecture of Arrighetti, who sees here an opportune change of subject and return to Plato. 75 Transl. by Ch. Vassallo ap. CPH XV 89. 76 Cf. Philippson (1937) 477.

310 

 Giuliana Leone

Furthermore, Philippson thought that he could extend the term παράθεσις to Empedocles’ doctrine of mixtures: the term appears at l. 5 in the meaning of ‘juxtaposition, mixture’ and is attested with that sense in Anaxagoras,77 Leucippus,78 and Democritus.79 In fact, according to Empedocles,80 the four elements, when they are mixed together in various eternally changing combinations, at a certain point come to form homogeneous substances, each composed of heterogeneous elements, but as we see from several testimonia, they seem to maintain in this mixture their own distinctive properties, which can be discerned again after the mixture separates. This ability to separate the mixture out again follows from the fact that, during the mixing process, the four elements are not fused completely, but remain distinct and simply juxtaposed.81 Here I would like to note that, precisely in opposition to this doctrine of mixtures (1.769 ff.), Lucretius denies the possibility of unification (v. 770: coire) for Empedocles’ four elements in such a way as to not meet with any change while mixed (v. 772: nil in concilio naturam ut mutet eorum). If it were so, the poet maintains, nulla (...) ex illis poterit res esse creata (v. 773), since each of them will instead show suam (...) in coetu (...) naturam (vv. 775–776), “and air will been commingled together with earth, fire abiding with water” (vv. 776–777: videbi­ tur aer / cum terra simul atque ardor cum rore manere),82 in clear contradiction with the phenomena.83 In the same way, again relying on the testimony of the senses, Lucretius acknowledges the birth and death of the elements (vv. 753–755: primordia rerum / [...] quae nos nativa videmus / esse et mortali cum corpore), and affirms that therefore, since these are the primordia, everything could come into being from nothing and disintegrate into nothing. As we know from Aristotle84 and Plutarch,85 Empedocles, aware of the impropriety of calling unification and

77 59 A 54 DK. 78 67 A 29 DK. 79 68 A 64 DK. Cf. also 59 A 54 DK and 67 A 29 DK. 80 In this regard, Arr.2, 605 cites 31 A 28, 34, 43–44 DK; cf. also 31 B 17 and 37 DK. 81 Cf. in particular Arist. Gen. corr. 2.7.334a28–30 (= 31 A 43 DK): καὶ τὸ μίγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ παρ’ ἄλληλα συγκειμένων. Cf. Wright (19952) 34–40, esp. 38–39. 82 Transl. by W. H. D. Rouse (rev. by M. F. Smith). 83 Cf. 31 A 41 DK, in which Philoponus (In Gen. corr. 19.3 Vitelli) highlights the contradiction with sensible appearances in Empedocles’ negation of qualitative change in the elements. 84 Arist. Gen corr. 1.1.314b7; Metaph. 5.4.1015a1. 85 Plut. Adv. Col. 1111f (= 31 B 8 DK). We owe the complete quotation of Empedocles’ verses to Plutarch.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 311

separation γένεσις and φθορά,86 had denied the birth and death of all mortal things and had affirmed, on the other hand, that there are only mixture and separation of mixed things (φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἑκάστου / θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη· / ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξίς τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων ἔστι, φύσις δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν). Plutarch puts this quotation, taken from Book 1 of Empedocles’ On Nature, in the mouth of the Epicurean Colotes, who, with evident irony but without particular harshness, sets Empedocles’ position in clear contradiction with the phenomena, just as Lucretius did. This is because, according to his interpretation, which Plutarch criticizes, this view would induce people to doubt reality, and in particular our own reality. The tone and manner of Colotes and Lucretius’ polemical arguments make me think that their common source could have been Epicurus’ criticism of Empedocles’ doctrine of mixtures, which was expressed (maybe only partially) in Book 14 of On Nature87 and perhaps completely developed in other works.88 Next, it seems significant that Lucretius, continuing his polemic against Empedocles, mentions elemental infinite divisibility (1.746–752), with which the next column of Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 14 (col. 35 Leone [1984]) opens, in a polemic which, so it seems, does not target solely Plato.89 Lastly, another indication of the presence of Empedocles in col. 34 seems to me to come from a passage of the Epicurean Demetrius Laco’s text transmitted by PHerc. 1012.90 Demetrius attributes the merit of τἀκόλου|θα δὲ συνάπτει(ν) to him

86 In Aët. 1.24.2, DG, 320 (= 31 A 44 DK), Epicurus is grouped with Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus as συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις εἰσάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθορὰς οὐ κυρίως. 87 Note that only the upper parts of the columns are preserved in PHerc. 1148. 88 We know that Epicurus expressed his own position about mixtures through Alexander of Aphrodisias (De mixt. 214.28 = fr. 290 Us.), who specifies that Epicurus wanted to distance himself from Democritus on this point. Indeed, while Democritus held that mixture, as it appears, happens κατὰ παράθεσιν σωμάτων ἀλλήλοις κατὰ μικρὰ σῳζόντων αὐτῶν ἑκάστου τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν, ἣν εἶχον καὶ πρὸ τῆς μίξεως (Alex. Aphr. De mixt. 214.18–23 = 68 A 64 DK), Epicurus, though sharing his thesis that mixture happens παραθέσει μέν τινων σωμάτων, denied that the bodies which get mixed remain unaltered in the separation, and affirmed, on the other hand, that they were dissolved into the elements and atoms (ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτῶν τῶν μιγνυμένων σωμάτων σῳζομένων ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει, ἀλλ’ ἀναλυομένων εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους). According to Alexander, the position of Democritus criticized by Epicurus coincides with that which Aristotle (Gen. corr. 2.7.334a26–31 = 31 A 43 DK, on which see above) attributes to Empedocles. Note that also in Cael. 3.7.305b1–5, Aristotle grouped Empedocles and Democritus together as upholders of a only φαινομένη γένεσις, given that in their view the elements remain distinct and unchanged. We cannot rule out that Aristotle’s criticism lead Epicurus to take up a position on mixture partially different from that held by Democritus and, as a consequence, Empedocles. 89 Cf. Leone (1984) 89–91. 90 PHerc. 1012, col. 65.6–7 Puglia (1988), on which see below.

312 

 Giuliana Leone

and cites him to clarify a passage of Epicurus. He uses the same respectful tone that Epicurus uses in PHerc. 1148, col. 34. But worth emphasizing is the fact that, though in deep disagreement about the doctrines in question, in this column Epicurus does in fact recognize Empedocles’ coherence (ἀκολουθία), which, as we saw in col. 40 of the same work, he denied to Plato and which he considered fundamental in a correct attitude towards scientific research.91 There remains the difficulty that, in the surviving testimonia and fragments of Empedocles, the question of the distinctive properties of the four elements in mixtures does not seem ever to be discussed in the way it appears in col. 34, i.e. in terms of σχήματα.92 This was the particular point of view from which Epicurus seems to have considered the question of atomic compounds in the first part of On Nature, Book 14, which was devoted to the exposition of his own doctrine; in the second part, he instead refuted opposing doctrines from the same particular point of view.93 The difficulty can be overcome if we only note that the repeated use of the modal particle ἄν in our text (at ll. 5–6 and 14) raises the possibility that Epicurus is drawing out the implications of Empedocles’ doctrine about mixtures according to his own theory, rather than referring to statements that Empedocles actually wrote. The expression ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκου|[σί]ως (at ll. 6–7) points in the same direction. Empedocles’ doctrine about the elements turns out at least more coherent than Plato’s doctrine, even after Epicurus examined it and found it fallacious. Again, thanks to the Herculaneum papyri, it is possible to hypothesize about the terms of the polemic that Epicurus, along with Metrodorus and Hermarchus, wrote in defense of an anthropomorphic conception of divinity94 against Empedocles, who had denied it,95 as well as Pythagoras, and Plato (contra Pythagoram, Platonem Empedoclemque). Cicero, in fact, who gives us

91 On the problem of Empedocles’ coherence or incoherence, cf. Arist. Metaph. 1.4.985a21–b3 (= 31 A 37 DK) and the comm. ad loc. by Alexander of Aphrodisias (219.15–16; 20–24 Hayduck); Arist. Gen. an. 1.18.722b8–10 as well; Philop. In Gen. corr. 19.3 Vitelli (= 31 A 41 DK), on which see above. 92 Cf. Leone (1984) 30–32. 93 Montarese (2012) 83 does not take the presence of Empedocles in this column for granted, but he shares my observations in Leone (2007) 234 and does not rule out the contraposition between Empedocles and Plato. 94 On Epicurus’ position, see at least frs. 353, 355, and 357a Us. Renna (1984), Longo Auricchio (1988), Santoro (2000), and Essler (2011) dwell at length on this topic, which was very important in the tradition of Epicurean school. 95 Cf. 31 B 133–134 DK.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 313

important testimonia, does not go into details about this polemic.96 Through the comparison of two passages in Epicurean authors, the first from PHerc. 101297 (attributed, as I noted above, to Demetrius Laco) and Philodemus’ On the Gods’ Way of Life (PHerc. 152/157),98 I believe that the polemic of the Epicurean school against Empedocles’ conception of the divine could have centered on the question of animal respiration. His view on this point had already provoked Aristotle’s criticism.99 In the first passage, Demetrius Laco appeals to the authority of Empedocles to justify, against an adversary’s incorrect interpretation, a certain usage found in a passage of Epicurus, whose context we do not know, namely the use of ἀναπνοή, ‘inhalation,’ as a synonym at different times for both ἐκπνοή, ‘exhalation,’ and εἰσπνοή, ‘inhalation.’ Empedocles too, according to Demetrius’ citation of his verses,100 would have made use of the term ἀναπνοεῖν as a synonym for εἰσπνοεῖν. Thanks to Philodemus’ testimonium,101 we know that this same problem had been raised by Hermarchus, probably in his Against Empedocles,102 exactly in relation to the Epicurean notion of divine anthropomorphism. According to Hermarchus, “it is necessary to think of the gods as beings that inhale and exhale” (νοητέον δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἕρμαρχον κ(αὶ) ἐπισπω|μ[ένους π]νεῦ[μ]α κ(αὶ) προϊεμένους τοὺς θεούς).103 Therefore, I do not think it is too risky to join these two testimonia with the passage from Cicero and to deduce that Epicurus too was able to sketch out his own polemic against the Empedoclean conception of the divine in the same terms as Hermarchus.

96 Cic. Nat. D. 1.33.92–93 = Hermarch. fr. 33 Longo Auricchio (1988) with comm. on pp. 132–133 and 137. The passage has been considered to be anti-Empedoclean by Rispoli (2007) 251–252 and Leone (2007) 237–238. 97 PHerc. 1012, col. 65 Puglia (1988), on which see below. 98 PHerc. 152/157, cols. 13.20–14.13 = Hermarch. fr. 32 Longo Auricchio (1988) with comm. on pp. 128–137. The title of the work was read and translated by Del Mastro (2014) 64–67, who agrees with Essler (2007) 130 n. 41 in claiming that neither the original nor the ‘disegni’ support Walter Scott’s reading of the number Γ in the third line of the subscriptio, which has been acritically accepted for a long time, inducing scholars to believe that the papyrus contained Book 3 of Philodemus’ On Gods. 99 In Arist. De resp. 13 (7).473a15 (= 31 B 100 DK), inter alia, Empedocles is criticized for not having made clear which types of ζῶια were involved in this theory. 100 31 B 100 DK, on which see below. 101 Cf. in particular Phld. De dis, PHerc. 152/157, col. 13.34 Diels. 102 Cf. Longo Auricchio (1988) 34–35. 103 Phld. De dis, PHerc. 152/157, col. 13.20–21 Diels.

314 

 Giuliana Leone

3 The testimonia of Philodemus’ On Piety induce us to think that Epicurus, no differently than Hermarchus, could have occupied himself with these theological problems not only from a physico-zoological point of view but also from an anthropological one concerning the development of human civilization.104 Indeed, in three passages of On Piety, Philodemus cites (unfortunately in lacunose contexts) Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles using critical arguments: e.g. the οἰκειότης between human beings and god (in Book 1 of Hermarchus’ work),105 or Empedocles’ use of florid metaphors to designate the four elements (which he considered divine)106 or even the honors that humans owe to the gods (according to Philodemus, the last two topics were dealt with by Hermarchus in the final book of his Against Empedocles).107 Then it is also plausible, as Dirk Obbink has underlined,108 that the same questions could have found space in the On Nature or in another writing as well, to which Philodemus refers explicitly immediately before or after the citations of Hermarchus’ work. In particular, the citation of Hermarchus’ first book is preceded by references to Books 6 and 8 of Epicurus’ On Nature,109 as well as the first book of Polyaenus’ 104 Leone (2007) 238–239, so also Rispoli (2007) 247. 105 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, cols. 38.27–39.7 (= ll. 1099–1108 Obbink [1996]) = Hermarch fr. 27 Longo Auricchio (1988), limited to cols. 38.27–39.4 (= ll. 1099–1105 Obbink [1996]). In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Nm]. At l. 1106, the term οἰκειότης was conjectured for the first time by Obbink. As for Empedocles, see the frs. 31 B 30, 115, 135–136 DK on the concept of natural affinity between living beings, analogous to that between humans and gods, and the connection between crime and punishment. This topic is developed in Hermarch. fr. 34 Longo Auricchio (1988) ap. Porph. De abst. 1.7–12; 1.26.4, on which see Longo Auricchio’s comm. ad loc. and Rispoli (2007) 259–262. 106 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077/1098 N, cols. 19.24–20.11 (= ll. 542–559 Obbink [1996]) = Hermarch. fr. 29 Longo Auricchio (1988), limited to col. 19.23–30 (= ll. 541–548 Obbink [1996]). Following Philippson, Longo Auricchio punctuates differently from Obbink, and deduces that Hermarchus’ work was written before Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 12, i.e. before 301–300 BC: cf. Longo Auricchio (1988) 126–127; contra Obbink (1996) 361–362. See also Rispoli (2007) 247–250. In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Nm]. On Empedocles’ use of metaphors, cf. Diog. Laërt. 8.57 (= Arist. fr. 70 Rose = fr. 73 Janko [2011] with comm. on p. 538); Arist. Poet. 21.1457b13 and b24, 21.1458a5, An. post. 2.13.97b37, and Mete. 2.3.357a24. 107 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 35.6–16 (= ll. 992–1002 Obbink [1996]) = Hermarch. fr. 30 Longo Auricchio (1988), limited to col. 35.7–15 (= ll. 993–1001 Obbink [1996]). In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Nm]. On this passage, see Obbink (1996) 454–455 and Rispoli (2007) 255–257. For divine cults in Empedocles, cf. 31 B 128 DK. 108 Obbink (1996) 362 and 481. See also Rispoli (2007) 249. 109 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 38.5–17 (= ll. 1077–1089 Obbink [1996] with nn. on pp. 477– 478); Sedley (1998) 116–118 proposed a different reconstruction and interpretation of the passage.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 315

work Against the On Philosophy of Aristotle. Furthermore, earlier, Philodemus stated that Epicurus had treated the topic of οἰκειότης and ἀλλοτριότης in Book 13 of his On Nature.110 On the other hand, a reference to Book 12 on the topic of Empedocles’ use of metaphors precedes the citation of Hermarchus’ work: Epicurus had criticized the atheists Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias for having changed the names of the gods through substitution, addition, or transposition of letters,111 and Hermarchus would have aligned himself with Epicurus’ position while adding his own criticism of Empedocles’ use of metaphors.112 Not by chance does the discussion return, after the reference to Hermarchus’ work, to the position taken by Epicurus in his writings.113 In the last of the three passages in which he cites Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles, Philodemus indicates that Hermarchus singled out Epicurus.114 Evidently, Philodemus, and perhaps Hermarchus before him, was searching Epicurus’ works in order to better support his positions.115 Besides, at the end of his treatise On Piety, Philodemus himself explicitly states that his own work is a continuation of Epicurus by describing it as τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐ|σεβείας λόγον τῆς | κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον.116 Precisely in the final column of that work,117 which now more than ever is an extremely rich source for testimonia about the Presocratics, Adolf Schober118 divined an allusion to Empedocles (and Parmenides) in the expression τοὺς κἀν τοῖς | θε[ο]ῖς μετὰ φιλαρχ⸌εί⸍ας | πόλ[ε]μον ἄσπονδον | παρεισάγοντα[ς], “those who introduce into the gods an implacable war along with a lust of power.”119

110 Cf. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1098 N, col. 37.6–10 (= ll. 1050–1054 Obbink [1996]). 111 Cf. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, cols. 18.30–19.18 (= ll. 518–536 Obbink [1996]). 112 On metaphors in Epicurus, see Leone (2014). 113 Cf. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1098 N, col. 20.6–11 (= ll. 554–559 Obbink [1996] with comm. on pp. 362–363). 114 Cf. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 35.11–12 (= ll. 997–998 Obbink [1996] with comm. on p. 456). 115 I study this topic in depth in Leone (forthcoming). 116 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 15.20–22 Henrichs (1974) (= Gomperz [1866] 89 = Schober [1988] 125). 117 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 15.10–13 Henrichs (1974) (= Gomperz [1866] 89 = Schober [1988] 125). 118 Schober (1988) 125, app. crit.: “Significat Philodemus (…) in v. 12 Parmenidem et Empedoclem.” 119 Transl. by Ch. Vassallo ap. CPH XV 93. The German translation by Henrichs (1974) reads as follows: “die selbst unter den Göttern im Verein mit Herrschsucht eine unversöhnliche Fehde bestehen lassen.” As for Empedocles, cf. Hippol. Haer. 7.29 ap. 31 B 115 DK: θεοὺς δέ, ὡς ἔφην, τέσσαρας μὲν θνητούς, πῦρ ὕδωρ γῆν ἀέρα, δύο δὲ ἀθανάτους, ἀγεννήτους, πολεμίους ἑαυτοῖς διὰ παντός, τὸ Νεῖκος καὶ τὴν Φιλίαν; as for Parmenides, cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.28 (= 28 A 37 [II] DK), where he is mentioned as someone quippe qui bellum, qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocet.

316 

 Giuliana Leone

Schober’s proposal was partially accepted by Henrichs in his edition,120 and Christian Vassallo included it, though with some hesitation, in his IPPH s.v. Empedocles Acragantinus.121 Vassallo122 has recently published a new edition of Philodemus’ On Piety, PHerc. 1428, fr. 14, which corresponds to col. 327123 in his proposed reconstruction of the papyrus.124 Here, Schober,125 and Robert Philippson126 before him, found a reference to Empedocles. This is Vassallo’s text and translation: ₍₎] καὶ τού[τοις ]σαι επ[ 30 ₍₎] σπένδον[τάς τε καὶ θύο]ντας κᾆτα [καθαγ[ί]σ{τ}σθαι· πολλ[ὰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς μέ34 ρεσιν τούτοις πε(c. 27 lines and 1–2 words missing) and [he (sc. Empedocles) maintains that] in honour of these (sc. of the gods vel dead people) (c. 3–4 words missing) making libations and offering sacrifices, and [he maintains] that afterwards they will light the funeral pyre: as a matter of fact, there are many things in these parts (1 word missing) (continues on) Vassallo too, thanks to autopsy of the papyrus with the aid of the multispectral images and Richard Janko’s readings and suggestions (per litteras),127 was able to reconstruct for the first time a text free from ‘sovrapposti’ and ‘sottoposti’, thereby disproving some of Philippson and Schober’s conjectures and, in turn, confirming some of Gomperz’s readings. On the basis of this new text, Vassallo is disposed to accept Philippson’s suggestion and to see in the passage a reference to Empedocles’ well-known position on the sacrifice of living animals.128 According

120 Cf. Henrichs (1974) 26 n. 42: “XV 9–13 z.B. Empedokles.” 121 In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Rc?]. 122 Vassallo (2016b) 328–329. In IPPH the fragment is doubtfully classified as [Ts]. 123  = Gomperz (1866) 68 = Schober (1988) 113. 124 Cf. Vassallo (2017a) and (2018). 125 Schober (1988) 111. 126 Philippson (1920) 367–368. 127 For the app. crit., see Vassallo (2016b) 328–329. 128 Vassallo (2016b) 330 and n. 55 refers to fr. 31 B 137 DK (but cf. also B 135–136) and to Rispoli (2007) 257–262 for discussion of the differences between Empedocles’ position and that of the Epicureans.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 317

to Vassallo, if Philodemus’ direct source was Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles, there are sufficient reasons to believe that the passage is a reference to a section of the Purifications, or possibly a paraphrase; the passage would count in favor of the doxographic tradition that distinguishes Empedocles’ two works and assigns ritual and religious themes to the Purifications.129 But if references to Empedocles in Philodemus’ works for the most part stem from Epicurus or Hermarchus, one cannot rule out the possibility that some of them can be attributed to Philodemus himself,130 who could well have had direct knowledge of his works.131 This might be the case in Book 5 of his On Poems (PHerc. 1425), in which Cecilia Mangoni was the first to read Empedocles’ name in a rather lacunose context,132 immediately after Philodemus’ polemical discussion of the effectiveness of poetry, in which he denies that pedagogical value is essential for a poem to be judged good, and immediately before a double reference to Homer which probably belongs to the same context.133 Mangoni noted that, in the Poetics,134 Aristotle already compared Empedocles and Homer, and affirmed that the two authors only had the meter in common and that the title of ‘poet’ only justly belonged to the latter, but it was right to call Empedocles a “physiologos rather than a poet” (φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν). Aristotle, as Indelli pointed out,135 called Empedocles Ὁμηρικός in his On Poets.136 There has been a long debate over whether to attribute the reference to Empedocles in a passage of Philodemus’ On Arrogance (PHerc. 1008, viz. Book 10 of the treatise On Vices and Their Corresponding Virtues)137 to Philodemus or to a not better specified Aristo, whose Epistolary Treatise on Freedom from Arrogance138 Philodemus is using. In this testimonium, Empedocles, along with Heraclitus,139 Pythagoras, and Socrates, is mentioned as being arrogant specifically because of philosophy itself (col. 10.19–20 Ranocchia [2007]: καὶ δι’ αὐτὴν φιλοσο|φί[αν]

129 Vassallo (2016b) 330–331. 130 Cf. Indelli (2007) 277. 131 I borrow this consideration from McOsker (2016). 132 Phld. De poem. 5, PHerc. 1425, col. 2 Mangoni (1993). In IPPH the fragment is classified as [Nm]. 133 Cf. Mangoni (1993) 185–187 and Indelli (2007) 283–284. 134 Arist. Poet. 1.1447b16–20. 135 Indelli (2007) 284. 136 Diog. Laërt. 8.57 (= Arist. fr. 70 Rose = fr. 73 Janko [2011], on which see above). 137 Phld. De sup., PHerc. 1008, col. 10.11–26 Ranocchia (2007). The passage does not appear in DK; in IPPH it is classified as [Ts]. 138 Indelli (2007) 278–280; cf. Ranocchia (2007) 16–17 and his contribution to this volume. 139 On which see Graziano Ranocchia’s paper in this volume.

318 

 Giuliana Leone

πολλῶν δοξάντων)140 and who, with a few unspecified poets, were the object of attacks by ancient comic poets. Critics have compared it with the very well-known fr. 31 B 112 DK,141 which Diogenes Laërtius says was from the prooemium of the Purifications and in which Empedocles greeted his fellow citizens by claiming to be for them “an immortal god, no longer a mortal” (v. 4: θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός).142 As Gallavotti pointed out, these words of Empedocles, if taken from their context, could be interpreted along with other testimonia that show his braggadocio and φιλαυτία – not to mention his habit of wearing solemn clothing, filets, and flower garlands – as a manifestation of his excessive arrogance.143 Further, Gallavotti144 noted the reference to Νῆστις, Σικελικὴ θεός – to be identified with water, one of Empedocles’ four ῥιζώματα145 – in a comedy by Alexis,146 and underlined that precisely the Philodemean testimonium indicates that the Athenian comedy was the probable source for the “clamorose caricature inserite nella biografia di Empedocle.”147 The scholar did not rule out the possibility that Empedocles’ metaphorical language could have been the target of the comic poets. It is probably not an accident that a quotation of the expression θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός from v. 4 of the Purifications (in fact, this is the oldest of the numerous quotations of this verse that we know of, thanks to the manuscript tradition) occurs in a passage of another Herculaneum papyrus, PHerc. 1788, which was not

140 Indelli’s (2007) translation reads as follows: “e certamente molti appaiono essere superbi anche per la stessa filosofía.” Ranocchia (2007) translates: “e certo molti sembrano insuperbire anche a causa della stessa filosofia.” Daniel Delattre and Voula Tsouna ap. Delattre/ Pigeaud (2010) 620 translate: “(…) et, bien sûr aussi, ceux, nombreux, qui ont dû leur gloire à la philosophie même, (…).” 141 Armstrong/Ponczoch (2011) 101–103 and 129–132 compare it with Empedocles’ fr. 111 DK, paraphrased in PHerc. 1570, on which see below. 142 For this reason, Ranocchia (2007) 322–323 does not rule out that a reference to philosophers like Pythagoras (on whom see 14 A 7–8 DK) and Empedocles could be implicit in PHerc. 1008, col. 16.24–26, where Aristo lists “believing that they have turned from men into gods” (τὸ θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώ|πων [ἑ]αυτοὺς γεγονέναι δο|κεῖν) among manifestations of insane arrogance. If this suggestion is accepted, one should add Phld. De sup., PHerc. 1008, col. 16.24–26 Ranocchia (2007) to IPPH’s sections devoted to Empedocles and Pythagoras. 143 Gallavotti (1975a) 266; cf. also Indelli (2007) 281–282, Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 215, and Ranocchia (2007) 18. 144 Gallavotti (1975a) 173. 145 Cf. 31 B 6 DK. 146 According to Photius’ Lexicon s.v. 147 Gallavotti (1975b) 161.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 319

unknown to Hermann Diels,148 though he did not include it in the Vorsokratiker. The papyrus, of which only an illegible ‘scorza’ and ‘disegni’ of eight fragments survive,149 was edited by Wilhelm Crönert150 after its publication in the eighth volume of the Herculanensium Voluminum Collectio Altera (1873). Very recently, Christian Vassallo has republished it,151 giving it some attention because many Presocratics are named in it: in the order, Pherecydes, Thales, Pythagoras, Gorgias, Empedocles, Leucippus, and Democritus. If Crönert, cautiously followed by Giovanni Indelli,152 sees in the work “Philosophengeschichtliches in einer Epikureischen Streitschrift,”153 Dirk Obbink speaks of a “doxographical work of unknown authorship.”154 Anna Angeli recently argued in favor of Philodemus’ authorship.155 Vassallo, in his turn, rules out a strictly polemical character of the work and attributes to it the goal of relating bio-doxographical pieces of information. In particular, he sets the text in the frame of Philodemus’ Σύνταξις τῶν φιλοσόφων on the basis of palaeography, content, and lexicon. This is the text and translation of PHerc. 1788, col. 6 Vassallo (= fr. 3 Crönert), on whose David Sedley made many conjectures per litteras: ]ως μισ[₍₎ ] τιθεὶς ἀξίως ₍₎]μενος τοῦ ἐκ ₍₎] ὕψους, ὡς αὑ5 τὸν ὁ Ἐμπε]δοκλῆς ἔφη· “θ[εὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκ]έτι θνητός.” ὄντος τινὸς ὕψ]ους ἐν ταῖς

148 Cf. Diels (1897), who at 1072 states that the citation has been recognized in the papyrus by Johann A. Nauck. In DK PHerc. 1788 is taken into account in the testimonia 14 A 13 [IV]; 67 B 1a; 68 B 4b. 149 PHerc. 1788, fr. 9 N was recognized as extraneous to the papyrus and a part of Philodemus’ On Piety by Crönert (1906) 19 n. 101. This fact was confirmed by Obbink (1996) 601–604, who was also able to track down its original, a ‘scorza’ numbered 1114 and stored in the ‘cassetto’ 78 of the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi, providing an edition of it along with that of fr. 9 N (= Phld. De piet., col. 82 Obbink [1996]). See Vassallo (2017b). 150 Crönert (1906) 147. 151 Cf. Vassallo (2017b). In IPPH the passage is classified as [Fr]. I thank Christian Vassallo for allowing me to read and use his work before its publication. 152 Cf. Indelli (2007) 285. Dorandi (1982) sees in it the remains of an anonymous polemical Epicurean text with biographical/doxographical content. 153 Crönert (1906) 147. M&P, 101 argue along the same lines. 154 Obbink (1996) 601. 155 Cf. Angeli (2003) 333, who was more cautious in Angeli (1983) 632–633.

320 

 Giuliana Leone

τῆς θνητότ]η τος ἀποφάσεσιν ] οὔτ’ ἐπιστη10 μ]ονον[₍₎ desunt versus plures (1 line and c. 2–3 words missing) worthily putting/referring (c. 2–3 words missing) of the sublimity deriving from/because of (2 words missing), as Empedocles said  of himself: “[immortal] god, no more human being”  – [as there would be a kind] of sublimity in denying [the] mortality [either] (c. 1–2 words missing) or wise/wisdom (c. 3–4 words and several lines missing) At ll. 5–6, Vassallo revives the hypothesis of a literal quotation of Empedocles’ verse, which Nauck and Crönert had already divined. On the other hand, Gallavotti’s two attempts to reconstruct the text are ruled out:156 he thought that the adjective ἄμβροτος did not follow θεός, but rather there was an infinitive (δοκεῖν/γενέσθαι) which transformed the citation into a paraphrase. According to Vassallo, as Gallavotti had already thought, the passage does not have a polemical tone; rather, the author justifies the only apparently arrogant words of Empedocles for the sake of the sublimity (ὕψος: the word appears at ll. 4 and 7 in Vassallo’s reconstruction) which his philosophy had achieved.157 In that case, it would be necessary to think that the author – Philodemus, if one accepts Angeli’s proposal, as Vassallo does – would be spokesman for two, opposite traditions, one hostile and one charitable to Empedocles’ verses, found in the On Arrogance and in the Σύνταξις, respectively. This contradiction induced Angeli to consider it unlikely that in this fragment of PHerc. 1788, which is damaged at the top and left, Philodemus was expressing his own opinion.158 I add that, in such a case, the quotation of Empedocles’ famous verses would be due to someone other than Philodemus. A similar case seems to occur for a testimonium handed down by another Herculaneum papyrus, totally illegible without the multispectral images. I refer to PHerc. 1570, which remained unpublished until 2011, when David Armstrong and Joseph A. Ponczoch deciphered it.159 With high probability, the editors attribute

156 Gallavotti (1975b) 160. 157 Gallavotti’s proposals were judged to be very fragile by Indelli (2007) 288, but more coherent than Crönert’s by Angeli (2003) 333. 158 Cf. Angeli (2003) 333. 159 Armstrong/Ponczoch (2011). On the morphological, bibliological, and palaeographic aspects of the roll, see Ponczoch (2009), who first ascribed the papyrus to Philodemus’ On Wealth.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 321

the papyrus to Philodemus’ treatise On Wealth, discovering in it, among other things, a new reference to Empedocles.160 In PHerc. 1570, col. 6, a paraphrase of vv. 6–12 of the well-known and much discussed fr. 111 DK of Empedocles appears,161 where he promises to Pausanias, the dedicatee of his poem On Nature, knowledge of medicines and remedies against old age, the power to calm and to raise the winds,162 and to bring the dead back to life. Armstrong and Ponczoch republished the column two years later,163 profiting from some brilliant readings and conjectures by David Sedley, whose proposals made a more coherent contextualization of the passage possible. In particular, according to the editors, it should be placed within an imagined diatribe that takes place in a discussion on death.164 In such context, an adversary would have affirmed that wealth possesses miraculous powers, comparable with those that Empedocles (fr. 111 DK) attributed allegorically not to himself but to knowledge of nature, i.e., in particular, the ability to calm and raise anew the winds from a state of calm – but, in the case of wealth, he would actually mean gusts of poverty and abundance (ll. 11–15). Philodemus could immediately have replied to him, reducing the power that Empedocles assigned to φυσιολογία in a rationalizing way and, at the same time, denying that wealth has such power in practical affairs (which is the position apparently upheld by the adversary). This is the edition and translation of col. 6.9–19 according to Armstrong/Ponczoch (2013) 114–115: ] οὔτε πρ(ὸς) τοὺς ζῶντα[ς  10   ο]ὔτε πρ(ὸς) τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ] μὴ ὄντας. ἀλλ’ ὅπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τ]ῆι φυσιολογίαι περιτίθη   σι, τοῦτο καὶ πλ]οῦτος ἔχει· παύει γ ὰρ τ[ὰς τῆς ἀπορία]ς πνοάς, ἐξ ἀνηνεμίας τ’ [εἰς πόρον

160 [Phld.] [De divit.], PHerc. 1570, col. 6 Armstrong/Ponczoch (2011) 100–103. In IPPH the passage is classified as [Fr]. 161 Armstrong/Ponczoch (2011) 130–131 and nn. 55 and 58, with bibliography, report the terms of the debate which, since antiquity, has divided the critics on the question of the authenticity of the fragment. Those who attend to Philodemus’ evidence in PHerc. 1570 advocate in favor of the authenticity of the passage. 162 On the role of the winds in the biography of Empedocles and its possible enchantment of Epicurus and Lucretius’ imaginations, cf. Leone (2015) 170–172. 163 Armstrong/Ponczoch (2013). 164 The column, in fact, opens with a quotation of Epicur. Ep. Men. 125. Cf. Armstrong/Ponczoch (2011) 101.

322  15

 Giuliana Leone

τὸ πνεῦ]μα τίθησιν. ἀλλ’ οὔθ’ ἡ φυσιολογία περὶ ταῦ]τα μεγ αλεῖόν τι ἔχε[ι κ]αὶ εἰκαστὸν  οἷ]όνπε[ρ] επαυτα καὶ μαι ]ετο, οὔτ[ε] πλοῦτος τ]ων πρα[γ]μάτων

[it makes no difference]165 either to the living (...) or to the dead (...) since they don’t exist. But what Empedocles attributes to physics is something that wealth too possesses. For wealth halts the storm-blasts of want, and from a becalmed state it sets the wind towards plenty.166 But neither does physical science have a miraculous and comparable power [over these thi]ngs such as (?) [(Empedocles) absurdly (?) suppos]ed, nor does wealth [(...) have power over (?)] practical matters (...)

4 Although in Philodemus’ case, the brevity of the sole quotation taken from Empedocles’ work on physics and the context of the sole paraphrase which is certainly present in his treatises allow doubts about his personal reading of Empedocles’ works, it seems more difficult to doubt this in the case of another Epicurean, Demetrius Laco, who lived around the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 1st cent. BC. One of his works – the above-mentioned PHerc. 1012, concerning textual and exegetical problems in Epicurus167  – hands down three quotations from Empedocles. Of his writings, Demetrius seems to have a good knowledge, probably the fruit of direct reading,168 since several quotations of other authors in his works – from Homer to Alcaeus, from Callimachus to Aristophanes of Byzantium,

165 Puglia (2015) 75 suggests that wealth is the subject of the sentence lost in the lacuna. 166 Cf. 31 B 111.3–5 DK: παύσεις δ’ ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἵ τ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν / ὀρνύμενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας· / καὶ πάλιν, ἢν ἐθέληισθα, παλίντιτα πνεύματ(α) ἐπάξεις. 167 The title of the work was conjectured by the last editor, Enzo Puglia, on the basis of the content. Crönert argued for Demetrius’ authorship on the basis of style, lexicon, orthography, and palaeography. Puglia (1988) collects the fruits of long critical labor, and it remains the reference edition, though some progress regarding the quotations of Empedocles has been made since. Cf. Puglia (2007) and (2015). 168 McOsker (2016) maintains that Demetrius “shows a breadth and depth of reading which is unlikely to have come solely from handbooks and compendia.” According to Puglia (2015) 80, one cannot rule out either that Demetrius depends from lexicographic and/or doxographic sources or that he takes the citations from the texts of his adversaries.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 323

from Sophron to other comic poets – also seem to be first hand. This is evidence of wide reading and varied interests which Demetrius often uses in defense of Epicurus’ philosophy on several levels (doctrinal, lexical, stylistic) in each case, maintaining the party line and showing a decided Epicurean orthodoxy.169 From Empedocles’ On Nature, Demetrius quotes the first hexameter of fr. 2 DK (= col. 57.3–5 Puglia [1988]) and the first two verses of fr. 100 DK (= col. 65.3–6 Puglia [1988]). These fragments are both known from other sources, and Demetrius’ text is just as good as them – at one point, it may be better. Fr. 142 DK (= col. 40.7–10 Puglia [1988]) is entirely owed to Demetrius and generally assigned to the Purifications.170 The text of fr. 2.1 DK, as reconstructed in PHerc. 1012, col. 57.3–5 Puglia (1988), reads as follows:171 “Στεινωποὶ μὲν ⸌γὰρ⸍ π[αλάμ]αι κατὰ γυῖα τέταν5  τ[αι.” Indeed, narrow deeds of force stretch under the limbs.172 Demetrius’ text, although known to Diels,173 was not included in either the Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta (1901) or, two years later, in the Frag­ mente der Vorsokratiker (1903), where Empedocles’ text is only recorded in the version by Sextus Empiricus,174 with one variant: κέχυνται instead of τέτανται.175 According to Puglia, in the passage, Demetrius’ polemic would be not directed towards Empedocles himself; rather, the verse would have been quoted as part of an argument used by an opponent of Epicurus, perhaps a Skeptic,176 who was using it to attack the well-known Epicurean position that “all senses are true.” This opponent would be the real target of Demetrius.177 In fact, in the view of this unknown philosopher, “once also Empedocles” shows, in the verse quoted

169 Cf. McOsker (forthcoming). 170 In IPPH the three passages are classified as [Fr]. 171 On this verse in DK, see Gemelli Marciano (1990) 30–34. 172 Transl. by Ch. Vassallo ap. CPH XV 84. 173 Cf. Diels (1897). 174 Sext. Emp. Math. 7.122–124. Angeli (2003) 325 notes how Diels’ choice confused Gallavotti, who was a defender of the authority of the Herculanean texts in comparison with the medieval tradition. 175 Cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.123. On the variants proposed by scholarship, see Puglia (1988) 282. 176 On the possible identity of this adversary, see Puglia (1988) 286. 177 Puglia (1988) 280–281.

324 

 Giuliana Leone

immediately after, that he distrusts the senses:178 in opposition to them, he links what is understandable to the intellect,179 inasmuch as for him “some sensations are true and others false.”180 According to Anna Angeli’s reconstruction of the three final lines of the column,181 recently adopted by Puglia as well with slight changes,182 Demetrius replies to the (alleged) Skeptic that “if all the senses are false, none of them are true; but if some of them are true and some false, then they are not all false”:183 that is, the two affirmations which, illogically and in bad faith, the adversary tries to attribute to Empedocles are contradictory and exclude each other. According to Angeli,184 Demetrius in col. 58 continues the polemic against the Skeptic while following in Epicurus’ tracks: he frees Empedocles’ views from the charge of incoherence which, later, Sextus Empiricus too levelled against them.185 The text of Empedocles’ fr. 100.1–2 DK186 as reconstructed in PHerc. 1012, col. 65.3–6 Puglia (1988) reads as follows: “Ὧδε δ’ ἀναπνήουσι καὶ ἐκπνήουσι λίφαιμοι σαρκῶν 5  σήρινγες πύματον κατὰ σῶ̲ ̲μα τέτανται.”

178 Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 57.1–2 Puglia (1988): φαίνε]||ταί ποτε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς | συνεμφαίνων τοῦτο κτλ. Sextus Empiricus clarifies that Empedocles’ verse is to be understood περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν τἀληθοῦς ὑπάρχειν (Math. 7.123). 179 Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 57.5–6 Puglia (1988): π]άλιν δὲ τὰ τῶι [νοή]μα|τ[ι ληπτ]ὰ ὑπηναντίωται. 180 Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 57.7–9 Puglia (1988): τῶ[ν γὰρ αἰσ]θήσεων τὰς | [μὲν ἀλ]η θεῖς [ε]ἶναι, τὰ δὲ | [ψευδεῖς] φ[ησιν]. 181 Cf. Angeli (2003) 325–328. 182 Cf. Puglia (2015) 77. 183 Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 57.11–16: εἴτ]ε γὰ[ρ π]ᾶσαι | [αἰσθήσει]ς ψ[ε]υδε[ῖς, ο]ὔκ εἰ|[σίν τινες ἀληθεῖς], ε[ἴ]τε τι|[νὲς μὲν αὐ]τῶν ἀ[ληθε]ῖς , | [τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς], οὔ κ ε[ἰ]σιν | [πᾶσαι ψευδ]εῖς. Puglia (1988)’s text is here partially modified: [τινες] at l. 13 and ψευδ]εῖς at l. 16 are Angeli’s (2003) conjectures; [τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς] at l. 15 has been supplemented by Puglia (2015). 184 Cf. Angeli (2003) 327–328. 185 Cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.124 (= 31 B 3 DK). According to Sextus in B 3, Empedocles would have maintained that “whatever is received through each of the senses is worthy of faith, provided that reason exercises its vigilance on the senses” (τὸ δι’ ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως λαμβανόμενον πιστόν ἐστι, τοῦ λόγου τούτων ἐπιστατοῦντος), but—Sextus observes—the contradiction emerges with B 2, where Empedocles “inveighed against belief in the senses” (καίπερ πρότερον καταδραμὼν τῆς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν πίστεως). 186 A bibliography on the philological work on this fragment can be found in Vítek (2006) III, 368 n. 14. Rashed (2008) has analyzed it without taking into account this Herculanean testimonium.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 325

And so, for those who draw and lose breath, lacking blood / pores of fleshes stretch along the outmost part of body.187 In this case, too, DK collection does not include Demetrius’ text. Diels preferred the longer version of it found in Aristotle’s On Respiration,188 which presents the first hexameter in a rather different version: ὧδε δ’ ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ· πᾶσι λίφαιμοι / σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον κατὰ σῶμα τέτανται. In this case as well, Gallavotti, following Gomperz, supported the superiority of the reading in the papyrus.189 I have already mentioned this passage and suggested a theological context for it.190 Demetrius, in a section of his book dedicated to demonstrating Epicurus’ coherence,191 appealed to the authority of Empedocles to justify Epicurus’ use of the term ἀναπνοή (properly, ‘respiration’) as a synonym for εἰσπνοή (‘inhalation’), since in the verses quoted the verb ἀναπνοεῖν was evidently paired by Empedocles with ἐκπνοεῖν (‘expire’). It is interesting to note that it is certainly Demetrius himself who cites Empedocles this time, and not an adversary, as occurred in the previous case.192 A great deal of attention, in the past as well as more recently, has been reserved for Empedocles’ fr. 142 DK, which is transmitted only in PHerc. 1012, col. 40.7–10 Puglia (1988). Diels ascribed it to the Purifications, finding there a description of a sort of Empedoclean demon banned from the celestial realm.193 To Diels we owe the plausible restoration of the first hexameter, but the reconstruction of the second has been much more controversial.194 I report the edition of this passage proposed in 2003 by Alain Martin195 (Michael McOsker’s review of the original manuscript performed on my behalf has not substantially altered the text established by Martin, who, unlike Puglia [1988], enjoyed the extremely important aid of the most recent multispectral images):

187 Transl. by Ch. Vassallo ap. CPH XV 85. 188 Arist. De resp. 13 (7).473b. 189 Gallavotti (1975b) 154–155, on which see Angeli (2003) 329–330. 190 See above, pp. 312–313. 191 Puglia (1988) 91–100. 192 So Puglia (1988) 293–294. 193 Cf. Diels (1884) and (1897). This thesis has been accepted by the majority of scholars, with the exception of Gallavotti (1975b) 157–159, who thinks that the verses were taken from Book 2 of Empedocles’ poem on physics and that they refer to Apollo’s being excluded from Olympus and Hades. 194 A historical overview on the critical work on these verses can be found in Puglia (1988) 252–256 and Martin (2003) 44–49. 195 Martin (2003).

326 

 Giuliana Leone

“τὸν δ’ οὔτ’ ἄρ τε Διὸς τέγεοι δόμοι αἰγ[ιόχοιο196 οὔτε τ[ί π]ηι197 Ἅ⸌ι⸍δου δέ[χεται πυ10  ̲ ̲κι[νὸ]ν198 στέγος [ ]δ[ ].” And then, neither the roofed houses of the aegis-bearing Zeus / nor in some place the strong mansion of Hades covered him (...)199 This time, a stylistic problem induced Demetrius to quote Empedocles. In particular, the syntactic structure called ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, in which the verb of one clause is understood in an adjacent clause as well, is in question here. Apparently, an adversary of Epicurus did not (or pretended to not) recognize this construction, which appears in the two hexameters by Empedocles, just as it does in an elegiac distich by Callimachus200 which comes just before. Oliver Primavesi201 agrees with Martin202 in thinking that it could have been a demon which was excluded from the houses of Zeus and Hades. Primavesi remarks that Zeus and Hades appear in Empedocles’ fr. 6 DK along with Hera and Nestis: all of them allegorically represent the four elements, viz. fire (Zeus), earth (Hera or Hades), water (Nestis), and air (Hades or Hera).203 Furthermore, Primavesi maintains that in fr. 142 DK as well, the two theonyms should be interpreted allegorically in the same way, as fire and earth. In this regard, he cites fr. 115 DK, in which the four ῥιζώματα ward off entities not expressly named, but 196 Martin doubts that the final word of the first hexameter was the αἰγ[ιόχοιο restored by Diels (1897) and suggests αἰγ[λήεντος, based on Diels’ (1884) proposal αἰγ[λήεντες. 197 According to McOsker, at l. 9 the reading ]ηι is plausible, though the iota is compressed and could be a correction (cf. the iota in Ἅ⸌ι⸍δου). 198 McOsker notes that, at the beginning of l. 10, the letter after kappa is only a trace of ink at the base of the line, which could be an iota, but not only that letter; on the other hand, before στέγος it is difficult to read a ny, since the left horizontal is more curved than usual (previously McOsker had read it as an eta). Furthermore, there are traces before it, high in the line and perhaps extending above bilinearity, which can be only interpreted as an omicron (in this case the ink above the line should belong to a ‘sovrapposto’). 199 Transl. by Ch. Vassallo ap. CPH XV 83, based on that by Martin (2003) 51: “Et lui, le palais couvert d’un toit de Zeus porteur de l’égide (ou du brillant Zeus) ne le reçoit pas, ni, en quelque lieu que ce soit, la robuste maison d’Hadès (…).” On the other hand, Puglia (2007) 274 translates as follows: “E lui, dunque, né le protette magioni di Zeus egioco né in qualche luogo la robusta casa di Ade accolgono.” 200 Callim. Epigr. 7.3–4 Pfeiffer (= Anth. Pal. 9.565). 201 Primavesi (2003). 202 Cf. Martin (2003) 51–52. 203 For a discussion of the (not always unanimous) doxographical tradition on these allegories, see Primavesi (2003) 60–61.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 327

which could be the demons: in fr. 142, then, the demon would be excluded from two of the four element-gods. In any case, if the demons are integrated into Empedocles’ cosmic cycle, we must think that this exclusion could happen in the time when Strife had total dominion over Love. Therefore, according to Primavesi, at the beginning of the second verse of fr. 142, one could read, with a different division of letters, [οὔ]τ’ ἔτ[ι π]ηι instead of [οὔ]τε τ[ί π]ηι, which presupposes a permanent exclusion. This would mean that neither Zeus nor Hades accept the demon any more.204 Lastly, Enzo Puglia205 has again suggested [ἔν]δ[ον], a supplement originally put forward by Van der Ben,206 whose value Martin recognized,207 although he considered it a little too long for the lacuna after στέγος. I agree with Michael McOsker, when he holds that three citations for different purposes  – philosophical, lexical, and stylistic  – can hardly be drawn from a single compendium, and it is much easier to accept that Demetrius read Empedocles directly.208 I also agree with Enzo Puglia,209 who emphasizes that the generally positive use that Demetrius makes of Empedocles’ works is a proof of an interest in and respect for his doctrines. And this is in line with what we have so far suggested in the cases of other Epicureans, beginning indeed with Epicurus himself.

References Acosta/Angeli (1992): Eduardo Acosta Méndez and Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Testimonianze su Socrate, Naples. Angeli (1983): Anna Angeli, “Filodemo: Le altre opere”, in: Συζήτησις: Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante, 2 vols., Naples, II, 585–633. Angeli (1988): Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Agli amici di scuola (PHerc. 1005), Naples. Angeli (2003): Anna Angeli, “Carlo Gallavotti e la Papirologia Ercolanese”, in: Mario Capasso (ed.), Contributi alla Storia della Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi 3, Naples, 301–390.

204 Primavesi (2003) 59–68. 205 Puglia (2015) 80. 206 Cf. Van der Ben (1975). 207 Martin (2003) 50–51 and n. 55 recognizes that ἔνδον is attested in Homeric clausulae and that it is associated with δέχομαι in Oppian (Hal. 1.352). Puglia (2015) 80 n. 28 has traced the same association in George of Pisidia (Anth. Pal. 1.125.5), noting that in this case it is God himself who is to be accepted within a sacred ark (κιβωτός). 208 McOsker (2016) observes: “Still, three citations for different purposes—stylistic, lexical, and philosophical—is surprising and rather a lot to load onto one posited compendium. Much easier is to accept that Demetrius was reading Empedocles directly.” 209 Puglia (2015) 81.

328 

 Giuliana Leone

Armstrong/Ponczoch (2011): David Armstrong and Joseph A. Ponczoch, “[Philodemus] On Wealth (PHerc. 1570 Cols. VI–XX, Pcc. 4–6a): New Fragments of Empedocles, Menander, and Epicurus”, in: CErc 41, 97–138. Armstrong/Ponczoch (2013): David Armstrong and Joseph A. Ponczoch, “Empedocles and Philodemus in PHerc. 1570, col. VI 9–19”, in: CErc 43, 113–115. Arr.2 = Graziano Arrighetti (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Atti XVII: Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, 3 vols., Naples 1984. Blank/Longo Auricchio (2017): David Blank and Francesca Longo Auricchio, “Ermarco contro Alessino: Nuova luce su una polemica antica”, in: CErc 47, 13–40. Booras/Seely (1999): Steven W. Booras and David R. Seely, “Multispectral Imaging of the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: CErc 29, 95–100. Campbell (2003): Gordon L. Campbell, Lucretius on Creation and Evolution: A Commentary on De rerum natura 5.772–1104, Oxford. Capasso (1988): Mario Capasso, “Un libro filodemeo in due esemplari”, in: CErc 18, 139–148. Caroli (2007): Menico Caroli, Il titolo iniziale nel rotolo librario greco-egizio, Bari. Casertano (2007): Giovanni Casertano (ed.), Empedocle tra poesia, medicina, filosofia e politica, Naples. Crönert (1906): Wilhelm Crönert, Kolotes und Menedemos: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Philosophen- und Literaturgeschichte, Leipzig 1906 (repr. Amsterdam 1965). Delattre/Pigeaud (2010): Daniel Delattre and Jackie Pigeaud (eds.), Les Épicuriens, Paris. Del Mastro (2014): Gianluca Del Mastro, Titoli e annotazioni bibliologiche nei papiri greci di Ercolano, Naples. Del Mastro (2016): Gianluca Del Mastro, “Il titolo del P.Herc. 1005”, in: Derda/Łajtar/Urbanik, I, 525–531. Derda/Łajtar/Urbanik (2016): Tomasz Derda, Adam Łajtar and Jakub Urbanik (eds.), Proceedings of the 27th International Congress of Papyrology, 3 vols., Warsaw. Diels (1884): Hermann Diels, “Gorgias und Empedokles”, in: SPAW 49, 343–368. Diels (1897): Hermann Diels, “Über ein Fragment des Empedokles”, in: SPAW 62, 1062–1073. Dorandi (1982): Tiziano Dorandi, “Note eraclitee: In margine al Symposium Heracliteum, 1981”, in: Elenchos 3, 347–353. Dorandi (1989): Tiziano Dorandi, Testimonia Herculanensia, in: CPF I.1*, 1–78. Erler (1994): Michael Erler, “Epikur – Die Schule Epikurs – Lukrez”, in: Friedrich Überweg (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie; Helmut Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophie der Antike, 4: Die hellenistische Philosophie, 2 vols., Basel, I, 29–490. Erler (2011): Michael Erler, “Autodidact and Student: On the Relationship of Authority and Autonomy in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition”, in: Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge/New York, 9–28. Erler/Heßler/Petrucci (forthcoming): Michael Erler, Jan Heßler and Federico M. Petrucci (eds.), Allegiance, System, and Use of Texts: On auctoritas of the Master and Dealing with Authoritative Texts in Platonism and Epicureanism in the Hellenistic and Imperial Age. Essler (2007): Holger Essler, “Zu den Werktiteln Philodems”, in: CErc 37, 125–134. Essler (2011): Holger Essler, Glückselig und unsterblich: Epikureische Theologie bei Cicero und Philodem, mit einer Edition von PHerc. 152/157, Kol. 8–10, Basel. Funghi/Roselli (1997): Maria S. Funghi and Amneris Roselli, “Sul Papiro Petrie 49E attribuito al De pietate di Teofrasto: Riedizione di PLitLond 159a–b”, in: Papiri Filosofici. Miscellanea di Studi I, Florence, 49–69. Gallavotti (1975a): Carlo Gallavotti, Empedocle: Poema fisico e lustrale, Milan.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 329

Gallavotti (1975b): Carlo Gallavotti, “Empedocle nei Papiri Ercolanesi”, in: Jean Bingen, Guy Cambier and Georges Nachtergael (eds.), Le monde grec: Pensée, littérature, histoire, documents: Hommages à Claire Préaux, Bruxelles, 153–161. Gallo (1985): Italo Gallo, “Ermarco e la polemica epicurea contro Empedocle”, in: Paolo Cosenza (ed.), Esistenza e destino nel pensiero greco arcaico, Naples, 33–50. Garani (2007): Myrto Garani, Empedocles Redivivus: Poetry and Analogy in Lucretius, London/ New York. Gemelli Marciano (1990): M. Laura Gemelli Marciano, Le metamorfosi della tradizione: Mutamenti di significato e neologismi nel Peri physeos di Empedocle, Bari. Gemelli Marciano (1991): M. Laura Gemelli Marciano, “L’‘atomismo’ e il corpuscolarismo empedocleo: Frammenti di interpretazioni nel mondo antico”, in: Elenchos 12, 5–37. Gigante (2007): Marcello Gigante, “Philodemus ridens”, in: Bernhard Palme (ed.), Akten des 23. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses, Wien, 239–247. Gomperz (1866): Theodor Gomperz, Philodem: Über Frömmigkeit, Leipzig. Gourinat (2017): Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, “La critique des stoïciens dans l’inscription d’Œnoanda”, in: Hammerstaedt/Morel/Güremen, 165–185. Hammerstaedt/Morel/Güremen (2017): Jürgen Hammerstaedt, Pierre-Marie Morel and Refik Güremen (eds.), Diogenes of Oinoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates, Leuven. Henrichs (1974): Albert Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428”, in: CErc 4, 5–32. Indelli (2007): Giovanni Indelli, “Filodemo ed Empedocle”, in: Casertano, 277–288. Inwood (2001): Brian Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with an Introduction, Toronto/Buffalo/London (1st ed. 1992). Inwood (2009): Brian Inwood, “Empedocles and ‘metempsychôsis’: The Critique of Diogenes of Oenoanda”, in: Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis (eds.), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, Berlin/New York, 71–86. Janko (2002): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus: An Interim Text”, in: ZPE 141, 1–62. Janko (2004): Richard Janko, “Empedocles, On Nature, I 233–364: A New Reconstruction of P.Strasb. Gr. inv. 1665–6”, in: ZPE 150, 1–26. Janko (2011): Richard Janko, Philodemus: On Poems, Books 3–4: With the Fragments of Aristotle, On Poets, Oxford/New York. Kranz (1912): Walther Kranz, “Empedokles und die Atomistik”, in: Hermes 47, 18–42. Leone (1984): Giuliana Leone, “Epicuro, Della natura, libro XIV”, in: CErc 14, 17–107. Leone (1987): Giuliana Leone, “La chiusa del XIV libro Della natura di Epicuro”, in: CErc 17, 49–76. Leone (1996): Giuliana Leone, “Questioni di terminologia filosofica: Una chiave di lettura delle polemiche di Epicuro”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, 3 vols., Naples, I, 239–259. Leone (2000): Giuliana Leone, “Epicuro fondatore del Giardino e l’opera sua conservata nei papiri”, in: CErc 30, 21–33. Leone (2007): Giuliana Leone, “Epicuro ed Empedocle”, in: Casertano, 221–240. Leone (2012): Giuliana Leone, Epicuro: Sulla natura, Libro II, Naples. Leone (2014): Giuliana Leone, “Εἴδωλα e nuvole: Su alcune metafore e similitudini in Epicuro”, in: CErc 44, 5–18. Leone (2015): Giuliana Leone, “Epicuro e la forza dei venti”, in: Dino De Sanctis, Emidio Spinelli, Mauro Tulli and Francesco Verde (eds.), Questioni epicuree, Sankt Augustin, 159–177.

330 

 Giuliana Leone

Leone (2017): Giuliana Leone, “Diogène d’Œnoanda et la polémique sur les meteora”, in: Hammerstaedt/Morel/Güremen, 89–110. Leone (forhcoming): Giuliana Leone, “Orthodoxy and Auctoritas: The Περὶ φύσεως in the School of Epicurus”, in: Erler/Heßler/Petrucci. Longo Auricchio (1988): Francesca Longo Auricchio, Ermarco: Frammenti, Naples. Mangoni (1993): Cecilia Mangoni, Filodemo: Il quinto libro della Poetica (PHerc. 1425 e 1538), Naples. Martin (2003): Alain Martin, “Empédocle, fr. 142 D.-K. : Nouveau regard sur un papyrus d’Herculanum”, in: CErc 33, 43–52. McOsker (2016): Michael McOsker, Demetrius Laco’s Citations and Literary Culture, Paper read at the Society for Classical Studies annual meeting in San Francisco, 2016. McOsker (2017): Michael McOsker, Epicurean Dissidence in Demetrius Laco, Philodemus, and Cicero: Philosophical and Personal Issues, Paper read at the 70th Annual Kentucky Foreign Language Conference: The Languages, Literatures, and Cultures Conference, held at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Kentucky, 2017. McOsker (forthcoming): Michael McOsker, “Demetrius Laco on the auctoritas of the Master”, in: Erler/Heßler/Petrucci. Montarese (2012): Francesco Montarese, Lucretius and his Sources: A Study of Lucretius, De rerum natura I 635–920, Berlin/Boston. M&P = Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Obbink (1988): Dirk Obbink, “Hermarchus, Against Empedocles”, in: CQ 38, 428–435. Obbink (1996): Dirk Obbink, Philodemus: On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary, Oxford. Obbink (2009): Dirk Obbink, “III. New Literary Texts; 4938. Empedocles, Physica”, in: Dirk Obbink and Nikolaos Gonis (eds.), The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. LXXIII, London, 41–44. Osborne (1987): Catherine Osborne, “Empedocles Recycled”, in: CQ 37, 24–50. Philippson (1920): Robert Philippson, “Zu Philodems Schrift über die Frömmigkeit”, in: Hermes 55, 225–278. Philippson (1937): Robert Philippson, Rev. of Achille Vogliano, “I frammenti del XIV libro del Περὶ φύσεως di Epicuro”, in: RAIB, s. III 6 (1931–1932) 3–46; Wolfgang Schmid, Epikurs Kritik der platonischen Elementenlehre, Leipzig 1936, in: GGA, 466–489. Piazzi (2005): Lisa Piazzi, Lucrezio e i Presocratici: Un commento a De rerum natura 1, 635–920, Pisa. Ponczoch (2009): Joseph A. Ponczoch, “PHerc. 1570: A Treatise on Poverty and Wealth”, in: CErc 39, 141–159. Primavesi (2003): Oliver Primavesi, “Die Häuser von Zeus und Hades: Zu Text und Deutung von Empedocles B 142 D.-K.”, in: CErc 33, 53–68. Primavesi (2008): Oliver Primavesi, Empedokles Physika I: Eine Rekonstruktion des zentralen Gedankengangs, Berlin/New York. Primavesi (2012): Oliver Primavesi, “Empedokles”, in: MansPr, 392–563. Primavesi (2013): Oliver Primavesi, “Empedokles”, in: GGPh 1.2, 667–739. Puglia (1984): Enzo Puglia, “Demetrio Lacone e Empedocle”, in: Atti XVII, II, 437–446. Puglia (1988): Enzo Puglia, Demetrio Lacone, Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro (PHerc. 1012), Naples. Puglia (2007): Enzo Puglia, “Demetrio Lacone ed Empedocle”, in: Casertano, 270–276.

12 Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update 

 331

Puglia (2015): Enzo Puglia, “Empedocle e gli Epicurei: La testimonianza dei Papiri Ercolanesi”, in: Mario Capasso (ed.), I Quaderni di Atene e Roma, 5, Lecce, 71–81. Ranocchia (2007): Graziano Ranocchia, Aristone Sul modo di liberare dalla superbia nel decimo libro De vitiis di Filodemo, Florence. Rashed (2008): Marwan Rashed, “De qui la clepsydre est-elle le nom? Une interprétation du fragment 100 d’Empédocle”, in: REG 121, 443–468. Renna (1984): Enrico Renna, “Considerazioni sulla concezione antropomorfica degli dèi nel PHerc. 1055”, in: Atti XVII, II, 447–451. Rispoli (2007): Gioia M. Rispoli, “Empedocle nelle testimonianze ermarchee”, in: Casertano, 241–269. Roskam (2017): Geert Roskam, “Diogenes’ Polemical Approach, or How to Refute a Philosophical Opponent in an Epigraphic Context”, in: Hammerstaedt/Morel/Güremen, 241–269. Santoro (2000): M. Santoro, [Demetrio Lacone], [La forma del dio] (PHerc. 1055), Naples. Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De pietate Pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125 [= Id., Philodemi περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg 1923]. Sedley (1998): David N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge. Sedley (2003): David N. Sedley, “Lucretius and the New Empedocles”, in: LICS 2/4, 1–12. Smith (1993): Martin F. Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription, Naples. Smith (2003): Martin F. Smith, Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription, Naples. Us.: Hermann Usener (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Van der Ben (1975): Nicolaas van der Ben, The Proem of Empedocles’ Peri physeos: Towards a New Edition of All the Fragments, Amsterdam. Vassallo (2016a): Christian Vassallo, “A Catalogue of the Evidence for Presocratics in the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: APF 62, 78–108. Vassallo (2016b): Christian Vassallo, “Towards a Comprehensive Edition of the Evidence for Presocratic Philosophy in the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: Derda/Łajtar/Urbanik, I, 315–345. Vassallo (2017a): Christian Vassallo, “La ‘sezione presocratica’ del De pietate di Filodemo: una nuova ricostruzione: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Parte I)”, in: APF 63, 171–203. Vassallo (2017b): Christian Vassallo, “P.Herc. 1788, ([Philodemi] [Historia philosophorum?]: Introduction, Edition, and Commentary”, in: AnPap 29, 7–56. Vassallo (2018): “The ‘pre-Socratic Section’ of Philodemus’ On Piety: A New Reconstruction: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Part II)”, in: APF, 64, 98–147. Verde (2010): Francesco Verde, “Ancora su Timasagora epicureo”, in: Elenchos 31, 285–317. Verde (2017): Francesco Verde, “Plato’s Demiurge (NF 155 = YF 200) and Aristotles’ Flux (fr. 5 Smith): Diogenes of Oinoanda on the History of Philosophy”, in: Hammerstaedt/ Morel/Güremen, 67–87. Vítek (2006): Tomáš Vítek, Empedoklés, vol. 2: Zlomky; vol. 3: Komentář, Prague. Wigodsky (2007): Michael Wigodsky, “Homoiotetes, stoicheia and homoiomereiai in Epicurus”, in: CQ 57, 521–542. Wright (1995): M. Rosemary Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, London (1st ed. New Haven/London 1981).

Part V: Anaxagoras and his School

Christian Vassallo

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum: A Contribution to the History of Ancient ‘Atheism’ Towards a new edition of testimonia concerning Anaxagoras for the series Traditio Praesocratica No study of early Greek philosophy can proceed without a thorough familiarity with not only whatever fragments of ipsissima verba that ancient sources provide, but also with the accounts of their thought (and occasionally life) that begin with Heraclitus (who criticizes Pythagoras) and continue throughout antiquity and beyond, down to the present day in a continuous tradition of exegesis. Hence the need classicists feel for cut-off dates, no matter how arbitrary they may seem. For the ongoing series Traditio Praesocratica, whose aim is to compile all the testimonies on the major Presocratics in the original and in facing translation into one or more modern languages, this cut-off date is Albertus Magnus in the 13th cent. AD. In Gershenson and Greenberg’s book on Anaxagoras, designed to provide an English translation of all the sources, Simplicius in the 6th cent. AD was the end of the line.1 Behind all this activity is the awareness that once one goes beyond the actual words of a Presocratic, it is essential to know not only all the ancient indirect testimony, but also the point of view and hence the inherent bias entailed in paraphrasing every citation. As Harold Cherniss showed with devastating thoroughness, even Aristotle cannot be trusted to represent Presocratic views with complete disinterest.2 1 Gershenson/Greenberg (1964), volume 1 of an aborted series entitled Philosophy before Aris­ totle. This series too, like Traditio Praesocratica, was arranged chronologically. 2 Cherniss (1935). For a more sympathetic view, see Frede (2008) 501–529. A critique in the style of Cherniss was applied to Theophrastus: cf. McDiarmid (1953). Note: I would like to warmly thank David Sider for his foreword to this work and his useful advice, along with all the other participants in the International Workshop Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition (in particular, I would like to mention Tiziano Dorandi, Maria S. Funghi, André Laks, Andrei Lebedev, Jaap Mansfeld, Richard McKirahan, David Sedley, and Georg Wöhrle), whose suggestions have considerably improved this paper. Any errors or oversights remain mine. Unless otherwise specified, the translations of the Greek texts quoted below are my own. Christian Vassallo, University of Calabria, Cosenza / University of Notre Dame, USA, with a Foreword by David Sider, New York University https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-014

336 

 Christian Vassallo

Not that (again, even) Plato is free of this, but his dialogue form puts the reader on guard that the dialogists (including Socrates) may be alluding to earlier thinkers (including poets) for their own ends.3 But it is Aristotle and Theophrastus who did so much to shape nearly the entirety of the history of the Presocratics, as is manifest in the so-called doxography laid out by Hermann Diels.4 Still, even a prejudiced source may yet provide valuable information if only one were able to pick out kernels of whatever truth is present, provided one knows the particular prejudices in play.5 Hence the need felt by serious students of the Presocratics to have ready access to as many sources as possible, knowing that some – actually, many – are to be dismissed as having nothing new to offer for our understanding of the Presocratics themselves, however much they contribute to the history of the philosophical tradition.6 It is with this limitation in mind that one welcomes this essay by Christian Vassallo, who makes available in one place the papyrological texts that mention Anaxagoras directly or indirectly, which are otherwise dispersed in several editions – a continuing service he offers to the study of this important author and, in general, to the tradition concerning many other Presocratics.7 This contribution is all the more important in that most of these papyri were written by Philodemus, who tries faithfully to report and defend the views held by his master Epicurus, who himself exists very much in fragments. These pages will prove an essential source for all serious students of Anaxagoras. David Sider

1 Introduction We have been long awaiting a comprehensive and thoroughly updated edition of all the testimonia concerning Anaxagoras.8 As is well known, such tasks in

3 It is unfortunate that Plato has not received a similar investigation of this scope. Woltjer (1904) discusses only Orpheus in detail. But see Capizzi (1970), who analyzes much of the Presocratic (including Sophistic) sources. 4 ap. DG. On Diels and his Doxographi Graeci, see M&R1–5. 5 Like that of the early Church Fathers, for example; cf. Osborne (1987). 6 For such a contribution to the tradition concerning Anaxagoras, see Silvestre (1989). 7 See the works under his name in the bibliography of this volume. 8 Until the announced new edition by David Sider for the renowned De Gruyter series Traditio Praesocratica appears, the most complete collection is Lanza (1966), which is largely based on DK, albeit with some additions. Sider’s (20052) important edition takes only Anaxagoras’ fragments into account. Curd’s (2007) collection, on the other hand, is extremely incomplete. In EGPh VI, 2–183 [25], Laks and Most integrate the current collections also through Hebrew (D95b; e),

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 337

the study of antiquity require a huge amount of preparatory work, not only in collecting the material from the Classical tradition, but also in accurately selecting it. In Anaxagoras’ case, this material covers more than a millennium and extends from Euripides to Simplicius.9 Things become more complicated – and this applies to any engagement with the Presocratics – when one wishes to take into account the testimonia that have no direct bearing on the Graeco-Latin Classical tradition: in particular, the Arabic10 and medieval texts.11 At any rate, within the ancient world, part of the doxographical tradition concerning Anaxagoras has yet to be adequately investigated and exploited. I am referring here to the papyrological tradition.12 Along with Empedocles and the early Atomists (especially Democritus), Anaxagoras is one of the Presocratic philosophers whose thought and tradition can be reconstructed through a large amount of papyrus evidence. So far, the CPF has provided scholars with only four testimononia concerning Anaxagoras.13 Their re-examination and, above all, due consideration of the Herculanean sources allowed me, according to the current state of research, to collect about 20 texts that, more or less directly, concern various aspects of Anaxagoras’ life and doctrine. Col. XIX of the Derveni Papyrus is deliberately not taken into account. As a matter of fact, a recent article by Ekaterina Matusova has studied that column (in particular ll. 1–4); she questions the traditional understanding of it, reflecting an Anaxagorean background, and points to physical elements that seem to be connected rather to Diogenes of Apollonia’s monism.14 Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, I here give the text established by KPT:15

Syriac (R36 = 59 B 23 DK, provided only in German by Diels) and Arabic (D95a; c; d) sources, but the papyrological tradition is absolutely omitted by them. 9 Cf. Silvestre (1989). See now Tzamalikos (2016). 10 Cf. Daiber (1980); Baffioni (1982a), (1982b), and (1990). 11 Cf. Rechenauer (2013) 787. 12 On this problem, I would refer to my general introduction in Vassallo (2016a). 13 This fact is obviously due to the original criteria adopted for the implementation of that project. See Adorno (1989) x–xi. 14 Matusova (2016). An exhaustive discussion of the influences of Anaxagoras’ thought on the Derveni Papyrus – influences that, apart from col. XIX, remain evident and irrefutable (cf. e.g. col. XVI.9–15) – is to be found in Betegh (2004) 278–305, KPT, 34–45, and Kotwick (2017) 36–38. See also Piano (2016) 292–297 with regard to Anaxagoras and the ‘Anaxagoreans’ in the Derveni Papyrus on the relationship between cosmology and philosophical allegory. This last question is linked to a Herculanean testimonium concerning Metrodorus of Lampsacus (IPPH XXVI 113) for whose interpretation I would refer to Michael Pozdnev’s paper in the present volume. 15 For the alternative readings by Richard Janko, see Kotwick (2017) 90–93 (with a German translation).

338 

5

10

15

[ 

 Christian Vassallo

ἐκ [τοῦ δ]ὲ [τ]ὰ ἐόντα ἓν [ἕκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος, Ζεὺ[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐκλήθη· πάντων γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἐπικρατεῖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον βούλεται. ‘Μοῖραν’ δ’ ‘ἐπικλῶσαι’ λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶσαι λέγουσιν τὰ ἐόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, ὅπως χρὴ γενέσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ὶ] παύσασθαι. βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰκάζει (τοῦτο γάρ οἱ προσφέρειν ̲ ̲ ἐφα[ί]νετο ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὀνομάτων) λέγων ὧδε· ̲ ̲ ]“Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς δ’ ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων ἀργικέραυνος.” βασιλέ]α ἔφη εἶναι ὅτι πολλῶ[ν τῶν ἀρ]χῶν μία πασῶν κ]ρατεῖ καὶ πάντα τελεῖ [ἅπερ θνη]τῶν οὐδενὶ ἄλλωι ἔξεσ]τιν τε[λ]έσαι· []ν[]ευ[- - ] ἀρχὸν δὲ [ἁπάντων ἔφη εἶναι α]ὐτὸν ὅτι πάντα ἄρ]χεται δια[₍₎]δε

(...) since the time when the beings were given names, each after what is dominant [in it], all things were called Zeus according to the same principle. For the air dominates all things as much as it wishes. So when they say that ‘Moira spun’, they are saying that the thought of Zeus ratified in what way exists and what comes to be and what will come to be must come to be and be and cease. And he likens it [sc. Air] to a king – for this among the names in use seemed to be suitable for it – saying thus: “Zeus the king, Zeus the ruler of all, he of the bright bolt.” He said that it is king because, though the magistracies are many, one prevails over all and performs all so that no other mortal is allowed to perform (...). And he said that it is ruler of all, because all things start (vel are ruled) through (...)16

The testimonia of the collection that I provide below are arranged in five groups:17 (a) those that contain pieces of information on Anaxagoras’ life and works, along with his Fortleben, namely his reception in other philosophical schools of antiquity; (b) those concerning, more or less directly, his trial for impiety; (c) and those that transmit some of his physical, (d) theological, and (e) ethical placita. In the first part of the paper I will give these texts, while in the second part I will mainly concentrate on the testimonia concerning Anaxagoras’ attitude towards the gods 16 Transl. by KPT, 135–136 (with a few changes). 17 The sequence of the texts follows conventional rules that also confer a logical and historico-philosophical order to the testimonia: a) when Graeco-Egyptian testimonia exist, they precede the Herculanean ones, even when the former are chronologically earlier than the latter; b) when the pieces of evidence are present in several papyri within the same thematic group, both Graeco-Egyptian and Herculanean sources are classified by increasing inventory numbers (except when this criterion violates the order of the book from the work or treatise containing two different testimonia, as with T4 and T5).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 339

and his alleged ‘atheism.’ As already observed by Eduard Zeller,18 Anaxagoras did not place religious questions (the existence, or lack thereof, of the gods and their influence on human vicissitudes) at the center of his philosophical interests. In spite of this seeming lack of interest in religious questions, the trial for impiety (ἀσέβεια) was one of the main events of Anaxagoras’ life.19 As we will see, the charge of ‘atheism,’ which was formally motivated by his cosmological theories on the fiery nature of the sun and the phases of the moon,20 was recognized already in antiquity as a political pretext intended to indirectly injure Pericles.21 On the philosophical level, an accurate analysis of the testimonia at our disposal shows that the image of Anaxagoras as an ‘atheist’ is unconvincing and anachronistic.22 Obviously, this problem is different from that of criticism of traditional religion, which represents a frequent topos among Presocratic philosophers, at least beginning from Xenophanes.23 But Anaxagoras does not seem to be a thinker particularly interested in attacking popular faith. His ‘impiety’ can be seen as the (unintentional) effect of his status and his goals as a ‘scientist.’ Another question – as we will see – is represented by the doxographical reconstruction of the figure of Anaxagoras qua ‘atheist.’24 Doxographica Anaxagorea in Papyris Reperta collegit, disposuit et restituit Christian Vassallo Index testimoniorum I. Vita et opera T1. Ammon. [Philos. elench.], PAmmon I 1 = PDuke inv. G 178, cols. I–II T2. Phld. Adv. […] 1, PHerc. 1005/862, fr. 109 T3. Phld. Adv. […] 1, PHerc. 1005/862, fr. 116 T4. Phld. De rhet. 3, PHerc. 1506, col. 21 T5. Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 1104 (olim 1114), fr. 7

18 Zeller/Mondolfo (1969) 422–423. 19 Cf. infra, § 2. 20 Cf. Lanza (1965) esp. 232–233. 21 Cf. infra, § 3. 22 The same could be said for other representatives of early Greek thought, such as for instance the early Atomists. Cf. e.g. Vassallo (2018b). 23 Cf. TP3. 24 Cf. infra, § 4.

340 

 Christian Vassallo

II. De impietate iudicium T6. Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 224, fr. 15 T7. Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 245, fr. 7 III. Physica T8. Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 224, fr. 3 T9. Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 6 T10. Epicur. De nat. 15, PHerc. 1151, col. 7 T11. Epicur. De nat. 15, PHerc. 1151, col. 11 T12. Epicur. De nat. 15, PHerc. 1151, col. 25 IV. Theologica T13. Satyr. fr. 6 Schorn, Vit. Eur., POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I T14. Satyr. fr. 6 Schorn, Vit. Eur., POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III T15. Phld. De dis 1, PHerc. 26, col. 9b T16. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 320 (olim fr. 9) T17. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 321 (olim fr. 10) V. Ethica T18. Auct. inc. [Enchirid. de elocutione], POxy. VII 1012, fr. 6 T19. Phld. De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, col. 17 VI. Spuria vel dubia T20. Didym. Comm. in Ps. 34.17, PTura V 222.27 T21. [Phld.] [Philosoph. hist. (?)], PHerc. 1788, col. 8 (olim fr. 1) Conspectus siglorum P papyrus [P] deest P N apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. [N] deest N Nac apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. ante correctionem Npc apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. post correctionem NArman apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. a M. Arman delineatum vel emendatum O apographum Oxoniense PHerc. [O] deest O Oac apographum Oxoniense PHerc. ante correctionem pc O apographum Oxoniense PHerc. post correctionem cr. ‘cornice’ PHerc. pz. ‘pezzo’ PHerc.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

Fleischer Janko Messeri Sedley Sider *

 341

Kilian J. Fleischer per litteras Richard Janko per litteras Gabriella Messeri per litteras David N. Sedley per litteras David Sider per litteras ego

Conspectus signorum  litterarum vestigia α̣β̣γ̣ litterae dubiae quae aliter legi possunt αβγ litterae superpositae vel subpositae ab editore recognitae et loco suo collocatae α̣β ̣γ ̣ litterae dubiae superpositae vel subpositae ab editore recognitae et loco suo collocatae  litterarum superposita vel subposita vestigia ab editore recognita et loco suo collocata [αβγ] litterae ab editore suppletae {αβγ} litterae ab editore deletae

litterae ad editore additae ⟦αβγ⟧ litterae a librario deletae ⸌αβγ⸍ litterae supra lineam scriptae a librario additae ⌈αβγ⌉ litterae alterutrius vel utriusque apographi ⌊αβγ⌋ litterae a fonte gemino ab editore suppletae α͙β͙γ ͙ litterae apographi ab editore mutatae [- - -] lacuna cuius litterarum numerus non aestimari potest [] litterae deperditae [₍₎] una vel duae litterae deperditae [₍₎] dimidia littera deperdita || finis columnae ̲ ̲ paragraphos  diple obelismene > signum quo librarius spatium explevit Note: The text of each testimonium is preceded by the indication of the century to which the papyrus belongs and by a list of all the editions to which the app. crit. refers (sometimes articles or works that give significant philological or philosophical contributions for establishing the text are mentioned as well). All the original manuscripts of the Herculaneum papyri involved in this inquiry have been checked: their autopsy has been aided by the most advanced multispectral images (MSI, Photos by Steven W. Booras © National Library “Vittorio Emanuele III,” Naples/ Brigham Young University, Provo, USA). As regards the Graeco-Egyptian sources, the images of POxy. VII 1012, fr. 6 and POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, cols. I–III were sent to me by the Toledo Museum

342 

 Christian Vassallo

of Art (© Toledo, USA) and by the British Library, inv. 2070 (© London, UK), respectively; but before then they had already been provided to me, with lower digital resolution, by Marie-Hélène Marganne, director of the Centre de Documentation de Papyrologie Littéraire (CEDOPAL), thanks to the kind mediation of Fabian Reiter. Τhe images of PDuke inv. G 178, cols. I–II (© Durham, NC, USA, Duke University Library) and of PTura V 222.27 (© Köln, Institut für Altertumskunde, Papyrussamlung, Pap. Theol. 58) on which I worked are those available online on the LDAB (http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/papyrus/records/178.html) and on the Digital Collection of the Didymus Papyri of the Brigham Young University Library (http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/ collection/DidymusPapyri/id/58), respectively. As for the editions below, where the readings of the reference edition have been confirmed but only few letters have been put out of brackets, my ‘new’ reading appears in the text, while the ‘old’ printed reading is recorded in the app. crit. For the sake of space (the columns are too long for the layout of the present volume) T20 is quoted in extenso, while the other papyrological testimonia mirror the mise en colonne of the original manuscript.

I Vita et opera T1 Ammon. [Philos. elench.], PAmmon I 1 = PDuke inv. G 178, cols. I–II25

4th cent. AD

Eds. Willis (1978) 145–151; Willis/Dorandi (1989); Willis/Maresch (1997) 7–13 [= CPF I.1*** (1999) 102. Thales, 4T, 827; CPF I.1* (1989) 13. Anaximander, 1T; 14. Anaxi­ menes, 1T, 172–173]; Vassallo (2015b) 289–291. Col. I

5

10

φιλοσό]φων ἀρ[χηγέται· - - -] vacat Θαλῆς Μι]λήσιος, Ἀναξί]μανδρ[ος] Μιλ]ή [σι]ος , Ἀναξιμέ]νη ς Μιλήσ, Ἀναξαγόρα]ς ἐκ Κλαζοvacat μενῶν, Ἀρχέλαο]ς Ἀθηναῖος, Φερεκύδ]ης Σύριος, Παρμεν]ίδη ς Ἐλεά[τη]ς,

25 = TM 64403 = LDAB 5626 = MP3 2603.2 = CPF I.1*, 1 = deest ap. DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

12

 343

Διογένης ἐξ Ἀπολλω]νίας, desunt versus fere 16

Col. II desunt versus 4 5 Σπεύσιππ[ος Ἀθηναῖος  Πλάτων[ος ἀδελφιδοῦς, Ξενοκράτης [Χαλκηδόνιος, Πολέμων Ἀ [θηναῖος, ̲ ̲Ἀρκεσίλαος [ἐκ Πιτάνης, 10 Καρνεάδης [Κυρηναῖος,  Ἀκαδημ[ίας μέσης· Κλιτόμαχο[ς Καρχηδόνιος, Φιλίων ἐ[κ Λαρίσσης, Ἀ]ντίοχ[ο]ς [Ἀσκαλωνίτης, 15 τῶν ἀρχηγ[ετῶν τῆς ̲ ̲τρ[ί]της Ἀκαδ[ημίας. Κυνικοί· [- - Διογ]ένης ὁ Σ[ι]νωπ[εύ]ς, Μό]νιμος ἀπὸ δουλίας, 20 ̲ ̲Κ]ράτης Βοιώτι ος. Περι]πατητικοί· Ἀ]ρι στοτέλη ς Σταγειρίτ‹ης›, Θεό]φ[ρ]αστος Ἴων, Στρά]των ἐκ Λαμψάκου, 25  Πραξιφ]άνης [Ῥ]όδιος, ̲ ̲Κριτόλ]αος Φα[σ]η λίτης. Στωϊ]κοὶ μετὰ [τ]ῶν Κυνικ· 28 Ζ]ήνων [- - Col. I 1 ἀρ[χηγέται suppl. Willis dub. || Col. II 9 [ἐκ Πιτάνης suppl. Willis, qui et Πιταναῖος prop. dub. (cf. Arcesil. test. 1a28 et 1f 4 Mette) || 11 Ἀκαδημ[ίας μέσης suppl. Willis dub., qui et [δευτέρας prop. || 13 Φιλίων sic Ammon, pro Φίλων vulgato || 15 ἀρχηγ[ετῶν suppl. Willis dub.

[Scolarch philosophers (?)] (1 line missing) [Thales] of Miletus, Anaximander of Miletus, Anaximenes of Miletus, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Archelaus of Athens, Pherecydes of Syros, Parmenides of Elea, Diogenes of Apollonia (c. 16 lines missing) || (4 lines missing) Speusippus [of Athens, Plato’s nephew], Xenocrates [of Chalcedon], Polemon of Athens, Arcesilaus [of Pitane], Carneades [of Cyrene] of the [Middle] Academy; Clitomachus [of Carthago], Philo of [Larissa], Antiochus [of Ascalon], among the scholarchs [of the] Third Academy. Cynics (c. 1–2 words

344 

 Christian Vassallo

missing): Diogenes of Sinope, Monimus the slave, Crates of Boeotia. Peripatetics: Aristotle of Stagira, Theophrastus [the] Ionian, Strato of Lampsacus, Praxiphanes of Rhodes, Critolaus of Phaselis. Stoics along with the Cynics: Zeno (c. 2–3 words missing; continues on)

T2 Phld. Adv. […] 1, PHerc. 1005/862, fr. 10926

1st cent. BC

2

Eds. VH I (1862) 132–161: 142 [fr. XIX]; Crönert (1906) 176; Sbordone (1947) 67 [fr. i, col. II]; Angeli (1988) 166 [fr. 109]; Ch. Vassallo *. desunt minimum versus 7 8 Χαρικλε[₍₎ τὰ] βέλτισ[τα τοῦ Ἀναξα10 γόρου κα[ὶ  desunt versus 2 13 λ]αμβάνει[₍₎ τῶν ἁπάντων [₍₎ 15  τοι]αῦθ’ ὁπό[τε ὁ Ἐπίκουρο ς ἐπέκρινε[ν ₍₎ ][][]ο[₍₎ 18 ][][₍₎ 7–8 ἐπὶ] | Χαρικλέ[ους suppl. Sbordone || 9 τὰ] βέλτισ[τα τοῦ * (βέλτισ[τ iam Angeli) || 9–10 Ἀναξα]|γόρου suppl. Crönert (qui Ἀναξ]αγόρου legit), deinde Sbordone et Angeli || κα[ὶ Sbordone || 13 λ]αμβάνει[ leg. ac suppl. Angeli : λ[α]μβά[νε]ι δ[ὲ] κ[αὶ Sbordone || 15 τοι]αῦθ’ ὁπό[τε * : τοιαῦθ᾽ ὁποῖα iam Angeli, sed vest. min. congr. || 15–16 ὁ Ἐπί]|κουρος ἐπέκρινε[ν temptaverim : ]λε Φαῖδρον [ perp. Sbordone (Φαῖδρον iam perp. Crönert) || 17 Πυ]θ[α]γόραι  [ restituerim e.g.

(at least 7 lines missing) [in the archonship (?) vel to] Charicles/Chariclides (?)27 [he (sc. Epicurus) ordered (?) the] best works of Anaxagoras and (c. 1–2 words and 2 lines missing) take (c. 1–2 words missing) [the principle (?)] of all things (c. 1–2

26 PHerc. 1005 = [TM] = LDAB 3610 = CatPErc, 215–216 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 16 = deest ap. DK. 27 According to F. Sbordone, this line contains a reference to the archontate of Charicles (196/195) or Chariclides (363/362). But on the chronological difficulties raised by this hypothesis see Angeli (1988) 230.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 345

words missing) such things when Epicurus chose/decided (c. 1 word, 2 lines, and other lines missing)

T3 Phld. Adv. […] 1, PHerc. 1005/862, fr. 11628

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 I (1862) 132–161: 144 [fr. XXIV]; Spengel (1863) 532–535; Crönert (1906) 174; Diano (1974) 65 [fr. 143 (III)]; Sbordone (1947) 78–79 [fr. x]; H. Diels ap. DK, II, 247 [75 A 7 (II) DK]; Arr.2, 461–462 (fr. [104]); Angeli (1988) 169 [fr. 116]. desunt minimum versus 2 3 ἐν] ταῖς ἡμερ[οκ]ωμίαι[ς ἐν Τέωι συσχόμενος π[ερὶ 5 τοῦ σοφιστεύσα[ν]τος͙ τἀν[αξαγόρου ἀναγι[ν]ώ σκοντος καὶ Ἐμπεδο[κλ]έους καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τ[ε]ρθρε[υομένο͙υ κατατεταμένω[ς”· 10  ἢ πάλιν· “ὁ τοὺς Ἑρμοκοπίδας ἐν Τέω συ[σ]τήσας͙ κατὰ Δ]ημόκρ͙ιτον καὶ Λεύκιπ]π͙ον πραγματευ14 [ομένους ₍₎ 3 ἐν] suppl. Angeli, quae ἐ|ν scripsit : καὶ πῶς ἂν οἷός τε ἤμεν ταύταις] Crönert : αὐτοῦ] Diels : ὁ] Diano : ἢ] Vogliano ap. Diano || ἡμερ[οκ]ωμίαι[ς Crönert et al. || 4 συσχόμενος leg. Crönert et al., O sec. : οὐ ἐχόμενος Spengel, N sec. || 4–5 π[ερὶ] | τοῦ leg. ac suppl. Angeli : π[ρὸ] | τοῦ Vogliano ap. Diels, Diano et Arrighetti : [μετ’ αὐ]|τοῦ Crönert et Sbordone spat. long. || 5 σοφιστεύσα[ν] τος͙ rest. Angeli : σοφιστεύσα[ι] τοῦ Spengel et al. || 5–6 τἀν[α]|ξαγόρου suppl. Crönert et al. (τἈν[α]|ξαγόρου Sider) : τ’ Ἀν[α]|ξαγόρου Vogliano ap. Diels || 6–9 suppl. Crönert et al. || 10 ὁ om. Crönert || 11 Τέω συ[σ]τήσας͙ rest. Vogliano ap. Diels, sic et Diano, Sbordone et Arrighetti : Τέω συ[σ]τῆσα[ι Crönert || 12–13 suppl. Crönert et al. || 13–14 πραγματευ|[ομένους suppl. Angeli, Arrighetti sec. : πραγματευ|[σομένους Crönert et al. : πραγματευ|[όμενος Vogliano ap. Arrighetti : πραγματευ|[ομένου ἀκουσομένους Diels

28 PHerc. 1005 = [TM] = LDAB 3610 = CatPErc, 215–216 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 17 = 75 A 7 [II] DK.

346 

 Christian Vassallo

(at least 2 lines missing) “(…) having kept together in friendship in the daily banquets in Teos around him [sc. Nausiphanes], who, reading the [books] of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, argued as a sophist and eagerly used extreme subtlety on these questions”; or again [he (sc. Epicurus) writes]: “he [sc. Nausiphanes], who organized in Teos [the group of] the ‘Hermes-mutilators,’ who was engaged [in philosophy] following [the thought of] Democritus and Leucippus (c. 1–2 words and some lines missing)”

T4 Phld. De rhet. 3, PHerc. 1506, col. 2129

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 III (1864) 1–71: 34; Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 196–254[–272]: 226–227; Ch. Vassallo*. deest versus fere 1 ₍₎ φιλοσο]φία[₍₎ μη[]τρο[₍₎ 5 με[]ει[ τοῖς φιλοσό[φοι]ς ειλ[₍₎ δισ[₍₎]σεπ[ ]ραμ[₍₎ δι]α͙τρίβου[σιν ][] 10 ] μυρίωι ₍₎]ομ[]τον λο₍₎] μεγάλα βαετου ]ν πιστευθέντας ὄν͙[τ]ες πονηροί, τ[ε]χνῖται 15  δ]ὲ ὅμως οὐ κωλύονται δ[ιαφο]ρώτατοι πάντων ̲ ̲ὑπ[ά]ρχειν. ὅθεν μὲν μ[ὴ] καλῶς προστή σεσθαι τὸν ῥήτορα τῆς πατρίδ[ο]ς 2

29 = TM 62478 = LDAB 3654 = CatPErc, 348–349 (cf. Chartes) = deest ap. IPPH (addendum est) = deest ap. DK = Diog. Bab. SVF III 125.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 347

20

κἂν ἔχῃ τὴν ἐνπειρίαν, ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας λέγο[υ]σι[ν. Περ[ι]κλῆς τοίνυν, ὃν ἔ[φ]η ἀνεκτότατον γεγονέ[ναι τ]ῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρ[ων καὶ 25 Ἀνα]ξαγόρου καὶ ἄ[λλων τινῶν] ἤκουσεν φι[λοσόφων, οἷς μὲν ἴσως παρέβαλε, Στωϊκοῖς δ’ ο[ὐ]δαμῶς ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ τὰς ἐναντίας ἐσχηκ[όσιν 30  δόξας ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλω ν· μόνον δὲ κατὰ Διο[γέν]ην ἡ Στωϊκὴ ποιεῖ πολ ί   [τ]ας ἀγαθούς.] τὸ δὲ μὴ κε[₍₎]εισθαι ]ε[ ἄ]νευ τα35 ] μ []ανω 2–3 * e.g. || 3 Μητρό[δωρος] perp. Sudhaus in app. crit. || 4–5 Ἕρμαρ]|χος perp. Sudhaus in app. crit. || 5–6 * || 9 restitui || 11–12 τὸν λό|[γον * e.g. || 14 suppl. Sudhaus || 15 δὲ] Sudhaus) || 16 suppl. Sudhaus || 17 ὑπ[άρ]χ ειν Sudhaus || 18 suppl. Sudhaus || 19 πατρίδ[ος Sudhaus) || 21 λέγο[υσιν Sudhaus) || 22 Περ[ι]κλῆς suppl. Sudhaus || [ἔφη Sudhaus) || 23 γεγο[νέναι Sudhaus || 24 τ]ῶ ν suppl. Sudhaus || ῥητό[ρων Sudhaus, cett. id. || 25–26 suppl. Sudhaus || 28 ο[ὐ]δα[μ]ῶς Sudhaus, cett. id. || 29 suppl. Sudhaus || 31 suppl. Sudhaus || 32 πο[λίτ]ας Sudhaus || 32–33 ἀγα|[θούς suppl. Sudhaus, qui versus non separavit || 34 * e.g.

(1 line and c. 2–3 words missing) philosophy (c. 3–4 words, 1 line, and c. 2–3 words missing) [to the] philosophers (c. 2–3 words and 2 lines missing) they spend time (c. 4–5 words missing) countless (3–4 words missing) the speech (?) (c. 1 word missing) great things/greatly (c. 2–3 words missing) entrusted with (?) being knavish [as (?)] technicians [sc. rhetoricians], nevertheless they are not hindered from being [the] most adverse of all. Whence they [sc. the Stoics] say that, although provided with experience, without philosophy the rhetorician could not be worthily put in charge of the country. Therefore Pericles, whom he [sc. Diogenes of Babylon] said to be among the rhetoricians [the] most tolerable, was a pupil of Anaxagoras and [some other] philosophers, [of which] he was equally a pupil, but absolutely not Stoics, rather having opinions opposite [to the Stoic ones] on everything. Yet, according to Diogenes only the Stoic philosophy would be able to make good [the] citizens. On the other hand, the not (c. 2–3 words missing) without (1 line missing)

348 

 Christian Vassallo

T5 Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 1104 (olim 1114), fr. 730

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 XI (1876) 11–19: 17; Sudhaus (1892–1896), II, 298–300: 299; Ch. Vassallo *. desunt minimum versus 431 5 ₍₎] ὥσπερ αἱ πολιτικῶ͙ν ₍₎]· τὰ πολλὰ τῶν [₍₎ ₍₎]γενου πρ[ὸς ₍₎]ημονου [₍₎  τῶν] ἀνθρώπων ον[₍₎ 10 ₍₎]ν ἐπιει[κ₍₎ ₍₎] ποιε͙ῖν λόγον [ ₍₎] οἱ ποιηταὶ [₍₎ ₍₎], ἀλλ’ ἐν φιλοσοφία[ι ₍₎] ἀθέ[ους δ]έ φησιν 15  ₍₎], ὡς Περικλῆς ἐ[λέγετο ἀκού]ε͙ιν Ἀ[ν]αξαγόρ[ου καὶ Δάμωνος]. τὸ Πυθ͙αγόρου [ ₍₎] καὶ φυσικὰ 19 ₍₎] κατὰ τῶνδ[ 5 πολιτικῶ͙ν addidi et correxi : πολιτικὸν Sudhaus || 6 init. ἀρεταί] (vel τέχναι] vel λέξεις]) * e.g. (et δυνάμεις] cogitavi, sed spat. long.) || 7 ]γένου vel ]γεν οὐ legi potest || fin. * || 8 ]ημον (fort. τὸν δ]ῆμον) vel ]ημόνου vel ]η μόνου legi potest || 9 init. τῶν] * (fort. et τούτων possis) || fin. ὄν[των (fort. et ὄν[τως) supplere possis || 10 ἐπιει[κ suppl. Sudhaus, qui ἐπιει|κ scripsit || 11 ποιε͙ῖν rest. Sudhaus || 13 fin. φιλοσοφία[ι * : φιλοσοφίᾳ Sudhaus || 14–15 λάθραι] ἀ[θέους δ]έ φησιν | [γενέσθαι] * e.g. : ταῦτ’ ἔμ]αθε[ν· εἰ δ]έ φησιν  Sudhaus || 15–16 ἐ[λέ|γετο ἀκού]ε͙ιν rest. Sudhaus, qui ἐ[λέγετο ἀκού]ειν scripsit || 16 fin. suppl. Sudhaus || 17 καὶ Δάμωνος] * e.g., conl. 37 A 3–6 DK (καὶ ] Sudhaus, cui nomen in -ης latere videtur) || Πυθ͙αγόρου correxi (Πυ[θ]αγόρου iam Sudhaus), fort. et Δάμωνος] το Πυθ͙αγορου e.g. || 19 τῶνδ[ε vel τῶν δ[ὲ * (τῶν δ[ Sudhaus)

(at least 4 lines missing) as the [virtues (?)] of the politicians: most of (c. 2–3 words missing) to/against [the people/popular assembly (?)] (1 line missing) of men [that are] (c. 2–3 words missing) good (?) (c. 1–2 words missing) to give a speech (c. 2–3 30 = TM 62460 = LDAB 3635 = CatPErc, 271 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 19 (olim 18); XXXV 167 (err. corr.) = deest ap. DK. 31 This (rough) estimate has been made possible by a comparison with the other apographs, which preserve the lower margin.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 349

words missing) the poets (c. 1–2 words missing), but in philosophy he32 says that [they become (?)] instead impious, as Pericles was said to be a pupil of Anaxagoras [and Damon]. The (1 word missing) of Pythagoras (1 word missing) and physical [treatises/ works vel arguments] (c. 1–2 words missing) concerning against (1 word missing)

II De impietate iudicium T6 Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 224, fr. 1533

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 VII (1871) 140–156: 154; Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 168–176: 175; Fimiani (2014) 77; Vassallo (2015a) 108. οὔτε] || γὰρ ἐν κυ[σὶ] λαγὼ φαντα[σίαν πα⟦ν⟧⸌ρ⸍έχοντα δυνατὸν σ[ώιζεσθαι κατ’ Ἀριστοτέλην, οὔ[τ’ ἐν ἀνθρώ⟦α⟧ποις κυνῶ⟦ι⟧δες [καὶ 5 καταφρόνητον ὑπολα[μβαν͙όμενον. οἱ μὲν οὖν̣ [φιλόσ]ο̣φοι πανταχῆ τοιοῦτ̣[οι φ]α̣ίνονται· διὸ καὶ συκο[φάνται]ς καὶ δυσμενέσιν α[₍₎ 10  εὐπρόσ]ιτο[ι] γείνοντα[ι. καὶ Ἀν]α̣αγόρας, ὃς ἐλ[εγε ₍₎]ιστους μ[ 13 ₍₎]θαι[ desunt versus fere 14 1–6 = Arist. Polit. fr. 4 [I] Ross || 1 suppl. Sudhaus || 2–3 σ[ώζεσ]|θαι Sudhaus || 3 οὔ[τ’ ἐν suppl. Fimiani : οὔ[τε ἐν Sudhaus || 4–5 suppl. Sudhaus || 6 ὑπολα[μβα]|ν͙όμενον rest. Fimiani (ὑπολα[μβα|ν]όμενον iam Sudhaus) || 6–7 [φιλό|σ]ο̣φοι leg. ac suppl. Fimiani (φιλό|σο]φοι iam Sudhaus) || 7 τοιοῦτ̣[οι suppl. Sudhaus || 8–9 suppl. Sudhaus || 9 fin. ἁ[πλῶς * e.g. : ἄ[γαν 32 This is almost certainly the opponent (Diogenes of Babylon?) whose ideas Philodemus is paraphrasing. 33 = TM 62460 = LDAB 3635 = CatPErc, 109 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 14 = deest ap. DK.

350 

 Christian Vassallo

Sudhaus || 10 suppl. Sudhaus || 11 καὶ Ἀν]α̣αγόρας restitui (ὁ δ’ Ἀν]- prop. Sider) : καθά|περ Ἀναξ]αγόρας Sudhaus (Ἀνα]ξ͙αγόρας Fimiani), etiam ] Δ̣αγόρας seu Πρω]τ͙αγόρας possis || ἔλ[εγε vel ἐλ[έγε|το * || 12 τοιαῦτ’ ε]ἰς τοὺς μ[αθητὰς * e.g. : πλε]ίστους μ[- - - Sudhaus

(…) in fact it is [neither] possible that [a dog], which, among dogs, displays the appearance of a hare, can save itself, according to Aristotle, nor [that] something considered dog-like and despicable [can be preserved among] men. Thus, the philosophers appear as such in any circumstance; hence they are (1 word missing) easily approachable by sycophants and enemies. [And/Also/Like] Anaxagoras, who said/is said (2 lines and c. other 14 lines missing)34

T7 Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 245, fr. 735

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 VIIΙ (1873) 166–169: 169; Us., 417; Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 178–180: 180; H. Diels ap. DK, II, 11 [59 A 20 DK]; Acosta Méndez (1990) 40 [= Acosta Méndez/ Angeli (1992) 155 (fr. 6)]; Vassallo (2015a) 112. Ἀναξαγό[ρα]ς [δὲ μαστιγωθεὶς τοὺ̣ς μώλωπας ἐπεδείκνυεν τοῖς δικασταῖς, καὶ Πυ5 θαγόρας, ὧι Κύλων ὁ Κροτωνιάτη͙ς ἐπαγαγὼν πρ[ά]γματα τῆς πόλεως ἐξέβαλε, τοὺ δὲ μαθητὰς ἀθρόους 10  ἐνέ[πρ]η σε, καὶ Σω[κράτης ὧι τὸ μὲν πρό[τε12  [ρον desunt versus fere 21

34 The edition and translation of this testimonium (above all in the first part) differs from that presented in Vassallo (2015a) 108. Following a suggestion that A. Laks made to me per litteras, I consider here λαγὼ at l. 1 a genitive instead of an accusative: this change results in an analogy between a dog/hare (symbol of fear) among dogs and a man/dog (symbol of contempt) among men. 35 = TM 62393 = LDAB 3558 = CatPErc, 114–115 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 15; XXXV 161 = 59 A 20 DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 351

1 Ἀναξαγό[ρας Usener (Ἀναξαγό[ρ]ας Acosta Méndez) : Ἀναξαγό [ραν Sudhaus : καὶ] || Ἀ- Vassallo 2015 || 1–2 [δὲ μασ]|τιγωθε[ὶς suppl. Sudhaus : [ὃς μασ]|τιγωθεὶς Acosta Méndez (ὃς] iam Usener) || 2–3 τοὺ̣ς μώλω|πας P : τ[ις] Κλέων[ος?] | πα[ῖ]ς perp. Sudhaus || 7 πρ[ά]γ μ ατα leg. ac suppl. Acosta Méndez : [σ]ύ[ρ]ματα Usener : ὀ[φλή]ματα Sudhaus : [ἐγκλή]ματα Diels : ὀ[χλή]ματα Delatte || 8 τοὺ add. Sudhaus || 10 ἐνέ[πρ]η σε leg. ac suppl. Sudhaus (ἐνέ[πρη]σε iam Usener) || 10–11 Σω[κρά]|της suppl. Usener || 11–12 πρό[τε|ρον suppl. Acosta Méndez (πρό[τερον iam Sudhaus spat. long.)

(…) then Anaxagoras, having been whipped, showed the judges [his] bruises, and Pythagoras, whom Cylon of Croton threw out of the city, after he had caused him some trouble, burning all [his] pupils (i.e. killing all [his] pupils in a fire), and Socrates, to whom [as the first] (c. 3–4 words and 21 lines missing)

III Physica T8 Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 224, fr. 336

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH 2 VII (1871) 140–156: 142; Sudhaus (1892–1896) II, 168–176: 169; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1899) 636; Crönert (1906) 192; Capasso (1987) 152; Brunschwig (1996) 25–26 n. 24; Vassallo (2015a) 84; Vassallo (2015b) 281–283; Ch. Vassallo *. {διὰ} γενέσθαι τὸ ὕδ[ωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν κατ’ Ἀν͙αξα[γόραν φ͙ήσαι τις ἀκολούθω[ς πάνθ’ ὑπάρχειν ἐν παντ[ί, οὐδ’ ἂν 5 κατὰ τὸν Χεῖον Μητ[ρόδωρον ὁμολογ͙ῴη͙ τῶι μὴ [εἰδέναι μηδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ[το, οὐδὲ κατὰ Παρμ͙ {γενέσθαι} Μέλισσον ἓν τὸ πᾶ[ν λέγον10 τας εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ [τὰς αἰσ[θήσ]εις ψευδε[ῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰ] πολλὰ [ 36 = TM 62460 = LDAB 3635 = CatPErc, 109 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 13; XXIV 111; XXV 112; XXX 138; XXXVI 175; XXXVIII 178 = 28 A 49 [I]; 30 A 14 [I]; 70 A 25 [II] DK.

352 

 Christian Vassallo

]των[ ]απαντα [ 15 τὴν δό]ξαν απ[  κ]ατὰ π[ ]ν μᾶλλο[ν  18  εἰ]δ⸌έναι⸍ τοῖς [ desunt versus fere 9 1 {διὰ} γενέσθαι restituerim e.g. : διαγενέσθαι Vassallo (2015a) et (2015b) : ἢ ἰ]||δία γενέσθαι Crönert || ὕδ[ωρ· οὐ suppl. Sudhaus || 2 Ἀν͙αξα[γόραν rest. Sudhaus || 3 φ͙ήσαι rest. Sudhaus (et ζησαι possis) ἀκολούθω[ς suppl. Sudhaus || [πάνθ’ * [πάντα Janko sec. (cf. 59 B 1; B 4; B 6; B 11; B 12 DK) : [πᾶν Sudhaus || 4 suppl. Sudhaus || 5 Μητ[ρόδωρον * : Μητ[ρᾶν suppl. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (acc. Vassallo [2015a] et [2015b]) : Μήτ[ρωνα Crönert : μὴ τ Sudhaus || 6 ὁμολογ͙ῴη͙ rest. Sudhaus, qui “talis optativus Philodemo usitatus” adn. || 6–7 suppl. Sudhaus || 8 κατὰ Παρμ͙ {γενέσθαι} restitui : κατὰ Παρ[μ]εν[ίδην κ]αὶ Sudhaus : Παρ[μ]εν[είδην καὶ Crönert : Παρμεν[είδην κ]αὶ Capasso || 9–11 suppl. Sudhaus || 12 * e.g. || 12–13 [ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν κριτηρίων τῆς ἀληθείας] Crönert e.g., sed apographi litt. vest. min. congr. || 15 τὴν δό]ξαν * (δό]ξαν iam Sudhaus) || fort. ἀπ[ατ- (ἀπ[ατηλὴν | εἶναι vix prob. Vassallo [2015a]) || 16 κ]ατὰ Π[αρμενίδην (iam Vassallo [2015a]) vel Π [ρωταγόραν * e.g. || 17 suppl. Sudhaus || 18 *

(…) [one cannot agree with Thales (?) who maintains that (?)] water generates [all things (?)]; as a matter of fact, one could [neither] say consistently, according to [what is maintained by] Anaxagoras, that [all things] are in all, [nor] agree, according to [what is maintained by] Metrodorus of Chios, with [the idea of] not knowing [and even of not knowing] this same thing [sc. knowing that one does not know] nor, according to [what is maintained by] Parmenides and Melissus, [affirm] that the all is one and that because the senses are deceptive, [also the] many [are so] (c. 1 line and 1 word missing) all things (?) (c. 1–2 words missing) [the] opinion (c. 2–3 words missing) according to (c. 2–3 words missing) rather (c. 1–2 words missing) to know with the (?) (c. 1 word and 9 lines missing)

T9 Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 637

2nd cent. BC

2

Eds. VH VII (1871) 1–29: 3; Crönert (1906) 115 [col. 8]; De Falco (1923) 26 [col. 4]; Puglia (1988) 152 [col. 6]; Ch. Vassallo *.

37 = TM 59506 = LDAB 606 = CatPErc, 222–223 (cf. Chartes) = deest ap. IPPH et DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 353

₍₎] πάντα ἀξιοῦσιν. τὰς δὲ πρώ]τας φύσεις ἔθηκεν ὁ Ἐπίκ]ουρος καὶ τοὺς πάντ’ ἀδιάφο]ρα λέγο͙ντας  5 εἶπεν τε]ταράχθα[ι]· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἦσαν] ἀπείραστοι τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ε]ἰπόντες καὶ πάνθ’ ὁμοι]ομερῆ [λ]έ͙γοντες ][][][]σ 10  ₍₎]τασ[]με[₍₎ ] ἀδια[]η ₍₎ ὁμοι]ομερ[]ρο ]λετε[] ]ρ 15 ] desunt versus minimum 10 1 et ἅ]παντα possis || 2–3 Crönert || 3 Ἐπί]κουρος Crönert, sed κ deest in PON || 4 πάντ’ ἀδιάφο]ρα Puglia || λέγ[ον]τας Puglia : λέγειν τὰς De Falco ex N || 5 τε]ταράχθα[ι] Puglia : τα]ραχ[ή De Falco || 6 γὰρ ὡς ἦσαν] Puglia || ἀπεί[ρ]αστοι Puglia || 7 τὰ τοιαῦτ’] Puglia || εἰ]πόντες Puglia (ε]ἰπόντες iam Crönert et De Falco in app. crit.) || 8 πάνθ’ ὁμοι]ομερῆ Puglia : ταῦτα ὁμοι]ομερῆ Crönert dub. || 8–9 λέγον|[τες εἶναι Crönert, sed λε in superposito || 11 ] ἀδια[φορ- Puglia, sed et ἀδια[ρθρ- et sim. vel -]α δια[- possis || 12 *

(1–2 words missing) they think everything worthy of a reward. [While] Epicurus reckoned [the] first natures [to be a principle] and [maintained] that those who say that [all things] are indistinguishable have been troubled: [because it is] clear [that they were] without experience in upholding [such ideas] and saying that [all things are] homeomeries [sc. made of similar parts] (c. 2 lines and 1–2 words missing) indistinguishable (?) (c. 2–3 words missing) homeomery/homeomeries (c. 1 word and 13 lines missing)

T10 Epicur. De nat. 15, PHerc. 1151, col. 738

2nd cent. BC

Eds. VH2 VI (1866) 24–36: 27; Vogliano (1956) 258–259 [fr. 7]; Arr.2, 279 (fr. [30.7]); Millot (1977) 16; Ch. Vassallo *. 38 = TM 59753 = LDAB 857 = CatPErc, 277–278 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 19bis = deest ap. DK.

354 

 Christian Vassallo

τῶν] || ἀτό]μων περὶ τὰς π͙[άντας συγκρίσε]ις ὑπαρχόντω[ν ₍₎ ἐξ] ὧν αἱ διάφοροι συγ[κρίσεις ἐπι]γίνονται· τὸ δὴ μηδ[₍₎ 5 ]σαν ὁμοιομερεια[][ ]εγειν ει[₍₎]ν ₍₎]σε[]εκ[ ][][₍₎ ₍₎][₍₎]οε[₍₎ 10 ₍₎][ 1 1 ₍₎][ 1–2 τῶν || ἀτό]μων περὶ τὰς π͙[άντας συγ|κρίσε]ις restituerim e.g. : ποικίλων σχημάτ]ων περὶ τὰς π͙[ρώ|τας φύσ]εις Arrighetti (ποικίλων σχημάτ]ων dub. in app. crit.) || 2 ὑπαρχόντω[ν suppl. Millot, Arrighetti sec. || 3 ἐξ] * (καὶ ἐξ] iam Arrighetti) || 3–4 συγ[κρίσεις | ἐπι]γ ίνονται * : συγ|[κρίσεις γ]ίνονται Arrighetti, Vogliano sec. || 4–5 μηδ[₍₎|]σαν legi : μὴ | [παρέχειν τὴ]ν Arrighetti || 5 ὁμοιομερεία[ις vel ὁμοιομερεία[ι vel ὁμοιομέρεια[ς vel ὁμοιομέρεια[ν supplere possis (ὁμοιομέρει[αν iam Arrighetti) || 6 init. ἐπιλ]έγειν (cf. Epicur. De nat. 28, PHerc. 1479/1417, fr. F, col. 1.8 Sedley) vel λ]έγειν suppleverim e.g. || fin. εἰς [τὸ]ν (seu [τὴ]ν)  vel εἶν[αι] ν cogitavi || 8–11 primum dispexi

(…) [of the] atoms that are round all the compounds [sc. in their outermost part] (1 word missing) [from] which [sc. atoms] the different compounds come into being after:39 a fact [that cannot be ascribed to] homeomery/homeomeries (c. 2 words, 5 lines, and other lines missing)

T11 Epicur. De nat. 15, PHerc. 1151, col. 1140 2

2nd cent. BC 2

Eds. VH VI (1866) 24–36: 28; Vogliano (1956) 260 [fr. 11]; Arr. , 281 (fr. [30.12]); Millot (1977) 17; Ch. Vassallo *. ]εν συνε[]κε[] καθὸ γὰρ πρ]οσαγορεύεται ὅ τι δὴ π[οτ’ 39 According to my interpretation, Epicurus is here dealing with the question of the ‘formal’ difference of the compounds due to the varying positions of the outermost atoms. 40 = TM 59753 = LDAB 857 = CatPErc, 277–278 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 19ter = deest ap. DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 355

ε]ἶναι, κατ’ ἐκε[ῖ]νο ἐκ τῶν π]λείστων τῶνδέ τινων 5 πε]ποιημένη ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν] σλων, οὐκ ἐκ ]ανιμ[₍₎]νησυ ][]ησει[] ἐκείνου ]ιοσο[]ζετα[ι 10  ]οτι []ι[ 2 πρ]οσαγορεύεται suppl. Arrighetti, qui πρ]οσα  γ ο ρ  εύετ[αι] legit (πρ]οσα  γορεύ  εται Millot) : ]ε γὰρ τοχυν[ Vogliano || 2–3 δὴ π[οτ’ | ε]ἶναι * : δῆ[λον | εἶ]ναι Millot : οὐκ [ἐ]πι| [- - -]ναι perp. Arrighetti || 3 ἐκε[ῖ]νο suppl. Arrighetti, qui ἐκε[ῖ]νο scripsit || 4 π]λείστων suppl. Vogliano, qui π]λείστων scripsit || 5 πε]ποιημένη * (πε]ποιη [μ]ένη iam Millot) || 5–6 ὁμοιομε|[ρῶν] suppl. Millot, quae ὁμοιο  με|[ρῶν - - -] scripsit || 6 ἡ φύσ  ις ἄλλ  ων legerim dub. || 9 * || 10 ὅτι vel ὅ τι vel δι]ότι legi potest

(c. 2–3 words missing) indeed, insofar as whatever exists is indicated, according to that way (?) [the nature of other phenomena (?)], which derives from most of these particular bodies, [is] made of homeomeries (c. 2–3 words missing), not of (1  line and c. 2–3 words missing) of that (1 line and c. 1–2 words missing) that/ whichever/because (c. 1–2 words and some lines missing)

T12 Epicur. De nat. 15, PHerc. 1151, col. 2541

2nd cent. BC

Eds. VH2 VI (1866) 24–36: 33; Vogliano (1956) 265–266 [fr. 25]; Arr.2, 287 (fr. [30.28]); Millot (1977) 21; Ch. Vassallo *. κατὰ] || ̲ ̲ταύτη ν τὴν δόξαν· ἡ[μῖν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ποιότ[ητα[ς κα]ὶ μὴ κατὰ μορφ[ὴν ὁμο[ιο]μέρεια προαιρετ[έον, 5 κ͙α[ὶ μηδὲ] κατὰ συνέχε[ιαν τῶν πλε[ί]στων [][₍₎][ 7  ]ε[]α[][

41 = TM 59753 = LDAB 857 = CatPErc, 277–278 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 19quater = deest ap. DK.

356 

 Christian Vassallo

1 κατὰ] || ταύτη ν * : ταύτ[η]ν Vogliano et al. || 1–2 ἡ[μῖν] | μὲν proposuerim : ἡ]|με[ῖς] Arrighetti || 2–3 ποιότ[η]|τα[ς κα]ὶ suppl. Arrighetti, qui π[οι]ότ[η]|τα[ς κα]ὶ scripsit : ποιότ[η]|τα[ς τὰς] Millot || 3 κατὰ μορφ[ὴν leg. ac suppl. Millot : κατ’ ἄλ[λ]ο ρ[ perp. Arrighetti || 4 ὁμο[ιο]μέρεια προαιρετ[έον restituerim e.g. : ὁμ[οιο]μέρεια, προα[ Millot, Arrighetti (qui ὁμο[ιο]μέρεια προα[ scripsit) sec. : ὁμο[ιο]μέρεια προαγ[ Vogliano || 5 κ͙α[ὶ μηδὲ] κατὰ συνέχε[ιαν τῶν restitui : ]κατὰ συνο[ι]κε[ Millot, vest. min. congr. : γ []κε[]ασ[]νοκε[ perp. Arrighetti : γκασνοκε[ perp. Vogliano || 6 primum dispexi || 7 *

(…) [according to (?)] this opinion [sc. that of Anaxagoras (?)42]; because for us one must prefer a homeomery [considered] according to the qualities [sc. of the compounds] and not according to [their] shape, [nor] according to the compactness of [the] greatest number of [atoms/images (?)43] (c. 2–3 words, 1 line, and other lines missing)

IV Theologica T13 Satyr. fr. 6 Schorn, Vit. Eur., POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I44

2nd cent. BC

Eds. Hunt (1912) 139–142; Leo (1912) 279; H. Diels ap. DK, II, 12 [59 A 20c DK]; Arrighetti (1964) 47–49; West (1966) 548; Funghi (1989) 158–159; Schorn (2004) 92–94; Ch. Vassallo *. Cf. Gerstinger (1916) 57–58; Lanza (1966) 32 [test. 20c]. 15

desunt versus fere 14 ][₍₎ ]ς [καὶ ἐπ]ὶ τοῖς ]ιοις ἀγαθοῖς ὑ]ψηλὸς ὤν, ο]ὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς

42 Cf. Millot (1977) 35 n. 61. 43 Cf. Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 48.2–3: καὶ γὰρ ῥεῦσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχής, κτλ. Until now, the only occurence of the term συνέχεια in Epicurus was in De nat. 11, PHerc. 1042, col. 10 II [26.42].10–11 Arr.2 (συνέ]|χειαν): but there the noun indicates the density of the inferior part of the Earth. 44 TM 62717 = LDAB 3905 = MP3 1456 = CPF I.1*, 10, 2T [I] = 59 A 20c [I] DK. Although for its content this testimonium would logically belong to the first group of the present collection (indeed, it concerns the ‘fortune’ of Anaxagoras in Euripides’ dramas), I have decided to include it among the ‘theological’ testimonia because of its strong link to the following testimonium (T14).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 357

20 ἀλ]λοτρίοις > τό]ποις ταπεινού]μενος· ἐτίμ]α δὲ τὸν Ἀνα]ξαγόραν, 25 δαιμ]ονίως ποι]ή σας φυσικὰ ἔπη, ἀλ]λὰ ]φαι29  ]ς 16 [καὶ ἐπ]ὶ  * (ἐπὶ] iam Hunt : ἐπ]ὶ  leg. Schorn) : [οὐκ ἐπὶ] Arrighetti, Leo sec. || 17 ἰ]δίοις leg. ac suppl. Hunt et cett. : ὁ]σίοις temptaverim e.g. || 18–20 suppl. Hunt || 21 τό]ποις * e.g. : ἔρ]γοις Hunt : ψό]γοις Arrighetti, Leo sec. : λό]γοις Funghi in app. crit. || 21–22 suppl. Hunt || 22–23 ἐ|[τίμ]α suppl. West : ἔ|[πειτ]α Hunt || 24–25 suppl. Hunt || 26–27 ποι]ή σας φυσι|[κὰ ἔπη leg. ac suppl. Funghi e.g. in app. crit. : ζηλώ]σ[ας] φυσι[ολογίαν Leo e.g. : ἠγά]σ[ατο] φυσι- Diels dub., sed spat. long. : ][] φυσι[ο|λογ- Arrighetti || 27–29 μα|[θητὴς δὴ] φαί|[νεται leg. ac suppl. Funghi e.g. in app. crit. : με]μα[θηκὼς κατα]φαί[νεται Leo e.g. || 29 το]ὺς vel τούτο]υς fort. supplere possis

(c. 15 lines and 1 word missing) and being proud of [his] (1 word missing) virtues, not humbling himself [when he was] in foreign places;45 furthermore he had esteem for Anaxagoras, skilfully composing physical [poetical verses], but (2 lines and other lines missing)

T14 Satyr. fr. 6 Schorn, Vit. Eur., POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III46

2nd cent. BC

Eds. Hunt (1912) 139–142; Leo (1912) 279; Arnim (1913) 3; Kumaniecki (1929) 46; H. Diels ap. DK, II, 12 [59 A 20c DK]; Arrighetti (1964) 47–49; Cantarella (1964) 34; 89–90 [fr. 10]; Parsons (1966) 179; Funghi (1989) 158–159; Diggle (1998) 169 [fr. IV]; Kannicht (2004) 2, 919–920 [TrGF V.2, inc. fab., fr. 912]; Schorn (2004) 92–94; Ch. Vassallo *. Cf. Gerstinger (1916) 57–58; Lanza (1966) 32 [test. 20c].

45 This is probably an allusion to the last period of Euripides’ life, which he spent at the Macedonian court. 46 TM 62717 = LDAB 3905 = MP3 1456 = CPF I.1*, 10, 2T [II] = 59 A 20c [II] DK.

358 

 Christian Vassallo

desunt versus 4 5 ₍₎][ α[₍₎]οφ[ κ[]οις, [ λ[]ς αμ[· “σο⌊ὶ τ⌋ῶι π⌊άν⌋10 των μεδ⌊έον⌋τι χλόην” π⌊ε⌋λανόν τε φέρ⌊ω⌋ Ζεὺς εἴ⌊θ’⌋ Ἅδης ̲ ̲ὀνομάζη ι. ” ἀ15 κριβῶς ὅλως περιείληφεν τὸν Ἀναξ[αγόρειον [διάκοσμον [][₍₎ 20  ̲ ̲τρισίν· περὶ [ὧν καὶ ἄλληι γ[έ πηι διαπορ[εῖ, τί πότ’ ἐστι τὸ προεστη25 κὸς τῶν οὐρανίων· “Ζεὺς ⌊εἴ⌋τ’ ἀνάγκ⌊η φύσεω⌋ς εἴτ⌊ε 29 [νοῦς βροτῶν⌋.” 6 Ξε]νοφ[αν- * e.g. (et minus prob. Ξε]νοφ[ων- possis) || 7 κ[ἀν θε]ίοις, [καὶ κτλ. cogitaverim : κ[ἀν τ]οῖς [Κρησὶ] Arnim : κ[ἀν τ]οῖς [ἑξῆς Cantarella || 7–8 ἄλ]|λη[ι ὡ]ς ἀμ[ηχανῶν vel ἀμ[ηχάνως et sim. cogitaverim : ἀπο]|λο[γο]ύμε[νος suppl. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff ap. Hunt, cui tamen hoc supplementum vest. min. congr. videtur : δ[ιὰ το]ῦ μέ[λους Arnim, vest. invit. : εὐ]|λα[βο] υμε[ν- Snell (λα[βο]υμε[ν- Schorn), MSS sec., vest. invit. || 9–14 Eur. fr. 912.1–3 TrGF (Kannicht), fragmentum e Clem. Al. Strom. 5.11.70.2 (= GCS 2.373.3 Stählin) traditum, quod ad Cretenses Valckenaer, Arnim et  al. referunt, ad Pirithoum autem Leo, Cantarella et al. (vid. Kannicht in app.  crit.) || 11 χλόην P, a Bergk (ap. Welcker) e MSS iam coniectum || 13 εἴ⌊θ’⌋ Ἅδης P ( add. Schorn) : εἴτ’ Ἀίδης lectio a Clem. Al. tradita || 14 ὀνομάζη ι P, verba poetae contrahens Satyrus Kannicht videtur (perp. ut Hunt [1912] 172 iam vid.) : ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις lectio a Clem. Al. tradita || 18–19 [διά]|κοσμον suppl. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff ap. Hunt || 19 fin. [ἔπ]ε σ[ι ([ἔπεσι iam Diels) vel [μέ]ρε[σι vel [λό]γο [ις vel [τό]πο[ις vel [ῥή]σε[σι et sim. possis : [ἐν Hunt, deinde Leo et Kumaniecki, sed spat. long. u.v. (cf. POxy. IX 1176, fr. 38, col. I = Eur. fr. 913 TrGF [Kannicht] = 59 A 20c [III] DK) || 20 περὶ [ὧν suppl. Carlini, qui post τρισίν interpungit, ap. Funghi : περι[όδοις Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (acc. Kumaniecki) ap. Hunt, cui tamen hoc supplementum

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 359

spat. long. videtur : περι[ιών Diels, deinde Arrighetti, sed supplementum vix prob. a Parsons putatur || 21–22 suppl. Hunt || 26–29 Eur. Tro. 886

(9 lines missing) [and elsewhere, as if he were puzzled, he (sc. Euripides) writes]: “To you, lord of the universe, I offer green shoots and libations, whether your name be Zeus or Hades.” He [sc. Euripides] encapsulated with exactness the cosmic order of Anaxagoras in three [poetic verses (?)]; [and] about these [things (sc. theological questions)] also in some other passages [of his tragedies] he is uncertain [sc. skeptical (?)], namely on what the [power] steering the celestial phenomena is, [as when he says]: “O Zeus, whether You be [the] Necessity of nature or [(the) Intelligence of mortals]” (some lines missing)

T15 Phld. De dis 1, PHerc. 26, col. 9b47

1st cent. BC

2

Eds. VH V (1865) 153–175: deest; Scott (1885): deest; Diels (1916–1917) I, 17; Ch. Vassallo *. δῶρα [ τὰς τῶ[ν , ἀλλὰ καὶ τρόπον τιν͙ὰ χ[₍₎ ἐνίο͙τε γὰρ Ἀναξ͙αγ͙ό͙ραν ἰδ[ 5 ἐκούφισεν τῆς παρ’ ἐκε[ίν- ὅλον ἐπισ{σ}τήσας, ἀλλὰ νο[]ν[ωσάμε͙ν͙ον͙ καθ’ ἡ[]νηδιον[ τερ[]γων []λλη[ 9 ]ητια[ 2 suppl. Diels || 3 τιν͙ὰ rest. Diels || 3–4 ἐνί]|ο͙τε suppl. et corr. Diels, sed et ὅτε legi potest e.g. || 4 Ἀναξ͙αγ͙ό͙ραν rest. Diels || fin. ἰδ[ὼν εὑρετὴν suppl. Diels, sed et ἰδ[ε- vel ἰδ[ι- possis e.g. || 5 ἐκε[ίνου μάχης, Diels || 6 ἐπισ{σ}τήσας restituerim : ἐπισστήσας Diels || 6–7 ἀλλὰ νο[]ν[]|ωσάμε͙ν͙ον͙ καθ’ ἡ[]νηδιον[ legerim : ἄλλ’ ἄλ͙λ͙ω͙ν [ἰ]δ̣ι̣|ωσάμε͙ν͙ον͙ καθ’ ἡ[μ]ῶ͙ν͙ Διον[ύσιον rest. Diels || 7–9 ἐ]|τερ[οίων λό]γων π̣[αρ’] ἄ̣λλη[λα συμμη|ρύσασθαι ταπ]ήτια suppl. Diels

47 TM 62382 = LDAB 3547 = CatPErc, 68–69 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 12 = deest ap. DK.

360 

 Christian Vassallo

(some lines missing?48) gifts (c. 3–4 words missing) the (1 word missing) of the (c. 2 words missing), but also in some way (1 word missing) since sometimes [this man49], having seen [sc. emulated (?)] Anaxagoras (1 word missing), relieved (i.e. raved?)50 in establishing (?) everything of (1 word missing) from him [sc. Anaxagoras (?)], but (c. 1–2 words missing) for [us (?)] (c. 2–3 words, 2 lines, and other lines missing)

T16 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 320 (olim fr. 9)51

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 II (1863) 1–22: 4; Gomperz (1866) 66; Schober (1988) 112; H. Diels ap. DG, 532; H. Diels ap. DK, II, 19 [59 A 48 (IV) DK]; Vassallo (2018a) 112–113. desunt versus fere 19 20 ₍₎]ενδε[₍₎ κ]οσμουσ[₍₎ ]ενειρ[₍₎ ], καὶ κίν[η]σ[ιν, τοῦ ν]οῦ διακο[σμ]ήσαν25  τος, ἀὶ {ν} γεγονέναι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ὶ ἔσ]εσ-

48 Unlike H. Diels, in my edition I do not take it for granted that the first line of the Oxonian apograph transmits the original first line of the column. The state of preservation of the column in O does not allow such a deduction. On the other hand, even if Diels’ supposition were true – namely, that this column (which Diels considered a ‘sovrapposto’) was a continuation of the beginning of col. 9 (which is preserved only in N) – we lack any textual element to demonstrate that O, col. 9b would begin with the first line of the original column. 49 Diels (1916–1917) I, 17 app. crit. hypothesizes that the subject of ἐκούφισεν was the alleged Epicurean identified as the opponent of the Stoic Dionysius of Cyrene in col. 9a.24. But in my view, if one understands the verb κουφίζω as to rave, its subject could also be the supposed Stoic philosopher. 50 Diels (1916–1917) I, 17 app. crit. notes that in this case the verb κουφίζω is intransitive, as in Phld. De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, col. 36.29–30 Henry. On the other uses of this verb in Epicurus and Philodemus, see GE, 391 and Vooijs/Van Krevelen (1934–1941) I, 175. 51 = TM 62400 = LDAB 3563 = CatPErc, 325–328 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 20 = 59 A 48 [IV] DK (cf. DG, 532; etiam 59 B 12 DK) = Lanza (1966) 96–97 = Curd (2007) 102 = deest ap. Sider (20052). On the bibliological reconstruction of PHerc. 1428, which allowed the replacement of several ‘sovrapposti’ and ‘sottoposti,’ I would refer to Vassallo (2017a) and (2018a).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 361

θ]αι· καὶ πάντ[ω]ν ἄρχε]ιν καὶ κρατεῖ ν καὶ νο]ῦν ἄπειρα ὄντα 30 με]μειγμένα τὰ σύμ31 παντα διακοσμῆ- || [σαι 20–24 primum dispexi || 20–21 τοὺς | κ]όσμους [ἀπείρους * e.g. (cf. 59 B 4 DK): δια|κ]οσμουσ[Sedley e.g. || 22 ἐνειρ[γάσατο (sc. νοῦς) Sider (cf. Philo Mech. Belop. 68.41) || 23 καὶ κίν[η]σ[ιν suppl. Sedley || [τοῦ * || 24–25 suppl. Sedley || 25 ἀὶ {ν} rest. Sedley : διακο[σμ]η σάν|των leg. ac suppl. Fleischer : ά{ι}ν cogitavi : νο]ῦν Gomperz dub. in app. (cf. Lanza [1966] 97 n.) : θε]ὸν Diels ap. DK || 26 suppl. Gomperz || 26–27 ἔσ]εσ|[θα]ι Gomperz || 27 πάντ[ων] Gomperz || 27–28 ἄρ|[χειν] Gomperz || 29 suppl. Gomperz : ἃ ν]ῦν prop. Messeri e.g. || ἄπειρα ὄντα P (ἄπειρον ὄντα corr. Diels ap. DG in app.) || 30 με]μειγμένα suppl. Schober : τὰ μείγμ⟦εν⟧ατα Gomperz || 31 sq. διακοσμῆ||[σαι suppl. Gomperz (cf. 59 B 12 DK)

(c. 20 lines missing) [the countless worlds vel arranging an order] (1 line and c. 1–2 words missing), and [he (sc. Anaxagoras) maintains that] it was because of the Mind imposing order [upon the universe] that motion always has been and is and will be. And [he further says that] Mind rules and governs all things, and [that] it arranged the sum total of all things, mixed together (continues on)

T17 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 321 (olim fr. 10)52

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 II (1863) 1–22: 4; Sauppe (1864) 6; Gomperz (1866) 66; Philippson (1920) 366; Schober (1988) 113; H. Diels ap. DK, I, 104 [14 A 17 (I) DK]; Vassallo (2018a) 114–115.

14

desunt versus fere 11 ][ κινη [₍₎ ἀσ]εβὴ[ς  desunt versus 9 λκ[

52 = TM 62400 = LDAB 3563 = CatPErc, 325–328 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH II 10 (err. corr.); IV 20bis (addend.); XXXV 168 = 14 A 17 [I] DK (cf. DG, 533) = Pythag. test. 17 Timpanaro Cardini.

362 

 Christian Vassallo

25  ̲ θ ̲ εωρεῖτα[ι· φαίνεται οὖν τοὺ[ς θεοὺς ἀνασκευάζ[ειν. Πυ θαγόρου δ’ αὐτοῦ γ’ οὐδέν φασί τινε[ς 30 εἶναι τῶν ἀναφ͙[ε31 ρομένων παρὰ [₍₎ 12–14; 24 primum dispexi || 12–13 ἀ]|κινη [τ- vel κινη [τ- vel κινη [σ- supplere possis || 13–14 * || 25–26 θεωρεῖτα[ι· φαίνε]|ται suppl. Schober, Philippson sec. (θεωρεῖτ[αι iam Gomperz) || 26–27 τοὺ[ς θεοὺς ἀ]|νασκευάζ[ειν * (ἀ]|νασκευάζ[ειν iam Philippson) : τὸ [θεῖον ἀ]|νασκευάζ[ων Schober ([θεῖον iam Philippson) : ἀ]|νασκευάζ- Gomperz : ἀνασκευάζ[ει Sauppe || 27–28 Πυ]|θαγόρου suppl. Sauppe et al. || 28 fin. γ’ leg. Schober : γ[ε Gomperz dub. : [μεν Sauppe || 29 τινε[ς suppl. Sauppe et al. || 30–31 ἀνα[φε|ρ]ομένων Sauppe || 31 sq. παρὰ [τῶν || μαθητῶν εἰς αὐτόν suppl. Schober : παρὰ Diels (14 A 17 [I] DK) dub. (cf. etiam 14 A 17 [II]–19 DK)

(c. 12 lines missing) [devoid of vel in)] motion [sc. God (?)] (c. 1–2 words missing) [he (sc. Anaxagoras?) is] impious (c. 2–3 words and 10 lines missing) is considered/observed. Therefore, he [sc. Anaxagoras (?)] gives the impression of eliminating the gods. Then, as for Pythagoras, some people say that he himself is not the author of any of the works ascribed to him by [his pupils (?)] (continues on)

V Ethica T18 Auctor inc. [Enchirid. de elocutione], POxy. VII 1012, fr. 653

3rd cent. AD in.

Eds. Hunt (1910) 87–88 [fr. B (6), col. I]; Fanan (1989) 152–153; Ch. Vassallo *. Cf. Giannantoni (1958) 315 [Aristipp. fr. 176]; Mannebach (1961) 40 [Aristipp. fr. 159 B]; Fanan (1977) 214; 235–236; G. Giannantoni ap. SSR II, 77 [Aristipp. SSR IV A 176]; Erbì (2006) 127–157.

53 TM 64229 = LDAB 5448 = MP3 2289 = CPF I.1*, 10, 1T = deest ap. DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 363

desunt versus fere 4254 ₍₎]ους ἐχ[₍₎ ₍₎ οὐ κατὰ δ]⸌ό⸍ξα[ν] γι[γνώ45 σκειν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀλήθεια]ν, καὶ περινo₍₎] κατὰ τὸν βίον θεωρητικὸν εἰ]δ[έ]ναι λέγοντες ὡς Ἀναξαγό]ρας ὁ Κ[λ]αζ ομέ[ ̲ ]̲ νιος· τοῦ δὲ παντὸς κο]ι⟦ι⟧νὴν ὕλην 50 ₍₎ ε]ἶναι θεῖ⸌ο⸍ν ὡ[ς [ ̲ ]̲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐδόκο]υν· οἱ δὲ [][₍₎ ₍₎ τοὺς] θεοὺς ὄντα[ς, μήτ’ ἀλγεῖν μήτε πο]νεῖν ὡς Ἐπί[ ̲ ]̲ κουρος ὁ Σάμιος· τὴν δ᾽] ἡδονὴν ⸌τὸ⸍ τέλος 55  τοῦ βίου εἶναι λ]έγοντες ὡς Ἀρίστιπ- || [πος ὁ Κυρηναῖος 43–44 τ]οὺς ἔχ[ον|τας * e.g. || 44 οὐ κατὰ δ]⸌ό⸍ξα[ν] * e.g. (δ]οξα[] iam Hunt), et δ]⸌ο⸍ξη[ legi potest : ἔδο]ξε[ν] et sim. Fanan in app. crit. || 44–45 γι[γνώ|σκειν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀλήθεια]ν proposuerim e.g. : ἐν τῷ ζητεῖ]ν Fanan in app. crit. || 45–46 περὶ νο|ήσεως vel περὶ νό|ου (vel νο) vel περινό|[ησιν (vel περινο|[ήσει) cogitaverim : περινο|[εῖν Fanan e.g. in app. crit., conl. Epicur. De nat. 11, PHerc. 1042, col. 2a.4 Sedley et Plot. Enn. 4.8 (6).7.28 || 47 θεωρητικὸν] prop. Fanan dub. in app. crit. || εἰ]δ[έ]ναι * e.g. (fort. et συν]ε[ῖ]ναι possis) : ε[ἶ]ναι Fanan, Hunt sec. || 48–49 ὡς Ἀναξαγό]ρας ὁ Κ[λ]αζομέ|[νιος leg. ac suppl. Fanan : ]ρας ο κ[ω]λυομε perp. leg. Hunt || 49 τοῦ δὲ παντὸς κο]ι⟦ι⟧νὴν * e.g. (et τοῦ δὲ κόσμου κτλ.] cogitavi : ἀνθρω]πίνην Fanan e.g. in app. crit., conl. Orig. C. Cels. 3.25 || 50 ε]ἶναι suppl. Fanan, Hunt sec. : ] ἵνα ἰπεῖν (lege εἰπεῖν) [ Sider dub. || addidi || ὡ[ς * || 51 οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐδόκο]υν * e.g., cf. Zen. SVF I 87 [3–4]; Chrysipp. SVF II 305–306 || 51–52 ν[ο]ή μ[α|τι ὁμοίους τοὺς] * e.g. || 52 fin. ὄντα[ς suppl. Hunt et Fanan, quae et ἰσο]θέους ὄντα[ς prop. in app. crit., conl. Epicur. Ep. ad matr. fr. [72.33] Arr.2 (= Diog. Oen. frs. 125–126 Smith) et Clem. Al. Strom. 2.21.127 || 53 μήτ’ ἀλγεῖν μήτε πο]νεῖν * e.g., cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 123–124; 131; RS I : μὴ ἀλγ]εῖν Fanan e.g. in app. crit., quae et ὑπάρχ]ειν, νομίζ]ειν et sim. prop. || 53–54

54 This figure is inferable in a stochastic way, by rounding off the result of the subtraction of the 13 lines of fr. 6, which only preserves the inferior margin, to the 56 lines of fr. C (fr. 9), col. II Hunt, which preserves instead both the superior and the inferior margin. The average length of the lines of the papyrus is always inferable by a comparison with the other, better preserved columns, when it comprises ca. 23/24 letters. But, as Fanan (1989) 153 observes, “la ricostruzione dell’ampiezza della colonna sulla base del confronto con le colonne integrate del papiro è suscettibile di variazioni sensibili: il numero di lettere per rigo oscilla fra 20 e 27.” In fr. 6, l. 55 is the longest (the last two letters clearly occupy the intercolumnium, which here measures on average 1,5 cm). Unfortunately, more than half of the left part of the lines has been lost. In the passage that transitions from one doxographical section to another ([Eleatics]/Anaxagoras → Stoics → Epicurus → Aristippus), it is possible that the scribe used the paragraphoi that were probably present at the beginning of ll. 49, 51, and 54.

364 

 Christian Vassallo

Ἐπί|[κουρος suppl. Fanan, Hunt dub. sec. || ὁ Σάμιος· τὴν δ᾽] * : ἄλλοι δὲ (τὴν)] Fanan e.g. in app. crit. || 55 τοῦ βίου] * (βίου] iam Fanan e.g. in app. crit.) || εἶναι λ]έγοντες suppl. Fanan, Hunt sec. || Ἀρίστιπ||[πος ὁ Κυρηναῖος * (Ἀρίστιπ||[πος iam Fanan)

(c. 42 lines and 2–3 words missing) [those who have (?)] (c. 1–2 words missing) know [not according to] opinion[, but according to] truth, and saying, with regard [to the thought/the Intellect (?)] (c. 1–2 words missing), that they know according to the [contemplative] life, as Anaxagoras of Clazomenae [maintained]; [or saying] that the55 divine, as [the Stoics believed], was [the] common matter [of the universe] (c. 2–3 words missing); then the (c. 2–3 words missing) [says that the] gods are [and they neither suffer or] strain themselves, as Epicurus [of Samos thought; or that] pleasure [is] the aim [of life], as Aristippus [of Cyrene maintained] (continues on)

T19 Phld. De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, col. 1756

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH1 IX (1848) xiii–48: 47 (= 59) [fragm. tab. III (this only reproduces the engraving by V. Orsini, from the ‘disegno’ by G. Casanova, without any edition or red supplements)]; G. Parascandolo (and A. A. Scotti), [trascription and interpretation of PHerc. 1050], in: AOP Ba XXIII/fasc. XXI, cc. 158–159: 158; Mekler (1885) 323–325; Arnim (1888) 371–373; Hayter (1891) = Scott (1885) app., III–XLI: XIX [fr. 7]; Henry (2009) 38–41; Ch. Vassallo *. Cf. Delattre (2011).

5

] τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ || σ[ώματ]ος χωρισμ[ού]ς, ὥστε τὸ τὴ[ν] ταχίσ[την τ]οῦτο συμβαίνειν αἱρετὸν ὑ̲ ̲πάρ[χει]ν. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνό γε χαρίεν ὑμ[ῶν λ]έγ⸌ε⸍ιν, ὅτι διὰ ταῦτ’ οὐχ αἱρε[τ]ὸν νέους τε[λ]ευτᾶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ συν[αποίσον[ται] τῶν ἐν τῶι ζῆν κακῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἀπα[λλ]αγήσονθ’ ὡς ἔοικε θᾶττ[ο]ν ἐλθόντε[ς πρ]ὸς τοὺς κολαστὰς καὶ τῶν ̲ ̲κακῶν ἀ[πα]λλακτάς, εἴ τ’ ἔνιοι τοῦτο

55  The addition of in the text is certainly debatable, although it could be well justified on the philosophical level. As D. Sider has pointed out to me per litteras, θεῖ⸌ο⸍ν could also be a predicate. 56 = TM 62444 = LDAB 3617 = CatPErc, 243–246 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH IV 19 = deest ap. DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 365

10

μὴ πείσο[ντ]αι, τί διοίσει ν⟦θ⟧έους ἢ πρεσβύτας α[ὐτοὺς τε]λευτᾶν; ὅσοι δὲ πείσονται, τί ἂ[ν ἐρωτ]ώημεν ὁπ[ηλί]κοι ποτ’ ὄ[ντες ἐγλεί]ποιεν; ῥα[θυμο]τερα γὰρ ὡσ[₍₎ ἡ τῶν] κακῶν [ἀφ]α[ί]ρεσις εκ[₍₎ 15 ται τῆς ψυχ[ῆς ἐπ]ανορθω[θείσ]ης ἐνθα[ ], ὡς δ’ ἔ[γ]ωγε φήσ[αι]μ’ ἄ[ν ἀ]π͙ὸ τού[του πρὸς Ἀναξαγ[όρ]αν, ἀπα[λλ]αγ[έ]ντες β[ίου δη[]εχνασα[]μαθεῖν ητ[₍₎]ντει[₍₎ ]ε[₍₎]τ[₍₎]ροστ[][][₍₎ 20 ]τησ[]μ[₍₎] γὰρ δ[₍₎ ]κω[₍₎][₍₎]οντος α[₍₎]σησ[₍₎ ]σ[]ηρω[₍₎]μεν[₍₎]αγ[₍₎ ₍₎]ην[]οπ[₍₎]ενομ[]θα[ ₍₎]ανη[₍₎]εις 25 ]προσ[]τιανε[ ]τ[₍₎] Ἀναξ[₍₎]ον[][₍₎ ]δυσφορουμε[₍₎]την[][]νε[  Ἀναξαγόρας τιτο[]ι[₍₎ [₍₎]δ[₍₎]φεσεντατη[₍₎]ος λ[ 30 ]ς ἀλλου[] περιτ[][]ου νεφη[]οφου [₍₎] ὥσπερ κ͙[αὶ ὑ]μεῖς. λέγω[μεν ] ἡμεῖς ἰ̲ ̲δίως περὶ τοῦ [δυναμένου πρ]οκ[ό]ψα[ι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν [₍₎]σθαι δ[ι35 ότι φυσικ[ὸν] μὲν τ[ὸ] νύττεσθαι τὸν τοι̲ ̲ο[ῦ]τον· ἐπ[εὶ δ’] ἄλλο[ι]ς εὐλογίαν παραδ[ι]δοὺς τοῦ [καλῶ]ς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν προκόψειν [₍₎] θαυμαστόν, ἀεὶ ἀ39  γαθὸ[ν  πο]λὺ μείζονα [₍₎ 1 σώματ]ος Mekler || χωρισμ[ού]ς Mekler || τὴ[ν] Hayter || 1–2 τα|χίσ[την suppl. Hayter || 2 τ]οῦτο suppl. Mekler || 2–3 suppl. Hayter || 4 ὑμ[ῶν suppl. Henry: ὑμ[ῖν Hayter, cett. id. || 5 suppl. Mekler || 5–6 suppl. Hayter || 7 ἀπα[λλ]αγήσονθ’ Hayter || θᾶττ[ο]ν Hayter || 8 ἐλθόντε[ς suppl. Hayter || πρ]ὸς Mekler || 9 fere suppl. Parascandolo (απαλλατας) || 10–12 suppl. Mekler || 13 ὄ[ντες suppl. Mekler, cett. Henry (qui ῥαθ[υμο]τερα leg.) || 14 * || init. ὡς vel ὥσ[τε legi potest || 15 ψυχ[ῆς suppl. Mekler, qui tamen solum duas litt. in lac. inser. || ἐπ]ανορθω[θείσ]ης suppl. Henry in app. crit. : ἀνορθω[θείσ]ης Mekler || fin. ἔνθα [ vel ἐν θα[- legi potest (ἐν θα[νάτωι] suppl. Mekler) || 16 ἔ[γ]ωγε φήσ[αιμ’ ἄν, Henry || fin. ἀ]π͙ὸ τού[του restitui : αὐ]τὸ τοῦ[το prop. Henry in app. crit. || 17 Ἀναξαγ[όρ]αν suppl. Mekler || ἀπα[λλαγέν]τες Henry || addidi || β[ίου suppl. Henry in app. crit. || 26 Ἀναξ[αγόρ- seu Ἀναξ[αγόρει]ον suppleverim

366 

 Christian Vassallo

(et Ἀναξ[ίμανδρ]ον vel Ἀναξ[ιμέν- vel Ἀναξ[αρχ- possis) : θ]ανατ[- perp. Henry || 30 ἀλλ’ οὐ[χὶ] leg. ac suppl. Arnim || περιτ[ιθ- vel περιτ[ρ- et sim. Possis : περὶ τ[ῆ]ς αἰτίας suppl., sed perp. leg. Henry, Arnim sec. || fin. []ου legi : τοῦ λό]γου leg. ac suppl. Arnim, vest. min. congr. || 31 init. νέφη φιλο[σ]όφου temptaverim e.g. : ὃ]ν ἔφη[σε, τοῦ σ]οφοῦ διέμα[θ]εν Arnim, spat. et vest. invit. || fin. κ͙[αὶ restitui || 32 ὑ]μεῖς. λέγω[μεν suppl. Henry : ἡ|[μ]εῖς, [ὁ] λέγω[ν Arnim || το]ιγαρο[ῦν] suppl., sed perp. leg. Henry : οὔτ]ι παρ’ ὅ[περ] perp. Arnim || 33 [δυναμένου πρ]οκ[ό]ψα[ι * : δυν]άμενον π[ροκό]ψ[αι Henry vest. invit. : παρ]αμένοντ[α προκό]ψ[αι Arnim vest. item invit. || 34 ἐ]ξ͙αρπάζεσθαι suppl., sed perp. leg. Henry || 34–35 δ[ι]|ότι suppl. Henry || 35 suppl. Mekler || 35–36 τοι|ο[ῦ]τον suppl. Mekler || 36 ἐπ[εὶ suppl. Henry || δ’] Arnim || ἄλλο[ι]ς Mekler || 36–37 παρα|δ[ι]δοὺς suppl. Mekler || 37 [καλῶ]ς * e.g. : [φυσικῶ]ς Mekler : [ὁμοίω]ς Arnim : [πάντω]ς Asmis ap. Henry : [πάντα]ς Henry in app. crit. || 38 [ὁμοίως] suppl. Henry in app. crit. : [βεβίωκε] Arnim (utraque supplementa fort. spat. brev.) || 38–39 ἀ|γαθὸ[ν suppl. Henry in app. crit. : ἀ|γαθο[ῖς Arnim || 39 πο]λὺ suppl. Arnim, qui et ἐντυχῶν] explev. || μείζονα [₍₎ legi : μεῖζο[ν Henry in app. crit. : μείζο[σι Arnim

(c. 2–3 words missing) the separations from the body, so that for this to come about by the quickest [means] is choiceworthy. Moreover, that [claim] of yours is not a pretty thing to say either, [namely] that for these reasons it is not choiceworthy for young men to die, since they will take away with them many of the bad things in life: for indeed they will be liberated – as it seems – more quickly on coming to the chastisers and liberators from bad things, and if some will not undergo this, what difference will it make whether [they] die young or as old men? And as for all those who will undergo it, why should we ask how old they happen to be when they [die]? For with more equanimity (?) like (?) (1 word missing) [the] removal of [the] bad things (1 word missing) the soul having been corrected then [in death (?)] (1 word missing), but as I myself would say from this fact to/against Anaxagoras, they [sc. the dead men] having been released from life (c. 2–3 words missing) learn (?) (c. 2–3 words, 1 lines and c. 2–3 words missing) as a matter of fact/because (c.  2–3 words, 5 lines, and c. 2–3 words missing) Anaxagorean/Anaxagoras (?) (c.  1–2 words missing) vexed (c. 4–5 words missing) Anaxagoras (c. 2–3 words, 1 line, and 1 word missing) other/but not about (?) (c. 2–3 words missing) clouds of a philosopher (?)57 (1 word missing) just like you. Let us then for our part say (1 word missing) specifically concerning the case of one who is snatched away (?) [sc. from life to death] when [capable] of progressing in philosophy, that it is natural for such a person to be stung; [but] since he transmits to others the plausibility of [the notion that] they will progress in philosophy (c. 1–2 words missing) wonderful, always good (c. 1–2 words missing) much greater (1 word missing)58

57 Cf. comm. ad loc. 58 Transl. by Henry (2009) 39 and 41, with some changes and additions based on my new readings.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 367

VI Spuria vel dubia T20 Didym. Comm. in Ps. 34.17, PTura V 222.2759

6th–7th cent. AD

Eds. Gronewald (1968); Gronewald (1969) 380–383; Decleva Caizzi (1999) 668–670. ἐπερ[- - -]· πῶς λέγεις ὅτι οὐ νενόηκα; οὐ δίδωμι αὐτὸν | δίκαιον. – ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος νοήσῃ ὡς εἴρηται καὶ δῷ ἀυτὸν δίκαιον, ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. ἄκουε δέ, διὰ τί εἶπον |20 εἰς δόξαν ἑτέραν οἱ Πρωταγόρο⟦α⟧⸌υ⸍ – σοφιστὴς δὲ ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας· λέγει ὅτι τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔστιν. | [λ]έγει ὅτι· “φαίνομαι σοὶ τῷ παρόντι καθήμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀπόντι οὐ φαίνομαι καθήμενος, ἄδηλον εἰ κάθημαι | ἢ οὐ κάθημαι.” καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔστιν· οἷον ὁρῶ τὴν σελήνην, ἄλλος δὲ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ἄδη|λον εἰ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐμοὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι ἀντίλημψις γίνεται τοῦ μέλιτος ὅτι γλυκύ, ἄλλῳ δὲ ὅτι πικρόν, ἐὰν | πυρέττῃ· ἄδηλον οὖν εἰ πικρὸν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν. καὶ οὕτω τὴν ἀκαταλημψίαν θέλουσιν δογματίζειν. ἐὰν οὐν καὶ ἡμεῖς |25 λέγωμεν ὅτι· “ἐπεὶ οὐ φ[αίν]εταί μοι ποίῳ λογισμῷ εἴρηκεν, ἄδικον καὶ ἀσεβῆ{ν} αὐτὸν ἡγοῦμαι.” ἐὰν ἄλλῳ | φαίνηται οἵῳ λογισ[μῷ] εἴρηκεν, δίκαιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς ἐκείνῳ φαίνεται. καὶ ἄλλος πάλιν οὐδὲ ἐπιστάνει τοῖς | εἰρημένοις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ εὐσεβὴς οὐδὲ ἀσεβής ἐστιν, καὶ εἰς τὴν αγόρειαν ἐμπίπτομεν δόξαν. | ἴδωμεν οὖν· δεῖ πρῶτον νοεῖν τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὕτως ἢ κρίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ κρίνεσθαι. ὁ μὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς |29 μηδὲ ὑγιαίνειν εἰρηκώς, ποίαν λέγει διάνοιαν τῶν λέξεων; 21 suppl. Gronewald || 25–26 suppl. Gronewald

In what sense do you say that I have understood? I do not consider it right. – If one understands what has been said and considers it just, he is both just and unjust. But listen [to the arguments] through which the followers of Protagoras expounded a different opinion – Protagoras was a sophist; he says that for the things that exist, being lies in appearance. He says: “to you, inasmuch you are present, I appear to be seated; but to the one who is absent, I do not appear to be seated, it is uncertain whether I am seated or not.” And they say that all things lie in appearance; for example, I see the moon, another does not see [it]: it is uncertain whether it exists or not. As I am healthy, I have the perception of honey as sweet, but he who is feverish [perceives it] as bitter; therefore it is uncertain whether it 59 TM 59674 = LDAB 776 = Van Haelst 0644 = CPF I.1*, 10, 4T (?) = CPF I.1***, 88, 3T = deest ap. DK.

368 

 Christian Vassallo

is bitter or sweet. And in this way they intend to lay down the doctrine of the inability to comprehend. Therefore, if we too were to say: “since it is unclear to me on the basis of what reasoning he spoke, I consider him unjust and impious”; if to another it is clear on the basis of what reasoning he spoke, he appears to him just and pious; and another in turn does not care for his words, [and for this reason for him] he is neither pious or impious; so we fall into the opinion of Protagoras. Therefore, we have to be careful: one must first of all understand things and in this way whether to judge or not to judge. He who said that he speaks incorrectly and that he is not healthy, what meaning does he give to [his] words? (continues on)

T21 [Phld.] [Philosoph. hist. (?)], PHerc. 1788, col. 8 (olim fr. 1)60

1st cent. BC

Eds. VH2 II (1863), 58–62: 58; Crönert (1906) 147; H. Diels ap. DK, II, 80 [67 B 1a DK]; 133 [68 B 4b DK]; Vassallo (2017b) 30–31.  γ]ράφων [ὅτι “ τ]αῦτα πρότε[ρον εἴρηται ἐν] τῶι Με[γ]άλω[ι διακόσμω]ι,” ὅν φασιν εἶνα[ι 5 Λευκίππου]. καὶ []οιουτο τὸ τῶν ἄλλ]ων διοποιούμενος ₍₎] ο͙ὐ μόνον ἐν τῶ[ι  δι]ακόσμωι τιθεὶ[ς 9 ]με[ 1 suppl. Crönert || 2 τ]αῦτα * : τὰ] αὐτὰ Crönert || πρότε[ρον suppl. Crönert || 3 εἴρηται ἐν] suppl. Diels : ἐρρήθη ἐν] Crönert || Με[γ]άλω[ι suppl. Crönert || 4 suppl. Crönert || 5 Λευκίππου] suppl. Crönert (rec. Diels) || fin. καὶ []οιουτο * (τ]οιοῦτο possis) : κἀπ[ὶ] το[σ]οῦτο Crönert || 6 rest. Crönert || 7 ο͙ὐ restitui : ἐλέγχετ’ ο]ὐ Crönert || τῶ[ι suppl. Crönert || 8 Μικρῶι δι]ακόσμωι suppl. Crönert : πάντων δι]ακόσμωι et supplere possis || τιθεὶ[ς Crönert || 9 ἃ κἀν τῶι] Με[γάλωι κεῖται suppl. e.g. Diels

(c. 1–2 words missing) writing [sc. Democritus]: “(1 word missing) these things have been said before in the Great [World­System,” a work] that they say was 60 = TM 62400 = LDAB 3563 = CatPErc, 394–395 (cf. Chartes) = IPPH X 55 = 68 B 4b DK (= deest ap. Luria [2007]); IPPH XXIII 110 (= 67 B 1a DK); Anaxag., deest ap. IPPH et DK.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 369

[actually] by Leucippus. And (c. 1–2 words missing) plagiarizing [sc. Democritus vel Anaxagoras (?)] what is [sc. the theories] [of the] others [and] putting/referring (c. 1–2 words missing) not only in the [Little] World­System61 (vel in the cosmic order [of the universe])62 (1 line and other lines missing)

2 In search of a historical context for Anaxagoras’ life and philosophy The chronology of Anaxagoras’ biography poses an outright brain teaser. The sources and the numerous interpretations of them provided by scholars are often in disagreement. The passage of Book 2 of Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives devoted to this topic stands out as paradigmatic:63 this passage combines at least four different sources. In order to smooth over the chronological contradictions, scholars have tried on several occasions to give the Laërtian text homogeneity and logical coherence. Here I provide the text as it has been established by Tiziano Dorandi, along with a series of textual notes that, in addition to the sources, offer a survey of the several emendations proposed in the last few decades. λέγεταιa) δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου διάβασινb) εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι, βεβιωκέναι δὲ ἑβδομήκοντα δύο. φησὶ δ’ Ἀπολλόδωροςc) ἐν τοῖς Χρονικοῖς γεγενῆσθαι αὐτὸν τῇ ἑβδομηκοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι,d) τεθνηκέναι δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς †ἑβδομηκοστῆς† ὀγδόης.e) ἤρξατο δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν Ἀθήνησιν ἐπὶ Καλλίουf) ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν ὤν,g) ὥς φησι Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺςh) ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀρχόντων ἀναγραφῇ, ἔνθα καί φασινi) αὐτὸν ἐτῶν διατρῖψαι τριάκοντα.l) Notes: a) Source A: anonymous. b) i.e. 480/479 BC. c) Source B: Apollod. FGrHist 244 F 31. d)  i.e. 500/496 BC. e) The text is corrupt. The emendation of ἑβδομηκοστῆς (BP) in ὀγδοηκοστῆς (rec.) is to be referred to Meursius, not to Scaliger (cf. Mansfeld [1979] 41 n. 4). The cruces were already used by F. Jacoby and, according to P. von der Mühll, the mistake already occurred in the text of Diogenes Laërtius (cf. Dorandi [2013] 153, app. crit.). It is clear enough, however, that the reference is to the first year of the eightieth Olympiad, viz. 428 BC. Cf. Mansfeld (1990a) 306, who maintains that Meursius’ conjecture ὀγδοηκοστῆς is unavoidable also in light of Hippol. Haer. 1.8.13 (= 59 A 42 DK), where the numeral adjective is correctly preserved. f) Καλλίου is the lectio of MSS BP (Callias’ archonship dates back to 456 BC). The correction Καλλιου, already proposed

61 The translation would be such if we chose the supplement Μικρῶι δι]ακόσμωι at l. 8 (in this case the testimonium would deepen the question of Democritus’ plagiarism). 62 One could translate so on the basis of the supplement πάντων δι]ακόσμωι at l. 8 (in this case there would be a reference to Anaxagoras’ plagiarism). 63 Diog. Laërt. 2.7.

370 

 Christian Vassallo

by Meursius (1622) II, 67–68, was accepted by Derenne (1930) 30–31, who refers Ἀθήνησιν to the archonship of Calliades (480 BC) and not to the philosophical activity of Anaxagoras, which in his view would began in Minor Asia rather than Athens (as already suggested by Diels [1876] 28; contra Mansfeld [1979] 48–51; on this point see Giannantoni [1992] 3604–3607). Most recently, also Banfi (1999) 24–31 has accepted the correction Καλλιου, but he has simultaneously pointed to 480 BC as the date both of Anaxagoras’ arrival in Athens and of the beginning of his philosophical teaching (cf. infra). g) ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν ὤν is the lectio of MSS BP. Diano (1973) 204, because of the chronological problems it raises, thought the expression should be eliminated. Mansfeld (1979) 41, instead, proposes integrating the text in this way: ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν ων. h) Source C (ap. B?): Demetr. Phal. fr. 94 SOD (= fr. 150 Wehrli). i) Source D: anonymous. l) τριάκοντα (BP) ed. Dorandi : πεντήκοντα ed. Marcovich. Following the alternative dating proposed by Mansfeld (1980) 87–88, Anaxagoras’ stay at Athens would have lasted not thirty, but twenty years (cf. infra).

He [sc. Anaxagoras] is said to have been twenty years old when Xerxes crossed over and to have lived seventy-two years. Apollodorus in his Chronology says that he was born in the 70th Olympiad and died in the first year of the 88th. He began to practice philosophy at Athens while Callias [sc. was archon], at the age of twenty, as Demetrius of Phaleron says in his List of Archons; they also say that he spent thirty years there.64 The only dates which can be inferred from this passage and on which the critics seem to agree65 are those of Anaxagoras’ birth and death. For everything else, and above all for the dates of his arrival in Athens and of his trial, a wide variety of hypotheses has been proposed. Because of the importance of chronology for better contextualizing the trial, I would like to briefly summarize the main points in this debate. On the basis of Apollodorus’ reliable account, Anaxagoras’ birth and death are dated to c. 500 and 428 BC, respectively. But the first problems occur with regard to the beginning of his philosophical career.66 One group of scholars thinks that it began when he was still in Asia Minor: some date the beginning to 480 BC;67 others, on the basis of the influence of Empedocles and

64 Transl. by EGPh VI.1, 8–9 (= P1) and 14–15 (= P11), with a few changes. 65 Unger (1884) 534 ff. backdated Anaxagoras’ birth to 534 BC, interpreting the γεγένηται of Apollodorus as “to emerge (floruit)” instead of “to be born.” In this way, Anaxagoras’ arrival in Athens would have occurred in 494, his death in 462/461. But this thesis, which was already criticized by E. Zeller, has remained isolated enough in the Forschungsgeschichte. 66 The expression ἤρξατο δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν in Diogenes Laërtius has generated various interpretations. In particular, it is debated whether the passage refers to the period in which Anaxagoras began to study or to teach philosophy. On this point, see Mansfeld (1979) 51–55, who opts for the second solution and considers Athens to be the place where the philosophical activity of Anaxagoras started (with clear consequences for the other chronological data). 67 Derenne (1930) 30 ff.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 371

Aeschylus’ Suppliants68 on his work, propose a period between 470 and 465 BC, suggesting that by this time Anaxagoras had already put his thought into writing.69 The question of his arrival in Athens is addressed by two main proposals: David Sider70 thinks that Anaxagoras, made famous by his writing, went to Athens (perhaps by the invitation of Pericles himself) in 465/464 BC and remained there for thirty years; in contrast, Jaap Mansfeld71 suggests that the Athenian stay should be postponed until 456/455 BC and that it lasted no more than twenty years.72 Finally, there is the most relevant question: the date of the trial and of Anaxagoras’ consequent flight to Lampsacus. Relying on the accounts by Ephorus (ap. Diodorus) and Plutarch, Eudore Derenne,73 along with the majority of scholars, dates the trial back to 433/432 or 432/431 BC, associating it with the ‘Megarian decree’ (c. 432 BC) issued not long before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; according to some scholars, it was one of the root causes of this war.74 Mansfeld,75 instead, has backdated the trial to 437/436 BC, setting it immediately after the ‘Diopeithes decree’: as suggested by the homonymous soothsayer, such a decree prescribed the death penalty for anyone who did not believe in the official gods of Athens. According to Mansfeld, it should be dated back not, as commonly supposed, to 432, but to 438/437 BC. To the chronological questions one can apply the papyrus testimonia on Anaxagoras’ life and works (T1–5) and those of ‘ethical’ nature that contribute in some way to better describing the personality of this Presocratic philosopher (T18–19). Below I provide a brief commentary on these testimonia.

68 Also in this case the papyrological tradition would play a decisive role. Thanks to POxy. XX 2256, fr. 3 Lobel, it has been possible to assign the Suppliants an earlier date, 463 BC. On this point, see A. Capizzi ap. Zeller/Mondolfo (1969) 455 n.; Stella (1994) 61–62. 69 Sider (20052) 11. 70 Sider (20052) 11. 71 Mansfeld (1979) 55–57. 72 Among other proposals, Banfi (1999) 31, who, however, dates the trial to c. 432, connects the arrival in Athens with the start of Anaxagoras’ philosophical activity in 480 BC. Taylor (1917) and Woodbury (1981) instead tend to limit Anaxagoras’ Athenian period to 480–450 BC, accepting in this case the amendment of the name Callias to Calliades in the Laërtian text. 73 Derenne (1930) 13–41, followed by Schachermeyer (1968) 55–89; Diano (1973) 206; Prandi (1977); Montuori (1984); and Schubert (1994) 103–137. 74 Actually, Thucydides (1.139–145) was notoriously reluctant in that decree to point out a single cause or even trigger for the war. 75 Mansfeld (1980) 84–89.

372 

 Christian Vassallo

T1. PDuke inv. G 178, cols. I–II transmits a list of scholarchs connected, but often in an incomplete and disordered manner, to the doxographical tradition concerning the philosophical ‘successions.’76 In the first column the list concerns only the Presocratics (all of whom are mentioned by their ethnicon). As William H. Willis and Tiziano Dorandi have already noted, the presence of Pherecydes of Syros in this list is also a surprise. Anaxagoras is mentioned immediately after the classical triad of the Milesians (Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes), and immediately before Archelaus, whom many sources say was his pupil.77 In the c. 16 missing lines of col. I, the sequence of the following philosophers most likely appeared: Zeno and Melissus, Pythagoras and his followers, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, the early Atomists (Leucippus and Democritus), and finally Socrates.78 Parmenides’ position immediately after Pherecydes is quite interesting. The author of this catalogue took into account a tradition of classification clearly different from that of Sotion,79 who considers Pythagoras the forefather of the ‘Italic’ line of the philosophical διαδοχαί, making him a direct pupil of Pherecydes. The sequence Anaximenes/Anaxagoras is perfectly in agreement with the discipleship of the latter in the school of the former, according to the attested tradition of the ‘Ionian’ line. Instead, the sequence Parmenides/ Diogenes of Apollonia deserves our attention. In Diogenes Laërtius, Diogenes of Apollonia’s life is placed between those of Protagoras and Anaxarchus, but the master assigned to him, viz. Anaximenes, belongs to the ‘Ionian’ line. As we know, Parmenides belongs to the ‘Italic’ line.80 In the opinion of André Laks (per litteras), the author of the catalogue in question has not confused the succession of philosophers, but is voluntary following a specific tradition that prefers to connect Diogenes of Apollonia’s monism to Parmenides’ One (as opposed to emphasizing the affinities of his physical system with that of Leucippus). It would be the “deuxième hétérodoxie de la liste, après celle concernant Phérécyde, et non moins intéressante qu’elle. Dance cas, Zénon et Mélissos auront sans doubte figuré dans la lacune qui suit la mention de Diogène.”81 76 As Otranto (2000) xxiii observes, it is a kind of index philosophorum very similar to that of Sen. Ep. 39.2. 77 Cf. Diog. Laërt. 2.16 (= 60 A 1 DK); Suda s.v. Ἀρχέλαος (= 60 A 2 DK); Porph. fr. 215 Smith (= Cyril. Adv. Iul. 6.186d = 60 A 3 [I] DK). 78 So Willis/Dorandi (1989) 83–84, who also point out the affinities of the catalogue by Ammon and that by Epiphanius (Adv. haeres. 3.2.9 = DG, 589–593). 79 ap. Diog. Laërt. 1.13. 80 Diog. Laërt. 9.57. In general, on the historiographical cliché concerning the division of early Greek philosophy into a ‘Ionian’ tradition founded by Thales and an ‘Italic’ one founded by Pythagoras, see Sassi (2011). 81 See also Laks (20082) 247–251.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 373

T2. Although it is full of gaps, this column allows us to restore the name of Anaxagoras with a good degree of confidence. The testimonium belongs to a Philodemean work of polemical nature. Although there is still no consensus on the question, PHerc. 1005/862 seems to transmit Book 1 of a work entitled Against Those that Proclaim Themselves Experts on the Books (Πρὸς τοὺς φασκοβυβλιακούς).82 The passage of interest to us refers to a letter by Epicurus concerning Anaxagoras’ books: it was, most probably, a request for works by those he considered to be the best philosophical authors and those most necessary for his own philosophical studies. Indeed, Diocles of Magnesia83 informs us that, despite the doctrinal polemics and the systematic disagreements (cf. T9–12), Anaxagoras, along with Archelaus, was Epicurus’ favorite philosopher (cf. also T3). If we take this context into account, the reading of the name of Pythagoras that I have cautiously proposed e.g. in the apparatus (l. 17) could testify to Epicurus’ (polemical?) interest in Pythagorean philosophy or the books produced by his School. Excerpta of this kind can also be read in the following frs. 110–111 Angeli of the same papyrus: from the first we can infer that Epicurus ordered his pupils to bring him a copy of Antisthenes’ Physics; from the second fragment we learn that Epicurus made similar requests for Aristippus’ On Socrates, Speusippus’ Praise of Plato, Aristotle’s Analitics and On Nature, and some books of Democritus. T3. We find here two Epicurean quotations by Philodemus.84 In the first quotation, Anaxagoras, along with Empedocles, is indicated as one of the authors most read and ‘frequented’ by the Atomist philosopher Nausiphanes of Teos. In this context, Nausiphanes is mentioned by Epicurus almost certainly for polemical

82 Cf. Del Mastro (2014) 185–187 and (2015). The title is restored in the subscriptio of PHerc. 1485, which contains a second copy of the text transmitted by PHerc. 1005/862 (Del Mastro [2014] 325). Puglia (2015) instead suggests the title Πρὸς τοὺς φαυλοβυβλιακούς. 83 ap. Diog. Laërt. 10.12 (= 59 A 26 DK). 84 According to Crönert (1906) 174, followed by H. Diels ap. DK, II, 247 n., they are excerpta of the alleged Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene by Epicurus. This view is also favored by Sedley (1976) 135–136, but with the precise distinction, already made by H. Usener, between the aforementioned Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene (Diog. Laërt. 10.6–8 = Epicur. frs. 112–113; 145 Us. = fr. [101] Arr.2; Sext. Emp. Math. 1.3–4 = Epicur. fr. 114 Us. = fr. [103] Arr.2) and the Letter on Occupations (Ath. 8.50.354b = Epicur. fr. 171 [I] Us. = fr. [102] Arr.2; Euseb. Praep. evang. 15.2 =  Aristocl. fr. 2 Chiesara = Epicur. fr. 171 [III] Us. = deest ap. Arr.2). W. Crönert, instead, considered these two texts to be one and the same. For a status quaestionis on this topic, see Angeli (1988) 241–251, who reaffirms Epicurus’ authorship of the two epistolary excerpta and considers the Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene one of the probable sources of these quotations (albeit not the only one).

374 

 Christian Vassallo

purposes. As we know, Nausiphanes had been the teacher of Epicurus in Teos, but later he disowned him, proclaiming himself to be self-taught.85 T4. Book 3 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric is transmitted in two copies: PHerc. 1426 and PHerc. 1506.86 In short, this book focuses on the relationship between rhetoric and politics. Philodemus seems to be saying that political skills do not depend on knowledge of the rhetorical art: for this reason, the politician must not necessarily be a rhetorician.87 The entire first part of the book is an extended polemical paraphrase by the Epicurean philosopher of Diogenes of Babylon’s thought concerning this topic.88 Within this context, PHerc. 1506, col. 21 hands down an interesting testimonium concerning Pericles’ attendance of the school of Anaxagoras and other philosophers (cf. 59 A 15 DK). By virtue of the anti-Stoic polemic of Philodemus, Anaxagoras’ philosophical activity is described in the light of its rhetorico-political consequences. From the paraphrase, it becomes clear that Diogenes of Babylon’s judgment on Pericles was rather positive simply because he followed Anaxagoras. In this way, Diogenes intended to show the close connection between rhetoric and philosophy. The point – Philodemus objects – is that Anaxagoras professed a philosophical thought totally different from Stoicism! T5. PHerc. 1104 (olim 1114) is one of the ‘scorze’ ascribed to PHerc. 1673/1007, which contains Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric.89 Although the context is full of gaps, the topic of fr. 7 seems to be the role of philosophy in the educational process. If used incorrectly, philosophy can lead to veiled forms of impiety. In this context, the case of Pericles, who was a pupil of Anaxagoras (and Damon: cf. 59 A 15 DK and T4; nevertheless, David Blank ap. Leonid Zhmud’s paper in 85 Cf. Diog. Laërt. 10.13 (= 75 A 8 DK = Epicur. fr. 123 Us. = fr. [48] Arr.2). 86 On the relationship between PHerc. 1426 and PHerc. 1506, see Cavallo (1983) 63–64 and (1984) 18–20; Dorandi (1990) 66–82; Blank (1998). Hammerstaedt (1992) 11–12 has definitively demonstrated that the two copies contain Book 3 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric. 87 For the papyrological questions and the content, I would refer to Hammerstaedt (1992). 88 As is well known, SVF III 210–243 draw fully from the Herculaneum papyri for reconstructing the testimonia on Diogenes of Babylon. Long passages from Philodemus’ On Music and On Rhetoric are quoted there. For the former treatise, we can now rely on the edition by D. Delattre. As regards On Rhetoric, von Arnim used above all the remains of the uncertain book transmitted by PHerc. 1004 and of Book 3, both of which have long been in need of a new comprehensive reconstruction. A new comprehensive edition of PHerc. 1004 by Graziano Ranocchia and myself is currently underway. 89 This book is handed down by two copies: PHerc. 1673/1007, which transmits it in its entirety, and PHerc. 1423, which, as the subscriptio shows, instead contains the first part of the book belonging to a ‘library edition’ in two tomes. For an updated survey on the ascription of the various ‘scorze’ to the two copies, I would refer to Fimiani (2012) 129–134.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 375

this volume does not agree with my supplement e.g. καὶ Δάμωνος] at l. 17), is mentioned as an example.90 The following reference to Pythagoras does not seem to be clear. T18. POxy. VII 1012 contains a treatise on rhetoric and stylistic technique.91 In fr. 6, however, a doxographical catalogue of ethical content can be read. In this catalogue, for each philosopher or philosophical school mentioned, the corresponding τέλος τοῦ βίου is given. On the grounds of the proposed reconstruction, at least four doxai can be detected: a) the first, which could be somehow referred to the Eleatic school as well (but this is only a working hypothesis), combines ethical and epistemological problems illustrating why the path of truth is to be preferred to that of opinion, and which take Anaxagoras as an example of a philosopher who identified the aim of contemplative life; b) the second doxa, along with the following one, links ethics and theology, referring to the Stoic materialistic conception of God; c) the third recalls the blessed conception of the gods theorized by Epicurus; d) finally, the fourth refers to Aristippus’ conception of pleasure as the distinctive aim of human life. T19. In this passage, Anaxagoras’ name is mentioned at least twice (ll. 17 and 28). According to W. Benjamin Henry, “the text is too fragmentary to allow any conjecture as to the context in which he was mentioned here.”92 But, in reality, what precedes the two quotations seems to be quite clear: death at a young age is in question, viz. its benefits or disadvantages in comparison to a death that occurs in old age. One could suppose that here Anaxagoras – quite apart from the theoretical and practical consequences of his philosophy for the conception of death – was called upon as the protagonist of certain anecdotes that confirmed his ethical adherence to the principles of his thought. For example, the story describing his impassive behavior after hearing the news of the death of his sons comes to mind, along with the supposed epitaph by which the citizens of Lampsacus remembered the suicide of the philosopher after his conviction for impiety.93

90 This testimonium concerning Anaxagoras (and Pythagoras) should be added to the other pieces of evidence collected in Vassallo (2015a). 91 For a summary of the themes of POxy. VII 1012, see Hunt (1910) 82. 92 Henry (2009) 39 n. 58. 93 Diog. Laërt. 2.13–15 (= 59 A 1 DK). Crönert (1906) 131–132 saw an echo of the first anecdote in PHerc. 1508, fr. 3.3 (most probably, part of Philodemus’ Survey of Philosophers); but on this point Cavalieri (2002) 46–47 is more cautious.

376 

 Christian Vassallo

3 On the trial for impiety The trial brought against Anaxagoras was the first judicial case of γραφὴ περὶ ἀσεβείας to take place in Athens. Almost all the condemnations for ‘atheism’ of which we have knowledge in antiquity fall (not by chance) within the brief period that extends from the date of Anaxagoras’ trial to the end of the 5th cent. BC: that is, within a few decades, during an epoch in which the cultural and political system of the poleis was slowly declining. In that period, the term ἀσεβής was connected not to the violation of religious dogma (a concept generally foreign to the Greeks), but to the lack of acknowledgement of the gods that institutionally, viz. politically, were a symbol of the city. The political nature of the trial against Anaxagoras emerges from several sources.94 It is not my intention to go through all these texts. I only wish to highlight some historical and ideological points that emerge from them, in order to better contextualize the two papyrological testimonia that (more or less directly) deal with this problem. (a) With regard to the historical background, there is no doubt that the most important source is Diodorus. Relying on Ephorus, Diodorus tries to explain the causes of the Peloponnesian War and says that Anaxagoras was falsely accused of impiety towards the gods. He further remarks that the trial was intended as an indirect attack on Pericles, insofar as Pericles was a pupil of the Presocratic philosopher.95 The witness, which sets the trial of Anaxagoras immediately after that of Phidias, points to the date 432 BC96 and strengthens the idea that the famous ‘Megarian decree’ was only an expedient to which Pericles resorted in order to divert the public opinion from the serious problems of internal opposition in this period. In ch. 32 of his Life of Peri­ cles, Plutarch essentially agrees with the reconstruction of Diodorus/Ephorus. In Plutarch as well, where the ‘Diopeithes decree’ is a valuable chronological reference point, the trial is considered an indirect attack against Pericles.97 (b) With regard to the judicial dynamics, one should take at least two other sources into 94 Diog. Laërt. 2.12–14 (= 59 A 1 DK; Sot. fr. 3 Wehrli; Satyr. Vit. Eur. fr. 16 Schorn = FHG III 163 F 14; Hermipp. FGrHistCont 1026 F 65; Hieron. Rhod. fr. 49 White = fr. 41 Wehrli = fr. 9 Hiller); Suda s.v. Ἀναξαγόρας (= 59 A 3 DK); Plut. Per. 32; Diod. Sic. 12.39 (= 59 A 17 DK); Plut. Nic. 23 (= 59 A 18 [I] DK); Joseph. Ap. 2.265; Olympiod. in Meteor. 17.19 Stüve (= 59 A 19 DK); Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 224, fr. 15 and PHerc. 245, fr. 7 (= 59 A 20 DK). On the two Herculanean testimonia, cf. infra. For an overview on this and the other ‘political’ trials in antiquity, cf. Derenne (1930) 223–237; Lanza (1966) xii–xiv, 10–13 n.; Dover (1976); Wallace (1994); O’Sullivan (1997); Piccirilli (2000) esp. 62–63; Gilardeau (2015) passim. 95 Diod. Sic. 12.39.2–3 (= 59 A 17 [II] DK). See supra, T4–5. 96 The side of the events given by Ephorus in Diodorus is chronologically dated during the archontate of Euthydemus (431 BC). 97 Plut. Per. 32.1–6 (= 59 A 17 [I] DK).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 377

account: first Sotion, who maintains that Anaxagoras’ prosecutor was Cleon and ἀσέβεια the only charge, arising from the Anaxagorean theory of the sun as a fiery mass;98 and secondly Satyrus, according to whom Anaxagoras, having been prosecuted by Thucydides, son of Melesias, was charged not only with ἀσέβεια, but also with μηδισμός, namely treacherous support of the Persians.99 As we know, both Cleon and Thucydides, son of Melesias, as prominent leaders of the conservative party, were Pericles’ main opponents after Cimon’s death (450 BC). Among the known sources, only Sotion speaks about the role of Cleon in Anaxagoras’ trial. By contrast (and contrary to what was maintained until a few years ago), no trace of Cleon is to be found in PHerc. 245, fr. 7 (T7), a ‘scorza’, viz. a piece of the outermost layer of PHerc. 1423.100 T7 is part of a long list of philosophers, all of whom were persecuted because of their ideas. Some scholars have maintained that here Philodemus – as he often does in this and other polemical treatises – is paraphrasing the writings of a rival philosopher: this hypothetical philosopher, who aims to show the superiority of rhetoric over philosophy, had drawn up a list of famous thinkers for whom philosophy was of no benefit in the dramatic circumstances of their death or exile.101 But this reading is not based on any incontrovertible textual elements and therefore needs to be further developed. In On Rhetoric, Philodemus often resorts to the example of the ban of the rhetoricians, not of the philosophers.102 The same occurs in Book 2 of that treatise103 and in the uncertain books from it transmitted by PHerc. 1004104 and PHerc. 1669.105 Undoubtedly, in Philodemus’ criticism against Diogenes of Babylon in PHerc. 1004, we find traces of a polemical comparison between philosophers and rhetoricians in order to demonstrate, against the Stoic point of view, that not all rhetoricians are corrupt and, indirectly, that even certain philosophers can use rhetoric in a perverse manner. But usually these ideas are Philodemus’ comments within a large paraphrase of the text by his Stoic adversary. In contrast, an explicit allusion to the charges of impiety against some philosophers 98 ap. Diog. Laërt. 2.12 (= 59 A 1 DK). 99 Ibid. 100 Cf. Fimiani (2012) 129–134. 101 Cf. Acosta Méndez (1990) 37 [= Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 231]. T6 can also be included in a list of this kind. Cf. Plut. Nic. 23.4 (= 59 A 18 [I] DK). 102 Cf. Radermacher (1895) xiii ff., where the testimonia of Sextus Empiricus, Quintilian, and Philodemus are compared; Longo Auricchio (1984) 464–465. 103 Cf. Phld. De rhet. 2, PHerc. 1674, fr. 5.5–10 and, in a more explicit manner, fr. 9.8–15 Longo Auricchio. 104 Cf. PHerc. 1004, col. 70 Sudhaus (I, pp. 359–360 = Diog. Bab. SVF III 110); col. 84.4–11 Sudhaus (I, p. 367). 105 Cf. PHerc. 1669, fr. 3 Ferrario (= Sudhaus I, pp. 226–227).

378 

 Christian Vassallo

can be found in On Piety, although it appears within a long apologetic digression on Epicurean philosophy: the Athenians would have reserved the same treatment as the one inflicted upon Socrates only for some Epicureans, but never charged Epicurus with impiety. Indeed, the philosopher was neither banished nor sentenced to death.106 These elements are enough to demonstrate that in PHerc. 245, fr. 7 the issue at stake was not the superiority of rhetoric over philosophy, but the role of philosophy in relation to the rhetorician’s education and probably to his ability to gain an audience.107 As already stated above, the fragment mentions Anaxagoras, Pythagoras and his followers, and probably Socrates as well: individuals who, despite their philosophical skills, were unable to persuade the judges and citizens of their innocence, so as to save themselves from death or exile. As for Anaxagoras, the text mentions both the torture he suffered before the trial and the staging of the latter, during which the philosopher showed the judges the marks of the beatings he had endured. Philodemus’ testimonium is the only source that discusses this torture. Relying on Diogenes Laërtius (2.12–14 = 59 A 1 DK), all the main sources on the event omit such a detail.108 David Sider per litteras suggests that it could derive from a lost comedy. In ll. 2–3, Siegfried Sudhaus’s reading τ[ις] Κλέων[ος?] | πα[ῖ]ς is wrong.109 Unfortunately, Diels printed this text in the Vorsokratiker, and the error has been systematically reproduced in the most recent editions and/or translations of the testimonia to Anaxagoras.110 According to this reading, Anaxagoras was made the object of the statement as well as the target of the complaint filed against him by Cleon’s slave. Following this reading, Sudhaus found in the Philodemean text 106 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077/1098, cols. 47–53 Obbink. Cf. Bignone (2007) 507 ff.; Obbink (1996) 509–530. See also Sext. Emp. Math. 2.25–34, on which cf. Gigante (1981) 207. 107 Cf. T5. 108 This the case with the Successions of Philosophers by the Peripatetic Sotion (fr. 3 Wehrli; cf. also 59 A 2; A 3; A 19; A 20a; A 42; A 72 DK); the Lives by Satyrus of Callatis (fr. 16 Schorn = FHG III 163 F 14), according to whom Anaxagoras was in the end sentenced by default (cf. Schorn [2004] 387–392); the Lives by Hermippus of Smyrna (FGrHistCont 1026 F 65), who, however, reports the alleged suicide of the philosopher because of the shame he felt after Pericles’ direct intervention to save him from the death sentence (cf. Bollansée [1999] 469–474); Book 2 of the Scattered Notes by Hieronymus of Rhodes (fr. 49 White = fr. 41 Wehrli = fr. 9 Hiller), who probably tendentiously says that Anaxagoras appeared in court in a poor state of health (διερρυηκότα καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ νόσου), deliberately led to make this appearance by Pericles in order to arouse pity among the judges, who released him for this reason alone. Nor is any hint about torture to be found in Suda s.v. Ἀναξαγόρας (= 59 A 3 DK); Plut. Per 32; Diod. Sic. 12.39 (= 59 A 17 DK); Plut. Nic. 23 (= 59 A 18 DK); Joseph. Ap. 2.265; Olympiod. in Meteor. 17.19 Stüve (= 59 A 19 DK). On the use of the verb μαστιγόω, see Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 234. 109 Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 232. 110 Cf. Lanza (1966) 30–31; Banfi (1999) 27; Curd (2007) 86.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 379

some correspondence with Sotion’s account in Diogenes Laërtius. On the contrary, the autopsy of the papyrus clearly allows us to read the masc. plur. accusative τοὺς μώλω|πας. Obviously, this fact suggests that Anaxagoras himself is the subject, so that a logical sequence of the various names of philosophers belonging to the list (all in the nominative) can be restored. The absence of Cleon’s name makes this Herculanean witness practically useless for dating the trial. The idea of a political conspiracy could also be read into fr. 15 of PHerc. 224 (T6),111 one of the ‘scorze’ of PHerc. 1673/1007 (Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric).112 T6 transmits an Aristotelian fragment which would be otherwise unknown.113 It belongs to a paremiological tradition difficult to reconstruct on the basis of our actual knowledge: just as hares are easy prey for dogs, so philosophers are prey for traducers.114 This comparison is used by Philodemus with regard to the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. As a matter of fact, philosophers are often calumniated, independently of the validity of their arguments.115 In this context, Anaxagoras is mentioned as an example of a persecuted philosopher, a probable allusion to his trial for impiety.116

4 The alleged ‘atheism’ of Anaxagoras between philosophy and doxography The political reasons behind Anaxagoras’ trial should not distract us away from certain aspects of his philosophy that certainly made the charge of ἀσέβεια credible. Although Anaxagoras cannot be considered an ‘atheist’ in the modern sense of the word, his thought, more than that of other Presocratics, presents theories and research methods which are potentially able to exclude the divine from any explanation of physical and human phenomena. Anaxagoras’ physical and 111 According to A. Laks per litteras, the sycophants and Anaxagoras’ name could not refer to the trial: Anaxagoras could have been mentioned “pour avoir dit à ses amis quelque chose qui doit avoir été comparable à ce qu’ Aristote dit.” 112 Cf. Fimiani (2012) 129–134. 113 Arist. Polit. fr. 4 [I] Ross (= deest ap. Gigon). 114 Katsimanis (1975) considers ll. 1–6 Aristotelian; Fimiani (2014) limits instead the quotation from Aristotle only to the proverb about hares and dogs. It still remains uncertain whether the fragment should be ascribed to a political (Ross suggested the Politicus) or ethical work by Aristotle. 115 The relationship of this fragment with Epicurus’ Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene, which Bignone (2007) 461 thinks Philodemus is quoting here, does not seem quite convincing. 116 Cf. Vassallo (2015a) 109–110, also for other solutions.

380 

 Christian Vassallo

cosmological theories raise problems that cannot be tackled here in a systematic fashion.117 Nevertheless, Anaxagoras’ physico-cosmological thought can be summarized as follows: everything that exists is made of seeds (σπέρματα) or, as the post-Theophrastean tradition was to call them, homeomeries (ὁμοιομέρειαι). They are endowed with forms, colors, and tastes of every kind which give everything its specific characters.118 The primeval universe appeared as a mixture, which was separated later on by the Nous, viz. a Mind ordering the cosmos.119 According to Anaxagoras, “everything is in everything”:120 this motto, considered by some scholars to be an Eleatic legacy, denies the birth of things out of nothing and, at the same time, makes Nous the ordering principle of all things, to be interpreted, depending on different perspectives, as a material or immaterial entity.121 Even if Anaxagoras theorizes a scientific-style cosmogony, his Περὶ φύσεως, as I previously said, does not seem to launch any direct attacks against traditional religion. But it is understandable that the most conservative Athenian factions could have been offended by the tenets of a philosophy which, through a ‘rationalistic’ method, reduced the sun to only a fiery mass or stone much bigger than the Peloponnese.122 Traces of Anaxagoras’ physical theories are preserved in the Herculaneum papyri. These pieces of evidence can be found in section III of DAPR. A few lines of commentary on these testimonia may be useful. T8. As I have already noted,123 PHerc. 224 is one of the ‘scorze’ of PHerc. 1673/1007 (Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric). Fr. 3 hands down a rich doxographical catalogue, in which the physico-cosmological, ontological, and epistemological theories of some of the most important Presocratics are mentioned and criticized. Among others (Thales [?], Metrodorus of Chios, Parmenides, and Melissus124), Anaxagoras is explicitly mentioned. In particular, Philodemus (or better, the editor of the catalogue) considers the theory of ‘homeomeries’ and, more specifically, the principle according to which “all things are in all” (cf. 59 B 1; B 4; B 6; B 11–12 DK) unacceptable as well as philosophically incoherent.125 117 For an updated overview, see Rechenauer (2013) 748–776. 118 59 B 4 DK. 119 59 B 12 DK. 120 59 B 4; B 6; B 11–12 DK. 121 On this point, I would refer to Schofield (1980), Curd (2007), and Marmodoro (2017). 122 59 A 72 DK. 123 See supra, n. 89. 124 On the philosophical and doxographical reasons that justifiy the reading of the name of Parmenides next to that of Melissus in this testimonium, I would refer to Vassallo (2015a) 104–106. 125 On this principle see Marmodoro (2017).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 381

T9. PHerc. 1012 is Demetrius Laco’s Verteidigungsschrift that, employing a correct philological interpretation of Epicurus’ works, tries to defend the founder of the Garden against attacks by his opponents. As Enzo Puglia observes,126 in col. 6 the subject of Demetrius’ treatise suddenly changes from ethics to physics. In particular, the Epicurean philosopher tries to better explain the nature of the atoms that Epicurus theorized and considered “first natures” (πρῶται φύσεις): they are infinite127 but different from one another. For this reason, Epicurus criticized those who maintained that all things are undifferentiated ([πάντ’ ἀδιάφο]ρα). According to Demetrius, Epicurus referred to the philosophers convinced that all things are made of ‘homeomeries,’ a term that a new autopsy of the papyrus allows us to restore not only in l. 8 ([πάνθ’ ὁμοι]ομερῆ), but also in l. 12 (ὁμοι]ομερ[). The polemical allusion to Anaxagoras’ physics is quite evident. Thus, this testimonium should be connected with the pieces of evidence most likely dealing with Anaxagoras contained in Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 15 (T10–12). T10. In addition to the questions related to atoms and compounds, Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 15 seems to have the nature and the composition of bodies as its principle topic.128 Therefore, the reading ὁμοιομερεια[ at l. 5 of PHerc. 1151, col. 7 is very significant. A comparison with T11 seems to suggest that here there is a critical reference to Anaxagoras’ doctrine of ‘homeomeries.’129 In particular, Epicurus would be disputing the claim that the great variety of bodies prevents us from thinking that all things have the same composition. T11. As in T10, in this testimonium too ‘homeomeries’ are mentioned, and this could be a further polemical allusion to Anaxagoras’ physics. In particular, Epicurus would then be describing the position of Anaxagoras before criticizing

126 Puglia (1988) 204. 127 In the following col. 15 Puglia of this work, Demetrius Laco better specifies this concept. Atoms are the “first nature,” viz. principles of reality, and are infinite (?), owing not to the number of their species but to the number of their forms: the only forms of the sensible world to be first forms are the compact ones (- - - ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἀπείρους λέγει || τ]ὰς πρώτα[ς φύσ]εις οὐ κ[ατ’ | ε]ἶδος [ἀλλὰ κατὰ] γένος, ὥσ|[τε] μὴ πάντα [τὰ σχήμαθ’ ὅ|σ]α περὶ τὰ αἰσ[θητά ἐστιν ἄλ|5λ]α τοσαῦτ’ εἶνα[ι σχήματα | π]ρῶτα, μόνον [δὲ  τὰ συμ|φ]υῆ· τὰς δὲ πολ[|]ιν καθὸ κ[- - |]ου α[]ολο[- - - |10]ον τουτ[- - -). 128 So Millot (1977) 14. 129 Millot (1977) 27–28. D. Sider per litteras suggests more caution. With reference to T10–12, he observes that “the one word homoiomereia seems to be not enough to justify inclusion (although of course it may in fact refer to Anaxagoras). Aristotle, for instance, uses this word c. 75 times without referring to Anaxagoras, and I imagine that Epicureans would do likewise.”

382 

 Christian Vassallo

it.130 The expression ἐξ ὁμοιομε|[ρῶν of ll. 5–6 could be a reference to the Anaxagorean thesis of the unitary composition of all bodies and their infinite divisibility. What precedes that expression could be related to the thesis according to which the composition of bodies would depend on the prevalence of one element over all others. On a stylistic level as well, such a thesis seems to recall some important fragments of Anaxagoras (59 B 1; B 4; B 12 DK). T12. Also in this column of PHerc. 1151 (cf. supra, T10–11) the term ὁμο[ιο]μέρεια that appears at l. 4 refers to the Anaxagorean doctrine of the resemblance of the parts of bodies.131 In particular, here Epicurus could be critically examining Anaxagoras’ physics with reference to the problem of the qualities of bodies (or, better, of compounds). According to Epicurus, these qualities do not depend on the external form of the bodies (cf. 59 B 12 DK, where Anaxagoras explicitly says that nothing is similar to anything else, but everything is made up of the most manifest elements and those of which it most participates, on the basis of the principle that “all things are in all”).132 In light of the previous outline, one can tackle the problem of Anaxagoras’ theology, or rather the link between his physico-cosmological thought and his alleged ‘atheism’ within the later doxographical tradition, with increased awareness. This interesting phenomenon stands out more or less directly both in Herculanean and in Graeco-Egyptian papyrological sources. With regard to the latter, we should first take into account two Oxyrhynchus testimonia that transmit part of fr. 6 Schorn of Satyrus’ Life of Euripides. The ‘philosophical’ relationship between Euripides and Anaxagoras that emerges from these witnesses is extremely

130 Millot (1977) 29. 131 According to Millot (1977) 35, the evidence presents (also lexical) affinities with col. 23 of the same papyrus, which she reconstructs as follows: ο ὅλον τῆς δό[ξ]ης τ[ὴν] | ἀρίστην ἔκθεσιν· μεγ[- - -] | ἔοικεν, οὐ ταῖς κατ[ὰ] τὴν | σχημάτισιν ποιό[τ]ησι τ[ῶν] | συγκρίσεων, ὁμοιοεις | φαίνειν[- - -] | φύσε[- - -. The thesis can be supported also in the light of the fact that the autopsy of the papyrus allows us to restore the adjective ὁμοιομ[ε]ρεῖς at l. 5. 132 Millot (1977) 35 observes that, while in col. 23 the term σχημάτισις is in question, in col. 25 Epicurus uses the term μορφή: “Alors que σχημάτισις est le terme employé pour désigner la forme des atomes, μορφή se rapporte plutôt à la forme du corps, conservée par les simulacres. Les ‘qualités liées à la forme’, dans ce deuxième cas, sont celles que perçoit la vue, dans le premier, celles qu’engendrent les différents contours atomiques.” For an analysis of this hypothesis, cf. Vassallo (2016b) 2 and 4 n. 4, where the thesis of Epicurus’ precise (semantic) difference between μορφή, qua exterior form of an object, and σχῆμα, qua inner figure or structure of a body, is discussed. The thesis has been already proposed by Leone (2012) 535–538 (with regard to Epicur. De nat. 2, PHerc. 1149, col. 38.2–3 Leone) and analysed by Corti (2015).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 383

important, as we will shortly see, for understanding Euripides’ place in the lists of ‘atheists’ handed down by the Placita philosophorum. The first testimonium from Oxyrhynchus to be considered is POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I (T13). The passage falls within the section of Satyrus’ Βίος Εὐριπίδου devoted to Euripides’ character and – to a lesser extent – his relationship with Anaxagoras.133 In ll. 22–27, Satyrus recalls that Euripides especially admired Anaxagoras and (probably inspired by his thought) composed high-quality poetical verses with a physical content.134 The second and more important testimonium is POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III (T14). After a probable reference to Xenophanes’ criticism of myth and its religious usage,135 Satyrus (fr. 6 Schorn) quotes Euripides’ fr. 912 Kannicht (ascribed by some scholars to Peirithous, by others to Cretans), where the nature of Zeus (as lord of the universe) and his possible appellation (Zeus or Hades) are in question. With regard to these verses, Satyrus maintains that Euripides summarized all the cosmology of Anaxagoras through poetry.136 As for the connection between theology and physical phenomena, he further adds that Euripides showed a kind of ‘skeptical’ attitude, as confirmed by v. 886 of the Trojans. Nevertheless, it seems reductive to consider this passage a mere testimonium on Euripides’ doctrinal debt to Anaxagoras. Most likely Satyrus devoted this section of the Βίος Εὐριπίδου to the influence of some Presocratics (not exclusively Anaxagoras) on Euripides’ physical and theological conceptions.137 As regards the Herculanean sources, one could first of all consider a neglected passage of Philodemus’ On Gods: T15. The passage, difficult to interpret, is preserved only in an Oxonian apograph of PHerc. 26,138 which is one of the several Herculaneum papyri to transmit Philodemus’ On Gods. According to Diels, col. 9b is a continuation of the Epicurean polemic contained by col. 9a against a 133 See Funghi (1989), with a status quaestionis on the topic; Schorn (2004) 197–220, with an updated bibliography. On the doxographical tradition that makes Euripides a pupil of Anaxagoras, see Arrighetti (1964) 105–108 and Sider (20052) 1 n. 2. 134 Nevertheless, the adversative conjunction ἀλ]λὰ that can be read at the end of l. 27 immediately cuts this apparent praise short, bringing Satyrus’ testimonium back to a biographical context hostile to the Athenian poet. 135 See the app. crit. of my edition at l. 6. 136 On the various conjectures proposed at the end of col. III.19, see the app. crit. of my edition. 137 In such a context, for example, a reference to Xenophanes and his influences on Euripides would be justified. For this topic, see Di Benedetto (1971) 307–308; Egli (2003) 37–78 (on Anaxagoras) and 121–135 (on Xenophanes). I also refer to Phld. De poem. 4, PHerc. 207, fr. 23 Janko (= Xen 34 Strobel/Wöhrle = deest ap. DK = IPPH XXXVIII 177), where, immediately after Euripides, the name of Xenophanes appears. Cf. Janko (2011) 258 n. 2; Vassallo (2014) 57–60. 138 Cf. Diels (1916–1917) I, 17 app. crit.: “Die Nummer des Pap. fehlt zwar, aber die Zugehörigkeit zu Pap. 26 ergibt Schrift, Orthographie (ἐπισστήσας Z. 6) und die Kolumnennummer (14, die bei Scott allein fehlt), die Beziehung zu col. IX der Name Dionysios (Z. 7).”

384 

 Christian Vassallo

certain Dionysius, which Wilhelm Crönert identified with the Stoic Dionysius of Cyrene, a disciple of Diogenes of Seleucia and a contemporary of Panaetius (also mentioned in Phld. Ind. Stoic., PHerc. 1018, col. 52.6 ff. Dorandi). This Dionysius theorized a tripartition of divine beings into visible ones, invisible ones, and ones who have joined the ranks of the gods via apotheosis, according to Tertullianus’ account (Ad nat. 2.2).139 The philosophical subject of the polemic would be (already from col. 8 onwards) the problem of the fear of death and, above all, that of the physical grounds for belief in divinity. Dionysius, author of a treatise On Gods critically directed against the ‘enlightening’ theology of Epicurus, would have attracted the later Epicureans’ wrath. According to Diels, Philodemus is drawing on Stoic sources through the mediation of his teacher Zeno of Sidon. In particular, in col. 9b the opponent of Dionysius seems to accuse him of having plagiarized, in his polemics against Epicurus, the opinions of Anaxagoras and other philosophers.140 But the two testimonia of Philodemus’ On Piety provide the most interesting evidence concerning the problem we are dealing with: cols. 320 Vassallo (= fr. 9 Schober) and 321 Vassallo (= fr. 10 Schober) of PHerc. 1428.141 Adolf Schober refers col. 320 (T16) both to Anaxagoras and to Alcmaeon. But, from an easy comparison with the text of On the Nature of the Gods, I think we can take only the reference to Anaxagoras for granted.142 In the column, the word Nous is clearly restorable. In the Epicurean vision represented by Philodemus, Anaxagoras’ Nous is in some way assimilated to a principle that gives order and form to the original mixture of elements. Furthermore – and this is perhaps the most important aspect – the order derived from the Nous is also the starting point of the eternal motion of beings. 139 Crönert (1906) 113 n. 512; 123; Diels (1916–1917) I, 55–56, who for this reason supplemented in his edition the name Διον[ύσιον at l. 7 of col. 9b. But the absence of the original manuscript drove me in this case to exercise greater prudence. 140 Diels (1916–1917) I, 57 adds: “Diese Aufdeckung des Plagiates hatte dann dem Epikureer Veranlassung gegeben, von einer Bekämpfung des unredlichen Gegners abzusehen. Er hat auch von anderen anderes gestohlen und so aus den fremden aneinandergereihten Lappen einen wertlosen Cento zusammengefingert.” Furthermore, he supposed (ibid. 58–59) that the polemic against Dionysius continues on in the following columns of PHerc. 26 as well, where, especially in cols. 11–15, the question of the relationship between the feeling of fear in animals and in human beings (viz. between the animal mind and human intelligence) is tackled. Also in this case, the charge of plagiarism against the opponent would be confirmed by certain arguments in Anaxagoras’ philosophy, especially his doctrine of the dominant force of the Nous over all living beings (59 B 12 DK), and the idea that, among living beings, only human beings are provided with passive reason, that is to say the only faculty able to interpret the intellect (59 A 101 DK). 141 Cf. Vassallo (2017a). 142 In my opinion, an allusion to Alcmaeon remains very uncertain. But a direct allusion to him in the lost section of the papyrus should not to be ruled out.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 385

Now, this last aspect of Anaxagorean cosmology openly reflects the words, as well as the aporias, of at least two fragments handed down by Simplicius: καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν.143 And Nous came to control the whole revolution, so that revolution would begin.144 καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεχρίθη· κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι.145 And when Nous began to instigate motion, from all that was moving there was separation, and all that Nous put into motion was broken up; and as things were moving and breaking up, the revolution made them break up much more.146

Since the time of Eduard Zeller, scholarship has frequently stressed the contradictions in the idea of the origin of motion from Nous. How can one reconcile the eternity of the ordering Mind and of the infinite particles of matter with the temporality of the motion of bodies within a cosmos that only acquired a distinct and recognizable form thanks to that Mind?147 The problem, mutatis mutandis, had already been outlined by Aristotle in Metaphysics’ Book Λ. Eternal movement, he maintains, can be explained only through an eternal principle whose substance is action (δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια). But the relationship between principle and movement cannot simply be reduced to that between power and action, also because not all that is in potency can transform itself into action. Considering the Nous as an act, Anaxagoras was forced to make the action something earlier than the potency.148 Plato in the Phaedo denounced this as an intellectual ‘trick’ by Anaxagoras: he used the Nous only to deliver a Cartesian-style ‘blow’ to the world, or – as Aristotle pointed out – as a Deux ex machina to solve the difficulties besetting his system, but in fact he explained the causes of the cosmic phenomena in a merely materialistic and mechanistic way.149 143 Simpl. In Phys. 156.13; 164.24 Diels (= 59 B 12 DK). Cf. Sider (20052) 133–134, who considers the περιχώρησις not simply a circular movement, but an actual vortex. Anaxagoras delves into this concept in B 9. 144 Transl. by D. Sider. 145 Simpl. In Phys. 300.27 Diels (= 59 B 13 DK). Cf. Lanza (1966) 233–234 n., who considers B 13 as a fragment that explains, through B 9, the meaning of B 12. 146 Transl. by D. Sider. 147 Zeller/Mondolfo (1969) 402–403. 148 Arist. Metaph. 12.6.1072a4–6. 149 Pl. Phd. 98b7–c2; Arist. Metaph. 1.4.985a18–21 (= 59 A 47 [I–II] DK). Cf. Mansfeld (2000) 11–15; Sedley (2007) 20–25 and 86–89.

386 

 Christian Vassallo

Simplicius considered the idea that motion began in a chronological dimension contradictory. He ascribed such an idea not only to Anaxagoras but also to his pupil Archelaus and to the Atomist Metrodorus of Chios. But, at the same time, he justified this conception in light of the didactic aim of those philosophers.150 However, one cannot help but notice that in Philodemus this aporia seems to get worse because, on the one hand, the Nous plays an archetypal role for the motion of bodies, and on the other, the eternity of that motion is explicitly stated. How, within the Epicurean perspective, such a position contributes to placing Anaxagoras on the list of ‘atheists’ can better be understood through two operations: first, a more careful comparison between Philodemus’ text and the parallel testimonium of Cicero; second, a re- examination of a passage of ps.-Plutarch’s Doctrines of the Philosophers (Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων) that is fundamental for any attempt to reconstruct the doxographical tradition of the Atheistenkataloge, as we know it from Cicero to Sextus Empiricus (without, of course, considering the early Church Fathers). As for the comparison between Philodemus and Cicero, the new reconstruction of PHerc. 1428, col. 320 allows us to advance some interesting doxographical considerations concerning both textual criticism and the philosophical meaning of the two testimonia. On the philological level, the new text of col. 320 strengthens the hypothesis that at least one of the various sources exploited by Cicero and Philodemus was common to both of them. Obviously, the two authors often used this common source in different ways, mixing it (for various purposes) with others whose natures and identities we are not able to detect with certainty.151 As I said above, in the Herculanean source, the order that Nous gives to the universe is considered the cause of motion (κίν[η]σ[ιν). In Cicero’s parallel text, Arthur S. Pease printed modum mentis, accepting the reading of the two Leiden MSS Vossianus 84 (A) and Vossianus 86 (B). In his most recent edition of Book 1 of Cicero’s dialogue, Andrew R. Dyck has instead preferred the reading motum mentis handed down by MS Oxoniensis Mertonianus 311 (O) and by the Hadoardi excerpta. In light of the Herculanean witness one can now infer that the latter philological choice is most likely the better one. At the level of content, Cicero’s testimonium concerning Anaxagoras (apart from its more polemical tone) establishes Velleius’ ‘Epicurean’ criticism on 150 Simpl. In Phys. 1121.21 Diels (= 59 A 64 DK). On the relationships between Simplicius and Anaxagoras, see Baltussen (2008) 78–84. 151 Philodemus himself speaks of the great number of sources and editions he has consulted, warning against possible confusion (De piet., PHerc. 247 N + 242 N, col. 86a//b Obbink). Cf. Obbink (1996) 613–614.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 387

philosophical grounds somewhat similar to those established by Philodemus. But Cicero adds further polemical arguments, which we can only imagine to have been developed within the first part of PHerc. 1428, col. 321 (cf. infra). In On the Nature of the Gods, with regard to Anaxagoras, we read the following: (…) inde Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et motum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione designari et confici voluit. in quo non vidit neque motum sensu iunctum et continentem in infinito ullum esse posse, neque sensum omnino quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem inte­ rius mente? cingatur igitur corpore externo; quod quoniam non placet, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adiuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. (…)152 Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the disposition and the movement of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding.153

First of all, both in Philodemus and in Cicero the Anaximenes/Anaxagoras sequence is confirmed. But only in Cicero is Anaxagoras explicitly said to be a follower of Anaximenes. Philosophically speaking, in the first part of the passage from Cicero, the Nous, considered rational and infinite, is directly the cause both of the order and of the movement of beings.154 Philodemus’ account says essentially the same thing, but with a difference that cannot be overlooked: the Nous first generates cosmic order and only after that does this order (viz. not directly the Nous)155 give rise to the motion of beings. Unfortunately, a lacuna in PHerc. 1428 prevents us from drawing a clear comparison between the continuation of the Philodemean text and the second part of Cicero’s evidence. In the latter, at least two aporias are pointed out: that concerning a Mind which, on the one hand,

152 Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.26–27a (= 59 A 48 [V] DK). I am quoting from Dyck’s (2003) edition. 153 Transl. by H. Rackham (with a few changes). 154 No hint to this motion can be found in the other doxographical catalogue transmitted by Cicero’s Lucullus (37.118 = 59 A 49 DK). 155 Therefore, I give the genitive absolute of ll. 23–25 a chronological (in addition to a strictly causal) meaning.

388 

 Christian Vassallo

is a free, simple, and absolute entity (aperta simplexque mens nulla re adiuncta), and, on the other hand, is the cause of motion; and the other aporia concerning a motion which is assumed to be provided with sense perception and, at the same time, infinite (neque motum sensu iunctum et continentem in infinito ullum esse posse). Everything that moves is necessarily provided with sense perception, and it is not possible that the entity giving rise to movement (in this case, the Nous) is not or does not become, in turn, something also provided with sense perception (neque sensum omnino quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret).156 Now, it is meaningful that in PHerc. 1428, col. 319 Vassallo (= fr. 8 Schober),157 devoted to the Milesians, Philodemus partly criticizes Anaximenes for the same reasons that Velleius adduces with regard to Anaxagoras in On the Nature of the Gods. In Cicero’s dialogue, Anaximenes is criticized for considering his God/ Air an entity that has a beginning in time, which is immeasurable, infinite, and always in motion (eumque gigni esseque immensum et infinitum et semper in motu), and above all for describing it as formless (sine ulla forma). Here there is no hint of sense perception, an element which will be an important part of Velleius’ criticism against other Presocratics like Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Diogenes of Apollonia. Conversely, in Philodemus’ On Piety, the theology of Anaximenes is (implicitly) denounced as contradictory just because his God/Air is infinite and, at the same time, devoid of sense perception. Col. 319 reads as follows: desunt versus fere 8 ]π[ 10 ]θαιτη[₍₎ ]σει προ[₍₎ τῶν] πάντων [ ][₍₎]τους [₍₎ ]καμεναν[₍₎ 15 ] φθα[ρτο]ῖς [θεοῖ]ς τε κ]αὶ κ[όσμοις], ἀλλὰ σ[ ][]συαν ]ιπα[₍₎ π]αντὶ γὰρ ]φ[₍₎]σ[.

156 On this peculiar (and complex) aspect of Anaxagoras’ philosophy, see his own words in B 11 and above all in the incipit of B 12. 157 I presented this edition provisionally in Vassallo (2015b) 293–295 and definitively in Vassallo (2018a) 109–110.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 389

20 καὶ Ἀνα]ξιμ[ένη]ς φ[ησὶν τὸν ἀέ]ρα τε[₍₎][ ]ισβο[][][ ]κτ[ ἄπειρο]ν οἴετ’ ε[ἶναι λέ25 γ]ων ἀέρα θεόν· [οὐδὲ καλ]ῶς θεωρεῖ τ[ὸν θεὸν] ὡς ἐστερημ[ένον τῆς αἰ]σθήσεως, [φὰς δ’ ἅπαν]τα τὰ γενόμενα 30 καὶ] τὰ γινόμενα καὶ 31 ₍₎ τὰ] ἐσόμεν[α] καὶ || ⌊θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα γίνεσθαι⌋ [ἐξ ἀέρος Duo superposita in cr. 1, pz. 5, sin. sup. et med. inter coll. 317 (olim fr. 6) et 318 (olim fr. 7) a * recognita et loco suo collocata || 9–23 primum dispexi || 11 πρὸ[ς * e.g. || 12 * || 13 τ]ο[ιού]τους vel ][₍₎] τοὺς * e.g. || 15–16 * (cf. 12 A 17 DK) || 18 * || 20 * || 21 τὸν ἀέ]ρα Sedley || 22 ]ις βολὴ ν vel βοᾶν * e.g. || 23–24 ἄ|πειρο]ν * e.g. (cf. 13 A 1; A 5–7; A 9–10; B 3 DK) || 24 οἴετ’ ε[ἶναι καὶ * (οἴετ’ [εἶναι iam Philippson) : οἴετ[αι perp. Diels et Schober, Bücheler et Gomperz sec. || 24–25 λέ|γ]ων Sedley (et κα|λῶν] vel πο|ιῶν] e.g.) : τὸ]ν Bücheler, Gomperz, Diels, Philippson : ν Schober (cf. 13 A 10 [I] DK) || 25–26 οὐδὲ | καλ]ῶς Sedley (et οὐδ’ ὑ|γι]ῶς vel οὐχ | ὑγι]ῶς e.g.) : μοχ|θηρ]ῶς * : ἀλλὰ | π]ῶς Philippson spat. brev. : εἶναι. | ἀλλ’] ὃς Schober (εἶνα|ι,?] ὃς iam Diels) || 26–27 θεωρεῖ τ[ὸν θε|ὸν] * : θεωρεῖ τ[οιοῦ|το]ς Philippson : θεωρεῖτ[αι φα|νερῶ]ς Schober (θεωρεῖτ[αι iam Diels, Gomperz dub. sec.) || 27 ἐστερημ[ένον * : ἐστερη[μένος Diels et al., Gomperz dub. sec. || 28 τ|ῆς αἰσ]θήσεως Diels (τῆς αἰσ]θήσεως Schober) : πά|σης αἰσ]θήσεως Philippson || [φὰς Sedley || [ἐξ οὗ Diels dub. : [πόθεν Philippson : [πῶς Schober || 29 ἅπαντ]α Schober : πάντ]α Diels (πάντα] Philippson) || 30 καὶ] Diels et al. || 31 {καὶ} τὰ] ἐσόμεν[α] restituerim (τὰ ἐσ]όμεν[α] iam Diels : τὰ ἐσ]όμενα sic Philippson) : τὰ γενησ]όμενα Schober || 31 sq. ⌊θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα γίνεσθαι⌋ conl. 13 A 7 DK || [ἐξ ἀέρος Sedley e.g. : [πάνθ’ ὅλως τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δύνα|ται ἐξ αὑτοῦ γεννῆσαι, ὧν γε πολ|λὰ αἰσθητικὰ καταλαμβάνομεν· | καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεν|νηθέντας εἰσάγων παντελῶς ἀφ|αμαρτῶν δῆλός ἐστιν τῆς ἀληθείας vix credib. Schober e.g.

(...) [he (sc. Anaximander) maintains that (...)] to/towards/against (...) of all [the things (?)] (...) [such] (...) [to the/with the/because of] destroyable gods and worlds, but (...) in fact, to all (...). And Anaximenes says [that] Air (...) is [infinite, maintaining that] god is Air; he wrongly conceives of god [as] devoid of sensibility, [saying that] all beings which were, are and will be and [the gods and the divine things are generated from Air] (...) In this case, something strange must also have occurred in how Philodemus and Cicero made use of the sources at their disposal. As we have seen, Velleius further criticizes the question of sense perception in Anaxagoras’ theology: a

390 

 Christian Vassallo

motion connected to sense perception (viz. to finitude) and that simultaneously shares in infinitude (viz. with the lack of sense perception) cannot exist.158 Now, whatever happened to these further Ciceronian arguments against Anaxagoras in the ‘Presocratic section’ of Philodemus’ On Piety? As previously noted, PHerc. 1428 contains a large lacuna at that very point. Τherefore, all we can do is reflect upon the fragments of the first part of col. 321 (T17), that is to say upon the scanty traces of the lines which immediately precede the following testimonium to Pythagoras. Whether the whole section of the column preceding the diple obelismene in l. 27 refers to Anaxagoras (in continuation with the content of col. 320) or to Alcmaeon is controversial. I consider the former hypothesis the more probable. As a matter of fact, the ‘bisovrapposto’ κινη [, which has been replaced at l. 13, could be a resumption of κίν[η]σ[ιν at l. 23 of the previous column. The striking length of the Philodemean testimonium to Anaxagoras (which is, however, no longer than those concerning Parmenides and Heraclitus) could be justified by the peculiar meaning which Anaxagoras’ thought had for Epicureanism, and in particular for Epicurean physics.159 One can infer that, according to (the source of) Philodemus, the physico-cosmological assumptions of Anaxagoras’ doctrine alone made him an ‘atheist’ (ἀ|σ]εβὴ[ς), whose theses gave the impression of demolishing the gods (φαίνε]|ται οὐν τοὺ[ς θεοὺς ἀ]|νασκευάζ[ειν).160 If this is true, the Anaxagoras/Alcmaeon/Pythagoras sequence attested in Cicero falls apart.161 And this should not come as a surprise, since such doxographical gaps frequently emerge when we compare the two texts in a synoptical way.162 The scanty fragments of the second part of Philodemus’ testimonium (and to a much smaller extent of Cicero’s one) do not allow us to make Anaxagoras an ‘atheist’ in the proper sense of the term. And yet, in what sense and why, according to a Philodemean (viz. Epicurean) interpretation, could Anaxagoras be regarded

158 Doxographical strategies of this kind are not new in the ‘Presocratic section’ of On Piety, as I have shown (with regard to the sequence Xenophanes/Parmenides) in Vassallo (2016c). 159 Cf. Piazzi (2005) 52–58 on the testimonium by Lucretius. But the reference to the ‘movement’ (of the soul and therefore of divine nature) suggests a doxographical context referring to Alcmaeon as well. On this point, see Mansfeld (2014). 160 Note that ll. 25–27, between a paragraphos and the diple cited above, represent Philodemus’ comment on the (presumably extended) doxographical piece of news reported before. 161 Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.27a–28. 162 I do not wish to linger on Philodemus’ and Cicero’s sources and on the relationship between the two texts. With regard to this point I would refer to H. Diels ap. DG, 121–129; Dyck (2003) 7–11; Philippson (1916) 606–608 and (1939) 36–37; Pease (1955–1958) I, 39–45; Steinmetz (1966) 154; Henrichs (1974) 9 n. 28; Capasso (1987) 145–146; Gigante (19832) 34; McKirahan (1996); Obbink (1996) 96–99; Summers (1997); Dorandi (1999) 232–236; Obbink (2001) 204–205; Essler (2011b).

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 391

as an ‘atheist’? If we consider the tenets of Epicurean theology,163 the reasons can probably be reduced to two main points, which are the direct consequence of the ‘divine’ nature of Nous, as we can infer it from PHerc. 1428, col. 320 (and from the parallel Ciceronian text), that is to say: a) the absurdity of a God who somehow takes care of the world and even represents its principle, but in doing so upsets his state of utter bliss; and b) the inconsistency of an eternal God who has given order and motion to all things, establishing himself, against his nature, as the origin of time. Within the later doxographical tradition, we find only one case of an Atheistenkatalog where this Epicurean-style criticism is clearly reproposed and is also accompanied by other theological aporias concerning the problem of ‘theodicy’ and the suffering of righteous men, “one of the very rare examples of an ethical issue in the Placita.”164 I would refer to a passage of ps.-Plutarch’s Placita Philosophorum, used by Diels as the only witness for reconstructing the theological section of Book 1 of Aëtius’ compendium.165 As we know, this book deals with physics and natural philosophy, with specific attention being given to the subject of physical principles. The chapter of interest to us (1.7) introduces, within the treatment of the principles, the problem of the essence and identity of God (Τίς ἐστι ὁ θεός), considered as a principle himself.166 This chapter is preceded by the one, also transmitted only by ps.-Plutarch, devoted to the origin of the human conception of the gods (Πόθεν ἔννοιαν ἔσχον θεῶν ἄνθρωποι), and then followed by another chapter that is a kind of appendix on divine and heroic figures (Περὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων). As regards Aëtius’ ch. 1.7, I have benefited from the draft of the new edition by Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia, whom I would like to warmly thank for giving me a preview of their work for the last volumes of Aëtiana. In the new text established by the two scholars, another lemma on Anaxagoras (ex S[tobaeus]6: § 6 [1] Ἀναξαγόρας νοῦν κοσμοποιὸν τὸν θεόν) appears: along with that on Empedocles (ex S17: §  19), it is, according to Mansfeld, consistent with the account of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Ν (4.1091b10–12).167 Below,

163 On Epicureanism and ‘atheism,’ see Pfligersdorffer (1957); Long/Sedley (1987) I, 139–149; Obbink (1989); Mansfeld (1993) and (1999) 454–456; Giannantoni (1996); Bremmer (2007); Essler (2011a); Sedley (2011) and (2013); Gourinat (2019). 164 Thus J. Mansfeld in his contribution to this volume. 165 Cf. Mansfeld (2013). On ps.-Plutarch as a source for reconstructing Aëtius’ compendium, see M&R1, 121–195, with remarks on the papyrological tradition as well (pp. 126–130); now Journée (2017) passim. 166 Aët. 1.7.1–10 Mansfeld/Runia (cf. infra). 167 See Mansfeld (2013) 352, who warns that “it is impossible to argue that they are in some way dependent on it.”

392 

 Christian Vassallo

however, I will provide the text already published by Runia in Mnemosyne168 and then republished by the scholar in vol. 3 of Aëtiana.169 The chapter Τίς ἐστι ὁ θεός is extremely interesting for our purposes, in particular because, as I said above, it provides a rich Atheistenkatalog, to which Anaxagoras also belongs. Offering a list of ‘atheists’ which appears in Cicero and Sextus Empiricus as well,170 ps.-Plutarch begins by mentioning the (allegedly) radically ‘atheistic’ position of Diagoras, Theodorus, and Euhemerus (§ 1). For these philosophers, the gods did not exist (καθόλου φασὶ μὴ εἶναι θεούς). Immediately after this section (§ 2), the author adds Euripides to this list and cites the most famous verses from his drama Sisyphus, which instead Sextus Empiricus attributed to Critias.171 It is the only instance known to us in which Euripides is mentioned in an Atheisten­ katalog, although the identification of Euripides as an ‘atheist’ in antiquity was not entirely new.172 It is interesting to note how both the radical ‘atheism’ of the philosophers mentioned at the beginning and the indirect, but no less radical, ‘atheism’ of Euripides are rebuked (and ridiculed) by the doxographer by quoting some verses of Callimachus.173 After this section, the most philosophical section

168 Runia (1996) 546–547. 169 M&R3, 346–348. 170 Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.1.2, 1.42.118–119; Sext. Emp. Math. 9.50–58. But here the list is extended to other philosophers as well. 171 Sext. Emp. Math. 9.54 (= 88 B 25 DK). Following Sextus, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1875) 166 and Winiarczyk (1987) ascribed these verses to Critias; Dihle (1977) and others considered them Euripidean, relying on Aëtius/ps.-Plutarch’s testimonium, who, however, quotes that fragment only partially (Aët. 1.6.7 = ll. 33–34; 1.7.2 = ll. 1–2 and 17–18). 172 Cf. Winiarczyk (1984) 171–172. On this point the bibliography is impressive. I would refer at least to Stinton (1976); Lefkowitz (1987), (1989), and (2016); Kullmann (2010); Matthiessen (2010). Following a chronological order, the most relevant passages on the religious problem in Euripides are the following: Heracl. 591–596 (c. 430 BC); Hipp. 189–197, 1102–1110 (c. 428 BC); Beller. fr. 286b TrGF (Kannicht), of uncertain dating (but not distant from Hippolytus); HF 339–346, 1263–1265, 1340–1346 (c. 425 BC); Andr. 1009–1017, 1028–1036, 1161–1165 (c. 422 BC?); Ion 436–451, 881–922, 1553–1562, 1609–1615 (c. 418 BC); El. 737–746, 1244–1248 (c. 418–415 BC); IT 380–391 (c. 413 BC); Tro. 884–889 (c. 415 BC), with a clear allusion to Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaxagoras; Hel. 711–715, 1137–1150 (c. 412 BC); while in the dramas from his Macedonian period (408–406) Euripides (cf. IA 1368–1403; Bacch. 72–87, 200–204, 370–401) seems to change his attitude towards religion, becoming aware of the force of necessity and reflecting his new view in a kind of “poetic aesthetism,” as Di Benedetto (1971) 239–272 remarks. 173 In the first case fr. 191 Pfeiffer, in the second one fr. 586 Pfeiffer. As for the second Callimachean quotation (§ 3), the verb φησίν by ps.-Plutarch/Aëtius (§ 3) gave rise to serious problems. DG, 59, and, in his wake, Philippson (1939) 21 and Lachenaud (1993) 220, considered the use of that verbum dicendi proof that Aëtius was quoting the excerpta of a Epicurean anthology (“Aëtii enim de deo eclogae ex anthologia αὐτῇ λέξει translatae videntur”). For a status quaestionis and alternative proposals, see Runia (1996) 557–558.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 393

of the testimonium begins. As observed by Runia, the doxographer passes here (§ 4) from the description of (more or less radical) ‘atheistic’ positions, which are considered illogical and hence impossible, to the description of ‘theistic’ positions, which end up being equally impossible (and in fact ‘atheistic’) qua contra naturam Dei.174 In this regard, the first to be attacked is Plato with his alleged ‘creationism,’ as described in the Timaeus (29e–31b) through arguments partly attested in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods.175 Actually, the doxographer twists Plato’s argument on the Demiurge and, clearly influenced by Middle-Platonic interpretations, places the ideas by which the God/Demiurge is inspired not outside, but inside his mind, thus creating the paradox of a ‘self-referential’ creation. It is at this point (§ 5) that Anaxagoras appears. His ‘theism,’ considered essentially ‘atheistic,’ is somehow joined to that of Plato and criticized with arguments that, as Diels already observed, lead us back to a precise source. The rest of the chapter reads as follows: § 5. ὁ δ’ Ἀναξαγόρας φησὶν ὡς “εἱστήκει κατ’ ἀρχὰς τὰ σώματα, νοῦς αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε θεοῦ καὶ τὰς γενέσεις τῶν ὅλων ἐποίησεν” [= 59 A 48 (I) DK]. § 6. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ ἑστηκότα ὑπέθετο τὰ πρῶτα σώματα, ἀτάκτως δὲ κινούμενα· διὸ καὶ ὁ θεός, φησίν, ἐπιστήσας ὡς τάξις ἀταξίας ἐστὶ βελτίων, διεκόσμησε ταῦτα. § 7. κοινῶς οὖν ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἀμφότεροι, ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησαν ἐπιστρεφόμενον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ καὶ τούτου χάριν τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζοντα· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ζῷον συμπεπληρωμένον τε πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῦ παντὸς ἄδεκτον, ὅλον ὂν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμονίας τε καὶ ἀφθαρσίας, ἀνεπιστρεφές ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· κακοδαίμων δ’ ἂν εἴη ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτονος ἀχθοφορῶν καὶ μεριμνῶν εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευήν. § 8. καὶ πάλιν ὁ θεὸς ὃν λέγουσιν ἤτοι τὸν ἔμπροσθεν αἰῶνα οὐκ ἦν, ὅτ’ ἦν ἀκίνητα τὰ σώματα ἢ ἀτάκτως ἐκινεῖτο, ἢ ἐκοιμᾶτο ἢ ἐγρηγόρει ἢ οὐδέτερον τούτων. καὶ οὔτε τὸ πρῶτον ἔστι δέξασθαι, ὁ γὰρ θεὸς αἰώνιος· οὔτε τὸ δεύτερον, εἰ γὰρ ἐκοιμᾶτο ἐξ αἰῶνος ὁ θεός, ἐτεθνήκει· αἰώνιος γὰρ ὕπνος ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ δεκτικὸς ὕπνου θεός, τὸ γὰρ ἀθάνατον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς θανάτου πολὺ κεχώρισται. § 9. εἰ δ’ ἦν ὁ θεὸς ἐγρηγορῶς, ἤτοι ἐνέλειπεν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ ἐπεπλήρωτο ἐν μακαριότητι· καὶ οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον μακάριός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, τὸ γὰρ ἐλλεῖπον εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ μακάριον· οὔτε κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον, μηδὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἔμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεσι. § 10. πῶς δέ, εἴπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔστι καὶ τῇ τούτου φροντίδι τὰ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομεῖται, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον εὐτυχεῖ τὸ δ’ ἀστεῖον τἀναντία πάσχει; Ἀγαμέμνων τε γάρ, “ἀμφότερον βασιλεύς τ᾽ ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ’ αἰχμητής” [= Hom. Il. 3.179], ὑπὸ μοιχοῦ καὶ μοιχάδος ἡττηθεὶς ἐδολοφονήθη· καὶ ὁ τούτου δὲ συγγενὴς Ἡρακλῆς πολλὰ τῶν ἐπιλυμαινομένων τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον καθάρας ὑπὸ Δηιανείρας φαρμακευθεὶς ἐδολοφονήθη.176

174 Runia (1996) 560. 175 Cic. Nat. D. 1.8.18–10.24. See J. Mansfeld’s paper in this volume. 176 Aët. 1.7.1–10 Mansfeld/Runia (= ps.-Plut. Plac. 880d7–881d8 = deest ap. Stob. Ecl. 1.1 [2] = DG, 297–301).

394 

 Christian Vassallo

§ 5. Anaxagoras says that at the beginning the bodies were at rest, but the mind of God gave them an orderly arrangement, and brought about the births of all things. § 6. Plato on the other hand supposed that the primary bodies were not at rest, but moving in a disorderly fashion. Therefore, he says, God, ordaining that order is better than disorder, gave them an orderly arrangement. § 7. Both thinkers therefore have this mistake in common, namely that they made God to be concerned with human affairs or even to create the cosmos on this account. For the blessed and indestructible living being, who is entirely replete with every kind of good thing and not receptive to any evil, being wholly focused on the maintenance of his felicity and indestructibility, is not involved with human concerns, for otherwise he would be wretched in the manner of a workman and a builder, burdened with care and fretting about the construction of the cosmos. § 8. Another argument is that the god of whom they speak either (i) did not exist in the previous age when the bodies were either at rest or in disorderly movement, or (ii) he was asleep or (iii) he was awake, or (iv) neither of these. The first option (i) is unacceptable, for God is eternal. The second (ii) too is unacceptable. If God was sleeping from eternity, he would be dead, since eternal sleep is (tantamount to) death. But God is also not receptive to sleep, for God’s immortality and a state close to death are separated by a great distance. § 9. If, however, God was awake (iii), either (αʹ) there was a deficiency in his felicity or (βʹ) he was wholly fulfilled in his blessedness. But neither according to the first option is he blessed, because a deficiency in felicity is incompatible with blessedness, nor according to the second option, because then, though in no way deficient in happiness, he would embark on deeds that were to no purpose. § 10. How does it happen then, if God indeed does exist and human affairs are administered through his forethought, that what is fraudulent flourishes and what is noble suffers the opposite fate? Agamemnon, for example, was: “both an excellent king and a mighty warrior,” but he was overpowered and murdered by an adulterer and an adulteress. And this man’s relative Heracles, after he had cleaned up many of the evils that infest human life, fell prey to the sorcery of Deïanira and was murdered.177

At a formal level, the dialectic technique in this passage, and in particular the diaeretic technique typical of the Placita, stands out unmistakably. Such a technique has its roots in the argumentative method of the Peripatetic School.178 In terms of content, instead, this doxographical piece of evidence places the ‘theism’ of Anaxagoras and that of Plato for the most part on the same level. The only difference between them lies in the fact that Anaxagoras conceives of God as the source of motion and order for bodies originally in stasis; Plato, instead, as the source of order for bodies originally in disordered motion. Therefore, in both perspectives the key-words are κίνησις and διακόσμησις. But for Anaxagoras, we

177 Transl. by D. Th. Runia. 178 Mansfeld (1990b) 3193–3206; Mansfeld (2010); Runia (1996) 563 ff.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 395

must also add the noun γένεσις, considering that the doxographer makes the very existence of things dependent on the motion and order given to them by the divine Mind.179 Now, if the condition of these two forms of ‘theism’ are identical, their ‘atheistic’ implications as described by the doxographer seem to be absolutely interchangeable. We are obviously speaking, as said above, not about an ‘atheism’ that denies God’s existence, but about a pseudo-theological conception that denies, wholly or only in part, the basic requirements of his nature. From the text, three attributes of divinity clearly emerge: a) bliss and indestructibility (τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ζῷον), which a God involved in cosmological events could not enjoy; b) eternity (ὁ γὰρ θεὸς αἰώνιος), in which a God who, before generating order and/or motion, did not exist or was asleep could not share; c) total lack of interest in human affairs, a characteristic that, if it did not exist, would, on the one hand, irreparably preclude God’s bliss, but on the other, would reveal his helplessness or envy (as it would make him an accomplice to the happiness of the unjust and unhappiness of the righteous, as the famous examples of Agamemnon and Heracles show180). In his Prolegomena to the Doxographi Graeci, Diels maintained that Aëtius’ ch. 1.7.1–10 (which he considered to fall outside the tradition of the so-called Vetusta Placita181) contained a stinging criticism of a superstition which most likely echoed the one prevalent in Epicurus’ Garden. Thus, the paragraphs of ps.-Plutarch devoted to Anaxagoras and Plato’s ‘atheism’ (in the sense explained earlier) must derive from an Epicurean source.182 Relying on Rudolf Hirzel’s opinion,183 Diels also thought that this source was directly dependent on the skepticalAcademic philosopher Clitomachus, a pupil of Carneades and author of a treatise On the Schools of Thought (Περὶ αἱρέσεων)184 and perhaps also of a treatise On Atheism (Περὶ ἀθεότητος).185 The lists of ‘atheists’ cited by Cicero186 and later by Sextus Empiricus, then, could have been derived directly from Clitomachus.187

179 Cf. Sedley (2007) 20–25. 180 On Epicureanism and theodicy, see Spinelli (2015). 181 Cf. M&R1, 64–110, esp. 80–81; M&R2, 27–41. 182 H. Diels ap. DG, 58: “I 7 1–10 (tantum a vetustis Placitis alienum) continet superstitionis irrisionem, qua acerbior vix umquam ex Epicuri hortis retinniit. Epicureus enim fuit qui ab atheis nobilibus exorsus contra Anaxagoram ac Platonem divinam providentiam vehementissime impugnavit.” 183 Hirzel (1877–1883) I, 39. 184 Cf. Diog. Laërt. 2.92, 4.67. 185 Cf. Theophil. Ad Autol. 3.7. Nestle (19422) 416 reads this passage as proof of the real existence of Clitomachus’ treatise concerning ‘atheism’. Contra Winiarczyk (1976) 36. 186 Cic. Nat. D. 1.42.118–119. 187 Sext. Emp. Math. 9.50.

396 

 Christian Vassallo

As far as the anonymous Epicurean source is concerned, Diels concluded: “quis fuerit ille Epicureus non sperare licet patefactum iri. credo tamen eum Philodemo aliquanto fuisse inferiorem.”188 In an article published in Philologus in 1976, Marek Winiarczyk re-examined Diels’ thesis thoroughly, assigning Clitomachus a central role in the doxographical tradition of the list of ‘atheists’: “Kleitomachos mag die Bemerkungen über die Atheisten, die sich in den Schriften der früheren Autoren fanden, gesammelt und zusammengestellt haben, weil er sie in der Polemik mit Vertretern anderer philosophischen Schulen brauchte.”189 According to this reconstruction, Clitomachus, probably influenced by Epicurus and by the historian Philochorus,190 gave rise to three doxographical trends on this topic: (a) one probably converged in Philodemus (via Zeno of Sidon) and, independently, in Sextus Empiricus; (b) another in Cicero (via Philo of Larissa); and (c) the last one in the anonymous Epicurean postulated by Diels, whose witness was acknowledged, via Aëtius, by ps.-Plutarch. In light of what has been previously argued and also on the basis of the new text of the two columns of Philodemus’ On Piety concerning Anaxagoras, we could now revise this reconstruction, amending it so as to downplay in particular the far too central role that Winiarczyk assigns to Clitomachus. The discussion of the lists of the ‘atheists’ in antiquity requires a preliminary distinction between two philosophical traditions: one [α] that considers, in not exclusively critical terms, the ‘atheists’ as ‘skeptics’; another one [β] that polemically qualifies them as God-deniers or deniers of God’s essential characteristics. Tradition [α], which could find its forerunners in the alleged ‘skepticism’ of Xenophanes and in Sophistic (especially Protagorean) ‘agnosticism,’ is no doubt the basis of the Atheistenkatalog-model that emerges from the skeptical-Academic sources, and hence most likely also in Clitomachus. Tradition [β], whose traces can somehow be found in the most extremist fringe groups of the Sophistic movement and in the presence of some Presocratics in Euripides’ dramas (including, as we have seen, Anaxagoras), was polemically inherited by the Epicurean School. Such a catalogue is mentioned in a passage of Philodemus’ On Piety,191 where the (prob-

188 DG, 59. 189 Cf. Winiarczyk (1976) 39 and his scheme at p. 45. 190 That this Atthidographer may have played a role in the tradition of the biographical events of the 5th-cent. BC ‘atheists’ had been hypothesized by Müller (1967) 158. 191 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 19.1–15 Obbink: καὶ πᾶσαν μ[ανίαν Ἐ]|πίκουρος ἐμ[έμψα]|το τοῖς τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]|κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]|ροῦσιν, ὡς κἀ[ν τωῖ] | δωδεκάτω[ι Προ]|δίκωι καὶ Δια[γόραι] | καὶ ⸌Κ⸍ριτίαι κἄ[λλοις] | μέμ͙φ[εται] φ͙ὰς π͙α[ρα]|κόπτειν καὶ μ[αίνεσ]|θαι, καὶ βακχεύου|σιν αὐτοὺς [εἰ]κά[ζει, κε]|λεύσ[ας μ]ὴ πρᾶγμα ἡ|μεῖν παρέχειν οὐ|δ’ ἐνοχλεῖν. κτλ. Cf. Runia (1996) 551.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 397

able) polemics of Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles, Book 22, on the ‘linguistic’ forms of ‘atheism’ (exchanges of names, metaphors, etc.) is also taken into account.192 Obviously, it is not quite certain whether traditions [α] and [β] have an independent origin. As a matter of fact, there are also clues that allow us to posit the existence of an original philosophical source (of authors and ideas) adopted in the later doxographical developments of the two traditions (including those displaying a skeptical tendency193). What seems certain, instead, is that up until the lists attested in Cicero and Philodemus, those traditions had an autonomous evolution. For this reason, I think one should reject Winiarczyk’s idea of Clitomachus’ dependence on Epicurus. The positions of Cicero and Philodemus, who, while preserving their own identities, represent the moment when the two traditions intersect, appear more complicated. There is no doubt that Cicero, via Philo of Larissa, depends upon Clitomachus. But it is equally clear that he somehow draws upon the Epicurean tradition represented by Phaedrus and Zeno of Sidon as well. Later on (and on this point one can agree with Winiarczyk), Sextus Empiricus’ Atheistenkatalog came to be based on Clitomachus alone. More or less directly via Epicurus and of course through Zeno of Sidon as well, the Epicurean tradition was passed along to Philodemus. Among the several sources he declares to have used in On Piety, Philodemus most likely incurred a doxographical ‘debt’ with the skeptical-Academic tradition, including Clitomachus. But – I would conclude – the anonymous Epicurean author (1st cent. AD)194 on which, as already supposed by Diels, ps.-Plutarch’s Atheisthenkatalog (via Aëtius) relies, cannot depend on Clitomachus, but must depend on Philodemus or on the Epicurean source that Philodemus used. Proof of that, I think, is offered by the arguments contra Anaxagoram which can be reconstructed in (and/or inferred

192 In the Herculanean text, Antisthenes is explicitly mentioned, but these practices can evidently be referred to specific Sophistic currents (from Gorgias onwards) as well. 193 This fact could be confirmed by the presence of ‘skeptical’ elements in the theological doxography in Philodemus’ On Piety, as in the case of Xenophanes, for example. On this point, cf. Vassallo (2015c). The existence of another Atheistenkatalog, perhaps richer than Clitomachus’, is hypothesized also by Winiarczyk (1976) 40–41, who notes the absence of ‘atheists’ like Hippon of Rhegium and Leon of Pella in the Academic philosopher’s list. 194 Probably an Epicurean author (Greek but active in Rome?) of whom we have no direct information and who lived long before the successive development of Epicureanism in the imperial age (2nd cent. AD).

398 

 Christian Vassallo

from) PHerc. 1428’s cols. 320–321, where Anaxagoras’ ‘atheism’ seems to be not so much a form of agnostic skepticism, but, rather, a denial of God based on disregard of his main attributes.

Appendix 1 Remarks on the spurious or dubious testimonia T20. The testimonium is entirely devoted to Protagoras and his relativistic theses. For this reason, the sequence αναξαγοριαν that can be read at l. 27 should be amended – as the editor princeps of this text has already done – to Πρωταγόρειαν, an adjective to be referred to the δόξα of the Sophist. Nevertheless, A. Laks per litteras notes that the scribe’s error could also depend on an indirect mental association between the couple of adjectives εὐσεβής/ἀσεβής and the name of Anaxagoras. If so, the testimonium could be placed within an appendix to the section of DAPR devoted to Anaxagoras’ trial for impiety. T21. Although full of gaps, this piece of evidence seems to hand down a quotation from Democritus’ Little Cosmology. In this fragment, the Atomistic philosopher says that he dealt with some arguments already in the Great Cosmology. The uncertain Herculanean author (most probably Philodemus195), following a tradition than can be traced back to Theophrastus,196 points out that in antiquity this last Democritean work was actually held to be by Leucippus. The second part of the testimonium refers to a case of plagiarism of others’ ideas. As already supposed by W. Crönert, this piece of information could be read in two ways: (a) as a development of the tradition according to which Democritus borrowed the opinions of others (and not just in the Great Cosmology); or – but in my view this is not very likely – (b) as a reference to the tradition that ascribed such plagiarism to Anaxagoras.197

195 As I attempt to demonstrate in Vassallo (2017b), where I hypothesize that PHerc. 1788 belongs to Philodemus’ Survey of Philosophers. See comm. ad loc. 196 Cf. Diog. Laërt. 9.46 (= 68 A 33 DK = Theophr. fr. 237 FHS&G). 197 Diog. Laërt. 9.34 (= 68 A 1 DK). Cf. Crönert (1906) 147 and 187.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 399

Appendix 2 Papyrological and Palaeographical Notes T1 → Sources: P These two columns were written by hand by Ammon, who was the owner of an important archive in Panopolis. In addition to the papyrus in question, in the same archive PAmmon II 26 (= PDuke inv. G 176) was found as well.198 This literary papyrus dates from the middle of the 3rd cent. AD and contains remains of Hom. Od. 9.298–309 and 344–384.

T2 → Sources: P (PHerc. 1005, cr. 3, pz. 3) and a ‘sovrapposto’ placed in cr. 3, pz. 3, fr. 107 Angeli = [O] = N, fr. 19 = VH2 I 142 (cf. Angeli [1988] 230) Before l. 8 the lacuna of at least 7 lines ex N || 8 ⌈χαρικλε⌉ N : [P] || 9 ⌈βελτι⌉ (σ, ο, ε, θ, ω) N : [P] || 10 ⌈γορουκα⌉ N, where γ is partially abraded : [P] || between ll. 10 and 13 the letters preserved in N do not belong to the original layer || 13 ⌈αμβανει⌉ N : ]ε[ P || 14 τωναπαντων[+1 P (the ‘sovrapposto’ is considered by A. Angeli as belonging to the original layer of fr. 107 of her edition) : τωναπαντων[ N || 15 ]αυθοπο[+1 P (the ‘sovrapposto’ is considered by A. Angeli as belonging to the original layer of fr. 107 of her edition) : ]αυθοτηνρ[ Nac : ]αυ[]οτηνρ[ Npc || 16 κουεκρινε[ (ρ, γ, π), ink at top, ink at bottom, (π, γι), ink at bottom P+1 (the ‘sovrapposto’ is considered by A. Angeli as belonging to the original layer of fr. 107 of her edition) : ]τ[₍₎]ιδρ[₍₎]ον[₍₎]ερι[ N || 17 ][][]ο[+1 ink at top, ink at top, (γ, γι, π), (ρ, υ), (α, λ), (ι, σ) P : [N] || 18 ][][+1 (η, π), vert. P : [N]

T3 → Sources: [P (PHerc. 1005)] = O Bodl. Libr. Ms. Gr. Class., c. 2, fol. 457 = N, fr. 24 = VH2 I 144 Before l. 3 the lacuna of at least 2 lines can be inferred by O || 3 ⌈η⌉ ONac : [Npc] || ⌉ε (μ, ν, κ) || ⌈ι⌉ N : [O] || 4 ⌈τ⌉ O : [N] || ⌈ισ⌉ O : σο N || ⌈σ⌉ O : ε N || ⌈π⌉ O : [N] || 5 ]τουταν[ ON || 6 ⌈γ⌉ N : τ O || ⌈γι⌉ O :  (π, γι) N || ]σ (ω, ο) || 7 δ[ (ο, ω) || 8 ⌈⌉ (ε, ο) O : [N] || 9 μενσυκατατεταμεν⌈ ON || ⌈ω⌉ N :  (ω, ο) O || 11 ⌈ιδ⌉ O : [N] || ⌈τ⌉ O : [N] || ⌈α⌉ O : [N] || fin. ⌈ε⌉ N : [O] || 12 ]ημοκειτονκα⌈ ON || ⌈ι⌉ N : [O] || 13 ]τονπραγματευ ON

198 = TM 60786 = LDAB 1913 = MP3 1081.1.

400 

 Christian Vassallo

T4 → Sources: P (cr. 23) = O Bodl. Libr. Ms. Gr. Class., c. 6, fol. 1338 = N, col. 21 = VH2 III 34 3 ⌈φια⌉ O : [PN] || 4 ⌈μη⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈τρο⌉ O : [PN] || 5 ⌈με⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈ει⌉ O : [PN] || 6 ⌈λοσ⌉ (ο, ω) O : [PN] || ⌈σειλ⌉ O (between σ and ε there is a spatium vacuum in the apograph) : [PN] || 7 ⌈δισ⌉ (ε, θ, ο, σ, ω) O : [PN] || ⌈σεπ⌉ O : [PN] || 8 ⌈ραμ⌉ O : [PN] || 9 ⌈οτριβου⌉ O : [PN] || ][] ink subter lineam, (κ, χ), (ε, ο), vert. at bottom, (ο, ω) || 11 ⌈ομ⌉ O : [ (ο, ω, σ, ε, θ) P : [N] || 12 ⌈με⌉ O : ] (ε, σ) P : ]ε N || αε ink trace, ink trace, (γ, τ) || 13 τθ left ink at top, (υ, κ) || 14 ⌈ολ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈ε⌉ ON :  right ink at top P || ⌈πο⌉ ON :  ink at top, (ο, ε) P || ⌈τ⌉ O :  (τ, υ) P : [N] || ⌈αι⌉ O : [ (α, λ) P : [N] || 15 ⌈ομω⌉ short horiz. with joint at mid-height N : ] ink at bottom, left ink at bottom and right ink at top P : ]ωμω O || ⌈ται⌉ O : [PN] || 16 ⌈δ⌉ O : [PN] || ]⌈ (ρ, φ) || ⌈ω⌉ O :  (ω, ν, κι) P :  (ο, ω) N || ⌈νων⌉ (τ, γ, π) O : [ descender at top P : ν[ (τ, γ, π) N || 17 ⌈υπ⌉ O (the paragraphos is in the apograph) : [PN] || ]χ (ρ, φ, ψ, β) || between ν and ο there is a spatium vacuum || ε⌈ left vert. || ⌈μεν⌉ O : [PN] || 18 ⌈μ⌉ O : [PN] || ]α (κ, χ) || τ⌈ (η, ν), (σ, ο, ω) || ⌈εσθαι⌉ O : [PN] || 19 ⌈τνρ⌉ (ο, ω) O : ] ink (apex?) at top, (ρ, ι) P : ]ρ N || ⌈δ⌉ ON :  horiz. at bottom (δ, ζ, ξ likely) P || ⌈σ⌉ O : [PN] || 20 ⌈καν⌉ O : ] (ν, τ) P : ]ν N || ⌈ν⌉ O :  right ink at bottom P : [N] || ⌈α⌉ (ν, ι) ON : [ (α, λ, δ) P || 21 ⌈αν⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈γο⌉ N :  (γ, τ), (ο, ε) P : [O] || ][ ink at top, ink at top || 22 ⌈πε⌉ vert. at top O : [PN] || ⌈ν⌉ N :  vert. at top P : [O] || ⌉[] curve at bottom, ink at top || 23 ⌈αν⌉ (ε, θ, ο, σ, ω) O : [PN] || ⌉τ ink at bottom || ο[ (ν, η), (ε, θ) || 24 ]ν (ω, ο) || 25 ]α (ξ, ζ, τ, π) || ι[ (α, λ, δ) || 26 between υ and σ there is a short spatium vacuum || 27 ⌈με⌉ O :  (μ, λ), (ε, σ) P : ]ε N || ⌈πα⌉ O :  (π, τ), (α, λ) P : γα N || ⌈λεστωι⌉ O : [PN] || 28 αω (μ, λ) || ⌈αλλακα⌉ O : [ (α, λ) P : κ[ N || 29 ⌈⌉ (τ, π, γ) N : [PO] || ση (χ, κ) || ⌈κ⌉ O :  ink at bottom P : [N] || 30 ο right short horiz. at bottom || λ⌈ (ω, ο) || ⌈μο⌉ right joint at top (ν, η likely) O : [PN] || 31 ⌈νονδε⌉ vert. O : [PN] || ⌉τ (α, λ) || ⌈ηνη⌉ O : [PN] || 32 ⌈στωικη⌉ O : [PN] || ο[ (λ, α), ink at top || ⌈ασαγα⌉ O : [PN] || 33 ⌈τοδ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈εισθαιτην⌉ O (almost certainly the last three letters do not belong to the original layer, given that in the apograph they are in the intercolumnium) : [PN] || 34 ]ε short vert. with apex at bottom, ink at bottom || ⌈⌉ (λ, α, δ) O (almost certainly the last three letters do not belong to the original layer, given that in the apograph they are in the intercolumnium) : [PN] || ⌈νευτα⌉ vert., horiz. at top, (η, ν, μ) || 35 ⌈μ⌉ O :  ink at bottom P : [N] || ⌈ανωπε[]ο⌉ O (almost certainly the last four letters do not belong to the original layer, given that in the apograph they are in the intercolumnium) : [PN]

T5 → Sources: [P] = [O] = N, fr. 7 = VH2 XI 17 5 πολιτικον N || 11 ποισιν N || 15–16 ε[- - - | - - -]σιν N || 17 πυταγορου N

T6 → Sources: [P] = [O] = N, fr. 15 = VH2 VII 154 1 ]αγφ (λ, α, δ), (ω, γ) || 2 ν[ (σ, ο, ω) || 6 γομενον N || between the second ν and the third ο there is a remarkable spatium vacuum || υ[ (ν, λ) || 7 ]φοιπανταχητοιου[ left curve at bottom, (τ, π, ζ, ξ) || 8 ]ι (α, λ) || 10 ]τ vert. at top || 11 ]α (α, λ, δ) || 13 ]θαι[ (λ, α), (υ, ψ)

T7 → Sources: P (cr. 1) = [O] = N, fr. 7 = VH2 VIII 169

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 401

1 ⌈α⌉ N :  (α, λ, δ) P || ][ (σ, ε) || a further autopsy of the original disproves Vassallo (2015a) 112, because the ρ with joint at mid-height at l. 1 belongs to the non-original layer (for this reason we should rule out the ῥά[βδωι suggested by D. Sedley per verba, perhaps spatio longius, and all the more so the ῥᾶ[ιον that I proposed in my previous edition) || 2 ιτοσ (σ, ε), ink at top || 3 ⌈ε⌉ N :  (ε, σ) P || ατ right ink at top || 5 ρω̣ (α, λ), (σ, ε) || ⌈ο⌉ N :  (ο, σ) P || 6 ⌈τασ⌉ N :  ink at top, descender, (σ, ε) P || ⌈πα⌉ N :  (π, γ), descender || 7 ]⌈ (γ, π, τ) || ⌈ματατησ⌉ N : ] curve at top P || 8 ⌈ξεβαλετου⌉ N : [P] || 9 ⌈δ⌉ N :  (δ, λ, α) P || ⌈μα⌉ N : [ (μ, λ) P || ⌈α⌉ N : [P] || ⌈θροουσ⌉ N : [P] || 10 ⌈νε⌉ N : [ (ν, τ) P || ]σ (η, π) || ⌈ω⌉ N : [P] || 11 ⌈σ⌉ N :  (σ, ε) P || ⌈τ⌉ N : [P] || ⌈νπρο⌉ (ε, θ, ο, σ) N : [P]

T8 → Sources: [P] = [O] = N, fr. 3 = VH2 VII 142 2 between ν and κ brief spatium vacuum || καταταξα[ N || 6 ομολοτων N || 8 παραγενεσθαι N (cf. Vassallo [2015a] 101) || 15 α[ horiz. at top (π, τ, ζ, ξ likely) || 17 λ[ (ο, ω)

T9 → Sources: P (cr. 1) = O Ms. Gr. class. c. 3, 3, fol. 553 = N, col. 2 = VH2 VII 3 1 ⌈πα⌉ N : [P] : ]α O || between the second and the third α there is a short spatium vacuum || ⌈ουσ⌉ ON : [] curve at bottom (ο, ω possible), (σ, ε) P || 2 ⌈τ⌉ ON :  (τ, π, γ) P || ⌈σε⌉ ON : [ left curve at bottom P || 3 ⌈ο⌉ N :  right curve at top PO || fin. ⌈α⌉ N, corrected in ὑ͙ by Crönert, seems rather to be in P ε or θ and it falls within a ‘sottoposto’ || ⌈ι⌉ N : [PO] || 4 ⌈ειν⌉ N : [PO] || σ left curve at top, ink at top || 5 ]ρ right horiz. at top, left obliq. (with ‘lace’ shape) at bottom || ⌈δ⌉ N : ]η ink at bottom (traces to the right and left) : λ O || 6 ι⌈ (ρ, β), (α, λ) || ⌈στ⌉ ON : [ right curve at bottom P || 7 ]π two ink traces at bottom || ⌈εσκ⌉ ON : [P]

T10 → Sources: P (cr. 2, ‘sovrapposto’) = [O] = N, fr. 7 = VH2 VI 27 1 ]ω right ink at top || ⌈γ⌉ N :  (π, γ) P || 2 before ι, N reads ε, but the letter (that might actually be a τ, π, γ) falls within a ‘sottoposto’ || 4 ]ι right ink at top || between the second ι and the second τ there is an ano stigme probably written by a second hand || οημη (δ, λ), ink at bottom and at top, curve at bottom (ΕΘΟΣ or o likely), vert. at bottom, ink at bottom || 5 σν (α, λ, δ) || ι[][ (α, ο, ρ), scattered and faded ink traces at bottom and at top || 6 ι[₍₎]ν two ink traces at bottom and at top, right vert. at mid-height, semi-vert. at top || 7 ]σ (η, π, γ, τ), (ε, σ), (γ, π), (η, κ) || ]εκ[ (θ, ο), left ink at top || 8 ][][ ink at bottom (arch or diagonal), (ε, θ), (ν, κ) || 9 ][ semivert. at bottom, arch at top || οε[ left semi-horiz. or semi-diag. at top, (ι, γ) || 10 ][ ink at top, ink at bottom, ink at bottom || 11 ][ (ε, σ), (ν, κ, ρ)

T11 → Sources: P (cr. 3) = [O] = N, fr. 11 = VH2 VI 28 1 ε[]κ horiz. at top, two ink traces at bottom, curve at bottom || 2 αγορευετ P : εγαρτοχυν wrongly N || τιοτιδη[ (α, λ), vert. (π, γ, ι, ν, κ likely : to be ruled out the λ read by Millot) || 3 between the first tau and the first epsilon the scribe (or a second hand) drew supra lineam a stigme (probably for indicating the apostrophe) || 4 νε left short horiz. at top || 5 ποιη P : τιν

402 

 Christian Vassallo

wrongly N || ηε (μ, λλ) || between the second η and the second ε the scribe (or a second hand) wrote an ano stigme || ξμ (ο, σ) || 6 ]σλωνυ (γ, τ, π, η, ν), left ink at top and right ink at bottom, (υ, η, π), ink at bottom, (σ, ι), (α, λ), ink at bottom, (ο, θ, σ, ε) || νυκεκ P : νευσεκ wrongly N || 7 μ[₍₎]νη (ε, ο), ink at bottom, ink at top, (ν, π, γι) || 8 ][]ησει[ ink subter lineam, left and right scattered ink traces at bottom and at top, semi-horiz. at bottom (or at mid-height), horiz. at top || 9 ιοσο right ink at bottom and at top, ink at bottom, (μ, ν, νι, κι) || 10 ]ι (ο, θ), (τ, π) || ]ι[ (α, λ), horiz. at top

T12 → Sources: P (cr. 5) = [O] = N fr. 25 = VH2 VI 33 1 τν right ink traces at bottom and at top || α·η (ν, κ), between the uncertain letter and η there is an ano stigme || 2 εα ink at top, (γ, τ) || σιο[ (π, τ), (ο, ε), (τ, π) || 4 μ[ (ο, ε, ω) || over the discender of the first α a kind of punct (different from an ano stigme and probably written by a second hand in order to point out an error, perhaps a missing letter) is readable || ρ[ curve at top, two ink traces at top and at bottom || 5 ⌈γ⌉ N :  (κ, γ, π) P || ⌉[ left ink at bottom || εε (χ, κ) || 6 λε[₍₎]τω[ (π, τ), ink at mid-height, ink at bottom, (σ, ε, θ, ο, ω) || ][₍₎][ (π, γι), (ε, θ), (ο, θ), ink at top || 7 ε[ (κ, θ) || ][ (σ, ε), ink at top, (φ, ψ), right arch or apex at bottom, (π, ν, γι) || the traces of letter in the following line fall in a ‘sovrapposto,’ that, along with another little ‘sovrapposto’ and two very little ‘sottoposti,’ extends up to l. 7

T13 → Sources: P 15 ][ curve at bottom (ΕΘΟΣ likely) || 16 ]ς ink at mid-height || ι ink at bottom || 17 σ of the letter almost half is readable at bottom, even though it looks slightly compressed because the papyrus fiber is damaged there (one cannot rule out a δ, as supposed by Hunt and others) || 20 > the ending ink trace most probably belongs to a filling mark, not to a sign wrongly written by the scribe, pace Hunt (1912) 172, partly followed by Arrighetti (1964) 108; cf. Funghi (1989) 158, who, referring to the similar case of fr. 38, col. I.19, thinks of a sign “tracciato soltanto per allungare la curva superiore della lettera per colmare il rigo”; so also Schorn (2004) 92 || 21 π of this letter almost the whole horizontal stroke at top and a faded trace of the right vertical stroke are readable (the γ read by the editor princeps and others is equally plausible, although the length of the horiz. seems to exceed that of γ in ll. 17 and 24) || 22 between σ and ε there is an ano stigme || 28 ]φ right ink at top || 29 ]ς ink at top (the letter is uncertain and the υ of the editio princeps remains only hypothetical)

T14 → Sources: P 5 ][ ink subter lineam, ink at bottom || 6 ]ο lower and upper traces of right vert. (because of phonetic and semantic considerations the ι read by Hunt and others does not seem convincing; one could think of a ν, but see the app. crit. ad loc.) || 7 ]ο ink at bottom || 8 λ[ left ink trace at bottom joined to λ (it could be the arch of letters ΕΘΟΣ or of a ω, or of a part of the rising obliq. of an α) || ]σαμ[ this sequence of letters seems to be certain (from the editio princeps onwards the common reading has been ]υμε[) || between the incomplete ι and α there is probably a (short)

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 403

spatium vacuum || 15 on the first σ (as it happens in the first σ of l. 13) the scribe traced a mark difficult to interpret, given that we must certainly rule out an expunction mark || ][ ink at top (curve possible), ink at top || 21 between the first ι and the following α a very short spatium vacuum can be read || 26 between the second ν and ζ there is an ano stigme (at the beginning of the line, as well as in ll. 14 and 20, there was probably a lost paragrahos marking the opening of the Euripidean quotation)

T15 → Sources: [P] = O, Ms. Gr. Class., c. 1, fol. 48 (‘sovrapposto’?) = [N] = [VH2] 3 τιθα O || 3–4 ]|ρτε O || 4 αναζαπραν O || 5 ετ right vert. at top (ν, η likely) || 6 οε (ν, γ, ι) || 6–7 αλλανο[]ν[- - -]|ωσαμογου͙καθη͙[]νηδιον[- - - O || 8 ν[]λ (π, γ), descendent (α likely) or right branch (υ likely) or branch at top (κ likely)

T16 → Sources: P (cr. 1, pz. 5 and a ‘sovrapposto’ placed at the centre of the same ‘pezzo,’ col. 318 [olim fr. 7]) = O Bodl. Libr. Ms. Gr. Class., c. 5, fol. 1227 (B,cinf.; 25dext.) = N, fr. 9 (4dext.) = VH2 II 4 21 ]σοσ[ (ο, ω), (μ, λλ), (υ, γ, τ, π) || 23 ]ικ[ (κ, χ), (α, λ), apex at bottom and ink at midheight, ink at top || ][ (σ, ο, ε, ω, θ) || 24 ]+1 (ο, σ, ε, θ, ω) || ]δικ apex at bottom, (α, λ, δ) || ]σ (η, γ, τ) || 25 τοσ+1 || ⌈ν⌉ N : [PO] || 26 κ+1 || 27 ]ι (α, λ) || ]α right ink at top || 28 ]ν apex at bottom || τν ink at top and at bottom, ink at bottom || in the inferior margin one can read ΤΚ, about cm 1 below the sequence ΔΙΑ of the last line of the column (on the probable meaning of the letters and, in general, on the stichometric problems of PHerc. 1428, I would refer to Vassallo [2018a] and the bibliography cited there)

T17 → Sources: P (cr. 1, pz. 5 and a ‘bisovrapposto’ placed in the upper part of the same ‘pezzo,’ col. 318 [olim fr. 7]) = O Bodl. Libr. Ms. Gr. Class., c. 5, fol. 1227 (B,finf.; 24 [olim 23]sin.) = N, fr. 10 (6dext.) = VH2 II 4 12 ][+2 (ζ, ξ, δ, φ) || 13 ιν[+2 (κ, λ, α), (η, ν, γ) || 14 ]βη[+2 ink at mid-height and at bottom || 24 λκ[ (α, λ), (α, λ), ink at bottom || 26 ⌈ι⌉ O : [PN] || ο[ left vert. (or slightly curved?) stroke at mid-height || 28 ⌈υτ⌉ Npc :  scattered ink traced at bottom and at top, (τ, π, γ) P : ] horiz. at top O : ]τ Nac || ⌈γ⌉ N:  vert. with apex at bottom P : [O] :  (λ, μ, α) NArman || 29 ⌈ε⌉ ON : [P] || 30 ⌈σ⌉ N : [PO] || 31 ο (ρ, β)

T18 → Sources: P 43 ο the more squared shape of this letter by comparison to the other ο of the papyrus might also suggest a ρ (a one-letter lacuna between ρ and υ is plausible : ]ρ[ο]υς?) || between σ and ε there is a short spatium vacuum || χ in P one can detect half of a rising obliq., which looks like a χ more than a λ (as maintained instead by Hunt and Fanan) || 44 ⸌ο⸍ the insertion supra lineam by the

404 

 Christian Vassallo

scribe (less probably by a second hand) of a (partially incomplete) omicron is quite clear and is also noted in the palaeographical apparatus by Fanan (1989) 153, who however did not print it in her edition || α traces of half of the left obliq. and of the horiz. are preserved (the obliq. stroke could also be considered a peculiar vert., and one might think of a η as well, but absolutely not of a ε) || ι the letter is almost entirely preserved (also Hunt and Fanan think of a ι), but a ν is palaeographically not to be ruled out || 45 between the incomplete ν and κ there is a spatium vacuum || 46 between ν and the incomplete β there is a short spatium vacuum || 48 αζ both letters are largely incomplete because of a break in the papyrus; nevertheless, the left obliq. and traces of the right one at top (crossed with the left) along with a little left portion of the horiz. of α are readable; as for the ζ, one can only read the lower and upper parts of the obliq. and (perhaps) a portion of the left part of the horiz. at top (Hunt’s [1910] 98 palaeographic description does not correspond to the traces preserved in P) || 49 ι right ink at bottom || ⟦ι⟧ on ι it seems to be readable an expunction mark, not a diaeresis (as supposed by Fanan [1989] 153) || on υ there seem to be no traces either of diaeresis (pace Hunt [1910] 98) or of diacritical marks (pace Fanan (1989) 153) || 50 between the second ι and the incomplete θ there is a spatium vacuum || θ the left arch readable at top suggests a letter ΕΘΟΣ, but the context allows us to opt for theta (a π, with reference to the last letter of l. 55, is instead suggested by Sider, who sees also on the second ι a little dot that could be a trace of a diaeresis: see the app. crit., ad loc.) || ⸌ο⸍ the letter, as usual in this writing, is ‘hung’ on the upper ‘rettrice’; ω remains an uncertain letter, whose left ink traces at bottom suggest a η as well (so also Fanan [1989] 153) || 51 υ short vert. subter lineam, probably rising left obl. at top (Fanan [1989] 153 reads a ι) || between ny and omicron there is a short spatium vacuum || [][ two vert. (ν or π?), (η, ει), two crossed diag. (χ or μ?) || 52 τ ink at bottom (?) || 53 ν right ink at bottom || between ν and the incomplete ω there is a short spatium vacuum || 54 ⸌το⸍ in the line-spacing the traces of these two letters (both preserved in their left half part) are clearly readable (it seems possible to rule out any diacritical marks)

T19 → Sources: P (cr. 2) = O Ms. Gr. Class., c. 4, fol. 858 = N, fr. 17 = VH1 IX 47 (= 59) 1[ curved stroke at bottom || ⌈ο⌉ O :  (ο, ω) P : [N] || ⌈χ⌉ O :  left ink traces at bottom and right ink traces at top at top P : [N] || ⌈ισμ⌉ O : [P] : ισ[ N || ⌈σωσ⌉ O : ] (ω, μ), (σ, ε) P : ]α[ N || ⌉ε apex at bottom || ⌈οτη⌉ ON : (ο, ω), ink at bottom P : ο[ N || ⌈τα⌉ ON : [P] || 2 ι[ (σ, ο, ω) || ⌈μ⌉ ON :  (μ, λ) P || ⌉α ink at mid-height || ⌈ιν⌉ O : [ (ι, γ, ν) P : [N] || ⌈ρετονυ⌉ ON : [ (ρ, ν), curve at bottom (ΕΘΟΣ?) or left part of a ω P || 3 ⌈⌉ (ρ, ν, κ, β) || between the first incomplete ν and the first ο there is a large spatium vacuum || ⌈ουδ⌉ O : [] right two ink traces at bottom and at mid-height, base of a letter (δ, ξ, ζ likely) P : ]δ N || ⌈ε⌉ O :  (ε, σ) P : [N] || ⌉⌈ vert. at bottom, left ink at bottom, curve at bottom || ⌈γεχ⌉ O : ][ curve at bottom P : ]εχ N || ⌉⌈ ink at bottom || ⌈ρι⌉ O : [P] : βι N || 4 ⌈εγ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈αιρε⌉ ON : ι[ (α, λ, δ), two ink traces at bottom and at top P || ⌈ον⌉ O : [P] : ]ν N || 5 τ[ (ε, ο) || ⌈ε⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈πολλα⌉ O : [] ink at bottom, (λ, α), (α, λ) P : [N] || 6 ⌈ζ⌉ O :  (ζ, ξ) P : [N] || ⌈νκαι⌉ between ν and κ there is a short spatium vacuum N : [P] : νκαι O || 7 π[ (α, λ) || ⌈ο⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈ν⌉ ON : [P] || 8 ⌈ε⌉ ON :  left short curve at bottom P || ⌈ο⌉ O :  (ο, ω) P : [N] || ⌈υ⌉ O :  left ink at top P : [N] || ⌈αστ⌉ O :  (α, λ), (σ, ε), apex at bottom P : [N] || ⌈ν⌉ N : [P] :  right vert. O || 9 ⌈α⌉ ON : [P] || ⌈λ⌉ ON :  (λ, α, δ) P || ⌈κτ⌉ O : [P] : ]τ N || ⌈ειτ⌉ O :  (ε, σ), ink at bottom, apex at bottom P : [N] || ⌈ο⌉ ON : [P] || 10 ⌈ισο⌉ O : [ vert. at top, curve at top P : ισ[ N || ]ι (α, λ, δ) || ⟦θ⟧ letter expunged by the scribe through an horiz. stroke at top || ⌈σηπρεσ⌉ O : ε (σ, ε), (η, γ), (π, τ, γι), left ink subter lineam, curve at bottom P : ]η[]εσ N || 11 ⌈α⌉ N : [P] :  (λ, α) O || ⌈ευτα⌉ O : [P] : ]τα N || ⌈σοιδ⌉ O :

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 405

[₍₎] (σ, ο, ω), (δ, λ, α) P : [N] || ⌈πεισον⌉ O : [ left vert. at top, (ε, σ), apex at bottom, (σ, ε), (ο, τ) P : πειων N || 12 ⌈ταιτια⌉ O : ][ (α, λ), vert. at bottom P : [N] || ⌈με⌉ O : [P] : ]ε N || ο[ (π, τ) || ⌈οιπο⌉ ON : [₍₎] left curve at top, ink at top P || as a whole, the line is slightly shorter than the others (as the textual connection with the following line shows) || 13 τ[ (ο, ω) || ]ο (π, λ) || ⌈τερ⌉ O : [ (τ, π, γ) P : ]ερ N || ⌈α⌉ N :  (α, λ, δ, μ) P :  (α, λ) O || ⌈γαρ⌉ ON : [P] || 14 ][ (α, λ) || ⌈ρεσ⌉ O :  vert. at bottom, left curve at bottom, curve or horiz. at top P : ]ε N || ⌈κ⌉ ON :  ink at top P || 15 ⌈υχ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈α⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈θ⌉ O :  curve at bottom P : [N] || ⌈η⌉ ON : [P] || ⌈α⌉ ON :  rising obliq. or vert. P || 16 δ[]γ left ink traces at bottom, (ω, ο) || ⌈ε⌉ O : [PN] || ][ (μ, λ, α), (α, λ, δ) || ⌈τ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈υ⌉ ON :  (υ, χ) P || 17 ⌈γ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈α⌉ O :  right ink at bottom P : [N] || ][]⌈ (α, λ), (γ, ρ), left vert. at top || ⌈τ⌉ O :  (τ, π, γ) P : [N] || 18 ⌈δη⌉ O :  base (δ, ξ, ζ likely), stroke at mid-height P : [N] || ⌈ε⌉ N :  (ε, θ) P : [O] || α⌈ ink at bottom || ⌈σα⌉ ON : [ curve at bottom or apex P || ]α (μ, λ) || ⌈η⌉ ON : [P] || ⌈ντει⌉ ON : [ right vert. at top, (τ, π, ξ, ζ) P || 19 ⌈ροστ⌉ ON : ] (σ, ε), (τ, π, γ) P || ][][ (σ, ε), ink at bottom || 20 ]τησ⌈ (ω, ο, ν, ι), ink at bottom, right horiz. at top || ⌈⌉ (ε, θ, ο, σ, ω) O : [PN] || ⌈⌉ (ο, ω, ε) O : [PN] || ⌈γαρδ⌉ O : [P] : ]αρ[ Ν || 21 ]κω[₍₎][ ink at bottom, apex at bottom, rising obliq. at top (α, λ, δ likely), ink at bottom || ⌈οντ⌉ ON : [P] || σα (ξ, ζ) || ⌈σησ⌉ O : [PN] || 22 ⌈ω⌉ O : [PN] || ]μ vert. || ⌈εν⌉ ON :  horiz. at mid-height, right vert. at top P || ⌉[ (α, λ) || ⌈αγ⌉ O :  (α, λ), (γ, τ, π) P : [N] || 23 ⌈οπ⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈ενομ⌉ O : [PN] || α[ ink at bottom || 24 ⌈ανη⌉ O : ] ink at bottom, ink at bottom P : [N] || 25 ⌈τιαν⌉ O : ] (ν, ω) P : [N] || 26 ]τ[ apex at bottom, scattered ink traces at bottom, vert. || ξ is a certain reading ex P (N wrongly reads τ) || ⌈ον⌉ O : ] (ν, η) P : [N] || ][ ink at bottom || 27 ⌈δ⌉ O :  (δ, α) P : [N] || ⌈φ⌉ O : ] curve at mid-height (φ, ψ likely) P : [N] || ⌈υ⌉ O : ] ink traces at bottom and at top P : [N] || ]την[][]ν right vert. at top, vert. at bottom, ink at top, (ε, θ), (υ, ι) || 28 ν (τ, π, γ), (ο, ω), ink traces at top, ink at bottom || ⌈τιτο⌉ O : [PN] || ]ι[ ink at top, (κ, χ), (ν, λ, α) || 29 [ curve at bottom, ink at bottom, (ω, π), (κ, χ, η) || ⌈δ[₍₎]φε⌉ O : ] ink at mid-height P : [N] || ντ left vert., right ink at top || ⌈τη⌉ ON : [P] || ]⌈ ink at top || ⌈οσ⌉ O :  curve at bottom, ink at bottom P : [N] || λ[ (ε, ο), apex at bottom || 30 ]α (σ, ο, ω) || ][ (σ, ε), (τ, γ), ink at mid-height, apex at bottom and ink trace at top || ⌈ου⌉ (τ, π, γ) O : ] apex at bottom P : [N] || 31 ⌈ε⌉ O :  (ε, ο) P : [N] || η[ (φ, μ), ink at bottom, (λ, α), ink at bottom || ⌈υ⌉ O :  (υ, χ) P : [N] || ⌈ωσπερι⌉ N : [ (ω, ο), (σ, ε), (π, τ), (ε, σ), (ρ, φ) P : ωσπερ O || 32 ]ε (μ, λ, α) || ⌈σ⌉ O :  (σ, γ) P: [N] || between the first σ (ex O) and λ there is a large spatium vacuum (Henry [2009] 40 conjectures the existence of a paragraphos at the beginning of the line, but this paragraphos is actually in the following line) || ⌈η⌉ O :  right apex at bottom P : ι N || σ ink at bottom || 33 ο[ left short obl. at top (υ, χ likely) || ο[ vert. at bottom || ⌈ψ⌉ O :  (ψ, φ) P : [N] || ⌉[ (α, λ) || 34 ⌈α⌉ O :  (α, λ) P : [N] || ⌉[ (ν, λ) || 35 ⌈φ⌉ O :  (φ, ψ) P : [N] || ⌈με⌉ O :  (μ, λ), curve at top P : [N] || ⌈τ⌉ N :  (τ, π) [PΟ] || ⌈υττεσ⌉ vert. O : [P] : ]υττ[ N || ⌉α apex at bottom joined with a short vert. || ⌈ο⌉ O :  ink at bottom P : [N] || 36 [ (ο, ω) || ⌈τ⌉ O :  (τ, π) P : [N] || ε[₍₎]⌈ left apex at bottom joined to a short vert., (α, λ, δ) || ⌈λ⌉ ON :  (λ, α) P || ⌈ο⌉ ON :  ink at top P || ⌈σευ⌉ ON : ] (υ, χ) P || ⌈ιανπ⌉ O :  ink at bottom, (α, λ), (ν, ο), (π, τ, γ) P : να[ N || 37 ⌈του⌉ O :  (τ, π, γ), ink at bottom, ink at top P : [N] || ⌈σκα⌉ O : ] (α, λ) P : κα (σ, λ) N || ⌈φι⌉ O : [ (φ, σ) P : [N] || ⌈φια⌉ O : [PN] || 38 τα ink at bottom, vert at bottom (perhaps subter lineam) || ⌈α⌉ O :  (α, δ) P : [N] || 39 ⌈αθο⌉ O : [PN] || ⌈ειζο⌉ O : ] horiz. at bottom, (ο, ω) P : [N]

T20 → Sources: P 20 in Πρωταγόρο⟦α⟧⸌υ⸍ the second ο is a correction of the ι previously written by the scribe || 22 οντα⸌τοισουσιν⸍εν || 25 ⸌επι⸍ P || 27 αναξαγοριαν P : αγόρειαν emend. Gronewald || ενπιπτομεν P

406 

 Christian Vassallo

T21 → Sources: [P] = [O] = N, fr. 1 = VH2 II 58 4 a little spatium vacuum between the first ν and φ || 5 α[ (ι, π, γ)

References Adorno (1989): Francesco Adorno, “Prefazione”, in: CPF I.1*, v–xi. Acosta Méndez (1990): Eduardo Acosta Méndez, “Anassagora, test. 20 D.-K.”, in: Mario Capasso, Gabriella Messeri Savorelli and Rosario Pintaudi (eds.), Miscellanea Papyrologica in occasione del bicentenario dell’edizione della Charta Borgiana, 2 vols., Florence, I, 37–40. Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992): Eduardo Acosta Méndez and Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Testimonianze su Socrate, Naples. Angeli (1988): Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Agli amici di scuola (PHerc. 1005), Naples. Arr.2: Graziano Arrighetti (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Arrighetti (1964): Graziano Arrighetti, Satiro: Vita di Euripide, Pisa. Baltussen (2008): Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator, London. Banfi (1999): Antonio Banfi, “I processi contro Anassagora, Pericle, Fidia ed Aspasia e la questione del «circolo di Pericle»: Note di cronologia e di storia”, in: AIIS 16, 3–85. Baffioni (1982a): Carmela Baffioni, “Una «Storia della filosofia greca» nell’Islam del XII secolo, II: Anassagora ed Empedocle”, in: Elenchos 3, 87–107. Baffioni (1982b): Carmela Baffioni, Atomismo e antiatomismo nel pensiero islamico, Naples. Baffioni (1990): Carmela Baffioni, Sulle tracce di sof ìa: Tre “divini” nella Grecia classica, Naples. Betegh (2004): Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation, Cambridge. Betegh (2013): Gábor Betegh, “Socrate et Archélaos dans les Nuées. Philosophie naturelle et éthique”, in: André Laks and Rossella Saetta Cottone (eds.), Comédie et Philosophie: Socrate et les «Présocratiques» dans les Nuées d’Aristophane, Paris, 87–106. Blank (1998): David Blank, “Versionen oder Zwillinge? Zu den Handschriften der ersten Bücher von Philodems’ Rhetorik”, in: Most (1998) 123–140. Bollack/Laks (1976): Jean Bollack and André Laks (eds.), Études sur l’Épicurisme antique, Lille. Bignone (2007): Ettore Bignone, L’Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro, Milan (repr. in one vol. of the ed. Florence 1973, 2 vols.; 1st ed. 1936). Bollansée (1999): Jan Bollansée, Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker Continued, Part 4: Biography and Antiquarian Literature, ed. by Guido Schepens; IV A: Biography, 3: Hermippos of Smyrna, Leiden/Boston/Cologne. Bremmer (2007): Jan N. Bremmer, “Atheism in Antiquity”, in: Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, Cambridge, 11–26. Brunschwig (1996): Jacques Brunschwig, “Le fragment DK 70 B 1 de Métrodore de Chio”, in: Keimpe A. Algra, Pieter W. van der Horst and David Th. Runia (eds.), Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy, Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday, Leiden/New York/Cologne, 21–38.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 407

Cantarella (1964): Raffaele Cantarella, Euripide: I Cretesi, Milan. Capasso (1987): Mario Capasso, “Epicureismo ed Eleatismo: Secondo contributo alla ricostruzione della critica epicurea alla filosofia presocratica”, in: Id., Comunità senza rivolta: Quattro saggi sull’epicureismo, Naples, 103–163 [already in: Mario Capasso, Francesco De Martino and Pierpaolo Rosati (eds.), Studi di filosofia preplatonica, Naples, 1985, 253–309]. Capizzi (1970): Antonio Capizzi, Socrate e i personaggi filosofi di Platone: Uno studio sulle strutture della testimonianza platonica e un’edizione delle testimonianze contenute nei dialoghi, Rome. Cavalieri (2002): Maria Ch. Cavalieri, “La Rassegna dei Filosofi di Filodemo: Scuola eleatica ed abderita (PHerc 327) e scuola pitagorica (PHerc 1508)?”, in: PapLup 11, 17–53. Cavallo (1983): Guglielmo Cavallo, Libri scritture scribi a Ercolano: Introduzione allo studio dei materiali greci, Naples. Cavallo (1984): Guglielmo Cavallo, “I rotoli di Ercolano come prodotti scritti: Quattro riflessioni”, in: S&C 8, 5–30. Cherniss (1935): Harold Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Baltimore. Corti (2015): Aurora Corti, “Ὁμοιοσχήμων e ὁμοιόμορφος: Alcune riflessioni sulle proprietà degli εἴδωλα nella dottrina di Epicuro”, in: Masi/Maso, 83–105. Crönert (1906): Wilhelm Crönert, Kolotes und Menedemos: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Philosophen- und Literaturgeschichte, Leipzig (repr. Amsterdam 1965). Curd (2007): Patricia Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia, Toronto/ Buffalo/London. Daiber (1980): Hans Daiber, Aetius Arabus: Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung, Wiesbaden. Decleva Caizzi (1999): Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, “Protagoras (PTura V 222, 18–29)”, in: CPF I.1***, 88, 3T, 668–676. De Falco (1923): Vittorio De Falco, L’epicureo Demetrio Lacone, Naples. Delattre (2011): Daniel Delattre, “Philodème, La Mort IV : Suppléments à l’édition de W. B. Henry”, in: CErc 41, 143–156. Del Mastro (2014): Gianluca Del Mastro, Titoli e annotazioni bibliologiche nei papiri greci di Ercolano, Naples. Del Mastro (2015): Gianluca Del Mastro, “Per la ricostruzione del I libro del trattato di Filodemo, Contro coloro che si definiscono lettori dei libri (PHerc. 1005/862, 1485)”, in: CErc 45, 85–96. Demont (2010): Paul Demont, “Socrate et le cresson”, in: Marc Baratin, Carlos Lévy, Régine Utard and Anne Videau (eds.), Stylus: La parole dans ses formes: Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur Jacqueline Dangel, Paris (printed in 2011), 389–397. Derenne (1930): Eudore Derenne, Les procès d’impiété intentés aux philosophes à Athènes au Ve et au IVe siècles avant J.-C., Liège/Paris. Diano (1973): Carlo Diano, “La data di pubblicazione della syngraphè di Anassagora”, in: Id., Studi e saggi di filosofia antica, Padua, 189–209 [= Id., in: Anthemon: Scritti di archeologia e di antichità classiche in onore di Carlo Anti, Florence 1955, 235–252]. Diano (1974): Carlo Diano, Epicuri ethica et epistulae, Florence (repr. of the ed. 1946). Di Benedetto (1971): Vincenzo Di Benedetto, Euripide: Teatro e società, Turin. Diels (1876): Hermann Diels, “Chronologische Untersuchung über Apollodors Chronika”, in: RhM n.s. 31, 1–54.

408 

 Christian Vassallo

Diels (1916–1917): Hermann Diels, Philodemos Über die Götter: Erstes und Drittes Buch: Griechischer Text und Erläuterungen I–III, 2 vols., Berlin 1916–1917 (repr. Lepzig 1970). Diggle (1998): James Diggle, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta selecta, Oxford. Dihle (1977): Albrecht Dihle, “Das Satyrspiel Sisyphos”, in: Hermes 105, 28–42. Dorandi (1990): Tiziano Dorandi, “Per una ricomposizione dello scritto di Filodemo sulla Retorica”, in: ZPE 82, 59–87. Dorandi (1999): Tiziano Dorandi, “Gli studi ercolanesi di Hermann Diels”, in: William M. Calder III and Jaap Mansfeld (eds.), Hermann Diels (1848–1922) et la science de l’antiquité, Geneva, 227–260. Dorandi (2013): Tiziano Dorandi, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge. Dover (1976): Kenneth J. Dover, “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society”, in: Talanta 7, 24–75 [= Id., The Greeks and their Legacy: Collected Papers, 2 vols., Oxford/New York 1987–1988, II, 135–158]. Dyck (2003): Andrew R. Dyck, Cicero: De natura deorum, Liber I, Cambridge. Egli (2003): Franziska Egli, Euripides im Kontext zeitgenössischer intellektueller Strömungen: Analyse der Funktion philosophischer Themen in den Tragödien und Fragmenten, Munich/ Leipzig. Erbì (2006): Margherita Erbì, “P.Oxy. 1012 come testo di erudizione”, in: Graziano Arrighetti and Mauro Tulli (eds.), Esegesi letteraria e riflessione sulla lingua nella cultura greca, Pisa, 127–157. Essler (2011a): Holger Essler, Glückselig und unsterblich: Epikureische Theologie bei Cicero und Philodem: Mit einer Edition von PHerc. 152/157, Kol. 8–10, Basel. Essler (2011b): Holger Essler, “Cicero’s Use and Abuse of Epicurean Theology”, in: Fish/ Sanders, 129–151. Fanan (1977): Graziella Fanan, “Il lessico del P.Oxy. 1012”, in: SCO 26, 187–248. Fanan (1989): Graziella Fanan, “P.Oxy. 1012, fr. 6: Manuale di tecnica stilistica”, in: CPF I.1*, 10, 1T, 152–157. Fimiani (2012): Mariacristina Fimiani, “I papiri del IV libro della Retorica di Filodemo: segni, correzioni e caratteristiche bibliologiche (PHerc. 1423, 1673/1007 e relative scorze)”, in: CErc 42, 121–188. Fimiani (2014): Mariacristina Fimiani, “Un proverbio nel IV libro della Retorica di Filodemo”, in: CErc 44, 77–80. Fish/Sanders (2011): Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge. Fortenbaugh/Gutas (1992): William W. Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, New Brunswick/London. Frede (2008): Michael Frede, “Aristotle’s Account of the Origins of Philosophy”, in: Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, 501–529. Funghi (1989): Maria S. Funghi, “Anaxagoras (POxy 1176, fr. 37, coll. I 16–30; III 5–29)”, in: CPF I.1*, 10, 2T, 157–168. Gershenson/Greenberg (1964): Daniel E. Gershenson and Daniel A. Greenberg, Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics, New York/London/Toronto. Gerstinger (1916): Hans Gerstinger, “Satyros’ βίος Εὐριπίδου”, in: WS 38, 54–71. Giannantoni (1958): Gabriele Giannantoni, I Cirenaici: Raccolta delle fonti antiche: Traduzione e studio introduttivo, Florence.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 409

Giannantoni (1992): Gabriele Giannantoni, “Il secondo libro delle ‘Vite’ di Diogene Laerzio”, in: ANRW, II, 36.5, 3603–3618. Giannantoni (1996): Gabriele Giannantoni, “Epicuro e l’ateismo antico”, in: Giannantoni/ Gigante, I, 21–63. Giannantoni/Gigante (1996): Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, 3 vols., Naples. Gigante (1981): Marcello Gigante, Scetticismo e epicureismo: Per l’avviamento di un discorso storiografico, Naples. Gigante (1983): Marcello Gigante, Ricerche filodemee, Naples (1st ed. 1969). Gilardeau (2015): Éric Gilardeau, Les grands procès politiques de l’Antiquité, Paris. Gomperz (1866): Theodor Gomperz, Philodem: Über Frömmigkeit, Leipzig. Gourinat (2019): Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, “L’athéisme antique, entre accusation et réalité”, in: Bernard Collette-Dučić, Marc-Antoine Gavray et Jean-Marc Narbonne (eds.), L’esprit critique dans l’antiquité 1. Critique et licence dans la Grèce antique, Paris, 167–189. Gronewald (1968): Michael Gronewald, “Ein neues Protagoras-Fragment”, in: ZPE 2, 1–2. Gronewald (1969): Michael Gronewald (in Verbindung mit Adolphe Gesché), Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), III: Kommentar zu Psalm 29–34, Bonn. Hammerstaedt (1992): Jürgen Hammerstaedt, “Der Schlussteil von Philodems drittem Buch über Rhetorik”, in: CErc 22, 9–117. Hayter (1891): John Hayter, Thirty-six Engravings of Texts and Alphabets from the Herculanean Fragments Taken from the Original Copperplates Executed under the Direction of the Rev. John Hayter, A.M., and now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Henrichs (1974): Albert Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428”, in: CErc 4, 5–32. Henry (2009): W. Benjamin Henry, Philodemus, On Death, Atlanta. Hirzel (1877–1883): Rudolf Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero’s philosophischen Schriften, 4 vols., Leipzig. Hunt (1910): Arthur S. Hunt, “POxy. 1012: Treatise on Literary Composition”, in: Id. (ed.), The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part VII, London, 82–103. Hunt (1912): Arthur S. Hunt, “POxy. 1176: Satyrus, Life of Euripides”, in: Id. (ed.), The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part IX, London, 124–182. Janko (2011): Richard Janko, Philodemus: On Poems, Books 3 and 4: With the Fragments of Aristotle, On Poets, Oxford. Journée (2017): Gérard Journée, “La tradition « présocratique » des Placita”, in: Christian Vassallo (ed.), Physiologia: Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and its Reception in Antiquity, Trier, 105–154. Kannicht (2004): Richard Kannicht, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (TrGF), vol. 5: Euripides, 1: Pars prior; 2: Pars posterior, Göttingen. Katsimanis (1975): Kyriakos S. Katsimanis, “Un témoignage de Philodème sur le Πολιτικός d’Aristote”, in: Platon 27, 258–262. Kotwick (2017): Mirjam E. Kotwick, Der Papyrus von Derveni: Griechisch-deutsch, Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert; basierend auf einem griechischen Text von Richard Janko, Berlin/Boston. Kullmann (2010): Wolfgang Kullmann, “Euripides’ Verhältnis zur Philosophie seiner Zeit”, in: Id., Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Antike: Kleine Schriften zu ihrer Bedeutung für die Gegenwart, Stuttgart, 27–40 [= Id., in: Siegfried Jäkel, Heikki Koskenniemi and Vappu Pyykkö (eds.), Literatur und Philosophie in der Antike, Åbo/Helsinki 1986, 35–49].

410 

 Christian Vassallo

Kumaniecki (1929): Kazimierz F. Kumaniecki, De Satyro Peripatetico, Warsaw/Krakow. Lachenaud (1993): Guy Lachenaud, Plutarque : Œuvres morales, Tome 12.2: Opinions des Philosophes, Paris. Laks (2008): André Laks, Diogène d’Apollonie, Sankt Augustin (1st ed. Lille 1983). Lanza (1965): Diego Lanza, Il pensiero di Anassagora, Milan. Lanza (1966): Diego Lanza, Anassagora: Testimonianze e frammenti, Florence. Lefkowitz (1987): Mary R. Lefkowitz, “Was Euripides an Atheist?”, in: SIFC s. III 5, 149–166. Lefkowitz (1989): Mary R. Lefkowitz, “‘Impiety’ and ‘Atheism’ in Euripides’ Dramas”, in: CQ 39, 70–82. Lefkowitz (2016): Mary R. Lefkowitz, Euripides and the Gods, Oxford. Leo (1912): Friedrich Leo, “Satyros βίος Εὐριπίδου”, in: NGG 68, 273–290 [= Id., Ausgewählte kleine Schriften, ed. by Eduard Fraenkel, 2 vols., Rome 1960, II, 365–383]. Long/Sedley (1987): Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge. Longo Auricchio (1984): Francesca Longo Auricchio, “Epicureismo e scetticismo sulla retorica”, in: Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, 2 vols., Naples, II, 453–471. Luria (2007): Salomon Luria, Democrito (Democritea, Leningrad 1970), transl. by Anastasia Krivushina, Milan. Mannebach (1961): Erich Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta, Leiden/Cologne. Mansfeld (1979): Jaap Mansfeld, “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian Period and the Date of his Trial: Part I: The Lenght and Dating of the Athenian Period”, in: Mnemosyne 32, 39–69 [= Mansfeld (1990a) 264–294]. Mansfeld (1980): Jaap Mansfeld, “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Life and the Date of his Trial: Part II: The Plot against Pericles and his Associates”, in: Mnemosyne 33, 84–95 [= Mansfeld (1990a) 295–306]. Mansfeld (1990a): Jaap Mansfeld, Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy, Assen/ Maastricht. Mansfeld (1990b): Jaap Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic: The Sitz im Leben of the Placita”, in: ANRW, II 36.4 (1990) 3056–3229. Mansfeld (1992): Jaap Mansfeld, “Physikai doxai and problêmata physika from Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond)”, in: Fortenbaugh/Gutas, 63–111. Mansfeld (1993): Jaap Mansfeld, “Aspects of Epicurean Theology”, in: Mnemosyne 46, 172–210. Mansfeld (1999): Jaap Mansfeld, Theology, in: Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, 452–478. Mansfeld (2000): Jaap Mansfeld, “Physical doxai in the Phaedo”, in: Maria Kardaun and Joke Spruyt (eds.), The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of Lambertus M. de Rijk, Leiden/Boston/Cologne, 1–17 [= M&R3, 183–201]. Mansfeld (2010): Jaap Mansfeld, “Physikai doxai and problêmata physika in Philosophy and Rhetoric: From Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond)”, in: M&R3, 33–97 [enlarged version of Id., “Physikai doxai and problêmata physika from Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond)”, in: Fortenbaugh/Gutas (1992) 63–111]. Mansfeld (2013): Jaap Mansfeld, “Detheologization: Aëtian Chapters and their Peripatetic Background”, in: Rhizomata 1, 330–362. Mansfeld (2014): Jaap Mansfeld, “Alcmaeon and Plato on Soul”, in: EPlaton [En ligne] 11, 1–9.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 411

M&R: Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Marmodoro (2017): Anna Marmodoro, Everything in Everything: Anaxagoras’s Metaphysics, Oxford. Masi/Maso (2015): Francesca G. Masi and Stefano Maso (eds.), Epicurus on Eidola: Peri phuseos Book II: Update, Proposals, and Discussions, Amsterdam. Matthiessen (2010): Kjeld Matthiessen, “Zur Religiosität der Tragödien des Euripides”, in: Hermes 138, 152–170. Matusova (2016): Ekaterina Matusova, “Between Exegesis and Philosophy: Philosophical Generalisations in cols. XVI, XVII and XIX of the Derveni Papyrus in Light of Interpretative Strategy”, in: AGPh 98, 113–143. McDiarmid (1953): John B. McDiarmid, “Theophrastus on the Presocratic causes”, in: HSCPh 61, 85–156. McKirahan (1996): Richard D. McKirahan, “Epicurean Doxography in Cicero, De natura deorum Book 1”, in: Giannantoni/Gigante, II, 865–878. Mekler (1885): Siegfried Mekler, “Φιλόδημος, Περὶ θανάτου δ: Philodems Über den Tod, viertes Buch: Nach der Oxforder und Neapolitaner Abschrift”, in: SAWW (philos.-hist. Cl.) 90, 303–354. Meursius (1622): Joannes Meursius, Archontes Athenienses sive De ijs, qui Athenis summum istum magistratum obierunt, libri quattuor, Leiden. Millot (1977): Claire Millot, “Epicure, De la nature, livre XV”, in: CErc 7, 9–39. Montuori (1984): Mario Montuori, “Sul processo di Anassagora”, in: Id., Socrate: Un problema storico, Naples, 153–204 [= Id., in: De Homine 22–23 (1967) 103–148]. Most (1998): Glenn W. Most (ed.), Editing Texts / Texte edieren, Göttingen. Müller (1967): Carl W. Müller, “Protagoras über die Götter”, in: Hermes 95, 140–159 [= Id., in: Carl J. Classen, Sophistik, Darmstadt 1976, 312–340]. Nestle (1942): Wilhelm Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos: Die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates, Stuttgart (1st. ed. 1940). Obbink (1989): Dirk Obbink, “The Atheism of Epicurus”, in: GRBS 30, 187–223. Obbink (1996): Dirk Obbink, Philodemus: On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary, Oxford. Obbink (2001): Dirk Obbink, “Le livre I du De natura deorum de Cicéron et le De pietate de Philodème”, in: Clara Auvray-Assayas and Daniel Delattre (eds.), Cicéron et Philodème: La polémique en philosophie, Paris, 203–225. Osborne (1987): Catherine Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hyppolitus of Rome and the Presocratics, Ithaca (NY). O’Sullivan (1997): Lara-Louisa O’Sullivan, “Athenian Impiety Trials in the Late Fourth Century B.C.”, in: CQ 47, 136–152. Otranto (2000): Rosa Otranto, Antiche liste di libri su papiro, Rome. Parsons (1966): Peter J. Parsons, “Satyrus on Euripides”, Rev. of Arrighetti (1964), in: CR n.s. 16, 179–180. Pease (1955–1958): Arthur S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum, 2 vols., Cambridge (MA). Pfligersdorffer (1957): Georg Pfligerdorffer, “Cicero über Epikurs Lehre vom Wesen der Götter (Nat. deor. I, 49)”, in: WS 70, 235–253. Philippson (1916): Robert Philippson, “Zur epikureischen Götterlehre”, in: Hermes 51, 568–608 [= Philippson (1983) 90–130].

412 

 Christian Vassallo

Philippson (1920): Robert Philippson, “Zu Philodems Schrift über die Frömmigkeit [I]”, in: Hermes 55, 225–278; 364–372. Philippson (1939): Robert Philippson, “Die Quelle der epikureischen Götterlehre in Ciceros erstem Buche De natura deorum”, in: SO 19, 15–40 [= Philippson (1983) 249–274]. Philippson (1983): Robert Philippson, Studien zu Epikur und den Epikureern, im Anschluß an Wolfgang Schmid, ed. by Carl J. Classen, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York. Piano (2016): Valeria Piano, Il Papiro di Derveni tra religione e filosofia, Florence. Piazzi (2005): Lisa Piazzi, Lucrezio e i Presocratici: Un commento a De rerum natura 1, 635–920, Pisa. Piccirilli (2000): Luigi Piccirilli, “Opposizione e intese politiche in Atene: I casi di Efialte-Cimone e di Pericle-Tucidide di Melesia”, in: Marta Sordi (ed.), L’opposizione nel mondo antico, Milan, 49–73. Prandi (1977): Luisa Prandi, “I processi contro Fidia, Aspasia, Anassagora e l’opposizione a Pericle”, in: Aevum 51, 10–26. Puglia (1988): Enzo Puglia, Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro (PHerc. 1012), Naples. Puglia (2015): Enzo Puglia, “Il misterioso titolo del Πρὸς τούς di Filodemo (PHerc 1005/862, 1485)”, in: PapLup 24, 119–124. Radermacher (1895): Ludwig Radermacher, “Critolaus und die Rhetorik”, in: Sudhaus (1892–1896), Suppl., ix–xxvi (repr. Amsterdam 1964). Rechenauer (2013): Georg Rechenauer, “Anaxagoras”, in: GGPh 1.2, 740–796. Runia (1996): David Th. Runia, “Atheists in Aëtius: Text, Translation and Comments on De placitis 1.7.1–10”, in: Mnemosyne s. IV 49, 542–576 [= M&R3, 343–373]. Sassi (2011): Maria M. Sassi, “Ionian Philosophy and Italic Philosophy: From Diogenes Laertius to Diels”, in: Oliver Primavesi and Katharina Luchner (eds.), The Presocratics from the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels, Stuttgart, 19–44. Sauppe (1864): Hermann Sauppe, Commentatio de Philodemi libro qui fuit de pietate, Göttingen, 1–17 [= Id., Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. by Conrad Trieber, Berlin 1896, 387–403]. Sbordone (1947): Francesco Sbordone, Philodemi Adversus [Sophistas]: E papyro Herculanensi 1005, Naples. Schachermeyer (1968): Fritz Schachermeyer, Religionspolitik und Religiosität bei Perikles: Voruntersuchungen zu einer Monographie über Perikles und seine Zeit, Wien. Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De pietate Pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125 [= Id., Philodemi Περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg 1923]. Schofield (1980): Malcolm Schofield, An Essay on Anaxagoras, Cambridge. Schorn (2004): Stefan Schorn, Satyros aus Kallatis: Sammlung der Fragmente mit Kommentar, Basel. Schubert (1994): Charlotte Schubert, Perikles, Darmstadt. Scott (1885): Walter Scott, Fragmenta Herculanensia: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oxford Copies of the Herculanean Rolls, together with the Texts of Several Papyri accompanied by Facsimiles, Oxford. Sedley (1976): David N. Sedley, “Epicurus and His Professional Rivals”, in: Bollack/Laks, 119–159. Sedley (2007): David N. Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London. Sedley (2011): David N. Sedley, “Epicurus’ Theological Innatism”, in: Fish/Sanders, 29–52.

13 Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 413

Sedley (2013): David N. Sedley, “The Atheist Underground”, in: Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy, Cambridge, 329–348. Sider (2005): David Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras, Sankt Augustin (1st ed. Meisenheim am Glan 1981). Silvestre (1989): Maria L. Silvestre, Anassagora nella storiografia filosofica: Dal V sec. a.C. al VI sec. d.C., Rome. Spengel (1863): Leonhard Spengel, “Die herkulanensischen Rollen”, in: Philologus Suppl. 2, 495–548. Spinelli (2015): Emidio Spinelli, “Senza teodicea: Critiche epicuree e argomentazioni pirroniane”, in: Dino De Sanctis, Emidio Spinelli, Mauro Tulli and Francesco Verde (eds.), Questioni epicuree, Sankt Augustin, 213–234. Steinmetz (1966): Peter Steinmetz, “Eine jungepikureische Sicht der Geschichte der Philosophie”, in: AGPh 48, 153–162. Stella (1994): Luigia A. Stella, Eschilo e la cultura del suo tempo, Alessandria. Stinton (1976): Thomas C. W. Stinton, “‘Si Credere Dignum Est’: Some Expressions of Disbelief in Euripides and Others”, in: PCPhS, 22 (1976) 60–89 [= Stinton (1990) 236–264]. Stinton (1990): Thomas C. W. Stinton, Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy, Oxford. Sudhaus (1892–1896): Siegfried Sudhaus, Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica, 2 vols. with Suppl., Leipzig (repr. Amsterdam 1964). Summers (1997): Kirk Summers, “The Books of Phaedrus Requested by Cicero (Att. 13.39)”, in: CQ 47, 309–311. Taylor (1917): Alfred E. Taylor, “On the Date of the Trial of Anaxagoras”, in: CQ 11, 81–87. TP3: Benedikt Strobel and Georg Wöhrle (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Turato (1973): Fabio Turato, Il problema storico delle Nuvole di Aristofane, Padua. Tzamalikos (2016): Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, Origen, and Neoplatonism: The Legacy of Anaxagoras to Classical and Late Antiquity, 2 vols., Berlin/Boston. Unger (1884): Georg F. Unger, “Die Zeitverhältnisse des Anaxagoras und Empedokles”, in: Philologus Suppl. 4, 511–550. Us.: Hermann Usener (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Vassallo (2014): Christian Vassallo, “Xenophanes in the Herculaneum Papyri: Praesocratica Herculanensia IV”, in: APF 60, 45–66. Vassallo (2015a): Christian Vassallo, “Testimonianze su Anassagora e altri Presocratici nel libro IV della Retorica di Filodemo: Praesocratica Herculanensia V”, in: LPh 3, 81–145. Vassallo (2015b): Christian Vassallo, “Supplemento papirologico alle recenti edizioni dei Milesii: Praesocratica Herculanensia VIII”, in: APF 61, 276–316. Vassallo (2015c): Christian Vassallo, “Senofane e lo scetticismo antico: PHerc. 1428, fr. 12 e il contesto dossografico di DK 21 B 34”, in: Victor Gysembergh and Andreas Schwab (eds.), Le Travail du Savoir / Wissensbewältigung : Philosophie, Sciences exactes et Sciences appliquées dans l’Antiquité, Trier, 165–193. Vassallo (2016a): Christian Vassallo, “Towards a Comprehensive Edition of the Evidence for Presocratic Philosophy in the Herculaneum Papyri”, in: Tomasz Derda, Adam Łajtar and Jakub Urbanik (eds.), Proceedings of the 27th International Congress of Papyrology, 3 vols., Warsaw, I, 315–345. Vassallo (2016b): Christian Vassallo, Rev. of Masi/Maso (2015), in: BMCR, 2016.03.10. Vassallo (2016c): Christian Vassallo, “Parmenides and the «First God»: Doxographical Strategies in Philodemus’ On Piety: Praesocratica Herculanensia VII”, in: Hyperboreus 22, 29–57.

414 

 Christian Vassallo

Vassallo (2017a): Christian Vassallo, “La ‘sezione presocratica’ del De pietate di Filodemo: Una nuova ricostruzione: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Parte I)”, in: APF 63/1, 171–203. Vassallo (2017b): Christian Vassallo, “P.Herc. 1788 ([Philodemi], [Philosophorum historia?]): Introduction, Edition, and Commentary”, in: AnPap 29, 7–56. Vassallo (2018a): Christian Vassallo, “The ‘pre-Socratic Section’ of Philodemus’ On Piety: A New Reconstruction: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Part II)”, in: APF 64, 98–147. Vassallo (2018b): Christian Vassallo, “Atomism and the Worship of Gods: On Democritus’ ‘Rational’ Attitude towards Theology”, in: PhA 18, 105–126. Vogliano (1956): Achille Vogliano, “I resti del XV libro del περὶ φύσεως di Epicuro (Aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben von Berthold Häsler)”, in: Philologus 100, 253–270. Von Arnim (1888): Hans von Arnim, “Philodemea”, in: RhM n.s. 43, 360–375. Von Arnim (1913): Hans von Arnim, Supplementum Euripideum, Bonn. Vooijs/Van Krevelen (1934–1941): Cornelius J. Vooijs and Dirk A. van Krevelen, Lexicon Philodemeum, 2 vols.: Pars prior, ed. Cornelius J. Vooijs, Purmerend; Pars altera, comp. Cornelius J. Vooijs, perf. Dirk A. van Krevelen, Amsterdam. Wallace (1994): Robert W. Wallace, “Private Lives and Public Lives and Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens”, in: Alan L. Boegehold and Adele C. Scafuro (eds.), Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, Baltimore, 127–155. West (1966): Stephanie R. West, Rev. of Arrighetti (1964), in: Gnomon 38, 546–550. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1875): Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Analecta Euripidea; inest Supplicum fabula ad codicem archetypum recognita, Berlin. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1899): Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, “Lesefrüchte”, in: Hermes 34, 203–230; 601–639. Willis (1978): William H. Willis, “Two Literary Papyri in an Archive from Panopolis”, in: IClS 3, 140–153. Willis/Dorandi (1989): William H. Willis and Tiziano Dorandi, “Lista di scolarchi”, in: CPF I.1*, 1, 81–84. Willis/Maresch (1997): William H. Willis and Klaus Maresch, The Archive of Ammon Scholasticus of Panopolis (P.Ammon), vol. 1: The Legacy of Harpocration: Texts from the Collections of Duke University and the Universität zu Köln, Opladen/Wiesbaden. Winiarczyk (1976): Marek Winiarczyk, “Der erste Atheistenkatalog des Kleitomachos”, in: Philologus 120, 32–46. Winiarczyk (1984): Marek Winiarczyk, “Wer galt im Altertum als Atheist?”, in: Philologus 128, 157–183. Winiarczyk (1987): Marek Winiarczyk, “Nochmals das Satyrspiel ‘Sisyphos’”, in: WS 100, 35–46. Woltjer (1904): Robert H. Woltjer, De Platone prae-Socraticorum philosophorum existimatore et iudice, Leiden. Woodbury (1981): Leonard Woodbury, “Anaxagoras and Athens”, in: Phoenix 35, 295–315. Zeller/Mondolfo (1969): Eduard Zeller, La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico (Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig 1892), ed. by Rodolfo Mondolfo, I: I Presocratici, 5: Empedocle, Atomisti, Anassagora, ed. by Antonio Capizzi, transl. by Domenico Musti, Florence.

Michael Pozdnev

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems, Book 2: PHerc. 1676, col. 2 + N 1081, col. 12 (= 61 A 4 DK; Test. 34.3 Lanata) The fragment in question – PHerc. 1676, col. 2 + N 1081, col. 12 (= 61 A 4 DK = test. 34.3 Lanata) – probably belongs to Book 2 of Philodemus’ Περὶ ποιημάτων.1 The text was first published in full length by Josef Heidmann;2 its most recent and conceivably most reliable reconstruction is by Costantina Romeo. The segment able to be translated reads as follows:3 PHerc. 1676.2 εὐθ[έ]ω̣ς τῆς μήνι[δος τὰ 20 ὀνόμα]τα σημαίνον[τα πολλάκις ὁμολ[ο]γοῦν̣[τες, ὅμως παριστάνειν ἄλλα [βο]ύ[λονται τὸν ποητὴν ὡ[ς] καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς σφαιροποιίας ὁ Κρά25 της· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ φ[α]νερ[ῶ]ς μαίνονται· καθ[ά]περ ο[ἱ 1 = Jensen (1923) V = Broggiato (2201) 259 = IPPH XXVI 113. 2 Heidmann (1971) 93. PHerc. 1676 was unrolled in 1798: see Heidmann (1971) 90. Gomperz (esp. [1891] 52) was the first who tried to reconstruct the corrupt parts of the text, but Hausrath (1890) 228–229 suggested to join it with PHerc. 1081, col. 12 N: see Jensen (1923) V–VI; Heidmann (1971) 90; Broggiato (2001) 258; cf. Mette (1936) 160–161; Hammerstaedt (1998) 28 n. 6. Further reconstruction perspectives can also be found in Romeo (1992) 163–164. 3 Romeo (1993) 102. Broggiato also quotes Romeo’s version. Instead of τῆς μήνι[δος τὰ ὀνόμα]τα σημαίνον[τα Heidmann (1971) and Sbordone (1976) 230 give τῆς μήνι[δος ἄρχεσθαι τὰ σημαίνον[τα. After that all editors print the same text. What stands before εὐθ[έ]ως is largely unreadable, Romeo ibid.: τῶν σαφεστά[των - - -]|χουσι προει[ρημέν . . .] | φέρο[ντ]αι ζηλ[- - -]. The fullest app. crit. with references is given by Heidmann, followed by Broggiato. A new edition by Richard Janko is forthcoming: see Vassallo’s CPH XXVII 128. Note: The author wants to thank the Russian Science Foundation (Project Nr. 18-18-0060) for the support to this work. Michael Pozdnev, St. Petersburg State University https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-015

416 

 Michael Pozdnev

26 PHerc. 1081.12

5

10

τὰς δύο ποήσεις [τοῦ Ὁμ]ήρου περί τε τοῦ κόσμ[ου] λέγον- // τες [πε]π[οι]ῆσ[θαι μερ]ῶν καὶ περ[ὶ] νόμ[ων] κα[ὶ ἐ]θισμ]ῶν τῶ[ν] πα[ρ’] ἀν[θρώπο[ις] καὶ τὸν ᾿Αγ[α]μέμνονα μὲν αἰθέρα εἶναι, τὸν ᾿Α]χιλλέα δ’ ἥλιον, τὴν ῾Ελένην δὲ γῆν καὶ τὸν ᾿Αλέξα]νδρον ἀέρα, τὸν ῞Εκτορα] δὲ σελήνην.∕ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλου]ς ἀναλόγως ὠνομάσθαι] τούτοις.∕ τῶν δὲ θεῶν τὴν] Δήμητρα μὲν ἧπ[αρ, τὸν Διό]νυσον δὲ σπλῆ[να, τὸν ᾿Α]πόλλω{ι} δὲ χολὴ[ν ․ ․ ․

(...) That the words literally mean ‘wrath’ they mostly consent, but make the poet represent other things, as Crates does – about the construction of a sphere. Still some are plainly insane, like4 those who say that the two poems of Homer are composed about the parts of the universe and the laws and customs of men, and that Agamemnon is the aether, Achilles the sun, Helen the earth and Alexander the air, and Hector is the moon. And others are called similar to those. But of the gods Demeter is the liver, Dionysos the spleen and Apollo the bile (…)5 Considering the number of works on ancient allegory, this text has received relatively little attention. The short essay by Wilhelm Nestle published in 1907 remains the main reference work on the identifications listed in its last segment. David J. Califf revisited these lines almost a century later. In the last few decades, significant contributions to the understanding of Metrodorus’ approach have been made by Félix Buffière, Nicholas J. Richardson, and Richard Janko, but they have not much improved Nestle’s interpretation, and this Herculanean testimonium as a whole still waits for a comprehensive commentary, which it certainly deserves, being the most detailed of very few pieces of evidence for Metrodorus of Lampsacus’ doctrine that have been preserved.6 The reason of this fact may be, first, that the name of Metrodorus is not

4  With καθάπερ begins the text in DK; Lanata (1963) 246 cites it starting with ᾿Αγαμέμνονα. 5 The translation is mine. 6 The lack of works on Metrodorus was stressed by Nestle and again, on the background of “the renewed interest in ancient literary criticism,” by Califf (for references, see below, n. 19).

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 417

explicitly mentioned in the testimonium. Thus, Sbordone disregarded the possibility that this Homeric scholar could be included among those who are “plainly insane”; in his view, they are the same Stoics whom Crates of Mallus exemplifies in the foregoing phrase.7 To be sure, Crates is one of the most famous Homeric allegorists, and the allegories contrived by the Stoics were included by the critics in late antiquity in the earliest strata of allegorical interpretation, of which they may have had only a vague idea.8 The present tense μαίνονται suggests also that Philodemus speaks rather of his contemporaries than of some critic of the remote past. However, ἔνιοι δὲ denotes an opposition, and the attitude discernible in the word “insane” reveals a certain difference from that of Crates and his like. Whatever the reconstruction of the first line cited (εὐθ[έ]ως ~ ὁμολογοῦντες) might be, it is clear that the first group of interpreters, those to whom Philodemus is more indulgent, regard the Iliad as a poem that actually deals with Achilles’ wrath, but implies other meanings as well; meanwhile, for the “insane,” the subject of the Homeric poems is neither Achilles nor Odysseus, but quite different things. The words of Homer (Romeo’s ὀνόματα thus seems a plausible suggestion; cf. ὠνομάσθαι in the penultimate sentence) are not pregnant with different meanings – they really mean something else. That is why Hesychius included the lemma ἀγαμέμνονα in his Lexicon with a gloss: τὸν αἰθέρα Μητρόδωρος εἶπεν ἀλληγορικῶς, thus providing an apparent parallel to the fragment cited above. This fact gave Gomperz enough reason for identifying the allegories found in this fragment with Metrodorus the Elder.9 Subsequently, Diels included Philodemus’ testimonium with the other five he had gathered for this philosopher. Hesychius cites Agamemnon’s name as a common noun, beginning with a lower-case letter (so it stands in the Venetian MS). Another point to be noted is that he puts it in the accusative form. This can only mean that, as in countless other cases, he transcribes the word directly from the book where it stood, and it is tantalizing to suppose that his quote goes back, perhaps via some intermediate source, to the treatise On Homer composed by Metrodorus towards the last third of the 5th cent. BC. We know of this work from Tatian, who offers his own criticism of the ancient allegorist, ch. 21 (= 61 A 3 DK): καὶ Μητρόδωρος δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ῾Ομήρου λίαν εὐήθως διείλεκται πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίαν μετάγων. οὔτε γὰρ ῞Ηραν οὔτε ᾿Αθηνᾶν οὔτε Δία τοῦτ’ εἶναί φησιν ὅπερ οἱ τοὺς περιβόλους αὐτοῖς καὶ τεμένη καθιδρύσαντες νομίζουσιν, φύσεως δὲ ὑποστάσεις καὶ στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις. καὶ τὸν ῞Εκτορα δὲ καὶ τὸν ᾿Αχιλλέα δηλαδὴ καὶ τὸν ᾿Αγαμέμνονα 7 Sbordone (1976) 231. 8 Primavesi (2005) 74. 9 Gomperz (1888) 14. This Metrodorus is sometimes confused with the friend of Epicurus. Cases of confusion are listed in Hammerstaedt (1998) 28 n. 2 and Califf (2003) 24 n. 4. The two thinkers have nothing in common save their name and origin. Janko (2000) 133 n. 5 thinks they were relatives.

418 

 Michael Pozdnev

καὶ πάντας ἁπαξαπλῶς ῞Ελληνάς τε καὶ βαρβάρους σὺν τῇ ῾Ελένῃ καὶ τῷ Πάριδι τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχοντας χάριν οἰκονομίας ἐρεῖτε παρεισῆχθαι οὐδενὸς ὄντος τῶν προειρημένων ἀνθρώπων. And Metrodorus of Lampsacus in his treatise On Homer has argued fairly stupidly reducing everything to allegory. Since he claims that neither Hera nor Athena nor Zeus are what those who build them shrines and precincts mean them to be, but the substances of nature and the arrangements of its elements.10 And as regarding Hector and indeed Achilles and Agamemnon also, and all the Greeks and the barbarians altogether along with Helen and Paris, you could say, then, that they are introduced only for the sake of economy partaking virtually of the likewise nature, although in fact none of the above-mentioned persons has ever existed.11

This rendering of Metrodorus’ thought reflects differences from Philodemus’ take on allegory. Consequently, Jürgen Hammerstaedt has argued that the allegories that Philodemus cites do not actually belong to Metrodorus (despite the parallel in Hesychius), but represent a summary of the most absurd views of various Homeric allegorists.12 Below, I will argue that the tradition from which Philodemus and Tatian have drawn was of a secondary character. On the other hand, it is worth noting that Tatian and Philodemus mention the same Homeric heroes (both connect the series of heroes with καί), and the fact that heroes, not gods, are listed, is, in iself, remarkable. Besides, Tatian’s summary (πάντας [...] τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχοντας) resembles that of Philodemus (τοὺς ἄλ|[λου]ς ἀναλόγως ὠνομάσ|[θαι] τούτοις). Hammerstaedt claims that in talking about heroes, Tatian no longer refers to Metrodorus’ thought, but tries of his own accord to reduce it to absurdity.13 It seems more likely that his sarcasm was suggested by the same source that provided him with Metrodorean material. Hammerstaedt’s argument

10 διακοσμήσεις was supposed to be Metrodorus’ own word: Porter (1992) 114 n. 19; cf. also Hammerstaedt (1998) 32 n. 23 and Janko (2000) 77 n. 151. 11 The translation is mine. 12 Hammerstaedt (1998) 29. 13 Hammerstaedt (1998) 30: “Unterzieht man allerdings die entscheidenden Worte Tatians einer genauen Betrachtung, erscheint der betreffende Satz nicht als Fortsetzung des Metrodorreferats, sondern stellt sich gedanklich wie sprachlich in aller Deutlichkeit als sarkastischer Kommentar aus der Sicht des christlichen Apologeten dar.” Hammerstaedt points out at δηλαδή and ἐρεῖτε. Instead of ἐρεῖτε παρεισῆχθαι V has ἐν τῇ ποιήσει παρεισήχθησαν. Janko (1997) 77, with n. 150, advocates this reading; Califf cites the text with ἐρεῖτε, but ignores it in his translation. Hammerstaedt (1998) 30 n. 13 plausibly objects to Janko that the admission of παρεισήχθησαν makes the accusatives τὸν ῞Εκτορα, τὸν ᾿Αχιλλέα κτλ. inexplicable. But even if ἐρεῖτε is authentic (δηλαδή certainly is), Hammerstaedt’s stylistic arguments are hardly sufficient: as elsewhere, Tatian draws the factual material (names, dates, etc.) from his source and shapes it anew within his own polemical framework.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 419

is, then, too weak to neglect attribution suggested by the testimony of Hesychius, and Califf is right to retain the traditional view supported by the most influential contemporary scholars as well.14 The way Tatian mentions Metrodorus is additional evidence for associating Philodemus’ criticism with this extravagant thinker: the Christian apologist is apparently more reserved in his expression, but λίαν εὐήθως evidently has the same pathos as μαίνονται, and πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίαν μετάγων corresponds to the technique that the Epicurean cites (cf. τοὺς ἄλ|[λου]ς ἀναλόγως ὠνομάσ|[θαι]). The opinion, attested by two very different thinkers, is likely to have been more or less common, and it seems that the symbolic interpretation of the Homeric gods or even their amalgamation by means of etymology, as represented in the 1st cent. AD by Heraclitus and L. Annaeus Cornutus,15 was considered less bizarre than Metrodorean natural-philosophical symbolism. This opinion stands in contrast to the attitude expressed by Plato in Ion 530c8–d3 (= 61 A 1 DK): ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐμοὶ γοῦν τοῦτο [sc. ἑρμηνέα τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι: 530c3–4] πλεῖστον ἔργον παρέσχεν τῆς τέχνης, καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ ῾Ομήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ ῾Ομήρου, ὅσας ἐγώ. Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotos of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.16

Ion, a caricatured figure, boasts that his “many and good interpretations” of Homer surpass those offered by the renowned critics of the age. Metrodorus is at the top of the list, considered the most skilled of the Homeric scholars; otherwise the comic effect of Ion’s self-aggrandizement would obviously have been ruined.17 Metrodorus’ contemporaries thus characterize his teaching as πολλαὶ καὶ καλαὶ διάνοιαι, whereas for the learned public of the Roman and early Christian Age 14 Buffière (19732) 127; Richardson (1975) 69; Janko (2000) 78 et al. 15 For the reception of Cornutus in Rome see Most (1989) 2046–2059. 16 Transl. by B. Jowett. 17 Contrary to the theory referred to by Califf (2003) 28 and Richardson (1975) 66, a rhapsode like Ion can by no means be associated with the “sophistic use of Homer.” Nor should we suppose with Califf that the Ion’s comparison of himself with Metrodorus “emphasized his own ignorance,” given that the explanations of Metrodorus were “notoriously eccentric.” This overcomplicates the parody, and unnecessarily makes Stesimbrotos and Glaucon equally suspicious. One can hardly doubt that Ion compares himself to those who are believed to be the most competent of all Homeric scholars: cf. his own hyperbolic οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων.

420 

 Michael Pozdnev

it is at least “very imprudent” if not altogether absurd. Nestle is convinced that Metrodorus deserved the censure of Tatian18 (that of Philodemus is unknown to him, since he only discusses the text of DK), but he disregards Plato’s appraisal and fails to take note of the fact that in the confused report of Metrodorus’ teaching that has come down to Diogenes Laërtius (more on this to follow below), not a single note of disapproval can be heard. This is just one of the many loose ends to be tied up. Presumably, another reason why the fragment in question lacks commentaries is the complete irrelevance of the allegories registered (τὸν ᾿Αγαμέμνονα μὲν αἰθέρα εἶναι κτλ.). As Nestle colorfully puts it: “Kein Wunder, dass diese Ausgeburten eines toll gewordenen Rationalismus immer wieder nur ‘einem allgemeinen Schütteln des Kopfes’ begegnen.”19 The catalogue starts with allegories of heroes and is thus unparalleled, since no other allegories for Agamemnon, Achilles etc. are known. That explains πάντα in Tatian’s rendering and justifies both his and Philodemus’ criticism, since the superhuman characters in poetry are essentially liable to rationalistic readings, but heroes, just as Tatian states, were thought to have indeed existed in history: either true or false, Homer has portrayed real persons. Similarly, we could claim that Renaissance epic introduces physical elements into Biblical cosmology. We could also claim that in describing the character of Richard III dramatically, Shakespeare has gone astray. But it would be impossible for us to think that this Richard of his is a celestial body or a physical element. How could a celebrated critic have concocted such nonsense? No less atypical is the second group of allegories. The Homeric allegorist Heraclitus takes gods to be the powers, elements, or products that they control (Zeus is sky, Aphrodite is love, Dionysos is wine and so on). The approach of Cornutus is more complex,20 but still virtually the same, cf. Theol. Graec. 3.4–5 Lang: ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει (...) καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεύς; ibid. 3.9–10 Lang: [᾿Αθήνα] φρόνησις (...) εἶναι δοκεῖ. Nonconformities are natural enough, since various gods are responsible for the same things. This method was used by the Stoics engaged in 18 Nestle (1932) 1476–1477: “Das Urteil Tatians λίαν εὐήθως διείλεκται πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίαν μετάγων hat er reichlich verdient.” 19 Nestle (1907) 503. It is this discouragement in the face of the absurdness of Metrodorus’ explanations that gave rise to the ‘aesthetic’ disapproval which Califf pointed out as the primary reason for scholars’ neglect of Metrodorus; to those who most influenced the history of philosophy in the last century (starting from Gomperz and Zeller), this kind of allegory is “tasteless”: Califf (2003) 24. Cf. Nestle (1932) 1476: “M. setzte die von Theagenes von Rhegion begonnene und von Anaxagoras betriebene allegorische Homererklärung in der geschmacklosesten Weise fort.” For Theagenes as allegorist see below. 20 Since it involves Stoic cosmological ideas and is based on etymologizing; for a detailed analysis, see Most (1989) 2018–2033.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 421

philological studies.21 The rationalistic exegesis made the gods something virtually intangible, like love or the soul or the heavenly bodies. Metrodorus, however, associates them with such concrete material things as organs or substances of the human body. In fact, a poet might easily represent the Sun talking to the Moon or Love to the Soul. He could, of course, compose a likewise dialogue between the Liver and the Spleen. This poet, however, would not be a Homer but rather an Aristophanes. Still, it seems improbable that Philodemus or his source fabricated these allegories himself in order to satirize the allegorists of the past. Furthermore, the allegories of the common type, largely different from what stands in the Philodemean report, are ascribed to the “followers of Anaxagoras” by the Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus, Chron. 1.140c, pp. 174–175 Mosshammer (= 61 A 6 DK): ἑρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ ᾿Αναξαγόρειοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεοὺς νοῦν μὲν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ ᾿Αθηνᾶν τέχνην, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ “χειρῶν ὀλλυμένων ἔρρει πολύμητις ᾿Αθήνη.” The fact that Syncellus is drawing on an ancient source is confirmed by the citation of an Orphic verse (OF 856 = fr. 347 Κern).22 The Anaxagorean school would have allegorized gods as abstractions: “Zeus is the mind and Athena the art.”23 Diogenes Laërtius (2.11 = 61 A 2 DK) reports that Metrodorus was a friend (γνώριμος) of Anaxagoras, which is quite possibly true, since the latter came to Lampsacus after being exiled from Athens.24 As I will show below, some of the Metrodorean allegories actually reveal his adherence to Anaxagoras’ doctrine. Califf ignored the incongruity, but it was noticed by Nestle, who, however, offered no clear explanation for it.25 Besides, Syncellus says nothing about Homer; in his opinion, the Anaxagorean school allegorizes “the gods of the myths,” and although Philodemus definitely has the allegorical interpretation of the Iliad and the Odyssey in mind, two of the three gods that he lists are irrelevant to Homeric 21 E.g. Crat. fr. 26 Broggiato; cf. Agathocl. fr. 11 Montanari; Long (1992) 65; Broggiato (2001) lxi. For the earlier Stoic allegoresis see Wehrli (1928) 94–5 and Steinmetz (1986) 20–29. 22 For translation, commentary, and further references see Janko (1997) 76 with n. 144; Leitao (2014) 112. Basing his argument on this fragment, Leitao supposes that for Metrodorus the myth of Athena’s birth allegorized mind giving birth to art. 23 Though Anaxagoras himself probably did not engage in allegory: cf. Dyck (1993) 367. 24 Sider (1997) 137–138 believes that in Lampsacus there existed “a circle of allegorizing Anaxagoreans” and that the author of the Derveni Papyrus belonged to it along with Metrodorus. 25 Nestle (1907) 504: “Freilich führt der zum geflügelten Wort gewordene Vers χειρῶν ὀλλυμένων ἔρρει πολύμητις ᾿Αθήνη zusammengehalten mit der Anschauung des Anaxagoras, dass namentlich der Gebrauch der Hand es sei, der den Menschen über das Tier erhebe, schon etwas über die Linie der ethischen Homererklärung hinaus. Hier aber, bei den Deutungen des Metrodoros, scheint aller Sinn und Verstand aufzuhören (...).” Janko (1997) 79 goes as far as to conjecture that Metrodorus explained Athena allegorically as ‘Hands’: “Hence, in Syncellus too, we may see gods equated with parts of the body, Zeus with the Mind and Athena with the Hands – but based on an Orphic text.” The same interpretation was proposed by Buffière (19732) 130 and Torshilov (2010).

422 

 Michael Pozdnev

epics: neither Demeter nor Dionysos take any part in the action or produce any speech. Contrary to the heroes that are unmistakably Homeric, the gods subject to Metrodorus’ allegorizing might have been “the gods of the myths.” The context by Diogenes Laërtius presents yet another incongruity. He asserts with reference to Favorinus (fr. 2.11 Barigazzi = FHG III 583) that Anaxagoras “was the first to claim that the Homeric poetry deals with virtue and justice” (δοκεῖ δὲ πρῶτος, καθά φησι Φαβωρῖνος ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ, τὴν ῾Ομήρου ποίησιν ἀποφήνασθαι εἶναι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης), and continues that Metrodorus “was the most devoted advocate of this doctrine, being at the same time the first who busied himself with the poet’s physical argument” (ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ προστῆναι τοῦ λόγου Μητρόδωρον τὸν Λαμψακηνόν, γνώριμον ὄντα αὐτοῦ, ὃν καὶ πρῶτον σπουδάσαι τοῦ ποιητοῦ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν πραγματείαν). This might well be a distant echo of Metrodorus’ physical allegories, but the main stress is put on the ethics: Anaxagoras and, most notably, his friend Metrodorus claimed that the Iliad and the Odyssey reveal certain moral instructions. The ethical meaning is definitely implied by Philodemus as well: the Homeric poems tell περὶ νόμων καὶ ἐθισμῶν τῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις. This way of thinking is common to all those who teach literature at school, and a reader of Homer will eagerly agree that his stories imply moral lessons: the regrettable consequences of Agamemnon’s arrogance and Achilles’ wrath are just the most striking instance.26 But how does the notion of Achilles as the sun or Apollo as bile help to make Homer a teacher of morality?27 We can find an answer to this question by examining the results achieved so far by Nestle, whose commentary Richardson and Califf supplemented with some important details. First of all, in seeking an explanation for Metrodorus’ absurdities, Nestle quite relevantly points out that Homer once actually compares Achilles to the sun, Il. 19.397–398: ὄπιθεν δὲ κορυσσάμενος βῆ ᾿Αχιλλεὺς / τεύχεσι παμφαίνων ὥς τ’ ἠλέκτωρ ῾Υπερίων. Nestle comments: “‘Was brauchen wir weiter Zeugnis’? – so mag Metrodor, als er das Gleichnis sich überlegte, gefolgert haben – hier sagt es ja der Dichter dem tiefer denkenden, verständnisvollen Leser deutlich genug, was ihm Achilleus eigentlich ist: nichts anderes als die Sonne!”28 Nestle assumes further that the simile in Il. 8.555–558, comparing the fires burned by the Trojans to the stars shining around the clear moon, gave Metrodorus the idea for his allegory of Hector. This assumption is again plausible (for one, because Anaxagoras studied the interaction between the sun and the moon), and if we look at the text closer, we can, I think, make of it more than Nestle does: 26 Herkenrath (1928) wrote a whole book making Homer into a guardian of morality. 27 Hammerstaedt (1998) 32 n. 22 refuses to admit that the physical explanations of Metrodorus could make Homer’s poetry a representation of ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη. 28 Nestle (1907) 505–506.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 423

ὡς δ’ ὅτ’ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστρα φαεινὴν ἀμφὶ σελήνην φαίνετ’ ἀριπρεπέα, ὅτε τ’ ἔπλετο νήνεμος αἰθήρ· ἔκ τ’ ἔφανεν πᾶσαι σκοπιαὶ καὶ πρώονες ἄκροι καὶ νάπαι· οὐρανόθεν δ’ ἄρ’ ὑπερράγη ἄσπετος αἰθήρ (...)29 The victorious Trojans camp in the open field just opposite the enemy, something they had never done before. Hector persuaded them to spend the night on hostile terrain – an undue risk, which only brought further casualties. Given that the moon is Hector and the stars that now filled the windless sky and made the upper sky break open are the Trojans, it is then but one step further to assume that aether, mentioned here twice in the accentuated position at the end of the verse, is meant to be Agamemnon and the Achaeans. The simile in question concludes Book 8. What follows is the panicked reaction of Agamemnon who, in view of the Trojan fires, summons an assembly of chieftains and insists that they head home. The imagery of the previous simile – the light of the moon and the stars “breaking through” the night and uncovering the aether above – is most suggestive for a Homeric scholar who tends to interpret allegorically. Thus there is no need to conjecture with Nestle that Agamemnon was identified with aether because aether was believed by some philosophers to be a supreme being.30 In his rendering of Homer, Metrodorus mostly follows the doctrines of Anaxagoras, and for this thinker, the supreme being is Mind, which is unmixed, whereas aether, like sun, moon, air etc. is a physical substance, a mixture of homeomerics. According to Aristotle, Anaxagoras derived αἰθήρ from αἴθειν and identified it with fire (Arist. Cael. 1.3.270b24–25 = 59 A 73 DK).31 Yet no such similes can be found for Helen as the earth or Alexander as the air, let alone the gods of the Philodemean catalogue, and, what is worse, there are comparisons suggesting the contrary, e.g. Ares as the air (Il. 5.864) or Apollo as the night (Il. 1.47). Besides, turning comparisons into allegories can hardly be called a safe practice. The world of Homeric similes and comparisons is extremely rich.32 The recurrent comparisons are also frequent, but those mentioned above are not of this kind. Metrodorus’ assertion that Achilles means the sun and Hector the moon, because Homer has once compared them to the sun and the moon,

29 This passage could have drawn the critics’ attention long before the Alexandrian grammarians, who discussed it among other ‘Homeric questions’ (since near the bright moon the stars cannot be conspicuous) and proposed the solution ἐκ τῆς λέξεως: cf. Combellack (1987) 207–208. 30 The author of the Derveni Papyrus identifies Zeus with air, which is also Mind: cf. Janko (2001) 3. 31 Baxter (1992) 127. 32 The main reason for it is that it implies various kinds of contrast: Basset (1921) 136–137.

424 

 Michael Pozdnev

would have to meet the challenge that elsewhere Homer compares Achilles to the Sirius star (Il. 22.26–29) and Hector to the wind (Il. 11.305). Nestle’s claim to have discovered the method of Metrodorus (he cites the words of Polonius: “Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t”) is, thus, preposterous.33 The zoological similes in the Iliad are so many that following this “method” one would easily affirm that Homer has actually written a treatise about wild nature. The similes of the sun, the moon, and the aether have probably strengthened Metrodorus’ theory, but this theory could not have been founded on the systematic elevating of similes into allegories. The context was of primary importance for contriving an allegory; that this context should include a direct ‘hint’ was very likely, though probably not absolutely necessary. The lack of textual material opens a wide space for speculation. Nestle argues that Helen is taken to be the earth because she and Paris are “das Liebespaar”; the Air holds the Earth in his hands, “wie es der uralte Mythos von Uranos und Gaia symbolisierte und wie es seit Anaximander der griechischen Physik ein geläufiger Gedanke war, dass die Erde auf dem Luftmeer ruhe.” Califf supports Richardson’s equally poetic idea of Helen as a centre of the “Iliad universe,” and supplements the picture drawn by Nestle with a reminiscence of Anaxagorean cosmology, in which the earth “is embraced” by the air.34 Richardson’s scheme is quite ingenious. One can indeed suppose that in Anaxagoras’ cosmological system, air covers the earth, the moon is over it, the sun moves still higher, and the aether rests above all these. Accordingly, “Helen is at the centre of the Trojan war, embraced by Paris,” while “Achilles pursues Hector around the walls of Troy,” and Agamemnon from his high position “instigates and maintains the war.”35 The only objection to this perfectly visual ‘geocentric model’ of ἡ τοῦ ῞Εκτορος δίωξις is that according to it, the sun would rotate between the earth and the

33 Califf (2003) 31: “At 19.374 the shield of Achilles is likened not to the sun but the moon, Hector’s symbol.” Without quoting Nestle, Califf notes relevantly: “the phrase τεύχεσι παμφαίνων ὥς τ’ ἠλέκτωρ is somewhat formulaic and is applied to Paris, the air in Metrodorus’s allegory at 6.513.” Hence the inference: “The key to Metrodorus’s allegorical system lies not in the simple identification of Achilles and Hector with the sun and moon based on isolated glosses on specific passages, but rather relates to the allegories’ ability to function on a broader narrative level by describing the heroes’ interaction in astronmical terms.” Califf is again right as he concludes that for Metrodorus “the general allegorical scheme is anterior to the particular interpretation of any given line” (p. 33). 34 Nestle (1907) 508; Califf (2003) 32; Richardson (1975) 69; Buffière (19732) 128 calls Helen “centre de le poésie Homerique.” 35 Cf. Buffère (19732) 128: “L’éther enflammant le soleil et les étoiles, les entraînant dans sa course autour de la terre, c’est Agamemnon, animateur de la grande éxpedition aux rivages troyens, chef de tous ces héros qui gravitent autour d’Hélène et dont le plus brilliant est Achille.”

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 425

moon (Il. 22.194–198; cf. Arist. Poet. 24.1460a15–16). In reply to Nestle’s supposition it should be noted, further, that in the Homeric representation, Helen and Paris are by no means a “pair of lovers.” In fact, Helen hates her seducer (Il. 3.427– 436), as she also hates Aphrodite who made her come to Troy (Il. 3.396–409); she goes to Paris because the goddess forces her (Il. 3.413–420). The meeting of Paris and Helen at the end of book three is their only scene together, the only episode where Homer deals with their relations. Metrodorus must have founded his allegory on this particular scene. An additional ‘hint’ for him could have been that Aphrodite transfers Paris to his chamber hidden in dense air (Il. 3.381: ἐκάλυψε δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἠέρι πολλῇ). This is the second instance showing that in building his system of hero-allegories Metrodorus looked at particular contexts. The end of Book 19, where Achilles is compared to Helios (Il. 19.397–398: κορυσσάμενος βῆ ᾿Αχιλλεὺς / τεύχεσι παμφαίνων ὥς τ’ ἠλέκτωρ ῾Υπερίων) and is talking to his horses just before going out to the battlefield and starting to slaughter the Trojans, probably formed for Metrodorus such a context as well. Early Greek physiology provides us with the most credible explanation for the allegory of Apollo: this god is bile since the qualitative and quantitative changings of the bile were made responsible for acute diseases. Aristotle expressly ascribes this theory to “the Anaxagoreans” (Part. an. 4.2.677a5 = 59 A 105 DK). Notably, this again binds the Metrodorean allegory to a certain Homeric episode, namely the infliction of plague (Il. 1.43–52)36 which ravaged for nine days so fiercely that “constantly pyres of the dead burned thick”37 and caused so many deaths that Achilles doubted if the Achaeans could stay further (Il. 1.60). And again a very indicative ‘hint’ can be found in the vocabulary of the scene, since the arrow (βέλος) of Apollo is called ἐχεπευκές, which probably means “sharp,” but Metrodorus’ contemporaries would naturally enough understand it as “bitter” (because pitch tastes bitter, cf. πεύκαες τὸ πικρόν: Hdn. 3.1.394.13 Lenz), as all the scholiasts and Eustathius actually do. The examples for χολὴ πικρά, πικρόχολος et sim. are, of course, plenty. The anatomy of veins by Metrodorus’ contemporary Diogenes of Apollonia discerns two main veins, a liver-vein and a spleen-vein (Arist. Hist. an. 3.2.511b31– 513b11 = fr. 10 Laks = 64 B 6 DK).38 The same is to be found in the Corpus Hippo­ craticum (Morb. 1.26; Epid. 2.4.1). The Anaxagoreans believed that blood is not generated in the body, but enters it with food (59 A 46; 104 DK). The idea that 36 Nestle (1907) 509; Califf (2003) 33; cf. Buffière (19732) 130–131 (without mentioning Nestle). 37 Transl. by A. T. Murray. 38 Nestle (1907) 510. Following Nestle, Richardson (1975) 69 aptly recalls Eur. Bacch. 274–279 as an echo of Prodicus’ identification of Demeter and Dionysos with bread and wine (test. 74 Mayhew = 84 B 5 [III] DK).

426 

 Michael Pozdnev

nutrition depends on the function of liver and spleen is clear from this concept of blood’s origins. Although we may never know what mythological poetry Metrodorus had in mind as he allegorized Demeter as the liver or Dionysos as the spleen, we do know what episode was crucial to the myth of Demeter. The angry goddess ‘retires’ to Eleusis, thus causing people to die from starvation; Homeric Hymn to Demeter (305–333) describes how stubbornly she refuses to go back to Olympus and to her duties, unless her daughter returns; all the suppliant words of the gods sent to her by Zeus she rejects “in a hard manner” (στερέως). The hardening of the liver as a dangerous symptom was well known to physicians in Metrodorus’ time (cf. Hippoc. Aph. 6.42.1; De affect. inter. 24.2). We do not need to conjecture on the exact source of the allegory Dionysos (the tragedy of Pentheus as told by Metrodorus’ contemporary Euripides in his Bacchae seems to be the most telling), since a kind of method can already be traced. The reduction of myths to physical or physiological conceptions, mostly those attested for Anaxagoras, proceeds from particular contexts that are likely to contain distinct semantic ‘hints.’ Consequently, the question arises: what do these contexts have in common? To answer this question, we must take a deeper look at the motivation underlying the Metrodorean approach. Our key source on the origins of Homeric allegory is Porphyry’s comment on the Battle of the Gods. This episode of the Iliad was the principal point for allegorical interpretation, since Plato also resorts to it in the Republic, Book 2, as he discusses the unsuitability of hyponoetic interpretations for school teaching (2.378d6–7: οὔτ’ ἐν ὑπονοίαις κτλ.). Both Plato and Porphyry present us with a clear idea of the reason why the scene gave rise to an allegorical approach. It was the primary object of criticism concerning the inappropriateness of Homeric gods (cf. Porph. Quaest. Hom. ad Il. 20.67, p. 240 MacPhail: τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου μὲν ὁ περὶ θεῶν ἔχεται καθόλου λόγος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀπρεποῦς· οὐ γὰρ πρέποντας τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν μύθους φησίν).39 Of the many critics that must have been known to Metrodorus, Xenophanes and Heraclitus were probably only the most famous. That Metrodorus would apply his method to the Battle of the Gods is nothing more than a conjecture. Still, it becomes more plausible if we take a closer look at the rest of Porphyry’s text. He relates how some interpreters “solve” the accusation of being ἀπρεπής by implying other meanings of the words, since “they believe that everything is said allegorically about the nature of the elements”: πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην κατηγορίαν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως ἐπιλύουσιν ἀλληγορίᾳ πάντα εἰρῆσθαι νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων φύσεως. This passage strikingly 39 Porphyry has added that the scene is “absolutely useless.” As regards the main action of the Iliad, this is certainly not correct, since the battle scene serves to slow down the action: Achilles should not meet Hector at once.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 427

coincides with the judgment of Tatian concerning Metrodorus: cf. πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίαν μετάγων (Tatian) and ἀλληγορίᾳ πάντα εἰρῆσθαι (Porphyry), φύσεως δὲ ὑποστάσεις καὶ στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις (Tatian) and ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων φύσεως (Porphyry). Tatian could have been one of Porphyry’s sources, or they could have both used the same source. Whatever the source that handed down the fragments of Metrodorean doctrine, Metrodorus is clearly echoed by Diogenes Laërtius, who says that Metrodorus was the first to study Homer’s ‘physics.’ The φυσικὴ πραγματεία is just what Porphyry proceeds to describe: τὸ ξηρὸν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν τῷ ψυχρῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ τὸ κοῦφον τῷ βαρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ σβεστικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πυρός, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ξηραντικὸν τοῦ ὕδατος. The opposites cited here confront each other in the Anaxagorean system as well, and what is more, since everything except Mind consists of homeomeries, bodily substances like bone and flesh are considered virtually identical to physical elements like water and air (Arist. Metaph. 1.3.984a11–16 = 59 A 43 DK): φύσεως ὑποστάσεις are the building blocks of the human organism, which means, pace Hammerstaedt, that as regards the allegories of the gods, Tatian does not so much contradict Philodemus. Porphyry’s cited abstract is thus likely to be traced back to Metrodorus. “This kind of apology is very old,” finishes Porphyry, after listing some other more or less trivial allegories, physical as well as moral, “and such way of solving problems by finding the proper meaning of the word goes back to Theagenes of Rhegium, who was the first to write about Homer”: οὗτος μὲν οὖν τρόπος ἀπολογίας ἀρχαῖος ὢν πάνυ καὶ ἀπὸ Θεαγένους τοῦ ῾Ρηγίνου, ὃς πρῶτας ἔγραψε περὶ ῾Ομήρου, τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως. Porphyry puts everything he knows about Homeric allegory to use,40 and even more, since Theagenes, whom Romeo believes to be included among the ἔνιοι of Philodemus,41 was, as I have argued elsewhere,42 probably not an allegorist at all. Nobody, including Tatian, who informs us about his date (i.e. c. 524 BC), associates him with an allegorical approach.43 From Tatian as well as from Porphyry, we learn that with this critic, the art of interpreting literary texts came into being. He is also reported to have introduced the school concept of ἑλληνισμός, i.e. the proper use of language (Schol. in Dion. Thr. 164.23–29 Hilgard [GG I 3.164.23–29; 448.12–16] = 8 A 1a DK). This strengthens the widely accepted opinion that he was a Homeric rhapsode: these individuals must have contributed to primary education, which was based on the texts they knew best. But Xenophon explicitly sets the rhapsodes apart from those who developed hyponoetic

40 On his Stoic sources see Wehrli (1928) 88–89. 41 Romeo (1993) 103; Wehrli (1928) 92 thinks of Metrodorus as the direct follower of Theagenes. 42 Pozdnev (2016) 14–23. 43 Thus Tate (1934) 108 discredits the testimony of Porphyry.

428 

 Michael Pozdnev

explanations (Mem. 3.5–7).44 Hence the fallibility of the popular theory according to which Xenophanes once ceased to recite Homer and began to criticize his views, and his attacks led another reciter, Theagenes, to invent allegoric methods to protect the poet. Porphyry cautiously credits Theagenes not with allegorical interpretations, but with the invention of the ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως technique of solving Homeric problems.45 Optimistically seen, Theagenes could at most have claimed that the gods’ battle is not liable to theological criticism since its meaning substantially differs from that of the fighting of men (as implied in the Homeric text itself: Il. 20.56–66). Theagenes was, thus, not an inventor of allegory, although he could well have inspired the later symbolist critics. As the verbal agreement between passages of Tatian and Porphyry, reinforced by the evidence of Diogenes Laërtius (Favorinus) shows, it really was Metrodorus who launched the allegorical interpretation of Homer: its ‘physical’ kind was thus the earliest. In his time, the Homeric poems became the most famous and widely used text of the Greeks; no wonder that the new readings of it arose. Speculating on the Battle of the Gods, Metrodorus came to the idea that neither Hera nor Athena took part in it, nor was it Zeus who told the gods to fight, but what are really at odds are the opposites such as dry and moist (as suggested by the scene of Hephaestus and Scamander), and what this and other such scenes display are, as Tatian says, “the basic substances of nature and the arrangement of the elements.” Along with the examples examined above, this proves (Philodemus’ and Tatian’s criticism notwithstanding) that Metrodorus did not force each god or hero to allegorize the same thing in all contexts. Like the later interpreters, he most probably believed that not every Homeric context necessarily implies hyponoetic meaning46 and, moreover, that different contexts could be allegorized differently.47 Philodemus, or rather his (and Tatian’s) source, picked out the most awkward meanings, and went on to proclaim that every Homeric hero is appointed the same meaning throughout, which would, of course, be ‘madness’ and was in fact never practiced.48 44 Rispoli (1980) 249–250. 45 “The solution based on language”: cf. Combellack (1987) 219. 46 The ancient and Byzantine commentators on Homer apply allegory where they think it necessary. See e.g., on Tzetzes, Hunger (1954) 35–41. 47 Just as Janko (1997) 79 puts it: “Such multiple identifications are common among the allegorists, and a given set of heroes or gods could be equally compatible with more than one set of allegorical identifications.” Cf. Reinhardt (1910) 80: “(...) augurari licet quam monstrosum Metrodorus et portentosum superstruxerit aedificium, variis heroum proeliis accipiens modo anni tempora significari modo siderum defectus modo quaslibet terrae caelique mutationes.” 48 Hammerstaedt (1998) 30 rightly supposes that Metrodorus did construct a coherent system (“ein stimmiges allegorisches Erklärungsgebäude”). Yet, on the other hand, this implies not the uniformity of allegorical equations, but the fact that they share the same contexts.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 429

Accordingly, Metrodorus’ motivation was the same as Favorinus ascribed to Anaxagoras: he claimed that Homer is “a poet of virtue and justice.”49 That Metrodorus also aimed at protecting natural philosophy against traditionalists,50 is doubtful, since reinterpreting classics in a risky manner is an odd way of advocating scientific innovations. As an apology of Homer, Metrodorus’ method would meet with approbation among his contemporaries. But, aimed as it was at defending philosophy or natural science, his allegories would probably damage what they were meant to defend. As attested in the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, thinkers contemporary with Metrodorus put into Homer’s mouth their disagreement on the new philosophical theories.51 Besides, the concepts reflected by his renderings are not so heretical as to require any such defense. Porphyry reports that Metrodorus was one of the earliest Homeric scholars to try and solve specific interpretive problems (Quaest. Hom. ad Il. 10.252, p. 170 MacPhail = 61 A 5 DK; the “old” ζήτημα in question is Il. 10.252–253: παρῴχηκε δὲ πλέω νὺξ / τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ’ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται). He stands, therefore, at the beginning of the literature on ‘Homeric questions’, the primary aim of which was to protect Homer against the charge of being an incongruous and bad poet. Likewise, his allegories were meant to fend off the attacks of critics like Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who accused Homeric gods and heroes of inappropriate behavior. Helen’s apology was a popular theme, introduced by Stesichorus and advanced by Euripides and Gorgias. Metrodorus made the most original contribution to it, arguing that Helen actually did not give herself to Paris, or, at least, that Homer did not represent her doing that. The Alexander-Helen scene is the representation of the earth surrounded by the air, i.e. of the physical substances that have no choice in what way they should interact with each other. Goethe portrays a very similar concept of adultery in his Die Wahlverwandtschaften. Similarly, Eustathius would not believe that it is Hera who cunningly seduces her husband on the Ida mountain, but ἡ τῶν στοιχείων θέσις ἀέρος τε καὶ τοῦ ἀνωτέρω αἰθέρος τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις ἐμφαίνεται (3.645.11 Van der Valk). Further on, Achilles did not slaughter the Trojans with that savage brutality, but Homer has portrayed the

49 The apologetic tendency of the earliest allegorists is almost unanimously recognized: see e.g. Sikes (1931) 13; Obbink (2010) 18; Schlaffer (1990) 68. For Metrodorus it is – erroneously, I think – denied by Lanata (1963) 247: “In ogni caso è chiaro che al di sotto di queste fredde e razionalistiche esercitazioni non c’è più alcun interesse reale per la poesia omerica [!], la quale non è più un oggetto di appassionate condanne o di amorose giustificazioni, ma solo un testo da adattare alle diverse teorie filosofiche.” 50 Westermann (2002) 137; Tate (1929) 142; Gatzemeier (1985) 39. 51 Cert. 158–159. Cf. Bassino (2019) 159–161.

430 

 Michael Pozdnev

parching sun. Hector was neither so imprudent as to reject the wise advice of the elders and to camp in the field, nor did his decision cause Agamemnon to panic. The episode is an allegory of the moon and the stars that have come too close to the above aether. Pindar refuses to believe that Demeter tasted man’s flesh, Ol. 1.51–52: ἐμοὶ δ’ ἄπορα γαστρίμαργον μακάρων τιν’ εἰπεῖν· ἀφίσταμαι. Likewise, Metrodorus would say on this point that it was not Demeter who ate the shoulder of Pelops, but the myth allegorizes the ill liver which is always ‘hungry.’ Neither did the goddess egoistically starve people to death, but in such a way the malfunction of the liver is described. Apollo does not kill innocent people with the plague, but the poet depicts the deadly effect of the fevered bile. The same kind of apologetic reflection would possibly justify the cruel vengeance taken by Dionysos on Pentheus. For Metrodorus, this would represent the intoxicating effect of the malfunctioning spleen. Poets have their ways of theodicy; Metrodorus, a Homeric philologist and a ‘friend’ of natural philosophy, invents his own. He was, then, not that ‘imprudent,’ ‘outrageous,’ or ‘tasteless’ as most critics have thought him to be. The high esteem attested in Plato’s Ion is more justified, since the Metrodorean approach required the perfect knowledge of the text and the above-average interpretative skills, let alone the rhetorical background needed to promote such views as these. Neither was he an eccentric who “seems to stand in a class of his own by virtue of his extremism,”52 but rather an urbane interpreter whose theories were in full accord with contemporary spiritual demands. That his system included hero-allegories turns out to be quite reasonable, if we consider that Plato’s ‘first critique’ of poetry in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic also includes heroes (3.388a–b; 389e–390a; 391a–c etc.), and that his criticism was the reason why in some Alexandrian or even pre-Alexandrian editions of the Iliad, meant to serve as textbooks, a number of dubious hero-scenes (e.g. Il. 1.225–233; 16.432–458) were cut off.53 Metrodorus was apparently trying to save Homer as moral poet acceptable for educational purposes. To be sure, allegory as an interpretative approach was always considered doubtful.54 Plato (who, as is well known, likes allegories himself) rejects it in the Republic, ironically condemns it in the Phaedrus (229c6–e5), and parodies it in the

52 Richardson (1975) 69; cf. Obbink (2010) 18; Lanata (1963) 246: “interpretazioni apparentemente assurde.” Califf, who is more indulging, initially denotes Metrodorus’ readings as “fanciful” but ends by calling him “weird.” 53 Pfeiffer (1968) 113–114; on the relation of Plato’s critic to the ‘Homeric problems’, cf. Heath (2009) 252–253. 54 Szlezák (2012) 17–19.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 431

Cratylus (esp. 393b; 409b).55 Aristarchus disapproved of it (cf. Schol. D in Il. 5.385), and there was probably no school except the Stoics (especially after Crates56) who consequently explained Homer allegorically. I finish with an assumption that the judgments of Philodemus and Tatian are due not to their own acquaintance with Metrodorus’ treatise, but to a current critical rendering of his doctrine. This is suggested, firstly, by the fact that Philodemus and Tatian mention the same heroes, but different gods; they give the allegories of the gods in a way that implies the same technique, but the allegories themselves are again different. Tatian coincides with Porphyry, and the way he appeals to the popular conception of the Olympic gods (οἱ τοὺς περιβόλους αὐτοῖς καὶ τεμένη καθιδρύσαντες) suggests the critical thought previous to him, since Cornutus, presumably reacting to similar censure, repeatedly claims that temples and altars are consecrated to the gods just because these gods actually mean what his allegorical interpretation wants them to (Theol. Graec. 12.5 Lang; cf. also 24.13; 35.8–9; 67.5). Finally, it explains why Philodemus does not mention Metrodorus by name, as he did with Crates. If he had read Metrodorus and picked these allegories out of his text, no courtesy would presumably have stopped him, a harsh critic as he was, to mention his source directly. The curious allegories he quotes belong to Metrodorus and to no one else. Still he prefers to generalize like a clever censor should, retelling the ‘absurdities’ a famous scholar was supposed to have contrived.

References Basset (1921): Samuel E. Basset, “The Function of the Homeric Simile”, in: TAPhA 52, 132–147. Bassino (2019): Paola Bassino, The Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi: A Commentary, Berlin/Boston. Baxter (1992): Timothy M. S. Baxter: The Cratylus: Plato’s Critique of Naming, Leiden. Broggiato (2001): Maria Broggiato, Cratete di Mallo: I frammenti, La Spezia. Buffière (1973): Félix Buffière, Les mythes d’Homère et la pensée Grecque et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes, Paris (1st ed. 1956). Califf (2003): David J. Califf, “Metrodorus of Lampsacus and the Problem of Allegory: An Extreme Case?”, in: Arethusa 36, 21–36. Combellack (1987): Frederick M. Combellack, “The λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως”, in: AJPh 108, 2–19. Dyck (1993): Andrew R. Dyck, “Anaxagoras the Allegorist?”, in: RhM 136, 367–368. Gatzemeier (1985): Matthias Gatzemeier, “Wahrheit und Allegorie: Zur Frühgeschichte der Hermeneutik von Theagenes bis Proklos”, in: Volker Gerhardt and Norbert Herold (eds.), Wahrheit und Begründung, Würzburg, 27–44.

55 For the critic of both οἱ περὶ ῞Ομηρον δεινοί and Ἀναξαγόρειοι in Pl. Cra. 407a9 and 409b6, see Baxter (1992) 124–130. 56 Goulet (2005) 118–119.

432 

 Michael Pozdnev

Gomperz (1888): Theodor Gomperz, “Nachlese zu den Bruchstücken der griechischen Tragiker”, in: SAAW 116, 3–52. Gomperz (1891): Theodor Gomperz, “Philodem und die ästhetischen Schriften der Herculanischen Bibliothek”, in: SAAW 123, 51–69 [= Tiziano Dorandi (ed.), Theodor Gomperz: Eine Auswahl herkulanischer kleiner Schriften (1864–1909), Leiden/New York/ Cologne 1993, 163–252]. Goulet (2005): Richard Goulet, “La méthode allégorique chez les stoïciens”, in: Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat (eds.), Les Stoïciens, Paris, 93–119. Hammerstaedt (1998): Jürgen Hammerstaedt, “Die Homerallegorese des älteren Metrodor von Lampsakos”, in: ZPE 121, 28–32. Hausrath (1890): August Hausrath, Philodemi Περὶ Ποιημάτων libri secundi quae videntur fragmenta, Leipzig. Heath (2009): Malcolm Heath, “Heraclides of Pontus on Homer”, in: William W. Fortenbaugh and Elizabeth Pender (eds.), Heraclides of Pontus: Discussion, New Brunswick/London, 251–272. Heidmann (1971): Josef Heidmann, “Der Papyrus 1676 der herculanensischen Bibliothek, Philodemos Über die Gedichte”, in: CErc 1, 90–111. Herkenrath (1928): Roland Herkenrath, Der ethische Aufbau der Ilias und der Odyssee, Paderborn. Hunger (1954): Herbert Hunger, “Allegorische Mythendeutung in der Antike und bei Johannes Tzetzes”, in: JÖByz 3, 35–54. Janko (1997): Richard Janko, “The Physicist as Hierophant”, in: ZPE 118, 61–94. Janko (2000): Richard Janko, Philodemus: On Poems, Book 1, Oxford. Janko (2001): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus (Diagoras of Melos, Apopyrgizontes Logoi?): A New Translation”, in: CPh 96, 1–32. Jensen (1923): Christian Jensen, Philodemos über die Gedichte: Fünftes Buch, Berlin. Lamberton/Keaney (1992): Robert Lamberton and John J. Keaney (eds.), Homer’s Ancient Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic’s Earliest Exegetes, Princeton. Lanata (1963): Giuliana Lanata, Poetica pre-platonica: Testimonianze e frammenti, Florence. Leitao (2014): David D. Leitao, The Pregnant Male as Myth and Metaphor in Classical Greek Literature, Cambridge. Long (1992): Anthony A. Long, “Stoic Readings of Homer”, in: Lamberton/Keaney, 41–66. Mette (1936): Hans J. Mette, Sphairopoiia: Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Krates von Pergamon, Munich. Most (1989): Glenn W. Most, “Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis: A Preliminary Report”, in: ANRW II 36.3, 2014–2065. Nestle (1907): Wilhelm Nestle, “Metrodors Mythendeutung”, in: Philologus 66, 503–510 [= Id., Griechische Studien: Untersuchungen zur Religion, Dichtung und Philosophie der Griechen, Stuttgart 1948, 164–172]. Nestle (1932): Wilhelm Nestle, “Metrodoros”, in: RE XV.2, 1476–1477. Obbink (2010): Dirk Obbink, “The Early Greek Allegory”, in: Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Allegory, Cambridge, 15–25. Pfeiffer (1968): Rudolf Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginning to the End of the Hellenistic Age, Oxford. Pozdnev (2016): Michael Pozdnev, “Homerstudien zur Zeit des Xenophanes”, in: WS 129, 7–24. Porter (1992): James I. Porter, “Hermeneutic Lines and Circles: Aristarchus and Crates on the Exegesis of Homer”, in: Lamberton/Keaney, 79–114.

14 Metrodorus the Allegorist as Reflected in Philodemus’ On Poems 

 433

Primavesi (2005): Oliver Primavesi, “Theologische Allegorie: Zur philosophischen Funktion einer poetischen Form bei Parmenides und Empedokles”, in: Marietta Horster and Christiane Reitz (eds.), Wissensvermittlung in dichterischer Gestalt, Stuttgart, 69–93. Reinhardt (1910): Karl Reinhardt, De Graecorum theologia capita duo, Diss. Berlin. Richardson (1975): Nicholas J. Richardson, “Homeric Professors in the Age of the Sophists”, in: PCPhS n.s. 21, 77–81. Rispoli (1980): Gioia M. Rispoli, “Teagene o dell’allegoria”, in: Vichiana 9, 249–250. Romeo (1992): Costantina Romeo, “Per una nuova edizione del PHerc. 1676”, in: CErc 22, 163–167. Romeo (1993): Costantina Romeo, “Ancora un contributo alla ricostruzione di un rotolo della Poetica filodemea”, in: CErc 23, 99–105. Sbordone (1976): Francesco Sbordone, Φιλοδήμου Περὶ ποιημάτων: Tractatus tres, Naples. Schlaffer (1990): Heinz Schlaffer, Poesie und Wissen: Die Entstehung des ästhetischen Bewußtseins und der philologischen Erkenntnis, Frankfurt am Main. Sider (1997): David Sider, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: André Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford, 129–148. Sikes (1931): Edward E. Sikes, The Greek Views of Poetry, London. Szlezák (2012): Thomas A. Szlezák, Homer oder Die Geburt der abendländischen Dichtung, Munich. Steinmetz (1986): Peter Steinmetz, “Allegorische Deutung und allegorische Dichtung in der alten Stoa”, in: RhM 129, 18–30. Tate (1929): Jonathan Tate, “Plato and Allegorical Interpretation”, in: CQ 23, 142–154. Tate (1934): Jonathan Tate, “On the History of Allegorism”, in: CQ 28, 105–114. Torshilov (2010): Dmitry Torshilov, “Possible Explanations of the Homeric Allegorical Interpretations by Metrodorus of Lampsacus” (in Russian), in: Aristeas 1, 110–117. Vassallo (2015): Christian Vassallo, “Orpheus in the Herculaneum Papyri: Praesocratica Herculanensia VI”, in: APF 61, 87–113. Wehrli (1928): Fritz Wehrli, Zur Geschichte der allegorischen Deutung Homers im Altertum, Diss. Basel/Leipzig. Westermann (2002): Hartmut Westermann, Die Intention des Dichters und die Zwecke der Interpreten, Berlin/New York.

Part VI: Early Atomists

Enrico Piergiacomi

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri: A Reassessment of the Sources Although Epicurus and Philodemus often quote Democritus respectfully,1 not a single text in the Herculaneum papyri preserves an exposition of his theory of εἴδωλα or simulacra. In contrast, external sources give plenty of clear information on the basic points of Democritean doctrine, which may be summed up as follows: A. Democritus calls the simulacra δείκηλα,2 and they resemble the physical appearance and the psychic properties of a given object or person. Just to give one example, εἴδωλα communicate to an observer that Socrates in love has the appearance of a human being and a snub nose, is mild in character, and is now possessed by erotic arousal.3 B. The simulacra are released by each body through a material atomic effluence (ἀπορροή or ῥεῦμα) and determine affections or τύποι in the sensible organs, as they enter them.4 Moreover, the emitted εἴδωλα cause a decrease in the internal atoms of the perceived object, while those received by the perceiver provoke an increase in its atomic constitution (cf. fr. 50.4 Leszl = Philop. in Gen. corr. 23.21–30 Vitelli). C. The sources link simulacra mostly to sight: they are transported by the air and impress upon the eyes the resemblance of the external object, but only after having been downsized by eye-rays.5

1 See the references in Huby (1978); Gigante/Indelli (1980); and Luciani (2003). 2 Etym. Gen. s.v. δείκελον (= 68 B 123 DK). 3 See Alex. Aphr. In Arist. Sens. 56.12 Wendland (= 67 A 1 DK), and Plut. Quaest. conv. 734a4–b5 (= 68 A 77 DK). On the doctrine of emanation, see esp. Sassi (1978) 48–56; Morel (1996) 291–332; and Dörrie (1976) 71–75. See also Brown (1987) 72–73 for the link between εἴδωλα and sexual arousal. 4 On the conceptual distinction between ἀπορροή, τύπος, and εἴδωλον, see Joly (1984) 252–259. 5 See the texts collected in 67 A 1 DK, Diog. Laërt. 9.44 (= 68 A 1 DK), Arist. Sens. 2.438a10–12 and 3.440a15–20 (= 68 A 121 DK = fr. 483 Luria), Porph. In Harm. 1.32.10–16 (= 68 A 126a DK), Theophr. Sens. 50–51, 53, 80–82 (= 68 A 135 DK), August. Ep. 118.30 (= fr. 282 Luria), Macrob. Sat. 7.14.3–4 (= fr. 471 Luria). Cf. Bailey (1928) 162–176, Bicknell (1969) and (1970), Baldes (1975), Burkert (1977), Enrico Piergiacomi, University of Trento https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-016

438 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

D. The simulacra are also involved in the mechanisms of hearing, smell, and thought (for even νόησις has its origin in the reception of εἴδωλα emitted by external things or objects), the dream experience, forethought, the evil eye, the attraction between the magnet and amber, and possibly poetic inspiration.6 E. The simulacra normally stimulate the mind after passing through the sensible organs (68 A 118 DK = Cic. Fam. 15.16.1; fr. 46.2 Leszl = Cic. Luc. 40). Others instead seem to stimulate the mind alone, as in the case of certain divine simulacra (fr. 472a Luria = Aug. Ep. 118.27–28). F. The simulacra have the capacity to be seen, to speak, and to reveal the future to the perceiver (68 A 77 DK = Plut. Quaest. conv. 735a10–b5); according to Sextus Empiricus, bigger, long-lasting simulacra and those which have monitory power – which may be gods, or effluences released by the gods – have these capacities (68 B 166 DK = Sext. Emp. Math. 9.19). However, it is not clear whether Democritus explicitly endorsed these claims or whether they were attributed to primitive human beings and then criticized by him.7 If we look for implicit references to Democritus’ theory of εἴδωλα, the Herculaneum papyri may instead be found to hold some interesting surprises. These texts include three columns of Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως (one from Book 2, two from Book 34), as well as extracts from two or three works by Philodemus: viz. the so-called ‘second part’ of Περὶ εὐσεβείας, Book 4 of Περὶ ποιημάτων, and Book 4 of Περὶ θανάτου. The goal of the present paper is to analyse these texts: in other words, it attempts to reassess our knowledge of the Democritean theory of simulacra preserved in the Herculaneum papyri. This analysis could yield some precious additions to what we know of Democritus’ theory and shed light on some unclear details. I will start with an analysis of the two books of Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως, and then move on to study the three works by Philodemus.

Barnes (1986) 290–296 and 553–559, Gregory (2013) 192–197. On the eye-rays, cf. Vitr. De arch. 7, praef. 11 (= fr. 139 Luria) with Rudolph (2011). 6 Aët. 4.8.10 (= 67 A 2 DK) and 5.2.1 (= 68 A 136 DK), Plut. Quaest. conv. 682f4–683a3 and 735a1–4 (= 68 A 77 DK), Cic. Fam. 15.16.1 (= 68 A 118 DK), Theophr. Sens. 51 and 82 (= 68 A 135 DK), Alex. Aphr. Quaest. 2.23 (= 68 A 165 DK), Arist. Div. somn. 2.463b31–464a21 (= fr. 472 Luria), Aul. Gell. 5.15.6–8 (= fr. 492 Luria), Arist. Sens. 5.443a21–22 (= fr. 501 Luria). On all these topics, see Langerbeck (1935) 100–118, and Cambiano (1980). I cite the texts that suggest a link between the simulacra and poetic inspiration in § 4. 7 I endorse the former view: see Piergiacomi (2013) 68–76 for arguments and references.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 439

1 The order and position of the soul particles of Democritus’ εἴδωλα A recent study by Pierre-Marie Morel has convincingly shown that Epicurus at the same time hints at and criticizes Democritus’ theory of εἴδωλα in On Nature, Book 2, PHerc. 993, cols. XIV.2–5 + 109.19–25 Leone.8 The text runs as follows: Col. XIV 

5 Col. 109  20

25

 [ο]ὐδ ὥστε το̣ια̣ ύτ̣ην θέσιν καὶ ̣ [τάξιν] τῶν̣ ἔν δ̣ο̣θ[εν ± 8 desunt versus 10

--τὴν]   προειρημένη[ν ταχ̣υτ̣ῆτα ἔχουσα[ν ̲ ̲συσσ [ώζεσ]θαι· αἱ · γὰρ ἔν[δο]θ̣εν θέσ[εις καὶ τάξεις, καθ’ ἃς [ἔμψυχον τόδε τι πρ̣[οσ-||   [αγορεύομεν

Nor in the way this disposition and order [of the atoms which are] in the inside [of the aggregate] (…) are held together, having the speed described beforehand. Indeed, the internal positions and orders [of the atoms], according to which we call this thing here animated (…)9 Col. 109.22–25 suggests that the main focus of the passage is the discussion of whether the εἴδωλα are alive or not, or more precisely whether the internal atoms of the soul keep the position and order which ensure life and in turn would allow us to call a thing “animated.” It is true that the text does not mention these particles. However, both Democritus and the Epicureans believed the ψυχή to be composed of specific atoms: Democritus posited that they were spherical (Aët. 4.3.5 = 68 A 102 DK), while the Epicureans believed them to be round-smooth (see the scholium to Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 66; Phld. De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, col. 8.13–16 8 Morel (2015) 60–65. 9 The translation is mine, based on that of Leone (2012) 458–459.

440 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

Henry). Therefore, the issue of whether simulacra are animated and the question of whether εἴδωλα have a soul that generates life are one and the same problem. Since Democritus held that at least some simulacra are atomic aggregates that possess life (see point F of the introduction) – i.e. that they preserve psychic atoms within their structure – it appears that Epicurus wishes to object that this view is false.10 After all, it is an affirmation incompatible with our physical understanding of atomic movement within the void. Since we can call a thing “animated” if (and only if) its psychic atoms are ordered and positioned in a specific way within the organism, and since the speed of the εἴδωλα is as great as that of thought, as Democritus himself partly recognized,11 it follows that the simulacra should not be regarded as ἔμψυχα at all. Presumably, they are so fast in their movement that they cannot maintain the arrangement necessary for soul particles to make a thing alive for long. Possible confirmation of such an interpretation is provided by Velleius’ criticism of Aristotle’s identification of god with the soul of the sky, which does not possess life due to the enormous speed of its revolutions.12 Diogenes of Oinoanda makes the same attack against Democritus’ theory of εἴδωλα (fr. 10, IV.12–V.6 Smith).13 The Epicurean claims that the simulacra that cause dream visions in the mind of a sleeping living being (fr. 9) could not possess sensation, reason, and language, for these δυνάμεις cannot be preserved by compounds that have a fine structure and lack the “depth of a solid nature” (στερεμν̣ί ̣ας φύσεως β̣άθος οὐκ ἔχουσ[ι]ν).14 The expression might refer to the atomic arrangement of the soul atoms that lie deep inside a living organism, but not a simulacrum. Indeed, Epicurus often states that εἴδωλα have a great void in their inner structure and claims that the atoms of simulacra preserve for considerable time the order/position they had when they were released by the object, but not in virtue of βάθη.15 Furthermore, it is probably this profound recess that hosts the psychic atoms

10 See here Leone (2012) 152 and 631–632, and Morel (2015) 64–65. Also Cassius the Epicurean refuted the vitality of the simulacra (see Plut. Brut. 37). 11 See Plut. Quaest. conv. 735b5–c2 (= 68 A 77 DK); Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 48; De nat. 2, PHerc. 1149/993, cols. 76, 92.6–8, 93–94, 98, 111, 119 Leone; Lucr. 4.176–238 and 4.793–801, with Barigazzi (1958); Verde (2010) 122–125; Leone (2012) 142–147, 552–557, and 570–575; and Konstan (2015). Silvestre (1985) 64–66 claims that this is one of the main points of agreement between Epicureans and Democritus on the theory of simulacra. 12 Cic. Nat. D. 1.13.33: quomodo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta conservari potest? 13 I am quoting this and all the following fragments from Smith (1992). 14 On Diogenes’ perspective, see Barigazzi (1981) 1–3; Morel (1996) 297–298; Clay (1998) 219–220. 15 Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 48; De nat. 2, PHerc. 1149/993, cols. 104–105 and 117 Leone. On these texts, cf. Verde (2010) 127–128 and (2016) 55–58; Leone (2012) 80–85, 612–613, and 674.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 441

and consequently life. One may reinforce this supposition by noting that Epicurus considers the soul a body that is protected from all external blows by the surrounding σῶμα (Ad Her. 63–65). Even more noteworthy are Velleius’ polemic against Anaxagoras, in which he claims that nothing is more interior (interius) than the mind, and Lucretius’ claim that the animus (“the soul of the entire soul”) is located in the innermost depths of the organism.16 Now, providing that the phrase στερεμνίας φύσεως β̣άθος is a reference to the arrangement of soul particles, we may suppose that Diogenes is accusing Democritus of not realizing that the εἴδωλα have no soul, because their fine structure and lack of any real depth prevents them from internally maintaining the order/position of the psychic atoms which generate life for any length of time. Even if simulacra had particles of ψυχή, it would be necessary to admit that they lose them in a brief period of time, especially after receiving many blows from the outside, which cannot be sustained because of the lack of protection from a strong surrounding σῶμα. In short, Diogenes formulates (in a succinct form) the same criticism as Epicurus, although he does so without also saying that speed may be one of the factors that forces atoms to lose θέσις and τάξις. One weakness of this interpretation is that Epicurus actually never claims that there is any correlation between the swift motion of εἴδωλα in the void and the loss of the position/order of the atoms. On the contrary, he clearly states the opposite point of view (even if he only does so once): it is when simulacra cross space so slowly that they become more exposed to fractures that they alter their atomic θέσις.17 Epicurus reveals another weakness in § 48 of the Letter to Hero­ dotus, where he says that εἴδωλα keep the order/position of their constituent particles for a long time (ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον). The text shows that the simulacra could in principle preserve their θέσις and τάξις, even without having any real depth. And it also raises a possible objection to Epicurus himself: is it not possible that the simulacra of Democritus are alive for the time in which they preserve this cohesion? I think that a solution to this weakness lies in the peculiar nature of the spherical soul atoms of Democritus. Aristotle18 reports that they have the most mobile (εὐκινητότατον) shape, and therefore that they are never immobile or at

16 See Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.26 (deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliq­ uid interius ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interius mente?) and Lucr. 3.273–281, esp. v. 273 (nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque). On the animus and its distinction from anima, see Giussani (1945) 190–217; Kerferd (1971); Verde (2015). 17 See De nat. 2, PHerc. 1149/993, col. 101 Leone, with Leone (2012) 588–589. 18 Arist. De an. 1.2.404a1–16 (= 67 A 28 DK), 1.2.405a8–13 (= 68 A 101 DK); De resp. 10 (4).471b30–472a18 (= 68 A 106 DK).

442 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

rest and could in principle leave the organism en masse. If such an event does not occur, it is because the process of respiration (which attracts other soul atoms from the outside) blocks the exit of the internal particles, or replaces the old ones with new ones. Now, the psychic atoms of the εἴδωλα might instead easily lose the order and position they assumed at the beginning, i.e. after having been released. The simulacra cannot recover by breathing new atoms, do not have a strong surrounding σῶμα which prevents the escape of their constituents, and are so fast that they ‘help’ the soul particles separate from the aggregate. The εἴδωλα are so swift that the psychic atoms may become even faster and could be literally cast into the infinite void. This is not the case instead with other, less mobile atoms, namely those implicitly recognized in Ep. Hdt. 48, which can remain inside the simulacra for a long time, due to their lesser mobility and speed. Providing that what has been said so far is plausible, col. 109 of Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 2 may be a contribution to our knowledge of the Democritean theory of εἴδωλα. Epicurus’ criticism would make sense if Democritus had stated that the physical cause of life in the simulacra is the position and the order that soul particles assume in the atomic aggregate. And since such a premise agrees with what we read in other sources, especially those which report that the properties of an object depend on the διαθιγή and the τροπή of atoms,19 one may suppose that it was not a doctrinal point invented by Epicurus as a polemical exaggeration. It was instead a doctrine that the historical Democritus held, which led Epicurus and Diogenes to seriously criticize him. We have learned, then, something that no other ancient source records, something that would have been lost forever without the existence of the Herculaneum papyri.

2 Εἴδωλα and φλεβοπαλίη What I have found in the preceding paragraph is not a great addition to our knowledge of the Democritean theory of εἴδωλα; it is just a minor point of detail that does not greatly change the general picture. Things become different, more interesting and rewarding, when we move to cols. 20–21 of Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 34 (PHerc. 1431): 19 See esp. Arist. Metaph. 1.4.985b10–22 and Gen. corr. 1.9.327a16–22 (= 67 A 6 DK; 68 A 38 DK) with Ferrari (1980). These same sources report that διαθιγή and τροπή are Democritus’ words for τάξις and θέσις.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 443

Col. 20 μένοις ⸌ἃ⸍ ἀληθῆ⟦ι⟧ [προσ̲ ̲αγορεύομεν· ἐν[νοού]μ̣εθα δ’ ὡς οὐδ[ὲν ἄλλ’ ἤ φασιν οἱ τὴν φλε5 β]οπαλίαν ὀνομάζοντ⸌ε̣⸍ς τῶν ἀρχαίων φυ[σ]ιο̣λόγων τὸ πρ̣ᾶγμ]α ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν ]ανα [δ]ειγμ[α 10  ± 10 ]ω̣π[ Col. 21 ἢ καὶ ὁτι[ο]ῦν τὸ ὡμοιωμέ̣[ν]ον τούτωι καλ̣έσο[μ]εν ἐνάργειαν μὴ ἐκ τοῦ 5 περιέχοντο[ς] ὄν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴ̣ [ν] φλε̲ ̲ βοπαλίαν· [ἐ]ὰν δὴ καὶ ἀγ ̣ο̣ρε[ύω]σ[ι]ν καὶ τ̣ [ διαφ]ο̣ρᾶς̣ 10  - - -]ν̣ (…) those [sc. representations vel things (?)] that the we call true; however, we think that they – i.e. those among the ancient physiologists who speak of the movement of the veins – speak nothing more of the experience that we call an example of a mind20 (…) || (…) or also we will call a clear perception any [representation (?)] similar to this, which does not stem from the external environment, but [exists] thanks to the movement of the veins; if, then, both proclaim and (…) of the difference (…)21 Leone provides an illuminating commentary on these two columns22 and acknowledges some important points. One is the confirmation of the reading φλεβοπαλία in cols. 20.5 and 21.6–7, which was first proposed by Sudhaus and Vogliano,23

20 I accept and translate here the reading δ̣[ι]ανο̣ί ̣[ας τι] δ̣εῖγμα̣ (see infra, n. 29). 21 The translation is mine, based on Leone (2002) 62–63. 22 Leone (2002) 120–126. I will largely be drawing upon this commentary in my following arguments. 23 See Leone (1988) 188–199.

444 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

and then defended by Arrighetti.24 The word must be an unmistakable allusion to Democritus. Indeed, the Hippocratic lexicon of Erotianus attributes the use of the Ionic form φλεβοπαλίη to the ancient atomist.25 An objection may be that Epicurus speaks of φυσιολόγοι, and hence cannot be referring to Democritus alone. But the problem is solved simply by supposing that he is alluding to Democritus and his master Leucippus, or to Democritus and his followers, or even to Leucippus and Democritus and their followers together. I do not wish to push this point too far, because these are just hypotheses. No source on Leucippus or Democritus’ followers shows anything comparable to the notion of φλεβοπαλία. Another important point is that the two columns in question describe two different processes of formation of evident representations. Epicurus says that from the φλεβοπαλία derives an ἐνάργεια – described in col. 19 – that is different from the one arising from the influence of the external environment (col. 21.1–7). Now, since each evident representation depends on the reception of εἴδωλα,26 and since these are emitted by the περιέχον (Ep. Hdt. 46), what the philosopher is describing here are two different reactions to the simulacra. Since we know that Epicurus explicitly contrasted the reaction to the εἴδωλα flowing from the external environment with the internal motion which entirely depends on us (παρ’ ἡμᾶς),27 it could be supposed that φλεβοπαλία is partly detached from the action of the περιέχον, and hence essentially under our control. Leone here quite rightly invokes the comparison between two different formations of dreams in the sleeper. Dream visions are always evident, since they are the outcome of movement provoked by the εἴδωλα (Diog. Laërt. 10.32). However, some of them are just the result of the impressions of the simulacra (e.g. dreaming of a cat due to the influx of a cat’s εἴδωλα), others arise from the impressions of the simulacra and the autonomous work of the sleeper, which could distort what is seen, either by adding or removing something (e.g. dreaming a cat with wings which flies in the air, or a cat with no tail or whiskers).28 The second of these two psychic operations may be involved in φλεβοπαλία.

24 Arr.2, 646. 25 See Erotian. 131.3–15 Nachmanson (= 68 B 120 DK). The passage corresponds to fr. 7 of Nachmanson (1918). 26 For textual confirmation, see Leone (2002) 118–119 and Ierodiakonou (2011) 63–68. 27 See Epicur. De nat. 25, PHerc. 1056, cr. 7, z. 1 Laursen (1997) 35 (= fr. [34.27] Arr.2). An allusion to the autonomous internal motion of the mind may also appear in On Nature, Book 34 (PHerc. 1431, cols. 16 and 19 Leone). On all these topics, see Masi (2006) 74–75, 99–104, and 124–144. 28 Once again, I refer to Leone (2002) 121–122 for the textual evidence and further arguments.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 445

What is more, after a recent analysis of the papyrus’ multispectral images (MSI), Leone suggested the reading δ̣[ι]ανο̣ί ̣[ας τι] δ̣εῖγμα̣ in PHerc. 1431, col. 20.9.29 One may possibly infer from this small but important detail that the experience or πρ̣ᾶ|[γμ]α that Epicurus is describing in cols. 20–21 is one example30 of the reaction of the mind during the reception of simulacra. After all, διάνοια is not only an organ that can be stimulated by the εἴδωλα, and that therefore has a sight or an ὄψις of its own, but it is also the source of the distortions of the contents of some of our internal representations.31 Therefore, on the basis of the new reading, one might conclude that the reaction to the περιέχον consists in the movement of the mind, which records the existence of a given object in the external environment (e.g. the dream of a cat due to the cat’s simulacra), whereas φλεβοπαλία is the motiοn of the mind which adds or removes something from the perception of that given object (e.g. the dream of a cat with wings or with no tail/whiskers). Apart from these clear points, the two columns raise many problems. What is this movement of veins? In what sense it is dependent on us and represents an experience of the mind? Did Democritus really establish a connection between εἴδωλα, φλεβοπαλία, and the διάνοια, or is this the result of Epicurus’ 29 Giuliana Leone, whom I thank very much for her contribution, wrote me per litteras: “Dopo una lunga revisione sul papiro, in confronto con le immagini multispettrali (ci sono più strati in questo punto), mi sono convinta che alla l. 9, prima di α e ν, possa esserci spazio per δ, di cui potrebbe vedersi in alto una piccola parte della trasversale discendente (quindi da scrivere fuori parentesi con il punto sotto), e una lettera stretta come ι in lacuna (in realtà coperta da un piccolo sovrapposto), da mettere tra parentesi quadre. Dopo il ν, infine, si vede una traccia tondeggiante che riporta a un ο da scrivere con il punto sotto, un segno in basso di un’asta verticale che può ricondurre a ι (con il punto sotto), mentre le tre tracce successive (forse υ/ι e σ incerti, poi α sicuro, che nell’edizione davo invece con il punto sotto e come appartenente allo strato di base) fanno parte di un sovrapposto. Subito dopo confermo δεῖγμα, anzi scriverei δ e α fuori parentesi con i punti sotto; il problema è che subito prima di questa parola ci sarebbe spazio per una lettera (coperta dal sovrapposto), per cui integrerei [τι], che può starci nello spazio (non così τό), e dunque δ̣[ι]ανο̣ί[ας ̣ τι] δ̣εῖγμα̣.” 30 This is the meaning that δεῖγμα has in the only other occurrences of the word in known Epicurean texts. The first one is fr. [26.39] Arr.2 (= Epicur. De nat. 11, PHerc. 1042, col. 9 V + PHerc. 154, col. 25 I Vogliano), where δείγματα are examples of false representations of the celestial phenomena created by astronomical machines. The second occurrence is in col. 21.2–4 of PHerc. 1027, which transmits Carneiscus’ Philistas, Book 2, edited by Capasso (1988). In that passage the book on friendship by the Peripatetic Praxiphanes is polemically defined by Carneiscus as a δεῖγμα καθ[ε]σ|τηκὸς τῆς καθ’ ὅλον τὸν | βίον φαύλης διαγωγῆς (in Capasso’s translation: “esempio della condotta meschina durante l’intero corso della vita”). The text corresponds to Praxiphan. fr. 20e Matelli (2012). 31 See Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 49–51; Leone (2002) 96–97; Verde (2010) 128–131 and 135–140. Note that in the remnants of Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 34 the word διάνοια occurs two times (i.e. PHerc. 1431, cols. 3.8 and 22.10 Leone).

446 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

interpretation? Finally, if the former alternative is true, did the Democritean theory differ in any significant way from the Epicurean one? None of these questions can be solved by reading Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 34, PHerc. 1431, cols. 20–21 Leone. I will try, then, with the following considerations to shed some light on the matter by studying what roles are assigned to veins and arteries in Democritus’ texts. The problem with such an investigation is that its textual basis is scanty and often problematic. Therefore, I will also compare the contents of the texts on the Democritean theory with the medical knowledge of that age, in the hope that this comparison will help us to better understand what Democritus’ texts report. Our sources attest that Democritus called δεξαμεναί the φλέβες in the body32 and referred to them mainly with the intention of explaining processes that, in Aristotelian terms, we could label as ‘vegetative.’ Veins are responsible for the nourishing of the fetus, for miscarriages, and for the growth of horns on some animals.33 Possibly, they could also be associated with bursts of laughter (see Cic. De or. 2.58.235 = 68 A 21 DK partim). Much more interesting, however, is the report provided by Theophrastus’ De sensibus (= 68 A 135 DK). The philosopher writes that according to Democritus, the conformation of φλέβες influences the quality of our perceptions. Indeed, we see better if the veins of the eyes are straight and free of moisture (§ 50), and we hear better if the veins are empty, devoid of liquid, and well spread throughout the body (§ 56). In relation to taste, moreover, we perceive sour flavors when the atomic shapes of the food ingested block the veins and prevent the material from flowing into the stomach (§ 66). If we trust Theophrastus’ account, while bearing in mind that sight and hearing arise through the impact of simulacra on sensible organs (cf. points C–D in the introduction of the paper), at the very least we can establish a connection between εἴδωλα and their flow through the φλέβες, and consequently the historical trustworthiness of Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 34, PHerc. 1431, cols. 20–21 Leone. Veins are a means of perception: this specifically applies to the vessels steming from the brain, which represents for Democritus the leading part of the soul.34 This perspective is partly confirmed by Hermippus’ De astrologia (1.16.122 = 68 A 78 DK partim), where we read that εἴδωλα change us by penetrating into our veins, arteries, and brain.

32 On the meaning of the term, cf. 68 B 135 DK and Manuli/Vegetti (2009) 231 n. 171. 33 Cf. 68 A 144 DK (= Arist. Gen. an. 2.4.740a33–b2); A 152–155 DK (= Ael. NA 12.17–20); Vlastos (1993) 333–334. 34 See Aët. 4.5.1 (= 68 A 105 DK); Theophr. Sens. 56 (= 68 A 135 DK); Sassi (1978) 67–69 and 117–118. Aelian too speaks of vessels that stem from the brain (NA 12.18 = 68 A 153 DK). Hippocrates also embraced this perspective (see e.g. Morb. sacr. 10).

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 447

It seems odd, of course, that for Democritus φλέβες are at work in both ‘vegetative’ processes and sense perception, and that they (instead of nerves) are the vessels that stem from the brain. But the problem is only apparent. The tripartition of vessels into nerves, arteries, and veins is a late discovery, not yet known at the time of Democritus. The ἀρτηρίαι will be distinguished from φλέβες only from Praxagoras onwards,35 while nerves were discovered – and divided into ‘sensory nerves’ and ‘locomotive nerves’ – only after the anatomical studies of Erasistratus and Herophilus.36 This tripartition will become strictly technical with Galen, who maintained that each specific vessel has its specific power and source. The nerves grow from the brain and cause cognition/movement, the arteries emerge from the heart and determine vital processes, and the veins spring from the liver and determine nutrition.37 If the atomist speaks only of φλέβες, then, it is because he recognized just a single kind of vessel. This implies that he also called arteries and nerves ‘veins,’ without feeling the need to develop (as Galen et al. were to do) any rigid conceptual or anatomic distinction. However, a closer investigation of the aforementioned paragraphs of Theophrastus’ De sensibus shows that both sight and hearing are simple mechanical responses to the simulacra, which are not under our control. A man or woman is not responsible for what he/she sees or hears in the external world, nor can he/ she decide to see or hear otherwise: all these representations simply occur, and necessarily so. This not only means that the movement of the matter inside the φλέβες described by Theophrastus does not coincide with φλεβοπαλία, but that it is actually to be identified with the reaction to the εἴδωλα of the περιέχον. We must therefore search elsewhere to understand the idea of the movement of the veins that Erotianus and Epicurus attribute to Democritus. Here the reconstruction becomes highly hypothetical, due to the lack of direct information. I suppose that Democritus’ φλεβοπαλία might be identified with what ancient physicians called the σφυγμός – namely, the pulsating motion which they observed in φλέβες.38 (For simplicity’s sake, henceforth I will refer to this movement by the term ‘pulse’). After all, the only other known occurrence of

35 See fr. 85 Steckerl (= Gal. De plen. 573.16–574.1 Kühn). This confusion was still to be found at the time of the Middle Platonic Taurus (test. 19 Petrucci = test. 20 Gioè = Aul. Gell. 18.10.1–6). On the topic, see Rüsche (1930) 222, 226–231, 239; Viano (1984); Gioè (2002) 241–242; Pino Campos (2005b) 63; Petrucci (2018) 10–11. Pino Campos (2007) shows, however, that some Hippocratic treatises actually distinguish the two vessels. 36 On the two physicians, see Von Staden (1989) 155–161 and (2000) 87–115; Leith (2015). 37 See e.g. Gal. De plac. Hipp. et Plat. 1.9–10, 2.4, 2.6.9–12, 2.8.24–25, 3.5.3–7, 6.3–4, 6.5.20–31, 6.8.38–58, 7.3.1–3 De Lacy. 38 See Rechenauer (2009) 130–131.

448 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

the word φλεβοπαλία appears in the description of the σφυγμός (Gal. Syn. de puls. 499.1–2 Kühn), and Erotianus himself provides further ground for this hypothesis. It would now be wise to quote his earlier passage on Democritus: φλεδονώδεα· φλεδονώδεα οὖν ἐκάλεσε τὰ μετὰ φλυαρίας καὶ πνευματώδους ταραχῆς ἐκκρινόμενα. ἄλλοι δέ φασι μὴ δεῖν γράφειν φλεδονώδεα, ἀλλὰ φλεβονώδεα, ὡς εἶναι τὰ μετ’ ἀλγήματος οἰδήματα. οἱ δὲ τὰ μετὰ σφυγμοῦ, οἱονεὶ φλεβονώδη εἶναι, τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους μηδόλως ὀνομάσαντος ἄλγημα. ἔστιν οὖν τὰ ἐν κινήσει καί τινι ταραχῇ ὄντα. φλέβας γὰρ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ τὰς ἀρτηρίας ἐκάλουν. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτός· “τὰ οὖν γινόμενα ῥίγεα μεθ’ ἡμέρην καὶ κατὰ νύκτα ἐπιπαροξυνόμενα ἀγρυπνίην ποιέει, καὶ τὰς φλέβας δονέει καὶ ταράσσει, καὶ πυκνότερον καὶ σφοδρότερον τὸ κίνημα ποιέει.” φλέβας δὲ οὐ τὰς συνήθως λεγομένας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀρτηρίας ὠνόμασε. καὶ ὁ δὲ φλεβοπαλίην καλεῖ τὴν τῶν ἀρτηριῶν κίνησιν.39 ‘Babblings’: he [sc. Hippocrates] then called ‘babblings’ the secretions accompanied by delirium and flatulent disturbance. Others, however, say that one should not write φλεδονώδεα, but φλεβονώδεα, which are swellings [of the veins] accompanied by pain. Others instead [claim] that the [secretions (?)/swellings (?)] are accompanied by a pulse, like an affection of the veins, which Hippocrates nowhere describes as painful. [Babblings (?)], then, are [secretions (?)/swellings (?)] in movement and are accompanied by a sort of disturbance. Indeed, the ancients called the arteries ‘veins’. For [Hippocrates] himself says: “Then, when tremors occur during the day and become more intense at night, the movement produces sleeplessness, and shakes and perturbs the veins, and becomes more thick and violent.” The term “veins” is not used in conformity to the [present linguistic] convention, but to refer to the arteries. Even Democritus calls the movement of the arteries 40 φλεβοπαλίη.

Erotianus’ text provides an explanation of the word φλεδονώδεα which occurs in Hippocrates’ Prorrheticum (1.101). Even if the plural also occurs in Epid. 4.1.45 and Coac. 20, we know that a discussion between physicians concerning the reading of φλεδονώδεα or φλεβονώδεα appears elsewhere only in Galen’s commentary on this Hippocratic treatise.41 The important point to recognize here is that Erotianus reports that the latter reading refers to a motion of the veins, which, according to people like Aristotle (De resp. 26 [20].479b27–30), is accompanied by pain, while, according to others, is accompanied by a pulse, which Hippocrates never describes as painful.42 39 Erotian. 131.3–15 Nachmanson. 40 The translation is mine. 41 See Gal. in Prorrh. 731.4–734.5 Kühn and Nachmanson (1917) 162–165. 42 Contra, apparently, Hippoc. De fract. 27 and 40, where the σφυγμός is associated with ὀδύνη. Since the former is conceptually distinguished from the latter, it could also be argued that according to the text, pain is one thing, the pulse another. It seems, however, that because of the ambiguity of this passage the point was debated, for example by Galen (De tum. praet. nat. 720–722 Kühn; De loc. aff. 2.75–79 Kühn).

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 449

Erotianus then seems to add a note on the second group of physicians, with the aim of explaining why they spoke of a pulse of the φλέβες, when a doctor is instead expected to read the pulse of the arteries. Immediately afterwards, he quotes a different version of the passage from Hippocrates’ Prorrheticum,43 where there is a reference to the motion of veins without any accompanying pain. The answer that Erotianus gives is the one reported above. The physicians knew that Hippocrates did not distinguish the two vessels, as that passage from the Pror­ rheticum demonstrates, i.e. they used the term ‘veins’ also to refer to the vessels which modern medicine identifies as ‘arteries’ rather than ‘veins.’ Now, providing that what I have said is true, it could be supposed that even the subsequent reference to Democritus’ φλεβοπαλία is in reality an allusion to the movement of the ἀρτηρίαι, which is to say to the pulse of those vessels and the καρδία which the Hippocratic authors associated with φλέβες. This point cannot be proven, since nowhere do we find a reference to σφυγμός in the sources on the Democritean doctrine.44 Yet this idea is compatible with the fact that Democritus studied the medical theories of his time.45 He could have known what Hippocrates said of the pulse and could have adopted it within his own system. Nonetheless, the supposition explained above raises the question of how Democritus understands the movement of the σφυγμός. Late physicians like Galen and Rufus of Ephesus argued that the pulse is an involuntary, natural, and continuous motion of the arteries, proceeding from the beating of the heart, which plays an important role in making the organism function, for instance by distributing a moderate heat through all organic parts and by contributing to the production of the psychic πνεῦμα of the brain.46 Knowledge of the pulse was also applied to diagnose and treat illnesses.47 However, this concept is not what the word σφυγμός indicated during the 5th and 4th cent. BC. In the Hippocratic treatises of this period, the pulse was generally regarded as a violent motion of inflamed vessels that could cause disturbances for sensible organs and 43 Nachmanson (1917) 163–164. 44 Galen (De diff. puls. 1.551.2–8 Kühn = 68 B 126 DK) and Boethius (De mus. 1.1 = fr. 540 Luria) are no exception. The former only quotes a study by Democritus on some fluctuating animals, while describing the vermicular pulse. The latter says that the ancient atomist taught Hippocrates the doctrine of pulsation when he was jailed by the citizens of Abdera for his supposed madness (an anecdote that is pure romance and depends on the late legend of Democritus’ madness). 45 Sassi (1978) 178–184 and Gemelli Marciano (2009). 46 Gal. De usu puls. 149–179 Kühn; Syn. puls. 458–460 and 469 Kühn; De diff. puls. 4.707–708 and 712–714 Kühn; De mot. musc. 372 and 442 Kühn; De plac. Hipp. et Plat. 2.4.49, 3.8.30, 6.1.10–13, 6.7.3–8, 6.8.33, 8.8.7–8 De Lacy; ps.-Ruph. Eph. De puls. 1–2. Cf. Siegel (1968) 61–68 and Furley/ Wilkie (1984) 40–46. 47 Lewis (2016).

450 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

delirium for the mind.48 If Democritus really was acquainted with the medicine of his time, it is unlikely that he conceived of the pulse otherwise. What is more, we have no evidence that Galen’s/Rufus’ perspective was held before the Hellenistic period; rather, what we find is that the idea of the σφυγμός as a disturbing motion survived at least until the beginning of the 3rd cent. BC.49 So Democritus too may have described the pulse or φλεβοπαλία as a sort of violent and unnatural movement. And since we have seen that, in different ways, both Theophrastus and Epicurus establish a link between the motion of the contents of the φλέβες, εἴδωλα, and perception, we could suppose that even the σφυγμός is a reaction to the simulacra that come from the outside and is accompanied by some kind of representations. Does any text that might allow us to defend this final claim exist? I believe so. In fr. 43 Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda first attacks Democritus’ conception of animated simulacra (fr. 43, Ι.12–ΙΙ.5) and then moves on to draw a distinction between two kinds of εἴδωλα (fr. 43, ΙΙ.5–14). The first kind makes the soul joyful; the second one fills the whole human being with great perturbation and fear (θορύβου τινὸς πολλ[οῦ] | γεμίζει καὶ φόβου τὸ[ν] | ὅλον ἄνθρωπον), thus making the heart pound (καὶ τ[ὸ] | πήδημα τῆς καρδία[ς | κεινεῖ]). One cannot be sure whether the second part of the fragment still contains a Democritean tenet, or whether it outlines Diogenes’ criticism of Democritus, which denies that the simulacra are inanimate, but at the same time affirms that they have the power to generate pleasure or pain in the organism. Both alternatives are possible. However, the parallel provided by Sextus Empiricus supports the former in reporting that, according to the ancient atomist, some εἴδωλα are ἀγαθοποιά, while others are κακοποιά.50 Unfortunately, the distinction is not explained, but since Democritus believes that beauty is intrinsically pleasurable, or rather gives the greatest pleasure of all,51 one may suppose that he at least argued that beautiful forms grant joy and ugly ones produce perturbation/fear. For example, the simulacra released by 48 Hippoc. Progn. 7; De diaet. 4, 8, 18; Epid. 4.1.20, 1.23, and 1.43; De capit. vuln. 15; De off. med. 25; De fract. 25 and 27; De artic. 40; Aph. 7.21; De hum. 4; Coac. 80, 121, 125, 136, 138, 276–277; De flat. 8; De loc. hom. 3. It was already recognized by Galen (De loc. aff. 2.75–76 Kühn; De plac. Hipp. et Plat. 6.8.46–47 De Lacy; Quod an. mor. corp. temp. seq. 803–804 Kühn). All these and other Hippocratic treatises describe only pathological pulsations: cf. Harris (1973) 185–186; Pino Campos (2008) and (2009). For a good overview of the ancient lore on the pulse, see Trifogli (1958) 3–15 and Pino Campos (2005b) 40–102. 49 See Arist. De resp. 26 (20).479b26–480a15, with Harris (1973) 163–164 and Pino Campos (2005b) 60–63. 50 Sext. Emp. Math. 9.19 (= 68 B 166 DK). Also Clay (1998) 224–225, favours the attribution to Democritus. 51 Cf. esp. 68 B 194 DK, but also B 207.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 451

a young and attractive man or woman will delight the soul, while those emitted by a half-decomposed corpse may frighten a human being, as I will explain in § 5 of this paper. Now, the pounding of the heart provoked by powerful distressing emotions (which in turn are provoked by εἴδωλα) could be a reference to the pulse. One proof is that θόρυβος occurs two times in the Hippocratic treatises in association with the σφυγμός (cf. Progn. 7 and Coac. 276). Another piece of evidence is handed down by Plutarch, who speaks about the leaps of the heart and the pulse as a pair.52 Third and finally, despite his great changes to the pulse theory, Galen continues to say that distressing emotions such as fear cause a violent σφυγμός. In other words, the earlier conception of the pulse as dependent on emotional extremes did not disappear, but was simply incorporated into the more elaborate theory of later authors.53 Although each proof in itself lacks strength and persuasion, their cumulative value shows that a link between the simulacra, the pulse, and the emotions is at least probable. The σφυγμός might then be identified with or considered an outcome of the φλεβοπαλία which – if Book 34 of Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως is historically trustworthy – must be for Democritus a violent and unnatural phenomenon that is also: a) internal, for the simple reason that it begins and ends inside the organism; b) evident, since the distress that the simulacra produce in the whole body and the pounding of the heart is a real physical effect; c) dependent on us or παρ’ ἡμᾶς, and therefore not reducible to the reaction to the simulacra released by the περιέχον, which, as we have seen, produce necessary and inescapable affections (one cannot decide to see a tree if a tree is there, or to hear music if someone is playing music nearby). Indeed, the φλεβοπαλία could be modified, controlled, and trained, hence we are partly responsible for its motions and also praiseworthy or blameworthy with respect to it in the strict moral sense. Take, for example, the fear raised by the simulacra of corpses. The emotion is certainly an instinctive reaction, since the forms transmitted by the εἴδωλα are naturally uncongenial to us, unless one is a perverse man like Leontius, the son of Aglaïon described by

52 Cf. Plut. De tranq. anim. 474e8: οἷον πηδήματα καρδίας καὶ σφυγμοὺς ἀφαιροῦσι. He also associates the term θόρυβος with the pulse in Demetr. 38.4–6. On Plutarch’s knowledge of lore on the pulse, cf. Pino Campos (2005a). 53 Gal. De puls. 473.18–20 Kühn; De caus. puls. 2.58.17–59.11 and 4.160.11–18 Kühn; De praes. ex puls. 249.17–250.17 Kühn; Syn. puls. 451.1–11 Kühn, with Siegel (1973) 184, 196, 227–230, and Harris (1973) 423. Cf. also Marcell. De puls. 124–126 (on this work, see Lewis [2015]); Oribas. Coll. med., Lib. inc. 36; Cels. De med. 3.6.5–8. Note that in Phaedr. 251d1–7, Plato links the pulsatory movement of the vessels with intense emotion.

452 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

Plato, who instead was delighted by them.54 At the same time, however, if fear and the concomitant movements of the veins are experienced, this is because we are not adequately trained or reasonable enough to govern, control, or modify this disposition. Therefore, if at the sight of corpses we feel anguish and may be irrationally led to fear death, we are morally blameworthy and responsible for our conduct, just like Leontius, whose joy is instinctive and nonetheless reproachable, for even he has the power to gradually change his behavior. This point finds support in Democritus’ fr. 33 DK, where he claims that the atoms of our natural constitution can be rearranged through teaching.55 The text implies that διδαχή can correct the starting φύσις which is prone to react with fear at the sight of corpses or, more precisely, that φύσις can change its natural disposition and produce a superior one, viz. an attitude imperturbable about death. An objection that can be raised against my interpretation is that, since Democritus embraced encephalocentrism, he could not have said that the heart is the seat of emotional responses like fear. This is a thesis that can be admitted only by proponents of the Epicurean cardiocentric theory,56 which implies that Diogenes of Oinoanda’s fr. 43 Smith is reporting a doctrine of his school. Even if Democritus recognized the work of the σφυγμός, this should be considered an unnatural condition occurring in the head (cf. e.g. Coac. 80), or in the vessels of the temples (cf. De loc. hom. 3 and 13). But the objection is solved by supposing that the leading role of the brain does not rule out some contribution from the blood and the heart in governing bodily processes. Maria M. Sassi has, for example, shown that Democritean physiology is indebted to Empedocles’ hemocentric perspective that holds that pores in the body play a role in the mechanism of perception.57 Moreover, it can be noted that Aëtius (= 68 A 105 DK) not only reports the idea that Democritus identified the brain with the leading part of the soul (5.1), but also attributes to him the opposite statement that reason dwells in the thorax (4.6). The contradiction can be explained by supposing that the name of the ancient atomist was interpolated into Book 4, or that Aëtius depends on a source that

54 See Pl. Resp. 4.439e6–440a3. Another reference to this Leontius is possibly to be found in a fragment of the playwright Theopompus. See Schol. ad Ar. Av. 1406 (= fr. 25 Storey [2011] 331 with n. 1). 55 On this topic, see Vlastos (1993) 341–344. Useful remarks can be found in Morel (2013) 72–90. 56 See Lucr. 3.112–116, and Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. 47.1–20 Puglia (1988). The latter text argues that, since in the region of the heart the passions of joy and fear, which have an intellectual basis, emerge, it is there that the mind should dwell. A similar argument is put forward by Phylotimus (Schol. in Hom. Il. 10.10 = fr. 1 Steckerl), the pupil of Praxagoras, who in turn endorsed a cardiocentric theory (see the texts collected in frs. 12, 26–29, 62, 69, 72 Steckerl). 57 Sassi (1978) 52–53 with n. 79. On Empedocles, see Manuli/Vegetti (2009) 77–82.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 453

tried to reconcile the Epicureans and their predecessor.58 But it is also possible that Aëtius was confused by the fact that Democritus identified the leading part with the brain and, at the same time, assigned to the heart a leading role with respect to all or some intellectual processes of the organism. If this is true, we have potential proof of the cooperation between the ἐγκέφαλος and the καρδία. Embracing encephalocentrism while claiming that the pulse is an affection of the heart, then, does not in principle involve any contradiction. The remaining question that must be settled is whether Democritus’ supposed theory of φλεβοπαλία and σφυγμός was to a certain extent different from the one of Epicurus. However, the questions I have raised could be a false problem: no text gives evidence of the existence of an Epicurean pulse theory. Lucretius establishes a technical distinction between nerves,59 arteries (cf. the tracheal artery mentioned in 4.528–531), and veins,60 and claims that all these vessels contain the atoms of the animus capable of producing sensation and all the other processes of the organism,61 but nowhere does he describe anything comparable to pulsation. Diogenes of Oinoanda only refers to the pulse in fr. 112 Smith (of course, with the exception of the aforementioned fr. 43), and in any case he uses this term metaphorically, to describe the excitement caused by rhetoric (τὸ ῥητορεύειν σφυγμοῦ). So, the only evidence of any Epicurean interest in the theory of the pulse is represented by cols. 20–21 of Book 34 of the Περὶ φύσεως. If we wish to evaluate whether or not Democritus’ conception differs from Epicurus’ view, we must rely on this text alone. Now, what is certain is that Epicurus indeed agrees with his predecessor as regards the existence of a motion dependent on us that can be used to contrast a mechanical response to stimuli coming from the external environment. On this limited point, both philosophers share the same view. Leone’s new reading δ̣[ι]ανο̣ί ̣[ας τι] δ̣εῖγμα̣ shows that Epicurus may have invoked this fact as evidence or proof within a discourse about the mind, which was probably presented in the lines that followed the big lacuna from col. 20.10 onwards. Since this portion of the text is now completely lost, one can only suppose that

58 Sassi (1978) 67–68; Silvestre (1990) 124–125 and 143. The fact that § 4.6 of Book 4 of the Placita also seems to be out of place and context strengthens the hypothesis of an interpolation. See M&R2, 141. 59 They transmit life, motion to the limbs, sexual arousal (Lucr. 1.809–811, 3.575, 4.1041–1044, 4.1115–1117). On Lucretius’ knowledge of medicine, see Spallicci (1966); Phillips (1982); Pigeaud (1988) 224–228; Kilpatrick (1996). 60 Responsible for nutrition and growth (Lucr. 2.1118–1119, 2.1134–1137, 2.1146–1152, 4.867–869, 4.954–956, and 5.807–815). 61 Lucr. 2.670, 2.904–906, 3.566–575, 3.691–697, 3.788–789, and 5.132–133.

454 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

Epicurus agreed with Democritus in establishing that there are some free movements that cause fearful representations in dreams. Earlier on (cols. 8 and 10), the philosopher alluded to the turmoil and the fear that arise while dreaming, which once again, from an emotional perspective, would be the result of the motions of a σφυγμός.62 These distorted and fearful dream visions may arise both from the reception of simulacra that are uncongenial to human nature and from the reception of ones that are congenial, like those emitted by the gods (who are good in themselves but frighten the minds that alter their appearance)63 – in other words, from a distortion of the contents of the εἴδωλα ἀγαθοποιά caused by the human intellect. When we look more closely, however, we could instead argue that these columns point to a distinction. Epicurus reports that Democritus called the motion dependent on our φλεβοπαλία, but does not adopt that name himself. He wishes to say that the general conception of his ancient predecessor agrees with his own epistemology and gives evidence of its truth, but he has no desire to follow the more technical details of Democritus’ exposition. Such a distinction might imply that Epicurus was not really interested in the Democritean pulse theory after all, but only in its ethical consequences, namely the existence of some free motions of the mind.64 Providing that this hypothesis is plausible, the silence of all the other Epicurean sources on the pulse theory suddenly appear to make sense. Epicurus invites us to study nature if and only if this helps us to overcome our fears or false opinions (RS XI), implicitly suggesting that one should not practice φυσιολογία for the sake of understanding natural phenomena, if this does not contribute to 62 On a similar perspective in Aristotle, see Verde (2016) 44–50. 63 This is at any rate the belief of the Epicureans: they believe that the simulacra of the gods cause the greatest pleasure of all (Cic. Nat. D. 1.19.49) and that human minds change the true appearance of the gods (i.e. as deities immune from anger and favour) into a false one (i.e. as deities prone to anger and favour), especially in dreaming (cf. Lucr. 5.1169–1183). But I think that the basic conception that the divine εἴδωλα are good can be traced back to Democritus. See Piergiacomi (2013) 70–76. 64 Ep. Men. 133. One may object that Leucippus and Democritus are criticized for admitting their belief in the work of an almighty necessity that eliminates free will: see Ep. Men. 134, Silvestre (1985) 146–155 and (1990) 27–28, and Heßler (2014) 300–301, 307–308, and 314–317. So they cannot be regarded as defenders of what is παρ’ ἡμᾶς. Note, however, that Epicurus recognizes that Democritus and Leucippus often appear to claim something consistent with the idea that an impulse within our power exists, since in specific moments they avoid deterministic behavior through a temporary ‘forgetfulness’ of their opinion. Cf. Epicur. De nat. 25, PHerc. 1056, cr. 7, z. 4 Laursen (1997) 40–42 (= fr. [34.30] Arr2.), on which see Masi (2006) 148–150 and Morel (2013) 96–99. It could then be supposed, then, that the motion of φλεβοπαλία is an anti-deterministic claim, which arose because Democritus had ‘forgotten’ for a moment his belief in the almighty necessity.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 455

the attainment of one’s goal.65 Therefore, the Epicureans may simply have abandoned the investigation of the σφυγμός. The pulse does not scare us, nor does knowledge of it help us to understand the limits of our pains and desires, which means that it is intrinsically useless for achieving happiness.66 Here, then, lies the important difference between the two conceptions. Democritus perhaps studied the pulse for its own sake, while the Epicureans considered this exercise to be a useless μάθημα, or a minor addition to the proof of the existence of free will. After much exploration, it is possible to conclude that in this case a Herculaneum papyrus has indeed made a great addition to our understanding of the Democritean theory of εἴδωλα. Book 34 of Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως allows us to infer two points: a) the first is based on what we can directly read in the text, i.e. the existence of a connection between the simulacra and a movement of the mind, independent of the mechanical stimuli coming from the external environment; b) the second point is instead gained through a work of supplementary reconstruction. Book 34 of the Περὶ φύσεως allows us to specify that this motion coincides with the pulse, conceived by Democritus in a similar way to the Hippocratic treatises of his time, for it consists in a violent and unnatural motion of the organism accompanied by intense emotion and turmoil. The Democritean theory of εἴδωλα can therefore also be interpreted as a way to explain through philosophical concepts and instruments a notion developed within the domain of ancient medicine.

3 The birth of the belief in god from the sky and εἴδωλα: two explanations, or one? I now move on to Philodemus, and more specifically to PHerc. 1428, fr. 16 Schober, an extract from the so-called ‘second part’ of his treatise.67 I provide Albert Henrichs’ text and translation:68

65 On the topic, see Gigante (1998). 66 Of course, there is still the alternative that Epicurus might have analyzed the σφυγμός in one or more of the lost books of the Περὶ φύσεως. In that case, however, it would be, in my opinion, striking to note the complete absence of its discussion in Lucretius’ De rerum natura, especially if it is true that the poem used those books as its only or principal sources: cf. Sedley (1998); Leone (2012) 47 and 51. 67 Obbink (1986) 19. 68 Henrichs (1975) 96.

456 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - κ̣αι[- - -69 θέρος εν[70 χε[ι]μὼν καὶ ἔ[αρ καὶ μεθόπωρον̣ [κ]αὶ πά̣[ν5 τα ταῦτα ἄνθεν διειπετῆ71 γενεται· διὸ δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐξεργαζόμενον γνόντας ̲ ̲σέβεσθαι. οὐ φαίνε10  ται δέ̣ μοι Δημόκρι11 τος ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τὸν (...) and (...) from here on earth, summer, winter, spring, autumn and all such phenomena come from high, falling down from heaven; that not surprisingly, therefore, they recognized what was producing these occurrences and worshipped it. But in my estimate, Democritus, unlike others, did not (...)72 In his clear analysis of the language and the contents of the fragments, Henrichs has convincingly demonstrated that in ll. 1–9 Philodemus reports Democritus’ explanation of how primitive human beings developed their belief in god.73 The atomist argued that they derived it from observing the movements of the sky that generate the seasons, believing that a divinity must be responsible for their occurrence. Such an argument returns in a more general form in Sextus Empiricus (Math. 9.29 = 68 A 75 [I] DK) and Lucretius (5.1186–1193 = 68 A 75 [III] DK), as well 69 Other readings are possible: see e.g. Crönert (1906) 130 n. 542; Schober (1988) 114; and Marcovich (1975). Α new reconstruction of the column can be found now in Vassallo (2018a) 129–132; (2018b) 111–112; and CPH XI 64 with comm. ad loc. 70 The second half of the line is not supplemented by Henrichs. Crönert (1917) 130 n. 542 and Schober (1988) 114 read ἐν [τῆι γῆι καὶ; Marcovich (1975) proposes ἐνταῦ[θα; Gigante/Indelli (1980) 451 n. 3 and Luciani (2003) 123 suppose ἐντε[ῦθεν (in my translation I take this last reading into account). 71 Henrichs renders διιπετής with “heaven sent.” The word is interesting: it may be both a synonym of the more common term οὐρανοπετής and a variant of διοπετής, which qualifies the divine origin of Epicurus’ Canon and is translated by Torquatus as quasi delapsa de caelo (cf. Plut. Adv. Col. 1118a7–9; Cic. Fin. 1.19.63 = Epicur. fr. 34 Us.). 72 Transl. by A. Henrichs, with some changes. I have received many useful suggestions for the translation and interpretation of the text from both David Armstrong and David Sedley (per lit­ teras). I thank both of them. 73 Henrichs (1975) 98–106. His position is supported by Gigante/Indelli (1980) 452–455; Bossu (1982) 292; and Wiśniewski (1987) 9–10.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 457

as in Clement of Alexandria (Protr. 6.68.5 = 68 B 30 DK), who also adds that the god who governs the heavens was called Zeus. However, Henrichs also asserts that this explanation represents the second of “two different but by no means mutually exclusive explanations” of the birth of the belief in god, more precisely the “less sophisticated” explanation. Indeed, the first, more sophisticated version is found in Democritus’ argument that primitive human beings received large, extraordinary, and long-lasting εὔλογχα εἴδωλα, which enabled their minds to foretell future events (Sext. Emp. Math. 9.19 = 68 B 166 DK) – probably during dreams (cf. the polemic of Diogenes of Oinoanda in frs. 9–10 and 43 Smith) – and were identified by the primitives with the gods.74 Therefore, Henrichs’ belief is that fr. 16 Schober of PHerc. 1428 neither alludes to nor hints at these simulacra. But is his opinion necessarily correct? I believe that the answer could be negative. Ll. 4–5 of the fragment show that not only the seasons, but also “all those things” (πά̣[ν]|τα ταῦτα) fall from the sky. Now, these events might include the arrival of the monitory εἴδωλα of B 166. The hypothesis is confirmed by a passage of Sextus Empiricus (Math. 9.42 = fr. 173b Taylor), where we read that those simulacra are ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι, which could mean “in the sky” or “in the atmosphere” (cf. esp. Diod. Sic. 1.7.4 = 68 B 5 DK). Cotta (in Cic. Nat. D. 1.43.120 = 68 A 74 DK) further reports that some gigantic divine imagines arrive in our world from the outside. One may also add that the εἴδωλα of B 166 were qualified as ὑπερφυῆ, which could literally mean “growing above,”75 i.e. be a further reference to their fall from outer space. A real threat to my reading comes from the fact that the πά̣[ν]|τα ταῦτα of ll. 4–5 can only refer to weather phenomena (i.e. to daily, monthly, or yearly changes in the heavens), so simulacra cannot be included in the list. However, nothing prevents us from supposing that the εἴδωλα of the gods were mentioned in a previous section, or that they accompany the celestial changes and movements. It could be of interest to note that according to John Lydus (De mens. 4.135 = fr. 186.3 Leszl), Democritus argued that the simulacra that cause monitory dreams occur particularly often in wintry January. This remark might indicate that the atomist discussed the power the εἴδωλα acquire in winter, in other words that he examined the seasons and the simulacra together, thus confirming the connection between seasonal change and images. Moreover, it might 74 Henrichs (1975) 103–104. See also Luciani (2003) 124–127. 75 See at least Luc. Lex. 6. If Democritus employed ὑπερφυῆ in its literal meaning (despite the fact that there are no other writers of the 5th-4th cent. BC who do so), then it follows that the ἄνωθεν in l. 5 is Philodemus’ synonym of the Democritean term, which was adopted by Epicurus. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Pyth. 104 and RS XIII, already quoted by Henrichs (1975) 101 n. 34, as well as De nat. 11, PHerc. 1042/154, fr. [26.42] Arr.2.

458 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

show that primitive human beings worshipped the sky, because they marvelled at its movement and realized that the sky is the place where the divine/monitory εἴδωλα dwell. If we accept the above interpretation, we may conclude that this fragment of Philodemus’ Περὶ εὐσεβείας contributes to our knowledge of the Democritean theory in the following way: it allows us to infer that Democritus may not have used two different explanations of the birth of the belief in god, but just one, which included both factors (i.e. the celestial phenomena and the simulacra) at the same time. The hypothesis could receive further support from a parallel in Lucretius. At the beginning of his description of the origin of the belief in god, preserved in Book 5 of De rerum natura, which could in part depend on Democritus,76 the Epicurean poet clearly refers to a single cause (v. 1161: Nunc quae causa ...), combining the reception of the simulacra of the gods during dream activity77 and the marvellous observance of the celestial movements of the sky.78 Our fragment paints a picture of the Democritean explanation that is more unified than the one that we derive from reading external sources only.

4 Democritus on musical inspiration? I have claimed at the beginning of the paper that Democritus’ theory of εἴδωλα is never quoted explicitly in the Herculaneum papyri. However, a notable exception seems to be found in fr. 10 Janko from Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Poems (PHerc. 207). Richard Janko, the most recent editor of the text, firmly believes that the fragment “supplies the missing link between his [i.e. Democritus’] theory of images and his belief that poetry and music are divinely inspired.”79 What are the

76 For further references, see Perelli (1955) 30–37; (1966–1967) 162–163 and 225–234. 77 Cf. Lucr. 5.1161–1183. In reality, the text does not mention the εἴδωλα directly. However, Lucretius claimed earlier on (4.752–822) that dreams arise through the impact of the simulacra released by external objects on the mind. For further arguments and some clarifications, see Schrijvers (1970) 92–112; Clay (1998) 220–223; Essler (2011) 175–182. 78 Cf. Lucr. 5.1183–1193. However, while the simulacra and weather phenomena form one and the same cause at the explanatory level, they nonetheless represent two different stages of chronological development. Primitive men first receive the εἴδωλα of the gods and then marvel at the sky and believe that a divinity lives/operates there. On this topic, see Perelli (1955) 36 and (1966–1967) 226–227. 79 Janko (2011) 251 n. 6. The fragment is not contained in any of the existing collections of Democritean texts.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 459

grounds for such a claim? In order to answer the question, it might be best to first quote Janko’s reconstruction and translation: deest versus 1 - - - . . . . . .]ν Δημοκ[ριτ - - - - - . . . . εἴ]δωλα τ[- - - - - ₍₎ παρι]στάμεν[α - - 5  - - - μου]σ̣ικ[- - desunt versus fere 29 Democritus (…) images (…) that present themselves (…) music (?) (…)80 The idea that poetic or musical inspiration arises from the reception of some divine εἴδωλα is never stated in any text on/by Democritus. However, I agree with the view that simulacra could possibly be identified with the sacred spirit (πνεῦμα ἱερόν) or ἐνθουσιασμός that divinely inspires those poets who compose beautiful and wise poems, such as Homer or, more generally, all those poets gifted with artistic skills (ἐτεκτήνατο) and a divine nature.81 Janko follows in the footsteps of this scholarly tradition82 and hopes to have found in our fragment textual confirmation for what has appeared so far as a good – but nonetheless hypothetical – reconstruction. However, I fear that Janko’s hypothesis is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, all of Janko’s textual proposals are dubious, especially “music” in l. 5.83 And if we cannot read such a reference here, then the “missing link” that Janko and other scholars are looking for simply crumbles into dust.

80 Transl. by Janko (2011) 250–251. 81 Cf. 68 B 18 DK (= Clem. Al. Strom. 6.18.168) and B 21 (= Dio Chrys. Or. 53.1), which for Mansfeld (2004) may report some original words of Democritus. Arguments that tend in the direction of a link between the simulacra and poetic inspiration are found in scholars like Delatte (1934) 28–51; Velardi (1989) 101–105; Morel (1996) 313–314; Brancacci (2007) 196–197 and 200–202; Brillante (2009) 224–232; Beer (2009) 445–446; McOsker (2016). Doubts are found in Chandler (2007) 850–851. 82 See the arguments in Janko (2011) 208–215. 83 The point has been already acknowledged by Mackey (2013) 124: “Any reference to music here is tenuous. All that remains of the relevant word is an ε or a σ, then ικ[ (fr. 10, line 5: fortasse δ]είκ[ελα).” If his emendation is correct, our fragment would be the only Herculanean evidence that reports the name that Democritus attributed to simulacra (see point A of the introduction, n. 2).

460 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

But even if we accept that the fragment really reports what Janko says,84 the most important part is still missing: a reference to the divine origin of the εἴδωλα that could inspire poets. The only argument that Janko supplies in this respect consists in an interpretation of the παριστάμενα of l. 4. His opinion is that the word indicates a voluntary movement of the simulacra towards human beings and recalls the similar use of the verb ἐμπελάζω in B 166 (= Sext. Emp. Math. 9.19), which describes the coming of the divine εἴδωλα to the minds of primitive men.85 But this is not enough. On the one hand, παρίστημι could not indicate a voluntary movement, for there are many occurrences in ancient Greek literature that show that the verb was simply used to mean “to produce,” “to occur,” “to happen,” as anyone can conclude by running a search on the TLG. On the other hand, it is not only the divine simulacra that voluntarily approach the minds or souls of human beings: even those released by angry or envious individuals have this power (Plut. Quaest. conv. 682f4–683a3 = 68 A 77 DK), which means that what emits the εἴδωλα may not be identified with the gods, or with other divine beings. Finally, a third reason why Janko’s reconstruction is unlikely is the hypothesis that the fragment does not hint at divine musical inspiration. There are other possibilities, namely that it might concern “Democritus’ physics of hearing,”86 or – and I wish to defend this alternative – the explanation of how human beings discovered the art of music. After all, Philodemus quotes Democritus in On Music, Book 4 with this intent.87 And we also know, thanks to Plutarch (De soll. an. 974a6– 10 = 68 B 154 DK), that Democritus acknowledged that human beings learned many important things by imitating the behavior of some animals, including the art of singing, mastered by birds like the swan and the nightingale.88 Although this source does not mention the εἴδωλα, their connection could be regarded as implicit, for φωνή consists of a flux of atoms, namely of simulacra.89 Therefore, the voices of birds release εἴδωλα that reach the ears of human beings and allow them to slowly develop the art of singing and, with it, music – for no songs could be delivered without musical accompaniment. In short, even if Janko’s text is regarded as trustworthy, his interpretation still admits an alternative exegesis. 84 Sider (2012) 3: “Even if Janko’s ‘music’ is wrong, Philodemus’ context alone sets this passage in such a context.” 85 Janko (2011) 251 n. 7. 86 Mackey (2013) 124. 87 See Phld. De mus. 4, PHerc. 1497, col. 36.29–39 Delattre (2007) (= 68 B 144 DK), and the analysis by Gigante/Indelli (1980) 458–460; Silvestre (1990) 59; Morel (1996) 346–352; Delattre/Morel (1998); Hammerstaedt (1998); Luciani (2003) 126–128; Morel (2013) 88. 88 Democritus’ explanation is echoed by Lucr. 5.1380–1384: see Luciani (2003) 128–130. 89 Aul. Gell. 5.15.6–8 (= fr. 492 Luria). Cf. Aët. 4.19.23 (= 68 A 128 DK); Epicur. Ad Her. 53, on which see Verde (2010) 143–145.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 461

My proposal could also be supported by invoking the following argument: it is difficult to believe that the divine inspiration caused by some particular εἴδωλα is responsible for every poetical and musical composition. The sources that I have quoted above clearly report that ἐνθουσιασμός was employed to describe how exceptional individuals managed to create works of both beauty and wisdom; in other words, they do not explain how all other people produce simply good, average, or even poor songs and poems, which lack either one or both of these qualities. A poet less gifted than Homer might write a stupid yet beautiful dithyramb, or a wise yet ugly epic poem, or a hymn completely devoid of insight and grace. Now, by admitting that some poetical and musical compositions are the outcome of the εἴδωλα released by the voices of birds, and not by a divine being, I believe that this gap could be filled. Homer or other greatly gifted artists are instructed by the simulacra of animals and gods, while less brilliant poets are only instructed by the simulacra of animals. The physical explanation is in both cases the same: what differs is the recognition of two different kinds of atoms, which enter into the minds of creative human beings. In conclusion, although Janko’s textual reconstruction of PHerc. 207, fr. 10 is certainly interesting and his interpretation of its content intriguing, it would be better to regard the former as too uncertain and to consider the latter simply as an unverifiable hypothesis that also admits alternative exegesis. If a new collection of the fragments of Democritus is ever published, I think that the future editor should include this Herculanean text among the dubious testimonia and make use of it for the reconstruction of the Democritean theory of εἴδωλα with great caution.

5 Simulacra of death? On Phld. De mort. 4, PHerc. 1050, cols. 29.27–30.7 A final reference to the theory of εἴδωλα is possibly to be found in Philodemus’ On Death, Book 4 (PHerc. 1050). This work quotes Democritus twice: in cols. 29.27–30.7 and 39.6–15 Henry. The latter text is surely unconnected to εἴδωλα, since it seems to describe the irrational behavior of some human beings who feel pain while writing their last will, when death is approaching, because until this moment they have acted in the absurd belief that they would live forever.90 The

90 I follow the interpretation of Gigante/Indelli (1980) 456–458 and Gigante (1983) 229–232, also accepted by Luciani (2003) 133–134 and Tsouna (2007) 308. It still appears plausible to me, even

462 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

former reference may instead partly refer to the action of simulacra, although once again this point is not made explicitly. But let us first quote the text: Col. 29

τῆς δ αὐ[τῆς φλε]δόνος ἔχετ[αι κατὰ Δημόκριτο[ν καὶ] τὸ δυσωπε[ῖσθαι  διὰ τὴν οσο[]ανυ̣[]ν̣ιτου[ 30 ασ[] καὶ [δ]υσμο[ρφί]ας· κατα[φέρονται γὰρ ἐπὶ [το]ι ̣οῦτ[ο] πάθος ὡς [κ]αὶ τῶ[ν μετὰ τ[ῆς εὐσ]αρκ̣ίας [κ]αὶ τοῦ κάλλου[ς ἀποθνη[σκόν]των καὶ τῶν ἐκ[ των τ[]νο̣[]ουτ̣[]νδ[ 35 ]ων καὶ []ερ εὐ̣χρό͙ω[ν  δ̣ὲ τα π[₍₎ τελ]ευτὴν []ο[ 37 ]οις ἢ δυ[σχρησ]τηθησομεν[]ατατεν-|| Col. 30  ̲ ̲γόμενα, κ̣αὶ παραπέμπουσιν ὅτι π̣[άντες ἅμα τοῖς ὡς Μίλων εὐσάρκοις ὀλίγου μὲν χρόνου σκελετοὶ γίνονται, τὸ δὲ πέρας εἰς τὰς πρώτας ἀναλύονται φύ5 σεις· ὑπακουστέον δὲ δηλονότι τὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀνάλογα καὶ περὶ τῆς κα[κο̲ ̲ χ ροίας καὶ συνόλως τῆς δυσμορφίας. It is connected to the same balderdash, as Democritus says, to be disgusted on account of (…) and bad appearance. For they are brought to an emotion91 of this kind as both those who die with their good physique and beauty [intact] and those (…) with good complexion (…) death (…) or will be in distress (…), and they disregard [the fact] that all men, including those with as good a physique as Milo, become skeletons in a short period of time, and in the end are dissolved into their elementary particles: and obviously, analogous points to those stated are to be understood also in the case of bad complexion and bad appearance in general.92 This passage is the only part of the treatise that describes what the dead look like and is so fragmentary that it is difficult to figure out what kind of argument Philodemus if the reading of the words δίχ’ ἐμφορεῖν in col. 39.13–14 suggested by Gigante (1983) 232 must be replaced with the verb διξυμφορεῖν read by Henry (2009b) 93 n. 184. 91 But πάθος here may simply mean “condition,” i.e. the state of being dead (as Sedley has suggested to me per litteras). 92 Transl. by Henry (2009b) 69.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 463

is trying to build. Nonetheless, one may note that its key elements are the noun εὐσαρκία (col. 29.32) and the adjective εὔχροος (col. 29.35). Both terms and related ones (e.g., εὔχροια) are linked together in many instances in Greek literature, often also in conjunction with the notion of εὐμορφία. This notion does not appear in the columns by Philodemus, although it must be noted that its opposite δυσμορφία is present (cf. cols. 29.30 and 30.7). There is nothing to prevent us, then, from supposing that εὐμορφία appeared in one of the lost lines of the passage, or that an ancient reader would have thought of this concept immediately. Moreover, these words form the lexicon of ancient physicians.93 Even if the detection of this terminology does not amount too much, it at least shows us that a philosophical argument drawing upon medical terminology and concepts might be at play in our passage. The problem now is how we are to understand the aim of such argument. Fortunately, I believe that the opening lines (col. 29.27–30) of the passage are clear enough to allow us to formulate a plausible hypothesis. They emphasize the disgust (cf. δυσωπε[ῖσθαι in col. 29.28) caused in human beings by δυσμορφία, and possibly by κακόχροια. Indeed, col. 30.5–7 might suggest that these two elements were discussed as a pair. Philodemus writes that “analogous points to those stated are to be understood also in the case of bad complexion and bad appearance in general,” thus implying that earlier on δυσμορφία and κακόχροια had been analyzed together, while focusing on particular cases. Since the passage follows immediately after the lines that employ the image of the corpse of Milo (30.1–5), a famous wrestler of the late 6th cent. BC,94 it is possible to specify that the disgust under investigation consists in the affliction which arises at the sight of dead bodies. In other words, human beings feel distress due to the bad color and appearance displayed by those who have died, possibly because they realize that this will be their own destiny after death. This point, of course, is not explicit in the text. But it agrees with the fact that what we read in cols. 29.27–30.7 is a part of a general polemic against the human tendency to imagine what will happen to oneself post mortem,95 a tendency which Philodemus had fought against earlier on (cols. 19.27–29.26) and will censure again later on in the text (cols. 30.7–37.18).

93 Cf. e.g. Hippoc. Aph. 5.42, Prorrh. 1.24 and 49; Gal. De nat. fac. 2.133.8–11; Thras. 822.8, 823.4, and 829.8; De reb. bon. et mal. 815.1 Kühn; Diosc. 3.1.3; Oribas. Coll. med. 4.8.3, 45.30.48, and 59.2.11. See also Villard (2002a); Boehm (2002); and Barra (2009). 94 Cf. Henry (2009b) 63 n. 115. For references on the wrestler, see Harris (1964) 110–112 and Poliakoff (1987) 117–118. Beer (2009) 371 instead supposes a reference to Titus Annius Milo, a contemporary of Cicero. 95 For further arguments, see Segal (1998) 165–192; Luciani (2003) 131–132; and Beer (2009) 370–375.

464 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

The argument developed in our passages, then, may be designed to show that one should not be distressed by the δυσμορφία and κακόχροια that our body will display once all life leaves it. And the text that has been preserved suggests that the very image of Milo may have been a therapeutic device. Indeed, if even the corpse of the strongest and most vigorous wrestler of the past soon broke down into its constituent atoms, then by analogy it must be concluded that the dissolution of weaker and feebler corpses will be even swifter, or at least as swift as that of Milo. So there is no reason to be distressed at the thought that dead bodies will manifest δυσμορφία and κακόχροια for a short time. Even if we admit that to take on a bad appearance and color is an ill, it will not be a great ill, since it will very soon cease. Provided that what has been said is true, two different problems arise. Firstly (and to return to the real aim of this paragraph), why should εἴδωλα be involved in the argument? The text does not mention them at all, and what seems to be at stake is not what is currently perceived, but what is imagined will happen after death. Secondly, did Democritus or Philodemus develop the argument? It is necessary to ask this question, because the ancient atomist may only have been quoted for stylistic reasons. Philodemus surely wishes to borrow the colorful word φλεδών (“balderdash”) from Democritus.96 What is more uncertain is the idea that in the following lines he also paraphrases or adopts an argument formulated by his predecessor against the distress caused by post mortem scenarios. I think that the first problem can be solved by supposing that δυσμορφία and κακόχροια implicitly allude to the distress or disgust caused by the impact of the εἴδωλα of corpses on the eyes of human beings.97 This claim finds textual confirmation. With regard to δυσμορφία, it is sufficient to recall fr. 43 of Diogenes of Oinoanda, which has been already shown to be Democritean in § 2 of the paper and which reports that some forms fill the perceiver with perturbation/fear. As regards κακόχροια, it is interesting to note that Theophrastus’ De sensibus (= 68 A 135 DK) – which describes and challenges Democritus’ doctrine that colored affections arise through the impact of simulacra on the eyes (§§ 50–54) – similarly 96 So Henry (2009a) 98 and (2009b) 69, n. 115. The scholar rightly follows Gigante/Indelli (1980) 462–463, who recognized a mere stylistic quotation of Democritus in Phld. De ira, PHerc. 182, col. 29.26–27 Indelli (1988). Contra Morel (1996) 290. 97 Luschnat (1953) 28–35; Gigante/Indelli (1980) 456; Morel (1996) 289–290; Warren (2002) 196– 197; and Tsouna (2007) 308 think that the simulacra which disturb the human beings strike not the eyes, but the nose, i.e. that human beings are distressed by the atoms released with putrefaction. But this opinion is based on the reading ὀσφαντῶν by Diels in col. 29.29 of Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Death (= 68 B 1a DK), which the new edition of Henry renders implausible. However, the claim that the smell of putrefaction causes distress in human beings can be found in Lucretius: see the references and the brilliant analysis in Segal (1998) 165–174.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 465

reports that some colors (such as purple: § 77) are pleasurable to the perceiver, while others (like white: §§ 74 and 81) provoke a disturbance or ταραχή. Now, both these instances allow us to infer that human beings feel distress at the sight of rotting corpses, because the εἴδωλα that convey their bad μορφή and bad χροιά are naturally uncongenial to human nature. In order to limit the disastrous effect of this physical response, Democritus may have developed the argument that we read in the passage from Philodemus’ On Death, which might in addition be identified with one of the teachings that rearranges the original atomic nature of man and produces the rational disposition of imperturbability toward death.98 Far more difficult is the solution to the second problem, for the attribution of this argument to Democritus or Philodemus is equally possible. The texts that we have admit both alternatives. Democritus argued against the imagination of irrational post mortem scenarios,99 underlined that human nature is prone to dissolution and is short-lived (68 B 285 and 297 DK), showed that many of human goods are transient (68 B 189 DK), was chronologically close to Milo (and hence might have used him as an example), discussed the notion of εὐμορφία (68 B 294 DK), and studied corpses (as many sources report: see the texts collected in 68 A 117, A 160, B 1 DK): all of which shows that he would have known first-hand just how swiftly the process of decay takes place. Four factors may instead be adduced in favor of the Epicurean ascription of the argument: a) the idea that corpses are destroyed in a short time is acknowledged by many Epicureans, such as Colotes and Lucretius;100 the latter also devotes a good portion of Book 3 of De rerum natura to dismissing fears concerning the destiny of the human body after death (3.870–893); b) the hypothesis that the image of Milo is intended to show that manifesting δυσμορφία and κακόχροια after death is just a temporary ill, and hence one easy to endure, finds a striking similarity in the treatment of intense pain in Epicur. RS IV; c) the claim that flesh qua flesh is destined to dissolve was accepted by Epicurus;101 d) the doctrine that some εἴδωλα transport forms and colors which are uncongenial to a perceiver is also an Epicurean tenet (cf. Lucr. 2.418–421, 6.777–780; consider also the description of the simulacra of the rooster that wound the eyes of the lion in 4.710–716). A further complication is that in

98 See the brief analysis of fr. B 33 in § 2. 99 Cf. 68 B 199 and 297 DK, on which see Bossu (1982) 287–298. 100 Cf. Procl. In Remp. 16.113.9–13 and 116.19–21 Kroll; Lucr. 3.717–740 and 3.870–893. On the topic, see also Warren (2002) 203–204 and Luciani (2003) 131–133. 101 Cf. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1098, col. 7.22–29 = ll. 194–201 Obbink (1996); as well as De dis, PHerc. 152/157, frs. 6 and 8 Essler (2011a).

466 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

their writings both Democritus and Philodemus resort to many medical words, concepts, and images.102 Therefore, the problem of the attribution is unsolvable, and the most prudent attitude here consists in a careful suspension of judgment. Philodemus may have developed a personal argument and quoted Democritus only for stylistic reasons, or he may have paraphrased one of his predecessor’s arguments, as well as borrowed his expression “balderdash” simply because he liked it. If, however, we suppose that the second alternative is more persuasive, it may be seen to provide a final, interesting clarification of Democritus’ theory of εἴδωλα. This theory was employed as an explanatory tool in relation not just to natural phenomena and epistemological issues, but also to the psychological and ethical behavior of irrational human beings. The passage from On Death, Book 4 allows us to infer a point made in no other source and to attribute greater unity to Democritus’ philosophical activity. Indeed, the link between εἴδωλα and the fear of death may give further support to those scholars who argue that in Democritean philosophy there exists a strong connection between physics and ethics,103 which then are not completely separate domains, but rather areas of investigation which become more comprehensible once they are studied together.

6 Conclusions With the exclusion of the analysis of the fragment reconstructed by Janko (cf. § 4), which de facto casts doubt on the only known direct reference to εἴδωλα by Democritus in the Herculaneum papyri, my reassessment has suggested that these texts contain implicit and sometimes rewarding details concerning Democritean doctrine. It has also pointed to some explicit reasons for agreement and disagreement between the Epicureans and the early Atomists. In § 1 I have shown that Democritus believed simulacra to be animated because they have soul atoms arranged according to the position and order which produce a living organism. We have also seen that Epicurus found this perspective unacceptable, due to the great speed of the εἴδωλα. § 2 has suggested that both philosophers agreed that the simulacra activate a free voluntary movement independent of the external environment. In § 3 I have argued that Democritus gave

102 For Democritus, cf. Vlastos (1993) 333–337. For Philodemus’ use of medicine, cf. Gigante (1978); Pearcy (2012); Fiorillo (2012) 202–208; Fausti (2012), with the caveat of Angeli (1985) 65–66. 103 Cf. e.g. Vlastos (1993) and Warren (2007).

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 467

an explanation of the birth of the belief in god the same as (or very similar to) that the one we find in Lucretius, for according to both philosophers the concept of θεός arose from both the reception of some divine εἴδωλα and the observation of celestial phenomena. Finally, § 5 has suggested the possibility that Democritus, the Epicureans, or both, claimed that the simulacra of corpses have the natural power to trigger the fear of death and provided a physical explanation of an irrational intellectual behavior.

References Angeli (1985): Anna Angeli, L’esattezza scientifica in Epicuro e Filodemo, in: CErc 15, 63–84. Arr.2 = Graziano Arrighetti (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Bailey (1928): Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study, Oxford. Baldes (1975): Robert W. Baldes, “Democritus on Visual Perception: Two Theories or One?”, in: Phronesis 20, 93–105. Barigazzi (1958): Alberto Barigazzi, “Cinetica degli eidola nel περὶ φύσεως di Epicuro”, in: PdP 13, 246–278. Barigazzi (1981): Alberto Barigazzi, “Nuova luce su Democrito e Lucrezio da Diogene d’Enoanda”, in: Emerita 49, 1–15. Barnes (1986): Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, London/New York (repr. of the 1st. ed. 1979, 2 vols.). Barra (2009): Edoarda Barra, “Des humeurs, des couleurs et des remèdes dans le Corpus Hippocraticum”, in: M. Carastro (ed.), L’antiquité en couleurs : Catégories, pratiques, représentations, Grenoble, 153–162. Beer (2009): Beate Beer, Lukrez und Philodem: Poetische Argumentation und poetologischer Diskurs, Basel. Bicknell (1969): Peter J. Bicknell, “Democritus’ Theory of Precognition”, in: REG 82, 318–326. Bicknell (1970): Peter J. Bicknell, “Demokritos’ Parapsychology Again”, in: REG 83, 301–304. Boehm (2002): Isabelle Boehm, “Couleur et odeur chez Galien”, in: Villard (b), 77–96. Bossu (1982): Bernard Bossu, “La crainte dans la morale de Démocrite”, in: RPh 56, 287–300. Brancacci (2007): Aldo Brancacci, “Democritus’ Mousika”, in: Brancacci/Morel, 181–205. Brancacci/Morel (2007): Aldo Brancacci and Pierre-Marie Morel (eds.), Democritus: Science, the Arts, and the Care of the Soul, Leiden/Boston. Brillante (2009): Carlo Brillante, “Poesia e invasamento poetico: Democrito e lo Ione di Platone”, in: Id., Il cantore e la Musa: Poesia e modelli culturali nella Grecia arcaica, Pisa. Brown (1987): Robert Duncan Brown, Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on De rerum natura 4.1030–1287, with Prolegomena, Texts, and Translation, Leiden/New York/ Copenhagen/Cologne. Burkert (1977): Walter Burkert, “Air-imprints or Eidola: Democritus’ Aetiology of Vision”, in: ICS 2, 97–109. Cambiano (1980): Giuseppe Cambiano, “Democrito e i sogni”, in: Romano, 437–450. Capasso (1988): Mario Capasso, Carneisco, Il secondo libro del Filista (PHerc. 1027), Naples. Chandler (2007): Clive Chandler, “Democritus on Homer and Inspiration, B 21 DK”, in: Athenaeum 95, 839–859.

468 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

Clay (1998): Diskin Clay, “An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams”, in: Diskin Clay, Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy, Ann Arbor, 211–231. Crönert (1906): Wilhelm Crönert, Kolotes und Menedemos: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Philosophen- und Literaturgeschichte, Leipzig (repr. Amsterdam 1965). De Lacy (1980): Philip De Lacy, Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, Berlin. Delatte (1934): Armand Delatte, “Les conceptions de l’enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques”, in: AC 3, 5–79. Delattre (2007): Daniel Delattre, Philodème de Gadara : Sur la musique, Livre IV, Paris. Delattre/Morel (1998): Daniel Delattre and Pierre-Marie Morel, “Une lecture nouvelle du fr. B 144 D.-K. de Démocrite”, in: ZPE 121, 21–24. Dörrie (1976): Heinrich Dörrie, “Emanation: Ein unphilosophisches Wort im spätantiken Denken”, in: Heinrich Dörrie, Platonica minora, Munich, 70–88. Essler (2011a): Holger Essler, “Eine Auslegung Epikurs theologischer Schriften”, in: CErc 41, 13–25. Essler (2011b): Holger Essler, Glückselig und unsterblich: Epikureische Theologie bei Cicero und Philodem, mit einer Edition von PHerc. 152/157, Kol. 8–10, Basel. Fausti (2012): Daniela Fausti, “La presenza del linguaggio medico nel De signis di Filodemo”, in: I Quaderni del Ramo d’Oro 5, 62–82. Ferrari (1980): Gian Arturo Ferrari, “La scrittura fine della realtà”, in: Romano, 75–89. Fiorillo (2012): Matilde Fiorillo, “Il medico, il timoniere e il retore in Filodemo, Retorica VII (PHerc. 1004)”, in: CErc 42, 193–208. Furley/Wilkie (1984): David J. Furley and James S. Wilkie, Galen: On Respiration and the Arteries, Princeton. Gemelli Marciano (2009): M. Laura Gemelli Marciano, “‘Evidentemente il sapiente ha studiato medicina’: Per una revisione dei rapporti fra i cosiddetti presocratici e la medicina ippocratica: L’esempio di Democrito”, in: M&S 17–18, 129–156. Gigante (1978): Marcello Gigante, “«Philosophia medicans» in Filodemo”, in: CErc 5, 53–61. Gigante (1983): Marcello Gigante, “La chiusa del quarto libro «Della morte» di Filodemo”, in: Id., Ricerche filodemee, Naples, 163–234. Gigante (1998): Marcello Gigante, “Physis: la natura nell’epicureismo”, in: Renato Uglione (ed.), L’uomo antico e la natura, Turin, 39–91. Gigante/Indelli (1980): Marcello Gigante and Giovanni Indelli, “Democrito nei Papiri Ercolanesi di Filodemo”, in: Romano, 451–466. Gioè (2002): Adriano Gioè, Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d.C.: Testimonianze e frammenti, Naples. Giussani (1945): Carlo Giussani, Studi lucreziani, Turin. Gregory (2013): Andrew Gregory, “Leucippus and Democritus on Like to Like and ou mallon”, in: Apeiron 46, 446–468. Hammerstaedt (1998): Jürgen Hammerstaedt, “Nochmals zu Demokrit (VS 68 B 144)”, in: ZPE 121, 25–27. Harris (1964): Harold Harris, Greek Athletes and Athletics, London. Harris (1973): Charles Reginald Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine: From Alcmaeon to Galen, Oxford. Henrichs (1975): Albert Henrichs, “Two Doxographical Notes: Democritus and Prodicus on Religion”, in: HSCPh 79, 93–123. Henry (2009a): W. Benjamin Henry, “New Light on Philodemus, On Death”, in: CErc 39, 89–102. Henry (2009b): W. Benjamin Henry, Philodemus: On Death, Atlanta.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 469

Heßler (2014): Jan E. Heßler, Epikur: Brief an Menoikeus, Basel. Huby (1978): Pamela M. Huby, “Epicurus’ Attitude to Democritus”, in: Phronesis 23, 80–86. Ierodiakonou (2011): Katerina Ierodiakonou, “The Notion of Enargeia in Hellenistic Philosophy”, in: Benjamin Morison and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes, Oxford, 60–73. Indelli (1998): Giovanni Indelli, Filodemo: L’ira, Naples. Janko (2011): Richard Janko, Philodemus: On Poems, Books 3–4: With the Fragments of Aristotle, On Poets, Oxford/New York. Joly (1984): Henri Joly, “Sur quelques significations ‘ontologiques’ et ‘épistémologiques’ de l’εἴδωλον démocritéen”, in: Linos G. Benakis (ed.), Proceedings of the 1st International Congress on Democritus, 2 vols., Xanthi, I, 247–265. Kerferd (1971): George B. Kerferd, “Epicurus’ Doctrine of the Soul”, in: Phronesis 16, 80–96. Kilpatrick (1996): Ross S. Kilpatrick, “Amicus medicus: Medicine and Epicurean Therapy in De rerum natura”, in: MAAR 41, 69–100. Konstan (2015): David Konstan, Minima and the Speed of Images, in: Masi/Maso, 135–150. Langerbeck (1935): Hermann Langerbeck, Δόξις ἐπιρυσμίη: Studien zu Demokrits Ethik und Erkenntnislehre, Berlin. Laursen (1997): Simon Laursen, “The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, in: CErc 27, 5–83. Leith (2015): David Leith, “Erasistratus’ Triplokia of Arteries, Veins and Nerves”, in: Apeiron 48, 251–262. Leone (1988): Giuliana Leone, “Achille Vogliano editore di Epicuro”, in: CErc 18, 149–191. Leone (2002): Giuliana Leone, “Epicuro, Della natura, Libro XXXIV (PHerc. 1431)”, in: CErc 32, 7–135. Leone (2012): Giuliana Leone, Epicuro: Sulla natura, Libro II, Naples. Lewis (2015): Orly Lewis, “Marcellinus’ De pulsibus: A Neglected Treatise on the Ancient ‘Art of the Pulse’”, in: SCI 34, 195–214. Lewis (2016): Orly Lewis, “The Practical Application of Ancient Pulse-Lore and its Influence on the Patient-Doctor Interaction”, in: Georgia Petridou and Chiara Thumiger (eds.), Homo Patiens – Approaches to the Patient in the Ancient World, Leiden/Boston, 345–364. Luciani (2003): Sabine Luciani, “Philodème et la «Réhabilitation» de Démocrite dans l’Épicurisme”, in Annick Monet (ed.), Le jardin romain : Épicurisme et poésie à Rome : Mélanges offerts à Mayotte Bollack, Paris, 119–135. Luschnat (1953): Otto Luschnat, “Die atomistische Eidola-Poroi-Theorie in Philodems Schrift De morte”, in: Prolegomena 2, 21–41. Mackey (2013): Jacob L. Mackey, Rev. of Janko (2011), in: CW 107, 123–125. Mansfeld (2004): Jaap Mansfeld, “Democritus, Fragments 68B18 and B21”, in: Mnemosyne 57, 484–488. M&R2: Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Manuli/Vegetti (2009): Paola Manuli and Mario Vegetti, Cuore, sangue e cervello, Pistoia. Marcovich (1975): Miroslav Marcovich, “Democritus on Gods: PHerc. 1428 fr. 16 = VS 68 A 75”, in: ZPE 19, 244. Masi (2006): Francesca G. Masi, Epicuro e la filosofia della mente: Il XXV libro dell’opera Sulla Natura, Sankt Augustin. Masi/Maso (2015): Francesca G. Masi and Stefano Maso (eds.), Epicurus on Eidola: “Peri Phuseos” Book II: Update, Proposals, and Discussions, Amsterdam.

470 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

Matelli (2012): Elisabetta Matelli, “Praxiphanes of Mytilene (called ‘of Rhodes’): The Sources, Text and Translation”, in: Andrea Martano, Elisabetta Matelli and David Mirhady (eds.), Praxiphanes of Mytilene and Chamaeleon of Heraclea: Text, Translation, and Discussion, New Jersey, 1–156. McOsker (2016): Michael McOsker, “Seeing Things No One Else Can See: The Supersanity of the Poet in Democritus”, Unpublished paper, read in advance by courtesy of the author. Morel (1996): Pierre-Marie Morel, Démocrite et la recherché des causes, Paris. Morel (2013): Pierre-Marie Morel, Atome et nécessité : Démocrite, Épicure, Lucrèce, Paris. Morel (2015): Pierre-Marie Morel, “I primi atomisti nel II libro Sulla natura di Epicuro”, in: Masi/Maso, 55–66. Nachmanson (1917): Ernst Nachmanson, Erotianstudien, Uppsala. Nachmanson (1918): Ernst Nachmanson, Erotiani vocum Hippocraticarum collectio cum fragmentis, Uppsala. Obbink (1996): Dirk Obbink, Philodemus: On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary, Oxford. Pearcy (2012): Lee T. Pearcy, “Does Dying Hurt? Philodemus of Gadara, De morte and Asclepiades of Bithynia”, in: CQ 62, 211–222. Perelli (1955): Luciano Perelli, “Epicuro e la dottrina di Crizia contro la religione”, in: RFIC 83, 29–56. Perelli (1966–1967): Luciano Perelli, “La storia dell’umanità nel V libro di Lucrezio”, in: AAT 101, 117–285. Petrucci (2018): Federico M. Petrucci, Taurus of Beirut: The Other Side of Middle Platonism, London/New York. Phillips (1982): Joanne H. Phillips, “Lucretius on the Inefficacy of the Medical Art: 6. 1179 and 6. 1226–38”, in: CPh 77, 233–235. Piergiacomi (2013): Enrico Piergiacomi, “Una preghiera per l’avvenire: La divinazione in sonno di Democrito”, in: Lexicon Philosophicum 1, 57–89. Pigeaud (1988): Jackie Pigeaud, “Die Medizin in der Lehrdichtung des Lukrez und des Vergil”, in: Gerhard Binder (ed.), Saeculum Augustum, vol. 2: Religion und Literatur, Darmstadt, 216–239. Pino Campos (2005a): Luis M. Pino Campos, “Panorama general del conocimiento del pulso cardiovascular en Plutarco”, in: Montserrat Jufresa, Francesca Mestre, Pilar Gómez and Pau Gilabert (eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia i societat, Barcelona, 109–115. Pino Campos (2005b): Luis M. Pino Campos, Sinopsis de Galeno de su propria obra sobre pulsos, Madrid. Pino Campos (2007): Luis M. Pino Campos, “En torno el significado de ἀρτηρίη en algunos textos Hipocráticos”, in: Fortunatae 18, 163–182. Pino Campos (2008): Luis M. Pino Campos, “La polisemia de σφυγμός en el Corpus Hippocraticum (I)”, in: Fortunatae 19, 127–151. Pino Campos (2009): Luis M. Pino Campos, “La polisemia de σφυγμός en el Corpus Hippocraticum (II)”, in: Fortunatae 20, 127–137. Poliakoff (1987): Michael B. Poliakoff, Combat Sports in the Ancient World: Competition, Violence, and Culture, New Haven/London. Rechenauer (2009): Georg Rechenauer, “Demokrits Seelenmodell und die Prinzipien der atomistischen Physik”, in: Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis (eds.), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, Berlin/New York, 111–142. Romano (1980): Francesco Romano (ed.), Democrito e l’atomismo antico, Catania.

15 Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri 

 471

Rudolph (2011): Kelli Rudolph, “Democritus’ Perspectival Theory of Vision”, in: JHS 131, 67–83. Rüsche (1930): Franz Rüsche, Blut, Leben und Seele: Ihr Verhältnis nach Auffassung der griechischen und hellenistischen Antike, der Bibel und der alten Alexandrinischen Theologen, Paderborn. Sassi (1978): Maria M. Sassi, Le teorie della percezione in Democrito, Florence. Spallicci (1966): Aldo Spallicci, La medicina in Lucrezio, Forlì. Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De pietate pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125. Schrijvers (1970): Pieter H. Schrijvers, Horror ac divina voluptas : Études sur la poétique et la poésie de Lucrèce, Amsterdam. Sedley (1998): David N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge. Segal (1998): Charles Segal, Lucrezio: Angoscia e morte nel «De Rerum Natura», transl. by Francesco Citti, Bologna. Sider (2012): David Sider, Rev. of Janko (2011), in: CJ-Online, 2012.11.14, 1–4 (seen: 25.8.2016). Siegel (1968): Rudolph E. Siegel, Galen’s System of Physiology and Medicine: An Analysis of his Doctrines and Observations on Blood Flow, Respiration, Humors and Internal Diseases, Basel/New York. Siegel (1973): Rudolph. E. Siegel, Galen on Psychology, Psychopathology, and Function and Diseases of the Nervous System, Basel/Munich/Paris/London/New York/Sydney. Silvestre (1985): Maria Luisa Silvestre, Democrito e Epicuro: Il senso di una polemica, Naples. Silvestre (1990): Maria L. Silvestre, Democritea: I documenti da Epicuro ad Aezio, Rome. Smith (1992): Martin F. Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription, Naples. Steckerl (1958): Fritz Steckerl, The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and his School, Leiden. Storey (2011): Ian C. Storey (ed.), Fragments of Old Comedy, vol. 3: Philonicus to Xenophon; Adespota, Cambridge (MA). Taylor (1999): Cristopher C. W. Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus, Toronto. Trifogli (1958): Roberto Trifogli, Galeno: De pulsibus ad tyrones, Rome. Tsouna (2007): Voula Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, Oxford. Us.: Hermann Usener (see the Abbreviations at the beginning of this volume). Vassallo (2018a): Christian Vassallo, “The ‘pre-Socratic Section’ of Philodemus’ On Piety: A New Reconstruction: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Part II)”, in: APF 64, 98–147. Vassallo (2018b): Christian Vassallo, “Atomism and the Worship of Gods: On Democritus’ ‘Rational’ Attitude towards Theology”, in: PhA 18, 105–126. Velardi (1989): Roberto Velardi, Enthousiasmòs: Possessione rituale e teoria della comunicazione poetica in Platone, Rome. Verde (2010): Francesco Verde, Epicuro: Epistola a Erodoto, Rome. Verde (2015): Francesco Verde, “Monismo psicologico e dottrina dell’anima in Lucrezio ed Epicuro”, in: Eugenio Canone (ed.), Anima-corpo alla luce dell’etica: Antichi e moderni, Florence, 49–64. Verde (2016): Francesco Verde, “Percezione, errore e residuo percettivo in Aristotele, Epicuro e Alessandro di Afrodisia”, in: GCFI 95 (97), 44–62. Viano (1984): Carlo A. Viano, “Perché non c’era sangue nelle arterie: La cecità epistemologica degli anatomisti antichi”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni and Mario Vegetti (eds.), La scienza ellenistica, Naples, 299–352. Villard (2002a): Laurence Villard, “Couleurs et maladies dans la Collection Hippocratique: les faits et les mots”, in: Villard (b), 45–64. Villard (2002b): Laurence Villard, Couleurs et vision dans l’antiquité classique, Rouen. Vlastos (1993): Gregory Vlastos, “Ethics and Physics in Democritus”, in: Gregory Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, vol. 1: The Presocratics, ed. by Daniel W. Graham, Princeton, 328–350.

472 

 Enrico Piergiacomi

Von Staden (1989): Heinrich von Staden, Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria, Cambridge/New York. Von Staden (2000): Heinrich von Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen”, in: John P. Wright and Paul Potter (eds.), Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightement, Oxford, 79–116. Warren (2002): James Warren, “Democritus, the Epicureans, Death, and Dying”, in: CQ 52, 193–206. Warren (2007): James Warren, “Democritus on Social and Psychological Harm”, in: Brancacci/ Morel, 87–104. Wiśniewski (1987): Bohdan Wiśniewski, “Λόγος et νοῦς chez Démocrite et Héraclite”, in: Eos 75, 5–11.

Tiziano Dorandi

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 1 Preliminaries My intention is to present the three papyrological testimonies on the philosopher Anaxarchus of Abdera (c. 380–320 BC), whose few fragments I published some years ago in a collection I presented as a “proecdosi, accompagnata da una traduzione italiana, ma priva ancora di commento,” which I did not rule out writing one day.1 We are most familiar with two aspects of Anaxarchus’ life: his ambiguous relationship with Alexander the Great and his sad end as a victim of Nicocreon, the tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus. Along with his disciple Pyrrho of Elis, Anaxarchus took part in the entourage of intellectuals who followed Alexander in the military expedition to the East. The ancient testimonies on the relationship between Anaxarchus and the Macedonian king are at odds with each other. Part of the tradition presents the philosopher as a friend and flatterer of Alexander, devoted to justifying his adoption of eastern proskynesis in opposition to the Peripatetic Callisthenes and to comforting the king after his execution of Cleitus (in the winter of 328/327 BC). Other authors painted Anaxarchus’ attitude against Alexander not as one of flattery, but as a scathingly ironic one, consistent with his philosophical ideas.2 Regarding Nicocreon, we know that, during a banquet that took place in Tyre in the spring of 331 BC, Anaxarchus earned the tyrant’s enmity with an inappropriate joke. After Alexander’s death, when Anaxarchus was forced to land in Cyprus against his will, Nicocreon took revenge on the philosopher and condemned him to be pressed alive in a mortar. Anaxarchus’ supposed last words are widespread in ancient sources: “Just pound the bag of Anaxarchus, you do not pound Anaxarchus.” Faced with Nicocreon’s threat to cut out his tongue, Anaxarchus himself cut it out and spat it in Nicocreon’s face.3

1 Dorandi (1994a) 11, with additions in Dorandi (1995). 2 Brunschwig (1993) gave an intelligent and innovating reading of Anaxarchus’ philosophy. In more recent times, his thought has been studied especially in relation to that of his disciple Pyrrho by Bett (2000) and Clayman (2009). 3 Dorandi (1994b). On Anaxarchus’ torture, see Bernard (1984). Note: This paper has been translated into English by Selene I. S. Brumana. Tiziano Dorandi, Centre J. Pépin, CNRS / ENS, Paris https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-017

474 

 Tiziano Dorandi

Anaxarchus wrote a treatise entitled Περὶ βασιλείας (On Kingship) of which a fragment (fr. 65 Dorandi)4 and a testimony (fr. 66 Dorandi) remain. If we could demonstrate that Epicurus’ work with the same name, also reduced to very few fragments, should be read in connection with Anaxarchus’ treatise, our knowledge of Anaxarchus and Epicurus’ works and political thought would be greatly increased.5 However, there are still strong doubts over this hypothesis, and I am cautious in drawing any kind of inference. I will return to the question briefly at the end of this paper. Anaxarchus’ flattery towards Alexander and his steadfastness in the face of death are the two aspects of his character that resurface in the three papyrological testimonies on the philosopher from Egypt and from Herculaneum.

2 From Egypt Let us start with Egypt. A fragment of an extremely damaged papyrus roll (paleographically datable to 2nd cent. AD) now kept at the University of Michigan (PMich. inv. 4912a = fr. 41 Dorandi)6 contains a testimony about Anaxarchus’ brave and contemptuous attitude toward death when faced with the tyrant Nicocreon.7 The reconstruction of the text of the papyrus profited from two independent editiones principes, which come to different conclusions regarding the little material that can be drawn from the beaten frustula.8 Two fragments (7,5 × 9,6 cm and 2,1 × 4 cm) are preserved. The first and wider fragment transmits the remains of two contiguous columns in which it is possible to read a few lines that allow us to have at least an idea of the content of the two sections, although they do not present a continuous text. At ll. 12–14 Priest (=ll. 11–13 Gronewald) of col. 1, one can read Anaxarchus and Nicocreon’s names in an incomplete context, which it is not possible to restore with certainty because the width of the writing column is unknown:

4 The ‘original’ text of the fragment was reconstructed by Diels by comparing several parallel traditions. See Dorandi (1994a) 13 n. 9, 50–52, and (1995) 255. 5 Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 479–497. 6 MP3 1196.1; LDAB 5066; TM 63852. A photographic reproduction of the papyrus can be found in CPF IV.2 pl. 114. 7 Gronewald (1978) and Priest (1978). The lines on Anaxarchus were proposed also by Dorandi (1989). 8 I take Priest’s (1978) edition as my model. I am waiting for the edition planned for vol. II.4 of CPF.

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 475

Ἀνάξα]ρχος ὁ φιλόσοφος   ]ης Νικοκρε  π]ροσγενομεLl. 8–14 Priest (= ll. 22–29 Gronewald) of col. 2 details the last moments of the life of Epaminondas, who was fatally wounded during the battle of Leuctra in 362 BC, and his great strength. In these fragments, Gronewald sees the remains of a prose anthology of exempla on the bravery in the face of death, and he supposes that other paradigmatic episodes precede and follow it. Gronewald suggests that the section on Anaxarchus should be read as a testimony of his book Περὶ βασιλείας and offers a reconstruction of the text (col. 2.9–14), although hypothetical. I reproduce it (followed by my translation) with the caveat I expressed above about the impossibility of determining the length of the lines of the column: ἐν Κύπρωι εἰς λό]γ ̣ον παραγενόμε10  νος περὶ τοῦ δεῖν δι]καίως ἄρχειν τὸν βασιλέα Ἀνάξα]ρ̣χ̣ο̣ς ὁ φιλόσοφος πρὸς τὸν τύραννον αὐτ]ῆς Νικοκρέοντα καὶ πάλαι ἐχθ]ρ̣ὸς γενόμενος αὐτοῦ Arrived in Cyprus to speak to the tyrant of the island, Nicocreon, of how the king must rule with justice, the philosopher Anaxarchus, who long since had become his enemy (...). Priest9 proposes the more likely scenario that the papyrus discusses Anaxarchus’ condemnation to death at Nicocreon’s behest and the bravery the philosopher displayed in that miserable situation. Even Priest attempts to reconstruct the fragment (col. 2.12–14). I reproduce the text followed by my translation with the same caveat raised about Gronewald’s attempt: ± 12 Ἀνάξα]ρχος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀκουσίως ἐλθὼν εἰς Κύπρον] ἧς Νικοκρέων ὁ τύραννος ἦρχεν  π]ροσγενομε-

9 Priest (1978) 66–67.

476 

 Tiziano Dorandi

The philosopher Anaxarchus arrived in Cyprus against his will under the power of the tyrant Nicocreon (…) Priest also proposes a reconstruction exempli gratia of the episode of Epaminondas’ death that follows (col. 2.8–14 = 22–29 Gronewald), taking in particular the very detailed description given by Diodorus Siculus (15.87) into account.10 Priest identifies a link between the two episodes in that they both describe violent deaths and equanimity in the face of death. According to Priest, an analysis of the lines of col. 1 (1–11 = 1–10 Gronewald) that precede Anaxarchus’ episode could allow us to have an idea of the kind of text to which the two frustula of Michigan’s papyrus belonged.11 The scholar starts from the premise that in col. 1.3 it is possible to integrate τὴν θαρ[ραλεότητα and in col. 1.4 μέ]τρον and κριτ[έαν or a form of κριτ[ήριον with some confidence.12 In his analysis, Priest observes that θαρραλεότης is a specific philosophical term, in particular belonging to the Stoic school, which carries the meaning of “reasoned confidence.” Aristotle avoids the abstract θαρραλεότης: instead, he uses the adjectival form θαρραλέος and the substantive θάρρος, but with a different meaning, namely that of “overconfidence.” According to Priest, Anaxarchus and Epaminondas show the same quality as θαρραλεότης towards death, which we should understand in the Stoic sense. On the basis of these considerations, Priest proposes two possible reconstructions and translations (both probable, but uncertain for the reasons already mentioned above) in col. 1.2–4. τὰ πε]ρ̣ὶ τὴν (or ] οἱ τὴν) θαρ[ραλεότητα νομίζοντες κατὰ μέ]τρον κριτ[έαν those who believe that confidence must be judged according to a standard of moderation or ὁριζόμεν]οι τὴν θαρ[ραλεότητα  τῶι τοῦ κατὰ μέ]τρον κριτ[ηρίωι those who define confidence in terms of a standard of that which is moderate.

10 Priest (1978) 64–65. 11 Gronewald assigned the final two lines (ll. 10–11 Priest = ll. 9–10 Gronewald) to Anaxarchus’ exemplum. 12 Priest (1978) 67–69.

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 477

These premises would have been explained by the exempla that follow. Therefore, the fragments at Michigan would preserve the remains of an ethical treatise illustrated with exempla, probably datable to the Hellenistic period. The general tone of the treatise “reminds one more of popular philosophy, adhering to no specific school, but concerned to express a popular approach to the problem of courage.”13 I remain unsure if all of these conclusions can be drawn from these very tattered papyrus’ remains. However, the idea that Anaxarchus’ example is included for his bravery in the face of death appears much more likely than the idea that there is any allusion to his book On Kingship.

3 To Herculaneum Now let’s turn to the two testimonies from Herculaneum, more legible, though the details of the text (the second at least) still remain uncertain.14

3.1 The Anaxarchus’ exemplum in Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Death I begin with the shorter and less problematic testimony, which also gives the example of Anaxarchus’ bravery in the face of death. We are at the end of the fourth (and probably last) book of Philodemus’ On Death (PHerc. 1050, col. 35.11– 34 Henry). I am here quoting the passage within a much broader context than in my collection (fr. 33 Dorandi), to better show Philodemus’ strategy:15 ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάζω τῶν ἀβίωτον ἡγουμένων τὸ καταγνωσ-

13 Priest (1978) 69. 14 Perhaps a third testimony is hidden in the tracks ]αναξ[ that Vassallo (in this volume, DAPR, T19) read in a text very full of lacunae in Book 4 of Philodemus’ On Death (PHerc. 1050, col. 17.26). Even if it is the beginning of the proper name Ἀναξ[, the alternatives are too many to be able to work with confidence. The presence of a testimonium on Anaxagoras in the same column, whose name recurs also in ll. 17 and 28, should make even more cautious. I cordially thank Christian Vassallo for having drawn my attention to this passage. 15 Text and translation are those of the recent edition by Henry (2009) 80. At col. 35.31 Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) read ἃ γάρ instead of [ἐ]ᾶ γάρ. This reading is not confirmed by a revision of the original text and of multispectral images (MSI). In addition to Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 496–497, see Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 156–157 (fr. 8), 185, 238–241.

478 

 Tiziano Dorandi

θῆναι, καὶ ταῦτ᾿ οὐχ ὑπὸ σπουδαίων ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὸ χειρίστων ἀνθρώπων, μᾶλλον 15 δὲ θη[ρ]ί ̣ων, εἰ μακαρίως ἡγοῦ[ν]ται βεβιωκέναι καὶ βιώσεσθαι τοὺ[ς] παμπονήρους μέν, ἀπολυομένους δὲ διαβολῶν ἢ μηδ᾽ ὅλως διαβαλλομένους παρὰ τοῖς τοιούτοις· ἔτι δ᾽εἰ μὴ̣ νομί20 ζουσιν [κ]α[ὶ] τ̣ῶν φρονιμοτάτ̣[ω]ν̣ τὸν βίον εἶν̣[αι] ταλαίπωρον, εἴπερ ἐσ̣τ̣[ὶ] συμφορὰ τ̣[ὸ γί]νεσθαι πε⸌ρι⸍πετη̑ τοῖς τοιούτοις. προλαμβ[ά]νοντας ἴσως ἔσε̣σ̣θαι καὶ περὶ ἑα[υ]τ̣ο̣ὺ̣ς̣, ἐ̣π̣ειδὴ τύχης ἐσ[τὶ]ν ἔρ25 γον. οὕ[τω] δ᾽ ἐστὶ πιστὸν τὸ γενν̣αίως δύνασθαι φέ̣[ρε]ιν τὰ τοιαῦτα το[ὺ]ς ἀρετ[η]φόρους τῶν ἀ̣ν̣δρῶ̣ν ὥστε κα[ὶ] τῶν ἰδιωτῶ[ν] πάρε̣σ̣τιν θεωρ[εῖν τ]ινας οὐκ εὐλόφως μόνoν ὑ[π]οφέροντα[ς] ἀλ30  λὰ καὶ κ[α]τανωτιζόμενους τῶν διατιθέντων̣· [ἐ]ᾶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Ἐλεάτης καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος, ὥς τινες ἱστ[ο]ροῦ[σιν,] κα[ί τ]ινες ἄλλοι τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων. 31 [ἐ]ᾶ γὰρ ὁ Hayter : [ἔ]α γὰρ ε[ἰ] Blass (1886) 540 : ἃ γὰρ ὁ Acosta Méndez/Angeli : τί γὰρ ε[ἰ] Diels (1886) 516.

And as for those who consider it insupportable to be condemned, and moreover (condemned) not by good but by very bad men, or rather beasts, I (for my part) marvel at them if they consider that (men who are) utterly wicked, but obtain acquittal from false accusations, or are not falsely accused at all among such men, have lived and will live blessedly; and in addition, (I marvel at them) if they do not think, given that it is a misfortune to fall in with such things, that even the most sensible men have a wretched life anticipating that perhaps it will happen to them too, since it is up to fortune. But (the claim) that the virtuous among men can bear such things nobly is so credible that it is possible to observe even among laymen some not just patiently enduring, but actually disdaining those who treat them so: for one need not mention Socrates and Zeno of Elea and Anaxarchus, as some record, and some others among those who practiced philosophy (have done so).

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 479

As a whole, the sense of the passage is very clear.16 Philodemus continues the discussion begun in cols. 33.37–34.15 (= fr. 7 Acosta Méndez/Angeli)17 about the violent death of some figures as a result of unjust accusations and about the state of mind appropriate in these situations. They are unhappy about their death sentence because they do not practice Epicurean philosophy. Those who are aware that they have lived an upright and happy life, guided by reason, face death peacefully without worrying about whether the sentence is just or unjust. This attitude is possible because, in addition to the fact that they are unconcerned with what happens after death, they are mindful of sharing their fate with famous men who were themselves victims of such a misfortune. They are also comforted by the fact that their accusers will live forever troubled by the memory of their evil deeds. The following exemplum of three very famous men – Socrates, Zeno of Elea, and Anaxarchus – has been understood in various ways. On the basis of their reading ἃ γάρ, Acosta Méndez /Angeli proposed an intriguing yet unlikely hypothesis. According to these scholars, for Philodemus the exemplum enhances ordinary men who managed to maintain a virtuous conduct in the face of an unjust condemnation, though they are not wise. The comparison with these philosophers then has a topical value here: “In fact, Socrates, etc. (endured) this,” ἃ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης κτλ. The inclusion of these philosophers has no negative implications, as Blass’ supplement (Hayter) [ἔ]α at l. 31 could lead one to assume (“for one need not mention if Socrates […],” so Henry translates). Through these examples, Philodemus would have shown its argument, referring to a tradition that finds virtuous acts of bravery in Socrates, Zeno of Elea, and Anaxarchus.18

3.2 Philodemus on Anaxarchus as a flatterer of Alexander the Great The last testimonium from Herculaneum on Anaxarchus is transmitted in an uncertain book (PHerc. 1675) of Philodemus’ work entitled Περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσι καὶ περὶ ἅ, On Vices and the Opposite Virtues and Those in whom and Concerning what things they occur.19 The book’s subject is flattery (κολακεία).20 16 Cf. Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 238–240. 17 Acosta Méndez/Angeli (1992) 234–237. 18 Bücheler (1860) 292 (= [1915] 200–201). 19 I follow the reconstruction and the translation of the title proposed by Del Mastro (2014) 369–373. 20 Capasso (2001) and (2016).

480 

 Tiziano Dorandi

In cols. 4.34–5.9 of PHerc. 1675, Philodemus discusses the relationship between Alexander the Great and Anaxarchus (fr. 19a Dorandi = 72 A 7 [I] DK) and he quotes two episodes of the philosopher’s life, the second of which finds some parallels in Plutarch (Quaest. conv. 737a = fr. 19b Dorandi = 72 A 7 [II] DK) and Diogenes Laërtius (9.60 = fr. 19c Dorandi = 72 A 1 DK). Philodemus’ text has caught scholars’ attention since Gomperz21 published a first edition based on the drawings of the Collectio Altera and on the Oxonian apographs, but without an autopsy of the papyrus. Later, in his Vorsokratiker Diels supplemented the text in the section devoted to Anaxarchus’ fragments (72 A 7 DK) by taking into account the results from the review of the original manuscript that Crönert made.22 More recently, I have been involved in the restoration of the text on two occasions.23 Here, I uses Capasso’s reference edition,24 which I reproduce along with a brief apparatus and my translation:25 Col. 4

  οὐκ εἰκῆι δέ, ἀλλὰ συνπαρατιθεὶς ἐντέχ[ν]ως τῶ[ι] δ̣άκνοντι τὸ γλυκαῖ[ν]ον μίσ̣γων ἔπαινον [ἁ]δρότερον ἐλάττονι ψόγωι κα[ὶ] συνκατάθεσιν ἀντιλογίαι, [κ]α̣θάπερ τοῖς ὄ40 ξος οὐ προσιεμ[έ]νοις ὀξύ[με]λι δ̣[ιδ]όασί τινες [τ]ῶι γλυκεῖ δαψ[ι]λ̣εστέρωι χ[ρ]ώμενοι. τοιοῦτον [δ]ὲ καὶ τὸν Ἀνάξαρχον λέγουσιν· [ἀντει]πὼν γ[ὰρ Ἀ]λ[ε45 ξάν̣δ̣ρ̣ωι []τ̣ο̣[]κ̣ο[]ενε[]νη Col. 5  τοῦτο τοῖς ἀπὸ Διός· Διον̣υυ[σος μὲν γὰρ ἔχαιρε Σατύροις, Ἡρακλῆς δὲ Κέρκωψ[ι]ν· ἔστιν δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ διερεθισθεὶς μὲν ἐπίκρανεν, 35

21 Gomperz (1877) 471–475. 22 Crönert (1906) 187. 23 Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 494–496 and Dorandi (1994a) 28–29 (fr. 19a). 24 Capasso (2001) 191–192 (quotation from 191). 25 Unlike Capasso, in the app. crit. I mention neither cases where the new autopsy of the papyrus has fully or partially confirmed earlier scholars’ additions nor the reconstructions made obsolete by the new autopsy.

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

5

 481

ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μνησθεὶς ἐγλυκανεν, ὡς ὁ ῥηθεὶς βαλόντος αὐτὸν ὑβριστικώτερον ἐπα[ράμενο[ς] τὸ ποτήρ[ιον]· βεβλ̣ήσεταί τις θεῶν βροτησ[ί]α̣ι χερὶ

Col. 4 35 Gomperz || 36 γλυκαῖ[ν]ον Gargiulo (1981) 104 adn. 18 || 39–40 τοῖς ὄξος leg. Capasso : τοιοῦ|τος N O VH2 edd. || 40 ὀξύ[με]λι Capasso : ὀξύτ̣[ερα] Crönert || 41 Crönert || 44 Crönert || Col. 5 7 post ὑβριστικώτερον add. Diels || 8–9 Eur. Or. 271.

(...) not by chance, but having skilfully matched sweetness to bitterness, mixing immeasurable praise with a less excessive blame and approval with disapproval, as some people are able to give a mixture of vinegar and honey to those who do not accept vinegar by using a more generous amount of what is sweet. Anaxarchus too is said to be so: after having blamed Alexander (...) “(...) this [is typical] of Zeus’ offspring; in fact, Dionysos was pleased with Satyrs, Heracles with Cercopes.” Even sometimes, being indignant [Alexander], he became angry, but mindful of himself he sweetened, as when the aforementioned [Anaxarchus], when [Alexander] hit him with a little too much insolence, raising the cup [he said]: “One of [the] gods will be hit by a deadly hand.” The reading τοῖς ὄ|ξος οὐ προσιεμ[έ]νοις ὀξύ[με]λι (δ̣[ιδ]όασί τινες) in col. 4.39–40 makes the sense of the sentence clearer and more consistent with Philodemus’ earlier remark on the necessity of mixing bitterness and sweetness (col. 4.35–37: τῶ[ι] δ̣ά|κνοντι τὸ γλυκαῖ[ν]ον μίσ̣|γων). In the contrast ὄξος/ὀξύμελι there is an evident reference to a medical context. In fact, ὀξύμελι is a known mixture of vinegar (ὄξος) and honey used to treat certain pathologies. For those patients who refused to drink a potion of vinegar, the same results were obtained using ὀξύμελι. The text thus restored also presents a parallel – perhaps just incidental – with the famous verses of Lucretius’ De rerum natura (1.936–942) on honey spread around the rims of the cups containing absinthe so that the children, deceived by the honey’s sweetness, would drink it and derive from it the necessary health benefits.26 Philodemus refers to the exemplum of Anaxarchus’ behavior towards Alexander in order to explain the behavior of the κόλαξ towards powerful men and,

26 Sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes  | cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum  | contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore, | ut puerorum aetas inprovida ludificetur | labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum | absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur, | sed potius tali facto recreata valescat. Where absinthia taetra and amarum | absinthi laticem find a correspondence in ὄξος and mellis dulci flavoque liquor in ὀξύμελι of Philodemus’ text.

482 

 Tiziano Dorandi

in particular, the mixture of boundless praise with less excessive criticism and of approval with disapproval that characterizes the flatterer. A bothersome lacuna at the end of col. 4 (ll. 45–46) makes an accurate reconstruction of the text of the first exemplum difficult. We find an apparently different version of this exemplum in Plutarch (De adul. et am. 60b–c). Here the protagonist is not Anaxarchus, but the epic poet Agis of Argos (4th cent. BC), irritated and saddened because Alexander had offered gifts to a ridiculous man (SH 17): ὁμολογῶ, φησίν (sc. Aγις ὁ Ἀργεῖος), ἄχθεσθαι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁρῶν ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐκ Διὸς γεγονότας ἅπαντας ὁμοίως κόλαξιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ καταγελάστοις χαίροντας· καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλῆς Κέρκωψί τισι, καὶ Σειληνοῖς ὁ Διόνυσος ἐτέρπετο, καὶ παρὰ σοὶ τοιούτους ἰδεῖν ἔστιν εὐδοκιμοῦντας. I admit, he [sc. Agis of Argos] said, that I am suffering and am offended to see that you all, offspring of Zeus, appreciated the company of flatterers and ridiculous men. Indeed, Heracles enjoyed the company of some Cercopes and Dionysos of Sileni and therefore around you it is possible to see these gentlemen.

It is interesting to note that Arrian (Anab. 4.9.9 = fr. 25a Dorandi = 72 A 5 DK) mentions the same Agis alongside Anaxarchus with regard to the debate about Alexander’s proskynesis. The incomplete state of the Philodemus’ passage prevents us from understanding in what context Anaxarchus too, as Agis did, drew attention to Heracles, Cercopes, Dionysos, and the Satyrs/Sileni.27 What seems undisputed is the fact that Philodemus attributed this joke to Anaxarchus and not to Agis, as he derived his text from a different source than that of Plutarch: τοι|οῦτον [δ]ὲ καὶ τὸν Ἀνάξαρχον | λέγουσιν (col. 4.42–43). Anaxarchus’ joke maybe have been inspired from (or modelled, from a lost source, on) Agis’ reply to the Macedonian king, although in an entirely different context; perhaps in the debate on proskynesis, in which, according to Arrian’s account (Anab. 4.10.6 = fr. 25b Dorandi = 72 A 6 [I] DK), Anaxarchus alluded to Heracles and Dionysos regarding Alexander’s divine offspring: ἄρξαι δὲ τοῦ λόγου Ἀνάξαρχον, ὡς πολὺ δικαιότερον ἂν θεὸν νομιζόμενον Ἀλέξανδρον Διονύσου τε καὶ Ἡρακλέους, μὴ ὅτι τῶν ἔργων ἕνεκα ὅσα καὶ ἡλίκα καταπέπρακται Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι Διόνυσος μὲν Θηβαῖος ἦν, οὐδέν τι προσήκων Μακεδόσι, καὶ Ἡρακλῆς Ἀργεῖος, οὐδὲ οὗτος προσήκων ὅτι μὴ κατὰ γένος τὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου· κτλ. Anaxarchus starts speaking first [arguing] that Alexander was considered a god much more rightfully than Dionysοs and Heracles, not only because of the numerous and much bigger ventures that Alexander had undertaken, but also because Dionysοs, who was Theban, had nothing to do with the Macedonians and even Heracles, who was Argive, he had nothing to do (…)

27 Probably there is a reference to the paremiographical tradition that associates Heracles with Cercopes. See Zenob. Ath. 85 with the extremely rich commentary of Bühler (1999) 430–438.

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 483

If [ἀντει]πών by Crönert is correct, Anaxarchus would have reproached Alexander for something that unfortunately eludes us: ἀντει]πὼν γ[ὰρ Ἀ]λ[ε45  ξάν̣δ̣ρ̣ωι []τ̣ο̣[]κ̣ο]ενε[]νη On the basis of what he believed to read on the papyrus, Crönert completes the lacunae of ll. 45–46 as follows: δ[ιότι ἐπή]ρ[κ]ει τοῖς κό|λ̣[αξ]ιν, ἐπήινει [πάλιν· ἀλλὰ μ]ὴ[ν πρέπει]. His text was welcomed by Diels, who improved the wording by suggesting to integrate στέ]ρ[γ]ει instead of ἐπή]ρ[κ]ει in order to avoid a hiatus, according to Philodemus’ usus scribendi. The sense is this: “While [Anaxarchus] was criticizing Alexander because he had flatterers he loved, he praised him in turn [saying] ‘certainly this befits those who are Zeus’ sons, because Dionysos was pleased with Satyrs, Heracles with Cercopes’.” The traces Capasso read on the papyrus and that I here reproduced make this reconstruction, at least in part, impossible.28 However, it is likely that there was a discussion about flatterers (κόλακες), as Crönert suggested: τ̣ο̣[ῖς] κ̣ο|[λάξιν or τ̣ο̣[ὺς] κ̣ό|[λακας, nor should we rule out that ἐπ̣ή̣ινε[ι is hidden in ενε. Without a renewed autopsy of the papyrus, I would not dare go further. Finally, I reject Diels’ supplement because it seems unnecessary to me either for the meaning or for the syntax to add after ὑβριστικώτερον, (“when with a little too much insolence hit him , raising the cup: ‘one of the gods etc.’”) on the basis of the parallel with Plutarch (Quaest. conv. 737a = fr. 19b Dorandi = 72 A 7 [II] DK): καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος ὑπ᾽ Ἀλεξάνδρου μήλοις βαλλόμενος παρὰ δείπνου ἐπαναστὰς καὶ εἶπον· βεβλήσεταί (...) χερί, “And Anaxarchus, who during a banquet was repeatedly hit with fruits by Alexander, stood up and said: ‘One of the gods etc.’.” In this testimony, Philodemus negatively judges Anaxarchus as Alexander’s κόλαξ,29 as in the following part of col. 5 (ll. 25–32) Callisthenes of Olynthus is judged.30 However, we must not rule out that at least the second joke was interpreted, in the original version of the episode, rather as an example of Anaxarchus’ skill on certain occasions not to succumb to anger thanks to his subtle irony.31 In 28 In contrast to what De Falco (1926) 18 n. 4 writes: “un’attenta collazione dell’originale mi ha confermato le nuove lezioni del Crönert (…).” 29 Capasso (2001) 193–194 with a reference to Gargiulo (1981) 105 n. 25. 30 Capasso (2005). 31 Gomperz (1877) 472.

484 

 Tiziano Dorandi

turn, Philodemus could have deliberately (mis)understood it, in the context of his speech on κολακεία, as an expression of low flattery of Anaxarchus towards the Macedonian king.

4 Epicurus and Anaxarchus At least in these testimonia there is nothing that goes beyond (or against) the biographical tradition on the Democritean Anaxarchus’ literary production and especially his treatise Περὶ βασιλείας. Yet formerly I myself was tempted by the intriguing hypothesis that Philodemus’ interest in Anaxarchus, and especially in Anaxarchus’ relations with powerful men, should be interpreted as elements included in the Epicurean tradition. Therefore, it would appear “ragionevole ammettere che Epicuro non ignorò il trattato del democriteo Anassarco Sul regno, che anzi gli fornì materia di riflessione e stimolo ad una concezione approfondita del rapporto fra monarca e sapiente (…). In entrambi i filosofi è presente il rispetto per un re o per un potente e il disprezzo per un tiranno. La tirannide infatti negando ogni libertà, impedisce al saggio anche la franchezza nel parlare, che fu uno dei principi della vita di Anassarco ed uno dei capisaldi della filosofia di Epicuro e della comunità epicurea.”32 Today I must admit that this reading is untenable. This view has been supported by scholars, although not all relevant and persuasive, who have been persuaded by the previous reconstruction of Epicurus’ doctrine of kingship and his lost work Περὶ βασιλείας,33 and also by a clearer overview of Epicurean ‘political’ thinking.34 Furthermore – and for me this is the most important aspect – for a long time, I have been convinced that a suggested correction of a crucial section of Diogenes Laërtius’ Life of Epicurus, the keystone of the previous hypothesis, is not only useless, but also misleading.35 In the previous paper, by analysing the short testimony that Aelian (VH 4.14 = fr. 66 Dorandi = 72 B 2 DK) quotes from Anaxarchus’ work On Kingship:36

32 Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 494. 33 Fowler (1989) and McConnell (2010) 185–187 (with some significant additions). Tepedino Guerra (1991) 129–131 tries to defend the thesis of Gigante/Dorandi (1980), but parts still remain doubtful. 34 Especially in the studies of Roskam (2007), De Sanctis (2009), and McConnell (2010). 35 Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 483–487. Gigante (1992) 35–36 emphasizes the need of the correction, but without concrete evidence. 36 The name of Anaxarchus is an independent and certain conjecture of Hercher and Wilamowitz instead of the Anaxagoras of MSS. See Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 483–484 n. 13.

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 485

καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος ἐν τῷ Περὶ βασιλείας φησὶ χαλεπὸν χρήματα συναγείρασθαι, χαλεπώτερον δὲ φυλακὴν περιθεῖναι. And in On Kingship Anaxarchus states that it is difficult to collect wealth, but even more difficult to preserve it.

It was claimed that such a text “fornisce un importante indizio per supporre l’opera di Anassarco Sul regno quale modello, se non per il trattato Sul regno di Epicuro, almeno per la discussione del rapporto fra un monarca e il modo in cui un sapiente debba procurarsi i mezzi di vita.” Therefore, Anaxarchus would have connected the problem of χρήματα συναγείρασθαι, i.e. χρηματίζεσθαι, to the other, subsequent problem of the preservation of acquired wealth. On the basis of this insight, it had been suggested that the two Epicurean doxai transmitted one after the other by Diogenes Laërtius (10.121b = frs. 567 and 577 Us.) related to the Epicurean σοφός – χρηματίζεσθαί τε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας ἀπορήσαντα (“he will obtain money thanks only to philosophy when he is in trouble”) and καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεαραπεύσειν (“if it is necesssary he will court a monarch”) – should be connected. This fact would be confirmed if, within the first doxa, we correct ἀπορήσαντα of the paradosis in εὐπορήσαντα:37 [The wise man] will try to obtain the means to live, but taking it only from philosophy. And if it is necessary, he will court a monarch. He will express an intense joy when someone will have achieved a moral improvement.38

To this statement was also added the claim – more of an assumption than a proven argument – that the entire ἐκλογὴ τῶν ἠθικῶν δογμάτων transmitted by Diogenes Laërtius (10.117–121) consisted of some “nuclei coagulanti,”39 one of which devoted to the δόγματα χρηματιστικά that Epicurus had developed in his lost work Περὶ βασιλείας.40 I am not rejecting the conjecture εὐπορήσαντα and consequently the entire chain of hypotheses directly deriving from it out of some fetishistic reverence for the transmitted text. Rather, I believe that there are no truly cogent arguments to replace ἀπορήσαντα, which gives a convenient sense41 to a section of Book 10 of

37 Gigante (19762) 574 n. 94. 38 Diog. Laërt. 10.121b. To the first two doxai Gigante adds a third one, which immediately follows them: καὶ ἐπιχαρήσθαί τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι (= Epicur. fr. 592 Us.). 39 Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 486. 40 Gigante/Dorandi (1980) 486–487, from which the quotations are cited. 41 McConnell (2010) 185–186.

486 

 Tiziano Dorandi

Diogenes’ Lives that has so often troubled scholars and which, where necessary, has been corrected with good reasons and arguments.42

5 To conclude The previous pages represent what derived from an analysis of the limited and battered testimonia concerning Anaxarchus in the papyrological tradition. Both in the Egyptian papyrus and in fragments of Philodemus’ works found at Herculaneum, the focus is exclusively on two aspects of Anaxarchus’ biographical tradition: the fearless bravery of the philosopher in the face of the cruel death inflicted on him by Nicocreon, the tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, and his flattering attitude toward Alexander the Great. On the contrary, we learn nothing about his thinking or his literary and philosophical production. The papyrological evidence is scanty and does not allow us sarcire mutila through fanciful hypotheses that lead (or have led) scholars to interpret oscura per obscuroria.

References Acosta/Angeli (1992): Eduardo Acosta Méndez and Anna Angeli, Filodemo: Testimonianze su Socrate, Naples. Bernard (1984): Paul Bernard, “Le philosophe Anaxarque et le roi Nicocréon de Salamine”, in: JS 1–2, 3–49. Bett (2000): Richard Bett, Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy, Oxford. Blass (1886): Friedrich W. Blass, Rev. of Scott (1885), in: GGA 13, 537–540. Brunschwig (1993): Jacques Brunschwig, “The Anaxarchus’ Case: An Essay on Survival”, in: PBA 81, 59–88. Bücheler (1860): Franz Bücheler, “Coniectanea critica”, in: RhM 15, 289–296 [= Id., Kleine Schriften I, Leipzig/Berlin 1915, 198–204]. Bühler (1999): Winfried Bühler, Zenobii Athoi proverbia, vol. 5, Göttingen. Capasso (2001): Mario Capasso, “Les livres sur la flatterie dans les De vitiis de Philodème”, in: Clara Auvray-Assayas and Daniel Delattre (eds.), Cicéron et Philodème : La polémique en philosophie, Paris, 179–194. Capasso (2005): Mario Capasso, “L’intellettuale e il suo re (Filodemo, L’adulazione, PHerc. 1675, col. V 21–32)”, in: SEP 2, 47–52. Capasso (2016): Mario Capasso, “Considerazioni sul De vitiis di Filodemo”, in: Angelo Casanova, Gabriella Messeri and Rosario Pintaudi (eds.), E sì d’amici pieno: Omaggio di studiosi italiani a Guido Bastianini per il suo settantesimo compleanno, Florence, 187–194.

42 Lapini (2015) 148–173.

16 Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum 

 487

Clayman (2009): Dee L. Clayman, Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into Poetry, Berlin/New York. De Falco (1926): Vittorio De Falco, “Appunti sul περὶ κολακείας di Filodemo (Pap. erc. 1675)”, in: RIGI 10, 15–26. De Sanctis (2009): Dino De Sanctis, “Il filosofo e il re: Osservazioni sulla Vita Philonidis (PHerc. 1044)”, in: CErc 39, 107–118. Del Mastro (2014): Gianluca Del Mastro, Titoli e annotazioni bibliologiche nei papiri greci di Ercolano, Naples.

Diels (1886): Hermann Diels, Rev. of Mekler (1885), in: DLZ 7, 1595. Dorandi (1989): Tiziano Dorandi, “11 Anaxarchus, 1T”, in: CPF I.1*, 169. Dorandi (1994a): Tiziano Dorandi, “I frammenti di Anassarco di Abdera”, in: AATC 59, 9–60. Dorandi (1994b): Tiziano Dorandi, “De Zénon d’Elée à Anaxarque. Fortune d’un topos litteraire”, in: Lucien Jerphagnon, Jaqueline Lagrée and Daniel Delattre (eds.), Ainsi parlaient les Anciens : Mélanges in honorem Jean-Paul Dumont, Lille, 27–37. Dorandi (1995): Tiziano Dorandi, “Novità su Anassarco”, in: Prometheus 21, 253–255. Fowler (1989): Don P. Fowler, “Lucretius and Politics”, in: Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, Oxford, 120–150. Gargiulo (1981): Tristano Gargiulo, “PHerc. 222: Filodemo sull’adulazione”, in: CErc 11, 103–127. Gigante (19762): Marcello Gigante, Diogene Laerzio: Vite dei filosofi, Rome/Bari (1st ed. 1962). Gigante (1992): Marcello Gigante, Cinismo e Epicureismo, Naples. Gigante/Dorandi (1980): Marcello Gigante and Tiziano Dorandi, “Anassarco e Epicuro Sul regno”, in: Francesco Romano (ed.), Democrito e l’atomismo antico, Catania, 479–497. Gomperz (1877): Theodor Gomperz, “Anaxarch und Kallisthenes”, in: Commentationes Philologae in honorem Theodori Mommseni scripserunt amici, Berlin, 471–480. Gronewald (1978): Michael Gronewald, “Prosaanthologie: Tapferkeit vor dem Tod”, in: ZPE 28, 278–280. Henry (2009): W. Benjamin Henry, Philodemus: On Death, Atlanta. Lapini (2015): Walter Lapini, L’Epistola a Erodoto e il Bios di Epicuro in Diogene Laerzio: Note testuali, esegetiche e metodologiche, Rome. Mekler (1885): Siegfried Mekler, “Φιλοδήμος Περὶ θανάτου Δ, Philodemos Ueber den Tod, viertes Buch”, in: SAWW (philos.-hist. Kl.) 110, 305–354. McConnell (2010): Sean Mc Connell, “Epicureans on Kingship”, in: PCPhS 56, 178–195. Priest (1978): Nancy E. Priest, “A Moral Treatise with Exempla”, in: ZPE 31, 61–69. Roskam (2007): Geert Roskam, Live Unnoticed: On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine, Leiden/Boston. Scott (1885): Walter Scott, Fragmenta Herculanensia: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oxford Copies of the Herculanean Rolls, together with the Texts of Several Papyri, accompanied by Facsimiles, Oxford. Tepedino Guerra (1991): Adele Tepedino Guerra, “Filosofia e società a Roma”, in: CErc 21, 125–132.

Part VII: The Sophistic Movement

Andrei Lebedev

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus, A Sophistic Treatise on the Origin of Religion and Language: A Case for Prodicus of Ceos Εἰς μνήμην τοῦ σοφοῦ καὶ φιλομούσου Martin L. West

1 (I) Preliminary remarks Since the very possibility of establishing the author of the Derveni Papyrus (hereafter PDerv.) has been questioned in the official editio princeps,1 we are obliged 1 Habent sua fata not only libelli, but also conference papers. The original version of this paper under the title The Derveni Treatise as a Document of Sophistic Atheism was presented at the international conference on the Derveni Papyrus held at Princeton University on April 25th, 1993 during my Perkins fellowship granted by the Council of Humanities of Princeton University: cf. Sider (1997) 129 n. 2. It was not included in the proceedings published later. I decided to wait for the publication of the official editio princeps of the papyrus (KPT) in order to verify the supplements I proposed, but this took quite a while. In the meantime, as a result of the change of platforms between Mac and PC, the Greek in my paper became unreadable; eventually, it was restored by the Institute of Linguistic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg (thanks are due to Nikolai Kazansky and Evgeniia Kriuchkova). I have benefited from several discussions of my hypothesis. During my fellowship in All Souls College, Oxford (1995–1996) I was invited by Richard Janko to present my ‘atheistic’ interpretation of PDerv. at his seminar in the Institute of Classical Studies, London on June 7th, 1996. Additional recent research was stimulated by the invitation to give a lecture, The Derveni Papyrus and Greek Enlightenment, at the Department of Classics of New York University on November 3rd, 2016 (thanks are due to David Sider, Mirjam Kotwick, and other colleagues who took part in the discussion) and by the participation at the International Workshop Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition, University of Trier, September 22nd–24th, 2016, organized by Christian Vassallo. Thanks are due to Valeria Piano for discussing with me on this occasion the possibility of some readings in PDerv., col. IV.6. All remaining faults are mine. The documentary apparatus of this investigation relies on innumerable TLG searches. Special thanks are due to Maria Pantelia who year after year provided me with immediate assistance whenever I experienced problems with access to the TLG. And last but not least, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Christian Vassallo both for his patient and accurate revision of the entire text with footnotes and bibliography, and for sharing with me his philosophical objections (above all on the question of Prodicus’ ‘atheism’) and several Andrei Lebedev, University of Crete / Russian Academy of the Sciences, Moscow https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-018

492 

 Andrei Lebedev

first of all to explain why we dare to take a different approach to this problem.2 The attribution of classical texts (whether anonymous or disputed) is one of the commonly recognized tasks of classical philology, from ancient times on. Callimachus, in his Catalogues (Pinakes), provided information on the authenticity and authorship of the books he described. Therefore, to dismiss a limine all attempts to establish the author of the text under discussion (as well as of any other anonymous text) is counterproductive. Some attributions remain questionable and are accepted by few or by none (like those discussed in § [F] below), while some are taken for certain and recognized by everybody or by most, e.g. Timotheus’ Persai or Aristotle’s Athenaion politeia. Questionable or unlikely attributions are based on insufficient evidence, superficial similarities, etc. We can take an attribution seriously only when it is based on precise and unambiguous evidence, above all on verbatim quotations from the anonymous text in ancient authors with a direct mention of the author’s name. Apart from the verbatim quotations, references to particular ideas, tenets, theories, etc. attested in the anonymous text and attributed by an external source to a certain writer (as well as his interests, specific subjects, literary habits, methodology, etc.) will also count as evidence, with the proviso that they are not too common and widespread, but rather peculiar (and best of all unique) to the supposed author. The attribution of PDerv. to Prodicus proposed in this article meets these requirements: it is based on verbal coincidences of peculiar phrases and terms in PDerv. and Prodicus’ fragments; Prodicus’ peculiar theory of the origin of the names of gods and religion from agriculture and other τέχναι ‘useful’ for human race is directly attested in PDerv.; there is also the evidence found in both Aristophanes and Themistius that Prodicus wrote an allegorical interpretation of the Orphic theogony. The demonstration of our thesis is presented in 11 sections (§) and three appendices (App.). After preliminary remarks on the necessary distinction of the two types of pantheism and allegoresis in Greek thought (§ [I]) we define in § (II) the literary genre, the general purpose, and the hermeneutical method of the Derveni treatise, and draw a preliminary intellectual portrait of its author describing his peculiar features, a kind of ‘composite image.’ In § (III), we argue for Prodicus as the author of PDerv. and present the 19 testimonia on which this attribution is based.3 These include both the verbatim quotations with Prodicus’ name that find an exact correspondence in the text of PDerv. (hereafter Derv.T) papyrological remarks. Unless otherwise specified, the translations of the Greek texts quoted below are my own. 2 Th. Kouremenos ap. KPT, 58–59. The skeptical attitude is shared by Betegh (2004) 349 and Kotwick (2017) 22, among others. We cite Janko’s new text from Kotwick (2017). 3 To these testimonia, the evidence of Xenophon in App[endix] (3) should be added.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 493

and the common peculiar features of language and style. In § (IV), we propose a reconstruction and interpretation of the text of col. IV that contains a quotation from Heraclitus. This column is of primary importance for understanding the aims and allegorical method of the author in general, as well as for his theory of names. In § (V), the problems of the original title and the date of the Derveni treatise are addressed, as well as its relation to the psephisma of Diopeithes (432 BC). In § (VI), the philosophical sources of Derv.T are discussed. Apart from the Anaxagorean source of the Derveni author’s cosmology and theory of matter recognized long ago, we discuss the possible influence of Democritus while dismissing Leucippus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and the Eleatics. We point to Protagoras as an important source of anthropology for the Derveni author and to Heraclitus as the source of his philosophy of language (including functionalist semantics) and criticism of popular religion. In § (VII), we briefly present our reasons for rejecting the ascription of PDerv. to other authors (Epigenes, Stesimbrotos, Euthydemus, Diagoras of Melos). § (VIII) expands the discussion of Prodicus’ atheistic sobriquet ‘Tantalos’ in § (III) by focusing on two cryptic Tantalos passages in Euripides’ Orestes. Taking the torture of Anaxagoras before his trial as a historical fact (which the new reconstruction of Philodemus’ account by Eduardo Acosta Méndez has brought to light, and which Christian Vassallo confirms in this volume, DAPR, T7), we interpret the tortures of Tantalos as an allusion to Anaxagoras’ trial, a cryptic commemoration of the 20th anniversary of his death, and a makarismos of the heroic martyr of science, analogous to Euripides’ cryptic commemoration of Protagoras’ death in Ixion. § (IX) searches for further reflections of the ‘avian’ theme (ὀρνίθειον in PDerv., cols. ΙΙ and VI) in Aristophanes’ Birds and Clouds.4 It starts with the attribution of a neglected comedy fragment in the Suda Lexicon to Aristophanes’ Seasons and connects the comic passages in the Clouds on ἀλεκτρυών with Prodicus’ orthoepeia. The passage on ‘Persian cock’ as a prehistoric king in Birds 481–492 is interpreted as a parody of Prodicus’ theory of the origin of religion and civilization. § (X) discusses three ‘Heraclitizing’ passages (apart from col. IV) in cols. V, XX, and XXII, and arrives at the conclusion that cols. V and XX contain either hidden verbatim quotations from Heraclitus or

4 Janko (2016) 21–22 questions the reading ὀ [ρ]νίθ  [ε]ιον πρότερον [ in col. VI.11 (KPT) and proposes φ[ο]ρτίον πρότερον [ἀείρει. This does not fit the context: the connection with prothysia is lost, ἕνεκ[εν becomes pointless, and what is meant by the “labouring souls” remains unclear. On the contrary, the reading ὀ[ρ]νίθ[ε]ιον (KPT) or ὀρνίθ ιον (Ferrari, followed by Piano) provides an immediate link with the air-cosmogony and with prothysia: first offerings are due to the air, the most ancient ‘god’. On the expression ὀρνίθειον κρέας see also Ferrari (2007) 204. But even if the reading ὀ[ρ]νί θ[ε]ιον is by any chance incorrect, this will not affect our study of the ‘avian’ parodies of Prodicus in Aristophanes (cf. § [IX]).

494 

 Andrei Lebedev

paraphrases close to the original text with authentic terms and phrases, whereas col. XXII contains a summarizing exposition of Heraclitus’ philosophy of language and religion (the invention of polytheism by poets due to their ‘ignorance’). In § (XI), the hypothesis that Euripides may have taken with him to Macedonia a copy of Prodicus’ work on religion, since he quotes it in the Bacchae on which he worked at that time, is advanced. A copy of it may have been made for the library of Archelaus in Pella. In App. (1) we defend the traditional 5th cent. date and the Preplatonic character of PDerv. in response to Luc Brisson’s Stoic hypothesis. App. (2) clarifies our use of the term peritrope and explains the Derveni treatise as a naturalistic peritrope of a religious text. App. (3) identifies a neglected reflection of Prodicus’ benefaction theory of religion in Xenophon’ Memorabilia with parallels from PDerv. We distinguish the terms Derveni Papyrus (PDerv.) and Derveni Treatise (Derv.T). The Derveni Papyrus is a document which we quote by the column and line of the official edition (KPT). By the Derveni Treatise we mean the original Sophistic text of the 5th cent. BC which can be reconstructed on the basis both of the extant columns of PDerv. and other testimonia discussed in § (III) which partly supplement our knowledge of the lost integral text. The Derveni treatise is a kind of reconstructed ‘archetype’ of which the extant PDerv. is the best and most important preserved ‘manuscript.’ In our opinion, the Derveni Papyrus has been often misread and misunderstood for six main reasons. (1) First, because the papyrus was falsely labeled as ‘Orphic’ in the very first report.5 (2) Second, because another misleading label – ‘Presocratic’ – was soon after that attached to its author.6 (3) Third, because the rhetorical/grammatical terms of the Derveni author τὰ κοινά καὶ τὰ ἴδια (sc. ὀνόματα or ῥήματα) that provide a clue for understanding his theory of language and the origin of religion have been misunderstood as alleged ‘echoes’ of Heraclitus’ own terminology. (4) Fourth, because of the failure to distinguish between two types of pantheism in early Greek thought, the naturalistic and the ethico-religious. (5) Fifth, because of the failure to distinguish between two types of allegoresis of myth: constructive (friendly and apologetical in purpose) and deconstructive (polemical or atheistic). (6) And, last but not least, the widespread (after Tsantsanoglou [1997]) misinterpretation of πάριμεν in PDerv., col. V as an alleged indication of the author’s religious profession. Mistake (1) is addressed in § (II), mistake (3) in § (IV), mistake (5) in § (II), mistake (6) in § (XI) below. Here is a brief explanation of what we mean by mistakes (2) and (4).

5 Kapsomenos (1964). 6 Burkert (1968).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 495

We have on different occasions since 1989 criticized the term ‘Presocratic/ Presocratics’ both for its chronological incongruities (if Presocratics were philosophers of the 6th and 5th centuries BC, then was Socrates ‘Presocratic’?) and for its physicalist bias that has led to the serious misunderstanding of Western Greek idealist metaphysics (Pythagoreans and Eleatics) and to the no less serious distortion of the general picture of what happened in early Greek thought before 400 BC.7 The Derveni Papyrus is a remarkable case at point: it provides a clear example of how this artificial and misleading modern term can bewilder scholars because of its surreptitious ‘interference’ with authentic ancient terms. Sophists knew that they were σοφισταί, the Pythagoreans knew that they were Πυθαγόρειοι, but Presocratics did not know that they were ‘Presocratics’ (and fortunately so). Ancient sophists like Protagoras and Prodicus were contemporaries of the so-called ‘Presocratics’ like Anaxagoras or Archelaus and held very similar doctrines about nature and the cosmos. But although they are included in Diels’ edition of Vorsokratiker, the sophists are usually not referred to by this term: since ‘Presocratics’ are thought to be cosmologists and physikoi, and sophists are not, the latter are commonly treated as a special group of ‘Sophists.’ That is why scholars, misguided by the label ‘Presocratic,’ turned away from the most obvious and promising group of candidates for the authorship of PDerv., viz. the Ionian Sophists. In our opinion, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of pantheism in early Greek thought. Both rely on the equation deus = natura, but interpret it in a different way: naturalistic pantheism reduces god to nature, while ethicoreligious pantheism reduces nature to god. Ethico-religious pantheism is ethically relevant: the ubiquity and omniscience of god is interpreted as a moral command of timor Domini and a warning “I am watching you!” Naturalistic pantheism is akin to deism and may have been perceived by ordinary Greeks as asebeia and

7 Cf. Lebedev (1989a) and (2009), where one can find a summary of my views. A defence of the ancient (and modern ante-Burnet) idealist interpretation of the metaphysics of Parmenides and the Pythagoreans is in Lebedev (2017b) and (2017c), respectively. The validity of the term ‘Presocratiсs’ has been, with good reasons, questioned by S. Luria starting from the 1920’s (see Luria [1970] 5 ff.) and by A. Long in his preface to The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Phi­ losophy (Long [1999]). Late M. West, after reading with approval my paper in Lebedev (2009) replied: “What you say about the Presocratics corresponds to what I have always thought. Forty-six years ago I wrote (CQ 17, 1967, 1 n. 2): “The term ‘Presocratics’ has so established itself that we should greatly inconvenience ourselves by abandoning it now. But it has two grave disadvantages: it exaggerates the effect of Socrates; and it lumps together an assortment of people, priests, doctors, vagabond poets, experimental physicists, whose methods and intentions were very various, and implies that they were somehow united in a common search.” (letter from March 2nd, 2013).

496 

 Andrei Lebedev

atheism. When Aristotle ascribes to “Anaximander and most of the physiologi” the doctrine of infinite matter as to theion, he is referring to naturalistic pantheism. Anaximander may have described his “boundless nature” (φύσις ἄπειρος) with ‘divine’ epithets like “eternal and ageless” (ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγήρως) in order to emphasize that it is eternal and indestructible, but he hardly prayed to it or to the cosmogonical vortex it produced.8 The pantheistic thesis “all full of gods” (πάντα πλήρη θεῶν), as Aristotle ascribed to Thales (De an. 1.5.411a7), is related to his pampsychism (ψυχὴν μεμῖχθαι ἐν τῷ παντί). Thales probably proved this thesis by adducing empirical evidence (tekmeria, Diog. Laërt. 1.24), such as the attractive force of magnet and amber. Even if Thales regarded these forces as ‘divine,’ it is doubtful that he ever prayed to them or feared their wrath. This is naturalistic pantheism. A classical example of an ethically relevant religious pantheism is the Orphic Hymn to Zeus that followed the kataposis scene and the absorption of the Protogonos by Zeus in the Orphic theogony. Naturalistic pantheism is of Ionian origin; ethico-religious pantheism (Orphic and Pythagorean) has Italian roots. In Xenophanes’ monotheistic poem, god “sees as a whole, perceives as whole, hears as whole” (21 B 24 DK = Xen 86 Strobel/Wöhrle), and according to another fragment quoted by Philoponus, nothing escapes his notice, not even a hidden thought in the heart of a man.9 The Derveni author perfectly understood the difference between these two types of pantheism. He definitely does not believe that the ‘air’ that we inhale monitors our thoughts and will punish our sins in Hades. In a brilliant polemical peritrope10 he substitutes the Ionian naturalistic pantheism for the Western Greek ‘Orphic’ ethico-religious pantheism (see App. [2] below).

2 (II) The purpose, literary genre, and the hermeneutical method of the Derveni treatise It has been thought that the Derveni author is quoting Orphic verses because he is interested in Orphic religious doctrine, or because he was an Orphic initiate or even an Orphic priest (Orpheotelestes), diviner, or a religious specialist himself. In 8 Against the authenticity of the term τὸ ἄπειρον, cf. Lebedev (1978); mechanistic physics, Lebedev (1988); vortex in cosmogony, Lebedev (2016) 597–598. 9 Philop. De aet. mund. 582.24 Rabe: πάντα θεοῦ πλήρη, πάντηι δ᾽ οἵ εἰσι ἀκουαί / καὶ διὰ πετράων καὶ ἀνὰ χθόνα, καί τε δι᾽ αὐτοῦ / ὅττι κέκευθεν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόημα. Attribution to Xenophanes: cf. Lebedev (1985a). 10 On the meaning of peritrope as polemical device see App. (2) below.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 497

order to understand these Orphic verses in light of some strange remarks the author makes about mysteries, it has been suggested that he is an ‘enlightened’ Orphic writing for a local Orphic community and trying to reconcile Ionian philosophy with Orphic faith. From the Greek point of view, the Derveni author quotes not ‘Orphic poetry,’ but a ἱερὸς λόγος. Classical authors avoid quoting Orpheus’ verses verba­ tim, which is why the bulk of the extant fragments comes from late antiquity, when the Neoplatonists made the Orphic theogony a Hellenic Bible. It is impossible to explain col. XX simply as a criticism of superstition, by comparing it, say, with Hippocratic De morbo sacro 2. The Hippocratic doctor does not attack the public cult. The Derveni author does. In col. XX, he makes derogatory and blasphemic remarks full of mockery and sarcasm about the mystery cults. The τέχνην ποιούμενοι τὰ ἱερά are first of all the Orpheotelestes who charged fees for the rites of initiation. How could an ‘Orphic’ priest or an initiate ridicule his own profession and faith? It has been rightly pointed out that his interest in Orphic poetry is neither grammatical nor philological.11 He does not seem to be interested in the text of Orphic theogony as such. He is not an allegorist in the usual sense of the word, either. Main-stream philosophical allegorism from Theagenes on has been usually apologetic in purpose. The purpose of an allegorical interpretation is to construct a coherent referential subtext that will exist side-by-side with the ‘surface’ text without destroying it, and that even ‘saves’ it.12 The Derveni author does exactly the reverse: he systematically destroys myths. He does this not because he is an unskilled or bad interpreter, but because this is the purpose of his work. He therefore is not an awkward allegorist, but an intelligent and skillful irreligious rationalist. His allegorical interpretation of the Orpheus’ theology, similar to the naturalistic meteoroleschia in Aristophanes’ Clouds and the physical gods-elements of the philosophers mocked by Epicharmus,13 belongs to the deconstructive type. An example of deconstructive naturalistic allegoresis of the Orphic theogony is provided by the sixth Homilia of the ps.­Clementina.14 The Christian apologists who reduced the Hellenic gods to the elements and natural phenomena did not want ‘to save’ them; their purpose was to exterminate them, to dismiss them as ‘just a cloud.’ Their method was anticipated by Xenophanes.15 Heraclitus’ use of

11 According to West (1983) 190, the author’s interest in the Orphic text “is wholly philosophical, not philological.” 12 Brisson (2004). 13 Lebedev (2017d). 14 See test. 19 in § (III) below. 15 21 B 32 DK (= Xen 344 Strobel/Wöhrle): ἥν τ᾽ Iριν καλέουσι, νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε, / πορφύρεον καὶ φοινίκεον καὶ χλωρὸν ἰδέσθαι. This comes from a series of demythologized pseudo-gods of the poets.

498 

 Andrei Lebedev

etymological allegory and of functionalist semantics may have been deconstructive with regard of the anthropomorphic polytheism of the poets, but by no means atheistic, since it was only a prelude to the new ethico-religious monotheism.16 The same holds true for the Stoics, although they may have been less iconoclastic than Heraclitus. Some sophists (Protagoras and Prodicus) may have mistaken Heraclitus for an atheist. The Derveni author is interested not so much in Orphic poetry, as in Orpheus himself. It is the figure of Orpheus in Derv.T that reveals the personality of the author and gives a key to understanding the purpose of his book. Orpheus in Derv.T is first of all a σοφὸς ἀνήρ of time immemorial, a prehistoric sage who invented religion and established the sacred rites (teletai). Secondly, he is the Onomatothetes who first established the divine names. Thirdly, he is an ἀρχαῖος φυσιολόγος who knew τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων. The text of the Orphic theogony is used in Derv.T only as historical evidence for the reconstruction of Orpheus’ work and philosophy as well as of the original religion of primitive people. Like poetry, rituals also preserve the original wisdom of Orpheus. The third class of evidence used by the Derveni author are proverbial expressions, taken as ‘remnants’ of ancient wisdom.17 This image of a prehistoric rationalist philosοpher who replaces traditional Greek culture heroes and divine πρῶτοι εὑρεταί is unmistakably Sophistic. ‘Orpheus’ in Derv.T may be compared with the σοφὸς ἀνήρ of the play Sisyphus (probably by Critias) who invented religion;18 with Cheiron the centaur in Euripides’ Melanippe the Wise, a prehistoric astronomer and Anaxagorean philosopher;19 with Heracles the ancient μάντις καὶ φυσικός 16 See Vassallo (2017a) and infra. 17 On the idea that the proverbs are ‘survivals’ of the ancient wisdom, cf. Arist. fr. 13 Rose (= Synes. Calvit. enc. 22.85c). 18 88 B 25 DK (= Sext. Emp. Math. 9.54). 19 Clem. Al. Strom. 1.73.2–3: ὁ δὲ Βηρύτιος Ἕρμιππος Χείρωνα τὸν Κένταυρον σοφὸν καλεῖ κτλ. Clement’s passage can be summarised as follows: just as according to Herodorus of Heraclea (fr. 13 Fowler), Heracles was a seer and a physical scientist (μάντις and φυσικός) who took over from Atlas (another scientist and astronomer) the knowledge of the heavenly bodies allegorically interpreted as pillars of the cosmos (κίονες τοῦ κόσμου), so, according to Hermippus of Berytus (FGrHistCont 1061 F 7), Cheiron was also an ancient astronomer and philosopher. From Cheiron, physical science (φυσικὴ θεωρία) passed to his daughter Hippo, who, in turn, taught it to Aeolus, a meteorologist ‘mastering’ the winds by the power of his knowledge. Two poets are cited as μαρτύρια of this remarkable construction: Titanomachia fr. 11 Bernabé and Euripides’ Melanippe the Wise, fr. 481 TrGF (Kannicht). Hippo/Hippe is the mother of Melanippe who expounds an Anaxagorean cosmogony in Eur. fr. 484 TrGF (Kannicht): cf. Anaxag. 59 A 1, A 62, and B 1 DK, and infra. It is therefore conceivable that Cheiron the physiologos derives from a 5th cent. ‘Anaxagorizing’ interpretation known to Euripides. The phraseology of Melanippe’s logos is strikingly similar to PDerv., col. XV.2 (χωρισθέντα διαστῆναι δίχ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐόντα). Cf. Lebedev (1998) 3–10.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 499

in Herodorus of Heraclea;20 and, last but not least, with Orpheus as an ancient philosopher and onomatothetes in Plato’s Cratylus who runs a philosophical school of his own (οἱ περὶ Ὀρφέα). The attention to hyperbaton in the exegesis of poets is a technique that Plato associates with Protagoras.21 The Derveni author takes the Sophistic antithesis of nomos and physis for granted and he is apparently a specialist in the linguistic science of ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων. Even his physical doctrine is Sophistic: he makes use of Anaxagorean physics, as modified by Archelaus (and possibly Democritus), who may be considered the father of the Kulturgeschichte. In his Περὶ φύσεως, Ionian cosmogony was for the first time supplemented by an archaeologia that discussed the origin of nomoi and of human language.22 The Derveni author’s theory of names is of primary importance for understanding his hermeneutical method and his theory of the origin of religion. It is based on the distinction between τὰ ἴδια and τὰ κοινὰ ὀνόματα or ῥήματα (see § [IV] below). Orpheus, who clearly saw the philosophical truth, decided, for some reason, not to reveal it to the polloi and therefore expressed it in enigmatic poetry (αἰνι[γμ]ατώδης col. VII.5 and αἰνίζεται passim). Presumably, he did the same when he established the sacred rites. Instead of using plain words in common language – the κοινὰ ὀνόματα – Orpheus obscured his message with ‘idiomatic’ or ‘peculiar’ words, τὰ ἴδια. The ‘peculiar’ words were partly invented by Orpheus himself – these are the divine personal names. In some cases, however, Orpheus used existing words of the current language of his time,23 but gave them unusual meaning – these correspond to what we call ‘metaphors’. The noun μεταφορά in a rhetorical sense is not attested before Isocrates and Aristotle; both the Derveni author and Epigenes (who wrote on τὰ ἰδιάζοντα παρ᾽ Ὀρφεῖ, i.e. on metaphorical or allegorical expressions) use a more archaic 5th-cent. terminology.24 The author of Derv.T pretends to know the secret code for the correct reading of this prototext of human civilization created by Orpheus col. ΙΧ.2–3: οἱ δὲ οὐ γινώσκον[τες] | τὰ λεγό[μεν]α; col. XΧΙΙΙ.2: τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσιν). His task is to retranslate the “peculiar expessions into common,” τὰ ἴδια into τὰ κοινά: this 20 See the quotation from Clement in the previous footnote. Herodorus of Heraclea wrote τὴν Ὀρφέως καὶ Μουσαίου ἱστορίαν (fr. 12 Fowler) and distinguished two Orpheuses and seven Heracleses. According to this history, Orpheus was recommended to Jason by Cheiron (fr. 43 Fowler), whereas Heracles did not sail with the Argonauts at all (fr. 41 Fowler). Herodorus knew Anaxagoras’ theory of the moon as a ‘celestial earth’ and used it in his science-fiction work about Selenites (fr. 21 Fowler). Can he be the author of Cheiron the astronomer story as well? 21 Pl. Prt. 339a ff. 22 60 A 1; A 2; A 4.6 DK. 23 PDerv., col. XIX.9: ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὀνομάτων. 24 Cf. Clem. Al. Strom. 5.49 (= OF 407 + 1128).

500 

 Andrei Lebedev

philological technique serves the historical reconstruction of the religious beliefs of the ‘ancients’ and their subsequent transformations. We will call this method ‘linguistic archaeology.’ Here is the list of correspondences with ‘translations’ from the prehistoric mythopoetic Greek into plain prose, a kind of glossary of the divine names and metaphorical expressions in the theogony of Orpheus: ΙΔΙΑ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ to ΚΟΙΝΑ (ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΑ) ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ (ΡΗΜΑΤΑ) 1. ἀήρ from αἰωρεῖσθαι (col. XVII.3–4); 2. ἄδυτον Νυκτός = βάθος Νυκτός (col. XI.2–3); 3. αἰδοῖον = ἥλιος (cols. XIII.9 and XVI.1); 4. ἀλκὴν καὶ δαίμονα = θερμόν (col. IX.4); θάλψιν (col. IX.7); 5. ἀρχὸν (…) | [ὅτι πάντα ἄρ]χεται διὰ [τοῦτον (col. XIX.14–15); 6. Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία = Ζεύς = ἀφροδισιάζειν = θόρνυσθαι = Πειθώ = Ἁρμονία (col. XXI.5–7); 7. ἀφροδισιάζειν = γυναικὶ μίσγεσθαι (col. XXI.6 ff.); 8. Ἀχελῶιος = ὕδωρ (col. ΧΧΙΙΙ.12); 9. βασιλεὺς = ἀρχή (col. XIX.11–12); 10. Γῆ νόμωι (col. XXII.8); 11. δαίμων from δαίω “to burn,” hence πῦρ = ἥλιος (col. IX.4–5); 12. Δημήτηρ = Γῆ Μήτηρ (col. XXII.10); 13. Δηιὼ ὅτι ἐδηϊ[ώθ]η ἐν τῆι μείξει (col. XXII.13); 14. Δία = διά (col. XIX.15); 15. Δία = δίνη (col. XVIII.1 ff.); 15. Ἐρινύες = ψυχαὶ τιμωροί = ποιναί (col. VI.4–5); 16. Εὐμενίδες = ψυχαί = ἀήρ (?) (col. VI.9–10); 17. εὐρὺ ῥέοντα = μέγα δυνατοῦντα because of μεγάλους ῥυῆναι (col. XXIII.6–10); 18. Zεύς = νοῦς (col. XVI.10); 19. Ζεύς = ἀήρ (cols. XVII.4–5 and XXIII.3); 20. κεφαλή = ἀρχή, μέσσα = κάτω φερόμενα κτλ. (col. XVII.12–14); 21. Κρόνος = κρούων Νοῦς (col. XIV.7); 22. Μή τηρ δ’ ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης πάντα γ[ίν]εται (col. ΧΧΙΙ.8); 23. Μήτηρ = Νοῦς = Ζεύς = ἀήρ (col. XXVI.1 ff.); 24. μητρὸς ἑᾶς = Νοῦς ἀγαθός (col. XXVI.2–12); 25. Μοῖρα Διός = πνεῦμα (col. XVIII.2); ἀήρ (col. XIX.3); 26. Μοῖρα = φρόνησις θεοῦ (sc. Διός) (col. XVIII.7 ff.); 27. Μοῖραν ἐπικλῶσαι = φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶσαι (col. XIX.4–5); 28. Ὄλυμπος = χρόνος (col. XII.3); 29. Οὐρανός = ὁρίζων (χωρίζων) = νοῦς (?) (col. XIV.12–13);

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 501

30. πανομφεύουσαν = πάντα διδάσκουσαν because φωνεῖν = λέγειν = διδάσκειν (col. X.9–10); 31. πατήρ = ἰσχυρότατον (sc. πῦρ vel θερμόν) (col. IX.1–2). Hence παρὰ πατρὸς ἑοῦ = “from the strongest part of his own” (cf. col. XIV.2, ἀφ᾽ ἑωυτοῦ); 32. Πειθώ from εἴκειν τὰ ἐόντα ἀλλήλοις (col. XXI.10–11); 33. Ῥέα δ’ ὅτι πολλὰ (...) | ζῶια ἔφυ [ἐκρεύσαντα] ἐξ αὐτῆς (col. XXII.14–15); 34. χρῆσαι = ἀρκέσαι (col. XI.5); 35. Ὠκεανός = ἀήρ = Ζεύς (col. XXIII.3). Equations of divine names Πρωτογόνος = Οὐρανός = Κρόνος = Ζεύς (cols. VIII–IX and XIII–XVI); Γῆ = Μήτηρ = Ῥέα = Ἥρη (col. XXII.7). The restricted use of etymology confirms our impression that the author is not an allegorist in the usual sense of the term. He uses etymologies and some of them are important for his argument, but more often he looks not for a phonetic correspondence of the explanatory κοινόν with the ἴδιον, but for a functional equivalence. Thus, αἰδοῖον is equated with the sun because their function is the same: a generative principle. He explicitly states his ‘functionalist’ thesis as a general principle of nomination in the following two passages: a) PDerv., col. XIV.9–10: Κρόνον δὲ ὠνόμασεν ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἔ[ρ]γου αὐτὸν καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τ[ὸν αὐτὸν λ]όγον, “He named Kronos after his function, and all other things (or gods) by the same principle” (i.e. “after the function of each thing”); b) PDerv., col. XXII.1: πάν[τ᾽ οὖ]ν ὁμοίω[ς ὠ]νόμασεν ὡς κάλλιστα ἠ[δύ]νατο, “And so, he named all things (or rather, gave all divine names) in the same way as best as he could.” In the second passage, ὁμοίως exactly corresponds to κατὰ τ[ὸν αὐτὸν λ]όγον in col. XX, i.e. it refers to the general principle of the ‘functionalist’ semantics (as we will call it) and the theory of nomination “after function” (ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἔ[ρ]γ ου).25 25 Therefore, the ingenious new reading πάν[τ᾽ ἀ]νομοίω[ς and interpretation proposed by Kotwick (2017) 94 and 302 cannot be correct. Kotwick takes ἀ]νομοίω[ς in the sense of “by different names.” According to Kotwick, Orpheus gave many different names to the same god Air, knowing that human nature and desire are never the same, etc. In such a case, Orpheus’ attitude towards this variability and instabilty of human behavior and speech must be positive since he named everything ἄριστα. But the following ll. 3–6 of col. XXII flatly contradict this conclusion: οὐδαμὰ ταὐτά cannot be an example of ἄριστα. This lack of stability and consistency is perceived in negative terms and even attributed to human πλεονεξία and ἀμαθία. The Derveni author contrasts human inconstancy and capricious wishfulness with Orpheus’ methodic exactness in giving names to things and the gods always in accordance with the same ‘best’ principle, i.e. ‘after function.’ This principle is exemplified in the col. XXII.7–16 that follows after the moralistic

502 

 Andrei Lebedev

The allegorical method based on ‘functionalist’ semantics rather than on lexical affinity and phonetic assonance of a name with its ‘original’ etymon can be with equal success used in physical allegoresis, but it should be distinguished from ‘classical’ etymological allegoresis of the Stoic type. The Stoic allegoresis of mythical names is based on etymology, i.e. on the phonetic similarity between the traditional name and the ‘real’ etymon for which it stands, e.g. χάος from χεῖσθαι, Ζεύς from ζῆν and διά, Ἥρη from ἀήρ, etc. But out of the 35 explanations of “peculiar” expressions in PDerv. (see the ‘glossary’ above), only ten are based on etymology.26 This means that more than two thirds are based not on etymology, but on ‘functionalist’ semantics (nomination ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου) and/or on the ‘linguistic mistake’ theory (e.g. hoi polloi misunderstood the phrase μοῖραν ἐπικλῶσαι). How do these two methods relate to the two schools of thought in the philosophy of language known from Plato’s Cratylus, i.e. naturalism and conventionalism? Prima facie one is tempted to correlate the etymological method with naturalism and functionalist semantics with conventionalism. But let us be cautious: out of 35 names, only one (γῆ) is said to be “by convention” (νόμωι). The Derveni author does not claim to be a conventionalist and he probably is not. He seems to believe that when something is named ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου, its name accords with nature or reality, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. As we shall see, in col. XX he contrasts Orpheus’ “always the same” rule of giving names to things with human inconstancy and wishfulness in their desires and speeches, and this juxtaposition already looks like a critique of conventionalism. The ‘correct’ method of naming is exemplified in the same col. XX by the names of the gods derived from their ‘functions’ or their deeds. The distinction of the name and the function of a thing it denotes (ὄνομα ~ ἔργον) plays an important role in Heraclitus’ theory of naming, but, unlike the Derveni author, Heraclitus emphasizes that ordinary names (i.e. koina, legomena in PDerv.) contradict their function.27 Functionalism and utilitarianism are related schools of thought. The functionalism in semantics points to a thinker with a

tirade: Meter was named from “giving birth” to all, Deo from “being ravaged” in congress, Rhea from ἐκρέω, etc. In addition, to judge by the pl. 22 in KPT, three letters after παν fill the gap better than two. 26 Cf. the list above, sub 1, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 29, and 33. 27 Cf. Heraclit. 22 B 48 DK (= fr. 28 Lebedev): (…) ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος; 22 B 23 DK (= fr. 118 Lebedev): Δίκης ὄνομα vel ταῦτα (sc. ἄνομα ἔργα). In 22 B 15 DK (= fr. 148 Lebedev) the ergon of Dionysos’ symbol (αἰδοῖον) is generation and life, but its name is death (Aides). Note that unlike the Derveni author, Heraclitus regarded separate names of ordinary language as ‘syllables’ of original natural names, i.e. of integrated pairs of opposite like life/death. For details see Lebedev (2017a).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 503

general utilitarian outlook: the value of something is determined only by its use, and hence by its usefulness (τὸ ὠφέλιμον). By translating χρῆσαι as ἀρκέσαι, the author eliminates mantic practices and oracles (χρησμοί) as nonsense; the humorous interpretation of the oracular cave of Night as a night-time (i.e. as a non-entity) in col. VII follows the same antimantic line. By explaining the mythical Οὐρανός as the sun, and Olympus as time (another non-entity),28 he intentionally deconstructs the divine world. The Hymn to Zeus is a godsend for this purpose. Since Zeus is everything, and his name “for those who understand correctly” (τοῖς ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσι) means “air,” all gods of Greek religion are literally dissolved in the air. Air is the common referential substrate of all conventional divine names (cf. Heraclit. 22 B 67 DK = fr. 43 Lebedev). Hence the equations of the divine names in Derv.T are to be taken not as examples of mystical syncretism or sophisticated philosophical theology, but as intentional deconstruction of divine personalities. The Succession myth, according to the Derveni author, is nonsense since all its participants – Protogonos, Night, Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus – are different names for the air, or for its constituents (hot particles), or for the processes such as the separation of the sun. The translation of Olympus as ‘time’ is connected with the reduction of the gods to processes: the ‘gods’ exist not on Olympus, but ‘in time’; they are fluctuations of the air. The conceptual framework for such etymologies is Heraclitus’ theory of the ‘universal flux’ and change of all things that Plato associates to the tandem Protagoras/ Heraclitus. It follows that not only the mysteries, but also Greek religion as a whole is a result of a misunderstanding, a kind of a linguistic mistake similar to a ‘disease of language.’ The worship of the traditional gods is a result of the ignorant polloi’s misreading of the proto-text. The referential meaning of the divine names is different from the meaning intended by the polloi. When they hear the name of Zeus, they imagine the well-known anthropomorphic figure, but κατὰ φύσιν this name refers to the air. Thus all ordinary Greeks are fools: they do not realize that they, in fact, worship different forms of air, i.e. natural phenomena. A theory of the original linguistic mistake of mortals that leads to even more catastrophic consequences, i.e. to the origin of the phenomenal world of plurality, is attested in Parmenides (28 B 8.53 DK).29 The Derveni author borrowed it from another source, which he cites in col. IV. Heraclitus, along with his theory of the ambiguity of the cosmic Logos, evidently gave the Derveni author the idea for the theory of the linguistic mistake of mortals.30 28 Cf. Antiph. fr. 9 Pendrick (= 87 B 9 DK): νόημα; Democr. 68 A 72 DK: φάντασμα. 29 Lebedev (2017b) 510–513. 30 Lebedev (2014) 61–69.

504 

 Andrei Lebedev

Was Orpheus’ ambiguity, according to the Derveni author, intentional? The answer must be yes, for this ambiguity clearly appears in col. VII. We subsequently learn that Orpheus deceived the crowd. Why? We do not find the explicit answer to this question in the extant parts of the text. But given the Sophistic character of the Derveni treatise, it is natural to suppose that Orpheus, according to our author, did it for the very same reason as the σοφὸς ἀνήρ in Critias’ Sisy­ phus (88 B 25 DK), who “covered the truth by a false logos” (v. 26: ψευδεῖ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγωι), so that the crowd would obey the laws through fear of the omniscient gods. The natural phenomena that were mistaken for anthropomorphic gods according to Sisyphus – the revolution of the heavens (viz. the vortex of air), thunder and lightning, the starry sky, the ὄμβροι – are very similar to those in Derv.T. According to the Derveni author, then, Orpheus intended the ‘surface’ meaning of his poetry for the ignorant polloi, and the hidden meaning for a few, i.e. for philosophers (who were called Sophists in 5th-cent. BC Athens) and their disciples. Religion and science were both invented and transmitted to posterity by Orpheus in his poetry. From the Derveni author’s point of view, the “common names” (κοινὰ ὀνόματα) existed already in Orpheus’ time, but the “peculiar names” (ἴδια) were invented by Orpheus. In other words, there was a time (ἦν ποτε χρόνος motif) when there were no gods. It follows that the “ancient men” (ἀρχαῖοι ἄνθρωποι) were natural atheists who worshipped only the sun, the moon, and the elements. They lived “in agreement with nature” (κατὰ φύσιν) and their language was natural, i.e. conforming to reality (κατὰ φύσιν). In his exegesis, the Derveni author therefore follows “the ancients.” The distinction of ‘first’ and ‘secondary’ names plays an important role in Plato’s Cratylus.31 Plato’s theory is significantly different from that of PDerv., since in it ‘first’ mimetic names are rather structural elementary units from which secondary names are built, and they are not identical with the common names of current usage (τὰ κοινά). Yet there are some points of convergence, too. In Plato, the first names imitate the essence of things,32 and in PDerv. the common names refer to real things (περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, col. XIII.7). All or most divine names in the Cratylus must be secondary, too, and all of them, as in PDerv, require a special decoding. Although it is not stated explicitly that the extant divine names are corrupted or distorted, this is implied by the reconstruction of their original ‘integral’ forms that the polloi have forgotten. Etymologizing is a kind of recollection (anamnesis). The Derveni

31 See the lists in Rijlaarsdam (1978) 163–164, 236 ff., 257 ff., 271 ff., 295 ff. 32 On this point, see Baxter (1992) 62 ff., 76 ff., 167 ff.; Barney (2001) 83–98; Ademollo (2011) 278–280.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 505

author’s explanation of traditional Greek mythology displays a striking similarity to Max Müller’s view of all ancient mythology as a ‘disease of language’: “Mythology, which was the bane of the ancient world, is in truth a disease of language. A myth means a word, but a word which, from being a name or an attribute, has been allowed to assume a more substantial existence. Most of the Greek, the Roman, the Indian and other heathen gods are nothing but poetical names, which were gradually allowed to assume a divine personality never contemplated by their original inventors.”33 There are reasons to suspect that Derv.T is not only a Sophistic Kultur­ geschichte with an atheistic message addressed to the ignorant polloi, but also a polemical work, a pamphlet, addressed to certain philosophical opponents. In Plato’s Cratylus, ‘Orpheus’ is quoted now as a witness to the Pythagorean soma/sema doctrine, now as supporting the Heracliteans, i.e., from Plato’s perspective, the Ionian naturalists, the supporters of the doctrine of ‘universal flux’ (οἱ ῥέοντες). Plato most probably parodies two conflicting interpretations of Orpheus at the time of Socrates. The ‘Pythagorean’ and the ‘Ionian’ versions of ‘Orpheus’ reflect the ideological conflict between the Sophistic ‘Enlightenment’ and religious conservatives: the dispute between Anaxagoras and Lampon, as well as the psephisma of Diopeithes against natural philosophers, are well-known and representative examples. In the Dissoi logoi, the “Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans” (Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι) seem to represent two main schools of the philosophical scene c. 400 BC with conflicting views.34 The ‘Pythagoreans’ claimed that their religious philosophy is sanctioned by the authority of the most ancient theologos, Orpheus.35 The simplest way to refute their claims was to prove that the Orphic Theogony is a fake and that the poet Orpheus never existed, as this was done by Aristotle, presumably in his polemics against the Old Academy.36 The Derveni author chose another method, which again testifies to his inventiveness and wit: he accepts (or pretends to accept) the historicity of Orpheus and the authenticity of the Orphic Theogony, and then proves that Orpheus was in fact an Anaxagorean himself, and that, consequently, naturalistic Ionian science is a πάτριος λόγος (on peritrope as polemical device in Greek philosophy see App. 2). On the grounds of these observations, we can draw the following portrait of the Derveni author: a Preplatonic Sophist and polymath; a specialist in the field of the “correctness of names” (ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων); adept in functionalist 33 Müller (1885) 11. 34 90 DK, 6.8. This was seen by Luria (1970) 386. 35 Orpheus μαρτυρεῖ in Philol. 44 B 14 DK. 36 Arist. frs. 26–27 Gigon.

506 

 Andrei Lebedev

semantics in his theory of naming (which is theoretically connected with his general utilitarianism); well-versed in rhetorics and physical science, in that he follows Archelaus’ version of Anaxagorean physics; deeply interested in Kul­ turgeschichte and the origin of religion and language; a supporter of naturalistic pantheism, which may well have been perceived by ordinary Greeks of his time as atheism (ἀσέβεια); heavily influenced by Heraclitus, especially by Heraclitus’ allegoresis of mythical names and criticism of popular religion; and a rationalist of the utilitarian stamp. He wrote his work with a polemical purpose against the Orpheotelestai, manteis, and religious conservatives as well as against the uneducated polloi who supported them. It is obvious that we are dealing with a thinker of great originality, amazing learning, and inexhaustible inventiveness. He speaks with authority as a recognized Master of Truth. It is very unlikely that he was a marginal figure and left no trace in Greek philosophy and intellectual life;37 it is also unlikely that his name has not been preserved in the tradition. On the contrary, we have good reasons to suppose that he is one of the intellectual celebrities of the Greek Sophistic ‘Enlightenment’; moreover, the work we call the Derveni treatise may have been scandalously famous.

3 (III) The attribution of the Derveni treatise to Prodicus of Ceos There are no discernible connections between Gorgias and Hippias. Critias’ theory of the origin of religion as invention of a sophos aner of ancient times displays a typological similarity with PDerv, but the smart impostor in this case is Sisyphus, not Orpheus. The divulgation of Eleusinian mysteries is insufficient for an ascription to Diagoras of Melos; besides, our author is a professional Sophist, whereas Diagoras was a dithyrambic poet (see further § [VII] below). Protagoras’ Περὶ θεῶν and Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως certainly come into consideration and fit the subject of the Derveni treatise, but the scarcity of references to Protagoras in the supposed references to Derv.T in later authors can hardly be accidental.38 Of all Greek Sophists, it is Prodicus of Ceos who exactly fits the composite image of the author. Prodicus was the leading expert in the ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων, he wrote

37 This possibility is rightly rejected by Burkert (1968). Contra Kouremenos ap. KPT, 59. 38 Protagoras is cited nominatim together with ‘Orpheus’ and Heraclitus in Pl. Tht. 152e; the title Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρασσομένων (Diog. Laërt. 9.55) resembles the criticism of the absurd practices and beliefs of hoi polloi in PDerv.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 507

on physics,39 his connections with Anaxagoras are well-attested,40 and his reputation as an atheist was second to none:41 “This man has been corrupted either by a book or by Prodicus.”42 After the trial of Anaxagoras and the psephisma of Diopeithes (432 BC), any Anaxagoreios in Athens may have looked suspicious to the conservative public.43 His name is regularly included in the lists of atheists, and it seems that he was a genuine philosophical atheist of the Protagorean (‘humanist’) extraction, but he is hardly as scandalous and iconoclastic as Diagoras in the anecdotal tradition. In Plato’s Protagoras (315b–c) the description of Prodicus in Callias’ house starts with a witty quotation from Homer’s Nekyia: καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλον γε εἰσεῖδον (...), “And, among others, I have noticed there Tantalos as well (...).” In a very important and underestimated article, Charles Willink has persuasively refuted the old interpretation (the sobriquet allegedly means “suffering grievious pains” and alludes to the poor condition of Prodicus’ health)44 and explained it as a mythical paradigm of the “hybristic audacity” of a “cosmological blasphemer”45 like that of the meteorosophistai satirized in Aristophanes’ Clouds with Prodicus as their prince and arch-sophist. The texts of Themistius and Aristophanes cited below leave no doubt that he discussed in his works “the rituals of Orpheus” (Ὀρφέως τελεταί) and proposed a ‘meteorosophistic’ interpretation of the Orphic Theogony. Prodicus is the common 39 Test. 61–66 Mayhew. Note that Prodicus’ ‘physics’ pays attention to etymology and the ‘correctness of names’. Galen (test. 64–66 Mayhew) rebukes Prodicus for his deviation from the common usage and ‘innovations’ in the use of names (ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι [...] καινοτομίαν). Cf. § (B), test. (T10) below. According to Aulus Gellius (15.20.4), Euripides was a pupil of Anaxagoras and Prodicus. 40 Aeschin. Socr. (SSR VI A 73) ap. Ath. 5.62.220a–b (= Prodic. test. 30 Mayhew). Aeschines in his Callias mocks Prodicus and Anaxagoras as ‘Sophists’ and immoral teachers corrupting the young. It seems that Aeschines re-addresses the accusations of ‘atheism’ and corruption of the young raised against Socrates to Prodicus and Anaxagoras. 41 See Henrichs (1975) 107 ff., a re-edition of the testimonium to Prodicus in Philodemus’ On Piety, PHerc. 1428, (1976), and (1984a); Willink (1983) 25–27; Burkert (1985) 313–315; Scholten (2003) 132 ff.; Mayhew (2011) xvii and 91; Bett (2013) 299–303; Roubekas (2017) 39–42. Reservations about Prodicus’‘atheism’ have been recently expressed by Kouloumentas (2018) and Vassallo (2018a); cf. also Sedley (2013) 141 and Winiarczyk (2016) 66, who ignore, however, the ‘Tantalos’ paradigm and the important work of Willink (1983). Prodicus did not begin to be regarded as an ‘atheist’ by the time of Cicero; he was nicknamed ‘Tantalos’ (= godless hybristes) already by his contemporaries. 42 Ar. (Τηγανισταί) fr. 506 PCG (ex Schol. [VE] in Ar. Nub. 361a = Prodic. test. 5 Mayhew): τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἢ βιβλίον διέφθορεν / ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἷς γέ τις. 43 For doxographical testimonia to Anaxagoras’ alleged ‘atheism’ from papyri, see Vassallo’s DAPR in this volume. 44 Willink (1983) 30. 45 Willink (1983) 31 ff.

508 

 Andrei Lebedev

source of the passages from Themistius, Aristophanes (Clouds and Birds), Plato’s Cratylus, Euripides’ Bacchae, and other testimonia discussed below. Testimonia (1) – (18) which support the attribution of PDerv. to Prodicus of Ceos

(T1) Plato [I] Prodicus has rightly been recognized as an important Sophistic source of Plato’s Cratylus.46 His fifty-drachmas “lecture on the correctness of names” (ἐπίδειξις περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος) is explicitly cited as a classic of the genre (the only one!) at the beginning of the dialogue.47 The words εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν “to know the truth” (Cra. 384b5) alluding to Prodicus may be compared with the phrase ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν in Derv.T. Orpheus as a Heraclitean and Anaxagorean philosopher and an onomatothetes appears in Cra. 402b: Ῥέα and Κρόνος as ῥευμάτων ὀνόματα, cf. ῥοή at 402a9.48 We may compare this passage with PDerv., col. XXII.13–15: δηλώσει δὲ [λί]αν | κατὰ τὰ ἔπη γεν[νᾶν]. Ῥέα δ᾽ ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ πο[ι]κ[ίλα] | ζῶια ἔφυ [ἐκρεύσαντα] ἐξ αὐτῆς , κτλ. The theory of διπλοῦς λόγος ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής is attested in the etymology of Pan in Cra. 408c. The ψεῦδος half belongs to the πολλοί and consists of poetic fiction (τραγικόν), μῦθοι τε καὶ ψεύδη.49 In Cra. 409a9 the etymological derivation of the name Σελήνη from σέλας (“light”) “seems to reveal the more ancient wisdom” similar to the “recent” theory of Anaxagoras that the moon reflects the light of the sun: ἔοικεν

46 See Rijlaarsdam (1978) 35 ff., 117 ff., 194 ff. The thesis οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν (cf. Pl. Cra. 429d–e: ἆρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστι, κτλ.) is explicitly ascribed to Prodicus by Didymus the Blind: see Prodicus’ test. 60 Mayhew (with comm. by Mayhew [2013] 153–159); Binder/Liesenborghs (1976) 453–462. 47 Pl. Cra. 384b (= Prodic. test. 42 Mayhew). 48 Mansfeld (1983)’s identification of Plato’s source as Hippias cannot be correct since: Hippias is the least philosophical of all the Sophists; the relativist theory of flux and sophisticated epistemology are a priori unlikely for him; in the parallel passages of Pl. Tht. 152e and 160d, Protagoras, not Hippias, is mentioned. Protagoras was never associated with Hippias but was often connected with his disciple Prodicus. Mansfeld, however, rightly postulates a Sophistic source for the ‘Heraclitizing’ passages in Cratylus and Theaetetus. This source is most probably Prodicus and/ or Protagoras himself, who quoted Heraclitus with approval of his criticism of popular religion. 49 In Lebedev (2014) 22 the source of Plato is identified with Heraclitus and Pl. Cra. 408c2 (οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει κτλ.) is included in Probabilia, fr. 3 Lebedev. The fanciful etymology of Pan may be Plato’s own, but the identification of Logos with the Universe is typically Heraclitean: it is based on Heraclitus’ metaphor of common logos or liber naturae in fr. 2 Lebedev (= 22 B 1 DK) and fr. 1 Lebedev (= 22 B 50 DK), on which see Lebedev (2017a).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 509

δηλοῦν τι παλαιότερον ὃ ἐκεῖνος (sc. Anaxagoras) νεωστὶ ἔλεγεν.50 The ancient onomatothetes in this passage is likely Orpheus, and so just as in Derv.T, the Anaxagorean physiologia is presented as an ancient wisdom known to Orpheus that can be discovered in divine names, when they are “correctly understood.”51 Plato’s source must be Prodicus, in whose history of culture and religion the case of Selene as a deified “useful thing” must have played important role: on PDerv., col. XXIV.7–12 see testimonium (T3) below. Plato’s “accusation” of Anaxagoras of plagiarism from ancient theologians is, of course, a joke; the playful and ironic tone of this remark is best explained as a parody of Prodicus’ extravagant claims about Orpheus’ Anaxagorean physics rather than a parody of Anaxagoras himself, who never made such claims.52

(T2) Euripides Prodicus’ test. 74 Mayhew (= 84 B 5 [III] DK) is an obvious and well-known source of Euripides’ Bacchae 274 ff., where Demeter is explained as earth (γῆ) and Dionysos as wine.53 According to the Derveni author, religion and mythology arose from the misreading and misinterpretation of an ancient text of a wise man (Orpheus) by the ignorant polloi. A remarkable parallel to this theory is found in Bacch. 286–297. The myth of Dionysos’ birth, in which he was sewn into and born from Zeus’ thigh (μηρός), is explained away as a misunderstanding of ὅμηρος (“hostage”) or μέρος τοῦ αἰθέρος (“part of aither”): cf. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρω[ποι οὐ γινώσκοντ]ες τὰ λεγόμενα in PDerv., col. XVIII.14. The multiple etymologies of the same name that seemed absurd to Euripidean scholars are typical for the Derveni author and for Plato’s Cratylus as well. Cf. Eur. Bacch. 296: ὄνομα μεταστήσαντες, an expression that can be compared with the text that I propose to read in PDerv., cols. IV.2, ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έμενος ὀνόματα, and IV.5, Ἡράκλειτος με[ταθέμενος] τὰ κοινὰ (sc. ὀνόματα). A similar terminology is attested in Plato’s Cratylus.54 Prodicus 50 On this passage, cf. Lebedev (1990) 81 n. 12. 51 For different names of ὀνοματοθέται in the Cratylus, cf. Rijlaarsdam (1978) 149. 52 Cra. 409a7: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν πιέζειν, “this name seems to press hardly upon Anaxagoras.” The term πιέζω here has the connotation “expose” – Anaxagoras’ plagiarism of ancient wisdom becomes exposed – as in legal contexts, in which it is associated with ἐλέγχω: cf. Plut. Alc. 4.3; Phld. De dis, PHerc. 152/157, col. 8.2–3 Diels (ὑπὸ τῶν ἐ|λέγχων πιέζωνται, “under the pressure of evidence”). 53 Roux (1972) 347; Dodds (1960) 104; Mayhew (2011) 242–244. Henrichs (1968) firstly compared this passage of Euripides with PDerv., col. XVIII (Demeter = Ge meter). See also Willi (2007) and Santamaría (2010). 54 Rijlaarsdam (1978) 147.

510 

 Andrei Lebedev

is the most plausible common source of Plato and Euripides. The cosmic αἰθήρ (=  air) in Euripides is always a reference to Anaxagoras’ cosmology; Zeus and Hera in this passage are apparently allegorized as Air and Earth. In PDerv. Zeus is air and Hera is earth (cf. cols. XVII.4 and XXII.7).

(T3) Themistius A neglected evidence of Themistius is of primary importance for the ascription of the Derv.T to Prodicus of Ceos. In Them. Or. 30, II, p. 183.1 ff. Downey/Norman (cf. Prodic. test. 77 Mayhew = 84 B 5 [IV] DK) we can read as follows: εἰ δὲ καὶ Διόνυσον καλοῖμεν καὶ νύμφας καὶ Δήμητρος κόρην ὑέτιόν τε Δία καὶ Ποσειδῶνα φυτάλμιον, πλησιάζομεν ἤδη ταῖς τελεταῖς καὶ τὴν Προδίκου σοφίαν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγκαταμίξομεν, ὃς ἱερουργίαν πᾶσαν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μυστήρια καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ τελετὰς τῶν γεωργίας καλῶν ἐξάπτει, νομίζων καὶ θεῶν ἔννοιαν ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐλθεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐσέβειαν ἐγγυώμενος. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ Ὀρφέως τελετάς τε καὶ ὄργια γεωργίας ἐκτὸς συμβέβηκεν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ μῦθος τοῦτο αἰνίττεται, πάντα κηλεῖν τε καὶ θέλγειν τὸν Ὀρφέα λέγων, ὑπὸ τῶν καρπῶν τῶν ἡμέρων ὧν γεωργία παρέχει πᾶσαν ἡμερῶσαι φύσιν καὶ θηρίων δίαιταν, καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς θηριῶδες ἐκκόψαι καὶ ἡμερῶσαι. καὶ τὰ θηρία γὰρ τῷ μέλει κηλεῖν κτλ. Let the gods who oversee agriculture be summoned to help me with my oration (…) For it is from the fruits of agriculture that they receive yearly recompense – drink-offerings, sacrifices, banquets and all the Hours cause to spring up from the earth – and they receive this recompense not only for helping mankind on oratory, but from everything that human beings have from the high. If we should also summon Dionysos, the nymphs, Demeter’s daughter (sc. Persephone), the rain-bringing Zeus and nourishing Poseidon, than we shall be within short range of the rites and add a dose of Prodicus’ wisdom to our eloquence. Prodicus makes all of mankind’s religious ceremonies, mysteries, festivals, and rites dependent on the blessings of agriculture. He thinks that even the idea of gods came to human beings from agriculture and he makes agriculture the guarantee of all piety. Not even the rites and mystic ceremonies of Orpheus are unconnected with agriculture but the myth about Orpheus also hints to this in enigmatic form, namely that it was through cultivated fruits provided by agriculture that Orpheus tamed the whole nature and the diaita (i.e. way of life and nutrition) of wild beasts and eradicated and tamed the bestial element in the souls. Indeed, he was believed to enchant wild beasts by his music conducting all sacrifices and rites in honor of the gods using the fruits of agriculture.55

After this passage, Themistius presents Orpheus as the greatest culture hero who taught the art of agriculture to all nations of οἰκουμένη, and in turn, this

55 Transl. by Penella (2000) 185–186, with slight alterations.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 511

development triggered the transition to sedentary life, the rise of civilization, the emergence of laws and justice, etc. Diels/Kranz print under Prodicus’ 84 B 5 DK from Themistius only the words πλησιάζομεν (...) ἐγγυώμενος; Mayhew (test. 77) expands the preceding context, but he also cuts the quotation at ἐγγυώμενος. This emendation is based on the assumption that at this point Themistius stops quoting “Prodicus’ wisdom,” i.e. his agricultural theory of the origin of religion, and adduces a new piece of evidence, the myth of Orpheus the musician, unrelated with Prodicus. But in the preceding text, “Prodicus’ wisdom” is connected with τελεταί, so in the text set in bold he rather states that what Prodicus explicitly said in his theory of the origin of religion is also in an enigmatic form “hinted by” traditional myth (καὶ ὁ μῦθος), which means that Prodicus himself referred to or discussed Orpheus’ teletai and Orphic mysteries as providing evidence in support of his theory of religion.56 The identification of Dionysos with wine, of Demeter with bread, of Poseidon with water are attested for Prodicus by the consensus of Philodemus and Sextus (84 B 5 [I, III] DK).57 The reference to Dionysos and Demeter in combination with mystery cults (μυστήρια) and initiations (τελεταί) is sufficient to conclude that Prodicus discussed the Eleusinian and Orphic (i.e. Bacchic) mysteries in his work on the origin of religion. If we accept Henrichs’ reinterpretation of Philodemus, according to which Prodicus added deified benefactors (πρῶτοι εὑρεταί) of the human race to “things beneficial for human life” (τὰ ὀφελοῦντα τὸν βίον), the characterization of Orpheus as the first agriculturalist in Themistius may also derive from Prodicus.58 Prodicus’ theory of the origin of religion from agriculture (and other “useful” τέχναι) is directly attested in PDerv., col. XXIV, which comments on the Οrphic verse about the moon (l. 3: “ἡ πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεσσι ἐπ᾽ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν”):

56 Mayhew’s skepticism about the authenticity of Themistius’ reference to mysteries, orgia, festivals, and teletai in Prodicus’ work is unjustified. The uniqueness of evidence may call for suspicion in the legal sphere, but not in the evaluation of historical or literary sources. Themistius’ reference is precise and concrete and is paralleled by a plausible reference to it in Plutarch’s De Daedalibus Plataeensibus (frs. 157–158 Sandbach), see below. Incidentally, Greek agrarian festivals (like those of Dionysos) or mysteries of Demeter provided more abundant and persuasive evidence on the connection between religion and agriculture than, say, the Orphic theogony or the poetic myth of Orpheus the singer. Even on a priori grounds, Prodicus could not miss such opportunity. And this explains why it is Demeter and Dionysos who have a prominent place in Prodicus’ theory of religion as cases at point. 57 Note the agriculturally relevant epikleseis of Zeus the Rain-giver (Hyetios) and Poseidon the Nourishing (Phytalmios). 58 Nestle (1976) 439 compares Min. Fel. Oct. 2.21, errando (on ‘wandering’ benefactors), and concludes that Orpheus was included in Prodicus’ list of deified inventors.

512 

 Andrei Lebedev

εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔλεγε, οὐκ ἂν “πολλοῖς” ἔφη φαίνειν αὐτήν, (ἀλλὰ ‘πᾶσι’ ἅμα59), τοῖς τε τῆν γῆν ἐργαζομένοις καὶ τοῖς ναυτιλλομένοις, ὁπότε χρὴ πλεῖν, τούτοις 10  τὴν ὥραν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν σελήνη, οὐκ ἂν ἐξηύρ[ι]σκον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἄριθμὸν οὔτε τῶν ὡρέων οὔτε τῶν ἀνέμω[ν ] καὶ τἆλλα πάντα []ην60 (…) he would not say “to many” (but to “all together”), i.e. to those who cultivate the land and those who are engaged in navigation, [signalling] to them the hour when the navigation starts. For if there were no moon, humans would have discovered neither the number of the seasons nor the number of the winds (…) nor all the rest (…) The Derveni author starts col. XXIV with an interpretation of the epithet of the moon ἰσομελής (hapax) that must have appeared in the verse from the Orphic theogony quoted in the lost lower part of the preceding column, and he takes it in the sense of “circular” on the grounds that only circular objects when “measured from the center” (i.e., the distance to the periphery) have “equal limbs” on all sides. Martin West suggests that the lost verse was similar to Parmenides’ 28 B 8.44 DK (μέσσοθεν ἰσοπαλές) and reads μέσσοθεν ἰσομελής. This reading remains attractive, although it cannot be proved. In any case, the reference to the circular shape of the full moon is plausible. An objection against this interpretation argues that adjectives ending with -μελής in Greek always refer to “stretched” limbs. But this is untenable. In fact, in the poetic language, μέλη (plur.) can be used as a pluralis poeticus for the whole body rather than for some “stretched” parts of the body: cf. e.g. Parmenides’ 28 B 16.1 DK, where the expression κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων, “the mixture (i.e. composition) of much-wandering (i.e. constantly changing) limbs (i.e. body),” refers to the condition of the body, not of some limbs, and the Homeric epithet of Eros λυσιμελής, “relaxing limbs,” refers to the relaxation of the whole body regardless of its shape. The commentator also doubts the (rather obvious) meaning of the verse about the moon that “shines,” i.e. is the source of light, “for many,” on the grounds that in this case, one would expect “shines to all” rather than “to many.” Instead, he interprets φαίνω as allegedly elliptical for φαίνειν τὴν ὥραν “to show (i.e. to indicate) the appropriate hour” for starting various activities: that is, he tries to connect it with the phases of the moon and the telling of time. The word “many”

59 We follow the subtle suggestion of Kotwick (2016) 3. The distinction between many and all refers to τεχνίται, on the one hand, and to all humanity indiscriminately, on the other. 60 PDerv., col. XXIV.7–12.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 513

is explained as a reference not to all mortals, but to specific groups, namely to “those who cultivate the land” and “those who are engaged in seafaring.” To the latter group, the moon “shows” the time when navigation starts. The author does not specify what exactly the moon “shows” to agriculturalists because it is selfevident: the agricultural cycle of “works and days” (like sowing, harvesting, etc.) based on the calendar year and the seasons. Without the moon, there would be no telling of time and no calendar, and without these, agriculture and seafaring would be impossible. Since the production of food (agriculture) and sea trade are essential for sustaining human bios, mortals deified the moon and the sun as “that which benefits human life.” This is exactly what we find in the reports on Prodicus’ rather peculiar ‘agricultural’ theory of the origin of the belief in gods.61 The word ὥρα in col. XXIV (τὴν ὥραν, l. 10; τῶν ὡρέων, l. 11) echoes the title of Prodicus’ work Ὧραι. It is reasonable to infer from this passage that in the lost parts of Derv.T similar connections between the sun and the practical needs of humans are made, which, for example, explain Helios as a deified ‘heat’ (thermon) useful for agriculture: the connection between the sun and the seasons imposes itself. Cf. Helios and Selene as γεωργοὶ ἀθάνατοι in Max. Tyr. Or. 23.5c5.62 Other examples illustrating the importance of explanatory time concepts in PDerv. are Ὄλυμπος = χρόνος (col. ΧΙΙ) and ἄδυτον = βάθος τῆς νυκτός (col. XI.2–3).

(T4) Aristophanes [I] Cf. Ar. Nub. 828: Δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δί’ ἐξεληλακώς. The text of PDerv., col. XVIII.1–3 runs as follows: καὶ τὰ κάτω [φερό]μενα. ⸌[τὴν δὲ “Μοῖρα]ν” φάμενος [δηλοῖ]⸍ ˪τὴν δ[ίνην] καὶ τἆλλα πάν[τ]α εἶναι ἐν τῶι ἀέρι  [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν. τοῦτ᾽ οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα Ὀρφεὺς 3  ὠνόμασεν Μοῖραν. (...) and the things that move down. By saying [“Moira” he means] the [vortex] and all the rest in the air which is wind. It is this wind that Orpheus called Moira. The supplement τήνδ[ε γῆν] in col. XVIII.1, proposed by KPT and accepted by Bernabé, is unlikely. First, because teste TLG, all instances of this phrase in classical authors come from tragedy, there is not a single instance of ἥδε γῆ, τῆς δὲ 61 Prodic. test. 66–78 Mayhew. 62 Nestle (1976) 439.

514 

 Andrei Lebedev

γῆς or τὴνδε γῆν in prose, either in classical or in late prose.63 Α possible phrase for “this earth” in Greek prose would be τὴν γῆν τήνδε (τῆς γῆς τῆσδε)64 or τὴνδε τὴν γῆν,65 but never τὴνδε γῆν which is an exclusively tragic idiom. And second, in most cases, ἡ γῆ ἥδε means “this land” rather than “this earth” and refers to the polis or region in which the speaker is located in drama, like Athens or Corinth, but such a meaning does not fit the context of Derv.T at all. It is conceivable that in astronomical and cosmological contexts, “this earth” might refer to “our” planet earth as distinguished from another similar planet, but there is no indication in the text of the papyrus that the Derveni author shared either Philolaus’ eccentric cosmology of two earths66 or the Ionian theory of innumerable worlds in the infinite universe, each with its own earth, sun, moon, etc.67 The most plausible reading that perfectly fits the context is τὴν δ[ίνην], the cosmogonical vortex of the Anaxagorean (and Ionian in general) physics.68 Vortex is a form of wind, and wind is air in motion, hence the mention of wind (πνεῦμα) and air in the next l. 2.69 According to the Ionian mechanics of the vortex, heavy

63 For τήνδε γῆν TLG gives ten classical occurrences: seven from Euripides, two from Sophocles, and one from Aeschylus. There are many more (50) instances of the genitive τῆσδε γῆς: 28 in Euripides, 13 in Sophocles, nine in Aeschylus, and none from prose. 64 Hdt. 6.107. 65 Dem. 60.8. 66 Arist. fr. 204 Rose (= Simpl. In Cael. 511.25 Heiberg): μετὰ δὲ τῆν ἀντίχθονα ἡ γῆ ἥδε φερομένη καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ τὸ μέσον, κτλ. 67 Theoretically, the Derveni author could share the latter theory since it is attested in Anaxagoras’ 59 B 4 DK, which describes extraterrestrials in a cosmos different from ours, apparently in a distant part of the infinite universe. But the cosmogonical context in PDerv., col. XVIII in any case has nothing to do with the theory of innumerable worlds. In late prose (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cassius Dio, Flavius Josephus, and others), the expression “this earth” is used as a synonym of οἰκουμένη, without antithesis to “another earth,” but these contexts are historical, geographical, and ethnographical, and cannot be compared with col. XVIII. 68 I have proposed this supplement in my 1993 Princeton conference paper, and I am glad that Walter Burkert and Richard Janko (ap. KPT, 227) arrived independently at the same conclusion. In Janko (2001) 27, the reading is that of KPT. I am also glad that Piano (2016) 9 confirmed by autopsy the supplement κόσ]μου which I proposed behind the iron curtain in Lebedev (1989b) 39. 69 Betegh (2004)’s objection (p. 378) that a vortex cannot be “in the air” is futile. See e.g. Plut. De Is. et Os. 373d4 ff.: αὐχμῶν δ᾽ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ πνευμάτων ἀτόπων, αὖθις τε πρηστήρων κτλ., “[Seth is the cause] of droughts in the air, as well as enormous winds and hurricans (vel tornados)”; Antiph. fr. 29 Pendrick (= 87 B 29 DK): ὅταν οὖν γένωνται ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ὄμβροι τε καὶ πνεύματα ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις, τότε συστρέφεται τὸ ὕδωρ (...) καὶ συνεστράφη ὑπό τε τοῦ πνεύματος εἰλλόμενον (...). Exactly as in PDerv., πνεῦμα in such contexts means “wind,” not “breath.” Antiphon explains the formation of hail (cf. Pendrick [2002] comm. ad loc.), but similar language is used by the Hippocratic author of Aer. 8 in the explanation of the formation of rain (ὁκόταν δέ κου ἀθροισθῇ καὶ ξυστραφῇ ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ ἀνέμων κτλ.). It could be used in the description of

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 515

bodies move to the center of the vortex, and light ones move to the perifery: this explanation fits perfectly with καὶ τὰ κάτω [φερό]μενα in l. 1. The conjunction καί presupposes τὰ ἄνω φερόμενα in the preceding lines. In col. XVII, the author interpreted the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ in terms of Anaxagorean cosmogony. In Anaxagoras’ cosmogony the operation of the Nous (identified by the Derveni author with Zeus) produces a vortex. We take πνεῦμα as “wind,” not as “breath” or “air” in general. The expression ἐν τῶι ἀέρι  [πνε]ῦμα (XVIII.2) is a translation into κοινά of the ‘idiomatic’ expression μοῖρα Διός. The link between Μοῖραν | ἐπικλῶσαι (XVIII.3–4) and the air-cosmogony is transparent: both κλώθω and δινέω mean “to spin”; the author most likely interprets “the spinning of Moira” as “whirling of wind.” Moira and ananke pertain to the same semantic field and are often associated with each other (cf. PDerv., col. XXV.7). The identification of δίνη and μοῖρα may be compared with Democritus ap. Diog. Laërt. 9.45: πάντα τε κατ’ ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει.70 The concept of Nous/Vortex determining the past, present, and future derives from Anaxagoras (59 B 12 DK). It is obvious that δίνη is intended as an etymon of Δία. Taking into account the uniqueness of this etymology, we can identify Ar. Nub. 380 and 828 as quotations from Derv.T. PDerv., col. XVIII also contains a remarkable parallel to the ‘linguistic mistake’ theory of the origin of religion in Tiresias’ logos. According to the Derveni author, when Orpheus said Ζεὺς ἐγένετο, “Zeus happened,” he meant that a cosmogonical vortex started in the air; people misunderstood his words (οὐ γινώσκοντ]ες τὰ λεγόμενα, XVIII.14) and decided that someone called “Zeus” was “born.” As a result of this misunderstanding, an anthropomorphic pseudo-god Zeus is still worshipped by the Greeks. In fact, they worship a cosmogonical vortex in the air (which is identical with the cosmic mind, φρόνησις) and when they say Μοῖραν ἐπικλῶσαι (XVΙΙI.4), they erroneously think of a mythical Moira, the spinner; the original – and the correct – meaning (= whirlwind in the air) intended by Orpheus has been forgotten, so they use the correct words without understanding their meaning: λέγοντες μὲν ὀρθῶς, οὐκ εἰδότες δέ (XVIII.5).

the formation of world-masses with equal success. In his comment on Antiph. fr. 29 Pendrick, Galen (in Epid. 3.33, p. 17a681 Kühn = pp. 128.5–9, 129.1–8 Wenkelbach) overstates his thesis that εἰλούμενον means “is condensed” and nothing else. The verb συστρέφεσθαι makes it clear that the connotation of “rolling” and “winding” is also present; on συστροφή “whirlwind,” see LSJ s.v. II, 3. 70 = 68 A 1 DK. Ἀνάγκη is a buzzword and a fundamental concept in Democritus’ cosmogony and mechanics: see the texts 22–30 collected by Luria (1970) 33–35 under the heading Necessitas naturalis.

516 

 Andrei Lebedev

(T5) Aristophanes [II] There are more parallels between PDerv. and Aristophanes’ Clouds. See, first of all, PDerv., col. XIX.14–15: ἀρχὸν δὲ [ἁπάντων ἔφη εἶναι α]ὐτὸν | [ὅτι πάντα ἄρ]χεται διὰ [τοῦτον κτλ. This is one of the earliest attestations of what has become later the standard philosophical etymology of the name of Zeus Δία = διά: Zeus is a universal causa activa that determines everything. The cosmogonical motif of the “vortex” reappears twice in col. XXIII.11: “ἶνας δ᾽ ἐγκατ[έλε]ξ᾽ Ἀχελωΐου ἀργυ[ρ]οδίνε[ω.”] | τῶ[ι] ὕδα[τι] ὅλ[ως τίθη]σι Ἀχελῶιον ὄνομ[α. ὅ]τι δὲ | τὰ[ς] δίνα[ς ἐγκαταλ]έξαι ἐστ[ι ]δε ἐγκατῶ[σ]αι . The commentator takes Achelous as a general term for the element of water and reinterprets ἐγκαταλ]έξαι71 “built in” as ἐγκατῶσαι “threw down,” i.e. Zeus/Air “pushed down water by vortex.” This is a plausible source of Ar. Nub. 376–381: ΣΩ. ὅταν ἐμπλησθῶσ᾽ ὕδατος πολλοῦ κἀναγκασθῶσι φέρεσθαι (sc. Νεφέλαι)  / κατακριμνάμεναι πλήρεις ὄμβρου δι᾽ ἀνάγκην, εἶτα βαρεῖαι / εἰς ἀλλήλας ἐμπίπτουσαι ῥήγνυνται καὶ παταγοῦσιν. / ΣΤ. ὁ δ᾽ ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτάς – οὐχ ὁ Ζεύς; – ὥστε φέρεσθαι; / ΣΩ. ἥκιστ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ αἰθέριος Δῖνος. ΣΤ. Δῖνος; τουτί μ᾽ ἐλελήθει, / ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ Δῖνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων. There can be little doubt that Dinos/Zeus derives from the same Sophistic source as ἀμέτρητ’ Ἀήρ (v. 264) and the whole ‘atheistic’ meteoroleschia of the Clouds. This source is almost certainly Prodicus of Ceos who is mentioned by name in v. 361 as a king of meteorosophistai second only to Socrates.72 Nephelai would not believe any other meteorosophistes except Prodicus because he surpasses all other sophists in wisdom and judgement: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ᾽ ὑπακούσαιμεν τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν / πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ, τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ γνώμης οὕνεκα, κτλ. (vv. 360–361). It has been thought by some that the cryptic allusions to mysteries and initiation in the text of the comedy are connected with the Eleusinian mysteries.73 However, we should rule out a limine the possibility that Aristophanes is mocking the Eleusinian mysteries. The language of mysteries and initiation in Aristophanes is a metaphorical code that exclusively belongs to the iconic, and not to the referential, level of text.74 On the referential level, we have the target of these allusions: Socrates and Prodicus, who represent all sophists and the new education perceived as a danger to traditional religion and morality. The 71 West (1983) 115. 72 Ambrose (1983) esp. 138 on Dinos. 73 Byl (1994) and (2007). 74 Incidentally, the ‘initiatory’ metaphors and analogies were used seriously by philosophical schools themselves, especially in the Pythagorean and Platonic tradition. See Riedweg (1987).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 517

φροντιστήριον is assimilated to the Eleusinian τελεστήριον by an allusive homoi­ oteleuton. Socrates is assimilated to a hierophant (v. 359: λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερεῦ),75 his teaching to initiation, and natural phenomena, deified according to Prodicus’ theory of religion, are assimilated to the new gods: “Oh my Lord, the Infinite Air,” Vortex/Zeus. The Clouds are sources of all kinds of useful knowledge that provide the sophists with money and means of living (τὰ ὠφελοῦντα τὸν βίον).76 The hyponoia – for those who understand correctly – of this allusions was that Socrates “introduces new divinities not recognized by the polis.” By 423 BC, the psephisma of Diopeithes had been already enacted, so Aristophanes’ allusions look like a cryptic message addressed to Socrates and Prodicus, an accusation of asebeia and a threat at the same time. Mayhew has pointed to additional possible allusions to Prodicus’ Horai in Aristophanes’ lost comedy Ὧραι. In this comedy, both Chaerephon, Socrates’ associate, and Prodicus’ associate Callias, whose house was a famous club of sophists and intellectuals in Athens, appear.77 Xenophon the Socratic admired Prodicus. Prodicus’ art of precise distinction of near-synonyms and Socrates’ quest for the exact definition of moral concepts shows a clear similarities and have been compared.78 Dover’s perception of the image of ‘Socrates’ in the Clouds as a composite portrait of a contemporary sophist is essentially correct.79 All attempts to take the meteoroleschia of Socrates at face value and to ascribe it to some ‘early stage’ of his philosophical career are ill-founded.80 Such attempts would make us believe that if we weigh the consensus of Plato, Aristotle, Xenophones, and other Socratics that the historical Socrates was predominantly or exclusively a moral philosopher who dismissed, on the one hand, the Ionian ‘natural history’ (including Anaxagoras) as worthless, and an isolated, grotesque, and malicious caricature in a politically motivated comedy, on the other hand, the latter will have more weight. However, Dover somewhat underestimated the ‘proportion’ of Prodicus’ features in this composite portrait.81 In what Dover describes as a

75 This is a unique metaphor in Aristophanes: cf. Taillardat (1962) 287 and 507. 76 Ar. Nub. 331 ff. This is an exact parallel to the birds, the new gods in Aristophanes’ Birds, who claim to be the source of beneficial things for humans. 77 Ar. frs. 583–584 PCG. Cf. Mayhew (2011) 247–248. 78 On this point, see Reesor (1983). 79 Dover (1968) xlix ff. 80 Contra Janko (2001) 13, who tries to revive the implausible hypothesis of Winspear/Silverberg (1960) 11 ff. 81 This was corrected by Willink (1983) 26: “(…) the arch-sophistic ‘Socrates’ satirised in the play is in several features (e.g. fee-taking, philological quibbling, heretical cosmology) specifically modelled on what we may take as to have been the popular view of arch-sophist Prodikos.”

518 

 Andrei Lebedev

“grotesque anticlimax” (vv. 359–363),82 the Clouds assure Socrates that they would not listen to any other “meteorosophist” except Prodicus and Socrates, the former because of his wisdom and judgment, and the latter because of his meaningless wanderings barefoot through the streets as he endured all kinds of discomfort. Prima facie this anticlimax looks like a comical absurdity, but behind it lurks Aristophanes’ excuse for ascribing the cosmological ‘wisdom’ of Prodicus to Socrates. It is Prodicus who has knowledge of this science and is the leading ‘meteorosophist’; Socrates is just an uneducated and wretched vagabond. The image of an ἄστεγος vagabond enduring evils (κακά) is an allusion to the popular Socratic motif of καρτερία, i.e. to Socrates’ ethics, and not to a physical doctrine he never held, whereas the alleged ‘ignorance’ of Socrates may be Aristophanes’ mocking parody of Socrates’ thesis ἓν οἶδα ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα.

(T6) Aristophanes [III] The quasi-Orphic ornithogony in Aristophanes’ Birds, vv. 709 ff., is introduced by a direct reference to Prodicus. Indeed, the choir of birds sings (Av. 690–692): 690  ἵν᾽ ἀκούσαντες πάντα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, φύσιν οἰωνῶν γένεσίν τε θεῶν ποταμῶν τ᾽ Ἐρέβους τε Χάους τε εἰδότες ὀρθῶς, παρ’ ἐμοῦ Προδίκῳ κλάειν εἴπητε τὸ λοιπόν. (...) you (= humans) will hear from us everything in the correct way about celestial things, / the nature of birds, the origin of gods, as well as of rivers, of the Chaos and Erebos, / and once you know all this correctly, you may tell Prodicus to weep for the rest of his life. The Birds’ cosmogony is with good reason included in the editions of Orphica as early evidence of the Attic version of the Orphic theogony with the primeval Nyx (rather than Kronos as in the Rhapsodies), who produces the world-egg from which the firstborn god (Eros) comes out. But it would be preposterous to take this text as a parody of ‘Orpheus’ theogony’ itself. First, mocking a Hieros logos in Athens after the psephisma of Diopeithes was a risky enterprise, and second, the emphatic mention of Prodicus from the start is left unaccounted for and unintelligible. Since we know now that Prodicus wrote an allegorical naturalistic interpretation of Orphic theogony, we must admit that the target of Aristophanes’ agonistic mockery is Prodicus’ allegorical interpretation of the Orphic theogony 82 Dover (1968) lv.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 519

rather than the Orphic theogony itself.83 It is hard to imagine that a rather traditional poet could mock a Hieros logos in his system of values. And it is only natural that he ridicules an ‘atheistic’ interpretation of a Hieros logos. The birds’ version of the origin of the world and their ‘ornithological’ explanation of the origin of gods (agonistically counterposed to Prodicus’ ‘meteorosophistic’ version) and of the meaning of the Orphic cosmic ‘egg’ will surpass Prodicus in their alleged “correct understanding” (ὀρθῶς εἰδέναι). Thus, one may forget about Prodicus’ history of the human race and his theory of the origin of religion allegedly supported by the ‘evidence’ of the ‘ancient poetry’ of Orpheus. The adverb ὀρθῶς, correctly, is emphatically repeated twice; it alludes to Prodicus’ terminology and his claims of correctness, ὀρθότης: the phrase εἰδότες ὀρθῶς in Av. 692 looks like a quotation of ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσιν in PDerv., col. XXIII.2. Aristophanes knew and perfectly understood that Prodicus’ playful interpretation of Orphic theogony as an alleged ancient proof of Anaxagoras’ physiologia was a hoax and a mockery of religious conservatives like Diopeithes. In this case, the purpose of his mock cosmogony was to surpass Prodicus in mockery and to ridicule the Sophistic Kultur­ geschichte, thus defending the traditional values of an ordinary Athenian. Mayhew, with a very good reason, criticizes DK for underestimating the importance of the chorus’ parabasis in Birds as evidence for Prodicus’ doctrines. Therefore, he prints under test. 69 the vv. 685–725 that expand the cosmogony in a narrow sense by preceding vv. 585–589 (the original miserable condition of humanity) and following Prodicus’ appearance in vv. 693–722 that, apart from theogony, contain a parody of Prodicus’ ‘utilitarian’ theory of religion. We understand these verses as follows: after you hear our Theogony, you may say goodbye to Prodicus’ version. Prodicus’ Horai are parodied in the context of Ar. Av. 708 ff.: πάντα δὲ θνητοῖς ἐστιν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν τῶν ὀρνίθων τὰ μέγιστα. πρῶτα μὲν ὥρας φαίνομεν ἡμεῖς ἦρος χειμῶνος ὀπώρας· 710  σπείρειν μέν, ὅταν γέρανος κρώζουσ᾽ εἰς τὴν Λιβύην μεταχωρῇ· καὶ πηδάλιον τότε ναυκλήρῳ φράζει κρεμάσαντι καθεύδειν, κτλ. And the greatest things for mortals are from us, the birds. / First, we make known the seasons: spring, winter, and summer; / when migrating to Libya, the crane cries “Sow your seeds” / – and tells the shipowner “Time to hang up your rudder and sleep” – etc.84

83 For a survey of modern opinions see Bernabé’s OF II.1, 73 ad fr. 64. 84 Transl. by R. Mayhew.

520 

 Andrei Lebedev

The “greatest things” (τὰ μέγιστα) in this context are synonymous with the “most useful things.” According to Prodicus’ theory of the origin of religion, humans first deified τὰ ὠφελοῦντα, things beneficial for the human race; the elements, the sun and the moon, which are indispensable for agriculture. PDerv., col. XXIV describes the usefulness of the moon for telling time and recognizing the seasons: without the moon, agriculture and navigation would be impossible. The choir of the birds, after announcing a competition with Prodicus, claims that thumans have been taught by the ‘signals’ that the birds sent to them to recognize the seasons; without birds, there would be no agriculture and navigation. Exactly the same crafts are mentioned in exactly the same order in PDerv., col. XXIV.8–9. The hyponoia of this in Aristophanes’ Birds is: the utility of birds for the human race far surpasses that of the traditional gods and of Prodicus’ “useful things,” therefore the birds win the agon with Prodicus, and they should be deified for their utility and proclaimed new gods. A number of other useful crafts accomplished by birds’ signals is adduced in the following lines: the crane signals when to weave (ὑφαίνειν) a winter cloak, “the kite appears after this to make known the change of season (ἑτέραν ὥραν), / when it’s the season to shear (πεκτεῖν) the sheep’s wool, in spring; then the swallow / appears when it’s necessary to exchange (πωλεῖν) the winter cloak and buy (πρίασθαι) some summer clothes.”85 The birds are equally indispensable for trade, for acquiring the means to live, and for man’s marriage.86 None of these crafts (except agriculture and navigation) is attested nominatim either in Prodicus or in PDerv., but this may be due to chance and the fragmentary state of our sources. Themistius’ encomium of agriculture ascribes the theory that agriculture is the cradle of religion, civilization, and all human crafts to Prodicus. It is hardly accidental that in the birds’ competition with Prodicus, different crafts are correlated with different “Seasons” (Ὧραι). The protogonos Eros “similar to the windy whirlwinds” (εἰκὼς ἀνεμώκεσι δίναις) in v. 697 alludes to the cosmogonical vortex and connects the ‘ornithogony’ of the Birds with the ‘cosmology’ of the Clouds.

(T7) Aristophanes [IV] The very idea of ‘surpassing’ Prodicus’ allegorical cosmogony in the comical agon in Aves by substituting the natural elements with the image of ‘birds,’ the new

85 Ar. Av. 713–715 (transl. by R. Mayhew). 86 Ar. Av. 718: πρός τ᾽ ἐμπορίαν, καὶ πρὸς βιότου κτῆσιν, καὶ πρὸς γάμον ἀνδρός.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 521

gods of the dream city of eternal happiness, more powerful and more ‘beneficial’ for the human race than Zeus and the Olympians, seems to have been suggested to Aristophanes by another passage of Derv.T (Prodicus), i.e. col. II in which we propose some new readings: PDerv., col. II.6–9 ἔτι δ᾽ ἐξαιρέ]τους τιμὰς [χ]ρὴ κ[αὶ τῆι Μήτ]ιδι νεῖμ[αι, δαίμοσι δ’] ἑκάστο[ι]ς ὀρνί θ ειόν τι κα[ίειν. καὶ] ἐπέθηκε[ν ὕμνους ἁρμ]οστο[ὺ]ς τῆι  μουσ[ι]κῆι. τούτων δὲ] τὰ σημαι[νόμενα ἔλαθε το]ὺς κτλ.87 And besides that (sc. besides honouring Erinyes), one should offer exceptional honours to Metis and burn something avian. And he (sc. Orpheus) added hymns [or poems] that suit the music, but their meaning escapes (sc. those who lack understanding) etc. The reading τ[ῆι Εὐμεν]ίδι at the beginning of l. 7 proposed by KPT is unlikely for two reasons. First, such a “collective singular” (KPT, 144) is unlikely as such and is nowhere attested. Second, honouring Erinyes has already been mentioned in the preceding lines, and this fact makes ἔτι, “and besides that,” pointless. In ll. 6–7, the author adds to the honouring of Erinyes the honouring of yet another (ἔτι ~ καί) daimon and the requirement of avian offerings to all daimones (i.e. not only Erinyes/Eumenides). It is hard to find a more plausible name of a daimon ending on -ιδι in the dative than Metis attested in col. XV.13: Μῆτιν κάπ[πιεν ἠδὲ λάβ]εν88 βασιληίδα τιμ[ήν], “[Zeus] swallowed Wisdom (Metis) and received the royal honor.” The author of the Derveni theogony (Onomacritus, according to Aristotle) borrowed from Hesiod the epithet of Zeus μητίετα which is attested in PDerv., col. XV.6 and 11. It is hard to see why he could not borrow the kataposis of Metis in Hes. Theog. 886–900 as well. The phrase βασιληίδα τιμ[ήν (XV.13) quotes Hes. Theog. 892.89 He adapts it to the Orphic narrative: Zeus follows the prophecy of Night and Kronos rather than that of Ouranos and Gaia, and Metis is not just a personification of Wisdom and not Zeus’ “first wife” (Rhea/Demeter in col. XXII), but one of the names of the daimon Protogonos. 87 The supplements κ[αὶ τῆι Μήτ]ιδι in l. 7 and ἔλαθε το]ὺς in l. 9 are ours, the rest by KPT. 88 κάπ[πιεν Kotwick (2017) 324 : κάπ[πινεν Santamaría (2012) 71 : ἠδὲ λάβ]εν vel ἠδ᾽ ἔλαβ]εν temptavi. 89 Contra KPT, 213, who are on this point vague and indecisive.

522 

 Andrei Lebedev

It is tempting to take ὀρνίθ ειόν τι in col. II.7 as a reference to the egg.90 The Derveni author must have discussed the cosmogonical egg from which Protogonos “sprouted first” in the lost parts of the papyrus. It has been preserved in Aristophanes’ ornithogony:91 the Derveni author may have allegorically interpreted it as an Anaxagorean mixture of various ‘seeds’ of all things (a similar naturalistic interpretation of the Orphic egg can be found in the ps.­Clementina).92 Avian offerings are for the second time mentioned in col. VI.8–11: “Mystai perform preliminary sacrifice (προθύουσι) to Eumenides in the same way as magoi, for Eumenides are souls (ψυχα[ὶ). For this reason (vel therefore, ὧν ἕνεκ[εν) one who is going to sacrifice to gods [would] first offer something avian (ὀ[ρ]νίθ[ε]ιον) etc.” Why is the identification of Eumenides/Erinyes with the souls presented as a necessary reason to sacrifice first “something avian”? This prima facie strange inference can be explained only on the grounds of the allegorical interpretation of the Eumenides-souls as ‘air.’ In Greek popular ‘folk-zoology’ and in Empedocles, the three elements (world-masses) of earth, sea, and air (sky) were correlated with three kinds of animals: terrestrial animals, fishes, and birds. The Derveni author is not a priest and he does not give in these lines ritual prescriptions: he ‘decodes’ in the teletai established by Orpheus the same ‘ancient wisdom’ as in his poetry. The commentator assumes that first offerings are due to the first gods. Both magoi and mystai converge in that they first make offerings to the souls that, like birds, reside in the air and (according to the commentator) are nothing but air.93 It follows that ancient religion accords with modern science: both in Orpheus and in the Anaxagorean physics, ‘air’ is the original source of everything.94 Once we admit that PDerv. is a work of Prodicus parodied by Aristophanes in the Birds, it is reasonable to conclude that the choice of ‘birds’ as ‘new gods,’ more ‘ancient’ than Olympians, was also suggested to Aristophanes by the same work on the origin of religion and was intended as a mocking parody of it.

90 See our objections to Janko’s text in n. 4 above. 91 So rightly Brisson (1990) 2876–2877; contra Betegh (2006) 148. 92 [Clem. Rom.] Recogn. 6.5.2: ὠιόν (...) Στοιχεῖα καὶ χρώματα παντοδαπὰ ἐκτεκεῖν δυνάμενον. 93 A similar logic underlies the discussion of the etymology of Hestia in Pl. Cra. 401c1–d7: Hestia’s genealogical priority can be deduced from the fact that she comes first in the order of sacrifices. Cf. Sedley (2003) 99 ff. 94 Some modern commentators of PDerv. do not seem to realize that in Anaxagorean physics there is no contradiction between the conception of matter as a mixture of various ‘seeds’ (sper­ mata) and ‘air.’ Both in Anaxagoras and in Democritus the traditional four ‘elements’ are not ‘chemical’ elements (immutable simple substances, as in Empedocles), but phenomenal aggregate states of matter: gaseous, liquid, solid. In Anaxagoras’ cosmogony the original (pre-cosmic) universal mixture appears in a gaseous state, i.e. it is described as ἀήρ καὶ αἰθήρ.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 523

(T8) Aristophanes [V] A metaphorical scene of prothysis appears in another comedy that targeted Prodicus’ air-cosmogony and exposed its ‘atheistic’ implications. In Nub. 606–608, Strepsiades experiences sacred awe as he enters the phrontisterion, the entrance of which is compared with a ritual katabasis to the oracular cave of Trophonius; he asks Socrates to give him first (πρότερον) a sacrificial honey-cake (μελιτοῦτταν). Before the initiation (τελετή) into the mysteria of Sophistic wisdom inside the phrontisterion, the old man wishes to perform the “preliminary offering” (πρόθυσις) of honey-cakes to placate the “wise souls” that inhabit the school of Socrates (cf. Nub. 94: ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ φρονιστήριον). All this looks like a parody of PDerv., col. VI. For further evidence on avian imagery and Prodicus see § (IX) below.

(T9) Plutarch [I] Plutarch’s fragmentary work Περὶ τῶν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς Δαιδάλων seems to draw on several sources, one of which looks like a summary of something very similar to the Derveni treaise:95 Plut. fr. 157 Sandbach ap. Euseb. Praep. evang., proem. 3.1.1: Λαβὼν ἀνάγνωθι τοῦ Χαιρωνέως Πλουτάρχου τὰς περὶ τῶν προκειμένων φωνάς, ἐν αἷς σεμνολογῶν παρατρέπει τοὺς μύθους ἐφ᾽ ἅς φησιν εἶναι μυστηριώδεις θεολογίας, ἃς δὴ ἐκκαλύπτων τὸν μὲν Διόνυσον τὴν μέθην εἶναί φησιν (...) τὴν δὲ Ἥραν τὴν γαμήλιον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συμβίωσιν· εἶθ᾽, ὥσπερ ἐπιλελησμένος τῆς ἀποδόσεως, ἑτέραν ἑξῆς ἐπισυνάψας ἱστορίαν τὴν Ἥραν οὐκέτι ὡς τὸ πρότερον ἀλλὰ τὴν Γῆν ὀνομάζει, λήθην δὲ καὶ νύκτα τὴν Λητώ· καὶ πάλιν τῆν αὐτὴν τῇ Λητοῖ φησιν εἶναι τῆν Ἥραν· εἶτ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰσάγεται αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεὺς εἰς τὴν αἰθέριον δύναμιν ἀλληγορούμενος. καὶ τί με δεῖ ταῦτα προλαμβάνειν, αὐτοῦ παρὸν ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὧδέ πως ἐν οἷς ἐπέγραψεν Περὶ τῶν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς Δαιδάλων τὰ λανθάνοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς τῆς ἀπορρήτου περὶ θεῶν φυσιολογίας ἐκφαίνοντος; Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παλαιὰ φυσιολογία καὶ παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις λόγος ἦν φυσικὸς ἐγκεκαλυμμένος μύθοις, τὰ πολλὰ δι᾽ αἰνιγμάτων καὶ ὑπονοιῶν ἐπίκρυφος, καὶ μυστηριώδης, θεολογία τά τε λαλούμενα τῶν σιγωμένων ἀσαφέστερα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσα καὶ τὰ σιγώμενα τῶν λαλουμένων ὑποπτότερα, κατάδηλόν ἐστιν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσι καὶ τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς καὶ Φρυγίοις λόγοις· μάλιστα δ᾽ οἱ περὶ

95  Parts of this text in OF 671 (= Diag. fr. 94 Winiarczyk = FGrHist 800 T 9).

524 

 Andrei Lebedev

τὰς τελετὰς ὀργιασμοὶ καὶ τὰ δρώμενα συμβολικῶς ἐν ταῖς ἱερουργίαις τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἐμφαίνει διάνοιαν. κτλ. “Take up Plutarch of Chaeronea and read his statements about our subject, statements in which he majestically converts the myths into what he says are ‘mystic theologies’; purporting to reveal these, he says that Dionysos is intoxication (...) and Hera the married life of husband and wife. Then, as if he has forgotten this interpretation, he tacks on directly afterwards a different account: contrary to his previous view he now calls Hera the earth, and Leto forgetfulness and night. Then again he says that Hera and Leto are identical; next on top of this Zeus is introduced, allegorized into the power of aether. Why should I anticipate all this, when we can listen to the fellow himself? In the work he entitles On the Festival of Images at Plataea he discloses what most men are unaware of in the secret natural science that attaches to the gods, and does so as follows. Ancient natural science, among both Greek and foreign nations, took the form of a scientific account hidden in mythology, veiled for the most part in riddles and hints, or of a theology as is found in mystery-ceremonies: in it what is spoken is less clear to the masses that what is unsaid, and what is unsaid gives more speculation than what is said. This is evident from the Orphic poems and the Egyptian and Phrygian doctrines. But nothing does more to reveal what was in the mind of the ancients than the rites of initiation and the ritual acts that are performed in religious services with symbolical intent.”96 Note the following similarities of Plutarch’s source with the Derveni treatise. The enigmatic Orphic poetry and mysteries are taken as remnants of the ancient physiologia, and alternative rationalistic interpretations confuse the reader: the equation of gods Ge = Hera = Leto is stated; Zeus is an airy substance; Hera is also ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς γαμήλιος συμβίωσις; Leto is night and a shadow of the earth that eclipses the sun. The identification of Hera with Ge is found in PDerv., col. XXII.7. Dionysos’ association with wine is attested for Prodicus in test. 71, 74, and 76 Mayhew and in the passage of Themistius quoted above (test. 77 Mayhew). Λητώ = λήθη is found in Pl. Cra. 406a8. The etymology of the name of Apollo in Plutarch’s fr. 157 Sandbach (§ 5: [...] Ἀπόλλων δ’ ὡς ‘ἀπαλλάττων’ καὶ ‘ἀπολύων’ τῶν περὶ σῶμα νοσηματικῶν παθῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. κτλ.) is paralleled in Pl. Cra. 405b9–c1 (κατὰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰς ἀπολύσεις τε καὶ ἀπολούσεις, ὡς ἰατρὸς ὢν τῶν τοιούτων, “Ἀπολούων” ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοίτο). The common source must be Prodicus/the Derveni author.

96 Transl. by F. H. Sandbach, with slight alterations.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 525

(T10) Plutarch [II] Plut. De Pyth orac. 407b5 ff.: Ὀνομάκριτοι δ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ Πρόδικοι (Botzon : προδόται MSS) καὶ Κιναίθωνες (Botzon : κινέσωνες MSS) κτλ. Bernabé identifies the Plutarchean Prodicus with Prodicus Φωκαεύς, the alleged author of the Minyas (test. 3, PEG I, 137). However, Plutarch gives a list not of epic poets qua poets, but of χρησμολόγοι and (from his point of view) pretentious charlatans who discredited oracles with their theatrical grandeur (τραγῳδία καὶ ὄγκος), which he contrasts with the simple style of the genuine oracles of the Pythia. The Rhapsodic Theogony was not a literary ‘poem’ composed by an ordinary poet: Ἱεροὶ λόγοι means that it was conceived and presented as divine word, as a kind of χρησμός inspired by Apollo, with Orpheus as his prophet. It is possible therefore that Ὀνομάκριτοι (...) καὶ Πρόδικοι in Plutarch is a kind of ‘hendiadys’ that refers both to the bombastic Theogony of ps.-Orpheus falsified by Onomacritus and its disreputable and scandalous (in Plutarch’s opinion) interpreter Prodicus.97

(T11) Epiphanius Apart from the sun and the moon, Epiphanius also includes the four elements in the list of the deified ‘beneficial’ things from Prodicus’ theory of religion: Πρόδικος τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα θεοὺς καλεῖ, εἶτα ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων πᾶσι τὸ ζωτικὸν ἔλεγεν ὑπάρχειν,98 “Prodicus calls ‘gods’ the four elements, and then the sun and the moon, for it is from them, in his opinion, that all men get their means of living.” All six are attested in the allegoresis of PDerv. as ‘real’ referential meanings of the mythical names: according to the Derveni author, air (and mind) was deified as ‘Zeus,’ fire and sun as Protogonos, the water element as Achelous, earth (Ge) as Demeter, the moon as Selene. A very similar naturalistic interpretation of Greek mythology was parodied as ‘atheistic’ already by Epicharmus.99

97 Clem. Al. Strom. 1.131.3 (= OF 707) attributes Orpheus’ ‘Descent to Hades’ to a certain Prodicus of Samos: (...) τήν τε εἰς Ἅιδου κατάβασιν Προδίκου (τοῦ Σαμίου sc. εἶναι λέγουσι); Suda s.v. Ὀρφεύς (= OF 709) has Προδίκου τοῦ Περινθίου. 98 Epiph. Exp. fid. 9.25, p. 507 Holl (= Prodic. test. 78 Mayhew). Cf. Cole (1990) 156. 99 Epich. fr. 199 PCG. For a detailed comparison with PDerv., see Lebedev (2017d) 19–22.

526 

 Andrei Lebedev

(T12) Orion of Thebes and George Syncellus Sync. Chron. 1.140c, pp. 174–175 Mosshammer (= 61 A 6 DK): ἑρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεοὺς νοῦν μὲν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τέχνην, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ “χειρῶν ὀλλυμένων ἔρρει πολύμητις Ἀθήνη,” “The followers of Anaxagoras interpret the mythical gods as follows: Zeus is mind and Athena is technical skill, whence the verse ‘once the hands have perished, the skilful Athena is gone’.” Orion Theb. Etymol., lett. Χ, 163.23–25 Sturz: . ἀπὸ τῆς χρήσεως, ὡσανεὶ χρήσιες (...). οὐδεμία γὰρ τέχνη προκόπτει δίχα χειρῶν, Ὀρφεὺς · χειρῶν (...) Ἀθήνη, “The word kheires ‘hands’ comes from khresis ‘use’ (…). For no skill advances without hands; [as the poet] Orpheus [says]: ‘once the hands (…) Athena’.” This is rare evidence that directly links the Anaxagorean allegoresis of the Greek mythology specifically with the Orphic poems.100 DK identify these ‘Anaxagoreans’ with Metrodorus of Lampsacus.101 But there is no evidence that Metrodorus worked on Orphic poems, the attested title of his allegorical work is On Homer, and all cited examples of his allegorical interpretations concern Homeric gods and heroes. The interpretation of Zeus as mind (nous) is attested in PDerv., but not for Metrodorus. According to Tatian, Metrodorus interpreted Athena not as τέχνη, but as a physical element or an arrangement of elements.102 Prodicus’ theory of religion originating from agriculture and other τέχναι useful for the human race seems to be a more plausible source. The battle of ideas between Ionian naturalists (adept at naturalistic monism) and religiously minded dualists in the second half of the 5th cent. BC in Athens was perceived by contemporaries as a conflict between Anaxagoreioi and Pythagoreioi. Most Sophists joined the former camp. The verse is quoted by three Byzantine authors and by the 5th-cent. AD grammarian Orion. Only Orion attributes the verse to Orpheus. Followed by Meletius (9th cent. AD), he quotes the verse on Athena as τέχνη to support the etymology χεῖρες ~ χρήσεις. Syncellus (8th cent. AD) and Cedrenus (11th cent. AD) quote it as supporting the rationalistic interpretation of the myth about the creation of man by Prometheus. Both Kern and Bernabé are right when they print in their editions of Orphic fragments πολύεργος, a very rare epithet unlike πολύμητις, the standard epithet of Odysseus in Homer.103 But πολύμητις is not a corruption due to 100 OF 856. 101 Cf. Sider (1997) 138. 102 Metrod. Lamps. 61 A 3 DK (= Tatian. Ad Gr. 21). 103 Kern explained it as a poetic equivalent of the epiklesis Ἐργάνη. It does not mean “hardworking” as in Nicander (Ther. 4: πολύεργος ἀροτρεύς), but rather “master of many works,”

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 527

chance: authors who connect the verse with “hands” prefer “one of many works,” whereas the authors who cite it in support of the allegorical interpretation of another famous mythical trickster, Prometheus, prefer “one of great prudence.” It is striking that both the etymology of χεῖρες and the allegorical interpretation of the name Prometheus seem to be related with Prodicus’ ‘utilitarian’ theory of the origin of religion: χρῆσις, χρήσιμον is a synonym of ὠφέλιμον, ‘useful,’ and both Athena and Prometheus fit perfectly into the category of πρῶτοι εὑρεταί that played an important role in Prodicus’ second stage. Since the interpretation of Zeus as ‘mind’ is attested in PDerv., chances are that Athena and Prometheus were mentioned in the lost parts of the papyrus. Τhe myth about Prometheus moulding (πλάττειν) man from clay is explained in Syncellus’ source as an allegory of forming man by knowledge and reshaping him from apaideusia state to the state of paideia. Both Syncellus and a scholiast on Aesch. PV 120.17 add to this allegory a quotation from the Σοφισταί of Plato Comicus (fr. 145 PCG): προμηθία γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ νοῦς. Some have thought that the title Sophists refers to tragic poets and musicians only, but the evidence for this is weak.104 The group of Sophistai mocked in the comedy may well have included both poets and sophists in the familiar sense, like Prodicus. One puzzle remains unsolved. The verse about Athena as a “master of many works,” i.e. τέχναι, is very different from the verses of Orphic theogony quoted in PDerv.: it looks like a gnome or a verse from elegy rather than a fragment of epic mythical narrative. It is hard to imagine what its original context in a theogony might have been. And even more puzzling is the fact that the author of this verse seems to share Prodicus’ somewhat unholy explanation of traditional gods as personifications of ‘useful’ τέχναι. Can it be a playful fabrication of Prodicus himself? Philochorus has been plausibly identified as the source of these quotations.105 Dirk Obbink, on independent grounds, has convincingly argued that Philochorus quoted the Derveni Papyrus.106 Objections to Obbink’s thesis (e.g., Philochorus i.e. presiding over different crafts (τέχναι). Πολύτεχνος is the epithet of Athena (and Hephaestus) in Solon’s fr. 13.49 West. 104 The scholiast on Ar. Nub. 331a (= Plato Com. fr. 149 PCG) commenting on σοφισταί tells us that the word is applied not only to those who study celestial phenomena, but – improperly (καταχρηστικῶς) – also to specialists in all kinds of knowledge, even to a flute player Bacchylides in Plato Comicus’s Sophistai. He does not tell that all Sophistai in this play were musicians like Bacchylides: on the contrary, he quotes Bacchylides as an extraordinary case. 105 Hussey (1999) 315. 106 Obbink (1994) 110–135. FGrHist 328 F 185 is to be compared with Phld. De piet., PHerc.1428, col. 6.16–26 Henrichs (= Chrysipp. SVF II 1078).

528 

 Andrei Lebedev

and the Derveni author may quote the same source independently)107 do not take into account Philochorus’ general predilection for rationalistic and ‘euhemeristic’ interpretations of myth which can be best explained by the influence exerted on him by Prodicus’ work on religion and Orphic theogony.108 Philochorus wrote a Περὶ μυστηρίων and a Περὶ μαντικῆς in which he mentioned Orpheus and quoted two Orphic verses on prophecies.109 Therefore, he may well have consulted the influential work of Prodicus on the same subject. Furthermore, neither ἡ αὐτή (sc. ἐστίν) in PDerv., col. XXII.7 nor τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι in Philodemus’ On Piety (PHerc. 1428, col. 5.3 Henrichs) is a part of the verse, i.e. of the supposed ‘common source.’ Unlike the names of the gods, it is in both cases a piece of the commentary or a paraphrase and therefore reflects the commentator’s linguistic preference (which is the same). It is hard to imagine that the identities of the three goddesses were stated in a hymn in such plain, prosaic language. Expressions like ἥν τε καὶ Γῆν καλέουσι are conceivable or, alternatively, the same goddess was called by three different names in the invocation. A striking sample of ‘linguistic archaeology’ reminiscent of PDerv. is provided by Philochorus’ rationalistic and naturalistic explanation of the names Tritopatores and Apollo. Cf. FGrHist 328 F 182 (verbatim quotation in Harpocration): Φιλόχορος δὲ τοὺς Τριτοπάτορας πάντων γεγονέναι πρώτους· “τὴν μὲν γὰρ Γῆν καὶ τὸν Ἥλιον (φησίν), ὃν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα τότε110 καλεῖν, γονεῖς αὑτῶν ἠπίσταντο οἱ τότε ἀνθρωποι, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τούτων τρίτους πατέρας.” Prehistoric men spoke an original, natural language not yet corrupted by misunderstanding and correctly applied the name ‘Apollo’ to the sun.111

(T13) Philodemus According to Philodemus, Epicurus exposed the atheistic views of Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias and accused them of madness; their method was that of “changing letters in the names of gods”: De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 19.1–23 = ll. ⌢]ν 519–541 Obbink (ibid. 16–18 = ll. 534–536 Obbink: παραγραμμίζ[ουσι] | τὰ τ[ω ⌢ θεων [ὀνόμα]|τα). 
Pace Winiarczyk, παραγραμμίζειν means “to change, to 107 Betegh (2006) 98–99 n. 20; Bremmer (2014) 65 n. 60; Vassallo (2015b) 98. 108 Chances are that the collection of hymns quoted by Prodicus was no longer extant or available some 150 years after Philochorus. 109 FGrHist 328 F 77 (= OF 810). The fragment is odd: Orpheus speaks in the first person and boasts that his prophecies are infallible. Is it a proem to a collection of χρησμοί? 110 For no good reason Jacoby deletes τότε. 111 On Orphic Physica and Tritopatores see Gagné (2007) 1–24 and Bremmer (2014) 62 ff.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 529

alter letters” (with a connotation of “to distort,” “to falsify,” by analogy with παραχαράττειν), not “to rearrange.”112 The reference is apparently to the rationalistic etymologies based on assonance between the divine name and its supposed etymon. Examples of this technique are found in PDerv., cols. XIV.7 (Κρόνος = κρούων νοῦς) and XXII.9–10 (Δημήτηρ by change of letter δ to γ becomes Γῆ Μήτηρ). The Derveni author (Prodicus) himself uses a similar expression in col. XXVI.11, γράμματα παρακλίνοντα, to describe the possible change of μητρὸς ἐᾶς to μητρὸς ἑοῖο. The phrase μικρὸν παρακλίνω “alter slightly,” exactly with the same meaning, occurs in Pl. Cra. 400c (the change of only one letter in Orphic etymology σῶμα/σῆμα) and 410a (the Phrygian pronunciation of the word πῦρ that “slightly deviates” from the Greek).113 Most of the etymologies of the divine names in Plato’s Cratylus are based on assonance between the name of a god and its etymon.

(T14) Galen On several occasions (in four different treatises!) Galen angrily rebukes Prodicus for using the term for phlegm (φλέγμα) not in its commonly accepted sense of a cold and dense liquid in the body, but in the unusual sense of something “burnt” on the ground of its etymological derivation from φλέγω, “to burn.”114 Cf. De nat. fac. 2.130.5 ff. Kühn: Πρόδικος δ’ ἐν τῷ περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου γράμματι τὸ συγκεκαυμένον καὶ οἷον ὑπερωπτημένον ἐν τοῖς χυμοῖς ὀνομάζων φλέγμα παρὰ τὸ πεφλέχθαι (…). ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τὸ πρὸς ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀνομαζόμενον φλέγμα τὸ λευκὸν τὴν χρόαν, ὃ βλένναν ὀνομάζει Πρόδικος, ὁ ψυχρὸς καὶ ὑγρὸς χυμός ἐστιν κτλ. The unusual periphrastic expression “as it is called by all men” instead of “common name,” according to a whole corpus TLG search, does not occur elsewhere, except in another passage of Galen (De loc. aff. 8.74 Kühn), but it strikingly resembles the distinction between the ‘peculiar’ expressions of Orpheus and the ‘spoken names,’ “which have been called by all men” (PDerv., col. XVIII.8–9: ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι | ὠνόμασαν).

112 LSJ s.v. παραγραμμίζω interpret παραγραμμίζουσι ὀνόματα θεῶν in Philodemus as “makes the gods nugatory” and thus mark its use as metaphorical. In our view the verb παραγραμμίζω (variant παραγραμματίζω) has the literal meaning “to change or to distort letters”: it is the result of such change that makes the gods nugatory and reduces them to trivial, non-sacred things like food and drink, elements, etc. 113 Another similar phrase in Cratylus is παράγειν γράμμα: cf. 400c9 and 407c1–2. 114 Prodic. test. 63–65 Mayhew.

530 

 Andrei Lebedev

(T15) Plato [II] Another common feature of Prodicus and the Derveni author is the attention to synonyms and similar phraseology in semantic analysis. It might seem prima facie that they follow different or even contrasting procedures: Prodicus was renowned for his subtle distinctions of words (ἀκριβολογία) with similar meanings, the Derveni author, in contrast, emphasizes “the same meaning” (ταὐτὸ δύναται, cf. cols. X.3, 8; XI.5). But there can be little doubt that Prodicus mastered his teacher Protagoras’ art of arguing both ways: (...) Πρόδικος διῃρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστιν. (...), “(...) Prodicus divided pleasures into joy, merriment and delight, for all these names denote the same, namely of pleasure.”115 Compare this triad of names with the triad γινώσκειν/μανθάνειν/πιστεύειν in PDerv., col. V.9–12 and λέγειν/ φωνεῖν/διδάσκειν in col. X.1–3. Although the author asserts ad hoc the semantic identity of the three words (ταὐτὸ δύναται), this passage betrays a professional knowledge of synonyms. The two different procedures are best explained by his two different goals: in his teaching of general rhetoric, Prodicus aimed to teach students orthoepeia, the correct use of names based on subtle semantic distinctions between synonyms. In his allegorical interpretation of divine names, his aim was exactly the reverse: naturalistic monism (“everything is air”) imposed an emphasis on “the same meaning.” Prodicus’ terminology of the semantical analysis (διαίρεσις) imitated in Pl. Prt. 340a8 ff. (= Prod. test. 50 Mayhew) is very similar to the terminology we find in PDerv.: (...), ᾗ τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν, (...) ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; κτλ.

(T16) Plato [III] ῾Υπερβατόν occurs in PDerv twice: in col. IV.10 in the authorial comments on Heraclitus’ quotation, and in col. VIII.6 applied to the verses of Orpheus (τ]αῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λανθάν[ει). In both cases, it is a rhetorical and grammatical term for irregular word order: see § (IV) below for details. In both cases, it is used to reveal the cause of the ambiguity of the text and the reason behind its misreadings. A third mention of hyperbaton is probably found in col. VII.3–4: [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τ[ε τὴν τῶν ὀ]νομάτων | [θέ]σιν, “and it is impossible to determine the position of names.”116 “Position” here means the syntactical position, i.e. πῶς 115 Arist. Top. 2.6.112b22 ff. (= Prod. test. 47 Mayhew). 116 θέ]σιν Janko, Bernabé : λύ]σιν KPT. Paсe KPT, λύσιν cannot mean here “solution” in the sense of interpretation. As a grammatical term, λύσις can only mean “looseness,” i.e. asyndeton,

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 531

κεῖται τὸ ὄνομα, i.e. whether it should be taken with what precedes or with what follows, as in the case of the word αἰδοῖον. Hyperbaton is an exegetical tool which Protagoras, the teacher and friend of Prodicus, used in his interpretation of poetic texts (Pl. Prt. 343e3: ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως). This word is a hapax in Plato, and since Plato puts it into the mouth of Protagoras, it may well be an authentic term of Sophistic hermeneutics. Plato probably regarded this technique with suspicion since it could easily be used for ‘sophistry’: the substitution of a “penis” for a “venerable god” in PDerv., col. VIII.6 by admitting a hyperbaton is a case in point.

(T17) In the Ionian dialect of Ceos (group of the Central Ionian) Atticisms are attested in the last quarter of the 5th cent. BC.117 This perfectly agrees with the dialect of PDerv. which Tsantsanoglou describes as “an Ionic text liberally sprinkled with Attic features,” and Willi characterizes as “a curious mixture of Attic and Ionic.”118

(T18) We do not rule out that one of the sources of the physical allegoresis of Orphic theogony in [Clem. Rom.] Recogn. 6 may be PDerv., especially in regard to the reduction of Olympian gods to different forms of air in 6.8–9: Zeus is θερμότατος and καθαρώτατος αἰθήρ; Hera is the sublunar ἀήρ which is not so clean, and her ability to beget refers to the εὐκρασία ἀέρων; Athena is very hot air (ἄκρως θερμόν), which is unable to generate anything, hence the myth that she is a virgin; and Artemis is the lowest part of the air that is extremely cold, hence the similar myth of virginity. The name of Dionysos refers to the exhalations upwards and downwards (a ‘Heraclitizing’ tenet!). In 6.9.5 can be read: Αφροδίτην εἰς μῖξιν καὶ γένεσιν. Orpheus is one of τῶν πάλαι ἀνδρῶν σοφώτατοι who concealed true knowledge of the divine from the unworthy in the form of myth: Kronos never castrated Ouranos, and Zeus never seized royal power from Kronos, never swallowed

LSJ II, 4 (f). But this does not fit the context because asyndeton is always obvious. Demetrius (Eloc. 191), following Aristotle, explained the obscurity of Heraclitus by lysis. 117 See the burial law ap. SGDI III.2, 5398.27 (ταύταις) 118 KPT, 11–14; similarly West (1983) 77 and n. 11; Willi (2010) 114. On the dialect see also Bremmer (2014) 64. On the alleged Doric νιν see § (VII) below (on Diagoras).

532 

 Andrei Lebedev

Metis, and never gave birth to Athena from his head and Dionysos from his thigh (6.2). All mythology is a result of a misreading of Orpheus’ text.

(T19) = App. (3).

4 (IV) The text and interpretation of PDerv., col. IV  119

In establishing the text of col. IV and in their commentary, KPT (148 ff.) move in the right direction when they supply τά[ξιν in l. 4 and understand διὰ τό]νδε as διὰ τὸν νοῦν. The cosmic order results from the action of the cosmic mind (= Zeus). But almost all other supplements in col. IV call for serious doubts since they are based on the false assumption that the words κοινά αnd ἴδια echo epistemological terms of Heraclitus as well as, based on the outdated physicalist interpretation, of his so-called “cosmic measures.” Kouremenos (KPT, 155) explains: “If τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια in the Derveni text echo Heraclitus’ use of ξυνόν and ἴδιον, it can be plausibly assumed that τὰ κοινά are the truths revealed by Heraclitus’ everlastingly true account (…), whereas τὰ ἴδια are the false beliefs held by uncomprehending people.” The following objections can be raised against this assumption and interpretation. 1) The opposition of ‘private’ and ‘common’ and the collocation of words κοινός/ἴδιος in extant Greek literature of all possible genres are very common, as are other common and non-specific oppositions like ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘big’ and ‘small,’ etc. To postulate ‘echoes’ of one text in another on the ground of ‘coincidence’ of such common and non-specific words is methodologically questionable. A TLG proximity search for κοιν(ός) and ἴδι(ος) within five lines for the period from the beginning to the end of 2nd cent. AD (pre-Patristic and pre-Neoplatonic literature) yields 1077 occurences. Only one of these is found in a doxographicum related to Heraclitus (Sext. Emp. Math. 9.133): in the overwhelming majority of cases, the reference is to the ‘common’ vs. ‘private,’ or ‘one’s own’ vs. ‘common’ with no relation whatsoever to metaphysics or epistemology. In other words, the probability that the occurence of the opposition κοινός/ἴδιος in any text ‘echoes’ Heraclitus’ usage is less than one in a thousand. 2) Heraclitus never uses the plur. neut. forms τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια. Such neuter substantives 119 This section supersedes the text and interpretation in Lebedev (1989b), although the basic approach to koina/idia and to the general meaning of Heraclitus’ fragment remains the same.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 533

with an article are not typical for Heraclitus’ archaic and poetic prose. Even on formal linguistic grounds, such language is unlikely in Heraclitus: he uses an article only in rare cases, and he regularly omits it when he speaks about phenomenal opposites.120 3) Such terminology in Heraclitus is unlikely not only on linguistic, but also on philosophical grounds: plur. τὰ κοινά in an epistemological or ontological sense is ruled out in Heraclitus’ work since τὸ ξυνόν (22 B 114 DK = fr. 133 Lebedev) means ‘one’ by definition and is opposed to ‘many.’ Ξυνὸς λόγος is the only one true logos and is opposed to many false logoi of poets and other philosophers. Sound mind (τὸ φρονεῖν) is also one and the same for all: it is “common to all” (ξυνὸν πᾶσι) and opposed to the plurality of imaginary worlds of dreamers and poets. Heraclitus’ authentic word for “false beliefs” or subjective opinions is δοκέοντα (22 B 28 DK = fr. 138 Lebedev), without an article, not τὰ ἴδια. Following this false assumption, KPT try to supplement verbs that would reflect Heraclitus’ rejection of ‘private’ (IV.3: σίνεται; IV.6: κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α) and approval of ‘common’ (IV.5: μα[ρτυρόμενος] τὰ κοινά), but this attempt results in strange and artificial Greek. The verb καταστρέφει to my ears sounds like modern Greek. In modern Greek, this (very popular) verb can be used in a wide variety of contexts not confined to physical destruction (e.g. καταστρέφει τὴν ὁμορφιά, τὸ νόημα, etc.), but in classical Greek it is used predominantly in military contexts and literally means “ruining,” or “destroying,” or “setting upside down” (a city). We could not find in lexica or TLG a single instance of this verb in a grammatical or rhetorical context: it simply does not convey the notion of “rejection,” “avoiding,” etc. The same a fortiori can be said about the verb σίνεται, which is used exclusively for physical violence, looting, plundering, damaging property, etc. Such verbs could not be used by a literary critic in a stylistic analysis and could not be used by a commentator as descriptions of what Heraclitus was doing either in his life or in his philosophy. For example, σίνεται could be appropriately used when Herostratus set the Artemision on fire. The only possibility of making sense of this opposition in col. IV is to admit that τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια, “common and peculiar names,” are rhetorical terms of the Derveni commentator himself with ὀνόματα or ῥήματα implied: the “common names” are plain words of ordinary language which are in common usage and have a transparent meaning intelligible to everybody; they are the same as the “names used by all men” in col. XVIII.8–9 and the “spoken and (commonly) recognized words” in col. XXIII.8. The “peculiar” names are poetic metaphors and divine names whose meaning escapes the understanding of hoi polloi and requires the Sophistic art of interpretation. Common words existed in the beginning before the “peculiar” ones;

120 Lebedev (2014) 53.

534 

 Andrei Lebedev

peculiar words seem to be a later invention of poets like Orpheus. This can be inferred from col. XVIII, according to which Orpheus metaphorically applied an already existing common name, μοῖρα (“part”), both to the wind (of cosmogonical vortex, l. 2) and to the intelligence (φρόνησις) of the god (ll. 7–9). The opposition of κοινά/ἴδια ὀνόματα in col. IV corresponds to the opposition ἄνθρωποι ὠνόμασαν/ Ὀρφεὺς ὠνόμασεν in col. XVIII. Furthermore, the distinction between earlier “common names” and later “peculiar names” recalls the distinction between “first” and “second” names in Plato’s Cratylus (see § [II] above). Plato may have borrowed this distinction from Prodicus. The time when only “common” names were in use probably corresponds to the original phase of civilization discussed in Protagoras’ Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως. The worship of anthropomorphic gods of official Greek religion at that time could not exist since the names of the gods had not yet been invented by poets. Humans living at that time either were natural atheists or worshipped natural phenomena, “things that really exist” (τὰ ἐόντα, τὰ πράγματα), like the stars and the elements, and, first of all, things that were useful for human life (τὰ ὠφελοῦντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους), like the sun and the moon. The false mythological religion of poets was the result of the subsequent ‘disease of language,’ of the misreading and misunderstanding of Orpheus’ poetic cosmogony by the ignorant polloi. Both Orpheus and Heraclitus, according to the Derveni author, use idiomatic cryptic language to convey to “those who understand correctly” similar philosophical ideas (in this case on the cosmic mind producing cosmic order) and at the same time to conceal these ideas from “the many.” It becomes clear that in this case the subject of μεταθέμενος is also Heraclitus (and not Zeus or the cosmic mind) and that the object of this verb is again ὀνόματα. The term μεταφορά for what we call a metaphor is not attested in poetics and rhetoric before Isocrates, Anaximenes of Lampsacus, and Aristotle in the 4th cent. BC. But words and concepts are not the same thing, so it does not follow that 5th-cent. BC Sophists had no concept of metaphorical language. We have good reason to suppose that ἴδιον ὄνομα or τὰ ἰδιάζοντα was one of the early (5th-cent. BC) terms for the metaphor.121 The 5th-cent. BC usage was still followed by

121 This usage is semantically related to the grammatical term ἰδίωμα (peculiarities of style, idiomatic expressions, LSJ s.v. II) and the common grammatical phrases ἰδίως λέγεσθαι, ἰδίως λεγόμενα (or κοινῶς λέγεσθαι), but should be distinguished from ἴδια ὀνόματα “specific, i.e. appropriate” words in Plato (Resp. 9.580e) and Aristotle (Rhet. 3.5.1407a31), as well as from the logical term τὸ ἴδιον to mean “specific or essential feature” in Aristotle and the Stoics, on which see Reesor (1983). An exact parallel to the usage in PDerv. is found in Antiphan. Com. fr. 207.1–3 PCG: πολύ γ᾽ ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν ποιητῶν διάφορος / ὁ Φιλόξενος. πρώτιστα μὲν γὰρ ὀνόμασιν / ἰδίοισι καὶ καινοῖσι χρῆται πανταχοῦ.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 535

Epigenes (ap. Clem. Al. Strom. 5.49) in his allegorical interpretations of Orpheus’ poetry: οὐχὶ καὶ Ἐπιγένης ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ὀρφέως ποιήσεως τὰ ἰδιάζοντα παρ᾽ Ὀρφεῖ ἐκτιθέμενός φησι (...)· “μῖτον” δὲ τὸ σπέρμα ἀλληγορεῖσθαι, και “δάκρυα Διὸς” τὸν ὄμβρον δηλοῦν, “Μοῖρας” τε αὖ τὰ μέρη τῆς σελήνης, τριακάδα καὶ πεντεκαιδεκάτην καὶ νουμηνίαν· διὸ καὶ “λευκοστόλους” αὐτὰς καλεῖν τὸν Ορφέα φωτὸς οὔσας μέρη. κτλ. The term τὰ ἰδιάζοντα, “peculiar expressions,” for poetic metaphors is not a part of Clement’s own lexicon. It occurs only once in a quotation from Epigenes and therefore most probably belongs to Epigenes. The Derveni author also conveys the concept of metaphorical language by the participles of the verb εἰκάζω: Orpheus compared time to snow (XII.11), the sun to the phallus (XIII.9), and Zeus to a king (XIX.8). A common name becomes metaphorical (“peculiar”) by re-attaching it (προσφέρειν) to a different object. The term προσφέρειν will be changed in the 4th cent. BC to μετα-φέρειν. Scholars who attempted to restore the text of the Heraclitus quotation have often been misguided by the long ago antiquated physicalist approach to Heraclitus’ philosophy in the tradition of Kirk and Marcovich that derives from Burnet and Reinhardt. Scholars of this trend dogmatically denied the authenticity of the world-conflagration (ekpyrosis) in Heraclitus, regarding it as a Stoic distortion of the alleged theory of “cosmic measures” which, as we said, emphasized stability rather than change: Heraclitus’ dynamic cosmic cycle, unanimously recognized by all ancient readers of his book, has been replaced by trivial ‘meteorological’ changes on a regular basis (like day and night) in a stable, eternal cosmos. Since the cyclical cosmogony is firmly linked with the notions of Time and Fate, they rejected the ‘universal flux’ as Plato’s invention (another imaginary ‘projection’) and interpreted the image of the cosmogonical god of Time (Aion) as a trivial saying about human fortune. Diels had already wrongly relegated authentic verbatim fragment of Heraclitus on Fate to Spuria.122 The days when such an approach to Heraclitus was dominant have passed. Charles Kahn was right when he remarked that “the Stoics were the Heracliteans of the ancient world” and when he emphasized in his criticism of Burnet, that if there was any theory of cosmic ‘measures’ in Heraclitus, it was a theory of “measure or equality

122 22 B 137 DK (= fr. 53 Lebedev). We defend its authenticity in the commentary to our edition (Lebedev [2014] 362–364) and restore the text as follows: ἔστι γὰρ εἱμαρμένα πάντως, “all things (or events) are in all ways determined by fate.” Stobaeus is an excellent and trustworthy source; γράφει indicates a verbatim quotation. Diels dismissed it with a surprising dogmatic verdict: “Zitate Heraklits gibt es in Placita nicht.” The Derveni Papyrus demonstrates how wrong Diels was: the doxa on the size of the sun is a verbatim quotation with a transposition of only one word (εἱμαρμένα is found already in Thgn. 1.1033 and need not be a ‘projection’ of Stoic εἱμαρμένη).

536 

 Andrei Lebedev

preserved over time” in a diachronically structured pattern.123 We have on many occasions criticized and refuted physicalist interpretations of Heraclitus. Both the theory of universal change and of periodic ekpyrosis, as well as the idea of Fate and dynamic cosmogony rather than static cosmology, are genuine doctrines of Heraclitus attested both by his ipsissima verba and by an impressive consen­ sus of independent ancient readers (first of all by Aristotle and the Stoics).124 Precise analysis of Heraclitus’ metaphorical language leaves no doubt that in 22 B 90 DK he speaks of the dynamic process of the alternation and interchange (ἀνταμείβεται, and not a static ἀνταμοιβή, is the reading of all MSS of Plutarch) of “all things” and “fire.” Burnet’s interpretation of the “cosmic measures” in Heraclitus as a kind of quanta of matter or stable “aggregate bulk of every form of matter” was based on a shaky foundation from the start. Formal papyrological considerations and restrictions imposed by them are no doubt very important in our case as in any other restoration of a papyrus text. However, although necessary, they are not sufficient. Any attempt to restore the original text of Heraclitus’ quotation in col. IV that ignores the general purpose of Heraclitus’ book and pays no attention to the original context of the sun fragment is doomed to failure. All supplements and interpretations proposed hitherto that focus on the size of the sun and understand the “limits” with reference to the size of the solar disk are misguided by Burnet’s, Kirk’s, and Marcovich’s physicalist approach to Heraclitus. Heraclitus was not a scientist; nay he attacked the Milesian mechanistic vortex cosmogony as an absurdity refuted by the beautiful harmony of the cosmos (22 B 124 DK = fr. 38 Lebedev). Cosmic order and harmony point to the existence of a providential cosmic Mind (Gnome) that “steers” the whole universe (22 B 41 DK = fr. 140 Lebedev). Of the three logoi (chapters) of his book (Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς, Λόγος πολιτικός, and Λόγος περὶ θεῶν), only in the second half of the First logos were cosmos and natural phenomena discussed: this discussion amounts to about 1/6 or so of the total text. But even this ‘cosmological’ section had little in common with the contents of a standard Ionian Peri physeos. There is not a single authentic (quoted verbatim in the Ionian dialect) fragment of Heraclitus that contains an aetiological explanation of natural phenomena typical for Ionian physikoi. Theophrastus could not find in Heraclitus’ work a consistent physical theory and attributed the contradictions to his melancholia. Instead of a unified scientific physical theory (like that of Anaximenes or Anaxagoras), we find in the extant fragments a plurality of poetico-metaphorical models of the cosmos:125 cosmos as liber naturae (λόγος ὅδε), cosmos as templum naturae 123 See Kahn (1981) 147–153 (Excursus I: On the traditional interpretations of the cosmic cycle). 124 See Lebedev (1985b), (2014), and (2017a). 125 We argue for this in extenso in Lebedev (2014) 59–90.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 537

(from which the sacral metaphor of πῦρ ἀείζωον derives), cosmos as a stadion with a cosmic race (ἐναντιοδρομία) of opposite forces, cosmos as a battlefield in which the four world masses (Pyr, Prester = Wind/Air, Sea, and Earth) are engaged (22 B 31 DK = frs. 44–45 Lebedev), winning and losing in turn at predestinated periods of time ‘measured’ by fate, cosmic cycle as a pesseia game conducted by the divine child Aion (22 B 52 DK = fr. 33 Lebedev), etc. Most of these metaphorical models present a diachronically, and not spatially (i.e. geometrically) structured pattern of the “road up and down” (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω) by which all things travel. All cosmic phenomena, including the elements and stars, incessantly move from a minimum to a maximum (“way up”) and backwards (“way down”), in a kind of swaying motion, like a pendulum. It is from this section of Heraclitus’ book, from a series of empirical “proofs” (tekmeria) of the universal “divine law” of regular “reversals” (tropai, amoibai) of opposite forces that the Derveni fragment of Heraclitus about the sun derives. 22 B 120 DK (= fr. 55 Lebedev), which in our edition immediately precedes the Derveni quotation from Heraclitus (fr. 56 Lebedev), speaks about the “turning posts” (τέρματα) of the Morning and Evening and identifies one of these points with οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός, “the limit of (the period) of clear Zeus = Sky,” i.e. “with the autumnal equinox.”126 And the Oxyrhynchus fragment on the moon (fr. 60 Lebedev) that follows soon after the Derveni fragment speaks about the number of days (fourteen), i.e. again about the time, not about size. The Hippocratic author of De diaeta 1 summarizes Heraclitus’ theory of cosmic change with more precision and accuracy than Plato in his passages on the ‘universal flux’ in Theaetetus and Cratylus.127 It is to these temporal limits and “turning points” of the “way up and down” (increase and diminution), and not to the size of the stars and material masses that Heraclitus applies the term ὅροι (synonymous with τέρματα “turning posts”), τροπαί (“turns” like those of a wheel), ἀμοιβαὶ ἀναγκαῖαι (“fated changes”), and παλίντροπος (“turning back”) in the extant authentic fragments. Therefore, in the quotation in PDerv., col. IV, ὅρους refers to the “fixed terms” of the year-cycle, i.e. to the summer and winter solstices (τροπαὶ ἡλίου) which the sun will “never exceed.” The mention of the “fixed month” (μηνὶ τακ[τῶι) in col. IV.13 makes this interpretation certain (see our commentary on this line below). The regular change (increase and diminution) of

126 Lebedev (1985b) and (2014) 368–373. 127 However, contra Reinhardt, Kirk, Marcovich and their modern followers, the theory of universal change was a genuine doctrine of Heraclitus. It was not invented by Plato since it is attested in earlier independent sources, such as Hippoc. De diaet. 1, and in ancient Sophists. Why would Plato ascribe to Heraclitus, Protagoras, and poets a theory that he invented himself? PDerv. has proved that ancient Sophists indeed studied and quoted Heraclitus. There can be no doubt that Protagoras did so before his disciple Prodicus.

538 

 Andrei Lebedev

all cosmic phenomena is not due to chance: the temporal “limits” are set by a divine Supervisοr and Umpire (ἐπιστάτης καὶ βραβεύς), the supreme ruler of the universe represented in the current cosmological phase by the sun, the remnant of the original pyr aeizoon. In Heraclitus’ mythopoetical universe, the sun is not a celestial body like the “ignited lump” of iron in Anaxagoras: it is a living god imbued with a mind and probably identified with Apollo.128 “Being the size of a human foot” is a rhetorical phrase that emphasizes the modesty of the ideal monarch: the sun is ‘tiny’ in size when compared with the huge masses of the Air (Prester), the Sea, and the Earth, and yet he rules over all of them because he is the mind of the universe. The supreme cosmic god is the size of man’s foot: this is political and theological rhetoric, and not physical science.129 The rule of “one the best” (εἷς ἄριστος) over many kakoi is “according to nature” (κατὰ φύσιν). He is the παράδειγμα of the best ruler, because he strictly obeys the θεῖος νόμος of 22 B 114 DK (= fr. 131 Lebedev). According to Diodotus, Heraclitus’ book was not περὶ φύσεως, but περὶ πολιτείας, τὰ δὲ περὶ φύσεως ἐν παραδείγματος εἴδει κεῖσθαι (Diog. Laërt. 9.15). Heraclitus points to the ‘paradigmatic’ form of government in the polis of Zeus (monarchy of the sun) in order to demonstrate that popular rule (the rule of ‘many’) is unnatural. And the law-abiding monarch is, at the same time, juxtaposed with the tyrant.130 The clause on Erinyes in Heraclitus’ fragment is a rhetorical circumlocution (imitating the style of Loxias’ oracles) “because the sun is bound by the unbreakable horkos,” where horkos is an archaic metaphor for the law of the cosmos, viz. the ‘divine law’ of the universe in B 114. The peculiar function of the Erinyes was to punish those who commit perjury (ἐπιόρκους). Therefore oaths may have been ‘sealed’ by a potential curse: “if I break the oath, let the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, find me out and seize me!” See, on this regard, the “decree of Ananke sealed by wide oaths (ὅρκοις),” i.e. the divine law of transmigration in Empedocles’ 31 B 115 DK. As in Heraclitus, cosmic ‘oaths’ determine fixed periods of time. Additional confirmation seems to be provided by §9 of Janko’s text of PDerv., where ὅρκοι μεγάλοι are associated with δίκης ὑπερήται (= Δίκης ἐπίκουροι). Having these considerations in mind, we propose the following reconstruction of the text of col. IV:

128 Probabilia, frs. 12–13 Lebedev. 129 The doxographers, hunting for rare doxai, wishfully tore out the phrase about the sun from its theologico-political context and placed it in the chapter Περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου (Plac. 2.21.4). See our commentary on l. 8 below. 130 Heraclitus attacks popular rule in 22 B 104 DK (= fr. 130 Lebedev) and the hybris of tyranny in B 43 (= fr. 135 Lebedev). Praise for monarchy and the rule of one: B 33 (= fr. 132 Lebedev) and B 49 (= fr. 128 Lebedev) et passim.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 539

PDerv., col. IV ]ου ε.[ θ]εῶν[ ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έμενος  ]ουναι μᾶλλ[ον τ]είνεται [πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ]· τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ[ρ οὐκ εἴ[η λα]μβάνειν. ἆρ᾽ οὐ τέ[τακται διὰ τό]νδε κόσμος; 5 κατὰ [Ὁρφέ]α Ἡράκλειτος με[ταθέμενος] τὰ κοινὰ ̲ ̲κατ[αγρά]φει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α· ὅσπερ ἴκελα [ἱερο]λόγωι λέγων· [νόος ἥλιος [κόσ]μου κατὰ φύσιν, ἀνθρωπ[ηΐου] εὖρος ποδὸς [ἐὼν, τὸ μ[έτριο]ν οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων· εἰ γά[ρ τι οὔ]ρους ἐ[οικότας ὑπερβαλε]ῖ, Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου[σι, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι. 10  οὕτω δὲ ἔφη ἵνα ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι κ[αὶ ἀσαφῆ τὸν λόγον. ]θυ[ ]α δίκης [ ] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι τροπὰς ποιεῖ ὁ ἥλιος 14 ]ισ [ 3 τ]είνεται [πρὸς τὸν νοῦν supplevi || 5 [Ὁρφέ]α et με[ταθέμενος] supplevi || 6 κατ[αγρά]φει Jourdan : [ἱερο]λόγωι Sider || [νόος supplevi || 7 [κόσ]μου et [ἐὼν Lebedev (1989b) 39 || 8 οὔ]ρους ἐ[οικότα]ς Tsantsanoglou || 9 ὑπερβαλε]ῖ  Tsantsanoglou || 10 supplevi || 13 fin. [τροπὰς ποιεῖ ὁ ἥλιος temptavi e.g.

[names?] of gods (...) “(...) he (sc. Orpheus) changes the established names (...) [the name of Zeus] rather alludes to the mind since it would be impossible to understand [the origin of the cosmos] as something due to chance. Isn’t the cosmos set in order by the mind? In accord with Orpheus, Heraclitus [also] changes the common names and uses in his writings peculiar expressions. Speaking similarly to the author of Hieros logos, he says: ‘the sun is the mind of the cosmos by nature, being one man’s foot in width and not exceeding the set limits. For if he does exceed the appropriate limits, Erinyes, the ministers of Justice will find him out.’ He said so in order to make his speech obscure and based on inverse word order (hyperbaton) (…) justice (…) the sun makes reversals (i.e. solstices) in a fixed month.”

Commentary Col. IV.2: The subject of μεταθ [ έμενος (or any other verb with similar semantics) is Heraclitus, not a mysterious “one of the gods” (pace KPT, 129) or Nous (in the commentary). The participle κείμ[ενα] (something already “set” and “established”) cannot refer to the primordial mixture of chaotic matter, and μεταθ [ έμενος vel sim.

540 

 Andrei Lebedev

would be unparalleled as a cosmogonical operation of god/mind. Both words are grammatical terms: κείμ[ενα] refers to ὀνόματα, whether mentioned in the preceding context or implied; μετατίθεσθαι ὄνομα is a well-attested phrase: τοὔνομα, Arist. fr. 519 Rose; ὀνόματα, to change the use of words in Epicurus (cf. GE, 435); ἐπωνυμίας, Hdt. 5.68; τῇ μισθαρνίᾳ ταῦτα μετατιθέμενος τὰ ὀνόματα (sc. φιλία καὶ φιλοξενία), transferring the names “friendship and hospitality” to the wageearning, Dem. 18.284. In Demosthenes’ passage the phrase refers to the use of words not in their proper, commonly accepted sense. Of special interest for us is the use of μετατιθέναι ὄνομα in Plato’s Cratylus in close proximity to the reference to Prodicus’ 50-drachmas lecture on the “correctness of names” (384b). In 384d Hermogenes, who argues for a conventional understanding of all names and denies that there is “any other correctness” except “convention and agreement” (συνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία), contends that if someone establishes a name for a thing (ἂν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα), it will be correct, and if he re-establishes (μεταθῆται) another name, it will be equally correct, as is the case when we rename (μετατιθέμεθα) our servants. Col. IV.3: LSJ s.v. τείνω A, I, 4: “aim at, direct upon a point,” explained as a metaphor: originally, “to stretch, i.e. to point a bow at someone” (cf. Pl. Phd. 63a7–8: εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον). It is also used in commentaries and scholia (not in LSJ): Eust. In Il. 4.955.22 (τὸ δὲ “οὐδ’ αὐτὸν” ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἕκτορα τείνεται); Ar. Plut. 379 (τὸ στόμ’ ἐπιβύσας κέρμασιν τῶν ῥητόρων). Col. IV.4: We agree with KPT, 153 that εἴ[η is an impersonal optative potential without ἄν as in col. XXV.8, but the verb has nothing to do with cosmogonical processes. Like κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έμενος in l. 2, τ]είνεται is a grammatical term, which means “to take in a certain sense,” “to interpret” (LSJ s.v. λαμβάνω, I, 9, b–c; cf. ἐκλαμβάνω, V). The perfect-tense verb τέτακται (with an allusion to cosmogony) goes better with διὰ τόνδε than the present tense τάξιν έχει. Cf. Dem. 4.36.1–2: ἅπαντα νόμῳ τέτακται. Α striking parallel from Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ, ch. 10 in a ‘Heraclitizing’ context: in the universe (ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις) the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) exists both as something separate (like a general of the army) and as something immanent (the order, τάξις in the army): πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, (...). πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, κτλ. (1075a16 ff.). It is emphasized that order in the army exists because of the general, but not vice versa: 1075a15, οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτον ἐστιν. Τhis imposed order, as in col. IV under discussion, and does not leave things up to chance (ἔτυχε). The analogy between strategos/army on the iconic level and god/universe on the referential level looks Heraclitean: in Heraclitus, Polemos (= Zeus) is the supreme commander in the cosmic war of elements, and god is conceived as νοῦς (= γνώμη in the Ionian dialect of Heraclitus).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 541

Col. IV.5–7: The reading [ἀστρο]λόγωι proposed in KPT is unlikely. In its early usage, ἀστρολόγος could only mean “astronomer,” but astronomers do not speak about Erinyes: mythical language is appropriate for a ἱερολόγος. According to the Derveni author, Heraclitus, like Orpheus, uses mythical names to describe cosmic processes and cosmic order, not in the sense intended by hoi polloi: in Heraclitus, Erinyes are not terrible mythical creatures, but physical forces that sustain the cosmic order. These are “peculiar names” (ἴδια ὀνόματα), the meaning of which is accessible only to “those who understand correctly” (οἱ ὀρθῶς γινώσκοντες). What we expect at the end of l. 6 is either a verb meaning “to rule,” “set in order,” on which the genitive [κόσ]μου depends (e.g. ἄρχει κόσμου), or a noun meaning something like “mind” (νόος or φρήν) or “ruler” (e.g. ἄναξ, if ἀρχός and βασιλεύς are too long). If these supplements are too long, we should postulate a lacuna between ll. 6 and 7, since ἥλιος cannot stand on its own without a verb or a nominal predicate. A nominal clause [νόος] | ἥλιος [κόσ]μου with asyndeton and hyperbaton, instead of the ordinary ἥλιός ἐστιν νόος τοῦ κόσμου, is both possible and quite likely in Heraclitus: the omission of articles and nominal clauses with asyndeton is well attested in the verbatim fragments of Heraclitus: ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος (22 B 26 DK = fr. 75 Lebedev); ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη (22 B 67 DK = fr. 43 Lebedev); νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐλβλητότεροι (22 B 96 DK = fr. 143 Lebedev); αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη (22 B 118 DK = fr. 73 Lebedev); ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἡ Ἄρκτος (22 B 120 DK = fr. 55 Lebedev); etc. Cleanthes’ identification of the sun with the “heart of the cosmos,” the seat of the cosmic mind, and the “ruling principle” (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) of the cosmos131 has ancient roots and can be traced back to Heraclitus. It is attested both in a verbatim quotation from Heraclitus and by a remarkable convergence of several independent testimonia in the Heraclitean tradition. In Heraclitus’ 22 B 100 DK (= fr. 57 Lebedev), the sun is ἐπιστάτης καὶ σκοπός who supervises the cosmic agon of the seasons (Homeric σκοπός is Heraclitus’ authentic word, ἐπιστάτης seems to be Plutarch’s gloss of it). Cf. Hippoc. De diaet. 1.10.17: ἐν τούτωι (= ἡλίωι) ψυχή, νόος, φρόνησις, κτλ.; ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 5.1.8–11 Tarán: ἐγὼ εἰ οἶδα κόσμου φύσιν, (...), μιμήσομαι θεόν, ὃς κόσμου ἀμετρίας ἐπανισοῖ ἡλίῳ ἐπιτάττων; Macrob. In Somn. Scip. 1.20.3 (sol dux, princeps et moderator reliquorum) hunc ducem et principem quem Heraclitus fontem caelestis lucis apellat; Pl. Cra. 413b4–5 (= Heraclit. fr. 81 [b] Marcovich): (etymology of δίκαιον) τὸν ἥλιον· (...) ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα; Scythinus of Teos, fr. 1 West ap. Plut. De Pyth. or. 402a (= Heraclit. fr. probab. 13 Lebedev). Col. IV.8–9: cf. οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα in Plutarch’s quotation De exil. 604a; for the phrase τὸ μ[έτριο]ν οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων, cf. Democrit. 68 B 233 DK: εἴ τις ὑπερβάλλοι

131 See the list of occurrences in SVF IV 67, s.v. Ἥλιος = ἡγεμονικόν.

542 

 Andrei Lebedev

τὸ μέτριον; [Pl.] Def. 415e9–10: ἕξις (...) ὑπερβάλλουσα τὸ μέτριον; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.74.3.8–9: κἀν ταῖς ὑπερβαλλούσαις τὸ μέτριον εὐτυχίαις. The reading μ[έγεθο]ς (KPT) should be ruled out for several reasons: a) it is an Attic and koine form: Herodotus has only μέγαθος; b) it is pleonastic and duplicates εὖρος; c) it is imposed by the mistaken ‘quantitative’ interpretation of cosmic ‘measures’ in Heraclitus; d) in restoring the original text of Heraclitus’ fragments, we adhere to the general rule that a verbatim quotation in Ionian dialect should not be ‘emended’ on the basis of a doxographical paraphrase. But τὸ μέγεθος is not even a part of paraphrase. Περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου in ps.-Plutarch’s Placita is a heading of a chapter in a handbook of physics of imperial times.132 Heraclitus was an ethico-religious and political thinker, not a physical scientist like Anaxagoras or Democritus. The ‘size’ of the heavenly bodies was the last thing in which he was interested; for him, as later for Socrates, πολυμάθεια was worthless. In his politico-theological ‘cosmology,’ he was primarily interested in the regularity of the cosmic cycles of alternating opposites (day/night, summer/winter, koros and chresmosyne of the Megas eniautos), which is directly linked with his theory of the natural law (‘cosmic justice’). In his ethico-political discourse, τὸ μέτριον is often associated with τὸ μέσον and τὸ δίκαιον, similarly to Plato in the Politicus and the Laws and Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics. Already Democritus anticipates Aristotle by equating the best disposition of the soul (εὐθυμίη) with a μέσον between ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις. The sun god in the polis of Zeus sustains the perfect balance of opposite forces in the cosmos by alternating periods of heat (summer) and cold (winter).133 The verbs ὑπερβάλλω (in the papyrus) and ὑπερβαίνω (in two Plutarch’s quotations) are roughly synonymous, but the former is more often used in the sense of “exceeding” a term (like the dates of τροπαί) or a period of time (cf. LSJ A II, 2), a context very similar to Heraclitus’ Oxyrhynchus fragment about the phases of the moon (ἐν ἡμέραις τεσσαρακαίδεκα).134 The reading οὔ]ρους ἐ[οικότας is strongly supported by προσήκοντας ὅρους in Plut. De Is. et Os. 370d6–7, since the two words are synonymous. Cf. also Gorg. 82 B 11a.28 DK: εἰκότα, (...) προσήκοντα; Pl. Resp. 2.362c5: προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων; Dem. 18.69.4: εἰκότως καὶ προσηκόντως. Col. IV.10: When reconstructing and interpreting a defective text, one should carefully study the usage of the given author and take it into account, as well as always respect Greek grammar and morphology. Those who mistranslate ὑπερβ]ατόν 132 On the origin of the doxographical tradition of Placita philosophorum see Lebedev (2016). 133 Cf. Alcmaeon’s concept of isonomia: in Lebedev (2017c) we have argued that Heraclitus may have used the term ἰσονομία in his cosmological historiosophy. 134 POxy. LIII 3710, col. II.43–47 (= Heraclit. fr. 60 Lebedev). Cf. also Hippoc. De hebd. 26.10–12 Roscher: ὅταν δὲ τούτους τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ὑπερβάλλῃ, χρονίη ἤδη γίνεται ἡ κατάστασις τῶν πυρετῶν.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 543

in IV.10 as “transgression”135 violate both of these principles at the same time: they neglect the evidence for the author’s usage provided by col. VIII.6 (τ]αῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λανθάν[ει), and they show a total disrespect for elementary Greek morphology by translating ὑπερβατόν as a nomen actionis. By all standards of Greek morphology, a nomen actionis from ὑπερβαίνω will be ὑπέρβασις or ὑπερβασία, not ὑπερβατόν!136 Both in col. VIII and in col. IV, ὑπερβατόν has nothing to do with physical processes and “cosmic measures,” but is a grammatical and rhetorical term for the transposition of words.137 Attention to hyperbaton was a characteristic feature in Protagoras’ intepretation of poetry (Pl. Prt. 343e), and Protagoras was regarded as a teacher of Prodicus. The mention of the figure hyperbaton in a commentary on Heraclitus’ style is to be expected, since Heraclitus from early times on was known as “Obscure” (ὁ Σκοτεινός); the lack of clarity in his prose (τὸ ἀσαφές) was commonly attributed by ancient critics to the use of words in a improper sense (lexical means), and asyndeton (or lysis), hyper­ baton, and ambiguity (amphibolia) in the syntax and word order. The authentic fragments of Heraclitus contain at least 9 instances of the syntactical ambiguity (amphibolia) that Aristotle had already noticed.138 Hyperbaton and syntactical ambiguity are related phenomena: whereas Demetrius attributes the obscurity of Heraclitus to lysis (asyndeton), Theon Alexandrinus ascribes it to the heavy abuse of syntactical ambiguity (amphibolia) resulting from the difficulty of dividing the text (diairesis, the same as diastixis in Aristotle’s passage). The discussion of hyperbaton and the ambiguity of αἰδοῖον in PDerv., cols. VIII + XIII, which can be construed either with the preceding ἔλαβεν (VIII.8) or with the subsequent κατέπινεν (XIII.4), looks similar to Aristotle’s discussion of the ambiguous position of ἀεί in Heraclitus’ 22 B 1 DK (= fr. 2 Lebedev). In Heraclitus’ fragment about the sun in PDerv., col. IV, there is a clear occurrence of at least one hyperbaton in l. 7: ἀνθρωπ[ηΐου] εὖρος ποδὸς, with the emphatic position of the adjective in the first position;139 ‘natural’ word order is restored in the quotation of these three words in Plac. 2.21.4: εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου.140 135 Laks/Most (1997) 11; Sider (1997) 141 (in an otherwise excellent study full of fine observations); Betegh (2004) 11; Janko (2001) 19 (“surpassing”). 136 The original source of this mistranslation seems to be Mouraviev (1985) 131. We pointed to this already in Lebedev (1989b) 39 and n. 1. 137 Betegh (2004). On hyperbaton, see Kühner/Gerth (1982), II/2, 600, § 607; Devine/Stephens (2000). 138 Lebedev (2014) 48–49. 139 Hyperbaton type Y1, according to Devine/Stephens (2000) 31 and 33 ff.; Denniston (1952) 47: “emphatic word placed early in violation of natural word order”. 140 Stob. Ecl. 1.25 (= Heraclit. 22 B 3 DK = fr. 56 [b] Lebedev). We do not quote ‘Aëtius,’ one of the many distortions of pagan names in Theodoret. For a detailed criticism of Diels’ mistaken attribution and of the neo-Dielsian doxographical theory of Mansfeld and Runia, see Lebedev (2016).

544 

 Andrei Lebedev

Col. IV.12–13: This is an excellent and virtually certain supplement of KPT. The “fixed month” is a month of the solstice: June for the summer solstice and December for the winter solstice. Solstices (τροπαὶ ἡλίου) were of greatest importance in Heraclitus’ theory of cosmic justice, and δίκη is mentioned in l. 12. If ὑπερβατόν is a rhetorical term of the commentator, then ll. 11–13 are not by Heraclitus, but a part of the commentary. In any case, something like τροπὰς ποιεῖ (or ποιεῖται) after μηνὶ τα[κτῶι seems very likely: a TLG proximity search for this phrase yields 60 instances (τροπὰς ποιεῖ or ποιεῖται) in astronomical texts: it was a fixed phrase that was used with a dativus temporis specifying the month of the solstice. The phrase occurs in the doxography of Anaximander (12 A 27 DK = Ar 8, 66 & 84 Wöhrle), Anaximenes (13 A 15 DK = As 40 & 125 Wöhrle), and Anaxagoras (59 A 42 DK); it is hard to imagine something very different from this in the original Preplatonic texts. Nevertheless, it looks like an explanation of Heraclitus’ mythopoetic ‘peculiar’ expressions in plain ‘common words.’ Janko’s ἀμήνιτα (accepted by Kotwick) is unfortunate: it is an archaic and poetic word (Archilochus, thrice in Aeschylus) derived from the Homeric μῆνις, unknown in prose (with a single exception, Hdt. 9.94) for more than 500 years until it resurfaces in Plutarch (10 instances), the lover of antiquarian lore. The probability of its occurrence in 5th-cent. BC Sophistic prose is close to zero. Furthermore, ἀμήνιτος is a characteristic (ἀοργησία in classical philosophical prose) possessed by the gods and the wise. The sing. neut. form τὸ ἀμήνιτον is conceivable and attested (once in Plutarch), but the plur. neut. ἀμήνιτα is hard to imagine and unattested, just as τὸ ἀόργητον (= ἀοργησία) is conceivable and attested, whereas the plural ἀόργητα is not found. Therefore, Janko’s reading should be ruled out with certainty: there is no alternative to μηνὶ τακ[τῶι of the KPT text.

5 (V) The title and date of the Derveni Treatise: its relation to the psephisma of Diopeithes Let us start with a list of candidates from extant sources. 1) Themistius quotes Prodicus’ allegorical interpretation of Orphic theogony with the remark πᾶσαν εὐσέβειαν, “all piety,” which might imply the title Περὶ εὐσεβείας. 2) The combination of two possible quotations of Prodicus’ etymologies of divine names in Plato’s Cratylus (409a9) and Plutarch’s fr. 157 Sandbach might suggest Περὶ παλαιᾶς φυσιολογίας or Περὶ ἀρχαίας φυσιολογίας. 3) Given that the author of Derv.T is Prodicus of Ceos, a disciple of Protagoras, and that through its literary genre, the Derv.T is related to the Sophistic

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 545

Kulturgeschichte, two titles of Protagoras’ works seem theoretically conceivable: Περὶ θεῶν and Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως. The latter is imitated in Plato’s Protagoras where Prodicus is also mentioned. 4) In the Cratylus, Plato discusses etymologies of the divine names similar to those found in PDerv. after an emphatic (in the very beginning) reference to Prodicus’ “fifty drachmas” lecture On the Correctness of Names (Περὶ ὀρθότητος τῶν ὀνομάτων) as a kind of a classic of the genre. 5) In Aristophanes’ parody of Prodicus’ allegorical interpretation of the Orphic theogony (Av. 709), one of the ‘greatest’ gifts of birds to the human race is the ability to tell time and distinguish between different seasons (ὥρας): cf. PDerv., col. XXIV.10–11. Of all the candidates, the last one seems to be the most promising and better documented. Ὧραι or Seasons was considered already by Prodicus’ contemporaries as his masterpiece. According to the scholiast, it contained the famous protreptic to virtue, the story of Heracles. In earlier scholarship, the word Horai was understood in a narrow sense as a reference to Heracles’ maturity.141 According to Wilhelm Nestle, it was much broader in scope and consisted of three parts: a) praise of agriculture, b) the origin of religion, and c) the story about Heracles.142 According to Robert Mayhew’ ingenious reconstruction, Horai consisted of two parts: Part 1 on the early ‘seasons’ of the human race and Part 2 on the seasons of human life (including the story of Heracles).143 The first part included: a) the miserable life of the wretched primitive people alluded to in Aristophanes’ Birds (685–687); b) the origin of religion, stage one: humans deify beneficial natural phenomena; c) the origin of religion, stage two: humans deify the inventors of τέχναι with special emphasis on agriculture and viticulture. In both stages, according to Mayhew, “etymologically appropriate names are given” to the objects of deification. Our reconstruction and reading of the Derveni treatise perfectly fits into Mayhew’s Part 1. However, one difficulty remains: Prodicus was famous for his exquisite style, and Heracles story (allegedly part of Horai) was praised by Xenophon as a literary masterpiece. The style of the Derveni treatise is anything but Kunstprosa (with the exception of cols. V, XX, and XXII, on which see § [X] below). To resolve this difficulty, we must admit that the text of PDerv. is a Sophistic lecture based on Horai. This hypothesis explains the sporadic change of style from simple to exquisite one: it was recommended by Prodicus as a didactic device to keep his 141 DK, II, 312 n. 20. 142 Nestle (1976). 143 Mayhew (2011) xxii. On the early history of the philosophical topos ‘the seasons of life,’ see also Lebedev (2017c).

546 

 Andrei Lebedev

listeners awake.144 Col. XX looks like an “insertion” (παρεμβολή) from the “fiftydrachma” lecture.145 Pace Nestle and Mayhew, we have some doubts about the possibility of integrating both Heracles’ choice and the treatise on the origin of religion and civilization into one and the same work. The former has nothing to do with agriculture and Kulturgeschichte; the latter has nothing to do with practical ethics. Stylistic differences alone make this integration unlikely.146 The choice of Heracles is quoted by many authors, but it is cited under the somewhat surprising title Seasons only once in a scholium to Ar. Nub. 361. This section would fit much better into a historical work in which agriculture was an important subject: in Greek linguistic consciousness, the word ὧραι was closely associated with the yearly agricultural cycle (ὧραι αἱ πάντα φέρουσι). The scholiast may have conflated Prodicus’ two most famous and influential works into one. Diels suggested that Ὧραι was an artificial title like Ἡροδότου Μοῦσαι invented by the Alexandrians.147 The alleged Muses of Herodotus refers to nine books, just as the Φιλολάου Βάκχαι (a sculpture group of three bacchants) refers to the three books of Philolaus’ Περὶ φύσεως: in the same way, Prodicus’ Seasons might have been attached by librarians to a collection of different speeches and works in four books. But this is unlikely since the title Ὧραι is alluded to already in Aristophanes (both in Birds and the neglected fragment from the Seasons) and in Xenophon (Mem. 4.4: see App. [3] below). In Themistius, ὧραι are also associated with Prodicus’ theory of religion, but not with Heracles’ choice. In the moral parable about virtue, Heracles is a conventional literary fiction; in Prodicus’ history of religion, he would have been presented as a deified king in the second stage. The date. The relation of Derv.T to the psephisma of Diopeithes and to the trial and death of Anaxagoras. A firm terminus ante quem is established by the production year of Aristophanes’ Birds: 414 BC. However, in view of the close relationship of the cosmogony of Birds with the cosmology of Clouds (dinos-motif), and especially in view of the 144 Arist. Rh. 3.14.1415b12 (= Prod. test. 41 Mayhew). 145 But this is uncertain. The style and the sarcastic tone of col. XX resembles that of col. V, which displays affinity with Heraclitus. 146 In the controversy on the authenticity of Xenophon’s exposition of Heracles’ choice, we side with Sansone (2004) and Mayhew (2011) 204 against Gray (2006). One of the disputed 15 words is καθαρειότης. Pollux (Onom. 6.27) condemns καθάρειος as vulgar (ἰδιωτικόν), i.e. non-Attic, despite one instance of καθαρείως in Xen. Cyr. 1.3.8.10. Plato has only καθαρός/καθαρότης, never καθάρειος/καθαρειότης. The latter form seems to be Ionic and therefore reflects Prodicus’ rather than Xenophon’s own regular usage. 147 DK, II, 312 n. 20.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 547

allusion to teletai in both comedies and possible quotations from Derv.T in Aristophanes’ Clouds, the terminus ante quem should be pushed up to 420/417 (the extant version of Clouds) or even 423 (the first version), since the image of Clouds cannot be separated from the ‘air’ and the vortex cosmogony. A plausible termi­ nus post quem is the psephisma of Diopeithes (433/432 BC)148 or rather the trial (c. 430) or even death (428) of Anaxagoras, since the Derv.T looks like a ‘response’ to these events. Thus the Derveni treatise should be dated most likely between 432 and 423 BC. A date soon after the trial of death of Anaxagoras, i.e. the early twenties, looks especially plausible. How do we know that the Derveni Treatise was written after and in response to the psephisma of Diopeithes rather than before it? Why not suppose that it was one of Diopeithes’ targets? The first possibility better explains the extravagant figure of Orpheus the Anaxagorean. Before the psephisma, any Anaxagorean or Sophist could express his views on nature, the cosmos, and τὰ μετάρσια without fear. Now one had to be cautious to avoid the charge of impiety. Orpheus the Anaxagorean was at the same time a parody (or a polemical peritrope: see App. [2] below), a protective device against the charge of impiety and an apology for Anaxagoras. The psephisma of Diopeithes introduced the prosecution by eisangelia (i.e. as offenders against the state) of those who do not recognize the traditional religion of the polis and teach astronomical theories (logoi) that deny the divinity of heavens.149 The traditional views about the gods and religious institutions were commonly referred to as τὰ πάτρια and πάτριοι λόγοι. Just as the buzzwords of conservative political discourse were πάτριος πολιτεία and πάτριοι νόμοι, the catchwords of the lexicon of religious conservatives were πάτριος λόγος or νόμος.150 It is conceivable that in the original formulation of the psephisma briefly paraphrased by Plutarch, πάτριοι λόγοι περὶ θεῶν or μεταρσίων were opposed to conflicting “new doctrines,” the target being Anaxagoras and the sophists who teach new astronomy and corrupt the young. In any case, the author of the Derv.T could not be formally accused of rejecting the 148 On Pericles’ trial and Diopeithes’ psephisma, see Rubel (2014) ch. 2.5–6, who argues for a date after 430. Contra Mansfeld (1980) 88, who proposes 438/437 BC. See the status quaetionis accurately outlined by Vassallo’s paper in this volume. 149 Plut. Per. 32: (…), καὶ ψήφισμα Διοπείθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας, κτλ. 150 Aristotle begins On Heaven’s Book 2 by prudently asserting that his views on the divinity of the heavens are in perfect agreement with “ancestral doctrines” (De cael. 2.1.284a2 ff.: διόπερ καλῶς ἔχει συμπείθειν ἑαυτὸν τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ μάλιστα πατρίους ἡμῶν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι λόγους, ὡς ἔστι ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ θεῖον κτλ.). Cf. also ps.-Arist. Mund. 6.397b13–15: ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεὸν συνέστηκεν, κτλ. In Plut. Cons. ad ux. 611d8–9, πάτριος λόγος is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as taught in the mysteries of Dionysos.

548 

 Andrei Lebedev

‘ancestral doctrines’: on the contrary, he expressed ‘admiration’ for the ancient wisdom of Orpheus and offered only a ‘corrected’ interpretation of his poetry. By proving that Anaxagoras’ astronomy is in perfect agreement with the ‘ancestral wisdom’ of Orpheus, the founder of Greek religion, Prodicus also attempted to absolve Anaxagoras from the charge of asebeia. About the same time, another disciple and friend of Anaxagoras, Euripides, in his Hippolytus (428 BC) launched an attack against “the books of Orpheus” and the puritanic Orphic life, targeting the ideology of Diopeithes & Co. Euripides probably did this on the occasion of Anaxagoras’ death in Lampsacus the same year. The angry invective of the father of the Athenian demos, Theseus, against the ‘insane’ obsession of the egocentric Hippolytus with ritual purity contains a hyponoia with a counter-accusation of ‘impiety’: the Orphico-Pythagorean vegetarian diet (ἄψυχος βορά) contradicts the ‘ancestral law’ of Greek religion, that of animal sacrifice (Hipp. 928 ff.). Now, the restoration of the correct reading in PHerc. 245, fr. 7.1–4 provides a unique new piece of evidence that Anaxagoras was tortured (μασ]|τιγωθείς) during the interrogation (anakrisis) at his trial.151 We take this evidence at face value as a historical fact since it comes from a series of trials of philosophers, the historicity of which cannot be doubted. The Herculanean evidence sheds new light on the meaning of two cryptic passages on Tantalos in Euripides’ Orestes (4–10 and 982–984). We interpret them as a veiled commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Anaxagoras’ death disguised as a parabel about the punishment of the ancient ⌢σσα): the physiologos Tantalos by Zeus for his licentious tongue (ἀκόλαστος γλω ‘rock’ hanging over Tantalos’ head is conceived as the Anaxagorean lump (bolos) of the sun. The ‘tortures’ of the mythical Tantalos allude to the real tortures of Anaxagoras at his trial, and the ‘rock’ that still hangs over the heads of those who investigate the nature of the stars is the charge of impiety. A Zeus who punishes audacious physiologoi alludes to the ‘Servant of Zeus,’ Dio­peithes, who punished Anaxagoras by his psephisma. In a kind of makarismos, Anaxagoras is praised by Euripides as an innocent martyr of science and a victim of religious fanaticism.152 It is tempting to view the grotesque αἰδοῖον κατέπινεν scene in col. ΧΙΙΙ.4 (Zeus “swallowed”) as an obscene joke intended by Prodicus as a personal insult towards Diopeithes, whose name etymologically means “the one who obeys Zeus.” Prodicus was the leading expert in the language and style of his time: it is inconceivable that he would so blatantly misread a perfectly clear text in which any reader would take αἰδοῖον as “venerable” (an epithet of a god)

151 See, in this volume, Vassallo’s DAPR, T7. 152 For a detailed discussion of the Tantalos’ paradigm in Orestes see § (VIII) below and Willink (1983).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 549

rather than as a substantive meaning “penis.”153 After Anaxagoras’ exile, Archelaus became the leading figure in post-Anaxagorean physiologia in Athens. It is around this time that the book of Heraclitus becomes fashionable in Socratic and Sophistic circles in Athens. Euripides and Socrates are among the first readers;154 Prodicus was connected with both. Prodicus and Euripides were friends, and both of them were disciples of Anaxagoras. After the death of Anaxagoras in 428 BC, they probably joined their efforts in a counter-attack against Diopeithes & Co. in order to restore the immaculate name of Anaxagoras and to absolve him of the false accusations of impiety. The author of De diaeta 1 (possibly Herodicus of Selymbria) in his cosmology and physics exhibits a strikingly similar synthesis of Anaxagoras and Heraclitus phrased in strikingly similar language; on independent grounds we date it to the same decade 430/420 BC.155 Possible influences of Democritus on PDerv. during or after his visit to Athens in the twenties would also support our date. It is reasonable to suppose that Prodicus was nicknamed Tantalos after he wrote Horai (Derv.T). Willink arrives at 420/410 (between Aristophanes’ Clouds and Euripides’ Orestes) as the most plausible date of Prodicus’ sobriquet Tantalos.156

6 (VI) The philosophical sources of the Derveni author (Prodicus of Ceos) The Derveni author (Prodicus) apparently relied on the same version of ‘Orpheus’ Theogony’ as the one alluded to in Aristophanes’ Birds in 414 BC. In the 4th cent. BC it was summarized by Eudemus in his History of Theology (fr. 150 Wehrli)

153 Contra Burkert (1980) 32; Kirk ap. KRS (1983) 32–33; Janko (2001) 24; Betegh (2004) 111 ff.; Bernabé (2007) 107, and others. The correct view (αἰδοῖον masc. acc., “the reverend,” sc. Δαίμονα) is that of West (1983) 84 ff., KPT, 133 and Sider (2014) 231, among others. Detailed and persuasive refutation can be found in Santamaría (2016). Sider (2014) 241 has pointed out the important fact, neglected by the supporters of the former view, that the sing. τὸ αἰδοῖον, “penis,” is a prosaic form not attested before the late 5th cent. BC (Hippocrates, Herodotus) and therefore unlikely in a 6th-cent. BC epic poem. In early 5th-cent. BC Ionian prose, we still find the epic plur. αἰδοίοισιν: cf. Heraclit. 22 B 15 DK (= fr. 148 Lebedev). The masculine pronoun ὅς in PDerv., col. XIII.4 alone makes it clear that αἰδοῖον is masc. acc. from the epithet αἰδοῖος applied to acc. δαίμον[α] κυδρόν at the end of the preceding verse (col. VIII.5). If αἰδοῖον means “penis,” then Olympus means “time,” Oceanus means “air,” Moira of Zeus means “vortex in the air,” and so on. 154 Diog. Laërt. 2.22 (= 22 A 4 [III] DK). 155 Lebedev (2014) 27–42. 156 Willink (1983) 33.

550 

 Andrei Lebedev

and was dismissed as a fake by Aristotle in his lost On Philosophy (frs. 25–26 Gigon). Chances are that already Herodotus and Ion of Chios in the 5th cent. BC expressed doubts concerning its authenticity and attributed the Orphic doctrine to the Pythagoreans. We call it the ‘Attic version’ of the Orphic Theogony. Its distinctive feature is the generation from Night as an initial stage rather than from the ageless Kronos of the Rhapsodic Theogony known to the Neoplatonists. According to the reliable (and for no good reason often neglected) evidence of Aristotle, supported by such learned and discerning minds as Plutarch, Pausanias, and Sextus, this ancient Attic version was composed in the late 6th cent. BC by the professional mantis Onomacritus in Athens. Onomacritus may well have been influenced by Pythagoras’ doctrine of the immortal soul as well as by the authentic Theogony of Epimenides of Crete composed c. 600 BC in which: a) the world originates from Night and a cosmic egg; b) the doctrine of reincarnation is alluded to in Epimenides’ fr. 33 [I] Bernabé.157 According to Aristotle, Onomacritus was “trained in the art of divination” in Crete, and the Cretan μαντικὴ τέχνη was no doubt that of Epimenides. Pausanias’ report that Onomacritus invented the myth of the sparagmos of Dionysos at the Titans’ hands look plausible, if not strictly demonstrable.158 In a sense, Onomacritus was a sophos aner of a not so distant past who invented a new religion for the masses: the ‘Orphic’ anthropogony explaining the dualistic nature of man is a transparent popularization in mythical terms of Pythagoras’ metaphysical dualism of peras and apeiron, the same and the ‘other,’ the body as source of evil and the divine soul.159 A religion 157 We argue for the authenticity of Epimenides’ Theogony in Lebedev (2015) 555 ff., on the Selene fragment and reincarnation 561 ff. 158 Contra Edmonds (1999) 43, who quotes in support of his hypercritical thesis Linforth (1941) 353: “No one else [sc. except Pausanias – A. L.] throughout antiquity quotes the works of Onomacritus or makes an allusion to them (…).” But this is blatantly wrong: Aristotle in his Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, fr. 26 Gigon ascribes to Onomacritus the Orphic Theogony. 159 On ταὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλο as first principles of Pythagoras (sic) cf. Arist. fr. 152 Gigon. On Archytas see Lebedev (2017c) 242 ff. and (2017d) 23–24. We argue that, in Metaphysics Α, Aristotle ascribes the table of 10 opposites to Pythagoras (sic) and 6th cent. BC Pythagoreans contemporary with Alcmaeon and distinguishes this ancient group (oἱ πρὸ τούτων) from Philolaus and 5th-cent. BC Pythagoreans contemporary with Empedocles and Anaxagoras (οἱ ἐν τούτοις). In this table, the corporeal changing substance (τὸ ἑτερόμηκες) is correlated with evil (τὸ κακόν) and darkness (σκότος), and the immutable substance of the soul (τετράγωνον) with good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) and light (φῶς). The square was a Pythagorean geometrical symbol of the immortal self-identical soul. Cf. Lyd. Mens. 2.9 Wünsch: ψυχὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου, ὡς Πυθαγόρας ἔφη, ἔστι τετράγωνον ὀρθoγώνιον (Archytas is a probable source). An unfinished square with two diagonals is pictured on the reverse side of the ‘Orphic’ bone plate (West [1983] 61 pl. 3) which on the obverse has a graffito with the name of Dionysos and pairs of opposites σῶμα ψυχή, ψεῦδος ἀλήθεια.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 551

of guilt is a godsend for tyrannical regimes, since it lowers man’s dignity and selfesteem and makes him more submissive and easier to manipulate: the original sin is perceived as a χρέος. Prodicus most likely knew that ‘Orpheus’ theogony’ was a fake. Orpheus was an exemplary mantis of the mythical past; Onomacritus was a chresmologos and mantis who served the tyrannical regime of the Pisistratidae and made the falsification of oracles his profession; Diopeithes and Lampon were contemporary manteis who swore by the holy name of ‘Orpheus’ and fought against Ionian natural science, which posed a threat to their profession. This explains the freedom with which Prodicus, a leading representative of the ‘liberal intelligentsia’ of his time, proposed fantastic fake interpretations of a fake ‘sacred discourse.’ Now, as regards Prodicus’ (= the Derveni author’s) properly philosophical sources, we should distinguish two areas: historical anthropology, origin of religion, philosophy of mythology, and philosophy of language on the one hand, and physics and cosmology, on the other. In “human things” (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα) his main sources of inspiration were Protagoras’ ‘Humanism’ and Sophistic Kulturgeschichte, above all Protagoras’ On the Original Condition (sc. of the Human Race). In the philosophy of religion and mythology, he combined the crypto-atheism of Protagoras’ On Gods with Heraclitus’ devastating criticism of theological anthropomorphism, ‘insane’ rituals, and mystery cults. The names of Protagoras and Heraclitus are emphatically joined as two main representatives of the ‘universal flux’ school of thought in Plato’s Theaetetus and Cratylus, in contexts that are at the same time ontological and theological. If we translate Plato’s language into familiar modern terminology, he regards (and ironically dismisses) them as knowledgeable of the Ionian naturalistic pantheism, in which the divine is not separated from cosmic processes and is conceived as constantly moving and changing. Plato himself sided with Western Greek philosophical theology, the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, who conceived god as set apart from matter and always ἀκίνητον. As a matter of fact, historical Heraclitus was not an atheist like Prodicus: his cosmic god is a genuine providential god, like the god of Stoics; his concept of the universal Logos paved the way to the Stoic theological doctrine; and his archaic term for cosmic Ιntelligence and Providential Will (Γνώμη) was ‘translated’ by the Stoics into familiar Attic idiom as πρόνοια. Therefore, by joining Heraclitus with Protagoras and the Sophists, Plato rather targeted the Sophistic reception of Heraclitus and may well have had Prodicus in mind as well. In Plato’s Cratylus, the ancient inventors of divine names like Rhea and Kronos are presented as prehistoric Heracliteans who held the ‘universal flux’ doctrine. Whether Prodicus’ (Derveni author’s) theory of the ‘agricultural’ origin of religion and deification of ‘beneficial things’ was anticipated in Protagoras is difficult to determine, since too little is known about the

552 

 Andrei Lebedev

contents of Protagoras’ relevant treatises.160 The same holds true for the distinction between two successive stages in the parallel development of language and religion: the original stage of simple and clear “common names” (κοινὰ, λεγόμενα ὀνόματα) denoting “real things” (τὰ ἐόντα), and the later stage when “peculiar names” (ἴδια ὀνόματα), like divine names, were invented by poets like Orpheus and added to the common names. Those who spoke the original, simple language were natural atheists: they venerated only real things (like the sun, the moon, the crops, etc.) that were ‘useful’ for survival. The cult of the anthropomorphic gods of Greek religion with strange and unintelligible (to hoi polloi) names appeared only at the second stage as a result of the ‘linguistic mistake’ of mortals. In the Derveni treatise (Prodicus), this mistake is attributed to the intentional ambiguity and enigmatic character of “peculiar names” invented by Orpheus rather than to the spontaneous ‘disease of language’ posited by Max Müller. The anthropomorphic polytheism of Greek mythology was dismissed as an invention of poets (Homer and Hesiod) already by Xenophanes and Heraclitus in the late 6th to early 5th cent. BC. The specific theory of the ‘linguistic mistake’ (a form of linguistic idealism) explaining the origin of the mythopoetic gods was held by both Heraclitus (c. 490 BC) and Parmenides (c. 480 BC). In Heraclitus the phenomenal world of plurality derives from the wrong diairesis of the “common logos” (ξυνὸς λόγος) of the universe: the meaningless ‘letters’ of the ‘book of nature’ were mistaken by the poets for names that gave rise to imaginary individual objects and the plurality of gods; “wisdom consists in knowing all things as one.”161 In Parmenides, the phenomenal world of Doxa results from another linguistic mistake: one of the two names posited by mortals for the supposed two primary elements (Light and Night = soul and body) should not have been posited at all since Night is not a separate substance, but just an absence of light, a non-entity.162 Parmenides’ influence on Prodicus and the Sophists is ruled out: Gorgias’ parody of Parmenides makes it clear that the heirs of Ionian ‘Enlightenment’ dismissed the idealist Eleatic ontology with a smile. 160 The lack of evidence on the contents of Protagoras’ Περὶ θεῶν (as compared with the relatively abundant evidence on the analogous work of Prodicus) may be due to the fact that most existing copies after his condemnation were confiscated and burned by the keryx on the agora: Diog. Laërt. 9.52 (ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων). Prodicus’ work escaped this fate because it was protected by his alleged respect for the ancient wisdom of Orpheus and the ἀρχαῖαι δόξαι about gods. Prodicus could easily acquit himself of the charge of impiety by pointing out that the law, as formulated in the psephisma of Diopeithes, forbids teaching the new λόγοι περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων, whereas he teaches the ancient doctrines. 161 Keeping the MSS’s correct reading εἰδέναι: Heraclit. 22 B 50 DK (= fr. 1 Lebedev: σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι). 162 Parmenid. 28 B 8.54 DK: τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν – ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσιν. See Lebedev (2017b) 512 ff.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 553

We have noticed above that in the philosophy of language, Heraclitus anticipated the Derveni author’s (Prodicus’) theory of nomination and functionalist semantics. The idea that in their ritual practices, hoi polloi do not realize what they are doing and that the meaning of sacred objects escapes their understanding is of fundamental importance in Heraclitus’ criticism of popular cults and mysteries: e.g. those who perform Bacchic rites and honour Dionysos with a hymn to the phallos (αἰδοῖον), a symbol of life and generation, do not realize that in fact they venerate the god of death (Ἀΐδης).163 Heraclitus probably meant that the ritual was instituted by a wise man who knew that life and death are one and the same thing, but his ambiguity and cryptic language have misled the many. Similarly, the Derveni author points out that, although the mystai sacrifice to the Erinyes popana polyomphala with good reason, they do not understand the symbolism of these offerings: if they did, they would have realized that the traditional image of the Erinyes is a figment of poetic imagination and that in fact they feed the air. Theophrastus’ superstitious man, deisidaimon, who goes to the Orpheotelestai (πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρφεοτελεστάς) every month, also buys sacrificial cakes (πόπανα) on the 4th and 7th day and remains insane the entire day (ἀφρονεῖ ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν).164 In his physics and cosmology, the Derveni author (Prodicus) strictly adheres to Ionian naturalism: no trace whatsoever of Empedocles, Pythagoreans, or Eleatics can be found.165 As has been rightly seen by many commentators, his main

163 Heraclit. 22 B 15 DK (= fr. 147 Lebedev). For interpretation see Lebedev (2014) 449. 164 Theophr. Char. 16.10–11a Steinmetz. Pythagorean approval: Diog. Laërt. 8.13; Iambl. VP 11.54; 28.150. 165 Contra Janko (2016), followed by Kotwick (2017) 107–108. A reconstruction of Parmenides’ verse B 1.1 from a few letters seems too bold. See the criticism of Tsantsanoglou (2017) and (2018). The attempt to connect Parmenides’ proem (interpreted as katabasis) with the oracle of Night in PDerv. cannot hold out against criticism: in Parmenides, Night is the source of ignorance (B 8.59: νύκτ’ ἀδαῆ), not of knowledge. In the opposition Light/Night of the Doxa, Night is axiologically marked as a negative element, exactly as in the Pythagorean table of opposites where it is correlated with κακόν, and Light with ἀγαθόν. The goal of kouros’ flight (sic) are the celestial gates (B 1.11–13: πύλαι [...] αἰθέριαι), and the revealing goddess is called in the neglected fragment νύμφη ὑψιπύλη, the “maiden of the high gates.” She proclaims ‘Night’ (i.e. the corporeal substance) an empty name, a linguistic mistake of mortals (B 8.54). Furthermore, in the geocentric cosmos of Parmenides (who knew the cause of eclipses) there is no place for Hesiod’s Tartarus. In the Pythagorean cosmos, Hades is the sublunar word, and we are dead now: for details see Lebedev (2017b). A quotation from Parmenides is a priori unlikely: in the fight between the Anaxagoreioi and Pythagoreioi, the Derveni author sides with the former, and Parmenides, ἀνὴρ Πυθαγόρειος (Strabo), with the latter. If, by any chance, Janko nevertheless is right, we would suggest that the reason for quoting Parmenides is, as in Heraclitus’ case, allegorical language: Sextus interpreted the proem of Parmenides allegorically.

554 

 Andrei Lebedev

source is Anaxagoras and the Anaxagorean school. It is not necessary to postulate that he knew the works of Diogenes of Apollonia, since the similarities are superficial and the differences essential.166 Diogenes was an obscure figure before his works were discovered by Aristotle and Theophrastus; there is no evidence that he ever visited Athens, let alone influenced Athenian intellectual life at the time of Socrates.167 The selection of texts in 64 C 1–2 DK with the alleged 5th-cent. BC allusions to Diogenes in Aristophanes and Euripides is arbitrary and misleading.168 The identification of Zeus with ‘air’ was commonplace in Preplatonic philosophy and needs not be associated with Diogenes in particular. In Anaxagoras’ own cosmogony (59 B 1 DK), the initial mixture of spermata was conceived as ἀήρ and αἰθήρ. Naturalistic pantheism, according to Aristotle, was held by “most of the physiologoi,”169 not by Diogenes alone. It would be incorrect to claim that the quasi-teleological argument in PDerv., col. XXI.9–10 cannot antedate Diogenes of Apollonia; the theory that makes Diogenes the first ‘teleologist’ overlooks Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans whose philosophy of nature was much more teleological than that of Diogenes. The Derveni author derives ἀήρ from αἰωρεῖσθαι in col. XVII.3–9. The mechanistic understanding of ‘air’ as a ‘suspension’ of small particles has little in common with Diogenes’ biomorphic idea of an animated continuum that transforms itself into different bodies (ἑτεροίωσις: cf. 64 B 5 DK). The physical system of the Derveni author is predominantly Anaxagorean, with three modifications: a) Nous is not a separate substance, but is inherent in the ‘air’; b) in the cosmogony, fire plays the extraordinary role of material causa movens; c) the sun and the moon are not solid ‘lumps,’ but agglomerates of hot particles. These are exactly the three modifications that Archelaus of Athens introduced into Anaxagoras’ system.170 We follow Luria in recognizing that “independent (from Democritus) tradition on Leucippus did not exist.”171 Therefore, when we discuss possible traces of atomistic doctrines in PDerv., we should have only Democritus in mind, regardless of how one solves the problem of the historicity of Leucippus.172 In any case, 166 Contra Janko (1997) 80 ff., correctly Betegh (2006) 306 ff. 167 τοῦτον in DK II, 51.40 refers to Anaxagoras, not Diogenes; so rightly Diels ad loc. 168 The source of Ar. Nub. 828 (on Dinos) and 264 (on Aer) is Prodicus, not Diogenes. The source of Eur. Tro. 884–889 is Anaxagorean. 169 Cf. Arist. Ph. 3.4.203b3–30 (= 12 A 15 DK = Ar 2 Wöhrle): Anaximander and “most of the physiologoi” (οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων) identify infinite matter with “the divine” (τὸ θεῖον). 170 The importance of Archelaus as a source of PDerv. has been rightly emphasised by Betegh (2006) 306 ff. 171 Luria (1947) 132 ff. and (1970) passim. 172 Our position differs from Luria in that we, following Epicurus, doubt the historicity of Leucippus: preliminary arguments in Lebedev (1984) 13–15, but see now Vassallo (2017b) 46–50.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 555

Leucippus is never mentioned before Aristotle. On the contrary, Democritus is a historical person made of flesh and blood, and his visit to Athens is documented both by the biographical tradition and by his own words.173 Scholars who compared PDerv. with Leucippus rather than with Democritus presumably did so on chronological grounds, following the old view that Democritus’ doctrines were not known before 420 BC. Luria has questioned this view and has argued that Democritus had formulated his basic doctrine already by 430 BC.174 An additional confirmation of Luria’s date of the dissemination of Democritus’ works is provided by the plausible traces of Democritus’ atomic theory in Hippocratic De diaeta 1, which we date between 430 and 420 BC, since it is criticized in the Ancient Medicine dated by Mark J. Shiefsky between 420 and 410 BC.175 If the story that Democritus wished to meet Anaxagoras in Athens, but was refused, is true, Democritus visited Athens before 430, the supposed year of Anaxagoras’ trial and flight to Lampsacus.176 If it was invented to explain his accusations of Anaxagoras’ plagiarism, the visit could have taken place later in the twenties. Democritus’ close ties with Protagoras would naturally bring him into contact with Sophistic circles and with Prodicus. It is worth noticing that Plato’s reference to the ‘proto-language’ in Cratylus, which we connect with Prodicus, also alludes to Democritus’ accusation of Anaxagoras.177 The Derveni treatise therefore might provide Leucippus probably was either Democritus’ pseudonym or a literary figure invented by Democritus, presumably an “ancient sage” (sophos aner) whose logos or logoi were ‘cited’ in the Megas Diakosmos and On Mind. The author of MXG 6.980a6–9, who does not depend on Epicurus, but also doubts his authorship, cites “logoi that are said to be by Leucippus” (ἐν τοῖς Λευκίππου καλουμένοις λόγοις): this language resembles quotations of Socrates’ logoi from Plato’s dialogues. Alternative hypothesis is as follows: the proem to the Megas Diakosmos contained a story about the ‘discovery’ of Leucippus’ ancient doctrines (inscribed on tablets) in ancient grave or some distant and mysterious place. Democritus may have intended the figure of ‘Leucippus’ as an Ionian reply to the Pythagorean ‘Orpheus.’ The author of the Genealogies of Acusilaus (which contained an Orpheus-style theogony) claimed, presumably in a proem, that the text is based on ancient “bronze plates” (ἐκ δέλτων χαλκῶν) discovered by his father when he was digging in the yard of his house (3 A 2 DK). 173 “I came to Athens and nobody knew me,” ἦλθον γὰρ εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ οὔτις με ἔγνωκεν, quoted by Demetrius of Magnesia ap. Diog. Laërt. 9.36 (= Democrit. fr. xxiv Luria = 68 B 116 DK). 174 Luria (1947) 134. 175 Lebedev (2014) 27–42. 176 Diog. Laërt. 9.34; cf. Democr. fr. xxiv Luria and, on Anaxagoras, Vassallo’s paper (§ 2) in this volume. 177 Diog. Laërt. 9.34–35 (according to Favorinus) λέγειν Δημόκριτον περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου ὡς οὐκ εἴησαν αὐτοῦ αἱ δόξαι αἵ τε περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχαῖαι, τὸν δὲ ὑφῃρῆσθαι. διασύρειν τε αὐτοῦ τὰ περὶ τῆς διακοσμήσεως καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, κτλ., “Democritus said about Anaxagoras that his views about the sun and moon were not his own, but ancient, and that he had stolen them. Democritus also ridiculed Anaxagoras’ view on cosmogony and the mind, etc.”

556 

 Andrei Lebedev

the earliest evidence on the influence of Democritus in Athens in the late thirties or twenties of the 5th cent. BC. Commentators have rightly drawn attention to discernible terminological similarities in the cosmogony of PDerv. and the Atomists: necessity (ἀνάγκη), collision of atoms (κρούεσθαι), separation of matter into small bodies (κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα), etc. The atomistic theory of matter and the corpuscular theory of matter are not the same thing: every atomistic theory is a corpuscular theory, but not every corpuscular theory is atomistic. Both Anaximander and Anaxagoras spoke of particles of matter (σπέρματα, μοῖραι), but they did not regard them as indivisible. Hence the difficult question of whether the Derveni author speaking of “tiny bodies” and particles has Anaxagoras’ divisible “molecules” or Democritus’ indivisible atoms in mind. The cosmogonic vortex (δίνη) and the mechanistic motion according to necessity featured already in Anaximander’s cosmogony and even the equation of dine with moira/ananke may have been a part of a common Ionian heritage.178 But the ‘collision’ of particles looks like a typically atomistic terminology, to which we should add the even more striking case of θόρνυσθαι in PDerv., col. XXI.2–4, where it describes the chaotic pre-cosmic motion of small particles of matter: ἐν τῶι ἀέρι κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα ἐκινεῖτο | καὶ ἐθόρνυτο, θορνύμενα δ’ ἕκατα συνεστάθη | πρὸς ἄλληλα. The original meaning of this verb is “to thrust out,” “to extrude,” to eject and ejaculate, hence it is used of copulation, hence θορός (“sperm”) and θόρνη (“copulation”), on which the Derveni author comments (XXI.1).179 In nonbiological contexts it was also used for ‘shoot-like’ swift motion, e.g. of arrows in shooting or of beans in winnowing.180 When applied to the movement of particles of matter, it is semantically very close, if not identical with ἐκθλίβεσθαι, an important concept in the atomistic mechanics of the vortex, denoting the ‘extrusion’ or ‘pressing out’ of light particles to the periphery of the vortex.181 Democritus also uses the very same verb θόρνυμι/θρῴσκω in his description of the swift motion of εἴδωλα.182 Neither κρούεσθαι, θόρνυσθαι, nor their synonyms 178 All cosmic processes in Anaximander’s 12 Β 1 DK (= Ar 163 Wöhrle) – cosmogonical vortex is one of them – occur κατὰ τὸ χρεών, which is simply a poetic phrase for κατ’ ἀνάγκην. 179 The explanation in LSJ Suppl. “mating” is correct (contra KPT ad loc.): θόρνη denotes a certain action or event rather than an object (sperm). It should be understood by analogy with θοίνη (“feast, banquet”) rather than by analogy with γυνή: therefore, the form θόρ{ν}ηι (KPT) is unlikely. At least the Derveni author himself took it as “copulation.” 180 Cf. Hom. Il. 13.589: “beans tossed from the winnowing shovel” (LSJ). 181 Cf. Plac. 1.4.2 (= 67 A 24 DK = fr. 383 Luria); Arist. Cael. 4.2.310a10 (= 68 A 60 DK = fr. 368 Luria); Simpl. In Cael. 712.27 Heiberg (= 68 A 61 DK = fr. 368 Luria): (...) τὸ πῦρ ἐκθλιβόμενον (...) ἄνω φέρεσθαι (...). It can also refer to the respiratory motion of the psyche (cf. Arist. De respir. 10 (4).471b30 ff. = fr. 463 Luria) or to growth of grain (cf. Ael. NA 12.18 = 68 A 153 DK = fr. 541 Luria). 182 68 Α 77 DK.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 557

occur in Anaxagoras’ fragments, and this is not due to chance: in Democritus this concept emphasized that the motion of atoms is not spontaneous or resulting from an inner vital force or psyche, but is produced by external mechanical force, by πληγή and ἀνάγκη. Democritus rejected and ridiculed Anaxagoras’ teleological concept of Mind,183 but the Derveni author does not care about such blatant contradictions, since he is an amateur in physics and the aim of his work is not to construct a consistent physical theory of matter and material change, but to reconstruct the “ancient” physiologia of Orpheus and to demonstrate that Greek anthromorophic religion is the result of “ignorance” (amathia) and the ‘disease of language.’ In col. XIV.1, ἐ]κθόρηι refers to the “sprouting out” of Protogonos and the formation of the sun. The Derveni author ‘detects’ a mechanistic concept of the contemporary science in an epic word suitable for a pious description of divine birth.

7 (VII) Unlikely candidates proposed as authors of the Derv.T: Epigenes, Euthyphron, Stesimbrotos, and Diagoras of Melos Epigenes All the allegorical interpretations of Orpheus’ “peculiar expressions” (τὰ ἰδιάζοντα in Epigenes,184 without exception, are connected with agriculture: ploughs (ἀρότροις), furrows (αὔλαξι), semen (σπέρμα), rain (ὄμβρον), time, and the seasons.185 Moirai are the phases of the moon. The influence of Prodicus (Derv.T) on Epigenes is obvious. Epigenes used Prodicus’ theory as a hermeneutical basis of his work; his term ἰδιάζοντα therefore most probably was also suggested to him in Prodicus᾽ distinction between ‘common’ and ‘peculiar’ names (PDerv., col. IV). Epigenes, the author of Περὶ τῆς εἰς Ὀρφέα ἀναφερομένης ποιήσεως, may be identical to Epigenes the Socratic, son of Antiphon of Cephisia (P. Natorp ap. RE VI.1, 64, s.v., no. 15), who may be the same as Epigenes the grammarian (L. Cohn ap. RE VI.1, 64–65, s.v., no. 16).186 If so, considering the close connections between Socrates and Prodicus, he may have “heard” (ἤκουσε) Prodicus’ 183 Diog. Laërt. 9.35. 184 Suggested as the author of PDerv. by Kapsomenos (1964). 185 OF 407 and 1128. 186 Cf. Nails (2002) 140.

558 

 Andrei Lebedev

lectures. He cannot be the author of the Derveni treatise because his exegetical style is different and because he denied the authenticity of Orpheus’ poems (ἀναφερομένης), whereas the Derveni author pretends to accept it. It is not necessary to assume that he was as ‘atheistic’ and iconoclastic as Prodicus or the Derveni author: he seems to be a genuine allegorist and more sympathetic to myth and religion.

Euthyphron From what has been said above, it becomes clear that the attribution of the Derveni treatise to Euthyphron proposed by Boyancé and Kahn cannot be correct.187 As William D. Furley has convincingly demonstrated,188 Euthyphron was not a religious innovator and ‘sectarian’ (Burnet), but a religious orthodox and conservative. As a professional soothsayer, he must have opposed natural philosophy of the Ionian type (and its Sophistic applications to the history of religion) and approved of the psephisma of his colleague Diopeithes banning the teaching of ‘meteorology’ in Athens. The Derveni author, in turn, almost certainly must have classed people like Euthyphron with τέχνην ποιούμενοι τὰ ἱερά, whom he sarcastically attacks in col. ΧΧ. If our attribution of the Derveni treatise to Prodicus is correct, and if Euthyphron, as Wilamowitz suggested,189 wrote a book on the etymology of divine names, the relationship between their works must have been polemical. Euthyphron should most likely be credited with ‘pious’ and mystical etymologies of divine names: Ἀθηνᾶ = ἁ θεονόα, “divine mind,” or Ἥφαιστος = φάεος ἵστωρ, “knower of light,” cited by Plato in Cra. 407b5 and c4. The purpose of these etymologies was apparently apologetic: to defend and to preserve the traditional images and functions of the gods as divine personalities, in conscious opposition to the rationalistic and naturalistic interpretations of the ‘Anaxagoreans’ and Prodicus. Plato was well aware of both trends, and he mentions them explicitly in Cra. 397a1, εἴτε τῶν ἱερέων τις εἴτε τῶν σοφιστῶν, where “priests” primarily refers to Euthyphron, and “Sophists” to Prodicus. It would be natural to conclude that the two versions of the philosophy of Orpheus in Plato (as above) correspond to the hermeneutical approaches of Prodicus (the Ionian ‘Orpheus’) and Euthyphron (the Pythagorean ‘Orpheus’).

187 Boyancé (1974) and Kahn (1997). 188 Furley (1985) 201–208. 189 Wilamowitz (1919) II, 77.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 559

Stesimbrotos of Thasos (Περὶ τελετῶν) This attribution190 cannot be accepted for the following reasons: 1) Strictly speaking, ἀρχὴν | (...) ἔ[λ]αβ[εν in PDerv., col. VIII.4–5 is determined by the Orphic verse and does not constitute a linguistic preference of the Derveni author. Not is only the combination of ἀρχήν/βασιλείαν with λαμβάνειν/ἀφαιρεῖν a are very common expression (as Burkert recognized himself), but it is also attested in similar mythographic contexts with no relation to Orphica or Stesimbrotos.191 2) The succession Rhea/Zeus/Artemis/Athena in Stesimbrotos does not seem to be ‘Orphic’ and cannot be reconciled with the Derveni theogony; the similarities with the Rhapsodies and especially the marriage of Zeus with Demeter/Rhea in col. XXII point to Dionysos as the successor to Zeus. 3) Stesimbrotos was a rhapsode, and his approach to myth in the extant fragments of Περὶ τελετῶν (FGrHist 107 F 12–20) is traditional and somewhat naïve, with no trace of philosophical interest or allegorical interpretation. In the only extant sample of his etymology of a divine name, Διόνυσος is derived from Διόνυξος, “piercing Zeus,” on the grounds that when Dionysos was born, he was horned and therefore ‘pierced’ the thigh of Zeus (FGrHist 107 F 13). Stesimbrotos’ method is exactly the reverse of the Derveni author’s. He does not reduce the mythical to the rational and the commonsensical; he firmly believes in the traditional myth of Dionysos’ miraculous birth from the thigh of Zeus. Leaving the myth as it is, he tries to bring the name of the god in accord with it.192 He is a highly unphilosophical mind; therefore, his identity with the Derveni author should be ruled out with certainty.

Diagoras of Melos Richard Janko made a move in the right direction with his general view of PDerv. as an ‘atheistic’ work rather than a piece of religious philosophy or a work by an Orphic initiate. But the attribution to Diagoras of Melos he proposed193 lacks documentary basis altogether and is utterly unlikely. Betegh and Winiarczyk have submitted Janko’s hypothesis to devastating and well-argued criticism.194

190 Proposed by Burkert (1986) 5. 191 Ps.-Apollod. Bibl. 1.3.7 ff.: (Titans) τῆς δὲ ἀρχῆς ἐκβαλόντες (sc. τὸν οὐρανὸν) τούς τε καταταρταρωθέντας ἀνήγαγον ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν Κρόνῳ παρέδοσαν. (…) τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφαιρεθήσεσθαι, κτλ. 192 Consequently, there is no ‘similarity’ with PDerv. whatsoever, pace Novokhatko (2015) 38. 193 Janko (1997) and (2001). 194 Winiarczyk (2016) 117–126, also criticized by Betegh (2004) 373–380.

560 

 Andrei Lebedev

We accept as valid all their arguments except those which are based on the false assumption that the Derveni author was an ‘Orphic’ himself. The attribution of PDerv. to Diagoras fails to meet the basic requirements for any reliable attribution that we formulated above in the ‘Preliminary remarks’: nothing is known about Diagoras’ philosophical views on religion (or any other subject), and this lack of information is not surprising given that he was not a philosopher, but a dithyrambic poet; and there is not a single quotation (verbatim or not) from his works that might be cited as proof of his authorship. Janko tries to support his thesis, inter alia, by citing two instances of the pronoun νιν in PDerv. (IV.9 and XI.3), a ‘Doric’ form that allegedly points to the Doric island of Melos. The dialect of PDerv. is Ionic with Atticisms (see test. [17] above): this combination fits Ceos with nearby Athens much better than Melos. As regards the instance of νιν in PDerv., Nikolai Kazansky, an expert in Greek dialectology, comments per litteras: “The form νιν is regarded as being of later origin (μιν is attested already in Mycenean), but it is essential that it occurs not only in the choral lyric, but also in tragedians outside lyrical parts. Compared with the neutral αὐτόν, -ήν this form should point to the tradition defined as literary Doric and typical for Epidaurus. I would not venture to determine by this form someone’s local dialect. In Attic tragedy this form is native, not epic. In Attic inscriptions it does not occur, but still it was in use, since only in Sophocles it occurs 80 times, and in Euripides 260, and it does occur in stichomythia. To try to determine by this form one’s local dialect seems to me fundamentally wrong.” The form νιν is attested in an archaic inscription from Amorgos, another island from the group speaking the ‘Central Ionic’ dialect, to which Ceos also belongs.195 The Clouds provide no evidence whatsoever on any philosophical work of Diagoras. As scholiasts saw, Μήλιος in v. 830 stands for ἄθεος. Aristophanes does not ascribe the identification of Zeus with the vortex to Diagoras, but he quotes Prodicus by name in v. 361 as the greatest meteorosophistes and eo ipso reveals his source. As regards Athenagoras’ report that Diagoras “divulgated the Orphic logos” and the Eleusinian mysteries,196 most other testimonia mention only Eleusinan mysteries, so the profanation of the Ὀρφικὸς λόγος in this context may be explained by the popular Athenian belief that Orpheus was the founder of the Eleusinian mysteries and by the existence in the late 5th cent. BC of a body of epic poetry connected with Eleusinian cults. Fritz Graf has advanced and persuasingly argued for this hypothesis.197 In PDerv. the ‘poetry’ of Orpheus is directly linked to 195 SGDI, II, 163. On ‘Central Ionic’ see Miller (2014) 161; cf. also EAGLL, II, passim. 196 Athenag. Pro Christ. 4 (= Diag. fr. 27 Winiarczyk). 197 Graf (1974) 22 ff.; see also Bremmer (2014). On the ‘Eleusinian connection’ of PDerv., col. II (prothymata to Eumenides) see Henrichs (1984b) 266–268.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 561

his hierourgia, i.e. to teletai (col. VII.2–3). Once we admit the authorship of Prodicus, who played an important role in the intellectual life of Athens in the last third of the 5th cent. BC, the Derveni Papyrus brings support to and a confirmation of Graf’s hypothesis. The discussion of the mysteries in the first columns is not a separate subject. The Derveni author (Prodicus) shares (or pretends to share) the late 5th-cent. BC belief of the Athenians that Orpheus was the founder of the Eleusinian mysteries and, in accordance with his view that Orpheus encoded his wisdom both in his poetry and in the sacred rites, applies the same allegorical method to dromena and legomena. In a manner typical for the Sophistic age, he also cites anthropological and ethnographical ‘parallels’ from the rituals of the Persian Magi that allegedly support his thesis.198 The main reason for doing so was probably his conviction that the barbarians (at least some of them) were closer to the primitive men from the Sophistic Kulturgeschichte and therefore may have preserved some archaic features that have been lost in Greek culture. Cf. Porph. Quaest. Hom. ad Il. 10.153, p. 285 MacPhail: ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἷαπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, “ancient beliefs were like those which still exist among the barbarians.”199 (Incidentally this Sophistic anthropological doctrine was ‘rediscovered’ by Edward B. Tylor in his influential essay Primitive Culture that appeared in 1870, including the theory of ‘survivals.’) In the early Greek tradition on the Persian Magi, it is noted as a peculiar feature that they have no temples and venerate the elements. From the similarity of the ritual performed by the Magi with that of the Eleusinian mysteries (a τεκμήριον), the author infers that Erinyes and Eumenides was the original name for air (ψυχαὶ = ἀήρ), like almost all other mythological names. It is probably no accident that Aristophanes chose the Persian cock for his parody of Prodicus’ ‘linguistic archaeology’ (see § [IX] below).

8 (VIII) Anaxagoras and ‘Tantalos paradigm’ in Euripides’ Orestes The restoration of the original reading of Phld. De rhet. 4, PHerc. 245, fr. 7 by Edoardo Acosta Méndez, confirmed by Christian Vassallo in this volume,200 is important for two reasons: first, it provides a new and unique piece of evidence 198 Ahmadi (2014) has persuasively demonstrated that the magoi in col. VI are genuine Iranian Magi, and not Greek charlatans. 199 Cf. Arist. Poet. 25.1461a3–4: οὕτω γὰρ τότ᾽ ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί. 200 See DAPR, T7.

562 

 Andrei Lebedev

on Anaxagoras’ trial, namely the reference to torture not attested elsewhere, and secondly, it provides a clue for the elucidation of two very ‘tantalizingly’ obscure passages in Euripides’ Orestes. Philodemus uses the trial of Anaxagoras as a case in point in a list of misfortunes of philosophers who failed to persuade judges or their fellow citizens and therefore did not escape the death penalty or exile. Two other cases in the preserved portion of the list are those of Pythagoras and Socrates. Nobody has ever doubted that Socrates indeed failed to persuade the judges in his apology and was executed, and nobody doubts the general credibility of the ancient tradition on Cylon’s uprising against Pythagoras and on the pogroms of the Pythagorean synedria. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that Anaxagoras was flogged (μασ]|τιγωθεὶς ) during the investigation and showed the stigmata201 to the judges at his trial (μώλω|πας ἐπεδείκνυεν | τοῖς δικασταῖς): we should accept this as historical fact. The language of Philodemus’s source is well illustrated in the forensic speeches of classical orators. The phrase ἐπιδείκνυμι τεκμηρίωι (-οις), “to demonstrate by proofs (facts),” or ἐπιδείκνυμι τεκμήρια, “to present the proofs,” occurs in Lysias, Isaeus, and Demosthenes. Anaxagoras’ stigmata were exactly such “proof” (τεκμήριον) of his torture that he “demonstrated” (ἐπεδείκνυεν) to the judges (presumably, showing them his back). In a speech of Hyperides, someone refers to the stigmata on the back of one of his opponent’s

201 The noun “bruises” is too mild a translation of the Greek μώλωπες. In the lexicographers, it is a synonym of τραῦμα, πληγή, ἕλκος (Ael. Herod. De orthogr. 3.2, GG III.2.1, p. 593 Lentz). It is regularly and specifically associated with flogging and scourge: in Theophrastus’ Physics (fr. 176 FHS&G), it illustrates a special kind of causation, scourge being the cause, and molops the effect ([...] ἢ τρίτον ὑπὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὅλως ὄντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ μώλωψ· ὑπὸ γὰρ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὔσης τῆς μάστιγος γίνεται, [...]). The μώλωπες bleed (πορφύρεοι, ἐρυθροί, φοινικοί) and may be the cause of death (Luc. Philops. 20). As scars, they last for a long time: Plut. Aem. 19.9; Epict. Diss. 2.18.12 speaks of μώλωπες in the soul caused by the passions, which, unless completely wiped out from the soul, become permanent scars and after the next emotional ‘flogging’ turn into open wounds (ἕλκη). Showing one’s μώλωπες causes compassion. Lucian (Somn. 4), after his brother beat him with a club, shows the stigmata to his mother and accuses him of “extreme cruelty” (πολλὴν ὠμότητα); his mother becomes outraged, etc. In Machon Com. fr. 16.285–289 Gow, the hetaera Gnathaina, after noticing οn the back of her lover μαστιγίας μώλωπας, exclaims: τάλαν, τάλαν, ἄνερ, πόθεν ἔχεις ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη, τὰ τραύματα;, “Oh my poor, poor boy! From where have you gotten these wounds?” In the New Testament, μώλωψ occurs once with a reference to the “healing wound” of Christ the Saviour (Ep. Petr. 1 2.24); St. Paul (Ep. ad Gal. 6.17) speaks of στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ and this expression becomes standard in Patristics. The distinction between μώλωψ as ἐκ πολέμου γινομένη πληγή and στίγμα as a wound from flogging in the grammarian Ptolemaeus (De diff. vocab., lett. μ, 99) is not supported by the early usage.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 563

slaves to prove that he was tortured: κρεμάσας ἐκ τοῦ κίονος ἐξέδειρεν, ὅθεν καὶ μωλώπων ἔτι νῦν τὸ δέρμα μεστὸν ἔχει.202 The torture (βάσανοι) of Athenian citizens was forbidden by law, but free aliens were not exempt from it.203 Classical orators attest to a number of cases in which a free alien accused of a serious offence was tortured, either to extract a confession or as a punishment.204 In other words, in some cases, they were treated like slaves, and that was the case of Anaxagoras. Physical pain aside, imagine how unbearable the ‘Tantalic’ torture of the humiliation that deprived him the dignity of eleutheros must have been for Anaxagoras. What kind of confession might the interrogators of Anaxagoras have tried to extract from him? Since according to Diodorus/Ephorus and Plutarch, the trial targeted Pericles, it is conceivable that in addition to the confession of his own intentional asebeia, they were looking for accomplices and threads leading to the ‘Olympian’ himself. Anaxagoras most likely expounded his theory on the nature of the sun and the moon in his Peri physeos published some 20 years before the trial. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates asserts that it could be bought by anyone for one drachma from a bookstall in the agora.205 The word μύδρος, “nugget,” that occurs in the reports about the prosecution is a rare and technical term (unlike the common πέτρος or βῶλος); therefore it looks like a verbatim quotation from his Peri physeos that probably figured in the accusation. This word was enough for the accusation of disrespect towards the νομιζόμενα of the polis, but to make their case even stronger, the investigators probably were looking for tekmeria that the asebeia of Anaxagoras and his disciples did not stop there, but went even further, i.e. that after rejecting traditional beliefs they “introduced new gods” and new cults such as the ‘meteorosophistic’ initiations satirized in Aristophanes’ Clouds. The surprising accusation of Anaxagoras in medismos that presented him as an undercover Persian agent in Athens was probably based on the alleged similarity between the non-anthropomorphic ‘naturalistic’ religion of the Persian Magoi (as perceived in early Greek tradition) and the Anaxagorean physical allegoresis of traditional Greek mythology. Keeping these considerations in mind, let us now turn to Euripides’ Orestes. In vv. 4–10 the “blessed” (μακάριος) Tantalos “flies in the air fearing the rock that rises over his head”; he “pays this penalty” for his “licentious tongue” (v. 10:

202 Hyp. fr. 200 Kenyon (= Poll. Onom. 3.79.6–7). Pollux remarks that ἐκδέρω, properly “to strip the skin from somebody” in this passage is catachrestic. It should be taken as a rhetorical hyper­ bole: he whipped the slave so fiercely that it was like stripping the skin from him. 203 See MacDowell (1978) 246–247. 204 See the list in Macdowell (1978) 274 n. 562. 205 Pl. Ap. 26e1.

564 

 Andrei Lebedev

ἀκόλαστον ἔσχε γλῶσσαν, αἰσχίστην νόσον).206 In vv. 982 ff., again in connection with Tantalos, Electra mentions “a rock suspended by golden chains between heaven and earth, a lump from Olympus carried by whirlwinds (δίναισι).” A lump or nugget (βῶλος) is a metallurgical term, with which Euripides renders Anaxagoras’ μύδρος with exactly the same meaning. In both cases, the ‘rock’ of the Tantalos myth is identified with the sun. This, combined with the Anaxagorean motif of the ‘vortex,’ leaves no doubt that Euripides blends together the Homeric golden chain and Anaxagoras’ astrophysics. Some modern interpreters suggest that these passages rely on a rationalistic interpretation of the Tantalos myth that derives from an Anaxagorean milieu.207 But it must be proved that Euripides here relies on an intermediate source. Euripides himself was a distinguished representative of the ‘Anaxagorean circles’ in Athens. He was a pupil and friend of Anaxagoras, he knew his doctrines from the original source, he was a creative poet, not a compilator, and he could freely use the doctrines of Anaxagoras in his tragedies. Thus in Melanippe the Wise, Melanippe (another ‘ancient physiologos’) recounts the traditional myth of the marriage of Heaven and Earth in the terms of Anaxagorean cosmogony.208 She attributes it to “her mother,” i.e. Hippo, the daughter of Cheiron the wise, a great culture hero and the inventor of various τέχναι. Therefore we should listen rather to the ancient interpreters of Orestes who attribute the rationalistic myth to Euripides himself.209 To begin with, there is no allegoresis in these passages. The identification of the sun with an ‘ignited lump’ was a scientific theory of Anaxagoras, and not an allegorical interpretation of a myth. In both passages, we are dealing with a parable rather than allegoresis, a parable about crime and punishment. Tantalos, like Melanippe, was an ancient sage and a physiologos who held210 that the sun was a flying rock or lump driven by a vortex (δίναισι). For this cosmological blasphemy, for his ἀκόλαστος γλῶσσα (v. 10), he was punished by Zeus. The hyponoia for those who understand ‘correctly’ is this: that is what happened in our days to Anaxagoras and this will happen to any intellectual who dares to undermine traditional beliefs by his ‘licentious tongue.’ The frightening ‘rock’ over the head of any physiologos 206 Eur. Or. 4 ff.: ὁ γὰρ μακάριος (κοὐκ ὀνειδίζω τύχας) / Διὸς πεφυκώς, ὡς λέγουσι, Τάνταλος / κορυφῆς ὑπερτέλλοντα δειμαίνων πέτρον / ἀέρι ποτᾶται· κτλ. Cf. LSJ s.v. ὑπερτέλλω incorrectly renders ὑπερτέλλω πέτρον as a rock “hanging over” Tantalos’ head. This verb is regularly applied to the rising sun, and it retains this meaning here. 207 Di Benedetto (1965) 7. Willink (1983) 32 n. 47 agrees and suggests Metrodorus of Lampsacus as a possible source. 208 Eur. fr. 484 TrGF (Kannicht). 209 Diog. Laërt. 2.8; Schol. in Pind. Ol. 1.91 Drachmann (= Anaxag. 59 A 20 DK); Eust. In Od. 1700.60. 210 Or discovered a secret hidden by the gods from mortals?

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 565

is the permanent threat of the γραφὴ περὶ ἀσεβείας and the psephisma of Diopeithes, the servant of Zeus. Willink compares the “licentious tongue” with the ἀδολεσχία of the meteorosophists like Prodicus in the Clouds, where ἀδολεσχία is virtually a synonym of atheism (asebeia). Euripides, no doubt, shared Anaxagoras’ cosmological ‘blasphemy,’ but he could not acknowledge this openly: hence the characterization of free speech as αἰσχίστη νόσος. Note, however, that this condemnation is phrased as a common perception placed in oratio obliqua which quotes what people say about Tantalos; Euripides distances himself from people’s accusations (ὡς μὲν λέγουσιν) and delicately alludes to his compassion (οὐκ ὀνειδίζω τύχας). The second crime of Tantalos, according to people’s accusations, was his desire to be a commensal of the gods, and thus to be equal with gods. This is probably a hint to the motif of the apotheosis of the philosopher widespread in early Greek thought and attested both in the mystical apotheo­ sis and deification in the Pythagorean tradition, and in the rather metaphorical ‘equation with the gods’ of a sophos in the Ionian humanist tradition: it is no accident that the saying ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐν ἡμῖν θεός is attributed to Anaxagoras.211 In both passages, Euripides speaks about ‘Tantalos’ with sympathy and compassion for his tortures. If Anaxagoras indeed was tortured before the trial (as we believe he was), Euripides must have known this fact. On these grounds, we venture to propose a hypothesis that vv. 4–10 (coupled with 982 ff.) of Euripides’ Orestes are a cryptic makarismos of Anaxagoras under the allusive name of Tantalos as an innocent and heroic martyr of Greek ‘Enlightenment’ (cf. μακάριος in v. 4). Like the mythical Tantalos, Anaxagoras endured unbearable tortures for revealing the true nature of the heavenly bodies and the origin of the universe to humanity. The date of the production of Orestes is 408 BC: Euripides, quite probably, commemorates the tragic fate of his teacher and friend on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Anaxagoras’ death (428 BC). A similar makarismos of a man who dedicated his life to the study of the laws of nature is found in Euripides’ fr. 910 Kannicht: ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας / ἔσχε μάθησιν, / κτλ. The adjectives μακάριος and ὄλβιος are synonymous: in both passages, alluding to Anaxagoras, they assert that the philosophical life is incompatible with the violation of law (ἄδικοι πράξεις) and “nasty deeds” (αἰσχρὰ ἔργα); this looks like an apology of Anaxagoras and a refutation of the false accusations against him in asebeia.212 211 Arist. Protr. fr. 110 Düring. 212 Anaxag. 59 A 30 DK. Contrast with ἀκόλαστος and αἰσχίστη in Eur. Or. 10. If, by any chance, the rationalist version of the Tantalos myth is not Euripides’ original creation, but antedates Orestes (the dramatic date of Plato’s Protagoras is 424 BC), Prodicus (rather than Metrodorus of Chios) might be considered as a source: the language of Euripides’ passage (αἰωρήμασιν, δίναισι) recalls the language of the astronomical passages in PDerv., cols. XVII.9, XXV.4, and XXV.7

566 

 Andrei Lebedev

The Tantalos parable in Euripides’ Orestes is a very rare example of a metaphorical construction on three levels. Normally, most metaphorical analogies in philosophical texts,213 as well as in allegorical texts or philosophical allegoresis of poetic and mythical texts, have two levels of meaning: the iconic level (traditional text) and the referential level (philosophical interpretation). The Tantalos parable has two iconic levels and one referential: the first iconic level (the traditional mythical narrative about the crime and punishment of Tantalos) encodes the second iconic level (an ancient physiologos who discovers the nature of the sun and is punished by Zeus), and finally the second iconic level encodes the referential meaning hidden from the eyes of polloi: the tragic fate of Anaxagoras (cf. Eur. Or. 2: ξυμφορὰ θεήλατος), his ‘tantalic’ tortures at the trial, and a makarismos of the philosophical bios. Why so much ‘mysticopathy’? One gets an impression that in 408 BC the fear of being charged with impiety was still felt by anyone who spoke about Anaxagoras’ cosmological ‘blasphemy’, his theory about the nature of the sun: Euripides covers his sympathy and compassion with a double layer of protection against such charges. According to MacDowell, the prosecution of Anaxagoras and Protagoras was brought by the εἰσαγγελία procedure, while the prosecution of Socrates was brought by γραφή.214 The change can be probably explained by the fact that in 403, the entire code of laws was reinscribed.215 Dressler draws attentiοn to the fact that in the indictment of Socrates by Meletus, there is no mention of the atheistic “teachings about celestial things” (λόγοι περὶ μεταρσίων), the second charge in the decree of Diopeithes.216 Therefore, chances are that Diopeithes’ ‘amendment’ remained in force until 403 and was still perceived as a threat to the freedom of speech by Euripides in 408.217 A question remains to be answered: how should we understand the relationship between the sobriquet ‘Tantalos’ given to Prodicus in Plato’s Protagoras and the Tantalos parable about Anaxagoras in Euripides’ Orestes? In Plato, Prodicus’ sobriquet has the pejorative connotation of a cosmological ‘blasphemer’ similar to the prince of ‘meteorosophists’ mocked in Aristophanes’ Clouds. In Euripides’ parable, this connotation (ἀκόλαστος γλῶσσα) is present only on the surface level

(occurrences of the verb αἰωρέομαι). Willink (1983) ibid. compares ἀκόλαστος γλῶσσα with the ἀδολεσχία of meteorosophistai like Prodicus mocked in the Clouds. But this would not affect our interpretation of the Tantalos paradigm in Orestes. 213 For the distinction between metaphorical and natural analogy see Lebedev (2017a) 233–235. 214 Macdowell (1978) 201. 215 Macdowell (1978) 201; Garland (1992) 145. 216 Dressler (2014) 242. 217 Contra Dressler (2014) 241, who underestimates both the applicability and the impact of the decree. See also Yunis (1988) 68 ff. and Rubel (2014) 35–37.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 567

of encoded message and is attributed to the ignorant polloi. Euripides himself admires ‘Tantalos’ and his scientific discoveries; he glorifies him as an innocent martyr and another Prometheus. It is only natural that the same image and sobriquet of Anaxagoras and his pupil is used in the pejorative sense by his theoretical opponents and in the positive sense by his friends and disciples. There are following possible explanations: 1) Prodicus’ or Anaxagoras’ sobriquet ‘Tantalos’ originated in the unfriendly milieu of Diopeithes or his followers and was meant as “the enemy of the gods.” Plato follows this anti-Anaxagorean tradition, while Euripides reinterprets the image of Tantalos as another Prometheus punished by Zeus for helping humanity in a polemical peritrope. 2) Tantalos as an allusion to Anaxagoras originates from Euripides’ Orestes. Plato, on the basis of these two passages, makes it into a generic nickname for the Anaxagoreans and reinterprets it in a pejorative sense. Note that the mention of Prodicus/Tantalos in Protagoras places him as a sinner in the underworld, whereas in Euripides he flies in the sky like a god. 3) Both Plato and Euripides rely on a common source, i.e. a rationalistic interpretation of the Tantalos myth either in Protagoras’ Περὶ θεῶν or in Prodicus’ Ὧραι. It is conceivable that Tantalos may have been mentioned in Prodicus’ second stage of the origin of religion as an ἀρχαῖος φυσιολόγος and a πρῶτος εὑρητής of astronomy, a practically useful τέχνη for agriculture and navigation (cf. PDerv., col. XXIV). The interpretation of Prometheus as the inventor of practical skills appears together with Athena/τέχνη in § (III) above. When Democritus accused Anaxagoras of stealing “ancient doctrines” about the nature of the stars,218 he could not mean the Milesians since both Anaximander’s and Anaximenes’ theories of the sun are very different from that of Anaxagoras. By ἀρχαῖοι, Democritus rather meant mythical sages like Orpheus, Cheiron, Atlas, Tantalos, or his own ‘Leucippus’ conceived as prehistoric scientists.219 There is no evidence that Democritus knew the work of Prodicus, but he certainly knew the work of Protagoras, whose ideas about religion must have been very close to those of Prodicus. Both (1) and (3) appear more likely than (2), but in the absence of definitive evidence, we would rather leave this question open for further discussion. One practical recommendation that follows from this investigation is that the Derveni 218 Diog. Laërt. 9.34 (= Democr. fr. 159 Luria). 219 Luria (1970) 458, comm. ad Democritus’ fr. 159 Luria,  excludes Leucippus and connects ἀρχαῖαι δόξαι with “most ancient philosophers” alluded to in Pl. Cra. 409a–b (Anaxagoras and the Anaxagoreans).

568 

 Andrei Lebedev

treatise should be included in any future edition of the remains of Prodicus or ancient Sophists to come. Setting aside the epideictic paignia-speeches of Gorgias and a collection of conflicting moral attitudes and customs known as Dissoi logoi, the Derveni treatise (= Horai of Prodicus of Ceos) is the only extant philosophically important Sophistic text of considerable length. It is of primary importance not only as a document of the Sophistic ‘Enlightenment’ and Protagorean ‘Humanism’ inasmuch as it provides a vivid picture of the intellectual battles between Anaxagoreioi and Pythagoreioi during the Peloponnesian War, but also as a classical text that illustrates the fundamental (for all Sophistic thought) conceptual opposition between physis and nomos at work. The Greek concept of nomos is much broader than our ‘law’ and covers customs, religion, and ritual in addition to political laws. The Sophistic art of orthoepeia, i.e. of the semantical and etymological analysis of words and divine names (parodied in Plato’s Cratylus), restores their ‘natural’ meaning and, in doing so, deconstructs and dismisses the whole body of the ‘conventional’ traditional myth as antediluvian nonsense, as a λῆρος βεκκεσέληνος.220

9 (IX) More reflections of the ‘avian’ theme in PDerv., cols. II and VI. Prodicus and Aristophanes᾽ Ὧραι; a neglected fragment in the Suda Lexicon. Prodicus’ linguistic archaeology and the cock who was an ancient king in Aristophanes’ parody in the Birds In Adler’s edition of Suda we read: Lex., lett. Epsilon, lemma 3812 Εὐφρόνη· ἡ νύξ. τίς τὸν μεγιστόφωνον ἔνδον τῆς στέγης ἔπεισεν ὄρνιν ὡρολογεῖν τὴν εὐφρόνην; The quotation that illustrates the use of εὐφρόνη in the sense of ‘night’ consists of two iambic trimeters which, as it seems, have escaped the notice both of the editors of Suda, and of the editors of comedy fragments. τίς τὸν μεγιστόφωνον ἔνδον τῆς στέγης ἔπεισεν ὄρνιν ὡρολογεῖν τὴν εὐφρόνην;

220 A comic word (Ar. Nub. 398) appropriated by the Epicureans as invective against Plato’s doctrine of the divine Nous/Demiourgos: cf. ps.-Plut. Plac. 881a.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 569

Who persuaded the loud-voiced bird to announce the hour at night?221 The two lines apparently come from a dialogue scene in an unknown comedy. The ‘loud-voiced’ bird is no doubt a cock. Cocks normally signal the morning hour outside the house. The speaker who presumably wakes up at night after a crow of a cock, whether real or imitated by someone, is indignant and demands explanation by pointing to the absurdity of the situation. The suspect who ‘persuaded’ the cock to crow at night must be a Sophist or a rhetorician: it is a comic allusion to Gorgias’ famous definition of rhetoric as a “maker of persuasion” (πειθοῦς δημιουργός: Pl. Grg. 453a, 455a = 82 A 28 DK). Sophistic rhetoric can perform wonders, even to ‘persuade’ a cock to crow at night! If so, the ‘house’ that provides the setting of the comedy seems to be a meeting place of Sophists like the house of Callias, a favourite target of mockery in ancient comedy. The speaker has an ‘Ionian accent’: εὐφρόνη is a poetic and Ionian word, inconceivable in colloquial Attic. The only Sophist in the extant sources whose name is associated with the very rare verb ὡρολογεῖν is Prodicus of Ceos. In his Lampoons (Silloi), Timon of Phlius calls Prodicus λαβάργυρος ὡρολογητής, viz. “money-grasping speaker-about-the-horai.” This phrase is part of a hexameter and therefore a ver­ batim quotation from the Silloi.222 The noun ὡρολογητής is an absolute hapax, most probably a neologism coined by Timon like his numerous other bombastic words of abuse;223 μεγιστόφωνος is also hapax.224 But the verb ὡρολογέω from which the nickname derives was in common use: this is proved by the fragment from comedy and by an epigram of Posidippus.225 The sobriquet ὡρολογητής is intentionally ambiguous: it alludes at the same time to the title of Prodicus’ work

221 We take τὴν εὐφρόνην adverbially, as acc. temporis (as it is used in Hdt. 7.188), not as direct object of ὡρολογεῖν. Note that the preceding lemma in Suda (3811) illustrates the same meaning of εὐφρόνη by quoting (also anonymously) exactly this passage of Herodotus: ταύτην μὲν τὴν εὐφρόνην οὕτω ἔμεινον, ἅμα δὲ ὄρθρῳ κτλ. This fact alone leads us to expect in 3812 a quotation from a classical author. 222 Ath. 9.71.406d–e (= Tim. fr. 18 Di Marco = fr. 792 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons = Prodic. test. 9 Mayhew). 223 More than 40 new formations in 135 fragments, according to Clayman (2009) 131. 224 It cannot be found either in LSJ or in the Supplement. TLG search yields, in addition to the Suda passage, only one instance in Tzetz. Chil. 4.4.859, where it is used for the characterization of a proverbial ‘fool’ who all the day ‘crowed’ “alpha, beta, gamma” like another fool who could count only up to 3, and then started again “one, two, three,” etc. The source of Tzetzes is most likely our passage in Suda: the verb ἀνέκραζε that he uses alludes to the cock’s ‘crow’: cf. Jo. Chrys. HEph. 4.12.3 Montfaucon (PG 62.92). 225 Posidipp. fr. 52 Austin/Bastiniani.

570 

 Andrei Lebedev

Ὧραι and to his provebial philargyria: he charged for his lectures “by hour.”226 Ambrose and Mayhew have advanced a plausible hypothesis that the lost comedy Ὧραι of Aristophanes was related to Prodicus’ work with the same title; according to Mayhew, Aristophanes’ Seasons may have been a ‘reply’ to Prodicus’ work of the same title or contained a parody of it.227 It is hard to imagine a more appropriate source for our fragment than a comedy with a title Ὧραι. In Aristophanes’ Seasons, Callias indeed was mentioned; he was described as “wealthy, pathicus, ruined by prostitues, and feeding parasites (flatterers).”228 Socrates’ associate Chaerephon was probably one of these κόλακες. It is tempting to suggest that the speaker in our fragment is Prodicus (or a caricature of him under a different name) and that the comic poet puts the verb ὡρολογεῖν (along with the Ionian word for night) into his mouth as a distinctive feature of his discourse. But even without this suggestion, ὡρολογητής is likely to be a mocking parody of Prodicus’ terminology.229 An important question that is not so easy to answer with certainty is this: can we explain the verbal coincidence of the comedy fragment and Timon’s Silloi by the common source (i.e. Prodicus’ Horai) or by Timon’s ‘quotation’ of Aristophanes’ Horai?230 Even if Timon depends on the comedy, we lose nothing, since in this case he explicitly identifies the speaker in the Suda fragment as Prodicus. We know from Cicero that Aristophanes “attacked new gods and the nocturnal vigils that accompany their worship, so that in his play Sabazios and certain other immigrant gods are expelled from the city after a trial.”231 It is probably from the final expulsion scene that the fr. 578 PCG comes: τὸν Φρύγα, τὸν αὐλητῆρα, τὸν Σαβάζιον. Fr. 581, the most significant of the remaining fragments, is a dialogue 226 So in the Epitome of Ath. 5.2.2 (p. 22) and Eust. In Il. 4.901.3–4 (λαβάργυρον ἔφη ὡς ἐπὶ μισθῷ ὡρολογοῦντα) in his quotation of the Athenaeus passage: cf. Mayhew (2011) 81. 227 Ambrose (1983) 137 ff.; Mayhew (2011) App. 4, 247–248. 228 Schol. (VΔ) in Luc. Iov. trag. 48, p. 83.16 Rabe (= Ar. [Horai] fr. 583 PCG). 229 In Posidipp. fr. 52 Austin/Bastianini the verb means “to count” the days rather than “to tell”: see the explanation of parthenos as caryatis in Fain (2010) 105. In the derivatives ὡρολογεῖον (later ὡρολόγιον), “clocks” (used both of sun dial and klepsydra), the second element of the compound, also means “to measure, to count,” not “to speak.” Cf. Orion Theb. Etymol., lett. Ω, 170.26–28 Sturz: Ὡρολογεῖον· λέγειν τὸ μετρεῖν. ὡρολογεῖον οὖν, ἐν ᾧ τὰς ὥρας μετροῦμεν. οὕτως Ἀπολλώνιος ἐν Γλώσσαις Ἡροδότου. 230 On the influence of Greek comedy and especially of Aristophanes on Timon’s Silloi, see Clayman (2009) 124–130. 231 Cic. Leg. 2.37 (= Ar. [Horai], PCG III.2, 296, test. *ii): novos vero deos et in his colendis noc­ turnas pervigilationes sic Aristophanes, facetissimus poeta veteris comoediae, vexat, ut apud eum Sabazius et quidam alii dei peregrini iudicati e civitate eiciantur (transl. by J. Henderson). The expression nocturnas pervigilationes suggests νυκτιπολεῖν, νυκτιπόλοι in the original Greek, and the last words καταδικασθέντες ἐκβάλλονται ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 571

between two unnamed characters: (A) is a god who promises to turn the market of Athens into a miraculous cornucopia of all kind of fruits, vegetables, poultry, etc. available throughout the year, even in midwinter, as a reward “for honouring the gods” (v. 13: ἐπειδὴ τοὺς θεοὺς σέβουσιν).232 His opponent (B) is a commonsensical skeptic: he does not believe in such miracles (instead of summer fruits in midwinter he expects rather to see a blinding dust-wind (v. 2) and warns that seeing gourds (a summer vegetable) in midwinter would confuse people about the time of the year (vv. 6–7), i.e. there will be confusion in telling time (sc. ὡρολογεῖν). In the end, the skeptic (B) accuses (A) with indignation: “you have turned Athens into Egypt!” (v. 15: Αἴγυπτον αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν πεποίηκας ἀντ’ Ἀθηνῶν). In earlier scholarship, (A) has been erroneously identified as Athena. Olson is right when he points out that the choir of Seasons would sympathize with (B) since (A) is their enemy who wishes to abolish seasons altogether. Olson also correctly associates the speaker (A) with the new gods and (B) with the traditional ones. The appearance of Egypt cannot be chalked up only to the stereotype of it as the land without seasons (Hdt. 2.77.3); according to Olson’s penetrating suggestion, “the more substantial point is that the city has no need of Egypt’s plethora of absurd deities.”233 While accepting Olson’s general approach, we would venture to make a further step in the same direction by specifying precisely both the identities of the two speakers and of the “absurd deities” of Egypt. In later authors, Sabazios was identified with the “chthonian Dionysos,” the son of Zeus and Persephone distinguished from the traditional Greek Dionysos, the son of Semele. This Dionysos was already in 5th cent. BC associated with Orpheus’ theogony (Hieros logos) and the myth of sparagmos of the divine child by the evil Titans: in the so-called ‘Orphic graffiti’ from Olbia dating from the second half of the 5th cent. BC, he is named Διόνυσος Ὀρφικός.234 The dialogue in fr. 581 is between the ‘old good’ Dionysos of Greek myth (in whose theatre the comedy was performed) and

232 Note that ἐπειδὴ τοὺς θεοὺς σέβουσιν is not a condition, but a statement of fact. 233 Olson (2007) 107. 234 We take ΟΡΦΙΚŌΙ as dat. sing., not as nom. plur.: Διο[νύσοι] Ὀρφικοί is a prescription to sacrifice to Dionysos Orphikos, i.e. to Dionysos of Orpheus’ Theogony, the son of Persephone, not the son of Semele. The ugly plate cannot be a dedication to Dionysos by a collegium of ‘Orphics.’ Ὀρφικοί is a late term: we know that the owners of the ‘Orphic’ lamellae called themselves μύσται καὶ βάκχοι, and not Ὀρφικοί. According to our hypothesis, the Olbian bone plates were kleromantic devices connected with astragalomanteia (7 astragaloi of Dionysos may be depicted on one of the plates), ancient ancestors of the Tarot cards. Their owner was probably a “diviner of Hermes” (θεοπρόπος Ἑρμοῦ) with a ‘royal’ Persian name Φαρνάβαζος known from other Olbian graffiti. Pharnabazos either posed as a magos or was an Orpheotelestes, or both. He probably had some competition with a rival street-diviner called Aristoteles: we interpret two ostraka published by Rusyayeva and Vinogradov as an exchange of angry curse letters between them. He

572 

 Andrei Lebedev

the outlandish newcomer, his illegal half-brother who was worshipped at night. Aristophanes portraits him as an impostor (probably targeting Orpheoletstai and agyrtai) who deceives the would-be worshippers with false promises of material paradise on earth and eternal bliss in heaven (μέθη αἰώνιος, in Plato’s words) in order to gain profit. The agon between Dionysos and Sabazios recalls the agon of Dikaios and Adikos logos in the Clouds. It was probably staged as a trial with Athena presiding as a judge, who, after hearing the litigation, chooses the worship of the traditional Dionysos in her city and condemns the alien god, “the Phrygian, the flutist, Sabazios” to exile.235 Sabazios probably was wearing a Phrygian cap and pictured as a wandering agyrtes and flute-player (αὐλητήρ) with vulgar manners; Dionysos must have been portrayed as a kompsos Athenian gentleman with good manners. Such contrast is suggested by the dialogue between the two. This reconstruction of the general plot can be supported by a roughly contemporary parallel provided by Cratinus’ comedy with the same title Ὧραι.236 In this play, Dionysos figured in person; his mistress, although abandoned by him (like Ariadne?), still loves him; the choir hails him as μακάριος τῶν παιδικῶν (fr. 278), a rare instance of τὰ παιδικά applied to a woman. Three fragments contain legal terms. In fr. 279, someone (probably a demagogue or rhetor) is compared with a “vociferous Persian cock who crows all the time”: ὥσπερ ὁ Περσικὸς ὥραν πᾶσαν καναχῶν ὁλόφωνος ἀλέκτωρ.237 Already in the 5th cent. BC, the antiquity of Orpheus’ theogony was doubted by some skeptics, Herodotus and Ion of Chios among them. Herodotus ironically remarks that the “so-called Orphic and Bacchic” rites are in fact Egyptian and Pythagorean implying that Pythagoras imported them much later from Egypt.238 Heraclitus, in turn, accused Pythagoras of stealing his wisdom from the writings of Thoth.239 Aristophanes may have

worked in the agora of Olbia in the last quarter of the 5th cent. BC near the temple of Zeus where he lost his cards. On Pharnabazos see Lebedev (1996). 235 Two out of the scanty 13 fragments are related with a trial. In fr. 579 PCG, διέφθορας τὸν ὅρκον ἡμῶν (“you have violated our oath”), the reference must be to the Attic διωμοσία, the “mutual oath” of both parties before ἀνάκρισις (ἡμῶν!). The oath must have been violated by the bad guy Sabazios: hence Dionysos is speaking. In fr. 588 δικαστικὸν ~ τριώβολον is mentioned. 236 PCG IV, frs. 269–298. 237 We follow the traditional understanding of ὁλόφωνος “vox et praeterea nihil” (LSJ) rather than from ὀλοός + φωνή, “killing with his voice” (Meineke) . Cf. Μεγιστόφωνος in Aristophanes’ Seasons. 238 Hdt. 2.81.5–7: ὁμολογέουσι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι καλεομένοισι καὶ Βακχικοῖσι, ἐοῦσι δὲ αἰγυπτίοισι, καὶ Πυθαγορείοισι. 239 Heraclit. 22 B 129 DK, reading (= fr. 22 Lebedev) (…) καὶ ἐπιλεξάμενος Τααύτου τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο κτλ. for ταύτας τὰς συγγραφάς, “and having read the writings of Taautos (= Thoth), he claimed as his own wisdom what was (in fact) much learning and a con game.”

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 573

shared the skeptical view, according to which the myth of the chthonian Dionysos and the Titans was invented by Onomacritus, who made an interpretatio Graeca of the Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris and expounded it in Homeric hexameters as a Hieros logos of Orpheus.240 A second allusion to Sabazios’ connection with Egypt is Dionysos’ remark about the danger of a “blinding dust-wind” in Athens (κονιορτὸν ἐκτυφλοῦντα, fr. 581.2), a picture more reminiscent of a sandstorm in the Egyptian desert rather than of the actual weather in winter Athens. What was the relationship between the theme of alien gods and the mockery of the Sophists in Callias’ house in the Seasons? The Clouds suggest an obvious answer: the common denominator was the introduction of new gods that were subversive to the religion and morality of the polis. Chaerephon, who seems to be the acting director of Socrates’ phrontisterion in the Clouds, is called a “child of the night” (παῖδα τῆς νυκτός) in the Seasons, and a ‘bat’ (νυκτερίς) in the Birds.241 These passages should be linked with the mysterious cock who awakes the inhabitants of Callias’ house at night­time and with irrational Sabazios’ disrespect for the rational Greek method of telling time in fr. 581. Do the inhabitants of Callias’ house wake up at night in order to participate in the nocturnae pervigilationes of the worship of Sabazios? Did Aristophanes depict the nocturnal mysteries of Sabazios as sexual orgies of Sophists and pornidia at Callias’ house? The scanty remains of Aristophanes’ Seasons do not allow for a definite answer. We confine ourselves to drawing attention to some details that might point in this direction. Callias in the Seasons was depicted as πλούσιος καὶ πασχητιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ πορνιδίων διαφορούμενος και κόλακας τρέφων (fr. 583). Hipponicus and Callias, the paradigmatic father and son pair in the Seasons, mirror Strepsiades and Pheidippides in the Clouds: an old-fashioned, but honest and hard-working father on the one hand, and a morally corrupt and effeminate son, an akolastos dandy who wastes the hard-earned fortune of his father, on the other. The only difference is that Pheidippides wastes his father’s money on horses, and Callias on pornidia and kolakes. The new ecstatic cult and the bohemian life-style of Callias’ salon share one feature in common: excess in sexual activity and drinking.242 Callias 240 The Egyptian origin of the Orphica and Dionysos’ Orphikos (Sabazios, Zagreus etc.) was recognised by both Orphic believers and non-believers: see OF 40–63. They only disagreed about the date of this event: the believers attributed it to Orpheus himself (i.e. 14th cent. BC), and the non-believers (Aristotle among them) to Onomacritus in the late 6th cent. BC. We side with Aristotle. Edmonds’ thesis of a much later ‘construction’ of Zagreus’ myth is hypercritical: the Orphic myth of the diamelismos and Dionysos/Aides were known already to Heraclitus. 241 Ar. fr. 584 PCG; Av. 1296 and 1564. 242 Intoxication is a characteristic of the worship of Sabazios: in Ar. Vesp. 9–10 two drinking slaves “worship the same god.” On the ecstatic mania of bacchic initiantions see Ustinova (2018) 115 ff., 124 (on Sabazios).

574 

 Andrei Lebedev

is described in the ancient comedy both as a womanizer and as a εὐρύπρωκτος at the same time. Whatever the obscene imagery in Aristophanes’ invective against Callias in the Frogs means exactly, it exposes his sexual extravaganza and portrays him as an erotic Heracles.243 The word πασχητιῶν, most likely a verbatim quotation from the comedy, was from Archilochus on associated with the passive role in a homosexual relationship:244 for example, a fragment from Aristophanes’ lost Γεωργοί mentions Callias’ relationship with Meletos.245 Unlike most other obscene words in Greek comedy, πασχητιᾶν is a psychological term: it describes a passion of a submissive attitude. It is this connotation that brings it into the sphere of religious psychology: the feeling of “being possessed” by a god is especially characteristic for βακχεία and ecstatic cults like that of Sabazios.246 According to Aristophanes, this ‘pathic’ sensuality is pernicious for a man’s moral health: it results in the loss of virility and in effeminacy.247 For Aristotle, the Phrygian mode in music and the aulos, as opposed to other instruments, are the most passionate and ‘orgiastic.’248 Therefore, the expulsion of the “Phrygian flute player” Sabazios from Athens is greeted with enthusiasm in fr. 578 not just because he is an alien, but primarily because his cult and his music are morally subversive. Fr. 578 may also contain a personal invective against Callias who could play flute, a rather unusual achievement for an Athenian gentleman.249 It is conceivable that Dionysos and Sabazios were also contrasted in the comedy as an ἀνδρεῖος and a μαλακός types respectively, the first promoting a ‘healthy’ form of heterosexual eros, associated with fertility, child-bearing, etc., and the second promoting either sexual abstinence, or a sterile and a non-masculine form of eros, both of which pose a threat to the polis (will Athens be turned into an Egyptian desert because of sexual abstinence and depopulation?). Orpheus was pictured in some versions of his myth both as a homosexual and a misogy-

243 Ar. Ran. 430. Cf. Henderson (1991) 163. 244 Archil. fr. 328.16 West: πασχητιώντων εὐρυπρώκτων σὺν γένει. 245 Ar. fr. 117 PCG (= Schol Areth. [B] Pl. Ap. 18b, p. 420 Greene: Μέλητος δὲ τραγωιδίας φαῦλος ποιητής, (...) ἐν δὲ Γεωργοῖς ὡς Καλλίαν περαίνοντος αὐτοῦ μέμνηται (...). Kassel and Austin (PCG III.2, 85 ad loc.) hold that the Meletus mentioned in Peasants as erastes of Callias was the father of Meletus, the prosecutor of Socrates. Cf. Dover (1968). 246 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.34.4 (the etiological myth on the origin of phallophoria). 247 Effeminacy of homosexuals: Henderson (1991) 219 ff. 248 Arist Pol. 8.7.1342b1 ff. disagrees with Plato’s Socrates in Politeia who condemns aulos, but still recognizes the Phrygian mode second best after the Dorian. Aristotle objects that the relationship of the Phrygian mode with other modes is the same as the relationship of the aulos with other instruments: “both are orgiastic and passionate (…) all baccheia [poiesis] is linked to auloi” (ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά· [...] πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεῖα [...] ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, κτλ.). 249 Ath. 4.84.184d. Cf. Macdowell (1962) 11.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 575

nist.250 The misogynism of Euripides’ Hippolytus (vv. 952 ff.) results from reading too many Orphic books and chastising his body with a vegetarian diet. Incidentally, Euripides was a friend and a pupil of Prodicus, and both of them were disciples of Anaxagoras and were therefore godless ‘Anaxagoreans’ in the eyes of Diopeithes & Co. Euripides’ Hippolytus was produced in 428, in the first years after the psephisma of Diopeithes and the trial of Anaxagoras, about the same time as the PDerv (Prodicus’ Horai), and the very same year as Anaxagoras’ death in Lampsacus. The chances are that the Aristophanes-style invective, unusual for a tragedy, against an ‘Orphic’ Hippolytus with his anti-social sectarianism – along with Theseus’, the father of the Athenian demos, egoistic obsession with personal salvation and disrespect for Aphrodite, as well as the dismissal of Orpheus’ books as nonsense (καπνός) – was Euripides’ message of solidarity to his Anaxagorean friends, first of all to Prodicus and Protagoras. Alternatively, or at the same time, it may have been a masked invective against Diopeithes & Co.: you swear by the name of Orpheus who ἀσεβεῖ against τὰ πάτρια, as the religion of our forefathers is based on animal sacrifice (θυσία), and not on a vegetarian diet (ἄψυχος βορά).

The date of Aristophanes’ Seasons According to Thomas Gelzer,251 the terminus post quem of Aristophanes’ Ὧραι is 423/422 BC (Euripides’ Erechtheus), and the terminus ante quem is 399 (the death of Chaerephon) or probably 411 (the death of Androcles). Gelzer opts for Dionysia 422 (the same year as Wasps) or Lenaia 421. Our reconstruction of the plot based on the new fragment would be compatible with both: with the exception of two appearances of Chaerephon’s name in Birds (vv. 1296 and 1564), most are found in Clouds (7 instances) and Wasps (vv. 1408 and 1412), i.e. date from 423–422 BC. However, the avian theme, the parody of Prodicus’ cock, the occurence of Chaerephon’s name, and the introduction of new divinities are also paralleled in Birds (v. 414). Athens was known for her relative tolerance towards foreign cults, therefore the panic and hysterical atmosphere after the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the mysteries (i.e. after 415) would provide a plausible context for the unusual harshness with which alien gods, like pharmakoi, are expelled from the city in the Seasons. From the basis of this assumption, we venture to hypothesize that the main target of the comedy was Callias (along with his Sophistic kolakes like Prodicus and Chaerephon) and that the noc-

250 OF 1003–1004. 251 Th. Gelzer ap. RE, Suppl. XII, s.v. Aristophanes, 1408–1409. Similarly Ambrose (1983) 137.

576 

 Andrei Lebedev

turnal scenes following the crow of the cock alluded to the profanation of the mysteries in a private house by means of a mocking reenactment of the Eleusin­ ian ritual. One might conjecture, for instance, that Prodicus played the role (in allusive form) of a hierophant (like Socrates in the Clouds), Callias the role of a dadouchos, and Chaerephon the role of a keryx. The ‘booming’ bass of Prodicus (Pl. Prot. 315d) may have been comically contrasted with the squeaky voice of Chaerephon the Bat. Callias was a hereditary torch-bearer (dadouchos) in the Eleusinian mysteries. Andocides (1.124) accuses him of illicit cohabitation in the same house with the daughter of Ischomachos and her mother. He sarcastically presents this as a blasphemous reenactment of his priestly duties to serve both “Mother and Daughter” in the cult of Eleusinian Demeter: καὶ συνῴκει ὁ πάντων σχετλιώτατος ἀνθρώπων τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τῇ θυγατρί, ἱερεὺς ὢν τῆς Μητρὸς καὶ τῆς Θυγατρός, καὶ εἶχεν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀμφοτέρας. Iphicrates called Callias metragyrtes rather than dadouchos (μητραγύρτην ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δᾳδοῦχον, Arist. Rhet. 3.2.1405a20); this joke may be a reference to Aristophanes’ Seasons, in which Sabazios worshipped in Callias’ house was portrayed as metragyrtes associated with the Great Mother.252 After the Sicilian disaster (413), ‘bad omens’ preceding the expedition of 415 were recalled (Plut. Nic. 18), especially the lamentations of the adoniazou­ sai women and the cries Σαβάζιος (Ar. Lys. 388): thus in popular imagination, Sabazios and other alien gods may have been blamed as scapegoats responsible for the catastrophy. Therefore the most plausible date of the Seasons is one of the nearest occasions after the fall of 413 BC (Lenaia 413?). The dialogue between Sabazios and Dionysos in fr. 582 presupposes winter-time. The winter of 413/412 BC must have been one of the hardest in the history of Athens with the public mood utterly depressed. According to Hansen’s estimate, in the Sicilian disaster the Athenian army lost 3000 citizens, and the Athenian fleet 160 triremes each with a crew of 200 or so, i.e. more than 30,000.253 Athens was literally depopulated: the polis was turned into a desert. That is the meaning of Dionysos’ caustic retort to Sabazios, “You have turned Athens into Egypt!” Sabazios was thought to be the the same as Adonis (see supra), and in popular imagination, the laments of adoniazousai women at the moment when the fleet was departing from Piraeus may have been perceived not only as forecasting, but also as magically causing the disaster. 252 According to Strab. 10.3.15 Sabazios is a child of the Great Mother (Meter), and Sabazia are the same as Metroa (Strab. 10.3.18). The teletai of Aischines’ mother in Dem. 18.259–260 combine peculiar features of Sabazios cult (cries εὐοὶ σαβοί, snakes) with what seems prima facie Bacchic (νεβρίς, κρατηρίζω), Orphic (βίβλους), and metragyrtic (Kybele/Attis) elements. However, all these belong to the same mystery initiation of Dionysos/Sabazios, the child of Meter, OF 577–578. 253 Hansen (1988) 15.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 577

The passage on the importance of distinguishing masculine and feminine words in the Clouds, vv. 658–694, has been previously seen as a parody of the Sophists, and primarily of Protagoras, who is credited with the distinction between three different genera.254 Recently several scholars have, with good reason, pointed out that the passage 661–669 is rather a parody of Prodicus.255 Socrates explains to Strepsiades that it is incorrect to use a common gender word ἀλεκτρυών for both the hen and the cock; instead, one should distinguish genera by using two different words: ἀλέκτωρ for the male bird, and ἀλεκτρύαινα for the female (v. 666). Ἀλεκτρύαινα, properly “she-cock,”256 is a hapax and is either a neologism of Prodicus257 or (rather) a mocking word coined by Aristophanes ad hoc.258 Even if this word is a neologism of Aristophanes, it must be a parody of a similar distinction made by Prodicus himself, otherwise there would be no comic effect. Prodicus indeed may have regarded the use of common gender words ‘incorrect’on the grounds of his principle, “no one word should have more than one meaning.”259 But he may have proposed something less ridiculous, e.g. ὁ ἀλέκτωρ / ἡ ἀλεκτορίς (which actually were in use). The cock was a popular phallic and agonistic symbol both in comedy and in the cult of Dionysos260 – the agon in the first Clouds was staged as a cockfight – and yet the highest occurence of cock-images in the comedies that mention Prodicus by name can hardly be accidental.261 On the grounds of these observations, it seems likely that the ornithological excursus on the ancient history focused on the farmyard cock (Persikos ornis),262 in Aristophanes’ Birds, vv. 481–492, is a parody of Prodicus’ Seasons.263 Peisthetairos argues that since the birds are more ancient than both gods and humans, they must have also been the first rulers and kings on earth. This recalls the

254 So 80 A 27–28 DK. 255 So correctly Sansone (2004) 133; Mayhew (2011) 169; Adams (2017) 18. 256 Halliwell (2016) translates ‘cockess’. 257 So Adams (2017) 18. Kilarsky (2013) 66, following Wackernagel, ascribes the neologism to Protagoras. Dover (1968) ad loc. and LSJ take it as a comic neologism of Aristophanes. 258 So Dover (1968) ad loc. and LSJ s.v. 259 The second of the three principles of Prodicus’ orthoepeia according to Matthew (2011) xv. 260 Csapo (2016) 142. 261 The highest number of instances of ἀλεκτρυών and variants ἀλέκτωρ, ἀλεκτρύαινα is attested in Aristophanes’ Clouds and Birds, viz. the only two comedies in which Prodicus is mentioned by name: cf. Nub. 4, 661, 663, 664, 666–667, 848–849, 851–852, 1427, 1430; Av. 71, 483, 1366; also Vesp. 100, 794; Ran. 939, 1343; Lys. 897; Eccl. 391. 262 Gallus gallus domesticus. On this see Dunbar (1995) ad loc. 263 Ar. Av. 481 ff.: ὡς δ’ οὐχὶ θεοὶ τοίνυν ἦρχον τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ παλαιόν, / ἀλλ᾽ ὄρνιθες, κἀβασίλευον, πόλλ᾽ ἐστὶ τεκμήρια τούτων / κτλ.

578 

 Andrei Lebedev

euhemeristic second stage in Prodicus’ theory of the origin of religion. The theory is “proved” (ἐπιδείξω) by empirical facts (τεκμήρια). Τεκμήρια were of primary importance not only in the courts and in rhetoric, but also in Hippocratic medicine and (pace Popper) in early Ionian Peri physeos historia.264 Like the Derveni author and Prodicus, Peisthetairos resorts to ‘linguistic archaeology.’ The Derveni author looks for the tekmeria that are ‘remnants’ of the beliefs of the ἀρχαῖοι not only in ‘ancient poetry’ and in ritual, but also in proverbial expressions (φάτις) like μοῖραν ἐπικλῶσαι or ἀφροδισιάζειν. Peisthetairos finds such a tekmerion in the Greek name of the farmyard cock Περσικὸς ὄρνις. He indeed was an ancient king of the Persians, “more ancient that Darius and Megabyzus,” as one may infer (τεκμαίρεσθαι) from his upright comb (the upright cap was a privilege of the Great King) and his royal power to wake up people of all professions. This may be compared with the μεγιστόφωνος ὄρνις and ὡρολογεῖν in the comedy fragment cited above. The list of craftsmen adduced as proof of the royal power of the cock looks like a parody of Prodicus’ reference to τέχναι. Note that ἀλφιταμοιβοί are likely to be the same as γεωργοί, for as Dunbar’s (1995) notes ad loc., in 5th-cent. Athens, producers and sellers were as a rule the same.

10 (X) The three ‘Heraclitizing’ passages in PDerv., cols. V, XX, and XXII Apart from the direct quotation from Heraclitus in col. IV, there are three other passages that display a striking similarity of the Derveni Papyrus with Heraclitus’ language and style. As in the case of the Hippocratic De diaeta 1, we face the problem of differentiating between possible verbatim quotations (single words, phrases, or continuous text), paraphrases, references, or simply imitation of Heraclitus’ style. The elevated and exquisite language of PDerv., cols. V, XX, and ΧΧΙΙ differs significantly the plain and calm ‘commentary’ style of the rest of the text. It has a rhetorical ‘Gorgianic’ flavor (antithesis, homoioteleuton) and is full of moralistic sarcasm and exposition of the idiocy of hoi polloi, combined with the aplomb of a ‘Master of truth’ typical for Heraclitus.265

264 On τεκμαίρεσθαι as empirical method in Alcmaeon and early Greek science, see Lebedev (2017c). 265 ‘Gorgianic’ need not be restricted to Gorgias himself: on the influence of Heraclitus’ antithetic style on Gorgias, Hippias, and Democritus, see Norden (19582) I, 18–23.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 579

According to our reconstruction of the third chapter of Heraclitus Peri physeos (Λόγος θεολογικός according to Diodotus),266 it began by recognizing the difficulty of the subject matter, asserting that all those who have written περὶ θεῶν have failed (Hesiod, Xenophanes, Pythagoras, and Hecataeus). The chapter consisted of two parts, with both a deconstructive and a constructive section: a) a devastating criticism of Greek anthropomorphic polytheism, of Bacchica, of mystery initiations, cathartic rituals, etc.; b) the exposition of a new philosophical theology of the Wise Being (τὸ Σοφόν) and cosmic Mind (Γνώμη). This new religion was strictly monotheistic and was based on the Heraclitean Logos theory and Fire cosmology exposed in chapter 1 (Περὶ τοῦ παντός). The Persian Magoi may have been mentioned in this section, too. Therefore, it seems a priori likely that if cols. V and XX contain hidden quotations or paraphrases of Heraclitus, the source must be the proem and the first deconstructive part of Heraclitus’ theological chapter. Heraclitus demolished the anthropomorphic polytheism of the poets by means of the etymological allegoresis of divine names and by attributing the ‘linguistic mistake’ of mortals (who believed in many gods because they failed to understand the absolute unity and the palin­ tropos harmonie of the cosmos) to the poets, first of all to Homer and Hesiod. Hesiod was a total idiot because he did not know that Day and Night are not separate entities, but two phases of the process, of “kindling and going out” of the same single substrate, the ever-living fire. Just as in Parmenides, the plurality of phenomena derives from the wrong distinction between opposites in language (linguistic idealism or linguistic relativism). Let us have a closer look at each of the three passages. PDerv., col. V.6–13 (my readings, partially different from KPT) ἆρ’ Ἅιδου δεινὰ τί ἀπιστοῦσι; οὐ γινώσ[κοντες ἐ]νύπνια οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλωμ πραγμάτων ἔκαστ[ον,] διὰ ποίων ἂν παραδειγμάτωμ π[ι]στεύοιεν; ὑπὸ [τῆς] ἁμαρτης καὶ [τ]ῆς ἄλλης ἡδον[ῆ]ς νενικημέν[οι, οὐ] μανθ[άνο]υσιν 10  οὐδὲ] πιστεύουσι. ἀ[πι]στίη δὲ κἀμα[θίη ταὐτόν· ἢν γὰρ μὴ μα]νθάνωσι μη [δ]ὲ γινώ[σ]κωσ[ι, οὐκ ἔστν ὅπως πιστεύσου]σι ν καὶ ὁρ[ῶντες ἐνύπνια τ]ὴν ἀπιστί[ην 266 Cfr. frs. 136–160 Lebedev; also theological Probabilia, frs. 10–15 Lebedev. The source of Diogenes Laërtius’ division of Heraclitus’ books into three logoi (9.5) is most probably Diodotus, as in the description of its scope (9.15). We refute the mistaken view that this division is Stoic: in Stoic thought, theology is a part of physics, and politics is a part of ethics. The differences do not stop here: the first chapter Περὶ τοῦ παντός combines Logos theory and Fire cosmology, i.e. logic and physics, and ethics is a part of politics in ch. 2. Cf. Lebedev (2014) 22–27.

580 

 Andrei Lebedev

Cf. Heraclit. 22 B 17 DK (= fr. 5 Lebedev): οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι; B 5 (= fr. 144 Lebedev): (...), οὔ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ’ ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι; and especially B 86 (= fr. 136 Lebedev): ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν θείων τὰ πολλά, καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον, ἀπιστίῃ διαφυγγάνει μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι. The context of Plutarch’s quotation (Coriol. 38) seems to be authentic267 and echoes Heraclitus’ σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον (B 108). The axynetoi (B 1 ~ B 34) fail to recognize and to believe in the only true god because he is totally different from all others (he is ‘incredible’ for them), and it is much easier to believe in the familiar human-like gods of the poets. The apistia motif is also attested in Clement’s quotation of B 19 (= fr. 10 Lebedev): ἀπίστους εἶναί τινας ἐπιστύφων Ἡράκλειτός φησιν· ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ᾽ εἰπεῖν.268 Essentially this fragment states the same idea as in PDerv., col. V.10: ἀ[πι]στίη δὲ κἀμα[θίη ταὐτόν. The disbelief (ἀπιστία) in one true god results from the ignorance and inability to understand (ἀμαθία), i.e. from the inability of poets to understand the unity of being. In Heraclitus’ epistemology, μανθάνω means “empirical acquaintance” with an object, which may or may not be accompanied by understanding (γιγνώσκω), a superior cognitive state. The ἄπιστοι are the same as ἀξύνετοι in Heraclitus’ B 1 (= fr. 2 Lebedev): the word may have a connotation of “disloyal,” “unfaithful” because they fail to recognize and to follow (ἕπεσθαι) the divine xynos logos of B 114 (= fr. 131 Lebedev) who is the Father and Master of all, gods and men. The peculiar use of ἄλλης in PDerv., col. V.9 also speaks in favour of the possibility of a verbatim quotation from Heraclitus: ἄλλης cannot mean “another pleasure,” since “error” is not a “pleasure”; the word has here a rare meaning “other than right,” “bad” (LSJ s.v. ἄλλος III, 4, cf. s.v. ἄλλως ΙΙ, 3). This usage is unparalleled elsewhere in PDerv., but it can be compared with Heraclitus’ B 5 (= fr. 144 Lebedev): καθαίρονται δ᾽ ἄλλωι αἵματι μιαινόμενοι κτλ., “in vain purify themselves those polluted by blood (...).” ‘Vain pleasures’ or ‘bad pleasures’ in Heraclitus’ puritanic ethics are the pleasures of Aphrodite and Bacchus, which cause the sensual ‘wetness’ of the soul and impede clarity and precision of thought: τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; (B 104 = fr. 130 Lebedev). In our commentary on Heraclitus (Lebedev [2014] 449), we argue that the image of bacchants who “sing a song” to phallos in B 15 (= fr. 148 Lebedev) is an allegorical parable about humanity connected with his pessimistic condemnation of childbearing in B 20 (= fr. 78 Lebedev): the bacchants think that the phallus is a symbol 267 We do not mean that it is a verbatim quotation. By “authentic context” of a philosophical fragment we mean that the writer who quotes it correctly understands it in a thematically relevant context. The authentic context shoud be distinguished from an accidental and irrelevant one. 268 Clem. Al. Strom. 2.24.5. The authenticity of this fragment is wrongly denied by Marcovich (20012) ad loc., who prints it (fr. 1 [g]) as an allusion to B 1. Correctly DK, Kahn, and Conche.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 581

of life and procreation, but in fact they worship the god of death, whose name in hidden in αἰδοῖον, and “generate new deaths.” In other words, they commit a ἁμαρτία. The chances are that the Derveni author’s interest in wineless libations (ἄοινα) in the first columns of PDerv. is a reflection of Heraclitus’ anti-alcoholic and anti-Bacchic exhortations. From the convergence of Chalcidius’ evidence with the Hippocratic De diaeta 1, we can infer that Heraclitus admitted the possibility of divination and believed in prophetic dreams.269 After Tsantsanoglou (1997), the author of PDerv., col. V.4 (πάριμεν [εἰς τὸ μα]ντεῖον ἐπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες, “we enter an oracle in order to ask a question”) has often been understood as a mantis or a religious specialist himself,270 but this understanding is contradicted by the verb ἐπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες: diviners do not ask questions, they answer them. We could not find a single instance of ἕνεκα in the sense of “for the sake of others” using various whole corpus proximity TLG searches for ἕνεκα with various verbs meaning “to ask an oracle” and nouns meaning “oracular response.” In all instances we found, ἕνεκα (or its synonym χάριν) in similar contexts refers to the purpose of consulting an oracle (syn. περὶ ὧν), but never means “for the sake of somebody”271 The words τῶν μαντευομένων ἕνεκα therefore mean “for the sake of prophecies,” and not “for the sake of inquierers.”272 The “we” in the pluralis πάριμεν refers not to a certain group or a corporation, but to general human habits. Greek philosophers, especially moralists, use we when they speak about common habits, practices, or experiences of people in general. Consider, for example, Heraclit. 22 B 21 DK (= fr. 77 Lebedev): θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέομεν, κτλ., “death is what we see while being awake, (…),” and Arist. Εth. Νic. 2.3.1104b9: διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. Examples can be multiplied. In the latter quotation, the speaker probably does not even include himself into his “we.” It would be preposterous to infer from this use of

269 Chalcid. In Tim. 260.20–261.2 Waszink (= 22 A 20 DK = fr. 123[a] Lebedev). Cf. Hippoc. De diaet. 12.2 ff.: μαντικὴ τοιόνδε· τοῖσι φανεροῖσι μὲν τὰ ἀφανέα γινώσκειν, (...) καὶ τοῖσι ἀποθανοῦσι τὰ ζῶντα, κτλ. 270 Contra Johnston (2014) 89 ff. The parallels quoted by Kouremenos, ad loc. do not support this inference, either, since both in Herodotus and Euripides the phrase is applied not to the Pythia, but to ordinary consultants. 271 Schol. in Pind. Pyth. 4.10 Drachmann (= FHG IV 1a1–4): περὶ τῆς τοῦ Βάττου εἰς τὸ μαντεῖον ἀφίξεως (...). οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕνεκεν τῆς φωνῆς φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, κτλ.; Nic. Damasc. FGrHist 90 F 8: (Laios and Epicaste had no children) τούτων ἕνεκα εἰς Δελφοὺς χρησόμενος τῷ μαντείῳ ἀφίκετο κτλ.; Eur. Ion 301: πότερα θεατὴς ἢ χάριν μαντευμάτων; Parthen. Myth. Narrat. amat. 3.1.3: (Ὀδύσσευς) εἰς Ἤπειρον ἐλθὼν χρηστηρίων τινῶν ἕνεκα κτλ.; Schol. in Soph. OT 114.1–2 Longo: φασι τοὺς εἰς τὰ μαντεῖα ἀπιόντας τοῦ μαθεῖν ἕνεκα περὶ ὧν αὐτοῖς ἐστι ζήτησις. 272 Correctly Janko and Kotwick (2017) 132, contra KPT.

582 

 Andrei Lebedev

“we” that Aristotle indulged in pleasures and abstained from noble behavior. The sentence under discussion in PDerv., col. V.3–6 may well have been an interrogation (with an expected negative answer) in a series of rhetorical questions.273 From the moralistic condemnation of their ἁμαρτία and ἡδονή, one may rather infer that he disapproved of their habit of consulting oracles. The Hippocratic author of De diaeta admits that dreams may have prognostic value but discourages his reader from going to interpreters of dreams because they often make mistakes (ἁμαρτία). Instead, he advises the reader himself to interpret the signs of health and disease in their dreams following his naturalistic guidelines.274 There are reasons to suppose that Heraclitus also believed that he possessed an internal, personal Delphic oracle in his psyche: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν (B 101 = fr. 97 Lebedev). There are indications in the Heraclitean tradition that he interpreted the most horrible of τὰ δεινά in Hades as an allegory of the actual moral condition of humanity, and the authors who quote this allegory repeatedly connect the “filth” with ἡδονή and ὕες who βορβόρωι ἥδονται μᾶλλον ἢ καθαρῶι ὕδατι.275 In the Republic, Plato says that the dialectical method elevates the “eye of the soul” buried in “barbaric filth” and raises it up: ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος (...) τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, (...) (Resp. 7.533c7 ff.). Hermann Fränkel plausibly suggested that τῷ ὄντι indicates a verbatim quotation (“indeed,” i.e. “as they say”) and identified the source as Heraclitus.276 A striking parallel is provided by Plot. Enn. 1.6 (1).6.1 ff.: ἔστι γὰρ δή, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή. διὸ καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς Ἅιδου κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, (...)· οἷα δὴ καὶ ὕες, οὐ καθαραὶ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ. κτλ. The “ancient logos” quoted by Plotinus is almost certainly the word of Heraclitus. Since Heraclitus in B 14 (= frs. 146–147 Lebedev) condemns the mysteries accepted among men as unholy and threatens the Bacchic initiates with punishment, it seems that he paradoxically reinterpreted the image of sinners “buried in filth” that refers to future punishment as a moralistic allegory of the present condition of humanity. The ethical topos characterizing a vicious person as a δοῦλος τῶν παθῶν is alluded to in PDerv., col.

273 E.g. ἆρα] (Lebedev) πόθωι  (Janko) π[ερ]ὶ (Lebedev) | αὑτοῖς πάριμεν [εἰς το μα]ντεῖον ἐπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες,] |5 τῶν μαντευομένων [ἕν]εκεν, εἰ θέμι[ς προσ]δοκᾶν (Piano) | ἐν Ἅιδου δεινά; τί ἀπιστοῦσι; “Do we by regret [or “disquietude”] about ourselves ever consult an oracle for the sake of prophecies, in order to ask whether it is righteous to expect the horrors in Hades? Why do they do not believe?” 274 Hippoc. De diaet. 1.87–88. 275 Heraclit. 22 B 13 [II] DK (= fr. probab. 10 Lebedev). 276 Fränkel (1938) 311 ff.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 583

V.9 ([τ]ῆς ἄλλης ἡδον[ῆ]ς νενικημέν[οι). It fits perfectly with Heraclitus’ strongly anti-hedonistic ethics of σωφρονεῖν, which is proclaimed the ἀρετὴ μεγίστη in B 112 (= fr. 100 Lebedev). We encounter the same epistemological scale of cognitive faculties ἀκούειν (ἰδεῖν)/μανθάνειν/γινώσκειν (i.e. sensation/experience/knowledge) in PDerv., col. XX. Rusten explained the paragraphos at XX.10 as a mark of the end of a quotation (preceding ll. 1–10) from a prose writer.277 This remains a plausible suggestion, or at least a serious possibility.278 Along with the ‘Gorgianic’ flavour of the exquisite style of this column, this suggestion can be supported by the use of the word γνώμη on col. XX.10 (καὶ τῆς γνώμης στερόμενοι πρὸς ἀπέρχονται). In early Ionian prose (Hippocrates, Herodotus), γνώμη was often used in the sense of “intelligence, mind” as distinguished from or opposed to the “body” or the senses. This use of the word was well known to Galen, who comments on one such instance in Hippocrates: τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἁπάσαις τὴν γνώμην ἐφεξῆς ἔταξεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἥν τε καὶ νοῦν καὶ φρένα καὶ λόγον κοινῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσιν.279 What was known to Galen has often been neglected by many interpreters of Heraclitus, who mistranslated this word280 in what is probably the most important theological fragment of Heraclitus: “To recognize only one wise being (= god): that Mind (Γνώμην) which alone steers the whole Universe.”281 In Attic

277 Rusten (1985) 138–139. 278 Despite the reservations of Obbink (1997) 44–46; KPT, 242. 279 Gal. In Hippoc. Off. Med. 18b.649.16–18 Kühn. Galen (ibid., 18b.656 Kühn) quotes parallels from Antiph. 87 B 1 DK (ὄψει ὁρᾷ vel γνώμῃ γιγνώσκει) and B 2 DK (γνώμη τοῦ σώματος ἡγεῖται). 280 Often mistranslated as “thought” (KRS), “true judgement” (Kirk), “Gedanken” (DK). Kahn’s “plan” does not hit the mark, either, but at least captures the ‘providential’ connotation inherent in the “mind.” Gnome is the “planning mind” of the cosmos. Marcovich came closer to truth, but still hesitated between “thought” and “intelligence.” It is interesting and instructive that 19th-cent. scholars who were not blinded by the myth of Stoic distortions of Heraclitus perfectly understood the true meaning of the word: Bernays translated as “Intelligenz” and Diels in his Herakleitos as “Vernunft.” On the origin of the tradition of the wrong translation in the early 20th cent. (Heidel and Reinhardt followed by Gigon and Kirk), see Marcovich (20012) ad loc. Anaxagoras took his concept of the cosmic mind from Heraclitus. A question might be raised whether the Derveni author (Prodicus) derived his notion of the cosmic nous from Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, or from both. The Anaxagorean tradition (as modified by Archelaus) must be his main source, but col. IV in our reconstruction makes Heraclitus a possible secondary source. 281 22 B 41 DK (= fr. 140 Lebedev) ap. Diog. Laërt. 9.1: ἓν τὸ σοφὸν ἐπίστασθαι· Γνώμην ἥτε οἴη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων (ἥτε οἴη scripsi). Note that Γνώμη is a common word for “mind, intelligence” in Corpus Hippocraticum (101 instances). It has been often mistranslated as “thought” or “plan” due to the wild text printed in DK. The form ὁτέη is not only unattested, but it also cannot be even imagined. In the first edition of Herakleitos, Diels correctly translated γνώμη as “Intelligenz,” as did Bernays. Cf. Vassallo (2017a).

584 

 Andrei Lebedev

4th-cent. BC philosophical prose, the standard word became νοῦς. Although Anaxagoras wrote in the Ionian dialect, he most likely adapted his usage to the Attic norm to avoid confusion. The Derveni author follows Anaxagoras and the Axagorean tradition in his use of γνώμη; in two other instances of the word in PDerv., it means “thought” or “meaning.”282 The initiates leave the telesterion after having been deprived of their mind, like μαινόμενοι: the ‘madness’ of the axynetoi is a moralistic topos in Heraclitus, who describes popular religion, politics, and poetry as insane. In Theophrastus, the deisidaimon after a visit to an Orpheotelestes “remains out of his mind the whole day” (ἀφρονεῖν ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν).283 Can a line containing this semantical hapax in PDerv. accidentally be marked by a paragraphos?284 Let us turn now to PDerv., col. XXII.1–6. We have analysed the meaning of ὁμοίω[ς ὠ]νόμασεν in XXI.1 in § (II) above. Note the rhetorical combination of an antithesis (πάν[τ’ ... ταὐτά ~ οὐδαμὰ ταὐτά) with a homoioteleuton (ὑπὸ πλεονεξίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀμαθίας) which may be compared with Heraclitus’ 22 B 129 DK (= fr. 22 Lebedev): σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. In B 95 (= B 109 = fr. 127 Lebedev), Heraclitus sarcastically advises his opponents “to conceal their ignorance rather than to expose it” (κρύπτειν ἀμαθίην κρέσσον ἢ ἐς τὸ μέσον φέρειν).285 The fact that the word πλεονεξία does not occur in the extant fragments of Heraclitus must be attributed to chance: πλεονεξία is the opposite of δικαιοσύνη and belοngs to the same semantical field as κόρος and κεκόρηνται. One of the main points of Heraclitus’ political cosmology was to show that in the polis of Zeus there is no pleonexia, as is shown by the regular tropai of the sun, etc. In addition to these similarities with Heraclitus, ll. 1–6 of PDerv., col. XXII contain a summary exposition of Heraclitus’ philosophy of language, including functionalist semantics 282 PDerv. cols. XI.2; XXIII.7. 283 Theophr. Char. 16.10–11a Steinmetz. 284 The word γνώμη in PDerv., col. XX.10 is incorrectly interpreted as “hope” in KPT, 241 on the assumption that it must have the same meaning as ἐλπίς in l. 12: γνώμη never means “hope”; such a meaning is unattested. The author ironically claims to feel pity for those who are initiated by private ‘professionals’ because, in addition to losing their money, they also lose their mind and their hope (belief) in a blessed afterlife. Heraclitus uses ἔλπομαι for beliefs about the afterlife: 22 B 27 DK (= fr. 145 Lebedev: ἀνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας ἅσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσι). In our reconstruction of the theological chapter of Heraclitus’ book, this fragment precedes B 14 (= frs. 146–147 Lebedev) with the criticism of mysteries. In B 18 (= fr. 157 Lebedev: ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπεται ἀνέλπιστον κτλ.), the verb ἔλπομαι also refers to the afterlife, and τὸ ἀνέλπιστον is the immortality and apotheosis of the philosopher. Cf. Vassallo (2006) and, from a doxographical perspective, Mansfeld (2015). 285 Ιn Lebedev (2014) 433–434 we defend the authenticity of Stobaeus’ version including the words ἢ ἐς τὸ μέσον φέρειν, contra Diels. The expression ἐς τὸ μέσον φέρειν (or λέγειν) may allude both to the speeches of orators and to public recitals of poets in agones.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 585

in the theory of names and his doctrine of the “common Logos,” which, due to the poets’ misreading of it, resulted in the invention of polytheism.286 The verb κρατιστεύειν, like its Homeric synonym ἀριστεύειν (αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν, Il. 6.208; 11.784), is often used in an agonistic context, therefore κρατιστεύοντες (...) λέγουσι most likely refers to prize-winning poets like Homer and Archilochus who, according to Heraclitus’ wish in 22 B 42 DK (= fr. 17 Lebedev), should be “thrown out from competitions and flogged” (ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι). In PDerv., col. XXII.1–6, the poets’ incorrect naming of the gods is contrasted with Orpheus’ correct  onomatothesia. The false naming results in “many names” of different gods (i.e. polytheism), while the correct method recognizes one and the same entity behind “many names” (i.e. monotheism): cf. Aesch. PV 210 (πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία) and Antisth. test. 179a Prince (= fr. 39a Decleva Caizzi ap. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, fr. 21.31–34 Schober: (...) λέγεται τὸ | κατὰ νόμον εἶναι | πολλοὺς θεοὺς κα|τὰ δὲ φύσιν ἕν[α]). The “ignorance” (ἀμαθία) of poets concerning “things divine” (τὰ θεῖα is the object of ἀπιστία in Heraclit. 22 B 86 DK = fr. 136 Lebedev) is a result of a fatal error (ἁμαρτης , col. V.8), which corresponds exactly to what we have called the ‘linguistic mistake’ of mortals aka the ‘disease of language.’ Orpheus’ onomatothesia is based on knowledge and understanding (γινώσκων, col. XXII.2), whereas poetic discourse is based on emotion (θυμόν, col. ΧΧΙΙ.5) and drinking too much: according to Heraclitus’ moral psychology, sex and wine make the soul ‘wet’ and impair human intelligence (φρόνησις) and sound judgement (γνώμας). Plutarch quotes Heraclitus’ dictum about ἀμαθία 4 times; in two out of four quotations, ‘ignorance’ is linked with drinking wine (Quaest. conv. 644a1, παρ’ οἶνον; fr. 129 Sandbach, ἐν οἴνῳ). It is by no means surprising that an ‘atheistic’ declaration of such iconoclastic force, which proclaims that all traditional gods of Greek religion are merely “empty names” and definitely liable to γραφὴ ἀσεβείας, is veiled by cryptic language and disguised as innocent talk about poetry. It seems that Heraclitus criticised not only Greek religion in ch. 3 and Greek politics in ch. 2, but also ordinary Greek language in ch. 1 of his poem. He claims to speak κατὰ φύσιν, to reform ordinary language, e.g. by avoiding the verb εἶναι when describing the phenomenal, and by omitting the conjunction καί between opposites, etc. Chances are that when he refers to people whose logoi (cf. λέγουσι in col. XXII.4) are various and wishful, the author means the poets who created anthropomorphic polytheism; these poets are contrasted with Orpheus, who named everything according to the same principle, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. However, this passage looks like a summary exposition of Heraclitus’ philosophy of religion and language (with some authentic terms) rather than a verbatim

286 Lebedev (2014) 61–71, 103–114, and (2017a).

586 

 Andrei Lebedev

quotation. What about the ‘Heraclitizing’ passages in cols. V and XX? It is difficult to decide between a verbatim quotation and a paraphrase. Both the paragraphos in PDerv., col. XXII.11 and the vicinity of Heraclitus’ direct quotation in col. V make the possibility of a verbatim quotation more likely than in the case of col. XXII. We would not take the risk of including these three passages in the main corpus of Heraclitus’ fragments. But they may and should be included in a separate section of Fragmenta probabilia or at least under the heading ‘Imitations.’

11 (XI) Some conjectures on the origin of the Derveni Papyrus: Euripides’ library in Pella as an intermediate link between Athens and Lete (Derveni)? The question of whether the papyrus found near Derveni’s grave A was a kind of funeral offering, a magical epistomion connected with ‘Orphic’ (i.e. Bacchic) initiations or just a torch used to light the funeral pyre may never be finally resolved since we do not know for certain who placed it there and why he did so. Our attribution and interpretation of the text prima facie seems to support the more skeptical view, but let us not jump to conclusions before considering two possible scenarios: (1) the papyrus roll was a personal belonging of the dead and was used in the funeral ceremony according to his will; (2) the decision to use it at funerals and deposit it in the grave was made by someone else after his death. This is further complicated by the following dilemma two interpretative options: (a) the owner of the papyrus (= the dead) understood the purpose and philosophical contents of the text; (b) the owner was a ‘naïve’ reader who took the alleged “wisdom of Orpheus” at face value. Scenario (1+a) is unlikely, since in such case the owner would not attach any religious significance to the papyrus. Scenario (1+b) is equally unlikely, since no Orphic or Bacchic initiate would burn quotations from a Hieros logos of Orpheus. We are left with scenario (2). “Someone else” in this situation is most probably the relatives of the dead. There is an obvious contradiction between the high intellectual and educational level indicated by the possession and knowledge of such books as Prodicus’ history of religion, on the one hand, and the apparent ‘magical’ and superstitious (δεισιδαίμων from the point of view of any educated Greek) act of burning a rare book that points to a low-culture and poorly educated milieu, on the other. One may guess, modifying Tzifopoulos’ suggestion, that the relatives of the dead, very simple people who believed in the magical power of

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 587

epistomia, driven by grief and expressing thus their love towards the deceased, decided to use a book from his library as a funeral torch and to place the remains in the grave as a funerary offering. They most likely did not understand the philosophical contents of the papyrus text, but the mere presence of Orpheus’ name in it and quotations from Hieros logos were sufficient for their choice. (Incidentally, if they did, they would have burnt it secretly and completely in the yard, so we should be grateful to them for their mistake, since otherwise the papyrus would not have been preserved.) The papyrus with Timotheus’ Persae dating from the time of Alexander the Great, which has also been found in a grave at the Greek necropolis in Abusir-Busiris, may have been a personal belonging of the dead, on the assumption that he was a veteran of Alexander who received for his service a kleros in the Busiris area; the patriotic poem may well have been a favorite book of a man who fought against the Persians.287 According to Tsantsanoglou, the spearheads, other weapons, and horse-gear found in the remains of the pyres of the so-called ‘Derveni tombs’ “might identify the dead as warlords or royal hetairoi of the Macedonian army.”288 A melopoios Eutychides, who ordered in his will that he be cremated along with 12 cithars and 25 boxes of his compositions, was considered eccentric and should not be compared with the Derveni case.289 A more ‘normal’ case, of the type that Jessica Hughes (2017) has labelled “souvenirs of the Self,” is the discovery of writing tablets with writing implements, a papyrus, and musical instruments in the “Tomb of the Poet” in Dafni, personal belongings of a young poet.290 If our attribution is correct (as we believe it is), the text known as the Derveni Papyrus was most probably written in Ioulis on the island of Ceos, the birthplace of Prodicus and two other 5th-cent. BC literary celebrities, Simonides and his

287 On palaeographical similarities between PDerv. and Timotheus’ Papyrus and the possibility that they may have a “common Macedonian origin,” see Hordern (2002) 68. Hordern himself admits that the papyrus was “simply lost by accident” (p. 65). According to Wilamowitz, the scribe of the Timotheus Papyrus must have been an Ionian. In this case, the owner of the papyrus may have been of Macedonian origin himself. 288 K. Tsantsanoglou ap. KPT, 3. The most famous native of Lete who took part in Alexander’s campaign was Nearchos (cf. Steph. Byz. Ethn. 11.49 [413.21–22] Meineke: οὕτως γὰρ ἱστορεῖται Nέαρχος Ληταῖος, τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ μεγάλῳ συστρατευσαμένων ὁ διασημότατος). 289 Satirized by the epigrammatist Lucillius (Anth. Pal. 11.133) and quoted by West (2013) as a parallel to the Dafni trove. The epigram is a ‘warning’ to “those below” that Eutychides with 25 boxes of his poetry is coming: “Where can one go 
in future, now that Eutychides is all over Hades too?” (transl. by M. L. West). 290 On this see West (2013) who comments: “The instruments, at any rate, will surely have been instruments that he or she played. The manuscripts will have contained texts that he or she owned: perhaps read, perhaps copied, possibly composed.” (p. 85).

588 

 Andrei Lebedev

nephew Bacchylides.291 At the same time, it is in many ways inseparably connected with the intellectual conflict between Anaxagoreioi and Pythagoreioi, or the Sophistic ‘Enlightenment’ and religious conservatives, at the time of the Peloponnesian War. As we have suggested above, the Derveni treatise may have been a reply to the psephisma of Diopeithes and the trial of Anaxagoras published between 430 and 423 BC. Quotations from or allusions to Derv.T in Aristophanes (423 and 414), Euripides (406), Plato, and Philochorus indicate that in the 5th and 4th cent. BC, Athens was the place where most of the existing copies of Derv.T circulated. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the Derveni Papyrus was also brought from Athens or was a local copy of an earlier Athenian papyrus. Although the Derv.T (Prodicus’ Horai) was well known among Athenian intellectuals in classical times, and was still read and quoted by scholars and philosophers in Hellenistic (Philochorus) and Imperial times (Plutarch, Themistius), it was not a literary classic like the Iliad that was studied in school and circulated in thousands of copies throughout Greece. It was rather a sophisticated ‘intellectual’ prose (as well as a political pamphlet) addressed to litterati and people interested in the philosophy of mythology, Kulturgeschichte, and the origin of language and religion. The discovery of such a book in a Macedonian grave near a small provincial polis seems somewhat unexpected. We have good reasons to suppose that a copy of Prodicus’ Horai may have existed in 406 BC in Euripides’ library or a collection of books in Pella. It can be taken for certain that Euripides died in Pella, since there was a cenotaph erected in his honour on the road from Piraeus to Athens. Some scholars believe that Euripides’ trip to Pella was just a tour following the invitation of Archelaus and that he had no intention to reside in Pella.292 But the interpretation of the two Tantalos passages in Euripides’ Orestes, proposed above in § (VIII) and based on the improved text of Philodemus cited above, leads us to a different reconstruction of Euripides’ motives and plans before the trip. By 406 BC, two out of three teachers of Euripides mentioned in the biographical tradition (Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Prodicus), namely Anaxagoras (in 432) and Protagoras (in 411) has already fallen victim to the witch-hunt initiated by Diopeithes. The “rock of Tantalos,” i.e. the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας, was still “hanging over the head” of Anaxagoras’ friends and disciples. The most prominent and influential friends and disciples of Anaxagoras in Athens after the expulsion of Protagoras were Prodicus and Euripides. The mysticopathy of the Tantalos 291 Simonides’ poetry held significant place in the lectures of Protagoras (Prodicus’ teacher and close associate) on how to read poets; the emphasis on hyperbaton in his technique provides a direct link with the Derveni Papyrus. 292 Scodel (2017) 37 ff. But we agree with the author that the war may have been another reason.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 589

passages is an indication of Euripides’ fear of the charge of impiety. Just as Euripides commemorated the trial and tortures of Anaxagoras in Orestes (408 BC), in the same cryptic manner he commemorated the prosecution of Protagoras in his Ixion, another paradigmatic godless sinner punished by Zeus.293 The anecdote about Euripides’ reply to those who censored him for bringing Ixion to the stage, a character μιαρὸς καὶ ἀσεβής, “abominable and impious,” is a bèn trovato: “But I did not let him leave the stage before I nailed him to the wheel of torture” (οὐ μέντοι πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξήγαγον ἢ τῷ τροχῷ προσηλῶσαι).294 The anecdote parodies Euripides’ ingenious use of ambiguous language as a protection against the possible charges of asebeia. The emphasis on the punishment of Tantalos in the Orestes has the same protective purpose. The oligarchic coup of 411 was followed by a new wave of witch-hunting for ἀσεβεῖς, who were to be blamed for the misfortunes of the war; there is no sufficient reason to doubt the report that Protagoras was charged by one of the Four Hundred in 411 BC.295 It seems, therefore, that Euripides’ apodemia to Pella was a self-exile rather than a tour: he was saving his life. According to the biographical tradition, Euripides “turned to tragedy” after he saw what kind of dangers Anaxagoras had to face for his novel theories.296 This report cannot be trusted as it stands not only because of its anachronism. In the mid-5th cent. BC, when Euripides started his dramatic career, nobody was afraid to read the books of Anaxagoras and Protagoras, the two founding fathers of Athenian ‘Enlightenment’ and new ‘Humanism’; everything changed only after the psephisma of Diopeithes (432 BC). On the contrary, reading their books might have been perceived as a sign of loyalty to the regime, since both of them were close friends of Pericles. Can this report in Suda be a distortion of the original explanation of the motives behind Euripides’ flight to Macedonia? As a renowned bibliophile,297 Euripides must have brought his library with him to Pella or, at least, a collection of his favorite books and/or books that might have been useful for his work on Bacchae. We have seen above that PDerv. (Prodicus) is cited in the Bacchae. We may conclude that in 406/405 BC a copy of the book that we call the ‘Derveni Papyrus’ probably existed in Pella at the distance of some 45 km from Lete (Derveni) and only several decades before the date of the papyrus

293 Diog. Laërt. 9.55 (= Protag. 80 A 1 DK = Philochor. FGrHist 328 F 217 = Eur. Ixion test. [33] i TrGF [Kannicht]). 294 Plut. De aud. poet. 19e (= Eur. Ixion test. [33] iii TrGF [Kannicht]). 295 Diog. Laërt. 9.54 (= Protag. 80 A 1 DK). 296 Cf. Suda ε 3695.8–10: (Euripides) ἐπὶ τραγῳδίαν δὲ ἐτράπη τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν ἰδὼν ὑποστάντα κινδύνους δι᾽ ἅπερ εἰσῆξε δόγματα. 297 On Euripides’ library see test. G 49–50 TrGF (Kannicht).

590 

 Andrei Lebedev

roll.298 A copy of it may have been made for the royal library of Archelaus, a close friend and admirer of Euripides. It is also conceivable that after Euripides’ death, his library was incorporated (purchased or donated by relatives) into the royal library in Pella. All further speculations on the fata libelli would be worthless. We cannot absolutely rule out a coincidence, and we do not intend this section as an argument in support of our attribution, which is rather based on quotations. The question mark in the title of this section should be taken at face value, i.e. as a question addressed by a historian of Greek philosophy to archaeologists and papyrologists.

Appendix (1) The Derveni Papyrus , Heraclitus, and the Stoics: A reply to Luc Brisson Luc Brisson has challenged the communis opinio that dates the commentary of PDerv. to the late 5th cent. BC and proposed to redate it c. 300 BC on the grounds that it contains a Stoic physical allegoresis of myth.299 Both a Stoic influence and a Hellenistic date for the Derv.T should be ruled out for the following reasons. 1) The Ionian dialect started to fall out of use already in the 5th cent. BC under the influence of the Attic dialect (we see this process in PDerv.). By 350 BC, it was already dead in the main central and eastern Ionian regions; only the western branch (Euboia) survived into the 3rd cent. BC. It not only disappeared by the mid-4th cent. BC from inscriptions, i.e. ceased to be a spoken language, but it also ceased to be the language of philosophy and science as it was in the 6th and 5th cent. BC. We would like to see a single Greek philosophical text written in a post-classical period in Ionian dialect. The Ionian dialect of any philosophical prose points to a pre-4th cent. BC date. 2) The pantheism of the Stoics and of Heraclitus (like the pantheism of the Orphic Hymn to Zeus) belongs to the ethico-religious type, while the ‘Anaxagorean’ pantheism of the Derveni author (Prodicus) belongs to a different type, a naturalistic pantheism which is irreligious and ethically irrelevant. The Stoics prayed to Zeus, but we doubt that the Derveni author would pray to the cosmogonic Vortex: Aristophanes made fun of this idea in the Clouds because he perfectly understood the irreligious character of Prodicus’ pantheism. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics unanimously dismissed

298 K. Tsantsanoglou ap. KPT, 9 dates 340–320 BC. Irigoin (1972) 543 admitted the first half of the 4th cent. BC. 299 Brisson (2009). Cf. Betegh (2007).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 591

the Nous of Anaxagoras because he works in accordance with Ionian naturalistic cosmogony and is incompatible with divine providence (Pronoia) and traditional religion, whereas the Nous-Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus works in accordance with creationism and Pythagorean mathematical metaphysics. 3) The allegorical method of Derv.T is also significantly different from that of the Stoics. As Brisson correctly recognizes, the Stoic allegoresis is based on etymology. But in PDerv., the dominant method is that of functionalist semantics combined with the theory of the ‘disease of language’: see the analysis of the ‘glossary’ in § (II) above. 4) Even if the dead was placed in the grave c. 300 BC, this does not affect the date of the papyrus (let alone of the Derveni treatise) which should be dated by papyrologists, not by archaeologists. 5) Πνεῦμα in col. XVIII does not mean “breath” and has nothing to do with the Stoic theological concept.300 It means “wind” (not a mixture of fire and air, as in Stoic philosophy) and refers to the cosmogonical vortex, which was repeatedly cursed (in its atomistic version) by the Stoics as an ‘atheistic’ doctrine that leaves no place for the divine pronoia.301 6) Already Aristotle in Physics Α302 clearly and correctly distinguished between two groups of physikoi propounding two different types of theories of matter and material change; Felix M. Cleve aptly labelled them “tranfomationists and agenetists.” The ‘transfomationists’ admit a transformation of a single substrate into the plurality of qualitatively different bodies (ἑτεροιοῦσθαι), while the ‘agenetists’ posit an initial mixture (μῖγμα) of spermata and describe the material change in mechanistic terms of excretion, conjunction, and disjunction; it was introduced by Anaximander, accepted by Anaxagoras, and later developed by Democritus, who made Anaxagoras’ ‘seeds’ indivisible and lacking sensible qualities. The physics of the Stoics (τὴν ὕλην τρέπεσθαι), like that of Heraclitus (ἀλλοιοῦται), is a classical example of the ‘transfοmationist’ type and is therefore incompatible with the Anaxagorean ‘agenetist’ type upheld by the Derveni author: θόρνυσθαι is a synonym of both Anaximander’s and Anaxagoras’ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, and of Democritus’ ἐκθλίβεσθαι. 7) One of the indications of the alleged late origin of PDerv., according to Luc Brisson, is the ‘Stoic Heraclitus.’ We believe, along with Charles Kahn and Anthony Long who saw the truth,303 that the ‘Stoic Heraclitus’

300 See above § (III), test. 4. 301 Marc. Aur. Med. 6.10.1.1–2: ἤτοι κυκεὼν καὶ ἀντεμπλοκὴ καὶ σκεδασμὸς ἢ ἑνωσις καὶ τάξις καὶ πρόνοια. κτλ. Two models of the world are contrasted in a dilemma: either the Epicurean cosmos produced by a ‘cocktail’ of atoms or the Stoic cosmos produced by the divine Pronoia. Kykeon is a denigrating metaphor for the blind cosmogonical vortex. If the first is true, then life is meaningless. Cf. ibid. 4.27; 9.39 302 Arist. Phys. 1.4.187a12 ff. (= Anaximand. 12 A 16 [II] DK = Ar 1 Wöhrle). 303 Kahn (1981) 147 ff.; Long (1996) 35–57.

592 

 Andrei Lebedev

is the genuine Heraclitus, unlike the heavily distorted physicalist Heraclitus of Aristotle and the relativist/subjectivist Heraclitus of Plato. The Stoics did non ‘project’ their doctrines onto Heraclitus, but derived them from him: they only rephrased (correctly, as a rule) Heraclitus’ archaic and metaphorical Ionian prose in contemporary language. The fundamental telos-formula of Stoic ethics is virtually a quotation from Heraclitus. The Stoic ἐκπύρωσις καὶ διακόσμησις are simply a translation into the plain hellenistic koine of the archaic words κόρος καὶ χρησμοσύνη in Ionian dialect. Projectonism has its roots in the hypercritical obsession of some 19th-cent. scholars with ‘exposing’ alleged ‘fraud,’ what has been aptly called “la psicosi moderna del falso antico.”304 The myth about the Stoic biased and distorting “assimilation” (συνοικειοῦν) of Heraclitus’ views to their own doctrines derives from two passages in Burnet’s Early Greek Philoso­ phy. We would like to emphasize that this claim of Burnet is based on imaginary evidence, i.e. on a misinterpretation of one passage in Philodemus’ On Piety.305 Physical allegoresis of poetic mythology and divine names did not originate with the Stoics. The evidence for Theagenes (6th cent. BC) is scanty and uncertain, but

304 Farinelli (2000). 305 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 6.16–26 Henrichs (on Chrysippus): ἐν δὲ τῶ[ι] δευ|τέρ[ωι] (sc. Περὶ θεῶν) τά τε εἰς Ὀρφέ|α [καὶ] Μουσαῖον ἀνα|φερ[όμ]ενα καὶ τὰ | παρ᾽ [Ὁ]μήρωι καὶ Ἡ|σιόδω[ι] καὶ Εὐριπί|δῃ καὶ ποιητα[ῖ]ς ἄλ|λοις [ὡ]ς καὶ  Κλεάν|θης [πει]ρᾶται σ [υ]νοι|κειοῦ[ν] ταῖς δόξ[αι]ς | αὐτῶ[ν]. Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.15.41. In the introduction to the sources, quoting this text in support, Burnet (19714) 32 writes: “they [sc. the Stoics] seem really to have believed that the early poets and thinkers taught doctrines hardly distinguishable from their own. The word συνοικειοῦν which Cicero renders by accomodare, was used by Philodemus to denote this method of intetrpretation, which has had serious results upon our tradition, especially in the case of Herakleitos.” [Italics mine]. But: 1) the text of Philodemus is not a piece of objective historical evidence: it is polemical, the term συνοικειοῦν is Philodemus’ own, not Chrysippus’, and it is here used ironically (this is made explicit in Cicero). 2) Burnet cites this text to support his claim that the Stoics misinterpreted “early poets and thinkers” [Italics mine], but there are no “thinkers” in Philodemus’ passage: it speaks about ancient poets only. It is obvious that συνοικειοῦν in Philodemus refers to Stoic allegorical interpretations of the mythical theogonies of Orpheus, Hesiod, etc. How can this passage of Philodemus be used as proof that the Stoics systematically misinterpreted Heraclitus and that these distortions allegedly have heavily influenced the whole doxographical tradition on Heraclitus? Heraclitus’ river fragment is cited and or/alluded to in dozens of sources in a thousand years. The unique quotation that preserves the ipsissima verba of Heraclitus in its intact form in Ionian dialect comes from the Stoic tradition of Zeno/Cleanthes/Arius Didymus: 22 B 12 DK (= fr. 67 Lebedev = fr. 40 Marcovich with testimonia). The context of this Stoic quotation is also the only one that preserves the original psychological context of the simile. It contains an example of the Stoic συνοικειοῦν, only in reverse order: Cleanthes assimilates Zeno’s theory of ψυχή as sensory exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις) to Heraclitus’ view of the soul, i.e. Zeno’s doctrine is derived from Heraclitus. There is no distortion in this assimilation: the Stoic archaic doctrine of the soul as an exhalation from the blood indeed derives from Heraclitus.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 593

the existence of the physical allegory of the Homeric gods in 5th cent. BC is established beyond any doubt by Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Euripides’ Bacchae. Epigenes’ allegoresis of Orphic poetry is certainly pre-Stoic. Prodicus’ first stage in the origin of religion (the veneration of the sun, the moon, and the seasons) is based on a kind of physical allegoresis of the mythical gods. Some of the Pythagorean akousmata seem allegorical. Equating the gods with numbers and numbers with the gods can also be viewed as a kind of mathematical allegoresis. Allegory is used in Parmenides’ proem, and his Doxa contained, it seems, a complete allegorical theogony of the gods of popular religion, which began with the creation of Eros. Parmenides’ Aphrodite the demiourgos is akin to the Pythagorean Har­ monia in Empedocles and Philolaus. The correlation of the four elements with the four divine names in Empedocles cannot be separated from allegory: fire is named ‘Zeus’ because the god Zeus of popular religion is κατὰ φύσιν celestial fire. Chances are that the true father of Greek ‘physical’ philosophical allegoresis was Heraclitus. In the third chapter of his work (λόγος θεολογικός), Heraclitus identified Zeus (Keraunos) with his “ever-living fire,”306 Apollo with the sun,307 Hades with the sublunar air,308 etc. 8) Brisson’s thesis contradicts itself: if we admit that the author of PDerv. is a Stoic, then we have Stoic evidence for pre-Stoic physical allegoresis (Heraclitus).

Appendix (2) Explanatory notice on the use of terms peritrope and ‘monism’/‘pluralism’

(A) Peritrope as a polemical device in Greek philosophy and the Derveni Papyrus At the beginning of this paper, we described the polemical substitution of the ethico-religious pantheism of Orphic theogony with the naturalistic (irreligious) pantheism of the Derveni author as a peritrope. We use this term in a peculiar way that requires clarification. In ancient logic and dialectic, περιτροπή was a term for self-refuting arguments.309 A self-refuting argument differs from ordinary

306 22 B 64 DK (= fr. 40 Lebedev). Cf. Vassallo (2018b). 307 Heraclit. fr. probab. 13 Lebedev. Cf. comm. in Lebedev (2014) 471–472. 308 22 B 98 DK (= fr. 155 Lebedev). Cf. comm. in Lebedev (2014) 453. 309 On this subject see Castagnoli (2010).

594 

 Andrei Lebedev

refutation in that it takes the opponent’s thesis as a premise. Sextus Empiricus applies the term περιτροπή to Plato’s and Democritus’ refutation of Protagoras’ homo mensura thesis in its Platonic interpretation that “every opinion (δόξα) is true”: if every opinion is true, then the opinion that not every opinion is true is true as well. Hence, it follows that not every opinion is true, i.e. that Protagoras’ thesis “turns around” (περιτρέπεται) and refutes Protagoras. We use peritrope as a modern hermeneutical term (suggested of course by Greek dialecticians), in a wider sense to denote a polemical device in the Greek philosophical culture of debates: one of the theoretical opponents borrows his own characteristic term, image, idea, theory, form of thought, or even a literary genre from the other, and ‘turns it around’ against him by ‘recharging’ it with contradictory polemical content. In the debate between the Anaxagoreioi and Pythagoreioi in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War, the ‘Anaxagorean’ Derveni author (Prodicus) borrowed the figure of Orpheus, his teletai, and his Hieros logos from his opponents and ‘turned around’ all this against them. A philosophical peritrope sometimes may contain elements of parody, but unlike, for example, the parodies of Timon, it is a serious polemical tool, nay it is the driving force of the dialectical development of thought. The history of Greek philosophy is an inexhaustible source of peritropai. Here are just a few. Heraclitus’ new teleological and theological concept of physis identified as a providential god was a polemical peri­ trope of the mechanistic concept of physis in Anaximander. Pythagoras’ doctrine of the immortality of the soul was a polemical peritrope of the Milesian law of the indestructibility of matter. Parmenides borrowed epic language and metre from Homer and Hesiod not because he wished to continue the epic tradition, but because his aim was to replace epic polytheism and anthropomorphism of the ‘immoral’ Homeric gods with the new Pythagorean god, a ‘Sphere’ of the divine Mind and Justice described in the Aletheia.310 Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος was, in turn, a peritrope (and a parody) of Parmenides’ deductive metaphysics. Plato’s geometrical atomism in the Timaeus was a peritrope of Democritus’ physical atomism, an immaterialist theory of matter, etc. Two types of peritrope should be distinguished: a) a deconstructive peritrope, whose aim is primarily to destroy the thesis of an opponent, and b) a constructive or synthesizing peritrope, which incorporates the opponent’s thesis into a new theory, subordinates it to a new synthetic structure, and forces it to serve a different purpose, i.e. ‘enslaves it.’ Gorgias’ peritrope of Parmenides’ ontology and the Derveni author’s (i.e. Prodicus’) peritrope of Orphic theogony are crystal-clear examples of the first type of peritrope. Heraclitus’ theologico-teleological peritrope

310 Lebedev (2010) and (2017b).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 595

of the Milesian concept of physis, Aristotle’s peritrope of the transcendental noetic Platonic forms as immanent forms of the physical world, and Plato’s subordination of Democritus’ pre-cosmic motion of matter to the dictates of the Pythagorean divine Mind-Demiourgos provide examples of the second type of peritrope.

(B) Explanatory notice on the use of the terms ‘monism,’ ‘dualism,’ and ‘pluralism’ When we write in § (3) above about “the battle of ideas between Ionian naturalists (adept at naturalistic monism) and religiously minded dualists” in 5th-cent. BC Athens, we use the term ‘monism’ in its traditional philosophical sense to mean the metaphysical school of thought that recognizes only one kind of reality and is opposed to metaphysical dualism that recognizes two kinds (corporeal and incorporeal, god and matter, etc.). Metaphysical monism can be naturalistic (only physis exists) and idealist, or mentalist (only Mind exists), also known as immaterialist. Most Ionian physikoi and Ionian Sophists were naturalistic monists; the Pythagoreans were dualists; Parmenides was an idealist monist or immaterialist.311 Some scholars apply the term ‘monism’ to single-element theories of matter and counterpose the proponents of such theories (dubbed ‘monists,’ e.g. Anaximenes) to multiple-elements theories of matter held by ‘pluralists’ (such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras). This unphilosophical use of the terms ‘monism’/‘pluralism’ (which probably derives from some ancient doxographical passages on the problem of ‘One’ and ‘Many’312) is potentially misleading and can result in the confusion of  the taxonomy of metaphysical theories of kinds of reality and the taxonomy of physical theories of matter or physical elements. Corpuscular theories of matter (such as those of Anaxagoras and Democritus) should not be called ‘pluralist’ and should not be contrasted with ‘monistic’ theories of a single material continuum. They should instead be called corpuscular theories and contrasted with single-substrate or single-element theories of matter. Corpuscular theories of matter may also be contrasted with single-substrate theories of matter, and discrete theories of matter may be distinguished from continualist theories. What matters in metaphysics and in the history of ancient metaphysics is the perennial conflict between naturalistic monism and metaphysical dualism of body and mind, god and matter, etc. Who the metaphysical 311 The doctrine of the identity of being and mind is directly stated by Parmenides in 28 B 3 DK. For a detailed refutation of the grammatically impossible interpretation of Burnet and his followers see Lebedev (2017b). 312 Cf. Stokes (1971); Vassallo (2015a).

596 

 Andrei Lebedev

‘pluralists’ are, we do not know and would be grateful to anyone who would solve this aporia for us. Aristotle’s four causes should not be cited as an example, since these are not four substances, but aspects of ousia or explanatory approaches to ousia. Perhaps the middle Platonic doxography of ‘three principles’ in Plato (god, matter, ideas) could serve as an example? But the historical Plato was a ‘dualist.’ Democritus recognized an infinite number of atoms, but he regarded them all as one (“as if each was a separate particle of gold”);313 he was a strict naturalistic ‘monist’ who ridiculed Anaxagoras’ theory of the cosmic Mind as a concession to ‘creationism.’ The Derveni author (Prodicus) seems to follow Archelaus’ ‘immanent’ version of the theory of the cosmic Mind and therefore seems like a naturalistic ‘monist.’ Both Empedocles and Anaxagoras should be classed as ‘dualists’ (not as ‘pluralists’), though the precise nature of Anaxagoras’ Nous remains uncertain and the subject of endless debates. We believe that the fundamental thesis of Greek philosophical theology, the identification of god with Mind (Νοῦς), goes back to the 6th cent. BC and may be of Pythagorean origin. In the late 6th/early 5th cent. BC, this is attested in Epicharmus (in a parody of Pythagorean theology), Xenophanes, and Parmenides (on Epicharmus see Lebedev [2017d], with regard to Xenophanes’ 21 B 24–25 DK (= Xen 86 & 229 Strobel/Wöhrle), and Lebedev [1985a]). If our reconstruction of the text of Heraclitus’ fr. 140 Lebedev is correct (as we believe it is),314 the theory of the divine cosmic Mind existed before Anaxagoras not only in the West, but also in the Ionian tradition itself. It is therefore conceivable that Anaxagoras derived his concept of the cosmic Mind from Heraclitus rather than from the Italian philosophers (however, the influence of both traditions cannot be ruled out). Heraclitus’ teleological ‘cosmotheism’ was directed against Anaximander’s mechanistic theory of matter and ‘vortex’ cosmogony (cf. Lebedev [1988] and [2016] 597–598). Anaxagoras tried to reconcile and to synthesize these two conflicting theories and world views: he took the mechanistic corpuscular theory of matter as ‘mixture’ from Anaximander and the cosmic Mind from Heraclitus, and made the Mind trigger the ‘vortex’ mechanism of ‘separation’ and world formation. The Western and the Heraclitean theories of the divine cosmic Mind are based on different types of metaphysics: in the dualist metaphysics of Magna Graecia, the God/Mind was ‘separated’ from matter (corporeal substance) and opposed to it as a creative (demiurgic) element for a formless and passive principle, while in Heraclitus’ strictly ‘monistic’ pantheism, God and physis were identified, and the providential cosmic Intellect (Γνώμη) or “the Wise Being” (τὸ Σοφόν) was conceived as immanent and inherent in the 313 Cf. Arist. Cael. 1.7.275b32–276a1 (= 67 A 19 [I] DK): τὴν δὲ φύσιν εἶναί φασιν αὐτῶν μίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ χρυσὸς ἕκαστον εἴη κεχωρισμένον. The image seems to be authentic. 314 Heraclit. 22 B 41 DK (= fr. 140 Lebedev).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 597

pyr aeizoon. It is conceivable, therefore, that in his theory of the cosmic Mind, the Derveni author was influenced not only by Anaxagoras and Archelaus, but also by Heraclitus. However, it should be stressed that Heraclitus’ cosmic God is personal, providential, and relevant both ethically and religiously; the Stoics were genuine Heracliteans in their pantheistic theology, as in their philosophy of nature and ethics. To our knowledge, there is no indication in the sources that Anaxagoras’ cosmic Nous was conceived as a providential personal God, who cares for humans and with whom they can communicate through prayer and worship. And Plato and Aristotle both dismissed this conception of Nous because they sensed the artificial character of this synthesis and the ‘deistic’ character of Anaxagoras’ Nous (never called θεός in the extant fragments). It remains unclear whether the Derveni author understood the difference between Anaxagoras’ and Heraclitus’ versions of the theory of cosmic Mind, e.g. when he quotes in col. IV the sun fragment which proves the existence of the cosmic Mind by the regularity of solstices.

Appendix (3) A neglected reflection of Prodicus’ benefaction theory and PDerv., cols. IV and XXIV in Xenophon’s Memorabilia Ch. 3 of Book 4 of Xenophon’s Memorabilia recounts Socrates’ conversation with Euthydemus on divine providence and various benefactions to humanity, upon which Xenophon happened (παρεγενόμην). The purpose of Xenophon’s appearance in this chapter is to prove that, far from being an asebes and disrespectful of τὰ νομιζόμενα τῆς πόλεως, Socrates made all those with whom he conversed more “sound-minded” (σωφρονέστεροι) in their attitude to religious worship and more “pious” (εὐσεβέστεροι); Socrates used to remind them that when someone asked Apollo in Delphi how one can please the gods, the oracle replied: “by observing the custom of the polis” (4.3.16: νόμῳ πόλεως). All necessary and “useful things” (πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα) for human life have been provided by the πρόνοια, ἐπιμέλεια, and φιλανθρωπία of the gods. The first example of τὰ χρήσιμα are daylight for work and darkness at night for rest. The sun is both the source of light and a natural clock that makes the hours of the day clear for us (4.3.4: τὰς τε ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμῖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα σαφηνίζει). For lighting at night-time, the gods also created the stars of the night that “show us the hours of the night” (4.3.4: ἃ ἡμῖν τῆς νυκτὸς τὰς ὥρας ἐμφανίζει). The moon makes not only the ‘parts,’ i.e. hours of night, but also the parts of the month (4.3.5: φανερὰ ἡμῖν ποιεῖ) clear (σαφηνίζει)

598 

 Andrei Lebedev

to us. This can be compared with PDerv., col. XXIV.7–11: (...) φαίνειν ~ τὴν ὥραν ~ σελήνη (...). Just as in this column of the Derveni Papyrus the telling of time revealed by the moon serves the needs of agriculture and the production of food “from earth”: the gods provided “appropriate hours” (4.3.5: ὥρας ἁρμοττούσας), i.e. the seasons, for the agricultural ἔργα of men, and by adjusting the ὧραι to the agricultural year cycle, they provided a water supply (rains) necessary for the cultivation of plants (4.3.6). The greatest gift of the gods is fire, which helps humans protect themselves against cold and darkness, and “helps in work towards any skill and everything that humans contrive for the sake of utility” (4.3.7: συνεργὸν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσαν τέχνην καὶ πάντα ὅσα ὠφελείας ἕνεκα ἄνθρωποι κατασκευάζονται); “without fire men cannot contrive anything worth of mention out of things that are useful for the human life,” οὐδὲν ἀξιόλογον ἄνευ πυρὸς ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον χρησίμων κατασκευάζουσι (4.3.7). This looks like a verbatim quotation from Prodicus. The following section (4.3.8) provides a remarkable parallel to PDerv., col. IV: it refers to the winter and summer solstices (τροπαί) that save us both from being frozen and being burnt to death: “Think again how the sun, when past the winter solstice (ἐπειδὰν ἐν χεμῶνι τράπηται), approaches, ripening some things and withering others, whose time is over; and having accomplished this, approaches nο nearer, but turns away, careful not to harm us by excess of heat (φυλαττόμενον μή τι ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων βλάψῃ); and when once again in his retreat he reaches the point where it is clear to ourselves, that if he goes further away, we shall be frozen with the cold, back he turns once more (πάλιν αὖ τρέπεσθαι) and draws near and revolves in that region on the heavens where he can best serve us.”315 Xenophon was an admirer of both Socrates and Prodicus. He quotes his version of Prodicus’ Heracles story in Book 2.316 The connection of Mem. 4.3 with Prodicus’ Horai and the benefaction theory is palpable. But there is one significant discrepancy, even a contradiction. The χρήσιμα and ὠφελοῦντα τὸν βίον are the same as in Prodicus, but they have been reinterpreted as gifts of the gods, as a result of which Prodicus’ ‘atheistic’ theory of religion has been transformed into its ‘creationist’ opposite, the traditional popular belief in divine πρῶτοι εὑρεταί. To resolve this contradiction, we must choose one of the following scenarios. A) The conversation of Socrates and Euthydemus in Mem. 4.3 has been invented by Xenophon. He took Prodicus’ benefaction theory, made a ‘pious’ version of it, and put it into Socrates mouth as proof of his religiosity in order to defend him against charges of asebeia. A similar ‘pious’ interpretation of Prodicus’

315 Transl. by E. C. Marchant. 316 Xen. Mem. 2.21–34 (= Prodic. test. 83 Mayhew).

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 599

benefaction theory was advanced later by Themistius (see § [3], test. 3 above). B) The conversation is real, at least in substance. In this case the ‘pious’ version of the benefaction theory was held by the historical Socrates. And if so, it might derive from Socrates’ dispute with Prodicus and might be his (and not Xenophon’s) dialectical peritrope of Prodicus’ Horai. The natural theology of Socrates’ speech in Mem. 4.3 has much in common with Heraclitus: Heraclitus’ fragment on the τροπαί of the sun quoted in PDerv., col. IV was in its original context in Heraclitus’ work a τεκμήριον of divine providence (Γνώμη). Socrates the reader of Heraclitus may be something more than an anecdote: our reconstruction of the ‘technological’ section of Heraclitus’ second chapter (λόγος πολιτικός) indicates that the use of τέχναι analogies in the Socratic dialogues may have been inspired by Heraclitus. In other words, the historical Socrates may have relied on Heraclitus in his real debate with Prodicus. C) A ‘mixed’ scenario. Socrates indeed held teleological and theological views similar to those ascribed to him by Xenophon, but Xenophon freely used Prodicus’ benefaction theory in order to present them in a more systematic and well-argued form. We leave the matter undecided. The vexed question of Xenophon’s credibility as a source on Socrates’ philosophy should not concern us at present. In any case, Xenophon’s passage brings an additional confirmation to our ascription of the Derveni Papyrus to Prodicus and should be added to the testimonia collected in § (III) above.

References Adams (2017): Don Adams, Socrates mystagogos, London/New York. Ademollo (2011): Francesco Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary, Cambridge/New York. Ahmadi (2014): Amir Ahmadi, “The Magoi and Daimones in Column VI of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Numen 61, 484–508. Ambrose (1983): Z. Philip Ambrose, “Socrates and Prodicus in the Clouds”, in: John P. Anton and Anthony Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, New York, 129–144. Bergomi (2014): Mariapaola Bergomi, “Some Considerations on the Presence of Derveni Allegory in Plato’s Cratylus”, in: Méthexis 27, 215–224. Barney (2001): Rachel Barney, Names and Nature in Plato’s Cratylus, New York/London. Baxter (1992): Timothy Baxter, The Cratylus: Plato’s Critique of Naming, Leiden/New York. Bernabé (2007): Alberto Bernabé, “The Derveni Theogony: Many Questions and Some Answers”, in: HSCPh 103, 99–133. Betegh (2004): Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation, Cambridge. Betegh (2007): Gábor Betegh, “The Derveni Papyrus and Early Stoicism”, in: Rhizai 4, 133–152. Bett (2013): Richard Bett, “Language, Gods, and Virtue: A Discussion of Robert Mayhew, Prodicus the Sophist”, in: OSAPh 44, 279–311.

600 

 Andrei Lebedev

Binder/Liesenborghs (1976): Gerhard Binder and Leo Liesenborghs, “Eine Zuweisung der Sentenz οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν an Prodikos von Keos”, in: Classen, 453–462 [= Iid., in: MH 23 (1966) 37–43]. Boyancé (1974): Pierre Boyancé, “Remarques sur le Papyrus de Derveni”, in: REG 87, 90–110. Bremmer (2014): Jan D. Bremmer, Initiation into the Mysteries of the Ancient World, Berlin/ Boston. Brisson (2004): Luc Brisson, How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology, Chicago. Brisson (2009): Luc Brisson, “Zeus did not Commit Incest with his Mother: An Interpretation of Column XXVI of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 168, 27–39. Burkert (1968): Walter Burkert, “Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker: Bemerkungen zum DerveniPapyrus und zur pythagoreischen Zahlenlehre”, in: A&A 14, 93–114 (= Id., Kleine Schriften III: Mystica, Orphica, Pythagorica, ed. by Fritz Graf, Göttingen 2006, 62–94). Burkert (1985): Walter Burkert, Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical, transl. by John Raffan, Oxford. Burkert (1986): Walter Burkert, “Der Autor von Derveni: Stesimbrotos Περὶ τελετῶν”, in: ZPE 62, 1–5. Burnet (19714): John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London (1st ed. 1892). Byl (1994): Simon Byl, “Les Mystères d’Eleusis dans les Nueés”, in: Simon Byl and Lambros Couloubaritsis (eds.), Mythe et Philosophie dans les Nuées d’Aristophane, Bruxelles, 11–68. Byl (2007): Simon Byl, Les Nuées d’Aristophane: Une initiation à Eleusis en 423 avant notre ère, Paris. Castagnoli (2010): Luca Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic and History of the Self-Refutation Argument from Democritus to Augustine, Cambridge. Classen (1976): Carl J. Classen (ed.), Sophistik, Darmstadt. Clayman (2009): Dee L. Clayman, Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into Poetry, Berlin/New York. Cole (1990): Thomas Cole, Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology, Atlanta. Cosmopoulos (2015): Michael B. Cosmopoulos, Bronze Age and the Origins of the Eleusinian Mysteries, Cambridge. Csapo (2016): Eric Csapo, “The ‘Theology’of the Dionysia and Old Comedy”, in: Esther Eidinow, Julia Kindt and Robin Osborne (eds.), Theologies of Ancient Greek Religion, Cambridge, 117–152. Denniston (1952): John D. Denniston, Greek Prose Style, Oxford. Devine/Stephens (2000): Andrew M. Devine and Laurence D. Stephens, Discontinuous Syntax: Hyperbaton in Greek, New York/Oxford. Di Benedetto (1965): Vincenzo Di Benedetto, Euripidis Orestes, Florence. Dodds (1960): Eric Dodds, Euripides: Bacchae, Oxford. Dover (1968): Kenneth J. Dover, Aristophanes: Clouds, Oxford. Dressler (2014): Jan Dressler, Wortverdreher, Sonderlinge, Gottlose: Kritik an Philosophie und Rhetorik im klassischen Athen, Berlin/Boston. Dunbar (1995): Nan Dunbar, Aristophanes: Birds, Oxford. Edmonds (1999): Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, “Tearing Apart the Zagreus Myth: A Few Disparaging Remarks on Orphism and Original Sin”, in: ClAnt 18, 35–73. Edmonds (2013): Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, Redefining Ancient Orphism: A Study in Greek Religion, Cambridge. Fain (2010): Gordon L. Fain, Ancient Greek Epigrams, Berkeley.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 601

Farinelli (2000): Caterina F. Farinelli, “Lobone di Argo ovvero la psicosi moderna del falso antico”, in: Giovanni Cerri (ed.), La letteratura pseudepigrafa nella cultura greca e romana, Naples, 367–379. Ferrari (2007): Franco Ferrari, “Note al testo delle colonne II–VII del papiro di Derveni”, in: ZPE 162, 203–211. Fränkel (1938): Hermann Fränkel, “A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus”, in: AJPh 59, 309–337. Furley (1985): William D. Furley, “The Figure of Euthyphro in Plato’s Dialogue”, in: Phronesis 30, 201–208. Gagné (2007): Renaud Gagné, “Winds and Ancestors: The Physika of Orpheus”, in: HSCPh 103, 1–23. Garland (1992): Robert Garland, Introducing New Gods: The Politics of Athenian Religion, Ithaca (NY). Graf (1974): Fritz Graf, Eleusis und die Orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit, Berlin. Gray (2006): Vivienne Gray, “The Linguistic Philosophies of Prodicus in Xenophon’s ‘Choice of Heracles’?”, in: CQ 56, 426–435. Hansen (1988): Mogens H. Hansen, Three Studies in Athenian Demography, Copenhagen. Henrichs (1968): Albert Henrichs, “Die ‘Erdmutter’ Demeter (P. Derveni und Eurip. Bakch. 275 f.)”, in: ZPE 3, 111–112. Henrichs (1975): Albert Henrichs, “Two Doxographical Notes: Democritus and Prodicus on Religion”, in: HSCPh 79, 93–123. Henrichs (1976): Albert Henrichs, “The Atheism of Prodicus”, in: CErc 6, 15–21. Henrichs (1984a): Albert Henrichs, “The Sophists and Hellenistic Religion: Prodicus as the Spiritual Father of the ISIS Aretalogies”, in: HSCPh 88, 139–158. Henrichs (1984b): Albert Henrichs, “The Eumenids and Wineless Libations in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, 2 vols., Naples, II, 255–268. Hughes (2017): Jessica Hughes, “‘Souvenirs of the Self’: Personal Belongings as Votive Offerings in Ancient Religion”, in: Religion in the Roman Empire 3, 181–201. Hordern (2002): James H. Hordern, The Fragments of Timotheus of Miletus, Oxford. Hussey (1999): Edward Hussey, “The Enigmas of Derveni”, in: OSAPh 17, 303–324. Irigoin (1972): Jean Irigoin, Les manuscripts grecs, II: Nouveaux recueils des fac-similés, in: REG 85, 543–571. Janko (1997): Richard Janko, “The Physicist as Hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates and the Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 118, 61–94. Janko (2001): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus (Diagoras of Melos, Apopyrgizontes Logoi?): A New Translation”, in: CPh 96, 1–32.
 Janko (2002): Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus: An Interim Text”, in: ZPE 141, 1–62.
 Janko (2016): Richard Janko, “Parmenides in the Derveni Papyrus: New Images for a New Edition”, in: ZPE 193, 1–21. Johnston (2014): Sarah I. Johnston, “Divination in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Papadopoulou/ Muellner, 89–105. Kahn (1981): Charles Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge. Kahn (1997): Charles Kahn, “Was Euthyphro the Author of the Derveni Papyrus?”, in: Laks/ Most, 55–69. Kapsomenos (1964): Stylianos G. Kapsomenos, “Ο Ορφικός πάπυρος της Θεσσαλονίκης”, in: ArchDelt 19, 17–25.

602 

 Andrei Lebedev

Kilarski (2013): Marcin Kilarski, Nominal Classification: A History of its Study from the Classical Period to the Present, Amsterdam/Philadelphia. Konaris (2016): Michael D. Konaris, The Greek Gods in Modern Scholarship, Oxford. Kotwick (2016): Mirjam E. Kotwick, “Notes on PDerveni cols. XV, XIX, XXII and XXIV”, in: ZPE 197, 1–4. Kotwick (2017): Mirjam E. Kotwick, Der Papyrus von Derveni: Griechisch-deutsch, Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert; basierend auf einem griechischen Text von Richard Janko, Berlin/Boston. Kouloumentas (2018): Stavros Kouloumentas, “Prodicus on the Rise of Civilization: Religion, Agriculture, and Culture Heroes”, in: PhA 18, 127–152. Laks/Most (1997): André Laks and Glenn W. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford. Lebedev (1978): Andrei Lebedev, “Τὸ ἄπειρον: Not Anaximander, but Plato and Aristotle”, in: Vestnik Drevnei Istorii (A Journal of Ancient History) 1, 39–54. Lebedev (1984): Andrei Lebedev, “‘Φύσις ταλαντέυουσα’: Neglected Fragments of Democritus and Metrodorus of Chios”, in: Proceedings of the 1st International Congress on Democritus, 2 vols., Xanthi, II, 13–25. Lebedev (1985a): Andrei Lebedev, “A New Fragment of Xenophanes”, in: Mario Capasso, Francesco de Martino and Pierpaolo Rosati (eds.), Studi di filosofia preplatonica, Naples, 13–15. Lebedev (1985b): Andrei Lebedev, “The Cosmos as a Stadium: Agonistic Metaphors in Heraclitus’ Cosmology”, in: Phronesis 33, 131–150. Lebedev (1988): Andrei Lebedev, “Anaximander the Originator of the Mixis Theory of Matter and the Founder of Mechanistic Physics”, in: 1st International Conference on Greek Philosophy: Ionian Philosophy (Samos, 27–31 August 1988), Abstracts of papers, 56–57. Lebedev (1989a): Andrei Lebedev, Fragmenty rannih grecheskih filosofov / The fragments of the Early Greek Philosophers, Moscow. Lebedev (1989b): Andrei Lebedev, “Heraclitus in the P.Derveni”, in: ZPE 79, 39–47. Lebedev (1996): Andrei Lebedev, “Pharnabazos the Diviner of Hermes: Two Ostraka with Curse-letters from Olbia”, in: ZPE 112, 268–278. Lebedev (1998): Andrei Lebedev, “The Justice of Cheiron (Titanomachia fr. 6 and 11 B.)”, in: Philologus 142, 3–10. Lebedev (2010): Andrei Lebedev, “Western Greek Philosophical Poems and the Homeric Tradition: Continuity or Rupture?”, in: Indo-Europen Linguistics and Classical Philology 14, 101–110. Lebedev (2014): Andrei Lebedev, Logos Geraklita: Rekonstrukciia mysli i slova. S novym kriticheskim izdaniem fragmentov / The Logos of Heraclitus: A Reconstruction of his Thought and Word: With a New Critical Edition of the Fragments, St. Petersburg. Lebedev (2015): Andrei Lebedev, “The Theogony of Epimenides of Crete and the Origin of the Orphic-Pythagorean Doctrine of Reincarnation”, in: Indo-Europen Linguistics and Classical Philology 19, 464–498 (in Russian with English summary). Lebedev (2016): Andrei Lebedev, “The Origin and Transmission of the Doxographical Tradition Placita Philosophorum (Arius Didymus, Ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus, Theodoret, Nemesius, Porphyrius)”, in: Indo-European Linguistics and Classical Philology 20, 573–633. Lebedev (2017a): Andrei Lebedev, “The Metaphor of Liber Naturae and the Alphabet Analogy in Heraclitus’ Logos Fragments (With some Remarks on Plato’s Dream Theory and the Origin of the Concept of Elements)”, in: Enrica Fantino, Ulrike Muss, Charlotte Schubert and Kurt Sier (eds.), Heraklit im Kontext, Berlin/New York, 233–269.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 603

Lebedev (2017b): Andrei Lebedev, “Parmenides ἀνὴρ Πυθαγόρειος: Monistic Idealism (Mentalism) in Archaic Greek Metaphysics”, in: Indo-European Linguistics and Classical Philology 21, 493–536. Lebedev (2017c): Andrei Lebedev, “Alcmaeon of Croton on Human Knowledge, the Seasons of Life and Isonomia: Two Additional Fragments from Turba Philosophorum and Aristotle”, in: Christian Vassallo (ed.), Physiologia: Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and its Reception in Antiquity, Trier, 227–257. Lebedev (2017d): Andrei Lebedev, “Epicharmus on God as Mind (Νόος): Α Neglected Fragment in Stobaeus (With some Remarks on early Pythagorean Metaphysics and Theology)”, in: Artisteas 16, 13–27. Linforth (1941): Ivan. M. Linforth, The Arts of Orpheus, Berkeley/Los Angeles. Long (1996): Anthony A. Long, Stoic Studies, Berkeley. Long (1999): Anthony A. Long, “Preface”, in: Id. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, xi–xiv. Luria (1947): Salomon Luria, Ocherki po istorii antichnoi nauki / Essays on the History of the Ancient Science, Moscow/Leningrad. Luria (1970): Salomon Luria, Democritea, Leningrad. MacDowell (1962): Douglas M. MacDowell, Andokides: On the Mysteries, Oxford. MacDowell (1978): Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, London. Mansfeld (1980): Jaap Mansfeld, “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Life and the Date of his Trial. Part II: The Plot against Pericles and his Associates”, in: Mnemosyne 33, 84–95 [= Mansfeld (1990) 295–306]. Mansfeld (1983): Jaap Mansfeld, “Cratylus 402a–c: Plato or Hippias?”, in: Livio Rossetti (ed.), Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981, 2 vols., Rome, I, 43–55 [= Mansfeld (1990) 84–96]. Mansfeld (1990): Jaap Mansfeld, Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy, Assen/ Maastricht 1990. Mansfeld (2015): Jaap Mansfeld, “Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul with an Afterthought on the Afterlife”, in: Rhizomata 3, 62–93. Marcovich (20012): Miroslav Marcovich, Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary (Editio Maior), Sank Augustin (1st ed. Merida 1967). Mayhew (2011): Robert Mayhew, Prodicus the Sophist: Texts, Translations, and Commentary, Oxford. Miller (2014): D. Gary Miller, Ancient Greek Dialects and Early Authors: Introduction to the Dialect Mixture in Homer, with Notes on Lyric and Herodotus, Boston/Berlin. Mouraviev (1985): Serge N. Mouraviev, “The Heraclitean Fragment of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: ZPE 61, 131–132. Müller (1885): Friedrich M. Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, vol. 1, London (repr. Cambridge 2013). Nails (2002): Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics, Indianapolis/Cambridge. Nestle (1976): Wilhelm Nestle, “Die Horen des Prodikos”, in: Classen, 425–451 [= Id., in: Hermes, 71 (1936) 151–170]. Norden (19582): Eduard Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa vom 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance, 2 vols., Darmstadt (1st ed. Leipzig 1898). Novokhatko (2015): Anna Novohatko, “Greek Scholarship from its Beginnings to Alexandria”, in: Franco Montanari, Stefanos Matthaios and Antonios Rengakos (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Greek Scholarship, 2 vols., Leiden/Boston, I, 3–59.

604 

 Andrei Lebedev

Obbink (1994): Dirk Obbink, “A Quotation of the Derveni Papyrus in Philodemus’ On Piety”, in: CErc 24, 110–135. Obbink (1996): Dirk Obbink, Philodemus: On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary, Oxford. Obbink (1997): Dirk Obbink, “Cosmology as Initiation vs. the Critique of Orphic Mysteries”, in: Laks/Most, 39–54. Olson (2007): S. Douglas Olson, Broken Laughter: Select Fragments of Greek Comedy, Oxford. Papadopoulou/Muellner (2014): Ioanna Papadopoulou and Leonard Muellner (eds.), Poetry as Initiation: The Center for Hellenic Studies Symposium on the Derveni Papyrus, Washington D.C. Papageorgiou (2004): Nikolaos Papageorgiou, “Prodicus and the Agon of the Logoi in Aristophanes’ Clouds”, in: QUCC n.s. 78, 61–69. Pendrick (2002): Gerard J. Pendrick, Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments, Cambridge. Penella (2000): Robert J. Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London. Piano (2016): Valeria Piano, “P.Derveni III–VI: Una riconsiderazione del testo”, in: ZPE 197, 5–16.
 Reesor (1983): Margaret Reesor, “The Stoic Idion and Prodicus’ Near-Synonyms”, in: AJPh 104, 124–133. Riedweg (1987): Christoph Riedweg, Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von Alexandrien, Berlin/New York. Rijlaarsdam (1978): Jetske C. Rijlaarsdam, Platon über die Sprache: Ein Kommentar zum Kratylos, Utrecht. Rogers (1930): Benjamin B. Rogers, The Clouds of Aristophanes, London. Roubekas (2017): Nickolas P. Roubekas, An Ancient Theory of Religion: Euhemerism from Antiquity to the Present, London/New York. Roux (1972): Jeanne Roux, Euripide: Les Bacchantes, II: Commentaire, Paris. Rubel (2014): Alexander Rubel, Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens: Religion and Politics during the Peloponnesian War, transl. by Michael Vickers and Alina Piftor, London. Rusten (1985): Jeffrey S. Rusten, “Interim Notes on the Papyrus from Derveni”, in: HSCPh 89, 121–140. Sansone (2004): David Sansone, “Heracles at Y”, in: JHS 124, 125–142. Santamaría (2012): Marco A. Santamaría, “Tiresias in Euripides’ Bacchae and the Author of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Paul Schubert (ed.), Actes du 26e Congrès international de papyrologie, Genève, 677–684. Santamaría (2016): Marco A. Santamaría, “A Phallus Hard to Swallow: The Meaning of αἰδοῖος/-ον in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: CPh 111, 139–164. Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De pietate Pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125 [= Id., Philodemi Περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg 1923]. Scholten (2003): Helga Scholten, Die Sophistik: Eine Bedrohung für die Religion und Politik der Polis?, Berlin. Scodel (2017): Ruth Scodel, “The Euripidean Biography”, in: Laura K. McClure (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Euripides, Chichester/Malden/Oxford, 27–41. Sedley (2003): David N. Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus, Cambridge. Sedley (2013): David N. Sedley, “From the Pre-Socratics to the Hellenistic Age”, in: Steven Bullivant and Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, Oxford.

17 The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus 

 605

Sider (1997): David N. Sedley, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Laks/Most, 129–148. Sider (2014): David Sider, “The Orphic Poem of the Derveni Papyrus”, in: Papadopoulou/ Muellner, ch. 12. Starkie (1911): William J. M. Starkie, The Clouds of Aristophanes, London (repr. Amsterdam 1966). Stokes (1971): Michael C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, Washington D.C./ Cambridge (MA). Taillardat (1962): Jean Taillardat, Les images d’Aristophane, Paris. Tsantsanoglou (1997): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “The First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and Their Religious Significance”, in: Laks/Most, 93–128. Tsantsanoglou (2017): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “Parmenides in the Derveni Papyrus?”, in: ZPE 203, 24. Tsantsanoglou (2018): Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “The Derveni Papyrus and Illusions”, in: ZPE 205, 15–23. Tzifopoulos (2014): Yannis Z. Tzifopoulos, “The Derveni Papyrus (PDerveni) and the Bacchic-Orphic Epistomia”, in: Papadopoulou/Muellner, ch. 8 [= Id., in: TC 2 (2010) 31–63]. Ustinova (2018): Yulia Ustinova, Divine Mania: Alteration of Consciousness in Ancient Greece, London. Vassallo (2006): Christian Vassallo, “Sul concetto di speranza da Omero ad Eraclito”, in: AAN 117, 5–39. Vassallo (2015a): Christian Vassallo, “On the Supposed Monism of Thales in PHerc. 1788 (= VH2 VIII 60, fr. 6): Praesocratica Herculanensia I”, in: Hermes 143, 101–118. Vassallo (2015b): Christian Vassallo, “Orpheus in the Herculaneum Papyri: Praesocratica Herculanensia VI”, in: APF 61, 87–113. Vassallo (2017a): Christian Vassallo, “Zeus unique, puissant, savant : Une note à Héraclite, fr. 84–85 Marcovich (= DK 22 B 32 et 41)”, in: Philosophia 47, 17–20. Vassallo (2017b): Christian Vassallo, “P.Herc. 1788 ([Philodemi] [Philosophorum historia?]): Introduction, Edition, and Commentary”, in: AnPap 29, 7–56. Vassallo (2018a): Christian Vassallo, “Persaeus on Prodicus on the Gods’ Existence and Nature: Another Attempt Based on a New Reconstruction of Philodemus’ Account”, in: PhA 18, 153–168. Vassallo (2018b): Christian Vassallo, “Feuer und göttliche Dialektik bei Heraklit: Neue Lesungen in PHerc. 1428, Kol. 330 (olim Fr. 17): Praesocratica Herculanensia IX”, in: Mnemosyne 71, 717–732 (preprint BrillOnline.com, DOI: 10.1163/1568525X-12342391). West (1983): Martin L. West, The Orphic Poems, Oxford. West (2013): Martin L. West, “The Writing Tablets and Papyrus from Tomb II in Daphni”, in: Greek and Roman Musical Studies 1, 73–92. Wilamowitz (1919): Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Platon, 2 vols., Berlin. Willi (2007): Andreas Willi, “Demeter, Gê, and the Indo-European Word(s) for ‘Earth’”, in: HSF 120, 169–194. Willi (2010): Andreas Willi, “Attic as the Language of the Classics”, in: Chrys C. Caragounis (ed.), Greek: A Language in Evolution: Essays in Honour of Antonios N. Jannaris, Hildesheim/ Zurich/New York, 101–118. Willink (1983): Charles W. Willink, “Prodicus, ‘Meteorosophists’ and the ‘Tantalus’ Paradigm”, in: CQ n.s. 33, 25–33 (= Id., Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy, ed. by W. Benjamin Henry, Leiden/Boston 2010, 81–94).

606 

 Andrei Lebedev

Winiarczyk (1981): Marek Winiarczyk, Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaeus: Reliquiae, Leipzig. Winiarczyk (2016): Marek Winiarczyk, Diagoras of Melos: A Contribution to the History of Ancient Atheism, Berlin. Winspear/Silverberg (1960): Alban D. Winspear and Tom Silverberg, Who was Socrates?, New York. Yunis (1988): Harvey Yunis, A New Creed, Göttingen. ZPE (1982): Anonymus, “Der orphische Papyrus von Derveni”, in: ZPE 47, 1*–12* (following 300).

Part VIII: The Papyrological Tradition and Doxographical Questions

Jaap Mansfeld

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods: Philodemus, Cicero, Aëtius, and Others 1 It is often worthwhile to go back to Hermann Diels, not only for the master’s wonderful discoveries, but also to consider what puzzled him or led him up a blind alley. Even where he is wrong he is often right, in a way, because he had an unfailing instinct for discovering an interesting problem. This time my point of departure will be his discussion in the Doxographi Graeci of two interrelated sections from the Protrepticus of Clement of Alexandria, the first of which deals with the “doxai of the philosophers on the gods […] who celebrated the elements they maintained as principles. […] these people, venerating the material principle, are atheists as well” (in actual fact what Clement calls atheism is hylotheism). The second list deals with those “other philosophers who, proceeding beyond the elements, strove for something higher and beyond the ordinary.”1 Diels argued that while the latter, from Democritus to Heraclides of Pontus (via Xenocrates, the Stoa, and representatives of the Peripatos among others, one may add), is one of the gods, the former, from Thales (via, among others, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, Parmenides, Hippasus, and Heraclitus) to the early Atomist Metrodorus of Chios – as Diels says; in fact it ends with Empedocles, see below –, is not one of the gods but one of the physical elements carelessly copied from who knows where by Clement.2 So in his view Clement combined two different lists, one of elements (or physical principles) and one of gods.

1 Clem. Al. Protr. 5.64 and 5.66 at DG, 129–131; quot. 64.1–3, p. 97.1–2 + 5 Marcovich: τῶν φιλοσόφων τὰς δόξας, ὅσας αὐχοῦσι περὶ τῶν θεῶν (…) στοιχεῖα μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς ἀπέλιπον ἐξυμνήσαντες, (…) ἄθεοι μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτοι, σοφίᾳ τινὶ ἀσόφῳ τὴν ὕλην προσκυνήσαντες, and 66.1, p. 100.1–2 Marcovich: τῶν δὲ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων ὅσοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπερβάντες ἐπολυπραγμόνησάν τι ὑψηλότερον καὶ περιττότερον. A much shorter version is at Strom. 1.52.4. Cf. Witt (1931) 195–196. 2 DG, 130 ‘incredibili Clementis socordia […] nescio unde caput de principio descripsit’. In both Protr. 5.64 and 5.66 Clement carefully added (or preserved) the ethnica, which hardly agrees with socordia (‘carelessness’). Diels ap. DG, 130–132, who of course (like Krische, to whom he refers) has noticed the parallels, also argues that this ‘second’, ‘theological’, list for the most part derives from Cicero’s theological doxography in Book 1 of the De natura deorum via the Greek translation of a Greek patristic source. Against this unlikely hypothesis see already Gabrielsson (1906) Jaap Mansfeld, Utrecht University https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-019

610 

 Jaap Mansfeld

But the difference emphasized by Diels is by no means as clear-cut as he makes it out to be. He has the first list end with Metrodorus, while actually it ends with Empedocles, and the second list begin with Democritus, while in fact it starts with Anaximander. This amputation of the beginning of the second list and incorporation of this amputated section at the end of the first list enables him to present a misleading interpretation of the evidence of the section from Anaximander to Metrodorus at the beginning of the second list. For here Anaximander remains a materialist,3 while only Anaxagoras and Archelaus, by adding nous, proceed beyond the apeiron they are said to share with him. Leucippus and Metrodorus of Chios posit two purely physical principles, the full and the void, and only Democritus proceeds beyond these by adding the divine images. Accordingly Anaximander’s as well as Leucippus’ plus Metrodorus’ purely physical elements figure on a list of divinities, and meeting up with the Atomists’ atoms and void or Parmenides’ fire and earth in this role is rather unusual.4 Therefore the question that remains on the agenda is how it is possible for mere physical elements, or principles, to appear on a list of divinities, or, how is hylotheism to be justified.5 Clement’s first list is announced as one of philosophers’ doxai about the gods. This question is not trivial, for Clement’s lists are not alone in displaying instances of this purported anomaly. The answer is that, just as the divinity may be an element or principle, so the element or principle may be divine. The difference is a matter of perspective, or definition.6 If Cicero’s list of principia rerum (Cic. Luc. 118) had been announced as opiniones philosopho­ rum de natura deorum, it would have been a list of gods, even if its contents had 69–74, whose own suggestions, however, are no improvement. For a new attempt to explain some of the parallels between Cicero, Aëtius and Clement see below, § 4. 3 In the face of Aristotle’s generally accepted evidence at Ph. 3.4.203b10–15 (= Anaximand. 12 Α 15; B 3 DK = Ar 2 Wöhrle), where “the principle (…) according to Anaximander and the majority of physiologists” is said to be “the divine” (τὸ θεῖον), “because it is immortal and imperishable.” For the so-called theology of the Presocratics see the famous book of Jaeger (1947), as well as Broadie (1999), Sedley (2007) 1–30, and Robinson (2008). 4 Clem. Al. Protr. 5.66.1–2, p. 100.3–8 Marcovich: οἳ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνησαν, ὡς Ἀναξίμανδρος [Μιλήσιος ἦν] (= Ar 72 Wöhrle) καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος (cf. 59 A 57; 60 A 11 DK) καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ἀρχέλαος (cf. 70 A 3 DK). τούτω μέν γε ἄμφω τὸν νοῦν ἐπεστησάτην τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ, ὁ δὲ Μιλήσιος Λεύκιππος (cf. 67 A 12 DK) καὶ ὁ Χῖος Μητρόδωρος (cf. 70 A 3 DK) διττάς, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ αὐτὼ ἀρχὰς ἀπελιπέτην τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν· προσέθηκε δὲ λαβὼν τούτοιν τοῖν δυεῖν τὰ εἴδωλα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης Δημόκριτος (cf. 68 B 166 DK). The view attributed to Parmenides at Clem. Al. Protr. 5.64.2 is printed as 28 A 33 DK. 5 Cf. Mansfeld (2018). 6 What is divine is not ipso facto a god; for the difference between θεός and θεῖος see e.g. Plut. Quaest. conv. 685b, Epiph. Adv. haeres. 2.29, p. 3.508.16–17 Holl (= SVF I 146), and Onatas Περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου ap. Stob. Ecl. 1.1.39, p. 50.11–16 Wachsmuth (= p. 140.15–19 Thesleff).

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 611

remained the same.7 Sextus Empiricus has a brief list of gods according to ‘the dogmatic systems’ (Pyr. 3.218, ἐν ταῖς δογματικαῖς αἱρέσεσιν), which displays an incorporeal entity as well as two corporeal ones that would have been equally at home on a list of archai. To this latter list I shall return below.8 A comparison between two chapters of the Aëtian Placita may be helpful, namely between ch. 1.3 On Principles, what they are (Περὶ ἀρχων τί εἰσιν), and ch. 1.7 Who the Deity is (Τίς ἐστὶν ὁ θεός). The chapter order and divisions of themes in the Placita is to an interesting extent determined by the division into parts and subparts (topoi) of the Stoic physikos logos, or Stoic ‘physical theory’.9 This physikos logos is first divided according to species into the investigation of on the one hand corporeals: “elements, principles, and gods” (περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν), and on the other incorporeals: “limits, place, and void.”10 The separate treatment of principles/elements and gods in two different chapters of the Placita, 1.3 and 1.7, agrees with the first part of this division, which is an innovation compared with the practice of the pre-Hellenistic philosophers. This, I hasten to add, does not imply that the point of view in these two chapters is Stoic throughout, for it is a matter more of form than content, though some upgrading of content in a Stoic sense has taken place, too. Nor do I pretend that there is a watershed separating the contents of the two chapters; quite the contrary. The order of treatment of principles and divinities is not always the same. In our main sources for the reconstruction of Aëtius, ps.-Plutarch’s Placita and the first Book of Stobaeus’ Anthology, the so-called Eclogae physicae, ps.-Plutarch 7 McKirahan (1996) 866 points out that the list of gods at Cic. Nat. D. 1.10.25–15.41 differs from the list of elements (principia rerum e quibus omnia consistant) at Cic. Luc. 118, which (following DG, 119–121) he says belongs more strictly with the tradition of Aristotle and Theophrastus (cf. Mansfeld [1989] 255–257 = Mansfeld [1990] 150–152). He rightly adds, ibid. 869, that for the Peripatetics “[t]heology per se is of no interest, and is so per accidens only in that the material principle (…) is divine or has attributes of the divine,” that there are “obvious connections to physical doctrine,” and that the approach represented by Cicero is concerned with “a different aspect of the philosophical systems from what was treated in the main line Theophrastean doxographical tradition.” This largely corresponds with the view I attempt to illustrate further (though I would not speak of a ‘Theophrastean’ tradition). Maso (2015) 118 suggests that Cicero at Nat. D. 1.10.25–15.41 “rather than focusing on deities and gods themselves (…) seems to fix his interest on the notion of the ἀρχή.” So he seems to be aware that the principle may be believed to be divine and the divinity a principle, but unnecessarily restricts this insight to this particular passage. 8 Below, n. 56 and text thereto. 9 For more details see M&R2, 97–109. 10 Diog. Laërt. 7.132 (= deest ap. SVF): τὸν δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ σωμάτων τόπον καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ. For the Stoic subdivisions of the parts of philosophy see Diog. Laërt. 7.41 and 7.43 (logic), 7.84 (ethics), and 7.132–133 (physics). Place and void are the theme of Aët. 1.18 and 1.19.

612 

 Jaap Mansfeld

treats the principles first (Plac. 1.3) and the gods further down (Plac. 1.7), and like Diels we may assume this represents the order of Aëtius. Stobaeus’ order is the reverse of ps.-Plutarch’s, for he gives priority to the gods (Ecl. 1.1), and treats the principles subsequently (Ecl. 1.10). It would seem that this amounts to various ways of expressing an order of priority: divinities before principles because gods are more important, or divinities after principles because more Stoico theology is the culmination of physics (cf. SVF I 538; II 42 and 1008). Ch. 1.7 consists of two large sections.11 The first part of the first section (§§ 1–3) is concerned with the question type of existence simpliciter, and collects views and arguments against by presenting the views of Diagoras and other atheists. Its second part (§§ 4–10) is concerned with a subsidiary question of existence, namely that of the existence of the Demiurge, that is, of a particular type of divinity, and as a corollary with the reality of providence, and collects arguments against both. The Epicurean nature of the arguments in §§ 4–10, which emphasize the carefree life of the anthropomorphic gods to destroy the creationist option, has been recognized.12 The second large section (§§ 11–34), concerned with the question type and category of substance in the sense of physical body or incorporeal entity, presents a surprisingly large number of positive views from Thales to the Stoics and Epicurus. As Runia rightly points out, “[t]he use of the article (sc. in the chapter heading of Aët. 1.7) is surely deliberate, i.e. the god identified as principle.”13 With no less than twenty-six 26 different name-labels in 22 paragraphs (§§ 11–34) this is in this respect the richest chapter of the Placita. Also note that among these 26 there are no less than 13 name-labels that are not paralleled in the related and also quite rich ch. 1.3 On Principles, namely (in order of appearance) Cleanthes, Oenopides (of Chius), Posidonius, Speusippus, Critolaus, Diodorus of Tyre, Mnesarchus, Boethus, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno (of Elea), Polemon, and Stoics. Three of these, namely the recherché name-labels Diodorus of Tyre, Mnesarchus, and Polemon, are found only here in the Placita, so we are in the presence of a real effort. This unequaled variety is surely meant as a counterweight to the atheist and anti-creationist positions and arguments in §§ 1–10, and provides

11 Aët. 1.7.1–10 have been thoroughly commented upon by Runia (1996) (= M&R3, 343–373), to whom I am much indebted. See also Baltes (2000) 93–99. 12 See the discussion and references of Runia (1996), who also discerns other influences. Epicurus and his followers made flêche de tout bois, but the main argument about the carefree and immortal anthropomorphic gods is definitely Epicurean, and Epicurean only. “Creationism seemed to involve God in endless fuss” (Chadwick [1967] 191). On creationism and its critics see of course Sedley (2007). 13 Runia (1996) 550 (= M&R3, 351).

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 613

an argument for attributing the first main section of the chapter to Aëtius.14 The thinkers listed in this section affirm the god’s or the gods’ existence by stating “what it is” (or: “they are”), that is, what particular body or incorporeal it consists of (a question we shall address below).15 It deals with the second genus of (in Augustine’s Varro’s words) the tria genera theologiae,16 namely the physical kind taught by the philosophers. The representatives of creationism in §§ 5–7 are Plato and Anaxagoras. In the second main section of the chapter there are three representatives of this doctrine, of which two are the same as in §§ 5–7, namely § 15 Anaxagoras: “God [is] a Mind

14 For the issue of this attribution see below, § 2 ad init. 15 An overarching diaeresis between existence on the one hand and substance or/and shape, i.e. what came be to called ‘quality,’ on the other is already found, in embryonic form, in the famous fragment of Protagoras, who said he could not know (or tell) whether or not the gods exist, or what would be their ‘form’ or shape (ἰδέα, 80 B 4 DK; cf. Xenophanes on conventional and disputable θεῶν ἰδέας (21 B 15.4 DK, cf. 21 B 14.2 DK δέμας and 21 B 15.6 DK = Xen 116 Strobel/ Wöhrle) and the different δέμας (21 B 23.4 DK = Xen 116 Strobel/Wöhrle) of his own God. For ἰδέα meaning “[visible] material substance,” see Pl. Ti. 40a: “the form of the divine kind he made for the most part of fire” (τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπηργάζετο, transl. by F. M. Cornford). Questions of existence, substance (or essence), and quality were made into formal principles of research by Aristotle, who distinguished between the four question types of ei esti “does it exist?,” ti esti “what is it?,” hoti esti “how is it?,” and dia ti esti (or dioti esti) “why is it?,” formulated in the first chapter of Book 2 of his Analytica posteriora and widely used till the end of antiquity and beyond. Aristotle’s example here of an ei esti question is “we inquire whether the centaur or the god exists or does not exist. (...) and when we know that he exists, we enquire what he is, e.g., what is God’ (An. post. 2.1.89b31–35). So the formal diaeresis of Aët. 1.7 goes back as far as Protagoras and (especially) Aristotle, one of whose examples of an existential question of course attests his awarenes of the fact that the existence of the gods had been doubted by Protagoras, or even denied by Diagoras. A preliminary Atheistenkatalog was probably at the back of his mind. For the Aristotelian question types see now Mansfeld (2016a) 311–316. 16 Varro Antiq. frs. 7–10 Cardauns ap. August. De civ. D. 6.5.1–3: tria genera theologiae dicit esse, id est rationis quae de diis explicatur, eorumque unum mythicon appellari, alterum physicon, ter­ tium civile [i.e. politicen, De civ. D. 6.12.2] (…); De civ. D. 6.5.9–10: deinde ait: “mythicon appellant, quo maxime utuntur poetae; physicon, quo philosophi, civile, quo populi”: the other kinds are the mythical genus taught by the poets, and the political or ‘legal’ genus that is the province of the individual city. Note that in Aët. 1.6.9 the physikon is not the second genus but the first! Varro’s Greek vocabulary shows that he had Greek predecessors. There are in fact references in earlier literature to one or the other of these kinds, see e.g. Obbink (1996) 491–492. I suggest that the paragraphs in Philodemus (on which see Dietz [1896], Henrichs [1972], and Salati [2012]) as well the brief passage Cic. Nat. D. 1.16.42, in which the views of the poets are criticized, may represent the mythikon genos taught by the poets. A crucial component of Philodemus’ and Velleius’ critique of the theology of the Stoics is their rejection of the allegorical interpretation of the views of the poets, as if this, so to speak, were a metabasis eis allo genos. Placing this in the context of the theologia tripertita offers some help to our understanding.

614 

 Jaap Mansfeld

that makes the cosmos,” and § 31 Plato: “God [is] a Mind,” and “[God] as Father and Maker.”17 To these the Stoics are added in § 33: “God is intelligent, a designing fire which proceeds methodically to the generation of the cosmos.”18 The two principal sections of the chapter are in this way linked also as to certain details. In Philodemus we read “and it reigns over and dominates all things, and the Mind arranges into cosmic order all the infinitely many blended things” (Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 320.27–31 Vassallo [= fr. 9 Schober]: καὶ πάντ[ω]ν ἄρ|[χε]ι ν καὶ κρατεῖ ν καὶ | [νο]ῦν ἄπειρα ὄντα | [με]μειγμένα τὰ σύμ|παντα διακοσμῆ||[σαι [= 59 A 48 (IV) DK]).19 In the speech of Velleius in Cicero (Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.26, “the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by an infinite mind”), Anaxagoras is presented as supporting the cosmic role of the divinity, though in a different way.20 Philodemus’ Plato is lost, while Velleius’ Plato is briefly mentioned as patrem huius mundi (Cic. Nat. D. 1.12.30), comparable to Aët. 1.7.33. Velleius does not mention Plato’s Demiurge at Cic. Nat. D. 1.12.30 or Stoic providence at Nat. D. 1.14.36–15.41, presumably because already at Nat. D. 1.8.18–9.21 Cicero has him argue at some length against both the Demiurge of the Timaeus, and Stoic Providence. The discussion of creationism at Aët. 1.7.5–7 (Anaxagoras and Plato) is resumed further down in the same chapter. Here Anaxagoras is contrasted with Archelaus in a neat diaeresis of their respective doxai: Archelaus (says that) the deity is air and Mind, but the Mind does not create the cosmos (οὐ […] κοσμοποιόν); Anaxagoras (says that) the deity is a Mind that creates the cosmos (κοσμοποιόν).21

This Archelaus is up to date (like Thales and others) in adding Mind to his physical principle,22 but from the anti-creationist point of view of the first section of the chapter he is less misguided than Anaxagoras, because unlike the latter he fails, or even refuses, to turn his divine Mind into a Demiurge. According to the

17 Aët. 1.7.15 (Anaxagoras), DG, 302b11–12 (= 59 A 48 [I] DK): νοῦν κοσμοποιὸν τὸν θεόν; and 1.7.31 (Plato), DG, 304a5/b26–27: νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεός; and (only in Stobaeus) DG, 304b32: πατρὸς καὶ ποιητοῦ. For Plato cf. ps.-Plutarch at Aët. 1.11.2 on Plato’s triad of causes: “the efficient cause, which is Mind” (τὸ ποιοῦν, ὅ ἐστι νοῦς – the three last words are omitted by Stobaeus). 18 Aët. 1.7.33 (Stoics), DG, 305a15/b14–306a1–2/b1–2 (= SVF II 1027): νοερὸν θεὸν (...), πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου. 19 Vassallo (2018) 112, and here DAPR, T16 (= IPPH IV 20). Cf. below, text to n. 78. 20 See below, n. 77 and text thereto. For Velleius’ argument against Plato and the Stoics see below, § 3 ad init. 21 Aët. 1.7.14–15: ᾿Αρχέλαος (= 60 A 14 DK) ἀέρα καὶ νοῦν τὸν θεόν, οὐ μέντοι κοσμοποιὸν τὸν νοῦν. ᾿Αναξαγόρας (= 59 A 48 [I] DK) νοῦν κοσμοποιὸν τὸν θεόν. 22 Called “infinite air” (ἀέρα ἄπειρον) at Aët. 1.3.6 (= 60 A 7 [II] DK).

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 615

standard diadochical order of the Ionian philosophers Archelaus is the follower of Anaxagoras,23 so the present contrast concerning the function of the Mind is most remarkable. The importance of the point made is underscored by the inversion of this diadochical sequence. The second main section of Aët. 1.7 on the gods is a counterpart and sort of mise en abyme or mirror image of ch. 1.3 on the principles, or conversely. There are even particular instances of this correspondence. In Aët. 1.3 on the principles there are four mentions of gods: 1.3.8 (Pythagoras), ‘Mind the god’ (DG, 281a10/b8, νοῦς ὁ θεός); 1.3.20 (Empedocles), quotation of 31 B 6 DK: Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis, followed by a physicist explanation of the divine names (DG, 287a6–16); 1.3.21 (Socrates and Plato), “the god is the Mind of the cosmos” (DG, 288a2/b2–3, ὁ δὲ θεὸς νοῦς ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου);24 and 1.3.25 (Zeno of Citium, SVF I 85), “the god” (DG, 289a2/b2, τὸν θεόν). At 1.3.21 (Plato, cf. 1.7.31) and 1.3.25 (Zeno) this divine principle is mentioned next to the principle of matter (Zeno), and next to the principles of matter and Form (Plato). One of the monistic material principles found in ch. 1.3 appears again as a divinity in ch. 1.7, namely at 1.3.4 ~ 1.7.13 (Anaximenes: air), 1.3.6 ~ 1.7.14 (Archelaus: air, in 1.7.14 now accompanied by νοῦς). In 1.3.4 Anaximenes’ cosmic air is moreover made to function as an analogue of the soul (itself air as well) that holds us humans together. A contemporary user of the doxography would unavoidably have identified this air as the divine World-Soul. Such a dual appearance, as principle and as divinity, also holds for the first of Pythagoras’ two principles, the Monad, see 1.3.8 (DG, 281a6–7/b5) and 1.7.18 (DG, 302a6–7/b17–18). Conversely, in the theological ch. 1.7.18 the two divinities attributed to Pythagoras, namely the (Platonic and Neopythagorean) Monad and the undetermined Dyad, are disertis verbis called principles: “Pythagoras [says that] of the principles (τῶν ἀρχῶν), the Monad is God and the Good (θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν), which is the nature of the One and identical to Mind,25 but the Undetermined Dyad is a daemon and evil (δαίμονα καὶ τὸ κακόν), about which the plurality of matter resides, and is also the visible cosmos.” For the most part this passage looks like a rather faithful paraphrase of a passage of ch. 1.3.8 on the principles, already partly cited above: “(Pythagoras places) the Monad and the Undeterminate Dyad

23 See already Theophr. Phys. op. fr. 4 Diels (= fr. 228a FHS&G), and for the standard diadoche e.g. Diog. Laërt. 1.14 and Aët. 1.3.7 (referring to 1.3.1–6). Archelaus is never mentioned by Aristotle but was included by Theophrastus. 24 As Donini (2011a) 431 on 1.3.21 points out, this God is the Demiurge, which also holds for Aët. 1.7.31, where the ἕν is said to be one of his names. 25 There is an interesting diaphonia between Pythagoras at 1.7.18 and Speusippus at 1.7.20 (fr. 89 Isnardi Parente = fr. 38 Lang = fr. 58 Tarán): according to the latter “(the deity is) the Mind which is not identical to the One or the Good, but has a nature of its own” (my emphasis).

616 

 Jaap Mansfeld

among the principles (ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς). One of his principles (τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν) strives towards the efficent and formal cause, which is Mind the god, the other (ἡ δέ) towards the passive and material (cause), which is the visible cosmos.”26 At 1.7.18 the theological aspect is highlighted, but the Dyad qua daemon and evil is incompatible with the positive picture of this principle in 1.3.8. Such a good God and evil Daemon can only be paralleled in accounts of Zoroastrianism.27 For a similar interchangeability of principles and divinities we may cite Sextus Empiricus, who is even explicit about the divinity qua principle. In the first paragraphs of his treatment of the physical part of philosophy in the Out­ lines of Pyrrhonism (3.1–2), he states that he will begin with the principles. First, following the common view, he distinguishes between “active and material principles” (τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δραστικάς). And the active principles will be treated first because they are superior to the material principles. He continues by telling us that, since the majority view is that “the most active cause is God” (θεὸν εἶναι δραστικώτατον αἴτιον), he will give priority to the inquiry concerned with God. In what follows the sections On God and On the Material Principles (Pyr. 3.3–12, γ΄ Περὶ θεοῦ, and Pyr. 3.30–37, ϛ΄ Περὶ ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν), are found at some distance from each other (other causes are treated in between). This order is the reverse of that of Aëtius, but analogous to that of Stobaeus. In Sextus’ Against the Mathematicians, on the other hand, the relative order is the same as in Aëtius, namely On the Physical Principles (Math. 9.4–12, α΄ Περὶ ἀρχῶν φυσικῶν, a list from Pherecydes to Strato), followed by On the Gods (Math. 9.13– 193, β΄ Περὶ θεῶν). See also ps.-Galen’s De historia philosophica where the author says that like the men of old he will begin with the “active and material principles” (ch. 16: ἀρχῶν τῶν τε δραστικῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν), and follows these men in holding that “the most active cause of what is and comes to being is the god.” The account of the material principles follows at Hist. Ph. 18, again a list from Pherecydes to Strato. Ps.-Galen’s order recalls that of Stobaeus, and of Sextus at Pyr. 3.2–37. Diels first thought that a number of chapters of De historia philosophica had been directly derived from Sextus,28 but subsequently more or less settled for a common source,29 which as far as I know still seems to be the common view.

26 DG, 281a6–12/b4–10 (~ Pythagoristae, 58 B 15 DK), cf. Lachenaud (1993) 223 n. 1 for the connection between the two passages. 27 Half-understood as ‘Dublette’ by Bottler (2014) 144: “das Lemma (…) gehört aufgrund seiner Thematik von den kosmologischen Prinzipien (ἀρχαί) unter Kapitel 1.3.” For Zoroastrianism see e.g. Plut. De Is. et Os. 369d, and for the dualism that is involved Donini (2011b) 261–268. 28 Diels (1870). 29 DG, 246–252, cf. M&R1, 140. See his modest ‘cf.’ at ps.-Gal. Hist. Ph. 9, 12, 13, 15, 22, and 23. He could have added ch. 18.

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 617

2 The two main sections of Plac. 1.7 could easily have appeared as separate chapters. Elsewhere the questions of the existence on the one hand and of the substance or essence of the divine on the other are indeed sometimes treated at a considerable distance from each other.30 The redactor of ch. 1.7 clearly found it important to gather the negative and positive ingredients in one and the same scholastic overview, thus achieving a satisfactory doxographical diaphonia. We are, however, confronted with a source problem. The complete version of the chapter is extant only in ps.-Plutarch’s Placita, for the section on the atheists and the anti-creationists, 1.7.1–10, is lacking in Stobaeus’ Anthology. Theodoret’s references to it in the Curatio affectionum graecarum derive, as he says himself, from ps.-Plutarch (consulted by him in Eusebius’ Praeparatio evangelica), so not from Aëtius.31 Diels argued that Stob. Ecl. 1.2, “On those who believe that providence and the ensuing divine powers relating to the management of the whole do not exist,” a lost chapter, may well have been where he placed the atheists.32 But, as Elter pointed out almost immediately, the name-labels Diagoras, Theodorus, and Euhemerus, three standard atheists prominently mentioned in ps.-Plut. (Aët.) 1.7.1, are absent from Photius’ index of names in the Anthology. Accordingly he concluded against Diels that 1.7.1–10 had never been in Stobaeus.33 But Diels quickly replied that there are omissions and irregularities in the index, and, precisely to the point in the present context, that Callimachus, cited by name ch. 1.7.1 (DG, 279a17–280a1), occurs twice in this index, the second time among the poets but the first time (Stob. cod. 167, p. 114b6–7) among the philosophers beginning with the letter Κ, between Cleanthes and Critias.34 The source for this (fortunate) mistake in his view can only be the section of ch. 1.7 lost in our text of Stobaeus: “Dieser wunderliche Irrtum zeigt deutlich, daß das atheistische Stück von Stobaios ganz oder theilweise berücksichtigt war,” sc. in the lost chapter.35 We may add that the parallels for the discussion of the atheist position over against its 30 For instance Clem. Al. Protr. 2.24.2 (atheists) and 5.64.1–2 and 5.66 (philosophers). 31 For these meager extracts see Theodoret. CAG 2.112–113 (2.112 is printed in the app. crit. at DG, 297), 3.4 and 6.6; he refrained from using §§ 11–34. See already DG, 10, 48. For proof that Theodoret elsewhere used Aëtius see Mansfeld (2016b). 32 DG, 59–60. Runia (1996) 544 (= M&R3, 345) points out that it may have been removed by the pious Byzantine epitomators. 33 Elter (1880) 22. 34 Possibly the lost text of Stobaeus had Critias (following after Callimachus), just as Sextus in the parallel passage at Math. 9.54, where Aëtius at ps.-Plut. 1.7.2 has “Euripides the tragedian.” 35 Diels (1881) 348–349. See also Winiarczyk (1976) 43 with n. 67. Bottler (2014) 135–136 typically declines to take notice of the force of Diels’ refutation.

618 

 Jaap Mansfeld

opposite in the wider tradition, namely both in earlier sources (esp. Cicero and Philodemus) and in the subsequent proximate tradition (Sextus), also support the presence of this diaeretic treatment in Aëtius. Conversely, consideration of the rather detailed parallels helps to place both the earlier and the later accounts in a wider context. What is more, the coupling of the argument about the origin of the concept of god in Aët. 1.6 (only extant in ps.-Plutarch) with the immediately following discussion of the existence and the nature of the gods in 1.7, is also paralleled elsewhere, namely in Cicero and Sextus,36 so provides a further argument in favour of deriving these theological matters from Aëtius. Cicero, in the proem of the De natura deorum, begins by formulating the main diaeresis and sub-diaeresis that, as we have seen, determine the structure of Aët. 1.7: As regards the present subject, for example, most thinkers have affirmed that the gods exist (~ Aët. 1.7.11–34) (…); but Protagoras declared himself uncertain, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held that there are no gods at all (~ Aët. 1.7.1–3). Moreover, the upholders of the divine existence differ and disagree so widely, that it would be a troublesome task to recount their opinions (~ Aët. 1.7.11–34). (…); but as to the question upon which the whole issue of the dispute principally turns, whether the gods are entirely idle and inactive, taking no part at all in the direction and government of the world, or whether on the contrary all things both were constructed and ordered by them in the beginning and are controlled and kept in motion by them throughout eternity, here is the greatest disagreement of them all (~ Aët. 1.7.4–10).37

What we find in Nat. D. 1.1.1–2 plus 1.8.18–16.43 (see below)38 is parallel to the whole of Aët. 1.7. But Cicero’s view of creationism and providence in his proem is much more positive than Aëtius’ critical account at 1.7.4–10, or than the scathing

36 Cic. Nat. D. 2.2.4–7.19 and Sext. Emp. Math. 9.13–48 are about the origin of the concept, Cic. Nat. D. 2.7.20–16.44 about their existence, ibid. 2.17.45–28.72 about their nature, and Sext. Emp. Math. 9.49–194 about their existence and nature. 37 Cic. Nat. D. 1.1.2–2.3: velut in hac quaestione plerique – quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes fere duce natura venimus – deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius (= fr. 40 Winiarczyk) et Theodorus Cyrenaicus (= fr. 29 Winiarczyk) putaverunt. qui vero deos esse dixerunt tanta sunt in varietate et dissensione, ut eorum infinitum sit enumera­ re sententias. (…); quod vero maxime rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant nihil moliantur omni curatione et administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio omnia facta et con­ stituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis magna dissensio est, eaque nisi diiudicatur in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maximarum rerum ignoratione ver­ sari. Sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humanarum proc­ urationem deos (text by A. R. Dyck; transl. by H. Rackham, with a few changes). Cf. Runia (1996) 553 (= M&R3, 353). 38 A useful outline of Velleius’ speech is at Dyck (2003) 74.

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 619

exposition of these matters by Cicero’s Epicurean spokesperson Velleius at Nat. D. 1.8.18–10.24. The ‘troublesome’ responsibility of recounting the various views of the theists is assumed by Velleius as well, who at Nat. D. 1.10.25–15.41 delivers his Epicurean critique of the views of other philosophers, followed by a brief rejection of the contribution of the poets at Nat. D. 1.16.42–43, the latter being ingeniously linked up with the account of the allegorical interpretation of the poets by the Stoics that precedes it. He ends with an undiluted eulogy of the theology of Epicurus, Nat. D. 1.16.43–20.56. The overarching diaeresis from Cicero’s proem is briefly summarized again, at the beginning of the speech of Cotta, Cicero’s Academic spokesperson: “[i]n an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not?”39 Diagoras, Theodorus, Critias (not his name but his doctrine), and Prodicus appear several pages later on.40 Cicero uses this material where it is at its most effective, namely as part of Cotta’s refutation of the theology of a well-known critic of the atheists, Epicurus. As has long been seen, Velleius’ presentation of the Epicurean critique of other philosophical views is largely parallel to what can be found in Philodemus’ On Piety. Diels influentially printed most of this material in parallel columns in the DG.41 The similarities are indeed striking as well as numerous, but there are also some interesting differences. We do not really know whether Cicero and Philodemus derive from a shared source, or whether Cicero followed Philodemus in the first place. Diels discussed the alternatives, and listed some parallels with what he calls the Vetusta placita, that is, with anterior doxographical traditions.42 He compared Cicero’s strong language (his “conviciandi furor,” and so on)43 with what he contends is Philodemus’ relative moderation, but some expressions of Philodemus are rather unkind,44 and one does not know what may have vanished in the

39 Cic. Nat. D. 1.22.61: quaeritur primum in ea quaestione quae est de natura deorum, sintne dei necne sint (transl. by H. Rackham). For Cotta’s criticism of Epicurus’ concept of anthropomorphous divinities at Nat. D. 1.31.87–88 and 1.35.97–98, which is less relevant in the present context, see Auvray-Assayas (1991). 40 Cic. Nat. D. 1.42.117–119: cf. Lachenaud (1993) 219 n. 3. 41 DG, 539–550, following the text of Gomperz (1866). 42 E.g. Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.28 and the purported doxographical source of Aët. 2.7.1, on Parmenides’ cosmic rings (28 A 37 DK, cf. 28 B 10–12 DK). See Vassallo (2016). 43 McKirahan (1996) 868–878 plausibly argues that Cicero may have exaggerated in order to place the Epicurean approach in a bad light. 44 E.g. Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 12.8–12 Henrichs, the Stoics “are more lowbrow than Philippus and the others, who reject the existence of the gods simpliciter” (ἀ[νε]λευ|θερώτεροι γινόμε|νοι Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν | ἄλλων τῶν ἁπλῶς τὸ | θ[εῖο]ν ἄ[ν]αιρούντων), or col. 14.17–20 Henrichs they “transfer the way of life of animals to humans” (τὸν τῶν [θη|ρίω]ν βίον εἰς το[ὺς] | ἀνθρώπ[ο]υς με[τ]α|φέρουσιν).

620 

 Jaap Mansfeld

lacunae. Cicero’s spokesperson is explicit about both sides of the coin, whereas Philodemus sometimes appears disinclined to refute once again.45 Obbink argues in favour of Philodemus as Cicero’s only source, but not, of course, of what he sees as Cicero’s more or less willful additions or modifications of his source.46 One of Obbink’s arguments is that when he asked Atticus to lend him Phaedrus’ On Gods (Cic. Att. 13.39.2), Cicero had already written the Epicurean section of Nat. D.’s Book 1 (Att. 13.38.1). But it is not certain that the reference in the earlier letter is to this work, for Tusculans is another option.47 On the other hand, why, if the reference is to Nat. D.’s Book 1, should he ask for Phaedrus’ treatise if he did not intend to do some more work?48 Accepting that Cicero used and followed Philodemus’ On Piety throughout does not preclude his consultation of another Epicurean source, or sources (e.g. Phaedrus’ On Gods, or Zeno of Sidon’s On Piety), or even of his consultation or recollection of non-Epicurean sources. If we follow Obbink’s reconstruction,49 the positive account of Epicurus’ theology is found in the first ‘part’ (or ‘book’) of Philodemus’ treatise, and the criticism of the poets and the philosophers in the second. This is the reverse of Cicero’s order. In Aët. 1.7 the poets per se are not dealt with. Obbink confirms that in this second ‘part’ (or ‘book’) Philodemus first dealt with the poets (though further poetic quotations are found ad finem, in the account of the allegorical interpretations of the Stoics), and next with the philosophers,50 which is the reverse of Cicero’s order as well. However, one should say, presumably, that Cicero’s order is the reverse of Philodemus’. Atheists, too, appear in Philodemus’ second ‘part’ of On Piety.51 Diagoras is mentioned in Schober’s edition at De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 45 DG, 121–128. 46 Obbink (1996) 96–98 (though p. 98 he prefers a non liquet) and (2001); Dyck (2003) 8 endorses the stronger view. Auvray-Assayas (1996) in her useful comparison of the accounts of Philodemus and Cicero, as well as (2001) in her “réponse” to Obbink, argues for greater independence on Cicero’s part, who has his own agenda, and refuses to see Philodemus as Cicero’s only source. 47 Shackleton Bailey (1999) 113 n. 1, endorsing the view of Beaujeu (1983) 221 n. b, 313. I have found nothing in McConnell (2014). 48 See Philippson (1939) 15, who of course adds that we do not know that he received and used the book; also Auvray-Assayas (2001) 230–231. 49 Obbink (1996), who speaks of two different ‘books’. In papyrological matters I can only follow the experts, but see now the critical remarks by Vassallo (2017) and below n. 53 with text thereto. 50 Obbink (1996) 609–614, and (2001) 206–207, where unfortunately the reference to Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1610 + 247 N, cols. 85.17–86a.9 = ll. 2479–2489 Obbink ([κατάρ]|ξομαι δ’ ἀπὸ τ[ῶν || σεμ]νῶν θεολογῶν | [καὶ π]οητῶν, κτλ.) is given as 2179–2189. See already e.g. Philippson (1939) 31. 51 And in the so-called first ‘book,’ namely Diagoras and others in the well-known quotation from Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 12 (Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1077 N, col. 19.5–18 = ll. 523–536 Obbink = Epicur. fr. 87 Us. = fr. [27.2] Arr.2).

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 621

11.7, while Protagoras’ view is referred to in a brief report at De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 15.1–4.52 Schober places these columns after the account of the philosophers from Thales to the Stoics, which as to order of treatment would agree with Cicero’s even further outplacement of the atheists, but a future editor of the text may see things in a different light. At De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 14.32–15.23 Henrichs, that is after the Philosophenkritik, Philodemus first lists some atheist views (no names) and then, looking back, declares that “Now this part of the diaeresis that has been formulated at the beginning has been completed as well, the opportunity arises to continue with the doctrine of piety according to Epicurus.”53 The important thing at any rate is that the negative half of the diaeresis is also represented in the On Piety, and that, just as in Cicero’s proem, it was found at the beginning of the account. And though its positive half is for the most part (namely except for Epicurus’ own theology) presented in a negative light in both Philodemus and Cicero, because the non-Epicurean tenets are rejected, these other thinkers, for all their differences from each other, still share the conviction that a god, or gods, exist, so are deists not atheists. Important parallels are to be found in Sextus Empiricus. At Math. 9.49–57 he collects arguments against the gods’ existence, at Math. 9.60–136 arguments in favour of their existence, including one based on the orderly arrangement of the universe. The first of these passages, Math. 9.49–57 on the atheists, placed under the heading Do gods exist? (a heading that would be perfectly appropriate as an ingredient of a heading for Aët. 1.7), as to its poetic quotations and cast of atheists is surprisingly parallel to Aët. 1.7.1–10.54 Runia points out that the third line of Callimachus’ fr. 191 Pfeiffer on Euhemerus is found only in Aët. 1.7.1 and Sext. Emp. Math. 9.51; this ‘cannot be a coincidence’ (his emphasis).55 Qua structure and contents the brief account at Sext. Emp. Pyr. 3.218 (only the anti-creationists are absent) is quite similar to the passage of the proem of Cicero’s De natura deorum cited above. And it is remarkably analogous to Aët. 1.7 as a whole, because Sextus first lists the standard atheists, and next provides a selection of four philosophical definitions of the divinity, neatly paired as contrasting tenets: 52 Schober (1988) 122 and 125 (= Henrichs [1974] 21 and 25). See Runia (1996) 551 (= M&R3, 351), who compares Diogenes of Oinoanda’s fr. 16 Smith on Diagoras and Protagoras. 53 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, cols. 15.14–23 Henrichs: καὶ τοῦ μέρ[ο]υς | τούτου τῆς δ[ιαι]ρέ|σεως τῆς κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς | ἐκτ[ε]θείσης ἀπο|χρώντω[ς ἐ]ξε[ι]ργασ|μένου και ρὸς ἂν εἴ|η{ι} τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐ|σεβείας λόγον τῆς | κατ᾿ ᾿Επίκουρον αὐ|τοῦ παραγράφε[ι]ν. This suggests that the pars con­ struens would follow upon the pars destruens. See Henrichs (1974) 24–26 and 29–30. 54 See DG, 58–59 and Winiarczyk (1976) 43–45, who argue for a collection of arguments of various provenance by Clitomachus as an important intermediary source. For a suggestion about Aristotle see above, n. 15 ad fin. 55 Runia (1996) 553–554 (= M&R3, 353).

622 

 Jaap Mansfeld

And everything concerned with piety and the gods is also full of controversy. The majority declare that the gods exist, but some that they do not exist, like Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus, and Critias of Athens. And of those who declare that the gods exist some accept the ancestral gods, and others those that are constructed in the dogmatic sects. Thus, Aristotle said that the god is incorporeal and the boundary of the heaven, but the Stoics that he is a pneuma pervading even ugly things; Epicurus that he has a human shape, but Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere.56

In themselves this impassive physical sphere, this all-pervading physical pneuma, and this incorporeal entity, which is at the same time, surprisingly, the (maybe physical) boundary of the heaven, are not immediately identifiable as divinities. They are deified by declaration.57

3 There are also other important points of agreement between Velleius’ account and Aët. 1.7.1–10, though, of course, there are also here differences of emphasis. There seem to be no parallels in the remains of the On Piety, but the Epicurean background of what Velleius is made to say at Nat. D. 1.18–24 is beyond doubt, see for instance the largely parallel argument at Lucr. 5.156–234. I can deal briefly with the most obvious points of correspondence, for these have been noticed by Philippson and in two cases accepted by Pease.58

56 Sext. Emp. Pyr. 3.218: καὶ τὰ περὶ εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν θεραπείας πεπλήρωται πολλῆς διαφωνίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Διαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον (= fr. 57 Winiarczyk) καὶ Θεόδωρον (= fr. 41 Winiarczyk) καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ( – ). καὶ τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναμένων οἱ μὲν τοὺς πατρίους νομίζουσι θεούς (possibly a reference to the politikon genos of tripartite theology), οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δογματικαῖς αἱρέσεσιν ἀναπλασσομένους, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης (cf. ps.-Arist. Mund. 6.397b24–30) μὲν ἀσώματον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Στωικοὶ (= SVF I 159; II 1037) δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος (= fr. 355 Us.) δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, Ξενοφάνης δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ (for this qualification cf. Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.225 = 21 A 35 [III] DK = Xen 90 Strobel/Wöhrle). Cf. Broadie (2016). 57 Or, as Isidore of Seville has it, “the theologians are the same as the physicists, but they are called theologians, because in their writings they have spoken about God” (Etym. 8.6.18–26: the­ ologi autem idem sunt qui et physici, dicti autem theologi, quoniam in scriptis suis de Deo dixerunt). 58 Philippson (1939) 17–21, cited by Pease (1955–1958) I, 187 and followed ibid. 188. The parallels for Cic. Nat. D. 1.8.18–10.24 in Lucr. 5.156–234 have been often pointed out, see e.g. already Giussani (1898) 21–22. For Aristotle’s influential arguments against creationism and about what is against god’s nature (esp. Phil. De aet. mund. 39–43 [without name-label] = Arist. De phil. fr. 19c Ross, and Cic. Luc. 119 = De phil. fr. 20 Ross) see Mansfeld (1981) 299–303, 307–312; for arguments against creationism in general see Runia (1996) 560–564 (= M&R3, 359–363).

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 623

The first argument is concerned with creationism per se. Aët. 1.7.4–7 argues against Plato’s Demiurge, clearly referring to the Timaeus, and against Anaxagoras’ cosmic intellect (Nous), paraphrasing the famous opening of the treatise. But how can the god be able to construct a cosmos by looking at (sc. and imitating) himself, or how can a god be spherical, a shape inferior to that of man? Plato and Anaxagoras ‘are both wrong’ (Aët. 1.7.7, DG, 300.7–8: κοινῶς οὖν ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἀμφότεροι), since this kind of activity conflicts with the nature of god qua happy and indestructible anthropomorphic living being without worries.59 Menial work and bothering about humans to the extent of constructing the cosmos for the sake of man – this well-know Stoic hominum causa motif is contested by Velleius at Cic. Nat. D. 1.9.23 – would be detrimental to the divinity’s felicity. Cicero’s Velleius at Nat. D. 1.8.18–9.21 argues at some length against Plato’s demiurgic God in the Timaeus and the demiurgic Providence of the Stoics, the latter appropriately because of the dramatic situation of the dialogue, where Velleius will be answered also by the Stoic spokesperson Balbus.60 The Aëtian point about God looking at (and imitating) himself is taken up by Cicero’s “by what eyes of the mind was Plato able to contemplate the construction of so mighty a work?” The phrase “to both of you (sc. Plato and the representative of the Stoics) the following question may be put (…)” (Nat. D. 1.9.21: ab utroque autem sciscitur) corresponds with the κοινῶς ἀμφότεροι directed at Plato and Anaxagoras. The analogy is structural and based on content, and only in part based on identical name-labels. The second argument, at Aët. 1.7.8–9, is about the more particular question of what the divinity was doing prior to the construction of the cosmos.61 Was he absent, or asleep?62 Eternal sleep is equivalent to death, and mortality is irreconcilable with the nature of the divinity. The decision to construct a world moreover must have been motivated by a deficiency in God’s felicity, which also conflicts with his nature. In Cicero “the question addressed to both” pertains to precisely this issue: if the builders of the cosmos suddenly became active, they must forever have been asleep before (Nat. D. 1.9.21–22). The third argument, at Aët. 1.7.10, is one of the very rare examples of an ethical issue in the Placita. We encounter the problem of moral evil in the theodicy, and have to listen to the well-worn complaint that good people suffer and evil people prosper, which shows beneficent providence to be an empty notion. This argument has only a limited and rather sarcastic analogue in Nat. D. 1.9.23. If 59 As e.g. in Epicur. RS I. 60 We have seen at text to n. 20 above that Anaxagoras’ creationist stance is included in Cic. Nat. D. 1.10.26. 61 Cf. Sedley (2007) 141–144. 62 On the possibly Aristotelian origin of this argument see Runia (1996) 568 (= M&R3, 365–366).

624 

 Jaap Mansfeld

God constructed the world for the sake of humans, Velleius asks, did he do so for the wise, a scarce commodity? Or for the fools? But God had no cause to favour the wicked (sc. as he clearly does when one assumes that he determines what happens in the world). These striking parallels further support the claim that ch. 1.7.1–10 is indeed Aëtian, and at the same time help to place the account of Cicero’s Epicurean spokesperson in the context of the wider tradition discussed above, where treatment of these further matters will have been obligatory as well. A further parallel for the combination of topics found in ch. 1.7, namely the argument about the gods’ existence, the argument about creationism and providence, and the argument about the substance or nature of the gods, is provided by Cic. Nat. D. 2.1.3, echoed at ibid. 3.2.6. Cicero’s Stoic spokesperson Balbus tells us that his school divides the question about the gods into four parts: (1) first they show that the gods exist; (2) next what is their nature; (3) then that the world is governed by them; and (4) finally that they take care of humanity.63 In Velleius’ account and the Aëtian chapter the question of the gods’ nature comes not second but last. We also see that the Stoics have subdivided the argument about creationism and providence into a cosmological and an anthropological section.64

4 Clement’s account at Protr. 5.64 and 66, as we have seen, demonstrates that those authorities, especially the Presocratics, who attribute a divine status to the physical elements come in for sharp but nevertheless somewhat easy criticism. The elements, or even principles, of water or air or fire or earth, physical substances, for a more sophisticated mind are hard to imagine as gods. I submit this is the reason why in the second main section of Aët. 1.7 some countermeasures seem to have been taken. In 1.3.1, on Thales, water is the principle (ἀρχή) of the things that are. But in 1.7.11 (I follow the longer text of Stobaeus) it is not water that is the divinity, for this is now a divine Mind (Νοῦς), and the ‘elemental liquid is pervaded by a divine force that moves it’, so water is demoted to the position

63 Cic. Nat. D. 2.1.3: omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis inmortalibus quaestionem in partis quattuor. primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab his administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. In the parallel division into three subparts at Epict. 2.14.11 cited by De Lacy (1945) 255 the quality or nature (ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν) pertains to attitude not substance. 64 See also Auvray-Assayas (1999) 98, who argues that what looks like an unparalleled division into four parts is rather an enumeration of “tout ce qui doit entrer dans la définition du sujet.”

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 625

of second principle. In other words this doctrine has been thoroughly Stoicized, in a way that makes it more up to date as well as theologically more acceptable. An earlier version of this startling upgrade is found in Cic. Nat. D. 1.10.25, where water is again the (material) principle of things, and God the ‘Μind’ (mens) that creates all things from water. This is a variety of the same dualism.65 Nevertheless Velleius (the section on Thales in Philodemus’ On Piety is unfortunately lost) criticizes the Thales doxa as if water still reigned as a God, for he adds: “as if gods can be without sensation,” a criticism that applies to water rather than mind. (Mind comes in for a censure of its own, for “why would it need water if can exist independently?”) This recalls Clement’s presentation of Thales as bluntly holding that water is a god.66 At Aët. 1.7.13 Anaximenes is said to have declared that the element of air is a (or the) god, which recalls Clement on the same subject. The same point of view is represented in Philodemus, who criticizes Anaximenes for positing “a god deprived of sensation,” i.e. air qua mere physical element.67 In a similar way Cicero criticizes Anaximenes’ concept of the divinity: “he posits air as God (…), as if air without any shape (forma, i.e. σχήμα, ἰδέα, τύπος, μορφή, εἶδος, figura, imago, or effigies) can be a god, especially because God should not just have some shape but the most beautiful one.”68 But in the Placita lemma (I again follow Stobaeus’ version, now for 1.7.13) a note is added which illustrates the upgrading not only of Anaximenes, but also of Thales at 1.7.11: “Statements such as these should be understood as referring to the forces that pervade all parts of the elements, or

65 On the difference of this version from our more reliable information on Thales see McKirahan (1996) 870. For the interpretatio Stoica see KRS, 97 n. 1. Think of SVF II 580 at Diog. Laërt. 7.135–136 on the presence of God = Intellect = Fate = Zeus etc. who changes the whole of matter via air into water (ὕδωρ), and qua spermatikos logos is present in this wet element (ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ) at the beginning of cosmogony. 66 Clem. Al. Protr. 5.64.2, see above, text to n. 4. 67 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 319.20–31 Vassallo (= fr. 8 Schober): καὶ Ἀνα]ξιμ[ένη]ς (cf. 13 A 9 DK = As 16 Wöhrle) φ[ησὶν | τὸν ἀέ]ρα τε (…) ἄ|[πειρο]ν οἴετ’ ε[ἶναι λέ|γ]ων ἀέρα θεόν· [οὐδὲ | καλ]ῶς θεωρεῖ τ[ὸν θε|ὸν] ὡς ἐστερημ[ένον | τῆς αἰ]σθήσεως, [φὰς | δ᾿ ἅπαν]τα τὰ γενόμενα | [καὶ] τὰ γινόμενα καὶ | [₍₎ τὰ] ἐσόμεν[α] καὶ || (breaks off). At Hippol. Haer. 1.7.1 (= 13 A 7 DK = As 56 Wöhrle), on the contrary, the “gods and things divine” (θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα) are the offspring of the principle. 68 Cic. Nat. D. 1.10.26: post Anaximenes (= 13 A 10 [I] DK = As 17 Wöhrle) aera deum statuit, (…) esseque immensum et infinitum (…): quasi aut aer sine ulla forma deus esse possit, cum prae­ sertim deum non modo aliqua sed pulcherrima specie deceat esse, etc. Augustine notices that Cicero thinks of a corporeal, or material, principle, see his comment at Ep. 118.23 Academicus Anaximeni (= As 103 Wöhrle = deest ap. DK) Cicero obiecerit formam et pulchritudinem deum habere oportere quasi corpoream speciem cogitans, quia ille corporeum deum esse dixerat, aer enim corpus est. On beauty and size (κάλλος and μέγεθος) as defining characteristics of the deity see Verdenius (1949) and Mussies (1988).

626 

 Jaap Mansfeld

the bodies,”69 pervading forces that recall the Stoic pneuma. This type of exegesis rather successfully defends Anaximenes (and other early thinkers) against the criticism leveled against him and Anaximander at Aët. 1.3.3–4, where we read that their doctrine fails because there is no effective cause (τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον) next to the material cause (ἡ ὕλη, τὴν ὕλην). Aristotle already argued that the earliest doctrines lacked “the principle of motion” (ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως), and highly praised Anaxagoras for adding Mind (Νοῦς).70 From a Stoic point of view it is easy to incorporate this criticism when assessing the principles of the early physicists, and to diagnose the absence of the active principle (τὸ ποιοῦν). It does not, on the other hand, require much imagination to add Mind (Νοῦς) to the material principle, or to infuse it with an all-pervading force (ἐνδιηκούσα τῷ στοιχειῷ δυνάμις). Diogenes of Apollonia according to Philodemus “praises Homer because he speaks about Zeus not mythically but truly. For he says that he considers the air to be Zeus, since he says that Zeus knows everything and [text breaks off].”71 The cognitive capacity this Diogenes attributes to air clearly elevates it to the level of a Mind. According to Obbink, this presentation preludes upon Philodemus’ pages on the Stoics, a move which, as he argues, Cicero failed to understand (as he must have if one wants to maintain Philodemus as his one and only source). For Cicero merely writes: “what about air, employed by Diogenes of Apollonia as god – what sensation can it have or what divine shape?”72 Possibly this criticism merely reiterates one of the Epicurean stock objections found scattered in his overview.73 On the other hand, in Cicero’s phrase Diogenes’ air is no more than a dumb element, just as Thales’ water and Anaximenes’ air were, and Clement, too, presents the elements of both Anaximenes and Diogenes (“who subsequently followed him”) in this way.74 It is not so obvious that the difference between Philodemus and Cicero amounts to a misunderstanding by the latter, since Cicero’s point of view looks like a definite interpretative stance, for we see that what he says about Diogenes is not the only instance of this approach: the objection concerned with 69 Aët. 1.7.13: ᾿Αναξιμένης (= 13 A 10 [III] DK = As 119 Wöhrle) τὸν ἀέρα· δεῖ δ᾿ ὑπακούειν ἐπὶ τῶν οὕτως λεγομένων [note the plural] τὰς ἐνδιηκούσας τοῖς στοιχείοις ἢ τοῖς σώμασι δυνάμεις. 70 Arist. Metaph. 1.3.984a18–27, 984b8–22 (= 59 Α 58 DK). 71 Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 331.23–31 Vassallo (= fr. 18 Schober): Διογ έ|νης (= 64 A 8 [I] DK = test. 6 Laks) ἐπαιν[εῖ] τὸν Ὅ|μηρον ὡς ο[ὐ] μυθικ[ῶς] | ἀλλ’ ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ | θείου διειλεγμένον· | τὸν ἀέρα γὰρ αὐτὸν | Δία νομίζειν φησὶν | ἐπειδὴ πᾶν εἰδέ|ναι τὸν Δία λέγει καὶ || (breaks off). 72 Cic. Nat. D. 1.12.29: quid aer, quo Diogenes Apolloniates (= 64 A 8 [II] DK = test. 7a Laks) utitur deo, quem sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei? See Obbink (2001) 212. 73 Listed McKirahan (1996) 870 n. 29. 74 Clem. Al. Protr. 5.64.2, see § 1 above.

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 627

the elements’ dumbness is thought to be decisive and so used ad satietatem. In Aët. 1.7.17 Diogenes’ theology is repaired in a different way than that of Thales or Anaximenes, namely by attributing the World-Soul to him as his divinity (just as to Cleanthes and Oenopides in the same lemma), through a doxographically useful confusion with Diogenes of Babylon, or (perhaps more likely) through assimilation to the Anaximenes of Aët. 1.3.4. Cicero’s explicit references to the formlessness or shapelessness of the air of Anaximenes and Diogenes, cited above, are likewise unparalleled in the remains of the On Piety.75 In the case of Anaximenes this formlessness seems to be a related to its infinity, stressed by Cicero and also mentioned by Philodemus if, that is, Christian Vassallo’s reconstruction76 is accepted. What has form always has a definite form, i.e. is enclosed with limits. Cicero attributes infinity to the Mind of Anaxagoras, too, whom he explicitly calls Anaximenes’ successor.77 Philodemus, however, does not call Mind infinite but applies the epithet to “all the infinite (sc. infinitely many) mixed things Mind sets in order.”78 Rather than arguing that Cicero is less accurate than Philodemus or misunderstood his words,79 I would submit that he again used the criterium of formlessness to discredit the divinity of a philosopher belonging to the tradition of Anaximenes to which, subsequently, the equally censurable Diogenes adhered as well.80 If, as seems to be believed by the majority, Cicero mainly follows Philodemus but not without modifications, this manifestation of independence may have been prompted by his knowledge of presentations of the gods of the early philosophers as being no more than dumb and sometimes formless elements or principles. And he may, but of course need not, have refreshed his memory by looking at other literature, as already suggested above.

75 But there is a single instance of ‘form’ in Philodemus of which there is no parallel in Cicero: according to a philosopher whose name has been lost, the god “has neither size nor beauty nor form” (Phld. De piet., PHerc. 1428, col. 322.28–30 Vassallo [= fr. 11 Schober]: οὐδὲ μέγ[εθος | οὐ] δὲ κάλλος οὐδ[ὲ] τ[ύ|πο]ν ἔχειν). Here ‘form’ is coupled with the two standard attributes referred to above, n. 68. 76 Vassallo (2015) 293–295 and (2018) 109–111. See text at n. 67 above. 77 Cic. Nat. D. 1.11.26: inde Anaxagoras (= 59 A 48 [V] DK), qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et motum [Hadoardus : modum AB] mentis infinitae vi ac ratione designari et confici voluit. 78 For Philodemus’ text see above, text to n. 19. 79 Pace McKirahan (1996) 871–875. 80 Surprisingly, neither Philodemus (as far as one can see) nor Cicero attacks the ‘formless’ God of Posidonius (fr. 101 EK = fr. 364 Theiler, ap. Aët. 7.1 [Stobaeus], cf. 6.1 [ps.-Plutarch], where it is attributed to “the Stoics” = SVF II 1009: πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν).

628 

 Jaap Mansfeld

References Auvray-Assayas (1991): Clara Auvray-Assayas, “Le livre I du De natura deorum et le traité De signis de Philodème : Problèmes de théologie et de logique”, in: REL 69, 51–62. Auvray-Assayas (1996): Clara Auvray-Assayas, “Les constructions doxographiques du De natura deorum et la réflexion cicéronienne sur la physique”, in: Carlos Lévy (ed.), Le concept de nature à Rome : La physique, Paris, 67–83. Auvray-Assayas (1999): Clara Auvray-Assayas, “Existence et providence des dieux dans la théologie stoïcienne : Remarques sur l’ordre de l’exposé du De natura deorum (livre 2) d’après la tradition manuscrite”, in: EPh 1, 91–104. Auvray-Assayas (2001): Clara Auvray-Assayas, “Relire Cicéron pour comprendre Philodème : Réponse à Dirk Obbink”, in: Auvray-Assayas/Delattre, 227–234. Auvray-Assayas/Delattre (2001): Clara Auvray-Assayas and Daniel Delattre (eds.), Cicéron et Philodème : La polémique en philosophie, Paris. Baltes (2000): Matthias Baltes, “Zur Nachwirkung des Satzes τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον”, in: Michael Erler and Robert Bees (eds.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und Kaiserzeit, Stuttgart, 93–108 [= Id., Ἐπινοήματα: Kleine Schriften zur antiken Philosophie und homerischen Dichtung, ed. by Marie-Luise Lakmann, Munich 2005, 27–48]. Beaujeu (1983): Jean Beaujeu, Cicéron: Correspondance, vol. 8, Paris. Bottler (2014): Heike Bottler, Pseudo-Plutarch und Stobaios: Eine synoptische Untersuchung, Göttingen. Broadie (1999): Sarah Broadie, “Rational Theology”, in: Anthony A Long,. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 205–224. Broadie (2016): Sarah Broadie, “Corporeal Gods, with Reference to Plato and Aristotle”, in: Thomas Buchheim, David Meissner and Nora Wachsmann (eds.), Körperkonzepte und körperliche Existenz in der antiken Philosophie und Literatur, Hamburg, 159–182. Chadwick (1967): Henry Chadwick, “Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought”, in: Arthur H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 137–192. De Lacy (1945): Phillip H. De Lacy, “The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles”, in: TAPhA 76, 246–263. Diels (1870): Hermann Diels, De Galeni historia philosopha, Diss. Bonn. Diels (1881): Hermann Diels, “Stobaios und Aëtios”, in: RhM 36, 343–350. Dietz (1896): Johannes Dietz, “Die mythologischen Quellen für Philodemos’ Schrift Περὶ εὐσεβείας”, in: Fleckeisens Jahrbücher 42, 218–226. Donini (2011): Pierluigi Donini, Commentary and Tradition: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. by Mauro Bonazzi, Berlin. Donini (2011a): Pierluigi Donini, “La connaisance de dieu et la hiérarchie divine chez Albinos”, in: Donini (2011) 423–436 [= Van den Broek/Baarda/Mansfeld (1988) 118–131]. Donini (2011b): Pierluigi Donini, “Testi e documenti, manuali e insegnamento: La forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica”, in: Donini (2011) 211–281 [= Id., in: ANRW II 36.7, 5027–5100]. Dyck (2003): Andrew R. Dyck, Cicero: De natura deorum, Liber I, Cambridge. Elter (1880): Anton Elter, De Ioannis Stobaei Codice Photiano, Bonn. Gabrielsson (1906): Johannes Gabrielsson, Über die Quellen des Clemens Alexandrinus: Erster Teil, Uppsala.

18 Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods 

 629

Giussani (1898): Carlo Giussani, T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex: Revisione del testo, commento e studi introduttivi, vol. 4: Libri V e VI, Turin (repr. New York 1980). Gomperz (1866): Theodor Gomperz, Philodem über Frömmigkeit, Leipzig. Henrichs (1972): Albert Henrichs, “Towards a New Edition of Philodemus’ Treatise On Piety”, in: GRBS 13, 67–98. Henrichs (1974): Albert Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428”, in: CErc 4, 5–32. Jaeger (1947): Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford. Lachenaud (1993): Guy Lachenaud, Plutarque Œuvres morale, vol. 12.2: Opinions des Philosophes, Paris. Mansfeld (1981): Jaap Mansfeld, “Bad World and Demiurge: A ‘Gnostic’ Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo”, in: Roel van den Broek and Maarten J. Vermaseren (eds.), Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions: Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, Leiden, 261–314 [= Id., Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism, London 1989, 261–314]. Mansfeld (2016a): Jaap Mansfeld, “Aristotle in the Aëtian Placita”, in: Andrea Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden/Boston, 299–318. Mansfeld (2016b): Jaap Mansfeld, “Theodoret of Cyrrhus’s Therapy of Greek Diseases as a Source for the Aëtian Placita”, in: StudPhilon 28, 151–168. Mansfeld (2018): Jaap Mansfeld, “Archai Lists in Doxographical Sources: Ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus, Theodoret, and Another Ps.Plutarch”, in: M&R4, 225–275. M&R1–4: Jaap Mansfeld and David Th. Runia (see the section ‘Abbreviations’ at the beginning of this volume). Maso (2015): Stefano Maso, Grasp and Dissent: Cicero and Epicurean Philosophy, Turnhout. McKirahan (1996): Richard D. McKirahan, “Epicurean Doxography in Cicero, De natura deorum, Book I”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, 3 vols., Naples, II, 865–878. McConnell (2014): Sean McConnell, Philosophical Life in Cicero’s Letters, Cambridge/New York. Mussies (1988): Gerard Mussies, “Identification and Self-identification of Gods in Classical and Hellenistic Times”, in: Van den Broek/Baarda/Mansfeld, 1–18. Obbink (1996): Dirk Obbink, Philodemus: On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary, Oxford. Obbink (2001): Dirk Obbink, “Le livre I du De natura deorum de Cicéron et le De pietate de Philodème”, in: Auvray-Assayas/Delattre, 203–226. Pease (1955–1958): Arthur S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum, 2 vols., Cambridge (MA). Philippson (1939): Robert Philippson, “Die Quelle der epikureischen Götterlehre im ersten Buche De natura deorum”, in: SO 19, 15–40 [= in: Id., Studien zu Epikur und den Epikureern, im Anschluß an Wolfgang Schmid, ed. by Carl J. Classen, Hildesheim/Zürich/ New York 1983, 249–274]. Robinson (2008): Thomas M. Robinson, “Presocratic Theology”, in: Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, 485–498. Runia (1996): David Th. Runia, “Atheists in Aëtius”, in: Mnemosyne 49, 542–576 [= M&R3, 343–374]. Salati (2012): Ornella Salati, “Mitografi e storici in Filodemo (De pietate, pars altera)”, in: CErc 42, 209–258.

630 

 Jaap Mansfeld

Schober (1988): Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De Pietate pars prior”, in: CErc 18, 67–125 [= Id., Philodemi περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg 1923]. Sedley (2007): David N. Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London. Shackleton Bailey (1999): David R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero, Letters to Atticus, vol. 4, Cambridge (MA)/London. Van den Broek/Baarda/Mansfeld (1988): Roel van den Broek, Tjitze Baarda and Jaap Mansfeld (eds.), Knowledge of God in the Greco-Roman World, Leiden/Boston. Vassallo (2015): Christian Vassallo, “Supplemento papirologico alle recenti edizioni dei Milesii: Praesocratica Herculanensia VII”, in: APF 61, 276–316. Vassallo (2016): Christian Vassallo, “Parmenides and the «First God»: Doxographical Strategies in Philodemus’ On Piety: Praesocratica Herculanensia VII”, in: Hyperboreus 22, 29–57. Vassallo (2017): Christian Vassallo, “La ‘sezione presocratica’ del De pietate di Filodemo: una nuova ricostruzione: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Parte I)”, in: APF 63, 171–203. Vassallo (2018): Christian Vassallo, “The ‘pre-Socratic Section’ of Philodemus’ On Piety: A New Reconstruction: Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Part 2)”, in: APF 64, 98–147. Verdenius (1949): Verdenius, Willem Jacob, “Κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος”, in: Mnemosyne 2, 494–498. Winiarczyk (1976): Marek Winiarczyk, “Der erste Atheistenkatalog des Kleitomachos”, in: Philologus 120, 32–46. Witt (1931): Reginald E. Witt, “The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria”, in: CQ 25, 195–204.

Indices Edited by Christian Vassallo

Index locorum Note: Generally, the passages appear without indication of the reference edition. Only the editors of collections of testimonia and/or fragments concerning the Presocratics or other authors, those of the Herculanean texts, and of the late-antique commentaries on Plato and Aristotle are systematically recorded. In all other cases, the name of the editor is mentioned either to establish correspondence with the other editions used by the contributors in their papers or to indicate a very recent edition that has superseded the old one(s). In the case of authors with more than one work, the works are recorded in alphabetical order, but the fragments—whenever they exist—are always recorded at the end of the heading. As regards the use of abbreviations, see the list at the beginning of the volume. Acusilaus (ed. Fowler) – fr. 6d (= FGrHist 2 F 5): 97 n. 37, 99 Aelianus – De natura animalium – 12.17–20: 446 n. 33 – 12.18: 446 n. 34, 556 n. 181 – Varia Historia – 4.14: 484 Aelius Herodianus (ed. Lentz) – De orthographia – 3.1.394.13: 425 – 3.2: 562 n. 201 Aelius Theon – Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel) – 99.6–9: 112 n. 7 – 101.3–103.2: 112 n. 6 Aeschines Sphettius (ed. Giannantoni) – SSR VI A 73: 507 n. 40 Aeschylus – Choephoroe – 985–986: 194 n. 39 – Prometheus Vinctus – 6–7: 279 – 210: 585 Aëtius (ed. Diels ~ eds. Mansfeld/Runia) – 1.3: 10, 611, 612, 615, 616 n. 27 – 1.3.1–6: 615 n. 23 – 1.3.1: 624 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-020

– 1.3.3–4: 626 – 1.3.4: 615, 627 – 1.3.6: 614 n. 22, 615 – 1.3.7: 135 n. 134, 615 n. 23 – 1.3.8: 615, 616 – 1.3.20: 615 – 1.3.21: 615, 615 n. 24 – 1.3.25: 615 – 1.4.2: 556 n. 181 – 1.6: 618 – 1.6.7: 391 n. 171 – 1.6.9: 613 n. 16 – 1.7: 10, 391, 611, 612, 613 n. 15, 615, 617, 618, 620, 621, 624 – 1.7.1–10: 391 n. 166, 393 n. 176, 395, 395 n. 182, 612, 612 n. 11, 617, 621, 622, 624 – 1.7.1–3: 612, 618 – 1.7.4–10: 612, 618 – 1.7.1: 391, 617, 621 – 1.7.2: 391, 617 n. 34 – 1.7.3: 391 n. 173 – 1.7.4–7: 623 – 1.7.4: 391 – 1.7.5–7: 613, 614 – 1.7.5: 393 – 1.7.6: 391 – 1.7.7: 623 – 1.7.8–9: 623 – 1.7.10: 623 – 1.7.11–34: 612, 617 n. 31, 618 – 1.7.11: 624 – 1.7.13: 615, 626 n. 69 – 1.7.14–15: 614 n. 21

634 

 Index locorum

– 1.7.14: 615 – 1.7.15: 613, 614 n. 17 – 1.7.17: 627 – 1.7.18: 615, 615 n. 25, 616 – 1.7.19: 391 – 1.7.20: 615 n. 25 – 1.7.31: 614, 614 n. 17, 615, 615 n. 24 – 1.7.33: 614, 614 n. 18 – 1.11.2: 614 n. 17 – 1.18: 611 n. 10 – 1.19: 611 n. 10 – 1.24.2: 311 n. 86 – 2.1.2: 199 n. 56 – 2.7.1: 619 n. 42 – 2.21.4: 197, 538 n. 129, 543 – 4.2.2: 134 n. 125 – 4.3.5: 439 – 4.4.6: 453 n. 58 – 4.5.1: 446 n. 34 – 4.6: 452 – 4.8.10: 438 n. 6 – 4.19.23: 460 n. 89 – 5.1: 452 – 5.2.1: 438 n. 6 – 5.19.5: 292 n. 26 – 5.26.4: 278 – 6.1: 627 n. 80 – 7.1: 627 n. 80 Agathocles Cyzicenus (ed. Montanari) – fr. 11: 421 n. 21 Agis (eds. Lloyd-Jones/Parsons) – SH 17: 482 Alcmaeon (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 24) – A 12: 133 n. 125 Alexander Aphrodisiensis – De mixtione (ed. Bruns) – 214.18–23: 311 n. 88 – 214.28: 311 n. 88 – In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria (ed. Hayduck) – 219.15–16: 312 n. 91 – 219.20–24: 312 n. 91

– In Aristotelis Meteorologicorum libros commentarium (ed. Hayduck) – 72.31 ff.: 211 n. 82 – In librum De sensu commentarium (ed. Wendland) – 56.12: 437 n. 3 – Quaestiones naturales et morales (ed. Bruns) – 2.23: 438 n. 6 Alexander Polyhistor (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 273 F 140: 116 n. 34 Ammonius – In Porphyrii Isagogen sive quinque voces (ed. Busse) – 13.24–28: 125 n. 75 Anaxagoras (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 59) – A 1: 375 n. 93, 376 n. 94, 376 n. 98, 378, 498 n. 19 – A 2: 378 n. 108 – A 3: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108, 378 n. 108 – A 15: 374 – A 17: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 – A 17 [I]: 376 n. 97 – A 17 [II]: 376 n. 95 – A 18: 378 n. 108 – A 18 [I]: 376 n. 94, 377 n. 101 – A 19: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108, 378 n. 108 – A 20: 117 n. 40, 350, 350 n. 35, 376 n. 94, 564 n. 209 – A 20a: 378 n. 108 – A 20c: 356, 357 – A 20c [I]: 356 n. 44 – A 20c [II]: 357 n. 46 – A 20c [III] – A 26: 372 n. 83 – A 30: 565 n. 212 – A 42: 369, 378 n. 108, 544 – A 42.2: 266 n. 56 – A 43: 427 – A 46: 425 – A 47 [I–II]: 385 n. 149 – A 48 [I]: 393, 614 n. 17, 614 n. 21 – A 48 [IV]: 360, 360 n. 51, 614 – A 48 [V]: 387 n. 152, 627 n. 77

Index locorum 

– A 49: 387 n. 154 – A 54: 310 n. 77, 310 n. 79 – A 57: 610 n. 4 – A 58: 626 n. 70 – A 62: 498 n. 19 – A 64: 386 n. 150 – A 72: 378 n. 108, 380 n. 122 – A 73: 423 – A 101: 384 n. 139 – A 104: 425 – A 105: 425 – B 1: 352, 380, 381, 498 n. 19, 554 – B 4: 267 n. 58, 352, 360, 379 n. 118, 380, 380 n. 120, 381, 514 n. 67 – B 6: 352, 380, 380 n. 120 – B 9: 385 n. 143, 385 n. 145 – B 11–12: 53 n. 18, 380, 380 n. 120 – B 11: 352, 388 n. 156 – B 12–14: 266 – B 12: 352, 360 n. 51, 361, 379 n. 119, 381, 382, 384 n. 139, 385 n. 143, 385 n. 145, 388 n. 156, 515 – B 13: 266, 266 n. 54, 385 n. 145 – B 14–16: 266 – B 15: 267 n. 57 – B 17: 267 n. 57 – B 23: 337 n. 8 Anaxarchus (ed. Dorandi) – fr. 19a (= 72 A 7 [I] DK): 8, 479, 480, 480 n. 23 – fr. 19b (= 72 A 7 [II] DK): 480, 483 – fr. 19c (= 72 A 1 DK): 480 – fr. 25a (= 72 A 5 DK): 482 – fr. 25b (= 72 A 6 [I] DK): 482 – fr. 33 (= deest ap. DK): 477 – fr. 41 (= deest ap. DK): 8, 474 – fr. 65 (= 72 B 1 DK): 474 – fr. 66 (= 72 B 2 DK): 474, 484 Anaxilas Comicus (eds. Kassel/Austin) – fr. 18.6–7: 37 n. 151 Anaximander (ed. Wöhrle) – Ar 1 (= 12 A 16 [II] DK): 591 n. 302 – Ar 2 (= 12 A 15; B 3 DK): 554 n. 169, 610 n. 3 – Ar 8 (= 12 A 27 [I] DK): 544

 635

– Ar 29, 54, 128, 142, 144, 145, 178 & 192 (= 12 A 17 DK): 389 – Ar 66 (= 12 A 27 [III] DK): 544 – Ar 72 (= deest ap. DK): 610 n. 4 – Ar 84 (= 12 A 27 [II] DK): 544 – Ar 101 (= 12 A 10 DK): 294 n. 29 – Ar 163 (= 12 B 1 DK): 64, 556 n. 178 Anaximenes (ed. Wöhrle) – As 16 (= 13 A 9 DK): 389, 625 n. 67 – As 17 (= 13 A 10 [I] DK): 389, 625 n. 68 – As 40 (= 13 A 15 [II] DK): 544 – As 56 (= 13 A 7 DK): 389, 625 n. 67 – As 72 (= 13 A 1 DK): 389 – As 83 (= 13 A 6 DK): 389 – As 103 (= deest ap. DK) – As 119 (= 13 A 10 [III] DK): 389, 626 n. 69 – As 125 (= 13 A 15 [I et III] DK): 544 – As 132, 133 & 140 (= 13 A 5 DK): 389 – As 174 (= 13 B 3 DK): 389 Andocides – 1 (De mysteriis) – 124: 576 Anonymi – Anonymus – Chronicon Oxyrhynchi (POxy. I 12): 114 n. 28 – Anonymus – PMG, fr. 871: 22 n. 28 – Anonymus – In Aristototelis Ethicam Nicomacheam (ed. Heylbut) – 248.17–27: 243 n. 94 – Anonymus Christianus – Hermippus, De astrologia dialogus (eds. Kroll/Viereck) – 1.16.122: 446 – Anonymus Londiniensis (PBrLibr. inv. 137; ed. Manetti) – col. XI: 140 – col. XVIII: 140 – Anonymus Photii (ed. Thesleff) – 237.5–7: 137 n. 145 Antiphanes Comicus (eds. Kassel/Austin) – fr. 207.1–3: 534 n. 121

636 

 Index locorum

Anthologia Palatina – 1.125.5 (Georgius Pisidiensis): 327 n. 207 – 6.309 (Leonidas): 27 n. 65 – 9.565 (Callimachus): 326 n. 200 – 11.133 (Lucillius): 587 n. 289 Antipho Rhamnusius – Orationes – 5 (De caede Herodis) – 16.2: 199 n. 56 – Fragmenta (ed. Pendrick) – fr. 1 (= 87 B 1 DK): 583 n. 279 – fr. 2 (= 87 B 2 DK): 583 n. 279 – fr. 9 (= 87 B 9 DK): 503 n. 28 – fr. 29 (= 87 B 29 DK): 514 n. 69, 515 n. 69 Antisthenes (ed. Prince) – test. 152b.4 (= fr. 47b.19 Decleva Caizzi): 199 n. 56 – test. 179a (= fr. 39a Decleva Caizzi): 585 – test. 187 (= fr. 51 Decleva Caizzi): 118 Antonius Monachus – Melissa (ed. Migne) – 1.59 (PG 136.960c): 230 n. 60 Apollodorus Atheniensis (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 244 F 31: 369 Apollonius Dyscolus – De coniunctionibus – 229.23–230.3: 68 – 230.31–231.3: 68 Apollonius Paradoxographus (ed. Keller) – Mirabilia – 49: 126 n. 86 Apollonius Rhodius – Argonautica – 1.19: 28 n. 74 – 4.1705: 28 n. 74 Aratus – Phaenomena – 979: 280

– 999: 280 – 1034: 280 Arcesilaus (ed. Mette) – test. 1a28: 343 – test. 1f4: 343 Archelaus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 60) – A 1: 371 n. 77, 499 n. 22 – A 2: 499 n. 22 – A 3 [I]: 371 n. 77 – A 4.6: 499 n. 22 – A 7 [II]: 614 n. 22 – A 11: 610 n. 4 – A 14: 614 n. 21 Archilocus (ed. West) – fr. 328.16: 574 n. 244 Archytas (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 47) – B 6: 164 n. 19 Aretaeus – De causis et signis acutorum et diuturnorum morborum (ed. Hude) – 2.1.6 (p. 43.5): 56 n. 24 Aristides Quintilianus – De musica – 2.18: 125 n. 78 Aristippus (ed. Giannantoni) – SSR IV A 176: 362 Aristo Ceus (eds. Stork/Fortenbaugh/Van Ophuijsen/Dorandi) – fr. 23 (= fr. 28 Wehrli): 239 – fr. 24a (= fr. 29 Wehrli): 239 – fr. 24b (= fr. 30 Wehrli): 239 – fr. 25 (= fr. 32 Wehrli): 239 Aristo Chius (ed. Von Arnim) – SVF I 386: 225 n. 27 Aristocles Messenensis (ed. Chiesara) – fr. 2: 373 n. 84

Index locorum 

Aristophanes – Aves – 71: 577 n. 261 – 414: 575 – 481 ff.: 577 n. 263 – 481–492: 493, 577 – 483: 577 n. 261 – 585–589: 519 – 685–725: 519 – 685–687: 545 – 690–692: 518 – 692: 519 – 693–722: 519 – 697: 520 – 708 ff.: 519 – 709 ff.: 518 – 709: 545 – 713–715: 520 n. 85 – 718: 520 n. 86 – 966–990: 21 n. 20 – 1296: 573 n. 241, 575 – 1366: 577 n. 261 – 1564: 573 n. 241, 575 – Ecclesiazusae – 391: 577 n. 261 – Lysistrata – 388: 576 – 897: 577 n. 261 – Nubes – 4: 577 n. 261 – 94: 523 – 264: 516, 554 n. 168 – 331 ff.: 517 n. 76 – 359–363: 518 – 359: 517 – 360–361: 516 – 361: 516, 546, 560 – 361a: 507 n. 42 – 376–381: 516 – 380: 515 – 398: 568 n. 220 – 606–608: 523 – 658–694: 577 – 661–669: 577 – 661: 577 n. 261 – 663: 577 n. 261 – 664: 577 n. 261

– 666–667: 577 n. 261 – 666: 577 – 828: 513, 515, 554 n. 168 – 830: 560 – 848–849: 577 n. 261 – 851–852: 577 n. 261 – 1427: 577 n. 261 – 1430: 577 n. 261 – Plutus – 379: 540 – Ranae – 159: 22 n. 25 – 194: 31 n. 101 – 203: 68 – 430: 574 n. 243 – 939: 577 n. 261 – 1343: 577 n. 261 – Vespae – 9–10: 573 n. 242 – 10: 22 n. 27 – 100: 577 n. 261 – 794: 577 n. 261 – 1408: 575 – 1412: 575 – Fragmenta (eds. Kassel/Austin) – fr. 117: 574 n. 245 – fr. 256.1: 193 n. 35 – frs. 269–298: 572 n. 236 – fr. 278: 572 – fr. 279: 572 – fr. 506: 507 n. 42 – fr. 578: 570, 574 – fr. 579: 572 n. 235 – fr. 581: 570, 571, 573 – fr. 581.2: 571, 573 – fr. 581.6–7: 571 – fr. 581.13: 571 – fr. 581.15: 571 – fr. 582: 576 – frs. 583–584: 517 n. 77 – fr. 583: 570 n. 228, 573 – fr. 584: 573 n. 241 – fr. 588: 572 n. 235 Aristoteles – Analytica posteriora – 2.1.89b31–35: 613 n. 15

 637

638 

 Index locorum

– 2.13.97b37: 314 n. 106 – Analytica priora – 1.16.35b33: 66 – De anima – 1.2.404a1–16: 441 n. 18 – 1.2.405a8–13: 441 n. 18 – 1.2.405a29–b1: 133 n. 125 – 1.2.405b2: 141 n. 164 – 1.5.411a7: 496 – 3.3.428b2–4: 213 n. 86 – De caelo – 1.3.270b24–25: 423 – 1.7.275b32–276a1: 596 n. 313 – 2.1.284a2 ff.: 547 n. 150 – 2.13.293a18–b16: 141 n. 163 – 3.5.303b10–11: 53 n. 19 – 3.6.304b23–305a14: 255 n. 15 – 3.7.305b1–5: 311 n. 88 – 4.2.310a10: 556 n. 181 – De divinatione per somnum – 2.463b31–464a21: 438 n. 6 – De generatione animalium – 1.23.731a: 292 n. 26 – 2.4.740a33–b2: 446 n. 33 – De generatione et corruptione – 1.1.314b7: 310 n. 84 – 1.9.327a16–22: 442 n. 19 – 1.18.722b8–10: 312 n. 91 – 2.6.334a6: 281 – 2.7.334a26–31: 311 n. 88 – 2.7.334a28–30: 310 n. 81 – De insomniis – 1.458b29: 213 n. 86 – 2.460b18–19: 213 n. 86 – De partibus animalium – 4.2.677a5: 425 – [De plantis] – 1.2.817a: 292 n. 26 – 1.2.817b14 ff.: 292 n. 26 – De respiratione – 10 (4).471b30 ff.: 556 n. 181 – 10 (4).471b30–472a18: 441 n. 18 – 13 (7).473a15: 313 n. 99 – 13 (7).473b: 325 n. 188 – 26 (20).479b26–480a15: 450 n. 49 – 26 (20).479b27–30: 448 – De sensu et sensibilibus

– 2.438a10–12: 437 n. 5 – 3.440a15–20: 437 n. 5 – 5.443a21–22: 438 n. 6 – Ethica Eudemia – 2.8.1225a30: 141 n. 163 – 7.1.1235a9–12: 255 n. 17 – Ethica Nicomachea – 2.3.1104b9: 581 – 8.4.1157a10–12: 259 n. 30 – Historia animalium – 3.2.511b31–513b11: 425 – Metaphysica (ed. Primavesi, Book 1; cett. ed. Jaeger) – 1.3.983b22–26: 141 n. 165 – 1.3.984a5: 141 n. 164 – 1.3.984a11–16: 427 – 1.3.984a18–27: 626 n. 70 – 1.3.984b8–22: 626 n. 70 – 1.4.984b23–30: 263 n. 44 – 1.4.985a18–21: 385 n. 149 – 1.4.985a21–b3: 312 n. 91 – 1.4.985a23–29: 254 n. 14 – 1.4.985a31–b3: 296 n. 32 – 1.4.985b10–22: 442 n. 19 – 1.8.989a20–30: 255 n. 15 – 1.8.989a25–26: 254 n. 14 – 3.4.1000b9–12: 254 n. 14 – 5.4.1015a1: 310 n. 84 – 12.6.1071b27: 100 n. 45 – 12.6.1072a4–6: 385 n. 148 – 12.10.1075a15: 540 – 12.10.1075a16 ff.: 540 – 12.10.1075b26: 100 n. 45 – 14.4.1091b4–10: 91 n. 2 – 14.4.1091b10–12: 391 – Meteorologica – 2.2.355a13–14: 211 – 2.3.357a24: 314 n. 106 – Physica – 1.4.187a12 ff.: 591 n. 302 – 2.8.199b: 286 n. 15 – 2.8.199b9–13: 292 n. 26 – 3.4.203b3–30: 554 n. 169 – 3.4.203b10–15: 610 n. 3 – 5.2.225b18–20: 190 n. 28 – Poetica – 1.1447b16–20: 317 n. 134

Index locorum 

– 15.1454b17–18: 187 n. 14 – 21.1457b12–13: 67 – 21.1457b13: 314 n. 106 – 21.1457b24: 314 n. 106 – 21.1458a4: 300 n. 10 – 21.1458a5: 314 n. 106 – 24.1460a15–16: 425 – 25.1461a3–4: 561 n. 199 – Politica – 8.6.1341a21–24: 125 n. 78 – 8.7.1342b1 ff.: 574 n. 248 – Rhetorica – 2.23.1398b10–20: 117 n. 43 – 3.2.1405a20: 576 – 3.5.1407a31: 534 n. 121 – 3.5.1407b11–18: 200 – 3.14.1415b12: 546 n. 144 – Topica – 2.6.112b22 ff.: 530 n. 115 – 5.4.133b16: 66 – Fragmenta – frs. 25–26 (ed. Gigon): 550 – fr. 26: 550 n. 158 – frs. 26–27: 505 n. 36 – fr. 152: 550 n. 159 – fr. 13 (ed. Rose): 498 n. 17 – fr. 70: 314 n. 106, 317 n. 136 – fr. 75: 118 n. 48 – fr. 204: 514 n. 66 – fr. 364: 164 n. 18, 166 n. 30 – fr. 519: 540 – fr. 611: 113 n. 22 – De philosophia, fr. 19c (ed. Ross): 622 n. 58 – De philosophia, fr. 20 (ed. Ross): 622 n. 58 – Politicus, fr. 4 [I] (ed. Ross): 349, 380 n. 113 – Protrepticus, fr. 110 (ed. Düring): 565 n. 211 Aristoxenus (ed. Wehrli) – fr. 6: 126 n. 86 – fr. 18: 118 nn. 46 and 48, 119, 122 – fr. 26: 126 nn. 80 and 86 – fr. 30: 126 n. 85 – fr. 31: 114 n. 27, 130 n. 106

– fr. 33: 126 – fr. 35: 126 – fr. 37: 126 – fr. 43: 119, 122 – frs. 81–82: 163 n. 13 – fr. 82: 163 n. 17 – fr. 110: 163 n. 16 – fr. 122: 126 n. 87 – fr. 131: 126 n. 85, 163 n. 14 Arnobius – Adversus nationes – 5.26: 26 n. 60 Arrianus – Anabasis Alexandri – 4.9.9: 482 – 4.10.6: 482 Artemidorus – Oneirocritica – 4.67: 114 n. 22 Athenaeus – Deipnosophistae – 4.84.184d: 574 n. 249 – 4.84.184e: 164 n. 19 – 5.2.2 (Epitome): 570 n. 226 – 5.62.220a–b: 507 n. 40 – 8.50.354b: 373 n. 84 – 9.71.406d–e: 569 n. 222 – 12.69.547d–548b: 225 n. 25 – 14.14.621c: 163 n. 16 – 14.18.624f–625a: 126 n. 83 – 14.42.638d: 22 n. 27 Athenagoras – Supplica pro Christianos – 4: 560 n. 196 Augustinus – Contra Iulianum – 5.23: 125 n. 77 – De civitate Dei – 6.5.1–3: 613 n. 16 – 6.5.9–10: 613 n. 16 – 6.12.2: 613 n. 16

 639

640 

 Index locorum

– Epistulae (ed. Goldbacher) – 118.23: 625 n. 68 – 118.27–28: 438 – 118.30: 437 n. 5 Aulus Gellius – Noctes Atticae – 3.17: 149 – 5.15.6–8: 438 n. 6, 460 n. 89 – 15.20.4: 507 n. 39 – 18.10.1–6: 447 n. 35 Basilius – De legendis gentilium libris – 9: 125 n. 75 Boethius – De institutione musica – 1.1: 125 n. 77, 449 n. 44 Callimachus (ed. Pfeiffer) – Epigrammata – 7.3–4: 326 n. 200 – Fragmenta – fr. 191: 391 n. 173, 621 – fr. 586: 392 n. 173 Carmina popularia (ed. Page) – fr. 871: 22 n. 28 Carneiscus – Philistas, Liber II (PHerc. 1027; ed. Capasso) – col. 21.2–4: 445 n. 30 Celsus – ap. Origenis Contra Celsum – 6.22: 33 n. 118 – De medicina – 3.6.5–8: 451 n. 53 Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi – 158–159: 429 n. 51 Chalcidius – In Platonis Timaeum commentarius (ed. Waszink) – 260.20–261.2: 581 n. 269

Chamaeleon (ed. Martano) – fr. 5: 126 n. 83 – frs. 6–7: 126 n. 84 Choricius (ed. Boissonade) – Orationes – 8.1.16: 114 n. 22 Chrysippus (ed. Von Arnim) – SVF II 1: 225 n. 25 – SVF II 42: 612 – SVF II 293: 116 n. 37 – SVF II 295: 116 n. 37 – SVF II 305–306: 363 – SVF II 580: 625 n. 65 – SVF II 762: 138 n. 151 – SVF II 1008: 612 – SVF II 1009: 627 n. 80 – SVF II 1027: 614 n. 18 – SVF II 1037: 622 n. 56 – SVF II 1078: 527 n. 106 – SVF III 698: 116 n. 37 Cicero – Brutus – 292: 224 n. 20 – Cato Maior de senectute – 78: 135 n. 132 – De consiliis suis (ed. Müller) – fr. 3: 125 n. 77 – De finibus – 1.19.63: 456 n. 71 – 1.20.10–13: 213 n. 86 – De legibus – 2.37: 570 n. 231 – De natura deorum (ed. Dyck, Book 1; cett. ed. Plasberg) – 1.1.1–2: 618 – 1.1.2.–2.3: 618 n. 37 – 1.1.2: 391 n. 170 – 1.7.11: 625 – 1.7.13: 625 – 1.8.18–16.43: 618 – 1.8.18–10.24: 393 n. 175, 619, 622 n. 58 – 1.8.18–9.21: 614, 623 – 1.9.21–22: 623 – 1.9.21: 623

Index locorum 

– 1.9.23: 623 – 1.10.25–16.43: 133 and n. 122 – 1.10.25–15.41: 611 n. 7, 619 – 1.10.25: 625 – 1.10.26: 623 n. 60, 625 n. 68 – 1.11.26–27a: 387 n. 152 – 1.11.26: 441 n. 16, 614, 627 n. 77 – 1.11.27–28: 135 n. 132 – 1.11.27a–28: 390 n. 161 – 1.11.27: 133 – 1.11.28: 315 n. 119, 619 n. 42 – 1.12.29: 626 n. 72 – 1.12.30: 307 n. 58, 614 – 1.13.33: 440 n. 12 – 1.14.36–15.41: 614 – 1.15.41: 592 n. 305 – 1.16.42–43: 619 – 1.16.42: 613 n. 16 – 1.16.43–20.56: 619 – 1.18–24: 622 – 1.19.49: 454 n. 63 – 1.22.61: 619 n. 39 – 1.31.87–88: 619 n. 39 – 1.33.92–93: 313 n. 96 – 1.35.97–98: 619 n. 39 – 1.42.117–119: 619 n. 40 – 1.42.118–119: 391 n. 170, 395 n. 186 – 1.43.120: 457 – 2.1.3: 624, 624 n. 63 – 2.2.4–7.19: 618 n. 36 – 2.7.20–16.44: 618 n. 36 – 2.17.45–28.72: 618 n. 36 – 3.2.6: 624 – De oratore – 2.27.117: 1 – 2.58.235: 446 – 3.33.132: 169 n. 41 – Epistulae – ad Atticum – 13.38.1: 620 – 13.39.2: 620 – ad familiares – 15.16.1: 438, 438 n. 6 – Lucullus (= Academica priora, Liber II) – 37.118: 387 n. 154 – 40: 438 – 118: 611 n. 7

 641

– 119: 622 n. 58 – Respublica – 6.15: 133 n. 124 – Tusculanae disputationes – 1.16.38: 103 – 5.38: 135 n. 132 Claudianus Mamertus – De statu animae – 2.3: 136 n. 139 Cleanthes (ed. Von Arnim) – SVF I 537.12–13: 68 – SVF I 538: 612 Clemens Alexandrinus – Protrepticus – 2.15.1: 23 n. 34 – 2.15.3: 26 n. 60, 34 n. 131 – 2.16.2: 33 n. 124 – 2.17.2: 27 n. 65 – 2.18.1: 25 n. 52, 27 n. 67, 31 n. 105 – 2.21.2: 27 n. 63, 34 n. 131 – 2.21.3: 26 n. 60 – 2.21.127: 363 – 2.24.2: 617 n. 30 – 2.34.4: 574 n. 246 – 5.64: 609 n. 1, 609 n. 2, 624 – 5.64.1–3: 609 n. 1 – 5.64.1–2: 617 n. 30 – 5.64.2: 610 n. 4, 625 n. 66, 626 n. 74 – 5.66: 134 n. 125, 609 n. 1, 609 n. 2, 617 n. 30, 624 – 5.66.1–2: 610 n. 4 – 5.66.1: 609 n. 1 – 6.68.5: 457 – Stromateis – 1.52.4: 609 n. 1 – 1.73.2–3: 498 n. 19 – 1.131.3: 525 n. 97 – 2.7.35: 113 n. 22 – 2.21.127: 363 – 2.24.5: 580 n. 268 – 5.8.45.2: 38 n. 155 – 5.8.73.1: 39 n. 164 – 5.11.70.2: 358 – 5.14.100: 139 n. 157

642 

 Index locorum

– 5.14.104: 201, 210 – 5.14.115.3: 192 – 5.49: 499 n. 24, 535 – 6.2.9.4: 92 n. 5, 94 n. 13 – 6.18.168: 459 n. 81 Colotes – Adversus Platonis Lysin (PHerc. 208; ed. Crönert) – T. III, p. 8a: 224 n. 20 – T. IV, p. 10b: 224 n. 20 – T. IV, p. 10d: 224 n. 20 – Adversus Platonis Euthydemum (PHerc. 1032; ed. Crönert) – T. II, p. 5c: 224 n. 20 – T. VI, p. 10a: 224 n. 20 – T. VI, p. 10b: 224 n. 20 – T. VII, p. 11c: 224 n. 20

– 3.2.3–3.3.3 (III, pp. 162–167): 99 n. 39 Damon Atheniensis (ed. Wallace) – A 2 (= 37 A 2 DK): 162 n. 11, 174 n. 64 – A 3 (= 37 A 2 DK): 162 n. 7 – A 4 (= 37 A 5 DK): 162 n. 9, 348 – A 7 (= 37 A 3 DK): 348 – A 9 (= 37 A 4 DK): 164 n. 18, 167 n. 32, 348 – A 10 (= 37 A 6 DK): 167 n. 33, 348 – A 25 (= deest ap. DK): 172 n. 55 – B 2 (= 37 B 10 DK): 170 n. 49 – B 8 (= 37 A 8 DK): 161 n. 1 – B 12 (= 37 B 4 DK): 173 n. 57 – B 13 (= 37 B 2 DK): 171 n. 51 – B 14 (= 37 B 1 DK): 169 n. 41

Critias (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 88) – B 25: 391 n. 171, 498 n. 18, 504 – B 25.1–2: 391 n. 171 – B 25.17–18: 391 n. 171 – B 25.26: 504 – B 25.33–34: 391 n. 171

Demetrius Laco – PHerc. 1012 (ed. Puglia) – col. 6: 340, 352, 380 – col. 6.8: 381 – col. 6.12: 381 – col. 15: 381 n. 127 – col. 40.7–10: 323, 325 – col. 40.9: 326 n. 197 – col. 40.10: 326 n. 198 – col. 47.1–20: 452 n. 56 – col. 57.1–2: 324 n. 178 – col. 57.3–5: 323 – col. 57.5–6: 324 n. 179 – col. 57.7–9: 324 n. 180 – col. 57.11–16: 324 n. 183 – col. 57.13: 324 n. 183 – col. 57.15: 324 n. 183 – col. 57.16: 324 n. 183 – col. 58: 324 – col. 65: 313 n. 97 – col. 65.3–6: 323, 324 – col. 65.6–7: 311 n. 90

Cyrillus – Adversus Iulianum – 6.186d: 371 n. 77

Demetrius Phalereus (eds. Stork/Van Ophuijsen/Dorandi) – fr. 94 (= fr. 150 Wehrli): 369

Damascius – De principiis (eds. Westerink/Combès) – 3.2.3 (III, pp. 164–165): 92 n. 3, 94 n. 11 – 3.2.3–3.3.1 (III, pp. 162–166): 100 n. 41

Demetrius (Rhetor) – De elocutione – 191: 531 n. 116 – 241.7: 115 n. 29

Cornutus – Compendium de graecae theologiae traditionibus (ed. Lang ~ Torres) – 3.4–5: 420 – 3.9–10: 420 – 12.5: 431 – 24.13: 431 – 35.8–9: 431 – 67.5: 431 Crates Mallensis (ed. Broggiato) – fr. 26: 421 n. 21

Index locorum 

Democritus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 68) – A 1: 398 n. 197, 437 n. 5, 515 n. 70 – A 21: 446 – A 33: 398 n. 196 – A 38: 442 n. 19 – A 60: 556 n. 181 – A 61: 556 n. 181 – A 64: 310 n. 79, 311 n. 88 – A 72: 503 n. 28 – A 74: 457 – A 75 [I]: 456 – A 75 [III]: 456 – A 77: 437 n. 3, 438, 438 n. 6, 440 n. 11, 460, 556 n. 182 – A 78: 446 – A 101: 441 n. 18 – A 102: 439 – A 105: 446 n. 34, 452 – A 106: 441 n. 18 – A 117: 465 – A 118: 438, 438 n. 6 – A 121: 437 n. 5 – A 126a: 437 n. 5 – A 128: 460 n. 89 – A 135: 437 n. 5, 438 n. 6, 446, 446 n. 34, 464 – A 136: 438 n. 6 – A 144: 446 n. 33 – A 152–155: 446 n. 33 – A 153: 446 n. 34, 556 n. 181 – A 160: 465 – A 165: 438 n. 6 – B 1: 465 – B 1a: 464 n. 97 – B 4b: 319 n. 148, 368, 368 n. 60 – B 5: 457 – B 18: 459 n. 81 – B 21: 459 n. 81 – B 30: 457 – B 33: 452, 465 n. 98 – B 116: 555 n. 173 – B 120: 444 n. 25 – B 123: 437 n. 2 – B 126: 449 n. 44 – B 135: 446 n. 32 – B 144: 460 n. 87 – B 154: 460

– B 166: 438, 450 n. 50, 457, 460, 610 n. 4 – B 189: 465 – B 194: 450 n. 51 – B 199: 465 n. 99 – B 207: 450 n. 51 – B 233: 541 – B 285: 465 – B 294: 465 – B 297: 465, 465 n. 99 – fr. 46.2 (ed. Leszl): 438 – fr. 50.4: 437 – fr. 186.3: 457 – fr. xxiv (ed. Luria): 555 n. 173, 555 n. 176 – frs. 22–30: 515 n. 70 – fr. 139: 438 n. 5 – fr. 159: 568 n. 218, 568 n. 219 – fr. 282: 437 n. 5 – fr. 368: 556 n. 181 – fr. 383: 556 n. 181 – fr. 463: 556 n. 181 – fr. 471: 437 n. 5 – fr. 472: 438 n. 6 – fr. 472a: 438 – fr. 483: 437 n. 5 – fr. 492: 438 n. 6, 460 n. 89 – fr. 501: 438 n. 6 – fr. 540: 449 n. 44 – fr. 541: 556 n. 181 – fr. 173b (ed. Taylor): 457 Demosthenes – Orationes – 4 (Philippica 1) – 36.1–2: 540 – 18 (De corona) – 69.4: 542 – 229: 185 n. 10 – 259–260: 576 n. 252 – 259: 21 n. 20, 26 n. 58, 33 n. 121 – 284: 540 – 19 (De falsa legatione) – 199: 21 n. 20 – 341: 185 n. 10 – 60 (Epitaphius) – 8: 514 n. 65

 643

644 

 Index locorum

Diagoras Melius (ed. Winiarczyk) – fr. 27: 560 n. 196 – fr. 40: 618 n. 37 – fr. 57: 622 n. 56 – fr. 94 (= FGrHist 800 T 9): 523 n. 95

Diogenes Babylonius (ed. Von Arnim) – SVF III 25: 121 n. 61 – SVF III 110: 377 n. 104 – SVF III 125: 346 n. 29 – SVF III 210–243: 374 n. 88

Dicaearchus (eds. Jacoby/Verhasselt) – FGrHistCont 1400 F 56 (= fr. 40 Mirhady = fr. 33 Wehrli): 118, 129 n. 103, 156 n. 27 – FGrHistCont 1400 F 57 (= fr. 41 Mirhady = fr. 34 Wehlri): 118 n. 46, 156 n. 27 – FGrHistCont 1400 F 57a (= fr. 41a Mirhady = fr. 34 Wehrli): 156 n. 27 – FGrHistCont 1400 F 58 (= fr. 42 Mirhady = fr. 36 Wehrli): 156 n. 27 – FGrHistCont 1400 F 59 (= fr. 45 Mirhady = fr. 41 Wehrli): 156 n. 27

Diogenes Laërtius – Vitae philosophorum (ed. Dorandi) – 1.13: 372 n. 79 – 1.14: 615 n. 23 – 1.16: 154 n. 18 – 1.24: 496 – 1.115: 103 n. 57 – 1.116: 102 n. 51, 102 n. 52, 102 n. 54 – 1.119: 92 n. 6, 94 n. 9, 96 n. 25, 99 n. 38 – 1.121: 103 – 2.7: 369 n. 63 – 2.8: 564 n. 209 – 2.11: 421 – 2.12–14: 376 n. 94, 378 – 2.12: 376 n. 98 – 2.13–15: 375 n. 93 – 2.16: 371 n. 77 – 2.22: 227, 229, 230 n. 57, 239, 549 n. 154 – 2.25: 129 n. 101 – 2.36: 225 n. 23 – 2.46: 118 n. 48 – 2.92: 395 n. 184 – 3.9: 138 n. 151, 150, 152 – 3.11: 139 n. 152 – 3.56: 187 n. 14 – 4.4: 154 n. 18 – 4.24: 154 n. 18 – 4.32: 187 n. 14 – 4.47: 154 n. 18, 225 n. 26 – 4.67: 395 n. 184 – 5.46: 100 n. 45 – 5.48: 99 n. 39, 100 n. 45 – 5.50: 99 n. 39 – 5.86–88: 170 n. 47 – 6.7–8: 225 n. 23 – 6.26: 225 n. 24 – 7.4: 124 – 7.41–42: 116 n. 37 – 7.41: 611 n. 10 – 7.43: 611 n. 10 – 7.84: 611 n. 10

Didymus Caecus Alexandrinus – Commentarii in Psalmos (ed. Gronewald) – 34.17 (= PTura V 222.27): 340, 366, 398 Dio Chrysostomus – Orationes – 49.7: 122 n. 66 – 53.1: 459 n. 81 Diodorus Siculus – Bibliotheca historica – 1.7.4: 457 – 4.4: 33 n. 124 – 4.43.1: 39 n. 161 – 4.48.6: 39 n. 165 – 5.64.4: 39 n. 165 – 10.3–11: 116 n. 35 – 10.4.1: 126 n. 85 – 12.39: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 – 12.39.2–3: 376 n. 95 – 15.87: 476 Diogenes Apolloniates (ed. Laks) – fr. 9 (= 64 B 5 DK): 554 – fr. 10 (= 64 B 6 DK): 425 – test. 6 (= 64 A 8 [I] DK): 626 n. 71 – test. 7a (= 64 A 8 [II] DK): 626 n. 72 – n. III, A & B.3 (= 64 C 1–2 DK): 554

Index locorum 

– 7.132–133: 611 n. 10 – 7.132: 611 n. 10 – 7.135–136: 625 n. 65 – 7.143: 136 n. 137 – 7.185: 225 n. 25 – 8.3: 131 n. 115 – 8.4: 130 n. 109, 224 n. 16 – 8.6: 135 n. 130, 135 n. 131, 149 – 8.7: 140 – 8.9: 135 n. 131 – 8.11: 129, 224 n. 16 – 8.13: 553 n. 164 – 8.15: 135 n. 131, 150, 152 – 8.24–35: 116 n. 34 – 8.28: 136 n. 137 – 8.36: 129, 224 n. 16 – 8.40: 131 n. 115 – 8.44: 131 n. 115 – 8.56: 117 – 8.57: 314 n. 106, 317 n. 136 – 8.66: 129 n. 101, 224 n. 17 – 8.70: 129 n. 101 – 8.73: 129 n. 101 – 8.77: 263 n. 43 – 8.78: 139 n. 157 – 8.84: 150 – 8.85: 4, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 187 n. 14 – 8.87: 154 n. 18 – 8.89: 154 n. 18, 187 n. 14 – 9.1–17: 226 – 9.1–6: 224 n. 14 – 9.1: 129 n. 101, 228 n. 47, 233, 235, 237, 583 n. 281 – 9.2–3: 234 – 9.2: 236 – 9.3: 234, 235, 236 – 9.4: 235, 240 n. 79 – 9.5: 227, 233, 234, 239, 240, 241, 244, 579 n. 266 – 9.6: 129 n. 101, 224 n. 15, 234, 235 – 9.8: 199 n. 57, 200 n. 59, 213 – 9.9: 213 – 9.10.1–6: 214 n. 88 – 9.11: 227, 227 n. 42, 229, 239, 244 – 9.12–15: 224 n. 14 – 9.12: 228, 229, 236 – 9.14: 235, 236, 237

 645

– 9.15: 129 n. 101, 235, 538, 579 n. 266 – 9.34–35: 555 n. 177 – 9.34: 398 n. 197, 568 n. 218 – 9.35: 557 n. 183 – 9.36: 555 n. 173 – 9.40: 163 n. 14 – 9.44: 437 n. 5 – 9.45: 515 – 9.46: 398 n. 196 – 9.52: 552 n. 160 – 9.54: 589 n. 295 – 9.55: 506 n. 38, 589 n. 293 – 9.57: 372 n. 80 – 9.60: 480 – 10.6–8: 373 n. 84 – 10.12: 372 n. 83 – 10.13: 373 n. 85 – 10.14: 239 – 10.25: 300 n. 11 – 10.32: 444 – 10.108: 305 n. 41 – 10.117–121: 485 – 10.121b: 485, 485 n. 38 Dionysius Epicus (ed. Benaissa) – Bassarica – 9.39: 25 n. 50 Dionysius Halicarnassensis – Antiquitates Romanae – 5.74.3.8–9: 542 Diogenes Oenoandensis (ed. Smith) – frs. 6–7: 301 n. 13 – fr. 6, II.2–4: 301 n. 13 – frs. 9–10: 457 – fr. 9: 440 – fr. 10, IV.12–V.6: 440 – fr. 16: 621 n. 52 – frs. 41–42: 301 n. 13 – fr. 42: 301 n. 13 – fr. 43: 450, 452, 453, 457, 464 – fr. 43, I.12–II.5: 450 – fr. 43, II.5–14: 450 – fr. 100: 301 n. 13 – fr. 112: 453 – frs. 125–126: 363

646 

 Index locorum

Dionysius Scytobrachion (ed. Rusten) – fr. 18: 39 n. 165 Dioscorides (ed. Wellmann) – De materia medica – 3.1.3: 463 n. 93 Dissoi logoi (vel Dialexeis; eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 90) – 6.7–8: 117 n. 42 – 6.8: 505 n. 34 Elias – In Porphyrii Isagogen (ed. Busse) – 31.11–13: 125 n. 75 Empedocles (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 31) – A 1: 263 n. 43 – A 20a: 255 n. 17 – A 28: 310 n. 80 – A 30: 278, 285, 294 – A 34: 310 n. 80 – A 37: 254 n. 14, 263 n. 41, 312 n. 91 – A 41: 263 n. 43, 310 n. 83, 312 n. 91 – A 43–44: 310 n. 80 – A 43: 310 n. 81, 311 n. 88 – A 44: 311 n. 86 – A 49: 278 – A 70: 278, 279, 285, 286 – A 72: 292 n. 26 – B 2: 323, 324 n. 185 – B 2.1: 323 – B 3: 324 n. 185 – B 3.4: 52 – B 3.8: 280 – B 6: 318 n. 145, 326, 615 – B 6.10–18 – B 8: 310 n. 85 – B 9.1: 278, 290 n. 24 – B 9.5: 277, 283 – B 17: 273, 273 n. 4, 310 n. 80 – B 17.3–5: 281 n. 5 – B 17.6–8: 253 n. 9 – B 17.24: 253 n. 12 – B 18: 253 n. 11 – B 19: 253 n. 11 – B 20: 273

– B 20.2: 253 n. 11 – B 21: 287 – B 21.7–8: 253 n. 10 – B 21.8: 253 n. 11 – B 21.12: 252 n. 6 – B 22: 255 n. 17, 262 – B 22.5: 255 – B 22.6–9: 255 n. 16 – B 22.6–7: 262 n. 39 – B 22.8: 262 – B 23.4: 254 n. 13 – B 26.5: 253 n. 11 – B 27–30: 281 – B 27: 254 n. 13 – B 29: 252 n. 6 – B 30: 290, 290 n. 22, 314 n. 105 – B 30.1–2: 278 – B 31: 252 n. 6 – B 35.4: 253 n. 11 – B 35.7: 278, 291 – B 35.9–11: 277 – B 35.13: 253 n. 11 – B 35.14: 252 n. 6 – B 37: 255 n. 17, 310 n. 80 – B 41: 263 n. 43 – B 52: 287 – B 53: 277 – B 59–61: 262 n. 40 – B 59: 252 n. 6 – B 60: 292 n. 26 – B 61: 262 – B 62: 255 n. 17, 273, 281, 284, 285, 286, 287 – B 62.4: 278 – B 62.5–6: 279 – B 62.5: 288 – B 62.6: 263, 278, 290 n. 22 – B 71: 253 n. 12, 254 n. 13, 295 – B 73: 280, 295 – B 75: 279, 280, 295 – B 75.1: 296 – B 76: 292, 293 n. 28 – B 76.1: 275, 280 – B 76.2: 275, 280 – B 76.3: 275, 280, 292 – B 79: 292 n. 26 – B 82: 289 n. 21

Index locorum 

– B 83: 293, 294 – B 84: 292 – B 84.1: 279 – B 84.7: 295 – B 85: 280 – B 86: 253 n. 12, 280, 295 n. 31 – B 87: 253 n. 12, 295 n. 31 – B 88: 300 n. 10 – B 90: 255 n. 17 – B 95: 295 n. 31 – B 96: 254 n. 13 – B 96.2: 279 – B 96.3–4: 254 n. 13 – B 98.5: 279 – B 100: 292, 313 n. 99, 313 n. 100, 323, 324 – B 100.1–2: 324 – B 110.8–9: 255 n. 17, 263 n. 41 – B 111: 318 n. 141, 321 – B 111.3–5: 322 n. 166 – B 111.6–12: 321 – B 111.11–15: 321 – B 112: 251, 252 n. 6, 318 – B 112.4: 318 – B 115: 252 n. 6, 272, 277, 283, 283 n. 9, 314 n. 105, 315 n. 119, 326, 538 – B 115.1–2: 277 – B 117: 252 n. 6 – B 118: 277 – B 119.1: 277 – B 121.1: 277 – B 122.2: 254 n. 13 – B 127: 252 n. 6 – B 128: 254 n. 12, 314 n. 107 – B 133–134: 312 n. 95 – B 134: 291 n. 25 – B 135–136: 314 n. 105, 316 n. 128 – B 135: 277 – B 136: 314 n. 105 – B 137: 316 n. 128 – B 139: 276, 282, 293 n. 28, 300 n. 7 – B 139.1: 274 – B 139.2: 275, 277, 282 n. 6 – B 142: 323, 325, 326, 327 – B 153b: 280, 287 – B 154: 279 PStrasb. Gr. inv. 1665–1666 (eds. Martin/ Primavesi)

 647

– a: 271, 273, 273 n. 4 – a (i): 273 n. 4 – a (ii): 273 n. 4, 278 – a (ii) 13: 280 – a (ii) 14: 280 – a (ii) 25: 294 n. 28 – a (ii) 27: 292 – a (ii) 28: 294 n. 28 – a (ii) 30: 281 – b: 6, 271, 273, 274, 280, 281, 286, 287, 292, 293, 293 n. 28, 294, 295, 296 – b 1: 275 – b 1–3: 293 n. 28 – b 2–3: 293 n. 28 – b 3: 294 – b 6: 296 – c: 271, 273 – d: 6, 271, 272, 273, 274, 281, 284, 286, 287, 290 n. 23, 292, 294, 295, 299 n. 4 – d 1–18: 281 – d 1–10: 281, 282 – d 1–4: 281 – d 1–2: 282 – d 1: 274 – d 3: 282 – d 4–5: 294 n. 28 – d 4: 282, 285 – d 5–10: 272, 282, 283, 283 n. 8 – d 5: 282, 294 – d 6: 282 – d 7: 272, 282 – d 8: 283 – d 10: 283 – d 11–19: 6 – d 11–18: 6, 271, 273, 281, 284, 286 – d 13: 286, 296 n. 33 – d 14: 291 – d 15: 287, 291 – d 17: 287 – d 18: 291, 294 – e: 272, 296 n. 33 – f: 6, 271, 273, 274, 281, 286, 287, 292, 294, 295 – f 1: 291 – f 4: 292 – f 5–8: 292 – f 6: 275

648 

 Index locorum

– f 8: 294 – k: 272 – d + f + b: 274 – col. 8: 274 – col. 9: 274 – col. 10: 274 – col. 11: 273, 274 – col. 12: 271, 273, 274 Ephorus (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 70 F 104: 39 n. 165 Epicharmus (eds. Kassel/Austin) – fr. 136 (cf. 23 B 2 DK): 138 n. 149 – fr. 199 (= deest ap. DK): 525 n. 99 – fr. 275 (= 23 B 1 DK): 138 n. 151 – fr. 276 (= 23 B 2 DK): 139 n. 152, 139 n. 154 – test. 11 [I]; Ps.-Epicharmus, fr. 296 (= 23 B 65 DK): 140 n. 158 Epictetus – Dissertationes – 2.14.11: 624 n. 63 – 2.18.12: 561 n. 201 Epicurus – De natura – Liber II (PHerc. 1149/993; PHerc. 1783/1691/1010; ed. Leone) – PHerc. 993, cols. XIV.2–5 + 109.19–25: 439 – PHerc. 993, col. 109: 8, 442 – PHerc. 993, col. 109.22–25: 439 – PHerc. 1149, col. 38.2–3: 382 n. 132 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 76: 440 n. 11 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 92.6–8: 440 n. 11 – PHerc. 1149/993, cols. 93–94: 440 n. 11 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 98: 440 n. 11 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 101: 441 n. 17 – PHerc. 1149/993, cols. 104–105: 440 n. 15 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 109: 439 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 111: 440 n. 11 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 117: 440 n. 15 – PHerc. 1149/993, col. 119: 440 n. 11 – Liber XI (PHerc. 154; PHerc. 1042; ed. Arrighetti)

– fr. [26.39]: 445 n. 30 – fr. [26.42]: 457 n. 75 – fr. [26.42].10–11: 356 n. 43 – col. 2a.4 (ed. Sedley): 363 – Liber XIV (PHerc. 1148; ed. Leone) – col. 30: 304 n. 40 – col. 34: 307 n. 63, 308, 311, 312 – col. 34.5: 310 – col. 34.5–6: 312 – col. 34.6–7: 312 – col. 34.10–11: 309 – col. 34.14: 312 – col. 34.15: 309 n. 74 – col. 34.16: 309 n. 74 – cols. 34–39: 307 – col. 35: 311 – cols. 39–43: 306 – col. 40: 306, 307, 312 – col.40.1–17: 306 n. 51 – col. 40.1–3: 307 n. 56 – col. 40.8–9: 306 – col. 40.17–20: 306 – col. 40.17: 307 – col. 40.18: 307 – col. 43.1–6: 306 n. 54 – Liber XV (PHerc. 1151; ed. Millot) – col. 7: 340, 353 – col. 7.5: 381 – col. 11: 340, 354 – col. 11.5–6: 381 – col. 23: 382 n. 131, 382 n. 132 – col. 23.5: 382 n. 131 – col. 25: 340, 355 – col. 25.4: 382 – Liber XXV (PHerc. 419/1634/697; PHerc. 1420/1056; PHerc. 1191; ed. Laursen) – PHerc. 1056, cr. 7, z. 1: 444 n. 27 – PHerc. 1056, cr. 7, z. 4: 454 n. 64 – PHerc. 1191, cr. 8, pz. II, -10, sup. 1–7: 185 – PHerc. 1191, cr. 8, pz. II, -8, sup. -1–4: 185 – Liber XXVIII (PHerc. 1479/1417; ed. Sedley) – fr. F, col. 1.8: 354 – Liber XXXIV (PHerc. 1431; ed. Leone) – col. 3.8: 445 n. 31 – col. 8: 454

Index locorum 

– col. 10: 454 – col. 16: 444 n. 27 – col. 19: 444, 444 n. 27 – cols. 20–21: 8, 442, 443, 445, 446, 453 – col. 20.5: 442 n. 19 – col. 20.9: 445, 445 n. 29 – col. 20.10: 453 – col. 21.1–7: 444 – col. 21.6–7: 442 n. 19 – col. 22.10: 445 n. 31 – Epistulae – Ad Herodotum (ed. Dorandi) – 46: 444 – 48: 440 n. 11, 440 n. 15, 441, 442 – 48.2–3: 356 n. 43 – 49–51: 445 n. 31 – 53: 460 n. 89 – 63–65: 441 – 66: 439 – Ad Menoeceum (ed. Dorandi) – 123–124: 363 – 125: 321 n. 164 – 131: 363 – 133: 454 n. 64 – 134: 454 n. 64 – Ad Pythoclem (ed. Dorandi) – 91: 213 n. 86 – 104: 457 n. 75 – Ratae Sententiae (ed. Arrighetti) – I: 363, 623 n. 59 – IV: 465 – XI: 454 – XIII: 457 n. 75 – Fragmenta – fr. [26.39] (ed. Arrighetti): 445 n. 30 – fr. [26.42]: 457 n. 75 – fr. [27.2]: 620 n. 51 – fr. [29.28]: 303 n. 33 – fr. [30.7]: 353 – fr. [30.12]: 354 – fr. [30.28]: 355 – fr. [34.27]: 444 n. 27 – fr. [34.30]: 454 n. 64 – fr. [48]: 373 n. 85 – fr. [72.33]: 363 – fr. [101]: 305 n. 45 – fr. [102]: 373 n. 84

 649

– fr. [103]: 305 n. 45, 373 n. 84 – fr. [104]: 303 n. 33, 305 n. 43 – fr. 34 (ed. Usener): 456 n. 71 – fr. 87: 620 n. 51 – fr. 111: 305 n. 45 – frs. 112–113: 373 n. 84 – fr. 114: 373 n. 84 – fr. 123: 373 n. 85 – fr. 145: 373 n. 84 – fr. 171 [I]: 373 n. 84 – fr. 171 [III]: 373 n. 84 – fr. 231: 224 n. 20 – fr. 290: 311 n. 88 – fr. 353: 312 n. 94 – fr. 355: 312 n. 94, 622 n. 56 – fr. 357a: 312 n. 94 – fr. 567: 485 – fr. 577: 485 – fr. 592: 485 n. 38 Epimenides (ed. Bernabé) – fr. 2 (= 3 A 2 DK = test. 2 Fowler): 555 n. 172 – fr. 33 [I] (= 3 B 2 DK = deest ap. Fowler): 550 – fr. 46 [II] (= 3 B 5 DK = fr. 6b Fowler): 99 Epiphanius – Adversus haereses (Panarion) – 2.29: 610 n. 6 – 3.2.9: 372 n. 78 – Expositio fidei – 9.25: 525 n. 98 Erotianus (ed. Nachmanson) – fr. 7 (p. 131.3–15): 444 n. 25, 448 n. 39 Etymologicum Genuinum – s.v. δείκελον: 437 n. 2 Etymologicum Gudianum – s.v. κᾶτα: 68 Etymologicum Magnum – 402.28 (s.v. δείκελον): 38 n. 153 Eudemus Rhodius (ed. Wehrli) – fr. 150: 99, 99 n. 39, 100, 100 n. 45, 133 n. 121, 549

650 

 Index locorum

Euripides – Alcestis – 40: 259 n. 31 – 240–243: 89 – 243: 84 n. 10 – Andromache – 1009–1017: 391 n. 172 – 1028–1036: 391 n. 172 – 1161–1165: 391 n. 172 – Bacchae – 72–87: 391 n. 172 – 139: 25 n. 48 – 200–204: 391 n. 172 – 274 ff.: 509 – 274–279: 425 n. 38 – 286–297: 509 – 296: 509 – 370–401: 391 n. 172 – 920: 22 n. 28 – Electra – 737–746: 391 n. 172 – 1244–1248: 391 n. 172 – Helena – 711–715: 391 n. 172 – 1137–1150: 391 n. 172 – Heraclidae – 591–596: 391 n. 172 – Hercules furens – 339–346: 391 n. 172 – 1263–1265: 391 n. 172 – 1340–1346: 391 n. 172 – Hippolytus – 189–197: 391 n. 172 – 928 ff.: 548 – 952 ff.: 575 – 954: 21 n. 20 – 1102–1110: 391 n. 172 – Ion – 301: 581 n. 271 – 436–451: 391 n. 172 – 881–922: 391 n. 172 – 1553–1562: 391 n. 172 – 1609–1615: 391 n. 172 – Iphigenia Aulidensis – 84: 67 – 1368–1403: 391 n. 172 – Iphigenia Taurica

– 380–391: 391 n. 172 – Orestes – 2: 566 – 4: 565 – 4 ff.: 564 n. 206 – 4–10: 548, 563, 565 – 10: 563, 564, 565 n. 212 – 271: 481 – 982 ff.: 564, 565 – 982–984: 548 – Phoenissae – 598: 68 – 626: 193 n. 35 – Troades – 884–889: 391 n. 172, 554 n. 168 – 886: 358, 383 – Fragmenta (ed. Κannicht) – 203: 22 n. 27 – 286b (= fr. 292 Nauck2): 391 n. 172 – 472: 24 n. 41 – 472.12: 25 n. 46 – 481: 498 n. 19 – 484: 498 n. 19, 564 n. 208 – 910: 565 – 912: 357, 383 – 912.1–3: 358 – 913: 358 Eusebius – Praeparatio evangelica – 3.1.1: 523 – 10.3.6–9: 102 n. 54 – 14.18.25: 225 n. 28 – 14.18.27: 225 n. 28 – 15.2: 373 n. 84 Eustathius – Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem (ed. Van der Valk) – 4.901.3–4: 570 n. 226 – 4.955.22: 540 – 3.645.11: 429 – Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam (ed. Stallbaum) – 1700.60: 564 n. 209

Index locorum 

Favorinus (ed. Barigazzi) – fr. 2.11 (= FHG III 583): 422 Firmicus Maternus – De errore profanarum religionum (ed. Turcan) – 6.3 (p. 88): 25 n. 52 – 6.5 (p. 89): 25 n. 51 – 18.1 (p. 115): 26 n. 53, 33 n. 118, 34 n. 136 Flavius Josephus – Contra Apionem – 1.163: 134 n. 129 – 2.265: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 Galenus (eds. Kühn et al.) – De locis affectis – 2.75–79: 448 n. 42 – 2.75–76: 450 n. 48 – De causis pulsuum – 2.58.17–59.11: 451 n. 53 – 4.160.11–18: 451 n. 53 – De differentia pulsuum – 1.551.2–8: 449 n. 44 – 4.707–708: 449 n. 46 – 4.712–714: 449 n. 46 – De locis affectis – 2.75–79: 448 n. 42 – 8.74: 529 – De motu musculorum – 372: 449 n. 46 – 442: 449 n. 46 – De naturalibus facultatibus – 2.130.5 ff.: 529 – 2.133.8–11: 463 n. 93 – De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (ed. De Lacy) – 1.9–10: 447 n. 37 – 2.4: 447 n. 37 – 2.4.49: 449 n. 46 – 2.6.9–12: 447 n. 37 – 2.8.24–25: 447 n. 37 – 3.5.3–7: 447 n. 37 – 3.8.30: 449 n. 46 – 6.1.10–13: 449 n. 46 – 6.3–4: 447 n. 37 – 6.5.20–31: 447 n. 37

 651

– 6.7.3–8: 449 n. 46 – 6.8.33: 449 n. 46 – 6.8.38–58: 447 n. 37 – 6.8.46–47: 450 n. 48 – 7.3.1–3: 447 n. 37 – 8.8.7–8: 449 n. 46 – De plenitudine – 573.16–574.1: 447 n. 35 – De praesagitione ex pulsibus – 249.17–250.17: 451 n. 53 – De pulsibus ad Tyrones – 473.18–20: 451 n. 53 – De rebus boni et mali succi – 815.1: 463 n. 93 – De tumoribus praeter naturam – 720–722: 448 n. 42 – De usu pulsuum – 149–179: 449 n. 46 – In Hippocratis De natura hominis – 15.25.14–26.5: 140 n. 161 – In Hippocratis De officina medici – 18b.649.16–18: 583 n. 279 – 18b.656: 583 n. 279 – In Hippocratis Epidemiae – 3.33: 515 n. 69 – In Hippocratis Prorrheticum – 731.4–734.5: 448 n. 41 – Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur – 803–804: 450 n. 48 – Synopsis de pulsibus – 451.1–11: 451 n. 53 – 458–460: 449 n. 46 – 469: 449 n. 46 – 499.1–2: 448 – Thrasybulus sive utrum medicinae sit an gymnasticae hygieine – 822.8: 463 n. 93 – 823.4: 463 n. 93 – 829.8: 463 n. 93 Gnomologium Vaticanum 743 (ed. Sternbach) – 310: 230 n. 60 Gorgias (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 82) – A 28: 569 – B 11a.28: 542

652 

 Index locorum

Harpocratio – Lexicon – s.v. ἀνακαλυπτήρια: 96 n. 24 Hellanicus Lesbius (ed. Fowler) – fr. 19b (= FGrHist 4 F 19b): 97 n. 34 Heraclides Ponticus (ed. Schütrumpf) – fr. 86 (= fr. 89 Wehrli): 130 n. 109 Heraclitus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 22) – A 1 (= fr. 61 [a] Marcovich): 199 n. 57 – A 4 [III] (= deest ap. Marcovich): 549 n. 154 – A 20 (= deest ap. Marcovich): 581 n. 269 – B 1 (= fr. 1 Marcovich): 67, 69, 199, 200, 201, 508 n. 49, 543, 580, 580 n. 268 – B 2 (= fr. 23 Marcovich): 67, 68, 192, 194 – B 3 (= fr. 57 Marcovich): 5, 67, 69, 70, 179, 198, 201, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 543 n. 140 – B 5 (= fr. 86 Marcovich): 580 – B 6 (= fr. 58 Marcovich): 67, 69, 211 – B 10 (= fr. 25 Marcovich): 200 n. 59 – B 12 (= fr. 40 Marcovich): 592 n. 305 – B 13 [II] (= fr. 36 [a1] Marcovich): 582 n. 275 – B 14 (= fr. 87 Marcovich): 582, 584 n. 284 – B 15 (= fr. 50 Marcovich): 196, 502, 549 n. 153, 553 n. 163, 580 – B 16 (= fr. 81 Marcovich): 195 n. 41 – B 17 (= fr. 3 Marcovich): 580 – B 18 (= fr. 11 Marcovich): 584 n. 284 – B 19 (= fr. 1 [g] Marcovich): 580 – B 20 (= fr. 99 Marcovich): 580 – B 21 (= fr. 49 Marcovich): 581 – B 23 (= fr. 45 Marcovich): 502 – B 26 (= fr. 48 Marcovich): 541 – B 27 (= fr. 74 Marcovich): 584 n. 284 – B 28 (= frs. 19–20 Marcovich): 533 – B 30 (= fr. 51 Marcovich): 69, 199, 200, 201, 210, 211 – B 31 (= fr. 53 Marcovich): 200 n. 59, 537 – B 32 (= fr. 84 Marcovich): 196 – B 33 (= fr. 104 Marcovich): 538 n. 130 – B 34 (= fr. 2 Marcovich): 192, 192 n. 33, 193 n. 34, 194, 580 – B 41 (= fr. 85 Marcovich): 536, 583 n. 281, 596 n. 314

– B 42 (= fr. 30 Marcovich): 585 – B 43 (= fr. 102 Marcovich): 538 n. 130 – B 48 (= fr. 39 Marcovich): 502 – B 49 (= fr. 98 Marcovich): 538 n. 130 – B 50 (= fr. 26 Marcovich): 508 n. 49, 552 n. 161 – B 52 (= fr. 93 Marcovich): 537 – B 55 (= fr. 5 Marcovich): 67 – B 60 (= fr. 33 Marcovich): 35 n. 137 – B 64 (= fr. 79 Marcovich): 195 n. 41, 200 n. 59, 593 n. 306 – B 66 (= fr. 82 Marcovich): 195 n. 41, 200 n. 59 – B 67 (= fr. 77 Marcovich): 503, 541 – B 75 (= fr. 1 [h2] Marcovich): 199 n. 53 – B 81 [II] (= fr. 18 [b] Marcovich): 123 n. 68 – B 86 (= fr. 12 Marcovich): 580, 585 – B 89 (= fr. 24 Marcovich): 199, 199 n. 57 – B 90 (= fr. 54 Marcovich): 200 n. 59, 536 – B 94 (= fr. 52 Marcovich): 5, 67, 179, 181, 188, 195, 197, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212 – B 95 (= fr. 29 Marcovich): 584 – B 96 (= fr. 76 Marcovich): 541 – B 98 (= fr. 72 Marcovich): 593 n. 308 – B 100 (= fr. 64 Marcovich): 541 – B 101 (= fr. 15 Marcovich): 582 – B 104 (= fr. 101 Marcovich): 538 n. 130, 580 – B 108 (= fr. 83 Marcovich): 580 – B 109 (= fr. 110 Marcovich): 584 – B 112 (= fr. 23 [f] Marcovich): 69, 199, 201, 583 – B 114 (= fr. 23 Marcovich): 533, 538, 580 – B 118 (= fr. 68 Marcovich): 541 – B 120 (= fr. 62 Marcovich): 196, 212, 537, 541 – B 124 (= fr. 107 Marcovich): 199, 536 – B 129 (= fr. 17 Marcovich): 572 n. 239, 584 – B 137 (= fr. 28 [d1] Marcovich): 535 n. 122 Hermarchus (ed. Longo Auricchio) – fr. 25: 300 n. 11 – fr. 27: 314 n. 105 – fr. 28: 299 n. 2, 300 n. 11 – fr. 29: 314 n. 106 – fr. 30: 314 n. 107 – fr. 32: 313 n. 98 – fr. 33: 313 n. 96 – fr. 34: 301 n. 12, 314 n. 105 – frs. 50–51: 304 n. 39

Index locorum 

Hermippus Berytius (eds. Jacoby/Radicke) – FGrHistCont 1061 F 7: 498 n. 19 Hermippus Smyrnensis (eds. Jacoby/ Bollansée) – FGrHistCont 1026 F 65: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 – FGrHistCont 1026 F 69: 149, 157 Herodorus Heracleotes (ed. Fowler) – fr. 12: 499 n. 20 – fr. 13: 498 n. 19 – fr. 21: 499 n. 20 – fr. 41: 499 n. 20 – fr. 43: 499 n. 20 Herodotus – Historiae – 1.3: 65 – 1.3.10: 187 n. 14 – 1.157.10: 187 n. 14 – 1.158.4: 187 n. 14 – 2.77.3: 571 – 2.81.5–7: 572 n. 238 – 2.118: 84 n. 9, 89 – 4.184: 184 n. 8 – 5.68: 540 – 5.83.3–84.1: 60 n. 40 – 6.71: 102 n. 50 – 6.107: 514 n. 64 – 7.142: 35 n. 138 – 7.188: 569 n. 221 – 8.131: 102 – 9.94: 544 Hesiodus – Opera et Dies – 9: 52 – 109: 51 n. 12 – 174–179: 277 – 252–254: 51 n. 13 – 267: 194 n. 39 – 293: 52 – 566: 212 n. 84 – 610: 212 n. 84 – Theogonia – 74–75: 96 n. 33 – 112: 96 n. 33

 653

– 116–117: 264 n. 44 – 120: 264 n. 44 – 175–206: 253 n. 12 – 193–200: 254 n. 12 – 230: 258 n. 29 – 360: 49 – 395–396: 96 n. 33 – 885: 96 n. 33 – 886–900: 521 – 892: 521 Hesychius – Lexicon – s.v. ἀνακαλυπτήριον: 96 n. 24 – s.v. Ἐφέσια γράμματα: 38 n. 156 – s.v. Ἠρικεπαῖος: 32 n. 110 Hieronymus Rhodius (ed. White) – fr. 49 (= fr. 41 Wehrli = fr. 9 Hiller): 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 Hippocrates et Corpus Hippocraticum (eds. Kühn et al.) – Aphorismi – 5.42: 463 n. 93 – 6.42.1: 426 – 7.21: 450 n. 48 – Coacae praenotiones – 20: 448 – 80: 450 n. 48, 452 – 121: 450 n. 48 – 125: 450 n. 48 – 136: 450 n. 48 – 138: 450 n. 48 – 276–277: 450 n. 48 – 276: 451 – De aera, aquis, locis – 8: 514 n. 69 – De affectionibus interioribus – 24.2: 426 – De articulis – 40: 450 n. 48 – De capitis vulneribus – 15: 450 n. 48 – De diaeta in morbis acutis – 1: 537, 555, 578 – 1.10.17: 541

654 

 Index locorum

– 1.87–88: 582 n. 274 – 4: 450 n. 48 – 8: 450 n. 48 – 12.2 ff.: 581 n. 269 – 18: 450 n. 48 – De flatibus – 8: 450 n. 48 – De fracturis – 25: 450 n. 48 – 27: 448 n. 42, 450 n. 48 – 40: 448 n. 42 – De hebdomadibus (ed. Roscher) – 26.10–12: 542 n. 134 – De humoribus – 4: 450 n. 48 – De locis in homine – 3: 450 n. 48, 452 – 13: 452 – De morbis – 1.26: 425 – De morbo sacro – 2: 497 – 10: 446 n. 34 – De natura ossium (ed. Littré) – 9.194.22: 113 – De officina medici – 25: 450 n. 48 – De vetere medicina – 1: 53 n. 19 – Epidemiae – 2.4.1: 425 – 4.1.20: 450 n. 48 – 4.1.23: 450 n. 48 – 4.1.43: 450 n. 48 – 4.1.45: 448 – De morbo sacro – 10: 446 n. 34 – Praedicta (Prorrheticum) – 1.24: 463 n. 93 – 1.49: 463 n. 93 – 1.101: 448 – Prognosticum – 7: 450 n. 48, 451 Hippolytus – Fragmenta in Proverbia (ed. Achelis) – 16.1: 114 n. 22

– Refutatio omnium haeresium – 1.4.1: 230 n. 60 – 1.7.1: 625 n. 67 – 1.8.13: 369 – 7.18: 279 – 7.29: 315 n. 119 – 7.29.23: 277 Hippon (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 38) – A 3: 141 n. 165 Homerus – Ilias – 1.13: 28 n. 74 – 1.43–52: 425 – 1.47: 423 – 1.60: 425 – 1.225–233: 430 – 1.372: 28 n. 74 – 2.272: 66 – 3.179: 393 – 3.277: 194 n. 39 – 3.381: 425 – 3.396–409: 425 – 3.413–420: 425 – 3.427–436: 425 – 3.458–459: 65 – 3.459: 187 n. 14 – 5.864: 423 – 6.46: 28 n. 74 – 6.113: 278 – 6.208: 585 – 6.513: 424 n. 33 – 8.555–558: 422 – 9.206: 279 – 9.212–213: 279 – 9.212: 279 – 9.632–639: 64 – 10.252–253: 429 – 11.1–2 (= 19.1–2): 278, 290 n. 23 – 11.305: 424 – 11.784: 585 – 13.21–22: 94 n. 14 – 13.589: 556 n. 180 – 14.201: 99 – 14.202: 94 n. 14

Index locorum 

– 16.432–458: 430 – 18.483: 94, 94 n. 16 – 18.484–485: 95 – 18.490: 95 n. 18 – 18.573: 95 n. 18 – 18.587: 95 n. 18 – 18.590: 95 n. 18 – 18.607: 94, 94 n. 16 – 19.1–2: 278 – 19.374: 424 n. 33 – 19.397–398: 422, 425 – 20.56–66: 428 – 21.238: 29 n. 78 – 21.246–247: 278 – 22.26–29: 424 – 22.194–198: 425 – Odyssea – 3.1–2: 278 – 5.247–248: 254 n. 13 – 9.109: 194 n. 39 – 9.298–309: 399 – 9.344–384: 399 – 9.430: 29 n. 78 – 11.484–486: 277 – 17.316–317: 277 Hymni Homerici – in Demetrem – 305–333: 426 Hyperides – Fragmenta (ed. Kenyon) – fr. 200: 563 n. 202 Iamblichus – De vita Pythagorae – 11.54: 553 n. 164 – 25: 132 n. 118 – 28.150: 553 n. 164 – 112: 125 n. 78 – 64–65: 126 n. 80 – 110–114: 126 n. 80 – 199: 150, 151, 152 – 239: 126 n. 85 – 241: 139 n. 157 – 266: 139 n. 157 – 267: 139

 655

Inscriptiones – Inscriptiones Graecae – 12(9).262: 22 n. 27 – Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae (ed. Moretti) – 4.160: 22 n. 27 – Inscriptiones Mileti – 6.3.1222.14–23: 25 n. 49 – Inscriptiones Pergami – 485.18: 22 n. 27 – Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum (ed. Dittenberger) – II3 736.96: 25 n. 45 – III3 1025.23: 25 n. 45 – III3 1044.40: 25 n. 45 – Tituli Asiae Minoris (ed. Kalinka) – V 2.1256.5–6: 32 n. 110 Isidorus – Etymologiae – 8.6.18–26: 622 n. 57 Isocrates – Orationes – 5 (Ad Philippum) – 11: 187 n. 14 – 12 (Panathenaicus) – 91: 199 n. 56 Johannes Chrysostomus – Homiliae in epistulam ad Ephesinos (ed. Montfaucon) – 4.12.3 (PG 62.92): 569 n. 224 Johannes Lydus – De mensibus (ed. Wünsch) – 2.9: 550 n. 159 – 4.135: 457 Justinus – Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi – 20.4: 118, 132, 132 n. 118 – 20.4.16–17: 118 n. 46 Leucippus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 67) – A 1: 437 n. 3, 437 n. 5

656 

 Index locorum

– A 2: 438 n. 6 – A 6: 442 n. 19 – A 12: 610 n. 4 – A 19 [I]: 596 n. 313 – A 24: 556 n. 181 – A 28: 441 n. 18 – A 29: 310 n. 78, 310 n. 79 – B 1a: 319 n. 148, 368, 368 n. 60 Libanius (ed. Foerster) – Declamationes – 1 (Apologia Socratis) – 157: 172 n. 55 Lucianus – De saltatione – 79: 22 n. 27 – Dialogi mortuorum – 20.8: 225 n. 29 – Icaromenippus – 5–8: 225 n. 30 – Lexiphanes – 6: 457 n. 75 – Philopseudes – 20: 561 n. 201 – Pro lapsu inter salutandum – 5: 224 n. 16 – Somnium sive Vita Luciani – 4: 561 n. 201 Lucretius – De rerum natura – 1.716–776: 302 n. 15 – 1.722–725: 279, 288 n. 16 – 1.734 ff.: 309 – 1.736: 308 n. 64 – 1.746–752: 311 – 1.753–755: 310 – 1.769 ff.: 310 – 1.770: 310 – 1.772: 310 – 1.773: 310 – 1.775–776: 310 – 1.776–777: 310 – 1.809–811: 453 n. 59 – 1.900: 279 – 1.936–942: 481

– 1.1087–1093: 288 n. 18 – 2.418–421: 465 – 2.670: 453 n. 60 – 2.904–906: 453 n. 60 – 2.1118–1119: 453 n. 60 – 2.1134–1137: 453 n. 60 – 2.1146–1152: 453 n. 60 – 3.112–116: 452 n. 56 – 3.273–281: 441 n. 16 – 3.273: 441 n. 16 – 3.566–575: 453 n. 60 – 3.575: 453 n. 59 – 3.691–697: 453 n. 60 – 3.717–740: 465 n. 100 – 3.788–789: 453 n. 60 – 3.870–893: 465, 465 n. 100 – 4.176–238: 440 n. 11 – 4.528–531: 453 – 4.710–716: 465 – 4.752–822: 458 n. 77 – 4.793–801: 440 n. 11 – 4.867–869: 453 n. 60 – 4.954–956: 453 n. 60 – 4.1041–1044: 453 n. 59 – 4.1115–1117: 453 n. 59 – 5.132–133: 453 n. 60 – 5.156–234: 622, 622 n. 58 – 5.783–787: 279, 289 n. 20 – 5.807–815: 453 n. 60 – 5.1161–1183: 458 n. 77 – 5.1161: 458 – 5.1169–1183: 454 n. 63 – 5.1183–1193: 458 n. 78 – 5.1186–1193: 456 – 5.1380–1384: 460 n. 88 – 6.777–780: 465 Lycon Troicus (eds. Stork/Fortenbaugh/Van Ophuijsen/Dorandi) – fr. 8 (= fr. 7 Wehrli): 225 n. 25 Machon Comicus (ed. Gow) – fr. 16.285–289: 561 n. 201 Macrobius – Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis – 1.20.3: 541

Index locorum 

– Saturnalia – 1.18.12: 31 n. 28 – 1.18.18: 32 n. 114 – 7.14.3–4: 437 n. 5 Marcellinus – De pulsibus – 124–126: 451 n. 53 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus – Meditationes sive Ad seipsum libri – 3.3.4: 230 n. 60 – 4.27: 591 n. 301 – 6.10.1.1–2: 591 n. 301 – 9.39: 591 n. 301 Martianus Capella – De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii – 9.926: 127 n. 90, 161 n. 1 – 9.928: 127 n. 90 Maximus Confessor – Sermones – 56 (PG 91.969a): 230 n. 60 Maximus Tyrius (ed. Koniaris) – Orationes – 23.5c5: 513 Melissus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 30) – A 14 [I]: 351 n. 36 Menestor (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 32): 140 Metrodorus Chius (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 70) – A 3: 610 n. 4 – A 25 [II]: 351 n. 36 Metrodorus Lampsacenus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 61) – A 1: 419 – A 2: 421 – A 3: 417, 526 n. 102 – A 4: 7, 415 – A 5: 429 – A 6: 421, 526

 657

Minucius Felix – Octavius – 2.21: 511 n. 58 Musaeus (ed. Bernabé) – fr. 81 (= 2 B 14 DK): 99 Nausiphanes (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 75) – A 7 [II]: 345, 345 n. 28 – A 8: 373 n. 85 Neanthes Cyzicenus (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 84 F 30: 118 n. 46 Nicander – Theriaca – 4: 526 n. 103 Nicolaus Damascenus (ed. Jacoby ~ Shahin) – FGrHist 90 F 8: 581 n. 271 Nicolaus Myrensis – Progymnasmata (ed. Felten) – 7.7: 57 – 7.12: 57 n. 27 Novum Testamentum – Epistula Petri 1 – 2.24: 561 n. 201 – Epistula Pauli ad Galatas – 6.17: 561 n. 201 Olympiodorus – In Aristotelis Meteorologica commentaria (ed. Stüve) – 17.19: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 – 136.6 ff.: 211 n. 82 – In Platonis Alcibiadem I (ed. Westerink) – 162.104: 103 n. 55 – In Platonis Gorgiam (ed. Westerink) – 5.4: 125 n. 75 Oppianus – Halieutica – 1.352: 327 n. 207 Oribasius

658 

 Index locorum

– Collectiones medicae (eds. Bussemaker/ Daremberg) – 4.8.3: 463 n. 93 – 45.30.48: 463 n. 93 – 59.2.11: 463 n. 93 – Lib. inc. 36: 451 n. 53 Origenes – Contra Celsum (ed. Borret) – 3.25: 363 – 6.42: 92 n. 6, 94 n. 12 Orion Thebanus – Etymologicon (ed. Sturz) – Lett. X (163.23–25): 526 – Lett. Ω (170.26–28): 570 n. 229 Orphica (ed. Bernabé) – Argonautica – 17: 29 n. 86 – 25: 39 n. 165 – 27: 28 n. 74 – Hymni – 1.10: 22 n. 27 – 2.14: 29 n. 79 – 20: 30 n. 91 – 31: 30 n. 90 – 31.1: 30 n. 92 – 31.7: 22 n. 27 – 38: 30 n. 90 – 69: 49 – 70: 49 – 70.4–5: 51 – Lithica – 463: 22 n. 27 – Titanomachia – fr. 1: 99 – fr. 11: 498 n. 19 – Fragmenta – 5: 252 n. 6 – 40–63: 573 n. 240 – 44: 20 n. 10 – 57–59: 31 n. 103 – 64: 519 n. 83 – 99: 29 n. 85 – 134: 31 n. 107 – 135: 31 n. 107, 32

– 139: 31 n. 107, 32 – 140 [XI]: 32 n. 110 – 143.4: 31 n. 107, 32 – 162: 31 n. 107, 32 – 167.2: 31 n. 107 – 170: 31 n. 107, 32 – 198: 30 n. 89 – 206: 31 n. 102 – 206.1: 30 n. 88 – 213: 30 n. 89 – 241.1: 31 n. 107 – 267–268: 30 n. 89 – 278–279: 30 n. 89 – 297: 30 n. 89 – 306: 27 n. 66 – 310: 17 – 314–316: 33 n. 34 – 315: 31 n. 105 – 316: 31 n. 104 – 350: 28 n. 73 – 383: 17 – 387–389: 17 – 392–393: 17 – 396–397: 17 – 398: 30 n. 88 – 407: 499 n. 24, 557 n. 185 – 431 [I–II]: 26 n. 59 – 463–465: 24 – 463: 35 n. 137 – 464–465: 35 n. 137 – 485–486: 24 n. 42, 26 n. 56 – 485.4: 24 n. 42 – 487.4: 24 n. 42 – 487.6: 29 n. 82 – 488.1: 31 n. 97 – 488.7: 34 n. 127 – 488.10: 24 n. 42 – 489.2: 31 n. 97 – 489.4: 28 n. 71 – 489.5: 32 n. 113 – 490.2: 31 n. 97 – 490.4: 28 n. 71 – 490.5: 32 n. 113 – 491.2: 31 n. 97 – 492.7: 24, 30 – 493: 29 nn. 81 and 84, 32 n. 111, 33 n. 119 – 519–523: 39 n. 165

Index locorum 

– 540.4: 31 n. 98 – 543: 32 n. 114 – 546–562: 20 n. 14 – 567: 24 n. 41 – 567.12: 25 n. 46 – 573: 21 n. 20 – 577–578: 576 n. 252 – 578: 18 n. 7, 18 n. 8, 25 n. 45, 31 n. 99, 32 n. 109, 35 n. 142 – 582.2–3: 25 n. 49 – 583: 25 n. 49 – 583.2: 27 n. 64 – 583.2–3: 25 n. 49 – 585: 22 n. 27 – 588 [I]: 27 n. 67 – 600 [I]: 22 n. 27 – 627: 21 n. 20 – 662: 32 n. 110 – 671: 523 n. 95 – 707–711: 36 n. 143 – 707: 525 n. 97 – 709: 525 n. 97 – 810: 528 n. 109 – 830: 38 n. 158 – 830 [I]: 37 n. 148 – 830a.6–7: 29 – 856: 421, 526 n. 100 – 865.1: 23 n. 32 – 1003–1004: 575 n. 250 – 1128: 499 n. 24, 557 n. 185 Papyri – PAmmon I 1 (= PDuke inv. G 178, cols. I–II): 339, 342, 343, 371, 399 – PAmmon II 26 (= PDuke inv. G 176) – PBerol. inv. 44: 17 – PBerol. inv. 9782 – col. LXX.5–12: 138 n. 148 – cols. LXX.43–LXXI.6: 299 n. 2 – col. LXXI.12–18: 138 n. 149 – PBonon. 4: 17 – PBrLibr. Add. Ms 37516.1 – 5: 115 n. 33 – PBrLibr. inv. 137 (= PLitLond. 165) – cf. Anonymus Londiniensis – PDerv. – fr. A3: 216

 659

– fr. A4: 216 – fr. D12: 216 – fr. D13: 216 – fr. F7: 180 – fr. F11: 203 – fr. F12: 203 – fr. F13: 203 – fr. F15: 180, 203 – fr. F17: 63 n. 48, 180, 181, 198, 202, 203, 203 n. 69, 205, 206 – fr. F17.1: 203 – fr. F17.2: 203 – frs. g12G1: 203 – frs. g13G4: 179 – fr. g13.6: 198 – fr. G4: 180, 190 – fr. G6.2: 46 n. 4 – fr. G9a.2: 46 n. 4 – fr. G13: 180 – fr. H6: 216 – fr. H8: 180 – fr. H9: 216 – fr. H15: 216 – fr. H46: 180, 203 – fr. I20: 216 – col. 0: 52 n. 16 – cols. I–VII: 71 – cols. I–VI: 3, 45, 46, 46 n. 3, 47, 52, 196 n. 44 – cols. I–II: 46 n. 4, 52 – col. I: 3, 46 n. 3, 48, 52, 53, 70 – col. I.4: 53 n. 18 – col. I.6: 46 n. 4 – col. I.9: 53 n. 20 – col. I.11: 53 n. 18 – col. II: 493, 521, 560 n. 197, 568 – col. II.3: 46 n. 4 – col. II.6–9: 521 – col. II.6–7: 521 – col. II.7: 521, 521 n. 87, 522 – col. II.9: 521 n. 87 – col. III: 203 n. 69, 204 – col. III.1–3: 203 n. 69 – col. III.5–8: 252 n. 6 – col. III.5: 46 – col. IV: 3, 4, 5, 46, 47, 48, 49, 62, 63, 63 n. 48, 64, 70, 179, 180, 183, 186 n. 12,

660 

 Index locorum

192, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206, 214, 215, 218, 493, 503, 532, 533, 534, 537, 538, 539, 540, 543, 557, 583 n. 280, 597, 598, 599 – col. IV.1–10: 64 n. 49 – col. IV.1–6: 64 – col. IV.1–4: 182 – col. IV.1–3: 64 – col. IV.1: 65, 185 – col. IV.2–3: 187, 190, 193 – col. IV.2: 65, 182, 182 n. 6, 183, 187, 188, 192, 509, 539, 540 – col. IV.3–4: 47, 49, 65, 182, 189 – col. IV.3: 187, 188, 189, 533, 540 – col. IV.4: 49, 66, 70, 182, 189, 199 n. 54, 532 – col. IV.5–10: 67 – col. IV.5–7: 541 – col. IV.5–6: 180, 186, 191 – col. IV.5: 67, 509, 533 – col. IV.6: 67, 69, 191 n. 30, 193, 193 n. 36, 196, 197, 533, 541 – col. IV.7–9: 66, 68, 197, 200 n. 60, 206 n. 74 – col. IV.7–8: 70 – col. IV.7: 69, 180, 197, 198, 199 n. 54, 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 209, 541, 543 – col. IV.8–10: 202 – col. IV.8–9: 70, 202, 541 – col. IV.8: 192 n. 33, 206, 207, 209, 538 n. 129 – col. IV.9–10: 64, 70, 180, 202 – col. IV.9: 46, 188, 192 n. 33, 203, 204, 205, 206, 211, 560 – col. IV.10–12: 70 – col. IV.10: 203, 204, 205, 530, 542, 543 – col. IV.11–13: 544 – col. IV.11: 218 – col. IV.12–13: 544 – col. IV.12: 218, 544 – col. IV.13: 204, 218, 537 – col. IV.14: 70 – col. V: 10, 203, 493, 494, 545, 546 n. 145, 578, 579, 586 – col. V.3–6: 582 – col. V.4: 581 – col. V.6–13: 579

– col. V.8: 585 – col. V.9–12: 530 – col. V.9: 580, 583 – col. V.10: 580 – cols. VI–VII: 50, 61, 70 – col. VI: 46, 46 n. 3, 54, 57, 58, 61, 252 n. 6, 493, 523, 561 n. 198, 568 – col. VI.1–8: 252 n. 6 – col. VI.1: 30 – col. VI.2: 38 n. 160 – col. VI.4–5: 28 n. 75, 47, 500 – col. VI.6: 46 n. 3 – col. VI.8–11: 522 – col. VI.9–11: 189 n. 22 – col. VI.9–10: 500 – col. VI.9 (bis): 46 – col. VI.11: 493 n. 4 – col. VII–XXVI: 196 n. 44 – col. VII: 2, 3, 45, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60 n. 40, 186, 196, 503, 504 – col. VII.2: 60 n. 39 – col. VII.2–3: 561 – col. VII.3–4: 60, 530 – col. VII.3: 54 – col. VII.4: 54 – col. VII.4–5: 60 – col. VII.5: 60, 499 – col. VII.5–9: 60 – col. VII.6: 66 – col. VII.7–11: 55 – col. VII.7–8: 58 n. 30 – col. VII.7: 60 – col. VII.8–10: 55 – col. VII.8–9: 57 n. 29 – col. VII.8: 60 n. 40 – col. VII.9–12: 60 – col. VII.9–11: 55, 58 – col. VII.9–10: 61 – col. VII.9: 56, 57 – col. VII.10–12: 59 n. 35 – col. VII.10: 59 n. 33 – col. VII.14: 61 n. 42 – col. VII.15: 61 – col. VII.16: 61 – col. VII.17: 59 n. 33 – cols. VIII–IX: 501 – col. VIII: 61, 543

Index locorum 

– col. VIII.1–12: 86 – col. VIII.2: 50, 61 – col. VIII.4–12: 47 – col. VIII.4–5: 62, 75, 559 – col. VIII.3–5: 62 n. 46 – col. VIII.5: 252 n. 6, 549 n. 153 – col. VIII.6: 530, 531, 543 – col. VIII.8: 543 – col. IX: 195 – col. IX.1–2: 501 – col. IX.1: 66 – col. IX.2–3: 499 – col. IX.4–5: 500 – col. IX.4: 500 – col. IX.5 ff.: 62 n. 46 – col. IX.5–10: 86 – col. IX.5–8: 78, 261 n. 36 – col. IX.5–6: 80 – col. IX.7–8: 75 – col. IX.7: 500 – col. IX.8: 75 – col. IX.9–10: 79 – col. IX.10: 66 – col. X.1–3: 530 – col. X.2: 66 – col. X.3: 530 – col. X.8: 530 – col. X.9–10: 501 – col. X.11–13: 64, 78, 87 – col. X.11: 197 n. 47 – cols. X–XI: 66 – col. XI.1: 78 – col. XI.1–10: 87 – col. XI.1–4: 78 – col. XI.2–3: 500, 513 – col. XI.2: 584 n. 282 – col. XI.3: 560 – col. XI.5: 501, 530 – col. XI.6–9: 206 – col. XI.6–7: 184 – col. XI.9: 197 n. 47 – col. XII: 513 – col. XII.3: 500 – col. XII.8–9: 60 n. 39 – col. XII.8: 66 – col. XII.9 ff.: 60 n. 39 – col. XII.9: 66

– col. XII.11: 535 – cols. XIII–XVI: 501 – col. XIII: 543 – col. XIII.1–11: 76, 87 – col. XIII.3: 78, 197 n. 47 – col. XIII.4: 543, 548, 549 n. 153 – col. XIII.5–6: 55, 205 n. 73 – col. XIII.7: 504 – col. XIII.8: 66 – col. XIII.9–11: 76 – col. XIII.9: 500, 535 – col. XIV.1–14: 87 – col. XIV.1: 557 – col. XIV.2–4: 76 – col. XIV.2: 501 – col. XIV.5: 66, 197 n. 47 – col. XIV.6: 77 – col. XIV.7: 76, 500, 529 – col. XIV.9–10: 501 – col. XIV.9: 66 – col. XIV.12–13: 500 – col. XIV.12: 78 – col. XV: 195 – col. XV.1–5: 183 – col. XV.2: 498 n. 19 – col. XV.3–5: 88 – col. XV.3–4: 76 – col. XV.6: 521 – col. XV.8: 62 n. 45 – col. XV.9–10: 182 – col. XV.11: 521 – col. XV.13: 521 – col. XVI: 83 – col. XVI.1–15: 88 – col. XVI.1–2: 197 n. 47 – col. XVI.1: 66, 76, 500 – col. XVI.2–8: 78 – col. XVI.9–15: 82, 337 n. 14 – col. XVI.9: 82 – col. XVI.10: 500 – col. XVI.14: 84 – col. XVII: 515 – col. XVII.2–9: 88 – col. XVII.3–9: 85, 554 – col. XVII.3–4: 500 – col. XVII.4–5: 500 – col. XVII.4: 510

 661

662 

 Index locorum

– col. XVII.6: 84 – col. XVII.7–9: 83–85 – col. XVII.8–9: 84 – col. XVII.9: 565 n. 212 – col. XVII.12–14: 500 – col. XVIII: 509 n. 53, 514 n. 67, 515, 534, 591 – col. XVIII.1 ff.: 500 – col. XVIII.1–3: 513 – col. XVIII.1: 513, 515 – col. XVIII.2: 500, 514, 515, 534 – col. XVIII.3–4: 193 n. 34, 515 – col. XVIII.3: 66 – col. XVIII.4: 515 – col. XVIII.5: 515 – col. XVIII.7 ff.: 500 – col. XVIII.7 (bis): 66 – col. XVIII.7–9: 534 – col. XVIII.8–9: 529, 533 – col. XVIII.12: 197 n. 47 – col. XVIII.14: 509, 515 – col. XIX: 83, 337, 337 n. 14 – col. XIX.1–7: 89 – col. XIX.1–4: 79, 337 – col. XIX.1–3: 81 – col. XIX.1–2: 80 – col. XIX.2–3: 81 – col. XIX.2: 81 – col. XIX.3: 500 – col. XIX.4–5: 500 – col. XIX.5–7: 83 – col. XIX.8–9: 197 n. 47 – col. XIX.8: 535 – col. XIX.11–12: 500 – col. XIX.11: 65 – col. XIX.14–15: 500, 516 – col. XIX.15: 500 – col. XX: 47, 255, 493, 497, 501, 502, 545, 546, 546 n. 145, 558, 578, 579, 583, 586 – col. XX.1–10: 583 – col. XX.1–3: 189 n. 22 – col. XX.10–13: 205 n. 73 – col. XX.10: 583, 584 n. 284 – col. XX.12: 584 n. 284 – col. XXI: 255, 256, 257, 263 – col. XXI.1–5: 260 – col. XXI.1–4: 257

– col. XXI.1–2: 257 – col. XXI.1: 66, 197 n. 47, 257, 556, 584 – col. XXI.2–4: 556 – col. XXI.4–5: 257 – col. XXI.5: 257, 258, 259 – col. XXI.5–7: 184, 257, 500 – col. XXI.6 ff.: 500 – col. XXI.9–11: 257 – col. XXI.9–10: 554 – col. XXI.10–11: 501 – col. XXII: 30 n. 88, 493, 494, 521, 545, 559, 578, 586 – col. XXII.1: 501 – col. XXII.1 (bis): 66 – col. XXII.1–6: 584, 585 – col. XXII.2: 585 – col. XXII.3–6: 501 n. 25 – col. XXII.4: 585 – col. XXII.5: 524, 585 – col. XXII.7–16: 501 n. 25 – col. XXII.7–9: 193 n. 34 – col. XXII.7: 193, 501, 510, 524, 528 – col. XXII.8: 500 – col. XXII.9–10: 529 – col. XXII.10: 500 – col. XXII.11: 586 – col. XXII.13–15: 508 – col. XXII.13: 500 – col. XXII.14–15: 501 – col. XXIII.1–3: 59 – col. XXIII.2: 499, 519 – col. XXIII.3: 500, 501 – col. XXIII.6–10: 500 – col. XXIII.7–8: 186, 192 – col. XXIII.7: 60 n. 39, 66, 205 n. 73, 584 n. 282 – col. XXIII.8: 533 – col. XXIII.11: 516 – col. XXIII.12: 500 – cols. XXIV–XXV: 70 – col. XXIV: 9, 216, 217, 218, 511, 512, 513, 520, 567, 597 – col. XXIV.3: 511 – col. XXIV.4–5: 218 – col. XXIV.7–12: 509, 512 n. 60 – col. XXIV.7–11: 598 – col. XXIV.7: 66

Index locorum 

– col. XXIV.8–9: 520 – col. XXIV.10–11: 545 – col. XXIV.10: 513 – col. XXIV.11: 513 – col. XXV: 83, 195, 217, 260 – col. XXV.1–3: 217 – col. XXV.1–2: 217 – col. XXV.3–12: 89 – col. XXV.3–9: 260 – col. XXV.3–6: 217 – col. XXV.3–4: 83 – col. XXV.3: 217 – col. XXV.4–6: 78 – col. XXV.4–5: 79 – col. XXV.4: 565 n. 212 – col. XXV.6: 79 – col. XXV.7–9: 217 – col. XXV.7–8: 83 – col. XXV.7: 515, 565 n. 212 – col. XXV.8–12: 261 n. 36 – col. XXV.8–9: 80 – col. XXV.8: 540 – col. XXV.9–12: 68, 215, 217 – col. XXV.9–10: 76 – col. XXV.10–12: 182 – col. XXV.10–11: 65 – col. XXV.11–12: 62 – col. XXV.12–13: 59 n. 37 – col. XXVI: 3, 45, 62, 62 n. 44 – col. XXVI.1 ff.: 500 – col. XXVI.2–12: 500 – col. XXVI.2–3: 66 – col. XXVI.11: 529 – PGrenf. II 11 – col. I: 92, 95 – col. I.14–18: 92 – col. II: 93, 94 n. 10, 95 – col. II.3: 92, 94 – PGurob 1 – col. I: 18, 18 n. 8 – col. I.1: 22 – col. I.2: 20, 23 – col. I.3: 20 – col. I.4: 23, 28 – col. I.5: 29 – col. I.6: 29 – col. I.7: 30

– col. I.8: 20, 24 – col. I.9–11: 23 – col. I.9: 23 – col. I.11: 23, 28 – col. I.12: 22 – col. I.13: 23 – col. I.14: 20, 23, 25 – col. I.15: 20, 21, 23 – col. I.16: 23 – col. I.17: 20, 29 n. 85, 30 – col. I.18: 20, 30 – col. I.19: 20, 22 n. 31, 31 – col. I.21: 31 – col. I.22: 21, 29 n. 76, 31 – col. I.23: 20, 31 n. 97, 32 – col. I.24: 20, 24, 33 – col. I.25: 20, 22, 26, 34 – col. I.26: 20, 34, 35 – col. I.27: 35 – col. I.28: 20, 27 – col. II: 18, 18 n. 8, 35 – col. II.10: 35 – col. II.11: 20, 35 – col. II.12: 26, 35 – col. II.13: 35 – col. II.15: 35 – col. II.22: 27 – col. II.23: 35 – PHerc. – cf. Carneiscus – cf. Colotes – cf. Demetrius Laco – cf. Epicurus – cf. Philodemus – PHibeh 13: 125 n. 79 – PIbscher II – 10–11: 299 n. 2 – PLitLond. 159b: 299 n. 2 – PMag. VII 450: 37 n. 148 – PMich. inv. 4912a (ed. Priest) – col. 1.1–11: 476 – col. 1.2–4: 476 – col. 1.3: 476 – col. 1.4: 476 – col. 1.10–11: 476 n. 11 – col. 1.12–14: 474 – col. 2.9–14: 475

 663

664 

 Index locorum

– col. 2.8–14: 475, 476 – col. 2.12–14: 475 – PMilVogl. VIII 309 – cf. Posidippus – POxy. I 12 (= BNJ 255 F 4): 114 n. 28 – POxy. VII 1012 – fr. 6: 340, 341, 362, 362 n. 54, 374 – fr. 6.49: 362 n. 54 – fr. 6.51: 362 n. 54 – fr. 6.54: 362 n. 54 – fr. 6.55: 362 n. 54, 404 – fr. C (fr. 9), col. II: 362 n. 54 – POxy. VIII 1084: 97 n. 34 – POxy. IX 1176, cols. I–III – cf. Satyrus – POxy. XI 1364 + LII 3647: 9 n. 10, 299 n. 1 – POxy. XIII 1609 + PPrinc. inv. AM 11224c – fr. a, col. II.4–13: 299 n. 2 – POxy. XV 1797: 9 n. 10, 299 n. 1 – POxy. XX 2256 – fr. 3: 370 n. 68 – POxy. XXXII 2623 – l. 6: 102 n. 50 – l. 11: 102 n. 50 – POxy. XLVII 3318: 299 n. 2, 300, 300 n. 11 – POxy. LIII 3710 – col. II.43–47: 542 n. 134 – POxy. LXXIII 4938: 300 – PPetrie II 49e (= PLitLond. 159a): 299 n. 2 – PSI VII 850: 17 – PStrasb. gr. inv. 1665–1666 – cf. Empedocles – PTura III 16.9–18: 9 n. 10 – PTura V 222.18–29: 8 n. 10 – PTura V 222.27: 342 – cf. Didymus Caecus Alexandrinus – PVatic. 11 – col. I.23–28: 299 n. 2 Palladius – Historia Lausiaca (ed. Butler) – Vita 57.2: 115 n. 31 Parmenides (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 28) – A 33: 610 n. 4 – A 37: 619 n. 42 – A 37 [II]: 315 n. 119

– A 49 [I]: 351 n. 36 – B 1.1: 553 n. 165 – B 1.11–13: 553 n. 165 – B 1.28–32: 54 – B 3: 595 n. 311 – B 8.2–4: 54 – B 8.4: 291 n. 25 – B 8.44: 512 – B 8.53: 503 – B 8.54: 552 n. 162, 553 n. 165 – B 8.55–61: 54 – B 8.59: 553 n. 165 – B 10–12: 619 n. 42 – B 13: 264 n. 44 – B 16.1: 512 – B 18: 264 n. 44 – B 19: 54 – B 20: 264 n. 44 Parthenius Mythographus – Narrationes amatoriae (ed. Martini) – 3.1.3: 581 n. 271 Pausanias – 3.7.5–6: 102, 103 – 4.4.4: 103 n. 59 – 4.6.5: 103 n. 60 Pherecrates (ed. Meineke) – Cheiron – 3.4: 67 – Krapataloi – 1.4: 67 Pherecydes Syrius (ed. Schibli) – fr. 1 (= 7 A 1 DK): 102 n. 52 – fr. 2 (= 7 A 2 DK): 92 n. 3, 103 – fr. 5 (= 7 A 1 DK): 103 – fr. 7 (= 7 A 5 DK): 103 – fr. 14 (= 7 A 1; B 1 DK): 92 n. 6, 94 n. 9, 96 n. 25, 99 n. 38 – fr. 16 (= 7 A 1 DK): 102 n. 51, 102 n. 54 – fr. 22 (= 7 A 6 DK): 102 n. 54 – fr. 23 (= deest ap. DK): 103 n. 55 – fr. 24 (= deest ap. DK): 103 n. 55 – fr. 25 (= deest ap. DK): 103 n. 57 – fr. 27 (= 7 A 1 DK): 96 n. 29

Index locorum 

– fr. 60 (= 7 A 8 DK): 92 n. 3, 94 n. 11 – fr. 63 (= 7 B 13 DK): 99 – fr. 68 (= 7 B 2 DK): 3, 92 – fr. 69 (= 7 B 2 DK): 92 n. 5, 94 n. 13 – fr. 78 (= 7 B 4 DK): 94 n. 12 – fr. 81 (= 7 A 7 DK): 91 n. 2 – fr. 83 (= 7 B 5 DK): 92 n. 6 Philo Alexandrinus – De aeternitate mundi – 39–43: 622 n. 58 – De Josepho – 133: 114 n. 28 Philo Mechanicus – Belopoeica (eds. Köchly/Rustow) – 68.41: 360 Philochorus (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 328 F 77: 528 n. 109 – FGrHist 328 F 182: 528 – FGrHist 328 F 185: 527 n. 106 – FGrHist 328 F 217: 589 n. 293 Philodemus – Adversus eos [qui se libros nosse profitentur] – Liber I (PHerc. 1005/862 et 1485; ed. Angeli) – fr. 107: 399 – fr. 109: 339, 344 – fr. 109.17: 373 – fr. 110: 373 – fr. 111: 373 – fr. 116: 304 n. 40, 305, 305 n. 45, 339, 345 – fr. 116.1–8: 305 – De dis – Liber I (PHerc. 26; ed. Diels) – col. 8: 384 – col. 9: 359 n. 48 – col. 9a.24: 359 n. 49 – col. 9b: 340, 359, 359 n. 48, 383, 384 – col. 9b.7: 384 n. 139  – cols. 11–15: 384 n. 139 – Liber incertus (PHerc. 152/157; ed. Diels) – fr. 6: 465 n. 101

 665

– fr. 8: 465 n. 101 – col. 8.2–3: 509 n. 52 – cols. 13.20–14.13: 313 n. 98 – col. 13.20–21: 313 n. 103 – col. 13.34: 313 n. 101 – De divitiis (?) (PHerc. 1570; eds. Armstrong/ Ponczoch) – col. 6: 321, 321 n. 160 – col. 6.9–19: 321 – col. 6.11–15: 321 – De ira (PHerc. 182; ed. Indelli) – col. 29.26–27: 464 n. 96 – De morte – Liber IV (PHerc. 1050; ed. Henry) – col. 8.13–16: 439 – col. 17: 340, 364 – col. 17.17: 375, 477 n. 14 – col. 17.26: 477 n. 14 – col. 17.28: 375, 477 n. 14 – cols. 19.27–29.26: 463 – cols. 29–30: 8, 462 – cols. 29.27–30.7: 461, 463 – col. 29.27–30: 463 – col. 29.28: 463 – col. 29.29: 464 n. 97 – col. 29.30: 463 – col. 29.32: 463 – col. 29.35: 463 – col. 30.1–5: 463 – col. 30.5–7: 463 – col. 30.7: 463 – cols. 30.7–37.18: 463 – col. 33.37–34.15: 478 – col. 35.11–34: 8, 477 – col. 35.31: 477 n. 15, 479 – col. 36.29–30: 360 n. 50 – col. 39.6–15: 461 – col. 39.13–14: 462 n. 90 – De musica – Liber IV (ed. Delattre) – PHerc. 225, cols. 46.45–47.11: 126 n. 84 – PHerc. 225, col. 109.29–39: 127 n. 88 – PHerc. 225 et al., cols. 55–142: 124 – PHerc. 411, col. 22.4–15: 128 n. 95 – PHerc. 411 + 1572, col. 34: 128 n. 95 – PHerc. 1497, col. 36.29–39: 460 n. 87 – PHerc. 1497, col. 131.28–35: 126 n. 84

666 

 Index locorum

– PHerc. 1497, col. 145.16–19: 137 n. 146 – PHerc. 1497, cols. 147–148: 128 n. 95 – PHerc. 1497, cols. 147.34–148.5: 171 n. 51 – PHerc. 1497, col. 148.1–5: 174 – PHerc. 1576, col. 22.4–15: 128 n. 95 – PHerc. 1576, col. 42.39–45: 124 n. 74 – PHerc. 1576, col. 42: 124 – PHerc. 1576, col. 42.39–45: 124 n. 74 – PHerc. 1576, cols. 46.45–47.11: 126 n. 84 – PHerc. 1576, col. 109.29–39: 127 n. 88 – PHerc. 1576, cols. 131.28–35: 126 n. 84 – PHerc. 1578, col. 100.37–45: 128 n. 95 – PHerc. 1578, cols. 100.37–101.1: 173 n. 57 – PHerc. 1578, cols. 100.39: 174 – PHerc. 1583 et al., cols. 1–54: 124 – De pietate – PHerc. 247 + 242, col. 86a//b (ed. Obbink): 386 n. 151 – PHerc. 247, col. 6a (sin. pars) (ed. Schober): 3, 97, 98, 104 – PHerc. 247, col. 6a (sin. pars).6–22: 3 – PHerc. 1077, cols. 18.30–19.18 (ed. Obbink): 315 n. 111 – PHerc. 1077, col. 19.1–23: 528 – PHerc. 1077, col. 19.1–15: 396 n. 191 – PHerc. 1077, col. 19.5–18: 620 n. 51 – PHerc. 1077, col. 19.16–18: 528 – PHerc. 1077, col. 19.26–27: 300 n. 11 – PHerc. 1077, col. 35.6–16: 314 n. 107 – PHerc. 1077, col. 35.7–15: 314 n. 107 – PHerc. 1077, col. 35.11–12: 315 n. 114 – PHerc. 1077, col. 35.14–15: 300 n. 11 – PHerc. 1077, col. 38.5–17: 314 n. 109 – PHerc. 1077, col. 38.27–39.4: 314 n. 105 – PHerc. 1077, col. 38.27–39.7: 314 n. 105 – PHerc. 1077, col. 39.3–4: 300 n. 11 – PHerc. 1077/1098, cols. 19.23–30: 314 n. 106 – PHerc. 1077/1098, cols. 19.24–20.11: 314 n. 106 – PHerc. 1077/1098, cols. 47–53: 377 n. 106 – PHerc. 1098, col. 7.22–29: 465 n. 101 – PHerc. 1098, col. 20.6–11: 315 n. 113 – PHerc. 1098, col. 37.6–10: 315 n. 110

– PHerc. 1428, col. 317 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 6 Schober): 389 – PHerc. 1428, col. 318 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 7 Schober): 389, 403 – PHerc. 1428, col. 319 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 8 Schober): 388 – PHerc. 1428, col. 319.20–31: 625 n. 67 – PHerc. 1428, col. 319.23–25: 387 n. 155 – PHerc. 1428, col. 319.25–27: 390 n. 160 – PHerc. 1428, col. 320 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 9 Schober): 340, 360, 384, 386, 390, 391, 398 – PHerc. 1428, col. 320.23: 390 – PHerc. 1428, col. 320.27–31: 614 – PHerc. 1428, col. 321 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 10 Schober): 134 n. 126, 340, 361, 384, 387, 390, 398 – PHerc. 1428, col. 321.13: 390 – PHerc. 1428, col. 321.25–27: 390 n. 160 – PHerc. 1428, col. 321.27: 134 n. 126, 390 – PHerc. 1428, col. 322.28–30 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 11 Schober): 627 n. 75 – PHerc. 1428, col. 327 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 14 Schober): 316 – PHerc. 1428, col. 329 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 16 Henrichs): 8, 455, 457 – PHerc. 1428, col. 331.23–31 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 18 Schober): 626 n. 71 – PHerc. 1428, fr. 16.1–9 (ed. Henrichs): 456 – PHerc. 1428, fr. 16.4–5: 457 – PHerc. 1428, fr. 16.5: 457 n. 75 – PHerc. 1428, fr. 21.31–34 (ed. Schober): 585 – PHerc. 1428, col. 5.3 (ed. Henrichs): 528 – PHerc. 1428, col. 6.16–26: 527 n. 106, 592 n. 305 – PHerc. 1428, col. 11.7: 621 – PHerc. 1428, col. 12.8–12: 619 n. 44 – PHerc. 1428, col. 14.17–20: 619 n. 44 – PHerc. 1428, col. 14.32–15.23: 621 – PHerc. 1428, col. 15.1–4: 621 – PHerc. 1428, col. 15.10–13: 315 n. 116 – PHerc. 1428, col. 15.14–23: 621 n. 53 – PHerc. 1428, col. 15.20–22: 315 n. 116 – PHerc. 1610, col. 3 (ed. Schober): 97, 98 – PHerc. 1610 + 247, cols. 85.17–86a.9 (ed. Obbink): 620 n. 50

Index locorum 

– De poematis – Liber II (PHerc. 1676 + PHerc. 1081; ed. Romeo) – PHerc. 1676, col. 2 + N 1081, col. 12: 7, 415, 415 n. 2, 416 – Liber IV (PHerc. 207; ed Janko) – fr. 10: 8, 458, 461 – fr. 10.4: 460 – fr. 10.5: 459, 459 n. 83 – fr. 23: 383 n. 137 – Liber V (PHerc. 1425; ed. Mangoni) – col. 2: 317 n. 132 – De rhetorica (ed. Sudhaus) – Liber II – PHerc. 1674, fr. 5.5–10: 377 n. 103 – PHerc. 1674, fr. 9.8–15: 377 n. 103 – Liber III – PHerc. 1506, cols. 3.32–4.10: 122 n. 64 – PHerc. 1506, col. 11a.25–12a.3: 121 n. 63 – PHerc. 1506, col. 15.16–16.9: 121 n. 63 – PHerc. 1506, col. 21: 339, 346, 374 – PHerc. 1506, col. 21.20–26: 121 n. 61 – Liber IV – PHerc. 224, fr. 3: 340, 351, 380 – PHerc. 224, fr. 15: 119, 340, 349, 376 n. 94, 378 – PHerc. 224, fr. 15.1: 350 n. 34 – PHerc. 224, fr. 15.1–6: 379 n. 114 – PHerc. 224, fr. 15.6–11: 118 n. 47 – PHerc. 245, fr. 7: 117 n. 40, 340, 350, 376 n. 94, 377, 561 – PHerc. 245, fr. 7.1: 401 – PHerc. 245, fr. 7.1–4: 548 – PHerc. 245, fr. 7.2–3: 378 – PHerc. 1007, col. 40a.3–8: 119 n. 54 – PHerc. 1104, fr. 7: 119 n. 53, 120, 122, 339, 348, 374 – PHerc. 1104, fr. 7.17–22: 121 n. 60 – PHerc. 1104, fr. 7.17: 374 – PHerc. 1104, fr. 7.22–23: 121 – PHerc. 1104, fr. 7.22: 121 – PHerc. 1104, fr. 7.23: 121 – PHerc. 1423: 374 n. 89, 377 – PHerc. 1673/1007: 374 n. 89, 378, 380 – Liber X – PHerc. 473 fr. 5: 132 n. 120 – Liber incertus (VII?)

 667

– PHerc. 1004, col. 56.5–13: 122 n. 64 – PHerc. 1004, col. 57: 123 – PHerc. 1004, col. 57.8–13: 122 – PHerc. 1004, col. 60: 123, 123 n. 69 – PHerc. 1004, col. 60.4: 123 – PHerc. 1004, col. 60.5–6: 123 – PHerc. 1004, col. 60.6: 123 – PHerc. 1004, col. 62.4–10: 123 – PHerc. 1004, col. 70: 377 n. 104 – PHerc. 1004, col. 84.4–11: 377 n. 104 – PHerc. 1004, col. 105.7–14: 122 n. 64 – Liber incertus – PHerc. 1078/1080, fr. 7.7–17: 122 n. 64 – Liber incertus – PHerc. 1669, fr. 3: 377 n. 105 – De signis (PHerc. 1065; ed. De Lacy) – col. 9.8–38: 213 n. 86 – De vitiis – Liber I (De adulatione) – PHerc. 1675 (ed. Capasso) – cols. 4.34–5.9: 8, 479, 480–481 – col. 4.35–37: 481 – col. 4.39–40: 481 – col. 4.42–43: 482 – col. 4.45–46: 482, 483 – col. 5.25–32: 483 – Liber X (De superbia) – PHerc. 1008 (ed. Jensen; cols. 10–24 ed. Ranocchia) – cols. 1–24: 128 n. 96 – cols. 1–10: 128 – col. 6: 128, 130 n. 105 – col. 6.19–21: 130, 130 n. 106 – col. 6.27–33: 130 – cols. 10–24: 5, 128, 221 – col. 10: 130 n. 105, 223 – col. 10.11–31: 223 – col. 10.11–26: 317 n. 137 – col. 10.11–25: 129 n. 98 – col. 10.16–26: 5, 223 – col. 10.19–26: 230 n. 59 – col. 10.19–20: 317 – cols. 10.31–16.29: 222 – col. 13.1–9: 129 n. 99, 223 – col. 13.33–35: 235 – col. 14.8–12: 234 – col. 14.25–37: 236

668 

 Index locorum

– col. 15.6–8: 235 – col. 16.24–35: 235 – col. 16.24–26: 223, 318 n. 142 – col. 16.24–25: 130 n. 108 – cols. 16.30–24.23: 222 – col. 17.12–14: 236 – cols. 17.19–18.12: 227 – col. 17.27–36: 234 – col. 17.31–34: 236 – col. 18.11–12: 235 – cols. 18.12–19.3: 233 – col. 18.19–31: 234 – col. 18.20–23: 225 n. 22 – col. 18.28–31: 235 – col. 19.21–22: 233 – col. 19.25–26: 234 – col. 19.26–30: 233 – col. 20.2–4: 234 – col. 20.4–33: 233 – col. 20.6–10: 233 – col. 20.22–27: 225 n. 22 – col. 20.34–38: 236 – cols. 21–23: 129 n. 99 – col. 21.16–34: 237 – col. 21.16–31: 237 – col. 21.16–27: 236 – col. 21.36–39: 223 – col. 22.34–36: 223 – col. 23.37–38: 223 n. 12 – col. 24.2–12: 236 – [Historia philosophorum?] – PHerc. 1508 (ed. Crönert) – fr. 3.3 (~ Cavalieri): 375 n. 93 – PHerc. 1788 – col. 1 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 8 Crönert): 3, 101, 102 n. 48, 104, 130, 131 – col. 1.6: 102 n. 49 – col. 1.7: 102 n. 49 – col. 2 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 7 Crönert): 130, 131 – col. 3 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 6 Crönert): 101, 130, 131 – col. 3.8–9: 103 – col. 4 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 5 Crönert): 130, 131 – col. 5 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 4 Crönert): 101, 130, 131

– col. 6 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 3 Crönert): 101, 130, 131, 319 – col. 6.4: 320 – col. 6.5–6: 320 – col. 6.7: 320 – col. 7 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 2 Crönert): 101, 130, 131 – col. 8 (ed. Vassallo = fr. 1 Crönert): 101, 130, 131, 340, 368 – col. 8.8: 368 n. 61, 368 n. 62 – [fr. 9] (= Phld. De piet., col. 82 Obbink): 319 n. 149 – Index Academicorum – PHerc. 164 (ed. Dorandi) – fr. 22: 157 n. 29 – PHerc. 1021 (ed. Dorandi) – cols. 1*–2.5: 157 – col. 1*: 147 n. 3, 156 – col. 1: 147 n. 3, 156 – col. 2: 147 n. 3, 156, 156 n. 24 – col. 2.4: 156 n. 24 – col. 3: 147 n. 3 – col. 5: 147 n. 3 – col. 4: 156 n. 26 – col. 11: 157, 157 n. 29 – col. 11.18: 157 n. 29 – col. 12: 157 n. 29 – cols. 13–19: 156 n. 26 – col. 18.40–41: 154 n. 19 – col. 18.41: 154 – col. 26–32: 156 n. 26 – col. Q: 156 n. 26 – col. R: 156 n. 26 – col. S: 156 n. 26 – col. X: 147 n. 3 – col. Y: 147 n. 3, 156 n. 24 – col. Z: 147 n. 3 – PHerc. 1691 (ed. Del Mastro) – fr. 2: 147 n. 1 – col. 2: 4, 147, 147 n. 2, 156 – col. 2.1–30: 148 – col. 2.5–11: 158 – col. 2.6: 152 – col. 2.10: 155 – col. 2.15: 155 – col. 2.16: 155 – col. 2.20: 148 n. 5, 156

Index locorum 

– col. 2.22: 155 – col. 2.37 ff.: 148 n. 5 – col. 3: 156 – col. 18.40–41: 154 n. 19 – Index Stoicorum (PHerc. 1018; ed. Dorandi) – col. 52.6 ff.: 383 Philolaus (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 44) – B1–3.6: 141 – B 1: 149, 264 – B 4: 265 n. 50 – B 6: 264, 265 n. 50 – B 6.10–18: 265 – B 14: 505 n. 35 – B 17: 183, 213 n. 87 Philoponus – De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum (ed. Rabe) – 582.24: 496 n. 9 – In Aristotelis libros de Generatione et Corruptione commentaria (ed. Vitelli) – 19.3: 310 n. 83, 312 n. 91 – 23.21–30: 437 Photius – Bibliotheca – 438b–441b: 116 n. 34 Phylotimus (ed. Steckerl) – fr. 1: 452 n. 56 Pindarus – Olympia – 1.51–52: 430 – Fragmenta (ed. Maehler) – fr. 80: 99 – fr. 133.1–2: 28 fr. 72 Plato – Alcibiades I – 118c: 162 n. 9 – Apologia Socratis – 26e1: 563 n. 205 – Charmides – 161d1–2: 66

– 162b10: 66 – 162d5: 66 – Cratylus – 384b: 508 n. 47, 540 – 384b5: 508 – 384d: 540 – 384d4: 185 – 385e: 184 – 393b: 431 – 397a1: 558 – 397b: 184 – 400c: 529 – 400c9: 529 n. 113 – 401c1–d7: 522 n. 93 – 402a9: 508 – 402b: 508 – 405b9–c1: 524 – 406a8: 524 – 407a9: 431 n. 55 – 407b5: 558 – 407c1–2: 529 n. 113 – 407c4: 558 – 408c: 508 – 408c2: 508 n. 49 – 409a–b: 568 n. 219 – 409a7: 509 n. 52 – 409a9: 508, 544 – 409b: 431 – 409b6: 431 n. 55 – 410a: 529 – 413b: 194 n. 40 – 413b4–5: 541 – 429d–e: 508 n. 46 – 433c: 184 – Critias – 110b4: 62 n. 45 – Crito – 43a: 259, 259 n. 33 – 44b: 29 n. 78 – [Definitiones] – 415e9–10: 542 – Gorgias – 453a: 569 – 455a: 569 – 457b5: 67 – 507e6–508a4: 69 – 510b1–c8: 259 n. 32

 669

670 

 Index locorum

– 521a6–7: 66 – Hippias minor – 365c8–d4: 66 – Ion – 530c3–4: 419 – 530c8–d3: 419 – Laches – 180c–d: 162 n. 11 – 180d2–3: 174 n. 64 – Leges – 1.626d5: 188 n. 16 – 3.693a4: 306 n. 52 – 7.805e5: 306 n. 52 – 6.775a1: 60 n. 40 – 7.796b: 30 n. 93 – 10.889e: 185 n. 10 – 12.942c: 199 n. 56 – Lysis – 214b2–5: 255 n. 17 – 220a6: 190 n. 28 – 223a2: 67 – [Minos] – 316c: 185 n. 10 – Parmenides – 135b2: 57 n. 29 – Phaedo – 63a7–8: 540 – 98b7–c2: 385 n. 149 – Phaedrus – 229c6–e5: 430 – 241d: 188 n. 16 – 251d1–7: 451 n. 53 – 253c: 306 n. 52 – Philebus – 64e: 306 n. 52 – Protagoras – 315b–c: 507 – 315d: 576 – 316e: 162 n. 10 – 318e–319a: 166 n. 28 – 326c3–6: 174 n. 63 – 326c–328a: 175 n. 66 – 328b: 166 n. 29 – 339a ff.: 499 n. 21 – 340a8 ff.: 530 – 343e: 543 – 343e3: 531

– 347e1–2: 66 – Respublica – 2.362c5: 542 – 2.363c–d: 26 n. 59 – 2.364e: 21 n. 20, 29 n. 83 – 2.375e: 259 – 2.378d6–7: 426 – 3.388a–b: 430 – 3.389e–390a: 430 – 3.391a–c: 430 – 3.392d2: 62 n. 45 – 3.398c–399e7: 127 n. 92 – 3.399a–400b: 127 – 3.399e8–400b: 127 n. 92 – 3.400b1: 127 n. 92 – 3.400b2: 127 – 4.424c: 170 n. 49 – 4.439e6–440a3: 452 n. 54 – 7.533c7 ff.: 582 – 9.580e: 534 n. 121 – 10.621a: 34 n. 129 – Sophista – 242c1–2: 56 n. 26 – 242c8: 62 n. 45 – 244a4–b1: 56 n. 26 – 253b2: 190 n. 28 – 257c: 184 n. 9 – Symposium – 175e: 224 n. 18 – 190d–191: 291 n. 25 – 218b5–7: 59 n. 32 – 219c: 224 n. 18 – 219c7: 129 n. 101 – 221c: 224 n. 18 – Theaetetus – 151b: 187 n. 14 – 152e: 138 n. 151, 506 n. 38, 508 n. 48 – 160d: 508 n. 48 – Timaeus – 27c1–d1: 54 – 29e–31b: 393 – 40a: 613 n. 15 – Spuria – 373a5–6: 190 n. 28 Plato Comicus (eds. Kassel/Austin) – fr. 145: 527

Index locorum 

– fr. 149: 527 n. 104 – fr. 207: 167 n. 31 Plotinus – Enneades – 1.6 (1).6.1 ff.: 582 – 4.8 (6).1.18–20: 283 n. 8 – 4.8 (6).7.28: 363 Plutarchus – Moralia – Adversus Colotem – 1108b: 224 n. 20 – 1111f: 310 n. 85 – 1113a–b: 278, 290 n. 24 – 1117d: 224 n. 20 – 1118a: 224 n. 20 – 1118a7–9: 456 n. 71 – 1118d: 224 n. 20 – Apophtegmata Laconica – 190a: 102 n. 50 – 222a–b: 102 n. 50 – Consolatio ad uxorem – 611d8–9: 547 n. 150 – De adulatore et amico – 60b–c: 482 – De audiendis poetis – 19e: 589 n. 294 – De animae procreatione in Timaeo – 104a: 202 n. 64 – De communis notitiis – 1064a: 230 n. 60 – 1083a: 138 n. 151 – De defectu oraculorum – 417c: 25 n. 50 – De esu carnium – 996c: 25 n. 47 – De exilio – 604a: 541 – 604a6–10: 208 n. 78 – 604a9–b1: 197 – 607c: 277 – De facie in orbe lunae – 927f: 280, 293 n. 28 – 934b: 279 – De fortuna Romanorum – 98d: 293

 671

– De Iside et Osiride – 369d: 616 n. 27 – 370c5–d10: 208 n. 77 – 370d3–10: 197 – 370d6–7: 542 – 373d4 ff.: 514 n. 69 – De liberis educandis – 4d: 230 n. 57 – De Pythiae oraculis – 402a: 541 – 407b5 ff.: 525 – De sollertia animalium – 974a6–10: 460 – De tranquillitate animi – 474e8: 451 n. 52 – De Stoicorum repugnantiis – 1051a: 117 n. 44 – De tuenda sanitate praecepta – 136b: 230 n. 60 – Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum – 777a3–8: 122 n. 65 – Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum – 1089f–1090a: 230 n. 60 – Quaestiones convivales – 618b: 293 n. 28 – 644a1: 585 – 682f4–683a3: 438 n. 6, 460 – 683e: 293 n. 27 – 684a: 293 n. 27 – 685b: 610 n. 6 – 706e1–2: 39 n. 161 – 733a9: 140 n. 161 – 734a4–b5: 437 n. 3 – 735a1–4: 438 n. 6 – 735a10–b5: 438 – 735b5–c2: 440 n. 11 – 737a: 480, 483 – Fragmenta (ed. Sandbach) – fr. 129: 585 – fr. 157: 511 n. 56, 523, 524, 544 – fr. 158: 511 n. 56 – Vitae – Aemilius Paulus – 19.9: 561 n. 201 – Agis

672 

 Index locorum

– 10.6: 103 n. 55 – Alcibiades – 4.3: 509 n. 52 – Brutus – 37: 440 n. 10 – Comparatio Cimonis et Luculli – 1.2: 26 n. 59 – Coriolanus – 38: 580 – Demetrius – 38.4–6: 451 n. 52 – Nicias – 18: 576 – 23: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 – 23.4: 377 n. 101 – Numa – 8: 139 n. 157, 140 n. 158 – Pelopidas – 21.3: 103 n. 58 – Pericles – 4: 164 n. 18, 167 n. 32 – 9: 167 n. 33 – 32: 376, 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108, 547 n. 149 – 32.1–6: 376 n. 97 – Romulus – 8.9: 187 n. 14 Pollux – Onomasticon – 3.36: 96 n. 24 – 3.79.6–7: 563 n. 202 – 6.27: 546 n. 146 Polystratus – De irrationali contemptu vulgarium opinionum (PHerc. 336/1150; ed. Indelli) – col. 16.23–28: 224 n. 20 Porphyrius – Commentarius in Claudii Ptolemaei Harmonica (eds. Barker/Raffa) – 1.32.10–16: 437 n. 5 – De abstinentia (eds. Bouffartigue/Patillon) – 1.7–12: 314 n. 105 – 1.26.4: 314 n. 105 – 2.31: 282 n. 6

– De vita Pythagorae (ed. Des Places) – 17–18: 131 – 30: 126 n. 80 – 32: 126 n. 80 – 59: 114 n. 28 – Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquiae (ed. MacPhail) – ad Il. 10.153 (p. 285): 561 – ad Il. 10.252 (p. 170): 429 – ad Il. 20.67 (p. 240): 426 – Fragmenta (ed. Smith) – fr. 215: 371 n. 77 – fr. 351: 52 – fr. 408: 102 n. 54 Posidippus – Epigrammata (eds. Austin/Bastianini) – fr. 52 (= PMilVogl. VIII 309, col. VIII.25–30): 569 n. 225, 570 n. 228 Posidonius (ed. Edelstein/Kidd) – fr. 101: 627 n. 80 – fr. 151: 135, 136 n. 139 – fr. 165: 136 n. 140 – fr. 168: 127 n. 89, 127 n. 93 – fr. 176: 222 n. 11 – fr. 284: 119 n. 56, 122 Praxagoras (ed. Steckerl) – fr. 12: 452 n. 56 – frr. 26–29: 452 n. 56 – fr. 62: 452 n. 56 – fr. 69: 452 n. 56 – fr. 72: 452 n. 56 – fr. 85: 447 n. 35 Praxiphanes (ed. Matelli) – fr. 20e: 445 n. 30 Proclus – In Platonis Alcibiadem I commentaria (ed. Segonds) – (1) 28: 48 n. 9 – (2) 5: 48 n. 9 – (3) 5.5: 48 n. 9 – (4) 21.5: 48 n. 9 – (5) 8: 48 n. 9

Index locorum 

– (6) 5: 48 n. 9 – (7) 4.5: 48 n. 9 – (7) 7.5: 48 n. 9 – (8) 4: 48 n. 9 – In Platonis Cratylum commentaria (ed. Pasquali) – 16.43–45: 184 – In Platonis Rempublicam commentaria (ed. Kroll) – Diss. 16 – 2.105: 307 n. 58 – 2.113.9–13: 465 n. 100 – 2.116.19–21: 465 n. 100 – In Platonis Timaeum commentaria (ed. Diehl) – 1.336.15: 32 n. 110 – 1.351.5: 230 n. 60 – 2.54.28: 96 n. 29 Prodicus (ed. Mayhew) – test. 5 (= 84 A 6 DK): 507 n. 42 – test. 9 (= deest ap. DK): 569 n. 222 – test. 30 (= 84 A 4b DK): 507 n. 40 – test. 41 (= 84 A 12 DK): 546 n. 144 – test. 42 (= deest ap. DK): 508 n. 47 – test. 47 (= 84 A 19 [I] DK): 530 n. 115 – test. 50 (= 84 A 14 DK): 530 – test. 60 (= deest ap. DK): 508 n. 46 – test. 61 (= 84 B 3 [II] DK): 507 n. 39 – test. 62 (= 84 B 3 [I] DK): 507 n. 39 – test. 63 (= deest ap. DK): 507 n. 39, 529 n. 114 – test. 64 (= 84 B 4 DK): 507 n. 39, 529 n. 114 – test. 65 (= deest ap. DK): 507 n. 39, 529 n. 114 – test. 66 (= 84 A 5 [I] DK): 507 n. 39, 513 n. 61 – test. 67 (= deest ap. DK): 513 n. 61 – test. 68 (= deest ap. DK): 513 n. 61 – test. 69 (= 84 A 10 [III] DK): 513 n. 61, 519 – test. 70 (= deest ap. DK): 513 n. 61 – test. 71 (= 84 B 5 [I] DK): 511, 513 n. 61, 524 – test. 72 (= deest ap. DK): 513 n. 61 – test. 73 (= 84 B 5 [II] DK): 511, 513 n. 61 – test. 74 (= 84 B 5 [III] DK): 425 n. 38, 509, 511, 513 n. 61, 524 – test. 76 (= deest ap. DK): 513 n. 61, 524 – test. 77 (= 84 B 5 [IV] DK): 510, 511, 513 n. 61, 524

 673

– test. 78 (= deest ap. DK): 513 n. 61, 525 n. 98 – test. 83 (= deest ap. DK): 598 n. 316 Protagoras (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 80) – A 1: 589 n. 293, 589 n. 295 – A 27–28: 577 n. 254 – B 4: 613 n. 15 Psellus  – De operatione daemonum (ed. Boissonade) – p. 39: 23 n. 34  Ps.-Apollodorus – Bibliotheca – 1.3.7 ff.: 559 n. 191 Ps.-Aristoteles – De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia – 6.980a6–9: 555 n. 172 – De mundo – 6.397b13–15: 547 n. 150 – 6.397b24–30: 622 n. 56 Ps.-Clemens (Clemens Romanus) – Recognitiones (ed. Rehm) – 6: 531 – 6.2: 532 – 6.5.2: 522 n. 92 – 6.8–9: 531 – 6.9.5: 531 Ps.-Diogenes – Epistulae – 21.31.1: 225 n. 24 Ps.-Galenus – De historia philosophica – 9: 616 n. 29 – 12: 616 n. 29 – 13: 616 n. 29 – 15: 616 n. 29 – 16: 616 – 18: 616 n. 29 – 22: 616 n. 29 – 23: 616 n. 29

674 

 Index locorum

Ps.-Heraclitus – Epistulae (ed. Tarán) – 5.1: 230 n. 60 – 5.1.8–11: 541 – 9.3: 51 n. 13 Ps.-Hesychius – s.v. Ἡράκλειτος: 230 n. 60 Ps.-Justinus – Cohortatio ad Graecos – 15.1: 32 n. 114 Ps.-Plutarchus – De musica – 1136c–e: 163 n. 13 – 1136d–e: 164 n. 18 – 1136d20–e2: 162 n. 12 – 1136d15–20: 163 n. 13 – 1136f14: 163 n. 17 – 1147a2–5: 126 n. 87 – Placita philosophorum – 880d7–881d8: 393 n. 176 – 881a: 568 n. 220 – 890c10: 197 – Stromateis – 2: 294 n. 29 Ps.-Ruphus Ephesius (eds. Daremberg/Ruelle) – Synopsis de pulsibus – 1–2: 449 n. 46 Ptolemaeus Grammaticus (ed. Palmieri) – De differentia vocabulorum – lett. μ, 99: 562 n. 201 Pythagoras (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 14) – A 5: 117, 117 n. 43 – A 7–8: 318 n. 142 – A 13: 131 n. 117 – A 13 [IV]: 131 n. 113, 319 n. 148 – A 17 [I]: 361, 361 n. 52, 362 – A 17 [II]–19: 362 Pythagoristae (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 58) – B 15: 616 n. 26

Quintilianus – Institutio oratoria – 1.10.32: 125 n. 77 – 2.17.15: 224 n. 20 Satyrus (ed. Schorn) – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I): 340, 341, 356, 382 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I.17): 402 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I.22–27): 383 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I.24): 402 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. I.27): 383 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. II): 341 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III): 340, 341, 357, 383 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III.6): 383 n. 135 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III.13): 403 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 37, col. III.19): 383 n. 136 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 38, col. I): 358 – fr. 6 (= POxy. IX 1176, fr. 38, col. I.19): 402 – fr. 10 (= FHG III 163–164): 150 – fr. 16 (= FHG III 163 F 14): 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 Scholia – in Aeschylum (ed. Dindorf) – PV 120.17: 527 – in Aratum vetera (ed. Martin) – 26.16: 95 n. 17 – in Aristophanem – Av. 1406 (ed. Holwerda): 452 n. 54 – Nub. 331a (ed. Holwerda): 527 n. 104 – Nub. 361a: 507 n. 42 – in Clementem Alexandrinum (eds. Stählin/ Treu) – Protr. 318.5: 25 n. 50 – in Dionysium Thracem (ed. Hilgard) – 164.23–29 [GG I 3.164.23–29; 448.12–16]: 427 – in Euripidem (ed. Schwartz) – Hec. 131: 123 n. 68 – in Homerum – Il. 5.385 (ed. Erbse): 431 – Il. 10.10: 452 n. 56

Index locorum 

 675

– in Lucianum (ed. Rabe) – Iov. trag. 48: 570 n. 228 – in Pindarum (ed. Drachmann) – Ol. 1.91: 564 n. 209 – Pyth. 4.10: 581 n. 271 – in Platonem (ed. Greene) – Alc. I 118c (p. 95 = pp. 148–149 Cufalo): 162 n. 7 – Ap. 18b (p. 420 = pp. 12–13 Cufalo): 574 n. 245 – Resp. 2.364e (p. 201): 21 n. 20 – Resp. 6.498 (pp. 240–242): 230 n. 60 – Theaet. 179e (p. 438 = p. 64 Cufalo): 230 n. 60 – in Sophoclem – OT 114.1–2 (ed. Longo): 581 n. 271

– 9.51: 621 – 9.54: 391 n. 171, 498 n. 18, 617 n. 34 – 9.60–136: 621 – 9.127: 136 n. 138 – 9.133: 532 – Pyrrhonianae hypotyposes – 1.225: 622 n. 56 – 3.1–2: 616 – 3.2–37: 616 – 3.3–12: 616 – 3.30–37: 616 – 3.218: 611, 621, 622 n. 56

Scythinus Theius (ed. West) – fr. 1: 541

Simplicius – In Aristotelis de Caelo commentaria (ed. Heiberg) – 294.4: 202 n. 64 – 511.25: 514 n. 66 – 712.27: 556 n. 181 – In Aristotelis Physica commentaria (ed. Diels) – 156.13: 385 n. 143 – 164.24: 385 n. 143 – 300.27–29: 266 n. 55 – 300.27: 385 n. 145 – 300.29–301.1: 266 – 372.6–9: 262 – 381.29: 284 n. 12 – 1121.21: 386 n. 150

Seneca – Epistulae ad Lucilium – 39.2: 371 n. 76 – 90.6: 119 n. 56 – 95.65–67: 222 n. 11 Sextus Empiricus – Adversus mathematicos – 1.3–4: 373 n. 84 – 2.25–34: 377 n. 106 – 6.7–8: 125 n. 75 – 6.23: 125 n. 75 – 7.122–124: 323 n. 174 – 7.123: 323 n. 175, 324 n. 178 – 7.124: 324 n. 185 – 7.132: 66 – 7.133: 67, 192 – 9.4–12: 616 – 9.13–193: 616 – 9.13–48: 618 n. 36 – 9.19: 438, 450 n. 50, 457, 460 – 9.29: 456 – 9.42: 457 – 9.49–194: 618 n. 36 – 9.49–57: 621 – 9.50–58: 391 n. 170 – 9.50: 395 n. 187

Simonides (ed. Page [SLG]) – S 319: 102 n. 50

Solon (ed. West) – fr. 4.31: 258 n. 29 – fr. 13.49: 527 n. 103 Sophocles – Fragmenta (ed. Radt) – fr. 752 (= fr. 1017 Nauck2): 194 n. 39 Sosibius (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 595 F 15: 103 n. 57 Sotion Peripateticus (ed. Wehrli) – fr. 3: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108

676 

 Index locorum

Sozomen – Historia ecclesiastica – 1.12.11: 115 n. 30 Speusippus (ed. Isnardi Parente) – fr. 89 (= fr. 38 Lang = fr. 58 Tarán): 615 n. 25 Stephanus Byzantinus (ed. Billerbeck/ Gaertner/Wyss/Zubler) – Ethnica – 11.49 (413.21–22 Meinecke): 587 n. 288 Stesimbrotus Thasius (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 107 F 12–20: 559 – FGrHist 107 F 13: 559 Stobaeus – Anthologium – Eclogae physicae et ethicae (ed. Wachsmuth) – 1.1 [2]: 393 n. 176, 612 – 1.1.39: 610 n. 6 – 1.2: 617 – 1.10: 612 – 1.25: 543 n. 140 – 2.31.85: 241 n. 87 – 3.1.178: 201 – Florilegium (ed. Hense) – 3.21.7: 230 n. 60, 241, 243 n. 97 – 4.25.44: 225 n. 27 Strabo – Geographica – 1.2.3: 126 n. 82 – 8.364: 300 n. 10 – 10.3.10: 126 n. 82 – 10.3.15: 576 n. 252 – 10.3.18: 576 n. 252 – 10.3.22: 39 n. 165 Suda (vel Suidas) – s.v. Ἀναξαγόρας: 376 n. 94, 378 n. 108 – s.v. Ἀρχέλαος: 371 n. 77 – s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλής: 224 n. 17 – s.v. Εὐριπίδης: 589 n. 296 – s.v. Εὐφρόνη: 568 – s.v. Ἡράκλειτος: 230 n. 60

– s.v. Ὀρφεύς: 525 n. 97 – s.v. Φερεκύδης: 103 Syncellus – Ecloga chronographica (ed. Mosshammer) – 1.140c: 421, 526 Synesius – Calvitii encomium – 22.85c: 498 n. 17 Syrianus – In Hermogenem commentaria (ed. Rabe) – 22.3–10: 125 n. 78 Tatianus – Oratio ad Graecos – 3: 227 n. 45, 230 n. 61, 240 n. 79 – 21: 417, 526 n. 102 Taurus Berytensis (ed. Petrucci) – test. 19 (= test. 20 Gioè): 447 n. 35 Tertullianus – Ad martyras – 4.5: 230 n. 60 – Ad nationes – 2.2: 384 Thales (ed. Wöhrle) – Th 155 (= 11 A 13b DK): 199 n. 56 Theagenes (eds. Diels/Kranz, ch. 8) – A 1a: 427 Themistius – Orationes (eds. Downey/Norman) – 30 (An agros colamus?) – II, p. 183.1 ff.: 510 Theodoretus – Curatio affectionum graecarum – 2.112–113: 617 n. 31 – 3.4: 617 n. 31 – 6.6: 617 n. 31 Theodorus Cyrenaicus (ed. Winiarczyk)

Index locorum 

– fr. 29: 618 n. 37 – fr. 41: 622 n. 56 Theognis (ed. Young) – 1.1033: 535 n. 122 Theophilus Antiochiensis – Ad Autolycum – 3.7: 395 n. 185 Theophrastus – Characteres – 16.10–11a: 553 n. 164, 584 n. 283 – De causis plantarum – 1.12.5: 289 n. 19 – 3.7.3: 35 n. 139 – De sensibus – 50–54: 464 – 50–51: 437 n. 5 – 50: 446 – 51: 438 n. 6 – 53: 437 n. 5 – 56: 446, 446 n. 34 – 66: 446 – 74: 465 – 77: 465 – 80–82: 437 n. 5 – 81: 465 – 82: 438 n. 6 Fragmenta (eds. Fortenbaugh/Huby/ Sharples/Gutas) – fr. 176: 561 n. 201 – fr. 225: 141 n. 165 – fr. 226a: 306 n. 52 – fr. 228a: 615 n. 23 – fr. 237: 398 n. 196 – fr. 720: 126 n. 86 – fr. 726a: 126 n. 86 Theopompus Comicus (ed. Storey) – fr. 25: 452 n. 54 Theopompus Chius (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist 115 F 70: 102 n. 54 – FGrHist 115 F 71: 102 n. 51, 102 n. 52

 677

Thucydides – Historiae – 1.42.3: 188 n. 16 – 1.71.6: 258 n. 28 – 1.139–145: 371 n. 74 – 2.40.1: 168 n. 39 – 2.40.2: 188 n. 16 – 2.41.1: 175 n. 67 – 2.42.3–4: 190 n. 29 – 2.51: 85 n. 11, 90 – 3.67.6: 190 n. 29 – 4.95.2: 191 n. 29 Timaeus Tauromenius (ed. Jacoby) – FGrHist III 566 F 2: 224 n. 17 – FGrHist III 566 F 14: 132 – FGrHist III 566 F 131: 132 – FGrHist III 566 F 132: 123 n. 68 Timon Phlius (ed. Di Marco) – fr. 9: 225 n. 28 – fr. 11: 225 n. 28 – fr. 18: 569 n. 222 – fr. 57: 130 n. 104, 224 n. 16 Tyrtaeus (ed. West) – fr. 5.1–2: 103 n. 59 Tzetzes – Historiarum variarum Chiliades – 4.4.859: 569 n. 224 Valerius Maximus – Factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri novem – 8.7 ext. 2: 132 n. 118 Varro – Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum (ed. Cardauns) – frs. 7–10: 613 n. 16 Vitruvius – De architectura – 7, praef. 11: 438 n. 5 Xenophanes (eds. Strobel/Wöhrle)

678 

 Index locorum

– Xen 34 (= deest ap. DK): 383 n. 137 – Xen 86 (= 21 B 24 DK): 496, 596 – Xen 90 (= 21 A 35 [III] DK): 622 n. 56 – Xen 116 (= 21 B 14; 15; 23 DK): 613 n. 15 – Xen 229 (= 21 B 25 DK): 596 – Xen 344 (= 21 B 32 DK): 497 n. 15 Xenophon – Apologia Socratis – 1.6.23: 224 n. 19 – Cyropaedia – 1.3.8.10: 546 n. 146 – De re equestri – 2.2: 187 n. 14 – Hellenica – 4.2.6: 56 n. 25 – Memorabilia – 2: 598 – 2.21–34: 598 n. 316 – 3.5–7: 428

– 4.2.18: 185 n. 10 – 4.3: 597, 598, 599 – 4.3.4: 597 – 4.3.5: 597, 598 – 4.3.6: 598 – 4.3.7: 598 – 4.3.8: 598 – 4.3.16: 597 – 4.4: 546 – 4.4.4: 224 n. 19 Zenobius Sophista – Athoi Proverbia (ed. Bühler) – 85: 482 Zeno Citieus (ed. Von Arnim) – SVF I 85: 615 – SVF I 87: 363 – SVF I 146: 610 n. 6 – SVF I 159: 622 n. 56

Index nominum antiquorum Abaris 99 Academics 172, 619 Achaeans 423, 425 Achelous 516, 525 Achilles 95, 278, 416, 417, 418, 420, 422, 423, 425, 429 Acusilaus 99, 100 Admetus 84 Adonis 576 Aelian 484 Aelius Theon 111 Aeolus 498 Aeschines 26, 33, 36 Aeschylus 371 Aetalides 130 Aether 99, 136, 416, 423, 424, 524 Aëtius 180, 198, 202, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 391, 395, 452, 611, 613, 616, 617, 618 Agamemnon 394, 395, 416, 417, 418, 420, 422, 423, 424, 430 Agathocles 162, 164, 167 Agesilaus 222 Agis of Argos 482 Aglaïon 451 Aidoneus 615 Albertus Magnus 335 Alcaeus 322 Alcibiades 224 Alcidamas 117, 129 Alcimus 138 Alcmaeon 133, 134, 135, 140, 384, 390 Alexander of Aphrodisias 266, 311 Alexander of Pherae 152 Alexander Polyhistor 116 Alexander the Great 8, 222, 473, 486, 587 Alexandrians 151, 152, 157, 430, 546 Alexis 318 Alyattes 103 Ammonius 125 Anaxagoras 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 132, 162, 168, 251, 253, 265, 266, 267, 305, 310, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 346, 347, 352, 357, 359, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-021

381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 429, 441, 493, 495, 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 515, 526, 538, 542, 547, 548, 549, 554, 555, 556, 557, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 575, 584, 588, 589, 591, 596, 610, 613, 614, 623, 626, 627 Anaxagoreans 117, 337, 382, 385, 421, 424, 425, 505, 506, 508, 509, 514, 522, 526, 547, 554, 558, 567, 575, 590, 591, 594 Anaxandridas I 102 Anaxarchus 8, 372, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486 Anaxilas 102 Anaxilaus 102 Anaximander 65, 224, 294, 496, 556, 567, 591, 594, 596, 610 Anaximenes of Lampsacus 534 Anaximenes of Miletus 343 Andocides 576 Androcles 575 Antigonus of Carystus 156 Antiochus 343 Antiphon of Cephisia 557 Antisthenes 118, 225, 373 Apollodorus of Athens 100 Apuleius 22 Arcesilaus 224, 343 Archelaus of Athens (vel Miletus) 554 Archidamus 101, 102, 103 Archidamus I 102, 103 Archilochus 544, 574, 585 Archimedes 169 Archytas 126, 164 Ares 423 Argonauts 499 Ariadne 572 Aristarchus (grammarian) 431 Aristides Quintilianus 125 Aristippus 373, 375 Aristo 128, 129, 130, 132, 222, 223, 227, 238, 239, 240, 242, 244, 317 Aristo of Ceos 128, 240, 241

680 

 Index nominum antiquorum

Aristo of Chios 128, 222, 242, 243, 244 Aristonymus 242, 243, 244 Aristophanes of Byzantium 322 Aristophanes (playwright) 9, 22, 29, 169, 228, 421, 492, 508, 516, 518, 522, 545, 546, 547, 549, 554, 560, 561, 563, 566, 570, 572, 574, 577, 590 Aristoteles 571 Aristotle 68, 78, 91, 100, 117, 118, 124, 125, 126, 133, 136, 137, 140, 141, 166, 201, 254, 258, 263, 310, 315, 317, 325, 336, 350, 385, 423, 440, 476, 492, 496, 499, 505, 517, 534, 542, 550, 554, 574, 582, 590, 592, 596, 597, 626 Aristoxenus 114, 116, 118, 119, 122, 126, 134, 163, 172 Arius Didymus 592 Arrian 482 Artemis 531, 559 Athena 31, 35, 95, 418, 526, 527, 531, 532, 571, 572 Athenaeus 164 Athenagoras 560 Athenians 85, 122, 166, 318, 371, 378, 380, 519, 554, 560, 563, 572, 575, 588, 589 Atlas 567 Atomists 337, 372, 373, 386, 398, 444, 450, 452, 456, 457, 556, 609, 610 Atticus 620 Augustine 613 Aulus Gellius 507 Bacchus 25, 580 Bacchylides (flute player) 588 Balbus 623, 624 Basil of Caesarea 125 Bion of Borysthenes 225 Boethius 449 Brimo 29 Calliades 370 Callias 370, 507, 517, 569, 570, 573, 574, 575, 576 Callimachus 169, 322, 326, 392, 492, 617, 621 Callisthenes 473, 483 Carneades 343, 395

Carneiscus 445 Cassius Dio 514 Cassius (Epicurean) 440 Cedrenus 526 Celsus 33, 92 Cercopes 481, 482, 483 Chaerephon 517, 570, 573, 575, 576 Chamaeleon 126 Chaos 77, 99 Charicles (vel Chariclides) 344 Charondas 119 Cheiron 167, 498, 564, 567 Christ (the Saviour) 562 Chronos (vel Kronos) 94, 96, 99 Chrysippus 127, 138, 225 Chthonie 94, 95, 96, 99, 104 Church Fathers 386 Cicero 103, 125, 133, 135, 313, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 392, 395, 397, 570, 610, 614, 618, 619, 620, 621, 623, 625, 626, 627 Cimon 377 Cleanthes 541, 612, 617, 627 Cleinias 126 Cleitus 473 Clement of Alexandria 36, 92, 457, 609 Cleon 377, 378 Clitomachus 343, 395, 396, 397 Clytemnestra 125 Colotes 311, 465 Cornutus 419, 420, 431 Cotta 457, 619 Crates of Boeotia 344 Crates of Mallus 417 Cratinus 228, 572 Critias 166, 315, 392, 504, 506, 528, 617, 619 Critolaus 344, 612 Cronos 31 Curetes 21, 30 Cylon of Croton 117, 351 Cynics 225, 243 Dactyls of Ida 39 Dafni 587 Damascius 100 Damnameneus 39 Damon of Athens (Oa) 120, 125 Darius 226, 578

Index nominum antiquorum 

Deïanira 394 Demeter 21, 29, 31, 416, 422, 426, 430, 509, 510, 511, 525, 559 Demetrius Laco 7, 302, 311, 322, 381 Demetrius of Magnesia 152 Demetrius of Phaleron 370 Demetrius Poliorcetes 222 Demiurge (vel Demiourgos) 96, 104, 393, 612, 614 Democedes 140 Democritus 101, 131, 132, 226, 303, 305, 310, 319, 372, 398, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 464, 465, 466, 493, 542, 549, 554, 555, 556, 567, 591, 594, 595, 596, 609, 610 Demosthenes 26, 122, 540, 562 Deo 502 Diagoras of Melos 493, 506, 559, 618, 622 Dicaearchus 118, 129, 156, 157, 158 Didymus the Blind 508 Diocles of Magnesia 373 Diodorus of Tyre 612 Diodorus Siculus 476 Diodotus 538 Diogenes Laërtius 4, 92, 103, 115, 131, 134, 140, 151, 154, 170, 199, 213, 224, 226, 227, 231, 238, 241, 243, 244, 318, 372, 379, 420, 421, 422, 427, 428, 484, 485 Diogenes of Apollonia 251, 253, 337, 343, 372, 388, 425, 493, 554, 609, 626 Diogenes of Babylon 4, 116, 121, 122, 128, 132, 172, 374, 377, 627 Diogenes of Oinoanda 301, 440, 450, 452, 453, 457, 464 Diogenes of Seleucia 384 Diogenes of Sinope 344 Dion of Prusa 122 Dion of Syracuse 222 Dionysius of Alicarnassus 514 Dionysius of Cyrene 384 Dionysius the Elder 222 Dionysos (vel Bacchus) 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 196, 416, 426, 481, 482, 509, 511, 524, 531, 532, 550, 553, 559, 571, 572, 573, 574, 576

 681

Diopeithes 9, 493, 505, 507, 517, 519, 547, 548, 551, 558, 565, 567, 575, 588 Dracon 166 Dyad 615, 616 Earth 29, 75, 76, 77, 94, 96, 104, 213, 264, 285, 287, 289, 290, 292, 294, 308, 310, 326, 416, 423, 424, 429, 456, 514, 522, 525, 538, 564, 624 Eleatics 375, 380, 493, 551, 553 Electra 564 Elias 125 Empedocles 52, 101, 117, 129, 130, 131, 136, 223, 224, 226, 227, 230, 238, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 271, 272, 281, 282, 283, 285, 287, 291, 294, 295, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 337, 346, 370, 372, 373, 388, 452, 593, 596, 610 Epaminondas 122, 475, 476 Ephialtes 172, 175 Epicaste 581 Epicharmus 138, 139, 140, 161, 497, 596 Epicureans 116, 128, 131, 133, 172, 221, 223, 224, 301, 302, 303, 313, 323, 374, 378, 383, 384, 386, 397, 439, 440, 453, 454, 455, 458, 465, 466, 479, 619, 622 Epicurus 6, 213, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 311, 312, 313, 315, 317, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 373, 378, 381, 382, 384, 395, 397, 437, 440, 441, 442, 444, 445, 447, 450, 451, 453, 454, 455, 474, 484, 528, 612, 620 Epigenes 535, 557 Epimenides 99, 100, 550 Epiphanius 525 Erasistratus 447 Erebos 518 Erinyes 46, 49, 181, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 218, 521, 522, 538, 539, 541, 553, 561 Erotianus 444, 447, 448, 449 Eubuleus 30, 32 Eudemus of Rhodes 133

682 

 Index nominum antiquorum

Euhemerus 392, 617, 621 Eumenides 3, 46, 49, 52, 522, 561 Euphorbus 130 Euphranor 164 Euripides 22, 24, 25, 36, 84, 85, 222, 223, 227, 228, 229, 238, 239, 243, 337, 382, 383, 392, 429, 493, 498, 509, 548, 549, 554, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 575, 588, 589 Eusebius 617 Eustathius 425, 429 Euthyphron 558 Eutychides 587 Fate 535, 536 Favorinus 422, 429 Firmicus Maternus 25 Flavius Josephus 134, 514 Furies 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70 Gaia 424, 521 Galen 127, 140, 447, 448, 449, 451, 529, 583, 616 Ge 76, 77, 92, 94, 96, 524, 525 Glaucon 419 Gnathaina 562 God 7, 9, 25, 32, 34, 53, 61, 69, 94, 95, 97, 99, 102, 186, 187, 196, 204, 208, 211, 214, 260, 314, 315, 376, 388, 391, 393, 394, 395, 398, 428, 429, 431, 438, 457, 460, 492, 493, 503, 518, 520, 524, 525, 540, 577, 580, 593, 594, 595, 596, 609, 610, 611, 614, 615, 625 Good 129, 199, 223, 532 Gorgias 101, 117, 131, 165, 166, 319, 429, 506, 552, 568, 569 Great Mother (vel Meter) 576 Hades (vel Aides) 32, 35, 99, 196, 283, 326, 383, 496, 593 Harmony (vel Harmonia) 163, 164, 184, 256, 264, 265, 306, 536 Harpocration 528 Heaven 80, 94, 287, 290, 456, 504, 547, 564, 622

Hecataeus 579 Hecate 29 Hector 416, 418, 422, 423, 424, 430 Helen 89, 416, 418, 423, 424, 425, 429 Helios 32, 76, 77, 425, 513 Hellanicus of Lesbos 97, 104 Hephaestus 94, 428 Hera 99, 326, 418, 428, 429, 510, 524, 531, 615 Heracles 102, 394, 395, 481, 482, 483, 498, 545, 546, 574 Heraclides Ponticus 169 Heracliteans 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 197, 199, 201, 208, 210, 212, 505, 508, 535, 540, 551, 579, 582, 596, 597 Heraclitus 4, 5, 10, 46, 48, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 123, 129, 130, 179, 180, 182, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 210, 213, 218, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 251, 317, 335, 372, 420, 426, 429, 493, 494, 497, 498, 502, 503, 506, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 549, 551, 552, 553, 572, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 591, 592, 593, 594, 596, 597, 599 Hermarchus 6, 300, 301, 302, 304, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 397 Hermes 224 Hermippus 150, 151, 152, 157, 158, 446 Hermogenes 540 Hermotimus 130 Herodicus of Selymbria 167, 549 Herodorus of Heraclea 499 Herodotus (historian) 84, 85, 102, 184, 542, 550, 572 Herophilus 447 Herostratus 533 Hesiod 50, 77, 100, 167, 263, 552, 579, 594 Hestia 522 Hesychius 38, 417, 419 Hippasus 609 Hippias of Elis 166, 238 Hippocratidas 101, 102, 103

Index nominum antiquorum 

Hippodamus 161 Hippolytus (son of Theseus) 548, 575 Hipponicus 573 Hippon of Rhegium 397 Hippo (vel Hippe) 564 Homer 50, 99, 100, 167, 194, 317, 322, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 428, 429, 430, 431, 459, 461, 526, 552, 579, 585, 594, 626 Hyperboreans 224 Hyperides 562 Iamblichus 125, 127 Iccus of Tarentum 167 Ion of Chios 550, 572 Iphicrates 576 Isaeus 562 Isidore of Seville 622 Isis 573 Isocrates 499, 534 Jason 499 Justice (vel Dike) 204 Kybele 99 Laios 581 Lampon 505, 551 Lamprocles 162, 163, 164 Leon of Pella 397 Leontius 451, 452 Leotychidas I 102 Leotychidas II 102 Leto 524 Leucippus 101, 304, 305, 310, 319, 346, 369, 372, 398, 444, 493, 554, 555, 610 Light (vel Day) 80, 508, 597 Liver 421, 426, 430, 447 Logos 62, 168, 191, 215, 503, 515, 533, 536, 551 Love (vel Eros/Philia/Philotes) 253, 263 Lucian 225 Lucillius 587 Lucretius 288, 289, 302, 304, 308, 310, 311, 441, 453, 456, 458, 467 Lycon 225

 683

Lycurgus 103, 132 Lydus John 457 Lysias 562 Lysis 122, 543 Macrobius 31, 32 Maenads 26 Magi (vel Magoi) 38, 561 Martianus Capella 161 Megabyzus 578 Melanippe 564 Meletius (the Monk) 526 Melissus 352, 372, 380, 612 Menestor 140 Menippus 225 Menon 140, 141 Meter 317 Metrodorus of Chios 380, 386, 609, 610 Metrodorus of Lampsacus (the Elder) 7 Milesians 372, 388, 536, 567, 594, 595 Milo (Titus Annius) 463 Mind (vel Nous/Intellect) 266, 380, 385, 526 Minos 132 Mnesarchus 612 Moira 513, 515 Monad 615 Monimus 344 Moon 95, 133, 213, 217, 218, 422, 423, 425, 504, 512, 513, 514, 520, 525, 534, 537, 542, 554, 557, 563, 593, 597 Mother Goddess 39 Musaeus 26, 99 Muse(s) 52, 95 Nausiphanes 305, 373 Neanthes 240 Nearchos 587 Neoplatonists 497, 550 Nestis 326, 615 Nicander 526 Nicias 162, 166 Nicocreon 473, 474, 475, 486 Nicolaus (rhetorician) 56 Nicomachus of Gerasa 126 Night (vel Nyx) 78 Numa 122

684 

 Index nominum antiquorum

Oceanus 99 Odysseus 417, 526 Oenopides of Chius 612 Ogenos 93, 94 Olympiodorus 125 Olympus 426, 503, 564 Onomacritus 525, 550, 551, 573 Ophioneus 94 Orion of Thebes 526 Orpheus 9, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 39, 45, 47, 48, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 68, 70, 100, 167, 186, 188, 192, 193, 196, 218, 251, 265, 497, 498, 499, 502, 504, 505, 506, 508, 509, 510, 511, 518, 519, 522, 525, 528, 529, 530, 531, 534, 535, 539, 547, 548, 549, 551, 552, 557, 558, 560, 561, 567, 571, 573, 574, 575, 585, 586, 587, 594 Orphics 2, 36, 37 Osiris 573 Ouranos 77, 78, 503, 521, 531 Palladius 115 Pallas 21, 31 Pan 508 Panaetius 384 Parmenides 54, 263, 352, 372, 380, 388, 503, 512, 552, 579, 593, 594, 595, 596, 609, 610, 612 Pausanias (geographer) 102, 103, 321, 550 Peisthetairos 577, 578 Pelinna 24, 26 Pelops 430 Pentheus 426, 430 Pericles 4, 119, 120, 121, 122, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 175, 222, 339, 347, 349, 374, 376, 563, 589 Perilaus 103 Peripatetics 344, 611 Persephone 29, 33, 571 Persians 377, 578, 587 Persuasion (vel Peitho) 184, 256, 451 Phaedrus (Epicurean) 133, 397, 620 Phaenias 157 Phanes 31 Pharnabazos 571 Pheidippides 573

Pherecydes of Athens 102 Pherecydes of Syros 3, 91, 92, 99, 101, 102, 104, 343, 372 Phidias 168, 376 Philip II of Macedon 122 Philippus 619 Philo of Alexandria 114 Philo of Larissa 396, 397 Philochorus 396, 527, 528, 588 Philodemus 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 147, 157, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 221, 302, 305, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321, 373, 374, 377, 378, 379, 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 396, 397, 415, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 427, 428, 431, 437, 438, 479, 455, 456, 457, 460, 462, 463, 464, 465, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 486, 493, 511, 528, 529, 562, 588, 592, 613, 614, 619, 620, 621, 625, 626, 627 Philolaus 4, 135, 140, 141, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 164, 183, 264, 265, 593 Philoponus 310, 496 Phintias 114, 130 Photius 116, 617 Phylotimus 452 Pindar 28, 99, 430 Plato 4, 26, 30, 36, 54, 68, 78, 96, 124, 125, 126, 127, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 165, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 184, 225, 259, 283, 307, 311, 312, 336, 385, 393, 394, 419, 420, 426, 430, 452, 499, 503, 504, 505, 508, 510, 517, 527, 531, 534, 537, 542, 545, 546, 551, 555, 558, 563, 566, 567, 574, 582, 588, 590, 592, 595, 596, 597, 613, 614, 623 Plutarch 25, 38, 70, 103, 117, 122, 162, 164, 166, 167, 180, 198, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 212, 230, 293, 310, 311, 371, 376, 451, 460, 482, 483, 524, 525, 541, 544, 547, 550, 563, 580, 585 Polemon 612 Pollux 546, 563

Index nominum antiquorum 

Polonius 424 Polyaenus 314 Polybius 57 Porphyry 51, 114, 131, 282, 301, 426, 427, 428, 429, 431 Poseidon 510, 511 Posidippus 569 Posidonius 119, 122, 127, 135, 136, 137, 222, 612 Praxagoras 447 Praxiphanes 344, 445 Presocratics 1, 2, 6, 101, 104, 140, 179, 303, 304, 315, 319, 335, 336, 372, 379, 380, 383, 388, 396, 495, 624 Proclus 184 Prodicus of Ceos 9, 506, 510, 516, 544, 568, 569 Prodicus of Samos 525 Prometheus 526, 527, 567 Protagoras 165, 166, 167, 168, 174, 175, 367, 372, 398, 493, 495, 499, 506, 530, 531, 534, 543, 544, 551, 555, 566, 567, 575, 577, 588, 589, 594, 618, 621 Protogonos 496, 503, 521, 522, 525, 557 Ps.-Galen 616 Ps.-Justin 32 Ps.-Plutarch 162, 163, 386, 391, 392, 395, 396, 397, 542, 611, 617 Ptolemaeus (grammarian) 562 Ptolemy Philopator 20 Pyrrho 225, 473 Pyrrhonians 225 Pyrrhus (fisherman) 130 Pythagoras 3, 6, 101, 111, 117, 150, 154, 155, 156, 158, 223, 224, 227, 230, 238, 312, 317, 319, 351, 362, 372, 373, 375, 378, 390, 550, 562, 572, 579, 594, 615 Pythagoreans 3, 111, 151, 153, 154, 155, 164, 495, 505, 550, 551, 553, 554, 595 Pythia 525, 581 Pythocleides 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168 Quintilian 125, 377 Rhea 21, 29, 31, 62, 99, 551, 559 Richard III 420 Rufus of Ephesus 449

 685

Sabazios 21, 33, 36, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 576 Sappho 163 Satyrs 481, 482, 483 Satyrus of Callatis 378 Scamander 278, 428 Selene 509, 513, 525 Selenites 499 Seleucus 230 Semele 571 Servius Tullius 103 Sextus Empiricus 124, 125, 136, 323, 324, 386, 392, 395, 396, 397, 438, 450, 456, 457, 594, 611, 616, 621 Sileni 482 Simonides 102, 167, 587, 588 Simplicius 262, 284, 295, 335, 337, 385, 386 Sirius (star) 424 Sisyphus 392, 498, 504, 506 Socrates 6, 8, 117, 118, 125, 129, 130, 162, 165, 168, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 238, 239, 243, 259, 317, 351, 372, 378, 419, 437, 478, 479, 505, 516, 517, 518, 523, 542, 549, 554, 557, 562, 563, 566, 570, 573, 574, 576, 577, 597, 598, 599 Solon 258, 527 Sophists 2, 4, 8, 9, 117, 162, 165, 166, 168, 398, 495, 498, 506, 517, 527, 534, 547, 551, 552, 558, 568, 569, 573, 577, 595 Sophocles 560 Sophron 323 Sosicrates 135 Soteira 29 Sotion 139, 240, 372, 377, 379 Soul 37, 126, 127, 133, 134, 135, 136, 272, 284, 421, 442, 446, 450, 451, 580, 615 Sozomen 115 Spartans 102, 103, 105 Speusippus 343, 373, 612 Sphaerus 240 Spleen 416, 421, 426, 430 St. Paul 562 Stesichorus 429 Stesimbrotos of Thasos 419, 559 Stilpo 131 Stobaeus 241, 242, 616, 625

686 

 Index nominum antiquorum

Stoics 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 133, 135, 136, 137, 224, 243, 344, 347, 375, 377, 417, 420, 431, 498, 502, 551, 590, 591, 592, 597, 611, 612, 621, 622, 626 Strabo 126 Strato of Lampsacus 344 Strepsiades 523, 573, 577 Strife (vel Eris/Neikos) 253, 254, 255, 262, 281, 282, 285, 286, 290, 327 Sun (vel Helios) 76, 513 Syncellus 421, 527 Syrianus 125

Timocreon of Rhodes 222 Timon of Phlius 130 Timotheus 587 Tiresias 515 Titans 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 37, 550, 571, 573 Torquatus 456 Tritopatores 528 Trojans 84, 85, 383, 422, 423, 425, 429 Trophonius 523 Tzetzes 569

Tantalos 9, 493, 507, 548, 549, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 588, 589 Tartarus 99 Tatian 230, 417, 418, 419, 420, 427, 428, 431, 526 Terpander 103 Tethys 99 Thales 101, 103, 131, 132, 141, 319, 496, 609, 612, 621, 624, 625, 627 Theagenes of Rhegium 427 Themistius 9, 492, 507, 508, 510 Theodoret 617 Theodorus of Cyrene 618 Theophrastus 69, 133, 134, 140, 213, 336, 344, 398, 446, 447, 450, 464, 536, 553, 554, 584 Theopompus (historian) 102, 103 Theopompus (playwright) 102, 103 Theopompus (Spartan king) 103 Theseus 548, 575 Thoth (vel Taautos) 572 Thrasymachus 166 Thucydides (historian) 85 Thucydides (son of Melesias) 377 Timaeus of Tauromenium 132 Time (vel Aion) 535 Timocrates 305

Varro 127 Velleius 386, 388, 389, 440, 441, 614, 619, 622, 623, 624, 625 Vortex (vel Dinos) 516, 517

Uranos 424

Wisdom (vel Metis) 521 Xenocrates 343 Xenophanes 134, 339, 372, 383, 388, 396, 426, 428, 429, 496, 497, 552, 579, 596 Xenophon 56, 224, 427, 494, 517, 545, 546, 597, 598, 599 Xerxes 130, 222, 370 Zagreus 573 Zaleucus 119, 122 Zas 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 104 Zeno of Citium 222 Zeno of Elea 8, 478, 479 Zeno of Sidon 384, 397 Zeus 31, 33, 73, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 95, 96, 99, 196, 212, 256, 257, 326, 327, 338, 457, 503, 510, 515, 521, 524, 525, 526, 527, 531, 532, 538, 542, 548, 554, 559, 593 Zeuxidamus 102, 103

Index nominum recentiorum Acosta Méndez, Eduardo 118, 479, 493, 561 Adler, Ada S. 568 Ambrose, Z. Philip 570 Angeli, Anna 302, 305, 319, 320, 324, 479 Armstrong, David 320, 321 Arrighetti, Graziano 303, 308, 444 Barker, Andrew 4, 162, 165, 170 Barnes, Jonathan 139, 201, 438 Bastianini, Guido 9, 111, 138 Battezzato, Luigi 138 Beer, Katrin 1 Bernabé, Alberto 32, 38, 39, 525, 526, 550 Bernays, Jacob 583 Bertini Malgarini, Alessandra 242 Betegh, Gábor 62, 68, 251, 559 Bett, Richard 136, 473, 507 Bignone, Ettore 301, 379 Blank, David 120, 374 Blass, Friedrich W. 94, 97, 478 Bodnár, István M. 113 Boeder, Heribert 200 Booras, Steven W. 341 Bounta, Spyridoula 1 Bower, Calvin 125 Boyancé, Pierre 558 Brancacci, Aldo 4 Breit, Pia 1 Brisson, Luc 68, 494, 590, 591 Broggiato, Maria 415 Brownson, Carleton L. 56 Brumana, Selene I. S. 1, 473 Brunschwig, Jacques 308 Bücheler, Franz 169, 170 Buffière, Félix 416 Burkert, Walter 24, 150, 151, 179, 514 Burnet, John 535, 536, 592 Busch, Stephan 1 Bywater, Ingram 201, 213 Califf, David J. 416, 419, 421, 422, 424 Capasso, Mario 8, 483 Capizzi, Antonio 168 Carlitz, Silvia 1 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666106-022

Casadio, Giovanni 100 Casanova, Giuseppe 364 Casertano, Giovanni 302 Caterino, Luigi 221 Cherniss, Harold 335 Chitwood, Ava 226 Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana 1 Cingano, Ettore 207 Cirillo, Salvatore 123 Clark, Gillian 114 Clement, Paul A. 293 Cleve, Felix M. 591 Cohn, Leopold 557 Coles, Revel A. 300 Conche, Marcel 580 Cornford, Francis M. 613 Crönert, Wilhelm 129 Crosby, H. Lamar 122 Decleva Caizzi, Fernanda 9 Delattre, Daniel 124, 153, 171 Del Mastro, Gianluca 147, 148, 149, 153, 154, 156 Derenne, Eudore 371 Diels, Hermann 1, 2, 319, 325, 336, 378, 384, 391, 395, 396, 417, 483, 535, 546, 609, 610, 612, 616, 617, 619 Dorandi, Tiziano 8, 302, 369, 372 Dover, Kenneth J. 517 Dressler, Jan 566 Dyck, Andrew R. 386 Edmonds, Radcliffe 68 Egorov, Alexander 1 Elter, Anton 617 Erbì, Margherita 122, 123 Erler, Michael 307 Essler, Holger 1, 312 Fait, Sandra 1 Fanan, Graziella 363 Ferrari, Franco 27 Fleischer, Kilian J. 4 Fowler, Robert L. 484

688 

 Index nominum recentiorum

Fränkel, Hermann 582 Franchi, Leonardo 1, 161 Funghi, Maria S. 335, 383 Furley, William D. 558 Gallavotti, Carlo 302, 304, 318, 320, 325 Gallo, Italo 302, 304 Gelzer, Thomas 575 Gershenson, Daniel E. 335 Gigante, Marcello 232, 303 Gigon, Olof 167 Goethe, Johann W. von 429 Gomperz, Theodor 316, 325, 417, 480 Goodwin, William W. 126 Graf, Fritz 560 Greaves, Denise D. 125 Greenberg, Daniel A. 335 Grenfell, Bernard P. 3, 92 Griffiths, Jonathan 1 Gronewald, Michael 474, 476 Gulick, Charles B. 38 Gysembergh, Victor 1 Hammerstaedt, Jürgen 418, 427 Hansen, Mogens H. 576 Hayter, John 309 Heidel, William A. 583 Heidmann, Josef 415 Hellmann, Oliver 1 Henderson, Jeffrey 570, 574 Henrichs, Albert 3, 9, 456, 457, 511, 621 Henry, W. Benjamin 375 Hense, Otto 242 Herkenrath, Roland 422 Herrero de Jáuregui, Miguel 33 Hirzel, Rudolf 395 Hock, Ronald F. 112 Hoffleit, Herbert B. 293 Hordern, James 18, 21, 26, 30, 34, 35 Hughes, Jessica 587 Hunt, Arthur S. 3, 92 Indelli, Giovanni 319 Ioppolo, Anna Maria 242

Jäckel, Michael 12 Jacoby, Felix 369 Janko, Richard 6, 8, 9, 52, 56, 69, 179, 198, 271, 273, 282, 283, 286, 289, 294, 316, 416, 458, 459, 460, 461, 466, 544, 559 Jensen, Christian 221 Jiménez San Cristóbal, Ana I. 2, 23, 32 Journée, Gérard 1 Jowett, Benjamin 419 Kaden, Dennis 1 Kahn, Charles 69, 201, 212, 535, 558, 591 Kazansky, Nikolai 560 Keller, Otto 56 Kenyon, Frederic G. 111 Kern, Otto 18, 526 Keßler, Simon 1 Kirk, Geoffrey S. 209, 212, 214, 535, 536 Knoepfler, Denis 151 Knögel, Wilhelm 5, 227, 232, 241 Kotwick, Mirjam E. 6, 69, 179, 190, 300 Kouremenos, Theokritos 257, 581 Kramer, Bärbel 1 Kraus, Manfred 1 Krische, August B. 609 Kriuchkova, Evgeniia 491 Laks, André 179, 372 Lapini, Walter 114 Lasserre, François 163, 174 Lattimore, Steven 258 Leaf, Walter 92 Lebedev, Andrei 1, 9, 69, 196, 198, 335, 508, 554, 596 Leone, Giuliana 1, 6, 8, 301, 308, 312, 382, 443, 444, 445, 446, 453 Linforth, Ivan M. 21, 550 Long, Anthony A. 421, 495, 591 Longo Auricchio, Francesca 221, 300, 314 Luria, Salomon 495, 554, 555, 567 MacDowell, Douglas M. 566 Manfredi, Manfredo 111 Mangoni, Cecilia 317 Mansfeld, Jaap 1, 10, 164, 335, 371, 391, 508 Marchant, Edgar C. 598

Index nominum recentiorum 

Marcovich, Miroslav 200, 370, 535, 536, 537, 583, 609, 610 Marganne, Marie-Hélène 342 Martin, Alain 271, 282, 299, 325, 326, 327 Martín-Hernández, Raquel 39 Matusova, Ekaterina 79, 80, 337 Mayhew, Robert 168, 511, 517, 519, 524, 545, 546, 570 McKirahan, Richard D. 1, 3, 10, 335, 611 McOsker, Michael 299, 322, 325, 326, 327 Meineke, August 67, 572, 587 Mejer, Jørg 226 Messeri, Gabriella 1 Meursius, Johannes 369 Millot, Claire 381, 382 Minar Jr., Edwin L. 39 Mondolfo, Rodolfo 226 Monet, Annick 305, 306, 308, 309 Montanari, Franco 62, 421 Montarese, Francesco 306, 307, 309 Moore Watkins, India 1 Morel, Pierre-Marie 439, 440, 452, 454 Most, Glenn W. 1, 45, 62, 69, 179, 207, 266, 336 Mouraviev, Serge N. 5, 201, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 239, 241, 243, 244 Mouraviev, Serge N.97 240 Müller, Max 396, 505, 552 Murray, Augustus T. 425 Natorp, Paul G. 557 Nauck, Johann A. 319, 320 Nestle, Wilhelm 416, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 546 Neuerburg, Fabia 1 Obbink, Dirk 300, 302, 304, 314, 319, 527, 528, 620, 626 Olson, S. Douglas 571 ONeil, Edward N. 112 Orsini, Vincenzo 364 Pantelia, Maria 491 Parascandolo, Giuseppe 364 Parássoglou, George M. 47, 69, 196 Pease, Arthur S. 386, 622

 689

Philippson, Robert 97, 133, 170, 308, 310, 314, 316, 622 Piaggio, Antonio 221 Piano, Valeria 1, 4, 5, 45, 47, 51, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 179, 180, 190, 192, 198, 203, 491 Piergiacomi, Enrico 1, 8 Ponczoch, Joseph A. 97, 320, 321 Popper, Karl R. 578 Pozdnev, Michael 1, 7, 337 Praechter, Karl 242 Priest, Nancy E. 475, 476 Primavesi, Oliver 10, 271, 282, 283, 286, 299, 326, 327 Puglia, Enzo 156, 302, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 381 Rackham, Harris 133, 135, 387, 618 Ranocchia, Graziano 1, 5, 128, 147, 318, 374 Rashed, Marwan 286, 289, 291, 294, 303 Raubitscheck, Anthony E. 165 Reeve, Charles D. Ch. 185, 259 Reinhardt, Karl L. 535, 537, 583 Reiske, Johann J. 213 Reiter, Fabian 1, 342 Reydams-Schils, Gretchen 8 Richardson, Nicholas J. 416, 419, 422, 424 Riedweg, Christoph 10, 251 Rispoli, Gioia M. 301, 302 Romeo, Costantina 415, 417, 427 Rose, Valentin 242, 540 Ross, William D. 259, 264, 379, 622 Rouse, William H. D. 288, 289, 310 Runia, David Th. 10, 391, 392, 393, 612, 621 Rusten, Jeffrey S. 583 Rusyayeva, Anna S. 571 Sandbach, Francis H. 523, 524, 544 Santamaría, Marco A. 3 Sassi, Maria M. 265, 452 Sbordone, Francesco 344, 415, 417 Scaliger, Joseph J. 369 Schibli, Hermann S. 92, 103 Schließmeyer, Stefan 1 Schober, Adolf 8, 97, 315, 316, 384, 455, 457, 585, 620, 621

690 

 Index nominum recentiorum

Schwab, Andreas 1 Schwind, Christiane 1 Schwind, Johannes 1 Scotti, Angelo A. 364 Scott, Walter 313 Sedley, David N. 1, 2, 111, 112, 113, 115, 179, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 283, 306, 319, 321, 335, 456 Shakespeare, William 420 Shiefsky, Mark J. 555 Shorey, Paul 259 Sider, David 7, 10, 196, 202, 299, 335, 336, 371, 378, 381 Smith, Martin F. 288, 301, 450, 452, 453 Smyly, Gilbert J. 18, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 34 Spengel, Leonhard von 345 Strobel, Benedikt 1, 2 Sudhaus, Siegfried 119, 121, 378, 443 Tack, Tobias 1 Tarán, Leonardo 226, 541 Tierney, Michael 21, 23, 28, 31 Timpanaro Cardini, Maria 161, 164 Trépanier, Simon 1, 6, 271, 282, 283, 300 Tsantsanoglou, Kyriakos 47, 56, 60, 69, 97, 182, 185, 192, 193, 198, 531, 581, 587 Tylor, Edward B. 561 Tzifopoulos, Yannis Z. 586

Verhasselt, Gertjan 129, 156 Vinogradov, Yuri G. 571 Vogliano, Achille 443 Von der Mühll, Peter 369 Wackernagel, Jacob 577 Wagner-Casser, Alexandra 1 Walker, Monica 17 Wallace, Robert W. 4, 97, 161, 164, 165, 167, 169, 170, 173 Wehrli, Fritz 99, 100, 240, 241 Weil, Henri 94, 95 West, Martin L. 18, 21, 23, 28, 31, 495, 512 Wigodsky, Michael 307 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von 229, 358, 392 Wilcken, Ulrich 35 Willi, Andreas 509, 531 Willink, Charles W. 97, 507, 517, 549, 565, 566, 577 Willis, William H. 372 Wilson, Nigel G. 147 Winiarczyk, Marek 396, 397, 528, 559 Wöhrle, Georg 1, 2, 10, 335 Woodward, Linda H. 128 Wozniczka, Piotr 1 Wünsch, Richard 38, 550 Wyttenbach, Daniel A. 163

Usener, Hermann 99, 373 Van der Ben, Nicolaas 283, 327 Van Gennep, Arnold 23 Vassallo, Christian 3, 7, 97, 103, 118, 119, 120, 121, 161, 171, 173, 299, 316, 319, 320, 336, 477, 491, 493, 561, 627

Zeller, Eduard 99, 226, 339, 370, 385 Zeyl, Donald J. 259 Zhmud, Leonid 1, 3, 100, 133, 264, 374 Ziegler, Konrat 163 Zuntz, Günther 31, 34