Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform 9781400868827

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
Preface to the 1974 Edition
1 Introduction
2 How Not to Reorganize the Government
3 Organization and Bureaucratic Politics
4 What to Do? The Need for an Organizational Strategy
5 The Strategies of Presidents: Foreign Policy-Making Under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
6 Problems with State: Presidential Dissatisfaction and Efforts at Reform
7 Formal Approaches to Coherent Foreign Policy
8 The Uses of Staffs
9 Building Lines of Confidence: A State-Centered Organizational Strategy
Epilogue The Nixon Systema-A Further Look
List of Abbreviations
Bibliographical Notes
Index

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PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY The Politics of Organizational Reform

PRESIDENTS BUREAUCRATS AND FOREIGN POLICY The Politics of Organizational Reform I. M. DESTLER

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright © 1972, 1974 by Princeton University Press Published bv Princeton University Press, Princeton and London ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

L.C. Card: 77-166368 ISBN: 0-691-02169-4 (paperback edn.) ISBN: 0-691-07543-3 (hardcover edn.) First PRINCETON PAPERBACK Edition, 1974 Second hardcover printing, with Epilogue, 1974 This book has been composed in Linotype Baskerville.

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press Portions of this book have appeared previously in somewhat different form: in articles in the Foreign Sewice Journal and Foreign Policy, and in a paper delivered to the 1971 American Political Science Asso­ ciation convention. Cooperation in arranging transfer of copyright to Princeton University Press is gratefully acknowledged.

TO MY FATHER Scholar, Author, and Example to his Son

"The real organization of government at higher echelons is not what you find in textbooks or organization charts. It is how confidence flows down from the President." Dean Rusk, January 1969 "The nightmare of the modern state is the huge­ ness of the bureaucracy, and the problem is how to get coherence and design in it." Henry Kissinger, August 1970

Contents Preface Preface to the 1974 Edition

ix xiii

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

CHAPTER TWO

How Not to Reorganize the Government

16

Organization and Bureaucratic Politics

52

What to Do? The Need for an Organizational Strategy

83

The Strategies of Presidents: Foreign Policy-Making under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon

95

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER FIVE

CHAPTER SIX

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHAPTER EIGHT CHAPTER NINE

EPILOGUE

1

Problems with State: Presi­ dential Dissatisfaction and Efforts at Reform

154

Formal Approaches to Coherent Foreign Policy

191

The Uses of Staffs

214

Building Lines of Confidence: A State-Centered Organizational Strategy

254

The Nixon System—A Further Look

295

List of Abbreviations

321

Bibliographical Notes

323

Index

343

Preface THIS book is about the problem of organizing our

government for foreign policy. It is intended for govern­ ment officials, scholars, students taking courses on Amer­ ican foreign policy, and general readers concerned about why our government sometimes behaves so "irrationally" and what we might be able to do about it. The book assumes that we want this government to exercise some degree of influence over people and events outside our borders. It assumes further that we wish to have this influence exercised by coordinated government actions which support conscious, central United States policy purposes. It seeks to illuminate the potentials and limi­ tations of particular organizational devices and strategies as means to these ends. The book makes no assumption about what our policy purposes should be. While the author is personally critical of a number of things the United States govern­ ment has done in foreign affairs over the past two decades, whatever lessons this book holds are equally useful for those of differing persuasion. Some may ques­ tion the appropriateness of such a book at a time when the substance of American foreign policy occasions such deep and bitter debate. Yet such a debate is little more than empty posturing unless our government and its leaders have the means to turn aspirations into actions. In rightly holding our top officials accountable for what the government does, we tend to forget the often sub­ stantial gap between what our Presidents seek and what the bureaucrats officially working for them actually do. How this gap might be reduced is the problem around which most of this book is written. And perhaps it is useful to point out here what I trust the reader would infer from the tone throughout: that the term "bureau­ crat" as used here means simply "government official," with no negative connotation intended.

PREFACE

I have sought to stay in that difficult middle ground between the world of scholarship and the world of practice. There is more generalization here about the way the government operates and the problems of or­ ganizational change than would be found in the typical official report or reform proposal, or indeed in most previous books on foreign affairs organization. Readers more interested in specific practical problems or cases may wish to skip Chapters Two and Three, moving directly from the Introduction to the treatment of the Presidency and the past three administrations in Chap­ ters Four and Five. But if some bureaucrats may feel there is excessive "conceptualizing" or "theorizing," some academics may feel that serious general analytic problems are not always given adequate attention. The specialist in organizational behavior, for example, may be troubled by the space I devote to analyzing foreign policy "staffs," even though I am unable to provide a rigorous definition which fully distinguishes them from other units in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Part of my response would be that no absolute distinction is pos­ sible. Yet certain types of staffs have been repeatedly employed by high officials to help them control that bureaucracy, so an effort to clarify what these staffs do and what they might accomplish seems essential. This book was made possible by an International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Rela­ tions, which enabled me to devote a full year to research and writing. Thus I am particularly indebted to Lester R. Brown—who recommended me to the Council—and to John Temple Swing, whose energetic support and en­ couragement went well beyond his obligations as direc­ tor of the Council program. Particularly valuable was the opportunity to present papers for critical comment in the Spring of 1970 to the Council's Discussion Group on Foreign Affairs Organization for the Seventies, chaired by McGeorge Bundy with Edward Hamilton as χ

PREFACE

Vice-Chairman. I am also indebted to Henry Owen for the opportunity to spend my Council Fellowship year as a Guest Scholar at The Brookings Institution. I doubt that I would ever have undertaken a study on this subject had not Executive Director Frederick Bohen invited me in early 1967 to join the staff of the Presi­ dent's Task Force on Government Organization chaired by Ben W. Heineman. It was one of those occasions— perhaps not so rare as staff members like to think— when the "principals" knew considerably more about the government they were seeking to change than those of us hired to analyze it for them. If this book shows any feel at all for the foreign affairs government as it looks at the Cabinet or near-Cabinet level, it is due consider­ ably to the brief but intensive education I gained from sitting in on Task Force discussions. More people contributed directly or indirectly to my thinking as my research progressed than it is possible to mention here. My greatest debt is to Richard Ullman, who has not only offered detailed substantive comment on two complete drafts but valued advice and assistance throughout. The original draft was also read in its en­ tirety by Marver Bernstein, Morton Halperin, and Andrew Scott, and the book reflects many of their in­ sights and suggestions. It was reviewed to my benefit by my father, Chester M. Destler, w r ho took time off from two books he was working on. And my wife Harriett provided invaluable help throughout the writing, not only in keeping faith when it looked as if this book might never be, but in reading page after draft page with a stubborn insistence that it be clearly written and that it make sense. Many others offered helpful comments and sugges­ tions on specific chapters and preliminary papers. I par­ ticularly profited from the detailed criticism provided by Leslie Gelb, Robert H. Johnson, Arnold Kanter, Her­ bert Kaufman, John Leddy, Henry Owen, and Allen

PREFACE

Schick, as well as a number of government officials whose names must regrettably not be mentioned here. I am also grateful to typist Maybelle Clark, who twice turned some shabby and stapled-together pages into a shiny clean manuscript in less time than I ought to have given her. I doubt that I have fully met all of the criticisms made by those who took the time to review my work. But their suggestions have, I believe, improved it at many points. It goes without saying that whatever imperfections re­ main are my own responsibility. Arlington, Virginia June 19J1

Preface to the 1974 Edition ANY book on a current subject begins to age as soon as

the author hands his manuscript to the publisher. An analysis based upon the past ten years does not become "dated" quite so fast, but it ages nonetheless. In par­ ticular, this book was completed too soon to take ac­ count of either the Nixon foreign policy achievements of 1972 or the Watergate revelations of 1973. For this reason, I decided to add a short epilogue, one aimed not so much at updating the facts as dealing with some of the larger issues raised by the events of the past two years. The difficulty of keeping up with a moving subject was underscored by the announcement of Henry Kis­ singer's designation as Secretary of State a week before the publisher's deadline. But it also gives fresh relevance to many of the problems analyzed in the book—the relationship of the State Department to the President, the need to enlarge the number of officials with strong Presidential foreign policy mandates, the tension be­ tween career services and the Presidency. And as the Kissinger approach to the State Department unfolds, it will offer the student of organizational reform one more opportunity to assess the relationship between formal structure and real decision-making, the interplay be­ tween procedure and personality. Aside from the Epilogue and a few editorial and typo­ graphical corrections, the book is the same as originally published. I would like to express my personal thanks to the men and women of Princeton University Press for all that they have done on behalf of the book, and to Fred Bergsten, Seyom Brown, and Harriett Destler for their helpful critical comments on the Epilogue when it was in draft form. Washington, D.C. August !973

I. M. D.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction IN MARCH 1971, Senator Stuart Symington made a speech denouncing "the concentration of foreign policy decisionmaking power in the White House" which had deprived Secretary of State William P. Rogers of his rightful authority. What got the headlines was the Senator's ad-libbed remark that Rogers was "laughed at" on the cocktail circuit as "Secretary of State in title only."® But what he was really attacking was "the unique and unprecedentedly authoritative role of Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger," who had become, said Sy­ mington, "clearly the most powerful man in the Nixon Administration next to the President himself." 1 Much of the press reaction inevitably centered around the personalities of Kissinger and Rogers, and their rela­ tive influence as individuals in power-conscious Wash­ ington. President Nixon's response to a news conference question two days later treated the issue mainly in these terms. He sought to bolster Rogers' prestige by charac­ terizing "Senator Symington's attack upon the Secre­ tary" as a "cheap shot," and insisting "very simply that the Secretary of State is always the chief foreign policy adviser and the chief foreign policy spokesman of the administration." 2 But at issue was something more fun­ damental: how the executive branch of the United States government should be organized for the central management and coordination of foreign policy. Though never really saying so publicly, Nixon had chosen—apparently quite consciously—to build an orBibliographical notes begin on page 297. ® To refute this claim, the Republican National Committee staff polled two Washington society columnists and four "prominent Washington hostesses," and "reported their 'unanimous' testimony that 'they had never heard the Secretary o£ State laughed at.' " (John Osborne in The New Republic, March 27, 1971, p. 13.)

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

ganizational system which would give his Assistant for National Security Affairs the central responsibility for foreign affairs short of the President. Symington was arguing that the Secretary of State was the official who should play this role. In protesting the weakening of the Secretary, the Senator was in good company. Of eleven major studies or proposals on foreign affairs organization which had addressed the subject since World War II, seven had urged that overall foreign policy coordination be built mainly around the Secretary and his department. 6 Only two backed alternative solutions. And the best of the studies—that conducted by Senator Henry Jackson's national security subcommittee—had explicitly warned against efforts to base foreign policy coordination on a "super-staff" in the White House. 3 President Nixon also had ample precedent when he proclaimed the primacy of his Secretary in form while weakening it in practice. The Kennedy Administration had described the Secretary's role as "agent of coordina­ tion in all our major policies toward other nations," but its major organizational innovation was the creation of a White House foreign policy staff which actually did much of the coordinating. In 1966, Lyndon Johnson created a network of general interdepartmental com­ mittees to support the Secretary in exercising his "au­ thority and responsibility" for "the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental ac­ tivities of the United States government overseas." But there was little evidence that either he or his Secretary of State Dean Rusk took the committees seriously. RichSThey varied in their emphases. The 1949 Hoover Commission re­ port, for example, argued that State's efforts should be supplemented by the creation of Cabinet-level interdepartmental committees with their memberships and mandates determined by the President. By contrast, the 1967 Heineman Task Force report and the 1968 AFSA report both endorsed a far-reaching and unambiguous leadership role for the Secretary.

INTRODUCTION

ard Nixon went both of his predecessors one better. Im­ mediately after his inauguration he established a policy­ making system providing unprecedented White House staff authority, all the while reaffirming "the position of the Secretary of State as his principal foreign policy adviser." 4 The President built this system because he had a goal —Presidential control over foreign policy. The State Department had not achieved this for other Presidents, and Nixon apparently concluded that a White Housecentered system had better prospects for success. The system was not designed mainly to shut out Congress, though it did tend to have that effect. What Nixon primarily sought to control, rather, was "his" part of the government, the executive branch. As Kissinger put it somewhat later, "The nightmare of the modern state is the hugeness of the bureaucracy, and the problem is how to get coherence and design in it." 5 It is a bureaucracy which could neutralize an explicit order by President Kennedy-that our obsolete and pro­ vocative Jupiter missiles be removed from Turkey, simply by not implementing the order. It is a bureauc­ racy which could at the same time pursue delicate nego­ tiations with North Vietnam and unleash bombing attacks on Hanoi which destroyed any chance of the negotiations succeeding. It is a bureaucracy which could locate a blockade around Cuba in October 1962 not where the President wanted it in order to minimize the danger of a rash Soviet response, but where the Navy found it most consistent with standard blockade pro­ cedures and the military problems as the Navy saw them. It is a bureaucracy which can provide unbalanced or incomplete information, continue outmoded policies through its own inertial momentum, and treat the needs of particular offices and bureaus as if they were sacred national interests. 6 It is also a bureaucracy which contains considerable

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

talent and unrivalled expertise, coupled with the means for giving Presidential decisions real effect; thus it is indispensable. It is filled with men generally loyal to the President, and to a certain degree responsive to him. But because they tend to be responsive even more to the de­ mands of their own particular jobs and organizations, they see things very differently from the way he does. To get "coherence and design" from this bureaucracy is an enormously difficult task. Yet to seek it is essential to our conducting an effective foreign policy at all. This book is about this problem—how the govern­ ment should be organized for purposive and coherent foreign policy. By "policy" we mean here not what we aspire to accomplish but what the government actually does. To have policy that is "purposive" means, then, to have what we do relate to what we aim to do; drawing on Webster, it is policy "having or tending to fulfill a conscious purpose or design." By wishing it to be "coherent" we mean we want the various things we do to be consistent with one another and with our broader purposes. Moreover, we do not mean consistency in the sense of being in line with certain general principles, or appearing to be. We mean instead consistency in effect. Thus a "coherent" foreign policy could well include defending one country against "aggression" and not another." The aim of coherent and purposive foreign policy has been shared by most analysts, pundits, and high-level practitioners in post-war America. Twenty-five years ago Walter Lippmann complained that "our foreign rela® Of course, we don't just want foreign policy to be purposive and coherent. We also wish it to be "effective," and most of all "good." It is assumed that purposiveness and coherence will, on balance, con­ tribute to effectiveness. It is hoped that the resulting policy will be "good." But while organizational devices can help men achieve good policies—are indeed indispensable to that purpose—the fact that or­ ganization is essentially a means implies that it can be employed for "poor"/"bad" policies as well.

INTRODUCTION

tions are not under control, that decisions of the greatest moment are being made in bits and pieces without the exercise of any sufficient overall judgment." 7 Since then men of such divergent policy viewpoints as Senator Jackson and George Kennan have stressed the need for our government to "speak with one voice," and have sought to show how it might be organized to do so.8 And most international relations scholars assume that states do or should act "rationally," as purposive units. 9 Whether speaking of the "science" of "statecraft" or the "art" of diplomacy, they have tended to assume the existence of a central intelligence and guiding force. Yet the goal does raise certain problems both of defini­ tion and of desirability. Precision is impossible, for example, in distinguishing "foreign" from other types of national policy. International issues are becoming more and more intertwined with a range of domestic policy interests, from the textile industry fighting Asian im­ ports to young men resisting the draft for a foreign war. But this book assumes the broadest reasonable defini­ tion. "Foreign policy," as used here, means activities by government officials which influence (and whose pur­ pose, in large part, is to influence) either events abroad or relationships between Americans and citizens of other countries, especially relations between the U. S. govern­ ment and other governments. Specifically included is a wide range of defense issues, since our armed forces are intended mainly for providing security against actual or potential threats from other countries, influencing events beyond our borders, or strengthening our inter­ national bargaining position generally. Thus our use of the term "foreign policy" encompasses what others call "national security policy." It also includes international economic policy, specifically aid, trade, monetary, and commercial policy. Another important question relates to whether we really want our foreign policy to be entirely coherent.

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

In stressing the need for the government to pursue calculated, purposive policies aiming to affect the world or parts of it in certain intended ways, this study tends to understate the degree to which governmental insti­ tutions perform useful functions simply by acting as a focal point for the resolution of the various foreign policy-related interests in our society. It is hard to make a case in theory that all of our government's overseas actions should be entirely consistent, and it is certain in fact that they will not be. There is clearly room for dif­ ferent programs pursuing values important to particular segments of our society, such as development assistance, cultural exchange, or the Peace Corps. It is also perfectly reasonable and legitimate for unions and industries directly affected by particular imports to undertake cam­ paigns to restrict them, however much those favoring a liberal trade policy may regret their doing so. When one reaches the political-military sphere, how­ ever, the case for "pluralism" becomes weaker, and the need for central control more urgent. Neither our armed forces, nor their network of overseas bases, nor our various intelligence activities can reasonably be con­ sidered ends in themselves. To the degree that they become so, they pose threats not only to international but to internal security. They must instead be the instru­ ments of foreign policy purposes. It is also in the politi­ cal-military area where we face the danger of irrevoca­ bility—in a matter of days, through failure to control our military actions in another Cuban missile crisis; or over a period of years, if an uncontrolled arms race eventually creates a condition where one nation feels it has to "strike first." Yet there can be no clear separation between the political-military (or national security) policy area and other U. S. government foreign affairs-related activities. The Marshall Plan was more than an economic program. The problem of U. S. troops in Europe is at once a mili-

INTRODUCTION

tary, diplomatic, and balance of payments issue of the first rank. For this reason, this study will continue to speak about bringing coherence to foreign policy as a whole. But as the careful reader will notice, the emphasis throughout is on the political-military side, with the main examples drawn from this sphere and the analysis and proposals directed mainly toward it. Once these general problems are clarified, a study about organizing for coherent foreign policy must cope with other types of questions. At one level, these are the "practical" ones raised repeatedly by both analysts and practitioners. Can the foreign affairs government be effectively run from the White House staff? By the State Department? What devices are available to help assure that important issues are brought before top decision­ makers in the most thorough and balanced way, and that decisions are in fact carried out? To what extent can broad advance planning make our actual policy more "rational?" Will coordinating committees really coordi­ nate? And perhaps most important of all, once it is de­ cided that a certain official or institution should play a central policy role, how does one go about increasing the chances that he (or it) will actually play it? But a review of how others have sought to answer these questions forces us to face broader issues. For in seeking to use organizational changes to promote pur­ posive. and coherent policy, experts and practitioners alike have often produced both strikingly inadequate recommendations and notably ineffective remedies. The first Hoover Commission, for example, urged in 1949 that the State Department should serve as "the focal point for coordination of foreign affairs activities throughout the Government," but neglected to even discuss how its bureaucratic rivals were to be made re­ ceptive to such coordination. Thirteen years later the Herter Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel placed its hopes for State Department management and inter-

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

agency coordination on the creation of a new, "Number Three" job, Executive Under Secretary of State. Never once did it raise the obvious question of how the incum­ bent could develop sufficient influence over those whom he was to "manage." Yet this recommendation was en­ dorsed in 1968 by a major foreign affairs professional organization, and in 1969 by an important independent study. 10 Both the Hoover and Herter reports failed to resolve (or even to treat) the central problem of how their chosen coordinators could develop sufficient leverage within the bureaucracy to be effective. It may not be just coincidence that the Herter proposal was not adopt­ ed, and that the Hoover recommendation did not work. Nor, given this track record, is it surprising that Presi­ dents have increasingly disregarded expert counsel to build foreign policy coordination around State, and sought instead to construct an alternative mechanism in the White House. Yet practitioners often do just as bad­ ly. The Eisenhower Administration's elaborate policy planning machinery was apparently more effective in burying key issues than in highlighting them. The 1969 State Department sought to emulate the White House and Defense by creating a staff to support the Secretary on critical current policy issues, yet undermined its prospects for effectiveness by the way it organized the staff in relation to other departmental units. Even the Nixon-Kissinger system, the product of considerably more sophisticated analysis of the ways of bureaucracies, has developed a number of quite serious weaknesses which threaten the achievement of the President's goals. An effort to analyze why reforms so often fail makes us face a more "theoretical" question: How in general can we make organizational changes affect what the government actually does, in the way we intend to af­ fect it? And to seek an answer to this question is to raise still another: What sorts of motivations and influences

INTRODUCTION

do affect how government officials behave in the day-to­ day bureaucratic world? Or to change that question slightly: How is policy in fact made? A serious study of foreign affairs organization, then, must involve an effort to relate organization to the "real world" of policy-making. This book seeks to do so in three ways. The first is relatively theoretical—a search for what general things scholars have to say about the foreign affairs governmental process. The second is more practical—a look at what has happened in the foreign affairs government since i960, with special at­ tention to the White House and the State Department. The third is an effort to assess the utility of specific or­ ganizational devices, such as central staffs and coordinat­ ing committee systems, and in particular to discover the circumstances which contribute to their effectiveness. All three assume the goal of purposive and coherent foreign policy. All seek to throw light on how, and how much, it can be achieved. The remainder of this chapter seeks to provide a brief introduction to the foreign affairs government and its organizational problems. Chapter Two looks at the most prominent post-war organizational approaches, seeking to uncover their central thrusts and their apparent un­ derlying assumptions. A resulting dissatisfaction with their treatment of the major problems sets the stage for Chapter Three, which delves into academic studies of bureaucratic politics for illuminating concepts about how foreign policy is actually made. This creates a gen­ eral framework for Chapter Four, which puts forward a tentative foreign affairs organizational strategy. Chapter Five looks at the approaches of our last three Presidents, with one important theme being the in­ creased role of the White House staff. Chapter Six in­ vestigates why the State Department has been unable to play the coordinating role, and assesses a range of pro­ posed or attempted departmental reforms. Chapter

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

Seven looks briefly at the utility of particular organiza­ tional devices as means of strengthening central manage­ ment. Chapter Eight treats the problems and potential of central substantive foreign policy staffs, and relates White House and Defense experience to the problem of staffing the Secretary of State. Finally, Chapter Nine seeks to draw on preceding analyses to propose a com­ prehensive strategy aimed at using organization as a tool to promote the making of purposive and coherent for­ eign policy. Since this study seeks to develop a realistic view of how organization can influence foreign policy, the author must stand ready to be judged on the practicality of his specific proposals. Yet they may be the least im­ portant part of the book. No single organizational scheme, whatever its built-in flexibility, can fully ac­ commodate the differing personalities and priorities of different Presidents and Administrations. But if this study proves at all useful, the questions raised and the experience analyzed should clarify the choices that are available. Thus the ultimate aim of this study is not to "solve" the problem. It is to provide a framework and a line of analysis useful to those who must grapple with parts of it either as analysts or as practitioners. The Foreign Affairs Government At the official center of the foreign affairs government is the Department of State. Its Secretary is the senior member of the Cabinet, and his Department has since 1789 been responsible for the basic conduct of our for­ eign relations. Its Foreign Service officers (FSO's), num­ bering about 3,000, represent our country overseas, con­ duct negotiations with other governments, and analyze and report on events in particular countries. Above all they are charged with carrying out American foreign policy and contributing—through their analysis, infor­ mation, and advice—to the decisions and actions of top

INTRODUCTION

leaders. Half of these FSO's are in Washington, where they and others of State's approximately 6,800 employees deal with envoys of 117 different countries represented there. The other half are overseas, the senior layer of a State Department presence totalling about 6,200 Ameri­ cans in 124 diplomatic missions. 11 By itself the Department is large enough and dis­ persed enough to constitute a formidable management problem. But State is only part of the foreign affairs government today, and by no means the predominant part. For example, its overseas staffs represent just 29 per cent of the approximately 21,500 officials in our diplomatic missions, and only 16.6 per cent if one sub­ tracts those State officials who are there to provide ad­ ministrative services to other U. S. agencies. By contrast, 28.7 per cent of the Americans attached to these missions are Defense Department (DoD) officials, 21.3 per cent represent the Agency for International Development (AID), and 5.6 per cent work for the United States In­ formation Agency (USIA). Others represent such pre­ dominantly domestic departments as Treasury, Agricul­ ture, Commerce, Labor, Justice, and Transportation. These numbers may or may not include Central Intelli­ gence Agency (CIA) officials," about whom no govern­ ment statistics are supplied. 12 The size of the foreign affairs bureacracy is also re­ flected in dollars spent. With the massive exception of defense, money is not as central to foreign policy as it is to domestic. But the Nixon Administration's proposed FY 1972 budget still listed, under the category of "interΛ Various published analyses o£ the CIA give estimates, of which Stewart Alsop's are reasonably representative. "The whole 'intelligence community,' " he writes, "spends on the order of ¢3 billion a \ear, and employs about 160,000 people. Of this, the CIA's share is around a halfbillion, and less than 16,000 people (other than agents and other foreigners). The code-breaking National Security Agency spends the most mone>—on the order of $1 billion—and employs, incredibly, over 100,000 people." (The Center, Harper and Row, 1968, p. 240.)

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

national affairs and finance," outlays totalling over $4 billion, including $2.3 billion for foreign economic as­ sistance, $962 million for the Food for Peace program, $438 million for general State Department activities, $197 million for USIA, $290 million for the Export-Im­ port Bank, and $73 million for the Peace Corps. This was, of course, entirely outside of the $76.0 billion for "national defense," which included $1.0 billion for mili­ tary aid. Americans in 1971 tend to have less expansive notions than they once had about what these expendi­ tures can achieve. But since most of our international activities reflect a long-range trend of increased inter­ dependence among nations, an abandonment of very many of them for very long is most unlikely. 13 Even if we could start from scratch in organizing this government for foreign policy, the geographic, substan­ tive, and programmatic range of our activities poses un­ avoidable dilemmas. First there is the classic problem of dividing the work. Should the principal organiza­ tional subdivisions be by country and region? By sub­ stantive problem? By specific operating program? If we decided to put all of the foreign affairs government into one large agency organized on a regional basis, how would we then assure that the aid programs in various countries conformed to general standards on terms of loans and quality of programs, or could draw on per­ sonnel with economic development expertise? Alterna­ tively, if we group all of the functions in a central aid organization, how do we make our aid program in Brazil consistent with our general policy there, rather than just a reflection of what the aid agency wants? Thus, however we establish our main organizational subdivi­ sions, we face the need for cross-cutting mechanisms to meet the needs for coordination neglected by the basic organizational subdivisions. These dilemmas are reflected in our actual foreign affairs organization. The State Department is organized

INTRODUCTION

primarily on a geographic basis, with functional and administrative units handling those activities not as­ signable to regional bureaus. Other agencies—like De­ fense, CIA, AID, USIA, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)—have been established to administer particular programs (aid and informa­ tion), work on specific policy problems (arms control), or provide important policy support functions and in­ struments (military force, intelligence gathering, and covert action). And the domestic departments involved in foreign affairs have primarily functional raisons d'etre. But for those seeking to bring coherence and central purpose to this government, the overriding organiza­ tional problem is one of coordination. For the major foreign affairs issues simply aren't divisible into com­ ponents which can be handled more or less on their own terms. Not only, for example, is the problem of our troop deployment in Europe critical to our defense posture (Defense), our balance of payments (Treasury), and our relations with several important countries in­ cluding the Soviet Union (State). It is also very difficult for an action to be taken by an agency concerned with one of these elements without it having an impact on another. Foreign affairs bureaucrats, of course, like to treat issues as military or diplomatic or aid or agricul­ tural matters; if a problem can be easily classified and assigned, everyone's job is easier. But it is difficult to do so on very many questions, and impossible on the most important. Whether the problem be our response to an India threatened by famine or by China, our bases in Japan or the textiles Japan ships here, the future shape of "the Alliance" or the "Alianza," it almost in­ evitably involves at least two agencies, and usually more. Yet in any large system which organizes thousands of people to perform parts of a complex body of work, most individuals will tend to think and act in terms of

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

quite narrow perspectives shaped by their particular sets of responsibilities. Means must somehow be found to bring their particular actions into accord with larger purposes. One useful type of coordination is lateral coordina­ tion. We avoid the left hand not knowing what the right is doing by the three "C's"—committees, clearances, and compromises. Committees must assure that various de­ partments' expertise, interests, and program responsi­ bilities are brought to bear on the issue; clearances are required to show interdepartmental agreement on out­ going cables or policy documents of broad importance; compromises are needed to reach such agreement. The development of a network of interagency relationships for lateral coordination has been one of the most im­ portant organizational developments of the post-war era. Richard Neustadt noted in 1963 that ". . . in the preKorea years . . . a Secretary of Defense could forbid contacts between Pentagon and State at any level lower than his own, and within limits could enforce his ban. That happened only 14 years ago. In bureaucrtic terms it is as remote as the stone age." 14 But lateral coordination has brought problems of its own—slowness in resolving issues, the extreme difficulty of getting anything significant "cleared" at all, or inter­ agency deals which postpone the most difficult problems or settle them on "least common denominator" grounds. So coordination among relative equals isn't enough. We need coordination from above as well. Such coordination is, of course, a major goal of the Nixon-Kissinger system which has caused Symington, and no doubt Rogers, so much anguish. It was the pur­ pose also of the first post-war effort to harmonize policies on critical issues, the establishment of the National Security CounciL c And it is the subject of most of this β The NSC was created by Congress in the "National Security Act of 1947, which also established the office of Secretary of Defense. It

INTRODUCTION

book. Before beginning our own analysis of the prob­ lems of achieving such coordination, however, it is first necessary to see how others have sought to do the job. That is the purpose of Chapter Two. is chaired by the President, and the other statutory members at present are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emeigency Preparedness. Its original official purpose was to relate military and weapons policies more closely to foreign policy. Its actual role has varied widely, reflecting Presi­ dents' differing organizational preferences and operating styles.

CHAPTER TWO

How Not to Reorganize the Government BUREAUCRATS and academics alike have tired of the subject of foreign affairs organization. Both question the relevance of past studies to present problems. Both wonder whether organizational forms affect policy-mak­ ing in anything like the intended ways. Both have doubts about the utility of "another study" to turn over ground already so amply plowed. Such skepticism has ample justification. Few problems have been probed as often since World War II as that of organizing our government for coherent and pur­ posive foreign policy. At least thirteen major studies or proposals have appeared, most with some degree of offi­ cial sponsorship. 1 Five Presidential Administrations have sought to handle the problem in at least five dif­ ferent ways. There also have been many narrower re­ views, focused on personnel administration or particu­ lar problems like foreign aid. And accompanying them all has been a chorus of published commentary by offi­ cials, scholars, and assorted prominent citizens. Not only have many looked into the problem, they also have come out of their reviews saying similar things. Studies of foreign affairs organization have fed substan­ tially on other studies, tending to raise the same issues and repeat (or reject) the same proposals. Incoming Administrations have responded mainly to the foreign affairs experiences of their predecessors, whether emu­ lation or avoidance was their aim. And in general, nei­ ther the recommenders nor the practitioners have sought very many insights from either the experience of the domestic government or the work of scholars in possibly relevant fields. Any new look at foreign affairs organization must cope

HOW NOT TO REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT

with this legacy, and establish a need to go beyond it. Such is the purpose of the present chapter. It seeks to analyze the post-war reform tradition not by summariz­ ing and criticizing each individual proposal or report, but by a broader analysis of some of their common themes. Such an approach has its dangers. No two of the post-war studies are identical in either content or quali­ ty, and there have been significant differences in practi­ cal efforts as well. A review which treats most of this legacy in a broader framework risks not being complete­ ly fair or thorough about any specific part of it. Yet the recurrence of similar answers to the question of how to organize the government for coherent foreign policy underscores the need for a broader assessment than a study-by-study analysis could offer. The great majority of post-war "solutions" to the foreign affairs organizational problem can be grouped under eleven general categories. These are: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)

The Separation of "Policy" from "Operations" The Joining of "Authority" and "Responsibility" The Creation of a New Central Official The Strengthening of Career Services The Elimination of "Over-Staffing" Coordination from the White House Coordination by the State Department Bringing Other Government Foreign Affairs Ac­ tivities into the State Department 9) Foreign Affairs Programming 10) The Establishment of General Interagency Co­ ordinating Committees 11) The Use of Central Policy Staffs Since they have different advocates, some of these "so­ lutions" are inconsistent with others. There is also over­ lap among them, with many studies and reforms com­ bining two or more.

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter will concentrate on the first five of these solutions," treating them as a reasonably representative sample of what the post-war tradition has to offer. Most of the major studies have recommended one or more of them, and each of the five has backers who see it as the major solution to the problem of coherent foreign policy-making. A look at their virtues and limitations, then, should serve as a useful introduction to the post­ war literature, and as the basis for a broader critique. i . T h e Separation of "Policy" from "Operations" b One of the most frequent approaches to organizing for coherent foreign policy is to separate responsibility for "policy planning," or "policy formulation" from re­ sponsibility for "operations." The usual aim is for the former to control the latter. There have been two major applications of this distinction. The first involves the separation of the State Department from operating pro­ grams. The second has been an effort to control day-today activities of all agencies through a central policy formulation process. a The others are discussed elsewhere: White House coordination in Chapter Five, "solutions" 8, 9, and 10 in Chapter Seven, and the uses of stafls in Chapter Eight. The limitations of the State Department as the lead agency for foreign policy are treated in Chapter Six, the possibilities for correcting them in Chapter Nine. δ This use of the word "policy" obviously differs from our Chapter One definition of the term as "what the government actually does." It is closer to Moi ton Halperin's definition of policy as "an authorita­ tive statement describing a general situation desired by the U.S. or prescribing general criteria for action." (See his forthcoming study of bureaucratic politics, discussed in Chapter Three.) To avoid con­ fusion, this book will use such phrases as "policy formulation." "policy objectives," and "policy guidelines" when the latter sense is intended, or will simply enclose the word "policy" in quotation marks. Also, the "policy-operations" and "planning-operations" distinctions discussed interchangeably here are not strictly speaking the same. But often "planning" in this context seems to mean "policy formulation," as in the Eisenhower Administration example. Both dichotomies are dis­ tinct from, but bear a family resemblance to, the State Department's in­ ternal "substance-administration" dichotomy referred to in Chapter Six.

HOW NOT TO REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT

The Hoover Commission in 1949 urged that State Department responsibility be concentrated on "formu­ lating [for the President] proposed policies in conjunc­ tion with other departments and agencies." State "should not be given responsibility for the operation of specific programs," but rather be "the focal point for coordination of foreign affairs activities throughout the government." Other studies of the time criticized this recommendation, but it was clearly attractive to the career Foreign Service. It has also been favored by top officials. No Secretary of State since World War II appears to have considered program operations to be an important part of his—or his Department's—job. 2 It is not clear that all proponents of this division of labor saw policy formulation as a way to control opera­ tions. Dulles and others in State apparently considered "operations" (defined as ongoing programs), as an en­ cumbrance to be shunted aside, insufficiently important for their attention. The Hoover Commission seems to have been interested mainly in a tidy division of labor between State and other agencies. But the NSC staff system under Eisenhower separated policy formulation and operations in a way that clearly saw the former as a management tool to shape the latter. The system built by his first Special Assistant for National Security Af­ fairs, Robert Cutler, had as its main working organs two interdepartmental committees. These were the Plan­ ning Board, charged with preparing issues for National Security Council consideration by drafting papers out­ lining general policy guidelines; and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), created to oversee imple­ mentation of decisions taken on these issues. And in this case the "operations" which the planning process aimed to control were not just "programs," but all day-to-day foreign affairs government activities. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, in the words of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

McGeorge Bundy, "deliberately rubbed out the dis­ tinction between planning and operation." 3 But it was given new life under the Nixon system, which has sought to make broad policy studies the basis for general Presidential decisions intended to control specific bur­ eaucratic actions. 0 The case for separating "policy" from "operations" has some undeniable logic. Unless relatively broad deci­ sions taken at high levels (often called policy) can shape specific actions at the far reaches of the foreign affairs government (often termed operations), the job of carry­ ing out a coherent foreign policy becomes far more difficult, since top officials cannot know and decide every detail. It is hard to dispute the aim espoused by Lannon Walker of "integrated planning and decentralized op­ erations," 4 and the idea implicit in this phrase that the former should shape the latter. Yet if carried very far the distinction sounds much like the politics-administration dichotomy which has haunted the field of public administration. For to work it must assume two things: that the processes, policy­ making and operations, are separate or separable, and that the first can control the second (or at least point it in clear general directions). Similarly, Woodrow Wil­ son's 1887 article urging the founding of a "science of administration" assumed that administration could be simply the efficient execution of policy and program decisions previously taken, though he saw policy-making c In form at least, the Nixon Administration also restored the dis­ tinction in another way, by making the NSC "the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision," but assigning responsibility to the Secretaiy of State, "in ac­ cordance with approved policy, tor the execution of foreign policy." (Jackson Subcommittee, "NSC: New Structure," February 6, 1969, italics added.) Thus State Department officials found themselves on the operational side of the dichotomy for a change, but with a similar lack of the leverage needed to play the central coordinating role.

HOW NOT TO REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT

as conducted in the broad political arena rather than centered in executive branch institutions. 5 In fact, broad policy decisions seldom provide effec­ tive guidance for specific operational situations. Often guidelines are too general to have clear applicability to particular cases, or several different "policies" will offer conflicting cues. For example, an overseas aid official may at once be expected to enforce Washington's project criteria yet encourage the recipient government to play a stronger planning role. Or he may be directed to stimulate grass-roots participation, yet stay out of sensi­ tive host-country matters like a struggle between advo­ cates of centralized power and champions of local au­ tonomy. If an effort is made to avoid excessive generality or conflicting cues through much more detailed policy guidance, it takes away the flexibility that those on the firing lines need in coping with special situations only vaguely understood in highest Washington. Also, cir­ cumstances change, and unforseen crises arise which render previous policy declarations obsolete. For these and other reasons, a large number of op­ erational decisions are made by harassed bureaucrats who treat each issue as it comes and resolve it mainly on its own terms. General policy guidance is only mar­ ginally relevant—either they get specific, ad hoc signals from their superiors, or they cope as best they can. Even the Hoover Commission's foreign affairs task force recog­ nized that the policy-operations distinction largely up­ held in its recommendations was "defective and illu­ sory,because "the operation alone of any given proΛ The Hoover Commission sought to reconcile this apparent con­ tradiction by indicating that other agencies did have a "policy" role, even i£ State had no proper direct role in "operations." But the lack of any explanation of how State's "policy" efforts would achieve lev­ erage over theirs made unviable State's proposed role of "leadership in defining and developing United States foreign policies," "recom­ mending the choice and timing of the use of various instruments to carry out policies as formulated," etc. ("Foreign Affairs," p. 29.)

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

gram involves policy decisions," some of the highest im­ portance. 6 In fact, specific operational decisions can in­ fluence our broader policy course to a marked degree. What was apparently a lower-level "operational" de­ cision to support the Laotian "Secret Army" in its ef­ forts to retake the Plaine des Jarres in 1969 not only constituted a significant immediate change in our policy toward that part of the world, but came back to haunt the President and constrict his range of choice when the Communists counterattacked earlier in 1970. Similarly, a Presidential statement that we are for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict has its influence, but more important is how we react to specific third-party peace feelers which cannot be anticipated in a planning process, or what Ambassador Bunker says to President Thieu day by day. This may help explain why the State Department has failed to serve effectively as the "focal point of coordina­ tion" for foreign policy, despite its general fidelity to the Hoover prescription. It may also illustrate the charge, "even by certain insiders," that the Eisenhower Administration's major policy papers were "so general that they were meaningless. . . virtually useless as guides to planning and action." 7 Perhaps the best commentary on the broader question, however, came from Senator Hugh Scott after the U.S. Senate passed the Stennis amendment, which had sought to cripple federal de­ segregation efforts in the South by undermining their legal basis. "Mercifully," said Scott, "this is mere policy and therefore not binding." 8 2.

The Joining of "Authority" and "Responsibility"

The second frequently proposed "solution" to the problem of organizing for coherent foreign policy places hopes in giving major officials "authority" commen­ surate with their "responsibility." The late fifties brought a lively organizational debate.

HOW NOT TO REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT

It was spurred by Sputnik, dissatisfaction with the for­ mal Eisenhower NSC machinery, and the upcoming Presidential election. It featured critical articles by men such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Hans Morgenthau. The most sustained and enduring con­ tribution to the debate, however, was the series of hear­ ings and reports begun in 1959 by Senator Henry Jack­ son's subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Govern­ ment Operations. The subcommittee's work was characterized by con­ siderable practical wisdom, and a resistance to sweeping solutions that solved nothing. And for the most part, its pragmatic approach was both encouraged and reflected by its first witness, Robert Lovett, the Secretary of De­ fense and Under Secretary of State under Truman whom Kennedy later sought in vain for a major Cabinet post. Lovett defined the foreign affairs management problem as "executive department overlap and the clash of group interests," and described "the device of inviting argument between conflicting interests" within the government as "the 'foul-up factor' in our equation of performance." His prescription was more traditional. "This huge organization would be hard enough to run if authority were given where responsibility is placed. Yet, that frequently is not the case," he said. "The authority of the individual executive must be re­ stored." 9/e This diagnosis and prescription were quoted with strong favor in Jackson Subcommittee reports. More­ over, giving authority to general executives had long been standard public administration doctrine. The to Jackson, in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. 1, p. 1 33®1 Lannon Walker, "Our Foreign Affans Machinery: Time for an Overhaul," Foreign Affairs, January 19G9, p. 319. 5 Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," June 1887; re­ printed in Political Science Quarterly, December 1941, pp. 481-506. 6 Harvey H. Bundy et al., "The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," prepared for the Hoover Commission, Januaiv 1949, pp. 71-72. 7 Joseph Ponturo in IDA, President and National Security, p. 220. 8 Quoted in Washington Post, F'ebruaiy 22, 1970, p. A10. 9 In Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. I, pp. 14, 16. 1 0 Hoover Commission, "Concluding Report," p. 5; "Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense 011 the Department of Defense," by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, July 1, 1970, p. 23. For elucidation of the contradiction between the Hoover Commission's preaching on authority and responsibility and some of its actual recommendations, as well as a broader discussion of this problem, see Herbert A. Simon, Donald W . Smithburg, and Victor L. Thompson, Public Administra­ tion, Albert A. Knopf, 1950, esp. pp. 286-91. n See Campbell, "What Is To Be Done?" pp. 88-89. Campbell's pro­ posals are developed at greater length in T h e Foteign Affairs Fudge Factory, Basic Books, 1971. 1 2 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, p. 268. T h e book he cites is James L. McCamy 1 Conduct of the New Diplomacy, Harper & Row, 1964. McCamy places particularly strong emphasis on making authority commensurate with responsibility. (See pp. 54 ff.) 1 3 Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol, I, pp. 944-46. 1 4 HaviIand et al., Formulation of U . S. Foreign Policy, pp. 3, 64 ff. A similar proposal was advanced by Aithur W . Macmahon in Adminis­ tration in Foreign Affairs, University of Alabama Press, 1953, pp. 92 ff. 1 5 Herter Committee, New Diplomacy, pp. 11-13, 15-18; AFSA, Mod­ ern Diplomacy, pp. 25-26; Hair, Professional Diplomat, pp. 334-36.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ιβ Jackson Subcommittee, "Super-Cabinet Officers," in Organizing, Vol. Ill, p. 19. 17 Mosher, "Observations About Foreign Service Reform," p. 604. The Wriston report is "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service," Report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, June 1954. 18 Don K ( . Price, "The Secretary and Our Unwritten Constitution," in American Assembly, Secretary of State, p. 178; Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration," American Political Science Review, December 1956, reprinted in Altshuler, Politics of the Bureaucracy, p. 85. 1 9 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr,, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 414. 20 Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. Ill, p. 5. 21 Jackson Subcommittee, "The Secretary of State," in Administra­ tion, Staff Reports, p. 37. 2 2 Ibid., p. 38; Kennan, "America's Administrative Response," in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 228; John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, Houghton Mifflin, 1969, p. 212; Campbell, "What Is To Be Done?" p. 88. 23 Richard Holbrooke, "The Machine That Fails," Foreign Policy, Winter 1970-71, p. 72. 24 Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity, Harper and Row, 1968, p. 212. 2 SRichard Hofstader, The Age of Reform, Vintage Books, i960, p. 248. 26 Both quotations are from William Attwood, "The Labyrinth in Foggy Bottom," Atlantic, February 1967, p. 47. 2 messages refer to the White House press release edition.) 30 AFSA, Modern Diplomacy, pp. 155, 22, 151; IDA, President and National Security, p. 10. CHAPTER THREE: ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS The major source for Chapter Three is the work of a limited but growing number of analysts on the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy-making. Among the pioneering efforts were those of Hilsman and Huntington already cited; a particularly fine case study by Warner R. Schilling ("The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and. Defense Budgets, Columbia University Press, 1962); several studies by Hammond; the Jackson Subcommittee ma­ terials; and, above all, Richard E. Neustadt's Presidential Power, Signet, i960. Recent years have seen efforts to systematize, modify, and elaborate the conclusions about the policv-making process reached in these earlier works. Probably the major intellectual locus of such work is the Ken­ nedy Institute at Harvard. Neustadt gives a brief outline of its work in Alliance Politics, Columbia University Press, 1970, pp. 139 ff. The most interesting and explicit analyses of bureaucratic politics to date are those of Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin. Allison's broad study is scheduled for publication in the fall of 1971 (Essence of De­ cision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Com­ pany); references here are to his article in American Political Science Review. Halperin is now completing a comprehensive study of bureau­ cratic politics. Except where otherwise noted, references to his work are based on preliminary drafts made available through the courtesy of the author. A related work which draws more on organization theory is Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, A Rand Corporation Research Study, Little, Brown and Company, 1967. A different kind of illumination comes from Charles Frankel's High on Foggy Bottom, Harper and Row, 1969. Although his position as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs was somewhat on the periphery of the foreign

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES affairs government as it concerns us here, Frankel's book includes a number of exceptionally cogent insights into the bureaucratic political process. Finally, one should not neglect case studies or participants' memoirs as sources of important clues about the broader process. Among the better recent ones are Cooper, The Lost Crusade·, Russell Edgerton, Sub-Cabinet Politics and Policy Commitment: The Birth of the De­ velopment Loan Fund, Inter-University Case Program, Inc., Syracuse, 1970; Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security, Harper and Row, 1970; Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, David McKay, 1969; and Frederick C. Mosher and John E. Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leader­ ship, Oxford University Press, 1970. 1 Neustadt,

Presidential Power, pp. 41, 45. 2Frankel, Foggy Bottom, p. 171. 3 Max Weber, "The Ruler vs. the Expert," reprinted in Jackson Subcommittee, Specialists and Generalists, 1968, pp. 43-44; Dean Acheson, "The President and the Secretary of State," in American Assembly, Secretary of State, p. 42. 4 Allison, "Conceptual Models," p. 708. Two very different early post-war books highlighting the complexity of bureaucratic relation­ ships within the (primarily domestic) government are Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy, Harper Brothers, 1950; and Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, Public Administration. 5 Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, Public Administration, p. 20. 6 Hilsman, "Foreign Policy Consensus," p. 365. t Schilling, "Politics of Defense," pp. 10-15; Hoopes, Limits of Inter­ vention, p. 225. s Allison, "Conceptual Models," p. 706; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 7; Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, p. 163. 9 Allison, "Conceptual Models," p. 710; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 559-61. The term "bargaining advantage," I believe, originates with Neustadt. 10 Allison, "Conceptual Models," p. 710. li Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. I, p. 15. 12 Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureau­ cratic Politics in the Pentagon and White House in the Johnson Ad­ ministration," Piepared for Delivery at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12, 1970, p. 8. I 3 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 561. 14 Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, pp. 214-20. is Allison, "Conceptual Models," p. 707. 16 Hilsman, To Mox'e a Nation, p. 5; Lindblom, Intelligence of De­ mocracy, Ch. 9. 1 ^ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 541-43; Altshuler, Politics of the Bureaucracy, v. 18 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 10. 19 In Jackson Subcommittee, Administration, Hearings, p. 403.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 20 Andrew M Scott: "The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture," International Studies Quarterly, March 1()69, pp. 2-5; "Enviionniental Change and Organizational Adaptation: The P i o b l e m of t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , March 1970, p. 87. 21 Moiton H. Halpei in, "Why Bureaucrats Plav Games," F o r e i g n Policy, Spiing 1971, p. 79 22 Jackson Subcommittee, "Basic Issues," in A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Staff Reports, p. 24; Scott, "Environmental Change: The Problem of State," P- 9 2 · 23 Downs, I n s i d e B u r e a u c r a c y , pp. 212-16 2-i Morton H. Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," World Politics, April 1961, reprinted in Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg, The Presidential Advisory System, Harper and Row, 19G9, pp. 196-97; "Management Strategy A Program for the Seventies," Remarks b> the Honorable William B. Macomber, Deputy U n d e r Secretary of S t a t e , J a n u a r y 14, 1970, i e p i i n t e d i n S t a t e , D i p l o ­ macy for the Seventies, p. 589. 23 Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and S)stems Budgeting," P u b l i c Administration Review, March/Apiil 1969, p. 142. 26 Huntington, C o m m o n D e f e n s e , p. 446; Hilsnian, T o M o v e a N a t i o n , P- 5492" Schilling, "Politics of Defense," pp. 25. 26, 218-22. 28 Hoffmann, G u l l i v e r ' s T r o u b l e s , p. 177. 29 Roger Fisher, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conflict for B e g i n n e r s , Harper and Row, 1969, p. 180. so Schilling, "Politics of Defense," p. 26; Henry A. Kissinger, "The Policymaker and the Intellectual," Reporter, March 5, 1959, reprinted in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 259; John Kenneth Galbraith (alias Mark Epernaj), The McLandress Dimension, Signet, 1968, p. 74. 31 Personal interview. 32 Gordon Tullock, T h e Politics of B u r e a u c r a c y , Public Affairs Press, 1965, pp. 167-70; Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 262. 33 John C. Ries, T h e M a n a g e m e n t of D e f e n s e , Johns Hopkins, 1964, pp- 49-50· 34 John Kenneth Galbraith, T h e N e w I n d u s t r i a l S t a t e , Houghton Mifflin, 1967. C h s . 6 a n d 8; W a r r e n G . B e n n i s . C h a n g i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n s , McGraw-Hill, 1966, pp. 11-12; Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 17¾. One wonders whether the President's invective was accurateh and fully reported. 35 Neustadt: "Staffing the Presidencv," in Altshuler, Politics of t h e Bureaucracy, p. 120; Presidential Power, p. 17. CHAPTER FOUR: NEED FOR A STRATEGY 1 Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts," in Altshuler, Politics of t h e B u ­ reaucracy, pp. 77 ff. 2 Harvev Bundv et al., "Organization for Foreign Affairs," p. 49; AFSA, M o d e r n D i p l o m a c y , p . 19; I D A . T h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e M a n a g e ­ ment of National Security; Herter Committee, New Diplomacy, p. 10.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 3 Jackson Subcommittee, "Basic Issues," in Administration, Staff Re­ ports, p. 9 ; Harvey Bund> et al., "Organization for Foreign Affairs," Ρ· 5 1 · * For an amusing if rather incoherent account of the visit, see Michael E. Kinsley, "The Harvard Brain Trust: Eating Lunch at Henry's," and J o h n Averill, " E a t i n g Crow a t Mike's," b o t h i n W a s h i n g t o n M o n t h l y , September 1 9 7 0 , pp. 4 5 - 5 0 . '> For an interesting summary of what the last generation of American students has learned about the Presidency and the need for a lowering of expectations about Presidential performance, see Thomas E. Cronin, "The Textbook Piesidency and Political Science," paper prepared for delivery at the 5 6 t h Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 7 - 1 2 , 1 9 7 0 . 6 Sam Brown, "The Politics of Peace," W a s h i n g t o n M o n t h l y , August '97°. P- 43τ George E. Reedy, T h e T w i l i g h t of t h e Presidency, World Publish­ ing Company, 1 9 7 0 , pp. 1, 1 4 . On the yellow pads, see Stewart Alsop, "The Timing of the Gamble," Newsweek, May 11, 1 9 7 0 , p. 1 1 2 . On the speech, see Hedrick Smith, "Cambodian Decision: Why President Acted," New York Times, June 3 0 , 1 9 7 0 , p. 2 . 8 Thomas E. Cronin, "New Perspectives on the Presidency?" Public Administration Review, November/December 1 9 6 9 , p. 6 7 3 . Bundy's book is The Stiength of Government, Harvard, 1 9 6 8 . a Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making i n t h e W h i t e H o u s e , Co­ lumbia University Press, 1 9 6 3 , p. 4 4 . 10 American Assembly, Secretary of State, p. 2 ; Acheson, "The Presi­ dent and the Secretary," p. 3 3 ; Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 1 0 3 . 11 Quoted by Richard M. Nixon in his campaign address of Septem­ ber 1 9 , 1 9 6 8 . 12 Quoted in L i f e , January 1 7 , 1 9 6 9 , p. 6 2 B .

CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTS Aside from personal interviews, the major sources for this chapter are official documents and journalists' accounts. Of the greatest general value have been the articles throughout the decade by Joseph Kraft (including those in his Profiles in Power, New American Library, 1 9 6 6 ) . Also particularly useful have been Stewart Alsop's column in Newsweek, Elizabeth B. Drew's commentary in Atlantic, several of John Osborne's "Nixon Watch" pieces in The New Republic, and a number of articles by Hedrick Smith in the New York Times. David Halberstam's two Harper's articles ("The Very Expensive Education of McGeorge Bundy," July 1 9 6 9 , pp. 21-41; and "The Programming of Robert McNamara," February 1 9 7 1 , pp. 3 7 - 7 1 ) offer manv insights into the inner workings of the Johnson Administration, though his judgments of the two individuals appear unduly harsh, Vietnam not­ withstanding. On the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Richard M. Moose's Chapter in IDA, President and National Security, is the best published description of overall White House staff operations. The Jackson

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Subcommittee materials are also a good source, particularly on the Kennedy Administration, as are Sorensen's Kennedy (Harper and Row, 1 9 6 5 ) and Decision-Making, Schlesinger's Thousand Days, and Hilsman's T o Move a Nation. Most "inside" accounts of Johnson Ad­ ministration policy-making are Vietnam-centered, such as Hoopes's Limits of Intervention and Cooper's Lost Crusade. Also good on LBJ a n d t h e W a r i s T o m W i c k e r ' s J F K a n d L B J : T h e I n f l u e n c e of P e r ­ s o n a l i t y o n P o l i t i c s , W i l l i a m M o r r o w & Co., 1 9 6 8 , As befits its emphasis on formal procedures, the Nixon Administra­ tion has already produced considerably more official description of its policv-making system than its two predecessors combined. Nixon's first foreign policy message (February 1 8 , 1 9 7 0 ) includes as Part I a description of the NSC system; his message of February 2 5 , 1 9 7 1 , pro­ vides useful further information in Part VI. Also important are the documents of Febiuary 7 , 1 9 6 9 , announcing the new system, and Kissinger's lettei of March 3 , 1 9 7 0 , to Senator Jackson. Both are available in Jackson Subcommittee prints: " T h e National Security Council: New Role and Structure," February 7 , 1 9 6 9 : and " T h e Na­ t i o n a l Security C o u n c i l : C o m m e n t b y H e n r y A . K i s s i n g e r , " M a r c h 3 , 1 9 7 0 . About the only comparable documents from the Kennedv-Johnson period aie McGeorge Bundy's September 1 9 6 1 letter to Jackson (Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. I, pp. 1 3 3 5 - 3 8 ) , and the an­ nouncement and description of the SIG/IRG system (Jackson Sub­ committee, " T h e Secretary of State and the Problem of Coordination: N e w D u t i e s a n d P r o c e d u r e s of M a r c h 4 , 1 9 6 6 " ) . Seven good articles on Nixon foreign policy-making appeared in the New York Times. Januarv 1 8 - 2 4 , >97 1 · T h e sharpest public criticism of the s\stem is Senator Symington's speech of March 2, 1971 (Congres­ sional Record, S 2 2 3 5 - 4 0 ) ; Nixon replied at his news conference of March 4 Also useful on Nixon are Robert H. Johnson's " T h e NSC: Relevance of Its Past" and Edward A. Kolodziej, " T h e National Security Council: Innovations and Implications," Public Administration Review, Novem­ ber /December 1969, pp. 573-85. Further especially illuminating materials published too late to be drawn on ill this study include Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, Har­ per and Row, 1 9 7 1 ; Alexander L. George, " T h e Case for Multiple Ad­ vocacy i n M a k i n g F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e R e v i e w , forthcoming: the "Anderson papers" on the Nixon Administration and Bangladesh; and above all the "Pentagon papers" on United States involvement in Vietnam. 1 Jackson Subcommittee, " T h e National Security Council," in O r ­ ganizing, Vol. Ill, p. 38. 2 White House press release, February 19, 1 9 6 1 ; Bundy to Jackson, in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing. Vol. I, p. 1338. ^Bundy to Jackson, pp. 1 3 3 7 - 3 8 ; Schlesinger, T h o u s a n d D a y s , p. 1 3 3 ; Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 269. 4 Schlesinger, T h o u s a n d D a y s , p. 4 2 1 ; Mosher and Harr, P r o g r a m ­ ming Systems, p. 3 0 ; Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, p. 2 1 ; personal interviews.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES SRichard Rovere, "Letter From Washington," The New Yorker, December 24, i960, pp. 54, 52; Sydney Hyman, "How Mr. Kennedy Gets the Answers," New York Times Magazine, October 20, 1963, p. 17. 6 Sorensen: Decision-Making, p. 63; Kennedy, p. 284. 7 Personal interview. 8 Moose in IDA, President and National Security, p. 81. 9 Schlesinger, Thousand Days, pp. 422, 423. 10 Very little seems to have been written about the task forces for public record. On their relation to crisis management, however, see John C. Ausland and Col. Hugh F. Richardson, "Crisis Management: Berlin, Cyprus, Laos," Foreign Affairs, January 1966. 11 Moose in IDA, President and National Security, p. 71. 1 2 Ibid., p. 81; Srhlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 423; Sorensen, Ken­ nedy, p. 282. 13 Kraft, Profiles, p. 164. 14 "Bill Moyers Talks About LBJ, Poverty, War, and the Young," Atlantic, July 1968, p. 35. is Moose in IDA, President and National Security, p. 85. is For two representations of his basic views, see Walt W. Rostow: "The Great Transition: Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Gen­ erations," Sir Montague Burton Lecture at University of Leeds, Eng­ land, February 23, 1967, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1967, pp. 491-504; and "Guerilla Warfare in the Underde­ veloped Areas," Address at Fort Bragg, June 28, 1961, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, August 7, 1961, pp. 233-36. 17 Moose in IDA, President and National Security, pp. 83, 98. I 8 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 413; James C. Thomson, Jr., "How Could Vietnam Happen?" Atlantic, April 1968, p. 49. is Douglas Kiker 1 "The Education of Robert McNamara," Atlantic, March 1967, p. 54. 20 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 414; personal interviews. 21 Quoted in Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 285. 22 Joseph Kraft, "Kennedy's Working Staff," Harper's, December 1962, p. 36. 23 Halberstam, "Education of McGeorge Bundy," p. 29. 24 Halberstam, "Programming of Robert McNamara," p. 62; Kraft, Profiles, p. 183. 25 Quoted in New York Times, October 25, 1968, p. 31. 26 Murray Marder in Washington Post, January 19, 1970, p. A8; personal interviews. , 2 ^ Jackson Subcommittee, "NSC: New Structure," p. 1. 2 8 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 29 Dean Acheson, "Thoughts About Thought in High Places," New York Times Magazine, October 11, 1959, reprinted in Jackson Sub­ committee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 292; Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 15. 30 Jackson Subcommittee, "NSC: Comment by Kissinger," p. 3. 3 INixon, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1970, pp. 13, 12. 32 Jackson Subcommittee, "NSC: Comment by Kissinger," p. 2; Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 15.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 33

Personal inteiview. 1 U.S. Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 13. 3 5 John Osborne, "Nixon's Command Staff," T h e N e w R e p u b l i c , February 15, 1969, p. 14. The oiiginal staff list is published in Jackson Subcommittee, "NSC: New Stiuctuie," pp. 2-3. 3 6 The number of Nixon NSC meetings is computed fiom infoimation provided by the NSC staff. The Kennedy figure is fiom Bundy's letter to Jackson in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. I, p. 1336. Information on who attends Nixon NSC meetings is fiom personal interviews. On who attended Eisenhower's, see Hammond, "The NSC: An Appraisal," in Altshuler, Politics of the Bureaucracy, p. 146. 3 ^ Computed fiom infoimation provided by NSC staff. 3 8 A'etc York T i m e s editorial, February 19, 1970, p. 44. 39 T i m e , June 8, 1970, p. 18. 4I > Jackson Subcommittee, "NSC: Comment by Kissinger," p. 2. 4 INixon, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 88. : Pentagon Also Encounters Re­ buffs," New York Times, January 21, 1971, pp. 1, 12. 5 5 Kraft in W a s h i n g t o n Post, September 16, 1969, p. A21. 3 4 Nixon

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 56 Personal interview. 5 7 Kissinger, "Policymaker and Intellectual," in Jackson Subcom­ mittee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 255. 5 8 Jackson Subcommittee, "Super-Cabinet Officers," in Oiganizing, Vol. Ill, p. 19. so This formulation of the problem is similar to Ries's criticism of Defense Department organization proposals based on a dominating "centralization" objective in Management of Defense, esp. Ch. XI. 6 0 Quoted in L i f e , January 17, 1969, p. 62B. 6 1 W a s h i n g t o n Post, February 7, 1969, p. A7. CHAPTER SIX: PROBLEMS WITH STATE The major source for this chapter is the author's interviews and conversations with present and former officials in State, the White House, and other government agencies. Providing useful documentary i n f o r m a t i o n a n d general b a c k g r o u n d have been t h e weekly Depart­ m e n t of State B u l l e t i n , t h e m o n t h l y D e p a r t m e n t of State Newsletter, and the specific materials on the Macomber reform progiam (above all State, Diplomacy for the Seventies). The author's understanding of the Department and Foreign Service was deepened by the opportunity to work as a consultant to the American Foreign Service Association while this studv was undergoing final revision. A number of informative books have been written about the State Department and Foreign Service. Among the relatively recent ones a r e R o b e r t E. Elder, T h e Policy M a c h i n e , Syracuse, i960; H a r r , Pro­ fessional Diplomat; J o h n P . Leacacos, Fires i n t h e In-Basket: T h e ABC's of the State Department, World Publishing Companv 1 1968; and Smith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department, Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Also useful are Scott's articles ("State: Informal Culture," and "Environmental Change: The Problem of State"); the chapters on State by Joseph Yager in IDA, President and National Security, the case study o n foreign affairs p r o g r a m m i n g by Mosher a n d H a r r (Pro­ gramming Systems); the paper by Chris Argyris ("Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State," Center for International Systems Research Occasional Paper Number 2. Department of State, January 1967); the foreign affairs personnel studies sponsoied by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in suppoit of the Herter Committee's efforts; the Jackson Subcommittee materials; and the memoirs and other writings of such men as Acheson 1 Hilsman, Kennan 1 and Schlesinger. The Foreign Service Journal, published by the American Foreign Service Association, provides a useful window into the Department and Foreign Service. It is also becoming less of a "house organ" and more a source for interesting articles on general foreign policy issues. AFSA's " Y o u n g T u r k s " p r o d u c e d n o t only T o w a r d a M o d e r n Diplo­ macy, but also a series of critical articles in Smith Simpson (ed.), "Re­ sources and Needs of American Diplomacy," The Annals, November 1968; and Walker's article, "Our Foreign Affairs Machinerv." The Association is presently issuing a series of red-edged "AFSA Bulletins

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES on Management Reform." These parallel, and sometimes react to, the series of blue-edged bulletins released periodically by Macomber's office to report reform implementation. ι Elliott Roosevelt (ed.), F.D.R.: His Personal Letters 1928-1945, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950, Vol. II, p. 914; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 406; New York Times, October 14, 1968, pp. 1, 30. 2 In Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 15. 3 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 287; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, pp. 406, 413; Jackson Subcommittee, Administration, Hearings, p. 81. 4 Quoted in Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 431. 5 Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, p. 212. In the discussion that follows, remarks that are quoted but not cited are derived from inter­ views and other private conversations. β Schlesinger, Thousand Days, pp. 417-18. 7 Moose in IDA, Piesident and National Security, p. 96; Paul Nitze, "Organization for National Policy Planning in the United States," in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 287. s Rovere quoted in Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 384, Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, p. 207. 9 Stevenson quoted in Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 408; Thomson, "How Could Vietnam Happen?" p. 50. 1» Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 878. 11 Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems, esp. Chs. II, III and VII. 12 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 287; Harr, Professional Diplomat, p. 110. 13 Scott: "State: Informal Culture," pp. 2-3; "Environmental Change: The Problem of State," p. 87. 1 4 Quoted in Harr, Professional Diplomat, pp. 208-9. is Argyris, "Causes of Ineffectiveness Within State," p. 2; Scott, "State: Informal Culture," p. 7. 16 Stewart Alsop, The Center, Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 106-7. i" Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems, p. 232; Daniel C. Lazorchick, "Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Initiative in Washington," The Annals, November 1968, p. 108. is Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 414; "Major Problems of Person­ nel Management in the Department of State," A Staff Paper Prepared for the President's Task Force on Government Organization by the AVhite House Staff, April 11, 1967. is Adam Yarmolinsky, "Bureaucratic Structures and Political Out­ comes," Journal of International Affairs, 1969—No. 2, p. 227; Yager in IDA, President and National Security, p. 123. 20 Herter Committee, New Diplomacy, pp. 4, 50, 53, 49. 21 Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 19. 22 Jackson Subcommittee, Administration, Healings, pp. 286, 288, 289. 23 Harr, Professional Diplomat, p. 44; Mosher and Harr, Program­ ming Systems, Chs. II, III, VII. 24 Jackson Subcommittee: "Secretary of State and Coordination," p. 6; Administration, Hearings, p. 398. 25 AFSA, Modern Diplomacy, p. 25; Yager in IDA, President and

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES National Security, p. 121. For a more extended discussion o£ the "country director" reform, see Harr, Professional Diplomat, pp. 302-11. 2β Yager in IDA, President and Natiqnal Security, p. 122. 27 AFSA, Modern Diplomacy, pp. 56, 20, 23. 28 Ibid., pp. 57, 145-50. 29 Macomber's speech which inaugurated the task force effort, "Man­ agement Strategy: A Program for the Seventies," is reprinted in State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, pp. 587-605. The compilation of recom­ mendations and their action status appears in Department of State Newsletter, January 1971, pp. 20-43. 30 State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, p. 589. s l Ibid., pp. 304, 111, 381. 3 2 Ibid., pp. 588, 4. 3 3 Ibid., p. 566. 3 i Ibid., pp. 567, 571, 12; Department of State Newsletter, January 197'. P· 35· 35 State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, p. 543. Task Force XIII also discusses formal White House-State relationships intermittently, espe­ cially on pp. 556, 563, and 571-72. s s Ibid., pp. 554, 567; Department of State Newsletter, January 1971, pp. 39, 40, 41. 3 ^ Quoted in Patrick J. McGarvey, "State Department Answers Fulbright: 'We Can Clean Our Own House,'" Government Executive, May 1970, p. 47. 38 Harr, Professional Diplomat, p. 332. 39 Herter Committee, New Diplomacy, pp. 11-12. 4 ° Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems, p. 183. This conclusion is consistent with other informal accounts. 41 State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, pp. 568-69. CHAPTER SEVEN: FORMAL APPROACHES Of the four formal approaches discussed here, programming is the most extensively treated in foreign affairs organizational literature. The place to begin, once again, is the Jackson Subcommittee, which inaugurated in August 1967 a series of reports, hearings, and related publications on PPB and its possible contribution to foreign affairs. (U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Planning-Programming-Budgeting, 1967 and after.) As one would expect, the Jack­ son materials emphasize the relation of programming to the real world of foreign policy-making. For an excellent discussion of the interaction of PPB and the (primarily domestic) policy process, see Charles L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending, Brookings, 1968. The Mopher-Harr book (Programming Systems) describes and ana­ lyzes the Crockett-Barrett effort to build a government-wide foreign affairs programming system around State. Henry S. Rowen and Albert P. Williams treat a number of the more general issues involved in

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES "Policy Analysis in International Affairs," pp. 970-1002 in U.S. Con­ gress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in G o v e r n m e n t , T h e Arialysis a n d E v a l u a t i o n of P u b l i c E x p e n d i t u r e s : The PPB System, 1969. For the most recent account of the Defense e x p e r i e n c e , see A l a i n C . E n t h o v e n a n d K . W a y n e S m i t h , H o w M u c h is Enough! Shaping the Defense Progiam 1961-1969, Harper and Row, 1971· The section on organizational integration draws heavily on an analysis done b\ the author for the Heineman Task Force in 1967, which in turn was based mainly on interviews. The treatment of formal policy guidance owes much to the early Jackson Subcommittee ma­ terials, and to Joseph Ponturo's treatment of the subject, "The Presi­ d e n t a n d Policy G u i d a n c e , " C h a p t e r X i n I D A , P r e s i d e n t a n d N a t i o n a l Security. The section on coordinating committees relies mainly on in­ terviews and conversations with persons involved in the SIG / IRG and Nixon NSC s> stems, mostly in staff support roles. The basic documents of both systems weie repiinted by the Jackson Subcommittee. ("Secretaiy of State and Coordination," and "NSC: New Structure.") Two useful general discussions of the problem of top-level control over discretionary decisions made at various levels of large organiza­ t i o n s a r e i n R o b e r t N . A n t h o n y , P l a n n i n g a n d C o n t r o l Systems- A Framework for Analysis, Haivard Business School, 1965; and Ries, M a n a g e m e n t of D e f e n s e . 1 Jackson Subcommittee, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p. 388. Informal inquiries indicate that this iemains a reasonably accurate pictuie of the cable involvement of Rusk and his successor, though there is wide day-to-day variation. 2 McCamy, C o n d u c t of t h e N e w D i p l o m a c y , pp. 79-86. 3 Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate transmitting the diaft bill on foieign aid, May 26, 1961; reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 2, 1961, p. 922. 4 "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach," Report to the President of the United States fiom the Task Force on Inter­ national Development (Peterson Task Force), March 4, 1970, p. 2; Richard Nixon: "Foreign Assistance for the Seventies," A Message to the Congress of the United States, September 15, 1970; and Message to the Congress of the United States, Apiil 21, 1971. ' One recent article calling for USIA's abolition is Bruce J. Oudes, "The Great Wind Machine," Washington Monthly, June 1970, pp. 3°-39· 6 Hoopes, L i m i t s of I n t e r v e n t i o n , p. 7. ϊ Dean Acheson, "Thought in High Places," in Jackson Subcom­ mittee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 292. 8 Ponturo in IDA, P r e s i d e n t a n d N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , p. 239; Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems, p. 57; Ponturo, p. 240; Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, p. 6. 9 Nixon, U . S . F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 1970, p. 5. 10 Ponturo in IDA, P r e s i d e n t a n d N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , p. 227. 11 Letter to Secretary Rusk from the Advisory Group on Foreign

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Affaiis Planning, Piogramming, and Budgeting (Hitch Committee), Octobei 5, 1966, p. i. 12 Thomas Schelhng 1 "PPBS and Foreign Affairs," pamphlet in Jack­ son Subcommittee series, Planning-Programming-Budgeting, p. 2. isSchultze, Politics of Public Spending, esp. pp. 92-97 1 4 Quoted in Leacacos, Fires i n t h e In-Basket, pp. 363-64. 15 Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular Number 385, March 4, 1966; reprinted in Jackson Subcommittee, "Secretary of State and Coordination," pp. 4, 5. ^ I b i d . , p. 4. 17 Computed from information supplied by the National Security Council staff. 1 8 Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Coun­ cil," Foreign Affairs, April 1956; reprinted in Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. II, p. 175. The other information and quotations in this paragraph are derived from personal interviews and other off-therecord sources. 1 9 Schlesinger, T h o u s a n d Days, p. 420. CHAPTER EIGHT: USES OF STAFFS This chapter owes much to interviews with well over fifty present and former members of foreign policy staffs in the White House, State, and Defense (ISA). All took place in the 1967-1971 period, the great majority between October 1969 and June 1970. The best published description of what a foreign affairs staff has actually done over a period of years is Moose's discussion of the NSC staff since 1947, C h a p t e r I V i n IDA, President and National Security. Elder's Policy Machine devotes a chapter to the Policy Planning Staff, and other books on the State Department (cited in Chapter Six) pro­ vide useful information. Unfortunately, much less has been written about the Pentagon's Office of International Secuiity Affairs. The Jackson Subcommittee materials include good general discus­ sions of the roles and problems of staffs, particularly the i960 teport, "Super-Cabinet Officers and Superstaffs," and Neustadt's testimony of March 1963 (Administration, Hearings, pp. 74-104). The former in­ cludes a response to a proposal for a Presidential Staff Agency for Na­ tional Security Affairs put forward by William R. Kintner in "Organiz­ ing for Conflict: A Proposal," Orbis, Summer 1958; reprinted in Jack­ son Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. II, pp. 240-54. The papers b> Gulick, Urwick and Henri Fa>ol in Gulick and Urwick, Papers on Administration present traditional, relatively for­ mal concepts of staff roles. A criticism of some of the distinctions they s o u g h t t o m a k e a p p e a r s i n Simon, S m i t h b u r g , a n d T h o m p s o n , Public Administration, pp. 280-91. For a practical analysis of staff-line con­ flict i n several business firms, see Melville Dalton, M e n W h o Manage: Fusions of Feeling and Theory in Administration, Wiley, 1959. !Quoted in Department of State Newsletter, July 1969, pp 2, 5. 2 Moose in IDA, President and National Security, p. 76.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 3 Quoted

in Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1969, p. 1. in Department of State Newsletter, July 1969, pp. 2-5. 5 IDA President and National Security, pp. 165-66. 1 sjackson Subcommittee, Administration, Hearings, pp. 400-402. 7 Frankel, Foggy Bottom, p. 93. 8 See Elihu Root, "The General Staff Concept," reprinted in Jackson Subcommittee, Specialists and Generalists, pp. 37-9; and Gulick and Urwick, Papers on Administration. 9 Jackson Subcommittee, "Super-Cabinet Officers," in Organizing, p. 21. 1 0 C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law, Houghton Mifflin, 1957, Ch. 6; George Kennan, Memoirs, Little, Brown and Company, 1967, p. 326. 11 Ibid., p. 345; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 214. I 2 For a description of how members of the Staff played this role in a particular case (the creation of the Development Loan Fund), see Edgerton, Sub-Cabinet Politics. 1 3 Robert M. Bowie, "The Secretary and the Development and Coordination of Policy," i n American Assembly, Secretary of State, p. 70. 1* Personal interviews. is Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, p. 317; Bowie, "Secretary and Development of Policy," p. 70. i" Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy, p. 370. 17 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Purpose and Planning in Foreign Policy," The Public Interest, Winter 1969, pp. 63, 64. is Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, pp. 34, 1; HaviIand et al., Formu­ lation of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 89. 19 On the trend in ISA since January 1969, see Neil Sheehan, "Key Pentagon Group Dissolving," New York Times, April 13, 1969, p. 3; George C. Wilson, "Defense 'Statesmen' Take T u r n to Right," Wash­ ington Post, June 1, 1969, p. Bi; William Beecher, "Laird Said to Tighten Rein on the Joint Chiefs of Staff," New York Times, June 14, 1970, p. 1; and Beecher, "Foreign Policy: Pentagon Also Encounters Rebuffs," New York Times, January 21, i97i> P- 1. 20 Yarmolinsky, "Bureaucratic Structures," p. 232; personal inter­ view. 21 The phrase is Rusk's characterization of Sorensen and Kaysen, as reported in Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 285. 22 Stephen K. Bailey, "Managing the Federal Government," in Kermit Gordon (ed.). Agenda for the Nation, Doubleday, 1968, p. 319. On Kaysen and the Harriman designation, see Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 903. For Neustadt on action-forcing processes, see Jackson Subcommittee, Administration, Hearings, p. 91. 2 3 On Kaysen's effective advocacy on the test ban treaty and other issues, see Kraft, Profiles, p. 66. The phrase about Thomson is taken from his "How Could Vietnam Happen?" p. 49. 4 Quoted

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 24

P-

Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, p.

51;

Goulding, Confirm or Deny,

177·

2 5 Bv a "colleague" of McGeorge Bundy, as quoted in Halberstam, "Education of McGeorge Bund\," p. 35. 2 6 Reedv, Twilight of the Presidency, Ch. VIII. 2 7 Thomas L. Hughes, "Relativity in Foreign Policy," Foreign Af­ fairs, July 1967, pp. 677-81; Thomson, "How Could Vietnam Happen?" p. 49; Edgerton, Sub-Cabinet Politics, p. 164. 2 8 Jackson Subcommittee, Organizing, Vol. I, pp. 844-45.

CHAPTER NINE: BUILDING LINES OF CONFIDENCE I

Downs. Inside Bureaucracy, p. 218. Smith, "Foreign Policy: Decision Power Ebbing at the State Department," New York Times, Januaiy 18, 1971, p. 1; Kraft in Washington Post, February 17, 1970, p. A15. 3 In Jackson Subcommittee, Administration, Hearings, p. 103. 4 John Fischer, "Mr. Truman Reorganizes," Harper's, January 1946, p. 27; Acheson, Creation, pp. 468, 466. 5 Robert W. Tufts, "The Secretary of State, 'Agent of Coordina­ tion,'" in Jackson Subcommittee, Administration, Hearings, p. 110. 6 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 285. 7 AFSA, Modern Diplomacy, p. 24. 8 Quoted in Jackson Subcommittee, Admmistration 1 Staif Reports, P- 439 IDA, President and National Security, pp. 165-66. i° Macomber, "Management Strategy," in State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, p . 600. I I Quoted in Life, Januarv 17, 1969, p. 62B; and Jackson Subcom­ mittee, Administration, Hearings, p. 387. 1 2 Statement of Arthur Allen dissenting from the report of Task Force VIII, "Role of the Countr> Director," in State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, p. 357. 1 3 Computed from Budget of U.S. Government, FY 1972, pp. 96, 86, 532· 1 4 AIlen Dulles, T h e Craft of Intelligence, Haiper and Row, 1963, P- 189. !5 Director General of the Foreign Service, "Proposed Changes in FSO Promotion, Selection-Out and Performance Evaluation Systems," Department of State, April 19, 1971. Approval of the order for junior and middle-level officers was announced in "Management Reform Bul­ letin: Promotion Reform: Threshold Review and Mid-Career Tenure." No. 27, July 6, 1971. The same bulletin seems to foreshadow later ap­ proval of the proposed changes dealing with grades 2 and above. 1 6 State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, pp. 81-83, 328. 1 7 "The FSO and FSIO Promotion Lists," Foreign Service Journal, May 1971, p. 2; "AFSA Bulletin on Management Reform," No. 3, February 9, 1971. 1 8 State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, pp. 10, 286-89, 325, 394; "Man2 Terence

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES agement Reform Bulletin: Lateral Entry Into the Foreign Service Officer Corps," No. 4, January 8, 1971. is Report of Task Force IX, "Openness in the Foreign Affairs Com­ munity," in State, Diplomacy for the Seventies, p. 394. 20 Frankel, Foggy Bottom, p. 177.

EPILOGUE: THE NIXON SYSTEM—A FURTHER LOOK i-New York Times, August 23, 1973, p. 28. 2 Washington Post, November 11, 1972, p. At. Washington Post, January 20, 1973, p. Gio. + See, for example, his Kansas City speech of July 6, 1971, in Depart­ ment of State Bulletin, July 26, 1971, pp. 93-97· •> One important effort to do so is Stanley Hoffmann: "Weighing the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, July 1972, pp. 618-43; allc ^ "Will the Balance Balance at Home?" Foreign Policy, Summer 1972, pp. 60-86. 6 See, for example, Leslie H. Gelb and Morton H. Halperin, "Henry Kissinger· Nixon's Sherpa in the Assent t o the Summit," Harpei's, November 1971, p. 38. 7 On this point, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University Press, 1972; Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization," World Politics, April 1970; and Seyom Brown's forthcoming study, New Forces in World Politics. x N e w York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 1. '1 United States Foreign Policy for the ipyo's. Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report by President Nixon to the Congress, Ma; 3, 1973, p. 106. 1 0 Quoted in the Washington Post, August 3, 1973, p. A19. 11 News Conference of August 22, 1973, in New York Tunes, August 23. !973. P- 2 8 · 12 Washington Post, August 5, 1973, p. C2. 1 3 See especially his Chapter Four. 1+Edward R. Fried et al., Setting National Priorities· T h e ic)';j Budget, Brookings, 1973, p. vii. l s Alton Frye, "Congress: The Mrtues of its Vices," Foreign Policy, Summer 1971, P- 110. 16 Bill D. Movers, "One Thing We Learned," Foreign Affairs, July 1968, p. 664. 17 Remarks to the International Platform Association, August 2, 1973. i s Ibid., italics added. 19 Quoted in New York Times, August 21, 1973, P- 20. 20 For a strong-minded critique and some proposals for restoring official credibility, see Anthony Lake, "Lying Around Washington," Foreign Policy, Spring 1971, pp. 9 1 - 1 1 3 . 21 See his Press Conference of August 23, 1973, excerpted in New York Times, August 24, 1973, p. 12.

Index A b e l , Elie, 88, 15811 Acheson, D e a n , 54, 64. 89. 92, 119, 1 6 m , 225, 227, 236, 244, 260 A c t i o n foi O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Development ( A C O R D ) program, 170, 171 action processes, i m p o r t a n c e of inv o l v e m e n t m , 58, 218-19, 235, 236-38, 248, 272-73 A d a m s , S h e r m a n , 101 A f r i c a , U.S. policy toward, 133, 150 A f i i c a n A f f a i r s (AF), Assistant Secretary of State for, 209, 26566; B u r e a u of, 18211. 209 Agency for International Developm e n t ( A I D ) , 11, 13, 29, 36, 36n, 59, 161, 163,169, 1 7 1 , 1 7 4 - 7 5 , 1 7 7 ; A d m i n i s t r a t o r of, 124, 195; Assistant A d m i n i s t i a t o r for V i e t n a m , 59; and i n t e i d e p a r t m e n t a l committees, 105, 121, 208; and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l integration, 193-97. ^ e e a ^ s o e c o n o m i c assistance, military assistance A g r i c u l t u r e , D e p a i t m e n t of ( U S D A ) , 11, 192, 207; International A g r i c u l t u r a l D e v e l o p m e n t Seivice, 255n; Secretary of, i 4 g n A i r Force, U.S., 60 A l l i s o n , G r a h a m , 42, 54, 5511, 58, 65, 65n, 67, 6gn A l s o p , Stewart, l i n , 11711, 164 alter ego relationships, i m p o i t a n c e of, 261, 267-69, 275 ambassadors, 59, 98, 274 Ambassadors-at-Large, 216, 270 A m e r i c a n F o r e i g n Service Association (AFSA), 27, 98, 155, 167, '73-75. 255", 282, 28gn, 284; Toward a Modern Diplomacy, 2n, 49, 84, 172, 173-75, 223, 269. See also Foreign Service analysis, staff provision of, io6n, 157, 231, 240, 246, 247-48. 249-50, 271-74 a p p o i n t m e n t s , 238, 265-67. 268,

274, 288; by K e n n e d \ , 97-98. 112; by N i x o n , 131-32. 14911 Arg\ris, Chris, 164, 283 a r m e d foices, iee military seivices arms c o n t i o l , 13. 24, 133, 197, 230, 238, 270. See also S A L T talks A r m s C o n t r o l and D i s a r m a m e n t A g e n c y ( A C D A ) , 13, 60, 197; Director of, 24 arms race, 6, 231 A r m y , U.S., 60, 78, 133; Departm e n t of, 45 A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k , 225 Assistant to the President for N a t i o n a l Security Affairs, 1-2, 28, 92-93, 100, 10611, 146-52. 153, 256-58, 259, 262, 265; choice be tween the Assistant and .Secretary of State as primaly foreign affairs official, 1-3, 92-93, 146-52, 153, 256-61; under Kennedy and Johnson, 25, 100, 106-07, 1 0 9 ' 241; u n d e r N i x o n , 1-2, 28, 48, 118, 123, 125-29, 146-52, 153, 241; Deputy Special Assistant, i5on A t t w o o d , W i l l i a m , 35 " a u t h o r i t y " and " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , " proposed j o i n i n g of, 17, 22-25, 37-3 8 . 5 0 " 5 1 ' 22' Bailey, Stephen, 237 balance of payments. 60-61 Ball, G e o i g e , g8n, 112, 209 B A L P A (balance of pa>ments) personnel 1 eduction, 35n b a r g a i n i n g adyantages, 57-59, 81, 91. See also leverage; staff members, b a r g a i n i n g advantages of b a r g a i n i n g relationships, 52-54 Barrett, R i c h a r d , 203 Basic N a t i o n a l Security Policy (BNSP), 199 Bator, Francis, 108, 143 Bay of Pigs invasion a t t e m p t , 159, 162, 280 Beecher, W i l l i a m , 142

343

INDEX Bennis, Warren, 80 Berger, Samuel, 272 Berlin, U.S. policy toward, 246 Biafra (Nigeria), U.S. policy toward, 142, 149η biological weapons, renunciation of, 60, 133-34, 142 Blue Ribbon (Fitzhugh) Defense Panel, report of, 24 Bohlen, Charles, 155 Bowie, Robert, 225, 226, 236 Bowles, Chester, 98, 98η, π 2, 266 Bowling, John W., 26411 Brandeis, Louis, 34 Brookings Institution, 26 Brown, Sam, 86 Brownlow, Louis, 46-47 Bryan, William Jennings, 91η Budget, Bureau of the (BoB), 30, 49η, 72, 159, 171. 2 0 4> 206, 238, 240, 243; Director of, 127. See also Management and Budget, Office of budget review, power of, 58, 20607, 238, 243, 277 budgets, foreign affairs, 11-12, 170, 181η, 202-07, 277 Bundy, McGeorge, 20, 31, 64, 88, 97. 97". 99. 100-104, 107-08, 113, 1 1 4. 115η, n6, 125, 126, 143, 145-46. 154, 155, 228, 233, 235, 236, 241. 249, 259, 262, 282 Bundy, William, 229 bureaucratic political intelligence, 231 bureaucratic politics, see politics, bureaucratic business corporation, debate over size of, 34 cables, 58, 191, 231, 236, 257 Cambodia, U.S. intervention in, 85, 86, 87, 124, 126η, 129, 139, 143, «ι Campbell, John F., 32 Camps, Miriam, 240η career services and systems, 17, 28-31. 37-38. 50, 70-71, 145η, 159. 163-67. 239. 248-49, 266-67,

282-88. See also Foreign Service, military services Cargo, William, 128, 218-20, 249 Carnegie Endowment for Inter­ national Peace, 168 Center for International Systems Research (CISR), 170, 171 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 11, 1 in, 13, 159, 162, 163, 177, 187, 196, 222η, 26ο; Director of, iogn, 123, 127; and interdepartmental committees, 105, 127, 208; problem of con­ trolling, 197, 280-81 central organizational strength, see organizational strength changes in policy, efforts to pro­ mote, 225-28, 232, 290-92; incremental nature of, 64-65; resistance to, 75-78, 88, 157, 158, 290-92 channels, bureaucratic, 62-63 China, U.S. relations with, 129, 149 clearances, role of, 14; as bargain­ ing advantage, 58, 62, 103, 237, 257-58; problem of, 14, 33, 35, 76-77, 102, 119-20, 158, 194, 221, 250, 257-58 Clifford, Clark, 31, 64, 111, 142, 229, 235, 241, 244, 268 coherent foreign policy, goal of, 4-7; definition of, 4; limited attainability of, 73, 80-81, 83, 289-90; relation to (and conflict with) other goals, 4η, 5-6, 290-92 Commerce, Department of, 11, 192; Secretary of, 149η committees, coordinating, 2, 14, 17. 32, 35. 9 6 . 99-1°°. 102, 105-06, 121-22, 124, 127-28, 200, 207-12, 233, 237, 273, 276-77. See also names of specific committees communications, bureaucratic, 33, 79, 110-11, 151, 153, 265; inter­ national, effect of bureaucratic politics on, 75

INDEX c o m p e t i t i o n , b u r e a u c r a t i c , 73-75; effect o n policy outcomes, 73-75, 290-91; w i t h i n F o r e i g n Service, 160, 284-85 Comprehensive Country Programm i n g System (CCPS), 170-71, 203-04, 205 compromises, b u r e a u c r a t i c , 14, 26, 33, 61, 74, 149, 160, 162, 206 concurrences, see clearances confidence, as b a r g a i n i n g advantage, 58, 90-93, 217-18, 235-37, 243; lines of, 236, 237, 245, 256, 263, 267, 275; Presidential, 58, 90-93, 103, 108, 129, 131, 151-53, 257, 266-67, 274, 275; Secretarial, 217-18, 267, 274 Congress, 3, 25, 54, 66, 85-86, 87, 89, 93n, 130, 196, 207, 209, 278, 289 Connally, John, i5on constituency relationships, as barg a i n i n g advantages, 58, 278, 290; as disqualification for top appointments, 267 control of f o r e i g n affairs b u r e a u cracy, g e n e r a l p r o b l e m of, 3-4, 10-14, 7 8 " 8 o > 9 l "94> 254-6I C o o p e r , Chester, 44, 109 c o o r d i n a t i n g committees, see committees, c o o r d i n a t i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n , 12-15; issue of central responsibility for, 1-3, 92-93, 146-52, 153, 256-61; lateral, 14, o p e r a t i o n a l , 96, 127, 181, 186, 217, 219, 223, 232-33, 237, 258, 264, 273 " C o o r d i n a t o r of Security Assistance," p r o p o s e d , 196, 27 m C o u n s e l o r , State D e p a r t m e n t , 128, 218, 269-70, 2 7 m c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y programs, 168, 242 C o u n t r y Analysis and Strategy P a p e r ( C A S P ) p r o g r a m , 204, 206, 210, 238, 277 " c o u n t r y d i r e c t o r " r e f o r m , 171-72, i 7 6 n , 179, 182, 274-76; l i m i t e d utility o f , 172, 275-76

covert action, 13, 280-81 creativity, 17611, 177, 178 crisis m a n a g e m e n t , 264, 264n, 270 Crockett, W i l l i a m , 167, 169-71, i73> ' 7 5 . 1 7 6 . 2 0 3 Crockett r e f o r m p r o g r a m , 169-72, 173, 175, 203-04 C r o l y , H e r b e r t , 34 C r o n i n , T h o m a s , 88 C u b a , U.S. policy toward, 230 C u b a n Missile crisis, 3, 57, 80, 88, 158, 211 c u l t u r a l affairs, 168, 198 c u l t u r a l e x c h a n g e , 6, 168 C u t l e r , R o b e r t , 19, 211 D a y , A r t h u r , 224n decisions, strategic, efforts to facilitate, 20-21, 101, 119-20, 125-26, 132-37, 278; l i m i t e d i m p a c t of, 20-21, 101, 134-40; p r o b l e m s of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , 138-42, 232 Defense, D e p a r t m e n t of (DoD), 11, 13, 14, 37, 165, 209, 224, 227, 228-30; and State D e p a r t m e n t , 1 6 m , 163, 177, 187, 236, 278-80; u n d e r L a i r d , 128, 129, 141-42, 210; u n d e r M c N a m a r a , 31, 98, i58n, 183, 188, 205, 214. See also names of specific organizational units Defense, D e p u t y Secretary of, 127, 269 Defense, Office of the Secretary of (OSD), 37, 63, 141-42, 230, 277, 279-80 Defense, Secretary of, i 4 n , i 5 n , 25, 37, 60, 61, 100, 105, 109, 123, 133-34. M i . 208, 228n, 233, 239, 240, 243, 250, 265, 279 defense b u d g e t , 12, 127, 142, 150, 278-79 defense policy, 5, 102, 1 3 m , 133, 141, 197, 270, 278-80. See also n a t i o n a l security policy, political-military policy Defense Program Review Comm i t t e e ( D P R C ) , 127, 142

345

INDEX Deming Group, 108 development assistance, see eco­ nomic assistance Development Loan Fund, 225, 247 Dillon, Douglas, 64 diplomacv, 1 6 8 , 1 9 4 ; treatment of State Department/Foreign Seivice role as, 70-71, 72, 131, 159, 160-63, 184, 264

diplomatic missions, 11, 1 7 6 η , 179 Director General of the Foreign Service, see Foreign Service, Director General of Domestic Policy Council, 150η Downs, Anthony, 68n, 71, 78, 255 Drew, Elizabeth, 149η Drucker, Peter, 33 Dulles, Allen, 281 Dulles, John Foster, 19, 26, 89, 92, 225, 228, 236, 259, 260

Dungan, Ralph,

98, 101, 125

Economic Advisors, Council of, Chairman, 128, 150η Economic Affairs (E) 1 Bureau of (State), 24, 270-71 economic assistance, 6.

12, 13, 61,

106, 107, 108, 161, 168, 193-97, 204, 263;

security-related,

196,

270

Economic Opportunity, Office of, 194η

economic policy, international, see international economic policy effectiveness, of bureaucrats and organizational units, 57-59, 67, 7 6 ; of organizational changes, 8 - 9 , 8 1 . See also staffs, effective­ ness of "effectiveness trap," 246-47 Ehrlichman, John, 125, 150η Eisenhower, Dwight, 26, 52η, 92, 96, io2, n 8 , 119, 120, 123η, 124,

152, 211

Eisenhower Administration, 8, 18η, 19, 22, 39, 45η, 68, ιοί, 123η, 199,

20

7 ' 228-29

Emergency Preparedness, Office of, 15η, 123,

211

Europe, U.S. policy toward, 116, 1 1 8 , 1 7 2 , 2 2 4 . 2 6 9 ; U.S. troops in, 6-7, 13, 24, 131η European Affairs (EUR), Assistant Secretary of State for, 172, 210, 222η, 265; Bureau of, 24, 115η, 2ΐδ, 222η

executive branch, danger of overconcentration on, 65-67 executive leadership, goal of, 30, 83-84

Executive Office of the Piesident, 47. 257-5 8 Executive Secretariat (S/S or Exec Sec), State Department, 181, 181η, 217, 217η, 218-19, 236, 271η, 272-73

Executive Secretary, State Depart­ ment, 2 3 1 η , 233, 2 7 2 "Executive Undei Secretary of State," proposed, see State, "Executive Under Secretary of" Expoit-Import Bank, 12 Falk, Stanley, 12311 "First Secretary of the Govern­ ment," proposed, 26-27, 37, 45, 51, 148

Fisher, Roger, 76 food aid (PL 480) program,

12,

jo6, 193, 207

foreign affairs programming, see programming, foreign affairs Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS), 159, 170, 171 foreign aid, see economic assist­ ance, military assistance, food aid foreign economic policy, see inter­ national economic policy foreign policy, definition of, 5 ; as outcome of bureaucratic politi­ cal process, 64-65, 73-75 Foreign Service, 10-11, 19,

28-31,

35, 49, 68, 70-71, 72, 162-67, 17374, 175, 176-78, 179η, i8o, 183, 184, 185, 194, 203, 205, 218, 239, 240η, 248-49, 253, 266-67, 272, 281-88;

bureaucratic effective-

INDEX ness, 49, 165, 166-67, '7 2 > lateral entry, 29, i82n, 283-84, 286-88; o v e r p o p u l a t i o n of senior ranks, 185, 285-86; Presidential relationship, 30-31, 98, 131-32, 15467, 281-82, 288; p r o m o t i o n system, 165-67, 176, i78n, 283-87; proposals to b r o a d e n m e m b e r ship, 168-69, 170-71, 174; subc u l t u r e , 70-71, 162-64. See also A m e r i c a n F o r e i g n Service Association F o r e i g n Service, B o a u l of the, 30,

H a r r , J o h n , 159, 165, 171, 185, i85n, 187, i89n, 190 H a n i m a n , A v e r e l l , 9 8 ^ 112, 113, 238, 266 H a v i l a n d (Brookings) R e p o r t , 26, 44, 229 Ha>s Bill, 170-71 H e a l t h , E d u c a t i o n and \V r elfare, D e p a r t m e n t of, i94n H e i n e m a n T a s k Force (President's T a s k Force on G o v e r n m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1967), 2n, 223,

3on, 174, 176 "" F o i e i g n Service, D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l of, 30, 30m 284 Foreign Service A c t of 1946, 3on Foreign Service Institute, i 7 6 n Forrestal, James, 84 Forrestal, M i c h a e l , 101 Fortas, A b e , 244 "Forty C o m m i t t e e , " 128 F r a n k e l , C h a r l e s , 53, 68n, 222, 290 F r e e m a n , O r v i l l e , 162 Fried, E d w a r d , 108 F u l b r i g h t , J. W i l l i a m , 130, 183

Herter C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t of 1962, 7-8, 27-28, 29, 2gn, 84, 168-69, 186 H i c k e l , W a l t e r , 130 H i l s m a n , R o g e r , 39, 42, 47, 55n, 57, 58, 64, 65, 66-67, 74. 93- " 3 H i t c h , Charles, 204 H i t c h C o m m i t t e e , 204, 2o6n H o f f m a n n , Stanley, 25, 74-75, 226 H o f s t a d e i , R i c h a r d , 34 Hoopes, T o w n s e n d , 57, 198, 229 H o o v e r , H e r b e r t , 26 H o o v e r C o m m i s s i o n R e p o r t of 1949 ("Foreign Affairs"), 2n, 7-8, 19, 2 i n , 24, 30, 41, 45-46; task force report, 21, 84, 85 H u g h e s , T h o m a s , 33n, 246 H u m p h r e y , G e o r g e , 260 H u n t i n g t o n , S a m u e l , 41, 46n, 55n,

2

G a i t h e r R e p o r t of 1957, 72 G a l b r a i t h , J o h n K e n n e t h , 32, 76, 79, 156, 158 G o o d p a s t e r , A n d r e w , 118 G o r d o n , L i n c o l n , 204 G r o m y k o , A n d r e i , 157 g r o u p processes, d e p e n d e n c e of large organizations on, 79-80 G u a t e m a l a , o v e r t h r o w of A r b e n z r e g i m e in, 280 G u l i c k , L u t h e r , 223

55n

73

H y m a n , Sydney, 99 India, U.S. relations w i t h , 13, 106,

H a l b e i s t a m , D a v i d , 97n, 116, 117 H a l d e m a n , H . R . , 125 H a l p e r i n , M o r t o n , i8n, 55n, 61,

118, 161, 162 i n f o r m a t i o n , access to, 58, 103, 236, 290; flow of, 79, 102, 105-06, 221-22; m a n a g e m e n t of, 78-79, 171, i82n, 231, 254 i n f o r m a t i o n p r o g r a m s , 13, 168,

65-66, 6gn, 71, 72, 75, 142 H a m i l t o n , E d w a r d , 108 H a m m o n d , P a u l , 227 " h a n d l e s " for i n v o l v e m e n t in issues, i m p o r t a n c e of, 219, 236-38, 243, 248, 271-73

192-93, 197-98, 204, 263 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study ( T h e President and the Management of National Security), 44, 49, 84, 172, 218-19, 223, 273

347

INDEX i n t e g r a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , see organizational integration i n t e l l i g e n c e activities, 6, n n , 13, 34, 197, 263, 280-81 I n t e l l i g e n c e and Research, B u r e a u o£ ( I N R ) , 24 i n t e l l i g e n c e reports, 102, 231, 236 I n t e r - A g e n c y Staff C o m m i t t e e , 207 Inter-American Affairs ( A R A - L A ) , Assistant Secretary of State for, 193, 206, 210, 234; B u r e a u of, 193-95- 204 I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l G r o u p s (IG's), 121-22, 127, 132, 141, 148, 159, 181, 210 Interdepartmental Regional G r o u p s (IRG's) 105, 117, 121, 159. i 7 i " 7 3 . 208, 209-10 interest and m o t i v a t i o n , b u r e a u cratic, 67-73 i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic policy, 5, 108, 118, 149, i s o n , 168, 220 I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c Policy, C o u n c i l on, 149, i4g-5on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Security A f f a i r s ( D o D / I S A ) , Assistant Secretary of D e f e n s e for, 128, 228, 229, 235, 241, 243, 268; Office of, 14142, 162, 228n, 235-38, 239-44, 245, 245n, 248, 250, 279-80, 282, 291; e v o l u t i o n of, 228-30; f u n c tions p e r f o r m e d by, 230-33 i n w a r d - l o o k i n g n a t u r e of b u r e a u cratic political process, 73-75, 258; of staffs, 246 I r a n i a n oil crisis, 227 I r w i n , J o h n , 129 issues, as bits a n d pieces, 59-60; as s i m u l t a n e o u s games, 60; int e r d e p a r t m e n t a l n a t u r e of, 13, 60-61 Italy, " o p e n i n g to the l e f t " in, 142, 158 Jackson, H e n r y M., 2, 5, 23, 31, 44, 120 Jackson S u b c o m m i t t e e investigations, 2, 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 40,

42, 60, 71, 84-85, 96, 148, 155, 169, 171, 191, 221, 224, 252 J a p a n , U.S. relations w i t h , 13, 133, 134, 242 Johnson, L y n d o n , 2, 86, 87, 92, 95. 104-12, 116-18, 125, 133, 135, i 5 o n , 157, 173, 188, 204, 207, 208, 231, 241, 242, 244, 293 Johnson, U . A l e x i s , 104, 171 Johnson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 19-20, 35. 35 n > 95. 104-12, 116-18, 123, 125, 152-53, 198, 199, 207-08, 2 3 m , 241 J o i n t C h i e f s of Staff (JCS), 25, 60, 72, 105, 134, 162, 208, 239; C h a i r m a n of, i o g n , 123-24, 127; J o i n t Staff, 239 Jones, A r t h u r , 2gn jurisdictions, tendency to emphasize, see p a r o c h i a l i s m Justice, D e p a r t m e n t of, 11 K a t z e n b a c h . N i c h o l a s , 1 1 1 , 187-88, 204, 2og K a u f m a n , H e r b e r t , 30, 83 Kaysen, C a r l , 101, 102, 113, 143, 238, 241, 242 K e e n y , S p u r g e o n , 143 K e n n a n , George, 5, 23, 32, 46n, 139. 224-25, 252 K e n n e d y , J o h n , 3, 27, 30, 32, 80, 87, 8g, 9 m , 94, 95-104, io6n, 112-16, 126, 142, i s o n , 152, 154, 155. i 5 6 . 157. 158, 159. >68, 195, 196, 211, 228, 230, 231, 235, 241, 259, 265, 266, 266n, 267, 293 K e n n e d y , R o b e r t , 101 K e n n e d y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 2, 19-20, 92, 95-104, 112-16, 123, 125, 152, 154-55. 198. 199 Kissinger, H e n r y , 1, 3, 23, 28, 31, 76, 85, 118-32, 134-53. 155. 175. 210, 214, 218, 220, 233, 235, 236, 240, 240n, 241, 243, 244, 245, 249, 257, 260, 262, 282 K o m e r , R o b e r t , 101, 144 K o r e a , U.S. troops in, 1 3 m K o r e a n W a r , 225, 227-28, 260

348

INDEX Kraft, Joseph, 115-16, 134η, 139η, i4 o n , 143. 242 n . 259 Labor, Department of, 11, 192; Secretary of, 149η Laird, Melvin, 129, 134, 141, 230, 242, 242η Laos, U.S. policy toward, 22, 196, 280 Latin America, U.S. polic> toward, 116, 133, 150, 193-94, 234 Latin American bureau, see InterAmerican Affairs, Bureau of "layering," 31, 171, 220-21, 232, 257-58 Lazorchick, Daniel, 165 leaks to the press, as bureaucratic tactic, 63; as contributor to closed decision-making, 111, 124, 211-12 legislative proposals, control of, 238 leverage, 7-8, 38, 81, 235. See also bargaining advantages Lincoln, Evelyn, 101 Lindblom, Charles, 65 "line," problem of defining, 222η line officials, need to strengthen, 251-53 "line solution" to foreign affairs organization, 24, 24η, 220-21, 25i Lippmann, Walter, 4-5 "living system," State Department, 164, 170, 283 Lovett, Robert, 23, 23η, 45, 6o MacArthur, Douglas, 260 McCamy, James, 24, 192-93 McElroy, Neil, 236 McGhee, George, 98 machinery, treatment of govern­ ment as, 38-42 McNamara, Robert, 25, 31, 57, 97η, 98, 102, 105, 108, no, 111, 113, 114, 115, 115η, 129, Η 1 · 161η, 183, 188, 201, 203, 207, 214, 229, 235, 236, 241, 242, 244, 249, 259, 268, 282

McNaughton, John, 229, 241, 242 Macomber, William, 167, 176-78, 181η, 182-83, 273, 284 Macomber reform program, 167, 176-83, 186, 191, 252-53, 271η, 276, 284-88; Diplomacy for the Seventies, 176-83, 223; Task Force XIII, 179-83, 189 McPherson, Harry, 64 Management and Budget, Office of (OMB), 206, 257, 277; Di­ rector of, i49*5on. See also Budget, Bureau of the (BoB) "management" approach to or­ ganizational reform, 178-90 Mansfield, Harvey, 48 March, James, 62η, 223η Marshall, George, 224-25, 260, 268 Marshall Plan, 6, 224 Martin, Graham, 174, 174η Middle East, U.S. policy toward, 130, 149η, 269 military assistance, 12, 168, 204, 228, 228η military bases and activities, over­ seas, 11, 204-05, 242, 2J79 military force, 6, 34; inflexibility of, 77-78 military policy, see defense policy, national security policy, politi­ cal-military policy military services, 6, 13, 57, 71, 7273, 78, 159, 161, 165, 204-05, 207, 228η, 229, 2 3o, 233η, 239, 240η, 242, 278-80, 282 MIRV, development of, 61 Mitchell, John, 124 Mondale, Walter, 255η monetary policy, see international economic policy Moose, Richard, 103, 106η, 108-09, 143. 157 Morgan, George, 224η Morgenthau, Hans, 23, 26, 35, 45η Mosher, Frederick, 29, 159, 165, 187 Moyers, Bill, 104, 107 multilateral force (MLF), pro­ posed, 118

INDEX N a t i o n a l Advisory C o u n c i l o n Int e r n a t i o n a l Monetary and Fin a n c i a l Policies ( N A C ) , 207 " N a t i o n a l F o r e i g n Affairs College," proposed, 168 N a t i o n a l Policy Papers (NPP's), 199, 200-201, 203 N a t i o n a l Security Act of 1947, i 4 n N a t i o n a l Security A c t i o n M e m o r a n d a (NSAM's), i58n, 198, 200 " N a t i o n a l Security A f f a i r s , " proposed Office of, 2, 257-58 N a t i o n a l Security A g e n c y , iin N a t i o n a l Security C o u n c i l (NSC), 14, i 4 - i 5 n , 26, 84-85, i23n, 211, 277; " E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e " of, 100, 211; u n d e r E i s e n h o w e r , 19, i23n, i g g , 211; u n d e r K e n n e d y and Johnson, 96, 100, 104, 123, 211; u n d e r N i x o n , 2on, 48, 11827. J 33. 135. i39> 149. !79> 2 " . 2ig; u n d e r T r u m a n , i23n N S C Ad Hoc G r o u p s , 122 N S C P l a n n i n g B o a r d , 19 N S C R e v i e w G r o u p , see R e v i e w Group " N S C - 6 8 , " 225, 227 N S C staff, 37, 92, 93, 95, 100, 15659, 210, 214-15, 228, 234, 235-38, 239-45. 248. 249, 250, 258, 260, 262-63, 273, 277, 278, 282, 290; f u n c t i o n s of, io6n, 230-33; u n d e r B u n d y , 99, 100-104, 112-14, 116, 249; u n d e r Kissinger, 3, 28, 12223, 125-27, 129, 130, 133, i 3 5 n , i3 6 -37. 139-40. 142-46, 175. 204, 210, 211, 214-15, 219, 249, 260; u n d e r R o s t o w , 105, 106-09, " 6 17, 208 N S C system, E i s e n h o w e r Administration, i g , 23, 39, 96-97, 101, 119, 120, igg, 201-02; N i x o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 2-3, 8, 15, 20, 20n, 28, 118-53, 176. 215, 219-20 N a t i o n a l Security Decision M e m o r a n d a (NSDM's), 198, i g g national security policy, 5-7, 27880; N i x o n definition of, 131,

1 3 m . See also political-military policy, defense policy n a t i o n a l security studies (NSSM) p r o g r a m , u g - 2 3 , 127, 128, 13237, 140, 144, 158, igg, 219-20, 233. 238, 278 N a v a l O p e r a t i o n s , C h i e f of, 57 N a v y , U.S., 3, 60, 68, 71 N e a r Eastern and South Asian A f fairs ( N E A ) , B u r e a u of (State), 216 N e u s t a d t , R i c h a r d , 14, 47, 52, 55n, 59 n > 75. 81, 1 i 5 n , 155. 166, 221, 235, 238, 245n, 259; Presidential Power, 52 n e u t r a l c o m p e t e n c e , g o a l of, 30 n e w central official, proposals to create, 17, 26-28, 37-39, 51. See also State, " E x e c u t i v e U n d e r Secretary o f , " "First Secretary of the G o v e r n m e n t " " n e w d i p l o m a c y , " 168, 173 " N e w R e f o r m M o v e m e n t , " State D e p a r t m e n t , 168-90 Nitze, P a u l , 157, i58n, 225, 227, 22g, 230, 236 N i x o n , R i c h a r d , 1-3, 30, 48, 66, 86, 87, 92, g2n, 95-96, io6n, 11826, 128, 129-31, 134-36, 139, 1394on, 140, 141-44, 146, 148-53, 154, 175, 197, 201, 211, 230, 233, 234, 235, 240, 241, 244, 293 N i x o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1-3, 11-12, 2on, 28, 33, 35, 94, 95-96, 118-53, 155, 159, 175-76, 196-97, 204, 208, 210, 211, 214-16, 242, 251, 258, 265 N i x o n D o c t r i n e , 1 3 m , 201 " n o n - g r o u p , " 111 n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n treaty. 118 N u t t e r , G. W a r r e n , 128, 141, 230, 242n "Office of N a t i o n a l Security A f fairs," proposed, see " N a t i o n a l Security A f f a i r s , " proposed O f fice of " O f f i c e of Policy R e v i e w and Coo r d i n a t i o n , " proposed, see " P o l -

350

INDEX icy Review and Coordination," proposed Office of Okinawa, return of to Japan, 134, 242 "openness," in State Department/ Foreign Service, 173-74, ^ n . 178, 179, 283-84, 286-87 operations, importance of, 20-22, 59-60, 101, 137-41, 289-90 Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 19, 96, 154 OPRED (Operation Reduction), 35^ options, Presidential efforts to en­ sure, 102, 119-20, 125-26, 133-37, 157, 249, 250, 261; to keep open, 110-11, 201, 274-75 organization, methods of treating role of, 42-50 organization, traditional approach to, 38, 40-41, 49-50, 55 organizational integration, 17, 19298; in State-AID Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA-LA), '93-95 organizational strategy, need for, 83-84; basic questions to be re­ solved by, 84-94; limits of, 28894; proposed, 249-94 organizational strength, central, problem of building, 90-94, 129,

State," proposed, see State, "Ex­ ecutive Under Secretary of" personnel, 28-31, 281-88. See also career services and systems, Foreign Service, military services perspectives, of bureaucrats, 5657, 67, 221-22, 238-45 Peterson, Peter, 150η Peterson (Rudolph) Task Force on International Development, 150, 197 planning, 222-23, 264; Kennedy de-emphasis on, 101, 114-15; Nixon efforts to restore, 118, 119-22, 132-37, 140; problem of defining, 224η; staffs for, 127, 224-28, 232, 273-74 Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC), State Department, 8, 128, 132, 176, 181η, 214-20, 222, 223, 227, 234, 235, 236, 239, 239-4on, 248-49, 271η, 272, 273 planning-operations distinction, 18-20, 97, 121 Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), 203, 204, 205 policy, definition of, 4, 18η "Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA)" system, proposed State Department,

140-53. 254-94 organizational studies, postwar, 2,

179-80, 189, 204, 206 policy guidance, formal, 20-21,

7-8, 16-51 Ormsby-Gore, David, 115η Osborne, John, in, 134η

198-202, 278 policy-opeiations dichotomy, 17,

"overstaffing," problem of, 17, 3138 Owen, Henry, 247 Packard, David, 279 Parkinson, C. Northcote, 224 parochialism, organizational tend­ ency toward, 68, 71-73, 160-63, 257, 264-65 Peace Corps, 6, 12, 195, 204 Pedersen, Richard, 128 "Permanent Under Secretary of

18-22, 37-39, 50, 184, 264, 273 Policy Planning Council, State Department, 98η, 199, 214, 2i8, 228, 235, 248 Policy Planning Staff, State De­ partment, 224-28, 252 "Policy Review and Coordina­ tion," proposed Office of, 21819. 273 political-military policy, 6-7, 22829, 263, 270, 278-81. See also defense policy, national security policy

INDEX Q u e m o y crisis of 1958, 62

P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y Affairs, B u r e a u of (J/PM), 24, 197, 236, 270-71, 278, 280 politics, b u r e a u c r a t i c , 52-82; dangers o f , 73-82; desire to transcend t h r o u g h o r g a n i z a t i o n , 4446; neglect of as factor i n policym a k i n g , 38-51; scholarly efforts to i l l u m i n a t e , 41-42, 54-55, 138, 138-3911; tendency to mask, 40, 46-49, 50 politics, partisan, 88-89 politics-administration d i c h o t o m y , 20-21, 41, 47, 48, 185, 190 P o n t u r o , Joseph, 201 President, 46-47, 52-53, 99, 13411, 240, 247; and f o r e i g n policym a k i n g , 3-4, i 4 - i 5 n , 27, 57, 66, 83-153. 156. 191. 239. 256-7 1 . 274-76, 278, 279, 282, 285, 288g i , 292-94; desires to l i m i t power of, 84-86; and partisan politics, 88-89; a n d State D e p a r t m e n t / F o r e i g n Service, 29-30, 9799. 131-32. 154-6 2 • l 6 3 . i 6 7 . 18081, 183, 187-89, 215, 220, 249-51; tendency t o w a r d isolation, 8687; t o w a r d activism, 87-88; treatm e n t of in post-war studies, 8485 Presidential f o r e i g n policy messages, N i x o n , 119, 130, 199, 201 " P r e s i d e n t i a l Staff A g e n c y for N a tional Security A f f a i r s , " proposed, 224 President's C o m m i t t e e on A d m i n i s t r a t i v e M a n a g e m e n t , 46-47 press, f o r e i g n policy r o l e of, 54, 63 Press Secretary to the President, lo9n Price, D o n , 30 p r o g r a m m i n g , f o r e i g n affairs, 17, 140, 168, 170, 175, 179-80, 194, 202-07, 273, 277-78. See also C C P S , F A P S , " P o l i c y Analysis and R e s o u r c e A l l o c a t i o n " system " p u r p o s i v e " f o r e i g n policy, definition, 4

"rational foreign policy-making," goal of, 38-40, 42, 46, 56, 81, 120, 180 R e a d , B e n j a m i n , 231, 2 3 m R e e d y , G e o r g e , 86, 245 r e p u t a t i o n , b u r e a u c r a t i c , 58-59, 235 resource allocation, 179-80, 1 8 m , 202-07, 264, 2 7 m R e v i e w G r o u p , 122, 124, 132, 136, 219, 277; r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of, 128, 210 R i c h a r d s o n , E l l i o t , 129, 132, 176, 183, 214, 215 Ries, J o h n , 78 R o b e r t s , C h a l m e r s , 138 R o c k e f e l l e r , Nelson, 26, 37, 45, 46n, 207 Rogers, W i l l i a m P., 1, 14, 93n, 12829. i 3 0 - 3 i . 135. i49n. 175. I 8 3 . 191, 215, 220 Roosevelt, F r a n k l i n , 30, 47, 84-85, 100, 113, 154 R o o s e v e l t , T h e o d o r e , 34 R o o t , E l i h u , 223 Rossiter, C l i n t o n , 90 R o s t o w , W a l t , 98, g8n, 101, 107-08, iog, 123, 126, 140, 143, lgg, 200, 203, 240, 241, 242, 244 routines, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , 77-78 R o v e r e , R i c h a r d , 157 rules of the g a m e , b u r e a u c r a t i c , 62-63 R u s k , D e a n , 2, 32, 6g, 81, go, 97g8n, g8, 105, 108, lqg, 112, 113, 1 1 5 1 . U 7 . H 7 n . 152, 154. 159. i 6 i n , 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 191, 201, 203, 205, 2o6n, 2og, 214, 221, 228, 231, 2 3 m , 235, 236, 244, 259, 263, 274 Russia, see Soviet U n i o n

352

Sapin, B u r t o n , ( M a k i n g of United States Foreign Policy), 43. 43-4411 Sayre, R o b e r t , 204 Schelling, T h o m a s , 187-88, 204

INDEX Schilling, Warner, 55η, 67, 74, 76 Schlesinger, Arthur, 30, 97, 101, 103, 155, 157. !5«. 165. 211 Schultze, Charles, 205, 206 Scott, Andrew, 70-71, 162-63, 164, 190, 283 Scott, Hugh, 22 secrecy, bureaucratic interest in maintaining, 66, 110-11 "Secretary of Foreign Affairs," proposed, 26 "Secretary's men," need for, 24950, 271-72, 282 Seidman, Harold, 49η Senate Foreign Relations Commit­ tee, 26 Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), 105, 111, 117, 121, 188, 208-09; SIG/IRG system, 2, 10405, 117, 122, 171-72, 174, 187, 207-10, 276, 293 "Senior Management Team," State Department, 181η, 271η Senior Review Group, see Review Group "Seventh Floor Staff," proposed, State, 132, 132η, 141, 172, 178, 180-83, 205-06, 215-21, 248-51, 263η, 269-74, 278, 290 "Seventh Floor Staff," proposed 249-53- 271-75, 277, 278, 280, 282-291 Simon, Herbert, 62η, 223η Simpson, Smith, 185η Sisco, Joseph, 149η size, see overstaffing Skybolt program, cancellation of, 61, 75. 114-15. "5 n Sneider, Richard, 142 Sorensen, Theodore, 88, 99, 101, 103, 113, 125, 134η, 155, !59. 267 Soviet Union, U.S. relations with, 131η, 135η, 157, 197- 23°· 265, 28ο Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, State Department, 216 Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,

see Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 150η speeches, involvement in writing, 230-31 staff, White House foreign policy, see NSC staff staff and line, need to strengthen both, 251-53 staff-boss divergence, determinants of, 238-45, 247; factors limiting, 242-44 staff director-boss relationship, 218-19, 235-36, 241, 244, 271-72 staff-line relations, 220-23, 232-33, 34, 251-53, 275-76 staff members, bargaining ad­ vantages of, 103, 143-46, 216-20, 234-38, 242-43; policy views of, 123, 241-42; where recruited, 100, 108-09, 123, 144-45. 23940η, 248-49, 272, 281-82 staff work, nature of, 103-04, 106η, 222-23, 224-28, 230-33, 272-74; as bargaining advantage, 58, 262-63, 271; quality of, 157, 260-61 staffs, 17, 218-59; distinction be­ tween personal and institu­ tional, 147-48, 245η; effectiveness of, 143-46, 216-20, 233-38; in­ fighting within and among, 216-17, 245-46; need for; 22123; organizational literature on, 223-24; problem of defining, 222η; relationship of boss to, 235-48; size of, 243, 244-45 staffs, general substantive, 103-04, 106η, 228-53, 271-75. See also names of specific staffs staffs, planning, 224-28, 232, 234, 273-74 staffs, specialized, 272, 280 staffs, State Department bureau (proposed), 252-53, 274-76 Stanford Research Institute, 205 State, Assistant Secretaries of (regional), 93, 105, 113, 121, 124,

INDEX State, Assistant Secretaries o£, (cont.) 127, 131-32, 141, 148, 172, 183, •9 1 · !93-94- 208, 251-53, 257, 259-60, 263, 263η, 265-67, 268, 269-70, 274-76, 278, 288, 2go. See also names of specific regions State, Department of, 10-13, 32-33, 35. 57> i3 2 n · !501. 152, 154-90, 192-98, 203-07, 210, 212, 214-21, 224-28, 248-53, 257-94; coordinanation role, 7, 17, 18-19, 20η, 2in, 22, 84, 97, 102, 104-05, 12122, 166-67, 168-69, 207-08, 25881; country desks, 158, 171-72, 182η, 193-95, 2ig, 275-76; inter­ departmental relations, 14, 4546, 49, 73, 160-63, 165. 169-70, 228η, 22g, 259-60, 263-64; Ken­ nedy and, 96, 97-99, 102-03, 11a14, 116, 154-59; leadership per­ formance, 31, 157, 159, 160-62, 166-67, 168-70, 259-61, 263-64, 278-80; Nixon and, 128-32, 135, 141, 149η, 154, >55. 158; parochi­ alism, 73, 160-63, !69-70, 26465; Presidents and, 3, 30-31, 15564, 166-67, 249-50, 259-69; re­ form efforts, 7-8, 167-90, 214-20; regional bureaus, 12-13, 24, 159, 193-94, 196, 216, 219, 221, 222η, 251-52, 274-76, 277-78; reorgani­ zation, proposed, 258-88; staffs, 214-21, 224-28, 248-53, 271-76; subculture, 70-71, 162-64. See also Foreign Service; names of specific officials and units State, "Deputy Secretary of," pro­ posed, 269, 27m State, Deputy Under Secretary of, for Administration, 169, 189, 216, 271, 271η; proposed re­ casting of position, 271, 271η State, Deputy Under Secretary of, for Economic (or Political) Af­ fairs, 216, 216η, 217η, 269; pro­ posed recasting of position, 270-71, 271η State, "Executive Under Secretary

of," proposed, 7-8, 27-28, 29η, 5i, i68, 174, 185-89, 270 State, Secretary of, 1-3, 10, 15η, ig, 20η, 27-28, 39, 54, 109, 113-14, 123, 125, 132η, 149η, ι8ο, 18690, 200, 257-79, 282, 287-89; as candidate for primary role, 1-3, 92-93. 153. 257-63; official pri­ macy of, 1-3, 49, 96, 97, 129-31, 154, 169, 207-08, 293; redefining role of, 261-63, 288-89; relation­ ship with President, 89, 90, 92, 159. 221, 257, 259-63, 265-67; staff support for, 157, 214-21, 223, 224-28, 247, 248-53, 271-74 State, Under Secretary of, 63, 105, 121, 123, 127, 12S-29, 137, 174, 181η, 185η, 2 o 8, 216, 217, 217η, 257, 263η, 265-69, 271η, 277, 2 90 State, Under Secretary of, for Political (or Economic) Affairs, 216, 216η, 217η, 269, 271η; pro­ posed recasting of position, 27071, 271η Stevenson, Adlai, 91η, 98, 158, 266

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 128, 129, 149 "Strategic Management Center," proposed State Department, 180-82 subcultures, organizational, 70-71, 75, 162-64, 184, 283 substance-administration dichot­ omy, State Department, 18η, 170, 180, 184 Suez crisis, 75 "sustaining manager," proposed, see State, "Executive Under Secretary of" Symington, Stuart, 1-2, 14, 125, 130 Systems Analysis (DoD/SA), Of­ fice of, 142, 240, 250 task forces, 98, 102, 108, 230, 232, 237

Taylor, Maxwell, 104, 171 territoriality, bureaucratic, 71-72

INDEX "Thanksgiving Da> Massacre," 98, 98η, 112 Thomson, James, 109, 158, 241, 242, 246 Thorne;croft, Peter, 115η trade policy, 5-6, 24, 150η, i68, 264 Transportation, Department of, 11 Treasury, Department of the, 11, 13, 108, 15011, 192, 209, 224; Secretary of, 24,60-61, 124, 149η, 207, 270 Truman, Harry, 23, 52η, 92, g8, 123η, 236, 26ο Tuesday Lunch, 109-12, 117, 125, 153 Tufts, Robert, 263 Tullock, Gordon, 78 Turkey, Jupiter missiles in, 3, 158, 158η Under Secretaries Committee (USC), 121-22, 127, 137, 180, 210, 217, 220 United States Information Agency (USIA), 11, 12, 13, 29, 163, 169, 17 1 . !74» 1 77» 193. !97-98. 222η; and interdepartmental commit­ tees, 105, 121, 208, 210, 211 Urwick, L., 223, 233η Vance, Cyrus, 64 Verification Panel, 128 Vice President, 15, 123

Vice President for foreign affairs, proposed, 26 Vietnam, impact of on foreign policy-making, 109-12 Vietnam, U. S. policy toward, 3, 22, 56, 57, 59-60, 63-64, 78, 89, 106, 107, 108, 109-12, 117, 123, 133. 135. 149. 159. 172. 196, 230, 236, 241-42, 244, 246, 290-91 Vietnam Special Studies Group, 128 Voice of America, 198 Waldo, Dwight, 41η Walker, Lannon, 20, 173, 174η Warnke, Paul, 229, 241-42 Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), 127, 139 Weber, Max, 53, 54η, 83 White House staff, 101, 125, 16566, 177. See also NSC staff Wiesner, Jerome, 101, 241, 242 Williams, G. Mennen, 98 Wilson, Woodrow, 20, 34, 91, 185 Woodrow Wilson Foundation stud} (Elliott et al., U. S. For­ eign Policy), 161η Wriston report ("Toward a Stronger Foreign Service"), 29 Wristonization, 29 Yager, Joseph, 167, 172 Yarmolinsky, Adam, 167, 232