Presidential Leadership and National Security: The Obama Legacy and Trump Trajectory [1 ed.] 113828419X, 9781138284197

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
Contributors
1 Introduction: The National Security Transition From Obama to Trump • Richard S. Conley
2 Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security • Cigdem V. Sirin and José D. Villalobos
3 Terrorism Strategy Shifts From Bush to Obama • Karen A. Feste
4 Military Initiatives by President Obama • Louis Fisher
5 Obama’s National Security Cabinet: The Fight to Survive White House Micromanagement • Shirley Anne Warshaw
6 Obama and Guantanamo: The Intractable—and the Internal—Dilemma • Nancy Kassop
7 Attack of the Drones: National Security, Due Process, and the Constitutionality of Unmanned Strikes • Jordan Cash and Dave Bridge
8 Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran: Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Political Commitments • Jeffrey S. Peake
9 US–Russian Relations During the Obama Presidency: From Reset to a New Cold War? • M. Leann Brown
10 The Clash of Civilizations and the Clash of Candidates: The 2016 Election • Richard S. Conley
Appendix A. US Domestic Terrorism, 2009–2016: Attackers Using Political Islam Justification
Appendix B. Selected Speeches of President Obama, 2009–2017: Counterterrorism Policy
Index

Citation preview

Presidential Leadership and National Security

This book assesses the foreign policy legacy of the Obama administration through the lens of national security and leadership. Timely, accessible chapters authored by leading scholars of presidential and international politics cover White House–cabinet relations; Congress and war powers; challenges including the Iran nuclear deal, ISIS, and the closing of Guantanamo; drone strikes; the New Cold War with Russia; and the ways in which the Obama foreign policy legacy shaped the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the book explores the philosophical basis of counterterrorism strategy in the Obama administration and traces how precepts differed from the administration of George W. Bush. More generally, the book contributes to an understanding of the distinctive interplay between the formal, constitutional powers of the president and the use of informal, executive powers in the quest for peace and security. Finally, the book surveys the challenges that Donald J. Trump faces in the transition to the new presidential administration. Richard S. Conley is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Florida. A scholar of the presidency and comparative executives and legislatures, he has authored or edited 11 books in print or in press and 30 journal articles on American and comparative politics.

Praise for Presidential Leadership and National Security Richard Conley’s Presidential Leadership and National Security is a timely, critical evaluation of President Obama’s administration and an analysis of the major international challenges facing President Trump. Nine top presidential scholars cover a variety of topics including presidential–congressional relations and foreign policy, presidential–cabinet relations, the successes and failures of Obama’s national security policy, the president’s constitutional war powers, and the impact of Obama’s legacy on the 2016 election. The book contributes to an in-depth understanding of presidential leadership and the current challenges of national security policy-making. James A. Thurber, American University This seminal volume establishes a usable framework for interpreting President Trump. In succinct, readable chapters, remarkably free of academic jargon and partisan rancor, the authors compellingly demonstrate that President Obama’s legacy is a bridge to the Trump administration, and how much they both are appending chapters to a national security playbook that George W. Bush wrote first. This book is an essential guide to change and (a more obvious but largely undocumented) continuity in American foreign policy since September 11, 2001. Timothy J. Lynch, University of Melbourne; Co-author of After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy With contributions by an impressive group of scholars, Richard Conley’s book offers a well-balanced approach to covering presidential leadership on national security policy. It details the central national security issues faced by the Obama administration and lays the foundation for understanding the successes and failures the Trump administration will have on foreign policy. Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, University of North Texas Richard Conley has assembled an impressive group of scholars to address fundamental issues of presidential leadership and national security. The various contributors’ insights and analyses are of uniformly excellent quality, adding up to a consistently strong book. Jon R. Bond, Texas A&M University Presidential Leadership and National Security is a must-read for serious scholars of U.S. foreign policy and presidential leadership. Cutting-edge analyses of phenomena ranging from rhetoric and staffing to drone strikes and unilateral agreements each pair rigorous theoretical development with to-themoment contemporary analysis. This peerless volume provides an indispensable source to those wanting to understand the roots of national security policy conflicts facing the United States in the Age of  Trump. Justin S. Vaughn, Boise State University This comprehensive, judicious, and lucid account of contemporary U.S. foreign policy is an important contribution to the literature. Insightful discussions of Obama’s legacy and Trump’s surprising early encounter with the world powerfully illuminate the forces of continuity and change shaping Washington’s approach to global affairs today. The contributors also highlight the central role of presidential choices in crafting effective policies in the national interest. Robert Singh, Birkbeck, University of London Richard Conley and an impressive group of scholars outline and lend perspective to Barack Obama’s national security policy. Each chapter begins its analysis with the situation he inherited from George W. Bush and ends with the first six months of Donald Trump’s administration. If you want to get a broad, critical perspective on the Obama national security legacy, you should read this book. James Pfiffner, George Mason University

Presidential Leadership and National Security The Obama Legacy and Trump Trajectory Edited by Richard S. Conley

Published 2018 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Taylor & Francis The right of Richard S. Conley to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-28419-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-28420-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-26969-6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To the memory of my beloved father and his fellow veterans of the Korean War

“Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Inaugural Address, 1953

Contents

Contributorsix   1 Introduction: The National Security Transition From Obama to Trump

1

RICHARD S. CONLEY

  2 Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security

19

CIGDEM V. SIRIN AND JOSÉ D. VILLALOBOS

  3 Terrorism Strategy Shifts From Bush to Obama

43

KAREN A. FESTE

  4 Military Initiatives by President Obama

74

LOUIS FISHER

  5 Obama’s National Security Cabinet: The Fight to Survive White House Micromanagement

93

SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW

  6 Obama and Guantanamo: The Intractable—and the Internal—Dilemma

112

NANCY KASSOP

  7 Attack of the Drones: National Security, Due Process, and the Constitutionality of Unmanned Strikes

127

JORDAN CASH AND DAVE BRIDGE

  8 Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran: Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Political Commitments JEFFREY S. PEAKE

142

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  9 US–Russian Relations During the Obama Presidency: From Reset to a New Cold War?

172

M. LEANN BROWN

10 The Clash of Civilizations and the Clash of Candidates: The 2016 Election

196

RICHARD S. CONLEY

Appendix A. US Domestic Terrorism, 2009–2016: Attackers Using Political Islam Justification223 Appendix B. Selected Speeches of President Obama, 2009– 2017: Counterterrorism Policy225 Index231

Contributors

Richard S. Conley is associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. A scholar of the presidency and comparative executives and legislatures, he has authored or edited 11 books in print or in press and 30 journal articles on American and comparative politics. Dave Bridge is associate professor of American government at Baylor University. A specialist in the courts, law, political development, and the presidency, he is author of six journal articles and several books on the courts and the Constitution. M. Leann Brown is associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. She specializes in international relations and political economy, and is author of two books and more than a dozen journal articles and specialized reports on international affairs. Jordan Cash is a PhD candidate at Baylor University. His interests focus on American politics and the courts, history, and judicial review. He has several manuscripts currently under review. Karen A. Feste is professor at the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Her professional work in international relations covers three themes: conflict resolution, terrorism, and military intervention. She is author of seven books and more than a dozen journal articles. Louis Fisher is Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project. From 1970 to 2010, he worked at the Library of Congress as Senior Specialist in Separation of Power at the Congressional Research Service and Specialist in Constitutional Law at the Law Library. During that period, he testified more than 50 times before congressional committees on a range of constitutional issues. He is author of 24 books, including The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power (2014). Nancy Kassop is professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, State University of New York, New Paltz. She is a specialist in the presidency and the Constitution and has published more than 30 articles and chapters in edited volumes.

x  Contributors

Jeffrey S. Peake is professor and chair in the Department of Political Science at Clemson University. His research focuses on unilateral executive power and the foreign policy presidency, and he is author of two books on the presidency and two dozen journal articles. Cigdem V. Sirin  is associate professor of political science at the University of  Texas, El Paso. Her main areas of interest are international relations and political psychology. Her research centers on examining whether, how, and why certain domestic factors (such as public opinion, ethnic/racial and religious configurations, and environmental scarcity) are associated with key conflict processes and decisions (such as military interventions). She has published more than a dozen journal articles in her field. José D.Villalobos is associate professor of political science and the Provost’s Faculty Fellow-in-Residence in the Center for Civic Engagement at the University of Texas, El Paso. His research examines policymaking and public opinion dynamics in the areas of the US presidency, race/ethnicity, and immigration. He has authored numerous articles and is co-author of the book Czars in the White House: The Rise of Policy Czars as Presidential Management Tools (2015). Shirley Anne Warshaw is professor of political science at Gettysburg College and holds the Harold G. Evans Chair of Eisenhower Leadership Studies. She has written 10 books on presidential decisionmaking and numerous book chapters and journal articles.

1 Introduction The National Security Transition From Obama to Trump Richard S. Conley

Assessing the foreign and national security policy record of any president just a few months after he leaves office is a precarious proposition. International politics are fluid, dynamic, and unpredictable. The long-term consequences of executive decisions, military actions, diplomatic endeavors, and responses to unforeseen crises spanning a four- or eight-year period may appear rather indeterminate the moment a new administration moves into the White House. Beginning at noon on January 20, the media naturally look forward to what the new president is doing, not back in time to appraise the former president’s performance. Recollections of the bygone days of the previous chief executive are almost immediately overshadowed by the daily drumbeat of White House announcements on cabinet appointments and palace intrigue. Indeed, the Sturm und Drang of the presidential transition of Donald Trump all but eclipsed serious discussions of Obama’s legacy as pundits and prognosticators peered into crystal balls and speculated about what the future holds for the Trump administration amid the fever pitch of controversies dominating the 12–24-hour news cycle. Intrepid scholars, however, necessarily take a longer view and seek to situate presidents’ places in history, however tentatively or confidently. Political scientists employ a variety of tools, from theory testing to empirical data and normative benchmarks, to draw conclusions about presidents’ successes and failures. Sometimes when a president leaves office, his approval and reputation are at a nadir. But his legacy may be subject to revision and even “rehabilitation” with objective retrospection, careful analysis, and reconsideration of governing contexts that comes in the fullness of time. Harry Truman is a case in point. As he turned over the reins of the Oval Office to Republican Dwight Eisenhower in 1953,Truman was not remembered for his leadership at the close of World War II, desegregation of the military, the Berlin Airlift, or his stunning, come-from-behind electoral victory in 1948.The phrase “to err is Truman” summed up the mounting frustration of a beleaguered nation at war in Korea, which the former general who had never held political office pledged to end. To the degree that polling data of the era were accurate, Truman’s final approval rating was 36 percent. Scholars’ retrospective evaluations of his performance in office 60 years later, however, place him

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at 89 percent approval (Panagopoulos 2012)! Ostensibly discredited upon leaving office, the 33rd president now ranks among the best-regarded chief executives in the modern era by many historians and political scientists. What of the legacy of the nation’s 44th president, Barack Obama? Like Truman, he returned to private life as a controversial, if somewhat more popular, ex-president as he handed the keys to the White House over to another Republican who promised to steer the nation’s foreign policy in a different direction. Unlike Eisenhower, Trump did not inherit a conventional ground war from his predecessor but rather a highly unconventional set of challenges and a stalemate of a different sort. Obama had not completely ended US military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he had made significant progress on that front by drawing down the number of troops. The cost, according to his critics, was the rise of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) that emerged out of civil war and managed to capture territory not only in Syria but in Iraq—domain that has proven challenging to retake, complicated by civil war and Russian involvement in the region. And the specter of homegrown terrorists only seemed to set the United States at greater unease. Obama’s national security policies figured prominently in the 2016 electoral contest between his former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, and the real estate mogul. From the Iranian nuclear agreement to “leading from behind” with air strikes in Libya and recriminations that he reneged on a “red line” pledge following Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, Obama’s foreign policy approach came under merciless attack by Trump and the Grand Old Party (GOP). Trump pledged an about-face to dismantle the fundamental aspects of Obama’s legacy. However, the disconnect between intemperate rhetoric on the campaign trail and the sober realities of navigating the ship of state through complicated and chaotic international waters has been palpable for the 45th president, at least in his first six months. This volume brings together a collection of timely analyses authored by leading scholars of presidential and international politics to assess the national security policy legacy of President Barack Obama and the implications for the transition of President Donald Trump. Three objectives inform the general approach to topics covered in this appraisal. First, the authors attempt to situate short- and long-term impacts of Obama’s leadership within the strategic setting of national and international politics in the post-9/11 era. Second, the contributors seek to understand the potential for lasting imprints that Obama made on the institution of the presidency and the implications for the constitutional order. Finally, scholars consider both the formal and informal bases of presidential power.The president’s constitutional authority as the nation’s top diplomat and commander in chief outlined in Article II is juxtaposed with relative mastery of communication and outreach to the public, the so-called “rhetorical presidency” that relies on the bully pulpit to build grassroots support and frame policy narratives.

Transition From Obama to Trump 3

Each chapter analyzes a particular facet of presidential leadership, with attention to criteria such as the president’s style, the strategic context and opportunity structure, and decisionmaking. Collectively, the essays cover a host of contemporary controversies spanning Obama’s two terms. Themes include the operationalization of alternate rhetorical approaches to change his predecessor’s narrative of the “war on terror”; the philosophical basis of counterterrorism strategy in the Obama administration and how precepts differed from the administration of George W. Bush; war powers and unilateral actions, including debates regarding military initiatives in the Middle East; the structure of cabinet/advisor relations on national security policymaking; the Iran nuclear deal; the ultimate failure to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; constitutional issues raised by drone strikes on US citizens abroad; the growing complexity of US–Russian relations; and the ways in which the Obama policy legacy shaped the 2016 presidential election. Readers will note that each chapter also includes a Future Challenges section that considers the potential consequences of Obama’s legacy for Donald Trump’s presidency. In Chapter 2, Cigdem V. Sirin and José D.Villalobos commence the journey to assess the Obama legacy by evaluating the differences in presidential rhetoric and public politics between George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Their astute analysis emphasizes Bush’s negative-valence rhetoric and Obama’s positive-valence rhetoric and the long-term implications for governance and national security policymaking for the two administrations. Bush shifted his public discourse toward the negative realm as a means of capitalizing on fears following 9/11 and building support for military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite earlier pledges of “compassionate conservatism” and the avoidance of nation building abroad. Obama’s dialogue on national security, in contrast, made every effort to mute negative commentary through messages of conciliation, empathy, enthusiasm, and hope for the future. He employed such messaging in the bid to cull support for his foreign policy vision, which marked a significant change from his predecessor’s: outreach, diplomatic problem solving, and collaboration instead of “hard” military power. By the end of Obama’s term, however, a dialectic emerged. Growing anxiety over terrorism and the situation in the Middle East enabled Donald Trump to come full circle to articulate a “negativevalence demagogic rhetorical approach” that exploited precisely the types of fears that emerged after 9/11. Sirin and Villalobos employ a theoretical framework that connects presidential decisionmaking with these differing rhetorical strategies of the Bush and Obama presidencies to underscore the impact. George W. Bush’s rhetorical approach represented a “domain of losses.” The death and destruction resulting from the worst terror attacks on US soil, which occurred less than nine months into his first term, produced collective anger, and “heightened threat perceptions further contributed to public support for the riskier, costly militaristic policy options to fight the war on terror while

4  Chapter 1

fear and anxiety allowed for defensive homeland security measures and antiterrorism policies.” Obama sought to extricate the United States from a domain of losses and move toward a “domain of gains.” One product of his rhetorical approach was to emphasize the advantages of diplomacy in conflict resolution, consistent with multilateral efforts such as halting the Iranian nuclear weapons program and removing the stockpile of deadly chemical weapons in Assad’s Syria after the dictator used them on civilians. Another product, however, was that even as worldwide events—the rise of ISIS, Muammar Qaddafi’s attacks on civilians in Libya, the Syrian Civil War and refugee crisis—compelled military action, Obama preferred risk-adverse methods consistent with his public messaging. As examples, drones were used in lieu of boots on the ground to combat ISIS, and the United States “led from behind” while France and the United Kingdom did the heavy lifting of bombing targets in Qaddafi’s Libya. The balance of the chapter, which urbanely places presidential rhetoric into the larger political science literature, concentrates on Obama’s legacy visà-vis the new Trump administration. Sirin and Villalobos question whether Trump’s election marks a return to zero-sum diplomacy and whether the new president’s staff reflects that weltanschauung. Moreover, questions abound as to how Trump’s attempt to enforce a ban on Muslims from select countries will affect US relations with the larger Islamic world, in which Obama spent much time trying to find mutuality. Similarly,Trump’s rhetoric on energy independence, climate change (withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement of 2015), and scrapping the Iran nuclear accord, if matched by action, has profound implications for Obama’s legacy. Finally, the authors consider the rise of social media and how it has intersected with the rhetorical presidency. Quite appropriately, they call for much more research to understand how media such as Twitter and Facebook enhance presidents’ direct connections with the public, and with what implications, depending on the valence presidents employ. In Chapter 3, Karen A. Feste assesses shifts in terrorism strategy from the administration of George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Obama, she posits, aspired to be a transformational and reconstructive president in national security. He set out to repudiate the policies of his predecessor largely through the bully pulpit. He emphasized “soft power” over “hard power” in terms of military force. He endeavored to change the vocabulary and narrative from “the war on terror” to “countering violent extremism” as a means to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the Muslim world and to begin to temper polarization at home and abroad. To do so, he relied largely on oratory in the bid to alter public views. In the final analysis, Feste’s provocative thesis that Obama, unlike George W. Bush, was a transactional leader whose rhetoric was insufficient to alter course significantly or change public opinion dramatically may prove controversial. One central factor she identifies was the deficiency of rhetoric to

Transition From Obama to Trump 5

make collective sense of homegrown terror and “lone-wolf ” attacks at home and abroad, not to mention the rise of ISIS and its brutality, which ratcheted up over the course of Obama’s second term. Borrowing from Skowronek’s (2011) theoretical frame of “political time,” she argues that Obama was caught in a certain cycle of history that precluded him from reconstruction and instead compelled him toward the politics of “preemption.” Shifting from the “politics of articulation” early in his presidency, Obama “reiterated basic operation norms and operating premises on US counterterrorism formulated by former president Bush as he introduced specifics of his new programs and direction.” Bush, according to Feste, did not set out to be a reconstructive president but embraced the task after 9/11. Alas, we are left to ponder a central conundrum with respect to the modern presidency, counterterrorism strategy, and national security policy. Under what conditions is the politics of reconstruction in this realm possible? Is it the product of events and the constraints of inalterable historical circumstances, or can presidents follow the prescriptions of Richard Neustadt (1991), who emphasized presidential persuasion and bargaining in his classic book Presidential Power? Or is the “rhetorical presidency” on its death bed as presidents’ pleas fall “on deaf ears,” as George C. Edwards III (2006) suggests? Perhaps the Trump presidency will offer important insights in the coming months. Trump pledged a wholesale reversal of national security policy during his 2016 campaign. Once in office, however, he has recoiled to a large degree. He jettisoned labeling China a “currency manipulator” to secure President Ji Xinping’s assistance against the rogue leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-Un, who is bent on developing ballistic missile technology capable of delivering nuclear weapons across the Pacific. Furthermore, after calling the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obsolete, Trump reassured Europeans of his support after leaders promised to step up efforts against ISIS—and the president came to realize the contributions of the Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan since 9/11. Finally, though he promised a more restrained foreign policy, his ordering of air strikes on a Syrian air base in early April 2017 following Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians represented another volte-face. Critics see policy incoherence, supporters flexibility.Whether the end result is the politics of reconstruction, consolidation, decay, or preemption in the Trump era remains an open question. In Chapter 4, Louis Fisher reviews military initiatives undertaken by President Obama from Afghanistan and Iraq to Libya and ISIS. His skilled analysis underscores the obvious complexities and subtle intricacies—strategic, statutory, and constitutional—of Obama’s actions as he operated under legislative frameworks (i.e., Authorizations for the Use of Military Force, or AUMF, 2001 and 2002) dating to the early post-9/11 era designed to combat the Taliban in particular. Embedded in Fisher’s detailed study is the solemn and paramount question of the war power and the constitutional balance between the executive and the legislature.

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As a candidate for the Oval Office, Obama articulated positions on the war power relatively consistent with an “originalist” view of the executive’s scope of authority. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a constitutional law professor, his rhetoric accentuated respect for the separation of powers and limitations on presidential military action absent approval by Congress. As Fisher notes, Obama rebuffed the Bush-era notion that “that the president may do whatever he deems necessary to protect national security” and criticized his predecessor’s challenges to interpretations of the war power that ran counter to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Most critically, Obama elaborated that military initiatives by the United States were most successful historically when approved by the legislative branch. Once in office, Obama found the precepts he so elegantly voiced problematic in the course of rapidly changing international events. The Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan prompted his deployment of 17,000 troops to ward off further advances and to bring stability to the country. In Iraq, despite continuing turmoil, battling insurgents was complicated by a Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by his predecessor that called for the removal of all US troops by the end of 2011. In Libya, he supported NATO intervention via air strikes against Muammar Qaddafi’s regime under the auspices of a UN resolution. When Congress raised objections that the actions were inconsistent with the War Powers Resolution, the president cited humanitarian concerns and dismissed bipartisan objections on the “limited basis” of the military action. In Syria, Obama unsuccessfully sought congressional support for military action against the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons against civilians; instead, he turned to Russia to broker an accord seeking to rid the country of its arsenal. Obama’s military offensives against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the constitutional issues they raise, are central to Fisher’s discerning analysis. The prospect of a protracted military engagement differentiated the operations against ISIS that commenced in August 2014 from the limited strikes in Libya, for example. The Obama administration justified action on the basis of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. However, the 2001 authorization never contemplated presidential authority against future terrorist organizations, and the 2002 authorization against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was wholly based on the false precept that the Baathist dictator was harboring weapons of mass destruction. In the final analysis, Fisher posits that the Obama administration’s legal and constitutional reasoning fell short, though Congress missed the opportunity to authorize military action that could have provided the president greater legitimacy, if not moral authority, in the battle against ISIS or other rogue regimes. Indeed, military action against ISIS without explicit congressional approval formed the basis for a lawsuit that received scant attention in the media. In essence, Captain Nathan Smith believed his oath to preserve, defend, and protect the Constitution was in direct conflict with military actions the president ordered, which were not authorized by Congress and putatively

Transition From Obama to Trump 7

violated the tenets of the War Powers Resolution adopted in 1973 (operations had exceeded the 60-day period of mandated presidential reporting to Congress). Captain Smith’s case was ultimately dismissed by a federal circuit court on the basis that his litigation represented “political questions” and matters of foreign relations inappropriate for judicial review. Yet, as Fisher notes, “the district court recognized that questions of statutory construction and interpretation are committed to the judiciary” even if it “declined to analyze the War Powers Resolution, the 2001 AUMF, and the 2002 AUMF.” Fisher’s analysis encourages us to reconsider anew and reconnect with the fundamental debates about the war power that first began in the Constitutional Convention in 1787, have continued through controversial judicial decisions such as U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export (1936), and came to a boiling point with passage of the War Powers Resolution as a direct result of the Vietnam War. Despite this history, presidents have scarcely been dissuaded from military interventions with or without congressional authorization in the last five decades, from Grenada and Panama to the First Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq, and now Syria. Fisher’s case study of Obama’s military initiatives suggests dysfunction in the executive and legislative branches that the judiciary is loath to adjudicate as “political matters.” The president took actions against ISIS on the basis of outdated statutes that did not consider future circumstances. Congress could have acted to update the authorizations, but did not, and arguably undermined its own institutional prerogatives. And, consistent with the 44-year legal history of the War Powers Resolution, none of the branches of the national government has much interest in a definitive ruling on the statute’s constitutionality. The debate is unlikely to disappear in the near future, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding Trump’s air strikes against Syria that once again raised, if only briefly at the moment, concerns about the extent of the executive’s unilateral military actions and the constitutional role that Congress should play. In Chapter 5, Shirley Warshaw delves into Obama’s advisory structures and processes for national security policymaking. Her research interests fall within an expanding literature on the “institutional presidency” (Burke 2000) and White House management of cabinet and staff relations as an organizational or management challenge. Highlighting criticisms of Obama as a micromanager, she assesses the competition for control over policymaking between the cabinet and national security staff, particularly the national security advisor. Warshaw underscores the degree to which policymaking in the Obama White House became centralized under National Security Advisor Susan Rice. It was Rice who sought to rein in Defense Secretaries Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel on issues spanning the troop surge in Afghanistan, the Syrian “red line” and potential military intervention, and the closure of the prisoner detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, when these principals had qualms. Gates, Panetta, and Hagel—as well as

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Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—were largely outsiders, often with more “hawkish” views on foreign policy than Obama. The result was a centralization of power under Rice’s watch and a level of micromanagement of cabinet secretaries that grew to new heights in the president’s second term. Of Obama’s four secretaries of defense, only John Kerry had somewhat better rapport with the White House, but micromanagement continued. Warshaw credits Kerry’s personal handling of diplomatic matters at the highest levels, in contrast to his predecessors, for successes such as the Russian-backed accord on Syria’s chemical weapons and the Iran nuclear deal. Warshaw’s chapter offers significant insight into two fundamentally important questions first raised in her book Powersharing: White House–Cabinet Relations in the Modern Presidency (1996), which focused on domestic policy. Have presidents exchanged the policy expertise of cabinet members for short-term political gain by relying on White House staff ? And have presidents structured a process that ensures policy-based analysis capable of reaching objectives as well as maintaining political consistency? For the Obama presidency, the consequences of micromanagement of national security policymaking often led to internal dysfunction, dissension, and resentment. Those were the costs of furthering conformity with the president’s goals. Robert Gates’s memoir Duty: Memoir From a Secretary at War details what one reviewer describes as the “astonishing lack of collegiality” stemming from efforts to review Afghanistan war policy early in the Obama administration, which led to Gates’s “deep distrust of Obama’s staff ” (Ricks 2014). Warshaw contends that cabinet members like Gates were not “equal partners” in policy development, whose expertise the president exchanged for the perspectives of loyal White House staff. Her conclusion is that “the choices that Obama made for his national security cabinet met the tests of cabinet building but failed the test that Obama needed: political loyalty and a firm commitment to his political agenda.” Herein lays the paradox: The cabinet was highly diverse on numerous representational criteria and in policymaking expertise. But it was precisely such diversity that forced the president to rely ultimately on a strong national security advisor to ensure political consistency and alignment with his agenda objectives at the cabinet’s expense. Scholars’ normative prescriptions notwithstanding, modern presidents privilege loyalty and are inclined to rely on White House staff for advice. The risk is a politicization of the policy process that can lead to poor decisions or disastrous results. Finding a balance in what Paul J. Quirk (2014) described as “strategic competence” requires a focus on policy decisions, policy processes, and policy promotion and treating the president’s time as a scarce resource. Presidential advisors should share the president’s broad philosophical outlook, but the president must himself be familiar enough with the substantive policy debates in each major area to recognize the signs of responsible argument. This familiarity

Transition From Obama to Trump 9

includes having enough exposure to the work of policy analysts and experts in each area to know, if in only general terms, how they reach conclusions and the contribution they make. (Quirk 2014, 140) On this basis, Quirk posited that “the president will be able to judge whether an advocate is bringing to bear the relevant kinds of evidence, considerations, and arguments and citing appropriate authorities” (140). Neutral competence and honest brokers are pivotal in the policymaking process.Will the lessons of the Obama administration carry any weight with the Trump administration? The new president obviously cherishes loyalty. Yet his firing of General Michael Flynn for being untruthful after just three weeks in office suggests that he also places a premium on competence. The rough transition period calls into question, perhaps, some staff picks and questions of vetting and certainly has laid bare tensions between competing elements of Trump’s advisory structure.Trump (2017) emphasized early during the transition, in reference to his cabinet picks, on Twitter that “I want them to be themselves and express their own thoughts, not mine!” Whether he comes to appreciate or disregard independent-minded and dispassionate arguments that conflict with his political instincts will reveal much about his White House management style in the next four years. In Chapter 6, Nancy Kassop examines President Obama’s mixed legacy with regard to the prisoner detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and his unsuccessful bid to close it altogether. The 45-square-mile naval station on the southeastern section of the island is per se an anachronism, an odd relic that rekindles an increasingly distant and frightening memory of Cold War hostilities that brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war in 1962 when the 35th president, John F. Kennedy, stared down Nikita Khrushchev over missile installations.The military base’s long borders of fence lines, sentry posts, and armed personnel exercises separate a mainstay of American military power—just 90 miles off the coast of Florida—from a communist dictatorship that surrounds it and with which the United States broke off relations following the 1959 Cuban revolution. The United States restored diplomatic ties with Cuba in 2015, just a year before Fidel Castro died and passed the reins of power to his brother, Raul. But the trajectory of the two nations’ future relations remains uncertain, as evidenced by Trump’s decision to scrap Obama’s liberalization of trade and travel with the island nation. Since 2002, the detention facility on the Guantanamo Bay base has been home to more than 700 suspected terrorists—“unlawful enemy combatants,” as the Bush administration called them—captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere after 9/11. To many observers, the installation is a metaphor for the convolutions of the war on terror: detainees putatively too dangerous to release for their radicalism but caught in legal limbo between international conventions and constitutional questions, and whose fates rest inexorably in

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colliding arguments about whether they should be tried in civilian courts or military tribunals. Kassop asserts that no single factor was responsible for Obama’s failure to close down the facility. Rather, the interplay of strategic decisionmaking on agenda priorities, internal White House discord, the complexities of Supreme Court rulings on prisoner rights, and the timing of domestic and international terrorist events all contributed to the debacle. Particularly perplexing is Obama’s decision not to use his unilateral authority—for which critics lambasted him on other policy fronts—as commander in chief to lock the doors of the detention facility decisively in the early days of his presidency. By hitting the ground running on health care, banking reform, and domestic economic recovery in his first two years, Obama’s attention to Guantanamo was placed on the backburner. Strategic missteps, such as Attorney General Eric Holder’s plans to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in New York City in civilian court and “stealth” plans to relocate Chinese Uighurs to Northern Virginia, provoked a public and congressional backlash that all but precluded forging bipartisan consensus on closing the detention center after the midterm elections of 2010 gave party control to Republicans on Capitol Hill. The public appetite for trying suspected terrorists in the United States and closing the facility further deteriorated against the backdrop of the fear unleashed by terrorist plots domestically, such as the Orlando nightclub and San Bernardino shootings and the mass casualties in Paris, France, over the course of the president’s second term (a list of attacks is provided in Appendix A). Hindsight offers no mechanism to calculate the costs in political capital— or the benefits—had Obama executed an order to terminate the facility in his first 100 days. But the president stated publicly that his failure to act constituted a major regret as he looked back on his leadership in the Oval Office. Instead, he settled for a piecemeal (and not insubstantial) dismantling of the facility, largely through prisoner transfers, whittling the number of detainees to just 41 by the time he left office. No small feat—but even those actions fell under greater scrutiny amid controversies such as the prisoner exchanges that culminated with the release of Bowe Bergdahl and questions about whether the soldier was a deserter, a traitor, or a sufferer of mental illness. In the final analysis, Obama’s legacy regarding Guantanamo Bay hinges on his successor’s national security policies. Not only did Trump deride Obama for prisoner releases in the days before the change of administrations, but he also pledged immediately after the election to fill Guantanamo with “some bad dudes” and keep the detention center operational (Welna 2016). Only time will tell whether Trump’s vow to eradicate ISIS will entail the capture of suspected terrorists abroad—or whether he will opt for the types of drone strikes that proved as effective as they were contentious over the course of Obama’s two terms.

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In Chapter 7, Jordan Cash and Dave Bridge detail and distill, with exceptional acuity, the legal issues surrounding Obama’s controversial decisions to employ unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—to kill suspected terrorist leaders abroad. The president’s use of drones marked both continuity with his predecessor’s policies of seeking to defeat terrorism and a differentiation insofar as the technology does not require boots on the ground. Bringing to bear court rulings on due process and procedural questions that provide some precedent or stare decisis on the constitutionality of drone strikes, Cash and Bridge provide an in-depth assessment of the case of Anwar al-Awlaki.The circumstances of alAwlaki’s targeting are particularly thought-provoking as the imam and al Qaeda leader was born in New Mexico and was a US citizen, yet was deemed an imminent threat to the nation’s security interests at home and abroad. Obama ordered a drone strike in September 2011 in Yemen that killed al-Awlaki; he had been targeted for his acumen in recruiting and motivating radical Islamists on the Internet to undertake acts of terror.Yemen had convicted him in absentia a year earlier for his al Qaeda ties and plots to murder foreigners. The al-Awlaki case raises complex constitutional issues. Paramount among the legal questions is the chain of command for ordering drone strikes. Does the power rest with the president’s authority as commander in chief? As Cash and Bridge trace, drone operations are compound decisionmaking affairs as they typically (theoretically) involve the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Joint Special Operations Command (  JSOC) of the military, and congressional oversight committees. Second, under what conditions should drone strikes occur? Obama centralized the decisionmaking process in the White House while contending that such strikes should take place only when terrorists abroad posed an imminent threat to the United States and capture is infeasible. But ultimately, according to the White House, the president was empowered to take such actions under the auspices of the AUMF passed after the 9/11 attacks, which was aimed at the Taliban in Afghanistan—and which, as noted earlier, did not foresee actions against future terrorist groups and is obsolete in the eyes of critics. Congress did not specifically authorize the president to undertake targeted, lethal operations against terrorists abroad through the use of drones. The presumptive rights of the target to due process under the Fifth and 14th Amendments of the Constitution play a central role in the debate over drone operations. Judicial interpretations link sinuously to the legal history of challenges to the detention of terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Supreme Court weighed the question of indefinite detention. Author of the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, set forth a balancing test that is tangentially relevant to the question of due process and drone strikes: a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification,

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and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. . . . At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hamdi provides an insufficient framework to determine the constitutionality of targeted killings on the battlefield, which are quite different from indefinite detention, but it furnishes some perspective on the judiciary’s general approach. On the one hand, al-Awlaki clearly had an interest in protecting his life and liberty covered under due process and a right to judicial review. On the other hand, the case can be made that the government’s interest in protecting US interests against nonstate acts of terror outweighed his individual rights in a time of military conflict. As Cash and Bridge observe, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), upon which the White House drew to justify targeted killings, seemingly rejects the notion that 14th Amendment rights are violated absent pretrial hearings. The government’s interest in protecting citizens in a time of war may outweigh the potential for “erroneous deprivation of liberty.” But if Hamdi and Mathews suggest that a balancing test is required for drone strikes, how are procedural mechanisms workable? If, as the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the president did not have the authority to set up military tribunals for Guantanamo Bay detainees unilaterally, it remains unclear whether targeted drone strikes require congressional assent and/or some type of jurisprudential review before they are ordered by the president, the CIA, or the military establishment. Moreover, as Bridge and Cash note, “Given Hamdi’s admonition that all three branches are concerned with individual rights in wartime, the executive’s unilateral authority is open to scrutiny.” But structuring procedural checks on unilateral executive action in this regard appears quite challenging. Establishing a review commission, for example, in the midst of battlefield operations against terrorist strongholds is infeasible. There are strong indications that Obama’s legacy on drone strikes will remain the policy of the new Trump administration and may go well beyond it. In February 2017, Trump authorized a drone strike targeting Egyptianborn Abu al-Khayr al-Masri and killed al Qaeda’s second in command in Syria. More poignantly, in March 2017,Trump elucidated at a speech to CIA employees in Langley,Virginia, that he planned to lodge operational authority for future drone strikes in the agency and ramp up their use (Shinkman 2017). Whatever Trump’s plans, the constitutional questions will persist. Will Congress cede another portion of the war power to executive discretion, or will it engage in the earnest debate necessary to authorize such limited military operations against terrorists and restore some institutional balance? Where will US courts, allies, and international public opinion fall on lethal

Transition From Obama to Trump 13

killings in the future? Is ISIS a “state” or nonstate actor, and how might interpretations affect congressional authorizations for the use of force or a formal declaration of war? In Chapter 8, Jeffrey S. Peake takes up the question of Obama’s unilateral actions in regard to the Iran nuclear accord. That accord, with international backing, sought to halt the Iranian regime’s march toward the development of a nuclear weapons program. But it proved highly controversial in Congress and was a focal point of Republican attacks on Obama’s legacy during the 2016 elections. Peake situates Obama’s record of executive unilateralism within a historical frame that better enables us to understand common linkages with his predecessors, such as congressional delegation of authority for international agreements to the president. Yet Obama’s infrequent use of treaties in favor of executive agreements poses a particular puzzle with respect to Peake and his colleague Glen Krutz’s (2009) adroit oeuvre, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitments in a System of Shared Powers. Using an “institutional bargaining” theory framework, they contended that the Senate historically gave presidents a fair hearing on treaties while international agreements furthered efficiency. During the Obama presidency, however, the president submitted a paltry number of treaties, the Senate considered very few that he did, and the president frequently exchanged the greater legitimacy a formal treaty carries in the international arena for unilateral action. In his chapter contribution, Peake asserts that two broad undercurrents buttress the dynamic: Obama’s focus on multilateralism and the heightened polarization in the Senate as he faced six years of divided government and a recalcitrant Republican majority. The case study of the Iran nuclear agreement highlights these larger dynamics and accentuates the implications throughout Obama’s two terms. As with the chapters by Fisher and by Cash and Bridge, Peake’s analysis raises paramount questions of institutional balance and the Founders’ intent. Obama exchanged the potentially greater weight that a treaty ratified by Congress might convey in the international arena for unilateral action due to his political commitment on Iran and other matters. Congress could restore its institutional prerogatives and equilibrium between the branches both by taking the treaty ratification process more seriously— for instance, holding the critical debates on pressing issues—and by reining in grants of broad authority for executive agreements in the future. As Peake maintains, Obama’s bold diplomatic actions . . . pushed the boundary of the president’s unilateral foreign policy powers, [but] they also threaten the delicate balance that worked effectively for much of the 20th century, whereby presidents would complete the vast majority of agreements unilaterally but involve Congress for the most significant and controversial accords.

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If the process is broken, as Peake suggests, will Trump seek to fix it? Trump’s focus, at least rhetorically, has been the withdrawal of the United States from multilateral accords in exchange for bilateral agreements, at least on trade. If the new president pursues this objective, it is unclear whether he would seek to do so unilaterally or in concert with Congress. White House discussions of a comprehensive review of multilateral agreements raise the pivotal question of presidential-congressional equipoise in foreign policymaking, which may take center stage in the years to come. Regardless, Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the Paris climate agreement in May 2017 underscores the vulnerability of Obama’s legacy absent congressional approval of a treaty, which is far more difficult to undo than an executive agreement. In Chapter 9, Leann Brown reviews US–Russian relations during the Obama presidency. Her insightful analysis is particularly timely against the backdrop of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 election and recriminations of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russian officials or operatives, if not Vladimir Putin himself. As calls for investigations into the matter have grown louder in Congress in 2017, looking back to changes and challenges in the US–Russia relationship over the course of Obama’s two terms is essential for an understanding of the contemporary setting. Of particular import in Brown’s analysis is the marked deterioration in US–Russian collaboration in Obama’s second term, which belies the substantial cooperation on a range of matters in his first term. Indeed, areas of cooperation from 2009 to 2012, when Dmitry Medvedev was president of Russia, have received less attention than they merit. US–Russian mutual interests and the collaboration that resulted contradict media attention to the optics and symbolism of Hillary Clinton’s flubbed “reset” machine handed to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in March 2009 (which incorrectly translated the word in Russian). Prominent was the establishment of a bilateral commission that oversaw matters ranging from nuclear weapons to anti-terrorism cooperation and joint military efforts in Afghanistan to thwart that country’s drug trade. The high points in what appeared to be a “reset” in relations included the signing of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010, Russian backing of UN economic sanctions against Iran in 2012, and Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization that same year. It is no coincidence that Putin’s return to the Kremlin for an historic third term as president of Russia in May 2012 foreshadowed a solemn turning point in bilateral relations.Was there writing on the wall? In 2005, Putin had described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (NBC News 2005). Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential candidate against Obama in 2012, seemed to recognize something that others, including the president, did not perceive when he called Russia the United States’ “number-one geopolitical foe” (Willis 2012). The idea of a new Cold War between the nations appeared incredulous to

Transition From Obama to Trump 15

Obama, who mocked Romney’s alleged gaffe by suggesting that “the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back, because the Cold War’s been over for 20 years” (quoted in Economist 2016). Romney’s putative foresight notwithstanding, Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 accents that the Russian president “overturned in a single stroke the assumptions on which the post–Cold War European order had rested” (Treisman 2016). Whether his decision to take the territory by force was the product of concerns over NATO expansion, a new “imperialism” to recapture the republics of the old Soviet Union, or an improvisation after the sudden fall of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych remains an open question. Combined with Russian meddling in eastern Ukraine, attempts to mitigate sanctions against Iran, and most poignantly support for the Assad regime in Syria, bilateral relations reached a nadir by the end of Obama’s second term. Putin’s human rights policies and the case of Edward Snowden, who leaked national security documents and then was granted temporary asylum in Russia, only added salt to these wounds. The future of US–Russian relations in the new Trump administration remains as uncertain as it is complex. Trump’s vocal admiration for Putin in the 2016 election cycle flummoxed journalists and political analysts and angered his political opponents, who suggest a common appreciation of authoritarianism. The two leaders’ outward veneration for one another is enigmatic. On the other hand, Trump’s air strike on a Syrian air base in April 2017, alongside other military operations in the region, and Russia’s provocative incursions in US airspace and near naval ships abroad has deepened concerns about a new Cold War. Trump has said it would “be nice” if he could get along with Putin (Mangan 2017). But the larger question is whether any US president can find the locus of greater cooperation with a leader who does not share democratic ideals, does not value human rights, and whose military and political ambitions are troublesome based on past behavior and unknown future geopolitical gambits. It is no wonder that in April 2017, at a meeting with Putin and Lavrov, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson described US–Russian relations as having plunged to a “low level,” and President Trump said,“Right now we’re not getting along with Russia at all” (quoted in Sampathkumar 2017). Tillerson’s comment that “two foremost nuclear powers cannot have this kind of relationship” is a particularly chilling, if apt, admonition. The final chapter in the volume, by Richard S. Conley, details the role of national security policy in the 2016 presidential election. The electoral contest between Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton and Republican nominee Donald Trump was as negative and personal as any race since the showdown between George H.W. Bush and Michael Dukakis in 1988. But if domestic issues were dominant in the Bush–Dukakis battle, foreign affairs were more prominent in the 2016 match. Framing the election as a successor campaign for Clinton, Conley suggests that the former secretary of state was placed in the position of having to

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defend the Obama-era foreign policy legacy and her prominent role as the nation’s top diplomat from 2009 to 2012. Trump had no record on which to campaign and indefatigably constructed a narrative of alleged failures of presidential leadership to which he connected Clinton, whether she was secretary of state at the time or not. The issues were multiple: the Russian “reset” fiasco, the Syrian “red line,” the Benghazi consulate attack, the Iranian nuclear deal, and the rise of ISIS as a putative result of the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. Trump doggedly reproached Clinton, and President Obama, for their failure to use the term “radical Islamic terrorists” in rhetoric that suggested Islam was at war against the West as a result of a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996). Ultimately, Clinton’s surprise defeat at the polls in November 2016 may have had as much to do with timing as self-inflicted wounds surrounding the email server scandal and the machinations of Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Director James Comey. Although she had left her position as secretary of state in Obama’s second term, voter angst about national security matters increased significantly as the election approached—and Trump’s recriminations, right or wrong, capitalized on growing disapproval of Obama’s handling of foreign policy generally and terrorism specifically, according to polling data. There is every reason to believe that national security matters will play a central role in the 2020 presidential race. Notwithstanding the eventual dénouement of already protracted investigations into the Trump campaign’s alleged collusion with Russia in 2016, the outcome depends not only on Democrats’ candidate choice but also on whether and how President Trump can match his 2016 campaign rhetoric to a record of success. Will ISIS be defeated, Iraq steadied, Iran’s nuclear program blocked, relations with Russia restored, and homegrown terror plots thwarted through policies like immigration bans? And what of North Korean tyrant Kim Jong-Un’s relentless pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missile technology that threatens stability in Asia and poses a potentially direct threat to the United States? By August 2017,Trump took an increasingly aggressive rhetorical stance against the North Korean regime’s continued missile tests. Most analysts, military and academic, suggest any war on the Korean peninsula would be catastrophic. Such challenges present a tall order for any chief executive. However Trump attempts to meet them will indubitably aggravate Democrats and perhaps some in his own party, leaving Trump’s immediate legacy to be decided by voters less than four years from now—and perhaps casting light on the longer-term impacts of his predecessor’s approach to international affairs. *****

History has recorded the people, polemics, events, and endeavors that have marked the Obama presidency in national security. Our collective hope is

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that this volume provides a judicious first step to begin interpreting where the nation’s 44th president falls among his predecessors in the modern era broadly, and in the post-9/11 era specifically, and provides a context for Trump’s transition. If the present book raises more questions than the contributions answer, all is as it should be. We hope that the substantive issues discussed in the original analyses will provide groundwork for future scholarship and civic debate that take on the challenges of assessing the imprint that Obama left on international as well as domestic affairs, not to mention the constitutional order.

References Burke, John P. 2000. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House From FDR to Clinton. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Economist. 2016. “The Threat From Russia.” October 22. www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21709028-how-contain-vladimir-putins-deadly-dysfunctional-empirethreat-russia Edwards, George C. 2006. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gates, Robert. 2014. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York: Random House. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Krutz, Glen S., and Jeffrey S. Peake. 2009. Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitments in a System of Shared Powers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Mangan, Dan. 2017. “President Donald Trump Says Getting Along with Russia Is ‘Not Terrible, It’s Good’.” CNBC.com, February 16. www.cnbc.com/2017/02/16/presi dent-donald-trump-says-getting-along-with-russia-is-a-good-thing.html NBC News. 2005. “Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy’.” April 25. www.nbc news.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#. WY8r1FGGOyI Neustadt, Richard E. 1991. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents:The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Simon and Schuster. Panagopoulos, Costas. 2012. “Ex-Presidential Approval: Retrospective Evaluations of Presidential Performance.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42: 719–29. Quirk, Paul J. 2014. “Presidential Competence.” In The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Ricks, Thomas E. 2014. “In Command.” New York Times, January 13. www.nytimes. com/2014/01/19/books/review/duty-a-memoir-by-robert-m-gates.html Sampathkumar, Mythili. 2017. “Donald Trump and Rex Tillerson Warn US-Russia Relations Are ‘At a Low Point’ After Tense Talks in Moscow.” The Independent, April 12. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/syria-crisis-chemical-attack-sergeylavrov-rex-tillerson-sabotage-relationship-a7681091.html Shinkman, Paul D. 2017. “Report: Trump Gives CIA Authority for Drone Strikes.” U.S. News & World Report, March 14. www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-03-14/ report-trump-gives-cia-authority-for-drone-strikes Skowronek, Stephen. 2011. Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal. 2nd Edition. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas.

18  Chapter 1 Treisman, Daniel. 2016. “Why Putin Took Crimea.” Foreign Affairs, May/June. www.foreign affairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-crimea Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump]. 2017. All of my Cabinet nominees are looking good and doing a great job. I want them to be themselves and express their own thoughts, not mine! [Tweet]. January 13. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/ 819858926455967744?lang=en Warshaw, Shirley Anne. 1996. Powersharing: White House–Cabinet Relations in the Modern Presidency. Albany: State University of New York Press. Welna, David. 2016. “Trump Has Vowed to Fill Guantanamo With ‘Some Bad Dudes’ — But Who?” National Public Radio Online, November 14. www.npr.org/sections/par allels/2016/11/14/502007304/trump-has-vowed-to-fill-guantanamo-with-somebad-dudes-but-who Willis, Amy. 2012. “Mitt Romney: Russia Is America’s ‘Number One Geopolitical Foe’.” The Telegraph, March 27. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-election/ 9168533/Mitt-Romney-Russia-is-Americas-number-one-geopolitical-foe.html

2 Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security Cigdem V. Sirin and José D.Villalobos

President Barack Obama ran his 2008 campaign with the slogan of “hope and change.” From a rhetorical perspective, that emotive campaign slogan signified from the get-go a presidential discourse that would be situated in positive emotive appeals for wielding the bully pulpit. In his address to a joint session of Congress on February 24, 2009, Obama painted an optimistic, hopeful picture of the future—one that Americans could strive for without being fearful: If we confront without fear the challenges of our time and summon that enduring spirit of an America that does not quit, then someday years from now our children can tell their children that this was the time when we performed. Although he inherited two wars from the previous administration, Obama’s key national security strategy subsequently centered on diplomacy (Bentley and Holland 2016). His conciliatory, positive foreign policy discourse was a natural match for his foreign policy goals. Obama adopted such rhetoric to publicly justify various national security decisions, such as ending major combat in Iraq, opening up diplomatic relations with Cuba, and striking the Iran nuclear deal. Obama’s positive-valence discourse and subsequent diplomatic-heavy approach was quite a notable departure from his predecessor, President George W. Bush, who also often employed emotive public appeals but with mostly negative triggers. Though he had initially campaigned with a “compassionate conservatism” underlying key domestic policy goals and even a pledge to avoid nation building, Bush’s rhetoric and policy agenda shifted dramatically toward a negative-valence discourse once he had to respond to the biggest-ever terrorist attack on US soil, on September 11, 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the unprecedented 9/11 attacks, the public psyche of the United States became filled with anger and anxiety (Huddy et al. 2003). Bush’s national security discourse subsequently fed into this public state of mind to rally support for the risky and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to justify homeland security provisions—particularly the

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PATRIOT Act—that contained significant security/liberty trade-offs (Davis 2006; Huddy and Feldman 2011). Eventually, Bush’s two terms in office as a war president resulted in an increasingly war-weary public, which paved the way for the positive-valence, diplomacy-based rhetoric of Obama. However, eight years later, the pendulum of the public mood swung once again. Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, adopted a striking negative-valence demagogic rhetorical approach that fed anew into public fears in the face of a major revival of terrorism threats with ISIS gaining significant ground in the Middle East, a refugee crisis emerging from civil war in Syria, and a wave of xenophobia and antiimmigrant sentiments arising in the Western world amid public perceptions centered on security-based, cultural, and economic threats (Inglehart and Norris, forthcoming). In this chapter, we first review the general literature on the public presidency as well as the more nuanced ties between the presidency and emotive rhetorical public appeals. We then discuss Obama’s rhetorical style with illustrative examples from some of his key speeches, analyzing the major dynamics behind Obama’s decisionmaking strategies in dealing with matters of national security. We review some key models of decisionmaking, mainly rational choice and prospect theory, and evaluate which decisionmaking model is more consistent with Obama’s rhetorical style. We also compare and contrast Obama’s style with his predecessor’s and successor’s. Last, we consider some future challenges to Obama’s legacy and, more generally, the rhetorical presidency. For instance, we address how new social media outlets such as Twitter affect the dissemination of presidential public appeals and whether such new venues may be helpful or detrimental for advancing presidents’ foreign policy agendas.

The Public Presidency: Strategies and Challenges Presidents often employ speeches to help increase public awareness of and interest in key issues (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Cohen 1995, 2010). In doing so, presidents seek the public’s support as a means to leverage influence over their key policy and political goals and to bolster their overall popularity (Ragsdale 1984). Presidential rhetoric can thereby influence which issues become a topic of public discourse (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Cohen 1995; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; see also Canes-Wrone 2001). The ability of a president to further influence the policy process largely depends on having enough public support for taking policy action, including in foreign affairs. Public support endows presidents with a political resource, a degree of justification for pursuing a presidential agenda in Congress, achieving reelection, and leaving behind a favorable legacy (Neustadt 1990; Brody 1991). Conversely, presidents who lack (or lose) public support are subject to frustration and vulnerability at the hands of their political opponents (Edwards 2003; Sigelman and Sigelman 1981). Not surprisingly, presidents dating back to

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Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson have increasingly sought ways to wield the bully pulpit (Ceaser et al. 1981; Kernell 1986). Obama was no exception to this trend, operating on the premise that he could achieve major policy changes by employing an extensive public leadership strategy (Edwards 2012). Modern presidents have, above all other governing approaches, endeavored to lead the public by relying on public appeals to advance their policy agendas, a strategy known as the “going public” model (Brace and Hinckley 1993). In his seminal work, Kernell (1986) describes this model as a strategy wherein presidents forgo executive-legislative bargaining to seek support for their policy proposals directly from the public, hoping to place pressure on legislators to pass their initiatives into law. Contrary to pluralist theories emphasizing the president’s need to bargain with legislators and other Washingtonians (Neustadt 1990), the “going public” model asserts the potential to effectively displace bargaining when practiced in a dedicated manner (Kernell 1986). Despite its intuitive appeal, the strategy of going public can be detrimental to the policymaking process because it often leads presidents to take less flexible policy positions, replaces substantive exchanges with symbolic rhetoric, leaves limited options for legislators to modify their policy positions or have an opportunity for policy input, and offers no explicit reward for legislative compliance, especially if the president publicly claims all credit when things go smoothly and tries to put the blame on legislators for unfavorable outcomes. Nevertheless, presidents have an incentive to go public given the gridlock often experienced when bargaining with legislators, particularly under a divided government and during an increasingly polarized political era. Like many presidents before him, Obama employed a “going public” approach in order to get Democrats and moderate congressional Republicans to help move his major agenda items through the legislative arena (Edwards 2012). Despite some successes, Obama’s approach proved too ambitious and polarizing, leading to major electoral defeat, or a “shellacking,” by Obama’s own admission (“Press Conference by the President” 2010), for Democrats in the 2010 midterm elections.Thereafter, Obama had to operate under a divided government and blatantly partisan atmosphere, which proved at times crippling for moving any legislation through Congress. Although he generally maintained moderate to high public support, did not experience extremely low approval ratings during his two terms, and finished with an approval rating of 59 percent (Gallup 2017), it was not surprising that whenever Obama lacked enough congressional support for key initiatives, he would be left to rely on executive orders and ancillary public appeals to justify his national security moves. Other conditions in the political environment, such as the rising influence of caucuses, working groups, political action committees, and policy entrepreneurs in Congress, have also served as incentives for presidents to

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increasingly go public over the last few decades (Kernell 1986). However, despite these developments, some scholars have seriously questioned the merits of going public, pointing out that the strategy rarely succeeds, is prone to backfiring, and is actually “antithetical” and “anti-deliberative” to governing (Edwards 2003, 2012). Perhaps the most difficult challenge a political leader faces in leading the public is overcoming existing public predispositions, as individuals tend to ignore or reject arguments that contradict their long-held personal preferences (Page and Shapiro 1985; Edwards 2003, 218). Historically, a change in predispositions across a wide cadre of the electorate has been a rare event. When such attitudinal change does occur, it is more often the result of an exogenous shock (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks) than a product of a president’s rhetorical overtures. Case in point: following the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush experienced an unprecedented rally-around-the-flag boost that helped him justify his decisions to initiate the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of Obama, he was able to end the war in Iraq because the public had become very war-weary by the time he entered the White House. In a way, Obama found himself dealing with an exogenous aftershock of sorts once the public became more cognizant of the high number of casualties and costs in getting bogged down in Iraq. Nevertheless, some of Obama’s major policies, such as the Iran nuclear deal, were not very popular due to strong preexisting negative attitudes. Despite historical evidence that presidential efforts to go public rarely succeed (Edwards 2003; Han and Heith 2005), previous setbacks have not dissuaded succeeding presidents from believing in the power of the bully pulpit. Outside of the academic community, few have questioned the merits of a “going public” strategy. Interviews with presidents, their advisors, political experts, and other staff suggest a continuing mainstream view that the use of presidential public appeals to move opinion represents an effective governing strategy (e.g., Edwards 2003; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). In fact, presidents often perceive their failures in moving opinion as more a problem of communication than of flawed strategy or ill-advised policy. Regardless of how often they fail or how they perceive their failures, presidents have limited alternatives to going public. For instance, coalition building in Congress is a complex and difficult endeavor given the marginal ability presidents have for persuading legislators to support their policy agendas in what has become an increasingly partisan and polarized political environment (Edwards 2000). Indeed, presidents have little bargaining capacity within the constitutional construct and are unlikely to be able to bargain with legislators when lacking public support, which is particularly crucial when a president has no cohesive majorities in Congress (Edwards 1989; Kernell 1986). As mentioned, when Obama and other presidents found themselves trapped in congressional opposition, they often turned to

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public support as a means to break through congressional gridlock. Amid these circumstances, it is not surprising that presidential trends in going public have increased, rather than decreased, over time. Given the paradox between the rising trend in presidents going public and the general dearth of success observed historically, subsequent scholarship has shifted away from measuring direct presidential influence on public opinion and instead placed its focus on exploring when presidents are most likely to succeed in going public and how presidents might employ their public leadership opportunities in a more strategic sense. For instance, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) posited that presidents can use information taken from public opinion polling to strategically frame their public appeals in a way that may manipulate the public into supporting their policy and political goals while concurrently portraying themselves as attentive and responsive to public preferences. Nevertheless, they note that manipulating opinion is difficult, citing as a major example the failures of the Clinton administration in attempting to pass its major health care initiative. Canes-Wrone (2001) has argued that presidents should be strategic in addressing issues that are already salient and popular among the general public. Examining nationally televised presidential addresses concerning domestic spending proposals for federal agencies, she found systematic evidence that presidents can strategically employ public appeals. Although she cautioned that such findings are not intended to suggest that “a president can achieve any policy goal by appealing to the public about it” (326), her study provided a vital empirical account of how presidents can use existing public support to their advantage. Barrett (2004) produced additional empirical evidence suggesting that presidential appeals can have a direct, positive influence on public support for presidential initiatives. Employing a content analysis of presidential remarks from 1977 to 1992, Barrett developed a data set covering 186 legislative proposals and found that the more often presidents addressed an issue through public statements, the higher their likelihood of policy success in Congress was. Along similar lines, Rottinghaus (2009) argued that presidents can best increase their prospects for influencing the public through their messages by relying on nationally televised addresses to propose their initiatives and avoiding as much as possible televised interactions with the media. He concluded that by focusing on strategic communication tactics, presidents can, if moderately, lead public opinion. Despite these many advances in knowledge, one area of research that merits further investigation concerns the role that emotions play in presidential rhetoric and how presidents are strategic in their employment of emotional stimuli when making public appeals. Although a number of key works have investigated the role emotions play in political rhetoric, such studies have been largely relegated to the fields of political communications and psychology, and few have focused specifically on the US presidency.

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Rhetorical Presidency and the Use of Emotive Public Appeals Presidents strive to convey messages that help set the agenda, signal policy preferences, and, among other things, strike an emotional chord with the public.Therefore, presidents often invoke motivational cues in their attempts to influence citizen responses and behavior (Bucy and Newhagen 1999). Although emotional content is frequently on display in presidential messages, relatively few works have considered the role that emotion plays in presidential communication (but see de Castella and McGarty 2011; Loseke 2009;Villalobos and Sirin 2017). Initial, general conceptualizations of emotion portray it as falling along a single bipolar dimension that runs from pleasant to unpleasant (valence) and gains intensity (arousal) as one shifts from the center toward the poles (Brader 2006; see, e.g., Ferguson and Wee 2000; Zajonc 1998). However, some scholars prefer a two-dimensional valence model that conceptualizes emotions as positive and negative (Huddy et al. 2007; see, e.g., Tellegan et al. 1999; Watson and Clark 1992). According to the latter model, positive emotions are associated with the approach system motivating one to achieve positive outcomes for pleasure and reward, whereas negative emotions are linked to the avoidance system activated to elude negative outcomes in order to protect against pain and harm (e.g., Cacioppo et al. 1999; Watson et al. 1999). In comparison to valence-based approaches, emotion-specific approaches propose that different emotions sharing the same valence (such as anger and fear) may nevertheless have dissimilar (or even opposite) effects on decisionmaking processes and outcomes (see, e.g., Bodenhausen et al. 1994; DeSteno et al. 2000; Huddy et al. 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2000). To elaborate, although fear and anger are both negative emotions, fear is linked to appraisals of uncertainty and lack of control, whereas anger is associated with appraisals of certainty about the source of a threat and feelings of personal control over the situation (Huddy et al. 2003; Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Such distinct appraisal tendencies associated with different emotions are also connected to variations in information acquisition patterns and cognitive processing, as well as assessments of risk. Specifically, several studies find that anxiety and fear are likely to raise one’s level of cognitive effort, vigilance, and perceived risks, whereas higher levels of anger tend to trigger more superficial information searches, heuristic-based cognitive processing, and lower risk assessments (Bodenhausen et al. 1994; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Lerner et al. 2003; Marcus et al. 2000; Mackuen et al. 2010;Valentino et al. 2008). Regarding policy preferences, studies show that anger increases people’s support for retaliatory and aggressive policy responses (Huddy et al. 2007; Sadler et al. 2005; Skitka et al. 2006). Anger is also more closely associated with a reluctance to consider alternatives, an unwillingness to engage in diplomacy and negotiation, and the rejection of compromise in dealing

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with political conflicts (Sabucedo et al. 2011; Mackuen et al. 2010). If anger is likely to increase support for aggressive policies and decrease risks associated with such policy options, a president who plans to resort to the use of force to deal with a conflict situation may strategically seek to invoke feelings of anger among citizens to garner public approval. In our own most recent study, we found that members of the public are highly sensitive to the risks of military interventions abroad but nevertheless quite susceptible to emotion-inducing presidential appeals that are crafted to trigger anger to heighten public support for a military intervention (Villalobos and Sirin 2017). As such, emotive stimuli can serve as an influential rhetorical tool when it comes to public appeals for military action. However, increased support cannot always guarantee facilitation of a president’s foreign policy agenda. Such opinion movement likely matters most in cases where presidents stand in a strategically advantageous position to take military action and can thus use the increase in support—if only symbolically— to help justify and facilitate their decisions to do so. As Edwards (2009, 2012) pointed out, the strategic positioning of the president greatly matters and often determines at the outset whether a president even has the opportunity to affect the output of government, leaving the president’s persuasive skills over the public and key political actors as more of a secondary, supplemental— and often limited—tool for moving the policy agenda forward. In other words, rather than employing public appeals with the specific intent to create opportunities for their preferred policies, presidents are better off using their appeals strategically—mainly by exploiting existing opportunities—to help facilitate policy changes where possible within the context of the American political system and the specific political environment in which they find themselves (Edwards 2003, 2009). It is especially in cases where public opinion already lies in the president’s favor and is malleable for generating further support that presidents can take advantage of such circumstances to help justify and facilitate their goals (Edwards 2015; see also Canes-Wrone 2001). Moreover, when presidents are able to make public appeals amid fewer countervailing agents or opposing messages (e.g., such as during a foreign policy crisis, where the narrative provides more of an “us vs. them” rather than “left vs. right” mentality), such conditions may help bolster a president’s ability to garner additional public support (Rottinghaus 2009, 2010; see also Zaller 1994). Nowhere is this more so than in the foreign policy realm, where the degree of public and congressional deference to the president’s policy agenda is greater than in the domestic arena (Peake 2001; Peterson 1994; see also Holsti 1996). Of course, an increase in public support may not reach or surpass a desired threshold (e.g., majority opinion), and even if it does, it may not be enough to help the president take action, especially if the president is relying on a polarized, gridlocked Congress to endorse a policy, much less provide any “potential for conversion” (Edwards 2009, 186). Too often, presidents have fallen to the temptation of overreach by overestimating their ability to create,

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rather than facilitate, opportunities while downplaying the limitations they face in attempting to push policy changes through Congress, particularly under divided government (Edwards 2009, 2012). Consider, for instance, Obama’s public message concerning Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s possible use of chemical weapons against civilians. Obama initially determined that such action was a “red line” not to be crossed. In fact, Obama attempted several times to convince the US public about the need to take action in Syria, given the ongoing violence that has left thousands of civilians suffering or killed at the hands of their own government. Although public support for such action somewhat increased, it never reached a threshold high enough to initiate US involvement, even after intelligence reports confirmed the use of chemical weapons on civilians by the Assad regime—the “red line” Obama had previously laid out (Dugan 2013). Instead, it was only after ISIS’s presence in Syria was perceived as a more serious, direct threat to US national security that public—and congressional— support for military action rose more notably. Yet even then, the US public remained generally unwilling to support any action beyond conducting air strikes in the region while not directly targeting Assad’s government forces (“Support for U.S. Campaign Against ISIS” 2014). This is just one of the many instances where emotion-inducing presidential appeals do not always engender strong enough public support to help facilitate policy action (Villalobos and Sirin 2017). Such legislative stumbling blocks can sometimes be circumvented, however. Historically, when situated strategically (e.g., with support from key allies abroad and at least the support of their political base at home, among other factors), presidents have from time to time acted unilaterally in overseas interventions with limited interference from Congress (Fisher 2000; see also Howell 2003; Mayer 2001; Warber 2006). Nevertheless, presidents risk losing political capital and public confidence if they act unilaterally without broad public support or at the least the perception of effective opinion leadership. Such was the case with Obama when he engaged in a partisan and institutional debate with Congress over what to do about Libya, as well as the ensuing crisis and controversy over the administration’s handling of the 2012 Benghazi attack.

Presidential Decisionmaking and Information Processing Models As the leader of the free world, the president of the United States is expected to be a rational decisionmaker. Rational choice models typically require that choices conform to the norms of transitivity, invariance, and dominance. Transitivity means that if a person prefers A to B, and B to C, they must also prefer A to C. Dominance requires that a person must prefer an option

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that is superior to another option on the relevant characteristics. And invariance demands that the person holds the same substantive preference regardless of the order, method, or form of presentation of the various options. (McDermott 2004, 52) Rational decisionmakers are also expected to engage in an extensive search for information, weigh all the key options, and reach a decision that would maximize benefits and minimize costs. Such high-level decisionmaking is thought to be vital for a person who holds the nuclear codes and thus, essentially, the fate of humanity.Yet, although it is understandable to expect presidents to be rational, is this expectation realistic? As critiques of rational choice models point out, human beings actually have bounded rationality (Simon 1982). One’s cognitive capacity is bounded by personality traits, intellectual ability, perceptions and misperceptions, affective factors such as stress, and time limitations (  Jervis 2017; Levy 2013). Presidents are not immune to such limitations and may in fact be more vulnerable to them. Amid such cognitive and affective limitations, along with the ever-changing political environment, the aforementioned key principles of rational choice—transitivity, dominance, and invariance—may not always hold. A leading decisionmaking model that effectively challenges the key principles of rational choice is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which asserts that transitivity, dominance, and invariance may be negated by positive versus negative framing of choices. Even when two choices are mathematically equivalent (e.g., choosing option A would save 2,000 people and choosing option B would result in losing 4,000 people, to counter a threat expected to kill 6,000 people), decisionmakers and their risk tendencies may be influenced by such framing effects. According to the main tenets of prospect theory, people are more risk-averse in the domain of gains and more risk-taking in the domain of losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory can shed some light on presidential decisionmaking and the ensuing presidential discourse to justify such decisions. The 9/11 terror attacks moved US foreign policy to a domain of losses. Bush’s public discourse reflected such a shift. His decision to engage in not one but two costly wars overseas was highly risky yet consistent with the predictions of prospect theory. While there were strong voices of opposition (especially regarding the Iraq War), the majority of the public rallied behind the president. The dominant emotional states of the public were anger, fear, and anxiety; as many political psychologists would predict, anger and heightened threat perceptions further contributed to public support for the riskier, costly militaristic policy options to fight the war on terror while fear and anxiety allowed for defensive homeland security measures and antiterrorism policies (such as increased surveillance, identity checks, and racial profiling) within US borders (e.g., Davis and Silver 2004).

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In his first official State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, Bush acknowledged the costs of war, but the rally-around-the-flag effect in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack had already given him a blank check: It costs a lot to fight this war.We have spent more than a billion dollars a month, over $30 million a day, and we must be prepared for future operations. . . . My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades, because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay. The war in Afghanistan already proved to be a complex one, with continued fights against an irregular army of insurgents and rough terrains. To justify yet another war would not be an easy task. So, Bush continued to pursue a negative-valence rhetoric filled with threat- and anger-inducing triggers. In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, Bush made the following remarks: Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses, and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes. He further emphasized his justification for a preventive (not even preemptive) strike: Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option. As military casualties accumulated, the US foreign policy realm encroached further into the domain of losses. Bush continued pursuing his policy agenda with negative-valence public appeals to justify homeland security provisions that contained significant civil rights intrusions. For instance, in the last State of the Union address of his first term, on January 20, 2004, President Bush noted, “Key provisions of the PATRIOT Act are set to expire next year. The terrorist threat will not expire on that schedule. Our law enforcement needs this vital legislation to protect our citizens. You need to renew the PATRIOT Act.”

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When Obama took office, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were still ongoing, with casualties piling up. There was also the 2008 recession, during which the United States was hit hard by the collapse of the housing market and the stock market. Obama himself depicted the episode as “the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression” in a presidential debate against John McCain (Goldman 2008). So the United States was deep in the domain of losses. Obama wanted to bring the public back to the domain of gains.To do so, he generally conveyed a positive-valence, diplomacy-based rhetoric throughout his presidency. Of course, his hand was forced by global threats such as ISIS, the situation in Libya, and a humanitarian crisis in Syria that at times swayed him toward military action rather than diplomatic options. Even then, Obama often chose to rely on risk-averse military methods such as drone strikes rather than ground troops. Obama’s public messages about matters of national security often remained clear of negative triggers that would induce fear and anger, and instead they strived to induce positive affect, such as empathy, enthusiasm, and hope. For instance, in his inaugural address to the nation on January 20, 2009, Obama stated, “On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord.” He then made sure to emphasize his foreign policy direction: We can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat and roll back the specter of a warming planet. . . . To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward based on mutual interest and mutual respect. Before the end of Obama’s first year in office, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that he was the recipient of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, noting his efforts to strengthen international, multilateral diplomacy based on respect for international institutions, his promotion of nuclear nonproliferation, democracy, and human rights, and his constructive role in meeting climatic challenges. In his acceptance speech, Obama acknowledged the controversy this prize created, as he was only at the beginning of his term in office and he was the commander in chief of the US military in the midst of two wars. That said, he reiterated his policy of mutual interest and mutual respect in the international arena. But Obama also noted that “the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace” and that “force can be justified on humanitarian grounds,” a rhetoric that he would later employ to publicly legitimize his not-so-popular decision to join the NATO-led multilateral intervention in Libya in March 2011 (Obama 2009).

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On August 31, 2010, Obama delivered a presidential address on a key campaign promise by declaring an end to “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” which denoted the official end of the US combat mission in Iraq. Obama noted that a transitional force of US troops would remain in Iraq but only to serve in an “advise and assist” role to aid Iraqi forces. Some circles considered the fact that not all troops would be coming home as going back on his campaign promise. Others criticized the decision as premature, suggesting that Iraq was not ready to be left alone, and later tied this decision to the rise of ISIS in the region. But public support for this policy decision was very high (Newport 2011). The war would officially end on December 15, 2011, with all remaining American troops withdrawing by the end of that year. Obama also delivered on his promise to promote nuclear nonproliferation by signing the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, and requires both countries to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads by February 2018 to no more than 1,550, the lowest level in decades (Landay and Rohde 2017). It also limits deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, as well as deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Republicans in the Senate stalled the ratification of the treaty for some time; however, the majority of Americans showed support for the accord (Newport 2010). Eventually, the Senate gave its final approval despite a highly contentious partisan quarrel following the 2010 midterm elections, which changed the dynamics in Congress as Republicans took control of the House and narrowed the Democrats’ lead in the Senate. The New START Treaty stands as one of Obama’s most tangible foreign policy accomplishments (Baker 2010). Without doubt, however, Obama’s most sensational national security victory in his first term was the killing of Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks as the leader of al Qaeda, on May 2, 2011. However, the Benghazi attack on September 11, 2012, which claimed the lives of the US ambassador and three other Americans, drew heavy criticism toward Obama (and the State Department under Secretary Hillary Clinton) only weeks before the 2012 presidential elections. Despite this foreign policy controversy, Obama was able to secure a second term in the White House. With the major national security accomplishments of his first term at hand, Obama drew a picture of the United States positioned in the domain of gains in the inaugural address of his second term on January 21, 2013: This generation of Americans has been tested by crises that steeled our resolve and proved our resilience. A decade of war is now ending. An

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economic recovery has begun. America’s possibilities are limitless, for we possess all the qualities that this world without boundaries demands: youth and drive; diversity and openness; an endless capacity for risk and a gift for reinvention. My fellow Americans, we are made for this moment and we will seize it—so long as we seize it together. In his second term, Obama faced serious international crises, including Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea and military incursions into Ukraine in 2014, the worsening of the civil war in Syria and ensuing refugee crisis, and ISIS gaining ground in Iraq and Syria. Shortly after ISIS released videos showing the beheadings of US journalists in August 2014, Obama’s approval ratings dipped to 38 percent (  Jones 2017). This drop in approval ratings, coupled with a series of international crises, might have moved Obama closer to the domain of losses and contributed to increasing the intensity of air strikes against ISIS. Right before the end of his second term, Obama was able to deliver one other campaign promise in September 2016 by formally joining the Paris climate agreement—the world’s first comprehensive climate agreement— which constitutes the most important step in combating climate change. Obama announced this key move to the public once again in a positivevalence frame (“Remarks by the President on the Paris Agreement” 2016): That’s our most important mission, to make sure our kids and our grandkids have at least as beautiful a planet, and hopefully more beautiful, than the one that we have. And today, I’m a little more confident that we can get the job done. Obama’s rhetorical strategy of positive frames embedded in the domain of gains is much different than his successor, Donald J. Trump, who chose to depict the state of the Union in his inaugural speech on January 20, 2017, as “American carnage,” clearly the opposite of the “American dream” Obama often accredited for his fortunes. Specifically, Trump argued that for too many of our citizens, a different reality exists: mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities; rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation; an education system, flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of all knowledge; and the crime and the gangs and the drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized potential. This American carnage stops right here and stops right now. With this rhetorical rift in mind, in the next section, we will review future challenges to Obama’s foreign policy legacy.

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Conclusion Presidents have long been using rhetorical strategies to convey their messages to the public with the goals of justifying their decisions, rallying support, and building their legacy. In prospect theory terminology, Obama chose a domain of gains to frame his public messages, which was consistent with his diplomacy-based foreign policy approach. Obama’s approach was a significant departure from his predecessor, Bush, who depended highly on a negative-valence discourse once the 9/11 attacks thrust him and the nation into fighting the war on terror, eventually leaving the public warweary and wary. Obama’s successor, Trump, has since entered the picture with a striking negative-valence demagogic rhetorical approach for campaigning and governing that has fed anew into public fears in the face of a major revival of terrorism threats. How Obama’s legacy will ultimately fare depends greatly on for how long and to what extent Trump will be able roll back Obama’s key foreign policies and undo Obama’s diplomatic understandings with other nations as he resets the political landscape against a backdrop of newwave American exceptionalism and protectionism.

Future Challenges From Non-Zero-Sum Diplomacy to Zero-Sum Discourse

As Kissinger (2012, 295) put it, diplomacy turns rigid in the presence of a zero-sum game “in which any gain of one side is conceived as a loss for the other.” Obama pursued a positive-valence discourse, which complemented his foreign policy strategy of diplomatic problem solving. In line with this approach, he often publicly conveyed his national security decisions using positive triggers and within a non-zero-sum frame. At times, Obama even seemingly ignored rhetorical slights from adversaries—including insulting tweets from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Lackey 2015)—as he kept his eye on the broader goals aimed toward major diplomatic breakthroughs with the likes of Iran and Cuba. The question that remains is, how will the policies of the Obama years be challenged and ultimately affected by the actions of his successor, Donald Trump? The new Trump administration’s initial foray into foreign relations lies in stark contrast to Obama’s reliance on diplomacy. Schwartz (2017), who co-wrote The Art of the Deal with Trump, summed up Donald Trump’s longheld proclivity toward a zero-sum strategy: “To survive . . . Trump felt compelled to go to war with the world. It was a binary, zero-sum choice for him: You either dominated or you submitted. You either created and exploited fear or you succumbed to it.” Thus far, Trump has touted his desire for such a zero-sum strategy—in not just foreign affairs but seemingly all avenues of interaction on the political stage.

Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security 33 Administrative Overhaul and Significant Shifts in the Foreign Policy Domain

In addition to the shifts in rhetoric, it is also useful to point out some of the most eye-popping shifts in administrative personnel that help illustrate how Obama’s diplomatic approach and legacy are being challenged and reversed. Consider the difference between Obama’s last national security advisor, Susan Rice, and Trump’s initial reliance on Michael Flynn. Rice first became a household name serving as Obama’s ambassador to the United Nations. Her soft-power, non-zero-sum presence constituted a key pillar of Obama’s diplomatic approach, one that she expanded on heavily once she took on the national security advisor position in July 2013 to work even more closely alongside Obama to hash out the Iran nuclear deal and various other diplomatic forays. Upon the inauguration of Donald Trump into the White House, Rice was succeeded by Michael Flynn, a retired Army lieutenant general and hawkish military man who had already begun making his way into household conversations with his bodacious Republican National Convention speech. In the speech, he led anti-Clinton rally cries of “lock her up,” and thereafter he promoted anti-Clinton conspiracy theories and controversial claims against Muslims (Baragona 2017; Kacynski 2016). In that same speech, Flynn decried the Obama diplomatic approach in no uncertain terms (Cloud and Mai-Duc 2016): “We are tired of Obama’s empty speeches and his misguided rhetoric. This, this has caused the world to have no respect for America’s word, nor does it fear our might.” However, Flynn’s intent to help Trump reverse Obama’s diplomatic approach was cut drastically short after only 24 days of service, upon his shocking resignation amid allegedly unlawful connections and interactions with the Russian and Turkish governments. Flynn was then replaced by another hawkish foreign policy firebrand, Army officer Herbert Raymond McMaster, who, in line with his longstanding reputation in the Beltway, has thus shown himself to be a far less controversial and far more reliable national security advisor appointee. Equally important, one may also consider the shift in the position of secretary of state. Once Hillary Clinton left the post amid the tumultuous controversy surrounding the 2012 Benghazi attack, John Kerry took over as Obama’s chief diplomat in 2013 to engage in exhaustive diplomatic ventures leading to, among other things, the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks of 2013–2014, his Organization of American States remarks citing the end of the Monroe Doctrine era, signing the Paris climate agreement at the United Nations on behalf of the administration, and serving as a key proponent of the Iran nuclear deal. Soon after Trump’s entrance into the White House, Rex Tillerson, the former chairman and chief executive of ExxonMobil, became the new face of the State Department.Though a well-known entity among the Washington establishment, Tillerson entered the position with little direct Beltway experience and has so far developed a reputation as a

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reclusive secretary of state. He is seemingly content to avoid interactions with the press, turning diplomatic interactions into largely symbolic and ceremonial affairs while tending to interact with only an “insular circle of political aides” and overseeing a State Department that has been gutted of its career staff (Gearan and Morello 2017; see also Labott and Gaouette 2017). Muslim Allies and the ISIS Threat

Another future challenge to Obama’s foreign policy legacy concerns relations between the United States and the Muslim nations. Trump’s antiMuslim rhetoric is likely to cause a rift in the already fragile alliances and partnerships forged in the region and fuel further radicalization, particularly in Afghanistan and other unstable Muslim countries where terrorists are looking into recruiting. The anti-insurgency efforts—to win the hearts and minds of people—that date all the way back to the Bush era may be rendered ineffective given such incendiary, discriminatory discourse. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, amid reports of Muslims being the target of hate crimes and harassment, Bush gave a compassionate speech depicting Islam as a religion of peace and noting that America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads. And they need to be treated with respect. In our anger and emotion, our fellow Americans must treat each other with respect. (“Islam Is Peace” 2001) Obama continued such rhetoric, stating that Islam is not the enemy and that Muslim communities should not be shunned. For instance, in his State of the Union address on January 25, 2011, Obama remarked, “As extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that American Muslims are a part of our American family.” This conciliatory presidential rhetoric toward Islam and Muslims took a sharp turn with Trump. Indeed, his exclusionary anti-Muslim discourse became one of his key campaign platforms. For instance, on December 7, 2015, Trump suggested, Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension.Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in jihad and have no sense of reason or respect for human life.

Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security 35

He then infamously announced his plans for a “Muslim ban” by declaring, “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what the hell is going on.” He followed up his speech with a tweet (Trump 2015): “Just put out a very important policy statement on the extraordinary influx of hatred & danger coming into our country. We must be vigilant!” Trump attempted to realize this campaign promise within the first 100 days of his presidency by issuing an executive order in February 2017, entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” which would suspend for 90 days the entry of aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The order would also halt refugee settlement for 120 days while indefinitely banning Syrian refugees. Obama reacted to the ban by stating that he “fundamentally disagrees with the notion of discriminating against individuals because of their faith or religion” (Reuters Staff 2017). Meanwhile, protests broke out across the United States in opposition to the ban, and chaos ruled in airports where legal permanent residents of the United States were not allowed to enter the country. Federal judges then blocked the key provisions of the order, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Trump administration’s request to resume the ban. When Trump issued a new travel ban in March 2017 that revised some provisions of the previous executive order (such as excluding Iraq), it faced the same fate as the first one. It was blocked before it went into effect, when a district court judge concluded that the order likely violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution by disfavoring Muslims. Even though Trump’s executive orders were blocked, the potential repercussions of such actions are critical. Many government officials and diplomats around the world expressed serious concern. For instance, Senator John McCain depicted Trump’s travel ban attempts as a “confused process” that will only give the terror group ISIS “more propaganda” (Schultheis 2017). While ISIS leadership did not openly react to these executive orders, there have been reports that ISIS sympathizers and followers have been using the travel ban as evidence of a war against Islam. Some of the seven countries targeted by the attempted ban are key allies of the United States in the region, especially in the war against ISIS. As such, the executive order came as an insult and a betrayal of the trust between nations President Obama worked so hard to build. Environmental Security and Energy Independence

One of the biggest challenges to Obama’s legacy will be in the arena of environmental security and energy independence. As previously mentioned, under Obama’s leadership, the United States became a member of the landmark Paris climate agreement in 2016. One of Trump’s key campaign promises, which he recently fulfilled, was to withdraw the United States

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from this agreement. Even before his declaration to pull out of the Paris agreement, the executive orders he previously signed to heavily roll back Obama-era climate change commitments and other environmental regulations (concerning areas such as offshore drilling and fracking) had already signaled that he had no intention of abiding by Obama’s ambitious carbon emissions-control pledges. In March 2017, Trump directed the head of the Environmental Protection Agency to start dismantling Obama’s Clean Power Plan, which was set to close a high number of coal-fired power plants and replace them with wind and solar farms (Davenport and Rubin 2017). Trump framed such executive orders lifting environmental regulations as moves toward energy independence and economic revival relying on scientific myths such as “clean coal” (Nijhuis 2017): My administration is putting an end to the war on coal. We’re going to have clean coal—really clean coal. With today’s executive action, I am taking historic steps to lift the restrictions on American energy, to reverse government intrusion, and to cancel job-killing regulations. (Applause.) And, by the way, regulations not only in this industry, but in every industry. We’re doing them by the thousands, every industry. And we’re going to have safety, we’re going to have clean water, we’re going to have clear air. But so many are unnecessary, and so many are job killing. We’re getting rid of the bad ones. For some other foreign policy issues, the new administration’s challenge to Obama’s legacy may not go farther than a populist, protectionist discourse. For instance, in May 2017,Trump sent Congress official notice regarding his plans to renegotiate NAFTA, which he once called “the worst trade deal ever” (Irwin 2017). But the notice did not offer any major notifications that he publicly announced during the campaign trail (Davis 2017). Trump may have realized that Mexico has some serious bargaining chips in talks over NAFTA, including corn—a commodity Mexico imports heavily from the United States; if Mexico moved to other markets to buy its corn, it would devastate the American farming industry. Another foreign policy deal that Trump labeled as “the worst deal ever negotiated” is the Iran nuclear deal, negotiated by the Obama administration (Kennedy 2017). In February 2017, he tweeted, “Iran has been formally PUT ON NOTICE for firing a ballistic missile. Should have been thankful for the terrible deal the U.S. made with them!” (Trump 2017). However, in May 2017, the Trump administration announced that it will continue to waive some sanctions against Iran, which constituted a key motivation for Iran agreeing to curb its nuclear program (Kennedy 2017). Of course, the erratic discourse and behavior that the new administration has displayed up to this point makes it hard to predict whether this deal will stay alive in the future, but so far, Obama’s legacy with regard to Iran continues to hold.

Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security 37 Governing by Tweeting and the Rhetorical Presidency

One of the key platforms for presidential public appeals has been the annual State of the Union address, to which millions of Americans tune in (Hoffman and Howard 2006). Once the speech ends, the contents are carefully dissected and critically assessed by vigilant observers. In Decision Points, Bush (2010, 102) remarked, In my 2003 State of the Union address, I had cited a British intelligence report that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. The single sentence in my five-thousand-word speech was not a major point in the case against Saddam. The British stood by the intelligence.Yes, those sixteen words became a political controversy and a massive distraction. While Bush experienced a hard time about “those sixteen words” in his State of the Union address, modern presidents now also have to watch out for their 140-character tweets. It is astonishing to observe how a tweet may at times make more political waves than a State of the Union address comprising thousands of words. Twitter and other social networking venues have increasingly become outlets of presidential public outreach (and sometimes public outcry) in recent years (Owen and Davis 2008). Presidential tweets are becoming powerful rhetorical tools as they can reach millions of Americans on a daily basis. Bush was the first president to ever use Twitter, and his successors quickly adopted this new platform for their public appeals; as of August 2017, Obama’s personal Twitter account had 93.7 million followers, while Trump had 36.1 million followers. It is no surprise, then, that Obama not only delivered an “old-school” final speech to defend his legacy before relinquishing power to Trump but also posted a series of tweets that laid out his legacy (in the areas of health care, energy independence and environmental protection, diplomacy and global partnership, job creation, and marriage equality) as his successor was getting ready to take over the official POTUS Twitter account (Bradner 2017). Presidential tweets also help set the public agenda in a political environment where many urgent policy issues are competing for salience. Sensational tweets may also allow presidents to divert attention away from certain issues they may prefer the public not to focus on. Given these new trends and developments, a systematic content analysis of presidential tweets is an ideal future avenue of research to empirically assess to what extent such social media messages shape public opinion and support and whether they have any potential for diversionary or uniting influences.

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38  Chapter 2 Baragona, Justin. 2017. “  ‘That Didn’t Age Well’: Tapper Mocks Michael Flynn for Leading ‘Lock Her Up’ Chants.” Mediaite. www.mediaite.com/online/that-didnt-age-well-tappermocks-michael-flynn-for-leading-lock-her-up-chants/ Barrett, Andrew W. 2004. “Gone Public: The Impact of Going Public on Presidential Legislative Success.” American Politics Research 32(3): 338–70. Behr, Roy L., and Shanto Iyengar. 1985. “Television, Real World Cues, and Changes in the Public Agenda.” Public Opinion Quarterly 49(1): 38–57. Bentley, Michelle, and Jack Holland, eds. 2016. The Obama Doctrine: A Legacy of Continuity in US Foreign Policy? London: Routledge. Bodenhausen, Galen V., Lori A. Sheppard, and Geoffrey P. Kramer. 1994. “Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness.” European Journal of Social Psychology 24(1): 45–62. Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1993. “Presidential Activities From Truman Through Reagan: Timing and Impact.” Journal of Politics 55(2): 382–98. Brader,Ted. 2006. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Bradner, Eric. 2017. “Obama Defends His Legacy on Twitter.” CNN. www.cnn. com/2017/01/01/politics/obama-tweets-legacy/ Brody, Richard A. 1991. Assessing the President:The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bucy, Erik P., and John E. Newhagen. 1999. “The Emotional Appropriateness Heuristic: Processing Televised Presidential Reactions to the News.” Journal of Communication 49(4): 59–79. Bush, George W. 2010. Decision Points. New York: Crown Publishers. Cacioppo, John T., Wendi L. Gardner, and Gary G. Berntson. 1999. “The Affect System Has Parallel and Integrative Processing Components: Form Follows Function.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76(5): 839–55. Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. “The President’s Legislative Influence From Public Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 313–29. Ceaser, James W., Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette. 1981. “The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 11(2): 158–71. Cloud, David S., and Christine Mai-Duc. 2016. “Retired Army Gen. Michael Flynn Delivers Fiery Speech to Emptying Convention Hall.” LA Times. www.latimes.com/ nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-republican-convention-2016-live-passed-over-asvice-presidential-pick-1468897531-htmlstory.html Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1995. “Presidential Rhetoric and Agenda Setting.” American Journal of Political Science 39(1): 87–107. Cohen, Jeffrey E. 2010. Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age. New York: Cambridge University Press. Davenport, Coral, and Alissa J. Rubin. 2017. “Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama Climate Policies.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/ trump-executive-order-climate-change.html Davis, Darren W. 2006. Negative Liberty: Public Opinion and the Terrorist Attacks on America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Davis, Darren W., and Brian D. Silver. 2004. “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America.” American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 28–46. Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2017. “Trump Sends NAFTA Renegotiation Notice to Congress.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/politics/nafta-renegotia tion-trump.html

Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security 39 de Castella, Krista, and Craig McGarty. 2011. “Two Leaders, Two Wars: A Psychological Analysis of Fear and Anger Content in Political Rhetoric About Terrorism.” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 11(1): 180–200. DeSteno, David, Richard E. Petty, Duane T. Wegener, and Derek D. Rucker. 2000. “Beyond Valence in the Perception of Likelihood: The Role of Emotion Specificity.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78(3): 397–416. Dugan, Andrew. 2013. “U.S. Support for Action in Syria Is Low vs. Past Conflicts.” Gallup. www.gallup.com/poll/164282/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx. Edwards, George C. III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press. Edwards, George C. III. 2000. “Building Coalitions.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30(1): 47–78. Edwards, George C. III. 2003. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press. Edwards, George C. III. 2009. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Edwards, George C. III. 2012. Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Edwards, George C. III. 2015. “Predicting the Success of Presidential Leadership.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January 16. Ferguson, Eva Dreikurs, and Beth Eva Ferguson Wee. 2000. Motivation: A Biosocial and Cognitive Integration of Motivation and Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press. Fisher, Louis. 2000. Congressional Abdication on War and Spending. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Gallup. 2017. “Obama Averages 47.9% Job Approval as President.” Gallup. www.gallup. com/poll/202742/obama-averages-job-approval-president.aspx Gearan, Anne, and Carol Morello. 2017. “Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Spends His First Weeks Isolated From an Anxious Bureaucracy.” The Washington Post. www.washing tonpost.com/world/national-security/secretary-of-state-rex-tillerson-spends-hisfirst-weeks-isolated-from-an-anxious-bureaucracy/2017/03/30/bdf8ec86-155f11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.051af4bc98c6 Goldman, Russell. 2008. “Debate Verdict: John McCain, Barack Obama Exchange Blows, No Knockouts.” ABC News. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/ story?id=5983603 Han, Lori Cox, and Diane J. Heith, eds. 2005. In the Public Domain: Presidents and the Challenges of Public Leadership. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Hoffman, Donna R., and Alison D. Howard. 2006. Addressing the State of the Union: The Evolution and Impact of the President’s Big Speech. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Holsti, Ole R. 1996. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Howell, William G. 2003. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Huddy, Leonie, and Stanley Feldman. 2011. “Americans Respond Politically to 9/11: Understanding the Impact of the Terrorist Attacks and Their Aftermath.” American Psychologist 66(6): 455–67. Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese. 2007. “On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger.” In The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior, eds. George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 202–30.

40  Chapter 2 Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Gallya Lahav, and Charles Taber. 2003. “Fear and Terrorism: Psychological Reactions to 9/11.” In Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public. New York: Routledge, 255–78. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. Forthcoming. “Trump and the Xenophobic Populist Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse.” Perspectives in Politics. Irwin, Neil. 2017. “Will Trump Go After NAFTA With Tweezers or a Hammer?” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/upshot/what-can-trump-do-to-overhaul-nafta-quite-a-lot.html “Islam Is Peace” Says President. 2001. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Jervis, Robert. 2017. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kacynski, Andrew. 2016. “On Twitter, Michael Flynn Interacted With Alt-Right, Made Controversial Comments on Muslims, Shared Fake News.” CNN. http://edition.cnn. com/2016/11/18/politics/kfile-flynn-tweets/ Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 47(2): 263–92. Kennedy, Merrit. 2017. “Trump Administration Upholds Iran Sanctions Waiver, Keeping Nuclear Deal Alive.” NPR. www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/17/528806647/ trump-administration-upholds-iran-sanctions-waiver-keeping-nuclear-deal-alive Kernell, Samuel. 1986. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Kissinger, Henry. 2012. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Labott, Elise, and Nicole Gaouette. 2017. “Tillerson Presides Over Abrupt Shakeup at State Department.” CNN. www.cnn.com/2017/02/17/politics/tillerson-state-departmentshakeup/ Lackey, Katharine. 2015. “Iranian Leader Tweets Graphic of Obama With Gun to Head.” USA Today. www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/07/25/iranian-leader-tweetsgraphic-obama-gun-head/30667081/ Landay, Jonathan, and David Rohde. 2017. “Exclusive: In Call With Putin, Trump Denounced Obama-Era Nuclear Arms Treaty – Sources.” Reuters. www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-trump-putin-idUSKBN15O2A5 Lazarus, Richard S. 1991. Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner. 2000. “Beyond Valence:Toward a Model of EmotionSpecific Influences on Judgment and Choice.” Cognition & Emotion 14(4): 473–93. Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner. 2001.“Fear, Anger, and Risk.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81(1): 146–59. Lerner, Jennifer S., Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff. 2003. “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment.” Psychological Science 14(2): 144–50. Levy, Jack S. 2013. “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press, 301–33. Loseke, Donileen R. 2009. “Examining Emotion as Discourse: Emotion Codes and Presidential Speeches Justifying War.” The Sociological Quarterly 50(3): 497–524.

Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security 41 MacKuen, Michael B., Jennifer Wolak, Luke Keele, and George E. Marcus. 2010. “Civic Engagements: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation.” American Journal of Political Science 54(2): 440–58. Marcus, George E.,W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Mayer, Kenneth R. 2001. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Neustadt, Richard. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents:The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press. Newport, Frank. 2010. “In U.S., Majority Supports Ratification of START Treaty.” Gallup. www.gallup.com/poll/145184/majority-supports-ratification-start-treaty.aspx Newport, Frank. 2011. “American Public Opinion and Iraq.” Gallup. www.gallup.com/ opinion/polling-matters/169370/american-public-opinion-iraq.aspx Nijhuis, Michelle. 2017. “Can Coal Ever Be Clean?” National Geographic. http://ngm. nationalgeographic.com/2014/04/coal/nijhuis-text Obama, Barack. 2009. “Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace.” www.nobelprize.org/ nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html Owen, Diana, and Richard Davis. 2008. “Presidential Communication in the Internet Era.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38(4): 658–73. Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1985. “Presidential Leadership Through Public Opinion.” In The Presidency and Public Policy Making, eds. George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C.Thomas. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 22–36. Peake, Jeffrey S. 2001. “Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy.” Political Research Quarterly 54(1): 69–86. Peterson, Paul E. 1994. “The President’s Dominance in Foreign Policy Making.” Political Science Quarterly 109(2): 215–34. Press Conference by the President. 2010. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president Ragsdale, Lyn. 1984. “The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949–1980.” American Political Science Review 78(4): 971–84. Remarks by the President on the Paris Agreement. 2016. https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/05/remarks-president-paris-agreement Reuters Staff. 2017. “Obama Says Disagrees with Discrimination Based on Religion: ­Spokesman.”Reuters.www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-obama-idUSKBN15E2GC Rottinghaus, Brandon. 2009. “Strategic Leaders: Determining Successful Presidential Opinion Leadership Tactics Through Public Appeals.” Political Communication 26(3): 296–316. Rottinghaus, Brandon. 2010. The Provisional Pulpit: Modern Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Sabucedo, José Manuel, Mar Durán, Monica Alzate, and Maria-Soledad Rodríguez. 2011. “Emotional Responses and Attitudes to the Peace Talks With ETA.” Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología 43(2): 289–96. Sadler, Melody S., Megan Lineberger, Joshua Correll, and Bernadette Park. 2005. “Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsements in Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 27(3): 249–58. Schultheis, Emily. 2017. “John McCain Says President Trump’s Travel Ban Will ‘Give ISIS Some More Propaganda’.” CBS News. www.cbsnews.com/news/

42  Chapter 2 john-mccain-says-president-trumps-travel-ban-will-give-isis-some-more-propaganda/ Schwartz, Tony. 2017. “I Wrote ‘The Art of the Deal’ With Trump. His Self-Sabotage Is Rooted in His Past.” The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/postevery thing/wp/2017/05/16/i-wrote-the-art-of-the-deal-with-trump-his-self-sabotage-isrooted-in-his-past/?utm_term=.774a930a76a0 Sigelman, Lee, and Carol K. Sigelman. 1981. “Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion: From ‘Benevolent Leader’ to ‘Kiss of Death’?” Experimental Study of Politics 7(1): 1–22. Simon, Herbert Alexander. 1982. Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Skitka, Linda J., Christopher W. Bauman, Nicholas P. Aramovich, and G. Scott Morgan. 2006. “Confrontational and Preventative Policy Responses to Terrorism: Anger Wants a Fight and Fear Wants ‘Them’ to Go Away.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 28(4): 375–84. Smith, Craig A., and Phoebe C. Ellsworth. 1985. “Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48(4): 813–38. Support for U.S. Campaign Against ISIS; Doubts About Its Effectiveness, Objectives. 2014. www.people-press.org/2014/10/22/support-for-u-s-campaign-against-isis-doubtsabout-its-effectiveness-objectives/ Tellegan, Auke, David Watson, and Lee Ann Clark. 1999. “On the Dimensional and Hierarchical Structure of Affect.” Psychological Science 10(4): 297–303. Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump]. 2015. Just put out a very important policy statement on the extraordinary influx of hatred & danger coming into our country. We must be vigilant! [Tweet]. December 7. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/673982228163072000 Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump]. 2017. Iran has been formally PUT ON NOTICE for firing a ballistic missile. Should have been thankful for the terrible deal the U.S. made with them! [Tweet]. February 2. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ status/827118012784373760?lang=en Valentino, Nicholas A.,Vincent L. Hutchings, Antoine J. Banks, and Anne K. Davis. 2008. “Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen? Emotions, Political Information Seeking, and Learning via the Internet.” Political Psychology 29(2): 247–73. Villalobos, José D., and Cigdem V. Sirin. 2017. “The Relevance of Emotions in Presidential Public Appeals: Anger’s Conditional Effect on Perceived Risk and Support for Military Interventions.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 47(1): 146–68. Warber, Adam L. 2006. Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating From the Oval Office. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Watson, David, and Lee Anna Clark. 1992. “Affects Separable and Inseparable: On the Hierarchical Arrangement of the Negative Affects.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(3): 489–505. Watson, David, David Wiese, Jatin Vaidya, and Auke Tellegen. 1999. “The Two General Activation Systems of Affect: Structural Findings, Evolutionary Considerations, and Psychobiological Evidence.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76(5): 820–38. Zajonc, Robert B. 1998.“Emotions.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology,Vol. 1, eds. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. New York: McGraw-Hill, 591–632. Zaller, John. 1994. “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence From the Gulf War.” In Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, eds. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 186–209.

3 Terrorism Strategy Shifts From Bush to Obama Karen A. Feste

The 2002 US National Security Strategy (1) issued by the Bush administration one year after the events of 9/11 proclaimed, “The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.” George W. Bush vowed that America would lead the fight and provide assistance to other nations. President-elect Barack Obama, inaugurated in January 2009, inherited unsuccessful, American-led ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a troubled domestic economy, relics of Bush’s policy. Obama intended to revamp the approach to confronting terrorism in order to achieve more effective results.The 44th president withdrew a large number of troops from the two conflict theaters, yet the terrorism problem persisted, drawing into question a popular premise that military intervention causes terrorism. In an aggressive action, Obama killed two main terrorist group leaders, al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden and charismatic cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Obama hoped to weaken follower support, but neither event dented radical jihadist movements and their leaderless resistance. His 2015 US National Security Strategy document, issued late in his term of office, asserted that “violent extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies.” Echoing the views of his predecessor, Obama reaffirmed the importance and necessity of US leadership to respond to the challenge and promote global stability. Both Bush and Obama were confronted with serious acts of terrorism, anti-American violence, and mass shootings while in office. Although the two presidents shared broad views about the terrorism challenges and the need for US global leadership and dealt with comparable crises of violence post-9/11, they conveyed a different spirit and alternative approaches toward the resolution of conflict. The result was a serious public debate over the level of impact of their respective strategies. The issue of terrorism has transitioned from a unified patriotic, bipartisan approach marking the immediate post-9/11 political dynamics of Bush’s first term to a sharpened partisan matter open for debate that has become a mainstay of American political deliberation. Remarkably, the public has developed a kind of immunity with regard to the impact of terrorist incidents: Short-term spikes of anger and compassion over occasional workplace

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or nightclub shootouts linked to politically motivated causes, especially radical Islam, dissipate soon. Such terror incidents rarely sway public opinion on the US president’s job approval rating—“rally effects” are a thing of the past. Passionate speeches by the president designed to unite the country in targeting terrorism to make America safe likewise show little effect. These developments are significant departures from the country’s reaction to the terror attacks of 9/11. Bush’s extremely high rating in the immediate aftermath was largely attributed to his rhetoric as he captured the soul of collective sadness and justified a sense of revenge and retribution. Obama’s victory in the 2008 presidential election was similarly a product of his own rhetoric—he emphasized hope, instilling optimism that the world could be a better, less fearful place by implementing an alternative approach to combat terrorism. What are the characteristics of leadership under the Obama administration with respect to counterterrorism policies? How did terrorism strategy shift from the Bush years, and what accounts for the changes? And what guidance did Obama adopt from his predecessor? This chapter outlines theories of leadership and cycles in presidential rule to show the reasons for change and continuities in terrorism strategy from Bush to Obama. The central argument is that Obama’s rhetorical leadership fell short of transformative leadership. The Obama record on countering terrorism is reviewed in light of this. The chapter appraises his main accomplishments, including the killing of bin Laden and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. Subsequent sections review his controversial policies, including responses to halting advances by the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives as well as security failures and domestic terrorism attacks at Fort Hood, Boston, San Bernardino, and Orlando, and the international terrorism assault in Benghazi, Libya. Prominent in the analysis are public reactions to the terrorism phenomena over the course of Obama’s two terms.

From 9/11 to Obama’s Election Victory The catastrophic terror attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. (and the loss of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania), perpetrated by 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001, stunned American policymakers. The entire safety blanket of US security fell under siege. Bush, a Republican who won the contested 2000 election after the Florida recount controversy, had pledged during his campaign to reduce international involvement. Homeland defense had not been a high-priority issue on the new administration’s agenda. The commander in chief now faced an enormous crisis: How should the world’s only superpower respond to the aggression? What punishment was appropriate for the perpetrators? What immediate defenses should be put in place? What kind of foreign policy would protect America against such savage, unpredictable acts in the future? And how could the

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United States, by virtue of its unique, powerful status, guard against global instability and violence? A comprehensive response plan was constructed swiftly at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Congress passed the PATRIOT Act, limiting civil liberties in an effort to pursue and punish suspected terrorists. In a nationally televised speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, Bush declared that enemies of freedom committed an act of war (emphasis added) against America. He identified al Qaeda and its leader, bin Laden, by name, noting that these terrorists practiced a fringe form of Islamic extremism rejected by most Muslims. “Our war on terror [emphasis added] begins with al Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated,” he said.The president warned further that every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorists will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. In October 2001, Bush announced the creation of the Office of Homeland Security within the White House (followed by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and a major reorganization of federal agencies in 2003). Expectations for a lengthy battle comprising dramatic military strikes, covert operations, and defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans ran high. “This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight . . . and in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment,” Bush posited.“Freedom and fear are at war. . . .We will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail” (George W. Bush Presidential Address, 2001). A few weeks later, US military forces invaded Afghanistan. Bin Laden escaped but the Taliban regime was overthrown, setting the stage for a long US occupation. By mid-2002, a second, major front of US-Islam conflict was unfolding. The Bush administration was determined to invade Iraq on the basis that its leader, Saddam Hussein, harbored weapons of mass destruction. Many in the administration believed incorrectly that Hussein’s forces were directly linked to al Qaeda terrorists and that toppling the Iraqi dictator would eliminate future threats. The decision to launch a major US military intervention in Iraq in March 2003 was vigorously opposed by the international community and across America. Regardless, Hussein was eventually captured and hanged, his accomplices shot or imprisoned, and the ruling Sunni Baathist party disbanded. With US assistance, a new democratic constitution was created in Iraq, followed by elections and the establishment of a working parliament. But the presence of a substantial number of military forces in the country led to an insurgency movement made up of local and foreign fighters.

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A surge of American troops boosted prospects of victory, but not for long. The operations were expensive—in blood and treasure. Public support for the Iraq War wavered. The United States seemed to become unmoored with respect to judging the effectiveness of its counterterrorism strategy. The resource investment was substantial but seemingly led to the discovery of more terrorism plots at home and abroad. Al Qaeda franchises began to spread across the Muslim world. Bin Laden evaded capture. Meanwhile, the US economy faltered, owing to trends that started in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and by the costs sustained by continued operation of a two-front war. Public approval of the president’s job performance reflected a steady downward trajectory (continuing in that direction until Bush left office with around 33 percent job approval). If Republicans held a political advantage relative to national security, their fortunes were about to change. In August 2006, a major terrorist plot organized by a group of Pakistanis living in Britain was uncovered. The group sought to blow up as many as 10 passenger jets en route from London to the United States. The foiled plan led to the arrest of 24 suspects. The result was also the cancellation of flights across the Atlantic and the temporary closure of airports. Democratic politicians seized the moment and blamed Republicans for refusing to implement all of the recommendations of the bipartisan September 11 Commission report on airline security.They argued that Bush and the GOP had neglected the safety of Americans by focusing on the Iraq War, which had made the country more vulnerable and less prepared to meet everyday terrorism threats to national security. The Democratic Party began developing a plan for taking control of the White House in the next presidential election. The party needed a viable, attractive candidate—someone well-spoken and passionate who represented an alternative strategy for confronting and resolving the terrorism issue. Within three months, Barack Obama, a junior Democratic senator from Illinois, burst onto the national political scene with his opposition to the Iraq War in eloquent, high-spirited public speeches. The former professor of law and Chicago community activist for social justice, an Illinois state politician and ardent opponent of Bush’s policies, emerged out of an unsettling domestic and international environment to announce his candidacy for the presidency in Springfield, Illinois, on February 10, 2007. Obama boldly outlined an idealistic stance in his speech, entitled “Our Past, Future, and Vision for America.” He stressed that he entered the race “to transform a nation” (emphasis added). With respect to anti-terrorism and foreign policy goals, he advocated an end to the Iraq War and promised to work to keep America safe by tracking terrorists and “exporting those ideals that bring hope and opportunity to millions around the globe.” Obama’s chance for attaining the high office was slim. He had served just two years in Congress. His job credentials were less than considerable, given his lack of experience in national politics or international affairs.

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Six months later, on August 1, 2007, Obama delivered a major foreign policy address in Washington, D.C. He outlined a five-point comprehensive strategy, including getting out of Iraq and on the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world’s most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values; and securing a more resilient homeland. Having secured the Democratic nomination, he delivered another major speech in Washington on July 15, 2008, “A New Strategy for a New World,” and reiterated his pledge to pursue “a tough, smart, and principled national security strategy.” Obama planned to send more troops to Afghanistan and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, and he added this threat: “We will take out high-level terrorist targets like bin Laden if we have them in our sights.” Obama led GOP rival John McCain in polls in spite of questions about his experience. His public remarks steadfastly emphasized themes of hope and change that implied a transformative feature in the conduct of politics and improved the positioning of the United States in global relations. He garnered 53 percent of the popular vote in the November 2008 presidential election and came into office a few months later with an extremely high approval rating—66 percent. Was Obama a transformative political leader, and did his plans for change actually suggest transformation? Extricating the United States from foreign entanglements was proposed as a course corrective; changes in counterterrorism policy seemed more incremental. Obama did not offer a means to rebrand America, nor did he suggest broad revisions for improvements of image beyond the dictum that we all rise above politics and seek harmonious solutions to political issues. But his political communication style seemed to convey a transformative leadership spirit reflecting the notion that an overhaul under his direction would be possible, useful, and profitable for America’s future. The Obama approach to leadership is a primary exemplar of the “rhetorical presidency” phenomenon in the modern era.

The Rhetorical Presidency and Obama’s Messaging As Sirin and Villalobos contend in Chapter 2, presidential leadership is intricately tied to the bully pulpit by which the chief executive can use positive or negative valence to reinforce messaging. Mass rhetoric became a principal tool of presidents in attempting to govern the nation in the early 20th century and gained more prominence through the means of instant electronic transmission, according to Ceaser et al. (1981). In this role, the commander in

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chief serves as an “educational and psychic” leader, declaring that “word rivals deed as the measure of presidential performance. The standard set for presidents has in large degree become an artifact of their own inflated rhetoric” (Ceaser et al. 1981, 167). Ceaser et al. explain this development as the result of three factors: the mass media, the modern presidential campaign, and the presidency as a position of moral leadership that exhorts common national purpose and a spirit of idealism. Further, presidential campaigns inflate expectations and affect notions of national governance in a serious way: So formative has the campaign become of our tastes for oratory and of our conception of leadership that presidential speech and governing have come more and more to imitate the model of the campaign. In a dramatic reversal, campaigns set the tone for governing rather than governing for campaigns. (Ceaser et al. 1981, 167) It comes as no surprise that some politicians, deceived by their own rhetoric, find it difficult to come to terms with the job of governing a nation of complex multiple interests. The emphasis on communication and grassroots outreach has become the bedrock of the modern presidency (e.g., Tulis 1987), though empirical evidence suggests that rhetoric rarely changes public opinion (Edwards 2009). Zarefsky (2004) argued that presidential messages do make a difference by defining social reality, in phrases or slogans as “condensation symbols.” Naming a situation provides a basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate response: “The president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposal are viewed by the public” (611). Leaders make public statements as a routine in order to address supporters and influence elites, argued Hart (2008). The public anticipates that its national leader will talk often about many issues, even though there is little correlation between presidential communication, public approval, and policy outcomes. Ryfe (2005) labeled a president’s speeches “crafted talk,” since they are the product of many individuals—writers, consultants, aides, and policy experts—codified in appeals to solicit particular responses that resonate with the public. But rhetoric, according to Shogan (2006), can only operate as a contingent source of leadership, for the political environment determines the efficacy of a president’s ethos, not the reverse. Greenblat (2012) judged that Obama was not as impressive at getting his message across after four years in the White House as he had been during the campaign that originally elected him. The president had trouble selling his vision and moving public opinion. His magnificence as an oppositional orator did not necessarily translate into the mobilization of greater support once in the Oval Office. “Prior to taking office,” Greenblat (2012) asserted, Barack Obama was like a living greatest-hits record, delivering one high-impact speech after another, but as the US president his speeches

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seem to have no effect; he’s been a surprisingly poor communicator, having failed to create conditions with his speechwriters so he achieves greatness with his remarks when he is trying to move some policy. Obama’s rhetoric often assumed structural qualities similar to religious sermons. He would commence by locating common ground with the audience, present a challenge, and conclude by lifting attendees up to higher ground than the opening (Kusnet 2016). He mentioned “terrorism” more than 3,000 times as president, according to Ostermeier’s (2015) calculations. From January 2009 through November 2015, the president used the term an average of 1.2 times daily, a figure that increased substantially in his second term and continued to escalate. But public opinion polls taken near the twilight of Obama’s second term showed Americans did not approve of his management of the ISIS threat, and critics admonished him for failing to draw a clear line between terrorism and radical Islam. He spoke often about these issues, but actions preferred by some sectors of the public were not forthcoming. Such consequences validate Shogan’s (2006) dire predictions of the limits of rhetoric for foreign policy performance.

Leadership Style With the largest popular vote in two decades and the largest Democratic victory margin since 1964, Obama smashed the race barrier and inspired the public to believe in the possibility of change (  Jacobs and King 2010). But central to critiques of his leadership is the gap between accomplishments and unfulfilled promises. Obama was accused of passivity from a failure to “sell” his policies, including counterterrorism. Obama approached conflict resolution from the perspective of problem solving. He was reluctant to lay blame or make sharp partisan distinctions. He focused on building bridges to opponents, moved beyond ideological categorization, and appeared reticent and detached. He demonstrated emotional intelligence, but he moved neither Congress nor public opinion very much once in office. In Kuttner’s (2011) judgment, the adjectives widely used to describe Obama are words like diffident, detached, aloof, professorial. Obama practices restraint to a fault. . . . Despite his eloquence and capacity to motivate, [he] seems to believe that power should be conserved and presidential leadership reserved for emergencies. . . .This style of leadership is expected to produce the voter approval that puts polite pressure on the other party to join the quest for consensus. Reciprocity and compromise then result in effective government and popular adulation. Such an approach may be incongruous with the increasingly partisan conflicts in contemporary American politics. Obama was clearly a polarizer as much as he was a conciliator. His decisionmaking can be explained by

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shifts that occur when a president thinks about his power stakes and guards his reputation. The result is that he disappointed supporters to his left and outraged opponents to his right but hoped that, by rhetorical flourishes, he would be able to appeal to a sense of unity and national interest (Pious 2011). Burns’s (1978) sweeping study of political, social, and psychological dimensions of leadership distinguished two ideal forms of directed management in policymaking that are helpful in understanding Obama. The first is the dramatic transformative approach. The second is a more common transactional approach. Other scholars have built upon this typology. Nye (2013) and Sestanovich (2014) each applied a binary category scheme designed to highlight and differentiate the role and effectiveness of American presidents in the historical evolution of foreign affairs. Skowronek (2008, 2011) developed a fourfold framework that captures presidential goals, visions, and styles applied to both domestic and international politics across a continuum of “political time.” All conceptualizations share a common base, which is to identify bold moves that track new directions and mark discontinuity from the past. Transforming leadership (Burns 1978) is linked to common goals and collective needs, when leaders and followers raise one another to enhanced levels of motivation and morality sensitive to higher purposes and aspirations. Transformational leaders appeal to the high road, lifting people to become their better selves, and the process may entail conflict engagement necessary to transcend status quo inertia and to set the platform for accomplishing critical objectives. Leaders provide inspiration for followers to adapt and respond to the changes. As Nye (2013a) stated, “Leadership experts and the public alike extol the virtues of transformational leaders—those who set out bold objectives and take risks to change the world. . . . They make choices that others would not” (emphasis added). However, transformational proclamations have not always succeeded in reaching policy goals. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman made “transformational bets” on US intervention in World War II and subsequent choices to contain the Soviet Union. Their policies worked to establish the primacy of the United States in the world order. Woodrow Wilson, by contrast, was a failed transformational president because his vision of a US-led League of Nations was not accepted by Congress and led to American isolationism. Transactional leaders are those relying on hard power resources of political bargaining to achieve goals. They are pragmatic, low-key, and often quite successful in executing their policies. Nye (2013a) provided several examples. Dwight Eisenhower refused to follow the advice of his military to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese during the Korean War. The former Supreme Allied Commander of World War II claimed that only disaster and instability would follow. Similarly, George H.W. Bush, whose response to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was not to gloat or humiliate the Soviet Union, helped set the stage for a successful summit with Mikhail Gorbachev one month later.

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Nye’s (2013a) typology of leadership rests on three variables: objectives (transformational; i.e., major change, incremental, or status quo); style (transactional—use of hard power resources, or inspirational—use of soft power resources); and context intelligence (understanding the evolving environment—smart power). Soft power refers to emotional self-control; attractive future visions balancing ideals, objectives, and capabilities; and communication for persuasion. Hard power skills are organizational capabilities to form winning coalitions and traditional power politics of bargaining.Transactional styles are more effective in stable environments, and inspirational styles work in periods of rapid and discontinuous social and political change. Consider George W. Bush from Nye’s (2013a) theoretical perspective. Bush expressed no transformational views on foreign policy during the 2000 campaign, but he developed into a transformational president following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and then Iraq. He lacked smart power in the sense that his contextual intelligence quotient was insufficient to understand the dynamic substantive setting or capitalize on trends. The result was counterproductive results within a transactional style. By contrast, Barack Obama proclaimed transformational foreign policy goals in his 2008 presidential campaign but followed incremental policies in office. His objectives were transformational but outcomes were not. Alas, herein lays the fundamental difference in leadership between Bush and Obama. Cycles in American Presidential Leadership

Sestanovich (2014) divided presidential office holders into two groups. The first group follows strategies of “maximalism,” while the second pursues strategies of “retrenchment.” In essence, each successive president pushes a new foreign policy direction in the belief that the world had changed in some fundamental way that his predecessor “either totally misunderstood or failed to manage effectively” (7). An American president is driven by two different types of failure: either a crisis, some new challenge that raises the possibility of a major American setback that requires an urgent response (do more, think big, stretch engagements abroad), or the problem of overcommitment (think harder not bigger, do less, pull back). The relationship between the two responses is cyclical—activist presidents are followed by those who advocate retreat—but both are seeking to fine-tune strategies to produce better long-term policy results. The problem is that each side may overcorrect. The maximalists are closest in conceptualization to transformational presidents. Sestanovich identified Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan among them. Obama, Eisenhower, and Nixon are in the retrenchment camp for their efforts to scale back international exposure and downsize American aims. As Sestanovich noted, retrenchment presidents are “big picture reconceptualizers. Bringing the boys home from war gives them an opening to deal with the deeper problems that produced the unsuccessful war in the first place” (327).

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Within a fourfold typology, Skowronek (2008, 2011) applied the term “politics of reconstruction” for presidents who establish new political orders. Reconstructive presidents make stark new commitments, set new values, and exercise the enormous power of the office.This characterization is most closely aligned with the maximalist conceptualization and transformative leadership (Skowronek’s examples included Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan). Other categories Skowronek identified include “politics of articulation,” defined as a presidential approach that ensures continuation of the vision created by their great predecessor (e.g., Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson), and “politics of preemption,” in which the other party elects a president who distances himself from the past failed order, is opposed to a regime that temporarily lost its way, and is less constrained by ideology. In this latter category, preemptive presidents represent mongrel politics and openly bid for a hybrid alternative, a third way to draw policy positions from different sides. Preemptive presidents include Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bill Clinton, and Obama. Such presidents have a higher-than-average reelection rate but also have a high likelihood of running afoul of Congress. And their political legitimacy is always in question. Obama aspired to usher in a transformational, reconstructive presidential era. He turned to the rhetorical levers of the presidency to articulate how he hoped to change public philosophy on domestic politics, and by repudiating Bush’s invasion of Iraq. As Plant (2013) wrote, Skowronek’s (2008, 2011) typology paid little attention to the preemptive presidents like Obama, those “wild cards” in the Republic’s history who do not fit more neatly into his recurrent pattern of foundation, consolidation, fragmentation, and decay. Preemptives can occupy more than one space in political time or fit into more than one category in Skowronek’s framework (Plant 2013). More recently, Skowronek (2014) refined his models of leadership to suggest that the president may be an agent of democratic transformation or a policy entrepreneur. The roles are not to be conflated because facilitating policy is not the same as transforming the polity, although “no leader has tried harder to convince us that these roles are equivalent and interchangeable than President Barack Obama” (798). His campaign premise was that a pragmatic, problem-solving style could be employed to forge a new foundation for government. The rhetoric of transformative leadership was translated into a pragmatic quest for policy remedies to immediate challenges. Obama came to power with the best opportunity in three decades to break the status quo of restraint of governance but “shied away from any attempt at ground clearing” (802) and “submerged the promise of reconstruction in the prospect of reinvigorating and vindicating a problem-solving style of rule” (803). His failure to fulfill the expectation of transformative or reconstructive leadership partially reflects his personal political skills but also the structural context constraining the reach of his actions.

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Obama’s Leadership Challenge and Response There is a relative consensus among some scholars that as a candidate for the presidency, Obama projected an image of dramatic change and new policy directions intended to go beyond mere campaign rhetoric (Nye 2013; Sestanovich 2014; Skowronek 2011, 2014). However, his performance in office was not commensurate with his oratory. Nye (2013) and Skowronek (2011, 2014) contended that Obama was reduced to ordinary political expediency and became a transactional operator who practiced the politics of preemption and politics of articulation. But his position in “political time” (Skowronek 2008, 2011) remains of central importance. Bush, Obama’s predecessor, was a transformative leader, a maximalist who adopted the politics of reconstruction completely and solely on the basis of the 9/11 attacks. The war on terror is critical to Bush’s legacy—the president had a mission to wage a global war against Islamic jihadists in an aggressive set of actions to fight terrorism and keep America safe. Once on course, he pursued actions and solutions with fervent energy and total commitment and with no doubt about the policy direction. This message formed the core of his Farewell Address to the Nation delivered on January 15, 2009—five days before Obama’s inauguration. The president declared that the nation was safer than it was seven years ago, but “the gravest threat to our people remains another terrorist attack. Our enemies are patient and determined to strike again . . . we must keep our resolve.” It is nearly impossible for a transformational leader to be followed by an equally transformational, reconstruction-oriented leader. Sestanovich (2014) places Obama in the “retrenchment” camp—as both a candidate for high office and as the president, noting that his promise of particular major foreign policy change, the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, was implemented. He hoped to make the troop departure a centerpiece in his self-perceived “transformational” policy orientation, but it was not appraised in that way.

From Bush to Obama Obama came to office with high hopes for transforming the politics of counterterrorism while maintaining the Bush legacy of centrality, seriousness, and the prominence of the terrorism issue. But he sought to replace the confrontational approach with soft power and smart power, to borrow Nye’s (2013) terms.This section details changes and continuities, and the following section assesses Obama’s legacy. Changes

One of the first acts in the Obama administration was to alter the vocabulary describing the terrorist problem. Bush viewed the 9/11 attacks as the start

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of a war. Calling it a global war on terror was an attempt to weave a grand narrative to reshape American foreign policy for the post–Cold War world. While the term may have been effective in mobilizing Americans, the concept polarized the public and international community by hardening sentiments and demonizing the enemy (Tran 2009). Obama replaced the term and referred instead to “countering violent extremism.” The new conceptualization was introduced at Senate hearings held on February 12, 2009, in the prepared statement submitted by Dennis Blair (US Navy, Ret.), the newly appointed director of national intelligence.The imperative was to recast terminology by removing “war on terror,” “fighting jihadists,” and “global war” and substituting another statement—that “the U.S. is at war with al Qaeda.” Such was the preferred phrase adopted and defended by John Brennan, Obama’s top homeland security official. Brennan argued that the change was consequential because fighting “jihadists” took a legitimate term, jihad (which means “to purify oneself or to wage war for a struggle for a moral goal”), and risked giving the enemy an ideological legitimacy that radicals desire but do not deserve for tactics of terrorism. Some national security advisors in the Bush administration dismissed the linguistic change. The language used in speeches by Bush and Obama on terrorism to describe the enemy and the tools to fight back were not dissimilar. Sarfo and Krampa (2013) discovered that both presidents used linguistic forms that legitimized anti-terrorism and delegitimized terrorism by carefully and intentionally selecting words and expressions to make a specific impact on their audience. Obama told Al Arabiya, an Arabic satellite television station, in an interview during his first week in office, “The language we use matters” (Al Arabiya 2009). Obama sought to bridge the divide with the Muslim world, soften Americans’ fear of Islam, and open possibilities to forge new partnerships with Arab countries based on mutual respect and common interests. Was this approach—the shift in rhetorical messaging—effective? In public opinion polls between May 2009 and May 2010, the number of Middle East Arabs expressing optimism in Obama’s approach toward their region dropped from 51 percent to 16 percent; and in US polling, fewer Americans held a favorable view of Islam (30 percent) than five years earlier, during the Bush years (41 percent), suggesting a limited role of rhetoric in fighting terrorism (Gottlieb 2010). “If rhetoric does not match policy, or appears to discount or play down threats, the credibility—and thus effectiveness—of the overall counterterrorism strategy may be undermined” (Gottlieb 2010). One example is Obama’s description of the failed 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing suspect in Detroit as an “isolated extremist” despite his ties to al Qaeda (Gottlieb 2010). Another example is the May 2010 failed Times Square bombing in New York City by an American Muslim trained in Pakistan, described as a “one-off ” event, which suggested that the administration was unwilling to speak candidly about the Islamic threat.

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A second policy put in place was the campaign promise to end the Iraq War. Obama had issued his first public statement in disapproval of military intervention in 2002 (NPR 2009), prior to the US invasion. He agreed that Hussein was a repressive, threatening leader but said he did not regard the Iraqi regime as an immediate threat. Moreover, a war would spoil the momentum of international support and sympathy for America that swelled after 9/11, anger Muslims around the world, and potentially create more terrorists through radicalization. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama said that Bush’s refusal to end the war in Iraq gave the terrorists what they wanted—a major grievance due to unlimited American occupation with undetermined consequences. In February 2009, Obama unveiled his Iraq strategy. He pledged an end to the combat mission by September 2010 and complete the withdrawal of all troops by December 31, 2011. The promise was fulfilled, although it should be noted that in November 2008, in the last weeks of the Bush administration, an agreement was reached between the United States and Iraq that specified American troops would leave at the end of 2011. Obama was therefore executing, not creating, a plan (although Bush officials may have been influenced by public sentiment for withdrawal stirred up by the Obama campaign). An extended timeline for the withdrawal of US troops was perhaps expected but never negotiated. As a result, Iraqi military forces were on their own when ISIS-trained soldiers entered their country some two years later, in mid-2014, and seized control of Mosul, the second largest city. In October 2016, a vigorous three-month campaign to retake the city was initiated with the help of American military advisors, equipment, and air support, although the conflict had not been concluded within the expected time frame, organized to fit into Obama’s presidential farewell address in mid-January 2017. The fight, with some success, progressed more slowly. Consistent with another campaign promise, a third change Obama instituted was refocusing and intensifying the struggle against Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border. He deployed, on a short-term basis, more than 21,000 additional troops to the area. He requested an increased contribution from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners and also announced a withdrawal plan envisioning a deadline at the end of 2014, a date later extended to the end of 2016. About 10,000 troops would remain in the country indefinitely due to continuing instability and violence. Obama also initiated a major program of drone strikes, targeted killings, and intensive electronic surveillance (see Bridge and Cash, Chapter 7).These unmanned aerial vehicles aimed at al Qaeda were employed in Afghanistan (more than 1,000 strikes), and more than 500 strikes in Pakistan as well as Yemen and Somalia killed 2,700–4,000 terrorists (Carroll 2016). In contrast, Bush had ordered approximately 60 such strikes. Leon Panetta, CIA chief under Obama, claimed that these strikes were very effective in disrupting

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and confronting al Qaeda leadership. However, General David Petraeus, in testimony before Congress, argued that the drone strikes in Pakistan should stop because of their high-level impact on public opinion and potential recruitment effects for terrorist groups (quoted in McCrisken 2013). Fourth, the Obama administration vowed to close the detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see Kassop, Chapter 6), where captured Islamic radicals were detained.The president issued an executive order to shut down operations but ran into a snag in Congress when the remaining prisoners required transfer to US mainland law enforcement facilities at a cost of $80 million and at perhaps an incalculable political cost for legislators. Ultimately, the number of detainees was reduced but the facility was not closed. Obama did succeed, however, in abolishing the secret prisons (or “black ops sites”) the United States had maintained to hold wartime suspects and in terminating the policy of extraordinary renditions to countries known to torture prisoners. Although Obama pushed Congress to outlaw torture, his position on interrogation techniques was complex and he seemed to prefer case-by-case flexibility (Pious 2011). Continuities

The counterterrorism policies of the Bush administration are not readily distinguishable from those adopted by Obama, according to McCrisken (2011, 2013) and Stern (2015). As McCrisken (2013) argued, the Bush strategy was quietly modified in the last three years before Obama’s accession to the Oval Office. A step change in strategic thinking during 2006 and 2007 meant that Obama adopted a counterterrorism strategy that is late Bush rather than early Bush. In other words, Obama’s changes were in the spirit of adaptations already underway to resolve already-identified problems. And, as the terrorism problem had become institutionalized in US governmental structures by the time Obama came to office, it is difficult for any leader, even one dedicated to change, to seriously challenge the underlying assumptions of a basic conflict. Obama never intended to step back from the struggle against terrorism but only to make it more focused and effective. He shared with Bush the interpretation of the 9/11 events that forced a commitment to continue meeting the threat. Both presidents declared that their number-one duty was to keep America safe, with particular attention to preventing another mass-casualty attack. Obama even revised his language, violating his own preferred concept, “confronting violent extremism,” following the failed Detroit bombing plot. The president said, While passions and politics can often obscure the hard work before us, let’s be clear about what this moment demands. We are at war [emphasis added]. We are at war against al Qaeda, a far-reaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11. . . and is plotting to strike us again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat them. (CNN 2010)

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As Stern (2015) asserted, some of the changes Obama introduced were basically rhetorical or reflected a shift in emphasis rather than a substantive move, although they were framed as corrective responses to the missteps of the Bush years. But both presidents are guilty of some of the charges of human rights abuse in their aggressive counterterrorism policies: Bush for supporting torture and Obama for allowing a high volume of drone strikes that caused the deaths of innocents. Certainly, one of the common goals shared by Bush and Obama in fighting terrorism was the capture of bin Laden, the al Qaeda leader who arranged and ordered the 9/11 attacks. It is open to speculation as to whether both presidents shared equally intense passions for hunting him down. Quoting the former president in 2002, Juan Cole (2011) posited that Bush did not spend much of his presidency looking for bin Laden: “I don’t know where he is. I—I’ll repeat what I said. I truly am not that concerned about him.” In 2006, Bush stated that “bin Laden was not a priority” (Mugsys RapSheet 2006). Obama, in contrast, was determined to find the al Qaeda mastermind and ordered his CIA chief, Leon Panetta, to actively engage in pursuing him as a top priority before the search trail went cold (Bowden 2012). Once bin Laden’s whereabouts had been ascertained, Obama ordered and approved a risky US Navy SEAL raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during the night of May 2, 2011. A small group of soldiers carried out the mission, stormed into bin Laden’s residence, and killed him. The president phoned former president Bush right away to transmit the news. Bush’s response was, “Good call” (Dwyer 2011). Bush later told CNBC that bin Laden’s death was “a great victory in the war on terror: he was held up as a leader” but declined President Obama’s invitation to come to Ground Zero for a ceremony four days after the raid (Dwyer 2011). Ironically, bin Laden’s killing failed to provide Obama with a “rally effect” in public approval. In a Newsweek/Daily Beast poll of 1,200 Americans conducted two days before and two days after the killing of bin Laden, Obama received no overall bump in approval ratings; 48 percent of respondents said Obama deserved more credit than Bush (who got 31 percent) for the al Qaeda leader’s death.Yet when respondents were asked who did better prosecuting the war on terror, results were nearly reversed: 31 percent said Obama, 45 percent said Bush.

Obama’s Legacy on Terrorism Success

The president prioritized the killing of bin Laden, a feat that became the centerpiece of his 2012 reelection effort. As the bumper-sticker slogan read, “Bin Laden is dead and General Motors is alive.” Obama became the star of the story, and while some said he deserved the right to crow about it a little, there were many other issues on the counterterrorism front. He appeared on national television near midnight after the attack had been confirmed

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to deliver the message to the world—a move his foreign policy advisors had cautioned against but his political handlers thought a good idea. He recorded an interview about the bin Laden mission with NBC news. In the heat of the 2012 presidential campaign, his chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, was interviewed on three Sunday morning news shows to discuss the state of al Qaeda a year after bin Laden’s killing. Brennan contended that “the death of bin Laden was our most strategic blow yet against al Qaeda” (Wilson 2012). Campaign officials for Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, noting that the killing was a momentous day for all Americans and crediting the president, asserted, “We are saddened to see the president of the United States politicize that event, even reducing it to a campaign slogan” (quoted in Wilson 2012). In the final analysis, the president received only a brief boost in approval rating in May 2011 after announcing that the al Qaeda leader had been killed. In the 2012 election, he received just 51 percent of the popular vote, dropping 2 percentage points from his 2008 victory. In a November 29, 2016, interview with Rolling Stone, the day after Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the presidential election, Obama was asked about his memories of private moments during his eight years in office. He stated right away that “there have been well-known moments like me walking across the colonnade and hearing the chants of ‘USA’ after we had gotten bin Laden” (Wenner 2016). The killing was the highpoint of Obama’s first term in office, and the event was used as a central factor in his campaign for reelection. But in an interview for The Atlantic in April 2016, in which he defended his decision against critics who labeled him too cautious, Obama lamented, “Nobody remembers bin Laden anymore” (Goldberg 2016, 89). The Killing of Osama bin Laden, a book by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published in April 2016, sought to demystify some of the story line around the al Qaeda leader’s capture through an inside account of the actual chronology of events that contradicted Obama’s public statements. Was bin Laden’s residency discovered via CIA interrogation or other agency effort tracking, or was it volunteered by an informant to collect the $25 million reward the United States had put up? Had bin Laden actually been living in a Pakistani intelligence service safe house in Abbottabad (located a few kilometers from the country’s military academy) for nearly five years, a secret kept from the Americans, their military aid primary benefactors? Did a few military officials in Pakistan secretly assist the United States before, during, and after the raid, to ensure the operation was successful? Hersh (2016) claimed that bin Laden was unarmed and that there was no fight, alongside a host of other allegations. The order was to kill him, not capture him.The terrorist mastermind was shot to death outright, though at this point in his life, he played no role in leading al Qaeda and had limited contact with the world outside his compound—which did not even have Internet access. His body was allegedly not buried at sea, and no Muslim last rites were administered. Indeed, it still not clear what happened to the

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terrorist’s remains. Hersh also alleged an agreement between the United States and Pakistan that the death would be announced about a week after the successful raid occurred. The announcement was to read that bin Laden had been killed in a drone raid in the Hindu Kush on Afghanistan’s side of the border. But the agreement was violated by Obama’s political advisors, who thought it best for the president to appear on television soon after the raid to report the event because it would boost his approval rating, despite the opposition of foreign policy experts worried about the US-Pakistani bilateral relationship—a point confirmed by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2014) in his memoir. There are certainly speculations behind Hersh’s version of events. His reputation for truth-telling is valued (Hersh has also written prize-winning exposés of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and the torture of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib), but his analysis is often criticized for leaps in logic. Still, Obama’s approved version of events seemed to be too neat and laced with sheer improbability that it could have happened. As Mahler (2015) reported, a White House spokesman said Hersh’s story was riddled with inaccuracies and falsehoods, but New York Times correspondent Carlotta Gall confirmed she was told that the Pakistanis were knowledgeable and had supported the raid. Aamir Latif, a foreign correspondent for U.S. News & World Report, had gathered similar evidence of local, official coordination on the ground. Mahler (2015) asked whether the public should be shocked by the conflicting versions of this event, noting that White House public affairs people represent a political entity inside the US government. He concluded that there is no reason to expect the whole truth from the administration about the killing of bin Laden. As an aside, two participating Navy SEALS, Matt Bissonnette and Robert O’Neill, went public with their somewhat contradictory accounts of the operation (forbidden by oath) in an effort to reap financial profits. In August 2016, Bissonnette was ordered to forfeit the nearly $7 million profit from sales of his book No Easy Day, published under the pseudonym Mark Owen (2012), and pay the US government $1.3 million for legal fees in a lawsuit settlement. Failure

In retrospect, Obama’s determination to withdraw all US troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, rather than making strong efforts to extend the troop departure timetable by renegotiating the Bush agreement, seems to have been misguided since it failed to account for the likelihood of future conflict. ISIS emerged in mid-2013, 18 months after the United States had left Iraq, consolidating power as an outgrowth of an al Qaeda affiliate dating from 2006 that fought American and Iraqi troops and waged sectarian war in Iraq. ISIS’s objective is to recreate an Islamic caliphate to take control over the Middle East. As ISIS gained ground among Sunnis alienated from the Shi’ite-controlled Iraqi central government, Obama failed to

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encourage political accommodation that might have dampened the ethnicbased conflict (Wittes 2016). Due to the power vacuum and the reluctance of US-trained Iraqi military forces to engage in conflict, the group has since captured significant territory in parts of Iraq, including Mosul, the second largest city. ISIS has also occupied lawless sections of Syria, a country engaged in anarchic civil war, where the Obama administration failed to see how large-scale refugee flows into Turkey, a NATO ally, might destabilize that country and escalate terrorism incidents sharply. The reputation of ISIS for extreme brutality, its advocacy of shari’a law, and its social media prowess in recruiting fighters, young supporters, and some American Muslims underscores its terrorist reach and threat. The ISIS strategy for self-sustaining revenue includes oil production, smuggling, ransoms from kidnappings, and extortions. In the 2015 annual report on terrorism, the US State Department declared that ISIS was becoming a greater threat than al Qaeda. By the end of Obama’s presidency, it had carried out attacks in 21 countries and killed around 1,400 people (CNN 2016), including attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Istanbul. The al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced the group in 2014 (for its violent brutality), around the same time the United States began military action against ISIS in response to the threat posed by its expansion and the shock of videos that depicted the actual beheading of American hostages. But the United States hesitated to take major, aggressive action under Obama. Initially, the United States planned to train moderate Syrian rebels committed to fighting ISIS, but the program failed. Later, the United States decided to provide ammunition and weapons for groups already engaged in the battle. A tragic irony is that a president elected and reelected on a platform of ending US participation in wars against Muslims in Iraq and in Afghanistan— situations he inherited and swore to avoid—left office with an escalating war against a vague terrorist enemy and without a clear strategy to avoid sliding into future involvement (Wittes 2016).The idea that the shadow of the crisis of terrorism has passed, as Obama opined in his 2015 State of the Union address, seemed out of date just several years later. Trends: Homegrown Anti-American Terrorism

The Obama administration was confronted by a new phenomenon: the self-radicalized, locally based terrorist. Under the Bush administration, there were fewer domestic attacks motivated by Islamic causes than in the Obama years. Homegrown, lone-wolf attacks reflect perhaps a shift in strategy by terrorists so that individuals acting alone or in groups might fall under the radar of the national security apparatus post-9/11. At least four attacks in the United States resulting in multiple deaths and numerous injuries were carried out under the guise of radical Islam. All of them attracted significant media attention and public speech reactions from Obama. In November 2009 in Fort Hood, Texas, an Army major, a Muslim

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of Palestinian heritage who was headed for duty in Afghanistan, shot and killed 13 people on the military base; in April 2013, during the Boston Marathon, two radicalized Muslim brothers from Central Asia planted explosives that killed four people and injured about 180; in San Bernardino, California, on December 2, 2015, a married couple, Muslims of Pakistani origin, used machine guns to kill 14 people at a workplace Christmas party; and in a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in early June 2016, a shooter of Muslim Afghan parentage, who had worked as a security guard, killed 49 partygoers. The timing of this event was not lost on Republican and Democratic presidential campaign operatives gearing up for the 2016 presidential race. The terrorists in all these cases had shown signs of self-radicalization before committing their violent, destructive acts. And while just 94 Americans had died from terrorism in the United States on Obama’s watch, a far smaller number than during the Bush administration (which includes the 9/11 casualties), more lone-wolf terrorist incidents arose, most involving firearms. Significant questions were brought to the fore. Were these attacks motivated by a homegrown Islam-based terrorism or self-hatred extended outward to the world? Or were these acts of random gun violence? A deadly combination of some extremist views (black-and-white thinking) and easy gun access may have sealed the fate of future tragedies, and Obama was short on prescriptions or promises for new, corrective action. Obama’s efforts to achieve any legislation in gun control were unsuccessful. Battling the gun lobby would require not only public speeches and rhetorical persuasion but also hard political bargaining, something which he tended to avoid throughout his two terms. President Obama stated in an interview with CNN in August 2011 that his biggest concern was not the launching of a major terrorist operation, but the lone wolf, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out large-scale massacres: When you’ve got one person who is deranged or driven by hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it’s a lot harder to trace those lone-wolf operators, so we’re spending a lot of time monitoring and gathering information. (UK Telegraph 2011) A program launched by the Obama administration in an effort to undermine the jihadist narrative and reduce recruitment for homegrown terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism, has not shown effectiveness thus far. The White House unveiled the strategy to counter radicalization in late summer 2011.The plan focused on community engagement, better training, and counternarratives. A major conference followed in February 2015 and was attended by representatives from more than 60 countries to discuss issues of recruitment and appeal, as well as means to reduce ISIS’s social media effectiveness. In July 2016, the Obama administration invited proposals on

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CVE ideas, distributing $10 million in grants to organizations for that purpose. The two-year awards were announced on January 13, 2017, just days before Obama’s term expired. So far, the inchoate CVE agenda has no meaningful influence on counterterrorism, and it is unclear how it would shape policies. “Can we move from talk to walk?” asked one official, who noted that there is broad consensus on the need for CVE efforts in the United States and also in the United Nations but that considerable political and practical challenges remain (Rosand 2016). There is a need to diminish the allure of violent extremism and prevent people from joining the terrorist cause in the first place—the key is getting ahead of the threat. Obama’s speech on February 19, 2015, at a White House summit urged everyone to “confront the warped ideology espoused by terrorists,” “address the grievances, including economic grievances,” and “build and bolster bridges of communication and trust.” But, as one Pentagon general suggested, the ISIS movement is anchored in an idea that Western policymakers do not yet understand, and it is difficult to defeat an idea without grasping its full communicative meaning. A US government report that reviewed research on CVE metrics in prevention, disengagement, and deradicalization programs (Mastroe and Szmania 2016) concluded that current literature does not include program evaluation data. One suggestion for preventive programs is supporting community resilience through outreach initiatives that promote dialogue. The CVE program is built on hope, not on evidence of effectiveness—a hallmark of Obama’s leadership approach in which words outflank deeds. It could become a bipartisan matter, as both Democrats and Republicans endorse it. But it remains an open question whether useful policies emerge that are applied to prevent future terrorism. Trends: International Anti-American Terrorism

During the Bush years, several mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the West or against prominent Western targets occurred: notably the Bali nightclub explosion in 2002, killing more than 200 people; the 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid, resulting in 192 casualties; London transportation bombings in 2005 that killed 53 and wounded more than 700; and the Mumbai attack against luxury hotels and restaurants in November 2008 that killed 209. These notable acts of violence were felt in the United States: the country determined to lead global efforts in counterterrorism had failed to foil each attack. During Obama’s tenure, the most dramatic acts of such terrorism happened in NATO countries closely allied with America, but these events were clustered in a short time frame. In Paris, two separate acts of violence occurred in 2015, the first in January (17 people died) and the second in November (nearly 140 people died). Another attack happened in Belgium in March 2016, with 35 deaths reported, and a fourth was the Berlin market truck crash on December 19, 2016, which led to 12 fatalities.

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Aggregated death tolls from terrorism incidents were higher during the Bush administration than in Obama’s time, although numerous small events occurred frequently in parts of the third world (against the United States or other targets) under both presidents without a discernable pattern of growth or decline. From the US perspective, however, the most dramatic terrorism event beyond US shores happened in 2012 at the US outpost in Benghazi, Libya, on the night of the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks—just weeks before Obama was elected to his second term in office.The attack was coordinated by a local Islamic militant group, Ansar al-Sharia, and four Americans died: US Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other US officials. (The US had lost seven ambassadors in the line of duty at that point, four to terrorism during the 1970s; the last, Adolph Dubs, the US ambassador to Afghanistan, was killed in 1979.) The primary story that unfolded in the aftermath of this event seemed driven mostly by partisan politics, pitting the Obama administration against Republican lawmakers in Congress and igniting issues of national security in two presidential campaigns: in 2012, when Obama ran as an incumbent, and in 2016, when his former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, ran as a Democrat (she lost, partially because of the treatment of this particular issue). Initially, Obama officials said that the Libyan terrorism was more or less spontaneous, that it developed out of a mob protest inspired by an anti-Islam YouTube video made in the United States by an Egyptian Copt, a Christian, and just represented out-of-control anger turned to violence from a few al Qaeda forces. This portrayal was woven by the administration and paraded a short time later in interviews on Sunday morning news programs. But by that time, it was already known that the attack was premeditated and wellplanned by a group under surveillance and that US security forces did not respond quickly or adequately, and these errors led to the ultimate success of the terrorist attacks, an outcome that embarrassed the Obama administration. Partisan barbs quickly emerged. Obama officials were accused of lying to the public to protect the administration’s self-image as running a successful counterterrorism policy in the heat of the presidential election. Republican members of Congress were accused of overzealousness in pursuing security errors that could be traced to the presidency. Snopes, an investigative fact-checking group with a reputation for reliability and evenhandedness, drew comparisons between the Reagan, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations on US embassy attacks, resultant deaths, and investigations. They discovered that under Reagan, 10 embassy attacks occurred, one ambassador was killed, 18 CIA officers lost their lives, and Congress held but a single investigation; under Bush, there were 13 embassy attacks and 66 deaths, including three American diplomats, but no investigations followed.The Obama years were different: two embassy attacks, four American deaths and 13 investigations. In the last one, an 800-page report was released at the end of June 2016 on Benghazi. (The report did not find

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evidence of wrongdoing against Clinton but alleged a lack of preparedness among administration officials the night the attack happened, although Clinton criticisms by Republicans were rampant throughout her 2016 bid for the presidency.) With respect to Obama’s “rhetorical presidency” approach, an intrepid investigative reporter for the Washington Post took a close look at the president’s language used in describing the Benghazi violence, noting that during a 2012 debate with Republican nominee Mitt Romney, “Obama claimed he told the American people that the killings were ‘an act of terror.’ But now he says he called it ‘an act of terrorism’ ” (Kessler 2013). Kessler asked whether a difference exists between the two phrases. He found that the president did not affirmatively say that Ambassador Stevens died because of an “act of terror,” and when given opportunities to clarify his position, that what happened in Libya was an “act of terrorism,” the president ducked the question. Kessler concluded that a president does not simply utter a phrase characterizing a major international incident without careful thought about the implications of each word, speculating that perhaps Obama viewed it as an “act of war” but did not wish to state that publicly, or perhaps he did not want to damage his campaign theme that terrorist groups like al Qaeda were on the run by conceding that anti-American terrorism had occurred in Libya, precisely at the time of 9/11 remembrances. In Obama’s view, language has consequences. Perhaps he intended to minimize political blow-back. Administration officials argued that these definition quibbles were insignificant. As to the terrorists involved in the violent attacks in Libya, one leader, Ahmed Abu Khatalla, captured in June 2014, is currently incarcerated in the United States. Another, Mohammed al-Zahawi, was killed in an ambush with local Libyan forces in 2015. No one else was captured or killed. The United States did not retaliate after the attacks. In Libya, what became a country in chaos with jihadist training grounds, officials apologized.

Obama on Terrorism: An Early Assessment Who killed more terrorists—Bush or Obama? In a Fox News Sunday interview on April 10, 2016, Obama claimed, “there isn’t a president who’s taken more terrorists off the field than me, over the last seven and a half years. . . . So, let’s be very clear about how much I prioritize this. This is my No. 1 job” (quoted in Carroll 2016). Truth-o-Meter decided to investigate Obama’s statement, finding that only he and Bush had extended campaigns against terrorists. So, the question becomes, Did Obama kill more than Bush? Under a strict definition, Bush likely killed more combatants, but Obama engaged in more targeted attacks (drone strikes), meaning his operations likely killed more people who would be considered terrorists, according to security expert Paul Pillar (Carroll 2016). From various sources, the kill rate tallies come to this: During the Bush administration,

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about 24,000 enemy combatants were killed in Iraq, from 2003–2009; during the Obama administration, more than 26,000 ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria were killed. In another accounting, some 65,800 to 88,600 terrorists have been killed since fighting started in the early years of the 21st century, and Obama is responsible for a little less than half by that count. Al Qaeda’s growth since 2009 and the emergence of ISIS would explain why more strict-sense “terrorists” were killed on Obama’s watch as the environment became target-rich (Carroll 2016). What was the homegrown terrorist threat under Obama? A data set collected on US domestic terrorist attacks from January 2009 through February 2016, during seven years of the Obama administration, lists 32 terrorist attacks within the United States (  Johnston 2016). These events resulted in 83 fatalities and 402 injuries, according to archivist Wm. Robert Johnston, who recorded that Obama acknowledged just three as terrorism and described two as workplace violence (including the 2009 Fort Hood shooting by Nidal Malik Hasan), condemned 14 others as acts of violence, called one other a tragedy, and issued no statements on the remaining 12. Johnson recorded 19 Islam-motivated, lone-wolf violence events on his list over the seven years, as shown in Appendix A. (In comparison, during each of those years, more than 350 murders occurred in New York City and an average of about 50 murders were recorded in Denver, Colorado). Out of this isolated group, it appears that seven terrorist events arose from American citizens with long US roots while immigrants or male offspring of immigrants from a variety of Islamic countries carried out 12 events. In all cases, there were indications of troubled minds, anger, a fascination with firearms, or asocial behavior noticeable to others before the acts of terrorism were committed, rendering the separation between politically motivated action and personally motivated action justified by proclaiming a religious cause quite difficult. Does this list portend a growing problem of threatening terrorism? It seems, at first look, to contain somewhat unrelated events; it’s not a long list, and the frequency of recorded lone-wolf terrorism events does not appear to be growing. Yet, the mind may see a frightening randomness instilling irrational fear that one’s personal safety is constantly threatened. Deciding what constitutes a purely political act of terrorism, and distinguishing between extreme acts of personal distress or suicidal tendencies and raw criminal activity, involves deep contextualized assessment. Expert opinion may differ. It is thus somewhat unclear what this list represents—whether it is far too short or far too long to convey the extent of the homegrown terrorism threat under the Obama years or how it should be used in evaluating Obama’s counterterrorism policy. But the information can provide a least one benchmark in following when and how the president decided to issue public statements in response to the events, and what message he tried to convey. Together with the highlighted international terrorism events, it is also possible to find out how public opinion views on terrorism moved (see Conley, Chapter 10).

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Finally, how did Obama try to influence public views on terrorism? The argument of the “rhetorical presidency” is that words change opinion. The argument of “political time” and leadership style is that American presidents are limited in policy action to some extent by structural forces put in place by their immediate predecessor. Since Bush was a transformative leader, a maximalist operating under “politics of reconstruction,” it might be expected that Obama’s profile of presidential action would resemble transactional leadership, a retrenchment of international obligations, and a “politics of preemption” approach, differentiating his plan from the practice of his predecessor, even though he aspired in his initial presidential campaign to transform the nation. The Obama policy was intent on drawing unity of purpose in execution, reverting back to the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when Americans lined up together with minimal dissent and low levels of polarization. The president began charting a separate course, his own, as his first term was ending and the 2012 presidential campaign competition intensifying; a new page in US counterterrorism history was begun. The rollout was intended to be smooth and linear—al Qaeda was reduced in strength and threatening power, US relations with the Arab-Muslim world were improved, and democracy and human rights were taking root in Iraq and Afghanistan, amid a growing sense of harmony in American domestic relations and its foreign policy. The plan—an optimistic expression—sounded good.Terrorism was under control. But no American wish list or initiatives could control the undercurrent of dissent, dissatisfaction, resentment, and quest for power that characterized the seemingly sudden rise of ISIS forces—more radical in ideology than their al Qaeda parent organization, more violent in behavior than other terrorist organizations (beheading foreign journalists and Christians, for example), more talented in organizing and managing statelike institutions for law and financing that showed their skills—a formidable cadre of fighters against the West that operated a highly effective recruitment program drawing bright Muslim youth from around the world to join their cause.This sparked-up, fast engine of terrorism practice spread quickly; from mid-2014 until the end of Obama’s term, the new threat loomed over his counterterrorism efforts, dampening its effectiveness and calling into question assessment of American national and international security once again, although Obama officials were quick to declare that ISIS was not an existential threat (drawing the implication that al Qaeda-sponsored terrorism, its predecessor whose power had been substantially curbed, seemed to have been in that category). As Bush had stated at the conclusion of his term of office—that America is safer because of his policies in countering terrorism, but the world is not yet safe—Obama essentially repeated the message, another example of issue prominence and continuity of the terrorism importance across the two administrations.

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In speeches, Obama rested his case on oration-talk and spoke in language illustrating Skowronek’s (2008, 2011) “politics of articulation.” He continued Bush’s policies and views in the early years and then engaged in the “politics of preemption” by pursuing themes aimed at forging his own path in leading the nation’s counterterrorism efforts. Notably, Obama reiterated basic operation norms and operating premises on US counterterrorism formulated by Bush as he introduced specifics of his new programs and direction. Excerpts from a number of Obama’s public remarks are juxtaposed with Bush legacy statements (Appendix B) to illustrate this dynamic. These selected passages from Obama’s speeches illustrate how he came to adopt Skowronek’s (2008, 2011) “politics of preemption” approach in outlining and defending his counterterrorism strategy. Moreover, at the beginning, Obama made clear reference to drawing on the Bush legacy in the war on terror, reflecting “politics of articulation,” demonstrating that the issue of terrorism would remain a prominent one in his administration. Faced with the ISIS threat and political pressures to respond to it, Obama went public to describe the specifics of his strategy and, at the end of his term, defended his approach in ways that seem reminiscent of his 2008 campaign, particularly his articulated optimism, but without the sense of transformational leadership or the “politics of reconstruction.” What were the effects of Obama’s statements on public opinion? Did his popularity rise or fall as a result of his oration? The simple answer is that his words had very little impact. The great orator, the impassioned speaker whose rhetorical skills brought him to the presidency in 2008, did not move public perceptions about terrorism or counterterrorism strategy once he was in the highest office of the land. As Conley (Chapter 10) shows through polling data, a majority of the public disapproved of Obama’s handling of foreign policy generally and terrorism specifically as he entered his second term. Did Obama’s speeches following particular domestic terrorism tragedies boost his approval ratings? Yes and no, but in all cases, there were marginal differences. Following the Fort Hood shootings, Obama’s approval ratings inched up a few points; in the case of the Boston bombers and San Bernardino shooters, it moved down just a little; and comparing before and after the Orlando nightclub violence shows basically no effect. Neither acts of terrorism nor what Obama said about reacting to terrorism and presenting new counterterrorism proposals seems to have made a difference in the public’s sense of safety and fear.

Conclusion Terrorism became a centerpiece in US foreign policy and national security in the immediate post-9/11 environment of American political life and is likely to be kept at that level for the near future. Obama’s election campaign rhetoric of 2008 did not stress ending the war on terror or reversing

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the foreign policy of the Bush administration but sought strategic changes aimed at fighting better and cleaner (McCrisken 2011). Obama’s inheritance from the Bush era required him to maintain a solid, strong devotion to fighting against the terrorism phenomenon, to show he was not weak in efforts aimed at confronting the enemy, and to shore up defenses through offensive actions such as drone attacks. He could not pull back, but he could redirect, moving pieces into place to ensure greater effectiveness. His election in “political time” (Skowronek 2011) relegated his position to a “preemptive” politician. Obama came to the presidency as a transformationalist (Burns 1978; Nye 2013), a leader intending to practice the “politics of reconstruction” (Skowronek 2008, 2011) to change the system and alter the course of direction in terrorism policy. Westen (2011) suggested that he stepped into a cycle of American history, a chance for a possible charismatic reformer to lead renewal, but his deep-seated aversion to conflict and his profound failure to understand bully dynamics—where conciliation is always the wrong course of action because bullies perceive it as weakness and just punch harder the next time—broke the arc of history bent toward justice, likely bending it backward instead. Was he not up to the task by virtue of his lack of experience? Perhaps, as Westen (2011) speculated, Obama intended to change the political dialogue in a manner that would rise above Republican and Democratic Party bickering by consistently choosing the message of bipartisanship, by stressing national unity over the message of confrontation. The widely unrealistic expectations that accompanied Obama’s ascendency into the high office, however, were simply beyond reach. Extraordinary measures were required to begin undoing the extraordinarily destructive Bush legacy, but Obama proved mostly incapable of them. He did not transform the world; the world transformed him. His war on terror was renamed as countering violent extremism, based on special operations and drone strikes rather than torture and ground invasions, but it was also subject to few restraints. Obama chose to eliminate enemies of the United States while avoiding land wars or public scrutiny. His vision of international diplomacy stressed the virtues of candid dialogue, mutual respect, and bridge building, but the world became more tribal, with more ancient loyalties. “Despite the best of intentions,” Shatz (2017) argued, “and for all his fine words, Mr. Obama became one of the midwifes of this dangerous and angry new world, where his enlightened cosmopolitanism increasingly looks like an anachronism.” Obama’s greater problem is that he failed to convince Americans that the threat of terrorism has been widely overhyped, according to Drezner (2016), who viewed the president’s grand strategy as de-emphasizing terrorism and the Middle East. The Obama administration continued policies of the Bush administration, blunting any charges that he would be weak on terrorism—a strategy of political survival entirely consistent with a “preemptive” presidency. While President Obama seemed to acknowledge that his administration underestimated the power and force of ISIS incursions into Syria

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and Iraq (he initially dismissed these fighters as a “JV team”; see Contorno 2014), his September 2014 speech to the nation presented a clear, detailed strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS though a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism plan. Obama’s foreign policy goals extended beyond the world he inherited. On Afghanistan, all of Obama’s speeches from 2009 emphasized withdrawal but scrapped his plan for full troop departure after former officials signed an open letter calling on him to repudiate his withdrawal policy and keep US troops in Afghanistan past 2016. The intention to withdraw in order to pressure the corrupt, intransigent Afghan government to reform did not work. The Taliban proved stubbornly resilient. On the home front, Obama was trying to engage oppositional elites, but they were not listening, so he went to the public as a great orator—but his strategy of appeal brought no changes. As Mueller and Stewart (2016) remarked in their analysis of public opinion polls, no change was really possible on the sticky terrorism issue—9/11 was a dramatic, tragic event. Although it may be an aberration in trends of terrorist attacks, it is permanently etched in American memory. The fear of terrorism and appropriate ways to counter this violence became a partisan issue. Obama was perhaps first in a line of presidents who will have to follow in that post-9/11 setting so long as the threat is not eradicated. His presidential leadership style was not transformative in spite of aspirational efforts; nor was his approach effectively transactional due to his conflict aversion. As a president operating within the “politics of preemption,” his only alternative, in light of his predecessor’s transformational leadership in setting a fundamental strategy for counterterrorism, was to attempt to chart a third course. The threat of al Qaeda diminished under his rule, and the Iraq War stalemate ended—both significant accomplishments. The rise of ISIS and homegrown terrorism were unanticipated developments, however, independent from the Bush legacy and Obama’s own initial strategic plan that ushered him into office. When he departed, the effects of his new initiatives were still unknown.

Future Challenges Why and how future presidents attempt to change the terrorism policies of their predecessor—and their ultimate success—is a central question in evaluating presidential leadership in the post-9/11 world. But as this research accentuates, it is imperative to juxtapose presidential rhetoric—both on the campaign trail and in the White House—with policymaking and empirical outcomes. Such analysis may elucidate the particular type of leadership presidents can exercise within the ebb and flow of historical and structural dynamics in the American political system. The new Trump administration poses a particularly important challenge for scholars on this front. Trump’s 2016 campaign repeatedly assigned blame to Obama for instability in the Middle East and the rise of ISIS in Syria

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and Iraq. With respect to ISIS, during a speech in November 2015, Trump asserted that the United States was losing the war on terror and that, as president, he would “quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of ISIS” (  Johnson 2015), a phrase that was parlayed into a popular radio advertisement for the campaign. Further, in a major speech in August 2016 in which Trump outlined his counterterrorism policy vision, he rejected the notion of regime change and nation building abroad, called on US allies including NATO to do more, proposed “ideological warfare” against radicalism with historical reference to the battle for hearts and minds during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and pledged to revamp immigration policies (Politico 2016). In the first six months of his administration, Trump has not bombed ISIS to smithereens, and rhetoric may have met reality. Indeed, the two military operations Trump ordered were measured: a terror raid in Yemen and the precision bombing of a Syrian air base after revelations that the Assad regime had once gain used chemical weapons against its citizenry. Moreover, the tough rhetoric on NATO as an obsolete alliance was forsworn after meetings with Transatlantic leaders, praise for their support of the Syrian air attacks, and pledges to do more to combat international terrorism. Threats to reduce military aid to Japan and denunciations of China as a “currency manipulator” have evaporated in light of successive ballistic missile tests by the North Koreans and Trump’s quest to secure pan-Asian sanctions and solidarity against Kim Jong-Un’s regime. Finally, whereas Trump called for a Muslim ban during the campaign, his two executive orders on immigration (both challenged in federal court) targeted six nations—all of which had been identified by the Obama administration as trouble spots for terrorism. Whether Trump’s counterterrorism policies and actions ultimately prove incremental, preemptive, or reconstructive over the next four years will tell us much of his style of presidential leadership and the evolving nature of the rhetorical presidency.

References Al Arabiya. 2009. “Obama Tells Al Arabiya Peace Talks Should Resume.” January 27. www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/27/65087.html Balkin, Jack M. 2012. “What It Will Take for Barack Obama to Become the Next FDR.” The Atlantic, November 1. www.theatlantic.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Bowden, Mark. 2012. “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo’.” Vanity Fair, October 12. www.vanity fair.com/news/politics/2012/11/inside-osama-bin-laden-assassination-plot. Accessed January 5, 2017. Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper and Row. Bush, George W. 2001. “Presidential Address.” September 20. http://edition.cnn.com/ 2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ Carroll, Lauren. 2016. “Who Killed More Terrorists, Obama or Bush? It Depends.” TruthO-Meter, April 18. www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/. Accessed January 5, 2017.

Terrorism Strategy Shifts 71 Ceaser, James W., Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette. 1981. “The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 11: 158–171. CNN. 2010. “Transcript: Obama Outlines Steps to Prevent Terrorism.” January 7.www. cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/07/transcript.obama.terror.report/index.html CNN. 2016. “A New CNN/ORC Poll Finds 71% of Americans Say Further Acts of Terrorism Are Very or Somewhat Likely.” June 23. www.cnn.com. Accessed December 15, 2016. Cole, Juan. 2011. “Top Ten Myths About Bin Laden’s Death.” Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History and Religion. www.juancole.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Contorno, Steve. 2014. “What Obama Said About Islamic State as a ‘JV’ Team.” Politi fact, September 7. www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/sep/07/barackobama/what-obama-said-about-islamic-state-jv-team/ Democracy Now. 2017. “Intercept Exposé on How SEAL Team 6 Killed Osama bin Laden, ‘Canoeing’ and Other Atrocities.” January 11. https://democracynow.org. Accessed January 5, 2017. Drezner, Daniel W. 2016. “Five Thoughts on the Obama Doctrine.” The Washington Post, March 11. www.thewashingtonpost.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Dwyer, Devin. 2011.“George W. Bush Gives First Public Reaction to Bin Laden Death.” ABC News, May 13. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/george-bush-reacts-publicly-osamabin-laden-death/story?id=13592860 Edwards, George C. III. 2009. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gates, Robert. 2014. Duty. New York:Vintage Books. Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic, April. www.theatlantic.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Gottlieb, Stuart. 2010. “War on Terror: Obama Softened the Language, But Hardened Muslim Hearts.” The Christian Scientist Monitor, October 14. www.csmonitor.com. Accessed December 15, 2016. Greenblat, Alan. 2012. “The Not-So-Great Communicator: Is Obama Overrated as a Speaker?” National Public Radio, October 15. www.npr.org. Accessed January 5, 2017. Hart, Roderick P. 2008. “Thinking Harder About Presidential Discourse: The Question of Efficacy.” In The Prospect of Presidential Rhetoric, eds. James Arnt Aune and Martin J. Medhurst. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press. Hersh, Seymour M. 2016. The Killing of Osama bin Laden. London:Verso Publishing. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Desmond S. King. 2010. “Varieties of Obamaism: Structure, Agency, and the Obama Presidency.” Perspectives on Politics 8: 793–802. Johnson, Jenna. 2015. “Donald Trump Promises to ‘Bomb the Hell out of ISIS’ in New Radio Ad.” Washington Post, November 18. www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/11/18/donald-trump-promises-to-bomb-the-hell-out-of-isis-innew-radio-ad/?utm_term=.6f8085f8397a Johnston, Wm. Robert. 2016. “Obama White House Statements on Domestic Terrorist Attacks.” www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/obamaonterorism1.html. Accessed December 1, 2016. Kessler, Glenn. 2013.“Obama’s claim he called Benghazi an ‘act of terrorism’.” Washington Post, May 13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamasclaim-he-called-benghazi-an-act-of-terrorism/2013/05/13/7b65b83e-bc14-11e297d4-a479289a31f9_blog.html?utm_term=.880973f7e63a

72  Chapter 3 Kusnet, David. 2016. “Obama Is the Nation’s Orator-in-Chief, and He Deserves the Title and the Accolades.” The Guardian, January 12. www.theguardian.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Kuttner, Robert. 2011. “Barack Obama’s Theory of Power.” The American Prospect 22, May 10. http://prospect.org/article/barack-obamas-theory-power Maggio, J. 2007. “The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately After 9/11.” Politics and Policy 35: 810–35. Mahler, Jonathan. 2015. “What Do We Really Know About Osama bin Laden’s Death?” The New York Times Magazine, October 15. http://nyti.ms.1/VTVp1G. Accessed January 5, 2017. Martosko, David, and Frencesca Chambers. 2016. “ ‘Let’s Move On’: Hillary’s Blithe Response After Devastating Congress Report Reveals She Lied and Lied Again About What Caused US Ambassador to Die in Benghazi.” The Daily Mail, June 28. www. dailymail.co/ul/news/article. Accessed January 5, 2017. Mastroe, Caitlin and Susan Szmania. 2016. “Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. McCrisken, Trevor. 2011. “Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice.” International Affairs 87: 781–801. McCrisken, Trevor. 2013. “Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice.” In Obama’s Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror, eds. Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland. London and New York: Routledge. Mueller, John, and Mark G. Stewart. 2016. “American Public Opinion on Terrorism Since 9/11:Trends and Puzzles.” Presented at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 17–21. Mugsys RapSheet. 2006. “Bush Truly Not Concerned About Bin Laden (short version).” August 11. www.youtube.com/watch?v=4PGmnz5Ow-o NPR (National Public Radio). 2009. “Transcript: Obama’s Speech Against the Iraq War.” January 20. www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469 Nye, Joseph. 2013. Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Nye, Joseph. 2013a. “Do Presidents Really Steer Foreign Policy?” The Atlantic, June. www.theatlantic.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Ostermeier, Eric. 2015. “Obama Has Mentioned Terrorism More Than 3,000 Times as President.” Smart Politics, December 1. editions.lib.umn.edu. Accessed January 5, 2017. Owen, Mark. 2012. No Easy Day: The Autobiography of a Navy SEAL. New York: Dutton Penguin. Parsons, Christi, and W. J. Hennigan. 2017. “President Obama,Who Hoped to Sow Peace, Instead Led the Nation Into War.” Los Angeles Times. www.latimes.com. Accessed January 20, 2017. Pew Research Center. 2017. “How America Changed During Obama Presidency: % Approving of President’s Job Performance, by Party.” January 10. www.pewresearch. org. Accessed January 20, 2017. Pious, Richard M. 2011. “Prerogative Power in the Obama Administration: Continuity and Change in the War on Terrorism.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41: 263–290. Plant, Alex. 2013. “Woodrow Wilson’s Place in Political Time: A Critique of Stephen Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents Make.” Writing Excellence Award Winners. Paper 47. http://soundideas.pudgetsoune.edu/writing_awards/47. Accessed January 5, 2017.

Terrorism Strategy Shifts 73 Politico. 2016. “Full Text: Donald Trump’s Speech on Fighting Terrorism.” August 15. www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-terrorism-speech-227025 Rosand, Eric. 2016. “The Global CVE Agenda: Can We Move From Talk to Walk?” Brookings Institution Newsletter, April 20. www.brookings.edu. Accessed January 5, 2017. Ryfe, David Michael. 2005. Presidents in Culture: The Meaning of Presidential Communication. New York: Peter Lang. Sarfo, Emmanuel, and Ewuresi Agyeiwaa Krampa. 2013. “Language at War: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Speeches of Bush and Obama on Terrorism.” International Journal of Social Science and Education 3: 378–390. Sestanovich, Stephen. 2014. Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama. New York: Alfred A Knopf. Shatz, Adam 2017. “Obama Hoped to Transform the World. It Transformed Him.” The New York Times Magazine, January 12. https://nyti.ms/2/AAa30. Accessed January 20, 2017. Shogan, Colleen. 2006. The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 2008. Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Skowronek, Stephen. 2011. Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal. 2nd Edition. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas. Skowronek, Stephen. 2014. “Twentieth-Century Remedies.” Boston University Law Review 94: 795–805. Stern, Jessica. 2015. “Obama and Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs 94: 62–70. Tran, Mark. 2009. “War on Terror—a Term That No Longer Applies.” The Guardian, January 15. www.theguardian.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Tulis, Jeffrey. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton University Press. UK Telegraph. 2011. “Barack Obama Fears a ‘Lone Wolf ’ Extremist Attack More Than al-Qaeda Spectacular.” August 17.www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/baracko bama/8705719/Barack-Obama-fears-a-lone-wolf-extremist-attack-more-than-alQaeda-spectacular.html US National Security Strategy. 2002. Washington, DC: The White House. www.state. gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf US National Security Strategy. 2015. Washington, DC: The White House. https://obama whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf Wenner, Jann. 2016. “The Day After: Obama on His Legacy, Trump’s Win and the Path Forward.” Rolling Stone Magazine, November 29. Westen, Drew. 2011. “What Happened to Obama?” New York Times, August 6. www. nytimes.com. Accessed January 5, 2017. Wilson, Scott. 2012. “Obama Strategy of Taking Credit for Osama bin Laden Killing Risky, Observers Say.” The Washington Post, April 30. www.washingtonpost.org. Accessed January 5, 2017. Wittes, Tamara Cofman. 2016. “The Slipperiest Slope of the All.” The Atlantic, March 12. www.theatlantic.com. Accessed January 20, 2017. Zarefsky, David. 2004. “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34(3): 607–620.

4 Military Initiatives by President Obama Louis Fisher

President Barack Obama inherited from the outgoing administration an ongoing war in Afghanistan and an unstable political system in Iraq following the decision of President George W. Bush to use military force in the region. Bush’s decision was based on six claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, with all claims later found to be empty. Moreover, a quick military victory in Iraq was followed by two decisions that left the country greatly weakened, both politically and economically: disbanding the Iraqi army and the process of de-Baathification that drove from government key figures needed to carry out essential public functions. The removal of Hussein resulted in open hostilities between the Shia and the Sunni religious factions that remain a destabilizing force today. In 2011, Obama decided to use military force against Libya for the ostensible purpose of protecting civilians threatened by President Muammar Qaddafi. Instead of seeking statutory authority from Congress, Obama went to the UN Security Council for a resolution to use military action to safeguard civilian lives. Intervention shifted from that objective to regime change, resulting in the removal and death of Qaddafi and a country so weakened that it became a breeding ground for terrorism in the Middle East. Military action intended to last for a brief period of a week or two stretched month after month until it exceeded the 60–90-day limit of the War Powers Resolution (WPR), forcing Obama to ask the Office of Legal Counsel for a supportive memo, which it refused to provide. With the discovery in 2014 that Syria had used chemical weapons against its own people, Obama was prepared to send Tomahawk missiles into Damascus. However, he decided to seek authorizing legislation from Congress, announcing to the public that such action would better comport with constitutional principles. After extensive debate, Congress decided it would not provide such authority. Although Obama claimed he could act unilaterally without statutory support, he did not pursue that course. Instead, he was able to remove chemical weapons from Syria with the assistance of Russia and other countries. Military action over the next few years by the United States, Russia, and other countries caused great destruction in Syria and sent millions of Syrian citizens to other countries seeking asylum.

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Amid continuing difficulties to stabilize Afghanistan, the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ultimately led Obama to order air strikes and work with Kurdish and Iraqi forces. After claiming that he possessed sufficient legal authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2001 and the AUMF of 2002, he sent draft legislation to Congress for it to consider. Members did not act on that draft or consider an alternative bill. The lack of express statutory authority for the war against the Islamic State prompted Captain Nathan Michael Smith to file a lawsuit in 2016, claiming that under the oath he took to obey the Constitution, he could not carry out military orders for an illegal war. This chapter assesses the strategic context of Obama’s presidency in regard to military interventions and the considerable constitutional questions raised by his actions. The analysis commences with a review of Obama’s articulation of constitutional principles regarding presidential use of military force in the Middle East and highlights differences in approach and substance compared to Bush, his predecessor. Continuity with both presidents includes the tension between the search for multilateralism, the imperative of protecting civilians, shifting objectives of regime change, the question of the necessity of congressional approval, and unilateral action within the American constitutional tradition. The balance of the chapter examines in greater depth Obama’s approach to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the Islamic State.The analysis then comes full circle to analyze a legal and constitutional challenge to Obama’s military actions in Syria.The final section briefly considers the Obama legacy on military interventions and the early actions of President Donald Trump.

Constitutional Principles During the presidential campaign in 2007, Charlie Savage of the Boston Globe put a number of questions to Obama about the scope of presidential power in national security affairs. The candidate described presidential power in terms far narrower than those articulated by President Bush. Savage asked, “In what circumstances, if any, would the president have constitutional authority to bomb Iran without seeking a use-of-force authorization from Congress?” (Savage 2007, 1). Obama replied that the president “does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation” (para. 00). He explained that the president, as commander in chief, “does have a duty to protect and defend the United States” in cases of self-defense, but history “has shown us time and again” that military action “is most successful when it is authorized and supported by the Legislative branch.” It is “always preferable,” Obama said, “to have the informed consent of Congress prior to any military action” (Savage 2007, 1). With regard to military actions against Iran, Obama said that he had introduced S.J.Res.23, stating in part that “any offensive military action taken by

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the United States against Iran must be explicitly authorized by Congress.” When asked whether the Constitution empowers the president to disregard a congressional statute limiting the deployment of troops, he responded that the president “does not have that power.” He promised that as president, “I will not assert a constitutional authority to deploy troops in a manner contrary to an express limit imposed by Congress and adopted into law” (Savage 2007,1). When asked to compare his constitutional views with those of the Bush administration, he said he agreed with recent decisions by the Supreme Court, including Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, that rejected “the extreme arguments of the Bush administration.” He rejected the view suggested in Justice Department memos during the Bush years “that the president may do whatever he deems necessary to protect national security.” Obama believed it was important for all would-be presidents to provide answers to such questions, “particularly at a time when our laws, our traditions, and our Constitution have been repeatedly challenged by this administration” (Savage 2007, 3). In The Audacity of Hope, Obama (2006) underscored his commitment to original constitutional principles. During debate in the US Senate, concern was expressed about “the erosion of Congress’s power to declare war.” He placed confidence “in the fundamental soundness of the Founders’ blueprints and the democratic house that resulted” (105). Constitutional principles, including the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,“are designed to force us into a conversation, a ‘deliberative democracy’ ” (110). Turning his attention to the Vietnam War, Obama (2006) said that the “disastrous consequences of that conflict—for our credibility and prestige abroad, for our armed forces (which would take a generation to recover), and most of all for those who fought—have been amply demonstrated.” Perhaps the “biggest casualty of that war was the bond of trust between the American people and their government—and between Americans themselves.” Americans “began to realize that the best and the brightest in Washington didn’t always know what they were doing—and didn’t always tell the truth” (Obama 2006, 339). Obama’s inaugural address on January 20, 2009, provides some insights into his constitutional orientation. In times of war and peace, America prospered not simply because of those who served as president “but because we the people have remained faithful to the ideals of our forebears and true to our founding documents.” In emphasizing the value he placed with the Framers and their intent, Obama seemed to reject presidential actions in the years following World War II that departed from those founding principles. For example, Harry S.Truman in 1950 became the first president to take the country to war without first seeking prior support of Congress, as required by the UN Participation Act of 1945. With regard to common defense, Obama in his inaugural address rejected “as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.” The Framers, “faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations.”

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Those ideals “still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake.” Those words underscore what appear to be Obama’s commitment to original constitutional principles.

Afghanistan After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Bush came to Congress to request statutory authority for military action against nations and organizations he determined responsible for planning the attacks and aiding the terrorists. That legislation became law on September 18, 2001 as the 2001 AUMF. The United States and its allies achieved major military victories against the Taliban in Afghanistan, but the problem became building within the Afghan government a capacity for self-government and an armed force capable of defeating future terrorist initiatives. When Obama reached the White House on January 20, 2009, he faced the challenge of Afghanistan as “the slow-burning disaster” he feared might consume his presidency, just as with Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam and George W. Bush with Iraq (Sanger 2013, 15–16). The Taliban in Afghanistan demonstrated a capacity to retake various parts of the country. With more than 150,000 US soldiers in Iraq, the Bush administration had limited opportunities to send additional troops to Afghanistan. One of Obama’s first decisions was to deploy 17,000 troops to Afghanistan in an effort to establish greater stability and protection for the Afghan government (Sanger 2013). Additional troops would be sent in subsequent years, but insurgents in Afghanistan calculated that it would be only a matter of time before the United States and its allies would decide to withdraw their troops.The problem was complicated not only by the Taliban within the country but also by the Haqqani terrorist network on Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan. The Obama administration was split between two positions: officials who challenged an effort at “nation building” in Afghanistan, and those who believed that a sustained military presence was essential to avoid the Taliban retaking the country (Gates 2015). If the latter occurred, it would eliminate important gains made after 2001, including democratic elections, rights extended to women, and better educational opportunities for children. Although Obama opposed the war against Iraq in 2003, his position on Afghanistan was fundamentally different: “This is not a war of choice.This is a war of necessity” (Gates 2015, 361).

Iraq In October 2002, the Bush administration sought and received congressional authority for US armed forces against Iraq. The legislation became law on October 16. Obama, as a state senator from Illinois, opposed the military action, regarding it as “based not on reason but on passion, not on principle but on politics” (Obama 2006, 348).

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The Bush administration justified the war with six claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. All of the claims turned out to lack any substance. For example, the administration stated that aluminum tubes were being used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In fact, the tubes were for a conventional rocket program. The administration maintained that Iraq tried to purchase uranium oxide from a country in Africa. The document supporting that claim turned out to be fabricated. It was further argued that Iraq had mobile labs that contained biological weapons, that a link existed between Iraq and al Qaeda, and that Iraq possessed unmanned aerial vehicles. Those claims were also empty (Fisher 2017b). On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented claims about Iraqi WMDs to the UN Security Council, speaking with full confidence: “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.” He soon discovered that his statements lacked any credibility. In his memoir, he regarded the errors and misinformation in his speech as “a blot, a failure, [that] will always be attached to me and my UN presentation” (Powell 2014, 223). After US troops entered Iraq in March 2003 and quickly defeated Saddam Hussein, the country entered a sustained period of looting, violence, and insurgency. The Bush administration anticipated those risks and attempted to ensure that the Iraqi government would continue to function effectively. There was hope that the existing civil service staff could keep the ministries running.That prospect vanished when many of the top officials who ran the ministries disappeared.They belonged to Hussein’s Baath Party. Government buildings were destroyed by looting and fires after Baghdad fell. By mid-May, no Iraqi ministry was operating at more than 40 percent capacity (Dobbins et al. 2009). On May 16, L. Paul (  Jerry) Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued an order entitled “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.” It prohibited the top four levels of party membership from public employment but allowed Bremer to grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis. The order reached beyond hard-core Saddamists to eliminate ministry officials, physicians, schoolteachers, and many others who joined the party because it was essential for employment, not because they endorsed party principles. Through de-Baathification, tens of thousands of officials were removed from government ministries, universities, hospitals, and public agencies responsible for transportation, electricity, and communication. A second Bremer order of May 23 dissolved the Iraqi security forces, including 385,000 in the armed forces, 285,000 in the Interior Ministry (police), and 50,000 in presidential security units (Pfiffner 2010). Hundreds of thousands of embittered and unemployed soldiers used their weapons against a US force they now regarded as occupiers. Many who lost their jobs through de-Baathification joined the insurgency. In his memoir, Bush said, “In retrospect, I should have insisted on more debate on Jerry’s orders,

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especially on what message disbanding the army would send and how many Sunnis the de-Baathification would affect” (Bush 2010, 259). In 2007, the Bush administration decided to substantially increase US forces in Iraq (the “surge”) to gain control over insurgent forces, promising to draw down US forces as soon as possible the following year (Gates 2015). In 2008, the Bush administration attempted to enter into a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, permitting a certain number of US soldiers to remain in Iraq. The Iraqi government refused part of the agreement that would protect US soldiers from being prosecuted in Iraqi courts. As a result, the SOFA agreed to on November 17, 2008, called for the withdrawal of US combat forces from all Iraqi cities and villages by June 30, 2009, and the removal of all US forces by December 31, 2011 (Gates 2015). Those conditions faced President Obama when he entered office on January 20, 2009.

Libya In early 2011, Obama decided that it would be necessary to use military force in Libya to protect civilians who were threatened by President Muammar Qaddafi. Instead of coming to Congress for authority, Obama chose to seek support from the UN Security Council and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a statement on March 21, 2011, he explained that the United States was taking military action in Libya to enforce Security Council Resolution 1973, anticipating that operations would conclude “in a matter of days and not a matter of weeks” (Public Papers of the Presidents 2011, I, 266, 271). Military force would last seven months, exceeding the 60–90-day limit of the WPR. In a report to Congress on March 21, Obama stated that US forces operating under the UN resolution had begun a series of strikes against Libyan air defense systems and military airfields “for the purposes of preparing a nofly zone.”The strikes, he said, would be “limited in their nature, duration, and scope” (Public Papers of the Presidents 2011, I, 280).The term “no-fly zone” might sound like something so constrained militarily that it should not be considered as war. However, it requires destroying the capacity to act against the United States and its allies. No matter how officials seek to downplay or minimize a no-fly zone, the use of military force against another country that has not threatened the United States is, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said, an “act of war” (Gates 2015, 513). The no-fly zone in Libya began with an attack on its system of air defenses. A memo released by the Office of Legal Counsel (2011, 6) on April 1 concluded that the military actions against Libya did not constitute “war” because of the limited “nature, scope, and duration” of the planned military operations. The next month, on May 19, Obama delivered a major address at the Department of State to offer his views on the impact of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. He began by stating that the United States “opposes the use of violence and repression against the people of the region” (Public

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Papers of the Presidents 2011, I, 554). However, in concert with NATO forces, he had ordered military strikes against Libya. Next, he said that the United States had “learned from our experience in Iraq just how costly and difficult it is to try to impose regime change by force, no matter how well intentioned it may be” (Public Papers of the Presidents 2011, I, 555).Yet it was his intention to use military force to drive Qaddafi out of office. Regime change in Libya resulted in a broken country that attracted terrorist groups. By early June 2011, US military intervention in Libya exceeded the limits of the WPR. The House passed H.Res.292, directing Obama to submit a report to the House within 14 days describing US national security interests in Libya, including the “President’s justification for not seeking authorization by Congress for the use of military force in Libya” (Congressional Record 2011, 8672). The resolution passed 268 to 145, representing strong bipartisan support among Democrats and Republicans. The administration submitted a 32-page report to the House on June 15, arguing that because of the “limited nature, scope, and duration” of the military actions, Obama possessed constitutional authority to direct the operations and required no statutory support (White House 2011, 25). Not only was there no war in Libya, according to the administration, there were not even “hostilities,” which would trigger the WPR. Based on the legal analysis of the Obama administration, if the United States conducted military operations by bombing at 30,000 feet, launched Tomahawk missiles from ships in the Mediterranean, and used armed drones, there would be no “hostilities” in Libya (or anywhere else), provided that US casualties were minimal or nonexistent. Having received OLC’s April 1 memo stating that “war” did not exist, Obama now wanted a legal judgment that “hostilities” did not exist. OLC declined to prepare that memo. It would have been difficult to do so. Its memo repeatedly mentioned the use of military “force” and the “destruction of Libyan military assets.” Jeh Johnson, General Counsel for the Defense Department, also refused Obama’s request. He could not deny the existence of hostilities in the form of Tomahawk missiles, armed drones, and NATO aircraft bombings. Eventually,White House Counsel Robert Bauer and State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh agreed to state that no hostilities existed in Libya (Savage 2011). If Obama did not anticipate hostilities in Libya, he had no obligation to report to Congress within the 48-hour deadline of the WPR. But he did. Through that public action, he acknowledged the existence of hostilities or imminent hostilities (Fisher 2012). In an interview with Thomas Friedman on August 8, 2014, Obama reflected on his use of military force in Libya: “I’ll give you an example of a lesson I had to learn that still has ramifications to this day,” he said, referring to the overthrow of Qaddafi. Although he “absolutely believed that it was the right thing to do,” he and his European partners “underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this.” There had to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn’t have any civic traditions. . . . So that’s a lesson that I now apply every time I ask

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the question, “Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer [for] the day after?” (Friedman 2014) In other words, the administration took step 1 without planning for step 2. In September 2016, a committee of British lawmakers issued a report that condemned the intervention in Libya by British and French forces. The lawmakers concluded that the military action in 2011 lacked a coherent strategy, relied on poor and unreliable intelligence, and resulted in a political collapse within Libya that assisted in the rise of the Islamic State in North Africa (Castle 2016). When Obama justified military action in Libya, he said in a speech on March 28, 2011, that some nations “may be able to turn a blind eye to the atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different” (Public Papers of the Presidents 2011, I, 309). After considering what Qaddafi might do against opponents in Benghazi and other regions, Obama felt compelled to act. Inaction “would have been a betrayal of who we are” (Public Papers of the Presidents 2011, I, 309). Several years later, aware of even greater humanitarian concerns in Syria, he decided not to use military force to topple a nation’s leader.

Syria In August 2013, President Obama was prepared to use military force unilaterally against Syria but decided to seek congressional authority. He had publicly warned Syria that if it used chemical weapons against its people, it would cross a “red line” and invite a retaliatory response by other countries. On August 21, Syria used nerve gas to kill over a thousand people— men, women, and children. As with Libya, Obama claimed constitutional authority under Article II to take “limited” military actions without seeking authority from Congress. Administration officials sought to reassure the American public that military action against Syria would be “proportional,” “surgical,” “tailored,” and a mere “shot across the bow” (Fisher 2013). The analogies fell short. A shot across the bow is designed to miss a target while sending a clear warning. Launching cruise missiles into Damascus would not be a shot across the bow. It would be an offensive military operation against a country that had not threatened the United States. The use of cruise missiles against Syria would likely lead to other actions beyond the predictive capacity of the administration. With Syria, the risks of errors, miscalculations, and unintended consequences were much greater than with Libya, given the political instability in the region and the active involvement of Iran, Russia, and other countries. If rebel forces in Syria, including the jihadist groups, gained political control, a possible result would be the slaughter of Alawites and Christians who had been protected by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Unlike in Libya, Obama was unable to gain the support of the UN Security Council for military action. Also, members of Congress heard

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from constituents who were overwhelmingly opposed to US military force against Syria (Edelson 2016). By the end of August 2013, Obama decided to seek authorization from Congress. In his address to the nation on September 10, 2013, he stated, “I have resisted calls for military action, because we cannot resolve someone else’s civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Yet that is what he attempted to do in Libya. Moreover, if military force cannot resolve someone’s civil war, why would the administration seek statutory authority to do precisely that? Although Obama claimed that as commander in chief, he possessed independent constitutional authority to act militarily against Syria, he added this qualification: I’m also the president of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy. So even though I possess the authority to order military strikes, I believed it was right, in the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress. I believe our democracy is stronger when the president acts with the support of Congress. And I believe that America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together. In his judgment, he did not think “we should remove another dictator with force—we learned from Iraq that doing so makes us responsible for all that comes next.” He should have learned that as well from what happened after removing Qaddafi in Libya. During her years as secretary of state, Hillary Clinton analyzed efforts by the United States to remove President Assad from office. She described Syria as a “wicked problem,” and by that she meant a problem that not only lacked a “right answer” but where every option “appears to be worse than the next” (Clinton 2015, 389). Intervene militarily and the administration risked “opening Pandora’s box and wading into another quagmire, like Iraq” (389). Send military aid to the rebels “and watch it end up in the hands of extremists” (389). Her observations recall a pattern pursued by presidents from Truman’s Korean War to Obama’s intervention in Libya. Congress did not pass legislation authorizing military force against Syria. Nor did Obama attempt to act unilaterally. Instead, the administration worked jointly with Russia and the world community to compel Syria to surrender its supply of chemical weapons. Although Congress refused to grant Obama the authority he requested to use military force against Syria, White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler said that a presidential strike against Syria would be lawful “both in international law and domestic law, even if neither the Security Council nor Congress approved it” (Edelson 2016, 97). Secretary of State John Kerry agreed that Obama could use military force against Syria in the absence of congressional authority. For support, Kerry cited a number of earlier actions by presidents who used military force against other countries without receiving statutory support (Edelson 2016).

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Identifying various precedents of unconstitutional actions does not build a legal framework.

The Islamic State By 2014, a new terrorist group called the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) threatened the northern part of Iraq and various parts of Syria. The Obama administration referred to this group as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). No one questioned the authority of President Obama to use military force to protect American diplomats and military advisors as part of a defensive operation. Nor were there objections to using military force to protect thousands of Yazidis, a minority religious sect in northern Iraq, from possible massacre by ISIS. US military actions began in August 2014. The constitutional question concerned Obama’s authority to act offensively against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in a war the administration estimated would last for years, and possibly a decade or more, without receiving express congressional authority. In acting militarily against ISIS, the administration argued that it possessed sufficient authority under two statutes: the 2001 AUMF, enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the Iraq resolution enacted in October 2002 (2002 AUMF). The first statute authorized the president to use military action against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. Those organizations were determined to be al Qaeda and the Taliban. ISIS did not exist at that time. Congress did not pass the 2001 AUMF to empower the president to use military force against any future terrorism organization. The 2002 AUMF authorized military action against Iraq because of the erroneous belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.The objective was to remove what was seen as a threat to the United States and other nations. The statute supported an offensive military operation. There was no implication that if Iraq in future years experienced threats from outside forces, there was an obligation on the part of the United States to use military force to protect it, to turn an offensive purpose into a permanent defensive commitment. There was no such objective when members of Congress passed the legislation. Various administration officials in the Pentagon and other departments offered their thoughts in defending the legal basis for military action against ISIS. Often, these remarks were attributed to individuals who were never identified. No constitutional analysis, however, ever came from the Justice Department, the OLC, or the White House Counsel, as with military

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operations against Libya in 2011. The likely reason is OLC’s April 1, 2011, memo on Libya, which explained what constitutes “war” within the meaning of the Declaration of War Clause, requiring congressional authorization. In making that determination, OLC stated that one has to assess the “anticipated nature, scope, and duration” of planned military operations.The standard of “war” is satisfied “only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of US military personnel to significant risk over a significant period” (Office of Legal Counsel 2011, 8). Initially, the administration expected military operations against Libya to conclude within a short period, not to exceed the 60–90-day limit of the WPR. With ISIS, Obama officials regularly estimated that military action would persist for years, into the next administration. In February 2015, the administration asked Congress to pass legislation specifically authorizing military force against ISIS. It submitted a draft bill for congressional action. No legislative action was taken in 2015, nor was there any expectation of action throughout 2016 (Edelson 2016). Fault certainly lies with Congress for failing to exercise its institutional powers, but the result is another presidential war that lacks any statutory or constitutional authority.

The “War” Against ISIS and Captain Smith’s Lawsuit On May 4, 2016, Captain Nathan Michael Smith filed a lawsuit against President Obama, challenging the legality of the war against ISIS. In so doing, he rejected the claims by the administration that no new authority was required from Congress. An intelligence officer stationed in Kuwait, Smith supported military action against ISIS but wanted a legal judgment from a federal court that the orders he was asked to carry out were legally binding. At issue in this case is the basic question of distinguishing between lawful and unlawful military orders. Captain Smith’s lawsuit sought a declaration that Obama’s war against the Islamic State “is illegal because Congress has not authorized it” (Fisher 2017a). Under the WPR, when the president introduces US troops into hostilities or into situations where hostilities are imminent, he must either receive congressional authorization within 60 days to continue the operation or must terminate the operation within 30 days after the 60-day period has expired. Smith’s lawsuit noted that, contrary to earlier precedents, President Obama had failed to release an opinion by the Justice Department’s OLC or the White House Counsel to justify the war against ISIS. The lawsuit states that when Smith was commissioned by President Obama in May 2010, Smith took an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” The Constitution “gives Congress the power to declare war, and the WPR prohibits the President from waging war without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.”Those principles prompted Smith to ask, “How could I honor my oath when I am fighting a

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war, even a good war, that the Constitution does not allow, or Congress has not approved?” (Fisher 2017a, 260). What does the Constitution actually allow in terms of presidential initiatives over the war power? First, the Framers broke with the British model that placed all external affairs—including the war power—with the executive. In 1690, John Locke spoke of three branches of government: legislative, executive, and federation. By the latter he meant “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all the persons and communities without the commonwealth.” The powers of executive and federative “are always almost united” (Locke 1690, Book II, Ch. XII, §§ 146–147). He placed the federative power with the executive because it “is not necessary” that the legislative branch “should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made” (Locke 1690, Book II, Ch. XII, § 153). The British jurist William Blackstone, writing in 1765, agreed with Locke’s decision to place all external affairs with the executive. In his chapter on the king’s prerogative, Blackstone said that royal character and authority “are rooted in and spring from the king’s political person, considered merely by itself, without reference to any other intrinsic circumstance; as, the right of sending embassadors [sic], of creating peers, and of making war or peace” (Blackstone 1765, Book the First, 232–233). Other powers that Blackstone placed exclusively with the king include making treaties, sending and receiving ambassadors, coining money, the “sole prerogative of making war and peace,” issuing letters of marque and reprisal, and “the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies” (Fisher 2017a, 243–245, 249–250, 254, 257). Article I of the US Constitution vests many of those powers expressly in Congress: the power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, raise and support armies, and provide and maintain a navy. Other external powers not mentioned by Blackstone are included in Article I: to regulate commerce with foreign nations, define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, make rules concerning captures on land and water, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. The power over treaties and the appointment of ambassadors is shared between the president and the Senate. Nothing in Article II places any exclusive power in the president over external affairs. Under Article II, he is the commander in chief of the army and navy and of the militia of the several states, “when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Article I empowers Congress to call forth “the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.” Debates at the Philadelphia Convention on August 17, 1787, underscore the Framers’ determination to reject the British model. On the motion to vest in Congress the power to “make war,” Charles Pinckney objected that the proceedings of the legislative branch “were too slow” and Congress

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would “meet but once a year.” He suggested it would be better to vest that power in the Senate, “being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions” (Farrand 1966, 2: 318). Pierce Butler wanted to vest the war power in the president, “who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it” (318). James Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to insert declare instead of make, leaving to the president “the power to repel sudden attacks” (318). Roger Sherman remarked that the president “shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.” Gerry said he “never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war” (318). George Mason was “agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not to be trusted with it. . . . He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace” (319). The Madison-Gerry amendment passed. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson expressed the prevailing view that the American system of checks and balances will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large. (Elliot 1836–1845, 2: 528) In Federalist No. 4, John Jay remarked, It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting any thing by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. (Wright 2002, 101) He warned that a single executive may “engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people” (Wright 2002, 101). In authorizing war, Congress may place limits on what presidents may and may not do in using military force. In 1798, Congress passed a number of statutes to authorize war against France. It is called the “Quasi-War” because it was not formally declared. Legislation authorized the president to seize vessels sailing to French ports. President John Adams exceeded statutory policy by issuing an order directing American ships to capture vessels sailing to or from French ports. In 1804, a unanimous Supreme Court held that congressional policy set forth in a statute necessarily prevails over contrary presidential orders and military action (Little v. Barreme).

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Presidential power in external affairs changed fundamentally in 1936 because of a judicial error in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation. After upholding a delegation of legislative power to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to impose an arms embargo in a region in South America, the Court fundamentally misread a speech that John Marshall gave in 1800 when he served as a member of the House of Representatives. Marshall said during debate, “The President is the sole organ of the nation in external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations” (10 Annals of Cong., 614). When one reads the speech, it is obvious that Marshall was merely defending President John Adams for transferring to Great Britain an individual charged with murder, relying not on independent presidential power but on an extradition provision in the Jay Treaty. Adams was carrying out the law, not making it. Yet the Court used Marshall’s speech to assert a presidential power in external affair that was “plenary and exclusive,” a position Marshall never advanced (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp). The Court’s error continued to inflate presidential power in external affairs decade after decade until partially corrected by the Court in 2015 (Fisher 2016). On July 11, 2016, the Justice Department filed a brief asking the district court to dismiss the case brought by Captain Smith. Various reasons were advanced, including that his claims raised nonjusticiable political questions and that he lacked standing to assert his claims. The government’s brief noted that, following enactment of the WPR,“nearly every President has committed US armed forces into combat operations overseas” (US Department of Justice 2016, 1). That is quite true, but those operations generally ceased within the 60-day limit of the WPR. Military intervention in Libya in 2011 lasted seven months. Air strikes against the Islamic State began in August 2014, and executive officials predicted that military operations would continue well beyond the Obama administration, possibly lasting 10 years or more. To the Justice Department, judicial review in this case would be “inappropriate absent a clear conflict between the political branches over the President’s authority to act” (US Department of Justice 2016, 1–2). According to the government’s brief, no such conflict existed because Congress had appropriated “billions of dollars in support of the military operation” (2). To the government, this reliance on appropriations is not disturbed by section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution, which purports to bar Congress from authorizing military operations through an appropriations measure unless that measure “states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter.” (36, n. 47) Section 8(a) did not “purport” to express the view of Congress on appropriations. By law, it established legislative policy. The Justice Department did

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not explain what led Congress to adopt Section 8(a). During the 1970s, the Nixon administration and congressional leaders differed on whether appropriations bills are instrument for setting congressional policy. Officials in the Johnson administration argued that Congress authorized the escalation of the Vietnam War by appropriating funds. Initially, federal courts accepted that argument (Berk v. Laird, 724). However, experts on congressional procedures advised federal judges that appropriations do not encompass major declarations of legislative policy. They cited House and Senate rules that are designed to prevent substantive legislation from being included in appropriations bills (Berk v. Laird, 721). Some judges began to change their minds, now refusing to accept appropriations as a statement of congressional policy in matters of military commitments (Atlee v. Laird, 706). On August 18, 2016, attorneys for Captain Smith filed a response to the government’s motion to dismiss. Their brief argued that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case, Smith had standing, and it was his duty as a military officer to disobey orders that are beyond the president’s authority as commander in chief. As for the harm that Smith faced, the brief explained that if he disobeyed an order he regarded as illegal, he faced the prospect of a court martial, lengthy imprisonment, and a dishonorable discharge. Smith’s attorneys regarded the case as “a garden-variety statutory construction case,” pointing to language in Section 8(a)(1) of the WPR (Plaintiff ’s Memorandum 2016, 1). On September 23, 2014, President Obama reported to Congress on the deployment of US armed forces to Iraq and Syria to combat the Islamic State. For his legal authority, he pointed to the AUMFs of 2001 and 2002 (Plaintiff ’s Memorandum 2016, 24). Captain Smith concluded that neither statute authorized the war against the Islamic State. As for the 2002 AUMF, it authorized the president to use armed forces to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” Under that interpretation, US presidents would be authorized to take military action for decades to come whenever necessary to protect Iraq. In passing the 2002 AUMF, members of Congress had no such intention. As for the 2001 AUMF, the brief for Captain Smith points out that after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush submitted legislation to Congress that would have, had it been adopted in full, “authorized President Obama’s current assertion of power” against the Islamic State (Plaintiff ’s Memorandum 2016, 36). Bush recommended language that does appear in the 2001 AUMF: “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001” (115 Stat. 224, § 2). However, Congress deleted language proposed by Bush, authorizing the president “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States” (37). Moreover, Congress added language that relates directly to the WPR, declaring that the 2001 AUMF is “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization

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within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution” (37).The language proposed by Bush made no mention of the WPR. Congress made this change with the specific intent to protect legislative prerogatives and to block future efforts by presidents to wield the war power single-handedly. In a decision released on November 21, 2016, a federal district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss Smith’s complaint, concluding that he had not alleged an injury sufficiently concrete or particularized to establish Article III standing. Moreover, the court held that his claims presented nonjusticiable political questions unsuitable for a court. In the judgment of the district court, Smith’s lawsuit marked a dispute involving foreign relations, an area the district court marked off as a political question. But disputes involving foreign relations are regularly accepted and decided by federal courts. As a recent example, on June 8, 2015, the Supreme Court decided that the president has exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and governments (Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry). Earlier, when the dispute was in the lower courts, the D.C. Circuit in 2009 regarded the litigation as a political question unsuitable for the judiciary (Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State). The Supreme Court reversed, treating the issue not as a political question but as one that raised constitutional issues requiring judicial determination (Zivotofsky v. Clinton). In Captain Smith’s case, the district court recognized that questions of statutory construction and interpretation are committed to the judiciary but declined to analyze the WPR, the 2001 AUMF, and the 2002 AUMF. The court noted that President Obama’s proposed budget for 2016 requested funds to conduct military operations against the Islamic State and that Congress appropriated the vast majority of the funds requested. However, the court did not analyze Section 8(a) of the WPR, requiring that funds be specifically authorized by Congress for a particular military operation. In response to the district court decision, Smith’s attorneys filed a brief on April 3, 2017, pointing out that no controversial fact-finding is needed “to establish that the AUMFs enacted by Congress in 2001 and 2002 cannot serve as the ‘specific authorizations’ required by the WPR for the President’s decision to initiate ‘hostilities’ against ISIL in 2014.” The brief underscored that “Congress’s rules prohibit the use of appropriations as vehicles for substantive legislation.” The matter is now before the D.C. Circuit. (For additional analysis of this litigation, see Fisher 2017a, 278).

Conclusion The Framers understood the dangers of allowing a single executive to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. Such power was implicit in the British model developed by John Locke and William Blackstone, a model the Framers explicitly rejected. In 1793, James Madison offered this judgment: “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be

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proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded” (Hunt 1906, 6: 148). That constitutional principle was followed from 1789 to 1950. With his military commitment to Korea, Truman became the first president to take the country to war without receiving congressional authority. That violation has been followed by other presidents, including Clinton and Obama, without limits imposed by Congress or the judiciary.

Future Challenges World affairs do not follow the quadrennial election calendar in the United States. Presidents inherit policies, procedures, and problems from the previous administrations. Whether and how they alter course may have a significant impact not only on national security generally but on their predecessor’s legacy. At stake also are these constitutional principles: the durability of selfgovernment, the system of checks and balances, and the Framers’ core belief that only Congress through the regular statutory process may take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. Indeed, the early months of the new Trump presidency suggest many of the uneasy tensions between military strategy and tactics, unilateralism, and the role of Congress and the international community that President Obama confronted in a world of uncertainty. Trump campaigned on an “America first” platform and criticized many of Obama’s decisions on the Middle East. But it is noteworthy that just days into Trump’s administration, the president ordered a military raid in Yemen that was justified to gather information on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and target its leaders. The mission ultimately cost the life of one Navy SEAL and killed 23 civilians.That raid once again brought to the fore not only the tactical complexities of such missions in hostile territory but also questions of strategic planning—and, most critically, the prudence of presidential unilateralism. Moreover, Trump publicly admitted that he had changed perspectives on the use of military force in the region after Assad’s regime again used chemical weapons on civilians in early April 2017. In a measured but powerful air strike on the Syrian air base at Shayrat, the United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles that destroyed nearly two dozen aircraft and demolished radar and other hardware. Trump justified the action by stating that he acted “in the vital national security and foreign policy interests of the United States pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” in this case “to degrade the Syrian military’s ability to conduct further chemical weapons attacks and to dissuade the Syrian regime from using or proliferating chemical weapons” (Letter to Congressional Leaders on United States Military Operations in Syria 2017). As with Obama’s actions in Libya in 2011, what step 2 would Trump take after this step 1? It remains an open question as to how—or if—Donald Trump can or will keep his promise to eradicate ISIS. Similarly, will further civilian casualties

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at the hands of brutal dictators who employ chemical weapons precipitate future military responses and perhaps persuade Trump of the necessity of regime change in countries like Syria? If so, Russian presence in that country and Vladimir Putin’s opposition to US intervention raise profound issues (see Brown, Chapter 9). Whether Trump’s administration pursues “hard” or “soft” power on a limited or broader scale (see Cash and Bridge, Chapter 7), the Obama legacy in the region and how Trump shapes it in the future highlight profound constitutional questions regarding the balance of power in American national institutions.

References Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court), aff ’d Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. N.Y. 1970), aff ’d sub nom. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). Blackstone, William. 1765. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bush, George W. 2010. Decision Points. New York: Crown Publishers. Castle, Stephen. 2016. “British Lawmakers Condemn 2011 Intervention in Libya.” New York Times, September 15, A8. Clinton, Hillary. 2015. Hard Choices. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Congressional Record. 2011. Official Record of the Floor Debate by the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States.Volume 157, June 3. Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas. 2009. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Edelson, Chris. 2016. Power Without Constraint:The Post-9/11 Presidency and National Security. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Elliot, Jonathan, ed. 1836–1845. The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 5 vols. Washington, DC. Farrand, Max, ed. 1966. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. New Haven: CT:Yale University Press. Fisher, Louis. 2012. “Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42: 176–89. Fisher, Louis. 2013. “More Than a Mere Shot Across Syria’s Bow.” Washington Times, September 9. Fisher, Louis. 2016. “The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright to Zivotoksky.” Constitutional Commentary 31: 149–208. Fisher, Louis. 2017a. “A Challenge to Presidential Wars: Smith v. Obama.” Congress & the Presidency, 44: 259–82. Fisher, Louis. 2017b. Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power: Unconstitutional Leanings. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Friedman, Thomas L. 2014. “Obama on the World.” New York Times, August 9. Gates, Robert M. 2015. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York:Vintage Books. Hunt, Gaillard, ed. 1906. The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Letter to Congressional Leaders of United States Military Operations in Syria. 2017. Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents. April 8. Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration.

92  Chapter 4 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804). Locke, John. 1690. Two Treatises of Civil Government. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962 ed. Obama, Barack. 2006. The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream. New York:Vintage Books. Office of Legal Counsel (White House). 2011. “Authority to Use Military Force in Libya.” April 1. www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-Libya.pdf Pfiffner, James P. 2010. “US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army.” Intelligence and National Security 25: 76–85. “Plaintiff ’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.” 2016. Nathan Michael Smith v. Barack H. Obama, Civ. No. 16–843 (CKK), August 18. Powell, Colin. 2014. It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership. New York: Harper Perennial. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2011.Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register of the National Archives and Records Administration. Sanger, David E. 2013. Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. New York: Broadway Paperbacks. Savage, Charlie. 2007. “Barack Obama’s Q&A.” December 20. www.boston.com/news/ politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/ Savage, Charlie. 2011. “2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Powers.” New York Times, June 18. US Department of Justice. 2016. “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” Nathan Michael Smith v. Barack H. Obama, Civ. No. 16–843 (CKK) July 11. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). White House. 2011. “United States Activities in Libya.” Report submitted by the Obama administration to Congress. https://fas.org/man/eprint/wh-libya.pdf Wright, Benjamin F., ed. 2002. The Federalist. New York: Metro Books. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012). Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015).

5 Obama’s National Security Cabinet The Fight to Survive White House Micromanagement Shirley Anne Warshaw Preventing another terrorist attack on US soil was a central tenet of Barack Obama’s presidency. Yet, on Christmas Day of 2009, a 23-year-old Nigerian man, intent on committing such an act of terror, boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit with a bomb sewn into his underwear. The bomb failed to detonate, but the threat confirmed Obama’s decision to closely monitor counterterrorism. He had made the decision prior to the Christmas bomber, having already approved targeted killing by drone strikes in Pakistan at his first National Security Council meeting only three days after the inauguration (Bergen 2012). By 2012, his weekly Tuesday meetings in the Situation Room became known as Terror Tuesday, where he personally approved the “kill lists” presented by the CIA for drone strikes (Cobain 2013; Shane 2015; see also Cash and Bridge, Chapter 7). This chapter posits that throughout his presidency, Obama and his White House staff oversaw not only the major policy decisions, such as those of counterterrorism, by the CIA, Defense, and State departments but also became so deeply involved in those decisions that speeches given by cabinet officers were often written in the White House. The national security cabinet constantly battled with the White House over micromanagement, leading not only to internal dysfunction at times but to post-administration books by retired cabinet officers who held deep-seated resentment about Obama’s management style.The next section provides an overview of White House–cabinet relations broadly. Subsequent sections consider specific cases during the Obama presidency, including the national security advisor, Defense, State, and CIA. The concluding section weighs how well management of advisory structures served the president and the potential lessons for President Donald Trump.

Team Building in White House–Cabinet Relations: Counselors and Cabinets Micromanaging departmental policymaking by the White House has been a battle for decades. White House staff have long viewed cabinet officers as rep­ resentatives of their departments rather than representatives of the president

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to their departments. John Ehrlichman famously said that the Nixon cabinet had “married the natives” and been co-opted by their own departments, a sentiment shared not only by Nixon but by each of his successors (Bennett 1996, 55). Co-option is almost inevitable, however, when cabinet-building strategies control cabinet selection. Obama never viewed his cabinet officers as representatives of the president, in part because of co-option and in part because he never fully trusted them. No one in the national security cabinet had been part of the Obama foreign policy team, nor did any have a personal rapport with the president or with his White House staff. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was not only a Republican but a Bush holdover, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had been a tenacious opponent during the Democratic primaries, and CIA Director Leon Panetta had served in the Clinton White House. In essence, Obama brought together a national security team who lacked common ground as a team and with the White House. Gates, Clinton, and Panetta each filled a piece of the diversity strategy, providing an opportunity to assuage multiple constituencies. The government of strangers lacked the trust necessary for building strong White House– cabinet relations, which was further exacerbated by the team-building approach. The president’s counselors would be in the White House, not the cabinet, which immediately became clear when cabinet appointments were announced. Rather than separately naming the cabinet and the White House staff during the transition, the Obama transition team unveiled “teams” of policymakers which included both the cabinet and the White House staff. The concept of team building, as the Obama administration referred to the process, was essentially the merger of cabinets and counselors as a policy unit, with the counselors, or White House staff, holding the president’s ear. Obama’s obvious distrust of the national security cabinet, all of whom were chosen primarily for political reasons, became evident as they were introduced as part of a White House–cabinet team that would manage national security policy. Their appointments were announced together, rather than individually, at the same time that the national security advisor was announced. A surprising addition to the national security team was Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, a position within the Department of State and subordinate to the secretary of state. Rice was a longtime friend of Obama’s who served as his foreign policy advisor during the campaign and as director of the transition team for national security. In addition, by placing Vice President Joe Biden on the national security team, another filter was added, further diluting the influence of Gates, Clinton, and Panetta (see Table 5.1). Their positions indicated the roles they would play in managing national security policy. Having both Jones and Biden above Clinton and Gates served as an early signal of the significant role that White House staff would play in managing national security policy.

Obama’s National Security Cabinet 95 Table 5.1  Obama’s National Security Team, 2009 Joseph Biden General James Jones Hillary Clinton Robert Gates Janet Napolitano Eric Holder Susan Rice

Vice President National Security Advisor Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of Homeland Security Attorney General US Ambassador to the United Nations

Announced December 1, 2008, by President-elect Obama, Chicago

The Counselors: The National Security Advisor The national security advisor, General James Jones, the former Supreme Allied Commander for NATO and chair of the Atlantic Council, was expected to serve as the president’s primary counselor in national security policy but quickly found that he lacked the insider status counselors traditionally held. Jones was an outsider and had not even been on the short list for national security advisors bandied about by senior campaign staff. His name had emerged from a list of possible national security advisors that John Podesta’s transition team, rather than Obama’s inner circle, developed. Once hired, Jones found himself surrounded by campaign insiders. These insiders, who often had more sway with the president than Jones, included Tom Donilon as his deputy, Denis McDonough as the National Security Council spokesman, and Mark Lippert as a top staffer.Within weeks of moving into his West Wing office, Jones found that his access to Obama was second to that of Donilon and Lippert, whom he felt often end-ran decisions around him to the president. Jones also learned that McDonough and Lippert had Obama’s private email address, which had not been given to Jones. To further aggravate matters, Donilon had regular meetings with Emanuel and Axelrod without consulting Jones. Lippert, in particular, became a major annoyance to Jones, who saw the young navy lieutenant as a “giant thorn in his side” (Woodward 2010, 197). Leaks about Jones—which he attributed to Lippert—began to appear in the press, including a suggestion that he was forgetful and that he fell asleep in meetings. Jones became so frustrated with Lippert’s maneuvering and routine forays to Obama, which Jones saw as undermining his authority (“rank insubordination,” as Jones called it), that he demanded Lippert be removed from his staff, which he was (see Rogin 2011). Jones’s internal wars were compounded by his inability to stop the Pentagon’s request for additional troops for Afghanistan. In September 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, the commanding general for Afghanistan, argued in a 66-page memo that without further troop support, the US faced an outcome “where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible” (CNN 2009). In spite of Obama’s pledge to reduce troops in Afghanistan, Jones could not build a coalition in the cabinet to oppose McChrystal. Gates, Clinton, and

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Panetta supported McChrystal’s request for more troops in spite of Obama’s determination to develop a new Afghan policy. The surge of troops, generally referred to only as “the surge,” was supported by the entire national security cabinet in spite of Jones’s efforts to control the situation. Within two years, Donilon had replaced Jones, in part because he never gained control of the military establishment he was hired to deal with. McChrystal in particular seemed to have a personal vendetta against Jones, as a detailed interview in Rolling Stone revealed. McChrystal’s staff, traveling with a Rolling Stone reporter on a plane, had such little respect for Jones that he was described as a “clown . . . stuck in 1985”: But part of the problem is personal: In private,Team McChrystal likes to talk shit about many of Obama’s top people on the diplomatic side. One aide calls Jim Jones, a retired four-star general and veteran of the Cold War, a “clown” who remains “stuck in 1985.” (Hastings 2010) Adding troops to a toxic war went against everything that Obama believed in and had campaigned against. The insistence of McChrystal, and his own national security cabinet, on adding troops to Afghanistan, in spite of campaign promises for a new strategy in Afghanistan and in spite of his pledge to end the US presence in Iraq, forced a reevaluation of the effectiveness of the national security advisor. Jones submitted his resignation in October 2010. Although Jones initially opposed the Pentagon’s request for more troops in Afghanistan, as did Donilon, Jones never gained traction as a voice against Gates, senior military commanders, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jones was replaced by Donilon, whom Obama glowingly introduced at a Rose Garden ceremony. Both Jones and Donilon stood next to Obama as he bid one advisor farewell and welcomed the other. Obama introduced Donilon as one of his closest advisors with “a probing intellect and a remarkable work ethic.” For Jones, the president simply said that he had been a “steady voice in Situation Room sessions”: On Jones: “Through these challenges, Jim has always been a steady voice in Situation Room sessions, daily briefings, and with meetings with foreign leaders, while also representing our country abroad with allies and partners in every region of the world.” On Donilon: “Tom has a wealth of experience that will serve him well in this new assignment. He has served three Presidents and been immersed in our national security for decades. Over the last two years, there is not a single critical national security issue that has not crossed Tom’s desk. He has helped manage our national security team and the policymaking process, and won the respect and admiration of his colleagues in the White House and across the administration. He has a probing intellect and a remarkable work ethic.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2010).

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A Washington Post headline echoed that sentiment: “Despite Stature, James L. Jones Was an Awkward Fit in Obama White House as NSA” (DeYoung 2010). Donilon served as national security advisor for the last two years of Obama’s first term with the president’s full confidence. As Biden described the success of Donilon as national security advisor, “Tom knows where the president wants to go. Tom knows when the president wants to go left, straight, up or down” (Baker 2012). During his two-year tenure in the White House, Donilon managed decisions on the Libya war and the ousting of Muammar Qaddafi and the military operation that killed Osama bin Laden, and he ensured that the troops allowed in the Afghan surge did not stay permanently. Dr. Susan Rice replaced Donilon at the start of Obama’s second term, moving from her role as United Nations ambassador at the State Department to the first among equals in foreign policy decisionmaking. Rice had hoped to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state as the second term began, but Rice’s Benghazi testimony in Congress alienated too many Senate Republicans for a successful confirmation. For the remaining six years of Obama’s tenure, the national security advisor (first Donilon and then Rice) became the president’s primary counselor on national security affairs, demanding that national security be managed in the White House. Micromanagement became more intense in the second term, as Rice used her experience in the State Department to negotiate the bureaucratic labyrinth that often stymies White House policy control. More than either Jones and Donilon, Rice oversaw a total centralization of national security policymaking in the White House.

The National Security Cabinet: Defense, State, and CIA The Department of Defense: Four Secretaries Detour From Presidential Policy Secretary of Defense Gates: The Afghan Troop Surge

Central to Obama’s original national security cabinet was Robert Gates, chosen to wind down the Iraqi and Afghan wars. His appointment surprised his own transition team, which had not considered him a possible candidate. Podesta, who led the transition team, argued forcefully against keeping a Bush appointee at Defense (Woodward 2010, 9). Obama, though, argued that continuity during war would build an important bridge to the military establishment. How to manage Afghanistan would become the first major battle between the White House and the Defense establishment and the one that would fracture relations with the Defense Department. The first sign of a fracture in the White House–Defense relationship occurred during Obama’s first National Security Council meeting, held three days after his inauguration. Although Obama had been clear throughout the presidential campaign that

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he would end the war in Iraq and reduce the US presence in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus pushed an increase of 30,000 troops in Afghanistan to deal with a new Taliban insurgency. Obama approved 21,000 troops. Throughout the spring and summer, Petraeus and McChrystal, commander of US forces in Afghanistan, lobbied for still more troops. On November 11, 2009, Obama convened the military leadership at the White House to discuss their proposals for more troops in Afghanistan. This group included Gates, McChrystal, Petraeus, General James Cartwright, and Admiral Mike Mullen, in addition to Biden, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and Jones, national security advisor. With Petraeus taking the lead, the generals argued that the insurgency sparked by the Taliban could be stopped only by additional troops. McChrystal recommended a surge of at least 40,000 US troops. He further argued that, although the Taliban appeared to have been substantially degraded in the past four years, they had recently mounted a significant counterinsurgency which required immediate action by an increased military presence. Gates supported the surge, arguing,“We’ve got to deny the Taliban the ability to take over the country” (Woodward 2010, 270). Yet, adding 40,000 more troops into the Afghan war violated the president’s pledge to wind down the US footprint in Afghanistan. Not only did he personally not want more troops added, but neither did the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, whose support was essential for the 2012 reelection. Contributing to the political repercussions of a surge were concerns that the military did not think through the full ramifications of an enlarged US presence in Afghanistan. Circulating among the White House staff was Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster, which detailed how the US military had failed to understand the Viet Cong or the communist insurgency (Woodward 2010, 129–130). In essence, Goldstein suggested that President Lyndon B. Johnson failed to ask probing questions and allowed the military to control decisionmaking. To counter the Johnson failures, Obama and his staff set up numerous meetings with the commanders on the Taliban and its growing role in the Afghan war. Eventually, after McChrystal agreed to reduce his troop request for the surge from 30,000, Obama finally concluded that the difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan was that al Qaeda posed a threat to the US homeland, which the Viet Cong never did (Alter 2010, 370). Obama then approved the surge. The surge, although ultimately successful, proved to be a critical juncture in the relationship not only between the White House and Gates but also with Jones. In both cases, there was an expectation that Gates and Jones would have argued against rather than for the surge, given the president’s very public assertions against any additional troops in Afghanistan. For the White House, not having a strong counterargument by Gates and Jones, but rather acquiescence on their part, was unsettling at best. Gates, however, had the same distrust for the White House. After leaving office, Gates wrote in his memoirs that, in his view, “Obama doesn’t trust

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his commanders . . . doesn’t believe in his own strategy, and doesn’t consider the war to be his. For him, it’s all about getting out” (Gates 2014, 338). Gates went even further by noting that the lack of trust from the White House was due to “a lack of experience with military affairs—particularly, in this case, training and logistical timelines, among the senior civilian White House officials from the vice president on down” (338). Gates went even further in his memoirs, adding that “suspicion and distrust of senior military offices by senior White House officials—including the president and vice president—became a big problem for me” (Gates 2014, 338). But the Obama White House viewed Gates’s support for the military in a different light. In their view, not only had Gates been captured by the military establishment, as most cabinet officers are prone to be, but he failed to understand the president’s agenda, which was repeated consistently throughout the 2008 campaign. Nor did he grasp the political implications for the 2012 election of an increase rather than a decrease in the US military presence in Afghanistan. Gates resigned in 2011, after two and half years on the job. But before leaving, he testified before Congress on the Libyan civil war and declared that he would not allow troops (boots on the ground, as he said) to be sent into Libya (Rubin 2011). However, the president had not made any public statement on the subject to date, nor had the president’s national security staff determined a definitive position. Whether or not Gates was sending a parting shot that he would not be micromanaged or whether he had made a simple slip of the tongue, the White House became even more determined to control the Pentagon. The problems with shared vision often led to differing perspectives, which Gates referred to as micromanaging. Speaking at a forum after he left office, Gates said, “I think when a president wants highly centralized control at the White House, that’s not bureaucratic, that’s political” (Burns and Pace 2014). Perhaps the problem was not about micromanaging but about ensuring that the Pentagon followed the political goals of the president. At the heart of the matter was whether a Republican holdover with strong ties to the military was the right fit for a Democratic president determined to quickly wind down two wars. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta: Iraq and Syria

Before Gates left his position at Defense, the White House asked him for his thoughts on a successor. At the top of the list was Leon Panetta. “You are the one person around here who understands loyalty and support for the troops,” Gates told Panetta (Panetta 2014, 333), adding that Panetta’s background in overseeing the Office of Management and Budget and as chair of the House Budget Committee would be essential to managing the congressionally mandated budget cuts. Spending cuts of $400 billion per year were necessary—a task that meant critical overviews of the Defense budget.

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For the White House, moving Panetta from the CIA to Defense would solve several problems. He was not part of the Obama campaign team, which gave him a certain degree of independence and a stronger chance of success in building rapport with the military establishment. Yet, his ability to stand up to the military was evident in his fight with Admiral Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, over whether embassy intelligence officers would continue to be chosen by the CIA or be pulled from various other intelligence agencies. Panetta had skillfully maneuvered the battles with Blair and won. The CIA would continue to control the process of naming station chiefs. The most pressing concern for the White House was to replace Gates with someone who could be trusted to move forward the Obama agenda to end two wars. They could not afford more troop requests from the Pentagon, such as Petraeus’s plea for the surge in Afghanistan, as the 2012 election closed in. They needed a politically savvy captain at the helm of Defense, which Panetta met, having chaired the House Budget Committee and having served as White House chief of staff under Clinton. For Obama, Panetta had a rare skill set. He understood the political demands of the White House in making national security decisions and, after serving as CIA director, had the operational skills of overseeing a key component of that national security team. From a practical perspective in their considerations, Panetta had been unanimously confirmed by the Senate as CIA director, which implied an easy confirmation process for Defense. Two years after its CIA director vote, the Senate again confirmed Panetta as secretary of defense by unanimous consent. Micromanagement by the White House became an immediate concern, although Panetta hoped that he could avoid it. He had criticized Denis McDonough and Donilon for demanding that speeches and media requests be approved by the White House, which he considered overly controlling by the White House (Panetta 2014, 232–233). Although annoyed, Panetta chalked this up to an overreaction by David Axelrod and David Plouffe, the president’s political advisors, to fears about mixed messages from the departments: “They were capable spokesmen, but because they came out of politics, their highly visible role had the effect of over-emphasizing the political side of important policy decisions” (Panetta 2014, 232). By the time Panetta moved to Defense, he had navigated policy decisions with the White House, most conspicuously his decision to allow members of the Senate Intelligence Committee to review documents on harsh interrogations conducted during the Bush years. Obama did not want the documents turned over, which Panetta blamed on Obama’s general dislike for working with Congress. Yet, Panetta’s fears of a White House staff “overemphasizing the political side of important policy decisions” became more serious as he managed decisionmaking at Defense. Differences in policy on Syria and Iraq were another source of discomfort for Panetta as he sought to change the course that the White House

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was pursuing. In Iraq, Panetta pushed for a small contingent of US troops to remain in Iraq after the formal pullout at the end of 2011 to ensure that the US could “continue exercising influence” (Panetta 2014, 415). Exercising influence to control al Qaeda was central to his plan. But, as Panetta saw while at the CIA, the White House staff often prioritized the political side of policy decisions. As the 2012 election drew near, the White House wanted all troops out of Iraq to comport with Obama’s 2008 election pledge to end the war. Maintaining a contingency force in Iraq did not meet that 2008 pledge. Similarly, Panetta sought to arm the Syrian rebels as they maneuvered to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. In February 2013, Panetta replied to a question during Senate testimony that he had been overruled by the White House in his plan to arm the Syrian rebels. The recommendation, which he supported, had been given to Panetta by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, yet the White House did not want to become embroiled in another Middle East war. Panetta was joined by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and CIA Director Petraeus in the recommendation. “What this means is that the president overruled the senior leaders of his own national security team, who were in unanimous agreement that America needs to take greater action to change the military balance of power in Syria,” one senator said (Pecquet 2013). Panetta left the Defense Department, and federal service, for the last time in early 2013 as Obama’s second term began. The president could start his new term with a fresh national security team, having already replaced Clinton at State with John Kerry and replaced Petraeus at the CIA with John Brennan. Yet, the White House national security staff remained intact, with Susan Rice continuing as national security advisor. With the election over, Rice controlled national security policy and was undaunted by the new cabinet. Her power had been solidified by the reelection victory and Obama’s determination to solidify his legacy that ended two wars, built a new relationship with Iran and Cuba, and kept the nation out of new wars. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel: Syria, ISIS, Guantanamo Bay, Ebola

To replace Panetta, Obama chose the former two-term Nebraska senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican who mentored Obama on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Their relationship blossomed during a preelection trip in 2008 to Iraq and Afghanistan, when General Petraeus made a long presentation on the successful Iraqi surge to reduce the insurgency and stabilize the country (Klaidman 2013). Hagel abruptly ended Petraeus’s presentation when the underlying message emerged that Petraeus needed more troops in Iraq. Hagel’s confirmation proved more difficult than expected, with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) leading a Republican challenge against the confirmation,

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centered on Hagel’s perceived lack of support for Israel. Republicans’ concerns during the confirmation hearing deepened when Hagel misstated the administration’s position on Iran, stating that the administration sought to contain Iran rather than stating that the administration was committed to keeping Iran from having nuclear weapons (Mak 2013). Although Hagel was ultimately confirmed in a 58–41 vote, the bruising fight had not been expected within the White House, which hoped for stronger support within Hagel’s own party. During the two years that Hagel served in the cabinet, his relationship with the White House was consistently poor, beginning with his response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons. Obama declared in 2012 that a “red line” would be crossed should Syria deploy chemical weapons in the civil war. Assad did deploy the chemical weapons in 2013, soon after Hagel was sworn into office. Hagel responded by moving American warships and other military assets closer to Syria to prepare for an attack on Assad, as Obama promised in his “red line” speech. Rice, who replaced Donilon in 2013 as national security advisor, opposed any military intervention that would add more troops into yet another Middle East country. Hagel was told to withdraw his forces from the area. Confusing messages sent by the White House on the role that the US military should play were seen again as the terrorist organization ISIS began to control large swaths of Syria and Iraq. Did the White House want to send troops or not? For months during 2014, the White House staff and the National Security Council staff (which numbered more than 400) debated policies to deal with ISIS as it claimed more territory and brutally killed Christians and Kurds in its path. Frustrated by the White House’s failure to define a military policy toward ISIS, Hagel sent a two-page memo to Donilon and Secretary Kerry, with a copy to Obama, seeking a clear theme in dealing with the civil war in Syria and the mounting threat from ISIS. He reiterated his argument that the White House “didn’t have a policy” (DeLuce 2015). Hagel’s relationship with the White House further deteriorated over the release of prisoners held at the naval facility at Guantanamo Bay. Although Obama had pledged during the 2008 presidential campaign to close the prison, Hagel had not aggressively pushed the process. Of the 149 prisoners then remaining at the prison, only six had been released (including the five swapped for Bowe Bergdahl) since Obama took office. Knowing that he had full control of the process—because Congress gave the secretary of defense, not the president, the final decision for prisoner release—Hagel was purposely reviewing each case. “My name goes on that document, that’s a big responsibility,” Hagel said. “I’m taking my time. I owe that to the American people, I owe that to the president” (Pickler 2014). Hagel’s refusal to aggressively deal with prisoner transfers to other countries, specifically four Afghan prisoners approved for repatriation, led counterterrorism specialist Lisa Monaco to again clarify the president’s position

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and their concern that there had been little progress in closing Guantanamo. In September 2014, Monaco said, “The president would absolutely like to see more progress in our efforts to close Guantanamo. He wants it closed. He’s pushing his own team very hard, raising it weekly with me, with Secretary Hagel, with Secretary (of State John) Kerry” (Pickler 2014). Two months later, Hagel was engaged in another battle with the White House over how to deal with soldiers returning from West Africa, in the vicinity of the Ebola virus. While the White House and the Centers for Disease Control were opposed to quarantines for doctors, nurses, and others returning from West Africa, the Army chief of staff, General Ray Odierno, ordered a 21-day quarantine for returning troops not because of medical necessity but to reassure troops and local communities that the Army was taking “all steps necessary to protect their health,” according to an Army statement. Hagel supported the decision even though official Pentagon policy had not been one of isolation for troops returning from West Africa (Alexander and Holland 2014). Rather than escalate the situation, Obama responded that “we don’t expect to have similar rules for our civilians and our military,” but the damage had been done (Alexander and Holland 2014). Hagel’s Defense Department appeared to be on a different page than the White House. When he accepted the position at Defense, one he had not sought, Hagel asked for and was given by Obama direct access to the Oval Office. In most cases, however, when Hagel asked for a meeting with the president, he would also be meeting with Rice and members of her team. After his resignation had been accepted, Hagel suggested that Rice and others in the White House were trying to “destroy him,” citing examples of anonymous stories to the press about his nonparticipation in cabinet meetings and deference to Joint Chiefs of Staff chair Michael Mullen in the Situation Room (DeLuce 2015). In essence, Hagel was always an outsider to the White House. An article in Foreign Policy noted, “Hagel’s biggest hurdle, though, was that he was never fully embraced by Obama’s tight inner circle” (Pace 2014), and subsequently Obama’s rhetoric on Iraq was absolutely clear. He declared on the eve of accepting the Democratic nomination for president, This war diminishes our security, our standing in the world, our military, our economy, and the resources that we need to confront the challenges of the 21st century. By any measure, our single-minded and open-ended focus on Iraq is not a sound strategy for keeping America safe. (Broder 2008) Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter: ISIS, Women in the Military

“Wanted: Thick-skinned candidate to oversee a sprawling bureaucracy bitten by budget cuts and join a national security team besieged by criticism. Must be tolerant of White House interference,” ran one national story

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(Pace 2014). After six years, the administration was now seeking its fourth secretary of defense. The micromanagement by the White House had become well known and had contributed to the short list of contenders at Defense. Few wanted the job, including Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson and former Deputy Secretary Michelle Flournoy. Hagel resigned under pressure in early 2015, replaced by his former deputy, Ashton Carter, a weapons expert with a long tenure at Defense, who was confirmed by a 93–5 vote in the Senate. Carter had credentials that appealed to the White House: an understanding of the Defense culture without direct ties to the military, experience outside of government, and an academic pedigree that melded with many in the White House, including Rice. Carter graduated summa cum laude from Yale, became a Rhodes Scholar, and received a PhD in theoretical physics from Oxford University. One of Carter’s first challenges at Defense was to state a firm US policy on ISIS, which was that the military would send limited numbers of special forces to train the opposition forces and to provide force protection. The White House never publicly opposed this position and issued press releases when special forces were being deployed. Marching with the White House on complete gender equality in the military, Carter announced that all positions and roles in the military would be open to women and transgender servicemembers. Thus, as 2016 unfolded, Carter’s one-year tenure at the helm of Defense appeared to be the strongest of all Obama’s four incumbents in the office. He appeared to work well with Rice and move policy decisions from task force to action.

Department of State Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Building Political Alliances Within the Cabinet

In a surprise move after the election, Obama pursued his former rival, Hillary Clinton, to ask her to join the new administration. Clinton would not only offer gender diversity for Obama’s male-dominated national security team but also provide a clear signal that he sought to unite the Democratic Party. Maintaining the Clinton coalition would be essential for holding the presidency in the 2012 election. Clinton praised the selection of Jones as national security advisor, calling him an honest broker (Clinton 2014, 23). She had less praise, however, for Rice, who had often attacked her during the 2008 campaign (Clinton 2014, 23). Rice, given cabinet rank, became an independent voice in cabinet meetings in spite of being in a line position under Clinton within the State Department hierarchy. Not only were relations with Rice uncomfortable throughout Clinton’s four years at the helm of State, but her relations with Jones’s replacement,

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Tom Donilon, were often icy. Unlike Jones, who gave the cabinet officers wide latitude, Donilon sought to bring not only decisionmaking but messaging under the White House purview. When Clinton met with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem in 2012, Donilon had been in Israel only days before. Before leaving, Donilon encouraged Clinton to coordinate her public and private remarks with him rather than leave an impression of contradiction between the White House and the State Department. Clinton balked at having any of her remarks reviewed by a White House aide. Emails later released by the State Department between Clinton and a State Department staffer show a complete disregard for Donilon’s request, offering withering commentary on the White House– State relationship. This State Department email from Jake Sullivan to Tom Vietor, National Security Council spokesman, suggests that Clinton had to “clean up” the mess left by Donilon in Israel: “ ‘S is going to clean up Tom’s mess,’ Mr. Sullivan replied to Mr.Vietor, referring to the secretary of state. ‘Is that okay?’ ” (Landler 2016). Clinton’s public stance displayed a strong working relationship with Donilon. “I have a great relationship with him. We don’t always agree, obviously. I bring my own perspective and experience to the table. But he is truly an honest broker,” she said (Baker 2012). Having watched the White House staff control policy during Bill Clinton’s presidency, she was astutely aware of the power that they held to manage decisionmaking. To avoid alienating Jones or Donilon, she referred to both as “honest brokers,” rather than asserting that either had colored her recommendations to the president. At no point, however, did she assume that either Jones or Donilon were honest brokers, and she carefully built a safety net by aligning herself with Vice President Biden, whom Obama routinely used as a key foreign policy advisor. Biden and Clinton met every Tuesday morning at 7:30 a.m. for breakfast at the vice president’s official residence and often hosted formal affairs together, such as the luncheon by the Clintons and the Bidens for President and Mrs. Felipe Calderón at the State Department. Similarly, she built an alliance with Gates, whom she saw as another ally against the White House. Gates, Clinton said, “was a convincing advocate for giving diplomacy and development more resources and a bigger role in our foreign policy.” She continued her praise by saying, “We became allies from the start, tag-teaming Congress for a smarter national security budget and finding ourselves on the same side of many internal administration policy debates” (Clinton 2014, 24). Clinton’s years in the cabinet had not lessened the deeply held skepticism— if not utter dislike—of her by most White House staff, particularly staffers who had campaigned vigorously against her for more than a year. She had few allies in the White House, particularly after Jones became sidelined by his own deputies. Throughout the campaign, her rhetoric had been more hawkish than Obama’s, which separated the Obama progressives from the Clinton centrists. Once in office, she continued to be more hawkish than anyone in the White House, pushing for an immediate response against

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Putin for his invasion of Ukraine, for the troop surge in Afghanistan, and for arming the Syrian rebels. None of the positions had support in the White House, which sought diplomatic rather than military solutions. Although the Afghan surge was finally implemented, she had built few allies in the White House for her aggressive support. After four years as secretary of state, Clinton resigned to begin preparations for her 2016 presidential campaign. Her relationship with the White House never improved during her tenure. When Panetta replaced Gates, Clinton forged another strong relationship, as she did with Petraeus at the CIA. Her relationships with the military establishment were consistently stronger than with the White House. With the White House dominated by campaign staff both in the political ranks and throughout the senior levels of the national security team, Clinton was always viewed with suspicion and never fully trusted. Her alliances with Gates, Panetta, and later Petraeus fueled that suspicion and convinced the White House that scrutiny of her decisions was necessary. For Clinton, this became micromanagement; for the White House, it became a necessity. When Obama first raised the question to his transition team of bringing Clinton into the new administration as secretary of state, Axelrod responded, “How could you trust Hillary?” (Woodward 2010, 26). That sentiment was never lost on the White House staff. Secretary of State John Kerry: Building Rapport With the White House

When Obama began his search in 2008 for a secretary of state, Senator John Kerry (D-MA), the Democratic Party’s standard-bearer four years earlier, asked Senator Ted Kennedy to recommend him for the position. Obama had secured Kennedy’s endorsement during the primaries and considered that one of his crowning achievements over Hillary Clinton in the hotly contested campaign. After the election, Obama held a series of meetings with candidates for the position in Chicago, including Kerry and, later, Clinton. Kerry ultimately lost to Clinton, but was chosen as her replacement in 2013. Even then, however, he had not been Obama’s first choice. Susan Rice was slated for the job until the controversy over her Benghazi remarks ended any chance of a smooth Senate confirmation. When Kerry finally moved into his Foggy Bottom office, the first instinct of the White House was to closely monitor his public role. Although Kerry had stronger support in the White House than his predecessor, micromanagement continued. Syria became an early test of Kerry’s relationship with the White House. Kerry and his counterpart in Defense, Chuck Hagel, advocated more aggressive punishment for the Assad regime, including US military intervention. But Rice and the White House national security staff had taken a firm position that the United States would not send troops

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into Syria, a position that continued Obama’s disengagement from military actions in the Middle East. Six months after taking office, Kerry was still under such a tight leash by the White House that the deputy national security advisor, Ben Rhodes, wrote Kerry’s August 2013 speech on the nonmilitary role that the United States would play in supporting the insurgents in Syria (Samuels 2016). Kerry eventually broke some of the White House’s choke hold on him, tackling the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, brokering a deal with Russia to remove chemical weapons held by Syria, and negotiating a treaty with Iran over nuclear weapon development (Rohde 2013). Unlike Clinton, who often delegated such assignments to special envoys such as Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell, Kerry personally handled high-level negotiations. Syria, however, continued to drive a wedge between Kerry and the White House.Three years after the White House insisted on writing Kerry’s speech on Assad, the tension between State and the White House melted into the public stage when 51 senior State Department officials sent the president a request to support the Syrian rebels, a position that the White House consistently refused to take (Calamur 2016).

Conclusion Complaints from the cabinet about White House micromanagement are hardly new. In 1997, Robert Reich, Bill Clinton’s first Secretary of Labor, published an anguished memoir describing how the White House staff “locked” him in the cabinet. Not surprisingly, his book was titled just that: Locked in the Cabinet (Reich 1997).Within months after taking office, Reich began to see the writing on the wall of a White House staff managing his time. “The White House called . . . they want you to go to Cleveland,” an aide said. Reich returns the aide’s comment: Don’t you see? Here I am, a member of the president’s cabinet, confirmed by the Senate, the head of an entire government department with eighteen thousand employees, responsible for implementing a huge number of laws and rules, charged with helping people get better jobs, and who is telling me what to do? . . . Some twerp in the White House who has no clue what I’m doing in this job. Screw him. I won’t go. (Reich 1997, 109) Reich continued to fume: Orders from twerps in the White House didn’t bother me at the beginning. Now I can’t stomach snotty children telling me what to do. From the point of view of the White House staff, cabinet officials are provincial governors presiding over alien, primitive territories. Anything of any

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importance occurs in the imperial palace, within the capital city. The provincial governors are important only in a ceremonial sense. (Reich 1997, 109) Although Reich wrote of the marginalization within the Clinton cabinet, the same discontent was felt within the Obama cabinet. Obama’s cabinet was never an equal partner in policy development. For that role, the president had his trusted loyalists on the White House staff. Cabinet members were chosen to fill geographic, ethnic, racial, and gender diversity. “Obama’s Cabinet—The Face of Diversity” headlined an article in the National Journal (Barnes 2009). Their role was to explain policy to their staffs and the public, not to make policy. Twenty years after Reich complained of disrespect from the White House, Politico writer Glenn Thrush found the same complaint of marginalization. Thrush titled his piece “Locked in the Cabinet: The Worst Job in Barack Obama’s Washington” (Thrush 2013). One deputy secretary commented to Thrush, “We are completely marginalized.” Former Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood said bluntly that the president simply did not rely on his cabinet (Thrush 2013). It appeared that little had changed in 20 years: The White House staff developed policy with little input from the cabinet. No one was more attuned to Reich’s concerns that cabinet members would be “locked away” than Gates. When Obama brought his cabinet and senior White House staff together several months after the inauguration for a weekend retreat at the White House, Gates saw how quickly the team approach was becoming a White House–centered approach to governance. “I could already see a president and White House staff, as so many before them, seeking total control and trying to centralize all power—and credit for all achievements—in the White House. I decided to address this bluntly” (Gates 2014, 301). Gates then laid out the role of the cabinet secretaries who, by law, were charged with implementing policy. Without a partnership between the White House and the cabinet officers, policies would not be made. Cabinet secretaries, who regularly testified before Congress, he said, had to “own” the president’s policies, which could only be done by joint discussions in policy development with the president and his senior staff (Gates 2014, 301). Gates wanted the White House staff to fully understand that as secretary of defense, he had the statutory responsibility of 2 million troops and 800,000 civilians and a multibillion-dollar budget. They were staff who had no formal authority and were, as their title inferred, staff. Finally, Gates got personal, underscoring his point: I then talked about how the White House treated the cabinet day to day. I told the assembled cabinet and White House staff that when my office told me the White House was calling and wanted something, I ignored it. A building didn’t make telephone calls. I said that, as a cabinet officer, I expected to be contacted only by a very senior White House person. (Gates 2014, 301)

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Gates would not be locked in the cabinet, he said, but two years later, he found that the team approach had disappeared as the White House staff “micromanaged” the policy and implementation process. “The controlling nature of the Obama White House and the NSS [National Security Council] staff took micromanagement and operational meddling to a new level” (Gates 2014, 301). His explanation for such micromanagement was that Obama’s “top tier of NSS people” had always been “super staffers” without independent reputations in foreign policy and national security. “This changed profile,” he said, “may explain, in part, their apparent lack of understanding or concern for observing the traditional institutional roles among the White House, the Pentagon, and the operational military” (Gates 2014, 587).

Future Challenges The choices that Obama made for his national security cabinet met the tests of cabinet building but failed the test that Obama needed: political loyalty and a firm commitment to his political agenda. Without a strong White House national security advisor and staff to guide departmental decisionmaking, departments would have moved in directions that veered away from the administration’s core mission. Political leadership by any White House is necessary to ensure that departmental leadership remains in the presidential orbit and loyal to presidential goals. If cabinet officers view that as micromanagement, then that is the price they pay for serving in the president’s cabinet. The lessons of Obama’s travails regarding his national security team may not have been lost on his successor, Donald Trump. On the one hand, in the early days of his administration, Trump elucidated that he wants to give broad latitude to his cabinet members to speak their minds and pursue creative solutions. A businessman, Trump prides himself on avoiding micromanagement. On the other hand, it also appears evident that the new president values loyalty—and honesty. Trump’s sacking of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn just three weeks into his presidency for having lied or misled the vice president about contacts with a Russian official threw the new foreign policy team into disarray. It is noteworthy that Flynn was allegedly forced out as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2014 under Obama. Former Joint Chiefs Chairman and Secretary of State Colin Powell posited that Obama had fired Flynn because he was “abusive with staff, didn’t listen, worked against policy, bad management, etc.” Powell then asserted, “He has been and was right-wing nutty every [sic] since” (Lamothe 2016, para. 5). Powell was referencing Flynn’s frequently outspoken, partisan rhetoric against Hillary Clinton and Obama’s foreign policy during campaign appearances in support of Donald Trump in 2016. Indeed, Flynn often led Trump supporters in chants of ‘Lock her up!’ as he accused her of corruption and negligence in her use of a private email

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server.Trump came to value Flynn not only for his like-minded view of global affairs but for his loyalty throughout the campaign. (Acosta and Diamond 2017, para. 25–26) Just two days after his election, Trump met with President Obama, who said “he would have profound concerns about Mr. Flynn becoming a top national security aide” in a broader discussion of personnel matters and Flynn’s management record at DIA (Shear 2017, para. 2). Whether the early fiasco with Flynn reflects poor vetting on the part of the Trump administration, the enduring temptation by new presidents to reward campaign surrogates with advisory positions, or a stubborn desire to privilege loyalty over questions of competence remains an open question. But the debacle underscores the perennial challenge presidents face in the search for balance in staff loyalty, aptitude, proficiency and, ultimately, control over national security advisory structures that are commensurate with their governing style and policy objectives.

References Acosta, Jim, and Jeremy Diamond. 2017. “Obama Warned Trump About Hiring Flynn.” CNN, May 9. www.cnn.com/2017/05/08/politics/obama-trump-michael-flynn/ Alexander, David, and Steve Holland. 2014. “Obama Sees Different Ebola Rules for U.S. Military Than for Civilians.” Reuters, October 28. www.reuters.com/article/ us-health-ebola-usa-military-idUSKBN0IH1ZM20141028 Alter, Jonathan. 2010. The Promise. New York: Simon and Schuster. Baker, Peter. 2012. “A Manager of Overseas Crises, as Much as the World Permits.” New York Times, September 23. Barnes, Robert. 2009. “Obama’s Cabinet—the Face of Diversity.” National Journal, June 20. Bennett, Anthony J. 1996. The American President’s Cabinet. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bergen, Peter. 2012. Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden From 9/11 to Abbottabad. New York: Crown Publishing. Broder, John M. 2008. “Obama and McCain Duel Over Iraq.” New York Times, July 16. Burns, Robert, and Julie Pace. 2014. “Hagel’s Exit and the Uneasy White House-Pentagon Relationship.” PBS Newshour, November 29. www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ hagels-exit-uneasy-white-house-pentagon-relationship/ Calamur, Krishnadev. 2016. “The Letter Urging a U.S. Rethink on Syria: Fifty-One State Department Officials Are Urging the Obama Administration to Conduct Airstrikes Against the Assad Regime.” The Atlantic, June 17. Clinton, Hillary. 2014. Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster. CNN (Cable News Network). 2009. “Report: U.S. General Calls for More Troops in Afghanistan.” September 21. Cobain, Ian. 2013. “Obama’s Secret Kill List: The Disposition Matrix.” The Guardian, July 13. DeLuce, Dan. 2015. “Hagel: The White House Tried to ‘Destroy’ Me.” Foreign Policy, December 18. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/hagel-the-white-house-triedto-destroy-me/

Obama’s National Security Cabinet 111 DeYoung, Karen. 2010 “Despite Stature, James L. Jones Was an Awkward Fit in Obama White House as NSA.” Washington Post, October 8. Gates, Robert. 2014. Duty. New York: Knopf. Hastings, Michael. 2010. “The Runaway General.” Rolling Stone, June 22. www.rolling stone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622#ixzz4CnAAVGVT Klaidman, Daniel. 2013. “The Origins of Obama’s Relationship With Chuck Hagel.” Newsweek, January 14. www.newsweek.com/origins-obamas-relationship-chuckhagel-63199 Lamothe, Dan. 2016. “Michael Flynn, Trump’s Military Adviser, Says Colin Powell’s Emails Include ‘Really Mean Things’.” Washington Post, September 15. www.washingtonpost. com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/09/15/michael-flynn-trumps-military-advisersays-colin-powells-emails-include-really-mean-things/?utm_term=.7fee626de7d6 Landler, Mark. 2016. “Agency Rivalries and Satire Show Up in Latest of Hillary Clinton’s Emails.” New York Times, March 4. www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/us/politics/ hillary-clinton-emails-reines-donilon.html?_r=0 Mak, Tim. 2013. “Hagel Stumbles on Iran Question.” Politico, January 31. www.politico. com/story/2013/01/chuck-hagel-stumbles-on-iran-question-087001 Pace, Julie. 2014. “Pool of Defense Secretary Contenders Dwindles.” Huffington Post, December 1. www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/01/obama-defense-secretary_n_62 50942.html Panetta, Leon. 2014. Worthy Fights. New York: Penguin Press. Pecquet, Julian. 2013. “Pentagon Leaders Backed Plan to Arm Syrian Rebels.” The Hill, February 7. Pickler, Nedra. 2014. “President Obama’s Goal of Closing Guantanamo Bay Prison Stalled at the Pentagon.” Huffington Post, September 30. Reich, Robert B. 1997. Locked in the Cabinet. New York: Knopf. Rogin, Josh. 2011. “McCain Demands Answers on Lippert/Jones Feud.” Foreign Policy, December 1. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/01/mccain-demands-answers-onlippertjones-feud/ Rohde, David. 2013. “How John Kerry Could End Up Outdoing Hillary Clinton.” The Atlantic, December. www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/john-kerrywill-not-be-denied/354688/ Rubin, Jennifer. 2011. “Time for Secretary for Defense Robert Gates to Leave—Or Be Fired.” Washington Post, April. Samuels, David. 2016. “The Storyteller and the President: How an Aspiring Fiction Writer Became One of the Central Figures Reshaping American Foreign Policy in the Obama Age.” The New York Times Magazine, May 8. Shane, Scott. 2015. Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. New York: Tim Duggan Books. Shear, Michael D. 2017. “Obama Warned Trump About Hiring Flynn, Officials Say.” New York Times, May 9. www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/us/politics/obama-flynn-trump. html Thrush, Glenn. 2013. “Locked in the Cabinet: The Worst Job in Barack Obama’s Washington.” Politico, November 2013. www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/11/lockedin-the-cabinet-099374 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2010. “Remarks by the President Announcing the Departure of General Jim Jones.” National Security Advisor, October 8. Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s Wars. New York: Simon Schuster.

6 Obama and Guantanamo The Intractable—and the Internal—Dilemma Nancy Kassop

Guantanamo Bay: The name today conjures up a familiar grainy image of orange-jumpsuited prisoners from foreign countries behind bars at an offshore detention center on the US naval base on the island of Cuba, situated 90 miles off the coast of Florida. The prison opened for business in January 2002 under the administration of President George W. Bush as the site where foreign terrorist suspects, believed to be members of al Qaeda or the Taliban and apprehended by US and allied forces on the battlefields of Afghanistan, would be housed and ultimately prosecuted for war crimes. Under international conventions of war, such a detention center is to operate only until the end of hostilities, at which point its occupants are to be released or repatriated. Yet, a decade and a half later, the struggle against international terrorism has not abated, and this prison continues to serve its captive population at the exorbitant annual cost of over $10 million dollars per detainee (as compared to about $80,000 per year to incarcerate a detainee in a US prison; Rosenberg 2017b). Symbolically, the facility is a stark reminder of what one journalist cast as “the toxic politics of terrorism” (Klaidman 2012, para. 15). By the end of his second term, Bush called for the closure of Guantanamo, a refrain echoed by 2008 Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama. Now a third president, Donald J.Trump, has inherited the controversial legacy of the prison and its future remains as unclear as its past has proven contentious. This chapter assesses the unsuccessful eight-year effort by President Obama to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. History will likely record that failed endeavor as one of the most disappointing setbacks of his administration. Moreover, the closure of Guantanamo constituted one of the central campaign issues for Obama in 2008—ultimately, a pledge he did not fulfill. Indeed, as a presidential candidate, then-Senator Obama was sharply critical of the Bush administration for creating the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, where fighters captured on the battlefield languished for years without being charged with crimes and without any path to determine their guilt or innocence (i.e., “indefinite detention”). On the campaign trail, Obama cited the litany of allegedly damaging effects to the nation caused by Guantanamo (and also by “black sites” and interrogation methods he regarded as

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government-approved torture). In Obama’s estimation, such measures ran counter to American values, violated international law, dismayed our allies, served as recruiting tools for terrorists, and stained the reputation of the US as a nation built upon a respect for the rule of law and governed by principles of due process. Once in the White House, however, Obama seemed gripped by immobilism on closing Guantanamo. He ultimately exchanged wholesale closure of the facility for a piecemeal effort to repatriate detainees to their home countries or to nations willing to house (or jail) them, thereby drawing down the number of detainees rather significantly by January 2017, when he handed over the keys to the Oval Office to Donald Trump. The new president pledged not only to keep the facility open but to increase its population with captives from the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS). This chapter traces the multiple obstacles to Obama’s efforts to discontinue use of the prison facility. No single factor, per se, was responsible for the failure. Rather, the combination of the president’s leadership style, competing agenda priorities, increasingly restrictive conditions imposed by Congress and prior executive actions reviewed by the Supreme Court, the timing of unforeseen terror attacks at home and abroad, self-inflicted wounds from his administration, and congressional discord linked to the Republican midterm victory in 2010 and six years of divided control of the White House and Capitol Hill highlight the significant roadblocks to shutting down the facility. As such, the case study accentuates a number of challenges that Obama was unable to overcome and conveys a portrait of his governing approach. The chapter commences with a brief review of the prison’s history dating to the Bush administration. Subsequent sections outline President Obama’s unique leadership style and strategic decisionmaking, which was often overshadowed by internal disharmony among White House staff; Obama’s puzzling decision not to use the unilateral levers of the presidency to close the facility via executive order; and the impact of domestic and international terrorism across his two terms, which increasingly ran headlong into public and congressional resistance to dismantling Guantanamo. The final sections summarize the lessons of Obama’s leadership on this seemingly intractable issue and review early indications of his successor’s plans for the prison in the future.

Guantanamo by the Numbers and by the Law Following its establishment in 2002, the prison at Guantanamo Bay has held a total of 780 prisoners. Approximately 540 were released during the eight years of the Bush administration, and 196 were released by the Obama administration. By January 2009, at the start of the Obama administration, the population stood at 242, and no new detainees were added during the 44th president’s tenure. The last arrival was in March 2008 (Rosenberg 2016). On January 19, 2017, just prior to Obama’s departure from office, the number of detainees stood at 41. Of those remaining, five have been cleared

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for release to third countries, 10 have been charged with war crimes and are awaiting either military commission trials at Guantanamo or sentencing, and 26 are designated as “forever prisoners” who are considered too dangerous to release but cannot be prosecuted (Rosenberg 2017). Under a 2011 executive order that established a Periodic Review Board process (Executive Order 13567), these “forever prisoners” are entitled to a full review every three years and to more frequent “file reviews” under certain circumstances, to determine if a change in status is warranted that could make them eligible for transfer. Three sets of basic documents guide government policy on the establishment and operations of Guantanamo: 1. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF; P.L. 107–40, 2001), passed by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush on September 18, 2001, provides the domestic legal authority for the US government to capture and detain enemy belligerents during the hostilities initiated by al Qaeda and its “associated forces.” Its stated objective is to authorize the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons” (P.L. 107–40). 2. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order that authorized “the detention, treatment, and trial” of non-US citizens who were members of al Qaeda or who engaged in or conspired to commit acts of international terrorism aimed at injuring the United States (Federal Register, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism” 2001). This order provided, inter alia, for the detention of such individuals “at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States” and mandated that they be “tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission . . .” (Federal Register, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial . . .” 2001). The order included provisions delegating authority to the Department of Defense to create military commissions at Guantanamo to try those suspects charged with war crimes. By the end of 2001, the Bush administration had settled on the US naval facility at Guantanamo Bay as the site for its military prison and soon thereafter began to transport foreign terrorist suspects apprehended in Afghanistan to the military base. 3. The US Supreme Court has handed down four main decisions on the legality of the processes and actions taken by the US government in connection with the apprehension, detention, and trial of enemy belligerents in military counterterrorism operations since September 11, 2001. First, the High Court determined in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)

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that the detention of individuals who met the criteria of the AUMF “is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use” in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban. This decision upheld the president’s authority during hostilities to capture and detain terrorist suspects, but it also ruled that detainees must be given the opportunity to challenge the government’s detention of them.   Yet the Hamdi decision left unresolved two critical questions. First, by what legal process could detainees challenge their detention (after the Court had determined in a prior issue that US law did, in fact, apply to detainees at Guantanamo)? Second, were the military commissions established under the November 2001 military order to try detainees at Guantanamo constitutional? The Court ruled by a 6–3 majority in Rasul v. Bush (2004), the same day as Hamdi, that the base at Guantanamo, although leased from Cuba since 1903, was under “the exclusive jurisdiction and control” of the United States, and, as such, US federal courts were authorized by statute to hear challenges through a petition for habeas corpus by any prisoner in US custody (Rasul v. Bush, 2004). Subsequently, the justices found by a narrow 5–4 majority in Boumediene v. Bush (2008) that procedural standards used by Guantanamo detainees to challenge their imprisonment had to meet constitutional specifications. Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the military commissions question in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006). A 5–3 majority held that the commissions authorized under the 2001 order were unconstitutional and in violation of both domestic and international law. In response, Congress then passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which stripped federal civilian courts of the authority to hear detainee habeas corpus cases (where detainees petition a federal court to rule on the legality of their detention); simultaneously, legislators responded to the Court’s objections in Hamdan by revising provisions for the military commissions. Subsequently, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2009, during the Obama administration, strengthening the legal protections for defendants when tried before military commissions. Thus, no less than three attempts were necessary over an eight-year time span to get the military commissions “right” from a constitutional perspective. Even so, vigorous criticism of the use of military tribunals continues unabated today as the commissions have been dogged by frequent changes in structure and procedures.The result has been a character of uncertainty and unpredictability that has undermined public confidence in the military tribunals to mete out justice effectively. The tribunals’ dismal record of convictions is apparent when juxtaposed with the record of civilian courts. Since 2001, military commissions have produced eight convictions in total, of which half were later vacated on appeal.Two others resulted in appeals pending in the US Supreme Court: Nashiri and Bahlul. Critics compare this shockingly thin record with the more than 500 convictions on

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terrorism-related charges in federal civilian (Article III) courts on the US mainland. This question of which judicial system is better equipped to handle trials of suspected terrorists—military commissions in which constantly changing procedures have precipitated steadfast legal challenges, or civilian courts with a longer history of respecting due process and a more successful prosecution record—remains one of the defining debates in the 15-year struggle over the closure of the Guantanamo prison.

Obama’s Leadership Style: Strategic Decisionmaking, Competing Agendas, and White House Infighting There is a rich political science literature that examines various approaches to leadership that presidents can take, from the rhetorical levers of the bully pulpit to behind-the-scenes maneuvering. Classic studies include Richard Neustadt’s (1960) Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership, which emphasizes the president’s reputation and bargaining ability; Samuel Kernell’s (2006) Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, which accents presidential efforts at going over the heads of members of Congress to build grassroots support for policy positions; James MacGregor Burns’s (1978) Leadership, which stresses the ability to find common ground in shared values to motivate followers; and Fred Greenstein’s (1982) The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, which suggests that the 34th president evidenced a unique approach that reconciled the inherent contradictions of the presidency. Eisenhower “denied being a ‘politician’ or understanding politics, but in both he exercised political influence” by making his appeals “in terms of the national interest and in terms of the specialized competence he could claim by virtue of his official role,” often manipulating processes and procedures out of public sight (Greenstein 1982, 11). More recently, presidency scholars such as Fred Greenstein (2009) in The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama, George C. Edwards III (2012) in Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency, and Bert Rockman, Eric Waltenburg, and Colin Campbell (2012) have specifically addressed Obama’s approach to presidential leadership. Reporting and analysis by several keen journalists provide complementary insights (see, e.g., Bruck 2016; Goldberg 2016; Klaidman 2012; Remnick 2014). Each of these authors’ approaches variably emphasizes Obama’s political skill, communication style, organizational acumen, and policy vision. What can we distill from these sources about Obama’s leadership style as it applies to his efforts to close Guantanamo? Two essential conclusions come through in most of these profiles. First, on national security policymaking, Obama emphasized the long view. He acknowledged the obstacles in shaping policy but trusted that the contested actions he took as president would ultimately come to be viewed more favorably in time as having “moved the ball” forward in constructive ways (Remnick 2014, quoting Valerie Jarrett: “The President always takes the long view.” Remnick commented that

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he began to “think of [this] as the Administration’s mantra”). As such, his reduction of Guantanamo’s prison population by 90 percent by the time he left office was, perhaps, a silver lining against the backdrop of his failure to close the facility altogether. Obama accentuated such progress in his final report to Congress on January 19, 2017. Noting that obstacles to closing the prison were exacerbated by the loss of bipartisan support in Congress, he said, “Despite those politics, we have made progress” (Obama 2017). Second, a frequent criticism of Obama’s leadership style is that he was timid and cautious—unwilling to go “bold.” Jeffrey Goldberg’s (2016) article in The Atlantic is one of the most insightful and comprehensive explorations of the president’s reasoning on national security matters. The “Obama doctrine” in foreign policy rested on the belief that the United States could not solve every world crisis. As a nation, the United States needed to strategically determine which ones would merit our attention and action (or, as Remnick described it, a theory of “policy particularism,” or “this thing is different from that thing”; Remnick 2014, italics in original). Rockman, Waltenburg, and Campbell (2012) characterized Obama as “paradoxical,” in that he was “goal-oriented as a politician but also consensusoriented and pragmatic in his political style” (337, italics in original). This seems apt. As a candidate, Obama was exceptionally inspirational and could move crowds with soaring oratory about moral principles, while pragmatic is the adjective that surfaces repeatedly in descriptions of his governing style. Obama uses it to describe himself: “So, there are values I am passionate about, but I am pretty pragmatic when it comes to how to get there” (Remnick 2014). It is easy to see this pattern applied to Guantanamo: in his campaign speeches and throughout his years in office, he consistently framed closing the prison as a moral imperative and an essential reassertion of the rule of law. Yet, he settled for a significantly reduced population in light of political realities. Edwards’s work captured another critical angle of Obama’s leadership efforts on Guantanamo. Edwards maintained that compelling oratory from presidents is insufficient to provoke major policy changes and to move the public or Congress to support their pleas (Edwards 2012). The best presidents can do is “facilitate” change and “understand the opportunities for change in their environments and fashion strategies and tactics to exploit them” (Edwards 2009, 12). Obama’s impassioned references to Guantanamo in speeches during his presidency were simply not enough to sustain public support for closing the prison. The support for dismantling the prison was clearly evident during his 2008 campaign. But polls indicated a marked decline and reversal early in his presidency, and a strong majority of Americans never wavered from that disapproval of closure throughout Obama’s two terms (McCarthy 2014). Other leadership qualities that did not work to his advantage in his handling of Guantanamo were his aloof nature, manifested by an unwillingness to do the “retail” politicking necessary for promoting compromise with Congress,

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and his ineffectiveness in managing the internal discord and inconsistencies within his administration over Guantanamo policies. Connie Bruck’s (2016) and Daniel Klaidman’s (2016) reporting compared Obama’s unwillingness to take bold action on Guantanamo, especially early in the administration, when he had a Democratic Congress. Bruck (2016) described Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as “far more willing than Obama to take political risks to get it closed.” Klaidman recounted at least two times during Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state in which she expressed her exasperation at Obama for his timidity in failing to push harder to close Guantanamo. The first came in a 2010 principals meeting. The second came in the form of a lengthy memo, penned as Clinton prepared to leave office in 2013, that laid out a series of specific recommendations. Dissension within the administration on the question of Guantanamo cannot be underestimated and occurred in two contexts: first, between White House staff members, notably Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and White House Counsel Gregory Craig throughout 2009; and second, between various White House staff and cabinet members. Emanuel’s contentious relationship with Attorney General Holder was aired in public. Tensions also emerged between National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, as well as with Hagel’s successor, Ashton Carter (Bruck 2016, 42–45). In sum, this pattern reflected the increased centralization of policymaking in the White House that has characterized modern presidencies and the diminished influence of departments and agencies on presidential decisions. But centralized infighting did not signal efficiency in decision outcomes. The conflict between Emanuel and Craig grew out of Emanuel’s singleminded goal to ensure the passage of health insurance reform early in Obama’s tenure. Klaidman (2012) said of Emanuel: His job, as he saw it, was keeping the president focused on the Main Chance, reforming health care while fighting two wars and staving off a depression. Guantanamo was just a pain-in-the-ass distraction, he told Craig. “We are trying to bring in two 747s (the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) at the same time we are trying to reform our national health care system, and right in the middle you want to send up a flock of Canadian geese, which is Guantanamo, which could take down one of those 747s.” (110) The rule-of-law agenda would have to wait, as the health bill soon overwhelmed many other initiatives, subordinating almost all other questions. White House staffers called it “triage,” the inescapable reality, as they saw it, of a president’s having to choose among policy priorities. They used the abbreviation AHC, or “after health care,” to refer to everything else they hoped to accomplish. (2)

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During the 2009 transition, Craig had authored the January executive order announcing that Guantanamo would close within the year, and he had been the person most associated with that goal throughout that year, despite criticism of him from Democrats in Congress that he did not engage sufficiently with them on it. By November 2009, Craig announced that he would step down from office by the end of the year, and there was little secret that Emanuel had forced him out (Blog of Legal Times 2010). Emanuel and Attorney General Eric Holder had a significant row when the latter announced on November 13, 2009, that the Department of Justice would prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four 9/11 co-conspirators in federal criminal court in New York. Emanuel viewed the decision as bad politics (Blog of Legal Times 2010). Indeed, public reaction shifted between frustration and outrage, ultimately forcing Holder to reverse course and relegate the trial of the defendants to a military commission at Guantanamo (see Baker 2010; Blog of Legal Times 2010). Finally, Bruck (2016) reported on how different units within the executive branch worked at cross-purposes with one another, with no effective oversight to coordinate their actions toward the same goal. As one critical example, National Security Advisor Susan Rice pressured Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the transfer of prisoners without certification, which was one putative reason for his resignation announced in November 2014.

Policy Priorities, Strategic Contexts, and Self-Inflicted Wounds Surrounding Guantanamo The primary reason Guantanamo was selected as a detention center by Bush administration officials soon after the 9/11 attacks was that they believed it to be a location where US law would not apply, although the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Rasul disproved that assumption. President Obama, having been trained as a lawyer and having taught constitutional law earlier in his career, brought a perspective to the office of the presidency that highlighted the need to restore the nation’s commitment to traditional legal and moral principles. Having campaigned on a pledge to close Guantanamo, it is not surprising, then, that fulfilling this campaign promise would be one of Obama’s priorities upon taking office. He demonstrated this by issuing, on his second day in office, an executive order that announced, in declarative form, that the prison would close within one year from that date (i.e., closure by January 22, 2010; Executive Order 13492). But there were competing policy priorities on the new president’s agenda, such as promoting universal health insurance (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), shoring up the financial system and providing for more effective oversight of it (the Dodd-Frank Act), bailing out the auto industry, passing the stimulus package (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), and shepherding two Supreme Court appointments in his first two years, all of which were made possible by Democratic majorities

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in both houses of Congress. By the midterm elections of 2010, Democrats had lost their majority in the House, making passage of any future legislative initiatives nearly impossible. Moreover, the president was becoming increasingly distracted by the uprisings in Libya and Syria. As noted earlier, public support for closing Guantanamo steadily declined as of 2009. By 2011, the “fundamentals” of presidential politics as scholars see them were trending unfavorably for Obama: The president’s party had lost control of one house of Congress, his attention had been diverted to urgent and unpredictable matters of foreign policy, and strategically, he had hit the ground running at the start of his presidency and given his full attention to matters of domestic policy during a short window of opportunity that existed with a majority on Capitol Hill from 2009–2010. Health care, infrastructure spending, and economic regulation overshadowed a focus on ancillary issues that were connected to his predecessor. Certainly, the timing of events beyond Obama’s control also played a pivotal role on the question of Guantanamo, particularly vis-à-vis public sentiment and congressional recalcitrance to close the prison. Domestic and international terrorism attacks or attempts (see Feste, Chapter 3) that occurred over the course of Obama’s two terms, however, intertwined and became entangled with administrative decisions that may be characterized as either misjudgments or clumsy political execution that undermined an otherwise more forceful case that the president might have been able to make to the public and Congress on closure of the prison. Such decisions, the most important of which are outlined in this section, are best described as self-inflicted wounds. In April 2009, the White House engaged in a “stealth” effort to relocate eight Chinese Uighur detainees to the United States. These Chinese nationals, part of a small Muslim sect in Central Asia, had been captured in Afghanistan but were ultimately determined to have no ties to al Qaeda or the Taliban. They were subsequently verified as no threat to the United States and were stripped of the label “enemy combatant.” The administration sought to relocate these eight detainees to Fairfax County, Virginia, where Uighur-Americans agreed to care for them. According to Newsweek, the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, and the Pentagon warned the White House that any public disclosure of the transfer of prisoners from Guantanamo was likely to outrage Republicans (Isikoff 2009). But failing to inform Congress—or at least the member from that district, Representative Frank Wolf—had immediate and longer-term consequences once the congressman learned of the plan. Wolf took to the floor of the House of Representatives to demand that the White House declassify information on trained terrorists and accused Attorney General Eric Holder of stonewalling efforts to do so (McCarthy 2009). Indeed, Wolf would do so more than a half-dozen times while firing off three letters to Holder on the subject, which provided ample press coverage (Gardner 2009). Most importantly, the showdown between Wolf and the White House hastened

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congressional efforts to draft a prohibition on bringing Guantanamo detainees to the United States. Eight months after the Uighur fiasco, Holder made an announcement that stunned New Yorkers and the nation: He planned to bring 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other co-conspirators, all detained at Guantanamo, to Manhattan for trial in federal court just blocks away from the World Trade Center. The announcement was met with immediate hostility from the public. New York City politicians, with whom the administration had not sufficiently liaised, were caught entirely off guard. Caught up in a veritable firestorm, Holder was attacked from all corners—Congress, the media, and within the White House, by Emanuel. The attorney general ultimately was forced to reverse course and relegate the Mohammed trial to a military tribunal. But as one member on Capitol Hill suggested, the debacle was “the final nail in the coffin” of White House prospects of trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts in the future (Phillip 2011, para. 1). Just three weeks after Holder’s 2009 decision to try Mohammed in New York, a chilling reminder of the terrorist threat to the homeland played out aboard a Northwest Airlines flight en route to Detroit from Amsterdam. On Christmas Day, an al Qaeda operative from Nigeria named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up the aircraft with explosives lodged in his underwear as the flight approached Detroit. The “underwear bomber,” as he was nicknamed, nearly succeeded in his attack until passengers and crew subdued him and put out the flames on his pants. If the foiled terrorist attack spooked the nation, according to Klaidman (2016), it “took a powerful psychic toll on the White House.” Against the backdrop of administration missteps and increasing concerns about terrorism, the White House made other decisions that likely contributed to declining support for the closure of Guantanamo in the public and in Congress. First, the June 2014 “swap” of five Taliban prisoners at Guantanamo for the return of American Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who was held captive in Pakistan for five years, proved deeply controversial. On one hand, the administration executed the prisoner exchange without complying with a 30-day notice requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. Republicans in Congress viewed the prisoner exchange as a violation of the statute. On the other hand, the circumstances of Bergdahl’s capture came under intense scrutiny—and in 2016, the Army announced two charges against him under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. Second, the administration’s multiyear delay in providing Congress with a comprehensive plan to close Guantanamo exasperated members on Capitol Hill. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) often ratcheted up his ire against the White House by demanding, “Where’s the plan?” Not until February 2016, with less than a year until Obama’s term ended, did the administration submit a formal plan to Congress (White House 2016). At that late juncture,

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unsurprisingly in an election year, the document was declared dead on arrival by the Republican majority and never given serious consideration.

A Coda on Presidential Unilateralism? Obama’s Decision Not to Close Guantanamo by Executive Order Each year, commencing in 2009, Congress’s annual fiscal year authorizations for national defense programs (NDAAs) included several important constraints on the president’s latitude regarding the Guantanamo facility and detainees. Appropriated funds could not be used to close Guantanamo. Restrictions were imposed on bringing detainees to the United States. And, with varying degrees of severity, constraints were placed on the release or transfer of detainees to third countries. As Matt Olsen, the Department of Justice lawyer who had been charged in January 2009 with overseeing the review of every one of the 240 detainees at Guantanamo at that time, remarked recently on a PBS Frontline program, politics, “not national security . . . [is] the main reason that it’s still open” (Breslow 2017, para. 32). The puzzle remains, then, why the president decided against using an executive order either at the beginning of his term or later to close Guantanamo definitively. Was such an order constitutional under his Article II authority as commander in chief? Absolutely. Was such an order too high a political price, particularly at the beginning of his term, that would have cost too much political capital? Perhaps. It is impossible to speculate about the fallout such a unilateral action might have had on Obama’s early legislative agenda. What is most clear is that once the early opportunity was forfeited, it became increasingly difficult for Obama to consider use of an executive order even as advisors pressed him and detractors criticized him for failing to carry through on an important campaign promise. Former administration lawyers Gregory Craig and Cliff Sloan (2015) contended in a Washington Post op-ed that Congress’s continuing restrictions on presidential actions toward Guantanamo were an unconstitutional intrusion on executive power. “In his capacity as commander in chief,” they argued, the president “has the exclusive authority to make tactical military decisions” (para. 5). Obama, however, did not seize on this legal rationale to close the prison. Still, many supporters continued to urge Obama to use an executive order and sweep the Guantanamo facility into the dustbin of history. At a Democratic fundraiser in San Francisco in 2013, a heckler shouted to the president, “Executive order!” and the crowd applauded loudly in approval. Obama responded by saying, “Wait, wait, wait. . . . Before everybody starts clapping, that’s not how it works. We’ve got this Constitution, we’ve got this whole thing about separation of powers. So, there is no shortcut to politics, and there’s no shortcut to democracy” (Remnick 2014). Obama’s remarks specifically, and his reticence more generally to avoid unilateral action on Guantanamo, are difficult to square with the use of

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executive orders in other policy domains. He issued 276 executive orders and took other presidential actions from immigration reform to reducing gun violence, some of which became focal points for litigation. One may surmise that, given the controversy over efforts to reform the nation’s immigration policy (Department of Homeland Security 2014), Obama came to the conclusion that there were limits as to how far he could push the use of unilateral authority. Additionally, he may have viewed an executive order as exceeding his constitutional authority vis-à-vis the statutory restrictions imposed in the annual NDAAs.

Conclusion The list of factors that contributed to Obama’s failure to achieve closure of Guantanamo is long and varied. External events beyond his control, administrative miscalculations, internal discord over policy strategy, and competing agendas early in his first term provide insights. But one is reminded of Harry Truman’s axiom regarding the president, “The buck stops here.” He is the primary driver of policy goals and is ultimately responsible not only for managing the White House but also for the policy accomplishments it achieves—and for those it does not. Criticisms of Obama on the failure to close Guantanamo abound. There was clearly the lack of a coordinated follow-up to the much-touted idea of an executive order when he came to the Oval Office. To observers, it was never clear who in the administration was in charge of the Guantanamo issue—a point person, so to speak. This oversight may well explain why there was little outreach to members on Capitol Hill and no sustained pressure from the White House to indicate to Congress that Guantanamo was a priority on which the president was willing to spend political capital (Finn and Kornblut 2011). It is telling that Obama commented on Guantanamo in his end-of-term reflections on his presidency. He noted that one of his deepest regrets is that he did not simply order the prison closed on his first day in office, when he had a Democratic Congress. Following the logic of Craig and Sloan (2015), if Bush had ordered the establishment of the prison via executive order, then Obama could certainly close it by employing the same mechanism. Still, other policy priorities such as health care and the fallout from the recession and financial collapse of 2008 dominated the president’s agenda. By late 2009, Obama had arguably already lost control over the issue when Congress, in its annual NDAAs, began to restrict the use of appropriated funds for any changes in Guantanamo policy and domestic and international terrorist plots and attacks increased public anxiety. Thus, there may have been an exceedingly narrow window of opportunity for Obama to have acted. Recognizing when those windows are about to close is much more difficult in the moment and far easier, with the benefit of hindsight, after they have slammed shut.

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Future Challenges The future of the military prison for suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay remains indeterminate as Obama handed over the reins of the presidency to Donald Trump. The fate of the facility did not figure prominently in the 2016 presidential election. Nevertheless, Trump posited on several occasions that he would not only keep Guantanamo open but would also send more captured terrorists to the facility. The contention fit rather neatly with his pledge to eradicate ISIS and “load up Guantanamo with some bad dudes” (Welna 2016). In early January 2017, just days before taking the oath of office, Trump derided Obama’s decision to release more prisoners from Guantanamo and cited recidivism. He turned to Twitter to argue, “There should be no further releases from Gitmo. These are extremely dangerous people and should not be allowed back onto the battlefield” (Trump 2017). Just a month later, in February 2017, there was much anticipation that now-President Trump would issue an executive order regarding the facility. The New York Times reported that a draft order circulating within White House circles laid bare plans not only to re-open “black sites” under the CIA’s authority but also direct the military to transfer future ISIS detainees to Guantanamo Bay (Savage 2017). Any such order, however, was never forthcoming. In Trump’s first 100 days, there was no substantive change in policy regarding Guantanamo, the reviews of detainees’ eligibility for release have continued, the same 41 prisoners in residence there remained as they did when Obama left office, and the new president showed more of a predilection for measured air strikes in Syria than for a wholesale ground war that would fill the prison cells with ISIS combatants. An additional controversy that would vastly complicate any effort to send ISIS detainees to Guantanamo is whether the 2001 AUMF would apply to ISIS, since that legislation authorized hostilities exclusively against those terrorist groups and associated forces who were responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. ISIS did not exist at the time Congress passed this authorization; thus, there is a robust debate over the question of bringing ISIS captives to a prison that is not legally authorized to receive them (Goldsmith 2017; Lewis 2017). The issues surrounding the military prison and the detention of suspected terrorists raise complex questions about constitutional rights such as due process and habeas corpus (and whether they should be extended to noncitizen detainees). From the standpoint of international watchdog groups, there are serious human rights implications of indefinite detention, and the Geneva Conventions may also apply. Further, civilian courts in the United States have a far better record of conviction than military tribunals. But Americans generally lack the appetite to try Guantanamo detainees stateside, and they are even less inclined to want to house alleged terrorists on the mainland—the so-called “not in my backyard” phenomenon. Such considerations explain, perhaps, the temptation to employ methods such as drone strikes to kill rather than capture members and leaders of terrorist organizations abroad, as Cash and Bridge detail in Chapter 7.

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References Baker, Peter. 2010. “Obama’s War Over Terror.” New York Times, January 4. www.nytimes. com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html Blog of Legal Times (BLT). 2010. “Obama’s Ex-Counsel Reveals White House Tensions.” September 25. http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/09/obamas-ex-counsel-revealswhite-house-tensions.html Breslow, Jason M. 2017. “Matt Olsen: ‘Politics’ Kept Guantanamo Open, ‘Not National Security’.” PBS. www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/matt-olsen-politics-kept-guanta­namoopen-not-national-security/ Bruck, Connie. 2016. “The Guantánamo Failure: Who’s Really to Blame?” The New Yorker,August 1. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failedto-close-guantanamo Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper & Row. Craig, Gregory B., and Cliff Sloan. 2015. “The President Doesn’t Need Congress’s Permission to Close Guantanamo.” Washington Post, November 6. www.washington post.com/opinions/the-president-doesnt-need-congresss-permission-to-close-guanta namo/2015/11/06/4cc9d2ac-83f5-11e5-a7ca-6ab6ec20f839_story.html?utm_term=.0c 1dc0307cc8 Department of Homeland Security. 2014. “The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others.” November 19. www.justice.gov/file/179206/download Edwards III, George C. 2009. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Edwards III, George C. 2012. Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Federal Register. 2001. Military Order of November 13, 2001. “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.” https://fas.org/irp/ offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm Finn, Peter, and Anne E. Kornblut. 2011. “Guantanamo Bay: How the White House Lost the Fight to Close It.” Washington Post, April 23. www.washingtonpost.com/world/ guantanamo-bay-how-the-white-house-lost-the-fight-to-close-it/2011/04/14/AFtx R5XE_story.html?utm_term=.b118d7192664 Gardner, Amy. 2009. “Candidates Cautious or Concerned About Possible Relocation of Detainees to Va.” Washington Post, May 15. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con tent/article/2009/05/14/AR2009051404098.html Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic, April. www.theatlantic. com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ Goldsmith, Jack. 2017. “The Practical Legal Need for an ISIL AUMF.” February 8. www. lawfareblog.com/practical-legal-need-isil-aumf Greenstein, Fred I. 1982. The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. New York: Basic Books. Greenstein, Fred I. 2009. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style From FDR to Bush. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Isikoff, Michael. 2009. “Chinese Uighurs and Obama’s Gitmo Problem.” Newsweek, May 22. www.newsweek.com/chinese-uighurs-and-obamas-gitmo-problem-80027 Kernell, Samuel. 2006. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Klaidman, Daniel. 2012. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency. New York: Houghton and Mifflin.

126  Chapter 6 Klaidman, Daniel. 2016. “How Gitmo Imprisoned Obama.” Newsweek, May 15. www. newsweek.com/2013/05/15/how-gitmo-imprisoned-obama-237388.html Lewis, Paul. 2017. “The Continuing Need to Close the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility.” March 14. www.lawfareblog.com/continuing-need-close-guantanamo-baydetention- facility McCarthy, Andrew C. 2009. “Rep. Frank Wolf: AG Holder Stonewalling on the Uighurs.” National Review. May 5. www.nationalreview.com/corner/181342/rep-frank-wolfag-holder-stonewalling-uighurs-andrew-c-mccarthy McCarthy, Justin. 2014. “Americans Continue to Oppose Closing Guantanamo Bay.” Gallup Poll, June 14. www.gallup.com/poll/171653/americans-continue-oppose-clos ing-guantanamo-bay.aspx Neustadt, Richard M. 1960. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: Free Press. Obama, Barack. 2017. “Letter From the President—Report With Respect to Guantanamo.” The White House, January 19. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press- office/2017/01/19/letter-president-report-respect-guantanamo Phillip, Abby. 2011. “Holder Transfers KSM Case.” Politico, April 4. www.politico.com/ story/2011/04/holder-transfers-ksm-case-052509 Remnick, David. 2014. “Going the Distance: On and Off the Road With Barack Obama.” The New Yorker, January 27. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/ going-the-distance-david-remnick Rockman, Bert, Eric Waltenburg, and Colin Campbell. 2012. “Presidential Style and the Obama Presidency.” In The Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects, eds. Bert A. Rockman, Andrew Rudalevige, and Colin Campbell. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Rosenberg, Carol. 2016. “By the Numbers.” Miami Herald, October 25. www.miamiher ald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article2163210.html Rosenberg, Carol. 2017. “Saudi Accepts 4 Guantánamo Captives; Prison Now Holds 55.” Miami Herald, January 5. www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/ guantanamo/article124755459.html Rosenberg, Carol. 2017b. “Obama to Leave With 41 Captives Still at Guantánamo, Blames Politics.” Miami Herald, January 19. www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article127473314.html Savage, Charlie. 2017. “Draft Trump Order on ISIS Detainees and Guantánamo.” New York Times, February 8. www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/08/us/documentRevised-draft-Trump-EO-on-detainees-and-Gitmo.html Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump]. 2017. There should be no further releases from Gitmo. These are extremely dangerous people and should not be allowed back onto the battlefield. [Tweet]. January 3. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/816333480409833472 Welna, David. 2016. “Trump Has Vowed to Fill Guantanamo with ‘Some Bad Dudes’—But Who?”NPR,November 14.www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/11/14/502007304/ trump-has-vowed-to-fill-guantanamo-with-some-bad-dudes-but-who White House. 2016.“Remarks by the President on Plan to Close the Prison at Guantanamo Bay.” February 23. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press office/2016/02/ 23/remarks-president-plan-close-prison-guantanamo-bay

7 Attack of the Drones National Security, Due Process, and the Constitutionality of Unmanned Strikes Jordan Cash and Dave Bridge In nearly every major American conflict, the US Judiciary has struggled with balancing constitutional rights and the rule of the law. The war on terror is no different. With advances in technology, particularly unmanned drones, these questions have only become more complicated. In this essay, we discuss the Obama administration’s use of targeted drone strikes in light of the Supreme Court’s recent due process jurisprudence. We address whether the administration’s unilateral policies may pose problems for procedural due process and separation of powers.We also recognize the unique jurisdictional questions arising and that existing precedent may have shortcomings in fully explicating the constitutional and legal ambiguities surrounding targeted strikes.To provide a better view into drone strikes’ targets and operations, we use the case of Anwar al-Awlaki (sometimes spelled al-Aulaqi). Al-Awlaki was an American citizen killed by a targeted drone strike in Yemen in 2011. His death raises due process and free speech issues, as well as institutional questions regarding presidential war powers. Al-Awlaki’s example provides a window into how the Obama administration’s drone policy sought to balance due process and national security. We start with a brief history of the United States’ drone program.Then we give a short description of al-Awlaki’s life. Next, we examine the Supreme Court’s due process frameworks developed in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. We apply these to the drone program to explore the constitutional issues those cases bring to bear, using al-Awlaki’s example as a reference point. Finally, we speculate on what these decisions mean for due process and presidential power in a world of drone warfare.

Drones and the Constitution Existing research covers numerous areas related to drone usage (e.g., Lauritzen 2013; Bhatt 2012; Nalden 2013; Farley 2014; Reid 2014; Cronogue 2013; Flaherty 2015; Chong 2012; Eviatar 2016). The most discussed topic is drones’ effect on due process rights. Most studies consider the procedures by which drone strikes are carried out, often using al-Awlaki as the primary point of reference. This procedural research tends to emphasize the need for

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more safeguards in determining the individuals targeted for drone strikes, with critics debating who should decide on kill targets. Some have proposed that the process remain in the executive branch (Murphy and Rasdan 2013); others argue for strengthening due process procedures outside the executive branch, although the level of these procedures has varied. Some, like former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, have advocated for more extraexecutive input but insist that Supreme Court rulings (such as Hamdi, which is discussed later) provide the president enough flexibility to act for national security interests. Even with such a broad reading, Gonzales has insisted that Congress and the courts should be involved in the president’s drone policy (Gonzales 2013). Some constitutional scholars have called for other institutional safeguards, with proposals ranging from oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to the creation of specialized federal drone courts (Eshaghian 2013; Bower 2014; Funk 2013;Vladeck 2014). Altogether, prior research is mostly normative, with scholars interpreting the Constitution themselves to advocate for whether drone strikes are constitutional (Kacou 2015; Gonzales 2013; Eshaghian 2013). This chapter builds on this literature in a more descriptive fashion. Without giving an up-or-down answer on drone strike constitutionality, we explore what previous rulings may indicate about drone strikes. We also note where these cases fall short and how drone strikes may be legally distinguished from previous due process jurisprudence. Additionally, by focusing more narrowly on al-Awlaki, we discuss the problems presented by targeting American citizens. Further, as al-Awlaki’s contributions to al Qaeda were not overtly violent, we ask how free speech and conspiracy jurisprudence could affect drone strikes.Thus, we speculate that courts may go beyond due process to decide drone cases. First, however, we describe the procedures surrounding unmanned strikes.

History of the United States’ Targeted Drone Program Broadly speaking, the term drone refers to “systems or vehicles that operate without human passenger-drivers. These vehicles either pilot themselves . . . or are controlled by pilots in remote contact” (Farley 2014, 142). Nations have used remote drones since World War II, although “predator” drones (i.e., those armed with missiles for targeted strikes) only emerged after September 11, 2001. A key part of Obama’s foreign policy, targeted strikes spiked once he took office in 2009. This is perhaps a result of Obama trying to distance himself politically from the military policies of George W. Bush while still pursuing the same general national security goal of defeating terrorism. Drone use preserved the presidential unilateralism of Bush’s national security policies but did not rely on boots on the ground. Drones also granted Obama the political flexibility to say he was withdrawing from the Middle East while still pursuing American interests in the region.

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Interestingly, who employs drones has varied, depending on the particular battlefield. In the “clear war zones” of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Air Force has had sole operation. In legally hazy areas, such as northwest Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, drones are jointly overseen by the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (  JSOC). The CIA controls drone operations for Pakistan, JSOC handles Somalia, and both share oversight of strikes in Yemen (Murphy and Rasdan 2013; Rasdan and Murphy 2011). Congress’s armed services and intelligence committees oversee strikes by the JSOC and the CIA, respectively. Because statutes require the CIA to promptly report covert actions to high-ranking members of both houses’ intelligence committees, oversight of the JSOC is considered to be lacking when compared to that of the CIA. CIA oversight, however, amounts to little more than post-strike briefings, as the White House has centralized most of the decisionmaking authority (Rasdan and Murphy 2011). While the exact process for selecting who is to be targeted for drone strikes is classified, the general outlines can be gleaned from information we do have. John Brennan, director of the CIA, has insisted that targeted drone strikes are limited to when “capturing the individual is not feasible” and are to be conducted only on those with “military value” and who suit “military objectives,” which has generally been defined to mean those individuals “who are part of al-Qaeda or its associated forces” (Brennan 2012). Obama raised the bar even higher, stating that targeted strikes “beyond the Afghan theater” only apply to “terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat” (Obama 2013). Further restrictions have been put forward by former Legal Adviser for the State Department Harold Koh, who proposed that the target must be a senior member of al Qaeda who is “externally focused” on harming the United States or its interests, and with evidence showing that he or she was plotting to strike (see Klaidman 2012). The plot need not be imminent, as preemptive strikes could be used against those who are in the beginning stages of planning. To use Klaidman’s summary, “terrorists wouldn’t have to be boarding the plane with bombs before American commandos could take them out. It would be enough if they were designing the suicide vests” (219–220; Koh 2010). Yet the official criteria for determining a drone strike’s legality—specifically one targeting an American citizen—was most clearly laid out in a Department of Justice White Paper1 leaked to the public in February 2013. The White Paper (2013, 1) identified four standards to be met in order to legally justify a drone strike on an American citizen: 1. The individual must be a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or an associated force. 2. “An informed, high-level official” must determine that the individual “poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.”

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3. Capture must be “infeasible,” although the White Paper notes that the government would continue monitoring the individual to assess “whether capture becomes feasible.” 4. The operation must be “conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.” The attorney general at the time, Eric Holder, seemed to confirm that the Obama administration followed these guidelines. In a March 2012 speech at Northwestern University, Holder articulated these standards for determining who should be targeted. He also insisted that “we are not in a conventional war” and “our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan” (2012). These principles are defined broadly.The word “imminent” is particularly elastic in the White Paper (2013), as it “does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future” (7). The rationale is that a narrow definition would force the government to wait until terrorist preparations are concluded, perhaps making the strike ineffective. Practically, this means that participating in any al Qaeda activities itself poses “an imminent threat” (8). Capture feasibility is defined as whether capture can be achieved within the “window of opportunity” (8) or if the country where the individual was located allows a capture operation. Undue risk to American personnel is also a factor, making feasibility “a highly fact-specific and potentially timesensitive inquiry” (8). Finally, the principles of war are defined as “necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity” (8)—principles that Brennan reiterated in his speech (2012). For instance, officials must consider civilian casualties, especially when they are “excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage” (White Paper 2013, 8). The authority for conducting these strikes derives from the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Passed in the wake of September 11, 2001, it authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons” that planned or aided in the September 11 attacks “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism” (AUMF 2001). Beyond the AUMF, the White Paper claims that the continuing conflict with al Qaeda allows the United States to act in self-defense, which covers drone strikes. Under this rationale, the strikes are legally permissible under international and domestic law, specifically the federal laws barring unlawful killings and the assassination ban instituted in Executive Order 12333. On a constitutional level, the White Paper asserts that the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge (i.e., pitting the suspected terrorist’s life interest against the government’s interest in “waging war, protecting its citizens, and removing the threat posed by members of enemy forces”; White Paper 2013, 6) allows for lethal targeting of a US citizen and does not violate the Due Process Clause or Fourth Amendment (White Paper 2013, 2). Furthermore, the White Paper justifies the use of drones outside “hot”

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battlefields by citing the lack of geographical limitations set by the AUMF. This makes the United States part of a “non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and its associated forces,” and “any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities” (3). While governments outside of acknowledged battlefield zones are considered, the United States retains the right to assess whether the host government where al Qaeda is operating “is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed” (1). Under this reading, the United States’ discretion for these operations encompasses practically the entire world. In assessing possible limitations, the White Paper assumes that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections accompany US citizens even when abroad. Thus, the Obama administration’s justification for drone strikes on citizens is not based on the argument that the Constitution only extends as far as American borders do. Instead, the White Paper uses Hamdi’s plurality opinion to assert that the Mathews balancing test employed necessarily falls in favor of the government (2013, 5–6). The White Paper does address whether a drone strike might constitute an “unlawful killing,” which is prohibited by Section 1119(b) of Title 18 of the United States Penal Code. Instead, the White Paper asserts that lethal operations fall under the “public authority” justification and are thereby legal under the aforementioned circumstances. The White Paper (2013) also argues that drone strikes should be handled solely by the executive branch, contending “there exists no appropriate judicial forum to evaluate these constitutional considerations” (10). Because national security and foreign policy are at stake, the feasibility of drone strikes relies on information and circumstances beyond the judiciary’s powers. The White Paper warns that judicial involvement would “require the Court to supervise inherently predictive judgments by the President and his national security advisors,” thus giving judges unwarranted policy and decisionmaking authority (10). The decision of who is placed on the “kill list” reportedly comes from a committee of over 100 national security officials. Meeting once a week to discuss potential targets, the committee recommends names to the president. The president then personally approves each person on the list, which is sent to a small cadre of CIA agents who conduct the strikes. President Obama is said to give another final approval before the strike takes place. When doing so, he assesses whether the potential collateral damage is “legally and morally justified.” Afterward, the CIA reports the strike to congressional leaders. Throughout the process, the target “is given no notice of the list, the reasons his name is on the list, or the opportunity to contest the President’s decision” (Gonzales 2013, 6–8). Obama has suggested more oversight measures, including the possibility of a special drone court or an independent oversight board within the executive branch, but these measures have not been implemented. Knowing these procedures, we now turn to the life and

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background of Anwar al-Awlaki, paying special attention to whether he fit the criteria the administration set for drone strike targets.

Life and Background of Anwar al-Awlaki2 Anwar al-Awlaki was born in 1971 in New Mexico to Yemeni immigrants. His family moved back to Yemen, where he spent his formative years before returning to the United States in 1990 to study civil engineering. When he began college, al-Awlaki began taking Muslim issues more seriously and became radicalized in response to the First Persian Gulf War, even visiting Afghanistan briefly in 1992. After graduation, al-Awlaki became an imam in Denver before moving to San Diego. In San Diego, al-Awlaki came to the FBI’s attention and was investigated for allegedly having connections with Ziyad Khaleel, a “procurement agent” for Osama bin Laden. Al-Awlaki had also met with an associate of Omar Abdel Rahman, the “blind sheikh” who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack.The FBI investigated al-Awlaki’s ties to various Islamic organizations, some of which were reportedly funneling money to terrorist organizations. Those investigations ended, but following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI again probed because two of the hijackers— Khalid al-Mindhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—attended al-Awlaki’s mosque. AlHazmi even followed al-Awlaki to Virginia when the latter moved there to pursue doctoral studies and became an imam at the Dar Al-Hijrah mosque, one of the largest in the United States. The FBI referred to al-Awlaki as alHazmi’s “spiritual advisor.” Al-Awlaki left the United States for Britain in 2002 before returning to Yemen in 2003. Throughout these travels, he broadcast his increasingly antiAmerican sermons online. The terrorists behind the 2005 London subway attacks had listened to his lectures, as did other individuals who carried out small individual attacks, such as the woman who stabbed a British member of parliament after listening to over 100 hours of al-Awlaki’s sermons.While al-Awlaki was not directly connected to any of these incidents, in 2009, the FBI found email correspondence between him and Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter. Hasan insisted that al-Awlaki gave him permission and encouragement to carry out the attack, although the FBI lacked evidence substantiating the claim. Later that year, a stronger link was established between al-Awlaki and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber” who attempted to blow up a flight to Detroit on Christmas Day. Abdulmutallab had traveled to Yemen, stayed with al-Awlaki, and received al-Awlaki’s permission for the attack. He then spent two weeks at a terrorist training camp run by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the organization with which al-Awlaki was affiliated. In 2010, al-Awlaki was also suspected of aiding a plot to detonate bombs in packages on a cargo flight entering the United States. Attorney General Eric Holder asserted that alAwlaki played a key role in planning and executing the plot.

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Following these incidents, the National Security Council classified alAwlaki as a top terrorist threat. He was placed on the kill list in February 2010. Meanwhile, the Yemeni government had also been trying to track down al-Awlaki, whom Yemen had previously arrested and held for 18 months. In October 2009, the Yemeni government asked the CIA for assistance in bringing him in. The CIA declined because of a lack of evidence that al-Awlaki threatened American lives. In May 2010, the United States attempted its first drone strike against al-Awlaki but failed to kill him. In August 2010, al-Awlaki’s father, Nasser al-Awlaki, raised the first due process question over drones by seeking an injunction to stop another attempted targeting of his son. In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, the petitioner asserted that since Anwar al-Awlaki had not been indicted (much less convicted) of a crime, he should not be targeted. To do so violated due process. In addition, Nasser questioned the kill list process, which, he asserted, lacked oversight and failed to disclose any standards. Nasser also noted that the attack would be outside the scope of armed conflict because the United States was not at war with Yemen. In December 2010, Federal District Judge John Bates dismissed the case for lack of standing. Interestingly, Bates said the case fell under the political questions doctrine, saying that the issues presented concerned particular military and foreign policy, questions to be determined by Congress and the president. A month later, Yemeni courts sentenced al-Awlaki in absentia to 10 years in prison for “inciting to kill foreigners.” In September 2011, the CIA placed al-Awlaki under surveillance for two weeks before executing the drone strike that finally killed him on September 30, 2011. Three other suspected al Qaeda members were killed along with al-Awlaki, including the naturalized American citizen Samir Khan.

The Administration’s Case for Targeting al-Awlaki The case made against al-Awlaki clearly matches up with the guidelines set forth in the White Paper (2013). Former Attorney General Holder penned a letter to Congress that laid out the reasons for targeting al-Awlaki. First, he was “a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula” and “the group’s chief of external operations, intimately involved in the detailed planning and putting in place plots against US persons.” Second, al-Awlaki was considered by high-level officials as posing “an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States” due to his involvement in the 2009 Christmas Day plot and 2010 cargo plane plot. Holder (2012) also hinted at classified evidence indicating that al-Awlaki was involved in other terrorist activities. Third, capture was infeasible. In a May 2013 speech, Obama said that while he preferred al-Awlaki be captured and prosecuted, detaining al-Awlaki was not possible. In conducting the operation according to war principles (the fourth criterion), the administration saw al-Awlaki as meeting the guidelines for a targeted drone strike.

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The Supreme Court, Due Process, and Targeted Drone Strikes While al-Awlaki fulfilled the administration’s criteria for targeted strikes conducted on American citizens, the question remains whether the manner in which drone strikes are conducted, particularly on American citizens, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s existing due process jurisprudence. We ask whether the Due Process Clause’s protections—as interpreted by the Supreme Court—apply not only to the acts conducted with drones but also to the procedures behind those actions.To clarify, providing a yes-or-no answer on whether the strike on al-Awlaki was constitutional is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we discuss aspects of due process jurisprudence that may apply to drone strikes and point out areas where the Court’s jurisprudence does not provide a clear guide to proper constitutional and legal action. Al-Awlaki provides an example to help ground our theoretical discussion. First, it is necessary to discuss the Supreme Court’s recent detainee cases: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Decided in 2004, Hamdi arose when American citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan and detained as an enemy combatant without formal charges or proceedings. Hamdi’s father filed a petition saying such detention violated the Fifth and 14th Amendments. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the president, pursuant to his powers as commander in chief, could detain American citizens classified as enemy combatants. The Court did not, however, dismiss the argument that the government could detain an American citizen as an enemy combatant. The opinion referred to the World War II case Ex Parte Quirin (1942), which held that citizenship did not prevent the government from imprisoning individuals who associated themselves with a hostile force intent on harming the United States. Further, the Court stated that Congress had authorized the detention of enemy combatants by passing the AUMF. Thus, the issue was not the detention itself but Hamdi’s due process rights. Using the test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), the Court weighed Hamdi’s private interest against the costs and interests of the government, including “the risk of erroneous deprivation” of liberty through detainment (Mathews v. Eldridge). Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, noted that Hamdi’s detention was not “offset by the circumstances of war or the accusation of treasonous behavior,” and that the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty was quite real. As a result, the Court insisted on certain procedural safeguards to be preserved for enemy combatants, specifically that “a citizendetainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.” At the same time, the Court noted that some elements of due process could be altered during wartime (e.g., hearsay could be accepted as

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reliable evidence from the government).The main holding, though, was that American citizens designated as enemy combatants deserve the opportunity to challenge their classification before a “neutral decisionmaker.” In doing so, the Court argued that the judicial branch could not be sidelined simply because the issue involved national security. Rather, the Constitution “most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake,” and “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Notably, the Court also commented that a military tribunal may satisfy the requirement of a neutral decisionmaker (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld).3 This point of what constitutes a neutral decisionmaker came to the fore in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006). Salem Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen and former aide to Osama bin Laden, was captured in Afghanistan and tried for conspiracy by a military commission set up by order of the president. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that trying Hamdan under a presidentially created military commission was beyond the executive’s authority and that such commissions had to be authorized by a congressional act or be consistent with “the common law of war.” As the AUMF did not explicitly authorize any military commissions, and conspiracy4 is not considered a violation of the law of war (discussed in the next section), Stevens determined that the commissions that tried Hamdan were illegal.Thus, according to Stevens, the commissions’ structure and procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, by extension, the Geneva Conventions. Notably, however, the Court did not decide whether the president had the power to create these commissions; the judiciary only said the commissions had to be supported by congressional statutes or the law of war. Stevens also noted that military tribunals could be required by virtue of military necessity, but the president had been unable to demonstrate them as necessary. This leaves open the possibility that were tribunals required on the battlefield as part of military necessity, trials before those tribunals may pass legal muster.

Conclusion Before addressing drone warfare in light of Hamdi and Hamdan, we comment on two items. First, there are certainly differences between the detainee cases and drone strikes. In the detainee cases, the petitioners were just that: detainees, captured and posing no immediate or potential threat. The question of whether al-Awlaki was a threat is debatable, but his “at large” status understandably changes the calculation in how the executive responds. At a basic level, it seems the president has more discretion to deal with individuals considered to pose a threat. This difference significantly changes potential calculations in weighing the constitutional issues associated with drone strikes. Therefore, it might render it difficult to fully apply the precedents of Hamdi or Hamdan to drone cases.

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Second, while the Supreme Court decided the detainee cases, al-Aulaqi was dismissed by the district judge as injusticiable under the political questions doctrine.Thus, we might think Bates’s decision would render all drone cases as dead on arrival. There are reasons, though, to believe this is not the case. For starters, al-Awlaki’s killing falls under the AUMF, which, like any other law, may be reviewed by the Court. In addition, the general principle of balancing military necessity versus due process rights is similar to the issues raised in Hamdi. In fact, the Mathews test would seem to be one way of deciding a case like al-Aulaqi. Lastly, in Hamdan, the Court rejected the government’s claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo Bay detainee cases. While the Court may not grant certiorari to drone cases, we do not believe that Bates’s opinion stands as a major roadblock. Keeping those issues in mind, what does the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence reveal about the constitutional questions surrounding drone strikes? Hamdi and Hamdan give some, if limited, indication of how the Court treats the president’s power in conducting unilateral drone strikes on two intertwined fronts: procedural grounds and separation of powers. The primary procedural question is, What kind of process can be used in a situation as fluid as war, particularly against a stateless enemy? As suggested by Offill-Klein (2013), Gonzales (2013), and others, Hamdi’s use of the Mathews test provides a rough framework. For instance, in applying Mathews to al-Awlaki, al-Awlaki had both a life and liberty interest.The government’s interest in national security, however, is legitimate, and given that al-Awlaki was at large and able to plan attacks, it is possible that the balance would lean toward the government because of the existence of a continuing threat. Thus, the question would come down to a balancing of interests. Of course, other questions would come out of the balancing test, particularly whether al-Awlaki was really a threat, especially since he was known for speaking out against the United States and for planning—rather than carrying out—terrorist plots. Such actions might be more in line with free speech, or possibly conspiracy, which has its own criminal liabilities. Lack of explicit violent action could bring in questions of where free speech and conspiracy fit into the jurisprudence of due process. On the former, it would need to be determined whether al-Awlaki’s proclamations—which were given over a period of years—constituted an incitement to imminent lawless action. If so, then under Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the government would have the ability to curtail his speech. On the latter, conspiracy is its own criminal charge under the common law and as adopted by the Court in United States v. Shabani (1994). A conspiracy charge, however, might raise problems under Hamdan, which explicitly concluded that “conspiracy is not a recognized violation of the law of war.” If al-Awlaki were only charged with conspiracy, it could be argued that he would not have qualified to be struck by a drone because he did not meet the administration’s own law of war criterion. Al-Awlaki’s situation, therefore, adds unique problems to the

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balancing test of whether the government had a legitimate interest in seeking his death. Beyond al-Awlaki’s case, basic questions remain about the administration’s procedures, particularly whether the AUMF may be read so broadly as to authorize military strikes into nontraditional battlefields, such as Yemen. Additionally, it is unclear whether the administration’s broad definition of the term imminent falls under the confines of military necessity as defined by the Court. Precedents such as Hamdan and Ex Parte Milligan (1866) may be lenient on what constitutes imminent action in cases of military policy. But such questions would still need to be addressed when balancing the interests of potential targets and the government’s legitimate national security interests. Separation of powers questions arise from the president retaining exclusive authority over drone strikes. Although certain members of Congress are informed of these strikes, they are not involved in the decisionmaking process. Given Hamdi’s admonition that all three branches are concerned with individual rights in wartime, the executive’s unilateral authority is open to scrutiny. Granted, historically, the Court has allowed the president wide discretion in conducting foreign and military policy. But given the rulings in Hamdi and Hamdan, the Court views the president’s power in these areas as not wholly unilateral—especially when individual rights of American citizens are at stake. Although the circumstances might warrant a larger amount of presidential discretion, the Court could call for extra-executive checks. The level of check, however, may be quite low. Hamdi ruled that while enemy combatants deserved due process, Congress could—and, via the AUMF, lawfully did—authorize their detention. In Hamdan, the Court might have ruled against military commissions, but only because they were not created by Congress. In other words, simple congressional authorization beyond the AUMF may resolve any unilateral issues. Taking the Court’s historical deference to the president in conjunction with recent rulings, it seems little would have to be altered to satisfy any separation of powers concerns.

Future Challenges On the whole, the recent cases concerning American citizen-detainees provide some indication of the types of constitutional questions surrounding drone strikes.The Court has a clear interest in protecting citizens’ individual rights, even while granting the president a substantial amount of authority in controlling foreign policy. Outside of any particular case, unilateral action in selecting, planning, and conducting drone strikes seems to go beyond what the Court has previously allowed the president to do in other due process cases. Of course, it is unknown how the Court would rule on drone strikes until a case comes before the Court. Even then, the features of each case are

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unique; the particular facts may allow the Court to depart significantly from previous decisions. The overall uncertainty surrounding the issue makes it difficult to assess how the next administration will approach it. In all likelihood, any president (including Donald Trump) would continue the practice of centralizing as much control of the process as possible. Whether the other branches expand or limit the president’s use of drones may hinge on how Trump employs drones. He has generally supported their use. In an August 2016 speech centered on fighting terrorism, Trump declared that “drone strikes will remain part of our strategy,” but he paired this with the statement that they would also seek to “capture high-value targets,” which may suggest a slight decrease in the use of drones (Trump 2016). Additionally, when we consider Trump’s support for broad executive power, it appears he would have no compunctions about tapping into what has become a unilateral power of the presidency. Whether he would maintain the same exact procedures instituted by the Obama administration remains an open question, although a March 2017 report from the Washington Post suggests the Trump administration plans to reduce existing restrictions on drone strikes (  Jaffe and DeYoung 2017). Trump’s advisors, however, seem to be split on the issue. Secretary of Defense James Mattis noted in a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee that for all practical purposes, the drone program—at least in Afghanistan—would continue “so long as we are there” (House Armed Services Committee 2013, 20). Granted, this statement was in response to a particular question about drones and not about Mattis’s preferences. Thus, it leaves open the possibility that Mattis himself may not consider drones to be effective. Meanwhile, Trump’s short-lived national security advisor, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, vocally expressed that drone strikes are not an effective military tactic. They are “investments in conflict . . . not investments in real strategic solutions,” said Flynn (2015). Detractors include Flynn’s replacement as national security advisor, Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster. Although McMaster has expressed concern over Russian advancement in drone technology, his statements accentuate that “he’s skeptical of surgical special operations raids and drone strikes absent a realistic plan to change political realities on the ground” (Tucker 2017, para. 1). From the perspective of the other two branches, their reactions will likely also be shaped by how Trump handles the program. Republicans in Congress have generally supported robust military power in the Middle East. If they did not challenge a Democratic president, there is little reason to think they would confront a Republican president. The Democratic minority, on the other hand, might see unilateral presidential power as a threat to institutional authority or partisan preferences. They may seek to limit Trump’s power on a number of issues, including drone strikes. There are coalition-building opportunities, too, as Democrats could reach out to noninterventionist Republicans with a history of criticizing presidential drone policy, such as Rand Paul, of Kentucky, or Justin Amash, of Michigan.

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Enough defections could result in Congress finding ways to limit the executive’s control over drones. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s involvement in future drone policy is highly dependent on Trump’s successful nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. Given that Gorsuch has replaced the very conservative Antonin Scalia and that the Republican Party holds a majority in the Senate, Gorsuch’s nomination may well reveal Trump’s true preferences for judicial appointees in the future. While Gorsuch himself has written on executive administration as part of his past jurisprudence, little of it has concerned issues of national security.Yet, if we look to his work as a Justice Department official from 2005 to 2006 (when he defended the Bush administration in various cases), we may anticipate that he would support the president on issues of national security. However, such conclusions at this point remain purely conjectural. Aside from Gorsuch, Trump may have the opportunity to appoint other justices to the Supreme Court. While conservatives have insisted on nominees who support executive power, it is not always the case that Republican-appointed justices defer to the president. Indeed, Scalia dissented in Hamdi because he believed the ruling gave the executive too much power. On the whole, then, there are many factors and actors that will affect the development of drone policy under a Trump administration. One thing, however, seems clear:The legal questions and overall uncertainty concerning drone strikes are indicative of the larger constitutional issues surrounding the war on terror and the role of the president in conducting military policy. Until the Court rules on the constitutionality of these actions, they will be left to the political arena. And even when—or if—the Court steps in, the pluralistic nature of American democracy will allow Congress, the president, and the people to respond.

Notes 1 Hereafter referred to as “White Paper.” 2 In order to create an accurate picture of al-Awlaki’s life, we consulted numerous sources to corroborate on specific details. The sources consulted for the entirety of the following section are Eshaghian 2013; Gonzales 2013; Funk 2013; Hoffman 2014; Scahill 2013; Olsson 2014; Dehn and Heller 2011; and Memorandum of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Anwar Nasser Aulaqi Opening LHM 1 (Sept. 2011). Accessed on February 18, 2016 at www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/2001_09_26.pdf; United States Department of Justice, “Eric Holder to Patrick Leahy,” May 22, 2013. Accessed February 18, 2016 at www.justice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf. For the case filed by Nasser al-Awlaki see Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 3 This precedent was somewhat extended in Boumediene v. Bush (2008), as the Court ruled that noncitizen detainees must also be allowed habeas corpus rights to challenge their detention. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion made a strong statement on individual rights as well as the Court’s prerogative in protecting the Constitution, stating, “The Nation’s basic charter cannot be contracted away. . . . To hold that the political branches may switch the Constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’ ” Kennedy also enunciated that the

140  Chapter 7 process of a proper trial afforded by habeas corpus is “an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers” (Boumediene v. Bush). 4 Justice Kennedy did not join the section of the opinion dealing with conspiracy, meaning that issue was only part of the opinion for a plurality of the Court.

References Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001, Public Law 107–40. Bhatt, Chetan. 2012. “Human Rights and the Transformations of War.” Sociology 46: 813–28. Bower, Daniel. 2014. “(Start to) Look Out Below! Creating a Court to Review Targeted Attacks on United States Citizens.” Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 71–106. Brennan, John O. 2012. “Remarks on the Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy.” Lecture at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Chong, Jane Y. 2012. “Targeting the Twenty-First Century Outlaw.” The Yale Law Journal 22: 724–80. Cronogue, Graham. 2013. “State Prosecution of Terrorism and Rebellion: A Functional Examination of the Protection of Civilians and the Erosion of Sovereignty.” The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 46: 121–65. Dehn, John C., and Kevin Jon Heller. 2011. “Debate,Targeted Killing:The Case of Anwar Al Aulaqi.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 159: 175–201. Eshaghian, Michael. 2013. “Are Drone Courts Necessary? An Analysis of Targeted Killings of U.S. Citizens Abroad Through a Procedural Due Process Lens.” Texas Review of Law & Politics 18: 169–98. Eviatar, Daphne. 2016. “Drones and the Law: Why We Do Not Need a New Legal Framework for Targeted Killing.” In Preventive Force: Drones, Targeted Killing, and the Transformation of Contemporary Warfare, eds. Kerstin Fisk, Jennifer M. Ramos. New York: New York University Press, 170–98. Farley, Robert M. 2014. Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press. Flaherty, Michael S. 2015. “The Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted Killings, Legal Constraints, and Judicial Safeguards.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 38: 21–42. Flynn, Michael. 2015. “Transcript: Michael Flynn on ISIL.” Al-Jazeera. www.aljazeera.com/ programmes/headtohead/2016/01/transcript-michael-flynn-160104174144334.html. Accessed December 14, 2016. Funk, William. 2013. “Deadly Drones, Due Process, and the Fourth Amendment.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 22: 311–35. Gonzales, Alberto R. 2013. “Drones: The Power to Kill.” The George Washington Law Review 82: 1–60. Hoffman, Tod. 2014. Al Qaeda Declares War: The African Embassy Bombings and America’s Search for Justice. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England. Holder, Eric. 2012. “Speech at Northwestern University School of Law.” Chicago, IL. www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwesternuniversity-school-law. Accessed August 12, 2017. House Armed Services Committee. 2013. “Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs.” House of Representatives 112th Congress.

Attack of the Drones 141 Jaffe, Greg, and Karen DeYoung. 2017. “Trump Administration Reviewing Ways to Make It Easier to Launch Drone Strikes.” Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/trump-administration-reviewing-ways-to-make-it-easierto-launch-drone-strikes/2017/03/13/ac39ced0–07f8–11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_ story.html?utm_term=.e787b4b270e7. Accessed May 16, 2017. Kacou, Amien. 2015. “Expanding ‘Practical Sovereignty:’ Pre-Deprivation Due Process Suits for Drone Strikes on Non-U.S. Persons.” North Carolina Law Review Addendum 92: 57–75. Klaidman, Daniel. 2012. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012. Koh, Harold. 2010. “The Obama Administration and International Law.” Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. Lauritzen, Paul. 2013. The Ethics of Interrogation: Professional Responsibility in an Age of Terror. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Murphy, Richard, and Afsheen John Rasdan. 2013. “Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard Before the President Kills You.” Wake Forest Law Review 48: 1–53. Nalden, F.S. 2013. “Heroes and Drones.” The Wilson Quarterly 36: 1–11. Obama, Barack. 2013. “Speech on Drone Policy.” Speech at the White House. Offill-Klein, Alexei. 2013. “Targeted Killings: Al-Aulaqi v. Obama and the Misuse of the Political Question Doctrine.” U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 19: 207–24. Olsson, Peter. 2014. Making of a Homegrown Terrorist: Brainwashing Rebels in Search of a Cause. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Rasdan, Afshen John, and Richard Murphy. 2011. “Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing.” University of Illinois Law Review 11: 1201–42. Reid, Melanie. 2014 “Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs Regulation Not Elimination.” Richmond Journal of Law & Technology 20: 1–73. Scahill, Jeremy. 2013. Dirty Wars:The World Is a Battlefield. New York: Nation Books. Trump, Donald J. 2016. “Speech on Fighting Terrorism.” Speech at Youngstown, OH. Tucker, Patrick. 2017. “How McMaster Could Change the Way the US Goes to War.” Defense One, February 20. www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/02/how-mcmastercould-change-way-us-goes-war/135571/. Accessed May 11, 2017. United States Department of Justice. 2013. “Department of Justice White Paper.” msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. Accessed August 12, 2017. United States Department of Justice. 2013. “Eric Holder to Patrick Leahy.” www.justice. gov/slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf. Accessed February 18, 2016. Vladeck, Stephen I. 2014. “Targeted Killing and Judicial Review.” George Washington Law Review 82: 11–28.

8 Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Political Commitments Jeffrey S. Peake In late 2012, the Senate considered the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities—a largely symbolic treaty based on US domestic law. The treaty failed on the floor, marking the first time that a treaty had been rejected outright on the Senate floor since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty failed in 1999. Opponents argued that the treaty potentially violated US sovereignty, even though the treaty was clearly symbolic and had no enforcement mechanism that could apply to the United States. Moreover, the United States already had a strong legal regime of protections for disabled people. The locus of opposition to the Convention was conservative Republicans, as 38 voted against the treaty. Proponents were just five votes shy of the constitutionally required supermajority to approve the treaty. During the lame duck congressional session of 2010, the Senate narrowly approved the New START treaty with Russia. The treaty was an important arms control agreement that followed on a long history of arms control treaties between the United States and Russia (and, previously, the Soviet Union). The three prior START treaties, ratified in 1992, 1993, and 2002, had a combined 10 votes against them, whereas Obama had to negotiate serious concessions with Republicans to pass the treaty 71–26, just six votes more than was needed to achieve the constitutionally mandated two-thirds majority for treaty approval (Peake et al. 2012). New START was the only major treaty approved by the Senate during the Obama presidency. While the UN Disabilities Convention and New START represent interesting cases of difficult treaty politics during the Obama presidency, they are indicative of more significant changes in how the executive branch completes its international agreements in today’s era of polarized politics. Most importantly, as should become apparent in this chapter, the domestic politics of treaties have broken down, creating a situation whereby President Obama was—and presumably his successors will be—emboldened to commit the US internationally with little input by Congress. After all, modern presidents have unilateral diplomatic tools at their disposal, and President Obama made good use of such tools.

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 143

The 2015 Iran nuclear accord provides a relevant and important example of the breakdown of this system. The Iran agreement is a very important multilateral agreement that was the culmination of years of negotiation to delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Despite heavy opposition to the agreement in Congress, the Obama administration managed to complete the agreement on the president’s own authority, causing an uproar in domestic politics and leading several Republican presidential candidates to promise abrogation of the agreement on day one of their presidency. During congressional testimony on the Iran accord, Secretary of State John Kerry was asked why the agreement was not completed as a treaty. He responded, “I spent quite a few years ago trying to get a lot of treaties through the United States Senate, and frankly, it’s become physically impossible.You can’t pass a treaty anymore” (Roberts 2015).1 Kerry’s frustration was clear. However, when compared to the scope of the history of the domestic politics of treaties, his comments suggest an important change in the domestic politics of treaties. Indeed, a treaty rejection on the floor of the Senate is a rare occurrence in the modern era. Since 1935, the Senate has rejected just four treaties in this manner, suggesting at first glance that the process may be politically uninteresting and that the Senate is a compliant partner. However, a much larger number of treaties languish in the Senate, as they are either ignored by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or are not brought to the floor following committee action. Languishing treaties include those that have a great deal of support from domestic economic interests, security interests, and presidents of both political parties.2 Ideological divides in the Senate, which are at an all-time high today, have often derailed or substantially delayed treaties during the ratification process (Peake 2016). President Obama has submitted the fewest treaties of any modern president, by far. When Obama did submit treaties to the Senate, his record of achieving Senate approval is poor in comparison to other modern presidents. While many international law scholars express concerns regarding the inability of the United States to ratify multilateral treaties (Kaye 2013), even the more common bilateral treaties were rarely completed during Obama’s presidency; when action occurred, it was often delayed for years. The problem extends beyond the far-reaching multilateral agreements and is fundamental to how the United States conducts diplomacy. American diplomacy has not come to a screeching halt as a result of the decline of treaties. In fact, Obama routinely resorted to the modern president’s alternative to the treaty, the executive agreement, which has the same functional authority as a treaty under international law but, in 99 percent of the cases, does not require subsequent approval by Congress. In the modern era, a vast majority (94 percent) of international agreements completed by presidents are executive agreements rather than treaties. In the book Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements (Krutz and Peake 2009), with

144  Chapter 8

Glen Krutz, I argue that the rise of executive agreements does not represent a trampling of the separation of powers, which is a view expressed by some scholars (e.g., Crenson and Ginsberg 2007), but rather was a rational response by separate institutions sharing power to the need for efficiency and predictability in completing international agreements. Obama’s disuse of treaties, the degree to which his treaties were ignored in the Senate, and his reliance on unilateral methods of diplomacy, however, require a reassessment of this argument. The rise in executive agreements and other unilateral diplomatic tools during the modern era did not mean the complete or near-complete absence of treaties, as modern presidents have continued to submit a large number of consequential treaties to the Senate and the Senate has approved a large share of submitted treaties. But, as is the case with separation of powers questions, more than one political institution is to blame. Our argument in Treaty Politics was also based on the notion that the Senate would complete its work on treaties and give treaties submitted by the president a fair shot at approval, particularly when the treaty had broad support or was critical for the president to meet his diplomatic goals. It is hard to argue that this happened during the Obama presidency. During Obama’s eight-year presidency, the Senate managed to approve just 20 treaties, six of which were originally submitted by President George W. Bush. By comparison, during just the two years of the 110th Congress, the Senate managed to ratify 22 out of 26 of President Bush’s treaty priorities. Thus, President Obama’s behavior on treaties presents an interesting puzzle, but so does the degree to which the Senate has shirked its responsibility on advice and consent. Why did Obama practically abandon the Article II treaty process? Partisan polarization and the attractiveness of unilateral action provide much of the explanation. The case of the Iran agreement, when placed into the broader context of Obama’s disuse of treaties and reliance on other forms of international agreements, points to two competing concerns: the need for action on the diplomatic stage to shape international law versus the need for those actions to withstand challenges to their democratic legitimacy. The Framers of the Constitution clearly intended for Congress to play a role in the diplomatic process, yet Obama’s behavior circumvented the legislature, even in instances where members of Congress went on record opposing Obama’s policies or his approach. When agreements have broad support in Congress, they are seen as more legitimate and credible (Martin 2000; Milner 1997). Because the Obama administration so rarely used treaties, the basic “institutional bargain” described in Treaty Politics appears to have been set aside for a process that overwhelmingly favors executive unilateralism (Krutz and Peake 2009). Are treaties dead? Is diplomacy functionally a unilateral power of the executive? To begin, I place Obama’s behavior on international agreements in historical perspective, offering some explanations for why he largely avoided using treaties in favor of other forms of international agreements. I then discuss, more generally, Obama’s use of executive agreements and political

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 145

agreements, which are the president’s primary unilateral diplomatic tools. I discuss in some depth the Iran nuclear deal of 2015. I conclude by discussing the implications of Obama’s behavior on treaties and executive agreements, for both the congressional role in US diplomacy and for American foreign policy more broadly.

A Brief History of the Domestic Politics of Treaties Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution states, “The President . . . shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” The Framers clearly intended that this critical diplomatic function would be shared with Congress.3 During the 19th century, the practicality of the treaty clause, however, was questioned. The Senate routinely put up roadblocks to treaty ratification, which became seriously problematic during the late 19th century, as the Senate routinely rejected presidents’ treaties or they languished due to inaction. Of the 22 outright Senate rejections of proposed treaties in the scope of US history, 14 occurred between 1860 and 1935. The inability to complete treaties was untenable for American diplomacy. The conflict over treaties during this era was marked with partisanship, much like what we see today. Ideological polarization of the two political parties was the primary culprit for the dysfunction during this earlier era. Much like today, the five decades following the Civil War were marked with ideologically polarized political parties. Figure 8.1 provides a graph of ideological polarization in the Congress based on NOMINATE scores. Such high levels of ideological polarization, particularly when coupled with divided control of the White House and the Senate, make the supermajority necessary for treaty ratification very difficult to achieve for any significant treaty. Treaty failures during this earlier era were routinely stories of partisanship (Fleming 1930; Holt 1933; Prins and Marshall 2009).

Distance Between the Parties

1.0

House r = 0.9

0.8

Senate

0.6

0.4

1879

1887

1895

1903

1911

1919

1927

1935

1943

1951

Figure 8.1  Source: Data from www.voteview.com.

1959

1967

1975

1983

1991

1999

2007

146  Chapter 8

After 1935, as partisanship and ideological polarization decreased, the conflict surrounding the treaty ratification process was much less severe, at least until recently. Since 1935, only four treaties have been rejected on the floor of the Senate.4 However, measuring treaty conflict based on floor failures underestimates the severity of political conflict surrounding treaties during the modern era (Krutz and Peake 2009). As foreign policy scholars have noted, the reemergence of hyper-partisanship over the last two decades coincides with the end of the Cold War consensus over the direction of foreign policy (Trubowitz and Mellow 2011). Senate consent to treaties is commonly subject to considerable delay, often proving costly to US foreign policy. However, as I show in the next section, treaty politics during the Obama presidency were markedly different than during the presidencies of his most immediate predecessors.

Executive Agreements The modern treaty process is both procedurally and politically cumbersome, especially given the supermajority requirement for Senate approval. Given this tedious and uncertain process, it is no wonder that presidents during the 19th century began looking for an alternative means to complete international agreements, which they found in the executive agreement. Executive agreements are a form of international agreement holding the same legal authority as a treaty under international law but are completed domestically using a much less cumbersome process than treaties. The practical difference between treaties and executive agreements as a matter of law is of some dispute in the legal literature; however, the view that the two forms of international agreements are legally interchangeable dominates common practice during the modern era (Ackerman and Golove 1995; Krutz and Peake 2009, 80–82). According to Lindsay (1994), “no objective distinction exists” (82) between a treaty and an executive agreement. This view, perhaps, is an exaggeration, as there are different forms of executive agreements that carry with them different weight in terms of the force of domestic law (Hathaway 2009). In terms of international law, however, there is no distinction between these two forms of agreement (all are considered treaties), though treaty partners may prefer treaties because of their perceived legitimacy and significance in domestic law (Martin 2005). In United States v. Pink (315 U.S. 203 [1942]), the Court found that “all international compacts and agreements” are to be treated “with similar dignity” as treaties. The State Department’s Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs categorizes treaties submitted to the Senate as treaties and all other binding international agreements as “agreements other than treaties,” or executive agreements. Executive agreements can be broken down into three categories: (1) congressional-executive agreements, which are pursuant to a previous act of Congress and may require congressional approval via joint resolution; (2) agreements pursuant to an existing treaty; and (3)

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 147

presidential agreements, or sole executive agreements, completed based on the president’s constitutional powers. Congressional-executive agreements are further broken down into three subtypes: (1) agreements where Congress provides ex ante authorization to the president to complete agreements in a particular policy area; (2) agreements where Congress legislates on a foreign policy matter, instructing the president to verify certain facts before the agreement can take effect; and (3) agreements where the president seeks ex post approval by submitting the agreement to Congress (rather than just the Senate) for bicameral approval.5 The third category requires only majority approval from both chambers, rather than the two-thirds Senate majority required by the treaty clause. Major trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA) are typically completed using the third subtype. Executive agreements, which make up the vast majority of international agreements, are commonly used to complete consequential international agreements. For example, the US commitments to the security of both Afghanistan and Iraq are governed entirely by executive agreements completed by the Bush and Obama administrations. Since 1940, 94 percent of all international agreements signed by the executive are completed as executive agreements (discussed in the next section). What is lost in these numbers, however, is the fact that most executive agreements receive congressional authorization in some fashion; that is, they are congressional-executive agreements. According to Johnson (1984), nearly 87 percent of executive agreements were either congressional-executive agreements or agreements pursuant to an existing treaty. Thus, while the vast majority of international agreements are executive agreements, the vast majority of these executive agreements involve Congress in some fashion, whether through ex post or ex ante approval. Presumably, this makes them seem less problematic. Hathaway (2009), however, argued that ex ante approval only gives the perception of congressional involvement, when in fact there is little if any actual inter-branch cooperation that exists once power is delegated to the executive. In her view, Congress has incrementally delegated away its authority over international law, such that the president has become the “sole actor” in making international law.Thus, Hathaway saw even ex ante congressionalexecutive agreements as violating the norm of legislative involvement in approval of international agreements.6 She much preferred the ex post variety, which happen to make up less than one half of 1 percent of the executive agreements she analyzed for the period 1980–2000 (150).7 Given her findings and my prior research on the nature of recent executive agreements (Peake 2015), it is safe to conclude that the overwhelming majority of recent congressional-executive agreements are of the ex ante variety and, in many cases, stem from tenuous authority delegated to the executive decades before the agreement was finalized (see Hathaway 2009). The attractiveness of executive agreements is apparent when one considers that the vast majority of executive agreements enter into force upon the executive’s signature. A very small percentage may require subsequent

148  Chapter 8

approval by Congress, and a larger subset may require subsequent spending or implementing legislation (in particular, aid agreements or arms transfer agreements). When such a requirement is necessary, normal legislative majorities are required, rather than the two-thirds requirement for treaties. Given the apparent freedom presidents have in choosing how to complete their agreements, why would they ever use treaties? After all, executive agreements afford presidents the opportunity to circumvent the treaty process, so why not always use executive agreements? The answer to this question is twofold and has more to do with domestic and international politics and less to do with law. In terms of domestic politics, political science scholarship suggests that presidents are constrained in their use of unilateral powers by the willingness of legislators to check executive action (Howell 2003; Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Krutz and Peake 2009). In other words, presidents are less free to act unilaterally when completing international agreements when legislative opponents are in a position to check their actions or make them pay a price for their behavior. Presidents, generally, use fewer executive agreements and more treaties when the opposing party has majority control of the Senate (Krutz and Peake 2006; Martin 2005).This is a trend that has continued with President Obama. Obama was most active in terms of submitting treaties during his last Congress (the 114th), with 15 treaty submittals, exceeding all of the other Congresses during which he served. Republicans controlled the Senate during the 114th Congress, whereas Democrats controlled the Senate during the 111th through 113th Congresses. In terms of international politics, agreement partners often prefer a treaty to an executive agreement. Martin (2000) persuasively argued that treaties send more credible signals of commitment to agreement partners because they require broad domestic political support. One example is when, in 2002, Russian president Vladimir Putin requested that President Bush submit the Moscow Treaty, a nuclear arms agreement, to the Senate for approval rather than complete it on his own authority. Putin believed that a treaty would have greater legitimacy. Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) sent a letter to the president demanding that he submit the treaty to the Senate. The treaty was approved 95–0 (Krutz and Peake 2009, 71–73). Thus, clear norms have developed regarding treaties that satisfy both domestic and international political concerns. For example, presidents submit arms control agreements to the Senate as treaties in order to involve Congress and satisfy the concerns of treaty partners.8 Similar norms exist for human rights accords, multilateral environmental agreements, and bilateral tax, legal assistance, and investment treaties (Spiro 2001). Have these norms broken down due to the paucity of treaties during the Obama administration? If so, why? It is clear that these norms, developed during the 20th century, came under considerable stress during the Obama presidency.The primary culprit

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 149

is partisan polarization, which has two effects on the treaty process. First, it makes getting a treaty approved very difficult, given the supermajority requirement and the fact that a presidential failure provides additional incentives for the president’s opponents to spike the president’s treaties. Relatedly, it exaggerates the power of anti-treaty interest groups (e.g., the Heritage Foundation) that effectively pressure Republicans in the Senate to oppose a host of international agreements.9 Second, partisan polarization reduces the capability of the Senate, and Congress more broadly, to protect its institutional prerogatives regarding international agreements. Political consensus must exist in order for Congress to act to constrain the president on international agreements, as presidents can act unilaterally and Congress must legislate in order to restrain the executive. Such consensus is impossible in today’s ideologically polarized Congress. In effect, partisan polarization increases the attractiveness of unilateral action. With the ability to act unconstrained due to congressional dysfunction, presidents can further push the envelope of their unilateral powers. These realities were clearly evident during the Obama presidency.

International Agreements During the Obama Administration President Obama’s record on treaties is fairly easy to describe. Obama completed far fewer treaties than his modern predecessors. When Obama went to the Senate, he met with much less success than his predecessors. In this section, I compare President Obama’s record on treaty approvals with other modern presidents. I then briefly summarize Obama’s use of executive agreements and other unilateral alternatives to Article II treaties. Table 8.1 presents the number of executive agreements and treaties for each two-year Congress from 1949 to 2016. Obama averaged just nine treaty transmittals to the Senate for each two-year Congress, compared to an average of 32 treaties per Congress from 1949 to 2008. Bush, his predecessor, averaged 24 treaties per Congress. Prior to Obama’s presidency, the lowest number of treaty transmittals in a two-year Congress was 18, by Eisenhower in 1957–1958. In all, Obama transmitted just 36 treaties, with 15 coming during his last two years in office. In 2013 and 2014, for each year, Obama transmitted just three treaties to the Senate. In 2015, Obama submitted just four treaties, continuing the trend. He transmitted six treaties to the Senate in February 2016, one in March, one in June, and three in December, bringing his total for the 114th Congress to 15 treaties, as of the end of 2016. Although this number is greater than any other two-year period for Obama, it is still lower than any other Congress since the end of World War II. Using the best publicly available data on executive agreements, at least 98 percent of Obama’s international agreements have been executive agreements.

Table 8.1 Treaties and Executive Agreements, 1949–2016 Congress

Years

President

Treaties Transmitted

Executive Agreements Concluded

Percent Treaties

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

1949–50 1951–52 1953–54 1955–56 1957–58 1959–60 1961–62 1963–64 1965–66 1967–68 1969–70 1971–72 1973–74 1975–76 1977–78 1979–80 1981–82 1983–84 1985–86 1987–88 1989–90 1991–92 1993–94 1995–96 1997–98 1999–2000 2001–02 2003–04 2005–06 2007–08 2009–10 2011–12 2013–14 2015–16

Truman Truman Eisenhower Eisenhower Eisenhower Eisenhower Kennedy Kennedy Johnson Johnson Nixon Nixon Nixon Ford Carter Carter Reagan Reagan Reagan Reagan Bush Bush Clinton Clinton Clinton Clinton GWB GWB GWB GWB Obama Obama Obama Obama

205 494 369 530 419 516 579 456 441 420 345 501 470 666 841 699 665 618 736 821 761 589 595 560 516 381 315 412 583 531 440 353 N/A N/A

17.34 7.32 7.75 3.64 4.12 4.80 3.66 4.80 6.37 6.25 6.76 6.53 7.30 4.03 3.11 8.03 4.04 4.92 4.04 2.61 2.81 6.51 6.15 6.04 10.26 11.40 6.25 6.36 3.80 4.15 1.79 2.22 — —

1949–2008 2009–2016

Average Average

43 39 31 20 18 26 22 23 30 28 25 35 37 28 27 61 28 32 31 22 22 41 39 36 59 49 21 28 23 23   8 (7)*  8  6 15 (through 2016) 30.6  9.0

534 397

6.04 2.22

Note: The counts of executive agreements are included in the data set at the time of signature. In 7.2% of the cases for the Obama years, the data indicate that the agreements are not yet in force. I include these in the count because the intention is to complete the agreement. *For the 111th Congress, the first treaty submittal was actually transmitted by Bush in early January 2009. Data on executive agreements for 2013–2016 are not publicly available. Sources: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html for treaties; Fisher (2001) for executive agreements 1949–1999; author-collected data from State Department websites for 2000–2012.

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 151 Obama and the Treaty Process

In Table 8.2, I show aggregate success rates for treaties transmitted to the Senate by presidential administrations since 1949. Although Bush was able to secure Senate approval for 88 percent of the treaties he transmitted to the Senate, Obama’s success rate was just 39 percent.10 The average comparable success rate for presidents Truman through Clinton is 79 percent. The percentages reflect the percentage of treaties approved by the end of each presidency. The lowest percentage prior to Obama is Carter, who saw only 52 percent of his treaties approved by the Senate while in office. In addition to submitting treaties to the Senate, presidents signal their strong desire for Senate approval by issuing a treaty priority list (see Peake et al. 2012, 1307). During his second term, Bush issued two treaty priority lists. In 2005, Bush listed 16 treaty priorities, of which 13 were approved, for a success rate of 81 percent. In 2007, Bush listed 26 treaty priorities, of which 22 (85 percent) were approved prior to his departure from office. Early during his first year in office, President Obama submitted his first and only treaty priority list to the Senate (see Table 8.1), which included 17 treaties. All but one of the treaties was left over from prior administrations, with one going as far back as Carter.11 Only six of the treaties on Obama’s priority list have been approved, for a success rate of just 35 percent. When we add together the treaties listed on Obama’s priority list and the treaties Obama has transmitted (see Table 8.2), we get a total of 52 treaties, of which only 20 (39 percent) have been ratified. This poor record is despite Obama’s party having control of the Senate for the first six years of his presidency. Why is Obama’s record on treaties so poor, especially when compared to Bush’s record? There are basically two answers to this question. The first answer deals primarily with the nature of Obama’s treaties. His focus was largely on multilateral treaties that dealt with relatively significant issues, whereas Bush’s lists include a larger share of the more mundane bilateral agreements. The second answer, which I believe to be more important, relates primarily to the political context in which Obama governed. Put simply, the polarized US Senate presents very difficult prospects for success, especially for policies that require supermajority support like treaties. However, Bush also faced a polarized Senate, though to a somewhat lesser degree (see Figure 8.1).The fact that Bush is a Republican and that most opponents to treaties in the Senate come from the GOP may also explain why Obama met with less success. Republican senators were more apt to oppose his foreign policies than the foreign policies of one of their own.12 In the modern era, Republican presidents have been slightly more successful in the treaty process, as shown in Table 8.2. A third possibility focuses on Obama’s leadership effort, or lack thereof, on treaties. John Bellinger (2012), a former legal advisor in the State Department

152  Chapter 8 Table 8.2  Success Rates on Treaties Transmitted to the Senate for Consent, 1949–2016 Presidential Administration

No. of Treaties Transmitted (bilateral/ multi)

% of Transmitted Treaties Ratified (bilateral/multi)

% Ratified during Administration (bilateral/multi)

Truman (2nd term)

82 (40 / 42) 100 (54 / 46) 97 (35 / 62) 129 (55 / 74) 88 (49 / 39) 110 (49 / 29) 61 (34 / 27) 187 (128 / 59) 97 (57 / 40) 36 (17 / 19)

84.1% (90% / 78.6%) 93% (92.6% / 93.5%) 91.8% (91.4% / 91.9%) 96.1% (98.2% / 94.6%) 88.6% (87.8% / 89.7%) 90% (93.8% / 84.4%) 96.7% (97.1% / 96.3%) 94.7% (98.4% / 86.4%) 95.9% (100% / 90%) 38.9% (52.9% / 21.5%) 92.3% (94.4% / 89.5%) 89.8% (91.9% / 86.7%) 94.3% (96.3% / 91.8%)

64.6% (72.5% / 57.1%) 80% (79.6% / 80.4%) 92.3% (91.4% / 88.7%) 84.5% (83.6% / 85.1%) 52.3% (55.1% / 48.7%) 73.6% (75.4% / 71.1%) 86.4% (79.4% / 88.9%) 88.2% (96.8% / 57.6%) 87.6% (93% / 88.9%) 38.9% (52.9% / 21.5%) 78.8% (80.8% / 74.1%) 74.4% (79% / 63%) 82.4% (82.2% / 82.9%)

Eisenhower Kennedy/Johnson Nixon/Ford Carter Reagan G.H.W. Bush Clinton G.W. Bush Obama (through 2016) Truman to G.W. Bush Average Democrats Average (pre-Obama) Republicans Average

Note: Column 2 includes the ratification success rate after the end of the administration, whereas column 3 includes the president’s success rate on treaties approved while president. Source: Data are from Peake and Krutz (2014), updated by author.

during the Bush administration, argued that the Obama’s “weakness on treaties” is largely a result of the administration’s lack of effort in pushing for their ratification and Obama’s sluggishness in transmitting treaties to the Senate. Indeed, the White House could have done more to shepherd the UN disabilities convention through the Senate, but it is not at all clear that such efforts would have been fruitful given the political context and the general trends in treaty failures noted here. Simply put, the weak record cannot be explained by a lack of presidential effort.13 Obama largely focused on multilateral treaties; 31 of the 53 (59 percent) treaties that Obama listed on his 2009 priority list or transmitted to the Senate for approval through 2016 were multilateral. The comparable statistic for Bush is 46 percent (46 out of 101 treaties). Among the multilateral treaties

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supported by Obama, only seven have been approved as of this writing. On average, presidents are less successful on multilateral treaties than on bilateral treaties. Multilateral treaties take longer to process than bilateral treaties, and ratification delay contributes greatly to rates of treaty failure (Peake 2016). Multilateral treaties, by their nature, typically involve more significant and controversial issues, including human rights, arms control, and the environment. Historically, the United States has a weak record in ratifying multilateral treaties in these areas. Conservatives who claim that the treaties violate American sovereignty or weaken American security often target multilateral treaties, particularly UN conventions dealing with these three issues (Kaufman 1990; Krutz and Peake 2009). Conservatives were central to the exceptional defeats on the Senate floor of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1999 and the UN disabilities convention in 2012, as well as the four-decade delay in ratifying the Genocide Convention. The political context is the most important variable that affects the treaty ratification process, particularly when a treaty is controversial (Kelley and Pevehouse 2015; Krutz and Peake 2009). A recent analysis by Peake (2016) found that high partisan polarization significantly contributes to delay in bilateral treaties receiving Senate consent; so, even the more mundane bilateral treaties are often held up as a result of partisan polarization. The partisan context was particularly problematic during Obama’s tenure as president, during which each successive Senate set a record in terms of partisan polarization (see Figure 8.1) and this impacted treaty approval (Homan 2016; Peake et al. 2012). Because treaties require two-thirds support, the president must be able to build a broad bipartisan coalition—something difficult to do when the parties are highly polarized. Moreover, treaties are clearly seen as presidential initiatives such that a successful ratification is seen as a win for the president and his party. Given the “team-play” that plagues the polarized Senate these days (Mann and Ornstein 2012), opposition party members, particularly in the GOP, are loath to provide the president the clear victory that a treaty approval would provide. The challenge is especially difficult for a Democratic president pushing a liberal and internationalist agenda, as Republican senators are free to oppose the president openly on the floor of the Senate and in committee. A Republican president, however, may have an easier time in getting the Senate to approve multilateral accords, should he be so inclined. Democratic senators are more likely to support multilateral treaties, given their more liberal ideology, while Republicans are less likely to openly oppose a Republican president. Thus, President Bush could draw on support from the opposition party, whereas doing so was much more difficult for Obama. An additional component of the political context relates to the policy agenda. Given the overwhelming amount of attention Obama paid to the economy and other domestic policy priorities (especially health care reform in 2009 and 2010), his focus was elsewhere. When he focused on foreign policy, his attention was largely on Iraq or Afghanistan, where he relied

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heavily on executive agreements rather than treaties. Obama’s focus on the economy necessarily limited the amount of attention and political capital he could spend on treaties. Much of Obama’s effort on behalf of treaties focused on the 2010 push to ratify the New START agreement with Russia. Prior research on treaty politics has suggested that presidential political capital spent on behalf of treaties can be decisive in the ratification effort (Homan 2016; Lantis 2009). With other prominent issues dominating the political agenda, the Obama administration lacked the political capital to spend on marshaling significant treaties through the Senate. In contrast, during the Bush presidency, much of the policy agenda focus was on foreign policy, given the focusing events of 9/11 and the wars that stemmed from Bush’s global war on terror. Even so, other modern presidents have had to deal with crowded policy agendas and have much more substantial records on treaties. A final component of the political context is the broader foreign policy environment in which the president must push his agenda. During the Cold War years, a broad consensus existed in American politics that largely supported liberal internationalism in foreign policy. Treaties are an important component of the liberal order. Moreover, the unifying threat of the Soviet Union and communism largely muted congressional opposition to internationalist foreign policies and provided presidents with substantial leeway in implementing their diplomatic agendas (  Johnson 2006). Increasing partisan polarization, which has coincided with the end of the Cold War consensus, is certainly related to this explanation (Trubowitz and Mellow 2011). It is difficult to disentangle the effects of polarization from the impact of this major change in the international political context, given their concomitance. In sum, a combination of factors contributed to President Obama’s poor record on treaties when compared to his predecessors. First, a significant share of the treaties that Obama supported are both controversial and multilateral, and opposition Republicans are more prone to oppose such treaties pushed by a Democratic president. Second, and perhaps most importantly, due to partisan polarization, the Senate was in particularly bad shape during Obama’s presidency for doing anything, let alone approving treaties that require supermajority support. Moreover, the clear consensus supporting liberal internationalist foreign policy no longer existed. Third, Obama’s attention was largely focused elsewhere, on more pressing issues, particularly the struggling economy. Finally, as is suggested by the data previously presented on the paucity of treaties during the Obama presidency, along with his reliance on executive agreements, President Obama had an alternative to the cumbersome (and now highly politicized) treaty process. While the alternative certainly existed for Obama’s predecessors, the incentives for avoiding the Senate treaty process were not so great as they were for Obama. Obama and Executive Agreements

The most obvious difference between Obama and other modern presidents in terms of behavior on international agreements is his nonuse of Article

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 155

II treaties. Of course, American diplomacy continued apace, as Obama’s administration completed executive agreements at a pace similar to his predecessors’. In prior work (Peake 2015), I examined a comprehensive data set of executive agreements completed from 2005 to 2012. Nearly 800 of these agreements were completed and reported by the Department of State during Obama’s first term (2009–2012).14 That examination suggests that Bush and Obama used executive agreements similarly, completing numerous highly important agreements unilaterally, primarily as sole executive agreements or ex ante congressional-executive agreements. My comparison of the two most recent administrations’ use of executive agreements leads to four conclusions. Firstly, as was the case with prior administrations, both Bush and Obama completed a number of very important bilateral agreements as executive agreements rather than as treaties. When contrasted with the paltry number of treaties completed by Obama, this is an important conclusion; Obama’s diplomacy took a decidedly unilateral turn.15 Secondly, a significant percentage of Obama’s executive agreements appear to stem directly from Article II of the Constitution, in particular the presi­dent’s power as commander in chief, or are preauthorized (ex ante) congressional-executive agreements, as described by Hathaway (2009). Nearly half (45 percent) of the executive agreements in the data set are security agreements, which is unsurprising given the “war on terror” and the broad range of existing security pacts in which the United States is committed. However, a large number of the security agreements relate to new agreements focused on nonproliferation, ballistic missile basing agreements, military assistance and the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and represent important security commitments. The degree to which Obama was simply executing his function as commander in chief or committing the nation to extended security arrangements is unclear. Although most of the security agreements may fit the former description, several clearly went beyond the president simply executing his executive function. Thirdly, the more mundane diplomatic activities represented by most executive agreements continued apace. While Obama was unable to ratify more than a handful of mutual legal assistance, extradition, investment, and tax treaties,16 he regularly finalized agreements in these domains as executive agreements. This suggests that the Obama administration, in particular, continued to implement its diplomacy in these areas but largely avoided doing so through treaties. These run-of-the-mill treaties were common throughout the modern era (including during the George W. Bush presidency) and constituted a majority of treaties overall. This was not the case during Obama’s presidency. During his first term, Obama transmitted just six bilateral tax treaties and one legal assistance treaty. During his second term, Obama transmitted just four bilateral tax treaties, three mutual legal assistance treaties, and two extradition treaties (see Table 8.3 and Table 8.4). The paucity of even mundane treaties suggests two possibilities. First, and least likely, is that the Obama administration did not complete these mundane, but

Table 8.3  President Obama’s 2009 Treaty Priority List Treaty Name

Submission Date

Latest Action as of March 2016

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105–28) Defense Cooperation Treaty with Australia (Treaty Doc. 110–10) Defense Cooperation Treaty with the UK (Treaty Doc. 110–7) Annex VI to Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111–2) Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses & Petrels (Treaty Doc. 110–22) Int’l Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food & Agriculture (Treaty Doc. 110–19) Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution (Treaty Doc. 110–5) Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Treaty Doc. 107–5) Rotterdam Convention on International Trade of Pesticides (Treaty Doc. 106–21) Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Ex. R., 96th Cong., 2nd Sess.) Investment Treaty with Rwanda (Treaty Doc. 110–23) Tax Convention with Malta (Treaty Doc. 111–1)

9/23/1997 (Clinton)

Failed ratification vote (48–51) on 10/13/1999, no action since Senate consent to ratification on 9/29/2010 Senate consent to ratification on 9/29/2010 Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

International Labor Organization Convention No. 111 (Treaty Doc. 105–45)

9/20/2007 (G.W. Bush) 9/20/2007 (G.W. Bush) 4/02/2009 (Obama)

9/26/2008 (G.W. Bush)

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

7/07/2008 (G.W. Bush)

Senate consent to ratify on 9/28/2016

9/04/2007 (G.W. Bush)

Reported by Committee on 9/11/2008, no action since (died on floor) Pending in Committee, hearings held 6/17/2003, no other action Pending in Committee, hearings held 6/17/2003, no other action Reported by Committee on 9/6/2002, no other action

5/07/2002 (G.W. Bush)

2/09/2000 (Clinton)

11/12/1980 (Carter)

11/20/2008 (G.W. Bush) 1/15/2009 (G.W. Bush) 5/18/1998 (Clinton)

Senate consent to ratification on 9/26/2011 Senate consent to ratification on 7/15/2010 Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

Treaty Name

Submission Date

Latest Action as of March 2016

Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, etc. (Treaty Doc. 105–49) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Treaty Doc. 103–39) Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel (Treaty Doc. 107–1) Hague Convention on the Int’l Recovery of Child Support (Treaty Doc. 110–21)

6/09/1998 (Clinton)

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

10/7/1994 (Clinton)

Reported by Committee on 12/19/2007; hearings 6/28/2012 Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

1/03/2001 (Clinton) 9/08/2008 (G.W. Bush)

Senate consent to ratification on 9/29/2010

Note: Multilateral treaties are shaded. Number of treaty priorities: 17; number ratified: 6; success rate: 35.3%. Source: Data compiled by the author.

Table 8.4 Treaties Submitted by President Obama, 2009–2016 Treaty Name

Date Signed; Date Transmitted

Latest Action as of January 2, 2017

Annex VI to Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Tr. (Treaty Doc. 111–2) Tax Protocol with New Zealand (Treaty Doc. 111–3) Tax Protocol with France (Treaty Doc. 111–4) New START Treaty with Russia (Treaty Doc. 111–5) MLAT with Bermuda (Treaty Doc. 111–6) Tax Convention with Hungary (Treaty Doc. 111–7)

6/14/2005; 4/02/2009

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

12/01/2008; 6/16/2009 1/13/2009; 9/09/2009 4/08/2010; 5/13/2010 1/12/2009; 6/29/2010 2/04/2010; 11/15/2010

Tax Protocol with Luxembourg (Treaty Doc. 111–8)

5/20/2009; 11/15/2010

Tax Protocol with Switzerland (Treaty Doc. 112–1)

9/23/2009; 1/26/2011

Protocols 1, 2, and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty Doc. 112–2)

6/14/2005; 4/02/2009

Senate consent to ratify on 7/15/2010 Senate consent to ratify on 9/26/2011 Senate consent to ratify on 12/22/2010 Senate consent to ratify on 9/26/2011 Reported by Committee on 2/9/2016, awaiting floor action Reported by Committee on 2/9/2016, awaiting floor action Reported by Committee on 2/9/2016, awaiting floor action Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action (Continued)

Table 8.4 (Continued) Treaty Name

Date Signed; Date Transmitted

Latest Action as of January 2, 2017

Protocols 1 and 2 to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty Doc. 112–3) Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent Illegal Fishing (Treaty Doc. 112–4) Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Taxes (Treaty Doc. 112–5) Convention on the Law Applied to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary (Treaty Doc. 112–6) UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Treaty Doc. 112–7) Tax Convention with Chile (Treaty Doc. 112–8)

3/25/1996; 5/02/2011

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

11/22/2009; 11/14/2011

Senate consent to ratify on 4/3/2014

5/27/2010; 5/17/2012

Reported by Committee on 2/09/2016, awaiting floor action

7/05/2006; 5/17/2012

Senate consent to ratify on 9/28/2016

6/30/2009; 5/17/2012

Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific (Treaty Doc. 113–1) Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the North Pacific (Treaty Doc. 113–2) Amendment to the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the NW Atlantic Fisheries (Treaty Doc. 113–3) Tax Protocol with Spain (Treaty Doc. 113–4)

1/31/2011; 4/22/2013

Failed ratification vote (61–38) on 12/04/2012, no action since Reported by Committee on 2/09/2016, awaiting floor action Senate consent to ratify on 4/3/2014

5/02/2012; 4/22/2013

Senate consent to ratify on 4/3/2014

9/28/2007; 4/22/2013

Senate consent to ratify on 4/3/2014

2/22/1990; 5/7/2014

Tax Convention with the Republic of Poland (Treaty Doc. 113–5) Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Chile (Treaty Doc. 113–6) Tax Protocol with Japan (Treaty Doc. 114–1)

2/13/2013; 5/20/2014

Reported by Committee on 2/09/2016, awaiting floor action Reported by Committee on 2/09/2016, awaiting floor action Senate consent to ratify on 7/14/2016

Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty Doc. 114–2)

5/6/2014; 4/27/2015

2/21/2012; 5/17/2012

6/5/2013; 9/17/2014 1/24/2013; 4/13/2015

Reported by Committee on 2/09/2016, awaiting floor action Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 159 Treaty Name

Date Signed; Date Transmitted

Latest Action as of January 2, 2017

MLAT with Algeria (Treaty Doc. 114–3) MLAT with Jordan (Treaty Doc. 114–4) UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in Int’l Contracts (Treaty Doc. 114–5) Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind (Treaty Doc. 114–6) The United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (Treaty Doc. 114–7) The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (Treaty Doc. 114–8) UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit (Treaty Doc. 114–9) Extradition Treaty with the Dominican Republic (Treaty Doc. 114–10) MLAT with Kazakhstan (Treaty Doc. 114–11) NATO Accession of Montenegro (Treaty Doc. 114–12)

4/7/2010; 10/5/2015 10/1/2013; 12/8/2015 11/23/2005; 2/10/2016

Senate consent to ratify on 9/15/2016 Senate consent to ratify on 9/15/2016 Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

6/27/2013; 2/10/2016

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

12/30/2003; 2/10/2016

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

6/24/2012; 2/10/2016

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

12/11/1997; 2/10/2016

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

1/12/2015; 2/10/2016

Senate consent to ratify on 7/14/2016

2/20/2015; 3/17/2016 5/19/2016; 6/28/2016

Maritime boundary treaty with Kiribati and Micronesia (Treaty Doc. 114–13) The Arms Trade Treaty (Treaty Doc. 114–14) UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState Arbitration (Treaty Doc. 114–15)

8/01/2014; 12/09/2016

Senate consent to ratify on 9/15/2016 Reported by Committee on 12/07/2016, awaiting floor action Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

9/25/2013; 12/09/2016 12/10/2014; 12/09/2016

Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action Pending in Committee, no hearings or other action

Note: Multilateral treaties are shaded. Number of treaties: 36; number ratified: 14; success rate: 38.9%. Sources: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html and www.congress.gov/treaties

critical, agreements because they were no longer necessary.17 Second, and more likely, is that the Obama administration strategically decided not to finalize many of these sorts of agreements as treaties, instead completing the agreements as executive agreements and then reporting them to Congress. Finally, as Kaye (2013) argued, President Obama implemented much US diplomacy using “stealth multilateralism.” This can occur in a number of

160  Chapter 8

ways, including the president signing multilateral international agreements with little intention of submitting the agreement to the Senate for ratification (but still participating in the multilateral organization, or at least abiding by guidelines set forth in the agreement);18 by submitting the agreement to the Senate, with the intention of behaving as if the agreement had been ratified, whether or not the Senate approved the agreement;19 or by completing the multilateral agreement as an executive agreement, rather than as a treaty, and thus binding the United States to international law without involving Congress. Each of these approaches, of course, cuts Congress out of the process. An additional option is the political agreement, whereby the president makes a political, rather than legal, commitment to a particular action. Political agreements are neither a treaty nor an executive agreement and are not considered a formal treaty under international law and thus are nonbinding. Hollis and Newcomer (2009) defined a political agreement “as a nonlegally binding agreement between two or more nation-states in which the parties intend to establish commitments of an exclusively political or moral nature.” The breach of treaties and executive agreements “can generate both political and legal consequences . . . only politics governs the political commitment” (517–520).20 It is often unclear during negotiations whether the executive intends to complete a binding international agreement (i.e., a treaty or executive agreement) or a political agreement, and there is often confusion between the two, even among policymakers and legal scholars. This was clearly the case for two major international agreements completed by Obama: the Iran nuclear agreement and the Paris climate agreement. As I describe in the next section, the Iran agreement was completed as a nonbinding political agreement. The Paris agreement, however, combined elements of both a nonbinding political agreement and a binding executive agreement (Goldsmith 2016). It should be stated, however, that political agreements, because they are nonbinding, are quite fragile and may be abrogated by future presidents with only political rather than legal costs. Although each of these unilateral tools has its limits, according to Kaye, given a dysfunctional Senate, presidents may have little choice but to employ them in order to “conduct foreign policy, seek solutions to global problems, and exercise leadership on the world stage” (2013, 116). This appears to be particularly the case for Obama, as each tool was central to helping him navigate some of the most difficult diplomatic issues during his presidency, including both the Paris climate agreement and the Iran nuclear agreement, a case to which I now turn.

The Iran Nuclear Accord The 2015 nuclear accord with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (  JCPOA), is a controversial case that pitted the Republican

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 161

Congress against President Obama in his efforts to broker a deal with Iran and five other states in which Iran would give up its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the elimination of certain economic sanctions.21 The agreement, which was signed on July 14, 2015, was the culmination of nine years of diplomatic efforts to forestall Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal. As the agreement took shape, it was clear that in exchange for Iran giving up its nuclear weapons program, the sanctions regime against the country would be need to be reduced substantially. Such action was politically controversial in the United States because Republicans, and some Democrats, had routinely pushed for harsher action against Iran rather than diplomacy. In their view, Iran was not just seeking a nuclear arsenal but was a terrorist-supporting state bent on the destruction of one of America’s greatest allies, Israel. That the Israeli government preferred less diplomacy on the issue also made it a litmus test for members of Congress on their support for Israel. As the diplomatic efforts moved toward completion in early 2015, 47 Republican senators went on record as opposing unilateral action by the president on the pending Iran nuclear deal, indicating in their March 2015 “open letter” to Iran that any such deal, if it were to be legally binding, would need congressional approval and that any future president would be free to renege on the deal if such approval was not forthcoming. The letter stated that any agreement “not approved by Congress is a mere executive agreement.”22 While much discussion ensued in the press about executive agreements versus treaties, it turns out that the agreement eventually signed in July was neither a treaty nor an executive agreement; rather, it was a political agreement that relied on existing congressionally delegated presidential authority to grant sanction waivers. It was initially argued by the White House, via the vice president’s office, that the president could complete the agreement on his own authority as an executive agreement. However, the president lacked the authority to eliminate or permanently waive sanctions due to statutes that required congressional review of nuclear cooperation agreements. Additionally, statutes governing Iranian sanctions only authorized the president to temporarily suspend sanctions. Indeed, the president’s legal authority to unilaterally complete a binding agreement in this case was nonexistent.23 The lack of presidential authority to unilaterally make a legally binding commitment, coupled with strong opposition in Congress, threatened to undercut one of Obama’s signature foreign policies. However, a nonbinding political agreement paired with the use of existing presidential authority to temporarily suspend sanctions offered an opportunity for Obama to both make the commitments necessitated by the Iran agreement and affect change in domestic law. Goldsmith (2016, 12) explained: The Obama team’s imaginative answer to this conundrum was to locate the authority to fulfill the political commitments in independent domestic

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law authorities that were not designed to effectuate or approve international agreements. With the Iran Deal, Obama pledged in a political commitment to lift US sanctions, and then followed through on that pledge by exercising an independent, pre-existing congressionally conferred authority to waive the sanctions in the national interest. In short, the president already had the legal authority under the sanctions laws to suspend certain economic sanctions on Iran; thus, additional congressional authorization to do so was not required. The political agreement solution was problematic, however, as it gave credence to the Republican argument that Obama’s successor was free to renege on the agreement should he or she wish to—and many of the Republican candidates for the presidency were stating that they would do just that, should they be elected. For example, during his winning campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump indicated his opposition to the Iran nuclear accord and signaled that he would abrogate the agreement once he was president. After all, if President Obama had the legal authority to waive the sanctions, his predecessor certainly has the authority to reinstate them, absent a congressionally authorized legally binding agreement.24 Moreover, a political agreement cannot legally bind one party (i.e., the Iranians) but not the others. Thus, the nonbinding nature of the agreement meant that it was also nonbinding for the Iranians, and thus, it lacked what international lawyers refer to as “compliance pull” (Goldsmith 2016, 11). Fixing this latter problem required action at the UN Security Council, which was required in order to suspend UN-mandated sanctions on Iran anyway.This occurred soon after the agreement was signed, as the Security Council passed resolution 2231, endorsing the JCPOA and terminating prior resolutions that subjected Iran to sanctions over its nuclear weapons program. Whether or not this action by the Security Council binds future presidents, given Article 25 of the UN Charter (a ratified treaty), is a subject of some legal debate in the United States. It certainly makes abrogating the agreement more difficult. Realizing that the political agreement approach was problematic, the Obama administration supported congressional efforts to require congressional review of the agreement once it was completed, as long as the law did not require congressional approval for the president to uphold his end of the agreement (Raju and Everett 2015).25 Initially, the administration opposed all congressional efforts to interject during the negotiation phase of the agreement (i.e., prior to its signing); however, the administration was eventually open to a compromise forged by Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD). Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114–17) in May 2015 with a bipartisan vote. The law suspended the president’s waiver authority on Iranian sanctions for 60 days while Congress reviewed and debated the agreement, after which time the president could waive sanctions (authority he already had) if Congress failed to enact a joint resolution of disapproval during that time period. It

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 163

should be noted, however, that the act did not require a vote of approval— the agreement would go into effect if Congress approved the agreement or did nothing, but could be stopped if Congress passed the disapproval resolution. The act also required some fairly onerous reporting requirements on the administration to facilitate congressional oversight (Katzman and Kerr 2016). The resolution of disapproval was subject to a presidential veto, of course. So, while the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act inserted Congress into the process once the deal was completed, to some extent, it did so with little real effect, since any resolution of disapproval would need to overcome a presidential veto. This had the practical effect of turning the required support necessary for congressional approval of the agreement from two thirds of the Senate in the case of a treaty or a majority of both chambers in the case of an ex post congressional-executive agreement to just one third plus one in just one chamber, the minimum required to sustain a presidential veto. It also provided a patina of legitimacy to the president’s authority, as it appeared that Congress was giving its go-ahead to the president to negotiate the deal.26 The agreement was signed in July 2015, and the 60-day clock started. Republican opposition to the deal was immediate and strident, with Senator Corker remarking that the administration “had been fleeced” (Welsh 2015). So much for the bipartisanship that led to the overwhelming passage of the review act back in May! The House of Representatives acted quickly to disapprove the deal, voting along party lines to take away the president’s authority to waive sanctions until January 2017 (H.R. 3460). However, action to confront the president stalled in the Senate, as a Democratic filibuster forestalled the Republican effort to enact a resolution of disapproval (H.J.Res. 61), which the president would have vetoed, and the president was able to fulfill his political commitment to suspend US sanctions (Katzman and Kerr 2016). Because Obama was in a weak position domestically—he lacked the authority to sign a legally binding agreement unilaterally, and there was no way the Republicans in Congress would allow for congressional approval of a binding agreement—he had to resort to a method that has led many to question the legitimacy of his actions with regard to the Iran agreement. Although technically legal, Obama’s approach was politically unpopular. Also, members of Congress were still confused as to whether the agreement was a legally binding agreement or a political agreement, as evidenced by the fact that the State Department had to clarify as late as September 2015 that the agreement was not legally binding—that it was a political agreement.27 The agreement is weakened by the fact that Obama’s successor is legally free to abrogate the agreement, although doing so might cause serious political problems with other agreement participants. For example, if the United States were to reapply sanctions without Iranian provocation, the other parties to the agreement would probably continue to keep their commitment

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to lift sanctions, making US sanctions less effective overall.28 Doing so would also diminish the United States’ reputation for making credible deals, an important consideration. And, finally, the United States would violate Security Council Resolution 2231.29 The case of the Iran nuclear agreement suggests that even when congressional majorities oppose presidential action on international agreements, the president is in a strong position to act regardless of this opposition and quite possibly in direct contravention of the opposition. This is especially the case when congressional statutes provide for greater presidential authority through delegation (i.e., waiver authority in the case of sanctions). To be sure, joint action by the branches in the form of a treaty or congressionally authorized executive agreement has more legitimacy and is binding under international law, thus binding future presidents, but the political context, in the words of Secretary Kerry, makes passing treaties “physically impossible.” The case also illustrates how the polarized politics Kerry lamented make it equally difficult for Congress to guard its own foreign policy prerogatives via the legislative process.30 In the end, President Obama was able to act and Congress was left to react. The Iran nuclear agreement is but one example of President Obama using unilateral diplomatic tools in order to push consequential foreign policies in furtherance of his legacy. The significant Paris climate agreement, which Obama signed in late 2015, is an additional example. The Paris agreement faced stiff Republican opposition, so Obama completed the agreement as part binding executive agreement and part political agreement, circumventing congressional approval. Like his predecessor, Obama also completed major military commitments to both Iraq and Afghanistan by executive agreement. In the case of the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan, the Obama administration committed the United States to stationing troops in the troubled country through 2024. In each case, Obama avoided taking his international agreements to Congress, significantly weakening both their democratic legitimacy and American engagement in international lawmaking.

Conclusion The Obama administration’s record on treaties is the weakest in modern history. Among modern presidents, Obama, by far, submitted the fewest treaties to the Senate and had the fewest number of treaties ratified. The president is not entirely to blame, however, as Republicans were effective in opposing Obama’s policies in the Senate, even in the cases of treaties that historically have not been highly politicized. What is the president to do when American political institutions routinely fail to finalize international commitments? Should the president do nothing and thus limit the ability of the United States to conduct its diplomacy? Can significant global issues, including climate change and nuclear proliferation, be resolved without credible

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commitments on the part of the United States? For President Obama, the consequences of inaction were serious enough to consider the use of unilateral authority even when joint action would provide better outcomes. Such are the enticements of unilateral presidential action in today’s ineffective and dysfunctional Washington.

Future Challenges As far as the treaty power goes, the United States is at a crossroads. Obama’s successors can follow his path and continue to push the boundary of unilateral action, creating end runs around Congress and making obscure claims to legal authority, or they can do the more difficult work of involving Congress, as seemingly required by the Constitution. The latter would make for more effective foreign policy and more credible commitments on the part of the United States, something agreement partners clearly value. It would also preserve the congressional role in US foreign policymaking, a valuable end that legitimizes policy decisions. Congress could also more effectively guard its institutional role in foreign policy by avoiding the delegation of vast amounts of authority, providing openings for presidential unilateralism. While Obama’s bold diplomatic actions on climate change, trade, military commitments, and arms control pushed the boundary of the president’s unilateral foreign policy powers, they also threaten the delicate balance that worked effectively for much of the 20th century whereby presidents would complete the vast majority of agreements unilaterally but involve Congress for the most significant and controversial accords. Put simply, the process is broken and the consequences are serious. The abandonment of treaties and end runs around Congress do not come cheaply. American foreign policy, as well as the United States’ international prestige, may suffer as a result of the president’s inability or unwillingness to use the treaty mechanism. Ratified treaties send clearer and more credible signals of national commitment, which is important for international relations to work effectively (Martin 2000). US agreement partners often prefer treaties to executive agreements, considering them more credible commitments (Milner 1997). Moreover, the United States operates from a position of strength in multilateral organizations created by treaties it has ratified. There are significant limitations on its engagement in such organizations when it has not ratified the agreement. Ratification failures also come with clear costs. A treaty that is not ratified is “devoid of any legal force” (Hathaway 2008, 103) with regard to international law, as states are not bound to international agreements that are not in force. One solution the Obama administration came up with is the use of political agreements, coupled with existing presidential authority to change US policy unilaterally. Calling an international agreement a political agreement to avoid congressional input, as was the case with the Iran nuclear agreement, makes for awfully fragile commitments on the part of the United States. The campaign rhetoric of

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the 2016 presidential election makes this plain to see, as Republican candidates promised to disavow both the Iran and Paris agreements, should they be elected. Whether and how Trump decides to withdraw the United States from these two accords may tell us much about the path forward regarding executive unilateralism in the new presidential administration. As of midMay 2017, Trump—after vowing to scrap the Paris climate accords on greenhouse gas emissions—put off a decision following a telephone conversation with the new French president, Emmanuel Macron, in advance of a meeting of the Arctic Council in Fairbanks, Alaska, to which Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was dispatched. Similarly, while “rip it up” was a refrain at his campaign rallies regarding the Iran nuclear deal, Trump has been subdued on the accord in the early days of his administration. In his first address to Congress in late February 2017, the president accentuated the imposition of further sanctions against Iran while reaffirming the United States’ support for Israel. He made no mention of scrapping the agreement aimed at halting the regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the early lesson of the Trump presidency is that withdrawing from international agreements unilaterally poses as many risks domestically and geopolitically as the Obama administration’s quest to implement them by circumventing Congress. A third possibility exists, of course. President Trump could purposively avoid formal multilateral diplomacy altogether, refusing to enter into legally binding agreements. While it is too early to tell, there were early signals during the Trump administration that the treaty mechanism may be further undermined by a lack of presidential interest in multilateralism and international law. As of mid-May 2017, President Trump has yet to submit a treaty for Senate ratification. This is not unusual, as presidents are usually working on other issues early in their term, but this lack of action also coincides with consideration in the White House to order a review of all multilateral agreements to which the United States is party, which could signal a significant change in American treaty behavior (Conrad and Ritter 2017; DeYoung and Rucker 2017). Past Republican presidents have largely been supportive of multilateralism and international law. Early indications suggest that President Trump could change this basic norm.

Notes 1 See www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/john-kerry-iran-nuclear-deal-con gress-hearing. Kerry was previously the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). 2 The best example of a significant stalled treaty is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has support from business groups (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce), energy interests, the US military, former president George W. Bush, and the Obama administration. President Clinton originally transmitted the treaty in 1994. Despite its significance and substantial domestic support, conservatives in Congress have blocked Senate consideration of the treaty. Senator John Kerry, then the chair of the

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 167 SFRC, held hearings on the treaty in June 2012. Prior committee action included favorable reports on the treaty in 2004 and 2007, at the behest of President Bush. In each instance, the treaty failed to reach the floor. 3 For example, in Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton stated that treaties and “every other species of convention usual among nations” require joint action by the president and the Senate. 4 The floor defeats include the Convention on the High Seas in 1960, the Montreal Protocol No. 4 in 1983, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1999, and the UN Convention for the Rights of the Disabled in 2012. 5 See Hathaway (2009) for a lengthy discussion of the differences between these types of executive agreements. 6 Hathaway (2009, 214) wrote, “Even though the [ex ante congressional-executive] agreements have been ‘approved’ by Congress in the narrow legal sense, there is little genuine cooperation between the President and Congress in the process of creating the agreements.” 7 Ex post congressional-executive agreements come in various forms, as outlined in several US statutes, including the Trade Act of 1974, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976. See Krutz and Peake (2009, 170–172) and US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2001, 236–238). These statutes require some form of congressional approval (or allow for disapproval) for all major trade agreements, nuclear cooperation agreements, and fisheries agreements. This bicameral approval process can also legally substitute for the Senate treaty approval process, should the president decide to go that route. 8 There is precedent for presidents to submit arms control agreements to Congress for bicameral approval, as Nixon did with the original SALT accord in 1972.The Senate jealously guards its turf on these kinds of agreements, especially. 9 Conservative interest groups have long opposed major international agreements, especially of the multilateral variety (see Krutz and Peake 2009, chapter 4, for examples). However, during the 20th century, presidents were generally able to overcome the opposition of such groups. Obama has been much less able. 10 Given that Obama submitted 11 treaties during 2016 and the short time until the end of his presidency, this 39 percent may be unfairly low. Several treaties languished on the Senate’s executive calendar during 2016, having cleared committee, which is the most significant hurdle in the treaty process. Since none of these pending treaties were ratified before the end of the 114th Congress, the process must begin again for the 115th. Of course, Obama’s success rate, listed in column 3 in Table 8.2, stands to improve after he leaves office. 11 I am referring to the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which was transmitted to the Senate by Carter in 1980, where it has been pending ever since. 12 As an example, we can look at the history of bilateral nuclear arms agreements with Russia. In 2003, Bush received unanimous support for the Strategic Offensive Weapons Reduction Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty. Obama completed a similar follow-on agreement with Russia in 2010 (New START). While Obama’s treaty was ratified, the president faced difficult negotiations in his effort to secure Senate approval and, in the end, 26 Republicans still voted against the treaty, just six shy of scuttling the accord (see Peake et al. 2012). 13 For example, the treaty on which Bellinger focused, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has languished in the Senate throughout Obama’s presidency. Bellinger argued that Obama simply has not pushed the treaty, whereas the Bush administration pushed hard for the treaty and saw the SFRC report the treaty twice, in 2004 and 2007. While this is true, Bush still was not able to get a vote on the Convention

168  Chapter 8 because of the clearly stated opposition by archconservatives in the GOP. It is odd to argue that Obama would be more successful than Bush in overcoming Republican opposition to the treaty, given the hyper-partisanship that infects the Senate. The Republicans effectively killed consideration of the treaty in July 2012, when 34 Senators stated on record their strong opposition, including 31 who wrote a letter to then-Senate majority leader Harry Reid (D-NV). In the case of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Obama promised early on to push hard for ratification. His efforts on behalf of the treaty stalled, however, and some suggest that his lack of effort on behalf of the treaty in face of concerted Republican opposition is what has stalled it (Homan 2016; Jones and Marsh 2014). 14 The exact figure reported in Table 8.1 is 793. I am positive that this undercounts Obama’s use of executive agreements during his first term. Executive-branch agencies are often delayed in reporting executive agreements they sign, and the State Department has been less transparent in reporting these agreements on its website since the end of 2012. See Peake (2015) for a discussion on the difficulties of collecting comprehensive and accurate data on executive agreements. 15 By unilateral here, I mean in terms of shared power with Congress. I do not mean that he has eschewed working with other states when it comes to diplomatic endeavors. 16 Specifically, the number is only eight. The eight include three tax treaties, including one left over from the Bush administration, three mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT), and two extradition treaties. The committee reported seven bilateral tax treaties in early 2016, but none of these received a vote during the 114th Congress and must be reported again before they can be approved by the 115th Congress (2017–2018). 17 I believe this to be unlikely because, when I examine the list of bilateral treaties transmitted to the Senate since 1949, I find numerous tax treaties and amendments to existing tax treaties throughout. Similar patterns emerge for extradition treaties and, to a lesser extent, investment treaties and legal assistance treaties. It strains logic to assume that the practical necessity of these agreements disappeared with Obama’s election. Moreover, Justice Department documents indicate that the United States has mutual legal assistance treaties with 70 countries, which means the United States has no such treaty with a majority of nations. 18 The Bush and Obama administrations did this with the International Criminal Court and various climate change agreements, including the Kyoto Protocol. Other examples include partial supporting behavior on the part of the Bush and Obama administrations on issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel mines (Kaye 2013). 19 When a country signs a treaty, under international law, it is expected that the country will endeavor to comply with the treaty whether domestic approval occurs or not. Moreover, the fact that the United States has not ratified a multilateral treaty severely limits its ability to participate in governing bodies established by the treaty or to affect the content of the treaty, since other signatories know that the United States will not ratify the agreement in the end. The Senate’s refusal to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is the best example. The Convention created a governing body to adjudicate disputes over deep-sea bed mining and other critical marine issues. The United States has no official representation or voting power because it has not ratified the treaty. 20 Examples of significant political commitments include the Shanghai Communiqué, which established a new relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the United States during the Nixon administration; the Helsinki Accords, which established a forum for human rights and other disputes that was the precursor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and several recent climate change accords, including the 2008 Group of Eight Declaration on the Environment and Climate Change and the 2014 US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change.

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 169 21 The other five signatories include China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. For further background and technical issues on the Iranian Nuclear Agreement, see Katzman and Kerr (2016). 22 For the text of the letter, see www.bbhub.io/assets/sites/2/150309-Cotton-OpenLetter-to-Iranian-Leaders.pdf. 23 Duncan Hollis laid out the various options for completing the Iran agreement here: http://opiniojuris.org/2015/03/11/dealing-with-iran-a-primer-on-the-pres idents-options-for-a-nuclear-agreement/. 24 The distinction between a binding executive agreement and a nonbinding political agreement is important but often quite confusing, especially when the administration does not clearly state the form the eventual agreement will take. At the time, and then again in July after the agreement was signed, there was still dispute on whether the agreement was legally binding (i.e., an executive agreement) or not. See, for example, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/can-the-next-president-repudiateobamas-iran-agreement/404587/ and http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-origi nalism-blog/2015/09/did-congress-approve-the-iran-dealmichael-ramsey.html. 25 For a letter outlining administration objections to the original Corker bill, see http:// images.politico.com/global/2015/03/15/mcdonoughletter.html. 26 It also led some observers to incorrectly conclude that the review act provided legal authority for the president to complete an ex ante congressional-executive agreement that was legally binding. For example, see www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/ can-the-next-president-repudiate-obamas-iran-agreement/404587/. 27 For example, there was an exchange of letters between Representative Mike Pompeo (R-KS) and the State Department, indicating the degree to which members of Congress were confused as to the nature of the agreement (see www.lawfareblog.com/ state-department-affirms-iran-deal-only-political-commitment). 28 One should also keep in mind that US sanctions typically targeted firms that engaged in trade with Iran, so reinstating the sanctions without justification would be politically costly, as it would harm firms in Europe, Russia, China, and elsewhere. 29 Of course, proponents of further sanctions in Iran could just point to the charge that Iran is violating 2231 with its continued ballistic missile tests (see www.iranwatch.org/ our-publications/policy-briefs/quietly-un-signals-violation-iran-new-resolution). 30 The agreement also commits a future president to submitting a request for Congress to permanently lift all suspended sanctions (i.e., those suspended by Obama) within eight years, or by 2023 (see Katzman and Kerr 2016). Such a commitment, of course, is not legally binding on future presidents. This contradiction further weakens the legitimacy of the agreement.

References Ackerman, Bruce A., and David Golove. 1995. Is NAFTA Constitutional? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bellinger, John B. 2012. “Obama’s Weakness on Treaties.” New York Times, December 18. Conrad, Courtenay R., and Emily Ritter. 2017. “A Trump Moratorium on International Treaties Could Roll Back Human Rights—Here at Home.” Monkey Cage Blog, Washington Post, March 1. Crenson, Matthew, and Benjamin Ginsberg. 2007. Presidential Power: Unchecked & Unbalanced. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. DeYoung, Karen, and Philip Rucker. 2017. “Trump Lays Groundwork to Change U.S. Role in the World.” Washington Post, January 26. Fisher, Louis. 2001. “Historical Background and Growth in International Agreements.” Chapter 2 in Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate. Congressional Research Service Report.Washington, DC: Library of Congress.

170  Chapter 8 Fleming, Denna Frank. 1930. Treaty Veto of the Senate. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Goldsmith, Jack. 2016. “The Contributions of the Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law.” Harvard International Law Journal 57(2): 1–19. Hathaway, Oona A. 2008. “Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States.” The Yale Law Journal 117(7): 1236–372. Hathaway, Oona A. 2009. “Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance.” Yale Law Journal 140: 210–12. Hollis, Duncan B., and Joshua J. Newcomer. 2009. “‘Political’ Commitments and the Constitution.” Virginia Journal of International Law 49(3): 507–84. Holt, W. Stull. 1933. Treaties Defeated in the Senate. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Homan, Patrick. 2016. Getting to 67:The Post-Cold War Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification. New York: Routledge. Howell, William G. 2003. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Howell, William G., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2007. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Johnson, Loch K. 1984. The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive. New York: New York University Press. Johnson, Robert David. 2006. Congress and the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jones, Christopher M., and Kevin P. Marsh. 2014. “The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.” The Nonproliferation Review 21(2): 207–27. Katzman, Kenneth, and Paul K. Kerr. 2016. Iran Nuclear Agreement. CRS Report, R43333. Kaufman, Natalie Hevener. 1990. Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. Kaye, David. 2013. “Stealth Multilateralism.” Foreign Affairs 92(5): 113–24. Kelley, Judith, and Jon Pevehouse. 2015. “An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior.” International Studies Quarterly 59(3): 531–43. Krutz, Glen S., and Jeffrey S. Peake. 2006. “The Changing Nature of Presidential Policy Making on International Agreements.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36(September): 391–409. Krutz, Glen S., and Jeffrey S. Peake. 2009. Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitments in a System of Shared Powers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lantis, Jeffrey S. 2009. The Life and Death of International Treaties. New York: Oxford University Press. Lindsay, James M. 1994. Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. 2012. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books. Martin, Lisa L. 2000. Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Martin, Lisa L. 2005. “The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (September): 440–465. Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Obama, Unilateral Diplomacy, and Iran 171 Peake, Jeffrey S. 2015. “Executive Agreements as a Foreign Policy Tool During the Bush and Obama Administrations.” Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2594414 Peake, Jeffrey S. 2016. “The Domestic Politics of U.S. Treaty Ratification: Bilateral Treaties From 1949–2012.” Foreign Policy Analysis. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1111/fpa.12086/full. Peake, Jeffrey S., and Glen S. Krutz. 2014. “President Barack Obama, Partisanship, and the Politics of International Agreements.” 2014 Annuaire Francais des Relations. For English version: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587806 Peake, Jeffrey S., Glen S. Krutz, and Tyler Hughes. 2012. “President Obama, the Senate and the Polarized Politics of Treaty-Making.” Social Science Quarterly 93(5): 1295–315. Prins, Brandon C., and Bryan W. Marshall. 2009. “Senate Influence or Presidential Unilateralism? An Examination of Treaties and Executive Agreements From Theodore Roosevelt and George W. Bush.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(2): 191–208. Raju, Manu, and Burgess Everett. 2015. “How Corker and Cardin Clinched the Iran Deal.” Politico, April 14. politico.com/story/2015/04/ben-cardin-bob-corker-irandeal-116979. Accessed August 11, 2017. Roberts, Dan. 2015. “John Kerry Warns Congress: Back Iran Deal or Face Dire Consequences.” The Guardian, July 28. www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/johnkerry-iran-nuclear-deal-congress-hearing. Accessed August 11, 2017. Spiro, Peter J. 2001. “Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method.” Texas Law Review 79(April): 961–1035. Trubowitz, Peter, and Nicole Mellow. 2011. “Foreign Policy, Bipartisanship, and the Paradox of Post-September 11 America.” International Politics 48: 164–87. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 2001. “Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of United States Senate.” 106 Congress, Committee Print. Welsh, Teresa. 2015. “Corker to Kerry: ‘You’ve Fleeced’ on Iran Deal.” US News & World Report, July 23. www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/23/corker-to-kerry-youvebeen-fleeced-on-iran-deal. Accessed August 11, 2017.

9 US–Russian Relations During the Obama Presidency From Reset to a New Cold War? M. Leann Brown Much has been made of the Barack Obama administration’s “reset”1 of relations with Russia in 2009 as an example of a desire to distinguish itself from the previous administration’s unilateralism and devaluing of diplomacy as an instrument in dealing with the rest of the world. In his inaugural address, Obama indicated a willingness to “to extend . . . a hand if [others are] willing to unclench [their] fist,” even to “rogue” states like Iran and North Korea. And, during the administration’s first term, it regarded Russian cooperation with US military efforts in Afghanistan, the signing of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010, Russian cooperation in imposing new UN economic sanctions against Iran in August 2012, and Russia’s accession to World Trade Organization membership in 2012 as indicators of a successful reset of relations (Indyk et al. 2012; Nichol 2014). However, with Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, relations deteriorated fairly quickly, and with Russian involvement in Ukraine (including the annexation of Crimea), Russia’s military intervention in Syria in support of the Bashar al-Assad regime, and other confrontational activities, there was concern that US–Russian relations had entered a new Cold War. As a matter of fact, in a speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in February 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev described relations between Russia and the West as “a new Cold War” (Sanchez et al. 2016). Given the profound differences in the political histories and systems of the two states, the legacy of the Cold War, and Russia’s dissatisfaction with its reduced status in world affairs, it is hardly surprising that the United States and Russia have different foreign policy interests and priorities. From the outset, the Obama administration was interested in reducing the quantity and proliferation of nuclear weapons, including preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dealing with global terror, and winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia was determined to stabilize its economy, including sustaining oil exports; to protect its frontiers and what it regarded as its “near abroad”2 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which involved impeding the further deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assets in Eastern Europe; to fight terrorism; and to regain great power status.

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As US–Russian relations became increasingly strained, Russia came to identify the United States as its primary “threat,” while the Obama administration sought to constrain and punish Russian military adventurism but regarded Russia as a lesser concern than the former Soviet Union had been. In the often-quoted 2016 Atlantic article, Obama explained: Unlike China, [Russia has] demographic problems, economic structural problems, that would require not only vision but a generation to overcome.The path that Putin is taking is not going to help them overcome these challenges. But in that environment, the temptation to project military force to show greatness is strong, and that’s what Putin’s inclination is. So I don’t underestimate the dangers there. (Goldberg 2016, 89) Taking into account these divergences in interests and objectives, it might be expected that over the course of the Obama administration, there have been areas of cooperation, conflict, and irritation between the two states. This chapter explores these areas of cooperation (nuclear relations, including a new arms control agreement and dealings with Iran, global terrorism, and Afghanistan) and conflict (NATO–Russian relations, the wars in Ukraine and Syria, and Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential election). The Conclusion considers areas of irritation in the relationship (including human rights, child adoption policies, and the Edward Snowden affair) and what this record portends for the new Donald Trump administration. The evidence confirms that while there were areas of cooperation early in the relationship, bilateral interactions deteriorated precipitously during Obama’s second term. US–Russian relations are among the most troublesome aspects of Obama’s foreign policy legacy, alongside the challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the rise of China, and the Syrian Civil War.

Areas of Cooperation In 2009, as part of the reset, Obama and then-President Medvedev established the US–Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) to facilitate cooperation on a range of issues: nuclear arms reductions and nuclear safety, counterterrorism, joint military exercises, countering illicit narcotics, energy security, and business development, among others. The BPC’s 21 working groups conducted hundreds of meetings until activities were suspended in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014.3 Four strategic areas of cooperation stand out even as US–Russian relations deteriorated: limiting the quantity and proliferation of nuclear weapons, cooperating to preclude Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons, cooperation in combating terrorism, and the Afghan conflict. In a speech in Prague delivered on April 5, 2009, President Obama designated nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation as important objectives of

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his administration. He pledged to pursue a rules-based system in which the world would “stand together to prevent these weapons” and “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The speech outlined a four-pronged strategy for disarmament: reduce the role nuclear weapons play in US national security, negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, achieve a global ban on nuclear testing and the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).4 The administration committed to a doctrine of “no first use” toward states that would forswear development of nuclear weapons. In March 2010, it signed a New START Treaty with Russia, and in April 2010, it convened the first of four Nuclear Safety Summits (Indyk et al. 2012) to promote its anti-nuclear weapons agenda.5 For its part, Russia indicated a willingness to reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal on a bilateral basis with the United States and in multilateral fora if its strategic stability was assured. It expressed readiness to participate with other states to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems as well as associated materials and technologies. Russia and the United States are signatories to the NPT, the Nuclear Supplier Group Agreement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The 2010 New START Treaty provided for modest reductions in strategic nuclear assets. Agreed aggregate limits on the various systems are as follows: • 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments • 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each heavy bomber is counted as one warhead) • 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments Verification measures under the treaty include on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notifications regarding strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty does not constrain testing, development, or deployment of current or planned missile defense programs or long-range conventional strike capabilities (US Department of State 2017). As the Obama administration came to an end, both the United States and Russia were pursuing new generations of smaller, less destructive, and more precise and stealthy nuclear weapons. The concern is that the precision and less destructive nature of these new weapons increase the temptation to use them. The United States is expected to spend an estimated $1 trillion over the next three decades revitalizing its nuclear program with five planned

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classes of improved nuclear arms and delivery systems. Russia has expressed intent to deploy large missiles topped with miniature warheads that may violate global agreements. The Russian navy is also developing an undersea drone designed to launch a radioactive cloud from an underwater explosion that would make target cities uninhabitable (Broad and Sanger 2016). American officials blame Russia and, more specifically, Putin for the failure to build upon the New START Treaty. Others blame the United States for proceeding with its nuclear modernization program in the name of improving safety and reliability (Mount 2015). At his final Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, Obama acknowledged the potential for “ramping up new and more deadly and more effective systems that end up leading to a whole new escalation of the arms race.” In 2016, the director of national intelligence told the Senate Armed Services Committee as part of his annual global threat assessment, “We could be into another Cold War-like spiral” (Broad and Sanger 2016). A related area of US–Russian cooperation was the effort to preclude Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran is a signatory to the NPT, but in November 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had repeatedly failed to meet its obligations, including failing to declare its uranium enrichment program. In December 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1737 imposed sanctions against Iran. The resolution called for compliance with IAEA requirements; banned trade with Iran of all materials, equipment, and technology that could contribute to a uranium enrichment program; and froze the financial assets of specific individuals and entities. The United States regards a nuclear weapon–armed Iran as totally unacceptable in that it could threaten Israel, including providing a shield for Hezbollah and Hamas to escalate attacks; coerce its Arab neighbors on regional issues and oil prices; exacerbate Islamic fundamentalism; and foster nuclear proliferation across the Middle East (Nasr 2013). At the April 2010 signing of the New START Treaty, Obama said that the United States and Russia were part of a coalition of states demanding that Iran face consequences for failing to fulfill its obligations under the NPT, and that “we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security.”6 Russia’s interests toward Iran are multiple and complex. It has always regarded relations with Iran as an important aspect of its foreign policy. Russia wishes to reduce the United States’ and Western influence and raise its own status in global and Middle Eastern affairs. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia was a member of the P5 + 1 (the Council plus Germany) tasked with negotiating with Iran to bring it into compliance with its NPT obligations. Participation in the P5 + 1 negotiations confirmed Russia’s position as a great power in world affairs. Russia acknowledged that Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons could damage the nonproliferation regime, trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and potentially invite further US military action in the Middle East. Although Moscow did not wish

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Tehran to develop nuclear weapons, it felt less threatened by Iran’s activities than did the Western states. Russia also benefits from significant weapons and nuclear technology sales to Iran.7 Aside from Syria, Iran remains one of Russia’s few remaining allies in the Middle East (Borshchevskaya 2015). Anna Borshchevskaya (2015) contended that, although Iranian officials regarded Russia as their closest ally in the talks and, in general, Moscow sought to minimize tough sanctions on Iran, US officials generally regarded Russia’s role in the negotiations as more helpful than obstructionist. Moscow largely fulfilled its commitment to enforce international sanctions against Iran. In June 2010, Russia (along with China) voted in favor of Security Council Resolution 1929, which expressed concern over Iran’s noncompliance with previous resolutions; expanded and reinforced sanctions, including restrictions on arms, finance, shipping, and other “proliferation-sensitive activities”; and called upon all states to take measures to prevent the transfer of weapons systems to Iran (Indyk et al. 2012, 14). Yet, Russia convinced the United Nations to temper the sanctions and extracted an important concession—the lifting of US sanctions against Russian firms that had previously transferred sensitive technology to Iran, which would technically allow Moscow to sell antiaircraft batteries to Tehran. Russia did agree, however, to cancel or suspend several arms contracts with Iran, including canceling an $800 million contract for S-300 antiaircraft missiles—a system that could threaten American or Israeli aircraft in the event of a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities (Borshchevskaya 2015). In July 2015, Iran and the P5 + 1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (  JCPOA), wherein Iran committed to relinquish efforts to create nuclear weapons in exchange for the removal of economic sanctions. Among the criticisms leveled at the United States’ Iranian policy is that it paid too high a price for Russian cooperation in dealing with Iran. The Obama administration reduced its commentary regarding democracy and human rights in Russia until 2012, when Russians took to the streets protesting Putin’s electoral victory. The administration also halted missile defense planned for Eastern Europe and NATO eastward expansion and relaxed some restrictions on US arms sales to Russia (Nasr 2013). Other critics, including Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, argued that rather than preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons, the JCPOA provides a legal path for it to do so. While Iran has continued troublesome behaviors like testing ballistic missiles, it has reduced its uranium and heavy-water stockpiles and poured cement into its reactors near Arak. It has also allowed unprecedented monitoring by the IAEA. In December 2015, the IAEA certified that Iran had fulfilled its responsibilities under the bargain (von Hein 2016). In a letter released in July 2016, 75 US scientists, generals, former ambassadors, and members of Congress wrote, “As a result of the JCPOA, all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon have been blocked, thereby providing greater security to our friends and partners in the region and to the world” (Morello 2016). Supporters regard the agreement as victories

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for Obama’s support for the nonproliferation regime, his approach to dealing with recalcitrant actors, the effectiveness of sanctions and diplomatic approaches in general to problem solving, and an important foreign policy legacy for his administration. Another clear-cut area where cooperation was obtained between the United States and Russia has been in addressing global terror. At a US–Russia summit in June 2000, then-Presidents Bill Clinton and Putin created a Working Group on Afghanistan to coordinate efforts to address Taliban and other terror groups’ activities worldwide. Since the terror attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001, the United States has waged a “war on terror,” and under that banner has undertaken large-scale military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia has waged an anti-terrorism campaign for years against the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (al Qaeda’s affiliate in Chechnya and Dagestan) and is concerned about radicalization of its large and growing Muslim population.8 Russia has used the need to ameliorate terrorism to justify its continuing dominant role in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, including integrating the security policy of the now 10 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Akerman 2002). Russia viewed the 9/11 attacks as an opportunity to pursue common interests with the United States on an equal footing. Putin was the first world leader to condemn the attacks, pointing out that as a victim of terrorism, Russia well understood the US tragedy.9 In a televised speech on September 24, 2001, Putin announced that Russia would work closely with NATO and the United Nations to construct a new strategic framework for addressing terrorism. It would share intelligence, open its airspace for humanitarian missions, cooperate in joint search and rescue missions, and provide arms to the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban. In 2002, the Working Group on Afghanistan was renamed the Working Group on Counterterrorism. In September of that year, a US–Russia Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Cooperation and Counter-Narcotics was signed, agreeing to provide training and other support to combat terrorism and terrorist financing. In 2009, the Working Group on Counterterrorism was included in the US–Russia BPC (Nichol 2014). Immediately after a January 2011 bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport, Obama telephoned Medvedev to propose greater cooperation in combating terrorism. At a summit in May, the two leaders agreed to enhance airport security and to explore ways to improve in-air security, including the deployment of air marshals and use of high explosive detectors. They announced that their governments had signed a memorandum increasing reciprocal security assessments at airports and the exchange of information on threats to civil aviation. At the end of May, the United States designated the Caucasus Emirate a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group and included its leader in its Rewards for Justice Program, offering a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to his whereabouts. At a June 2013 summit, the United States and Russia pledged greater cooperation, including

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the exchange of intelligence and the conduct of coordinated operations. They also agreed to “interact” to provide security for the Sochi Olympic Games (Nichol 2014, 28). Under the auspices of the BPC, the US and Russia discussed cooperation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (a multilateral consultative group formed in 2011) to counter terrorist threats to the tourism industry and coordinate terrorist designations as well as preparations for the Sochi Olympics. Additional BPC activities included joint military exercises, collaboration on nuclear and transportation safety, and financial monitoring. The two countries also cooperated in the annual Four-Party Counterterrorism Working Group, which includes the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency and the Russian Federal Security and Foreign Intelligence Services. Russia was also a member of the NATO–Russia Council’s Counterterrorism Working Group. However, in late 2012, Russia informed the United States that it was abrogating the US–Russia Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Cooperation, on the grounds that it no longer needed the assistance provided under the agreement. In April 2013, in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings carried out by two ethnic Chechen brothers who had immigrated to the United States, Obama and Putin agreed to further enhance counterterrorism cooperation (Nichol 2014). It was reported in April 2016 that counterterrorism operational cooperation continued even after Russian–Western relations soured over Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea (Schreck 2014). There has been no more important area of US–Russian cooperation than the efforts to secure nuclear materials from terrorists and other nefarious actors. Al Qaeda and North Caucasus terrorist groups have sought to acquire nuclear weapons. A technically sophisticated enemy could manufacture, deliver, and detonate a crude nuclear bomb if it has access to sufficient fissile material (Belfer Center . . . 2011, 5). Beginning with the 1991 Nunn–Lugar Act, the United States has provided approximately $2 billion in funding and expertise to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, technology, scientists, and facilities in Russia and other states falling into unauthorized hands. US–Russian cooperation has expanded over the years to include destroying hundreds of weapons and nuclear-powered submarines, providing security equipment at Russian facilities, training security personnel, paying workers’ salaries, and setting up detection systems at key border crossings across Asia and the Middle East. Between 2009 and 2014, the United States removed 5,060 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU; this amount is sufficient to produce more than 200 atomic bombs) in 12 countries and handed over the material to Russia for disposal in seven: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, and Vietnam (Bender 2014). A report published by the Harvard Kennedy School (Belfer Center . . . 2011) lists the following bilateral cooperative efforts: • Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program • Cooperative nuclear security and accounting upgrades, including the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative

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•

Efforts to convert HEU-fueled research reactors and remove their HEU, including the Global Threat Reduction Initiative • US–Russia HEU Purchase Agreement • US–Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement • US–Russia Strategic Framework Declaration • US–Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation/123 Agreement • US–Russia Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security • US–Russian Working Group on Foreign Policy and Fighting Terrorism • US–Russian Working Group on Arms Control and International Security Despite the manifest shared US–Russian interests in securing nuclear materials, even this essential area of cooperation deteriorated in the final years of the Obama presidency. In response to growing tensions over Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, on December 16, 2014, the Russians informed the Americans that they were refusing further help protecting their largest stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium from being stolen or sold on the black market. US Department of Energy officials warned that the consequences of the decline in US–Russian cooperation on nuclear safety “could be catastrophic” (Bender 2014). At the time, the two states were discussing removing more weapons material from Belarus, Poland, and Uzbekistan and continuing to upgrade security in Russia’s own nuclear facilities. A limited amount of cooperation will continue in third countries that have HEU that originated in Russia, and the two sides also will continue working to secure industrial sources of radioactive material, which could be used to make a “dirty bomb.”The Russian decision will not affect inspections that both sides conduct of each other’s active nuclear arsenals as part of arms control treaties (Bender 2015). Despite the fact that the United States and Russia have the world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material and more experience in securing these stocks than any other countries in the world, and thus they bear a special responsibility for nuclear security, the shared interests and responsibilities associated with combating terrorism and particularly the dangers of nuclear terrorism have been insufficient to offset Russia’s interest in controlling its “near abroad” (specifically Ukraine), its outrage at the economic consequences of US and Western sanctions in the context of a decline in global oil prices, and its determination to demonstrate its great power status (Belfer Center . . . 2011). Russian–US shared interests to combat global terrorism, including nuclear terrorism and addressing the drug trade, also translated into cooperation in the Afghanistan conflict. Afghanistan has long been a Russian concern due to its instability and proximity to its Central Asian allies, and Russia’s declining population concerns are increasingly exacerbated by drug and AIDS epidemics.10 The Afghan crisis also provided Russia the opportunity to emphasize its role in the global fight against terror and legitimize its campaign in Chechnya (Akerman 2002).

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In June 2012, the US State Department recognized that “our two countries have developed excellent cooperation . . . to make Afghanistan a peaceful, stable, and economically self-sustaining country, free of terrorism and illegal narcotics.” Bilaterally and through NATO, Russia and its Central Asian allies supported ground and air transit into and out of Afghanistan in the Northern Distribution Network.11 In the decade after the 9/11 attacks, more than 2,200 flights, more than 379,000 military personnel, and more than 45,000 containers of cargo were transported across Russia to support operations in Afghanistan (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 2012). The United States and Russia have cooperated in counter-narcotics and other law enforcement activities, including supporting a comprehensive approach to reduce narcotics production by undermining terrorist networks’ access to financial resources, offering farmers alternatives to poppy cultivation, and assisting Afghan-led counter-narcotics and other law enforcement efforts. In October 2010, Russian troops joined US soldiers in drug raids on four Afghan labs, an operation that destroyed nearly a ton of heroin (FerrisRotman 2011). In May 2011, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Nikolay Makarov and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen signed a memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism cooperation (Nichol 2014). The NATO–Russia Council counter-narcotics program trained more than 2,000 law enforcement officers from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia between 2006 and 2012. Russia, NATO, and the United States also established the Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to support Afghan’s fleet of Russian-built Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters. By April 2013, 30 Afghan helicopter technicians had completed a 90-day technical and practical course at the Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant in Russia to provide Afghan forces with aircraft to allow them to assume greater responsibility for their own security (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 2012).12 Although some areas of anti-terrorism cooperation continued after the 2014 Ukraine intervention, US–Russian cooperation in anti-drug efforts fell victim to this conflict.Viktor Ivanov, chief of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service and cochair of the working group countering the illegal drug trade of the BPC, was among the persons close to Putin sanctioned after the Ukraine intervention.

Areas of Conflict As discussed previously, even as shared interests yielded areas of cooperation between Russia and the United States, incompatible interests obtained from the outset of the Obama administration in several areas, including NATO expansion and missile defense. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, and then in September 2015 intervened militarily in Syria in support of the Assad regime. By the end of the Obama administration, tensions were high in these areas, and Russian and US military assets had

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risky encounters in the air and sea along the frontiers separating NATO members and Russia. In the final days of the administration, US officials also concluded that Russia had engaged in cyber hacking to influence the US presidential election, and Obama deported 35 Russian diplomats and intelligence operatives and imposed other sanctions as punishment for these actions (Sanger 2016). Unsurprisingly, given the legacy of the Cold War, NATO–Russian relations over the past two decades have ranged from “open constructive interaction” to talk of a new Cold War. The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by Putin) stated that, from Russia’s point of view, the level of cooperation depends on nonuse or threat of force and nondeployment of conventional armed forces, nuclear weapons, and their delivery vehicles in the territories of NATO’s new East European members. The Concept (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013) specifically stated, Russia maintains a negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion and to the approaching of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders in general as actions that violate the principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. Putin and many conservatives within the Russian government have asserted that the country’s military security requires a line of defense along the borders of the former Soviet Union (the “near abroad”) and even “neutral” Central Europe (Library of Congress, 2016). They contended that great powers are entitled to a sphere of influence comparable to that of the United States articulated in the Monroe Doctrine (Menon 2016). Stephen Cohen (2012) opined that NATO’s expansion13 has institutionalized geopolitical and potential military conflict, and NATO membership for Georgia or Ukraine would cross Moscow’s “red lines.” At the outset of his administration, President Obama downplayed prospects for Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO and scaled back missile defense for the Czech Republic and Poland planned by the previous Bush administration to secure Russian cooperation in dealing with Afghanistan and Iran (Deuck 2015). After the Russian incursion in Ukraine, the US Defense Department’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (US Department of Defense 2014, 6) stated that the United States is willing to undertake security cooperation with Russia, both in the bilateral context and in seeking solutions to regional challenges, when our interests align, including Syria, Iran, and post2014 Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia’s multi-dimensional defense modernization and actions that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors present risks.We will engage Russia to increase transparency and reduce the risk of military miscalculation.

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With regard to the US military presence in Europe, the QDR stated that “we will continue to work to achieve a Europe that is peaceful and prosperous, and we will engage Russia constructively in support of that objective” (35). General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, provided a less optimistic assessment on March 23, 2014, when he stated that “Russia is acting much more like an adversary than a partner” (Nichol 2014, 33). In April 2014, NATO–Russia Council meetings were suspended for two years after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea and the West’s response with economic sanctions, although ambassadorlevel meetings continued. At the resumption of Council meetings in April 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that there would be “no return to practical cooperation” between NATO and Moscow “until Russia returns to the respect of international law.” He continued, “NATO and Russia have profound and persistent disagreements” (Sanders 2016). East European NATO members, particularly Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, have demanded more assurances from the alliance against possible Russian aggression. The US Defense Department announced that it would increase troop numbers and prepositioning equipment in Europe for contingency operations as a step toward “reassuring our NATO allies and partners in the wake of an aggressive Russia in Eastern Europe and elsewhere” (Clark 2016). NATO plans to deploy four combat battalions of approximately 1,000 troops each in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The Obama administration proposed a $3.4 billion European Reassurance Initiative to increase US participation in military training and exercises, to deploy more military planners, and to conduct more regular air and naval deployments in and around the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. In May 2016, a senior US defense official was quoted as saying, “We’re moving from assurance to deterrence . . . moving from assurance to war-fighting posture” (Shinkman 2016). Russia responded to proposed US/NATO enhancements in Eastern Europe by announcing in January 2016 that it would create three new military divisions (likely motorized rifle divisions of approximately 10,000 soldiers each) and bring five new strategic nuclear missile regiments into service (Solovyov and Kelly 2016). Russia’s ambassador to NATO told the press in April 2016, “We are facing NATO military build-up which is completely unjustified. NATO is deploying military assets near Russian borders” (  James 2016). An associated area of Russian–US conflict is the area of missile defense. The US and NATO claim the right to deploy missile defense systems to protect against attacks by “rogue” states like Iran or terrorist groups. Deuck stated that Russia “object[s] to virtually any existing US missile defense plans whatsoever” (2015, 71) on the grounds that missile defense would undermine its second-strike capability. As was noted, acknowledging Russian concerns about missile defense, the Obama administration initially withdrew plans for deploying missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland planned by the

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Bush administration to secure Russian cooperation in dealing with Afghanistan and Iran (Indyk et al. 2012; Deuck 2015). After the Russian incursion into Ukraine, however, the United States enhanced its contribution to European missile defense in the European Phased Adaptation Approach, including deploying missile defense radar in Turkey, Aegis naval destroyers in Rota, Spain, and planning two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland (The White House 2014). The Romanian site at Deveselu Air Base “went live” on May 5, 2016, and the Polish site broke ground several days thereafter (Erlanger 2016). The Russians responded in kind. In July 2016, the Russian defense minister said, “Since 2013 . . . we have formed four divisions, nine brigades and 22 regiments.They include two missile brigades armed with Iskander missile complexes, which has allowed [us] to boost fire power to destroy the potential adversary.” (Reuters 2016). At the opening ceremony for the Romanian missile site, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said that the missile defense site in no way undermines or weakens Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. This site in Romania, as well as the one in Poland, are not directed against Russia. The interceptors are too few, and located too far south or too close to Russia, to be able to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The interceptors were designed “instead to tackle the potential threat posed by short- and medium-range attacks from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.” (Mutler 2016). A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “We still view the destructive actions of the United States and its allies in the area of missile defense as a direct threat to global and regional security.” Putin regards NATO as encircling Russia to limit its influence. He has argued that Russia is the only possible target for NATO’s missile defense, given that Iran has agreed to limit its nuclear program (Erlanger 2016). Both Russia and the United States argue that their opposites’ missile defense program violates the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The military buildup in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea areas has heightened NATO/US–Russian tensions and contributed to risky encounters between military assets in these areas. A sharp worsening of US–Russian relations during the Obama administration came in 2014 with the Russian military incursion into Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in February and March, respectively. Russian behavior toward Ukraine reflects its determination to retain influence over the former Soviet republics. It rewards, bargains, harasses, bullies, and occasionally invades the former Soviet republics to retain control (Blank 2008). The precipitating event for this crisis was Ukraine’s intent to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, which included creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

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Russia also claims special interest in Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine. Multiple paragraphs in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept made clear Russia’s intent to protect and support the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad and to expand and strengthen “the space of Russian language and culture” (para. 39(d)). Although at the time of the incursion, Putin claimed that no Russian troops were active in Ukraine and Crimea but only “local forces of self-defence” (Reuters 2014a), on April 18, 2014, in a televised call-in show, he stated, “We had to take unavoidable steps so that events did not develop as they are currently developing in southeast Ukraine. Of course our troops stood behind Crimea’s self-defence forces” (Reuters 2014a). In his annual state of the union address to the parliament on December 4, 2014, Putin stated that the annexation of Crimea was a “historic reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia” that would not be reversed because, “for Russia, Crimea . . . has a great civilizational and sacred meaning (Reuters 2014b). The United States has an interest in preserving the territorial integrity of all sovereign states, in supporting the independence of East European states, and thus in containing Russian revanchism. In response to the intervention into Ukraine, the United States froze the assets of individuals and entities close to Russia’s political leadership, restricted transactions with firms operating in key sectors of the Russian economy (finance, energy, and defense), and limited oil-related exports to Russia. The European Union and several other countries followed suit. Russia retaliated against the sanctions by banning imports of certain agricultural products from sanctioning countries for one year (Nelson 2015). World resolve to punish Russian actions in Ukraine hardened significantly when, on July 17, 2014, the Donbass People’s Militia in eastern Ukraine shot down a commercial airliner, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, with a Russianmade Buk surface-to-air 9M38-series missile with a 9N314M warhead (Dutch Safety Board 2015). The aircraft had departed Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam en route to Kuala Lumpur with 298 passengers onboard. Russian economic growth suffered a significant setback due to the sanctions and a concurrent fall in world oil prices. The International Monetary Fund estimated that approximately 50 percent of the decline in GDP in 2015 was due to sanctions and Russia’s ban on imports in response.The Ukraine crisis created the most dangerous tensions between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War (Winter 2016). Russian military activities beyond its borders continued with its unexpected intervention into the four-year-old Syrian Civil War in September 2015. US and Russian involvement in the Syrian Civil War is an important area of interaction that confirms the countries’ diverse interests and their complicated mixture of conflict and occasional cooperation. Although both countries are interested in defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)14 as part of their war on global terror, Obama opined that President Assad of Syria should step aside in that he no longer was regarded as

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legitimate by his people. However, although the Obama administration built a coalition to support “moderate” opposition groups,15 it declined to intervene militarily on a large scale. Russia supports the Assad regime and intervened militarily in September 2015 when it appeared the regime would fall, reversing the military situation on the ground. As the Obama administration left office, US–Russian relations had deteriorated to the degree that US officials labeled Russian actions in Syria as “barbarism” and war crimes, and US Secretary of State John Kerry occasionally broke off negotiations with the Russians. Some label US and Russian military actions in Syria as one among several proxy wars in the Middle East being waged to the detriment of the Syrian people. The United States remains militarily involved in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide, addressing the challenge of terrorism. At the outset of the Syrian conflict, the Obama administration also operated on the assumption that a nuclear crisis with Iran could erupt at any time (Borger 2012). Further, the Obama administration always sought to act on a fairly narrow definition of what constitutes US security interests.16 Obama criticized the Assad regime’s violence against demonstrators, and when it was revealed that it had crossed a “red line” by employing chemical weapons against it citizens in August 2013, the president opined that the Assad regime must go. When a new challenge to world peace emerged in the form of ISIL, the United States began a bombing campaign against ISIL and introduced special operations forces to support anti-ISIL and anti-regime efforts. Soviet/Russian–Syrian relations may be traced back to the 1950s. Russia has had access to the Syrian port of Tartous, on the Mediterranean, since the 1970s and maintains its largest foreign electronic eavesdropping facility in Latakia. Syria remains among Russia’s few remaining allies in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Russia remains committed to demonstrating its reliability in that partnership. Russia also has strong interests in defeating terrorist networks around the world, including ISIL. As Russia faced widespread condemnation and sanctions in response to its intervention in Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Syria in support of the regime and against ISIL came as somewhat of a surprise to Western policymakers. While US–Russian relations regarding Syria have been marked by significant acrimony, there have been areas of tenuous cooperation. When it was revealed that the Syrian government had used sarin gas in an attack against rebels in a Damascus suburb on August 21, 2013 (which US intelligence sources believe killed an estimated 1,400 civilians), the United States threatened to intervene militarily in the conflict. In response, Russia brokered an accord in September in which Syria agreed to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and ostensibly to destroy its chemical weapons production facilities and surrender its chemical stockpile. On October 31, inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced that Syria had declared 1,290 tons of chemical agents and precursors in 41

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facilities at 23 sites and had destroyed its declared chemical weapons facilities (Morris and Birnbaum 2013). This led to the destruction of a significant quantity of Syria’s most dangerous chemical weapons, including sarin, VX, and sulfur mustard. While these efforts forestalled extensive US military involvement in the conflict in 2013, chlorine gas continued to be used in the civil war, particularly in fighting around Aleppo (Goldman 2016).17 The most significant area of US–Russian conflict in the Syrian Civil War is the fact that, while Russia claims its primary objective is to defeat ISIL, most of its actions, including aerial bombardment, have been against antigovernment forces supported by the United States and its allies.18 At the Munich Security Conference in February 2016, Secretary Kerry charged that Russian military action in Syria had largely been “against legitimate opposition groups” (Sanchez et al. 2016). Having US and Russian military assets conducting operations in such close proximity is dangerous, and the two militaries have collaborated to reduce the likelihood of unplanned confrontation.19 By 2015, the Syrian Civil War increasingly was described as a new Cold War or a proxy war between the two states and other regional powers. Although in February 2016, as was noted earlier, Prime Minister Medvedev described Russia–West relations as a new Cold War, most scholars reject that label on the grounds that ideological differences no longer separate the two sides and US–Russian competition is no longer a global phenomenon. In early October 2015, discussing Russian air strikes against ISIL and non-ISIL forces opposed to Assad, Obama said, “We’re not going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United States and Russia. That would be bad strategy on our part. This is not some superpower chessboard contest.” A fervent critic of Obama’s policy with regard to Syria, US Senator John McCain, responded, “Of course it is [a proxy war],” a result of “an abdication of American leadership.” At the time, McCain concurred with General David Petraeus’s assessment that the United States should “stop the barrel bombing, establish a no-fly zone, arm the Kurds, get some forward air controllers at work there, [and] build up the Free Syrian Army again” (Pengelly 2015). If one conceptualizes “proxy war” as indirect conflict between two states who use external strife to undermine the interests of the other, it is clear that while Russia and the United States share an interest in defeating ISIL, their interests directly collide in their support for and desire to defeat the Assad regime. Although, in the strictest sense, the Syrian conflict isn’t a proxy war, it follows the common pattern of involvement by external powers increasing the duration and intensity of armed conflict. Combatants have fewer incentives to seek diplomatic solutions, and the damage to people’s lives and infrastructure increases. Aleppo fell to Syrian and Russian forces in December 2016.The four years of fighting there claimed an estimated 31,000 lives.20 Critics point out that with large-scale military intervention taken off the table, the Obama administration had little leverage to affect Russian and Syrian behavior, which

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included bombing civilians, medical facilities, and UN aid convoys. The reduced number of policy options with regard to Syria is a negative Obama foreign policy legacy bequeathed to the new administration. Administration critics point out that wicked problems like the Syrian Civil War don’t resolve themselves. Without strong US leadership, they tend to metastasize, yielding outcomes like the creation of ISIL and Russian military opportunism in the Middle East (Goldberg 2016). A final area of conflict between the United States and Russia is the area of cyberwarfare, which includes activities like hacking, misinformation campaigns, state-sponsored political blogs, and interference in the US presidential election. For example, in October 2014, researchers with the Dallas-based firm iSight alleged that Russians were hacking computers being used by the European Union, NATO, Ukraine, and various energy and telecommunications corporations. iSight concluded that the hackers were associated with the Russian government because of language clues in the software code, the choice of targets, and the fact that the hackers were engaged in espionage rather than cybercrime (Finkle 2014). In early October 2016, the Obama administration formally accused the Russian government of stealing and disclosing emails from the Democratic National Committee and other organizations and individuals, charging that the leaked emails were “intended to interfere with the U.S. election process.” In some cases, before being leaked, the documents were edited to include false information. The emails were posted on the WikiLeaks site, DCLeaks.com, and Guccifer 2.0; these last two sites are associated with Russian intelligence (Sanger and Savage 2016). In addition to the deportation of 35 Russian diplomats and spies in Washington and San Francisco, the Obama administration imposed sanctions on Russia’s security services, the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye) and Federal Security Service, four GRU officers, and three firms that supported GRU cyber operations. It also penalized two Russians for stealing more than $100 million from American financial institutions and other entities and for compromising computer networks in at least three e-commerce companies. Some speculate that Obama administration officials moved to charge and punish Russia before leaving office to forestall a weak response from the incoming Trump administration in light of its statements and alleged dealings with the Russian government. At this writing, the FBI and both houses of Congress are investigating dealings between Trump presidential campaign and administration officials and Russia.21

Conclusion The evidence presented here confirms that while US and Russian interests coincide in some areas, fostering cooperation (e.g., reducing the dangers associated with nuclear and chemical weapons, fighting the Taliban and ISIL, combating the drug trade), their interests clash in a larger number of areas (e.g., NATO expansion, missile defense, Ukraine, Syria, cyber matters), such

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that during the Obama administration, the relationship deteriorated from a “reset” to what some regard as a new Cold War. As was noted, one might expect great powers to have divergent interests, but given the legacy of the Cold War, US global interests, Russia’s profound desire to reclaim great power status, and Putin’s cynical opportunism with regard to the former Soviet republics and use of military force, US–Russian relations are among the most troublesome aspects of Obama’s foreign policy legacy bequeathed to the Trump administration. This chapter has discussed major areas of cooperation and conflict between the United States and Russia during the Obama administration, tracing the deterioration of the relationship. However, further indicators of this deterioration are also provided by several areas of irritation that increasingly emerged. During Obama’s administration, the United States occasionally commented on and acted on human rights concerns, such as LGBTQ rights in Russia, to which Russia usually responded that these were domestic matters. In 2012, the US Congress imposed visa and financial sanctions on persons responsible for the detention, abuse, and/or death of Sergei Magnitsky22 and on persons responsible for other gross violations of human rights. In support of this US legislation, a Russian human rights group provided a list of more than 300 individuals it identified as violators of Magnitsky’s and other human rights advocates’ rights. In tit-for-tat fashion, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that some US citizens would be placed on a visa ban list, and other Russian outlets reported that Americans linked to the Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantanamo Bay facilities and involved in prosecuting Russian organized crime figures would be denied visas. In December 2012, in retaliation against the Magnitsky Act, Russia introduced legislation to bar US citizens who allegedly had violated the rights of Russian citizens from entering and investing in Russia and froze their assets in the country. The bill also barred US adoptions of Russian children. The bill was entitled “the Dima Yakovlev Act” in honor of a Russian adoptee who had died in the United States (Nichol 2014, 14–16). Between 2005 and 2012, Congress allocated between $5 million and $9 million per year in humanitarian assistance for Chechnya and the North Caucasus through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), UN agencies, and US and global nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At the end of 2012, Russia banned USAID from operating in Russia, and in February 2013, Putin required Russian authorities to strictly implement laws regarding NGOs receiving foreign funding. The Russian Justice Ministry inspected hundreds of NGOs, including the Moscow offices of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Transparency International, as well as prominent Russian NGOs such as the Moscow Helsinki Group (Nichol 2014). At the end of June 2013, Putin signed a law amending legislation on the protection of children to impose a fine on actors who propagandize “nontraditional sexual relations.” The law also called for arresting and deporting

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foreigners who engage in such activities, raising concerns that LGBTQ individuals and organizations might be banned from attending the upcoming 2014 Sochi Olympics. On July 31, 2013, the US State Department called on Russia to protect the human rights of all people attending or participating in the Olympic Games. Russia responded that all would be welcome to the Games as long as they respected Russia’s laws and recommended that LGBTQ advocates attend to affairs in their own countries. In early July, Putin signed a law banning domestic and foreign adoptions by same-sex couples to prevent adoptees’ “spiritual suffering” (Nichol 2014, 11–12). In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former CIA and National Security Agency employee, revealed thousands of classified documents to the press and was indicted under the US Espionage Act. Russia granted Snowden asylum in early August despite repeated US requests for his extradition. The following month, Obama declined to attend a scheduled summit with Putin in Moscow after a Group of 20 meeting in St. Petersburg (Deuck 2015). A final indicator of the dangerous deterioration of US–Russian relations is the heightened number of incidents of military confrontation between the two countries. For example, on April 12, 2014, a Russian Su-24 made numerous close-range, low-altitude passes near the USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea, an incident labeled a “provocative act” by the Pentagon. And, in mid-April 2016, a Russian military jet again buzzed the USS Donald Cook in international waters in the Baltic Sea, coming within 30 feet in a “simulated attack profile.” A US defense official stated, “This is more aggressive than anything we’ve seen in some time.” At the time, a White House spokesman described the overflights as “entirely inconsistent with the professional norms of militaries operating in proximity to each other in international waters and international airspace.” And on April 23, a Russian fighter “barrel rolled” over a US reconnaissance plane over the Baltic Sea (Agence France Presse 2016). The dangers associated with the two countries’ military assets in close proximity in Ukraine and Syria have already been noted.

Future Challenges Among other objectives, this chapter explicitly seeks to understand the foreign policy legacy the Obama administration bequeaths to its successor— the Trump administration. While this chapter makes clear that the Trump administration inherited abysmal US–Russian relations, at this writing in late April 2017, it is unclear whether continuity will characterize the relationship going forward. Soon after taking office,Trump expressed respect for Putin and equated Putin’s violent behavior toward his political enemies as morally equivalent to the United States “killing people” around the world,23 questioned US commitment to NATO, dismissed US intelligence agencies’ findings that Russia used cyberattacks to influence the US presidential election, and failed to condemn Russian military actions in Ukraine. It is also alleged that Trump’s initial national security advisor, Michael Flynn,

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reassured the Russian ambassador before the inauguration that the Trump administration would dial back Obama administration sanctions imposed to punish Russia for interfering in US elections (Miller et al. 2017).24 At the same time, some members of the new US foreign policy team, such as Secretary of Defense James Mattis and UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, have taken a hardline stance toward Russia (Gaouette and Roth 2017). Whatever the reason or reasons for Trump’s benign attitude toward Putin and Russia or the inconsistency of US policy toward Russia in the early days of the administration, it is clear that the Obama administration’s policies toward Russia will not significantly affect the new administration’s policies. The jury is out regarding whether we are facing a “new reset” in US–Russian relations.

Notes 1 The reset was symbolized in March 2009 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presenting Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov with a red plastic button ostensibly labeled “reset” in Russian. The translation, however, was closer to “overreached” (Deuck 2015, 41). Angela Stent (2014) contended that there have been four US– Russian resets in the post–Cold War era. Recall George W. Bush’s comments during his initial meeting with Vladimir Putin in June 2001: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy.We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country” (see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2001/06/20010618.html). 2 “Near abroad” refers to the 14 former Soviet republics that became independent after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia has attempted to restore bilateral relations and to create new relationships wherever possible with the near abroad and has expressed its determination to employ diplomatic and military means to protect the rights of the more than 25 million ethnic Russians residing there. 3 The United States withdrew from the Commission’s working group on civil society in January 2013 in response to “recent steps taken by the Russian government to impose restrictions on civil society” (Schreck 2014). 4 “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic,” April 5, 2009. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office. Accessed October 22, 2016. 5 Subsequent summits were convened in Seoul in 2012, The Hague in 2014, and in Washington, D.C., in 2016 (see www.nss2016.org). 6 DIPNOTE blog, “New START Treaty and Protocol,” April 8, 2010. http://blogs.state. gov/stories/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol. Accessed July 28, 2016. 7 Between 1991 and 2001, Russian weapons sales to Iran totaled nearly $3 billion (Cohen 2001). Even as the P5 + 1 talks proceeded, the Russian state-run firm Atomstroyexport helped the Iranians complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant, turning over control of the facility in September 2013. And, in November 2015, Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom announced an agreement to build two new reactors in Iran, possibly to be followed by an additional six. Bilateral cooperation has increased and expanded to other sectors in the context of Russia’s standoff with the West over Ukraine (Borshchevskaya 2015). In August 2016, it was revealed that Russian bombers were using the Hamadan air base in Iran to launch air strikes in Syria (Barnard and Kramer 2016). 8 Muslims account for 21 million to 23 million (15 percent) of Russia’s total population of 144 million.

US–Russian Relations 191 9 Stent (2014) labeled Putin’s reaching out to President Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks as the third post–Cold War “reset,” this one initiated by Russia. 10 Russia has one of the world’s most serious heroin problems, with up to 3 million addicts. Drug addiction kills at least 30,000 Russians a year, a third of the world’s total heroin-related deaths. In 2009, Medvedev labeled heroin a threat to national security; 21 percent of heroin produced in Afghanistan (which produces 90 percent of the world’s heroin) finds its way to Russia (Ferris-Rotman 2011). 11 The NDN, established in 2009 in response to the unreliability of sending supplies through Pakistan, includes several routes. The most commonly used, but also one of the longest, begins at the port of Riga on the Baltic Sea and continues south for 3,212 miles using railroads built by the Soviet Union in the 1980s to execute its war in Afghanistan. Supplies then pass through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before reaching Afghanistan’s northern border at Termez. The cost of moving material via the NDN is nearly twice that of the Pakistani route but is significantly less expensive than air transport (Baldauf 2012). 12 See www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/articles/20121130-nrc-10-years-hmtf/. 13 The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004 and Albania and Croatia in 2009. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro have expressed aspirations for NATO membership. 14 ISIL is also known as Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Daesh (its Arabic acronym). 15 Efforts to create an anti-ISIL coalition began in October 2014. In December, US Central Command established Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve to coordinate military efforts against ISIL with personnel from more than 30 countries (for further information, see https://web.archive.org/web/20150 714031347/www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/docs/Inside_the_ coalition_to_defeat_ISIL_3.pdf  ). 16 Obama did not believe that the United States should place military personnel at risk to prevent humanitarian disasters unless opponents posed a direct security risk to the United States. However, neither did he believe that the United States should remain silent in the face of atrocities; instead, Obama believed the United States should exercise moral authority by calling out brutal regimes (Goldberg 2016). 17 Another large-scale use of gas occurred in the Syrian Civil War on April 4, 2017, when at least 86 persons (30 of whom were children) succumbed to a likely sarin attack in the rebel-held city of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib Province. The attack prompted missile strikes on a Syrian air base by the new Trump administration and discussions among Group of 7 foreign ministers regarding imposing additional economic sanctions on Russia and Syria (Winsor 2017). Critics of the Obama administration charged that Syria’s continued use of gas against its population is a legacy of the Obama administration’s failure to intervene forcefully in Syria on the occasion of the 2013 attack. Commenting on the US missile attack in a television interview, Trump said, “What I did should have been done by the Obama administration a long time before I did it, and you would have had a much better—I think Syria would be a lot better off right now than it has been.” However, in 2013, Trump had repeatedly praised Obama for not taking military action; he tweeted, “We should stay the hell out of Syria, the ‘rebels’ are just as bad as the current regime.WHAT WILL WE GET FOR OUR LIVES AND $ BILLIONS? ZERO” (  Johnson 2017). 18 The Syrian opposition, represented by the Syrian National Coalition, receives financial, political, and military support from Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey as well as the United States. Kurdish People’s Protection Units have received support from Iraqi Kurdistan and air support from Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

192  Chapter 9 19 Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian bomber near Latakia in November 2015 highlights the dangers of military brinksmanship and miscommunication by both sides (Winter 2016). 20 Civilians constituted 76 percent of fatalities in Aleppo, among whom 18 percent were children. These estimates are provided by the Violations Documentation Center in Syria, run by opposition activists. The primary sources of information are medical records, families of the victims, and imams who perform burials. In February 2016, the Syrian Center for Policy Research reported that 470,000 lives had been lost in the conflict that began in 2011. An additional 1.88 million have been injured (see www. vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs/1/c29ydGJ5PWEua2lsbGVkX2RhdGV8c29y dGRpcj1ERVNDfGFwcHJvdmVkPXZpc2libGV8ZXh0cmFkaXNwbGF5PTB 8cHJvdmluY2U9NnxzdGFydERhdGU9MjAxMi0wNy0xOXxlbmREYXRlPTI wMTYtMTItMjJ8). 21 Trump’s initial national security advisor (Michael Flynn), his attorney general (  Jeff Sessions), and his campaign manager (Paul Manafort) are among several officials currently being investigated for alleged ties to Russia (Lederman 2017). FBI Director James Comey and a dossier compiled by a former British intelligence operative allege that Carter Page, a national security advisor to the Trump campaign, met senior Russian officials as an emissary of the Trump campaign to discuss quid-pro-quo deals relating to sanctions, business opportunities, and Russia’s interference in the election (Perez et al. 2017). 22 Magnitsky was a Russian lawyer and auditor whose arrest and death in custody triggered inquiries into possible fraud, theft, and human rights violations. At the time of his arrest, Magnitsky represented the investment firm Hermitage Capital Management. 23 In an interview with Fox News on February 5, 2017, Trump said of Putin, “I do respect him. Well, I respect a lot of people, but that doesn’t mean I’m going to get along with them.” When pressed regarding Putin’s alleged ties to extrajudicial killing of journalists and dissidents, Trump said, “[We’ve] got a lot of killers. You think our country’s so innocent?” 24 The motivations for these actions is a mystery at this point. Could it simply be these two narcissistic populists hold mutual admiration for each other’s “strong-man leadership,” or is something more sinister afoot? There is some evidence that the Russians may possess a damning dossier on Trump (Borger 2017).

References Agence France Presse. 2016.“Russian Jets in Repeated ‘Aggressive’ Passes of US Warship,” April 13. Akerman, Ella. 2002. “September 11: Implications for Russia’s Central Asian Policy and Strategic Realignment.” Review of International Affairs 1(3): 1–16. Baldauf, Scott. 2012. “NATO Will Exit Afghanistan as Soviets Did, Through Central Asia.” Christian Science Monitor, June 5. Barnard, Anne, and Andrew E. Kramer. 2016. “Iran Revokes Russia’s Use of Air Base, Saying Moscow ‘Betrayed Trust’.” New York Times, August 22. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies. 2011. The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. Bender, Bryan. 2014. “US-Russia Work on Nuclear Materials in Jeopardy.” Boston Globe, August 3. Bender, Bryan. 2015. “Russia Ends US Nuclear Security Alliance, Accord Worked to Keep Stockpiles Secure.” Boston Globe, January 19.

US–Russian Relations 193 Blank, Stephen. 2008. “What Comes After the Russo—Georgian War? What’s at Stake in the CIS.” American Foreign Policy Interests 30: 379–91. Borger, Julian. 2012. “Russian Military Presence in Syria Poses Challenge to US-Led Intervention.” The Guardian, December 23. Borger, Julian. 2017. “John McCain Passes Dossier Alleging Secret Trump-Russia Contacts to FBI.” The Guardian, January 11. Borshchevskaya, Anna. 2015. “How Russia Views the Iran Nuclear Talks.” PolicyWatch 2383,The Washington Institute, March 12. Broad, William J., and David E. Sanger. 2016. “Race for Latest Class of Nuclear Arms Threatens to Revive Cold War.” New York Times, April 16. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, United States State Department. 2012. “U.S. Russia Cooperation on Afghanistan,” June 18, www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/193096. htm. Accessed October 22, 2016. Clark, Fiona. 2016. “Nasty NATO and Resentful Russia.” Deutsche Welle, April 3. Cohen, Ariel. 2001.“Putin’s Foreign Policy and U.S.–Russian Relations.” Heritage Foun­ dation Backgrounder 1406 on Russia, pp. 1–13. Cohen, Stephen F. 2012. “America’s Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy.” Huffington Post, February 28. Deuck, Colin. 2015. The Obama Doctrine, American Grand Strategy Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dutch Safety Board. 2015. MH17. The Hague. www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phasedocs/1006/debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2017. Erlanger, Steven. 2016. “NATO Ratchets Up Missile Defense Despite Russian Criticism.” New York Times, May 5. Ferris-Rotman, Amie. 2011. “Special Report: In Russia, a Glut of Heroin and Denial.” Reuters, January 25. Finkle, Jim. 2014. “Russian Hackers Target NATO, Ukraine and Others.” Reuters, October 14. “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” February 12, 2013. http:// archive. mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D>. Accessed October 27, 2016. “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” June 28, 2000. http://fas.org/ nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. Accessed February 14, 2016. Gaouette, Nicole, and Richard Roth. 2017. “Ambassador Haley Hits Russia Hard on Ukraine.” CNN, February 3. Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. “The Obama Doctrine, How He’s Shaped the World.” The Atlantic (April): 70–90. Goldman, Russell. 2016. “Syria’s Chemical Weapons Have Been Destroyed. So, Why Do Chlorine Gas Attacks Persist?” New York Times, August 11. Indyk, Martin S., Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon. 2012. Bending History, Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. James, William. 2016. “U.S. Sends F-22 Fighters to Reassure NATO Allies Facing Russia.” Reuters, April 26. Johnson, Jenna. 2017. “In Explaining His Reasons for the Syria Strike,Trump Focuses on Obama.” Washington Post, April 12. Lederman, Josh. 2017. “Key Members of Trump’s Circle Under Scrutiny for Russia Ties.” Associated Press, March 13. Library of Congress. 2016 “The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy,” http://countrystudies.us/russia/77.htm. Accessed February 14, 2016.

194  Chapter 9 Menon, Rajan. 2016. “Putin’s Rational Choices, There Is More to His Strategy Than Western Weakness.” Foreign Affairs, February 29. Miller, Greg, Adam Entous, and Ellen Nakashima. 2017. “National Security Adviser Flynn Discussed Sanctions With Russian Ambassador, Despite Denials, Officials Say.” Washington Post, February 9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2013. Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. February 12. Morello, Carol. 2016. “Assessing the Iran Nuclear Deal One Year After It Was Reached.” Washington Post, July 14. Morris, Loveday, and Michael Birnbaum. 2013. “Syria Has Destroyed Chemical Weapons Facilities, International Inspectors Say.” Washington Post, October 31. Mount, Adam. 2015. “The Real Danger in Nuclear Modernization.” The Diplomat, February 9. Mutler, Alison. 2016. “US Missile Defense Site Opens in Romania, Russia Sees Threat.” Associated Press, May 12. Nasr, Vali. 2013. The Dispensable Nation, American Foreign Policy in Retreat. New York: Anchor Books. Nelson, Rebecca M. 2015. “U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications,” Report 7–5700 (February 4). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Nichol, Jim. 2014. “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests,” Report 7–5700 (March 31). Washington: Congressional Research Service. Pengelly, Martin. 2015. “John McCain Says US Is Engaged in Proxy War With Russia in Syria.” The Guardian, October 4. Perez, Evan, Shimon Prokupecz, and Manu Raju. 2017. “FBI Used Dossier Allegations to Bolster Trump-Russia Investigation.” CNN, April 18. Reuters. 2014a. “Putin: Russian Troops Deployed to Crimea to Support Local Defense Forces,” April 17. Reuters. 2014b. “Putin Delivers Keynote Speech on Economy, Ukraine,” December 4. Reuters. 2016. “Russia Beefs Up Military on Southwestern Flank as NATO Approaches,” July 27. Sanchez, Ray, Nic Robertson, and Don Melvin. 2016. “Russian PM Medvedev Equates Relations With West to a ‘New Cold War’,” CNN, February 15. Sanders, Lewis, IV. 2016. “Stoltenberg: ‘Profound disagreements’ Between NATO and Russia,” Deutsche Welle,  April 20. Sanger, David E. 2016. “Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking.” New York Times, December 29. Sanger, David E., and Charlie Savage. 2016. “U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks to Influence Elections.” New York Times, October 7. Schreck, Carl. 2014. “Freeze Settles on U.S.-Russian Commission Amid Ukraine Standoff,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 28. Shinkman, Paul D. 2016. “U.S., NATO Look to Combat an Aggressive Russia.” U.S. News & World Report, May 2. Solovyov, Dmitry, and Lidia Kelly. 2016. “Russia Warns of Retaliation If NATO Makes More Deployments in E. Europe.” Reuters, May 4. Stent, Angela E. 2014. The Limits of Partnership, U.S. Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. U.S. Department of Defense. 2014. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. archive.defense. gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf/. Accessed August 11, 2017.

US–Russian Relations 195 U.S. Department of State. 2017. “New START.” www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index. htm. Accessed August 11, 2017. von Hein, Matthias. 2016. “Progress Comes in Small Steps One Year After Iran Nuclear Deal.” Deutsche Welle, August 1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2014). “FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners.” June 3. www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassuranceinitiative-and-other-us-efforts-support-. Winsor, Morgan. 2017. “Sarin Gas Used in Syria Chemical Attack, Turkey’s Health Minister Says.” ABC News, April 6. Winter, Chase. 2016. “NATO, Russia to Meet for First Time in Two Years.” Deutsche Welle, April 8.

10 The Clash of Civilizations and the Clash of Candidates The 2016 Election Richard S. Conley In US presidential elections in the post–World War II era, national security and foreign policy issues are usually secondary to jobs and the economy. Many political analysts emphasize the centrality of retrospective voting based on the state of the national economy, the employment situation, and citizens’ sense of their own economic well-being when considering their candidate choice specifically and the fortunes of the incumbent party generally. There are, however, a number of important exceptions in which national security matters have been thrust to the fore in quadrennial presidential contests in the post–World War II period. In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower promised he would “go to Korea” to end a conflict that left incumbent Harry Truman so unpopular that the Missourian decided not to seek reelection. In 1960, John F. Kennedy warned of a “missile gap” with the Soviets following the launch of Sputnik, despite the lack of empirical evidence of a mismatch between US and Soviet strategic arsenals. The Vietnam War, and its genesis of widespread domestic unrest, framed Lyndon Johnson’s stunning decision in March 1968 not to seek the presidency for a second term and was central to Richard Nixon’s 1972 reelection bid in the search to end the protracted conflict in Indochina. Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory in 1980 was shaped as much by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis—and the Republican candidate’s portrayal of incumbent Jimmy Carter as weak and indecisive on foreign policy—as it was by high unemployment and high inflation (“stagflation”) domestically. And the 2004 and 2008 victories of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, respectively, were intricately connected to post–9/11 national security themes and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While questions about the legacy of the Obama presidency on economic and social affairs figured prominently in the 2016 presidential race between Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican rival Donald Trump, the contest was unique for the types of national security issues over which the candidates sparred. Foreign and national security policy disputes between the candidates rendered the 2016 election the most negative since the 1988 contest between George H.W. Bush and Michael Dukakis. Of central importance were linkages Trump attempted to draw between Clinton’s service as

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head of the Department of State from 2009 to 2012 and Obama’s allegedly failed leadership on controversial issues as diverse as the Russian “reset,” the administration’s handling of the so-called “Arab Spring,” and the 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Against the backdrop of the immigration debate and domestic insecurity following numerous terrorist attacks on American soil and abroad during Obama’s second term, Trump endeavored to make the case that the rise of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and Iran’s continued quest for nuclear weapons were by-products of Clinton’s legacy as the nation’s top diplomat. Moreover, Trump made Clinton’s use of a private email server as secretary of state a central issue from which to allege that she had poor judgment on national security. On controversy after controversy, and correctly or incorrectly, Trump indefatigably sought to tie Clinton to the Obama record and create a narrative in the most negative terms. Having never been employed in public service, Trump may well have had a tactical advantage insofar as he had no profile in foreign affairs and national security to defend other than his business dealings abroad. As a result, the Obama legacy—and Clinton’s alleged place in it—positioned the Democratic nominee in a defensive posture on these vital issues. This chapter assesses the impact of the foreign policy and national security legacy of President Barack Obama on the 2016 presidential election. The analysis gives primacy to Trump’s campaign chronicle of an allegedly failed and shared policy legacy between Clinton, as secretary of state, and the nation’s 44th president. The chapter considers from a theoretical angle Clinton’s “successor” candidacy. In addition, Trump’s characterizations of Obama’s proactive diplomatic endeavors, such as the Iranian nuclear deal (for details, see Peake, Chapter 8) and unforeseen events abroad such as the “Arab Spring,” to which the White House was largely placed in a reactionary stance, are considered. Finally, the analysis considers the disconnect between the post-9/11 struggle against international terrorism and Trump’s apparent Cold War frame of reference in national security policy.

Narratives and Shared Policy Legacies: The Clinton– Obama Nexus and the Successor Context One useful way to approach the 2016 presidential race is to consider the contest as a type of “succession” election. As Weisberg and Hill (2004, 27) suggested, succession elections are notable for “an attempt by the incumbent president to control his legacy, if the heir apparent is willing to be associated with that legacy.” Although the framework is typically employed to assess vice-presidents seeking the White House in an “open” election (such as in 1960, 1988, and 2000), the approach clearly applies to Hillary Clinton’s campaign for the Democratic nomination against Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont and her general election campaign against Republican standardbearer Donald Trump.

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Having narrowly lost the 2008 Democratic nomination to Barack Obama, Clinton quickly became a central figure in the new administration.The new president’s choice (or perhaps co-opting) of the former First Lady and his chief political rival as the nation’s top diplomat was hailed by many Democrats as a coup for party unity. As Obama’s presidency wound down, Clinton was the clear frontrunner to inherit her party’s nomination in 2016. Indeed, she sought steadfastly to connect her efforts as secretary of state to Obama’s foreign policy weltanschauung and the reversal of George W. Bush’s policies (see Feste, Chapter 3), including attempts to close the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detention facility (see Kassop, Chapter 6), drone strikes instead of the capture and interrogation of suspected terrorists (see Cash and Bridge, Chapter 7), the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the use of “soft” or “smart power” and enabling North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to take the lead (i.e., “leading from behind”) in conflicts like Libya (see Fisher, Chapter 4). The president returned the favor, repeatedly praising her for her extensive travel and policy acumen in liaising with foreign governments throughout his first term. Models of retrospective voting (Fiorina 1978) that emphasize the domestic economy on presidential elections move us only so far in understanding the dynamics of the 2016 campaign. Rather, “incumbency and succession effects suggest a more general assessment of the incumbent president, one that is weighted for successors by the extent to which the incumbent and successor are linked in the public’s mind” (Weisberg and Hill 2004, 29). The Obama–Clinton narrative on national security was mutually reinforcing in this regard. Clinton attempted to parlay her shared legacy with Obama into a positive force for her campaign in the same way that George H.W. Bush endeavored in 1988 to connect his campaign to Reagan’s Cold War successes. On all four essential criteria delineated by Weisberg and Hill—Clinton as Obama’s “designated successor,” her efforts to associate herself with the incumbent president, the opposition party’s tying her to Obama’s legacy, and the public’s view of Clinton’s intricate association with the incumbent’s policies over the last four (or eight) years—the succession model on foreign policy and national security appears solid. What is remarkably paradoxical is that in 2015, and despite the controversy about and congressional investigations of the Benghazi consulate attack fiasco in September 2012, Clinton was for the 20th time, according to a Gallup poll, the most admired woman in America. Yet, by late July 2016, just three months before the November election, she suffered a massive reversal: Her unfavorability rating stood at 56 percent. In fact, as Figure 10.1 shows, her favorability rating turned “upside down” in spring 2015 and never recovered, edging up rather consistently as the 2016 presidential campaign moved forward. Perhaps the only solace for the Clinton campaign was that Trump’s unfavorability outpaced hers by several points throughout most of the election season. American voters were confronted with choosing

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Favorability (%)

55 50 45 40 35 30

20

Jan-09 Mar-09 May-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Nov-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-11 Nov-11 Jan-12 Mar-12 May-12 Jul-12 Sep-12 Nov-12 Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Sep-14 Nov-14 Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Jul-15 Sep-15 Nov-15 Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Nov-16

25

Favorable

Unfavorable

Figure 10.1  Hillary Clinton’s Favorability Rating, 2009–2016 Source: Data from Gallup Poll, www.gallup.com/poll/1618/favorability-people-news.aspx.

between the least popular presidential candidates in the postwar era since polls have been taken. If Trump’s unfavorable numbers may be explained by his ad hominem attacks on fellow Republicans in the primary campaign, allegations of misogyny, and irascible Twitter commentary on the “establishment” as much as his personal invectives against Clinton, which factors explain her slide into the abyss of public disdain? And what is the potential connection to foreign policy and national security issues? There are several potential explanations, none of which excludes others. By mid-summer 2016, more than two thirds of Democrats had a favorable view of Clinton, while only 8 percent of Republicans did. The effect indubitably reflected the coalescence, to some degree, of the parties’ bases around their nominees and against the opposing party’s nominee. Clinton’s most troubling problem may have been independents’ lackluster support. A few months earlier, one poll showed that her favorability rating had tumbled by 15 percent among independents to a low of just 20 percent—with 62 percent of independents viewing her unfavorably. Regardless, aggregate polling data on partisans’ or independents’ views of the candidates explain little about the underlying causes of voter angst. The balance of this chapter examines the ways in which foreign and national security issues were framed during the presidential campaign and affected the election narrative. The first section considers the shared legacy

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between Clinton and Obama during his first term. The second section analyzes select controversies during Obama’s second term and the Trump team’s efforts to connect Clinton to alleged failures.The subsequent section assesses very briefly the impact of Clinton’s email server scandal. The concluding section considers the future of presidential elections and national security policy in a rapidly changing and chaotic world.

A Shared Legacy? The Obama–Clinton Era (2009–2012) and Election Controversies Hillary Clinton’s term as secretary of state commenced much as many of her contemporaries’ terms had. She faithfully did the president’s bidding and traveled extensively for symbolic and substantive reasons. She made a trip to Pakistan in October 2009, following a horrific bombing in Peshawar, as a sign of solidarity. In January 2010, she went to Haiti to meet with President René Préval following a devastating earthquake. By summer 2010, she had become fully immersed in the elusive search for a resolution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, an almost de rigeur task for the nation’s top diplomat in recent decades. The same year, she successfully renegotiated a military alliance with New Zealand and witnessed Senate approval of a new strategic arms reduction treaty (New START) with Russia that she had helped spearhead. These efforts, and arguably successes, were not major issues in the 2016 campaign. Instead, Trump’s narrative of Clinton’s alleged foreign policy “disasters” was succinctly outlined in a speech to supporters in New York in June 2016. He ticked off putative fiascoes, one after another, to great applause. Her handling of the “Arab Spring,” the rise of ISIS and the Syrian Civil War, and the general disruption of Middle East governments formed the corpus of his argument, which was a leitmotiv throughout the campaign. Trump posited: In 2009, before Hillary Clinton was sworn in, it was a different world. Libya was cooperating, Iraq was seeing a reduction in violence, believe it or not. Syria was under control, Iran was being choked by sanctions. Egypt was governed by a friendly regime that honored its peace treaty with Israel. Something very nice because by the way, Israel has been totally mistreated by the United States. ISIS wasn’t even on the map. Fast forward to 2014. In just four years, Secretary Clinton managed to almost single-handedly destabilize the entire Middle East. Her invasion of Libya handed the country over to ISIS, the barbarians.Thanks to Hillary Clinton, Iran is now the dominant Islamic power in the Middle East and on the road to nuclear weapons. Hillary Clinton’s support for a violent regime change in Syria has thrown the country into one of the bloodiest civil wars anyone has ever seen, while giving ISIS a launching pad for terrorism against the West. She helped force out a friendly regime in Egypt and replace it with the

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radical Muslim Brotherhood.The Egyptian military has retaken control, but Clinton has opened the Pandora’s box of radical Islam. Then there was the disastrous strategy of announcing our departure from Iraq, handing large parts of the country over to ISIS and the ISIS killers. ISIS threatens us today because of the decisions Hillary Clinton has made, along with President Obama. ISIS also threatens peaceful Muslims across the Middle East, and peaceful Muslims across the world who have been terribly victimized by horrible brutality and who only want to raise their kids in peace and safety. In short . . . in short, Hillary Clinton’s tryout for the presidency has produced one deadly foreign policy disaster after another. One by one, they’re all bad. She’s virtually done nothing right. She’s virtually done nothing good. (Beckwith 2016) Let us take a closer look at the context of select foreign policy and national security issues, the ways in which Trump fashioned his critical narrative, and the Clinton camp’s responses. The analysis follows a chronological path as closely as possible, assessing events from 2009 to 2016 and the ways in which they became central in the election dynamics. The Russian “Reset”

The so-called Russian “reset” in March 2009 proved an early embarrassment to Clinton, though the flop was less prominent than other controversies surrounding Vladimir Putin when allegations of Russian hacking and influence in the 2016 election are considered. As one of her first diplomatic ventures, Clinton traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov with the intent to reestablish a more productive relationship with his nation. In what was transformed into an awkward photo op, Clinton presented Lavrov with a mock-up “reset” device to symbolize the meeting.The Russian word was mistranslated—something Lavrov immediately pointed out amid the international press—with the word “overload” or “overcharge” (перегрузка) used in lieu of “reset.” Critics suggested that the mistranslation was prophetic as a harbinger of Russian aggression against neighboring countries (see Brown, Chapter 9). In 2015, Lavrov admonished the media to stop questioning him about the reset, claiming that the whole notion was contrived by Clinton and the Obama White House. The Russian minister posited that he had a good working relationship with former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and that Russian president Vladimir Putin and President George W. Bush similarly got on well together, notwithstanding the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 that had soured relations between the United States and Russia (Ernst 2015). In numerous Twitter communications, or tweets, on the campaign trail in 2016, Trump pointed to the reset as one in a long string of allegedly failed

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policies overseen by Hillary Clinton as secretary of state. In a 2014 interview, Clinton defended the reset, stating, “I think it was a brilliant stroke which in retrospect it appears even more so, because look at what we accomplished” (Halper 2014, para. 3) She pointed to Russia’s support for tougher sanctions against Iraq, the success of the New START Treaty, and Russia’s willingness to allow US aircraft to use its airspace en route to resupply troops in Afghanistan. As we shall see,Trump’s view was entirely opposite. He contended that the tough sanctions Clinton had won against Iran, with Russian backing, resulted in a catastrophic international deal that would putatively enable that regime to develop nuclear weapons. The “Arab Spring”

The United States has a long history of supporting leaders of regimes in the Middle East who may sustain the nation’s shifting strategic and geopolitical interests while not always sharing the same democratic norms. The unforeseen “Arab Spring”—a set of sudden uprisings in the region that included protests in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Jordan—caught the Obama administration off guard. In the midst of growing turmoil, Secretary Clinton said, “The region is being battered by a perfect storm of powerful trends” and “The status quo is simply not sustainable” (BBC News 2011). Clinton’s response to the unfolding events, as well as that of President Obama himself, was reserved but also seemed incoherent and confused. Levin (2014) noted that with respect to Egypt, “Obama and Clinton backed popular calls for political reform and then criticized President Hosni Mubarak’s first proposals. Belatedly, Clinton backed off aggressive calls for Mubarak’s immediate departure” (para. 22–23). Clinton called for free and fair elections but reconsidered her stance, perhaps too late, with the realization that the only organized opposition to Mubarak was the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. By the end of 2011, Clinton suggested, “I don’t think anybody could have predicted we’d be sitting here talking about the end of the Mubarak presidency at the time that this all started” (Al Arabiya 2011). Clinton called for an orderly transition. But Mubarak was subsequently chased from office, and the Muslim Brotherhood won the 2012 elections. The new president, Mohamed Morsi, immediately sought to implement an Islamist agenda. He was then overthrown by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in a military coup, leading to more instability as the military leader’s quest to root out “terrorism” and the Muslim Brotherhood resulted in the deaths of more than 800 civilians. Chastising the US government, el-Sisi posited, “You left the Egyptians. You turned your back on the Egyptians, and they won’t forget that” (Weymouth 2013). El-Sisi’s comments and the general disruption of the Egyptian political order fit well with Trump’s election story line. Neither Tunisia nor Yemen dominated the back-and-forth between Trump and Clinton. Perhaps Tunisia, of all the countries in which uprisings took

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place, was the most successful in terms of moving toward some form of democracy. The situation in Yemen remained far more troubling. By 2015, more than 6,800 people were killed and another 35,000 sustained injuries, largely due to air strikes by a Saudi-led multinational coalition backing the incumbent president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The Obama administration supported the Saudi-led coalition.Yet, as Jonah Shepp (2016) contended, neither candidate has bothered to articulate much of a position on how they would handle the situation as president. It doesn’t even merit a mention in the “issues” pages of Hillary Clinton’s campaign website. . . . As for Donald Trump, the smattering of word-salad commentary he has issued on the Yemen conflict (“They [Iran] get Syria, they get Yemen. Now they didn’t want Yemen, but you ever see the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia? They want Saudi Arabia”) makes clear that he doesn’t know much about it. Libyan Air Strikes and “Leading From Behind”

The situation in Libya, however, did dominate much campaign discourse. Trump routinely criticized the NATO-backed air strikes on Libya in March 2011, spearheaded by France and the United Kingdom with critical American logistical support. In June 2016, referencing military actions that chased dictator Muammar Qaddafi from power (and that led to his death), Trump opined, “The Hillary Clinton foreign policy has cost America thousands of lives and trillions and trillions of dollars and unleashed ISIS across the world. No secretary of state been more wrong, more often and in more places than Hillary Clinton” (Beckwith 2016). Alas, the turmoil that followed Qaddafi’s ouster fit neatly into Trump’s narrative of a failed foreign policy—but did not indemnify him from criticism of flip-flopping on the issue and providing scant details as to what he might have done differently. Indeed, Trump appeared to contradict himself. In a blog post in January 2011, he had squarely favored military intervention in Libya. He wrote: Qaddafi in Libya is killing thousands of people, nobody knows how bad it is, and we’re sitting around we have soldiers all have the Middle East, and we’re not bringing them in to stop this horrible carnage and that’s what it is: It’s a carnage. (Kessler 2016) For her part, Clinton had hesitated on the wisdom of military strikes as secretary of state at the time but came to support intervention after consultations with the French and British, who were anxious about a potential humanitarian disaster. Clinton defended the actions as “smart power at its

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best.” During the October presidential debate, she further accentuated her view that we had a murderous dictator . . . threatening to massacre large numbers of the Libyan people. . . . We had our closest allies in Europe burning up the phone lines begging us to help them try to prevent what they saw as a mass genocide, in their words. And we had the Arabs standing by our side saying, “We want you to help us deal with Gaddafi.” (Sullivan 2016) To his critics, Trump’s position appeared inconsistent. They pointed to his recurring contention that under his leadership, the United States would only exercise limited military power on the ground in international conflicts, and to his focus on convincing other countries, such as Turkey, to fight ISIS themselves (French 2016). Still, Trump continued to reference the Libyan air strikes as a reflection of Clinton’s “horribly bad judgment” that yielded a “total catastrophe.” In April 2016, Trump had said, “One day we’re bombing Libya and getting rid of a dictator to foster democracy for civilians, the next day we are watching the same civilians suffer while that country falls apart” (New York Times 2016a). But Trump gave no precise details on how he might have handled the situation differently. At the second presidential debate in October 2016, Clinton underscored her position: I’ll say this for the Libyan people. . . . I think President Obama made the right decision at the time. And the Libyan people had a free election, the first time since 1951. And you know what, they voted for moderates, they voted with the hope of democracy. Because of the Arab Spring, because of a lot of other things, there was turmoil to be followed. Trump’s positions, however incongruent with past commentary, artfully focused on the aftermath of the strikes as Libya descended into a chaotic vacuum filled by militias once Qaddafi was toppled. “Leading from behind,” as some critics viewed Obama’s strategy, connoted US weakness and a disengaged commander in chief (though Conley and Baron [2015] showed that the president was intricately involved in liaising with US allies and the Defense Department during the French and British strikes)—a perception Trump attempted to tap into, if indirectly. Others raised concerns about a potential violation of the War Powers Resolution (see Fisher, Chapter 4), though Trump largely steered clear of that controversy. The Syrian “Red Line”

In September 2013, evidence emerged that the regime of Bashar al-Assad had used chemical weapons against his own citizens as Syria descended further into civil strife. Approximately 1,400 civilians were killed in the city of Damascus as

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a result of chemical warfare. A year earlier, in August 2012, President Obama had publicly stated that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would cross a “red line” that would trigger a US military response. None was forthcoming once the horrors of the attack came to light months later. Obama said in an interview that he had not reneged on the pledge, but rather,“My decision was to see if we could broker a deal without a strike to get those chemical weapons out, and to go to Congress to ask for authorization” (  Jaffe 2016). Any threat of US-led air strikes against Assad’s regime was forestalled with a surprise accord with Russian backing in September 2013 that called for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal within a year (Gordon 2013). Trump again tried to link Clinton to the controversy. At the second presidential debate in October 2016, in what became a heated exchange in which the candidates interrupted one another in an embarrassing lack of decorum, Trump asserted that the former secretary of state had been involved in the decision not to take military action against the Assad regime. Clinton retorted that she was not in office during that time and called for fact checking. Trump replied, You were in total contact with the White House, and perhaps sadly Obama probably still listened to you. I don’t think he’ll be listening to you very much anymore. Obama draws the line in the sand. It was laughed at all over the world, what happened. The news site Politico did fact checking and determined that Obama’s “red line” statement was made in August 2012, while Clinton was secretary of state. She had been replaced by John Kerry, however, when the evidence of the chemical attacks surfaced a year later. Nonetheless, in December 2012, several months before she resigned her position, Clinton referenced the “red line” in a press conference in the Czech Republic. “We have made our views very clear. This is a red line for the United States,” she told a reporter. “I’m not going to telegraph in any specifics what we would do in the event of credible evidence that the Assad regime has resorted to using chemical weapons against his own people, but suffice to say we are certainly planning to take action if that eventuality were to occur.” (Carroll 2016, para. 13) Out of office in September 2013, once the US–Russian brokered deal on the destruction of Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile was reached, Clinton supported Obama’s decision, noting, “If the regime immediately surrendered its stockpiles to international control, as was suggested by Secretary Kerry and the Russians, that would be an important step” (Rucker 2013) According to the Washington Post, Clinton had also consulted Obama in the days prior to the agreement.

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Trump predictably turned to Twitter to reiterate the case that Clinton had “been there” during the White House deliberations on Syria and the lack of a US response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons. In September 2016, Trump attempted to equate a mustard gas attack by ISIS militants on US forces stationed in Iraq with a loss of credibility stemming from President Obama’s decision in Syria: When you look at they’re starting to hit us with gas now on top of everything else, that’s a total lack of respect and you cannot let them get away with it. . . .You have to go after them big league. (Carter 2016) Clinton’s primary recourse during the campaign was to highlight the intricacies of foreign policy leadership. As one example, in a January 2016 Democratic primary debate with rival Bernie Sanders, Clinton said “a commander-inchief needs to constantly reevaluate decisions, and cited the ‘red line’ as one of them” (Fox News Politics 2016). The Benghazi Consulate Attack

Perhaps no other substantive national security issue had a greater impact on the presidential campaign than the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, that took the life of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three others. Following the attack, the White House dispatched National Security Advisor Susan Rice to make the rounds to Sunday morning news shows to argue that the assault had been “spontaneous” rather than organized by a terror group. Further, Rice suggested that an Internet video mocking the Prophet Muhammad had been responsible for the attack. Questions immediately surfaced as to what the president and secretary of state knew, when they knew it, and why there was no military support provided to the consulate employees. What followed was months of political theater in Congress as the House Oversight Committee, chaired by Darrell Issa (R-CA), held extensive hearings. Some of Clinton’s public commentary, testimony, and email exchanges suggested contradictions in her recollection of the events that fateful evening. It was at a Senate hearing on January 23, 2013, that former secretary Clinton, frustrated and angered by questioning by Ron Johnson (R-WI), boiled over and exclaimed, With all due respect, the fact is, we had four dead Americans! Was it because of a protest or was it because of guys out for a walk one night and decided they’d go kill some Americans? What difference, at this point, does it make? The video of that heated exchange was played repeatedly in pro-Trump campaign advertisements.

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In 2015, the House Select Committee on Intelligence, led by Trey Gowdy (R-SC), while investigating the Benghazi attack, discovered that Clinton had used a private email server during her tenure as secretary of state (discussed later in this chapter). That story rapidly overtook media headlines and launched another round of congressional investigations to which Trump pointed as a means of questioning Clinton’s judgment. The Benghazi controversy was routinely mentioned during Trump’s stump speeches, though Clinton was ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing by the House of Representatives (McCammon 2016). Moreover, the Benghazi affair formed a critical context in the diatribes both candidates launched at one another at the first presidential debate in September 2016. Following the debate, Clinton said, “We saw more evidence that he is temperamentally unfit and totally unqualified to be commander in chief. He trash-talked American generals, saying they’ve been ‘reduced to rubble’ ” (Balakrishnan 2016). The Trump campaign responded, “Last night Hillary Clinton again failed the commander-in-chief test, where she was unable to answer for her terrible foreign policy judgment. . . . Her claim that no lives were lost in Libya was an insult to the memory of the four brave Americans who died in Benghazi” (Morrongiello 2016). The Bin Laden Killing

There is little dispute that perhaps no other military operation was as successful for President Obama—both symbolically and substantively—as the raid led by SEAL Team 6 that ended the life of 9/11 terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden in May 2011. But to what degree could Hillary Clinton share in the success of that mission? At one campaign appearance in Iowa, Clinton made the link explicit: I’m grateful I’ve been in the Situation Room making really tough decisions— they don’t get there if they’re not tough decisions. . . .There was nothing at all preordained about what the outcome would be. . . . I was asked to be among the very small group of advisers asked to weigh in. (Thrush 2016) On the campaign trail, Clinton portrayed herself as steadfastly in the camp supporting the raid. A major controversy subsequently erupted when an unlikely ally for Trump, Vice President Joe Biden, contradicted Clinton’s account. Biden contended that only two advisors, CIA Director Leon Panetta and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, provided definitive advice on the mission (Fabian and Parnes 2015). Other advisors, and by extension Secretary Clinton, were allegedly divided on the raid, and Biden contended that “while he privately supported the raid, he didn’t want to say so in front of everyone else as it risked ‘undercutting’ his relationship with Obama if the president decided against the raid” (Fox News Politics 2015a). As Biden contemplated entering

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the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, he seemed to cast doubt on Clinton’s tight relationship with Obama’s decisionmaking in other ways. Biden stated publicly, referencing both Clinton and John Kerry, “We’ve had two great secretaries of state, but when I go, they know that I am speaking for the President. There is nothing missed between the lip of the cup, that whatever I say, the President is saying” (  Joseph 2015). For his part, Trump sought to downplay Clinton’s involvement in the bin Laden killing. On the stump in Cleveland in September 2016, he told an audience, “I would have been tougher on terrorism. . . . Bin Laden would have been caught a long time ago, before he was ultimately caught, prior to the downing of the World Trade Center” (Hensch 2016). Trump gave no details on how he would have done so. The polemic was perhaps little more than a tempest in a teapot.What is most central is that Clinton’s attempt to share credit with Obama’s decisionmaking— though the president had canceled prospective raids three times previously— was aimed at highlighting her proven leadership. Clinton had long accentuated her role in the bin Laden killing. In her memoir Hard Choices (2014), she recalled watching a video feed of the raid and wrote, “I looked at the President. He was calm. Rarely have I been prouder to serve by his side as I was that day” (as cited in Rayman 2014).

Obama’s Second Term and the Clash of Candidates Several foreign policy crises placed the Obama White House in a reactive situation from 2013 to 2016. Russian annexation of Crimea, Putin’s military interventionism in Ukraine, and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East became the focal points of the campaigns’ tit for tat. Moreover, homegrown terror plots, including the Orlando nightclub and San Bernardino shootings, in addition to others (see Appendix A), seemingly drove President Obama’s approval on handling terrorism to new lows—and at least indirectly affected Clinton’s campaign negatively. On the other hand, Obama’s inexorable and proactive efforts to conclude an accord on Iran’s nuclear program were at the heart of the two campaigns’ competing rhetoric on the wisdom of the deal. This section reviews the impact in greater detail, particularly as the Trump campaign sought to tie Clinton to controversies despite her having resigned as secretary of state in February 2013. Russia, Crimea, Ukraine, and Putin

The Clinton campaign seized upon Trump’s peculiar comments about Russian aggression to underscore his lack of preparedness to deal with foreign affairs. When Putin annexed Crimea after the pro-Ukrainian government collapsed following popular protests by Russian nationalists in 2014, the United States and the European Union refused to recognize the legitimacy of the seizure of the territory. In July 2016, however, Trump announced at

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a news conference that as president he would “be looking into” the idea of lifting sanctions against Russia and formally recognizing the annexation without offering a rationale for this (Pager 2016). At the same presser,Trump suggested that perhaps Russia could locate the missing 30,000 emails deleted from Hillary Clinton’s private server under FBI investigation. The Clinton camp posited that Trump’s tongue-in-cheek comments on the hacking were a national security issue. Moreover, Jake Sullivan, a Clinton campaign aide, asserted, While Trump hasn’t mastered basic facts about the world, he has mastered Putin’s talking points on Crimea (which, of course, the United States and most of the world still recognizes as part of Ukraine). . . . Today, he gamely repeated Putin’s argument that Russia was justified in seizing the sovereign territory of another country by force. (CBS News 2016a) Trump’s later comments that Russia would not invade Ukraine not only belied the Crimea annexation but also were at odds with Russian military incursions in that country in support of nationalists. Democratic vice presidential candidate Tim Kaine used the occasion to argue that Trump “promised that Putin would not, and had to be reminded that Putin went in and took over Crimea two years ago” (see Pager 2016; Savransky 2016). Trump, rather inexplicably to this day, repeatedly fired shots across the bow on the campaign trail to argue that the former secretary of state had been “too tough” on Vladimir Putin: “ ‘She speaks very badly of Putin, and I don’t think that’s smart,’ Trump said. ‘How do you speak so badly of someone?’ ” (Boston Globe 2016, para. 3). To some degree, Trump found support from an unlikely source: the secretary’s spouse. In January 2016, stumping as a surrogate for her campaign, former president Bill Clinton suggested, “The only thing that has survived the estrangement of the United States and Russia from our attempt to do better is something called the New START Treaty” (Weissman 2016). Trump’s “admiration” for Putin became a rallying point for the Clinton campaign that Russia sought to interfere in the 2016 election—and with the Republican nominee’s alleged blessing. At the second presidential debate in October 2016, Trump stated, “I think it would be great if we got along with Russia because we could fight ISIS together, as an example.” Trump had praised Putin a month earlier, stating that he was “a leader far more than our president [Obama] has been” (BBC News 2016, para. 1) and that Putin had “great control over his country” (para. 7). Clinton referred to flattering comments Putin made about Trump to suggest that we have never in the history of our country been in a situation where an adversary, a foreign power, is working so hard to influence the outcome of the election . . . and believe me, they’re not doing it to get me

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elected. They’re doing it to try to influence the election for Donald Trump. (Derespina 2016) Persian Riddles: The Iran Nuclear Deal and Beyond

Perhaps no other issue in Obama’s second term drew as much attention from the Trump campaign than relations with Iran in the bid to wed Clinton to significant controversy—though she had been out of office several years when the P5 + 1 (the UN Security Council plus Germany) and the European Union reached an accord with Iran on the country’s nuclear program in July 2015. That framework called for Iran to restructure its nuclear program away from the pursuit of weaponry in exchange for the lifting of international economic sanctions. As noted earlier, Clinton argued that her role in obtaining international sanctions against Iran with Russian support (i.e., the “reset”) brought Iran to the negotiating table, thereby making the deal possible. While many foreign leaders were cautiously optimistic that Iran would comply, Israel—the United States’ most trusted ally in the Middle East—rejected the notion that Iran could be trusted. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu told President Obama by telephone that the deal threatened the survival of Israel and, echoing the sentiments of other Israeli officials, that he regarded the accord as a “capitulation by the U.S. and the West that will lead to the creation of a military nuclear program by Iran” (Fox News Politics 2015b). As pundits and scholars debated the merits and shortcomings of the Iran nuclear deal, a major controversy arose a year later when, in August 2016, details emerged that the United States had negotiated “side deals” with Iran to secure the agreement. One such agreement included the delivery of $400 million in cash (foreign currency) via airplane to Teheran. The payment was putatively to settle a decades-long dispute over an undelivered US military sale to the country (CBS News 2016b). As Republicans in Congress denounced the payment as a “ransom” that coincided with the release of four American hostages and Iran’s formal implementation of the nuclear deal, the Obama White House announced a few days later that Iran had received an addition $1.3 billion in payments on interest stemming from international financial sanctions (Labott and Kludt 2016). The administration had said Iran would receive some $1.7 billion upon implementation of the nuclear accord but did not provide specifics at the time. Regardless, the Trump campaign seized on the controversy quickly and endeavored to tie Hillary Clinton to the specific polemic as part of allegedly larger foreign policy failures. The GOP standard-bearer characteristically turned to Twitter with statements such as “Our incompetent Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was the one who started talks to give 400 million

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dollars, in cash, to Iran. Scandal!” (Trump 2016a). Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus declared, In foreign policy, a Clinton presidency means forgetting our friends and enabling our enemies. . . . Just look, just look at her disastrous Iran nuclear deal, which lined the pockets of the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism with your money, while abandoning our greatest ally in the Middle East, the nation of Israel. (Neidig 2016) Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, Trump’s foreign policy advisor (and briefly national security advisor), said in September 2016, The deeply flawed nuclear deal Hillary Clinton secretly spearheaded with Iran looks worse and worse by the day. It’s now clear President Obama gave away the store to secure a weak agreement that is full of loopholes, never ultimately blocks Iran from nuclear weapons, emboldens our enemies and funds terrorism. Just last week, Iran once again took advantage of this and deployed a sophisticated Russian-made air defense system around one of its enrichment sites that directly challenges the U.S. position that all options are on the table. Hillary Clinton’s continued support of this dangerous deal, which undermines the long-term security interests of the United States and Israel, shows just how bad her judgment really is. (DonaldJTrump.com, “Statement on Exposed Secret Side Agreements in Clinton–Obama Iranian Nuclear Deal”) In a major foreign policy speech, Trump went further to lambast Obama and suggest that perceptions of American weakness in the nuclear deal drove Iran’s capture of US sailors who drifted into Iranian waters in January 2016. Trump contended, We’ve had a president who dislikes our friends and bows to our enemies. He negotiated a disastrous deal with Iran, and then we watched them ignore its terms, even before the ink was dry. Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon and, under a Trump administration, will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. All of this without even mentioning the humiliation of the United States with Iran’s treatment of our ten captured sailors. In negotiation, you must be willing to walk. The Iran deal, like so many of our worst agreements, is the result of not being willing to leave the table. When the other side knows you’re not going to walk, it becomes absolutely impossible to win. (DonaldJTrump.com, “Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Speech”)

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Trump’s attempt to link Clinton to the controversies of the Iran deal was aimed at undermining her claim to proficiency in foreign relations. At the first presidential debate,Trump quipped, “Hillary has experience, but it’s bad experience.” He later continued, “You started the Iran deal, that’s another beauty,” and called the agreement “one of the worst deals ever made by any country in history,” a “horrible deal.” For her part, Clinton sought more generally to paint a nuanced position on the Iran deal. At a series of speeches and forums in September 2016, she claimed credit for its success and expressed uncertainty about its future while “positioning herself as tougher than her former boss and perhaps more devoted to keeping rifts with Israel from breaking out into the open” (Sanger and Chozick 2015). Clinton did not rule out the use of military force against Iran if that country was close to procuring nuclear weapons. But she also affirmed the centrality of negotiation as one of her chief skills. In a late September 2016 interview, Clinton said, We did drive them [Iran] to the negotiating table. And my successor, John Kerry, and President Obama got a deal that put a lid on Iran’s nuclear program without firing a single shot. That’s diplomacy. That’s coalition-building. That’s working with other nations. (New York Times 2016b) The Rise of ISIS and Homegrown Terrorism: A Perfect Storm in a Rhetorical War?

Trump’s argument about the rise of ISIS as part of a general weakness represented by Clinton and Obama—specifically connected to the “red line” controversy in Syria and the drawdown of US troops in Iraq in 2011 (which had been planned under a Status of Forces Agreement by President Bush in 2008)— may well have become more powerful to elements of the electorate due to increased angst about domestic terror attacks. Reports of drownings, beheadings, and the persecution of Christians by ISIS abounded against the backdrop of homegrown,“lone-wolf ” attacks throughout Obama’s second term: the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, the beheading of a woman in Oklahoma in 2014, an attack in Garland,Texas, over cartoons of Muhammad in 2015, the San Bernardino shootings in 2016, a mall “hacking” near Minneapolis in 2016, the Orlando nightclub attack in 2016, the September 2016 bombings in New York and New Jersey, and, just days after the election in November 2016, the attack on Ohio State University, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. President Obama not only sought to change relations with Middle Eastern countries but also endeavored to alter the rhetoric of the “war on terror.” Part of the strategy entailed the avoidance of potentially inflammatory expressions such as “radical terrorism” or “radical Islam.” Trump pounced on Clinton amid terror attacks at home and tried to link them to the larger question of ISIS. At the second presidential debate in October 2016, and in

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response to the San Bernardino and Orlando shootings, Trump noted that the United States has been targeted on multiple occasions in the past year by “radical Islamic terrorists. And she [Clinton] won’t even mention the word and nor will President Obama. . . . Now, to solve the problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is or at least say the name. She won’t say the name and President Obama won’t say the name.” (Martel 2016) In point of fact, in June 2016, Hillary Clinton stated publicly that she would be happy to label attacks such as the one in Orlando “radical Islamism.” But she clarified a more nuanced position, suggesting that the term might be perceived as declaring war on an entire religion—something she thought was entirely counterproductive and that “it helps to create this clash of civilizations that is actually a recruiting tool for ISIS and other radical jihadists who use this as a way of saying we’re in a war against the West.” (Philip 2016). She said on CNN’s New Day, From my perspective, it matters what we do more than what we say. . . . And it mattered we got bin Laden, not what name we called him. I have clearly said we—whether you call it radical jihadism or radical Islamism, I’m happy to say either. I think they mean the same thing. (Wright 2016) At the time, Trump strove to take credit for Clinton’s about-face, tweeting on June 13, “I have been hitting Obama and Crooked Hillary hard on not using the term Radical Islamic Terror. Hillary just broke-said she would now use!” (Trump 2016b). Trump may well have capitalized on public apprehension over ISIS and domestic attacks to portray negatively Clinton’s shared linkages with Obama’s foreign policy and national security stances. Aggregate polling data indirectly suggest that the confluence of events in Obama’s second term took a significant toll on his approval ratings in foreign affairs. Figure 10.2 shows polling data from RealClearPolitics surveys that queried public approval of Obama on foreign policy specifically. The data show that the president maintained relatively strong, positive approval over his first term. However, beginning in summer 2013, around the timing of the Boston Marathon bombing and through the rest of his second term, 50 to 60 percent of respondents disapproved of his handling of foreign policy. Moreover, as Figure 10.3 elucidates, by August 2014, relatively strong majorities disapproved of Obama’s handling of terrorism according to the Gallup poll—though it is unclear what the president could have been able to do domestically or on the international scene to halt ongoing and frequently “lone-wolf ” attacks. Such data provide only a context in which Trump’s arguments and Clinton’s defense played out. But they do suggest the limits of Clinton’s ability to positively

214  Chapter 10 70

60

Percent (%)

50

40

30

Approve

8/1/2016

11/1/2016

2/1/2016 5/1/2016

8/1/2015

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5/1/2015

2/1/2015

11/1/2014

8/1/2014

5/1/2014

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11/1/2012 2/1/2013 5/1/2013

2/1/2012 5/1/2012 8/1/2012

8/1/2009 11/1/2009 2/1/2010 5/1/2010 8/1/2010 2/1/2011 5/1/2011 8/1/2011 11/1/2011

5/1/2009

10

2/1/2009

20

Disapprove

Figure 10.2  Public Approval of President Obama’s Handling of Foreign Policy, 2009–2016 Source: Data from RealClearPolitics.com. 60

58

Percent (%)

55

40

55

53

53 50

50 45

56

47 45

48 45

45

45 42

40

41

35

35 30

Nov 2009 Aug 2010 Aug 2011 Aug 2012 Aug 2013 Jun 2014 Aug 2015 Aug 2016

Approve

Disapprove

Figure 10.3  Public Approval of President Obama’s Handling of Terrorism, 2009–2016 Source: Data from Gallup Poll, www.gallup.com/poll/1726/presidential-ratings-issues-approval.aspx.

portray her “successorship” to Obama. It is an old axiom that presidents can claim credit for a good economy and are blamed for a bad one. In the post-9/11 world, perhaps incumbents, and by extension their successors, are subject to similar fates in relation to world affairs and domestic terrorism.The commonality in both policy realms is that presidents have little control over either.

Clash of Candidates:The 2016 Election 215

Sidenote: Clinton’s Email Server Scandal and the 2016 Campaign The daily drumbeat of media stories about Clinton’s use of a private email server as secretary of state and the court-ordered monthly drip of revelatory communications from that server indubitably took a toll on Clinton’s campaign as Trump ratcheted up his campaign rhetoric during the general election contest. Trump charged that Clinton was corrupt, exercised poor judgment, and had used her public position for personal gain. Though the email server scandal had nothing to do, per se, with President Obama’s national security policy legacy, Trump was successful to some degree in connecting the controversy to other issues on which he leveled criticism of Clinton’s national security judgment broadly. More than anything else, the scandal contributed to a perception of dishonesty. One survey by McClatchy–Marist a full year prior to the election found that 68 percent of those polled believed that the use of a private email server was inappropriate, 40 percent believed that the usage was unethical but not illegal, 28 percent said she broke the law, and 27 percent thought she did nothing wrong (Hensch 2015). In July 2016, 55 percent of Americans said the word “honest” doesn’t describe Clinton well at all, up slightly from 50 percent in April and 44 percent in October 2015 (Fortune 2016). In September 2016, a Reuters/IPSOS poll found that half of those polled said they were “very concerned” about her use of a private email server and donations to her family’s foundation (Newsweek 2016). As for FBI Director James Comey’s reopening of the investigation less than two weeks before voting began, six in 10 Americans according to a Washington Post–ABC poll said Comey’s decision had no impact on their decision, while three in 10 said they were less likely to vote for her (Clement and Guskin 2016). Whatever the impact of the email server scandal, in the early days of Trump’s presidency, his firing of Comey, Clinton’s contention that she lost the election in part due to the FBI Director’s actions, and recriminations of Russian interference in the election have furthered conspiracy theories rivaling those of Kennedy’s assassination and the grassy knoll in Dallas.

Conclusion The 2016 election was remarkable on numerous fronts: the antiestablishment fervor among activists in both parties, the high unpopularity of both nominees, and the caustic personal attacks both leveled against each other are now etched into the annals of history. But the election was also exceptional for the degree to which foreign policy and national security issues further polarized the electorate as voters retrospectively evaluated President Obama’s legacy and sought to weigh Hillary Clinton’s role therein. From the very beginning of the campaign, Donald Trump emphasized fundamental philosophical differences with the Obama–Clinton shared legacy that effectively placed the former secretary of state on the defensive.

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Indeed, the roots of discord are traceable to Trump’s early disavowal of Obama’s 2009 “apology tour,” as it was labeled by the president’s critics. For critics of Obama, the president’s quest for improved relations abroad reflected a flawed doctrine at odds with the realpolitik of the times. Obama had traveled extensively in search of dialogue, particularly with countries in the Middle East. Despite never actually having apologized to any country in his speeches, the president’s conciliatory tone was lambasted by many conservatives for putatively portraying a weak foreign policy. Former GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney, for example, wrote that Obama’s early effort signaled to foreign countries and foreign leaders that their dislike for America is something he understands and that is, at least in part, understandable. There are anti-American fires burning all across the globe; President Obama’s words are like kindling to them. (Holan and Sanders 2012) Trump seized on that perception among many of Obama’s critics to contend that, as president, he would proudly promote our system of government and our way of life as the best in the world—just like we did in our campaign against communism during the Cold War. We will show the whole world how proud we are to be American. (The Hill 2016) As one commentator noted, “This is the sort of language that originally drew Republicans to Trump—the patriotic verbiage so disdained by President Obama and his post-patriotic order” (Shapiro 2016). The problem for now-President Trump is that the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape is radically different from the Cold War era, as are the challenges for the commander in chief. The policy of “containment” of the Soviet Union from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 no longer unifies the Democratic and Republican occupants of the White House to a generally common national security policy that spanned the decades, however unevenly. Elite consensus began to evaporate with the Vietnam War long ago, and in the post-9/11 era, unity—at least in Congress— was ephemeral. Trump may not yet grasp that the “two presidencies” theory positing broader latitude for the president in foreign and defense policy compared to domestic affairs was “time and culture bound” (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989, 55). Sadly for a generation of Sovietologists, the ostentatious and redoubtable May Day pageant of military hardware in Moscow’s Red Square, where an identifiable military threat was on public display against the backdrop of portraits of Marx and Stalin, has been relegated to distant memory. Such

Clash of Candidates:The 2016 Election 217

exhibitions of martial prowess are largely limited now to the rogue and enigmatic regime in North Korea. The Russian eagle under Vladimir Putin and his military interventionism against neighbors and in the Middle East has replaced the old Soviet bear and the quest for communist domination. Further, the “wars of proxy” between the superpowers in an epic ideological battle of the 20th century have given way to widespread civil conflict, intractable chaos, and humanitarian disasters. Ascertaining which shadowy groups and militias the United States can and should support in places like the Middle East now is often elusive, and military action is complicated by Russian involvement in Syria. Finally, professors, policymakers, pundits, and apparently President Trump must wrestle with theses far removed from one another temporally and otherwise—whether, for example, as Huntington (1996) stated two decades ago, that the emerging geopolitical landscape of chaos is a “clash of civilizations” pitting the Islamic world against the West, or whether radicalism is an ephemeral development more to do with lack of education and economic development and patterns of authoritarian leadership that have precipitated fringe groups under the cloak of sinister black flags like ISIS. Regardless, the incongruity between the Cold War era and the post-9/11 world is placed into sharp relief with a particular irony of history. Thirty years ago, Ronald Reagan called on the Soviets to “tear down this wall” at the iconic Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The new American president has clamored for the construction of a lengthy wall on the southwest border to dissuade immigrants and would-be terrorists from entering the country.

Future Challenges A new dialectic appears to be emerging in American presidential elections with regard to national security. In the Cold War era, presidents may well have disagreed on tactics to contain the old Soviet Union. The blood and treasure spilled in Korea and Vietnam generated significant public backlashes. But the overarching commitment to the strategy of containment provided some level of philosophical stability between presidents—and candidates of the two parties. Since 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, views of the outgoing president’s national security legacy are unremittingly polarized if not delegitimized by his opponents. In this new era of globalization and uncertainty, national security issues are ever more interconnected to domestic concerns, from terrorism and immigration to foreign trade. The gulf between the parties’ worldviews—from the war power to normative arguments about what America’s international role should be—has rendered consensus increasingly elusive in the electorate as much as in Congress. New administrations have subsequently embarked on a wholesale dismantling of their predecessor’s policies. George W. Bush’s decisions gave rise to widespread voter apprehension and disapproval of seemingly intractable conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Barack Obama sought to reverse

218  Chapter 10

course on interventionism and take a different tack to end those conflicts and use the levers of diplomacy elsewhere (Iran, Syria, etc.), “soft power,” or drones instead of the capture of prisoners and intelligence gathering through “enhanced interrogation.” Donald Trump has now pledged to sail the ship of state in yet another direction, however undefined for the moment. Is adhocracy, a complete turnabout, or ambiguity now the defining feature of the result of 21st-century presidential elections in regard to foreign affairs? Is there any common linkage between administrations? And what are the implications for stability in national security policymaking? The risk is that the rhetorical war of words and dogged hyper-partisanship over national security policy in American national election cycles belies the complexities, unforeseen crises, and strategic decisions that any president has to make quickly under the contexts of “bounded rationality” and without full information. Evaluating any president’s legacy retrospectively, tying that legacy to a successor, and/or gambling on a candidate with no public service experience are all risky endeavors . . . including one candidate with questionable judgment and ethical challenges and another with an untested hand and a penchant for quick-tempered 4 a.m. tweets. This was the decision— unsavory, according to many voters—that the electorate faced in 2016 as to who would better serve the nation as commander in chief and chief diplomat. Whatever else happens in the next four years of the Trump administration, the president will have at least one commonality with his predecessor: a record on which he will be judged.

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Clash of Candidates:The 2016 Election 219 CBS News. 2016a. “Trump Says He May Let Russia Keep Crimea.” July 31. www. cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-russia-vladimir-putin-crimea-nato/ CBS News. 2016b. “U.S. Paid $1.3 Billion to Iran Two Days After Cash Delivery.” August 24. www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-paid-1-3-billion-to-iran-two-days-after-cash-delivery/ Clement, Scott, and Emily Guskin. 2016. “Post-ABC Poll Finds Tight Presidential Race, With Mixed Reaction to FBI’s Review of Clinton’s Emails.” Washington Post, October 30. www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/30/post-abc-poll-findstight-presidential-race-with-mixed-reaction-to-fbis-review-of-clinton-e-mails/? utm_term=.ee8e412df4b4 Conley, Richard S., and Kevin Baron. 2015. “Obama’s ‘Hidden-Hand’ Presidency: Myth, Metaphor, or Misrepresentation?” White House Studies 13: 129–57. Derespina, Cory. 2016. “Clinton Bashes Trump Over Russia Praise, But Emails Show She Praised Putin.” Fox News Politics, October 12. www.foxnews.com/politics/ 2016/10/12/clinton-bashes-trump-over-russia-praise-but-emails-show-praisedputin.html Ernst, Douglas. 2015. “International Diss: Russia’s Sergey Lavrov Says Failed ‘Reset’ Was ‘Invention of Hillary Clinton’.” Washington Times, June 3. www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2015/jun/3/russian-fm-sergey-lavrov-failed-reset-was-inventio/ Fabian, Jordan, and Amie Parnes. 2015. “Biden Contradicts Clinton’s Account of bin Laden Raid Decision.” The Hill, October 20. http://thehill.com/homenews/adminis tration/257430-biden-contradicts-clintons-account-of-bin-laden-raid-decision Fiorina, Morris P. 1978. “Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 22: 426–43. Fortune. 2016. “Hillary Clinton Survived Her Email Scandal, But Not Unscathed, New Poll Shows.” July 15. http://fortune.com/2016/07/15/hillary-clinton-email-scandal-poll/ Fox News Politics. 2015a. “Biden Contradicts Clinton Account of bin Laden Raid—and His Own.” October 21. www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/10/21/biden-contradictsclinton-himself-on-bin-laden-raid.html Fox News Politics. 2015b. “Netanyahu to Obama: Iran Deal Would ‘Threaten the Survival of Israel’.” www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/04/02/netanyahu-on-collisioncourse-with-allies-in-wake-iran-deal-framework.html Fox News Politics. 2016. “Clinton Defends Obama Decision to Back Off Syria ‘Red Line’.” January 18. www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/01/18/clinton-defends-obamadecision-to-back-off-syria-red-line.html French, David. 2016. “Trump Will Fail the Heroes Who Endorsed Him.” National Review, July 19. www.nationalreview.com/article/438063/donald-trump-foreign-policy-americanretreat Gordon, Michael R. 2013. “U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms.” New York Times, 14 September. www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/mid dleeast/syria-talks.html Halper, Daniel. 2014. “Hillary: Russian Reset ‘A Brilliant Stroke’.” The Weekly Standard, June 13. www.weeklystandard.com/hillary-russian-reset-a-brilliant-stroke/article/ 794974 Hensch, Mark. 2015. “Poll: Most Think Clinton’s Emails Unethical or Illegal.” The Hill, November 12. http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/259941-poll-most-think-clin tons-emails-unethical-or-illegal Hensch, Mark. 2016. “Trump: I Would Have Caught bin Laden Before 9/11.” The Hill, September 8. http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/295080trump-id-have-caught-bin-laden-before-9-11

220  Chapter 10 Holan, Angie Drobnic, and Katie Sanders. 2012. “Mitt Romney Says Barack Obama Began His Presidency “With an Apology Tour’.” Politifact, October 17. www.politi fact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/oct/17/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-saysbarack-obama-began/ Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Jaffe, Greg. 2016. “The Problem With Obama’s Account of the Syrian Red-Line Incident.” Washington Post, October 4. www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/ wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-lineincident/?utm_term=.5bea9293166b Joseph, Cameron. 2015. “Joe Biden Sets Himself Apart From Hillary Clinton in Speech as U.S. Waits to See if He’ll Run for President.” New York Daily News, October 21. www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/biden-draws-implicit-contrasts-clinton-article-1.2403933 Kessler, Glenn. 2016.“Fact Check: Clinton’s Claim that Trump Supported an Intervention in Libya.” Washington Post, September 26. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/ live-updates/general-election/real-time-fact-checking-and-analysis-of-the-first-pres idential-debate/fact-check-clintons-claim-that-trump-supported-an-intervention-inlibya/?utm_term=.a6d9e44a492b Labott, Elise, and Tom Kludt. 2016. “Administration Confirms Two More Payments to Iran, Totaling $1.3 Billion.” CNN, September 8. www.cnn.com/2016/09/07/politics/ iran-cash-payments-congress-hearing/ Levin, Jonathan. 2014. “Hillary Clinton’s Foreign Policy Failures.” American Thinker, August 29. www.americanthinker.com/articles/2014/08/hillary_clintons_foreign_policy_ failures.html Martel, Francis. 2016. “Fact-Check: Yes, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama Have Refused to Say ‘Radical Islamic Terrorism’.” Breitbart, October 9. www.breitbart. com/live/second-presidential-debate-fact-check-livewire/fact-check-yes-hillaryclinton-barack-obama-refused-say-radical-islamic-terrorism/ McCammon, Sarah. 2016. “Inside Donald Trump’s Stump Speech, Annotated.” NPR, September 15. www.npr.org/2016/09/15/493915412/inside-donald-trumps-stumpspeech-annotated Morrongiello, Gabby. 2016. “Trump Campaign Slams Clinton Over ‘Desperate’ Press Conference.” Washington Examiner, September 8. www.washingtonexaminer.com/ trump-campaign-slams-clinton-over-desperate-press-conference/article/2601265 Neidig, Harper. 2016. “Priebus Blasts Clinton for Promoting ‘Failed Status Quo’.” The Hill, July 23. http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/288947-priebus-blastsclinton-for-promoting-failed-status-quo New York Times. 2016a. “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech.” April 27. www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html New York Times. 2016b. “Transcript of the First Debate.” September 27. www.nytimes. com/2016/09/27/us/politics/transcript-debate.html Newsweek. 2016. “Hillary Clinton’s Emails: New Poll Finds Nearly Half of American Adults Are Concerned About Them.” September 14. www.newsweek.com/hillaryclinton-emails-clinton-foundation-poll-reuters-trump-498559 Oldfield, Duane M., and Aaron Wildavsky. 1989. “Reconsidering the Two Presidencies.” Society 26: 54–9. Pager, Tyler. 2016. “Trump to Look at Recognizing Crimea as Russian Territory, Lifting Sanctions.” Politico, July 27. www.politico.com/story/2016/07/trump-crimeasanctions-russia-226292 Philip, Abby. 2016. “As Clinton Shifts on ‘Radical Islamic’ Label, Trump Claims Credit.” Washington Post, June 13. www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/

Clash of Candidates:The 2016 Election 221 wp/2016/06/13/clinton-on-radical-islamic-terrorism-label-its-not-what-we-call-itits-what-we-do-about-it/?utm_term=.4ad05f37c157 Rayman, Noah. 2014. “5 Things to Know From Hillary Clinton’s New Book.” Time, June 5. http://time.com/2834739/hillary-clinton-hard-choices-book/ Rucker, Philip. 2013. “Hillary Clinton Backs Obama on Syria Strikes.” Washington Post, September 19. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hillary-clinton-backs-obama-onsyria-strikes/2013/09/09/f697ecc6-196f-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html? Sanger, David E., and Amy Chozick. 2015. “Hillary Clinton Backs Iran Nuclear Deal, With Caveats.” New York Times, September 9. www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/ politics/hillary-clinton-backs-iran-nuclear-deal.html?_r=0 Savransky, Rebecca. 2016. “Trump Disputes Kaine’s Claim He Didn’t Know ‘Russia Took Over Crimea’.” The Hill, September 4. http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/ presidential-races/294454-trump-disputes-kaines-claim-he-didnt-know-russia-took Shapiro, Ben. 2016. “Trump: No More ‘Apology Tour . . .We Will Show the Whole World How Proud We Are to Be American’.” Daily Wire, September 7. www.dailywire.com/ news/8954/trump-no-more-apology-tourwe-will-show-whole-world-ben-shapiro Shepp, Jonah. 2016. “The Debate We Should Be Having About America’s Role in the Yemen War.” New York Magazine, June 22. http://nymag.com/daily/intelligen cer/2016/10/what-the-candidates-should-be-saying-about-the-yemen-war.html Sullivan, Kevin. 2016. “A Tough Decision That Still Haunts.” Washington Post, February 3. www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/02/03/a-tough-call-on-libya-that-stillhaunts/?utm_term=.b4af5d46c0f9 The Hill. 2016. “Transcript of Donald Trump’s Speech on National Security in Philadelphia.” September 7. http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/campaign/294817-transcriptof-donald-trumps-speech-on-national-security-in Thrush, Glenn. 2016. “Clinton Revamps Stump Speech to Tout Her Role in bin Laden Raid.” Politico, January 12. www.politico.com/story/2016/01/hillary-clinton-2016bin-laden-raid-217637 Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump]. 2016a. Our incompetent Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was the one who started talks to give 400 million dollars, in cash, to Iran. Scandal! [Tweet]. August 3. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/760783 130978648064?lang=en Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump]. 2016b. I have been hitting Obama and Crooked Hillary hard on not using the term Radical Islamic Terror. Hillary just broke-said she would now use! [Tweet]. June 13. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/74237 0798850199552?lang=en Weisberg, Herbert F., and Timothy G. Hill. 2004. “The Succession Presidential Election of 2000: The Battle of Legacies.” In Models of Voting in Presidential Elections: The 2000 U.S. Election, eds. Herbert F. Weisberg and Clyde Wilcox. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Weissman, Shoshana. 2016. “Bill Clinton Joins Chorus of Criticism on Hillary’s Russian Reset.” The Weekly Standard, January 5. www.weeklystandard.com/bill-clinton-joinschorus-of-criticism-on-hillarys-russian-reset/article/2000416 Weymouth, Lally. 2013. “Rare Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.” Washington Post, August 3. www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rare-interviewwith-egyptian-gen-abdel-fatah-al-sissi/2013/08/03/a77eb37c-fbc4-11e2-a369-d1954 abcb7e3_story.html?utm_term=.19cd195bac54 Wright, David. 2016. “I’ll Say the Words ‘Radical Islamism’.” CNN Politics, June 14. www.cnn. com/2016/06/13/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-orlando-attacks-reaction/

Appendix A US Domestic Terrorism, 2009–2016: Attackers Using Political Islam Justification

Year

Date

Event

2009

June 1

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (formerly Carlos Bledsoe) fatally shot an Army private at the ArmyNavy Career Center, Little Rock, Arkansas. Nidal Malik Hasan, of Palestinian heritage, fatally shot 13 Army servicemembers at Fort Hood, Texas. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, injured two passengers when attempting to detonate an improvised explosive on an airliner approaching a Detroit airport. No events. No events. No events. Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, of Dagestan and Kyrgyzstan, killed four people as bombs exploded near the Boston Marathon finish line and in a car chase. Identified as terrorism. Ali Muhammad Brown, an American, fatally shot four citizens in Washington state and New Jersey. Identified as terrorism. Alton Nolen, an American and recent convert to Islam, beheaded one person at food processing plant in Oklahoma. Zale Thompson, an American and recent convert to Islam, injured two police officers in an attack with a hatchet in Queens, New York. Ismaaiyl Brinsley, an American, fatally shot two police officers execution style in New York City. Elton Simpson, an American charged with attempting to travel to Somalia for violent jihad, injured one person at a contest in Garland, Texas, over cartoons critical of Islam. Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez, a Kuwaiti citizen, fatally shot four Marines at the Naval Reserve Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Faisal Mohammad, of Pakistani origin, stabbed four people at the University of California in Merced.

Nov. 5 Dec. 25

2010 2011 2012 2013

Apr. 15

2014

June 1, 25 Sept. 24 Oct. 23 Dec. 20

2015

May 3

July 16 Nov. 4

(Continued )

(Continued) Year

2016

Date

Event

Dec. 2

Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, of Pakistani heritage, fatally shot 24 people at a San Bernardino, California, social services center Christmas party. Edward Archer, an American, injured a police officer in Philadelphia “in the name of Islam.” Mohamed Barry, a Somali, injured four people with a machete in an Israeli-owned restaurant. Omar Mateen, of Afghan heritage, fatally shot 49 people at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Dahir Adan, a Somali, stabbed and injured eight people in a mall in St. Cloud, Minnesota. Ahmad Khan Rahami, an Afghan-American, planted bombs in New York City and New Jersey. Three exploded, injuring 31 people. Abdul Razak Ali Artan, a Somali, injured 12 people with a knife on the campus of Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio.

Jan. 7 Feb. 1 June 8–9 Sept. 17 Sept. 16–18 Nov. 28

Adapted by Feste (Chapter 3) from Johnston, Wm. Robert. 2016. “Obama White House Statements on Domestic Terrorist Attacks.” www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/obamaonterorism1.html

Appendix B Selected Speeches of President Obama, 2009–2017: Counterterrorism Policy

2009

Jan. 20

May 21

June 4

Inaugural Address: “Our nation is at war against a farreaching network of violence and hatred . . . on this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord. . . . We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan . . . and to those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror . . . our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken . . . we will defeat you.” Politics of articulation: Bush address to the nation, Sept. 20, 2001 Politics of preemption: New direction; unity over politics Remarks at the National Archives: “My single most important responsibility as President is to keep the American people safe. . . . An extremist ideology threatens our people. . . . We know that this threat will be with us for a long time. . . . I have confidence that the American people are more interested in doing what is right to protect this country than in political posturing . . . recent debate has obscured the truth and sent people into opposite and absolutist ends . . . those who make little allowance for the unique challenges posed by terrorism . . . [and] those who . . . suggest that the ends of fighting terrorism can be used to justify the means. . . . I believe that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together. We will not be safe if we see national security as a wedge that divides America.” Politics of articulation: Bush farewell speech, Jan. 15, 2009 Politics of preemption: Unity over politics Remarks in Cairo: “Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims. . . . I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect. . . . It’s easier to start wars than to end them. It’s easier to blame others than to look inward. . . . The people of the world can live together in peace.” Politics of articulation: Bush address to the nation, Sept. 20, 2001 Politics of preemption: Unity over politics (Continued )

(Continued) Nov. 10

Dec. 28

2011

May 2

Oct. 21

2012

Jan. 24

Remarks at Memorial Service at Fort Hood, Texas: “It may be hard to comprehend the twisted logic that led to this tragedy. But this much we do know: No faith justifies these murderous and craven acts. . . . In a world of threats that know no borders, their legacy will be marked in the safety . . . and security and opportunity that’s extended abroad.” Politics of articulation: Bush address to the nation, Sept. 20, 2001 Remarks on Improving Homeland Security After Attempted Terrorist Attack on Christmas Day: “The American people should remain vigilant, but also be confident. Those plotting against us seek not only to undermine our security but also the open society and the values that we cherish as Americans. . . . We will be guided by our hopes, our unity, and our deeply held values.” Politics of articulation: Bush address to the nation, Sept. 20, 2001 Politics of preemption: Unity over politics Remarks on the Death of Osama bin Laden: “On September 11, 2001, in our time of grief, the American people came together . . . we were also united in our resolve to protect our nation and to bring those who committed this vicious attack to justice. . . . We must also reaffirm that the United States is not—and never will be—at war with Islam. . . . And tonight, let us think back to the sense of unity that prevailed on 9/11. I know that it has, at times, frayed . . . we are one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” Politics of articulation: Bush address to the nation, Sept. 20, 2001 Politics of preemption: Assertive actions; unity of the nation Remarks on the Withdrawal of the United States From Iraq: “I pledged to bring the war in Iraq to a responsible end—for the sake of our national security and to strengthen American leadership around the world . . . as promised after the rest of our troops in Iraq will come home by the end of the year. After nearly nine years, America’s war in Iraq will be over. . . . So to sum up, the United States is moving forward from a position of strength.” Politics of preemption: Assertive actions charting a new course State of the Union Address: “For the first time in nine years there are no Americans fighting in Iraq. For the first time in two decades, Osama bin Laden is not a threat to this country. Most of al Qaeda’s top lieutenants have been defeated. The Taliban’s momentum has been broken. . . .” [On bin Laden capture operation] “All that mattered that day was the mission. No one thought about politics. . . . the mission only succeeded because every member of that unit trusted each other. . . . so it is with America. . . . as long as we are joined in common purpose, as long as we maintain our common resolve . . . the state of our Union will always be strong.” Politics of preemption: Unity over politics

2013

Apr. 16

2014

Sept. 10

Dec. 6

Remarks on Terrorist Attack in Boston, Massachusetts: “. . . given what we now know about what took place, the FBI is investigating it as an act of terrorism. Any time bombs are used to target innocent civilians, it is an act of terror. What we don’t know, however, is who carried out this attack, or why; whether it was planned and executed by a terrorist organization, foreign or domestic, or was the act of a malevolent individual.” Politics of preemption: nothing specific Address to the Nation on US Strategy to Combat the Islamic State: “ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. . . . ISIL poses a threat to Iraq, Syria, the broader Middle East, including American citizens, personnel, and facilities.” [Strategy summary: The United States is meeting the threat by a campaign of air strikes and with ground troop advisors, military assistance (resources and training) for Syrian opposition, counterterrorism messaging, and humanitarian assistance for innocent civilians.] “My administration has also secured bipartisan support for this approach here at home. I have the authority to address the threat from ISIL, but I believe we are strongest a nation when the President and Congress work together. So I welcome congressional support for this effort in order to show the world that Americans are united in confronting this danger.” Politics of preemption: A new plan; unity over politics Address to the Nation on US Counterterrorism Strategy: “14 Americans were killed as they came together to celebrate holidays. . . . I want to talk with you about this tragedy, the broader threat of terrorism, and how we can keep our country safe.” [Strategy summary: Air strikes taking out ISIL leaders, military training and equipment provided to Iraqi and Syrian forces, increased intelligence sharing with European allies to counter ISIL’s narrative, pursuing political resolution to Syrian war.] “Congress should act to make sure no one on a no-fly list is able to buy a gun.What could possibly be the argument for allowing a terrorist suspect to buy a semiautomatic weapon? This is a matter of national security. . . . Finally, if Congress believes, as I do, that we are at war with ISIL, it should go ahead and vote to authorize the continued use of military force against the terrorists. . . .We cannot turn against one another by letting this fight be defined as a war between America and Islam. . . . an extremist ideology has spread within some Muslim communities.This is a real problem that Muslims must confront, without excuses. . . .We have always met challenges . . . terrorist attacks—by coming together around our common ideals as one Nation and one people.” Politics of preemption: The new plan reiterated; unity over politics (Continued )

(Continued) 2016

June 14

Dec. 6

Remarks on US Strategy to Counter the Islamic State: “. . . We do not have any information to indicate that a foreign terrorist group directed the attack in Orlando. It is increasingly clear, however, that the killer took in extremist information and propaganda over the Internet. He appears to have been an angry, disturbed, unstable young man who became radicalized . . . these lone actors or small cells of terrorists are very hard to detect and very hard to prevent. . . . Our mission is to destroy ISIL . . . to ratchet up our fight.” [Strategy summary: ISIL continues to lose key leaders and to lose ground in Iraq, Syria, and Libya; ISIL is effectively cut off from the international finance system; ISIL’s ranks are shrinking and morale is sinking.] “Be tough on terrorism . . . reinstate the assault weapons ban. Make it harder for terrorists to use these weapons to kill us. . . . otherwise . . . these kinds of events are going to keep on happening. And the weapons are only going to get more powerful . . . the main contribution of some of my friends on the other side of the aisle have made in the fight against ISIL is to criticize this administration and me for not using the phrase ‘radical Islam.’ That’s the key, they tell us. We can’t beat ISIL unless we call them ‘radical Islamists.’ What exactly would using this label accomplish? What exactly would it change? . . . Calling a threat by a different name does make it go away. This is a political distraction. . . . So there’s no magic to the phrase ‘radical Islam.’ It is a political talking point; it’s not a strategy. And the reason I am careful about how I describe the threat has nothing to do with political correctness and everything to do with actually defeating extremism . . . and up until this point, this argument about labels has mostly just been partisan rhetoric. . . . We’re starting to see where this kind of rhetoric and loose talk and sloppiness about who exactly we are fighting, where this can lead us. . . . Where does this stop? The Orlando killer, one of the San Bernardino killers, the Fort Hood killer— they were all U.S. citizens . . . treating everyone fairly . . . the unity and resolve that will allow us to defeat ISIL.” Politics of preemption: The new plan reiterated; unity over politics Remarks on US Counterterrorism Strategy:“The most solemn responsibility for any President is keeping the American people safe. . . . Today, by any measure, al Qaeda—the organization that hit us on 9/11—is a shadow of its former self. . . . Dozens of terrorist leaders have been killed. Osama bin Laden is dead. . . . ISIL has a lot more than half its territory. ISIL has lost control of major population centers, its morale is plummeting, its recruitment is drying up . . . local populations are turning against it . . . and we’ve accomplished all this at a cost of $10 billion over two years,

2017

Jan. 10

which is the same amount that we used to spend in one month at the height of the Iraq War. So the campaign against ISIL has been relentless. It has been sustainable. . . . We’ve launched a Global Engagement Center to empower voices that are countering ISIL’s perversion of Islam. . . . No foreign terrorist organization has successfully planned and executed an attack on our homeland. . . . We know that a deadly threat persists. We know that in some form, this violent extremism will be with us for years to come. . . . And what complicates this challenge even more is the fact that for all of our necessary focus on fighting terrorists overseas, the most deadly attacks on the homeland over the last eight years . . . have been carried out by homegrown and largely isolated individuals who were radicalized online . . . in Boston, in San Bernardino, in Fort Hood, and Orlando. . . . Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people, but they don’t pose an existential threat to our nation, and we must not make the mistake of elevating them as if they do. . . . If we act like this is a war between the United States and Islam, we’re not just going to lose more Americans to terrorist attacks, but we’ll also lose sight of the very principles we claim to defend. . . . We are a nation that at our best has been defined by hope, and not fear.” Politics of preemption: Defense of Obama’s plan Farewell Address: “No foreign terrorist organization has successfully planned and executed an attack on our homeland these past eight years. . . . We have taken out tens of thousands of terrorists—including bin Laden. The global coalition we’re leading against ISIL has taken out their leaders, and taken away about half their territory. ISIL will be destroyed. . . . We cannot withdraw from big global fights. . . . For the fight against freedom and intolerance and sectarianism and chauvinism are of a piece within the fight against authoritarianism and nationalist aggression. . . . So let’s be vigilant, but not afraid. ISIL will try to kill innocent people. But they cannot defeat America unless we betray our Constitution and our principles in the fight. . . . I leave this stage tonight even more optimistic about this country than when we started.” Politics of preemption: Defense of Obama’s plan

Source: Feste (Chapter 3), from Compilation of Presidential Documents. www.archives.gov/federalregister/publications/presidential-compilation.html

Index

9/11 3, 5, 19, 22, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 44, 46, 53, 63, 66, 69, 77, 88, 124, 177 Abbotabad, Pakistan 57, 58 Abdulmutallab, Umar Farouk 121, 132, 223 Abu Ghraib, Iraq 59, 188 Adams, John 86, 87 Afghanistan 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 22, 28, 29, 34, 43, 45, 47, 51, 55, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 69, 74, 75, 77, 82, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 112, 114, 118, 120, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 138, 147, 153, 155, 164, 172, 173, 177, 179, 180, 181, 185, 191, 196, 202, 217, 225; Bilateral Security Agreement (2014) 164; narcotics/drug trade 19, 180; Russian cooperation with US 183; Soviet invasion of 196; US invasion of 51; US troop surge 95 – 97, 99 – 100,  106 Africa 78, 79, 81, 103 “after health care” 118 Agency for International Development (AID) 188 Air Force 129 al Arabiya 54, 202 al-Assad, Bashar 2, 6, 26, 81, 82, 90, 101, 172, 180, 205; “red line” and chemical weapons in Syria 2, 4, 5, 6, 102, 106, 204 – 206; Russian support of 15, 70, 107, 184 – 186 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama 133, 136 al-Awlaki, Anwar 11, 43, 127, 132, 133, 136; constitutionality of drone strikes 12, 128, 134 – 137 al-Awlaki, Nasser 133 al-Hazmi, Nawaf 132 al-Hijrah, Dar, mosque 132 al-Masri, Abu al-Khayr 12 al-Mindhar, Khalid 132

al Qaeda 11, 30, 43, 45, 46, 54, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 69, 78, 83, 90, 98, 112, 114, 115, 120, 121, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 177, 178, 226, 228; and drone strikes 12, 55; growth in Iraq 59, 65, 101 al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 90, 132, 133 al-Zahawi, Mohammed 64 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 60 Amash, Justin 138 Amnesty International 188 Amsterdam, Netherlands 93, 121, 184 Arab Spring 79, 197, 200, 202 – 203 Arak, Iran 176 Arctic Council 166 Army (US) 121 Article I (Constitution) 85 Article II (Constitution) 2, 81, 85, 122, 144; and treaties 145, 149, 155 Article III (Constitution) 89, 116 Asia 16, 61, 70, 120, 158, 172, 177, 178, 179, 180 Atlantic (The) 58, 117, 173 Atlantic Council 95 Attorney General 10, 95, 118, 119, 120, 121, 128, 130, 132, 133; see also Holder, Eric Audacity of Hope 76 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF 2001) 5, 6, 11, 77, 83, 87, 88, 89, 114, 115, 124, 130, 131, 134, 135, 137 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF 2002) 5, 6, 75, 77, 83, 88, 89 Axelrod 95, 100, 106 Baath Party 6, 45, 78; see also de-Baathification Bagram, Iraq 188

232 Index Baltic Sea 182, 183, 189 Bates, John 133, 136 Bauer, Robert 80 Belgium 60, 62 Bellinger, John 152 Benghazi, Libya 16, 30, 33, 44, 63, 106, 197, 206 – 207; congressional testimony 26, 64, 81, 97, 198 Bergdahl, Bowe 10, 102, 121 Berk v. Laird (1970) 88 Berlin, Germany 62, 217; Airlift 1 Berlin Wall 50, 198, 216 Biden, Joseph 105, 94, 95, 97, 98, 148, 207, 208 Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) 173, 178; see also Russia bin Laden, Osama 30, 43, 44, 45, 46, 57, 58, 97, 132, 135; killing 47, 59, 207, 208, 213, 226, 228, 229 Bissonnette, Matt 59 Black Sea 182, 183, 189 “black sites” 112, 124 Blackstone, William 85, 89 Blair, Dennis 54, 100 Boston Globe 75 Boston Marathon (bombing) 61, 67, 178, 212, 213, 223 Brandenburg Gate 217 Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 136 Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative 178 Breedlove, Philip 182 Bremer, Paul (Jerry) 78 Brennan, John 54, 58, 101, 129, 130 Britain 46, 87, 132, 203, 204; and Libya strikes 81; see also United Kingdom Brussels, Belgium 60 Burns, James MacGregor 50, 116 Bush, George Herbert Walker 15, 50; 1988 election 196, 198; treaties 150 – 152 Bush, George Walker 3, 4, 5, 6, 34, 44, 52, 56, 57, 60, 61, 64, 68, 139, 154, 198, 225, 226; Afghanistan 77; Decision Points 37; drones 128; elections 196; enemy combatants 9; enhanced interrogation 100; Guantanamo Bay 112 – 115, 123; international terrorism during presidency 62 – 63; leadership style 51, 53, 66, 67; legacy 69; military force 74 – 76, 88, 89; public approval and “rally” after 9/11 22, 28, 44, 46, 217; rhetorical style 19, 20, 27, 32, 54; Russia 181, 201; treaties 144, 148, 149,

150 – 153, 154, 156 – 157; War in Iraq 52, 55, 59, 78, 79, 212; war on terror 43, 45 Butler, Pierce 86 Calderón, Felipe 105 Campbell, Colin 116 Carter, Ashton 103, 104, 118 Carter, James Earl 156, 196; treaties 150 – 152 Cartwright, James 98 Castro, Fidel 9 Castro, Raul 9 Caucusus, terrorist groups 178 Centers for Disease Control 103 Central Asia 120, 172, 177, 180 Central Europe 181 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 11, 12, 55, 57, 58, 63, 93, 94, 100, 101, 106, 124, 129, 131, 133, 178, 189, 207 Chechnya 177, 179; humanitarian aid 188 chemical weapons 2, 4 – 6, 8, 26, 70, 74, 81, 82, 90, 91, 102, 107, 185, 186, 187, 204, 205, 206; see also al-Assad, Bashar; Syria Chemical Weapons Convention 185 Chief of Staff 99, 100, 118 China 5, 70, 173; Iran sanctions 176 Christians, in Syria and Iraq 102 Christmas Day (bombing attempt) 121 Cleveland, Ohio 208 Clinton, Hillary Rodham 2, 8, 15, 33, 58, 63, 82, 94, 95, 97, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 196, 200 – 203, 207, 209 – 211, 213, 215; 2016 nomination 198; Benghazi attack 30, 198, 199, 206; cabinet 30; favorability 199; Hard Choices 208; most admired woman 198; Obama’s decisionmaking 208; private email server 197, 215; Russian “reset” 14; Syria 82, 205 Clinton, William Jefferson 52, 90, 107, 177; treaties 151 – 152 CNBC 57 CNN 61 Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) 78 Cold War i, 9, 14, 15, 54, 70, 96, 146, 154, 172, 175, 181, 184, 186, 188, 197, 198, 216, 217 Comey, James 16, 215 Commander-in-Chief 90 Commonwealth of Independent States 177 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 142, 153

Index  233 Congress i, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 36, 46, 49, 50, 52, 56, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 97, 100, 102, 105, 108, 113, 199, 207, 208, 217, 227; armed services and intelligence committees 129; Benghazi investigation 198 – 199, 206; delegation of authority 148 – 149; drone strikes 128 – 129, 133 – 135, 137 – 139; Guantanamo Bay 114 – 124; institutional prerogative 149; Iran nuclear agreement 142 – 150, 160 – 164; mid-term elections (2010) 120; military action and war powers 6, 7; Military Commissions Act (2006) 115; national defense programs 122; Obama address to (2009) 19; PATRIOT Act 45; partisan polarization 149; presidential drone policy 139; Republican opposition to Obama 161; Russia and Trump election 187 – 188; support for Guantanamo Bay closure 121; torture and enemy combatants 56; treaty ratification failures 165; see also Article I (Constitution); House of Representatives; Senate Constitution 76, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89; congressional treaty approval 165; Declaration of War Clause 84; drone strikes 128; due process 11; Philadelphia Convention (1787) 7, 85; presidential military action 6; see also Article I; Article II; Article III containment 216; see also Cold War; Soviet Union Corker, Robert (Bob) 162, 163 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 44, 61, 62 Craig, Gregory 118, 119, 122, 123 Crimea 15, 31, 172, 208; and European Union 208; Russian annexation 178, 180, 182 – 184,  209 Cruz, Ted  101 Cuba 3, 7, 9, 19, 31, 56, 101, 112, 115; see also Castro, Fidel; Castro, Raul; Guantanamo Bay Czech Republic 178, 205; and missile defense 182 – 183 Daily Beast 57 Damascus, Syria 74, 81; chemical weapons attack on 185, 204 DCLeaks 187

de-Baathification 74, 79; see also Baath Party Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 183 Defense, Department of 93, 99, 100, 101, 103 Defense, Secretary of 59, 79, 94, 95, 95, 97, 99 – 104, 108, 114, 118, 119, 138, 190, 207; see also Carter, Ashton; Gates, Robert; Hagel, Charles (Chuck); Panetta, Leon Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 109, 110 Democratic Party 46, 68, 98, 104, 106, 119 Dempsey, Martin 101 Denver, Colorado, murder rate 65 Detroit, Michigan (airline bombing plot) 54, 56, 93, 121, 132, 223 Dima Yakovlev Act  188 Director of National Intelligence 54, 100, 175; see also Blair, Dennis dirty bomb 179 Dodd-Frank Act 119 Donilon, Thomas 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 105 drone strikes i, 3, 11, 12, 29, 55, 57, 64, 68, 80, 93, 124, 128, 198; administrative procedures 131, 137; and Authorization for the Use of Military Force 130; Donald Trump’s policy 10, 134, 138; and due process 127, 134 – 136; and Pakistan 56; Russia’s technological advancement 138; see also al-Awlaki, Anwar Dubs, Adolph 63 due process 11, 12, 113, 116, 124, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137; see also al-Awlaki, Anwar; Constitution; drone strikes Dukakis, Michael 15, 196 Eastern Europe 172, 176, 182 Ebola 103 Edwards III, George C. 5, 116, 117 Egypt 202 Ehrlichman, John 94 Eisenhower, Dwight David 1, 2, 50, 51, 52, 196; leadership style 116; and treaties 149 – 150,  152 el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah 202 Emanuel, Rahm 95, 98, 118, 119, 121 enemy combatants 9, 11, 12, 65, 120, 134, 135, 137 Energy, Department of 99

234 Index Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 36 Espionage Act 189 Estonia 182 European Reassurance Initiative 182 European Union 183, 184, 187; and Crimea 208; and Iranian nuclear agreement 210 Executive Order 12333 130 executive orders 21, 35, 36, 56, 70, 130; Obama and Guantanamo Bay 113 – 114, 119, 122, 123 Ex Parte Milligan (1866) 137 Ex Parte Quirin (1942) 134 ExxonMobil 33 Facebook 4 Fairbanks, Alaska 166 Fairfax County,Virginia 120 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 16, 132, 175, 187, 209, 227; Clinton email server investigation 178, 227 Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court 128 Federalist No. 4, 86 Fifth Amendment 11, 131, 134; see also Constitution Florida 112; 2000 election recount 44; Orlando shooting 61, 224 Flournoy, Michelle 104 Flynn, Michael (Lt. General) 9, 33, 109, 110, 138, 189, 211 Ford, Gerald Rudolph; and treaties 150 – 152 foreign Policy 13, 14, 16, 19, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 47, 49, 54, 58, 59, 66, 67, 69, 117, 120, 146, 187, 188, 189, 190, 201; and 9/11 27, 44; bin Laden killing 59; 2016 election 2, 196, 197, 198, 199 – 200, 215; Donald Trump 5, 90, 211, 216; and drones 128, 131, 133, 137; and George W. Bush 68, 154; Hillary Clinton 8, 203, 206, 207, 210, 211, 213; international agreements and treaties 145, 147, 154, 160, 164, 165; Mitt Romney and Cold War 15; Obama and Iran nuclear agreement 36; Obama and Iraq troop withdrawal 53, 153; Obama approval 16, 49, 67, 213, 214; Obama’s advisors and structure 90, 94, 97, 105, 108, 109; Obama’s discourse 3, 19, 28, 29, 36, 47, 54, 58, 66, 117; Obama’s legacy 16,

31, 34, 173, 187, 188 – 189; Obama’s strategic approach 3, 32, 46, 51, 53, 177; partisanship 146; and Russia 30, 172, 173, 175, 183 – 184, 208; and social media 20 Foreign Policy 103 Fort Hood, Texas 44, 60 Founders 76 Four-Party Counterterrorism Working Group 178 Fourteenth Amendment 134; see also Constitution; due process; Fifth Amendment Fourth Amendment 131; see also Constitution; due process; Fifth Amendment Fox News Sunday 64 Framers of the Constitution 89; see also Founders France 4, 203, 204; and Libya strikes 81; and “Quasi-War”  86 Free Syrian Army 186 Friedman, Thomas  80 Frontline 122 Gall, Carlotta 59 Gallup Poll 198, 213 Garland, Texas 212, 223 Gates, Robert 7, 17, 59, 77, 79, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106, 108, 109, 207; memoir 8 General Motors 57 Geneva Conventions 124, 135; see also United Nations Genocide Convention 153; see also United Nations Georgia: Russian invasion 201 Gerry, Elbridge 86 Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (GRU) [Russia Security Services], 187 Global Counterterrorism Forum 178 going public 21, 22, 23, 116 Goldberg, Jeffrey 117 Goldstein, Gordon 98 Gonzales, Alberto 128 Gorbachev, Mikhail 50 Gorsuch, Neil 139 Gowdy, Trey  207 Great Depression 29 Greenstein, Fred I. 116 Grenada 7 Ground Zero 57; see also 9/11; New York City

Index  235 Guantanamo Bay 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 56, 102, 103, 112, 120, 188; closure 113 – 114, 119, 121, 123; Donald Trump on 124; executive order 122 – 123; military commissions 12, 114 – 116; number of detainees 113; Obama’s leadership style on 116; Obama’s speeches on 117; Periodic Review Board 114; reduction of detainees 117 Guccifer 2.0, 187 gun violence 123 habeas corpus 115; see also Constitution; due process; Ex Parte Milligan; Ex Parte Quirin; Fifth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment Hadi, Abdrabbuh Mansour 203 Hagel, Charles (Chuck) 7, 101 – 104, 118, 119 Haiti 200 Haley, Nikki 190 Hamdan, Salem Ahmed 135 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 12, 76, 115, 127, 134 – 137 Hamdi,Yaser Esam 134 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) 11, 76, 114, 115, 127, 131, 134, 135 – 137, 139 Hasan, Nidal Malik 65 Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund 180 Helms, Jesse 148 Hersh, Seymour 58 Hindu Kush, Afghanistan 59 H.J. Res. 61, 163 Holder, Eric 10, 95, 119, 130, 132; and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed trial 120; and targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki 133 Homeland, Secretary of 95; see also Johnson, Jeh Homeland Security, Department of 19, 45, 104 Homeland Security, Office of 45 House of Representatives: Armed Services Committee 138; Budget Committee 99 – 100; Committee on Intelligence 207; Oversight Committee 206; see also Congress; Senate H.R. 3460 163 H. Res 292 80 Human Rights Watch 188 Hungary 178 Huntington, Samuel 217 Hussein, Saddam 6, 28, 45, 74, 78

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 30, 174 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 183 International Atomic Energy Agency 175, 176 International Monetary Fund 184 Iran 31, 35, 36, 101, 102, 161, 172; nuclear weapons program 197; and Russia 183; sanctions against 163, 176, 210; US cash payment to 210 Iranian hostage crisis 196 Iran nuclear accord 2, 8, 16, 13, 19, 22, 33, 143, 160, 210 – 212; and presidential authority 164; see also Join Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 162 – 163 Iraq 2, 3, 7, 16, 19, 22, 29, 35, 43, 45, 46, 59, 65, 69, 74, 75, 78, 80, 82, 83, 88, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 129, 155, 172, 177, 185, 196, 217; drawdown of US troops 44, 55, 79, 212; military forces 60; Obama rhetoric on 103; and Status of Forces Agreement 6; surge of troops 79; US invasion of 51 – 52; war in 27, 46, 55, 118 iSight 187 ISIL (Islamic State in the Levant) 83, 89, 184 – 187 ISIS (Islamic State in Syria) 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 16, 20, 26, 29, 30, 31, 35, 44, 49, 59, 62, 65 – 67, 70, 75, 83 – 84, 87 – 88, 101, 102, 103, 113, 124, 197, 200, 203, 208, 209, 212, 213, 217; as “JV team” 69; and Ohio State University attack 212; and social media 61 Islam, American fear of 54 Islamic Emirate of the Caucusus 177 Islamic State in North Africa 81 Israel 175, 211; and Palestinian conflict 107, 200 Issa, Darrell 206 Istanbul, Turkey  60 Ivanov,Viktor  180 Jarrett,Valerie  116 Jay Treaty  87 Ji, Xinping 5 jihad 54 Johnson, Jeh 80, 104

236 Index Johnson, Lyndon Baines 77, 88, 98, 196; and treaties 152 Johnson, Ron 206 Johnson, William Robert 65 Join Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 160, 162, 176; see also Iran nuclear agreement Review Act Joint Chiefs of Staff 96, 101, 103 Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 11, 129 Jones, James L. (General) 94 – 97, 104 – 105 Jong-Un, Kim 5, 16, 70 Jordan 159, 202 Justice, Department of 76, 83, 87, 119, 120, 122; white paper (2013) 130 – 131,  133 Kaine, Tim  209 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald 9, 51; and missile gap with Soviet Union 196; and treaties 150 – 152 Kernell, Samuel 116 Kerry, John 8, 33, 82, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 143, 164, 185, 186, 205, 208, 212 Khaleel, Ziyad 132 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali 32 Khan, Samir 133 Khatalla, Abhmed Abu 64 “kill lists” 93, 131 Klaidman, Daniel 118 Koh, Harold 129 Korean War 50, 82, 90, 196, 217; see also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Truman, Harry S. Kruschev, Nikita 9 Krutz, Glen 13, 144 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 184 Kurds 102, 186 Kuwait 84 Labor, Secretary of 107 LaHood, Ray 108 Latakia, Syria 185 Latif, Aamir 59 Latvia 182 Lavrov, Sergei 14, 15, 188, 201 League of Nations 50 Legal Counsel, Office of (White House) 79, 80, 83, 84 LGBTQ rights 188, 189 Libya 2, 4, 5, 19, 29, 35, 63, 64, 74, 75, 79 – 82, 84, 87, 90, 97, 120, 178, 202, 228; air strikes on 87, 203 – 204;

Benghazi attack 44, 63, 64, 71, 197, 207; civil war 99 Lippert, Mark 95 Lithuania 182 Little v. Barreme (1804) 86 Locke, John 85, 89 London, England (airline bomb plot) 46 “lone wolf ” attacks 212 Macron, Emmanuel 166 Madison, James 86, 89 Magnitsky, Sergei 188 Mai Lai massacre (Vietnam) 59 Makarov, Nikolay 180 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, 184 Management and Budget, Office of 99 Manhattan, New York 121 Marshall, John 87 Marx, Karl 216 Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 12, 130 – 131, 134, 136 Mattis, James 138, 190 McCain, John 29, 35, 47, 186 McChrystal, Stanley 95, 96, 98 McClatchy-Marist poll 215 McDonough, Denis 95, 100 McGain, John 121 McMaster, H.R. (Herbert Raymond) 33, 138 Mediterranean 80 Medvedev, Dmitry 14, 172, 173, 177, 186; see also Russia Mexico 36 Middle East 20, 59, 68, 69, 74, 79, 101, 107, 128, 138, 175, 176, 200, 211, 217 midterm elections (2010) 21, 30, 113, 120 Military Commissions Act of 2006 115, 135; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) Minneapolis, Minnesota, mall attack 212 missile defense 183, 187 Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh 10, 119, 121 Monaco, Lisa 102, 103 Monroe Doctrine 33 Morsi, Mohamed 202 Moscow, Russia 176 Moscow Helsinki Group 188 Moscow Treaty  148 Mosul, Iraq 60 Mubarak, Hosni 202 Muhammad (Prophet) 206 Mullen, Michael (Admiral) 98, 103, 180 Munich Security Conference 172, 186 Muslim Brotherhood 201, 202

Index  237 Muslims 33, 34, 45, 46, 54, 55, 60, 61, 66, 120, 132, 177, 201, 225, 227; and extremism 45; and immigration ban 4, 35, 70; and radicalization 55 mustard gas see chemical weapons Napolitano, Janet 95 National Defense Authorization (FY 2014) 121 National Journal 108 National Security Advisor 8, 95, 109, 118, 119, 206 National Security Agency 189 National Security Council 93, 97, 102, 105, 109, 120, 133 National Security Strategy (2002) 43 National Security Strategy (2015) 43 NATO-Russia Council 180; Counterterrorism Working Group 178 Navy SEALS 57, 59, 90, 207 NBC 57 Netanyahu, Benjamin 105, 210 Neustadt, Richard 5, 116 New Jersey (bombing) 212 New Mexico 132 Newsweek 57, 120 New York City 65, 119, 212; and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed trial 121; see also 9/11; Ground Zero New York Times 59, 124 New Zealand 200 Nigeria 121 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 35 Nixon, Richard Milhous 51, 88, 196; and cabinet 94; and treaties 150 – 152 Nobel Peace Prize 29 No Easy Day 59 no fly zones 79 NOMINATE scores 145 Non-Proliferation Treaty 30, 174, 175 North Africa 79 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 36, 147 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 5, 6, 29, 55, 62, 70, 79, 80, 95, 172, 176, 177, 180, 187, 198; and admission of Georgia 181; and Donald Trump 70, 203; and Libya air strikes 6, 29, 79, 80, 203; and Russia relations 173, 181 – 183, 189; and Turkey 60; and Ukraine admission 181

North Korea 5, 16, 70, 172, 173, 217 Northwest Airlines, Flight 253, 93, 121 Northwestern University 130 Nunn-Lugar Act 178 Obama, Barack Hussein: 2016 election 16, 196 – 222; advisory structure 7 – 9, 93 – 111; “apology tour” 216; Audacity of Hope 76; Clean Power Plan 36; counterterrorism policies 43 – 73; drones 11 – 12, 127 – 141; executive orders on gun violence 123; Guantanamo Bay closure 10, 112 – 126; leadership style 4, 44, 47, 49 – 52, 53, 68; military initiatives 5 – 7, 74 – 92; Nobel Peace Prize winner 29; rhetorical leadership 3, 19 – 43, 44, 47 – 49; Russian relations 14 – 15, 172 – 195; treaty record and executive agreements 13 – 14, 142 – 171 O’Connor, Sandra Day 11, 134 Odierno, Ray (General) 103 Ohio State University 212 Olsen, Matt 122 O’Neill, Robert 59; see also Navy SEALS Operation Iraqi Freedom 30 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons  185 Organization of American States (OAS) 33 Orlando, Florida (shootings) 10, 44, 61, 67, 208, 213 Owen, Mark 59; see also Bissonnette, Matt; Navy SEALS Pakistan 46, 47, 54 – 59, 61, 77, 93, 121, 129, 180, 200, 223, 224 Panama 7 Panetta, Leon 7, 55, 57, 94, 96, 99, 100 – 101, 106,  207 Paris, France 10, 60 Paris climate agreement (2015) 4, 14, 31, 33, 36, 166 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 119 PATRIOT Act 20, 28, 45 Paul, Rand 138 Pentagon 2, 62, 96, 103, 120 Periodic Review Board 114; see also Cuba; Guantanamo Bay Persian Gulf War (1991) 7, 132 Petraeus, David (General) 56, 98, 100, 101, 106, 186

238 Index Philadelphia Convention 85; see also Constitution, Philadelphia Convention (1787) Pillar, Paul 64 Pinckney, Charles 85 Plouffe, David 100 Poland 182 Politico 108, 205 Powell, Colin 78, 109 Prague, Czech Republic 173 Preibus, Reince 211 presidential approval ratings 1,2, 21, 25, 31, 46, 47, 48, 57, 58, 59, 67, 208, 213, 214, 217 presidential rhetoric 2, 3, 20, 54, 64, 67, 69, 70, 103, 105, 109, 116, 212 Préval, René 200 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 122 Putin,Vladimir 14, 15, 90, 148, 172, 176, 177, 180, 189, 201, 208, 217; and Crimea 208 – 209; and Donald Trump 190, 209; Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 181, 184; and homosexuality 188 – 189; and invasion of the Ukraine 106, 180, 184; see also Russia Qaddafi, Muammar 4, 6, 74, 79, 80, 97, 203, 204 Quirk, Paul 8 radical Islamic terrorism 16, 201, 212, 213 Rahman, Omar Abdel 132 rally around the flag 22, 28, 44; see also presidential approval ratings Rasul v. Bush (2004) 115, 119 rational choice 26, 27 Reagan, Ronald Wilson 51, 63, 196, 217; and Cold War 198; treaties 150 – 152 RealClearPolitics 213 Red Square (Moscow) 216 Reich, Robert 107, 108 Republican National Convention 33 retrospective voting 198 Reuters/IPSOS poll 215 Rewards for Justice Program 177 rhetorical presidency 64, 66 Rhodes, Ben 107 Rhodes Scholar 104 Rice, Susan 7, 33, 94, 95, 97, 101, 103, 104, 106, 118, 119, 206 Rockman, Bert 116 Rolling Stone 58, 96

Romania 178 Romney, Willard (Mitt) 14, 15, 58, 64, 216 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 50, 87 Roosevelt, Theodore  21 Rota, Spain 183 Ruemmler, Kathryn 82 Russia 2, 6, 16, 30, 33, 74, 82, 91; air defense systems 211; annexation of Crimea 178, 182 – 184; Dima Yakovlev Act 211; drone technology 138; Federal Drug Control Service 180; human rights 188 – 189; interference in 2016 election 215; intervention in Ukraine 178, 180, 182; invasion of Georgia 201; narcotics 180; navy 175; Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant 180; “reset” with the US 181, 201 – 202; security services (GRU) 178, 187; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 142, 154; summit with US (June 2000) 177; and transition of Donald Trump 109; US sanctions on 181, 209; World Trade Organization membership 172; see also Medvedev, Dmitry; Putin,Vladimir San Bernardino, California (shootings) 10, 44, 61, 67, 208, 213 Sanders, Bernie 197 San Francisco, California 122 sarin gas see chemical weapons Saudi Arabia: coalition in Yemen 203 Savage, Charlie 75 Scalia, Antonin 139 Schiphol Airport (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 184 SEAL Team 6; see also Bissonnette, Matt; Navy SEALS; O’Neill, Robert Senate: Armed Services Committee 175; and arms treaties 148; Foreign Relations Committee 101, 143; Intelligence Committee 100; and rejection of treaties 145 – 146 September 11 Commission Report 46 Serbia 178 Sherman, Roger 86 S.J. Res 23, 75 Skowronek, Stephen 5 Sloan, Cliff 122 Smith, Nathan (Captain) 6, 75, 84, 87 – 89 Snowden, Edward 15, 173, 189 Sochi Olympic Games 178, 189 “soft power” 90

Index  239 Somalia 35, 129 South America 87 Soviet Union 9, 14, 15, 50, 70, 142, 154, 173, 181, 185, 216, 217; see also Cold War; Russia Springfield, Illinois 46 Sputnik 196 “stagflation” 196 Stalin, Joseph 216 State, Department of 34, 60, 93, 97, 105, 107, 152, 180, 189; and Iran nuclear agreement 163 State, Secretary of 95 State of the Union Address 2002 28, 37 Status of Forces Agreement (Iraq) 6, 79, 212 Stevens, J. Christopher (Ambassador) 63, 206 Stevens, John Paul 135 Stoltenberg, Jens 182, 183 St. Petersburg, Russia 189 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 14, 30, 142, 154, 172, 174, 175, 200, 202; see also Russia; Putin,Vladimir Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) 30, 174 Sudan 35 Sullivan, Jake 105, 209 Sunni (Muslims) 45, 59, 74 Supreme Court 10, 89, 113, 114, 119, 128; and drones 139; and due process 127, 134; and political question doctrine 136 Syria 6, 7, 12, 15, 20, 26, 31, 35, 44, 60, 65, 68, 69, 74, 75, 81, 82, 83, 88, 99, 100, 101, 107, 120, 124, 172, 173, 176, 187; air strikes on 5, 70, 90; chemical weapons 82, 102, 185, 205, 206; civil war 4, 173, 184, 186, 187, 200; Free Syrian Army 186; rebels 60, 101, 107; and “red line” 7, 16, 102, 204 – 205; and Russian intervention 185, 217; and Russian military assets 189 Taliban 5, 6, 11, 45, 69, 77, 83, 97, 98, 112, 120, 187 Tartous, Syria 185 Tehran, Iran 176 terrorism 172, 173, 197 Thrush, Glenn 108 Tillerson, Rex 15, 33, 166 Times Square (bombing) 54; see also New York City

Tomahawk Missiles 74, 80 transactional leadership 50 transformational leadership 50, 53, 68 Transparency International 188 Transportation, Secretary of 108 treaties 150 – 152, 153; Obama record 144 Truman, Harry S. 1, 50, 51, 76, 82, 90; and popularity 196; and treaties 150 – 152 Trump, Donald John: 2016 election 15 – 16, 192 – 222; advisory structure 9, 33, 109 – 110; anti-Muslim rhetoric 34; Art of the Deal 32; bombing of Syrian airbase 7, 15, 70; China 5; and Clinton email server 209; Cold War 197; collusion with Russia 14, 16, 187; counterterrorism strategy 70; drone strike policy 12 – 13, 138 – 139; energy policy 4, 35 – 36; executive order on immigration 4, 35, 70; Guantanamo Bay 10, 113, 124; inaugural address 31; Iran nuclear accord opposition 162, 166; and ISIS 10, 34, 70; military policy 90, 91, 204; NAFTA 36; NATO 5; North Korea 5, 70; Paris climate accord 166; “radical Islamic terrorism” 16; relations with Russia 15, 188 – 190; rhetorical approach 3, 20, 31, 32, 34, 69 – 70; and terrorism 197; and treaties 14, 166; and Twitter 37 Tunisia 202 Turkey 33, 60, 183, 204 Twitter 4, 9, 20, 37, 199, 201, 206, 210 two presidencies theory 216 Uighurs 10, 120, 121 Ukraine 31, 172, 173, 178, 179, 187, 208; and computer hacking 187; Donbass People’s Militia 184; and Russian intervention 106, 178, 180, 182, 183; and Russian military assets 189 Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 121, 135 United Kingdom 4, 203; see also Britain United Nations 33, 62, 97, 177; Charter, Article 25, 162; Convention on Disabilities 142, 152; conventions 153; and economic sanctions 14, 172; Participation Act of 1945 76; US ambassador to 94, 95 United Nations Security Council 74, 78, 79, 81, 162, 175, 210; Resolution 1737 175; Resolution 1929 176

240 Index United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936) 87 United States v. Pink (1942) 146 United States v. Shabani (1994) 136 United States-Russia Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Cooperation and Counter-Narcotics 177 unlawful enemy combatants 9 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) see drone strikes U.S. News & World Report 59 US-Russia Agrement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation/123 Agreement 179 US-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement 179 US-Russia Letter of Agreement 178 US-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement 179 US-Russian Working Group on Arms Control and International Security 179 US-Russian Working Group on Foreign Policy and Fighting Terrorism 179 US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration 179 US-Russia Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security 179 USS Donald Cook 189 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export (1936) 7 Victor, Tom  105 Viet Cong 98

Vietnam 98, 178; War 7, 59, 76, 77, 88, 196, 217 VX gas see chemical weapons Waltenburg, Eric 116 war on terror 3, 4, 9, 27, 32, 45, 53, 54, 57, 67, 68, 70, 127, 139, 154, 155, 177, 212 War Powers Resolution 6, 7, 79, 80, 84, 87, 88, 89 Washington Post 64, 97, 122, 138, 205 Washington Post/ABC Poll 215 weapons of mass destruction 78 West Africa: and Ebola 103 White House 93 WikiLeaks 187 Wilson, James 86 Wilson, Woodrow 21, 50 Wolf, Frank 120 women, in the military 103 Working Group on Afghanistan 177 Working Group on Counterterrorism 177 World Trade Center 121, 132; attack (1993) 132 World Trade Organization 14, 172 World War II 50, 76, 128, 134, 149, 196, 216 Yale University 104 Yanukovych,Viktor  15 Yazidis 83 Yemen 11, 35, 129, 132, 133, 202; Saudi coalition against 203 YouTube 63 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry 89