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PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AM) CHILE
A Thesis Presented to the Department of Political Science The University of Southern California
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts
by Lawrence D. Pritchard October 1 % 2
UMI Number: EP63729
All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Ruoiusrartg
UMI EP63729 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
T h is thesis, w r it t e n by
LAWRENCE
D. PRITCHARD
u n d e r the d i r e c t i o n o f h.%3. F a c u l t y C o m m it te e , a n d a p p r o v e d by a l l its m e m b e r s , has been presented to a n d accepted by the C o u n c i l on G r a d u a t e S t u d y a n d Research in p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r th e d e g r e e o f
MASTER OF ARTS
Secretary
F aculty C om m ittee
.TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER
PAGE
I.
INTRODUCTION.................................
1
II.
THE ECONOMY OF A R G E N T I N A .....................
4
Resources and production Geography
..............
4
...............................
4
Wealth of the s o i l .......................
5
Wealth under the s o i l .....................
7
Power resources...........................
8
Transportation and communication
..........
9
........
11
Industrial capacity and production
Foreign trade . . ■...........................
13
I m p o r t a n c e ...............................
13
Exports
.................................
13
Imports
...........
14
Customers and suppliers
..................
13
B a l a n c e s .................................
16
Trade c o n t r o l s ...........................
16
...................................
23
General...................................
23
Foreign d e b t ........................ . . .
24
Foreign capital.........
24
War borrowing
.......................
26
SOCIAL FACTORS J3T ARGENTINA...................
27
P o p u l a t i o n .................................
27
Finance
III.
...
iii CHAPTER
PAGE Numbers
...........................
2?
.............................
27
Buenos A i r e s .............................
28
The p e o p l e .................................
28
Distribution
Racial b a s e s ............................. .
28
Immigration...............................
29
Education
.......... . .....................
30
Social s t r a t a ...............................
32
Standard of l i v i n g .........................
35
General
.........................
White-collar workers
.....................
35
Industrial workers..........................
36
Parm w o r k e r s .............................
36
Labor and social w e l f a r e .................... General
IV.
35
36
.................................
36
Labor u n i o n s .............................
37
ARGENTINE P O L I T I C S ...........................
39
Framework of government
...................
39
G e n e r a l ...................................
39
Executive b r a n c h .....................
39
Legislative branch. . . .
40
Judicial branch
..................
.........
Local g o v e r n m e n t ............. Political realities .........................
41 42 42
CHAPTER
PAGE General...................................
42
Left vs. r i g h t ...........................
42
B a c k g r o u n d .............
43
Two p r e s i d e n t s ...........................
45
Party alignment...........................
46
Fifth c o l u m n .............................
48
Undemocratic Argentina
50
. . ..................
52
.........................
53
Democratic Argentina Foreign relations General
. . . .............
53
B r i t a i n ..................................
53
Germany
. ................................
54
...............................
54
Neighbors
.
....................
United States
..............
. .
55
Reasons for Argentina’s attitude toward the United States .............................
56
Cultural factors
.........................
56
.......................
57
Geographic factors Economic factors
V.
. . . . . . . . .
........
57
Human factors .............................
59
THE ECONOMY OF B R A Z I L .........................
62
Resources and p r o d u c t i o n ........... Geography
...........
Wealth of the s o i l .......................
62 62 64
V
CHAPTER
PAGE Wealth under the s o i l ................... . . 69 Power resources...........................
70
Transportation and communication..........
70
Industrial capacityand production
.........
72
foreign trade ...............................
74
I m p o r t a n c e ...............................
74
Exports
.................................
75
Imports
.................................
76
Customers.................................
76
Suppliers.................................
77
F i n a n c e ...................................... . 84 .............................
84
Foreign d e b t .............................
84
Foreign capital . .. . ....................
8$
Recent borrowing............................
85
General
VI.
SOCIAL FACTORS IN B R A Z I L .....................
87
P o p u l a t i o n .................................
87
N u m b e r s...................................
87
D i s t r i b u t i o n .........
87
C i t i e s ...................................
89
The p e o p l e .................................
90
Racial bases
.............................
90
Immigration...............................
92
Education...................................
93
CHAPTER
PAGE Social strata .
...........................
94
Standard of l i v i n g ......... ................
95
The wealthy and the comfortable............
95
The p o o r .......................
96
Labor and social w e l f a r e .................... VII.
BRAZILIAN P O L I T I C S .........
99
B a c k g r o u n d ................................. General
98
99
.................................
99
Colonial r o o t s ............ ...............
99
The e m p i r e ...........
100
The republic to V a r g a s ...................
101
Vargas* rise to power
......................101
Provisional government andcivil war
....
102
Constitution of 1 9 3 4 ........................103 The "communist” revolt
. .
The coup and ”Novo Estado”
................ 103 of1937 ........
104
Provisions of the anticipatedNovo Estado . .
105
The fascist r e v o l t .......................... 107 The Vargas government.......................... 107 G eneral......................................107 Undemocratic Brazil ........................
108
Accomplishments.........................
109
.
The fifth c o l u m n ............................ 110 Foreign affairs
...........................
114
vii CHAPTER
PAGE G e n e r a l ......................................114 The United S t a t e s ............................ 114
VIII.
THE ECONOMY OP C H I L E ............................ 117 Resources and p r o d u c t i o n ................. . .
117
Geography....................................117 Wealth of the s o i l .......................... 120 fifealth under the s o i l ........................ 121 C o p p e r ......................................121 N i t r a t e s .............................
123
Iron and c o a l ...........
124
O t h e r s ......................................123 Power resources.............................. 123 Transportation and communication Industrial capacity and production
. . . . . . ........
Foreign trade ...............................
123 126 129
G e n eral......................................129 E x p o r t s ......................................130 Imports.............
130
F i n a n c e ..................................... 13 8 G e n e r a l................................... 138 B u d g e t ......................................138 D e b t s ........................................138 Foreign capital ........................... IX.
139
SOCIAL FACTORS IN C H I L E .......................... 140
viii CHAPTER
PAGE P o p u l a t i o n .................................. 140 Numbers
.................................. 140
Distribution
...........................
Racial b a s e s ...........
140 141
Education
.................................. 142
General
.................................. 142
G r o w t h ....................................143 Scope
.................................... 144
Social strata ............................. General.....................
143 145
The wealthy
.............................. 146
Middle class
...........................
147
The p o o r .................................. 148 Standard of l i v i n g ............. General
148
........... ....................... 148
Upper middle class
.............. 149
Industrial w o r k e r s ........................ 149 Agricultural workers
...................
150
The t o l l ..................................150 Labor and social w e l f a r e .................... 150 General
.................................. 150
Social security .........................
151
Labor u n i o n s .............................. 152 X.
CHILEAN P O L I T I C S .............................. 155 Pramework of government...................... 155
ix CHAPTER
PAGE General.................................
155
Executive b r a n c h ........................
155
Legislative branch
......................
156
Judicial branch ..........................
157
Local g o v e r n m e n t ........................
157
Political realities .......................
158
General.................................
158
Basic i s s u e s ...........................
158
B a c k g r o u n d .............................
159
Formation of the popular f r o n t ..........
163
The Nazi putsch and the e l e c t i o n ........
164
Popular front g o v e r n m e n t ................
165
B e n e f i t s ...............................
166
Political parties .......................
167
Cerda*s successor ........................
170
Fifth c o l u m n ...........................
170
Foreign relations .........................
172
General
...............................
United S t a t e s ........... XI.
173
C O N C L U S I O N ................................. Common denominators of Latin-America
172
175
....
175
Two classes.............................
175
Race p r o b l e m ...........................
176
Race, language, religion,, culture........
176
X
CHAPTER
PAGE Nationalism...............................177 Education, public health and welfare
....
177
Agricultural e c o n o m y ............... Poverty midst plenty
178
...................... 178
Foreign capital ...........................
178
Poor transportation.......................179 Nationalism vs. state*s rights
............
179
Caudillismo, personalismo, and rule by the few . . . Misconceptions
................................ 180 .............................
181
That Lat in-America is a single entity . . . .
182
That all is old, backward, and picturesque
. 183
That all Latin-American governments are 184
dictatorships ........................... Pan-Americanism........... War-time vs. long-range Pan-Americanism . .
186 . 187
The myth of self-sufficiency............. 188 The skeptic and the c y n i c ................. 192 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................
195
APPENDICES..............................................201 A.
Other Latin-American C o u n t r i e s ............... 202
B.
Origin and Destination of Principal LatinAmerican E x p o r t s ........................... 220
C.
Percentage Shares of Latin-American Imports and Exports
.
.................................. 241
LIST OF TABLES TABLE I.
PAGE Percentage Shares of Argentine Exports by Principal Purchasers
II.
............
17
Percentage Shares of Argentine Imports by Principal Suppliers .........................
18
III.
Principal Argentine E x p o r t s ...................
19
IV.
Principal Argentine Imports...................
20
V.
Total Argentine Exports
.....................
21
VI.
Total Argentine Imports
. . . . .............
22
VII.
Percentage Shares of Brazilian Exports by Principal P u r c h a s e r s .......................
VIII.
78
Percentage Shares of Brazilian Imports by Principal Suppliers
.......................
79
IX.
Principal Brazilian E x p o r t s ...................
80
X.
Principal Brazilian Imports ...................
81
XI.
Total Brazilian E x p o r t s .......................
82
XII.
Total Brazilian Impo r t s.......................
83
XIII.
Percentage Shares of Chilean Exports by Principal P u r c h a s e r s .................................... 132
XIV.
Percentage Shares of Chilean Imports by Principal Suppliers
XV. XVI.
....................................133
Principal Chilean Exports .....................
134
Principal Chilean I mports....................... 135
TABLE XVII. XVIII. XIX.
PAGE Total Chilean E x p o r t s ................
136
Total Chilean Imports........................
137
Representatives in theChileanCongress Before and After the Elections ofMarch,
1941
. • .
169
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
c
South of the Rio Grande twenty independent nations are rapidly assuming increased stature and importance.
Once dis
missed as a backward area scarcely to be included among modern societies, Latin-America now receives the respectful and eager attentions of most of the earth's great powers.
This new im
portance in the eyes of the world is due, in part, to an awakening to the tremendous present and potential wealth of the hemisphere; in part, to the economic, military and politi cal importance that war strategy has thrust upon the area; and, in part, to the fact that Latin-America itself has been making prodigious strides toward catching up with the twentieth century. The exigencies of war have served to kindle in the United States a particularly sudden and marked interest in these neighbors to the south.
Although created by war, this
new appreciation of Latin-America is bound to extend far be yond the war period and to play an important part in hemi spheric peace-time development.
The United States is beginning
to realize that in war and in peace the American nations are bound together by many ties and that, with positive efforts toward mutual good will and co-operation, a meaningful society of nations may be evolved which can bring peace and improved
living to all its members. Improved economic, cultural, and institutional standards of living and tbe creation of a working example that nations can dwell together without bloodshed as they jointly pursue a better day are the primary objective of Pan-Americanism. These goals are sometimes overlooked in a frantic quest for the more immediate and pressing aim of a hemispheric solidarity to win the war, but it is these long-range ideals which lend real dignity and permanence to Pan-Americanism.
Both the
immediate and long-range objectives of Pan-Americanism are attainable only through co-operation. Co-operation can succeed only in a spirit of friendly understanding and upon the basis of knowledge about the people and problems of the other nations.
It is essential that
Latin-American nations know each other and the United States. It is, perhaps, even more important that the United States know the Latin-American countries, for we, in many ways, are the outsider in this group.
Some of our past errors and most
of our present mistakes in dealing with Latin-America are the result of our gross misunderstanding and misjudgment of these countries.
Destiny has made us neighbors, but only man can
make us friends. The following chapters seek to present significant facts about the three most advanced nations of South America— Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
Emphasis has been given to the
present status and future possibilities of economic, social, and political development.
Little history except that which
is needed as a background for the present has been included. The cultural life of these countries is not the subject of review, and descriptive material is at a minimum.
It is
hoped that within the limits prescribed by space and an un fortunate dearth- of reliable statistics and analyses these pages will convey to the reader an accurate and reasonably comprehensive impression of the major considerations in cur rent Argentinean, Brazilian, and Chilean affairs.
CHAPTER II THE ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA. I.
RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION
Geography. .Argentina is. a large country.
Its one
million square miles1 occupy an area roughly one third that of the continent of Europe or seven times that of the State of California.
This storied land of the gauchos is the fourth
largest in the Americas and the eighth largest in the world. The Argentine national territory includes a wide variety of kinds of country.
Argentine geographers recognize
four major physical divisions, each with numerous subdivisions.
2
The first area, known as the "Andes,” embraces the
high cordillera which constitutes the western boundary of the country and which extends the length of the land from the dry north to the heavily glaciated mountains of Patagonia.
This
is a narrow and pronounced zone which rises rather abruptly from the dry rolling foothills to the rugged majesty of twentythousand foot peaks.
1 (1,076,966 square miles) United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 386. 2
/
/
0. Manito, and J. J. Nagera, Geografia fisica de las Americas y de la Repdblica Argentina (Buenos Aires: 193Ff, P* 97. "
5 The second major section is the "North."
Generally
speaking, this part of Argentina is the wettest and receives twenty to eighty inches of rain a year.
It consists for the
most part of the vast alluvial plain of the Chaeo with its sub-tropical scrub forest covering and the flood plain between the Parand and Uruguay rivers. The third and best known division is the "Pampas," the great plains which lie south of the Chaco and east of the Andean piedmont.
One may divide this section into a wetter
eastern part and a drier western part.
Ordinarily, when an
Argentinean refers to La Pampa, he is designating the area within the dry Pampa.
This is the famous cattle country that
gave rise to the gaucho, the tango, and the Argentine wealth. Finally, the fourth major physical division of Argentina is Patagonia at the southern tip of the country where it nar rows so noticeably.
This is a land of arid, wind-swept
plateaus, crossed at wide intervals by strips of green vegeta tion along the valley bottoms.
In the far south of Patagonia,
Argentina shares with Chile the land of continuously cool and stormy weather, where winters are never severe, but where there is never any summer. Wealth of the soil.
One may run his fingers through
*5
Preston E. James, Latin America (New York; The Odyssey Press, 1942), p. 28.
6 the wealth of Argentina.
He may drive south or west of Buenos
Aires into the vast flat pampas and sift the soil in his hand. He will find no pebbles, no rocks to clear, nothing but rich black soil in which the plow cuts clean furrows which are black all the way through.
Here, piled deep by the rains and
the rivers, the heart of a continent has been deposited to make rich Argentina. This is the primary wealth of Argentina.
In 1939, of
her total exports, 97 per cent were of agricultural and pas toral products.^
She is the world’s chief exporter of beef,
furnishing two thirds of the world’s trade in this field. First also is Argentina as a seller of corn and as a producer of linseed.
As an exporter of wheat, mutton, and wool, she
ranks in second place among the nations of the world. Q,uebracho is virtually an Argentine monopoly, and hides, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and wines are produced in sizeable quantities. Although Argentina is popularly identified with the meat trade, 49 per cent of the exports of the country are agricultural as
distinct from pastoral.-* A total of more than 53 per cent of the national area is used today for agriculture and grazing.
Argentina*s
^ Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. Jo.
5
Howell DavieSi,. editor, The South American Handbook (London: Trade and Travel Publications, Ltd., 194 I ), p . lo3.
7 agricultural experts estimate that the area now used for the raising of grains may be increased from 10.7 per cent to 26.68 per cent, still leaving about 39 per cent for pasturage, indicating a total of about 67 per cent of all Argentine area as usable for agriculture and grazing.
They calculate that
after further allowance for 17*9 per cent of forest lands, much of it economically valuable, there remains but 14.3 per cent of the area which is completely unproductive from the £ point of view of the agriculturalist. Wealth under the soil. Argentina is as poor in minerals as she is rich in agriculture and livestock.
Nature,
generous to Peru, Chile and Brazil, seems to have overlooked Argentina in this connection.
It would appear that the
Argentine future like her past will be an agricultural one. There is no coal and no iron.
To be sure Argentina
hopefully dreams of veins on her Bolivian and Chilean borders, but the existence of mineral wealth which can be economically exploited remains unproved.
She mines insignificant quanti
ties of lead, tin, zinc, manganese, and tungsten, and produces enough of such prosaic items as sand, lime, and building stone. The entire productions from the subsoil, not including petro7 leum, aggregated in 1939 about twenty-nine million dollars. ^ Herring, 0£. cit., p. 30. ^ Ibid., p. 3 1 .
a Petroleum is being produced in sizeable but insufficient quantities.
Exploitation and production is being centered in
a national trust, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiseales, which is designed to gradually displace foreign operators.
Although
new fields are being developed in scattered spots, production is still small and furnished in 1 9 3 9 .only 75 per cent of the requirements of the nation.^ Power resources. Argentina’s almost total lack of coal and her insufficient supply of petroleum is not compensated for by water power.
Electric power is produced thermetically,
but little hydroelectric power is developed or likely to be developed due to a fundamental deficiency and the distances between potential power sites and the centers of population. At present, 67,000 horsepower^ is being developed, about four tenths of 1 per cent of that developed in the United States or about 3 per cent of that of Germany., is usable in Buenos Aires.
None of this
It is estimated that there is a
potential capacity for the development of five million horse power in the country, ^ about one seventh of the United States potential, but most of this cannot be used. 3
For example,
Davies, o£. cit., p. 114.
^ United States Department of Commerce, op. cit., p. 413. 10 Davies, o£. cit., p. 117.
325,000 horsepower might he developed at Iguazd Falls on the northern border, but this is eight hundred miles from Buenos Aires.
No method has yet been devised of transmitting power
that far . 11 Much wood and carbon are used for home consumption and in some industries.
Nearly three million tons of coal and one
and one-half tons of crude oil are imported each year. ^
In
1 9 3 8 , of the total fuels used in home and industry, 59 per
cent were imported.1^ Transportation and communication.
The most extensive
system of railways in Latin-America is in Argentina. there are more than 25,000 miles in operation.1^
Today,
Most of the
mileage is concentrated in the province of Buenos Aires, focusing on the great ports of Buenos Aires, Bahia Blanca, and Rosario.
The level topography and mild climate have favored
railway construction and operation, but rails, rolling stock, and fuel must be imported from Europe and the United States. Important trunk lines connect Argentina with her neighbors Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and southern Brazil.
About
11 James, o£. cit.t p. 368. 12
Clarence H. Haring, Argentina and the United States (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), p. 43.
p. 203.
^
Herring, ££. cit., p. 31.
^
United States Department of Commerce, 0£. cit.,
10 one fifth of the mileage is government owned and operated, mainly in the outlying and less developed parts of the coun try. ^ Argentina is still without a system of surfaced roads. The total length of all roads is 214,628 miles1^ of which only about thirty thousand miles1? are suitable for traffic in all weather.
The city and municipal area of Buenos Aires and some
important interior towns are well paved, but in the whole nation there is only three thousand miles of macadamized road. In 1933, there were 264,000 registered automobiles and trucks,1** about one sixth the number in Germany and one ninth those in the United Kingdom. River communication between Buenos Aires and the northern provinces, as well as the republics of Paraguay, is afforded by the rivers Plata, Parana, Uruguay, and Paraguay.
The port of
Buenos Aires is the principal outlet to the world, and while quite adequate, must be constantly dredged.
Argentina’s mer
chant fleet is negligible as compared to her foreign commerce.
^
Haring, op. cit., p. 4&. United States Department of Commerce, op. cit.,
p. 4 1 6 . 17
' Davies, op. cit., p. 118.
^
p. 417.
United States Department of commerce, 0£. cit.,
11 In 1933 it amounted to 303,000 tons*^ or approximately one fourth that of Canada and one thirty-seventh that of the United States. Industrial capacity and production.
It would appear
that Argentina will never be a truly important industrial nation.
Although citizens of Buenos Aires optimistically
speak of a great manufacturing future, the sobering facts seem to argue against it.
Lacking iron, coal, and other miner
als; possessed of meager water power and inadequate petroleum, Argentina does not seem destined to occupy a prominent place as an industrial nation. Paradoxically, in spite of these limitations, Argentina has evidenced one of the world’s most rapid growths in indus trialization.
From 1914 through 1933 industrial production
increased 79 per cent,^ and from 1935 to 1939
value of
products produced was again increased by 43 per cent.
21
In
1935 manufacturing accounted for 47 per cent of the country’s 22
total production.
An analysis of this growth should be
comiqion Argentina de Altos Estudios Internacionales, Annuario Estadistico Interamericano (Buenos Aires: 1940 [The MacMillan Company, New YorkJ), p. 443. 20 Delia Goetz and Yafian Fry, The Good Neighbors (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1941),p. $0. Haring, o£. cit., p* 42. Revista de Economia Argentina (Buenos Aires: 1935).
p. 285.
12 tempered by the realization that a part if it is to be found in the increase of food processing, really a part of the meat industry. The real explanation of this development is to be found in Argentina’s attempt to free herself from an almost complete dependence on imports for her needs in manufactured goods. Under the stimulus of government efforts, chiefly high protec tive tariffs, she has been developing processing industries based upon her own agricultural raw products.
The products
manufactured, processed, or assembled in Argentina are thus consumed by the domestic market and are not exported.
In 1940
about one fourth of the manufactured goods used were produced 23 within the country. This proportion is likely to increase and already has had a strong influence on the character of international commerce. The leading industries of Argentina2^ are in the food, beverage, and tobacco group, which accounts for more than a third of the total value of fabricated products. portance is textile manufacturing of all sorts.
Kext in im A variety of
leather, chemical and light metal manufactures are of some importance, and considerable numbers are employed in the assem bling of products actually manufactured in other countries.
Davies, o£. cit., p. 116'. "Industrial Census of 1935," Bulletin of the PanAmerican Union, September, 1937, p. 285.
13 Tiie Argentinean is proud to point out that his country now produces almost all the textiles, tobacco, cement, shoes, soap, glassware, finished clothing, and furniture that it n e e d s .
He will tell you that Argentina packs its own foods
and makes its own wine and beer.
To him a false index of in
dustrial might are the assembly plants which put together such articles as American and European radios and which assemble four out of five of Argentina’s automobiles and trucks.2** II. Importance.
FOREIGN TRADE
It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to find a nation more completely dependent upon foreign trade than is Argentina.
Her tremendous capacity to produce agri
cultural products has resulted in her becoming one of the world’s greatest exporters, and her inability to produce more than a small fraction of her manufactured needs has kept her greatly dependent upon imports.
Argentine thinking, economics,
and politics are deeply rooted in her ever-present concern with foreign trade. Exports. Practically all of Argentina’s exports are of
2 5 Katherine Carr, South American Primer (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939)> p. 44.
Hevista de Economia Argentina, p . 285•
14 agricultural p r o d u c t s . W h e a t , beef, and corn are the princi pal items in that order.
These are followed closely in rank
by linseed and wool; while hides, preserved meat, quebracho, and mutton complete the principal list.
In 1938 Argentina
shipped 98 per cent of all the wheat exported from LatinAmerica; 80 per cent of all the meat; 50 per cent of all hides and skins; 93 per cent of all the linseed; 95 per cent of all the corn; 59 per cent of all other cereals; and 52 per cent of all the wool.
Generally speaking, this accounted for about
half the total commerce of South America and ranks Argentina as the world’s leading exporter of beef, corn, linseed, and quebracho and one of the principal exporters of wheat and other products. Imports.
The large import total of Argentina is made
necessary by her deficiencies in fuel and manufactured pro ducts.
She is constantly and unusually dependent on other
nations for the wide variety of articles necessary to any modern country. 1 In 1938 high-grade textiles constituted 20 per cent of her imports; fuels made up 16 per cent; and machinery, including automobiles, accounted for. 16 per cent.
see p. 6 . 28 ^
James. o£. cit., p. 365. Loc. cit.
15 Metal manufactures, chemicals, woods, foods, and paper products were among the other important items. Customers and suppliers.
The United Kingdom has always
been predominately Argentina’s best customer.
In second place
has been the United States, except in the year 1938 when Germany received 11*7 per cent of the Argentine exports as compared to 8.5 per cent for the United States .^ 0
Prior to
the outbreak of the war, the United Kingdom ordinarily took approximately one third of all Argentine exports; the United States one eighth; and Germany one sixteenth.
The war, of
course, has resulted in many changes, chief of which has been an almost 50 per cent increase in exports to the United States.-*"*Argentina’s imports have been supplied chiefly by the United Kingdom and the United States.
These two nations to
gether ordinarily supply about 40 per cent of imports with a slight advantage to the United Kingdom.
32
By comparison,
Germany has ordinarily accounted for about 10 per cent.
Since
the beginning of the war, the United States has considerably outstripped England as a supplier of Argentina and now accounts
3° Pan-American Union, La tin-American Foreign Trade; A General Survey, 1938 (Poreign Trade Series:No. 178. Washington, B.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 3* 31 United States department of Commerce, International Reference Service, Vol. I, No. 26, June, 1941. Pan-American Union,lop, cit.
16 for at least one third of all her imports. Balances. Argentina usually has had a slightly "favorable" balance of trade with the world.
She has had a
decidedly "unfavorable" balance with the United States.
Ex
cept for a short period in the World War and during recent months, Argentina always has evidenced a greater need for our motor ears and manufactures, than we for her linseed, hides, and wool. Trade controls.
This chronic circumstance, the irrita
tion over our exclusion of Argentine meats, and the depressionborn need to restrict imports to counteract the faltering export trade, led in 1933 to a "buy-from-those-who-buy-fromus" campaign.
This policy has been a thorn in the side of
American exporters and undoubtedly has kept our exports to Argentina from increasing more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case. It was accomplished by discriminating against nations with which Argentina had adverse trade balances, through the media of exchange manipulations, customs sur charges on unfavored nations’ products, and actual quotas on important products.
Many of these restrictions, harmful
chiefly to the United States, recently have been greatly re laxed .
17
TABLE I PERCENTAGE SHARES OP ARGENTINE EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PURCHASERSa
Year
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United States
1937
29.1
4.1
6.8
6.2
1.0
12.8
1938
32.8
5*4
11.7
2.5
1.2
8.5
1939
35.8
4*8
5.7
2.1
0.7
12.0
1940
37.7
5.8
0.01
3.4
1.6
17.7
a Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: a General Survey 1938 (Foreign Trade Series No. 178. Washington,' D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940) , p. 3.
18
TABLE II PERCENTAGE SHARES OF ARGENTINE IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERS8 Year
United Kingdom
France
Germany
_ Italy
■ Japan
United states
1937
20*7
4.2
10.7
4.7
3.6
16.1
1938
20.1
4.7
10.3
6.1
3.7
17.4
1939
19.9
5.6
9.2
2.7
0.8
17.2
1940
19.7
3.0
0.7
2.2
2.1
29.1
a Pan-American Union, Latin-AmericanForeign Trade: a General Survey 1938 (Foreign Trade Series Jtfo. 178. Washington, D.C.;"Tan-American Union, 1940), p. 3.
19
TABLE III PRINCIPAL ARGENTINE EXPORTS 1939a Rank
Commodity Total exports
American Dollars $ 3 9 3 ,2 9 3 ,0 0 0
1
Wheat
6 8 ,6 2 9 ,0 0 0
2
Beef
51,964,000
3
Corn
50,644,000
4
Linseed
42,558,000
5
Wool
4 0 ,6 8 5 ,0 0 0
6
Hides
20,573,000
7
Preserved Meat
1 2 ,7 3 2 ,0 0 0
3
Quebracho
10,469,000
9
Mutton
8 ,8 1 4 ,0 0 0
a Pan-American Union , Pore ign Trade of Argentina for 1933 and 1939 (Foreign Trade Series No. 1$4. Washington, D.C.: Pan-Amer ic an Union, 1 9 4 1 ), p. 2.
20
TABLE IV PRINCIPAL ARGENTINE IMPORTS 1939a Rank
Commodity
American Dollars
Total imports
#312,088,000
1
Textiles and Manufactures
70,284,000
2
Fuel and Lubricants
45,744,000
3
Iron, Steel and Manufactures
42,705,000
4
Machinery and Vehicles
37,398,000
5
Chemicals, Drugs, Oils, Paints
23,675,000
6
Alimentary Substances
23,180,000
7
Wood and Manufactures
20,468,000
8
Metals (excluding iron) and Manufactures
17,373,000
9
Paper and Manufactures
13,899,000
a Pan-American Union, Foreign Trade of Argentina for 1938 and 1 9 3 9 (Foreign Trade Series No. 1 8 4 . Washington, D.C.: Pan-American tJnion, 1941), p. 2.
21
TABLE V TOTAL ARGENTINE EXPORTSa Year
American Dollars
1937
$757,776,000
1933
357,255,000
1939
393,293,000
1940
382,750,000
a Pan-American Union, Lat in-American Foreign Trade: a General Survey, 1933 (Foreign Trade Series Ho, 173. Washington, D,C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 3; Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: a General Surveyt 1940 (Foreign Trade Series Ho. 193« Washington, b •C.: Pan-American Union, 1942J, p. 2.
22
TABLE VI TOTAL ARGENTINE IMPORTSa Year
American Dollars
1937
$482,259,000
1938
372,673,000
1939
312,088,000
1940
289,367,000
Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: a General Survey, 1938 (Foreign Trade Series No. 178. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 3; Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: a General Survey, 1940 (Foreign Trade Series No. 1$3. Washington^ D . G.: Pan-American Union, 1942), p. 2.
23 III. General.
FINANCE
Argentina’s rinaneial condition is governed,
almost completely by Her foreign trade.
Whereas in the United
States only about one tenth or the total business is foreign, in the Argentine more than one third of the business volume is in international commerce.
This circumstance results in the
Argentinian financial status fluxuating in almost direct pro portion to the condition of her foreign trade.
Therefore,
prosperity, solvency, and stability is a constant twofold problem of assuring sufficient exports and of maintaining the credit and exchange structure through the proper balance of imports to exports. Although constantly harassed by economic problems, Argentina, nonetheless, is the wealthiest and most solvent South American nation.
Possessed of only 16 per cent of South
America’s population, she has 50 per cent of the foreign trade, 43 per cent of the railways, 60 per cent of the freight, 56 per cent of the passenger traffic, 45 per cent of the telephones, 58 per cent of the motor vehicles, and 60 per cent of the postal business.33
She almost alone among the nations of the
world was able to maintain a balanced budget during the
33 Samuel Guy Inman, Latin America (New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937}, p. 200.
24 depression*
34 During this same period she was more suooessful
than other Latin-American republics in maintaining her exchange, and she was able to reduce her foreign debt by about 16 per cent.
35
At the same time she was able to begin the nationaliza
tion by purchase of British railroad and other foreign holdings. Foreign debt. Argentina enjoys the distinction of being the only Latin-American country, excepting Venezuela, which since the beginning of the world depression has not defaulted on any of its foreign obligations.3^ debt is held in the United States.
About a third of that
Many provincial and munici
pal bonds have been in default, but since 1934 the national government has taken over the major obligations and is now servicing them. The national debt of Argentina is not unduly large. 193S her foreign debt was #1,039,100,000 (pesos). 37 would be roughly 250,000,000 American dollars.
This
Her internal
debt in 1939 was #3,574,020,578 (pesos).38 Foreign capital. About one half of all Argentine
34
p. 203.
33 Pamphlet, Buenos Aires Branch, Bank of Boston. 36 Haring, ££. cit., p. 52. 37 Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1940), p. 253• 3^ Davies, oja. cit.» p. 115.
In
25 3Q
industry is owned by foreign capital. 7
A recent estimate
places the total foreign capital invested in Argentina at about four billion dollars.^0
Of this amount British invest
ments account for more than two billion; United States, six hundred million; and French, German, Dutch, and Belgian, one billion. WArgentine railroads are 75 per cent owned by British bond holders.
The imports of petroleum are furnished chiefly
by Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Texas, and Shell.
Half of all quebracho is processed by an English
company, and most of the cement by an American firm.
Goodyear,
Firestone, Michelin, and Dunlap supply or construct Argentina’s tires.
Meat packing, so important to the country, is done by
the American firms of Swift, Armour, and Wilson; and the British companies of Anglo, Smithfield, andArgentine.
Chemi
cals are supplied by DuPont and ImperialChemical,while auto mobiles are assembled by Ford and General Motors.
American,
Swiss, German, and Belgian capital control the public utilities, with half the telephones in the hands of American Interna tional Telephone and Telegraph Company.
Streetcars and subways
in Buenos Aires are chiefly British-owned.
39 Herring, 0£. cit., p. 33. 40 Davies, ©£. cit.,p. 115. ^
Haring,
££. cit.,p. 50.
26 War borrowing.
The most recent loans to the Argentine
Government have been incurred since the outbreak of the war. An advance of fifty million dollars has been authorized by the United States Treasury, and sixty million by the ExportImport Bank*
They are designed to stabilize the currency by
relieving the strain on peso exchange, and to permit imports to continue in spite of the loss of normal exports.
They are
a part of our wartime strategy, to enable Argentina, in the past economically dependent on Europe, to make provisional adjustment to the emergency and carry over her unsalable . surpluses of beef, wheat, and corn.
It should be pointed out
that Great Britain still buys large quantities of Argentine beef, but the sterling credits thereby accumulated in London are blocked by the British Government and are not available for the payment of Argentine purchases in the United States.
CHAPTER III SOCIAL FACTORS IN ARGENTINA I.
POPULATION
Numbers. Argentina is not a heavily populated nation. Her thirteen million people^ comprise a population which equals about three tenths that of France or Brazil, one tenth that of the United States, or twice that of the State of California.
The twelve persons per square mile^. of Argentina
is less than the density of population in sprawling Brazil and does not compare to the forty-three per square mile, in the United States and the 4^9 per square mile in the United Kingdom. Distribution.
It is a curious fact that, in a nation
so predominately agricultural, 74 per cent of the inhabitants live in cities.3
Of the total population, rural and urban,
three fourths is concentrated in one fourth of the national area within a half-circle extending 300 miles north, west, and
^ (13,130,000) Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, p. 16. 2 Loc. cit. 3
p. 101.
Howell Davies, editor, South American Handbook,
28 south of Buenos Aires.^
Contrasted with this great center of
Argentine population is one half the national area which con tains but 8 per cent of the population.^ with a population of 2,345*221
Buenos Aires itself,
a metropolitan population of
more than three million, contains more than one fifth of the nation*s people.
Other important cities are Rosario (508,000),
Cordoba (350,000), La Plata (190,000), and Tacuman (140,000)* Buenos Aires.
Special mention should be made here of
the capitol of Argentina.
Twice as large as Los Angeles,
comparable to Chicago, and largest in Latin-America, Buenos Aires is one of the principal cities of the world.
At the
focal point of all communications, the possessor of most of the industry, and the port of 85 per cent of all foreign trade^ it is to an eminent degree the heart of Argentina. Wide and well-engineered boulevards, ultra-modern subways, air-conditioned skyscrapers, and giant subterranean parking lots are but a few of the evidences that it is one of the most modern metropolises of the earth. II. Racial bases.
THE PE0FIE
Of all the American republics, including
4 Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 11. 5 Preston E. lames, Latin America, p. 286. Prank Henius, The ABC of Latin America (Philadelphia: David McKay Company, 19427, p. 13.
29 the United States, Argentina and Uruguay are the "whitest." Almost 98 per cent of the Argentine people are of unmixed European origin,
7
with only 2 per cent having some Indian
blood.
There are. very few Negroes and only about twenty ' f t thousand pure Indians. Of those of European ancestry, 74
per cent were born in Argentina and 24 per cent in E u r o p e . 9 About 70 per cent of the present population is of predomi nately Spanish origin and the most of the rest has come from Mediterranean Europe, chiefly Italy.10 Immigration. From 1850 to the World War, immigration into Argentina was diligently encouraged by the government. As a result large numbers entered the country each year in growing amounts and approximately six million people were received in seventy years.11
In evaluating this figure it
should be noted that there was also a sizeable emigration, often of the same people. about fifty thousand.12
In 1938 the new arrivals numbered While not strictly enforced, law now
7 lames, on. cit., p. 286.
8
Herring, o£. cit., p. 12.
9 y James,
o jd .
cit.. p. 286.
^
Clarence H. Harding, Argentina and The United States,
^
Samuel Guy Inman, Latin America, p. 56.
p. 34.
12 Haring, ag,. cit., p. 55.
30 restricts immigration of each nationality. Approximately 40 per cent of all immigrants have been Italian, H ana it is unofficially estimated that one out of four Argentineans is of some Italian blood.
Similarities of
custom and language have facilitated assimilation, and today practically all Italians have been absorbed into the national fabric.
Spain contributed about an equal number of people
since 1850 while English and French immigrants made up much smaller groups.
Recently there have been increasing numbers
of Poles, Yugoslavs, Germans, and Levantines. III.
EDUCATION
Argentina enjoys a favored position in Latin-America in the percentage of literacy, probably ranking third after Uruguay and Costa Rica.
Estimates vary greatly and none can
be cited with complete confidence.
The Statesmans Yearbook
for 19411^f places the illiteracy figure at 21.9 per cent for the nation and 2.6 per cent for the Federal Capital.
Argentine
estimates are more optimistic and one authority placed the illiteracy figure in 1938 as 12 per cent.^5
in any event
Argentina is in a different class from Chile, Brazil, Peru,
■**3 inman, 0£. cit., p. 57. 14
The Statesman* s Yearbook (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1941), p . 753. 15 Alejandro E. Bunge, cited in Herring, op. cit., p. 49.
and other Latin-American countries in which illiteracy amounts to 50 per cent and more* Recent years have brought a great increase in educa tional facilities, a growth that is continuing.
The Federal
Government provides primary schools in the capital, in the Federal Territories, and in some Provinces. Governments also provide elementary schools.
The Provincial Primary educa
tion is free, secular, and compulsory from the ages of six to fourteen, and is maintained by a Federal appropriation of more than three hundred million pesos, about 14 per cent of the Federal budget, and one hundred million pesos from provincial, municipal, and private funds.^
The parochial school plays
little part as only 6 per cent of the children are under church control.^ In 1939, 1,977,357 children were enrolled in 13,693 primary schools being taught by 74,279 teachers.1** When to these figures are added those of secondary, commercial, agricultural, and other schools as well as those of the twenty-four univer sity faculties, the result is a total enrollment of two million, a teaching force of more than ninety thousand, and above ‘fourteen thousand institutions.1^
in 181 public libraries
32 throughout the country there are 1,346,000 volumes read by 1,500,000 readers.20 IV.
SOCIAL STRATA
Placing the people of a modern nation in distinct classes is a difficult task often leading to dangerous miscon ceptions.
Fundamentally subjective to begin with, such classi* fication easily lends itself to over-simplification and does not always reflect the interrelations of one type of division with another.
Nevertheless, to understand Argentina, one must
appreciate at least the broad outline of its social stratifica tion. The fundamental classification, from which other group ings largely flow, is that based upon personal economic and social status.
In Argentina the principal classes are three
in number: ;the landed aristocracy, the comfortable middle class, and the very poor.
In common with other Latin-American
countries, Argentina possesses a very few rich who dominate the nation's economics and politics and who own the land, the forests, the banks, the trading houses, and the industries. These are the aristocratic and conservative decendants of the original recipients of land grants and titles of nobility who grow wealthy from their great holdings and who spend their 20
Alberto Caprile, Jr., Argentina (New York: Hastings House, 1941), p. 16.
33 time and money in leisure on the Riviera, in their palatial homes in the city, and on their feudal "estancias.” influence and wealth, they are small in numbers.
Large in
In the rich
Province of Buenos Aires fifty families own 15 per cent of the land,21
and 230 families own 40 per cent of the land.22
It is estimated that of all of Argentina’s thirteen millions, three thousand families enjoy the major profits of Argentina’s 23 wealth. This landed class, whose aristocratic rule was once unchallenged, has been slipping but still manages to keep a substantial, if uncertain, hand on the reins. The second group, now challenging the power of the rich, is the urban middle class.
The growth of Argentine industry
has produced the largest Latin-American middle class, though it would seem unimportant as compared to the United States. These are the shopkeepers, doctors, lawyers, and skilled crafts men who make enough to buy a house and garden; have a car, a radio, life insurance; and who read books.
It may be noted
that large numbers of this middle class are more "foreign” than Argentinian. The third and largest group are the poor, -who are neither comfortable nor secure; who are not well housed or clothed or
21 John Gunther, Inside Latin America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 297. 22 Herring, ££. cit., p. 39. 23 Ibid., p. 40.
34 fed.
This rough classification includes the lower middle
class of white collar workers, the stenographers and clerks, and other attaches of industry and business; the 663,000 in dustrial workers, and the one million farm laborers, sharecrop-. pers, and small farmers.2^
It is estimated that nine tenths of
the Argentine people may be included in this classification.2^ In addition to this three-fold classification, others may be made, though they largely are the products of this original social cleavage.
Authorities frequently mention the
differing interests of those who live in Buenos Aires and those who live in the country.
Although not at all a perfect
corollary, this distinction can be traced to the conflict be tween the urban middle class of the city and the aristocracy of the country land holders.
In polities there is a notable
division into "left" and "right" which again reflects the greater liberalism of the urban middle class as opposed to the conservatism of the wealthy.
Recently, in questions of taxa
tion and in other respects, there is evidence of a split be tween the industrial and the agricultural interests, although here again one sees reflections of the .middle class— upper' class conflict.
24 a i d .. p. 41. ^
Iioc. cit.
35 V. General.
STANDARD OF LIVING
The Argentine standard of living, like that
of the United States, is a story of abundance for some, too little for others.
Compared to the United States, there are
proportionally fewer who live well and many more who live poorly.
Standards of living are difficult to define, but it is
fairly sale to generalize that Argentina’s over-all standard of living is probably better than that of any other LatinAmerican country, but considerably poorer than our own. Inasmuch as Argentine prices in pesos seem to differ from American prices in dollars in somewhat the same ratio as do the currencies, we may get a very rough picture of living standards from typical wages.
One may overlook the few rich
who live in abundance, and he may dismiss the one tenth in the middle class who live well, but somewhat below our own stan dards for similar positions.
It is the nine tenths of the
population, who may be classed as poor, at which one should look in evaluating the Argentine standard of living. White collar workers.
The following examples are
typical of the wages paid' white collar workers.
A drug store
clerk indicates that he receives the equivalent of $20.00 per month.
The girl in the corner stationary store reports
#16.00 per month.
A stenographer receives #30.00, s school
teacher $45.00, a bank clerk $40.00.
36 Industrial workers.
The 663,906 industrial wage
earners, together with their families, represent about one fifth the Argentine population.
In this group common labor
receives on an average less than $ 3 0 .0 0 .per month; semiskilled workers, $37*00 to $43.00, and the relatively few skilled workers, $43.00 to $63.00 per m o n t h . T h e s e figures are disputed by individuals who cite many cases of industrial families whose total income seldom tops $13.00 or $20.00. Farm workers.
The one million farm workers fare worst
of all.
On the average they will receive $13.00 per month to27 gether with the most rudimentary food and lodging. In the
north contract labor involving whole families will be found in its worst form.
Wages paid in company script, company stores
with excessive prices, mean housing, inadequate food, and pay seldom exceeding fifty cents a day for the family, are suffered by 130,000 to 200,000 workers.
In some remote areas, out
right peonage still prevails. VI. General.
LABOR AND S0CIAL WELFARE
Only modest progress has been made in
Herring, op. cit., p. 42. 27 Ibia.. p. 43. Loo. cit.
37 developing a governmental program of social welfare.
For in
dustrial workers significant beginnings have been made; for agricultural workers, none.
Laws, the literal intent of which
is broad and far reaching, frequently fall far short in prac tice. Probably most significant has been legislation govern ing the hours and working conditions for women and children and for work in the home.
Accident compensation laws have been
passed which apply in certain fields, and pension plans have been started for railroad workers and a few others.
Working
conditions, wages, and hours are regulated to some extent. Beginnings have been made in the fields of public health, juvenile delinquency, public housing, and in other phases of public welfare which seem to be growing in number and impor tance. Labor unions.
Collective bargaining and the right to
strike prevail in Argentine industry.
In 1939 more than 65
per cent of the industrial workers were members of one duespaying union or a n o t h e r . T h e s e unions, in the past rather ineffective, are becoming stronger and more vocal and are pressing harder for their objectives.
Comjsion Argentina de altos Estudios Internacionales, Anuario Estadistico Interamerioano, p. 437.
38 The principal labor group is the Confederation General del Trabajo which is composed of more than fifty affiliates and 2 7 0 , 0 0 0 m e m b e r s . 3°
It is a closely knit and ably led
organization which resembles in attitude and approach the American Federation of Labor.
The Confederacion General del
Trabajo, like the American Federation of Labor, is not mili tant and has chosen to co-operate with rather than oppose the government.
These tactics have won steady if not brilliant
gains in social legislation. The Union Sindical Argentina is a loose assemblage of public employees, maritime workers, and telephone employees, with 32,000 members.
In the Federacion de Asociasiones
Catollcas de Empleados are 19,000 women workers In needlework. Independent unions claim about 120,000 members.
Comision Argentina de Altos Estudios Internacionales, loc. cit.
CHAPTER IV ARGENTINE POLITICS I. General.
FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT
Argentina is a republic with a constitution
dating from 1853 and patterned after that of the United States. It is a federal state of fourteen provinces, ten national territories and one federal district.
Government is divided
into the familiar executive, legislative, and judicial bran ches • Executive branch. Executive authority is centered in the President of the Republic.
The President is Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy and is the nation’s administrative head.
As such he appoints all civil, military, and judicial
officers, and in very few cases must his appointments be ap proved by the upper house.
Executive authority is exercised
through a Cabinet of eight Secretaries of State, representing the Departments of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Worship, Treasury, Justice and Public Instruction, War, Navy, Agriculture, and Public Works.
These secretaries are appointed by and en
tirely accountable to the President.
The President’s actual
power is much greater than that of the President of the United States in normal times. A presidential term is six years and no president may
40 serve two successive terms.
Presidential candidates must be
members of the Roman Catholic Church and must have been born in Argentina.
Election of the chief executive is by 376 elec
tors representing the fourteen provinces and the Federal capital and equal to double the number of Senators and Deputies com bined.
These electoral college members are chosen by popular
ballot but, unlike the United States counterpart, they are not obligated to cast their ballot for a prescribed person.
Elec
tions are held in March or April and the president takes office on the following twelfth of October.
The president is entitled
to a salary of $96,000 (pesos) and an expense account of $28,000 (pesos).^
The ¥ice president, who presides over the
Senate and succeeds the president, has little other responsi bility or power. Legislative branch. The legislative power of the Republic of Argentina is vested in Congress.
This body is
divided into two houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. There are 158 Deputies in the lower house and thirty Senators in the upper hody.
The two houses meet each year from May 1
to September 30. Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected directly by the people from districts within the provinces and the
Approximately $24,000 (dollars) and $7,000 (dollars).
41 Federal Capital.
Their term of office is four years, with one
half of the Chamber being renewed each two years.
The lower
house acts concurrently with the Senate on most legislation, exeept in such instances as the approving of presidential appointments and of treaties, which is the exclusive right of the upper house.
The most significant advantage of the Chamber
of Deputies is its sole right to receive the executive budget and to initiate fiscal legislation. Senators are elected by provincial legislatures in the provinces and by the city council in the Federal Capital. Each of the provinces and the capital is entitled to two senators.
The term of office is nine years and one third of
the Senate is renewed each three years. Judicial branch.
The judicial system corresponds very
closely to that of the United States. and provincial courts.
It consists of federal
The federal judiciary deals with cases
of national character or those in which different provinces or individuals of different provinces are parties.
A Supreme
Court of five judges in Buenos Aires, five Appeal Courts located in Buenos Aires, La Plata, Parana, Cordoba, and Rosario, and Courts of first instance in the provinces and territories constitute the federal system.
Each province has its own sys
tem consisting of a supreme court and a variety of minor courts. Trial by jury for criminal cases is established by the Constitu tion but actually is not practiced except in the Province of
42 Buenos Aires. Local government.
Argentina is experiencing the same
struggle over "state’s rights” that has played such a large part in the politics of the United States.
The provinces have
always been relatively independent, but in recent years the Federal Government has been assuming more and more authority in local matters.
Provincial Governors are elected by the
people for terms of three or four years, but they may be re moved by the President when ^stable government is threatened.” A Federal Interventor in such cases is appointed by the President.
Provincial Legislatures vary slightly, follow the
traditional bi-cameral pattern and are elected by the people. II.
POLITICAL REALITIES
General. Argentine politics are in turmoil, a tangled skein difficult even for an Argentinean to unravel.
Political
currents are diverse and reflect a turbulent struggle among many factors and factions in the life of the Republic.
A
country until recently with two Presidents, Argentina is struggling to settle issues between the city and the country, the national government and the provinces, the industrialists and the agriculturalists, and, fundamental to all, between the ’’left and the right.” Left vs. right.
Clearest and most important is the
43 conflict between the "left" and the "right."
Generally speaking,
the "left," represented chiefly by the Radical Party, has the support of the urban middle class patriots, union labor, and such of the agrarian workers as evidence any active interest in polities.
The "right" is composed of the large land-holders
who are desperately holding to the economic and political power which was once theirs without challenge.
It is safe to say
that the radicals command the votes, but the conservatives i*
command the ballot box and governmental instruments of control and today are still in power. Background.
In common with most Latin-American republics,
Argentina at the turn of the century was ruled by an oligarchy of the wealthy.
There was no secret ballot, elections were *U
everywhere controlled by those in power, and the opposition, with no hope of success, abstained from political participa tion,
During the second ten years of the century, the growing
middle class and the increasingly self-conscious laboring group expressed more and more insistent dissatisfaction with conditions, and a peaceful revolution took place. In 1912 an electoral law was passed through the sponsor ship of President Roque Saenz Pena which made voting both secret and compulsory.2 2
p. 11.
The result was an astonishing change
Clarence H. Haring, Argentina and The United States,
44 in the government.
In the election of 1916 the Radicals swept
the country and not only elected their candidate as President, but also secured a majority of the Chamber of Deputies. Unfortunately, however, the liberals were more successful in winning the election than they subsequently were in running the country.
Their political methods displayed little improve
ment over those of their predecessors and demonstrated once more that more than law is necessary for popular control. President Hipolito Irigoyen, popular, modest, and nationalistic, nonetheless dominated his party and the functions of government in the old-fashioned tradition. During his second administration which began in 1928, President Irigoyen became more and more autocratic, and govern ment became less and less efficient.
Crowing discontent was
brought to a head by depression conditions.
In September of
1930, the conservatives and the Army staged a virtually blood less and popular revolution and the "right" was back in power. After a short period an election was held, but the revolutionary government would allow the Radicals no candidate on the ballot and General lusto, a conservative, was easily elected.
The conservatives governed well from 1932 to 1936
and were particularly successful in combatting the effects of the depression.
However, no truly free elections were allowed
the Radicals in the selection of Deputies. In the presidential election of 1936, the conservative
45 government in power did not dare repeat the stratagem of 1932 of prohibiting a radical candidate.
However, elections were
so obviously controlled and fraudulent in key provinces, that the election of the government candidates were assured, Roberto Ortiz was elected President and Ramon Castillo was named Vice President. Two presidents.
Ortiz and Castillo were presented by
the conservatives as a coalition in the hope of appeasing the liberals sufficiently to soften their ever-louder objections. Roberto Ortiz, a former Radical, was felt to be ”controllabletf and yet of sufficient reputation for liberalism to satisfy the virtually disenfranchised majority.
After the election, con
servatives were dismayed and liberals enheartened, by the many evidences that Ortiz was more liberal than had been thought and by his promises of free elections and other reforms.
It is
significant that in the election following the inauguration of the new President, the Radicals for the first time in more than ten years were able to elect a majority of the Chamber of Deputies. On July of 1940 the event occurred which reversed the picture and created the great anomaly of Argentina politics. Ortiz, long suffering from diabetes and failing eyesight, was forced to ask for an indefinite leave of absence with the right to return to his office if his health improved. move elevated Castillo, the arch-conservative, to the
This
46 Acting-Presidency and placed the "rightists* in complete con trol once more.
Thus Argentina has two Presidents, a conserva
tive one running the government and a more liberal one ever present in the background.3
In the background, too, is
General Agustln P. Justo, former president, whose influence in conservative circles and whose control over parts of the Army qualify him as a behind-the-scenes threat to Argentine liberalism. Party alignment.
The two principal parties of
Argentine politics are the Partido Democrats Nacional repre senting the conservatives, and the Union Civica Radical^ representing the liberals.
Allied at present with the Partido
Democrats Nacional is the anti-Personalista party ranking third in size but numerically much smaller than the other two parties. This group left the ranks of the Radicals as a result of the general disapproval of President Irigoyen1s high-handed methods when the liberals were in power prior to 1930.
This conserva
tive alliance is known as the Concordancia and very largely accounts for the success of the conservatives in maintaining
2 Since this study was made, Ortiz’s death has left Castillo in full command as President. ^ The term "Radical" does not carry the same connotation in Argentina as in the United States. The Radical party objec tives are much more liberal than those of the conservatives, but would seem very commonplace in the United States.
their control of government.
There are about three other
relatively insignificant parties including the Socialistas which ordinarily line up with the liberals.
The Communist
Party is barred from political activity. The actual party strength in Congress is not a reliable index of public sentiment.
As has been pointed out, there
have been no completely free national elections in recent years and liberals have had difficulty in being elected even when they appeared to command a distinct majority of the electorate. Nonetheless, the Radical Party now possesses the largest mem bership of all parties in the Chamber of Deputies and with its Allies usually ean count on a majority.
The Senate, on the
other hand, remains a stronghold of the eonservadores.
Of the
149 seats presently occupied in the Chamber of Deputies, seventy-two are filled by members of the Radical Party, while forty-five are held by the Partido Democrats Nacional and fifteen by the anti-Personalistas.5
in the upper house the
Partido Democrata Nacional controls thirteen of the twenty-six filled positions; the anti-Personalistas, seven; and the Radicals, four.6
a
very rough generalization on the basis of
party affiliations would produce a division in the Senate of twenty-one conservatives to six liberals, and in the Chamber of
5 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Political Handbook of the World (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 1. ^ Loc. c it.
48 Deputies of sixty conservatives to eighty-nine liberals* The lower house in recent times has opposed the administra tion at almost every turn*
For example, it has refused to vote
a budget for the Castillo government, thus forcing the President to use extra-legal measures as well as constitutional provisions to finance the country by executive decree.
As a reflection of
public opinion, the Chamber of Deputies is serving a valuable purpose and sooner or later must bring about the destruction of the ruling-class hold on the ballot box and government. Fifth column. Although there are two million people in Argentina of Italian blood and seven thousand Japanese, there appears to be no real political activity by either of these groups.
German activity is a different story.
The so-called
Nazi fifth column has been hard at work and has had notable influence. No one knows how many Germans there are in Argentina, but there are many*
About 250,000 is the estimate which seems
to come closest to meeting general a g r e e m e n t . 7
Qf
these some
60,000 were born in Germany, about 135,000 were American-born of German blood and the rest are of partial German heritage.®
? i.e. Herring, 250,000, 300,000; Gunther, 250,000; Haring, 150,000.
8
Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 67; John Gunther, Inside Latin America, p* 306.
In the United States, persons of German blood, unless by word or deed they indicate otherwise, are rightfully con sidered good citizens.
In Argentina this situation is not
found, for most of the Germans are pro-Nazi,
Although they
are admittedly guessing, authorities feel the evidence indicates that about 50 to 90 per cent of the German-Argentines support the Fuhrer.9 The evidences of the thoroughness and magnitude of the German efforts in Argentina are so many, so conclusive, and so well known as not to need review here.
Through the German
Embassy and through other agents, some of them non-German Argentineans, the Reich has flooded the country with pro-Nazi propaganda.
An extensive and well-knit organization has spent
lavish sums to gain its ends.
Pressure— economic, personal,
and political— has been brought on Germans and on firms carry ing German goods; officials have been entertained even to the extent of trips to Germany; the press, mails, radio, churches, and schools have been extensively utilized, and the German trade policy with Argentina has been directed toward political ends. To accurately evaluate the effect of this campaign is impossible, as conflicting reports will testify. general conditions may be safely advanced.
However, two
One is that the
50 success the fifth column has had has been for the most part confined to the influencing of Germans and a relatively few of the ultra-conservatives and Army leaders.
The other con
clusion is that recently the German influence has been losing ground rapidly and there is every indication of mounting antiNazi sentiment.
Congressional investigation committee reports,
some police arrests, press attacks, and some anti-German re pressive legislation have roused the people who formerly were unconcerned.
A significant observation is that the conserva
tive leaders, often felt in the United States to be completely sympathetic to Germany, in most cases are motivated more by pro-Argentine, strongly nationalistic sentiments than by proGerman sentiements.
While many do not like Britain and the
United States, care little for democracy and are not critical of Germany, they nonetheless would not advocate a Germandominated, Nazi Argentina. Undemocratic Argentina.
There is much about Argentina
that does not conform to our concepts of traditional democracy. As has been indicated, much of this undemocratic or anti democratic sentiment stems from the gentlemen of the broad acres.
These entrenched aristocrats frequently are aghast at
the prospect of greater democracy and have a consuming fear of the liberal.
There is little doctrinaire leftism, radical
ism, or revolutionism in Argentina, yet the ultra-conservatives constantly see the spectre of communism.
A communist to them
51 is any one who agitates for freer elections, higher income taxes, division of the great estates, better wages and working conditions, or improved housing for the poverty stricken peons.
These men, together with their fraternally affiliated
church and Army leaders, have succeeded in many respects in defeating democracy by maintaining minority control of a democratically minded people. This control is maintained in many ways, but three techniques are most apparent.
First, there is the control of
the ballot box and elections to maintain the oligarchy in office in the face of a hostile majority.
Second, there is the
technique authorized by the Constitution of intervention. Under this provision the President may remove Provincial Governors and other officers when stable government is threat ened and appoint in their places Federal Interventors.
This
process has been used by practically all Presidents with abandon and, needless to say, has been occasioned more by political motives than by any conscientious concern for demo cratic government.
Third, there are various ways whereby the
President may assume authority far beyond that intended by the Constitution or the people.
The chief method, being used at
this writing by Acting-President Castillo, is a declaration of emergency or siege.
In such a declared state the nation is
ruled arbitrarily, as can be illustrated by the present presidential ban of all public and press comment on Argentina’s
52 foreign policy. Democratic Argentina.
In spite of these limitations,
Argentina is one of the most democratic of the Latin-American nations.
Her Constitution is quite liberal in its protection
of the rights of the individual; and other evidences attest to a degree of democracy rarely found in her sister nations. Elections, while not entirely free, usually have not been the complete farce usually noticed in Latin-America.
One cannot
overlook the fact that in She face of government control of the ballot box, the Argentine people have succeeded in electing an outspoken majority of the Chamber of Deputies.
Voting is
not only open to all male, adult citizens but it is legally though\not actually compulsory on penalty of ten pesos fine. Argentina boasts real freedom of speech and the press has been definitely one of the freest in Latin-America.
La Prensa and
La Nacion are independent, pro-democratic, outspoken, and objective, and rank with the best papers of the world.
Others
such as La Hazon, Noticias Grafioas, El Mundo, and Critioa also have ably and freely added their contribution to the rising tide of democracy.
The growing strength of organized
labor and of the middle class together with rapidly improving educational facilities lend further impetus to the expanding liberalism. Despite all obstacles, the Argentine people press on
toward a better democracy.
Question the common man wherever
one finds him--ask him about Hitler, politics, standards of living— and one will usually hear the reply of a man who is building toward a freer nation.
Observe the crowd reaction
to a newsreel or mass meeting, and one is convinced that the people seek a more democratic Argentina and that they will have it. Ill. FOREIGN REIATIONS General.
The foreign relations of Argentina cannot be
said to be complex, unless it be .with regard to the Argentinian attitude toward the United States.
Foreign policy is dictated
primarily by three considerations.
First and foremost,
Argentina lives on international commerce and her policies are directed chiefly toward the development, protection, and regula tion of this foreign trade.
Secondly, the Argentinean is in
tensely proud, patriotic, and nationalistic, which fact intro duces a human factor into her relations with other countries. Thirdly, the nation’s foreign relations are tinged by domestic affairs through the conservatives anxiety to control "communism. Britain.
The strongest and most consistent relation
ship has been maintained with the United Kingdom.
England, an
industrial nation, has been the best customer for Argentine agricultural and pastoral products, and has invested heavily in Argentine industry.
Relations have been friendly and are
54 marred only by the dispute over the Falkland Islands, which England holds but Argentina claims.
Recently commercial agree
ments have been effected based on the now familiar "buy-fromthose-who-buy-from-us" philosophy in which reciprocal trade favoritism is exchanged between the two countries.
Argentineans
appear, for the most part, to like the large numbers of British who live in Argentina, particularly because they have not been transient and have settled in the country to stay.
Occasionally
criticism of the British ^clannishness" and "snobbery" is heard, and there seems to be a growing.resentment of British financial control of large parts of Argentinian industry. Germany.
In recent years there has been a tendency to
draw closer to Germany.
This development has been due to the
effect Nazi propaganda efforts have had on governmental and army leaders and to the active trade campaign of the Reich. Barter arrangements led to an increased trade with Germany, but there are many evidences that the barter arrangements were proving distasteful to the Argentineans, whose latitude in purchasing was thereby so strictly reduced.
Most Argentineans
are anti-German, some influencial persons are pro-German, and many leaders are simply neutral waiting to see which way to jump. Neighbors. Argentina has no outstanding boundary or other disputes with her neighbors.
Whatever differences there
55 be are psychological ones based on commercial rivalry and national jealousy.
Border disputes with Chile have been
practically settled, as the impressive seal to the covenant, the Christ of the Andes, demonstrates.
Uruguay, once a pawn
of Brazil and Argentina, is now a settled, well-defined nation having no major quarrel with Argentina.
With Paraguay and
Bolivia there are no official differences.
These nations
serve Argentina as buffers with Brazil and as "frontiers” for Argentina’s commercial penetration.
Argentina is jealous and
disdainful of Brazil, but with her has no disputes. United States. Americans are familiar with the Argentinian opposition to the United States.
In so. many in
stances has Argentina sided against the United States in interAmerican affairs, that her antagonism is apparent to all.
No
real disputes exist between the two nations, yet an unfortunate breach of understanding undeniably exists. The conclusion, reached by many, that the reason for this misunderstanding is a general pro-Axis sentiment in Argentina is neither fair nor true.
It should be understood
that Argentina’s position is largely founded on a purely proArgentine basis and does not represent a desire to aid Germany. There can be no doubt that some influencial Argentineans are possessed of pro-Axis leanings, but it is equally true that most leaders are thinking of Argentina, not Germany, and that the great majority of the people are anti-Hitler and
56 pro-democratic.
In this connection not only should it be
borne in mind that one who opposes the United States does not necessarily favor Nazism, but also it should be remembered that one who favors demooracy may at the same time dislike the United States. As a matter of fact it is safe to say that among the largest part of the people, there is not only a pro-democratic, pro-ally sentiment but a rapidly growing pro-American feeling as well.
The depth of Argentina*s opposition probably at
present is being overdrawn.
A distinction should be made
between the official attitude of the government and the ideas of the people as a whole, for Castillo^s extreme position is not one wholeheartedly shared by the populace.
At the same
time, in spite of growing friendliness toward the United States among the people, one must not gloss over a deeply im bedded antipathy toward the United States that has long been shared by most Argentineans. IV.
To what is this due?
REASONS FOR ARGENTINA* S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES Cultural factors. Argentina is culturally closer to
Europe than to the United States.
The practice of treating
the western hemisphere as a unit has led to the illusion of a cultural unity which in fact does not exist.
Argentina and
the United States have shared few cultural ties as compared to the bonds of race, language, religion, education, art,
57 music, and literature which have bound Argentina to Europe. Since her founding, Argentina has felt more European than American and has sought culture in Paris, London, Rome, and Berlin— not in New York# Geographic factors.
Surprising to most is the discovery
that Argentina is eloser to Europe than to the United States. Aotually the west coast of South America is farther east than the east coast of the United States.
Lima and Santiago on the
west coast are east of Boston, and Buenos Aires is closer and of easier access to Europe than to New York.
Argentina then
has small reason based on geography to feel close to the United States. Economic factors.
Of particular significance is the
economic basis of the Argentine attitude toward the United States.
Argentina produces meat, corn, wheat, cotton, and
wool; products also produced in abundance in the United States. Thus the two nations are competitors in all the principal Argentine products, a situation seldom conducive to good will. This competitive element, however, is but one result of this duplication of production. . Inasmuch as the United States has little need to import products she already produces, she naturally purchases little from countries which have only these things to sell.
On the other hand Germany, England, Japan, and
similar nations are in the opposite position for they need such
58 agricultural products.
Thus, it is natural that they should
he happy to import the Argentine 'surpluses which they need and in turn to supply Argentina the manufactured goods which she so greatly requires.
Europe and Argentina, then, are
drawn together by natural and strong economic bonds not normally found between the United States and Argentina.
Not
only is Argentina closer economically to Europe than to the United States, but hard feelings develop out of the exchange problems that arise from our selling popular American products to Argentina without reciprocating in the purchase of Argentine merchandise. Probably the most important cause of ill feeling in connection with our trade with Argentine has been our tariff and quarantine policies.
Argentineans have resented the
virtual tariff embargo on Argentine beef maintained by the American farmer.
They, have taken it quite personally and feel
that it is discriminatory,
\forst of all in their eyes is the
quarantine against Argentine beef because of the prevalence of the hoof and mouth disease in their country.
These proud
people feel that this is but a subterfuge, slanderous to the nation, designed only to keep their better and cheaper meat out of our country.
The damage to their pocketbooks and to
their pride has made the. quarantine a bitter, anger-arousing hazard to understanding. £ The Argentine utter dependence on the exporting of
59 agricultural products and the importing of manufactured goods is in still another respect responsible for her attitude toward hemispheric solidarity and the United States• Argentina knows that with the minimum of domestic manufacturing she must sell in order to live*
To whom" is she to sell?
The
United States on the one hand refuses to buy from her and on the other hands indicts her for selling to Germany or Japan. Our concept of hemispheric solidarity is that no one shall deal with the Axis, and as long as we will not,.buy Argentine meat and corn and wheat, Argentina is reluctant to embrace this concept of hemispheric solidarity for it leaves largely unanswered her fundamental economic dilemma.
Argentina
knows, too, that after the war, regardless of its outcome or of the political regimes in power, Germany, Japan, and such nations will be her market and not the United States. Human factors. The personal and human "element is fre quently underestimated as a factor in international relations. In the ease of Argentine-American understanding the attitudes of people, well founded or not, must be given considerable weight.
Though undoubtedly an oversimplification, these atti
tudes may be best understood by classifying them into those which arise from an Argentine "complex” and those arising from American errors of human relations. The Argentine "complex” refers to a state of mind ap parently shared by most of the Argentine people.
It is based
60 primarily on a strong nationalism and an intense pride*
The
Argentinean feels superior (even as do we), and, as a natural psychological phenomenon, he dislikes anyone who hurts his pride.
For example, it is a common belief in Argentina that
the country is destined by its superiority to be the leader of a Latin-American hegemony.
Consequently, the pre-eminent
leadership the United States has assumed in inter-American affairs is resented by the Argentinean.
It may be suspected
that the wealth and strength of the United States has led to an unacknowledged Argentinian inferiority complex which makes the individual sensitive and rebellious.
The Argentinean feels
a rivalry with the United States, which is unshared here, that embues him with a certain envy and jealousy.
It is probably
true that some of the Argentine opposition to the United States in inter-American affairs is an effort to prove by such opposi tion that Argentina is a power to be reasoned with and that it does not wish to be classed as but one of many tails to the American kite. Americans, through ignorance and lack of concern, have made many errors in dealing with Argentineans and other LatinAmericans which have aggravated this misunderstanding and antagonism.
We frequently fail to appreciate differences in
modes of living, mental outlook, and social etiquette, and have made grievous mistakes in doing things our way which appear to the Argentinean as breaches of good taste and social
61 standards.
A failure to appreciate the extent of national
pride together with misconceptions about Argentina itself have led us to an unrealized patronizing demeanor distasteful to the Argentinean.
Through ignorance of the truth, our con
versation, our books, and our motion pictures have pictured Argentina as tropical when it is not; considered Argentineans as of backward Indian blood, when they are more European than we; painted them as backward and primitive, when they are cul tured and modern; described them as easy going, lazy siestataking people, when they actually exhibit much of our hustle and bustle; or attribute to them the rhumba or conga, when these are not danced in Argentina unless it be in copy of a Hollywood picture.
Businessmen, by their methods and by their
refusal to conform to Argentine custom and procedure, have added to the anti-American feeling; and American tourists by their manners, criticisms, and unnecessary air of superiority have not always been the best ambassadors of good will.
CHAPTER V THE ECONOMY OF BRAZIL I*
RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION
Geography. Brazil is immense.
Occupying half of the
whole South American continent, its more than three million square miles-1- constitute an area larger than that of the United States, as large as all of Europe, fifteen times the size of France, and sixty-three times the area of England. Largest of the American republics, this giant of nations is exceeded in size only by Russia, Canada, and China. In such a large portion of the earth’s surface will be found, of course, a wide range of types of country and climate.
For our purposes, however, we may conveniently
generalize by considering Brazil in five principal divisions. First in size and legend is the great valley and drainage basin of the Amazon River, the world’s largest.
This great
heart of Brazil Is an equatorial empire in itself, possessed of great wealth and mystery.
Largely uncharted and unknown,
much of it unexplored, it is characterized chiefly by lowlands of tangled, giant, tropical jungles or of the more prosaic
**■ (3,286,170 square miles) United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing S f ^ I c e , 1938), p. 386.
63 brush and scrub covering.
Hot and humid, this area receives
for the most part forty to eighty inches of rain, with the deep western interior receiving more than eighty inches.2 A second section may be said to be the Guiana highlands in the far north.
These are found in the coastal area north
of the mouth of the Amazon, and at one place reach an altitude of 8,633 feet above the sea.^
The coastal area receives heavy
rains and is forested, while the rest is almost desert. The third general area is known as the Brazilian plateau or highland and extends south of the Amazon basin over much of the rest of the country.
It occupies a considerable
portion of Brazil, and contains most of the present population and industry.
An area of mountain ridges, plains, table Land's.,
and forests, it receives an average of fifty-one inches of rain a year.^
Its average altitude of from one to three thous
and f e e t , 5 together with other factors, assure it of a good climate that is cooler than its relatively tropical location would indicate. The fourth area is the coastal plain.
Beginning south
of Rio de Janeiro, it is a very narrow border between the plateau and the sea until it reaches the south where it spreads 2 Preston E. James, Latin America, p. 28. 3 Ibid.. p. 390. ^ Frank Henlus, The ABC of Latin America. p. 25. 5 ^ Howell Davies, editor, The South American Handbook,
p. 205.
64 out into the more expansive grassy plains of Rio Grande do Sul.
This is the region of moderate temperature and above
average rains in which is found most of Brazil’s present cultivations and cattle raising. The last of the five great areas is the drainage basin of the Rio de la Plata and the Rio Parana in the south.
This
river basin together with that of the Amazon comprise about three fifths of the total Brazilian expanse.^
Merging with
the coastal plain it is a region of valleys, tablelands, and rich soil with a moderate and slightly cooler climate. Wealth of the soil.
Brazil is potentially one of the
world's greatest food-producing nations.
Her great size and
her variety of climates and soil make possible the growing in prodigious quantities of practically all the crops known to man.
Here, almost untouched by the plow, nature has placed a
huge, dormant agricultural domain that one day will bring profound changes in the world's food supply and international commerce. It is estimated that 80 to 90 per cent of.the national area of Brazil, under present methods of agriculture and stock raising, is potentially productive.?
6
Davies, loc. cit.
* lames, 0 £. cit., p. 3&7.
Much of this is forest
65 land, difficult of clearing, and no one knows how to evaluate its economic possibilities.
However, it is quite clear that
millions of acres are available. Of this great expanse, only 8 9 1 to 3 per cent is at present being utilized, thus present ing a vivid picture of possible expansion. Forty per cent of the country is still virgin forests,10 scarcely touched by the woodmen.
These wooded lands, chiefly
in the Amazon basin, contain most of the woods known to man and many unfamiliar ones of equal value.
At the present time
the principal products of these forests are from nuts and oils. Small quantities of lumber are exported, but Brazil, in spite of her own supply, continues to import wood products. Agriculture and grazing have been the chief sources of Brazil’s income.
About 70 per c e n t ^ of all Brazilian labor
is engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry and the products of their effort monopolize the export list.
The kernel of the
agricultural industry, the principal source of Brazilian wealth, and the prime consideration in politics, trade and foreign affairs is coffee. Although recently diversification has been started,
Herbert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 110. ^ Katherine Oarr, South American Primer, p. 72. Henius, ojd, cit., p. 29. 11 Loc. cit.
66 Brazil has long leaned on the one crop, coffee, and her economy has fluctuated with its profits.
Brazil produces three fifths
of the world's coffee,^-2 furnishes more than half of the world trade market in this commodity, and could produce all the earth uses.
More than half of Brazil's export total is of
coffee, hut this is not enough to dispose of her production. The smoke of surplus coffee being burned often colors the sky of southern Brazil.
Brazil’s size and potentialities are
emphasized by the fact that this most important source of in come is derived from an area around Sao Paulo about the size of New Hampshire, a dot on the Brazilian map. Large areas in the north, exceeding in size our own cotton belt are suitable to the raising of cotton.
Out of the
realization of the limitations of a one-crop economy has come a phenomenal increase in cotton production of twelve-fold since 1930.13
Cotton is now the second cash crop and in 1933 ac
counted for 18.5 per cent of Brazil's exports. Cacao is third in the list of Brazilian agricultural production, and in its sale Brazil ranks second in the world. ^ Meats, hides, and skins are important items, and although meat 12
13
Herring, ££. cit., p. 111. L o £* cit.
^ kQQ. cit. 15
Davies, o£. cit., p. 212.
67 is not as large an item in trade as it is in Argentina, there actually are more heads of cattle in Brazil than in Argentina* The grasslands of the south are well suited to grazing and are ample to provide for great new herds* Brazil is producing many other items, numbers of them important*
Tobacco, sugar, corn, wheat; a long list of oils
and nuts; earnauba wax, yerba mate and many more are worthy of mention.
The fruit industry is growing and today Brazil is
the world’s second largest exporter of oranges.1^
In a survey
of Brazil’s wealth of the soil, recounting the extent of present production of specific items is a measure only of what has been done and not of potentialities.
Actually Brazil has
a tremendous but uncalculated capacity to produce great quanti ties of practically all agricultural products. Rubber and where to get it recently has been a subject of prime importance to the United States.
In any consideration
of this problem, discussion almost inevitable turns to Brazil, the original home of the rubber tree.
Prior to the turn of
the century Brazil produced all the world’s rubber and in 1910 she produced 88.2 per c e n t ^ of the total.
Today she produces
an insignificant 1 per cent. Her decline has been due to the cultivation of scientific
^
Herring, op. cit., p. 112
17 Ibid., p. 113.
rubber plantations in tbe East Indies developed from original Amazonian stock.
The new plantations possessed advantages with
which Brazil could not compete, and produced more rubber of better quality at a lower price.
Brazil’s disadvantages, largely
present today, were: dependence on scattered, wild trees as compared to the orderly, concentrated production of the planta tion technique; inadequate labor supply, as compared to the plentiful and cheap East-Indian labor; and inferior trees, as compared to the carefully selected and developed trees of the scientific plantation. A development of the Brazilian rubber industry on scale suitable to present needs would be a difficult though not neces sarily impossible task.
Henry Ford has been pioneering in the
plantation mode of production in the Amazon area.
Plant
diseasesi, the difficulties of securing types of trees that will grow well close together,, and labor problems have presented obstacles leading to the abandonment of the original site in in favor of a new one and to slow progress in solving the gen eral problem.
Latest reports seem to reflect greater success,
but even at its best the experiment will be but a beginning. In view of the difficulties involved and the long period that must elapse before any satisfactorily developed tree can mature into production, one cannot view with optimism the possibilities of substantial supplies of Brazilian rubber.
One must not over
look the fact, however, that even though difficult, greatly
69 improved production is not impossible.
The press of circum
stances, together with resourcefulness and energy, may yet re turn rubber to its home. Wealth under the soil.
Brazil’s mineral resources,
like her agricultural wealth, are unmeasured but tremendous. Great areas are scarcely explored, much less prospected, yet already enough subsoil treasures have been discovered to assure Brazil’s rank as one of the most richly endowed nations of the earth.
Few are the minerals which do not exist in
copious quantities in this great land, though little produc tion has as yet been effected. Brazil has the world’s greatest resource of manganese,^ a metal required for making steel.
She boasts the largest
supply of iron ore, 22 per cent of the world’s reserve,^9 which exists in surface mountains up to 70 per cent pure20 ready to be shoveled up.
Gold and diamonds and other precious
and semi-precious metals and jewels have been mined for many years. The list of minerals run the alphabet or chemistry charts virtually from end to end.
It includes bauxite,
13 Carr, o£. cit., p. 73. **■9 Davies, o£. cit. , p. 221. 20
Herring, op. cit., p. 114.
70 chromium, molybdenum, nickel, platinum, tin, tungsten, asbestos, mica, lead, zinc, mercury, quartz, and many more.
21
Petroleum
has been discovered in many places, though it is not yet in substantial production. The one possible weak spot in the Brazilian mineral supply is that occasioned by an apparent lack of high-grade coal.
Huge coal reserves have been found, but so far these
consist of low-grade deposits not well suited to smelting. Brazil must import a large part of her coal from the United States and England until her own resources are developed. She may always need some for smelting unless better qualities are discovered or her coal is found to be usable, or until a means is found of using her hydroelectric power. Power resources. Brazil's power, like her other resources, is a story of almost unlimited possibilities but little present development.
She possesses plentiful low-grade
coal, great reserves of oil, and almost unlimited water power. The exact capacity for hydroelectric power is uncalculated but known to be larger than that of the United Transportation and communication.
States.
Transportation and
communication are among the greatest obstacles to the 21
Herring, loc. cit.
22 Carr, ££. cit., p. 73.
71 development and unification of Brazil,
Except in the immedi
ate areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro facilities are rarely found and great sections of the nation are completely isolated.
Fortunately, the Amazon, navigable by ocean
steamers for a thousand miles, offers an avenue into the heart of the country. There are 20,711 miles of railway in Brazil.
Practi
cally all of this mileage is concentrated in south-east Brazil in a relatively small area around the two large cities.
There
are no north-south railways, and the pattern of roadsteads reveals a fringe on the south-east coast, and a giant void in the balance of the country.
Railways are nationalized, some
of them outright, and the British lines under an elaborate and none-too-satisfactory system of leases and concessions. By any standard, but particularly in comparison to area, Brazil has practically no highways.
A roadbuilding
campaign is now under way but in 1937 the total mileage was only 93,133 m i l e s . T h i s represents about twenty-eight miles per one thousand square miles of territory as compared to Argentina*s 213 or the United States’ one thousand.
Of the
total length only 13,500 m i l e s ^ were first-class road and a very little of this paved.
In 193# there were 159,000
United States Department of Commerce, og. cit., p. 416. Davies,
o jd .
cit., p. 227.
72 25
automobiles and trucks, J one for each 289 persons as compared to one for each forty-nine persons in Argentina and one for each four persons in the United States.
Brazil’s merchant
fleet is negligible though slightly larger than Argentina’s. In 1938 it amounted to 486,000 tons as compared to the United States with 12,000,000 tons.2^ Industrial oapacity and production.
Although Brazil’s
export list is predominately agricultural, rapid advancement in industrial production is taking place.
Actually, statistics
indicated in 1938 a total of 682 million dollars in industrial production as compared to 528 million dollars in agricultural production.2^
Care should be taken in evaluating this figure,
however, as it does not reflect the immense agricultural activity of the home gardener and small farmer.
Almost three
fourths of the people continue to earn their livelihood from the soil.2** Nonetheless the industrial figures are significant and represent a rapidly growing manufacturing activity that has few natural limitations.
Most of the goods produced in Brazil
2^ United States Department of Commerce, ££. cit., p. 417*
26
Comision Argentina de Altos Estudios Internaeionales, Annuario Estadistico Interamericano, p. 443. 27 ' United States Department of Commerce, International Reference Service, Vol. I, No. 1, January, 1941. 2® Henius, 0£. oit., p. 29.
73
are consumed at home and do not represent as yet a considera tion in international commerce, except as they diminish the demand for foreign goods* In 1935 there were 53,680 factories2^ employing 700,000 w o r k e r s , figures which have undoubtedly grown since then.
Under the stimulus of protective tariffs, plants have
been springing up to make Brazil independent of other nations in many fields.
The principal development has been in Sao
Paulo, the coffee center, which is today the largest industrial center in South America and accounts for at least one third of 31 all Brazilian production. The largest development has been in cotton textile manu facturing, food processing, and shoe and clothing manufacturing. Accelerating output is already noticeable of such products as cement, paper, tobacco products, sugar, flour, machinery, chemicals, glassware, hardware, rubber products, and the assembling of American automobiles and other articles.
A
longer list of diverse types might be cited to indicate that while production is not now important, circumstances permit of tremendous development. There is strong evidence that Brazil may become a center
Davies, op. cit., p). 224. 30 31
Herring, 0 £. cit., p. 115. L o c . cit.
74 of heavy industry as well as light manufacturing.
Her enor
mous reserves of exceptionally pure iron, her equally impor tant supplies of manganese and other metals, and her plentiful power would seem to point to the development of the iron and steel industry.
In 1940 the Export-Import Bank of the United
States extended a loan to Brazil for the construction of a modern steel plant in the Paraiba Valley.
In this and other
anticipated projects it is hoped to make use of Brazilian coal, which, though of low grade, is thought to be usable with the high-grade iron.
Should this prove to be true, there should
be no limits on Brazil’s heavy or light industry, except those of leadership, capital, domestic market, or competition with older and better established centers of production. II.
FOREIGN TRADE
Importance. Brazil, like Argentina, has leaned heavily on foreign trade as the source of her wealth.
Although becoming
less so each day, she has long depended on the outside world, for many of her needs and has paid for them in exports.
In
this respect she differs from Argentina to the extent that Brazil possesses the essentials of manufacturing to a far greater extent than Argentina and one day will likely have less dependence on imports and a nicer balance between agri culture and manufacturing.
At present Brazil is second to
Argentina in the volume of trade of South American countries.
75
In 1938 she exported 16.2 per cent of all Lat in-American ex ports and imported 19.7 per cent of all imports.^2 Exports.
Of Brazil’s exports 90 per
cent33
have been
of agricultural products, and of those ooffoe has predominated. In 1928 it made up 71 per cent of all Brazil’s exports but this figure has been declining and stood at 45 per cent in 1938.^*
This decline is not indicative of smaller quantities
for in 1938 more coffee was shipped than in any previous year. The explanation is found in declining prices together with the development of other products for export.
In this same
year Brazil exported 57 per cent of all the coffee sent from Lat in-Amer ica . Brazil has been "ruled" by single products which have led to great riches and great poverty.
The rubber boom, the
gold rush, the coffee era have followed in turn.
Now it would
appear the diversification is finally on its way and its herald is the rapidly expanding exportation of cotton.
Cotton
is second on the export list and in 1938 accounted for 18 per cent of Brazil’s exports and 70 per cent of all the cotton exported from Latin-America. ^
32 Ibid., p. 116. 33
Henius, op. cit., p. 31.
34
James, ©£. cit., p. 562.
35
L o c . cit.
76
The remainder of the export list is a long one in which no single item accounts for more than a small percentage of the total.
Third in 1936 was cacao (4.2 per cent), followed
by hides and skins (4*1 per cent), oranges (2.2 per cent), carnauba wax (2 per cent), and many small items constituting about 24 per cent.
The war has undoubtedly changed for the
time the nature of the export list.36 Imports.
Brazil’s imports have been dictated by her
deficiencies in industrial production.
By far the greatest
share has been of machinery, vehicles and iron and steel. After these has come fuels, foods, chemicals, and paper manu factures. Customers. best customer.
The United States has long been Brazil’s
We have consistently taken more than one third
of all Brazilian exports and more than one half of her c o f f e e . 37 Next in rank has been the United Kingdom receiving about one tenth, except in very recent years when Germany’s barter ar rangements raised her to second place with 17 to 19 per cent of Brazilian exports.3&
The war, of course, has radically
changed the normal picture, virtually removing Germany, Italy,
36 I b i d . , p.
563-
37 T
Loc. cit.
38
Pan-American Union, Lat in-Amer ican Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1936 (Foreign Trade Series No. 178), p. 3#
77 Ir,ance, and Japan from the picture, increasing the United Kingdom’s share and raising the United States’ portion to more than 50 per cent. Suppliers.
The United States ordinarily also has been
the chief source of Brazilian imports, supplying about one fourth of her needs. In 1937 and 193# Germany slightly surpassed the United States by a fraction of 1 per cent, each sending about 25 par c e n t . T h e sudden German increase was brought about by barter arrangements in which Brazilian cotton was traded for German machinery.
In 1938 Argentina was third with 11.8 per cent^0
and Britain was fourth with 10.4 par cent.^
Again it must
be said that the war has completely changed the picture, with the United States supplying perhaps three fourths of Brazilian imports.
Brazil has with rare exception maintained a slight
but consistently ’’favorable” balance of trade.
39
Pan-American Union, loc. cit. James, op. cit., p. 564.
^
Pan-American Union, op. cit., p. 3. Davies, op. cit., p. 223.
78
TABLE VII PERCENTAGE SHARES OF BRAZILIAN EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PURCHASERS8 Year
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United States
1937
9.0
6*4
17.1
2.2
4.7
36.3
1938
8*8
6.4
19.1
2.1
4.6
34.3
1939
9.6
6.3
11.9
2.4
5.5
36.2
1940
17.3
5.7
42.3
- -
—
—
a P.an-American Union, Lat in-Amer ican Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1938 (Foreign tfrade Series, N o . 178. Washington, D. C.: Pan-American tJnion, 1940) , p. 3.
79
TABLE VIII PERCENTAGE SHARES OF BRAZILIAN IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERS 9 Japan
United States
1.5
1.6
23.1
25.0
1.8
1.3
24.2
19.2
1.8
1.5
33.6
—
2.4
51.9
Year
United Kingdom
France
1937
12.1
2.4
23.9
1938
10.4
3.4
1939
9.3
2.7
1940
9.4
—
Germany
—
Italy
a Pan-American Union, Lat in-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1938 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 17#. Washington, D.G.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 3*
80
TABLE IX PRINCIPAL BRAZILIAN EXPORTS 1938a Rank
Commodity Total exports
American Dollars #295,568,651
1
Coffee
2
Cotton, raw
53,922,000
3
Cocoa
12,352,000
4
Hides and Skins
12,118,000
5
Oranges
6,522,000
6
Carnauba Wax
5,858,000
7
Meat
5,109,000
8
Tobacco
4,976,000
9
Oil-seed Cake
4,918,000
Castorseed
4,62.6,000
10
133,151,000
a Pan-American Union, Brazil (Foreign Trade Series, No. 177* Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 2.
81
TABLE X
PRINCIPAL BRAZILIAN IMPORTS
1938& Rank
Commodity Total imports
American Dollars #295,368,155
1
Machinery, Apparatus, et cetera
62,774,000
2
Vehicles and Accessories
31,378,000
3
Wheat
30,450,000
4
Iron and Steel Manufacturings
21,453,000
5
Fuel
14,955,000
6
Chemicals, Drugs
13,360,000
7
Gasoline
9,814,000
8
Iron and Steel
8,167,000
9
Paper and Manufacturings
6,452,000
Fuel and Oil
6,361,000
10
a Pan-American Union, Brazil (Foreign Trade Series, No. 177. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 2.
82
TABLE XI TOTAL BRAZILIAN EXPORTS a Year
American Dollars
1937
$347,584
193#
295,569
1939
333,674
1940
301,021
a Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1938 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 17$. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 2; Pan-American Union, Lat in-Amer ican Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1940 (Foreign ‘J?rade Series, Ho. 1971 Washington, D .C .: Pan-American Union, 1942), p. 2.
83
TABLE XII TOTAL BRAZILIAN IMPOBTSa Year
American Dollars
1937
$330,565
1938
295,368
1939
296,127
1940
300,877
a
Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1938 (Foreign Trade Series, No. I78 V Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 2; Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade; A General Survey, 1940 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 193. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1942), p. 2.
III. General.
FINANCE
It is a paradox that in the midst of great
riches Brazil is desperately poor.
With three times Argentina’s
size and population and many times her resources, Brazil, nonetheless, operates on an annual budget only two thirds that of her neighbor.
This budget, too, is in a chronic state of
defieit, a deficiency which has usually been covered by foreign loans.
The exchange structure has been riddled and
is maintained today by strict government decree at arbitrary, and weak, ratios to the United States’ dollar.
Brazil has
little money and, except for the adorned eities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, few of the material evidences of wealth.
A rather clear indication of Brazil’s poverty is
found in the fact that in 1938 Brazil bought $4.00 per capita in the world’s market as compared to Argentina’s $20.50 or Denmark’s $5 3 •30. ^ Foreign debt. considerable size.
Brazil is burdened by a foreign debt of
There is confusion and wide variation in
available figures, but all indicate a story of government borrowing and defaulting.
All attempts at servicing the
the foreign debt were abandoned in 1937, but were partly re sumed in 1940 through the familiar technique of additional
^3 Herring,
ojd.
cit.,
p.
124.
85 borrowing from the United States. Foreign capital.
A large share of Brazilian industry
is financed by foreign capital.
It is estimated that about
five hundred million dollars of British
money44
and about
three hundred million dollars of American capital are invested in Brazil.45
When the one billion dollars or so of government
bonds held in England and the United States are added, the share of these two nations is enormous.
Ford, General Motors,
Electric Bond and Share Company, International Telephone and Telegraph, Chicago packing companies, and the United States1 Steel Corporation are among the American concerns interested in Brazil. Recent borrowing.
In March 1939, Brazil concluded an
agreement with the United States under which she is to reeeive large sums from the Export-Import Bank.
It was agreed to
advance nineteen million dollars for the liquidating of blocked commercial accounts; to loan fifty million dollars to the Central Reserve Bank of Brazil to stabilize currency; and to extend an indefinite amount, probably exceeding one hundred million dollars, in long-term loans for industrial and railroad expansion.
Brazil, in turn, agreed to resume
44 Carr, o£. cit., p. BO. 4^ Herring, ££. cit., p. 161.
payments on $357,000,000 in dollar bonds.
In addition to
these sums, twenty million dollars more was provided in 1940 as part of the capital of a Brazilian steel company, this loan to be expended in the United States for supplies and equipment.
CHAPTER VI SOCIAL FACTORS IN BRAZIL I. Numbers.
POPULATION
The unusual sparseness with which Brazil’s
great area is settled, often leads to misconceptions as to the total population.
Brazil’s forty-four million1
Portuguese speaking people are half of all South Americans, and constitute a population as large as that of the United Kingdom, France, or Italy; five times that of the Netherlands; and one third that of the United States.
The thirteen persons
per square mile in Brazil2 is, of course, far less than the 489 in the United Kingdom, the 688 in the Netherlands, or the forty-three per square mile in the United States. Distribution. Mpst of Brazil is empty, for the Brazilians live today in a very small portion of their great national area.
The population is centered on the seaboard
strip and in the temperate coastal plateau, with more than half in the southeast area near the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
In one third of the area of the nation live
1 (44,116,000) Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, p. 16. 2 Loc. cit.
8890- per cent of the people,3 while in two thirds of the country the density of population is less than one person per square mile.^
Although the State of Texas with its twenty-four
persons per square mile is considered sparsely settled, the inland State of Amagonas, three times the size of Texas, is inhabited by less than one-half person per square mile.5 Here, then is a new frontier.
Most of it is rich in
soil and minerals, but the pioneering to be done and the tropical nature of much of the land tend to discourage the immigrant from cooler climes.
It is significant, however, that
the Henry Ford experiment in the heart of the hottest jungles has proven that modern science can overcome most of the tradi tional hazards of tropic life.
The Ford plantation, in the
midst of equatorial disease and fever, is the healthiest spot in Brazil.^
Estimates of the number of people that might be
supported in Brazil vary greatly, but there appears to be adequate authority behind the statement that Brazil clearly has the largest population capacity of any country in the world.7 3
Katherine Carr, South American Primer, p. 71.
4 Loc. oit. 5 Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 109. 6 Preston E. James, Latin America, p. 557. 7
Francisco Silva, Jr., Brazil (New York: Hastings House, 1940), p. 16.
89
Cities. Rio de Janeiro, capital of Brazil, lias been featured in song and story as the most beautiful city in the world.
There are many who will testify to the validity of
this distinction, for its two million people live in a para dise that cannot be adequately pictured.
Wide, curving, white
beaches; harbors; bays; and inlets of deepest blue dotted with islands and fringed with tropic foliage; startling peaks, tall and grotesquely shaped, that afford all-embracing vistas of water, jungle, and city; eight- and twelve-lane boulevards bright at night, shaded by day; warm but not hot days and nights; carefree, polite, unhurried, intelligent people; wide sidewalks of inlaid black and white marble in sweeping, un usual patterns; new, white, air-conditioned buildings; Sugar Loaf, sentinel of the harbor— these are some of the features of incomparable Rio.
Here is the modern political heart of
the country, beautiful but important too, which serves as a sharp contrast to the surrounding poverty and jungle. Brazil’s second city is Sao Paulo, which is as business like as Rio is romantic.
Center of the coffee district, hub of
Brazilian manufacturing, it is known as the "Chicago" of South America.
Its modern buildings, its more than a million people,
its hustle and bustle make the Norteamericano feel at home. Recife, or Pernambuco, is the third most populous city of Brazil (421,818), and easternmost port of South America. Other important cities in order of size are Salvador, Belem,
90 Porto Alegre, Santos, and Belo Horizonte.
Manaos, known
throughout the world, is the former rubber capital of the earth, now a virtual ghost city a thousand miles up the Amazon. II. Racial bases.
THE PEOPLE
One frequently hears the American social
worker enthuse over Brazil’s solution of the race problem. Such optimistic enthusiasm appears to be overdrawn in view of the facts.
In many respects Brazilians are more tolerant
than Americans in discriminating between races, but Brazil does have a distinct race problem. The most noticeable difficulty is in connection with the N.egroes of Brazil.
No reliable statistics exist and
estimates vary widely, but all figures show a large percentage of Negro blood.
In 1922 the Museo Naeional do Rio de Janeiro
estimated that 14 per cent of the Brazilian people were Negro and 22 per cent more were of some Negro blood,^
indicating
that not less than one of every three Brazilians was at least partially Negroid.
At the same time it was stated that 51 per
cent where white, 11 per cent white and Indian, and 2 per cent Indian.
Other figures place the Negro percentage higher, the
white figure lower and include Negro-Indian, Asiatic, and
® Cited in Herring, ojs. cit., p. 134.
91 other racial strains. Discrimination against the Negro, so apparent in the United States,
is not as pronounced in Brazil, and the stigma
of mixed Negro
blood is not the social barrier that it is in
this country.
It is not uncommon to see groups of young
people strolling together in Rio de Janeiro, in which all shades of color from black to white will be represented.
Many
Brazilians of pronounced blackness have won places of distinc tion in government, the arts and sciences, and church.
Those
of only some Negro blood find it a relatively small_. handicap, for such a color line is an embarrassing one to draw in most sections of Brazil. Nonetheless there is a premium on whiteness and the Negro problem,
rather than having been solved, appears to be
growing.
is particularly true with relation to the dark
This
and obviously Negroid person.
The darker Negro eertainly does
not meet the prejudice that he does in the United States, but at the same time he faces appreciable barriers. Of the white blood, pure and mixed, the largest portion is of the Portuguese and Italian races.
The balance is of
German, Dutch, Polish, Scamdinavian, and various other strains. In addition to the Negro problem, there are others occasioned by unassimilated German, Italian, Polish, and Japanese com munities.
Largest of these groups is the German, composed of
some fifty thousand persons born in Germany and 800,000 to
900,000 second, third, and fourth generation GermanBrazilians.^
These people are found in the cities and mainly
in colonies in the south which frequently appear more German than Latin. Immigration. From 1822 to 1937 more than 4*600,000 immigrants had come to Brazil, about half of them to remain.^ Italians with 32.6 per cent of the total and Portuguese with 3 0 . 3 per cent have easily outranked other nationalities.
Following these two groups with much smaller totals have been Spanish (12.9), Germans (4.9), Japanese (3.9), Russians (2.5), and others (12.9).11 In recent years these figures have been greatly modi fied.
The most significant change has been the increase in
the influx of Japanese which raised them to first place on the list during the period of 1931-1937.
Some 300,000 Japanese
now live in Brazil, but their further entrance has been re duced to a quota of three thousand a n n u a l l y . T h e total number of foreigners who entered Brazil in 1939 was 38,448, of whom 22,668 were classified as permanent residents and
9 Herring, ££. oit., p. 152. James, ££. cit., p. 566. ^
Loc* cit.
93 15,780 as temporary.
Among them were 15,120 Portuguese, 1,975
Germans, 1,414 Japanese, 1,004 Italians, 612 Poles, 508 Americans, and 309 British.^ The gradual growth of unassimilated colonies of for eigners led in 1934 and 1938 to the creation of a drastic immigration code.
Foundation stone of the new policy is the
restriction to 2 per cent of the past fifty years* immigration of each national group.1^
The law also states that 80 per cent
of each quota must be composed of farmers or rural technicians and that these must remain in rural occupations for at least four years.15
Another section stipulates that in each new
colony 30 per cent of the people must be of Brazilian birth and not more than 25 per cent may be of any one foreign born nationality. u III.
EDUCATION
Brazil’s educational system can be described only as chaotic and hopelessly inadequate.
Some spasmodic progress
is now being made but the road ahead remains long and difficult.
13
^ Howell Davies, editor, South American Handbook,
p. 226. ^
T^e Statesman*s Yearbook, p. 742.
15 James, op. cit., p. 567. The Statesman* s Yearbook, p. 742.
94 Fully 70 per cent of Brazilians are illiterate.^7
Education
is said to be free and in some states compulsory, yet 80 per 18 cent of the children have no schools. New York City with one sixth of Brazil’s population spends thirteen times as 19 much on education. There are said to be 35,000 primary OA
schools and 913 high schools v in Brazil with an enrollment 21 of three million pupils, but even these are largely of pitifully low standards. IV.
SOCIAL STRATA
The sharply definable aristocracy based on land and family which is so apparent in Argentina is to only a small degree noticeable in Brazil.
There are sharp distinctions on
the basis of wealth which are significant in politics and economics and which lead to social cleavages, but the hereditary class of aloof, proud, and exclusive landed-people is not so much in evidence.
True, many of the wealthy are from old
lauded families, but the "newly-richf’ are of equal prominence. The currents and eddies of diverse racial strains, the 17 United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing bffiee, 1936), p. 216. 18 Herring, op. cit., p. 130. ^ k°o. cit. 20 Silva, Jr., op. cit., p. 20.
21
The Statesman’s Yearbook, p. 742.
95
shifting emphasis of modes of economic endeavor, and the in dividualism encouraged by the constant frontier struggle have led to a more tolerant and democratic attitude in which the Argentinian type of aristocracy does not thrive.
In Brazil
the principal basis of social division is economic*
There are
a few families who are rich and rein, a relative handful who are prosperous, and an overwhelming majority who are poor— very poor. V.
STANDARD OF LIVING
Brazil is a pointed example of poverty in the midst of plenty.
Most Brazilians exist under a standard of living that
is extremely low— a standard of starvation, mean housing, and disease.
Misrule, years of slavery, dependence on single crops,
lack of manufacturing, and the vast expanse of tropic wilder ness have taken their toll. The wealthy and the comfortable.
It has been estimated
that not more than 2 per cent of the Brazilian people are secure and well fed.22
These include the owners of the wealth
and the upper stratum of professional, governmental, and business leaders.
The census of 1920 indicated that less than
1 per cent of the people owned more than one sixth of the
22 Cited in Herring, o£. cit., p. 118.
96 national area and that not more than 25,000 others could he classed as
prosperous.
22
Included in this group are the
men who hold responsible public offices, who are successful business executives, and who are the better paid professional workers.
Some idea of standards is conveyed by the fact that
#150.00 a month is considered generous pay for those in high office. The poor.
The rest of the people are poor, most of
them indescribably so.
Although above the general average,
even the white-collar workers and low-paid professional people are very poorly paid.
In this group of clerks, bookkeepers,
lawyers, doctors, teachers, and government workers can be counted about one million people or perhaps one twelfth of the workers.
A village schoolteacher will receive from #10.00
to #20.00 per month while one in the cities of Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo will earn from #15.00 to #25.00 per month.
A
clerk in one of Rio de Janeiro’s best stores received #27.00 per month and a bank clerk #33.00.
An intelligent reporter
on a major newspaper assigned to an interview received #34.00 and his camera-man #25.00. The one million industrial workers and the nine million agricultural workers which constitite most of the employed in Brazil fare much worse.
The best of them, such as skilled
22 Cited in Herring, loc. cit.
workmen, trainmen, or craftsmen, ordinarily will receive from #12*00 to #20.00 per month*
A survey made in 193# by the
National Ministry of Labor, Industry, and Commerce indicated an average monthly wage of all workers of 236 milreis (about #11*80),
but this report did not include many on the eco
nomic and geographic fringes.
The average wage in Pernambuco
is #5.00 per month, while a modified peonage in the interior usually provides little or no monetary income.
Corroboration
of these figures is supplied by the recently proclaimed minimum wage law which cite the minimum as #4.50 to #12.00 per month according to the section of the nation concerned. Diseases of malnutrition and poor sanitation take a terrible toll.
No reliable statistics exist for the country
as a whole, but League of Nations* inadequate estimates of death rates for the cities are revealing.
Deaths of babies
from intestinal diseases are thirty-eight times as great in Rio de Janeiro as in Philadelphia; deaths from measles are twenty-seven times as many as in Chicago, and from influenza seven times as many as in Boston.
Rio de Janeiro's infant
mortality rate is four times that of New York's and the general death rate about ten times that of American cities.
24 Ibid., p. 120. 25 Ibid.. p. 121.
98 VI.
LABOR AM) SOCIAL WELFARE
No organized movement or noticeable trend worthy of the move toward the improvement of labor and social conditions is observable.
Labor unions are outlawed under the present
government and other social progress has been spasmodic and slow.
The Vargas regime appears somewhat concerned with some
of the deplorable conditions in education, health, and living standards and has made some efforts to improve them.
The
magnitude of the task coupled with scant budgets offers little hope for the near future.
The people of Brazil, giving little
evidence of the blossoming social consciousness of Chile and Argentina, seem destined to endure yet longer their meager existence.
CHAPTER VII BRAZILIAN POLITICS I. General.
BACKGROUND
Brazil, probably to as great an extent as
any nation, is ruled by one man, Getulio Vargas.
Consequently,
any consideration of formal constitutional provisions and governmental structure is purely academic and misleading. Though it would be possible to describe the government as ostensibly outlined in the Constitutions of 1934 and 1937, such a discussion would be largely wasted effort.
Brazil is
ruled by the personal decrees of the President, and it has long been apparent that the earlier Constitutional forms have . been almost completely obliterated and that the present Constitution is but a legalistic cloak to the virtually un limited and opportunistically exercised powers of Dr. Vargas and his lieutenants.
The government of Brazil today can be
described only in terms of men— not laws or forms. Colonial roots. Brazil was ruled by Portugal from 1332 to 1822.
Mis-rule would be a better term, for this was
a period of Indolent control and mismanagement providing a heritage of disunity, corruption, and inefficiency that has not as yet been overcome.
Nominally controlled by a viceroy
appointed in Portugal, Brazil actually was divided into almost
100 independent captaincies controlled by weak and corrupt men, Tiie inevitable result was the growth of a sectionalism which is still sharply present and an era that developed feudal realms, slavery, chaos,.and poverty.
During the Napoleonic
control of Portugal, the court of Joao VI was moved to Brazil where the King ruled the country in a more personal but scarcely more efficient manner.
In 1921, Joao returned to Lisbon,
leaving his son, Pedro, as regent.
At the urging of the
colonists who saw the success of the independence movements of their Spanish neighbors, Pedro was persuaded to declare Brazil free of Portugal, and on September 7, 1822, declared himself Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil. The Empire.
Pedro I ruled the Empire until 1831 when
under pressure he abdicated, leaving his throne to his fiveyear-old son.
Regents served in the boy's name until 1840,
when his majority was declared, and in 1841 he was crowned Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil.
For forty-nine years Pedro II
reined in one of the longest eras of peace and progress that ever had been enjoyed by any Latin-American state.
Pedro II
was a good ruler and great progress in the arts, sciences, education, health, and, paradoxically, democracy was made. However, his insistence on the separation of the church and state and his freeing the slaves of the great landowners earned the opposition of the clergy and landed gentry, and in 1889 Pedro was forced to retire to France.
The Republic
101 was born. The Republic to Vargas.
The forty years from 1889 to
1930 were marked by continued progress.
Constitutional ameni
ties were Observed to a degree rarely equalled in LatinAmerica, and in the face of great difficulties forward steps were taken in many fields.
The crack in coffee prices of 1930
found Brazil’s one-crop economy ill-equipped to cope with the crisis;
discontent grew, and the resultant unsettled condition
brought
to power Getulio Vargas. Vargas’ rise to power.
For year prior to 1930 the rich
coffee-producing state of Sao Paulo dominated Brazilian politics in spite of the futile resentment and objections of other states.
Growing pressure, however, led to
a working agreement
with the nearhy iron-producing state of Minas Geraes by which the two states alternated control of the presidency and the federal legislature.
In the election of 1930, however,
President Washington Luis, a Paulista, made the error of violating the agreement by -presenting as the government candi date for the presidency another Paulista, Julio Prestes. The political leaders of Minas Geraes, understandably, then threw their support to the opposition candidate, Getulio Vargas, governor of the increasingly wealthy state of Rio Grande do Sul.
Supporters of Vargas were convinced that their
candidate had won the election, but the government’s control
102 of the election machinery assured the naming of the govern ment candidate.
Charging the government with fraud, leaders
in Minas Geraes, Rio Grande do Sul, and Parahyba began an armed revolt, which together with a military coup in the capital soon sent the newly elected Prestes to Portugal and Getulio Vargas to the Cattele Palace. Provisional government and civil war.
The junta of
revolutionists, with Dr. Vargas as Provisional President of the Republic, immediately undertook to reorganize Brazil's political system from top to bottom.
All federal, local, and
state legislative bodies were dissolved, constitutional guar antees were suspended, and all offices including the state governorships were filled with appointed adherents to the Vargas group.
These high-handed methods aroused considerable
opposition throughout the country.
Sao Paulo, long accustomed
to power and fretting under the Vargas interventors, brought matters to a head in 1932 by initiating an armed counter revo lution.
The civil war lasted three months and ended with a
government victory and the exiling of some of the insurgent leaders.
The conclusion of the insurrection brought evidence
of the Vargas political shrewdness that has left him in office and popularized him throughout Brazil.
There were no execu
tions and no aftermaths of hatred and revenge.
President
Vargas immediately declared a general amnesty which included the army officers, many of whom, indeed, hold major posts in
103 the army today.
Vargas 1 popularity grew and was further en
hanced when he announced his intention of calling a constitu ent assembly to draft a new constitution. Constitution of 1934*
Tbe assembly met in November,
1 9 3 3 , and was composed largely of handpicked supporters, al
though the secret ballot was used for the first time and some opposition delegates were allowed to be elected.
The
Constitution, adopted on July 16, 1934, was much more national istic than that of 1891 had been, giving the federal government much greater power over a much wider range of economic, and political spheres.
Certain liberal provisions were included
such as those providing for: the right of suffrage for women, eight hour day, minimum wages, and the prohibition of child labor.
A significant section provided that one sixth of the
Chamber of Deputies should be chosen by associations represent ing various economic and professional classes.
From a realis
tic point of view, probably the principal result of the meeting of the assembly was its "legal" election of Vargas as President for four years and the provision that a presidential election be held in 1937 to select a successor. The "communist" revolt.
VargasT "constitutional"
period of office from 1934 to 1937 was far more peaceful, al though his personal popularity was growing.
Most widly known
episode of the various disturbances was the "communist"
104 uprising in November, 1935# the treatment of which led many to believe that Vargas was a fascist of the European brand. Noncommissioned officers together with leftist elements en gineered the revolt, and minor street fighting took place. However, the army quickly quelled the trouble and large num bers were rounded up and arrested. leader, is still in jail.
Luiz Carlos Prestes, the
One result of this episode was the
placing of Brazil under martial law— a status that has since been chronic. The coup and "Novo Estado" of 1937*
By the terms of
the Constitution of 1934, Vargas was forbidden to succeed him self, so the election year of 1937 was one of great political excitement.
Nominally the government candidate was Jose
Americo de Almeida, a cabinet minister, but Vargas never gave him the official approval so frequently supplied in LatinAmerican "elections."
The opposition candidate was a well-
known and powerful Paulista, Armando de Salles Oliveira. While the two candidates were campaigning, Vargas worked be hind the scenes and executed an efficient coup d ’etat.
Declar
ing martial law, the President called off the elections, disbanded Congress, banned all political parties, and pro claimed a new constitution, with himself as dictator. The new Constitution was written by the intellectual leader of the Vargas regime, Francisco Campos, and created the "Novo Estado."
Although the Novo Estado as literally outlined
105 is completely authoritarian, the document creating it cannot be used as reference as actual practice has been quite differ ent from the written plan.
For example, the Constitution
provides for a Congress of sorts, yet no Congress yet has been called.
Apparently, although it is rather futile to attempt
to trace the "legality" of the Presidency in the maze of Brazilian developments, Vargas rules under the pretext of a temporary dictatorship provided for in the document which he himself decreed.
Theoretically, at some future time to be
determined by the President, the dictatorship will end and the almost equally authoritarian rule of the Novo Estado will begin.
A glance at the plan demonstrates eloquently that
should such a time come Vargas or his successor will still be a dictator. Provisions of the anticipated Novo Estado.
In addition
to creating a temporary dictatorship to extend as long as the President decrees, the Constitution of 1937 provides that the President shall continue to exercise wide powers after the "emergency."
He has the unhindered power to legislate on most
subjects when the Congress is not in session, and has broad authority to make most appointments and to intervene•in state governments.
The upper house, according to the document, is
to be composed of one representation of each state and ten other members appointed by the President.
The lower house
membership is to be selected by a scheme of indirect election
106 which increases the probability of governmental control*
The
legislative body as a whole has a relatively subordinate position* The President may decree a state of war or suspend the Constitution in any part of the country on his own authority. If not acted upon within a certain time, the President’s budget takes effect without legislative approval*
The right
to introduce bills is,in general, restricted to the President, and most classes of them must be either accepted or rejected without amendment, if they have been approved by the Economic Council* The Economic Council is an innovation in the Americas, reminiscent of the Italian scheme.
With advisory and some
legislative power, it is to be composed of members of pro fessional organizations representing agriculture, industry, commerce, and transport*
Credit and labor groups are to be
equally represented with those of employers* The presidential term of office is six years and no president may succeed himself*
Selection of the president
is in the hands of an electoral college composed of representa tives of municipal councils, the two houses of Congress, and the Economic Council.
However, should the choice of president
of the,electoral college not meet with the retiring president’s approval, he may name his own candidate and the two shall be submitted to a general election*
In such an event all registered
107 persons, including women, over eighteen years of age may vote. The fascist revolt.
Vargas* speedy and decisive quelling
of the leftist uprising in 1935 together with the obviously authoritative philosophy of the Novo Estado led many to the i
belief that he was sympathetic to Italian fascism or German Nazism.
This sentiment was largely dispelled, however, by
the equal dispatch with which he put down the "Integralistas, ** the green-shirted fascist organization.
For some time this
group under one Plenio Salgado had been marching, posing and saluting, when in May, 1938, they attempted to seize the government.
The r,battle*f lasted three hours, twelve persons
were killed, and the fascists were overcome.
Many Integralistas
were imprisoned and Salgado was exiled to Portugal.
Since this
affair Brazil has been politically quiet and the personal popu larity of Vargas has appeared to grow. II. General.
THE VARGAS GOVERNMENT
The Vargas* dictatorship is a personal one
resting almost entirely on the pronunclamentos of the one man. No party backs the president, for neither a party, nor badges, nor salutes exist.
He is surrounded by a few friends, such as
Francisco Campos, author of the 1937 Constitution; General Pedro Aurelio Goes Monteiro, Chief of Staff of the army, and Oswaldo Aranha, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
These men, no doubt,
exert considerable influence on the president on a personal
108 basis, but indications point to the fact that decisions rest ultimately with Dr. Vargas alone. Getulio Vargas is popular in Brazil.
His dictatorship
is thoroughgoing, but, nonetheless, a gentle and benevolent one. None of his political opponents nor the leaders of uprisings have been executed, and many who once opposed him now hold responsible government positions.
Dr. Vargas, quiet and
smiling, is possessed of considerable administrative ability and is unexcelled in his capacity to make friends and sup porters even among his opponents.
Never, does it appear, have
his policies been governed by vindictiveness, revenge, or hate. He appears to have a genuine interest in the welfare of Brazil and seems to be prompted more by patriotic motives than by the desire for selfish gain.
President Vargas represents the
wealthy in Brazil, yet has convinced the poor of his real in terest in them.
He is a master of compromise and placation.
Unassuming, he enjoys the friendly nicknames the Brazilians have for him and laughs at the nonvicious jokes they tell on him.
Enemies, no doubt, he has, but most Brazilians like him
very much.
The Brazilian government rests on a foundation of
the personal popularity of Getulio Vargas. Undemocratic Brazil.
The traditional democratic safe
guards are. nonexistent in Brazil.
There is no Congress of any
sort and apparently no thought of creating one.
There are no
elections of any kind, for all officers of every type are
109 picked by the President.
The President rules by decree with
the nonbinding advice of his Cabinet and the Vargas appointed Economic Council. unity is stressed.
State power has been stripped, and national Although labor may organize under govern
ment aegis, it cannot strike and little organization has taken place.
There is no liberty of press, speech, or assembly.
Censors are stationed at every newspaper, and the dispatches of foreign correspondents are carefully edited.
However,
Brazilians are not regimented in the European sense; there is complete freedom of religion and little is done to interfere with the personal life of the people.
It is an amiable dic
tatorship. Accomplishments.
Vargas has stifled traditional democ
racy and civil liberties in Brazil, but apologists and many Brazilians will defend the regime.
President Vargas* rule has
brought order out of extreme political and interstate strife and has greatly improved official morale.
Many flagrant
abuses have been eliminated and finances have been improved. During his administration substantial progress has been made in developing wheat, cotton, and other answers to the one-crop economy, and industrial production has been more than doubled. He has evidenced a genuine interest in the poor, and has made honest beginnings in the improvement of their condition.
Con
siderable attention has been given to improved transportation,
110
sanitation, education, housing, and other elements or better standards of living.
Judgment of the administration of
Getulio Vargas should be made against the background of Brazil’s poverty and meager budgets, its illiteracy, its primitive state, the pre-Vargas political abuses, and the level of democracy to be found in the rest of Latin-America. The fifth column.
Although there are large numbers of
Italians and Japanese in Brazil, it is the Germans who con stitute the real problem., Estimates vary widely as to the numbers of German people in the country, but all figures demonstrate that there are many.
The most reliable authori
ties place the count at 50,000 German-born and 900,000 second, third, and fourth generation Germans,1 but this one million total is conservative as compared to other estimates of a twomillion figure composed of 830,000 German-born and 1,370,000
2
German-descended persons. Germans have been coming to Brazil for many years, settling on farms and in communities in the south, organizing coffee business in Sao Paulo, operating thousands of shops in the chief cities and smaller towns, practising the profes sions and otherwise entering the economic fabric of the
1 Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 152. 2
John Gunther, Inside Latin America, p. 3&6.
Ill country,
Today they are everywhere, and are particularly ' i
noticeable and powerful in the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catherina, where large unassimilated colonies exist.
In 1939, Preston E. James of the University of
Michigan reported on the town of Blumenau in Santa Catherina, where he found 63 per cent of the population speaking German as their mother tongue and 33 per cent Portuguese.-^
A glance
at the telephone directory, at the man on the street, or the name-plates on businesses lends weight to these figures. The Nazis have been busy among their fellow Aryans, and have secured a large following— exactly how large, of course, no one knows.
All of the familiar techniques observed
in Argentina and elsewhere have been employed, and, if anything, on a grander and more determined scale.
Between one and two
thousand German language schools were established; German newspapers, frequently subsidized, have flourished; German newsreels have been widely circulated; German clubs, societies, and associations have enrolled large numbers in these suspici ously diseiplinized and militarized organizations; and all of the other well-known propaganda and pressure media have been widely used.
The embassy of the Reich has had an ab
normally large staff and, it is well established, has spent lavish sums in the Nazi propaganda campaign.
^ Herring, 0£. cit., p. 133-
It is frequently
112
reported by reliable observers that practically every German individual and firm pays a stipulated percentage of income amounting to 10 per cent and up into the German "relief fund."
German artists, professors, or others of distinction
in Brazil have been subsidized and Brazilians personages have been flattered and showered with attention and gifts. The German trade drive with its inevitable political implications was impressive.
Through the medium of barter
agreements from 1933 to 1938 Germany increased her purchases from Brazil 58 per cent and more than doubled her sales.^ In 1933 Brazil took 12.1 per cent of her Imports from Germany; by 1938 this figure had risen to 25 per cent.
Dur
ing the same period Brazil’s exports to Germany increased from 8.1 of the Brazilian total to 19*1 per cent.
In 1938
Germany’s rapid rise had placed her first as a supplier of Brazil’s needs and second as a Brazilian customer.^
This
trade drive brought German products, German agents, German pressure, and German influence to Brazil.
However, as in
Argentina, even before the present war, the barter agreements were growing unpopular in Brazil.
Brazilians wanted the
American, British, and other foreign credits denied them in
4 Ibid.. p. 157. 5 ^ Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: General Survey, 1938, p. 3-
113 the barter transactions, and they were wondering what to do with the surplus cameras, aspirin tablets, and glass-eyes they were forced to accept. Confiscated insignia, uniforms, flags, guns, and other materials; pictures of drilling men, and countless other evidences lend adequate proof to the fact that Brazil has faced and faces today a problem in its unassimilated German population.
This menace easily can be and probably has been
overdrawn; many Germans are not Nazis; but no one can deny the existence of the threat.
However, it is a mistake to
assume that the German plans and activities meet with govern ment approval.
The Vargas dictatorship is purely a Brazilian
one, with no desire to see its power directed from Germany or its policies guided by Brazilian Nazis.
Those holding
authoritarian views need not be in league with Germany, and while there may be those of the Vargas government who are pro-Hitler and others who opportunistically wait to see which way to jump, there is not in general in Brazil the easy toler ance of German Nazism to be noticed in some quarters of the Argentine government. The Vargas government, before Pearl Harbor, had taken drastic measures against Nazism.
Since the entrance of the
United States into the war, precautions have been even more stringently observed.
The government has suppressed all
foreign language newspapers, closed down 1,200 German schools,
114 outlawed the speaking of German at public gatherings, for bidden all political activity and propaganda, and prohibited insignia, parades, and societies of any kind.
Military
barracks have been installed throughout all the "German" territory.
The problem is not solved; a threat remains, but
whatever danger there is exists not beeause of the Vargas dictatorship but in spite of it. III. General.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Brazil has no outstanding disputes or dif
ferences with any nation.
Boundary difficulties have been
settled and other causes of trouble do not appear to exist. Brazil has more territory than she can handle and does not claim more, while no other nation lays serious claim to Brazil’s.
Argentina and Brazil are not friendly, though
there is increasing trade between them, but their differences are psychological ones based on jealousy, competition, past difficulties and perhaps fear. The United States.
The United States has long been
Brazil’s best customer and Brazil’s best friend.
The
Brazilian people look upon our country and people with genu ine and wholehearted affection.
Press and radio are pro-
American and friendly, and American fads, habits, clothes, slang, and products are eagerly embraced.
The applause at
115 theatres or newsreels is noticeably for things American and democratic. The governmental attitude has been one of complete co operation with the United States and with the war effort.
Brazil
was the only South American country to declare war on Germany in 1917 and she has already demonstrated her official antiGerman policy in this war.
Even if it were not for the bonds
of years of traditional friendship and the pro-American senti ment among the people, our purchases, our loans, our assistance in industrial development, our military, scientific, and other advisers, our military assistance and supplies, and our other efforts would probably be enough to assure the support of most Brazilian or Latin-American dictators. However, one must not be Pollyannic about the situation. Brazil is a dictatorship run by one man.
For some time after
Vargas is replaced Brazil, no doubt, will continue in the Latin-American tradition of "personalismo" by which very few control very many.
Dictators are usually opportunists, and,
if occasion demands, their attitude can change quickly.
For
that matter dictators themselves are apt to change quickly. [Jnder such circumstances a German victory or a sudden revolu tion by which German influence might place German-minded Brazilians in power conceivably could change the official government position.
However, both contingencies appear quite
unlikely at the moment and little evidence can be offered
that the Brazilian government or people have any wish to terminate the eo-operation and friendly relations between the United States and Brazil.
CHAPTER VIII THE ECONOMY OF CHILE I. Geography.
RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION Chile is one of the smaller of the South
American countries, yet it is larger than many of the major nations of the world.
Its 2 8 6 ,39 6 ^ square miles constitute
an area slightly larger than Texas, substantially larger than France, and three times as large as the United Kingdom.
Ex
ceeding in size Ecuadoi; Paraguay and Uruguay among the South American republics, Chile possesses, none the Le'S's , only onefourth the expanse of Argentina and one-twelfth that of Brazil. The long, thin strip of Chile is almost crowded off the South American map.
For the most part less than one hun
dred miles wide, it stretches 2 ,6 6 0 miles north and south and, if placed on the United States, would reach from New York to San Francisco.
Roughly half of its precious one hundred mile
width is consumed by the giant and rugged Andes which reach from the north to the far south and whose Crestline serves as the eastern boundary for almost the entire length of Chile. This majestic range contains several twenty-thousand-foot
^ United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook (1938), p. 3 8 6 .
118 peaks and is clearly visible from practically any point in the land.
From it rush short east-west rivers which plunge
toward the Pacific Ocean only to be usually lost amid the desert sands of the north or in the irrigation systems of the central valley. Geographically there are three distinct regions of Chile:
northern Chile where it rarely rains; central Chile
where, like California, it rains in the winter; and southern Chile where it rains all year.
In the north lies the famous
Atacama Desert said to be the driest area on earth.
Incredibly
barren, multi-colored, and desolate, this South American "painted desert" allows for no vegetation except in a few unimportant oases.
Paradoxically, the very dryness which makes
this region an uninhabited wilderness has been responsible for the creation of much of Chile's wealth.
Here lie the minerals
and nitrates that have meant so much to the country, and which, being soluble, would have disappeared centuries ago had this been an area of normal rain. The greater part of Chile's population, agriculture and industry is concentrated in central Chile.
Here is found a
very fertile area about five hundred miles long resting between the coast range and the Andes.
Occasional valley spurs extend
toward or to the sea where rivers have cut through the coastal Cordillera.
Generally known as the central valley, this area
is really a series of connected basins bound by lateral
119 projections of the coastal and Andean ranges.
Although
central Chile is more than one hundred miles wide, the moun tain ranges crowd the fertile area into a much smaller width leaving only S per cent to 11 per cent of the total area that is tillable. 2 In climate central Chile is mild and very similar to southern California,
temperatures in Valparaiso for winter
and summer maintain an average almost identical to that of San Diego, California;
it rarely snows, except in the moun
tains; and only an occasional freeze is experienced.
The
dry summers make irrigation necessary, while the winter rains r
vary from 4 * 5 inches at the edge of the desert in the north to 30.1 inches at Concepcion in the south.^
Valparaiso and
Santiago, the heart of the central area receive 1 3 .8 inches of rain a year. Southern Chile is quite different from either the central or northern areas.
It is a land of forests and heavy,
year-round rains that grow progressively heavier toward the south.
In the upper part of this region is an alpine area
of beautiful lakes, glaciated mountains and small farms cut out of virgin forests.
The lower part becomes a labrynth of
fiords and islands, steep and rocky, and a dense tangle of
o
York:
Carl Parker Hanson, Chile, Land of Progress (Mew Beynal and Hitchcock, 1941)', P. 5. 3 Preston E. James, Latin America, p. 2 3 4 .
120
soggy forests.
It is a landscape shrouded in clouds and
driving rain most of the time. Wealth of the soil.
Only about 8 per cent of one-
fourth of Chile can be used for agriculture.^
The northern
desert which constitutes 36.1 per cent of all Chilean terri tory is so unproductive that only 0.1 per cent can be used for crops and pasture.^
in the south, 37.5 per cent of Chile
is a land of uncleared forests, heavy rains and long winters scarcely suited to extensive farming.
Only the scant,
precious fertile soil of the valleys spared from the mountains in central Chile is available for the growing of foodstuffs. Even then, the best use is not made of the arable land.
Chile*s agriculture is still dominated by the virtually
feudal system of landed estates owned by proud aristocrats and worked in a primitive fashion by the tenant-farmers.
The
ox-team, the manual butter churn, and the primitive hand threshing and winnowing of grain are characteristics of this outmoded system.
Each "fundo," or barronial estate, seeks
little more than to be as self-sufficient as possible, to feed its "inquilinos” and to provide the luxuries required by the owner.
4 Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 188. York:
5 George A. McBride, Chile: Lana ana Society (New American Geographical Society, 193^77 p. l"6 .
121
Wheat and corn are the crops most extensively grown, although each "fundo,” is likely to have its plata of potatoes, beans, peas, lentils, onions, artichokes, peppers, and similar vegetables.
Chilean fruits are very excellent and there are
small areas planted to peaches, apricots, and similar fruits. Yineyards adorn many hillsides and very good wine is made. Well-blooded horses and cattle are bred, but these are not a sizeable factor in the nations economy.
In the wind-swept
plateaus of Patagonia sheep are raised and substantial quanti ties of wool produced.
The forests of southern Chile some
day may easily be of value in the production of lumber and pulp.
While Chile has exported modest quantities of fruits,
vegetables, and wine, she has been forced to import larger amounts of sugar and other foodstuffs.
One is led to the
conclusion that, even with improved methods, Chile will do well to supply her own growing population with agricultural products and that certainly she will never be a major exporter in this field. Wealth under the soil. minerals.
Chile must pin her hopes on
Nature has been sparing in her allotment to Chile
of tillable soil, but she has been more generous in her endow ments of the subsoil.
Copper, nitrates, iron, and coal are
her most important gifts. Copper.
Copper is one of Chile’s chief sources of
122
wealth and is her principle contribution to international commerce.
The Chilean reserves of this important metal are
thought to be perhaps the largest in the world.^
Chile ranks
second only to the United States in the world’s production of copper, producing in 1939 more than 320,000 metric tons? as compared to 300,000 tons for the United States.
In 1900
copper constituted only 5 per cent of Chile’s exports0 , but production has increased twelve-fold since then and today Q
copper forms 50 per cent^ of the Chilean exports.
Most of it
is shipped to the United States. Possession and production of this mineral has not been the complete blessing to Chile that on the surface it might appear to be.
Copper, probably because it is an important
war material, has not had a stable market and has been subject to wild price fluxuations.
Chile has felt the bitter results
of these factors through unpredictable lean and fat periods. A principal drawback to Chile of her great copper production is the fact that practically none of it is produced by Chileans or financed by Chilean money.
Anaconda and
Kennicott, American companies, produced in 193$ more than 92
6 Herring,
ojd
.
cit., p. 199.
7 Howell Davies, editor, The South American Handbook, P. 2938
Herring, op. cit., p. 199.
9 James, op. cit., p. 257*
123 per cent of all Chilean production;^ French companies claimed a 3.B per cent s h a r e a n d when other small American and foreign companies are included, only 2.5 per cent**-2 of the total production remains as truly Chilean.
To be sure taxes
and wages leave money in the country, but compared to the value of the output few persons are employed.
Like nitrates,
copper has caused and continues to bring many a Chilean headache. Nitrates.
Second in importance to Chile among her
subsoil treasures are the nitrates from the great northern desert.
At one time these fields were a lush source of profit
upon which practically all of Chile’s wealth was based and from which as high as 70 per cent of her government budget was obtained.
This era of nitrate prosperity saw Chile
producing more than half of the world’s nitrates.
Government
officials grew rich, large government loans were floated, and the great landowners were relieved of the unpleasant duty of taxing themselves. However, the World War led to the discovery of ways of producing nitrogen from the air and the Chilean prosperity bubble was burst.
From a virtual domination of the world
10 Herring, op. cit., p. 199* ^
hoc. cit.
I2 Hanson, op. cit., p. 116.
124 supply, Chilean nitrate exports dropped to 7 . 9 per cent of the world’s total supply.^3
It is not difficult to imagine
the catastrophic consequences to Chile’s national economy. Improved production methods, however, have enabled the country to maintain nitrates as a most important item of production.
Nitrates are second on the list of exports and
constitute almost one-fourth of the total.
Iodine, a by
product, is produced in large quantities and today accounts for about 70 per cent of the world’s supply.1^ An interesting Chilean Government in Sales Corporation.
development was the creation by the 1933 of the Chilean Nitrate and Iodine
By this national organization the effect
of American and foreign ownership of most nitrate properties is somewhat counter-balanced.
Through the Corporation, the
government stimulates domestic and foreign sales, standardizes the product, fixes quotas, otherwise regulates the industry, and,most important, takes 23 per
cent of the gross profits.
Iron and coal.Chile is fortunate
in possessing both
iron and coal and at the present time is the leading producer and exporter in South America of both these items.
Her
reserves, though not being fully exploited, seem large and
^3 Herring, op. cit., p. 19&. Davies, op. cit., p. 293*
125
Quite adequate to her domestic needs.
Both the iron and coal
are of good quality, although the coal sometimes must be mixed with imported stocks for coking purposes.
Others.
Copper, nitrates, coal, and iron are the major
subsoil assets of Chile.
There are other minerals in the
mountains, some of which are being modestly exploited and others only prospected.
Considerable gold, silver, and sulphur
are mined and large reserves of manganese are known to exist. There are exploitable deposits of cobalt, molybdenum, lead, aluminum, bismuth, mercury, mica, and zinc. Bower resources.
Chile has adequate power.
Ho pe
troleum yet has been produced but coal and waterpower are abundant.
Chile already has developed three times as much
power from hydroelectric sources as has Argentina and appears to have additional capacity which if not lavish, is at least substantial. Transportation and communication.
Although the total
length of Chile’s railroad system is only a fourth that of Brazil and a fifth that of Argentina, Chile has the best railroads and the most complete network of any Latin-America country. railroad^-5
p. 203.
Because of the shape of Chile, the 5,134 miles of reach most of the national area.
Most of the
United States Department of Commerce, op. cit., "
126
mileage is government owned and operated, and the rollingstock, equipment, and roadstead are maintained to a high standard, even in comparison to the best that the United States can offer, Boadbuilding is proceeding rapidly but an adequate highway system has not yet been developed.
The total length
of all roads is 2 6 ,7 9 5 miles1^ about one eighth that of Argentinafs poor system.
Of this length only 1,000 miles 17 are paved and 8,500 improved. In 1938 there were 40,815
registered trucks and automobiles in Chile, about one-sixth the number in Argentina, or one-sixtieth the number in the United Kingdom. Industrial capacity and production.
Chile has gone
farther than any other South American nation in freeing her self of dependence upon other countries for her manufactured goods.
While her manufacturing industry would seem pitifully
small as compared to our own and while her industrial future may never match her unboundedly optimistic anticipations, she has made notable progress.
The label, ttFabrecacion Chilena"
is a far more familiar sight in Chile than are similar stamps in other South American countries.
^ ^
» P* 416. Hanson, op. cit., p. 131.
127 The factories of Chile produced 60 per cent more goods in 1939 than in 1930.*L^
During approximately this same period
the number of factories, Including a large proportion of home and small units, increased from 8,600 to 19,432.^
In 1935
nearly 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 persons were employed in manufacturing indus tries^ and in 1937 it is estimated that one-fifth of all Chilean workers were engaged in industry,
21
Chile has been
steadily reducing the proportion of imports to total trade as one may appreciate from the fact that during the first five months of 1937 imports- increased only 8 per cent while
pp
exports jumped 90 per cent. ^
The extent of increased pro
duction of certain items is indicated by the Industrial Census of 1 9 3 7 Using 1927-29 as the base of 100, pro duction in 1937 was as follows: Woolen cloth Cotton cloth Paper products Shoes Soap Cement Electrical energy
240 762 308
153 132 264
191
^ Herring, op. cit.» p. 201. 19 Hanson, op. cit., p. I 3 4 . 20 Wilhern Mann, Chile» luchando por nuevas formas de vida (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1938), p. 197* 21 Herring, op. cit., p. 202. 22
Hanson, pp. cit., p. 135.
23 Cited in Herring, op. cit. , p. 201.
128 There is every indication that the increase in industrial activity has continued in the very recent years since the latest comprehensive statistics were made available. Chile’s manufacturing is of articles for domestic consumption and is based largely upon local raw materials. Although foreign capital has made a beginning in the pro duction of iron and steel by utilizing Chilean iron and coal, the development of manufacturing has not been in the field of heavy industry.
A wide variety of processed,
assembled, and manufactured items are turned out in varying volumes, and Chile has made herself virtually self-sufficient in the production of cement, woolen textiles, shoes, and tanning products, glassware, lumber, explosives, paper products, sugar, tobacco, soap, perfumes, enamelware, matches, beer and wine, and canned fruits and vegetables. The struggle to free herself from dependence on foreign nations for industrial goods has led Chile to adopt a rigid tariff and price fixing policy.
Products which are placed
under the wing of the government are so completely protected as to almost exclude foreign-made, competing articles.
This
policy guarantees to local industry the meager domestic market, but, at the same time, it forces the ill-paid Chilean to pay higher prices for products which ordinarily are inferior in quality to those of foreign make. By virtue of her power resources and her supply of
129 iron and other raw materials, Chile may hope for a manufactur ing future.
There is little reason to believe, however, that
this development can be expected in the immediate future or that it will ever place Chile among the great industrial nations of the world.
Chile’s difficulty in supporting a
large population, her geographic location, and other factors must be considered in evaluating her eventual position in the world scene.
At present she is handicapped by a lack of
capital and by drastically limited markets.
She cannot compete
with other industrial countries in the foreign fields and the market provided by her own small population is even further limited by the very meager purchasing power of her land-bound, moneyless, agrarian people.
To provide the larger part of
the population with the ability to purchase will require land and agricultural reforms— a step carefully avoided by the land-minded officials of Chile. II. General.
FOREIGN TRADE
The pattern of Chile’s foreign trade is simple
and easily understood.
On the one hand, Chile has exported
nitrates and copper in overwhelmingly large proportions; on the other, she has imported the necessities of life which she has lacked.
Her customers and her suppliers have remained
relatively unchanged.
130
Exports.
While Chile’s people largely have lived from
the soil of the feudal-like fundos, the government has lived from export revenues.
At one time nitrates monopolized the
export total, and, when the nitrate market collapsed, so did Chile’s finances.
Today, copper is first on the list having
more than twice the value of the nitrates which are in second place.
The two together constitute roughly five-sevenths of
all Chile’s exports.
The remaining two-sevenths is principally
composed of gold, silver, wool, vegetables, and fruit.
Exports
generally have exceeded imports in value and have totalled very roughly one-third as much as Argentina’s exports.
The United
States, clearly and consistently, has been Chile’s best cus tomer.
In second place has been the United Kingdom, and third
in importance has been Germany. Imports.
Chile has utilized the exchange secured from L
her exports together with credits garnered from foreign loans to purchase the manufactured goods and other commodities which she herself did not produce.
Increased manufacturing in Chile
and high tariffs, of course, are altering somewhat the nature and extent of these imports.
Sugar, petroleum, textiles and
machinery are usually among the most important items.
The
United States usually has supplied the largest share of these items, followed by the United Kingdom and Germany.
During the
recent German trade drive, however, Germany forged into second
131 place, substantially above the United Kingdom and only slightly below the United States.
In 193&> the Reich secured a slight
advantage over the United States, which was lost during the succeeding years*
132
TABLE XIII PERCENTAGE SHAKES OF CHILEAN EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PUR CHASERS a Japan
United States
4.6
1.6
22.5
0• 0 H
4.0
1.6
15.7
8.4
3.7
1.8
- 30.5
0.01
3.0
4.5
58.3
Year
United Kingdom
1937
19.-5
4.9
9.5
1938
21.8
4.4
1939
12.3
4.7
1940
5.8
0.9
France
Germany
Italy
a Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: ^ General Survey, 1938 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 1 7 8 . Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 3.
133
TABLE XIV PERCENTAGE SHARES OF CHILEAN IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERSQ.
Japan
United States
1.9
2.6
29.1
25.8
2.7
2.5
27.7
1.8
22.7
3.9
3.7
31.1
0.3
3.3
4.0
5.5
47.9
Year
United Kingdom
1937
18*8
1.9
26.0
1938
12.3
2.0
1939
8.3
1940
10.4
France
Germany
Italy
Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1938 (Foreign Trade Series, No. I?8 . Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 3.
134
TAB LI XV PRINCIPAL CHILEAN EXPORTS 1939 a Rank
Commodity Total exports
American Dollars $138,376,000
1
Copper Bars
68,351,000
2
Nitrate
29,390,000
3
Gold and Silver
7 ,340,000
4
Wool
5,717,000
5
Iron Ores
2,815,000
6
Lentils
2 ,029,000
7
Beans
1,880,000
8
Hides
1 ,614,000
9
Iodine
1,555,000
Fresh Fruits
1 ,530,000
10
Pan-American Union, Foreign Trade of Chile for 1938 and 1939 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 180. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1941), p. 2.
135
TABLE XVI PRINCIPAL CHILEAN IMPORTS 1939a Rank
Commodity Total imports
American Dollars $ 8 4 ,666,000
1
Sugar
4 ,046,000
2
Petroleum, Crude
3 ,201,000
3
Cotton Textiles
2 ,831,000
4,
Wool Textiles
2 ,299,000
5
Benzene in Drums
2 ,144,000
6
Chassis
2 ,071,000
7
Cotton Yarn for Looms
1 ,976,000
8
Automobiles
1 ,825,000
9
Iron and Steel Bars
1 ,623,000
Mining and Agricultural Machinery
1 ,349,000
10
a Pan-American Union, Foreign Trade of Chile for 1938 and 1939 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 180. Washington, D.C.: Pan-Amerioan Union, 1941), p. 2*
136
TABLE XVII TOTAL CHILEAN EXPORTSa Year
American Dollars
1937
$ 1 95 ,300,000
1938
1 4 0 ,601,000
1939
1 3 8 ,368,000
1940
143,596,000
a Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1936 (Foreign Trade Series, No, 17^. Washington, D,C,: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 2; Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: it General Survey, 1940 (Foreign Trade Series,' No. I9TI Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1942), p. 2,
137
TABLE XVIII TOTAL CHILEAN IMPORTSa Year
American Dollars
1937
#88,396,000
1938
1 0 3 ,462,000
1939
84,633,000
1940
104,313,000
Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A G-eneral Survey, 1938 (Foreign fra&e Series, No. 178. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940), p. 2; Pan-American Union, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1940 (Foreign Trade Series, No. 193. Washington, D.G. ; Pan-American Union, 1942) , p. 2.
138
III. General*
FINANCE
Chile’s financial condition is poor.
Budgets
are small; debts are large, and foreign investors obtain the lion’s share of the revenues-.
Chile’s social progress and
her stature as compared to other Latin-American countries probably have led many to over-evaluate her actual -fiscal condition. Budget.
The federal budget of Chile for 1941 contem
plated an expenditure of $B7,776,000.
An appreciation of how
meager this amount is may be found in the realization that it is about the same as the budget of Philadelphia and only onesixth the budget of California.
Philadelphia has about one-
third the population of Chile, and California has about an equal number of people.
In neither Philadelphia nor California
are an army, navy, foreign legations, or other similar insti tutions necessary, yet Philadelphia spends three times as much per capita and California six times as much as does Chile. Debts.
During the days of the nitrate boom and during
the neasy money” era of the late 1920’s Chile contracted sub stantial debts.
Approximately $500,000,000.00 is owed by the
government itself*^ an& other large amounts are owed on private
Davies, op. cit., p. 296.
loans and bonds.
One of Chile's problems today is to take
care of yesterday's obligations.
Recently, in two trans
actions, the Export-Import Bank has loaned an additional $17,000,000' ‘ to purchase American industrial and agricul tural goods, stabilize the currency and service old debts. Foreign capital.
Probably the natural wealth of no
Latin-American country is exploited by foreign capital more completely than is that of Chile.
Copper is produced almost
exclusively by American companies and the nitrate business is shared between American and British capital.
Iron, coal,
government bonds, many factories, and utilities have attracted foreign money.
The Chilean government, largely through govern
ment corporations, is exercising a growing control over these properties and is beginning to demand a share of the profits. Expropriation is frequently mentioned but so far has not been significantly practiced.
CHAPTER IX SOCIAL FACTORS IN CHILE I, Numbers.
POPULATION
Chile does not possess a large population.
The less than five million people1 living within her borders constitute a total which ranks fifth in South America after Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru.
Her population is
about one ninth that of France, one tenth that of Brazil, or one third that of Argentina; and is slightly larger than that of Switzerland.
The sixteen persons per square mile^ in Chile
are, however, more than the twelve in Argentina and the thirteen in Brazil, but this is considerably less than the forty-three per square mile in the United States or the 489 per square mile in the United Kingdom. Distribution. As in Argentina and Brazil a large pro portion of the people of Chile live in a small section of the national area.
Between 80^ and 90^ per cent of all Chileans
live in about one fourth of the country.
In Argentina and
1 (4,684,000) Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, p. 16. 2 Lo £. oit. 3 Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 189. ^ Katherine Carr, South American Primer, p. 89.
141 Brazil the concentration is around seacoast cities, and, as population grows and the nation develops, the distribution can and likely will spread.
In Chile this is not true, for
the forbidding northern desert and the soggy southern forests confine the people today and tomorrow to the central valley, Santiago (851,850) and Valparaiso (245,000) are the focal point of the concentration of population, but the balance of people are dispersed throughout the central section.
Concepcion
(75,000) and Valdivia (35,000) are probably the next most im portant cities, although there are a number which vary in population from ten thousand to fifty thousand. Racial bases.
There is no race problem worthy of the
name in Chile, for here has been one of the most successful melting pots of the world.
The typical Chilean is neither
European nor Indian but a mixture of both, and few are the distinctions made upon the degree of "whiteness" of an indi vidual.
Whereas: Argentina boasts a 98 per cent European
population; Brazil struggles with unassimilated European groups and the problems of a large Negro and mulatto population; and other countries, such as Peru and Bolivia, are beset with large undigested Indian groups, Chile has created a new race of the blended Spanish and Indian blood. Today, about 5 per cent of the people of Chile are Indians,^ most of whom participate rather naturally in the 5 '
Preston E. James, Latin America, p. 227.
142 life of the nation.
Between 20 and 30 per cent of the popula
tion is of unmixed European ancestry, and 65 to 70 per cent is of Spanish (or other European)— Indian origin.^
With rare
exception, all are Chilenos at heart whose common national bond is much stronger than difference of blood and who make no serious distinctions on the basis of racial heritage. The European element, both of the pure and the mestizo groups, is largely Spanish.
However, there also has been a
substantial immigration of people from England, Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and other lands.
Some have remained
unabsorbed racially, but most have married into Chilean fami\
lies.
Such names as Balfour, Swinglehurst, MacKenna,
Ilanvitch, Edwards, Braun, Gildermuster are good Chilean names and designate families which speak only Spanish.
The first
president of the Republic of Chile was of Irish descent and with'dignity his name is carried on the main thoroughfare of Sant iago, 0* Higgins Avenue. II. General.
EDUCATION
In progressiveness and vigor the public schools
of Chile probably rank first among, the school systems of LatinAmerica.
In recent years, the considerable attention given to
James, loc. cit.
education by the government has resulted in expansion of school facilities and wide experimentation with newer and freer methods ordinarily untried in Latin-America.
Small
budgets slow the process, but progress is being made.
Not
many years ago illiteracy in Chile stood at 9 0 per c e n t ; ? by 1930 this figure had been reduced to 30 per cent,
g
and, al
though figures are unavailable, it is estimated that consider able improvement has been made during the last decade. Growth.
The growth of the school system of Chile can
best be appreciated by reviewing the statistics.
In 1920 the
country had 3,14$ elementary schools with a total enrollment of 335>047 full-time students.^
In 1938 these numbers had
increased to 4,757 schools and 611,494 pupils.^-0
Present
estimates raise the number to 675,000 full-time and 500,000 part-time elementary students.
During this same period, the
number of secondary schools increased from 91 to 26S,11 and the number of students in the normal schools grew from 1 , 3 0 0 to 2,000.^ 7
These indications of progress, however, should
Carl Parker Hanson, Chile, Land of Progress, p. 145.
g
Herring, o£. cit., p. 221. 9
Hanson,
o jd.
Loc. cit.
cit . , p. 147.
144 not be misconstrued.
There remains much to be done as may be
seen from the fact that there are no school desks for 42 per cent-^ of the boys and girls of school age. Scope.
In 1928 Chilean educators instituted sweeping
reforms that received world-wide attention and which may well be copied by other Latin-American countries.
All the announced
principles have not been retained, but considerable success has been evident in achieving the separation of the schools from politics and the church and in observing a modern philosophy of education.
Such a forward step has this been that some of the
results merit attention. The secondary schools have been co-ordinated with the primary schools so that they may be of practical value to all students rather than only to those who are preparing for higher education.
In keeping 'with this reform, most flliceos,f
or high schools have discarded the traditional Latin-American humanistic and philosophic studies and have substituted courses in business, shop practice and crafts and similar practical studies.
The humanities are provided in some schools
for those who intend to prepare for the higher studies of law, medicine, engineering, the arts, and other university courses. Today, there are in operation forty-five vocational
13 Herring, 0£. cit., p. 221.
schools, most of them new, attended by some fifteen thousand boys and girls who have met the entrance requirement of graduation from a primary school.
There are twelve agricul-
tural schools, twenty-two industrial schools, 156 adult nightschools, and a number of schools of art and music.
Six
special schools train some five hundred women in obstetrics, nursing, and social service.
Through the Ministry of Educa
tion, and the Department of Agriculture a great deal of good is being done through informal education in the rural areas by means of lectures, pictures, advisers, and easily under stood literature.
The universities, too, have received atten
tion; are being improved and made more practical; and are now open to students of all classes.
Through her educational
system Chile is struggling to overcome practical and psycho logical difficulties in order to raise the social consciousness and living standard of her workers, hasten industrialization, and prepare Chilenos to handle the economy of the nation now so predominately in the hands of foreigners. III. General.
SOCIAL STRATA
Until very recent years the description of
Chile’s social stratification was an exceptionally simple one. There were the few of wealth who exercised all the political and economic power, and there were the great masses of poor who worked the soil of the land-owners.
The past thirty years,
146 however, have brought significant changes which have resulted in a more complex although almost equally clear-cut pattern. There remain the few wealthy who continue to be a potent factor to Chilean life, but there is also, today, a small middle class which has secured a large share of the political control of the nation.
The poor continue to constitute the
largest part of the population, but now must be divided into two groups, the agricultural and the industrial workers. The wealthy.
The landed aristocracy built Chile and
ruled it without opposition until recent years.
None but the
few ever had any appreciable part in Chilean culture, economics, or government for these few were Chile and on them alone must rest the responsibility for the good and the evil in Chilean development.
Recently, however, this monopolistic control has
been lost for the small middle-class group has become the most powerful in politics.
The influence of the upper class must
not be minimized, however, because the actual present-day strength of the wealthy is still substantial and is buttressed by the natural difficulties of changing long-standing tradi tions and institutions which the aristocrats established. Probably five thousand families may be classed today as members of this upper class in Chile.
Of the arable land
of the nation, 52 per cent is controlled by only 375 owners^
1/|' Ibid., p. 206.
whose holdings average 40,165 acres apiece.
To this group may
be added the 2,500 whose "fundos" are more than five thousand acres and the 2,000 who own smaller pieces or whose wealth is in mines, banks, factories, and other commercial establish ments.
With few exceptions this wealthy group is extremely
conservative and is of the belief that most changes of the old ways are "communistic."
By comparison, these aristocrats put
President Roosevelt’s economic royalists on the pinkish side. Middle class.
The recently developed middle class, which,
with the political support of the urban industrial workers, has assumed an uneasy dominance of government, is not large. Composed of lawyers, doctors, merchants, traders, independent small farmers, and salaried white-collar workers, it consti tutes very roughly 5 to 10 per cent of the population.
It is
estimated that the prosperous members of this group, that Is, the professional people, proprietors, managers, and modest entrepreneurs, number perhaps only five thousand f a m i l i e s . 15 The poorly paid white-collar middle class, composed of teachers, salaried workers, clerks, and similar groups, probably totals between 200,000 and 300,000 persons.!^
typical middle
person is liberal, but not radical; he has sponsored social
whose holdings average 40,165 acres apiece*
To this group may
he added the 2 *500-whose wfundos** are more than 'five thousand acres -and the 2,000 who- own smaller pieces or whose wealth is in mines, hanks, factories,, and other commercial establish ments*
With few exceptions this wealthy group is extremely
conservative and is of; the belief that most'changes of the old ways are ^communistic.n
By comparison, these aristocrats put
President Eoosevelt*s economic royalists on the pinkish side. Middle class*
The recently developed middle class, which,
with the political support of the urban industrial workers, has assumed an uneasy dominance of government, is not large. Composed of lawyers, doctors, merchants, traders, independent small- farmers, and salaried white-collar workers, it consti tutes very roughly 5 to 10 per cent of the population.
It is
estimated that the prosperous members of this group, that Is, the professional people, proprietors, managers, and modest entrepreneurs, number perhaps only five thousand families.*5 The' poorly paid white-collar middle class, composed of teachers, salaried workers, clerks, and similar- groups, probably totals between 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 and 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 persons.^
The typical middle
person is liberal, but net radical; h e 'has .sponsored social
149 Upper middle class.
The basic pay for public school
teachers is equivalent to #36 per month and at the end of each five years it is raised by 20 per cent. ceives from #18 to #33 per month.
A stenographer re
A cleric in a consular
office receives #22 per month and one in a corner store #18. According to the Industrial Census of 1938, white-collar workers in private employment received an average of #23.40 per month.
Many employees in government offices receive
around #17 per month and #80 is considered a handsome wage for many responsible positions.
The President of the Republic
is paid #280 per month. Industrial workers.
Workers in the city, in the factory,
in the mine earn little and live their lives poorly clothed, housed and fed.
According to government surveys, miners re
ceive on the average from #180 to #300 per year, with company housing and medical service supplied.
The Industrial Census
of 1938 revealed that 14,131 textile workers received an average of #.31 a day for an average of 287 working days a year, while industrial workers averaged about #3.36 per week. Skilled craftsmen in Santiago such as carpenters and plumbers receive from # . 0 7 to #.12 per h o u r . ^
17 Ibid;', p. “207. 18 Loc. cit.
150
Agricultural workers.
The ’’inquilinos” of the great
farms of Chile are legally free but economically they are slaves. They live generation after generation in their small mud or thatched huts on the property of the owner and work the soil for him in return for a few cents, a garden patch, some pasturage, and the right to remain.
On work days he may be
given one or two meals, and if the owner is generous, he may receive other paternalistic endowments. of security and with certain poverty.
He lives with a sort He earns about #.12 a
day for his family. The toll. Malnutrition, lack of sanitation, over crowded, meager housing, poverty, and ignorance take their toll in city and country alike.
More than one fourth of all
Chilean babies die during the first year— four and one-half times the rate of the United States, two and one-half times that of Argentina— the highest infant mortality rate in the entire world.
Chile’s general death rate is more than twice
that of the United States.
The rate of deaths from pneumonia
is six times that of the United States, from tuberculosis seven times, and from typhoid and kindred diseases it is five times that of the United States. V. General.
LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Although the lot of the Chilean worker is
difficult, Chile is making mighty efforts to better it.
One
in of the most comprehensive patterns of social legislation in the world has been formulated in Chile, and diligent attention is being given to its fulfillment*
This social progress ex
ceeds anything in Latin-America, including Mexico, and is the more inspiring when set against the difficulties inherent in the Chilean poverty. Social security. Dating from 1924, Chile’s basic social security laws precede the popular front.
At the heart
of the legislation are the "cajas” or funds for various types of work, to which all employees in the field covered must be long.
The funds are maintained by fixed percentages of wages
contributed by the employer, employee, and government on the ratio of 3, 2, and 1. Benefits are many and vary according to the f’caja,” but certain fundamental protections are common to all.
The
Chilean worker is now guaranteed medical attention and hospi talization for twenty-six weeks in case of illness. hospitals and clinics have been built.
People’s
In addition to medical
and hospital care, the workers receives, if ill, cash payments during the twenty-six week period amounting to full-pay the first week, half-pay the second, and quarter-pay thereafter. In case of disability a payment of from one half to the total of the last year’s salary is made.
Modest pensions are pro
vided for, to begin at the age of fifty-five, or at sixty or sixty-five if the worker so chooses.
152
Other advantages are made possible by the basic and supplementary laws.
An employee may not be dismissed without
warning, the reasons being stated in writing, and six days’ wages being paid.
Minimum wages, overtime pay, hours of work,
compulsory vacations, Sunday rest, child labor, and other forward looking steps are the subject of legislation.
All of
these provisions have not worked with complete satisfaction, but essentially they are being followed.
The chief obstacle
is not a lack of desire to implement these laws, but the poverty of the land and people. Further indications of the social enlightenment of the government are not difficult to find.
Social services are
being organized and social workers trained.
Rural education
is receiving attention and efforts are being redoubled to liberate the agrarians.
People’s restaurants have been estab
lished in the cities which provide wholesome, well-balanced meals at surprisingly low prices.
Clinics for expectant
mothers, child welfare organizations, public health improve ments, impressive housing projects and loan-funds for homebuilding— these are but a few of the indications that Chile, in spite of her low standard of living, is taking impressive strides toward a new and better day. Labor unions. Union organization is encouraged by the government, although the unions are somewhat circumscribed by a labor code of governmental regulations.
Provisions are
153 made for two general types of unions, industrial unions representing the workers in any one plant, and trade unions representing workers in any one trade or profession.
Con
federations of trade unions are allowed, but associations of industrial organizations are legal only for purposes of educa tion, welfare work, and the establishment of co-operative stores.
A. nation-wide industrial organization corresponding
to the C.I.O. is specifically prohibited by law.
Any union
or association of unions may be dissolved by presidential decree, if it violates the labor code. Strikes are allowed., but, since the early bitter and bloody disputes, they are regulated so minutely as to make them quite difficult.
The existence of a labor dispute must
be disclosed in writing as a basis for arbitration.
Once this
has been done, no worker may be discharged or suspended, except for destroying property or similar acts.
Disputes that cannot
be handled through negotiations between management and labor committees are referred to permanent conciliation boards set up by the government in every department of a province.
If
the board fails to affect a satisfactory settlement, the question is then referred to special labor courts.
In 1935
it is reported that 95 per cent of all disputes were satis factorily and peacefully handled by such means.**-9
19 Hanson,
ojd.
cit.,
p.
162.
154 Unionism is strong and is growing*
It has become not
only a force in labor-management relations, but, of perhaps, greater significance, a factor in politics.
The unions are
serving to give voice to the common man, to create a political unity among the lower classes, and to develop an awakening among workers who previously had considered natural their com plete lack of rights.
There is undoubtedly some extreme
radicalism in their ranks, but much of the communism with which they are indicted is but the reaction of the ultra conservative who are bewildered and dismayed at any change which alters their own exclusive power.
It is estimated that
approximately 60 per cent of the industrial workers are now 20 unionized and syndicates are beginning to be formed among the agrarian workers. 20
Comision Argentina de Altos Estudios Internacionales, Annuario Estadistico Interamerioano, p. 437*
CHAPTER X CHILEAN POLITICS i. General.
framework: of government
Chile is a republic with a present consti
tution dating from October IS, 1925.
Unlike the United States
and most Latin-American countries, the twenty-four provinces of Chile are administrative units of a strong central govern ment.
The constitution provides for the traditional executive
and legislative branches and for a judicial system. Executive branch.
Executive authority is headed by
the President of the Republic who legally possesses more power than the President of the United States does in ordinary times. The president has wide authority to make both civil and mili tary appointments, he is in charge of foreign affairs, and exercises a veto power subject to being over-ridden by a twothirds vote.
Should he differ with the Congress on the
national budget, he may establish one by executive decree. In instances in which differences arise between the president and congress over constitution provisions or reform, he may take advantage of a constitutional clause which permits him to take the issue directly to the people by means of a pleberite.
Executive authority is administered through a minis
try of eleven divisions consisting of Ministers of:
Interior,
156 Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development, Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Education, Colonization, and Health.
These
Ministers are appointed by and ar.e entirely accountable to the President. A presidential term is six years and no president may serve two successive terms.
The presidential election is by
direct, popular vote open to all male citizens of twenty-one years of age who can read.
The salary of the President is
84.000 pesos or approximately $3,300 (dollars) a year.
There
is no vice-president. Legislative branch.
The legislative power of the
Republic of Chile is vested in the National Congress.
This
body is divided into a lower and upper house, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
The Congress meets each year from
May 21 to September 18 to consider legislation.
All bills
originate in the Chamber of Deputies, may be revised by the Senate, and must be voted on by both houses. There are 143 Deputies in the lower house who serve for terms of four years, with half of the membership retiring each two years.
Deputies are elected by departments or groups
of departments on the basis of one representative to each 30.000 of population.
They are elected by direct popular vote
under the Belgian system of proportional representation. In the upper house are forty-five Senators.
They are
157 elected from nine groupings of the twenty-four provinces for terms of eight years. four years.
One-.half of the Senate retires each
Election is by direct popular vote.
Judicial branch.
The judiciary of Chile is not inde
pendent as it is in the United States.
It is in reality a
branch of administration under the Minister of Justice and cannot determine the constitutionality of legislative acts. Such decisions rest with the President and Congress and, if a plebiscite is called, with the people. vincial or local court system. three levels:
There is no pro
The federal courts are on
The High Court of Justice, eight Courts of
Appeal, and numerous and varied Tribunals of First Instance. Local government.
Chile has never experienced a
struggle over "state’s rights" as has the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and most Latin-American countries.
From
earliest days the tradition of a centralized national govern ment has been established.
The twenty-four provinces are
governed by Intendentes appointed by the President of the Republic.
These Intendentes are, however, advised by pro
vincial assemblies composed of representatives of the munici palities, and there are some indications of growing power among these bodies.
The provinces are divided into departments
which are administered by Governors, also appointed by the President.
Within the departments are municipal districts,
158 which, while nominally under the authority of the Intendentes and Governor, actually are largely governed by Municipal Councils.
These councils consist of from five to fifteen
citizens who are elected for three year terms.
Election is
by direct popular vote, and women and foreigners, as well as citizens— men, may vote. II. General.
POLITICAL REALITIES
Chilean politics are in angry confusion.
The
so-called popular front is scarcely popular or a real front. Numerous parties, one for every taste, fight for leadership and fight with each other.
Coalitions and fronts of strange
bedfellows are frequently formed and just as frequently broken. Through all the mad scramble run bitter feelings and acrimoni ous charges.
But the significant point is not the turmoil,
but the fact that turmoil is possible; not the abuses of democracy, but the existence of democracy at all; not the argument and conflict, but the freedom of speech, press, and ballot which makes all this possible.
Chile’s new democracy
is unsettled and proceeds in the direction of a precarious, not-now-predictable future, but it is a popular movement which has cleared the way and set an example for all of Latin-America. Basic issues.
A plethora of immediate issues provide
the points of departure in Chilean politics, but most of them
159 spring from the one great conflict between the "left" and "right."
Chile is in the process of wresting control from
the ultra-conservative men of wealth who for so long ruled the nation according to their own interests and whims, and who today would return to power at the expense of democracy which they call communism.
At the moment the middle-class
of moderate liberalism sits behind the driver’s wheel, but it is able to steer the nation only with the assistance of the more numerous working class which prompts from the lefthand rear seat.
There is general agreement among all com
ponents of the liberal element upon the prime objectives of securing democracy, overcoming poverty and the low standard of living, liberal social concepts, and land reform.
As
usual, the differences arise out of methods of securing these ends.
These differences lead to the bitter inter-party
disputes and the communist— socialist— moderate— fascist— conservative tug-o *-war. Background.
The popular front which was formed in
1938 really was the culmination of a series of developments
beginning in 1920.
Prior to that time Chile was disturbed
by few political difficulties, for government was securely in the grasp of a handful of landholders.
Just prior to the
election of 1920 , however, the urban working class had grown to such proportions and had become so dissatisfied with social
160 and economic conditions that Arturo Alessandri was encouraged to run on a platform of labor and social reforms.
After a
"bitter campaign, the election was so obviously fraudulent that there was talk of an armed uprising of the workers. Congress, fearing civil war, appointed a "tribunal of honor" to decide the election.
Alessandri was named by the margin
of one vote. Alessandri’s party, the Liberal Alliance, obtained control of the Chamber of Deputies, but the conservatives retained a majority in the Senate.
The result was a dead
lock which forced one cabinet after another to resign and which blocked most of the proposed liberal reforms.
Financial
difficulties growing out of the collapse of nitrates, together with internal political opposition, made Alessandri’s position extremely difficult.
A crisis arose in September, 1924, when
the new Chamber voted that its members should receive salaries rather than serving for the honor of office as had previously been the case.
The younger members of the army whose own pay
was in arrears were indignant and took advantage of the issue to force Alessandri to flee to Argentina. There followed a "junta de gobierno" composed of two generals and an admiral who governed in close collaboration with the old conservative regime.
Younger officers were
disappointed in the extreme conservatism and in the failure to execute a new constitution and a new "junta" composed largely
161 of friends of Alessandri seized the government on January 23, 1925*
The ex-President, whose resignation had never been
legally accepted by the Congress, was invited to return to complete his constitutional term and received a warm welcome when he returned to Santiago,
During the next few months a
new, much more liberal constitution was drawn up and ratified and financial reforms were instituted in an attempt to sta bilize the currency which by then was in a deplorable state. At the end of Alessandri*s term, confusion arose on the election of a successor, but finally a compromise candid date, Fmiliano Figueroa Larrain, was agreed upon and he took office in December, 1925•
Party strife and discontent among
the people made the position of this conservative leader precarious and in 1927 he was forced to withdraw.
Colonel
Carlos Ibahez was then elected to the presidency by an over whelming vote, Ibahez’s regime was more nearly a dictatorship than any which had existed in Chile for several decades.
Members
of Congress were hand-picked, the press was muzzled, the left was silenced and political enemies were exiled.
Nonetheless,
Ibafiez leaned toward the Alessandri liberalism and significant reforms were instituted.
It was during his regime that many
advanced labor laws were promulgated, a modest agrarian reform was begun, attention was given to improved education, finances were strengthened, and the long-standing Tacna-Arica dispute
with Peru was finally settled. The world-wide depression unseated Ibafiez.
Opposition
to him increased with the deterioration of Chilean economy and the movement which eliminated Ibafiez was an emphatic demon stration of popular discontent rather than the typical aimed revolt. 1931.
It
began with student rioting in
SantiagoinJuly,
This
agitation was followed within
a day byanextra
ordinary general strike of intellectuals— lawyers, engineers, school-teachers, and even doctors* The situation grew more tense until on July 26 Ibafiez resigned in
favor of the President of the
Senate, whoturned
over the presidency on the following day to Juan Esteban Montero*
In a few days Montero, who wished to be a candidate
in the forthcoming elections, handed the office to Manuel Trucco. In the presidential elections Montero, with the con servative support, easily defeated the former president, Alessandri.
Upon his inauguration in December, 1931* he faced
a situation that was little short of hopeless.
Industry was
paralyzed, finances were completely disorganized, unemployment was staggering, the peso was worth one-sixth its former value, and the army morale and discipline was shattered.
The result
was chaos and near anarchy. On June 4, 1932, a group of radical conspirators seized the government and a dictatorial Mjunta" set up the Socialist
163 Republic of Chile.
The socialist regime lasted but a few
days, however, when it was displaced by a new "junta.”
Shortly
thereafter this group was ousted by a military corps, which in turn promptly lost its control to another faction.
By
this time everyone was thoroughly disgusted with disorder, intrigue, and corruption and a constitutional election was called. Though the conservatives nominated a candidate of their own, the majority of the conservative groups threw their support to ex-President, Alessandri, in order to defeat the still more radical candidate Marmaduke Grove.
Alessandri in
December, 1932, for the third time became President and the right-wing element obtained a majority in both houses of Congress.
Alessandri served his full term from 1932 to 1936,
but it was not a period of the real reform that might have been expected upon the basis of the President’s early career and previous leanings.
He apparently personally swung con
siderably to the right, a trend that was accentuated by the policies of the conservative Congress.
Some domestic reforms
were made, and restrictions on foreign interests were estab lished, but his.term was, on the whole, a reactionary one that brought increased radical discontent. Formation of the popular front.
As the election of
1936 approached it became apparent that the only hope of the left-wing parties was in laying aside their own disputes and
164 uniting on one candidate.
At first, the communists and
socialists joined hands and then the powerful Radical Party (moderate liberals) entered the combination.
These three
major groups, together with diverse bourgeois political ele ments, agreed upon a formal **Frente Popular** and in convention nominated as their candidate the veteran Radical leader, Pedro Aguirre Cerda. The conservative elements also united upon a candidate, Gustavo Ross, the rather liberal Minister of Finance in the Alessandri ministry.
In the running, too, was ex-President
Carlos Ibafiez, the nominee of the Chilean Nazi Party which advocated a fascist state but disclaimed any European affili ations.
It generally was felt that Ross easily would win the
election, which probably would have been the case but for an extraordinary episode. The Nazi putsch and the election.
Just prior to the ,
election, the Nazis, knowing their candidate could not win at the ballot box, attempted a demonstration which was intended to seize the government by force and place Ibafiez in the presidency.
A small well-drilled group of young men shot a
policeman as they assembled and then fled to one of the govern ment buildings across the square from the presidential offices. At this point, however, someone, presumably Alessandri who was present, ordered "carbineros** to storm the building and when the excitement was over everyone of the demonstrators lay dead.
165 Ibafiez and Gonzalez von Marees, the party leader who had directed the "revolution” by radio, were jailed. The Nazis then threw their support to the popular front, and many of the public who supported Ross were so shocked at the breach of "LatinkAmerican revolutionary etiquette” which the massacre represented that they swung to Cerda.
The strange
episode enabled Cerda to be elected by a very few votes, and the anomaly of a left-wing group being brought to power through aid of a Nazi party was created.
Paradoxically, too, Cerda,
who strongly opposed the Nazis, pardoned the jailed Nazi leader as his first political act.
Such is Chilean politics.
Popular front government.
The history of the popular
front government since 19 3$ is largely that of inner squabbles and tussling for power among communists, socialists, and radicals.
The original Cerda coalition cabinet consisted of
seven Radicals, three Socialists, and one Democrat.
Communists
were invited to participate, but, as they had done with Leon Blum in Paris, they refused any active part in government. Later the socialists withdrew from the cabinet in a quarrel over the momentary support the Radicals had given to the Communists on an issue, and, to complete the confusion, Cerda’s own party ministers withdrew when Cerda permitted a communist and a fascist newspaper to be briefly closed down on the same day. men.
The cabinet was filled with non-party and small-party
166 The popular front was scarcely ever a front and hardly can be said to exist today, except in a common opposition to, the conservatives.
Because he lacked congressional support
and the enthusiastic backing of his .own party and because the Radicals, Socialists, and Communists could not agree among themselves, Cerda was unable to affect much real legislation. On the whole the popular front has been liberal in comparison to the old oligarchy1,: but its "radicalism” has been mild. Benefits.
It is too soon to write the balance sheet
of the popular front and the movement which it started.
How
ever, in spite of its obvious difficulties and shortcomings, the believer in democracy has reason to be encouraged. grasp of the ultra-conservative has been broken.
The
Free speech
flourishes; freedom of the press is allowed; traditional guarantees to the individual are observed, and people may organize and they may vote in significant elections.
The
great framewood of social and labor legislation has been pro tected and more money and attention has been given to health, education, and general social welfare.
The people's movement i
as expressed in the “popular front has maintained complete order in the face of stormy obstacles and it has tenaciously adherred to constitutional procedure against temptation and against persistent and aggravating opposition.
It has given
the people a new hope and interest in their own future and it
167 has succeeded enough, to make improbably another tyrant like Ibafiez. Political parties.
Small groups in Chile may entertain
hopes of securing representation in Congress, because of the system of proportional representation that prevails.
Conse
quently the Chilean may take his pick of a dozen parties, or perhaps organize a new one.
Party names mean little for while
Conservadores are always conservative, Liberales are never liberal and Radicales are never radical.
Socialismo may mean
anything from modest liberalism to Marxism or Nazism. Lemocraticos and Democraticas are of different cults.
General
izations as to party position are difficult to make, for party policy often fluxuates; it not infrequently is contradictory; it rarely is clearly expressed; and it always is complex.
With
these limitations in mind, a broad outline of the pattern of Chileans parties ivill be informative. There are probably five parties that might be classed as being on the right and representing the ultra-conservative in Chilean politics.
At the heart of this group are the
Conservadores, the party which has been dominant during most of the history of Chile.
The Conservadores are the wealthy
and landed people who believe in church, land, family, and government control by the few.
Closely associated and of
considerable strength are the Liberales, who are not liberal.
168 This party is composed largely of conservative professional and business men and some landowners who believe in land, the best people, family, and order but who lean somewhat away from the church.
The Falangists are the sons of old families
who oppose both communism and fascism, disclaim any connection with their Spanish counterpart, and appear to seek new and younger leadership for the conservative cause.
The agrarios
and democraticas are minor conservative parties of mild dissent. In the center, representing the middle-class, are found the Radicales.
Composed of business and professional people,
this party has led the overthrow of the conservatives, and is only moderately liberal.
For convenience sake, the Fanguardia
Popular Socialista is placed in the center, though they might easily be classed on the right.
These are the Nazis of Chile,
but do not appear to owe any allegiance to the Reich and differ from the German counterpart in several ways.
They oppose the
communists, appear totalitarian minded, rely on military organ ization, but have shown evidence of social objectives quite different from the leader-follower, race, military, and nation alistic concepts of Germany.
The Bemocraticos are moderate
liberals of no distinctive program. On the left, two growing parties vie for supremacy and easily surpass all others.
These are the working-class parties,
the Socialistas and the Comunistas.
Both are active and well
TABLE XIX
REPHESENTATIVES IN THE CHILEAN CONGRESS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS OF MARCH, 1941 Senate 1940 1941
Party
Chamber 1940 1941
Right Conservadores Falangistas Liberales Agrarios
12
11
—
—
32 3 22 3
10
8
—
1
30 6 35 3
4
1
4
3
11 -1
13 — 1
32 3 6
42 2 6
4 —
5 —
—
—
8 5 5 7
15 2 2 15
(Original) Popular Front Democraticas Center Radicales Vanguardia Popular Socialists Democraticos Left
1
4
169
Socialistas Trabajadores Radicales Socialistas Radicales Comunistas
170 organized; both are far to the left, with the Comunistas being the more extreme.
The Trahaja&ores Socialistas and the
Socialistas Radicales are two smaller ultra-liberal groups which stand between the Socialistas and the Comunistas. Cerda* s successor.
The sudden death of Aguirre Cerda
on November 25, 1941, and the holding of an election reunited, for the moment, most left-wing political parties.
A coalition
of the liberal groups supported the Radical Party leader Juan Antonio Rios against the conservative candidate, ex-President Carlos Ibafiez.
Rios won by a substantial majority, and was
inaugurated in April, 1942.
It is too soon to know the effect
on government of Rio’s leadership, but the new President has always leaned toward the right wing of his party. Fifth column.
There are many German people in Chile,
although not as many.as alarmists claim.
Estimates vary
widely because adequate statistics are unavailable, and be cause it is as difficult in Chile as in the United States to determine the precise heritage that makes one a German.
Sober
and careful estimates indicate that there are some 20,000 nonJewish Germans-*- in Chile who were born in Germany.
There are
about 40,000 German-Ghileans2 born in Chile of one or two
1 Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors, p. 232. 2 Loc. cit.
171 German parents, and roughly 9,000 German refugees,3 mostly Jews. German names may be seen throughout Chile.
In
Valaparaiso and Santiago they adorn many stores, banks, trading houses, office windows, and residential mail-boxes. The chief concentration, however, is in southern Chile.
For
several generations German immigrants have settled in the alpine area; have carved out small German farms; have built German homes and buildings; and have created a startling reproduction of the Bavarian countryside.
Southern Chile,
countryside and city, is German in appearance and custom. The propaganda machine of the Beich has not neglected Chile.
Following the same general pattern as that outlined
in Argentina and Brazil, the German Embassy in Santiago clearly has headed a large campaign.
The tolls levied on German
people and firms, the German clubs, the tons of printed materials, and all the other characteristics and techniques of the Nazi methods are to be observed. No one knows, except in a general way, what the results have been.
Generally speaking, the influence of German ide
ology has not been as strong in Chile as in Argentina and Brazil.
One has the impression for the most part of hard
3 Herring, loc. cit.
172 working people who have contributed and are contributing much to Chilean development and who ask only to be left alone. Germans are held in high.respect in Chile, have often married into Chilean families, and’usually are about as Chilean as Milwaukeans are American.
Most Chilean-Germans seem to be a
part of the soil and to be thrif/fcy, wholesome, non-militant merchants and farmers. This impression can, of course, be overdrawn.
There
are many ardent Hitlerites, and the unassimilated German colonies must be considered a national problem.
Evidence
seems to point to the fact that most of the Hitlerphiles are drawn from the younger, Aryan, German-born group, and that the refugees are just as violently opposed to Hitlerism.
The
largest part of the Germans are those who have intermarried or at least have been in the country for more than one genera tion, and these for the most part do not appear interested in any crusade for the ideas of Hitler, Ghandi, or Roosevelt. The average, intelligent Chilean entertains a splendid regard for his German countrymen, and is far more concerned with the Yankee and British monopoly of Chile’s economy than with the danger of Nazi ’’Impenetration. ” III.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
General.' Chile has no real differences with any nation. No love is lost between Chile and her neighbors, Peru, Bolivia,
173 and Argentina, but, except for small differences over the southern boundry with Argentina, no real dangers to peace' seem to exist.
Chile’s foreign policy is governed by two
principle considerations.
One is the danger to national
security made important by her exposed coastline, her .riches, and her inability to defend herself.
The other, of necessity,
is her preoccupation with the extent to which foreign capital controls her chief sources of revenue and international trade. American ownership of Chilean copper,, nitrates and other hold ings have made the United States the most important factor in Chilean foreign relations. United States.
In general, relations with the United
States are satisfactory.
There has been the customary criti
cism of the unilateral nature of the Monroe Doctrine and there has been some of the usual charges of Yankee imperialism and materialism, but for the most part one finds a very cor dial and unstrained attitude toward the United States and her people.
American loans and American ownership of Chilean
mines and factories are not calculated to engender friendship, but, so far this situation has not appeared to arouse general resentment.
Chile has not broken with the Axis, but this
position is to be explained by internal politics and by unpro tected coastlines rather than by an anti-American or pro-Axis sentiment.
There is a difference in the motives of Argentina
174 and of Chile in this respect, and most observers feel that Chile may sever relations with the Axis at any time.
Chile
and the United States have many psychological and material reasons to be drawn together, and such co-operation appears to be developing today.
CHAPTER XI CONCLUSION I.
COMMON DENOMINATORS OF LATIN-AMERICA
Generalizing about Latin-lmerica easily can lead to misconceptions, for that which is true of one country may not be so of another, and characteristics which are common to all are shared by each in varying degree and manner.
There
is value, however, in seeking out common denominators, if they are not used rigidly and if the possibility of exceptions is borne in mind.
There are certain strands running through
most of Latin-America which, if identified, assist in an understanding of our neighbors to the south. Two classes.
One social phenomena which accounts for
many Latin-American developments is the cleavage of the people into rather distinct classes.
Although a middle class is
everywhere present and is significatly developed in some countries,, the principal divisions of society are usually but two, the upper and the lower.
Latin-America struggles with
a situation in which a very few possess most of the wealth and power, while the greater part of the people live in ignor ance, poverty, and relative political and economic impotence. The upper class traces its origin to the early Spanish or Portuguese colonial period during which noblemen,
176 conquistadores, or favorites of the King were granted wide privileges and power and huge sections of land.
These few
ruled their lands and the people on them, and, as a group, they ruled the territory and later the nation.
Today they
continue to dominate in varying degrees the economy and government of the Hispanic-American countries.
This aristo
cracy based on land, wealth, family, and power is a social as well as economic one.
In order to avoid errors in evaluat
ing Latin-American attitudes and developments, one constantly must be aware of the psychological and material differences which separate these two components of Latin-Aoierican society. Race problem.
Indians, Negroes, and unassimilated
Europeans and Asiatics provide problems common to most of Central and South America.
A very few countries such as
Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica have no Indian problem, but the majority face the task of integrating into the social and economic fabric large populations of illiterate, povertystricken, and ostracized Indians.
Brazil and other Carribbean
countries must solve the problems arising from their large number of Negroes, while Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others must attempt to absorb the many Europeans and Japanese who remain apart. Race, language, religion, culture.
Although there are
some differences in racial composition, Latin-Americans are
177 "bound together by strong ties of race, language, religion and culture.
At international conferences the tendency for
Latin-American representatives to gravitate together fre quently has been noted.
These peoples seem to understand
each other well, probably because they share similar back grounds, cultures, and customs.
Eighteen of the twenty re
publics claim Spanish as the national tongue, while Brazil and Haiti speak the closely related languages of Portuguese and French.
The Catholic faith has always been a strong
factor in all of these countries, and most of the customs, social procedures, and cultural developments of the various countries may be traced to identical sources.
Differences
there are, some of them major ones; but, in general, these nations share a common heritage. Nationalism.
Latin-American countries are character
ized by strong national feelings.
From the meanest to the
grandest country the people are intensely nationalistic, proud, and patriotic.
Many mistakes are made in our dealings
with these countries by our failure to recognize and cater to this nationalistic sentiment.
Neither Honduras, Ecuador,
nor Argentina relishes a paternalistic attitude on the part of the United States. Education;, public health and welfare.
Our good neigh
bors share together the task of improving the standards of
17$
education, health, and general welfare of their people. Illiteracy, disease, high death rates, poor housing, and similar problems characterize to one extent or another all the Latin-American countries.
These low standards, the
.raising of which is a challenge to the hemisphere, are, of courss, the burden of the lower class and are not experienced by the cultured and gracious well-to-do whom the visitor ordinarily meets. Agricultural economy.
Another common denominator of
Latin-America is the dependence of most of the people on agri culture.
Even in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, where indus
trialization is more advanced then elsewhere, the majority of the people live from the soil.
The agrarian worker is typical
of all the countries, for not only is he employed in producing for the export and domestic market but large portions of the population live from their own small garden plots and tiny farms. Poverty midst plenty.
Latin-America is rich in re
sources, but most of the people are very poor.
This great
poverty of the masses in the midst of tremendous natural wealth is a phenomena common to most of the American republics. constitutes one of the hemisphere’s greatest challenges. Foreign capital.
Practically all of the American
It
179 nations have experienced the development of their industries and utilities through the means of foreign capital.
Latin-
America has lacked its own capital in sufficient extent to develop its resources, so it has naturally attracted foreign money.
The dirth of local finances and the prevalence of
foreign control are common throughout the hemisphere and provoke many a domestic and foreign controversy. Poor transportation.
A drawback which troubles practi
cally all of Latin-America is the meagerness of transportation and communication facilities.
Not only are most of the coun
tries separated from each other by the absence of railroads and highways, but the various sections of any one nation fre quently are isolated as effectively.
The lack of transpor
tation systems hinders the economic and political develop ment of the American nations, and it tends to prevent the peoples of one country from knowing and understanding those of another. Nationalism vs. state1s rights.
To comprehend Latin-
American polities one must recognize the constant struggle in most countries between the states or provinces and the federal government.
The various present-day provinces origin
ally were virtually autonomous colonial units which owed little allegiance to the colonial authorities and which were
180 separated by the jealousies and rivalries of their royallyappointed governors.
Consequently, a tradition of indepen
dence has been handed down to the present day.
The diffi
culties of transportation and communication, which remain evident, have helped to keep alive this emphasis on the state or province.
Latin-American politics frequently are inter
state struggles for power or involve disputes over the di vision of authority between the federal government and the provincial governments.
The American nations, for the most
part, are still in a process of unification which results in strenuous arguments and unsettled politics. Caudillismo, personalismo, and rule by the few. Most of Latin-America shares a common background of revolutions, dictatorships, and the circumventing of traditional democracy. At the present time completely free balloting is a rarity, and in some instances undisguised dictatorships exist.
Progress
is being made, but, as yet, the words "democracy" and "republic" have a different meaning below the Bio Grande than they do in the United States.
Caudillismo, personalismo, and the oli
garchy of wealth have guided Latin-American countries--not the people. The era of the caudillo appears to be almost, if not completely, closed.
Whereas, once the self-appointed, military
chieftain and his independent "army" was common and might hope
181 to seize the government, today he is a rarity.
However, he
has left political habits which are difficult to break, and his techniques are still utilized upon occasions by his more "legalized" successors. Personalismo remains a prevalent and po^verful force in most Latin-American countries.
It refers to the practice
of supporting men rather than issues.
Latin-American "elec
tions" or revolutions are apt to hinge on the personal popular ity, the personal power, and the: personal following of an individual. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of LatinAmerican politics has been the oligarchy of wealth which has exercised the authority of government.
It should be remem
bered that throughout all of the American nations the greater part of the people have had little voice in government or economics.
Elections are frequently complete farces and
revolutions virtually never have been popular uprisings of the people.
The land-owners, the wealthy, the "gentlemen"
have maintained their small group in power since the early days and only now are they beginning to be challenged by the overwhelmingly more numerous lower class or by the expanding middle class. II.
MISCONCEPTIONS
The people of the United States know little about
182 Latin-America.
Research materials have "been scarce, interest
in our neighbors to the south has-been slight, and textbooks have made only passing reference to this area.
Furthermore,
many of the impressions of Latin-America held in this country are incorrect.
These misconceptions frequently are harmful
to understanding and friendship and lead us to errors of thought and action. That Latin-America is a single entity.
Recently, the
director of a well-known radio program, having secured the participation of the Consuls in Los Angeles of Great Britain, China, and Poland, sought to obtain also the services of the ”Latin-American Consul.”
This instance, while perhaps extreme,
is an excellent example of the tendency to think of LatinAmerica as a single entity.
Our habit of thinking that all
the peoples and countries of Latin-America are alike leads us to faulty concepts and to tragic errors in our relations with these neighbors. It should be remembered that these are separate coun tries which should be considered and treated as such.
Wide
divergences exist in climate, geography, racial composition, economic and political status, habits, customs, traditions, and history.
There is no such prototype as the Latin-American,
for the differences between a Mexican and an Argentinian or between a Brazilian and a Chilean are substantial and easily
noticed.
183 True, all of these people have much in common which
.
provides a certain unity, yet to believe that they all think, eat, and live alike in virtually identical countries is far from the fact.
The tango is danced in Argentina but not the
Cuban rhumba which we are inclined to feel typifies LatinAmerica; Mexicans eat tamales and wear broad-rimmed hats, but this is not so of the Argentineans, nor the Brazilians, nor the Chileans, nor Costa Ricans, nor many others.
Palm trees
and sieatas are typical of some countries but not of many others.
More important than the actual differences among
the American nations is the fact that each considers itself different and cultivates a strong national sentiment that is incompatible with our habit of overlooking their individualism. That all is old, backward, and picturesque. Most norteamericanos carry a mental image of Latin-America that revolves around burros, sombreros, ignorant Indians, cobblestoned streets, llamas, and other physical reflections of backwardness and prinitiveness.
It is unfortunate that this is true, for, while
there is much that is old and quaint about Latin-America, there is also the new, the modern, and the progressive.
Our failure
to appreciate this side of Latin-America has led us to adopt an exaggerated attitude of paternalism and condescension and has frequently prompted us to take steps obviously geared to the level of a backward, ignorant people.
Both errors are
184 extremely distasteful to the proud and cultured leaders of these nations to the south. In Latin-America today there are excellent subway and railroad systems which are more significant than the more familiar llama and burro trails.
There are ultra-modern sky
scrapers that cast their shadows over the oft-pictured colonial buildings.
Cobblestoned streets and ox-carts have been crowded
into the hinterland by wide boulevards and shiny' automobiles. Modern metropolises containing their factories and business houses replace the disappearing villages with their spinning wheels and barter markets.
If there are colorful and pictur
esque natives that attract the photographer, there are also well-dressed, keen, alert people who engage in the.pursuit of culture and modern business.
True it is that much of Latin-
America remains backward and quaint, but it is equally true that there is also a rapidly expanding modern side of LatinAmerica which is infinitely the more important to the United States. That all Latin-American governments are dictatorships. It is a common practice in the United States to dismiss all Latin-American governments with the blanket assertion that they are dictatorships.
Such a generalization is misleading.
Not all these governments are dictatorships, and, of greater importance, the indiscriminate application of the term
165 "dictatorship" to all countries connotes a uniform degree of authoritarianism which in fact does not exist. It cannot be denied that the observance of democratic practices in Latin-America generally falls short of the stand ards deemed to be proper by people of the United States.
How
ever, outright dictatorships, such as those of Vargas or Trujillo, are rare, and even these are hardly of the European type ordinarily associated with term "dictatorship.”
While
control of the election machinery by one part or class fre quently modifies the real effectiveness of the ballot, popular strength in most countries is, nonetheless, being felt through voting.
Representatives are being elected, public
opinion as thus revealed is being catered to, and in many *
instances major elections are being won. "Dictatorship" implies an arbitrary rule that disregards certain other rights in addition to that of voting.
Few people
realize the extent to which these other expressions of democracy are observed in Latin-America.
There is a substantial and
growing practice of following the traditional guarantees of individual liberty, the right to privacy, and freedom of ex pression.
One must not gloss over the undemocratic phases of
Latin-American politics, but, on the other hand, neither should he over-draw them on the basis of the many popular misconcep tions which exist in the public mind.
Latin-America, indeed,
falls short of our concept of democracy, but fairness dictates
186 that her many democratic practices be recalled and that judg ment of her progress be measured against her obstacles of poverty, illiteracy, and poor communications.
In fairness,
too, it should be observed that few Latin-Americans are de prived of the ballot and privileges of democracy as effec tively as are our own southern Negroes.
In any event, the
error of using the term "dictatorship" to characterize all our good neighbors should be avoided; first, because it im plies a degree of authoritarianism which does not exist, and, secondly, because it can hardly be applied to twenty differ ent nations whose governments range in the scale of democracy from the Dominican dictatorship to the very liberal democracy of Chile. III.
PAN-AMERICANISM
The exigencies of war have converted the concept of Pan-Americanism from an intellectual plaything into an im mediate and significant consideration in American and world affairs.
While there are legitimate differences of opinion
as to the fundamental and proper objectives of Pan-Americanism and while the likelihood of their attainment is viewed with varying degrees of optimism and pessimism, most of the con fusion grows out of a lack of information about the hemisphere and faulty thinking as to the nature of Pan-Americanism. These chapters have been devoted to specific and necessary
187 information about a part of the hemisphere; they may be con cluded appropriately -with a few observations on the funda mental nature of the ideal of Pan-Americanism. War-time vs. long-range Pan-Americanism.
To many
people, the search for hemishperic solidarity is merely a frantic effort to make friends and allies to help win the war.
Enlisting continental support for the defeat of the
Axis is of course a prime consideration to us at the moment. But a Pan-Americanism which looks no farther than this ob jective is hardly, worthy of the name.
Upon too many occasions
the United States has exhibited sudden interest in LatinAmerica only to forget and neglect it when the urgency of the moment has passed.
Xt may not be without reason that
some skeptical Latin-Americans have responded with reserve to our most recent outburst of friendship..
They may be
wondering if Franklin Roosevelt may not be succeeded by an other Theodore Roosevelt, and the good-neighbor policy re placed by the "big-stick." Pan-Americanism should be a long-range policy.
It
should stretch out over the years not as a selfish or uni lateral instrument but as a mutually embraced philosophy for the common good of all.
Its objectives should be more than
the defeat of Hitler and should include at least the goals of a mutually improved economic, cultural and political life
188 among all peoples and nations of the hemisphere and the attain ment of a working example that nations profitably can dwell i
and work together without hatred and bloodshed. The myth of self-sufficiency.
There is a tendency to
rest the philosophy of hemispheric solidarity on a basis of hemispheric self-sufficiency.
It is assumed by many that a
prerequisite of Pan-Americanism is a perfectly-balanced hemispheric economy with the surpluses and requirements of all American nations fitting nicely into an all-American trade pattern.
A classic bit of evidence of this philosophy
is to be found in the great effort to which many people go to determine how, or prove that, Argentina’s economy may be so altered as to provide products which the United States will buy in quantities equal to the demand for American goods in Argentina. As many authorities have demonstrated, the western hemisphere to a remarkable degree is endowed with the potentials of self-sufficiency.
That the attainment of such is desirable,
or that balanced trade between, let us say, Argentina and the United States would ensue, or that either is necessary to PanAmericanism is quite another question.
It is wrong to believe
that friendship or the sharing of common goals and ideals of humanity must be based upon either a mutually self-sufficient economy or balanced two-way trade.
189
Proof of this fact is abundant.
Far greater and more
satisfactory trade was maintained with Japan, our enemy, than with China our ally.
Trade with Mexico before the last war
was greater than that with most of the other Latin-American nations combined, yet Mexico was hardly a friend.
Argentina
herself cannot be made to support the proponents of the balanced-trade theory of friendship.
If such persons insist
that Argentina leans toward the Axis simply because she can not sell her identical products to the United States, they are overlooking the fact that Argentina actually sells more to the United States than to Germany, and the more conclusive fact that Argentina’s most profitable and best-balanced trade has been with Great Britain, one of the United Nations. The conclusion that the elimination of competing surpluses and the establishment of a self-sufficient, balanced hemis pheric trade are necessary to the development of Pan-Americanism grows out of a failure to differentiate between the require ments of war-time and peace-time Pan-Americanism.
During the
war the United States asks that Latin-American nations do not sell to the Axis powers and a blockade assures their compli ance to the request.
The result is the closing to Latin-
America of many markets and the accumulation of those surpluses which cannot be sold to the hemisphere or to the United Nations. As a consequence of this state of affairs serious
190 economic problems arise in those countries, such as Argentina, which are drastically affected.
Therefore, if these nations
are to live, if they are to he friendly, and if they are to endorse this war effort that results in the blockade, some answer through new trade channels or outright assistance must be found to their economic predicament.
Only the United
States among the western nations has the wealth and ability to assume this burden of solving these economic problems of war-time solidarity.
As a consequence a philosophy of two-
way trade between the United States and each of the several republics has grown up.
Once such an outlook is accepted,
Argentina proves a special problem for her duplication of American products makes a satisfactory two-way trade between these two nations seem difficult or impossible of attainment. Here, then, is the basis for the feeling that the United States must stop producing the same things.
Since both of
the contingencies seem unlikely, if not impossible, there are many people who see no hope for Pan-Americanism. The duplication of Argentine and United States products, the difficulties of two-way trade Which thereby arise, and the fear of Argentina’s natural economic tendency to trade out of the hemisphere are, however, critical problems only during the war.
When peace comes, why shouldn’t Argentina
sell to Europe or Asia?
Why need there be a completely
balanced trade between her and us?
With the hoped-for
191 condition of a freer international movement of goods and credits, it will be quite possible, for example, for Argentina to sell to Germany and buy from us.
Certainly no one pro
poses that the United States, after the war, refuse to deal with the present enemies.
Why then should we expect other
American nations to do so? It should be remembered that we have two PanAmericanisms and therefore two separate problems.
On the
one hand is the problem of securing hemispheric solidarity for the war effort which requires temporary and often un economic expedients.
On the other hand is the goal of a
long-range friendly co-operation for the common good which is not dependent on hemispheric self-sufficiency nor the principle of balanced two-way trade. To be sure, Latin-America in war and in peace can produce many things which we can use, and, to assure mutually better living and more wholesome trade, these products and industries should be developed.
But let us not allow present
emergency requirements and measures to mislead us into believ ing that, in the long run, this development can or should be continued to the point that all nations are producing only those products as will permit of balanced two-way trade with the United States.
For example, no matter how many times it
is suggested, Argentina never can and never will produce the oft-re commended "cure-all" of rubber and tin, nor will or
192 should she cease producing the competing meat, wheat, corn, and cotton.
Hemispheric solidarity in wartime must be main
tained by two-way trade and "artificial’* economic help from the United States.
Long-range Pan-Americanism neither should
nor does it need to depend upon such self-sufficiency or com pletely complementary economics. The skeptic and the cynic.
There is the person who
scoffs at the guest of Pan-Americanism.
He abuses Latin-
Ameriean leaders and prophesies that they will be friends only so long as it is expedient and profitable.
He seeks to
demonstrate the selfish nature of the good-neighbor policy and calls it simply a technique of gaining nationalistic and imperialistic arms.
He emphasizes the economic, human, and
political differences among the American nations that stand in the way. As is frequently the case in human affairs, there is an element of truth in all his charges.
Certainly, only the
most impractical idealist can believe that the ultimate goal is near, or that the path toward the goal is smooth, or even that there is general agreement as to the goal or the path. Obvious it must be that disappointments and discouragements, problems and differences, treachery and human nature are obstacles to progress.
-Nonetheless, only the pessimist, the
skeptic, and the cynic will overlook the progress that already has been made, deride and ridicule the present efforts, and
193 deny that it is -worthwhile to struggle on. The man who, in the name of realism, seeks to discredit the idealist by calling him a dreamer has ever been with us. If his counsels of pessimism had prevailed in the past, man still would be living with the institutions anc concepts of < the middle ages.
To embrace his cynicism today is to deny
man’s desire for a better life and is to renounce any hope for progress and a better world. Pan-Americanism may be called a dream or idealistic wish.
Yet it is of such dreams and wishes that civilization
Is made, for history has demonstrated that the visions of today have become the realities of tomorrow.
If there are
human and material obstacles to Pan-Americanism, they are no greater than those that have been faced and overcome many times in man’s ever^upward struggle. Significant progress toward understanding and co operation already has been made.
In Latin-America there is
a far greater degree of friendship for and trust of the United States than ever before.
In this country may be noted a com
pletely new understanding and appreciation of the LatinAmerican peoples and nations.
In all the hemisphere there
is a growing allegiance to the great common goals of PanAmericanism. Let the cynic reflect on the many evidences of progress. Let him also appreciate the fact that there is more in common
194 and there are fewer deep-rooted differences in the western hemisphere than in other portions of the globe.
Let him
realize that greater obstacles than those which face PanAmericanism have been overcome before.
Above all, let him,
and let us all, realize that the oft-cited mundane differ ences which separate men are not as strong as the human bonds which draw them together.
The hope of Pan-Americanism
and all world progress rests upon humanity1s common search for a better life and upon the similar hopes, fears, ideals, and visions i*vhich are shard by all men.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY A.
RECENT BOOKS
Adamson, Hans Christian, Lands of New World Neighbors. New York: Whittlesey House, 1941. 593 pp. Aikman, Duncan, The All-American Front. Garden City, New York Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1940. 344 pp. Beals, Carleton, America South. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1937. 559 PP* _____ The Coming Struggle for Latin America. Philaldelphia I. B. Lippincott Company, 19 3W. 401 pp. _______, Pan America. 194 0 . 545 pp.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
Berle, Jr., A. A., New Directions in the New World. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940 . 141 pp. Bidwell, Percy W . , Economic Defense of Latin America. World Peace Foundation, 1941. 96 pp. Caprile, Jr., Alberto, Argentina. 1941. 77 pp.
Boston:
New York: Hastings House,
Carr, Katherine, South American Primer. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 19391 208 pp. Clark, Sydney A . , The East Coast of South America. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940. 315 pp. _______ , The West Coast of South America. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940. 358 pp.” Comision Argentina de Altos Estudios Internacionales, Annuario Estadistico Interamericano. Buenos Aires: (The Macmillan Company, New York), 1940. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Political Handbook of the World. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. Crow, Carl, Meet The South Americans. Brothers, 1941. 350 pp.
New York: Harper and
197 Davies, Howell, editor, Tlie South American Handbook. London: Trade and Travel Publications, Ltd., 1941* PP* Duggan, Stephen, The Two Americas: An Interpretation. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934. 277 pp. Frank, ?/aldo D., America Hispana. New York: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1940. 388 pp. Garland, J. V., editor, War and the Americas. New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1941. 363 pp. Goetz, Delia, and Varian Fry, The Good Neighbors. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1941. 96 pp. Green, Philip Leonard, Our Latin American Neighbors. New York: Hastings House, 1941. 182 pp. _______ , Pan American Progress. 1942. 214 pp.
New York: Hastings House,
Gunther, John, Inside Latin America. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. 498 pp. Hanson, Carl Parker, Chile, Land of Progress. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941. 201 pp. Haring, Clarence H . , Argentina and The United States. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941. 73 pp. Henius, Frank, Latin American Trade. Brothers, 1941. 143 pp.
New York: Harper and
, The ABC of Latin America. Philadelphia: David McKay Company, 1942. 134 pp. Herring, Hubert, Good Neighbors. Press, 1941. “38l pp.
New Haven: Yale University
Inman, Samuel Guy, Latin America. and Company, 1937. 462 pp.
New York: Willett, Clark
James, Preston E., Latin America. New York: The Odyssey Press, 1942. 908 pp. Kirkpatrick, F. A., Latin America. Company, 1939. 330 pp.
New York: Macmillan
Manger, William, Inter-American Cooperation. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1941. H pp.
198 Manito, 0., and J. J. Najera, Geografia fislca de las Americas ^ de la Republics Argentina. Buenos Aires: (n.n.) 1938 . 321 pp.
Mann, Wilhem, C h ile , luchando por nuevas formas de v id a . S antiago: U n ive rsid a d de C h ile , 1938- 378 pp. McBride, George A., Chile: Land and Society. New York: American Geographical Society, 1936". 320 pp. McCullock, John I. B., Challenge to the Americas. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1940. 64 pp. Munro, Dana Gardner, The Latin-American Republics. New York: D. A ppleton-C entury Company, 1942. 650 pp. Peck, Anne Merriman, Roundabout South America. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. 359 pp. Phelps, D. M . , The Migration of Industry to South America. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19361 335 PP• Raushenbush, Joan, Look at Latin America. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 19401 64 pp. Revista de Economia Argentina. Buenos Aires: (n.n.), 1935Schurz, William Lytle, Latin America: A Descriptive Survey. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1942. 378 pp. Silva, Francisco Jr., Brazil. 1940. 77 PP.
New York: Hastings House,
Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations. 1940.
Geneva: (n.n.),
Stuart, Graham H . , Latin America and the United States. Third edition; New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938. 510 pp. The Statesman’s Yearbook. 1941.
London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd.,
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1936. , Foreign Commerce Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.
199 Wertenbaker, Charles, A New Doctrine for the Americas. New York: The Viking Press, 1941. 211 pp. Whitaker, John T., Americas to the South. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 300 pp. White, John W. , Argentina: The Life Story of a Nation. New York: The Viking Press, 1942. 360 pp. Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, The People ancl Politics of Latin America. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930. 845 pp. Zweig, Stefan, Brazil: Land of the Future. New York: The Viking Press, 1941. 282 pp. B.
MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES USED IN THIS STUDY
"Industrial Census of 1933,” Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, September, 1937. Pamphlet.
Buenos Aires Branch, Bank of Boston.
Pan-American Union, Brazil. Foreign Trade Series, No. 177. Washington, D. C.: Pan-American Union, 1940. 16 pp. _______ , Foreign Trade of Argentina for 1938 and 1939. Foreign Trade Series, N o . 1 84 . Washington, D.C.: PanAmerican Union, 1941. 20 pp. , Foreign Trade of Chile for 1938 and 1939. Foreign Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1941. 18 pp. Trade Series, No. 1^0.
_____
, Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, Foreign Trade Series, No. 177. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1940. 27 PP. 1 93 8 .
_____ , Latin-American Foreign Trade: A General Survey, 1940. Foreign Trade Series, No. 197. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1942. 27 PP* United States Department of Commerce, International Reference Service, Vol. 1, No. 1, January, 1941. , International Reference Service, Vol. 1, No. 26, June, 1 9 4 1 .
200 C.
PERIODICALS
There is a plethora of magazine and newspaper articles applicable to the field embraced by this study.
It would be
impractical to list them all here, or to attempt to select a few fdr a briefer list.
The student who wishes further read
ing is referred particularly to the Reader* s G-uide to Periodical Literature and to the Index of the New York Times. The Bulletin of the Pan-American Union and The Inter-American Monthly are excellent publications devoted exclusively * to inter-American affairs.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A OTHER LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES
203 BOLIVIA 1.
AREA —
419,470 square miles
2.
POPULATION -- 3,457,000
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Fer capita exports — $15.62 b. Per capita imports — # 7*43 c. Principal exports (1) Tin (92 per cent) (2) Other metals d. Principal imports (1) Wheat, meat (2) Sugar, foodstuffs (3) Automobiles, machinery e. Best customer — United Kingdom (62.5 per cent) f. U.S. share of exports -- 4.6per cent g. U.S. share of imports — 25*5 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION -- 55 per cent Indian; 35 per cent mestizos; 10 per cent European
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. La Paz (capital - 200,000) b. Sucre (legal capital - 32,000) c. Cochabamba (35,574) d. Potosi (35,000) e . Oruro (40,000) f. Santa Cruz (30,000)
S.
RAILROAD MILEAGE -- 1,311
9.
BUDGET
~
75-80 per cent General Enrique Peharanda
#14,500,000
204
COLOMBIA 1.
AREA
476,916 square miles
2.
POPULATION -- 9,000,000
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports — #10.87 b. Per capita imports — #10.27 c. Principal exports (1) Coffee (2) Petroleum (3 ) Bananas d. Principal imports (1) Machinery (2) Textiles (3 ) Foodstuffs e. Best customer -- United States (66.9 per cent) f. U.S. share of imports— - 54 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION — 70 per cent mestizo; 20 per cent white; 5 per cent Indian; 5 per cent Negro
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT -- Da?. Eduardo Santos
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Bogota (capital — 331,000) b. Medillin (170,622) c. Baranguilla (152,348) d. Cali (110,579). e. Buenaventura (27,220)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
55 per cent
1,918
#51,500,000
205 COSTA RICA 1*
AREA —
23,000 square miles
2.
POPULATION -- 639,197
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports -- # 16.73 b. Per capita imports -- #20.81 c. Principal exports (1} Coffee (2) Bananas (3 ) Cacao d. Principal imports (1) Machinery (2} Textiles (3 ) Foodstuffs (4) Fuels e. Best customer -- United States .(45*6 per cent) f. U.S. share of imports — 56.8 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5-
ILLITERACY -- 20 per cent
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. San lose (capital — b. Cartago (8,353}
predominantly Spanish
Dr. Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
#5,600,000
413
65,075)
206 CUBA 1.
AREA —
44,164 square miles
2 • POPULATION —
4,300,000
3 . FOREIGN TRADE (1939)
a. Per capita exports — #34.73 b. Per capita imports — $25.BO c. Principal exports (1) Sugar (2) Tobacco a. Principal imports (1) Cereals (2) Machinery (3 } Textiles e. Best customer — United States(75*3 V er cent) f. U.S. share of imports — 74 per cent 4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5. ILLITERACY— 6 . PRESIDENT —
large negro and mulatto influence
35 per cent Colonel Fulgeneio Batista
7. PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Habana (capital — 5 80 ,000 ) b. Santiago (103,961) 8 . RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
3,030
#66,800,000
20 7 DOMINICAN, REPUBLIC 1.
AREA —
19,325 square miles
2.
POPULATION —
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports — $9*45 b. Per capita imports — $7-17 c. Principal exports (1) Sugar (2) Cacao (3 ) Coffee d. Principal imports (1) Textiles (2) Machinery (3 ) Chemicals e. Best customer — United Kingdom (36.2 per cent) f. U.S. share of exports 27*1 per cent g. U.S. share of imports — 59.2 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION — Mostly negro and mulatto; 10 per cent white; no Indian
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Ciudad Trujillo (71,297)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET -- $12,100,000
1,655,779
Extremely high Rafael Leonadis Trujillo
412
208 ECUADOR 1.
AREA «
337,392 (?)
2.
POPULATION —
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a.. Per capita exports — #4*76 b. Per capita imports -- ?4*33 c. Principal exports (1) Gacao (2) Mineral earth (3) Petroleum (4) Coffee d. Principal imports (1) Textiles (2) Wheat flour (3) Machinery e. Best customer — United States(49.1 per cent) f. U.S. share in imports — 48.7per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION — 10 per cent white; 50 per cent mestizo; 40 per cent Indian
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Guito (capital — 120,000) b. Guayaquil (138,000)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
3,000,000
80 per cent Dr. Qrroyo del Rio
7,800,000
782
209
EL SALVADOR 1.
AREA
13,173 square miles
2.
POPULATION -- 1,704*497
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports — $6 . 7 0 b. Per capita imports — $5*60 c. Principal exports (1) Coffee (2) Gold and silver (3 ) Minerals (4 ) Sugar d. Principal imports (1) Textiles (2) Machinery (3 ) Drugs e. Best customer — United States (59*9 per cent) f. U.S. share in imports — 53 per cent
4*
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5*
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7*
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. San Salvador (capital — b. Santa Ana (75,860)
Mestizo and Indian
50 per cent General Maximiliano Martinez
S.
RAILROAD MILEAGE -- 37 S
9*
BUDGET —
$£,600,000
102,500)
210 GUATEMALA 4 8 , 2 9 0 square miles
1.
AREA —
2.
POPULATION
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports #7*21 b. Per capita imports #9.24 c. Principal exports (1) Coffee (2) Bananas (3 ) Chicle d. Principal imports (1} Manufacture s (2) Textiles (3) Foods e. Best customer — United States(70.7 per cent) f. U.S. share in imports -- 54.5per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5.
ILLITERACY ~
6.
PRESIDENT ~
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Guatemala City (capital — b. Quetzaltenango (4 1 ,8 5 8 )
3,284,269
Predominantly Indian
80 per cent General Jorge Ubico
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET ~
737
#16,430,000
176,780)
211 HAITI 1.
AREA — ' 10,700 square miles
2.
POPULATION —
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports #2 . 3 2 b. Per capita imports #2.53 c. Principal exports (1) Coffee (2) Sugar (3 } Cotton (4) > Sisal (5) Bananas d. Principal imports (1) Textiles (2) Foods (3 ) Manufactures e. Best customer — United States (3 4 . 4 per cent) f. U.S. share of imports (6 2 . 3 per cent)
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT -- Elie Lescot
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Port-au-Prince (capital —
3,000,000
Predominantly negro and mulatto
Very high
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
$5,8 3 7 ,000
158
125,000)
212
HONDURAS 1.
AREA —
46,332 square miles
2*
POPULATION
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports #7*64 b. Per capita imports §9 * 8 3 c. Principal exports (1) Bananas (2) Gold and silver d. Principal imports (1 ) Manufactures e. Best customer — United States(90.7 per cent) f. U.S. share of imports — 6 5 . 2 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION -- Largely mestizo and Indian
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT -- Dr. Tiburcio Carias Andino
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Tegucigalpa (capital -- 40,000)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE -- 816
9.
BUDGET —
1,038,061
Very high
$3,200,000
213 MEXICO 1.
AREA --
2.
POPULATION -- 20,000,000
3.
FOREIGN .TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports -- $11.24 b. Per capita imports — # 6 . 6 3 c. Principal exports (1) Gold (2) Silver (3 ) Dead (43 Copper (5) Zinc (6 ) Petroleum d. Principal imports (1} Automobiles (2) Machinery (3 ) Copra (4) Rayon (5) Iron and steel e. Best customer — United States (74*2 per cent) f. Ut S. share of imports — 66 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION -- 30 per cent Indian; 60 per cent mestizo; 10 per cent white
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITES a. Mexico (capital -- 1,300,000). b. Guadalajara (200,000) c. ' Monterrey (132,577) d. Puebla (114,793)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE -- 14,220
9.
BUDGET -- $88,400,000
758,258
square miles
50-60 per cent Manuel Avila Comacho
214
Nicaragua 1.
AREA —
57 >143 square miles
2.
POPULATION —
1,380,287
3 . -FOREIGN TRADE
a.' t>. c. d.
e. f.
Per capita exports — #9*22 Per capita imports — §8.02 Principal exports (1) Gold (2) Coffee Principal imports (1) Machinery (23 Cotton products (3 ) Iron and steel products Best customer -- United States(77*5 per cent) U.S. share of imports — 6 8 . 4 per cent
4*
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
Indian and mestizo
5.
ILLITERACY — * 60 per cent
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Managua (capital —
General Anastasio Somoza
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE - -4 5 7
9*
E0DGET —
#4,050,000
118,000)
215
■PANAMA 1.
AREA —
34,169 square miles
2.
POPULATION -- 573*351
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports - #14.01 b. Per capita imports - #32.24 c. Principal exports (1) Bananas (2) Cacao &. Principal imports (1). Textiles (2) Cigarettes (3 ) Automobiles (4) Poods (5) Clothing e. Best customer — United States {43.6 per cent) f. U.S. share of imports — 6 7 . 5 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Panama City (capital b. Colon (43,199)
Conglomerate
50 per cent
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
La Guardia
98
#11,390,000
126,000)
216 PARAGUAY 1.
AREA -- 169,266 square miles
2.
POPULATION —
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports - $8.27 b. Per capita imports - $8.50 '"c. Principal exports (1) Quebracho (2) Canned meat (3 ) Yerba mate (4) Hides (5) Cotton d.. Principal imports (1) Cotton textiles (2) Tin plate . (3 ) Cattle (4) Wheat (5) Automobiles e. Best customer — Argentina f. U.S. share of exports -- 14*7 per cent g. U.S. share of imports — 9*7 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5.
ILLITERACY - - 8 0 per cent
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Asuncion (capital -- 105,000) b. Villa Rica (50,000) c. Villa Concepcion (40,000)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET -- $2,360,000
1,000,000
Mestizo
General Higinio Morfnigo
713
217 PERU 1.
AREA -«-■ 500,000 square miles
2.
POPULATION
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports — $12.48 b. Per capita imports — f> 9.48 c. Principal exports (1) Cooper (2) Cotton (3 ) Petroleum (4) Sugar (5) Gold (6 ) Wool d. Principal imports (1) Machinery, tools, vehicles (2) Metals (3 ) Poods (4 ) Drugs (5) Paints and dyes e. Best customer — United States (3 0 , 4 per cent) f . U.S. share of imports — 4 1 . 1 per cent
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION — 50 per cent Indian; 35 per cent mestizo; 15 per cent white
5*
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Lima (capital — 522,800) b. Callao (75,000) c. Arequipa (60,000)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET -- $27,900,000
6,762,881
75 per cent Dr. Manuel Prado
2,758
218 URUGUAY 1. AREA —
72,153 square miles
2. POPULATION -- 2,093,331 3 . FOREIGN TRADE (19395
a. Per capita exports — $26.34 b. Per capita imports — $20.35 c. Principal exports (1) Wool (2) Meats (3 ) Linseed (4) Hides d. Principal imports (1) Petroleum (2) Sugar (3 ) Coal and fuel oil e. Best customer — United Kingdom (18.5 f. U.S. share in exports — I 3 . 8 per cent g. U.S. share in imports — 5.2 per cent 4. RACIAL COMPOSITION — 5. ILLITERACY — 6 . PRESIDENT —
white
very low General Alfredo Baldomir
7 . PRINCIPAL CITIES
a.
Montevideo (capital —
8 . RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET —
1,436
$32,830,000
524,576)
cent)
219
VENEZUELA 1.
AREA —
352,170 square miles
2.
POPULATION -- 3,^91,159
3.
FOREIGN TRADE (1939) a. Per capita exports — b. Per capita imports — c. Principal exports (1) Petroleum (2) Coffee (3 ) Gold (4) Cacao d. Principal imports (1) Machinery (2) Foods (3 ) Textiles e. Best customer -- West f . U.S. share of exports g. U.S. share of imports
4.
RACIAL COMPOSITION —
5.
ILLITERACY —
6.
PRESIDENT —
§78.29 $30 .63
Indies (oil refining) -- 20.4 per cent — 61.1 per cent
Largely mestizo
Very high - - 9 0 per cent (?) General Isais Medina Angarita
7.
PRINCIPAL CITIES a. Caracas (capital -- 205,000) b. Maracaibo (100,010) c. Valencia (49,9°3)
8.
RAILROAD MILEAGE —
9.
BUDGET
—
539
#101,000,000
APPENDIX B ORIGIN AND DESTINATION OF PRINCIPAL LATIN-AMERICAN EXPORTS
221
PETROLEUM EXPORTS FROM LA.TIN-AMERICA — 193S Total value —
Origin
Venezuela
Per Cent 79
1317»361,000
Destination
Per Cent
United States
12 68
Peru
8
Netherlands West Indies
Colombia
6
United Kingdom
5
Mexico
5
Canada
U
Ecuador
—
France
3
Argentina
—
Germany
1
All Others
7
222 COFFEE EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERIGA ~ 193$ Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
$233,501,000
Destination
Per Cent
Brazil
57
United States
57
Colombia
21
Germany
16
Venezuela
5
France
5
Guatemala
4
The Netherlands
3
El Salvador.
4
Sweden
3
Mexico
2
United Kingdom
1
Costa Rica
2
All Others
Haiti
1
Nicaragua
1
Ecuador
—
Cuba Dominican Republic
—
Peru
—
Honduras
—
15
223
MEAT EXPORTS FROM .LATIN-AMERICA — 1938 Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
$1 2 4 ,137>000
Destination
Argentina
80
United States
Uruguay
10
United Kingdom
Per Cent 5 74
Brazil
9
Germany
5
Chile
1
Italy
3
France
3
Venezuela
—
Cuba
—
Colombia
—
*Spain All Others
.3 7
224
SUGAR EXFORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 1938 Total value -- $115,704,000
Origin
Cuba
Per Cent 86
. Destination
Per Cent
United States
72 18
Dominican Republic
7
United Kingdom
Peru
5
Chile
2
Haiti
1
France
2
Argentina
—
Germany
Brazil
—
All others
El Salvador
—
Nicaragua
—
Guatemala
—
Costa Rica
a. —
_ •
5
22$
COPPER EXPORTS FROM latin-Imerica -- 1938 Total value -- $106,659,000
Origin
Chile Peru
Per Cent .76 13
Destination
Per Cent
United States
35
United Kingdom
23
Mexico
8
Belgium
9
Cuba
3
Italy
5
France
5
Sweden
4
Bolivia
—
Germany
—
All Others
19
226
WOOL
K X P O K T f c S - FKOfvi
LATIN-AMERICA
Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
—
1938
$92,187,000
Destination
Per Cent
Argentina
52
United States
Uruguay
37
United Kingdom
23
8
Chile
6
France
11
Brazil
2
Germany
23
Peru
3
Belgium
U
Italy
3
All Others
28 .
227
COTTON EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — .1938 Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
$76,535,000
Destination
Per Cent
•Brazil
70
United States
Peru
18
Germany-
29
2
Mexico
5
United Kingdom
26
Argentina
5
Japan
17
Haiti
1
Prance
9
Italy-
K
Nicaragua
) ) Dominican Republic) ) Colombia )
1
All Others
13
228
METAL EXPORTS OTHER THAN COPPER AND TIN FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 1938 Total value —
Origin
Mexico
$73,066,000.
Per Cent
64
Destination
Per Cent
United States
42
Bolivia
9
Belgium
20
Peru
8
Germany-
12
Cuba
6
United Kingdom
10
Chile
5
France
5
Argentina
4
The Netherlands
3
Brazil
3
All Others
8
All Others
1
229
HIDE AND SKIN EXPORTS.EROM LATIN-AMERICA — 193$ Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
#62,539,000
Destination
Per Cent
Argentina
50
United States
Brazil
19
Germany
Uruguay
13
Franc e
9
• 24 25
Chile
4
United Kingdom
9
Colombia
3
Belgium
5
Cuba
3
Czechoslovakia
4
Mexico
2
Poland
3
Peru
1
All Others
Bolivia
1
All Others
4
20
230
WHEAT EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — .1936 Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
Argentina
98
Uruguay
2
#61,436,000
Destination
Per Cent
United States
—
Brazil
48
United Kingdom
13
Belgium
7
Germany
6
Peru
5
All Others
20
231
exports from LATIN-AMERICA — .1938
linseed
Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
Argentina
95
Uruguay .
5
#59,572,000
Destination
Per Cent
United States
26
The Netherlands
25
France
11
Belgium
8
Germany
5
Italy
3
Sweden
3
All Others
18
232
MAIZE EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 19 3^ Total value —
Origin
Argentina
Per Cent 95
Brazil
4
Cuba
$59>299,000
Destination
Per Cent
United States
—
United Kingdom
28
Germany
19
Dominican Republic
—
Belgium
17
Haiti
—
The Netherlands
11
Nicaragua
—
Irish Free State All Others
6
19
233
NUT, WAX, OIL, CHICLE, EXTRACT EXPORTS EROM LATIN-AMERICA — 1938 Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
$37>739,000
Destination
Per Cent
Brazil
71
United States
52
Argentina
12
United Kingdom
16
Mexico
7
Germany
7
Chile
3
France
7
Bolivia
2
Belgium —
Guatemala
2
All Others
Ecuador
1
Uruguay
1
Peru
1
All Others
—
Luxembourg
5 13
234
CEREAL EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 193^ Total value -- $32,059,000
Origin
Per Cent
Destination
Per Cent
Argentina
59
United States
—
Brazil
17
United Kingdom
20
Chile
14
The Netherlands
11
Uruguay
8
.Germany
22
Mexico
1
Belgium
15 3
El Salvador
—
Denmark
Dominican Republic
—
All Others
Honduras
—
Nicaragua
28
235
NITRATE EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — -193$ Total value —
Origin
Chile
$31,478,000
Per Cent 100
Destination
Per Cent
United States
40
Egypt
10
Germany
9
France
9
The Netherlands
4
United Kingdom
4
Italy
3
Belgium
3
All Others
17
236
BANANA EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — -1938 Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
$28,139,000
Destination
Per Cent
Colombia
IB
United States
Guatemala
17
United Kingdom
2
Honduras
15
Germany
7
Mexico
13
Argentina
4
Costa Rica
10
The Netherlands
4
Panama
10
All Others
4
Brazil
5
Cuba
5
Nicaragua
3
Ecuador
2
Haiti
2
79
237
TIN EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 1938 Total value -- $24,793,000
Origin
Per Cent
Argentina
U
Bolivia Mexico
95 1
Destination
United States United Kingdom
Per Cent
2 8U
Belgium
7
The Netherlands
5
Germany All Others
-2
238
CABINET WOOD, LUMBER, AND QUEBRACHO EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA -- 1938 Total value —
$21,705,000
Origin
Per Cent
Destination
Argentina
57
United States
23
Brazil
21
Argentina
16
Mexico
12
Germany
12
Per Cent
Chile
5
Italy
7
Nicaragua
2
Japan
4
Cuba
1
United Kingdom
3
Ecuador
1
Peru
1
Guatemala
—
Colombia
--
Paraguay
-
— —
All Others
34
239
CACAO EXPORTS FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 19 38 Total value -- $21,672,000
Origin
Per Cent
Destination
Per Cent
Brazil
57
United States
67
Venezuela
14
Germany
20
Ecuador
13
The Netherlands
4
All Others
9
Dominican Republic
9
Costa Rica
4
Panama
1
Haiti
1
Cuba
) \ Guatemala) ) Mexico )
1
240
FIBER EXPORTS (HENEQUEN, ETC.) FROM LATIN-AMERICA — 1938 Total value —
Origin
Per Cent
$9,069,000
Destination
Per Cent
Mexico
60
United States
62
Cuba
14
Germany
15
Chile
11
United Kingdom
4
Haiti
7
Belgium
2
Brazil
6
All Others
El Salvador
1
Peru
——
17
APPENDIX C PERCENTAGE SHARES OE LATIN-AMERICAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
242
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF LATIN-AMERICAN IMPORTS — 19 38
Seller
South American from —
North American, from —
Latin American from —
United States
270
60.6
34.0
United Kingdom
13*8
4.9
11.8
Germany
17.5
13.3
16.5
rFrance
3.5
3.0
3.4
Italy
3.3
1.5
3.0
Japan
2.8
2.5
2.7
243
PERCENTAGE SHARE OE LATIN-AMERICAN EXPORTS ■— 1938
Customer
South. America to —
North America to —
LatinAmerica to —
United States
20.3
67.9
31.3
United Kingdom
17.5
11.5
16.1
Germany'
11.7
5.9
10.3
France
4 .5
2.1
4.0
Italy
1.9
0.4
1.5
Japan
1.6
0.4
1.3