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Power Transitions: Strategies fo r the 21 st C entury Ronald L. Tammen Jacek Kugler Douglas Lemke Allan C. Stam III Mark Abdollahian Carole Alsharabati Brian Efird and A.F.K. Organski


BF 374340



P R E S S ,



Seven Bridges Press, LLC 135 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10010 Copyright © 2000 by Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a re­ trieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. An earlier version of chapter 6 appeared as “Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China,”by Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam. Reprinted with permission from Political Science Quarterly 113 (1998): 361-82. Publisher: Robert J. Gormley Managing Editor: Katharine Miller Cover Design: Andrea Barash Design Composition: ediType Printing and Binding: Victor Graphics, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Power transitions : strategies for the 21st century / Ronald L. Tammen ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-889119-43-1 1. United States - Foreign relations - 1989 - Forecasting. 2. World politics - 1989 - Forecasting. 3. United States - Foreign relations - 1989-. 4. United States - Foreign relations - 1945-1989. 5. World politics - 1989-. 6. World politics - 1945- I. Tammen, Ronald L., 1943E840 ,P66 2000 327.1'01 -dc21 99-50686

Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To an extraordinary man with extraordinary ideas — A.F.K. Organski

---------------------------------------- —



List of Figures






A Tribute to A.F.K. Organski


Part I Foundations 1.


Power Transition Theory for the Twenty-first Century


The Search for New Explanations The Structure of Power Transition Theory

4 6

Dynamics of Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction


Dynamics of Power Why Conflict Arises in the International System

15 21

The Management of World Politics Conclusions and Projections

33 42

Power Transition Theory Tested in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries


Evolution of the International System since 1815


Conclusions and Projections


Part II Applications 3.


Regional Applications: Multiple Hierarchies


Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics The Multiple Hierarchy Model

64 66

Regional Analyses of the Multiple Hierarchy Model


Dynamics of Regional Transitions The Diffusion of War

74 77

Conclusions and Policy Implications


Security Applications: Deterrence andProliferation The Costs of Nuclear War

82 83

The Structure of Deterrence




The Dynamics of Deterrence Nuclear Proliferation and the Likelihood of War The Case of Ballistic Missile Defense Conclusions and Policy Implications


94 97 103 104

Economic Applications: Growth, Trade, and Democracy


The Politics of Security and Economics The Status Quo and International Political Economy Power Transition and Economic Policies Economic Growth and Regime Change Integration Economic Consequences of War Conclusions and Policy Implications

107 109 113 122 125 128 130

Part III Policy Challenges 6.

The Realignment Challenge: The Expansion of NATO Power Transitions and the Expansion of NATO Russia's Options Managing Russian Entry into NATO Managing the Chinese Reaction Conclusions: The Future of NATO


The Asian Challenge Managing Power: The Primacy of China The Dynamics of China's Power Transition Managing the Transition Strategy 1: Engineering Satisfaction with "Realignment" Strategy 2: Controlling Territorial Flashpoints Strategy 3: Reengineering Power Distributions Managing Power: The Emergence of India Conclusions: China, India, and the United States

8 . The World to Come The State of the World The Next International Period

135 135 136 140 146 150 153 153 156 157 158 167 175 176 179 182 182 189

N otes






About the Authors


List of Figures



Classic Power Pyramid FIGURE 1.2


Hierarchies in the International System FIGURE 1.3


Distribution of Satisfaction FIGURE 1.4




Regional Hierarchies in the International System


Probability of Regional Wars


Relative Power of North and South Vietnam, 1955-75


Relative Power of Iran and Iraq, 1962-95


Nuclear War Population Losses for Great Powers


The Structure o f Deterrence


Classical Deterrence and the Probability of Nuclear War





A Transition with a Low Probability of War FIGURE 1.11


A Transition with a Very High Probability of War FIGURE 1.12


Relative Power, and Satisfaction, and the Probability of War FIGURE 1.13


The Timing of War FIGURE 1.14

FIGURE 4.4 29

The Severity of War FIGURE 1.15

The Duration of War



A Transition with a High Probability of War FIGURE 1.10


Superpower Status Quo Evaluation, 1941-2000

The Endogenous Growth Trajectory FIGURE 1.9



Alliance Formation, Status Quo, and the Probability of War FIGURE 1.8


Great Power Competition, 1815-1900 52



Superpower Competition, 1950-2000

Alliances and Joint Status Quo Evaluations FIGURE 1.7


German-U.K. Status Q uo Evaluation, 1870-2000

War Occurrences and Joint Status Quo Evaluations FIGURE 1.6


The German Challenge, 1900-1950

Degree of Cooperation and Joint Status Quo Evaluations FIGURE 1.5


Great Power Shifts, 1815-2000











Power Transition and the Probability of Nuclear War FIGURE 4.5

The Dynamics of Deterrence






Shifts in Nuclear Capabilities, 1990-2000 FIGURE 4.7


Classical Deterrence, Proliferation, and Nuclear War FIGURE 4.8




The Global Hierarchy in the Cold War Period


The Global Hierarchy in the Post-Cold War Period





Economic versus Security Concerns FIGURE 5.3

The Dynamics of Trade and Monetary Policies FIGURE 5.4







Current World GDP Shares FIGURE 8.7


Mid-Century World GDP Shares 129

The Consequences of War: The Phoenix Factor The Global Hierarchy: A Chinese Perspective


Current World Population Shares FIGURE 8.6


The Dynamics of Labor Mobility and Technology Transfers FIGURE 5.5


The Global Hierarchy in the World Wars Period

Maximizing Cooperative and Competitive Dyadic Relations


Evolution of the Global Hierarchy


Power Transition, Proliferation, and Nuclear War FIGURE 5.1


U.S. and PRC Power Shifts, 1980-2040



Alternative A: The Global Hierarchy under a U.S.-led Superbloc 154


Alternative B: The Global Hierarchy under China


Preface The purpose of this book is to help bridge the gap between the academic and policy communities in world politics. We recognize the magnitude of that task and the modest role we hope to play in the process. We also understand that this may be an exercise that will not be welcomed by some authorities on both sides. There may be those in the academic commu­ nity who would have preferred that we had devoted this entire volume to the purpose of the first chapter — codifying and unifying Power Transition theory by integrating its various strands and themes and by adding the con­ clusions of formal proofs. And there may be those in the policy community who will find the introduction of theoretical terms and tests to be less than useful in an operational setting. In a sense, it is this membrane of ignorance that keeps us apart, diluting the rich intellectual promise of the former and handicapping the strategic thinking of the latter. Despite these anticipated obstacles, we designed this book with both constituencies in mind. The importance of the practical applications of the theory motivates us to speak to the policy community. The importance of the academic implications of a unified theory motivates us to extend and rectify the various strands of Power Transition research. We ask policy­ makers to be patient with the theoretical chapters and theoreticians to be pStient with the policy chapters. Scholars will find many of their questions addressed in the more detailed endnotes. Policymakers looking for a set of tools to address critical problems of the twenty-first century may safely pass over many of these academic references without losing the thrust of our argument. The arguments presented herein are a coherent compilation and ex­ tension of the academic tradition of Power Transition theory. The authors represent three intellectual generations of that theory, including A.F.K. Organski, who invented the theory in 1958; Jacek Kugler, who collabo­ rated with Organski in an empirical evaluation of the theory; and Douglas Lemke, who extended it beyond merely great power interactions. Ronald L. Tammen and Allan Stam, also in the Organski lineage, have published articles that apply Power Transition concepts in policy settings. Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, and Brian Efird have added formal tests and theoretical extensions to the theory. This book represents the latest, and in some ways the most aggressive, step in a continuing forty-year research project. Those years have produced a theory unusual among academic products



in that it offers clear and relevant implications for policymakers concerned with the management of international politics. This is a propitious moment for this theory to be extended into policy terms. The theory has now pro­ gressed far enough to offer refined policy advice. And there is a demand for new ideas to guide foreign policies at the start of the new century. This book explains how the international system is organized. It dis­ cusses when, how, and why wars occur at the great power and regional power levels. It provides guidance for policymakers about managing the international system to avoid war. It offers a general theory of international politics that ties together both economic and security considerations. It also provides a guide to understanding peace as a product of economic and political integration. Our ideas are first presented theoretically. The theory subsequently be­ comes a framework for the applications, but only after being subjected to empirical validation by testing against the historical record. Following this foundation, current policy implications are discussed and analyzed. Future extensions are elaborated as a guide to systematic long-term policy devel­ opment. The final chapter offers a theoretically informed walk into the future. The policy chapters address the fundamental challenges of the inter­ national system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, regional conflicts have been elevated in importance. We deal with these issues directly in chapter 3. Despite the ascendancy of regional issues, nuclear weapons and strategy re­ tain a position of national importance. Therefore, nuclear deterrence and proliferation are discussed in chapter 4. With the downgrading of major power conflict propensity, the focus of major power relations also has shifted to economic interactions. In this arena there are two trends, one toward integration and consolidation and a second involving sanctions and trade wars. Chapter 5 discusses these issues in detail. Having looked at current regional, nuclear, and economic issues, we move to the challenges faced by decision makers looking forward in time. Chapters 6 through 8 formulate specific policy recommendations for the future relations of the great powers of the twenty-first century: the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, and India. In the policy chapters we focus first on how NATO expansion, perhaps to include Russia, could affect worldwide power distributions. In the early decades of this century, the British failed to construct a coalition to preserve stability and peace in the face of the German-led challenge to the inter­ national order. The United States has the opportunity to avoid the mistakes of the 1930s by structuring a more successful coalition. The United States can also maintain peace and stability by successfully managing the future transitions with China and India. The coalition option is discussed in chap­ ter 6, the Chinese and Indian power transitions are discussed in chapter 7, and the shape of the next international hierarchy is projected in chapter 8.



The concept of this book was born in a typhoon in Tokyo, where Organski, Kugler, and Tammen found themselves isolated by the forces of nature. Released from the tyranny of their schedules, they outlined the organization of this volume with the purpose of translating Power Tran­ sition from its theoretical base to policy prescriptions. We hope this is just the first step in this evolution. Being individuals, not to mention aca­ demics, we may disagree on some nuances or colorings in this volume, but we share a common dedication to the Power Transition tradition and to the proposition that, where possible, academic research should be utilized in the policy world. To do less is to waste a significant resource and to place the United States at a competitive disadvantage in the international marketplace of ideas.


This is a jointly authored book, an undertaking designed to demonstrate the broad appeal of Power Transition theory. All authors contributed to each chapter, an exercise that proved intellectually stimulating and re­ markably collegial. For organizational purposes, some individuals assumed leadership for particular chapters as follows: chapter 1, Kugler, Lemke, and Tammen; chapter 2, Abdollahian; chapter 3, Lemke; chapter 4, Alsharabati and Kugler; chapter 5, Efird and Kugler; chapter 6, Stam (an earlier version of this chapter was coauthored with Bruce Russett); chapter 7, Tammen; and chapter 8, Kugler, Lemke, and Tammen. Kenneth Organski, of course, lives on in every page. The Earhart Foundation, led by Secretary and Director of Program Antony T. Sullivan, was generous in providing funding for our research, including two conferences, one at the National War College (NWC), the other at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS). We thank Provost Steve Baker and Dean Phil Morgan of MIIS and Dean David Tretler of NWC for hosting us at their institutions and for providing sabbatical support to Ron Tammen, which facilitated the organization of this ef­ fort. The National Defense University Foundation administered the Earhart Foundation grant. We enjoyed the strong support and exceptional service provided by James V. Dugar and Tom Gallagher, the president and execu­ tive director, respectively, of that Foundation. Bob Gormley, the publisher of Chatham House, has become a friend and key adviser in this project. The importance of his firm commitment to our goal of reaching both the aca­ demic and policy communities cannot be overstated. Katharine Miller has added immeasurably to the quality of this book. We thank her not only for her editorial skills but for her patience in dealing with multiple authors. We also wish to thank Sarah Mikels, Library Director, and Jeannemarie Faison, Reference Librarian, at the National Defense University. Their expertise and assistance proved invaluable. A number of individuals reviewed portions or all of our drafts and provided important insights and welcome criticisms. With apologies to any­ one we may have accidentally omitted, we specifically wish to thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Glenn Palmer, Yi Feng, Paul Zak, Marina Arbetman, Thomas Willett, Woosang Kim, Frank Zagare, Charles Doran, Randy Siverson, Sherry Bennett, Jim Rosenau, George Graham, Richard Rosecrance, Siddharth Swaminathan, Michelle Benson, and Kenneth Osterkamp. A spe-



cial appreciation to Bruce Russett, with whom Allan Stam collaborated for chapter 6. All of our spouses deserve special commendation for tolerating us during the often inconvenient process of writing this book. We therefore gratefully acknowledge Cheryl Kugler, Jill Lemke, B.B. Stam, Danny Alsharabati, and, in particular, Susan Tammen, who not only graciously invited an army of us to occupy her home on several occasions but also was influential in the selection of our book title. Patricia Organski sup­ ported us every step of the way, even through the most difficult of times. Patricia, you are always in our hearts. As one of our authors is an employee of the U.S. government, we must state that nothing contained in this volume should be construed as repre­ senting the views of the Department of Defense or the executive branch more generally. That said, clearly we believe that one day this volume should represent those views.

A Tribute to A.F.K. Organski

This work was inspired by the brilliant theoretical contributions of A.F.K. Organski, who died on 6 March 1998, while this project was in progress. In addition to his profound intellect and originality, Kenneth Organski will be remembered for his zest for life, love of language, and gift for friend­ ship. The magnetic force that surrounded him inexorably drew students and colleagues into his vortex. He was a devoted husband, father, and grandfather who will be missed beyond measure by his family, colleagues, and generations of devoted students. Kenneth was an academic’ s academic who made major contributions to the study of world politics. At a time when it was considered heresy, he challenged the realism school of Hans Morgenthau by detailing its in­ consistencies. Later, he pioneered the use of empirical evidence to test propositions when other scholars relied on instinct or authority. With an uncanny ability to identify and restructure central issues in the field, Kenneth was a galvanizing figure of his generation. His impact on the profession has many measures but perhaps the most important is that he inspired generations of students to advance the frontiers of knowledge. AFKO did not believe in sterile academic accomplishments. If possible, he urged, research should be put to use for the benefit of mankind. Thus he strongly supported the transfer of academic research into the policy world. This extraordinary political scientist, practitioner, and educator was born in Rome in 1923, where he attended the Ginnasio Liceo Torquato Tasso. He came to the United States fleeing the anti-Jewish laws of the Mussolini regime. He served with the American armed forces in the Pacific theater from 1943 to 1945. (Later in his life, when lecturing before senior military officials, Kenneth would gleefully recount that as a private he had hated officers and that he now took great pleasure telling them what to do!) After World War II, he settled in New York, where he became an American citizen in 1944 and earned his B.A. (1947), M.A. (1948), and Ph.D. (1951) degrees from New York University. In 1952 he started teaching at Brook­ lyn College, moving in 1964 to the University of Michigan, where most recently he was professor of political science and senior research scientist in the Institute for Social Research. In addition to his long and extraordi­ nary teaching and research career, he was also chairman of the board of Decision Insights, a consulting firm. He cofounded this company in order



to introduce scientific rigor to the execution of policy and decision making in government and business. A.F.K. Organski will long be remembered for a series of extraordi­ nary intellectual contributions. His influential ideas on power hierarchies in world politics were introduced in World Politics and extended in The War Ledger, coauthored with Jacek Kugler. His powerful insights on national development were set forth in Population and World Power, coauthored with Katherine Davis Fox, advanced in Stages o f Political Development, and documented in Birth, Death and Taxes, .which was written with several of his students. In The $36 Billion Bargain, Kenneth outlined the prospects and possibilities for peace in the Middle East. In these works and countless articles and presentations, he advanced new ideas about the future of world politics and applied these notions to real problems. He was the rare inno­ vative academic who involved and inspired others to further elaborate his insights and to apply these new angles of vision to resolve problems. His willingness to take risks in the pursuit of knowledge was a distinguishing characteristic of his career. Organski’ s honors included the Distinguished Faculty Achievement Award from the University of Michigan, the lifetime achievement award from the Conflict Processes Section of the American Political Science Association, and the Cavalieri de la Republica from the government of Italy. Above all, Kenneth Organski was a superb educator. His lectures at the University of Michigan were, without exaggeration, legendary. He would light up a room with his intellectual force and with the passion and humor of his charismatic personality. Some will remember him telling students: “math, math, math”and “write, write, write.”Others will re­ member his authoritative voice and presentation style and his ability to focus intently on each individual as if no one else mattered. Through his writings and through his students, Kenneth Organski achieved immortality. He counted among his students many who became prominent authorities in the profession, including Aaron Wildavsky, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Jacek Kugler, Youssef Cohen, Allan Lamborn, Allan Stam, Glenn Palmer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. In turn they taught and inspired others, including Douglas Lemke, Marina Arbetman, Suzanne Werner, Frank Zagare, James Morrow, David Lalman, Woosang Kim, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Vesna Danilovic, Brian Efird, and Ben Hunt — all dedicated to extending our knowledge of development and war and peace, and all keepers of the Organski flame. Other students chose to hone their tal­ ents in the policy world, including Ronald L. Tammen, Arthur House, Robert Hormats, and Ajaj Jarrouj. There they applied Organski insights on Capitol Hill, in the executive branch, and in the business and financial communities. In Kenneth’ s memory, we have constructed an “Organski Tree”at the Internet site Powertransitions.com. This genealogy depicts the successive



generations of Organski students who have continued to advance his Power Transition theory. The tree is a first and very limited effort to visually cat­ alog the “Organski Effect.”We invite all who have been associated with Kenneth’ s Power Transition work to contact Ron Tammen at that site so that we can add names to this lineage. This book represents our — his students’— immeasurable debt of gratitude. Thank you, Kenneth.

Part I





Power Transition Theory for the Twenty-first Century Never before has there been such utter confusion in the public mind with respect to U.S. foreign policy. The President doesn ’ t understand it; Congress doesn ’ t understand it; nor does the public, nor does the press. They all wander around in a labyrinth o f ignorance and error and conjecture, in which truth is intermingled with fiction at a hundred points, in which unjustified assumptions have attained the validity o f premises, and in which there is no recognized and authoritative theory to hold on to. — G e o r g e F. K e n n a n The United States is engaged in a quiet war. It is the intellectual war be­ tween those who favor the expansion of American influence abroad and those who reject involvement in distant lands with strange names for pur­ poses having little apparent linkage to their daily lives. It is a war that goes far beyond the old descriptions of “internationalist”and “isolation­ ist”or the more modern terms of “engagement”and “retrenchment.”It is a war fought with words, ideas, public opinion, and legislation as each side attempts to mobilize its resources within the interested public. Often oper­ ating as the subtext of national debates, this battle for primacy represents the single most important decision the United States faces today. Funda­ mentally, it is a struggle over no less than the defining role of the United States in the third millennium. Will the United States retrench, withdraw, retreat into the perceived security of noninvolvement, or will it recognize the impending power shifts and make the policy choices necessary to meet these new conditions? It is a decision critical not only to the economic well-being and security of the United States, but to that of the international system it informally leads. It is a question central to this book. Intellectually the United States is ill prepared for this challenge. From 1945 to 1990, American elites and the informed public were unified in their worldview. The single exception was the Vietnam War in its later stages. The United States was unified because of a common, documented threat. To meet that threat, American policy intellectuals, political leaders, and military officials fashioned a series of strategies with the common goal of



defending the United States from the ideological and military challenges of communism as represented by the USSR. The single-mindedness of this ef­ fort, its narrow but necessary perspective, masked emerging trends in world power that will have a profound impact on the international system in this twenty-first century. From the mid-1900s on, American strategists forged consensus based on perceptions of the threat. Then the dissolution of the Soviet Union undercut the intellectual and public support for the U.S. role in the world. In a phrase, it changed everything. The nature of the threat, the so-called bipolar world, the East-West blocs, all melted into history. In the aftermath, it is as if an intellectual void has been created, filled ad hoc by the threat of the day or the sum of all new threats. What has been missing is the theo­ retical and practical foundation upon which policy can be established. The purpose of this book is to offer a new perspective of the world based on a coherent and validated theory that bridges the theoretical-policy gap. This book deals with the fundamental shifts in world power — power transitions — that have been submerged by the U.S.-USSR competition. It provides a theory, a worldview that not only explains the rise of the United States as the dominant power but also projects that role into this century. Laying out the future challenges to American leadership, it offers not only an intellectual foundation for anticipating these events but suggests spe­ cific management tools that could be utilized to ensure a peaceful evolution among the great powers. This is a book about theory in policy terms and policy in theoretical terms. It unifies Power Transition theory and applies it to the central ques­ tions of the next decades. How should the United States attempt to manage world politics, particularly the challenge of China? H ow will critical al­ liances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) evolve in the future? What is the nature and scope of regional instability? How can regional conflicts be managed? How will nuclear proliferation affect the stability of deterrence? What are the global economic effects of integration, trade, and growth? How will economic patterns influence international power relationships? This book offers a bridge whereon practitioners and theorists may meet to evaluate these issues and walk together into the new century.

The Search for New Explanations The economic collapse and political dissolution of the Soviet Union has left policymakers and scholars searching for new fundamental truths about the nature of the international system. For many, the Cold War era was the supreme threat to international peace and security, but in hindsight, it was also intellectually comfortable. The nature of the threat was known. It was a powerful mobilizing tool for government, business, and society.



The loss of that threat has created conditions, for the first time in more than fifty years, favorable to an open, unconstrained assessment of how the international system operates without first being viewed through the prism of the Cold War. The absence of a monolithic threat has forced policymakers to search for explanations that fit the new international circumstances without vio­ lating old, cherished concepts. The U.S. foreign policy community has gone through a difficult and wrenching exercise in the past ten years. The De­ partment of Defense has identified a new set of transnational threats — including international crime, drugs, terrorism, biological and chemical weapons, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems — that, in many ways, are less powerful for mobilizing political support, yet more complex and challenging than the brute force specter of Soviet aggres­ sion. Similarly, U.S. foreign policy has undergone a systematic realignment, substituting an economic focus for the political and military imperative of meeting communist challenges in the developing world. The sense of uncertainty about the look of the new world stems not just from the radical changes it has undergone, but equally from the real­ ization that the old theories did not predict and cannot explain why this dramatic transformation occurred.1 Why is it that the world seems safer without two great superpowers balancing each other — the mutual deter­ rence that secured global peace? Was our notion of peace and balance of power misplaced? If so, that misjudgment may well represent the single most important intellectual and policy failure of the post-World War II era. This chapter is designed to accomplish two goals. First, it offers the reader a composite picture of Power Transition theory by integrating the various extensions and amplifications into a coherent whole.2 It brings to­ gether that new research and weaves it into the rich text of the underlying theory.0By providing a systematic outline of the hierarchical relationship among power, satisfaction, and the choice of peace and conflict, Power Transition theory offers a foundation for exploring international politics. Second, this chapter translates Power Transition theory into policy­ relevant terms. Despite extensive empirical validation, the theory has been inaccessible to the policy community, in part because of its specialized use of language and in part because of its academic focus. For the policyoriented reader, therefore, we keep the theoretical arguments cogent and readable. For the academic specialist, we provide detailed citations and discuss various nuances, colorings, and controversies in the endnotes. The heart of this chapter is devoted to the three components of Power Transition theory: structure, dynamics, and policy. The structural aspect of the theory is explored first since it provides an understanding of the nature of power, power relationships among nations, and the characteristics of the international system linking nations. With the international structure in place, the theory then accounts for the most important dynamics in the



system.(Of all theories at the international level, Power Transition has the most tightly integrated and internally consistent explanation for why, how, and when wars occur. In addition, it provides evidence about the costs, intensity, duration, and consequences of waiy Having described the international system and how it deals with con­ flict, this chapter continues by exploring how the theory addresses the major policy issues facing the world. With the structural and dynamic com ­ ponents in place, the theory is in position to deal with the management of alliances and international organizations, coalition building, political economy concerns, and threats to international order — such as nuclear proliferation and local wars. Finally, the chapter ends with a look beyond the present, based upon the Power Transition view of our future.

The Structure of Power Transition Theory (Tn a theoretical sense, Power Transition defies traditional typecasting. It is neither realist nor idealist, though some scholars have placed it in the for­ mer category.3 We prefer to call it rationalist)That is, it is structural, yet dynamic, since it recognizes that policy interests are at the core of all dis­ putes. Subject to empirical testing, it meshes well with objective conclusions flowing from history. Thus, it marries empirical evidence with traditional scholarly research and sound policy advice. It is a theory that lends itself to a blend of the empirical and policy worlds.

Hierarchies Power Transition theory describes a hierarchical system. All nations recog­ nize the presence of this hierarchy and the relative distribution of power therein. The distribution of power is uneven and is concentrated in the hands of a few. A dominant nation sits at the top of this system (see fig­ ure 1.1). That nation controls the largest proportion of resources within the system. Yet this nation, despite our description as dominant, is not a hegemon. It cannot single-handedly control the actions of other power­ ful nations. It maintains its position as dominant power by ensuring power preponderance over potential rivals and by managing the inter­ national system under rules that benefit its allies and satisfy their nationalaspirations. As we can see in figure 1.1, the category of great powers resides below the dominant nation, each having a significant proportion of the power of the leader. Currently the great powers are China, Japan, Germany or the European Union (EU) in toto, and Russia (assuming recovery). Their role, in most circumstances, is to share in the allocation of resources and to help maintain the international system. Among great powers one occasionally finds nations, such as China or India, that are not fully integrated into the



Dominant Power

dominant power’ s regime. On occasion a potential challenger arises out of this pool. Challengers are defined as those with 80 percent or more of the dominant country’ s power. Today, only China represents a potential chal­ lenger to the United States, and then only if it remains dissatisfied with its international role. In the distant future India could also play this role. Dissatisfied challengers and their supporters are the initiators of war. Beneath the great powers are the middle powers, substantive states of the size of France, Italy, or Brazil, with resources that cannot be dis­ missed but with insufficient power to challenge the dominant power for international control. The largest number of nations resides farther down the pyramid: small powers with few resources relative to the middle and great powers. They pose no threat to the dominant nation’ s leadership of the international system. New research has shown that hierarchies also exist at regional levels.4 Within each region, such as South America or the Middle East, there are regional hierarchies, with their own sets of dominant powers, great powers, and lesser powers. These regional hierarchies are influenced by the global hierarchical system but cannot, in turn, control that larger system. Figure 1.2 (p. 8) suggests the relative power distributions in the global system and in a few regional systems. Note that the distribution of power clearly makes the regional hi­ erarchies subordinate to the global hierarchy. These regional hierarchies function in the same manner and operate under the same power rules as the global hierarchy. In all cases, the dominant power in the regional hier-



archy is subordinate to the influences of the global dominant power and the great power structure. Relative power establishes the relationships within regional hierarchies and determines the spheres of influence that link the global and regional hierarchies. Power Transition anticipates that wars will 7 diffuse downward from the global to the regional hierarchies but will not diffuse upwardlxom regional to global. For this reason, World Wars I and II, which were major conflicts for the great powers of the international system, diffused to include almost every regional hierarchy. Limited wars involving the major global powers, such as the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, remained confined to their regions, despite fears to the contrary.

Power Defining power is central to the theory of Power Transition as relative power establishes the precondition for war and peace in the international system.(Power is (defined as the ability to impose on or persuade an oppo­ nent to comply with demands.) In the lexicon of Power Transition theory, power is a combination of three elements:^he number of people who can work and fight^heir economic productivity,/f^nd the effectiveness of the political system in extracting and pooling individual contributions to ad­ vance national goals. How much “power”these capabilities endow a state



with generates the ability to project influence beyond its borders. Popula­ tion is an essential component but cannot alone confer international power, as can be seen by the relative weakness of Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Brazil. In order to be truly powerful the population also must be productive. For this reason developed countries have far more influence than their develop­ ing counterparts. That is why the United States dominates China today. But those advantages cannot be realized without political capacity, de­ fined as the ability of governments to extract resources to advance national goals. Politically capable governments garner relatively more resources and thereby expand national power. For this reason North Vietnam defeated the more populous and affluent South Vietnam in spite of the United States’ massive help to the South.

Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction The_jnotivation driving decisions for war and peace is relative satisfaction with the rules of the global or regional hierarchy. While parity defines the structural conditions where war is most likely, conflicts are generated by the desire of a nation to improve its political position in the hierarchy. Dissatis­ fied nations challenge the status quo. Conflict does not occur frequently at the great power level because most of these nations are relatively satisfied and support the existing rules of the international system. Instead, these status quo nations seek cooperative solutions to problems that enhance~fheir economic and security gains. Nations at the top of the hierarchy (figure 1.3, p. 10) set the rules in place and are more likely to be more satisfied with those rules than those lower in the global hierarchy. This should not come as a surprise since the great powers control most of the wealth, enjoy most of the prosperity, and wield most of the power in the international system. By definition, the dom­ inant power is satisfied, and specifically so in the absence of open conflict challenging its dominance. The dominant nation is the defender of the sta­ tus quo. After all, it creates and maintains the global or regional hierarchy from which it accrues substantial benefits.6 The few dissatisfied nations at the top and many at the bottom of the hierarchy view the international system as not conferring benefits equal to their expectations and long-term interests. They consider the international system to be unfair, corrupt, biased, skewed, and dominated by hostile forces. Their rationale or grievance may be historical (Germany prior to World Wars I and II), ideological (Soviet Union), religious (Iran), territorial (Israel), personal (Libya and Iraq), or cultural (China). Despite different perspectives, dissatisfied nations all view the global status quo as unfavor­ able. They are dissatisfied with established international leadership, its rules and norms, and wish to change them. The largest proportion of dissatisfied nations likely resides in the small power category, nations with minimal



Dominant Power

Dissatisfied Satisfied

Figure 1.3 Distribution of Satisfaction influence in the international system who often consider themselves the victims of more powerful neighbors. Occasionally a great power — like Germany or the Soviet Union — is dissatisfied with its role and status in the international system. If it is growing at a fast rate and extracting re­ sources for use at the national level, that nation may become a challenger to the dominant nation.

Dynamics of Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction The horizontal axis of figure 1.4 illustrates the relationship between the sat­ isfaction or dissatisfaction of two countries with either a global or regional status quo. The vertical axis describes the type of relationship, by degree of cooperation, within the same dyad of nations. Jointly satisfied nations interact cooperatively. Examples are long-term security communities, such as NATO with the United States and any number of European actors and economic integration, as is occurring within the European Union. Deteri­ oration in the degree of cooperation implies that one of the states may be becoming dissatisfied. Thus, the dyadic relationship is becoming more competitive. The second column illustrates the relationship within a satisfieddissatisfied dyad. Nations cooperate under these conditions when the satisfied power anticipates that the other is becoming satisfied. This is a transitional stage that should be temporary at best. The most prevalent relationship is confrontational competition. Given parity within this col-






Joint Status Quo Evaluation Satisfied-Satisfied


Security communities Economic integration



Confrontational Competition


Collusive partnership

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Index aerospace projects, 144-45 Afghanistan great powers intervention in, 69, 117 non-nuclear, 102 regional wars, 8, 78 Africa, regional wars, 43, 68, 71, 73 aid. See foreign aid Albright, Madeleine, 145 alliances economic, 38-39 managing, 33-34, 175-76 types of, 13-15 See a lso u n d er specific alliance; specific country Allied Signal, 145 anarchy, 88-89 antiballistic missile systems, 103-4 APEC. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) Arab-Israeli conflict, 68, 129-30 Argentina, non-nuclear, 99 arms control Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 178 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 178 strategic arms limitation treaty (START), 137 Strategic Defense Initiative, 90, 103-4 United States, 82-83, 93 See a lso nuclear deterrence; nuclear proliferation; nuclear weapons; security arms sales, Russia-Chinese, 138 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), 127, 176 Asian authoritarianism, 146, 147 Atacama Desert, 68, 80 Austria-Hungary, 46, 48, 53, 78 balance of power theory, 32 balance of terror, 86, 87, 101 Balkans, 78 ballistic missile defense, 103-4 bandwagoning, 137, 149-50 Battle of Britain, 77 Belarus, non-nuclear, 98, 102 Berlin Crisis, 93 Boeing, 145 Bolivia, 68, 80 Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 53 borders. See territorial disputes Brazil non-nuclear, 99 as a regional hierarchy, 64-65

Bretton Woods Agreement, 117-18 Brosio, Manlio, 143 Burundi, 68 business sector, 108 displaced by military sector, 163-64 importance of, 162-63, 183 See a lso economic growth Canada, 108, 109, 126 Carter, Jimmy, 117 Chaco War, 71, 80 challengers, 182-83 defined,7 regional, 71-74 Chile, 68, 80 China alliance with Russia, 135, 136, 137-39 bombing of Belgrade embassy, 172 as challenger, 7, 153 decentralization, 164-65, 172 as dominant power, 193 economic growth, 47-48, 140, 154-56, 157, 159-62 emergence of, 157-58 free market system, 157, 158-59, 166-67 as great power, 6, 42 human rights, 165-66 ideology, 146-47 Japanese invasion of, 52, 77 military, 148-49, 160-61 nuclear weapons, 89, 138, 140 overtaking of United States, 42-43, 59-60, 92, 154-55, 193 parity, 139-40 People’ s Armed Police, 161 People’ s Liberation Army (PLA), 160—61, 171, 172 political system, 155-57 reaction to NATO expansion, 146-50, 177 relations with India, 177-78 rural-to-city migration, 161-62 sanctions on, 117 satisfaction of, 158, 179, 184 and Taiwan, 37, 167-75, 180 technology transfer, 121, 122 trade policies, 116, 159-60 and World Trade Organization (WTO), 127, 149, 165 Civil War, 49 classical nuclear deterrence. See nuclear deterrence, classical perspective Cold War, conditions for, 12



Cold War era, 4-5, 47 business interests, 162-63 dynamics of, 55-57 end of, 188 global hierarchies, 188 mutual assured destruction, 32, 89 security interactions, 111-12 trade relations, 114 collusive partnerships, 11 communism, threat of, 4 competition, confrontational, 10 competitive strategy, 107-8 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 178 cone of war, 86, 87, 90, 91 confrontational competition, 10 cooperation, degree of, 10-13, 109, 110, 123 cooperative monetary policy, 117 cooperative strategy economic relations and, 107-8, 109 security relations and, 110, 112 toward trade, 114-15 See a lso cooperation, degree of; noncooperative strategy Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), 127 crises advance warnings of, 41-42 managing local, 40-41 Cuba, sanctions on, 117 Cuban Missile Crisis, 32, 54, 99 currency devaluation, 118-19 European, 112, 119, 125-26 exchanges, 117-18 decentralization, Chinese, 164-65, 172 democratic peace, 124, 125 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 68 democratization, 184-85 China and, 166-67 economic development and, 123-24 of NATO members, 152 deterrence. See nuclear deterrence diplomacy, 96 dissatisfaction and China’ s overtakings, 193 and German overtakings, 51-52 India’ s, 124, 178 noncooperative strategy and, 109 regional hierarchies, 71-72, 79 See a lso satisfaction-dissatisfaction dyads dollar-gold equivalence standard, 118 domestic regimes, 123-24, 186 dominant powers, 6-8, 27-28, 182 regional, 71-74 satisfaction of, 9

East Asia, regional wars, 71, 73 Eastern Europe, 54 EU integration and, 183 Iron Curtain, 12 NATO and, 59-60, 183 economic alliances, 38-39 economic communities integration into, 125-27, 130 purpose of, 36 economic growth, 189-90 democracy and, 123-24 of great powers overview of, 45-48 19th century, 48-51 20th century (1900-1949), 51-54 20th century (1950-95), 54-58 power and, 15, 16-18 for status quo members, 122-23 See a lso u n der specific country economic incentives, 176 economic policies monetary, 117-19 sanctions, 116-17 trade, 113-16 economic relationships, 38-39, 107-8, 109,


economic sector, importance of, 162-63, 183 economics, security and, 107, 108, 110-12 economy, effect of war on, 128-29 Egypt, 80, 130 endogenous growth theory, 16-17, 20, 184, 190 Ethiopia-Somalia war, 71 ethnic regional differences, 68 euro, 112, 119, 126 Europe, as great power, 42 European currency, 125-26 See a lso euro European unification, U.S. support of, 175, 183 European Union (EU), 125-26, 127 creation of, 47, 57, 59 currency, 112, 119, 126 as great power, 6 security/economic interactions, 112 exchange-rate system, 117-18 Falkland-Malvinas War, 13 foreign aid, 113, 116 foreign policy management of, 41-42 reduction of dissatisfaction, 106 regional hierarchies and, 79-81 shared goals, 15, 23 U.S. priorities, 163 France nuclear weapons, 89, 99 overtakings of, 46, 48, 50-51


Quintuple Alliance, 142 in Vietnam, 74 WWI consequences, 53 Franco-Prussian War, 29, 51 free market system, Chinese, 157, 158-59, 166-67 Fukuyama, Francis, 150 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 115, 126, 176 Germany, 113 as challenger, 44, 48, 128 as great power, 6 invasion of Russia (1941), 13 overtakings of, 45, 51-52, 54, 77 United, 142 WWI/WWII consequences, 47, 53-54, 129 global hierarchies, 182, 185-86 evolution of, 186-88 future, 186, 189-93 regional compared with, 65 See a lso great powers; hierarchies; regional hierarchies global status quo, 182 globalization, 38-39 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 137 G r a f Spee, 77 Great Depression, 47 great powers, 6-7 and diffusion of war, 77-78 historical considerations, 44-48 interaction with minor powers, 69-71 See a lso dominant powers Greece, relations with Turkey, 143 Gulf War, 76, 89, 98 Hapsburg Empire, dissolution of, 53 hierarchies, 6-8, 182 future, 186, 189-93 See a lso global hierarchies; multiple hierarchy model; regional hierarchies Hong Kong, 169 human rights, China and, 165-66 Hungarian Revolution, 93 ideological regional differences, 39, 68-69 India emergence of, 176-79 Indo-U.S. alliance, 181 integration of, 127, 175-76 lack o f sustained growth, 124 nuclear weapons, 26, 89, 98, 178 overtaking U.S. or China, 42-43, 193 population growth, 176 as potential great power, 6-7, 42, 180 regional conflicts, 68, 71, 80-81 as a regional hierarchy, 64-65 relations with China, 177-78


sanctions on, 117 and U.S.-led superbloc, 191 India-Pakistan wars, 71 information technology, 39 integration economic and political, 125-27, 130 European, 175, 183 international commercial rules, 165-66 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 40, 115 international system Asia as center of, 193 current great powers, 42 evolution of, 44, 186-88 Iran, 75-76, 93, 98 Iran-Iraq War, 71, 76 Iranian Revolution (1978), 75 Iraq, 75-76, 89 nuclear weapons, 89, 93, 98 sanctions on, 117 Ireland, economic growth, 126 Iron Curtain, 12 Israel, 68, 80 nuclear weapons, 89, 92, 97, 99 West Bank settlement, 129-30 Israeli-Syrian War (1982), 71 Japan as challenger, 113 economic growth, 47 as great power, 6 invasion of China (1932), 52, 77 potential NATO member, 151 U.S. trade agreements with, 115-16 Jiang Zemin, 138, 159, 161 Kashmir, 68, 80 Kazakhstan, non-nuclear, 98, 102 Khomeini, 75 Korean peninsula, 21-22, 37, 79, 83 Korean War, 8, 71, 78, 93, 96, 156 Kosovo, 144, 151 Kuwait, 76 labor policies, 119-20 Lardy, Nicholas R., 158 Lee Teng-hui, 170 Leninist doctrine, 146 Li Peng, 138 local crises, managing, 40-41 Locarno treaties (1925), 144 Lord, Winston, 153 “loss-of-strength”formula, 67 Mao Zedong, 146, 147 Marshall Plan, 12, 15, 122, 126, 129, 143 Marx, Karl, 149 massive retaliation, 86, 87, 89, 91-92, 93, 94, 101 Mercosur, 127



Mexico, economic growth, 126 Middle East, 39 nuclear conflicts, 83, 92-93, 96-97 regional wars, 71, 73, 75-76, 78 transitions in, 43 West Bank settlement, 129-30 middle powers, 7 Militarized Interstate Dispute, 69-70 monetary policies, 117-19 trade policies and, 114 Monroe Doctrine, 13 most favored nation, 116 multiple hierarchy model, 64-65 diffusion of war, 77-79 dominant power/challenger relations, 71-77 patterns of interaction, 68-71 policy implications, 79-81 proximity, 66-68 See a lso regional hierarchies mutual assured destruction (MAD), 82, 100-101

Middle East and, 97 need for avoidance of, 26 probability o f war and, 91-92 theory of, 32, 85-86, 87, 88-90 See a lso nuclear deterrence Mutual Security Treaty, 129 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) NASA, 145 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Nixon, Richard, 137 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 178 noncooperative strategy economic relations and, 109 security relations and, 110-11, 112 toward trade, 114-15 See a lso cooperation, degree of; cooperative strategy North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 125, 126, 176, 180 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) benefits of integration, 151 Europe and, 57, 183 expansion, 139-40 implications of, 59-60 limited, 135-36 purpose of, 145, 150 formation of, 15, 27 integration of losers, 129 managing conflict, 36 member cooperation, 111 membership criteria, 150-51, 152 objective of, 34 superbloc, 191 See a lso u n der specific country

North Korea, 79 nuclear weapons, 90, 98 See a lso Korean peninsula North Vietnam, 68-69, 74-75 nuclear deterrence, 25, 82-84, 139, 183 balance o f terror, 86, 87, 101 classical perspective, 85-86, 87-90, 95-97, 98-99 cone of war, 86, 87, 90, 91 dynamics of, 94-97 massive retaliation, 86, 87, 89, 91-92, 93, 94, 101 Power Transition perspective, 90-94, 95-97 selective, 90, 93, 101 See a lso mutual assured destruction (MAD) nuclear preponderance, 82, 87, 88, 90-91, 93, 97 nuclear proliferation, 82-83, 90, 93, 183 evolution of, 97-99 importance of blocking, 183 probability o f war and, 99-102, 104-5 stability and, 99, 100, 101 nuclear war, 32-33 diplomacy prevents, 96 effects of, 83-85 probability of, 83, 87, 90-92, 104-5 nuclear weapons abandonment of, 98, 99, 102, 105 arms agreements, 83 managing, 39-40 parity, 82, 88, 90-92, 97, 101 and probability o f war, 25 second-strike technology, 90, 97, 100, 101 size of, 89-90, 91, 96 See a lso un der specific country “One China”policy, 37 Operation Barbarossa, 13 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 126 overtaking, 21-24 speed of, 30-31 Pakistan, 68, 80-81, 178 nuclear weapons, 26, 89, 98 Paraguay, 80 Paraguayan-Bolivian competition, 80 parity, 21-24, 27 nuclear, 82, 88, 90-92, 97, 101 regional hierarchies, 63, 71-72, 79 P a x A m ericana, 57-58, 117, 124, 127 China and, 59 Pax Britannica, 48, 49, 130 peace nuclear weapons and, 87, 90, 95 postwar era, 54, 55-57 probabilities of, 21, 23 reconciling differences and, 104


peaceful solutions, 80 People’ s Armed Police, 161 People’ s Liberation Army (PLA), 160-61, 171, 172 Perry, William, 174 Peru, 68, 80 Phoenix Factor, 31, 47, 54, 128-29, 131 political capacity o f China, 156-57 power and, 9, 16-17, 20 political integration, 125-27, 130 political power, of great powers, 45-46 political systems, cooperation between similar, 124 politically relevant neighborhoods, 66-68 population, power and, 9, 15, 17-19, 123 Portugal, 145 postwar era, 54 poverty trap, 16, 17 power, 26-28, 182 components of, 8-9, 15-20 managing, 37-38 power pyramid, 6-7 privatization, Chinese, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162 profit, 108 proximity, 66-68 Prussia, 46, 50-51 Quintuple Alliance, 142 Reagan, Ronald, 103 “realignment,”158 regional conflicts, 78 escalation of, 78, 80 likeliness of, 183 managing, 40-41 overview of, 63-64 20th century, 52, 57-58 regional hierarchies, 64-65, 183 definition of, 66-67 dominant power/challenger relations, 71-74 global compared with, 65 great powers intervention with, 69-71, 74-77 nuclear weapons, 83, 92-93 patterns of interaction, 68-71 prediction o f war, 79 proximity and, 66-68 stability and, 185-86 See a lso hierarchies; regional conflicts religion, 39 Rodionov, Igor, 138 Russia alliance with China, 135, 136, 137-39 economic collapse, 57 Germany invasion of (1941), 13 as great power, 6, 42


integration into NATO, 136, 137, 175, 188-89 benefits of, 34, 38, 127, 139, 150-52 managing, 140-46 military technology, 137-38, 141-42 nuclear weapons, 83 U.S. foreign aid to, 116 WWI consequences, 53 See a lso Soviet Union Russo-Japanese War (1905), 52 Rwanda, 68 sanctions, 116-17 technological, 121 satisfaction, managing, 35-36 satisfaction-building, 25 satisfaction-dissatisfaction dyads, 9-13, 111 Saudi Arabia-U.S alliance, 14 security antiballistic missile systems, 103-4 and business sector, 162-63, 163-64, 183 and economics, 107, 108, 110-12 integration and, 125, 126 technology transfer and, 120-21 transnational threats, 5 See a lso arms control Security Council, 35, 40, 184-85 Serbia, 78, 144 Seven Days’War, 130 Singapore, 169 Sino-Indian War (1962), 177 Six Day War, 71 small powers, 7, 9-10 Soong, James, 169, 171 South Africa, 89, 98 South America, 71, 73, 80 South Korea, 79 S ee a lso Korean peninsula South Vietnam, 68, 74-75 Southeast Asia, 68-69 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 150 Soviet Union collapse of, 4-5, 47, 57, 188 nuclear weapons, 89 U.S.-Soviet postwar relations, 54-57 See a lso Russia space station (U.S.-Russia collaboration), 144-45 strategic arms limitation treaty (START), 137 Strategic Defense Initiative, 90, 103 Taiwan, 167-75, 180 Taiwan Straits crisis, 170 technology, transit range, 67 technology transfer policies, 119-22 territorial disputes, 36-37, 66, 68, 80 Three Communiques, 37



Tiananmen Square, 117 trade policies, 113-16 China and, 159, 160 and monetary policies, 114 sanctions, 116-17 technology, 120-21 transnational threats, 5 Treaty of Rome, 126 Trotsky, Leon, 146 Turkey, relations with Greece, 143 Uganda-Tanzania war, 71 Ukraine, non-nuclear, 98, 102 UN Security Council. See Security Council United Kingdom, 44 as dominant nation, 187 German challenges to, 47 German overtaking of, 51-52, 54, 77 nineteenth century, 48-49 nuclear weapons, 89 overtaking of France, 48-49 United States overtaking of, 49-50 United Nations, 184 United Nations Security Council. See Security Council United States anti-Chinese forces, 174, 180 arms control policy, 82-83, 93 China’ s overtaking of, 154-55, 180 Civil War, 49 as dominant power, 183, 188 and emergence of China, 157-58, 158, 162, 179 foreign policy, 5 as great power, 42, 58 and India, 180 intervention in Vietnam, 74 management of world crisis, 40-41 nineteenth century economic growth, 46, 47,49 nuclear weapons, 83, 89 overtaking of United Kingdom, 49-50 priority of foreign affairs, 163 relations with Britain, 13-14, 23, 49-50 China, 13, 18, 37, 59-60, 153-54, 160, 163-64 Russia, 144-45 Saudi Arabia, 14 Soviet Union, 14, 54-57

security options, 175-76 superbloc, 60, 175-76, 180, 183, 191, 193 and Taiwan, 173-75 WWI consequences, 53 Vance, Cyrus, 143 Vietnam, 68-69, 74-75 Vietnam-Cambodia war, 71 Vietnam War, 8, 20, 71, 78 von Clausewitz, Carl, 87 Wang Jisi, 154 war consequences of, 31-32, 53-54 diffusion from global to regional, 77-78 duration of, 30 economic recovery from, 128-29 global compared with regional, 52-53 hierarchies and, 8 initiation of, 24-26, 94, 95 major/minor compared, 78 nuclear. See nuclear war probabilities of, 99-102, 104-5 regional, 74-76, 78, 79 severity of, 29, 52, 75 speed of the overtaking, 30-31 timing of, 28-29, 94 War of 1812, 23 War of the Pacific, 68, 71 Warsaw Pact, 34, 36, 54, 111 West Germany, NATO and, 142 World Bank, 40 World Trade Organization (WTO), 115, 116, 126 China’ s entry into, 127, 149, 165 World War I, 51-52, 187-88 consequences of, 53 escalation of, 78 hierarchies and, 8, 187 World War II, 51-52, 77, 187-88 economic growth after, 47 hierarchies and, 8, 187 population casualties, 84 Xue Mouhang, 154 Yeltsin, Boris, 137, 138, 143 Yom Kippur War, 71 Zhu Rongji, 159

About the Authors

L. T a m m e n is Chair of the Department of National Strategy and Professor of National Strategy at the National War College in Washington, D.C., where he also has served as associate dean of faculty, codirector of regional studies, and core course director. In prior positions, he was man­ aging partner of public relations firm, chief of staff to Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), and staff consultant to the Congressional Foreign Policy and Arms Control Caucus led by Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.). His publications and research have centered on U.S. foreign policy and national security issues; he is the author of MIRV and the Arms Race and editor of The Economics o f Defense Spending. Ronald

is the Elisabeth Helms Rosecrans Professor of International Relations at the School of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University, where he has also served as director and chairman. He is the cofounder of Decision Insights, Inc. His publications in world politics and political economy are widely available in scholarly journals. He is the coau­ thor of The War Ledger and Births, Deaths, and Taxes, as well as the coeditor of Parity and War, The Long Term Stability o f Deterrence, and Political Capacity and Economic Behavior.

Ja c e k K u g l e r

D o u g l a s L e m k e is an assistant professor of political science at the Uni­ versity of Michigan. His research focuses on the causes of international conflict. He has published articles in International Studies Quarterly, Jour­ nal o f Conflict Resolution, International Interactions, and other scholarly journals dedicated to the scientific analysis of world politics. He is coeditor of Parity and War, and has completed work on Regions o f War and Peace, a book about regional hierarchies. A l l a n C. S t a m III is an assistant professor of political science at Yale University. His research focuses on initiation, escalation, and resolution of international disputes. He is the author of Win Lose or Draw and has published articles in the American Political Science Review, the Journal o f Conflict Resolution, and other scholarly journals dedicated to the scien­ tific analysis of world politics. He is now working on a book, Search for Victory, dealing with the issue of why democracies win wars, as well as a book-length project that explores why states fight the way they do during interstate war.



M a r k A n d r e w A b d o l l a h i a n is Vice President of Decision Insights, Inc., a New York consulting firm that forecasts political and economic events. He has lectured on decision making and foreign policy at Claremont Graduate University and UCLA. His work focuses on decision making, the dynamics of interstate relations, and the historic evaluation of international politics. He has recently published articles on the politics of Russia and South Africa in International Interactions and has contributed chapters to historical assessments of world politics. C a r o l e A l s h a r a b a t i is an assistant professor currently teaching at the Balamand University Business School and on the Faculty of Law and Po­ litical Science of the University Saint Joseph in Beirut, Lebanon. Her work centers on game theoretical and formal approaches to the study of inter­ national politics. She specializes in operationalizing advanced computerbased policy evaluation tools using game theoretical approaches. She is working on a book dealing with the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. B r i a n E f i r d is completing his Ph.D. in political science at the Clare­ mont Graduate University and is an Associate at Decision Insights, Inc., in New York. His research focuses on interstate conflict, bargaining problems, dispute mediation, and the political economy of growth. His dissertation accounts for the dynamic relationship between the probability and severity of war, economic change, status quo assessment, and alliance formation. He has published articles in biternational Interaction and in books on political economy.

A.F.K. O r g a n s k i was Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and a cofounder of Decision Insights, Inc. He pioneered work spanning several decades on several aspects of world politics, including political demography, political development, and grand strategy. His pub­ lications are widely available in scholarly journals. He was the author of World Politics, The Stages o f Political Development, The War Ledger, Birth Death and Taxes, and The $36 Billion Bargain.