Power Struggles in the Middle East: The Islamist Politics of Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood 9781350987609, 9781786731159

Table of contents :
Cover
Author Bio
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. Islamist Movements as Social Movements and Political Actors: A Framework for Analysis
2. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategies: Moderation Forced by Repression
3. Hizbullah: Expanded Action Repertoire in a Fragile Regional and National Context
4. A Comparative Perspective on Political Strategies of Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brothers
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

‘It is not only timely with regard to most recent events in the Arab world, but also speaks to the ongoing more general debate about whether or not Islamist movements and liberal democracy go together or not.’ Thomas Risse, Freie Universität Berlin

www.ibtauris.com

POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

‘... an innovative, well-argued and thoroughly researched addition to the debates surrounding the development of political Islam ...’ Rachid Ouaissa, Philipps-Universität Marburg

The Islamist Politics of Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood Eva Dingel

Eva Dingel has worked as a consultant and researcher with a variety of non-governmental organisations and academic institutions focusing on the Middle East over the last ten years. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Freie Universität Berlin (FU Berlin).

Who are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah? What do the two movements – one Sunni and one Shi‘a – have in common? Despite being classified by a number of countries as ‘terrorist’ organisations, both are, or have been, serious political players in the states in which they operate – Lebanon and Egypt. Both have, at various points, advocated the unity of Muslims under an Islamic state or caliphate, but rather than focusing on their role as extremist religious movements, Eva Dingel here studies them as players within the political process. She considers why, at certain points, they have chosen to play by the conventional political rules, while during other periods, they have applied different, more extreme, methods of protest. Dingel’s comparative history of two of the most prominent political Islamist movements sheds light on the complex – and often misunderstood – interaction between Islam and politics in the Middle East. This book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the changing dynamics of politics in the Islamic world.

Cover design: Ian Ross www.ianrossdesigner.com

PowerStruggles_UKHB_AW.indd 1

03/11/2016 10:35

Eva Dingel has worked as a consultant and researcher with a variety of non-governmental organisations and academic institutions focusing on the Middle East, over the past ten years. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Freie Universita¨t Berlin (FU Berlin).

‘Dingel makes a timely and important contribution to the debates surrounding the topic of political Islam. The book is an innovative, wellargued and thoroughly researched addition to the debates surrounding the development of political Islam, and very nicely complements the political science literature on power structures and transformation processes in the Middle East.’ Rachid Ouaissa, Philipps-Universita¨t Marburg ‘A very timely and original book which tackles a research question of extremely high relevance in both academic terms and from a policy perspective. It is not only timely with regard to most recent events in the Arab world, but also speaks to the ongoing more general debate about whether or not Islamist movements and liberal democracy go together or not.’ Thomas Risse, Freie Universita¨t Berlin

POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST The Islamist Politics of Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood

EVA DINGEL

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2017 Eva Dingel The right of Eva Dingel to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of Modern Middle East Studies 180 ISBN: 978 1 78453 433 2 eISBN: 978 1 78672 115 0 ePDF: 978 1 78673 115 9 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

To my mum

CONTENTS

List of Figures Acknowledgements Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4.

Islamist Movements as Social Movements and Political Actors: A Framework for Analysis The Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategies: Moderation Forced by Repression Hizbullah: Expanded Action Repertoire in a Fragile Regional and National Context A Comparative Perspective on Political Strategies of Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brothers

viii ix 1 10 54 139 220

Conclusions

260

Notes Bibliography Index

269 294 303

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Model of analytical framework.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book could not have been written without the support – mental, emotional and technical – of many different people, and I would like to thank them all sincerely. My first thank you goes to my family, my parents and my sister, who have made it all possible and have occasionally helped me out in times of financial difficulty during the writing and completion of this book. Secondly, I’d like to thank my supervisors for adopting and supporting the dissertation project this book is based on as well as making the thesis defense a collegial and friendly affair. Orient Institute Beirut have generously supported the field phase of this project with a research scholarship, for which I am very grateful. In terms of inspiration for the project, I thank all my Lebanese and Egyptian friends and acquaintances for the many enlightening conversations on politics, the world and the meaning of life, which have in one way or another found their way into this book. I also thank them for their patience with me while using these conversations to build my knowledge and reduce my ignorance . . . Thank you also to all my interview partners for taking time to talk to me and sharing information, knowledge and insights with me – without their help, this book would not exist. Most of my Egyptian interview partners are now in prison and I have decided not to mention their names in this book. Invaluable thanks in conducting the interviews go to Sarah Hani, who helped in translating a number of them and was an intrepid interview companion. I thank my inspiring teachers at Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Aix-en-Provence as well as my colleagues at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin (Volker Perthes, Muriel Asseburg, Ahmed Badawi, Iris Glosemeyer, Isabelle Werenfels, the late Johannes

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Reissner) for introducing me to the study of the Middle East region in the first place, and for setting extremely high standards for this research that I always keep in firm view, although surely do not reach at all times. But I try. For reading and commenting on parts of the manuscript, I owe many thanks to Manfred Sing, Muriel Asseburg and Henriette Rytz, in particular. Thanks also to my friend and fellow scholar Claudia Hofmann for going through the research design with me and helping to make it less wobbly and more of a stable affair. I thank Ulrich Schneckener for the opportunity to present the dissertation project at a conference early on that proved very helpful. My gratitude also goes to Madeleine Sauer and Judith Vey, who patiently listened to problems with the writing process, helped me organise my arguments and draft them into a first version. Finally, I thank many friends and dear ones for their invaluable emotional support on this, in particular: Gesche Knolle, Julia Ehrt, Silke Lode, Lili Krause, David Koschel, Frans Willems, Sarah Hartmann, Laura Stielike, Tobias Koepf, Ingrid Jacobs, as well as my fellow martial artists and teachers Maria Saraceno, Tina Mu¨ller, Heinrich Knuck, Gundula Bischoff and Stephan Schaks. Last but not least, a million thanks to my copyeditor Karin van der Tak for sticking with the book project through a number of hangups, including data loss due to a break-in into my apartment. Also, I’d like to acknowledge the support I received from anyone who ever liked my PhD statuses on Facebook, and I apologize to anyone I might have omitted from this list. Needless to say, all mistakes in this book remain my own. The transliteration of place names and people’s names in this book does not rely on one coherent system, but instead and for reasons of easy recognition, uses the most common spelling employed in the English-language press and literature on the subject.

INTRODUCTION

The idea for this book came to me while I was living and working in Lebanon in 2006. One hot day in July, skirmishes were being reported in South Lebanon between Hizbullah forces and the Israeli army. I remember thinking that this was not unusual, and continued with my day, making my way to work through the chaotic traffic of Beirut in the humid summer heat. Soon enough, however, it became obvious that this was indeed an unusual event. Hizbullah had attacked an Israeli army patrol, killed three soldiers and kidnapped another two. To most Lebanese, it was immediately clear that this would not remain without consequences, and that Israel would retaliate. In fact, around midday, Israeli fighter planes flew raids on Beirut’s international airport and destroyed the runways, halting all international air traffic. As it turned out, they were acting upon a retaliation plan that had previously been drawn up, and things started to happen very fast. I remember the eerie feeling inspired by the fact that my most obvious way out of the country, by airplane, had now been cut, and that I was stranded, together with 5 million Lebanese, on the wrong side of an Israeli army attack. In the course of the four weeks that followed, the Israeli air force destroyed most major infrastructure in the country, and pounded civilian areas in South Lebanon as well as in the suburbs of Beirut that it deemed strongholds of Hizbullah. Around 1,400 Lebanese civilians were killed; many, many more were injured, traumatized, lost family members and loved ones, in addition to their material possessions and houses. I left on a German government evacuation plane via Turkey about a week after the attacks started. At the end of all this, one question stood out for me

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personally: Why? Why had Hizbullah decided on this attack and the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers? What did it stand to gain, when the losses for the whole country were so glaring and obvious? (And why did the Israeli army retaliate, yet again, against civilians, hoping this would undermine Hizbullah’s credibility, when previous campaigns had revealed that the opposite was likely to happen and that its legitimacy and popularity were going to increase?) This question did not leave me, and this book, which is based on my PhD dissertation, is the outcome of a quest for greater understanding of this issue. How did political Islamist movements, such as Hizbullah, but also other mass movements like the Muslim Brothers, frequently end up at the heart of the most violent conflicts in their respective states? How did they take decisions such as the ones described above, which have often affected whole populations? Which circumstances and patterns affected the strategies they made, and how? Was it all down to valuesbased, religious conflict? Proxy schemes in a conflict-ridden Middle East? How to make sense of and explain all this? Shortly after I had seriously embarked on doing research for this study, the events that came to be known as the Arab uprisings started sweeping across the Middle East region. Needless to say, they only heightened the relevance of attempting to understand what drives Islamist movements in their decision-making. From a vantage point of five years later, the trajectory the Muslim Brotherhood has embarked on after the uprisings looks like a huge failure: Having reached the apex of political power, the Brotherhood saw the Egyptian military take back power and exercise a degree of repression against the movement worse than anything witnessed during the past decades. Most of the Brotherhood’s senior leaders and members are currently imprisoned, many have been sentenced to death. This includes virtually all interview partners I spoke to in Egypt for this study. Yet, this development perhaps also demonstrates that as of yet, no solution has been found to the political and social challenge that political Islam poses in the Middle East (and beyond). Only in Tunisia has a tentative compromise been found and political power been shared among religious and secular parties, and this arrangement is under a lot of pressure. In most other environments including Egypt, conflicts between political Islamists of different stripes and secular actors have only escalated.

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These issues and developments drove me to analyse why Islamist movements choose different strategies towards the political regime in power over others. In this book, I define strategies as those courses of action taken by a movement that go beyond mere responses to individual events and are designed to further the movement’s interests.1 In the case of Islamist movements, as with other political movements, these courses of action can include withdrawal from the political scene, participation in the existing political framework and peaceful protest strategies, as well as the use of violence against state targets or political rivals. By regime, I mean those institutions and actors that embody a state’s power to enforce its decisions: the government, the state security apparatus, the military and police. Could their actions be accounted for by regional and international events, by the values they held or perhaps by repression and threats they faced from the respective state governments they were surrounded by? Based on surveying the relevant literature, I decided to investigate the role that state repression can play in radicalizing a given Islamic movement. In looking at a case such as Lebanon, this seemed to make no sense, as Hizbullah was obviously not suffering any state repression. Yet, the explanation that its actions were exclusively driven by regional politics, that is, that it was acting solely as a proxy for Iran, and responding only to the conflict with Israel, seemed equally unsatisfactory. After observing Lebanese politics from up-close for a while, I had a strong sense that the domestic context also mattered to a movement such as Hizbullah, even if there was no repression. If state repression was not decisive, by itself at least, in bringing about the radicalization of a movement – or the inverse: the absence of repression did not lead to moderation – what other factors were at play in this process? Were there patterns that could lead to something resembling an explanation or a causal relation? To investigate further, I decided on a comparative research design that would put the case of Lebanon, with its weak central governments, up against another case facing a strong regime with significant repressive capacity. This is how I decided to look into the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in addition to that of Hizbullah. However, these two cases do not lend themselves particularly well to a classic comparative design according to Mill’s methods of agreement or difference.2 Such a design would either start with the assumption that the outcomes of a process are similar or the same, and that the reasons

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that led to these outcomes in two or more cases appear to differ (method of agreement). This would then allow finding out which factors remained the same between the two cases and which differed; the ones that differ would then cause the variation in outcome. Or, alternatively, the factors leading to an outcome in two or more cases are different, but the result is identical in both cases (method of difference). The analysis would then attempt to find a factor that is present in both cases and hold this factor responsible for the identical outcome. In the cases I chose to study, there is a great deal of variation both in the contexts of the two cases, as well as within them – too many different variables vary, in other words, for a strict comparative design following Mill’s methods to be implemented. Instead, I will consider each case in its own right and consider its evolution over time, starting in 1928 for the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and in 1982 for Hizbullah, and leading up to 2011, and compare different stretches and episodes within each case. Only after having established the guiding patterns that have influenced the Muslim Brotherhood’s and Hizbullah’s histories, respectively, will I compare factors across the two cases and see where they differ or coincide. My research design is thus a loosely comparative case study based on tracing the processes within each case, and with an analysis of their similarities, differences, as well as the implications this might have. As such, it does not claim to represent a strict case comparison adhering fully to Mill’s criteria, but represents a comparison of processes and narratives found in each case. Regarding the context, there are considerable differences between the two situations that I analyse. In Lebanon, Hizbullah, a very strong movement with an armed wing that is more powerful than the national army, is facing a relatively weak government in a fragile state, at least if we consider conventional measures of state strength such as the ability to control one’s own state territory or to implement decisions.3 Hizbullah also has important and close connections with two neighbouring states, Iran and Syria, which influence its decision making and back it up with resources vis-a`-vis its domestic rivals. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, has for most of its history been faced with a high-capacity regime. The central government was mostly not only able to control its entire territory, but was also able to enforce its own decisions. Throughout the movement’s history there are fewer, and recently no, significant connections with outside actors – apart from its

INTRODUCTION

5

loose institutional connections to other country branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, which have largely not proven influential for its development – or conflict settings. The two movements themselves, of course, are also very different from each other. One is a Shiʽi movement with close ties to Iran’s clerical leadership, while the other adheres to Sunni Islam and is influenced by religious scholars based in Sudan or various Gulf states. The Brotherhood has also widely become recognized as a non-violent opposition movement, and previous analyses have shed light on its very close ties to pre-revolutionary Egyptian regimes that often suggest some kind of agreement or working relationship between them.4 So, what are the benefits of comparing the two movements? First of all, contrasting these two cases with each other promises to be interesting, because not only do they differ sharply in many respects, they also have quite a few things in common. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah employ similar models of popular mobilization: they provide a range of services to the ‘common people’, urban and rural poor and lower-middle classes, that are often neglected by state social service provision. Beyond such material concerns, however, as important and crucial as they may be, the two movements provide an entire identity model that encompasses a moral code and instructions on day-to-day living, personal conduct and the like. Both have become very successful and a force to be reckoned with in their respective national environments and beyond. Both also seek to convert their strong popular base into political influence in their respective national contexts, and both regularly meet with scepticism and opposition by secular actors when they seek to do this. Secondly, considering the behaviour of two different movements instead of one, and trying to make sense of the interrelationships between them and their political context, leads to a slightly higher degree of generalization. An in-depth case study of one movement will provide fascinating insights; looking for commonalities and differences across two different contexts allows for the identification of patterns. These patterns might be applicable to other contexts where powerful Islamist movements interact with a political system or regime. The strong and wide-ranging popular base that both movements possess regularly triggers fears of their political opponents, whether from rival political actors or from the regime in power. I will argue that this

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type of political interaction, with a drive towards political power by the Islamist movement provoking a strong reaction from other political actors, is another similarity that makes it worth considering the two movements’ stories in a comparative fashion. The question I seek to answer is: what makes the Islamist movements adhere to or breach the rules of the political game, respectively? Why do they use sanctioned avenues such as participating in parliamentary or municipal elections, striking deals with other political actors or the regime, or becoming active in various labour unions and professional syndicates? And why, at other times, do they willingly breach the ‘red lines’ by engaging in nonconventional forms of politics, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, protests and boycotts, as well as armed, violent clashes with or attacks on the regime? Are there particular configurations of circumstances – which I will seek to identify as variables – that lead to an escalation or a de-escalation of this political interaction, respectively? My findings suggest that first of all, the manifest difference in state capacity between the two cases does make a big and consequential difference. Over the course of time, various Egyptian regimes have managed to considerably limit the oppositional choices available to the Muslim Brotherhood by employing a mixture of repression, coercion and co-optation. While the movement started out with a rebellious armed wing, it had, by the end of the Hosni Mubarak regime – shortly before the 2011 Egyptian revolution – become largely withdrawn from politics. I will argue that this is the result of a constant narrowing of its action repertoire, or of the political action choices available to it. The continuous heavy repression that the movement faced over several decades (with some easing and tightening of the space allowed) left room for little else than withdrawing from the political arena and concentrating on the religious and social aspects of the Brotherhood’s work, or for seeking a deal or arrangement with the regime that would limit the latter’s repressive measures. Apart from the repression-cooptation dynamic, I also considered other factors or variables based on the literature, both concerned with the Muslim Brotherhood directly, as well as the more general social movement literature. I looked for supranational variables that might influence movement behaviour, such as ties to movements in other countries, to international conflict situations or to other states or governments. I also considered factors internal to the movement, such as resources, internal power conflicts,

INTRODUCTION

7

generational changes and the like. In the case of the Brotherhood, the international level proved to be less and less influential over time. In the movement’s early history, the close connection to the Palestine conflict, and the fact that the Brotherhood had sent armed units to fight in Palestine, led to clashes with the regime in power and radicalized many in the movement. This supranational influence declined over time, however, and eventually ceded to play any significant role for the Brotherhood’s interaction with the regime. Generational changes and the changing influence of various ideological factions inside the movement also proved influential for its strategy choices. The pattern of heavy repression through a powerful security apparatus that the Muslim Brotherhood experienced for most of its history seems to have provided the blueprint for its own behaviour after the toppling of the Mubarak regime in 2011. When Mohammad Morsi, the first Muslim Brotherhood representative in Egyptian history to become president, took office in 2012, he sought to suppress the political opposition by unconstitutionally appropriating executive and legislative powers, and employing the security apparatus in order to break up street protests. For Hizbullah, state repression has largely not played any significant role, but state capacity has. The central government’s lack of ability to implement its decisions has left the movement with room to display its significant military power when necessary, often to influence political decisions. It has also provided Hizbullah with the ability to maintain its close ties to other regional regimes such as Iran and Syria, or more precisely, it has provided for these countries or regimes to influence domestic politics in Lebanon through the actions of Hizbullah. The central government was not in a position to keep out these interferences by limiting the scope of actions available to the movement. On the contrary, Hizbullah has expanded its action repertoire throughout its existence. The strength and presence established by the movement’s armed forces in South Lebanon, combined with the relative weakness, poor equipment and training of Lebanon’s state army, led to Hizbullah taking over the defence of Lebanon’s border with Israel after the latter’s withdrawal from the country’s south in 2000. The non-state actor was effectively fulfilling a key state function and providing for border security, with the tacit acceptance of most of the country’s political forces. Concurrently, Hizbullah was rising through Lebanon’s political

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ranks and participating in local as well as national elections, finally culminating in its involvement in executive government after 2005. All these developments cemented the movement’s strength vis-a`-vis its rivals in domestic politics, but they did not render it immune to political pressure by its opponents inside Lebanon. The very lack of Lebanon’s central control of its territory and borders that proves advantageous to Hizbullah when it comes to receiving support from Iran or Syria also constitutes a weakness that renders the movement vulnerable. The US and a number of European countries are backing the movement’s political opponents of the so-called March 14 movement, most notably the Sunni Future Movement. Through this fault line, Hizbullah is feeling considerable pressure that combines with internal rivalries for power. This conflict has dominated the movement’s strategy decisions at different points in time, and has driven it to employ violence against Future Movement supporters and others, breaching its own vow never to use force of arms against another Lebanese group. Besides reacting to international pressure, the movement was also fighting its domestic enemies by force of arms. As I will argue below, Hizbullah cannot be understood as a mere proxy for Iranian and/or Syrian interests. It has its own stakes to fight for in Lebanon, and it frequently does. Looking beyond the individual cases, and considering the choices and histories of both movements in their respective contexts, I argue that both movements are less unique and less driven by their religious nature than is often assumed. They display many differences, but also important similarities, which can be found in other Islamist movements as well. My analysis also shows that Islamist parties, despite their religious frames of reference, display similar behaviour to other, secular political actors. Just like the latter, Islamist groups engage in bargaining processes and political manoeuvring in order to attain their short- and medium-term goals. Thus, by employing analytical frameworks used for understanding the actions of other social movements and political parties, we stand a good chance of gaining important insights into the behaviour of Islamist parties as well. Their religious nature does not remove them from the mundane world of ‘politics as usual’. This book is divided into four chapters. Chapter I will explain the theoretical framework, research design and methods I will use to analyse the two Islamist movements. For each Islamist movement, I consider three levels of possible influence factors: the transnational, domestic and

INTRODUCTION

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movement-internal plains. I evaluate each of these factors and their mutual interaction both within each movement over time (synchronically), before moving on to a cross-case, diachronic comparison. I will also engage the existing literature on Islamist movements, social movements in general, as well as the specific Lebanese and Egyptian contexts in the first chapter. Chapter II then proceeds with an analysis of the political strategies used by the Muslim Brotherhood vis-a`-vis the regime in Egypt since its establishment in 1928. The overall pattern I discern in this analysis is one of increasing dependence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the domestic context. Where initially the movement had a transnational outlook and was influenced by issues beyond the Egyptian borders, by the time of the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the Brotherhood was solely concerned with managing pressure exerted upon it by the ruling regime. Despite having moderated and rescinded the use of violence, it had still suffered from heavy regime repression and had been powerless to change this dynamic. Its internal coherence and ideological fabric, however, had resulted in a steadfast attitude focused on survival. Chapter III will do the same for Hizbullah in Lebanon, starting with the rise of Shiʽi social movements during the 1960s. In a reverse dynamic to that experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah has gone from a renegade resistance movement to a social movement-cum-political-movement-cum-armed wing that dominates developments in the Levant region (Syria, Lebanon, Israel/ Palestine). While its strength relative to that of the Lebanese government and army has continued to grow due to Iranian support, it has still been forced to reckon with and take into account its domestic context. This context has at times, for instance in 2008, proven more influential to its actions than any transnational link to Syria or Iran. Chapter IV will bring together the results from Hizbullah’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s histories and distil some overarching patterns in their behaviour. Chiefly, it argues that domestic context has been the key factor influencing both movements’ behaviour; other influences have played out at different times, of course, but the domestic context has been crucial in both cases. Finally, in a brief epilogue, I consider what has happened in the time since the end of the main period of study, which finished in late 2011. Post-Arab Spring developments have brought unpredictable and undeniably historic changes and trajectories for both movements, which I will attempt to summarize at the end of this book.

CHAPTER 1 ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL ACTORS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

This chapter will specify the theoretical framework used in the book, as well as the operationalization of its main research variables, and elaborate on the methods used to gather the data necessary for answering the main research questions. The main question the book will answer is: under which conditions do Islamist movements change their political relations with the state/government from peaceful and cooperative towards rejectionist and violent (and back again). What brings about change in the political strategies of Islamist movements? Why do they act cooperatively towards the state at certain times, and choose to (violently) confront it at others? And what accounts for different strategies employed by different movements? The short answer is that the immediate political context in which Islamist movements operate strongly influences their behaviour. When compared with possible contending explanations – for instance, transnational factors, regional developments, feuds and factions within a movement – the political game that Islamist movements find themselves in within a national context tends to come out on top. Mostly, they react to how a state or regime is interacting with them, rather than forcing their own agenda onto a local political environment. This is due to many reasons, which I will explore below; one of the key ones is certainly that when faced with secular states that are suspicious of their agenda, and an

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international community that tends to want to curb their power, Islamists rely on the local political context as a means of staying engaged in politics, having alternative routes of negotiation and communication (other than violence) open to them, and deflecting the accusation of a violent agenda of regime change and state overthrow – which is usually restricted to the fringes of their ideological and political spectrum, and generally does not form part of the political mainstream found within Islamist movements. In my view, this finding has important implications; once we view Islamist movements not as beamed down from another planet and imposed on the local context, but as originating from that context and interacting with it, states and regimes become more visible as an influence on their behaviour.

Three Levels of Political Opportunity I will be looking into causal factors and patterns on three analytically distinct, but in reality, often intertwined levels: the transnational, domestic and subnational ones. My interest is in processes, events and connections that influence the dependent variable of my research design, that is, the behaviour of Islamist social movements, as exemplified by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah in Lebanon. The distinction of three analytical levels is loosely based on traditions in International Relations theory that deal with the interconnectedness of supranational and domestic factors, such as Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level games’ metaphor.1 His model is concerned with the interaction between international and domestic levels in international negotiations, where he assumes that players simultaneously play at two different bargaining tables. Other models from the extensive literature on transnational relations map how ideas spread beyond borders and influence policy, for example by creating a ‘boomerang effect’,2 or building insider-outsider coalitions.3 These concepts capture the idea that actors’ behaviour is influenced by their considerations beyond the domestic level, and that societal actors such as social movements can build momentum and pressure on their respective national governments by establishing coalitions with other, domestic or international groups or organizations. They also stress the power of norms and ideas in such processes, versus interest-based bargaining.

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The build-up of research on these phenomena has gradually led to a recognition that there are shared interests and overlapping fields of research between both International Relations theory and Social Movement Theory.4 This is an insight that I will be using, as I am convinced that the political context relevant for Islamist social movements goes beyond the merely domestic and – through the link of Islamic values and identity – reaches out to other, similar movements in other settings. The key concept I will use in order to understand what shapes movement strategy and behaviour is the Political Opportunity Structure (POS). I attempt to grasp the interrelations between Islamist movements, their transnational context, society and the state with the help of Social Movement Theory and its theoretical tools. In using the POS in particular, I use the insights of Kathryn Sikkink and many others regarding the international dimension of this structure – that is, the factors that shape movement behaviour beyond the domestic structure in which a movement operates. Following Charles Tilly’s definition of social movements as ‘a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people made collective claims on others’,5 we can conceive of Islamist parties as social movements. Most Islamist movements, whether they are organized into political parties – such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt post-2011, Hizbullah in Lebanon or the Islah party in Yemen – or exist as social movements – such as a number of Muslim Brotherhood branches barred from political organization, for instance in Syria – usually claim to represent ‘ordinary people’ as mobilizing against established power elites. While, as Asef Bayat rightly points out, most modern Islamist movements cannot claim to exclusively represent the dispossessed and very poor against the ruling elites, they nonetheless aim to mobilize, and bring into the political process, the educated lower-middle and middle classes.6 Their extensive networks of social institutions such as hospitals, day-care centres, support organizations for widows, orphanages or youth groups ensure that they reach out to broad swathes of the population not usually represented in politics and often left without government services or care.7 They regularly employ a range of contentious action in order to make claims on those in power. As Quitan Wiktorowicz puts it: Though the ideational components and inspiration of Islam as an ideological worldview differentiate Islamic activism from other

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examples of contention, the collective action itself and concomitant mechanisms demonstrate consistency across movement-types. In other words, Islamic activism is not sui generis.8 Conceptualizing Islamist movements as social movements avoids an overly normative view that holds them to be acting solely on their religious values; it stresses the fact that as societal actors, they are subject to dynamics and strategic calculations also undergone or employed by other social groups and movements. By using this definition, I aim to render the subject as unbiased as possible, leaving the context of political Islam as such and stressing the fact – which is one of the core assumptions I make in this book – that Islamist opposition movements, as strategic and political actors, do not function in an inherently different way than other social actors. Within Social Movement Theory, the political process model is particularly concerned with the impact that the political context has on a movement,9 and how this shapes what the movement does. In the words of David Meyer, the approach is defined by its interest in the structures that inhibit or enable social movement mobilization: ‘The wisdom, creativity and outcome of activists’ choices – their agency – can only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political context and the rules of the games in which these choices are made – that is, structure.’10 It is out of the political process literature that the concept of POS developed. It denotes, at the most basic level and in its earliest formulation by Peter Eisinger, ‘such factors [. . .] that serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals’.11 Eisinger used the idea in a comparative study on protest movements in different US cities. He found that protests broke out where alternative (more peaceful or cooperative) avenues of participating in decision making had been blocked by those in government. Yet, a totally repressive environment with a massive police presence and heavy restrictions on mobilization prevented the occurrence of protests. Consequently, the most likely conditions that produce protest are somewhere in between: ‘regular’ routes of participation are blocked, but some presence in the streets is possible. The POS concept has subsequently been developed and utilized in a number of studies and settings, with a number of variables added over time. In fact, as a concept it has been applied and developed so unevenly that, according to Meyer’s

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observation, ‘analysts identify different factors as elements of opportunity depending on the sorts of movements they address and the questions they ask.’12 As I am interested in different articulations of Islamist movements across different domestic or national contexts, I choose to adopt a definition of political opportunity that is more specific than Eisinger’s and takes into account both the openness and capacity of political regimes. Developed for a cross-national comparison of various European anti-nuclear protest movements, Herbert Kitschelt’s articulation of the concept comprises both the nature of input and policy output structures. The degree of openness on the input side is defined by the number of parties and groups able to effectively articulate demands within the electoral process (the more groups, the more open the system); the independence of the legislature vis-a`-vis the executive; facility of access for new groups to the decision-making system; and finally, the existence of mechanisms to aggregate demands and enable political coalitionbuilding.13 On the output side, Kitschelt’s definition is concerned with the political structures’ ability to control policy making – in other words, is the system able to convert demands into policies effectively, and without these policies becoming unrecognizable in the process? As preconditions for effective output structures, Kitschelt names the degree of administrative centralization (the more centralized the structures, the more effective they are), the degree of government control over economic resources and decision centres, as well as the independence of the judiciary.14 Kitschelt’s formulation of the openness of input and output structures is essentially concerned with the same dimensions found in Tilly’s definition of regime qualities. Tilly understands regimes to vary along two essential axes, capacity and democracy.15 Like Kitschelt, Tilly also understands the various manifestations of opposition – the repertoires of contention, in his terms – to co-vary with changes in the POS, and to do so in a curvilinear relationship. That is to say (violent) protest is likely to occur where there is some, but not too severe, repression by the regime. The problem with Tilly’s definition of POS, however, is that they comprise so many variables that it becomes difficult to draw the line between cause and effect, or between what is to be explained and the reasons that may explain it. Tilly uses a definition of POS that includes at least:

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(a) the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime, (b) the openness of the regime to new actors, (c) the instability of current political arrangements, (d) the availability of influential allies or supporters, (e) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim-making, and (f) decisive changes in (a) to (e).16 His definition of a regime is a relational one: ‘A regime means repeated, strong interactions between major political actors, including a government.’17 These definitions render it possible to include a broader range of factors than Kitschelt’s much more static definition. Tilly, as well as his collaborators in a strain of social movement research that he helped found, are also concerned with cultural factors, ideas and perceptions, as well as with what they call the dynamics of contention.18 Their perspective is concerned with breaking down attempts at causal connection into their constituent parts, and to look for the individual mechanisms that are present in a specific case. There is much to be gained from adopting this rather fine-grained approach; however, in terms of POS operationalization for my present purposes, I will opt for Kitschelt’s more parsimonious – albeit more static – concept, and broaden it by keeping Tilly et al.’s responsiveness to cultural understandings, process, dynamics and constituent mechanisms.

Summary of Theoretical Approach In using Kitschelt’s definition of POS, I will slightly alter the understanding of his ‘output capacity’ dimension, which he takes to mean the capacity of the government to implement policies within the democratic process. This makes sense in the context of his research on anti-nuclear movements in four European democracies. The concern is with the government’s control over various institutions and interest groups that may alter policies in the process of implementation. In applying his concept to less overtly democratic or to semiauthoritarian settings, which form the context for most Islamist social movements, a slightly different understanding of ‘output capacity’ by the state seems more appropriate. I will be using Thomas Risse et al.’s concept of state capacity as developed in the context of their work on governance in areas of limited statehood.19 They employ two indicators

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for measuring a state’s capacity, or its output structures, to stay in Kitschelt’s terms. One concerns the state’s control over the monopoly on violence, as developed by Max Weber; the other concerns the state’s ability to have the final authority in implementing policies on its territory, based on Stephen Krasner’s definition of ‘domestic sovereignty’.20 It implies a state’s ‘ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions’. This makes the definition applicable to a wider range of political contexts – including authoritarian or non-democratic ones – than Kitschelt’s democracy-focused understanding. Risse and his collaborators aim to avoid the ‘normative orientation towards OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] statehood’ that they find to be implicit in many definitions of statehood and state capacity.21 As I intend to focus on the non-European contexts that political Islamist movements operate in, this definition seems particularly well suited to my current concerns. Risse et al.’s main indicator within the concept of ‘governance in areas of limited statehood’ is the Weberian notion of the government’s monopoly over the use of force – are government agents the only legitimate users of force, do they control the entire territory, do they possess the capability of implementing their own decisions?22 If this is not the case for the state’s entire territory, who controls other areas within the state? If decisions cannot be implemented by the state within certain policy areas, who is taking action instead? How is governance supplied in these (geographical or policy) areas, and by which combination of actors: governance by government, governance with government or governance without government?23 As I have discussed above, I will also be considering two further levels of political opportunity, in addition to the domestic or national level. These are the transnational and subnational dimensions of political opportunity. This extension both takes into account the current state of research in Social Movement Theory and political Islam, and makes sense for a study on political Islamist movements, which frequently define themselves as transnational actors by declaring their allegiance to the universal community of believers in Islam, or umma. On the transnational level, I will be looking for ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization’.24 Using this definition, I will be taking into account

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Islamist movements’ (the non-state agent as defined above) connections both to movements in other countries and to foreign governments, as the literature shows that both types of connections are relevant for understanding the strategies and choices of Islamist movements. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as between Israel and Arab states more generally, will also be considered as an important transnational influencing factor. On the subnational level, I will consider factors internal to the movements under study; as I am considering their development over time, I am mainly interested in internal learning processes, as well as changing power constellations – in the form of generational or leadership changes – inside the movements that have led to changes in strategic direction. Ruud Koopmans provides a helpful concept for grasping intra-movement dynamics which also takes into account the political environment in what he terms an ‘evolutionary approach’ to studying social movements.25 He posits that instead of rational choice calculations on the part of social movements, which are implicitly assumed by most strands of Social Movement Theory, movements adapt to their environment by way of a trial-and-error process. The three mechanisms at work in Koopmans’ theory are modelled on Darwinian evolutionary biology: abundance, variation and selection.26 Koopmans goes to some lengths to explain why this does not translate into a ‘survival of the fittest’ logic, but can explain the selection of some strategies and choices over others in response to the given political environment: All that is required is a varied input of strategies that may initially be entirely random and the capacity after each round of interaction to evaluate a set of alternatives on the basis of equally limited, prestructured information about these (and not the many other conceivable) alternatives.27 His last point refers to the incomplete nature of information that undergirds the choices of individuals, and ultimately, of movements – his main point of critique of other types of theories working with a POS approach. The difference between Koopmans’ approach to information and that used in sophisticated rational choice models, bounded rationality, is that Koopmans assumes information is incomplete because only some events, protests and strategies get reported and become

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POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST Transnational: - links to other movements - links to governments

Domestic: - openness of system - ability to implement decisions

Movement behaviour: - use of violence - protest tactics - participation in political process

Movement-internal: - generational/ leadership development - learning process/evolution

Figure 1.1

Model of analytical framework.

available. It is not necessarily because information is costly or because intellectual capacities are limited that individuals possess incomplete information; a selection mechanism is already present in determining which information becomes known.28 Koopmans’ concept of an alternative to rational-choice based decision making in social movements provides an interesting perspective on movement choices of action repertoires, while still avoiding too much emphasis on valuebased decision making. I therefore consider his approach a useful metaphor for attempting to understand the behaviour of Islamist movements. As has become obvious by now, the latter forms the dependent variable of my research design: the strategic choices that Islamist movements make in presenting their claims. This can include assassination attempts, bombings or armed attacks; demonstrations, sit-ins or other peaceful actions in the public sphere; and finally, regular participation in the

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democratic decision-making process, such as the participation in union, municipal or parliamentary elections. I am interested in specifying what kind of factors on these three levels influence movement behaviour, how they do so and how they are interacting with each other.

Why Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood? Loosely based on a most-different-systems design, I will compare two movements that are relatively similar in outlook – in that both are religious actors, albeit adhering to different strands of Islam – organizational structure and choices of political activism, but operate in radically different environments. The core question that this design is meant to answer is: do the different contexts really impact the political behaviour the movements display? And if so, how exactly does this process unfold? Can we identify which factors exactly are making a difference by being more prominent than, or simply preceding, others? With the rise of Islamist movements in the Arab world and the Middle East throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, it became increasingly obvious that these religious-based movements were speaking to significant portions of the population and were increasingly gaining in political clout. To the prolonged economic crises in the Arab world and the failure of independent Arab states to generate and redistribute wealth in a sustainable way, Islamist movements offered ‘Islam as the solution’. From Morocco’s Justice and Development Party, via the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria and of course the various country branches of the longest-established of Middle Eastern Islamist movements, the Muslim Brotherhood, these groups have mostly built on grassroots-level social and religious work prior to any political involvement. This is not to argue that all social work undertaken by Islamist groups is necessarily part of a political strategy, but to say that most large Islamist movements are active in social services provision and that this has significantly strengthened their visibility and provided them with legitimacy. Most of these movements have over time merged into contenders on the political scene, and have thus come to confront their respective ruling powers or regimes, and to challenge their hold on power. Following the work of Tilly and others situated within the political process approach of Social Movement Theory, I assume that the policies

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of the state or central government towards a social movement come to shape its behaviour over time, and are thus a key factor in influencing the strategies of social movements.29 At the same time, it is obvious that there is no clear, linear causal relationship that leads from a certain state policy – for example, violent repression – to a certain social movement response, such as violent protest, the participation in elections or the endorsement of government policies. Additional factors must be at play in bringing about such changes of repertoire, and the objective of the current analysis is to identify them and gain an understanding of how they interact with one another to produce certain results. As I have elaborated above, I am starting with the assumption that these factors are situated on three different levels: the transnational, domestic and movement-internal ones. Consequently, I have chosen the comparative method to investigate this question, as it allows for identifying and contrasting different variables and their interaction within, as well as across different case studies. The two cases I chose for comparison are the Lebanese Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The underlying logic of this choice is to compare and contrast two large Islamist movements that display a number of similarities, yet operate in different political environments. Speaking of the two movements as ‘relatively similar’ usually provokes resistance and objection in my interlocutors, so I will take a moment to explain the rationale for doing so. Obviously, the movements differ immensely in many respects: one, the Muslim Brotherhood, is one of the oldest Sunni Islamist movements established in 1928, while Hizbullah is a relatively recent creation that grew out of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and adheres to the Twelver Shiʽi doctrine espoused by the religious leader of Iran. So how can one speak of them as similar? Quite simply, it is their incarnation as mass social movements that permits for this approach. Though their religious beliefs differ substantially, both use similar structures and mechanisms for setting up large, popular movements working towards political goals. Vying for greater political power has formed part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s DNA from its very beginnings. Hizbullah’s has been an equally political project, aimed at liberating the ‘downtrodden of the earth’ and restoring them to their right place in society, while repelling the evil brought on by corrupt enemies such as the US, Israel or France. Both movements also employ similar

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organizational structures marked by hierarchical, top-down decision making, broken down into independent cells or smaller units that leave enough room for individual aspirations and grievances of members to be addressed. To their members, both hold out the promise of redemption, of keeping them on the right path, of purification in the midst of a society perceived as morally corrupt and threatened by collapse. They offer a complete value system to their members that provides answers to most questions in life, from the ultimate goals of human existence via the make-up of society, the assignment of gender roles, right down to questions of what to wear, how to behave in certain situations or what to eat. Both movements also provide the comfort of community, of belonging to a large group, a benefit that to their followers makes them superior to the lost, corrupt and lonely ways of Western societies. In short, both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood provide a fully developed identity to their members that leaves few questions unanswered. An important difference, of course, is their attitude towards the use of violence. In contrast to the now-peaceful Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah is engaged in active combat on a number of fronts: in South Lebanon on the Israeli border, in Syria and in Iraq. Its role as an armed resistance movement forms the backbone of its identity within Lebanon, yet, as I will discuss below, does not determine all its actions domestically, nor is it the dominant or only facet of that identity. The Muslim Brotherhood’s determination to stay peaceful has largely prevailed even throughout the extremely violent and turbulent aftermath of the 2011 uprisings – at least where the official line of the leadership is concerned. This is nonetheless an important difference between the two movements; yet, looking at their domestic actions allows me to focus on that part of their existence where their similarities come into play, without ignoring the differences and how they influence behaviour. Comparing the two movements is interesting also because they operate in very different contexts. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has been confronted by strong, repressive regimes throughout most of its history, before the recent uprisings in Egypt briefly turned the tables and eventually catapulted the movement to the country’s political leadership. This remarkable trajectory allows for analysing the movement’s relationship with a strong, repressive state and how this has affected its choices; and it also permits looking at the sudden

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disappearance of this variable, and the Brotherhood’s reaction to it. Hizbullah, on the other hand, has been facing a weak central government in Lebanon, whose emblematic lack of state strength or capacity is reflected in such monikers as ‘precarious republic’30 or ‘shattered country’.31 In other words, the two cases vary on a key variable – state strength, that is, the government’s ability to enforce its own decisions – which is an essential, if not the defining feature of any movement’s political environment. Both movements have at times participated in the political process and sought accommodation or even reconciliation with the state; and at other times acted violently against the established state order by attempting or carrying out assassinations of key state officials, or engaging in armed combat with rival political groups. Thus, they both display a range of strategic choices towards the state and their political environment, reaching from cooperative to confrontational. Consequently, I will attempt to identify the effects that a political context characterized by a strong or a weak state has on a movement, respectively, and to analyse how these effects interact with other factors that might influence a movement’s political strategies. I will draw conclusions from both cases and identify differences and similarities without forcing them into a classical comparative design that would seem too artificial in this case.

Comparative Method and Operationalization I will compare both different historical phases within the same case, as well as different periods across the two different cases to one another.32 I am combining ‘within-case’ and ‘across-case’ comparisons,33 considering both the change over time within a case and comparing between different cases in a structured way – altogether building towards what Alexander George and Andrew Bennett call ‘structured, focused comparison’, a method designed to ensure that qualitative causal inference – in other words, the attempt to identify causes and effects – is maximally transparent and as sound and grounded in the facts as possible. George and Bennett argue that the method of process tracing is most appropriate for implementing this overall research design. The method differs from historical case analysis – basically, a narrative of how events in a given case have unfolded – in that it is meant to help theorize about causal relationships by confirming or ruling out different explanations. To this

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end, it employs several logical ‘tests’ for hypotheses that are meant to determine whether they are necessary and/or sufficient for causation: a ‘straw-in-the-wind’ test means a hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause an outcome; a ‘hoop’ test reveals a variable to be necessary, but not sufficient; a ‘smoking gun’ test establishes a hypothesis to be sufficient to trigger an outcome on its own, but it is not necessary to do so; while, finally, a ‘doubly decisive’ test means a factor is both necessary and efficient to establish causation.34 For each of the two country cases I am considering in this study – Egypt and Lebanon – I select several phases that form the basis for a within-case analysis, that is, for comparing different time periods within each movement’s evolution to each other, using the process tracing method. These phases are chosen according to their respective outcome on the dependent variable, namely, the strategy that a political movement chooses vis-a`-vis the state, ranging from cooperation to confrontation. Within the history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, several periods are characterized by confrontation or cooperation towards the state. The periods have been selected because they usually include one of these strategies at its extreme (i.e. full violent confrontation or full cooperation with the regime); however, they are often characterized by a development of one towards the other, so that they can feature both confrontation and cooperation. While choosing different phases to compare, I am also attempting to build a comprehensive narrative of both movements’ evolution. Therefore, phases can be relatively long. They mostly contain one key episode that has them using different strategies, but generally are preceded by a prologue and sometimes followed by an epilogue that are necessary in order to gain a full understanding of events. For the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, I have chosen the following episodes as relevant for my research design: .

.

Between violence and appeasement: In the mid-to-late 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in violence against the state, assassinating a prime minister as well as other state officials, even while its founder and leader at the time tried to quell the violence. Disavowal of violence: During the late 1960s the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi published a book

24

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firmly disavowing any use of violence, following the rise of a radical strand of Islamism promoted by Sayyid Qutb.35 Moderation and backlash: During the 1970s, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat released many imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood in an offer of reconciliation aimed at winning Islamists’ support; while the Muslim Brotherhood movement took up the offer, fringe groups that split from its mainstream grew disillusioned with the decision, radicalized and ultimately assassinated Sadat. Non-violent reaction to renewed state repression: After a period of growing involvement in politics for the Muslim Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime clamped down harshly on the movement following the 1995 elections, a policy that was not met with any noticeable response by the Brotherhood. Withdrawal from politics in reaction to repression: The aftermath of the 2005 elections saw yet another wave of repression after a slight opening from 2000 –5; the Muslim Brotherhood responded by a withdrawal from formal politics coupled with protest actions such as demonstrations. Hizbullah has likewise seen several alternating periods of accommodation and confrontation with the established political order. A trend towards pragmatism and moderation within Hizbullah that the literature describes for its recent history is somewhat contradicted by recurring outbreaks of violence. Radical rhetoric and actions during the 1980s: Hizbullah’s first manifesto in 1985 called for a dismantling of the existing system and the installation of an Islamic state, while the organization was engaging in military operations against Israel and simultaneously co-opting members of secular resistance groups. Endorsement of sectarian system and participation in 1992 elections: In a marked change of strategy, Hizbullah decided to participate in the first post-civil war elections of 1992 and thereby indirectly endorsed the previously vilified sectarian political system. Solidification of grassroots-level support during 1998 municipal elections: The 1990s saw a phase of Lebanonization for Hizbullah, marked by its participation in politics and resulting in a takeover of a number of municipalities in 1998.

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Refusal to cede monopoly of power to the state after 2000: Following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah refused to surrender its weapons and thereby renewed its challenge to the state monopoly of violence. Increasing confrontation with the state following the 2005 Syrian withdrawal: After Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, Hizbullah was faced with renewed and strong pressure to surrender its weapons, which it sought to counter using a strategy of gradual escalation culminating in the 2008 fighting between its forces and those of rival political movements.

For each of these phases, I will look for variables on the three levels of analysis I have discussed above. On a transnational level, I will mainly consider the linkages that movements have to other Islamist movements abroad, or to foreign states or governments, and search for the ways in which these linkages influence movement decisions. Domestically, I am interested in the government’s ability to curtail a movement’s actions and mobilization, mainly in the form of repression, for which the degree of state strength – that is, the government’s capacity to enforce its own decisions – is a precondition. By repression, I mean government actions ranging from the withdrawal of privileges/positions accorded to the movement, via arrests of members or the prohibition of certain activities (demonstrations and the like), to complete bans or regime violence against the movement in the form of executions. As far as movementinternal dynamics – the third level of influence I am analysing – are concerned, I will consider factors such as the heterogeneity versus the rigidity of a movement, as expressed by a top-down hierarchical structure versus a more flexible one allowing for internal rivalries to influence movement behaviour. I will argue that in the case of both movements results show that strong transnational linkages accord them a position of strength vis-a`-vis their respective governments. When these linkages wane or become less important, movements become more susceptible to developments related to the domestic opportunity structure. State strength then begins to make a significant difference: a strong and capable state, able to exert repression, is able to substantially shape the development of an Islamic social movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. A weak state structure such as the one found in Lebanon is unable to confront a

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powerful movement like Hizbullah, and any attempts to do so lead to open conflict. Internal dynamics are at times influential for a movement’s strategic course, particularly for a more heterogeneous movement like the Muslim Brotherhood that has not seen excessively dominant leaders at the helm after the time of its founder, Hassan al-Banna. Hizbullah, on the other hand, has been dominated by strong leader figures connected to Iran’s clerical regime, and any dissent has led to spin-offs rather than produced a decisive change in strategy.

Data Collection and Analysis The main methods I used for collecting empirical data for this book are semi-structured interviews using an interview guide, as well as the analysis of party/movement documents and websites. Interviews are conceptualized as ‘expert interviews’, where an expert is any person who has participated in or has detailed inside knowledge of the event or chain of events being investigated.36 The questions in the interview guide centre on certain key events or people that I identified as likely to provoke opinions, views and ideas, in an effort to generate a personal and continuous narrative from the interviewee. The interviews thus follow the approach used in problem-centred interviews.37 They were recorded and later transcribed in order to carry out a content analysis that looks for certain patterns of argumentation and meaning across the range of interviews. The accounts that emerge from these protocols are firmly grounded within an analysis of the existing literature on the subject, and are triangulated with documents published by the two parties – such as party platforms and strategy documents – as well as with analyses by independent researchers and journalists working on the two movements. Interview partners have been selected based on a preliminary survey of the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah, with an explicit focus on key decision makers within the parties, and where possible, involvement of various factions and age groups within each movement. This has been accompanied by snowballing techniques using interlocutors’ recommendations for additional, suitable interview partners. Interviews have been conducted for this book over a period of four months, from June to October 2011; five of those were conducted with Hizbullah members or persons identifying themselves as ‘sympathizers’ of the party. Two additional Hizbullah-related interviews

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were conducted with a researcher and a journalist, who are both well connected to the Lebanese political scene. Six Lebanese interviewees were male, one female. All Lebanese interviews were conducted in Beirut in June, August, September and October 2011. Seven interviews were conducted with members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, three female, four male. All interviews were conducted in Cairo, in July and September 2011. The Brotherhood members hailed from different backgrounds, held various positions and represented different levels of seniority in the movement. Most, but not all of them, were also members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), founded after the fall of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt. Two interview partners were formerly highly ranked in the Muslim Brotherhood, but left the movement after the Egyptian uprisings of 2011 to found their own political party. One interviewee was a former member of the Brotherhood’s youth movement and a prominent blogger who had suspended his membership over political disagreements. Two interview partners were prominent political science researchers based in Cairo with long-term research experience related to the Muslim Brotherhood.

What has Been Said so Far: The Literature In this section and before delving into my own argument, I will provide a brief survey of major contributions to the fields of Islamist movements and their relations with the state, as well as the literature more directly concerned with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah. I will highlight gaps in the literature that concern the explanation of cooperation or confrontation processes that Islamist parties undergo vis-a`-vis the state. Starting with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, I will then move to a section on Hizbullah in Lebanon, and conclude with a survey of the debate on political Islam more generally, and of the theory of social movements within this current specifically. Essentially, with regard to the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the existing literature considers the movement’s ideological development and long history of conflict with the Egyptian regime. The picture that emerges is one of strong influence by certain leadership figures or circles at certain times, as well as of splits and spin-off movements. Overall, the Muslim Brotherhood is depicted as a relatively heterogeneous organization that

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has moderated over the course of its history. So far, none of the existing works on the movement consider the ups and downs in the movement’s overall strategy, and its responses to the political environment over time – including phases of moderation (defined by non-violent activism) versus phases of (re-)radicalization (defined as use of violence). Works on specific phases of moderation, for example during the 1970s and 1980s, exist; yet, when attempting to consider the bigger picture of why the movement re-radicalized during the 1960s, or withdrew from politics despite ample reason to fight a repressive regime during the 1990s, the literature offers little in the way of understanding these connections and longer-term developments. On the topic of Hizbullah, a striking fact about the abundant literature on the party is the lack of explanations for its apparent internal re-radicalization during the past eight years or so. Many analyses deal with its ideology, conflict with Israel and development on the domestic Lebanese scene. On the latter, the overall gist is that Hizbullah has moderated due to its exposure to the Lebanese political context, meaning that it has become less likely to use violence and engage in radical rhetoric than during its founding years. However, this leaves much to explain when considering Hizbullah’s escalation of the conflict with Israel in 2006, as well as its triggering of what one Hizbullah cadre has termed a ‘mini-civil war’ in 2008, when the party attacked its political opponents by using violence.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was founded by al-Banna in 1928, and most periods and aspects of its history have received scholarly scrutiny. Richard Mitchell’s early English-language work on the Brotherhood was originally written during a period of relative decline for the movement, namely, the Egyptian regime’s heavy and violent crackdown in the 1960s.38 Consequently, he considers the ‘rise and decline’ of the Brotherhood as faced with the Egyptian regime and highlights its exceptional mobilizational record, as well as its leadership’s effective use of ideology and religion in building a mass movement, followed by its turn to more radical policies and subsequent decline. Another major Englishlanguage work on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is Brynjar Lia’s book on the period 1928–42, in which he analyses the transformation of religious concepts employed by the Brotherhood and the ways in which

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it has managed to reinterpret some of them for the sake of organizational development.39 Lia especially covers the period of rapid expansion of the Brotherhood during the 1930s, when the movement’s growth seemed to take on the character of an unstoppable success story. He attributes this to the interplay of a number of factors, notably the charismatic leadership of al-Banna, the efficient organizational structure of the movement, as well as the development of its political and religious ideologies. A comprehensive overview of the Brotherhood’s history in Egypt is Amr Elshobaki’s 2009 volume using a broad range of Arabic-language sources and covering its various ideological and organizational transformations.40 Abd el-Monem Said considers the interrelationship of state and religion in Egypt, as exemplified by the Brotherhood’s confrontation with the state since its establishment, and looks at recent ideological developments and transformations within the movement from a policy perspective.41 Hesham al-Awadi’s analysis of the interrelationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime is particularly interesting for this study’s approach, as he considers the legitimization strategies employed by both the regime and the Brotherhood over time, the ways in which they interact, as well as the results this has produced for both sides for the period 1982– 2000.42 Also pertinent to the focus of this analysis is Omar Ashour’s comparative study of the de-radicalization processes of several Islamist movements, in which he also considers the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.43 He compares several variables across a number of cases and concludes that for the Brotherhood, a combination of state repression, leadership, organizational learning and selective inducements provided by the state led to the lasting de-radicalization of the movement and the fact that it has eschewed the use of violence even in the face of renewed and severe repressive measures on the part of the Mubarak regime.44 Both Ivesa Lu¨bben and Mona el-Ghobashy consider the Brotherhood’s transformation from a mass-based social movement to a political party and argue that the promulgation of concrete policies in many areas turns the Brotherhood into a political actor which should be approached like any other, and which employs strategic calculations just as any other political actor would.45 Finally, Gudrun Kra¨mer’s biography of al-Banna is an important resource on the movement’s early history and draws on all the major Arabic-language as well as Englishlanguage publications.46

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Several works have come up with hypotheses regarding the effects of state repression on the behaviour of the Muslim Brotherhood. As mentioned above, Ashour attributes the lasting de-radicalization and transformation towards non-violence by the Muslim Brotherhood to a combination of factors. Strong leadership by charismatic and credible figures within the movement is at the top of the list in his account.47 The fact that several commanders of the Muslim Brotherhood’s armed wing – active in the 1940s and 1950s – backed a transition to non-violence was, in his view, instrumental and provided the necessary legitimacy for such a move in the eyes of the majority of movement followers. The reasons for the reassessment, according to Ashour, are primarily due to the fact that key Brotherhood leaders rationally concluded that armed resistance against the powerfully superior regime or government was doomed to fail48 due to heavy repression. They therefore advocated a change in strategy towards non-violent resistance, and a book published in 1977 in the name of al-Hudaybi, the organization’s Supreme Guide at the time, clarified that violence ‘will not be the ideological preference of the mainstream MB’.49 It is important to note that the limitation of ‘mainstream MB’ applies, and that, as Ashour goes on to note, the harsh repression experienced by many Islamist activists in Egypt during the 1960s ‘has led to the further radicalization of a group of young MB activists. Since the MB leadership was not interested in another confrontation, this group ultimately split from the MB and founded the first takfiri organization in the twentieth century: Jama’at al-Muslimin.’50 Al-Awadi, in his account of the interaction between the Mubarak regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, considers the search for legitimacy to be a crucial factor shaping the relationship between the two. At the beginning of his rule, Mubarak, coming from an exclusively military background and relatively inexperienced at politics, granted comparatively wide spaces of action to the Muslim Brotherhood in order to shore up his acceptance and legitimacy in society.51 This political opportunity space was used by the Brotherhood for rebuilding the tanzim, the network of societal organizations that forms the backbone of the movement’s strength, and which had suffered during previous years of state repression. Al-Awadi paints a picture of an intertwined conflict over legitimacy, taking one possible perspective on how structures and agency interact with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

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This perspective sees both sides – the mainstream of the Muslim Brotherhood on one hand and the Mubarak regime on the other – essentially involved in a struggle for strength and survival, reacting to any possible threats emanating from the other side by adapting their strategies accordingly. Practically and in a temporal sense, the Brotherhood essentially followed the lead taken by the regime, occupying whatever space was left to the movement by the regime, resorting to new avenues for gaining political influence and asserting strength politically when backed up by a solid social base of influence embodied in the tanzim. Where al-Awadi’s account remains fairly vague, however, is on the content of the Muslim Brotherhood strategy, which emerges as mostly concentrated on self-preservation and increasing the movement’s influence in Egyptian politics and society. This might be a result of the Brotherhood’s own lack of an articulated strategy during the period under scrutiny for al-Awadi, namely, 1982–2000. As some internal documents of the Muslim Brotherhood obtained by him show, there was an awareness on the part of the movement that merely reacting to the regime’s strategy would deprive it of agency and leave its long-term plans subject to the mercy of openings or crackdowns emanating from the regime.52 Yet, little was said by the Muslim Brotherhood on a future vision for Egypt and on what should be done in practical terms, instead focusing on how the Brotherhood might be able to develop and expand as an organization in spite of the many obstacles thrown in front of it by a repressive and power-hungry regime. A second issue that al-Awadi’s account remains silent about is why the Brotherhood decided to re-enter the political arena during the 1990s at all, given its historical experience of violent regime response and a wave of arrests, military trials and torture each time it tried to act politically. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham attempts to answer this question in her account of political mobilization by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.53 She links structural factors to the question of agency and analyses the Brotherhood’s vast network of educational and religious organizations performing da’wa, religious education and mobilization, which in a sense rebrands religiosity as an all-encompassing social and political vision rather than a personal matter of faith. Specifically, she highlights the motivations for mobilization among lower-middle-class youth, arguing that from a rational choice perspective, young people in Egypt would have

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been rationally compelled to stay out of politics for fear of regime repression in the form of very tangible measures such as imprisonment, torture, as well as endangering one’s own and one’s family’s livelihood.54 Rosefsky Wickham shows how, regardless of these considerations, young student leaders of the Islamist movement carried their civil society mobilization plainly into the political arena of trade unions and professional syndicates by capturing most of the politically influential unions and syndicates during elections in the 1980s. In this, they were largely propelled by the logic of their own mobilization and activism: notions such as ‘speaking truth to power’, representing the younger generation in the face of an old-fashioned, unrepresentative and bureaucratic state, and challenging the established order to represent a ‘more humane and responsive political tradition’ were carrying these student leaders into politics notwithstanding the real risk of arrest and torture.55 She also contends that the Muslim Brotherhood’s very success was what triggered a cycle of counter-mobilization on the part of the regime, restricting the possibilities of political action in the student and professional unions, and sentencing many ‘middle-generation’ activists of the Brotherhood to prison terms or hard labour.56 Only as long as the Muslim Brotherhood stayed away from the ‘political center’, as Rosefsky Wickham calls it, did the regime remain tolerant of its activities. The subsequent crackdown on the movement went hand in hand with an increased opening to other Islamist actors within society, with which the state hoped to further harness and control the Islamist challenge to its ruling power. This ‘creeping Islamization’ of the Egyptian state is also one of the themes of Bayat’s influential comparative account of political Islam in Egypt and Iran.57 Bayat elaborates on this notion and relates it to that of a ‘passive revolution’: The tidal wave of Islamism that seemed poised to wash away the Egyptian state actually left it intact and subsided by the late 1990s. In fact, the state skilfully survived the wave, weathered its initial crash ashore, and rode its smooth sprawl into society. But along the way society, state, and movement all went through significant change. [. . .] And the Egyptian state, by appropriating aspects of conservative religiosity and nationalist sentiment underwent an

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Islamic ‘passive revolution,’ a sort of managed religious restoration in which the state, in reality the target of the change, succeeded in staying in charge.58 Bayat argues that the Egyptian state has been relatively successful in suppressing the challenge presented by political Islam in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. From putting up a real threat to state authority in the early 1990s, by the 2000s the movement – aided by its own undemocratic nature and lack of intellectual development – had sunk into relative obscurity as a direct result of harsh state repression: However, the internal dynamics of Islamist movements, in addition to the dramatic domestic and international events at the turn of the century such as the September 11 attacks, have only reinforced gradual change in the nature of Islamism from a political project challenging the state to one concerned with personal piety, ethical concerns, and global malaise.59 He even considers the 17-seat gain for the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2000 parliamentary elections only a temporary comeback and essentially views the longer-term vision of the Brotherhood gradual reform project as having failed and been partially appropriated by the state. Bayat concludes with a positive appraisal of the reform capacities inherent in Egypt’s secular opposition movements such as Kifaya (Enough), which increasingly challenged the status quo in Egypt from 2005 onwards. Mohammed Hafez distinguishes between pre-emptive and reactive repression: pre-emptive refers to the use of repressive measures – defined in Tilly’s terms as actions that ‘raise the contenders’ cost of collective action’60 – before the actual occurrence of mobilization around a given topic,61 while reactive repression implies that mobilization by an opposition or contender movement had already begun by the time the government/incumbent reacted repressively. According to Hafez, ‘preemptive repression will likely discourage rebellion by Islamist movements’, while ‘reactive repression [. . .] predisposes opposition movements towards rebellion’.62 The main causal link making the difference between the effects of pre-emptive and reactive repression, respectively, is the build-up of close personal ties between movement activists. Once they have been knit, a movement is less likely to become

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intimidated or negatively affected by repression, and more likely to resort to countermeasures in order to stand up for its cause. According to his framework, we should look to reactive and ‘indiscriminate’ repression as triggers for violence used by Islamist movements. In a synthesis of various strands of Social Movement Theory, Hafez sees these types of violence as likely to trigger splinter groups within Islamist movements that are prone to developing ‘anti-system’ frames and to using violence.63 While his model may help explain selected events in the Egyptian and Algerian cases, and contains propositions relevant to small group dynamics, it does not explain (nor does it attempt to explain) the behaviour of larger, mainstream Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, by focusing on the radicalization of the few, Hafez’s work leaves unanswered the question of how to explain the lack of radicalization of the many, even in the face of state repression. Hafez integrates internal group dynamics and framing processes, but only those that point in one direction, that is, towards the use of violence and radicalization. Noha Antar stresses that the arrangement between an officially banned Muslim Brotherhood and a repressive regime that is worried about its legitimacy and its ability to stay in power was in fact mutually beneficial.64 In this logic, the fact that the Brotherhood was banned and repressed by the regime bought it public support and sympathy for being the regime’s ‘victim’. Additionally, its presence in professional syndicates from the 1980s onwards, but more so, its ability to take part in the political process by fielding ‘independent’ candidates, afforded the Brotherhood a platform to voice its ideas and a means of generating publicity, reaching out to its constituents and recruiting new members. In return for granting this limited autonomy and visibility to the movement, the regime was afforded new capabilities contributing to its output legitimacy. According to Antar, the many social services offered by the Brotherhood created the illusion among the public that the regime was still ‘capable of solving problems’. In consequence, these spaces of activity for the Brotherhood had a stabilizing effect for the regime.65 Bayat’s work provides perspective on the interrelationship of the state and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, focusing on state-society relations and providing a broader picture of societal developments than both al-Awadi’s and Rosefsky Wickham’s works do. Like their accounts,

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however, Bayat stays relatively silent on the substantial contents of or changes in the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategies, assuming a relatively linear strategic outlook aimed at increasing political power and transforming society as well as the state towards a more Islamic perspective. The grey zones, nuances and strategy changes within the Muslim Brotherhood, often an expression of conflicts between competing factions, are the topic of Barbara Zollner’s book on the Muslim Brotherhood during the period of al-Hudaybi’s leadership.66 Her careful historical analysis exposes the critical role that this period has played in turning the Muslim Brotherhood into a peaceful opposition movement, leaving behind its rather violent beginnings despite the harsh repressive measures the regime took against the Brotherhood. Essentially, in her account it is thus the power of an idea, put forward by a leader and embraced by a close circle around him, that spoke to a majority of the movement’s members and thus came to form a guiding principle for the Brotherhood’s future political action vis-a`-vis the state. Zollner argues that al-Hudaybi’s grounding of this ideology in a religious and jurisprudential discussion in the book Du’at la qudat (Preachers not Judges), and his subsequent achievement of a clear juxtaposition of his ideas with the influential and more radical thought of Qutb, has been crucial in bringing about the transformation towards non-violence. What is lacking in her perspective, as in most others, is how and why the leadership may have possibly been responding to membership demands; in short, the internal relations between grassroots and leadership are largely assumed by Zollner, and remain the black box of her study. Several other authors focus on leadership issues within the Muslim Brotherhood. Diaa Rashwan et al.’s short overview of reform initiatives within the Muslim Brotherhood assumes that leadership struggles are both the outcome and frequently the initiation of changes in the relationship with the state.67 Similarly, Khalil al-Anani perceives a split between a very young generation of Brotherhood bloggers who openly confront the movement elders about internal democracy and transparent decision making, which they perceive to be lacking.68 In time, he argues that this could influence the movement’s overall strategy towards embracing human rights, democracy and transparency, as many young activists within the movement express such priorities and are willing to campaign for a change in strategy from within the organization.

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Generational changes, fragmentation and splits, as well as the actions of influential individuals are at the heart of additional explanations of the Muslim Brotherhood’s behavioural choices. During the founding period of the Muslim Brothers, the influence of al-Banna was of course paramount for the general development of the Brotherhood as an organization. From 1928 until his death in 1949, he shaped the structure and activities of the movement with his frequently authoritarian leadership style, often instigating conflicts inside the movement.69 Yet, it may have been partly due to this internal authoritarianism that he lost legitimacy in the eyes of other movement members, who were willing to follow a more confrontational and violent strategy.70 They ultimately acted outside of al-Banna’s control within the influential armed wing, the Special Apparatus (al-Nizam al-Khass).71 Consequently, individual actions and conflicts between individuals seem to have played a major role in determining the Brotherhood’s overall strategy in the 1930s and 1940s. El-Ghobashy argues that ‘the institutional rules of authoritarian electoral politics have led to both organizational and ideological change within the group.’72 Using the ideological transformation of the German Social Democratic Party as a model, she argues that the Muslim Brotherhood has undergone a profound and lasting moderation driven by the ‘1970s Generation’, a number of relatively young members who gave the movement a more moderate outlook: ‘Hassan al-Banna’s Society of Muslim Brothers was instead irrevocably transformed into a flexible political party that is highly responsive to the unforgiving calculus of electoral politics. The Muslim Brothers have left no political opportunity untapped.’73 El-Ghobashy thus combines structural factors as background conditions with actor-related aspects such as generational change and internal party dynamics. Other authors agree that participation in the political process has set in motion different mechanisms within the Muslim Brotherhood that have led to a moderation of its position. Antar points out that the mere fact the Brotherhood campaigned for the parliamentary elections of 2005 with a political platform forced it to declare its position on a number of issues.74 This has led to some internal debate. The general gist of several case studies on Islamist political parties and their behaviour on the political sphere, carried out by Asseburg et al., also points towards the generally moderating influence that participation in the political process has had on Islamist movements.75

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There were also attempts at moderation and integration into the political system on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood, manifested in the attempt to form a political party, Wasat. This well-researched development in the Brotherhood’s strategy represents, in the words of one scholar, ‘a response to a period of relative tolerance in Mubarak’s Egypt’.76 Structural factors and political opportunities are invoked as major facilitating conditions for the moderation in Muslim Brotherhood strategy that ultimately produced the Wasat Party. Joshua Stacher and Rosefsky Wickham basically agree that a combination of contextual and movement-internal factors brought about the Wasat’s establishment. While a lack of repression during the first years of the Mubarak regime led to new voices within the Islamic movement in Egypt forming the Wasatiyya trend, that is the Wasat Party’s ideological base, the crackdown on all opposition forces, and especially the Muslim Brotherhood, after the 1995 elections represents the enabling mechanism that led to the actual formation of the party in 1996 (and its subsequent rejection by the Political Parties Committee). Both Stacher and Rosefsky Wickham attribute it to the rational calculation on the part of movement activists that a more ‘moderate’ party represented a better shot at avoiding further repression on the part of the regime.77 Several publications cover the international dimension of the Muslim Brotherhood. Johannes Grundmann compares the structures of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood to that of the Muslim World League and finds the former to be an opaque body of very little ascertainable impact today,78 a view echoed by Nathan Brown.79 This seems remarkable given that historically, the Muslim Brotherhood had a much more regional outlook and partially framed its mission as including the liberation of Palestine and the halting of any expansion designs on the part of Zionist Israel, an ideological phase comprehensively documented by Abd al-Fattah el-Awaisi.80 El-Awaisi argues that the founding of the State of Israel and the threat of further occupation of Arab territories were the main reasons behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s establishment of a secret armed wing, the so-called Special Apparatus, which was sent to fight in the Arab revolt in Palestine during 1936– 9, as well as the fighting against the British during the 1956 Suez crisis.81 Taking these arguments together, it seems that the Muslim Brotherhood never institutionalized the transnational character of its political aspirations that, according to el-Awaisi, had been a

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formative element during the 1930s and 1940s. As a result, both the link to the Israel –Palestine conflict as well as the framing of the Muslim Brotherhood as a transnational movement that encompasses the grievances and aspirations of Muslims outside of Egypt were successively dropped. The Brotherhood in Egypt, while being recognized as the founding and leading ‘branch’ of the movement when compared to its sister organizations in other Arab countries, maintains few links with Brotherhood organizations beyond its home country. Brown relates an episode during a meeting with the leaders of a ‘Brotherhood-inspired movement in another Arab state’ (that is, not Egypt) in which his interlocutors were trying to remember the name of the new head of the Egyptian Brotherhood and Supreme Guide of the movement as a whole. The Islamist leaders began to brainstorm for the name between them, which was eventually interjected by the Western researcher.82 This episode goes a long way towards illustrating how weak the ties are between the Egyptian ‘mother’ branch of the movement and branches or similar organizations in other countries. A somewhat contrasting narrative is provided in a volume on the Muslim Brotherhood edited by Barry Rubin.83 In his introduction, Rubin places the Brotherhood on a spectrum of various Islamist organizations, arguing that as a ‘moderate’ movement, it differs from jihadist ones. He suggests that the choice of using violence has never been ruled out on principle by the Brotherhood, and that the different behaviours displayed by different movement branches in various countries are tactical choices. He reads the movement as more internationally connected than most other analysts, and considers it a transnational organization with national chapters and a common vision. Another transnational factor that is supposed to influence the behaviour of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, is found in the work and preaching of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an influential Egyptian cleric living in Qatar. Nicknamed the ‘global mufti’ for his strong presence in social media and on the internet,84 al-Qaradawi publishes extensively on the everyday practice of ‘correct’ Islam. The use of cheap and accessible communication channels, such as small pamphlets, radio and TV appearances, as well as several websites, has allowed al-Qaradawi to become a chief reference for proper Islamic behaviour throughout Egypt and the Arab world. Since 1996, he has appeared in an immensely

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popular TV show titled Shari’a and Life on Al Jazeera, which also deals with issues of the everyday application of Islamic principles. Beyond providing advice to followers and believers, however, al-Qaradawi has always been closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational structures, having become a member of the movement during its early years and allegedly acted as its spokesperson at the religious institution of Al-Azhar in the 1940s.85 Kra¨mer points out that through his extensive international travel to conferences and meetings, as well as his many contacts throughout the Islamic world, al-Qaradawi has acquainted most leadership figures within the Brotherhood and kept in close touch with them, while at the same time being careful not to declare his allegiance with the banned movement too openly.86 Assessments of the content and direction of al-Qaradawi’s teaching varies somewhat; the general opinion among scholars attests a certain ambiguity to his fatwas and pronouncements. While Kra¨mer points out that al-Qaradawi insists on seeing Islam as a positive guidance for individuals’ lives, and not as a negative, limiting one, and that he embraces moderate and pragmatic principles in many of his general statements, his positions on tangible issues are much more conservative and orthodox.87 On apostasy, for example, there is no room for arguing for the Islamic scholar, and he firmly labels it as a crime to be punished.88 Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen concurs by labing al-Qaradawi’s teachings ‘pragmatic, but not moderate’.89 Al-Qaradawi’s influence on the Muslim Brotherhood is hard to measure objectively, and even if it were, it would most likely be hard to determine the direction in which he might influence the thinking and acting of Muslim Brotherhood leaders – towards a more liberal approach where they might be pragmatic, or towards greater orthodoxy. Yet, his activities and publications, and the intellectual field of gravity they create, might come into play nonetheless, as I will argue below that returnees from Qatari exile played an important role for the strategies embraced by the Brotherhood at certain points in time.

Hizbullah Hizbullah’s comparatively short history since its establishment in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 1982 has also been extensively covered. One of the first historical accounts of the mobilization of Hizbullah’s Shiʽi community is Augustus Richard Norton’s ‘Amal and the Shiʽa’,

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which depicts the rise and success of the Amal movement initially led by a Shiʽi cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr.90 In an updated historical account, Norton uses many years of residence and fieldwork in South Lebanon, as well as the resulting close contacts with party members and leaders, for an analysis of the party’s emergence and development, both in terms of its religious as well as its political outlook.91 He concludes that Hizbullah’s deep entanglement in Lebanese and regional politics make it a force to be reckoned with by all Lebanese parties but also by neighbouring states. Judith Palmer Harik also considers Hizbullah’s historical development, with a special focus on its perception by US policy makers, which for a long time perceived the movement as solely a terrorist organization.92 Consequently, Palmer Harik traces the strategies that Hizbullah has employed in becoming part of the Lebanese and regional political scene: on the one hand, its military resistance against Israel that was solely directed at military targets, and on the other hand its self-portrayal as a Lebanese political party. She essentially perceives these as conscious strategies aimed at changing Hizbullah’s image as a terrorist group in Lebanon, and making it more amenable to outside observers and less likely to become the target of direct US or Israeli military action. Several works tackle the history of Hizbullah with a political-science analytical framework, focusing on the party’s interaction with the domestic political environment. These include Nizar Hamzeh’s analysis of Hizbullah’s ideology, decision-making structure and action within Lebanese politics, addressing the question of whether and to what degree becoming part of the political system in Lebanon has transformed the movement.93 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb provides a well-informed analysis of Hizbullah’s political and religious discourse, based on numerous interviews with key party members.94 She concludes that the movement has evolved from adopting a revolutionary rhetoric and logic towards a resistance movement that rationally calculates its strategies, weighing its resistance activities against its participation in Lebanese politics while always prioritizing the former. Joseph Alagha also traces a process of moderation in the evolution of Hizbullah: he analyses key Hizbullah documents from its first programme published in 1985 – referred to as the ‘Open Letter’ – to its 2009 electoral platform, complemented by interviews with party members and representatives. He perceives a relatively small number of strategic positions, of which resistance

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against Israel has remained a constant throughout the movement’s history, while others such as the rejection of the Lebanese political system and the demand for an Islamic state have been dropped or modified over time.95 Jean-Loup Samaan juxtaposes external representations of Hizbullah as a ‘terrorist’ organization with the party’s own narrative of itself as a resistance movement by conducting a discourse analysis.96 He then uses game-theoretical models in order to show how these two conflicting narratives have interacted and clashed during certain conflictual episodes, demonstrating how conflict on a discursive level can lead to quite tangible economic and security results. Stephan Rosiny considers Hizbullah’s evolution from its more radical origins as a terrorist organization to the ‘middle of society’ with a special focus on its social milieu.97 Concerning the international dimensions of the movement, Walid Charara and Fre´de´ric Domont caution against perceiving Hizbullah as a transnational Islamist movement in the mould of al-Qaeda and others.98 They see Hizbullah as firmly entrenched in the Lebanese scene and stress its inherently nationalist character and outlook. An edited volume with contributions by many prominent and emerging scholars in the field, Mervin’s overview of Hizbullah’s many facets and incarnations also includes chapters on the transnational linkages of Hizbullah, most importantly of course its relations with Iran and Syria.99 Mervin herself portrays the Hizbullah– Iran relationship as having evolved from an ‘extension’ of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran inside Lebanon, into greater independence from – the however still crucial – Iranian influence by 2008. Among other things, she attributes this to changes in Iranian politics after 1989, with a moderation under President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani leaving Hizbullah the manoeuvring space needed for a Lebanonization or infitah (opening) towards other political parties in Lebanon.100 As for Hizbullah’s relations with its other main ally in the region, Syria, Olfa Lamloum paints a picture of frequent ups and downs, as Syrian support for Hizbullah has ebbed and flowed in line with the former’s other interests in the region.101 Where Syria was seeking to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon, it would withdraw or lessen its support to Hizbullah and vice versa. This is in line with the frequently employed description of the Syria – Hizbullah relationship as a ‘marriage of convenience’102 rather than an essential or identity-based linkage.103

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Abbas William Samii concurs that the relations between Syria and Hizbullah especially, but also between Iran and Hizbullah have been characterized by pragmatism and expediency. He argues that Hizbullah would not endanger its domestic goals by fighting for the interests of either Syria or Iran, short of an external attack.104 He makes the same proposition regarding the opposite relationship, arguing that neither Iran nor Syria would go out of their way to support Hizbullah; a statement that certainly seems more likely in 2013 for the case of Syria, which is embroiled in a violent civil war at the time of writing and unlikely, as a state, to involve itself in other battlefields. A volume edited by Rula Abisaab and Houchang Chehabi considers Iranian– Lebanese relations during the past 500 years, and the essays focusing on recent history add much nuance and detail to the Iran – Hizbullah relationship.105 The inclusion of substantial amounts of Persian-language literature allows the authors an in-depth survey of relations between different players within the Iranian regime on the one hand, and Hizbullah on the other. The picture that emerges gives an account of the varying priorities of Iranian as well as Hizbullah actors over time, and their decisions appear much more driven by circumstance and contingencies than for instance in Naim Qassem’s linear, teleological account.106 Many policy-related publications focus exclusively on the close links between Hizbullah, Iran and Syria, reaching the conclusion – based on an analysis of capabilities, relations and discourses – that Hizbullah mainly serves as a proxy in the confrontation between a ‘rejectionist’ front composed of Iran and Syria on the one hand, and the US, Israel, Saudi-Arabia and France on the other. This is a view also held by the large body of literature that exclusively considers Hizbullah a terrorist organization, often turning a blind eye to the many other facets of the movement and focusing exclusively on its conflict with Israel.107 The notion that Hizbullah is a terrorist organization driven by inalienable, ideological concerns is challenged by Rola El Husseini, who argues that taking international pressure off Hizbullah, and reassuring the Lebanese Shiʽi community that Israel no longer represents a physical threat to South Lebanon, would lead to a greater Lebanonization of Hizbullah. According to her argument, this would imply a toning down of resistance rhetoric and greater participation in Lebanese politics and institutions.108

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Hizbullah has been the object of several studies from a Social Movement Theory perspective, which analyses its network of social institutions and their connection with Hizbullah’s political strategies within the Lebanese political system. Erik Mohns argues that Hizbullah has responded to several enabling and restraining factors in its approach to and participation in the Lebanese political system after 1990.109 Lara Deeb’s ethnographic study of women’s construction of a religiously grounded sense of modernity and cosmopolitanism in Beirut’s southern suburbs is a major contribution to the literature. Deeb dislodges the ‘Western’ notion of the incompatibility of religiosity and modernity, while at the same time providing a very dense and engaging account of the life of pious Shiʽi women in Lebanon.110 Simon Haddad, meanwhile, did quantitative survey research on the social origins of support for Hizbullah and found that religiosity is a key explanatory factor for adherence to Hizbullah as an organization, but that, contrary to most expectations, dissatisfaction with government services was not.111 Although most comparative country studies on state–society relations tend to exclude Lebanon – and hence, Hizbullah – on the grounds that the state poses an exception to most parameters due to its particular power-sharing arrangement and ongoing conflict with Israel, Hizbullah has been analysed as part of some comparative research designs. Palmer Harik’s contribution to an edited volume on non-state armed actors in world politics concludes that the prospects for Hizbullah disarming and turning into a solely political actor remain slim, especially given the fact that its use of violence during the past several years has resulted in increased political influence and has thus provided substantial benefits for the movement.112 David Lawrence Phillips’ comparative overview of Islamic movements and their moderation processes provides short descriptions of the ideology, structure and relations to the state of a number of movements including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah and Hamas.113 Last but not least are the voices of key Hizbullah leaders themselves. Nicholas Noe’s publication of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s key public speeches held between 1986 and 2006, translated by Ellen Khouri, provides the party leader’s key positions on many crucial questions surrounding the movement, tracing an evolution from more radical and resistance-oriented ideas towards a repositioning and moderation vis-a`-vis other political players in Lebanon.114 Hizbullah’s

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Deputy Secretary-General Qassem has published an in-depth account of the party’s vision and goals, organizational structure, key historical milestones, as well as its regional and international relations.115 These testimonies of course provide little, if any, critical reflection on Hizbullah’s development and positions, instead presenting the movement’s stances as always having been strategically chosen, coherent, natural and generally quite unproblematic. However, they are crucial documents of the party’s vision that need to be taken into account and their omissions and lacunae might be more telling than their actual words for an analysis of the party’s strategies.

Political Islam and the state The body of literature concerned with the topic of political Islam is vast, and has essentially – in its current form – developed during the second half of the twentieth century. Amr Hamzawy helpfully notes that the terms islami (Islamic) and usuli (fundamentalist) only appeared in Arabic writings on the subject after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981.116 The point of this short overview is not to summarize or evaluate the entire literature related to the notion of political Islam, but to identify those contributions that have shaped the debate regarding the relationship between Islamist actors and the modern state. Kra¨mer’s work on Islam and politics in general, as well as democracy in particular, remains critical. She points out that Islamist political movements are shaped by their environments to the same degree that other actors are. In most settings and for long periods of time, they have, however, neglected the analysis of their political environment – their stance on the use of opposition roles, on a multi-party system in general or on the various opportunities and challenges of political participation have remained vague at best. This translates into a peculiarly ‘unpolitical’ understanding of the political, in which moral discourses based on Islam have often replaced the development of tangible positions on individual issues.117 Prefiguring the debate are also analyses and observations that stress the ‘political normality’ of political Islam, comparing it to conservatism or Christian democratic politics in Europe, for instance.118 For my own research, this forms a point of departure in trying to assess Islamist movements’ behaviour as political actors, not as ideology-driven or purely religious ones. In this vein, Mohammed Ayoob challenges the

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notion that Islam and politics have always been inseparably linked, portraying it as a frequent misperception.119 Instead, there has been a clear separation between the political and the religious realms throughout Arab and Islamic history, with the temporal frequently winning out over the religious. Islamic groups and movements, in other words, have been engaged in worldly politics throughout history, and there is no specific ‘essence’ to Islam that pre-determines how actors that define themselves as Islamic behave in politics. Hence the necessity to reaffirm that the politics of Islamic groups today may be religiously motivated, but it is not the case that religion has dominated politics when it comes to the history of political Islam. This is a counterpoint to works such as Bassam Tibi’s, who holds that Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to Western-dominated modernization is inevitable and on the rise.120 Bassam Tibi stresses the fact that Islam (he tends to speak of the religion as a whole as opposed to individual actors) is especially prone to dominating the political sphere and to developing radical visions for a religiously dominated state.121 Brown’s historical study of the relationship between state and Islam in a variety of contexts,122 in contrast, also highlights the fact that religion and politics are separate realms for many Islamist actors. Which interpretations of Islam have influenced certain groups, how they have developed their political agenda and related to their respective political surroundings then becomes a matter of empirical study – something that Jillian Schwedler terms the ‘life cycle’ approach to modern Islamist groups. While engaged in the empirical analysis of various Islamist parties herself, Schwedler is critical of the fact that scholars are preoccupied with analysing different movements’ life cycles: their foundation, methods of enlarging the movement and the evolution of their relations with their respective political systems remain the focus of most studies, and in doing so largely respond to common Western prejudices that ‘Islam’ is a coherent and often violent political ideology, rather than a religion interpreted differently in various contexts. Schwedler argues for moving away from this rather restrictive research programme, which narrows the field of scholarly work, and towards a new set of questions evolving around the everyday practice of religion, and of how ordinary people affect their societies. I agree with Schwedler’s criticism that starting one’s analysis from the common prejudice that Islam determines politics, and then dislodging that very notion, is

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something that limits a scholar’s perspective and furthermore, this has been done a number of times. However, I still regard a deeper understanding of how Islamist organizations behave as political and as social actors as necessary – especially an understanding that puts them on par with other actors and does not essentialize them as Islamic, and therefore as ‘different’. Several scholars of political Islam use a social movement perspective and turn away from classical frameworks that prioritize organizations, such as Bayat123 or Peter Mandaville.124 The latter uses the analytical framework of new social movements to study in which ways people change a prevailing order by living today the very changes they would like to see implemented on a societal scale in the future. Mandaville reviews the work of Olivier Roy in his discussion of political Islam: Roy had declared the ‘failure of political Islam’125 in an influential work as early as 1996 and developed the concept of ‘post-Islamism’ to account for the increasing privatization of religion in many Muslim countries.126 Roy’s argument contends that broad-based movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood are no longer regarded as harbingers of desired change by a majority of Muslims, who instead turn inwards and express their religiosity in their private lives, rather than seeking to affect their political contexts. Mandaville, however, takes this argument a step further and posits that Roy’s concept of individualization falls short because it regards as ‘political’ only the exercise of state power, while Mandaville himself attributes political potential for change to everyday practices such as lobbying for observance of Islamic principles in business or finance. Additionally, Rachid Ouaissa situates the evolution of Islamic social movements within a class framework.127 He views the movements as able to draft the lower classes into its ranks, while also attracting an upwardly mobile middle class that often takes leading positions within a movement. The fact that this middle class is not granted further room for social or political advancement leads to its disillusionment. In Ouaissa’s analytical framework, based in turn on Nazih Ayubi’s work,128 Islamic social movements are made up of a ‘coalition of losers’ produced by the existing regimes, including groups such as ‘segments of the bourgeoisie, state employees-turnedproletarians, engineers, an industrial proletariat, an under-challenged intelligentsia, notables, agrarian capitalists and students’.129 The more these movements subsequently gain access to the political system in

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authoritarian regimes, the more pragmatic and shaped by their political environments they become, and the less able they are to cater to and to control their original constituents. Their social and economic programmes eventually end up adapting to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) structural adjustment agenda and thus embrace ‘neo-liberal principles’.130 Large Islamic movements still remain important political players in many countries in the Middle East, and hence remain a worthwhile field of inquiry. In fact, by bringing in a perspective that considers both the individual-level activism of large movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah as well as their political work, the field of Social Movement Theory offers an interesting perspective for a better understanding of how such movements function. Social Movement Theory has been increasingly applied to the study of Islamic parties and movements in the Middle East during the past decade or so; Wiktorowicz’s edited volume remains an influential contribution, gathering many analyses of most of the important Islamic movements in the Arab world, and pioneering the application of Social Movement Theory in this field.131 The main contribution of this work is its connection between the analysis of movement dynamics on both the micro and macro levels, encompassing an understanding of how movements gather strength through mobilizing their followers, and how they apply this strength in the political arena. The contributions of Hafez, and Hafez and Wiktorowicz in the edited volume Islamic Activism consider the use of violence by large Islamic movements in Egypt and Algeria.132 Hafez’s analysis of ‘anticivilian violence’ in Algeria uses most of the key tools of Social Movement Theory in order to understand how Islamic groups in the country came to massacre civilians: political process, resource mobilization and framing. These had been developed in the context of social movements in the US or Europe, such as the US civil rights movement or student movements in European countries.133 Hafez convincingly applies them to the Algerian context, arguing that a combination of state repression, exclusive and secretive mobilization as a response to that repression, as well as the increasing use of ‘anti-system frames’ calling for violent counter-action against a system and society portrayed as alien and hostile, brought about a radicalization of the Groupe Islamiste Arme´ (GIA) that culminated in the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians and state representatives during the 1990s. While Hafez’s

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portrayal of events in Algeria seems pertinent in retrospect, a cursory comparison with other movements in repressive contexts brings up the question whether the concepts of Social Movement Theory are able to identify sufficient conditions for the use or rejection of violence, or whether they suffer from what has been called ‘hindsight bias’ in the social sciences.134 The combination of state repression, secretive organizational structures and violent anti-system rhetoric can be found in other contexts, for instance Egypt, where it has not always produced the same type of violence, or even any violent outcome at all: Egyptian Islamic groups using violence rarely targeted Egyptian civilians at random, nor has the Muslim Brotherhood, in whose history Hafez’s combination of factors was frequently present, always resorted to using violence (and never against civilians). Hafez’s writings also demonstrate the difficulty inherent in making generalizable statements concerning the triggers for violent action by Islamic groups, as he put forward the thesis that state repression brings about what he terms ‘Muslim rebellions’.135 This, again, seems difficult to maintain considering contradictory phenomena such as the longstanding employment of non-violent means of resistance and participation by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the face of fierce state repression over sustained periods of time.136 Additionally, recent research on the effects of violent state repression on protest movements shows that a wide range of responses persists: some movements moderate, some radicalize, others simply give in to repression and dissolve.137 In this context, any assertion of the causal effects of repression remains difficult to uphold and the phenomenon clearly needs more scrutiny. Overall, the contributions to Wiktorowicz’s edited volume remain somewhat in the framework of the ‘life-cycle’ approach, considering the mechanisms of mobilization and contestation in various national contexts by using the analytical toolbox supplied by Social Movement Theory. Other works in this vein are Rosefsky Wickham’s analysis of the political mobilization undertaken by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,138 as well as Janine Clark’s account of the role of middleclass networks in social welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen.139 As the topic of the use of violence shows, however, more analytical work remains to be done on specific questions to make Social Movement Theory frameworks hold up beyond a single national context in the

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Middle East. In order to do this concerning the question of when Islamic movements use violence, and under which conditions they are willing to participate in electoral politics and ‘moderate’, it is important to consider the by now extensive literature on the ‘radicalizationmoderation’ question. This has been a major field of research both in political Islam more generally, and also within Social Movement Theory applied to Islamic activism. Growing out of a general recognition that conventional relative deprivation theory cannot account by itself for the mobilization of Islamic groups, this body of work has sought to refine arguments accounting for the radicalization (leading to use of violence) or the moderation (resulting in a participation in electoral politics and/or the adoption of more tolerant worldviews) of Islamic social movements. Relative deprivation theory held that a gap between people’s expectations of what they should have (materially or in terms of social status) and what they have in reality leads to a sustained frustration which, when building up long enough, will eventually result in political violence.140 This explanation has frequently been challenged for the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,141 essentially for its inability to answer the question ‘Why Islam?’ – in other words, why grievances had come to be expressed in a religious framework rather than any other.142 On the other end of the spectrum are cultural or religious-based explanations that attribute the use of political violence in the Arab world to a large extent either to the nature of Islam or to broader ‘Arab’ cultural factors.143 Both these structural-level explanatory traditions get into trouble, as noted above, where they encounter similar structural conditions and different outcomes as far as moderation or radicalization are concerned. This is where approaches come in that are based on Social Movement Theory and consider the political process that Islamist parties or groups are part of, as they allow for combining structural and actorbased factors in explaining violent versus non-violent policies. Schwedler’s comparative analysis of the moderation processes of two Islamist parties (the Yemeni Islah party as well as the Islamic Action Front or IAF in Jordan) leads her to conclude that several factors impact whether or not Islamist actors will ‘moderate’, which she defines as moving from a closed worldview to one more open to alternative perspectives. 144 In her view, the pivotal process determining whether a movement will become more moderate in

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response to taking part in electoral processes is the movement’s or party’s ability to successfully reframe changes in its Weltanschauung and policy and to make them plausible and acceptable to its followers. Schwedler argues that the Jordanian IAF was able to do so and subsequently moderated, while the Yemeni Islah party was not and did not become more moderate. Rosefsky Wickham also employs a Social Movement Theory framework to describe the moderation and subsequent breakaway of a faction of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood that was eventually to turn into the Wasat Party.145 She argues that the limited political openings granted by the authoritarian regime in Egypt – what social movement theorists term an opening in the POS – triggered internal, democratic learning processes that have produced a long-lasting moderation in the values of the party,146 and not just a short-term one strategically motivated by political gains. Clark, on the other hand, reaches quite different conclusions from these, and distils from her analysis of the Jordanian IAF that any moderation on the part of the movement concerned only matters of procedural democracy, but fell short of a transformation of core substantive values.147 She essentially argues that several ‘red lines’ persist for the movement, and most of them concern the application of shari’a law. On these differences in findings, notably between Schwedler’s and Clark’s accounts of the supposed moderation of one and the same movement, namely, the Jordanian IAF, it is worthwhile to consider Ashour’s comment that they use quite different definitions of the same phenomenon, so one should be careful to generalize their findings: while Clark was comparing the IAF’s stances on women’s rights to those of secular, Leftist groups, Schwedler was comparing the IAF to the much more radical Yemeni Islah party, and was considering issues beyond gender questions.148 Based on the Egyptian case, Cilja Harders notes the important effect that the use of violence generally has on the ruling elites; it can lead to rifts and faction-building where one section of the elite favours the use of violence, while other sections oppose it.149 Summarizing the results of several case studies,150 Eva Wegner highlights the cost-benefit calculations employed by Arab authoritarian regimes in their decision making regarding the use of repression. The inclusion of Islamic political actors in the political process can produce important benefits for regimes, chiefly in the form of legitimacy, both domestic and international. Yet, it is also a risky

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strategy, especially in Arab republics (as opposed to monarchies): a win at the polls could effectively sweep Islamists into power. Another important factor is how strong individual Islamist parties or movements are on their respective domestic scenes. Wegner finds that the probability of repression grows in line with a movement’s strength: it has in fact been most likely in Arab republics with dominant Islamist movements on the political scene.151 Ashour’s comparative study of the de-radicalization of several Islamist movements, finally, represents an attempt to build on and draw together the factors present in the literature on moderation and radicalization in order to explain the phenomenon of de-radicalization, that is, of the laying down of weapons, but not necessarily the embrace of democratic or pluralist values.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have outlined the framework for analysis that I use for studying the strategic choices of Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. Through the lens of Social Movement Theory’s political opportunity concept, I will consider how three different levels of influence – transnational, domestic and movement-internal – have shaped each movement’s strategies at different points in time. I have also explained how the two cases can be instructive because of their difference on a key domestic variable, that is, state strength. While Lebanon’s state capacity is low, Egypt’s has been high, and the movements have responded to this difference. The Muslim Brothers’ greater degree of heterogeneity when compared to Hizbullah may be due to this difference, as members have constantly had to position themselves towards the heavy state repression they have been facing. At the same time, this heterogeneous nature also makes for different choices and learning experiences compared to Hizbullah. The ultimate goal, greater political power and influence, stays the same for both movements, however. I have also reviewed the major contributions to the literature dealing with political Islam, Islamist groups’ relationship with the state, as well as those specifically concerned with Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Scholarship inspired by a Social Movement Theory framework explains processes of moderation or

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de-radicalization quite differently and has no clear explanatory mechanism for the inverse process of radicalization. Research on the effects of a key perceived variable for radicalization, that is, state repression, remains inconclusive. As has been observed above, these differences and incongruences are often due to the fact that single-case studies examine historical processes in specific national contexts, which makes any transfer to a different setting problematic and any findings hardly generalizable. Where comparative studies exist, they mostly consider one half of the radicalization-moderation continuum. The question remains how to account for the occurrence of both processes within the same movement, that is, the radicalization and subsequent moderation – or vice versa – of the same movement over time. By employing a comparative research framework seeking to identify common factors accounting for a moderation or radicalization process vis-a`-vis the state, I attempt to add to the common body of knowledge on this subject. It is also important to note that within the scholarship broadly concerned with political Islam, an important question I will be addressing in this book is how exactly large Islamist movements respond to their political contexts over time. They remain significant players beyond any statement on whether political Islam has failed, and notwithstanding any societal trend towards the privatization of religion in Muslim societies. Regarding the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, both the period of its moderation and rejection of violence (late 1960s and early 1970s), as well as of its failure to re-radicalize in response to state repression in the 1990s and 2000s merit further scholarship. The literature on the former period is not extensive, and remains somewhat inconclusive on whether it was the power of leadership, ideas or simply changes in the political context that have brought about a lasting rejection of violence. The latter period would then constitute an interesting test of any explanation for this, as the Brotherhood theoretically faced a strong incentive to turn back to the use of violence. On Hizbullah, the interesting question not accounted for in the literature so far is what factors beyond the conflict with Israel influence the movement’s choice to use violence as a veto mechanism for internal political gains. Most studies connect Hizbullah’s use of violence to the regional situation and especially to its function as an armed resistance movement against Israel. More attention should be paid, however, to its

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relationship with the state and political system, and to those factors that shape its cooperation with or veto of them, as well as to its strategies on the Lebanese internal political scene. For it remains a puzzle why the movement escalated the conflict with Israel in 2006, and did not hesitate to use violence internally for the first time in 2008, when most scholarly studies on its post-1991 trajectory had attested the movement a trend towards pragmatism and moderation.

CHAPTER 2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S STRATEGIES:MODERATION FORCED BY REPRESSION

Egypt: Case Introduction The Muslim Brotherhood has played an important role in Egypt’s modern political history. At the time the movement was founded, in 1928, Egypt was still nominally under British occupation. Present-day Egypt had been a province of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century. It was first occupied by European powers in 1798, when French forces led by Napoleon invaded the country. Shortly afterwards, the Mamluk officer Muhammad Ali was sent by the Ottomans to Cairo in an attempt to control the situation. He did more than this, however, effectively assuming power over the territory and calling himself khedive, a term denoting significantly more political power than the usual wali (custodian) accorded by the Ottomans to heads of provinces. However, the Ottoman Porte did not attempt to curb Muhammad Ali’s power, giving him the opportunity to institute a series of sweeping reforms. He attempted to modernize the military, and carried out Egypt’s first major land reform of modern times, nationalizing most of the territory. He also undertook several military campaigns in order to extend Egypt’s territory, gaining control of Sudan in 1820. An expedition into Syria remained unsuccessful after British forces bombed the advancing Egyptian army. During the 1840s, Muhammad Ali’s grip on control faded as he grew senile, and brought first his son, then several of his nephews and

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other male relatives to power. They largely continued to uphold his reform policies, but lacked their predecessor’s political abilities,1 enabling the British to sign a trade treaty with Egypt that was extremely favourable to European merchants doing trade with Egypt, while disadvantaging local traders. European exploitation of Egypt continued with the building of the Suez Canal, inaugurated in 1869, which was dug by unpaid Egyptian labourers and effectively cost the nascent Egyptian state a lot of assets and required it to take up a foreign loan. By 1882, discontent with foreign domination had developed into a full-blown uprising led by the Egyptian military. The British dispatched several thousand troops, bombed Alexandria and proceeded to occupy the country. Egypt remained under an internationally unrecognized British occupation until 1914, when the country was declared a British Protectorate at the outbreak of World War I. At the end of the war, an Egyptian wafd (delegation), led by Saad Zaghluul, asked the British to attend the Versailles Peace Conference in order to demand full independence for Egypt. The delegation became the namesake for the secular, nationalist Egyptian Wafd party that exists until this day. The British responded to this request by deporting Zaghluul and his followers to Malta, igniting sustained anti-imperial uprisings throughout the country. The situation was only brought under control in 1922, when the British high commissioner, Lord Allenby, agreed to formally declare the independence of Egypt – however, the number of restrictions on that independence was so high that British control of Egyptian politics remained in place. Nonetheless, a series of reforms and concessions, such as the abolition of martial law and the drafting of a new constitution heralded the beginning of a ‘liberal era’ for Egypt.2 This new era was marked by the institution of multiparty politics, in which an Egyptian nationalist agenda could find expression, even though the British still ruled things from behind the scenes. There was an effective power triangle consisting of the Egyptian Prime Minister, the British-appointed King, and the British High Commissioner, which ensured that the British grip on Egyptian politics remained tight. In 1936, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed, which promised renewed reforms and greater independence for Egypt, representing the ‘high-water mark’ in Egypt’s liberal age.3 The promises contained in that treaty, however, could not be fulfilled in the near term. Economically, Egypt’s export-based economy, mainly dependent on cotton, was suffering during

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the Great Depression of the 1930s. The contrast between a liberal, urban elite benefitting from Egypt’s quasi-independence, and a desperately poor rural population was growing increasingly stark. Finally, events on an international scale added additional strains to the political situation, with the revolt against Jewish settlement in Palestine and the Palestinians’ call on fellow Arabs for support. This created an additional fault line between Egyptian forces loyal to the Palestinian cause – such as, for example, the Muslim Brothers – and British representatives in Egypt as well as their political allies. Egyptian nationalism began to form around the issue of Palestine, but the kind of nationalism that was argued in the Egyptian parliament quickly became discredited during the second half of the 1930s. There was mounting infighting between different political parties, and the political game being played in Cairo grew more and more disconnected from the reality most Egyptians were encountering every day. Hence, an intense dislike for and distrust in party politics emerged, a development that the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder al-Banna was quick to capitalize on, as will be argued below. Another result of this growing mistrust was the establishment of armed groups by various political parties and movements, including the Wafd party, the Young Egypt party and the Muslim Brotherhood. The kind of parliamentary democracy embraced by Egypt’s elite was seen as leading nowhere and bringing no results for the population at large, whether in terms of full independence, employment or economic advancement. During World War II, things did not look up for democracy in Egypt. Instead, it became more obvious than before that Britain still retained a firm grip on decision making in the country. In 1942, for example, the British Ambassador (formerly the High Commissioner) prevented a new, more independent-minded government from being formed, pressuring King Farouk to install a pro-British coalition in government. This move did much to undermine the credibility of Egypt’s nascent state and democracy, as it became clear that sovereignty could not really be upheld and that the government was subject to British interference. As soon as the British ended their mandate in Palestine and the UN voted to partition the area, enabling the setting up of a Jewish state, Egypt’s government along with a number of other Arab states decided to send troops to support the Palestinians. The Egyptian troops were badly prepared and equipped, however, and the whole campaign was unsuccessful. Troops of the newly founded State of Israel

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managed to hold their ground and even expand their territory beyond that originally granted in the UN partition plan. After the defeat, the outlook of Egyptian politics grew even dimmer; elections in 1950 returned the Wafd party to government while belligerence among other political forces continued to grow. The late 1940s had seen a number of political assassinations, and still the British could not be persuaded to relinquish the strategic Suez Canal to Egyptian control, keeping about 80,000 troops stationed in the Canal zone in a blatant demonstration of their continuing power.4 In 1952, a group of army officers around Gamal Abd el-Nasser, Sadat and Mohammad Naguib, calling themselves the Free Officers, staged a revolution and overthrew the government. After some internal wrangling, Nasser established himself as the leader of the group and became Egypt’s president. In 1954, he won a major political victory by persuading the British to restore the Suez Canal to Egyptian control. The terms of the relevant contract, however, still retained some backdoor possibilities for Britain to re-occupy the Canal zone in case the Western allies were attacked by the Soviet Union or its proxies. It thus seemed to tie Egypt into an Allied defence logic, which was vehemently opposed by some Egyptian political forces, including the Muslim Brothers. Shortly after signing the treaty, Nasser survived an assassination attempt during which eight shots were fired at him. When the perpetrators were arrested, they turned out to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood, whereupon Nasser proceeded to ban the movement and arrest many of its members and leaders. Although initially, the Free Officers had not ruled out the possibility of setting up a parliamentary democracy, once they were in power their goals changed. Political parties were banned and political life contained in a new single-party system. The new regime, and Nasser personally, received an immense boost in credibility and legitimacy – a main concern during the initial postrevolutionary years – after the Suez crisis of 1956. This conflict reoriented the foreign policy connections of Egypt towards the Soviet Union and established Nasser as a rising star of the non-aligned movement and champion of Egyptian and Arab nationalism. What happened was that the government was trying to build a new dam at Aswan to control the Nile River’s flooding cycles. It applied for funds from the World Bank and the US, which then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles used as a welcome

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opportunity to humiliate Nasser and the new Egyptian government. Dulles refused to support Egypt’s dam project, and the World Bank followed suit and withdrew its offer for funding. Dulles hoped to nip Nasser’s emerging non-aligned connections and status in the bud, and force him to return to the Allied fold. The opposite came to pass, however, as Nasser reacted swiftly, announcing the nationalization of the Britishowned Suez Canal Company, whose profits were to be used for funding the High Dam project at Aswan. In response, Britain and France, already angered by Nasser’s land reforms and appropriations of European property, attempted to pressure him into submission by amassing naval forces in the Mediterranean and destroying Egypt’s recently acquired military fighter jets. Israeli forces, meanwhile, invaded the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt was beleaguered militarily and would not have been able to withstand the combined, tripartite forces; before the conflict could escalate, however, the US decided to withdraw support for military action, and it was clear that the UN would not sanction it, either. Eventually, European and Israeli forces retreated and Nasser had won his gamble and emerged a hero from the confrontation. The subsequent roughly two decades brought relative economic prosperity to Egypt, with strong annual growth rates and a redistribution of wealth (notably in the form of landholdings) from the top elites to a broader section of society. There was also a cultural and political renaissance, with Egypt establishing itself as a leader of the Arab world, and galvanizing feelings of Arab nationalism. The success experienced by Nasser’s regime was, however, also based on strict authoritarianism, with any form of political dissent being stifled, and an extensive security apparatus spying on citizens’ lives. Some regime policies, notably in the realm of foreign policy, however, also cast doubt on Nasser’s apparent success story. The reunion with Syria provides a good example of misjudgement and overreach; acting on the rhetoric of Arab unity, Syria requested to unite with Egypt in 1958, in a first step towards all-Arab unity. The Baathist Syrian government’s main motivation was to fend off a challenge from the communists in the country,5 and Nasser, the champion of Arab unity, was not really in a position to decline. In 1958, the two states came together to form the United Arab Republic. In practice, the union between the two states could not really be implemented, as societies and cultures in the two countries differed and the two states were not even contiguous; therefore, in 1961 the experiment was ended.

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Throughout the 1960s, Nasser embarked on a course of Arab socialism, redistributing wealth and involving peasants, workers and students in various state organizations. The record of these policies was mixed, however, with no real decision-making power given to these organizations. The Arab Socialist Union became the country’s single political party. The economy was badly managed by Nasser’s administration. The public sector was dramatically expanded by the nationalization of firms, businesses and banks. Posts in the country’s expanding administration were often filled according to loyalty principles, not merit. Consequently, many building and development projects were begun but not finished, and even though increased productivity in agriculture and the regime’s industrialization policies resulted in economic growth, Egypt soon became dependent on loans from Soviet-bloc countries due to the administration’s failure at managing funds effectively. The military under Nasser turned into an independent political power base that Nasser had to keep satisfied by buying new, state-of-the-art equipment and weaponry and providing material benefits to the officer corps.6 Things took a dramatic turn for the worse with the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Egyptian forces were badly routed by Israel, which occupied the Sinai Peninsula up to the eastern shores of the Suez Canal. A drawn-out war of attrition continued for several years after the end of the 1967 war and was only brought to an end in 1970. Nasser took full responsibility for the 1967 defeat and resigned, but continuous mass demonstrations and calls for him to stay on as president finally led him to stay. His regime never recovered from the heavy blow dealt by the Six-Day War, however, and Nasser died of a heart attack in 1970. He was succeeded by his Vice President Sadat, who had been part of the Free Officers during the 1952 revolution. Similar to Nasser’s own beginnings as president, initially few observers expected him to remain for long and he was regarded as a weak president. However, Sadat was able to shore up his legitimacy both domestically and internationally by a series of strategic moves. Sadat reoriented Egypt’s foreign policy away from Arab socialism, which had begun its decline after 1967, and towards the West. In 1972, he expelled all Soviet military advisers. Internally, he opened up to Islamist politics, releasing many Islamists imprisoned under Nasser and allowing the long-banned Muslim Brotherhood to re-emerge on the political scene. In 1973, Sadat planned

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a joint attack on Israel with Syria in what became known as the Yom Kippur War, in order to regain territory lost in 1967, international prestige and standing, and external support. During the early 1970s, Egypt had nearly depleted its hard currency reserves and suffered a severe economic crisis; the ongoing altercations with Israel and extensive rebuilding costs incurred after 1967 had further exacerbated the situation. Sadat aimed for a game-changing development with his attack. It turned out to be a military defeat: after rapid initial advances, Israeli forces were able to beat back the Egyptian forces and even cross the Suez Canal. Nonetheless, subsequent negotiations under US auspices turned it into the desired gain for Sadat. Israel withdrew to a line 10 miles from the Suez Canal, and Egyptian– US relations improved markedly after the war. Domestically, Sadat had improved his image from a ‘lightweight’ president to that of a rais (president) in his own right.7 He was now able to implement a number of transformative policies, such as, for example, the economic infitah. This reversed the trend of expropriation and nationalization begun under Nasser, placed value on private business and was designed to attract foreign investment. While the latter remained fairly sparse, Egypt was now able to take up loans with the IMF, which, however, came with structural adjustment conditions attached. These foresaw, for instance, the ending of subsidies, which the government tried to do in the late 1970s, provoking a prompt reaction in the form of bread riots in major cities. In order to quell the riots, the government re-instituted all subsidies, increasing the burden on Egypt’s state finances. Another game-changing initiative was needed, and Sadat delivered it when he went to Jerusalem in 1977, giving a speech in Israel’s Knesset (parliament) in which he offered a lasting peace agreement. This took most observers completely by surprise and alienated Egypt from many of its fellow Arab states. On the domestic scene, however, the initiative served to appease the general mood, as most Egyptians had tired of war after decades of costly, open conflict with Israel. The peace between the two countries was sealed with the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, which returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and enabled the restoration of diplomatic relations. While Sadat was receiving credit for his initiative, he also alienated several political factions, both on the political Left and on the Right. For Islamist activists, his visit to Jerusalem and peace offer to Israel constituted high treason. It was not long before they acted on this

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perception – in 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Islamist extremists during a military parade. After initial uncertainty as to whether the attack would be extended to other government targets, again the vice president, Mubarak, took over the office of president. Mubarak was a military man like Sadat had been, and in a similar pattern to the one followed by his predecessor, he aimed to shore up his initially weak legitimacy by seeking amends with opposition forces. Hence, Islamists, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, were accorded increased political space and allowed to take part in politics (even if still officially banned). This space was enthusiastically used by the Muslim Brotherhood, so that Mubarak soon moved to rein in Islamist mobilization. After 1984, the regime allowed political parties to form, subject to approval by a government panel – with the exception of parties based on ‘religious principles,’ in an obvious move to contain the Islamist opposition. At all times, the Mubarak regime kept its quasi-authoritarian grip on politics while flirting with the appearances of democracy. This was reflected in the regular holding of elections and the existence of a multiparty system, which was offset by blatant manipulation of the electoral process, intimidation and imprisonment of any open dissenters. Throughout all this, Mubarak kept the close ties to the US that Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem had established. Egypt grew, and continues, to be the largest recipient of US military aid worldwide. During the 1980s, however, the regime also took steps to balance the economy, which had become too dependent on imports during the years of Sadat’s open-door policy. During the Second Gulf War in 1990, Mubarak sided with the US and its allies, and Egyptian troops took part in the invasion of Iraq dubbed ‘Desert Storm’. The close connection to Western policies drew increasing criticism among the population, and ignited violent opposition among Islamists who viewed the regime to be complicit in the invasion of a fellow Muslim country and the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia. In the mid-1990s, the Mubarak regime therefore faced what was essentially an armed Islamist insurgency in Upper Egypt. Terrorist attacks and assassinations were frequent, and the government was not always in control of all of its territory. The army hit back severely, and Islamists were persecuted on all possible levels – politically and militarily, with help from the secret services. Islamists were given long sentences or executed. The response was so severe that eventually, the major armed Islamist insurgent groupings, Islamic Jihad and

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Gama’a Islamiyya, declared their rejection of violent resistance by the end of the decade. After 2000, the regime increasingly lost legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Young Egyptians were unable to find jobs, even as universities continued to turn out many graduates with high expectations for their future. Political opposition continued to be stifled, even if pressure increased on the regime to open up. The US, Egypt’s main economic benefactor, demanded more democracy as part of President George W. Bush’s ‘Freedom Agenda’. Suddenly, the US was questioning its own decades-old approach of ignoring Egyptian human rights violations in return for stability and keeping the peace with Israel. As a result, the regime engaged in more of its ‘back-andforth’ approach to political liberalization, allowing opposition parties to form and demonstrations to take place, but continuing to manipulate election results by blatant obstruction of voters and open interference. In this vein, Mubarak was able to win the presidential elections of 2005, the first multi-candidate ones in Egyptian history. Increasingly suffering from health issues, the ageing Mubarak was angling for his son Gamal to take over after his resignation. This eventually proved too much for Egypt’s public to bear. The prospect of yet another spell of authoritarian reign by Mubarak’s son, coupled with the brutal repression of increasing opposition protests, finally culminated in the Egyptian revolution of 2011. After weeks of street protests, violent fights and initial regime attempts at appeasing protesters with half-hearted measures, it became obvious that a fundamental change was needed. Mubarak resigned, and executive power was taken over by a military council, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), headed by the top army commander, Hussein Tantawi. After excitement at Mubarak’s resignation had ebbed somewhat among the population, activist and opposition politicians realized that SCAF was essentially carrying on the old regime’s policies and was preparing to consolidate its power for the long-term. Additionally, it appeared during the summer of 2011 as though SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood were cooperating closely, angering many secular activists and citizens. They feared the country would be sold out to the Islamists, who were in a vastly superior position to secular opposition parties as far as mobilization capacity, funding and even electoral experience were concerned. A constitutional referendum was

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held in March 2011, drawing much criticism because a pro-vote would have further favoured those already part of the political process, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. After some debate, the vote was held and the constitutional amendments approved, setting parliamentary elections for the fall. Eventually they were held in November 2011, yielding a more than comfortable victory for Islamist parties, which after decades of persecution now had a parliamentary majority. In the lead-up to Egypt’s first post-revolution presidential elections, SCAF usurped many key powers and eventually dissolved parliament right before the elections. It also changed eligibility conditions so that Ahmed Shafik, the country’s last pre-revolution prime minister and a Mubarak ally, could stay in the presidential race. Eventually it came down to a choice between him or Morsi, a long-time member and parliamentary representative of the Muslim Brotherhood. He carried the elections to become Egypt’s first president after the revolution, and the first Islamist politician in its history to hold the highest office in the country. Contrary to what many observers had been expecting, Morsi did not rule in consensus with SCAF, but instead dissolved the council and arrayed most executive powers to himself by decree, in November 2012. He subsequently reshuffled posts within the military and the security services in order to consolidate his power.

Initial Hypotheses on Brotherhood Strategies Vis-a`-Vis the State In the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the topic of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategies – and especially its relationship to violence – has received renewed, great attention. Many voices especially in the Western but also in the Egyptian press express doubt as to the Muslim Brotherhood’s lasting renunciation of violence. However, the majority of scholars studying the movement agree that while isolated statements by Muslim Brotherhood figures may reference the use of violence as legitimate, on the whole the Brotherhood has squarely moved away from considering violence a viable tactical means. This, of course, does not guarantee that it will never again change its position on this issue in the future; especially as its turns towards violence were backed by a strong ideological current centred around the writings of Qutb, and

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thus cannot be said to merely have been a fleeting, tactical phenomenon. Consequently, there are calls for the movement to clearly and credibly disavow the use of violence.8 In the time since the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011, however, there have been many violent clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and secular activists, which has returned the Brotherhood to an image of a violent movement. In addition to this line of criticism, other observers see the Brotherhood as having been excessively close to the Egyptian regime during crucial periods, and of having lost much profile and neglected the development of its policy proposals while perpetually attempting to position itself favourably vis-a`-vis the regime – at least during the Mubarak years.9 Such critics paint a picture of a power-hungry elite movement solely concerned with attaining political power.10 However, speculations about possible ‘deals’ with the regime abound for earlier periods as well, especially during the Sadat years: here, regime representatives may have been involved in or facilitated a major shift in the Brotherhood’s strategy towards the regime, namely its clear denunciation of the use of violence in the book Du’at la qudat.11 In return, many Muslim Brotherhood members and leaders were released from prison and permitted to become politically active in universities and syndicates. The view that the movement played its cards with the government well, and benefitted from a close relationship especially with the Egyptian military, has certainly gained currency since the events of 2011 and with the practical takeover of power in the wake of Egypt’s uprisings. On the face of it, most scholars thus agree that the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood has been a dominant factor determining the strategies of the movement, largely because the government was able to restrain its activities by imprisoning movement members or selectively releasing them; denying the formation of a political party and at the same time allowing individual members to run for parliament as independents; in short, by regulating the political opportunities available to the movement.12 Yet, it is equally well established that individual leaders or factions within the movement have played crucial roles in determining the moves on the political scene that the Muslim Brotherhood has carried out; for example, al-Banna’s successor al-Hudaybi was allegedly instrumental in bringing about a clear denunciation of violence and the endorsement of a peaceful strategy

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focused on gradual reform.13 What remains puzzling is which patterns can be recognized over time, and how structural (regime-based) and actor-related influences have played together in shaping the movement’s decisions and strategies; especially where they appear to counter the predictions of theory regarding the perception and use of political opportunities by the Muslim Brotherhood. Several studies put forward structural explanations for some of the Brotherhood’s major strategy decisions. For early historical periods of the Muslim Brotherhood, Lia regards the generally violent climate in Egypt after World War II as a major factor leading the Brotherhood to use violence against the regime: A number of other radical groups participated in this surge of disturbances and violence, stemming from the continued colonial domination as well as the general political and socio-economic impasse which characterized the post-war monarchical Egypt. [. . .] the Society had not been involved in violence since its inception in 1928 and until the late 1940s, and when it was finally used it was condemned by the leadership.14 Lia further elaborates that the Brotherhood’s pattern of participation in the political process and breaking away from it using violence were heavily influenced by structural factors. Al-Banna withdrew his candidacy in the parliamentary elections in 1942 when faced with the immediate threat of a government crackdown on the Brotherhood in case he were successful.15 The upshot of the arguments put forward in the literature is, put most simplistically, that a combination of structural changes related to regime policy mostly went hand in hand with internal processes in causing the Muslim Brotherhood to change its approaches or strategies. This seems to lend credence to Tilly’s assertion that regimes come to shape repertoires over time, and vice versa – meaning that the institutional constellation surrounding a social movement will influence its choice of protest repertoires, and that protest repertoires will influence how institutions and actors surrounding the movement will respond to social movements in general.16 Turning to a closer examination of several periods in the history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, I will now attempt to trace what patterns can be

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discerned in the interactions between the movement and the Egyptian government. The periods have been selected based on their variation in movement behaviour, that is, on the dependent variable: in some instances, the Brotherhood resorted to the use of violence, while in others it did not and engaged other means of expressing contention. The analysis will be based on existing sources both in English and Arabic, as well as on in-depth, problem-centred interviews with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the FJP, other political parties and academic researchers. It aims to add building blocks to a typological theory of strategies employed by Islamic social movements, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Phase I: 1928–54: From the Founding Days to Radicalization This phase sees several conditions at play simultaneously: the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, experiences a surge in organizational capacity and political influence throughout the 1940s; the Egyptian government increasingly began to confront the powerful challenger movement that the Brotherhood had become throughout the 1940s; and finally, the Brotherhood’s Special Apparatus carried out several assassinations of political figures, among them Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi, at the end of that decade. The 1952 revolution carried out by the Free Officers first seemed to widen the room for manoeuvre of the Brotherhood; however, things quickly deteriorated and when an attempt was made on Nasser’s life in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood was blamed and the most severe and consequential regime crackdown on the movement ensued, with many Brothers imprisoned, tortured, and key leaders locked away for long sentences. In terms of the variables discussed above, this period in the Brotherhood’s history sees a key mobilizing issue on the transnational level in the form of the war in Israel/Palestine. On the domestic level, there is a sharp decline in state capacity during the latter half of the 1940s, with frequent outbreaks of violence and lack of state control over these developments. Internally, the Brotherhood had been led hierarchically and often in an authoritarian style since its inception by al-Banna. By the time the movement used violence in 1948, a split had occurred, however, and a second power-centre around the leadership of the Special Apparatus had emerged.

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Regime-movement interactions: The Brotherhood’s growth and the first periods of mihna Throughout the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood grew from a relatively small organization with a few branches into a broad popular movement that, continuing through the 1940s, increasingly began to inspire defensiveness and repression on the part of successive Egyptian governments. Several factors are considered as essential in having brought about the remarkable expansion that set the Muslim Brothers apart from other Islamic movements in Egypt at the time, and indeed throughout the Muslim world as a whole. Al-Banna’s modern ideology was key for the Brotherhood’s growth, with a blend of Sufi-influenced ideas focusing on the role of the individual and non-elite activism that stood in stark contrast to Egyptian politics of the day.17 As Kra¨mer puts it, ‘He was an activist who essentially “put to work” what Muslim reformers had advocated for decades, though he did so in his own way.’18 This activism seems to have filled a void in Egyptian society at just the right moment in time, for al-Banna was able to build a highly successful opposition movement that soon began to challenge government power. The content of the Muslim Brotherhood’s discourse at this point in time included an emphasis on Islam as an all-encompassing idea, strongly advocating that there is no such thing as a separation between religion and politics and that being religious implies a call to action in many domains of life pure and simple; hence every individual who embraced this type of Islam could and should be involved in politics and the affairs of society. This represented a clear break from traditional, inwardlooking Islamic organizations as they existed in Egypt at the time.19 Al-Banna was first arrested in 1941; although he was keen on maintaining good contacts with the government and was pragmatic to an extent that ‘went much further than his rhetoric implied’ by this time relations with the Egyptian government had become sufficiently tense for the latter to try to rein in the movement.20 A large part of this development was due to the generally difficult and tense circumstances the government found itself in during World War II. Still subject to heavy-handed British manipulations of its political scene and treatybound to support British policy,21 Egypt increasingly moved closer to British interests as the war progressed; the putsch carried out against British occupation in Iraq caused the British to re-evaluate the security situation in Egypt as well, and under a military order, the schoolteacher

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and civil servant al-Banna was transferred to Upper Egypt in 1941.22 Presumably, the government and British officials deemed it safer to have the man behind the Muslim Brotherhood, who had continuously been denouncing British colonialism, away from events in the capital and stranded in the countryside. There is also evidence that al-Banna had maintained contacts with Italian and German agents, and that the Muslim Brotherhood had received funds from both.23 As Italy had entered the war and declared its intention to free Egypt from British occupation, and had bombed targets in Egypt, the Egyptian government was now concerned about any pro-Axis connections. A few months later, however, al-Banna was allowed to return to Cairo when the situation apparently was deemed safer – only to be arrested for a short amount of time in October 1941 after a rally denouncing the British.24 He was released after barely a month, when tensions seemed to have eased somewhat. The firm grip British officials had on Egyptian King Farouk and on successive governments resulted in a keen awareness of any plots that may have been in the making against them, and a strong determination to prevent them from unfolding. This may have been the intention behind al-Banna’s transfer and arrest, as it was flanked by simultaneous incarcerations of other Egyptian political figures, some of whom were rumoured to have been in touch with al-Banna and who were decidedly anti-British in their political outlook.25 While al-Banna seems to have maintained good connections with the Egyptian political establishment including King Farouk during the 1940s, the British heavily influenced the political scene and built alliances with local foes of the Brotherhood, resulting in the first crackdowns on the work of the movement since its establishment in 1928. While al-Banna’s arrests and other impediments, such as the closing down of Muslim Brotherhood branch offices or bans on its publications, were mostly shortlived, they left a lasting impression on the self-image of the organization, as witnessed by al-Banna’s letter to his followers, leaving them with instructions and guidance in case he should be handed a long-term prison sentence: Ye Muslim Brothers, listen: I have tried with these words to place your message before you. Perhaps we may have a critical period of time during which we will be separated from one another. In this case, I will not be able to talk or write to you. [. . .] You should feel

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yourselves the bearers of the burden which all others have refused. [. . .] If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction. [. . .] If they insist on pursuing their oppression, say to them, ‘Peace be upon you, we will ignore the ignorant.’26 The repeated obstacles placed in front of the Brotherhood’s work throughout 1941 were, according to Mitchell, regarded by key organization figures as the first period of mihna (persecution) in the Brotherhood’s history, to be followed by many others exerted by almost every Egyptian government.27 We can thus see that the government’s policy towards the Muslim Brothers was to leave a lasting impact, embodied by al-Banna’s letter to all members, which assumed a top position on reading lists for new adherents. Members of the movement were to factor in persecution, imprisonment and sacrifice for the right cause; they were instructed to defend against criticisms of meddling in politics by stressing that there was no distinction to be made between religion and politics. This is curious in the sense that al-Banna and other leading Muslim Brothers, such as Ahmad al-Sukkari, were quite obviously involved in the wheeling and dealing of wartime politics in Egypt; as Kra¨mer observes, ‘The only exceptional feature was that the Muslim Brothers claimed not to be doing what they were, in fact, doing – playing the political game.’28 This game at times included explicit deals with the Egyptian government. When parliamentary elections were called by a new, British-supported government headed by the secular, nationalist Wafd party, al-Banna announced his intention to stand for election in the Ismailiya district. The prime minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, threatened al-Banna with imprisonment if he and other Muslim Brothers were to contest the elections; he offered al-Banna a deal, which the latter accepted, and according to which he published a letter in a leading daily in support of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. In return, the government promised a curb on alcohol sales and prostitution, in line with the wishes of the Brotherhood, and lifted restrictions on the Brotherhood’s publications.29 These incidents reveal, at an early stage, an essential paradox in the actions and discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood. While on the one hand, the reactions to al-Banna’s imprisonment and his subsequent letter to all members speak of a dogged attitude of carrying on through the storm and enduring injustice at the hands of the regime, on the other

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hand al-Banna’s connections and moves on the political scene convey a large dose of pragmatism and a willingness to cooperate with the government. The deal struck with al-Nahhas Pasha brought about concrete results for the Brotherhood and enabled it to continue spreading its message. At the same time, al-Banna’s original intention to stand in the elections exposes his rhetoric of steering clear of party politics in Egypt and staying above the morally questionable and petty motivations of hizbiyya (political party system) as empty talk.30 It is thus safe to say that starting at an early stage of the Brotherhood’s history, the discourse al-Banna and other leading figures engaged in vis-a`-vis the general membership of the movement differed quite substantially from the pragmatic, sober and realpolitik approach adopted towards members of the palace and of other political parties. This establishes a discourse of moral superiority to mundane power politics that was, of course, to become one of the main selling points of the Muslim Brotherhood and indeed of Islamist political movements at large. It seems that during this stage in the Brotherhood’s development during the 1930s and early 1940s, several variables combine to produce an approach that was pragmatic in deed but radical in rhetoric. One is the presence, at the domestic level, of a militarily strong occupation force, the British, who were especially wary of any emerging security threats. They were both willing and able to control the actions of the Brotherhood by targeting and imprisoning its leader, and curtailing its outreach capabilities in the form of publications, banning demonstrations and the like. Al-Banna responded to this by seeking accommodation with the regime wherever possible and by trying to take part in the political process itself, most likely in recognition of the regime’s capabilities and a bid to avoid a ban of the movement. The ensuing assertion of vicitimization at the hands of the regime that al-Banna and other leading Muslim Brothers increasingly employed throughout the 1940s did not necessarily cause a radicalization of the movement’s actions by itself; however, in a way it may have provided an enabling environment for the use of violence against the regime, which became apparent as the 1940s progressed. Other factors were also crucial in bringing this about, however – chief among them the central place that ‘action’ and exercise were accorded in the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, as well as internal schisms that led to certain sub-groups taking that action without explicit sanctioning by the broader

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movement. Another condition that enabled the radicalization and use of force by the Muslim Brotherhood is the perception of continued occupation of ‘Muslim lands’, either at the hands of the British in Egypt or by Jewish forces in Palestine. Each will be considered in turn below.

Rover units, Battalions and the Special Apparatus: The ‘action’ side of the Muslim Brotherhood It is well established that al-Banna was intent on joining his influences of ‘reform Islam of the Salafi type, popular Sufism of the “sober” kind, and Egyptian patriotism’31 with a repertoire of action for young adherents to the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Its earliest expression were the firqat al-rahhalat (excursion units), set up during the mid-1930s. At its fifth General Conference in 1935, the Muslim Brotherhood regularized its Rover scout units, which provided a programme of paramilitary-style exercise and outdoor activity for young men.32 By 1939, the Rover scout units were formally registered in the Egyptian National Scout Movement.33 They were modelled on other contemporary examples of scout groups, including European Nazi and fascist youth groups, of whose existence and operating procedures al-Banna was well aware. He promoted, as Lia argues, an ‘Islamized version of the new militarism’ spreading throughout Europe in the 1930s. Lia quotes from al-Banna’s ideological tract on the subject: The modern nations have paid close attention to this [militarism]. They have been founded on these principles: we see that Mussolini’s Fascism, Hitler’s Nazism and Stalin’s Communism are based on pure militarism. But there is a vast difference between all of these and the militarism of Islam, for Islam has sanctified force, but it has preferred peace.34 The functions that these units served have been recognized as providing adherents with a notion of chivalry and manliness, of taking action rather than watching passively as Egypt was being dominated by foreign powers. In the early stages and until a proper system was set up, al-Banna himself taught some of the Rover units.35 Nonetheless, the Rover units were not being trained in using arms or being explicitly prepared for military action. Rather, their activities included actual athletics such as football or basketball, outdoor activities such as camping and hiking, as well as

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charitable work and religious education.36 Overall, the units seem to have mostly contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational strength and coherence, by drawing in new members and serving as a moral and organizational support structure for young, male adherents. It is also significant, however, that together with the other sub-groups discussed below – the Battalion system and most importantly, the Special Apparatus – they form a structure aimed at action and militarization, providing the potential for serious anti-regime insurgency action. This is all the more true as during the late 1930s and early 1940s, the organization underwent a significant expansion in its membership; while exact numbers are hard to find, estimates range from several thousands in the mid-1930s to between 100,000 and 500,000 in 1944.37 Coupled with this steep growth in numbers, the militant character of the Rover units and other structures within the Brotherhood certainly constituted a potentially serious threat to the regime’s power. Yet, as we shall see below, this does not automatically mean that the Muslim Brotherhood was actually intent on overthrowing the Egyptian government during the 1940s. Before moving on to this discussion, two other structural developments within the Muslim Brotherhood need to be considered. The first is the introduction of the Battalion system at the fifth General Conference of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1937. This was closely connected to the Rover scout system, and in fact its members were required to register as Rover scouts and to wear the same uniforms as the Rovers.38 In contrast to the latter, who were very out in the open, often conducting parades or shows on memorable occasions, and who were intent on winning and recruiting new members for the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the Battalions were an internal structure set up for the already initiated. Their foundation was in step with what al-Banna envisaged to be the developmental stages of the Muslim Brotherhood: while the period between 1928, when the organization was founded, and 1937, marked the first stage (that of ‘acquaintance’, consisting of organizational build-up and expansion), the founding of the Battalions was meant to initiate the second stage in the movement’s history, that of ‘formation’ or ‘special call’.39 The Battalions were an instrument of indoctrination and were thus meant to contribute to ‘the efficient propagation of the Muslim Brothers’ mission’: A Battalion was composed of between 10 and 40 members between the ages of 18 and 40. Only people with some background in the

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Society were eligible to become members, and the integrity and sincerity of candidates had to be attested to by the other members of the Battalion. Each Battalion was headed by a chief (naqib), who was elected by a secret ballot [. . .]. It was usually subdivided into ‘companionships’ (‘israh), each headed by a deputy (mandub) and consisting of 10 members. All members were to be registered in meticulous detail in personal files in the ‘archives’ of the Battalion.40 Al-Banna had high hopes for this system of close-knit indoctrination units, reportedly planning on enrolling 12,000 members in the structure.41 They were initially a reaction, according to Mitchell, to a great influx of new members especially from student ranks, which needed to be organized and instructed in the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mitchell also regards the setting up of the Rover scouts, as well as the Battalions, as a general response to ‘membership loyalty problems’.42 The activities of the Battalions consisted of weekly training meetings, including night vigils with long teaching sessions; at the outset, just as with the Rover scouts, al-Banna headed these meetings himself, talking to young members at length about anything from ‘Sufism to sex’, according to Mitchell’s oft-quoted summary.43 The Battalions did not fare as well as al-Banna had hoped, and were eventually discontinued in 1943 and replaced by the much more effective ‘family’ system still in use today. The smaller families relied on a similar tight-knit system of loyalties as the Battalions, but were less secretive and less focused on physical, rigorous practices such as the night vigils. They encompassed a broader range of issues and had a more long-term character: the system envisaged members of the Brotherhood learning and growing together over a period of time. They were to share responsibility and even financial means, distributing expenses as well as gains between them. The content of the teachings taught and discussed in the family groups initially consisted of the tracts or rasa’il composed by al-Banna.44 The replacement of the Battalion system by the family units seems to constitute a result of a learning process within the organization: as the Battalions failed to bring about the desired results of building a substantial body of initiated members, a different format for indoctrination and education was devised. This format, the ‘family’ system, was not, in contrast to its predecessors the Rover scouts and the Battalions, based primarily on physical activity, but relied on building

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close personal allegiances and passing on the message by studying and discussing together. At the same time as the change from the Battalion to the ‘family’ system was hatched and then executed, al-Banna also instituted one of the most consequential innovations in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history by forming the Secret Apparatus, which outside of the organization came to be called the Special Apparatus. While a relative refocusing away from physical activity and militarization thus occurred within the mainstream organization, these very attributes were preserved and institutionalized in the form of the Special Apparatus. Essentially, this sub-group constituted an armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood that was ready and willing to use force against the regime in order to right its perceived wrongs. It is recognized that reliable information on the establishment and actions of the Special Apparatus is scarce even today, and that a large amount of rumours surround it; the first evidence of its foundation was given by al-Banna himself, when he spoke of Brothers having taken on the oath for the third, ‘execution’ stage of the Brotherhood’s development in 1940. Some leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood were involved, among them Mahmud Labib, who was also head of the Rover scout units.45 Members were also recruited from among Rover and Battalion adherents. Mitchell quotes ‘reliable sources’ as estimating membership figures in 1948 to be at around 1,000.46 He argues: While it was true that before 1948 few members indeed knew about the secret apparatus, those who did – and after 1948 this number included most of the articulate members – found few if any reasons to resist it. Thus while the secret apparatus had relatively few members, it had, as a concept, large if inarticulate support.47 Kra¨mer concurs with this statement and adds, ‘The growing body of literature written by former members as well as critical observers has done little to modify Mitchell’s judgement’,48 highlighting that the armed wing of the Brotherhood was known to and tolerated by most of its members. This exposes current claims by Muslim Brotherhood leaders that the use of violence was an isolated phenomenon carried out by individuals as trivializing the issue. Members of the Special Apparatus trained in athletics and the use of firearms, and weapons caches were built up. The motives for establishing

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the Special Apparatus seem to stem from a mix of factors: on the one hand, the repeated calls by al-Banna for action and advancement to the ‘next stage’ in the Brotherhood’s development, as well as the establishment of the Rover units and Battalions, had created expectations for taking action among some of the members. This is evident in the split-off of a group calling itself Mohammad’s Youth in 1939–40, which, while not essentially disagreeing with the Muslim Brotherhood’s orientation or programme, preferred different means for reaching its goals: its leaders called for revolutionary action, fighting support for the ongoing revolt in Palestine, and decried a lack of ‘courage’ among the Muslim Brotherhood.49 They were prompted to do so in part by al-Banna’s rather flamboyant rhetoric announcing the beginning of a period of ‘struggle and action’ in 1938, marking the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political work. Disappointed with al-Banna’s attempts to keep up a minimum of accommodation with the government and to avoid open conflict with the authorities, the breakaway group officially formed in February 1940. While al-Banna, in response to challenges by the newly formed dissident group as well as the radically anti-imperialist Young Egypt party, was intent on urging restraint on the part of his followers, he was apparently also hedging his bets by forming the Special Apparatus, a secret, militant insurgency group. Most observers concur that these contradictory signals stem from al-Banna’s somewhat strained attempts at ‘walking a narrow path between demands for action and the perceived need to reach some kind of accommodation with the authorities’.50 While al-Banna was intent on maintaining tight control over his organization – his frequently authoritarian leadership style had been a point of contention from the early days of the Brotherhood and had contributed to the secession of Mohammad’s Youth – he was increasingly unable to do so as the Muslim Brotherhood expanded. This became evident throughout the 1940s and is perhaps best illustrated by the actions of the Special Apparatus, which soon began to act on its own and according to most observers, not on the orders of al-Banna. After 1945, security in Egypt began to break down as a result of social unrest and a political crisis that was fuelled by the escalating conflict around the Palestine issue; in this volatile environment, several paramilitary groups, such as those of the Wafd party and the Young Egypt party as well as the Muslim Brotherhood Rover units, engaged in parades and armed skirmishes.51 From 1946 onwards, members of the Special Apparatus readily engaged in the increasingly frequent practice of

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targeting British patrols and establishments with bombs, which for them constituted ‘target practice’.52 The situation was further inflamed when the UN Security Council (UNSC) ignored an Egyptian request for full independence from Britain in 1947, with riots and violent demonstrations taking place in Cairo and Alexandria. On 22 March 1948, judge Ahmad al-Khazindar was assassinated by two members of the Special Apparatus in retaliation for his sentencing a member of the Muslim Brothers to prison for an attack on a club in Alexandria.53 In January of that year, a weapons cache in the Moqattam hills near Cairo had been discovered and linked to Muslim Brotherhood members who were training in the hills. In October, the famous ‘Jeep case’ was opened, in which several Muslim Brotherhood members – most of the leaders and some members of the Special Apparatus – were arrested and appeared in court after they had been caught on their way to a meeting, with a vehicle full of weapons, explosives and important organizational documents. The case led to the disclosure of the hitherto secret existence of the Special Apparatus. In it, the Muslim Brothers were charged with incitement of and direct involvement in violence directed against the government, cumulatively constituting, in the eyes of the prosecution, a plot to overthrow the government and take over power.54 After renewed violence at a student demonstration that was attributed to the Muslim Brothers, the Muslim Brotherhood was officially banned on 8 December 1948, scores of members were arrested and its assets were seized and placed under jurisdiction of the government, which was to redistribute them to charitable organizations. Al-Banna was briefly held but then released and placed under house arrest. He frantically tried to defuse the situation, bargain with the government and forestall the ban on the organization, but Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi refused to see him. With so many Brotherhood members under arrest and the chain of command interrupted, al-Banna reportedly feared for the worst – and it duly came to pass, when on 28 December 1948, a young member of the Muslim Brotherhood shot dead al-Nuqrashi. He was arrested, tried and later hanged. Al-Nuqrashi’s successor, Abd al-Hadi, instituted a stringent security regime, arrested additional members, mostly rank and file, of the Brotherhood, and allowed for severe torture of Muslim Brotherhood members and activists in various Egyptian prisons. Witnesses of the events described their treatment as severe and brutal, but still paling in comparison to what they had to endure under the rule of Nasser in the 1950s.55 Given Abd al-Hadi’s reaction to the events, al-Banna’s attempts at

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calming the situation and distancing the Muslim Brotherhood from the ongoing violence – in a famous 1949 pamphlet, he described the perpetrators of violence as ‘neither Brothers nor Muslims’ – were moot. All-out war between the government and the Brotherhood had now begun, with the government acting just as violently as the Muslim Brothers: on 12 February 1949, al-Banna was shot dead in the street, most likely by members of the Egyptian secret police.56

Back to the structures: The Palestine Revolt, 1948 war and postwar security breakdown So far, I have mostly considered the dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood’s evolvement as an organization, and the reasons for it becoming increasingly confrontational and violent towards the government throughout the 1940s. As argued above, there are several aspects to this development: internally, a radicalization was set in motion with the setting up of the Rover units and Battalions, culminating in the foundation of the Special Apparatus which soon began to carry out violent attacks. Al-Banna, the founder and key leader of the Brotherhood, steered an ambivalent course by trying to keep up good relations with the government, while at the same time planting the seeds for paramilitary action and adopting militant rhetoric when it seemed suitable. Militant groups within the Muslim Brotherhood were not allowed a say in its policy, however, either driving them out of the movement (as was the case with Mohammad’s Youth) or into secrecy and unauthorized manoeuvres, as happened with the Special Apparatus. The radicalization process during the 1930s and early 1940s is thus partly the outcome of movementinternal processes: an armed wing and an action-oriented rhetoric were part of al-Banna’s vision, and his autocratic leadership style ensured that his vision was decisive for the Brotherhood’s strategy decisions. In the 1940s, however, several enabling variables on the domestic and transnational levels led to the use of violence by the Brotherhood. These were the controversy surrounding Egypt’s policy towards the revolt in Palestine, as well as the breakdown of domestic security in the latter half of the 1940s. Additionally, al-Banna lost his tight control over the Brotherhood’s armed wing, which started to act independently. The growing Arab resistance to the establishment of an Israeli state in the Levant was a crucial issue for the Brotherhood. Gershoni’s study contends that the Palestine issue was the main point of focus for the

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Muslim Brotherhood, and that the campaign against Zionist occupation of Arab land led by the Brotherhood played a crucial role in the organization’s expansion.57 He argues that the Muslim Brotherhood was able ‘to exploit the pro-Palestine campaign as a material and ideological springboard for domestic expansion’.58 This was mainly achieved by using Palestine as a galvanizing and motivational factor for the Rover units, as well as for fundraising: while Palestine was invoked as a reason to support the Brotherhood, few transfers were made to the Higher Arab Committee that was the official body of support to the Arab revolt in Palestine during the 1930s. Gershoni also sees the establishment of the Battalions as a direct result of this exploitation of the Palestinian cause: while there is no evidence, according to him, that the Brotherhood actually sent fighting units to Palestine during the period he studies, 1936–39 (which could have been a possible function of the Battalions), the Palestine issue was used to mobilize members for the Battalions. Hence this constituted, in Gershoni’s view, ‘additional proof that the pro-Palestine campaign, rather than providing real aid to Palestine, contributed to strengthening the Society by consolidating its internal apparatus and institutions’.59 As discussed in Chapter I, other studies offer different perspectives on how the Palestine question affected the Muslim Brotherhood during this period. None dispute the fact that the issue served as a strong galvanizing factor for the majority of movement members, and was regarded by many as an ideological question of principle. Supporting resistance fighters in Palestine amounted to a patriotic duty, as Egypt might be next in line in the plans of Zionist expansion, so the argument went.60 Moreover, the issue had been part of the Brotherhood’s rhetoric and had been embraced by members right from the beginning, before the rapid expansion of the 1940s – which goes to show that it was not merely being instrumentalized for recruiting new adherents or raising funds.61 Many of the most fervent demonstrations with a large Brotherhood presence in Cairo centred on support for Arabs fighting Zionism in Palestine during the late 1930s and early 1940s. For these demonstrators, it was inconceivable that the Egyptian government was not extending its full support to the uprising in Palestine. When al-Banna, seeking accommodation with the regime and trying to avoid further repressive measures against the movement, decided to embrace the official Egyptian policy of no support for the Palestine revolt, parts of

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the rank and file broke off to found the more radical Mohammad’s Youth. The issue eventually led to a young Brotherhood member assassinating Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948, after the latter decided to withdraw Egyptian support for Palestine. This shows how developments in Palestine provided a facilitating issue for movement radicalization during the late 1940s, as fervent supporters of the uprising in Palestine became disillusioned with al-Banna’s conciliatory stance. Al-Banna’s tight grip on the mainstream movement meant that dissent, and armed support for the uprising in Palestine, was only possible outside of the chain of command, as it were – either by founding breakaway factions such as Mohammad’s Youth, or by bypassing al-Banna’s orders and planning and carrying out clandestine armed action, as the Special Apparatus did. Consequently, the combination of al-Banna’s reaction to potential government repression (i.e. pre-emptive attempts at reaching accommodation with the government) and a transnational mobilizing factor in the form of support for the revolt in Palestine, laid the groundwork for the Brotherhood’s resort to the use of violence. Another factor on the domestic or national level eventually led to the Brotherhood using violence against the regime: a sharp drop in state capacity after 1945. Immediately following the end of World War II, a security vacuum persisted in Egypt, with many attacks on politicians as well as British or Jewish targets taking place. Living conditions had worsened during the war years and prices had risen considerably; additionally, there was ongoing political conflict over the direction in which the country was to be taken after the war, and especially about reaching full independence from Britain. In Mitchell’s phrase, ‘The end of the war brought with it a release of tensions and lifted the lid from hostilities which had long raged beneath the controls of martial law.’62 Many ills came to be blamed on the occupiers and on foreigners in general. In 1945, cinemas were bombed with the intent of killing foreigners (in fact, more Egyptians died in these attacks); Jewish and Christian property was looted; student unrest continued building and culminated in riots which saw 50 students killed in confrontations with British forces in February and March 1946; and in November of the same year, there were widespread riots in Cairo and the authorities made a number of arrests across all political camps.63 These conditions and the British and Egyptian authorities’ apparent inability to control the widespread rioting and unrest resulted in an atmosphere that was

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conducive to the use of violence, and the majority of established Egyptian political forces engaged in violent acts at this time, most of all the Wafd party, the Young Egypt party and the Muslim Brotherhood, which all had set up armed wings. Lia speaks of a ‘wave of political violence that ravaged Egypt in the latter half of the 1940s’ and regards the Brotherhood’s role in this as a product of troubled times,64 rather than active instigators of government violence or revolutionaries intent on overthrowing the government.65 As already argued above, this period provided ample opportunity for sections of the Muslim Brotherhood to train in the use of weapons, prepare for armed conflict and start targeting Egyptian politicians as well as British outposts and patrols. A lack of state capacity thus acted as a driving factor for the use of violence. It may seem paradoxical that on the one hand, the threat of government repression shaped many of al-Banna’s strategy decisions during the 1930s and early 1940s, while the absence of that very repressive capacity is what eventually facilitated the use of violence by the Brotherhood. This can be explained, however, by taking into account that the drop in state capacity after the end of the war was relatively sudden, and that the mechanisms which produced the Brotherhood’s turn to violence – the development of clandestine, armed structures outside of al-Banna’s control which were willing to risk an armed confrontation with the regime – had already been set in motion by this time. Kra¨mer also notes the negative side-effects that the Brotherhood’s involvement in the Palestine campaign had for the movement: not only did it bring up accusations of financial mismanagement and misappropriation of funds – that is, donations collected for the Palestinians but used for organizational build-up of the Brotherhood – it also brought about government retaliation and clampdowns at a time when al-Banna wanted to keep a low profile and to maintain a good working relationship with the government of Ali Mahir Pasha in the late 1930s.66 Additionally, the situation in Palestine, the fight against imperialism and against foreign occupiers of Muslim lands prominently features in the accounts of current Muslim Brotherhood figures. While these arguments may obviously be tainted by a wish to retroactively justify the use of violence and to stress that the violence the Brotherhood engaged in was perpetrated by ‘individuals’ and not the organization as a whole, it is still important to note the invocation of foreign occupation and imperialism as legitimate targets for violent resistance. A long-time

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leading figure of the Brotherhood who later joined the rival Al-Nahda party following the 2011 revolution in Egypt, explicitly links the al-Nuqrashi assassination to the prime minister’s decision to withdraw Egyptian troops from Palestine in 1948.67 Disappointment with his perceived caving-in and a belief that a conspiracy existed between alNuqrashi’s government and the British were the key motives behind the assassination, according to this source. Another leading Muslim Brotherhood politician later active in the movement’s post-revolution political party, the FJP, also describes the struggle against armed occupation as the only legitimate reason for using violence, and contends that any violent acts perpetrated by Muslim Brothers were ‘individual cases’.68 An official spokesperson for the FJP in 2011 concluded that the Brotherhood’s ‘jihad organization’ (Special Apparatus) had been founded with the goal of freeing Egypt of illegitimate foreign occupation, and that the Palestine issue provided additional impetus for the use of violence, as occupied Muslim land needed to be liberated from its Zionist occupiers.69 These statements were made with an intent to stress that the Muslim Brotherhood was not engaged in explicit conflict with the Egyptian state authorities during the 1940s, had never planned to overthrow the government and was not seeking to do so at present – that is, after the 2011 revolution. It is still remarkable, however, that all speakers concur in their legitimation of violence as long as it is directed against foreign occupation, as well as in their admission that the situation in Palestine was a major factor of radicalization of the Brotherhood. To sum up, then, most observers and activists agree that as the conflict in Palestine evolved from the mid-1930s onwards and throughout the 1940s, it came to radicalize many of the Brotherhood’s rank and file, while al-Banna seems to have been intent on containing this development and preventing a conflict with the Egyptian government over it. Even Gershoni, who assumes a cynical use of the Palestine question for reasons of organizational strengthening by the Muslim Brotherhood, admits that the conflict there impacted on the Brotherhood’s willingness to use violence.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers Contacts between al-Banna and some of the leaders of the Free Officers that were to overthrow the monarchy in a military putsch in 1952 had

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existed as early as the 1940s. Among the Free Officers sympathetic to the Brotherhood was Sadat, who was apparently delighted to see that the Muslim Brothers were preparing for armed combat and stockpiling weapons during the 1940s.70 It is also remarkable that the many trials opened against the Muslim Brotherhood during the late 1940s – among them the famous ‘Jeep case’ as well as several others involving weapons caches and attacks against foreign institutions – led to no considerable arrests, even though the general political situation was tense and martial law had been declared in 1948. Leaders of the revolutionaries-in-themaking at this time, including Nasser, had participated in the military campaign in Palestine, and while there, had also worked with and trained units belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. Upon his return in 1949, Nasser was even summoned and charged with the crime of aiding the military units of the Brotherhood, and declared his support of the Brotherhood on this occasion.71 When it became clear that the existing system – with a monarchy that was increasingly the target of popular jokes, and a party system that since the 1920s had never lost its reputation of being an elitist club concerned with power politics and little else – had become totally discredited, the group around Nasser, Sadat and most of all, Naguib, decided to act and staged their coup on 26 July 1952. The Muslim Brothers were an important part in their calculations for the revolution, both contributing armed units that had been especially trained for this purpose, and a structure and manpower for keeping things under control and the situation quiet during the first days and weeks after the coup. Yet, things quickly began to fall apart. As early as 1953, the leadership of the Free Officers, now dominated by Nasser, began to move in the direction of a oneparty system. The Muslim Brothers increasingly felt themselves left out of the equation and, additionally, were in the throes of an internal conflict that once again focused on whether and how closely to cooperate with the government. Nasser officially banned the organization in 1954 and had several hundred members arrested, all on charges of lack of support to the revolutionary government. In late October 1954, Nasser was shot at eight times during a speech but remained unharmed; however, the incident provided the occasion for arresting even more members of the Brotherhood, hanging several of them for their alleged involvement in the assassination attempt, and destroying the organization’s headquarters.

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Conclusion to Phase I On all three levels of political opportunity, – transnational, domestic and movement-internal – developments have influenced the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy choices during the first phase of its existence, from 1928 to 1954. Regarding a prominent regime feature – repression – the above discussion has shown that it had a profound effect on the self-definition of the Muslim Brotherhood and significantly shaped its subsequent actions and decisions. Regarding the nature of the regime, we can also state that for the period 1948 to 1954, state capacity was weak to moderate, able to deliver blows to the organization and officially ban it, but unable to effectively prohibit the functioning of all of its sections. The Egyptian state was not fully sovereign and British troops remained stationed on Egyptian territory until the Suez crisis in 1956. This not only had a lasting effect on how politics in Egypt were run – chiefly by way of the British ability to exert pressure on the king, who then appointed governments according to British priorities – but also on the policies and ideological orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood. After 1945, a security vacuum persisted and the state was not in control of a number of armed groups which were committing various attacks on British military posts as well as British and foreign shops, cinemas and restaurants. Yet, we have also seen that it was possible for al-Banna and al-Sukkari, his second-in-command, to maintain close ties to regime politicians and to negotiate deals; even participation in the supposedly reviled party system by way of standing in the parliamentary elections was an option for al-Banna. This points to the fact that from the early days of the Brotherhood onwards, the relationship with the regime was actually less distant and less hostile than the Brotherhood’s own rhetoric would suggest. At the same time, al-Banna’s recipe for success, a new ideology that blended religion and politics and made the call for action a cornerstone of the Muslim Brotherhood’s identity, created expectations among members. While he himself demonstrated a willingness to stay on good terms with the authorities and to take on the role of leader of a vocal and dynamic opposition, others understood the call to action differently. Al-Banna had set up the Rover scouts system and later the Battalions in an effort to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization and to channel and control the energies of new members. In a sense, this can

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be regarded as a trial-and-error process by which he sought to build a strong, hierarchically organized group that could be effectively governed from the top. As was discussed above, however, he was less and less able to do so as soon as the organization’s membership began expanding rapidly from the mid-1930s onwards. The secession of the Mohammad’s Youth group in 1939 and the subsequent foundation of parallel structures within the Special Apparatus bore witness to this trial-anderror strategy taking on a life of its own under the circumstances. In fact, the actions taken by the leaders and members of the Special Apparatus impacted on the history of the movement as a whole as much as they did because of several factors: the leader of the Special Apparatus disagreed with al-Banna on a number of counts and was able to exploit the fact that al-Banna was unable to control the dynamics of the Special Apparatus; he purportedly sought to carve out a leadership profile for himself;72 in the volatile situation that followed the end of World War II, the government was unable to impose order and violence was widespread; the continuing shadow of imperialism and the stationing of British troops on Egyptian soil provided a legitimizing framework for using violence against the British as well as against any government that was seen as aiding and abetting them; and finally, the Palestine question and the Egyptian government’s policy towards it served to further radicalize many of the Brotherhood’s members. In sum, the situation that led to the escalation of violence and the subsequent ban of the Brotherhood can be characterized, recurring to the variables outlined in the previous chapter, as the outcome of: .

.

.

a weak state without full sovereignty and with repeated interference in politics on the part of an imperial power, Britain, unable to effectively control the movement but responding to its growing strength with bouts of selective repression (domestic level: state weakness, especially after 1945); an international political and ideological conflict in Palestine that exacerbated the domestic situation in Egypt and radicalized the members and ultimately also the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood (transnational level: radicalizing framework); a hierarchical movement whose leader, responding to the pressures of a growing membership, embarked on a trial-and-error strategy of organizational development that – whether intentionally or not – led

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to a militarization, while at the same time attempting to keep close relations with the regime and to strike deals when necessary (movement-internal level: hierarchical leadership and no toleration of dissent). An interesting perspective is opened up by the change in regime at the end of the first phase considered here. With the fall of the old regime – the monarchy and largely discredited multiparty system – new opportunities arose for the Brotherhood. Still in a rebuilding phase after the sudden death of its founder and leader, al-Banna, the movement chose to act cautiously towards the new regime, initially declining an offer to take several ministries under Nasser. Later on, its criticisms of core policies of the new regime, for example, the move towards a singleparty system, brought on a conflict between the Brotherhood and the regime that ended in total repression. This pattern, one of initial cooperation followed by harsh repression once the movement began to make its weight felt politically, can be found across different phases of the movement’s history.

Phase II: 1954 –70: Re-radicalization Followed by Moderation After Nasser started an intense crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, the most difficult phase in the movement’s history to this day began. Thousands of members were in prison and torture was widespread. The movement’s activities largely came to a halt or had to be conducted in secrecy, and many Brothers left the country to escape persecution. Repression during this phase was not uniform, however, with several peaks followed by relative lulls. Neither was all activity of the Brotherhood suppressed, for with so many Brotherhood activists imprisoned, a debate centred on key ideological issues and on the future direction the movement was to take developed inside the major prisons.73 As one long-time observer of the Muslim Brotherhood with prison experience of his own has remarked, ‘After the interrogations or torture, [. . .] once things are settled, and you are in your cell, either alone or with fellow prisoners, you have all the time in the world, there are no other appointments, ten years, fifteen years ahead of you; so you think, you reflect, you read, you discuss, you debate.’74 In this manner,

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two main currents of thought developed during the period of repression under Nasser: a more mainstream, moderate one that sought reconciliation with the authorities, as well as a radical one, based on the writings of Qutb, that brought about a renewed attempt at militarization as well as, later, new splinter groups that embraced radical thoughts and methods.

Sayyid Qutb, Organization 1965 and the consequences One of the Brothers jailed after 1954 was Qutb, who had only joined the Brotherhood in 1951 but had quickly become influential within the movement. Like al-Banna, he was a schoolteacher trained at the same institute that al-Banna had studied at. During an overseas stay in the US, where he had been sent by the Ministry of Education, he was repelled by the loose morals he encountered, a theme that was to play an important part in his future writings. During his time in prison, most of which he spent in the infirmary due to injuries and bad health, he wrote extensively: his best-known works include the 30-volume In the Shade of the Qur’an and the famous Milestones, widely seen as a call to arms and compared to Lenin’s What is to be done.75 The cornerstones of his ideology were the concepts of hakimiyya (sovereignty of God) and jahiliyya (state of ignorance from the guidance of God).76 He argued that most Arab states lived in a state of jahiliyya and needed to be liberated and set on the right path by way of jihad (struggle). In his view, it was actually the societies and not just the corrupt regimes that had strayed off the right path and gave rise to takfir (accusation of unbelief),77 thus becoming legitimate targets in the struggle over right and wrong. Most analysts stress the fact that the prolonged incarceration and the witnessing of extreme cruelty and torture on the part of the prison guards influenced and radicalized Qutb’s thinking and writing. However, as Zollner notes, it is important to bear in mind that the basic ideas Qutb drew on had been part of the Brotherhood’s ideological make-up prior to 1954 and the subsequent repression experienced by the movement.78 He drew on the writings of South Asian scholars Abu Ala al-Mawdudi and Abul Hassan al-Nadwi, combining them with pre-existing Muslim Brotherhood concepts such as that of al-haraka al-islamiyya (Islamic activism) – al-Banna’s blend of religion and politics.79 Yet, some of the brutal measures adopted by Nasser’s regime seem to have led to both a proliferation and a radicalization in Qutb’s

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thoughts and writings, as most of his more radical tracts appeared after the 1957 Limane Turrah prison massacre.80 Qutb played an important part in the revitalization of the movement after the 1954 crackdown, as his writings could be more easily smuggled from the hospital, and as he was able to encounter other members of the Brotherhood there.81 He was leading a sort of ‘intellectual reawakening’ of the movement and his writings were inspiring a current that sought to regroup the Muslim Brothers and rebuild their old strength.82 Details on this process are scarce; leading Muslim Sister Zainab al-Ghazali, who was well connected within Islamic circles and had merged her Muslim Ladies Group with the Brotherhood in 1948 after direct negotiations with al-Banna, describes it in her memoir. According to her account, she and Abd el-Fattah Ismail had been meeting regularly from the late 1950s onwards and had discussed ways of re-energizing a movement whose activities had become virtually naught. This involved travel to all regions of Egypt and outreach activities, as well as connecting with any Muslim Brothers released from prison in order to ‘test their true colours.’ They also studied and researched the situation in the Muslim world in order to evaluate ‘the state of Islam’ in all Muslim countries, concluding that ‘the nation of Islam was not upheld’, that is, that the rightful kind of Islam was not actually in existence anywhere.83 Based on this, alGhazali relates, they conducted a survey among their acquaintances and the members of various reading circles and youth study groups led by them in order to determine their stance on the implementation of an ‘Islamic state’: if 75 per cent or more of those asked responded in favour, they would ask for the implementation of such a state, if less, they would embark on renewed efforts at educating and teaching the ignorant in order to make them appreciate true Islam. Al-Ghazali recounts that all their efforts had the blessing of the General Guide, al-Hudaybi, and that they made contact with Qutb and read and discussed his Milestones, equally with al-Hudaybi’s knowledge and approval.84 She then in detail relates her experience after being arrested on charges of instigating a rebellion and plotting to overthrow the state with violent means, something which, according to her memoir, she had never intended to do; her own and Ismail’s efforts were directed at raising awareness and educating youth, as well as reconnecting members of the Muslim Brotherhood with their current efforts.

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An alternative account is given by Farid Abdul Khaliq, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Office; he recounts that the reorganization attempt definitely involved an armed wing and occurred without the order or blessing of al-Hudaybi, the General Guide at the time.85 Other sources, however, hold that al-Hudaybi knew about and tacitly consented to the development of a new armed wing, perhaps knowing that he was not powerful enough to stop it.86 Two further indicators seem to strengthen Abdul Khaliq’s version of events, in the absence of solid proof: one is that el-Fattah Ismail was a former member of the Special Apparatus and thus had both the experience, and likely, also the contacts and connections needed for the preparation of armed action against the government. Second, a former leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood also actively refers to the Organization 1965 as an attempt at re-establishing an armed wing based on the takfiri principles advocated by Qutb.87 The official, who openly referenced this development during an interview in July 2011, may have been at greater liberty to speak than other Muslim Brotherhood representatives and politicians who were interviewed for this study. He has publicly clashed with the movement’s leadership in 2009, spoken out about his discontent in being passed over in the elections for General Guide and has since left the Brotherhood to join a different political party. In contrast, the mainstream argument offered by Brotherhood and FJP representatives holds that due to harsh state repression, the organization was unable to keep up any activity at all during the Nasser era, much less plans for an armed insurrection.88 This is, however, what the Nasser authorities claimed when in 1965 they proceeded to rearrest all Muslim Brothers who had been detained in 1954,89 and instituted a renewed cycle of military trials, detentions and torture. In 1966, Qutb was executed in prison; repression only started to lift somewhat for the Muslim Brotherhood after 1967, when Nasser’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel weighed in and dealt a heavy blow to the regime’s legitimacy. At this time, the government started releasing selected Muslim Brothers in order to increase its declining popularity somewhat.90

Hassan al-Hudaybi and Du‘at la qudat Another indication that Organization 1965 had been a serious attempt at reviving the movement’s militant current was the leadership’s

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subsequent disavowal of Qutb’s ideological legacy of radicalism, published in the form of a book titled Du’at la qudat. The crackdown on the movement following the alleged discovery of the Organization 1965 plot led to an attempt at moderation by the movement leadership. It is, in fact, uncertain whether the movement’s General Guide, al-Hudaybi, actually wrote the book himself. It provides a detailed rebuttal of Qutb’s arguments, drawing on Islamic legal interpretation. For various reasons, it is assumed that al-Hudaybi did not author the text: his knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence was not advanced enough for such a detailed refutation of Qutb; he was pressured by the regime to strike a deal and consented to a group of others writing the text for him. Alternatively, it is alleged that agents of Nasser’s security service authored the book.91 The latter argument seems somewhat unlikely given that Nasser’s security agents, even if they were high-ranking, were not usually recruited from among the u’lama (Islamic scholars). What seems certain, and is affirmed by current and former members of the Brotherhood at present, is that the book was representative of al-Hudaybi’s reasoning as a leader, and of his attempts to end the movement’s pariah status and to reach some kind of modus operandi with the authorities at the time the book was actually published, in the mid-1970s.92 In other words, his approach was highly pragmatic, which merited him little sympathy from the movement’s rank and file who had witnessed the brutal repression of the Nasser years. It did, however, contribute to a softening of repressive measures against the Brotherhood, and provided the impetus for a lasting disavowal of violence, or de-radicalization, of the movement.93 An important question posed by Zollner merits closer attention: if al-Hudaybi’s intent was indeed to move towards moderation and away from Qutb’s radical course, and to disavow the renewed attempt at establishing an armed wing, why did he wait until several years after Qutb’s death to do so? And, moreover, why had he given tacit consent to the activities of Organization 1965, only to withdraw it later on and to leave all of those associated with it out in the cold? According to Zollner’s argument, this harks back to the fact that Du’at la qudat was not originally written in order to communicate with the regime regarding the movement’s stance on violence, but was foremost an attempt at quelling an internal leadership struggle. Qutb’s enormous popularity, prolific writing and connection to an attempt to revitalize and re-establish the

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Muslim Brotherhood at a time of heightened repression had lent him a great degree of legitimacy, presumably at the expense of that of al-Hudaybi, the movement’s actual leader at the time. Qutb was referred to as the ‘great mujahid, Imam and scholar’94 and ‘became broadly acknowledged as an outstanding figure’.95 During the course of the 1960s, a struggle over the appropriate response to state repression, and generally over the strategy and goals of the movement broke out among Muslim Brotherhood members and leaders. What is documented of it is the debate taking place in the prisons, with Qutb’s extensive publishing, as well as, later, written responses by al-Hudaybi to questions posed by individual members and finally, the writing of Du’at la qudat.96 It pitted a moderate faction under the leadership of al-Hudaybi against the followers of Qutb’s thought. This was certainly the intent of Nasser: to reach accommodation with a part of the movement, represented by al-Hudaybi, knowing that this sort of arrangement would alienate other factions of the Brotherhood. The regime strategy at this point amounted to a classic divide et impera manoeuvre, which was to enjoy some success. By most accounts, al-Hudaybi had been a compromise candidate upon the death of the seemingly irreplaceable al-Banna. Apparently, several factions within the movement each had their favourite candidate. The former leader of the Special Apparatus, Salih al-Ashmawi, headed a faction mostly composed of members of the Special Apparatus; a second group was headed by Sheikh Hassan al-Baquri and made up of religious scholars; another group included al-Banna’s relatives, such as his brother Abd al-Rahman and his brother-in-law; and finally, an ‘elite’ section of financially well-off and educated Brothers, including Munir Dilla and Abdul Khaliq, backed al-Hudaybi.97 How exactly the factions agreed to pick al-Hudaybi is not entirely clear, but there seems to have been a consensus between them that given the difficult circumstances – the Muslim Brotherhood was still banned in the early 1950s following the violence of the late 1940s described above – there was a clear need to avoid internal conflict. And internal conflict would have been the result of any of the factions trying to dominate the others; by contrast, the appointment of al-Hudaybi was less controversial, as he was not even a member of the organization at the time, was unknown to most members and even leaders, had close contacts with the palace and thus seemed a good candidate for putting a ‘fresh face’ on the Brotherhood and of de-escalating the conflict with the government.98 The other factions

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which were contenders for the Brothers’ leadership, especially members of the Special Apparatus, viewed al-Hudaybi as a convenient tool for getting the ‘names of the terrorists’ out of peoples’ minds when they talked about the Brotherhood, and counted on the fact that he would be easily replaceable once the situation had grown more opportune for the movement. However, as it turned out, their calculation was mistaken and al-Hudaybi remained at the head of the Brotherhood for the next 22 years, until his death in 1973. Although details about his background are fairly sparse, al-Hudaybi recounted that he became a committed follower of the Brotherhood after hearing al-Banna speak, soon had a close personal relationship with al-Banna and from 1944 onwards served as his personal legal adviser.99 He proved an astute political operative and soon after his official inauguration as the Brotherhood’s murshid (Supreme Guide) reshuffled many key positions within the movement, dismissing older members and replacing them with younger ones loyal to him. He also resisted the demand made by some long-term members that he forego the use of the title murshid, which was too closely associated with and shaped by al-Banna. These moves showed that he in no way conceived of his position as being temporary and had an agenda of his own; although some of his early manoeuvres, such as his refusal of cabinet posts held out to him by the Free Officers after the 1952 revolution, brought about angry reactions by members and additionally cost him legitimacy. Shortly after his appointment as murshid, al-Hudaybi decided to take on one of the prime power centres of the Brotherhood and its selfdeclared ‘elite’, namely, the members of the Special Apparatus. After he discovered that the unit still existed, even after the ban on the movement and the violence that had severely tainted its reputation, he declared his intention to resign in protest. This was solved by way of a compromise: al-Hudaybi withdew his resignation, and in return a committee was charged with mediating between al-Hudaybi and the leaders of the Special Apparatus; new leaders were appointed for the Special Apparatus and information about its membership was requested. However, al-Hudaybi’s attempt at bringing the group under control in this manner was not crowned by success. In 1953, the latent conflict escalated into the open, when membership factions loyal to Abd alRahman al-Sanadi, the leader of the Special Apparatus, and opposed to al-Hudaybi’s allegedly ‘unrepresentative’ leadership, occupied the

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Muslim Brotherhood headquarters and demanded his resignation.100 Things escalated further when a member of the Special Apparatus, who had allegedly agreed to hand over long sought-after information on the membership and structure of the Special Apparatus to al-Hudaybi, was assassinated. Several known members and leaders of the Special Apparatus were subsequently expelled by the al-Hudaybi-dominated Guidance Bureau of the organization. It was only after these expulsions, which the leadership did not justify to observers or even to most members, that a new attempt to deal with the parallel power structure embodied by the Special Apparatus could be started. This time, with its key leaders removed by expulsion, the whole Special Apparatus was to receive a new image – one less secret and more in tune with the mainstream of the Brotherhood’s institutions – which was to lead to its eventual dissolution and merger with the existing ‘family’ system.101 This attempt was begun shortly before the Nasser regime decided to crack down on the Brotherhood once again, spurred on by the fact that al-Hudaybi and his faction had won an internal victory against the Special Apparatus leaders, whom Nasser had personal ties with.102 The turn of events after 1954, with a new bout of harsh repression, certainly once again shaped the strategy and reaction of the Brotherhood in the years to come. On the one hand, the repression made al-Hudaybi’s attempts at controlling the armed factions of the movement ground to a halt, as around 1,400 members of the Brotherhood were arrested and taken to several different prisons spread out across Egypt,103 initially rendering communication between them impossible. On the other hand, the actions of the Nasser regime lent additional credence to the arguments of those who favoured the continued existence of an armed wing for the Muslim Brotherhood, perceived as the only way to put up an effective defence against a government bent on destroying the movement.104 The fact that the new wave of repression undermined al-Hudaybi’s attempt at controlling the Special Apparatus, and thereby simultaneously clarifying a central issue in the Brotherhood’s strategy – whether or not to use violence against the regime – is significant. Al-Hudaybi was imprisoned and given a death sentence, which was then commuted to life imprisonment. After spending a short amount of time in prison, he was released and placed under house arrest from 1954 to 1965. This effectively cut him off from many of the debates going on in

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the prisons, and left him with little opportunity to influence, let alone forestall, the development of a clear new ideological vision based on Qutb’s writings. Al-Hudaybi had not been able to establish such a vision prior to 1954, as he was mired in internal conflict (and possibly not the type of leader cut out for this task). Qutb’s vision effectively filled a gap and provided a sophisticated ideological framework that was geared towards confrontation with the state rather than accommodation. Rather than trying to quell this development, al-Hudaybi gave his consent to the faction within the Brotherhood that was aiming to establish an armed wing and to confront Nasser’s regime.105 It was only after the preparations for establishing Organization 1965 were exposed and a renewed crackdown and wave of arrests befell the Brotherhood that al-Hudaybi changed course, gave up his ambiguous stand on the use of violence and formulated – or at least sanctioned the formulation of – an ideological vision to rival and refute that of Qutb. Zollner’s argument that the original writing of Du’at la qudat was primarily directed at the membership body and aimed to win back influence and legitimacy for al-Hudaybi and his faction seems plausible in light of these developments.

The aftermath of Organization 1965 and the Brotherhood’s revival in the 1970s However, it is not clear that al-Hudaybi actually set up a long-lasting vision of his own; it seems more likely that his actions and those of his supporters managed to soften the regime’s repressive stand in the short term and represented a pragmatic approach rather than a full-fledged programmatic turnaround. Al-Hudaybi and those surrounding him – his son Ma’mun, Umar al-Tilmisani, Mustafa Mashour and Mohammad Abu al-Nasr, all of whom were later to become murshid of the Brotherhood – chose the path of accommodation with the regime, presumably after witnessing yet another attempt at active and armed opposition end in failure. The fact that Du’at la qudat was most likely authored with the help of Al-Azhar scholars shows that the regime was aware of the effort and supported it, as Al-Azhar was largely under governmental control.106 While part of the intended audience of the text may have been rival factions within the Brotherhood, the fact remains that by composing it with the knowledge and support of the regime, al-Hudaybi was sending a clear signal of accommodation and a

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willingness to cooperate and refrain from the use of violence. In a way, he and his supporters were thus upholding al-Banna’s pragmatic approach of keeping avenues of communication and cooperation with the government functioning wherever possible, and in a larger sense, of incorporating political work into the Brotherhood’s mission. This differed markedly from the ideas proposed by Qutb; even though Qutb never explicitly called for the toppling of Nasser’s regime, he nevertheless identified secular governments as being on the wrong track and functioning according to a logic of ignorance, jahiliyya. He emphasized teaching and preaching, dirasa wa da’wa, as activities preferable to participating in politics.107 What brought about the ‘victory’ of al-Hudaybi’s faction and the establishment of their pragmatic approach as the dominant one in the years to come, which resulted in the disavowal of violence and the resort to peaceful means of participation in the political system? Before we can answer this question with any certainty, it is necessary to survey several more developments that occurred during Nasser’s rule, both structurally and related to the actors involved in the Muslim Brotherhood at the time. First of all, it is important to note, as Ashour argues, that the regime was able to co-opt several former members of the Special Apparatus, chief among them the former leader, al-Sanadi.108 He was secured a lucrative position in an oil company and given real estate in Ismailiya. Several of his followers were also accorded state employment. These individuals had never opposed Nasser and were generally in agreement with his policies and his treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood prior to 1954. Nasser’s policy thus did not aim at actively turning committed Muslim Brothers into followers of his rule; rather, he was cementing the support of those already inclined towards him. While he was thus successfully manipulating a split within the movement and weakening al-Hudaybi’s position in the short term, in the longer term this manoeuvre removed a whole faction potentially inclined towards jihad and struggle from the Brotherhood, and may ultimately have contributed towards the peaceful path chosen by the movement’s leadership during the late 1960s. Second, and crucially, the regime quickly discovered the attempt at reviving and potentially rearming the Muslim Brotherhood; Nasser responded swiftly by rearresting many of the leadership and executing the key figure of the renaissance attempt, Qutb. This renewed repression

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naturally dealt a blow to the effort. Al-Hudaybi himself was arrested and originally handed down a death sentence; this turning point may well have impressed the lesson on al-Hudaybi and his collaborators – most of whom would succeed him at the top of the organization at different points in the Brotherhood’s history – that rearming and confronting the regime was not worth the consequences and not benefitting the movement in any way. It is, however, important to note that many key representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood today do not refer to al-Hudaybi’s efforts and to Du’at la qudat as the crucial turning point in the Brotherhood’s ideology and history that brought about the adoption of a non-violent strategy. The official version given by representatives holds that the Muslim Brotherhood has always adopted a peaceful and non-violent strategy towards the regime, and has never viewed the regime or government as an enemy to be fought. Any acts of violence committed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood were acts carried out by individuals, without licence by the Guidance Office or the leadership in general.109 Exceptional circumstances may legitimize the use of violence, and may do so in the future, such as armed occupation by foreign powers.110 None of the 11 (current or former) Muslim Brotherhood representatives interviewed for this study independently brought up the effort of al-Hudaybi when asked about the movement’s position on violence. Instead, structural developments, context and circumstance were named as reasons for the shift in policy towards the regime – mostly, of course, the harsh repression, torture and imprisonment of women exerted by the regime, which were perceived as a violation of ‘human dignity’ and left a certain ‘stream’ within the movement no other choice but to oppose by using violence itself.111 Once these conditions were removed, however, the violence-prone stream disappeared and all initiative went back to the mainstream of the movement, which, according to all interviewees, had ‘always’ been opposed to the use of violence. Another factor contributing to the movement’s reverting back to the mainstream is also related to regime repression: many members who were inclined towards Qutb’s ideas were either imprisoned or left the country to live in exile. Europe or the Gulf countries were popular destinations for many cadres who were later to play important parts in the movement, and who were followers of Qutb’s concept of takfir and his idea of Islamic activism in general.112 Additionally, the late 1960s

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saw, as mentioned above, a slow decline in legitimacy for the Nasser regime, especially after the hasima or defeat of 1967. In the short term this brought more conflict between Islamists and the regime, but in the longer term it contributed to a stronger position for the Muslim Brotherhood as the regime began to lift its harsh repressive measures somewhat, and it became easier for Islamists of all colours – including those of the Brotherhood – to meet and organize.113 This of course played into the hands of the moderate policies propagated by al-Hudaybi and his supporters, as the immediate cause for mobilization and radicalization had been removed. After the sudden death of Nasser in 1970, President Sadat, his successor, began to gradually remove the restrictions placed on the Muslim Brotherhood. It is well documented that Sadat, eager to back his somewhat weak public standing with political support and determined to confront the ‘Nasserites’ questioning his rule, sought to build a coalition with Islamist forces.114 Starting in 1971, he began to release imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood and in 1975 granted a general amnesty to all its members.115 Thus, the scene for a revival of Islamism in general and of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular was set with the arrival of Sadat.

Conclusion to Phase II Considering the developments from the mid-1950s until 1970, the variables ‘ideological change’ of the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and regime policy – notably repression – on the other, seem to constitute the defining influences of this period. Whereas in Phase I, repression produced radicalization, during Phase II, it produced both radicalization as well as ideological moderation. This is mainly due to the difference in state capacity between the two phases. During the 1940s, the Egyptian regime, largely controlled by the British occupation forces, was able to deliver targeted blows against the movement. This affected the thinking and planning of al-Banna, who clearly seemed to be factoring in this reaction in his speeches and actions. Under Nasser, during the 1960s, however, repression was carried out on an entirely different scale. Nasser’s regime built up a strong security apparatus and commanded a tight network of secret police that made his control over the Brotherhood very effective. This is manifest in his regime’s ability to imprison scores of Brotherhood members and to relocate their struggle

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from the streets into the prisons, and in the concurrent build-up of a ‘military society’ dominated by the class of officers now in power.116 In other words, during the 1960s the regime was able to drive an effective and sustainable wedge between two wings of the Brotherhood: a more accommodationist one, led by al-Hudaybi, and a more radical one influenced by the ideas and writings of Qutb. The ideology developed and disseminated by Qutb influenced the strategies embraced by the Brotherhood during Phase II, and its role is not to be underestimated. The kind of radicalization embodied by Organization 1965 differs markedly from that of the late 1940s. In the mid-1960s, there was no immediate connection to issues of imperialism, which had been a dominant enabler of Muslim Brotherhood violence in the 1940s: al-Nuqrashi was assassinated with explicit reference to his decision to withdraw Egyptian troops from Palestine in 1948. In the early 1960s, by contrast, those who were preparing armed action against the state in the context of Organization 1965 were fighting an unjust order represented not by foreign powers occupying their land, but by infidel (Egyptian) regimes which were obstructing the direct rule of God that was the hallmark of true Islam, in their view. This ideological adaptation was significant and influenced the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and strategies more profoundly than the concerted but ideologically less grounded violence of the late 1940s. The fundamentally different nature of these two diversions into violence is illustrated by the fact that the regime was able to co-opt key actors of the first radicalization undertaken by the Special Apparatus in the 1950s, most notably the former head of the organization, al-Sanadi. They were wooed with material benefits such as lucrative state employment and real estate. Such co-optation is difficult to imagine for actors of the more religiously grounded Organization 1965. While the key ideas of Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones), Qutb’s manual for Organization 1965, can be found in his earlier writings, it still seems unlikely that his thinking would have turned as radical as it did had he not personally witnessed the ruthless repression and torture the Nasser regime inflicted on the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the 1952 revolution, or coup, and the takeover of power by the Free Officers movement, the political opportunity space for the Brotherhood had briefly seemed to open up. Their initially good relations with Nasser and his inner circle rapidly declined when it became obvious that Nasser was not intent on power-

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sharing and was not going to grant the Muslim Brotherhood the extensive share of state power and influence that the latter had been hoping for. With the stand-off between the two sides escalating, Nasser proceeded to ban the Brotherhood and had scores of members arrested on charges of failing to support the revolution’s cause – a fact which is remembered among Muslim Brotherhood members of today as ‘losing the revolution’, and which they hoped to avoid at all costs following the revolution of 2011.117 When the 1954 assassination attempt on Nasser was blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser obtained the necessary pretext for stepping up his repression campaign, arrested scores of Brotherhood members for indefinite amounts of time, and had numerous adherents of the movement court-martialled and hanged. The development of Organization 1965 and its aftermath thus represent an interplay of ideological change and state repression, with repression as the key enabler that set off the turn towards violence taken by the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the latter is hard to imagine without the ideas and driving force of Qutb. Contrary to Phase I, which had witnessed ideological ambivalence regarding the use of violence, Phase II saw an ideological radicalization openly calling for a violent fight with a secular state deemed evil and repressive. This state was much more capable than the Egyptian regime of the 1940s, in the sense that it was clearly able to enforce its decisions. For Qutb, Muslims who regarded jihad as a defensive concept only, and who disavowed the use of violence in order to fight those holding on to the misguided concepts of jahiliyya – that is, the pre-Islamic or un-Islamic world – were the ‘product of the sorry state of the current Muslim generation’ and ‘have laid down their spiritual and rational arms in defeat’.118 Clearly, they have not understood the following: No political system or material power should put hindrances in the way of preaching Islam. It should leave every individual free to accept or reject it, and if someone wants to accept it, it should not prevent him or fight against him. If someone does this, then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission.119 Regime intervention was also crucial to the de-radicalization phase, to borrow Ashour’s term, driven by murshid al-Hudaybi and exemplified in

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the book Du’at la qudat. Al-Hudaybi is not the promoter of peace that some accounts make him out to be; while he did try to rein in the representatives of the Special Apparatus in the early 1950s, he may not have done so for purely altruistic reasons. The members and supporters of this faction had originally opposed his nomination as murshid and regarded his term in office as temporary and rather insignificant. In short, they were his intra-organizational opponents, and his attempt at dissolving the Special Apparatus an effort at self-preservation as much as keeping the Muslim Brotherhood on a peaceful course. Additionally, al-Hudaybi tolerated the work of Qutb and implicitly gave his blessing to the founding of Organization 1965 and its renewed attempt at setting up an armed wing for the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi’s moderate, probably regime-backed ideological discourse meant to counter that of Qutb was initially designed to strengthen his position within the organization and to win back support from the general membership. Only with the weakening of the Nasser regime at the end of the 1960s, and then the takeover of Sadat in 1970, did this discourse, embodied in Du’at la qudat, become official policy. It was published in response to Sadat’s offer of a deal to the Brotherhood: the adoption of a peaceful strategy in return for the release of prisoners and permission to operate normally again. This again underlines the role that increased state capacity played during this period; the regime was able to exert long-term influence on the movement by offering a convincing co-optation incentive. Summing up the developments on the three levels of political opportunity I am considering, the following emerges from Phase II of the Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution. While repression was a key factor in shaping the movement’s repertoire of action during this time, there was no external (transnational) linkage that was heating up and radicalizing the movement’s thoughts, as there had been during the 1930s and 1940s in the form of the Palestine question. The decision by influential Brotherhood figures to pursue a path of confrontation was entirely driven by considerations belonging to the interaction with the regime. The fact that the state was more capable of exerting targeted repression than in Phase I made a crucial difference during this stage. It both prompted a more pronounced radicalization of the Brotherhood in the form of Qutb’s writings, as well as a moderation discourse in the form of al-Hudaybi’s non-violence policy. Clearly, the radicalization of

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the movement during this phase was a product of its struggle with the regime for survival, or at least of how some people within the Brotherhood interpreted this struggle. On a movement-internal level, the lack of strong leadership within the Brotherhood during this time opened the way for Qutb’s ideas becoming popular and influential for the movement. Where previously, al-Banna had attempted to steer an accommodationist course, there was now enough of a vacuum for a more radical vision to take hold. Al-Hudaybi’s accommodationist course was also a response to the state’s repressive policies and cemented a split within the movement between radicals and moderates that was to become more salient during the next stage of the movement’s history. The change in strategy undergone by the Brotherhood between the mid-1950s and 1970 thus grew out of a number of internal and external factors. It prompted the careful development of a more moderate strategy that was put forward and nurtured by the Supreme Guide of the movement, al-Hudaybi. He tacitly consented to the setting up of Organization 1965 but did not become actively involved, thus being able, as the plot was discovered and a second severe wave of repression by the Nasser regime hit the movement, to pick up the pieces and seek an arrangement of coexistence between the movement and the regime. His book Du’at la qudat laid the foundation for a ban of Qutb’s radical ideas from the mainstream of Muslim Brotherhood ideology, and provided a clear refutation of violent jihad, effectively limiting the repertoire of action of the movement, at least officially. The fact that some of Qutb’s other ideas continue to be part of the ideological statements of leading Brotherhood figures today, however, accounts for a certain amount of unease among observers of the movement – essentially a fear that, were the context conducive to it, the movement might resort to violence once again, building on the thoughts and ideas of Qutb. The analysis of the first two phases in the movement’s development considered here shows that this is not unrealistic, if an open struggle for survival between the regime and the movement were to break out again.

Phase III: 1970 –2000: Continued Non-Violence, Attempts at Democratization, Radical Spin-Offs Having steadily gained freedom to act and organize throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, after the 1995 elections the Muslim Brotherhood was

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exposed to a renewed crackdown by the regime. Arrests and military trials were once again dealt out to them by the state, presumably because their growing political influence and weight was beginning to threaten the Mubarak regime. This section will analyse how the movement was able to attain a relatively high level of political leverage, and how it reacted to the subsequent repression exerted by the regime. What were the crucial differences that prevented a radicalization similar to that witnessed during the previous phase of harsh repression in the 1960s? In order to identify causal patterns and factors, this section will first briefly trace the rise of the Brotherhood throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, and then examine the process of interaction between regime repression and movement response after 1995. I will argue that movement-internal factors made a crucial difference to the Brotherhood’s response to repression during the 1990s. The return of a generation of Brotherhood leaders from exile during this time led to a more inward-looking strategy that eschewed further confrontation with the regime.

Prologue: The Brotherhood and the Sadat years, 1970–81 As mentioned above, the beginning of Sadat’s presidency brought about a notable relaxation of conditions for Islamic activists of all colours. Already at the end of the 1960s, Islamic scholars who had previously been prevented from preaching were allowed to appear in public and hold Friday sermons again.120 The trend continued as soon as Sadat became president in 1971 and attempted to shore up his legitimacy against the many doubters who saw him as an inadequate successor to Nasser and who potentially planned to wrest power back from his hands. Sadat aimed to win over Islamists and thus to cement his rule with their support against Leftist rivals, in return granting different privileges to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups and associations. Part of his conditions was the definite disavowal of the use of violence by all Islamic groups, in return for which they did not receive official permission to act in the political arena – for example by establishing a political party – but were granted freedom of expression and organizational movement.121 This resulted in the Brotherhood’s ability to publish its monthly magazine Al-Dawa again, which the movement used as an opportunity to voice at times vocal criticism of Sadat and his policies, albeit without mentioning his name and while simultaneously reaffirming its absolute commitment to non-violence.122

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At the same time, the newly released leaders of the Brotherhood were able to reach out to new members, mostly by meeting with Islamic student groups and winning them over to their principles and to joining the Brotherhood.123 Among the recruits who joined the Muslim Brotherhood at this time were several of its most prominent representatives in later years, such as Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Essam Erian and Essam Sultan. Together with other members, they form what has been classified as the ‘middle’ or ‘70s generation’, constituting the first major internal group that was able to challenge the ‘old-guard’ leadership – those leaders that had risen through the Brotherhood’s ranks under Nasser. Although their ideological and political outlook varied from more conservative to liberal-democratic and the group is far from homogeneous, in terms of internal movement dynamics they embody a distinct faction that was soon to gain its own power base. Not only were most of the 70s generation, as the group is sometimes called, active in student politics, but they proceeded to get involved in professional syndicates and associations during the 1980s, and thus built a strong base from which to engage the regime in various types of confrontation. However, before they began to do so, the Brotherhood leadership challenged Sadat’s treatment of them on several counts during the 1970s. While the movement was relatively successful in co-opting Islamic student groups into their structure or tanzim (literally, organization), and was left the necessary manoeuvring space for doing so, the official ban on the movement that Nasser had imposed was still in place. Al-Tilmisani, al-Hudaybi’s successor as murshid, presented legal challenges to this ban in the late 1970s on the grounds that the Muslim Brotherhood’s goals were completely in accordance with Article 2 of the constitution the Sadat regime adopted in 1971: this article declared the state to be an Islamic state and the Islamic shari’a as a source of law.124 According to al-Tilmisani’s argument, there was thus no reason to ban the Brotherhood from officially establishing itself as a movement or party on the grounds that it was a religious organization, as the Sadat regime was doing. The fact that no ruling was ever declared in the case brought by al-Tilmisani confirmed to the Brotherhood that, despite its rhetoric, the regime was still intent on curbing the movement’s activities.125 Altogether, however, the Brotherhood’s leadership steered clear of major confrontations with the regime during the 1970s. Through its

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publications and public discourse, the movement made it clear that it disagreed with Sadat’s key policies: economic infitah, the shift from alignment with the Soviet Union to a strategic partnership with the US and the peace agreement with Israel.126 This criticism was uttered while constantly reaffirming that the movement was committed to nonviolence. On the domestic front, the 1970s mainly saw an attempt to rebuild the tanzim (structure of the Brotherhood) that was designed to keep up its mission of tarbiya (religious education), aiming to achieve gradual reform from within the current system. The official publication of Du’at la qudat in 1977 publicly confirmed the conciliatory stance of the Muslim Brotherhood, and underlined their willingness to become a non-violent movement. At the same time, there was a lot of residual opposition to the regime within the Islamic current in Egyptian society in general, and many of Sadat’s policies reinforced this opposition. The upheaval surrounding the figure of Qutb and the current within the Brotherhood that was founded on his ideas and writings, coupled with the leadership’s subsequent pledge not to use violence, had left many followers of Qutb’s ideas discontented. Among this faction, there had been hope that the Brotherhood as a whole would adopt the concept of takfir as well as an activist, militant method of implementing it. When this failed to materialize and its leadership adopted a peaceful stance, some members turned away from the Brotherhood and began to establish independent, underground movements with a militant outlook. One example is the al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra group, also known as ‘Repentance and Holy Flight’. Its leader, Shukri Mustafa, had been a Brotherhood member and was arrested and sentenced to several years’ imprisonment in 1965. While in prison, he purportedly became disillusioned with the Brotherhood’s leaders, as he personally witnessed some of them breaking down under the regime’s torture and turning away from the ‘right path’. He decided to take matters into his own hands and founded al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra while still in prison, recruiting among fellow prisoners. Upon his release in 1971, he began to expand the group’s membership and to build a system of u’sar (families), imitating the Brotherhood’s organizational structure but indoctrinating members with a much more radical and militant type of teaching. The group was finally dissolved, most of its leadership killed and many rank and file arrested in 1977, after they had held a government minister hostage for several days, hoping to free

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imprisoned members of the movement.127 Similarly, the Islamic Liberation Organization (Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami) was founded by a former member of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood who had moved to Egypt in the early 1970s. There, he recruited among disillusioned Muslim Brotherhood student supporters and formed a militant group which occupied the Military Academy in 1974, planning this as a first step in the takeover of all state institutions as well as political power. The group was overwhelmed by regime forces and its leadership imprisoned and later executed. The Brotherhood’s accommodationist stance vis-a`-vis the regime thus came at the price of significant defection and militarization at the fringes of the Islamic movement in Egypt. At the same time, this stance had several advantages: it did not rule out public criticism of the regime. Additionally, it allowed for the slow rebuilding of the Brotherhood’s organizational structure, and was able to convince and attract a group of young Islamic student organisers into the movement who were later to become influential members and leaders. This group, among them current top Brotherhood leaders such as Erian and Aboul Fotouh, were originally much more radical in their outlook and not entirely opposed to the use of violence, as one of them relates.128 Yet, they gradually moderated and sought out contact with Muslim Brotherhood representatives, eventually joining forces at the end of the 1970s and bringing a whole new group of members into the movement. A focus of this new membership body was the provision of services to fellow students and their families, which helped the movement gain acceptance, legitimacy, as well as a reputation for efficiency and honesty among a large constituency.129 The promotion of welfare and social justice became a central theme for the Brotherhood throughout the 1970s, in line with their efforts to rebuild the structure and the tanzim. Towards the end of the decade, several developments brought about a deterioration in relations between the Brotherhood and the Sadat regime. As already mentioned above, General Guide al-Tilmisani began to challenge the regime’s ban on the movement to exist with official sanction, either as a movement (haraka) or as a political party (hizb).130 At the same time, the economic situation worsened and in 1977, bread riots broke out in several parts of the country as a response to rising prices – a by-product of President Sadat’s infitah policy of economic opening, which made the Egyptian economy more vulnerable to

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dynamics in the global economy as a whole. Aboul Fotouh, one of the Islamic student leaders and by the late 1970s a Brotherhood member, publicly questioned the social policies of the regime and criticized rising prices and social injustice.131 Confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime began to build up, in a context of Sadat’s developing tendency to narrow the space for political and civil society activism across the political spectrum as a whole.132 The signing of the peace accord with Israel in 1979 was a further strain on relations between the regime and Islamist opposition, with pressure building up on Sadat and opposition growing more overt and vocal. In 1981, Sadat went back on his tolerance and opening towards the Muslim Brotherhood, effectively banning the organization once again and arresting hundreds of members as part of a general wave of arrests of political activists of all colours, which saw 1,500 regime critics jailed.133 This radical closure of the political environment, designed to bring back under control what Sadat’s previous overture to the opposition, especially to political Islamists, had unleashed, resulted in the 1981 assassination of Sadat during a military parade. Activists of the Jihad organization, acting on a radical ideology partly originating with Qutb’s ideas, partly drawing on the writings of Mohammad Abd al-Salam Farag, the founder of Jihad, shot Sadat dead in the grandstand. Farag drew on the writings of medieval Islamic philosopher Ibn Taymiyya to establish a Manichean ideology of binary oppositions, calling for militant activism.134 Jihad incorporated several of the Islamic Liberation Organization’s remaining members after 1974.135 Both Islamic Jihad and Gama’a Islamiyya, another militant Islamist organization that originated in the revival of student Islamist politics in the 1970s, were essentially concerned with capturing political power and taking over governance of the state.136 Hence Sadat’s closure of the political environment spurred additional resistance to his already un-Islamic policies among the radical Islamists, leading to the plot to assassinate him. After the assassination, many Jihad members were rounded up, tried and sentenced to death or to long prison sentences. The evolution of the Islamist current in Egypt throughout the 1970s and up until 1981 confirms theoretical explanations of the turn towards violence among social movements: ‘radical ideologies engendered radical violent repertoires only when political opportunities triggered escalation’, in the words of Donatella Della Porta.137

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The Islamic Liberation Organization, drawing directly on the writings of Qutb and having experienced the 1965 repression against those surrounding him, used the initial relaxation of the security situation after 1970 for a reorganization and a first attack on the regime. In a sense, the establishment of their ideology in the mid-1960s had directly coincided with a repressive state response against it, confirming the group’s determination to act against the state. In 1981, they were responding to severe state repression and arrests by employing violent means and assassinating the President. It is important to note that Sadat’s assassins or the members of Jihad, the Islamic Liberation Organization and others adhere to a different strand of Islamism than that embraced by the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Although based on ideas also embraced by the Brotherhood, the more radical split-offs of the Islamic movement developed a Manichean vision of believers versus unbelievers and groups such as al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra deemed it legitimate to execute anyone who strayed from the right path of Islam, which in their view included most people outside of their group. This clearly differs from the vision embraced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is grounded in a general acceptance of the political order and expresses the will to participate in it. During the 1970s, the mainstram Muslim Brotherhood was led by followers of the ‘al-Banna school’, if such a term can be applied to describe them. The immediate supporters of al-Hudaybi, who during the late 1960s had led the attempt to re-establish a ‘proper’, peaceful ideology modelled on al-Banna’s words and deeds, were leading the movement throughout the Sadat years. Chief among them were the General Guide after 1973, al-Tilmisani, and Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, Hassan’s son. Their conception of Islamic activism was closer to alBanna’s than Qutb’s, as they conceived of politics as inseparable from religious matters, hence participation in the political system remained a definite option and a priority. The fact that al-Tilmisani sought to reverse Sadat’s ban on officially establishing the movement as a political party illustrates this effort to use existing legal (and hence, intra-system) means to challenge the regime. In contrast, groups such as Gama’a Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad acted in secret and developed ‘anti-system frames’, which according to Della Porta facilitate a social movement’s turn towards the use of violence as a means of protest.138 When Muslim

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Brotherhood members and leaders were gradually released from the prisons after 1974, they managed to co-opt several of the student leaders into the peaceful mainstream, while others chose to follow more radical groups working underground. In this, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly benefitted from Sadat’s desire to counter the influence of remaining Leftists and ‘Nasserists’ after taking power, and this offer of semi-legality in return for non-violence strengthened the Brotherhood throughout the 1970s. While members of militant groups such as Islamic Jihad and Gama’a Islamiyya numbered several thousands,139 the Muslim Brotherhood was able to rebuild its former strength of several hundred thousands of members by the 1980s. In addition to regaining strength by adopting a policy of moderation, the Brotherhood also benefitted from the regime’s crackdown on the militant groups: And here was the gamble, whether by design or by defect: that after every confrontation between the young militants and the Egyptian state, those militants would be thrown in prison, will grow older in prison and by the time they come out, they have moderated, so they join the Muslim Brothers.140

The early Mubarak years and the Brotherhood’s shift to the political arena, 1981– 95 The takeover of power by Mubarak in 1981, who had served as Sadat’s vice president since 1975, resulted in a renewed opening of the system towards non-violent Islamists in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Many, especially younger members who had been arrested in 1981 as part of Sadat’s crackdown on the opposition, were released again in 1982 and 1983. Mubarak’s relaxation of the repressive measures put in place by Sadat has been explained by a number of factors, such as his apolitical background (his training had been purely military and he had held no political office prior to 1975), the fact that he was little-known and possessed no personal charisma to rival that of Sadat and his desire to counter the violent activism of radical Islamists by enlisting the support of moderate ones, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.141 In a sense, he was mirroring Sadat’s efforts to make the enemies of his enemies his friends – in Sadat’s case, the enemy initially were Leftists and Nasserists, whereas in Mubarak’s time it was radical Islamists.

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Al-Awadi identifies two key strategic goals the Muslim Brotherhood was working towards under Mubarak: to continue the rebuilding of the tanzim, and to strive for the establishment and recognition of a political party for the movement. This most likely is the result of a political learning process that began among the established movement leadership following the experience of the Special Apparatus and Organization 1965, which led to the realization that any secret or underground activity made the movement more vulnerable and an easier target for regime repression. Being part of the public sphere, on the other hand, would make any repression public as well and would therefore cost the regime legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This logic was invoked to al-Awadi during interviews with the Muslim Brotherhood membership in the mid-1990s, and it has been mentioned as a conscious strategy by Brotherhood members and politicians during interviews with this author in 2011. A leading figure of the FJP expressed the strategy concisely when interviewed in September 2011: ‘The Muslim Brothers is a very public organization, it cannot work underground, it works within the public, all its calls and objectives are quite declared, and quite well accepted by the majority of the Egyptian people!’142 This was mirrored by other FJP cadres interviewed around the same time,143 as well as a former Deputy Supreme Guide interviewed for this book. He stressed participation in politics and the public sphere as a key tool for achieving several objectives for the movement: gaining a legal right to express its views, gaining a forum and audience for making its political visions heard and influencing public opinion.144 The strategy of staying public to avoid marginalization and repression thus seems to have become a cornerstone of Brotherhood activity over time, was first openly followed and expressed under al-Tilmisani during the 1970s, and constituted the main logic behind the movement’s actions throughout the 1980s. It was coupled with efforts to rebuild the tanzim of social and cultural organizations and committees, working at a grassroots level and devoting energy to countering the image of an underground, militant organization that the regime was trying to attach to the movement.145 Over time, the movement’s mainstream has thus incorporated this strategy into its repertoire of action on a movementinternal level, which has contributed to its ability to manage relations with various repressive regimes.

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The 1980s saw an influential decision which further underlined this conscious shift to a pragmatic approach of working through existing institutions and processes: the Brotherhood’s coalition-building with secular political parties in order to gain representation in parliament. Again, it was driven by murshid al-Tilmisani, who has stated on various occasions that the drive to enter politics and eventually establish a political party – for which the participation in parliamentary elections was a precondition according to the Egyptian Constitution – was merely the second-best option. Ideally, the movement would have been recognized for what it perceived itself as: a transnational social movement that transcends the petty concerns of party politics and domestic issues.146 As this option was not available, becoming involved in politics was at least a way of according some legal status to the actual work of the movement: engaging with society at a grassroots level and engaging in da’wa work, furthering the call to faith and to Islam. The decision to ally the Brotherhood with the secular New Wafd party in 1984 was, in a way, a pragmatic response to the legal environment the Mubarak regime was creating for the Brotherhood and for political parties on the whole; only parties that had been approved by the Political Parties Committee (Lagnat al-Ahsab al-Siyasiya) were allowed to formally participate in the elections, and there was an 8 per cent hurdle that had to be taken by parties (they were required to take at least 8 per cent of the vote in order to be represented in parliament).147 Hence, incentives to form a coalition existed both for the Brotherhood and for the New Wafd party: the Brotherhood would be able to participate by forming a joint list with the New Wafd, while the latter would be able to jump the 8 per cent hurdle by drawing on the Brotherhood’s greater popularity. The fact that al-Tilmisani and the leader of the New Wafd party, Fu’ad Siraj al-Din, were personally close helped ensure implementation of the alliance,148 with both leaders stressing that the marriage was entirely temporary and instrumental. There was a degree of ideological similarity, as one faction within the New Wafd party had developed a religious discourse and declared themselves to be embracing Islamic principles and shari’a, but no further organizational cooperation was envisaged or implemented by the respective party leaderships.149 The incentives provided through the POS – namely, the win-win situation created by the 8 per cent hurdle and the restriction to formally recognized parties in the elections – were

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most likely what made the alliance become a reality. The list made up of the New Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood gained 13 per cent of the vote in the elections, resulting in 58 seats, of which 50 went to the Wafd and eight to the Brotherhood, making the bloc the largest opposition group in parliament.150 A similar alliance was forged for the 1987 elections, this time between the Brotherhood, the Liberal Party (LP) and the Socialist Labour Party (SLP). The New Wafd party, at this time, was more confident of getting above the 8 per cent threshold, while these smaller parties were not. The three parties formed the ‘Islamic alliance’, again with factions within the LP and SLP shedding their secularist agenda for an Islamic one calling for the implementation of shari’a and leading to open conflict within the two smaller parties.151 This yielded a more substantial amount of participation for the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to the alliance with the New Wafd, which had taken most of the seats that the list managed to win in 1984. In 1987, the Islamic alliance won 60 seats, of which the Brotherhood took 36, while the SLP gained 16 and the LP six seats. Muslim Brotherhood members of parliament, contrary to expectations that they would engage in purely religious rhetoric, quickly gained a reputation of efficiency and of working on the demands and needs of their constituencies. During the 1987 election campaign, the famous slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ was first used, a phrase which has since become closely associated with the movement. When in 1990 the Supreme Court dissolved parliament for the second time on the grounds that the electoral law was unconstitutional and called for new elections, the Muslim Brotherhood and several other political parties decided to boycott. There are several theories as to the reasons for this decision. Al-Awadi cites two studies, one of which argues that the boycott was the result of a growing frustration with parliament and the simultaneous ability to get various shari’a provisions implemented. Alternatively, the realization that the Brotherhood was organizationally incapable of covering all legislative districts in the country had led to the election boycott.152 Antar, on the other hand, cites the Brotherhood as arguing that fair elections could not be guaranteed and hence withdrawing from the election race.153 Whatever may have been the ultimate reason or combination of reasons behind the decision, it seems that it was not reflecting a deeper, strategic reorientation, as the Muslim Brotherhood actively and vocally contested the 1995 and 2000 elections.

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The 1990 election boycott did, however, herald a new era of confrontation between the Brotherhood and the regime, which has been extensively analysed. Structurally, the Mubarak regime was less intent on seeking opposition approval or consent for its policies; this had been the case at the beginning of Mubarak’s rule, when he was more inclined to seek legitimacy and approval. With the regime strengthened over the course of its 10-year existence, alienating the opposition seemed less costly. This became apparent in the decision to ban a coordinating committee of professional syndicates, many of which were at this time dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had, throughout the 1980s, steadily increased its presence in the professional syndicates and associations, most notably in the Egyptian Medical Association. When an effort was made to use these representations as a political tool by expressing demands towards the regime, the tone between the two sides – the authorities and the Muslim Brotherhooddominated syndicates – quickly grew harsher. This was not a unanimous decision and Erian, one of the major figures involved in the drive to gain influence in the professional associations, has questioned the decision to adopt a more confrontational discourse with the regime.154 However, the Brotherhood leadership, having significantly gained in influence and visibility throughout the 1980s and having rebuilt its system of societal organizations that had largely been destroyed during the Nasser years, was willing to flex its muscle and to make its growing influence felt politically. In a give-and-take dynamic, this in turn was prompting the regime to progressively restrict the political space: in the professional associations, on university campuses and in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections of 1995, student activists with the Brotherhood were feeling the effects of the new, harsher political climate in the early 1990s: When I was in college, I was a new member of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was my first year and it was in 1994. They were able to manipulate the Student Union, which was having an election in different colleges, and we were successful in most of the colleges at the time. And the next year, when I was in my second year, they started interfering, they were rigging the election, excluding us, refusing our participation. Because at first we had to present the names of those on the list, and from the very beginning

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they started to refuse such names, using vague excuses, [. . .] so we realized that they’re going to exclude us.155 Economic issues such as the acceptance of structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF were leading to accusations of social injustice, and the regime’s legitimacy was on the decline. A 1992 earthquake that destroyed many parts of Cairo, especially poor areas with slum-like dwellings, brought the regime’s shortcomings to the forefront and graphically underlined its incapacities in delivering essential and life-saving support to the people. Various Muslim Brotherhood associations responded much faster to the disaster than state agencies, a fact that was much noticed and discussed in the press at the time. The regime responded to this perceived challenge by denouncing the Brotherhood’s ‘state within a state’ that was allegedly posing a threat of Islamist violence. Concurrently, it was curtailing the Muslim Brotherhood’s representation in the professional syndicates by introducing a new election law for them. The new law required a much higher turnout and forced a re-run of elections in case a minimum of 50 per cent participation was not attained.156 Regime repression during this period was also a response to the increase in assassinations and violent attacks by radical Islamists from Gama’a Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad. To cite the most prominent instances, in 1992 the liberal university professor Farag Fawda was shot by Gama’a Islamiyya; the following year, Islamist ambushes and attacks on police and security forces claimed hundreds of victims. Gama’a Islamiyya also carried out an assassination attempt on Mubarak himself during a 1995 visit to Ethiopia. Furthermore, in 1997 Gama’a Islamiyya together with another group brutally murdered 62 tourists at Luxor in a move explicitly designed to hurt the country’s tourism industry and weaken the regime. Mubarak’s security forces responded with a brutal clampdown on radical Islamists, but also on those within the Muslim Brotherhood who were not taking explicit steps to disassociate themselves from the violence. The 1992 Salsabil case presented a first instance of arrests of Muslim Brotherhood cadres and leaders in a long time. In this, the regime was responding to a perception of the Brotherhood’s growing influence in society, and the fact that it was well financed through various economic enterprises. When government agents raided the offices of Salsabil,

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a computer company headed by leading Brotherhood figure Khairat al-Shater, and confiscated documents, they found evidence of a wideranging plan to infiltrate various societal sectors as well as the military, in order to make the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence felt there.157 The regime immediately construed this as a conspiracy to topple the government and take over political power, arresting the purported leaders and sentencing them to between one and two years’ imprisonment; presumably, the electoral success of Islamists in Algeria at the same time was further worrying the Mubarak regime and prompting its harsh response. From the time al-Shater’s so-called Empowerment Plan was discovered up until the elections of 1995, regime repression against the Brotherhood steadily increased.158 Despite these measures, the movement remained determined to pursue its course of political participation, using all available avenues, such as professional syndicates and student unions as well as activism focused on society. In 1994, it also published a document dealing with the issue of citizenship, openly engaging in a discourse on political rights for the first time, and underlining its commitment to non-violence and to participating in the political process.159 This was foreshadowing the attempt to establish the Wasat Party, referred to below, and the subsequent split within the Brotherhood.

The 1995 elections and their aftermath Building on previous successes in the political arena, the Muslim Brotherhood fielded 170 candidates in the 1995 parliamentary elections. As the regime realized that, left to its own devices, the Brotherhood might even supersede its previous electoral successes and possibly come to gain as much as a third of the votes in parliament, it decided to act. The fact that the 1995 assembly was needed to nominate Mubarak for a fourth term as president in 1999, as well as the still harrowing example of Islamist electoral success in Algeria, were among the key factors that drove the authorities to forestall the Brotherhood’s participation by extremely repressive means.160 At least 51 people were killed during the voting process, 28 of them by state authorities, and 878 were cited as wounded.161 In the end, the Brotherhood was able to win a single seat, a gain which was later declared illegitimate by the authorities on the grounds that the deputy belonged to an illegal movement, that is, the Brotherhood. Additionally, 95 members of the Brotherhood were

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arrested, tried in military tribunals and sentenced to between three and five years’ imprisonment with hard labour. Among them were leading figures of the tanzim, the network of largely civil society organizations that constituted the power base for the Brotherhood at the time: Erian, Aboul Fotouh, Habib and al-Shater (who had already been arrested in 1992) were among those detained. Soon it became obvious that the regime’s intent was not merely to prevent their participation in the elections, but to politically incapacitate them – and with them, the movement as a whole – for longer, thus significantly weakening the Muslim Brotherhood as an opposition force. This had an immediate and quite severe impact on the Brotherhood’s further strategy for years to come, and the repression exerted by the regime in 1995 and the years after that remains in the eyes of most observers, as well as the majority of movement members interviewed for this study, the worst treatment the movement had received since the Nasser years in the 1950s and 1960s. For one, the masterminds of the 1970s generation, Erian and Aboul Fotouh among them, were behind bars and unable to influence the movement’s course. Contrary to the 1960s, when many Brotherhood prisoners were interned together and able to communicate, the incarcerations of the mid-1990s did not lead to comparable ‘prison talk’, at least not in a way that left a noticeable impact on the movement’s strategy.162 Instead, other factions than that of the ‘70s generation’ began to have a noticeable influence on strategies and decisions; this was exemplified by the appointment of Mashour as General Guide in 1996. He was a former head of the Special Apparatus and ideologically more conservative and hard line than his predecessors al-Tilmisani and Hamed Abu Nasr; especially the latter had been considered a relatively weak figure who left much of the actual strings to be pulled by Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, the son of former murshid al-Hudaybi.163 Under Mashour’s leadership,164 a general trend towards attaining ‘social legitimacy’ was noticeable within the movement,165 which translated into a turn to da’wa-oriented work and internal organization-building rather than politicization of the Brotherhood’s activities. This is confirmed by various internal strategy documents of the movement which al-Awadi analyses; in these documents, a threepronged approach is recommended. First, the movement should avoid competing with the regime in areas which the latter considers its own (mainly, politics) and instead focus on social work. Second, the work in

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professional syndicates should be maintained but should not become politicized. And third, energy should be devoted to reassessing key positions on social, economic, political and organizational reform.166 These positions seem clearly exemplified in the movement leadership’s response to the formation of the breakaway Wasat Party in 1997. Muslim Brotherhood leaders finally decided that the ‘time was not ripe’ for such an overtly political move and declared that the movement would not sanction it,167 whereupon most of its backers retracted and withdrew their support, except for a few of its initiators around Abou Elaa Madi and Essam Sultan. In itself, the foundation of the Wasat Party had in part been a lesson drawn from the regime’s policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement, and an attempt to move its political work out of an illegitimate, quasi-clandestine environment into the open arena, in the hope to gain public legitimacy and support and to make the movement less vulnerable to repression. In another interesting and influential development unfolding after the 1995 elections, arrests and trials, is an exchange in leadership personnel beyond the choice of Mashour as General Guide (who was selected by an inner leadership circle around Ma’mun al-Hudaybi after Hamed Abu Nasr’s death, bypassing the movement’s bylaws which stipulate the convening of a general assembly for the election). With many leading thinkers, especially of the 1970s generation, imprisoned, there was a sort of leadership vacuum that was soon filled by ‘returnees’ from the Gulf states. Many members who had chosen exile during the Nasser years, such as al-Ghozlan or Mohammad Badie, the movement’s murshid from 2010 onwards, and who had returned to Egypt during the 1980s, now saw their moment to rise to positions of influence. According to a former youth member of the Brotherhood, these members had picked up more conservative ideas while abroad; they were more aligned with some of Qutb’s ideas, not interpreting him in the sense of calling for jihad, however, but as focusing on teaching and preaching the call to Islam.168 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood, after the renewed repression set in 1995, withdrew into ‘developmental’ work rather than trying to confront the regime in the political arena, is attributed to the return of exiles from the Gulf by Brotherhood members interviewed for this study. Al-Ghozlan, who went on to become the FJP’s media spokesperson, was dubbed a follower of the takfir principle by younger members of the movement, demonstrating the conservative

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image that many who were in leading FJP and Brotherhood positions in 2011 have in the eyes of the youth. The new leadership that took over was intent on damage control, trying to avoid any further confrontation with the regime. They had embraced ‘more conservative’ views during exile, sometimes being dubbed ‘Salafis’ by younger adherents of the movement.169 Their chief aim was to return to the religious, da’wa roots of the Brotherhood, caring for the community, reaching out and spreading the faith. In this, they also aimed to demonstrate to the regime that they were not out to do any harm but only sought to do unpolitical, religious work at a community level. Their strategic mindset was thus going back to a focus on the social movement that stood at the outset of the Brotherhood’s development, and they were turning away from the more recent political orientation embraced by Wasat generation leaders such as Aboul Fotouh, Erian and others.

Conclusion to Phase III Throughout the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood was actively seeking out the political arena and pursuing all avenues for participation: official ones, in parliamentary elections, where possible, and more unofficial opportunities such as control of professional syndicates which were then used as platforms for political activity. In the early years of Mubarak’s rule, this was possible largely because the new president was still relatively concerned about the legitimacy of his regime, and because he and his advisers realized that a cooperative attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood would win them much sympathy. This began to change at the outset of the 1990s, when IMF structural adjustment programmes led to rising prices and worsening economic conditions, while the regime’s corruption, at the same time, became more blatant and perceptible to the public. The tone between the political opposition as a whole, on one hand, and the regime on the other, worsened considerably. The 1992 Salsabil case provided a new impetus for the regime to arrest members and denounce the Muslim Brotherhood’s plans for overthrowing the government and taking over political power – something that the actual evidence does not support, and that seems more motivated by the regime’s attempt to weaken the ever-growing popular support and legitimacy enjoyed by the Brotherhood. These developments resulted in renewed, heavy repression during the 1995 elections

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and afterwards, obviously designed to prevent a Brotherhood victory at the polls, but also to weaken the movement organizationally and politically for years to come. This was successful, in a way, as the incarceration of many leading, moderate thinkers of the movement after 1995 brought in more conservative, ‘old-guard’ leaders who chose a course of turning inwards and concentrating on religious and social work, rather than on politicizing the movement’s role as a political opposition force. A current within the movement that drew a different conclusion from these events and aimed to establish a moderate political party (Wasat Party) in order to avoid repression, was eventually thwarted and drawn back into the fold of the mainstream. The conservative, older leaders of the movement, for their part, had apparently drawn their own lessons from past experience, for they insisted on non-violence instead of a return to more jihadist rhetoric or actions. On a domestic level, the mid-to-late 1990s were characterized by an upsurge in repression by Mubarak’s regime after the Brotherhood had successfully exploited a new action repertoire: participation in parliamentary elections. Here, the regime seems to have somewhat underestimated a new participatory strategy developed by the Brotherhood, which aimed at gaining maximum influence through all available participatory avenues, chiefly student and professional unions. Through their active participation in such democratic processes and by continuous canvassing and campaigning, the movement was able to rebuild credibility and popularity. This was, of course, coupled with considerable financial resources the movement was able to generate from its membership base, as well as from exiled members living in various Gulf states. These funds as well as its superior organizational structure, which looked back on several decades of efficient mobilization, put the Brotherhood at a massive advantage compared to most other Egyptian political forces. The Brotherhood remained locked in a struggle with the regime, where both sides were influencing each other’s strategies, and which definitely pre-structured the Brotherhood’s further choice of action repertoires. However, it is also important to note that movement-internal dynamics played a role in strategy choice during this period, as well: chief among them was the return of important and long-term movement cadres returning from exile and bringing with them a cautious, non-political approach to running the movement’s affairs.

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In addition to these dynamics, the truly ‘radical’ and violenceoriented streak of the Egyptian Islamist movement had in the meantime found different outlets than the Brotherhood movement and had founded alternative organizations, contributing to a continued moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood mainstream. The two most influential ones were Islamic Jihad and Gama’a Islamiyya. These offshoots were founded by disgruntled former Brotherhood members who had become dissatisfied with the overall strategy of the movement, which they deemed to be wrong. In their eyes, violence was the only way of confronting the regime, hence their attacks on key government figures, as well as on key revenue-generating industries for the regime, such as foreign tourism. Any Brotherhood member or figure who was looking for a similar approach could join these organizations, or found new, similar ones, now that the ideological niche of violent jihad was fully carved out and thriving. Certainly, this would have decreased the inhibitions of individuals or groups looking to use violence against the regime in order to fight jihad. Ultimately, this strategy would prove wholly unsuccessful: the regime pulled no punches and cracked down extremely hard on these radical groups, eventually causing them to dissolve or pledge their allegiance to using non-violent means, as happened with the Islamic Jihad in 2000. The fate these groups suffered thus likely strengthened the Muslim Brotherhood’s own adherence to non-violence, as the effects of using violence against the regime (severe repression and existential threat) were glaringly obvious both looking at the movement’s own history and at current regime-radical movement interactions. These two elements – the existence of violent jihadist organizations at the fringes of the Islamic current, as well as the repression-induced internal leadership change within the Muslim Brotherhood – thus seem to largely account for the Brotherhood’s continued peaceful orientation in the face of a new wave of government repression and arrests during the second half of the 1990s. In the aftermath of the elections, the movement was very careful to pursue a low-key style and avoid open confrontation with the regime, while still maintaining its position as the paramount political opposition movement present on the Egyptian scene. It is perhaps illustrative of the Brotherhood’s long-term experience in walking the thin line between opposition and conformity that the movement actually succeeded with this strategy between 1995

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and 2000, when it was able once again to appear in the public sphere with vocal if strictly limited criticism of Mubarak regime policies. Having said that, the regime had also gained a decade and a half (sometimes much more, depending on whether individuals within the regime apparatus had already served under Sadat or even Nasser) of experience in managing the Brotherhood’s activity and had drawn conclusions as to the political opportunity space it was willing to grant them. Non-threatening participation in elections (such as during the 2000 vote) as well as the voicing of criticism were OK; any actions, organizational build-ups or more radical tendencies which provided a basis for actually threatening and confronting the regime were not. One movement member has characterized the Mubarak years as follows, a description that undoubtedly many Egyptians would share: ‘Under Mubarak, it was always allowed to talk; people would talk, talk, talk,’170 meaning, they were allowed to voice their frustration and dissatisfaction with their current living arrangements. Anything beyond that, however, and the security services would knock on the door. The caution and non-political course embraced by the Muslim Brothers in the wake of the 1995 elections proved successful in that by the time of the next elections in 2000, the movement had regained some political opportunity space and was able to field candidates in the elections once again.

Phase IV: 2000 –10: Continued Non-Violence and Eventual Withdrawal from Politics Following the repression of the mid-1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to avoid confrontation with the regime for the remainder of the decade. This fact was mostly attributable, as has been argued above, that most influential thinkers of the ‘political camp’ within the Muslim Brotherhood – that is, those who sought to use political, legitimate avenues for their demands and for holding the regime accountable – remained behind bars. More conservative leaders, most of whom had spent long years in exile in the Gulf countries and elsewhere, took the helm of the movement in their stead. The result was a strategy that turned inward on strengthening the religious elements of Brotherhood activities: religious education and activism in society. Things began to change again starting in 2000, as many of those imprisoned began to be

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released and as external pressure on the Egyptian regime increased and demanded reforms and a political opening in return for foreign economic and military aid. Together with secular opposition movements, the Brotherhood began to take a quite vocal opposition role in the early 2000s and contested the 2005 elections, winning 88 seats and using these to underline its pivotal role on Egypt’s political scene. As a result, there was a renewed crackdown on the movement after 2005.

The 2000 elections and their aftermath The latter part of the 1990s and the lead-up to the parliamentary elections of 2000 are characterized by two main traits: a deepening split between the older, more conservative leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood on one hand, and activists of the 1970s generation on the other;171 and the Mubarak regime’s ambivalent attitude towards a political opening and political competition. The latter resulted in partial openings – such as allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to field candidates in the elections – followed by reversals and new repressive measures, such as the rearrests of substantial numbers of Muslim Brothers prior to the elections. These two developments came to impact the Brotherhood’s strategy choice for the 2000 elections. In 2000, many of those middlegeneration (or 70s generation) activists arrested in 1995 ended their prison terms and were duly released. They did not hesitate to become involved in politics once again, and in fact, Erian is believed to have masterminded the Brotherhood’s election campaign for the 2000 elections,172 a careful mixture of political ambition and restraint that won the movement 17 seats in the assembly. This was presumably possible because a new kind of understanding had been reached between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood leadership: the regime would tolerate the movement’s activities and recognize its current, oldergeneration leadership as long as the Brotherhood refrained from openly challenging the regime’s power. In this vein, arrests of Brotherhood cadres were made prior to the 2000 elections, but they spared the higher echelons of the movement along the lines of this deal or understanding.173 Again presumably, this would have meant that the leadership under General Guide Mashour and Deputy Guide Ma’mun al-Hudaybi reined in the activities of the 70s generation enough so as not to cause an open confrontation with the regime. The ‘younger’ activists of the 70s generation (although not so young themselves and

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mostly in their 50s), made efforts to ease the movement’s generational conflicts and to patch its internal divides.174 When Mashour passed away in 2002, his Deputy al-Hudaybi took over, again representing the movement’s more conservative streak, but at the same time also a supporter of becoming active in the political arena rather than just in religious and social activism.175 He did not have time to leave a significant imprint on the movement, however, as he also passed away in 2004, whereupon Mahdi Akef was chosen as General Guide. He had closely cooperated with many of the 70s generation activists and mentored quite a few of their efforts,176 seeming to offer an opportunity to further mend fences between different camps within the Muslim Brotherhood. In the aftermath of the 2000 elections, the Brotherhood’s course in the public arena remained cautious and was designed to avoid further repressive measures as a result of posing a threat to the regime. The newly elected Brotherhood parliamentarians were mostly unknown, second-tier members of the movement; they continued previous members of parliament’s simultaneously ‘confrontational and low-key style’, focusing on culture and identity issues, but also on power abuses by the security forces.177 In effect, considering the overall situation of the movement and its political context in the early 2000s, this represented somewhat of a winwin situation. The Brotherhood had regained visibility, and with it also a degree of public legitimacy; through its representatives in parliament, it possessed a platform for making its views heard. The regime, on the other hand, seemed to have contained the threat to its political power posed by the Muslim Brotherhood during the mid-1990s, and was now in a position to allow for a limited opening and limited contestation of the elections – both within strict bounds – that would help improve its image both to the Egyptian and international publics. This ‘truce’ went so far as seeing the regime and the Brotherhood stage joint demonstrations against the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

International pressure for democratization In the wake of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, international pressure on most Middle Eastern governments for democratization increased. Working on the assumption that an upsurge in democracy and transparency would automatically decrease the risk of terrorist attacks, governments in Europe and the US created policy

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initiatives meant to further a democratization of the region. The US first formulated its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2002; in 2004, a US – European forum was created in the form of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), integrating many existing policy tools to avoid duplication, but also following European criticism of the aggressive Bush administration approach towards the region.178 The volume of aid dispensed through these initiatives has been remarkable, stressing the high priority that democratic reform in the Middle East holds for European and US policy makers. Through their various regional and country programmes, these initiatives have come to impact domestic politics in Egypt, as well. In 2003, during the lead-up to the trial of human rights advocate and social scientist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the Bush administration voiced strong concerns over his imprisonment (on charges of using foreign funding for election monitoring) and threatened to withhold financial aid. Ibrahim was eventually released in 2003 and his sentence overturned. In a similar case (at least one relevant to the West, with many others going unnoticed and/or unreported), when opposition politician Ayman Nour was arrested in January 2005, the US Secretary of State cut short a visit to Egypt to protest his imprisonment. The pace of reform demands and Egyptian government responses quickened, and President Mubarak had begun to state his intention of embracing political reform starting in 2000, effectively placing the parliamentary elections of that year under judicial review for the first time in Egyptian history.179 In 2005, these concessions resulted in the announcement that Egypt’s presidential elections were open to other candidates besides Mubarak, the incumbent. In this unprecedented political opening, a number of civil society and political initiatives saw a glimpse of hope and began to mobilize. Notably, the Kifaya movement staged street demonstrations, and Nour placed second in the presidential elections with 8 per cent of the vote – reflecting the low turnout and successful manipulation of results by adherents of the regime.180 Passages from US Embassy cables released by WikiLeaks demonstrate the US government’s confidence that they were able to influence the pace of political reform in Egypt: After absorbing Washington’s clear message on reform, Gamal Mubarak’s NDP clique, allied with ministers and advisors, was

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given unprecedented power over the conduct of the election. The positives of September 7 – sidelining of the NDP ‘old guard’ and the security forces – were a direct result of the reformers’ influence.181 In his address to parliament after the 2005 elections, President Mubarak repeated his pledge to secure democratic reform, freedom and rights of individual citizens, as well as the strengthening of political parties and civil society.182 Although subsequent events have clearly revealed this to be lip service only, the years between 2001 and 2005 were characterized by increasing external pressure on Egypt, one of the foremost recipients of US foreign aid, to open up political space and to implement political reforms.

The Brotherhood during the 2005 elections This spirit of change was apparently perceived and acted upon by the Muslim Brotherhood as well. Upon assuming office in 2004 after the death of Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, Supreme Guide Akef convened a press conference announcing an initiative for political, democratic reform. Presumably, the Mulsim Brotherhood’s leadership was aiming to capitalize on the reform mood prevalent in the country at the time; however, the actual content of the initiative as announced by Akef was vague and failed to make pertinent reform proposals, not going beyond general demands for greater openness as formulated by the majority of Egyptian opposition movements. It has been widely regarded as a response to the US’ discourse on reform needs in the Middle East, as well as an attempt to signal to the Egyptian public that the Brotherhood was firmly back on the political scene prior to the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2005.183 This is confirmed by current members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, who acknowledge both the opening that US pressure on the Egyptian government has granted them,184 as well as their intention of staying visible on the political scene as a way of ‘annoying’ the government and making their presence and strength felt to the regime.185 As the majority of commentators and observers have noted, the Brotherhood’s actual election campaign has not primarily been concerned with issues of political reform and greater democracy, however. The 2005 election manifesto of the movement illustrates the attempt to integrate reform language used by a young generation

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of activists into the essentially conservative vision held by the leadership ranks: The authority of the ruler is derived from a social contract between ruler and ruled. It is instituted by the Umma, which creates civic institutions. The civic nature of the state deprives it of any sanctity but it must nonetheless abide by the principles of Islam for Islam has prescribed certain limits and rights. It is a state that blends religion and politics without either separation or merger.186 As is obvious from the passage, the platform reflected an effort to blend religious with civil and constitutional efforts, but the language remains muddled and vague. This may reflect the lack of experience in formulating platforms and programmes within a civil, democratic environment – which is not surprising given Egypt’s authoritarian political history of late. Undoubtedbly, however, the political leadership took a decision to demonstrate the movement’s strength to the regime, and had dropped all efforts at restraint and avoidance of confrontation with the authorities. This is evident both in the number of candidates the movement decided to field – with 150 candidates running as independents, the chances of winning substantial representation were high – and in its use of religious slogans such as ‘Islam is the solution’. The Brotherhood was sending a clear message that it was here to stay on the political scene, a force to be reckoned with if there was to be any kind of democratic opening in Egypt, and ultimately daring Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) elite to make good on their promises of reform. Some analysts have noted that this points to the fact that ‘reformers’ such as Erian and Aboul Fotouh, although represented in the Guideance Bureau and Shura Council of the movement, respectively, were nonetheless sidelined by the movement leadership.187 Events after the 2011 revolution, however, may indicate that at least Erian is perhaps less of a reformer than has been generally assumed; instead of continuing to push for a moderate agenda, he has firmly rejoined the mainstream of the Brotherhood embodied in the FJP which, although employing the language of democracy and demanding a ‘civil state with an Islamic frame of reference’, keeps open the possibility of forming a coalition with ultra-conservative Salafist parties. This has provoked much disappointment with his decisions and course among young Brotherhood activists

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who seek to make the movement fully compatible with secular, democratic principles.188 Be this as it may, it remains a fact that the Brotherhood strategy prior to the 2005 elections aimed to mobilize the strength of its base, and therefore reached out to them via religious slogans. This type of mobilization clearly paid off, as became evident with the progress of the three-stage parliamentary elections. In the end, more than half of the movement’s candidates were successful, in part due to a strategy that avoided direct confrontation between Brotherhood and regime candidates, and concentrated on those districts were the Muslim Brotherhood commanded strong support already.189 This unprecedented success took place despite the regime’s decision to abandon its originally tolerant stance, and to use intimidation, harassment and violence to keep Brotherhood voters away from ballot boxes as the elections progressed, and as the Brotherhood’s initial successes became evident.

Return to repression in the aftermath of the elections and movement response Returning to a familiar pattern, as soon as the 88 Brotherhood delegates had taken up their seats in parliament, the regime resorted to a crackdown on the movement, which had once more become too influential and had politicized its presence to a degree that Mubarak and his advisers found intolerable. The Brotherhood began to suffer the consequences of its success right away. Even during the elections, voting was blatantly obstructed by armed regime thugs, and Brotherhood members were arrested, courtmartialled and sent to prisons. This did not lead to a radicalization on the part of the Brotherhood, but instead saw the movement bog down and hold on to any legal means of challenging the regime available to it. Among such measures were the staging of demonstrations, which became increasingly frequent in Cairo and throughout Egypt in order to protest restrictions such as the state of emergency (in effect since 1981), and call for democracy and transparency. In the months after the election, events kept unfolding: in March 2006, doctors, university professors and businessmen who were members of the Brotherhood were arrested, allegedly in response to their demands for abolishing the emergency law.190 In April, more arrests occurred during protests against the trials of pro-reform judges. Also in March, at another protest, large numbers of Brotherhood members including senior leaders

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Erian and then-president Morsi were arrested while attending a protest demanding free and fair presidential elections. Finally, in July 2006, there was another wave of arrests of Brotherhood members while they were attending group meetings, and they were charged with illegally collecting funds for a banned movement. These and other measures signalled a clear return to a policy of repression, blatantly contradicting everything the Mubarak regime had pledged in the way of democratic reform prior to the 2005 elections. Most observers perceived this as an understanding reached between the regime and the US: with the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the spectre of Islamist-dominated governments in the region was raised once again, and Washington was falling back on its policy of cooperating with secular regimes even if that meant going back on its pro-democracy rhetoric of the preceding years. The connection seemed particularly pertinent in light of a Mubarak visit to Washington, immediately prior to the renewed wave of arrests and repression. The Brotherhood response to these measures was mixed, seemingly falling back into familiar patterns of partial radicalization, partial opening and reform. In December 2006, a paramilitary-style parade of masked students declaring themselves members of the Brotherhood at AlAzhar university once again raised the spectre of violence. The display came after several months of tensions between Muslim Brotherhood students and the Security Apparatus: when student association elections in 2006 were repeatedly obstructed by security agents, Muslim Brotherhood students resolved to form their own, independent student union. When this was dissolved by the regime, tension escalated and led to the parade, which in turn provided an excellent handle for the government authorities to denounce the Brotherhood as dangerous and violent.191 Once again, the movement leadership was quick to denounce the paramilitary display as the misguided acts of individuals, but the incident obviously heightened tensions between the movement and the regime. In another kind of response, the Muslim Brotherhood for the first time formulated a fully fledged election platform in 2007, and distributed it to journalists and pundits for commentary. This was illustrative of the opposite response to the regime’s repression and violence: once again seeking out legitimate political participation as a way of forestalling future repression. The fact that the draft platform was

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distributed to commentators and also reached US and European academics and journalists, demonstrates the movement’s intention to communicate its democratic nature and intentions as widely as possible. The move was not as successful as had been hoped, however, largely because the draft contained provisions that banned Copts and women from running for president. Thus, once again, the more conservative ‘old guard’ had won out over younger-generation reformers. In fact, a former Brotherhood member relates how he and several other young Brothers had been on the Youth Committee responsible for working on the draft platform, working together with the leadership. When they protested the passages banning Christians and women from taking the country’s highest political office, the leadership refused to budge and he subsequently quit the committee and declared his membership in the Brotherhood dormant.192 To be fair, the platform was never adopted as an official programme, and the FJP later dropped such demands from its platform, declaring it will accept a woman or a Copt as president, but would not vote for them.193

Conclusion to Phase IV The 2000s have, in sum, seen relatively familiar patterns as far as the interactions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime are concerned. After the heavy repression endured by the movement in the mid-1990s, the beginning of the 2000s saw a cautious Brotherhood re-emerge onto the scene, eager to stay well within the ‘red lines’ formulated by the regime that essentially, in the words of one Brotherhood representative, amounted to ‘not causing any serious effect on political life’.194 Its approach to the 2000 elections was restrained and it fielded an unthreatening number of candidates, encountering comparatively little government repression. These regime-movement interactions fit into a pattern and demonstrate how the regime, and the Muslim Brotherhood as a social movement with political ambitions, depend on each other for legitimacy, and prompt each other’s strategies and tactics. Any significant political gain for the Brotherhood prompts repression and power displays by the regime; but granting additional freedoms to the Brotherhood and allowing it to re-emerge into public space has proved a valuable way of appeasing public sentiment for the regime, and thus represents an important steam valve which it has been able to open at appropriate times.

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The tone between the two sides began to grow harsher as the 2000s progressed; when the US and Europe started exerting pressure on Mubarak for a democratic opening, this amounted to a significant shift in political opportunity that the Brotherhood was quick to act on. It successfully challenged the regime during the 2005 elections and gained an unprecedented number of seats in parliament. Again, this was followed by the typical regime reaction – in the form of renewed repression – as soon as the US took pressure off it in response to fears of an Islamist resurgence in the Middle East. These in turn triggered a fairly familiar response, with one wing of the Muslim Brotherhood – in this case, students – radicalizing, while another, represented by the leadership, denounced violence and increased efforts to gain legitimate representation in political institutions. There was an interesting constellation of variables present during this period, with international pressure for democratization in the wake of 11 September 2001, playing a key role in influencing the Mubarak regime’s actions during this time. As the recipient of major US military aid – amounting to around $1.3 billion annually, an amount unrivalled by any other recipient – the Egyptian government keenly began to feel the pressure exerted by the Bush administration in the wake of its ‘Freedom Agenda’. Mubarak had to make some concessions and decided to employ a reform-oriented discourse, allow for judicial oversight of elections, and opened the presidential elections for alternative candidates in 2005, a first during his reign. Perceiving this change in context, the Muslim Brotherhood reacted by employing a two-pronged strategy – although it remains open to debate to what extent this was actually a conscious and deliberate decision rather than a reflection of multiple decision-making centres within the movement. On the one hand, the new leadership under Supreme Guide Akef issued a reform document that embraced a cautious but vague discourse of political reform. On the other, the movement proceeded to mobilize its base with proven religious slogans such as ‘Islam is the solution’. In the lead-up to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood sent clear signals that it intended to challenge the regime’s political power, presumably capitalizing on the opening in political opportunity space afforded by US pressure on the Mubarak regime. Erian was reportedly about to declare his intention to run for president when he was arrested by the regime in May 2005. This move, fielding a

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candidate to directly challenge the current president, thus seemed to clearly go beyond the government’s red lines. Another strong signal sent out to the government was the movement’s decision to field 150 candidates in the parliamentary elections, for a total of 444 seats. This was not asking for the majority, but for sufficient representation in order to keep ‘bugging’ the regime, as some Brotherhood representatives have termed their strategy. It amounted to a clear refusal of being pushed into the ‘dirty corner’ assigned to the movement by the government, for example via press campaigns that spread rumours of a ‘secret’ remilitarization of the Brotherhood.195 The calculation on the part of the Brotherhood’s leadership at this point was to keep all actions of the movement out in the public sphere, simultaneously profiting from an opening in the political opportunity space and hoping to prevent it from closing again. Internally, the leadership was dominated by fairly conservative figures such as Akef and al-Shater, with the movement’s Guidance Office continuing to be dominated not by reformers but by more traditional-thinking members. Deputy Supreme Guide Habib was probably one of the more forward-looking and reform-oriented leaders at the time, but continued to be sidelined by more conservative factions. This is demonstrated by his call for Muslim Brotherhood members to vote for Nour, the oppositional candidate of the Ghad party, in the presidential elections, which was overshadowed by calls from the Supreme Guide and other Guidance Office members to vote for the Wafd party’s candidate.196 By the time of the 2005 elections and their aftermath, the opportunity space and regime-movement interactions had narrowed down the strategic options of the Brotherhood to ‘avoid politics’ or ‘participate in politics’, completely obliterating – by brute force, more or less – the option of ‘violent confrontation.’ As in prior phases, the aftermath of the 2005 elections saw movement leaders and cadres arrested – beginning in 2005 and continuing through 2006, this wave of detentions saw a number of Brotherhood student leaders imprisoned, along with Erian and Morsi. However, the Muslim Brotherhood remained defiant and intent on staying in the public sphere, as a statement published in response to the arrests demonstrates: If the regime were seeking by these measures to stop the deputies of the People’s Assembly, the MB bloc will not cease to perform its

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legislative and popular roles. Those who believe that arrests will stop the MB are daydreaming [. . .]197 Throughout 2006, this remained the tone of confrontation between the movement and the regime: an all-out fight with available means, except for the option of violence on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood. Internally, this phase also witnessed – as had prior phases – attempts at reforming the movement and making it more transparent and democratic. This was true for the drafting of the 2007 political platform, initially a reform-oriented move that saw the participation of various factions from within the movement, including its youth organization. However, the internal fault line of ‘old-guard’ conservatives versus younger reformers appeared in this instance, with power clearly in the hands of the ‘old guard’: it simply introduced the controversial clauses banning women and Copts from the presidency without further consultation, causing the youth representatives to defect.198 A similar atmosphere surrounded the announced elections for filling vacant seats on the movement’s Guidance Bureau: while initially promising greater transparency for the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal procedures, the elections brought representatives of the movement’s most conservative and inward-looking current to the Guidance Bureau. And finally, conflict erupted around the succession of Akef as the movement’s Supreme Guide in 2010, with a conservative candidate winning out over former Deputy Supreme Guide Habib, a reformer, who had counted on inheriting the post. This string of personnel changes and internal struggles finally resulted in many of the more politically minded Brothers turning away from the movement and looking for alternative outlets for their work. These developments were deemed by observers to reach to the roots of the movement and to have caused a fundamental split akin to that which caused the breakaway of the Wasat Party in the mid-1990s, in an interesting historic parallel. They eventually resulted in the adoption of a strategy of avoidance and of lying low in the lead-up to the 2010 elections.

Patterns in Interactions between the Muslim Brotherhood and Different Egyptian Regimes A main characteristic that emerges from this overview of the Muslim Brotherhood’s history and activity is its political ambition that has led to

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frequent conflict with various, mostly if not always strong Egyptian regimes, and has meant that the movement’s strategy has been one of survival. After al-Banna’s founding efforts had led to initial success and rapid expansion of the movement, he sought out political contacts within the regime and was planning to stand in parliamentary elections. While the ultimate goal of these actions may have been to safeguard the Brotherhood’s interests rather than to gain power for its own sake, they nonetheless tied the movement’s fate as well as its strategies to the dynamics of the political game in Egypt. These dynamics have, from the start, included the respective ruling authorities’ strong desire to curb the movement’s undeniable power based on its wide net of social organizations and its deep penetration of Egyptian society. Most leaders, starting with al-Banna and his successor al-Hudaybi, and continuing through to al-Tilmisani and Akef, have sought accommodation with the ruling regime, often displaying a willingness to strike deals with the government that involved a pledge to exercise restraint or display limited support of the regime in return for greater freedom of action. Al-Banna and al-Hudaybi both tolerated the emergence of armed wings, hoping to gain leverage and put the regime on the defensive through the actions of fringe groups, while keeping the general membership under their control. In both instances, these experiments failed miserably: not only did the fringe groups begin to act independently and to assume a much greater influence than was envisaged by the leaders, they also invited extremely harsh repressive responses by the regime that nearly crippled the movement as a whole. Starting with al-Tilmisani’s leadership, the movement’s top circles had internalized the lesson that violence was a no-go strategy bound to fail. They have since imposed this lesson on the movement, making it Egypt’s largest non-violent opposition movement. Yet, this circle of leaders, most of whom knew al-Banna personally (with the exception of Akef), with the continuity they have displayed in their actions and thoughts, have also prevented a true opening of the movement towards democratic ideas and practices. Time and again, younger generations of activists have been unsuccessful in their attempts at convincing the movement leadership of adopting such ideas: the Wasat Party activists failed in this just as younger, ‘blogger’ generation members have failed in 2007. Despite recurring internal frictions and conflicts, the ‘old-guard’ leadership has largely stayed on top, and has thus been able to determine the highly

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hierarchical movement’s course, which has been one of demonstrating power as a social movement within the political ‘red lines’ drawn by the regime. In order to answer the questions raised in Chapters I and II – what makes Islamist social movements change their strategy with regards to the authorities/the state? – we can now survey the evidence provided by the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, understood as a broad-based social movement facing a powerful, high-capacity state. The first thing that is apparent is that state repression was involved as an independent variable in all but one of the episodes analysed here. However, we were able to exclude from the beginning that it was sufficient to trigger a radicalization and resort to violence by the Muslim Brotherhood on its own, as later episodes show: here, repression led to attempts at moderation, political opening and reform instead. Thus, it becomes crucial to look at the other variables that were present in conjunction with state repression, as well as to consider the degree of state capacity and repression in each phase, in order to start drawing a clearer picture of what exactly brings about strategy changes towards radicalization or moderation. During Phase I, we saw that repression was flanked by an already developed, paramilitary-type structure: the Rover units and the Battalions. These had been part of al-Banna’s ideological framework from the very beginning, starting in the 1920s. Hence, these ideas had not been developed as a response to state repression. What they did, however, was to provide the structures that made thinking about violently fighting the state possible to begin with. When repression really did begin to hit the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s, this began to play a role, and finally led to the use of violence after several intervening factors came to bear on the movement. These were a continued ambivalence at the top of the movement – that is, with al-Banna and those around him – concerning the use of violence, a breakdown in the movement’s chain of command and, most importantly, a sharp decline in state capacity to control the use of violence after 1945. A background condition further facilitated the use of violence at this time: the conflict surrounding the establishment of the State of Israel during the 1930s and the 1940s. It provided a transnational frame of reference and sense of mission for the movement that made a confrontation with the domestic, national regime appear manageable.

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If losses were sustained at the national level, there was always the larger endgame against ‘Zionist expansion’ at the regional level. If we compare this instance to the second phase analysed above, we can note that regime repression was the defining feature of interactions between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The extent of repression was even harsher than before, given that the Brotherhood had already suffered two waves of repression (in the late 1940s and mid-1950s) which were now being renewed and even exacerbated. It seems that for the different regimes that were reacting in this way, repression was the most convenient option in an overall scheme of denying the Muslim Brotherhood tangible influence on Egyptian politics. The Brotherhood, for its part, had established and rooted the option of violence in its action repertoire during the late 1940s. The early Nasser years and the first wave of repression under Nasser ruled out the use of this option. However, with the ideological invigoration provided by the rise of Qutb’s thoughts, and many of the Special Apparatus personnel still in place, this option became a reality again and was driven forward in the form of Organization 1965. The renewed crackdown on the Brotherhood and the ideological challenge posed by Qutb’s ideas to the mainstream of the movement led to a ‘critical juncture’ that was to have an enduring influence on the Brotherhood’s overall strategy. Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen define a critical juncture as ‘relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest’.199 In other words, these junctures are moments when defining structural conditions might prove less influential on outcomes, and individual agency can come to the fore. This had certainly been the case during Phase I, when the breakdown of security as well as of authority within the Muslim Brotherhood led to the Special Apparatus taking over and employing violence against the regime. In the mid-1960s, the conjunction of variables also seems to point towards this definition of a critical juncture being fulfilled: a lack of clear leadership by al-Hudaybi allowed for the ideas of Qutb to gain widespread popularity among the movement, and to link up with the remnants of the Brotherhood’s paramilitary unit, leading to the attempt to establish Organization 1965 and resulting in its subsequent discovery. More so, it was perhaps the aftermath of this development that proved a truly critical and influential juncture for the movement: with the new

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ideology and its implementation structure destroyed by the regime, a deal was reached between the regime and the leadership around al-Hudaybi. This allowed for the publication of Du’at la qudat in the early 1970s and marked the beginning of a truly path-dependent development towards non-violence for the Brotherhood, with each new phase of repression reinforcing the conviction that violence as strategy was doomed to fail, and that avoiding conflict with the regime at all costs was the preferable option. Therefore, the radicalization in Phase II occurred under somewhat different conditions than that of Phase I. Most notably, the state was much more capable during the 1960s and there was no drop in state capacity comparable to that of the 1940s. In terms of a transnational linkage or frame of reference, Qutb’s ideas represent an agenda and an ideological framework that goes beyond the mere confrontation between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime. It both incorporates radical ideas from non-Egyptian thinkers such as al-Mawdudi, and propagates the struggle against infidel regimes anywhere in the world. However, as shown above, his ideology was unable to gain a lasting foothold in the movement’s mainstream, which instead moderated and embraced a discourse of non-violence to avoid further repressive measures by the regime. The third phase analysed above, especially the period post-1995, provides an example of renewed confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, followed by a non-violent and inwardlooking response by the Brotherhood. The confrontational streak within the movement had, by this time, been channeled not into secret, paramilitary activities, as in the past; instead, it found an outlet in an increased involvement in any political channels that the Mubarak regime left open for the Muslim Brotherhood. The overriding goals of Supreme Guides al-Tilmisani and Ma’mun alHudaybi, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, had been to gain official political recognition for the Brotherhood (as a political party) and to stay active in the public, political arena. This led to a splintering in the hitherto rather monolithic Egyptian Islamic current, with more radical as well as more moderate offshoots developing out of the Brotherhood and establishing organizational structures – for example, al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra, Islamic Jihad and Gama’a Islamiyya on the radical end, and eventually, the Wasat Party on the moderate

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side. For the Muslim Brotherhood movement, this focus on posing a legal, political challenge to the regimes of the period brought relative gains. It was occasionally able to exploit the political strategies of the ruling regimes to its own benefit, as was the case with Sadat’s attempt to counter the influence of Nasserists by engaging with the Islamists, or Mubarak’s ploy to sideline radical, violent Islamists by boosting the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood. The overall effect of this period was that the movement’s non-violent course became increasingly engrained and irreversible – it was even able to moderate and co-opt previously more radical student leaders during this time, such as Aboul Fotouh or Erian; and the Brotherhood was able to rebuild the tanzim, its system of service-provision, educational and religious institutions, throughout all of Egypt. This allowed for thoroughly rebuilding a movement that had suffered severely by several decades of harsh regime repression. These developments explain why, by 1995, the interaction between the regime and the Brotherhood had attained a completely different dynamic from that of earlier phases. Similar variable constellations now lead to a different outcome: the regime’s repression increases during the 1995 election campaign and forecloses the avenue of legitimate political participation that the Brotherhood had been diligently and effectively exploiting for the past several years. Leaders were again court-martialled and sent away on long prison sentences. However, this did not result in any radicalization within the movement itself: there are no structures in place that would facilitate such a turn towards the use of violence. The remaining leaders and operatives of the Special Apparatus were too old and held no influence that would have allowed them to mobilize any followers. Due to the ‘lock-in’ into a non-violent interaction with the regime that the Brotherhood has been experiencing, no alternative structures for the use of violence had been developed. The leadership was focused on attaining political recognition instead of risking violent confrontation. And the effects of staging violent opposition against the regime were amply demonstrated by the fate of radical Islamic organizations of Islamic Jihad and Gama’a Islamiyya. While they contain any spill-over of Muslim Brotherhood members frustrated with the moderate course the movement is embracing during this phase, later on they were routed by the regime and eventually declared their turn towards non-violence.

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In terms of variables, the Mubarak regime was helped by a general stabilization of its rule during this time, which prevented security breakdowns akin to those that accompanied the use of violence by the Muslim Brotherhood during the late 1940s. Also, there was no ideological rejuvenation accompanied and led by the rise of a leading figure, as had been the case with Qutb. On the contrary, the moderate current that had been gaining traction throughout the 1980s found a new outlet soon after the 1995 elections: in 1996, some former student leaders-turned-Brotherhood-cadres – Abu Alaa Maadi, Aboul Fotouh, Erian and others – attempt to set up a democratic political party, Wasat. However, the Brotherhood’s leadership, made up of key figures who had spent long years in exile and had filled the power vacuum left behind by more confrontational leaders, set the movement on a more inward-looking course, thus embodying an organizational learning process. This movement-internal variable made a crucial difference to the Brotherhood’s inward turn during the late 1990s. In the period 2005 – 10, the final phase analysed above, we find a similar outcome on the main variables: there was repression in the wake of the Brotherhood’s political success in the early 2000s. It is important to note that contrary to earlier phases, this repression itself was not a reaction to violence on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, it was a reaction to the pursuit of legal avenues for participation by the Brotherhood. Again, one of the manifestations of regime repression was the arrest of those Brotherhood leaders most active in politics. And again, those leaders who remain – the older, more politically and religiously more conservative ones – chose to stay out of politics altogether. As in the preceding phase after the elections of 1995, the conjunction of repression in the form of narrowing political spaces, obstructing elections, intimidation and the like, and repression in the form of arresting political leaders, brought about the outcome desired by the regime: the Brotherhood grew more inwardoriented and invested less energy in an open challenge to the regime. Eventually, the movement even withdrew from the 2010 elections, boycotting the second round of voting and eventually gaining only a single seat. In return, the movement leadership gained the perspective of avoiding a repressive backlash, and of being able to continue its grassroots work.

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In fact, what political space there was prior to the 2005 elections, was most likely due to external pressure for democratization by the US and Europe. During this phase, the Mubarak regime was not as independent in its management of ‘liberalizing and de-liberalizing’ the political space as before. Some opportunity space was forced open by external political pressure, and was cleverly used by the Brotherhood in 2005 and thereafter. Its members of parliament did use the platform that the assembly offered them to put their items on the agenda, pushing for issues perceived key to the Muslim Brotherhood agenda that mainly evolved around religious practices in everyday life. This led to a reputation that, even if it could not be termed ‘moderate’, at least made the Brotherhood seem fully compatible with parliamentary life and ultimately, democracy. In a way, this outcome was jeopardizing the regime’s argumentative strategy that it served as a bulwark against undemocratic Islamists who, once allowed into the halls of power, would make everyday life for most Egyptians miserable. Clearly, this did not appear to be the case, and therefore more repressive waves were guaranteed for the movement. They did materialize in the period 2005 – 10, with more arrests of reformist Brotherhood leaders. For the majority of the Brotherhood’s membership and rank and file, however, it seems that a certain steadfastness had taken hold regarding their political engagement: even in the face of repeated and apparently guaranteed failure in the form of repression and manipulation by the regime, they kept choosing to participate in the political process.200 However, to the dismay of reform-oriented younger members, the ‘oldguard’ leadership once again pushed through with their preferences and put controversial principles atop the new political agenda: that women and Copts could not run for president. This squarely placed the movement outside the realm of democratic politics. By 2010, the leadership around Badie had once again decided to withdraw from politics and not to face the risk of confronting the regime, repeating the pattern of a movement-internal turn away from politics in the face of potential repression.

Conclusion Summing up the trends surveyed above, we can distil the following out of about 80 years of Muslim Brotherhood history. State repression has played

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a large role in the movement’s history and identity construction, but it has not resulted in any predictable outcomes. The results of repression have taken different forms in the different phases analysed. Other context variables have influenced these outcomes: where an ideological, transnational mobilizing factor was present, radicalization was more likely, especially where it was promoted by a strong and unified group within the movement. This was the case with the Brotherhood’s involvement in the uprising in Palestine. During the 1960s, a mobilizing impetus was present in the form of Qutb’s ideas and writings. After the mid-1960s, such strong ideological mobilization was lacking. Concurrently, state capacity had stayed consistently strong after about 1950. Its lack during the late 1940s had resulted in the Brotherhood’s ability and willingness to use violence. Thereafter, different Egyptian regimes were largely able to enforce their decisions and to curb the activities of the Brotherhood, eventually resulting in the negation of violence by the Muslim Brotherhood. Internally, the movement has experienced many leadership challenges and changes, with the mainstream usually dominated by conservative, apolitical leaders, often formed by years of exile in different Gulf countries. At various times, these leaders have reached understandings or deals with the government; their moderation has resulted in more radical members leaving the movement to set up alternative organizations. Alternatively, it has resulted in drives to establish a political party for the movement. Both developments have not deterred from the moderate, accommodationist course embraced by Brotherhood leaders over the movement’s history. This course has been focused on making the movement and its ideas survive in the face of hostile, capable regimes.

CHAPTER 3 HIZBULLAH:EXPANDED ACTION REPERTOIRE IN A FRAGILE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTEXT

Lebanon: Case Introduction Present-day Lebanon became a province of the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century. The area has always witnessed a lot of migration and settlement of different religious and ethnic groups, accounting for its current mix of Muslim, Druze and Christian confessions. For centuries, these have lived peacefully side by side, but sectarian fault lines have at different times provided incentives for armed conflict, a pattern that continues to the present day. Conflicts between Christian Maronites and Muslim Druze first started to arise on a major scale during the nineteenth century, with massacres being carried out against the Druze and retaliatory fighting taking place. In 1860, this pattern escalated into a full-scale war and saw the interference of foreign powers in the region’s internal conflicts, in this case France, which took the side of the Christian Maronites, prompting the British to support the Druze. The fighting was finally ended by a compromise proposed by European powers, which accorded the Maronites an area in Mount Lebanon, with most Druze settled in the Shouf Mountains. The conflict as well as its settlements foreshadowed similar patterns in many conflicts to come. The rest of the nineteenth century remained relatively peaceful in the area, which was able to consolidate economically and prospered with

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exports of silk and tobacco. Lebanon was once again drawn into conflict with the outbreak of World War I, which ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Levant was divided into spheres of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and Mount Lebanon and its surroundings fell under a French mandate accorded by the League of Nations. The new mandate area joined together territories that had been separately settled and administered previously: the mostly Maronite, Christian Mount Lebanon on the one hand, as well as the Muslim-settled areas of the Bekaa Valley and South Lebanon, on the other. Things remained calm during the interwar period, when Lebanon and especially the capital Beirut became famous travel destinations for Europeans and Beirut acquired its somewhat cliche´d moniker of ‘Paris of the Middle East’. Lebanon became an independent republic in 1943, when France was occupied by Nazi Germany and unable to hold on to its mandated territories. The principles governing the interactions between Lebanon’s different groups and sects were laid down in the ‘National Pact’, an unwritten gentleman’s agreement that divided political posts between the main sects. The president of the Republic was to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim. Furthermore, according to the constitution drawn up in 1926 under the mandate authorities, there was to be a six-to-five ratio of Christian to Muslim delegates in parliament. In other words, Christians were guaranteed an edge in decision making in the new republic, on the understanding, based on a 1932 census, that they formed the majority of the population in the new state’s territory. Until the present day, there has been no repeat of the 1932 census. Lebanon’s consociational democracy has thus always been reliant on consensus between different sects, and disagreement between them is sure to lead to a political breakdown. This occurred for the first time in 1958. Internal power conflicts between President Camille Chamoun’s Christian supporters on the one hand, and a mostly Sunni opposition (including some Christian breakaways from the president’s camp) were exacerbated by deep disagreement over the country’s foreign policy orientation. While Chamoun wanted the country to align with Western interests and supported the 1955 Baghdad Pact, his opponents supported Nasser’s bid for a pan-Arab revival. The 1956 Suez crisis as well as the 1958 union between Egypt and Syria had exacerbated fears on the Christian, pro-Western side in Lebanon that the country’s

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independence might be threatened by a drive for Arab unity. The crisis finally came to a head with fighting between Christian and Muslim forces, causing an intervention by US military forces on Lebanese soil. The US troops remained on the ground from July to October 1958, when the crisis could be resolved with the election of a new president, former army Commander Fouad Chehab, who was less controversial on the Lebanese scene. With an apparent compromise candidate found, the breakdown in the political system could be surmounted. President Chehab set in motion a number of reforms, concentrating on infrastructure development and support for peripheral areas of the country. This clashed with Lebanon’s traditional patronage networks and was viewed by many political players with some suspicion. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s the situation remained peaceful and relatively stable. The sociopolitical changes under way during the decade, however, helped set the stage for the era of civil war that was to come. There was sustained rural-urban migration with little infrastructure to contain it, resulting in the build-up of informal, slum-like suburbs around Beirut. That most rural migrants were disadvantaged Shiʽa who had hitherto been left out of the country’s development efforts exacerbated the latent sectarian tensions. After 1970, an even more dangerous element was added to the equation because Palestinian militants of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been expelled from Jordan, relocated to South Lebanon and carried out their guerrilla attacks on Israel from here. This drew frequent retaliatory attacks by Israel, the consequences of which were mostly faced by the rural Lebanese population. The Palestinians built up a strong infrastructure in Lebanon, based partly in the various refugee camps that had existed ever since the formation of the State of Israel in 1948. They also built contacts with a growing, left-wing and mostly Muslim opposition to Lebanon’s Christian ruling elites, who regarded the country’s power balance as unjustly skewed and felt left out of decision making. Slowly, a deep social and political polarization developed mostly along the Christian– Muslim fault line. The spark that set off the civil war was the shooting of Palestinian civilians travelling on a bus through a Christian neighbourhood in April 1975. In retaliation, Christians were attacked, and the situation quickly deteriorated. Targeted sectarian killings became commonplace, but since both the ‘right-wing’ Christian as well as the ‘left-wing’ Muslim sides had been

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preparing for armed conflict for some time, there was also heavy artillery combat. The initial phase of the civil war in 1975– 6 saw heavy fighting, with front lines developing between the two sides. The Syrian army intervened in 1976 in favour of the Christians, who seemed to be losing out against the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the alliance of left-wing forces. The Syrian leadership feared that a victory of the LNM and their Palestinian allies would draw Israel into the conflict, potentially drawing Syria into an open war with Israel. The intervention indeed prevented an LNM victory and established an uneasy stalemate. The capital Beirut became divided into two camps along the so-called Green Line, and the rest of the country was divided into spheres of influence, threatening the country’s territorial contiguity. With the Syrian presence, the stalemate continued, with the Palestinians nonetheless managing to mount escalating attacks on Israeli targets from South Lebanon. Israel eventually decided to intervene in order to quell the Palestinian attacks, and to help cement Christian rule in Lebanon. The Jewish state had been supporting Lebanon’s Christian camp for some time and hoped to install a friendly regime in Lebanon, thus removing one hostile front line along its borders. The 1982 Israeli invasion proved a turning point in Lebanon’s civil war in several respects. The atrocities against Palestinian refugees committed by Lebanese Christian militias under Israel’s auspices at Sabra and Shatila were one of the war’s worst massacres; in the wake of the Israeli invasion and occupation of Beirut, an Islamic resistance started taking shape, eventually leading to the establishment of Hizbullah; and the PLO was forced to leave Lebanon, removing an important variable from the Lebanese war scene. Israeli troops remained on the ground for the remainder of the war, eventually withdrawing to a 12-km-wide security zone along the Lebanon– Israel border. With the Palestinians gone from Lebanon and Israel withdrawn from most of its territory, the remainder of the 1980s saw a lot of infighting between various Lebanese factions, along with occasional confrontations with the Syrians. The country’s division into different cantons progressed. During the ‘War of the Camps’, between 1984 and 1989, the Shiʽi Amal militia was fighting Palestinian forces in various refugee camps in and around Beirut. After 1988, two rival governments persisted in Lebanon, and one faction, headed by Christian General Michel Aoun, launched an all-out war against the Syrian occupation

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forces with the goal of forcing their retreat. The initiative failed, and against a backdrop of general war-weariness on all sides, an internationally brokered peace agreement was signed in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989. It took until 1991 for all fighting to finally die down, and all militias except Hizbullah to disarm. The latter, backed by Syria, was spared from this stipulation in the peace agreement, as Hizbullah’s militia provided important leverage for Syria in its confrontation with Israel, and kept Syrian and Israeli forces from directly engaging with one another. The postwar era in Lebanon carried high hopes for a reconstruction and redevelopment of the country. While reconstruction did take place, Lebanon continued to be beset by recurring political breakdowns. Politically, Sunni politician and businessman Rafik Hariri left an important mark on Lebanon’s political development during the 1990s. He was prime minister from 1992 to 1998, and again from 2000 until 2004. Hariri skilfully managed Lebanon’s political conflicts and relations with the occupying power, Syria, while involving his business empire in the reconstruction of the country’s war-torn infrastructure. Meanwhile, the conflict with Israel continued to be played out in South Lebanon, where Hizbullah forces were fighting Israel’s proxy militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Israel invaded Lebanon in order to weed out this source of conflict two more times during the 1990s, in 1993 and 1996. Both attempts remained unsuccessful as far as the cessation of Hizbullah activities was concerned. Mounting public pressure in Israel concerning the material as well as the human cost of keeping up the occupation of Lebanese territory finally led to a unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000. The Hariri era and Syrian occupation, during which the mostly Christian anti-Syrian opposition had to stay in hiding, came to an end with the assassination of Hariri in 2005, following his falling-out with the Syrian leadership and resignation from the post of prime minister. Syria was internationally accused of being responsible for Hariri’s death, leading to a build-up of pressure on Lebanon’s neighbour and the eventual withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country. In the new political era heralded by these developments, the anti-Syrian opposition became vocal and led several governments. Political instability took hold once again, with a string of assassinations, mostly of Syria-critical politicians. Israel, for its part, grew wary of the new power constellations

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developing in its northern neighbour country and seized on a Hizbullah attack on one of its border patrols in order to start a new military campaign against Lebanon. The 2006 war was once again designed to squash Hizbullah and make the population turn away from the Shiʽi party, but once again without success. Hizbullah came out of the conflict even stronger and slowly became the most important political player on the Lebanese scene of the post-Hariri years. This trend was reinforced when in 2008, Hizbullah attacked Sunni, government-backed forces, causing massive fears of a renewed civil war. With Qatari mediation, a new consensus was brokered which accorded Hizbullah effective veto power in Lebanese politics. This initially led to more political stalemate, as was to be expected, with difficulty in forming a government after the 2009 parliamentary elections. Things began to change yet again, however, with the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, and the toppling of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Hizbullah supported these revolts in rhetoric, but when an uprising started in neighbouring Syria, the party did not back it, losing much credibility and support. Increasingly, the Syrian uprising began to affect the situation in Lebanon, with many refugees fleeing across the border and rival groups in Lebanon taking sides in the conflict and engaging in armed skirmishes. In 2013, Hizbullah officially announced its involvement in the Syrian civil war, fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime; the party was thus effectively staking its fortunes on the Syrian regime’s survival and stands to lose even more credibility as well as material support if the al-Assad regime were to fall.

Structure of this Chapter This chapter attempts to trace the major decision-making processes that have led Hizbullah to progressively become more involved in the Lebanese political process, yet remain a highly effective military organization capable of confronting external and internal opponents by using force. The initial paradox is the apparent contradiction between a Lebanonization of Hizbullah on one hand, that is, its involvement in Lebanese politics that has led a number of analysts to speak of its moderation or integration into the political process. On the other hand stands Hizbullah’s willingness to abrogate this consensus and to escalate the situation by using its military strength. How have external factors,

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such as changes in the regional environment or in the national-level POS, interacted with internal developments – schisms, ideological evolutions and changes, organizational dynamics – to produce outcomes such as the decision to participate in parliamentary elections, or to violently attack political opponents? I will argue that these outcomes are less a function of religious or ideological norms and values than is generally assumed, and more a product of political, tactical considerations on a national as well as regional level. Although Hizbullah is undoubtedly and fundamentally a religious organization, its actions on the political scene bear the characteristics of calculated, rational action – at times more successful than at others – that, under the guise of ‘protecting the resistance’ (that is, the resistance against Israel, which is Hizbullah’s self-proclaimed main raison d’eˆtre), ultimately aims to secure political power and influence. As I have argued with regard to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah’s religious and ideological outlook has also adapted to realities over time, but has largely not been a main driving factor in its political decisions. These have to a great extent been determined by a combination of international and national-level changes in the POS. The most dominant of these have been its close ties to the Iranian regime, which have often dictated Hizbullah’s strategy changes, as well as a prolonged and intense confrontation with its main domestic rival, the so-called March 14 alliance.1 Its willingness to risk alienating large portions of the Lebanese population, as well as some political allies, by using violence in 2008, can be explained by the movement leadership’s self-definition as a transnational Islamic movement with a larger mission that prioritizes maintaining an armed wing over seeking accommodation on the national political scene. Any challenges posed to this strategy by other Lebanese parties or the Lebanese government carries the risk of armed response by Hizbullah, a fact that all political players in Lebanon are painfully aware of. In order to identify the main factors that have shaped Hizbullah’s strategies and how they have evolved over time, this chapter will be divided into four sections, each dealing with a time period that features a decisive change in context and environment. This will allow for assessing the impact of such events on the movement, and to differentiate between longer-term components of the movement’s strategies and shorter-term, tactical changes.

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Phase I: From the Beginnings of Hizbullah to 1992 This phase is characterized by several early transformations in the organization and outlook of Hizbullah. From its beginnings as a militia formed to resist the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, the organization morphed into a party with a proper structure modelled on that of other Islamist parties, such as the Iraqi Da’wa Party. At the end of the civil war and after having negotiated the right to retain its arms, the party decided to become part of the national political scene and to take part in the first post-Civil War parliamentary elections in 1992. In an attempt to trace the key factors that have influenced the movement’s decision-making processes, we need to trace the political mobilization processes that have occurred within Lebanon’s Shiʽi community during the 1960s and 1970s. This will provide context and background for Hizbullah’s actual founding process, as well as its initial ideological and political outlook. The party’s history as a militia active in Lebanon’s civil war is less well documented in available sources, and only a few internal skirmishes and battles stand out. The end of the civil war marked a major transition in political outlook, flanked by internal conflicts and schisms.

Prologue: Shiʽi mobilization, formation of Hizbullah and first years, 1960– 85 While, with the benefit of scholarly hindsight, many tenets of modernization theory seem outdated and have been proved incorrect in their predictions and assumptions of a linear historical evolution with clear consequences, some concepts inherent to the theory seem valuable in explaining the political mobilization of the Lebanese Shiʽa throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This development has been accounted for in great detail in several publications;2 accordingly, a brief summary will suffice here in order to provide context for subsequent developments. Several processes occurring from the mid-twentieth century onwards contributed to the eventual rise of a politicized movement of Shiʽa in Lebanon. Traditionally, the Shiʽi population of South Lebanon had been involved in small-scale agriculture. As production processes began to change from the 1950s onwards, many former labourers moved to the cities and especially to the capital Beirut in order to find work in production or services, as living off the

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land grew increasingly harder. Yet, jobs were underpaid and too far between, so that soon, many unemployed and poor Shiʽa were living in the suburbs of the capital. At the same time, authors writing from a modernization theory angle ascribe a ‘heightened political consciousness’ to these masses, expressed in an ‘awakening’ taking place throughout the 1960s which featured the ‘modernization’ of the Shiʽi political leadership in Lebanon.3 In fact, a number of parties and organizations were able to attract members from among the newly urbanized Shiʽa: the Communist Party as well as other left-wing political parties and Palestinian groups all benefitted from the Shiʽi awakening. Among the contributing factors for this political prise de conscience were not only the dismal living conditions experienced by many Shiʽa and the perceived injustice inherent in this fact, but also regional developments such as the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War, bringing with it the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as an additional influx of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon. These, according to the literature, served as main mobilizing factors for the Lebanese Shiʽa and were exacerbated by the fact that the community, as part of Lebanon’s consociational democracy, had been accorded less political influence than the other main confessional groups in the country, the Sunnis and Maronite Christians. According to the 1943 National Pact or al-mithaq al-watani, the Maronites had been accorded the presidency, the Sunnis the post of prime minister and the Shiʽa the comparatively less influential position of speaker of parliament. This notwithstanding the fact that even by the mid-1940s, the Shiʽa were no longer the smallest among the main confessional groups in Lebanon; certainly by the 1960s, they probably constituted the largest single confessional group. While this somewhat simplistic portrait of the grievances afflicting the Lebanese Shiʽa may not account for individual paths of mobilization, it provides a background against which a growing political consciousness began to take shape. It found its initial outlets in the adherence of many Shiʽa to Leftist, secular political parties such as the Baath Party or the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), looking to improve the condition of Arabs generally but also displaying a strong communal character focused on how the Shiʽa were faring as compared to other Lebanese sects. Writing about the late 1960s and early 1970s, Saad-Ghorayeb maintains that ‘the Arab nationalist and Leftist parties which won Shiʽi support did so not because of their secular

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nature, but in default of a viable communal or Islamic alternative at the time’.4 This may be the case, but the seed that would eventually grow into such a communal, Islamic alternative had already been sown at the time. In the context of the above-mentioned conditions and grievances, a charismatic Iranian Islamic scholar named Musa al-Sadr founded what was to become an influential social movement, called harakat al-mahrumin, or the Movement of the Deprived. Al-Sadr moved to Lebanon from Iran in 1959 and built his base as a cleric in the South Lebanese town of Sur (Tyre), quickly acquiring a reputation as a respected man of religion, and immediately setting out to improve the community’s welfare. According to Norton, ‘one of his first significant acts was the establishment of a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al-Shimali, which was constructed [. . .] with monies provided by Shiʽi benefactors, the Ministry of Education, and bank loans.’5 Becoming a community leader at a time of stark grievances for the Lebanese Shiʽa obviously carried political overtones, and sure enough alSadr soon became a major player in Lebanon’s pre-war politics as well as during the civil war itself. He was able to tap into and build on an incipient trend of political mobilization among the Shiʽa,6 using his advantage of an outside perspective that enabled him to stand above petty political quarrels and to view the community as part of a bigger picture. Yet, at the outset of Lebanon’s civil war, the community-based appeal of al-Sadr and his Amal militia movement founded in 1974 (ostensibly for defensive purposes) was eclipsed by the broader conflict lines prevalent at the time. Amal was initially loosely allied with the ‘Leftist’ camp that brought together various Muslim forces as well as Palestinian groups, and which was opposed by the ‘Rightist’, mostly Christian Maronite militias fighting for their idea of a ‘Phoenician’ Lebanon that was to hold a special place in the Mashrek region, and which some elements were later willing to ally with Israel. Initially, these general conflict lines would seem to have been more important than a Shiʽi community-focused mobilization. As Saad-Ghorayeb argues, it was only with the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 that the policy and predominance of Lebanese Maronites, both militarily and politically, fuelled a counter-radicalization of Shiʽa.7 Prior to the war, alSadr had attempted to maintain cordial relations with Maronite politicians and had resisted the sectarian temptation of calling for a redistribution of political power – he realized that the Maronite

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community needed the reassurance provided by holding the highest political office in the country.8 Yet, he was also keen on improving the perspectives for Lebanon’s Shiʽi community and did not hesitate to criticize Maronite politicians on their policies as he saw fit. After the war broke out and developed an increasingly sectarian dynamic, support for Amal began to grow significantly and to take on a different meaning: Of all the Lebanese sectarian groups, the Shiʽites incurred the highest number of fatalities during the civil war, especially in its first year, at the hands of the Maronite militias amongst others. In particular, it was the eviction of 100,000 Shiʽites from Nab’a in August 1976 and their resettlement in the overpopulated southern suburbs which radicalised the community. It was not until the late 1970s that this radicalisation was rechannelled to Amal, which witnessed a considerable upsurge in popularity after Sadr’s disappearance in 1978. Shiʽite support for the movement was further bolstered by the Israeli invasion of 1978 and the Islamic Revolution in Iran a year later.9 In the establishment of Hizbullah alongside and as a rival to Amal, the political mobilization described above, the dynamics of the Lebanese civil war, the Israeli invasions of 1978 and especially 1982, as well as interpersonal networks of Shiʽi clerics and their inspiration by the Iranian Revolution combined and all played their part. Although Amal capitalized on a communal mobilization in Lebanon which preceded the Shiʽa’s religious mobilization,10 a group of religious scholars partly influenced by the Iraqi Da’wa Party, partly by Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini eventually set up a splinter group called ‘Islamic Amal’. This was the nucleus out of which Hizbullah developed, and the more radical faction inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideas quickly gained leadership of the new group. It included a number of sheikhs who, later on, were to become leading figures in Hizbullah: Subhi Tufayli and Abbas Mussawi (the first and second secretary-general of Hizbullah, respectively) came from the Da’wa Party, while Nasrallah, Qassem, Mohammad Yazbek and others came from Amal; Imad Mughniyeh, who was to become Hizbullah’s notorious head of military operations and was assassinated in Damascus in 2008, presumably by Israeli agents, originally had been a member of Fatah’s Islamist wing;11 even the Lebanese Communist Party

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contributed members to Hizbullah’s nucleus, as the Lebanese resistance against Israel originally included Leftist as well as Islamist groups jointly fighting against the enemy. Three major catalysts enabled this development away from the religiously inspired but community-focused activism embraced by Amal, and towards the more radical, revolutionary founding group that was to evolve into Hizbullah: the disappearance of alSadr in 1978, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Al-Sadr left Lebanon in 1978 on his way to Libya, and never returned. The circumstances of his disappearance remain unclear today and are the focus of numerous conspiracy theories; their elucidation has been requested by Lebanon of the new governing authorities in Libya that have emerged after the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi’s regime in 2011. At the time, Libya claimed that al-Sadr had arrived in Tripoli but then left for Italy; the Italian authorities denied the claim. His disappearance left Amal in a state of disarray and factionalism, and the subsequent takeover of leadership by Nabih Berri set it on a course of firm integration with the Lebanese system of competing sectarian groupings. In a way, this opened up a gap for a revolutionary-oriented religious movement declaring itself intent on establishing an Islamic state. While this may have occurred regardless of whether al-Sadr disappeared or not, it seems likely that the lack of a charismatic figure capable of channelling communal resentment changed the dynamic in the Lebanese Shiʽi community and enabled the nascent Hizbullah grouping to capture a following. Especially those who may have been disappointed by Amal’s development from the mid-1970s onwards, its relative loss of importance vis-a`-vis other groups and militias on the ‘Left’ and increased infighting in the wake of al-Sadr’s absence would seem likely to have been attracted by the new and more resolute group that was to become Hizbullah.12 In addition to such internal factors, significant as they may have been, Hizbullah’s initial establishment, ideological direction and choice of methods was of course also a function of the regional and international environment at the time. With the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, regional dynamics changed significantly. Israel and its allies – the US, Britain and France – became, in Iran’s perspective and those of its partners, archenemies that needed to be fought not just on tactical or strategic grounds, but out of ideological necessity. The new Iranian

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regime also regarded as crucial that the Wahhabi Islam exported to the whole Arab region by Saudi Arabia – on cordial economic terms with the US since the 1950s – be countered. The Saudi regime was providing funds for religious education, social services and the building of mosques, furthering the conservative Islam embraced by the House of Saud.13 Against these developments, especially as they were occurring on a crucial regional battleground such as Lebanon, the Khomeiniinspired trend was intent on gaining ground. Hence, Iran quickly provided military training for those Shiʽi clerics and their followers who had set up residence in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and who were eventually to turn into Hizbullah.14 A contingent of 1,500 Islamic Revolutionary Guards were dispatched to the Bekaa Valley and set up training camps there. In the account of Qassem, today the deputy secretary-general of Hizbullah, the party was initially set up on the basis of the ‘Manifesto of the Nine,’ a group consisting of the representatives of several Islamist groups fighting the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and later its occupation of a ‘protection zone’ in the south of the country. Three representatives from the clerical congregation of the Bekaa Valley, three from ‘various Islamic committees’ and three from Amal drew up a document that propagated Islam, the practice of jihad and the guardianship of the jurist-theologian (wilayat al-faqih) as the key principles of a new movement intent on beating back Israel’s occupation and setting up a new order in Lebanon.15 These steps were closely coordinated with Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran, who, as the jurist-theologian and thus both the religious and the political leader recognized by the new movement, gave instructions on the general framework of what was to become Hizbullah, as well as on minute details such as the name and logo.16 The close links between the new party and Iran are symbolized by Hizbullah’s logo, which is closely modelled on the one used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Pasdaran. The leading members of the new Hizbullah quickly underwent military and doctrinal training in the Bekaa Valley, and were also busy building up an organizational structure for their new group that is often compared to that of Marxist – Leninist parties.17 Strongly hierarchical, the movement sees the Iranian leader as its top source of guidance and instruction; a seven-member Shura Council is the key decision-making body, overseeing an administrative structure with various subcommittees. The military wing of Hizbullah, consisting of the Islamic Resistance

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(al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) as well as the Party Security (Amn al-Hizb) is nominally under the direct command of the secretary-general. Some observers as well as a former Hizbullah member insist, however, that Hizbullah’s military activities are directed by Iran’s IRGC and are therefore not under full control of Hizbullah’s Lebanese leaders,18 an argument which is used to account for a number of seemingly counterintuitive strategic decisions such as the 2006 kidnapping of Israeli soldiers which led to a brutal and large-scale retaliatory campaign by Israel. Shortly after the establishment of the party nucleus, large-scale recruitment efforts were begun, focusing on young men from Lebanon’s south who would have every reason to join a resistance force against the Israeli occupation of the country. While initially, Israeli forces had been welcomed by the population of Lebanon’s south, which was exhausted by several years of Fatah activities in South Lebanon that would regularly invite harsh Israeli repression, things had changed by 1982. The Israeli invasion and bombardment of Beirut that year, which caused heavy civilian casualties, as well as the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps – in which up to 1,500 Palestinian civilians, mostly women and children, were killed by Maronite militias with the aid of Israeli forces – had definitely led to a rejection of the Israeli presence in the country. The Israeli ambition to establish a close relationship with Bashir Gemayel and his forces, and thereby to gain a friendly neighbour on its northern borders, was of course not lost on other Lebanese actors and sparked heavy resistance. Building on resentment against the Israeli occupation, Hizbullah cadres would, for example, recruit among regular visitors of mosques, and invite young men into the privileged circles of Hizbullah members. Mosques were then used for indoctrination as well as weapons and paramilitary training, while the party often insured that young adherents were financially independent of their parents and thus not subject to family pressures and preferences.19 Resistance against Israel provided one key motivation, while another was presumably inherent in the promise of ‘Islam as the solution’; while this was not an official Hizbullah slogan, in the apt phrase of Ayubi, religion functioned as a ‘goal replacement mechanism’ in the Lebanese Shiʽi community.20 In a milieu fraught with feelings of political exclusion and exposed to heavy losses inflicted by other Lebanese communities, the promise that religion held out to Lebanon’s Shiʽa was to attain a higher goal which

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simultaneously offered salvation and was unattainable to other religious communities. Incrementally, the party thus built up a substantial following; to the initial party structure comprising political and military elements, other institutions and structures were added over time and as the need arose. The Martyr’s Foundation and Khomeini Support Committee were both founded in 1982 under direct supervision of Ayatollah Khomeini; the former was to provide welfare and education to the families of martyrs, both military and civilian, while the latter was set up to support families in South Lebanon who had suffered under Israeli attacks. Other major service providers in Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley are the Foundation for the Wounded, and of course the extensive Health Unit, both established later on. They are often the only providers of medical care in those areas and thus serve to underline the blatant failure of the Lebanese state to care for its own citizens.21 Due to the sectarian nature of Lebanon’s political regime, the state is carved up into different spheres of influence for different sects. The central government is thus unable – and often unwilling – to extend authority over the whole of its territory. South Lebanon, deemed to be Shiʽi territory and indeed claimed as such by Shiʽi political organizations, is largely left to its own devices in terms of service provision. In the words of one observer, this phenomenon constitutes a classic chicken-and-egg problem, as it is now difficult to say whether services were set up because the state was not providing any, or whether the provision of services by an armed, non-state actor was keeping the state from investing in these areas.22 In a context of civil war, where the state did no longer have the effective monopoly on the use of force on its territory, it is safe to say that Hizbullah and its Iranian mentors were providing essential services to their constituents as much as they were exploiting the situation to their advantage. In addition to the support granted Hizbullah by Iran, the new movement was also benefitting from Syria’s aid. Syria had initially intervened on the side of Lebanon’s Maronite militias, and its troops had entered the country to that end in 1976. The objective was to curb the strength of Palestinian forces in the country at the time; however, by 1982 the tide had turned. With the PLO gone from Lebanon, and the originally Syrian Golan Heights that had been occupied by Israel in 1973 now unilaterally annexed by the Jewish state, Syria had every reason to fight the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Consequently,

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in 1982 a deal was reached between the Iranian and Syrian regimes on one hand and Hizbullah on the other, that Iran would provide financial as well as military support, while Syria would facilitate this support by providing resupply routes through its territory.23 Hizbullah’s first actions on the political and military scene were harbingers of its subsequent success both in Lebanon and in the region. The movement managed to carry out military attacks against Israeli and Western targets that inflicted heavy casualties and came to impact the power configurations in Lebanon at the time. In November 1982, Hizbullah fighters engaged in minor skirmishes with Israeli forces, and carried out a bomb attack against the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre.24 In 1983, fighters belonging to the Islamic Jihad organization, which was an affiliate of Hizbullah in the Islamic resistance milieu, first attacked the US Embassy in Beirut, killing 80 people, and then blew up the barracks of an international force which had been stationed in Lebanon in order to oversee a first peace accord with Israel. In the attack, 241 US Marines and 58 French paratroopers died, which led to the withdrawal of international forces and ultimately, the invalidation of the so-called May 17 Accord between Israel and Lebanon that Hizbullah regarded as deeply humiliating and unacceptable.25 When demonstrations against the signing of the May 17 Accord were fired upon by Lebanese army soldiers in 1984, forces of Amal, Hizbullah and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) led an armed uprising against the Lebanese army,26 and thereby effectively contributed to a split in Lebanon’s armed forces – some siding with those leading the uprising, some taking the opposite stance – that was to further exacerbate and entrench the already drawn-out civil war. Effectively, however, Hizbullah forces had reached some key goals at this early stage in their operations: Western occupation forces had withdrawn from the country, and the May 17 Accord was never implemented, the Lebanese government headed by President Amin Gemayel having lost control over the armed forces as well as substantial parts of state territory. At the same time, fighting between Hizbullah and members of Amal reached quite an intense level in 1984 and subsequent years, as both movements were vying for support among the population and for control of the south. Hizbullah was steadily gaining ground and had won some major battles by 1987; it is remarkable how in the memoirs of one former Hizbullah fighter, the battles he recounts for the years

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1984–7 are almost exclusively between Hizbullah and Amal, rather than – as one might be led to believe by Hizbullah’s own rhetoric – between Hizbullah and the Israeli occupation forces.27 Be that as it may, the nascent organization had made significant headway on the battlefield, on the political scene as well as organizationally, and decided to publish a first public document that declared its name, official existence and a rudimentary political programme. This was the so-called Open Letter to the Oppressed of Lebanon and the World of 1985, which was first read out by Sayyid Ibrahim al-Sayyid, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, at a mosque in Beirut in February of that year, and subsequently published in Hizbullah’s newspaper Al-Ahd.28 While many observers point to this statement as proof of Hizbullah’s early radicalism and militancy, the Open Letter in most passages reads like a political document that consciously leaves the door open for dialogue or cooperation with other Lebanese parties, albeit on Hizbullah’s terms, of course. It reaffirms the adherence to the principle of wilayat al-faqih and declares the rule of Islamic law as the most desirable form of governance; yet, at the same time, the document declares: We are an umma that abides by the message of Islam. We would like the oppressed and all the people to study this heavenly message because it is conducive to establishing justice, peace and tranquillity in this world [. . .] From this perspective, we do not want to impose Islam on anyone, like we do not want others to impose upon us their convictions and their political systems. We do not want Islam to govern Lebanon by force, as political Maronism is governing now.29 Instead, the document assures, Hizbullah is looking to have wilayat alfaqih chosen by the free will of the people. The main enemies of Hizbullah are named as ‘the nations of infidelity (a’immat al-Kufur): America, France and Israel’ in that order,30 although in the same paragraph, the ‘major foes’ are repeated as ‘Israel, America, France and the Phalangists.’ In a paragraph titled, ‘Why do we confront the existing regime?’ two main factors are listed: 1. It is the product of world arrogance and oppression and part of the political map that is an adversary to Islam;

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2. It is an unjust regime in its very foundations, which is resistant to any change or reform. Rather it is incumbent upon us to completely uproot it [. . .]31 The existing political regime is thus judged unacceptable both on grounds of representativeness and justice, as well as on religious grounds. It follows that ‘we are not concerned about the formation of any cabinet or fielding any [Hizbullah] member to become a minister, since any governmental ministry is part and parcel of the oppressive, unjust regime.’32 Specifically, the nature of the (Maronite-dominated) political system is rejected as it is ‘based on tribal blood-ties (‘asabiyya), sectarian privileges, and alliance with colonial powers and Israel [. . .]’.33 The ‘Christians of Lebanon’ are invited to shake off the yoke of this backward system, and to join in the fight of overthrowing it and establishing a more equitable and just order based on the tenets of Islam. It is perhaps needless to say that in the context of a raging civil war, the document failed to persuade any Christians to join in Hizbullah’s struggle and to support it; yet, the conciliatory tone employed towards Christians and thereby, presumably, other groups in Lebanon is remarkable and shows a minimal political window for coalition-building and cooperation. Yet, the actions of the group show that the ‘enemies’ of Hizbullah are not granted any mercy whatsoever: the Open Letter lauds the bombings of the US Embassy and the Marine barracks as heroic operations, and in 1985 a number of brutal kidnappings of Western diplomats were carried out, often ending in death for the hostages. A US Embassy cable dated March 1985, for example, cites a newspaper article recounting the fate of a kidnapped US Embassy staff member: An American diplomat kidnapped by Lebanese extremists is being paraded around the country in an open truck and publicly tortured and humiliated. The CIA caravan – as the kidnappers call it – goes from one Shiʽite village to another in Lebanon’s Beka’a valley, attracting huge jeering crowds while the prize hostage is forced to take part in the ‘show’.34 Hizbullah-affiliated groups had kidnapped dozens of Americans, British and French in March 1984. A TWA plane was also hijacked by Hizbullah in 1985, as well as two Kuwaiti airplanes, in 1984 and

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1988.35 Nasrallah later dismissed many of the hostage-takings as having been the work of Islamic Jihad, an organization entirely independent of Hizbullah.36 Islamic Jihad is, however, regarded as Hizbullah’s ‘military wing’ at least during the 1980s,37 and has been closely linked to Imad Mughniyeh, one of the founding figures of Hizbullah who was assassinated in Damascus in 2005. Today, Mughniyeh is officially claimed as a major reference and a revered martyr by Hizbullah; billboards with his image and captioned ‘Martyr of the Resistance’ abound in South Beirut and South Lebanon. Viewed in light of this, the claim of Hizbullah’s current Secretary-General that Mughniyeh’s work was totally independent of Hizbullah’s seems somewhat disingenuous.

From revolution to participation: 1985–92 So far, I have been summarizing Hizbullah’s development from the founding days up to the Open Letter of 1985, which is often regarded as the official founding of the party. However, a lot of important groundwork for Hizbullah’s establishment was already done prior to 1985. Out of a splinter of Amal (the so-called Islamic Amal) and various other military groups fighting the Israeli occupation, a common thread evolved: they all had the same goals, the same religion, the same belief that out of their actions a new Islamic order could emerge. They envisaged an Islamic, Shiʽi revolution similar to the one that had taken place in Iran a few years previously, and that would provide a better order for everyone to live under and make things more just and equitable, in their eyes. This has been termed by Nazih Ayubi, as mentioned above, a ‘goal-replacement mechanism’,38 in the sense that it offers a detailed political programme or vision. These are provided by religion, the big goals as well as the minor ones to reach along the way, in addition to the minute rules that should govern everyday behaviour. Given the background of deprivation and political under-representation experienced by the Shiʽi community in Lebanon, a revolution that would lead to the establishment of a ‘just’ Islamic state certainly would have seemed a convenient solution for many. Consequently, the rationale for setting up Hizbullah was driven as much by endogenous factors as it was by exogenous ones. This contradicts the portrayal of Hizbullah’s foundation as a mere response to Israeli occupation, in other words, as purely exogenously induced. It is of course true that the party’s foundation was a product of that occupation, whose shaking off was the main goal of the

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movement. Just as much, however, it was about creating a strong community and a counter-movement to what Hizbullah terms ‘political Maronism’ in its Open Letter,39 which is defined as a hegemonic vision for Lebanon that was closely tied to ‘Western’ – that is, American, French and to some extent, British – interests and viewed as a neocolonial movement. The newly established party immediately set about countering the injustices identified in its founding document by violent means (assassinations, attacks, abductions of foreigners and so on), and in terms of military action, Hizbullah quickly gained a reputation for efficiency, forcefulness and organizational sophistication. This was made possible by the extensive training the new Hizbullah received from detachments of Iran’s IRGC in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. In the West, the new party gained the reputation of a formidable, merciless terrorist movement responsible for abductions and the indiscriminate killing of civilians, something that still remains in Western collective memory, as well as in not a small number of publications today. In the narrative of Qassem,40 the Iranian-educated Lebanese clerics who went back to Lebanon provided the crucial link between the Iranian clergy and the emerging Hizbullah. They developed a plan for setting up a resistance movement, modelling the new organization’s structure on a previously established Iraqi Shiʽi party. In this phase, the group of clerics behind the establishment of the new party stayed closely connected to Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and could count on his support. As argued above, the latter had a motivation of his own in supporting the new Hizbullah: to get out of the rut that was his war with Iraq, gain a foothold in the region beyond his immediate neighbours and provide Israel with a solid thorn in the side. As noted above, in view of the fact that Hizbullah conceived of itself as a revolutionary movement with a revolutionary agenda at its outset – bent on overturning the old order and establishing a new one with itself as the top authority – the 1985 Open Letter offers a surprising amount of open doors for other Lebanese groups to join in and work together. As far as wordings go, the document is less radical than many commentators would suggest. It is directed against the US, France and Israel, the politics or even existence of the latter being wholly rejected and its annihilation advocated. It seems somewhat surprising that the US gets named as the movement’s main enemy, with Israel being much closer geographically and also the initial impetus for setting up a

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resistance movement. Surely, Iranian influence comes into play in this particular ideological opposition to the ‘Great Satan’, that is, the US.41 It is also important to remember, however, that with the Iran –Iraq War over and the chances of a Shiʽi revolution being exported to the Middle East region including Lebanon, Hizbullah dropped its revolutionary rhetoric. As Saad-Ghorayeb explains: Revolutionary activity is not only shunned in principle, but is also eschewed out of purely rational considerations related to the unlikelihood of such an activity succeeding. [. . .] After the implementation of UN Resolution 598, which called for a permanent ceasefire [between Iran and Iraq], Hizbu’llah had to reformulate its political strategy.42 This provides a good prompt to start looking at the next stretch in Hizbullah’s development, which turned it from a revolutionary antioccupation movement into a political party willing to integrate the political system while maintaining an armed wing. This is a big shift; as long as Iran stood a chance of winning its war with Iraq, as Saad-Ghorayeb points out, Hizbullah upheld its calls for an Islamic state to be established. This Islamic state was only deemed viable as part of a regional project, an Islamic ‘super-state’ encompassing Iran, Iraq and Lebanon: ‘This would have paved the way for the creation of an all-encompassing Islamic state in the region, of which Lebanon would have been an intrinsic part.’43 With this perspective removed, Hizbullah changed course and opted for Lebanonization, which Alagha uses interchangeably with infitah, directed specifically at Lebanon’s Christians.44 The notion that in turning to Lebanese politics and opening up towards other groups, Hizbullah was performing something of a rite of passage, and was leaving behind its violent, revolutionary past – which is belied by its more recent activities, however – was one promoted by the party itself in the aftermath of the Taif Agreement. Alagha describes it as a ‘public relations campaign’ aimed at fostering a moderate image of the party,45 which paid off in the sense that the party was allowed to keep its armed wing on the premise that it would moderate and become part of the system. The idea that ceasing its revolutionary rhetoric after the civil war amounted to an actual moderation of the party is also voiced by Hilal Khashan, a long-term

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researcher on Hizbullah and former academic tutor of Ibrahim Moussawi, today the spokesman for the party.46 However, as I will discuss below, the hypotheses of moderation theory, namely, that participation in the electoral process will make parties adopt ‘centrist’ or more moderate platforms, and that being part of democratic politics makes them avoid confrontations with the state for fear of repression,47 does not hold true for Hizbullah. This is of course due to the fact that the party was able to have the best of both worlds, as it were; on the one hand, it became part of the political system and the electoral process, but on the other, it was able to keep its armed wing, a fact which rendered any looming threat of state repression meaningless. An important step on the road towards getting its armed wing stabilized even in a changing political order within Lebanon was for Hizbullah to gain acceptance of its weapons as necessary for resistance against Israel. According to Rami Ollaik’s descriptions mentioned above, the late 1980s were a period of intense conflict and fighting between Hizbullah and Amal, to the extent that these fights were able to preoccupy young Hizbullah fighters more than the fight against the ‘real enemy’, Israel.48 Added to this was the fact that Amal had decided as early as 1983 that cooperation with political Maronism within its confines was feasible and even necessary, thus accepting the baselines of Lebanon’s pre-war political system. Consequently, much of the language in the Open Letter directed against Maronism may have been used to differentiate Hizbullah from Amal, and state clearly its opposition to the existing system. The success of that strategy in terms of public support became apparent at the beginning of the 1990s, when a poll conducted by Palmer Harik and colleagues found that the majority of respondents were willing to vote for a member of the ‘resistance’, that is, Hizbullah. Simultaneously, they were not willing to support any militia leader as an elected politician, which shows that many people even at this early stage had disassociated Hizbullah from the term ‘militia’ and viewed it, instead, as a legitimate resistance force against Israel.49 During this period, there are thus different types or categories of Hizbullah violence: the fight against Amal; hostage-taking and hijacking/terrorism activity; and the fight against the SLA and Israel in South Lebanon. The fight against Amal seems to have taken up a large amount of Hizbullah’s resources and energy during the late 1980s, with 1987 being a particularly bloody year of street fighting between the two

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factions, and was not really called for by the Open Letter. The US and other foreign nations were targets in terrorist and kidnapping attacks. In 1984, there was fighting between the party’s forces and the Lebanese army led by President Gemayel for control of West Beirut, which was won by Hizbullah fighters. This was a major victory, along with the fact that the May 17 Accord of 1983 was never signed, as argued above. It amounts to a major confrontation with what is termed ‘political Maronite’ forces in the party’s founding document. Shortly thereafter, in 1989, the Taif Agreement was brokered and signed in Saudi Arabia. According to Palmer Harik, Hizbullah was initially not enthusiastic about signing the agreement, as it did not fundamentally better the Shiʽi representation within Lebanon’s political system. Also, Lebanese Christian groups were unwilling to sign at the outset, but eventually had to relent since Syria was brokering the deal, in part, and was already establishing its dominance over all things Lebanese, a dominance which was to become enshrined in various treaties after 1991. Palmer Harik argues that usually, some compromise is struck between radical resistance movements and the state when a civil war is coming to an end and the transition to a new order is about to be done: Situations like this are not uncommon and usually feature direct or implicit bargaining between radical parties wishing to transform themselves into moderate political actors and the governments holding the keys to the political arena. For a successful ‘deal’ to take place, the radical party must first foreswear its hostility to the state and promise to abide by the rules and regulations governing all other parties on the scene. For its part, the state guarantees the transforming party the protection and prerogatives that are due legitimate political organizations. Mutual interest underwrites this arrangement and demonstrations of good will and delivery on the promises made clinch it. In this case, for the deal to be swung between the radical Islamist party, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese authorities it had to be brokered by a third interested party – Syria.50 She goes on to say that this deal included terms that would allow Hizbullah to carry out its resistance activities, and which did not offer the Lebanese government a lot – except that Hizbullah was perhaps the

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only Lebanese player able to militarily confront Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon, which was providing the Lebanese government with security along its southern border. Lebanon’s army was weak and undergoing reconstruction after the chaos of the civil war. Had Syria become involved, this would have set off a whole chain of events internationally, since it would have amounted to an interstate war. With an armed and capable resistance group to guard its southern border, the postwar Lebanese government was absolved of having to devote substantial resources to the task. Syria was benefiting by planting a continuous hostile presence on Israel’s border, potentially annoying enough so that it would consider giving the Golan Heights back to Syria. At times, this deal was hard to stick to for the Lebanese government, Palmer Harik argues, as ceding the task of security provision to Hizbullah carried obvious risks in credibility and legitimacy. As for Hizbullah’s internal dynamics, the decision to join the political system was a classic case of radicals versus moderates. Secretary-General Tufayli, belonging to the ‘radical’ faction, was vehemently opposed, and was adamant that the goal of establishing an Islamic state should be pursued. Tufayli and his ideology (although this was shared by the entire top echelon, but he was the face of Hizbullah at the time) were also the reason why Hizbullah was able to attract so many young Lebanese recruits.51 Nasrallah stuck to a more moderate line, realizing that the only way that Hizbullah would be able to maintain its resistance activities from Lebanon was by agreeing to the rules of its political system, and hence giving up the stipulation that an Islamic state should be established on Lebanese soil. Consequently, Tufayli left the movement, and a faction headed by him later engaged in fighting with state forces in the Bekaa Valley, in a dispute over the growing of illegal drugs.52 Other factors that brought about Hizbullah’s transformation included a general softening in Iran’s regional politics, reflective of a growing pragmatism, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the taking over of the presidency by Rafsanjani. There were tensions between Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Rafsanjani, but the latter was a much more powerful president than his predecessors under Ayatollah Khomeini, and was able to significantly influence Iranian foreign policy, including in Lebanon. He saw it as essential that in the new game being played out in Lebanon, Hizbullah needed to be part of

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the system.53 Additionally, according to one interview partner, Hizbullah was witnessing a ‘we are doing this because we can’-effect, meaning that there was a realization within the party of its increased organizational strength and popular appeal, and a desire to convert this into gains within the political arena.54 Hizbullah was able to occupy the gap in the system entailed by Amal’s conversion into a political and – in the eyes of many – by association with Lebanon’s zu’ama system,55 necessarily corrupt, movement. Many followers of the Movement of the Deprived had trouble following Berri, the leader of Amal, and his machinations and deal-making within Lebanon’s patronage system, and would have opted for supporting Hizbullah instead. Most commentators agree that Hizbullah also joined the system and Lebanese institutions as a way of safeguarding its ‘armed wing’, that is, the Islamic Resistance. Alagha argues that pressure was built up on Hizbullah after the signing of the Taif Agreement, and the government really wanted to disarm all militias. Consequently, Hizbullah realized it had to avoid the term ‘militia’ and instead embarked on a major public relations campaign in order to repackage itself as a resistance movement, which spared it from disarming as it was now no longer a militia.56 Qassem mentions a 12-member council that debated this question and weighed the pros and cons, finally deciding in favour with a 10 to 2 vote.57 The pros that this committee identified are listed by Qassem as follows: (1) using parliament as a political forum in which to voice the concerns of the Islamic Resistance; (2) exerting influence on budget decisions concerning ‘development’ issues; (3) getting inside knowledge on legislation being prepared; (4) gaining access to Lebanon’s network of political relations; (5) the granting of public recognition by the state authorities; and (6) presenting an Islamic point of view in public.58 This prioritization reflects a very functionalist and pragmatic approach to the political system: it is useful to us, so we will accept it. Most of my interview partners mentioned that Hizbullah’s participation in the political system was first and foremost a way of safeguarding its resistance activities. A Hizbullah representative argued this explicitly by saying: ‘Hizbullah’s main message is the resistance against Israel, and its engagement in Lebanon has to be understood in this respect.’59 Also, Hizbullah wants to influence social and economic policy in Lebanon in order to counteract the ‘uneven development’ caused by the sectarian system. Behind this phrase lies the view, held by Hizbullah, that most

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Lebanese postwar governments, having been dominated by Hariri’s Sunni Future Movement, have diverted state resources to their own (confessional) constituencies to the detriment of Hizbullah’s followers, and regions dominated by Hizbullah more generally. One interview partner sees the participation in parliamentary elections as a main turning point, inaugurating a new phase in the party’s history. Partaking in political institutions afforded the necessary protection for Hizbullah’s resistance activities, and would make it harder for ‘Westerners’ to accuse it of being a terrorist organization.60 The protection offered by Syria also helped a great deal with this. In all, it appears that a mix of different factors almost over-determined that Hizbullah would take part in Lebanon’s political institutions and embark on an explicit policy of Lebanonization or infitah. First, on the international level: a change of leadership in Iran brought about a more accommodationist stance by Hizbullah that downplays the establishment of an Islamic state and prioritizes an arrangement with existing Lebanese institutions. The civil war in Lebanon almost simultaneously ends with the signing of the Taif Agreement, which ushers in a new era of Syrian tutelage over Lebanon. The Syrians see a very helpful ally in Hizbullah, keeping the Israelis at bay in South Lebanon, which the Syrian army would be unable to do without causing an interstate war. Also, their actions and their wearing out of Israel’s military as well as its public opinion might come in as a useful bargaining chip in getting the Golan Heights back. Accordingly, Syria pressured the Lebanese government to accept Hizbullah, and to accept its weapons. This was aided, on the domestic level, by Hizbullah’s clever repositioning of itself as a resistance movement rather than a militia. Militias have to be disarmed according to the Taif Agreement, but the positioning as a national resistance movement brings greater legitimacy and acceptance of the party’s armed status both publicly and politically. Moreover, inside the movement, the victory of a moderate faction around Nasrallah greatly helped the transformation into a political actor; the ‘radical’ Tufayli loses in a power struggle and has to leave the movement altogether, taking some of his radical elements with him and consequently making the party’s rebranding seem even more logical and necessary. The new Hizbullah leadership sees participating in elections as a win-win situation all around: it gets official recognition by the authorities and a great new forum in which to voice its ideas. Additionally, inside knowledge on the dealings of the state and the

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opportunity to make political contacts and to influence important budgeting decisions also accrue to the party in the wake of its decision to join parliamentary politics. This also goes a long way towards explaining Hizbullah’s view and conception of itself vis-a`-vis the state: it is not a resistance movement against the state that engages in a bargaining process and ultimately wants to replace state authority. It is a resistance movement against another kind of enemy altogether, and has goals, visions and ideas that are essentially transnational and not focused on the state, explicitly. The state, and its participation in it, are subject to deliberation, to the weighing of pros and cons, and ultimately are really viewed as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Consequently, Hizbullah’s approach towards the state is often subject to rational calculations concerned with regional, not domestic, factors. The influence does not only work one way, however; as I will discuss below, particularly in relation to the 2006 war with Israel, the party’s domestic-level power calculations can also lead to regional-level action. Hizbullah won eight seats in 1992, which has been termed a ‘stunning victory’, out of 120.61 Six of those elected were members of Hizbullah’s politburo, which according to Hamzeh has a supervisory function only and is not a real decision-making body. It merely coordinates the work of the party’s different committees.62 Hamzeh explains in detail the electoral strategy and list building by Hizbullah that enabled it to capture such a relatively high number of seats. Added to the eight actual Hizbullah deputies are four loyal ones: two Sunnis who are close to the party, and two Christians who had teamed up with it in order to garner votes. Practically the first act of the newly elected Hizbullah faction was to vote against Hariri as Lebanon’s first postwar prime minister. They had proposed their own candidate instead. Their declared goals for the parliamentary session were to gain official legal recognition for the Islamic Resistance, and to abolish ‘political Maronism’ while simultaneously abolishing the existing sectarian political system, and changing it to a nonconfessional one as proposed by the Taif Agreement. They voted against Hariri because he was not pushing for these goals, and also because they vehemently opposed, from the beginning, his plan of rebuilding the suburbs of Beirut. They correctly perceived that this project, termed Solide`re and carried out by one principal contractor, Dar al-Handasah (House of Planning), which was closely associated with Hariri,63 was principally accruing financial

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benefits for the new Prime Minister and his allies, while ordinary citizens often lost properties without proper restitution, and war-torn neighbourhoods not connected to the rebuilders’ interests were left out of the reconstruction effort. In the southern suburbs of Beirut, which were under Hizbullah control since the 1980s, rebuilding was carried out by Jihad al-Bina (The Building Struggle), an agency specifically set up by the party for this purpose.

Conclusion to Phase I Hizbullah’s decision to participate in Lebanon’s postwar parliamentary democracy was a win-win situation for the movement that was determined by numerous factors. The regional situation had changed from the 1980s and Iran was embracing a more conciliatory foreign policy; Hizbullah felt it had the strength to use the Lebanese system to its own advantage domestically; and it wanted to counter the postwar economic and social agenda aggressively pursued by the Hariri camp. Participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections and in the Lebanese postwar system in general was simultaneously generating progress on all these fronts. Aside from these circumstantial and tactical considerations, Hizbullah’s participation was also the expression of a longer-term, structural ideological change the movement had undergone during the first ten years of its existence. This is expressed in its political platform for the 1992 elections, which, compared to the Open Letter of 1985, shows a much more moderate and conciliatory approach to the political situation in Lebanon and beyond. Instead of the ambition to stop the spread of evil US, European and Israeli designs in the region by revolutionary means and to set up an Islamic state instead, the 1992 programme represented a willingness to ‘muddle through’ and to keep all options open with other Lebanese actors. The Islamic state was downplayed although not abandoned altogether: as Hamzeh relates, its abandonment could not have been sold to Hizbullah’s constituency, as it would have meant letting go of the extremely popular concept of wilayat al-faqih.64 Yet, there is no explicit reference to the concept in the 1992 electoral platform, bearing witness to the ideological shift behind Hizbullah’s decision to enter parliamentary politics. In order to cooperate with other Lebanese political actors and become a political party in its own right, Hizbullah had to downplay any reference to an Islamic state, as well as its 1985 intention of countering ‘political

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Maronism’ in all its forms. Now, limited cooperation with Maronite parties was a reality and the party adjusted to it. Instead of fighting political Maronism, Hizbullah was now denouncing the sectarian political system as a whole and affirmed its intention of replacing it with a majoritarian democracy without sectarian quotas and allocations, be it in the political arena, the civil service or in business. The strategy paid off, and Hizbullah proved apt at both influencing the structure of the political system in its favour – by having all other parties accept that it be allowed to keep its arms – and using it in order to gain representation in the political arena. This can be understood in terms of ‘legitimizing the resistance’ and ‘political jihad’,65 and the party gained eight parliamentary seats in the 1992 elections. The new patron of Lebanese politics, Syria, meanwhile ensured that Hizbullah got to keep its exceptional status as a non-state armed actor with one foot inside the door of political participation, and one outside of it, firmly planted on the military battlefield of wider regional politics along the Iran– Syria –Israel axis. As for its internal rivals, mostly incarnated by Hariri’s Future Movement at this point (the Christian parties having boycotted the 1992 elections), Hizbullah clearly and obviously announced its intention to counteract the Hariri agenda for postwar Lebanon by voting against Hariri’s cabinet. On the key variables considered in this study, this first phase has the following values. Repression, defined as the hindrance of the movement’s work by way of arrests, other forceful means or restrictions on its legal and political rights, is virtually absent during this period. On the contrary, while there were actual legal grounds of restricting Hizbullah’s access to the political system (the fact that it remained armed), the movement benefitted from international protection by Syria, the new guardian of Lebanese politics and was granted an exception. Transnational linkages were thus present both in the form of Syria’s protection, as well as Iran’s influence on Hizbullah’s ideological position and decision to enter the political game in Lebanon. For as we have noted above, Iran was interested in accommodating its regional neighbours during this phase and sought a more conciliatory stance; therefore, having its key ally Hizbullah join Lebanese politics was a policy priority for Iran during this phase. Intra-organizationally, Hizbullah had to pay for its decision to join the political framework with the secession of one of its former leaders, Tufayli, and a number of his followers. The internal

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power struggle between his faction and that led by Nasrallah, who favoured political participation, was of course also influenced by Iran, which backed the latter faction.

Phase II: 1992 –2000: Hizbullah Victorious Inside and Out In the next phase, Hizbullah is largely able to consolidate its position, both domestically as well as regionally. It is now officially part of Lebanese politics, and begins to use this position in order to lobby for changes in the reconstruction plans for Beirut’s south, effectively blocking the Hariri agenda for these areas. This foreshadows the mounting power struggle between Hizbullah and ‘Hariri Lebanon’, a confrontation that is soon to become fuelled by the regional situation (but not yet during this time period). Israel continues to attack and invade Lebanon, as in 1993 and 1996, underlining the necessity for Hizbullah’s continued resistance activities against the southern neighbour, in the reasoning of the party. Towards the end of this period, Syria is becoming engaged in serious peace talks with Israel and an agreement between the two sides seems to become a possibility. Also, the Oslo Accords are signed, bringing hopes for a possible two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. Finally, Israel, led by Ehud Barak, calculates that the losses of staying in Lebanon outweigh the gains by far, and therefore decides to unilaterally withdraw from South Lebanon – handing Hizbullah a major victory in the process, one that lent a lot of weight to its internal political position in Lebanon.

Continued and deepening participation: 1992–2000 This is the time between Hizbullah’s official entry into politics and Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon. I will trace, in this section, how Hizbullah was faring in Lebanese politics, and how the renewed conflict with Israel was affecting its position internally. According to Hizbullah’s Deputy Secretary-General Qassem, these years were defined by a catchphrase often used, that of ‘imperative harmony between the government and the resistance.’66 He implies that the government was not too shy to try and capitalize on the success of the ‘resistance’, and use it as a ‘political ticket’, in his phrase. This endeavour was doomed to fail, however, as Israel was prepared to do anything in order to ratchet up political pressure for Hizbullah to disarm, including reinvading Lebanon or bombing targets on Lebanese territory. Consequently, the

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Lebanese government was shooting itself in the foot by embracing Hizbullah’s military actions against Israel, as they resulted in more Israeli invasions of the country. Qassem depicts the 1993 Israeli invasion as a corollary to the signing of the Oslo Accords. Israel was trying to quell the Palestinian uprisings, and in the process wanted to bring quiet to its northern front and to demolish and disarm Hizbullah as an opponent. Israel was counting on the logic that hitting back at civilian targets would turn the population of South Lebanon against Hizbullah, similar to the situation with the Palestinians beforehand. This turned out to be a miscalculation, however, as Hizbullah had more rockets at its disposal than Israeli military intelligence had assumed, and was therefore able, in 1993, to keep up its bombing campaign of northern Israeli villages for much longer than anticipated. Finally, with US brokerage, a ceasefire deal was proposed whereby Hizbullah would halt its Katyusha rocket attacks in return for Israel stopping its bombardments of South Lebanon. Hizbullah agreed and reaped political profit from this deal, as the proposed formula explicitly linked the Katyusha rocket attacks to Israel’s military actions. This meant that Israel and the US acknowledged Hizbullah as an equal military opponent of Israel. Moreover, the ceasefire agreement forbade any indiscriminate Israeli attacks against civilian Lebanese targets and therefore forced Israel into confronting only the military side of Hizbullah, which the latter considered a political victory.67 With the military action having failed, Israel then tried to suppress Hizbullah activity by political means. Through US diplomatic channels, it started pressuring the Lebanese government to deploy the army in all of its territory including Hizbullah-dominated South Lebanon, and thereby to re-establish its monopoly on the use of force and to keep in check Hizbullah’s military capabilities. This was prevented by Syria: its agents quickly made sure the Lebanese government did not act on this idea, whereupon it was dropped.68 Even if Syria had not intervened, the Lebanese government and army would have been incapable of controlling South Lebanon against Hizbullah’s will, demonstrating Lebanon’s severe lack in state capacity. On top of this, Westphalian sovereignty – that is, recognition of sovereignty by other actors on the international level – also lacked in the case of Lebanon, with Syria occupying parts of the country and controlling most political decisions.

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In April 1996, Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath, for roughly the same objectives as the 1993 invasion – pressuring the Lebanese government into suppressing Hizbullah, giving it a bad name among the Lebanese population for causing Israeli retaliation, as well as crushing its military, rocket-launching capabilities. The operation resulted in an agreement that reset and formalized the rules of engagement between Israel and Hizbullah in South Lebanon. Syria approved the agreement in the final instance. It explicitly allowed Hizbullah to ‘launch’ its ambush attacks from civilian-occupied areas, but proscribed the ‘firing’ of rockets from such areas. According to Qassem, now ‘combatants could launch their attacks from any bases that they would consider to be sufficiently safe and beyond the reach of Israel given that the latter is bound by agreements and understandings not to shell civilian areas or else face the wrath of Katyusha rockets on its northern settlements.’69 In 1996, parliamentary elections also took place in Lebanon. Hizbullah dropped from eight parliamentary seats to seven, thus proving able to hold out and to more or less repeat its success in gaining parliamentary representation. The 1998 municipal elections, held for the first time after the civil war, were perceived by Hizbullah as a crucial opportunity for reaching out to the people and providing vital services. The party sanctioned its participation, and the alliance-building necessary for it, as halal, declaring ‘winning religiously permissible’.70 The focus was placed on honest municipal work for the community, not ideology or religion, and the party often introduced candidates on a non-sectarian basis.71 This represents one of the main political themes of Hizbullah, and of Islamist political parties generally. They often stress their non-elite character and their representativeness of ‘the people’ as opposed to corrupt political elites. Most Muslim Brotherhood interviewees who I spoke with for this study repeated this theme. Taking part in the municipal elections thus represents ‘capturing part of the state’ in order to be able to provide and dispense even more services to the community than beforehand. Hamzeh files Hizbullah’s participation in the elections under the rubric ‘operational choices’ and heads the paragraph on the elections, ‘capturing municipal councils.’72 His choice of words goes a long way towards revealing his assumptions about what Hizbullah is doing politically. According to him, ‘politics for Hizbullah is purely utilitarian rather than ideological or religious.’73

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Militarily, towards the end of the 1990s the power dynamics in South Lebanon started to change. The Israeli government of Barak started discussing a withdrawal from South Lebanon, a deployment which had become hugely unpopular among the Israeli public, and which did not seem to accomplish its goal of controlling Hizbullah. With these discussions taking place, it was predictable that fighting morale among the SLA, Israel’s proxy in Lebanon, sharply declined. Hizbullah was able to make further headway in controlling the ‘security zone’ along the border between Israel and Lebanon. Israel demanded that the Lebanese government take full control of its territory up to the border between the two countries once it withdrew, but Beirut insisted that the relevant UN resolutions called for an ‘unconditional’ withdrawal by Israel, rejecting the calls for a deployment to South Lebanon. This, again, reflects the government’s inability to confront Hizbullah and occupy territories against the latter’s will, especially at a time when the Shiʽi party was feeling strong and empowered. In May 2000, Israel finally officially withdrew from South Lebanon. It is also important to keep track of Hizbullah’s social activities during this period. The Elyssar project is a good example of how Hizbullah was playing politics on a Lebanese level well before 2005, when most observers would date its official entry into the messy business of Lebanese local politics. Elyssar is a major urban development project for Beirut’s ‘south-western suburbs’, according to its website.74 It is to be implemented by a public agency of the same name, which was instituted in 1996. The original schedule foresaw the extensive rebuilding of Beirut’s informal suburbs, and the creation of new housing units and highways. Amal and Hizbullah regard the suburbs in question as their own, as they are mostly inhabited by Shiʽi Lebanese. According to Mona Harb: The Elyssar project can be seen as an example of urban governance that brings together actors with different connections to the state, varying resources and repertoires of action, and diverse stakes and strategies. On first reading, the Elyssar project seems to epitomize ‘good urban governance’, since state agencies and political actors representing the interests of the residents are involved in project decisionmaking and implementation.75

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The Elyssar project is much less studied than the wider-known and more visible rebuilding project for the centre of Beirut, namely, Solide`re. This is due to the fact that the suburbs affected by Elyssar – parts of Ghobeyri and Burj al-Barajneh – are largely products of the civil war, they did not really exist as such prior to the fighting. Consequently, they capture the popular Lebanese imagination much less than does the former centre of Beirut around the Place des Martyrs. Also, the suburbs’ inhabitants are mostly Shiʽa, who are often stigmatized as poor and uneducated, and there is still an expectation that they will eventually ‘return to the villages’.76 The project’s high tide took place in 1996– 7. It essentially envisaged tearing down large parts of Beirut’s southern suburbs and rebuilding ‘tourism and service zones’, segregating commercial from residential areas. Amal and Hizbullah, as the key political players in the southern suburbs, fought first with Hariri over the nature of the institution that was to oversee the planning and execution of Elyssar. While Hariri and others wanted this to be a private entity, Hizbullah and Amal insisted on making it a public body with political participation. Hizbullah was able to benefit from the better grassroots connections it had compared to Amal, which was increasingly perceived as a state body with little relation to the people it was supposed to represent. The two movements did not have any joint meetings concerning Elyssar, and conducted separate meetings and campaigns on the issue.77 At the same time, Hizbullah was able to use the conflict over Elyssar for strengthening its position as the key organization representing Shiʽi residents vis-a`-vis the state: it was consciously withholding information from the public, releasing it bit by bit and thus demonstrating its position of power over the population. At the same time, its strategy concerning the state seems to reflect an instance of institution building in a weak state environment, where everything is in flux, the rules and regulations governing a situation are not fixed and people (and organizations) will do everything to influence the rules and regulations to better suit their interests. This is evident, for example, in Amal and Hizbullah’s attempt to influence the nature of the body governing the Elyssar project; but, as a metaphor, it can be extended to Hizbullah successfully changing the nature of the political system with the Doha Accords of 2008, by force. In the final result, Hizbullah’s and Amal’s obstruction techniques regarding Elyssar led to a stalemate, with the project never being implemented, but not officially being taken off

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the agenda, either. Some of the grander building projects proposed as part of Elyssar were implemented, such as the cite´ sportive near Sabra, while the large-scale relocation of residents initially proposed was not. Harb summarizes the effects of the project: The negotiation processes show that the three actors are benefitting in unequal ways and at different moments from the project. The Hariri government constructed highways and distributed the surplus value to its entrepreneur clientele from the resulting economic transactions. Amal obtained more resources for its network of beneficiaries. Hezbollah won more political legitimacy and even some material benefits.78 To restate the point, this would seem to contradict the notion that Hizbullah was ‘staying out of executive politics’ prior to 2005.79 Rather, it was right in the thick of it early on, but was not taking responsibility for this in the form of participation in the government.

Conclusion to Phase II Throughout the 1990s, Hizbullah on the whole witnessed a steady progress and success in its political and military endeavours. Of course there were setbacks and several Israeli invasions, but generally speaking the party became established on the political scene and was able to provide a counterweight to Hariri’s Future Movement and at least protect the interests of its own constituency, as evidenced by its success in preventing the complete implementation of the Elyssar project. It was also successful in local politics and its steady work in social and community service provision paid off during the municipal elections of 1998. Militarily, the strategy of engaging Israel in a drawn-out war of attrition, engaging patrols in skirmishes and firing off Katyusha rockets, proved successful. The steady loss of life on Israel’s northern border provoked a counter-reaction among the Israeli public, which had already begun to revolt against Israel’s military presence and its associated losses in Lebanon during the 1980s. This eventually led to Prime Minister Barak declaring Israel’s complete withdrawal from occupied South Lebanon in 2000. During the 1990s, there were two major attacks by Israel against Lebanon, Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. The first one still bet on Israel’s past strategy:

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carry out wide-ranging air attacks that lead to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Sooner or later, in the Israeli calculation, this would pay off by turning public opinion against Hizbullah and would lead the government to reign in the party’s military activities. This strategy had already been unsuccessful during the 1980s, and proved so again in the 1990s. Neither did the public at large turn against Hizbullah – the calculation was dramatically underestimating the movement’s popularity and support as the Shiʽa’s bulwark of representation within Lebanon’s sectarian political and social system – nor did the Hariri government disavow the party and try to pressure it. Doing so would have been impossible for the government not solely in terms of military capability, but also given the larger political context in which Syria kept close control over Lebanese politics and the military situation, and was counting on Hizbullah’s continued availability as a possible bargaining chip in defending Syrian interests in the region. This recap of the military altercations between Israel and Hizbullah during the 1990s serves to illustrate that despite Israel’s intention to eliminate the movement using military and political means (displacement of civilians and subsequent build-up of political pressure), its place on the regional as well as the Lebanese political scene, as well as the steady hardware support provided by Iran, ensured Hizbullah’s survival and even its continued growth. In other words, Hizbullah’s strategy of becoming part of Lebanese politics and thereby alleviating its status as a pariah terrorist movement seemed to be paying off. Additionally, Lebanon’s extremely weak form of statehood, with Syria practically dominating most aspects of Lebanese political and economic life, ensured that Hizbullah had the most powerful backer on the Lebanese scene that it could wish for. Put differently, Hizbullah possessed transnational linkages that rendered its position vis-a`-vis the Lebanese government extremely strong. Prime Minister Hariri was also in need of good relations with Syria in order to be able to pursue his postwar, neo-liberal economic restructuring of the country – from which his various firms and enterprises greatly benefitted – and thus could not have confronted the movement even if he had wanted to. In terms of the third variable that is being considered here – dynamics internal to the movement – less is known than about external

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factors. During the 1990s, Hizbullah continued to provide various medical and social services to its constituents in South Lebanon especially, but also in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. These activities were pursued continuously, regardless of the military actions undertaken by the movement, implying a steady flow of financial resources, mostly from Iran. In its various struggles with the Hariri government, Hizbullah also showed aptness and an ability to adapt to the Lebanese political game, and to follow through on its interests where needed. This brought renewed tensions with the rival Shiʽi movement, Amal, leading to clashes between the two parties in the 1990s. Yet, when it comes to split-offs regarding the overall strategy of the movement, we find none; not even various factions favouring one option over another are documented. This mirrors the author’s experience when searching for Hizbullah interview contacts in Lebanon in 2011. One well-connected researcher put it this way: ‘Bear in mind that all party representatives toe the same party line. You may not have to interview too many of them, they will tell you the same things.’ Other researchers have found that the most a high-ranking Hizbullah cadre such as Mohammad Ra’ad is willing to admit, is that there is ‘a nonideological continuum ranging from “flexibility and realism” to “less flexibility and realism”’.80 Consequently, it is not surprising that no major internal movement disagreements are on record for the mid-tolate 1990s, contrary to the decision to join the parliamentary elections in 1992. In this instance, reflecting a wide-ranging strategic change of direction, the Iranian leader – as the wilayat al-faqih, and also as Hizbullah’s spiritual leader and highest decision-making organ – intervened to solve the conflict that had arisen out of Tufayli’s and Nasrallah’s conflicting position regarding political participation. This incident remains the only publicly well-documented instance of internal disagreement within Hizbullah. In conclusion, for this period we can attest a steady upkeep of the same strategy for Hizbullah, in the absence of any meaningful repression on the domestic scene, and against the background of the continuing conflict with Israel. The party became increasingly present on the domestic political scene, repeated its success in the parliamentary elections of 1996 and won a number of municipalities during the local elections of 1998. It continued its military conflict with Israel, repeatedly risking the flare-up of hostilities that were

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bound to cause major civilian casualties and strain its political relations with the Lebanese central government and the Christian parties. However, due to the backing by Syria and Iran that the movement enjoyed, the remaining Lebanese political forces were unable to seriously challenge Hizbullah’s strategy. It remained fairly untouchable to other actors in Lebanon. At the same time that Hizbullah was reaping the fruits of its longer-term strategy of participation in the political system and keeping up the resistance, it also kept up a steady opposition to Hariri’s vision of Lebanon. This did not take place publicly and confrontationally, but via less-observed channels, such as the committee meetings for the Elyssar project. Hizbullah had a keen awareness of Hariri’s project, intended mostly to benefit the Sunni community and its allies, and closely tied to Saudi Arabian, US and European interests in Lebanon; this of course stood in glaring contrast to Hizbullah’s Shiʽa, Iran-affiliated vision that foresaw a completely different future for the country. This slowburning confrontation, as it were, between the Hariri camp and Hizbullah, would come to dominate Lebanon’s political scene in the coming years, and would also significantly shape Hizbullah’s political strategy, as we shall see in the following sections.

Phase III: The End of Israeli Occupation and Hizbullah’s Search for a New Domestic Role The years 2000– 5 appear in hindsight as relatively calm before the assassination of Hariri hit the country like an earthquake and fundamentally changed the rules of Lebanon’s political game. The Israeli withdrawal in 2000 was celebrated as a major victory by Hizbullah. The party’s military wing had achieved success in the fight against one of the best-equipped and most powerful armies in the world. Not to mention the ideological gains made by liberating Arab land from Israeli occupation and oppression. Hizbullah did not set about attacking collaborators internally, however, as had been feared; mostly at the behest of the Iranian leadership, which continued in its attempt to tread carefully in the regional and international arena, the party was intent on avoiding open confrontation. It focused on defining a new role for itself after one of its main military goals – the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory – had been reached.

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2000– 5: Participation in national and local politics During the parliamentary elections of 2000, Hizbullah was able to capitalize on the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon earlier that year, after the Israeli – Syrian peace negotiations had collapsed. Israeli Prime Minister Barak had promised a withdrawal either as part of a peace deal with Syria, or unilaterally, and stuck to his word. At the same time, Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran decreed that Hizbullah continue its course of pragmatism and accommodation to the political realities and to other political players in Lebanon.81 After Israel’s withdrawal, Iran apparently was intent on keeping things calm and preventing Hizbullah from gloating in its success and possibly reconnecting this with religious zeal, calls for an Islamic state and the like. Nasrallah stayed pragmatic at Iran’s behest. Hamzeh conceives of Hizbullah’s action during this phase as a strategy that unfolds on several different levels, simultaneously: the political (capturing seats and municipalities), the military and the social level, all of which, obviously, are intertwined. For in parallel to the political activities described above, Hizbullah was clearly continuing its resistance activity and attacking and fighting Israel, and was also maintaining and expanding its network of social services. Ayatollah Khamenei decreed that Hizbullah and Amal keep the peace and cooperate. This was of course not a natural thing to do, and Hamzeh relates how, when Hizbullah and Amal candidates appeared on joint lists, many adherents of one movement or the other would cross out the candidate of their respective opponents. This concurs with what one researcher interviewed for this study says about the development of relations between Amal and Hizbullah: they were essentially ready to fight each other until 2000, and afterwards the leadership cooperated, while the rank and file kept a grudging truce.82 Consequently, Hizbullah was able to keep up the same formula that had ensured its success beforehand: it was not getting involved too deeply in government, as this would imply too much responsibility and would represent too many liabilities as compared to participation in parliament, which allows for the voicing of opinions and a public platform without responsibilities attached.83 The party was quite open about its motivation to stay above the fray of Lebanon’s political game, while using parliament as a means to promote their ideas and to make connections. This approach continued through the municipal elections

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of 2004, which were an all-round success for Hizbullah. Not only did Amal lose out significantly vis-a`-vis the party, but Hizbullah was able to capture a majority of municipalities in Beirut, the south and the Bekaa Valley. Hizbullah’s pragmatic approach to politics stands out during this period; the Christians of Haret Hreik, for example, had boycotted the 1998 municipal elections as they perceived the electoral process as biased against them and in favour of a Muslim, that is, Shiʽi victory, and did not want to consent to such elections. In 2004, they were ‘back’ according to Hamzeh, and Hizbullah was able to set up a joint Shiʽi–Christian list, while Amal failed to do any such coalition-building.84 Basically, any means was right by Hizbullah in the fight for political influence and budgetary control, and for state spoils to be distributed among its cliente`le.

The Shebaa Farms as a new strategic goal In order to keep up its cornerstone strategic goal of resisting Israeli oppression, Hizbullah after the 2000 withdrawal began to focus on previously neglected areas, such as the Shebaa Farms. They represented, in the party’s view and rhetoric, more Lebanese territory occupied by Israel, hence the necessity to resist and liberate the land persisted. On the domestic scene, Hizbullah began to face increasingly vocal criticism for this perceived blowing-up of a relatively small issue.85 Finally, it seemed the logic that Israel had been counting on began to work its way into the upper echelons of Lebanon’s political elite: Christian politicians such as Gebran Tueni began to openly criticize the fact that Hizbullah was provoking heavy Israeli retaliation in order to ‘liberate’ a stretch of thinly populated farm land.86 We can thus note, with regard to the relationship between Hizbullah and its domestic political opposition, that although there was still no power centre on the Lebanese domestic scene that would have been able to openly confront Hizbullah (and stand a chance of winning that confrontation), there was at least growing opposition to its military strategy. The fact that its main raison d’eˆtre, the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, had ended, and that the party continued to insist on the need to maintain an armed resistance movement, increasingly came under fire from other Lebanese factions. As far as the transnational linkage angle goes during this period, Iran was urging Hizbullah to stay calm and react with restraint to the Israeli withdrawal.

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Build-up of domestic political tensions The period also saw a generally tense relationship between Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, re-elected in 2000 after a two-year absence from power, and Syria as well as Syria’s main representative in Lebanon, President Emile Lahoud. Having originally sought to maintain cordial relations with Syria – a necessity for acting on the political scene in Lebanon – Hariri felt increasingly curtailed by Syria’s close grip on Lebanon. Economic investments and cooperation were envisaged with Syria, but fell short of the goals set for them; Lahoud made a point of demonstrating his political influence to all concerned by assuming prerogatives not normally associated with the office of president. For instance, he would insist on chairing cabinet meetings, which constitutionally were to be headed by the prime minister.87 This naturally affected Hizbullah’s standing on the Lebanese scene as well; as Syria’s principal and most influential ally on the Lebanese scene, Hizbullah became part of the Hariri– Syria standoff, with tensions rising throughout this period. Additionally, Hizbullah’s actions often conflicted with the Hariri government’s goals, for instance during an episode related by Palmer Harik.88 In early 2001, Hariri was on a state visit to France that was aimed at generating new investments and funding for Lebanon. While there, the Lebanese delegation learned on the news that Hizbullah had fired several rockets at the Shebaa Farms area, killing an Israeli soldier. Hariri was outraged by this unannounced move that he had to explain and justify internationally. When he returned, however, several high-ranking Hizbullah cadres visited with him to reassure the Prime Minister that Hizbullah had not sought to embarrass him. Hariri also went to Damascus to confer with Syrian President al-Assad, who made it clear to him that Syria wished for his government to continue backing Hizbullah. In this way, the incident was resolved, demonstrating Hizbullah’s leeway in Lebanese politics that the party was afforded by benefitting from Syria’s support. However, as the 2000s went on, this configuration slowly began to change, foreshadowing the open conflicts in Lebanon during the latter half of the decade. Although Hizbullah generally reacted with restraint to other major developments affecting the region, such as the attacks on 11 September 2001 or the US invasion of Iraq, increasingly the party – and all other political forces in Lebanon – became drawn into a valueladen conflict with two opposing camps. On the one hand were some of

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Lebanon’s Christian parties as well as Hariri’s Future Movement, backed by the US and European countries. On the other hand were Hizbullah, its political allies in Lebanon and its patrons, Iran and Syria. In the early 2000s, this conflict line was beginning to emerge without dominating the political scene yet. Hizbullah reacted with a ‘calculated response’ to the attacks on 11 September, a mix of pragmatism and calls for restraint on the one hand, and a clear message in the form of mortar and rocket attacks to Israel on the other, that made the point that the party and resistance forces were intent on adhering to their goals (defending Lebanon against Israel militarily, mainly, but also against the US ‘project’ in the region).89 Once again, this also reflected Iran’s policy of avoiding open conflict with the US. A similar response was displayed by the movement vis-a`-vis the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, again influenced by Iran’s intention of keeping all channels open and avoiding a war by proxy between Iraq’s US-backed Sunni and Iranian-affiliated Shiʽi forces. However, the Sunni– Shiʽi conflict line began to assume ever greater resonance throughout the region after the invasion. Inside Lebanon, the US were upping the ante against Hizbullah, by explicitly denouncing Syria’s grip on Lebanon as well as Hizbullah’s holding on to its weapons, by issuing UNSC Resolution 1559. The resolution called for free and fair elections in Lebanon and for the disarmament of all militias, including Hizbullah. A monitoring and evaluation mechanism was set up for this resolution, indicating that the diplomatic pressure on Hizbullah would be kept up for some time. The Bush administration sought to bolster its ‘Freedom Agenda’ with these measures, and to counter the ‘axis of refusal’ embodied by Syria, Iran and their Lebanese ally Hizbullah. The rhetoric was turning increasingly inflammatory, and various Lebanese political forces perceived this as the long-awaited bandwagon that was out to disarm Hizbullah, and they were happy to jump on it. Finally, these conflicts escalated over the issue of changing the constitution to allow President Lahoud to run for a third term in office. Hariri opposed this move but was unable to resolve the issue in a dialogue with the Syrian leadership, leading him to resign as prime minister in 2004.

Conclusion to Phase III As far as political opportunities on a domestic level were concerned, the years 2000 to 2004 were certainly marked by a strengthening of

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Hizbullah’s position that allowed it to pursue its different goals without meeting much dissent inside Lebanon. The Lebanese government as well as political rivals were forced to recognize that Hizbullah had managed to force Israel’s withdrawal from the south, and was continuing to position itself as a political party on the Lebanese scene. By politicizing the issue of the Shebaa Farms, Hizbullah was underlining its necessity for liberating all of Lebanon’s territory and making Israel’s withdrawal complete. Concerning transnational linkages, Hizbullah benefitted from Syria’s interference in Lebanese politics to support the party’s position in any conflicts with the Hariri government. Iran was also signalling for the movement to maintain a cautious, non-confrontational course. Internally, Secretary-General Nasrallah was firmly at the helm of the movement, bolstered by the ‘victory’ against Israel in 2000. Internal conflicts between dissenting factions thus played no major role during this period. It was only at the end of this phase that conflict between Hizbullah and its domestic rivals began to escalate. UNSC Resolution 1559 increased pressure on Hizbullah to disarm at a time when the justification for maintaining its military wing was wearing thinner. Finally, Hariri, who had been willing to toe the Syrian line and to support Hizbullah’s resistance project, resigned from office in 2004 over disagreements with Syria.

Phase IV: 2005 –8: Open Confrontation and Use of Violence In and after 2005, most factors that had been previously influencing Hizbullah strategies underwent fundamental and often dramatic changes. Hariri, the party’s main domestic rival, was assassinated in February 2005; one of the most controversial figures that Hizbullah had been critical of since the beginning was removed from the political scene. Following the assassination and early accusations, including by UN Prosecutor Detlef Mehlis, that Syria was responsible, international pressure began to build and al-Assad had to withdraw his troops from Lebanon. For the first time, the Lebanese army was deployed in the entire country, including South Lebanon. Politically, if not militarily, this changed the game quite fundamentally. Effectively, the Lebanese army acted in close coordination with Hizbullah in South Lebanon and did nothing to antagonize the party’s armed forces. Nonetheless, the

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anti-Syrian opposition was able to come out into the open much more than it had previously been; however, it was paying a heavy, and bitter, price, with the assassinations of many of its leading figures, such as Samir Kassir, George Hawi or Tueni. The fault line March 8 versus March 14 was becoming the main political divide in Lebanon, impossible to bridge, each with its own international affiliations. The ensuing conflict that has engulfed the country in hindsight almost seems like a continuation of the civil war by other means, and with other players in the foreground. It still featured the confrontation between the Hariri camp and Hizbullah, and was characterized by the seemingly unstoppable rise of Hizbullah, while the fortunes of Saad, the son of the late Prime Minister Hariri, declined despite long stretches during which his camp was able to command considerable political power. The US and various Gulf states supported the Hariri camp financially and also militarily, by supplying weapons; while Hizbullah, of course, remained supplied via its supporters Syria and Iran, with most measures intended to curb its financial and military supply apparently not having much effect.

2005 –6: Open conflict erupts Prior to the 2004 elections, two landmark events shaped the political scene. There was debate over the possible extension of President Lahoud’s term, who was normally due to step down in mid-2004. Syria and its allies wanted him to stay on and sought to extend his mandate, a renewal that would have required a change to the Lebanese Constitution. The UNSC passed Resolution 1559, calling for free and fair elections in Lebanon and the disarming of all militias. This step represented an international endorsement of calls for Hizbullah to disarm, and confronted the non-transparent practice of Syrian interference in Lebanese elections. The following day, the Lebanese parliament approved the extension of Lahoud’s mandate, and Hariri resigned as prime minister in reaction. Although the Future Movement initially kept a relative distance from the older, Christian opposition circles around Qornet Shehwan and the Bristol gathering, Hariri clearly emerged as a possible leader of the new ‘opposition’ bloc that was confronting all pro-Syrian forces. A few months later, in February 2005, Hariri was assassinated by a massive car bomb; initially, Syria was suspected as the likely perpetrator, but later on the focus of the UN-led investigation

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into the crime and of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) shifted towards a possible participation by Hizbullah in the planning and implementation of the assassination. These events again shook up the entire political landscape, especially when Syria was forced to withdraw from Lebanon as a result of international pressure. Syria, the puppet master of Lebanese politics, which had been running things from behind the scenes for the past 30 years, was suddenly gone, and the cards were being reshuffled. The first remarkable development in the wake of Hariri’s assassination and the Syrian withdrawal was the setting up of a fourway coalition between Hizbullah, Hariri’s Future Movement, Amal and the Druze PSP led by Walid Jumblatt in the south (in the north, the Future Movement and the PSP cooperated with Christian parties). Political pragmatism prevailed over the seemingly unbridgeable divides which had governed political life up until a short while beforehand – ‘opposition’ (anti-Syria) and ‘loyalists’ (pro-Syria) were competing on joint lists for the 2005 parliamentary elections. This was, in itself, a political manoeuvre by Jumblatt: ‘Druze leader Walid Jumblatt took the initiative to co-opt both Hizbullah and Amal as a device to prevent an electoral alignment between the Shiʽa and the most popular Christian politician, retired General Aoun, who had returned to Lebanon from exile in France to compete in the elections.’90 Jumblatt’s calculations did not bear fruit, however, as several months later, Hizbullah and Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) formed a political alliance that has lasted until the time of writing. After that, things began to crystallize into the political arrangements that currently continue to dominate Lebanese politics: the March 8 alliance encompassing Amal, Hizbullah, Aoun’s FPM, the Marada movement and others on the one hand, faces Hariri’s Future Movement with some Christian allies, together forming March 14, on the other. The ensuing political manoeuvres carried out by Hizbullah quickly began to point towards a more substantial participation in (executive) politics than before, signalling a significant change of course on the part of the party. Some observers make 2005 out to be a watershed that saw the entry of Hizbullah into the political game; yet, as discussed above, that entry had incrementally taken place ever since 1992, with small and gradual steps followed by sudden jolts, so that 2005 marks perhaps a deepening of Hizbullah’s participation, but not a beginning. What are

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the decisive factors that brought about this change in the quality of Hizbullah’s participation in the political game, and what shape did it assume in the years to come? Clearly, with the departure of Syrian troops and to some extent, the end of absolute Syrian predominance over all political affairs in Lebanon, a new game was being played and a new situation ensued. The US and France in particular sought to diminish Syrian influence in Lebanon, and to support a strong political presence in the country that would be able to provide an adequate counterweight to it. This took place in the form of political and also material and military support for Hariri’s Future Movement. Support was also given to various Christian political forces. In line with the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the US was aiming to support Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution, a key cornerstone in President Bush’s and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s vision of a ‘Freedom Agenda’ for a ‘new Middle East’.91 Hizbullah’s initial response was to keep all avenues of contact open, and it reneged on its previous total ideological aversion to all things American in order to make contact with the US administration. A meeting between Nawaf al-Musawi and Graham Fuller in March 2005 ensued.92 In a sense, the weeks and months following the assassination of Hariri seemed to hold out the prospect of an opening of the political space in Lebanon. Hizbullah had equally – to follow the judgement of some observers93 and also the assertions of Hizbullah representatives94 – by this time gained considerable independence with regards to Iranian doctrine and politics, and therefore had greater leeway in its decisions within Lebanon’s political scene. This is illustrated by the party’s seeking approval of a Lebanese religious authority, Sheikh Afif al-Naboulsi – who was the head of Shiʽi religious scholars of Jabal A’mil, that is, South Lebanon95 – for its decision to participate in the cabinet and in executive politics in the summer of 2005. Beforehand, Hizbullah would have turned to Iran for such religious-ideological approval; this shift thus embodies the results of Hizbullah’s Lebanonization or infitah policy begun in the 1990s. In the past, Syria had always sought to keep Hizbullah’s political influence in check and in the balance, preventing its influence from growing too strong, as part of a general divide et impera strategy employed with all its Lebanese clients.96 Hizbullah used the opening that provided itself in the wake of Syria’s withdrawal by giving up its reticence towards the assumption of political responsibility on a

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larger scale, and several Hizbullah members joined the 2005 cabinet led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Siniora was part of Hariri’s Future Movement, and also proved to be a close ally of the US in the months and years to come. The confrontation between him on the one hand, and Hizbullah and its political allies on the other, would turn into the key political conflict line in Lebanese politics in the period 2005– 8. The main accelerator for this conflict was the investigation into the assassination of the late Hariri, which the US and France (then President Jacques Chirac had been a close personal friend of the elder Hariri) were supporting. Relatively soon, in January 2007, the Lebanese government requested the setting up of a UN investigation into the Hariri assassination. In line with the demands of the opposition led by Hizbullah, parliament Speaker Berri (also the leader of Amal) refused to convene parliament in order to ratify the proposed UN investigative body. The government thereupon chose a different route and requested the UNSC to decree the creation of the STL, which it did in Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007. The STL was effectively created with this resolution. Hizbullah immediately perceived this step not as an attempt to achieve justice and involve an impartial investigative body, but as a political move by ‘the West’ designed to delegitimize it along with its political protector, Syria. Already at the end of 2005, the conflict between the two camps, Siniora on the one hand and Hizbullah and Amal on the other, had begun to fester. Hizbullah ministers and representatives criticized the Siniora government’s decision to have the statutes of an official UN Tribunal for Lebanon approved by the Lebanese cabinet, if need be by simple majority. Tensions escalated and in early 2006, Hizbullah showed that it was still willing to employ repertoires of action other than peaceful political cooperation. There were repeated fights between Hizbullah youth gangs and Future Movement adherents, as well as random street fighting between Shiʽi and Sunni groups, using sticks, rocks and firearms, resulting in around a dozen fatalities.97 The slightly more open political space had become highly contested, with internal Lebanese quarrels for political weight and influence becoming intertwined with international foreign policies seeking either to weaken Syrian influence and secure the success of ‘pro-Western’ forces (the Future Movement and Christian forces being backed by the US and Europe), or to further support the political ascendancy of Hizbullah and its allies (backed by

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Iran and Syria). Hizbullah emerged as a key political player on the rise, becoming more vocal and focused in its political demands as it was reaching out to assume governmental responsibility.

The 2006 war In the midst of this growing internal political conflict with its international entanglements came Hizbullah’s seemingly spontaneous and completely unanticipated decision to attack an Israeli border patrol on Israeli soil, and to kidnap several Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006. There has been much speculation as to this choice of timing, with very little substantive evidence. The hypothesis that Iran must have ordered this move at the time, in the context of a wider confrontation with the West over its nuclear programme and its growing political influence after arch-rival Saddam Hussein had been deposed, remains popular among many Lebanese observers and commentators. However, in light of the previously discussed growing independence that Hizbullah enjoyed from Iran with regards to its policy decisions, it seems to make little sense that Iran would now suddenly reverse that trend and order the attack. It seems to make even less sense that Hizbullah would follow suit and carry out such an attack against its better judgement. At the same time, if the thesis of Hizbullah’s increasing Lebanonization, infitah and general willingness to play by the rules of the political game is true, why such a seemingly random and deliberate escalation that was bound to draw heavy retaliation on the part of Israel? There is proof that Nasrallah said he would not have conducted the operation (the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers) had he known what the consequences would be.98 Seymour Hersh, in August 2006, concluded that the US administration, chiefly President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Rice, viewed the war as fairly inevitable, given that Israel had its war plans stowed away in a drawer and was waiting for an opportunity to implement them. An Israeli victory over Hizbullah would have provided two main benefits from their perspective: first, it would have gotten rid of a notorious troublemaker and terrorist organization, and second, that troublemaker would have been eliminated from the equation if an Israeli –US attack on Iran was to happen eventually. This, according to Hersh’s research, is why the US was reluctant to call for a ceasefire, and in Rice’s words, was waiting for the moment when the ‘circumstances would be conducive’.99 However,

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all this does not really explain why Hizbullah chose the moment that it did for launching its attack. Paul Salem explains the calculations of the different actors involved as follows: Hezbollah’s July 12 raid into Israel, backed by Iran, was intended to entangle Israel in a limited skirmish on its northern border and a drawn-out prisoner exchange at a time when Iran was facing mounting pressure over its nuclear program. Israel, backed by the United States, responded with a large-scale war meant to deliver a knockout blow to Hezbollah and thereby remove the missile threat to northern Israel, weaken Iran in any upcoming showdown, and eliminate what the United States considers a major opponent in the war on terrorism. Washington also hoped to give a boost to the Lebanese government, which it considered a potential democratic success story.100 Needless to say, the strategies and calculations of all actors backfired: the limited skirmish envisaged by Hizbullah turned out to be a full-scale bombing campaign of South Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. While Hizbullah’s eventual victory brought the party a surge in popularity, it also alienated many Lebanese (mostly Christians, but not exclusively) and brought back old resentments against Hizbullah for inciting Israel’s wrath for its own gains. Israel simply failed in achieving any of its goals: Hizbullah was not defeated, and the Lebanese population did not spontaneously start a revolution in order to get rid of it. As for Washington, its actions did not boost the Lebanese government but instead completely discredited it. Lebanese Interior Minister Ahmed Fatfat was perceived as a collaborator of Israel, one of the most politically dangerous and laden charges to be levelled against anyone in Lebanon and in most Arab countries. Salem also argues that the war might have been averted had the Lebanese army been able to deploy in South Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Moreover, Salem makes the point that the initial conflict over the extension of Lahoud’s term, and the ensuing passing of UNSC Resolution 1559 were consequences of rising regional tensions ‘following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003’. The regional power balance, with a major Sunni regime removed in Iraq and Shiʽi parties on the rise there, provided additional impetus for

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Sunni actors in Lebanon to counter Hizbullah. The Hariri camp grew more belligerent in its rhetoric and also its actions vis-a`-vis the Shiʽi party. The handling of the Hariri assassination aftermath is a case in point, with Sunni Prime Minister Siniora trying to overrule Hizbullah’s objections to the UN Tribunal, and running into rejection and resistance with that plan. In this situation, the added prestige of being able to conduct a raid into Israeli territory, abduct soldiers and subsequently trade them for Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners would have gone a long way towards entrenching Hizbullah’s political clout, and would have increased its bargaining power. Instead, as Salem argues, things turned out differently. While the initial outcry at Hizbullah’s unprovoked triggering of a major war faded and was replaced with growing public support for the party in the face of international inertia and willingness to let Israel finish what it had started, Hizbullah also had to make concessions at the end of the war. UNSC Resolution 1701 put a ceasefire in place and included a seven-point plan put forward by the Siniora government. This plan foresaw the deployment of UN and Lebanese army troops in South Lebanon, as well as the handing over of control of key Lebanese – Syrian border crossings to international and Lebanese troops. Both moves constituted, as Salem says, ‘significant concessions’ by the Shiʽi party and resulted in a decreased tactical manoeuvring space for Hizbullah.101 In the wake of the 2006 war, the party could no longer claim that its weapons served as a major deterrent against an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which further weakened its internal position and increased the pressure for disarmament. Meanwhile, the end of the war brought a major influx of Iranian funds into Lebanon, as a reward for Hizbullah’s loyalty and willingness to fight on behalf of Iranian interests.102 Salem also mentions that during and following the 2006 war, Iran replaced Syria as Hizbullah’s direct mentor in Lebanese affairs generally. The money was used for rebuilding the homes of families, and for strengthening Hizbullah’s long-standing reputation as a major provider of services for its constituency. This may have worked to some extent, but politically, Hizbullah continued to be in dire straits. It had built a strategic coalition based on key agreements with Aoun’s FPM prior to the war. After the war, although hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel had ceased, political conflicts with the March 14 camp obviously continued, essentially around the issue of a UN Tribunal. They quickly intensified, towards the end of 2006, and

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Hizbullah began to send signals that it was going to put pressure on the Siniora government to resign.103 Summing up, what can be learned regarding Hizbullah’s strategies around the time of the 2006 war? It was coming under increasing pressure to disarm, following the heating up of Sunni –Shiʽi tensions throughout the region after the US invasion of Iraq and the passing of UNSC Resolution 1559. Relations with the March 14 camp quickly deteriorated throughout 2005– 6, seeing as March 14 wanted to set up a UN tribunal to look into Hariri’s murder and was hurling accusations against Hizbullah’s backer, Syria. Hizbullah’s other ally Iran was coming under fire for keeping up its nuclear programme despite international calls for ending it, or at least for submitting it to regular International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. Hizbullah, for its part, was looking to increase its prestige and bargaining power by using a transnational issue, seeing as the national political arena increasingly looked blocked. Hence the idea of the limited skirmish with Israel that would solve several problems at once; and hence the failure to recognize what an attack against Israel would effectively mean in terms of retaliation. Lebanonization became increasingly discredited in light of the 2006 events. If indeed Hizbullah was reaching out to the international arena, as it were, in order to improve its internal standing after the Syrian withdrawal and after the UN investigation had started in 2005, this does not exactly support the thesis of a moderation or integration into the national political arena. In fact, Qassem’s words, published in 2005, underline the notion that Hizbullah’s Lebanonization might have been a purely academic exercise to begin with: Frequent talk of the ‘Lebanonization’ of Hizbullah or of the Party’s immersion in Lebanon’s internal political life is only one other form of enticing abandonment of Party principles, of the priority awarded to resistance activity and confrontation with Israel. Such talk is directed at inducing the disarmament of Hizbullah and the surrender of its reasons for power. It is directed against the Party’s rejection of a political compromise that is found to be inequitable to the Palestinian cause and to the detriment of the region.104 This would square with what other Hizbullah representatives have told this author in interviews. For example, Mohsen Saleh, who argued a

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classic with-us-or-against-us line: ‘You are either with us or against us! If you are not with Hizbullah and the resistance, you are not defending your country.’105 Hizbullah’s deep unhappiness over the March 14dominated cabinet’s decision to accept the statutes of a prospective UN tribunal finally led to the resignation of Hizbullah’s ministers from the government, along with those of Amal and the FPM. On 1 December 2006, Hizbullah began its ‘sit-in’ in downtown Beirut, calling for the resignation of the Siniora cabinet and the installation of a ‘national unity’ government, in which Hizbullah would receive a ‘blocking minority’. All these new terms were used to describe a new reality and a new Hizbullah approach. Essentially, Hizbullah was asking for a right to veto government decisions, and was invoking the logic of the Taif Agreement to justify this: according to this line of argument, all Lebanese sects had to be represented in the cabinet, otherwise it was no longer authorized to take decisions, especially not on matters of national security.

2007– 8: Intense conflict In the internal power conflict between Hizbullah and March 14, the Siniora government refused to back down. The stand-off between Hizbullah and its allies on one hand, and the March 14 camp on the other continued to intensify. The main issues of contention were the fact that Hizbullah was holding on to its arms despite international pressure, as well as its opposition against an international tribunal to investigate the Hariri assassination. During 2007 and 2008, this power conflict escalated. The Lebanese government tried to confront Hizbullah and force it to give up some of its operational independence. Hizbullah reacted by using force against the Future Movement and other government-affiliated agents. In January and February 2007, violent street demonstrations broke out, with frequent clashes between Shiʽi and Sunni neighbourhood gangs. Eventually, Nasrallah appeared on Hizbullah’s TV station AlManar to calm the waters, saying that anyone who picked up a weapon against a Lebanese brother was working on behalf of the Israelis.106 Presidential elections were still blocked and no cabinet had been formed at the end of 2007, after Lahoud’s term had ended in November of that year. No new government had been formed and the country was generally moving along in crisis management mode. Aoun and the

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pro-Syrian forces were blocking the election of Michel Sleiman and the formation of a cabinet headed by Saad Hariri, the son of late Prime Minister Hariri.107 Partly to attempt destroying the Hariri legacy, partly as a way of acquiring a negotiating chip and pressing for additional influence in the cabinet-to-be, they were making things difficult for Sleiman even though Syria generally backed him as a candidate. According to what Saad Hariri told the US Ambassador, however, Syria was waiting to have the US and Saudi Arabia consent to its candidate. Hariri himself had, at this point, already secured the backing of Saudi Arabia for his bid to become prime minister. Nonetheless, things were in a political stalemate at this point, with the country more or less having stepped back from the brink of civil war, and the ‘civil disobedience’ campaign led by Hizbullah largely having failed. They had ‘sat in’ in front of the Se´rail and in downtown Beirut for almost a year and a half, calling for the resignation of Siniora’s cabinet and the formation of a national unity government, without success. There was no face-saving way out of this situation. Hizbullah’s show of force simply failed to bring about the desired result – batter the March 14 camp politicians into retreat and force the formation of a new cabinet – and pretty much resulted in the contrary, that is, ever-mounting polarization between the March 14 and March 8 camps, along with increased loud-mouthing and brinksmanship by March 14 politicians. A good example of this is the strategy that Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh, presumably in coordination with his fellow ministers and the Prime Minister, embraced in April and May 2008, leading up to the deadly fighting that broke out between the two sides. Before elaborating on this, it is also worth noting that the international community – that is, the leaders of Western industrialized nations – continuously fuelled the obstinate attitude embraced by the March 14 camp. The Paris III donor conference held in January 2007 granted Lebanon unconditional fiscal support, which was read – more or less accurately, it must be said – by the March 8 side as a strong financial and political show of support by Western donors for the Siniora government. It is fairly obvious to any observer of Lebanese politics (and to most Lebanese citizens) that funds which are not conditioned will not be accounted for in Lebanon’s intricate webs of corruption and patronage. Returning to the campaign launched by Hamadeh in April 2008 which immediately preceded the outbreak of fighting in Lebanon for the

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first time since the end of the civil war in 1991, it is obvious that his brinksmanship was a response to that embraced by Hizbullah throughout 2007 and 2008 – the sit-in and frequent calls for resignation of the government, notably, but also its fairly obvious involvement in various street fights. The build-up of renewed tension started in August 2007, at the height of the sit-in by Hizbullah, when Hamadeh first made it known that the government had discovered a ‘fibre-optic network’ of communications, illicitly installed by Hizbullah in the south of the country and in parts of the Bekaa Valley.108 He did not elaborate on what exactly this network was accomplishing, that is, whether it was a commercial telephone network or a military communications facility. Judging by the level of preoccupation displayed by Hamadeh and other March 14 politicians, the issue seemed to constitute an acute threat to Lebanese sovereignty, implying a military use of the network. The government was angered by this blatant evasion of ‘official’ licensing procedures for landline communications systems. A US Embassy cable composed at the time and later published on WikiLeaks laconically notes that it seems unlikely that the government did not previously know about the network, and that it, in any case, merely constitutes another example of Hizbullah assuming state functions without asking for consent – in addition to its ‘electric company, school system, armed militia, and road works capability’.109 Hamadeh also made reference to his theory that the Iranian company rebuilding parts of South Lebanon after the 2006 war was responsible for building up the illegal network, thus bringing a regional connection into the conflict. His interlocutors at the embassy remained sceptical, as the cable shows. Other March 14 politicians later on jumped onto the bandwagon of making the telecommunications network a sufficient reason for curbing Hizbullah’s influence. On 1 May 2008, key Hariri adviser Mohammad Chatah started pressing the issue with US Embassy contacts, saying that it constituted ‘yet another example of Hizbullah’s many infringements against the state. The network could thus not be separated from Hizbullah’s military activities.’110 At the same time that the issue of Hizbullah’s telecommunications network was festering behind the scenes, the Lebanese government – led by Hizbullah’s rivals of the March 14 camp and still represented by Prime Minister Siniora – was coordinating next steps regarding a new UNSC resolution dealing with the failed implementation of

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Resolution 1559. Obviously, this was yet another level on which the government could increase the pressure on Hizbullah to disarm, which was one of its key objectives in order to restore full government sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon’s territory. A progress report on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 published in 2008 obviously left much to be desired,111 and a debate in the UNSC on the resolution was scheduled. The Lebanese government was, in late April and early May 2008, in the process of determining the chances of a new resolution including ‘strong language’ on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559.112 Apart from the disarmament of Hizbullah, for which the government was obviously trying to get international support and build up pressure, the stakes involved in the wording of the resolution also concerned the strengthening of Lebanese sovereignty vis-a`-vis Syria and the delineation of borders between the two countries, an issue still left unresolved despite the long-standing need to define them. The US Embassy cables composed around this time also reveal the problematic and escalating role the UN investigation into the assassination of Hariri played in domestic Lebanese politics.113 Druze leader Jumblatt, in a meeting with US Ambassador Miche`le Sison, pointed to the fact that the former head of the UN investigation had not followed up on a lead that, for the first time, directly implicated Hizbullah into the assassination of the former Prime Minister.114 Apparently this information was not acted upon for a year and a half at least, and when Daniel Bellemare, chief of the Investigation Commission in 2008, met with Wissam Eid, who had discovered the evidence possibly implicating Hizbullah, the latter was assassinated a week after the meeting, in January 2008. This underlines just how tense the situation had become, and pointed to the fact that the stakes between Hizbullah and the government were already high and kept on mounting. The story regarding the Hizbullah link to Hariri’s investigation only properly broke on an international scale in 2010, with an extensive investigative article published by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).115 Yet, the US Embassy cable shows that the information was known in Lebanese political circles well before then, and therefore fed into the already escalating conflict between Hizbullah and March 14, represented in this case by the Siniora cabinet. The stalling with regard to the investigation may be due, as the CBC report maintains, by the fact that Wissam Hassan, Hariri’s former chief of protocol, may have been cooperating with Hizbullah and may have prevented the UN

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International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) from acting on this information in 2006, when Eid first filed his report with the UN investigation. Right around the same time that these developments surfaced, the government continued to increase pressure on Hizbullah. The party responded by making it known, through its head of security operations, Wafiq Safa, that Hizbullah would interpret any government attempt at closing down its telecommunications network as an ‘act of war’, comparable to and to be met with a similar response to an aggression carried out by Israel.116 Safa also called the telecommunications network a ‘key part of Hizbullah’s arsenal’, and categorically ruled out taking down any of the lines; his argument vis-a`-vis the government was that the network had ‘no commercial or trade implications’ and was purely a matter of resistance, which Hizbullah obviously claimed for itself as a field of action independent of government influence. He left open the door to the government by proposing that the network could be ‘discussed as part of a defence strategy’,117 meaning that Hizbullah would only debate the telecommunications network if the government granted it official recognition as an armed actor operating on its territory. The networks of interaction surrounding these issues are complex, as a study of the relevant diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks in September 2011 reveals. Georges Khoury, a Lebanese Armed Forces general, and Ashraf Rifi, head of Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces, were the interlocutors that Safa spoke with regarding the disputed telephone network. They did not pass on this information until several weeks later, angering the government and Minister of Telecommunications Hamadeh, the key driver of the campaign meant to expose Hizbullah’s secret network.118 Rifi, a controversial figure on the Lebanese scene, is also linked to efforts to build up a Sunni militia containing several thousand members, as another conversation between Druze leader Jumblatt and US Ambassador Sison in 2008 reveals: The second issue Jumblatt raised was Saad’s reported training of Sunni militias in Lebanon (allegedly 15,000 members in Beirut and more in Tripoli). In establishing his own ‘security agencies’ in Beirut and Tripoli, Saad was being badly advised by ‘some people,’ Jumblatt said, such as ISF General Ashraf Rifi. [. . .] Jumblatt said Saad’s militia would cause significant damage to March 14,

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especially because Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Suleiman Franjieh’s Marada were in line to train their own forces.119 In the same meeting, Jumblatt also notes that the Lebanese army was demoralized after drawing criticism from Hizbullah and Amal for killing several Shiʽi protesters in January 2008. Many of the army’s officers are Shiʽa, and the army’s status as the country’s unifying force is normally almost of mythical proportions; hence the harsh criticism voiced by Hizbullah representatives added fuel to the fire in an already tense situation.120 Summing up, we have noted the following developments for the period 2007– 8 that in retrospect constitute a clear lead-up to the May 2008 fighting between Hizbullah and Hariri allies: there is no president and the different political camps cannot seem to agree on a suitable candidate, leading to a power vacuum and to non-representation in the executive of Maronite Christians, to whom the post of president is constitutionally reserved. Although Sleiman has long been discussed as a possible consensus candidate also palatable to Syria, no action is taken and the government remains in crisis. Hizbullah has been staging a campaign of civil disobedience, exemplified by its prolonged sit-in in downtown Beirut, repeated protests and continued verbal haranguing of the Siniora government, calling for its resignation and asserting its unrepresentative nature. Siniora, however, refuses to budge and instead tries everything in his power to cling on to the post of prime minister; his government, personified by Communications Minister Hamadeh, instead launches a counter-campaign against Hizbullah designed to ‘expose’ its illegal telecommunications network financed and built by Iran, implying a clear violation of governmental sovereignty. The government is lobbying for international support, decrying Hizbullah’s breach of governmental prerogatives to European partners as well as Arab Gulf states, hoping to build on the anti-Iran momentum among these actors (but encountering more or less veiled scepticism instead). Rumours are spreading, and apparently evidence is surfacing, that at least Hariri’s camp, if not other March 14 actors as well (such as Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces) are acquiring weapons and building up militias. The apprehension that Lebanon may be headed to another civil war seemed to acquire more and more substance. Regionally, with no progress both on the Iranian and Israeli –Palestinian fronts, the situation

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remained equally tense. Syria tries to maintain influence and keep its grip on what is happening on the Lebanese arena at this point. Right into the build-up of these slowly escalating conflicts comes an apparent miscalculation by the Lebanese government. Having encountered Hizbullah’s clear threat that any attempt to dismantle its secret telecommunications network will be understood as an act of war, the government, in a ten-hour cabinet meeting, takes a highly controversial decision. Hoping to avoid a direct provocation of Hizbullah, and having understood Safa as drawing a red line around the actual dismantling of the network only, the cabinet draws up a missive declaring the network ‘illegal and a clear violation of sovereignty’.121 This is sent to the UN Secretary-General in the hope that he will agree and work for a new and stricter UN resolution on the issue of Hizbullah’s weapons. The missive calls on the Lebanese security forces to stop any attempted extension of the network. Having discovered that Hizbullah also runs a network of surveillance cameras at Beirut International Airport, the government relieves the chief of airport security – close to Hizbullah, but not a member – of his duties, regarding this as the appropriate signal to send to Hizbullah and anticipating that this will not run into much opposition, as the security chief is regarded as a ‘nobody’ anyway and described by Minister of Information Tareq Mitri as ‘often drunk at 8 in the morning’.122 The key worry for the government at this point is whether the deposed security chief, still a Lebanese army general, will show up for work the next morning in defiance of the cabinet’s decision, and how the government would deal with such disobedience. This clearly shows how unprepared the government was for the eventual response displayed by Hizbullah, and how badly it miscalculated the significance Hizbullah attached to this issue. These developments also demonstrate how eagerly Hizbullah was looking for a way out of a disappointing scenario, with its show of force in the streets (the ‘sit-in’) totally unsuccessful in bringing about the demise of the government, and the Hariri camp successfully obtaining weapons and building up its hardware strength for a possible confrontation with Hizbullah. Therefore, on 8 May 2008, Hizbullah fighters and allies – mostly adherents of the SSNP – started attacking Hariri positions in West Beirut, with ensuing street fighting in Hamra and downtown Beirut. All of a sudden, the spectre of civil war was raised again. Roadblocks

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were erected throughout Beirut and the airport road was blocked, a strategy harking back to civil wartimes, when control of the airport road was a key chip to be won or lost by respective militias. On 7 –9 May, only a limited number of flights were landing and taking off from the airport, and passenger traffic largely came to a halt as staff could not report to the airport for work. More significantly and damagingly, however, fighting ensued in other regions of the country, around Zahle and in the Shouf Mountains, and in total it is estimated that around 200 people were killed in the fighting. Hizbullah also held a victory parade along the West Beirut Corniche, and fighters destroyed the headquarters of the Hariri-owned Future TV station, also in West Beirut. Eyewitness reports attest to the presence of Hizbullah and Amal fighters all throughout West Beirut and even in some regions of the Shouf. Individual fighters reported that roadblocks would be kept up, and life in Beirut consequently locked down, until three conditions were met: ‘The pro-US government pledges to keep its hands off the fibre-optic telecommunication network of the resistance; the government reinstates head of Beirut Airport Security General Wafiq Shouqair; and the majority agrees to a dialogue. Until that happens, West Beirut and the airport will stay closed.’123 In a televised speech, Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah vowed to ‘cut off the hand that reaches for the weapons of the resistance’. He clearly perceived the issue of the telephone network as a pretext used by the government for bringing up the issue of Hizbullah’s weapons, and described how Hizbullah was approached by the government with a deal: a ‘blind eye’ would be turned to the network, and in return Hizbullah should end the sit-in in central Beirut. Nasrallah interpreted this as proof of the corrupt and criminal character of the government, which he called a ‘gang’. Naturally, he was adamant that Hizbullah would never give in to this kind of threat, and he saw the government’s move against the telephone network as an attempt to press for the disarmament of Hizbullah. As for the timing of the initiative, he perceives it as driven by regional considerations: [. . .] the matter doesn’t relate to the wired network, but there are bets through the authority [the government], and these bets have fallen, there are bets on regional and international developments that have fallen, there are bets on wars that have backed away,

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consequently what is wanted is to go through a battle in a different way, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Palestine, and even against Iran and Syria, this is an option, so they have come and opened the issue of the wired communication.124 He is also attempting to calm the waters between Shiʽa and Sunni, affirming that there is no conflict between the two sides and that the only enemy for all Muslims is the US, which is trying to conquer the region. With this move, Hizbullah is regaining some room for manoeuvre once again; after the sit-in had largely failed as a strategy in bringing down the government and increasing Hizbullah’s representation and power within the government, military action achieved this goal. Fearful of yet another civil war breaking out in the country, various international mediators (mainly Qatar and Saudi Arabia) intervened in order to make the Lebanese parties reach a new compromise. The resulting Doha Accords of May 2008 finally gave Hizbullah what it had been working for: a ‘blocking third’ number of ministers in the cabinet, that is, effective veto power of all government decisions as well as a reassignment of voting districts, also slightly bettering Hizbullah’s chances in elections. It was also decided that Sleiman, the former army leader and consensus candidate, would be elected president of the republic, ending the months-long stalemate and political crisis. The agreement of course also contained the usual solemn pledges by all parties never to resort to force of arms against other Lebanese parties. That this was a promise easily broken had of course just been demonstrated by Hizbullah itself, which after the end of the civil war had already made this pledge in order to make its holding on to weapons more palatable to the public. Hizbullah obviously had had no regrets in breaking it in order to play power politics and keep its main rival, Hariri’s Future Movement and its allies, in check. In fact, the Future Movement’s ‘armed militias’ largely fled in the face of Hizbullah’s and Amal’s assault, with some fighters claiming they had signed on for ‘security services’ and a monthly salary, not for being fighters in a civil war.125 Direct Hizbullah reactions that I have encountered range from plain denial – there was no attack by Hizbullah on other Lebanese factions126 – to intricate justifications for why it was a necessary action (Nasrallah’s TV speech) to the admission

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that this was a ‘small civil war’ and a type of action that should be avoided in the future: It was an internal Lebanese conflict between the Lebanese people. It was a sort of small civil war. But I think the resistance was out of this conflict. I am talking about the construction of the resistance. Of course all the Lebanese parties have witnesses in the streets and everywhere. And even the other side has snipers on the roofs of Jamiyaa Arabiya and have fighters in Hamra street and everywhere. It was a bad experience, and I understand that the political philosophy of 8 May, 7 of May, it was when one of the Lebanese parties violated the red lines. This will permit for the other side to react in violating the red lines also. And this is exactly what happened. And I think the richest lesson which we have learned, that we have to respect the red lines in our relationship. We have to respect the rules.127 Hizbullah Member of Parliament, Ali Fayyad, introduces the interesting concept of ‘red lines’, in this case the red lines clearly imposed by Hizbullah and violated by the government. The fact that the March 14 government acted provocatively and contributed significantly to the escalating conflict is also acknowledged by Salem in an interview: Well, they [Hizbullah] really felt that the government [. . .] they really felt that the government, you know, it was prompted by what the government did, and had the government not made those decisions, they probably would not have done what they did. The government was moving in ways that they thought they were moving against them. In the airport, the telecommunications field and, they felt they had to stop it. Well, I think they [the government] were under pressure from the international community and others to do something. The international community said, look, we’re helping you, we’ll stand with you, we have the tribunal going, but you gotta do something, you can’t just leave Hizbullah [. . .] I mean you know, Hizbullah is considered a terrorist group up to doing anything, so I think the government, some in the government felt, we have to do something, you know. Even if they knew it wasn’t gonna work, but they needed to make a

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gesture towards the international community and Europe and the US to say, look, we’re trying. And they didn’t expect Hizbullah to take it so seriously, as it were. And in effect, Hariri the next day said he takes it back and he will cancel the decisions, but they wouldn’t listen and they just went ahead and did it.128 This mirrors the widely held perception that the initial move by March 14 against Hizbullah’s fibre-optic network had been ‘ordered’ by the US. Nasrallah, in his televised speech, refers to this by saying that the ‘government of Walid Jumblatt’ had declared the network illegal, with Jumblatt being perceived – and rightly so, as the WikiLeaks cables attest – as a close friend and ally of the US government in Lebanon. In a way, a tit-for-tat game was being played by Hizbullah and the March 14 camp: mutual provocations were put in place, until finally the situation escalated and the sought-after mediation in the conflict – in the form of the Doha Accords – brought about the outcome that Hizbullah had been seeking all along.

2009 parliamentary elections and after Even if it may seem logical that Hizbullah was so dominant in the political system by now that it would be able to cement its power during the next parliamentary elections, this was not the case. After a highly charged and incredibly overfunded campaigning period was finally over, the results were largely identical to those of 2005; they did not lead to clear results immediately, but brought several months of further political wrangling over how to form a cabinet. Effectively, they resulted in another political and governmental crisis for Lebanon, which remained without a government for months after the elections. Hizbullah was accused of dragging on the negotiations over forming a cabinet at the behest of Iran, which was dealing with its own domestic political crisis as massive demonstrations swept the country after the presidential elections of 2009 were deemed by many Iranians to have been unfair. Whether or not this was true is hard to say, and Nasrallah certainly denied the allegation, but the fact remains that the political conflicts over forming a cabinet also had a purely domestic flavour to them. For one, the post of telecommunications minister remained contested; with the highly lucrative privatization of the country’s two mobile phone networks in the offing, control over the ministry also implied the opportunity to sell

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the networks to friendly business partners. This is reportedly what Christian leader and Hizbullah ally Aoun was pushing for when he lobbied for the Ministry of Telecommunications to remain in the hands of his son-in-law and close political ally, Gebran Bassil. On the other hand, the Hariri camp wanted control over the ministry for itself, as this would enable the continued cooperation of the ministry with the UNIIIC looking into the assassination of Hariri. The analysis of telecommunications data had assumed a pivotal role in the investigation by this point. As the negotiations looked to be going nowhere, Prime Minister Saad Hariri stepped down after a proposal for dividing up the ministries had been rejected by Hizbullah as not meeting any of its demands. When negotiations resumed, Hariri was sworn in as prime minister once again; and finally, in November, a new government was formed. Dubbed a national unity government, there was nothing unitary about it beyond the fact that it comprised ministers of both the March 14 and March 8 camps, which had been the case since 2005. Now, however, the political situation was much more charged and therefore, having both parties to the conflict represented in the government merely spelt out the prospect of more political conflicts at the very heart of Lebanon’s decision-making process. It was reported that the government’s formation went ahead only after the Emir of Qatar met the President of Iran along with Ayatollah Khamenei, and after tensions between Saudi Arabia and Syria eased somewhat during this period.129 The cabinet’s composition continued the ‘blocking third’ formula adopted with the Doha Accords of 2008, meaning that any decision on ‘basic national issues’ required a two-thirds majority in the cabinet. With Hizbullah, Amal and the FPM, as well as one other allied minister, holding a total of ten seats in the cabinet, this blocking third was assured to them. In fact, the ministerial statement made reference to the ‘resistance’ and its legitimate responsibilities: Based on its responsibility to protect Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, unity, and the safety of its territory, the government asserts the right of Lebanon, its people, its army, and its resistance to liberate or regain Shebaa Farms, the Lebanese Kfar Shouba Hills, and the Lebanese part of Ghajar village, its right to defend Lebanon against any aggression, and its right to keep its water through all legitimate and possible means.130

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The kind of language used in the statement amounted to an assertion of political support by Hariri for Hizbullah, and promptly drew harsh criticism by his allies from the March 14 camp, who felt they had been passed over during the distribution of ministries, anyway. They accused Hariri of selling out to the opposition, and of caving in to Saudi pressure for softening his stance on Hizbullah and ‘accommodating Syria’s demands’.131 This virtually brought the March 14 coalition to the brink of collapse. Even March 14’s official Secretary-General was saying that the coalition would be put on hold. Hariri was harshly criticized for doing a bad job negotiating with Hizbullah; he gave away too many bargaining chips unnecessarily, for example by proposing himself as prime minister, when putting forward Siniora – who was a definite nogo for March 8 – and then relenting and agreeing to do the job himself could have bought him extra concessions.132 However, it was also acknowledged that given the regional climate and Hizbullah’s continued rise in power, other candidates for the position of prime minister would have faced similar obstacles and might not have done a better job than Saad Hariri did. The Saudi– Syrian reconciliation course continued throughout 2010 and kept on restricting Hariri’s room for manoeuvre vis-a`-vis Syria and consequently, also vis-a`-vis Hizbullah. As Saudi Arabia’s client and closest ally in Lebanon, Hariri had no choice but to accept a visit to Damascus. A return visit by Syrian President al-Assad took place in the summer of 2010, when Saudi King Abdullah was visiting Syria and decided to simply take al-Assad along with him on a visit to Lebanon, in order to improve relations between the two countries.133 Viewed against the backdrop of these regional dynamics, Hizbullah’s position appeared strengthened, even though key developments such as the STL’s investigation of course continued to threaten its political position. Concurrently, it became increasingly obvious that Hizbullah was continuing on a course of Lebanonization, as its new manifesto published at the end of November 2009 reveals. The first proper political platform published by Hizbullah since its Open Letter dating from 1985 obviously drew a lot of attention, and its analysis revealed a relative softening of ideological posturing, and a clear commitment to the Lebanese Republic as Hizbullah’s main point of reference. In this, obviously, the party had come a long way, since its 1985 programme declared the state to be dominated by ‘political Maronism’, an

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unacceptable form of sectarian power-brokerage. Back then, the clear orientation had been towards Iran and to establishing an Islamic state ruled by wilayat al-faqih in Lebanon, as well. Now, Hizbullah pledged to continue its support for Lebanon’s current system of ‘consensual democracy’, that is, to the power arrangement that had been laid down in the Doha Accords of 2008 and which afforded Hizbullah a clear veto on all matters of national importance. The document still makes it clear that Hizbullah is fighting America’s ‘grand design’ of taking over and controlling the world, in the party’s terms. It identifies ‘fighting terrorism’ as the key mechanism in the US design, as it renders anyone accused of terrorism a legitimate target. It affirms that ‘Lebanon is the homeland to which we have offered the dearest of sacrifices,’ and that it should continue to remain the homeland to all Lebanese.134 Naturally, the need to maintain a resistance force capable of deterring Israel militarily is also asserted, stressing the need for Hizbullah to maintain its weapons. Israel’s aggressions against Lebanon are also to be comprehended in the wider context of America’s plan to manipulate and dominate the region, of which Israel is a key enforcer. Political sectarianism continues to be seen as a root cause of internal strife and a continuing plague for the political system, yet it is acknowledged that it is here to stay for some time to come. Hence, in the meantime, consensual democracy remains the best way of ensuring that everyone’s interests will be met, instead of decision making by simple majority, which would be guaranteed to hurt some groups at the expense of others. This amounts to clear support for Lebanon’s elite-based sectarian negotiating system, in place since 1943. The state that Hizbullah, according to the manifesto, would like to see, is a state that most international donors would also be quite happy to support in Lebanon: from the rule of law to women’s rights, it includes the whole plethora of donor goals when it comes to development cooperation. The manifesto still remains vague on the party’s economic policies, apart from ensuring ‘balanced development’, which judging by Hizbullah’s past performance and by the statements of Hizbullah members interviewed for this book, amounts to encountering the Hariri agenda by funnelling a maximum of state funds to Hizbullah-dominated areas, and thereby providing for its constituency through the allocation of state funds (a normal process embraced by all sects in Lebanon, it has to be said). Friendly and special relations with Syria are affirmed, as well as of course with Iran,

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and ‘Arab attempts’ at instigating discord with the Islamic Republic are condemned.135 This reorientation towards the Lebanese state perhaps marks Hizbullah’s programmatic arrival in the day-to-day politics of Lebanon, which had been preceded by its de facto arrival on this scene by about two decades. Another development that would confirm this trend is the exposure of a sophisticated pyramid scheme run by a supporter of Hizbullah, and closely linked to the party’s finances. With this, it would become more difficult for Hizbullah to maintain that somehow, it was cleaner and less corrupt than other political actors, an illusion which would have been recognizable as such for keen observers long beforehand. In the scheme, an investor dubbed the ‘Lebanese Madoff’ used his close links with Hizbullah to get small-scale farmers and employees to invest in his funds, which turned out to be completely fraudulent and enriching nobody but himself.136 Further allegations of dubious financial practices turned up when the Lebanese Canadian Bank was being sold off, and auditors discovered evidence in its books for a wide-ranging money-laundering scheme, in which proceeds from the global cocaine trade were being funnelled to high-ranking Hizbullah operatives via a whole series of intermediate bank accounts.137 This is certainly not what the Iranian leadership referred to as Lebanonization during the 1990s. As for the Hariri government formed at the end of 2009, one of the first major projects to be faced by it were the municipal elections scheduled for May 2010. The new minister of interior, Ziad Baroud, had been a lawyer and civil society activist prior to his governmental employment. He had spent several years lobbying for increased transparency and accountability in Lebanon, and coming into his new position tried his best to oversee the holding of free and fair elections on the municipal level. To this end, a new electoral law was proposed by the Ministry of Interior at the end of 2009, in order to break the predominant patterns of local clientelism: Proposed reforms in the bill would have constituted a fundamental challenge to the majority of the parliamentary blocs and political forces. The reforms include adopting a system of proportional (party list) representation, closed slates, a 20 percent quota for women, ballots pre-printed by the Ministry of Interior and

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Municipalities, and allowing university professors and government employees (below a certain level) to run for the municipal councils. These changes would have strengthened the role of political parties in the system and allowed broader and more accurate representation of society in the parliament. The proposed reforms also would have required parties to attain a greater degree of internal cohesion based on political platforms, a factor that is sorely lacking in most political parties in Lebanon. The parties opposed a proportional electoral system and closed slates out of fear of fragmentation and internal disputes, because the reforms would have required them to select candidates from among their ranks. They prefer instead to maintain the current majoritarian system, in which citizens vote for individual candidates and seats are allocated per district based on predetermined confessional divisions.138 By the time the cabinet had finally debated the new bill, it was already March 2010, and in order to hold the elections on time, the old electoral law had to be kept in place. Accordingly, the municipal elections largely kept up the existing distribution of power, with Hizbullah winning many municipalities in South Lebanon, Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Concurrently to these developments, for the first time since 2006, the National Dialogue sessions were reconvened, reuniting the heads of Lebanon’s major political factions around the same table. The key topic to be discussed in this round of talks was a blueprint for a ‘national defence strategy’, which essentially is a euphemism for the attempt to integrate Hizbullah’s armed units into the Lebanese National Army, or in other words bringing Hizbullah’s weapons under the control of the state. The talks, this time around, lasted from March to November 2010 and brought no major achievements. During the previous round of National Dialogue talks, at least the participants had agreed on some things: declaring the Shebaa Farms to be Lebanese and vowing to disarm Palestinian groups active outside the refugee camps, for example. Things that everyone could agree on because they did little harm to any single group’s interests and that nonetheless could be sold off as ‘progress’ by the participants. Similarly, there were no substantial agreements reached during the 2010 round of talks, but, as one observer notes: ‘On the one hand, it’s easy to deride it as little more than a glorified back-room for

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deal-making. On the other hand, given the problems of political representation within the Lebanese system, the talks give everyone something to take home to their constituents. Hizbullah’s critics get to show that they are putting pressure on Hizbullah while the latter demonstrates that it is open to a process of nationalizing its [military wing].’139 Hizbullah finally broke off its participation in the talks in November 2010; by then, the story of the party’s implication in the killing of Hariri had broken, and the STL had announced its intention of indicting members of Hizbullah proper. With that, Hizbullah’s effort to get Saad Hariri’s government and the Prime Minister personally to stop the process of investigation and avoid an indictment of party members, had failed. This is what Hizbullah had been trying to get Hariri to agree to over the course of the summer of 2010, to no avail.140 The regional situation hardly looked calm, either – international sanctions against Iran had started to bite, and the latter was increasingly under pressure to react to US and European demands for allowing oversight of its nuclear programme. Both domestically and internationally, therefore, Hizbullah was coming under pressure to avert the PR disaster and political weakening that a STL indictment would have implied. Iran needed a strong ally on the ground in its struggle against the West, and Hizbullah needed a strong (power) position within Lebanon’s political system, now that it had committed in writing to working within that system in the future. The mediation effort led by Saudi Arabia and Syria that had attempted to bridge the divides between Lebanon’s rival political camps had failed.141 Consequently, Hizbullah decided to take the dynamic into its own hands once again, and in January 2011 its ministers, along with its allies from the FPM, resigned and brought down the ‘national unity government’ put together with great effort only about a year previously. Once again, negotiations about forming a government ensued, but this time it was obvious that Hizbullah was negotiating from a position of strength, having brought down the previous government by way of all opposition ministers resigning. After four and a half months, a new cabinet was formed with Hizbullah taking three ministries, but together with its allies of Amal, the FPM, the Marada movement, SSNP and the Tashnaq party, holding 15 of the 30 seats in the cabinet, and thereby easily controlling government decision making. On top of this, the new

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Sunni prime minister, Najib Mikati, had been a close ally of Syria and while he had a credible record of attempting to build political consensus where possible, the cabinet line-up clearly spoke of Syrian and Hizbullah influence. From this new position of power, Hizbullah was in a good place to weather the indictment of four of its members by the STL in the summer of 2011 despite the potentially explosive political ramification this step might have entailed. Instead, Hizbullah broadcast a prolonged speech by Secretary-General Nasrallah, interspersed with video ‘evidence’ demonstrating the clearly biased nature of the STL, such as someone appearing to take a wad of cash. Nasrallah again and again repeated that Hizbullah did not need to take a tribunal seriously which was an obvious conspiracy set up by the US and its allies and designed to discredit Hizbullah. The speech kept the majority of Lebanese glued to their television sets, and the streets of Beirut quiet and deserted. Any anticipated riots or clashes did not occur, however, and by stating that the indicted members had long left the country and Hizbullah had no inkling of their whereabouts, the party was able to largely ignore the indictment, which in other conditions might have substantially hurt it. While it had not been able to get Saad Hariri to disavow the STL and stop the process of indictment, which had been one of its policy priorities throughout 2010,142 Hizbullah had gained leverage by its toppling of the previous government. Nonetheless and even considering the favourable domestic conditions throughout 2011, however, Hizbullah was slowly suffering in terms of credibility and its image of being incorruptible and morally superior to most other Lebanese political actors. As the uprising in Syria kept unfolding in 2011, Hizbullah was increasingly driven into a moral dilemma – it had supported the Egyptian revolution that led to the toppling of Mubarak and had lauded it as the ‘Arab street’ finally being able to express its aspirations and throwing off the yoke of dictatorship. When the uprising in Syria increasingly gained momentum in 2011, however, Hizbullah remained suspiciously silent, not willing or indeed able to confront the Syrian government. As one Hizbullah sympathizer remarked, ‘It’s not right for Hizbullah to be against al-Assad because he is its main backer. It has no alternative to supporting the Syrian regime.’143 In other interviews, Hizbullah officials have voiced more nuanced and cautious positions, making their support of the regime appear conditional on the latter’s future behaviour.144 On

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the whole, the party has to stay true to its course of backing the Syrian regime, given how closely intertwined its own standing is with the existence of al-Assad’s government, and the extent to which it depends on functioning supply lines coming from Syria. Consequently, its selfdeclared position as supporter of the oppressed and downtrodden will increasingly look hypocritical.

Conclusion to Phase IV Summarizing the main variables during this period, we can first of all attest to a change in several of them, together with a change in Hizbullah’s hitherto relatively non-confrontational strategy, as far as its relationship with the Lebanese state is concerned. First of all, regarding the main variables we have considered so far – repression, internal movement dynamics and transnational linkages – the most notable change to be observed in Phase IV is on the first of them, repression. While no Lebanese government had attempted to limit Hizbullah’s activities since the movement’s foundation in 1982, this began to change in the early-to-mid-2000s. Responsible for this increasingly daring attitude on the part of the Lebanese government was, to a large extent, the international backing that Hariri’s successive cabinets had been experiencing by the US and Europe, mostly France – the personal friendship between French President Chirac and Hariri is an oft-cited connection in this regard. UN Resolution 1559 provided a clear signal that international as well as Lebanese tolerance for Hizbullah’s continued military presence on Lebanese soil was coming to an end. This, along with the assassination of Hariri,145 greatly heightened tensions between the March 8 (Hizbullah and allies) and March 14 (many Christian parties, Future Movement, etc.) camps in Lebanon. Hizbullah won representation in the cabinet in 2005, a first in the movement’s history. That the party decided to take up these government posts also marks a change in its ideology; participation in the government had previously been deemed unfitting, as the political system was regarded as corrupt and non-representative due to its sectarian character. Now, however, it was legitimized on pragmatic grounds, as long as Hizbullah was not taking up too many seats and its participation remained relatively modest. In return, the party received the government’s confirmation that it was recognized as a national resistance force, not a militia that illegally held on to its arms – in effect, justifying Hizbullah’s continued armed

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status to some extent and protecting it from some of the pressure to disarm and moderate.146 These decisions may have been interpreted by some as a continued process of Lebanonization, amounting to an ideological moderation. However, subsequent events have belied such a softening. Hizbullah’s decision to attempt the kidnap of Israeli soldiers in July 2006 can be explained as a mix of national-level (hedging its bets against a renewed push for disarmament) and regional-level (Iran and Syria’s willingness to demonstrate their proxy war capabilities to Israel) calculations. Which of these levels was more influential than the other is, of course, a hard thing to determine. Available data suggests varying explanations: in interviews and testimonials, former Hizbullah members and sympathizers have stressed that Hizbullah’s military-level decision making especially depends on Iran’s orders.147 The official position embraced by Hizbullah and put forward by Fayyad, a long-time representative of Hizbullah’s political positions in Lebanon and member of parliament, is that Hizbullah is ‘in alliance’ with Syria and Iran. Especially with Iran, the country has a connection that includes a ‘religious dimension’ related to Shiʽism. He stresses, however, that this connection is with Iran’s religious authority and clergy, not with the ‘Iranian state’. He is adamant that nobody can dictate to Hizbullah any terms on its major decisions: ‘But we are not in a position which permits for the other players to dictate their orders to Hizbullah. We are strong enough to say, we accept or we refuse, and we have our own national strategy.’148 A review of Hizbullah’s major strategic decisions of the preceding periods seems to lend credence to Fayyad’s statements. Hizbullah had been engaged in a power conflict with the Hariri party and its allies for several years, and regarded, by its own admission, the fight over state resources as important and legitimate.149 A (mis)calculated move intended to shore up Hizbullah’s standing vis-a`-vis the Lebanese government, such as the 2006 war, and specifically to protect its weapons from internal and international pressure to disarm, fits into the context of this ongoing conflict. Especially when we look at the wider regional setting which, at the time, was heating up with conflicts between Hariri’s and Hizbullah’s international backers – that is, Saudi Arabia, the US and France on one hand, and Iran on the other. The Sunni– Shiʽi fault line, or more precisely, the desire of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries (as well as the US and European countries) to counter Iran’s

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growing influence in the region after its main enemy, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, had been replaced with a Shiʽi-dominated government, certainly played a role in this. Yet, these transnational factors have not been sufficient in triggering conflict and have functioned in conjunction with national-level variables, namely, the confrontation between Hizbullah and Hariri. During the 2008 fighting in Lebanon, the national-level dimension gained even greater salience. In this open and armed attack by Hizbullah on Hariri’s Future Movement, there was hardly any transnational linkage involved that would allow for inferring the predominance of such a causal link. The increasingly tense stand-off between the Future Movement, now led by Hariri’s son Saad, and Hizbullah had the international fault lines of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the US and others versus Iran and Syria playing their role. However, as far as the linkage with Israel goes, there is no available evidence underlining that this played any significant role. Instead, the Hizbullah– Hariri confrontation took a very manifest form when the Siniora government directly challenged Hizbullah by trying to shut down its parallel telecommunications system. The party responded to this direct challenge to its position and power within Lebanon with an extensive display of its military capability. A new dimension to Hizbullah’s strategy in terms of using its weapons was added by the Syrian uprising that began in March 2011. As the military confrontations between the Syrian regime and the increasingly organized Free Syrian Army (FSA), consisting of deserted Syrian army soldiers and supported by Qatar, other Arab states and presumably the US, grew increasingly violent and sophisticated, Hizbullah began to become more involved. Initially, the party had done its best to stay on the sidelines of the conflict, and had attempted to avoid taking sides too openly. This fence-sitting strategy cost it much of the admiration that many Lebanese had previously expressed towards the movement. Now, Hizbullah’s lack of endorsement for the Syrian popular uprising was viewed critically and cost it credibility, as Nasrallah had used the opportunity of Egypt’s revolution on 25 January 2011 to call for an overthrow of Mubarak’s regime and for supporting the uprising of the Egyptian ‘street’. As the conflict between the Syrian regime and the FSA began to intensify, there were increasing reports of Hizbullah fighters being spotted inside Syria.

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Hizbullah went as far as admitting its presence in Syria when, in October 2012, it officially mourned the death of Mohammad Nasif, a senior Hizbullah military operative who was killed in action on Syrian soil. This engagement in military action is not necessarily linked to national-level considerations, of course, but owes to Hizbullah’s moral and ethical commitment to its long-time political and military sponsor, Syria. It is mentioned here to illustrate that Hizbullah’s calculations, especially where the use of violence and military action are concerned, are manifold and relate to a number of internal, domestic and regional factors.

Patterns in Hizbullah’s Stance Vis-a`-Vis the Lebanese Government Surveying the history of Hizbullah’s strategy towards and relationship with the Lebanese government, several seemingly paradoxical tendencies start to emerge. While the movement transformed from armed civil war militia into political party-cum-armed wing and became increasingly involved in Lebanese politics, it did not moderate its key stances and instead became increasingly belligerent towards its main political rivals. How to explain this lack of moderation despite the ostensible turn towards non-violent, legitimate means of participation in the political system? Hizbullah’s two immediate strategic goals come to bear on its decisions: holding on to its status of armed resistance movement, and linked to the first one, the consolidation of its domestic political power in order to secure the attainment of the first. The positions and strategies of Iran on a regional level also frequently determine the course of Hizbullah’s politics, as do its relations with Syria. These transnational linkages often combine with domestic factors to result in a certain strategic outcome for Hizbullah. Generally, where one of its state patrons has embraced moderation (for instance, Iran during the early 1990s), Hizbullah has used peaceful, political avenues for expressing its demands. When Syria came under international pressure after 2005, Hizbullah was engaging in conflict with Syria’s domestic opponents inside Lebanon. However, at certain times, domestic rivalries and power conflicts have also taken the upper hand in determining Hizbullah’s strategy choices, as was the case in 2008; it would therefore be oversimplifying matters to view Hizbullah as a mere puppet of Iran or Syria.

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During the first phase analysed above, the establishment and formation of the movement, an attitude of ‘self-defence against internal rivals while fighting Israeli occupation’ is an adequate description of Hizbullah’s approach. While jihad against Israel remained the main focus of Hizbullah’s activity, supported by Iranian weapons and training, the fight against internal rivals for dominance within the Shiʽi community soon assumed an equally important position. During the late 1980s, Amal and Hizbullah were engaged in fierce military battles for control over the southern suburbs (dhahiyeh) of Beirut; they differed on key political positions, such as the unconditional fight against Israel, something that Amal was much less clear about than Hizbullah. They also had contradictory stances towards the Lebanese political system, with Hizbullah categorically rejecting it while Amal’s leader Berri saw participation as a means of obtaining state funds and redistributing them to his client networks. Above all, however, they were also involved in a bloody conflict over dominance within Lebanon’s Shiʽi community. On ideological grounds, Hizbullah was also fighting the Lebanese Communist Party and was engaged in several bloody battles, abducting and killing members of the party. The main reason for this enmity was Hizbullah’s rejection of the Communist Party’s affiliation with the Soviet Union, which the Shiʽi party regarded as equally corrupt and evil as its nemesis, the US. These actions convey a brutal and unscrupulous approach to any rivals Hizbullah may have had internally on the Lebanese scene, in keeping with the ideologically rigid programme contained in the 1985 Open Letter. This phase shows well how the two goals mentioned above are connected: while fighting the presence of Israel on Lebanese ground remained the main justification for Hizbullah’s actions and existence, securing its internal power position and eliminating, or at least keeping in check, its internal rivals was an equally important priority. Looking at the transnational level, it is clear that Hizbullah’s leading circle of Iranian-trained Shiʽi clerics was taking its decisions in very close coordination with Iran, which remained the spiritual home of the new movement. The long-term vision at the time was that of establishing an Islamic state encompassing Shiʽi communities in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Iraqi Shiʽi parties also served as the organizational blueprint for setting up Hizbullah’s party command structure. Within the new organization, this resulted in very strict and hierarchical structures that ostensibly left

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little room for dissent or debate, although Qassem documents some discussion and debate within the leadership circles around the time of establishment.150 The national-level context in which the party was first established was one, of course, of complete absence of any state authority. The late 1980s, marking the end phase of Lebanon’s drawn-out civil war, were a period of especially anarchic infighting, with each major militia controlling separate parts of territory and extorting protection money. Remnants of the central state were embodied in the government of Gemayel, and where these remaining structures opposed Hizbullah’s units, such as in the battle for West Beirut taking place in 1984, they met with fierce fighting. Eventually, the confrontation with Hizbullah units caused a split in the ranks of the Lebanese army and thus facilitated the complete breakdown of state control over the national territory. The elements identified above also remain valid for the next phase in Hizbullah’s history. The end of the civil war and the internationally brokered (mainly by Saudi Arabia) Taif Agreement resulted in a complete system change that accrued several major benefits for Hizbullah. Still strongly involved in fighting Israel’s proxies in South Lebanon, as well as in directly engaging Israeli troops, the movement now perceived the opportunity to strengthen its internal position by participating in Lebanon’s post-civil war political system. Iran’s influence in strengthening those internal factions which were in favour of participation is well documented – as is the fact that by the early 1990s, Hizbullah had grown into a major force both on the Lebanese scene as well as regionally, so that extending its political power within the system appeared like a logical step. Iran mentored this step and its religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, gave his approval to a Hizbullah delegation specifically sent to Tehran for this purpose. However, the decision also led to the only relatively well-documented split within Hizbullah to this date: a faction led by former Secretary-General Tufayli vehemently opposed the move to participate in the parliamentary elections, left the movement and even engaged in armed skirmishes with Hizbullah fighters. The mainstream, now led by Nasrallah as Tufayli’s successor, moved towards participation, while at the same time voicing strong criticism of the postwar reconstruction agenda begun by Prime Minister Hariri. These decisions marked Hizbullah’s entry into a new arena of confrontation and self-assertion on the national scene. Instead of fighting rival militias, the party now formed part of the local political

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system dominated by various clans, and promptly began to play by the new rules of political confrontation within this system. This is evident, for example, in the party’s successful efforts to stall Hariri’s Elyssar reconstruction project for the southern suburbs, which Hizbullah deemed its own turf and on which it did not tolerate rival interference. On the whole, the assertion of the second goal – that is, the maintenance and extension of Hizbullah’s domestic power position vis-a`-vis its political rivals – continued to assume a prime position within the party’s calculations. Alongside this was, of course, the continued fight against Israel and its Lebanese proxies in the south of the country, Hizbullah’s main raison d’eˆtre and priority. Iran continued to back both Hizbullah’s military operations as well as the gradual and continuous build-up of a network of social and educational institutions, supporting families and children affected by military conflict, and also providing early recruitment, religious indoctrination and training for youth in the form of the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts. Israel continued its attempts to existentially weaken Hizbullah and force it to retreat from its gradually consolidating internal power position, yet without success – renewed incursions into South Lebanon in 1993 and 1996 caused substantial military and civilian losses on the Lebanese side, but did not achieve the goal of forcing Hizbullah into retreat. On the contrary, the party, now well established on the political scene, continued to make use of the expanding political opportunity space and successfully participated in the 1998 municipal elections, further consolidating its power base and gaining access to additional state funds that could now be redistributed to its constituencies. This was essentially crowned by a military success in 2000, when Israel withdrew from South Lebanon. Now, Hizbullah’s rhetoric regarding Israel necessarily began to change and to focus on ‘national defence’ against a continuous risk of attack, and on liberating the Shebaa Farms. Ironically, Hizbullah’s most significant military success up to this date also created a problem with regard to justifying the existence of its military wing. The majority of Lebanese territory was now nominally free of Israeli troops, and the issue of the Shebaa Farms was used as a justification for staying armed. The issue of Hizbullah’s armed status came increasingly under attack as the 2000s progressed; in the post-11 September atmosphere of securitization and counter-terrorism policy, aggressively pushed forward in the Middle East by the Bush

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administration, Hizbullah began to feel pressure to lay down its arms and integrate the Lebanese political system as a regular political party. In this drive, both international powers as well as Lebanese factions were united and collaborated in order to build up pressure on the Shiʽi movement to let go of its armed wing. In 2004, a year in which once again Hizbullah was able to defend its parliamentary representation in the general elections, the UNSC passed Resolution 1559, explicitly calling for the disarmament of Hizbullah and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including Syria, from Lebanese territory. In the face of this increased pressure, Hizbullah stuck to its position without fail and used all available avenues in a concerted veto-strategy aimed at preventing its disarmament. This strategy grew more confrontational as the pressure was building up: the party started using all system and extra-system means available to it when its political opponents, the March 14 camp, upped the ante by pushing for the establishment of a UN tribunal to investigate the assassination of Hariri and other political assassinations in Lebanon. Hizbullah ministers resigned from the government in 2006, and in 2007 street fighting between the March 8 and March 14 camps broke out, while Hizbullah staged a sit-in in central Beirut for several months calling for the government to resign and for the establishment of a ‘national unity government’ in which the Shiʽi party would have the possibility for a veto. The post-2005 phase has definitely been the most confrontational one so far regarding Hizbullah’s domestic-level strategy. With its main backer, Syria, removed from the Lebanese political scene, the rules of the game changed fundamentally. More open criticism and opposition regarding Hizbullah’s armed status were now possible. The US, Europe, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were able to continue their support for the March 14 forces, some of which also flowed in the form of arms supplies. The 2008 outbreak of violence between the two camps, or more precisely, Hizbullah’s show of military strength and attack on its opponents, mark the peak of this escalating confrontation so far. One pattern is visible in this strategy: where peaceful avenues of political participation are available, Hizbullah will use them. This does not preclude, however, that the party also uses violent means of asserting its influence. In 2008, for example, Hizbullah formed part of the Lebanese government and was represented in parliament. Due to the specificities of the Lebanese government, however, the party was unable to put in a

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political veto against the political majority’s decision to depose the chief of airport security and to pledge to dismantle Hizbullah’s fibre-optic network. This show of power on the part of the March 14 camp was met with a military show of power by Hizbullah, that is, the attacks on Future TV’s broadcasting station and street fighting in West Beirut. This accounts for the fact that mere participation in the political situation, for Hizbullah, may not be enough – the real power dynamics lie outside the official system of government, anyway, thus prompting not only Hizbullah, but other political actors in Lebanon as well, to go beyond the system and to fend for their interests by using violent means as they see fit. On the whole, this provides further support for Tilly’s hypothesis that the regime comes to shape the behaviour of political and social actors, and to a large extent determines their choice of contentious repertoires.151 Yet, another phase in Hizbullah’s development has seen it take over the major share of executive power with the formation of Prime Minister Mikati’s government in January 2011. The issue that prompted Hizbullah to withdraw its ministers from the government, bringing down Saad Hariri’s cabinet and leading to the formation of Mikati’s, was once again the UN STL. Up until the last minute, Hizbullah had been trying to pressure Saad Hariri into preventing the indictment of four Hizbullah members by the tribunal, and into withholding government endorsement of the tribunal’s work.152 This would have represented a significant political victory for Hizbullah, and having the son of Hariri personally withhold his backing for the investigation would have insulated the party from a further build-up of pressure. However, Hariri refused to budge and Hizbullah chose a symbolic moment to announce its withdrawal from government; it made its move while Saad Hariri was meeting with US President Barack Obama at the White House in Washington. Although Hizbullah maintains that all fears of a takeover of power in Lebanon by Hizbullah are exaggerated and that it only has four ministers in the current government, there is little doubt that within the logic of Lebanon’s political clans and factions, Hizbullah is now able to veto any government decisions that go against its interests, and to significantly shape policy making. With the intensifying conflict in Syria, however, the party is also facing its most difficult moment so far; its credibility is threatened, as it had previously voiced overt support for the popular

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uprisings against authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. With a similar movement now happening in Syria, Hizbullah is refraining from support for the uprising and is voicing continued backing of al-Assad’s regime in Syria, as well as sending experienced fighters to the neighbouring country in order to help battle the opposition FSA. Not only would the fall of al-Assad’s regime deprive the party of one of its main backers in the region, the ongoing conflict as well as any possible escalation of intersectarian fighting in Syria is also bound to have repercussions on the Lebanese scene. Consequently, even though Hizbullah may have achieved some major political victories inside Lebanon’s political system, it is also fighting an existential battle for survival both against the political threat represented by the ongoing investigation into the Hariri murder, as well as against the demise of a key political and military backer in the region. This survival battle is bound to make Hizbullah’s strategy choices in the near future hard to predict, and the use of further violence likely.

Conclusion On the whole, Hizbullah witnessed a remarkable series of political successes since its founding in the early 1980s. Judging by its political influence, it has enjoyed a steady rise from 1982 until 2011, when it found itself largely in control of Lebanon’s government and able to ward off a potentially existential threat in the form of the STL. Concerning the dynamics of its participation in or rejection of Lebanon’s political system, Hizbullah’s action has been characterized by an increasing insertion into Lebanese domestic politics, including its intrigues and power conflicts. Contrary to what might be assumed, however, the socalled Lebanonization of Hizbullah does not equal a moderation of its stance, or a softening of the means it is willing to adopt in order to achieve its goals. In the early years, the party and its militia were established on the model of the Iranian Pasdaran, and its actions and ideological stance closely tied to Iranian preferences. With the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1991, a watershed was reached: new opportunities for action and participation opened up for Hizbullah, and since the moment coincided with a change of leadership and a softening of tone and policy in Iran, Hizbullah chose to participate in parliamentary elections against the declared will of high-ranking party officials.

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The 1990s then witnessed Hizbullah learning to flex its considerable muscle inside the rules of Lebanon’s political game, for example by countering the Hariri agenda of welfare distribution and fighting for a redistribution of funds to its own constituency. All the while, the party’s military organization remained involved in recurring armed conflicts with Israel, and continued to pose a considerable difficulty for Israel’s armed forces. Finally, in 2001, Israel’s government under Barak relented and unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon, handing Hizbullah its most significant victory to that date. After 2003 and the US-led invasion of Iraq, dynamics changed somewhat: with Shiʽi parties in government in Iraq, there was an increasing Sunni –Shiʽi conflict dynamic that was also being played out in Lebanon, and which exacerbated the already existing conflict between Hizbullah and the Hariri political camp, closely allied with Saudi Arabia and the US. After Hariri finally broke off his still close relations with Syria in 2004, he was assassinated in early 2005, and a new front of political pressure opened up for Hizbullah. Now, the US along with most Western countries were pushing for a disarmament of Hizbullah, and with the STL looking into the assassination of Hariri, that front received additional weight. The West was backing the Siniora government, in which the Future Movement now led by Saad Hariri played a key role. Hizbullah was again playing on several fronts at once, opposing the establishment of the STL politically, while engaging in a national dialogue on its weapons with other Lebanese leaders. The attempted kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in July 2006 was likely meant to hand it additional bargaining chips in the form of securing the release of political prisoners in Israel. The move backfired, however, and brought a major war, turning to Hizbullah’s favour nonetheless because it was able to withstand the badly designed Israeli attempt at destroying it militarily. This almost automatically translated into a political victory, with Hizbullah seemingly having defeated Israel’s mighty army. Keeping the momentum going, the party then sought to bring down the Siniora government by a series of demonstrations and sit-ins, framed in all-or-nothing terms. When the government simply refused to resign and kept on working, Hizbullah risked losing face – and promptly used the government’s attempt at constraining its telecommunications network as a pretext for staging a quasi-coup. This resulted in the Doha Accords of 2008, which effectively gave Hizbullah a veto right in all matters of key national importance. The link with Iran, increasingly

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under pressure because of its insistence on building its atomic programme, was still close, and key decisions were still coordinated. However, the analysis has shown that apart from responding to Iranian orders, Hizbullah increasingly takes developments inside Lebanon into account for its strategic decisions. The main conflict line in this respect runs between the party and Hariri’s Future Movement. Hizbullah used every means available to pressure the younger Hariri into blocking the establishment of the tribunal, but Hariri, backed by the US, held on to the project. Once again, Hizbullah changed the dynamics by toppling the government in early 2011 in order to weather the STL indictment – achieving by political means what it had been unable to do militarily in 2008. Hizbullah has steadily broadened its repertoire of action since its establishment – going from militia to political party, to parliamentary actor to participating in executive power, back to street movement staging sit-ins and militia; all of this accompanied by its exercising the function of a regular army ‘securing’ Lebanon’s border with Israel. It is willing and able to use any combination of these repertoires to follow its political goals. These goals consist of keeping up the resistance against Israel, and securing benefits for its Shiʽi constituency in order to maintain its popular power base. Its increasing decision-making freedom vis-a`-vis Iran may have led to some ideological softening and toning down; but it should by no means be mistaken for a willingness to moderate and to forego the option of armed action.

CHAPTER 4 A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF HIZBULLAH AND THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS

After examining both the histories of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Lebanese Hizbullah in detail, and tracing the factors and patterns that have made them either cooperate with other actors in the political system (chiefly, the state authorities) or violently confront them, this chapter will take a step back and look at the key dynamics in a comparative perspective. First of all, it seems useful to specify the instances that will be compared across the different cases. They are basically defined by the different action repertoires of the two movements, or the outcomes on the dependent variable: cooperative behaviour and participation in the political system on one hand, and veto strategies and violent confrontation on the other. Starting from this premise, the context variables will be compared: what kind of international linkages were present? Which kind of action repertoire was the government employing towards the movements under scrutiny? What kind of internal developments were taking place and how did they affect the movements’ strategies? The different action repertoires along with their various causal connections to independent variables will be compared across cases. This will allow for identifying independent variables or conjunctions of different variables that have produced specific outcomes within the cases, and will therefore lead to a clearer

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picture of what makes popular modern Islamist movements such as Hizbullah or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood tick.

Comparing across Cases: Main Patterns in the Muslim Brotherhood’s and Hizbullah’s Political Strategies Comparing the very different experiences, contexts and strategy changes of Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt yields some interesting insights. The first and most fundamental level of comparison between the two is their key strategic goals. We can note that both movements define and understand themselves to be religious actors with explicit political goals. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the original intent as pursued by its founder al-Banna was to impact society and convince – or coerce, where necessary – fellow Egyptians to adhere to Islamic rules. At the same time, his own efforts and that of his close advisers at striking deals with Egypt’s political elite speak of the intention to be present in the political sphere, and to consolidate the standing and political power of the Brotherhood. Subsequent strategic choices of the Brotherhood mainstream echo this ambition to carry weight on the political scene. In the case of Hizbullah, the original goal was to resist and fight Israel out of both a practical-military as well as an ideological motivation. This remained its key strategic goal, with both its organizational structure as well as its national-level political strategies and tactics built around it. Despite their very different histories and backgrounds, both movements display similarities in the following respects.

Mobilization and protest strategies as a first resort Both movements have been highly successful at building social and religious networks that have managed to create veritable milieus of their own. Both in Lebanon and in Egypt, those who identify with the Brotherhood or with Hizbullah are often recognizable to their fellow citizens, and certain areas of both countries or of major cities are clearly recognized as having an ‘Islamic atmosphere’, or a jaww Islami, about them that is identified with the respective movements. Certainly, they have both contributed to and benefitted from a general ‘Islamic turn’ that has been notable across many Middle Eastern countries from the

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1970s onwards. Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have, however, proved especially apt at drawing in substantial numbers of followers and members, and to tie them to their mission for extensive periods of time. Often, entire families identify with either the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or with Hizbullah, or entire villages, towns or regions are known to be Hizbullah territory. The successful establishment of these networks has developed slightly differently in both cases. For Hizbullah, a strict party structure modelled on an Iraqi Shiʽi party and inspired by a Leninist-type party organization was installed from the top, that is, with Iranian help. In parallel, its network of social organizations started out as a response to concrete needs, such as caring for martyrs’ families, children orphaned in the course of Lebanon’s civil war, and so on. For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the establishment of social-needs organizations was more generally geared towards outreach into society, aiming to provide services and guidance, and to enlighten society about the right path of Islam. The upshot of both organizational structures, however, was and continues to be similar: both movements possess an impressive mobilization capacity, which they have often demonstrated. They have been able to call thousands, sometimes even tens of thousands of supporters together in the street in order to protest government measures. Any government policies deemed controversial by the two movements have met with such responses, be it Egypt’s 1940s stance on the Palestine question, Mubarak-era measures such as the imposition of a permanent state of emergency or the Lebanese government’s push for the setting up of an independent tribunal to investigate the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The pattern to note in this respect is that both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood have used (largely) peaceful demonstrations as their protest repertoire of first resort in a peacetime environment. Lebanon’s civil war is, of course, an exception in this regard, as Hizbullah fought bloody battles both against the remnants of Lebanon’s state army and against rival militias whenever it perceived its status or territorial control to be threatened. Not to mention the actual fighting against Israeli forces, as well as numerous kidnappings and hostage-takings during the initial phase of the movement’s history. As long as both movements formed part of the political process – in the case of Hizbullah, after 1992; for the Muslim Brotherhood, originally during the 1930s and early 1940s, then again from the 1970s onwards

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on a limited basis – however, they have used demonstrations before any other strategies. For the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, there was a significant time lag between its establishment in 1928 and the outright use of violence in the late 1940s; as the analysis has shown, the growth and development of the movement’s Special Apparatus was, in part, a response on the part of al-Banna to the increasingly difficult political circumstances the Brotherhood found itself in. As for Hizbullah, it took from its first participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections to the violent conflicts after 2005 for the movement to begin using violence against the state as part of its protest repertoire. The use of violence was eventually a response within an escalating, tit-for-tat-style conflict with the government over the investigation into Hariri’s death.

The political arena as refuge and space for contestation Entering politics, and staying in the political arena, has been a goal coveted by both movements in relatively early periods of their development; in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposite (withdrawal from politics) was a response to state repression during later phases. For both Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, entering politics initially represented a welcome extension of their protest repertoire and general societal influence. For both movements, it also served as a means for protecting their primary strategic goals: Hizbullah would be better able to legitimize and maintain its resistance operations against Israel with a presence in the parliament and the parallel function of a political party. The Brotherhood in Egypt, on the other hand, initially sought out the political arena in order to influence the political wheeling and dealing of the time; its willingness to bargain and strike deals with the regime during the 1930s and early 1940s is documented in Chapter II. After its re-entry into politics during the Sadat era, the Brotherhood increasingly looked for ‘cover’ by joining the political process – by staying out in the open and behaving like any other political actor, the movement sought to counter regime allegations that it was still the ‘secret terrorist organization’ bent on attacking the regime that it presumably had been during the 1940s. Hizbullah, throughout its participation in politics, has also stated its intention to use that participation as a way to gain access to state funds and to redistribute them to its own constituency along the lines of Lebanon’s sectarian political system. More directly, winning elections on the local

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level has provided the party with very direct influence over the budget and political configuration at the municipal level, opening up additional roads to state funds and power. In short, for both movements, participation in the political process has largely proven a means, not necessarily an end in itself – with notable exceptions such as the Wasat Party founded out of the Muslim Brotherhood and committed to democratic politics as the primary way to participate in society. What of changes – that is, restrictions or expansions – in the possibility to participate in the political process? Restrictions have primarily been imposed by the Egyptian regime, as noted above. In the case of Hizbullah, the state has arguably not been strong enough to successfully impose any restrictions on Hizbullah’s ability to participate in the political process; the only notable changes have been the establishment of the postwar political system through the Taif Agreement (expansion of political space), and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon (expansion to the effect that Hizbullah participated in executive government for the first time). Returning to the restrictions, where they have occurred in Egypt during the 1990s and 2000s under Mubarak, they have mostly brought about an inward turn imposed by the Brotherhood leadership on the movement as a whole. This inward turn has resulted in an orientation away from politics, and a focus on building the tanzim and engaging in grassroots work. The leadership thus hoped to avert a renewed confrontation with the regime, but was also prompted to follow this path by deeperseated religious and ideological convictions, as noted above. The returnees from Gulf exile apparently displayed a greater propensity for the type of religiously conservative thought that regards politics as a secondary exploit. This was much to the chagrin of younger movement members who had been hoping to stay involved in politics and to engage in a different sort of confrontation with the regime, one that is based on the rules of democratic politics. This was true for the Wasat activists of the mid-1990s as much as younger-generation Brotherhood members (sometimes referred to as the ‘bloggers’ of the movement as a number of them publish personal, often movement-critical blogs) of the 2000s. The decision to withdraw from politics thus regularly led to disagreements or even splits within the movement, but the ‘old-guard’ leadership was able to prevail each time and to impose this course on the movement mainstream.

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Where expansions in the political opportunity space had been present, however, the Muslim Brotherhood proved both eager and adept to use them to their advantage each time. This was the case during the early Sadat years, when the Muslim Brotherhood began its spectacular rise within the professional associations. It continued throughout the Mubarak era, when a renewed opening appeared and the Brotherhood started branching out into student unions, professional syndicates and also into parliament. When external, mostly US pressure on the Mubarak regime for reform started to build and the rules of the game were temporarily loosened, the Brotherhood made use of this and obtained the best showing in parliament in its history, with 88 seats falling to independent candidates affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. As noted above, Hizbullah has also made use of greater political opportunities wherever they have presented themselves, after the end of the civil war as well as after the withdrawal of Syrian forces. In both cases, contrary points of view existed within the party and were expressed; in 1992, this led to the deposition of Tufayli from the position as secretary-general and his split from the party. In the second instance, in 2005, there was some internal debate over whether the party should join executive government, and disagreements were tolerated and debated according to Qassem;1 ultimately, however, Nasrallah decided to move ahead and send ministers to the cabinet of Siniora, while downplaying that this participation contradicted earlier positions the party had taken vis-a`-vis the corrupt and sectarian nature of Lebanon’s political system. The patterns that emerge from these decisions can thus be described as pragmatic rather than ideological in nature: despite fundamental misgivings about the ruling political regimes, both the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as well as Hizbullah have tended to participate in their respective political systems when the opportunity arose. Restrictions on participation – such as the obstructions in campaigning or vote-casting experienced by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in the 1990s and 2000s – have tended to result in a temporary withdrawal from the political arena.

Regime challenges to Islamist movements As described in Chapter II, the Brotherhood began to experience government repression as soon as it became obvious that its membership

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had grown exponentially during the 1930s to reach into the hundreds of thousands, and as soon as al-Banna’s and al-Sukkari’s political intentions – to mix with the political elites and engage in bargaining like everyone else on the political scene – were revealed. The authorities then began to exert a mix of repressive measures, ranging from bans on Muslim Brotherhood publications, to arresting al-Banna, or assigning him to a post in the countryside. This changed the tone and the interactions between the movement and the authorities from one of cautious acceptance and observation, to increasingly aggressive and confrontational. It also set in motion, as I have analysed above, a process of radicalization and of mobilization of an armed wing to the Brotherhood, the Special Apparatus. This process was flanked by the utilization of other protest repertoires, such as student demonstrations to protest the government course on the Palestine question. Whether or not, or to what degree, al-Banna helped along, knew of or condoned the development of the Special Apparatus’ increasing militarization and preparation of al-Nuqrashi’s assassination is not clear. What is certain, however, is that the growth of an armed section within the Brotherhood was as much a response to context factors – including the denial or repression of political opportunities – as it was a result of an ideological radicalization and the outcome of the al-Banna-inspired paramilitary Rover units and Battalions. As argued above, these factors interacted with each other to produce the path of militarization that eventually led to the assassination of al-Nuqrashi and the subsequent ban of the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood’s fortunes changed a few years later, after the 1952 revolution and the takeover of power by the Free Officers; however, as documented above, relations quickly soured, again in response to the Brotherhood’s demand for more outright political influence. Nasser reacted with repressive measures, and after the 1954 attempt on his life provided him with adequate justification, he subjected the Brotherhood to an unprecedented campaign of arrests, torture and military trials. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, then, all Brotherhood activities were restricted to prisons or clandestine activities, again provoking a radicalization process. Again, this was the outcome of several variables interacting: ideological radicalization through the writings of Qutb, partly itself as a reaction to regime repression; continuing, heavy and ruthless repression by the Nasser

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authorities; and the existence of structures that enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to start using violence again, in the form of Special Apparatus operatives who had escaped arrest and were highly motivated and willing to set up another armed campaign of resistance against the government. In 2006, the first signs of a possible remilitarization of the Brotherhood in a long time started appearing again, in the form of paramilitary-style Brotherhood students parading through Cairo. Preceding this was, among other things, a renewed campaign of repression (mostly in the form of member and leadership arrests) the government was carrying out against the Muslim Brotherhood after the latter had won 88 seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections. What about Hizbullah? It had militarily fought government attempts to control parts of West Beirut during the civil war, as well as rival militias – but obviously, it would be difficult to argue that this was a strategy that was specific to Hizbullah in any way, as all civil war militias active in Lebanon at this time fought off their opponents and/or the Lebanese army where it was still active. After the civil war ended, Hizbullah’s armed action was exclusively directed at Israeli forces or Israeli territory. As long as Israel was still occupying South Lebanon and Hizbullah was engaging it along with its proxies there, there was less pressure on the Shiʽi party-cum-militia to disarm than afterwards. Instances of outright repression exerted by the government against Hizbullah during these years are not documented. In addition to its status as a resistance movement active in South Lebanon, Hizbullah was benefitting from Syrian protection. Conflicts with major political opponents, such as Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, were instead played out in other contexts, as noted in Chapter III Hizbullah was putting up political resistance against Hariri’s reconstruction and rebuilding projects wherever possible. After Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, the context – and with it, all kinds of political opportunities – changed dramatically. In the wake of these events, the Lebanese government, backed by UN Resolution 1701 that ended the 2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel, sent Lebanese army troops into South Lebanon for the first time since the movement’s establishment in 1982. Up until this date, the Lebanese state had technically not been in control of the monopoly of violence in all of its territory, as Hizbullah had de facto military control over South Lebanon. However, there was no kind of confrontational, let alone

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military, action undertaken by Hizbullah in response to the Lebanese army’s move. The party accepted the army’s deployment without further complaints and was able to rely on its good relations with the army command, as well as the fact that Lebanon’s national army would do everything possible to avoid a confrontation with Hizbullah for fear of sectarian conflicts. Additionally, it had secured the Lebanese government’s backing for its role as a ‘resistance movement’ in the south in return for its support. Things changed in 2008, however, when the government, in the context of an escalating political conflict with Syria and its allies in Lebanon – that is, Hizbullah and some other political factions in the country – and emboldened by international support to do so, moved to dismantle Hizbullah’s military telecommunications system. This occurred outside of any political bargain-striking and thus constituted a clear breach of the rules that usually govern the interactions between Hizbullah and the March 14 camp. As long as some give and take was part of these interactions, or they did not concern vital Hizbullah interests – such as its military infrastructure or the UN investigation into the Hariri assassination, in which Syria and then Hizbullah are suspects at the time of writing – these sometimes confrontational interactions remained largely peaceful. In May 2008, however, the government decided to launch a concerted attack against Hizbullah interests on its own account, triggering a major Hizbullah show of force and fierce fighting in Beirut and the Shouf Mountains. The message sent both by these actions as well as by Nasrallah’s rhetoric was clear: the ‘hand’ that would touch the resistance’s military capabilities would be ‘cut off’. The periods analysed show that when faced by an open challenge by the ruling regime, be it in the form of bans, confiscation of assets, dismantling of key infrastructures or arrests of its members, Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood have usually reacted – at least in parts of their organizations, with the Muslim Brotherhood displaying greater heterogeneity than Hizbullah in its responses to such measures – with some kind of radicalization or escalation of their interactions, often involving the use of violence. On the other hand, parts of both parties have either called for a withdrawal of politics or promoted political moderation – defined as an explicit adoption of democratic principles and a disavowal of violence – in response to regime challenges, as well. Examples are the Muslim Brotherhood’s 1970s moderation process

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referred to above, as well as the formation of the Wasat Party in the mid1990s. For Hizbullah, calls for moderation remain based on anecdotal evidence, and involve calls for a withdrawal from politics rather than for increased participation in politics on a democratic basis. Especially in the wake of the 2006 war and the subsequent inflow of Iranian funds for reconstruction and build-up, some of which apparently also found their way into personal bank accounts of Hizbullah members, there were calls to ‘drop all this and just return to the mosque’.2 As observed above, however, this was not accompanied by a lasting strategy of adhering to democratic politics, or disavowing the use of violence either internally or externally. This remained an option and was employed in 2008, and does remain an option at the time of writing. An ideological moderation comparable to that experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood mainstream did not occur. There are several reasons for this; for Hizbullah, its position within the regional conflict involving Syria, Israel and Iran obviously introduces calculations that impact its strategies and actions, and that lie outside of the Lebanese political arena. From what has been argued and analysed above, it seems clear that these calculations play a significant role in determining Hizbullah’s actions within Lebanon. However, they are not solely responsible in triggering different courses of action the movement takes. Its local political environment, that is, the political opportunities presented to it, the obstacles and repressive policies it encounters and the connections with other political elite actors, all have an impact on any given strategic decision the party takes.

Transnational linkages This aspect leads into the next category of comparison between the two movements: their respective transnational linkages and the roles they have played in determining political action on the domestic scene. This is perhaps the key difference between Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood, especially when it comes to reacting to government repression. Whereas Hizbullah’s power centre and frame of reference lie outside of and surpass Lebanon’s national boundaries, those of the Muslim Brotherhood have, throughout the course of its history, become exclusively focused on the Egyptian political scene. This implies that the Muslim Brotherhood is facing the Egyptian regime one-on-one, no external power calculations enter the equation when it comes to their interaction. This was, as we have noted above, slightly different in the

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movement’s early history, when the conflict in Palestine served as a radicalizing transnational influence on the Muslim Brotherhood, and the setting up of various branches in Arab countries gave it some leverage outside of the boundaries of the Egyptian state. With the passage of time, however, this connection lost its importance; with regards to Palestine, the 1967 defeat changed the equation significantly, and after 1979, when Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel, this angle lost all importance as a political tool for the Brotherhood. Where the other Arab branches of the Muslim Brotherhood are concerned, the links between them – and especially the links between the Egyptian organization and other national organizations – are weak and have not served to strengthen the Brotherhood’s position vis-a`-vis the Egyptian regime. The International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, likewise, remains fairly ineffective and obscure, and has not been used by national branches to increase the strategic weight or clout of national branches, including the Egyptian one. The case is obviously different for Hizbullah, which has been established with explicit help from Iran and has kept these close ties throughout its history. As we have observed, Iran’s influence has quite often been moderating and cooperative, at least where signals were sent out by Iran’s political leadership under Rafsanjani. At other times, speculations run high that Iranian orders are behind Hizbullah’s escalating and confrontational moves such as the 2006 attack on an Israeli patrol that triggered the subsequent war with Israel. Iran’s calculations obviously change along with the regional situation it finds itself in, recently often along with the ups and downs in the international standoff relating to its nuclear programme. While it is too difficult for the present analysis to completely open up the ‘black box’ of Iranian – Hizbullah relations – reliable evidence and interviews being impossible to obtain under the given circumstances – what is clear is that Iranian influence plays a key role for Hizbullah’s decisions. However, this influence is constantly mediated by the domestic Lebanese context Hizbullah finds itself in, and the resulting strategic priorities it develops. A complete Lebanonization of Hizbullah has not taken place, it remains tied to larger regional considerations and thus with one foot in the domestic arena and another in the complex, conflictual triangle that exists between Iran, Syria and Israel.

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Movement-internal power dynamics When it comes to the decision-making structures and the power dynamics within the two movements, they reveal significant differences. While both have strictly top-down decision-making structures, the Muslim Brotherhood has proved more heterogeneous and more flexible – in the sense that dissent has resulted in debate and has led to peaceful splits within the movement. The more open nature of the movement has also meant that such debates have reached the public sphere and are relatively well researched; members of the movement also quite openly talk about them. In the case of the much more secretive Hizbullah, information about internal splits and the handling of dissent is much harder to come by. Those that have been documented do not speak of much flexibility, such as the breaking away of Tufayli and his faction, which led to armed conflict with the mainstream of the movement. Other radical-moderate divisions have influenced decision making within the movement/party at times, as we have seen surrounding the decision to join parliamentary politics in 1992. Generally, the strict party organization that defines Hizbullah, with a top-down command structure and little room for open dissent, means that when profound disagreements occur, they likely lead to members leaving the movement rather than trying to effect policy changes from the inside. One such member, Ollaik, has published extensively about his attempts to engage a debate about Hizbullah strategy and particularly, to challenge its dependence on Iranian orders,3 and has confirmed them in interviews with this author. His public criticism and publication of internal debates and his experience remains the exception, however; in most cases, Hizbullah’s tight structure will mean that internal dissent does not reach the public. The Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, owing partly to its much longer history, has experienced a greater degree of fluctuation in its leadership, as well as generational changes, both of which have come to bear on key decisions. With many politically oriented leaders being imprisoned in the mid-1990s, older returnees from exile in the Gulf were able to take over and to give the movement a more conservative, withdrawn direction that sought out less confrontation with the regime. This is one interesting trend that is proven to have influenced the movement’s decisions. At the same time, the movement’s leadership called back many younger, Wasat-generation activists who had wanted

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to set up the Wasat Party. Here, the mainstream leadership exercised its dominant influence over those who wanted to follow a different course. Another such instance is the continuous influence – in personnel, as well as outlook – that the Special Apparatus has had on the Brotherhood’s decisions. The fact that some of the Special Apparatus’ leaders continued to be influential even after it was officially disbanded by al-Banna in the late 1940s came to influence the Brotherhood’s subsequent radicalization in the mid-1960s. This was helped by the rise of Qutb as the movement’s most prominent and influential ideologue, eclipsing the actual Supreme Guide of the movement, al-Hudaybi. This dynamic led first, as we have observed above, to a rapid radicalization of the movement, followed by a lasting moderation and the disavowal of the use of violence when plans to use violence again were discovered by the regime and led to renewed, severe repression. These fluctuations and confrontations within the two movements have, consequently, often impacted their strategic decisions, as who gets to make the decision, and the respective calculations and priorities of this group, obviously make a difference on the decisive outcome. Another interesting aspect that pertains to internal power dynamics is how they interact with other variables, such as transnational linkages. Clearly, where the Iranian leadership backed a certain Hizbullah faction in 1992, that faction won out over the more radical one and was able to impose its course on the movement. Likewise, the ideological and religious influence exerted on Muslim Brotherhood leaders during their time in exile in various Gulf countries, combined with the effects of repression that imprisoned many alternative leaders, empowered the Gulf returnees to influence the movement’s strategy.

Trends in Islamist movement strategies Throughout their respective histories, both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood have displayed identifiable trends in their strategies. For the Muslim Brotherhood, the trend has been a development towards non-violence, political participation and seeking arrangements with the ruling regime. For Hizbullah, the trend has amounted to becoming a player in an increasingly complex regional conflict and a certain unpredictability as a result of its implication within this regional situation. Put differently, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been forced to adopt an accommodationist survival strategy in the face of a

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capable and hostile regime and military. Hizbullah, on the other hand, has been able to implement a confrontational and aggressive strategy, as its local political context is only one of the arenas it ‘plays’ in, and it has at its disposal external power bases in Syria and Iran that provide it with additional weight and support. In order to identify patterns that influence these different paths, several levels of analysis have been compared, both within the two cases and across case boundaries. First of all, dynamics within the two movements have been traced in order to gain an understanding of how they influence each movement’s strategy. Second, interactions on the domestic level – with the government/ regime, or with political rivals – have been analysed. Finally, the transnational or regional level has been considered. The outcome to be explained has been the way the movements/parties have positioned themselves vis-a`-vis the regime: cooperatively, confrontationally or violently. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the analysis has shown that the movement had become relatively heterogeneous by the time of its first violent clash with the regime in the late 1940s. While al-Banna had tried to keep up an authoritarian leadership style during the first years, he increasingly lost control over different factions within the Brotherhood, which resulted in the use of violence against the regime – in conjunction with other variables such as a breakdown of state power and an escalating confrontation between the Brotherhood and the regime over support for Arab forces in Palestine. This episode shows in detail how the three levels of analysis overlap and come together in bringing about a decisive change in repertoire for the Muslim Brotherhood, that is, the use of violence against the regime. Indeed, using the terminology of path dependency theory, this period was a ‘critical juncture’ at which many of the movement’s subsequent decisions were first influenced. It established a pattern of violence followed by regime repression that was repeated during the 1960s. Over the course of time, the Brotherhood’s action repertoire became successively smaller – the extremes of using violence, as well as seeking to participate in executive government vanished. Instead, the movement became increasingly locked in a defining struggle with the regime. While often staying critical and voicing its opposition to government policies both under Sadat and Mubarak, the movement did not challenge the regime outside of the ‘red lines’ defined by the latter. The model that has come to define

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relations between the Brotherhood and the regime is one of uneasy but largely peaceful coexistence, with contacts and negotiations being conducted to keep the balance. While naturally, the context has drastically changed for the Brotherhood after the revolution in Egypt in 2011, it has largely followed the same cautious approach of trying to strike balanced relations with the military. This has resulted in Morsi taking over the presidency; but one can ask the question whether it has actually furthered the Brotherhood’s agenda on the whole. The rules of the game had become tighter and tighter before the revolution, allowing little moving space for the Muslim Brotherhood; and even after the revolution, they are still tight, turning Morsi’s presidency into somewhat of a tightrope walk, and costing the Brotherhood much popularity which it had previously held on the grounds of being a steadfast opposition movement. For Hizbullah, the story has been quite different. Instead of narrowing its action repertoire, as the Muslim Brotherhood has done, the party has over time expanded it to include the use of violence and the calculated risk of starting another civil war in Lebanon. Its ‘critical juncture’ moment indeed came in the postwar era, with the setting up of the first Hariri cabinet. During this period, the influential conflict between Hizbullah and the Hariri camp over the postwar make-up and regional positioning of Lebanon started, and has come to dominate the movement’s strategy inside Lebanon. However, contrary to the Muslim Brotherhood, which became locked down in its struggle with the regime, Hizbullah has had many other factors play into the strategy it pursued within Lebanon: the influence of its political protector within Lebanon, namely Syria; the ongoing conflict between Iran and the West; as well as, of course, its military confrontation with Israel. The basic difference that this comes down to is one of power; Hizbullah, due to its connections with Iran and Syria, has had a power base outside of Lebanese politics that it could bring to bear on its political relations there. This has prevented it from becoming ‘just another’ Lebanese political party. At the same time, however, Hizbullah has enjoyed little help and protection from Syria when it came to confronting the Future Movement and its allies, as well as the international community, over the assassination of Hariri. With the Syrian leadership itself coming under pressure for its implication in the crime, it was not in a position to help solve the dilemma for Hizbullah. In this, the party was largely left to

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handle the situation with its own devices, resulting eventually – after other variables described above came into play – in the violent clash with other Lebanese parties in May 2008. While Hizbullah has also expanded its repertoire to include the participation – and since 2011, the influential participation – in executive government, this has not led to a ruling out of violent means by the party. This is due not so much to any grand-power designs harboured by Hizbullah but to its threat perception; the fact that the camp of its political opponents is constantly trying, and often with the backing of the US and European powers, to curtail Hizbullah’s space of manoeuvre and get it to lay down its weapons, is enough of a threat to the party for it to defend itself violently.

Implications: What makes Islamist movements tick? How do these developments relate to the bigger theoretical picture that we had referred to in the beginning? We can first of all note that the different variables identified above have interacted to produce patterns in the environment of both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which the movements have reacted to in the following ways. State capacity makes a crucial difference: where it is strong, it can make even a movement as long-established and large as the Muslim Brotherhood toe the regime’s ‘red lines’ and moderate. The absence of state capacity in Lebanon leads to a much more aggressive posturing by Hizbullah, which can rest assured that the state is not strong enough to confront it. In Egypt, the main pattern shaping the Brotherhood’s strategy has been a moderate ebb and flow of state repression – during most phases considered here, repression was present – to which the movement has successively adapted. Where this repression has met the movement in an ideologically ‘radical’ and homogeneous phase – with a clear sense of mission that has put its objectives at odds with those of the state – it has produced a violent response on the part of the Brotherhood. This has been true for the late 1940s, when the Brotherhood regarded the fight for Palestine as a religious and ideological duty, and the government of Egypt was renouncing its involvement in Palestine and repressing the Brotherhood’s demonstrations for the Palestinian cause. It was also true for the mid-1960s, when the ideology of Qutb was on the rise, being perceived as a threat by the Nasser regime and consequently persecuted and repressed. This led to a renewed intention of using

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violence against the state, which was nipped in the bud before it could lead to any actions on the ground. Repression ebbed in different periods, between these two instances as well as after them, but surely did return – in the mid-1990s, it produced an attempt at opening the Brotherhood up to democratic politics and entering the political arena as a party. This had been the outcome of internal reflection and learning processes, as well as generational change, which brought a slew of politically minded Brothers into leadership positions of the movement. Yet, the new generation did not prevail in its attempts and was eventually called back by the older-generation movement leadership. These leaders did not want to risk a confrontation in the political arena and preferred to continue working as a social movement, with occasional implication in politics as well as professional syndicates. In this phase, the repression exerted by the regime met with a less homogeneous movement that was undergoing some generational conflict, which resulted in a split of the movement. The mainstream decided to eschew the establishment of a political party, preferring instead an arrangement with the regime whereby the movement remained officially banned, but was allowed to unofficially field ‘independent’ candidates in parliamentary elections. When this proved too much of a success for the regime to bear and the Brotherhood won almost 90 parliamentary seats in 2005, a new wave of repression followed; this time, the conclusion drawn was to withdraw from politics once again. Both in the mid-1990s and in 2005, repression specifically targeted those leaders who favoured involvement in politics and political activism over grassroots work or the semi-clandestine status the movement had been assigned by the regime. These measures thus represented an intelligent ‘divide and rule’ strategy on the part of the regime and proved more effective, from its perspective, in silencing the Brotherhood’s opposition than indiscriminate arrests or court martials and executions. Repression thus emerges as the dominant variable that has shaped how the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved over time. It has interacted with different contextual variables, such as generational change within the Brotherhood, conflicts between radicals and moderates, ideological developments or transnational linkages, to produce different results: violent action, ideological moderation, trying to establish a political party or turning away from politics altogether. The general pattern has been a turn away from violence on the part of the Brotherhood, and the

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development of pragmatism as its guiding principle: anything that would avoid a costly confrontation with the regime was ‘out’, anything that would allow the movement to continue to exist without clashing with the regime was ‘in’. The variable combination ‘repression/ ideological radicalization/low regime capacity’ has produced the outcome ‘use of violence against regime representatives’ in the late 1940s. In the mid-1960s, the variable combination ‘repression/ ideological radicalization/high regime capacity’ produced a plan to use violence again, but a capable regime was able to suppress it before it came to fruition. This was followed by a sustained drive to ‘moderate’, that is, to turn away from using violence altogether. In the mid-1990s, it was a combination of ‘repression/ideological moderation/high regime capacity’ that produced ‘withdrawal from politics’ as the strategy of choice for the Brotherhood. Finally, the mid-2000s saw the combination ‘repression/ideological moderation/high regime capacity’ produce the outcome ‘withdrawal from politics’ once again. From the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, we can thus take away the following main points: .

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Regime repression has deeply affected the movement’s strategies over time and become the main contextual factor to shape its action repertoire. The regime’s capacity has influenced the movement’s response: more violent where regime capacity was lower, more evasive when regime capacity was higher. The loss of a broader, transnational appeal, and the focus on reaching an arrangement with the regime and thereby securing its existence, have taken away leverage from the movement and made it more vulnerable when facing the regime. The frequency of disagreements within the movement has frequently led to splits and spin-off groups being established, which have often pursued a more radical agenda, while the Brotherhood mainstream has followed a peaceful path since the mid-1970s in order to avoid renewed regime crackdowns; the different splits have allowed for the letting off of ‘steam’.

In the case of Hizbullah, the main trend that we can summarize from the above analysis is that even though the party has increased its action

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repertoire throughout its history, it has nonetheless become more tied to the Lebanese domestic context over time, and thus has been rendered more vulnerable to attacks by its opponents (chiefly, the so-called March 14 camp, or the Future Movement and its Christian allies). A regime’s ability to substantially hinder the movement’s political or social work has only recently become somewhat of a factor for Hizbullah. For most of its history, the regime simply did not possess enough capacity on any level in order to attempt any repressive measures. Taking advantage of Syria’s withdrawal and the support of international actors, most notably the US, the Lebanese cabinet dared to use its force and authority in 2008, by attempting to place restrictions on Hizbullah’s freedom to act as a military force. The result was the first use of violence by Hizbullah inside the Lebanese state since the end of the civil war, which the party was then able to transform into political gains enshrined in the Doha Accords of 2008. Subsequently, the party’s ascent within the formal political system continued. Although its results in the 2009 parliamentary elections were not stellar, the party was nonetheless able to continue building its political power behind the scenes. As described above, this led to it bringing down the government in 2011, and in the formation of the new one, Hizbullah wielded significant bargaining power. With the Hizbullah-friendly Mikati being chosen as prime minister and its effective veto right still in place, the party now held considerable executive power and was able to influence most policy decisions in the country. Hizbullah had completed its transition from opposition, non-state armed actor to embodying executive power. Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, the party had become the kind of actor it had previously fought against, and the transition has actually weakened its position. It can now be blamed for deficiencies attributed to the ‘state’, and is additionally losing credibility and popularity by its continued refusal to break with the regime of al-Assad in Syria. Returning to the overview of the different variables according to the research design, the first phase of Hizbullah’s evolution, 1985– 92, saw the variable combination ‘civil war/ideological moderation by transnational influence/radical-moderate conflict’, with the outcome that at the end of the war, Iranian influence ensured that a more moderate faction within Hizbullah carried the day and the party entered the postwar elections. Subsequently, between 1992 and 2000, the combination ‘low regime capacity/ideological moderation by

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transnational influence/strong party leadership’ have resulted in a continuing use of the political system’s available avenues, such as elections and steering committees. Hizbullah’s goals and policies were not necessarily in agreement with those of the government, but peaceful avenues were used to express them. Syria played out its political influence in Lebanon in order to ensure that other political actors did not openly challenge the party and continued to support its armed resistance against Israel. During the years 2000– 4, this peaceful trend continued: ‘Low regime capacity/ideological moderation by transnational influence/ unified movement’ continued to produce the use of available political means for the expression of demands. Iran was still exercising a restraining influence on Hizbullah in Lebanon, but conflict with other political players started to build up. During 2005– 11, the combination ‘low regime capacity/ideological radicalization/unified movement’ led to open conflict between Hizbullah and the Hariri camp. Syria was gone from Lebanon as a mediating factor securing the party’s interests, and Iran began to take a more confrontational stance towards the West. This resulted in a major war with Israel in 2006, as well as in the internal use of force in 2008. Radicalization that occurred during this period concerned the domestic political conflict between Hizbullah and the March 14 camp, not necessarily the ideological outlook of the movement. Based on the above analysis, we can identify the following trends and patterns as having shaped Hizbullah’s positioning vis-a`-vis the state: .

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The party has undergone a steady refocusing onto the domestic level: transnational linkages and concerns have progressively become weaker, while calculations pertaining to the Lebanese political system have become more important. The exacerbating confrontation between Hizbullah on the one hand and its opposing political camp, first embodied by the Future Movement alone, later on by the so-called March 14 coalition, on the other, has prompted the party to use all available means – including violence – against its rivals. The confrontation with March 14 has been fuelled by regional developments, such as the Iraq War, that have accentuated the Sunni–Shiʽi fault line and have contributed to its prevalence in Lebanese internal affairs.

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The perception that the conflict with the government is a zero-sum game has driven Hizbullah to react aggressively to any perceived threats to its position, and to pre-empt such threats as much as possible.

Ultimately, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah, once in positions of power, have behaved much like the regimes they initially had set out to fight, then to change. Both movements have taken up the political opportunities that have presented themselves over time, and both have acted extremely pragmatically, entering into alliances with former rivals and making pragmatic, ad-hoc choices. The Muslim Brotherhood has reached its current position via adaptation and cooptation, while Hizbullah has reached it via dominance. For both movements, their current positions of power in executive government have largely proven detrimental in terms of popularity, credibility and legitimacy. On a broader level, we can thus conclude that state capacity matters, and plays an important role in influencing Islamist movement behaviour. Also important, however, is the internal power configuration of the movement and the way it is organized. A strongly hierarchical movement such as Hizbullah with its low toleration of debate and dissent will respond differently than a more open, heterogeneous movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This has been shown in the preceding discussion, where rival factions of the Brotherhood have engaged in quite a public debate over which strategic course to follow and whether to engage in politics or focus on social movement work. Usually, in the case of the Egyptian Brotherhood, the more cautious and accommodationist approach has won out within the movement’s mainstream, doubtlessly as a consequence of the lesson that confrontation inevitably draws heavy repression as a response. Any dissenting groups or currents within the Muslim Brotherhood that wanted to follow a more radical approach have either changed course, or formed spin-off groups ranging from the Gama’a Islamiyya to Islamic Jihad to, eventually, al-Qaeda, which has been heavily influenced by radical Islamist thinkers hailing from and influenced by the Egyptian political context. Hizbullah has both been more ideologically streamlined, and has not faced the threat of a repressive response, resulting in its more aggressive stance. The conclusion to draw from

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these developments is that where a movement is ideologically unified and coherent and is challenged by a regime or rival group, its response is likely to be forceful or even violent. This is especially true where repression is not feared as a possible response. Conversely, if repression is a possible response, large and especially heterogeneous movements with some room for debate will choose an accommodationist course. In their case, it is more likely that individual groups can split off the mainstream and put their radical ideas into practice independently of the group’s majority. The above analysis has also shown that transnational linkages can significantly empower a movement vis-a`-vis the state or government it is facing. This is true for material support, obviously, which Hizbullah receives from Iran and through Syria. It is also true in a more ideational sense, where a community of support can make a movement take a stronger stance on the ground, as was the case for the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1930s and 1940s. The notion that any social movement can summon support from across the borders of its national context will make a government or regime calibrate its response accordingly. This ties in with the many theoretical conceptualizations of transnational social movement connections and coalition-building, which have been discussed at the beginning of this book. Where no such coalitions exist, the capacity of the relevant regime will have much more determining influence for the possibilities of action faced by Islamist movements as well as other social movements.

Epilogue on the Muslim Brotherhood: Post-Revolutionary Developments The political situation in Egypt remains in flux at the time of writing, and it would be difficult to fully incorporate it into the analysis of this book due to its volatile and constantly evolving nature. What this section will accomplish, however, is to give a brief overview of postrevolutionary developments in Egypt, and to assess how these developments fit with the findings of the book, which incorporate only pre-revolutionary events. On 25 January 2011, mass protests began in Egypt, calling for the ouster of President Mubarak. They had been sparked by events in Tunisia, where demonstrators had been successful in forcing the end of the authoritarian Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali regime and

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had overthrown the political order. The protests also built on growing dissent and sporadic demonstrations among the trade union movement as well as bloggers and journalists, who had increasingly become targets for the security services. Preceding the revolution, there had been massive online mobilization mostly on social media sites. The events in Tunisia helped channel this mobilization into an actual protest movement in the streets. Weeks of demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said, as well as in smaller towns, finally resulted in Mubarak’s admittance of defeat and his resignation on 11 February 2011 to the incredulous delight of protesters in the street. Power was handed over to the SCAF headed by former army Commander-in-Chief General Tantawi. The fact that the armed forces took over during an unstable turnover situation reassured many, as the army had cultivated an image of being an impartial power broker sympathetic to the people’s demands, and was trusted in this capacity by the majority of protesters. Images and slogans of ‘the people and the army are one hand’ seen during the protests attest to the trust placed in the armed forces. I will briefly summarize the subsequent developments here, as some of them have already been mentioned in Chapter II. First off was the constitutional referendum, held in March 2011, which set the date for parliamentary elections for November of that year, and for presidential elections to be held in June 2012. This prompted much criticism, as noted in Chapter II, because such a speedy electoral process would skew the chances of winning in favour of long-established actors such as the Muslim Brothers. However, the results of the referendum were in favour of the constitutional amendment, and parliamentary elections in November brought an Islamist majority in parliament, followed by the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Morsi, during the presidential elections. The Muslim Brotherhood had risen from banned political actor to ruling power in the country within the space of several months, carrying the hopes of its supporters and angering the many secular activists who had fought for a democratic revolution and now felt their aspirations cheated by an Islamist takeover. This was reinforced when President Morsi carried out a wide-ranging personnel changeover among the security establishment and armed forces command that ended the era of SCAF dominance, and brought allies of the President to key security positions in the fall of 2012. He then further aggravated his opponents by issuing a decree, in

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November 2012, that placed his decisions outside of judicial oversight in a bid to curtail the judges’ influence and secure his own grip on the constitution-making process. The latter was then duly passed and hastily signed into law after a referendum in December 2012. Morsi had rescinded the decree extending his powers at the beginning of December, but kept in place the stipulation that a referendum was to be held on the constitution the same month. In all, Morsi thus quite cleverly played the transition process in order to safeguard his own power, and to keep cordial relations with the key power broker, the Egyptian military. How does this course of events reflect the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy in the post-revolutionary era? First of all, it yet again reveals the movement’s cautious and pragmatic approach to power politics, aimed at maximizing its power within the political context even at the expense of going back on ideological positions. During the revolution, the Brotherhood had at first taken on a low-key stance on the expectation that the initial protests of January 2011 would not lead to much.4 After it became obvious that something bigger than previous, scattered protests was under way, the Brotherhood’s leadership decided to adopt a middle-of-the-road position designed to avoid clashes with either the protesters or the military: while not officially participating as a movement, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership permitted the movement’s members to take part in the demonstrations. With this move, the leadership hoped to seize the revolutionary mood of the moment, while avoiding any possible backlash in case the regime decided to crack down on the protesters.5 This goes to demonstrate yet again to what extent the years of heavy regime repression had influenced the Brotherhood’s decision making, accounting for a cautious approach, aware of the fact that the regime was likely to blame Islamists for instigating the revolution if it were to crack down. When this did not happen, the Brotherhood turned its attention to the most important power centre of the moment, the Egyptian military, entering into negotiations and talks with SCAF before any of the other political players did.6 The Brotherhood’s immediate goals during this stage were to end the movement’s illegal status and gain recognition for a full-fledged political party, which it was able to do with the establishment of the FJP in February 2012. Throughout the postrevolutionary turmoil and de facto months of SCAF governance, which only effectively ended with the holding of parliamentary and then

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presidential elections, the FJP and Brotherhood continued to be careful not to antagonize the armed forces, which they perceived to be representing the important remnants of the old regime.7 This was manifest in the FJP’s initial insistence on not fielding a presidential candidate, and running for a limited number of parliamentary seats only. These steps were designed to send the message that an Islamist takeover of power was far from imminent – aimed at both the political opposition as well as the military. Rival political groups in Egypt were wary of the Brotherhood’s superior organizational structure, ample funding and years of experience in navigating the regime’s and the military’s red lines. The military itself wanted to leave the political spotlight, hand over power to civilian politicians and continue to safeguard its substantial economic assets and socio-economic privileges that largely lay – and continue to lie – outside of any legal oversight. When SCAF’s hold on political power became increasingly strong, the Brotherhood decided to put up a fight. The leadership went back on its earlier, non-confrontational decision not to field a presidential candidate, and declared that it would run al-Shater in the race for the office of president. In the words of one observer, the Brotherhood, having played its relations with SCAF rather well thus far and having obtained legal status, was now so close to power it could ‘smell it’,8 but with the military leadership assuming more and more executive powers – for example by dissolving parliament shortly before the presidential elections – the final success was being threatened. Having learned from the long history of confrontation and cooperation with the military, especially from the ‘loss’ of the revolution in 1952, Brotherhood leaders were not leaving their political fate up to the military this time. As mentioned in Chapter II, several Brotherhood members interviewed explicitly linked the events of 1952 with the post-revolutionary process in 2011. In a final move presumably meant to weaken the Muslim Brotherhood’s bid for power, al-Shater was subsequently banned from running for president because his mother had held dual citizenship and was also a US citizen, which the constitution did not allow for. He was replaced by Morsi, who faced Shafik, the last prime minister under Mubarak’s rule. Morsi won the election, meaning that the military and old regime elements had been unable to install their candidate, but also directing attention away from SCAF’s mismanagement of the first six post-revolutionary months and concentrating all hopes and expectations

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on the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood now that it was finally in power. As mentioned above, Morsi soon moved against SCAF and decreed a substantial reshuffle of key positions. He had the backing of other military figures for this, as SCAF was blamed for the continuing military trials of protesters after the revolution and of authoritarian tendencies, which was tainting the military’s reputation as impartial arbiter. With Tantawi and several other key figures replaced and sent to retirement, the military was able to start with a clean slate. In dealing with Morsi’s rule, the military leadership had also ensured that the National Defence Council, a body originally established under Nasser but long dormant, was reinstituted, giving the military sufficient say in executive decisions. By having Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi take the post of defence minister, the military leadership ensured that its extensive economic interests would be safeguarded. In the end, both sides seemed to have gained during the confrontation: the Brotherhood was finally in power and the Egyptian president, the most powerful office in the country, was held by one of its adherents, a fact which had been absolutely unimaginable a mere two years previously. The military was back in its comfortable position on the ‘back seat’ of power: it was no longer running day-to-day affairs in the country and therefore avoided being held responsible for any mishaps and negative developments. These would, on the contrary, be blamed on Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that, incidentally, served the military’s interest in curtailing the Brotherhood’s power in the longer term. Disappointment with Morsi’s rule became apparent soon after the election, when it became clear that the government was doing little to alleviate poverty, was still cooperating with the much-criticized IMF to prop up national finances, and was not able to prevent random violence from occurring, for example in Muslim– Christian conflicts. Most of all, however, it was Morsi’s own manoeuvring for power that cost the Brotherhood most of the legitimacy it had won during its years in the opposition. His decree of December 2012, which gave him virtually unfettered executive power, contributed to the sharp drop in his popularity, and ultimately in the legitimacy of his rule and of the Muslim Brotherhood as ruling power. The post-revolutionary period thus continues a trend in the Brotherhood’s political behaviour that had been apparent in previous episodes analysed in this study. It was first and foremost a struggle for

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political power between the movement and the main power brokers in the state at that point, the Egyptian military. Considerations such as the Brotherhood’s vision for politics and for the type of state the movement eventually wanted to shape during the transitional period came secondary to establishing a hold on power. Muslim Brotherhood spokespeople and representatives were careful to project a democratic image and to address fears of an Islamist turn in politics, saying that they wanted a secular state with an ‘Islamic frame of reference’, and thereby implying that little would change in the relationship of religion and politics, as Islam was already enshrined in the constitution as Egypt’s state region. The initial appeasement of the military’s position, which was expressed in a refusal to field a candidate for the presidential elections, led to renewed splits in the movement. Several leading Brotherhood figures decided not to go along with this decision; former Deputy Supreme Guide Habib as well as Aboul Fotouh broke away to form their own political party, Al-Nahda, which ran Aboul Fotouh as a candidate in the elections. Others, who had previously been counted among the movements ‘reformers’, such as Erian, toed the leadership’s line and stayed with the official, conservative and cautious FJP policy. This policy only started to change when the military started reaching for power more forcefully. When in November 2011, a document drawn up by the military became public that would have placed the military budget entirely outside of legislative oversight, there was intense criticism and the document was eventually withdrawn. As the military dissolved parliament and thus deprived the Brotherhood of a main power base, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership decided on a riposte and challenged the military for the country’s presidency, with success. The interaction between the military and the Brotherhood had reverted into a familiar pattern of a struggle for survival, and as soon as this became evident, the Brotherhood did not hesitate to challenge the military, while remaining peaceful in its methods and thereby careful not to provide the generals with a pretext for a crackdown. An important aspect that was once again disregarded by both the military and the Brotherhood’s leaders was that of public legitimacy, however. Entirely focused on correctly positioning itself in the power game with the army’s leaders, Morsi and his advisers lost sight of the high public aspirations that their rise to power had generated. For the duration of its entire existence, the Brotherhood had claimed to represent values of purity and

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moral uprightness, which it could not act upon once in power. Some of the actions undertaken by the Brotherhood, such as President Morsi’s controversial decree of November 2012, cost the movement additional legitimacy and essentially made it look like the semi-authoritarian regimes that had preceded it.

Post-Revolutionary Developments, 2012 –15 The Brotherhood during Egypt’s transition Once in power, the Muslim Brotherhood decisively influenced the course of Egypt’s transition – first, by polarizing the political scene, then by succumbing to the military and ushering in Egypt’s next incarnation of an authoritarian military regime, this time led by al-Sisi. This, of course, was far from the aspirations held by the movement’s leaders and followers for the scenario that by some turn of events, they would ever access and exercise political power. How did this catastrophic turn of events come about? How did the movement manage to ‘lose the revolution’ yet again after having actually risen to the top of the political hierarchy? Several developments coincided to lead to the most recent wave of regime repression that the Brotherhood has found itself subjected to by the al-Sisi regime. First, the Brotherhood, as it turned out, was completely unfit for actually occupying the presidency after years of political marginalization and opposition. Consequently, its leaders behaved with complete incompetence after Morsi was elected president in the June 2012 elections and thus managed to alienate not only the wider public,9 but also many actors within the political and state-security sphere. Second, and resulting from such incompetent governance, the movement was threatening a number of vested interests. After failing to implement any coherent economic policy due to internal squabbles, and faced with a dire economic outlook after the uprisings had disrupted much of the country’s commercial activity, the IMF refused to grant the Morsi government a $4.8 billion loan. Morsi also dismissed senior members of the military from their posts, including SCAF leader Tantawi, antagonizing large sections of the military-security establishment. Concurrently, he failed to engage with the secular opposition parties in parliament, which soon started boycotting crucial initiatives such as the Constitutive Assembly for the drafting of a new constitution. Third, the

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military began trying to take back power from Morsi by implementing constitutional changes soon after he was elected, effectively carrying out a ‘soft coup’.10 In the final result, the military had a perfect pretext for taking back power when public demonstrations against Morsi’s rule paralysed much of the country and demanded his resignation. After Morsi was removed from power, a new, extremely violent cycle of confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, as well as between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents ensued. The military failed to control what was happening in the streets, and given the extremely polarized atmosphere, countless people were killed in clashes with security forces or even in lynchings on the street. In this section, I will trace the lead-up to these developments and assess their aftermath, which saw – once again – the entire leadership echelon of the Muslim Brotherhood being locked up in prison, many of them sentenced to death, and the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement as well as all organizations associated with it banned from the public sphere by an authoritarian military regime. Today, it seems hard to think of a period in Egypt’s history when relations between supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and those who identify with Islamist values on the one hand, and those who espouse secular values and view the Brotherhood as a threat on the other, have been more strained and fraught with conflict and escalation.

The Brotherhood’s rapid rise and fall In the process of Egypt’s transition to the next political phase after Mubarak had been ousted, many steps were implemented haphazardly, as Brown points out. In fact, the entire transition period’s main characteristic can be summarized in the sentence that ‘there was no plan’; many things were simply left to chance in the context of an unprecedented power vacuum. The military was able to arrogate political power immediately following the revolution simply because the military ‘claimed it’.11 Executive power effectively passed to SCAF, a body of top military officials headed by former Defence Minister Tantawi, which suspended parliament as well as the constitution. The protests that had led to Mubarak’s ouster subsided, but did not stop, as a number of political activists continued to be weary of the military’s takeover of power. SCAF had pledged to relinquish power within six months or whenever elections could be held, but given the Egyptian

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military’s previous involvement in politics, many activists did not fully trust this pledge. On the other hand, the Egyptian army had been welcomed by protesters into Tahrir Square and was often viewed as the people’s guardian. An uneasy calm thus prevailed in the immediate postrevolutionary weeks and months. Early on during this phase, SCAF turned to established political actors in order to negotiate the possible path of a transition. As one of the country’s most popular and most established political actors, the Muslim Brotherhood became part of these negotiations early on. In June 2012, coinciding with the presidential polls which saw the Brotherhood’s Morsi emerge victorious, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court ruled the parliamentary election results of November 2011 to be null and void. This was justified with the argument that the electoral process had unfairly favoured political party candidates over independent ones. The latter had been restricted to running for only a third of available seats, and on top of this, had had to compete against the superior organizational structures and better resources of party candidates. The court thought this to be sufficient grounds for dissolving parliament and ordering a repeat of elections; in the meantime, legislative power passed back to SCAF. Morsi initially opposed the ruling and called on parliamentarians to defy it and to assemble regardless. Recognizing that given the polarized situation during the transition phase and the lack of support for this initiative parliament was not likely to follow suit, he subsequently relented and accepted the court’s decision. This insight notwithstanding, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood leadership continued to exacerbate the already stark schism between a secular opposition and Brotherhood supporters and allies. His restructuring of the security services has already been mentioned, as has the presidential decree of November 2012 that briefly shielded the presidency from judicial review, before being revoked again. The Brotherhood’s actions during this period alienated many especially among the younger voters, who had given Morsi their votes in the presidential elections in order to avoid a return of Shafik, the former regime candidate, to power. In December 2012, things escalated further when Morsi pushed a draft constitution through to a referendum vote. Secular members of the Constitutive Assembly tasked with drawing up a new constitution had previously resigned and voiced their opposition to

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the draft produced, which embodied an Islamist legal agenda and curtailed women’s rights as well as some political liberties, such as the freedoms of speech and assembly. The constitution was approved in the vote, which triggered extensive protests by the political opposition as well as Copts and women’s groups and further ratcheted up the tension. In this tense situation, protests started turning violent, often taking the form of Coptic –Muslim street battles or attacks on churches, but also pitting opposition activists and Muslim Brotherhood supporters against each other more generally. In January 2013, street fights in Cairo and other major cities began to escalate again, and more than 50 people were killed in clashes surrounding the two-year anniversary of the 2011 uprisings. These fights demonstrated the extent to which the outcome of the uprisings, and the direction of Egypt’s transition, remained contested and fought over. The Muslim Brotherhood was fighting this battle in the political arena and was using all legal and constitutional means now at its disposal in order to hold on to political power and dictate the outcome of Egypt’s ongoing political and social strife. Other political activists had to resort to means outside of the political process and kept up the street demonstrations, while secular political actors were voicing their discontent and sending messages by withdrawing from the Constituent Assembly. The deteriorating security situation that was the outcome of this development soon called the army back onto the political playing field. Early on during this wave of protests, defence minister and head of the Egyptian army al-Sisi warned that demonstrations and clashes were spiralling out of control, and during several days in January 2013, state security forces no longer seemed to be in control of Port Said. Demonstrations here had been particularly strong after 21 people had been sentenced to death for their involvement in the Port Said football massacre.12 President Morsi declared a curfew in a number of Suez Canal cities including Port Said and Suez. Protests continued in Cairo as well and several demonstrators were killed there by security forces without any follow-up. Clashes between protesters and security forces continued to flare up throughout the following three months, while the government was experiencing difficulties in securing a new loan from the IMF. In early 2013, a new youth movement, Tamarod (Rebellion), launched a large-scale campaign aiming to oust Morsi from power with the declared intention of collecting 15 million signatures demanding

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the president’s resignation. They were soon joined by other movements, such as the 6 April Movement, Kifaya and the National Salvation Front, turning the campaign into a full-fledged challenge to Morsi’s rule. There were no tangible improvements, or visible policy measures aimed at such improvements, in living conditions for Egyptian citizens. At the same time, as discussed above, the legal and constitutional setting, and with it the democratic process itself, remained highly contested. In a further blowback to Morsi’s plans, an administrative court cancelled his decree setting the date of the next parliamentary elections for April 2013. The court referred both the decree and the electoral law to the Supreme Constitutional Court for review in order to establish whether they conformed with the constitution. In parallel with these developments that certainly seemed problematic from the point of view of the Muslim Brotherhood, the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula also continued to spiral out of control. Several attacks were carried out by armed militants against Egyptian security forces stationed there, reinforcing the impression that state forces were unable to control Egyptian territory. Additionally, the Sinai Peninsula attacks and President Morsi’s reaction to them – regarded by many as too lenient vis-a`-vis the supposedly Islamist attackers – prompted accusations of an Islamist takeover of state institutions. Regardless of whether this was actually happening, it provided the army with very plausible arguments for a potential takeover of power. It seems almost obvious, with the benefit of hindsight, that Morsi was unable to consolidate his rule in any way, and that public unrest as well as the suspicion of power centres within the armed forces continued to be on the rise, threatening his hold on political power. His appointment of 13 new regional governors politically supportive of him and including one member of Gama’a Islamiyya allegedly linked to the 1997 Luxor massacres, in June 2013, represented the final straw in the escalating confrontation between Morsi, the political opposition and indeed, public opinion. Mass protests once again started to accumulate in central Cairo, including Tahrir Square, as well as in other cities, calling for the resignation of President Morsi. The Egyptian army was quick to capitalize on the movement and carried out publicity stunts in support of the protest, such as having helicopters carrying Egyptian flags circle over Tahrir Square. Al-Sisi issued an ultimatum for politicians to reach a

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compromise and ‘fulfil the people’s demands’, failing which the army would impose a ‘road map’ for national politics. Ministers started resigning from the current government and it became increasingly clear that a change of power was imminent. In clashes and protests surrounding these developments, numerous protesters were again killed. On 3 July, the military finally declared the end of Morsi’s presidency and Adly Mansour was named as interim president. Morsi was immediately taken into custody by the military. As much as the enormous popular protests had expressed popular frustration with Morsi’s presidency, in the weeks following his ouster, the deep divisions riddling Egyptian society became apparent in a massive wave of protests and sit-ins held by supporters and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The military immediately started to move against the Brotherhood, arresting many top leaders in addition to Morsi, including current leader Badie and former Supreme Guide Akef. The situation grew more tense, and Brotherhood supporters vowed not to accept the coup carried out by the armed forces, setting up two large sit-in protests in Al-Nahda Square as well as outside the Rabia alAdawiya mosque in Cairo. The sit-ins lasted until mid-August and all attempts at mediation failed, with protesters still calling for Morsi to be reinstated as president and for the results of the military coup to be reversed. The army, under al-Sisi’s leadership, then decided to ‘clear’ the sit-ins, and started to move against protesters on 13 August 2013, using tear gas, birdshot and live ammunition. The security forces contend that they had repeatedly called for protesters to leave the square and that peaceful participants in the protests had been given a chance to leave. However, eyewitness accounts as well as footage taken with smart phones and hand-held cameras shows that snipers were repeatedly firing on and killing protesters. A report by Human Rights Watch, based on hundreds of eyewitness accounts, video analysis and interviews, estimates that ‘at least 817 and likely well over 1,000 people were killed in Rabia al-Adawiya Square alone on August 14’.13 The Egyptian Health Ministry estimated casualties to number around 288 protesters, while Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim alleged in an interview that ‘40-something bodies’ were found in Rabia al-Adawiya Square, which the Muslim Brotherhood had brought there from other locations.14 In July, security forces killed scores of other protesters in different incidents as well: according to the same Human Rights Watch report, on 5 July,

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security forces shot and killed five unarmed pro-Morsi demonstrators outside the Republican Guard headquarters. Three days later, on 8 July, another 61 demonstrators holding a peaceful sit-in outside the Republican Guard to protest the 5 July killings were shot by security forces. The list of such killings continued throughout the remainder of 2013; protesters were again shot and killed during a pro-Morsi rally in October. Concurrently, the government banned the Muslim Brotherhood, confiscated all of its assets and arrested most members of the top leadership as well as many of the rank and file. The freedoms of assembly and speech were further restricted under the terms of a new protest law in November 2013.

Return to the familiar: The al-Sisi regime and persecution of the Brotherhood In January 2014, a new version of a constitution was approved by public referendum. Once again, it banned political parties based on religious principles, ruling out any possibility of a return of a Muslim Brotherhood-related party. This was, however, scarcely possible anyway, given the exceptionally harsh repression applied by the government to the Brotherhood’s personnel and structures. Soon afterwards, campaigning for a new presidential election began. The Muslim Brotherhood remained excluded this time, and the race soon focused on Defence Minister al-Sisi and Hamdeen Sabahi, a moderate secular politician critical of any remnants of the old regime. Elections were held in May 2014, and al-Sisi won by a considerable margin, enjoying widespread popularity and sparking a phenomenon known as ‘al-Sisi mania’, which saw numerous artefacts and gadgets with his image and name on them produced. It seemed that popular opinion, wary of the ups and downs and the frequent outburst violence experienced during the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, wanted calm and order to be restored by someone judged capable of doing so. Al-Sisi apparently met the criteria and was able to cater to this desire. Ever since al-Sisi has been in power, political liberties have been on the decline again, becoming curtailed even more strongly than under the rule of Morsi. In addition to the protest law, the cases against Muslim Brotherhood members and leaders, and restrictions on press freedom resulting in the arrest of a number of journalists, conditions were also tightened once again for civil society organizations. Measures imposing

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stricter regulations on non-governmental organizations had already been taken by the Morsi administration; in November 2014, all nongovernmental organizations in Egypt were notified that they had to officially re-register with the authorities, or close down. While the government was trying to pass this off as an administrative measure, to most Egyptian activists, especially those working for civil and political as well as human rights, it was clear that the government was targeting them and that they would have to close down or face long jail sentences.15 Despite the increasingly restrictive civil and political environment in Egypt and the outright persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood, the alSisi regime, at the time of writing of this epilogue, has been unable to establish thorough hold and control over its territory, thus failing to deliver on the main currency al-Sisi had been touting since his days as defence minister. The upholding of security, law and order for a population tired of arbitrary violence, insecurity and a failing infrastructure had been the promise that ultimately got al-Sisi elected, in the long-standing tradition of a military strongman who is able to deliver these kinds of goods. However, pushing the Brotherhood underground once again, silencing the political opposition, curtailing civil society and changing the set-up of important courts in order to better control the judiciary have failed to get al-Sisi the control and prestige that he and his regime, in the tradition of Egyptian military regimes of the past six decades, have apparently attempted to secure with these measures. The security situation especially in the Sinai Peninsula further deteriorated in late 2014 and continues to do so; in two major insurgent attacks on Egyptian army barracks in the Sinai Peninsula in November 2014 and February 2015 around 70 army personnel were killed in an unprecedented intensity of peacetime attacks in Egypt. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, an al-Qaeda-affiliate organization, has claimed responsibility for the attacks. In a statement related to the attacks in the Sinai Peninsula in February 2015, President al-Sisi blamed the insurgency on the Muslim Brotherhood, using a familiar approach of employing the movement as a scapegoat for a fragile security situation, and blaming terrorist attacks on it despite its long history of nonviolence. The regime had earlier alleged the Muslim Brotherhood had been involved in the recurring attacks together with Hamas, which was blamed for supporting a terrorist infrastructure inside Egypt by way of

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smuggling weapons and ammunition from Gaza into Egypt through a tunnel system. In December 2014, the Egyptian government destroyed large parts of the Egyptian town of Rafah that borders the Gaza Strip in order to stop the alleged smuggling. By stressing a connection between Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the regime has further tried to paint the Brotherhood as a ‘terrorist movement’ needing to be contained, and has thus attempted to justify its intimidation and prosecution campaign against the movement. Throughout 2015, there have been recurrent clashes between individuals thought to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and state security forces, with a number of casualties on both sides. Most recently, nine people were killed in January 2016 when security forces raided a supposed militant hideout.

Hizbullah in the Aftermath of the Arab uprisings On the whole, Hizbullah has also not fared especially well during the years after 2011, albeit for obviously different reasons than the Muslim Brotherhood. After an initial period of watching events in Syria unfold from a relative distance, Hizbullah openly sided with the regime of alAssad and started fighting to support the Syrian regime against various, and multiplying, rebel factions also active on the ground. This decision was immediately perceived to come at considerable political and reputational cost: after offering rhetorical support to the Egyptian people in their struggle against Mubarak in 2011, the party was now openly supporting another dictatorial regime against the will of the Syrian people. Hizbullah’s support has also increased the military and strategic risks the party is exposing itself to. By becoming active on the Syrian battlefield, Hizbullah has made a number of new enemies, mostly Sunni militias, incurred heavy losses and begun to spread out its military capabilities over a much larger area than usual. While the political situation inside Lebanon has remained largely stagnant and the political process stalemated, Sunni militant groups have carried out a string of bomb attacks against Hizbullah targets on its very home turf, in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Uncertainty after the uprisings of 2011 and military involvement in Syria and Iraq Initially, the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings seemed to bode well for Hizbullah, which had defined itself as a key champion of the

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disadvantaged and downtrodden in the Arab world ever since its establishment. Therefore, the party initially endorsed the uprising of the disadvantaged. With events unfolding in Syria, however, Hizbullah quickly grew more ambiguous and finally fully came out in support of the Syrian regime, acknowledging in mid-2012 that it was fighting alongside the troops of al-Assad. Prior to this statement, Nasrallah had attempted to make this apparent volte-face more palatable to the public at large, arguing that it was in the best interest of the Syrian populace to enter into ‘dialogue’ with the al-Assad regime and voice their demands for change. He maintained that al-Assad would listen and implement reforms, but that he needed time.16 This was, of course, mere propaganda, as it had already become obvious by mid-2011 that alAssad was not going to listen to reform demands and had instead instructed state security forces to arrest, fire on and torture protesters – essentially, to do everything and anything that was necessary to quell the nascent uprising. Yet, Hizbullah still appeared, in a relatively uncertain regional situation, to keep riding the wave of popularity and legitimacy that the role of the champion of the underdogs afforded it. Uncertainty also began to spread in Lebanon domestically. Although Hizbullah found itself in a comfortable position of power in domestic politics, to all appearances, the years 2011 and 2012 brought a number of challenges to this newfound place in Lebanese affairs. The party found itself embroiled in a full-on propaganda war concerning the STL, extending considerable effort, together with Aoun’s FPM, in trying to discredit the court and its findings. Apparently, this strategy was quite successful, as many, at least among the movement’s following in Lebanon, viewed the tribunal as biased, and the ‘Christian street’ was seemingly divided on the issue.17 Hizbullah also did its best in trying to withhold Lebanon’s share of funding for the tribunal, which it had agreed to provide as per the tribunal’s statutes. A governmental crisis arose around this issue when Hizbullah attempted to turn the denial of tribunal funding into a precondition for forming a new government; it was eventually resolved, with mediation from Saudi Arabia and other actors, and Hizbullah had to accept that the Lebanese government would officially endorse the tribunal’s work. Mikati became Lebanon’s prime minister, a well-connected and wealthy Sunni businessman independent of March 14 and therefore well suited to head the government and cooperate with Hizbullah as well as with its political rivals.

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The political stalemate continued, however, with the gulf between the March 8 and March 14 camps ever widening. This was true for the financing of the UN Tribunal, but also for parliamentary elections, where the different political camps were unable to agree on questions of process and the electoral framework. The electoral law dating from the 1960s was due to be overhauled, and a controversial proposal for a new law, named ‘Orthodox law’ after the parties who drew it up, was contributing to the fragmentation of the already divided political scene. It would have accorded Christian parties an advantage compared to the existing law, and given Sunnis a worse outlook in Lebanon’s sectarian-influenced electoral list by turning the country into a single electoral district, with each sect voting for their own seats in a proportional-representation system. Due to the alliance between Hizbullah and Aoun’s FPM, the Orthodox law would have translated into a clear advantage for the March 8 coalition and worked to the detriment of March 14. Due to the inability of all sides to find a compromise on this, members of parliament eventually voted to postpone elections until the end of 2014, in a move not seen since the days of Lebanon’s civil war. The rationale was that due to the worsening security situation, the presidential vacuum – President Sleiman’s term ended in May 2013 and agreement on a new compromise candidate was missing – and the conflict over the electoral law, elections would not be able to be held fairly and safely. Also in May 2013, Hizbullah had become openly involved in a battle on the border with Syria, fighting rebel forces for the town of Qusayr. This, in turn, had prompted clashes in the notorious flashpoint of Sunni–Shiʽi violence in Lebanon, namely, the northern city of Tripoli. These outbreaks of violence clearly demonstrated how the conflict in Syria was affecting the internal political situation in Lebanon and contributing to the ongoing stalemate, while the use of violence was flaring up in Tripoli and on the country’s borders. Additionally, Hizbullah’s involvement in the conflict, its fight against Sunni militias and the perception that it was helping the Lebanese army secure Lebanon’s border with Syria drew retaliation. Both Hizbullah targets and Lebanese army personnel at checkpoints were targeted in a series of bombings and attacks throughout 2014, further adding to the already tense situation.

Hizbullah’s military endeavours With both parliamentary and presidential elections postponed and the security situation worsening, added to the massive influx of Syrian

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refugees into Lebanon, the country seemed increasingly adrift. Hizbullah, in this situation, largely refrained from controversial action on the domestic political scene, focusing on its military involvement in Syria. A new twist was added to the situation with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) militia in mid-2014. Growing out of increasing Sunni resistance against the rule of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and drawing on forces built up in civil war Syria, IS soon invaded large parts of Iraq and in June 2014 captured Mosul, Iraq’s third-largest city. It did not stop there, however, and continued to move towards Baghdad. With the rise of this Sunni militia in a strategic arena long dominated by Shiʽi forces thrust in its face, Hizbullah did not stay out of the conflict for long. Hizbullah forces soon became involved in fighting IS in Iraq, and sustained losses there as well: a key military commander was killed north of Baghdad in late 2014. In February 2015, Secretary-General Nasrallah officially acknowledged Hizbullah’s Iraq involvement in a speech, calling for more volunteers to join the fight there and also stating that the party’s armed wing would need the help of allied forces from within Iraq and Iran.18 Prior to these developments, a new arena for confrontation had also sprung up on the Syrian–Israeli border: Israel was presumed to be behind the early 2015 killing of a Hizbullah squad containing top commanders, as well as Jihad Mughniyeh, the son of late Hizbullah military commander Imad Mughniyeh, who had been killed in a Damascus car bombing in 2008. Likely in retaliation, Hizbullah had then shelled an Israeli military convoy, killing two soldiers and briefly summoning the spectre of a renewed Israel –Hizbullah military conflict. De-escalation on both sides prevented such a conflict, at least for the time being. Post-Arab uprising developments thus reveal a Hizbullah increasingly beleaguered and forced to deploy its considerable military resources almost to the point of overstretch. Politically, the movement has been content to keep things stalemated inside Lebanon, preventing further strains on its apparently compromised situation, while also preventing the image of a successful, dominant social and political movement that had still prevailed in early and mid-2011. This compromised situation results, on the one hand, from a perceived drop in support and legitimacy following the party’s official coming-out as a supporter of the Syrian regime. On the other hand, Hizbullah’s armed wing found itself embroiled in not one, but three military theatres by

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the end of 2014. This resulted in higher demands on the crisis management deployed by its leadership, and in a quieter stance on the Lebanese political scene. Here, things had increasingly heated up following the uprisings of 2011, the outbreak of a full-blown civil war in Syria and the increasing spillover of that conflict into Lebanese politics, to the point of bringing Tripoli to the edge of civil war again as Sunni– Shiʽi tensions manifested in gunfights. In early 2015, the two main political camps inside Lebanon were once again involved in National Dialogue sessions aimed at moving forward on the questions of parliamentary and presidential elections, which appeared to be stalling and if any, brought minor results – such as the decision to take down banners and flags depicting political leaders in different neighbourhoods of the Lebanese capital Beirut.

CONCLUSIONS

From the preceding discussion, one thing emerges as an overarching theme: we have considered the history and political development of two organizations that have been radically transformed by their changing circumstances. At the same time, they have also made a big contribution to changing their respective contexts. Within this mutually transformative relationship, especially considering developments in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, outcomes for both movements have on the whole not been positive. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is facing a level of repression and outright persecution that is fully reminiscent of the worst periods witnessed under President Nasser. Before that, Morsi and other leading figures in the movement had made a number of bold moves and tried to grab a maximum of power during the time of Morsi’s presidency. In Lebanon and the surrounding region, Hizbullah is increasingly being drawn into a renewed proxy war, is progressively leaving the political context of Lebanon and retransforming into a fully militarized fighting force. The rise of IS militia in Syria and Iraq and the drawn-out civil war in Syria have completely changed the political parameters Hizbullah is working in. Considering these developments, what can we make of Hizbullah’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s histories, and what can we take away from their trajectories over time? What could this mean for the development of political Islam as a whole, or for other, similar movements operating in different contexts? For one, the preceding analysis has revealed that both Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have been willing to sacrifice ideological tenets, to moderate and behave pragmatically in order

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to work from within the political system. In other words, they behave like the majority of their rival political groups, and act based on a rational calculation of risks and possible gains. While this might seem straightforward, it is a remarkable contrast with common expectations and perceptions of how these movements behave politically. At the same time, this does not take away from the fact that naturally, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah derive their core values from religion, and frequently engage in political action to see these values implemented and acted upon. Parliamentary records show that religious-based legislation has been important to lawmakers from both parties, but not exclusively; they have sought out all political avenues available to them to push their agenda, but have done so with a clear awareness of what is feasible in their political context, and what is not. This also reveals the importance of differentiating between the two actors’ political behaviour, and their social and charity-oriented structures, which form their organizational core. These are interdependent, but their grassroots social work does not exclusively serve as a tool to implement a religious-based political agenda, an assumption that is sometimes encountered in Western discussions. On the contrary, that political agenda sometimes takes on a life of its own and sees the two movements make amends with other political actors in their respective contexts. Hizbullah, for example, has long been adamant that its religious values cannot be imposed on Lebanese society in the form of no alcohol legislation or the like, since this would contradict the diverse and multi-religious nature of its social fabric. The Muslim Brotherhood initially adopted a reluctant and hesitant stance when demonstrations started in Egypt in February 2011, calculating that an arrangement with the regime might be a better strategy in case the uprising failed. This is quite different from acting on religious values as an overriding strategic compass. This leads to the next important takeaway: due to their responsiveness to, and embeddedness in, the political context, the nature of the regime the movements face has made a big difference. Egypt’s mostly highly capable regimes have curbed the Brotherhood’s repertoire of action, while Lebanon’s extremely low-capacity regimes have been unable to mount a credible challenge for Hizbullah. Simply put, the Lebanese state would not have been able to enforce any decision contravening the will of Hizbullah, while for the Muslim Brotherhood, almost the opposite has been true, at least in the political arena.

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For the latter, consequently, adaptation and survival have been the determining strategies during the later episodes I analysed (not in the early, rebellious stages of its history). For Hizbullah, the main strategy has been one of leveraging its regional endeavours with a firm groundedness in the domestic context; leading to the discovery that spending time in and becoming increasingly involved in the Lebanese domestic context has had consequences for the movement. Hizbullah, as a political party, has done much to fit in on the Lebanese political scene, tempering its rhetoric after the decision to participate in the 1992 elections and subsequently working through institutions and the political process. This has had many benefits for the party, such as the recognition that it is a political movement as well and not just a terrorist group. It has also, however, led to conflict on the political scene and to attempts by its political opponents from March 14 to call Hizbullah out on undemocratic and non-transparent practices outside the realm of the state, such as its control of parts of the security apparatus or its separate telecommunications network. The Muslim Brotherhood’s adaptation and appeasement strategy has opened up many political spaces for the movement over time, has enabled it to continue its grassroots and political work, and as for Hizbullah, participation in the political process has served as an important source of legitimacy and credibility. In the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, it has even brought the movement to the apex of political power for a short time, before the military decided to take over, pointing to the political and social chaos present during Morsi’s rule (which it had failed to help prevent or control). If anything, this reveals the inherently toxic relationship between political Islamist movements and secular, or in any case rival governments. While large Islamic movements with a moderate political outlook usually miss no opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate in a given political process, and to reassure fellow political actors and public opinion of their benign intentions, this rarely leads to the desired results. Instead, the political context usually remains highly divisive and full of mutual distrust and a readiness to assume the worst. This has been true for the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and it is currently also true in the case of Tunisia’s Ennahda party. In order to reduce this distrust, all parties, Islamists and secular or other political parties alike, would have to renounce undemocratic practices and work towards strengthening the democratic framework they are operating in. They would have to place

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democratic procedures, transparency and accountability above their own desires for greater influence and political power. The fact that this is not happening in post-Arab Spring Egypt or Tunisia is a result not so much of attempted power grabs by Islamists, but of remnants of the old regimes and the military working towards keeping their power. These conflicting forces have led to a deterioration of the political situation, and have taken most post-Arab-Sping countries away from a development towards democracy. Reversing this trend would require a joint effort by all parties concerned, Islamists and non-Islamists alike. Hizbullah, in this regard, is a special case: while the movement has integrated politically, it fundamentally undermines the workings of a regular democratic process by holding on to its weapons and challenging the state’s monopoly of force. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of any strengthening of democratic practices. That the movement’s armed wing in itself is recurrently creating trouble not only for the movement but also for Lebanon’s population as a whole is easy to see, and brings up the question whether it is in fact in the movement’s long-term interest to stay armed. Repeated invasions of Lebanon by the Israeli army, as well as an overstretch of Hizbullah forces in Syria and Iraq are the consequences brought about by its involvement in regional conflicts. Recently, Nasrallah has begun to argue that in the name of standing up against IS in Syria might require sacrificing a large number of Lebanese Shiʽi lives, and that paying this price would be justified by the larger cause. In saying so, he is turning back on several years spent by key movement leaders arguing that Hizbullah was in no way representing a ‘culture of death’ focused on winning armed conflicts at any cost and worshipping its martyrs, and was instead embracing a positive, vibrant political culture. On a transnational level: the Muslim Brotherhood has had progressively fewer connections to fellow Islamist movements or third states, and has had to face a repressive regime without much support from beyond Egypt’s borders. This is true even for most other national branches of the Brotherhood, with whom contact has been loose and relatively inconsequential for developments between the Egyptian branch and the Egyptian government. The exception are perhaps events in early 2015, when the al-Sisi regime blamed Hamas on supporting terrorist attacks in Egypt, and used this as yet another stick to beat the Muslim Brotherhood with. Hizbullah, on the other hand, has been able

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to resort to its links to Syria and Iran, and has benefitted from their support, affording it substantial independence in its actions from the Lebanese state. However, as has been shown, this does not mean that the domestic context has no influence on Hizbullah; on the contrary, domestic political conflicts have at times contributed to a violent reaction by Hizbullah. More recently, the transnational level has come to play a much greater role for the Shiʽi movement again, as it has increasingly involved itself in the Syrian civil war as well as in fighting in Iraq. Under the impression of these regional events, Lebanese domestic politics has more or less ground to a halt, with parliamentarians extending their own terms and postponing elections. Overall, my analysis also shows that the response that a movement chooses when faced with challenges by the regime also depends on its internal constellation: where a determined group exists within the movement that is ideologically coherent and holds a confrontational attitude towards the regime, a movement is likely to resort to violent means. Examples are the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1940s (also taking advantage of a temporary drop in state capacity) and the mid-1960s, or Hizbullah in 2008. This goes to underline the fact that even though Islamic movements such as the Brotherhood or Hizbullah might seem formidable and liable to pose a real threat to a given state or regime, their actions at times betray a sense of insecurity. They tend to mount a violent response whenever there is a sense of threat emanating from their political opponents; in the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, this threat was mostly felt in the form of repression. For Hizbullah, it was the attempt of the Lebanese state to forcibly take away some of their military capabilities. Far from exonerating any such violent response, these dynamics do reveal, however, that states or regimes facing Islamist movements heavily influence how these movements behave, because in most cases Islamists are in the opposition – post-Arab Spring as much as prior to 2011. The different levels of influence playing into movement behaviour – transnational, domestic and internal – also frequently interact: the threat of state repression has led certain groups within the Muslim Brotherhood to radicalize, while prompting others (mostly the ‘oldguard’ leadership) to withdraw. Where heavy state repression has encountered ideologically radical factions within the Brotherhood, such as during the mid-1960s and the time of Qutb, a violence-prone strategy

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has been the outcome. In Lebanon, the regional situation in the Levant has also shaped the way the Lebanese government behaved towards Hizbullah. Lebanon’s power-broker Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, keen on a good management of relations with Syria and on spreading the responsibility for confronting the Israeli army once it attacked Lebanon, included a clause in his governmental statement that officially endorsed Hizbullah’s keeping of its weapons. Under Prime Minister Siniora, on the other hand, the influence of the US began to be felt much more keenly in Lebanese politics, and the government launched an attempt at forcing Hizbullah to give up some of its military capabilities, resulting in violent confrontations in 2008. These results point to the conclusion that Islamist social movements always respond to attempts by the regime to curb their power and repertoire of action. The nature of the response depends on the constellation of domestic and transnational factors that either enable a movement to forcefully respond to the challenge or make the leadership conclude that accommodation and trying to reduce the damage are better responses. A general tendency is that where political opportunities exist at the domestic level, Islamist movements will mostly use them; where they face a strong challenge by a regime or rival that threatens their key interests or even their existence, they will try to reciprocate. This response can take a violent form where a strong group inside the movement promotes violence, and the consequences of using violence seem manageable. Where a regime has the proven and consistent capacity of overpowering the movement’s resources, moderation and the disavowal of violence are chosen as strategies. Does this mean that state repression is a good answer to broad-based Islamist movements that might potentially use violence? It certainly does not. My analysis has shown that repression, where it is as longstanding, forceful and certain to overpower the movement’s resources as it has been in the Egyptian case, might lead a movement’s mainstream to moderate. However, it is also likely to trigger the spin-off of more radical movements that do not find their position accepted by the mainstream leadership. In Egypt, this has led to a decade of frequent attacks on state as well as on civilian targets, including tourist sites, during the 1990s, carried out by movements originating within the Muslim Brotherhood. It has also triggered the exodus of many radical Islamists, fuelling the rise of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and potentially

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helping to spark movements like the IS militia. Therefore, it would be difficult to argue that outright repression is a successful strategy in dealing with Islamist movements in the long term. Rather, my analysis confirms that the integration of Islamist movements in a political process will strengthen their responsiveness to their surroundings, and will encourage them to play by the rules of the political game. Hizbullah’s use of violence in 2008, however, shows that this is not a guarantee, and that respect for these rules remains extremely fragile. Agreement on staying within the boundaries of the non-violent is subject to constant renegotiation, certainly in the case of Hizbullah, but also for the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. It is a two-way process that involves both the regime in power and the leadership and rank and file of Islamist movements. In the case of both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood, their involvement in the day-to-day politics of their domestic context has significantly shaped their strategies. The Muslim Brothers have built political alliances with secular parties in order to deal with the regime’s restrictions on their participation, exposing them to new ideas and influences. Hizbullah has used a range of different strategies in order to counter the growing influence of its main domestic rival, Hariri’s Future Movement, involving the movement in different bargaining processes, and exposing it to public feedback during street sit-ins and protests. Ultimately, the growing political influence that both movements have enjoyed, have gradually deprived them of the relative safety that political opposition confers. For most of their histories, both movements provided ample social benefits to their constituencies and were not responsible for actual policy decisions. Once they were, after the fortunes had changed for both movements in 2011, they were being held accountable for running the state’s affairs, something that their political opponents had been doing previously. Both movements failed to deliver, and had to face significant losses in support and legitimacy as a result. Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood had a much better chance of winning over the population when in government – after all, it clearly dominated both the executive and legislative branches of government once President Morsi was elected. This provided ample opportunity for delivering on its many promises, and on attempting to improve living conditions for ordinary Egyptians. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership did little in this respect, resorting to power politics and

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reinforcing the perception that, once in power, it was no better than most other Egyptian regimes. Hizbullah, even at the height of its domestic influence in Lebanon in 2011 and 2012, was always part of a coalition government and of the extremely difficult consensus-building process that is the daily work in Lebanese politics. One of the statements often repeated by Secretary-General Nasrallah as well as other top Hizbullah officials in recent years has been that given the Lebanese sectarian context with its many diverse communities, Hizbullah would not attempt to impose lifestyle choices on citizens. Arguably, this would be impossible. The result has been that domestically, the party has taken on a relatively discreet role in politics, and has often worked with its allies of the FPM in moving forward its agenda. This has tended to shield it from excessive public disdain while in government, but has not spared it a steep loss in respect and support among many Lebanese upon its open declaration of support for the Syrian regime of al-Assad. These developments have revealed that despite their formidable organizational structure and mass membership, both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brothers are subject to the need for broader legitimacy and public support as much as other political actors. Their time in power has cost both movements much of the latter: Hizbullah has been blamed for supporting the Syrian al-Assad regime despite its claim to fight for the Arab masses. The Muslim Brotherhood has been entirely focused on managing its relations with the Egyptian military, and has completely neglected popular needs and demands, resulting in widespread disappointment and the eventual overthrow of Morsi as president. Islamist parties’ involvement in the political process, as the analysis has shown, will expose them to public scrutiny, especially after the events of the Arab Spring and the steep rise in popular expectations regarding democracy and the rule of law that the downfall of regimes in Egypt and Tunisia brought with it. Another lesson is to engage them as the multifaceted actors they are, providing social services, being involved in politics and even maintaining an armed wing, as is the case for Hizbullah. Any attempt to ignore or repress any of these activities appears short-sighted. Instead, calling for greater transparency in the provision of social services, for open political engagement and the involvement in public debate, and pressing for an integration of Hizbullah’s armed wing with the Lebanese military, are important steps that engage these movements with all their facets. It would also take

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them seriously as the important sociopolitical actors that they are. This requires, however, a reliable, transparent and democratic political framework that they can become part of, which to date is not the case in any post-Arab Spring country. Events in Egypt at the time of writing in 2015 only demonstrate that arbitrary and outright repression of Islamists, even if it may be a wish harboured by many secular citizens, cannot lead to their containment, and only increases the already present, deep polarization surrounding the issue of political Islam.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Raschke, Joachim and Ralf Tils, Strategie in der Politikwissenschaft: Konturen eines Neuen Forschungsfelds (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010). 2. Collier, David and Jason Brady, ‘Outdated views of qualitative methods: Time to move on’, Political Analysis 18/4 (2010), pp. 506 – 13; Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005); Lieberson, Stanley, ‘Small n’s and big conclusions: An examination of the reasoning in comparative studies based on a small number of cases’, Social Forces 70/2 (1991), pp. 307 – 20; Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (London: John W. Parker, 1843); Minkenberg, Michael, Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005). 3. Risse, Thomas, Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Risse, Thomas and Ursula Lehmkuhl, ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood. New Modes of Governance?’, Research Programme of the Research Center (SFB) 700 (Freie Universita¨t Berlin, 2012). Available at: http://www.sfbgovernance.de/en/publikationen/working_papers/wp1/index.html (accessed 20 March 2016). 4. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982– 2000 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004).

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Chapter 1 Islamist Movements as Social Movements and Political Actors: A Framework for Analysis 1. Putnam, Robert, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics. The logic of two-level games’, International Organization 42/03 (1988), pp. 427 – 60. 2. Sikkink, Kathryn and Thomas Risse, ‘The socialization of human rights norms into domestic practices: Introduction’, in T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1 – 38. 3. Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ‘Ideas do not float freely: Transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the Cold War’, International Organization 48/02 (1994), pp. 185– 214; Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘Patterns of dynamic multilevel governance and the insider-outsider coalition’, in D. Della Porta and S. Tarrow (eds), Transnational Protest and Global Activism, pp. 151 – 74 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 4. Sikkink, ‘The socialization’, pp. 151– 2. 5. Tilly, Charles, Social Movements, 1768– 2004 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), p. 3. 6. Bayat, Asef, Life as Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 44. 7. See, for example: Bayat, Asef, Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007); Clark, Janine, Islam, Charity, and Activism. Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003); Deeb, Lara, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi‘i Lebanon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Lia, Brynjar, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928– 1942 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2006); Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Islamic Activism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 8. Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, p. 3. 9. See, for example: Kriesi, Hanspeter, ‘Political context and opportunity’, in D. Snow, S. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 67 – 90 (Malden: Blackwell, 2004); Meyer, David and Debra Minkoff, ‘Conceptualizing political opportunity’, Social Forces 82/4 (2004) pp. 1457 –92. 10. Meyer, David, ‘Protest and political opportunities’, Annual Review of Sociology 30/1 (2004), pp. 125– 45, here: pp. 121–2, emphasis in original. 11. Eisinger, Peter, ‘The conditions of protest behavior in American cities’, The American Political Science Review 67/1 (1973), pp. 11 – 28, here: p. 11. 12. Meyer, ‘Protest and political opportunities’, p. 134. 13. Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 16/01 (1986), pp. 57– 85, here: p. 63. 14. Ibid., pp. 63 – 4.

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15. Tilly, Charles, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2006), pp. 23 – 5. 16. Ibid., p. 44. 17. Ibid., p. 19, emphasis in original. 18. McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency: 1930– 1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); McAdam, Doug, S. Tarrow and C. Tilly (eds), Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires. 19. Bo¨rzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse, ‘Governance without a state: can it work?’, Regulation & Governance 4/2 (2010), pp. 113– 34; Risse, Thomas, Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Risse, Thomas and Ursula Lehmkuhl, ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood. New Modes of Governance?’, Research Programme of the Research Center (SFB) 700 (Freie Universita¨t Berlin, 2012). Available at: http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/ working_papers/wp1/index.html (accessed 20 March 2016). 20. Krasner defines domestic sovereignty as ‘the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity.’ Krasner Stephen D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, 1999), p. 4; Risse, Governance Without a State?, p. 4. 21. Risse and Lehmkuhl, ‘Research Programme’, p. 9. 22. Bo¨rzel and Risse, ‘Governance without a state’; Risse, Governance Without a State; Draude, Anke, Cord Schmelzle and Thomas Risse, ‘Grundbegriffe der Governanceforschung’, Collaborative Research Center 700 (SFB), Working Paper 36 (2012). Available at http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publ ikationen/working_papers/wp36/SFB-Governance-Working-Paper-36.pdf (accessed 27 September 2015). 23. Risse, Thomas, ‘Governance Under Limited Sovereignty’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Convention (Washington: 2010), p. 8. 24. Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 3. 25. Koopmans, Ruud, ‘The missing link between structure and agency: outline of an evolutionary approach to social movements’, Mobilization 10/1 (2005), pp. 19 – 33. 26. Ibid., p. 28. 27. Ibid., p. 29. 28. Ibid. 29. McAdam, Political Process; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention; Tarrow, Power in Movement; Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires.

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30. Hudson, Michael, The Precarious Republic. Political Modernization in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). 31. Picard, Elizabeth, Lebanon: A Shattered Country. Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon (Teaneck: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 2002). 32. George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). 33. Ibid., p. 245. 34. Bennett, Andrew, ‘Integrating Comparative and Within-Case Analysis: Typological Theory’, paper presented at George Washington University (Washington, 2003), pp. 30– 1. 35. Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 66) emerged as one of the key thinkers of Egypt’s Islamic movement. His writings often form a point of reference for radical, armed action by Islamic groups, although it is unclear how much of this was intended by Qutb himself. More on his life and thoughts will be discussed in Chapter III. 36. Gla¨ser, Jochen and Grit Laudel, Experteninterviews und Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente Rekonstruierender Untersuchungen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009). 37. Witzel, Andreas, ‘The Problem-Centred Interview’ (2000). Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung. Available at http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/ fqs/article/viewArticle/1132/2519 (accessed 2 October 2015). 38. Mitchell, Richard, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 39. Lia, Brynjar, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928– 1942 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2006). 40. Elshobaki, Amr, Les Fre`res Musulmans des Origines a` Nos Jours (Paris: Karthala, 2009). 41. Said, Abd-al-Mun’im, Ad-Din Wa-’D-Daula Fi Misr. Al-Fikr Wa-’S-Siyasa Wa-’L-Ihwan Al-Muslimun (Giza: Nahdat Misr li-t-Tiba’a wa-’n-Nasr wa-’tTauzi’, 2008). 42. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982– 2000 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004). 43. Ashour, Omar, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2009). 44. Ibid., pp. 13 – 5. 45. El-Ghobashy, Mona, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 37/3 (2005), pp. 373 – 95; Lu¨bben, Ives, ‘Die A¨gyptische Muslimbru¨derschaft: Auf dem weg zur politischen partei?’, in Holger Albrecht and Kevin Ko¨hler (eds), Politischer Islam im Vorderen Orient: Zwischen Sozialbewegung, Opposition und Widerstand (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 75– 88. 46. Kra¨mer, Gudrun, Hasan al-Banna (London: Oneworld, 2009). 47. Ashour, Omar, ‘A World Without Jihad? The Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements’, PhD Thesis, McGill University (2008), pp. 179 –92.

NOTES 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67.

68.

69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75.

TO PAGES

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Ibid., p. 183. Ibid., p. 178. Ibid., p. 183. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982– 2000 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 50. Ibid., p. 220. Rosefsky Wickham, Carrie, Mobilizing Islam. Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Ibid., pp. 14 – 15. Ibid., p. 203. Ibid., pp. 200 – 3, pp. 214– 19. Ibid., p. 212. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 181, p. 193. Ibid., p. 146. Quoted in: Hafez, Mohammed M., Why Muslims Rebel. Repression and Resistance in the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 71. Ibid., p. 72. Ibid., pp. 73 – 4. Ibid., p. 204. Antar, Noha, ‘Die Muslimbruderschaft in A¨gypten: Zwiespa¨ltige reformer’, in Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure. Rahmenbedingungen und Programmatischer Wandel, SWP-Studie (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (2007), pp. 63 – 76. Ibid., p. 69. Zollner, Barbara, The Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2008). Rashwan, Diaa, Mohammed Fayez Farahat and Abd-al-Mun’im Said, ‘The Muslim Brothers in Egypt’, in Diaa Rashwan (ed.), The Spectrum of Islamist Movements (Berlin: Hans Schiler, 2007), pp. 165– 92. Al-Anani, Khalil, ‘The young Brotherhood in search of a new path’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 9 (2009). Available at http://www.currenttrends.org/research/ detail/the-young-brotherhood-in-search-of-a-new-path (accessed 16 March 2011). Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’; Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, pp. 75– 85; Elshobaki, Amr, Les Fre`res Musulmans des Origines a` Nos Jours (Paris: Karthala, 2009), pp. 47 – 81. This branch of the organization is also known as Secret Apparatus, al-Jihaz alSirri, or Special Section, al-Tanzim al-Khass. For the sake of simplicity I will use the term Special Apparatus throughout. El-Ghobashy, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, p. 374. Ibid., p. 390. Antar, Die Muslimbruderschaft in A¨gypten. Asseburg, Muriel, ed., Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure. Rahmenbedingungen und programmatischer Wandel (Berlin, 2007). Available at http://nbn-resolving. de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-245339 (accessed 19 May 2014).

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76. Stacher, however, also focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood’s undemocratic internal governance as an explanatory factor, arguing that the ‘70s generation’ of the Brotherhood often felt left out of important decision-making processes and was searching for a new way of making themselves heard. Stacher, Joshua A., ‘Post-Islamist rumblings in Egypt: The emergence of the Wasat party’, Middle East Journal 56/3 (2002), pp. 415– 32, here: pp. 418 – 22. 77. Rosefsky Wickham, Carrie, ‘The path to moderation: strategy and learning in the formation of Egypt’s Wasat party’, Comparative Politics 36/2 (2004), pp. 205 –28, here: p. 213; Stacher, ‘Post-Islamist rumblings’, p. 421. 78. Grundmann, Johannes, Islamische Internationalisten (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2005). 79. Brown, Nathan, ‘The Irrelevance of the International Muslim Brotherhood’, The Middle East Channel (2010). Available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy. com/posts/2010/09/20/the_irrelevance_of_the_international_muslim_ brotherhood_0 (accessed 16 June 2011). 80. El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928– 1947 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998). 81. Ibid., pp. 117– 22. 82. Brown, ‘The Irrelevance of the International Muslim Brotherhood’. 83. Rubin, Barry, The Muslim Brotherhood (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Available at http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/relphil2010/browse/ inside/9780230106871.html (accessed 22 April 2013). 84. Skovgaard-Petersen, Jakob and Bettina Graf, eds., The Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 85. Skovgaard-Petersen, Jakob, ‘Ulama, da’iya and the new Islamic internationalism’, in Meir Hatina (ed.), Guardians of the Faith in Modern Times. Ulama in the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 291–310, here: p. 295. 86. Kra¨mer, Gudrun, ‘Drawing boundaries: Yusuf al-Qaradawi on apostasy’, in Sabine Schmidtke and Gudrun Kra¨mer (eds), Speaking for Islam. Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 181–217, here: p. 195. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid., p. 204. 89. Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘Ulama, da’iya and the new Islamic internationalism’. 90. Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi’a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987). 91. Norton, Augustus Richard, Hizbullah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 92. Palmer Harik, Judith, Hizbullah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007). 93. Hamzeh, Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004). 94. Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

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95. Alagha, Joseph, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam: ISIM, 2006). 96. Samaan, Jean-Loup, Les Me´tamorphoses du Hizbullah (Paris: Karthala, 2007). 97. Rosiny, Stephan, ‘Vom radikalen milieu in die mitte der gesellschaft: Die dynamik der Hizb Allah im Libanon’, in Radikale Milieus: Das Soziale Umfeld Terroristischer Gruppen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2012), pp. 167 –89. 98. Charara, Walid and Frederic Domont, Le Hizbullah: Un Mouvement IslamoNationaliste (Paris: Fayard, 2006). 99. Mervin, Sabrina, Le Hizbullah: E´tat Des Lieux (Arles: Actes Sud, 2008). 100. Mervin, Sabrina, ‘Le lien Iranien’, in Hizbullah: Etat des Lieux (Arles: Actes Sud, 2008), pp. 75– 88. 101. Lamloum, Olfa, ‘La Syrie et le Hizbullah: Partenaires sous contrainte?’, in Le Hizbullah: Etat des Lieux (Arles: Actes Sud, 2008), pp. 93– 101. 102. El Husseini, Rola, ‘Hizbullah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria’, Third World Quarterly 31/5 (2010), pp. 803– 15. 103. The relationship remains crucial to the movement, however, which is borne out by its open support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the ongoing violent repression of popular uprisings in Syria in 2011. As one close observer of Hizbullah remarks, it would be both ‘unfeasible’ and ‘unethical’ for the party to openly criticize the Syrian regime. Interview with researcher, Beirut, July 2011. 104. Samii, Abbas William, ‘A stable structure on shifting sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria relationship’, Middle East Journal 62/1 (2008), p. 32. 105. Chehabi, Houchang and Rula Abisaab, eds., Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006). 106. Qassem, Naim, Hizbullah (Hizbullah): The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books, 2005). 107. Boroumand, Ladan and Roya Boroumand, ‘Terror, Islam, and democracy’, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002): pp. 5 –20; Byers, Ann, Lebanon’s Hizbullah (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003); Byman, Daniel, ‘Should Hizbullah be next’, Foreign Affairs 82/6 (2003), pp. 54 – 66. 108. El Husseini, Rola, ‘Hizbullah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria’, Third World Quarterly 31/5 (2010), pp. 803– 15. 109. Mohns, Erik, ‘Die Libanesische Hizbollah. Gratwanderung zwischen mandat und widerstand’, in Holger Albrecht and Kevin Ko¨hler (eds), Politischer Islam im Vorderen Orient. Zwischen Sozialbewegung, Opposition und Widerstand (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 205– 28. 110. Deeb, An Enchanted Modern. 111. Haddad, Simon, ‘The origins of popular support for Lebanon’s Hizbullah’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29/1 (2006), pp. 21–34. 112. Palmer Harik, Judith, ‘Force of arms and Hizbullah’s staying power in precarious Lebanon’, in Klejda Mulaj (ed.), Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 137 – 56.

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113. Phillips, David Lawrence, From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009). 114. Nasrallah, Sayyed Hassan, in Nicholas Noe (ed.), Voice of Hizbullah. The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (New York: Verso, 2007). 115. Qassem, Hizbullah (Hizbullah). 116. Hamzawy, Amr, ‘Arab writings on Islamist parties and movements’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 43/1 (2011), pp. 138 – 40. 117. Kra¨mer, Gudrun, Demokratie im Islam. Der Kampf fu¨r Toleranz und Freiheit in der Arabischen Welt (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung, 2012), pp. 121 –3. 118. Ouaissa, Rachid, ‘Blockierte mittelschichten als motor der vera¨nderungen in der Arabischen welt?’, in Arabellions. Zur Vielfalt von Protest und Revolte im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), pp. 257 – 73; Perthes, Volker, ‘Die fiktion des fundamentalismus’, Bla¨tter fu¨r deutsche und internationale Politik 38/2 (1993), pp. 188– 200. 119. Ayoob, Mohammed, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008). 120. Tibi, Bassam, Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung: Der Islam und die Weltpolitik (Mu¨nchen: C.H.Beck, 2003). 121. Ibid., p. 162. 122. Brown, L. Carl, Religion and State. The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 123. Bayat, Life as Politics. 124. Mandaville, Peter, ‘Transnational Muslim solidarities and everyday life’, Nations and Nationalism 17/1 (2011), pp. 7 – 24. 125. Roy, Olivier and Carol Volk, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 126. Roy, Olivier, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 127. Ouaissa, ‘Blockierte mittelschichten’. 128. Ayubi, Nazih, Overstating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 1995). 129. Ibid., p. 265. 130. Ibid., p. 267. 131. Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism. 132. Hafez, Mohammed, ‘From marginalization to massacres. A political process explanation of GIA violence in Algeria,’ in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activsm (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 37 – 60; Hafez, Mohammed M. and Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Violence as contention in the Egyptian Islamic movement’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activsm (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 61 –88. 133. Della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Malden: Blackwell, 2006); Johnston, Hank and John A. Noakes, Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005);

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142. 143.

144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149.

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Kriesi, Hanspeter, ‘Political context and opportunity’, in David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 67–90; McAdam, Doug, ‘Beyond structural analysis: Toward a more dynamic understanding of social movements’, in Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (eds), Social Movements and Networks. Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 281–98; McAdam, Doug and David A. Snow, ‘Interpretive factors: Framing processes’, in Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (eds), Readings on Social Movements. Origins, Dynamics, and Outcomes (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 317–18; Snow, David A., Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Malden: Blackwell, 2006); Tarrow, Power in Movement. Hounshell, Blake, ‘Dark crystal. Why didn’t anyone predict the Arab revolutions?’, Foreign Policy (2011). Available at http://www.foreignpolicy. com/articles/2011/06/20/dark_crystal (accessed 11 August 2011). Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel. Wegner, Eva, ‘Politischer Islam als soziale bewegung im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika’, in Holger Albrecht and Kevin Ko¨hler (eds), Politischer Islam im Vorderen Orient. Zwischen Sozialbewegung, Opposition und Widerstand (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 33– 50. Davenport, Christian, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, Repression and Mobilization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism. Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Munson, Ziad, ‘Islamic mobilization: social movement theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’, Sociological Quarterly 42/4 (2001), pp. 487 – 510. Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’. Burgat, Franc ois, Face to Face with Political Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003); Kramer, Martin S., Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1996). Schwedler, Jillian, Faith in Moderation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Rosefsky Wickham, ‘The path to moderation’. Kriesi, ‘Political context and opportunity’. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’. Harders, Cilja, ‘Revolution I und II: A¨gypten zwischen transformation und restauration’, in Arabellions. Zur Vielfalt von Protest und Revolte im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), pp. 19 – 38, here: pp. 28 – 9. Asseburg, ed., Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure. ¨ ber die kostenn-nutzen-kalku¨le Wegner, Eva, ‘Inklusion oder repression. U autorita¨rer herrscher’, in Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure. Rahmenbedingungen

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und Programmatischer Wandel, SWP-Studie (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007), pp. 77–83, here: p. 79.

Chapter 2 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategies: Moderation Forced by Repression 1. Al-Sayyid Marsot, Afaf Lutfi, A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), pp. 77 – 80. 2. Ibid. 3. Goldschmidt, Arthur, A Brief History of Egypt (New York: Facts On File, 2008), p. 125. 4. Ibid., p. 140. 5. Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, p. 137. 6. Hashim, Ahmed S., ‘The Egyptian military, part one: From the Ottomans through Sadat’, Middle East Policy 18/3 (2011), pp. 63 – 78. 7. Al-Sayyid, Marsot, A History of Egypt, p. 160. 8. Hamzawy, Amr, Marina Ottaway and Nathan Brown, What Islamists Need to Be Clear About. The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). Available at http:// carnegieendowment.org/files/ottaway_brown_hamzawy_islamists_final.pdf (accessed 7 July 2013). 9. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982– 2000 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004). 10. Interview with journalist, Beirut, September 2011. 11. Ashour, Omar, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2009), pp. 93 – 4. 12. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy; Elshobaki, Amr, Les Fre`res Musulmans des Origines a` Nos Jours (Paris, 2009); Rashwan, Diaa, Mohammed Fayez Farahat and Abd-al-Mun’im Said, ‘The Muslim Brothers in Egypt’, in Diaa Rashwan (ed.), The Spectrum of Islamist Movements (Berlin: Hans Schiler, 2007), pp. 165 – 92; Zahid, Mohammed, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood in the postMubarak era’, Foreign Policy Journal. Available at http://www.foreignpolicyjou rnal.com/2011/09/17/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-post-mubarak-era/ (accessed 7 July 2013). 13. Zollner, Barbara, The Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2008). 14. Lia, Brynjar, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2006), p. 85. 15. Ibid., pp. 170– 220. 16. Tilly, Charles, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 17. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 282– 3. 18. Kra¨mer, Gudrun, Hasan al-Banna (London: Oneworld, 2009), pp. 91 – 2.

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19. Ibid.; Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. 20. Mitchell, Richard, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 31. 21. For examples, see Ibid., pp. 21– 2. 22. Ibid., pp. 20 – 1 23. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 62. 24. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 22. 25. Ibid., p. 23. 26. Ibid., pp. 29 – 30. 27. Ibid., p. 23. 28. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 62. 29. Ibid., pp. 64 – 5; Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 26 – 7. 30. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, pp. 52– 3, p. 57. 31. Ibid., p. 1. 32. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 14. 33. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, p. 168. 34. Ibid., p. 167. 35. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 35. 36. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, pp. 170–2. 37. Ibid., pp. 92 – 3; pp. 155– 6. 38. Ibid., p. 175. 39. Ibid., p. 173; Mitchell translates the Arabic terms ta’rif, takwin, tanfidh as ‘making known’, ‘forming and sustaining’ and ‘executing’ (Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 14– 15, p. 197). 40. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, pp. 172–3. 41. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 197. 42. Ibid., pp. 196 – 7. 43. Ibid., p. 196. 44. Ibid., p. 197. 45. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, p. 180. 46. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 206. 47. Ibid., p. 205. 48. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 73. 49. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, pp. 252–4. 50. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 73. 51. Ibid., pp. 75 – 6. 52. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 60. 53. Ibid., p. 62. 54. Ibid., pp. 64 – 7. 55. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 81. 56. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 68. 57. Gershoni, Israel, ‘The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936– 39’, Middle Eastern Studies 22/3 (1986), pp. 367 – 97, here: p. 370. 58. Ibid., p. 381.

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59. Ibid., p. 384. 60. El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah, ‘The conceptual approach of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers towards the Palestine question, 1928– 1949’, Journal of Islamic Studies 2/2 (1991), pp. 225– 44, here: p. 226. 61. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, pp. 246 –8. 62. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 35. 63. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, pp. 75– 6. 64. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, p. 270. 65. Ibid., p. 285. 66. Kra¨mer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 50. 67. Interview with former member of the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 2011. 68. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament, 2011. 69. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, Cairo, 2011. 70. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 26. 71. Ibid., p. 25. 72. Ibid., pp. 54 – 5. 73. Zollner, Barbara, ‘Prison talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s internal struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s persecution, 1954 to 1971’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 39/3 (2007), pp. 411– 33. 74. Interview with human rights activist, Cairo, September 2011. 75. Bergesen, Albert J., ed., The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 4. 76. Ibid., p. 5. 77. Interview with human rights activist, Cairo, September 2011; Zollner, ‘Prison talk’, p. 417. 78. Zollner, ‘Prison talk’, pp. 415– 16. 79. Pargeter, Alison, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition (London: Saqi Books, 2010); Zollner, ‘Prison talk’. 80. Bergesen, Albert J., ed., The Sayyid Qutb Reader, p. 4. In this incident, 23 Muslim Brothers were killed inside their cells and another 46 were wounded. Reacting to rumours that they were about to be killed during their daily work chores, the Brotherhood members had stayed in their cells, which the prison guards then entered to shoot at the prisoners (Ashour, Omar, ‘A World Without Jihad? The Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements’, PhD Thesis, McGill University (2008), p. 91. 81. Zollner, ‘Prison talk’, p. 418. 82. Al-Ghazali, Zainab, Return of the Pharaoh. Memoirs in Nasir’s Prison (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1994), p. 40. Available at http://www.scribd.com/ doc/24777817/Return-of-the-Pharoah-Zainab-Al-Ghazali (accessed 24 February 2012). 83. Ibid., pp. 39 – 41. 84. Ibid., p. 41. 85. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, p. 91.

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86. Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood; Zollner, ‘Prison talk’, p. 418. 87. Interview with former member of the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, July 2011. 88. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament, Cairo, July 2011; Interview with Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, Cairo, July 2011; Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011. 89. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, p. 92. 90. Interview with human rights activist, Cairo, September 2011. 91. Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, p. 182. 92. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011. 93. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’. 94. Al-Ghazali, Return of the Pharaoh, p. 39. 95. Zollner, ‘Prison talk’, p. 425. 96. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood, p. 426. 97. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, p. 140. 98. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 84– 7. 99. Ibid., p. 85. 100. Ibid., pp. 120 – 1. 101. Ibid., pp. 124 – 5. 102. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, p. 161. 103. Ibid.; Interview with Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, Cairo, July 2011. 104. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 125. 105. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, pp. 170– 2. 106. Zollner, ‘Prison talk’, p. 424. 107. Ibid., p. 424. 108. Ashour, ‘A World Without Jihad?’, pp. 159– 61. 109. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament, Cairo, September 2011; Interview with Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, Cairo, July 2011. 110. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, Cairo, July 2011. 111. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011. 112. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 113. Aboul Fotouh, Abdul Moneim, Shahada Ala Tarikh Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya Fi Masr, 1970– 1984 (Account of the Islamic Movement’s History in Egypt) (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 2010), p. 23. 114. Interview with human rights activist, Cairo, September 2011; Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 48– 9. 115. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood, p. 49. 116. Abdel Malek, Anouar, Egypt: Military Society – the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser (New York: Random House, 1968); Sayigh, Yezid, ‘Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012). Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt/d4l2# (accessed 29 November 2012).

282

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117. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011. 118. Qutb, Sayyid, Milestones (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1993), p. 33. Available at majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf (accessed 13 December 2011). 119. Ibid., p. 36. 120. Aboul Fotouh, Shahada Ala Tarikh Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya Fi Masr, p. 22. 121. Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. Egypt Islam and Democracy. Critical Essays (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002), p. 36. 122. Ibid., p. 37. 123. Aboul Fotouh, Shahada Ala Tarikh Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya Fi Masr, pp. 39 – 40. 124. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 41. 125. Ibid., p. 42. 126. Ibrahim, Egypt Islam and Democracy, pp. 37– 40. 127. Ibid., p. 14, pp. 21– 2. 128. Interview with former member of the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, July 2011. 129. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, pp. 42 –3. 130. Ibid., pp. 39 – 40. 131. Ibid., p. 42. 132. Shehata, Dina, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict, and Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 27. 133. Ibid., p. 27. 134. Ibrahim, Egypt Islam and Democracy, p. 63. 135. Ibid., p. 63. 136. Gerges, Fawaz A., ‘The end of the Islamist insurgency in Egypt? Costs and prospects’, Middle East Journal 54/4 (2000): pp. 592 – 612, here: p. 593. 137. Della Porta, Donatella, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 196. 138. Ibid., pp. 197– 8. 139. Gerges, ‘The end of the Islamist insurgency in Egypt?’. 140. Interview with human rights activist, Cairo, September 2011. 141. Al-Awadi, Hesham, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, pp. 51 –6. 142. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, September 2011. 143. Interviews with two Muslim Brotherhood members, Cairo, July 2011. 144. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide, Cairo, September 2011. 145. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011. 146. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 83. 147. Shehata, Dina, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict, and Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 84– 5. 148. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 80. 149. Shehata, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt, pp. 86– 7. 150. Ibid., p. 85.

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151. Ibid., p. 87. 152. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 144. 153. Antar, Noha, The Muslim Brotherhood’s Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005. Reasons and Implications (Brussels: Euro-Mediterranean Studies Commission, 2006), EuroMeSCo Paper 51, p. 20. 154. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy. 155. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, July 2011. 156. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 153. 157. Ibid., p. 186; Ayalon, Ami, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1995), p. 376; Rutherford, Bruce K., Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2010), p. 86. 158. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 159. Al-Anani, Khalil, ‘The young Brotherhood in search of a new path’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 9 (2009). Available at http://www.currenttrends.org/ research/detail/the-young-brotherhood-in-search-of-a-new-path (accessed 16 March 2011). 160. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, pp. 172– 3. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood stood together with other Leftist parties and some judges in denouncing the unfair conduct of the elections in early 2006, leading to more arrests. 161. Other sources cite a toll of 61 dead, 1,313 injured and 2,400 detained during the voting period (El-Ghobashy 2005, p. 384); Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 171. 162. Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh notes in a 2012 interview, however, ‘But in their own way, they were beautiful years, as we spent them praying and rearranging our thoughts about the conditions of our country.’ Fawzy, Tamer, ‘Interview with Abdel Monem Abol Fotoh’, Enigma, 10 February 2012. 163. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy; El-Ghobashy, Mona, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 37/3 (2005), pp. 373– 95; Pargeter, Alison, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition (London: Saqi Books, 2010). 164. Which, according to most observers, was still heavily influenced by Ma’mun al-Hudaybi (El-Ghobashy 2005, p. 389). 165. Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, p. 183. 166. Ibid., 177–8. 167. El-Ghobashy, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’. 168. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 169. Ibid. 170. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011.

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171. Although subsequent events have revealed that this split may have been overemphasized by analysts, and may actually have been less clear-cut and less relevant for the organization’s development than has often been assumed. 172. Rosefsky Wickham, Carrie, Mobilizing Islam. Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 221. 173. US Embassy Cairo, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood at Low Ebb (Cairo: US Embassy 1999). Confidential. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/1999/03/ 99CAIRO2104.html (accessed 13 February 2012). 174. El-Ghobashy, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, p. 389. 175. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 176. Ibid. 177. El-Ghobashy, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, p. 388. 178. Perthes, Volker, ‘America’s “Greater Middle East” and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue’. Middle East Policy 11/3 (2004), p. 85. 179. Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 223. 180. US Embassy Cairo, Domestic Monitors Issue Preliminary Findings (Cairo: US Embassy, 2005). Confidential. Available at http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php? id¼45190 (accessed 20 March 2016). 181. US Embassy Cairo, Next Steps on Democracy in Egypt (2005). Secret. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05CAIRO7045 html (accessed 14 February 2012). 182. US Embassy Cairo, Highlights of President Mubarak’s Address Opening Parliament (2005). Unclassified/For Official Use Only. Available at http://wikileaks.org/ cable/2005/12/05CAIRO9352.html (accessed 14 February 2012). 183. El-Ghobashy, ‘The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, p. 390. 184. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011. 185. Interview with Freedom and Justice Party representative, Cairo, September 2011; Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament, Cairo, September 2011. 186. Shehata, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt, p. 62. 187. Ibid., p. 63. 188. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 189. Economist Intelligence Unit, Egypt Country Report Updater (London: The Economist. EUI Country Reports, 2005), p. 3. 190. Antar, The Muslim Brotherhood’s Success, p. 23. 191. Azuri, L., ‘The Egyptian Regime vs. the Muslim Brotherhood’ (2007). Available at Frontpagemag.com. Available at http://archive.frontpagemag. com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID¼ 293 (accessed 8 December 2011). 192. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 193. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011.

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285

194. Interview with Freedom and Justice Party representative, Cairo, September 2011. 195. US Embassy Cairo, The Goe and the Muslim Brotherhood: Anatomy of a ‘Showdown’ (2005). Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05CAIRO3755_a.html (accessed 20 March 2016). 196. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, ‘Muslim Brotherhood Declares Intention to Vote in Presidential Elections’ (2005). 197. US Embassy Cairo, Increased Detentions of Muslim Brotherhood Members (2006). Available at: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06CAIRO5709_a.html (accessed 20 March 2016). 198. Interview with former Muslim Brotherhood youth leader, Cairo, September 2011. 199. Capoccia, Giovanni and Daniel Kelemen, ‘The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism’, World Politics 59/3 (2007), pp. 341– 69, here: p. 348. 200. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo, July 2011.

Chapter 3 Hizbullah: Expanded Action Repertoire in a Fragile Regional and National Context 1. There are two opposing political groupings in Lebanon, known by the monikers March 8 and March 14. The names derive from two massive demonstrations. Both were held in central Beirut following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. One, held on March 8, supported the Syrian regime and its presence in Lebanon, and was composed of supporters of all pro-Syrian parties in Lebanon: Hizbullah, Amal, the Syrian Socialist National Party, the Arab Democratic Party and a number of others. The one held on March 14 brought together the opponents of a Syrian presence in Lebanon and called for a withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country. The alliance of political parties that subsequently adopted the name ‘March 14’ for itself is composed of the Sunni Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces and a number of other mostly Christian political parties which had previously been opponents of Syria. 2. Aboul-Enein, Youssef, ‘Hizballah. A discussion of its early formation’, Infantry Magazine 94/3 (2005), pp. 21–5; Haddad, Simon, ‘The origins of popular support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29/1 (2006), pp. 21 –34; Hamzeh, Nizar, ‘Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to parliamentary accommodation’, Third World Quarterly 14/2 (1993), pp. 321 – 37; Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi’a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 3. Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi’a, quoting from Hudson, Michael, The Precarious Republic. Political Modernization in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

286 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

NOTES

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Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion, p. 9. Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi’a, p. 37. Ibid., pp. 39 – 40. Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion, p. 9. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a, p. 38. Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion, p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. Hamzeh, Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 24. Ibid., p. 23; Norton, Amal and the Shi’a, pp. 55– 6. Samaan, Jean-Loup, Les Me´tamorphoses du Hezbollah (Paris: Karthala, 2007), p. 35. Hamzeh makes the point that Islamic Amal broke away from Amal in 1982 to protest Nabih Berri’s decision to join, with Bashir Gemayel and others, the ‘Salvation Committee’ formed by President Elias Sarkis following the Israeli invasion (Hamzeh 1993). Qassem, The Story from Within, pp. 19– 20. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, pp. 24–5; Qassem, The Story from Within, p. 20. Interviews with journalist/researcher by the author, Beirut, June and July 2011. Interview with former Hizbullah member, Beirut, July 2011; Rabil, Robert, ‘Hezbollah: Lebanon’s power broker’, The Journal of International Security Affairs 15 (2008). Ollaik, Rami and Chaden Maalouf Najjar, La Route des Abeilles (Paris: Editions Anne Carrie`re, 2012). Quoted in: Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion, p. 8. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, pp. 52– 5. Interview with journalist, Beirut, July 2011. Rabil, ‘Hezbollah: Lebanon’s power broker’; Palmer Harik, Judith, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007). Qassem, The Story from Within, p. 89. Ibid., pp. 92 – 3. Ibid., p. 93. Ollaik and Najjar, La Route des Abeilles, pp. 57– 64. Alagha, Joseph, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), p. 193. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 45. Ibid. Ibid., p. 46. US Embassy Beirut. ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Evening Standard Article on US Captives In Lebanon’ (Embassy London, 1985). Available at: https://wikileaks. org/cable/1985/03/85LONDON6332.html (accessed 11 September 2015).

NOTES 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56.

TO PAGES

157 –163

287

Hamzeh, In The Path of Hizbullah, p. 856. Ibid., p. 73, p. 85. Ibid., p. 86. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents. Qassem, The Story from Within. Alagha, Joseph, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam: ISIM, 2006), p. 133. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion, pp. 50 – 1. Ibid. Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, p. 151. Ibid., pp. 149f. Interview with the author, Beirut, June 2011. Originally formulated by Michels, Robert, Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1966); Summary in Tezcu¨r, Gu¨nes¸ Murat, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), pp. 28 – 31. Ollaik and Najjar, La Route des Abeilles. Palmer Harik, Judith, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), pp. 50– 1. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 55. Picard, Elizabeth, ‘The demobilization of the Lebanese militias’, in Prospects for Lebanon (Oxford: Oxford Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1996). Available at http ://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/c368be59.-The-demobil isation-of-the-Lebanese-Militias-Elizabeth-Picard.pdf (accessed 17 September 2015). Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2011. Ibid. Zu’ama is plural of za’im (loosely meaning leader), which denotes the head of a large, powerful family or clan. Most political figures in Lebanon hail from families or clans with a history of political activity. The families are usually representative of sectarian communities and thus form an integral part of Lebanon’s system of sectarian politics. Power and resources are divided between clans and deals are struck between their leaders, who secure access to goods at a state level (money, political influence, connections) and then redistribute it within their clan as well as to any individuals associated with it. Thus, they cement their leadership position. For an overview of how this clanbased patronage system works, see for example Michael Johnson’s All Honourable Men. The Social Origins of War in Lebanon (London: I.B.Tauris, 2001), as well as Ussama Makdisi’s The Culture of Sectarianism. Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000). Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, pp. 149– 50.

288 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

NOTES

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163 –175

Ibid., pp. 152– 5; Qassem, The Story from Within, pp. 187 – 91. Qassem, The Story from Within, pp. 189– 90. Interview with Hizbullah representative, Beirut, July 2011. Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2011. Hamzeh, ‘Lebanon’s Hizbullah’, p. 321. Ibid., p. 327. Harb, Mona, ‘Urban governance in post-war Beirut. Resources, negotiations and contestations in the Elyssar project’, in S. Shami (ed.), Capital Cities. Ethnographies of Urban Governance in the Middle East (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2001), pp. 111–33; Harb el-Kak, Mona, ‘Post-war Beirut: Resources, negotiations, and contestations in the Elyssar Project’, The Arab World Geographer 3/4 (2000), pp. 272–88. Available at http://arabworldgeographer. metapress.com/content/8Q0284022441228V (accessed 17 September 2015); Kabbani, Oussama, ‘The reconstruction of Beirut’, Prospects for Lebanon (Oxford: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992) Available at http://lebanesestudies.com/ wp-content/uploads/2012/04/903771b6.-The-Reconstruction-of-Beirut-Ouss ama-Kabbani.pdf (accessed 17 September 2015). Hamzeh, ‘Lebanon’s Hizbullah’, p. 324. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 112. Qassem, The Story from Within, p. 106. Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., p. 112. Ibid., p. 117. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 123. Ibid. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., p. 124. According to legend, Elyssar is a Phoenician goddess who left Tyre (Sur) in South Lebanon to escape the Romans (Harb, ‘Urban governance in post-war Beirut’). The legacy of the Phoenicians, claimed to be the ancient predecessors of (Christian) Lebanese and possibly subject to persecution, is often appropriated by political factions in Lebanon in order to allude to the country’s glorious past and high level of civilization. Used in the context of a chauvinist discourse, the Phoenician legacy is also claimed to demonstrate the superiority of Christian Lebanese vis-a`-vis Muslims, who are thought to stem from a different lineage. A poignant deconstruction of Lebanese founding myths is contained in (Salibi, Kamal, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Harb, ‘Urban Governance in post-war Beirut’, p. 112. Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 133. Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2011. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah. Politics and Religion, p. 43.

NOTES TO PAGES 177 –191 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103.

104. 105. 106. 107.

289

Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 116. Interview with researcher and political analyst, Beirut, June 2011. Qassem, The Story from Within, p. 200. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 132. The Shebaa Farms are a small piece of contested territory on the Lebanese– Israeli border. They comprise around 20 square kilometres and are uninhabited. After the end of the French mandate in the region in 1946, the territory was originally administered by Syria but annexed by Israel together with the Golan Heights in 1981. Syria supports Lebanon’s claims on the territory. Norton, Augustus Richard, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 117– 18. Ibid., p. 118. Palmer Harik, The Changing Face of Terrorism, pp. 151– 5. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, pp. 135–9. Norton, A Short History, p. 438. The White House, Freedom Agenda. Available at http://georgewbush-whitehous e.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda (accessed 17 September 2015). Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, p. 195. Ibid., pp. 191 – 3. Interviews with Hizbullah member of parliament and representative of Hizbullah research institute, Beirut, June and August 2011. Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, pp. 192– 3. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. Dingel, Eva, ‘Libanon: Dramatische Zuspitzung der Regierungskrise’ (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007). Available at: http://www.swp-berl in.org/de/publikationen/swp-aktuell-de/swp-aktuell-detail/article/libanon_ regierungskrise.html (accessed 17 September 2015). McCarthy, Rory, ‘Hizbullah leader: we regret the two kidnappings that led to war with Israel’, The Guardian, 28 August 2006. Hersh, Seymour, ‘Watching Lebanon’, The New Yorker, 21 August 2006. Salem, Paul, ‘The future of Lebanon’, Foreign Affairs 85/6 (2006), pp. 13 – 22. Ibid. Interview with former Hizbullah member, Beirut, October 2011. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: UN Envoy Sees Hardening of Hizballah Position Linked to Tribunal, 1701’ (2006). Available at https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BEIRUT3655_a.html (accessed 17 September 2015). Qassem, The Story from Within, pp. 211– 12. Interview with Hizbullah representative, Beirut, July 2011. Norton, Augustus Richard, ‘The role of Hezbollah in Lebanese domestic politics’, The International Spectator 42/4 (2007), pp. 475 – 91. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Lebanon: Hariri Determined To Be PM’ (2007). Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BEIRUT1942_a.html (accessed 17 September 2015).

290

NOTES

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192 –197

108. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Lebanon: Hizballah Telephone Network “Discovered”’ (2007). Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/07BEIRUT1301_a.html (accessed 17 September 2015). 109. Ibid. 110. Al-Manar TV, ‘Complete Story of March 14 War on Resistance Network’. Available at http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid¼14933& frid¼23&cid¼23&fromval¼1&seccatid¼113 (accessed 17 September 2015). 111. United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)’ (New York: United Nations, 2008). 112. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Lebanon: Jumblatt on Possible New UNSCR, National Dialogue; Rizk on UNIIIC Extension’ (2008). Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BEIRUT586_a.html (accessed 17 September 2015). 113. Much of the narrative in this chapter is based on US diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks. It is obvious that these cables represent an arbitrary collection of diplomatic correspondence, and have been released without going through an editing process. Many of the cables classified as ‘confidential’ or ‘secret’ contain relevant information and statements from Lebanese politicians. It must be borne in mind when reading these accounts that they might contain politically motivated leaks of information. On the whole, however, they provide interesting insights into the workings of Lebanese politics. When first released in 2011, the cables relating to Hizbullah’s actions since 2006 caused a stir and much debate in Lebanon. 114. Ibid. 115. Macdonald, Neil, ‘CBC Investigation: Who Killed Lebanon’s Rafik Hariri?’, CBC News, 21 November 2010. 116. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Lebanon: Hizballah Goes Fiber Optic’ (2008). Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BEIRUT523_a. html (accessed 17 September 2015). 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. 119. WikiLeaks, ‘Jumblatt on Possible New UNSCR’. 120. Biedermann, Ferry, ‘Hizbollah criticises Lebanese army over killings’, Financial Times, 22 January 2008. 121. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Lebanon: Ten-Hour Cabinet Meeting on Hizballah’s Airport Camera, New UNSCR, Minimum Wage’ (2008). Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BEIRUT618_a.html (accessed 17 September 2015). 122. Ibid. 123. Lamb, Franklin, ‘Street notes from the Hamra district’, Counterpunch, 9 May 2008.

NOTES

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124. Vineyard of the Saker blog, ‘Translation of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah Speech’, 12 May 2008. Available at http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.de/2008/ 05/translation-of-sayyid-hassan-nasrallah.html (accessed 18 September 2015). 125. Lamb, ‘Street Notes’. 126. Interview with Hizbullah representative, Beirut, July 2011. 127. Interview with Hizbullah member of parliament, Beirut, August 2011. 128. Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2011. 129. Daragahi, Borzou and Meris Lutz, ‘Lebanon rivals form unity government’, Los Angeles Times, 10 November 2009. 130. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Ministerial Statement Goes Public’ (2009). Available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0912/S00653.htm (accessed 18 September 2015). 131. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: March 14’s Winter of Discontent’ (2009). Available at http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id¼238920 (accessed 20 March 2016). 132. US Embassy Beirut, ‘WikiLeaks Cable: Cabinet Statement Signed, Hariri Faces Bumpy Road Ahead’ (2009). Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/09BEIRUT1271_a.html (accessed 20 March 2016). 133. Oudat, Bassel, ‘Partial success, worrisome failures’, Al Ahram Weekly, 30 December 2010. 134. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, p. 122. 135. Ibid., p. 133. 136. Worth, Robert, ‘Billion-dollar pyramid scheme rivets Lebanon’, New York Times, 16 September 2009. 137. Becker, Jo, ‘Beirut bank seen as a hub of Hezbollah’s financing’, New York Times, 13 December 2011. 138. Karam, Karam, ‘Lebanese Municipal Elections on Time, But Reform Delayed’, Sada, 28 April 2010. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/sada/ 2010/04/28/lebanese-municipal-elections-on-time-but-reform-delayed/6bqg (accessed 18 September 2015). 139. Blanford, Nicholas, ‘Lebanon resumes defense talks on Hezbollah’s military wing’, Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 2010. 140. Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2015. 141. Blanford, Nicholas, ‘Hezbollah-led pullout brings down Lebanon’s government’, Christian Science Monitor, 12 January 2011. 142. Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2015. 143. Ibid. 144. Slim, Randa, ‘Hezbollah’s most serious challenge’, Foreign Policy Blogs, 3 May 2011. Available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/03/ hezbollah_s_most_serious_challenge (accessed 18 September 2015). 145. The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon has charged four Hizbullah suspects with assassinating Hariri in 2011. If these charges turn out to be true, they would confirm that Hizbullah was in no way becoming more moderate or was

292

146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152.

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even genuinely interested in participating in the political system as a peaceful way of working towards its interests. Norton, ‘The role of Hezbollah’, p. 483. Interviews with former Hizbullah member, Beirut, June and October 2015. Interview with Hizbullah member of parliament, Beirut, July 2015. Interview with Hizbullah representative, Beirut, August 2015. Qassem, The Story from Within. Tilly, Charles, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Interview with political analyst, Beirut, June 2015.

Chapter 4 A Comparative Perspective on Political Strategies of Hizbullah and the Egyptian Muslim Brothers 1. Qassem, Naim, Hizbullah (Hizbullah): The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books, 2005). 2. Interview with former Hizbullah member, Beirut, October 2011. 3. Ollaik, Rami and Chaden Maalouf Najjar, La Route des Abeilles (Paris: Editions Anne Carrie`re, 2012). 4. Tadros, Samuel, ‘Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood after the revolution’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 12 (2011). 5. Ibid. 6. Interview with human rights activist, Cairo, October 2011. 7. Tadros, ‘Egypt’s Brotherhood’. 8. Awad, Marwa and Sherine El Madany, ‘In U-turn, Egypt’s Brotherhood names presidential candidate’, Reuters, 31 March 2012. 9. Lynch, Mark, ‘Did we get the Muslim Brotherhood wrong?’, Project on Middle East Political Science. Available at http://pomeps.org/2014/02/03/ did-we-get-the-muslim-brotherhood-wrong/ (accessed 29 March 2016). 10. Rosefsky Wickham, Carrie, The Muslim Brotherhood. Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 248. 11. Brown, Nathan, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, Journal of Democracy 24/4 (2013), pp. 45 – 58. 12. The term ‘football massacre’ refers to the incident on 1 February 2012, when supporters of Port Said’s Al-Masry football club stormed the pitch and the stands in Port Said’s stadium following a match, attacking supporters of the opposing Al-Ahly club from Cairo. Many of the Al-Masry ‘ultras’ carried knives, iron rods and other weapons even though fans normally get searched by police prior to a match, leading to accusations that police had stood by and let the attack happen in order to get back at Al-Ahly fans. The latter had been forceful participants in the 2011 uprisings. In total, 74 Al-Ahly supporters were killed in the incident. The defendants on trial for the attacks had apparently been arrested randomly and without much evidence to back up the charges.

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13. Human Rights Watch, ‘All According to Plan. The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt’ (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2014), p. 78. 14. Ibid., p. 78. 15. Lehmann, Elisabeth, ‘Silencing the voice of civil society’, Qantara.de – Dialogue with the Islamic World, 29 December 2014. 16. Dabashi, Hamid, ‘Arab Spring exposes Nasrallah’s hypocrisy’, Al Jazeera, 22 June 2011. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/06/ 2011618103354910596.html (accessed 20 March 2016). 17. Slim, Randa, Hezbollah in the Wake of the Arab Spring (Washington: Middle East Institute, 2011). 18. Sly, Liz and Suzan Haidamous, ‘Lebanon’s Hizbullah acknowledges battling the Islamic State in Iraq’, The Washington Post, 20 March 2015.

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INDEX

6 April movement, 251 2011 uprisings, 9, 21, 64, 210, 250, 253, 255 – 7, 266 Akef, Mahdi, 121, 123, 128, 129, 130, 131, 252 Allenby, Lord, 55 Amal militia, 142, 148, 149, 150, 151, 154, 155, 157, 160, 163, 171, 172, 175, 177, 178, 183, 185, 190, 195, 197, 198, 201, 206, 212 Anglo-Egyptian treaty 1936, 55 Aoun, Michel, 142, 183, 188, 190, 201 Al-Azhar university, 39, 93, 126 Baath Party, Lebanon, 147 Baghdad Pact (1955), 140 al-Banna, Hassan assassination, 77 early life, 68 political career, 65, 68– 70 Battalions, 72– 7, 78, 83, 132, 226 Bayat, Asef, 12, 32, 33, 34, 35, 46 Beirut Green Line, 142 ‘War of the Camps’, 142 Berri, Nabih, 150, 163, 185, 212 ‘boomerang effect’, 11

Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), 122 Chamoun, Camille, 140 Chehab, Fouad, 141 comparative method, 3 – 4, 6, 13, 20, 22– 6, 29, 32, 43, 49, 51, 52 comparison, 4, 20, 22 – 6 across-case, 9, 14, 22 within-case, 9, 22 da’wa, 31, 94, 109 de-radicalization, 29 – 30, 52 Druze, 139, 154, 183, 193, 194 Du’at la qudat, 35, 64, 88, 89, 90, 93, 95, 99, 100, 103, 134 Egypt brief historical background, 54 – 63 as British protectorate, 54 – 5 constitutional referendum 2011, 62– 3 independence, 55 Egyptian Parliamentary elections 1995, 113– 19 2000, 120– 1 2005, 123– 5 2010, 136– 7 Egyptian revolution 2011, 62, 241 –2

304

POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Farouk, King (Egypt), 56, 68 firqat al-rahhalat, 71 Free Officers, 57, 59, 66, 82, 91, 97 ‘Freedom Agenda’, 62, 128, 180, 184 Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 27, 66, 81, 88, 108, 115, 116, 124, 127, 243, 244, 246 Gama’a Islamiyya, 62, 105, 106, 107, 112, 118, 134, 135, 240, 251 Golan Heights, 153, 162, 164 governance, 15, 16, 105, 155, 171, 243, 247 hakimiyya, 86 harakat al-mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived), 148, 163 Hariri, Rafik, 143, 222, 227, 265, 285 Hizbullah and 2006 war, 28, 144, 165, 186 – 90, 209, 239 2008 events, 25, 28, 144, 172, 190 – 200, 210, 211, 215, 218, 228, 238 – 9, 265, 266 after 2011, 255 – 7 Lebanonization of, 24, 41, 42, 144, 159, 164, 184, 186, 189, 202, 204, 209, 217, 230 literature on, 39 –44 manifesto, 24, 151, 203 origins, 146, 151– 7 al-Hudaybi, Hassan, 23, 30, 35, 64, 87 – 9, 90, 91 – 2, 93, 94, 95, 97 – 9, 100, 131 insider-outsider coalition, 11 International Relations theory, 12 interviews, 26 – 7 Iranian Revolution 1979, 41, 149– 51 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 151 – 2, 158 Iraqi Da’wa Party, 146, 149 Islamic Jihad (Egypt), 61– 2, 105, 106, 107, 112

Islamic Jihad (Lebanon), 61, 105 – 7, 112, 118, 134 – 5, 154, 157, 240 Islamist movements and the state, 44 – 51 use of violence by, 3, 44 – 51 jahiliyya, 86, 94, 98 Jama’at al-Muslimin, 30 ‘Jeep case’, 76, 82 al-Khazindar, Ahmad, 76 khedive, 54 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 149, 151, 153, 158, 162 Kifaya movement, 33, 122, 251 Lebanese Communist Party, 147, 149, 212 Lebanese National Movement (LNM), 142 Lebanon 2006 War, 28, 144, 165, 186 – 90, 209, 239 brief historical summary, 139 – 44 civil war, 146 –67 independence, 140 National Pact (al-mithaq al-watani), 147 Syrian occupation of, 146 level of analysis, 8 – 9, 20, 25, 233, 264 domestic, 20, 25, 66, 233, 239, 265 movement-internal, 20, 25, 100, 233 transnational, 20, 25, 66, 233, 239, 264 Limane Turrah prison massacre, 87 Luxor massacre, 112, 251 Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, 115, 123 March 8 movement, 182, 191, 201, 208, 215, 257 March 14 movement, 8, 145, 182–183, 188–94, 199–202, 208, 215–16, 228, 239, 257, 262

INDEX Marine barracks bombing, Lebanon, 154, 156 Maronites, 139, 147, 148 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), 122 Mill, John Stuart most different systems, 4, 19 most similar systems, 4 Mohammad’s Youth, 75, 77, 79 monopoly of force, 16, 25, 153, 169, 227, 263 Mubarak, Gamal, 62, 122– 3 Mubarak, Hosni early rule, 29 – 32 overthrow, 241 – 2 policy towards Islamists, 61– 3, 107 – 13, 114 – 19, 122– 30 Upper Egypt uprisings, 61– 2 Mubarak regime, 6, 24, 29– 31, 61– 3, 107 – 16, 119 – 27 Mughniyeh, Imad, 149, 157, 258 Muhammad Ali, 54 Muslim Brotherhood after 2011, 7, 21, 62, 64, 81, 98, 108, 241 – 55 bans, 34, 39, 57, 68, 76, 82, 84, 91 Battalions, 72 –7, 78, 83, 132, 226 family system, 73 – 4, 92 literature on, 28 –39 origins, 66 – 71 in Parliament, 37, 69, 120, 236, 242 Special Apparatus, 36, 37, 66, 72–7, 79, 81, 84, 88, 91, 92, 94, 97, 99, 108, 114, 133, 135, 223, 226, 227, 232 Mussawi, Abbas, 149 Nasrallah, Hassan, 43, 149, 157, 162, 164, 168, 175, 177, 181, 186, 190, 197, 200, 207, 210, 213, 225, 228, 256, 258, 263, 267 el-Nasser, Gamal Abd and Arab unity, 57 – 9 assassination attempt, 57– 60

305

socialist policies, 57 al-Nizam al-Khass see Special Apparatus al-Nuqrashi, Mahmoud, 66, 76, 79, 81, 97, 226 organization 1965, 86 – 8, 89, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 108, 133 ‘output capacity’, 15 Palestine revolt of 1948, 77 – 81, 97 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) expulsion from Jordan, 141 expulsion from Lebanon, 142 Pasdaran, 151, 217 Political Opportunity Structure (POS), 12, 13–15 political process model, 13 process tracing method, 4, 22, 23 Putnam, Robert, 11 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 38, 39 Qutb, Sayyid, 24, 35, 63, 86 – 9, 90, 93– 5, 97, 98 – 100, 103, 105, 115, 133, 134, 136, 232 re-radicalization, 52, 85 regime definition of, 3, 14, 15, 21 Egypt, 6, 7 and Muslim Brotherhood, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 23– 4, 29, 30 – 7, 50 – 1, 64 – 6, 67– 71, 78– 9, 91 – 5, 97 – 107, 117– 19, 125 – 7, 128 – 38 repression definition, 33– 4 Rover units, 71– 7, 78, 132, 226 Sabra and Shatila massacres, 142, 152 Sadat, Anwar assassination, 61 foreign policy, 59 –61 infitah, 61, 103, 104

306

POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

reforms, 59– 61 visit to Jerusalem, 60 al-Sadr, Musa disappearance, 150 role in Lebanese politics, 40, 148 Salsabil case, 112 – 13, 116 Second Gulf War, 61 al-Shater, Khairat, 113, 114, 129, 244 Social Movement Theory, 12 social movements definition of and Islamist movements, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 46, 47, 51 South Lebanese Army (SLA), 143, 160, 171 sovereignty, 84, 193 domestic, 16 Special Apparatus (al-Nizam al-Khass) foundation, 72 – 7, 79, 81, 84, 88, 91, 92, 94, 97, 99 membership, 74 state strength (capacity), 7, 22, 25, 51 statehood, 15, 174, OECD concept, 16 strategies definition, 3 Suez Canal inauguration, 55 Suez Crisis 1956, 37, 83 Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolution, 245 – 6 takeover of power, 242 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 140 Syria occupation of Lebanon, 143 withdrawal from Lebanon, 182– 3

Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), 147, 196, 206 Tahrir Square (Cairo), 249, 251 Taif Agreement, 143, 159, 161, 163, 164, 165, 190, 213, 224 takfir, 30, 86, 88, 95, 103, 106, 115, 134 definition, 86 al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra, 103, 106, 134 takfiri, 30, 88 tanzim, 30, 31, 102, 103, 104, 108, 114, 135, 224 tarbiya, 103 Tilly, Charles, 12, 14, 15, 19, 33, 65, 216 al-Tilmisani, Umar, 93, 102, 104, 106, 108, 109, 114, 131, 134 Tufayli, Subhi, 149, 162, 164, 167, 175, 213, 225, 231 ‘two-level games’, 11 umma, 16, 124, 155 United Arab Republic (UAR), 58 wali, 54 Wasat Party, 37, 50, 113, 115, 116, 117, 130, 131, 136, 224, 229, 232 Wasatiyya, 37 Weber, Max, 16 wilayat al-faqih (jurist-theologian), 151, 155, 166, 175, 203 Yom Kippur War, 60 Zaghluul, Saad, 55

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POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

‘... an innovative, well-argued and thoroughly researched addition to the debates surrounding the development of political Islam ...’ Rachid Ouaissa, Philipps-Universität Marburg

The Islamist Politics of Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood Eva Dingel

Eva Dingel has worked as a consultant and researcher with a variety of non-governmental organisations and academic institutions focusing on the Middle East over the last ten years. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Freie Universität Berlin (FU Berlin).

Who are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah? What do the two movements – one Sunni and one Shi‘a – have in common? Despite being classified by a number of countries as ‘terrorist’ organisations, both are, or have been, serious political players in the states in which they operate – Lebanon and Egypt. Both have, at various points, advocated the unity of Muslims under an Islamic state or caliphate, but rather than focusing on their role as extremist religious movements, Eva Dingel here studies them as players within the political process. She considers why, at certain points, they have chosen to play by the conventional political rules, while during other periods, they have applied different, more extreme, methods of protest. Dingel’s comparative history of two of the most prominent political Islamist movements sheds light on the complex – and often misunderstood – interaction between Islam and politics in the Middle East. This book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the changing dynamics of politics in the Islamic world.

Cover design: Ian Ross www.ianrossdesigner.com

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03/11/2016 10:35