Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees: Why They Refuse to Return ‘Home’-Myths and Realities [1st ed.] 9811067554, 9789811067556, 9789811067563

Table of contents :
Foreword by Mark Gibney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Foreword by Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Foreword by Charles Onana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi
Introduction: The Urgency of the Rwandan Refugee Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xxv
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii

1 Refugees’ Durable Solution: Voluntary Repatriation and Cessation of the Refugees’ Status . .1
1.1 Definition of Refugee and UNHCR’s Mandate, Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 International Influence of Refugee Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
1.3 Evolution of Durable Solutions and Preference for Voluntary Repatriation . . . . . . . . .6
1.4 From “Voluntary” Repatriation to “Safe Return” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Cessation of Refugee Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
1.6 Myths and Realities of Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

2 Process of “Armed Repatriation” of Old-Caseload Tutsi Refugees(1959–1994) . . . . . . . . .19
2.1 Pre-1959 History and “Social Revolution” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Harassment of Refugees in Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Rwandan Government’s Gradual Change on Refugees’ Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
2.4 RPF’s Preparation for Armed Return from Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
2.5.1 Democratisation and Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
2.5.2 Massacres and Massive Displacement of Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
2.6 Motives of the RPF’s Armed Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal to Return(1994–1997) . . . . . . . . .39
3.1 Shooting Down of Habyarimana’s Plane (6 April 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
3.2 Genocide (April–July 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Rwandan Government’s Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Their Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 Massacre at an IDP Camp (April 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6 Attacks of Refugee Camps and “Genocide” in DRC(October 1996–April 1997) . . . . . . . . .57
3.7 UNHCR’s Policy on (Imposed) Return(July 1994–May 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.8 Killing Continues upon Return (November 1996 ~ ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate(1995–2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 Post-Genocide Political Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
4.2 Political Characteristics of Post-Genocide Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
4.3 Less Reported Killings but Diminishing Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
4.4 Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation (2002/2003–2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5 Strategies of Rwandan Government and Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
4.6 Following the Announcement of the Cessation Clause(October 2009–June 2013) . . . . . . . 91
4.7 Security Incidents Faced by Refugees(October 2009–June 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.8 UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
4.9 Invocation of Cessation Clause of Refugee Status(June 2013–December 2017) . . . . . . . 103
4.10 Security Incidents Faced by Refugees(June 2013–December 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
4.11 President Kagame’s Attitude Vis-à-Vis Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.12 Refugees’ Psychological Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

5 US Responsibility in the Great Lakes Regional Power Dynamics and Rwandan Refugees . . . . 113
5.1 US Interests in the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 France’s Interest in Rwanda and Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
5.3 US (in)Action from the 1980s Until the 1994 Genocide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
5.4 US Humanitarian and Military Aid in Eastern DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5 US Involvement in the Forced Repatriation of Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6 US Complicity in RPA’s Massacres of Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
5.7 US Interference in UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135

Barbara Harrell-Bond’s Quote on Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Author’s Letter Addressed to the High Commissioner of the UNHCR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141

Citation preview

Masako Yonekawa

Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees Why They Refuse to Return ‘Home’: Myths and Realities

Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees

Masako Yonekawa

Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees Why They Refuse to Return ‘Home’: Myths and Realities

123

Masako Yonekawa Economics and Informatics Department Tsukuba Gakuin University Tsukuba, Japan

ISBN 978-981-10-6755-6 ISBN 978-981-10-6756-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6756-3

(eBook)

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword by Mark Gibney

This book provides a fascinating and timely analysis of the role that different refugee groups have played in Rwandan politics over the course of the past half century. Masako Yonekawa challenges many popular perceptions that, unfortunately, have taken root, particularly the simple dichotomy that has equated the country’s Tutsi population as passive victims and all Hutus as “genocidaires”. As the attention of the world has drifted elsewhere, it is important to be reminded of the oppression and corruption that afflicts Rwandan society, which has had a profound effect on the country’s inability to repatriate large segments of its Hutu population, thereby forestalling any meaningful form of national reconciliation. Mark Gibney Carol G. Belk Distinguished Professor of Humanities and Professor of Political Science University of North California Asheville, USA

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Foreword by Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza

I highly congratulate Yonekawa for her courage to write such controversial and sensitive subject without fear or favour. Her personal experience and knowledge as a staff member of the UNHCR during the forced repatriation of Rwanda refugees in 1996 is an invaluable asset in shedding light on what happened and the motivations of international actors at the time. Knowing the truth about the history and experiences of Rwandan refugees, understanding their needs, pain, fears, hopes and expectations will help to respond better to their needs and hopefully pre-empt a repeat of a forced entry back home as it happened in 1990 when Tutsi refugees decided to force their way back to Rwanda because they considered that their right to return had been denied. The great merit is not about getting all the information or interpretation accurate but about her courage to seek the truth in spite of the risk of going against the politically correct narrative about Rwandan refugees. Only truth can make us free. Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza Chair of the Party FDU-Inkingi Kigali, Rwanda

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Foreword by Charles Onana

Few researchers have bothered to examine the issue of Rwandan refugees since the 1994 massacres and the reasons for their reluctance to return home. Yonekawa brings together her academic experience and her field knowledge to offer an intimate, courageous and informed reading of the political situation that plunged Rwandan refugees into fear, terror and death in the DRC. An eyewitness to the distress and forced repatriation of these refugees and their “reintegration” to Rwanda, she dares that no expert has taken the risk of doing for 25 years at the international level: simply telling the truth. And it gives a shiver because the regime of Paul Kagame has never stopped producing refugees for at least two decades. It is from this haemorrhage of Rwandan refugees that Yonekawa treats here as a clinician. It shows how a policy contrary to respect for human rights and the promulgation of repressive laws led many Rwandans (Hutu and Tutsi) to leave in exile. The interviews with these refugees give Yonekawa's work additional strength and make it a fundamental book, the first that goes so far in the exposition of facts, political analysis and the troubled game of the international community. Charles Onana Investigative Journalist Paris, France

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Preface

A sea of people washed over the landscape. Like prisoners they walked silently, many balancing belongings on their heads. Mothers with babies strapped to their backs struggled to move forward, and small children whimpered from the pain of their long, inexplicable trek. Rwandan soldiers scrutinised the hordes of refugees, occasionally screaming at them and striking them with sticks to force them to move faster. In the faces of refugees, I saw fear, hopelessness, and emotional exhaustion. Many had not washed in weeks and smelled foul and sick.

Forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees in end 1996 (taken by Yasuki Shimomura)

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Preface

It was late 1996, and thousands of refugees were being expelled en masse from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)1 and Tanzania where they had sought asylum since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Their dramatic exodus was ordered and forced by these host governments and Rwandan Government and approved by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United States (US). The Rwandans were returning home against their will. I witnessed the massive forced repatriation of refugees from the DRC and Tanzania to Rwanda. The scenes were unforgettable, both in their entirety and in their excruciating detail, from the disarray to the individual misery. As a staff member of UNHCR, I felt helpless; the only thing that the UNHCR and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were able to provide were biscuits and water along with transportation for the most vulnerable people. We were there to monitor the “refugees’ march”, but in reality we did very little for these people. Nearly two-and-a-half decades have since passed, and some of these returnees, as well as other Rwandans, have fled their country again. While Rwanda is recognised for its rapid development under President Paul Kagame, the country continues to produce refugees today. A large majority of them have categorically refused to return to Rwanda. I became intensely interested in the plight of refugees and the forced migration in the 1990s while working for 10 years with the United Nations (UN) in Africa’s Great Lakes region.2 I worked in a refugee camp in western Tanzania from 1994 to 1995. I later spent three years in Rwanda with the UNHCR, monitoring the return and reintegration of the 1959 “old-caseload” and the 1994 “new-caseload” returnees from Uganda, Tanzania, and the DRC. I was then deployed to eastern DRC in 1998 until the war erupted, and again in 2007 with the UNHCR, where part of my work was to assist with the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. After my retirement from the UNHCR, I began working as a researcher, using my field experience to explore questions that had long troubled me. While in the region I witnessed the constant movement and suffering of Rwandan people, it has become the norm for many Rwandans to be refugees. The forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees in 1996 was one of the most controversial moves in the history of the UNHCR. At the time, both my senior colleagues and I regarded repatriation as a long-term solution. In 1997, I remember applying for a job as a field officer in Goma in eastern DRC. The position required searching for missing Rwandan refugees and helping them repatriate after Rwandan forces invaded Congo. The job was eventually withdrawn, presumably because so many refugees had disappeared or were massacred. The UNHCR regarded these deaths as 1

The name of the country has changed four times since the country’s independence in 1960. The post-independence name was Republic of the Congo until 1 Aug. 1964, when its name was changed to the DRC. On 27 Oct. 1971, the then President Mobutu renamed the country Zaire. Following the First Congo War, the country was renamed the DRC on 17 May 1997. In this book, DRC or Congo will be used regardless of the period. 2 The Great Lakes region includes Rwanda, DRC, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania.

Preface

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“unfortunate incidents” that were “out of their control” due to the spiralling war in the Congo. In early 2014, I visited several camps in an African country that hosts Rwandan refugees. The purpose was to help organise an international seminar at Rikkyo University in Tokyo to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the exodus of Rwandan refugees. The event took place on World Refugee Day on 20 June 2014. The interviews I conducted with refugees in an African country made me realise that I had never really understood the depth of their fear or the true meaning of refugee protection. I believe that leaving the UNHCR to become an independent researcher gave me a deeper understanding of the problems refugees faced, and it likely heightened my sensitivity to their suffering. Refugees openly expressed fear and mistrust, not only of host governments and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the present ruling party which was a rebel group prior to 1994, but also of the UNHCR, which they viewed their boss. In their mind, the UNHCR had developed an intimate relationship with Rwanda, whose government had persecuted them, and UNHCR officials abandoned refugees in 1996, when the Rwandan troops under Kagame violently attacked their camps in the Congo. The UNHCR went on to recommend3 the cessation clause of the Rwandan refugees’ status, which refugees rightly argued eroded their basic human rights. This is why most Rwandan refugees have difficulty trusting the UNHCR or even sharing their concerns with its staff. One refugee was candid with me in an interview, “In fact, I did not feel like meeting with you, a former UNHCR employee, as I have very bad memories of this organisation”. I learned that some refugees felt compelled to disguise their nationality to avoid discrimination and bias on the part of the UNHCR. Hearing this helped me to understand why refugee statistics had always seemed skewed to me; for many years, I had wondered why the number of Congolese refugees was so high, while the number of Rwandans was so low. It was during this preliminary research in Africa that I met Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond, Founding Director of Refugee Studies Centre of Oxford University. She co-directed the Rights in Exile Programme, previously known as Fahamu Refugee Programme; this was the only organisation that has actively opposed the invocation of the cessation clause for Rwandan refugees.4 My association with Harrell-Bond allowed me to expand my network with refugees, researchers, and activists worldwide and to conduct interviews with refugees thanks to the strong trust she gained from them.

3

Although Article 35 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees gives only the UNHCR a supervisory role, it was reported that UNHCR has been actively calling for invocation of cessation clause. Fahamu, Refugee Legal Aid Newsletter Issue 21 Dec. 2011, 7–8. 4 Fahamu Refugee Programme, Rwanda: Cessation of Refugee Status is Unwarranted. Memorandum of Fact and Law, 2011.

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Preface

It is my deepest regret that Harrell-Bond who enormously supported, advised, and encouraged my research and this publication passed away on 11 July 2018 at the age of 85. Until her death, we had an intense exchange for four years on how to advocate for Rwandan refugees’ protection via email and during my visit to her home in Oxford. I am grateful for the Rwandan refugees for sharing their painful and dreadful experiences as well as invaluable documents with me. I was deeply impressed by their wise and non-violent attitude, their long-time fight for justice, and their passion in pursuing education for themselves and for their children. They have maintained this spirit in spite of repeated threats and harassment. Obviously, I cannot speak on behalf of the Rwandan refugees, but I have tried as much as possible to highlight their concerns from their perspective. Any errors of fact and analysis are my responsibility. This book is dedicated to Barbara and to Rwandan refugees worldwide. I hope this book will help to promote an understanding of the current situation faced by Rwandan refugees and aid in policy implementations for all refugees. Research grant was provided by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan under the JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP16H05699. Tokyo, Japan

Masako Yonekawa

Introduction: The Urgency of the Rwandan Refugee Situation

Based on the preliminary research and literature review, I found it important, even urgent for the international community,5 and in particular the UNHCR, to review the core issues of protection and repatriation of refugees using Rwandan refugees as a case study, which has been contested for decades. The UNHCR claims that Rwanda “has changed significantly since the 1994 genocide, and today enjoys an essential level of peace and security”.6 This situation, if it were true, would allow refugees to return home if they wish to. However, the vast majority of refugees refuse to return. There are four main reasons for this refusal, according to the UNHCR and the Rwandan Government: first, “[refugees’] strong links to their countries of asylum after many years in exile”7; second, “[some] fear of facing justice having participated in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi [minority group]”8; third, “the majority of refugees are being held hostage by ‘refugee leaders,’ who are organizing opposition to return in the hope of evading judicial proceedings”9; and fourth, “[their] apprehension about conditions in their home country”.10 While the first three reasons may apply to some refugees, this book will demonstrate empirically based on literature review and field research that the fourth reason may be the most pronounced. To be more explicit, refugees have extremely

5

In this book, this term refers to the major donor states, which have been playing a prominent role in influencing refugee policies, as well as the UN bodies, especially the UNSC and the UNHCR. 6 UNHCR, Refworld, “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for the Rwandan Refugee Situation, including UNHCR’s recommendations on the Applicability of the ‘ceased circumstances’ Cessation Clauses”, 30 Dec. 2011. http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain? docid=4f33a1642 para. 28. 7 Ibid, para. 2. 8 The New Times, “Rwandans lose refugee status as cessation clause comes into force”, 1 Jan. 2018. 9 K. Long, “Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee repatriation”, UNHCR, Sept. 2013, para. 192. 10 UNHCR, “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for the Rwandan Refugee Situation”, para. 2.

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Introduction: The Urgency of the Rwandan Refugee Situation

strong fear and well-founded grievances against the Rwandan Government (RPF). They are aware that the RPF has committed grave crimes and human rights violations in the region since 1990. They point to crimes committed during the RPF invasion war from 1990 to 1994, during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in addition to attacks on refugee camps and the crimes of “genocide” in eastern DRC from 1996 to 1997, and the sporadic killings and other crimes in central Africa and beyond. Today, Rwanda continues to produce countless refugees, including a number of high-profile political ones who have been subjected to imprisonment, kidnapping, threats, and assassination in and outside of Rwanda. Apart from Rwandans, foreigners who had reportedly witnessed or documented Hutu civilian massacres by the RPF have also become victims; they have been killed because they were considered dangerous witnesses to RPF crimes.11 In spite of these incidents and the ongoing outflow of refugees, the governments of Rwanda and asylum countries in addition to the UNHCR are adamant that refugees should return to Rwanda—where returnees (former refugees who returned to their homeland) can end up facing death. To make matters worse, the enforcement of the cessation clause of refugee status on 31 December 2017 by Rwanda and asylum countries, recommended by the UNHCR, suggests that Rwandan refugees can be refouled anytime by the host governments; this applies notably to the Republic of Congo that applied cessation clause of Rwandan refugees’ status. This could lead to another massive forced return and forced displacement, and risks triggering a similar dynamic scene in 1996–1997. Moreover, if Rwandan refugees do not return to Rwanda, they “risk situations of de jure [lack of legal nationality in any country] or de facto [the inability to enjoy the benefits associated with legal nationality] statelessness unless they can attain alternative nationality to replace their Rwandan citizenship”.12 The complex issues around statelessness are not examined in this book, however. There is general agreement among historians that the three-decade, unresolved problem of Rwandan Tutsi refugees led to the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the RPF, whose founding members were mainly raised in exile in Uganda.13 The invasion was followed by civil war and genocide. The UNHCR acknowledges this:

11

Such foreigners include three Spanish employees of the Medicos del Mundo; Canadian and Cambodian personnel of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Office (OHCHR); Fathers from Canada, Croatia, and Spain; and a Tanzanian lawyer for the International Criminal Court for Tribunal (ICTR). Other foreigners who have challenged the RPF’s genocide narratives have been imprisoned and threatened. 12 L. N. Kingston, “Bringing Rwandan Refugees ‘Home’: The Cessation Clause, Statelessness, and Forced Repatriation”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 29 (3), 2017. 13 H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, “Preface”, Adelman and Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000, x; Africa Watch, Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War, Human Rights since the October 1990 Invasion, IV (3), 27 Feb. 1992, 8.

Introduction: The Urgency of the Rwandan Refugee Situation

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Inevitably, one is forced to ask how the course of subsequent events might have been different if a durable solution had been found for the Rwandan refugees in the 1960s. That the vast majority of refugees wanted to go home was in little doubt. An inquiry into the situation in Kivu [in eastern Congo] in 1963 found an overwhelming desire amongst the refugees to return to their homeland if UNHCR were able to give a ‘watertight’ guarantee for their well-being in Rwanda. Had repatriation taken place at that time, a new accommodation might have been found between the Tutsi and Hutu, thus avoiding the genocide that occurred 30 years later. Or, it may be argued, if the international community had been more generous in providing the necessary funds, then local settlement in a politically stable environment like Tanzania might have worked. More, too, could no doubt have been done to find regional solutions.14

In contrast to the UNHCR’s inaction in the past, the same UN refugee agency today has been seeking to aggressively resolve the problem of Rwandan refugees by organising repatriation and recommending the invocation of cessation clause, forcefully against refugees’ will. The main argument here is twofold; first, the promotion of voluntary repatriation and invocation of the cessation clause of Rwandan refugees’ status remain premature, and second, Rwandan refugees refuse to repatriate to Rwanda because they fear and associate trauma with the RPF, whose agenda has been partially or fully backed by the US Government. Since early 1990s, the US has become one of the main political and military supporters of the RPF even before its army seized power in 1994.15 The unbridled support of the RPF has dramatically affected international policy and the lives of Rwandan refugees.

Literature Review and Research Gap Since the Social Revolution in 1959 which resulted in the mass movement of oldcaseload refugees, mainly Tutsi, Rwandan refugees are one of the most protracted and violent in Africa.16 Some of that violence has flowed from the militarisation of refugee camps. A great deal of literature exists on Rwandan refugees who fled from 1959 onwards and in 1994. Studies have described how the second generation of old-caseload refugees led an eventual invasion of Rwanda, or an “armed repatriation” as it is called by some analysts; the invasion was in part caused by the crisis of citizenship in Uganda.17 Studies describe in detail how the killing campaign was executed in 1994, including the role of external actors, such as 14

UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, 52. 15 Amnesty International (hereafter, Amnesty), Rwanda: Ending the Silence (hereafter, Ending the Silence), Sept. 1997, 42. 16 For Rwandan refugees’ movement prior to 1959, see D. Newbury, “Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of ‘Coming Home’ to Rwanda”, Society for Comparative Study of Society and History, 47 (2), 2005. 17 M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, 36.

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Introduction: The Urgency of the Rwandan Refugee Situation

France, which is said to have led to the massive flight of new-caseload refugees, mainly Hutu, and “génocidaires” (genocide killers).18 Some research has critically examined the forced repatriation policy of these new-caseload refugees in 1996–1997.19 The reintegration problem in Rwanda, especially with regard to land policies, has been identified in both the old-caseload and new-caseload returnees.20 The restricted political space in post-genocide Rwanda which led to the additional flight of refugees has been analysed by former Rwandan politicians and international academics.21 There is substantial documentation examining serious human rights violations committed against the Rwandan refugees by the RPF army in the DRC.22 Testimonies from post-genocide and current Rwandan refugees have attempted to show the reasons they fled and why they were reluctant to repatriate, but these are scarce.23 Human rights organisations have criticised the UNHCR’s policy on voluntary repatriation and the cessation clause of Rwandan refugees.24 Largely speaking, there is a paucity of research on the role of external parties, in particular the US Government, in influencing events that have caused refugees to flee in the first place.25 18

A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell Stores: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch (hereafter, HRW), March 1999; G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, Kampala, Foundation Publishers, 1999. 19 Amnesty, Rwanda: Human Rights overlooked in mass repatriation, Jan. 1997; M. B. Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 20 S. Takeuchi and J. Marara, “Land tenure security in post-conflict Rwanda”, S. Takeuchi ed. Confronting Land and Property Problems for Peace, Oxon, Routledge, 2014. 21 F. Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013; J. Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation, New York, Atria, 2009; T. Rudasingwa, Healing A Nation, A Testimony: Waging and Winning a Peaceful Revolution to Unite and Heal a Broken Rwanda, South Carolina, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013. 22 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/1998/581, 29 Jun. 1998; OHCHR, Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between Mar. 1993 and Jun. 2003 (hereafter, Mapping Report), Aug. 2010. 23 International Refugee Rights Initiative and Refugee Law Project, A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, Jun. 2010; C. Karooma, “Reluctant to return? The primacy of social networks in the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Uganda”, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Working Paper Series No. 103, Aug. 2014. 24 Amnesty, Ending the Silence; Amnesty, Rwanda. Protecting their rights: Rwandese refugees in the Great Lakes region, 2004. Although Amnesty and HRW have continued to criticise the human rights violations committed by the Rwandan Government, these organisations since 2010 have kept silent or weakened their argument on the cessation clause of Rwandan refugees, although this is related to the human rights situation in the country. 25 A. R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989; M. Gibney, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Creation of Refugee Flows”, H. Adelman ed. Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States, Toronto, York Lanes Press, 1991.

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There are three main research gaps in the literature. First, there has been no systematic and comprehensive research on the protection of and repatriation challenges of post-genocide Rwandan refugees who are classified as those who fled after 1995 and including former 1959 and 1994 returnees. The lack of rigorous research on 1994 refugees is likely due to perception bias and their being labelled “génocidaires”. Second, there have been only fragmented studies on the cessation clause of Rwandan refugee status. The few studies available are mostly from Uganda.26 Thirdly, the role and interests of external actors in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region, as it relates to Rwandan refugee policy, have not been examined. It is worth noting that the author did not have access to primary sources of information, especially from the US Government; therefore, there are limitations regarding my assessment of US policy.

Methodologies To demonstrate my argument, the following questions were explored: how has the durable solution of refugees evolved from the 1950s—when the UNHCR was born —to the 1990s when the RPF’s armed repatriation and new-caseload refugees’ forceful return took place; what motives have various actors had vis-à-vis the solution of Rwandan refugees, such as the previous Rwandan Government under President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973–1994), or the current RPF (1994*), in addition to the UNHCR; what are the refugee concerns with regard to repatriation from the early 1960s until today; and what have the Global North’s policies been, especially that of the US, in the Great Lakes region. In addition to a literature review, interviewing refugees was absolutely essential to understand the plight of these post-genocide refugees and address the gap in research. There are two methods of research: quantitative and qualitative. In quantitative research, data are in the form of numbers, stressing neutrality and objectivity and minimising or eliminating the subjective human factor.27 In qualitative research, real events are documented, what people say is recorded, written documents are examined, and social context is emphasised; this includes “time context (when something occurs), spatial context (where something occurs), emotional context (the feeling regarding how something occurs), and socio-cultural context (the social situation and cultural milieu in which something occurs)”.28 For

K. E. McMillan, “Uganda’s Invocation of Cessation Regarding its Rwandan Refugee Caseload: Lessons for International Protection”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 24 (2), May 2012; F. Ahimbisibwe, “The Host State of Refugee Security in Uganda: The Case of Rwandan Refugees in Nakivale Settlement”, Ph.D. dissertation, Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Dec. 2015; A. S. Sniderman, “Explaining Delayed Cessation: A Case Study of Rwandan Refugees in Zimbabwe”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 27 (4), 2015. 27 W. L. Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Boston, Allyn & Bacon, 2011, 169-9, 174. 28 Ibid, 175. 26

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my research, I used the latter method for two reasons. I considered it important to focus on the perspective of the post-genocide refugees whose fear and psychological insecurity in particular are not well documented in academic literature, except for refugees in Uganda. Second, it has become clear, given some of the testimonies of refugees, including ex-RPF officers, that dominant narratives of the RPF on the genocide and other crimes do not reflect the reality. Kevin Dunn and Iver Neuman argue the following: Since some representations become accepted as ‘true’ and others do not, it is important to ask how certain structures of knowledge become dominant. Particular meaning and identities are widely accepted, or ‘fixed,’ not because of any inherent ‘truth’ but because of the strength of that specific representation.29

To demonstrate why refugees have not returned to Rwanda, the following questions were raised, where applicable: (1) the reason and timing of their flight; (2) the type of persecution refugees have experienced in Rwanda and in asylum countries, as well as their degree of fear; (3) the reason for their refusal to repatriate, and the minimum conditions for voluntary repatriation; (4) how refugees have dealt with land and property ownership; (5) how the UNHCR and countries of asylum explain the cessation clause process and the qualification for the exemption clause; and (6) conditions for local integration. I needed to interview as many refugees as possible to understand their personal stories and the problems they might have in common. The objective of the research, therefore, was not to compare policies towards refugees in host countries—whether they were in Africa, Europe, or North America—but to examine the issues they currently face and gain a deeper knowledge of their experiences when they fled. It is worth noting that finding and persuading Rwandan refugees to open up and give interviews proved to be very challenging. As a rule, most refugees are highly reluctant to share their stories and have trouble trusting outsiders. My research was made possible only when refugees were willing to refer me to others on the basis of trust. I got help from foreigners, among them Barbara Harrell-Bond, who worked directly with Rwandan refugees, and advocated on their behalf for many years. I held individual interviews with 86 Rwandan refugees, both former and current, in five countries in Africa—four of which invoked cessation clause and one which had not—and also in five countries in Europe and North America. While some have refugee status, others have lost refugee status when the cessation clause was invoked in 2017; others are asylum-seekers or had obtained nationality or residence status in the countries of asylum. Five interviewees belonged to opposition groups in exile, such as the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) and the United Democratic Force (FDU)-Inkingi. Out of 86, I only used testimony from 57 interviewees for this book, the majority of whom live in African countries. Not all interviews were cited in the book due to various reasons. Those who obtained nationality in the host countries are not anxious about repatriation and thus talked less about it. Additionally, 29

K. C. Dunn and I. B. Neuman, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2016, 55.

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time spent with interviews was in some cases limited, and therefore, it was difficult to grasp the full context of their experiences. Supporting documents based on interviewees’ statements could not always be found. However, my conversations with all refugees were very useful, especially in understanding President Habyarimana’s refugee policy (Chap. 2) and RPF’s tactics in promoting repatriation (Chap. 4). As much as possible, I tried to select interviewees from varied backgrounds, ethnic group-wise, gender-wise, age-wise, profession-wise, and experience-wise, including those who have been displaced a number of times in and outside of Rwanda, those who served as witnesses before the International Criminal Court for Tribunal (ICTR), those who claimed their land and houses, and those who worked with the Gacaca court. Most of the interviewees were Hutu, and some were Tutsi, including former RPF officials and former old-caseload refugees. More than half of the interviewees turned out to be men. The majority of refugees, especially those in Africa, collaborated in research interviews for the first time since fleeing Rwanda simply because hardly any researchers have conducted research. Most interviews took about two hours on average, but some lasted as long as six hours and some less than an hour. Occasionally interviews were interrupted due to the trauma refugees felt in relating their experiences. For six people who had difficulty speaking in English or French, Rwandan interpreters were used. To clarify certain issues, refugees were in some cases interviewed a second, third, or fourth time. While a number of refugees interviewed were living in urban environments, some resided in camps or settlements. A majority of refugees interviewed were over 40 years old, which meant that at the time of 1994 genocide, they were at least 17 years old. A few were minor or born after 1994. After explaining the purpose of the research and the importance of maintaining anonymity, interviews were conducted privately. In order to protect the refugees, the names of the interviewees, as well as the location and dates of interviews, are not disclosed in this book, except where permission was granted (Table). Overall, the interview had mainly four limitations. First, because of security reasons, I did not have access to Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC, where the vast majority of Rwandan refugees now live. Second, it is extremely difficult or almost impossible to conduct field research in Rwanda to countercheck the returnee situation (see Chap. 4). Third, ex-Rwandan Government army (FAR) and Interahamwe were not met with, despite my attempt to do so. Fourth, in order to verify the UNHCR’s view, several attempts were made to meet with the Representative and Deputy Representative (Protection) in two UNHCR country offices in Africa to no avail; government officials in some African countries were not met with either. The fact that I was unable to meet UNHCR made me decide to write a letter to the High Commissioner Filippo Grandi (see pp. 139–140). Congolese refugees, many of whom have lived beside the Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC since 1994, were also interviewed as part of efforts to provide context for testimony from Rwandan refugee. In addition, a total of 31 persons, including journalists, researchers, and former ICTR lawyers were interviewed.

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Table Breakdown of interviewed refugees used in the book Refugee Sex/Age Refugee A F old CC B F mid DD C F mid EE D F old FF E F old GG F F youth HH G F mid II H F old JJ I F old KK J F old LL K M mid MM L M mid NN M M mid OO N M mid PP O M mid QQ P M mid RR Q M old SS R M old TT S M old UU T M youth VV U M old WW V M mid XX W M mid YY X Mid old ZZ Y M mid AAA Z M youth BBB AA M youth CCC BB M old DDD Age: youth (20–35), mid-aged (36–50), old (51–)

Sex/Age M old M mid M mid M youth M old M youth M old M old M old M youth M old M old M mid M mid M mid M mid M mid M mid M old M mid M old M old M mid M mid M old M youth M old M mid

While ethnic categories are officially prohibited in today’s Rwanda and no statistics regarding ethnicity are publicly available,30 the current regime “thinks in strongly ethnic terms”.31 Scholar Filip Reyntjens used the terms “RPF-isation” and “Tutsisation” to describe consolidating the hold of the RPF Tutsi, and often undermining RPF 30

Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 201, fn. 84. Prior to 1994, the population of Rwanda was said to be composed of three ethnic groups: the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa (1%). UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), “Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and Territories”, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1, 11 Aug. 1993 para. 13. 31 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 201.

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Hutu.32 Likewise, refugees, regardless of Hutu or Tutsi, think the same. Therefore, this book attempts to explore the ethnic dimension of issues facing refugees.

Composition of Book To critically examine the circumstances of Rwandan refugees, especially those who fled after the genocide, Chap. 1 reviews basic information about refugees, such as the definition of this group and the evolution of a durable solution. The issue of voluntary repatriation and the cessation clause of refugee status require particular attention, as these topics are not sufficiently explored. Although this book deals mainly with post-genocide refugees, the history of 1959 old-caseload refugees is first reviewed in Chap. 2. Understanding the history of these refugees, mostly Tutsi, is important because their plight set off a chain reaction. Their armed repatriation triggered the exodus of mostly Hutu who fled during and in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the new-caseload and post-genocide refugees, respectively, exploring the reasons for refugee movement and the refugee policies of the RPF government and the UNHCR. In Chaps. 2 and 3, five main atrocities committed by the RPF are examined, all of which are related to the refugees’ unwillingness to repatriate: RPF’s invasion and civil war (1990–1994); the shooting down of Habyarimana’s presidential jet (1994); the genocide in Rwanda (1994); the massacre of the Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs)33 camp (1995); and the attack of refugee camps and “genocide” in the DRC (1996–1997). This book does not cover human rights violations committed by the RPF in eastern DRC after 1998, such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources, massacres, and forced displacement, although these have affected the movement of many Rwandan refugees who remain in eastern DRC. Chapter 5 highlights the Global North’s role within the refugee policy in general and its influence and interest in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region; in particular, that of the US vis-à-vis Rwandan refugees is examined. Chapter 6 provides my conclusions. In countries of asylum where the cessation clause was applied, or where refugees have obtained citizenship, refugees should be precisely referred to as former refugees. However, throughout the book, the term “refugee” is used regardless of their status. In the future, I hope to have an opportunity to publish more on these issues, after thorough analysis.

32

Ibid, 19–21. According to the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2004), IDPs are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border”.

33

Contents

1 Refugees’ Durable Solution: Voluntary Repatriation and Cessation of the Refugees’ Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Definition of Refugee and UNHCR’s Mandate, Protection . . . 1.2 International Influence of Refugee Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Evolution of Durable Solutions and Preference for Voluntary Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 From “Voluntary” Repatriation to “Safe Return” . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Cessation of Refugee Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Myths and Realities of Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Process of “Armed Repatriation” of Old-Caseload Tutsi Refugees (1959–1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Pre-1959 History and “Social Revolution” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Harassment of Refugees in Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Rwandan Government’s Gradual Change on Refugees’ Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 RPF’s Preparation for Armed Return from Uganda . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Democratisation and Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Massacres and Massive Displacement of Civilians . . . . 2.6 Motives of the RPF’s Armed Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal to Return (1994–1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Shooting Down of Habyarimana’s Plane (6 April 1994) . . . . . 3.2 Genocide (April–July 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Rwandan Government’s Claim . . 3.4 Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Their Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Massacre at an IDP Camp (April 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 1 4

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6 10 13 16

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19 20 22

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24 27 30 30 33 36

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39 40 43 49 51 55

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3.6 3.7 3.8

Attacks of Refugee Camps and “Genocide” in DRC (October 1996–April 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNHCR’s Policy on (Imposed) Return (July 1994–May 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Killing Continues upon Return (November 1996  ) . . . . . . . . . .

4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate (1995–2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Post-Genocide Political Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Political Characteristics of Post-Genocide Refugees . . . 4.3 Less Reported Killings but Diminishing Return . . . . . . 4.4 Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation (2002/2003–2009) 4.5 Strategies of Rwandan Government and Refugees . . . . 4.6 Following the Announcement of the Cessation Clause (October 2009–June 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Security Incidents Faced by Refugees (October 2009–June 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 Invocation of Cessation Clause of Refugee Status (June 2013–December 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 Security Incidents Faced by Refugees (June 2013–December 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11 President Kagame’s Attitude Vis-à-Vis Refugees . . . . . 4.12 Refugees’ Psychological Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57 60 67

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73 74 77 78 83 87

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91

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94

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96

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. . . . . . . 103 . . . . . . . 105 . . . . . . . 107 . . . . . . . 109

5 US Responsibility in the Great Lakes Regional Power Dynamics and Rwandan Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 US Interests in the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 France’s Interest in Rwanda and Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 US (in)Action from the 1980s Until the 1994 Genocide . . . . 5.4 US Humanitarian and Military Aid in Eastern DRC . . . . . . . 5.5 US Involvement in the Forced Repatriation of Refugees . . . . 5.6 US Complicity in RPA’s Massacres of Refugees . . . . . . . . . 5.7 US Interference in UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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113 114 116 119 122 125 128 130

6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Barbara Harrell-Bond’s Quote on Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Author’s Letter Addressed to the High Commissioner of the UNHCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Abbreviations

AFDL ADEPR AMF CDR CIA DMI DRC ECOSOC FAR FDLR GNU HRW ICRC ICTR IDP IRC MNF MSF NGO OAU OHCHR PDD RNC RPA RPF SPLM UK UN

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire Association des Églises de Pentecôte au Rwanda American Mineral Field Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (Rwanda) Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Military Intelligence (Rwanda) Democratic Republic of the Congo Economic and Social Council (United Nations) Armed Forces of Rwanda (before 1994) Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda Government of National Unity (Rwanda) Human Rights Watch International Committee of the Red Cross International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Internally Displaced Person International Rescue Committee Multinational Force Médecins Sans Frontières Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation of African Unity UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Policy Decision Directive Rwandan National Congress Rwandan Patriotic Army Rwandan Patriotic Front Sudan People’s Liberation Movement United Kingdom United Nations

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UNAMIR UNHCR UNSC US USCOR

Abbreviations

UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Security Council United States United States Committee for Refugees

Invasion point of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990 40 km

0

RUHENGERI BYUMBA GISENYI

Lake Kivu

KIGALI

KIBUYE

GITARAMA

KIBUNGO

CYANGUGU

GIKONGORO

BUTARE préfecture border KIBUYE

Map 1 Rwanda’s administrative map until 2011

capital and name of préfecture

Kagera

Ruhengeri

Goma

River

Byumba

Gisenyi KIGALI Kibuye

Gitarama

Gikongoro Bukavu

Cyangugu

Uvira

Kibungo

Ngara

Butare

BUJUMBURA

Map 2 Map indicating the location of Rwandan refugee camps in neighbouring countries (1994– 1996)

CHAD

SUDAN

(present South Sudan)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC to Benin

Juba

BANGUI

CAMEROON

Gemena

Buta

Watsa Province Orientale

Impfondo

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Equateur

UGANDA

Kisangani

Mbandaka Boende

Ndjundou

Tingi-Tingi

GABON

Loukolela

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO/ ZAIRE

RWANDA

Goma Shabunda

KIGALI

to Kenya

Bukavu

Kindu Bandundu

BRAZZAVILLE

Kivu

Uvira

BUJUMBURA

BURUNDI

Kasai Orienta

KINSHASA

Fizi

Kinshasa

Kikwit

Bas-Congo

Kasai Occidental Mbuji-Mayi

Matadi

Kalemi

Katanga

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Kapanga

LUANDA Katango

ANGOLA

Lubumbashi

to Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, etc.

LEGEND Capital Town / village Administrative boundary International boundary Refugee / IDP movement

ZAMBIA 0

200 kilometres

400

LUSAKA

Map 3 Map indicating Rwandan refugees’ main movement (1996–1999). Sources UNHCR, The State of the World Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 2000, 270; Amnesty International, Great Lakes Region: Still in Need of Protection: Repatriation, Refoulement and the Safety of Refugees and the Internally Displaced, 1997, 12; and author’s interview with Rwandan refugees

Chapter 1

Refugees’ Durable Solution: Voluntary Repatriation and Cessation of the Refugees’ Status

This chapter aims to review the definition of a refugee and its associated history: the UNHCR’s foundation, the evolution of durable solutions for a refugee, and the UNHCR’s changes of operations in the early 1990s. This helps in understanding the influence of the Global North, above all the US, in refugee policy and operations, as well as the UNHCR’s limited autonomy over refugees. This chapter then explores the meaning of “voluntariness” and the modification of voluntary repatriation and its myths and realities, as well as the relationship between standards of voluntary repatriation and the invocation of the cessation of refugee status.

1.1

Definition of Refugee and UNHCR’s Mandate, Protection

To begin with, the UNHCR was established in 1950 with its core mandate to ensure the international protection of refugees and other uprooted people worldwide— except for Palestinian refugees—who are no longer protected by their own governments. According to the original 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), a refugee is someone “who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. In other words, the 1951 Convention was Eurocentric, with chronological and geographical limitations in the aftermath of Second World War. Western countries were not interested in non-European refugees, “since they [Western countries] were using the United Nations as the means for dealing with © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 M. Yonekawa, Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6756-3_1

1

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1 Refugees’ Durable Solution: Voluntary Repatriation …

their own problems, they were obliged to make at least some apparent concessions to universality”.1 The 1967 Protocol amended this Convention, expanding its scope as the problem of displacement spread around the world. This expansion was crucial because “[t]he United States perceived refugee problems in developing countries as sources of instability which the Soviet Union could exploit for its own advantage in extending hegemony in the third world”.2 The presence of the UNHCR was intended to partially block Soviet power in Africa and Asia during the Cold War.3 As a consequence, Western governments regarded assistance to refugees “as a central part of their foreign policy towards newly independent states”.4 In addition to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in 1969 added the following definition of a refugee as: “every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”. A refugee is a civilian, and armed groups and people who have participated in war crimes and violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws do not qualify for refugee status.5 The UNHCR’s mandate, international protection, was initially defined “in terms of its function to eliminate any disabilities which may arise from the lack of national protection and from the status of refugee, and secondly to its ultimate aim, the cessation of refugee status”.6 Therefore, the UNHCR is to “advocate the legal claims of refugees, as a substitute for the sovereign that had been renounced until a replacement for that sovereign could be found”.7 This implies that “‘protection’ was to be an international legal bridge between periods of national sovereign assimilation”.8 This legal protection is critical as the bond between citizen and government has been broken: “[refugee’s] fear has taken the place of trust, and hatred the

G. Coles, “Approaching the Refugee Problem Today”, G. Loescher and L. Monahan (eds.), Refugees and International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, 373. 2 G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 10. 3 C. Ruthström-Ruin, Beyond Europe: the Globalization of Refugee Aid, Lund, Lund University Press, 1993, 195. 4 A Betts, G. Loescher and J. Milner, UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, Oxon, Routledge, 2008, 27–28. 5 UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Dec. 2011, paras. 146–163. 6 UN docs. A/AC.36/23 (1953), para 3. Memorandum by the High Commissioner on the International Protection of Refugees, cited in M. Zieck, UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees: Legal Analysis, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 82. 7 D. W. Kennedy, “International Refugee Protection”, Human Rights Quarterly, 8(1), Feb. 1986, 4. 8 Ibid. 1

1.1 Definition of Refugee and UNHCR’s Mandate, Protection

3

place of loyalty, while the authorities on their part wish to intimidate and oppress the person whom they consider an opponent, or at least, are inclined to ignore him”.9 In practice, in order to protect refugees, the UNHCR must identify them, issue travel documents, assist in obtaining recognition of their various legal statuses, and advocate increasingly precise guidelines for handling recognised refugees.10 Countries of asylum are not to “discriminate against refugees, allowing them at least the same civil and economic rights that are enjoyed by other legal immigrants”.11 Moreover, UNHCR’s protection responsibilities include “obtain[ing] the best available information regarding conditions in the country of origin, and an accurate analysis of the extent to which the causes of flows have modified or ceased”.12 Such information must be shared with refugees, governments, and other concerned parties.13 UNHCR states clearly that “the most essential component of refugee status and of asylum is protection against return to a country where a person has reason to fear of persecution”, which is called the principle of non-refoulement (non-expulsion).14 Although persecution is not defined in the 1951 Convention, “Articles 31 and 33 refer to threats to life or freedom, so clearly it includes the threat of death, or the threat of torture, or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishments”.15 This principle “applies across a broad class, even if the resulting regime of law and practice is far from adequate either for States or individuals”.16 Thus, to be more precise, protection means to legally protect refugees from repressive States or non-State actors against reprisals and forced displacement.17 In the case of expulsion, no international mechanism is present to monitor returnees.18 As such, the UNHCR is ensured by the government of origin of the “direct and unhindered access to all returning refugees in order to monitor their situation, in particular the

9

A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1966, 78. Kennedy, “International Refugee Protection”, 4–5. 11 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of Protection, New York, Penguin Books, 1993, 5. 12 G. S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Third Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 495. 13 Ibid. 14 UNHCR, “Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner), EC/SCP/2”, 23 Aug. 1977, para. 1. 15 G. S. Goodwin-Gill, “Migration and Forced Migration Today: Challenges for the Rule of Law”, G. S. Goodwin-Gill and P. Weckel eds., Protection des migrants et des réfugiées au XXIe siècle, Aspects de droit international, Migration and Refugee Protection in the 21st Century, International Legal Aspects, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2015, 7. 16 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 50. 17 Loescher, The UNHCR and World Power Politics, 2. 18 T. Allen and H. Morsink, “Introduction: When Refugees Go Home”, T. Allen and H. Morsink (eds.), When Refugees Go Home, Trenton, UNRISD, James Currey and Africa World Press, 1994, 5. 10

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fulfilment of any amnesties, guarantees or assurances provided by the country of origin which may have played a part in the refugees’ decision to return”.19 For the refugee status determination, “well-founded fear of being persecuted” mentioned in the definition of a refugee requires careful examination.20 Fear is subjective, but when determining whether “well-founded fear” exists, both subjective and objective elements must be taken into consideration.21 In order to determine whether fear of persecution is objectively well founded, analysing detailed country of origin information is required, including the human rights situation.22 The same analysis is also required when the UNHCR recommends the invocation of the cessation clause as stated in the subsequent section.

1.2

International Influence of Refugee Movements

Although the UNHCR, a “Western-dominated and donor-dependent organization”,23 is heavily affected by external parties, international influence of refugee flow is not well researched. A few scholars, such as Aristide R. Zolberg et al., have highlighted: The international dimension of the causes of refugee movements has not been recognized in prevailing legal concepts and definition […][F]actors internal to the country of origin predominate in conventional interpretations of persecution. An internalist emphasis also has influenced public perceptions of the origins of refugee movements. This not only is incorrect but also obscures the point that external parties by action—or inaction—can significantly influence the processes that generate refugees. Refugees do not appear simply because they are persecuted by government X or victimized by brutalizing rulers in weak states; such governments and states exist within a necessary structure of international support.24

Among the external actors, the US in particular requires attention. At the time of UNHCR’s establishment, the US wanted it to be a temporary institution with a three-year mandate, whereas the Europeans preferred a more permanent agency.25 This explains why the definition of a refugee was limited to the events prior to

19

UNHCR, Handbook, Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (hereafter, Handbook, Voluntary Repatriation), 1996, para. 2.6. 20 J. C. Hathaway, “The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear”, 26 Michigan Journal of International Law, 493, 2005, http://www.mjilonline.org/jdforum/digital-scholarship/opinio-juris2/michigan-guidelines-on-well-founded-fear/. 21 UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 11. 22 Ibid, 100. 23 Betts et al., UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 28. 24 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 264. Emphasis added. 25 For detail, see L. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time-The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951–1972, New Jersey, Scarecron Press, 1975, Vol. 1, Chap. 3 ; Betts et al., UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 13–14.

1.2 International Influence of Refugee Movements

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January 1951, excluding economic hardship, wars, and famines as reasons of flight. In addition, the US was instrumental in creating two UN refugee organisations in regions of key geopolitical interest to the US: United Nations Relief and Palestine Refugees—replaced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East—and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.26 This was to ensure US policies’ influence in these regions through the US’s generous funding.27 In order to implement the US Government’s policies, it is important to examine the relationship between the US Government and NGOs.28 NGOs that received US funding have often been used to assist American foreign policy objectives, such as those during the Cold War and now in countering the influence of Islamic nations; such use of NGOs applies to those in Pakistan and cross-border operations to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Honduras, Vietnam, and southern Sudan.29 One of the typical examples is the US Committee for Refugees (USCOR), which is “the intelligence nerve centre for the entire relief apparatus, and coordinates the political ‘attitude’ to be taken toward refugees”, including supplying military aid in the 1990s.30 Another NGO is the International Rescue Committee (IRC); founded at the request of Albert Einstein in 1933 in order to assist Jewish refugees, it has been suspected of working on behalf of the US Government.31 The IRC had previously worked in Vietnam, Cuba, and Iraq among some countries.32 Furthermore, the US also “has created or brought about refugee flows in the first place, or has taken action that has perpetuated such flows while pursuing foreign policy objectives and national security goals”.33 However, the relationship between foreign policy, including foreign military or political interventions, and refugees remains little explored.34 Indeed, refugee movements are not only side effects of conflict, but “in many cases are central to the objectives and tactics of war”.35 Such cross-border population movements, which can include strategic repatriation, “are

26

G. Loercher, The UNHCR and World Politics, 56–57. Ibid. 28 E. Davey, with J. Borton and M. Foley, A history of the humanitarian system: Western origins and foundations, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Jun. 2013, 11. 29 Ibid; F. Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Itacha, Cornell University Press, 2002, 74–75, 104, 143; R. P. Winter, “Refugees, War and Famine in the Sudan”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, XIX (2), 1991, 58. 30 Executive Intelligence Review, “Roger Winter: boss of the warlords”, 25 (46), 20 Nov. 1998, 61. 31 E. T. Chester, Covert Network: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee and the CIA, Armonk/London, M.D. Sharpe, 1995. 32 Ibid, 145–159, 184–205. 33 M. Gibney, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Creation of Refugee Flows”, Howard Adelman ed. Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States, Toronto, York Lanes Press, 1991, 81. 34 G. Loescher, “Introduction: Refugee Issues in International Relations”, Loescher and Monahan (eds.), Refugees and International Relations, 4; M. S. Teitelbaum, “Immigration, refugees, and foreign policy”, International Organization 38 (3), Summer 1984, 433. 35 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 282. 27

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deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, military and/or economic concessions from a target state of states”.36 Forced movements have various objectives, such as the appropriation of the territory or property of another group or groups, alteration of the demographic composition of territory, settlement of another population, and the elimination of said group(s), in other words, ethnic cleansing.37 US role in such refugee movements will be explored in Chap. 5.

1.3

Evolution of Durable Solutions and Preference for Voluntary Repatriation

There are three durable solutions to the refugee problem: local integration in neighbouring countries, resettlement in the third countries of permanent asylum, and voluntary repatriation to the home country. Apart from these solutions, there are three other coping mechanisms, such as drifting in orbit between countries, holding refugees in camps, and forced return or refoulement.38 The last mechanism has often become a more popular choice for donor and host countries as well as in countries of refugees’ origin. The nature of the international response vis-à-vis durable solutions gradually changed in the post-Second World War period, especially since the 1980s. Before the 1970s, resettlement was actively promoted, except for Algerian refugees in 1962. This promotion of resettlement was carried out despite the fact that voluntary repatriation was accepted in principle as the preferred solution,39 which was mentioned in the initial UN resolutions in 1946 pertaining to refugees.40 Subsequently, in December 1950, the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR called upon governments to cooperate through “assisting the High Commissioner in his efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees”.41

36

K. M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, New York, Cornell University, 2010, 13. Emphasis added. 37 Ibid, 14; M. Jacques, Armed Conflict and Displacement: The Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons under International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 21. 38 J. R. Rogge, “Repatriation of Refugees”, Allen and Morsink eds., When Refugees Go Home, 15. 39 B.S. Chimni, “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2004, 23 (3), 55. 40 Although the term “voluntary repatriation” is not mentioned, the text of UN General Assembly Resolution 8 (I) of 12 February 1946 reads: “[N]o refugees or displaced persons who have finally and definitely, in complete freedom, and after receiving full knowledge of the facts, including adequate information from the governments of their countries of origin, expressed valid objectives to returning to their countries of origin… shall be compelled to return to their country of origin”. 41 UN General Assembly, “Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 428 (V)”, 14 Dec. 1950 (d).

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The preference for settlement in a country of asylum and resettlement in a third country can be attributed to three factors. First, in the Cold War context, repatriation implied sending refugees back to communist countries.42 “Normal” refugees were perceived as being “male, white, Christian, and anti-communist” and possessing ideological and geopolitical value, beneficial for Western countries.43 Second, two solutions, namely settlement and resettlement, were “initially designed and implemented to address the needs of post-World War II Europe” which lost large productive assets, namely labour and capital.44 To offset the labour force loss in the war and facilitate rapid economic recovery and reconstruction, it was crucial to settle the refugees.45 Third, discussions about repatriation at the international level were politically associated with the creation of the State of Israel.46 Both Zionist and Palestinian demands to repatriate to their respective homeland led to sensitive debate about the general issue of return, including sending refugees back to communist lands.47 Thus, it was originally emphasised that “the appropriate (or only) solution entailed that the early protection concerns largely coincided with achieving the ‘assimilation’ of refugees (either in the country of asylum or a third country)”.48 However, since the 1970s, the nature and character of the flow of refugees have changed. The number of asylum requests has increased consequent to the political and economic breakdown caused by civil war, the decolonisation process, and transition to independence in the Global South in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These movements affected internationally recognised borders and changing relations with the international system.49 Many refugees fled to neighbouring countries and the Global North. In the 1980s, asylum-seekers from Africa arrived directly in Western countries, partially thanks to the expansion of air travel.50 Most asylum claims to Western countries “represent[ed] a thinly disguised movement of ‘economic migrants’ rather than ‘political refugees’”.51 This growing number of

42

Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, 325–327. B.S. Chimni, “Post-conflict peace-building and the return of refugees: Concepts, practices and institutions”, E. Newman and J. v. Selm (eds.), Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State, Tokyo, United Nations University, 2003, 195. 44 R. F. Gorman and G. Kibreab, “Repatriation Aid and Development Assistance”, Reconceiving International Refugee Law, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 39. 45 Ibid. 46 Allen and Morsine, “Introduction”, 2. 47 Ibid, 3; Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, 325–327. 48 M. Zieck, UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees, 81. 49 J. Milner, Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2009, 18. 50 Betts et al., UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 35. 51 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 278. 43

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refugees and changes from the east–west to south–north refugee movement implied increased financial, political, and environmental burden on donor and host countries.52 Gradually, both donor and host countries became intolerant of supporting refugees.53 In 1980, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR examined voluntary repatriation for the first time, acknowledging it as the most appropriate solution.54 The current policy of the UNHCR to promote repatriation received international approval as a direct result of the July 1985 San Remo Round Table on Voluntary Repatriation.55 The Round Table “reaffirmed that voluntary repatriation was, in principle, the best solution to a refugee problems”,56 stressed that attempts to promote voluntary repatriation should not “weaken in any way the fundamental importance of not forcing refugees to return against their will”, and “did not deny thereby the necessity in some situations of settling refugees in another country”.57 However, at the same time, it had the view that “international co-operation and solidarity [among the “eagles”] should be directed, first and foremost, in favour of the solution of return”.58 Later in 1991, High Commissioner of the UNHCR Sadako Ogata declared that one of the organisation’s primary goals was “to pursue every opportunity for voluntary repatriation. […] the right to return on one’s homeland merited as much recognition as the right to seek asylum abroad”.59 Subsequently, she stated that the 1990s would be the decade of repatriation for refugees.60 To actively organise repatriation, even under less than ideal conditions, the UNHCR’s operations changed, redefining or creating new terminologies, such as preventive protection or right to remain, safe return, imposed return, and introducing new categories of return.61 The protection of refugees originally focused on their fundamental right to asylum, and therefore, the UNHCR’s operations before the 1990s served refugees in countries of asylum, waiting for them to cross the

52 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Itacha and London, Cornell University Press, 2004, 94–95. 53 Ibid. 54 UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, “Voluntary Repatriation, No. 18 (XXXI) – 1980”, 16 Oct. 1980, (a). 55 B. Harrell-Bond, “Repatriation: Under What Conditions is it Conditions is it the Most Desirable Solution for Refugees? An Agenda for Research”, African Studies Review, 32 (1), 1989, 45. 56 UNHCR, “Voluntary Repatriation EC/SCP/41”, 1 Aug. 1985. 57 G. Coles, “Voluntary Repatriation, A Background Study”, Prepared for the Round Table on Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR/IIHL, San Remo, 16–19 Jul. 1985, cited in Harrell-Bond, “Repatriation: Under What Conditions”, 46. 58 Ibid. 59 UNHCR, “Statement of the High Commissioner to the 42nd session of the Executive Committee”, 7 Oct. 1991, 4. 60 UNHCR, “Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the International Management Symposium”, St. Gallen, Switzerland, 25 May 1992. 61 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 99.

1.3 Evolution of Durable Solutions and Preference for Voluntary Repatriation

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border to obtain protection.62 However, since the 1990s, the UNHCR began to operate in countries of origin, instead of passively waiting in countries of asylum for conditions to change so that refugees could volunteer to return.63 The UNHCR stated in 1988: “[Voluntary repatriation] upholds the right of refugees to return to their country of origin and achieves the ultimate objective of refugee protection, i.e. the re-establishment of the refugees in a community—in this case, their own”.64 As scholar Michael Barnett argues, this implies that the “repatriation culture” developed in the 1980s has become “nearly synonymous with ‘protection’”.65 During this process, protection was redefined as “the right to be allowed to remain in one’s home in safety and in dignity”, undermining the right to seek asylum.66 In 1992, citing the context of Bosnia, Ogata stated: “If the policy of ethnic cleansing were to be defeated, protection must include the notion of prevention [preventive protection]”.67 This preventive protection intended to protect would-be refugees in their home communities, starting with the Kurds in northern Iraq in the early 1990s and then in Bosnia. This was when European countries were reluctant to receive Bosnian refugees and asylum-seekers, which explains why the UNHCR was obliged to assist the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bosnia, their country of origin.68 Since the 1970s, the UNHCR has been unable to provide systematic assistance and protection to IDPs, as such protection would infringe on national sovereignty; thus, merely ad hoc assistance has been provided.69 This practice of humanitarianism by providing material aid and monitoring human rights violations in countries of origin has become useful for the UNHCR to intervene in the domestic affairs.70 This explains why the UNHCR had to transform from a legal protection agency for refugees to a broader humanitarian aid organisation “primarily concerned with the immediate needs of the refugees and not with questions of causes and

M. Barnett, “UNHCR and the ethics of repatriation”, Forced Migration Review 10 Aug. 2001,10. 63 UNHCR, “Opening Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Forty-sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (ExCom)”, Geneve, 16 Oct. 1995. 64 UNHCR, “Note on International Protection”, A/AC.96/713, 15 Aug. 1988, para. 37. Emphasis added. 65 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 75. 66 UNHCR, “Statement of Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid for Victims of the Conflict in the former Yugoslavia”, Geneva, 29 Jul. 1992. 67 Ibid. 68 Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, 300. 69 P. Kourula, Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and International Protection Revisited, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 185–186. 70 M. Barnett, “Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow”, International Migration Review, 35(1), Spring 2000, 245. 62

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solutions”.71 As the UNHCR states, apart from “personal security from physical attack whether from armed forces, death squads, or lone assassins”, “[p]hysical protection also means keeping people alive through humanitarian assistance”.72 It is claimed that preventive protection or the right to remain was meant to deliberately avoid the Global North’s responsibility to protect through asylum, and the UNHCR’s presence in countries of origin was to help avert the outflow of returnees and IDPs and reduce displacement.73 The UNHCR’s activities have been questioned, as they “appear to support State-inspired policies of [‘humanitarian’] ‘containment,’ or promote ‘preventive protection’ oriented more to reducing admissions and costs, than to ensuring the interests of refugees”.74 Using the context of Bosnia, Harrell-Bond argued that this preventive protection could result in the opposite effect, such as the “right to stay and be killed”.75

1.4

From “Voluntary” Repatriation to “Safe Return”

To explain voluntary repatriation, a refugee’s decision to return home must always be voluntary. The principle of voluntariness is “the cornerstone of international protection with respect to the return of refugees”.76 Scholars Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam argue, “voluntariness (the choice of the individual) is justified because in the absence of formal cessation, the refugee is the best judge of when and whether to go back; because it allows for the particular experiences of the individual, such as severe persecution and trauma, to receive due weight; and finally because there is a value in individual choice”.77 Simply put, refugees are the main decision-makers in voluntary repatriation.78 This implies that “UNHCR must simply facilitate return, rather than organize it, respecting the knowledge and decisions of the refugees”.79 However, the lower autonomy and less involvement of refugees in the decision-making process became clear in 1996, when the UNHCR published the Handbook on Voluntary

G. Coles “Approaching the Refugee Problem Today”, Loescher and Monahan (eds.), Refugees and International Relations, 381. 72 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of Protection, 5. 73 C. Dubernet, The International Containment of Displaced Persons: Humanitarian Spaces Without Exit, Hampshire, Ashagte, 2001, 166. 74 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 494. 75 B. Harrell-Bond, “Along the Way Home”, Time Literary Supplement, 5 May 2006. 76 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.3. 77 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 496. 78 F. C. Cuny, B. N. Stein and P. Reed eds., Repatriation During Conflict in Africa and Asia, Texas, Centre for the Study of Societies in Crisis, 1992, 16. 79 B. S. Chimni, “The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 5 (5), 1993, 448. 71

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Repatriation. This Handbook mentions that refugees should simply remain informed of the progress of repatriation.80 This explains why the UNHCR takes the initiative to organise voluntary repatriation, rather than merely helping it. There are two ways to organise this, namely through facilitation and promotion. Voluntary repatriation is facilitated “when refugees indicate a strong desire to return voluntarily and/or have begun to do so on their own initiative, even where UNHCR does not consider that, objectively, it is safe for most refugees to return”.81 On the other hand, promotion means “actively undertaking broad and wide-ranging measures to advocate refugees’ return”, “when a careful assessment of the situation shows that the conditions of ‘safety and dignity’ can be met”.82 If a thorough assessment in the country of origin is not conducted prior to repatriation, then returnees risk fleeing the country again. Thus, the UNHCR is obliged “to refrain from promotion where circumstances have not changed, or where instability and insecurity continues”.83 To trace the history, voluntariness originated from “protect[ing] citizens’ rights against a single form of over-reaching state authority, the Soviet bloc”.84 Therefore, voluntariness intended neither “to offer refugees the power to reshape the nation-state system, nor […] to engage with alternative forms of international power”.85 As a result, when more refugees in Asia and Africa began to flee to northern States in an “economic” exodus, voluntariness did not suit the international community’s agenda. In assessing the condition of voluntariness, the UNHCR affirms that repatriation is not voluntary when: • Host country authorities deprive refugees of any freedom of choice such as reducing essential services, encouraging anti-refugee sentiment on the part of the local population. • Factions among the refugee population or exiled political organisations influence refugees’ choices either by physically pressuring them or through disinformation campaigns. • Certain groups in the host country actively discourage voluntary repatriation by disseminating false information including incorrect promises of assistance, economic opportunities, or improvement of legal status.86

80

UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 3.6. Ibid, para. 3.1. 82 Ibid. 83 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 495. 84 K. Long, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 100. 85 Ibid. 86 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 4.1. 81

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This voluntariness can be highly questionable in certain circumstances as reported by some organisations.87 Return, particularly in a conflict situation, is often involuntary, and “it is not easy to determine the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable pressure, encouragement, suggestion, persuasion, and inducement”.88 In other words, the boundary between voluntary repatriation and refoulement has become ambiguous in some cases.89 To create conditions conducive to refugees’ return, the UNHCR was obliged to develop a concept of “safe return”.90 Safe return implies that repatriation is to “take place in conditions of safety, dignity and security” or so-called return in safety and with dignity.91 Return in safety means return under conditions of legal safety (such as public assurances of personal safety, non-discrimination, and freedom from fear of persecution or punishment upon return), physical security (including protection from armed attacks), and material security (access to land or means of livelihood).92 Apart from these, reconciliation (structures to promote confidence building and coexistence) was added as part of core elements of voluntary repatriation.93 Return with dignity must ensure that refugees are not manhandled; that they can return unconditionally; are not arbitrarily separated from family members; and are treated with respect and full acceptance by their national authorities, including the full restoration of their rights.94 These elements of “safe return” and “safety and dignity” were criticised for two reasons. First, these elements implied that “conditions in the home country did not have to improve ‘substantially’ but only ‘appreciably’” to ensure “safe” return.95 Replacing voluntariness with safe return and substituting the judgment of states and the UNHCR with refugees “may be tantamount to violating the principle of nonrefoulement”.96 Second, these elements refer to the physical movement from the country of asylum to country of origin and include “permission for refugees to bring their movable possessions when returning”, and “respect for school and planting seasons in the timing of such movements”.97 Important are not merely the

HRW “Ensuring that Repatriation is Voluntary”, 1997; Amnesty, Not Time to Go Home: Unsustainable Returns of Refugees to Somalia, 2017. 88 B. N. Stein and F. C. Cuny, “Repatriation in a Civil War/Conflict Situation”, paper presented at Roundtable Consultation on Voluntary Repatriation and UNHCR, Geneve, 2–3 Jun. 1993, 16, cited in Chimni, “The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation”, 449. 89 J. F. Crisp, “Voluntary Repatriation Programmes for African Refugees: A Critical Examination”, British Refugee Council/Queen Elizabeth House Working Papers on Refugees, 1(2), Dec. 1984. 90 Ogata, “Opening Statement at the Forty-sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme”. 91 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.4. 92 Ibid. 93 UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, May 2004, one-3. 94 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.4. 95 Betts et al., UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 51. 96 Chimni, “The Meaning of Words”, 454. 97 UNHCR, Handbook, para. 2.4. 87

1.4 From “Voluntary” Repatriation to “Safe Return”

13

voluntariness and the short-term conditions, but the long-term human rights situations and their security after returning home, which tends to be overlooked.98 This is why upon refugees’ return, the UNHCR is to be ensured by the government of origin of the “direct and unhindered access to all returning refugees in order to monitor their situation, in particular the fulfillment of any amnesties, guarantees or assurances provided by the country of origin which may have played a part in the refugees’ decision to return”.99 Furthermore, when the UNHCR published the Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation in 1996, it announced in the same year the doctrine of “imposed return”. Imposed return implies that refugees may be sent back “to less than optimal conditions in their home country” against their will,100 “such as Bosnia and Rwanda because host countries didn’t want them”.101 UNHCR’s disregard for the principle of voluntariness was already observed elsewhere in the case of forced return of Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Burma (Myanmar) in 1994, and Iran’s expulsion of Afghan and Iraqi refugees in 1996.102 Facing restrictive budgets, the host and donor countries’ insistence on a quick solution regarding the Rwandan refugee crisis led to the UNHCR developing a draft paper justifying “imposed return” in March 1996.103 The Assistant High Commissioner of the UNHCR Sergio Vieira de Mello urged that “return itself be solution-driven rather than principle-driven”.104 This implies that refugees are expected to return to their countries of origin, regardless of the situation, or remain as IDPs. This is despite the UNHCR’s acknowledgement that forced return to a volatile situation can cause additional or renewed instability, risking future refugee flows.105

1.5

Cessation of Refugee Status

The cessation of refugee status is explained as a measure, wherein a refugee “can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection S. Takahashi, “The UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: The Emphasis of Return over Protection”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 9(4), 1997, 604–606. 99 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.6. 100 Ibid. 101 Sunday Age, “Refugees may be Forced out”, 21 Apr. 1996. 102 Betts et al., UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 52; Jeremy R. Tarwater, “Analysis and Case Studies of the ‘Ceased Circumstance’ Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention”, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 15, 2001, 570. 103 Long, The Point of No Return, 133. 104 K. Long, “Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee repatriation”, UNHCR, Sep. 2013, para. 138. 105 UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”, 10 Feb. 2003, para. 6. 98

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of the country of his nationality” (Article 1C [5] of the 1951 Refugee Convention), and “[b]eing a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence” (1C [6]). For cessation to apply, the changes of circumstances in the country of origin must be fundamental and enduring, and “address the causes of displacement which led to the recognition of refugee status”.106 The fundamental nature of the changes in the country of origin—including the general human rights situation and the reasons for fear of persecution—must be carefully assessed by States and the UNHCR before invoking the cessation clause.107 According to the UNHCR, these human rights indicators may include the “right to life and liberty and to nondiscrimination, independence of the judiciary and fair and open trials which presume innocence, the upholding of various basic rights and fundamental freedoms such as the right to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, movement and access to courts, and the rule of law generally”.108 Thus, the States and the UNHCR must not look into any changes, but “assess the impact of those changes” on refugees.109 Moreover, for the cessation clause to be applicable, national protection must be effective, as international protection by the UNHCR will no longer be available. Apart from physical security or safety, national protection needs to include the “presence of a functioning governing authority, the existence of basic structures of administration including a functioning system of law and justice and the existence of adequate infrastructures to enable residents to exercise their right to a basic livelihood”.110 In principle, all recognised refugees lose their refugee status automatically once the cessation declaration comes into effect. On the other hand, even if circumstances in the country of origin have undergone fundamental change, some individuals “continue to have a well-founded fear of persecution or compelling reasons not to return arising out of previous persecution”.111 In that case, “they must, upon request, have the possibility to apply for an exemption of the cessation declaration on grounds relevant to their individual case”.112 These compelling reasons can be exposure to traumatic events as a witness or ongoing emotional, mental, and

UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”, 10 Feb. 2003, para. 10. 107 Ibid, para. 8. 108 UNHCR Standing Committee, “Note on the Cessation Clauses, EC/47/SC/CRP.30”, 30 May 1997, para. 23. Emphasis added. 109 A. Garcia v. Canada (1993) FCJ 635 (Can. FC, 23 Jun. 1993), J. C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 924. 110 UNHCR Standing Committee, “Note on the Cessation Clauses”, para. 25. 111 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.2. 112 UNHCR, “Guidelines on Exemption Procedures in respect of Cessation Declarations”, Dec. 2011, para. 3. 106

1.5 Cessation of Refugee Status

15

physical problems resulting from severe persecution.113 All procedures for determining cessation imply that the clauses must be strictly interpreted to ensure the fairness, clarity, and transparency of procedures.114 This is because invoking cessation prematurely or improperly can trigger serious consequences and lead to more displacement and risks to life and personal security.115 Scholar James Hathaway states that once the criteria of the cessation clause are met, States are permitted to cease refugee status and repatriate former refugees to their home countries by force.116 This cessation clause signifies “the ability to forcibly repatriate refugees—that has become particularly attractive to states with faced mass influxes”.117 Therefore, the cessation of refugee status is termed a “mandated repatriation”.118 Ultimately, the invocation of the cessation of refugee status can be considered one means of imposed return, which is a last resort “where there has been a fundamental failure in the mechanism of international protection”.119 The promotion of voluntary repatriation “can take place at a lower threshold of change in the country of origin than cessation”, according to the UNHCR, compared to conditions needed for cessation, which requires “a ‘fundamental change of circumstances’ [which is] the consolidation, over time, of a process of stabilization”.120 Thus, voluntary repatriation would be expected before invoking cessation clauses.121 This explains why scholar B. S. Chimni argues that voluntariness must be emphasised during voluntary repatriation to avoid involuntary return, which amounts to refoulement.122 The principle of safe return is often misapplied, resulting in refoulement to countries of origin without sufficiently changed conditions to warrant cessation,123 as in the case of Rwandan refugees.

113

Ibid, para. 28a. UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C (5) and (6)”, para. 7. 115 UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 8th meeting, “Note on the Cessation Clauses”, EC/47/SC/CRP.30, 1997, para. 40. 116 J. Hathaway, “The Meaning of Repatriation”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 9(4) 1997, 551–552. 117 Y. Siddiqui, “Reviewing the application of the Cessation Clause of the 1951”, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Working Paper Series No. 76, Aug. 2011, 8 fn. Emphasis added. 118 M. E. Cwik, “Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause of Article 1c (5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and Practice”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 44(3), May 2011, 714. 119 Long, “Back to where you once belonged”, para. 165. 120 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.2. 121 Chimni, “Post-conflict peace-building”, 203. 122 Ibid, 204. 123 J. R. Tarwater, “Analysis and Case Studies of the ‘Ceased Circumstance’ Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention”, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 15, 2001, 617. 114

16

1.6

1 Refugees’ Durable Solution: Voluntary Repatriation …

Myths and Realities of Repatriation

Thus far, voluntary repatriation and cessation of refugee status or “mandated repatriation” has been discussed. Repatriation, whether voluntary or not, has been organised by the UNHCR based on the assumption that it is the most preferable and desirable option and that all refugees want to go home.124 Returning home being a “‘natural’ and thus a ‘problem-free’ process” is taken for granted.125 However, scholar John R. Rogge argues that this is “undoubtedly one of the most misleading myths surrounding the process of repatriation”.126 A successful return is “more often the exception than the rule”127 and, therefore, the most difficult solution to implement.128 The volume of the literature on repatriation has increased since the 1990s129; however, refugees’ situation after their return—whether they are integrated or remain alive—is not well studied,130 especially for cases of spontaneous return, which is return through the refugees’ own means.131 Three issues and realities associated with repatriation, in particular the conditions of resistance or total opposition to returning, are examined based mainly on Rogge’s discussion of the African context. First, the notion of return cannot be studied only from the refugees’ viewpoint and their nostalgia for return, but also “from the point of view of the ‘home’ and those people who have remained”.132 In some cases, returnees may be unwelcome by remainees, who did not flee during the conflict.133 The same attitude applies to the government of origin. This is because refugees are often regarded as political opponents to the government of the home country, which fears the opposition these

Chimni, “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation”, 59. Rogge, “Repatriation of Refugees”, 20. 126 Ibid, 21. 127 G. Coles, Voluntary repatriation: a background study, a report for UNHCR’s Round Table on Voluntary Repatriation, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 1985. 128 UNHCR, “Note on International Protection”, Executive Committee, Thirty-sixth Session (A/ AC. 96/660), Jul. 1985. 129 Apart from the literatures cited in this book, see also L. D. Longo and E. Oxfeld eds., Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants, and Those Who Stay Behind, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; M. Bradley, Refugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility and Redress, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013; M. Gerver, The Ethics and Practice of Refugee Repatriation, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2018. 130 N. Omata, “Repatriation and Integration of Liberian Refugees from Ghana: the Importance of Personal Networks in the Country of Origin”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 26(2), 2012, 266. 131 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 3.3. 132 D. Warner, “Voluntary Repatriation and the Meaning of Return to Home: A Critique of Liberal Mathematics”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 7(2/3), 1994, 170. 133 Rogge, “Repatriation of Refugees”, 37. 124 125

1.6 Myths and Realities of Repatriation

17

returnees may create.134 This applies to those “refugees [who] have been associated with, or are believed to be sympathetic to, past or present insurgencies”.135 For many protracted refugees in particular, repatriation does not necessarily mean “going home”.136 Rather, home could be places or environments that are “different or appear to have changed, or alternatively, where the resident population regard the returnees as strangers because of differing customs and beliefs that they have acquired”.137 One typically different custom is the language of instruction, as some returnees, especially second-generation ones, may not have had the opportunity to learn the official language of their country.138 Second, it is important to understand the basis on which refugees decide to return, whether this is individually or collectively, and the sources of information they most depend upon.139 Many actors including governments of origin and of asylum, the UNHCR, and political fronts in exile influence or determine refugees’ intention to return.140 Regarding the government of origin, “the type of signals it sends out to the refugees will greatly influence their desire to return”.141 Exiled political groups also significantly influence refugees’ decision to return, especially “when their credibility and international recognition as a political force are contingent upon the numbers of people the fronts are seen to represent, irrespective of whether the population is politically active or passive”.142 Furthermore, these groups can discourage refugees from returning, “either indirectly by such activities as disseminating misinformation about the risk of returning, or indirectly by physically preventing their return”.143 Third, the extent of the destruction or devastation in home areas and radical change of the political–economic system during the period of exile affects refugees’ willingness to return and to reintegrate.144 An example of such political–economic change would be restrictions in land tenure. Land previously owned by refugees can be occupied by remainees or new populations (or new returnees), while the communal land tenure system may have replaced freehold systems, or the control of all agricultural land and production may now be entirely vested in the State.145

J. R. Rogge and J. O. Akol, “Repatriation: Its Role in Resolving Africa’s Refugee Dilemma”, International Migration Review, 23(2), Summer, 1989, 196. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid, 193. 137 Ibid, emphasis added. 138 Ibid, 193; Rogge, “Repatriation of refugees”, 42. 139 Rogge, “Repatriation of Refugees”, 32. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid, 33. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid, 33–34. 144 Ibid, 36. 145 Ibid. 134

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1 Refugees’ Durable Solution: Voluntary Repatriation …

Therefore, upon returning home, recovering land becomes critical, including property such as houses owned by returnees before fleeing. Based on these Rogge’s arguments as well as other illusions of repatriation discussed in subsequent chapters, the myths and realities of three different caseloads of Rwandan refugees are examined in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4. These three repatriations took place during the decade of repatriation in the 1990s and afterwards, although the one in 1990 is rather recognised as the RPF’s invasion, and none of these repatriations is voluntary.

Chapter 2

Process of “Armed Repatriation” of Old-Caseload Tutsi Refugees (1959–1994)

This chapter covers the period from 1959 when the old-caseload refugees started to flee the country, up until 1990–1994 when they started to return to Rwanda. This chapter aims to demonstrate why and how the second generation of these old-caseload refugees, especially those in Uganda, decided to invade in 1990, 30 years after their first flight. This invasion was largely perceived as an armed attempt by Tutsi refugees to return home.1 The Rwandan Government’s gradual change of refugee policy and its intention to receive refugees during this period is also examined. This RPF’s armed repatriation was followed by civil war, culminating with the genocide of 1994. The RPF’s invasion from Ugandan territory with the full military assistance from that country drew little reaction from the international community; in fact, the UNSC did not react at all. In contrast, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, two months before the RPF invaded Rwanda, drew immediate condemnation from the UNSC. The UNSC called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and followed up with a dozen resolutions from August to November 19902; the US and the Soviet Union acted together for the first time in a major international crisis and succeeded in isolating Iraq. Likewise, in the early 1960s, the massive movement of Rwandan refugees was not in the spotlight, as it was overshadowed by several interrelated events. These include: the Cold War divisions which affected Africa’s politics; the decolonisation process of many African states, associated with large-scale armed

1

F. Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, Rwanda, Burundi: 1988–1994, Paris, Karthala, 1994, 91. 2 UNSC Resolution includes 660–678. http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 M. Yonekawa, Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6756-3_2

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liberation movement, which attracted Soviet Union and China to gain more allies3; and the secessionist movement of mineral-rich Katanga province in neighbouring Congo as well as assassination of two high-profile personalities, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.4

2.1

Pre-1959 History and “Social Revolution”

The pre-1959 history of Rwanda will be briefly reviewed in order to understand the background of Hutu and Tutsi. At the time of foundation of kingdom in the 1600s, which was called Nyiginya, the term Tutsi implied being a member of Rwanda’s political elite, whereas Hutu “was a demeaning term that alluded to rural boorishness or loutish behaviour used by the elite”.5 Later, the elite began to call all farmers “Hutu”, and to oppose this word, “Tutsi” was used to describe to all herders, whether they were of Tutsi origin or not.6 These distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi gradually spread all across the country and beyond, with increasing political and military significance until the mid-nineteenth century.7 Belgium, which established colonial rule of Rwanda in 1924 following the end of the First World War, intentionally exacerbated divisions between monarchy/ chief-dominated Tutsi—though only about five per cent of them were in positions of political power—and lower-rank Hutu although not all majority Hutu were poor and without influence.8 Moreover, Belgians assisted the mwami (ruler) and his representatives in establishing their control over local administration, including the use of land.9 In March 1957, nine Hutu elites including Grégoire Kayibanda, who became the first President after the independence in July 1962, challenged the feudal system, which they contended was politically monopolised by “one race, the Tutsi race”, and proposed “the integral and collective promotion of the Hutu”.10 They advocated for “the abandonment of case prejudice, the recognition of individual landed

3

S. Funada-Classen, translated by M. Osada, The Origins of War in Mozambique: A History of Unity and Division, Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobo, 2012, 2. 4 Ibid, 52. As for Hammarskjöld, there is a high possibility that he was assassinated. The Guardian, “Dag Hammarskjöld crash inquiry: UK and South Africa criticised for not cooperating”, 12 Dec. 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/12/dag-hammarskjold-crash-inquiry-uk-andsouth-africa-criticised-for-not-cooperating. 5 J. Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2005, 134. 6 Ibid, 135. 7 Ibid. 8 D. Newbury, “Understanding Genocide,” African Studies Review, 41 (1), Apr. 1998, 84. 9 A. Des Forges, “Land in Rwanda: Winnowing out the Chaff”, F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2005-2006, Paris, L’Hartmattan, 2006, 356. 10 R. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970, 149.

2.1 Pre-1959 History and “Social Revolution”

21

property, […] the promotion of Hutu to public office, and the extension of educational opportunities at all levels to Hutu children”.11 Following the collapse of the traditional Tutsi-centred political system, the so-called Social Revolution12 took place in November 1959 between the period of colonisation and independence. The period was marred by outbreaks of violence against Tutsis who formerly sidelined the majority Hutus, yet allowed for the liberation of Hutus from both Tutsi and white colonisation.13 The Social Revolution abolished the customary control of Tutsi chiefs over extensive land areas, particularly those that had been reserved as pasture by the king.14 Following the flight of 130,000 Tutsi as refugees by the end of 1963, land owned by these Tutsi was redistributed by the post-independence regime, occupied by over 300 Hutu whose posts were previously monopolised by Tutsi.15 This Tutsi monopoly had exacerbated racial tensions in two ways: their status-consciousness as a group vis-à-vis the Hutu and the responsibility of Tutsi, who were regarded as the agents of the European administration, for the hardships associated with the colonial rule.16 In their attempts to overthrow the Rwandan government and restore the Tutsi monarchy, Rwandan refugee leaders in Burundi and Uganda organised an armed attack in 1961, calling themselves Inyenzi.17 This attack from Burundi was made possible by a Tutsi-dominated government there and the close proximity of the refugee camps18; moreover, China supplied arms and ammunitions to the mwami Kigeri who was in exile in Burundi.19 However, these raids failed and caused Hutus to lash out at Tutsis. Between 1967, the last Inyenzi’s attack, and 1990, there had

11

Ibid. For its detail, see ibid. The term of “‘Social Revolution’ has been used mainly by Hutu elites because it overthrew four hundred years of injustice; on the other hand, some others, mostly Tutsi‚ refer the events of 1959 as “genocide”. E. King, “From Data Problems to Data Points: Challenges and Opportunities of Research in Postgencide Rwanda,” African Studies Review, 52 (3), Dec. 2009, 138. 13 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 103–104. 14 Ibid, 134, 146. 15 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 171–173; C. Huggins, “The Presidential Land Commission; Undermining Land Reform,” S. Straus and L. Waldorf eds., Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2011, 255. 16 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 125. 17 Ibid, 189. Inyenzi literally means “cockroach” in Kinyarwandan, but in fact originates from the acronym IN.YE.NZI of the “INgangurarugo yiYemeje kuba ingeNzi” (a member of Ingangurarugo, an army division under Kigeli Rwabugili, a Tutsi King who ruled Rwanda at the end of the 19th century, committing himself to bravery). P. Péan, Noires fuerurs, blancs menteurs: Rwanda 1990– 1994, Paris, Mille et Une Nuits, 2005, 40. Thus, it has a positive connotation, as opposed to the general idea that they were named by Hutu as a discriminatory term. Interview with a refugee II. 18 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 227; R. Van Der Meeren, “Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960–1990”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 9 (3), 1996, 263. 19 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 205, 227. The fact that Burundi became a major warehouse for arms and ammunitions of Communist penetration in Africa is due to its strategic location in relation to the Congo. Ibid, 390–395. 12

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been no attempt to return by force.20 This does not imply that refugees abandoned their right to return to their country.21 On the contrary, they often expressed their claim both to the Rwandan government and to the international community.22 By the end of the 1980s, the number of Rwandan refugees in the Great Lakes region, West Africa and elsewhere was estimated to be between 200,000 and 500,000.23

2.2

Harassment of Refugees in Uganda

Among the countries of asylum for Rwandan refugees, Uganda was the most politically violent. In the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda experienced regime turnover from three coup d’états and civil war by Milton Obote, Idi Amin, again Obote II, and Yoweri Museveni. Rwanda’s current President Kagame was one of those refugees in Uganda. He was born into a Tutsi family in Gitarama Prefecture, Rwanda, in 1957, and fled with his family in 1959 when they became threatened by the mounting violence.24 Although Kagame’s father was related to the royal family of Mutara Rudahigwa, and his mother was closely related to the queen, his father, a successful businessman, was not dependent on the monarchy.25 This political chaos in Uganda diverted attention from the refugee issue, although Amin’s regime as well as Museveni’s rebel group, which later seized power, used and abused these refugees for their own reasons. Obote administration resented Rwandan refugees for three reasons: refugee camps were used to recruit Inyenzi rebels to attack Rwanda; refugees received special assistance from the UNHCR, creating jealousy among some Ugandans; and Tutsi became allies with the culturally related Hima ethnic group of Museveni, who were resented locally as elitists.26 After seizing power in 1971, Amin recruited refugees into his army and secret service, eliminating many Ugandans from those positions.27 Rwandans, who were hostile towards Obote,28 joined forces with south Sudanese and Congolese refugees

20

Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 142. Ibid. 22 Ibid, 143. 23 A. Guichaoua, From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda 1990-1994, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2015, 25. 24 C. M. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, North California, McFraland & Company, 2004, 7. 25 Ibid, 8. 26 A. J. Kuperman, “Provoking genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front”, Journal of Genocide Research, 6 (1), 2004, 65. 27 O. Otunnu, Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979–2016, Cham, Palgrave McMillan, 2017, 134. 28 O. Otunnu, Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1890–1979, Cham, Palgrave McMillan, 2017, 224. 21

2.2 Harassment of Refugees in Uganda

23

“to secure good jobs, […] and receive security”.29 In order to encourage refugees to join in, Amin even invited the deposed Rwanda’s mwami Kigeri IV from Kenya to Uganda.30 Reportedly, Amin promised to help re-establish the monarchy in Rwanda and assist in the refugees’ repatriation to Rwanda.31 While some Rwandan refugees worked for Amin, others, including teenage secondary school student Fred Rwigyema, who later led the RPF’s invasion to Rwanda in 1990, was recruited by Museveni in the anti-Amin forces in the mid-1970s.32 Following the fall of Amin in 1979 and the outbreak of civil war in Uganda, hope grew among the refugees to return to Rwanda. The revolutionary fervour led refugees to establish the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation (RRWF) in June 1979 to examine an eventual return to their country and prepare for an armed struggle.33 The name of the RRWF was changed to the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1980, which openly discussed the eventual return of exiles to Rwanda.34 Rwigyema and Kagame, who had been active in RANU, later joined Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla war against Obote II from 1981 to 1986.35 This Rwandan refugees’ joining the notorious Amin regime in 1970s, followed by Museveni’s guerrilla war in 1980s was viewed with great disdain by the Obote II regime.36 In February 1982, the Ugandan government attempted to force Rwandan refugees to return to camps where they left during the Amin period, to no avail.37 Then the authorities targeted all people of Rwandan origin, including refugees and nationals,38 looting their houses and cattle. In October 1982, the south-western authorities in Uganda issued a memorandum urging the eviction of the refugees.39 A total of 40,000 Rwandans were evicted from Uganda by November 1982, but 4000 people were trapped at the Ugandan border, remaining neither refugees nor returnees for many years.40 This eviction was against the principle of non-refoulement. Although the Rwandan Government allowed some Rwandans to cross

O. Otunnu, “Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda”, Adelman and Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide, 14. 30 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 167. 31 Ibid. Author was unable to seek primary documents on President Amin’s speeches or any literature on analysing Amin’s policy. 32 Ibid, 168. 33 P. Rutayisire et al., RWANDA: la Renaissance d’une Nation, Butare, Editions de l’université du Rwanda, 2012, 110, cited in J-P. Kimonyo, Rwanda demain! Une Longue Marche vers la Transformation, Paris, Karthala, 2017, 110; Rudasingwa, Healing a Nation, 51. 34 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 67. 35 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 172. 36 Ibid, 168. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid, 161–162. 39 Otunnu, Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979–2016, 139. 40 Ibid, 140; Newbury, “Returning Refugees”, 275. 29

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into the country, many of them died in atrocious conditions after being quarantined in Nasho in eastern Rwanda.41 Meanwhile, prejudice and discrimination against Rwandan refugees by the Obote II regime and the Ugandan society were rampant.42 This prejudice arose, in part, because refugees participated in the anti-Obote violence and seized land from some Ugandans in the southwest.43 The inability of refugees in Uganda to obtain Ugandan citizenship, unlike those in Tanzania and Congo, fuelled their sense of alienation and injustice, leading many Tutsi refugees in Uganda to identify themselves as Rwandan, and not as Tutsi.44 This struggle to affirm their identity and basic rights reinforced the refugees’ desire to return home.45 RANU subsequently began to recruit refugees in Uganda and in Kenya for the Museveni-led NRM in the early 1980s, buoyed by the refugees’ expectation of receiving military training for the purpose of attacking Rwanda in the future.46

2.3

Rwandan Government’s Gradual Change on Refugees’ Policy

In July 1973, Major General Habyarimana of the Minister of National Guard and Police staged a coup d’etat, and the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) was established in 1975 as Rwanda’s single party. Habyarimana, who was from the northeastern prefecture of Gisenyi, concentrated political power in the north. President Habyarimana’s regime was historically reluctant to allow Rwandan refugees to return home, arguing that land shortage and population density made their repatriation problematic.47 In August 1976, Rwanda’s Minister to the Presidency instructed that “[t]he return of refugees must be strictly controlled and only encouraged when those applying to return are useful to the country […] since their massive return would conflict with the population explosion”.48 In early 1982, President Habyarimana expressed his wish in the European Economic Community Review that refugees permanently settle out of the country due to Rwanda’s dense

41

Rudasingwa, Healing A Nation, 38. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 165. 43 Otunnu, Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979–2016, 134. 44 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 165. 45 C. Watson, Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion, The U.S. Committee for Refugees Issue Paper, 1991, 9. 46 Otunnu, “Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda”, 15–16; Rudasingwa, Healing a Nation, 51. 47 J-P. Kimonyo, Rwanda: Popular Genocide, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008, 51. 48 Ibid; Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President, “Instruction présidentielles relatives aux réfugies,” 12 June 1976. Ibid, 51. 42

2.3 Rwandan Government’s Gradual Change on Refugees’ Policy

25

population.49 This refusal served as an appropriate pretext for old-caseload refugees to take up arms for their return in 1990. However, what is not well known is that Habyarimana’s position gradually shifted after late 1982, and especially after 1986, which led to negotiation on the repatriation process with the Ugandan Government. Even before, in July 1974, the Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Ugandan Government in Kampala, including President Amin, to discuss the return of refugees and drafted a preliminary agreement on the gradual repatriation of refugees.50 The preconditions for this initiative were the “desire expressed by Rwandan refugees […] to return […] and live a […] peaceful life in respect of the Constitution and the laws of the Rwandan republic”.51 Refugees gave six conditions for their repatriation, one of which was the restoration of a monarchy.52 Despite some ambiguities, the refugees’ insistence on re-establishing a monarchy was a key impediment in negotiations and ultimately led to the Rwandan Government rejecting their return.53 In 1962, a referendum was held which rejected restoring a monarchy and voters favoured a republican system of government.54 The expulsion of refugees in October 1982, as stated above, was a turning point for Habyarimana. He was concerned because those who were expelled were suspected to be members or supporters of the RANU, and the remaining refugees, including RANU supporters, would flee to Rwanda.55 This expulsion crisis, along with international pressure, led the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to organise a meeting in October 1982 to address the voluntary repatriation issue.56 UNHCR organised another joint ministerial meeting in March 1983 in Uganda, to begin categorising refugees.57 During this meeting, Obote suggested that Habyarimana should work together with him to fight against the NRM, which was regarded as Obote’s enemy, enrolling Rwandan refugees.58 After having learned about this meeting, Museveni informed Habyarimana that no Rwandans would return if he

49

Le Courrier ACP/CEE, Brussels, No. 72, Mar.–Apr. 1982, cited in A. Guichaoua, The Problem of the Rwandese Refugees and the Banyarwanda Populations in the Great Lakes Region, UNHCR, May 1992, 27. 50 Kimonyo, Rwanda: Popular Genocide, 47–48. Ugandan newspaper Voice of Uganda on 29 July 1974 on the first page shows a photo with a caption “President Amin receiving a special message from President Habyarimana of the Republic of Rwanda delivered to him by the Rwanda Minister of Foreign Affairs at State House, Entebbe”. 51 Kimonyo, Rwanda: Popular Genocide, 48. 52 Ibid, 48–49. 53 Interview with a refugee II. However, as not all Rwandan refugees were monarchists, this requires verification. 54 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 125. 55 Otunnu, Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979-2016, 142–143. 56 Otunnu, “Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda”, 22–23. 57 Uganda Times, “Uganda, Rwanda sign pact”, 11 Mar. 1983, 1. 58 Interview with a former Rwandan government official.

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won the war.59 Habyarimana was obliged to go along with Museveni for economic reasons, as the latter controlled south-western Uganda where imported goods must pass to reach the landlocked country of Rwanda.60 Rwanda’s agreement to examine voluntary repatriation became clear after the victory of the NRM, more than a quarter of its members being Rwandan refugees.61 One of them was Rwigyema, the NRM’s Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence with a distinguished military career. The ruling MRND declared in July 1986 that they would recognise the principle of return and would consider the delivery of passports and travel documents, allowing the refugees’ punctual visits to Rwanda.62 However, refugees’ reaction was negative because the MRND’s proposal was deemed “devoid of impact”; and visits were already ongoing from neighbouring countries.63 Moreover, delivering passports only to refugees who could prove their ability to meet their own needs in Rwanda was considered restrictive, discriminatory and arbitrary.64 Several meetings between the two governments and the UNHCR took place between 1988 and 1990, which decided to arrange a refugee visit to Rwanda in early October 1990. At the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1990, Habyarimana announced his intention to offer citizenship and travel documents to those refugees who wished to return.65 The UNHCR was to conduct a survey in January 1991 on the refugees’ desire to return to Rwanda or remain in Uganda.66 Refugee visit eventually did not take place because the RPF invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990. Thus, it appears that the invasion was intended to short circuit the negotiations that were underway.67 In February 1991, Habyarimana signed the Dar-es-Salaam declaration on the right of refugees to return, followed by the provision of Rwandan passports to refugees in July.68 Habyarimana reiterated during his visit to Uganda in September 1993—soon after the Arusha Peace Accords with the RPF (see below)—that “all refugees are free to return home and they can obtain passports from Rwandese embassies abroad”.69 It is argued that apart from the government’s fear of the military influence of the RPF that helped the NRM to seize power, three factors had facilitated a shift in

59

Ibid. Ibid. 61 J.-M. Ndagijimana, translated by M. Collins, How Paul Kagame Deliberately Sacrificed the Tutsi, La Pagaie, 2016, kindle version. 62 Guichaoua, The Problem of the Rwandese Refugees, 27. 63 Ibid, 23. 64 Ibid. 65 Kimonyo, Rwanda demain!, 108. 66 Watson, Exile from Rwanda, 13. 67 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 25. 68 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, 72. 69 The New Vision, “Rwanda refugees availed passports”, 2 Sep. 1993. 60

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Rwanda’s approach vis-à-vis refugees: the high possibility that the refugees would choose to return; Rwanda’s awareness of Museveni’s favourable relations with the Rwandan refugees; and “the French fear of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ erosion [RPF’s invasion coming from Anglophone Uganda] of their position on the African continent”.70 In order to use the external crisis to quell the internal crisis (see below), Habyarimana used the French fear as a major trump-card.71 This was why, in order to stop the RPF advance, France immediately reacted to the RPF’s invasion and remained until December 1993, and reappeared in the latter half of the genocide period.72 Despite this change of policy on the part of President Habyarimana, Rwanda hoped that most refugees would want to remain in Uganda, but doubted the survey would show this.73 Both governments suspected that the refugees were under control of the RPF, and thus were forced to say that they wanted to return to Rwanda.74

2.4

RPF’s Preparation for Armed Return from Uganda

The expulsion of refugees from Uganda to Rwanda in 1982 was said to be the turning point not only for Rwandan Government to modify its refugee policy, but also for refugees75; as they did not believe in integration, they joined the NRM in order to protect themselves from another possible expulsion.76 It was alleged that the NRA recruited refugees in refugee settlements, and that Museveni promised the refugees citizenship or to assist them in their return to Rwanda in exchange for their support.77 This factor, as well as a prohibition against non-Ugandans to hold state positions, was said to have triggered the refugees’ invasion of Rwanda in order to regain their right to nationality and right to land.78 In the end, the NRM overthrew Obote’s regime and seized power in January 1986. In name and strategy, RANU was ultimately transformed into the Rwandan Patriotic Front in December 1987 during the organisation’s seventh congress in Kampala. This RPF became “an offensive political organisation dedicated to the

70

Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 99. Ibid. 72 Ibid, 111. 73 Watson, Exile from Rwanda,13. 74 Ibid. 75 A. Guichaoua, The Problem of the Rwandese Refugees, 23. 76 P. Ngoga, “Uganda: The National Resistance Army”, C. Clapham ed., African Guerrillas, Bloomington, Indiana University Press,1998, 98. 77 Watson, Exile from Rwanda, 11. 78 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers,183. Despite the ambiguity, refugees’ claim on recovery of monarch seemed to have halted. 71

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return of exiles to Rwanda, by force if necessary”.79 Although RPF was mainly Tutsi-led, there were a few Hutus, such as Seth Sendashonga, former leader of a student movement opposed to Rwandan President Habyarimana, who left Rwanda in 1975, and Alexis Kanyarengwe, who fled Rwanda in 1980 amid accusations that he was plotting against Habyarimana. Hutu membership in the RPF was nominal, however, and largely seen as a public relations move by Tutsi leaders to mask its ethnocentric goals.80 A World Congress of Rwandan Refugees was held in Washington, D.C., in August 1988, which adopted a resolution to bring about the refugees’ right to return, “by force if necessary” (see Chap. 5).81 Within the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA; RPF’s army), there was growing internal power rivalry and frustration with respect to the issues of repatriation.82 Kagame, Acting Head of the NRA’s military intelligence, was alleged to have used its resources to intimidate dissenters within the RPF who did not favour an armed return, and some were imprisoned or killed.83 Additionally, refugees were dissuaded from conforming to the UNHCR’s repatriation plan under heavy pressure of the RPF leaders whose popular slogan was “We left together, we will return together”; those who disagreed were marginalised.84 This meant all refugees were expected to obey RPF policy on repatriation, in particular in refugee camps where the RPF extended its influence.85 The RPF was afraid of “losing a large segment of their prospective recruits though the UNHCR’s programs for reinsertion [local integration]”.86 At the same time, the RPF began circulating a newsletter in Kampala, urging refugees to “take up their right to their homeland”.87 Thus, the RPF’s notion of repatriation was vastly different from voluntary return, which the UNHCR started to activate in the 1990s. The RPF’s invasion of Rwanda was carried out amid great political and economic upheaval.88 Politically, there were the Hutu–Tutsi and north–south dichotomies. During the Habyarimana regime, Tutsis were not systematically harassed, and as a group, its members were more represented in the private sector, in particular in commerce and development projects; they were however

79 Prunier’s interview with RPF cadre Tito Rutaremara, Kabale [Uganda], 11 Jul. 1992. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 73. 80 RPF’s dissident declared this in the press, 17 May 1991, cited in Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs in Crise, 147. 81 A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 42. 82 O. Otunnu, “As Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)”, Adelman and Suhrke (eds.), Path of a Genocide, 34. 83 Watson, Exile from Rwanda, 13. 84 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 26. 85 Interview with Rudasingwa. 86 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 26. 87 Watson, Exile from Rwanda, 13. 88 Guichaoua, The Problem of the Rwandese Refugees, 11.

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discriminated against in education and getting access to government jobs.89 However, once the Tutsi-led RPF invaded and gained control of regions in northern Rwanda, the conflict intensified with ethnic tensions escalating. Likewise, Hutus from the south were discriminated against in terms of their access to higher education.90 Habyarimana, who concentrated political power in the north, marginalised his predecessor Kayibanda’s supporters in the south in the competition for power and resources.91 This resulted in the southern population’s heightened grievance over land scarcities, structural famine, and 30 percent unemployment rate amongst rural adults at the end of 1980s.92 From that point on, the decline of the legitimacy of Habyarimana’s regime accelerated.93 Therefore, the issues of land shortage and population pressure which Habyarimana initially used to justify his reluctance to refugees returning home was not a major issue inside Rwanda. The most critical issues were the growing cleavages between northern elites and poor peasants in the south. Habyarimana’s Government presided over an inequitable distribution of land and was accused of appropriating land to serve political interests.94 The land issue became the centre of conflict, continuing through the genocide and its aftermath. Economically, there were three troubling issues emerging in Rwanda from the late 1980s: a 50 per cent drop of coffee price in 198995; the government’s acceptance of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund-led Structural Adjustment Programme, which resulted in a 40 per cent devaluation of the national currency a few months prior to the invasion96; and increased military spending from 1.9 per cent in 1989 to 7.8 per cent of GDP in 1992 following the RPF invasion.97 This 1990 invasion was generally considered a military defeat for the RPF after the Congolese, Belgian, and French armies intervened to shore up support for Habyarimana, which led to RPF forces losing men and retreating to Uganda. However, the RPF quickly regrouped and invaded again in 1991 and started seizing territory as it displaced the mainly Hutu population in the north. At the same time, the RPF was able to attract international attention and establish itself as a viable force in Rwandan politics. Only 17 days after the invasion, Belgian and Tanzanian officials mediated an OAU-UNHCR-supervised conference on the refugee C. Newbury, ‘Ethnicity and Politics of History in Rwanda’, Africa Today 45, 1996, 15; P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 1998, 35. 90 Uvin, Aiding Violence, 35. 91 J. Gasana, “Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda”, in M. Halle, J. Mathew and J. Switzer (eds.), Conserving the Peace: Resources, Livelihoods and Security, Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2002, 218. 92 Gasana, “Natural Resource Scarcity”, 206, 210. 93 Ibid, 218. 94 Ibid, 211. 95 I. Kamola, “The Global Coffee Economy and the Production of Genocide in Rwanda”, Third World Quarterly, 28 (3), 2007, 578. 96 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 160. 97 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 147–8. 89

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problem.98 Presidents Habyarimana and Museveni agreed on direct negotiations with the RPF, even if the former accused the latter of supporting the RPF’s invasion.99

2.5

Civil War

As the Rwandan Government was modifying repatriation policy, the civil war raged as a result of the RPF’s invasion. Moreover, the peace process and transition from a single-party dictatorship to multiparty democracy were simultaneously taking place. Worse, many civilians, in particular Hutus in the north, were displaced and killed. As discussed in Chap. 1, forced movements aim to appropriate the territory or property of another group and settle another population in the territory.100 These two factors of massive displacement and the targeted killings of Hutus were indeed inseparable in armed conflicts101 and became one of the main reasons that Hutu refugees have refused to return.

2.5.1

Democratisation and Peace Process

Regarding the democratisation movement since 1990 following the end of the Cold War, French President François Mitterrand at the June 1990 Franco-African conference advised introducing a multiparty system. Soon after, Habyarimana announced on 5 July that the democratisation process would begin. On 24 September, the National Synthesis Commission on Political Reform was established and given two years to make recommendations for a new democratic national charter.102 The first “independent party” was created in November 1990, followed by the registration of other opposition parties from March 1991. Some opposition parties formed a coalition in April 1992.103 However, Habyarimana’s view of democratisation was so artificial that MRND officials feared erosion of its own power and the development of opposition parties

98 Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 1 Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, 1996, 42. 99 Ibid. 100 Jacques, Armed Conflict and Displacement, 21. 101 C. Onana, Rwanda l’Opération Turquoise et la controverse médiatique (1994–2014): Analyse des enquêtes journalistiques, des documents secret-défense et de la stratégie militaire, Université Lyon III Jean Moulin, Ph.D. thesis, 2017, 508. 102 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 153. 103 Ibid, 154; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 121.

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that would link with the RPF.104 Some opposition parties and the RPF began collaborating in June 1992, as both were fighting the same enemy, namely the MRND.105 At this stage, the opposition met in Brussels with RPF officials who announced the end of their armed struggle to focus on their political objectives.106 At the same time, the so-called technical modalities of the peace process were agreed on in Paris to initiate peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania.107 Another ceasefire agreement between the Rwandan government and RPF was signed in June 1992, following the first ceasefire agreement in March 1991.108 Thus, when the Arusha negotiations began in July 1992, Habyarimana’s team faced “the dual crises of war and internal opposition [which] had merged into a single grave threat to their continued control”.109 Meanwhile, opposition parties felt betrayed by the RPF, and their alliance began eroding following its military attack in February 1993.110 Although the Rwandan Government respected the ceasefire, the RPF did not and continued to rely on military assistance from the NRA for supplies and armaments, using Uganda as a rear base.111 The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed by Rwandan Government and the RPF in August 1993. It included the repatriation of Rwandan refugees, which affirms: the right of return, and the choice of settling down “in any place of their choice…, so long as they do not encroach on the rights of other people” (Article 1 and 2); “[F] or purposes of settling returnees, the Rwandese Government shall make lands available, upon their identification by ‘Commission for Repatriation’ so long as [… land is] not currently occupied by individuals” (Article 3); and “in order to promote social harmony and national reconciliation, refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim their properties, which might have been occupied by other people. The government shall compensate them by putting land at their disposal and shall help them to resettle” (Article 4).112 Furthermore, Article 28 affirmed that “[h]ousing schemes in settlement sites should be modelled on the ‘village’ grouped type of settlement to encourage the establishment of development centres in the rural areas and break with traditional scattered housing”.113 Except

104

Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 127; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Stories, 42, 46. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Stories, 87. Although Des Forges wrote May 1992, the meeting took place in Jun. 1992. 106 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 150. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 HRW, Briefing Paper, The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared, Apr. 2006, 4. 110 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Stories, 87; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 176. 111 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 31; A. J. Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrete, Paris. Editions du Panama, 2005, 168. 112 Arusha Peace Agreement, “Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons”, 3 Jun. 1993. 113 Ibid. 105

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for the villagisation, which was emphasised by the RPF delegates,114 almost none of the provisions of the Arusha Accords were put into effect by the RPF when it took over power in 1994 (see Chaps. 3 and 4). One of the key provisions of the Arusha Accords had been the military share-out of troops, allowing the FAR 60 per cent and the RPF 40 per cent of a future army. The RPF was regarded seen as having benefited from the agreement, which also allowed its politicians to establish a presence at the parliamentary buildings in Kigali and a protective force of 600 soldiers (“600 battalion”; see below) in the capital. The RPF reportedly arrived with 3000 men, and a sufficient supply of weapons them allowed them to recruit and train soldiers.115 Despite agreeing to the tenets of the peace accord and signing on, neither side trusted the intentions of the other; the commitment of both side on establishing democracy and coexistence was doubtful.116 Moreover, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, Special Representative of Secretary General of UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), questioned the intention of the RPF, whose members made demands that elicited new discussions and obstacles every time he organised a meeting between different political forces and Hutu opponents of the RPF.117 In fact, Kagame stated around 1992 that “[t]he best way to fight is protracted war […] because the ultimate solution is political. War is to create pressure to force the government to break down completely or realize the need for a negotiate settlement”.118 In late 1991, during the peace process, the MRND created a youth wing known as the Interahamwe, as a measure to assemble grassroots party activists to spread the political ideas.119 Other parties also developed their own youth wings, which resulted in an escalation of violence, with the MRND transforming the Interahamwe into a militia.120 The Interahamwe destabilised other political parties and co-opted their more active members.121 Destabilising the opposition became possible through the Interahamwe’s massive infiltration into the youth wings of other political parties.122 Amid the new politically segmented administration, and highly charged environment, the youth wings of other political parties radicalised and developed 114

HRW, Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda, Chap. 10: Land, https://www.hrw.org/reports/ 2001/rwanda/. 115 Lt. M. Nees, intelligence officer, UNAMIR, 1 Feb 1994, Kigali Battalion, S2, cited in Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 106; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Stories, 180–181. 116 US Embassy Kigali to Secretary of State, Washington DC, Doc # 1993KIGALI0306, Aug. 1993, 8. 117 C. Onana, Les secrets de la justice internationale: Enquêtes truquées sur le génocide rwandais, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2005, 56. 118 C. Watson, “War and Waiting”, Africa Report, Nov./Dec. 1992, 55. 119 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 125–126. 120 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Stories, 46. 121 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 128. 122 Ibid.

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militia.123 Fearful of losing power, the opposition parties recruited unemployed and landless rural youth to their youth wings to ensure their political protection.124 Opposition parties blamed these grievances on land resource capture by those faithful to Habyarimana, as well as political and economic domination of the north.125 Meanwhile, rising anti-Tutsi violence pushed many Tutsi youth to join the RPF for self-protection purposes.126 The assassination of Burundian Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi army officers in October 1993 had four effects. First, some 300,000 Burundian Hutu refugees arriving in Rwanda in the wake of the massacres following the incident were recruited by the Interahamwe.127 Second, the assassination persuaded opposition parties that they were powerlessness without weapons.128 Third, it heightened the pro-Hutu movement “Hutu Power” in reaction to fears of mounting RPF ascendency.129 Fourth, Tutsi university students left the campus to bail out the RPF.130 Many Hutu leaders in Rwanda focused on the political struggle, and Hutu youth wings from different parties began coordinating their struggle against the RPF.131 While the Interahamwe underwent military training in the northern prefectures by the beginning of 1994 and were offered weapons,132 a large volume of machetes were sold in February 1994 and widely used during the genocide period.133 Neither democratisation nor peace could be achieved, obviously, as the civil war disturbed both processes.

2.5.2

Massacres and Massive Displacement of Civilians

After the RPF invaded, the FAR committed various violations such as killing, summary executions, and rapes.134 According to the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, the Rwandan Government killed approximately 2000 people in three main areas from October 1990 to January

Gasana, “Natural Resoruce Scarcity”, 221. Ibid. 125 Ibid, 220. 126 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 80. 127 Ibid, 132; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 199. 128 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 201. 129 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 97. 130 M. Niwese, Le people rwandais un pied dans la tombe: Récit d’un Réfugié étudiant, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, 32. 131 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 98. 132 Ibid, 98, 139. 133 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 243. 134 UN ECOSOC, “Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” para. 33, 34, 35. 123 124

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1993, namely north-western Kibilira and Bugogwe in October 1990 and January to March 1991, respectively, and southern Bugesera in March 1992.135 While the Bugogwe massacre seemed to have taken place in retaliation for the RPF’s raid of Ruhengeri in January 1991 (see below), the ground for the Bugesera massacre had been psychologically prepared.136 As the massacres targeted Tutsis, the UN Special Rapporteur questioned whether these acts could be termed genocide.137 In the meantime, Theogene Rudasingwa, RPF’s Former Secretary-General, stated that the RPF was “active in convincing the international community and human rights organizations that these massacres of Tutsis in Bugesera, Kibilira and Bugogwe were acts of genocide”.138 Moreover, the report by the above-mentioned International Commission of Investigation relied on an informant named Janvier Afrika, whose testimony lacked credibility and who later admitted he had close ties with the RPF and had been encouraged by the RPF to give false testimony against Habyarimana to international human rights organisations.139 The scale of crimes by the RPF against Hutu civilians was much larger. Upon its invasion, the RPF forcibly moved hundreds or thousands of people inside the country and into Uganda “in order to create free-fire zones”.140 Investigative journalist Charles Onana has persuasively argued that the RPF pursued an intense military strategy from 1990 onward that pushed Hutu civilians en mass from northern Rwanda towards the south—which allowed RPF forces to occupy most of northern Rwanda before the genocide.141 The number of RPF members grew from 5000 in early 1991 to 25,000 by April 1994.142 On the other hand, FAR had grown ten times from 5200 in October 1990 to 50,000 in mid-1992.143 However, even with France’s supply of weapons from Egypt and South Africa, the FAR’s living conditions deteriorated as the government’s economic situation worsened.144 The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) established by the RPF in 1990 played a major role in massacring the population from 1990 through the genocide.145 This massacre was possible because by the beginning of 1994, the RPF had

135

Report of International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, Mar. 1993, 11. 136 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 136–137. 137 UN ECOSOC, “Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, para. 78, 79. 138 J. Rever, In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Random House Canada, 2018, 263. 139 Ibid, 263–264 n3. 140 HRW Arms Project, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, 6 (1), Jan 1994. 4; in total, 10,000 persons fled to Uganda. D. Kamukama, Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications, Kampala, Foundation Publishers, 1997, 56. 141 Onana, Rwanda l’Opération Turquoise, 502. 142 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 117. 143 Ibid, 113. 144 Ibid, 113, 149, 174. 145 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 65, 109–111.

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infiltrated both Hutu political parties and all four Hutu youth wings, including the Interahamwe146; this implies that youth wings of political parties were infiltrated both by the RPF and the Interahamwe, as stated above. These RPF and DMI infiltrators actively killed Tutsi villagers in staged attacks and murdered key figures from May 1993 to February 1994, such as Hutu politicians, opposition leaders, and Hutu hardliners.147 Thanks to this infiltration, RPF got political leverage by staging attacks, known as false flags, against prominent Hutus, in acts that were blamed on Habyarimana’s allies.148 The RPF’s raid on the north-western strategic town of Ruhengeri in January 1991 managed to free and recruit political prisoners.149 By May 1991, the RPF directly fired on the civilian population in Byumba in a bid to push the population southward and seize territory from FAR forces behind the front line.150 Under Kagame’s orders, the RPA laid antipersonnel mines, demolished houses, and looted properties.151 By mid-1992, the RPF had forced 350,000 Hutu peasants from their land in northern Byumba into 40 camps, which were regularly hit with mortar, rockets, and gunfire by the RPF.152 The RPF launched a major offensive in Ruhengeri and Byumba prefectures in February 1993, massacring 40,000 Hutu civilians.153 The number of IDPs increased to one million by February 1993, or one-seventh of the country’s entire population, who were at that point edging close to Kigali.154 The displacement of a mostly Hutu population, which was caused by the Tutsi-led RPF, and the tantamount suffering in IDP camps contributed to the rise in ethnicity, fuelling Hutu radicals.155 These factors enabled Habyarimana to reclaim legitimacy and recruit people for the Interahamwe.156 In addition to tarnishing the RPF’s image among opposition parties as mentioned, the RPA’s military offensive had three effects. First, it disrupted agricultural production and aggravated the problem of famine, as Ruhengeri and Byumba prefectures were food basket regions157; as of 1991, there were an alarming

146

Ibid, 60; Administration of Justice (Madrid), Order of Indictment, 6 Feb. 2008, 7. Rever, In Praise of Blood, 60; Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 65, 113. 148 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 60. 149 Ibid, 119. 150 Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrete, 138. 151 Ibid. 152 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 215–217. 153 J. Gasana, Rwanda: Du Parti-Etat a l’Etat-Garnison, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2002, 185. 154 UN ECOSOC, “Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” para. 23; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 295. 155 Gasana, “Natural Resource Scarcity”, 223; R. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania, 2009, 126. 156 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 126. 157 Gasana, “Natural Resoruce Scarcity”, 223. 147

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500,000 victims of famine.158 Second, according to FAR Colonel Théoeste Bagosora, “plans were drawn up to organise groups of armed militiamen”.159 Third, the offensive allowed RPF troops to access an area within 20 kilometres of Kigali’s northern outskirts.160

2.6

Motives of the RPF’s Armed Repatriation

Throughout the invasion war, the RPF ostensibly raised two major problems: one was democracy, human rights, restoration of unity, and promotion of economy161; the RPF’s other rallying cry was the return of refugees.162 In a communique published in Kampala on 10 October 1990, the RPF said “[t]he use of arms is imposed on us by the persistent refusal of the Rwandan government to solve the country’s problems and, among other things, to ensure the peaceful return of Rwandan refugees in their country”.163 As pressing issues as those issues were, they had already been debated within Rwanda; thus, there was no need for the RPF to invade. The preparation for refugees to officially visit on 1 October 1990 was in fact unfavourable for the RPF, who risked losing refugee support if the refugees could actually return to Rwanda without fighting.164 The RPF was not pleased to see democratic development in Rwanda because its members could no longer legitimately claim that they were fighting against an oppressive dictatorship.165 Therefore, in a bid to sabotage the repatriation process and democratic reform, the RPF accelerated preparations to invade ahead of the planned refugees’ visit in October 1990, which never did take place.166 It appears that regardless of the Rwandan Government’s policy towards refugees returning, the RPF was likely set on invading in 1980 when RANU was formed, and most certainly in 1987 when the RPF was established. For RANU, the issue of repatriation was less important than the pursuit of political and social transformation of Rwanda “with all the possible means, whether political or military”.167

158

Republic of Rwanda, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, letter dated 16 Aug. 1991 addressed to Grand Duché in Luxumburg, cited in Onana, Rwanda l’Opération Turquoise, 496. 159 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 132. 160 Ibid, 65. 161 F. Reyntjens, “Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 9 (3), 1996, 245. 162 Rudasingwa, Healing a Nation, 76. 163 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 147. 164 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 91. 165 G. Prunier, “The Rwandan Patriotic Front”, C. Clapham ed., African Guerrillas, 1998, 129. 166 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 91. 167 Kimonyo, Rwanda Demain!, 111.

2.6 Motives of the RPF’s Armed Repatriation

37

Eventually, this original mission of the RANU changed; the RPF broadened its political agenda to remove President Habyarimana so that returning refugees could seize political power.168 RPF’s overall ambitions became clearer following the end of genocide in 1994 when the RPF excluded the MRND and established a RPF-based government.169 Subsequently, when the Arusha peace talks started in 1992, Kagame launched a deliberate policy to create a Tutsi land by massacring and displacing the Hutus, according to RPF Founder, Alphonse Furuma.170 This policy, which continued until 1995, enabled the old-caseload refugees to return and resettle in Rwanda.171 Even when the RPF advanced during the civil war, these returnees started occupying the land they had owned in the northeast before they fled in 1959.172 This may explain why even after the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord in August 1993, the RPF, under the “security pretext”, did not want 600,000 IDPs to return home until the full implementation of the Accord.173 The same conditions, however, were not enforced for the old-caseload returnees. Since the Inyenzi attacks of the early 1960s, the 1990 invasion raised the spectre of a return to the pre-1959 Tutsi domination, as alleged by Rwanda’s Foreign Minister at the time, Casimir Bizimungu174—and fears of renewed “Tutsi Power inside Rwanda”.175 Both the Inyenzi and the RPF had the same objective, which was to return to Rwanda,176 claim their place, and receive support from neighbouring countries. The difference was that the RPF argued it had invaded Rwanda in the first place in order to liberate its people. In reality, especially for Rwandans in the north, the invasion was actually an occupation and a brutal one.177 As such, the population “showed no enthusiasm for being ‘liberated’” by the RPF and were displaced massively to create a “Hutu-free territory”,178 not “free-fire zones” as the RPF called them,179 so that the 1959 returnees could claim their land.180 The RPF’s intention was to seize land and power—which they did following the civil war and genocide. Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, 68. G. Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 7. 170 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 217. 171 Ibid; email from Rudasingwa, 7 Apr. 2018. 172 Des Forges “Land in Rwanda”, 358. 173 R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, London, Arrow Books, 2004, 67. 174 Washington Post, “Invasion Stirs Tribal Tension in Rwanda,” 14 Oct. 1990. 175 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 189. 176 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 146. 177 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 185, 189. 178 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 217; Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrete, 138. 179 HRW Arms Project, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, 6 (1), Jan. 1994, 4. 180 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 78. 168 169

Chapter 3

New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal to Return (1994–1997)

This chapter aims to clarify why such a large number of 1994 new-caseload refugees, mainly Hutu, fled during and in the aftermath of the genocide as well as what happened to these refugees, especially those in eastern DRC, after the destruction of refugee camps in 1996. This chapter also examines Rwandan Government and the UNHCR’s repatriation policy chronologically. In order to understand the massive movement of population and refugees’ refusal to return until today, it is important to review four incidents: the shooting down of the presidential jet on 6 April 1994; subsequent mass, targeted killings from April to July 1994—whose phenomenon is called genocide when a total of 937,000 persons were killed according to the Rwandan Government1; attacks against IDP camp in Rwanda in April 1995; and attacks of refugee camps and hunting down of refugees in the DRC from October 1996 to April 1997. After the RPF’s seizure of power in 1994, three main population movements were observed in the same year: first, the outflow of the two million new-caseload refugees mostly to the DRC and Tanzania; second, the displacement of 1.8 million IDPs in the so-called Safe Humanitarian Zone established by France in south-western Rwanda; third, the return of 750,000 old-caseload refugees from 1994 onwards.2 This implies that following the genocide, half of the seven-million population were displaced in and outside the country.3

1

The source of this number is the Rwandan Government although this number has been contested. The New Humanitarian, “Census finds 937,000 died in genocide”, 2 April 2004; S. Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, New York, Cornell University Press, 2008, 51. 2 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 312, 364. 3 Ibid, 313. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 M. Yonekawa, Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6756-3_3

39

40

3.1

3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

Shooting Down of Habyarimana’s Plane (6 April 1994)

In analysing how the genocide unfolded, two factors need to be examined: first, what made the genocide possible, and second, what directly triggered the genocide. Regarding the first factor, genocide took place in the context of continuing civil war from October 1990 to early April 1994; this was, as explained in Chap. 2, when the country was facing a dramatic economic and political crisis, coupled with other destabilising factors such as the mobilisation of ethnic groups, the formation of militias and their infiltration, and the distribution of weapons. The trigger for the killings occurred on 6 April 1994, when Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart were assassinated in shooting down of presidential plane in Kigali after returning from meetings in Dar-es-Salaam on implementing the Arusha Peace Accord. Who was responsible for this act? A number of observers have argued it that Habyarimana’s inner circle did not want to inaugurate a new, broad-based government that would have diminished their power, and those individuals in that circle wanted to remove him.4 Others have argued the RPF was responsible for his assassination, “because they believed that Habyarimana would never permit the Accords to be implemented or, conversely, because they thought he was about to do so and they preferred a clear military victory to sharing power as part of a coalition”.5 The incident has been investigated, to varying extents, by four entities: the ICTR, French judges, Spanish judge, and the Rwandan Government. The ICTR, an international court established by the UN in November 1994 in Arusha, had a mandate to investigate breaches of international humanitarian law including acts of international terrorism, and to prosecute people alleged to have committed the most serious crimes, among them genocide, in Rwanda in 1994. An ICTR Lawyer and Investigator named Michael Hourigan was informed in early 1997 by three members of the RPF (current and former) about the direct implication of the then Vice President Kagame and his subordinates in shooting down the plane.6 The ICTR’s Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour, who initially was intrigued by this information, later advised that the ICTR’s mandate only extended to events that occurred during the genocide itself, which in her view began after the plane attack.7 This was in spite of its temporal mandate from 1 January 1994 until 31 December 1994, which clearly covered the plane attack, as well. Arbour also failed to investigate most politically sensitive issue at the ICTR: RPF crimes.8 However, she

4

Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 145. Ibid. 6 Affidavit of Michael Andrew Hourigan, 8 March 2007, para 7.4. Regarding the direct witness of the plane crash, see J-M Herbaut, N. Poux, “Réquisitoire Definitif Aux Fins de Non-Lieu”, 11 Oct 2018, 54–65. 7 Affidavit of Hourigan, para. 10, 11, 22. 8 T. Cruvellier, translated by C. Voss, Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin Press, 2010, 156. 5

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41

authorised a clandestine unit to begin probing RPF atrocities after she left the tribunal.9 Drawing on Hourigan’s investigation and other testimony from RPF defectors and Western officials, French anti-terror Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière began investigating in 1997 the assassination of Habyarimana, which also took the lives of three French nationals who were board the presidential plane.10 In 2006, he issued arrest warrants for nine RPF members who were accused of organising and executing the assassination of the Hutu president (The judge could not issue a warrant against Kagame because he enjoyed immunity as president). The warrants stipulated that Kagame gave orders for the assassination because the death of Habyarimana “was the necessary precondition for seizing power by force”.11 Rwanda immediately broke off diplomatic relations with France. Bruguière was accused by the French pro-Kigali organisation Survie of carrying out a shoddy probe and not doing an investigation inside Rwanda; Survie also said the Bruguière investigation used false evidence, such as the photograph of a missile tube that indicated the missile might not have been launched.12 In February 2008, the Spanish judge Fernando Andreu Merelles issued arrest warrants against 40 RPF/A officers in connection with crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda and the DRC, including the killing of Spanish nationals. After Bruguière left his job, he was succeeded in 2009 by Marc Trévidic and Nathalie Poux, at a time when France was eager to restore diplomatic relations with Rwanda and repair the rift caused by Bruguière.13 In January 2012, they issued a technical report contradicting their predecessor’s finding. It suggested the missiles were likely fired from Kanombe, an area that included the FAR military barracks, a report that appeared to exonerate the RPF from responsibility. Their report was based on acoustic and ballistic tests and was quickly criticised because the missile simulation tests were conducted in France, not Rwanda.14 In 2016, Jean-Marc Herbaut and Nathalie Poux reopened their investigation to hear testimony from the RPF’s former chief of staff Kayumba Nyamwasa who claimed that Kagame was responsible for organising the assassination.15 Although he submitted a written deposition, he was not permitted to provide oral testimony before the French

9

Rever, In Praise of Blood, 180. Ibid, 182. 11 The Guardian, “French judge accuses Rwandan president of assassination”, 22 Nov. 2006. 12 Survie, La Complicité de la France dans le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda: 15 ans après, 15 questions pour comprendre, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009, 90. 13 Le Monde, “Rose, le joker de Kigali”, 5 May 2009. 14 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 184–185. 15 Radio France International (RFI), “France: enquête relancée sur l'attentat contre le président rwandais Habyarimana”, 7 Oct. 2016. 10

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3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

court.16 The French investigation also failed to get Rwanda’s then Minister of Defence, James Kabarebe, to testify.17 In late December 2018, Judge Herbaut dismissed the case against Kagame’s entourages due to a “lack of sufficient evidence”, in particular a lack of material evidence.18 It was argued that reconciliation with President Kagame was a priority for French President Emmanuel Macron’s Government.19 After Bruguière’s issuance of arrest warrant, the Rwandan Government set about to establish its own record, notably against France. It quickly released a report by Rwanda’s Former Attorney General, Jean de Dieu Mucyo, in August 2008, and another one by jurist Jean Mutsinzi in January 2010. The Mucyo commission had a specific mission to collect “evidence indicating the role of the French State played in the preparation and implementation of the genocide”,20 while the Mutsinzi committee was tasked with “establishing the truth regarding the circumstances of the crash of the Falcon 50 airplane”.21 Subsequently, the US law firm Cunningham Levy Muse LLP published a report in December 2017, commissioned by the Rwandan Government, to “investigat[e]… the role of the French government and its officials regarding the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi”.22 The Cunningham Levy Muse has as its Board Member, Barbara Mulvaney, Former Senior Trial Attorney who led the Military 1 team prosecuting Theoneste Bagosora, the Hutu Officer who was found guilty by the ICTR of directing the genocide.23 These three reports commissioned by the Rwandan Government placed the responsibility squarely on France, alleging it had trained the FAR and the Interahamwe and provided weapons to the former Hutu regime, which facilitated, it argued, the shooting down of the plane by Hutu forces. Central to Bruguière’s conclusions that Kagame’s commandos had killed Habyarimana was the controversial account from the RPF dissident Abdul Ruzibiza, but his testimony was not included in Rwanda’s Governmentcommissioned reports. Ruzibiza retracted his testimony in November 2008, saying he had been under pressure by the French judge and had in fact made up part

L’Express, “Rwanda: non-lieu dans l’enquête sur l’attentat déclencheur du génocide de 1994”, 26 Dec. 2018. 17 RFI, “Affaire Habyarimana: l’enquête définitivement bouclée en France”, 21 Dec. 2017. 18 RFI, “Affaire Habyarimana: non-lieu en France pour sept proches de Kagame”, 26 Dec. 2018. 19 L’ Opinion, “Rwanda: entre Paul Kagamé et la France, l’impossible réconciliation?”, 13 Nov. 2017. 20 Republic of Rwanda, Mucyo report: The role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Aug. 2008, 6. 21 Republic of Rwanda, “Committee of Experts Investigation of the April 6, 1994 Crash of President Habyarimana’s Dassault Falcon–50 Aircraft: Media Guide”, Jan. 2010, 2. 22 Cunningham Levy Muse LLP, Report and Recommendation to the Government of Rwanda on the Role of French Officials in the Genocide Against the Tutsi, 11 Dec. 2017, 3. 23 Barbara Mulvaney, http://www.cunninghamlevy.com/attorneys/barbara-mulvaney/. 16

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43

of his story.24 Ruzibiza retraction came six days after Rwanda’s Head of State Protocol, Rose Kabuye, was detained at a German airport on a French warrant for her alleged part in the assassination of Habyarimana.25 Kabuye was one of nine senior Rwandan officials indicted by Bruguière. Prior to his death in 2010, Ruzibiza confessed he had retracted his testimony over concerns for his personal security, that of his family, and other witnesses.26 Another key witness for Bruguière named Emmanuel Ruzigana also issued a retraction in late 2006.27 Despite the divergence in testimony, there was certainly evidence indicating that the RPF was responsible for shooting down the plane and triggering genocide: the RPF’s assistance from Uganda in procuring supplies and armaments and its use of Uganda as a rear base during the civil war28; the use of Russian-made surface-to-air missiles, whose launchers were found in the RPF-controlled area in Kigali (see Chap. 5);29 a majority of testimonies, especially the most detailed, came from RPF dissidents who claimed that the RPF was responsible; and finally, a ICTR confidential, unpublished document in 2003 that concluded that “the presidential assassination was planned by Mr. Kagame, Mr. Nyamwasa, and other senior rebel leaders”.30 Such repeated, concerted manipulation of investigations has made refugees suspicious of the Rwandan Government and fearful of safe returning.31

3.2

Genocide (April–July 1994)

The mass, targeted killings began immediately after the plane attack—when a campaign to physically eliminate the population was launched— and ended, at least publicly, on 19 July 1994 when the RPF established the new government.32 Starting

RFI, “Key witness in Kabuye trial retracts testimony”, 20 Nov. 2008, http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/ articles/107/article_2190.asp. For more detail, see C. Vidal, “Les Contradictions d’ un Lieutenant Rwandais Abdul Ruzibiza, Témoin, Acteur, Faux-Témoin”, S. Marysse, F. Reyntjens et S. Vandeginste (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs Annuaire 2008–2009, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2009, 43–55. 25 Le Monde, “Rose, le joker de Kigali”. 26 Jeune Afrique, “Questions autor de la mort de Joshua Abdul Ruzibiza”, 24 Sep. 2010, https:// www.jeuneafrique.com/184337/politique/questions-autour-de-la-mort-de-joshua-abdul-ruzibiza/. 27 Libération, “Un témoin rwandais récuse le juge Bruguière”, 4 Dec. 2006. 28 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 31; Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrete, 168. 29 H. C Epstein, Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda, and the War on Terror, New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2017, 111. 30 The Globe and Mail, “Probe revisits mystery of assassination that triggered Rwandan genocide”, 11 Oct. 2016, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/probe-revisits-mystery-ofassassination-that-triggered-rwandan-genocide/article32316139/. 31 Interview with refugees A, D, E, F, I, K, P, Q, U, W, Z, AA, HH, KK, OO, RR, AAA, and BBB. 32 S. Straus, “How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An Estimate”, Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), 2004, 87. 24

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3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

at dawn on 7 April, the FAR bombarded the position of the RPA, and with the Interahamwe, searched all homes with a list of names of targeted persons, both Hutu and Tutsi.33 On the same morning, the Interahamwe, which was already infiltrated by the RPF as mentioned above, moved into strategic points in Kigali, followed by widespread killings erupted at the roadblocks.34 This systematic violence had become the norm in most parts of the country by 21 April; the conflict’s scheme remained the same until July.35 On 11 April, French newspaper Libération described the violence as genocide.36 On 19 April, Human Rights Watch estimated 100,000 dead, and requested the UNSC to use the term “genocide”.37 On 24 April, OXFAM became the first humanitarian organisation to use the term “genocide” to describe the massacre.38 On 31 May, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s report to the UNSC concluded that “there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been a large scale of killings of communities and families belonging to a particular group”.39 Most murders were blamed on the Interahamwe and Hutu peasants.40 The killings were efficient, as many people obeyed orders, “given the density of Rwanda’s state, Rwanda’s geography and patterns of settlement, and the sometimes lethal consequence of dissent”.41 Many men participated in the killings because of fear, including that of punishment from other Hutus if they refused to participate in the violence, that of the advancing RPF that had come close to overthrowing the government, and that of Tutsi civilians suspected of secretly working with the RPF.42 More importantly, killings were exacerbated to a large extent over access to, and control of, land (see below). These massacres by the FAR, Interahamwe, and Hutu peasants have been widely reported and researched. The NGO African Rights was the first organisation to publish substantial findings after the genocide, issuing a 750-page report in September 1994 that helped reinforce the genocide’s official narrative that “heroic Tutsi rebels fought a just war against Hutu génocidaires [who massacred mostly Tutsi]”.43 According to African Rights, violations committed by the RPF during the 33

Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 231; Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrete, 252. Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 214. 35 S. Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, Itacha, Cornell University Press, 2006, 50. 36 Libération, “Kigali livré à la fureur des tueurs hutus”, 11 Apr. 1994. 37 S. Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Harper Perennial, 2002, 357. 38 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 333. 39 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, S/1994/640, 31 May 1994, para. 36. 40 Straus, The Order of genocide, 27, 96. 41 Ibid, 232. 42 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 106. 43 L. Reydams, “NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan Genocide”, Human Rights Quarterly, 38 (3), 2016, 549. 34

3.2 Genocide (April–July 1994)

45

genocide were merely reprisal killings, and the RPF did not have policies aimed at systematically killing civilians.44 African Rights’ account of the genocide, entitled Death, Despair and Defiance, was possible in a short time span, because the NGO was co-opted in the first weeks of the genocide by the RPF, which gave them their full and active support.45 Compared to the massacres by the FAR and Interahamwe, which have been examined, what is not well known is that soon after the plane attack, all RPA forces —between 25,000 and 30,000 troops—after having stayed in the trenches the night of 6 April, quickly moved into position along the border between Rwanda and Uganda and moved southward, and along the eastern border, with great speed.46 The RPF’s military offensive contrasts with that of the FAR, whose troops merely established roadblocks in the immediate aftermath of the plane’s downing, which was routine procedure whenever a president travels in and out of the country.47 RPF forces quickly seized territory, cleared out FAR and Interahamwe, which was infiltrated by the RPF, and killed as many Hutus as possible.48 In the first few days of the genocide and thereafter, DMI agents infiltrated the Interahamwe at roadblocks in the FAR/Interahamwe-controlled areas “to take part in the killings and to incite the Interahamwe to do more massacres”.49 In one reported case, the RPF stole FAR uniforms to camouflage their identity.50 All these acts by the RPF/DMI were blamed on Hutu forces, which was the objective of the RPF’s infiltration.51 The RPF’s tactics were successful; René Degni-Ségui, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, issued the first UN report on 28 June 1994 confirming the genocide against Tutsi.52 During the initial period of the genocide, the RPF also massacred Tutsis remainees—those who had not fled the country since 1959 and were considered by

44

African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, African Rights, 1994, 1084–1086. Reydams, “NGO Justice”, 547, 576. 46 UNAMIR military observers’ information according to Luc Marchal, the then Belgian Contingent Commander and Kigali Sector Commander with UNAMIR. He said that such large-scale offensive of the RPF, which “would have required weeks of preparation”, was able to be implemented as a consequence of the strategy with enough ammunition and other supplies, already brought in from Uganda prior to the shooting down. This shipment from the NRA to the RPF was confirmed in February 1994 by the UN peacekeeping operations, established on the Ugandan side of the border. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 201; Rever, In Praise of Blood, 62; Marchal’s email on 30 Jul. 2018. 47 Marchal’s email on 29 Jul. 2018. 48 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 182. 49 ICTR top secret summary report, 25, cited in Rever, In Praise of Blood, 68, 255n; Rever’s email, 8 Aug. 2018. 50 ICTR’s Top Secret Report, date unknown. 51 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 60. 52 UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 Jun. 1994, 11–12. 45

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Kagame to be “collaborators” with the Hutu—fuelling the killing.53 Tutsi civilians recruited by the RPF before, during, and after the genocide also committed atrocities against the Hutus.54 The RPF’s violations remained unreported, mainly because of the limited access of foreigners to the population in the RPF-controlled area; to gain access, they had to be escorted by an RPF official.55 From the beginning, the RPF and/or especially Kagame did not intend to end the war or negotiate to win it,56 but to seize power and eliminate the Hutu population in its territory as much as possible.57 This could be justified by three factors. First, on 9 April, the RPF issued an ultimatum to the UN’s Ghanaian contingent to leave the demilitarised zone in the north, and requested the Belgian, Italian and French troops— the latter two’s troops were deployed to evacuate foreign nationals—to leave the country on 12 April.58 By the same day, Luc Marchal, UNAMIR Sector Commander for Kigali, had witnessed at least four RPF battalions in Kigali that could have created safe havens for the Tutsis but did not.59 This contradicts Rwanda’s leading newspaper The New Times report, which cast the RPF’s operations in a favourable light; the RPA’ s 600-strong battalion was embarking on rescue missions around Kigali to “save the Tutsi during the Genocide in 1994”, it said.60 Moreover, on 12 April, the new interim government proposed a truce to facilitate talks with the RPF to establish the broad-based transitional government, under the provisions of the Arusha peace accord; however, the RPF apparently was not interested in negotiations.61 Adding to this dynamic were the indiscriminate killings of intellectuals, politicians of the Habyarimana regime, teachers, and business people, both Tutsi and Hutu, and the concerted wiping out of key members of political parties.62 This was committed by DMI agents and other RPF operatives dressed in civilian clothes in the RPF-controlled Byumba prefecture. Amid the political vacuum, the RPF was able to fill these positions with its returnees from Uganda and elsewhere.63 Worsening matters, on 30 April, the RPF categorically opposed the proposed UN PKO. Although the UN decided on 21 April to reduce the number of UNAMIR

53

A. Ruzibiza’s statement to Judge Bruguière. C. Onana Les secrets de la justice internationale: Enquêtes truquées sur le génocide rwandais, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2005, 118; Rever, In Praise of Blood, 70. 54 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 107. 55 Amnesty, Rwanda: Reports of killings and abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, AprilAugust 1994, 19 Oct. 1994, 2. 56 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 338; Onana, Les secrets de la justice internationale, 56. 57 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 114. 58 Ibid, 62. 59 Ibid. 60 A. Tashobya, “Photos & Videos: RPA’s ‘600’ honoured for bravery during Genocide”, The New Times, 14 Dec. 2017, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/225597. 61 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 295, 338. 62 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 108; ICTR’s Special Investigations Unit summary document. 63 W. Madsen, Genocide and covert operations in Africa, 1993-1999, New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1999, 132.

3.2 Genocide (April–July 1994)

47

personnel from 1705 to 270,64 a week later, the UN explored the deployment of a new UN force with a stronger mandate to protect Tutsi civilians.65 The UN wanted to address the problem of a large number of refugees flowing out of Rwanda, which could threaten stability in the region.66 The RPF opposed it, however, stating “the genocide is almost completed. […] UN intervention at this stage no longer serve any useful purpose as far as stopping the massacre is concerned”.67 In reality, civilians were awaiting rescue.68 The RPF was aware that the opposition to a new UN force would slow efforts to rescue civilians.69 On 30 April, Kagame threatened UNAMIR Lt. General Roméo Dallaire, warning that “[i]f an intervention force is sent to Rwanda, we will fight it”.70 Kagame feared that UNAMIR would intervene and rob him of that opportunity, thus preferring the departure of UNAMIR, whose personnel would thwart the RPF’s military advance.71 In spite of the UNAMIR II’s eventual deployment after May 1994, it was unable to fully function because the RPA prevented UNAMIR from getting access to parts of the country, and UNAMIR personnel were delayed or denied entry at Kigali airport.72 As the RPF rapidly seized territory, reaching the south-eastern edge of the country by the end of April, more than 200,000 Rwandans crossed into Tanzania in a 24-hour period between 28 and 29 April.73 The vast majority of those who fled were Hutus, who said they were being attacked by RPF forces. The accounts from these refugees and IDPs said that the RPF would “first control access to an area, then round up or lure large groups of Hutus to a designated site with promises of food and safety”, where they would be killed.74 Allegedly, the RPF killed 40,000 people whose bodies were thrown into the Kagera River, and whose upper arms were tied with ropes behind their backs; this technique was possibly learned from the NRM.75

64

UNSC, S/RES/912, 21 April 1994. Before the departure of Belgian troops, there were 2486. At the end, 540 remained. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 482. 65 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 23. 66 Ibid. 67 RPF, “Statement by the Political Bureau of the Rwandan Patriotic Front on the Proposed Deployment of a U.N. Intervention Force in Rwanda”, 30 Apr. 1994. 68 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 23. 69 Ibid, 23–24. 70 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 342. 71 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 23. Rudasingwa, Healing A Nation, 155. 72 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda, S/1995/457, 4 June 1995, para 7–8. 73 UNHCR, Refugees Magazine, Issue 110, “Crisis in the Great Lakes”, 1 Dec. 1997. 74 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 75, 84; UNHCR Ngara (Western Tanzania), Situation Report, 17 May 1994, 1. 75 UNHCR Ngara, 1; Amnesty, Rwanda: Reports of killing and abductions, 7.

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3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

On 22 June, the UNSC authorised the deployment of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would provide for a multinational, humanitarian operation in Rwanda until UNAMIR was “brought up to the necessary strength”.76 France led this operation and established a Safe Humanitarian Zone in south-western Rwanda; by mid-June, the RPF was on the move, controlling more than two thirds of the country.77 The French mission, dubbed Operation Turquoise, was to save the lives of the local population, and did protect 10,000 Tutsi IDPs in Nyarushishi camp in Cyangungu prefecture according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and 1200 Tutsis in Bisesero in Kivuye prefecture.78 As soon as the Operation Turquoise started, the RPF, through its military operations, pushed a further 100,000 inhabitants, including sick people, from RPF-controlled northern Rwanda to the south.79 Overall, two factors fuelled the civil war and genocide: the RPF’s seizure of power replacing political and military power with Tutsi leaders,80 and the association between land and ethnicity. During the genocide, local Hutu authorities insisted that Tutsi refugees intended to re-establish the mwami monarchy—which they never did as for the second generation of old-caseload refugees, the old Inyenzi of the monarchism appeared anachronic81—and to reclaim “Hutu” land distributed to Tutsis who remained.82 The interim Hutu authorities promptly distributed land vacated by the killing or flight of Tutsi, to reward and to encourage their further involvement.83 The solidarity of the Hutu majority was undermined during this process, however, as Hutu ideologues tried to convince peasants that they were “people of the land, meaning both that they lived from cultivation of crops and that they claimed to own the land because […] they had occupied Rwanda before the arrival of Tutsi”.84 At the same time, the RPA exterminated as many Hutu peasants as possible especially those in the north in order to secure land and property for Tutsi returnees from neighbouring countries.85 All these suggested that the 1994 events “provided a unique opportunity to settle scores or to reshuffle land

76

UN, S/RES/929 (1994), 22 Jun. 1994, para. 1. See the map and animation at GenoDynamics, https://genodynamics.weebly.com/dataanimations.html. 78 J-H Bradol and M. Le Pape, Humanitarian aid, genocide and mass killings: Médecins Sans Frontières, the Rwandan experience, 1982–97, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2017, 42; P. Péan, Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs, 457. 79 MSF Speaking Out, The Violence of the New Rwandan Regime 1994–1995, 2013, 19–21. 80 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 229. 81 G. Prunier, “Éléments pour une histoire du Front patriote rwandais”, Politique africaine, 51, Oct. 1993, 126. 82 Des Forges, “Land in Rwanda”, 358. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid, 358–359. 85 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 229. 77

3.2 Genocide (April–July 1994)

49

properties”86 for both sides. Although constant tension pertaining to property and land control was observed since the Habyarimana regime, this conflict intensified with an added ethnic dimension once the RPF regime gained control. Indeed, this land and property issue has discouraged a majority of refugees from returning to Rwanda.

3.3

Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Rwandan Government’s Claim

After seizing power in Kigali on 4 July, the RPF captured Gisenyi on 14 July. This experience of the RPF helped to create the narrative that the RPF being the “saviour of Rwanda”.87 In spite of this RPF’s role, an estimated one million people walked from north-western Rwanda into Goma in eastern DRC between 15 and 17 July.88 This massive exodus was perceived by the UNHCR as “a strategic population withdrawal by the defeated regime, which wished to retain its control over large numbers of people and to establish a hostile military force on the country’s borders”.89 Rwanda’s new RPF-led government shared the view that “[t]he former Rwandan government officials, who controlled the camps, passed out large sums of money to the militia to control the refugees on their behalf”.90 Meanwhile, the RPF continued to harass civilians, pushing them southwest into the Safe Humanitarian Zone and neighbouring countries, especially Congo, and creating a volatile exodus of refugees.91 Refugees who fled from April 1994 were categorised by the Rwandan Government (RPF) into three groups: first, “the criminals who had committed the genocide and feared being brought to justice by the new government”; second, “those innocent people who were confused by the propaganda of the criminal clique and were actually intimidated and coerced into running away to exile [by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe]”; and third, “the people who genuinely ran away,

C. Andre and J.-P. Platteau, “Land Tenure under Unendurable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap”, Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, January 1996, 35. The same authors added that “It is not rare, even today, to hear Rwandans :ague (sic) that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of population and to bring numbers into line with the available land resources”, fn 29. 87 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 96. 88 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, xIviii. 89 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, 32. 90 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, “Rwanda’s Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC”, 30 Sep. 2010, para. 10. 91 Onana, Rwanda l’Opération Turquoise, 512. 86

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3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

because the situation in the country was highly volatile”.92 According to refugee law, those who committed genocide should not be recognised as refugees and should be separated from the civilian refugees. On 19 July, the RPF inaugurated the Transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) together with opposition parties of the Habyarimana Government, although the GNU was essentially Tutsi-based and military-driven, ensuring full control of the RPF.93 The RPF and RPA leadership were mostly the so-called Ugandans, those returnees from Uganda.94 Kagame became Vice President and the Minister of Defence. No one from the MRND, even those who were not involved in the genocide, joined the new government.95 This exclusion discouraged the return of MRND members in exile.96 Moreover, after the departure of French troops from Rwanda on 21 August 1994, another half a million fled for Bukavu in eastern DRC,97 most probably because the population was afraid to be protected by the RPF. Among the countries of asylum for Rwandan refugees, the DRC was the most politically and militarily unstable, owing in part to the number and nature of refugees.98 Apart from Benaco camp in western Tanzania, virtually all the politicians and military men from Habyarimana Government fled to eastern DRC, whose President Mobutu Sese Seko had previously established a strong ally with Habyarimana.99 President Mobutu used refugee problem to both deflect attention from his government’s mismanagement and regain international stature.100 Very few people fled to Uganda whose government had military and political ties with the RPF, or to Burundi whose government was Tutsi-led. The GNU’s top priority was the repatriation of refugees, as declared by the newly appointed Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu.101 However, few refugees returned. This was in spite of DRC’s Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo’s attempt to repatriate the refugees for political and security reasons, even by force.102 Over the course of three days in August 1995, more than 20,000 refugees were expelled by UNSC, S/1994/1115, “Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council”, 29 Sep. 1994, 2. 93 Rudasingwa, Healing a Nation, 176. 94 G. Prunier, Africa’s World War, 4. 95 Ibid, 7. 96 Interview with refugees Q and S. 97 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 311. 98 UNSC, Second Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps, S/ 1995/65 25 Jan. 1995, para. 14. 99 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 25. 100 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 252. 101 R. Winter, “Lancing the Boil: Rwanda’s Agenda in Zaire”, H. Adelman and G. C. Rao (eds.), War and Peace in Zaire/Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention, 1996–1997, Trenton, Africa World Press, Inc., 2004, 114. 102 H. Adelman and G. C. Rao, “The DRC War and Refugee Crisis, 1996–1997: Creating a Culture of Conflict Prevention”, Adelman and Rao (eds)., War and Peace in DRC/Congo, 19. 92

3.3 Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Rwandan …

51

Congolese soldiers, leading many refugees to commit suicide refusing instead of returning to Rwanda.103 The DRC set an official deadline of 31 December 1995 for refugees to repatriate, but the edict was ignored.104 Rwanda’s claims about refugees’ reluctance to return began to filter into international community rhetoric and assumptions of the Hutu refugee situation in Zaire and had three essential components. First, Rwanda claimed that ex-FAR and Interahamwe were holding refugees hostage to prevent their repatriation.105 Armed Hutu elements used propaganda and scare tactics, to convince refugees that Rwanda was not safe and they would be killed if they returned.106 Second, Rwanda contended that the refugees in the DRC were used as a future military recruitment pool and as human shields by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe.107 Third, refugees’ reluctance to return was viewed as evidence of refugees’ “guilt, or their allegiance to those who were guilty”.108

3.4

Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Their Claim

Against this claim of Rwandan Government, refugees refused to repatriate not because they were prevented from repatriating, but because of three main factors. First, they did not want to return to Rwanda because of well-founded fears of the RPF, whose forces had systematically massacred civilians, especially Hutus, during the civil war and genocide period.109 In August and September 1994, UNHCR Consultant Robert Gersony assessed the prospects for the repatriation of refugees and reported that the overwhelming majority of refugees stated that “their main—in most cases their only—constraint to [returning] was the fear of being killed in their home areas, either upon their return or at a later time”.110 The report concluded that

103

Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 89. UN Commission on Human Rights, “Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. René Degni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights”, Jan. 1996, para. 110–115, 138. 105 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 258; Rwanda, “Rwanda’s Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report”, para. 25. 106 UNSC, S/1994/1115, 3. 107 Rwanda, “Rwanda’s Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report”, para. 22. 108 P. Hammond, Framing post-Cold War conflicts: The media and international intervention, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007, 92. 109 Interview with refugees P. R, U and BB. 110 Gersony team did not have mandate to conduct an inquiry into the massacres by the ex-FAR and militias. UNHCR, “Prospects for Early Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees Currently in Burundi, Tanzania and DRC” (hereafter, Gersony report), Oct. 1994, 3, 14. 104

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3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

conditions were not yet conducive for their safe return.111 In fact, the refugees’ fear of the RPF, which had caused them to flee in the first place, was well known at the time of their arrival in eastern DRC, but was rejected by the UNHCR as “largely unfounded and merely a product of extremist propaganda”.112 The Rwandan Government categorically rejected Gersony findings, alleging that “[t]he UNHCR accepted and widely publicized false reports by MRND-CDR militias in the refugee camps in Ngara. […]. When these reports were cross-checked by the U.S. Committee for Refugees [see Chap. 5] and by Independent journalists they were found to be false”.113 Amnesty International, meanwhile, reported in October 1994 that the RPA committed “deliberate executions, as well as abductions or ‘disappearances’ of captured combatants and unarmed civilians suspected of supporting the former government”.114 These reports indicated that the commonly accepted genocide theory (Hutu massacred Tutsi) was dubious. In fact, the official narrative was questioned in November 1994 by the French President Mitterrand who stated plural “genocides” in his speech, suggesting that both the former regime and the RPF committed genocide.115 In addition, Ruzibiza wrote explicitly about the genocide of Tutsis and genocide of Hutus.116 Second, refugees perceived Rwanda as a country occupied by a “foreign” army and could not rely on the RPF for their protection.117 Rwanda’s drastic political structure had been changed (see Chap. 4), and many refugees viewed it, more or less, as a “new country”.118 The new government used the legacy of genocide to reinforce its international credibility and power: only Tutsi victims of the genocide carried out by ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutus were recognised for their loss and buried with dignity; other victims, mainly Hutus, slaughtered by the RPF were forgotten.119 Third, Hutu elites among the refugee community—educated people, students, community leaders, former politicians, former soldiers—were aware that RPF was interested only in the return of peasants, whose members were needed to relaunch the country’s agriculture sector.120 The RPF made these concerns known to the 111

Ibid, 1. African Rights, Rwanda, 1091. 113 Rwandan government, “Statement on the Question of Refugees and Security in Rwanda”, 25 Sep. 1994, 5. 114 Amnesty, Rwanda: Reports of killings and abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, 1. Amnesty also acknowledged that massacres were committed by FAR as well. 115 F. Mitterand, “Discours de Monsieur François Mitterand” , Biarritz, 8 Nov. 1994, 4. 116 Ruzibiza, Rwanda. L’histoire secrète, 328–336. 117 J-P Godding, Réfugiés Rwandais au Zaïre: sommes-nous encore des hommes? documents des groupes de réflexion dans les camps, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, 82–83. 118 Interview with refugees K, M and P. 119 Godding, Réfugiés Rwandais au Zaïre, 83. 120 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 121; G. Musabyimana, L’APR et les réfugiés rwandais au Zaïre 1996–1997: Un génocide nié, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004, 17. 112

3.4 Refugees’ Refusal to Return: Their Claim

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UNHCR, which proposed, following a meeting with NGOs in North Kivu in 1995, that would ask elite refugees to convince the peasant refugees to return, and in exchange, the elite refugees would receive assistance in resettling in other countries of asylum.121 However, it was difficult for the elites to convince refugees to go home, since Hutu peasants from rural areas, especially in Byumba and Ruhengeri prefectures where the RPF had committed atrocities, had strong grievances against the RPF.122 Although he was unaware of the UNHCR’s meeting, the RPF’s Former Secretary General, Theogene Rudasingwa, confirmed that the RPF had sought the return of peasants to distance them from Hutu elites, whom the RPF considered hostile.123 During my interviews, the refugees refuted RPF’s claim that ex-FAR and Interahamwe held Hutu refugees hostage in the camps, thereby preventing their repatriation; the refugees stated they were never used as human shields in the camps.124 Refugees were free to decide whether or not to return. This raises an important question: how and why did the narrative that refugees were held hostage become dominant? Observers may have assumed they were held hostage possibly because of the militarisation of refugee camps.125 Refugees and Congolese Government officials said the camps appeared to be militarised, because ex-FAR officials had been partly disarmed by the Congolese army at the border but had worn their military uniform when crossing into the DRC.126 The separation of civilian and military population was not that rigorous though, even though the ex-FAR and Interahamwe were kept in camps called Lac Vert in Goma and Bulongi/Panzi in Bukavu, which were separate from the civilian camps.127 As previously stated, refugees had little interest to return, and likewise, the Rwandan Government was mainly interested in peasants returning, but not educated Hutus. It was therefore useful for the Rwandan Government to convince the international community and media that refugees were controlled by the ex-FAR/ Interahamwe, which in part enabled it to justify the RPA’s invasion in eastern DRC under the pretext of addressing its security concerns. This invasion had been planned by Kagame and his senior intelligence officers immediately after the genocide as part of a wider geopolitical objective to exploit natural resources and establish spheres of political control in the DRC,128—and possibly even earlier

121

Musabyimana, L'APR et les réfugiés rwandais, 17. Ibid. 123 Email from Rudasingwa on 12 Dec. 2017. 124 Interview with refugees P, R, U, BB, and CC. 125 Ibid. 126 Interview with refugees P, U, BB, and ex-Congolese government official. 127 Interview with refugees P, U and BB. 128 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 221. 122

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when Kagame evoked “protracted war” in 1992. At that time, Kagame said that “[m]ilitarily, we are not interested in Kigali. There is nothing for us there”.129 The RPF therefore created the story about Hutu refugees being held hostage, and the DMI used agents and Congolese civilians to gain entry into camps through bribery and/or coercion.130 In the camps, refugees were threatened by the infiltration, reconnaissance, and espionage of RPF agents mingling with the refugees,131 although it was claimed that “[r]efugees were being threatened, attacked, and killed for being ‘RPF spies’”.132 These RPF agents included Hutu high school students recruited by the RPF who settled inside the refugee camps and posed as fake refugees or orphans.133 Adding to this propaganda, the RPF launched a series of false flag attacks in north-western Rwanda in 1996 in order to convince the international community that Hutu rebels were threatening to reignite the genocide, according to a former RPF intelligence officer’s testimony.134 Despite refugees’ fear of the RPF, the refugees still did weigh the options of returning to Rwanda. Around August 1995, there were two opposing opinions among refugees in the DRC concerning their immediate return.135 One was the armed repatriation for some, especially the youth, fighting just like the old-caseload Tutsi refugees had done to regain power.136 However, refugees were aware that the RPF had support from its hosting country, Uganda, whereas refugees in the DRC could not rely on the local government.137 Another opinion was to return peacefully, but refugees were doubtful about the goodwill of Rwandan government, especially in August 1995 when the RPF government dismissed senior Hutus, Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu and Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga.138 Moreover, donor countries remained silent, and did not encourage the Rwandan government to create the conducive conditions for the refugees’ return.139

Watson, “War and Waiting”, 55. Confirmed by former RPF officials. Email from Rever, 15 Sep. 2017; this infiltration and use of Congolese were also confirmed by refugees and a former Congolese military official. 131 Interview with refugees P, Q, U, and BB. The presence of these RPF spies was confirmed by ex-RPF officer interviewed although he does not recognise the violence and crimes committed by them. 132 I. Martin, “Hard Choices after Genocide: Human Rights and Political Failures in Rwanda”, J. Moore ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, 160. 133 Confirmed by one former RPF officer. 134 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 142, 221. 135 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 93. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid, 94. 138 Ibid, 95. 139 Ibid. 129 130

3.5 Massacre at an IDP Camp (April 1995)

3.5

55

Massacre at an IDP Camp (April 1995)

In Rwanda, where the UNHCR did not oversee protection of IDPs as it did in Bosnia, “right to stay and be killed” (as stated in Chap. 1) occurred at an IDP camp. The largest camp was in Kibeho, and others were in south-western Rwanda in the former Safe Humanitarian Zone initially created by the French Operation Turquoise and later handed over to the UNAMIR. Under the name of “Operation Retour”, the UN managed to repatriate about 80,000 IDPs from this zone between October 1994 and January 1995.140 However, as killings of Hutu civilians by RPF forces resumed following the donor’s conference in January 1995, the IDPs refused to return home, feeling more security in the camps.141 Reports of returnee arrests, overcrowded prisons, the illegal occupation of homes, as well as a lack of confidence in local judicial procedures led more Hutus to seek refuge in the camps.142 Some 220,000 IDPs still remained in the camps by late March.143 In spite of this situation, the government was adamant on closing the camps, “by force if necessary”.144 The government said it suspected that the IDP camps were providing sanctuary to the génocidaires, who were forming an anti-government militia.145 Moreover, in the view of the Rwandan government, security could only be established when concentrations of IDPs had dispersed.146 In other words, Rwandan Government had a different standard of “return in safety and dignity” than that of the UNHCR. In April 1995, after the Butare governor announced a formal closing of the camps, the RPA attacked the IDP settlements.147 On the same day of the attack, the RPF Minister of Rehabilitation declared that “[t]here are rumours that if the IDPs return home they will be killed. (…) If that were the government’s intention then it would have gone ahead and killed the people within the camps. After all, the camps are still within Rwandan territory”.148 Scholar Gérard Prunier interpreted this statement as: “national sovereignty had to be reestablished over this former Turquoise nest of génocidaires, and since this was their territory they could kill whomever they wanted”.149 In fact, before the Kibeho attack took place, the RPA and Tutsi civilian cadres “regularly rounded up Hutus and brought them to

140

Prunier, Africa’s World War, 38. Ibid. 142 S. T. E. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “The Kibeho crisis: towards a more effective system of international protection for IDPs”, Forced Migration Review, Aug. 1998, 8. 143 Ibid. 144 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 38. 145 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “The Kibeho crisis”, 8. 146 Ibid, 8–9. 147 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 39. 148 Ibid, 40. 149 Ibid. 141

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3 New-Caseload Hutu Refugees’ Flight and Their Refusal …

Photo. 3.1 Kibeho IDP camp where the massacre took place and tons of dead bodies are lying. Few PKO soldiers from Zambia can be seen on the right (taken by Médecins Sans Frontières [hereafter, MSF] International)

Gikongoro [where Kibeho was located] military camps, where they were promptly executed”.150 RPA soldiers continued killing in Kibeho for three days, this time in front of the PKO and NGO (Photo 3.1).151 According to the Minister of Rehabilitation’s report, “[t]he cause of the incident which resulted in the deaths of so many was traced to the criminal gangs in the camps who were determined to make [repatriation] process fail”.152 The Australian Force of the PKO counted 4000 dead bodies until they were stopped halfway by the RPA.153 The “independent” commission of inquiry established under the leadership of RPF stated that the number of victims was merely 338. One of the Zambian troops, who witnessed the massacre, was later threatened with death by the RPF after having been interviewed by international media.154 Australian PKO confirmed that the RPA tried continually to intimidate and provoke the IDPs, looking for a chance to start shooting at them, as the RPA believed that some of the Interahamwe could be among the IDPs.155

150

Rever, In Praise of Blood, 220. T. Pickard, Combat Medic: An Australian’s Eyewitnesses Account of the Kibeho Account, Wavell Heights, Big Sky Publishing, 2008, 72–79. 152 Ministère de la Réhabilitation et de l’Intégration Sociale, “Closure of Displaced People’s Camps in Gikongoro”, 25 Apr. 1995. 153 The number could have been as many as 10,000. Pickard, Combat Medic, 81; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Twenty years since Kibeho massacre in Rwanda’, 22 Apr. 2015. 154 Interview with a refugee P. 155 Pickard, Combat Medics, 74. 151

3.5 Massacre at an IDP Camp (April 1995)

57

The Kibeho massacre had a huge impact on the return of refugees and IDPs. UNHCR had to suspend its repatriation of refugees from April to July 1995. While many IDPs were forcefully “repatriated”, others fled to refugee camps in the DRC.156 This new influx reinforced the refugees’ fear of return, and repatriation came to a virtual standstill.157 The massacre at the Kibeho IDP camp was the beginning of a series of atrocities, which led to another flight of people in and out of Rwanda.158 Even larger scale atrocities against Hutu refugees were ahead, in the DRC.

3.6

Attacks of Refugee Camps and “Genocide” in DRC (October 1996–April 1997)

In October 1996, the RPA invaded eastern DRC and destroyed refugee camps, known as the First Congo’s War. For this act, Rwanda needed a cover, which was made possible by recruiting Congolese Laurent-Désire Kabila in the fight to remove President Mobutu from office. He became the spokesperson of a rebel group known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), formed by the RPA in Kigali.159 Kabila subsequently became the President of the DRC in May 1997 after having overthrown President Mobutu. Rwanda-leaning Banyamulenge160 also played a key role in the military campaign against the refugee camps.161 In fact, the RPF began training Banyumulenge immediately after the genocide in 1994 at Gako military barracks.162 The RPF justified its invasion and busting up of camps by pointing to the militarisation of refugee camps. The RPF claimed it was acting out of self-defence and needed to create security and humanitarian reasons to save refugees.163 Rwanda further argued that it was compelled to force the refugees home because the international community failed to

156

UN, Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. René Degni-Séqui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/ CN.4/1996/7, 28 Jun. 1995, para. 130. 157 MSF, “Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Virtual Standstill on Repatriation”, Jul. 1995, 19. 158 Amnesty, Rwanda and Burundi. The return home: rumours and realities, 20 Feb. 1996. 159 M. Ruhimbika, Les Banyamulenge (Congo-Zaïre) entre deux guerre, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, 55. 160 It literally means “the people of Mulenge” in Swahili. It is not an ethnic group, but instead refers to the Rwandan Tutsi who lives in South Kivu. Its name was likely adopted in the 1960s by earlier Tutsi settlers to distinguish themselves from more recent refugees from Burundi and Rwanda. 161 F Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 48. 162 Testimony of Major R. Higiro, former RPF officer, who oversaw some of this training at Gako. Email from Rever, 5 March 2019. 163 Rwanda, “Rwanda’s Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report”, para. 19, 20.

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“move the camps away from the border, to disarm the militants, and to separate genuine refugees from genocidal forces”164 despite Rwanda’s repeated appeals at the UN.165 The Rwandan government claimed that the “presence of a large number of refugees offered convenient cover for their military actions”,166 allowing them to “discredit the GoR [Government of Rwanda] and, as a last resort, use them as bargaining chip for negotiations with the GoR”.167 Kagame confirmed that the RPA was at the frontline of the rebellion to dismantle the camps and to destroy the structure of the former FAR and militia in the camps.168 The UN accused the AFDL and RPA soldiers of a six-hour indiscriminate killing spree at Mugunga camp and surrounding area in Goma in November 1996; this was when an unknown number of refugees were murdered with heavy weapons.169 In addressing this accusation, the RPF claimed to have “moved against the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the camps, and in the process, rescued and repatriated 600,000 Rwandan refugees in the course of four days from the Mugunga camp only”.170 Heightening the propaganda, Rwanda said the operation was “aimed at liberating and repatriating innocent civilian refugees”.171 Rwanda’s claims were contradictory for two reasons, quite apart from the fact that government did not have will to receive refugees, and the fact the refugees in South Kivu could not cross into Rwanda when the camps were attacked; the border was closed by the RPF which forced many people flee further west.172 First, a certain percentage of refugees who returned from Mugunga camp to Rwanda did so because they had no other choice. In Goma, Marie Béatrice Umutesi, former Rwandan refugee and genocide survivor both in Rwanda and the DRC, stated that “[t]he only exit that was not blocked by the rebels was the one that led back to Rwanda”.173 A good number of refugees had neither the financial means nor diplomas they could use in other countries of asylum, and others decided to return because of fatigue and hunger after having hidden in the forest in eastern DRC for several months.174 Other refugees were tricked and betrayed by the RPA soldiers. One refugee said:

164

Ibid, para. 12, 19. UNSC, S/PV.3504, 27 Feb. 1995, 4-5; UNSC, S/PV.3605, 12 Dec. 1995, 14. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 J. Pomfret, “Rwanda Led Revolt in Congo; Defence Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied For Anti-Mobutu Drive”, Washington Post, 9 Jul. 1997. 169 OHCHR, Mapping Report, para. 220. 170 Rwanda, “Rwanda’s Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report, para. 13. 171 Ibid, para. 24. 172 F. Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Laurent Kabila, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 4. 173 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 120. 174 Ibid, 93. Interview with a refugee O. 165

3.6 Attacks of Refugee Camps and “Genocide” in DRC …

59

The soldiers captured us. Then they laid down their weapons. They offered us beer. We talked for at least two hours and they told us there was no problem, that they would take us to our country. We followed them. Suddenly, they started shooting. I fell on my knees asking for forgiveness. We were very numerous. Only seventeen managed to escape.175

Libération reported that mass graves were observed around the refugee camps in the Goma area.176 Thus, it was an involuntary, forced, and deadly repatriation. Even among those refugees who returned, some left the country once again. Second, those who chose not to return were mostly the educated, including former politicians, former soldiers, and students,177 and they fled as far as north-western DRC and beyond. These elite refugees refused to return because they were afraid of the RPF and they were aware, unlike peasant refugees, that the Rwandan Government would pose a threat to them in particular. During the refugees’ flight, the RPA systematically hunted down and massacred many refugees, in particular refugee leaders and Congolese civilians who aided and hosted the refugees, in addition to influential Congolese leaders who were perceived by Kagame being unsupportive of Rwanda’s oppression, such as the Archbishop of Bukavu, Monsignor Christophe Munzihirwa.178 According to the Congolese in the Kivus and the AFDL Congolese soldiers, the AFDL troops who killed were often from Rwanda, easily distinguished from language spoken.179 Furthermore, the RPA dispatched a “cleansing team” to the surrounding area of Kisangani in April 1997 to search and destroy the camps, where 19,000 people disappeared.180 As soon as the RPA soldiers arrived in Mbandaka, they did not look for Mobutu’s army, but they sought out refugees, whom they slaughtered.181 This massacre of tens of thousands of people mainly by the RPA was even characterised as a potential genocide by the 1998 UN Report led by Special Rapporteur Roberto Garreton,182 and reconfirmed by the UN Mapping Report in 2010.183 Garreton raised the possibility of whether those incidents were planned or systematic,

Libération, Zaïre: dans la forêt des Virunga, des charniers et des réfugiés moribonds “Ce n'est rien, je ne suis plus vivant”, 7 Dec. 1996. 176 Ibid. 177 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 121. 178 “The Testimony of Lt. Aloys Ruyenzi”, 12. HRW, Democratic Republic of the Congo: What Kabila is Hiding, Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo (hereafter, What Kabila is Hiding), 9 (5) (A), Oct. 1997, 16. 179 HRW, What Kabila is Hiding, 35; J. Pomfret, “Massacres were a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War”, Washington Post, 11 Jun. 1997. 180 S. Smith, “Des morts sans nombre dans l’ombre de Kabila: 190,000 personnes sont portées disparues, estime Médecins sans frontières”, Libération, 20 May 1997. 181 R. Block, “Congo Villagers Describe Horrific Killings of Refugees—Kabila Denies Massacre of Rwandans, But Citizens and Aides Say Otherwise”, The Wall Street Journal, 6 Jun. 1997. 182 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team, in the DRC, Letter dated 29 June 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/581, 29 Jun. 1998, 7. 183 OHCHR, Mapping Report, para. 7. 175

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especially due to “the tactic of laying siege to camps before attacking them, irrespective of their importance as military targets; summoning the inhabitants of predominantly Hutu towns to meetings in schools or churches, so as to massacre them; issuing appeals over the official radio station urging all those hiding in the forests to come out for medical care and food aid, so as to murder them; and hampering or opposing humanitarian operations in the camps”.184 As discussed above, similar tactics were used during the genocide in Rwanda. Most victims of this act were women, children, the elderly, and patients, who posed no threat to the RPF.185 In the end, scholar Emizet Kisangani estimated that the death toll of Rwandan refugees in the DRC from 1996 to 1997 was nearly 233,000.186 This number could have been higher if the ex-FAR and Interahamwe were not accompanying the refugees during their flight, as they served to guide and protect refugees.187 Some personnel of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe were reportedly given arms by the Congolese army during the camps’ attack by the RPA in order for the ex-FAR to fight against the RPF.188 Those refugees who refused to return and remained in the DRC were believed to be “génocidaires, their families and their captive Hutu carriers”.189 This perception continues until today, which explains why many refugees cannot return to Rwanda (see Chap. 5).

3.7

UNHCR’s Policy on (Imposed) Return (July 1994–May 1997)

Since the arrival of the refugees en mass in neighbouring countries in July 1994, the UNHCR in general pushed for repatriation for two reasons: asylum, in particular in the DRC, was not viable security-wise, in particular due to a cholera outbreak in

184

UN General Assembly, Report of the joint mission charged with investigating allegations of massacres and other human rights violations occurring in eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) since September, 1996A/51/942, 2 Jul. 1997, para. 77. 185 OHCHR, Mapping Report, para. 31. 186 E. Kisangani, “The Massacres of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 38(2), 2000, 173–179; MSF’s estimation of death toll was 220,000. J.-H. Bradol and A. Guibert (Médecins Sans Frontières), “Le temps des assassins et l’espace humanitaire, Rwanda, Kivu, 1994–1997”, Hérodote 86/87, 1997, 148. 187 Interview with refugees K, U, Z, AA, BB, and CC. 188 Interview with refugee U and Z. According to a former Congolese army officer, some arms brought by ex-FAR and Interahamwe upon their arrival in eastern DRC in 1994 were disarmed at the border, but Congolese troops sold them back to ex-FAR. 189 H. Adelman and L. J. Baxter, “The Multinational Force for Eastern Zaire: The Conception Planning and Termination of OP Assurance”, Adelman and Rao (eds.), War and Peace in Zaire/ Congo, 266.

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Goma in July 1994,190 and the Rwandan Government ensured that refugees could return safely.191 In fact, even before the RPF seized Gisenyi on 17 July, UNHCR had already announced that it was “prepared to ‘help’ the RPF to stabilise the people in their villages”.192 Within the UNHCR, however, there were various opinions on how to proceed with the return. Prunier summarised the “UNHCR geopolitics”: The Goma UNHCR office pushed for early return because it was afraid of the destructive local impact of the camps and feared the highly politicized leadership; the Kigali office wanted staggered gradual returns because it was influenced by the security views of the Rwandese government; […] and the Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi in Geneva preached caution because it had limited trust in the RPF promises. The result was inaction.193

This repatriation exercise was so sensitive that the UNHCR “had to walk a narrow line between two impediments: ‘coercion (in camps) not to return and no guarantees of a safe return (in Rwanda)’”.194 The UNHCR suspended the repatriation programme—although only until December 1994, after receiving Gersony’s findings, that was so damaging to the RPF that senior UN officials refused to publicly release.195 In parallel, UNAMIR developed a strategic plan to close IDP and refugee camps under the name of Operation Rondaval. The plan was aimed at “restoring the country”, according to a confidential document at the time, and suggested that “people [refugees and IDPs] must go home”.196 Interior Minister Sendashonga said the Gersony report, despite being suppressed, made Kagame keep a low profile for a while, and the number of killing incidents lessened.197 In December 1994, as the UNHCR noted signs of improved security in Rwanda and favoured an early return of refugees, the agency resumed voluntary repatriation.198 However, its assessment of “improved security” was merely the

Le Monde, “La situation des réfugiés rwandais Entre la peur du choléra et celle du FPR: Le HCR encourage les réfugiés à rentrer au Rwanda, mais le mouvement de retour n'a pas encore commence”, 24 Jul. 1994. 191 S. Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s, New York, Norton, 2005, 189. 192 Le Libre Belgique, “Une solution politique, seule issue au désastre humanitaire annonc锂 18 July 1994. 193 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 34. 194 Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, 195. 195 Gersony report was leaked online in 2010. 196 UNAMIR, “A Strategic Plan for the Partial Relocation of Rwanda of Rondaval”, 28 June 1994, para. 6. 197 Interview with a former NGO worker in the Great Lakes region who had spoken to the late Sendashonga. 198 Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, 196. 190

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UNHCR’s impression; Amnesty reported a spate of disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and the killing of civilians, including returning former government soldiers and officials between July 1994 and March 1995.199 Despite Amnesty’s alarming reports, the UNHCR reaffirmed its stance on repatriation. The Former Head of UNHCR Goma Office acknowledged the agency’s repeated emphasis on early return; the UNHCR was convinced that “it would be more difficult to reclaim one’s property after someone else had cultivated it for several years, than to reclaim if after only a few months”.200 And yet there were contradictions within the UNHCR and differing opinions on the ground among staff. When refugees registered for voluntary repatriation at the UNHCR office, UNHCR officers were compelled to admit to elite refugees that the RPF was only interested in the return of peasants, and it might not be wise for others to return.201 In March 1996, the UNHCR developed a draft paper on “imposed return” to respond to host and donor countries’ insistence on solving the Rwandan refugee crisis; this was seven months prior to the RPA’s invasion in eastern DRC in October 1996. In September 1996, the UNHCR announced the doctrine of imposed return, and immediately after, the forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees from the DRC and Tanzania took place. After the RPA launched its attacks in late 1996 and continued its military campaign from east to west, the UNHCR’s policy was to rescue and repatriate refugees202—even by use of threat. There were five chronological phases of this imposed return. First, at the beginning of the RPA’s invasion of the DRC in October 1996, the UNHCR issued a shocking statement to the refugees. After having expressed her deep sorrow that Rwandan refugees were again fleeing for their lives, Ogata stated “we will do everything possible, in cooperation with the authorities, to help you where we can”.203 “Noting the Rwandan government has renewed its offer to receive refugees in peace”, Ogata meant that “the international community is present in Rwanda to support repeated government assurances that refugees can return safely”.204 While refugees were fleeing from the RPA, the UNHCR was in cooperating with the regime that was carrying out the killing. Evidently, she believed that Rwanda was safer for refugees than the DRC. Ogata’s statement that the “UNHCR will do everything possible” implied that the UNHCR would abide by the RPF’s wishes, and this was implemented not only through forced repatriation but in the subsequent 20 years by invoking the cessation clause of refugees’ status, which aggravated refugees’ insecurity (see Chap. 4). 199

Amnesty, Rwanda: Crying Out for Justice, Apr. 1995. J. Boutroue, “Missed Opportunities: The Role of the International Community in the Return of the Rwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire: July 1994-December 1996”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Centre for International Studies/UNHCR, Feb. 1998, 6. 201 Interview with refugees U and BB. 202 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 271. 203 UNHCR, “Ogata urges Rwandan refugees to consider repatriation”, 25 Oct. 1996. Emphasis added. 204 Ibid. 200

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Second, on 3 November 1996, Ogata, who was concerned about emergency lifelines to Rwandan refugees and other displaced people caught in the fighting in eastern DRC, said: “We must open humanitarian corridors to enable refugees to return in safety to Rwanda”.205 The US shared her view.206 To recall, the UNHCR had become a broader humanitarian aid organisation in the 1990s, concerned with the immediate needs of the refugees,207 but in this case, humanitarian needs were synonymous with repatriation. Amnesty warned against blinding pursuing the policy of refoulement on 8 November, saying “humanitarian corridors must be premised on providing protection and assistance for those at risk of human rights abuses […]. Attempts to induce, persuade, or pressure population groups to move are likely to result in a further serious escalation of human rights abuses if measures are not first introduced to ensure effective protection of human rights”.208 Despite this alarm, forced repatriation did take place. Third, during Ogata’s trip to Tingi Tingi refugee camp in north-eastern DRC in February 1997, she focused on the importance of refugees returning to Rwanda instead of alerting the international community to the human rights situation.209 During the massacres and flight of refugees across the DRC from east to west, Umutesi recalled that refugees were faced with an impossible dilemma: “It was really a choice of two ways to die, rather a choice between life and death”.210 Yet, repatriation was not an option for the vast majority of refugees, who preferred to “rot and die in the jungle rather than be butchered in Rwanda”.211 Despite refugees’ refusal to return, both the UNHCR and the Rwandan government continued to claim that the refugees were hostages of ex-FAR and the Interahamwe.212 As a result, refugees lost trust in the UNHCR, and believed the agency was the “refugees’ sworn enemy”,213 because of its institutional mantra that refugees had to return to Rwanda, at any cost.214 Fourth, from December 1996 to September 1997, under the guise of a “rescue operation”,215 the UNHCR attempted to repatriate refugees from north/

UNHCR, “Ogata urges emergency lifelines to refugees and displaced people in Zaire”, 3 Nov. 1996. 206 Le Monde, “La France a du mal à convaincre l’ONU de l’urgence d'une intervention au Zaïre”, 8 Nov. 1996. 207 G. Coles “Approaching the Refugee Problem Today”, 381. 208 Amnesty, “CRISIS IN EASTERN ZAIRE: Amnesty International’s appeal for the protection of human rights in the crisis in eastern Zaire”, 8 Nov. 1996. 209 P.-C. Ndacyayisenga, Dying to Live: A Rwandan Family’s Five-Year Flight Across the Congo, Montreal, Baraka Books, 2012, 80. 210 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 173. 211 Ndacyayisenga, Dying to Live, 80. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid, 80. 214 Ibid, 96. 215 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 271. 205

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north-western DRC to Rwanda.216 Reportedly, the AFDL set a deadline for the UNHCR to start on 1 May 1997 to search and repatriate refugees within 60 days.217 The UNHCR went to remote villages to look for refugees, even threatening them that it would send Kabila’s soldiers218 to repatriate them to Rwanda.219 Local villagers were informed not to help the refugees but “to get them to leave the forest and come out onto the road to make their way to Rwanda”.220 Refugees were killed, however, once on the road; village chiefs were ordered to assist the military in “cleaning the road”, which was to remove bodies and bones as well as other indications of killings, such as clothes, cooking utensils, from the roadside.221 The UNHCR’s sole option was to “return to an uncertain and dangerous situation in Rwanda” because “staying in DRC meant almost certain death”.222 Yet, the people who ordered the killings of refugees were in Rwanda. Finally, after having failed to locate the whereabouts of refugees who were in hiding, the UNHCR initiated a system of paid compensation of 10 US dollars per one refugee for any Congolese who brought them in.223 This became one of the most lucrative activities in the area, as hunters arrived with flyers from the UNHCR demanding that the local authorities help them in their work. When a villager refused to deliver the refugees he had hosted, hunters of refugees threatened that they would get Kabila’s soldiers to kill the villager and his family.224 Regarding this aggressive attitude of UNHCR, Umutesi claimed: The UNHCR had only one goal: repatriate the Rwandan refugees either willingly or by force. The measure of success was simply the number of people repatriated, and not the welcome that was reserved for them once they got there or whether or not they wanted to go.225

That implies that UNHCR was forcing repatriation by violating the principle of non-refoulement; moreover, the UNHCR failed to take into consideration the long-term human rights situation and the refugees’ security after returning home, as stated in Chap. 1.

216

Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 208. MSF, Forced flight: a brutal strategy of elimination in eastern Zaire, Apr. 1997, 6. 218 To be more precise, these soldiers are RPF as AFDL was more interested in overthrowing Mobutu regime than hunting Rwandan refugees. 219 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 210. 220 MSF, Forced flight, 8. 221 Ibid, 8–9. 222 UNHCR, The State of World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 278. 223 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 211. When I asked about this compensation to my former UNHCR senior colleagues who worked in the DRC at that time, the only reply I received was “there must be a misunderstanding. How can the UNHCR do such a thing?” If that were true, that would mean Umutesi has made a false statement and stained UNHCR’s honour. In that case, as Harrell-Bond pointed out, why did not the UNHCR sue Umutesi and the publishing company? 224 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 211. 225 Ibid, 209. 217

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In the end, the UNHCR failed to condemn the RPA for destroying refugee camps and massacring refugees, which resulted in a high number of deaths and the massive forced displacement of refugees. To make matters worse, the UNHCR even thanked the Banyamulenge rebels (which constituted a core part of the RPA) for having repatriated refugees who did not have any desire go home.226 With this UNHCR’s statement, refugees reconfirmed that the UNHCR was standing with the Rwandan Government and felt betrayed.227 Refugees simply wanted the UNHCR to condemn and stop the atrocities by the RPA.228 Refugees who were forcefully repatriated faced a dreadful experience at the hands of the RPA and the UNHCR. For example, MSF reported that on 4 May 1997, 92 refugees died of asphyxiation or were crushed to death on an overcrowded train to Kisangani in north-eastern Congo.229 During one movement from a makeshift refugee camp to the Kisangani airport in a roofless freight train, refugees were ordered by the RPA not to stand or look outside of the train230; the army did not want the refugees to witness a pile of dead Rwandan refugees and Congolese citizens next to the railway.231 Another example was an estimated 2000 refugees who ended up in Gabon after trekking across northern DRC and Republic of the Congo. They were ordered by the local army to lie down from morning until evening at the school where they were staying.232 When they could no longer stand it and decided to finally stand up, they were given food and water and told they would be relocated to Gabon.233 However, once they boarded the plane, the refugees were told that their destination would be Kigali.234 Inside the plane, the UNHCR personnel and armed RPA were standing next to the refugees who were handcuffed as if they were criminals.235 Following this mass refoulement from the DRC, the Tanzanian Government also decided in December 1996 the same mass refoulement of refugees.236 Prior to that, in March 1995, Tanzania had unilaterally closed its border to new arrivals of Rwandan refugees.237 In April 1995, a Tripartite Agreement on voluntary repatriation between Rwanda, Tanzania, and UNHCR was signed. However, only 6400 in

226

Ibid, 155. Interview with refugees K, P, U, and BB. 228 Interview with refugees P, U, and BB. 229 MSF, Forced flight, 7. 230 Interview with a refugee NN. 231 Interview with a refugee NN. 232 Interview with a refugee V. 233 Interview with a refugee V. 234 Interview with a refugee V. 235 Interview with a refugee V. Regarding forceful repatriation from Gabon, see Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 39. 236 Amnesty, Rwanda: Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation, Jan. 1997, 9. 237 Long, The Point of No Return, 133. 227

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1995 and 3400 persons in 1996 returned from Tanzania out of a refugee population of 480,000 in the camps; this implies merely 0.02% repatriated.238 Moreover, in August 1996, seven refugees, all educated, were arrested by Tanzanian authorities and were then refouled to Rwanda; their arrest was reportedly not because of their involvement in genocide, but because of their call “for better security in Rwanda and for dialogue between refugees and the Rwandese Government”.239 To make matters worse, the UNHCR agreed—or rather was forced to agree— that refugees should return to Rwanda within a month; otherwise, the Tanzanian Government would use its “own methods” to repatriate refugees240 with the help of local officials. UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner de Mello justified the closing down of camps as refugees were under the control of Interahamwe and ex-FAR.241 He also did not object the use of Tanzanian police and security forces in the camps as “he doubted that the refugees would budge without some form of coercion”.242 On 6 December 1996, Tanzania and the UNHCR issued a joint statement that all Rwandan refugees were to return by 31 December 1996243; it also demanded the immediate suspension of economic and agricultural activities in the camps.244 The UNHCR provided Tanzania’s ministry of home affairs more than US $1.5 million for equipment and personnel for this operation.245 Unlike the volatile DRC, Tanzania was not a conflict zone and therefore mass refoulement was unnecessary. Thus, the UNHCR and the Tanzanian Government breached the principle of non-refoulement. The UNHCR’s support for the forced return was “a bow to the ‘new realities’”, among them budget cuts by Western Governments.246 The US Government had urged that food aid to the refugees be cut, so that they would return.247 Among the refugees in Tanzania, more than 35,000 refused to return to Rwanda and fled towards Kenya and Zambia, away from the Rwandan border.248 Just like in the DRC, refugees had two choices: the possibility of death in Tanzania and certain death upon return to Rwanda.249 Heavily armed Tanzanian troops set up roadblocks to force 200,000 fleeing refugees to turn

238

UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 264. Amnesty, Rwanda: Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation, 8. 240 S. Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World, London, Penguin Books, 2008, 212. 241 R. Bonner, “U.N. Shift on Rwandans A Bow to ‘New Realities’”, New York Times, 21 Dec. 1996. 242 Power, Chasing the Flame, 212. 243 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 265. 244 B. E. Whitaker, “Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 21 (1&2), 2002, 328. 245 Ibid, 329. 246 Bonner, “U.N. Shift on Rwandans A Bow to ‘New Realities’”. 247 Ibid. 248 Power, Chasing the Flame, 214. 249 Whitaker, “Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection”, 329. 239

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around and retrace their steps.250 Some were killed in road accidents or beaten to death.251

3.8

Killing Continues upon Return (November 1996~)

Prior to refugees’ mass refoulement from the DRC, 75,000 Rwandan refugees in Burundi were also forcibly returned in July and August 1996 by the Burundian authorities, with the full cooperation of Rwandan authorities.252 At that time, the Rwandan government and international organisations stated that “only around 1 per cent” of the returnees had been arrested.253 However, by November 1996, more than 2000 returnees, including many intellectuals and former government officials, were reportedly detained without charge or trial.254 Regarding the mass refoulement from the DRC, the Rwandan Government reported in November 1997 that “[t]he nearly impossible task of reabsorbing and integrating 25 percent of the country’s population within a week [in November 1996] without major incidents had been due […] mostly [to] the desire of the Rwandan refugees to return home that had outweighed the conditions of their return”.255 However, as stated above, refugees did not intend to return to Rwanda, which means that repatriation was involuntary. To make matters worse, within days of the first wave of refugees’ return from the DRC, killings, “disappearances” and arbitrary arrests were already reported.256 As “death has become almost a banality in the lives of ordinary Rwandese”,257 refugees’ fear of certain death upon return proved to be true. Attempts to find out the whereabouts of the “disappeared” were complicated by the chaos which surrounded the mass refoulement from the DRC and Tanzania, and by the fact that neither the Rwandan government nor international agencies carried out a systematic registration of returnees, hence the absence of records.258 Although it is generally claimed that as many as 750,000 returned from the Congo, this figure cannot be verified.259

250

Ibid. International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., A Dangerous Impasse, 21; Power, Chasing the Flame, 215. 252 Amnesty, Rwanda: Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation, 15. 253 Ibid, 12. 254 Ibid. 255 UN Press Release, “Armed Elements must be Removed from Refugee Camps, Representative of Rwanda Tells General Assembly’s Third Committee”, GA/SHC/3436, 4 Nov. 1997. Emphasis added. 256 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 3. 257 Ibid, 12. 258 Ibid, 26. 259 Ibid. 251

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When refugees returned to Rwanda in November 1996, they had to pass through the transit centre in Rwanda, where each adult was questioned by the RPF about the location of their passage in the DRC.260 According to the refugees, if the RPF suspected or confirmed that the returnees had witnessed any misconduct by the RPA, they were immediately killed.261 At night, at the Runda transit centre in Kigali, returnees heard screaming, “please save us”.262 Amid the terror, the rate of killings and disappearances in Rwanda escalated sharply since after January 1997.263 Between January and August 1997, a minimum of 6000 civilians were killed mainly by the RPA; this estimate included many returnees from the DRC and Tanzania.264 In addition, Human Rights Watch reported that in 1998, people “disappeared” were found murdered.265 Many of these disappearances were likely related to the illegal occupation of land and property. These unexplained “disappearances” caused by soldiers became the reason that many of the 11,000 Rwandans fled to Tanzania between January and June 1998.266 As previously stated, the majority of the old-caseload refugees returned to Rwanda in the wake of the RPF’s victory in 1994, when the country was half emptied of people through massive displacement and death. Moreover, an estimated 150,000 houses were destroyed during the genocide period.267 This implies that old-caseload returnees either had to loot or squat Hutu properties.268 These returnees reportedly engaged in land grabbing and occupied half of the properties belonging to the Hutu refugees.269 This illegal occupation of property was one of the most frequent forms of violation of human rights.270 In fact, even prior to 1994, old-caseload returnees started to occupy the land they had owned in the northeast before their flight in 1959.271 This was despite the fact that Arusha Accords prohibited the illegal occupation for those who had left the country more than ten years earlier (in line with the “ten-year rule”). This implies that many new-caseload returnees from the DRC and Tanzania in 1996 and 1997 found their properties occupied by old-caseload returnees. Many of the formers were not able to reclaim their houses, because when they did they were

260

Interview with a refugee K. Interview with refugees K and M. 262 Interview with a refugee K. 263 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 3. 264 Ibid, 2. 265 HRW, “Rwanda”, World Report, 1999. 266 Ibid. 267 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 365. 268 Ibid. 269 UN, Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. René Degni-Séqui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/ CN.4/1995/70, 11 Nov. 1994, para. 24. 270 Ibid. 271 Des Forges “Land in Rwanda”, 358. 261

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immediately denounced and accused of participating in the genocide and subsequently arrested or killed.272 Rwandan authorities ordered the old-caseload returnees to return the occupied houses to their former owners (new-caseload returnees), “but with the caveat that the land should be divided equally between the two parties”, under an expedient policy called “land sharing”.273 Although initiated as temporary, this land sharing policy was legally authorised without offering any compensation and was a violation of the new constitution’s property guarantees.274 Furthermore, this ten-year rule became invalid following the victory of the RPF, which forced many new-caseload landowners to give their land back to the old-caseload returnees, even if the former had certificates from the local authorities.275 Apart from land sharing, the Rwandan Government introduced the villagisation (imidugudu) policy in December 1996 in order to deal with the mass forced return of new-caseload refugees; this imidugudu was the only legal form of rural settlement in the country. In spite of the past failure of similar land schemes and the donors’ initial reluctance to villagisation, the policy was eventually accepted following the mass return of new-caseload refugees.276 However, villagisation was implemented so hastily, forcefully, and erratically that participation in imidugudu turned out to be involuntary and fraught with mainly three problems. The first problem arose when the government coerced all residents to move into villages—including the new-caseload house owners who were forced to destroy their houses and build new houses, often with little or no assistance, rather than obliging the old-caseload returnees to cede houses to their former owners.277 Old-caseload returnees often ignored the property rights of the owners (new-caseload returnees), taking building materials and furniture from the occupied houses and bringing it along to the new sites of imidugudu.278 Second, at the new sites, the old-caseload returnees received a new plot of land, while the new-caseload returnees were obliged to work on their old farmland, which was farther away from their new homes.279 This distance lowered agricultural productivity, which caused the residents to depend on food aid to survive.280 As a result, many Hutu residents have become poorer than they were before moving to the village sites.281 272

Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 31. Takeuchi and Marara, “Land tenure security in post-conflict Rwanda”, 92. 274 J. W. Bruce, “Return of land in post-conflict Rwanda: International standards, improvisation, and the role of international humanitarian organizations”, J. Unruh and R. Williams eds., Land and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Oxon, Routledge, 2013, 129. 275 Takeuchi and Marara, “Land tenure security in post-conflict Rwanda”, 97. 276 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 194. 277 C. Newbury, “High Modernism at the Ground Level: The Imidugudu Policy in Rwanda”, Straus and Waldorf (eds.), Remaking Rwanda, 231, 233. 278 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 194–195. 279 Ibid. 280 HRW, Chap. 10. Land, Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda. 281 Des Forces, “Land in Rwanda”, 363. 273

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Third, imidugudu were often built on existing farms, but the former landowners from which it was acquired were never compensated, as the land was recognised as State-owned.282 In the cases where new land was awarded for land lost, it was often of inferior quality or was far from their homes.283 Military officers, after having become the new owners of the large farms, employed the former landholders as wage labourers.284 Some studies highly suspected that imidugudu had two goals. One was to compensate and favour the old-caseload returnees, who were exclusively Tutsi, for their inability to claim their property under the Arusha Accords.285 Apart from the returnees, the properties of the genocide survivors—only Tutsi are officially recognised as such—have been exempted from land sharing.286 This resulted in the reinforcement of ethnic polarisation and a delay in reconciliation, which was partially related to the re-education policy in ingando (solidarity camps).287 Ingando camps were intended only for the new-caseload returnees prior to being reintegrated into the community in order “to promote ideas of nationalism, to erase the ethnically charged lessons taught by the previous government, and to spur loyalty to the RPF”.288 Until returnees attended this training, they were unable to obtain their new identity card, find employment, or register for school. Many returnees were afraid of applying for their identity card in case of an arbitrary arrest or killing, but on the other hand, individuals without these cards were suspected by the authorities as having participated in the genocide.289 Another aim of villagisation was to use returnees as part of a counterinsurgency strategy “to reduce the likelihood of any recurrence”.290 During the 1997–1998 northwest counterinsurgency believed to be conducted by the ex-FAR/ Interahamwe,291 the RPA forcibly displaced residents into large camps aiming partially to prevent residents from supporting the insurgents.292 When the security situation improved, authorities directed these people to new settlements rather than having them return to their place of origin.293 The same counterinsurgency included J. Bruce, “Drawing a line under the crisis: Reconciling returnee land access and security in post-conflict Rwanda”, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, June 2007, 10; UNHCR Executive Committee of the Commissioner’s Programme, “Legal Safety Issues in the Context of Voluntary Repatriation”, EC/54/SC/CRP.12, 7 Jun. 2004, para. 16. 283 Des Forges, “Land in Rwanda”, 362. 284 HRW, Chap. 10: Land, Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda. 285 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 196. 286 Takeuchi and Marara, “Land tenure security in post-conflict Rwanda”, 92. 287 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 33. 288 HRW, “Solidarity camps”, World Report 2000. 289 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 34. 290 Takeuchi and Marara, “Land tenure security in post-conflict Rwanda”, 93. 291 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 15. 292 HRW, Chap. 8: The Use of Force, Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda. email from Rever, 16 Jan. 2019. 293 Des Forges, “Land in Rwanda”, 362. 282

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the attack of Mudende refugee camp hosting Congolese Tutsi refugees in western Rwanda in August and December 1997, killing at least 300 persons.294 Although it was claimed that the ex-FAR/Interahamwe based on eastern DRC were responsible for this operation, it was revealed that both attacks were launched by the RPA as a false flag operation.295 Its objective was not only to loot the refugees’ cattle, but also to “spread fear among Tutsis and create[…] sympathy for their cause”,296 while triggering “an international outcry, which further justified the RPF’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign against Hutus”,297 and “persuaded the United States to continue training RPF soldiers and supplying Rwanda with military material”.298 This discriminatory policy against the Hutu led to their displacement in and out of the country. In spite of no official statistics of the number of IDPs, the UNHCR estimated that many of the 650,000 were displaced in the northwest from 1998 to 1999 without adequate access to land and shelter.299 Human Rights Watch also concluded that tens of thousands of Rwandans, including returnees, lost their homes.300 Additionally, thousands of Rwandans fled the country in April 2005 with “continuing anger at having had to sacrifice some of their land at official order”.301 Thus, the repatriations in 1996–1997 from the Congo and Tanzania were not only forced, admitted by Ogata,302 but also turned out to be deadly and unsustainable, leading to more displacement.

U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, “Massacre at Mudende Refugee Camp, Rwanda”, 17 Dec. 1997. https://1997-2001.state.gov/briefings/statements/971218. html. 295 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 142. 296 Ibid. 297 Ibid, 143. 298 Ibid. 299 C. Huggins, “Land in return, reintegration and recovery processes: Some lessons from the Great Lakes region of Africa”, Unchartered Territory: Land, conflict and humanitarian action, Sara Pantuliano ed., Practical Action Publishing, 2009, 72. According to the UNHCR statistics of 1999, 604,200 were newly displaced in 1998, but 625,000 IDPs returned home in 1999. UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR, 1999 Statistical Overview, Jul. 2000, Table 1.3. https://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bc834. 300 HRW, Chap. 10: Land, Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda. 301 Des Forges, “Land in Rwanda”, 363–364. 302 Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, 231. 294

Chapter 4

Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate (1995–2017)

This chapter aims to examine why the majority of refugees have categorically refused to repatriate and why Rwandans continue to flee today. Based on Rogge’s three arguments on repatriation’s myths and realities—political–economic system, government’s attitude vis-à-vis refugee repatriation, and sources of information that refugees rely on when deciding their return—the following elements are analysed: the post-genocide political structure and President Kagame’s speeches as well as the Rwandan Government’s intentions and repatriation strategies. Furthermore, this chapter describes post-genocide refugees’ ongoing fear, insecurity, and survival strategies according to the three phases of the UNHCR’s policy on Rwandan refugees: first, from 2002/2003 when the promotion phase of voluntary repatriation began, to 2009 when invoking cessation clause of refugee status was announced; second, from 2009 to 2013 when the cessation clause was invoked; and third, from 2013 to 2017 when cessation clause of refugee status was finally enforced. Security incidents during the second (2009–2013) and third (2013–2017) phases are described that reinforced refugees’ conviction not to return. The post-genocide refugees comprise three categories: first, refugees who did not return in 1996–1997 after the destruction of refugee camps and continue to remain outside of Rwanda, mainly in the DRC; second, old-caseload and new-caseload returnees who fled for the second time or more; and third, genocide survivors—both Hutu and Tutsi—who have never fled. The time frame of these second and third categories began in early 1995 before the fall of the GNU in August 1995.1 However, a gradual outflow of refugees has become more prominent since 1997 when the new-caseload returnees began to flee in groups.

1

For those elites who left in exile in early 1995, see Reyntjens, Political Governance in PostGenocide Rwanda, 9. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 M. Yonekawa, Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6756-3_4

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Post-Genocide Political Structure

While the refugees’ refusal to repatriate is a direct result of serious crimes and human rights violations committed by the RPF as stated in Chaps. 2 and 3, their reluctance to return is also driven by the Tutsi-based and military-driven post-genocide political structure. The RPF Government adopted domestic policies and enacted new laws, in particular after Kagame became president in 2001. Apart from land sharing and Ingando, new controversial policies and laws were introduced that had a dramatic impact on the daily lives of Rwandans. The establishment of the Gacaca community-based courts in 2001 (which is related to establishment of the ICTR in 1994), the imposition in 2003 of English as the country’s official language which replaced French as the language of education five years later, the “genocide ideology” law enacted in 2008,2 and the Ndi Umunyarwanda (“I am Rwandan”) programme in 2013 together contributed to conditions that fuelled refugee displacement and reinforced their belief not to return. Among them, Gacaca, genocide ideology, and Ndi Umunyarwanda are explored below. The RPF’s concerted campaign to detain Hutu suspects after the genocide meant that Rwandan prisons became overcrowded and housed an estimated 130,000 Hutus by 1998.3 As conventional courts were not able to accelerate the trial, the government proposed Gacaca community-based courts to prosecute genocide crimes4; nearly two million ordinary people were tried for genocide crimes under Gacaca.5 The ICTR prosecuted genocide leaders, indicting 93 individuals before its closure in 2015.6 While Kagame has praised Gacaca for restoring unity, trust, and reconciliation at considerably less cost than the ICTR,7 the trials at both institutions were seriously flawed and were regarded as a form of victor’s justice; neither court dealt with crimes committed by RPF soldiers punishing only the Hutus.8 Other problems associated with Gacaca were the inability for Rwandans to tell their entire truth if it did not fit the official RPF narrative, and many Rwandans were not able to speak at all or were forced to participate even if they did not wish to; defence witnesses and judges were also intimidated.9 Likewise, the Rwandan Government had access to ICTR

2

International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., A Dangerous Impasse, 23–27, 32–34. HRW, Rwanda, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts, 31 May 2011, 13. 4 Ibid, 14–15. 5 The New Times, “The Legacy of Gacaca”, 10 Apr. 2012, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/ read/39079. 6 ICTR, “The ICTR in Brief”, 2019, http://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal. 7 The New Times, “Gacaca closes shop” 19 Jun. 2012. 8 S. Takeuchi, “Gacaca and DDR: The Disputable Record of State-Building in Rwanda”, JICA Research Institute, Jul. 2011, 17–18; P. Erlinder, “The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice or Judicially-Constructed ‘Victor’s Impunity’”, DePaul University for Social Justice, 4(1) Fall 2010, 131–214. 9 HRW, Rwanda. Justice Compromised, 98–103. 3

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witnesses10 who were instructed by RPF officials to provide false testimony. For example, when two defence witnesses, including a Tutsi survivor, gave true testimony at the ICTR that the suspect was innocent, both of their houses were later destroyed, and both were forced to flee into exile.11 In another case, two other men—one former driver of the ex-FAR official and one former medical assistant who worked under a prominent doctor, both before 1994— were requested by the Rwandan government to give testimony at the ICTR relating to their respective supervisors’ involvement in the genocide; when they refused as they simply were not aware of such involvement, they were sexually tortured, which made them decide to flee Rwanda.12 Legislation governing genocide ideology was enacted to ensure that crimes against humanity never occur again in Rwanda, and “to fight anything that can lead to the same”.13 The legislation refers to any behaviour aimed at dehumanising individuals through “threatening, intimidating, degrading through defamatory speeches, […] degrading creating confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, […] killing, planning to kill […] for purposes of furthering genocide ideology”.14 Since this law was introduced, 912 people (356 awaiting trial and 556 convicted) were reportedly in prison on genocide ideology charges as of August 200915; in total, 1845 cases were brought before the courts from 2007 to 2009.16 The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, expressed concern that this law is “overly broad and open to abuse with a view to limiting any opposition, even moderate and peaceful, to the Government”.17 Scholar Lars Waldorf also argues that “any mention of alleged RPF war crimes or human rights abuses would constitute ‘genocide ideology’”.18 Under the policy of Ndi Umunyarwanda, Rwandans are encouraged to “openly talk about their history, repent, forgive, and heal the scars of the bad experiences the country went through”.19 President Kagame asked Hutu children at the June 2013 10

Cruvellier, Court of Remorse, 161. Interview with a refugee N. 12 Interview with refugees UU and CCC. 13 Rwanda National Police, “Understanding the Crime of Genocide Ideology”. 8 Apr. 2015. 14 Government of Rwanda, “Law N°18/2008 of 23/07/2008 Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology”, 23 Jul. 2008. 15 Amnesty, Amnesty International Report 2010: The State of the World's Human Rights 2010, 273. 16 Amnesty, Safer to Stay Silent: The chilling effect of Rwanda's laws on 'genocide ideology' and 'sectarianism', 31 Aug. 2010, 19. 17 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, on his mission to Rwanda (20–27 Jan. 2014)”, A/HRC/ 26/29/Add.2, 16 Sep. 2014, para. 13. 18 L. Waldorf, “Revising Hotel Rwanda, Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers”, Journal of Genocide Research, II:I, 2009, 111. 19 Rwanda Environment Management Authority, “REMA staff members in a dialogue about “Ndi Umunyarwanda” Program”, 12 Nov. 2013 available at: http://www.rema.gov.rw/index.php?id= 10&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=71&cHash=1dfabefcf77a99b156d24e9f24f632e9 (last visited 30 Apr. 2018). 11

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Youth Connect Dialogue in Kigali to apologise for the crimes committed “in their name” by their parents who were responsible for the 1994 genocide. Government officials, including the Prime Minister Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, were among those who led this apology on behalf of Hutus.20 In November 2013, this call for public apologies led to the launch of the programme.21 Both Hutu and Tutsi refugees find these public declarations humiliating and counterproductive to reconciliation efforts, as they believe this policy is to maintain and solidify the minority Tutsi’s power in Rwanda.22 Taken as a whole, these policies and laws targeted and victimised Hutus. Moreover, there was no assurance that they would promote the safety of Tutsis. After the RPF seized power in 1994, Hutus were very fearful of the RPF, and Tutsi civilians began to feel safer for the most part—however that was only during the initial stage.23 The fact that Tutsi were also vulnerable was pointed out as early as April 1995 by a Tutsi survivor and RPF veteran named Jean-Pierre Mugabe. He wrote: “There are many Tutsi extremists […] in the civil service […]. They have arbitrarily arrested many Hutu, as if all Hutu were Interahamwe. For these extremists even the Tutsi survivors of the genocide are Interahamwe. Today many of the Tutsi are just as vulnerable as the Hutu”.24 Rudasingwa also described that “[t]he Tutsi may look confident that their sons have absolute control of the security institutions and the country, but they too live fearful[ly], (…), not knowing for how long the promise by a small group of Tutsi’s hold on power will last”.25 This Tutsi vulnerability proved to be true. Former Speaker of Parliament, Joseph Sebarenzi, an interior Tutsi, who was part of an opposition party, fled the country in 2000 barely surviving an attempted assassination after he tried to establish accountability and good governance.26 Other Tutsis, former RPF officers, were forced to flee and turned into opponents.27 Even young Tutsi survivors who were mere children during the genocide, among others, could be at risk if they challenged the RFP’s narrative and authority. One such case is Kizito Mihigo, a singer who was imprisoned in 2014 for expressing in lyrics that both Hutu and Tutsi were victims of war, and both should be remembered for Rwandans to truly heal. Similarly, Diane Shima Rwigara, an outspoken critic of the RPF, was disqualified from running against Kagame in presidential elections in 2017. The government claimed that she distorted the number of signatures needed to qualify, a charge she denied, and charged her with insurrection.

The East African, “Apology: Singling out a community over the genocide is not right”, 19 Jul. 2013. 21 Rwanda Environment Management Authority, “REMA staff members in a dialogue”. 22 Interview with refugees A, P, U, II, MM and RR. 23 J. Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation, 81–82. 24 J.-P. Mugabe, Le Tribun du People, No. 48, Apr. 1995. 25 Rudasingwa, Healing a Nation, 277. 26 Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 137–207. 27 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 85. 20

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Another reason that Tutsis, in addition to Hutus, remain vulnerable under the RPF regime is that government officials and civil servants are forced to contribute to the RPF, often by joining the RPF or its army and donating part of their salary to the party.28 If Rwandans refuse this offer, they risk being accused of being “Igipinga mizi” (against the government, or considered an obstacle); the RPF can gradually escalate this threat by asking questions such as: “Who has given you employment? Who has given you security?”29 Resigning from government work is not allowed either, as this implies political opposition to the RPF. That is why government officials and civil servants have only two choices: either to continue working under threat, or flee the country and risk being targeted abroad by RPF agents.30 These officers cannot even apply for passports without the permission of their supervisors, because the RPF is afraid that they could leave the country and reveal their stories to the outside world, as others have done in the past.31

4.2

Political Characteristics of Post-Genocide Refugees

Under the political structure imposed by the RPF, post-genocide refugees fall into three political categories. First, Hutu refugees are branded as génocidaires.32 This labelling of certain groups has been a useful propaganda tool by the Rwandan Government to boldly hunt and repatriate or target refugees. This is partially why hardly any Rwandans have sought asylum in the DRC after 1996–1997, where ex-FAR and Interahamwe have been based; no Rwandans wanted to be viewed as part of these “génocidaire” groups by fleeing there. This contrasts with Tanzania and Uganda to where Rwandans’ repeated outflux has been reported. Second, these refugees are framed as anti-Rwandan, opposing the State process of reconciliation and national unity.33 The ideal Rwandan citizen is considered a refugee who voluntarily returns to the motherland to contribute to the reconstruction of the State34; this way of thinking complies with the UNHCR’s policy, stipulating that returnees “should be seen as productive members of society (human capital), who can contribute to the recovery process”.35

28

Interview with refugees G and O. Interview with refugees G and O. 30 Interview with a refugee G. 31 Interview with refugees G, X and GG. 32 R. Lemarchand, “The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda”, P. Clark and Z. D. Kaufman eds., After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, New York, Columbia University Press, 2009, 71. 33 L. N. Kingston, “Bringing Rwandan Refugees ‘Home’, 3. 34 K. O’Connor, “Repatriation: the Politics of Re-Constructing and Contesting Rwandan Citizenship”, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Jun. 2013, 28. 35 UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, one-10. 29

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Third, many refugees are outspoken members of the elite, such as journalists, human rights activists, teachers, both Hutu and Tutsi. In addition, former war comrades and Kagame’s entourage members have also fled, including politicians, civil servants, military officers, judicial officers, secretaries, drivers, and bodyguards. Some refugees are politically active and form various political organisations, opposing the RPF regime. A good number of Rwandan refugees are educated and seemingly unwilling to obey RPF ideology. They therefore have become more prone to being targeted, facing mounting security risks, threats, and, in some cases, political assassinations, allegedly by the Rwandan Government. As of 2017, more than ten refugees, among them high-profile persons,36 have been subjected to assassination, while others, assassination attempts, attacks, or kidnappings. These incidents did not occur under the Habyarimana Government. Individuals who have been assassinated in recent years apparently had incriminating evidence of RPF crimes.37 The latest statistics on post-genocide refugees worldwide stands at 261,257 at the end of 2018.38 This number should be considered the minimum because the outflux is ongoing despite the cessation clause of refugee status being invoked in June 2013, and outflux is hardly ever recorded. In addition, the fact that a significant number of refugees have disguised themselves as Congolese and Burundian suggests that the UNHCR’s statistics do not fully reflect the reality of the situation.39

4.3

Less Reported Killings but Diminishing Return

After the end of the counter-insurgency in 1998 and fewer reports of killings and disappearances in Rwanda, the UNHCR deemed that Rwanda began enjoying “an essential level of peace and security”,40 and therefore recommended the cessation clause. However, the fewer reports of violence may be explained by three reasons.

36

These include, in chronological order, Theoneste Lizinde in 1996 (Kenya), Seth Sendashonga in 1998 (Kenya), Pasteur Musabe in 1999 (Cameroon), Bagasora Regima Uwamariya in 2000 (Belgium), Laurent Bangaya in 2003 (Nigeria), Juvenal Uwiringyimana in 2008 (Belgium), Charles Ingabire in 2011 (Uganda), Theogene Turatsinze in 2012 (Mozambique), and Patrick Karegeya in 2013 (South Africa). The host country where the assassination took place is indicated in parentheses. See HRW, “Rwanda: Repression Across Borders, Attack and Threats Against Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad”, 28 Jan. 2014. 37 A. Guichaoua From War to Genocide, 146. 38 UNHCR, Global Trends; Forced Displacement in 2018, 20 Jun. 2019, 72. This number includes refugees and asylum seekers (pending case). 39 RFI, “En Ouganda, des Rwandais semblent victimes de rapatriements forces”, 2 Nov. 2017. Apart from Uganda described in this article, similar situation takes place in other countries according to the author’s interviews. 40 UNHCR, “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy”, para. 28.

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First, the RPF’s interest has shifted from Rwanda to the mineral-rich eastern DRC. Rwanda invaded in 1998 for the second time and continues to maintain its presence today. The DRC is where most of the Rwandan-led massacres have taken place in recent years, and the violence is directly linked to accessing minerals.41 Second, there is less awareness about the human rights situation in Rwanda today than there was in the 1990s, because many international agencies have been suspended or expelled. The UN Special Rapporteur and the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda terminated their mandate for human rights monitoring in June 1997 and July 1998, respectively. Other external actors, such as journalists and academia, were declared persona non grata.42 Moreover, after scaling down its staff prior to promotion of voluntary repatriation, the UNHCR was obliged to rely heavily on local government for information on the returnee situation.43 While the number of international researchers conducting field research has significantly increased since 1994, they have been working in a “very hostile environment”.44 Thus, the researchers face difficulty in collecting data that reflect the reality of the situation. Since the late 1990s when Amnesty and the Human Rights Watch reported the returnee situation as stated in Chap. 3, no single study has been conducted on the returnee situation. Thus, the only means to obtain this information is to rely on recyclers (people who returned home and then go back to the host country) or refugees who maintain contact with remaining families and friends in the country. Third, after observing first-hand the consequences faced by people challenging local authorities, such as those claiming land and property, the population must have understood that these challenges, however small, can lead to death. It is now assumed that many Rwandans have decided to remain silent. Those who cannot tolerate this lack of freedom of expression45 could have fled the country or have already been killed in and outside of Rwanda. The first victim of such political assassination, which drew attention worldwide, was Sendashonga. The RPF’s motive for his killing, according to his widow, was to prevent him from testifying before both the ICTR and the French Parliamentarian Commission of Inquiry, which was due to be held after his assassination in May 1998.46 His murder in Kenya had a huge impact on Rwandan refugees, especially those in Africa, and forced many to flee to Europe.47

41 OHCHR, Mapping Report, 70-284. Amnesty, Rwandese-Controlled Eastern DRC: Devastating Human Toll, 2001, 4; HRW, “You will be Punished”: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, 2009, 51, 85. 42 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 125–126. 43 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 15. 44 Times Higher Education, “Truly hostile environment”, 19 Dec. 2013. 45 Amnesty, Safer to Stay Silent, 13. 46 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 367–368. 47 Interview with a refugee D.

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Other high-profile Rwandans have been assassinated, and lower profile refugees have faced insecurity as well. Despite their gravity, Rwandan refugee issues have rarely received international attention because their concerns have often been overshadowed by the perception of the pernicious threats posed by the Rwandan rebel group named Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), partially composed of ex-FAR and Interahamwe. The FDLR’s presence has been very useful in distracting the international community’s attention from the plight of refugees. It is generally acknowledged that Rwanda has suffered grave ethnic conflict, and many observers have naturally assumed that the biggest obstacle to Rwanda’s security is the past and current activities of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The FAR and Interahamwe are blamed for having shot down the presidential plane, committed genocide, and threatened refugees in the camps in the DRC and Rwanda to prevent them from returning. As a result, Rwanda and the international community have identified the FDLR as a génocidaire group and a source of instability in the Great Lakes region. The FDLR was even named a “negative force”48 and a “terrorist organization” by the Rwandan and US governments.49 In understanding the violent events of 1994, a central question needs to be examined: if the tenets of the official narrative of the genocide require scepticism— in terms of how the violence occurred—and if President Kagame ordered the presidential plane to be shot down, which was a direct trigger of genocide, then who are these “génocidaires” and the members of the FDLR? To trace the history, the FDLR is composed of young refugees recruited in refugee camps since 1994 and survivors and orphans of 1996–1997 “genocide” in eastern DRC.50 Thus, only a small portion of FDLR members were actually involved in the Rwandan genocide.51 The unrecognised “genocide” in eastern DRC in 1996–1997 strengthened the resolve of Hutu militants, who claim to be defending “refugees who have not received any assistance for over a decade”.52 Many Rwandans who arrived in eastern DRC in 1994 have operated as local armed bands, while others are integrated into Congolese society, working for agriculture

48

The RPF likely imposed the negative portrayal of FDLR during the 1999 Lusaka Accord. E. F. Kisangani, Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1960–2010, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2012, 51. Even those RPF officials who are accused of committing treason are also labelled negative force. “The Testimony of Lt. Aloys Ruyenzi”, 30 Nov. 2010, 2. 49 U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Exclusion List”. 29 Dec. 2004; Permanent Representative of Rwanda, S/2005/223. 4 Apr. 2005. 50 HRW, Rwanda: Observing the Rules of War? 13 (8) (A). Dec. 2001, 2; S. Hege, “Understanding the FDLR in the DR Congo: Key facts on the Disarmament & Repatriation of Rwandan Rebels”, 2009, 1. 51 J. Astill, “West helpless to end the slaughter and looting: Rwandans wage a war of plunder”. The Observer. 4 Aug. 2002; RFI, “Rwanda: pour Faustin Twagiramungu, “il est temps de mettre fin au chantage de Kigali”, 16 Jan. 2014. 52 S. Hege, “Understanding the FDLR in the DR Congo”, 1.

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and trade.53 Although the FDLR, significantly weakened since 2000, remained a threat to Congolese civilians,54 it does not currently constitute a military threat to Rwanda; this was acknowledged even by Kabarebe and other Rwandan Government officials.55 Therefore, the FDLR is neither a génocidaire group in its aims nor merit being labelled as a terrorist organisation if it does not stage attacks against Rwanda. Thus, the UN’s characterisation of the FDLR leadership as harbouring genocidal ideology that caused the 1994 genocide56 is questionable. It can be argued that the FDLR has served as a “useful enemy” or useful collaborator to achieve the RPF’s economic agenda. The FDLR’s presence in eastern DRC justified the Rwandan army’s intervention there under the official security narrative. Since the 1990–1994 civil war, the RPF and FDLR (and its ancestors) have been recognised as enemies. During the passage of time, however, they have become collaborators in both economic and military terms, while ostensibly remaining political opponents.57 This shifting alliance between the two entities, which have a common interest in enriching themselves from the region’s natural wealth, was described by one Interahamwe combatant during the Second Congo War: We haven’t fought much with the RPA [Rwandan army] in the last 2 years. We think they are tired of this war, like we are. In any case, they aren’t here in the Congo to chase us, like they pretend. I have seen the gold and coltan mining they do here, we see how they rob the population. These are the reasons for their being here. The RPA come and shoot in the air and raid the villagers’ houses but they don’t attack us any more. If you are lucky, and you have a big brother in the RPA, he might be able to get you some food and ammunition.58

As noted below, the RPF has been hunting refugees in Africa, Europe, and North America, far from Rwanda, and lesser so in the neighbouring DRC. One of the reasons is that Rwandan refugees in the DRC have not been politically active like refugees in other countries. More importantly, the RPF has avoided militarily eliminating the FDLR precisely to maintain its presence in the DRC, because the group provides a convenient excuse for the RPF’s incursions and activities next door.

HRW, “Democratic Republic of Congo - Rwanda Conflict: A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder”, 4 Dec. 2004. 54 UNSC, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2018/ 531, 4 Jun. 2018, para. 15. 55 The East African, “Congo-Kinshasa: FDLR Resurfacing Poses Huge Threat to Great Lakes Security, Say Experts”, 26 Sep. 2015. 56 UNSC, S/RES/2211. 26 Mar. 2015, 2. 57 M. Yonekawa, “The Prolonged and Flawed Nature of Contemporary Conflict and Peace Processes: ‘Spoiler’ Phenomenon in the DR Congo”, Peace: Economic, Global and Social Challenges, New York, NOVA Science Publisher, 2016, 112–115. 58 UNSC. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2002/1146, 16 Oct. 2002, para. 68. 53

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The FDLR has also served as a distraction from the more serious refugee threat posed by Kagame’s troubling enemies, the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), an opposition group largely composed of Kagame’s former war comrade. The narratives around the FDLR and Interahamwe have also been beneficial to the RPF for two other reasons related to refugee and returnee matters. First, the Rwandan Government was able to place blame on the FDLR/ Interahamwe and Hutu civilians for all crimes during and after the genocide, even those committed by the RPF. Former RPA soldier Aloys Ruyenzi testified that André Kisase Ngandu, who was a leading member of the AFDL, was thought to have been killed in January 1997 in an ambush by Interahamwe and the former Congolese army under Mobutu.59 In fact, he was killed by the RPA officers under the orders of Kagame because Ngandu was opposed to the killing of Rwandan refugees.60 By forcing Hutus to give false testimony against the FDLR, the RPF can intimidate and justify arresting or killing Hutu (refugees) for their participation in the genocide.61 People who refuse to join the RPF or who attempt to reclaim their properties occupied by the RPF were accused of belonging to the FDLR or Interahamwe.62 One refugee who was involved in opposition party’s activities was ordered by the Rwandan embassy to make a false claim that his party’s leader has been a collaborator with the FDLR and the refugee himself was also an FDLR agent.63 Second, FDLR members can be co-opted by the Rwandan Government and used to promote repatriation. For example, Séraphine Mukantabana, a former influential Rwandan refugee leader in the Republic of the Congo, had been instrumental in creating the FDLR in 2000, recruiting young refugees in the DRC.64 In 2011, following negotiations between Kagame and Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesou, she returned to Rwanda.65 In February 2013, she was appointed as the Minister of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs and has actively promoted refugees’ repatriation and the RPF objectives ever since. A. Ruyenzi, “President Paul Kagame is indeed a war criminal”, Le Médiateur-Umuhuza, 14 Jul. 2009. 60 Ibid. 61 Interview with refugees O and V. 62 Interview with refugees G and T; International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., A Dangerous Impasse, 34. 63 Interview with a refugee V. In a separate case, S. Hege, former Coordinator of the UN Group of Experts member on the DRC, was condemned by the Rwandan government for being a sympathizer of the FDLR, after having highlighted Rwanda’s support of M23 in 2012. He made a statement that: “I later discovered that Rwandan officials in the Office of the Presidency had also concocted false testimonies with current FDLR officers promising rewards for media statements about my alleged involvement in providing the rebels with weapons”. S. Hege, “The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo”, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, 11 Dec. 2012, 3. 64 AfroAmerica Network, “Embattled Rwandan Refugees Leader in the Republic of the Congo Gives up Refugee Status”, 2 Aug. 2011. 65 Interview with a refugee AAA. 59

4.4 Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation (2002/2003–2009)

4.4

83

Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation (2002/2003–2009)

Since 1994, the UNHCR has been “facilitating” voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees with some intermission in between. In October 2002, the UNHCR changed this policy to “promotion” of voluntary repatriation, agreeing with governments of Rwanda and Tanzania that Rwandan refugees should repatriate voluntarily by the end of December 2002.66 This was followed by UNHCR’s signing tripartite agreements with the governments of Rwanda and some asylum countries, such as the Central African Republic and Burundi in 2002, and then with Zambia, the Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in 2003. This movement was despite solid evidence suggesting a greater outflux of refugees than influx of returnees over several years. For example, in Tanzania, before the policy of voluntary repatriation was promoted, 2743 Rwanda returned in the year 2000, more 4000 in 2001, and an estimated 4000 refugees in 2002; during the same period, 11,500 refugees arrived for the first time in Tanzania while over 5000 refugees were registered as having left Tanzania for neighbouring countries.67 Beyond these statistics, the nature of repatriation is questionable. In 2004, Amnesty expressed concern that “the current focus on repatriation can lead to involuntary and premature repatriations that violate internationally recognized principles of asylum and non-refoulement and which in themselves may lead to further human rights abuses and renewed violence in the refugees’ country of origin”.68 This concern turned out to be valid. Even after Tanzania ended its practice of giving Rwandan asylum-seekers prima facie (at first sight) refugee status as of 1998, Rwandans still arrived there either as refugees or as “illegal migrants”.69 However, after some time, they were forcibly returned to Rwanda.70 In 1999, Tanzanian authorities ordered all Rwandan refugees to live in refugee camps.71 In February 2000, this order was followed by the arrest and forcible return of those who were not in the camps; this also applied to all of the old-caseload Tutsi refugees, even though they had been locally integrated.72 By

J. Frushone, “Repatriation of Rwandan refugees living in Tanzania”, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 10 Jan. 2003. 67 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 16. 68 Ibid, 2. 69 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 13. Refugees are accepted on a prima facie basis “when the reasons for flight are objectively apparent and there is no evidence to the contrary”. UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection No. 3: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convection relating to the Status of Refugees”, 10 Feb. 2003, HCR/GIP/03/03, para. 23. 70 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 13. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 66

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January 2002, the Rwandan refugee population in Tanzania had reached 25,00073; more than half of them were former returnees of the 1996 mass forcible repatriation, and another 11,000 were newly arrived refugees.74 Before the voluntary repatriation was signed in Tanzania in September 2002, Rwandan refugees were given two choices: either accept repatriation or face deportation in the future.75 As soon as voluntary repatriation began, the attitude of Tanzanian authorities became more aggressive, beating and detaining refugees whenever they held meetings to discuss repatriation procedures.76 The 31 December 2002 deadline was set for repatriation in collaboration with the UNHCR, whose officials organised a proactive information campaign.77 When Presidents Kagame and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania met ahead of the deadline, refugees suspected that the meeting would lead to another forced repatriation involving Rwandan troops as in 1996.78 As a result, the refugees fled to Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe by the end of 2002 and in the beginning of 2003.79 Those who remained in Tanzania reportedly hid in local villages to avoid the repatriation exercise or claimed they were from Burundi.80 In February 2003, the Tanzanian Government set another deadline with a two-week ultimatum for repatriation; however, the ultimatum did not persuade the refugees to go along.81 During the High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers’ visit to Tanzania in April 2003, he said, “we informed the refugees that they could return to Rwanda. Some have returned, but many remain. Such people (…) were not refugees anymore”.82 In May 2006, the Tanzanian Government also began expelling the old-caseload Tutsi refugees who claimed to have had Tanzanian citizenship or temporary residence status, and labelled them “illegal migrants”.83 This expulsion continued at least until 2013.84 The UNHCR insisted that the repatriation was voluntary despite its violent nature85; however, it was suspected that this expulsion may have been

73

Ibid. Ibid. 75 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 17. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid, 14. 78 Human Rights First, A Decade of Unrest; Unrecognized Rwandan Refugees in Uganda and the Future of Refugee Protection in the Great Lakes, 2004, 11. 79 Ibid. 80 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 14. 81 Ibid. 82 The New Humanitarian, “Rwanda is safe for returning refugees, says UNHCR head”, 16 Apr. 2003. 83 HRW, “Human Rights Watch Letter to President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete of Tanzania”, 8 May 2007. 84 The East African, “Kagame meets Kikwete, signaling bid to mend relations between countries”, 14 Mar. 2015. 85 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 15; HRW, “Human Rights Watch Letter to President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete”; John Bruce, “Drawing a line”, 27. 74

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conducted intentionally by the Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, who was not on favourable terms with Kagame.86 Since voluntary repatriation began in Uganda in November 2003, the number of Rwandan refugees registered in settlements has continued to fall because the majority of them have established themselves outside of the settlements in order to avoid being sent back to Rwanda.87 In August 2004, about 700 out of 2000 Rwandans who had returned to Rwanda subsequently fled to Uganda again, due to persecution and arbitrary arrests, accompanied by 145 new arrivals.88 In September 2004, the UNHCR announced that refugee resettlements hosting Rwandans would be closed, and it would no longer provide any assistance because Rwandan refugees “ceased to be considered refugees”.89 In Zambia, after the tripartite agreement was reached in January 2003, only 125 out of 5000 Rwandans chose to repatriate over 18 months.90 At the same time, provisions of food and other aid such as scholarships were cut, and the resettlement programme for Rwandan refugees heading to third countries was halted.91 In the Republic of the Congo, where the same agreement was signed in June 2003, only 73 out of 6000 returned within a year.92 In Burundi, 6500 Rwandan asylum-seekers were forcibly returned in 2005, many of whom managed to return to Burundi and claim asylum.93 In order to promote repatriation, the UNHCR, Government of Rwanda, and the governments of the asylum countries organised “go and see” visits, which ostensibly allowed refugees to assess the situation in Rwanda before making a final decision on their repatriation.94 Although refugees were encouraged to take part in this visit, many refused due to their suspicion that the Rwandan Government would use this to spy on other refugees.95 One refugee could not participate because his name was listed as someone who was to be imprisoned by the Rwandan Government.96 The refugees who participated in the visit reported that upon arrival in Rwanda, their belongings, including mobile telephones and cameras, were confiscated by the The East African, “Kagame speaks out on Kikwete's call for negotiations with FDLR rebels”, 10 Jun. 2013. 87 Karooma, “Reluctant to return?”, 3. 88 D. Williams, Is Rwanda safe? An inquiry into the reluctance of the Rwandan refugee community to repatriate, Jesuit Refugee Service, 2004, 7. 89 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 20. 90 Williams, Is Rwanda safe?, 3. 91 Interview with a refugee P. 92 Amnesty, Protecting their Rights, 19. 93 HRW, “Tanzania/Uganda: Prevent Forced Return of Refugees”, 19 Jun. 2009. 94 UNHCR, “Rwandan refugees in Malawi encouraged to return after ‘go-and-see’ visit”, 28 Dec. 2005. 95 Face 2 Face Africa, “Unable to Meet Immigration Requirements, Rwanda Refugees in Zambia Face Forced Repatriation”, 4 Aug. 2015. 96 Williams, Is Rwanda safe?, 3. 86

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local authorities, and one government official stayed with them at the lodge.97 They were allowed to visit only Kigali or other main cities where peace events were held, and were not permitted to go to their place of origin in rural areas or prisons to meet their family members or close friends.98 Visiting hospitals were not allowed either where refugees wanted to confirm whether Hutus can receive the same medical treatment as the Tutsis.99 These restrictions made refugees even more suspicious.100 Those refugees who managed to visit their places of origin recounted shocking stories. One refugee was informed by her uncle that her mother had been in a clandestine prison since 1994, being sexually abused, and as a result, caught HIV.101 Another refugee was shouted by his uncle upon arrival in the village: “How can you come back here? Have you become fool?”102 His uncle continued: “You are lucky to have arrived here without any problem but it is not clear whether you can leave the country safely. You can be arrested here at night. You cannot compare Habyarimana and Kagame times”.103 The same refugee was told by his neighbours that many or all people in Rwanda want to leave the country but they lack financial means to do so.104 In another country in Africa, three Rwandan “RPF agents”105 have been active in organising a “go and see” visit unilaterally, without associating with the host government or the UNHCR.106 Twenty individuals participated in the visit, received cash and passports, and stayed at a luxurious hotel in Kigali.107 Following this visit, one refugee decided to remain in the host country while the rest reportedly repatriated to Rwanda.108 These examples of involuntary repatriation, recycling to the countries of asylum, and the refugees’ reluctance to even visit Rwanda signify their continuous fear and mistrust of the RPF. In some studies, recyclers reported that in addition to having no right to claim their land, a number of refugees were arrested and imprisoned as soon as they arrived in Rwanda, and young men in particular were forced to join “security patrols” at night and eventually disappeared.109 Another recycler escaped from the Gacaca courts on genocide charges, knowing that no Hutu would win the

97

Interview with refugees. XX, YY and ZZ. Interview with refugees XX, YY and ZZ. 99 Interview with a refugee DDD. 100 Interview with refugees XX, YY and ZZ. 101 Interview with a refugee DDD. 102 Interview with a refugee DDD. 103 Interview with a refugee DDD. 104 Interview with a refugee DDD. 105 Interview with a refugee K. 106 Interview with a refugee K. 107 Interview with a refugee K. 108 Interview with a refugee K. 109 Refugee Law Project, “Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees from Uganda”, Mar. 2005, 1; Karooma, “Reluctant to return?”, 20. 98

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case regardless of his or her innocence.110 In another case, the recycler had repatriated with his brother, who was a former driver for a préfet under the Habyarimana regime.111 He and his brother returned to Rwanda under the UNHCR-led voluntary repatriation in 2007, but this individual fled to the host country again after his brother disappeared and other returnees were imprisoned when they arrived in Rwanda.112 In sum, none of the standards for voluntary repatriation, which is composed of legal safety, physical security, material security, and reconciliation,113 has been respected, and the nature of repatriation was far from voluntary.

4.5

Strategies of Rwandan Government and Refugees

The refugee’s strong reluctance to return to Rwanda despite the organised campaign for voluntary repatriation and “go and see” visits must have embarrassed President Kagame. Under what reasonable conditions, then can the Rwandan Government convince refugees to return? The RPF has reportedly deployed a “refugee spy” group.114 Comprised of diplomats, students, and even refugees themselves, members of this group pose variously as Rwandan, Congolese, or Burundian refugees and they infiltrate the host government’s refugee office, the UNHCR, Red Cross, and refugee camps and resettlements.115 This group allegedly supervises and informs the RPF of refugee movements. The group also encourages or convinces refugees to return, and spreads defamatory rumours about refugees.116 These acts are intended to divide and weaken the refugee community, and to threaten and kill them.117 These infiltrations tactic apparently began around 2002–2003, at the time of the promotion of voluntary repatriation.118 The RPF’s former intelligence officer, late Patrick Karegeya, confessed his involvement in organising this infiltration in Zambia where he frequently visited.119

Karooma, “Reluctant to Return?”, 20. Interview with a refugee WW. 112 Interview with a refugee WW. 113 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.4; UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, one-4. 114 Interview with refugees A, B, G, K, OO, RR, SS, UU, VV. 115 HRW, Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living Without Protection in Nairobi and Kampala, 2002, 89; G. Verdirame & B. Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism, New York, Berghahn, 2005, 165. 116 Interview with refugees P, U, X and GG. 117 Interview with refugees P. Z, AA, GG and II. 118 Interview with a refugee P. 119 Interview with a refugee P. 110 111

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During this infiltration, it was suspected that RPF officers collaborated with a Burundian Tutsi UNHCR staff member in one African host country to convince fellow Burundian refugees to spread rumours that Rwandan refugees were génocidaires planning to kill Burundian refugees.120 Reportedly, the RPF officers anticipated that these rumours would stir up resentment among Rwandan refugees towards the Burundians, and trigger violence that the host government could use to justify the expulsion of Rwandan refugees. Such violence did not take place, however, as Rwandan refugees became aware of the deceit.121 In the Ugandan capital Kampala, refugees fear that the receptionists at refugee-related agencies are actually Ugandan nationals or Rwandans who have a strong link with the RPF. In other words, refugees suspect that agencies have been infiltrated by the RPF.122 Therefore, many refugees have difficulty in approaching these offices because they fear their information will be leaked and their life will be in danger.123 This RPF infiltrating the UNHCR and other NGOs already started in 1996–1997 when the RPA’s hunted down refugees in the DRC.124 In another African country, a member of a refugee committee began working for the RPF, most likely because he was threatened by the RPF.125 This refugee was reportedly given gifts by the RPF, which included a new house, motorcycles, and a bar to manage.126 The RPF has convinced its refugee agents to provide complete lists of refugees, their residential addresses, and their registration and student numbers.127 This is likely how confidential refugee data were leaked from government offices, in host countries such as Uganda and Zambia, in and around 2014.128 The RPF has also used similar infiltration tactics in schools, places of work, refugee student associations, and even within refugees’ own families.129 Rwanda is eager to promote its international image and claim that its repatriation policy is aimed at reconciling Hutus and Tutsis.130 Yet, its actions belie sinister intentions and have created a politically hostile relationship between refugees and the Kigali Government. Even the RPF’s ardent supporter Roger Winter (see Chap. 5) has admitted that when it comes to repatriation, Rwanda’s real intentions are evident:

120

Interview with a refugee P. Interview with refugees P, Q, R and S. 122 Interview with refugees H, HH and QQ. 123 Interview with refugees A, H, LL, MM, NN and QQ. 124 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 36–37. 125 Interview with refugees H and HH. 126 Interview with a refugee HH. 127 Interview with refugees P, S and T. 128 Interview with refugees R, Z and AA. 129 Interview with refugees A, D, E,F, G, H, K, M, O, P, Q, R, S, AA, BB, CC, GG, QQ, SS and TT. 130 International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., A Dangerous Impasse, 21. 121

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[T]he repatriation [of] Rwandans […] was always a primary goal of the government. […] for the government, the two primary reasons were politically motivated. Firstly, because the RPF leadership grew up in exile without a solution, it understood that having such a large portion of the Rwandan population outside of the country was a destabilizing factor. Secondly, having the population inside Rwanda was the only way to win its support, or, for those whose support could not be won, to effectively control them. Thus, repatriating was the only realistic means of winning the support of the Rwandan population, and stabilizing the region.131

Indeed, based on his refugee experience, Kagame understands very well the psychology of refugees who may plan to overthrow the regime so that they can eventually return home. It is for this reason that he must have a very strong fear of refugees, in particular of those who were former RPF officers, as they are fully aware of Kagame’s responsibility and involvement in serious crimes committed in Rwanda and the DRC.132 Although Winter was referring to the RPF’s goal in pushing refugees back home from July 1994 to November 1996, the same overall objectives (and tactics) to control Rwandans persist to this day. This explains why refugees have long refused to return. One RPF dissident, however, argued that the RPF has no intention to repatriate all refugees because there is not enough space for them in the country; the government’s real aims are to destabilise and silence the refugee community.133 He argued that the RPF seeks to threaten refugees and wear down their resolve with repeated repatriation calls and invoking cessation and stripping them of their refugee status.134 Since refugees are under constant threat by the Rwandan Government to return against their will, how do Rwandan refugees manage to survive? A significant number of Rwandan refugees have pretended to be Congolese (or Banyamulenge) or Burundian. The refugee committee in one African country estimated that more than 50 per cent of Rwandans have registered as Congolese or Burundian upon arrival.135 A percentage of refugees in Uganda has also easily disguised themselves as Ugandans due to the migrant history from Rwanda.136 According to the refugees, being a Congolese refugee is particularly beneficial and often necessary for survival reasons. The level of assistance provided to the Congolese is more than that of Rwandan refugees137; since 2003 when the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees began, food aid has been cut in several countries while aid for the Congolese continues. Moreover, the UNHCR personnel’s attitude towards Congolese refugees is friendlier than their attitude towards

Winter, “Lancing the Boil”, 128. K. Nyamwasa, P. Karegeya, T. Rudasingwa, and G. Gahima, Rwanda Briefing, Aug. 2010. 133 Interview with a refugee GG. 134 Interview with a refugee GG. 135 Interview with a refugee P. 136 Karooma, “Reluctant to return?”, 16–17. 137 Interview with refugees A, P and R. 131 132

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Rwandans due to their label as génocidaires.138 More importantly, Congolese is one of the few nationalities in Africa eligible to apply for resettlement in third countries.139 However, disguising one’s nationality does not necessarily mean that the refugee’s safety is guaranteed; one refugee, who disguised himself as a Burundian refugee, was still hunted and hurt allegedly by Rwandan agents in several countries.140 There are three ways to disguise refugees’ nationality. First, Rwandan refugees register as Congolese or Burundian refugees upon arrival in the countries of asylum.141 In 1996, following the destruction of refugee camps in eastern DRC, some refugees fled together with Congolese citizens to Uganda and other countries. During this movement, Rwandan refugees began registering as Congolese.142 Among those refugees who managed to escape the forced repatriation from Tanzania, some registered as Burundian and remained in the camps there—though as soon as their identity was discovered, they were forced back to Rwanda in 1997.143 Umutesi also admitted that before leaving the DRC for Europe, she was obliged to obtain a bogus Congolese passport and dress like a Congolese woman.144 Second, even if Rwandan individuals register as Rwandan refugees upon arrival in the countries of asylum, they can bribe the host governments to obtain bogus Congolese refugee ID cards.145 In particular, since before and after the cessation clause was invoked in June 2013 and Rwandan refugees’ identity cards became invalid, selling these Congolese identity cards has become a profitable business for certain governments of asylum.146 Third, regarding those Rwandan refugees in the DRC, many of them reportedly obtained Congolese voting cards for the presidential election in 2006.147 These voting cards helped Rwandan refugees and FDLR members to be recognised as Congolese when they fled to Uganda after 2007.148 Moreover, it is said that some Rwandan refugees in the DRC have registered themselves as Congolese IDPs when IDP camps were officially opened by the UNHCR for the first time in 2007.149

138

Interview with refugees K, M, P and R. With few exceptions, apart from Congolese, Somali is the only nationals who are eligible for resettlement. Interview with refugees A, H, P. R and QQ. 140 Interview with a refugee N disguised as Burundian refugee. 141 Interview with refugees A, J, P. R and MM. 142 Interview with refugees A and MM. 143 Interview with refugees N and R. 144 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 245. 145 Interview with a refugee P. 146 Interview with a refugee P. 147 Interview with a Congolese refugee. 148 Interview with a Congolese refugee. 149 This information was obtained during the author’s assignment in Goma in eastern DRC in 2007–2008. 139

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Thus, they also must have registered as Congolese refugees when they fled the country.150 For Rwandans, disguising as Burundians is simple to do as both Rwanda and Burundi have same population composition (mainly Hutu and Tutsi) and speak similar languages. Likewise, disguising as Congolese is very simple due to the migration history of Rwandans to eastern DRC since the sixteenth century151 and frequent changes of nationality laws in the DRC that resulted in ambiguous nationality to this day.152

4.6

Following the Announcement of the Cessation Clause (October 2009–June 2013)

In October 2009, the UNHCR and all concerned governments announced that the implementation of the cessation clause would come into effect after 31 December 2011. The implementation was eventually delayed to 30 June 2012 and finally to 30 June 2013.153 The Rwandan and Tanzanian governments began requesting the cessation clause to be invoked as early as September 2002, when the UNHCR agreed to promote voluntary repatriation; the UNHCR promised to consider their requests.154 Refugees were offered three options: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and application for citizenship in countries of asylum, or renewal of their refugee status to regain associated UN protection. If one of these options was not pursued, the refugees risked forced repatriation or statelessness. Just like the promotion of voluntary repatriation, the ruling on the cessation clause was highly contested due to the extremely limited number of refugees who were actually willing to voluntarily repatriate, with the exception of those from the DRC (see graph in Sect. 4.8). Reports of ongoing recycling, which were rarely officially registered, also made it difficult to believe that the cessation clause was reasonable or enforceable. In 2004, Amnesty was already opposed “to any whole or partial invocation of the cessation clauses because neither the ‘fundamental character’ of change in Rwanda nor the ‘profound and enduring nature’ of this change

150

Interview with a Congolese refugee. A. Kagame, Un abrégé de l’ethno-histoire du Rwanda, Butare, 1972, cited in K. Vlassenroot and C. Huggins, “Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC”, C. Huggins and J. Clover (eds.), From the Ground Up’: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2005, 128. 152 S. Jackson, “Of ‘Doubtful Nationality’: Political Manipulation of Citizenship in the D. R. Congo”, Citizenship Studies, 11 (5), 2007, 490. 153 It is only in Africa that the cessation clause for Rwandan refugees has been invoked. European governments “have been advised by UNHCR’s European Bureau, not to consider Rwanda as a safe country”. B. Harrell-Bond and G. Cliché-Rivard, “Rwandan refugees face no choice but repatriation”, Open Society, 10 May 2012. 154 Amnesty, Protecting their rights, 14, 26. 151

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has eliminated the ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ that led Rwandese refugees to seek asylum elsewhere”.155 This concern is still valid today. As previously stated, host countries are supposed to assess the impact of those changes on refugees before invoking the cessation clause, but in fact officials from these countries have never visited Rwanda, according to the Rights in Exile Programme.156 Even the UNHCR, whose officials claim that the conditions that have created the refugee situation no longer exist, were not able to share their findings or their analysis of the conditions conducive for repatriation.157 Following the Tripartite Commissions in Uganda in April 2009, which was six months prior to announcing cessation clause, the pressure on Rwandan refugees to return was further heightened on the ground. In Uganda, the “deadlines” for repatriation were established on 31 July 2009 (Tanzania also warned of the same “deadline” on 30 June 2009).158 In June 2009, the governments of Uganda and Rwanda threatened the refugees with forced return, explaining that after the deadline, the remainees would be stripped of their refugee status and treated as “illegal immigrants”.159 Rwandan refugees in Uganda were banned from cultivation, and food rations were halved for those who had been in the settlement for more than four years; in addition, Rwandan refugee children lost access to school.160 This ban was meant to force refugees to repatriate based on the belief that they continued to stay solely because of better living conditions and services in the settlement.161 After this campaign, in July 2010, some 1700 refugees and asylum-seekers were forcefully returned from camps in Uganda; they were gathered around trucks at gunpoint, in a joint operation organised by the governments of Uganda and Rwanda.162 These governments deceived refugees by announcing food distribution, as well as information on the outcome of asylum appeals.163 According to the refugees, 14 lost their lives during the operation. The causes of death included: being strangled by Rwandan officials, shot dead by police, jumping off the truck,

155

Ibid. Rights in Exile Programme, “Open Letter to EXCOM: The Threat of Invoking the Cessation Clause with Particular Reference to Rwanda”, 1 Oct. 2012. 157 Author’s email correspondence with Senior Legal Advisor, Africa Bureau on 6 Nov. 2015. 158 HRW, “Tanzania/Uganda: Prevent Forced Return of Refugees”, 19 Jun. 2009. 159 The New Humanitarian, “Go home, Uganda tells Rwandan refugees”, 4 Aug. 2009. 160 International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., A Dangerous Impasse, 23. 161 F. Ahimbisibwe, “Rwandan Refugees Right in Uganda: Analysis of Law and Practice”, USChina Law Review, 13 (12), 2016, 863. 162 HRW, “Uganda/Rwanda: Halt Forced Returns of Refugees, Uganda Forces More Than 1700 Back to Rwanda”, 17 Jul. 2010. 163 Ibid. 156

4.6 Following the Announcement of the Cessation Clause …

93

flattened by the crowd, and “genitals amputated by barbed wire”.164 Additionally, contrary to official reports, 17 recognised refugees were refouled.165 In 2010, again in Uganda, the UNHCR announced that it would conduct a census of all the nationalities of refugees living in the country. The UNHCR began with Rwandan refugees, asking “If there were peace in Rwanda, would you return to Rwanda?”166 Most Rwandan refugees answered yes, but when a refugee asked for more clarification on the meaning of peace, UNHCR staff merely asked refugees to respond: “Just say yes or no”.167 In the end, the UNHCR did not conduct a census of the refugees of other nationalities, so Rwandan refugees suspected that this census was actually a ruse to justify their return.168 In September 2012, the Zambian Government held individual interviews with the head of each Rwandan refugee family in order to assess their intention of local integration or repatriation. Refugees were asked mainly two questions by government officials and three-month trained lawyers: the reason for their flight and for their refusal to repatriate.169 Some refugees felt that they were treated as if they were criminals, as the questions concerned their possible involvement in the genocide.170 Although the refugees inquired about land and property issues in Rwanda, no explanation was given by the Zambian officials who merely repeated that Rwanda is “peaceful with tremendous development”.171 Overall, it was an intimidating interview for refugees, who were not given any real assurances about how safe Rwanda was.172 Refugees, who should be the primary decision-makers in the process of voluntary repatriation, said: “If Rwanda were really safe, nobody would need to force us to go back. We know more than anybody else how secure or insecure Rwanda is”.173 For some refugees, while information provided by their relatives remaining in Rwanda can be reliable, for other refugees, information by returnees is more reliable than that by refugees’ relatives; this is because of the returnees’ previous experience as refugees.174 Thus, the information given by the UNHCR and Rwandan Government on the situation in Rwanda is hardly trustworthy for refugees. B. Harrell-Bond, “The Cessation Clause Uganda Style”, Keynote Speech Delivered at the Northwestern University Conference on Human Rights, 23 Jan. 2011, 13–14, cited in the Fahamu Refugee Programme, “Rwanda: Cessation of Refugee Status is Unwarranted: Memorandum of Fact and Law”, 22 Sep. 2011, 31. 165 Ibid. 166 Interview with a refugee HH. 167 Interview with a refugee HH. 168 Interview with a refugee HH. 169 Interview with refugees P and R. 170 Interview with refugees P. Q and R. 171 Interview with refugees P, Q and R. 172 Interview with refugee P. 173 Interview with refugees P. U, V and HH. 174 Interview with refugees A, H, P and HH; Karooma, “Reluctant to return?”, 22. 164

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4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate …

In order to protest against the cessation clause, refugee communities in some countries wrote petitions to the UNHCR, explaining how premature the cessation clause was and requesting continued protection from the UN for Rwandans.175 At the same time, refugees did not agree with the UN plan for them to acquire Rwandan passports. They protested with placards that read, “Rwandan passport is slow poison” (see below).176 Refugees took risks to be engaged in such activities; in one case, a member of a refugee committee was kidnapped and raped, allegedly by a Rwandan agent, while collecting signatures for a petition.177

4.7

Security Incidents Faced by Refugees (October 2009–June 2013)

From the time of the announcement of the cessation clause in October 2009 until its actual implementation in June 2013, several violent attacks against high-profile Rwandan exiles and refugees took place, allegedly at the hands of Rwandan operatives. The incidents created an overwhelming chill, and no doubt affected the ordinary refugees’ repatriation, fuelling their scepticism about safe returning home. First, there was an assassination attempt on Kayumba Nyamwasa, Kagame’s former Chief of staff, in South Africa in June 2010. After seeking asylum in South Africa in February 2010, he co-founded the opposition group, RNC, with former Intelligence Chief Patrick Karegeya and RPF’s former Secretary General, Theogene Rudasingwa. They accused Kagame of being a despot and committing serious war crimes against the Rwandan and Congolese people.178 Nyamwasa survived two subsequent murder attempts and another in 2014. He said he was ready to testify about the RPF’s crimes, and was fully aware that he could be assassinated, as Karegeya had been (see below).179 Consequently, his refugee status in South Africa is presently in limbo. Rwanda wants him extradited on terrorism charges, and he was also indicted by Spain on charges of terrorism and war crimes in a case of universal jurisdiction. Second, uncertainty among refugees escalated in Uganda, where the UNHCR failed to protect refugees against a spate of Rwandan Government instigated attacks against high-profile dissidents. In a number of cases, officials in Kigali claimed they

Rwandan Refugees and Asylum Seekers Community in Uganda, “Petition of Rwandan Refugees and Asylum Seekers Living in Uganda”, 2011. Similar actions were taken elsewhere but author was not able to get hold of the petition. 176 Africa Review, “Rwandan passport is slow poison”, 18 Nov. 2013. 177 M. Mutuyimana, “The Wake of Prematurity of the Cessation Clause: Rwandan Government Orchestrating New Forms of Serious Threats against Rwandan Refugees in Uganda”, Jan. 2015, 3. 178 K. Nyamwasa et al., Rwanda’s Briefing, Aug. 2010, 49. 179 Aljazeera, “Q&A: Rwanda's controversial history”, 7 Apr. 2014. 175

4.7 Security Incidents Faced by Refugees (October 2009–June 2013)

95

were acting on Interpol alerts issued for these individuals.180 Charles Ingabire, a journalist refugee and outspoken critic of the RPF, was repeatedly threatened by Rwandan Government agents and was temporarily relocated to a UNHCR’s “Safe House” under 24-h supervision by Ugandan police to ensure his safety. However, several months after moving into this house, he was kicked off the premises by the UNHCR, who considered his claim to be “baseless”.181 The UNHCR informed him that the only solution for Rwandans was to go home.182 In the end, he was murdered in December 2011, allegedly by Rwandan operatives.183 Another alarming case involved Joel Mutabazi, a former bodyguard of Kagame who had faced an assassination attempt in July 2012. He was also living in a UNHCR’s Safe House with his family. However, he was abducted in August 2013 by a Rwandan spy in collaboration with Ugandan police and was brought back to Rwanda, where he was tortured and threatened with death before standing trial on charges of trying to kill the President.184 Mutabazi’s brother Jackson Kalemera was also abducted in Kampala and brought to Rwanda, where he was charged with offences before he disappeared. He was believed to be murdered by the DMI.185 In Europe, several outspoken refugees or dissidents have also been targeted. In 2011, the British police warned two dissidents that their lives could be in danger because the Rwandan Government may be plotting to kill them.186 Sweden expelled a Rwandan diplomat in 2012 who had engaged in “refugee espionage”.187 All these examples suggest that Rwandan refugees have valid reasons for mistrusting Rwandan attempts to bring them home. Regarding legal safety, an opposition party leader, Victoire Ingabire, was accused of promoting genocide ideology and divisionism188 after having stated that Hutu victims of the genocide should be remembered, in addition to Tutsi, and that those who may have killed Hutu must be punished according to the law just like those who killed Tutsi victims. Being a non-refugee, Ingabire returned to Rwanda D. J. Weddi and R. Mutumba, “ISO to Hunt Down Abductors”, New Vision, 10 Mar. 1998. Rwandan Refugees and Asylum Seekers Community in Uganda, “Petition of Rwandese Refugees and Asylum Seekers”, 64. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid, 52. 184 The East African, “Arrests expected to test Kigali-Kampala relations”, 28 Oct. 2017. 185 J. Rever, “Another Rwandan is kidnapped in Africa: Kagame agents suspected”, Digital Journal, 10 Jul. 2015. 186 BBC, “Rwandan exiles in London 'threatened by hitman'”, 21 May 2011. 187 Global Post, “Rwanda News: Sweden expels Rwanda diplomat for spying”, 14 Feb. 2012. 188 According to Ministry of Justice, “[d]ivisionism is […] generally understood as the use of any speech, written statement or action that is likely to divide people or spark conflicts among people, or cause an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination. It is thus considered illegal to do anything that is tantamount to divisionism based on race, tribal, ethnic, religion or region in Rwanda.” Ministry of Justice, The 9th and 10th Periodic Report of the Republic of Rwanda Under the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, period covered by the report 2005 – Jul. 2009, Jul. 2009, 22, cited in Amnesty, Setting the Scene for Elections Two Decades of Silencing Dissent in Rwanda, 7 Jul. 2017, fn 7. 180 181

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4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate …

from the Netherlands in 2010 to run in presidential elections. She was imprisoned in 2010 and denied a fair and impartial trial.189 Although she was granted a presidential pardon in September 2018, the charges and conviction were not dropped. In March 2019, Ingabire’s close aide was found dead in Rwanda.190 Her American lawyer, Peter Erlinder, was also arrested on the same charges during his trip to Rwanda in 2010. In all the aforementioned cases, it was clear that their rights for legal protection and safety, which are basic requirements for voluntary repatriation, were violated.

4.8

UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status

On recommending the cessation clause of Rwandan refugees, the UNHCR’s reasoning is examined based on the UNHCR’s “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for the Rwandan Refugee Situation, including the Applicability of the ‘Ceased Circumstances’ Cessation Clauses” dated 30 December 2011. Its argument can be summarised as follows: 1. The greatest part of the Rwandan refugee population, including those who fled events before the 1994 genocide and the genocide itself, has returned to Rwanda. From August 1994 to November 2011, some 3.2 million Rwandan refugees returned home.191 2. The UNHCR recommends cessation to bring closure a refugee situation resulting from conflict and violence between 1959 and 1998.192 3. Since the 1994 genocide and 1997–1998 insurgency which caused large-scale forced population movements, “Rwanda has undergone rapid, fundamental and crucially positive changes”.193 4. Based on the Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention and in keeping with established principles of international refugee law, there are two categories of refugees who are to be exempted: “(a) refugees who continue to have a well-founded fear of persecution; and (b) persons who have compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country of origin”.194 Each of these points will be explored.

Amnesty, Justice in Jeopardy: The first instance trial of Victoire Ingabire, 25 Mar. 2013. A. Adeoye, “Aide to leading Rwandan opposition politician found dead”, CNN, 11 Mar. 2019. 191 UNHCR, “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy”, para. 11. 192 Ibid, para. 30. 193 Ibid, para. 28. 194 Ibid, para. 33. 189 190

Number of Rwandan refugeesa

2,254,100 1,819,000 469,100 68,000 77,700 88,900 119,100 84,500 75,216 75,270 63,800 116,124 101,551 89,201 78,638 138,733 125,155 116,089 107,676 92,447 89,430 297,315

Year

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015c

450,000 86,000 776,500 178,400 2400 36,000 23,300 16,800 14,300 17,604 10,833 8048 5828 9408 8074 14,780 10,807 8352 10,780 7199 5650 5024

210,000 13,100 506,100 25,700 2600 1000 2200 4700 23,800 470

7 375 414

3174 5701

2568 1586 56

210,000 99,800 200 8,800 4400 500 300 500 600

338,000 39,649 127,000 3,600 1500 700 100

15

63 56 60 40 26 36 37 49 55 18 64

1,500

Number of Rwandan returnees (per country of asylum) DR Congo Tanzania Uganda Burundi Republic of Congo

Table 4.1 Statistics of Rwandan refugees and returnees (1994–2017)

18 7 29 14

125 31 19

Zambia

1,208,000 240,700 1,410,800 220,500 10,900 38,400 26,300 21,700 38,600 18,862 13,488 9713 5971 9501 11,790 20,596 10,906 8524 11,249 7803 5787 5054 (continued)

Totalb

4.8 UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status 97

Number of Rwandan refugeesa

Number of Rwandan returnees (per country of asylum) DR Congo Tanzania Uganda Burundi Republic of Congo Zambia

Totalb

2016 297,785 6066 17 9 6105 278,539 18,110 2017d Total of returnees 1,712,353 801,670 337,881 511,649 2036 252 3,379,359 (1994–2016/7) Total of returnees 128,453 13,881 536 252 145,349 (2003–2016) Compiled by author in collaboration with Minori Nagaki Source UNHCR, Statistical Yearbooks 1994–2016; UNHCR Global Trends 2005–2017 Note In 1992 and 1993, there were 437,400 and 450,500 refugees, respectively. In 1993, there was a total of 400 returnees from DRC and Burundi. Counting refugees pose a challenge owing to the ongoing nature of the influx in emergency situations, among many other reasons. See UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 1998, 5 a Refugee statistics include refugees, asylum seekers (pending cases), and others of concern to UNHCR whom the UNHCR may extend its protection and assistance due to humanitarian ground b The total number for per year does not necessarily match the sum of the number indicated above as there are refugees elsewhere c According to the UNHCR, Global Trends 2015, “The number of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is subject to change based on an ongoing registration exercise. The figure 245,000 was provided by the Government of Democratic Republic of the Congo” d Breakdown per country not available as of March 2019

Year

Table 4.1 (continued)

98 4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate …

4.8 UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status

99

First, to be precise, from August 1994 to October 1995, 700,000 or more old-caseload refugees returned to Rwanda.195 This means that about 2.5 million are new-caseload returnees. With regard to the number and nature of repatriations, since the promotion of voluntary repatriation in 2003, among the whole returnee population, 88 per cent of them were from the DRC (see Table 4.1 and Graphs). Nevertheless, this return was not because of peace and stability in Rwanda as the UNHCR claimed; it had more to do with the fact that refugees in eastern DRC had no other choice than to return because they had not been protected or assisted by the UNHCR since October 1996, after the RPAs attacked refugee camps and hunted them across the country.196 Likewise, in some cases, refugees returned from the DRC a few months after their flight in 1994 for reasons unrelated to safety at home. Refugees were in unfavourable physical condition, enduring ailments such as hunger and sickness, in part due to the confiscation of food supplies by the former FAR soldiers.197

Graph 1: Number of Rwandan returnees per year 1,410,000 1,400,000 1,210,000

1,200,000 240,000

220,000 40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

19 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 1 20 1 1 20 2 1 20 3 1 20 4 1 20 5 1 20 6 17

0

Refugee International, “Repatriation of Rwandans: Findings and Recommendations”, 1 Nov. 1995. 196 Author’s observation and analysis from her UNHCR assignment in Goma, DRC in 2007–2008. 197 UNHCR, Gersony report, 13. 195

4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate …

100

Graph 2: Number of Rwandan refugees per year 2,300,000

2,200,000 1,800,000 1,500,000 500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

19

9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 1 20 1 1 20 2 1 20 3 1 20 4 1 20 5 1 20 6 17

0

Apart from Umutesi’s criticism that the UNHCR’s measure of success was simply the number of returnees, the figures are likely misleading because of the actual nature of that repatriation; much of it was carried out in 1996–1997 from the DRC against the will of refugees—even if the UNHCR, unlike Ogata who clearly admitted as forced return,198 does not acknowledge that their return was forced or involuntary (Graph 1).199 Certain refugees were arbitrarily arrested, disappeared, or killed upon their return to Rwanda, and many have fled the country for the second or third time.200 Therefore, the actual number of refugees who have returned and resettled today “in safety and with dignity” may be much less than 3.2 million. Second, the dividing line of 1998 is highly questionable. As mentioned, during and after the 1994 genocide, the majority of Rwandan refugees are Hutus who fled RPF acts of violence. This implies that so long as the RPF—which was the source of fear, persecution, and displacement for Hutus in 1994—remains in power, refugees will not and cannot return. Most importantly, by making the division of 1998, the UNHCR has indirectly suggested that those who fled after 1998 still have a well-founded fear of persecution. This contradicts its argument that “Rwanda (…) today enjoys an essential level of peace and security” (Graph 2).201 Furthermore, this cut-off date of 1998 cannot be made because refugee migration was not singular, and many refugees have been repeatedly displaced. Additionally,

198

Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, 231. UNHCR, The State of the World Refugees, A Humanitarian Agenda, 146. 200 International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., A Dangerous Impasse, 2. 201 UNHCR, “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy”, para. 28. 199

4.8 UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status

101

regardless of this date, some countries have mandated a blanket cessation to all refugees.202 Certain governments reportedly have not been registering the newly arrived asylum-seekers since the cessation clause was invoked on 30 June 2013.203 Third, regarding “rapid, fundamental, and crucially positive changes” that Rwanda has undergone, the UNHCR claims that steps towards democracy in Rwanda include the following, among many developments: the adoption of a new constitution, holding elections and implementation of Gacaca courts, accession to several human rights treaties, and the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights.204 The UNHCR, however, has merely cited its mechanism as a sign of improvement, but not how these mechanisms functioned. For example, Kagame won presidential elections with 95 and 93 per cent support in 2003 and 2010, respectively (and he won with more than 98 per cent of the vote in August 2017), but independent observers noted that the 2003 election was held in “a climate of permanent fear and apprehension”, and the 2010 election featured a lack of transparency in the tabulation procedure.205 In 2015, two years before the 2017 presidential election when President Kagame’s term was to end, he modified the constitution to allow him to rule until 2034. Moreover, prior to these elections, the RPF banned and arrested members of the most popular and credible opposition parties, such as Victoire Ingabire, Bernard Ntaganda, and Diane Rwigara, and intimidated and accused them of promoting divisionism and genocide ideology, etc.206 Despite government’s call for Rwandans to return, refugee Thomas Nahimana was refused entry into Rwanda to run as a presidential candidate in 2017.207 Notably, the UNHCR’s “Comprehensive Strategy” made no mention of Rwanda’s law on genocide ideology and the arbitrary, often unlawful policies regarding the occupation of land and property—factors which have contributed to refugee fleeing Rwanda and their refusal to return. The illegal occupation of land continues today. When one refugee returned to Rwanda in 2010 under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation campaign, she attempted to claim her three houses, which were occupied by RPF officers, but she was imprisoned for a few days.208 Furthermore, she was treated as a “foreigner”, because she prayed in church in the mother language of the country of asylum she had inhabited for more than ten years. As a woman, she could not be branded as Interahamwe, but merely a 202

Interview with refugees P. Z, AA and QQ. Interview with refugee P and a church group. 204 UNHCR, “Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy”, paras. 6, 28. 205 National Democratic Institute, Assessment of Rwanda’s Pre-electoral Political and the Role of Political Parties, 3–11 Aug. 2003, publication’s date unknown, 2; Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group: Rwanda Presidential Elections, 9 Aug. 2010, 25. 206 Amnesty, Setting the Scene for Elections Two Decades of Silencing Dissent in Rwanda, 6, 13. 207 RFI, “Rwanda: rentrant d'exil pour la présidentielle, un opposant bloqué au Kenya”, 24 Nov. 2016. 208 Interview with a refugee C. 203

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4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate …

stranger.209 After moving from one church to another for six years, she returned to her previous country of asylum.210 Likewise, a man who returned to Rwanda in 2007 found that the RPF occupied two of the three houses previously owned by his parents.211 He stayed at the third house where his brother had been living, but the latter was arrested soon after, suspected of “lodging Interahamwe”, which was considered a crime. The returnee was considered a spy.212 According to the refugees, even if returnees did not claim their properties, the RPF suspected they would claim these in future; thus, returnees do not have the freedom to live even in their family’s homes.213 All these problems demonstrate that the rule of law and right to freedom of expression, which are considered human rights indicators for invoking the cessation clause, have been undermined. This implies that refugees continue to have not only subjective fear but also objective fear. Fourth, as stated in Chap. 1, the general exemption includes those refugees who have compelling reasons based on previous persecution.214 While in some circumstances, the fear of persecution ends upon the refugees’ arrival in the country of asylum, in other situations, persecution continues or even escalates. Both the previous and ongoing persecutions mainly by the Rwandan Government are exactly what the post-genocide refugees have been suffering from (see below), but the ongoing persecution is not highlighted in the UNHCR’s “Guidelines on Exemption Procedures in respect of Cessation Declaration” dated December 2011. To be more specific, according to the UNHCR document, the following Rwandans are in continued need of international protection: (A) Former members of the Habyarimana’s MRND Government and those of the interim government and members of MDR (B) Members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises) “ex-FAR” (C) Deserters/evaders from the Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Defense Force (D) Demobilised RPF/Rwanda Defence Force personnel (E) Persons belonging to proscribed or illegal political groups and the armed wings of such groups (F) Opponents of the government inside the country of origin (G) Journalists/publishers/editors/writers/distributors/newspaper vendors (H) Claims based on deprivation of property and fear of subjection to the Gacaca jurisdiction (I) Persons acquitted of genocide and who fear of being re-arrested (J) Witnesses before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 209

Interview Interview 211 Interview 212 Interview 213 Interview 214 UNHCR, 210

with a refugee C. with a refugee C. with a refugee EE. with a refugee EE. with refugees AA, DD and EE. Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.2.

4.8 UNHCR’s Justification on Cessation Clause of Refugee Status

(K) (L) (M) (N) (O)

103

Victims of particularly egregious crimes and victims of torture Survivors of the genocide Religious persecution Rwandans of mixed ethnicity Other claims of persecution.215

This list reconfirms that all refugees should be exempted from the cessation clause, except for those who committed serious crimes.

4.9

Invocation of Cessation Clause of Refugee Status (June 2013–December 2017)

Understandably, the cessation clause that went into effect on 30 June 2013 was controversial not only because of security incidents reported in the preceding section, but also because the UNHCR itself acknowledged the following in 2011, after announcing in 2009 the recommendation of the cessation clause: “The returnees face extreme poverty,216 as well as land and shelter issues, lack of medical coverage, a dearth of job opportunities”.217 Without material security, how could the cessation clause be implemented, let alone promoting voluntary repatriation, which takes place at a lower threshold of change than that of the cessation clause? This poverty, which is partially caused by the government’s agricultural policy in monocropping for commercial purposes,218 has led to additional displacement of Rwandan people.219 In addition, forceful recruitment of civilians into the ranks of the Rwandan army was reported as a partial cause of flight during this period. In 2013, 16 Rwandan students sought asylum in Uganda to escape forced recruitment to fight in eastern DRC with the RPF-led rebel group M23.220 According to refugees, the RPF’s myriad of strategies to infiltrate groups and institutions in a bid to force refugees to return has intensified since 2014. The RPF began to infiltrate a church known as the Association des Églises de Pentecôte au Rwanda (ADEPR).221 The ADEPR was established during the Habyarimana

UNHCR “International Protection Consideration in Respect of Rwandan Asylum-Seekers and Other Categories of Persons of Concern in Continued Need of International Protection”, Jan. 2004, 1. 216 Regarding poverty which has been manipulated, see France 24, “Rwanda Accused of Manipulating Poverty Statistics”, 2 Nov. 2015. 217 UNHCR, Rwanda in Global Appeal 2011 Update, 2011, 35. 218 A. Ansoms, “Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Economic Reconstruction: The Mismatch between Elite Ambitions and Rural Realities”, Straus and Waldorf (eds.), Remaking Rwanda, 243. 219 Interview with refugees U, HH. 220 Star Tribune, “16 Rwandan students seek asylum in Uganda over for Congolese M23 rebels”, 17 Jun. 2013. 221 Interview with refugees H, Q. 215

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4 Post-Genocide Refugees’ Continued Refusal to Repatriate …

regime and frequented by many devoted Hutu churchgoers.222 The RPF has dismissed Hutu pastors and replaced them with Tutsi and RPF-sided Hutu pastors.223 The Rwandan Government must be fully aware that religious faith and places of worship are the last resort for many refugees, who have been betrayed by the UNHCR and other governments. These pastors, just like the RPF agents, have convinced the refugees to mobilise other refugees to abandon their refugee status and to visit and return to Rwanda.224 After the cessation clause was invoked in June 2013, very few have returned to Rwanda. The UNHCR raised the same suspicions it had from 1994 to 1996 that “the majority of refugees are being held hostage by ‘refugee leaders,’ who are organizing opposition to return in the hope of evading judicial proceedings”,225 and “a small number of refugees did repatriate in conditions of secrecy and on an individual basis so as to avoid community reprisals”.226 However, the UNHCR’s argument is not convincing. After former refugee leader Mukantabana was reportedly co-opted by the Rwandan Government to convince refugees to return,227 very few refugees in fact did return. The notable exception was the vulnerable groups with a chronic disease whose medical aid stopped in 2010 by the UNHCR’s implementing partner and others who were allegedly bribed by the Rwandan Government.228 The vast majority of refugees did not repatriate because they mistrusted Mukantabana, suspecting her of being a double agent, both a refugee leader and coordinator working closely with the RPF.229 After a repatriation campaign was launched in 2016, only 11 out of 9200 refugees opted for repatriation.230 This was in spite of the fact that Mukantabana had been actively promoting repatriation as the Minister of Refugee Affairs from 2013 to August 2017.231 As of January 2018, in Republic of the Congo, only 802 maintained their refugee status, 104 repatriated to Rwanda, and 18 opted for local integration by applying Rwandan passports.232 The rest of 8000 refugees remained without any status since 1 January 2018 when the cessation finally came into effect.

222

Interview with refugees H and QQ. Interview with refugees H and QQ. 224 Interview with a refugee QQ. 225 Long, “Back to where you once belonged”, para. 192. 226 Ibid. 227 Interview with refugees Z, AA, BB, CC and FF. 228 It is unclear why medical assistance stopped, but refugees suspected that Mukantabana, who worked as refugees’ translator for the UNHCR and NGOs, deliberately mistranslated as a way to force refugees to repatriate. Interview with refugees C, AA and BB. 229 Interview with refugees Z, AA and CC. 230 Africatime.com, “Les réfugiés rwandais au Congo invités à choisir entre intégration ou rapatriement”, 28 Sep. 2017. 231 She repatriated to Rwanda in 2011. Jeune Afrique, “Rwanda: avec Séraphine Mukantabana, tous les chemins mènent à Kigali”, 5 Jul. 2013. 232 RFI, “Congo-B.: polémique autour de la question des ex-réfugiés rwandais”, 25 Jan. 2018. 223

4.9 Invocation of Cessation Clause of Refugee …

105

In Zambia, 25 Rwandans are known to have returned since 2013, but after some time, 15 of them went back to Zambia and to other countries.233 According to one of the recyclers, family members were separated upon arrival in Rwanda, and all adult males were assumed to have been killed.234 During this process, Rwandan soldiers said that they were “tired of killing”, so they requested cash to release some returnees.235 In another country in Africa, one refugee returned to Rwanda in 2014 after having been promised a prominent position at the Ministry of Justice.236 He left behind his wife and children, who were hesitant to go with him.237 Upon arrival, he was given no job and could not get medical treatment in Rwanda due to a lack of documents. He eventually died.238 Even for refugees who have opted for local integration, certain host countries have required that they apply for a Rwandan passport. Refugees categorically refused this application, as it implies that the applicant as well as his/her family and relatives would be under constant surveillance by the Rwandan Government239; on the four-page passport application form, four names of family members who live inside of Rwanda, and another four who live outside, must be given.240 Without this passport, the refugee cannot continue to study or seek employment, and he or she could be expelled to Rwanda.241 Additionally, “refugee spies” began to sensitise the refugees to apply for Rwandan passports in order to achieve local integration.242 The UNHCR has also pressed refugees to obtain these passports or to repatriate.243

4.10

Security Incidents Faced by Refugees (June 2013– December 2017)

Following the invocation of the cessation clause in June 2013, the main incident involving Rwandan refugees was the assassination of Karegeya in South Africa on New Year’s Eve in 2013. Karegeya and Nyamwasa, former war comrades and refugees in Uganda, had worked closely with Kagame for thirty years in

233

Interview Interview 235 Interview 236 Interview 237 Interview 238 Interview 239 Interview 240 Interview 241 Interview 242 Interview 243 Interview 234

with with with with with with with with with with with

a refugee P. a refugee P. refugees P and PP. a refugee K. a refugee K. a refugee K. refugees P and R. a refugee P. refugees P. Q and R. refugees P, Q, R, S, Z, AA, BB and CC. refugees A, P, Q, R, Z, AA, BB, CC and OO.

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intelligence in the NRA and RPF. Karegeya’s murder may have been related to the intention of French Judge Trévidic to obtain Karegeya’s testimony.244 In July 2013, in an interview with Radio France Internationale, Karegeya was asked whether he had proof that Kagame was behind the assassination of President Habyarimana: We are not like those investigators [Trévidic], who said the missile has come from Kanombé [military camp of the FAR]. We know where the missiles came from, who transported it and who shot it. We are not speculating but speaking something that we know.245

The RPF approached a demobilised RPF officer in Uganda, who had known the two for years, and another unemployed Rwandan refugee to convince them to assassinate Nyamwasa and Karegeya.246 Both of these individuals refused to cooperate in the murder.247 The Rwandan Government likely assumed that refugees in vulnerable situations would have easily accepted any kind of work—including murder. Before resorting to violence against his opponents, President Kagame had attempted to ostracise them and accuse them of crimes. He branded Karegeya and Nyamwasa as “terrorists” and cancelled their Rwandan passports for having criticised the government.248 Other RPF dissidents and former civil servants who fled have seen their passports cancelled and were prevented from obtaining refugee status or being naturalised in their countries of asylum.249 A more recent case of an RPF deserter targeted for assassination was Emile Garifita, a former Bodyguard of President Kagame, who was kidnapped in November 2014. Gafirita was slated to testify before the French court that he had transported missiles used to shoot down the presidential plane in 1994.250 He intended to testify before international authorities in connection with RPF crimes and would ultimately be eliminated. Shortly after Judge Trévidic identified Gafirita as a future witness in the inquiry, he was kidnapped in Nairobi by a group of armed men, taken to the military barracks on the outskirts of Kigali, and presumably killed.251 At the same time, ordinary refugees continued to be targeted. In Zambia, the local population in April 2016 attacked hundreds of shops and properties of Rwandan Le Monde, “Le Rwanda ouvre une enquête sur le rôle de responsables français dans le genocide”, 29 Nov. 2016. 245 RFI, “Patrick Karegeya: “Nous savons d’où les missiles sont partis»”, 9 Jul. 2013 (author’s translation). 246 J. Rever and G. York, “Assassination in Africa: Inside the plots to kill Rwanda’s dissidents”, The Globe and Mail, 2 May 2014. 247 Ibid. 248 Kingston “Bringing Rwandan Refugees ‘Home’”, 18; Mail & Guardian, “Rwanda cancels exiles' passports”, 10 Nov. 2012. 249 Interview with refugee X. 250 J. Rever, “Witness in French inquiry into 1994 Rwanda plane crash disappears”, Digital Journal, 20 Nov. 2014. 251 Rever, “Deconstructing the Conspiracy”. 244

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refugees, who were accused of engaging in ritual killings.252 According to the refugees, the RPF was responsible for these attacks and covered up the evidence.253 In the Republic of the Congo, buses and minibuses owned by a Rwandan refugee businessman were burned in March 2017.254 Refugees claimed the Rwandan was bent on threatening or destroying refugee livelihoods and was likely behind these incidents.255 In camps in western Tanzania, Rwandan security operatives are regularly accused of harassing refugees.256 These incidents are rarely reported because of heightened security concerns and diplomatic relations between Rwanda and Tanzania under President John Magufuli257; his policy is different from that of his predecessor Kikwete who was known to be more critical about Kagame.258 International staff have difficulty accessing remote area in western Tanzania due to shortage of transport means which in part explains why these issues are not well known. Despite daunting challenges in invoking the cessation clause, an agreement on “Comprehensive Solutions Strategy” was nevertheless inked on October 2015 between the UNHCR and the governments of Rwanda and several asylum countries in Africa. These asylum countries included Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the DRC, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The Comprehensive Solutions Strategy for Rwandan refugees was concluded on 31 December 2017.259 This implies that refugees who remain in their countries of asylum can be expelled any time after 2018. Apart from these security incidents, Rwandan Government’s attitude needs to be analysed, which equally prevent refugees’ return.

4.11

President Kagame’s Attitude Vis-à-Vis Refugees

President Kagame’s attitude vis-à-vis Rwandan refugees is evident in his speeches, which have greatly influenced refugees’ attitude towards returning home.260 Three of the President’s speeches should be examined. International Business Times, “Zambia: Xenophobic attacks target Rwandan shop owners accused of ritual killings”, 18 Apr. 2016, available at: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/zambia-xenophobicattacks-target-rwandan-shop-owners-accused-ritual-killings-1555447 (last visited 10 Oct. 2018). 253 Interview with refugees P. Q and R. 254 Le Troubadour (Republic of the Congo), “Y’aurait-il une guéguerre entre les réfugiés rwandais au Congo?”, No. 115, 24 Mar. 2017. 255 Interview with refugees P, Q, S and AA. 256 Interview with a refugee RR. 257 Interview with a refugee RR. 258 The East African, “Kagame speaks out on Kikwete's call for negotiations with FDLR rebels”, 10 Jun. 2013. 259 UNHCR “Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Solutions Strategy for Rwandan Refugees: Joint Communique”, 2 Oct. 2015. 260 Interview with refugees K, P, U, HH, II and KK. 252

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On the 13th anniversary of the genocide on 7 April 2007, Kagame gave a shocking speech, in which he castigated the international community and expressed regret for not having eliminated more Rwandan “killers” when he had the chance. He accused France of having protected the killers during Operation Turquoise and then letting them flee to Congo: The international community has the nerve to say these people should be prosecuted. But why, what gives them this right? There is no such right, because it’s not fair and there is no legal basis for them to be prosecuted. There is only one thing that saddens me. I regret only one thing. It’s that the events of the genocide occurred very quickly and we did not have enough time to punish those who killed. This is the only sin I committed. We did not do what was necessary. Those who killed, in particular those who were in Operation Turquoise, fled before I was able to see them, before we met up with them. We should have eradicated all the fury in them, so that they return home with something from Rwanda.261

Kagame accused the international community of failing to stop the violence and France in particular for their supposed complicity in the genocide. His accusation against France came less than six months after French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière had pinned the assassination of Habyarimana on Kagame and issued arrest warrants against several of his senior RPF officers. Hutu refugees were thoroughly frightened by Kagame’s violent rhetoric. They believed that his use of the words punish and eradicate meant he wanted to imprison or kill Hutu refugees and returnees.262 Additionally, according to one Hutu refugee, this speech officialised the narrative that Hutus were criminals, and denied Hutu’s presence.263 This refugee started to be accused in his workplace at a Ministry and his neighbourhood in Kigali that “there is not a place for you here”; this accusation led him to flee the country.264 In another speech on 13 April 2010, during a swearing in several military officials and James Kabarebe as Defence Minister, Kagame likened RPF officers who broke ranks and fled the country to excrement: People fleeing are like the waste being excreted from the body. In this case, that means that the country has filtered. […] Those who work for the benefit of the country, and who are aware of their role, the country owns them and they live there. [However], the country rejects the waste outside. This is done automatically.265

It is assumed that President Kagame wanted to warn or threaten Kabarebe and other senior military officers against fleeing the country, as Nyamwasa had done.

“Discours de son Excellence le président de la République Paul Kagame prononcé à Murambi, le 7 avril 2007”, (author’s translation), available at: http://www.rwamucyo.com/uploads/media/ 20070407-Discours_de_Paul_Kagame_Murambi.pdf (last visited on 15 Apr. 2018). 262 Interview with refugees P, U and II. 263 Interview with refugee NN. 264 Interview with refugee NN. 265 Rwandinfo_ENG, “Kagame: “Rwandan exiled officials are like excreted human waste”, 14 Apr. 2010, available at: http://rwandinfo.com/eng/kagame-rwandan-exiled-officials-are-like-excretedhuman-waste/ (last visited 30 Apr. 2018) (refugee’s translation into French, and author’s translation into English). 261

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In a third speech on 12 January 2014, less than two weeks after Karegeya’s murder, President Kagame told a national prayer breakfast: “You cannot betray Rwanda and get away with it. There are consequences for betraying your country. […] I cannot be apologetic about that if you know the grenades that have been thrown on our streets killing Rwandan children. […] Anyone who betrays our cause or wishes our people ill will fall victim. What remains to be seen is how you fall victim”.266 This betrayal speech was reiterated during Kagame’s visit to Nairobi a few weeks later. After stating he had no knowledge of any political assassinations carried out by his security forces, Kagame said: When you betray the government, you betray the people of Rwanda. The fact that these people live in exile has consequences. They are not at peace. Many of them tend to die. People die but these same people who die, die from different causes. These Karegeyas and other belong to an organisation that has been killing people in Rwanda. There’s evidence. A mountain of evidence.267

Many refugees have said that Kagame’s public outburst of hostility towards high-profile dissidents and ordinary refugees has made them feel psychologically insecure.

4.12

Refugees’ Psychological Insecurity

While acts of violence and exposure to conflict are known causes of fear and trauma, the psychological impact of other experiences such as forced repatriation and cessation of refugee status has been poorly examined and under-researched. The UNHCR documents, such as the Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation and the Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, stipulate only legal, physical, and material security.268 The UNHCR’s The State of the World’s Refugees (1997) discusses psychological security, but only that of returnees and not of refugees.269 The dreadful experiences suffered by Rwandan refugees after the civil war and genocide have taken a toll on their psychology. Understanding this is essential when assessing the prospects of repatriation; otherwise, recycling will continue to occur. To trace the history, the fear of persecution among Rwandan refugees started in 1990, when they witnessed the RPF’s systematic killing of civilians during the civil war, followed by the genocide in Rwanda. This fear continued in neighbouring countries, notably in the DRC, due to continuous threats by RPF agents based in

BBC, “Rwanda's President Paul Kagame warns traitors”, 13 Jan. 2014. Daily Nation, “Kagame: We’re not hunting down defectors,” 21 Jan. 2014. 268 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, para. 2.4.; UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, Geneva, May 2004, one-3. 269 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, 155. 266 267

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refugee camps, followed by the destruction of refugee camps and the subsequent “genocide” orchestrated by the RPA. During the refugees’ flight to western DRC in 1997, even the UNHCR instilled fear in them by hunting and threatening them. Upon their forced return to Rwanda in 1996–1997, many returnees were victimised by arbitrary arrest, disappearance, and killing, which made some refugee population flee the country again. For more than 15 years, the Rwandan Government has allegedly infiltrated Rwandan refugee organisations in host countries in a bid to threaten, destabilise and kill refugees, and convince refugees to return home, at the time of the promotion of voluntary repatriation. This is why many refugees have continued to flee from one country to another or within the same host country. Despite the refugees’ fear of returning, the UNHCR has insisted on promoting voluntary repatriation, followed by the invocation of the cessation clause of refugee status or, in other words, mandated repatriation or deportation. When the cessation clause was invoked in 2013, the fear among refugees peaked. Some said they felt “half dead”, not knowing what to do, because they saw no solution.270 High school and university students were also affected. Their study permits became invalid once the cessation clause was invoked, and they tried to hide the fact that they had illegal status. As a result, many of them were so frightened of being expelled that they could not concentrate on their studies.271 One parent complained that his bright high-school-student son cannot continue his studies due to lack of document.272 Another refugee, with tears in her eyes, described her feelings when she first heard about the cessation clause imposed on Rwandan refugees: “We fled from the Rwandan government out of fear, so why does this cessation clause have to be invoked? Where can we go? Do we exist in this planet?”273 For refugees, the cessation clause has meant that their presence in this world is denied. Refugees’ fear and insecurity were particularly acute whenever their family members, friends, and high-profile dissidents were threatened, killed, or faced with attempted deportation, allegedly by the Rwandan Government.274 Many refugees expressed their “death fatigue”.275 They simply wanted the killing of Rwandans to stop; all they wanted was to be assured of their basic right to life.276 Some refugees were so worried about being expelled that they did not stay in their shelter, instead hiding and sleeping in the bush for several months.277 Only one refugee whom I interviewed downplayed his fear, pegging his it at “50 per cent”. He explained he could manage his anxiety as long as he remained silent and did not participate in

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refugees E, F, G, H, I and Z. a refugee T. a refugee R. refugee A. refugees H, P and HH. refugees B, H, G and W. refugees B, H, P, W and HH. refugees A, MM and OO.

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any events organised by any Rwandans, where RPF spies could be present.278 He has never called his remaining family members in Rwanda since his flight in 2007 due to his fear of wiretapping.279 To make matters worse, the UNSC acknowledged in 2014, 20 years after the genocide, that it was a “genocide against Tutsi”, referring to one specific group as génocidaires; the “genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda” was followed by the phrase “during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed”.280 While the deep suffering of Tutsi victims deserves attention, it is worth noting that the official recognition by the UN has made the lives of Hutus more difficult worldwide; one Hutu refugee lamented that “we Hutus have no future”.281 This suffering of Hutus is not well known; some Hutu parents have disguised their nationalities and therefore have difficulty in sharing their heritage and customs with their children.282 Hutus as a group have also suffered as a result of being forced to conceal their sorrow and tears. Umutesi described it in the following terms: When I denounced the crimes of the RPF, I was treated like a Hutu extremist. For the most part, to have some peace, I had to bear my sorrow in silence. It was the same for all of the victims of the massacres no matter whether they were victims of the RPF rebels or victims of angry Hutu civilians and soldiers. No one could speak out loud about his or her pain. Only the victims were blamed. The killer had all the rights.283

All these factors—Hutus being labelled génocidaires, Hutus hiding their identity and pain, and their “amplified silences”284—imply that Hutu identity can be gradually weakened or eventually destroyed. The destruction of group identity requires strong attention, which was in fact a concern of Raphael Lemkin, the founder of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.285 The combined actions of the Rwandan Government and the policies imposed by the UN made refugees not only fearful and insecure but also angry, distressed, frustrated, and suspicious. These sentiments have affected refugees’ daily lives. Some refugees are even afraid to eat out or to receive medical treatment, believing that restaurants and medical facilities could be infiltrated by RPF agents, who could

278

Interview with a refugee NN. Interview with a refugee NN. 280 UNSC, S/RES/2150, 16 Apr. 2014. 281 Interview with refugees U. 282 Interview with refugees B and P. 283 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 34. 284 Jennie Burnet coined this term to refer to the many experiences of Rwandans that are excluded from discourse. Burnet, “Genocide Lives in Is: Amplified silence and the Politics of Memory in Rwanda”, Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 2005, 155-174, cited in King, “From Data Problems to Data Points”, 132. 285 A. Weiss-Wendt, Raphael Lemkin and the UN Genocide Convention, Oslo, HL-Senteret, Senter for studier av Holocaust og livssynminoriteter, 2011, 9. 279

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inject them with poison.286 A few people have trauma so severe that just hearing the word “Rwanda” makes them nervous.287 Additionally, refugees of mixed Hutu/ Tutsi parentage suffer, not least if the father worked for the FAR. These refugees cannot belong to either Hutu or Tutsi community because of strong suspicion from both groups.288 Overall, refugees’ psychological insecurity is in part related to the lack of attention on the part of the international community. Refugees feel they have been completely abandoned and betrayed by the international community for more than 25 years.289 In the light of the crimes and other stark violations of human rights by the RPF, how could the world lack the political will to stop the atrocities and protect refugees?

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refugees A. K and MM. refugees B and H. a refugee LL. refugees D. E. H, I, K, P, R, U, V, BB, HH, OO, RR and WW.

Chapter 5

US Responsibility in the Great Lakes Regional Power Dynamics and Rwandan Refugees

As elaborated upon in Chaps. 3 and 4, conditions for refugees to return to Rwanda today are not conducive, and a new influx of refugees from Rwanda has been reported. Despite that, the UNHCR recommended—or rather, imposed—the following policy implementations: forced repatriation or refoulement from the DRC and Tanzania in 1996–1997, promotion of voluntary repatriation in 2002–2003, invocation of the cessation clause in 2013, which implies “mandated repatriation”, and finally, the end of the Comprehensive Solutions Strategy at the end of 2017. All these consistent and controversial policies raise the question: what are the motivations of the UNHCR and the Global North regarding Rwanda and its refugees? In spite of some fragmentary data on the US policies and action in Rwanda and the DRC, this chapter aims to explore the US interest and involvement in the Great Lakes region, which has affected the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. It should be recalled that the UNHCR is a donor-dependent organisation, both financially and in terms of policy making.1 Among the Global North donor countries, the role of the US merits particular examination. While the role of France—formerly a strong ally of the Habyarimana regime—before and during the genocide has been studied and criticised, the equal or greater responsibilities of the US, which has been a strong supporter of the RPF even before its seizing power in 1994, have not been fully addressed. Moreover, as discussed in Chap. 1, the US has been influential in creating refugee policies and has often pursued foreign policy objectives on the ground with the help of NGOs. In this chapter, after reviewing the US and France’s respective interests in the Great Lakes region, I will explore US action and inaction before and during the genocide in Rwanda. I would also examine the US role in fuelling forced repatriation and assisting operations that led to the massacres of refugees in 1996–1997 in the DRC and the issues of US complicity in the RPA’s crimes.

1

Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, 7–8.

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US Interests in the Congo

The US’s historical relationship with Africa can generally be described as “indifference and neglect, punctuated by flurries of interest and action”.2 This is largely due to the US’s absence of colonial ties, but also because of the role of European countries who had colonised most of Africa.3 Despite its known indifference towards Africa, the US was the first State in the 1880s to acknowledge the International Association of the Congo as an independent, sovereign entity, which strengthened the efforts of King Leopold of Belgium to establish the Congo Free State.4 What brought these two countries closer were significant Belgian-American uranium trade deals, which ultimately gave Belgium a significant role in the Cold War.5 Belgium’s diplomatic significance to the US grew in relation to the Congo as it controlled the largest deposit of uranium in the world at the dawn of the age of nuclear power.6 Unlike Europe, Africa was not a high priority for the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union.7 However, in the late 1950s, as the US was concerned that the decolonisation process would allow the Soviet Union to make allies in Africa, the US was determined to prevent this.8 One of those directly affected was Patrice Lumumba, the country’s first legally elected prime minister and nationalist leader. In August 1960, Lumumba secretly requested military aid from the Soviet Union to help suppress a secessionist movement in the province of Katanga.9 After Lumumba turned to the Soviets for their support, the US embassy and the CIA began to plan his assassination.10 In 1965, Washington succeeded in placing in power the pro-US Mobutu, who facilitated wielding “Anglo-Saxon influence” in the largest country of francophone Africa.11 Already, in 1957, when Mobutu was working as a journalist, he was hired as an informer for the Belgian intelligence service and was retained as an informer

2

P. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 5–8, cited in C. Alden, “From Neglect to ‘Virtual Engagement’: The United States and its New Paradigm for Africa”, African Affairs, 99(396), 2000, 355. 3 Alden, “From Neglect to ‘Virtual Engagement’”, 356. 4 J. E. Helmreich, United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940–1960, London, Associated University Presses, 1998, 15. 5 Ibid, 29. 6 Ibid, 16. 7 B. E. Whitaker & J. F. Clark, Africa’s International Relations: Balancing Domestic & Global Interests, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2018, 49. 8 Ibid, 48–49. 9 Ibid, 59. 10 Ibid, 60. 11 P. Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa,” Political Science Quarterly, 115 (3), 2000, 400.

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for the CIA.12 The Mobutu regime enjoyed strong external support from the US, France, Belgium, and others, as the Congo had a “moral commitment” to its US allies in the context of the Cold War.13 Most importantly, Congo was needed to promote Western interests in Central and Southern Africa.14 According to scholar George Nzongola-Ntalaja, in order for the US-led international bourgeoisie to break the Belgian colonial monopoly of the Congolese economy, the Mobutu had to become their instrument.15 Three main changes in US foreign policy vis-à-vis post-Cold War Africa were observed. First, newer challenges of democracy and human rights in Africa had been emphasised by US President Bill Clinton,16 as articulated by French President Mitterrand. Clinton’s intervention in the Somali crisis in 1992 was “the first real test of US policy towards in Africa in the post-Cold War era”.17 However, the killings of 18 US soldiers in October 1993 became a nightmare for the US military. Second, the presence of Mobutu was no longer necessary, and he was eventually abandoned by the US. The Clinton administration wanted to ally instead with a new generation of leaders, Museveni, Kagame, and Kabila—for the latter at least initially—as well as Ethiopian Meles Zenawi, Eritrean Isaias Afweki while promoting an “African renaissance”.18 These leaders were supported by the Clinton administration because of “their ability to maintain stability and their commitment to the creation of ‘responsible and accountable’ governments”.19 The Clinton administration began providing military vehicles and other equipment to its allies, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, in order to help defend themselves against terrorist incursions from Sudan (see below).20 Tanks, grenades, and other weapons donated by these countries were transferred to the RPA shortly before its invasion of the Congo.21 Third, the US has been concerned about Sudan, an Islamic regional power and the largest country on the African continent until South Sudan became independent in 2011. The US concern was based on two factors. Starting in 1989, when Omar al-Bashir became the President of Sudan, he began to expand Islamic influence in Africa and the Middle East.22 Bashir sided with Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991, 12

G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History, London: Zed Books, 2007, 143–144. 13 Ibid, 160. 14 Ibid, 161. 15 Ibid, 147. 16 J. F. Clark, “The Clinton Administration and Africa: White House Involvement and the Foreign Affairs Bureaucracies”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 26 (2), 1998, 8–9. 17 Whitaker & Clark, Africa’s International Relations, 255–256. 18 P. J. Schraeder, “Guest Editor’s Introduction: Trends and Transformation in the Clinton Administration’s Foreign Policy toward Africa (1993-1999)”, A Journal of Opinion, 26 (2), 3. 19 Ibid. 20 Epstein, Another Fine Mess, 131. 21 Ibid. 22 R. P. Winter, “Refugees, War and Famine in the Sudan,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion, XIX (2), 1991, 59.

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and Sudan hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996, during which time al-Qaeda bombed the World Trade Centre in New York.23 Following the bombing of the two US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, the US increased its focus on East Africa in order to counter Islamic subversion.24 Sudan has also been regarded as a threat by Israel due to Sudan’s potential support of Israel’s enemies.25 In order to curb Sudan, Uganda became geostrategically important, at least for Israel, as it shares a lengthy border with Sudan, which was used as the entry point to Khartoum.26 Therefore, Uganda has been used by the US to provide arms to the south Sudanese rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), founded in 1983.27 Uganda also became one of the donor darling countries. From 1989 to 1994, bilateral foreign aid doubled, from US $179.9 million to $342.7 million, and donor interest in political events also grew.28

5.2

France’s Interest in Rwanda and Congo

While France has long had a strong interest in the Congo, which is mineral-rich and the largest francophone country outside France, it also started to develop an interest in Rwanda in 1960 when the country began the process of independence.29 Rwanda under the Kayibanda regime was perceived by France as a francophone outpost.30 The report by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1963 clarified the geostrategic importance of Rwanda: Situated at the bridge between francophone Africa and anglophone East Africa, Rwanda can contribute effectively in the coming years to the development of French influence. From its geographic location, it is able to build a bridge between Madagascar and francophone Africa. In addition, its demographic growth and the necessary emigration can result in a significant instrument of cultural penetration in neighbouring English-speaking countries: Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika [today Tanzania].31 J. Mayotte, “Civil War in Sudan: The Paradox of Human Rights and National Sovereignty,” Journal of International Affairs, 27 (2), Winter 1994, 521; Whitaker & Clark, Africa’s International Relations, 195 n17. 24 F. Ngolet, “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire,” Africa Today, 47 (1), 2000, 82. 25 P. Péan, Carnages: Les Guerres Secrètes des grandes puissances en Afrique, Paris, Fayard, 2010, 277–299. 26 Ibid, 219–249. 27 Ngolet, “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire”, 71; SPLM has also received support from Uganda and Ethiopia. Clark, “The Clinton Administration and Africa”, 10. 28 E. Hauser, “Uganda relations with Western donors in the 1990 s: what impact on democratisation?”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (4), 1999, 626. 29 O. Thimonier, “Aux sources de la coopération franco-rwandaise”, Golias magazine no 101, 14 Mar.-Apr. 2005, cited in Survie, La Complicité de la France, 60. 30 Survie, La Complicité de la France, 60. 31 Rapport de mission de Bertrand Dufourcq, cited in Survie, La Complicité de la France, 60–61, (author’s translation). 23

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However, in July 1973, when Habyarimana seized power through a coup d’état, a new era between the two countries started.32 In July 1975, a Franco-Rwandan military assistance agreement was signed to organise and train the Rwandan police gendarmerie; France had similar bilateral agreements with 21 other States.33 In the 1970s and 1980s, the French Government sought to reassert its declining international significance through increased intervention in Africa.34 The Mitterrand and Habyarimana families developed a close personal relationship, in particular through Mitterrand’s son, which helped serve Rwandan Government interests in French circles.35 As a result of these factors, France expanded its development support to Rwanda in the 1980s.36 The RPF’s invasion in 1990 legitimised French support of the Habyarimana regime.37 The 1975 accord established provisions for French military assistance to the Rwandan Government during the Rwandan civil war.38 However, French troops left Rwanda in December 1993, acquiescing to the RPF’s demands. France, despite having helped broker the Arusha Accords, was accused of providing arms and military training to the FAR before 1994, which was said to facilitate the 1994 genocide.39 As soon as massive killings started in April 1994, The New York Times pointed to a $6 million shipment of weapons from Egypt to Rwanda in 1992, a transaction that was guaranteed by the French bank Credit Lyonnais.40 On 23 June 1994, when French troops launched Operation Turquoise in western Rwanda, observers strongly suspected that it was a thinly veiled attempt to allow former Rwandan army soldiers and Hutu militia to escape to eastern DRC.41 The area around Goma, in DRC, served as a rear base for Operation Turquoise, which provided food aid and other supplies for refugees arriving in eastern DRC, and as critics alleged, gave sustenance to fleeing former FAR and others suspected of committing genocide

O. Thimonier, “Habyarimana, un ami de la famille”, Golias magazine, no 101, 23 Mar.-Apr. 2005. 33 Survie, La Complicité de la France, 62; M. McNulty, “France’s Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double Discrediting”, International Peacekeeping, 4 (3), Autumn 1997, 29–30. 34 T. Longman, “Rwanda: Democratization and Disorder: Political Transformation and Social Deterioration”, J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier eds. Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Colorado Westview Press, 1997, 296. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 McNulty, “France’s Role in Rwanda”, 30–31. 38 Assemblée nationale français, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990–1994), Rapport no 1271, Paris, 1998, 27. 39 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 93. 40 F. Smyth, “French Guns, Rwandan Blood”, The New York Times, 14 Apr. 1994. 41 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 520. 32

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against Tutsis.42 The same critics argued that France tried to prevent the RPF’s victory and quash an anglophone incursion in Rwanda; many of the RPF members had grown up in Uganda and were anglophone.43 However, according to the investigative journalist Charles Onana, who consulted Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and accessed documents from Operation Turquoise and the CIA, the French army neither facilitated the escape of Hutu military forces to the DRC nor did it provide arms to the FAR.44 Before the RPF advanced towards western Rwanda, the members of the interim Government already moved on their own to the Congo, passing through the Safe Humanitarian Zone.45 French Parliamentary Commission also concluded that during the Operation Turquoise, the exodus of members of the interim Government responsible for genocide did not take place.46 In 1996, during the US military and political intervention in the DRC (see below), France, under the pretext of aiding refugees in eastern Congo through the MNF (multinational force; see below),47 attempted to support Mobutu—although he had been ill for some time—including providing covert military aid, in order to keep him in power.48 French policy was driven by the DRC’s status as the most populous francophone country in Africa,49 and France was most likely keen to control the post-Mobutu era.50 The DRC was therefore seen as a linchpin to strengthen French geopolitical interests, just like Rwanda in 1994.51

42

Ibid. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 104-107, 281, 284. 44 Onana, Rwanda l’Opération Turquoise, 402, 415–416, 541. 45 General J-C Lafourcade’s letter dated 30 Jul. 1998, cited in Ibid, 402–403. 46 Assemblée nationale français, Rapport d’Information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, d'autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994, 15 Dec. 1998, 345, http://www. assemblee-nationale.fr/11/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp#P5196_761466. French mission’s primary objective, however, was merely to inform, not investigate the issue (J-C Willame, “Le génocide et la communauté internationale”, Politique Africaine, 79, March 1999, 164-171). Thus, René Lemarchand argues that “[t]he selectiveness and ambiguity of the information disclosed by the French mission is one reason why France’s role remains a matter of considerable controversy”. Lemarchand, “Mass Violence and Resistance-Research Network”, 25 Jun. 2018, https://www. sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-state-research. 47 Libération, “40,000 réfugiés rwandais localisés au Zaire”, 27 Nov. 1996. 48 R. Bonner, “France Linked to Defense of Mobutu”, New York Times, 2 May 1997. 49 J. Foccart with P. Gaillard, Foccart Parle: entretiens avec Phillippe Gaillard, Paris: Gayard, 1995, 1, 310, cited in Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace”, 415. 50 J. Boutroue, “Missing Opportunities: The Role of the international community in the Return of the Rwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire: July 1994-December 1996”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Center for International Studies/UNHCR, 51 Feb. 1998. 51 Ibid. 43

5.3 US (in)Action from the 1980s Until the 1994 Genocide

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US (in)Action from the 1980s Until the 1994 Genocide

Before and after the 1990s, the US Government as a whole was engaged in assisting Uganda and the RPF, both militarily and politically. The US Justice Department and the US Customs Service were involved in a Pentagon-CIA arms transfer operation that supplied Uganda (and the RPF) with US$30 million in annual aid, mostly military.52 In 1991 alone, “Uganda purchased ten times more US weapons than in the preceding 40 years combined”.53 This implies that the US was providing military support to the RPF, at least indirectly when the RPF continued to rely on military assistance from the NRA for supplies and armaments.54 Regarding the Arusha peace talks, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen agreed with his French counterpart that both governments facilitate the peace negotiations between Habyarimana and the RPF that started in May 1992 and help pay its bills.55 This US involvement seemed to intensify and coalesce in the activities of the US Committee for Refugees (USCOR), whose director was Roger Winter, who has been highly instrumental in shaping US foreign policy in the Great Lakes region.56 Winter began his involvement with Rwandan refugees when they were expelled from Uganda in 1982,57 at which time Winter started supporting Museveni, followed by Kagame and the RPF, and the SPLM.58 In 1983, he met Professor Alexandre Kimenyi from the Rwandan diaspora in the US.59 Financially aided by Winter, Kimenyi began to publish a journal entitled Impuruza to remind the Tutsi to show their heroism.60 Its first issue urged: “We are the people full of resources. What do we wait for? A genocide”; Impuruza rapidly became an ideological platform for the Tutsi to retake power.61 USCOR and Winter were engaged on a number of political fronts, in particular, in helping to organise an important conference on the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Washington, D.C. in August 1988.62 At this conference, Winter reportedly stated that the only way for Tutsis to return to Rwanda was through an armed struggle.63 In 1989, when the UNHCR in Uganda planned to conduct a survey on the refugees’ intention to return to Rwanda, Winter attempted to interfere 52

Madsen, Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993–1999, 44. H. C Epstein, “America’s secret role in the Rwandan genocide”, The Guardian, 12 Sep. 2017. 54 Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 31; Ruzibiza, Rwanda l'histoire secrete, 168. 55 Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide, 69. 56 Interview with R. Lemarchand on 26 Jan. 2019. 57 Adelman and Rao, War and Peace in Zaire/Congo, 349. 58 Executive Intelligence Review, “Roger Winter,” 62. 59 Péan, Carnages, 429, 432. 60 Ibid, 433. 61 Ibid. 62 Kimonyo, Rwanda demain! 105. 63 Péan, Carnages, 434. 53

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with the process and proposed that the USCOR take charge.64 During Winter’s meeting with the Rwandan Ambassador in Kampala in March 1990, he discussed the Rwandan Government’s plan to repatriate refugees.65 Winter also organised Kagame’s participation in military training in the US in 1990,66 where Kagame was hailed as “America’s Man in the Great Lakes”.67 According to scholar René Lemarchand, Winter played a key role in 1992 in connecting Kagame with high-ranking bureaucrats in the US State Department.68 Thanks to the USCOR, the RPF was able to attract international support prior to 1994.69 Despite the growing connection between the US and the RPF, the US Government showed no willingness to intervene in the massive slaughter during the genocide in 1994. On 15 April, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher instructed the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, to demand a full UN withdrawal.70 Most of the UNAMIR troops were evacuated by 25 April, leaving behind 503 peacekeepers.71 Dallaire submitted a plan on 9 May to the UNSC requesting about 5500 well-armed soldiers to stop the genocide,72 but the US blocked this deployment; the UNSC simply followed the US lead.73 This opposition was based on three factors. President Clinton signed the Policy Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) on 3 May 1994 following the Somali crisis in order to ensure the US take a cautious approach with future peacekeeping missions.74 Additionally, the US agreed not to challenge Belgium’s withdrawal of its troops from UNAMIR following the killing of ten Belgian soldiers on 7 April; when the Belgian Government decided to withdraw its soldiers at a later stage, the US was asked to support it.75 Finally, Washington faced other serious foreign policy challenges in the mid-1994, such as ongoing atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as a refugee outflow from Haiti, which was said to have dampened political willingness to intervene in Rwanda.76 However, regarding the US response to the Rwandan genocide, Samantha Power argued: “What is most remarkable is not […] so much the absence of U.S. military 64

Ibid. Interview with a former Rwandan diplomat in Uganda. 66 Péan, Carnages, 449–450. 67 Prunier, “The Rwanda Patriotic Front”, 130 fn. 68 K. H. Snow, “Exposing U.S. Agents Of Low-Intensity Warfare In Africa: The “Policy Wonks” Behind Covert Warfare & Humanitarian Fascism”, Conscious Being Alliance, 8 Aug. 2012. 69 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 39;. 70 Power, A Problem from Hell, 367. 71 Ibid, 369. 72 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 359–360; B. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga, New York, Random House, 1999, 135. 73 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 135. 74 Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace”, 411. 75 Power, A Problem from Hell, 367. 76 D. Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013, 63. 65

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action as that during the entire genocide the possibility the U.S. military intervention was never debated. Indeed, the United States resisted even diplomatic intervention”.77 Clinton instructed his spokesperson not to use the term “genocide”, which could force the US to intervene under the 1948 Genocide Convention.78 It was only on 21 May, six weeks after the killing started in Rwanda and about one month after Human Rights Watch and Oxfam called the massacre a “genocide”, that Christopher authorised his diplomats to use the terms “acts of genocide” and “genocide”.79 Furthermore, despite RPF’s resistance, the UNSC finally adopted Resolution 918 on 17 May, expanding UNAMIR’s mandate to provide security and protection for displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk, and increasing its force to 5500 troops.80 But on the same day, the US slowed down UNAMIR’s deployment in the same resolution;81 US argued against a UN plan for a robust effort, arguing that “much of the killing (is) completed and most of the remaining armed forces (are) fleeing the RPF’s countrywide advance”.82 At the same time, the US memorandum dated 18 May 1994 stated that the RPF “has also killed Hutus in battle and had admitted targeting extremist Hutus whom it believes to be responsible for massacres of Tutsis”.83 The same document went on to say, without providing any evidence, that “[u]nlike government forces, the RPF does not appear to have committed Geneva Convention defined genocidal atrocities”.84 These efforts by the US to obstruct intervention in Rwanda during the genocide, may be related to the fact that Kagame was responsible for the shooting down of the plane with surface-to air missiles obtained from the US via Uganda according to the hearing of Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney on 16 April 2001.85 This blockade by the US coincided with RPF rhetoric threatening UNAMIR on 12 April and repeated warning the UN against deploying more troops.86 Scholars Luc Reydams and Jan Wouters wrote: “In retrospect, it seems clear that the RPF/RPA leadership 77

Power, A Problem from Hell, 367. Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace”, 411. 79 Action memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George E. Moose et al., through Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth et al., to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?”, 21 May 1994, The National Security Archive, Document 14. 80 Scheffer, All the Missing Souls, 63; UNSC, S/RES/918, 17 May 1994, para. 3(a). 81 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 372. 82 US Department of State to US Mission to the UN, cable number 127262, New York, “Rwanda: Security Council Discussions”, The National Security Archive, 13 May 1994, Document 13. 83 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research Toby T. Gati to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose et al., “Rwanda – Geneva Convention Violations”, The National Security Archive, 18 May 1994, Document 15. 84 Ibid. 85 K. Kern, “The Human Cost of Cheap Cell Phones”, S. Hiatt (ed.), A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption, San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2007, 110. 86 For detail, see L. Reydams, J. Wouters & C. Ryngaert (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 31–32. 78

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was willing to endure the cost of genocide in order to ensure a complete military victory over the Rwandan Army”.87 In the meantime, Winter continued his activities on the ground in RPF held zones. Just a few days before 6 April 1994, when the presidential plane attack took place, Winter spent four days in RPF-controlled northern Rwanda, which included a visit to RPF headquarters in Mulindi, to assess the return of the IDPs,88 despite no evidence they could return home and worrisome attacks in the demilitarised zone. He stated: “I had unhindered access to all territory controlled by the RPF rebels”.89 Winter publicly acknowledged his frequent trips to Rwanda during the genocide from April to July 1994 and attended the RPF’s inauguration on 19 July 1994.90

5.4

US Humanitarian and Military Aid in Eastern DRC

Since the end of the genocide in 1994, it has been said that the RPF has enjoyed what is referred to as “genocide credit”—stemming from “feelings of guilt over international inaction in 1994”.91 This guilt coincides with “natural sympathy for the Tutsi” following the horrors in 1994, which resulted in “emotionally overpowering but deeply flawed analogies with Israel and with European Jewry and the Holocaust (that) began to drive Washington and other Global North’s policies in Central Africa”.92 This genocide credit helped aid pour in as soon as the RPF formed a new government, which coincided with a massive outflow of people to eastern DRC. On 21 July, two days after the RPF was in power, President Clinton promised a vigorous new approach, with a $76 million budget and a large number of transport planes from bases in Germany.93 On 22 July, Clinton announced that “Washington was to intensify ‘massively and immediately’ its involvement in the ongoing humanitarian operation”.94 His judgment arose from the sudden concentration of nearly a million refugees at the Congolese border, which could turn into “the worst humanitarian crisis the world has seen in a generation.”95 The Americans landed an advance party of troops in Uganda and started the immediate airdropping of 87

Ibid. R. Winter, “Power, not tribalism, in Rwanda’s slaughter”, The New Vision, 18 Apr. 1994. 89 Ibid. 90 Péan, Carnages, 440. On the inauguration day of the RPF, Winter was tapping Kagame’s shoulders, according to Twagiramungu. Snow, “Exposing U.S. Agents Of Low-Intensity Warfare In Africa”. 91 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiii. 92 H. W. French, A Continent for the Taking The Tragedy and Hope of Africa, New York, Vintage, 2005, 142. 93 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, 304. 94 Le Monde, “La mobilisation internationale en faveur des réfugiés rwandais M. Clinton annonce la mise en place d'un dispositif d'aide mais écarte un engagement militaire”, 24 Jul. 1994. 95 Ibid. 88

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supplies on 25 July.96 Under the name of “Support Hope”, the US’s intention was to “bring refugees back to Rwanda”, “stabilise the situation in a manner that returnees can remain in Rwanda”, and to “give more authority to the UNHCR to lead the operation”, according to General George Joulwan, Chief Commander of US Force in Europe.97 Unlike Operation Turquoise, the US Support Hope was not authorised by the UNSC, and may have assisted the UNHCR and/or UNAMIR’s Operation Rondaval, as discussed in Chap. 3 to facilitate the return of refugees. Subsequently, in early 1995 or at least since early 1996, the US military started a training programme for RPA officers in both the US and Rwanda.98 According to Physicians for Human Rights, this training had included, among other things, counterinsurgency operations and cross-border surgical strikes,99 as well as “land mine removal, civil affairs, and public information instructors”.100 The report from the US Department of Defence said that the US training to RPA officers—when the RPF was still a rebel group—had already begun in January 1994, three months prior to the plane attack.101 As mentioned in Chap. 3, the RPA and AFDL invaded eastern DRC in October 1996 in order to destroy the refugee camps, which caused massive numbers of refugees to flee and return. The US was also involved in this rebellion from the very beginning.102 Prior to this invasion, according to one source, US military and “civilian”103 planes transported tons of supplies out of Uganda and Rwanda towards eastern DRC as early as July–August 1996.104 Later, possibly in October and November 1996, the US Air Force reportedly offloaded arms, ammunition, and other equipment in Goma.105 Moreover, according to the witnesses, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), working on behalf of the US Government, “installed anti-aircraft artillery in Bukavu and Goma” and “paid the first wages to the civil servants of the rebel administration in the form of food”.106 The US

96

Pruner, The Rwandan Crisis, 304. Le Figaro, “Les forces américaines attendues à Kigali”, 28 Jul. 1994. 98 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 126. 99 Physicians for Human Rights, Investigations in Eastern Congo and Western Rwanda, 8 Jun. 1997. 100 French, A Continent for the Taking, 216. 101 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 43. The name of the report by the US Department of Defence was not mentioned in the Amnesty’s report. 102 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 78–79. 103 Some of these aircraft operated for the CIA. Ibid, 70. 104 Ibid. According to refugee BB, US Air Force that initiated its activities in July 1994 continued to be stationed in Goma airport in eastern DRC until 1996. 105 P. De Barba, “L’engagement américain pendant la guerre au Zaire,” Raids-Magazine, 138, Nov. 1997, cited in Reyntjens, The Great African War, 70–71. 106 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 68. 97

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continued training and equipping the RPA, enabling the latter to invade and occupy eastern DRC for the second time in 1998.107 In addition to the US military, US Government officials were present in eastern DRC. Apart from Winter,108 both Dennis Hawkins and Peter Whaley, the US Political Officer in Kinshasa and the former US Deputy Chief of Mission in Rwanda, respectively, frequently visited Kabila in Goma between November 1996 and May 1997.109 Whaley “conveyed Washington’s messages flawlessly—about caution vis-à-vis refugees, force protection for MNF troops, respect for human rights, access for international humanitarian personnel, and repeated entreaties for cease fires and negotiations”.110 His mission in the DRC was known as “Whaley’s War” at that time, and he clearly said that “there is no reason to think the fighting is going to end”.111 The US intelligence agents’ and diplomats’ secret accompaniment to the AFDL during its seven-month-long civil war aimed to quietly support Rwanda’s military efforts to install a pro-US Government in the DRC under the leadership of Kabila.112 Indeed, overthrowing the governments of Rwanda and Congo in 1994 and 1996, respectively, changed regional power dynamics. Washington’s support of the AFDL was made clearer by Kabila’s deals with US companies. One was Bechtel, which provided satellite data by drawing up a master development plan and inventory of the country’s vast mineral resources for the DRC, and provided high-tech intelligence for the AFDL at no charge.113 Bechtel commissioned and paid for US National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellite studies of the DRC and for infrared maps of its mineral potential.114 Some of these satellite data gave Kabila useful military information before the fall of Mobutu.115 In exchange, Bechtel, which designed and built projects for mining companies, became first in line to win contracts.116 Another deal was with the American Mineral Field (AMF) headquartered in Clinton’s home State of

The East African, July 20-26, 1998 in J. F. Clark, “Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War: Uganda’s Vietnam?”, J. F. Clark ed., The African Stakes of the Congo War, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, 151. 108 Winter “Lancing the Boil,” 124. 109 French, A Continent for the Taking The Tragedy, 216; D. Aronson, “Mobutu Redux?”, Dissent, Spring 1998, 21; Ngolet, “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire”, 70. 110 Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide, 202. 111 Washington Post, “Peter Whaley, Outspoken U.S. Diplomat in Africa, Dies at 54.” 6 Feb. 2005. 112 P. J. Schraeder, “Trends and Transformation”, 3; C. Lynch, “US agents were seen with rebels in Zaire: Active participation is alleged in military overthrow of Mobuétu”, Boston Globe, 8 Oct.1997. 113 R. Block, “U.S. Firms Seek Deals in Central Africa—Bechtel Woos Congo as Region’s Conflicts Continue to Fester”, The Wall Street Journal, 14 Oct. 1997. 114 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 25. 115 Block, “U.S. Firms Seek Deals in Central Africa”. 116 R. Block, “As Zaire’s War Wages, Foreign Businesses Scramble for Inroads”, Wall Street Journal, 14 April 1997. 107

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Arkansas.117 The AMF signed a US$1 billion contract with Kabila to explore cobalt and copper deposits in exchange for providing funds for the war.118 Moreover, military contractor Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, one of the world’s largest providers of products and services to the energy industry, reportedly constructed a military base on the Congolese/Rwandan border, where the RPA has trained.119 At the beginning of the war, the US embassy in Kigali was heavily involved in helping establish joint ventures to exploit coltan—a fact omitted from official reports.120

5.5

US Involvement in the Forced Repatriation of Refugees

During the RPA/AFDL’s rebellion, refugee camps were destroyed, and refugees were scattered. In response to the refugee crisis, France and Spain proposed on 5 November 1997 the deployment of a MNF on the condition that the US also participated on the basis of political consideration; however, they faced difficulty convincing the UNSC.121 On 9 November, the UNSC authorised its deployment and reiterated its authorisation on 15 November.122 On 14 November, President Clinton approved the deployment of several thousand US troops for the MNF, which was to enable relief organisations to deliver aid to Rwandan refugees; aid supplies were to be used as a magnet in order to assist in voluntary return of refugees whose food assistance has been stopped since the evacuation of the UNs and NGOs in the end of October 1996.123 To implement this plan, US forces were sent to East Africa to secure the airfield at Goma, as well as a corridor from Goma to the Rwandan border.124

Washington Post, “U.S. Firms Stake Claims In Zaire's War”, 17 Apr. 1997. K. C. Dunn, “A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Son”, John F. Clark, ed., The African Stakes of the Congo War, 59. 119 Kern, “The Human Cost of Cheap Cell Phones”, 99. 120 F. Grignon, “Economic Agendas in the Peace Process,” in M. Nest, ed., The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers Series, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2005, 87. 121 P. Dupont, “La Communaute Internationale Face a la Question de l’Intervention Humanitaire lors de la Rebellion au Kivu (Octobre-Decembre 1996)”, S. Marysse & F. Reyntjens eds. L’Afrique des Grand Lacs Annuaire 1996–1997, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, 210. 122 UNSC, S/RES/1078, 9 Nov. 1996; UNSC, S/RES/1080, 15 Nov. 1996. 123 New York Times, “Clinton Offers U.S. Troops to Help Refugees in Zaire”, 14 Nov. 1996; MSF, Forced flight, 1. 124 Ibid. 117 118

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However, a day later, on 15 November, refugees were reported to have regrouped in Mugunga camp—in fact, after Kibumba camp in North Kivu was attacked on 25 and 26 October, refugees there fled to Mugunga—,125 and were heading back to Rwanda.126 RPA ensured to attack Mugunga near Goma from the west, so that most refugees could flee towards east—to Rwanda.127 By 17 November, upon the arrival in the region of the MNF Commander, Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril, it was estimated that 400,000 refugees— one-third of the refugee population—had already crossed into Rwanda.128 This sudden mass return of refugees led the Rwandan Government to argue that the MNF was no longer relevant.129 The AFDL, or rather the RPF which was leading the rebellion, was not favourable to a Canadian-led international intervention in Kivu in any case.130 In the course of nine successive meetings from 19 November to 13 December 1996 in New York, Brussels, Stuttgart, etc., States from European Union and others, and international organisations gradually lost their will to intervene since refugees started to return en mass in mid-November; finally, the plan of MNF was buried.131 Meanwhile, the US organised an air reconnaissance mission in eastern DRC in the context of the decision-making process on the deployment of the MNF.132 During this mission, the US transmitted information on the movements and concentration of refugees to the RPA, which was admitted by Kagame himself.133 This transmission became possible as the US army and the CIA installed communication monitoring stations in Rwanda, Uganda, the DRC, and the Republic of the Congo in 1996–1997.134 According to the former refugee, Pierre-Claver Ndacyayisenga, who was on the ground, aircraft flew over refugees, often at low attitude for one week.135 One refugee confirmed that this aircraft had an American flag underneath.136 In spite of the many Rwandan refugees remaining in eastern DRC

125

Niwese, Le people rwandais un pied dans la tombe, 100. Dupont, “La Communaute Internationale Face a la Question de l’Intervention Humanitaire,” 216. 127 Pomfret, “Rwanda Led Revolt in Congo”. Lake Kivu and Mountain Nyiragongo are located in the south and north of Mugunga camp. 128 Le Monde, “Les Hutu réfugiés dans les camp du Zaïre regagnent massivement le Rwanda”, 18 Nov. 1996; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 122. 129 UN Press Release, SC/6291, “Security Council Authorizes Establishment, for Humanitarian Purposes, of Temporary Multinational Force in Eastern Zaire”, 15 Nov. 1996. 130 Le Soir, “Une marée humaine renter au Rwanda,” 16 et 17 Nov. 1996. 131 Dupont, “La Communaute Internationale Face a la Question de l’Intervention Humanitaire”, 217–219. 132 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 71. 133 Gowing, Dispatches from Disaster Zones, 58–60. 134 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 67; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 127. 135 Ndacyayisenga, Dying to Live, 56. 136 Interview with refugee BB. 126

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(see below), the radio broadcasted that aircraft failed to locate the whereabouts of refugees.137 One question remains: How did this sudden mass return of refugees take place in the mid-November? In fact, the US military had “asked the refugees to take advantage of their presence in order to go back to Rwanda, because afterwards it would be too late”.138 This was announced a few days before the destruction of the Mugunga refugee camp in Goma, where refugees who were living in other camps in North Kivu were all regrouped.139 This implies that the US military was already informed about the RPA’s plan afterwards—to massacre refugees, or at least strongly suspected blood was to be shed during the operation. Umutesi stated: It was after this [US’s call] that there was a massive return. The only exit that wasn’t blocked by the rebels was the one that led back to Rwanda. Even though they controlled the movements of the people and could take whoever they wanted aside and kill them, they let the great majority of the refugees pass. At all the other camp exits, they shot anyone who moved on sight. Put in the position of having to choose between returning to Rwanda and death from rebel bullets, many chose the first alternative. Everyone knew that they ran a very real danger by returning, but they thought that it was their last chance of survival.140

Before this massive return took place, the US Information Agency communiqué dated 25 October 1996 stated that the US State Department supported the UNHCR’s efforts for the safe return of refugees from the DRC.141 Afterwards in November 1996, the US Department of Defence trained Rwandan civilian and military personnel in “public information” to “assist repatriation of refugees and other displaced civilians”.142 This training included producing leaflets and radio messages that encouraged refugees to return and “sought to counter the ex-FAR/ Interahamwe message that returnees would be killed upon their return”.143 Subsequently, in March and April 1997, the US military helped establish the Rwandan Military Information Platoon to produce posters and other kinds of media.144 This was, as described in Chap. 3, when the UNHCR initiated $10 compensation to forcibly return refugees. Amnesty stated that this heavily US-led public information convinced foreign governments and international organisations that Rwandan refugees could return safely.145

137

Ibid. Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 120. Emphasis added. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. Umutesi obtained this information from other refugees who were in Mugunga camp. 141 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 116. 142 Amnesty, Ending the Silence, 43. 143 Ibid, 43–44. 144 Ibid, 44. 145 Ibid. 138

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The US army’s assistance to the RPA and its active involvement in repatriation leads to one question: What exactly was the US interest in having refugees return to Rwanda?

5.6

US Complicity in RPA’s Massacres of Refugees

The forceful repatriation campaign or mass refoulement occurred after refugee camps were attacked by the RPA/AFDL forces, which were supported by the US military. In fact, it appeared that the information on the movements and concentration of refugees relayed by the Americans to the RPA stated above “was used to localise (sic) the refugees, not in order to assist them, but to exterminate them”.146 It was widely reported that the US was using satellites and Orion surveillance planes to track the missing refugees.147 The US military’s involvement in assisting operations that massacred refugees in eastern DRC was witnessed by several actors and well documented, even if this allegation was categorically rejected by US Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin.148 In addition to the findings of Physicians for Human Rights, Kathi Austin, a Human Rights Watch Specialist on arms transfers in Africa, testified before the US House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights on 5 May 1998, saying: “the killing of tens of thousands of refugees, considered as ‘collateral damage,’ had been facilitated by US assistance to Rwanda and other governments in the region”.149 Moreover, European intelligence sources leaked reports to the European press that US Special Forces participated in the fighting in eastern Congo.150 Another report indicates that a group of 60 African American mercenaries, who had been privately recruited in the US, joined the RPA and AFDL.151 Journalist Colette Braeckman also reported that black US Special Forces were observed next to the RPA soldiers, according to the witnesses.152 Additionally, the French journal Valeurs Actuelles stipulated that “American military was involved in machine-gunning refugee camps, notably by using a C-130 gunship belonging to the special forces”.153 146

Reyntjens, The Great African War, 71. Emphasis added. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “Daily Emergency Highlights on Eastern Zaire”, 21 Nov. 1996. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/daily-emergency-highlightseastern-zaire-0. 148 Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide, 188. 149 Ibid, 233; Reyntjens, The Great African War, 77. 150 Lynch, “US agents were seen with rebels in Zaire”. 151 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 118. 152 C. Braeckman, Le Soir, 13 Nov. 1996. One former Congolese army officer also heard from a former FAR official who was on the spot, about the presence of black American soldiers. Interview with a former Congolese army officer, 2017. 153 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 71. Reyntjens stated that the source of the document remains unknown. 147

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In other words, the US was involved both in mass refoulement, and “genocide” in the DRC—indirectly, and possibly directly—at the same time. It can therefore be argued that mass refoulement and “genocide” became two sides of the same coin. Moreover, behind the mass refoulement and “genocide”, the US Government was re-installing a pro-US Government in the DRC under the leadership of Kabila. Organising mass refoulement at this time was crucial for the RPF for three reasons: first, to cancel the plan to deploy the MNF which “could have posed an obstacle to Kagame’s victorious sweep across Zaire and the final ousting of Mobutu”154 (this was the second time that Kagame interfered with the international force following the 1994 genocide); second, to justify the RPA’s invasion in the DRC under the cover of liberating refugees who were allegedly prevented by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe from returning to Rwanda; third and most importantly, to help conceal the extent of refugee massacres not only in the DRC, but also in Rwanda upon their return as discussed in Chap. 3. Furthermore, UNHCR’s global policies, voluntary repatriation and imposed return, as well as dominant narratives such as that the RPF was a saviour of Rwanda and that refugees were held hostage by the génocidaire group helped cover up and distract the “genocide” in the DRC. The US at this time was deeply involved in shifting the African leadership by using the notion of “new generation” and “African renaissance”.155 By labelling Kagame as one of African exemplary leaders, the US might have been obliged to hide the facts that could have contradicted it. Therefore, in order to hide these facts, the US lied about the number and fate of remaining refugees so that the deployment of MNF could be shelved.156 The debate over refugee numbers and whereabouts in the DRC became an international issue. The number of returnees was generally estimated to be 700,000.157 This means among the 1.2 million refugees who fled to the DRC in the wake of the genocide, a little less than half remained unaccounted for. Kagame’s position was that “virtually all civilian refugees had returned to Rwanda; only the génocidaires, consisting of Interahamwe and ex-FAR, refused to come home, fearing retribution”.158 Many external actors, particularly in United Kingdom (UK) and the US, also recognised that those Hutu remainees in Zaire were “fugitives from justice”, “bad guys”, and “targets of (military) opportunity”.159 Thus, this US claim “gave the AFDL/RPA its

154

Rever, In Praise of Blood, 40. Schraeder, “Guest Editor’s Introduction”, 3. 156 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 78. 157 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 44. 158 F. Reyntjens and R. Lemarchand, “Mass Murder in Eastern Congo, 1996–1997”, R. Lemarchand, ed. Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, 31. 159 A. de Waal, “No bloodless miracle”, Guardian, 15 Nov 1996; French, A Continent for the Taking, 142; N. Gowing, Dispatches from Disaster Zones; New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies: Ominous lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997, 27 May 1998, 59. 155

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licence to kill in eastern Zaire”.160 This perception persisted long after the war,161 which is one of the main reasons why refugees cannot return to Rwanda. It was argued that the information provided by the US was contradictory since aerial photographs were taken only along specific routes in the Congo.162 At a press conference in Kigali on 23 November 1996, the US military claimed that their satellite photos had located only one significant cluster of Rwandans in eastern Zaire, consisting of soldiers and militia members.163 However, according to the OXFAM senior official on 20 November—three days before the press conference— his staff was shown the US military’s satellite and aerial photos, which confirmed, in considerable detail, the presence of over 500,000 people.164 Moreover, aerial photos taken by the ICRC seemed to have indicated the movement of some 800,000 refugees and IDPs within a radius of 200 km around Uvia, Bakavu, and Goma in eastern DRC.165 The UNHCR and Le Monde estimated that 800,000 refugees remained.166 According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees who arrived by walking en masse in the Republic of the Congo in 1997 passing by northern DRC was 9200.167 Following the feud over figures between the UNHCR and the US, the latter announced that “UNHCR figures were inflated and that no refugees remained in Zaire”.168 Subsequently, during the mass forced repatriation, the US declared that it took over the counting of the number of returnees.169 The US daily estimated returnee figures were some 100,000 persons higher than UNHCR’s.170 Eventually, the US and Rwandan Government figures were accepted by UNHCR.171

5.7

US Interference in UN

The serious crimes committed by the RPF, both in Rwanda and the DRC, have been well documented by the UN and NGOs, and their reports were made public. Rather than punishing the criminals, the US Government has been complicit in these

160

Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 149. French, A Continent for the Taking, 142. 162 Boutroue, “Missing Opportunities”, 78. 163 J. Crisp, “‘Who has counted the refugees?’ UNHCR and the politics of numbers”, New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR, 11 Jun. 1999. 164 Ibid, 12. 165 Libération, “Kinshasa de rêve de reconquête au Kivu”, 22 Nov. 1996. 166 Ibid. 167 UNHCR, “December 2017 Factsheet: Republic of Congo (RoC)”, 1. 168 Boutroe, “Missing Opportunities”, 78. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 161

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crimes and interfered with the UN investigation reports and the ICTR. The international legal cover the US has provided for Kagame and his RPF has prevented refugees from returning to Rwanda. Washington’s brazen attempts to cover up RPF crimes seem to begin in October 1994 after Gersony’s report concluded that RPF forces had systematically massacred Hutu civilians, and conditions were not yet conducive for Hutu refugees to safely return. After intense lobbying by the Rwandan Government and the US State Department, the UN suppressed the report.172 The US Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, Timothy Wirth, was ordered by Washington to discredit Gersony’s findings173 because they “conveyed truths that the United Nations in particular and the international community in general did not wish to be known”.174 Second, in April 1997, when Garreton, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DRC, called for further investigation of the massacre of Hutu refugees, Washington tried to sabotage the probe. According to the US officials in Kigali, “the United States [which] provided counterinsurgency training to the RPA […], instructed Kabila not to cooperate with the U.N. investigation of the massacres”.175 Initially, Garreton issued a report based on his preliminary visit to three mass gravesites in North Kivu and interviews with Rwandan refugees and local people. Hutu refugees were massacred, allegedly by the AFDL, in many refugee camps in eastern DRC.176 The inadequacy of the response, and the fact that atrocities continued with complete impunity, was the reason why Garreton called for further investigation.177 In June 1997, Garreton’s team demanded access to Mbandaka in northwestern Congo to investigate the killings there and gather crucial recent evidence.178 Garreton’s team and a new team which replaced Garreton’s in August 1997 were twice refused by the local government and ultimately failed to complete its probe.179 Former RPF Officer Ruyenzi stated that refusal of Kabila allowed Kagame to buy time and destroy evidence.180 One solider, presumably

172

Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 96. Prunier, Africa’s World War, 31. 174 Krueger, From Bloodshed to Hope in Burundi, 111. 175 D. Aronson, “The Dead Help No One Living,” World Policy Journal, Winter 1997/98, 14 (4), 95. 176 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire, prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Robert Garretón, in accordance with Commission resolution 1996/ 77, E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, 2 Apr. 1997, para. 11, 21. Due to the short duration of the mission and the urgency to prepare a report, Garreton could not investigate the violations of the right to life committed by the former FAR and Interahamwe. para. 43. 177 Ibid, para. 51, 55. 178 H. French, “Cold Trail: A special report; Congo Not Alone in Ending Massacre Inquiry”, New York Times, 7 May 1998. 179 Ibid. 180 Ruyenzi, “The Testimony of Lt. Aloys Ruyenzi”, 11. 173

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Rwandan, said “there is much work to do, digging up the bodies and burning them. When the UN eventually comes to investigate, there will be no evidence”.181 The International Crisis Group argued that: Since this resistance to the investigation bore such a heavy price for the Kabila regime, one has to question why it adopted this policy. It is all the more puzzling because Kabila did not really control the troops, which presumably perpetrated these massacres. Indeed, in some instances, it is known that Rwandan troops were involved. The only plausible explanation is that Rwandan/Tutsi influence was great enough to force Kabila to resist, and/or that Kabila and the people around him distrusted Western motives for insisting on the investigation.182

There was sufficient belief that Washington eventually came to support an investigation183 so that the US and Rwanda could lay the blame solely at the feet of Kabila.184 Once Kabila realised that the strategy of the US and Rwanda was to incriminate him, he allegedly refused to cooperate with the UN team.185 The US efforts to protect the RPF and derail accountability were also evident at the ICTR, a tribunal the US was instrumental in establishing in the aftermath of the genocide.186 For the purpose of sharing intelligence at the UN tribunals, the US created in 1997 the position of US Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes issues.187 Florence Hartmann, the Spokesperson of ICTR Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte— Arbour’s successor—noted Washington’s interest both in Bruguière’s and Del Ponte’s investigation of Kagame, as well as the American strategy for precipitating the closure of the ICTR.188 The US State Department memos, including one to the US Secretary of State Christopher from September 1994, clarified that a cover up of RPF crimes began as early as August 1994, before the UNSC resolution in November 1994 on the establishment of the ICTR.189 The US intervened in the ICTR’s attempts to indict RPF suspects. Despite Del Ponte’s announcement that the ICTR had enough prima-facie evidence to issue indictments against RPF suspects in 2002, the tribunal never indicted or prosecuted a single suspect from the ruling RPF. Del Ponte was dismissed by the US

Associated Press, “Kabila’s Soldier Shows Mass Graves”, Kisangani, 23 May 1997, cited in F. Reyntjens, “Waging (Civil) War Abroad: Rwanda and the DRC”, Straus and Waldorf ‘(eds.), Remaking Rwanda, 136. 182 International Crisis Group, How Kabila Lost His Way: The performance of Laurent Désiré Kabila’s government, 22 May 1999, 21. 183 HRW, What Kabila is Hiding, 54. 184 Interview with a former Congolese government officer. 185 Interview with a former Congolese government officer. 186 Scheffer, All the Missing Souls, 71–76. 187 Ibid, 43–44. 188 F. Hartmann, Paix et châtiment: Les guerres secrètes de la politique et de la justice internationales, Paris, Flammarion, 2007, 262–263. 189 Ibid. 181

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Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes and a former War Crimes Prosecutor for ICTR, Pierre Prosper, and was replaced by US-approved Hassan Abubacar Jallow.190 According to journalist Judi Rever, who obtained confidential ICTR documents, “[i]n black and white, the ICTR had become a surrogate of Washington, and by extension, Kagame. It had granted Kagame legal immunity from war crimes and terrorism. It allowed the killers to investigate themselves”.191 In examining the US’s historic role in the Great Lakes crisis during the 1990s, the activities of Winter as a point man in the US-RPF relationship cannot be overlooked. Nor can historians forget how Washington impeded efforts aimed at stopping the genocide and how US officials opposed the reinforcement of UNAMIR. Both of these foreign policy decisions matched RPF objectives at the time. The US Support Hope demonstrated that, within a short number of weeks, the US had the capability to mobilise troops to Rwanda and the DRC.192 This implies that the US could have assisted a multinational operation, prior to or in coordination with the French-led Operation Turquoise. However, it was only immediately after the RPF’s seizure of power that the US military started to intervene in Rwanda for refugee repatriation and military purposes, including the training of the RPA. The US was aware of the RPF’s plan to invade the DRC and forcefully repatriate refugees. Moreover, the US indirectly, and possibly directly, took part in operations that aimed to exterminate refugees. This explains why the US avoided the deployment of the MNF, abandoning the remaining Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC. The US Government buried the Gersony report, which explained the reason for the refugees’ flight, and was uncooperative regarding the Garreton probe, which exposed the massacre of Rwandan Hutu refugees. Finally, the US, along with the UK, dismissed the ICTR prosecutor, who was ready to indict RPF suspects. It has become clear that the US had no interest in saving the lives of the Rwandans during the atrocities in Rwanda in April–July 1994 and in the DRC in October 1996–April 1997. As a result of Washington’s support for the RPF and its concerted role in covering up RPF crimes, Kagame and his senior officers have gone unpunished. The US policy has therefore fuelled the culture of impunity and contributed to an escalation in the RPF’s predatory activities in the region. The impunity and de facto immunity from prosecution have ultimately discouraged Rwandan refugees from safely returning home. Additionally, the US bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the suffering of refugees because it worked to convince foreign governments and international organisations that refugees could return to Rwanda in safety and dignity. Washington’s advocacy in this respect may have resulted in the cessation clause of refugee status being applied.

190

C. Del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and Culture of Impunity, New York, Other Press, 2009, 231, 239–240. 191 Rever, In Praise of Blood, 161. 192 Scheffer, All the Missing Souls 67.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Since the late 1980s and especially the early 1990s, the UNHCR started to actively promote refugee repatriation worldwide. This was when the armed repatriation of Rwandan old-caseload Tutsi refugees, and forced repatriation, mass refoulement, or imposed return of new-caseload refugees took place. At the same time, regional power dynamics in the Great Lakes were modified by the US following the end of the Cold War. After the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the US supported military efforts of its new ally, the RPF, to re-install a pro-US Government in the mineral-rich DRC under the new leadership of Kabila. These policies of the UNHCR and of the US Government coincided in Rwanda, which had a devastating impact on the lives of Rwandan refugees. This book has advanced two arguments. First, the promotion of voluntary repatriation and invocation of the cessation clause of the Rwandan refugee status remain premature. Second, Rwandan refugees have refused to repatriate to Rwanda due to the fear of and trauma associated with the RPF as a result of its agenda in the Great Lakes region, partially or fully backed by the US Government. To support these arguments, based on Rogge’s three arguments on repatriation’s myths and realities—the attitudes of remainees and the government of origin towards returnees, refugees’ decision-making body on repatriation, and the change of the political-economic system in the country of origin, I have examined four factors that reinforced Rwandan refugees’ decision not to return. These factors include the attitude and intentions of the Rwandan Government, particularly President Kagame, aggressively urging refugees to return while not welcoming Hutu refugees who were falsely branded as génocidaires; the Rwandan Government’s multiple attempts, such as the RPF’s infiltration of refugee communities and government’s use of refugee leaders, to influence refugees’ decision to return, most of which failed; the introduction of controversial policies in Rwanda, such as the Gacaca court, the genocide ideology law, and Ndi Umunyarwanda, as well as occupation of land and properties; and refugees’ psychological insecurity, which aggravated as a result of these first three factors and peaked when the cessation clause of refugee status was invoked and whenever any Rwandan was killed. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 M. Yonekawa, Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6756-3_6

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6 Conclusion

Additionally, several myths concerning the policy, reason for flight, and intention of repatriation of Rwandan refugees were reviewed. First, the RPF justified its armed invasion in Rwanda in 1990 in order to address the problem of democracy and return of refugees, but the RPF was already determined to invade since 1980 so that it could seize power. In order to block the repatriation process and the democratisation reform initiated by Habyarimana, the RPF accelerated its plans to invade ahead of the October 1990 deadline on the refugees’ visit that eventually did not take place. Second, regarding the reason for the refugees’ flight during and after the genocide in 1994, refugees were thought to be terrified of possible RPF reprisals, but in fact many of them were fearful of the RPF’s systematic killing of civilians, which was the original cause of their fear of persecution; this explains why they have refused to return to this day. Third, the Rwandan Government (RPF) in 1996–1997 used as pretext a humanitarian argument (claiming to save refugees who were allegedly taken hostage by the former FAR and Interahamwe) to repatriate refugees and provide security (self-defence) as justification in destroying refugee camps in eastern DRC and (paradoxically) attacking the refugees. However, the RPF’s actual intention was to gain access to natural resources there, which it succeeded in doing with US Government assistance. Refugees have long stated that they were never taken hostage by the former FAR or Interahamwe and they were free to return. Mass refoulement was beneficial to cover up both the “genocide” and “disappearances” of refugees. Fourth, while it has long been pointed out that the French Government had a role in fuelling genocide in 1994 and that this led to a massive flight of refugees and ex-FAR, the US may have played a larger role not only in training the RPF prior to and after the 1994 genocide, but also in refouling and massacring refugees in the DRC in collaboration with the RPA. As a result of promoting the return or mass refoulement of refugees, the US responsibility is huge since many returnees were subsequently subjected to human rights violations, including death and disappearances. Fifth, while the Rwandan Government has urged refugees to return to Rwanda, it intends to control outspoken refugees upon their return or destabilise the refugee community. Despite its heavy involvement in several crimes, the Rwandan Government has been able to evade justice as the Global North was silenced by “genocide credit”; this silence has prevented refugees from returning. Overall, most of the repatriations of three different caseloads were not only involuntary or refoulement, but also deadly. Invoking the cessation clause of refugee status—in other words, mandated repatriation—may also result in similar violence. In order to prevent such forced repatriations in the future, it is urgent for the UNHCR and host countries to examine the policy of repatriation and the cessation clause of the refugee status of Rwandan refugees based on their will and the human rights record of the Rwandan Government (RPF).

Barbara Harrell-Bond’s Quote on Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees

Speaking in Kigali with a minister in the newly-appointed Tutsi-led government of Rwanda in 1995, I asked him why the government was so anxious for all those Rwandans still in exile to repatriate. He said, “You can never trust a refugee”. I replied ironically, “I guess you should know”. This gentleman happened to have been a Tutsi refugee whose parents had fled to Canada years ago and who had often visited me in Oxford in the years preceding the genocide at the Refugee Studies Centre which I had founded and directed (1982–96). As is a matter of historical record, the Tutsi’s first invasion of Rwanda was 1990.

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